From 89592fc9a35b2c15dedb33b3e923c179b615f7f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jzlv Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 20:47:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] [refactor][components] Restructure the catalogue, sync from internal repo --- components/CMakeLists.txt | 25 +- components/ai/CMakeLists.txt | 2 + components/{ => ai}/TensorFlowLite/.gitignore | 0 .../{ => ai}/TensorFlowLite/CMakeLists.txt | 0 components/{ => ai}/TensorFlowLite/LICENSE | 0 components/{ => ai}/TensorFlowLite/README.md | 0 .../tensorflow/lite/c/builtin_op_data.h | 0 .../tensorflow/lite/c/c_api_types.h | 0 .../TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.c | 0 .../TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.h | 0 .../lite/core/api/error_reporter.cc | 0 .../tensorflow/lite/core/api/error_reporter.h | 0 .../lite/core/api/flatbuffer_conversions.cc | 0 .../lite/core/api/flatbuffer_conversions.h | 0 .../tensorflow/lite/core/api/op_resolver.cc | 0 .../tensorflow/lite/core/api/op_resolver.h | 0 .../tensorflow/lite/core/api/tensor_utils.cc | 0 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126 + .../tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 4022 ++ .../suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function | 5630 +++ .../test_suite_psa_crypto_attributes.data | 27 + .../test_suite_psa_crypto_attributes.function | 129 + ...test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data | 610 + ..._suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function | 1833 + .../suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data | 45 + .../test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function | 195 + ...est_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function | 49 + ...ite_psa_crypto_generate_key.generated.data | 342 + .../suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.data | 587 + .../test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.function | 102 + .../suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.data | 66 + .../test_suite_psa_crypto_init.function | 304 + .../test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data | 435 + .../test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function | 713 + ...st_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.function | 52 + ...te_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated.data | 947 + ...t_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.misc.data | 11 + 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.../tests/suites/test_suite_random.function | 202 + .../mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 627 + .../tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 1865 + .../mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.data | 190 + .../tests/suites/test_suite_shax.function | 255 + .../mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 10709 +++++ .../tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 4654 +++ .../tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data | 17 + .../tests/suites/test_suite_timing.function | 74 + .../tests/suites/test_suite_version.data | 15 + .../tests/suites/test_suite_version.function | 73 + .../tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data | 2881 ++ .../suites/test_suite_x509parse.function | 1287 + .../tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data | 130 + .../suites/test_suite_x509write.function | 416 + .../mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.data | 76 + .../tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.function | 86 + .../mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/benchmark.vcxproj | 167 + .../mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_app.vcxproj | 167 + 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graphics}/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.c (100%) rename components/{ => graphics}/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.h (100%) rename components/{ => graphics}/lvgl/widgets/lv_widgets.mk (100%) create mode 100644 components/libc/CMakeLists.txt create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/compiler.h create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/config.h create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/Kconfig create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/Make.defs create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_Exit.c create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_abort.c create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_abs.c create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atof.c create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoi.c create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atol.c create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoll.c create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_bsearch.c create mode 100644 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100644 components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_vikmemcpy.c create mode 100644 components/libc/nuttx/nuttx_limits.h rename components/{utils => }/libc/printf.c (85%) create mode 100644 components/libc/snprintf.c create mode 100644 components/libc/sys/types.h rename components/{utils => libc}/vlibc/printf.c (78%) rename components/{utils => libc}/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.c (95%) rename components/{utils => libc}/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.h (96%) rename components/{utils => libc}/vlibc/vlibc_vsnprintf.c (96%) rename components/{utils => }/libc/vsnprintf.c (99%) rename components/{utils => }/libc/vsnprintf_nano.c (98%) create mode 100644 components/lzma/CMakeLists.txt rename components/{ => lzma}/xz/CMakeLists.txt (82%) rename components/{ => lzma}/xz/Kconfig (100%) rename components/{ => lzma}/xz/Makefile (100%) rename components/{ => lzma}/xz/readme.txt (100%) rename components/{ => lzma}/xz/xz.h (100%) rename components/{ => lzma}/xz/xz.mk (100%) rename components/{ => lzma}/xz/xz_config.h (100%) rename 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rename components/{ => mm}/tlsf/CMakeLists.txt (81%) create mode 100644 components/mm/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.c rename components/{ => mm}/tlsf/tlsf.c (99%) rename components/{ => mm}/tlsf/tlsf.h (100%) create mode 100644 components/net/CMakeLists.txt create mode 100644 components/net/lwip/CMakeLists.txt rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/CHANGELOG (97%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/CMakeLists.txt (91%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/COPYING (97%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/FEATURES (99%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/FILES (97%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/README (97%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/UPGRADING (97%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/lwipopts.h (97%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/src/FILES (97%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/src/Filelists.cmake (96%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/src/Filelists.mk (97%) rename components/{ => net/lwip}/lwip/src/api/api_lib.c (97%) rename components/{ => 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mode 100644 components/utils/queue/queue.h create mode 100644 components/utils/tree/tree.h delete mode 100644 components/utils/vlibc/syscalls.c create mode 100644 components/wireless/CMakeLists.txt diff --git a/components/CMakeLists.txt b/components/CMakeLists.txt index 4a7d4a31..c8cc155b 100644 --- a/components/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,14 +1,15 @@ -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_SHELL shell) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_FREERTOS freertos) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_CHERRYUSB cherryusb) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_FATFS fatfs) +add_subdirectory(ai) sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_BFLOG bflog) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_LUA lua) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_LVGL lvgl) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_LWIP lwip) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_BLUETOOTH bluetooth) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_XZ xz) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_TINYMAIX TinyMaix) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_TENSORFLOWLITE TensorFlowLite) -sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_TLSF tlsf) +add_subdirectory(crypto) +add_subdirectory(fs) +add_subdirectory(graphics) +add_subdirectory(libc) +add_subdirectory(lzma) +add_subdirectory(mm) +add_subdirectory(net) +add_subdirectory(os) +add_subdirectory(runtime) +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_SHELL shell) +add_subdirectory(usb) add_subdirectory(utils) +add_subdirectory(wireless) diff --git a/components/ai/CMakeLists.txt b/components/ai/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d6ecb34 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/ai/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_TINYMAIX TinyMaix) +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_TENSORFLOWLITE TensorFlowLite) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/.gitignore b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/.gitignore similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/.gitignore rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/.gitignore diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/CMakeLists.txt b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/CMakeLists.txt similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/CMakeLists.txt rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/CMakeLists.txt diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/LICENSE b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/LICENSE similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/LICENSE rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/LICENSE diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/README.md b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/README.md similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/README.md rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/README.md diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/builtin_op_data.h b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/builtin_op_data.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/builtin_op_data.h rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/builtin_op_data.h diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/c_api_types.h b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/c_api_types.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/c_api_types.h rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/c_api_types.h diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.c b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.c similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.c rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.c diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.h b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.h rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/c/common.h diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/error_reporter.cc b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/error_reporter.cc similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/error_reporter.cc rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/error_reporter.cc diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/error_reporter.h b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/error_reporter.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/error_reporter.h rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/error_reporter.h diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/flatbuffer_conversions.cc b/components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/flatbuffer_conversions.cc similarity index 100% rename from components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/flatbuffer_conversions.cc rename to components/ai/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/flatbuffer_conversions.cc diff --git a/components/TensorFlowLite/tensorflow/lite/core/api/flatbuffer_conversions.h 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b/components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_resnet_q.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_resnet_q.h rename to components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_resnet_q.h diff --git a/components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_f.h b/components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_f.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_f.h rename to components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_f.h diff --git a/components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_q.h b/components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_q.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_q.h rename to components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_q.h diff --git a/components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_q_be.h b/components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_q_be.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_q_be.h rename to components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/mnist_valid_q_be.h diff --git a/components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/vww96_f.h b/components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/vww96_f.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/vww96_f.h rename to components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/vww96_f.h diff --git a/components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/vww96_q.h b/components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/vww96_q.h similarity index 100% rename from components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/vww96_q.h rename to components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl/vww96_q.h diff --git a/components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl2header.py b/components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl2header.py similarity index 100% rename from components/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl2header.py rename to components/ai/TinyMaix/tools/tmdl2header.py diff --git a/components/TinyMaix/updates.md b/components/ai/TinyMaix/updates.md similarity index 100% rename from components/TinyMaix/updates.md rename to components/ai/TinyMaix/updates.md diff --git a/components/bflog/CMakeLists.txt b/components/bflog/CMakeLists.txt index e930e30b..ef9f5966 100644 --- a/components/bflog/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/bflog/CMakeLists.txt @@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ sdk_library_add_sources(bflog.c) sdk_add_include_directories(.) sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_BFLOG) - if(CONFIG_BFLOG_USER) -sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_BFLOG_USER) +sdk_add_private_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_BFLOG_USER) endif() if(CONFIG_BFLOG_DEBUG) -sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_BFLOG_DEBUG) +sdk_add_private_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_BFLOG_DEBUG) endif() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/bflog/bflog.c b/components/bflog/bflog.c index 226a097b..ceb82a54 100644 --- a/components/bflog/bflog.c +++ b/components/bflog/bflog.c @@ -33,44 +33,48 @@ * @{ */ -#ifndef bflog_fopen -#define bflog_fopen fopen +#ifndef bflogc_fopen +#define bflogc_fopen fopen #endif -#ifndef bflog_fclose -#define bflog_fclose fclose +#ifndef bflogc_fclose +#define bflogc_fclose fclose #endif -#ifndef bflog_fwrite -#define bflog_fwrite fwrite +#ifndef bflogc_fwrite +#define bflogc_fwrite fwrite #endif -#ifndef bflog_ftell -#define bflog_ftell ftell +#ifndef bflogc_ftell +#define bflogc_ftell ftell #endif -#ifndef bflog_fflush -#define bflog_fflush fflush +#ifndef bflogc_fflush +#define bflogc_fflush fflush #endif -#ifndef bflog_memcpy -#define bflog_memcpy memcpy +#ifndef bflogc_memcpy +#define bflogc_memcpy memcpy #endif -#ifndef bflog_snprintf -#define bflog_snprintf snprintf +#ifndef bflogc_snprintf +#define bflogc_snprintf snprintf #endif -#ifndef bflog_vsnprintf -#define bflog_vsnprintf vsnprintf +#ifndef bflogc_vsnprintf +#define bflogc_vsnprintf vsnprintf #endif -#ifndef bflog_remove -#define bflog_remove remove +#ifndef bflogc_remove +#define bflogc_remove remove #endif -#ifndef bflog_rename -#define bflog_rename rename +#ifndef bflogc_rename +#define bflogc_rename rename +#endif + +#ifndef bflogc_strcmp +#define bflogc_strcmp strcmp #endif /** @@ -89,9 +93,10 @@ #define _BFLOG_CHECK(_expr, _ret) ((void)0) #endif -#define _bflog_t(_ptr) ((bflog_t *)(_ptr)) +#define _bflog_t(_ptr) ((bflog_t *)(_ptr)) -#define _msg_t(_ptr) ((struct _bflog_msg *)(_ptr)) +#define _msg_t(_ptr) ((struct _bflog_msg *)(_ptr)) +#define _tag_t(_ptr) ((struct _bflog_tag *)(_ptr)) #define _direct_t(_ptr) ((bflog_direct_t *)(_ptr)) #define _direct_buffer_t(_ptr) ((bflog_direct_buffer_t *)(_ptr)) @@ -100,9 +105,9 @@ #define _direct_file_time_t(_ptr) ((bflog_direct_file_time_t *)(_ptr)) #define _direct_file_size_t(_ptr) ((bflog_direct_file_size_t *)(_ptr)) -#define _layout_simple_t(_ptr) ((bflog_layout_simple_t *)(_ptr)) -#define _layout_format_t(_ptr) ((bflog_layout_format_t *)(_ptr)) -#define _layout_yaml_t(_ptr) ((bflog_layout_yaml_t *)(_ptr)) +#define _layout_simple_t(_ptr) ((bflog_layout_simple_t *)(_ptr)) +#define _layout_format_t(_ptr) ((bflog_layout_format_t *)(_ptr)) +#define _layout_yaml_t(_ptr) ((bflog_layout_yaml_t *)(_ptr)) /*!< default log record flag */ #ifndef BFLOG_FLAG_DEFAULT @@ -167,8 +172,13 @@ static char *bflog_level_strings[6] = { BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE_STRING }; +static uint32_t global_filter = 0xffffffff; + static char *bflog_dummy_string = ""; +extern struct _bflog_tag __bflog_tags_start__; +extern struct _bflog_tag __bflog_tags_end__; + /** * @brief dummy function */ @@ -359,14 +369,14 @@ static void queue_put(bflog_t *log, struct _bflog_msg *msg) /*!< ring loop */ if (msg->size >= remain) { /*!< store to ring tail */ - bflog_memcpy(pool + log->queue.wpos, msg, remain); + bflogc_memcpy(pool + log->queue.wpos, msg, remain); log->queue.wpos = msg->size - remain; /*!< store to ring head */ - bflog_memcpy(pool, (char *)msg + remain, log->queue.wpos); + bflogc_memcpy(pool, (char *)msg + remain, log->queue.wpos); } else { - bflog_memcpy(pool + log->queue.wpos, msg, msg->size); + bflogc_memcpy(pool + log->queue.wpos, msg, msg->size); log->queue.wpos += msg->size; } @@ -396,14 +406,14 @@ static void queue_get(bflog_t *log, struct _bflog_msg *msg) /*!< ring loop */ if (size >= remain) { /*!< load from ring tail */ - bflog_memcpy(msg, pool + log->queue.rpos, remain); + bflogc_memcpy(msg, pool + log->queue.rpos, remain); log->queue.rpos = size - remain; /*!< load from ring head */ - bflog_memcpy((char *)msg + remain, pool, log->queue.rpos); + bflogc_memcpy((char *)msg + remain, pool, log->queue.rpos); } else { - bflog_memcpy(msg, pool + log->queue.rpos, size); + bflogc_memcpy(msg, pool + log->queue.rpos, size); log->queue.rpos += size; } @@ -412,6 +422,101 @@ static void queue_get(bflog_t *log, struct _bflog_msg *msg) ((char *)msg)[msg->size] = '\0'; } +/** + * @} + */ + +/** @addtogroup BFLOG_FILTER + * @{ + */ + +/** + * @brief find the last bit set + * @param word word + * @return int bit index + */ +static int bflog_fls(uint32_t word) +{ + int bit = 32; + + if (!word) { + bit -= 1; + } + if (!(word & 0xffff0000)) { + word <<= 16; + bit -= 16; + } + if (!(word & 0xff000000)) { + word <<= 8; + bit -= 8; + } + if (!(word & 0xf0000000)) { + word <<= 4; + bit -= 4; + } + if (!(word & 0xc0000000)) { + word <<= 2; + bit -= 2; + } + if (!(word & 0x80000000)) { + word <<= 1; + bit -= 1; + } + + return bit; +} + +/** + * @brief alloc a filter + * @return uint32_t (0 on faild) filter bit + */ +static uint32_t bflog_filter_alloc(void) +{ + uint8_t shift = bflog_fls(global_filter) - 1; + + if (shift >= 0) { + global_filter = global_filter & ~(0x1 << shift); + return 0x1 << shift; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * @brief free a filter + * @param filter filter bit + */ +static void bflog_filter_free(uint32_t filter) +{ + global_filter = global_filter | filter; +} + +/** + * @brief config filter + * @param filter filter bit + * @param tag_string tag string pointer + * @return int + */ +static int bflog_filter_set(uint32_t filter, void *tag_string, uint8_t enable) +{ + struct _bflog_tag *ps = &__bflog_tags_start__; + struct _bflog_tag *pe = &__bflog_tags_end__; + + while (ps < pe) { + if ((tag_string == ps->tag) || (0 == bflogc_strcmp(tag_string, ps->tag))) { + if (enable) { + ps->en |= filter; + } else { + ps->en &= ~filter; + } + return 0; + } + ps += 1; + } + + return -1; +} + /** * @} */ @@ -420,6 +525,13 @@ static void queue_get(bflog_t *log, struct _bflog_msg *msg) * @{ */ +int bflog_global_filter(void *tag_string, uint8_t enable) +{ + _BFLOG_CHECK(tag_string != NULL, -1); + + return bflog_filter_set(0xffffffff, tag_string, enable); +} + /** * @brief create recorder, thread unsafe * @param log recorder @@ -427,7 +539,7 @@ static void queue_get(bflog_t *log, struct _bflog_msg *msg) * @param size pool size * @return int */ -int bflog_create_s(bflog_t *log, void *pool, uint16_t size, uint8_t mode) +int bflog_create(bflog_t *log, void *pool, uint16_t size, uint8_t mode) { _BFLOG_CHECK(log != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(pool != NULL, -1); @@ -450,6 +562,13 @@ int bflog_create_s(bflog_t *log, void *pool, uint16_t size, uint8_t mode) log->exit_critical = dummy; log->flush_notice = dummy; + uint32_t filter = bflog_filter_alloc(); + if (filter > 0) { + log->filter = filter; + } else { + return -1; + } + return 0; } @@ -458,7 +577,7 @@ int bflog_create_s(bflog_t *log, void *pool, uint16_t size, uint8_t mode) * @param log recorder * @return int */ -int bflog_delete_s(bflog_t *log) +int bflog_delete(bflog_t *log) { _BFLOG_CHECK(log, -1); @@ -502,6 +621,8 @@ int bflog_delete_s(bflog_t *log) log->status = BFLOG_STATUS_ILLEGAL; + bflog_filter_free(log->filter); + log->exit_critical(); return 0; @@ -513,7 +634,7 @@ int bflog_delete_s(bflog_t *log) * @param direct directed output * @return int */ -int bflog_append_s(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct) +int bflog_append(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct) { _BFLOG_CHECK(log != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -562,7 +683,7 @@ int bflog_append_s(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct) * @param direct directed output * @return int */ -int bflog_remove_s(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct) +int bflog_remove(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct) { _BFLOG_CHECK(log != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -620,7 +741,7 @@ int bflog_remove_s(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct) * @param log recorder * @return int */ -int bflog_suspend_s(bflog_t *log) +int bflog_suspend(bflog_t *log) { _BFLOG_CHECK(log != NULL, -1); @@ -662,7 +783,7 @@ int bflog_suspend_s(bflog_t *log) * @param log recorder * @return int */ -int bflog_resume_s(bflog_t *log) +int bflog_resume(bflog_t *log) { _BFLOG_CHECK(log != NULL, -1); @@ -677,7 +798,6 @@ int bflog_resume_s(bflog_t *log) } if (log->enter_critical()) { - printf("3"); return -1; } @@ -707,7 +827,7 @@ int bflog_resume_s(bflog_t *log) * @param param config param * @return int */ -int bflog_control_s(bflog_t *log, uint32_t command, uint32_t param) +int bflog_control(bflog_t *log, uint32_t command, uint32_t param) { _BFLOG_CHECK(log != NULL, -1); @@ -715,6 +835,11 @@ int bflog_control_s(bflog_t *log, uint32_t command, uint32_t param) case BFLOG_STATUS_READY: case BFLOG_STATUS_SUSPEND: break; + case BFLOG_STATUS_RUNNING: + if (command != BFLOG_CMD_LEVEL) { + return -1; + } + break; default: return -1; } @@ -747,6 +872,11 @@ int bflog_control_s(bflog_t *log, uint32_t command, uint32_t param) case BFLOG_STATUS_READY: case BFLOG_STATUS_SUSPEND: break; + case BFLOG_STATUS_RUNNING: + if (command != BFLOG_CMD_LEVEL) { + return -1; + } + break; default: log->exit_critical(); return -1; @@ -759,7 +889,7 @@ int bflog_control_s(bflog_t *log, uint32_t command, uint32_t param) log->flags = param & 0xff; break; case BFLOG_CMD_LEVEL: - log->level = param & 0xff; + log->level = param & BFLOG_LEVEL_MASK; break; case BFLOG_CMD_QUEUE_POOL: log->queue.pool = (void *)param; @@ -792,12 +922,48 @@ int bflog_control_s(bflog_t *log, uint32_t command, uint32_t param) return 0; } +/** + * @brief config recorder filter, thread safe + * @param log recorder + * @param tag_string tag string + * @param enable tag enable + * @return int + */ +int bflog_filter(bflog_t *log, void *tag_string, uint8_t enable) +{ + _BFLOG_CHECK(log != NULL, -1); + _BFLOG_CHECK(tag_string != NULL, -1); + + int ret; + + switch (log->status) { + case BFLOG_STATUS_READY: + case BFLOG_STATUS_RUNNING: + case BFLOG_STATUS_SUSPEND: + break; + default: + return -1; + } + + if (log->enter_critical()) { + return -1; + } + + ret = bflog_filter_set(log->filter, tag_string, enable); + + if (log->exit_critical()) { + return -1; + } + + return ret; +} + /** * @brief record log msg, thread safe * tag, file, func only recorded pointer * @param log recorder * @param level level threshold - * @param tag const tag string + * @param tag tag * @param file const file name * @param func const func name * @param line file line @@ -805,7 +971,7 @@ int bflog_control_s(bflog_t *log, uint32_t command, uint32_t param) * @param ... format params * @return int */ -int bflog_s(void *log, uint8_t level, const char *const tag, const char *const file, const char *const func, const long line, const char *format, ...) +int bflog(void *log, uint8_t level, void *tag, const char *const file, const char *const func, const long line, const char *format, ...) { _BFLOG_CHECK(log != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(format != NULL, -1); @@ -817,16 +983,25 @@ int bflog_s(void *log, uint8_t level, const char *const tag, const char *const f /*!< working only during running and suspend */ switch (_bflog_t(log)->status) { - case BFLOG_STATUS_SUSPEND: case BFLOG_STATUS_RUNNING: break; default: return -1; } - /*!< ignore high level */ - if (level > _bflog_t(log)->level) { - return -1; + /*!< level filter */ + if ((level & BFLOG_LEVEL_MASK) > _bflog_t(log)->level) { + return 0; + } + + /*!< if advanced tag, use tag filter */ + if (((uintptr_t)(&__bflog_tags_start__) <= (uintptr_t)(tag)) && + ((uintptr_t)(tag) < (uintptr_t)(&__bflog_tags_end__))) { + /*!< tag filter */ + if ((tag != NULL) && + ((_tag_t(tag)->en & _bflog_t(log)->filter) != _bflog_t(log)->filter)) { + return 0; + } } /*!< record clock tick */ @@ -850,7 +1025,7 @@ int bflog_s(void *log, uint8_t level, const char *const tag, const char *const f if (_bflog_t(log)->flags & BFLOG_FLAG_TAG) { _msg_t(msg)->tag = tag; } else { - _msg_t(msg)->tag = bflog_dummy_string; + _msg_t(msg)->tag = NULL; } /*!< record func, only record pointer */ @@ -886,7 +1061,7 @@ int bflog_s(void *log, uint8_t level, const char *const tag, const char *const f /*!< print string to msg->string */ va_start(args, format); - ret = bflog_vsnprintf(_msg_t(msg)->string, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE, format, args); + ret = bflogc_vsnprintf(_msg_t(msg)->string, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE, format, args); va_end(args); /*!< check true size */ @@ -908,7 +1083,6 @@ int bflog_s(void *log, uint8_t level, const char *const tag, const char *const f } /*!< working only during running and suspend */ switch (_bflog_t(log)->status) { - case BFLOG_STATUS_SUSPEND: case BFLOG_STATUS_RUNNING: break; default: @@ -926,7 +1100,7 @@ int bflog_s(void *log, uint8_t level, const char *const tag, const char *const f _bflog_t(log)->exit_critical(); - return bflog_flush_s(_bflog_t(log)); + return bflog_flush(_bflog_t(log)); } /** @@ -934,7 +1108,7 @@ int bflog_s(void *log, uint8_t level, const char *const tag, const char *const f * @param log recorder * @return int */ -int bflog_flush_s(void *log) +int bflog_flush(void *log) { _BFLOG_CHECK(log != NULL, -1); @@ -942,6 +1116,7 @@ int bflog_flush_s(void *log) char buf[BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2]; struct _bflog_list *node; void *direct; + uint32_t filter = _bflog_t(log)->filter; /*!< working only during running */ switch (_bflog_t(log)->status) { @@ -981,7 +1156,7 @@ int bflog_flush_s(void *log) if (_msg_t(msg)->zero != 0) { if (_msg_t(msg)->zero == 0xbd) { /*!< no msg */ - return -1; + return 0; } else { /*!< error */ return -1; @@ -990,12 +1165,12 @@ int bflog_flush_s(void *log) /*!< color */ char *color; - color = bflog_color_strings[_msg_t(msg)->level]; + color = bflog_color_strings[_msg_t(msg)->level & BFLOG_LEVEL_MASK]; /*!< level */ char *level; if (_bflog_t(log)->flags & BFLOG_FLAG_LEVEL) { - level = bflog_level_strings[_msg_t(msg)->level]; + level = bflog_level_strings[_msg_t(msg)->level & BFLOG_LEVEL_MASK]; } else { level = bflog_dummy_string; } @@ -1007,6 +1182,15 @@ int bflog_flush_s(void *log) bflog_unix2time(_msg_t(msg)->time, &tm); #endif + /*!< check if advanced tag */ + uint8_t advanced_tag; + if (((uintptr_t)(&__bflog_tags_start__) <= (uintptr_t)(_msg_t(msg)->tag)) && + ((uintptr_t)(_msg_t(msg)->tag) < (uintptr_t)(&__bflog_tags_end__))) { + advanced_tag = 1; + } else { + advanced_tag = 0; + } + _bflog_t(log)->enter_critical(); /*!< foreach direct, execute layout to buf(on stack), then output buf(on stack) */ BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_NEXT(node, &(_bflog_t(log)->direct)) @@ -1022,10 +1206,34 @@ int bflog_flush_s(void *log) } /*!< level filter */ - if (_msg_t(msg)->level > _direct_t(direct)->level) { + if ((_msg_t(msg)->level & BFLOG_LEVEL_MASK) > _direct_t(direct)->level) { continue; } + if (advanced_tag) { + /*!< tag filter */ + if ((_msg_t(msg)->tag != NULL) && + ((_tag_t(_msg_t(msg)->tag)->en & filter) != filter)) { + continue; + } + } + + char *tag; + if ((_msg_t(msg)->tag == NULL)) { + tag = bflog_dummy_string; + } else { + tag = advanced_tag ? _tag_t(_msg_t(msg)->tag)->tag : _msg_t(msg)->tag; + } + + /*!< raw output */ + if (_msg_t(msg)->level & BFLOG_LEVEL_RAW) { + size = bflogc_snprintf( + buf, + BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, + "%s", _msg_t(msg)->string); + goto output; + } + /*!< nolayout */ if (_direct_t(direct)->layout == NULL) { goto simple_layout; @@ -1036,16 +1244,47 @@ int bflog_flush_s(void *log) case BFLOG_LAYOUT_TYPE_FORMAT: if (_direct_t(direct)->color) { #ifdef BFLOG_TIMESTAMP_ENABLE - size = _layout_format_t(_direct_t(direct)->layout)->snprintf(buf, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, color, level, &tm, _msg_t(msg)); + size = _layout_format_t(_direct_t(direct)->layout) + ->snprintf( + buf, + BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, + color, + level, + tag, + &tm, + _msg_t(msg)); #else - size = _layout_format_t(_direct_t(direct)->layout)->snprintf(buf, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, color, level, NULL, _msg_t(msg)); + size = _layout_format_t(_direct_t(direct)->layout) + ->snprintf( + buf, + BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, + color, + level, + tag, + NULL, + _msg_t(msg)); #endif - } else { #ifdef BFLOG_TIMESTAMP_ENABLE - size = _layout_format_t(_direct_t(direct)->layout)->snprintf(buf, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, bflog_dummy_string, level, &tm, _msg_t(msg)); + size = _layout_format_t(_direct_t(direct)->layout) + ->snprintf( + buf, + BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, + bflog_dummy_string, + level, + tag, + &tm, + _msg_t(msg)); #else - size = _layout_format_t(_direct_t(direct)->layout)->snprintf(buf, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, bflog_dummy_string, level, NULL, _msg_t(msg)); + size = _layout_format_t(_direct_t(direct)->layout) + ->snprintf( + buf, + BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, + bflog_dummy_string, + level, + tag, + NULL, + _msg_t(msg)); #endif } goto output; @@ -1062,17 +1301,49 @@ int bflog_flush_s(void *log) if (_direct_t(direct)->color) { /*!< default and simple color format */ #ifdef BFLOG_TIMESTAMP_ENABLE - size = bflog_snprintf(buf, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING(color, level, &tm, _msg_t(msg))); + size = bflogc_snprintf( + buf, + BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, + BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING( + color, + level, + tag, + &tm, + _msg_t(msg))); #else - size = bflog_snprintf(buf, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING(color, level, NULL, _msg_t(msg))); + size = bflogc_snprintf( + buf, + BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, + BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING( + color, + level, + tag, + NULL, + _msg_t(msg))); #endif } else { /*!< default and simple no color format */ #ifdef BFLOG_TIMESTAMP_ENABLE - size = bflog_snprintf(buf, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING(bflog_dummy_string, level, &tm, _msg_t(msg))); + size = bflogc_snprintf( + buf, + BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, + BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING( + bflog_dummy_string, + level, + tag, + &tm, + _msg_t(msg))); #else - size = bflog_snprintf(buf, BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING(bflog_dummy_string, level, NULL, _msg_t(msg))); + size = bflogc_snprintf( + buf, + BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE * 2, + BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING( + bflog_dummy_string, + level, + tag, + NULL, + _msg_t(msg))); #endif } @@ -1150,7 +1421,7 @@ int bflog_direct_create(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint8_t type, uint8_t color, voi * @param direct directed output * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_delete_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) +int bflog_direct_delete(bflog_direct_t *direct) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -1184,6 +1455,8 @@ int bflog_direct_delete_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) int (*unlock)(void) = direct->unlock; direct->unlock = dummy; + bflog_filter_free(direct->filter); + unlock(); return 0; @@ -1194,7 +1467,7 @@ int bflog_direct_delete_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) * @param direct directed output * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_suspend_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) +int bflog_direct_suspend(bflog_direct_t *direct) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -1216,7 +1489,7 @@ int bflog_direct_suspend_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) * @param direct directed output * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_resume_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) +int bflog_direct_resume(bflog_direct_t *direct) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -1244,7 +1517,8 @@ int bflog_direct_link(bflog_direct_t *direct, bflog_layout_t *layout) _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(layout != NULL, -1); - if (direct->status != BFLOG_DIRECT_STATUS_READY) { + if ((direct->status != BFLOG_DIRECT_STATUS_READY) && + (direct->status != BFLOG_DIRECT_STATUS_SUSPEND)) { return -1; } @@ -1264,7 +1538,7 @@ int bflog_direct_link(bflog_direct_t *direct, bflog_layout_t *layout) * @param param * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_control_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint32_t command, uint32_t param) +int bflog_direct_control(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint32_t command, uint32_t param) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -1272,13 +1546,18 @@ int bflog_direct_control_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint32_t command, uint32_t pa case BFLOG_STATUS_READY: case BFLOG_STATUS_SUSPEND: break; + case BFLOG_STATUS_RUNNING: + if (command != BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_LEVEL) { + return -1; + } + break; default: return -1; } switch (command) { case BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_LEVEL: - direct->level = param & 0xff; + direct->level = param & BFLOG_LEVEL_MASK; break; case BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_COLOR: @@ -1308,6 +1587,34 @@ int bflog_direct_control_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint32_t command, uint32_t pa return 0; } +/** + * @brief config direct filter, thread safe + * @param direct direct + * @param tag_string tag string + * @param enable tag enable + * @return int + */ +int bflog_direct_filter(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *tag_string, uint8_t enable) +{ + _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); + _BFLOG_CHECK(tag_string != NULL, -1); + + int ret; + + switch (direct->status) { + case BFLOG_STATUS_READY: + case BFLOG_STATUS_RUNNING: + case BFLOG_STATUS_SUSPEND: + break; + default: + return -1; + } + + ret = bflog_filter_set(direct->filter, tag_string, enable); + + return ret; +} + /** * @} */ @@ -1367,7 +1674,7 @@ static void bflog_direct_write_stream(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *ptr, uint16_ * @param stream_output stream output function pointer * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_init_stream_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint16_t (*stream_output)(void *, uint16_t)) +int bflog_direct_init_stream(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint16_t (*stream_output)(void *, uint16_t)) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(stream_output != NULL, -1); @@ -1401,7 +1708,7 @@ int bflog_direct_init_stream_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint16_t (*stream_output) * @param direct directed output * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_deinit_stream_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) +int bflog_direct_deinit_stream(bflog_direct_t *direct) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -1452,8 +1759,8 @@ static void bflog_direct_write_file(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *ptr, uint16_t return; } - bflog_fwrite(ptr, 1, size, _direct_file_t(direct)->fp); - bflog_fflush(_direct_file_t(direct)->fp); + bflogc_fwrite(ptr, 1, size, _direct_file_t(direct)->fp); + bflogc_fflush(_direct_file_t(direct)->fp); } /** @@ -1462,7 +1769,7 @@ static void bflog_direct_write_file(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *ptr, uint16_t * @param path * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_init_file_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path) +int bflog_direct_init_file(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(path != NULL, -1); @@ -1484,10 +1791,10 @@ int bflog_direct_init_file_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path) } size_t pathsize = strlen(path); - bflog_memcpy(fullpath, path, pathsize); - bflog_snprintf(fullpath + pathsize, 16, ".log"); + bflogc_memcpy(fullpath, path, pathsize); + bflogc_snprintf(fullpath + pathsize, 16, ".log"); - _direct_file_t(direct)->fp = bflog_fopen(fullpath, "a+"); + _direct_file_t(direct)->fp = bflogc_fopen(fullpath, "a+"); if (_direct_file_t(direct)->fp == NULL) { direct->unlock(); return -1; @@ -1508,7 +1815,7 @@ int bflog_direct_init_file_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path) * @param direct * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_deinit_file_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) +int bflog_direct_deinit_file(bflog_direct_t *direct) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -1524,7 +1831,7 @@ int bflog_direct_deinit_file_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) return -1; } - if (bflog_fclose(_direct_file_t(direct)->fp)) { + if (bflogc_fclose(_direct_file_t(direct)->fp)) { direct->unlock(); return -1; } @@ -1563,31 +1870,31 @@ static void file_rotate(bflog_direct_file_size_t *direct) void *fp; size_t pathsize = strlen(direct->path); - bflog_memcpy(oldpath, direct->path, pathsize); - bflog_memcpy(newpath, direct->path, pathsize); + bflogc_memcpy(oldpath, direct->path, pathsize); + bflogc_memcpy(newpath, direct->path, pathsize); if (direct->fp) { - bflog_fclose(direct->fp); + bflogc_fclose(direct->fp); } for (int i = direct->keep - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - bflog_snprintf(oldpath + pathsize, 16, i ? "_%d.log" : ".log", i - 1); - bflog_snprintf(newpath + pathsize, 16, "_%d.log", i); + bflogc_snprintf(oldpath + pathsize, 16, i ? "_%d.log" : ".log", i - 1); + bflogc_snprintf(newpath + pathsize, 16, "_%d.log", i); - fp = bflog_fopen(newpath, "r"); + fp = bflogc_fopen(newpath, "r"); if (fp != NULL) { - bflog_fclose(fp); - bflog_remove(newpath); + bflogc_fclose(fp); + bflogc_remove(newpath); } - fp = bflog_fopen(oldpath, "r"); + fp = bflogc_fopen(oldpath, "r"); if (fp != NULL) { - bflog_fclose(fp); - bflog_rename(oldpath, newpath); + bflogc_fclose(fp); + bflogc_rename(oldpath, newpath); } } - direct->fp = bflog_fopen(oldpath, "a+"); + direct->fp = bflogc_fopen(oldpath, "a+"); } #endif @@ -1618,8 +1925,8 @@ static void bflog_direct_write_file_time(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *ptr, uint _direct_file_time_t(direct)->timestamp = timestamp; } - bflog_fwrite(ptr, 1, size, _direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); - bflog_fflush(_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); + bflogc_fwrite(ptr, 1, size, _direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); + bflogc_fflush(_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); } /** @@ -1630,7 +1937,7 @@ static void bflog_direct_write_file_time(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *ptr, uint * @param keep max keep file count * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_init_file_time_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint32_t interval, uint32_t keep) +int bflog_direct_init_file_time(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint32_t interval, uint32_t keep) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(path != NULL, -1); @@ -1658,10 +1965,10 @@ int bflog_direct_init_file_time_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint } size_t pathsize = strlen(path); - bflog_memcpy(fullpath, path, pathsize); - bflog_snprintf(fullpath + pathsize, 16, ".log"); + bflogc_memcpy(fullpath, path, pathsize); + bflogc_snprintf(fullpath + pathsize, 16, ".log"); - _direct_file_time_t(direct)->fp = bflog_fopen(fullpath, "a+"); + _direct_file_time_t(direct)->fp = bflogc_fopen(fullpath, "a+"); if (_direct_file_time_t(direct)->fp == NULL) { direct->unlock(); return -1; @@ -1685,7 +1992,7 @@ int bflog_direct_init_file_time_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint * @param direct * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_deinit_file_time_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) +int bflog_direct_deinit_file_time(bflog_direct_t *direct) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -1701,7 +2008,7 @@ int bflog_direct_deinit_file_time_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) return -1; } - if (bflog_fclose(_direct_file_time_t(direct)->fp)) { + if (bflogc_fclose(_direct_file_time_t(direct)->fp)) { direct->unlock(); return -1; } @@ -1745,14 +2052,14 @@ static void bflog_direct_write_file_size(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *ptr, uint } /*!< fseek(_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp, 0L, SEEK_END); */ - size_t fsize = bflog_ftell(_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); + size_t fsize = bflogc_ftell(_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); if (fsize > _direct_file_size_t(direct)->size) { file_rotate((void *)direct); } - bflog_fwrite(ptr, 1, size, _direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); - bflog_fflush(_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); + bflogc_fwrite(ptr, 1, size, _direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); + bflogc_fflush(_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp); } /** @@ -1763,7 +2070,7 @@ static void bflog_direct_write_file_size(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *ptr, uint * @param keep * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_init_file_size_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint32_t size, uint32_t keep) +int bflog_direct_init_file_size(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint32_t size, uint32_t keep) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(path != NULL, -1); @@ -1790,10 +2097,10 @@ int bflog_direct_init_file_size_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint } size_t pathsize = strlen(path); - bflog_memcpy(fullpath, path, pathsize); - bflog_snprintf(fullpath + pathsize, 16, ".log"); + bflogc_memcpy(fullpath, path, pathsize); + bflogc_snprintf(fullpath + pathsize, 16, ".log"); - _direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp = bflog_fopen(fullpath, "a+"); + _direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp = bflogc_fopen(fullpath, "a+"); if (_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp == NULL) { direct->unlock(); return -1; @@ -1816,7 +2123,7 @@ int bflog_direct_init_file_size_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint * @param direct * @return int */ -int bflog_direct_deinit_file_size_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) +int bflog_direct_deinit_file_size(bflog_direct_t *direct) { _BFLOG_CHECK(direct != NULL, -1); @@ -1832,7 +2139,7 @@ int bflog_direct_deinit_file_size_s(bflog_direct_t *direct) return -1; } - if (bflog_fclose(_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp)) { + if (bflogc_fclose(_direct_file_size_t(direct)->fp)) { direct->unlock(); return -1; } @@ -1915,7 +2222,7 @@ int bflog_layout_delete(bflog_layout_t *layout) * @param snprintf format * @return int */ -int bflog_layout_format(bflog_layout_t *layout, int (*u_snprintf)(void *ptr, uint16_t size, char *color, char *level, bflog_tm_t *tm, struct _bflog_msg *msg)) +int bflog_layout_format(bflog_layout_t *layout, int (*u_snprintf)(void *ptr, uint16_t size, char *color, char *level, char *tag, bflog_tm_t *tm, struct _bflog_msg *msg)) { _BFLOG_CHECK(layout != NULL, -1); _BFLOG_CHECK(u_snprintf != NULL, -1); diff --git a/components/bflog/bflog.h b/components/bflog/bflog.h index eb97b347..0d3a8bf6 100644 --- a/components/bflog/bflog.h +++ b/components/bflog/bflog.h @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ #define _BFLOG_H #include +#include +#include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_BFLOG_USER #include "bflog_user.h" @@ -35,20 +38,20 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_CSI Control Sequence Introducer * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_CSI_START "\033[" -#define BFLOG_CSI_CUU "A" -#define BFLOG_CSI_CUD "B" -#define BFLOG_CSI_CUF "C" -#define BFLOG_CSI_CUB "D" -#define BFLOG_CSI_CNL "E" -#define BFLOG_CSI_CPL "F" -#define BFLOG_CSI_CHA "G" -#define BFLOG_CSI_CUP "H" -#define BFLOG_CSI_ED "J" -#define BFLOG_CSI_EL "K" -#define BFLOG_CSI_SU "S" -#define BFLOG_CSI_SD "T" -#define BFLOG_CSI_SGR "m" +#define BFLOG_CSI_START "\033[" +#define BFLOG_CSI_CUU "A" +#define BFLOG_CSI_CUD "B" +#define BFLOG_CSI_CUF "C" +#define BFLOG_CSI_CUB "D" +#define BFLOG_CSI_CNL "E" +#define BFLOG_CSI_CPL "F" +#define BFLOG_CSI_CHA "G" +#define BFLOG_CSI_CUP "H" +#define BFLOG_CSI_ED "J" +#define BFLOG_CSI_EL "K" +#define BFLOG_CSI_SU "S" +#define BFLOG_CSI_SD "T" +#define BFLOG_CSI_SGR "m" /** * @} */ @@ -90,9 +93,9 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_COLOR * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_COLOR_START BFLOG_CSI_START -#define BFLOG_COLOR_END BFLOG_CSI_SGR -#define BFLOG_CLOLR_SEP ";" +#define BFLOG_COLOR_START BFLOG_CSI_START +#define BFLOG_COLOR_END BFLOG_CSI_SGR +#define BFLOG_CLOLR_SEP ";" #define BFLOG_COLOR_DEFAULT #define BFLOG_COLOR_RESET BFLOG_SGR_RESET BFLOG_CLOLR_SEP #define BFLOG_COLOR_FG_NONE @@ -133,7 +136,7 @@ #endif #ifndef BFLOG_COLOR_INFO -#define BFLOG_COLOR_INFO BFLOG_COLOR_FG_GREEN BFLOG_COLOR_BG_NONE BFLOG_SGR_NORMAL +#define BFLOG_COLOR_INFO BFLOG_COLOR_FG_NONE BFLOG_COLOR_BG_NONE BFLOG_SGR_RESET #endif #ifndef BFLOG_COLOR_DEBUG @@ -180,12 +183,14 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_LEVEL * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_LEVEL_FATAL 0 /*!< level fatal, create a panic */ -#define BFLOG_LEVEL_ERROR 1 /*!< level error */ -#define BFLOG_LEVEL_WARN 2 /*!< level warning */ -#define BFLOG_LEVEL_INFO 3 /*!< level information */ -#define BFLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG 4 /*!< level debug */ -#define BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE 5 /*!< level trace information */ +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_FATAL 0x00 /*!< level fatal, create a panic */ +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_ERROR 0x01 /*!< level error */ +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_WARN 0x02 /*!< level warning */ +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_INFO 0x03 /*!< level information */ +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG 0x04 /*!< level debug */ +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE 0x05 /*!< level trace information */ +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_MASK 0x7F /*!< level mask */ +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_RAW 0x80 /*!< level raw bit */ /** * @} */ @@ -193,14 +198,14 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_FLAG * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_FLAG_LEVEL ((uint8_t)0x01) /*!< supported print level */ -#define BFLOG_FLAG_TAG ((uint8_t)0x02) /*!< supported record tag */ -#define BFLOG_FLAG_FUNC ((uint8_t)0x04) /*!< supported record function */ -#define BFLOG_FLAG_LINE ((uint8_t)0x08) /*!< supported record line */ -#define BFLOG_FLAG_FILE ((uint8_t)0x10) /*!< supported record file */ -#define BFLOG_FLAG_CLK ((uint8_t)0x20) /*!< supported record clock */ -#define BFLOG_FLAG_TIME ((uint8_t)0x40) /*!< supported record time */ -#define BFLOG_FLAG_THREAD ((uint8_t)0x80) /*!< supported record thread */ +#define BFLOG_FLAG_LEVEL ((uint8_t)0x01) /*!< supported print level */ +#define BFLOG_FLAG_TAG ((uint8_t)0x02) /*!< supported record tag */ +#define BFLOG_FLAG_FUNC ((uint8_t)0x04) /*!< supported record function */ +#define BFLOG_FLAG_LINE ((uint8_t)0x08) /*!< supported record line */ +#define BFLOG_FLAG_FILE ((uint8_t)0x10) /*!< supported record file */ +#define BFLOG_FLAG_CLK ((uint8_t)0x20) /*!< supported record clock */ +#define BFLOG_FLAG_TIME ((uint8_t)0x40) /*!< supported record time */ +#define BFLOG_FLAG_THREAD ((uint8_t)0x80) /*!< supported record thread */ /** * @} */ @@ -212,10 +217,10 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_STATUS * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_STATUS_ILLEGAL ((uint8_t)0) -#define BFLOG_STATUS_READY ((uint8_t)1) -#define BFLOG_STATUS_RUNNING ((uint8_t)2) -#define BFLOG_STATUS_SUSPEND ((uint8_t)3) +#define BFLOG_STATUS_ILLEGAL ((uint8_t)0) +#define BFLOG_STATUS_READY ((uint8_t)1) +#define BFLOG_STATUS_RUNNING ((uint8_t)2) +#define BFLOG_STATUS_SUSPEND ((uint8_t)3) /** * @} */ @@ -223,8 +228,8 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_MODE * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_MODE_SYNC ((uint8_t)0x00) -#define BFLOG_MODE_ASYNC ((uint8_t)0x01) +#define BFLOG_MODE_SYNC ((uint8_t)0x00) +#define BFLOG_MODE_ASYNC ((uint8_t)0x01) /** * @} */ @@ -232,16 +237,16 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_COMMAND * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_CMD_ILLEGAL ((uint32_t)0x00) -#define BFLOG_CMD_FLAG ((uint32_t)0x01) -#define BFLOG_CMD_LEVEL ((uint32_t)0x02) -#define BFLOG_CMD_QUEUE_POOL ((uint32_t)0x03) -#define BFLOG_CMD_QUEUE_SIZE ((uint32_t)0x04) -#define BFLOG_CMD_QUEUE_RST ((uint32_t)0x05) -#define BFLOG_CMD_ENTER_CRITICAL ((uint32_t)0x06) -#define BFLOG_CMD_EXIT_CRITICAL ((uint32_t)0x07) -#define BFLOG_CMD_FLUSH_NOTICE ((uint32_t)0x08) -#define BFLOG_CMD_MODE ((uint32_t)0x09) +#define BFLOG_CMD_ILLEGAL ((uint32_t)0x00) +#define BFLOG_CMD_FLAG ((uint32_t)0x01) +#define BFLOG_CMD_LEVEL ((uint32_t)0x02) +#define BFLOG_CMD_QUEUE_POOL ((uint32_t)0x03) +#define BFLOG_CMD_QUEUE_SIZE ((uint32_t)0x04) +#define BFLOG_CMD_QUEUE_RST ((uint32_t)0x05) +#define BFLOG_CMD_ENTER_CRITICAL ((uint32_t)0x06) +#define BFLOG_CMD_EXIT_CRITICAL ((uint32_t)0x07) +#define BFLOG_CMD_FLUSH_NOTICE ((uint32_t)0x08) +#define BFLOG_CMD_MODE ((uint32_t)0x09) /** * @} */ @@ -270,11 +275,11 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_DIRECT_COMMAND * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_ILLEGAL ((uint32_t)0x00) -#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_LEVEL ((uint32_t)0x02) -#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_LOCK ((uint32_t)0x06) -#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_UNLOCK ((uint32_t)0x07) -#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_COLOR ((uint32_t)0x0A) +#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_ILLEGAL ((uint32_t)0x00) +#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_LEVEL ((uint32_t)0x02) +#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_LOCK ((uint32_t)0x06) +#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_UNLOCK ((uint32_t)0x07) +#define BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_COLOR ((uint32_t)0x0A) /** * @} */ @@ -295,8 +300,8 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_DIRECT_COLOR * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_DIRECT_COLOR_DISABLE ((uint8_t)0) -#define BFLOG_DIRECT_COLOR_ENABLE ((uint8_t)1) +#define BFLOG_DIRECT_COLOR_DISABLE ((uint8_t)0) +#define BFLOG_DIRECT_COLOR_ENABLE ((uint8_t)1) /** * @} */ @@ -322,9 +327,9 @@ /** @addtogroup BFLOG_LAYOUT_TYPE * @{ */ -#define BFLOG_LAYOUT_TYPE_SIMPLE ((uint8_t)0) -#define BFLOG_LAYOUT_TYPE_FORMAT ((uint8_t)1) -#define BFLOG_LAYOUT_TYPE_YAML ((uint8_t)2) +#define BFLOG_LAYOUT_TYPE_SIMPLE ((uint8_t)0) +#define BFLOG_LAYOUT_TYPE_FORMAT ((uint8_t)1) +#define BFLOG_LAYOUT_TYPE_YAML ((uint8_t)2) /** * @} */ @@ -364,6 +369,15 @@ struct _bflog_list { struct _bflog_list *prev; }; +/** + * @brief tag + */ +struct _bflog_tag { + char *tag; + /*!< max 32 filter */ + uint32_t en; +}; + /** * @brief message */ @@ -391,7 +405,7 @@ struct _bflog_msg { uint32_t line; /*!< msg line */ const char *func; /*!< msg function, must be static string, only record pointer */ const char *file; /*!< msg file, must be static string, only record pointer */ - const char *tag; /*!< msg tag, must be static string, only record pointer */ + void *tag; /*!< msg tag */ const char *thread; /*!< msg thread, must be static string, only record pointer */ char string[0]; /*!< msg string */ }; @@ -411,6 +425,8 @@ typedef struct uint8_t level; uint8_t mode; + uint32_t filter; + struct { uint16_t free; @@ -449,7 +465,7 @@ typedef struct typedef struct { _BFLOG_STRUCT_LAYOUT_EXTENDS - int (*snprintf)(void *ptr, uint16_t size, char *color, char *level, bflog_tm_t *tm, struct _bflog_msg *msg); + int (*snprintf)(void *ptr, uint16_t size, char *color, char *level, char *tag, bflog_tm_t *tm, struct _bflog_msg *msg); } bflog_layout_format_t; /** @@ -468,6 +484,7 @@ typedef struct uint8_t color; \ uint8_t level; \ uint8_t type; \ + uint32_t filter; \ int (*lock)(void); \ int (*unlock)(void) @@ -538,48 +555,50 @@ extern uint64_t bflog_clock(void); extern uint32_t bflog_time(void); extern char *bflog_thread(void); -extern int bflog_create_s(bflog_t *log, void *pool, uint16_t size, uint8_t mode); -extern int bflog_delete_s(bflog_t *log); -extern int bflog_append_s(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct); -extern int bflog_remove_s(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct); -extern int bflog_suspend_s(bflog_t *log); -extern int bflog_resume_s(bflog_t *log); -extern int bflog_control_s(bflog_t *log, uint32_t command, uint32_t param); -extern int bflog_s(void *log, uint8_t level, const char *const tag, const char *const file, const char *const func, const long line, const char *format, ...); -extern int bflog_flush_s(void *log); +extern int bflog_global_filter(void *tag_string, uint8_t enable); + +extern int bflog_create(bflog_t *log, void *pool, uint16_t size, uint8_t mode); +extern int bflog_delete(bflog_t *log); +extern int bflog_append(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_remove(bflog_t *log, bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_suspend(bflog_t *log); +extern int bflog_resume(bflog_t *log); +extern int bflog_control(bflog_t *log, uint32_t command, uint32_t param); +extern int bflog_filter(bflog_t *log, void *tag_string, uint8_t enable); +extern int bflog(void *log, uint8_t level, void *tag, const char *const file, const char *const func, const long line, const char *format, ...); +extern int bflog_flush(void *log); extern int bflog_direct_create(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint8_t type, uint8_t color, void(*lock), void(*unlock)); -extern int bflog_direct_delete_s(bflog_direct_t *direct); -extern int bflog_direct_suspend_s(bflog_direct_t *direct); -extern int bflog_direct_resume_s(bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_direct_delete(bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_direct_suspend(bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_direct_resume(bflog_direct_t *direct); extern int bflog_direct_link(bflog_direct_t *direct, bflog_layout_t *layout); -extern int bflog_direct_control_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint32_t command, uint32_t param); +extern int bflog_direct_control(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint32_t command, uint32_t param); +extern int bflog_direct_filter(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *tag_string, uint8_t enable); -extern int bflog_direct_init_buffer_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *buffer, void *size); -extern int bflog_direct_deinit_buffer_s(bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_direct_init_buffer(bflog_direct_t *direct, void *buffer, void *size); +extern int bflog_direct_deinit_buffer(bflog_direct_t *direct); -extern int bflog_direct_init_stream_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint16_t (*stream_output)(void *, uint16_t)); -extern int bflog_direct_deinit_stream_s(bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_direct_init_stream(bflog_direct_t *direct, uint16_t (*stream_output)(void *, uint16_t)); +extern int bflog_direct_deinit_stream(bflog_direct_t *direct); -extern int bflog_direct_init_file_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path); -extern int bflog_direct_deinit_file_s(bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_direct_init_file(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path); +extern int bflog_direct_deinit_file(bflog_direct_t *direct); -extern int bflog_direct_init_file_size_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint32_t size, uint32_t keep); -extern int bflog_direct_deinit_file_size_s(bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_direct_init_file_size(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint32_t size, uint32_t keep); +extern int bflog_direct_deinit_file_size(bflog_direct_t *direct); -extern int bflog_direct_init_file_time_s(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint32_t interval, uint32_t keep); -extern int bflog_direct_deinit_file_time_s(bflog_direct_t *direct); +extern int bflog_direct_init_file_time(bflog_direct_t *direct, const char *path, uint32_t interval, uint32_t keep); +extern int bflog_direct_deinit_file_time(bflog_direct_t *direct); extern int bflog_layout_create(bflog_layout_t *layout, uint8_t type); extern int bflog_layout_delete(bflog_layout_t *layout); -extern int bflog_layout_format(bflog_layout_t *layout, int (*u_snprintf)(void *ptr, uint16_t size, char *color, char *level, bflog_tm_t *tm, struct _bflog_msg *msg)); +extern int bflog_layout_format(bflog_layout_t *layout, int (*u_snprintf)(void *ptr, uint16_t size, char *color, char *level, char *tag, bflog_tm_t *tm, struct _bflog_msg *msg)); #ifdef BFLOG_TIMESTAMP_ENABLE extern void bflog_unix2time(uint32_t timestamp, bflog_tm_t *time); #endif -#ifdef BFLOG_ENABLE - #ifndef BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE #define BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE BFLOG_LEVEL_INFO #endif @@ -608,50 +627,92 @@ extern void bflog_unix2time(uint32_t timestamp, bflog_tm_t *time); #define __BFLOG_LINE__ __LINE__ #endif +#define __BFLOG_WRAP(x) #x + +/*!< define a tag */ +#define BFLOG_DEFINE_TAG(name, _string, enable) \ + __attribute__((unused)) struct _bflog_tag __bflog_tag_##name##__ __attribute__((section(".bflog_tags_array"))) = { \ + .tag = _string, \ + .en = enable ? 0xffffffff : 0x00000000 \ + } + +/*!< extern a tag */ +#define BFLOG_EXTERN_TAG(name) extern struct _bflog_tag __bflog_tag_##name##__ __attribute__((section(".bflog_tags_array"))) + +/*!< get tag name */ +#define BFLOG_GET_TAG(name) &__bflog_tag_##name##__ + +/*!< set tag */ +#define BFLOG_TAG NULL + +#ifdef BFLOG_ENABLE + +#define BFLOG_X(_log, _level, _tag, ...) bflog((void *)(_log), (_level), (_tag), __BFLOG_FILENAME__, __BFLOG_FUNCTION__, __BFLOG_LINE__, ##__VA_ARGS__) + #if (BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE >= BFLOG_LEVEL_FATAL) -#define BFLOG_F(_log, _tag, ...) bflog_s((void *)(_log), BFLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, (_tag), __BFLOG_FILENAME__, __BFLOG_FUNCTION__, __BFLOG_LINE__, __VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_F(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_RF(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_RAW | BFLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define BFLOG_F(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_F(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RF(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) #endif #if (BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE >= BFLOG_LEVEL_ERROR) -#define BFLOG_E(_log, _tag, ...) bflog_s((void *)(_log), BFLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, (_tag), __BFLOG_FILENAME__, __BFLOG_FUNCTION__, __BFLOG_LINE__, __VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_E(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_RE(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_RAW | BFLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define BFLOG_E(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_E(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RE(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) #endif #if (BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE >= BFLOG_LEVEL_WARN) -#define BFLOG_W(_log, _tag, ...) bflog_s((void *)(_log), BFLOG_LEVEL_WARN, (_tag), __BFLOG_FILENAME__, __BFLOG_FUNCTION__, __BFLOG_LINE__, __VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_W(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_WARN, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_RW(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_RAW | BFLOG_LEVEL_WARN, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define BFLOG_W(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_W(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RW(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) #endif #if (BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE >= BFLOG_LEVEL_INFO) -#define BFLOG_I(_log, _tag, ...) bflog_s((void *)(_log), BFLOG_LEVEL_INFO, (_tag), __BFLOG_FILENAME__, __BFLOG_FUNCTION__, __BFLOG_LINE__, __VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_I(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_INFO, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_RI(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_RAW | BFLOG_LEVEL_INFO, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define BFLOG_I(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_I(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RI(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) #endif #if (BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE >= BFLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG) -#define BFLOG_D(_log, _tag, ...) bflog_s((void *)(_log), BFLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, (_tag), __BFLOG_FILENAME__, __BFLOG_FUNCTION__, __BFLOG_LINE__, __VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_D(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_RD(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_RAW | BFLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define BFLOG_D(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_D(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RD(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) #endif #if (BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE >= BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE) -#define BFLOG_T(_log, _tag, ...) bflog_s((void *)(_log), BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE, (_tag), __BFLOG_FILENAME__, __BFLOG_FUNCTION__, __BFLOG_LINE__, __VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_T(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_RT(_log, ...) BFLOG_X(_log, BFLOG_LEVEL_RAW | BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE, (BFLOG_TAG), ##__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define BFLOG_T(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_T(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RT(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) #endif #else -#define BFLOG_F(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) -#define BFLOG_E(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) -#define BFLOG_W(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) -#define BFLOG_I(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) -#define BFLOG_D(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) -#define BFLOG_T(_log, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_tag), (void)(__VA_ARGS__) +#define BFLOG_X(_log, _level, _tag, ...) (void)(_log), (void)(_level), (void)(_tag), + +#define BFLOG_F(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RF(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_E(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RE(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_W(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RW(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_I(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RI(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_D(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RD(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_T(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) +#define BFLOG_RT(_log, ...) ((void)(_log)) #endif diff --git a/components/bflog/bflog_default.h b/components/bflog/bflog_default.h index 61133a9d..a3bd214d 100644 --- a/components/bflog/bflog_default.h +++ b/components/bflog/bflog_default.h @@ -24,66 +24,84 @@ #ifndef _BFLOG_USER_H #define _BFLOG_USER_H -#include "vlibc_stdio.h" #include "bflog.h" -/*!< param check enable */ -#define CONFIG_BFLOG_DEBUG - +/*!< 启用LOG, 禁用将使LOG内容不参与编译 */ /*!< log enable */ #define BFLOG_ENABLE +/*!< 全局启用的LOG等级, 小于此等级的LOG内容不参与编译 */ /*!< log enable level */ -#define BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_ENABLE BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE +/*!< 默认LOG记录器配置的LOG等级, 小于此等级的LOG将不被记录 */ +/*!< 可以动态调节LOG记录器等级来调整记录内容 */ /*!< default log record level */ -#define BFLOG_LEVEL_DEFAULT BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE +#define BFLOG_LEVEL_DEFAULT BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE +/*!< 默认LOG输出器配置的LOG等级, 小于此等级的LOG将不被输出 */ +/*!< 可以动态调节LOG输出器等级来调整某个输出器输出的内容 */ /*!< default direct print level */ #define BFLOG_DIRECT_LEVEL_DEFAULT BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE +/*!< 使能时间戳 */ /*!< enable timestamp to time */ #define BFLOG_TIMESTAMP_ENABLE +/*!< 使能BUFFER输出器, 未完成配置无效果 */ /*!< enable buffer directed output */ #define BFLOG_DIRECT_BUFFER_ENABLE +/*!< 使能流输出器 */ /*!< enable stream directed output */ #define BFLOG_DIRECT_STREAM_ENABLE +/*!< 使能文件输出器 */ /*!< enable file directed output */ #define BFLOG_DIRECT_FILE_ENABLE +/*!< 使能按时间分割的文件输出器 */ /*!< enable file time directed output */ #define BFLOG_DIRECT_FILE_TIME_ENABLE +/*!< 使能按文件大小分割的文件输出器 */ /*!< enable file size directed output */ #define BFLOG_DIRECT_FILE_SIZE_ENABLE +/*!< 使能短文件名 */ /*!< enable short file name */ #define BFLOG_SHORT_FILENAME +/*!< 使能文件名记录, 占用flash高 */ /*!< enable file name record, flash use high */ #define BFLOG_FILENAME_ENABLE +/*!< 使能函数名记录, 占用flash中等 */ /*!< enable function name record, flash use medium */ #define BFLOG_FUNCTION_ENABLE +/*!< 使能文件行数记录, 占用flash低 */ /*!< enable line record, flash use low */ #define BFLOG_LINE_ENABLE +/*!< 行缓冲大小, 使用的是栈上空间, 请确保栈空间足够 */ +/*!< 行缓冲设置大小不足时, 一次长LOG输出可能不完整 */ /*!< line buffer size (in stack) */ /*!< flush use 4xline buffer size in stack */ /*!< log use 2xline buffer size in stack */ /*!< pay attention to prevent stack overflow */ -#define BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE 256 +#define BFLOG_LINE_BUFFER_SIZE 256 +/*!< 最小文件尺寸分割大小 */ /*!< file size rotate min size */ -#define BFLOG_FILE_SIZE_MIN (1024) +#define BFLOG_FILE_SIZE_MIN (1024) +/*!< 最小时间分割大小 */ /*!< file time rotate min interval */ #define BFLOG_FILE_INTERVAL_MIN (60) +/*!< 默认记录器配置的记录功能 */ +/*!< 可以动态修改记录器配置调节记录功能, 提高速度 */ /*!< default record flag config */ /*!< | item | time occupancy | */ /*!< | level | low | */ @@ -94,64 +112,56 @@ /*!< | clock | medium | */ /*!< | time | high | */ /*!< |thread | medium | */ -#define BFLOG_FLAG_DEFAULT ( \ - (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_LEVEL) | \ - (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_TAG) | \ - (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_FUNC) | \ - (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_LINE) | \ - (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_FILE) | \ - (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_CLK) | \ - (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_TIME) | \ +#define BFLOG_FLAG_DEFAULT ( \ + (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_LEVEL) | \ + (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_TAG) | \ + (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_FUNC) | \ + (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_LINE) | \ + (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_FILE) | \ + (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_CLK) | \ + (0xff & BFLOG_FLAG_TIME) | \ (0x00 & BFLOG_FLAG_THREAD)) +/*!< 不同日志等级颜色配置 */ /*!< color config */ #define BFLOG_COLOR_FATAL BFLOG_COLOR_FG_MAGENTA BFLOG_COLOR_BG_NONE BFLOG_SGR_NORMAL #define BFLOG_COLOR_ERROR BFLOG_COLOR_FG_RED BFLOG_COLOR_BG_NONE BFLOG_SGR_NORMAL #define BFLOG_COLOR_WARN BFLOG_COLOR_FG_YELLOW BFLOG_COLOR_BG_NONE BFLOG_SGR_NORMAL -#define BFLOG_COLOR_INFO BFLOG_COLOR_FG_GREEN BFLOG_COLOR_BG_NONE BFLOG_SGR_NORMAL +#define BFLOG_COLOR_INFO BFLOG_COLOR_FG_NONE BFLOG_COLOR_BG_NONE BFLOG_SGR_RESET #define BFLOG_COLOR_DEBUG BFLOG_COLOR_FG_WHITE BFLOG_COLOR_BG_NONE BFLOG_SGR_NORMAL #define BFLOG_COLOR_TRACE BFLOG_COLOR_FG_WHITE BFLOG_COLOR_BG_NONE BFLOG_SGR_FAINT +/*!< 简易排版的格式 */ /*!< simple layout */ -#define LAYOUT_USE 1 - -#if (LAYOUT_USE == 0) -#define BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING(_color, _level, _tm, _msg) \ - "%s" \ - "[%s][%10lu][%d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d]" \ - "[%s:%s:%d]" \ - "<%s> %s", \ - (_color), \ - (_level), \ - ((_msg)->clkl), \ - (_tm)->year, (_tm)->mon, (_tm)->mday, \ - (_tm)->hour, (_tm)->min, (_tm)->sec, \ - ((_msg)->file), ((_msg)->func), ((_msg)->line), \ - ((_msg)->tag), \ - ((_msg)->string) -#elif (LAYOUT_USE == 1) -#define BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING(_color, _level, _tm, _msg) \ - "%s" \ - "[%s][%10lu][%d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d]" \ - "<%s> %s", \ - (_color), \ - (_level), \ - ((_msg)->clkl), \ - (_tm)->year, (_tm)->mon, (_tm)->mday, \ - (_tm)->hour, (_tm)->min, (_tm)->sec, \ - ((_msg)->tag), \ +#if 0 +#define BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING(_color, _level, _tag, _tm, _msg) \ + "%s" \ + "[%s][%10lu][%d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d]" \ + "[%s:%s:%d]" \ + "<%s> %s", \ + (_color), \ + (_level), \ + ((_msg)->clkl), \ + (_tm)->year, (_tm)->mon, (_tm)->mday, \ + (_tm)->hour, (_tm)->min, (_tm)->sec, \ + ((_msg)->file), ((_msg)->func), ((_msg)->line), \ + (_tag), \ ((_msg)->string) #else -#define BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING(_color, _level, _tm, _msg) \ - "%s" \ - "[%s][%lu]" \ - " %s", \ - (_color), \ - (_level), \ - ((_msg)->clkl), \ +#define BFLOG_SIMPLE_LAYOUT_STRING(_color, _level, _tag, _tm, _msg) \ + "%s" \ + "[%c][%10lu]" \ + "[%s:%s:%d]" \ + "<%s> %s", \ + (_color), \ + (_level[0]), \ + ((_msg)->clkl), \ + ((_msg)->file), ((_msg)->func), ((_msg)->line), \ + (_tag), \ ((_msg)->string) #endif +/*!< 不同日志等级提示信息配置 */ /*!< level string config */ #define BFLOG_LEVEL_FATAL_STRING "FATL" #define BFLOG_LEVEL_ERROR_STRING "ERRO" @@ -160,16 +170,4 @@ #define BFLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG_STRING "DBUG" #define BFLOG_LEVEL_TRACE_STRING "TRAC" -#define bflog_fopen vlibc_fopen -#define bflog_fclose vlibc_fclose -#define bflog_fwrite vlibc_fwrite -#define bflog_ftell vlibc_ftell -#define bflog_fflush vlibc_fflush -#define bflog_snprintf vlibc_snprintf -#define bflog_vsnprintf vlibc_vsnprintf -#define bflog_remove vlibc_remove -#define bflog_rename vlibc_rename - -#define bflog_memcpy memcpy - #endif diff --git a/components/bflog/bflog_dlist.h b/components/bflog/bflog_dlist.h index 9a4c21fd..9c74a5f8 100644 --- a/components/bflog/bflog_dlist.h +++ b/components/bflog/bflog_dlist.h @@ -92,19 +92,19 @@ (bflog_dlist_is_empty(_pnode) ? NULL : BFLOG_DLIST_ENTRY_FIRST(_pnode, _type, _member)) /*!< 正向遍历链表 */ -#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH(_pos, _head) for ((_pos) = (_head)->next; (_pos) != (_head); (_pos) = (_pos)->next) +#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH(_pos, _head) for ((_pos) = (_head)->next; (_pos) != (_head); (_pos) = (_pos)->next) /*!< 正向遍历链表 */ -#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_NEXT BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH +#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_NEXT BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH /*!< 逆向遍历链表 */ -#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_PREV(_pos, _head) for ((_pos) = (_head)->prev; (_pos) != (_head); (_pos) = (_pos)->prev) +#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_PREV(_pos, _head) for ((_pos) = (_head)->prev; (_pos) != (_head); (_pos) = (_pos)->prev) /*!< 安全正向遍历链表 */ -#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_S(_pos, _n, _head) for ((_pos) = (_head)->next, (_n) = (_pos)->next; (_pos) != (_head); (_pos) = (_n), (_n) = (_pos)->next) +#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_S(_pos, _n, _head) for ((_pos) = (_head)->next, (_n) = (_pos)->next; (_pos) != (_head); (_pos) = (_n), (_n) = (_pos)->next) /*!< 安全正向遍历链表 */ -#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_NEXT_S BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_S +#define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_NEXT_S BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_S /*!< 安全逆向遍历链表 */ #define BFLOG_DLIST_FOREACH_PREV_S(_pos, _n, _head) for ((_pos) = (_head)->prev, (_n) = (_pos)->prev; (_pos) != (_head); (_pos) = (_n), (_n) = (_pos)->prev) diff --git a/components/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_rtx.c b/components/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_rtx.c deleted file mode 100644 index a3955631..00000000 --- a/components/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_rtx.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,164 +0,0 @@ -#include "usb_osal.h" -#include "usb_errno.h" -#include "stdlib.h" -#include "RTL.h" - -uint32_t enter_critical(void); -uint32_t exit_critical(uint32_t sr); - -//ʱ=timeout/os_tick os tickΪ1msʱ=timeout -//ֲΪarm9汾Ҫ - -//˵ãΪ8 -_declare_box8(sem_mpool, sizeof(OS_SEM), 8); -_declare_box8(mut_mpool, sizeof(OS_MUT), 8); - -usb_osal_thread_t usb_osal_thread_create(const char *name, uint32_t stack_size, uint32_t prio, usb_thread_entry_t entry, void *args) -{ - void *stk = malloc(stack_size); - _init_box8(sem_mpool, sizeof(sem_mpool), sizeof(OS_SEM)); - _init_box8(mut_mpool, sizeof(mut_mpool), sizeof(OS_MUT)); - - return (usb_osal_thread_t)os_tsk_create_user_ex (entry, prio, - stk, stack_size, - args); -} - -void usb_osal_thread_suspend(usb_osal_thread_t thread) -{ - os_suspend(); -} - -void usb_osal_thread_resume(usb_osal_thread_t thread) -{ - os_resume(0); -} - -usb_osal_sem_t usb_osal_sem_create(uint32_t initial_count) -{ - void *sem = _alloc_box(sem_mpool); - if(sem != NULL) os_sem_init(sem, initial_count); - return (usb_osal_sem_t)sem; -} - -//ɾosͬ //޵ȴźɾ -void usb_osal_sem_delete(usb_osal_sem_t sem) -{ - _free_box(sem_mpool, sem); -} - -int usb_osal_sem_take(usb_osal_sem_t sem, uint32_t timeout) -{ - return (os_sem_wait(sem, timeout) != OS_R_TMO) ? 0 : -ETIMEDOUT; -} - -//̣߳жϾ -int usb_osal_sem_give(usb_osal_sem_t sem) -{ - uint32_t intstatus = 0; - /* Obtain the number of the currently executing interrupt. */ - __asm volatile ( "mrs intstatus, cpsr" ); - if ((intstatus & 0xf) == 0) { //user mode - os_sem_send(sem); - } else { - isr_sem_send(sem); - } - - return 0; -} - -usb_osal_mutex_t usb_osal_mutex_create(void) -{ - void *mut = _alloc_box(mut_mpool); - if(mut != NULL) os_mut_init(mut); - return (usb_osal_mutex_t)mut; -} - -void usb_osal_mutex_delete(usb_osal_mutex_t mutex) -{ - _free_box(mut_mpool, mutex); -} - -int usb_osal_mutex_take(usb_osal_mutex_t mutex) -{ - os_mut_wait(mutex, 0xffff); - return 0; -} - -int usb_osal_mutex_give(usb_osal_mutex_t mutex) -{ - return (os_mut_release(mutex) == OS_R_OK) ? 0 : -EINVAL; -} - -usb_osal_event_t usb_osal_event_create(void) -{ - return (usb_osal_event_t)os_tsk_self(); -} - -void usb_osal_event_delete(usb_osal_event_t event) -{ - return; -} - -int usb_osal_event_recv(usb_osal_event_t event, uint32_t set, uint32_t *recved) -{ - os_evt_wait_or(set, 0xffff); - *recved = os_evt_get(); - return 0; -} - -//̣߳жϾ -int usb_osal_event_send(usb_osal_event_t event, uint32_t set) -{ - uint32_t intstatus = 0; - /* Obtain the number of the currently executing interrupt. */ - __asm volatile ( "mrs intstatus, cpsr" ); - if ((intstatus & 0xf) == 0) { //user mode - os_evt_set(set, (OS_TID)event); - } else { - isr_evt_set(set, (OS_TID)event); - } - - return 0; -} - -//̵ֻ߳ãԸΪtsk_locktsk_unlock汾 -size_t usb_osal_enter_critical_section(void) -{ - return enter_critical(); -} - -void usb_osal_leave_critical_section(size_t flag) -{ - exit_critical(flag); -} - -void usb_osal_msleep(uint32_t delay) -{ - os_dly_wait(delay); -} - -#pragma arm - -__asm uint32_t __builtin_ctz(uint32_t val) -{ - rsb r3, r0, #0 - and r0, r3, r0 - clz r0, r0 - rsb r0, r0, #31 - bx lr -} - -__asm uint32_t enter_critical(void) -{ - mrs R0, CPSR - orr R1, R0, #0xC0 ; Disable IRQ and FIQ - msr CPSR_c, R1 - bx lr -} - -__asm uint32_t exit_critical(uint32_t sr) -{ - msr CPSR_c, R0 - bx lr -} diff --git a/components/crypto/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3ead9d9e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_MBEDTLS mbedtls) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..28bf5ecb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +sdk_generate_library() + +## These include paths would be exported to project level +sdk_add_include_directories(.) +sdk_add_include_directories(mbedtls/include) +sdk_add_include_directories(port) +sdk_add_include_directories(port/platform) + +## not be exported to project level +sdk_add_private_include_directories(.) +sdk_add_private_include_directories(mbedtls/library) + +sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE=\"mbedtls_sample_config.h\") + +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/xtea.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/aes.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/aesni.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/arc4.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/aria.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/asn1write.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/base64.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/blowfish.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/camellia.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ccm.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/certs.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/chacha20.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/cipher.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/cmac.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/constant_time.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/debug.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/des.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/dhm.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ecdh.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ecp.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/entropy.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/error.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/gcm.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/havege.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/hkdf.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/md2.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/md4.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/md5.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/md.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/oid.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/padlock.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/pem.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/pk.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/platform.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/platform_util.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/poly1305.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/rsa.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/sha1.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/sha256.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/sha512.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/threading.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/timing.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/version.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/version_features.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/x509.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/x509_create.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/xtea.c) + +sdk_library_add_sources(port/platform/mbedtls_port_bouffalo_sdk.c) + +sdk_library_add_sources(port/pkparse.c) + +if(CONFIG_LWIP) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DMBEDTLS_NET_C) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/net_sockets.c) +endif() + +sdk_library_add_sources(port/hw_entropy_poll.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(port/bignum_ext.c) + +set(MBEDTLS_USE_HW 0) + +# bignum HW +if (CONFIG_MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_USE_HW) + set(MBEDTLS_USE_HW 1) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/bignum.c) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/hw_acc/bignum_hw.c) +else() + sdk_library_add_sources(mbedtls/library/bignum.c) +endif() + +# Hash HW +if (CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA1_USE_HW) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/hw_acc/sha1_alt.c) +endif() + +if (CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_HW) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/hw_acc/sha256_alt.c) +endif() + +if (CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_HW) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/hw_acc/sha512_alt.c) +endif() + +# AES HW +if (CONFIG_MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HW) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/hw_acc/aes_alt.c) +endif() + +# ECC HW +if (CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECC_USE_HW) + set(MBEDTLS_USE_HW 1) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/hw_acc/ecp_alt.c) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/hw_acc/ecp_curves_alt.c) +endif() + +if (MBEDTLS_USE_HW) + sdk_library_add_sources(port/hw_acc/hw_common.c) +endif() + +if (CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DMBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +endif() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/Makefile.projbuild b/components/crypto/mbedtls/Makefile.projbuild new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30f09d4e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/Makefile.projbuild @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +CPPFLAGS += -D MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE=\"mbedtls_sample_config.h\" + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA1_USE_HW),1) +CPPFLAGS += -D CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA1_USE_HW=1 +endif + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_HW),1) +CPPFLAGS += -D CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_HW=1 +endif + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_HW),1) +CPPFLAGS += -D CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_HW=1 +endif + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HW),1) +CPPFLAGS += -D CONFIG_MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HW=1 +endif + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECC_USE_HW),1) +CPPFLAGS += -D CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECC_USE_HW=1 +endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/bouffalo.mk b/components/crypto/mbedtls/bouffalo.mk new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0e465dc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/bouffalo.mk @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +# Component Makefile +# + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_CHIP_NAME),BL602) +CFLAGS += -DBL602 +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_CHIP_NAME),BL616) +CFLAGS += -DBL616 +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_CHIP_NAME),BL702) +CFLAGS += -DBL702 +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_CHIP_NAME),BL808) +CFLAGS += -DBL808 +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_CHIP_NAME),BL606P) +CFLAGS += -DBL606P +endif + +## These include paths would be exported to project level +COMPONENT_ADD_INCLUDEDIRS += mbedtls/include port + +## not be exported to project level +COMPONENT_PRIV_INCLUDEDIRS := mbedtls/library + +LIBRARY_DIR := mbedtls/library +LIBRARY_SRCS := \ + xtea.c \ + aes.c \ + aesni.c \ + arc4.c \ + aria.c \ + asn1parse.c \ + asn1write.c \ + base64.c \ + blowfish.c \ + camellia.c \ + ccm.c \ + certs.c \ + chacha20.c \ + chachapoly.c \ + cipher.c \ + cipher_wrap.c \ + cmac.c \ + constant_time.c \ + ctr_drbg.c \ + debug.c \ + des.c \ + dhm.c \ + ecdh.c \ + ecdsa.c \ + ecjpake.c \ + ecp.c \ + ecp_curves.c \ + entropy.c \ + entropy_poll.c \ + error.c \ + gcm.c \ + havege.c \ + hkdf.c \ + hmac_drbg.c \ + md2.c \ + md4.c \ + md5.c \ + md.c \ + memory_buffer_alloc.c \ + mps_reader.c \ + mps_trace.c \ + nist_kw.c \ + oid.c \ + padlock.c \ + pem.c \ + pk.c \ + pkcs11.c \ + pkcs12.c \ + pkcs5.c \ + pk_wrap.c \ + pkwrite.c \ + platform.c \ + platform_util.c \ + poly1305.c \ + ripemd160.c \ + rsa.c \ + rsa_internal.c \ + sha1.c \ + sha256.c \ + sha512.c \ + ssl_cache.c \ + ssl_ciphersuites.c \ + ssl_cli.c \ + ssl_cookie.c \ + ssl_msg.c \ + ssl_srv.c \ + ssl_ticket.c \ + ssl_tls13_keys.c \ + ssl_tls.c \ + threading.c \ + timing.c \ + version.c \ + version_features.c \ + x509.c \ + x509_create.c \ + x509_crl.c \ + x509_crt.c \ + x509_csr.c \ + x509write_crt.c \ + x509write_csr.c \ + xtea.c \ + +## This component's src +COMPONENT_SRCS := $(addprefix $(LIBRARY_DIR)/, $(LIBRARY_SRCS)) + +COMPONENT_SRCS += \ + port/pkparse.c \ + port/mbedtls_port_mem.c \ + port/net_sockets.c \ + port/hw_entropy_poll.c \ + port/bignum_ext.c \ + +MBEDTLS_USE_HW=0 + +# bignum HW +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_USE_HW),1) +MBEDTLS_USE_HW=1 +COMPONENT_SRCS += port/bignum.c +COMPONENT_SRCS += port/hw_acc/bignum_hw.c +else +COMPONENT_SRCS += $(addprefix $(LIBRARY_DIR)/, bignum.c) +endif + +# Hash HW +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA1_USE_HW),1) +COMPONENT_SRCS += port/hw_acc/sha1_alt.c +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_HW),1) +COMPONENT_SRCS += port/hw_acc/sha256_alt.c +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_HW),1) +COMPONENT_SRCS += port/hw_acc/sha512_alt.c +endif + +# AES HW +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HW),1) +COMPONENT_SRCS += port/hw_acc/aes_alt.c +endif + +# ECC HW +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECC_USE_HW),1) +MBEDTLS_USE_HW=1 +COMPONENT_SRCS += port/hw_acc/ecp_alt.c \ + port/hw_acc/ecp_curves_alt.c +endif + +ifeq ($(MBEDTLS_USE_HW),1) +COMPONENT_SRCS += port/hw_acc/hw_common.c +endif + +# test cases +COMPONENT_SRCS += port/test_case.c + +COMPONENT_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,%.o, $(COMPONENT_SRCS)) + +COMPONENT_SRCDIRS := $(LIBRARY_DIR) port port/hw_acc + +## diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/kvs_webrtc_mbedtls_config.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/kvs_webrtc_mbedtls_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3fe24a0e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/kvs_webrtc_mbedtls_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,4039 @@ +/** + * \file config.h + * + * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable + * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global + * memory footprint. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: System support + * + * This section sets system specific settings. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * The compiler has support for asm(). + * + * Requires support for asm() in compiler. + * + * Used in: + * library/aria.c + * library/timing.c + * include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h + * + * Required by: + * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Comment to disable the use of assembly code. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + * + * The platform lacks support for double-width integer division (64-bit + * division on a 32-bit platform, 128-bit division on a 64-bit platform). + * + * Used in: + * include/mbedtls/bignum.h + * library/bignum.c + * + * The bignum code uses double-width division to speed up some operations. + * Double-width division is often implemented in software that needs to + * be linked with the program. The presence of a double-width integer + * type is usually detected automatically through preprocessor macros, + * but the automatic detection cannot know whether the code needs to + * and can be linked with an implementation of division for that type. + * By default division is assumed to be usable if the type is present. + * Uncomment this option to prevent the use of double-width division. + * + * Note that division for the native integer type is always required. + * Furthermore, a 64-bit type is always required even on a 32-bit + * platform, but it need not support multiplication or division. In some + * cases it is also desirable to disable some double-width operations. For + * example, if double-width division is implemented in software, disabling + * it can reduce code size in some embedded targets. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + * + * The platform lacks support for 32x32 -> 64-bit multiplication. + * + * Used in: + * library/poly1305.c + * + * Some parts of the library may use multiplication of two unsigned 32-bit + * operands with a 64-bit result in order to speed up computations. On some + * platforms, this is not available in hardware and has to be implemented in + * software, usually in a library provided by the toolchain. + * + * Sometimes it is not desirable to have to link to that library. This option + * removes the dependency of that library on platforms that lack a hardware + * 64-bit multiplier by embedding a software implementation in Mbed TLS. + * + * Note that depending on the compiler, this may decrease performance compared + * to using the library function provided by the toolchain. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + * + * CPU supports SSE2 instruction set. + * + * Uncomment if the CPU supports SSE2 (IA-32 specific). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * System has time.h and time(). + * The time does not need to be correct, only time differences are used, + * by contrast with MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * Defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME allows you to specify MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT, + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME. + * + * Comment if your system does not support time functions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below). + * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least + * the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of + * X.509 certificates. + * + * Comment if your system does not have a correct clock. + * + * \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that + * behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to + * the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information. + * + * \note It is possible to configure an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + * + * Enable the memory allocation layer. + * + * By default mbed TLS uses the system-provided calloc() and free(). + * This allows different allocators (self-implemented or provided) to be + * provided to the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY without the + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACROs will provide + * "mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free()" allowing you to set an alternative calloc() and + * free() function pointer at runtime. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY and specifying + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC,FREE}_MACROs will allow you to specify the + * alternate function at compile time. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of alternative memory allocators. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + * + * Do not assign standard functions in the platform layer (e.g. calloc() to + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and printf() to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) + * + * This makes sure there are no linking errors on platforms that do not support + * these functions. You will HAVE to provide alternatives, either at runtime + * via the platform_set_xxx() functions or at compile time by setting + * the MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_XXX defines, or enabling a + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Uncomment to prevent default assignment of standard functions in the + * platform layer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS support the + * function in the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT, mbed TLS will + * provide a function "mbedtls_platform_set_printf()" that allows you to set an + * alternative printf function pointer. + * + * All these define require MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C to be defined! + * + * \note MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT is required on Windows; + * it will be enabled automatically by check_config.h + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot be defined at the same time as + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO! + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base + * platform function + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + * + * Mark deprecated functions and features so that they generate a warning if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * This only works with GCC and Clang. With other compilers, you may want to + * use MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Remove deprecated functions and features so that they generate an error if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + * + * This configuration option controls whether the library validates more of + * the parameters passed to it. + * + * When this flag is not defined, the library only attempts to validate an + * input parameter if: (1) they may come from the outside world (such as the + * network, the filesystem, etc.) or (2) not validating them could result in + * internal memory errors such as overflowing a buffer controlled by the + * library. On the other hand, it doesn't attempt to validate parameters whose + * values are fully controlled by the application (such as pointers). + * + * When this flag is defined, the library additionally attempts to validate + * parameters that are fully controlled by the application, and should always + * be valid if the application code is fully correct and trusted. + * + * For example, when a function accepts as input a pointer to a buffer that may + * contain untrusted data, and its documentation mentions that this pointer + * must not be NULL: + * - The pointer is checked to be non-NULL only if this option is enabled. + * - The content of the buffer is always validated. + * + * When this flag is defined, if a library function receives a parameter that + * is invalid: + * 1. The function will invoke the macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). + * 2. If MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() did not terminate the program, the function + * will immediately return. If the function returns an Mbed TLS error code, + * the error code in this case is MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * When defining this flag, you also need to arrange a definition for + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). You can do this by any of the following methods: + * - By default, the library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call a + * function mbedtls_param_failed(), but the library does not define this + * function. If you do not make any other arrangements, you must provide + * the function mbedtls_param_failed() in your application. + * See `platform_util.h` for its prototype. + * - If you enable the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT, then the + * library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(\c cond) to be `assert(cond)`. + * You can still supply an alternative definition of + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), which may call `assert`. + * - If you define a macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() before including `config.h` + * or you uncomment the definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() in `config.h`, + * the library will call the macro that you defined and will not supply + * its own version. Note that if MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() calls `assert`, + * you need to enable #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source + * files include ``. + * + * Uncomment to enable validation of application-controlled parameters. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + * + * Allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`, and make it default to + * `assert`. This macro is only used if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is defined. + * + * If this macro is not defined, then MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() defaults to + * calling a function mbedtls_param_failed(). See the documentation of + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for details. + * + * Uncomment to allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + +/* \} name SECTION: System support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support + * + * This section sets support for features that are or are not needed + * within the modules that are enabled. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + * + * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), + * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay() + * + * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled. + * + * You will need to provide a header "timing_alt.h" and an implementation at + * compile time. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto, an arithmetic or hash + * module (e.g. platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep + * in mind that the function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces the whole module. If you only want to replace one of the + * functions, use one of the MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, mbed TLS will no longer + * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base + * function declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from + * "aes.h" to include the new function definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * module. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their + * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend + * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message + * digests and ciphers instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT +// Hash HW +#if CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA1_USE_HW +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +#endif + +#if CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_HW +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +#endif + +// AES HW +#if CONFIG_MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HW +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +#endif + +/* + * When replacing the elliptic curve module, pleace consider, that it is + * implemented with two .c files: + * - ecp.c + * - ecp_curves.c + * You can replace them very much like all the other MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT + * macros as described above. The only difference is that you have to make sure + * that you provide functionality for both .c files. + */ +// ECC HW +#if CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECC_USE_HW +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT +#endif + +#if CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECC_USE_HW && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#error "ECP Restartable is not implemented with ECP HW acceleration!" +#endif + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use you + * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in + * mind that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces only one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT, mbed TLS will + * no longer provide the mbedtls_sha1_process() function, but it will still provide + * the other function (using your mbedtls_sha1_process() function) and the definition + * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible + * with this definition. + * + * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are + * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt, + * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should + * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt + * must stay untouched. + * + * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then it is recommended to also set + * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES + * tables. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use + * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding + * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests + * and ciphers instead. + * + * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are + * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the + * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore + * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating + * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative + * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() + * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is + * desirable). + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * + * Expose a part of the internal interface of the Elliptic Curve Point module. + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternative core implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic. Keep in mind + * that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This partially replaces one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT flag. The original implementation + * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the + * alternative. + * + * The original implementation can in addition be removed by setting the + * MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK option, in which case any function for which the + * corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT macro is defined will not be + * able to fallback to curves not supported by the alternative implementation. + * + * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * and implementing the following functions: + * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( + * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the + * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0 + * otherwise. + * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free are + * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to + * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions. + * + * Example: In case you set MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac() + * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac() if the group + * for the operation is supported by your implementation (i.e. your + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable() function returns 1 for this group). If the + * group is not supported by your implementation, then the original mbed TLS + * implementation of ecp_double_jac() is used instead, unless this fallback + * behaviour is disabled by setting MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK (in which case + * ecp_double_jac() will return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE). + * + * The function prototypes and the definition of mbedtls_ecp_group and + * mbedtls_ecp_point will not change based on MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT, so your + * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp__function_name__ must be compatible + * with their definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + */ +/* Required for all the functions in this section */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT +/* Turn off software fallback for curves not supported in hardware */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK +/* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT +/* Support for curves with Montgomery arithmetic */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + * + * Enables testing and use of mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources. + * This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has + * been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the + * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches). + * + * WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable + * only for development. + * Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library. + * + * Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + * + * Uncomment this macro to let mbed TLS use your own implementation of a + * hardware entropy collector. + * + * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same + * prototype as declared in entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first argument. + * + * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + * + * Use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * + * Uncomment this macro to use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * Comment this macro to generate AES tables in RAM at runtime. + * + * Tradeoff: Using precomputed ROM tables reduces RAM usage by ~8kb + * (or ~2kb if \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES is used) and reduces the + * initialization time before the first AES operation can be performed. + * It comes at the cost of additional ~8kb ROM use (resp. ~2kb if \c + * MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES below is used), and potentially degraded + * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + * + * Use less ROM/RAM for AES tables. + * + * Uncommenting this macro omits 75% of the AES tables from + * ROM / RAM (depending on the value of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + * by computing their values on the fly during operations + * (the tables are entry-wise rotations of one another). + * + * Tradeoff: Uncommenting this reduces the RAM / ROM footprint + * by ~6kb but at the cost of more arithmetic operations during + * runtime. Specifically, one has to compare 4 accesses within + * different tables to 4 accesses with additional arithmetic + * operations within the same table. The performance gain/loss + * depends on the system and memory details. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + * + * Use less ROM for the Camellia implementation (saves about 768 bytes). + * + * Uncomment this macro to use less memory for Camellia. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING + * + * If this macro is defined, emit a compile-time warning if application code + * calls a function without checking its return value, but the return value + * should generally be checked in portable applications. + * + * This is only supported on platforms where #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN is + * implemented. Otherwise this option has no effect. + * + * Uncomment to get warnings on using fallible functions without checking + * their return value. + * + * \note This feature is a work in progress. + * Warnings will be added to more functions in the future. + * + * \note A few functions are considered critical, and ignoring the return + * value of these functions will trigger a warning even if this + * macro is not defined. To completely disable return value check + * warnings, define #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN with an empty expansion. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + * + * Enable Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + * + * Enable Cipher Feedback mode (CFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + * + * Enable Counter Block Cipher mode (CTR) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + * + * Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + * + * Enable Xor-encrypt-xor with ciphertext stealing mode (XTS) for AES. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + * + * Enable NULL cipher. + * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for + * encryption or channels without any security! + * + * Requires MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES as well to enable + * the following ciphersuites: + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable the NULL cipher and ciphersuites + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 + * + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_XXX: Uncomment or comment macros to add support for + * specific padding modes in the cipher layer with cipher modes that support + * padding (e.g. CBC) + * + * If you disable all padding modes, only full blocks can be used with CBC. + * + * Enable padding modes in the cipher layer. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + * + * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module. + * By default, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Enable weak ciphersuites in SSL / TLS. + * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for + * channels with virtually no security at all! + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites: + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable weak ciphersuites + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Remove RC4 ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. + * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on RC4 from the default list as + * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible to + * enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including them + * explicitly. + * + * Uncomment this macro to remove RC4 ciphersuites by default. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Remove 3DES ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. + * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on 3DES from the default list as + * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible + * to enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including + * them explicitly. + * + * A man-in-the-browser attacker can recover authentication tokens sent through + * a TLS connection using a 3DES based cipher suite (see "On the Practical + * (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers" by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan + * Leurent, see https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf). If this attack falls + * in your threat model or you are unsure, then you should keep this option + * enabled to remove 3DES based cipher suites. + * + * Comment this macro to keep 3DES in the default ciphersuite list. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP_XXXX_ENABLED: Enables specific curves within the Elliptic Curve + * module. By default all supported curves are enabled. + * + * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it + */ +/* Short Weierstrass curves (supporting ECP, ECDH, ECDSA) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +/* Montgomery curves (supporting ECP) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + * + * Enable specific 'modulo p' routines for each NIST prime. + * Depending on the prime and architecture, makes operations 4 to 8 times + * faster on the corresponding curve. + * + * Comment this macro to disable NIST curves optimisation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + * + * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an + * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect + * against some side-channel attacks. + * + * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the + * DRBG modules. For very constrained implementations that don't require this + * protection (for example, because you're only doing signature verification, + * so not manipulating any secret, or because local/physical side-channel + * attacks are outside your threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of + * that dependency. + * + * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some + * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for + * your use case. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + * + * Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed. + * + * This allows various functions to pause by returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in + * order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is + * controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum + * number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information. + * + * This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking + * for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations. + * + * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of + * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with + * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT + * and MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + * + * Use a backward compatible ECDH context. + * + * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context + * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes + * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, + * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. + + * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller + * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it + * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. + * The new format is incompatible with applications that access + * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. + * + * Define this macro if you enable MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE or if you + * want to access ECDH context fields directly. Otherwise you should + * comment out this macro definition. + * + * This option has no effect if #MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is not enabled. + * + * \note This configuration option is experimental. Future versions of the + * library may modify the way the ECDH context layout is configured + * and may modify the layout of the new context type. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + * + * Enable deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979). + * Standard ECDSA is "fragile" in the sense that lack of entropy when signing + * may result in a compromise of the long-term signing key. This is avoided by + * the deterministic variant. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-only based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C, + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECJPAKE based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the + * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification + * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + * + * Enhance support for reading EC keys using variants of SEC1 not allowed by + * RFC 5915 and RFC 5480. + * + * Currently this means parsing the SpecifiedECDomain choice of EC + * parameters (only known groups are supported, not arbitrary domains, to + * avoid validation issues). + * + * Disable if you only need to support RFC 5915 + 5480 key formats. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + * + * Enable a dummy error function to make use of mbedtls_strerror() in + * third party libraries easier when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is disabled + * (no effect when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled). + * + * You can safely disable this if MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled, or if you're + * not using mbedtls_strerror() or error_strerror() in your application. + * + * Disable if you run into name conflicts and want to really remove the + * mbedtls_strerror() + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + * + * Enable the prime-number generation code. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_FS_IO + * + * Enable functions that use the filesystem. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + * + * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific, + * mbedtls_timing_hardclock and HAVEGE based poll functions. + * + * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an + * application. + * + * Uncomment this macro to prevent loading of default entropy functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + * + * Do not use built-in platform entropy functions. + * This is useful if your platform does not support + * standards like the /dev/urandom or Windows CryptoAPI. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the built-in platform entropy functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + * + * Force the entropy accumulator to use a SHA-256 accumulator instead of the + * default SHA-512 based one (if both are available). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * On 32-bit systems SHA-256 can be much faster than SHA-512. Use this option + * if you have performance concerns. + * + * This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + * Enable the non-volatile (NV) seed file-based entropy source. + * (Also enables the NV seed read/write functions in the platform layer) + * + * This is crucial (if not required) on systems that do not have a + * cryptographic entropy source (in hardware or kernel) available. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * \note The read/write functions that are used by the entropy source are + * determined in the platform layer, and can be modified at runtime and/or + * compile-time depending on the flags (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_*) used. + * + * \note If you use the default implementation functions that read a seedfile + * with regular fopen(), please make sure you make a seedfile with the + * proper name (defined in MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) and at + * least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes in size that can be read from + * and written to or you will get an entropy source error! The default + * implementation will only use the first MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * bytes from the file. + * + * \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is + * given to an external source, to update it. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + +/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + * + * Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier. + * + * The owner of a key is identified by a value of type ::mbedtls_key_owner_id_t + * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t. + * + * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed + * without notice. It is incompatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + * + * Enable debugging of buffer allocator memory issues. Automatically prints + * (to stderr) all (fatal) messages on memory allocation issues. Enables + * function for 'debug output' of allocated memory. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Uncomment this macro to let the buffer allocator print out error messages. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + * + * Include backtrace information with each allocated block. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * GLIBC-compatible backtrace() an backtrace_symbols() support + * + * Uncomment this macro to include backtrace information + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + * + * Support external private RSA keys (eg from a HSM) in the PK layer. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for external private RSA keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + * + * Enable support for platform built-in keys. If you enable this feature, + * you must implement the function mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key(). + * See the documentation of that function for more information. + * + * Built-in keys are typically derived from a hardware unique key or + * stored in a secure element. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * + * Enable support for PSA crypto client. + * + * \note This option allows to include the code necessary for a PSA + * crypto client when the PSA crypto implementation is not included in + * the library (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled). The code included is the + * code to set and get PSA key attributes. + * The development of PSA drivers partially relying on the library to + * fulfill the hardware gaps is another possible usage of this option. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + * + * Enable support for the experimental PSA crypto driver interface. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + * + * Make the PSA Crypto module use an external random generator provided + * by a driver, instead of Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * If you enable this option, you must configure the type + * ::mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t in psa/crypto_platform.h + * and define a function called mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * with the following prototype: + * ``` + * psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + * mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + * uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + * ); + * ``` + * The \c context value is initialized to 0 before the first call. + * The function must fill the \c output buffer with \p output_size bytes + * of random data and set \c *output_length to \p output_size. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning If you enable this option, code that uses the PSA cryptography + * interface will not use any of the entropy sources set up for + * the entropy module, nor the NV seed that MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * enables. + * + * \note This option is experimental and may be removed without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure + * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a + * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process + * Environment). + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + * + * Enable support for entropy injection at first boot. This feature is + * required on systems that do not have a built-in entropy source (TRNG). + * This feature is currently not supported on systems that have a built-in + * entropy source. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + * + * Do not use the Chinese Remainder Theorem + * for the RSA private operation. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + * + * Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonnable compromise between + * performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at + * the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of + * mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about + * 30%. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-512 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA512. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 + * + * Disable the SHA-384 option of the SHA-512 module. Use this to save some + * code size on devices that don't use SHA-384. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Uncomment to disable SHA-384 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + * + * Enable sending of alert messages in case of encountered errors as per RFC. + * If you choose not to send the alert messages, mbed TLS can still communicate + * with other servers, only debugging of failures is harder. + * + * The advantage of not sending alert messages, is that no information is given + * about reasons for failures thus preventing adversaries of gaining intel. + * + * Enable sending of all alert messages + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + * + * Enable the function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() which can be used to check + * the validity and authenticity of an incoming record, to verify that it has + * not been seen before. These checks are performed without modifying the + * externally visible state of the SSL context. + * + * See mbedtls_ssl_check_record() for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable support for record checking. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + * + * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension + * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes + * in the underlying transport. + * + * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`, + * `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. + * See the corresponding documentation for more information. + * + * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state. + * We make no stability promises for the availability + * or the shape of the API controlled by this option. + * + * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured + * through the options + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + * + * Enable asynchronous external private key operations in SSL. This allows + * you to configure an SSL connection to call an external cryptographic + * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the + * operation inside the library. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + * + * Enable serialization of the TLS context structures, through use of the + * functions mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load(). + * + * This pair of functions allows one side of a connection to serialize the + * context associated with the connection, then free or re-use that context + * while the serialized state is persisted elsewhere, and finally deserialize + * that state to a live context for resuming read/write operations on the + * connection. From a protocol perspective, the state of the connection is + * unaffected, in particular this is entirely transparent to the peer. + * + * Note: this is distinct from TLS session resumption, which is part of the + * protocol and fully visible by the peer. TLS session resumption enables + * establishing new connections associated to a saved session with shorter, + * lighter handshakes, while context serialization is a local optimization in + * handling a single, potentially long-lived connection. + * + * Enabling these APIs makes some SSL structures larger, as 64 extra bytes are + * saved after the handshake to allow for more efficient serialization, so if + * you don't need this feature you'll save RAM by disabling it. + * + * Comment to disable the context serialization APIs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + * + * Enable the debug messages in SSL module for all issues. + * Debug messages have been disabled in some places to prevent timing + * attacks due to (unbalanced) debugging function calls. + * + * If you need all error reporting you should enable this during debugging, + * but remove this for production servers that should log as well. + * + * Uncomment this macro to report all debug messages on errors introducing + * a timing side-channel. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + * + * Enable support for Encrypt-then-MAC, RFC 7366. + * + * This allows peers that both support it to use a more robust protection for + * ciphersuites using CBC, providing deep resistance against timing attacks + * on the padding or underlying cipher. + * + * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + * + * Enable support for RFC 7627: Session Hash and Extended Master Secret + * Extension. + * + * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake familiy of + * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable + * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the + * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV + * + * Enable support for RFC 7507: Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) + * for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks. + * + * For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support + * only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients + * implements a fallback strategy. + * + * For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which + * is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to + * interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * + * This option controls the availability of the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + * giving access to the peer's certificate after completion of the handshake. + * + * Unless you need mbedtls_ssl_peer_cert() in your application, it is + * recommended to disable this option for reduced RAM usage. + * + * \note If this option is disabled, mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() is still + * defined, but always returns \c NULL. + * + * \note This option has no influence on the protection against the + * triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will + * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation, + * for exaple by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate. + * + * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate + * after the handshake. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL + * + * Enable hooking functions in SSL module for hardware acceleration of + * individual records. + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable hooking functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + * + * Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in SSLv3 and TLS 1.0. + * + * This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk + * of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records. + * + * Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + * + * Enable support for TLS renegotiation. + * + * The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived + * connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake. + * If you don't need renegotiation, it's probably better to disable it, since + * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to + * misuse/misunderstand. + * + * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation. + * + * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware + * of the Renegotiation Indication Extension (RFC 5746) used to + * prevent the SSL renegotiation attack (see RFC 5746 Sect. 1). + * (See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation for the + * configuration of this extension). + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + * + * Enable support for receiving and parsing SSLv2 Client Hello messages for the + * SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable support for SSLv2 Client Hello messages. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + * + * Pick the ciphersuite according to the client's preferences rather than ours + * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * + * Uncomment this macro to respect client's ciphersuite order + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + * + * Enable support for SSL 3.0. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL 3.0 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.0. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA1_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * (Depends on ciphersuites) + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + * + * This macro is used to selectively enable experimental parts + * of the code that contribute to the ongoing development of + * the prototype TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 implementation, and provide + * no other purpose. + * + * \warning TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 aren't yet supported in Mbed TLS, + * and no feature exposed through this macro is part of the + * public API. In particular, features under the control + * of this macro are experimental and don't come with any + * stability guarantees. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable experimental and partial + * functionality specific to TLS 1.3. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions). + * + * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0, + * and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + * + * Enable support for RFC 7301 Application Layer Protocol Negotiation. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for ALPN. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + * + * Enable support for the anti-replay mechanism in DTLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * \warning Disabling this is often a security risk! + * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay() for details. + * + * Comment this to disable anti-replay in DTLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Enable support for HelloVerifyRequest on DTLS servers. + * + * This feature is highly recommended to prevent DTLS servers being used as + * amplifiers in DoS attacks against other hosts. It should always be enabled + * unless you know for sure amplification cannot be a problem in the + * environment in which your server operates. + * + * \warning Disabling this can ba a security risk! (see above) + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Comment this to disable support for HelloVerifyRequest. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + * + * Enable support for negotiation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) + * through the use_srtp extension. + * + * \note This feature provides the minimum functionality required + * to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP and to allow the derivation of + * the associated SRTP packet protection key material. + * In particular, the SRTP packet protection itself, as well as the + * demultiplexing of RTP and DTLS packets at the datagram layer + * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature. + * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating + * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb() should be used to implement + * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705 + * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs). + * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack. + * + * Setting this option enables the runtime API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles() + * through which the supported DTLS-SRTP protection + * profiles can be configured. You must call this API at + * runtime if you wish to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment this to enable support for use_srtp extension. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + * + * Enable server-side support for clients that reconnect from the same port. + * + * Some clients unexpectedly close the connection and try to reconnect using the + * same source port. This needs special support from the server to handle the + * new connection securely, as described in section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347. This + * flag enables that support. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Comment this to disable support for clients reusing the source port. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT + * + * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC. + * + * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + * + * Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL. + * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a + * session store remains the responsibility of the application, though). + * Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing + * tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example + * callbacks are provided by MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + * + * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret. + * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for key export + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 server name indication (SNI) in SSL. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for server name indication in SSL + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 truncated HMAC in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT + * + * Fallback to old (pre-2.7), non-conforming implementation of the truncated + * HMAC extension which also truncates the HMAC key. Note that this option is + * only meant for a transitory upgrade period and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \warning The old implementation is non-compliant and has a security weakness + * (2^80 brute force attack on the HMAC key used for a single, + * uninterrupted connection). This should only be enabled temporarily + * when (1) the use of truncated HMAC is essential in order to save + * bandwidth, and (2) the peer is an Mbed TLS stack that doesn't use + * the fixed implementation yet (pre-2.7). + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment to fallback to old, non-compliant truncated HMAC implementation. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + * + * When this option is enabled, the SSL buffer will be resized automatically + * based on the negotiated maximum fragment length in each direction. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test + * suites can then be run normally. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for + * testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be + * done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when + * using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + * + * Enable features for invasive testing such as introspection functions and + * hooks for fault injection. This enables additional unit tests. + * + * Merely enabling this feature should not change the behavior of the product. + * It only adds new code, and new branching points where the default behavior + * is the same as when this feature is disabled. + * However, this feature increases the attack surface: there is an added + * risk of vulnerabilities, and more gadgets that can make exploits easier. + * Therefore this feature must never be enabled in production. + * + * See `docs/architecture/testing/mbed-crypto-invasive-testing.md` for more + * information. + * + * Uncomment to enable invasive tests. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + * + * Provide your own alternate threading implementation. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to allow your own alternate threading implementation. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + * + * Enable the pthread wrapper layer for the threading layer. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to enable pthread mutexes. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + * + * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, and + * enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. + * + * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed + * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts + * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not + * break backwards compatibility. + * + * \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description of what this + * option currently does, and of parts that are not affected by it so far. + * + * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs which are currently + * considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any time. + * That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual + * promises of API stability. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * + * This setting allows support for cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA + * API to be configured separately from support through the mbedtls API. + * + * Uncomment this to enable use of PSA Crypto configuration settings which + * can be found in include/psa/crypto_config.h. + * + * If you enable this option and write your own configuration file, you must + * include mbedtls/config_psa.h in your configuration file. The default + * provided mbedtls/config.h contains the necessary inclusion. + * + * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since + * it is not completed. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + * + * Allow run-time checking of compile-time enabled features. Thus allowing users + * to check at run-time if the library is for instance compiled with threading + * support via mbedtls_version_check_feature(). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 + * + * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate + * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate. + * + * Uncomment to prevent an error. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + * + * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate + * and encountering an unknown critical extension. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, enabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Uncomment to prevent an error. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + * + * If set, this enables the X.509 API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` + * and the SSL API `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` which allow users to configure + * the set of trusted certificates through a callback instead of a linked + * list. + * + * This is useful for example in environments where a large number of trusted + * certificates is present and storing them in a linked list isn't efficient + * enough, or when the set of trusted certificates changes frequently. + * + * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE + * + * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension (CA and leaf certificates). + * + * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused + * (intermediate) CA and leaf certificates. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Comment to skip keyUsage checking for both CA and leaf certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + * + * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (leaf certificates). + * + * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused certificates. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Comment to skip extendedKeyUsage checking for certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + * + * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS + * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1). + * + * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT + * + * If set, the SSL/TLS module uses ZLIB to support compression and + * decompression of packet data. + * + * \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the + * CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if + * CRIME or similar exploits may be applicable to your use case. + * + * \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS. + * + * \deprecated This feature is deprecated and will be removed + * in the next major revision of the library. + * + * Used in: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This feature requires zlib library and headers to be present. + * + * Uncomment to enable use of ZLIB + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS modules + * + * This section enables or disables entire modules in mbed TLS + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * + * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64. + * + * Module: library/aesni.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86-64 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * Enable the AES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ctr_drbg.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * + * PEM_PARSE uses AES for decrypting encrypted keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * + * Enable the ARCFOUR stream cipher. + * + * Module: library/arc4.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoidng dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger ciphers instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 parser. + * + * Module: library/asn1.c + * Caller: library/x509.c + * library/dhm.c + * library/pkcs12.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 writer. + * + * Module: library/asn1write.c + * Caller: library/ecdsa.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * Enable the Base64 module. + * + * Module: library/base64.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * + * This module is required for PEM support (required by X.509). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + * + * Enable the multi-precision integer library. + * + * Module: library/bignum.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/ecp.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_internal.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C + * + * Enable the Blowfish block cipher. + * + * Module: library/blowfish.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * Enable the Camellia block cipher. + * + * Module: library/camellia.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * Enable the ARIA block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aria.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C + * + * Enable the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode for 128-bit block cipher. + * + * Module: library/ccm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are + * enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C + * + * Enable the test certificates. + * + * Module: library/certs.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20 stream cipher. + * + * Module: library/chacha20.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * Module: library/chachapoly.c + * + * This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + * + * Enable the generic cipher layer. + * + * Module: library/cipher.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + * + * Enable the CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) mode for block + * ciphers. + * + * \note When #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is active, meaning that the underlying + * implementation of the CMAC algorithm is provided by an alternate + * implementation, that alternate implementation may opt to not support + * AES-192 or 3DES as underlying block ciphers for the CMAC operation. + * + * Module: library/cmac.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator. + * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. + * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above. + * + * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG, + * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy. + * See ctr_drbg.h for more details. + * + * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + * + * Enable the debug functions. + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + * Enable the DES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/des.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * + * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys. + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module. + * + * Module: library/dhm.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library. + * + * Module: library/ecdh.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve DSA library. + * + * Module: library/ecdsa.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, + * and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED for a + * short Weierstrass curve. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library. + * + * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the + * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification + * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * + * Module: library/ecjpake.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECJPAKE + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve over GF(p) library. + * + * Module: library/ecp.c + * Caller: library/ecdh.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/ecjpake.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + * + * Enable the platform-specific entropy code. + * + * Module: library/entropy.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * This module provides a generic entropy pool + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + * + * Enable error code to error string conversion. + * + * Module: library/error.c + * Caller: + * + * This module enables mbedtls_strerror(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_C + * + * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). + * + * Module: library/gcm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other + * requisites are enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + * + * Enable the HAVEGE random generator. + * + * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is not suitable for virtualized + * environments + * + * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is dependent on timing and specific + * processor traits. It is therefore not advised to use HAVEGE as + * your applications primary random generator or primary entropy pool + * input. As a secondary input to your entropy pool, it IS able add + * the (limited) extra entropy it provides. + * + * Module: library/havege.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the HAVEGE random generator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + * + * Enable the HKDF algorithm (RFC 5869). + * + * Module: library/hkdf.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code + * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the HMAC_DRBG random generator. + * + * Module: library/hmac_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number geerator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + * + * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, + * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes + * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. + * + * Module: library/nist_kw.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Enable the generic message digest layer. + * + * Module: library/md.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_C + * + * Enable the MD2 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md2.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs. + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD4_C + * + * Enable the MD4 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md4.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs. + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * + * Enable the MD5 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md5.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2 + * depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking + * MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded + * encrypted keys. + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Enable the buffer allocator implementation that makes use of a (stack) + * based buffer to 'allocate' dynamic memory. (replaces calloc() and free() + * calls) + * + * Module: library/memory_buffer_alloc.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY (to use it within mbed TLS) + * + * Enable this module to enable the buffer memory allocator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NET_C + * + * Enable the TCP and UDP over IPv6/IPv4 networking routines. + * + * \note This module only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, BSD and OS X) + * and Windows. For other platforms, you'll want to disable it, and write your + * own networking callbacks to be passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/net_sockets.c + * + * This module provides networking routines. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_OID_C + * + * Enable the OID database. + * + * Module: library/oid.c + * Caller: library/asn1write.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/x509.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * This modules translates between OIDs and internal values. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Enable VIA Padlock support on x86. + * + * Module: library/padlock.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + * + * Enable PEM decoding / parsing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + * + * Enable PEM encoding / writing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for encoding / writing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key layer. + * + * Module: library/pk.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key parser. + * + * Module: library/pkparse.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymetric) key writer. + * + * Module: library/pkwrite.c + * Caller: library/x509write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + * + * Enable PKCS#5 functions. + * + * Module: library/pkcs5.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + * + * Enable wrapper for PKCS#11 smartcard support via the pkcs11-helper library. + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Module: library/pkcs11.c + * Caller: library/pk.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * This module enables SSL/TLS PKCS #11 smartcard support. + * Requires the presence of the PKCS#11 helper library (libpkcs11-helper) + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + * + * Enable PKCS#12 PBE functions. + * Adds algorithms for parsing PKCS#8 encrypted private keys + * + * Module: library/pkcs12.c + * Caller: library/pkparse.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * Can use: MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * + * This module enables PKCS#12 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable the platform abstraction layer that allows you to re-assign + * functions like calloc(), free(), snprintf(), printf(), fprintf(), exit(). + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C enables to use of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT + * or MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO directives, allowing the functions mentioned + * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively. + * + * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2) + * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. + * + * Module: library/platform.c + * Caller: Most other .c files + * + * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + * + * Enable the Poly1305 MAC algorithm. + * + * Module: library/poly1305.c + * Caller: library/chachapoly.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * + * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + * + * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture + * cryptography API. + * + * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided + * for API evaluation and testing purposes only. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, + * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of + * the PSA ITS interface + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + * + * Enable the emulation of the Platform Security Architecture + * Internal Trusted Storage (PSA ITS) over files. + * + * Module: library/psa_its_file.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_FS_IO + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + * + * Enable the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/ripemd160.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem. + * + * Module: library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_internal.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Enable the SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha1.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2 + * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256. + * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + * + * Enable simple SSL cache implementation. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cache.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + * + * Enable basic implementation of DTLS cookies for hello verification. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cookie.c + * Caller: + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + * + * Enable an implementation of TLS server-side callbacks for session tickets. + * + * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS client code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cli.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS client support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS server code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS server support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_tls.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Enable the threading abstraction layer. + * By default mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or that + * contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts + * between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race + * conditions. See also our Knowledge Base article about threading: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading + * + * Module: library/threading.c + * + * This allows different threading implementations (self-implemented or + * provided). + * + * You will have to enable either MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT or + * MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD. + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of mutexes within mbed TLS + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * + * Enable the semi-portable timing interface. + * + * \note The provided implementation only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, + * BSD and OS X) and Windows. On other platforms, you can either disable that + * module and provide your own implementations of the callbacks needed by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS, or leave it enabled and provide + * your own implementation of the whole module by setting + * \c MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT in the current file. + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/timing.c + * Caller: library/havege.c + * + * This module is used by the HAVEGE random number generator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Enable run-time version information. + * + * Module: library/version.c + * + * This module provides run-time version information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for using certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509.c + * Caller: library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, + * MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 certificate parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 CRL parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crl.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 CRL parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_csr.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is used for reading X.509 certificate request. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for creating certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_create.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate creation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR). + * + * Module: library/x509_csr_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate request writing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + * + * Enable the XTEA block cipher. + * + * Module: library/xtea.c + * Caller: + */ +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + +/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module configuration options + * + * This section allows for the setting of module specific sizes and + * configuration options. The default values are already present in the + * relevant header files and should suffice for the regular use cases. + * + * Our advice is to enable options and change their values here + * only if you have a good reason and know the consequences. + * + * Please check the respective header file for documentation on these + * parameters (to prevent duplicate documentation). + * \{ + */ + +/* MPI / BIGNUM options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ + +/* CTR_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 /**< Amount of entropy used per seed by default (48 with SHA-512, 32 with SHA-256) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* HMAC_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* ECP options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< Maximum bit size of groups. Normally determined automatically from the configured curves. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< Maximum window size used */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */ + +/* Entropy options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Default minimum number of bytes required for the hardware entropy source mbedtls_hardware_poll() before entropy is released */ + +/* Memory buffer allocator options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */ + +/* Platform options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR /**< Header to include if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS is defined. Don't define if no header is needed. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< Default allocator to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< Default free to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" /**< Seed file to read/write with default implementation */ + +/* To Use Function Macros MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C must be enabled */ +/* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot both be defined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ + +/** + * \brief This macro is invoked by the library when an invalid parameter + * is detected that is only checked with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + * (see the documentation of that option for context). + * + * When you leave this undefined here, the library provides + * a default definition. If the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + * is defined, the default definition is `assert(cond)`, + * otherwise the default definition calls a function + * mbedtls_param_failed(). This function is declared in + * `platform_util.h` for the benefit of the library, but + * you need to define in your application. + * + * When you define this here, this replaces the default + * definition in platform_util.h (which no longer declares the + * function mbedtls_param_failed()) and it is your responsibility + * to make sure this macro expands to something suitable (in + * particular, that all the necessary declarations are visible + * from within the library - you can ensure that by providing + * them in this file next to the macro definition). + * If you define this macro to call `assert`, also define + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source files + * include ``. + * + * Note that you may define this macro to expand to nothing, in + * which case you don't have to worry about declarations or + * definitions. However, you will then be notified about invalid + * parameters only in non-void functions, and void function will + * just silently return early on invalid parameters, which + * partially negates the benefits of enabling + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS in the first place, so is discouraged. + * + * \param cond The expression that should evaluate to true, but doesn't. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN + * + * This macro is used at the beginning of the declaration of a function + * to indicate that its return value should be checked. It should + * instruct the compiler to emit a warning or an error if the function + * is called without checking its return value. + * + * There is a default implementation for popular compilers in platform_util.h. + * You can override the default implementation by defining your own here. + * + * If the implementation here is empty, this will effectively disable the + * checking of functions' return values. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__)) + +/** \def MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN + * + * This macro requires one argument, which should be a C function call. + * If that function call would cause a #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN warning, this + * warning is suppressed. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( result ) ((void) !(result)) + +/* PSA options */ +/** + * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the + * PSA crypto subsystem. + * + * If this option is unset: + * - If CTR_DRBG is available, the PSA subsystem uses it rather than HMAC_DRBG. + * - Otherwise, the PSA subsystem uses HMAC_DRBG with either + * #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 or #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 based on availability and + * on unspecified heuristics. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + * Restrict the PSA library to supporting a maximum amount of simultaneously + * loaded keys. A loaded key is a key stored by the PSA Crypto core as a + * volatile key, or a persistent key which is loaded temporarily by the + * library as part of a crypto operation in flight. + * + * If this option is unset, the library will fall back to a default value of + * 32 keys. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 + +/* SSL Cache options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */ + +/* SSL options */ + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers + * in such a way that both are capable of holding the specified amount of + * plaintext data, regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * To configure incoming and outgoing I/O buffers separately, use + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + * which overwrite the value set by this option. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of both + * incoming and outgoing I/O buffers. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the incoming TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * If this option is undefined, it inherits its value from + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer + * independently of the outgoing I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for incoming DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for outgoing DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * in TLS 1.3. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of outgoing plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the outgoing TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * If this option undefined, it inherits its value from + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping + * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification. + * + * The minimum required outward buffer size is determined by the handshake + * protocol's usage. Handshaking will fail if the outward buffer is too small. + * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any + * certificate data which is sent during the handshake. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer + * independently of the incoming I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING + * + * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of + * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering. + * + * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size, + * together with its reassembly bitmap. + * + * A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default) + * should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows + * to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate) + * while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 + +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ + +/** \def MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID + * + * At the time of writing, the CID extension has not been assigned its + * final value. Set this configuration option to make Mbed TLS use a + * different value. + * + * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of + * this option to match evolving standards and usage. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 + +/** + * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference. + * + * \warning No dependency checking is done on that field! This option can only + * be used to restrict the set of available ciphersuites. It is your + * responsibility to make sure the needed modules are active. + * + * Use this to save a few hundred bytes of ROM (default ordering of all + * available ciphersuites) and a few to a few hundred bytes of RAM. + * + * The value below is only an example, not the default. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + +/* X509 options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ + +/** + * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake + * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1 + * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes. + * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by + * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use + * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default + * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general + * warning applies nonetheless: + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is a widely used function across the library to + * zero a block of memory. The implementation is expected to be secure in the + * sense that it has been written to prevent the compiler from removing calls + * to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() as part of redundant code elimination + * optimizations. However, it is difficult to guarantee that calls to + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized by the compiler as older + * versions of the C language standards do not provide a secure implementation + * of memset(). Therefore, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT enables users to + * configure their own implementation of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), for + * example by using directives specific to their compiler, features from newer + * C standards (e.g using memset_s() in C11) or calling a secure memset() from + * their system (e.g explicit_bzero() in BSD). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The + * library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as + * gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target + * system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to + * using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to + * gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex + * if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the + * library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However, + * if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will + * unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + * supplied at compile time. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT + +/** + * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest + * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH + * contexts and therefore is a compatibility break for applications that access + * fields of a mbedtls_ecdh_context structure directly. See also + * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT in include/mbedtls/ecdh.h. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED + +/* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */ + +/* Target and application specific configurations + * + * Allow user to override any previous default. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.github/issue_template.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.github/issue_template.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..370066f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.github/issue_template.md @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +_Note:_ this is a template, please remove the parts that are not +applicable (these initial notes, and the "Bug" section for a Feature request +and vice-versa). + +**Note:** to report a security vulnerability, see +[SECURITY.md](../SECURITY.md). Please do not use github issues for +vulnerabilities. + +_Note:_ to get support, see [SUPPORT.md](../SUPPORT.md). Please do not use +github issues for questions. + +--------------------------------------------------------------- +### Description +- Type: Bug | Enhancement / Feature Request +- Priority: Blocker | Major | Minor + +--------------------------------------------------------------- +## Bug + +**OS** +Mbed OS|linux|windows| + +**mbed TLS build:** +Version: x.x.x or git commit id +OS version: x.x.x +Configuration: please attach config.h file where possible +Compiler and options (if you used a pre-built binary, please indicate how you obtained it): +Additional environment information: + +**Peer device TLS stack and version** +OpenSSL|GnuTls|Chrome|NSS(Firefox)|SecureChannel (IIS/Internet Explorer/Edge)|Other +Version: + +**Expected behavior** + +**Actual behavior** + +**Steps to reproduce** + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +## Enhancement / Feature Request + +**Suggested enhancement** + +**Justification - why does the library need this feature?** + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.github/pull_request_template.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.github/pull_request_template.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5804436 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.github/pull_request_template.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +Notes: +* Pull requests cannot be accepted until the PR follows the [contributing guidelines](../CONTRIBUTING.md). In particular, each commit must have at least one `Signed-off-by:` line from the committer to certify that the contribution is made under the terms of the [Developer Certificate of Origin](../dco.txt). +* This is just a template, so feel free to use/remove the unnecessary things +## Description +A few sentences describing the overall goals of the pull request's commits. + + +## Status +**READY/IN DEVELOPMENT/HOLD** + +## Requires Backporting +When there is a bug fix, it should be backported to all maintained and supported branches. +Changes do not have to be backported if: +- This PR is a new feature\enhancement +- This PR contains changes in the API. If this is true, and there is a need for the fix to be backported, the fix should be handled differently in the legacy branch + +Yes | NO +Which branch? + +## Migrations +If there is any API change, what's the incentive and logic for it. + +YES | NO + +## Additional comments +Any additional information that could be of interest + +## Todos +- [ ] Tests +- [ ] Documentation +- [ ] Changelog updated +- [ ] Backported + + +## Steps to test or reproduce +Outline the steps to test or reproduce the PR here. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a3221cb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +# Random seed file created by test scripts and sample programs +seedfile + +# CMake build artifacts: +CMakeCache.txt +CMakeFiles +CTestTestfile.cmake +cmake_install.cmake +Testing +# CMake generates *.dir/ folders for in-tree builds (used by MSVC projects), ignore all of those: +*.dir/ +# MSVC files generated by CMake: +/*.sln +/*.vcxproj +/*.filters + +# Test coverage build artifacts: +Coverage +*.gcno +*.gcda +coverage-summary.txt + +# generated by scripts/memory.sh +massif-* + +# Eclipse project files +.cproject +.project +/.settings + +# MSVC build artifacts: +*.exe +*.pdb +*.ilk +*.lib + +# Python build artifacts: +*.pyc + +# CMake generates *.dir/ folders for in-tree builds (used by MSVC projects), ignore all of those: +*.dir/ + +# Microsoft CMake extension for Visual Studio Code generates a build directory by default +/build/ + +# Visual Studio artifacts +/visualc/VS2010/.localhistory/ +/visualc/VS2010/.vs/ +/visualc/VS2010/Debug/ +/visualc/VS2010/Release/ +/visualc/VS2010/*.vcxproj.filters +/visualc/VS2010/*.vcxproj.user + +# Generated documentation: +/apidoc + +# PSA Crypto compliance test repo, cloned by test_psa_compliance.py +/psa-arch-tests + +# Editor navigation files: +/GPATH +/GRTAGS +/GSYMS +/GTAGS +/TAGS +/cscope*.out +/tags diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.globalrc b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.globalrc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01b2ea5a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.globalrc @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +default:\ + :langmap=c\:.c.h.function:\ + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.mypy.ini b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.mypy.ini new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b831ddb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.mypy.ini @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +[mypy] +mypy_path = scripts +namespace_packages = True +warn_unused_configs = True diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.pylintrc b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.pylintrc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d217ff69 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.pylintrc @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +[MASTER] +init-hook='import sys; sys.path.append("scripts")' + +[BASIC] +# We're ok with short funtion argument names. +# [invalid-name] +argument-rgx=[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*$ + +# Allow filter and map. +# [bad-builtin] +bad-functions=input + +# We prefer docstrings, but we don't require them on all functions. +# Require them only on long functions (for some value of long). +# [missing-docstring] +docstring-min-length=10 + +# No upper limit on method names. Pylint <2.1.0 has an upper limit of 30. +# [invalid-name] +method-rgx=[a-z_][a-z0-9_]{2,}$ + +# Allow module names containing a dash (but no underscore or uppercase letter). +# They are whole programs, not meant to be included by another module. +# [invalid-name] +module-rgx=(([a-z_][a-z0-9_]*)|([A-Z][a-zA-Z0-9]+)|[a-z][-0-9a-z]+)$ + +# Some functions don't need docstrings. +# [missing-docstring] +no-docstring-rgx=(run_)?main$ + +# We're ok with short local or global variable names. +# [invalid-name] +variable-rgx=[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*$ + +[DESIGN] +# Allow more than the default 7 attributes. +# [too-many-instance-attributes] +max-attributes=15 + +[FORMAT] +# Allow longer modules than the default recommended maximum. +# [too-many-lines] +max-module-lines=2000 + +[MESSAGES CONTROL] +# * locally-disabled, locally-enabled: If we disable or enable a message +# locally, it's by design. There's no need to clutter the Pylint output +# with this information. +# * logging-format-interpolation: Pylint warns about things like +# ``log.info('...'.format(...))``. It insists on ``log.info('...', ...)``. +# This is of minor utility (mainly a performance gain when there are +# many messages that use formatting and are below the log level). +# Some versions of Pylint (including 1.8, which is the version on +# Ubuntu 18.04) only recognize old-style format strings using '%', +# and complain about something like ``log.info('{}', foo)`` with +# logging-too-many-args (Pylint supports new-style formatting if +# declared globally with logging_format_style under [LOGGING] but +# this requires Pylint >=2.2). +# * no-else-return: Allow the perfectly reasonable idiom +# if condition1: +# return value1 +# else: +# return value2 +# * unnecessary-pass: If we take the trouble of adding a line with "pass", +# it's because we think the code is clearer that way. +disable=locally-disabled,locally-enabled,logging-format-interpolation,no-else-return,unnecessary-pass + +[REPORTS] +# Don't diplay statistics. Just the facts. +reports=no + +[VARIABLES] +# Allow unused variables if their name starts with an underscore. +# [unused-argument] +dummy-variables-rgx=_.* diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.travis.yml b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.travis.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2b41c28f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/.travis.yml @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +language: c +compiler: gcc +sudo: false +cache: ccache + +jobs: + include: + - name: basic checks and reference configurations + addons: + apt: + packages: + - gnutls-bin + - doxygen + - graphviz + - gcc-arm-none-eabi + - libnewlib-arm-none-eabi + - gcc-arm-linux-gnueabi + - libc6-dev-armel-cross + language: python # Needed to get pip for Python 3 + python: 3.5 # version from Ubuntu 16.04 + install: + - scripts/min_requirements.py + script: + - tests/scripts/all.sh -k 'check_*' + - tests/scripts/all.sh -k test_default_out_of_box + - tests/scripts/all.sh -k test_ref_configs + - tests/scripts/all.sh -k build_arm_linux_gnueabi_gcc_arm5vte build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_m0plus + + - name: full configuration + script: + - tests/scripts/all.sh -k test_full_cmake_gcc_asan + + - name: Windows + os: windows + script: + - scripts/windows_msbuild.bat v141 # Visual Studio 2017 + +after_failure: +- tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh + +env: + global: + - SEED=1 + - secure: "JECCru6HASpKZ0OLfHh8f/KXhKkdrCwjquZghd/qbA4ksxsWImjR7KEPERcaPndXEilzhDbKwuFvJiQX2duVgTGoq745YGhLZIjzo1i8tySkceCVd48P8WceYGz+F/bmY7r+m6fFNuxDSoGGSVeA4Lnjvmm8PFUP45YodDV9no4=" + +addons: + apt: + packages: + - gnutls-bin + coverity_scan: + project: + name: "ARMmbed/mbedtls" + notification_email: support-mbedtls@arm.com + build_command_prepend: + build_command: make + branch_pattern: coverity_scan diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5fc607b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +/Makefile diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..18945e52 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +list (APPEND thirdparty_src) +list (APPEND thirdparty_lib) +list (APPEND thirdparty_inc_public) +list (APPEND thirdparty_inc) +list (APPEND thirdparty_def) + +execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/config.h get MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED RESULT_VARIABLE result) + +if(${result} EQUAL 0) + add_subdirectory(everest) +endif() + +set(thirdparty_src ${thirdparty_src} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(thirdparty_lib ${thirdparty_lib} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(thirdparty_inc_public ${thirdparty_inc_public} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(thirdparty_inc ${thirdparty_inc} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(thirdparty_def ${thirdparty_def} PARENT_SCOPE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/Makefile.inc b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/Makefile.inc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0ed85af5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/Makefile.inc @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +THIRDPARTY_DIR = $(dir $(lastword $(MAKEFILE_LIST))) +include $(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/Makefile.inc diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6eb25f66 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +*.o +Makefile diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d81d995f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +list (APPEND everest_src) +list (APPEND everest_inc_public) +list (APPEND everest_inc) +list (APPEND everest_def) + +set(everest_src + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/library/everest.c + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/library/x25519.c + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c +) + +list(APPEND everest_inc_public ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include) +list(APPEND everest_inc ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/everest ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/everest/kremlib) + +if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS) + + install(DIRECTORY include/everest + DESTINATION include + FILE_PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ + DIRECTORY_PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE + FILES_MATCHING PATTERN "*.h") + +endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS) + +set(thirdparty_src ${thirdparty_src} ${everest_src} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(thirdparty_inc_public ${thirdparty_inc_public} ${everest_inc_public} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(thirdparty_inc ${thirdparty_inc} ${everest_inc} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(thirdparty_def ${thirdparty_def} ${everest_def} PARENT_SCOPE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/Makefile.inc b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/Makefile.inc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..77a6b496 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/Makefile.inc @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES+=-I../3rdparty/everest/include -I../3rdparty/everest/include/everest -I../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib + +THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS+= \ + ../3rdparty/everest/library/everest.o \ + ../3rdparty/everest/library/x25519.o \ + ../3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.o diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/README.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bcf12c0c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +The files in this directory stem from [Project Everest](https://project-everest.github.io/) and are distributed under the Apache 2.0 license. + +This is a formally verified implementation of Curve25519-based handshakes. The C code is automatically derived from the (verified) [original implementation](https://github.com/project-everest/hacl-star/tree/master/code/curve25519) in the [F* language](https://github.com/fstarlang/fstar) by [KreMLin](https://github.com/fstarlang/kremlin). In addition to the improved safety and security of the implementation, it is also significantly faster than the default implementation of Curve25519 in mbedTLS. + +The caveat is that not all platforms are supported, although the version in `everest/library/legacy` should work on most systems. The main issue is that some platforms do not provide a 128-bit integer type and KreMLin therefore has to use additional (also verified) code to simulate them, resulting in less of a performance gain overall. Explicitly supported platforms are currently `x86` and `x86_64` using gcc or clang, and Visual C (2010 and later). diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/Hacl_Curve25519.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/Hacl_Curve25519.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e3f5ba44 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/Hacl_Curve25519.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +/* This file was generated by KreMLin + * KreMLin invocation: /mnt/e/everest/verify/kremlin/krml -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrcLh -minimal -fbuiltin-uint128 -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrcLh -minimal -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/code/lib/kremlin -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/kremlin/kremlib/compat -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/specs -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/specs/old -I . -ccopt -march=native -verbose -ldopt -flto -tmpdir x25519-c -I ../bignum -bundle Hacl.Curve25519=* -minimal -add-include "kremlib.h" -skip-compilation x25519-c/out.krml -o x25519-c/Hacl_Curve25519.c + * F* version: 059db0c8 + * KreMLin version: 916c37ac + */ + + + +#ifndef __Hacl_Curve25519_H +#define __Hacl_Curve25519_H + + +#include "kremlib.h" + +void Hacl_Curve25519_crypto_scalarmult(uint8_t *mypublic, uint8_t *secret, uint8_t *basepoint); + +#define __Hacl_Curve25519_H_DEFINED +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..392e7924 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@ +/* + * Interface to code from Project Everest + * + * Copyright 2016-2018 INRIA and Microsoft Corporation + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org). + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_EVEREST_H +#define MBEDTLS_EVEREST_H + +#include "everest/x25519.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Defines the source of the imported EC key. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_OURS, /**< Our key. */ + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_THEIRS, /**< The key of the peer. */ +} mbedtls_everest_ecdh_side; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_x25519_context ctx; +} mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest; + + +/** + * \brief This function sets up the ECDH context with the information + * given. + * + * This function should be called after mbedtls_ecdh_init() but + * before mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(). There is no need to call + * this function before mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(). + * + * This is the first function used by a TLS server for ECDHE + * ciphersuites. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. + * \param grp_id The group id of the group to set up the context for. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_everest_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, int grp_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees a context. + * + * \param ctx The context to free. + */ +void mbedtls_everest_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a public key and a TLS + * ServerKeyExchange payload. + * + * This is the second function used by a TLS server for ECDHE + * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup().) + * + * \note This function assumes that the ECP group (grp) of the + * \p ctx context has already been properly set, + * for example, using mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context. + * \param olen The number of characters written. + * \param buf The destination buffer. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_everest_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t ), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses and processes a TLS ServerKeyExchange + * payload. + * + * This is the first function used by a TLS client for ECDHE + * ciphersuites. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context. + * \param buf The pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param end The address for one Byte past the end of the buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_everest_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses and processes a TLS ServerKeyExchange + * payload. + * + * This is the first function used by a TLS client for ECDHE + * ciphersuites. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context. + * \param buf The pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param end The address for one Byte past the end of the buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_everest_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an ECDH context from an EC key. + * + * It is used by clients and servers in place of the + * ServerKeyEchange for static ECDH, and imports ECDH + * parameters from the EC key information of a certificate. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. + * \param key The EC key to use. + * \param side Defines the source of the key: 1: Our key, or + * 0: The key of the peer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_everest_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_everest_ecdh_side side ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a public key and a TLS + * ClientKeyExchange payload. + * + * This is the second function used by a TLS client for ECDH(E) + * ciphersuites. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context. + * \param olen The number of Bytes written. + * \param buf The destination buffer. + * \param blen The size of the destination buffer. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_everest_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t ), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses and processes a TLS ClientKeyExchange + * payload. + * + * This is the third function used by a TLS server for ECDH(E) + * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup() and + * mbedtls_ecdh_make_params().) + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context. + * \param buf The start of the input buffer. + * \param blen The length of the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_everest_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret. + * + * This is the last function used by both TLS client + * and servers. + * + * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement + * countermeasures against side-channel attacks. + * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul(). + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context. + * \param olen The number of Bytes written. + * \param buf The destination buffer. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_everest_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t ), + void *p_rng ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_EVEREST_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f06663f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2016-2018 INRIA and Microsoft Corporation + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) and + * originated from Project Everest (https://project-everest.github.io/) + */ + +#ifndef __KREMLIB_H +#define __KREMLIB_H + +#include "kremlin/internal/target.h" +#include "kremlin/internal/types.h" +#include "kremlin/c_endianness.h" + +#endif /* __KREMLIB_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib/FStar_UInt128.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib/FStar_UInt128.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d71c8820 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib/FStar_UInt128.h @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +/* This file was generated by KreMLin + * KreMLin invocation: ../krml -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrB9w -minimal -fparentheses -fcurly-braces -fno-shadow -header copyright-header.txt -minimal -tmpdir dist/uint128 -skip-compilation -extract-uints -add-include -add-include -add-include "kremlin/internal/types.h" -bundle FStar.UInt128=* extracted/prims.krml extracted/FStar_Pervasives_Native.krml extracted/FStar_Pervasives.krml extracted/FStar_Mul.krml extracted/FStar_Squash.krml extracted/FStar_Classical.krml extracted/FStar_StrongExcludedMiddle.krml extracted/FStar_FunctionalExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot_Base.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot_Properties.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot.krml extracted/FStar_Seq_Base.krml extracted/FStar_Seq_Properties.krml extracted/FStar_Seq.krml extracted/FStar_Math_Lib.krml extracted/FStar_Math_Lemmas.krml extracted/FStar_BitVector.krml extracted/FStar_UInt.krml extracted/FStar_UInt32.krml extracted/FStar_Int.krml extracted/FStar_Int16.krml extracted/FStar_Preorder.krml extracted/FStar_Ghost.krml extracted/FStar_ErasedLogic.krml extracted/FStar_UInt64.krml extracted/FStar_Set.krml extracted/FStar_PropositionalExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_PredicateExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_TSet.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_Heap.krml extracted/FStar_Heap.krml extracted/FStar_Map.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_HyperHeap.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_HyperStack.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_Witnessed.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_ST.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_All.krml extracted/FStar_Date.krml extracted/FStar_Universe.krml extracted/FStar_GSet.krml extracted/FStar_ModifiesGen.krml extracted/LowStar_Monotonic_Buffer.krml extracted/LowStar_Buffer.krml extracted/Spec_Loops.krml extracted/LowStar_BufferOps.krml extracted/C_Loops.krml extracted/FStar_UInt8.krml extracted/FStar_Kremlin_Endianness.krml extracted/FStar_UInt63.krml extracted/FStar_Exn.krml extracted/FStar_ST.krml extracted/FStar_All.krml extracted/FStar_Dyn.krml extracted/FStar_Int63.krml extracted/FStar_Int64.krml extracted/FStar_Int32.krml extracted/FStar_Int8.krml extracted/FStar_UInt16.krml extracted/FStar_Int_Cast.krml extracted/FStar_UInt128.krml extracted/C_Endianness.krml extracted/FStar_List.krml extracted/FStar_Float.krml extracted/FStar_IO.krml extracted/C.krml extracted/FStar_Char.krml extracted/FStar_String.krml extracted/LowStar_Modifies.krml extracted/C_String.krml extracted/FStar_Bytes.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_IO.krml extracted/C_Failure.krml extracted/TestLib.krml extracted/FStar_Int_Cast_Full.krml + * F* version: 059db0c8 + * KreMLin version: 916c37ac + */ + + + +#ifndef __FStar_UInt128_H +#define __FStar_UInt128_H + + +#include +#include +#include "kremlin/internal/types.h" + +uint64_t FStar_UInt128___proj__Mkuint128__item__low(FStar_UInt128_uint128 projectee); + +uint64_t FStar_UInt128___proj__Mkuint128__item__high(FStar_UInt128_uint128 projectee); + +typedef FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_t; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_add_underspec(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_add_mod(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_sub(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_sub_underspec(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_sub_mod(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_logand(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_logxor(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_logor(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_lognot(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_shift_left(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, uint32_t s); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_shift_right(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, uint32_t s); + +bool FStar_UInt128_eq(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +bool FStar_UInt128_gt(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +bool FStar_UInt128_lt(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +bool FStar_UInt128_gte(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +bool FStar_UInt128_lte(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_eq_mask(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_gte_mask(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128(uint64_t a); + +uint64_t FStar_UInt128_uint128_to_uint64(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Plus_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Plus_Question_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Plus_Percent_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Subtraction_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Subtraction_Question_Hat)( + FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, + FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1 +); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Subtraction_Percent_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Amp_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Hat_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Bar_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Less_Less_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Greater_Greater_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern bool (*FStar_UInt128_op_Equals_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern bool +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Greater_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern bool (*FStar_UInt128_op_Less_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern bool +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Greater_Equals_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern bool +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Less_Equals_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_mul32(uint64_t x, uint32_t y); + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(uint64_t x, uint64_t y); + +#define __FStar_UInt128_H_DEFINED +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib/FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib/FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..21560c4a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib/FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.h @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +/* This file was generated by KreMLin + * KreMLin invocation: ../krml -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrB9w -minimal -fparentheses -fcurly-braces -fno-shadow -header copyright-header.txt -minimal -tmpdir dist/minimal -skip-compilation -extract-uints -add-include -add-include -add-include "kremlin/internal/compat.h" -add-include "kremlin/internal/types.h" -bundle FStar.UInt64+FStar.UInt32+FStar.UInt16+FStar.UInt8=* extracted/prims.krml extracted/FStar_Pervasives_Native.krml extracted/FStar_Pervasives.krml extracted/FStar_Mul.krml extracted/FStar_Squash.krml extracted/FStar_Classical.krml extracted/FStar_StrongExcludedMiddle.krml extracted/FStar_FunctionalExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot_Base.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot_Properties.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot.krml extracted/FStar_Seq_Base.krml extracted/FStar_Seq_Properties.krml extracted/FStar_Seq.krml extracted/FStar_Math_Lib.krml extracted/FStar_Math_Lemmas.krml extracted/FStar_BitVector.krml extracted/FStar_UInt.krml extracted/FStar_UInt32.krml extracted/FStar_Int.krml extracted/FStar_Int16.krml extracted/FStar_Preorder.krml extracted/FStar_Ghost.krml extracted/FStar_ErasedLogic.krml extracted/FStar_UInt64.krml extracted/FStar_Set.krml extracted/FStar_PropositionalExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_PredicateExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_TSet.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_Heap.krml extracted/FStar_Heap.krml extracted/FStar_Map.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_HyperHeap.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_HyperStack.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_Witnessed.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_ST.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_All.krml extracted/FStar_Date.krml extracted/FStar_Universe.krml extracted/FStar_GSet.krml extracted/FStar_ModifiesGen.krml extracted/LowStar_Monotonic_Buffer.krml extracted/LowStar_Buffer.krml extracted/Spec_Loops.krml extracted/LowStar_BufferOps.krml extracted/C_Loops.krml extracted/FStar_UInt8.krml extracted/FStar_Kremlin_Endianness.krml extracted/FStar_UInt63.krml extracted/FStar_Exn.krml extracted/FStar_ST.krml extracted/FStar_All.krml extracted/FStar_Dyn.krml extracted/FStar_Int63.krml extracted/FStar_Int64.krml extracted/FStar_Int32.krml extracted/FStar_Int8.krml extracted/FStar_UInt16.krml extracted/FStar_Int_Cast.krml extracted/FStar_UInt128.krml extracted/C_Endianness.krml extracted/FStar_List.krml extracted/FStar_Float.krml extracted/FStar_IO.krml extracted/C.krml extracted/FStar_Char.krml extracted/FStar_String.krml extracted/LowStar_Modifies.krml extracted/C_String.krml extracted/FStar_Bytes.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_IO.krml extracted/C_Failure.krml extracted/TestLib.krml extracted/FStar_Int_Cast_Full.krml + * F* version: 059db0c8 + * KreMLin version: 916c37ac + */ + + + +#ifndef __FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8_H +#define __FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8_H + + +#include +#include +#include "kremlin/internal/compat.h" +#include "kremlin/internal/types.h" + +extern Prims_int FStar_UInt64_n; + +extern Prims_int FStar_UInt64_v(uint64_t x0); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_uint_to_t(Prims_int x0); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_add(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_add_underspec(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_add_mod(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_sub(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_sub_underspec(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_sub_mod(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_mul(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_mul_underspec(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_mul_mod(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_mul_div(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_div(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_rem(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_logand(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_logxor(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_logor(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_lognot(uint64_t x0); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_shift_right(uint64_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_shift_left(uint64_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt64_eq(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt64_gt(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt64_gte(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt64_lt(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt64_lte(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_minus(uint64_t x0); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt64_n_minus_one; + +uint64_t FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(uint64_t a, uint64_t b); + +uint64_t FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(uint64_t a, uint64_t b); + +extern Prims_string FStar_UInt64_to_string(uint64_t x0); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_of_string(Prims_string x0); + +extern Prims_int FStar_UInt32_n; + +extern Prims_int FStar_UInt32_v(uint32_t x0); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_uint_to_t(Prims_int x0); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_add(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_add_underspec(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_add_mod(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_sub(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_sub_underspec(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_sub_mod(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_mul(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_mul_underspec(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_mul_mod(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_mul_div(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_div(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_rem(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_logand(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_logxor(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_logor(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_lognot(uint32_t x0); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_shift_right(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_shift_left(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt32_eq(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt32_gt(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt32_gte(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt32_lt(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt32_lte(uint32_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_minus(uint32_t x0); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_n_minus_one; + +uint32_t FStar_UInt32_eq_mask(uint32_t a, uint32_t b); + +uint32_t FStar_UInt32_gte_mask(uint32_t a, uint32_t b); + +extern Prims_string FStar_UInt32_to_string(uint32_t x0); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt32_of_string(Prims_string x0); + +extern Prims_int FStar_UInt16_n; + +extern Prims_int FStar_UInt16_v(uint16_t x0); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_uint_to_t(Prims_int x0); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_add(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_add_underspec(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_add_mod(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_sub(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_sub_underspec(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_sub_mod(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_mul(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_mul_underspec(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_mul_mod(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_mul_div(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_div(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_rem(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_logand(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_logxor(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_logor(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_lognot(uint16_t x0); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_shift_right(uint16_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_shift_left(uint16_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt16_eq(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt16_gt(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt16_gte(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt16_lt(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt16_lte(uint16_t x0, uint16_t x1); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_minus(uint16_t x0); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt16_n_minus_one; + +uint16_t FStar_UInt16_eq_mask(uint16_t a, uint16_t b); + +uint16_t FStar_UInt16_gte_mask(uint16_t a, uint16_t b); + +extern Prims_string FStar_UInt16_to_string(uint16_t x0); + +extern uint16_t FStar_UInt16_of_string(Prims_string x0); + +extern Prims_int FStar_UInt8_n; + +extern Prims_int FStar_UInt8_v(uint8_t x0); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_uint_to_t(Prims_int x0); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_add(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_add_underspec(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_add_mod(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_sub(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_sub_underspec(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_sub_mod(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_mul(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_mul_underspec(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_mul_mod(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_mul_div(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_div(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_rem(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_logand(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_logxor(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_logor(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_lognot(uint8_t x0); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_shift_right(uint8_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_shift_left(uint8_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt8_eq(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt8_gt(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt8_gte(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt8_lt(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern bool FStar_UInt8_lte(uint8_t x0, uint8_t x1); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_minus(uint8_t x0); + +extern uint32_t FStar_UInt8_n_minus_one; + +uint8_t FStar_UInt8_eq_mask(uint8_t a, uint8_t b); + +uint8_t FStar_UInt8_gte_mask(uint8_t a, uint8_t b); + +extern Prims_string FStar_UInt8_to_string(uint8_t x0); + +extern uint8_t FStar_UInt8_of_string(Prims_string x0); + +typedef uint8_t FStar_UInt8_byte; + +#define __FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8_H_DEFINED +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/c_endianness.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/c_endianness.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5cfde5d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/c_endianness.h @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +#ifndef __KREMLIN_ENDIAN_H +#define __KREMLIN_ENDIAN_H + +#include +#include + +/******************************************************************************/ +/* Implementing C.fst (part 2: endian-ness macros) */ +/******************************************************************************/ + +/* ... for Linux */ +#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__) +# include + +/* ... for OSX */ +#elif defined(__APPLE__) +# include +# define htole64(x) OSSwapHostToLittleInt64(x) +# define le64toh(x) OSSwapLittleToHostInt64(x) +# define htobe64(x) OSSwapHostToBigInt64(x) +# define be64toh(x) OSSwapBigToHostInt64(x) + +# define htole16(x) OSSwapHostToLittleInt16(x) +# define le16toh(x) OSSwapLittleToHostInt16(x) +# define htobe16(x) OSSwapHostToBigInt16(x) +# define be16toh(x) OSSwapBigToHostInt16(x) + +# define htole32(x) OSSwapHostToLittleInt32(x) +# define le32toh(x) OSSwapLittleToHostInt32(x) +# define htobe32(x) OSSwapHostToBigInt32(x) +# define be32toh(x) OSSwapBigToHostInt32(x) + +/* ... for Solaris */ +#elif defined(__sun__) +# include +# define htole64(x) LE_64(x) +# define le64toh(x) LE_64(x) +# define htobe64(x) BE_64(x) +# define be64toh(x) BE_64(x) + +# define htole16(x) LE_16(x) +# define le16toh(x) LE_16(x) +# define htobe16(x) BE_16(x) +# define be16toh(x) BE_16(x) + +# define htole32(x) LE_32(x) +# define le32toh(x) LE_32(x) +# define htobe32(x) BE_32(x) +# define be32toh(x) BE_32(x) + +/* ... for the BSDs */ +#elif defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) +# include +#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) +# include + +/* ... for Windows (MSVC)... not targeting XBOX 360! */ +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) + +# include +# define htobe16(x) _byteswap_ushort(x) +# define htole16(x) (x) +# define be16toh(x) _byteswap_ushort(x) +# define le16toh(x) (x) + +# define htobe32(x) _byteswap_ulong(x) +# define htole32(x) (x) +# define be32toh(x) _byteswap_ulong(x) +# define le32toh(x) (x) + +# define htobe64(x) _byteswap_uint64(x) +# define htole64(x) (x) +# define be64toh(x) _byteswap_uint64(x) +# define le64toh(x) (x) + +/* ... for Windows (GCC-like, e.g. mingw or clang) */ +#elif (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && \ + (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) + +# define htobe16(x) __builtin_bswap16(x) +# define htole16(x) (x) +# define be16toh(x) __builtin_bswap16(x) +# define le16toh(x) (x) + +# define htobe32(x) __builtin_bswap32(x) +# define htole32(x) (x) +# define be32toh(x) __builtin_bswap32(x) +# define le32toh(x) (x) + +# define htobe64(x) __builtin_bswap64(x) +# define htole64(x) (x) +# define be64toh(x) __builtin_bswap64(x) +# define le64toh(x) (x) + +/* ... generic big-endian fallback code */ +#elif defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ + +/* byte swapping code inspired by: + * https://github.com/rweather/arduinolibs/blob/master/libraries/Crypto/utility/EndianUtil.h + * */ + +# define htobe32(x) (x) +# define be32toh(x) (x) +# define htole32(x) \ + (__extension__({ \ + uint32_t _temp = (x); \ + ((_temp >> 24) & 0x000000FF) | ((_temp >> 8) & 0x0000FF00) | \ + ((_temp << 8) & 0x00FF0000) | ((_temp << 24) & 0xFF000000); \ + })) +# define le32toh(x) (htole32((x))) + +# define htobe64(x) (x) +# define be64toh(x) (x) +# define htole64(x) \ + (__extension__({ \ + uint64_t __temp = (x); \ + uint32_t __low = htobe32((uint32_t)__temp); \ + uint32_t __high = htobe32((uint32_t)(__temp >> 32)); \ + (((uint64_t)__low) << 32) | __high; \ + })) +# define le64toh(x) (htole64((x))) + +/* ... generic little-endian fallback code */ +#elif defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ + +# define htole32(x) (x) +# define le32toh(x) (x) +# define htobe32(x) \ + (__extension__({ \ + uint32_t _temp = (x); \ + ((_temp >> 24) & 0x000000FF) | ((_temp >> 8) & 0x0000FF00) | \ + ((_temp << 8) & 0x00FF0000) | ((_temp << 24) & 0xFF000000); \ + })) +# define be32toh(x) (htobe32((x))) + +# define htole64(x) (x) +# define le64toh(x) (x) +# define htobe64(x) \ + (__extension__({ \ + uint64_t __temp = (x); \ + uint32_t __low = htobe32((uint32_t)__temp); \ + uint32_t __high = htobe32((uint32_t)(__temp >> 32)); \ + (((uint64_t)__low) << 32) | __high; \ + })) +# define be64toh(x) (htobe64((x))) + +/* ... couldn't determine endian-ness of the target platform */ +#else +# error "Please define __BYTE_ORDER__!" + +#endif /* defined(__linux__) || ... */ + +/* Loads and stores. These avoid undefined behavior due to unaligned memory + * accesses, via memcpy. */ + +inline static uint16_t load16(uint8_t *b) { + uint16_t x; + memcpy(&x, b, 2); + return x; +} + +inline static uint32_t load32(uint8_t *b) { + uint32_t x; + memcpy(&x, b, 4); + return x; +} + +inline static uint64_t load64(uint8_t *b) { + uint64_t x; + memcpy(&x, b, 8); + return x; +} + +inline static void store16(uint8_t *b, uint16_t i) { + memcpy(b, &i, 2); +} + +inline static void store32(uint8_t *b, uint32_t i) { + memcpy(b, &i, 4); +} + +inline static void store64(uint8_t *b, uint64_t i) { + memcpy(b, &i, 8); +} + +#define load16_le(b) (le16toh(load16(b))) +#define store16_le(b, i) (store16(b, htole16(i))) +#define load16_be(b) (be16toh(load16(b))) +#define store16_be(b, i) (store16(b, htobe16(i))) + +#define load32_le(b) (le32toh(load32(b))) +#define store32_le(b, i) (store32(b, htole32(i))) +#define load32_be(b) (be32toh(load32(b))) +#define store32_be(b, i) (store32(b, htobe32(i))) + +#define load64_le(b) (le64toh(load64(b))) +#define store64_le(b, i) (store64(b, htole64(i))) +#define load64_be(b) (be64toh(load64(b))) +#define store64_be(b, i) (store64(b, htobe64(i))) + +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/builtin.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/builtin.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..219b2668 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/builtin.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +#ifndef __KREMLIN_BUILTIN_H +#define __KREMLIN_BUILTIN_H + +/* For alloca, when using KreMLin's -falloca */ +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) +# include +#endif + +/* If some globals need to be initialized before the main, then kremlin will + * generate and try to link last a function with this type: */ +void kremlinit_globals(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/callconv.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/callconv.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bf631ff4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/callconv.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +#ifndef __KREMLIN_CALLCONV_H +#define __KREMLIN_CALLCONV_H + +/******************************************************************************/ +/* Some macros to ease compatibility */ +/******************************************************************************/ + +/* We want to generate __cdecl safely without worrying about it being undefined. + * When using MSVC, these are always defined. When using MinGW, these are + * defined too. They have no meaning for other platforms, so we define them to + * be empty macros in other situations. */ +#ifndef _MSC_VER +#ifndef __cdecl +#define __cdecl +#endif +#ifndef __stdcall +#define __stdcall +#endif +#ifndef __fastcall +#define __fastcall +#endif +#endif + +/* Since KreMLin emits the inline keyword unconditionally, we follow the + * guidelines at https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Inline.html and make this + * __inline__ to ensure the code compiles with -std=c90 and earlier. */ +#ifdef __GNUC__ +# define inline __inline__ +#endif + +/* GCC-specific attribute syntax; everyone else gets the standard C inline + * attribute. */ +#ifdef __GNU_C__ +# ifndef __clang__ +# define force_inline inline __attribute__((always_inline)) +# else +# define force_inline inline +# endif +#else +# define force_inline inline +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/compat.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/compat.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5b8889d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +#ifndef KRML_COMPAT_H +#define KRML_COMPAT_H + +#include + +/* A series of macros that define C implementations of types that are not Low*, + * to facilitate porting programs to Low*. */ + +typedef const char *Prims_string; + +typedef struct { + uint32_t length; + const char *data; +} FStar_Bytes_bytes; + +typedef int32_t Prims_pos, Prims_nat, Prims_nonzero, Prims_int, + krml_checked_int_t; + +#define RETURN_OR(x) \ + do { \ + int64_t __ret = x; \ + if (__ret < INT32_MIN || INT32_MAX < __ret) { \ + KRML_HOST_PRINTF( \ + "Prims.{int,nat,pos} integer overflow at %s:%d\n", __FILE__, \ + __LINE__); \ + KRML_HOST_EXIT(252); \ + } \ + return (int32_t)__ret; \ + } while (0) + +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/debug.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/debug.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..44ac22cd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/debug.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +#ifndef __KREMLIN_DEBUG_H +#define __KREMLIN_DEBUG_H + +#include + +#include "kremlin/internal/target.h" + +/******************************************************************************/ +/* Debugging helpers - intended only for KreMLin developers */ +/******************************************************************************/ + +/* In support of "-wasm -d force-c": we might need this function to be + * forward-declared, because the dependency on WasmSupport appears very late, + * after SimplifyWasm, and sadly, after the topological order has been done. */ +void WasmSupport_check_buffer_size(uint32_t s); + +/* A series of GCC atrocities to trace function calls (kremlin's [-d c-calls] + * option). Useful when trying to debug, say, Wasm, to compare traces. */ +/* clang-format off */ +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#define KRML_FORMAT(X) _Generic((X), \ + uint8_t : "0x%08" PRIx8, \ + uint16_t: "0x%08" PRIx16, \ + uint32_t: "0x%08" PRIx32, \ + uint64_t: "0x%08" PRIx64, \ + int8_t : "0x%08" PRIx8, \ + int16_t : "0x%08" PRIx16, \ + int32_t : "0x%08" PRIx32, \ + int64_t : "0x%08" PRIx64, \ + default : "%s") + +#define KRML_FORMAT_ARG(X) _Generic((X), \ + uint8_t : X, \ + uint16_t: X, \ + uint32_t: X, \ + uint64_t: X, \ + int8_t : X, \ + int16_t : X, \ + int32_t : X, \ + int64_t : X, \ + default : "unknown") +/* clang-format on */ + +# define KRML_DEBUG_RETURN(X) \ + ({ \ + __auto_type _ret = (X); \ + KRML_HOST_PRINTF("returning: "); \ + KRML_HOST_PRINTF(KRML_FORMAT(_ret), KRML_FORMAT_ARG(_ret)); \ + KRML_HOST_PRINTF(" \n"); \ + _ret; \ + }) +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/target.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/target.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b552f52b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/target.h @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +#ifndef __KREMLIN_TARGET_H +#define __KREMLIN_TARGET_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "kremlin/internal/callconv.h" + +/******************************************************************************/ +/* Macros that KreMLin will generate. */ +/******************************************************************************/ + +/* For "bare" targets that do not have a C stdlib, the user might want to use + * [-add-early-include '"mydefinitions.h"'] and override these. */ +#ifndef KRML_HOST_PRINTF +# define KRML_HOST_PRINTF printf +#endif + +#if ( \ + (defined __STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) && \ + (!(defined KRML_HOST_EPRINTF))) +# define KRML_HOST_EPRINTF(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__) +#endif + +#ifndef KRML_HOST_EXIT +# define KRML_HOST_EXIT exit +#endif + +#ifndef KRML_HOST_MALLOC +# define KRML_HOST_MALLOC malloc +#endif + +#ifndef KRML_HOST_CALLOC +# define KRML_HOST_CALLOC calloc +#endif + +#ifndef KRML_HOST_FREE +# define KRML_HOST_FREE free +#endif + +#ifndef KRML_HOST_TIME + +# include + +/* Prims_nat not yet in scope */ +inline static int32_t krml_time() { + return (int32_t)time(NULL); +} + +# define KRML_HOST_TIME krml_time +#endif + +/* In statement position, exiting is easy. */ +#define KRML_EXIT \ + do { \ + KRML_HOST_PRINTF("Unimplemented function at %s:%d\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); \ + KRML_HOST_EXIT(254); \ + } while (0) + +/* In expression position, use the comma-operator and a malloc to return an + * expression of the right size. KreMLin passes t as the parameter to the macro. + */ +#define KRML_EABORT(t, msg) \ + (KRML_HOST_PRINTF("KreMLin abort at %s:%d\n%s\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, msg), \ + KRML_HOST_EXIT(255), *((t *)KRML_HOST_MALLOC(sizeof(t)))) + +/* In FStar.Buffer.fst, the size of arrays is uint32_t, but it's a number of + * *elements*. Do an ugly, run-time check (some of which KreMLin can eliminate). + */ + +#ifdef __GNUC__ +# define _KRML_CHECK_SIZE_PRAGMA \ + _Pragma("GCC diagnostic ignored \"-Wtype-limits\"") +#else +# define _KRML_CHECK_SIZE_PRAGMA +#endif + +#define KRML_CHECK_SIZE(size_elt, sz) \ + do { \ + _KRML_CHECK_SIZE_PRAGMA \ + if (((size_t)(sz)) > ((size_t)(SIZE_MAX / (size_elt)))) { \ + KRML_HOST_PRINTF( \ + "Maximum allocatable size exceeded, aborting before overflow at " \ + "%s:%d\n", \ + __FILE__, __LINE__); \ + KRML_HOST_EXIT(253); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900 +# define KRML_HOST_SNPRINTF(buf, sz, fmt, arg) _snprintf_s(buf, sz, _TRUNCATE, fmt, arg) +#else +# define KRML_HOST_SNPRINTF(buf, sz, fmt, arg) snprintf(buf, sz, fmt, arg) +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/types.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/types.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b936f00d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/types.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +#ifndef KRML_TYPES_H +#define KRML_TYPES_H + +#include +#include +#include + +/* Types which are either abstract, meaning that have to be implemented in C, or + * which are models, meaning that they are swapped out at compile-time for + * hand-written C types (in which case they're marked as noextract). */ + +typedef uint64_t FStar_UInt64_t, FStar_UInt64_t_; +typedef int64_t FStar_Int64_t, FStar_Int64_t_; +typedef uint32_t FStar_UInt32_t, FStar_UInt32_t_; +typedef int32_t FStar_Int32_t, FStar_Int32_t_; +typedef uint16_t FStar_UInt16_t, FStar_UInt16_t_; +typedef int16_t FStar_Int16_t, FStar_Int16_t_; +typedef uint8_t FStar_UInt8_t, FStar_UInt8_t_; +typedef int8_t FStar_Int8_t, FStar_Int8_t_; + +/* Only useful when building Kremlib, because it's in the dependency graph of + * FStar.Int.Cast. */ +typedef uint64_t FStar_UInt63_t, FStar_UInt63_t_; +typedef int64_t FStar_Int63_t, FStar_Int63_t_; + +typedef double FStar_Float_float; +typedef uint32_t FStar_Char_char; +typedef FILE *FStar_IO_fd_read, *FStar_IO_fd_write; + +typedef void *FStar_Dyn_dyn; + +typedef const char *C_String_t, *C_String_t_; + +typedef int exit_code; +typedef FILE *channel; + +typedef unsigned long long TestLib_cycles; + +typedef uint64_t FStar_Date_dateTime, FStar_Date_timeSpan; + +/* The uint128 type is a special case since we offer several implementations of + * it, depending on the compiler and whether the user wants the verified + * implementation or not. */ +#if !defined(KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128) && defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_X64) +# include +typedef __m128i FStar_UInt128_uint128; +#elif !defined(KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128) && !defined(_MSC_VER) +typedef unsigned __int128 FStar_UInt128_uint128; +#else +typedef struct FStar_UInt128_uint128_s { + uint64_t low; + uint64_t high; +} FStar_UInt128_uint128; +#endif + +typedef FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_t, FStar_UInt128_t_, uint128_t; + +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/wasmsupport.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/wasmsupport.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b44fa3f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlin/internal/wasmsupport.h @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +/* This file is automatically included when compiling with -wasm -d force-c */ +#define WasmSupport_check_buffer_size(X) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/Hacl_Curve25519.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/Hacl_Curve25519.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..27ebe079 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/Hacl_Curve25519.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +/* This file was generated by KreMLin + * KreMLin invocation: /mnt/e/everest/verify/kremlin/krml -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrcLh -minimal -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrcLh -minimal -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/code/lib/kremlin -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/kremlin/kremlib/compat -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/specs -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/specs/old -I . -ccopt -march=native -verbose -ldopt -flto -tmpdir x25519-c -I ../bignum -bundle Hacl.Curve25519=* -minimal -add-include "kremlib.h" -skip-compilation x25519-c/out.krml -o x25519-c/Hacl_Curve25519.c + * F* version: 059db0c8 + * KreMLin version: 916c37ac + */ + + + +#ifndef __Hacl_Curve25519_H +#define __Hacl_Curve25519_H + + +#include "kremlib.h" + +void Hacl_Curve25519_crypto_scalarmult(uint8_t *mypublic, uint8_t *secret, uint8_t *basepoint); + +#define __Hacl_Curve25519_H_DEFINED +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/inttypes.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/inttypes.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d53f87f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/inttypes.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Custom inttypes.h for VS2010 KreMLin requires these definitions, + * but VS2010 doesn't provide them. + * + * Copyright 2016-2018 INRIA and Microsoft Corporation + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#ifndef _INTTYPES_H_VS2010 +#define _INTTYPES_H_VS2010 + +#include + +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/* VS2010 unsigned long == 8 bytes */ + +#define PRIu64 "I64u" + +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/stdbool.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/stdbool.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b7039c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/stdbool.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Custom stdbool.h for VS2010 KreMLin requires these definitions, + * but VS2010 doesn't provide them. + * + * Copyright 2016-2018 INRIA and Microsoft Corporation + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#ifndef _STDBOOL_H_VS2010 +#define _STDBOOL_H_VS2010 + +typedef int bool; + +static bool true = 1; +static bool false = 0; + +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a973dcf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +/* + * ECDH with curve-optimized implementation multiplexing + * + * Copyright 2016-2018 INRIA and Microsoft Corporation + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X25519_H +#define MBEDTLS_X25519_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_CURVE25519 0x1d +#define MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES 32 + +/** + * Defines the source of the imported EC key. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_X25519_ECDH_OURS, /**< Our key. */ + MBEDTLS_X25519_ECDH_THEIRS, /**< The key of the peer. */ +} mbedtls_x25519_ecdh_side; + +/** + * \brief The x25519 context structure. + */ +typedef struct +{ + unsigned char our_secret[MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; + unsigned char peer_point[MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; +} mbedtls_x25519_context; + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an x25519 context. + * + * \param ctx The x25519 context to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_x25519_init( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees a context. + * + * \param ctx The context to free. + */ +void mbedtls_x25519_free( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a public key and a TLS + * ServerKeyExchange payload. + * + * This is the first function used by a TLS server for x25519. + * + * + * \param ctx The x25519 context. + * \param olen The number of characters written. + * \param buf The destination buffer. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x25519_make_params( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses and processes a TLS ServerKeyExchange + * payload. + * + * + * \param ctx The x25519 context. + * \param buf The pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param end The address for one Byte past the end of the buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_x25519_read_params( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an x25519 context from an EC key. + * + * It is used by clients and servers in place of the + * ServerKeyEchange for static ECDH, and imports ECDH + * parameters from the EC key information of a certificate. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The x25519 context to set up. + * \param key The EC key to use. + * \param side Defines the source of the key: 1: Our key, or + * 0: The key of the peer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_x25519_get_params( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_x25519_ecdh_side side ); + +/** + * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret. + * + * This is the last function used by both TLS client + * and servers. + * + * + * \param ctx The x25519 context. + * \param olen The number of Bytes written. + * \param buf The destination buffer. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x25519_calc_secret( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a public key and a TLS + * ClientKeyExchange payload. + * + * This is the second function used by a TLS client for x25519. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The x25519 context. + * \param olen The number of Bytes written. + * \param buf The destination buffer. + * \param blen The size of the destination buffer. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x25519_make_public( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses and processes a TLS ClientKeyExchange + * payload. + * + * This is the second function used by a TLS server for x25519. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The x25519 context. + * \param buf The start of the input buffer. + * \param blen The length of the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x25519_read_public( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* x25519.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..450b9f8d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,760 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +/* This file was generated by KreMLin + * KreMLin invocation: /mnt/e/everest/verify/kremlin/krml -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrcLh -minimal -fbuiltin-uint128 -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrcLh -minimal -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/code/lib/kremlin -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/kremlin/kremlib/compat -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/specs -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/specs/old -I . -ccopt -march=native -verbose -ldopt -flto -tmpdir x25519-c -I ../bignum -bundle Hacl.Curve25519=* -minimal -add-include "kremlib.h" -skip-compilation x25519-c/out.krml -o x25519-c/Hacl_Curve25519.c + * F* version: 059db0c8 + * KreMLin version: 916c37ac + */ + + +#include "Hacl_Curve25519.h" + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint128_t FStar_UInt128_add(uint128_t x0, uint128_t x1); + +extern uint128_t FStar_UInt128_add_mod(uint128_t x0, uint128_t x1); + +extern uint128_t FStar_UInt128_logand(uint128_t x0, uint128_t x1); + +extern uint128_t FStar_UInt128_shift_right(uint128_t x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern uint128_t FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128(uint64_t x0); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt128_uint128_to_uint64(uint128_t x0); + +extern uint128_t FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +static void Hacl_Bignum_Modulo_carry_top(uint64_t *b) +{ + uint64_t b4 = b[4U]; + uint64_t b0 = b[0U]; + uint64_t b4_ = b4 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t b0_ = b0 + (uint64_t)19U * (b4 >> (uint32_t)51U); + b[4U] = b4_; + b[0U] = b0_; +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_copy_from_wide_(uint64_t *output, uint128_t *input) +{ + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint128_t xi = input[i]; + output[i] = (uint64_t)xi; + } +} + +inline static void +Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_sum_scalar_multiplication_(uint128_t *output, uint64_t *input, uint64_t s) +{ + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint128_t xi = output[i]; + uint64_t yi = input[i]; + output[i] = xi + (uint128_t)yi * s; + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_carry_wide_(uint128_t *tmp) +{ + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)4U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint32_t ctr = i; + uint128_t tctr = tmp[ctr]; + uint128_t tctrp1 = tmp[ctr + (uint32_t)1U]; + uint64_t r0 = (uint64_t)tctr & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint128_t c = tctr >> (uint32_t)51U; + tmp[ctr] = (uint128_t)r0; + tmp[ctr + (uint32_t)1U] = tctrp1 + c; + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_shift_reduce(uint64_t *output) +{ + uint64_t tmp = output[4U]; + uint64_t b0; + { + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)4U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint32_t ctr = (uint32_t)5U - i - (uint32_t)1U; + uint64_t z = output[ctr - (uint32_t)1U]; + output[ctr] = z; + } + } + output[0U] = tmp; + b0 = output[0U]; + output[0U] = (uint64_t)19U * b0; +} + +static void +Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_mul_shift_reduce_(uint128_t *output, uint64_t *input, uint64_t *input2) +{ + uint32_t i; + uint64_t input2i; + { + uint32_t i0; + for (i0 = (uint32_t)0U; i0 < (uint32_t)4U; i0 = i0 + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint64_t input2i0 = input2[i0]; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_sum_scalar_multiplication_(output, input, input2i0); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_shift_reduce(input); + } + } + i = (uint32_t)4U; + input2i = input2[i]; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_sum_scalar_multiplication_(output, input, input2i); +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *input, uint64_t *input2) +{ + uint64_t tmp[5U] = { 0U }; + memcpy(tmp, input, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof input[0U]); + KRML_CHECK_SIZE(sizeof (uint128_t), (uint32_t)5U); + { + uint128_t t[5U]; + { + uint32_t _i; + for (_i = 0U; _i < (uint32_t)5U; ++_i) + t[_i] = (uint128_t)(uint64_t)0U; + } + { + uint128_t b4; + uint128_t b0; + uint128_t b4_; + uint128_t b0_; + uint64_t i0; + uint64_t i1; + uint64_t i0_; + uint64_t i1_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_mul_shift_reduce_(t, tmp, input2); + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_carry_wide_(t); + b4 = t[4U]; + b0 = t[0U]; + b4_ = b4 & (uint128_t)(uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + b0_ = b0 + (uint128_t)(uint64_t)19U * (uint64_t)(b4 >> (uint32_t)51U); + t[4U] = b4_; + t[0U] = b0_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_copy_from_wide_(output, t); + i0 = output[0U]; + i1 = output[1U]; + i0_ = i0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + i1_ = i1 + (i0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + output[0U] = i0_; + output[1U] = i1_; + } + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare__(uint128_t *tmp, uint64_t *output) +{ + uint64_t r0 = output[0U]; + uint64_t r1 = output[1U]; + uint64_t r2 = output[2U]; + uint64_t r3 = output[3U]; + uint64_t r4 = output[4U]; + uint64_t d0 = r0 * (uint64_t)2U; + uint64_t d1 = r1 * (uint64_t)2U; + uint64_t d2 = r2 * (uint64_t)2U * (uint64_t)19U; + uint64_t d419 = r4 * (uint64_t)19U; + uint64_t d4 = d419 * (uint64_t)2U; + uint128_t s0 = (uint128_t)r0 * r0 + (uint128_t)d4 * r1 + (uint128_t)d2 * r3; + uint128_t s1 = (uint128_t)d0 * r1 + (uint128_t)d4 * r2 + (uint128_t)(r3 * (uint64_t)19U) * r3; + uint128_t s2 = (uint128_t)d0 * r2 + (uint128_t)r1 * r1 + (uint128_t)d4 * r3; + uint128_t s3 = (uint128_t)d0 * r3 + (uint128_t)d1 * r2 + (uint128_t)r4 * d419; + uint128_t s4 = (uint128_t)d0 * r4 + (uint128_t)d1 * r3 + (uint128_t)r2 * r2; + tmp[0U] = s0; + tmp[1U] = s1; + tmp[2U] = s2; + tmp[3U] = s3; + tmp[4U] = s4; +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_(uint128_t *tmp, uint64_t *output) +{ + uint128_t b4; + uint128_t b0; + uint128_t b4_; + uint128_t b0_; + uint64_t i0; + uint64_t i1; + uint64_t i0_; + uint64_t i1_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare__(tmp, output); + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_carry_wide_(tmp); + b4 = tmp[4U]; + b0 = tmp[0U]; + b4_ = b4 & (uint128_t)(uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + b0_ = b0 + (uint128_t)(uint64_t)19U * (uint64_t)(b4 >> (uint32_t)51U); + tmp[4U] = b4_; + tmp[0U] = b0_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_copy_from_wide_(output, tmp); + i0 = output[0U]; + i1 = output[1U]; + i0_ = i0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + i1_ = i1 + (i0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + output[0U] = i0_; + output[1U] = i1_; +} + +static void +Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_(uint64_t *input, uint128_t *tmp, uint32_t count1) +{ + uint32_t i; + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_(tmp, input); + for (i = (uint32_t)1U; i < count1; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_(tmp, input); +} + +inline static void +Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *input, uint32_t count1) +{ + KRML_CHECK_SIZE(sizeof (uint128_t), (uint32_t)5U); + { + uint128_t t[5U]; + { + uint32_t _i; + for (_i = 0U; _i < (uint32_t)5U; ++_i) + t[_i] = (uint128_t)(uint64_t)0U; + } + memcpy(output, input, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof input[0U]); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_(output, t, count1); + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_inplace(uint64_t *output, uint32_t count1) +{ + KRML_CHECK_SIZE(sizeof (uint128_t), (uint32_t)5U); + { + uint128_t t[5U]; + { + uint32_t _i; + for (_i = 0U; _i < (uint32_t)5U; ++_i) + t[_i] = (uint128_t)(uint64_t)0U; + } + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_(output, t, count1); + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Crecip_crecip(uint64_t *out, uint64_t *z) +{ + uint64_t buf[20U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *a0 = buf; + uint64_t *t00 = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *b0 = buf + (uint32_t)10U; + uint64_t *t01; + uint64_t *b1; + uint64_t *c0; + uint64_t *a; + uint64_t *t0; + uint64_t *b; + uint64_t *c; + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(a0, z, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t00, a0, (uint32_t)2U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(b0, t00, z); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(a0, b0, a0); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t00, a0, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(b0, t00, b0); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t00, b0, (uint32_t)5U); + t01 = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + b1 = buf + (uint32_t)10U; + c0 = buf + (uint32_t)15U; + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(b1, t01, b1); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t01, b1, (uint32_t)10U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(c0, t01, b1); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t01, c0, (uint32_t)20U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(t01, t01, c0); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_inplace(t01, (uint32_t)10U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(b1, t01, b1); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t01, b1, (uint32_t)50U); + a = buf; + t0 = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + b = buf + (uint32_t)10U; + c = buf + (uint32_t)15U; + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(c, t0, b); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t0, c, (uint32_t)100U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(t0, t0, c); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_inplace(t0, (uint32_t)50U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(t0, t0, b); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_inplace(t0, (uint32_t)5U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(out, t0, a); +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_fsum(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b) +{ + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint64_t xi = a[i]; + uint64_t yi = b[i]; + a[i] = xi + yi; + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b) +{ + uint64_t tmp[5U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t b0; + uint64_t b1; + uint64_t b2; + uint64_t b3; + uint64_t b4; + memcpy(tmp, b, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof b[0U]); + b0 = tmp[0U]; + b1 = tmp[1U]; + b2 = tmp[2U]; + b3 = tmp[3U]; + b4 = tmp[4U]; + tmp[0U] = b0 + (uint64_t)0x3fffffffffff68U; + tmp[1U] = b1 + (uint64_t)0x3ffffffffffff8U; + tmp[2U] = b2 + (uint64_t)0x3ffffffffffff8U; + tmp[3U] = b3 + (uint64_t)0x3ffffffffffff8U; + tmp[4U] = b4 + (uint64_t)0x3ffffffffffff8U; + { + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint64_t xi = a[i]; + uint64_t yi = tmp[i]; + a[i] = yi - xi; + } + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_fscalar(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *b, uint64_t s) +{ + KRML_CHECK_SIZE(sizeof (uint128_t), (uint32_t)5U); + { + uint128_t tmp[5U]; + { + uint32_t _i; + for (_i = 0U; _i < (uint32_t)5U; ++_i) + tmp[_i] = (uint128_t)(uint64_t)0U; + } + { + uint128_t b4; + uint128_t b0; + uint128_t b4_; + uint128_t b0_; + { + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint64_t xi = b[i]; + tmp[i] = (uint128_t)xi * s; + } + } + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_carry_wide_(tmp); + b4 = tmp[4U]; + b0 = tmp[0U]; + b4_ = b4 & (uint128_t)(uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + b0_ = b0 + (uint128_t)(uint64_t)19U * (uint64_t)(b4 >> (uint32_t)51U); + tmp[4U] = b4_; + tmp[0U] = b0_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_copy_from_wide_(output, tmp); + } + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_fmul(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b) +{ + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(output, a, b); +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_crecip(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *input) +{ + Hacl_Bignum_Crecip_crecip(output, input); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_step(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t swap1, uint32_t ctr) +{ + uint32_t i = ctr - (uint32_t)1U; + uint64_t ai = a[i]; + uint64_t bi = b[i]; + uint64_t x = swap1 & (ai ^ bi); + uint64_t ai1 = ai ^ x; + uint64_t bi1 = bi ^ x; + a[i] = ai1; + b[i] = bi1; +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t swap1, uint32_t ctr) +{ + if (!(ctr == (uint32_t)0U)) + { + uint32_t i; + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_step(a, b, swap1, ctr); + i = ctr - (uint32_t)1U; + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_(a, b, swap1, i); + } +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t iswap) +{ + uint64_t swap1 = (uint64_t)0U - iswap; + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_(a, b, swap1, (uint32_t)5U); + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_(a + (uint32_t)5U, b + (uint32_t)5U, swap1, (uint32_t)5U); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Point_copy(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *input) +{ + memcpy(output, input, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof input[0U]); + memcpy(output + (uint32_t)5U, + input + (uint32_t)5U, + (uint32_t)5U * sizeof (input + (uint32_t)5U)[0U]); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fexpand(uint64_t *output, uint8_t *input) +{ + uint64_t i0 = load64_le(input); + uint8_t *x00 = input + (uint32_t)6U; + uint64_t i1 = load64_le(x00); + uint8_t *x01 = input + (uint32_t)12U; + uint64_t i2 = load64_le(x01); + uint8_t *x02 = input + (uint32_t)19U; + uint64_t i3 = load64_le(x02); + uint8_t *x0 = input + (uint32_t)24U; + uint64_t i4 = load64_le(x0); + uint64_t output0 = i0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t output1 = i1 >> (uint32_t)3U & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t output2 = i2 >> (uint32_t)6U & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t output3 = i3 >> (uint32_t)1U & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t output4 = i4 >> (uint32_t)12U & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + output[0U] = output0; + output[1U] = output1; + output[2U] = output2; + output[3U] = output3; + output[4U] = output4; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_first_carry_pass(uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t t0 = input[0U]; + uint64_t t1 = input[1U]; + uint64_t t2 = input[2U]; + uint64_t t3 = input[3U]; + uint64_t t4 = input[4U]; + uint64_t t1_ = t1 + (t0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t0_ = t0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t2_ = t2 + (t1_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t1__ = t1_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t3_ = t3 + (t2_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t2__ = t2_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t4_ = t4 + (t3_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t3__ = t3_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + input[0U] = t0_; + input[1U] = t1__; + input[2U] = t2__; + input[3U] = t3__; + input[4U] = t4_; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_first_carry_full(uint64_t *input) +{ + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_first_carry_pass(input); + Hacl_Bignum_Modulo_carry_top(input); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_second_carry_pass(uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t t0 = input[0U]; + uint64_t t1 = input[1U]; + uint64_t t2 = input[2U]; + uint64_t t3 = input[3U]; + uint64_t t4 = input[4U]; + uint64_t t1_ = t1 + (t0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t0_ = t0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t2_ = t2 + (t1_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t1__ = t1_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t3_ = t3 + (t2_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t2__ = t2_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t4_ = t4 + (t3_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t3__ = t3_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + input[0U] = t0_; + input[1U] = t1__; + input[2U] = t2__; + input[3U] = t3__; + input[4U] = t4_; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_second_carry_full(uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t i0; + uint64_t i1; + uint64_t i0_; + uint64_t i1_; + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_second_carry_pass(input); + Hacl_Bignum_Modulo_carry_top(input); + i0 = input[0U]; + i1 = input[1U]; + i0_ = i0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + i1_ = i1 + (i0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + input[0U] = i0_; + input[1U] = i1_; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_trim(uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t a0 = input[0U]; + uint64_t a1 = input[1U]; + uint64_t a2 = input[2U]; + uint64_t a3 = input[3U]; + uint64_t a4 = input[4U]; + uint64_t mask0 = FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(a0, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffedU); + uint64_t mask1 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a1, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU); + uint64_t mask2 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a2, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU); + uint64_t mask3 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a3, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU); + uint64_t mask4 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a4, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU); + uint64_t mask = (((mask0 & mask1) & mask2) & mask3) & mask4; + uint64_t a0_ = a0 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffedU & mask); + uint64_t a1_ = a1 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU & mask); + uint64_t a2_ = a2 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU & mask); + uint64_t a3_ = a3 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU & mask); + uint64_t a4_ = a4 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU & mask); + input[0U] = a0_; + input[1U] = a1_; + input[2U] = a2_; + input[3U] = a3_; + input[4U] = a4_; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_store(uint8_t *output, uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t t0 = input[0U]; + uint64_t t1 = input[1U]; + uint64_t t2 = input[2U]; + uint64_t t3 = input[3U]; + uint64_t t4 = input[4U]; + uint64_t o0 = t1 << (uint32_t)51U | t0; + uint64_t o1 = t2 << (uint32_t)38U | t1 >> (uint32_t)13U; + uint64_t o2 = t3 << (uint32_t)25U | t2 >> (uint32_t)26U; + uint64_t o3 = t4 << (uint32_t)12U | t3 >> (uint32_t)39U; + uint8_t *b0 = output; + uint8_t *b1 = output + (uint32_t)8U; + uint8_t *b2 = output + (uint32_t)16U; + uint8_t *b3 = output + (uint32_t)24U; + store64_le(b0, o0); + store64_le(b1, o1); + store64_le(b2, o2); + store64_le(b3, o3); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract(uint8_t *output, uint64_t *input) +{ + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_first_carry_full(input); + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_second_carry_full(input); + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_trim(input); + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_store(output, input); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_scalar_of_point(uint8_t *scalar, uint64_t *point) +{ + uint64_t *x = point; + uint64_t *z = point + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t buf[10U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *zmone = buf; + uint64_t *sc = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + Hacl_Bignum_crecip(zmone, z); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(sc, x, zmone); + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract(scalar, sc); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_AddAndDouble_fmonty( + uint64_t *pp, + uint64_t *ppq, + uint64_t *p, + uint64_t *pq, + uint64_t *qmqp +) +{ + uint64_t *qx = qmqp; + uint64_t *x2 = pp; + uint64_t *z2 = pp + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *x3 = ppq; + uint64_t *z3 = ppq + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *x = p; + uint64_t *z = p + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *xprime = pq; + uint64_t *zprime = pq + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t buf[40U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *origx = buf; + uint64_t *origxprime0 = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *xxprime0 = buf + (uint32_t)25U; + uint64_t *zzprime0 = buf + (uint32_t)30U; + uint64_t *origxprime; + uint64_t *xx0; + uint64_t *zz0; + uint64_t *xxprime; + uint64_t *zzprime; + uint64_t *zzzprime; + uint64_t *zzz; + uint64_t *xx; + uint64_t *zz; + uint64_t scalar; + memcpy(origx, x, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof x[0U]); + Hacl_Bignum_fsum(x, z); + Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(z, origx); + memcpy(origxprime0, xprime, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof xprime[0U]); + Hacl_Bignum_fsum(xprime, zprime); + Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(zprime, origxprime0); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(xxprime0, xprime, z); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(zzprime0, x, zprime); + origxprime = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + xx0 = buf + (uint32_t)15U; + zz0 = buf + (uint32_t)20U; + xxprime = buf + (uint32_t)25U; + zzprime = buf + (uint32_t)30U; + zzzprime = buf + (uint32_t)35U; + memcpy(origxprime, xxprime, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof xxprime[0U]); + Hacl_Bignum_fsum(xxprime, zzprime); + Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(zzprime, origxprime); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(x3, xxprime, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(zzzprime, zzprime, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(z3, zzzprime, qx); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(xx0, x, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(zz0, z, (uint32_t)1U); + zzz = buf + (uint32_t)10U; + xx = buf + (uint32_t)15U; + zz = buf + (uint32_t)20U; + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(x2, xx, zz); + Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(zz, xx); + scalar = (uint64_t)121665U; + Hacl_Bignum_fscalar(zzz, zz, scalar); + Hacl_Bignum_fsum(zzz, xx); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(z2, zzz, zz); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_step( + uint64_t *nq, + uint64_t *nqpq, + uint64_t *nq2, + uint64_t *nqpq2, + uint64_t *q, + uint8_t byt +) +{ + uint64_t bit0 = (uint64_t)(byt >> (uint32_t)7U); + uint64_t bit; + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional(nq, nqpq, bit0); + Hacl_EC_AddAndDouble_fmonty(nq2, nqpq2, nq, nqpq, q); + bit = (uint64_t)(byt >> (uint32_t)7U); + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional(nq2, nqpq2, bit); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_double_step( + uint64_t *nq, + uint64_t *nqpq, + uint64_t *nq2, + uint64_t *nqpq2, + uint64_t *q, + uint8_t byt +) +{ + uint8_t byt1; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_step(nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, byt); + byt1 = byt << (uint32_t)1U; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_step(nq2, nqpq2, nq, nqpq, q, byt1); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop( + uint64_t *nq, + uint64_t *nqpq, + uint64_t *nq2, + uint64_t *nqpq2, + uint64_t *q, + uint8_t byt, + uint32_t i +) +{ + if (!(i == (uint32_t)0U)) + { + uint32_t i_ = i - (uint32_t)1U; + uint8_t byt_; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_double_step(nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, byt); + byt_ = byt << (uint32_t)2U; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop(nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, byt_, i_); + } +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Ladder_BigLoop_cmult_big_loop( + uint8_t *n1, + uint64_t *nq, + uint64_t *nqpq, + uint64_t *nq2, + uint64_t *nqpq2, + uint64_t *q, + uint32_t i +) +{ + if (!(i == (uint32_t)0U)) + { + uint32_t i1 = i - (uint32_t)1U; + uint8_t byte = n1[i1]; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop(nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, byte, (uint32_t)4U); + Hacl_EC_Ladder_BigLoop_cmult_big_loop(n1, nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, i1); + } +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Ladder_cmult(uint64_t *result, uint8_t *n1, uint64_t *q) +{ + uint64_t point_buf[40U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *nq = point_buf; + uint64_t *nqpq = point_buf + (uint32_t)10U; + uint64_t *nq2 = point_buf + (uint32_t)20U; + uint64_t *nqpq2 = point_buf + (uint32_t)30U; + Hacl_EC_Point_copy(nqpq, q); + nq[0U] = (uint64_t)1U; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_BigLoop_cmult_big_loop(n1, nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, (uint32_t)32U); + Hacl_EC_Point_copy(result, nq); +} + +void Hacl_Curve25519_crypto_scalarmult(uint8_t *mypublic, uint8_t *secret, uint8_t *basepoint) +{ + uint64_t buf0[10U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *x0 = buf0; + uint64_t *z = buf0 + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *q; + Hacl_EC_Format_fexpand(x0, basepoint); + z[0U] = (uint64_t)1U; + q = buf0; + { + uint8_t e[32U] = { 0U }; + uint8_t e0; + uint8_t e31; + uint8_t e01; + uint8_t e311; + uint8_t e312; + uint8_t *scalar; + memcpy(e, secret, (uint32_t)32U * sizeof secret[0U]); + e0 = e[0U]; + e31 = e[31U]; + e01 = e0 & (uint8_t)248U; + e311 = e31 & (uint8_t)127U; + e312 = e311 | (uint8_t)64U; + e[0U] = e01; + e[31U] = e312; + scalar = e; + { + uint64_t buf[15U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *nq = buf; + uint64_t *x = nq; + x[0U] = (uint64_t)1U; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_cmult(nq, scalar, q); + Hacl_EC_Format_scalar_of_point(mypublic, nq); + } + } +} + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ee62be1c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Interface to code from Project Everest + * + * Copyright 2016-2018 INRIA and Microsoft Corporation + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + +#if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && (__SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16) +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT128 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT128) +#include "Hacl_Curve25519.c" +#else +#define KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128 +#include "kremlib/FStar_UInt128_extracted.c" +#include "legacy/Hacl_Curve25519.c" +#endif + +#include "kremlib/FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.c" + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) */ + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/everest.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/everest.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..82c4e03a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/everest.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Interface to code from Project Everest + * + * Copyright 2016-2018 INRIA and Microsoft Corporation + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org). + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" + +#include "everest/x25519.h" +#include "everest/everest.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + +int mbedtls_everest_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, int grp_id ) +{ + if( grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + mbedtls_x25519_init( &ctx->ctx ); + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_everest_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_x25519_free( &ctx->ctx ); +} + +int mbedtls_everest_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t ), + void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_x25519_context *x25519_ctx = &ctx->ctx; + return mbedtls_x25519_make_params( x25519_ctx, olen, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ); +} + +int mbedtls_everest_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + mbedtls_x25519_context *x25519_ctx = &ctx->ctx; + return mbedtls_x25519_read_params( x25519_ctx, buf, end ); +} + +int mbedtls_everest_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_everest_ecdh_side side ) +{ + mbedtls_x25519_context *x25519_ctx = &ctx->ctx; + mbedtls_x25519_ecdh_side s = side == MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_OURS ? + MBEDTLS_X25519_ECDH_OURS : + MBEDTLS_X25519_ECDH_THEIRS; + return mbedtls_x25519_get_params( x25519_ctx, key, s ); +} + +int mbedtls_everest_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t ), + void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_x25519_context *x25519_ctx = &ctx->ctx; + return mbedtls_x25519_make_public( x25519_ctx, olen, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ); +} + +int mbedtls_everest_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + mbedtls_x25519_context *x25519_ctx = &ctx->ctx; + return mbedtls_x25519_read_public ( x25519_ctx, buf, blen ); +} + +int mbedtls_everest_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t ), + void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_x25519_context *x25519_ctx = &ctx->ctx; + return mbedtls_x25519_calc_secret( x25519_ctx, olen, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED */ + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/kremlib/FStar_UInt128_extracted.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/kremlib/FStar_UInt128_extracted.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1060515d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/kremlib/FStar_UInt128_extracted.c @@ -0,0 +1,413 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +/* This file was generated by KreMLin + * KreMLin invocation: ../krml -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrB9w -minimal -fparentheses -fcurly-braces -fno-shadow -header copyright-header.txt -minimal -tmpdir extracted -warn-error +9+11 -skip-compilation -extract-uints -add-include -add-include "kremlib.h" -add-include "kremlin/internal/compat.h" extracted/prims.krml extracted/FStar_Pervasives_Native.krml extracted/FStar_Pervasives.krml extracted/FStar_Mul.krml extracted/FStar_Squash.krml extracted/FStar_Classical.krml extracted/FStar_StrongExcludedMiddle.krml extracted/FStar_FunctionalExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot_Base.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot_Properties.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot.krml extracted/FStar_Seq_Base.krml extracted/FStar_Seq_Properties.krml extracted/FStar_Seq.krml extracted/FStar_Math_Lib.krml extracted/FStar_Math_Lemmas.krml extracted/FStar_BitVector.krml extracted/FStar_UInt.krml extracted/FStar_UInt32.krml extracted/FStar_Int.krml extracted/FStar_Int16.krml extracted/FStar_Preorder.krml extracted/FStar_Ghost.krml extracted/FStar_ErasedLogic.krml extracted/FStar_UInt64.krml extracted/FStar_Set.krml extracted/FStar_PropositionalExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_PredicateExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_TSet.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_Heap.krml extracted/FStar_Heap.krml extracted/FStar_Map.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_HyperHeap.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_HyperStack.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_Witnessed.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_ST.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_All.krml extracted/FStar_Date.krml extracted/FStar_Universe.krml extracted/FStar_GSet.krml extracted/FStar_ModifiesGen.krml extracted/LowStar_Monotonic_Buffer.krml extracted/LowStar_Buffer.krml extracted/Spec_Loops.krml extracted/LowStar_BufferOps.krml extracted/C_Loops.krml extracted/FStar_UInt8.krml extracted/FStar_Kremlin_Endianness.krml extracted/FStar_UInt63.krml extracted/FStar_Exn.krml extracted/FStar_ST.krml extracted/FStar_All.krml extracted/FStar_Dyn.krml extracted/FStar_Int63.krml extracted/FStar_Int64.krml extracted/FStar_Int32.krml extracted/FStar_Int8.krml extracted/FStar_UInt16.krml extracted/FStar_Int_Cast.krml extracted/FStar_UInt128.krml extracted/C_Endianness.krml extracted/FStar_List.krml extracted/FStar_Float.krml extracted/FStar_IO.krml extracted/C.krml extracted/FStar_Char.krml extracted/FStar_String.krml extracted/LowStar_Modifies.krml extracted/C_String.krml extracted/FStar_Bytes.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_IO.krml extracted/C_Failure.krml extracted/TestLib.krml extracted/FStar_Int_Cast_Full.krml + * F* version: 059db0c8 + * KreMLin version: 916c37ac + */ + + +#include "FStar_UInt128.h" +#include "kremlin/c_endianness.h" +#include "FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.h" + +uint64_t FStar_UInt128___proj__Mkuint128__item__low(FStar_UInt128_uint128 projectee) +{ + return projectee.low; +} + +uint64_t FStar_UInt128___proj__Mkuint128__item__high(FStar_UInt128_uint128 projectee) +{ + return projectee.high; +} + +static uint64_t FStar_UInt128_constant_time_carry(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) +{ + return (a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))) >> (uint32_t)63U; +} + +static uint64_t FStar_UInt128_carry(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) +{ + return FStar_UInt128_constant_time_carry(a, b); +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = { a.low + b.low, a.high + b.high + FStar_UInt128_carry(a.low + b.low, b.low) }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_add_underspec(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = { a.low + b.low, a.high + b.high + FStar_UInt128_carry(a.low + b.low, b.low) }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_add_mod(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = { a.low + b.low, a.high + b.high + FStar_UInt128_carry(a.low + b.low, b.low) }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_sub(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = { a.low - b.low, a.high - b.high - FStar_UInt128_carry(a.low, a.low - b.low) }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_sub_underspec(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = { a.low - b.low, a.high - b.high - FStar_UInt128_carry(a.low, a.low - b.low) }; + return flat; +} + +static FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_sub_mod_impl(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = { a.low - b.low, a.high - b.high - FStar_UInt128_carry(a.low, a.low - b.low) }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_sub_mod(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + return FStar_UInt128_sub_mod_impl(a, b); +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_logand(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 flat = { a.low & b.low, a.high & b.high }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_logxor(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 flat = { a.low ^ b.low, a.high ^ b.high }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_logor(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 flat = { a.low | b.low, a.high | b.high }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_lognot(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 flat = { ~a.low, ~a.high }; + return flat; +} + +static uint32_t FStar_UInt128_u32_64 = (uint32_t)64U; + +static uint64_t FStar_UInt128_add_u64_shift_left(uint64_t hi, uint64_t lo, uint32_t s) +{ + return (hi << s) + (lo >> (FStar_UInt128_u32_64 - s)); +} + +static uint64_t FStar_UInt128_add_u64_shift_left_respec(uint64_t hi, uint64_t lo, uint32_t s) +{ + return FStar_UInt128_add_u64_shift_left(hi, lo, s); +} + +static FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_shift_left_small(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, uint32_t s) +{ + if (s == (uint32_t)0U) + { + return a; + } + else + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = { a.low << s, FStar_UInt128_add_u64_shift_left_respec(a.high, a.low, s) }; + return flat; + } +} + +static FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_shift_left_large(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, uint32_t s) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 flat = { (uint64_t)0U, a.low << (s - FStar_UInt128_u32_64) }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_shift_left(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, uint32_t s) +{ + if (s < FStar_UInt128_u32_64) + { + return FStar_UInt128_shift_left_small(a, s); + } + else + { + return FStar_UInt128_shift_left_large(a, s); + } +} + +static uint64_t FStar_UInt128_add_u64_shift_right(uint64_t hi, uint64_t lo, uint32_t s) +{ + return (lo >> s) + (hi << (FStar_UInt128_u32_64 - s)); +} + +static uint64_t FStar_UInt128_add_u64_shift_right_respec(uint64_t hi, uint64_t lo, uint32_t s) +{ + return FStar_UInt128_add_u64_shift_right(hi, lo, s); +} + +static FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_shift_right_small(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, uint32_t s) +{ + if (s == (uint32_t)0U) + { + return a; + } + else + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = { FStar_UInt128_add_u64_shift_right_respec(a.high, a.low, s), a.high >> s }; + return flat; + } +} + +static FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_shift_right_large(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, uint32_t s) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 flat = { a.high >> (s - FStar_UInt128_u32_64), (uint64_t)0U }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_shift_right(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, uint32_t s) +{ + if (s < FStar_UInt128_u32_64) + { + return FStar_UInt128_shift_right_small(a, s); + } + else + { + return FStar_UInt128_shift_right_large(a, s); + } +} + +bool FStar_UInt128_eq(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + return a.low == b.low && a.high == b.high; +} + +bool FStar_UInt128_gt(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + return a.high > b.high || (a.high == b.high && a.low > b.low); +} + +bool FStar_UInt128_lt(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + return a.high < b.high || (a.high == b.high && a.low < b.low); +} + +bool FStar_UInt128_gte(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + return a.high > b.high || (a.high == b.high && a.low >= b.low); +} + +bool FStar_UInt128_lte(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + return a.high < b.high || (a.high == b.high && a.low <= b.low); +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_eq_mask(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = + { + FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a.low, + b.low) + & FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a.high, b.high), + FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a.low, + b.low) + & FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a.high, b.high) + }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_gte_mask(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a, FStar_UInt128_uint128 b) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = + { + (FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(a.high, b.high) & ~FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a.high, b.high)) + | (FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a.high, b.high) & FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(a.low, b.low)), + (FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(a.high, b.high) & ~FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a.high, b.high)) + | (FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a.high, b.high) & FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(a.low, b.low)) + }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128(uint64_t a) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 flat = { a, (uint64_t)0U }; + return flat; +} + +uint64_t FStar_UInt128_uint128_to_uint64(FStar_UInt128_uint128 a) +{ + return a.low; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Plus_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_add; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Plus_Question_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_add_underspec; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Plus_Percent_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_add_mod; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Subtraction_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_sub; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Subtraction_Question_Hat)( + FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, + FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1 +) = FStar_UInt128_sub_underspec; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Subtraction_Percent_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_sub_mod; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Amp_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_logand; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Hat_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_logxor; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Bar_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_logor; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Less_Less_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, uint32_t x1) = + FStar_UInt128_shift_left; + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Greater_Greater_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, uint32_t x1) = + FStar_UInt128_shift_right; + +bool +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Equals_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_eq; + +bool +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Greater_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_gt; + +bool +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Less_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_lt; + +bool +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Greater_Equals_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_gte; + +bool +(*FStar_UInt128_op_Less_Equals_Hat)(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1) = + FStar_UInt128_lte; + +static uint64_t FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(uint64_t a) +{ + return a & (uint64_t)0xffffffffU; +} + +static uint32_t FStar_UInt128_u32_32 = (uint32_t)32U; + +static uint64_t FStar_UInt128_u32_combine(uint64_t hi, uint64_t lo) +{ + return lo + (hi << FStar_UInt128_u32_32); +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_mul32(uint64_t x, uint32_t y) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = + { + FStar_UInt128_u32_combine((x >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32) + * (uint64_t)y + + (FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(x) * (uint64_t)y >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32), + FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(x) * (uint64_t)y)), + ((x >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32) + * (uint64_t)y + + (FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(x) * (uint64_t)y >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32)) + >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32 + }; + return flat; +} + +typedef struct K___uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t_s +{ + uint64_t fst; + uint64_t snd; + uint64_t thd; + uint64_t f3; +} +K___uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t; + +static K___uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t +FStar_UInt128_mul_wide_impl_t_(uint64_t x, uint64_t y) +{ + K___uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t + flat = + { + FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(x), + FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(x) * FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(y)), + x + >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32, + (x >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32) + * FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(y) + + (FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(x) * FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(y) >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32) + }; + return flat; +} + +static uint64_t FStar_UInt128_u32_combine_(uint64_t hi, uint64_t lo) +{ + return lo + (hi << FStar_UInt128_u32_32); +} + +static FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_mul_wide_impl(uint64_t x, uint64_t y) +{ + K___uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t_uint64_t scrut = FStar_UInt128_mul_wide_impl_t_(x, y); + uint64_t u1 = scrut.fst; + uint64_t w3 = scrut.snd; + uint64_t x_ = scrut.thd; + uint64_t t_ = scrut.f3; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + flat = + { + FStar_UInt128_u32_combine_(u1 * (y >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32) + FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(t_), + w3), + x_ + * (y >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32) + + (t_ >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32) + + ((u1 * (y >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32) + FStar_UInt128_u64_mod_32(t_)) >> FStar_UInt128_u32_32) + }; + return flat; +} + +FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(uint64_t x, uint64_t y) +{ + return FStar_UInt128_mul_wide_impl(x, y); +} + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/kremlib/FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/kremlib/FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..08265248 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/kremlib/FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +/* This file was generated by KreMLin + * KreMLin invocation: ../krml -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrB9w -minimal -fparentheses -fcurly-braces -fno-shadow -header copyright-header.txt -minimal -tmpdir dist/minimal -skip-compilation -extract-uints -add-include -add-include -add-include "kremlin/internal/compat.h" -add-include "kremlin/internal/types.h" -bundle FStar.UInt64+FStar.UInt32+FStar.UInt16+FStar.UInt8=* extracted/prims.krml extracted/FStar_Pervasives_Native.krml extracted/FStar_Pervasives.krml extracted/FStar_Mul.krml extracted/FStar_Squash.krml extracted/FStar_Classical.krml extracted/FStar_StrongExcludedMiddle.krml extracted/FStar_FunctionalExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot_Base.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot_Properties.krml extracted/FStar_List_Tot.krml extracted/FStar_Seq_Base.krml extracted/FStar_Seq_Properties.krml extracted/FStar_Seq.krml extracted/FStar_Math_Lib.krml extracted/FStar_Math_Lemmas.krml extracted/FStar_BitVector.krml extracted/FStar_UInt.krml extracted/FStar_UInt32.krml extracted/FStar_Int.krml extracted/FStar_Int16.krml extracted/FStar_Preorder.krml extracted/FStar_Ghost.krml extracted/FStar_ErasedLogic.krml extracted/FStar_UInt64.krml extracted/FStar_Set.krml extracted/FStar_PropositionalExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_PredicateExtensionality.krml extracted/FStar_TSet.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_Heap.krml extracted/FStar_Heap.krml extracted/FStar_Map.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_HyperHeap.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_HyperStack.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack.krml extracted/FStar_Monotonic_Witnessed.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_ST.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_All.krml extracted/FStar_Date.krml extracted/FStar_Universe.krml extracted/FStar_GSet.krml extracted/FStar_ModifiesGen.krml extracted/LowStar_Monotonic_Buffer.krml extracted/LowStar_Buffer.krml extracted/Spec_Loops.krml extracted/LowStar_BufferOps.krml extracted/C_Loops.krml extracted/FStar_UInt8.krml extracted/FStar_Kremlin_Endianness.krml extracted/FStar_UInt63.krml extracted/FStar_Exn.krml extracted/FStar_ST.krml extracted/FStar_All.krml extracted/FStar_Dyn.krml extracted/FStar_Int63.krml extracted/FStar_Int64.krml extracted/FStar_Int32.krml extracted/FStar_Int8.krml extracted/FStar_UInt16.krml extracted/FStar_Int_Cast.krml extracted/FStar_UInt128.krml extracted/C_Endianness.krml extracted/FStar_List.krml extracted/FStar_Float.krml extracted/FStar_IO.krml extracted/C.krml extracted/FStar_Char.krml extracted/FStar_String.krml extracted/LowStar_Modifies.krml extracted/C_String.krml extracted/FStar_Bytes.krml extracted/FStar_HyperStack_IO.krml extracted/C_Failure.krml extracted/TestLib.krml extracted/FStar_Int_Cast_Full.krml + * F* version: 059db0c8 + * KreMLin version: 916c37ac + */ + + +#include "FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.h" + +uint64_t FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) +{ + uint64_t x = a ^ b; + uint64_t minus_x = ~x + (uint64_t)1U; + uint64_t x_or_minus_x = x | minus_x; + uint64_t xnx = x_or_minus_x >> (uint32_t)63U; + return xnx - (uint64_t)1U; +} + +uint64_t FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) +{ + uint64_t x = a; + uint64_t y = b; + uint64_t x_xor_y = x ^ y; + uint64_t x_sub_y = x - y; + uint64_t x_sub_y_xor_y = x_sub_y ^ y; + uint64_t q = x_xor_y | x_sub_y_xor_y; + uint64_t x_xor_q = x ^ q; + uint64_t x_xor_q_ = x_xor_q >> (uint32_t)63U; + return x_xor_q_ - (uint64_t)1U; +} + +uint32_t FStar_UInt32_eq_mask(uint32_t a, uint32_t b) +{ + uint32_t x = a ^ b; + uint32_t minus_x = ~x + (uint32_t)1U; + uint32_t x_or_minus_x = x | minus_x; + uint32_t xnx = x_or_minus_x >> (uint32_t)31U; + return xnx - (uint32_t)1U; +} + +uint32_t FStar_UInt32_gte_mask(uint32_t a, uint32_t b) +{ + uint32_t x = a; + uint32_t y = b; + uint32_t x_xor_y = x ^ y; + uint32_t x_sub_y = x - y; + uint32_t x_sub_y_xor_y = x_sub_y ^ y; + uint32_t q = x_xor_y | x_sub_y_xor_y; + uint32_t x_xor_q = x ^ q; + uint32_t x_xor_q_ = x_xor_q >> (uint32_t)31U; + return x_xor_q_ - (uint32_t)1U; +} + +uint16_t FStar_UInt16_eq_mask(uint16_t a, uint16_t b) +{ + uint16_t x = a ^ b; + uint16_t minus_x = ~x + (uint16_t)1U; + uint16_t x_or_minus_x = x | minus_x; + uint16_t xnx = x_or_minus_x >> (uint32_t)15U; + return xnx - (uint16_t)1U; +} + +uint16_t FStar_UInt16_gte_mask(uint16_t a, uint16_t b) +{ + uint16_t x = a; + uint16_t y = b; + uint16_t x_xor_y = x ^ y; + uint16_t x_sub_y = x - y; + uint16_t x_sub_y_xor_y = x_sub_y ^ y; + uint16_t q = x_xor_y | x_sub_y_xor_y; + uint16_t x_xor_q = x ^ q; + uint16_t x_xor_q_ = x_xor_q >> (uint32_t)15U; + return x_xor_q_ - (uint16_t)1U; +} + +uint8_t FStar_UInt8_eq_mask(uint8_t a, uint8_t b) +{ + uint8_t x = a ^ b; + uint8_t minus_x = ~x + (uint8_t)1U; + uint8_t x_or_minus_x = x | minus_x; + uint8_t xnx = x_or_minus_x >> (uint32_t)7U; + return xnx - (uint8_t)1U; +} + +uint8_t FStar_UInt8_gte_mask(uint8_t a, uint8_t b) +{ + uint8_t x = a; + uint8_t y = b; + uint8_t x_xor_y = x ^ y; + uint8_t x_sub_y = x - y; + uint8_t x_sub_y_xor_y = x_sub_y ^ y; + uint8_t q = x_xor_y | x_sub_y_xor_y; + uint8_t x_xor_q = x ^ q; + uint8_t x_xor_q_ = x_xor_q >> (uint32_t)7U; + return x_xor_q_ - (uint8_t)1U; +} + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/legacy/Hacl_Curve25519.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/legacy/Hacl_Curve25519.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..babebe4f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/legacy/Hacl_Curve25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,805 @@ +/* Copyright (c) INRIA and Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + Licensed under the Apache 2.0 License. */ + +/* This file was generated by KreMLin + * KreMLin invocation: /mnt/e/everest/verify/kremlin/krml -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrcLh -minimal -fc89 -fparentheses -fno-shadow -header /mnt/e/everest/verify/hdrcLh -minimal -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/code/lib/kremlin -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/kremlin/kremlib/compat -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/specs -I /mnt/e/everest/verify/hacl-star/specs/old -I . -ccopt -march=native -verbose -ldopt -flto -tmpdir x25519-c -I ../bignum -bundle Hacl.Curve25519=* -minimal -add-include "kremlib.h" -skip-compilation x25519-c/out.krml -o x25519-c/Hacl_Curve25519.c + * F* version: 059db0c8 + * KreMLin version: 916c37ac + */ + + +#include "Hacl_Curve25519.h" + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_add_mod(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 +FStar_UInt128_logand(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, FStar_UInt128_uint128 x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_shift_right(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0, uint32_t x1); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128(uint64_t x0); + +extern uint64_t FStar_UInt128_uint128_to_uint64(FStar_UInt128_uint128 x0); + +extern FStar_UInt128_uint128 FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(uint64_t x0, uint64_t x1); + +static void Hacl_Bignum_Modulo_carry_top(uint64_t *b) +{ + uint64_t b4 = b[4U]; + uint64_t b0 = b[0U]; + uint64_t b4_ = b4 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t b0_ = b0 + (uint64_t)19U * (b4 >> (uint32_t)51U); + b[4U] = b4_; + b[0U] = b0_; +} + +inline static void +Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_copy_from_wide_(uint64_t *output, FStar_UInt128_uint128 *input) +{ + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 xi = input[i]; + output[i] = FStar_UInt128_uint128_to_uint64(xi); + } +} + +inline static void +Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_sum_scalar_multiplication_( + FStar_UInt128_uint128 *output, + uint64_t *input, + uint64_t s +) +{ + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 xi = output[i]; + uint64_t yi = input[i]; + output[i] = FStar_UInt128_add_mod(xi, FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(yi, s)); + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_carry_wide_(FStar_UInt128_uint128 *tmp) +{ + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)4U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint32_t ctr = i; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 tctr = tmp[ctr]; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 tctrp1 = tmp[ctr + (uint32_t)1U]; + uint64_t r0 = FStar_UInt128_uint128_to_uint64(tctr) & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 c = FStar_UInt128_shift_right(tctr, (uint32_t)51U); + tmp[ctr] = FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128(r0); + tmp[ctr + (uint32_t)1U] = FStar_UInt128_add(tctrp1, c); + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_shift_reduce(uint64_t *output) +{ + uint64_t tmp = output[4U]; + uint64_t b0; + { + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)4U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint32_t ctr = (uint32_t)5U - i - (uint32_t)1U; + uint64_t z = output[ctr - (uint32_t)1U]; + output[ctr] = z; + } + } + output[0U] = tmp; + b0 = output[0U]; + output[0U] = (uint64_t)19U * b0; +} + +static void +Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_mul_shift_reduce_( + FStar_UInt128_uint128 *output, + uint64_t *input, + uint64_t *input2 +) +{ + uint32_t i; + uint64_t input2i; + { + uint32_t i0; + for (i0 = (uint32_t)0U; i0 < (uint32_t)4U; i0 = i0 + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint64_t input2i0 = input2[i0]; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_sum_scalar_multiplication_(output, input, input2i0); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_shift_reduce(input); + } + } + i = (uint32_t)4U; + input2i = input2[i]; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_sum_scalar_multiplication_(output, input, input2i); +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *input, uint64_t *input2) +{ + uint64_t tmp[5U] = { 0U }; + memcpy(tmp, input, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof input[0U]); + KRML_CHECK_SIZE(sizeof (FStar_UInt128_uint128), (uint32_t)5U); + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 t[5U]; + { + uint32_t _i; + for (_i = 0U; _i < (uint32_t)5U; ++_i) + t[_i] = FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128((uint64_t)0U); + } + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b4; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b0; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b4_; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b0_; + uint64_t i0; + uint64_t i1; + uint64_t i0_; + uint64_t i1_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_mul_shift_reduce_(t, tmp, input2); + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_carry_wide_(t); + b4 = t[4U]; + b0 = t[0U]; + b4_ = FStar_UInt128_logand(b4, FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU)); + b0_ = + FStar_UInt128_add(b0, + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide((uint64_t)19U, + FStar_UInt128_uint128_to_uint64(FStar_UInt128_shift_right(b4, (uint32_t)51U)))); + t[4U] = b4_; + t[0U] = b0_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_copy_from_wide_(output, t); + i0 = output[0U]; + i1 = output[1U]; + i0_ = i0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + i1_ = i1 + (i0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + output[0U] = i0_; + output[1U] = i1_; + } + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare__(FStar_UInt128_uint128 *tmp, uint64_t *output) +{ + uint64_t r0 = output[0U]; + uint64_t r1 = output[1U]; + uint64_t r2 = output[2U]; + uint64_t r3 = output[3U]; + uint64_t r4 = output[4U]; + uint64_t d0 = r0 * (uint64_t)2U; + uint64_t d1 = r1 * (uint64_t)2U; + uint64_t d2 = r2 * (uint64_t)2U * (uint64_t)19U; + uint64_t d419 = r4 * (uint64_t)19U; + uint64_t d4 = d419 * (uint64_t)2U; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + s0 = + FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(r0, r0), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d4, r1)), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d2, r3)); + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + s1 = + FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d0, r1), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d4, r2)), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(r3 * (uint64_t)19U, r3)); + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + s2 = + FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d0, r2), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(r1, r1)), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d4, r3)); + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + s3 = + FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d0, r3), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d1, r2)), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(r4, d419)); + FStar_UInt128_uint128 + s4 = + FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_add(FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d0, r4), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(d1, r3)), + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(r2, r2)); + tmp[0U] = s0; + tmp[1U] = s1; + tmp[2U] = s2; + tmp[3U] = s3; + tmp[4U] = s4; +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_(FStar_UInt128_uint128 *tmp, uint64_t *output) +{ + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b4; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b0; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b4_; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b0_; + uint64_t i0; + uint64_t i1; + uint64_t i0_; + uint64_t i1_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare__(tmp, output); + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_carry_wide_(tmp); + b4 = tmp[4U]; + b0 = tmp[0U]; + b4_ = FStar_UInt128_logand(b4, FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU)); + b0_ = + FStar_UInt128_add(b0, + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide((uint64_t)19U, + FStar_UInt128_uint128_to_uint64(FStar_UInt128_shift_right(b4, (uint32_t)51U)))); + tmp[4U] = b4_; + tmp[0U] = b0_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_copy_from_wide_(output, tmp); + i0 = output[0U]; + i1 = output[1U]; + i0_ = i0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + i1_ = i1 + (i0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + output[0U] = i0_; + output[1U] = i1_; +} + +static void +Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_( + uint64_t *input, + FStar_UInt128_uint128 *tmp, + uint32_t count1 +) +{ + uint32_t i; + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_(tmp, input); + for (i = (uint32_t)1U; i < count1; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_(tmp, input); +} + +inline static void +Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *input, uint32_t count1) +{ + KRML_CHECK_SIZE(sizeof (FStar_UInt128_uint128), (uint32_t)5U); + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 t[5U]; + { + uint32_t _i; + for (_i = 0U; _i < (uint32_t)5U; ++_i) + t[_i] = FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128((uint64_t)0U); + } + memcpy(output, input, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof input[0U]); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_(output, t, count1); + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_inplace(uint64_t *output, uint32_t count1) +{ + KRML_CHECK_SIZE(sizeof (FStar_UInt128_uint128), (uint32_t)5U); + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 t[5U]; + { + uint32_t _i; + for (_i = 0U; _i < (uint32_t)5U; ++_i) + t[_i] = FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128((uint64_t)0U); + } + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_(output, t, count1); + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_Crecip_crecip(uint64_t *out, uint64_t *z) +{ + uint64_t buf[20U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *a0 = buf; + uint64_t *t00 = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *b0 = buf + (uint32_t)10U; + uint64_t *t01; + uint64_t *b1; + uint64_t *c0; + uint64_t *a; + uint64_t *t0; + uint64_t *b; + uint64_t *c; + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(a0, z, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t00, a0, (uint32_t)2U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(b0, t00, z); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(a0, b0, a0); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t00, a0, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(b0, t00, b0); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t00, b0, (uint32_t)5U); + t01 = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + b1 = buf + (uint32_t)10U; + c0 = buf + (uint32_t)15U; + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(b1, t01, b1); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t01, b1, (uint32_t)10U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(c0, t01, b1); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t01, c0, (uint32_t)20U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(t01, t01, c0); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_inplace(t01, (uint32_t)10U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(b1, t01, b1); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t01, b1, (uint32_t)50U); + a = buf; + t0 = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + b = buf + (uint32_t)10U; + c = buf + (uint32_t)15U; + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(c, t0, b); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(t0, c, (uint32_t)100U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(t0, t0, c); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_inplace(t0, (uint32_t)50U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(t0, t0, b); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times_inplace(t0, (uint32_t)5U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(out, t0, a); +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_fsum(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b) +{ + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint64_t xi = a[i]; + uint64_t yi = b[i]; + a[i] = xi + yi; + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b) +{ + uint64_t tmp[5U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t b0; + uint64_t b1; + uint64_t b2; + uint64_t b3; + uint64_t b4; + memcpy(tmp, b, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof b[0U]); + b0 = tmp[0U]; + b1 = tmp[1U]; + b2 = tmp[2U]; + b3 = tmp[3U]; + b4 = tmp[4U]; + tmp[0U] = b0 + (uint64_t)0x3fffffffffff68U; + tmp[1U] = b1 + (uint64_t)0x3ffffffffffff8U; + tmp[2U] = b2 + (uint64_t)0x3ffffffffffff8U; + tmp[3U] = b3 + (uint64_t)0x3ffffffffffff8U; + tmp[4U] = b4 + (uint64_t)0x3ffffffffffff8U; + { + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint64_t xi = a[i]; + uint64_t yi = tmp[i]; + a[i] = yi - xi; + } + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_fscalar(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *b, uint64_t s) +{ + KRML_CHECK_SIZE(sizeof (FStar_UInt128_uint128), (uint32_t)5U); + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 tmp[5U]; + { + uint32_t _i; + for (_i = 0U; _i < (uint32_t)5U; ++_i) + tmp[_i] = FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128((uint64_t)0U); + } + { + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b4; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b0; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b4_; + FStar_UInt128_uint128 b0_; + { + uint32_t i; + for (i = (uint32_t)0U; i < (uint32_t)5U; i = i + (uint32_t)1U) + { + uint64_t xi = b[i]; + tmp[i] = FStar_UInt128_mul_wide(xi, s); + } + } + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_carry_wide_(tmp); + b4 = tmp[4U]; + b0 = tmp[0U]; + b4_ = FStar_UInt128_logand(b4, FStar_UInt128_uint64_to_uint128((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU)); + b0_ = + FStar_UInt128_add(b0, + FStar_UInt128_mul_wide((uint64_t)19U, + FStar_UInt128_uint128_to_uint64(FStar_UInt128_shift_right(b4, (uint32_t)51U)))); + tmp[4U] = b4_; + tmp[0U] = b0_; + Hacl_Bignum_Fproduct_copy_from_wide_(output, tmp); + } + } +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_fmul(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b) +{ + Hacl_Bignum_Fmul_fmul(output, a, b); +} + +inline static void Hacl_Bignum_crecip(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *input) +{ + Hacl_Bignum_Crecip_crecip(output, input); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_step(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t swap1, uint32_t ctr) +{ + uint32_t i = ctr - (uint32_t)1U; + uint64_t ai = a[i]; + uint64_t bi = b[i]; + uint64_t x = swap1 & (ai ^ bi); + uint64_t ai1 = ai ^ x; + uint64_t bi1 = bi ^ x; + a[i] = ai1; + b[i] = bi1; +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t swap1, uint32_t ctr) +{ + if (!(ctr == (uint32_t)0U)) + { + uint32_t i; + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_step(a, b, swap1, ctr); + i = ctr - (uint32_t)1U; + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_(a, b, swap1, i); + } +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t iswap) +{ + uint64_t swap1 = (uint64_t)0U - iswap; + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_(a, b, swap1, (uint32_t)5U); + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional_(a + (uint32_t)5U, b + (uint32_t)5U, swap1, (uint32_t)5U); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Point_copy(uint64_t *output, uint64_t *input) +{ + memcpy(output, input, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof input[0U]); + memcpy(output + (uint32_t)5U, + input + (uint32_t)5U, + (uint32_t)5U * sizeof (input + (uint32_t)5U)[0U]); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fexpand(uint64_t *output, uint8_t *input) +{ + uint64_t i0 = load64_le(input); + uint8_t *x00 = input + (uint32_t)6U; + uint64_t i1 = load64_le(x00); + uint8_t *x01 = input + (uint32_t)12U; + uint64_t i2 = load64_le(x01); + uint8_t *x02 = input + (uint32_t)19U; + uint64_t i3 = load64_le(x02); + uint8_t *x0 = input + (uint32_t)24U; + uint64_t i4 = load64_le(x0); + uint64_t output0 = i0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t output1 = i1 >> (uint32_t)3U & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t output2 = i2 >> (uint32_t)6U & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t output3 = i3 >> (uint32_t)1U & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t output4 = i4 >> (uint32_t)12U & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + output[0U] = output0; + output[1U] = output1; + output[2U] = output2; + output[3U] = output3; + output[4U] = output4; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_first_carry_pass(uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t t0 = input[0U]; + uint64_t t1 = input[1U]; + uint64_t t2 = input[2U]; + uint64_t t3 = input[3U]; + uint64_t t4 = input[4U]; + uint64_t t1_ = t1 + (t0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t0_ = t0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t2_ = t2 + (t1_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t1__ = t1_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t3_ = t3 + (t2_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t2__ = t2_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t4_ = t4 + (t3_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t3__ = t3_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + input[0U] = t0_; + input[1U] = t1__; + input[2U] = t2__; + input[3U] = t3__; + input[4U] = t4_; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_first_carry_full(uint64_t *input) +{ + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_first_carry_pass(input); + Hacl_Bignum_Modulo_carry_top(input); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_second_carry_pass(uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t t0 = input[0U]; + uint64_t t1 = input[1U]; + uint64_t t2 = input[2U]; + uint64_t t3 = input[3U]; + uint64_t t4 = input[4U]; + uint64_t t1_ = t1 + (t0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t0_ = t0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t2_ = t2 + (t1_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t1__ = t1_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t3_ = t3 + (t2_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t2__ = t2_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + uint64_t t4_ = t4 + (t3_ >> (uint32_t)51U); + uint64_t t3__ = t3_ & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + input[0U] = t0_; + input[1U] = t1__; + input[2U] = t2__; + input[3U] = t3__; + input[4U] = t4_; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_second_carry_full(uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t i0; + uint64_t i1; + uint64_t i0_; + uint64_t i1_; + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_second_carry_pass(input); + Hacl_Bignum_Modulo_carry_top(input); + i0 = input[0U]; + i1 = input[1U]; + i0_ = i0 & (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU; + i1_ = i1 + (i0 >> (uint32_t)51U); + input[0U] = i0_; + input[1U] = i1_; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_trim(uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t a0 = input[0U]; + uint64_t a1 = input[1U]; + uint64_t a2 = input[2U]; + uint64_t a3 = input[3U]; + uint64_t a4 = input[4U]; + uint64_t mask0 = FStar_UInt64_gte_mask(a0, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffedU); + uint64_t mask1 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a1, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU); + uint64_t mask2 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a2, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU); + uint64_t mask3 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a3, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU); + uint64_t mask4 = FStar_UInt64_eq_mask(a4, (uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU); + uint64_t mask = (((mask0 & mask1) & mask2) & mask3) & mask4; + uint64_t a0_ = a0 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffedU & mask); + uint64_t a1_ = a1 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU & mask); + uint64_t a2_ = a2 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU & mask); + uint64_t a3_ = a3 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU & mask); + uint64_t a4_ = a4 - ((uint64_t)0x7ffffffffffffU & mask); + input[0U] = a0_; + input[1U] = a1_; + input[2U] = a2_; + input[3U] = a3_; + input[4U] = a4_; +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_store(uint8_t *output, uint64_t *input) +{ + uint64_t t0 = input[0U]; + uint64_t t1 = input[1U]; + uint64_t t2 = input[2U]; + uint64_t t3 = input[3U]; + uint64_t t4 = input[4U]; + uint64_t o0 = t1 << (uint32_t)51U | t0; + uint64_t o1 = t2 << (uint32_t)38U | t1 >> (uint32_t)13U; + uint64_t o2 = t3 << (uint32_t)25U | t2 >> (uint32_t)26U; + uint64_t o3 = t4 << (uint32_t)12U | t3 >> (uint32_t)39U; + uint8_t *b0 = output; + uint8_t *b1 = output + (uint32_t)8U; + uint8_t *b2 = output + (uint32_t)16U; + uint8_t *b3 = output + (uint32_t)24U; + store64_le(b0, o0); + store64_le(b1, o1); + store64_le(b2, o2); + store64_le(b3, o3); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract(uint8_t *output, uint64_t *input) +{ + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_first_carry_full(input); + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_second_carry_full(input); + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_trim(input); + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract_store(output, input); +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Format_scalar_of_point(uint8_t *scalar, uint64_t *point) +{ + uint64_t *x = point; + uint64_t *z = point + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t buf[10U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *zmone = buf; + uint64_t *sc = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + Hacl_Bignum_crecip(zmone, z); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(sc, x, zmone); + Hacl_EC_Format_fcontract(scalar, sc); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_AddAndDouble_fmonty( + uint64_t *pp, + uint64_t *ppq, + uint64_t *p, + uint64_t *pq, + uint64_t *qmqp +) +{ + uint64_t *qx = qmqp; + uint64_t *x2 = pp; + uint64_t *z2 = pp + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *x3 = ppq; + uint64_t *z3 = ppq + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *x = p; + uint64_t *z = p + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *xprime = pq; + uint64_t *zprime = pq + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t buf[40U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *origx = buf; + uint64_t *origxprime0 = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *xxprime0 = buf + (uint32_t)25U; + uint64_t *zzprime0 = buf + (uint32_t)30U; + uint64_t *origxprime; + uint64_t *xx0; + uint64_t *zz0; + uint64_t *xxprime; + uint64_t *zzprime; + uint64_t *zzzprime; + uint64_t *zzz; + uint64_t *xx; + uint64_t *zz; + uint64_t scalar; + memcpy(origx, x, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof x[0U]); + Hacl_Bignum_fsum(x, z); + Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(z, origx); + memcpy(origxprime0, xprime, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof xprime[0U]); + Hacl_Bignum_fsum(xprime, zprime); + Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(zprime, origxprime0); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(xxprime0, xprime, z); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(zzprime0, x, zprime); + origxprime = buf + (uint32_t)5U; + xx0 = buf + (uint32_t)15U; + zz0 = buf + (uint32_t)20U; + xxprime = buf + (uint32_t)25U; + zzprime = buf + (uint32_t)30U; + zzzprime = buf + (uint32_t)35U; + memcpy(origxprime, xxprime, (uint32_t)5U * sizeof xxprime[0U]); + Hacl_Bignum_fsum(xxprime, zzprime); + Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(zzprime, origxprime); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(x3, xxprime, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(zzzprime, zzprime, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(z3, zzzprime, qx); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(xx0, x, (uint32_t)1U); + Hacl_Bignum_Fsquare_fsquare_times(zz0, z, (uint32_t)1U); + zzz = buf + (uint32_t)10U; + xx = buf + (uint32_t)15U; + zz = buf + (uint32_t)20U; + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(x2, xx, zz); + Hacl_Bignum_fdifference(zz, xx); + scalar = (uint64_t)121665U; + Hacl_Bignum_fscalar(zzz, zz, scalar); + Hacl_Bignum_fsum(zzz, xx); + Hacl_Bignum_fmul(z2, zzz, zz); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_step( + uint64_t *nq, + uint64_t *nqpq, + uint64_t *nq2, + uint64_t *nqpq2, + uint64_t *q, + uint8_t byt +) +{ + uint64_t bit0 = (uint64_t)(byt >> (uint32_t)7U); + uint64_t bit; + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional(nq, nqpq, bit0); + Hacl_EC_AddAndDouble_fmonty(nq2, nqpq2, nq, nqpq, q); + bit = (uint64_t)(byt >> (uint32_t)7U); + Hacl_EC_Point_swap_conditional(nq2, nqpq2, bit); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_double_step( + uint64_t *nq, + uint64_t *nqpq, + uint64_t *nq2, + uint64_t *nqpq2, + uint64_t *q, + uint8_t byt +) +{ + uint8_t byt1; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_step(nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, byt); + byt1 = byt << (uint32_t)1U; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_step(nq2, nqpq2, nq, nqpq, q, byt1); +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop( + uint64_t *nq, + uint64_t *nqpq, + uint64_t *nq2, + uint64_t *nqpq2, + uint64_t *q, + uint8_t byt, + uint32_t i +) +{ + if (!(i == (uint32_t)0U)) + { + uint32_t i_ = i - (uint32_t)1U; + uint8_t byt_; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop_double_step(nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, byt); + byt_ = byt << (uint32_t)2U; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop(nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, byt_, i_); + } +} + +static void +Hacl_EC_Ladder_BigLoop_cmult_big_loop( + uint8_t *n1, + uint64_t *nq, + uint64_t *nqpq, + uint64_t *nq2, + uint64_t *nqpq2, + uint64_t *q, + uint32_t i +) +{ + if (!(i == (uint32_t)0U)) + { + uint32_t i1 = i - (uint32_t)1U; + uint8_t byte = n1[i1]; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_SmallLoop_cmult_small_loop(nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, byte, (uint32_t)4U); + Hacl_EC_Ladder_BigLoop_cmult_big_loop(n1, nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, i1); + } +} + +static void Hacl_EC_Ladder_cmult(uint64_t *result, uint8_t *n1, uint64_t *q) +{ + uint64_t point_buf[40U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *nq = point_buf; + uint64_t *nqpq = point_buf + (uint32_t)10U; + uint64_t *nq2 = point_buf + (uint32_t)20U; + uint64_t *nqpq2 = point_buf + (uint32_t)30U; + Hacl_EC_Point_copy(nqpq, q); + nq[0U] = (uint64_t)1U; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_BigLoop_cmult_big_loop(n1, nq, nqpq, nq2, nqpq2, q, (uint32_t)32U); + Hacl_EC_Point_copy(result, nq); +} + +void Hacl_Curve25519_crypto_scalarmult(uint8_t *mypublic, uint8_t *secret, uint8_t *basepoint) +{ + uint64_t buf0[10U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *x0 = buf0; + uint64_t *z = buf0 + (uint32_t)5U; + uint64_t *q; + Hacl_EC_Format_fexpand(x0, basepoint); + z[0U] = (uint64_t)1U; + q = buf0; + { + uint8_t e[32U] = { 0U }; + uint8_t e0; + uint8_t e31; + uint8_t e01; + uint8_t e311; + uint8_t e312; + uint8_t *scalar; + memcpy(e, secret, (uint32_t)32U * sizeof secret[0U]); + e0 = e[0U]; + e31 = e[31U]; + e01 = e0 & (uint8_t)248U; + e311 = e31 & (uint8_t)127U; + e312 = e311 | (uint8_t)64U; + e[0U] = e01; + e[31U] = e312; + scalar = e; + { + uint64_t buf[15U] = { 0U }; + uint64_t *nq = buf; + uint64_t *x = nq; + x[0U] = (uint64_t)1U; + Hacl_EC_Ladder_cmult(nq, scalar, q); + Hacl_EC_Format_scalar_of_point(mypublic, nq); + } + } +} + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/x25519.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/x25519.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9faa9ab7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/x25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +/* + * ECDH with curve-optimized implementation multiplexing + * + * Copyright 2016-2018 INRIA and Microsoft Corporation + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + +#include + +#if !(defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && (__SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16)) +#define KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128 +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "x25519.h" + +#include + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_x25519_init( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_x25519_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_x25519_free( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->our_secret, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->peer_point, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ); +} + +int mbedtls_x25519_make_params( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + uint8_t base[MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES] = {0}; + + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, ctx->our_secret, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + return ret; + + *olen = MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES + 4; + if( blen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_CURVE25519 >> 8; + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_CURVE25519 & 0xFF; + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES; + + base[0] = 9; + Hacl_Curve25519_crypto_scalarmult( buf, ctx->our_secret, base ); + + base[0] = 0; + if( memcmp( buf, base, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) == 0 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x25519_read_params( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, const unsigned char *end ) +{ + if( end - *buf < MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( *(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ctx->peer_point, *buf, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ); + *buf += MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x25519_get_params( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_x25519_ecdh_side side ) +{ + size_t olen = 0; + + switch( side ) { + case MBEDTLS_X25519_ECDH_THEIRS: + return mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &key->grp, &key->Q, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED, &olen, ctx->peer_point, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ); + case MBEDTLS_X25519_ECDH_OURS: + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &key->d, ctx->our_secret, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_x25519_calc_secret( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + /* f_rng and p_rng are not used here because this implementation does not + need blinding since it has constant trace. */ + (( void )f_rng); + (( void )p_rng); + + *olen = MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES; + + if( blen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + Hacl_Curve25519_crypto_scalarmult( buf, ctx->our_secret, ctx->peer_point); + + /* Wipe the DH secret and don't let the peer chose a small subgroup point */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->our_secret, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ); + + if( memcmp( buf, ctx->our_secret, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) == 0 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x25519_make_public( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int( *f_rng )(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char base[MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES] = { 0 }; + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, ctx->our_secret, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + return ret; + + *olen = MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES + 1; + if( blen < *olen ) + return(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES; + + base[0] = 9; + Hacl_Curve25519_crypto_scalarmult( buf, ctx->our_secret, base ); + + base[0] = 0; + if( memcmp( buf, base, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ) == 0 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_x25519_read_public( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + if( blen < MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES + 1 ) + return(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + if( (*buf++ != MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) ) + return(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA); + memcpy( ctx->peer_point, buf, MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES ); + return( 0 ); +} + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/BRANCHES.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/BRANCHES.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7fb706d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/BRANCHES.md @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +# Maintained branches + +At any point in time, we have a number of maintained branches consisting of: + +- The [`master`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/master) branch: + this always contains the latest release, including all publicly available + security fixes. +- The [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/development) branch: + this is where new features land, + as well as bug fixes and security fixes. +- One or more long-time support (LTS) branches: + these only get bug fixes and security fixes. + +We use [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/). In particular, we maintain +API compatibility in the `master` branch between major version changes. We +also maintain ABI compatibility within LTS branches; see the next section for +details. + +## Backwards Compatibility for application code + +We maintain API compatibility in released versions of Mbed TLS. If you have +code that's working and secure with Mbed TLS x.y.z and does not rely on +undocumented features, then you should be able to re-compile it without +modification with any later release x.y'.z' with the same major version +number, and your code will still build, be secure, and work. + +Note that this guarantee only applies if you either use the default +compile-time configuration (`mbedtls/config.h`) or the same modified +compile-time configuration. Changing compile-time configuration options can +result in an incompatible API or ABI, although features will generally not +affect unrelated features (for example, enabling or disabling a +cryptographic algorithm does not break code that does not use that +algorithm). + +There are rare exceptions: code that was relying on something that became +insecure in the meantime (for example, crypto that was found to be weak) may +need to be changed. In case security comes in conflict with backwards +compatibility, we will put security first, but always attempt to provide a +compatibility option. + +For the LTS branches, additionally we try very hard to also maintain ABI +compatibility (same definition as API except with re-linking instead of +re-compiling) and to avoid any increase in code size or RAM usage, or in the +minimum version of tools needed to build the code. The only exception, as +before, is in case those goals would conflict with fixing a security issue, we +will put security first but provide a compatibility option. (So far we never +had to break ABI compatibility in an LTS branch, but we occasionally had to +increase code size for a security fix.) + +For contributors, see the [Backwards Compatibility section of +CONTRIBUTING](CONTRIBUTING.md#backwards-compatibility). + +## Backward compatibility for the key store + +We maintain backward compatibility with previous versions of the +PSA Crypto persistent storage since Mbed TLS 2.25.0, provided that the +storage backend (PSA ITS implementation) is configured in a compatible way. +We intend to maintain this backward compatibility throughout a major version +of Mbed TLS (for example, all Mbed TLS 3.y versions will be able to read +keys written under any Mbed TLS 3.x with x <= y). + +Mbed TLS 3.x can also read keys written by Mbed TLS 2.25.0 through 2.28.x +LTS, but future major version upgrades (for example from 2.28.x/3.x to 4.y) +may require the use of an upgrade tool. + +## Current Branches + +The following branches are currently maintained: + +- [master](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/master) +- [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/) +- [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28) + maintained until at least the end of 2024. + +Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/BUGS.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/BUGS.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47bde07a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/BUGS.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +## Known issues + +Known issues in Mbed TLS are [tracked on GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues). + +## Reporting a bug + +If you think you've found a bug in Mbed TLS, please follow these steps: + +1. Make sure you're using the latest version of a + [maintained branch](BRANCHES.md): `master`, `development`, + or a long-time support branch. +2. Check [GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues) to see if + your issue has already been reported. If not, … +3. If the issue is a security risk (for example: buffer overflow, + data leak), please report it confidentially as described in + [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). If not, … +4. Please [create an issue on on GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues). + +Please do not use GitHub for support questions. If you want to know +how to do something with Mbed TLS, please see [`SUPPORT.md`](SUPPORT.md) for available documentation and support channels. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc58e40e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,348 @@ +# +# CMake build system design considerations: +# +# - Include directories: +# + Do not define include directories globally using the include_directories +# command but rather at the target level using the +# target_include_directories command. That way, it is easier to guarantee +# that targets are built using the proper list of include directories. +# + Use the PUBLIC and PRIVATE keywords to specify the scope of include +# directories. That way, a target linking to a library (using the +# target_link_libraries command) inherits from the library PUBLIC include +# directories and not from the PRIVATE ones. +# + Note: there is currently one remaining include_directories command in the +# CMake files. It is related to ZLIB support which is planned to be removed. +# When the support is removed, the associated include_directories command +# will be removed as well as this note. +# - MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX: CMake targets are designed to be alterable by calling +# CMake in order to avoid target name clashes, via the use of +# MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX. The value of this variable is prefixed to the +# mbedtls, mbedx509, mbedcrypto and apidoc targets. +# + +cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 2.8.12) + +# https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/policy/CMP0011.html +# Setting this policy is required in CMake >= 3.18.0, otherwise a warning is generated. The OLD +# policy setting is deprecated, and will be removed in future versions. +cmake_policy(SET CMP0011 NEW) +# https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/policy/CMP0012.html +# Setting the CMP0012 policy to NEW is required for FindPython3 to work with CMake 3.18.2 +# (there is a bug in this particular version), otherwise, setting the CMP0012 policy is required +# for CMake versions >= 3.18.3 otherwise a deprecated warning is generated. The OLD policy setting +# is deprecated and will be removed in future versions. +cmake_policy(SET CMP0012 NEW) + +if(TEST_CPP) + project("mbed TLS" C CXX) +else() + project("mbed TLS" C) +endif() + +# Set the project root directory. +set(MBEDTLS_DIR ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}) + +option(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY "Build mbed TLS with the pkcs11-helper library." OFF) +option(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT "Build mbed TLS with zlib library." OFF) + +option(ENABLE_PROGRAMS "Build mbed TLS programs." ON) + +option(UNSAFE_BUILD "Allow unsafe builds. These builds ARE NOT SECURE." OFF) +option(MBEDTLS_FATAL_WARNINGS "Compiler warnings treated as errors" ON) + +string(REGEX MATCH "Clang" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") +string(REGEX MATCH "GNU" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") +string(REGEX MATCH "IAR" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_IAR "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") +string(REGEX MATCH "MSVC" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") + +# the test suites currently have compile errors with MSVC +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + option(ENABLE_TESTING "Build mbed TLS tests." OFF) +else() + option(ENABLE_TESTING "Build mbed TLS tests." ON) +endif() + +# Warning string - created as a list for compatibility with CMake 2.8 +set(WARNING_BORDER "*******************************************************\n") +set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1 "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined!\n") +set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2 "**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES\n") +set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3 "**** AND IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE\n") + +set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING "${WARNING_BORDER}" + "${NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1}" + "${NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2}" + "${NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3}" + "${WARNING_BORDER}") + +set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1 "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY defined!\n") +set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L2 "**** Using 128-bit keys for CTR_DRBG limits the security of generated\n") +set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L3 "**** keys and operations that use random values generated to 128-bit security\n") + +set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING "${WARNING_BORDER}" + "${CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1}" + "${CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L2}" + "${CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L3}" + "${WARNING_BORDER}") + +# Python 3 is only needed here to check for configuration warnings. +if(NOT CMAKE_VERSION VERSION_LESS 3.15.0) + set(Python3_FIND_STRATEGY LOCATION) + find_package(Python3 COMPONENTS Interpreter) + if(Python3_Interpreter_FOUND) + set(MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE ${Python3_EXECUTABLE}) + endif() +else() + find_package(PythonInterp 3) + if(PYTHONINTERP_FOUND) + set(MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE ${PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}) + endif() +endif() +if(MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE) + + # If 128-bit keys are configured for CTR_DRBG, display an appropriate warning + execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/mbedtls/config.h get MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + RESULT_VARIABLE result) + if(${result} EQUAL 0) + message(WARNING ${CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING}) + endif() + + # If NULL Entropy is configured, display an appropriate warning + execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/mbedtls/config.h get MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + RESULT_VARIABLE result) + if(${result} EQUAL 0) + message(WARNING ${NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING}) + + if(NOT UNSAFE_BUILD) + message(FATAL_ERROR "\ +\n\ +Warning! You have enabled MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY. \ +This option is not safe for production use and negates all security \ +It is intended for development use only. \ +\n\ +To confirm you want to build with this option, re-run cmake with the \ +option: \n\ + cmake -DUNSAFE_BUILD=ON ") + + return() + endif() + endif() +endif() + +# If this is the root project add longer list of available CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE values +if(CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR STREQUAL CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR) + set(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE ${CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE} + CACHE STRING "Choose the type of build: None Debug Release Coverage ASan ASanDbg MemSan MemSanDbg Check CheckFull" + FORCE) +endif() + +# Create a symbolic link from ${base_name} in the binary directory +# to the corresponding path in the source directory. +function(link_to_source base_name) + # Get OS dependent path to use in `execute_process` + if (CMAKE_HOST_WIN32) + #mklink is an internal command of cmd.exe it can only work with \ + string(REPLACE "/" "\\" link "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${base_name}") + string(REPLACE "/" "\\" target "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/${base_name}") + else() + set(link "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${base_name}") + set(target "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/${base_name}") + endif() + + if (NOT EXISTS ${link}) + if (CMAKE_HOST_UNIX) + set(command ln -s ${target} ${link}) + else() + if (IS_DIRECTORY ${target}) + set(command cmd.exe /c mklink /j ${link} ${target}) + else() + set(command cmd.exe /c mklink /h ${link} ${target}) + endif() + endif() + + execute_process(COMMAND ${command} + RESULT_VARIABLE result + ERROR_VARIABLE output) + + if (NOT ${result} EQUAL 0) + message(FATAL_ERROR "Could not create symbolic link for: ${target} --> ${output}") + endif() + endif() +endfunction(link_to_source) + +string(REGEX MATCH "Clang" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") + +include(CheckCCompilerFlag) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU) + # some warnings we want are not available with old GCC versions + # note: starting with CMake 2.8 we could use CMAKE_C_COMPILER_VERSION + execute_process(COMMAND ${CMAKE_C_COMPILER} -dumpversion + OUTPUT_VARIABLE GCC_VERSION) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Wextra -Wwrite-strings") + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 3.0 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 3.0) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral") + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 4.3 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 4.3) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wvla") + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 4.5 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 4.5) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wlogical-op") + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 4.8 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 4.8) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wshadow") + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 5.0) + CHECK_C_COMPILER_FLAG("-Wformat-signedness" C_COMPILER_SUPPORTS_WFORMAT_SIGNEDNESS) + if(C_COMPILER_SUPPORTS_WFORMAT_SIGNEDNESS) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wformat-signedness") + endif() + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 7.0 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 7.0) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wformat-overflow=2 -Wformat-truncation") + endif() + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "-O2") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG "-O0 -g3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_COVERAGE "-O0 -g3 --coverage") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASAN "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK "-Os") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECKFULL "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK} -Wcast-qual") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Wextra -Wwrite-strings -Wpointer-arith -Wimplicit-fallthrough -Wshadow -Wvla -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "-O2") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG "-O0 -g3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_COVERAGE "-O0 -g3 --coverage") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASAN "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MEMSAN "-fsanitize=memory -O3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MEMSANDBG "-fsanitize=memory -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls -fsanitize-memory-track-origins=2") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK "-Os") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_IAR) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} --warn_about_c_style_casts --warnings_are_errors -Ohz") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_IAR) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + # Strictest warnings, UTF-8 source and execution charset + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} /W3 /utf-8") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + +if(MBEDTLS_FATAL_WARNINGS) + if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} /WX") + endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + + if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Werror") + if(UNSAFE_BUILD) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wno-error=cpp") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASAN "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASAN} -Wno-error=cpp") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG} -Wno-error=cpp") + endif(UNSAFE_BUILD) + endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU) +endif(MBEDTLS_FATAL_WARNINGS) + +if(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE STREQUAL "Coverage") + if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS "--coverage") + endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) +endif(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE STREQUAL "Coverage") + +if(LIB_INSTALL_DIR) +else() + set(LIB_INSTALL_DIR lib) +endif() + +if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + find_package(ZLIB) + + if(ZLIB_FOUND) + include_directories(${ZLIB_INCLUDE_DIR}) + endif(ZLIB_FOUND) +endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +add_subdirectory(include) + +add_subdirectory(3rdparty) +list(APPEND libs ${thirdparty_lib}) + +add_subdirectory(library) + +# +# The C files in tests/src directory contain test code shared among test suites +# and programs. This shared test code is compiled and linked to test suites and +# programs objects as a set of compiled objects. The compiled objects are NOT +# built into a library that the test suite and program objects would link +# against as they link against the mbedcrypto, mbedx509 and mbedtls libraries. +# The reason is that such library is expected to have mutual dependencies with +# the aforementioned libraries and that there is as of today no portable way of +# handling such dependencies (only toolchain specific solutions). +# +# Thus the below definition of the `mbedtls_test` CMake library of objects +# target. This library of objects is used by tests and programs CMake files +# to define the test executables. +# +if(ENABLE_TESTING OR ENABLE_PROGRAMS) + file(GLOB MBEDTLS_TEST_FILES ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/tests/src/*.c ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/tests/src/drivers/*.c) + add_library(mbedtls_test OBJECT ${MBEDTLS_TEST_FILES}) + target_include_directories(mbedtls_test + PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/tests/include + PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include + PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/library) +endif() + +if(ENABLE_PROGRAMS) + add_subdirectory(programs) +endif() + +ADD_CUSTOM_TARGET(${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}apidoc + COMMAND doxygen mbedtls.doxyfile + WORKING_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/doxygen) + +if(ENABLE_TESTING) + enable_testing() + + add_subdirectory(tests) + + # additional convenience targets for Unix only + if(UNIX) + + ADD_CUSTOM_TARGET(covtest + COMMAND make test + COMMAND programs/test/selftest + COMMAND tests/compat.sh + COMMAND tests/ssl-opt.sh + ) + + ADD_CUSTOM_TARGET(lcov + COMMAND rm -rf Coverage + COMMAND lcov --capture --initial --directory library/CMakeFiles/mbedtls.dir -o files.info + COMMAND lcov --capture --directory library/CMakeFiles/mbedtls.dir -o tests.info + COMMAND lcov --add-tracefile files.info --add-tracefile tests.info -o all.info + COMMAND lcov --remove all.info -o final.info '*.h' + COMMAND gendesc tests/Descriptions.txt -o descriptions + COMMAND genhtml --title "mbed TLS" --description-file descriptions --keep-descriptions --legend --no-branch-coverage -o Coverage final.info + COMMAND rm -f files.info tests.info all.info final.info descriptions + ) + + ADD_CUSTOM_TARGET(memcheck + COMMAND sed -i.bak s+/usr/bin/valgrind+`which valgrind`+ DartConfiguration.tcl + COMMAND ctest -O memcheck.log -D ExperimentalMemCheck + COMMAND tail -n1 memcheck.log | grep 'Memory checking results:' > /dev/null + COMMAND rm -f memcheck.log + COMMAND mv DartConfiguration.tcl.bak DartConfiguration.tcl + ) + endif(UNIX) + + # Make scripts needed for testing available in an out-of-source build. + if (NOT ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR} STREQUAL ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}) + link_to_source(scripts) + # Copy (don't link) DartConfiguration.tcl, needed for memcheck, to + # keep things simple with the sed commands in the memcheck target. + configure_file(${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/DartConfiguration.tcl + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/DartConfiguration.tcl COPYONLY) + endif() +endif() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/CONTRIBUTING.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/CONTRIBUTING.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cea12f15 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +Contributing +============ +We gratefully accept bug reports and contributions from the community. There are some requirements we need to fulfill in order to be able to integrate contributions: + + - As with any open source project, contributions will be reviewed by the project team and community and may need some modifications to be accepted. + - The contribution should not break API or ABI, unless there is a real justification for that. If there is an API change, the contribution, if accepted, will be merged only when there will be a major release. + +Coding Standards +---------------- +- We would ask that contributions conform to [our coding standards](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards), and that contributions are fully tested before submission, as mentioned in the [Tests](#tests) and [Continuous Integration](#continuous-integration-tests) sections. +- The code should be written in a clean and readable style. +- The code should be written in a portable generic way, that will benefit the whole community, and not only your own needs. +- The code should be secure, and will be reviewed from a security point of view as well. + +Making a Contribution +--------------------- +1. [Check for open issues](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues) or [start a discussion](https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman3/lists/mbed-tls.lists.trustedfirmware.org) around a feature idea or a bug. +1. Fork the [Mbed TLS repository on GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls) to start making your changes. As a general rule, you should use the ["development" branch](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/development) as a basis. +1. Write a test which shows that the bug was fixed or that the feature works as expected. +1. Send a pull request (PR) and work with us until it gets merged and published. Contributions may need some modifications, so a few rounds of review and fixing may be necessary. We will include your name in the ChangeLog :) +1. For quick merging, the contribution should be short, and concentrated on a single feature or topic. The larger the contribution is, the longer it would take to review it and merge it. +1. All new files should include the [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) standard license header where possible. +1. Ensure that each commit has at least one `Signed-off-by:` line from the committer. If anyone else contributes to the commit, they should also add their own `Signed-off-by:` line. By adding this line, contributor(s) certify that the contribution is made under the terms of the [Developer Certificate of Origin](dco.txt). The contribution licensing is described in the [License section of the README](README.md#License). + +Backwards Compatibility +----------------------- + +The project aims to minimise the impact on users upgrading to newer versions of the library and it should not be necessary for a user to make any changes to their own code to work with a newer version of the library. Unless the user has made an active decision to use newer features, a newer generation of the library or a change has been necessary due to a security issue or other significant software defect, no modifications to their own code should be necessary. To achieve this, API compatibility is maintained between different versions of Mbed TLS on the main development branch and in LTS (Long Term Support) branches, as described in [BRANCHES.md](BRANCHES.md). + +To minimise such disruption to users, where a change to the interface is required, all changes to the ABI or API, even on the main development branch where new features are added, need to be justifiable by either being a significant enhancement, new feature or bug fix which is best resolved by an interface change. + +Where changes to an existing interface are necessary, functions in the public interface which need to be changed, are marked as 'deprecated'. This is done with the preprocessor symbols `MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING` and `MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED`. Then, a new function with a new name but similar if not identical behaviour to the original function containing the necessary changes should be created alongside the existing deprecated function. + +When a build is made with the deprecation preprocessor symbols defined, a compiler warning will be generated to warn a user that the function will be removed at some point in the future, notifying users that they should change from the older deprecated function to the newer function at their own convenience. + +Therefore, no changes are permitted to the definition of functions in the public interface which will change the API. Instead the interface can only be changed by its extension. As described above, if a function needs to be changed, a new function needs to be created alongside it, with a new name, and whatever change is necessary, such as a new parameter or the addition of a return value. + +Periodically, the library will remove deprecated functions from the library which will be a breaking change in the API, but such changes will be made only in a planned, structured way that gives sufficient notice to users of the library. + +Long Term Support Branches +-------------------------- +Mbed TLS maintains several LTS (Long Term Support) branches, which are maintained continuously for a given period. The LTS branches are provided to allow users of the library to have a maintained, stable version of the library which contains only security fixes and fixes for other defects, without encountering additional features or API extensions which may introduce issues or change the code size or RAM usage, which can be significant considerations on some platforms. To allow users to take advantage of the LTS branches, these branches maintain backwards compatibility for both the public API and ABI. + +When backporting to these branches please observe the following rules: + +1. Any change to the library which changes the API or ABI cannot be backported. +1. All bug fixes that correct a defect that is also present in an LTS branch must be backported to that LTS branch. If a bug fix introduces a change to the API such as a new function, the fix should be reworked to avoid the API change. API changes without very strong justification are unlikely to be accepted. +1. If a contribution is a new feature or enhancement, no backporting is required. Exceptions to this may be additional test cases or quality improvements such as changes to build or test scripts. + +It would be highly appreciated if contributions are backported to LTS branches in addition to the [development branch](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/development) by contributors. + +The list of maintained branches can be found in the [Current Branches section +of BRANCHES.md](BRANCHES.md#current-branches). + +Tests +----- +As mentioned, tests that show the correctness of the feature or bug fix should be added to the pull request, if no such tests exist. + +Mbed TLS includes a comprehensive set of test suites in the `tests/` directory that are dynamically generated to produce the actual test source files (e.g. `test_suite_mpi.c`). These files are generated from a `function file` (e.g. `suites/test_suite_mpi.function`) and a `data file` (e.g. `suites/test_suite_mpi.data`). The function file contains the test functions. The data file contains the test cases, specified as parameters that will be passed to the test function. + +[A Knowledge Base article describing how to add additional tests is available on the Mbed TLS website](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/test_suites). + +A test script `tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh` is available to show test coverage of the library. New code contributions should provide a similar level of code coverage to that which already exists for the library. + +Sample applications, if needed, should be modified as well. + +Continuous Integration Tests +---------------------------- +Once a PR has been made, the Continuous Integration (CI) tests are triggered and run. You should follow the result of the CI tests, and fix failures. + +It is advised to enable the [githooks scripts](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/development/tests/git-scripts) prior to pushing your changes, for catching some of the issues as early as possible. + +Documentation +------------- +Mbed TLS is well documented, but if you think documentation is needed, speak out! + +1. All interfaces should be documented through Doxygen. New APIs should introduce Doxygen documentation. +1. Complex parts in the code should include comments. +1. If needed, a Readme file is advised. +1. If a [Knowledge Base (KB)](https://tls.mbed.org/kb) article should be added, write this as a comment in the PR description. +1. A [ChangeLog](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/ChangeLog.d/00README.md) entry should be added for this contribution. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/ChangeLog b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 00000000..54217fec --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,4607 @@ +Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date) + += Mbed TLS 2.28.1 branch released 2022-07-11 + +Default behavior changes + * mbedtls_cipher_set_iv will now fail with ChaCha20 and ChaCha20+Poly1305 + for IV lengths other than 12. The library was silently overwriting this + length with 12, but did not inform the caller about it. Fixes #4301. + +Features + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, you may list the PSA crypto + feature requirements in the file named by the new macro + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE instead of the default psa/crypto_config.h. + Furthermore you may name an additional file to include after the main + file with the macro MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE. + +Security + * Zeroize dynamically-allocated buffers used by the PSA Crypto key storage + module before freeing them. These buffers contain secret key material, and + could thus potentially leak the key through freed heap. + * Fix a potential heap buffer overread in TLS 1.2 server-side when + MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, an opaque key (created with + mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()) is provisioned, and a static ECDH ciphersuite + is selected. This may result in an application crash or potentially an + information leak. + * Fix a buffer overread in DTLS ClientHello parsing in servers with + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE enabled. An unauthenticated client + or a man-in-the-middle could cause a DTLS server to read up to 255 bytes + after the end of the SSL input buffer. The buffer overread only happens + when MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN is less than a threshold that depends on + the exact configuration: 258 bytes if using mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(), + and possibly up to 571 bytes with a custom cookie check function. + Reported by the Cybeats PSI Team. + +Bugfix + * Fix a memory leak if mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() is called twice. + * Fix several bugs (warnings, compiler and linker errors, test failures) + in reduced configurations when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. + * Fix a bug in (D)TLS curve negotiation: when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO was + enabled and an ECDHE-ECDSA or ECDHE-RSA key exchange was used, the + client would fail to check that the curve selected by the server for + ECDHE was indeed one that was offered. As a result, the client would + accept any curve that it supported, even if that curve was not allowed + according to its configuration. Fixes #5291. + * Fix unit tests that used 0 as the file UID. This failed on some + implementations of PSA ITS. Fixes #3838. + * Fix API violation in mbedtls_md_process() test by adding a call to + mbedtls_md_starts(). Fixes #2227. + * Fix compile errors when MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME is not defined. Add tests + to catch bad uses of time.h. + * Fix the library search path when building a shared library with CMake + on Windows. + * Fix bug in the alert sending function mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() + potentially leading to corrupted alert messages being sent in case + the function needs to be re-called after initially returning + MBEDTLS_SSL_WANT_WRITE. Fixes #1916. + * In configurations with MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled but none of + MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL, MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS or MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C, + DTLS handshakes using CID would crash due to a null pointer dereference. + Fix this. Fixes #3998. + * Fix incorrect documentation of mbedtls_x509_crt_profile. The previous + documentation stated that the `allowed_pks` field applies to signatures + only, but in fact it does apply to the public key type of the end entity + certificate, too. Fixes #1992. + * Fix PSA cipher multipart operations using ARC4. Previously, an IV was + required but discarded. Now, an IV is rejected, as it should be. + * Fix undefined behavior in mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(), where val is + not NULL and val_len is zero. + * psa_raw_key_agreement() now returns PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL when + applicable. Fixes #5735. + * Fix a bug in the x25519 example program where the removal of + MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT caused the program not to run. Fixes #4901 and + #3191. + * Encode X.509 dates before 1/1/2000 as UTCTime rather than + GeneralizedTime. Fixes #5465. + * Fix order value of curve x448. + * Fix string representation of DNs when outputting values containing commas + and other special characters, conforming to RFC 1779. Fixes #769. + * Silence a warning from GCC 12 in the selftest program. Fixes #5974. + * Fix mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi() writing an incorrect encoding of 0. + * Fix resource leaks in mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key() in low + memory conditions. + * Fix server connection identifier setting for outgoing encrypted records + on DTLS 1.2 session resumption. After DTLS 1.2 session resumption with + connection identifier, the Mbed TLS client now properly sends the server + connection identifier in encrypted record headers. Fix #5872. + * Fix a null pointer dereference when performing some operations on zero + represented with 0 limbs (specifically mbedtls_mpi_mod_int() dividing + by 2, and mbedtls_mpi_write_string() in base 2). + * Fix record sizes larger than 16384 being sometimes accepted despite being + non-compliant. This could not lead to a buffer overflow. In particular, + application data size was already checked correctly. + +Changes + * Assume source files are in UTF-8 when using MSVC with CMake. + += mbed TLS 2.28.0 branch released 2021-12-17 + +API changes + * Some fields of mbedtls_ssl_session and mbedtls_ssl_config are in a + different order. This only affects applications that define such + structures directly or serialize them. + +Requirement changes + * Sign-magnitude and one's complement representations for signed integers are + not supported. Two's complement is the only supported representation. + +Removals + * Remove config option MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES, + which allowed SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for certificate + signing. It was intended to facilitate the transition in environments + with SHA-1 certificates. SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and + its use constitutes a security risk. + * Remove the partial support for running unit tests via Greentea on Mbed OS, + which had been unmaintained since 2018. + +Features + * The identifier of the CID TLS extension can be configured by defining + MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID at compile time. + * Warn if errors from certain functions are ignored. This is currently + supported on GCC-like compilers and on MSVC and can be configured through + the macro MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN. The warnings are always enabled + (where supported) for critical functions where ignoring the return + value is almost always a bug. Enable the new configuration option + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING to get warnings for other functions. This + is currently implemented in the AES, DES and md modules, and will be + extended to other modules in the future. + * Add missing PSA macros declared by PSA Crypto API 1.0.0: + PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH, PSA_ALG_NONE, PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH, PSA_KEY_ID_NULL. + * Add new API mbedtls_ct_memcmp for constant time buffer comparison. + * Add PSA API definition for ARIA. + +Security + * Zeroize several intermediate variables used to calculate the expected + value when verifying a MAC or AEAD tag. This hardens the library in + case the value leaks through a memory disclosure vulnerability. For + example, a memory disclosure vulnerability could have allowed a + man-in-the-middle to inject fake ciphertext into a DTLS connection. + * In psa_cipher_generate_iv() and psa_cipher_encrypt(), do not read back + from the output buffer. This fixes a potential policy bypass or decryption + oracle vulnerability if the output buffer is in memory that is shared with + an untrusted application. + * Fix a double-free that happened after mbedtls_ssl_set_session() or + mbedtls_ssl_get_session() failed with MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED + (out of memory). After that, calling mbedtls_ssl_session_free() + and mbedtls_ssl_free() would cause an internal session buffer to + be free()'d twice. + +Bugfix + * Stop using reserved identifiers as local variables. Fixes #4630. + * The GNU makefiles invoke python3 in preference to python except on Windows. + The check was accidentally not performed when cross-compiling for Windows + on Linux. Fix this. Fixes #4774. + * Prevent divide by zero if either of PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE() or + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE() were called using an asymmetric key type. + * Fix a parameter set but unused in psa_crypto_cipher.c. Fixes #4935. + * Don't use the obsolete header path sys/fcntl.h in unit tests. + These header files cause compilation errors in musl. + Fixes #4969. + * Fix missing constraints on x86_64 and aarch64 assembly code + for bignum multiplication that broke some bignum operations with + (at least) Clang 12. + Fixes #4116, #4786, #4917, #4962. + * Fix mbedtls_cipher_crypt: AES-ECB when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. + * Failures of alternative implementations of AES or DES single-block + functions enabled with MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT, + MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT or MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT were ignored. + This does not concern the implementation provided with Mbed TLS, + where this function cannot fail, or full-module replacements with + MBEDTLS_AES_ALT or MBEDTLS_DES_ALT. Reported by Armelle Duboc in #1092. + * Some failures of HMAC operations were ignored. These failures could only + happen with an alternative implementation of the underlying hash module. + * Fix the error returned by psa_generate_key() for a public key. Fixes #4551. + * Fix the build of sample programs when neither MBEDTLS_ERROR_C nor + MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY is enabled. + * Fix PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS verification accepting an arbitrary salt length. + This algorithm now accepts only the same salt length for verification + that it produces when signing, as documented. Use the new algorithm + PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT to accept any salt length. Fixes #4946. + * The existing predicate macro name PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN is now reserved + for algorithm values that fully encode the hashing step, as per the PSA + Crypto API specification. This excludes PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW and + PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY. The new predicate macro PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH covers + all algorithms that can be used with psa_{sign,verify}_hash(), including + these two. + * Fix issue in Makefile on Linux with SHARED=1, that caused shared libraries + not to list other shared libraries they need. + * Fix a bug in mbedtls_gcm_starts() when the bit length of the iv + exceeds 2^32. Fixes #4884. + * Fix an uninitialized variable warning in test_suite_ssl.function with GCC + version 11. + * Fix the build when no SHA2 module is included. Fixes #4930. + * Fix the build when only the bignum module is included. Fixes #4929. + * Fix a potential invalid pointer dereference and infinite loop bugs in + pkcs12 functions when the password is empty. Fix the documentation to + better describe the inputs to these functions and their possible values. + Fixes #5136. + * The key usage flags PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE now allows the MAC + operations psa_mac_compute() and psa_mac_sign_setup(). + * The key usage flags PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE now allows the MAC + operations psa_mac_verify() and psa_mac_verify_setup(). + +Changes + * Set config option MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE to be + disabled by default. + * Improve the performance of base64 constant-flow code. The result is still + slower than the original non-constant-flow implementation, but much faster + than the previous constant-flow implementation. Fixes #4814. + * Indicate in the error returned if the nonce length used with + ChaCha20-Poly1305 is invalid, and not just unsupported. + * The mbedcrypto library includes a new source code module constant_time.c, + containing various functions meant to resist timing side channel attacks. + This module does not have a separate configuration option, and functions + from this module will be included in the build as required. Currently + most of the interface of this module is private and may change at any + time. + += mbed TLS 2.27.0 branch released 2021-07-07 + +API changes + * Update AEAD output size macros to bring them in line with the PSA Crypto + API version 1.0 spec. This version of the spec parameterizes them on the + key type used, as well as the key bit-size in the case of + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH. + The old versions of these macros were renamed and deprecated as follows: + - PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH -> PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_1_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG + * Implement one-shot cipher functions, psa_cipher_encrypt and + psa_cipher_decrypt, according to the PSA Crypto API 1.0.0 + specification. + +Requirement changes + * The library now uses the %zu format specifier with the printf() family of + functions, so requires a toolchain that supports it. This change does not + affect the maintained LTS branches, so when contributing changes please + bear this in mind and do not add them to backported code. + +Features + * Add mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext() function allowing to generate a + signature with a specific salt length. This function allows to validate + test cases provided in the NIST's CAVP test suite. Contributed by Cédric + Meuter in PR #3183. + * Added support for built-in driver keys through the PSA opaque crypto + driver interface. Refer to the documentation of + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS for more information. + * Implement psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message(). + * The new function mbedtls_mpi_random() generates a random value in a + given range uniformly. + * Implement psa_mac_compute() and psa_mac_verify() as defined in the + PSA Cryptograpy API 1.0.0 specification. + * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is now determined automatically from the configured + curves and no longer needs to be configured explicitly to save RAM. + +Security + * Fix a bias in the generation of finite-field Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) + private keys and of blinding values for DHM and elliptic curves (ECP) + computations. Reported by FlorianF89 in #4245. + * Fix a potential side channel vulnerability in ECDSA ephemeral key generation. + An adversary who is capable of very precise timing measurements could + learn partial information about the leading bits of the nonce used for the + signature, allowing the recovery of the private key after observing a + large number of signature operations. This completes a partial fix in + Mbed TLS 2.20.0. + * It was possible to configure MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS to a value that is + too small, leading to buffer overflows in ECC operations. Fail the build + in such a case. + * An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory + accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure + enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim + performing a single private-key operation. Found and reported by + Zili KOU, Wenjian HE, Sharad Sinha, and Wei ZHANG. + * An adversary with access to precise enough timing information (typically, a + co-located process) could recover a Curve25519 or Curve448 static ECDH key + after inputting a chosen public key and observing the victim performing the + corresponding private-key operation. Found and reported by Leila Batina, + Lukas Chmielewski, Björn Haase, Niels Samwel and Peter Schwabe. + +Bugfix + * Add printf function attributes to mbedtls_debug_print_msg to ensure we + get printf format specifier warnings. + * Fix premature fopen() call in mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file which may + lead to seed file corruption in the case where the path to the seed file is + equal to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE. Contributed by Victor + Krasnoshchok in #3616. + * PSA functions other than psa_open_key now return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + rather than PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST for an invalid handle, bringing them + in line with version 1.0.0 of the specification. Fix #4162. + * PSA functions creating a key now return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT rather + than PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE when the identifier specified for the key + to create is not valid, bringing them in line with version 1.0.0 of the + specification. Fix #4271. + * Fix some cases in the bignum module where the library constructed an + unintended representation of the value 0 which was not processed + correctly by some bignum operations. This could happen when + mbedtls_mpi_read_string() was called on "-0", or when + mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi() and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int() was called with one of + the arguments being negative and the other being 0. Fixes #4643. + * Fix a bug in ECDSA that would cause it to fail when the hash is all-bits + zero. Fixes #1792 + * Fix a compilation error when MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT is + defined. Fixes #4217. + * Fix an incorrect error code when parsing a PKCS#8 private key. + * In a TLS client, enforce the Diffie-Hellman minimum parameter size + set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen() precisely. Before, the + minimum size was rounded down to the nearest multiple of 8. + * In library/net_sockets.c, _POSIX_C_SOURCE and _XOPEN_SOURCE are + defined to specific values. If the code is used in a context + where these are already defined, this can result in a compilation + error. Instead, assume that if they are defined, the values will + be adequate to build Mbed TLS. + * The cipher suite TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 was not available + when SHA-1 was disabled and was offered when SHA-1 was enabled but SHA-384 + was disabled. Fix the dependency. Fixes #4472. + * Do not offer SHA384 cipher suites when SHA-384 is disabled. Fixes #4499. + * With MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled, some functions were getting built + nonetheless, resulting in undefined reference errors when building a + shared library. Reported by Guillermo Garcia M. in #4411. + * Fix test suite code on platforms where int32_t is not int, such as + Arm Cortex-M. Fixes #4530. + * Fix some issues affecting MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT implementations: a misplaced + directive in a header and a missing initialization in the self-test. + * Fix a missing initialization in the Camellia self-test, affecting + MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT implementations. + * Restore the ability to configure PSA via Mbed TLS options to support RSA + key pair operations but exclude RSA key generation. When MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + is not defined PSA will no longer attempt to use mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(). + Fixes #4512. + * Fix a regression introduced in 2.24.0 which broke (D)TLS CBC ciphersuites + (when the encrypt-then-MAC extension is not in use) with some ALT + implementations of the underlying hash (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384), causing + the affected side to wrongly reject valid messages. Fixes #4118. + * Remove outdated check-config.h check that prevented implementing the + timing module on Mbed OS. Fixes #4633. + * Fix PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF and PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS being too permissive + about missing inputs. + * Fix mbedtls_net_poll() and mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() often failing with + MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED on Windows. Fixes #4465. + * Fix a resource leak in a test suite with an alternative AES + implementation. Fixes #4176. + * Fix a crash in mbedtls_mpi_debug_mpi on a bignum having 0 limbs. This + could notably be triggered by setting the TLS debug level to 3 or above + and using a Montgomery curve for the key exchange. Reported by lhuang04 + in #4578. Fixes #4608. + * psa_verify_hash() was relying on implementation-specific behavior of + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() and was causing failures in some _ALT + implementations. This reliance is now removed. Fixes #3990. + * Disallow inputs of length different from the corresponding hash when + signing or verifying with PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS (The PSA Crypto API mandates + that PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS uses the same hash throughout the algorithm.) + * Fix a null pointer dereference when mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod() was called with + A=0 represented with 0 limbs. Up to and including Mbed TLS 2.26, this bug + could not be triggered by code that constructed A with one of the + mbedtls_mpi_read_xxx functions (including in particular TLS code) since + those always built an mpi object with at least one limb. + Credit to OSS-Fuzz. Fixes #4641. + * Fix mbedtls_mpi_gcd(G,A,B) when the value of B is zero. This had no + effect on Mbed TLS's internal use of mbedtls_mpi_gcd(), but may affect + applications that call mbedtls_mpi_gcd() directly. Fixes #4642. + * The PSA API no longer allows the creation or destruction of keys with a + read-only lifetime. The persistence level PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY + can now only be used as intended, for keys that cannot be modified through + normal use of the API. + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is enabled, crypto_spe.h was not included + in all the right places. Include it from crypto_platform.h, which is + the natural place. Fixes #4649. + * mbedtls_pk_sign() and mbedtls_pk_verify() and their extended and + restartable variants now always honor the specified hash length if + nonzero. Before, for RSA, hash_len was ignored in favor of the length of + the specified hash algorithm. + * Fix which alert is sent in some cases to conform to the + applicable RFC: on an invalid Finished message value, an + invalid max_fragment_length extension, or an + unsupported extension used by the server. + * Correct (change from 12 to 13 bytes) the value of the macro describing the + maximum nonce length returned by psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + +Changes + * Add extra printf compiler warning flags to builds. + * Fix memsan build false positive in x509_crt.c with Clang 11 + * Fix the setting of the read timeout in the DTLS sample programs. + * Remove the AES sample application programs/aes/aescrypt2 which shows + bad cryptographic practice. Fix #1906. + * Alternative implementations of CMAC may now opt to not support 3DES as a + CMAC block cipher, and still pass the CMAC self test. + * Remove configs/config-psa-crypto.h, which was identical to the default + configuration except for having some extra cryptographic mechanisms + enabled and for unintended differences. This configuration was primarily + intended to demonstrate the PSA API, and lost most of its usefulness when + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C became enabled by default. + * When building the test suites with GNU make, invoke python3 or python, not + python2, which is no longer supported upstream. + * When using session cache based session resumption on the server, + double-check that custom session cache implementations return + sessions which are consistent with the negotiated ciphersuite + and compression method. + * Fix build failure on MinGW toolchain when __USE_MING_ANSI_STDIO is on. + When that flag is on, standard GNU C printf format specifiers + should be used. + * Reduce the default value of MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE. This reduces RAM usage + during ECC operations at a negligible performance cost. + * mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(), mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le() and + mbedtls_mpi_read_string() now construct an mbedtls_mpi object with 0 limbs + when their input has length 0. Note that this is an implementation detail + and can change at any time, so this change should be transparent, but it + may result in mbedtls_mpi_write_binary() or mbedtls_mpi_write_string() + now writing an empty string where it previously wrote one or more + zero digits when operating from values constructed with an mpi_read + function and some mpi operations. + * Implicitly add PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE key usage policy flag when + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH flag is set and PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE flag + when PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH flag is set. This usage flag extension + is also applied when loading a key from storage. + += mbed TLS 2.26.0 branch released 2021-03-08 + +API changes + * Renamed the PSA Crypto API output buffer size macros to bring them in line + with version 1.0.0 of the specification. + * The API glue function mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa() now takes the curve size + in bits rather than bytes, with an additional flag to indicate if the + size may have been rounded up to a whole number of bytes. + * Renamed the PSA Crypto API AEAD tag length macros to bring them in line + with version 1.0.0 of the specification. + +Default behavior changes + * In mbedtls_rsa_context objects, the ver field was formerly documented + as always 0. It is now reserved for internal purposes and may take + different values. + +New deprecations + * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE, PSA_HASH_SIZE, PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE, + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE and + PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN have been renamed, and the old names + deprecated. + * PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH and PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH + have been renamed, and the old names deprecated. + +Features + * The PSA crypto subsystem can now use HMAC_DRBG instead of CTR_DRBG. + CTR_DRBG is used by default if it is available, but you can override + this choice by setting MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE at compile time. + Fix #3354. + * Automatic fallback to a software implementation of ECP when + MBEDTLS_ECP_xxx_ALT accelerator hooks are in use can now be turned off + through setting the new configuration flag MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK. + * The PSA crypto subsystem can now be configured to use less static RAM by + tweaking the setting for the maximum amount of keys simultaneously in RAM. + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT sets the maximum number of volatile keys that + can exist simultaneously. It has a sensible default if not overridden. + * Partial implementation of the PSA crypto driver interface: Mbed TLS can + now use an external random generator instead of the library's own + entropy collection and DRBG code. Enable MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + and see the documentation of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() for details. + * Applications using both mbedtls_xxx and psa_xxx functions (for example, + applications using TLS and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) can now use the PSA + random generator with mbedtls_xxx functions. See the documentation of + mbedtls_psa_get_random() for details. + * In the PSA API, the policy for a MAC or AEAD algorithm can specify a + minimum MAC or tag length thanks to the new wildcards + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC and + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG. + +Security + * Fix a security reduction in CTR_DRBG when the initial seeding obtained a + nonce from entropy. Applications were affected if they called + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(), if they called + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() with a size that was 3/2 times the key + length, or when the entropy module uses SHA-256 and CTR_DRBG uses AES-256. + In such cases, a random nonce was necessary to achieve the advertised + security strength, but the code incorrectly used a constant instead of + entropy from the nonce. + Found by John Stroebel in #3819 and fixed in #3973. + * Fix a buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when calculating + |A| - |B| where |B| is larger than |A| and has more limbs (so the + function should return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE). Only + applications calling mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() directly are affected: + all calls inside the library were safe since this function is + only called with |A| >= |B|. Reported by Guido Vranken in #4042. + * Fix an errorneous estimation for an internal buffer in + mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(). If MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is set to an odd + value the function might fail to write a private RSA keys of the largest + supported size. + Found by Daniel Otte, reported in #4093 and fixed in #4094. + * Fix a stack buffer overflow with mbedtls_net_poll() and + mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() when given a file descriptor that is + beyond FD_SETSIZE. Reported by FigBug in #4169. + * Guard against strong local side channel attack against base64 tables by + making access aceess to them use constant flow code. + +Bugfix + * Fix use-after-scope error in programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c and ssl_server2.c + * Fix memory leak that occured when calling psa_close_key() on a + wrapped key with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined. + * Fix an incorrect error code if an RSA private operation glitched. + * Fix a memory leak in an error case in psa_generate_derived_key_internal(). + * Fix a resource leak in CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + is enabled, on platforms where initializing a mutex allocates resources. + This was a regression introduced in the previous release. Reported in + #4017, #4045 and #4071. + * Ensure that calling mbedtls_rsa_free() or mbedtls_entropy_free() + twice is safe. This happens for RSA when some Mbed TLS library functions + fail. Such a double-free was not safe when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C was + enabled on platforms where freeing a mutex twice is not safe. + * Fix a resource leak in a bad-arguments case of mbedtls_rsa_gen_key() + when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled on platforms where initializing + a mutex allocates resources. + * Fixes a bug where, if the library was configured to include support for + both the old SE interface and the new PSA driver interface, external keys were + not loaded from storage. This was fixed by #3996. + * This change makes 'mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints' + consistent with RFC 5280 4.2.1.9 which says: "Conforming CAs MUST + include this extension in all CA certificates that contain public keys + used to validate digital signatures on certificates and MUST mark the + extension as critical in such certificates." Previous to this change, + the extension was always marked as non-critical. This was fixed by + #3698. + +Changes + * A new library C file psa_crypto_client.c has been created to contain + the PSA code needed by a PSA crypto client when the PSA crypto + implementation is not included into the library. + * On recent enough versions of FreeBSD and DragonFlyBSD, the entropy module + now uses the getrandom syscall instead of reading from /dev/urandom. + += mbed TLS 2.25.0 branch released 2020-12-11 + +API changes + * The numerical values of the PSA Crypto API macros have been updated to + conform to version 1.0.0 of the specification. + * PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER replaces PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 and PSA_ALG_ARC4. + The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4). + * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() no longer accept NIST_KW contexts, + as they have no way to check if the output buffer is large enough. + Please use mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() instead. Credit to OSS-Fuzz and + Cryptofuzz. Fixes #3665. + +Requirement changes + * Update the minimum required CMake version to 2.8.12. This silences a + warning on CMake 3.19.0. #3801 + +New deprecations + * PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 and PSA_ALG_ARC4 have been deprecated. + Use PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER instead. + * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() are deprecated in favour of the new + functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). Please note that with AEAD ciphers, + these new functions always append the tag to the ciphertext, and include + the tag in the ciphertext length. + +Features + * Partial implementation of the new PSA Crypto accelerator APIs. (Symmetric + ciphers, asymmetric signing/verification and key generation, validate_key + entry point, and export_public_key interface.) + * Add support for ECB to the PSA cipher API. + * In PSA, allow using a key declared with a base key agreement algorithm + in combined key agreement and derivation operations, as long as the key + agreement algorithm in use matches the algorithm the key was declared with. + This is currently non-standard behaviour, but expected to make it into a + future revision of the PSA Crypto standard. + * Add MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX CMake variable, which is prefixed to the mbedtls, + mbedcrypto, mbedx509 and apidoc CMake target names. This can be used by + external CMake projects that include this one to avoid CMake target name + clashes. The default value of this variable is "", so default target names + are unchanged. + * Add support for DTLS-SRTP as defined in RFC 5764. Contributed by Johan + Pascal, improved by Ron Eldor. + * In the PSA API, it is no longer necessary to open persistent keys: + operations now accept the key identifier. The type psa_key_handle_t is now + identical to psa_key_id_t instead of being platform-defined. This bridges + the last major gap to compliance with the PSA Cryptography specification + version 1.0.0. Opening persistent keys is still supported for backward + compatibility, but will be deprecated and later removed in future + releases. + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH, PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE, PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH and + PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE macros have been added as defined in version + 1.0.0 of the PSA Crypto API specification. + +Security + * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() would write past the minimum documented + size of the output buffer when used with NIST_KW. As a result, code using + those functions as documented with NIST_KW could have a buffer overwrite + of up to 15 bytes, with consequences ranging up to arbitrary code + execution depending on the location of the output buffer. + * Limit the size of calculations performed by mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod to + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE to prevent a potential denial of service when + generating Diffie-Hellman key pairs. Credit to OSS-Fuzz. + * A failure of the random generator was ignored in mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(), + which is how most uses of randomization in asymmetric cryptography + (including key generation, intermediate value randomization and blinding) + are implemented. This could cause failures or the silent use of non-random + values. A random generator can fail if it needs reseeding and cannot not + obtain entropy, or due to an internal failure (which, for Mbed TLS's own + CTR_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG, can only happen due to a misconfiguration). + * Fix a compliance issue whereby we were not checking the tag on the + algorithm parameters (only the size) when comparing the signature in the + description part of the cert to the real signature. This meant that a + NULL algorithm parameters entry would look identical to an array of REAL + (size zero) to the library and thus the certificate would be considered + valid. However, if the parameters do not match in *any* way then the + certificate should be considered invalid, and indeed OpenSSL marks these + certs as invalid when mbedtls did not. + Many thanks to guidovranken who found this issue via differential fuzzing + and reported it in #3629. + * Zeroising of local buffers and variables which are used for calculations + in mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(), mbedtls_internal_sha*_process(), + mbedtls_internal_md*_process() and mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() + functions to erase sensitive data from memory. Reported by + Johan Malmgren and Johan Uppman Bruce from Sectra. + +Bugfix + * Fix an invalid (but non-zero) return code from mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey() + when the input has trailing garbage. Fixes #2512. + * Fix build failure in configurations where MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is + enabled but ECDSA is disabled. Contributed by jdurkop. Fixes #3294. + * Include the psa_constant_names generated source code in the source tree + instead of generating it at build time. Fixes #3524. + * Fix rsa_prepare_blinding() to retry when the blinding value is not + invertible (mod N), instead of returning MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED. This + addresses a regression but is rare in practice (approx. 1 in 2/sqrt(N)). + Found by Synopsys Coverity, fix contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). + Fixes #3647. + * Use socklen_t on Android and other POSIX-compliant system + * Fix the build when the macro _GNU_SOURCE is defined to a non-empty value. + Fix #3432. + * Consistently return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT on invalid cipher input + sizes (instead of PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE in some cases) to make the + psa_cipher_* functions compliant with the PSA Crypto API specification. + * mbedtls_ecp_curve_list() now lists Curve25519 and Curve448 under the names + "x25519" and "x448". These curves support ECDH but not ECDSA. If you need + only the curves that support ECDSA, filter the list with + mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(). + * Fix psa_generate_key() returning an error when asked to generate + an ECC key pair on Curve25519 or secp244k1. + * Fix psa_key_derivation_output_key() to allow the output of a combined key + agreement and subsequent key derivation operation to be used as a key + inside of the PSA Crypto core. + * Fix handling of EOF against 0xff bytes and on platforms with unsigned + chars. Fixes a build failure on platforms where char is unsigned. Fixes + #3794. + * Fix an off-by-one error in the additional data length check for + CCM, which allowed encryption with a non-standard length field. + Fixes #3719. + * Correct the default IV size for mbedtls_cipher_info_t structures using + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB to 0, since ECB mode ciphers don't use IVs. + * Make arc4random_buf available on NetBSD and OpenBSD when _POSIX_C_SOURCE is + defined. Fix contributed in #3571. + * Fix conditions for including string.h in error.c. Fixes #3866. + * psa_set_key_id() now also sets the lifetime to persistent for keys located + in a secure element. + * Attempting to create a volatile key with a non-zero key identifier now + fails. Previously the key identifier was just ignored when creating a + volatile key. + * Attempting to create or register a key with a key identifier in the vendor + range now fails. + * Fix build failures on GCC 11. Fixes #3782. + * Add missing arguments of debug message in mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf. + * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when the result was negative + (an error condition) and the second operand was aliased to the result. + * Fix a case in elliptic curve arithmetic where an out-of-memory condition + could go undetected, resulting in an incorrect result. + * In CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG, don't reset the reseed interval in seed(). + Fixes #2927. + * In PEM writing functions, fill the trailing part of the buffer with null + bytes. This guarantees that the corresponding parsing function can read + the buffer back, which was the case for mbedtls_x509write_{crt,csr}_pem + until this property was inadvertently broken in Mbed TLS 2.19.0. + Fixes #3682. + * Fix a build failure that occurred with the MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT + option on. In this configuration key management methods that are required + for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS were excluded from the build and made it fail. + Fixes #3818. Reported by John Stroebel. + +Changes + * Reduce stack usage significantly during sliding window exponentiation. + Reported in #3591 and fix contributed in #3592 by Daniel Otte. + * The PSA persistent storage format is updated to always store the key bits + attribute. No automatic upgrade path is provided. Previously stored keys + must be erased, or manually upgraded based on the key storage format + specification (docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md). + Fixes #3740. + * Remove the zeroization of a pointer variable in AES rounds. It was valid + but spurious and misleading since it looked like a mistaken attempt to + zeroize the pointed-to buffer. Reported by Antonio de la Piedra, CEA + Leti, France. + += mbed TLS 2.24.0 branch released 2020-09-01 + +API changes + * In the PSA API, rename the types of elliptic curve and Diffie-Hellman + group families to psa_ecc_family_t and psa_dh_family_t, in line with the + PSA Crypto API specification version 1.0.0. + Rename associated macros as well: + PSA_ECC_CURVE_xxx renamed to PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx + PSA_DH_GROUP_xxx renamed to PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx + PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE renamed to to PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY + PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_GROUP renamed to PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY + +Default behavior changes + * Stop storing persistent information about externally stored keys created + through PSA Crypto with a volatile lifetime. Reported in #3288 and + contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3382. + +Features + * The new function mbedtls_ecp_write_key() exports private ECC keys back to + a byte buffer. It is the inverse of the existing mbedtls_ecp_read_key(). + * Support building on e2k (Elbrus) architecture: correctly enable + -Wformat-signedness, and fix the code that causes signed-one-bit-field + and sign-compare warnings. Contributed by makise-homura (Igor Molchanov) + . + +Security + * Fix a vulnerability in the verification of X.509 certificates when + matching the expected common name (the cn argument of + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify()) with the actual certificate name: when the + subjecAltName extension is present, the expected name was compared to any + name in that extension regardless of its type. This means that an + attacker could for example impersonate a 4-bytes or 16-byte domain by + getting a certificate for the corresponding IPv4 or IPv6 (this would + require the attacker to control that IP address, though). Similar attacks + using other subjectAltName name types might be possible. Found and + reported by kFYatek in #3498. + * When checking X.509 CRLs, a certificate was only considered as revoked if + its revocationDate was in the past according to the local clock if + available. In particular, on builds without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE, + certificates were never considered as revoked. On builds with + MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE, an attacker able to control the local clock (for + example, an untrusted OS attacking a secure enclave) could prevent + revocation of certificates via CRLs. Fixed by no longer checking the + revocationDate field, in accordance with RFC 5280. Reported by + yuemonangong in #3340. Reported independently and fixed by + Raoul Strackx and Jethro Beekman in #3433. + * In (D)TLS record decryption, when using a CBC ciphersuites without the + Encrypt-then-Mac extension, use constant code flow memory access patterns + to extract and check the MAC. This is an improvement to the existing + countermeasure against Lucky 13 attacks. The previous countermeasure was + effective against network-based attackers, but less so against local + attackers. The new countermeasure defends against local attackers, even + if they have access to fine-grained measurements. In particular, this + fixes a local Lucky 13 cache attack found and reported by Tuba Yavuz, + Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihan) Bai, Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler + (University of Florida) and Dave Tian (Purdue University). + * Fix side channel in RSA private key operations and static (finite-field) + Diffie-Hellman. An adversary with precise enough timing and memory access + information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure + enclave) could bypass an existing counter-measure (base blinding) and + potentially fully recover the private key. + * Fix a 1-byte buffer overread in mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(). + Credit to OSS-Fuzz for detecting the problem and to Philippe Antoine + for pinpointing the problematic code. + * Zeroising of plaintext buffers in mbedtls_ssl_read() to erase unused + application data from memory. Reported in #689 by + Johan Uppman Bruce of Sectra. + +Bugfix + * Library files installed after a CMake build no longer have execute + permission. + * Use local labels in mbedtls_padlock_has_support() to fix an invalid symbol + redefinition if the function is inlined. + Reported in #3451 and fix contributed in #3452 by okhowang. + * Fix the endianness of Curve25519 keys imported/exported through the PSA + APIs. psa_import_key and psa_export_key will now correctly expect/output + Montgomery keys in little-endian as defined by RFC7748. Contributed by + Steven Cooreman in #3425. + * Fix build errors when the only enabled elliptic curves are Montgomery + curves. Raised by signpainter in #941 and by Taiki-San in #1412. This + also fixes missing declarations reported by Steven Cooreman in #1147. + * Fix self-test failure when the only enabled short Weierstrass elliptic + curve is secp192k1. Fixes #2017. + * PSA key import will now correctly import a Curve25519/Curve448 public key + instead of erroring out. Contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3492. + * Use arc4random_buf on NetBSD instead of rand implementation with cyclical + lower bits. Fix contributed in #3540. + * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_md_setup() when using HMAC under low memory + conditions. Reported and fix suggested by Guido Vranken in #3486. + * Fix bug in redirection of unit test outputs on platforms where stdout is + defined as a macro. First reported in #2311 and fix contributed in #3528. + +Changes + * Only pass -Wformat-signedness to versions of GCC that support it. Reported + in #3478 and fix contributed in #3479 by okhowang. + * Reduce the stack consumption of mbedtls_x509write_csr_der() which + previously could lead to stack overflow on constrained devices. + Contributed by Doru Gucea and Simon Leet in #3464. + * Undefine the ASSERT macro before defining it locally, in case it is defined + in a platform header. Contributed by Abdelatif Guettouche in #3557. + * Update copyright notices to use Linux Foundation guidance. As a result, + the copyright of contributors other than Arm is now acknowledged, and the + years of publishing are no longer tracked in the source files. This also + eliminates the need for the lines declaring the files to be part of + MbedTLS. Fixes #3457. + * Add the command line parameter key_pwd to the ssl_client2 and ssl_server2 + example applications which allows to provide a password for the key file + specified through the existing key_file argument. This allows the use of + these applications with password-protected key files. Analogously but for + ssl_server2 only, add the command line parameter key_pwd2 which allows to + set a password for the key file provided through the existing key_file2 + argument. + += mbed TLS 2.23.0 branch released 2020-07-01 + +Default behavior changes + * In the experimental PSA secure element interface, change the encoding of + key lifetimes to encode a persistence level and the location. Although C + prototypes do not effectively change, code calling + psa_register_se_driver() must be modified to pass the driver's location + instead of the keys' lifetime. If the library is upgraded on an existing + device, keys created with the old lifetime value will not be readable or + removable through Mbed TLS after the upgrade. + +Features + * New functions in the error module return constant strings for + high- and low-level error codes, complementing mbedtls_strerror() + which constructs a string for any error code, including compound + ones, but requires a writable buffer. Contributed by Gaurav Aggarwal + in #3176. + * The new utility programs/ssl/ssl_context_info prints a human-readable + dump of an SSL context saved with mbedtls_ssl_context_save(). + * Add support for midipix, a POSIX layer for Microsoft Windows. + * Add new mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine which allows + parsing unsupported certificate extensions via user provided callback. + Contributed by Nicola Di Lieto in #3243 as + a solution to #3241. + * Pass the "certificate policies" extension to the callback supplied to + mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() if it contains unsupported + policies (#3419). + * Added support to entropy_poll for the kern.arandom syscall supported on + some BSD systems. Contributed by Nia Alarie in #3423. + * Add support for Windows 2000 in net_sockets. Contributed by opatomic. #3239 + +Security + * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could + reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. Noticed by Sangho Lee, + Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim and Hyesoon Kim (Georgia Institute + of Technology); and Marcus Peinado (Microsoft Research). Reported by Raoul + Strackx (Fortanix) in #3394. + * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and + mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a + private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as + mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL + f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and + memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system + attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. + Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley. + * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when + hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT + macros). This would cause the original Lucky 13 attack to be possible in + those configurations, allowing an active network attacker to recover + plaintext after repeated timing measurements under some conditions. + Reported and fix suggested by Luc Perneel in #3246. + +Bugfix + * Fix the Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration for mbedtls itself. + Completes a previous fix in Mbed TLS 2.19 that only fixed the build for + the example programs. Reported in #1430 and fix contributed by irwir. + * Fix undefined behavior in X.509 certificate parsing if the + pathLenConstraint basic constraint value is equal to INT_MAX. + The actual effect with almost every compiler is the intended + behavior, so this is unlikely to be exploitable anywhere. #3192 + * Fix issue with a detected HW accelerated record error not being exposed + due to shadowed variable. Contributed by Sander Visser in #3310. + * Avoid NULL pointer dereferencing if mbedtls_ssl_free() is called with a + NULL pointer argument. Contributed by Sander Visser in #3312. + * Fix potential linker errors on dual world platforms by inlining + mbedtls_gcc_group_to_psa(). This allows the pk.c module to link separately + from psa_crypto.c. Fixes #3300. + * Remove dead code in X.509 certificate parsing. Contributed by irwir in + #2855. + * Include asn1.h in error.c. Fixes #3328 reported by David Hu. + * Fix potential memory leaks in ecp_randomize_jac() and ecp_randomize_mxz() + when PRNG function fails. Contributed by Jonas Lejeune in #3318. + * Remove unused macros from MSVC projects. Reported in #3297 and fix + submitted in #3333 by irwir. + * Add additional bounds checks in ssl_write_client_hello() preventing + output buffer overflow if the configuration declared a buffer that was + too small. + * Set _POSIX_C_SOURCE to at least 200112L in C99 code. Reported in #3420 and + fix submitted in #3421 by Nia Alarie. + * Fix building library/net_sockets.c and the ssl_mail_client program on + NetBSD. Contributed by Nia Alarie in #3422. + * Fix false positive uninitialised variable reported by cpp-check. + Contributed by Sander Visser in #3311. + * Update iv and len context pointers manually when reallocating buffers + using the MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH feature. This caused issues + when receiving a connection with CID, when these fields were shifted + in ssl_parse_record_header(). + +Changes + * Fix warnings about signedness issues in format strings. The build is now + clean of -Wformat-signedness warnings. Contributed by Kenneth Soerensen + in #3153. + * Fix minor performance issue in operations on Curve25519 caused by using a + suboptimal modular reduction in one place. Found and fix contributed by + Aurelien Jarno in #3209. + * Combine identical cases in switch statements in md.c. Contributed + by irwir in #3208. + * Simplify a bounds check in ssl_write_certificate_request(). Contributed + by irwir in #3150. + * Unify the example programs termination to call mbedtls_exit() instead of + using a return command. This has been done to enable customization of the + behavior in bare metal environments. + * Fix mbedtls_x509_dn_gets to escape non-ASCII characters as "?". + Contributed by Koh M. Nakagawa in #3326. + * Use FindPython3 when cmake version >= 3.15.0 + * Abort the ClientHello writing function as soon as some extension doesn't + fit into the record buffer. Previously, such extensions were silently + dropped. As a consequence, the TLS handshake now fails when the output + buffer is not large enough to hold the ClientHello. + * The unit tests now rely on header files in tests/include/test and source + files in tests/src. When building with make or cmake, the files in + tests/src are compiled and the resulting object linked into each test + executable. + * The ECP module, enabled by `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`, now depends on + `MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C` or `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C` for some side-channel + coutermeasures. If side channels are not a concern, this dependency can + be avoided by enabling the new option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG`. + * Align MSVC error flag with GCC and Clang. Contributed by Carlos Gomes + Martinho. #3147 + * Remove superfluous assignment in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(). Reported + in #3182 and fix submitted by irwir. #3217 + * Fix typo in XTS tests. Reported and fix submitted by Kxuan. #3319 + += mbed TLS 2.22.0 branch released 2020-04-14 + +New deprecations + * Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL that enables function hooks in the + SSL module for hardware acceleration of individual records. + * Deprecate mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() in favour of + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() and + mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() to be more precise about which max + fragment length is desired. + +Security + * Fix issue in DTLS handling of new associations with the same parameters + (RFC 6347 section 4.2.8): an attacker able to send forged UDP packets to + the server could cause it to drop established associations with + legitimate clients, resulting in a Denial of Service. This could only + happen when MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE was enabled in config.h + (which it is by default). + * Fix side channel in ECC code that allowed an adversary with access to + precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an + untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) to fully recover + an ECDSA private key. Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, + Billy Brumley and Cesar Pereida Garcia. CVE-2020-10932 + * Fix a potentially remotely exploitable buffer overread in a + DTLS client when parsing the Hello Verify Request message. + +Features + * The new build option MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH automatically + resizes the I/O buffers before and after handshakes, reducing the memory + consumption during application data transfer. + +Bugfix + * Fix compilation failure when both MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and + MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL are enabled. + * Remove a spurious check in ssl_parse_client_psk_identity that triggered + a warning with some compilers. Fix contributed by irwir in #2856. + * Fix a function name in a debug message. Contributed by Ercan Ozturk in + #3013. + +Changes + * Mbed Crypto is no longer a Git submodule. The crypto part of the library + is back directly in the present repository. + * Split mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() into + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() and + mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() to ensure that a sufficient input + buffer is allocated by the server (if MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + is defined), regardless of what MFL was configured for it. + += mbed TLS 2.21.0 branch released 2020-02-20 + +New deprecations + * Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO that enables parsing + SSLv2 ClientHello messages. + * Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 that enables support for SSLv3. + * Deprecate for MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C, the wrapper around the pkcs11-helper + library which allows TLS authentication to use keys stored in a + PKCS#11 token such as a smartcard. + +Security + * Fix potential memory overread when performing an ECDSA signature + operation. The overread only happens with cryptographically low + probability (of the order of 2^-n where n is the bitsize of the curve) + unless the RNG is broken, and could result in information disclosure or + denial of service (application crash or extra resource consumption). + Found by Auke Zeilstra and Peter Schwabe, using static analysis. + * To avoid a side channel vulnerability when parsing an RSA private key, + read all the CRT parameters from the DER structure rather than + reconstructing them. Found by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob + Brumley. Reported and fix contributed by Jack Lloyd. + ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#352 + +Features + * The new build option MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 allows building SHA-512 + support without SHA-384. + +API changes + * Change the encoding of key types and curves in the PSA API. The new + values are aligned with the upcoming release of the PSA Crypto API + specification version 1.0.0. The main change which may break some + existing code is that elliptic curve key types no longer encode the + exact curve: a psa_ecc_curve_t or psa_key_type_t value only encodes + a curve family and the key size determines the exact curve (for example, + PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1 with 256 bits is P256R1). ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#330 + +Bugfix + * Fix an unchecked call to mbedtls_md() in the x509write module. + * Fix build failure with MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT enabled. Reported by + Jack Lloyd in #2859. Fix submitted by jiblime in #2963. + * Fix some false-positive uninitialized variable warnings in X.509. Fix + contributed by apple-ihack-geek in #2663. + * Fix a possible error code mangling in psa_mac_verify_finish() when + a cryptographic accelerator fails. ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#345 + * Fix a bug in mbedtls_pk_parse_key() that would cause it to accept some + RSA keys that would later be rejected by functions expecting private + keys. Found by Catena cyber using oss-fuzz (issue 20467). + * Fix a bug in mbedtls_pk_parse_key() that would cause it to + accept some RSA keys with invalid values by silently fixing those values. + += mbed TLS 2.20.0 branch released 2020-01-15 + +Default behavior changes + * The initial seeding of a CTR_DRBG instance makes a second call to the + entropy function to obtain entropy for a nonce if the entropy size is less + than 3/2 times the key size. In case you want to disable the extra call to + grab entropy, you can call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() to force the + nonce length to 0. + +Security + * Enforce that mbedtls_entropy_func() gathers a total of + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes or more from strong sources. In the + default configuration, on a platform with a single entropy source, the + entropy module formerly only grabbed 32 bytes, which is good enough for + security if the source is genuinely strong, but less than the expected 64 + bytes (size of the entropy accumulator). + * Zeroize local variables in mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() and + mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() before exiting the function. The value of + these variables can be used to recover the last round key. To follow best + practice and to limit the impact of buffer overread vulnerabilities (like + Heartbleed) we need to zeroize them before exiting the function. + Issue reported by Tuba Yavuz, Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihang) Bai, + Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler (University of Florida) and + Dave Tian (Purdue University). + * Fix side channel vulnerability in ECDSA. Our bignum implementation is not + constant time/constant trace, so side channel attacks can retrieve the + blinded value, factor it (as it is smaller than RSA keys and not guaranteed + to have only large prime factors), and then, by brute force, recover the + key. Reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley. + * Fix side channel vulnerability in ECDSA key generation. Obtaining precise + timings on the comparison in the key generation enabled the attacker to + learn leading bits of the ephemeral key used during ECDSA signatures and to + recover the private key. Reported by Jeremy Dubeuf. + * Catch failure of AES functions in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(). Uncaught + failures could happen with alternative implementations of AES. Bug + reported and fix proposed by Johan Uppman Bruce and Christoffer Lauri, + Sectra. + +Features + * Key derivation inputs in the PSA API can now either come from a key object + or from a buffer regardless of the step type. + * The CTR_DRBG module can grab a nonce from the entropy source during the + initial seeding. The default nonce length is chosen based on the key size + to achieve the security strength defined by NIST SP 800-90A. You can + change it with mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). + * Add ENUMERATED tag support to the ASN.1 module. Contributed by + msopiha-linaro in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#307. + +API changes + * In the PSA API, forbid zero-length keys. To pass a zero-length input to a + key derivation function, use a buffer instead (this is now always + possible). + * Rename psa_asymmetric_sign() to psa_sign_hash() and + psa_asymmetric_verify() to psa_verify_hash(). + +Bugfix + * Fix an incorrect size in a debugging message. Reported and fix + submitted by irwir. Fixes #2717. + * Fix an unused variable warning when compiling without DTLS. + Reported and fix submitted by irwir. Fixes #2800. + * Remove a useless assignment. Reported and fix submitted by irwir. + Fixes #2801. + * Fix a buffer overflow in the PSA HMAC code when using a long key with an + unsupported algorithm. Fixes ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#254. + * Fix mbedtls_asn1_get_int to support any number of leading zeros. Credit + to OSS-Fuzz for finding a bug in an intermediate version of the fix. + * Fix mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null to correctly parse bitstrings of at + most 2 bytes. + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() and + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len() now work if you call them before + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(). + +Changes + * Remove the technical possibility to define custom mbedtls_md_info + structures, which was exposed only in an internal header. + * psa_close_key(0) and psa_destroy_key(0) now succeed (doing nothing, as + before). + * Variables containing error codes are now initialized to an error code + rather than success, so that coding mistakes or memory corruption tends to + cause functions to return this error code rather than a success. There are + no known instances where this changes the behavior of the library: this is + merely a robustness improvement. ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#323 + * Remove a useless call to mbedtls_ecp_group_free(). Contributed by + Alexander Krizhanovsky in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#210. + * Speed up PBKDF2 by caching the digest calculation. Contributed by Jack + Lloyd and Fortanix Inc in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#277. + * Small performance improvement of mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(). Contributed by + Alexander Krizhanovsky in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#308. + += mbed TLS 2.19.1 branch released 2019-09-16 + +Features + * Declare include headers as PUBLIC to propagate to CMake project consumers + Contributed by Zachary J. Fields in PR #2949. + * Add nss_keylog to ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, enabling easier analysis of + TLS sessions with tools like Wireshark. + +API Changes + * Make client_random and server_random const in + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t, so that the key exporter is discouraged + from modifying the client/server hello. + +Bugfix + * Fix some false-positive uninitialized variable warnings in crypto. Fix + contributed by apple-ihack-geek in #2663. + += mbed TLS 2.19.0 branch released 2019-09-06 + +Security + * Fix a missing error detection in ECJPAKE. This could have caused a + predictable shared secret if a hardware accelerator failed and the other + side of the key exchange had a similar bug. + * When writing a private EC key, use a constant size for the private + value, as specified in RFC 5915. Previously, the value was written + as an ASN.1 INTEGER, which caused the size of the key to leak + about 1 bit of information on average and could cause the value to be + 1 byte too large for the output buffer. + * The deterministic ECDSA calculation reused the scheme's HMAC-DRBG to + implement blinding. Because of this for the same key and message the same + blinding value was generated. This reduced the effectiveness of the + countermeasure and leaked information about the private key through side + channels. Reported by Jack Lloyd. + +Features + * Add new API functions mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and + mbedtls_ssl_session_load() to allow serializing a session, for example to + store it in non-volatile storage, and later using it for TLS session + resumption. + * Add a new API function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() to allow checking that + an incoming record is valid, authentic and has not been seen before. This + feature can be used alongside Connection ID and SSL context serialisation. + The feature is enabled at compile-time by MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + option. + * New implementation of X25519 (ECDH using Curve25519) from Project Everest + (https://project-everest.github.io/). It can be enabled at compile time + with MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED. This implementation is formally + verified and significantly faster, but is only supported on x86 platforms + (32-bit and 64-bit) using GCC, Clang or Visual Studio. Contributed by + Christoph Wintersteiger from Microsoft Research. + * Add mbedtls_net_close(), enabling the building of forking servers where + the parent process closes the client socket and continue accepting, and + the child process closes the listening socket and handles the client + socket. Contributed by Robert Larsen in #2803. + +API Changes + * Add DER-encoded test CRTs to library/certs.c, allowing + the example programs ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 to be run + if MBEDTLS_FS_IO and MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C are unset. Fixes #2254. + * The HAVEGE state type now uses uint32_t elements instead of int. + * The functions mbedtls_ecp_curve_list() and mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list() now + list all curves for which at least one of ECDH or ECDSA is supported, not + just curves for which both are supported. Call mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() or + mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() on each result to check whether each algorithm is + supported. + * The new function mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is similar to + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() but allows passing an external RNG for the + purpose of blinding. + +New deprecations + * Deprecate mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() in favor of a functions that can take an + RNG function as an input. + * Calling mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() with NULL as the f_rng argument + is now deprecated. + +Bugfix + * Fix missing bounds checks in X.509 parsing functions that could + lead to successful parsing of ill-formed X.509 CRTs. Fixes #2437. + * Fix multiple X.509 functions previously returning ASN.1 low-level error + codes to always wrap these codes into X.509 high level error codes before + returning. Fixes #2431. + * Fix to allow building test suites with any warning that detects unused + functions. Fixes #1628. + * Fix typo in net_would_block(). Fixes #528 reported by github-monoculture. + * Remove redundant include file in timing.c. Fixes #2640 reported by irwir. + * Fix build failure when building with mingw on Windows by including + stdarg.h where needed. Fixes #2656. + * Fix Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration by inheriting + PlatformToolset from the project configuration. Fixes #1430 reported by + irwir. + * Enable Suite B with subset of ECP curves. Make sure the code compiles even + if some curves are not defined. Fixes #1591 reported by dbedev. + * Fix misuse of signed arithmetic in the HAVEGE module. #2598 + * Avoid use of statically sized stack buffers for certificate writing. + This previously limited the maximum size of DER encoded certificates + in mbedtls_x509write_crt_der() to 2Kb. Reported by soccerGB in #2631. + * Fix partial zeroing in x509_get_other_name. Found and fixed by ekse, #2716. + * Update test certificates that were about to expire. Reported by + Bernhard M. Wiedemann in #2357. + * Fix the build on ARMv5TE in ARM mode to not use assembly instructions + that are only available in Thumb mode. Fix contributed by Aurelien Jarno + in #2169. + * Fix propagation of restart contexts in restartable EC operations. + This could previously lead to segmentation faults in builds using an + address-sanitizer and enabling but not using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. + * Fix memory leak in in mpi_miller_rabin(). Contributed by + Jens Wiklander in #2363 + * Improve code clarity in x509_crt module, removing false-positive + uninitialized variable warnings on some recent toolchains (GCC8, etc). + Discovered and fixed by Andy Gross (Linaro), #2392. + * Fix bug in endianness conversion in bignum module. This lead to + functionally incorrect code on bigendian systems which don't have + __BYTE_ORDER__ defined. Reported by Brendan Shanks. Fixes #2622. + +Changes + * Replace multiple uses of MD2 by SHA-256 in X.509 test suite. Fixes #821. + * Make it easier to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED as assert (which config.h + suggests). #2671 + * Make `make clean` clean all programs always. Fixes #1862. + * Add a Dockerfile and helper scripts (all-in-docker.sh, basic-in-docker.sh, + docker-env.sh) to simplify running test suites on a Linux host. Contributed + by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). + * Add `reproducible` option to `ssl_client2` and `ssl_server2` to enable + test runs without variability. Contributed by Philippe Antoine (Catena + cyber) in #2681. + * Extended .gitignore to ignore Visual Studio artifacts. Fixed by ConfusedSushi. + * Adds fuzz targets, especially for continuous fuzzing with OSS-Fuzz. + Contributed by Philippe Antoine (Catena cyber). + * Remove the crypto part of the library from Mbed TLS. The crypto + code and tests are now only available via Mbed Crypto, which + Mbed TLS references as a Git submodule. + += mbed TLS 2.18.1 branch released 2019-07-12 + +Bugfix + * Fix build failure when building with mingw on Windows by including + stdarg.h where needed. Fixes #2656. + +Changes + * Enable building of Mbed TLS as a CMake subproject. Suggested and fixed by + Ashley Duncan in #2609. + += mbed TLS 2.18.0 branch released 2019-06-11 + +Features + * Add the Any Policy certificate policy oid, as defined in + rfc 5280 section 4.2.1.4. + * It is now possible to use NIST key wrap mode via the mbedtls_cipher API. + Contributed by Jack Lloyd and Fortanix Inc. + * Add the Wi-SUN Field Area Network (FAN) device extended key usage. + * Add the oid certificate policy x509 extension. + * It is now possible to perform RSA PKCS v1.5 signatures with RIPEMD-160 digest. + Contributed by Jack Lloyd and Fortanix Inc. + * Extend the MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS to export the handshake randbytes, + and the used tls-prf. + * Add public API for tls-prf function, according to requested enum. + * Add support for parsing otherName entries in the Subject Alternative Name + X.509 certificate extension, specifically type hardware module name, + as defined in RFC 4108 section 5. + * Add support for parsing certificate policies extension, as defined in + RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.4. Currently, only the "Any Policy" policy is + supported. + * List all SAN types in the subject_alt_names field of the certificate. + Resolves #459. + * Add support for draft-05 of the Connection ID extension, as specified + in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05. + The Connection ID extension allows to keep DTLS connections beyond the + lifetime of the underlying transport by adding a connection identifier + to the DTLS record header. This identifier can be used to associated an + incoming record with the correct connection data even after the peer has + changed its IP or port. The feature is enabled at compile-time by setting + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID (disabled by default), and at run-time + through the new APIs mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid() and mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(). + + +API Changes + * Extend the MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS to export the handshake randbytes, + and the used tls-prf. + * Add public API for tls-prf function, according to requested enum. + +Bugfix + * Fix private key DER output in the key_app_writer example. File contents + were shifted by one byte, creating an invalid ASN.1 tag. Fixed by + Christian Walther in #2239. + * Fix potential memory leak in X.509 self test. Found and fixed by + Junhwan Park, #2106. + * Reduce stack usage of hkdf tests. Fixes #2195. + * Fix 1-byte buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_write_string() when + used with negative inputs. Found by Guido Vranken in #2404. Credit to + OSS-Fuzz. + * Fix bugs in the AEAD test suite which would be exposed by ciphers which + either used both encrypt and decrypt key schedules, or which perform padding. + GCM and CCM were not affected. Fixed by Jack Lloyd. + * Fix incorrect default port number in ssl_mail_client example's usage. + Found and fixed by irwir. #2337 + * Add psa_util.h to test/cpp_dummy_build to fix build_default_make_gcc_and_cxx. + Fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). #2579 + * Add missing parentheses around parameters in the definition of the + public macro MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG. This could lead to invalid evaluation + in case operators binding less strongly than subtraction were used + for the parameter. + * Add a check for MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C in ssl_server2, guarding the crl + sni entry parameter. Reported by inestlerode in #560. + * Set the next sequence of the subject_alt_name to NULL when deleting + sequence on failure. Found and fix suggested by Philippe Antoine. + Credit to OSS-Fuzz. + +Changes + * Server's RSA certificate in certs.c was SHA-1 signed. In the default + mbedTLS configuration only SHA-2 signed certificates are accepted. + This certificate is used in the demo server programs, which lead the + client programs to fail at the peer's certificate verification + due to an unacceptable hash signature. The certificate has been + updated to one that is SHA-256 signed. Fix contributed by + Illya Gerasymchuk. + * Return from various debugging routines immediately if the + provided SSL context is unset. + * Remove dead code from bignum.c in the default configuration. + Found by Coverity, reported and fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). Fixes #2309. + * Add test for minimal value of MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE to all.sh. + Contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). + * Change wording in the `mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()`'s documentation to + improve clarity. Fixes #2258. + += mbed TLS 2.17.0 branch released 2019-03-19 + +Features + * Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()` + which allows copy-less parsing of DER encoded X.509 CRTs, + at the cost of additional lifetime constraints on the input + buffer, but at the benefit of reduced RAM consumption. + * Add a new function mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring() to write ASN.1 + named bitstring in DER as required by RFC 5280 Appendix B. + * Add MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES to allow removing 3DES ciphersuites + from the default list (enabled by default). See + https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf. + +API Changes + * Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()`. + See the Features section for more information. + * Allow to opt in to the removal the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + for the benefit of saving RAM, by disabling the new compile-time + option MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE (enabled by default for + API stability). Disabling this option makes mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + always return NULL, and removes the peer_cert field from the + mbedtls_ssl_session structure which otherwise stores the peer's + certificate. + +Security + * Make mbedtls_ecdh_get_params return an error if the second key + belongs to a different group from the first. Before, if an application + passed keys that belonged to different group, the first key's data was + interpreted according to the second group, which could lead to either + an error or a meaningless output from mbedtls_ecdh_get_params. In the + latter case, this could expose at most 5 bits of the private key. + +Bugfix + * Fix a compilation issue with mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx not being defined + when MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined. Reported by jwhui. Fixes #2242. + * Run the AD too long test only if MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT is not defined. + Raised as a comment in #1996. + * Reduce the stack consumption of mbedtls_mpi_fill_random() which could + previously lead to a stack overflow on constrained targets. + * Add `MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST` for the mbedtls_self_test functions + in the header files, which missed the precompilation check. #971 + * Fix returning the value 1 when mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey failed. + * Remove a duplicate #include in a sample program. Fixed by Masashi Honma #2326. + * Remove the mbedtls namespacing from the header file, to fix a "file not found" + build error. Fixed by Haijun Gu #2319. + * Fix signed-to-unsigned integer conversion warning + in X.509 module. Fixes #2212. + * Reduce stack usage of `mpi_write_hlp()` by eliminating recursion. + Fixes #2190. + * Fix false failure in all.sh when backup files exist in include/mbedtls + (e.g. config.h.bak). Fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin) #2407. + * Ensure that unused bits are zero when writing ASN.1 bitstrings when using + mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(). + * Fix issue when writing the named bitstrings in KeyUsage and NsCertType + extensions in CSRs and CRTs that caused these bitstrings to not be encoded + correctly as trailing zeroes were not accounted for as unused bits in the + leading content octet. Fixes #1610. + +Changes + * Reduce RAM consumption during session renegotiation by not storing + the peer CRT chain and session ticket twice. + * Include configuration file in all header files that use configuration, + instead of relying on other header files that they include. + Inserted as an enhancement for #1371 + * Add support for alternative CSR headers, as used by Microsoft and defined + in RFC 7468. Found by Michael Ernst. Fixes #767. + * Correct many misspellings. Fixed by MisterDA #2371. + * Provide an abstraction of vsnprintf to allow alternative implementations + for platforms that don't provide it. Based on contributions by Joris Aerts + and Nathaniel Wesley Filardo. + * Fix clobber list in MIPS assembly for large integer multiplication. + Previously, this could lead to functionally incorrect assembly being + produced by some optimizing compilers, showing up as failures in + e.g. RSA or ECC signature operations. Reported in #1722, fix suggested + by Aurelien Jarno and submitted by Jeffrey Martin. + * Reduce the complexity of the timing tests. They were assuming more than the + underlying OS actually guarantees. + * Fix configuration queries in ssl-opt.h. #2030 + * Ensure that ssl-opt.h can be run in OS X. #2029 + * Re-enable certain interoperability tests in ssl-opt.sh which had previously + been disabled for lack of a sufficiently recent version of GnuTLS on the CI. + * Ciphersuites based on 3DES now have the lowest priority by default when + they are enabled. + += mbed TLS 2.16.0 branch released 2018-12-21 + +Features + * Add a new config.h option of MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS that enables validation + of parameters in the API. This allows detection of obvious misuses of the + API, such as passing NULL pointers. The API of existing functions hasn't + changed, but requirements on parameters have been made more explicit in + the documentation. See the corresponding API documentation for each + function to see for which parameter values it is defined. This feature is + disabled by default. See its API documentation in config.h for additional + steps you have to take when enabling it. + +API Changes + * The following functions in the random generator modules have been + deprecated and replaced as shown below. The new functions change + the return type from void to int to allow returning error codes when + using MBEDTLS__ALT for the underlying AES or message digest + primitive. Fixes #1798. + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update() -> mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() -> mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() + * Extend ECDH interface to enable alternative implementations. + * Deprecate error codes of the form MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH for + ARIA, CAMELLIA and Blowfish. These error codes will be replaced by + the more generic per-module error codes MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * Additional parameter validation checks have been added for the following + modules - AES, ARIA, Blowfish, CAMELLIA, CCM, GCM, DHM, ECP, ECDSA, ECDH, + ECJPAKE, SHA, Chacha20 and Poly1305, cipher, pk, RSA, and MPI. + Where modules have had parameter validation added, existing parameter + checks may have changed. Some modules, such as Chacha20 had existing + parameter validation whereas other modules had little. This has now been + changed so that the same level of validation is present in all modules, and + that it is now optional with the MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS flag which by default + is off. That means that checks which were previously present by default + will no longer be. + +New deprecations + * Deprecate mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update + in favor of functions that can return an error code. + +Bugfix + * Fix for Clang, which was reporting a warning for the bignum.c inline + assembly for AMD64 targets creating string literals greater than those + permitted by the ISO C99 standard. Found by Aaron Jones. Fixes #482. + * Fix runtime error in `mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll()` when run + through qemu user emulation. Reported and fix suggested by randombit + in #1212. Fixes #1212. + * Fix an unsafe bounds check when restoring an SSL session from a ticket. + This could lead to a buffer overflow, but only in case ticket authentication + was broken. Reported and fix suggested by Guido Vranken in #659. + * Add explicit integer to enumeration type casts to example program + programs/pkey/gen_key which previously led to compilation failure + on some toolchains. Reported by phoenixmcallister. Fixes #2170. + * Fix double initialization of ECC hardware that made some accelerators + hang. + * Clarify documentation of mbedtls_ssl_set_own_cert() regarding the absence + of check for certificate/key matching. Reported by Attila Molnar, #507. + + = mbed TLS 2.15.1 branch released 2018-11-30 + + Changes + * Update the Mbed Crypto submodule to version 0.1.0b2. + + = mbed TLS 2.15.0 branch released 2018-11-23 + + Features + * Add an experimental build option, USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE, to enable use of + Mbed Crypto as the source of the cryptography implementation. + * Add an experimental configuration option, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, to enable + the PSA Crypto API from Mbed Crypto when additionally used with the + USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE build option. + + Changes + * Add unit tests for AES-GCM when called through mbedtls_cipher_auth_xxx() + from the cipher abstraction layer. Fixes #2198. + += mbed TLS 2.14.1 branch released 2018-11-30 + +Security + * Fix timing variations and memory access variations in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 + decryption that could lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle + attack. In TLS, this affects servers that accept ciphersuites based on + RSA decryption (i.e. ciphersuites whose name contains RSA but not + (EC)DH(E)). Discovered by Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham + (University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan), + Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom + (University of Adelaide, Data61). The attack is described in more detail + in the paper available here: http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf CVE-2018-19608 + * In mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(), don't leak the exact size of the number + via branching and memory access patterns. An attacker who could submit + a plaintext for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption but only observe the timing + of the decryption and not its result could nonetheless decrypt RSA + plaintexts and forge RSA signatures. Other asymmetric algorithms may + have been similarly vulnerable. Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, + Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom. + * Wipe sensitive buffers on the stack in the CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG + modules. + +API Changes + * The new functions mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() and + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() are similar to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update() + and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() respectively, but the new functions + report errors whereas the old functions return void. We recommend that + applications use the new functions. + += mbed TLS 2.14.0 branch released 2018-11-19 + +Security + * Fix overly strict DN comparison when looking for CRLs belonging to a + particular CA. This previously led to ignoring CRLs when the CRL's issuer + name and the CA's subject name differed in their string encoding (e.g., + one using PrintableString and the other UTF8String) or in the choice of + upper and lower case. Reported by Henrik Andersson of Bosch GmbH in issue + #1784. + * Fix a flawed bounds check in server PSK hint parsing. In case the + incoming message buffer was placed within the first 64KiB of address + space and a PSK-(EC)DHE ciphersuite was used, this allowed an attacker + to trigger a memory access up to 64KiB beyond the incoming message buffer, + potentially leading to an application crash or information disclosure. + * Fix mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() to use more rounds of probabilistic testing. The + previous settings for the number of rounds made it practical for an + adversary to construct non-primes that would be erroneously accepted as + primes with high probability. This does not have an impact on the + security of TLS, but can matter in other contexts with numbers chosen + potentially by an adversary that should be prime and can be validated. + For example, the number of rounds was enough to securely generate RSA key + pairs or Diffie-Hellman parameters, but was insufficient to validate + Diffie-Hellman parameters properly. + See "Prime and Prejudice" by by Martin R. Albrecht and Jake Massimo and + Kenneth G. Paterson and Juraj Somorovsky. + +Features + * Add support for temporarily suspending expensive ECC computations after + some configurable amount of operations. This is intended to be used in + constrained, single-threaded systems where ECC is time consuming and can + block other operations until they complete. This is disabled by default, + but can be enabled by MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE at compile time and + configured by mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() at runtime. It applies to the new + xxx_restartable functions in ECP, ECDSA, PK and X.509 (CRL not supported + yet), and to existing functions in ECDH and SSL (currently only + implemented client-side, for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphersuites in TLS 1.2, + including client authentication). + * Add support for Arm CPU DSP extensions to accelerate asymmetric key + operations. On CPUs where the extensions are available, they can accelerate + MPI multiplications used in ECC and RSA cryptography. Contributed by + Aurelien Jarno. + * Extend RSASSA-PSS signature to allow a smaller salt size. Previously, PSS + signature always used a salt with the same length as the hash, and returned + an error if this was not possible. Now the salt size may be up to two bytes + shorter. This allows the library to support all hash and signature sizes + that comply with FIPS 186-4, including SHA-512 with a 1024-bit key. + * Add support for 128-bit keys in CTR_DRBG. Note that using keys shorter + than 256 bits limits the security of generated material to 128 bits. + +API Changes + * Add a common error code of `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` for + a feature that is not supported by underlying alternative + implementations implementing cryptographic primitives. This is useful for + hardware accelerators that don't implement all options or features. + +New deprecations + * All module specific errors following the form + MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE that indicate a feature is not + supported are deprecated and are now replaced by the new equivalent + platform error. + * All module specific generic hardware acceleration errors following the + form MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_HW_ACCEL_FAILED that are deprecated and are replaced + by the equivalent plaform error. + * Deprecate the function mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() in favor of + mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows specifying the number of + Miller-Rabin rounds. + +Bugfix + * Fix wrong order of freeing in programs/ssl/ssl_server2 example + application leading to a memory leak in case both + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE are set. + Fixes #2069. + * Fix a bug in the update function for SSL ticket keys which previously + invalidated keys of a lifetime of less than a 1s. Fixes #1968. + * Fix failure in hmac_drbg in the benchmark sample application, when + MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is defined. Found by TrinityTonic, #1095 + * Fix a bug in the record decryption routine ssl_decrypt_buf() + which lead to accepting properly authenticated but improperly + padded records in case of CBC ciphersuites using Encrypt-then-MAC. + * Fix memory leak and freeing without initialization in the example + program programs/x509/cert_write. Fixes #1422. + * Ignore IV in mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() when the cipher mode is + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB. Found by ezdevelop. Fixes #1091. + * Zeroize memory used for buffering or reassembling handshake messages + after use. + * Use `mbedtls_platform_zeroize()` instead of `memset()` for zeroization + of sensitive data in the example programs aescrypt2 and crypt_and_hash. + * Change the default string format used for various X.509 DN attributes to + UTF8String. Previously, the use of the PrintableString format led to + wildcards and non-ASCII characters being unusable in some DN attributes. + Reported by raprepo in #1860 and by kevinpt in #468. Fix contributed by + Thomas-Dee. + * Fix compilation failure for configurations which use compile time + replacements of standard calloc/free functions through the macros + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO. + Reported by ole-de and ddhome2006. Fixes #882, #1642 and #1706. + +Changes + * Removed support for Yotta as a build tool. + * Add tests for session resumption in DTLS. + * Close a test gap in (D)TLS between the client side and the server side: + test the handling of large packets and small packets on the client side + in the same way as on the server side. + * Change the dtls_client and dtls_server samples to work by default over + IPv6 and optionally by a build option over IPv4. + * Change the use of Windows threading to use Microsoft Visual C++ runtime + calls, rather than Win32 API calls directly. This is necessary to avoid + conflict with C runtime usage. Found and fixed by irwir. + * Remember the string format of X.509 DN attributes when replicating + X.509 DNs. Previously, DN attributes were always written in their default + string format (mostly PrintableString), which could lead to CRTs being + created which used PrintableStrings in the issuer field even though the + signing CA used UTF8Strings in its subject field; while X.509 compliant, + such CRTs were rejected in some applications, e.g. some versions of + Firefox, curl and GnuTLS. Reported in #1033 by Moschn. Fix contributed by + Thomas-Dee. + * Improve documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(). + Fixes #517 reported by github-monoculture. + * Add MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR flag to mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime() and + use it to reduce error probability in RSA key generation to levels mandated + by FIPS-186-4. + += mbed TLS 2.13.1 branch released 2018-09-06 + +API Changes + * Extend the platform module with an abstraction mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + whose implementation should behave as a thread-safe version of gmtime(). + This allows users to configure such an implementation at compile time when + the target system cannot be deduced automatically, by setting the option + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. At this stage Mbed TLS is only able to + automatically select implementations for Windows and POSIX C libraries. + +Bugfix + * Fix build failures on platforms where only gmtime() is available but + neither gmtime_r() nor gmtime_s() are present. Fixes #1907. + += mbed TLS 2.13.0 branch released 2018-08-31 + +Security + * Fix an issue in the X.509 module which could lead to a buffer overread + during certificate extensions parsing. In case of receiving malformed + input (extensions length field equal to 0), an illegal read of one byte + beyond the input buffer is made. Found and analyzed by Nathan Crandall. + +Features + * Add support for fragmentation of outgoing DTLS handshake messages. This + is controlled by the maximum fragment length as set locally or negotiated + with the peer, as well as by a new per-connection MTU option, set using + mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(). + * Add support for auto-adjustment of MTU to a safe value during the + handshake when flights do not get through (RFC 6347, section 4.1.1.1, + last paragraph). + * Add support for packing multiple records within a single datagram, + enabled by default. + * Add support for buffering out-of-order handshake messages in DTLS. + The maximum amount of RAM used for this can be controlled by the + compile-time constant MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING defined + in mbedtls/config.h. + +API Changes + * Add function mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing() to configure + the use of datagram packing (enabled by default). + +Bugfix + * Fix a potential memory leak in mbedtls_ssl_setup() function. An allocation + failure in the function could lead to other buffers being leaked. + * Fixes an issue with MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C which would not compile if + MBEDTLS_ARC4_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER weren't also defined. #1890 + * Fix a memory leak in ecp_mul_comb() if ecp_precompute_comb() fails. + Fix contributed by Espressif Systems. + * Add ecc extensions only if an ecc based ciphersuite is used. + This improves compliance to RFC 4492, and as a result, solves + interoperability issues with BouncyCastle. Raised by milenamil in #1157. + * Replace printf with mbedtls_printf in the ARIA module. Found by + TrinityTonic in #1908. + * Fix potential use-after-free in mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() + and mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() after a session reset. Fixes #1941. + * Fix a bug that caused SSL/TLS clients to incorrectly abort the handshake + with TLS versions 1.1 and earlier when the server requested authentication + without providing a list of CAs. This was due to an overly strict bounds + check in parsing the CertificateRequest message, + introduced in Mbed TLS 2.12.0. Fixes #1954. + * Fix a miscalculation of the maximum record expansion in + mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() in case of ChachaPoly ciphersuites, + or CBC ciphersuites in (D)TLS versions 1.1 or higher. Fixes #1913, #1914. + * Fix undefined shifts with negative values in certificates parsing + (found by Catena cyber using oss-fuzz) + * Fix memory leak and free without initialization in pk_encrypt + and pk_decrypt example programs. Reported by Brace Stout. Fixes #1128. + * Remove redundant else statement. Raised by irwir. Fixes #1776. + +Changes + * Copy headers preserving timestamps when doing a "make install". + Contributed by xueruini. + * Allow the forward declaration of public structs. Contributed by Dawid + Drozd. Fixes #1215 raised by randombit. + * Improve compatibility with some alternative CCM implementations by using + CCM test vectors from RAM. + * Add support for buffering of out-of-order handshake messages. + * Add warnings to the documentation of the HKDF module to reduce the risk + of misusing the mbedtls_hkdf_extract() and mbedtls_hkdf_expand() + functions. Fixes #1775. Reported by Brian J. Murray. + += mbed TLS 2.12.0 branch released 2018-07-25 + +Security + * Fix a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based on CBC and using SHA-384, + in (D)TLS 1.0 to 1.2, that allowed an active network attacker to + partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions by + exploiting timing measurements. With DTLS, the attacker could perform + this recovery by sending many messages in the same connection. With TLS + or if mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit() was used, the attack only + worked if the same secret (for example a HTTP Cookie) has been repeatedly + sent over connections manipulated by the attacker. Connections using GCM + or CCM instead of CBC, using hash sizes other than SHA-384, or using + Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. The vulnerability was + caused by a miscalculation (for SHA-384) in a countermeasure to the + original Lucky 13 attack. Found by Kenny Paterson, Eyal Ronen and Adi + Shamir. + * Fix a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based on CBC, in (D)TLS 1.0 to + 1.2, that allowed a local attacker, able to execute code on the local + machine as well as manipulate network packets, to partially recover the + plaintext of messages under some conditions by using a cache attack + targeting an internal MD/SHA buffer. With TLS or if + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit() was used, the attack only worked if + the same secret (for example a HTTP Cookie) has been repeatedly sent over + connections manipulated by the attacker. Connections using GCM or CCM + instead of CBC or using Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. + Found by Kenny Paterson, Eyal Ronen and Adi Shamir. + * Add a counter-measure against a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based + on CBC, in (D)TLS 1.0 to 1.2, that allowed a local attacker, able to + execute code on the local machine as well as manipulate network packets, + to partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions (see + previous entry) by using a cache attack targeting the SSL input record + buffer. Connections using GCM or CCM instead of CBC or using + Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. Found by Kenny Paterson, + Eyal Ronen and Adi Shamir. + +Features + * Add new crypto primitives from RFC 7539: stream cipher Chacha20, one-time + authenticator Poly1305 and AEAD construct Chacha20-Poly1305. Contributed + by Daniel King. + * Add support for CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites from RFC 7905. + * Add platform support for the Haiku OS. (https://www.haiku-os.org). + Contributed by Augustin Cavalier. + * Make the receive and transmit buffers independent sizes, for situations + where the outgoing buffer can be fixed at a smaller size than the incoming + buffer, which can save some RAM. If buffer lengths are kept equal, there + is no functional difference. Contributed by Angus Gratton, and also + independently contributed again by Paul Sokolovsky. + * Add support for key wrapping modes based on AES as defined by + NIST SP 800-38F algorithms KW and KWP and by RFC 3394 and RFC 5649. + +Bugfix + * Fix the key_app_writer example which was writing a leading zero byte which + was creating an invalid ASN.1 tag. Found by Aryeh R. Fixes #1257. + * Fix compilation error on C++, because of a variable named new. + Found and fixed by Hirotaka Niisato in #1783. + * Fix "no symbols" warning issued by ranlib when building on Mac OS X. Fix + contributed by tabascoeye. + * Clarify documentation for mbedtls_ssl_write() to include 0 as a valid + return value. Found by @davidwu2000. #839 + * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(), found by catenacyber, + Philippe Antoine. Fixes #1623. + * Remove unused headers included in x509.c. Found by Chris Hanson and fixed + by Brendan Shanks. Part of a fix for #992. + * Fix compilation error when MBEDTLS_ARC4_C is disabled and + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER is enabled. Found by TrinityTonic in #1719. + * Added length checks to some TLS parsing functions. Found and fixed by + Philippe Antoine from Catena cyber. #1663. + * Fix the inline assembly for the MPI multiply helper function for i386 and + i386 with SSE2. Found by László Langó. Fixes #1550 + * Fix namespacing in header files. Remove the `mbedtls` namespacing in + the `#include` in the header files. Resolves #857 + * Fix compiler warning of 'use before initialisation' in + mbedtls_pk_parse_key(). Found by Martin Boye Petersen and fixed by Dawid + Drozd. #1098 + * Fix decryption for zero length messages (which contain all padding) when a + CBC based ciphersuite is used together with Encrypt-then-MAC. Previously, + such a message was wrongly reported as an invalid record and therefore lead + to the connection being terminated. Seen most often with OpenSSL using + TLS 1.0. Reported by @kFYatek and by Conor Murphy on the forum. Fix + contributed by Espressif Systems. Fixes #1632 + * Fix ssl_client2 example to send application data with 0-length content + when the request_size argument is set to 0 as stated in the documentation. + Fixes #1833. + * Correct the documentation for `mbedtls_ssl_get_session()`. This API has + deep copy of the session, and the peer certificate is not lost. Fixes #926. + * Fix build using -std=c99. Fixed by Nick Wilson. + +Changes + * Fail when receiving a TLS alert message with an invalid length, or invalid + zero-length messages when using TLS 1.2. Contributed by Espressif Systems. + * Change the default behaviour of mbedtls_hkdf_extract() to return an error + when calling with a NULL salt and non-zero salt_len. Contributed by + Brian J Murray + * Change the shebang line in Perl scripts to look up perl in the PATH. + Contributed by fbrosson. + * Allow overriding the time on Windows via the platform-time abstraction. + Fixed by Nick Wilson. + * Use gmtime_r/gmtime_s for thread-safety. Fixed by Nick Wilson. + += mbed TLS 2.11.0 branch released 2018-06-18 + +Features + * Add additional block mode, OFB (Output Feedback), to the AES module and + cipher abstraction module. + * Implement the HMAC-based extract-and-expand key derivation function + (HKDF) per RFC 5869. Contributed by Thomas Fossati. + * Add support for the CCM* block cipher mode as defined in IEEE Std. 802.15.4. + * Add support for the XTS block cipher mode with AES (AES-XTS). + Contributed by Aorimn in pull request #414. + * In TLS servers, support offloading private key operations to an external + cryptoprocessor. Private key operations can be asynchronous to allow + non-blocking operation of the TLS server stack. + +Bugfix + * Fix the cert_write example to handle certificates signed with elliptic + curves as well as RSA. Fixes #777 found by dbedev. + * Fix for redefinition of _WIN32_WINNT to avoid overriding a definition + used by user applications. Found and fixed by Fabio Alessandrelli. + * Fix compilation warnings with IAR toolchain, on 32 bit platform. + Reported by rahmanih in #683 + * Fix braces in mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(). Found by sbranden, #552. + +Changes + * Changed CMake defaults for IAR to treat all compiler warnings as errors. + * Changed the Clang parameters used in the CMake build files to work for + versions later than 3.6. Versions of Clang earlier than this may no longer + work. Fixes #1072 + += mbed TLS 2.10.0 branch released 2018-06-06 + +Features + * Add support for ARIA cipher (RFC 5794) and associated TLS ciphersuites + (RFC 6209). Disabled by default, see MBEDTLS_ARIA_C in config.h + +API Changes + * Extend the platform module with a util component that contains + functionality shared by multiple Mbed TLS modules. At this stage + platform_util.h (and its associated platform_util.c) only contain + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), which is a critical function from a security + point of view. mbedtls_platform_zeroize() needs to be regularly tested + against compilers to ensure that calls to it are not removed from the + output binary as part of redundant code elimination optimizations. + Therefore, mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is moved to the platform module to + facilitate testing and maintenance. + +Bugfix + * Fix an issue with MicroBlaze support in bn_mul.h which was causing the + build to fail. Found by zv-io. Fixes #1651. + +Changes + * Support TLS testing in out-of-source builds using cmake. Fixes #1193. + * Fix redundant declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites. Raised by + TrinityTonic. #1359. + += mbed TLS 2.9.0 branch released 2018-04-30 + +Security + * Fix an issue in the X.509 module which could lead to a buffer overread + during certificate validation. Additionally, the issue could also lead to + unnecessary callback checks being made or to some validation checks to be + omitted. The overread could be triggered remotely, while the other issues + would require a non DER-compliant certificate to be correctly signed by a + trusted CA, or a trusted CA with a non DER-compliant certificate. Found by + luocm. Fixes #825. + * Fix the buffer length assertion in the ssl_parse_certificate_request() + function which led to an arbitrary overread of the message buffer. The + overreads could be caused by receiving a malformed message at the point + where an optional signature algorithms list is expected when the signature + algorithms section is too short. In builds with debug output, the overread + data is output with the debug data. + * Fix a client-side bug in the validation of the server's ciphersuite choice + which could potentially lead to the client accepting a ciphersuite it didn't + offer or a ciphersuite that cannot be used with the TLS or DTLS version + chosen by the server. This could lead to corruption of internal data + structures for some configurations. + +Features + * Add an option, MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES, to dynamically compute smaller AES + tables during runtime, thereby reducing the RAM/ROM footprint by ~6KiB. + Suggested and contributed by jkivilin in pull request #394. + * Add initial support for Curve448 (RFC 7748). Only mbedtls_ecp_mul() and + ECDH primitive functions (mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(), + mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared()) are supported for now. Contributed by + Nicholas Wilson in pull request #348. + +API Changes + * Extend the public API with the function of mbedtls_net_poll() to allow user + applications to wait for a network context to become ready before reading + or writing. + * Add function mbedtls_ssl_check_pending() to the public API to allow + a check for whether more more data is pending to be processed in the + internal message buffers. + This function is necessary to determine when it is safe to idle on the + underlying transport in case event-driven IO is used. + +Bugfix + * Fix a spurious uninitialized variable warning in cmac.c. Fix independently + contributed by Brian J Murray and David Brown. + * Add missing dependencies in test suites that led to build failures + in configurations that omit certain hashes or public-key algorithms. + Fixes #1040. + * Fix C89 incompatibility in benchmark.c. Contributed by Brendan Shanks. + #1353 + * Add missing dependencies for MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE and + MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES in some test suites. Contributed by + Deomid Ryabkov. Fixes #1299, #1475. + * Fix the Makefile build process for building shared libraries on Mac OS X. + Fixed by mnacamura. + * Fix parsing of PKCS#8 encoded Elliptic Curve keys. Previously Mbed TLS was + unable to parse keys which had only the optional parameters field of the + ECPrivateKey structure. Found by Jethro Beekman, fixed in #1379. + * Return the plaintext data more quickly on unpadded CBC decryption, as + stated in the mbedtls_cipher_update() documentation. Contributed by + Andy Leiserson. + * Fix overriding and ignoring return values when parsing and writing to + a file in pk_sign program. Found by kevlut in #1142. + * Restrict usage of error code MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ to situations + where data needs to be fetched from the underlying transport in order + to make progress. Previously, this error code was also occasionally + returned when unexpected messages were being discarded, ignoring that + further messages could potentially already be pending to be processed + in the internal buffers; these cases led to deadlocks when event-driven + I/O was used. Found and reported by Hubert Mis in #772. + * Fix buffer length assertions in the ssl_parse_certificate_request() + function which leads to a potential one byte overread of the message + buffer. + * Fix invalid buffer sizes passed to zlib during record compression and + decompression. + * Fix the soversion of libmbedcrypto to match the soversion of the + maintained 2.7 branch. The soversion was increased in Mbed TLS + version 2.7.1 to reflect breaking changes in that release, but the + increment was missed in 2.8.0 and later releases outside of the 2.7 branch. + +Changes + * Remove some redundant code in bignum.c. Contributed by Alexey Skalozub. + * Support cmake builds where Mbed TLS is a subproject. Fix contributed + independently by Matthieu Volat and Arne Schwabe. + * Improve testing in configurations that omit certain hashes or + public-key algorithms. Includes contributions by Gert van Dijk. + * Improve negative testing of X.509 parsing. + * Do not define global mutexes around readdir() and gmtime() in + configurations where the feature is disabled. Found and fixed by Gergely + Budai. + * Harden the function mbedtls_ssl_config_free() against misuse, so that it + doesn't leak memory if the user doesn't use mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() and + instead incorrectly manipulates the configuration structure directly. + Found and fix submitted by junyeonLEE in #1220. + * Provide an empty implementation of mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2() when + MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C is not enabled. This allows the use of PBKDF2 + without PBES2. Fixed by Marcos Del Sol Vives. + * Add the order of the base point as N in the mbedtls_ecp_group structure + for Curve25519 (other curves had it already). Contributed by Nicholas + Wilson #481 + * Improve the documentation of mbedtls_net_accept(). Contributed by Ivan + Krylov. + * Improve the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_write(). Suggested by + Paul Sokolovsky in #1356. + * Add an option in the Makefile to support ar utilities where the operation + letter must not be prefixed by '-', such as LLVM. Found and fixed by + Alex Hixon. + * Allow configuring the shared library extension by setting the DLEXT + environment variable when using the project makefiles. + * Optimize unnecessary zeroing in mbedtls_mpi_copy. Based on a contribution + by Alexey Skalozub in #405. + * In the SSL module, when f_send, f_recv or f_recv_timeout report + transmitting more than the required length, return an error. Raised by + Sam O'Connor in #1245. + * Improve robustness of mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys against the use of + HMAC functions with non-HMAC ciphersuites. Independently contributed + by Jiayuan Chen in #1377. Fixes #1437. + * Improve security of RSA key generation by including criteria from + FIPS 186-4. Contributed by Jethro Beekman. #1380 + * Declare functions in header files even when an alternative implementation + of the corresponding module is activated by defining the corresponding + MBEDTLS_XXX_ALT macro. This means that alternative implementations do + not need to copy the declarations, and ensures that they will have the + same API. + * Add platform setup and teardown calls in test suites. + += mbed TLS 2.8.0 branch released 2018-03-16 + +Default behavior changes + * The truncated HMAC extension now conforms to RFC 6066. This means + that when both sides of a TLS connection negotiate the truncated + HMAC extension, Mbed TLS can now interoperate with other + compliant implementations, but this breaks interoperability with + prior versions of Mbed TLS. To restore the old behavior, enable + the (deprecated) option MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT in + config.h. Found by Andreas Walz (ivESK, Offenburg University of + Applied Sciences). + +Security + * Fix implementation of the truncated HMAC extension. The previous + implementation allowed an offline 2^80 brute force attack on the + HMAC key of a single, uninterrupted connection (with no + resumption of the session). + * Verify results of RSA private key operations to defend + against Bellcore glitch attack. + * Fix a buffer overread in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() that could cause + a crash on invalid input. + * Fix a buffer overread in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint() that could cause a + crash on invalid input. + * Fix CRL parsing to reject CRLs containing unsupported critical + extensions. Found by Falko Strenzke and Evangelos Karatsiolis. + +Features + * Extend PKCS#8 interface by introducing support for the entire SHA + algorithms family when encrypting private keys using PKCS#5 v2.0. + This allows reading encrypted PEM files produced by software that + uses PBKDF2-SHA2, such as OpenSSL 1.1. Submitted by Antonio Quartulli, + OpenVPN Inc. Fixes #1339 + * Add support for public keys encoded in PKCS#1 format. #1122 + +New deprecations + * Deprecate support for record compression (configuration option + MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT). + +Bugfix + * Fix the name of a DHE parameter that was accidentally changed in 2.7.0. + Fixes #1358. + * Fix test_suite_pk to work on 64-bit ILP32 systems. #849 + * Fix mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb, which used to reject all certificates + with flag MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK even when the key type was correct. + In the context of SSL, this resulted in handshake failure. Reported by + daniel in the Mbed TLS forum. #1351 + * Fix Windows x64 builds with the included mbedTLS.sln file. #1347 + * Fix setting version TLSv1 as minimal version, even if TLS 1 + is not enabled. Set MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION + and MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION instead of + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1. #664 + * Fix compilation error on Mingw32 when _TRUNCATE is defined. Use _TRUNCATE + only if __MINGW32__ not defined. Fix suggested by Thomas Glanzmann and + Nick Wilson on issue #355 + * In test_suite_pk, pass valid parameters when testing for hash length + overflow. #1179 + * Fix memory allocation corner cases in memory_buffer_alloc.c module. Found + by Guido Vranken. #639 + * Log correct number of ciphersuites used in Client Hello message. #918 + * Fix X509 CRT parsing that would potentially accept an invalid tag when + parsing the subject alternative names. + * Fix a possible arithmetic overflow in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() + that could cause a key exchange to fail on valid data. + * Fix a possible arithmetic overflow in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint() that + could cause a key exchange to fail on valid data. + * Don't define mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt under + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED. #1388 + * Fix a 1-byte heap buffer overflow (read-only) during private key parsing. + Found through fuzz testing. + +Changes + * Fix tag lengths and value ranges in the documentation of CCM encryption. + Contributed by Mathieu Briand. + * Fix typo in a comment ctr_drbg.c. Contributed by Paul Sokolovsky. + * Remove support for the library reference configuration for picocoin. + * MD functions deprecated in 2.7.0 are no longer inline, to provide + a migration path for those depending on the library's ABI. + * Clarify the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_setup. + * Use (void) when defining functions with no parameters. Contributed by + Joris Aerts. #678 + += mbed TLS 2.7.0 branch released 2018-02-03 + +Security + * Fix a heap corruption issue in the implementation of the truncated HMAC + extension. When the truncated HMAC extension is enabled and CBC is used, + sending a malicious application packet could be used to selectively corrupt + 6 bytes on the peer's heap, which could potentially lead to crash or remote + code execution. The issue could be triggered remotely from either side in + both TLS and DTLS. CVE-2018-0488 + * Fix a buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the hash was too large + for the key size, which could potentially lead to crash or remote code + execution. Found by Seth Terashima, Qualcomm Product Security Initiative, + Qualcomm Technologies Inc. CVE-2018-0487 + * Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the unmasked data is all + zeros. + * Fix an unsafe bounds check in ssl_parse_client_psk_identity() when adding + 64 KiB to the address of the SSL buffer and causing a wrap around. + * Fix a potential heap buffer overflow in mbedtls_ssl_write(). When the (by + default enabled) maximum fragment length extension is disabled in the + config and the application data buffer passed to mbedtls_ssl_write + is larger than the internal message buffer (16384 bytes by default), the + latter overflows. The exploitability of this issue depends on whether the + application layer can be forced into sending such large packets. The issue + was independently reported by Tim Nordell via e-mail and by Florin Petriuc + and sjorsdewit on GitHub. Fix proposed by Florin Petriuc in #1022. + Fixes #707. + * Add a provision to prevent compiler optimizations breaking the time + constancy of mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp(). + * Ensure that buffers are cleared after use if they contain sensitive data. + Changes were introduced in multiple places in the library. + * Set PEM buffer to zero before freeing it, to avoid decoded private keys + being leaked to memory after release. + * Fix dhm_check_range() failing to detect trivial subgroups and potentially + leaking 1 bit of the private key. Reported by prashantkspatil. + * Make mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() constant-time with respect to the input + data. Previously, trailing zero bytes were detected and omitted for the + sake of saving memory, but potentially leading to slight timing + differences. Reported by Marco Macchetti, Kudelski Group. + * Wipe stack buffer temporarily holding EC private exponent + after keypair generation. + * Fix a potential heap buffer over-read in ALPN extension parsing + (server-side). Could result in application crash, but only if an ALPN + name larger than 16 bytes had been configured on the server. + * Change default choice of DHE parameters from untrustworthy RFC 5114 + to RFC 3526 containing parameters generated in a nothing-up-my-sleeve + manner. + +Features + * Allow comments in test data files. + * The selftest program can execute a subset of the tests based on command + line arguments. + * New unit tests for timing. Improve the self-test to be more robust + when run on a heavily-loaded machine. + * Add alternative implementation support for CCM and CMAC (MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT, + MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT). Submitted by Steven Cooreman, Silicon Labs. + * Add support for alternative implementations of GCM, selected by the + configuration flag MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT. + * Add support for alternative implementations for ECDSA, controlled by new + configuration flags MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT and + MBEDTLS_ECDSDA_GENKEY_AT in config.h. + The following functions from the ECDSA module can be replaced + with alternative implementation: + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(), mbedtls_ecdsa_verify() and mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(). + * Add support for alternative implementation of ECDH, controlled by the + new configuration flags MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT and + MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT in config.h. + The following functions from the ECDH module can be replaced + with an alternative implementation: + mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public() and mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(). + * Add support for alternative implementation of ECJPAKE, controlled by + the new configuration flag MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT. + * Add mechanism to provide alternative implementation of the DHM module. + +API Changes + * Extend RSA interface by multiple functions allowing structure- + independent setup and export of RSA contexts. Most notably, + mbedtls_rsa_import() and mbedtls_rsa_complete() are introduced for setting + up RSA contexts from partial key material and having them completed to the + needs of the implementation automatically. This allows to setup private RSA + contexts from keys consisting of N,D,E only, even if P,Q are needed for the + purpose or CRT and/or blinding. + * The configuration option MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT can be used to define alternative + implementations of the RSA interface declared in rsa.h. + * The following functions in the message digest modules (MD2, MD4, MD5, + SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) have been deprecated and replaced as shown below. + The new functions change the return type from void to int to allow + returning error codes when using MBEDTLS__ALT. + mbedtls__starts() -> mbedtls__starts_ret() + mbedtls__update() -> mbedtls__update_ret() + mbedtls__finish() -> mbedtls__finish_ret() + mbedtls__process() -> mbedtls_internal__process() + +New deprecations + * Deprecate usage of RSA primitives with non-matching key-type + (e.g. signing with a public key). + * Direct manipulation of structure fields of RSA contexts is deprecated. + Users are advised to use the extended RSA API instead. + * Deprecate usage of message digest functions that return void + (mbedtls__starts, mbedtls__update, + mbedtls__finish and mbedtls__process where is + any of MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) in favor of functions + that can return an error code. + * Deprecate untrustworthy DHE parameters from RFC 5114. Superseded by + parameters from RFC 3526 or the newly added parameters from RFC 7919. + * Deprecate hex string DHE constants MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P etc. + Supserseded by binary encoded constants MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN + etc. + * Deprecate mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param() for setting default DHE parameters + from hex strings. Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin() + accepting DHM parameters in binary form, matching the new constants. + +Bugfix + * Fix ssl_parse_record_header() to silently discard invalid DTLS records + as recommended in RFC 6347 Section 4.1.2.7. + * Fix memory leak in mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() when called multiple times. + Found by projectgus and Jethro Beekman, #836. + * Fix usage help in ssl_server2 example. Found and fixed by Bei Lin. + * Parse signature algorithm extension when renegotiating. Previously, + renegotiated handshakes would only accept signatures using SHA-1 + regardless of the peer's preferences, or fail if SHA-1 was disabled. + * Fix leap year calculation in x509_date_is_valid() to ensure that invalid + dates on leap years with 100 and 400 intervals are handled correctly. Found + by Nicholas Wilson. #694 + * Fix some invalid RSA-PSS signatures with keys of size 8N+1 that were + accepted. Generating these signatures required the private key. + * Fix out-of-memory problem when parsing 4096-bit PKCS8-encrypted RSA keys. + Found independently by Florian in the mbed TLS forum and by Mishamax. + #878, #1019. + * Fix variable used before assignment compilation warnings with IAR + toolchain. Found by gkerrien38. + * Fix unchecked return codes from AES, DES and 3DES functions in + pem_aes_decrypt(), pem_des_decrypt() and pem_des3_decrypt() respectively. + If a call to one of the functions of the cryptographic primitive modules + failed, the error may not be noticed by the function + mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() causing it to return invalid values. Found by + Guido Vranken. #756 + * Include configuration file in md.h, to fix compilation warnings. + Reported by aaronmdjones in #1001 + * Correct extraction of signature-type from PK instance in X.509 CRT and CSR + writing routines that prevented these functions to work with alternative + RSA implementations. Raised by J.B. in the Mbed TLS forum. Fixes #1011. + * Don't print X.509 version tag for v1 CRT's, and omit extensions for + non-v3 CRT's. + * Fix bugs in RSA test suite under MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY. #1023 #1024 + * Fix net_would_block() to avoid modification by errno through fcntl() call. + Found by nkolban. Fixes #845. + * Fix handling of handshake messages in mbedtls_ssl_read() in case + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is disabled. Found by erja-gp. + * Add a check for invalid private parameters in mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). + Reported by Yolan Romailler. + * Fix word size check in in pk.c to not depend on MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64. + * Fix incorrect unit in benchmark output. #850 + * Add size-checks for record and handshake message content, securing + fragile yet non-exploitable code-paths. + * Fix crash when calling mbedtls_ssl_cache_free() twice. Found by + MilenkoMitrovic, #1104 + * Fix mbedtls_timing_alarm(0) on Unix and MinGW. + * Fix use of uninitialized memory in mbedtls_timing_get_timer() when reset=1. + * Fix possible memory leaks in mbedtls_gcm_self_test(). + * Added missing return code checks in mbedtls_aes_self_test(). + * Fix issues in RSA key generation program programs/x509/rsa_genkey and the + RSA test suite where the failure of CTR DRBG initialization lead to + freeing an RSA context and several MPI's without proper initialization + beforehand. + * Fix error message in programs/pkey/gen_key.c. Found and fixed by Chris Xue. + * Fix programs/pkey/dh_server.c so that it actually works with dh_client.c. + Found and fixed by Martijn de Milliano. + * Fix an issue in the cipher decryption with the mode + MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS that sometimes accepted invalid padding. + Note, this padding mode is not used by the TLS protocol. Found and fixed by + Micha Kraus. + * Fix the entropy.c module to not call mbedtls_sha256_starts() or + mbedtls_sha512_starts() in the mbedtls_entropy_init() function. + * Fix the entropy.c module to ensure that mbedtls_sha256_init() or + mbedtls_sha512_init() is called before operating on the relevant context + structure. Do not assume that zeroizing a context is a correct way to + reset it. Found independently by ccli8 on Github. + * In mbedtls_entropy_free(), properly free the message digest context. + * Fix status handshake status message in programs/ssl/dtls_client.c. Found + and fixed by muddog. + +Changes + * Extend cert_write example program by options to set the certificate version + and the message digest. Further, allow enabling/disabling of authority + identifier, subject identifier and basic constraints extensions. + * Only check for necessary RSA structure fields in `mbedtls_rsa_private`. In + particular, don't require P,Q if neither CRT nor blinding are + used. Reported and fix proposed independently by satur9nine and sliai + on GitHub. + * Only run AES-192 self-test if AES-192 is available. Fixes #963. + * Tighten the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification code and remove the + undeclared dependency of the RSA module on the ASN.1 module. + * Update all internal usage of deprecated message digest functions to the + new ones with return codes. In particular, this modifies the + mbedtls_md_info_t structure. Propagate errors from these functions + everywhere except some locations in the ssl_tls.c module. + * Improve CTR_DRBG error handling by propagating underlying AES errors. + * Add MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_HW_ACCEL_FAILED error codes for all cryptography + modules where the software implementation can be replaced by a hardware + implementation. + * Add explicit warnings for the use of MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, DES and ARC4 + throughout the library. + += mbed TLS 2.6.0 branch released 2017-08-10 + +Security + * Fix authentication bypass in SSL/TLS: when authmode is set to optional, + mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() would incorrectly return 0 when the peer's + X.509 certificate chain had more than MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + (default: 8) intermediates, even when it was not trusted. This could be + triggered remotely from either side. (With authmode set to 'required' + (the default), the handshake was correctly aborted). + * Reliably wipe sensitive data after use in the AES example applications + programs/aes/aescrypt2 and programs/aes/crypt_and_hash. + Found by Laurent Simon. + +Features + * Add the functions mbedtls_platform_setup() and mbedtls_platform_teardown() + and the context struct mbedtls_platform_context to perform + platform-specific setup and teardown operations. The macro + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT allows the functions to be overridden + by the user in a platform_alt.h file. These new functions are required in + some embedded environments to provide a means of initialising underlying + cryptographic acceleration hardware. + +API Changes + * Reverted API/ABI breaking changes introduced in mbed TLS 2.5.1, to make the + API consistent with mbed TLS 2.5.0. Specifically removed the inline + qualifier from the functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt, mbedtls_aes_encrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec and mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk. Found + by James Cowgill. #978 + * Certificate verification functions now set flags to -1 in case the full + chain was not verified due to an internal error (including in the verify + callback) or chain length limitations. + * With authmode set to optional, the TLS handshake is now aborted if the + verification of the peer's certificate failed due to an overlong chain or + a fatal error in the verify callback. + +Bugfix + * Add a check if iv_len is zero in GCM, and return an error if it is zero. + Reported by roberto. #716 + * Replace preprocessor condition from #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) + to #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) as the library cannot assume they will + always be implemented by pthread support. #696 + * Fix a resource leak on Windows platforms in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(), + in the case of an error. Found by redplait. #590 + * Add MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK to check for error value of mbedtls_mpi_fill_random. + Reported and fix suggested by guidovranken. #740 + * Fix conditional preprocessor directives in bignum.h to enable 64-bit + compilation when using ARM Compiler 6. + * Fix a potential integer overflow in the version verification for DER + encoded X.509 CRLs. The overflow could enable maliciously constructed CRLs + to bypass the version verification check. Found by Peng Li/Yueh-Hsun Lin, + KNOX Security, Samsung Research America + * Fix potential integer overflow in the version verification for DER + encoded X.509 CSRs. The overflow could enable maliciously constructed CSRs + to bypass the version verification check. Found by Peng Li/Yueh-Hsun Lin, + KNOX Security, Samsung Research America + * Fix a potential integer overflow in the version verification for DER + encoded X.509 certificates. The overflow could enable maliciously + constructed certificates to bypass the certificate verification check. + * Fix a call to the libc function time() to call the platform abstraction + function mbedtls_time() instead. Found by wairua. #666 + * Avoid shadowing of time and index functions through mbed TLS function + arguments. Found by inestlerode. #557. + +Changes + * Added config.h option MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION, to prevent the use of + 64-bit division. This is useful on embedded platforms where 64-bit division + created a dependency on external libraries. #708 + * Removed mutexes from ECP hardware accelerator code. Now all hardware + accelerator code in the library leaves concurrency handling to the + platform. Reported by Steven Cooreman. #863 + * Define the macro MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in the configuration file + config-no-entropy.h to reduce the RAM footprint. + * Added a test script that can be hooked into git that verifies commits + before they are pushed. + * Improve documentation of PKCS1 decryption functions. + += mbed TLS 2.5.1 released 2017-06-21 + +Security + * Fixed unlimited overread of heap-based buffer in mbedtls_ssl_read(). + The issue could only happen client-side with renegotiation enabled. + Could result in DoS (application crash) or information leak + (if the application layer sent data read from mbedtls_ssl_read() + back to the server or to a third party). Can be triggered remotely. + * Removed SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 from the default hash algorithms for + certificate verification. SHA-1 can be turned back on with a compile-time + option if needed. + * Fixed offset in FALLBACK_SCSV parsing that caused TLS server to fail to + detect it sometimes. Reported by Hugo Leisink. #810 + * Tighten parsing of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, to avoid a + potential Bleichenbacher/BERserk-style attack. + +Bugfix + * Remove size zero arrays from ECJPAKE test suite. Size zero arrays are not + valid C and they prevented the test from compiling in Visual Studio 2015 + and with GCC using the -Wpedantic compilation option. + * Fix insufficient support for signature-hash-algorithm extension, + resulting in compatibility problems with Chrome. Found by hfloyrd. #823 + * Fix behaviour that hid the original cause of fatal alerts in some cases + when sending the alert failed. The fix makes sure not to hide the error + that triggered the alert. + * Fix SSLv3 renegotiation behaviour and stop processing data received from + peer after sending a fatal alert to refuse a renegotiation attempt. + Previous behaviour was to keep processing data even after the alert has + been sent. + * Accept empty trusted CA chain in authentication mode + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL. Found by Jethro Beekman. #864 + * Fix implementation of mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() to not annihilate + fatal errors in authentication mode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL and to + reflect bad EC curves within verification result. + * Fix bug that caused the modular inversion function to accept the invalid + modulus 1 and therefore to hang. Found by blaufish. #641. + * Fix incorrect sign computation in modular exponentiation when the base is + a negative MPI. Previously the result was always negative. Found by Guido + Vranken. + * Fix a numerical underflow leading to stack overflow in mpi_read_file() + that was triggered uppon reading an empty line. Found by Guido Vranken. + +Changes + * Send fatal alerts in more cases. The previous behaviour was to skip + sending the fatal alert and just drop the connection. + * Clarify ECDSA documentation and improve the sample code to avoid + misunderstanding and potentially dangerous use of the API. Pointed out + by Jean-Philippe Aumasson. + += mbed TLS 2.5.0 branch released 2017-05-17 + +Security + * Wipe stack buffers in RSA private key operations + (rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(), rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt). Found by Laurent + Simon. + * Add exponent blinding to RSA private operations as a countermeasure + against side-channel attacks like the cache attack described in + https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2. + Found and fix proposed by Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, + Clémentine Maurice and Stefan Mangard. + +Features + * Add hardware acceleration support for the Elliptic Curve Point module. + This involved exposing parts of the internal interface to enable + replacing the core functions and adding and alternative, module level + replacement support for enabling the extension of the interface. + * Add a new configuration option to 'mbedtls_ssl_config' to enable + suppressing the CA list in Certificate Request messages. The default + behaviour has not changed, namely every configured CAs name is included. + +API Changes + * The following functions in the AES module have been deprecated and replaced + by the functions shown below. The new functions change the return type from + void to int to allow returning error codes when using MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, + MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT or MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT. + mbedtls_aes_decrypt() -> mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() + mbedtls_aes_encrypt() -> mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() + +Bugfix + * Remove macros from compat-1.3.h that correspond to deleted items from most + recent versions of the library. Found by Kyle Keen. + * Fixed issue in the Threading module that prevented mutexes from + initialising. Found by sznaider. #667 #843 + * Add checks in the PK module for the RSA functions on 64-bit systems. + The PK and RSA modules use different types for passing hash length and + without these checks the type cast could lead to data loss. Found by Guido + Vranken. + += mbed TLS 2.4.2 branch released 2017-03-08 + +Security + * Add checks to prevent signature forgeries for very large messages while + using RSA through the PK module in 64-bit systems. The issue was caused by + some data loss when casting a size_t to an unsigned int value in the + functions rsa_verify_wrap(), rsa_sign_wrap(), rsa_alt_sign_wrap() and + mbedtls_pk_sign(). Found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson. + * Fixed potential livelock during the parsing of a CRL in PEM format in + mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(). A string containing a CRL followed by trailing + characters after the footer could result in the execution of an infinite + loop. The issue can be triggered remotely. Found by Greg Zaverucha, + Microsoft. + * Removed MD5 from the allowed hash algorithms for CertificateRequest and + CertificateVerify messages, to prevent SLOTH attacks against TLS 1.2. + Introduced by interoperability fix for #513. + * Fixed a bug that caused freeing a buffer that was allocated on the stack, + when verifying the validity of a key on secp224k1. This could be + triggered remotely for example with a maliciously constructed certificate + and potentially could lead to remote code execution on some platforms. + Reported independently by rongsaws and Aleksandar Nikolic, Cisco Talos + team. #569 CVE-2017-2784 + +Bugfix + * Fix output certificate verification flags set by x509_crt_verify_top() when + traversing a chain of trusted CA. The issue would cause both flags, + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED and MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, to be + set when the verification conditions are not met regardless of the cause. + Found by Harm Verhagen and inestlerode. #665 #561 + * Fix the redefinition of macro ssl_set_bio to an undefined symbol + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio_timeout in compat-1.3.h, by removing it. + Found by omlib-lin. #673 + * Fix unused variable/function compilation warnings in pem.c, x509_crt.c and + x509_csr.c that are reported when building mbed TLS with a config.h that + does not define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C. Found by omnium21. #562 + * Fix incorrect renegotiation condition in ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate() that + would compare 64 bits of the record counter instead of 48 bits as indicated + in RFC 6347 Section 4.3.1. This could cause the execution of the + renegotiation routines at unexpected times when the protocol is DTLS. Found + by wariua. #687 + * Fixed multiple buffer overreads in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() when parsing + the input string in PEM format to extract the different components. Found + by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed potential arithmetic overflow in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed() that could + cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed potential arithmetic overflows in mbedtls_cipher_update() that could + cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed potential arithmetic overflow in mbedtls_md2_update() that could + cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed potential arithmetic overflow in mbedtls_base64_decode() that could + cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed heap overreads in mbedtls_x509_get_time(). Found by Peng + Li/Yueh-Hsun Lin, KNOX Security, Samsung Research America. + * Fix potential memory leak in mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(). The leak was caused + by missing calls to mbedtls_pem_free() in cases when a + MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT error was encountered. Found and + fix proposed by Guido Vranken. #722 + * Fixed the templates used to generate project and solution files for Visual + Studio 2015 as well as the files themselves, to remove a build warning + generated in Visual Studio 2015. Reported by Steve Valliere. #742 + * Fix a resource leak in ssl_cookie, when using MBEDTLS_THREADING_C. + Raised and fix suggested by Alan Gillingham in the mbed TLS forum. #771 + * Fix 1 byte buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_write_string() when the MPI + number to write in hexadecimal is negative and requires an odd number of + digits. Found and fixed by Guido Vranken. + * Fix unlisted DES configuration dependency in some pkparse test cases. Found + by inestlerode. #555 + += mbed TLS 2.4.1 branch released 2016-12-13 + +Changes + * Update to CMAC test data, taken from - NIST Special Publication 800-38B - + Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for + Authentication – October 2016 + += mbed TLS 2.4.0 branch released 2016-10-17 + +Security + * Removed the MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV option, because it was not compliant + with RFC-5116 and could lead to session key recovery in very long TLS + sessions. "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries Practical Forgery Attacks on GCM in + TLS" - H. Bock, A. Zauner, S. Devlin, J. Somorovsky, P. Jovanovic. + https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/475.pdf + * Fixed potential stack corruption in mbedtls_x509write_crt_der() and + mbedtls_x509write_csr_der() when the signature is copied to the buffer + without checking whether there is enough space in the destination. The + issue cannot be triggered remotely. Found by Jethro Beekman. + +Features + * Added support for CMAC for AES and 3DES and AES-CMAC-PRF-128, as defined by + NIST SP 800-38B, RFC-4493 and RFC-4615. + * Added hardware entropy selftest to verify that the hardware entropy source + is functioning correctly. + * Added a script to print build environment info for diagnostic use in test + scripts, which is also now called by all.sh. + * Added the macro MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN that enables the user to + configure the maximum length of a file path that can be buffered when + calling mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(). + * Added a configuration file config-no-entropy.h that configures the subset of + library features that do not require an entropy source. + * Added the macro MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE in config.h. This allows users + to configure the minimum number of bytes for entropy sources using the + mbedtls_hardware_poll() function. + +Bugfix + * Fix for platform time abstraction to avoid dependency issues where a build + may need time but not the standard C library abstraction, and added + configuration consistency checks to check_config.h + * Fix dependency issue in Makefile to allow parallel builds. + * Fix incorrect handling of block lengths in crypt_and_hash.c sample program, + when GCM is used. Found by udf2457. #441 + * Fix for key exchanges based on ECDH-RSA or ECDH-ECDSA which weren't + enabled unless others were also present. Found by David Fernandez. #428 + * Fix for out-of-tree builds using CMake. Found by jwurzer, and fix based on + a contribution from Tobias Tangemann. #541 + * Fixed cert_app.c sample program for debug output and for use when no root + certificates are provided. + * Fix conditional statement that would cause a 1 byte overread in + mbedtls_asn1_get_int(). Found and fixed by Guido Vranken. #599 + * Fixed pthread implementation to avoid unintended double initialisations + and double frees. Found by Niklas Amnebratt. + * Fixed the sample applications gen_key.c, cert_req.c and cert_write.c for + builds where the configuration MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C is not defined. Found + by inestlerode. #559. + * Fix mbedtls_x509_get_sig() to update the ASN1 type in the mbedtls_x509_buf + data structure until after error checks are successful. Found by + subramanyam-c. #622 + * Fix documentation and implementation missmatch for function arguments of + mbedtls_gcm_finish(). Found by cmiatpaar. #602 + * Guarantee that P>Q at RSA key generation. Found by inestlerode. #558 + * Fix potential byte overread when verifying malformed SERVER_HELLO in + ssl_parse_hello_verify_request() for DTLS. Found by Guido Vranken. + * Fix check for validity of date when parsing in mbedtls_x509_get_time(). + Found by subramanyam-c. #626 + * Fix compatibility issue with Internet Explorer client authentication, + where the limited hash choices prevented the client from sending its + certificate. Found by teumas. #513 + * Fix compilation without MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST enabled. + +Changes + * Extended test coverage of special cases, and added new timing test suite. + * Removed self-tests from the basic-built-test.sh script, and added all + missing self-tests to the test suites, to ensure self-tests are only + executed once. + * Added support for 3 and 4 byte lengths to mbedtls_asn1_write_len(). + * Added support for a Yotta specific configuration file - + through the symbol YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE. + * Added optimization for code space for X.509/OID based on configured + features. Contributed by Aviv Palivoda. + * Renamed source file library/net.c to library/net_sockets.c to avoid + naming collision in projects which also have files with the common name + net.c. For consistency, the corresponding header file, net.h, is marked as + deprecated, and its contents moved to net_sockets.h. + * Changed the strategy for X.509 certificate parsing and validation, to no + longer disregard certificates with unrecognised fields. + += mbed TLS 2.3.0 branch released 2016-06-28 + +Security + * Fix missing padding length check in mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt + required by PKCS1 v2.2 + * Fix potential integer overflow to buffer overflow in + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt and mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt + (not triggerable remotely in (D)TLS). + * Fix a potential integer underflow to buffer overread in + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt. It is not triggerable remotely in + SSL/TLS. + +Features + * Support for platform abstraction of the standard C library time() + function. + +Bugfix + * Fix bug in mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi() that caused wrong results when the three + arguments where the same (in-place doubling). Found and fixed by Janos + Follath. #309 + * Fix potential build failures related to the 'apidoc' target, introduced + in the previous patch release. Found by Robert Scheck. #390 #391 + * Fix issue in Makefile that prevented building using armar. #386 + * Fix memory leak that occurred only when ECJPAKE was enabled and ECDHE and + ECDSA was disabled in config.h . The leak didn't occur by default. + * Fix an issue that caused valid certificates to be rejected whenever an + expired or not yet valid certificate was parsed before a valid certificate + in the trusted certificate list. + * Fix bug in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse that caused trailing extra data in the + buffer after DER certificates to be included in the raw representation. + * Fix issue that caused a hang when generating RSA keys of odd bitlength + * Fix bug in mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt that made null pointer + dereference possible. + * Fix issue that caused a crash if invalid curves were passed to + mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves. #373 + * Fix issue in ssl_fork_server which was preventing it from functioning. #429 + * Fix memory leaks in test framework + * Fix test in ssl-opt.sh that does not run properly with valgrind + * Fix unchecked calls to mmbedtls_md_setup(). Fix by Brian Murray. #502 + +Changes + * On ARM platforms, when compiling with -O0 with GCC, Clang or armcc5, + don't use the optimized assembly for bignum multiplication. This removes + the need to pass -fomit-frame-pointer to avoid a build error with -O0. + * Disabled SSLv3 in the default configuration. + * Optimized mbedtls_mpi_zeroize() for MPI integer size. (Fix by Alexey + Skalozub). + * Fix non-compliance server extension handling. Extensions for SSLv3 are now + ignored, as required by RFC6101. + += mbed TLS 2.2.1 released 2016-01-05 + +Security + * Fix potential double free when mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data() fails to + allocate memory. Only used for certificate generation, not triggerable + remotely in SSL/TLS. Found by Rafał Przywara. #367 + * Disable MD5 handshake signatures in TLS 1.2 by default to prevent the + SLOTH attack on TLS 1.2 server authentication (other attacks from the + SLOTH paper do not apply to any version of mbed TLS or PolarSSL). + https://www.mitls.org/pages/attacks/SLOTH + +Bugfix + * Fix over-restrictive length limit in GCM. Found by Andreas-N. #362 + * Fix bug in certificate validation that caused valid chains to be rejected + when the first intermediate certificate has pathLenConstraint=0. Found by + Nicholas Wilson. Introduced in mbed TLS 2.2.0. #280 + * Removed potential leak in mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(), found by + JayaraghavendranK. #372 + * Fix suboptimal handling of unexpected records that caused interop issues + with some peers over unreliable links. Avoid dropping an entire DTLS + datagram if a single record in a datagram is unexpected, instead only + drop the record and look at subsequent records (if any are present) in + the same datagram. Found by jeannotlapin. #345 + += mbed TLS 2.2.0 released 2015-11-04 + +Security + * Fix potential double free if mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() is called more than + once and some allocation fails. Cannot be forced remotely. Found by Guido + Vranken, Intelworks. + * Fix potential heap corruption on Windows when + mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path() is passed a path longer than 2GB. Cannot be + triggered remotely. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. + * Fix potential buffer overflow in some asn1_write_xxx() functions. + Cannot be triggered remotely unless you create X.509 certificates based + on untrusted input or write keys of untrusted origin. Found by Guido + Vranken, Intelworks. + * The X509 max_pathlen constraint was not enforced on intermediate + certificates. Found by Nicholas Wilson, fix and tests provided by + Janos Follath. #280 and #319 + +Features + * Experimental support for EC J-PAKE as defined in Thread 1.0.0. + Disabled by default as the specification might still change. + * Added a key extraction callback to accees the master secret and key + block. (Potential uses include EAP-TLS and Thread.) + +Bugfix + * Self-signed certificates were not excluded from pathlen counting, + resulting in some valid X.509 being incorrectly rejected. Found and fix + provided by Janos Follath. #319 + * Fix build error with configurations where ECDHE-PSK is the only key + exchange. Found and fix provided by Chris Hammond. #270 + * Fix build error with configurations where RSA, RSA-PSK, ECDH-RSA or + ECHD-ECDSA if the only key exchange. Multiple reports. #310 + * Fixed a bug causing some handshakes to fail due to some non-fatal alerts + not being properly ignored. Found by mancha and Kasom Koht-arsa, #308 + * mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(_with_profile)() now also checks the key type and + size/curve against the profile. Before that, there was no way to set a + minimum key size for end-entity certificates with RSA keys. Found by + Matthew Page of Scannex Electronics Ltd. + * Fix failures in MPI on Sparc(64) due to use of bad assembly code. + Found by Kurt Danielson. #292 + * Fix typo in name of the extKeyUsage OID. Found by inestlerode, #314 + * Fix bug in ASN.1 encoding of booleans that caused generated CA + certificates to be rejected by some applications, including OS X + Keychain. Found and fixed by Jonathan Leroy, Inikup. + +Changes + * Improved performance of mbedtls_ecp_muladd() when one of the scalars is 1 + or -1. + += mbed TLS 2.1.2 released 2015-10-06 + +Security + * Added fix for CVE-2015-5291 to prevent heap corruption due to buffer + overflow of the hostname or session ticket. Found by Guido Vranken, + Intelworks. + * Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() is called more than + once in the same handhake and mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() was used. + Found and patch provided by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced + remotely. + * Fix stack buffer overflow in pkcs12 decryption (used by + mbedtls_pk_parse_key(file)() when the password is > 129 bytes. + Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely. + * Fix potential buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_read_string(). + Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not exploitable remotely in the context + of TLS, but might be in other uses. On 32 bit machines, requires reading a + string of close to or larger than 1GB to exploit; on 64 bit machines, would + require reading a string of close to or larger than 2^62 bytes. + * Fix potential random memory allocation in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() + on crafted PEM input data. Found and fix provided by Guido Vranken, + Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely in TLS. Triggerable remotely if you + accept PEM data from an untrusted source. + * Fix possible heap buffer overflow in base64_encoded() when the input + buffer is 512MB or larger on 32-bit platforms. Found by Guido Vranken, + Intelworks. Not trigerrable remotely in TLS. + * Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_conf_psk() is called repeatedly on + the same mbedtls_ssl_config object and memory allocation fails. Found by + Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced remotely. + * Fix potential heap buffer overflow in servers that perform client + authentication against a crafted CA cert. Cannot be triggered remotely + unless you allow third parties to pick trust CAs for client auth. + Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. + +Bugfix + * Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc. Found and patch provided by + zhasha (#278). + * Fix macroization of 'inline' keyword when building as C++. (#279) + +Changes + * Added checking of hostname length in mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() to ensure + domain names are compliant with RFC 1035. + * Fixed paths for check_config.h in example config files. (Found by bachp) + (#291) + += mbed TLS 2.1.1 released 2015-09-17 + +Security + * Add countermeasure against Lenstra's RSA-CRT attack for PKCS#1 v1.5 + signatures. (Found by Florian Weimer, Red Hat.) + https://securityblog.redhat.com/2015/09/02/factoring-rsa-keys-with-tls-perfect-forward-secrecy/ + * Fix possible client-side NULL pointer dereference (read) when the client + tries to continue the handshake after it failed (a misuse of the API). + (Found and patch provided by Fabian Foerg, Gotham Digital Science using + afl-fuzz.) + +Bugfix + * Fix warning when using a 64bit platform. (found by embedthis) (#275) + * Fix off-by-one error in parsing Supported Point Format extension that + caused some handshakes to fail. + +Changes + * Made X509 profile pointer const in mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile() to allow + use of mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next. (found by NWilson) + * When a client initiates a reconnect from the same port as a live + connection, if cookie verification is available + (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined in config.h, and usable cookie + callbacks set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies()), this will be + detected and mbedtls_ssl_read() will return + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT - it is then possible to start a new + handshake with the same context. (See RFC 6347 section 4.2.8.) + += mbed TLS 2.1.0 released 2015-09-04 + +Features + * Added support for yotta as a build system. + * Primary open source license changed to Apache 2.0 license. + +Bugfix + * Fix segfault in the benchmark program when benchmarking DHM. + * Fix build error with CMake and pre-4.5 versions of GCC (found by Hugo + Leisink). + * Fix bug when parsing a ServerHello without extensions (found by David + Sears). + * Fix bug in CMake lists that caused libmbedcrypto.a not to be installed + (found by Benoit Lecocq). + * Fix bug in Makefile that caused libmbedcrypto and libmbedx509 not to be + installed (found by Rawi666). + * Fix compile error with armcc 5 with --gnu option. + * Fix bug in Makefile that caused programs not to be installed correctly + (found by robotanarchy) (#232). + * Fix bug in Makefile that prevented from installing without building the + tests (found by robotanarchy) (#232). + * Fix missing -static-libgcc when building shared libraries for Windows + with make. + * Fix link error when building shared libraries for Windows with make. + * Fix error when loading libmbedtls.so. + * Fix bug in mbedtls_ssl_conf_default() that caused the default preset to + be always used (found by dcb314) (#235) + * Fix bug in mbedtls_rsa_public() and mbedtls_rsa_private() that could + result trying to unlock an unlocked mutex on invalid input (found by + Fredrik Axelsson) (#257) + * Fix -Wshadow warnings (found by hnrkp) (#240) + * Fix memory corruption on client with overlong PSK identity, around + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN or higher - not triggerrable remotely (found by + Aleksandrs Saveljevs) (#238) + * Fix unused function warning when using MBEDTLS_MDx_ALT or + MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT (found by Henrik) (#239) + * Fix memory corruption in pkey programs (found by yankuncheng) (#210) + +Changes + * The PEM parser now accepts a trailing space at end of lines (#226). + * It is now possible to #include a user-provided configuration file at the + end of the default config.h by defining MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE on the + compiler's command line. + * When verifying a certificate chain, if an intermediate certificate is + trusted, no later cert is checked. (suggested by hannes-landeholm) + (#220). + * Prepend a "thread identifier" to debug messages (issue pointed out by + Hugo Leisink) (#210). + * Add mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() to query the current maximum fragment + length. + += mbed TLS 2.0.0 released 2015-07-13 + +Features + * Support for DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 (RFC 6347). + * Ability to override core functions from MDx, SHAx, AES and DES modules + with custom implementation (eg hardware accelerated), complementing the + ability to override the whole module. + * New server-side implementation of session tickets that rotate keys to + preserve forward secrecy, and allows sharing across multiple contexts. + * Added a concept of X.509 cerificate verification profile that controls + which algorithms and key sizes (curves for ECDSA) are acceptable. + * Expanded configurability of security parameters in the SSL module with + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(). + * Introduced a concept of presets for SSL security-relevant configuration + parameters. + +API Changes + * The library has been split into libmbedcrypto, libmbedx509, libmbedtls. + You now need to link to all of them if you use TLS for example. + * All public identifiers moved to the mbedtls_* or MBEDTLS_* namespace. + Some names have been further changed to make them more consistent. + Migration helpers scripts/rename.pl and include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h are + provided. Full list of renamings in scripts/data_files/rename-1.3-2.0.txt + * Renamings of fields inside structures, not covered by the previous list: + mbedtls_cipher_info_t.key_length -> key_bitlen + mbedtls_cipher_context_t.key_length -> key_bitlen + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info.size -> bit_size + * Headers are now found in the 'mbedtls' directory (previously 'polarssl'). + * The following _init() functions that could return errors have + been split into an _init() that returns void and another function that + should generally be the first function called on this context after init: + mbedtls_ssl_init() -> mbedtls_ssl_setup() + mbedtls_ccm_init() -> mbedtls_ccm_setkey() + mbedtls_gcm_init() -> mbedtls_gcm_setkey() + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init() -> mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(_buf)() + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init() -> mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() + Note that for mbedtls_ssl_setup(), you need to be done setting up the + ssl_config structure before calling it. + * Most ssl_set_xxx() functions (all except ssl_set_bio(), ssl_set_hostname(), + ssl_set_session() and ssl_set_client_transport_id(), plus + ssl_legacy_renegotiation()) have been renamed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_xxx() + (see rename.pl and compat-1.3.h above) and their first argument's type + changed from ssl_context to ssl_config. + * ssl_set_bio() changed signature (contexts merged, order switched, one + additional callback for read-with-timeout). + * The following functions have been introduced and must be used in callback + implementations (SNI, PSK) instead of their *conf counterparts: + mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() + mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() + mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() lost its last argument (peer_cn), now set + using mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(). + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache() changed prototype (only one context + pointer, parameters reordered). + * On server, mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb() must now be used in + place of mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets() to enable session tickets. + * The SSL debug callback gained two new arguments (file name, line number). + * Debug modes were removed. + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac() now returns void. + * mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init() now returns void. + * X.509 verification flags are now an uint32_t. Affect the signature of: + mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() + mbedtls_x509_ctr_verify_info() + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() (flags, f_vrfy -> needs to be updated) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() (f_vrfy -> needs to be updated) + * The following functions changed prototype to avoid an in-out length + parameter: + mbedtls_base64_encode() + mbedtls_base64_decode() + mbedtls_mpi_write_string() + mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret() + * In the NET module, all "int" and "int *" arguments for file descriptors + changed type to "mbedtls_net_context *". + * net_accept() gained new arguments for the size of the client_ip buffer. + * In the threading layer, mbedtls_mutex_init() and mbedtls_mutex_free() now + return void. + * ecdsa_write_signature() gained an additional md_alg argument and + ecdsa_write_signature_det() was deprecated. + * pk_sign() no longer accepts md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE with ECDSA. + * Last argument of x509_crt_check_key_usage() and + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage() changed from int to unsigned. + * test_ca_list (from certs.h) is renamed to test_cas_pem and is only + available if POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C is defined (it never worked without). + * Test certificates in certs.c are no longer guaranteed to be nul-terminated + strings; use the new *_len variables instead of strlen(). + * Functions mbedtls_x509_xxx_parse(), mbedtls_pk_parse_key(), + mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key() and mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm() now expect the + length parameter to include the terminating null byte for PEM input. + * Signature of mpi_mul_mpi() changed to make the last argument unsigned + * calloc() is now used instead of malloc() everywhere. API of platform + layer and the memory_buffer_alloc module changed accordingly. + (Thanks to Mansour Moufid for helping with the replacement.) + * Change SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATION config.h flag to SSL_RENEGOTIATION + (support for renegotiation now needs explicit enabling in config.h). + * Split MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME into MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME and MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + in config.h + * net_connect() and net_bind() have a new 'proto' argument to choose + between TCP and UDP, using the macros NET_PROTO_TCP or NET_PROTO_UDP. + Their 'port' argument type is changed to a string. + * Some constness fixes + +Removals + * Removed mbedtls_ecp_group_read_string(). Only named groups are supported. + * Removed mbedtls_ecp_sub() and mbedtls_ecp_add(), use + mbedtls_ecp_muladd(). + * Removed individual mdX_hmac, shaX_hmac, mdX_file and shaX_file functions + (use generic functions from md.h) + * Removed mbedtls_timing_msleep(). Use mbedtls_net_usleep() or a custom + waiting function. + * Removed test DHM parameters from the test certs module. + * Removed the PBKDF2 module (use PKCS5). + * Removed POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC (use mbedtls_strerror()). + * Removed compat-1.2.h (helper for migrating from 1.2 to 1.3). + * Removed openssl.h (very partial OpenSSL compatibility layer). + * Configuration options POLARSSL_HAVE_LONGLONG was removed (now always on). + * Configuration options POLARSSL_HAVE_INT8 and POLARSSL_HAVE_INT16 have + been removed (compiler is required to support 32-bit operations). + * Configuration option POLARSSL_HAVE_IPV6 was removed (always enabled). + * Removed test program o_p_test, the script compat.sh does more. + * Removed test program ssl_test, superseded by ssl-opt.sh. + * Removed helper script active-config.pl + +New deprecations + * md_init_ctx() is deprecated in favour of md_setup(), that adds a third + argument (allowing memory savings if HMAC is not used) + +Semi-API changes (technically public, morally private) + * Renamed a few headers to include _internal in the name. Those headers are + not supposed to be included by users. + * Changed md_info_t into an opaque structure (use md_get_xxx() accessors). + * Changed pk_info_t into an opaque structure. + * Changed cipher_base_t into an opaque structure. + * Removed sig_oid2 and rename sig_oid1 to sig_oid in x509_crt and x509_crl. + * x509_crt.key_usage changed from unsigned char to unsigned int. + * Removed r and s from ecdsa_context + * Removed mode from des_context and des3_context + +Default behavior changes + * The default minimum TLS version is now TLS 1.0. + * RC4 is now blacklisted by default in the SSL/TLS layer, and excluded from the + default ciphersuite list returned by ssl_list_ciphersuites() + * Support for receiving SSLv2 ClientHello is now disabled by default at + compile time. + * The default authmode for SSL/TLS clients is now REQUIRED. + * Support for RSA_ALT contexts in the PK layer is now optional. Since is is + enabled in the default configuration, this is only noticeable if using a + custom config.h + * Default DHM parameters server-side upgraded from 1024 to 2048 bits. + * A minimum RSA key size of 2048 bits is now enforced during ceritificate + chain verification. + * Negotiation of truncated HMAC is now disabled by default on server too. + * The following functions are now case-sensitive: + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string() + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name() + mbedtls_md_info_from_string() + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string() + mbedtls_version_check_feature() + +Requirement changes + * The minimum MSVC version required is now 2010 (better C99 support). + * The NET layer now unconditionnaly relies on getaddrinfo() and select(). + * Compiler is required to support C99 types such as long long and uint32_t. + +API changes from the 1.4 preview branch + * ssl_set_bio_timeout() was removed, split into mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() with + new prototype, and mbedtls_ssl_set_read_timeout(). + * The following functions now return void: + mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport() + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version() + mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version() + * DTLS no longer hard-depends on TIMING_C, but uses a callback interface + instead, see mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(), with the Timing module providing + an example implementation, see mbedtls_timing_delay_context and + mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay(). + * With UDP sockets, it is no longer necessary to call net_bind() again + after a successful net_accept(). + +Changes + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() are now + thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. + * Reduced ROM fooprint of SHA-256 and added an option to reduce it even + more (at the expense of performance) MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER. + += mbed TLS 1.3 branch + +Security + * With authmode set to SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, verification of keyUsage and + extendedKeyUsage on the leaf certificate was lost (results not accessible + via ssl_get_verify_results()). + * Add countermeasure against "Lucky 13 strikes back" cache-based attack, + https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2714625 + +Features + * Improve ECC performance by using more efficient doubling formulas + (contributed by Peter Dettman). + * Add x509_crt_verify_info() to display certificate verification results. + * Add support for reading DH parameters with privateValueLength included + (contributed by Daniel Kahn Gillmor). + * Add support for bit strings in X.509 names (request by Fredrik Axelsson). + * Add support for id-at-uniqueIdentifier in X.509 names. + * Add support for overriding snprintf() (except on Windows) and exit() in + the platform layer. + * Add an option to use macros instead of function pointers in the platform + layer (helps get rid of unwanted references). + * Improved Makefiles for Windows targets by fixing library targets and making + cross-compilation easier (thanks to Alon Bar-Lev). + * The benchmark program also prints heap usage for public-key primitives + if POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG are defined. + * New script ecc-heap.sh helps measuring the impact of ECC parameters on + speed and RAM (heap only for now) usage. + * New script memory.sh helps measuring the ROM and RAM requirements of two + reduced configurations (PSK-CCM and NSA suite B). + * Add config flag POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING (off by default) to produce + warnings on use of deprecated functions (with GCC and Clang only). + * Add config flag POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED (off by default) to produce + errors on use of deprecated functions. + +Bugfix + * Fix compile errors with PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS. + * Fix compile error with PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT (thanks to Rafał Przywara). + * Fix bug in entropy.c when THREADING_C is also enabled that caused + entropy_free() to crash (thanks to Rafał Przywara). + * Fix memory leak when gcm_setkey() and ccm_setkey() are used more than + once on the same context. + * Fix bug in ssl_mail_client when password is longer that username (found + by Bruno Pape). + * Fix undefined behaviour (memcmp( NULL, NULL, 0 );) in X.509 modules + (detected by Clang's 3.6 UBSan). + * mpi_size() and mpi_msb() would segfault when called on an mpi that is + initialized but not set (found by pravic). + * Fix detection of support for getrandom() on Linux (reported by syzzer) by + doing it at runtime (using uname) rather that compile time. + * Fix handling of symlinks by "make install" (found by Gaël PORTAY). + * Fix potential NULL pointer dereference (not trigerrable remotely) when + ssl_write() is called before the handshake is finished (introduced in + 1.3.10) (first reported by Martin Blumenstingl). + * Fix bug in pk_parse_key() that caused some valid private EC keys to be + rejected. + * Fix bug in Via Padlock support (found by Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos). + * Fix thread safety bug in RSA operations (found by Fredrik Axelsson). + * Fix hardclock() (only used in the benchmarking program) with some + versions of mingw64 (found by kxjhlele). + * Fix warnings from mingw64 in timing.c (found by kxjklele). + * Fix potential unintended sign extension in asn1_get_len() on 64-bit + platforms. + * Fix potential memory leak in ssl_set_psk() (found by Mansour Moufid). + * Fix compile error when POLARSSL_SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTATION and + POLARSSL_SSL_SSESSION_TICKETS where both enabled in config.h (introduced + in 1.3.10). + * Add missing extern "C" guard in aesni.h (reported by amir zamani). + * Add missing dependency on SHA-256 in some x509 programs (reported by + Gergely Budai). + * Fix bug related to ssl_set_curves(): the client didn't check that the + curve picked by the server was actually allowed. + +Changes + * Remove bias in mpi_gen_prime (contributed by Pascal Junod). + * Remove potential sources of timing variations (some contributed by Pascal + Junod). + * Options POLARSSL_HAVE_INT8 and POLARSSL_HAVE_INT16 are deprecated. + * Enabling POLARSSL_NET_C without POLARSSL_HAVE_IPV6 is deprecated. + * compat-1.2.h and openssl.h are deprecated. + * Adjusting/overriding CFLAGS and LDFLAGS with the make build system is now + more flexible (warning: OFLAGS is not used any more) (see the README) + (contributed by Alon Bar-Lev). + * ssl_set_own_cert() no longer calls pk_check_pair() since the + performance impact was bad for some users (this was introduced in 1.3.10). + * Move from SHA-1 to SHA-256 in example programs using signatures + (suggested by Thorsten Mühlfelder). + * Remove some unneeded inclusions of header files from the standard library + "minimize" others (eg use stddef.h if only size_t is needed). + * Change #include lines in test files to use double quotes instead of angle + brackets for uniformity with the rest of the code. + * Remove dependency on sscanf() in X.509 parsing modules. + += mbed TLS 1.3.10 released 2015-02-09 +Security + * NULL pointer dereference in the buffer-based allocator when the buffer is + full and polarssl_free() is called (found by Mark Hasemeyer) + (only possible if POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C is enabled, which it is + not by default). + * Fix remotely-triggerable uninitialised pointer dereference caused by + crafted X.509 certificate (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a + client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix remotely-triggerable memory leak caused by crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix potential stack overflow while parsing crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix timing difference that could theoretically lead to a + Bleichenbacher-style attack in the RSA and RSA-PSK key exchanges + (reported by Sebastian Schinzel). + +Features + * Add support for FALLBACK_SCSV (draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv). + * Add support for Extended Master Secret (draft-ietf-tls-session-hash). + * Add support for Encrypt-then-MAC (RFC 7366). + * Add function pk_check_pair() to test if public and private keys match. + * Add x509_crl_parse_der(). + * Add compile-time option POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA to limit the + length of an X.509 verification chain. + * Support for renegotiation can now be disabled at compile-time + * Support for 1/n-1 record splitting, a countermeasure against BEAST. + * Certificate selection based on signature hash, preferring SHA-1 over SHA-2 + for pre-1.2 clients when multiple certificates are available. + * Add support for getrandom() syscall on recent Linux kernels with Glibc or + a compatible enough libc (eg uClibc). + * Add ssl_set_arc4_support() to make it easier to disable RC4 at runtime + while using the default ciphersuite list. + * Added new error codes and debug messages about selection of + ciphersuite/certificate. + +Bugfix + * Stack buffer overflow if ctr_drbg_update() is called with too large + add_len (found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson) (not triggerable remotely). + * Possible buffer overflow of length at most POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE + if memory_buffer_alloc_init() was called with buf not aligned and len not + a multiple of POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE (not triggerable remotely). + * User set CFLAGS were ignored by Cmake with gcc (introduced in 1.3.9, found + by Julian Ospald). + * Fix potential undefined behaviour in Camellia. + * Fix potential failure in ECDSA signatures when POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS is a + multiple of 8 (found by Gergely Budai). + * Fix unchecked return code in x509_crt_parse_path() on Windows (found by + Peter Vaskovic). + * Fix assembly selection for MIPS64 (thanks to James Cowgill). + * ssl_get_verify_result() now works even if the handshake was aborted due + to a failed verification (found by Fredrik Axelsson). + * Skip writing and parsing signature_algorithm extension if none of the + key exchanges enabled needs certificates. This fixes a possible interop + issue with some servers when a zero-length extension was sent. (Reported + by Peter Dettman.) + * On a 0-length input, base64_encode() did not correctly set output length + (found by Hendrik van den Boogaard). + +Changes + * Use deterministic nonces for AEAD ciphers in TLS by default (possible to + switch back to random with POLARSSL_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV in config.h). + * Blind RSA private operations even when POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT is defined. + * ssl_set_own_cert() now returns an error on key-certificate mismatch. + * Forbid repeated extensions in X.509 certificates. + * debug_print_buf() now prints a text view in addition to hexadecimal. + * A specific error is now returned when there are ciphersuites in common + but none of them is usable due to external factors such as no certificate + with a suitable (extended)KeyUsage or curve or no PSK set. + * It is now possible to disable negotiation of truncated HMAC server-side + at runtime with ssl_set_truncated_hmac(). + * Example programs for SSL client and server now disable SSLv3 by default. + * Example programs for SSL client and server now disable RC4 by default. + * Use platform.h in all test suites and programs. + += PolarSSL 1.3.9 released 2014-10-20 +Security + * Lowest common hash was selected from signature_algorithms extension in + TLS 1.2 (found by Darren Bane) (introduced in 1.3.8). + * Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing some X.509 certificates + (server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing crafted ClientHello + (not affected if ECC support was compiled out) (found using Codenomicon + Defensics). + +Bugfix + * Support escaping of commas in x509_string_to_names() + * Fix compile error in ssl_pthread_server (found by Julian Ospald). + * Fix net_accept() regarding non-blocking sockets (found by Luca Pesce). + * Don't print uninitialised buffer in ssl_mail_client (found by Marc Abel). + * Fix warnings from Clang's scan-build (contributed by Alfred Klomp). + * Fix compile error in timing.c when POLARSSL_NET_C and POLARSSL_SELFTEST + are defined but not POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME (found by Stephane Di Vito). + * Remove non-existent file from VS projects (found by Peter Vaskovic). + * ssl_read() could return non-application data records on server while + renegotation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received. + * Server-initiated renegotiation would fail with non-blocking I/O if the + write callback returned WANT_WRITE when requesting renegotiation. + * ssl_close_notify() could send more than one message in some circumstances + with non-blocking I/O. + * Fix compiler warnings on iOS (found by Sander Niemeijer). + * x509_crt_parse() did not increase total_failed on PEM error + * Fix compile error with armcc in mpi_is_prime() + * Fix potential bad read in parsing ServerHello (found by Adrien + Vialletelle). + +Changes + * Ciphersuites using SHA-256 or SHA-384 now require TLS 1.x (there is no + standard defining how to use SHA-2 with SSL 3.0). + * Ciphersuites using RSA-PSK key exchange new require TLS 1.x (the spec is + ambiguous on how to encode some packets with SSL 3.0). + * Made buffer size in pk_write_(pub)key_pem() more dynamic, eg smaller if + RSA is disabled, larger if POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE is larger. + * ssl_read() now returns POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ rather than + POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE on harmless alerts. + * POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE now defaults to 1024 in order to allow 8192 bits + RSA keys. + * Accept spaces at end of line or end of buffer in base64_decode(). + * X.509 certificates with more than one AttributeTypeAndValue per + RelativeDistinguishedName are not accepted any more. + += PolarSSL 1.3.8 released 2014-07-11 +Security + * Fix length checking for AEAD ciphersuites (found by Codenomicon). + It was possible to crash the server (and client) using crafted messages + when a GCM suite was chosen. + +Features + * Add CCM module and cipher mode to Cipher Layer + * Support for CCM and CCM_8 ciphersuites + * Support for parsing and verifying RSASSA-PSS signatures in the X.509 + modules (certificates, CRLs and CSRs). + * Blowfish in the cipher layer now supports variable length keys. + * Add example config.h for PSK with CCM, optimized for low RAM usage. + * Optimize for RAM usage in example config.h for NSA Suite B profile. + * Add POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES to allow removing RC4 ciphersuites + from the default list (inactive by default). + * Add server-side enforcement of sent renegotiation requests + (ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced()) + * Add SSL_CIPHERSUITES config.h flag to allow specifying a list of + ciphersuites to use and save some memory if the list is small. + +Changes + * Add LINK_WITH_PTHREAD option in CMake for explicit linking that is + required on some platforms (e.g. OpenBSD) + * Migrate zeroizing of data to polarssl_zeroize() instead of memset() + against unwanted compiler optimizations + * md_list() now returns hashes strongest first + * Selection of hash for signing ServerKeyExchange in TLS 1.2 now picks + strongest offered by client. + * All public contexts have _init() and _free() functions now for simpler + usage pattern + +Bugfix + * Fix in debug_print_msg() + * Enforce alignment in the buffer allocator even if buffer is not aligned + * Remove less-than-zero checks on unsigned numbers + * Stricter check on SSL ClientHello internal sizes compared to actual packet + size (found by TrustInSoft) + * Fix WSAStartup() return value check (found by Peter Vaskovic) + * Other minor issues (found by Peter Vaskovic) + * Fix symlink command for cross compiling with CMake (found by Andre + Heinecke) + * Fix DER output of gen_key app (found by Gergely Budai) + * Very small records were incorrectly rejected when truncated HMAC was in + use with some ciphersuites and versions (RC4 in all versions, CBC with + versions < TLS 1.1). + * Very large records using more than 224 bytes of padding were incorrectly + rejected with CBC-based ciphersuites and TLS >= 1.1 + * Very large records using less padding could cause a buffer overread of up + to 32 bytes with CBC-based ciphersuites and TLS >= 1.1 + * Restore ability to use a v1 cert as a CA if trusted locally. (This had + been removed in 1.3.6.) + * Restore ability to locally trust a self-signed cert that is not a proper + CA for use as an end entity certificate. (This had been removed in + 1.3.6.) + * Fix preprocessor checks for bn_mul PPC asm (found by Barry K. Nathan). + * Use \n\t rather than semicolons for bn_mul asm, since some assemblers + interpret semicolons as comment delimiters (found by Barry K. Nathan). + * Fix off-by-one error in parsing Supported Point Format extension that + caused some handshakes to fail. + * Fix possible miscomputation of the premaster secret with DHE-PSK key + exchange that caused some handshakes to fail with other implementations. + (Failure rate <= 1/255 with common DHM moduli.) + * Disable broken Sparc64 bn_mul assembly (found by Florian Obser). + * Fix base64_decode() to return and check length correctly (in case of + tight buffers) + * Fix mpi_write_string() to write "00" as hex output for empty MPI (found + by Hui Dong) + += PolarSSL 1.3.7 released on 2014-05-02 +Features + * debug_set_log_mode() added to determine raw or full logging + * debug_set_threshold() added to ignore messages over threshold level + * version_check_feature() added to check for compile-time options at + run-time + +Changes + * POLARSSL_CONFIG_OPTIONS has been removed. All values are individually + checked and filled in the relevant module headers + * Debug module only outputs full lines instead of parts + * Better support for the different Attribute Types from IETF PKIX (RFC 5280) + * AES-NI now compiles with "old" assemblers too + * Ciphersuites based on RC4 now have the lowest priority by default + +Bugfix + * Only iterate over actual certificates in ssl_write_certificate_request() + (found by Matthew Page) + * Typos in platform.c and pkcs11.c (found by Daniel Phillips and Steffan + Karger) + * cert_write app should use subject of issuer certificate as issuer of cert + * Fix false reject in padding check in ssl_decrypt_buf() for CBC + ciphersuites, for full SSL frames of data. + * Improve interoperability by not writing extension length in ClientHello / + ServerHello when no extensions are present (found by Matthew Page) + * rsa_check_pubkey() now allows an E up to N + * On OpenBSD, use arc4random_buf() instead of rand() to prevent warnings + * mpi_fill_random() was creating numbers larger than requested on + big-endian platform when size was not an integer number of limbs + * Fix dependencies issues in X.509 test suite. + * Some parts of ssl_tls.c were compiled even when the module was disabled. + * Fix detection of DragonflyBSD in net.c (found by Markus Pfeiffer) + * Fix detection of Clang on some Apple platforms with CMake + (found by Barry K. Nathan) + += PolarSSL 1.3.6 released on 2014-04-11 + +Features + * Support for the ALPN SSL extension + * Add option 'use_dev_random' to gen_key application + * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension for CA and leaf + certificates (POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension + (POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + +Changes + * x509_crt_info() now prints information about parsed extensions as well + * pk_verify() now returns a specific error code when the signature is valid + but shorter than the supplied length. + * Use UTC time to check certificate validity. + * Reject certificates with times not in UTC, per RFC 5280. + +Security + * Avoid potential timing leak in ecdsa_sign() by blinding modular division. + (Found by Watson Ladd.) + * The notAfter date of some certificates was no longer checked since 1.3.5. + This affects certificates in the user-supplied chain except the top + certificate. If the user-supplied chain contains only one certificates, + it is not affected (ie, its notAfter date is properly checked). + * Prevent potential NULL pointer dereference in ssl_read_record() (found by + TrustInSoft) + +Bugfix + * The length of various ClientKeyExchange messages was not properly checked. + * Some example server programs were not sending the close_notify alert. + * Potential memory leak in mpi_exp_mod() when error occurs during + calculation of RR. + * Fixed malloc/free default #define in platform.c (found by Gergely Budai). + * Fixed type which made POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 uneffective (found by + Gergely Budai). + * Fix #include path in ecdsa.h which wasn't accepted by some compilers. + (found by Gergely Budai) + * Fix compile errors when POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC is undefined (found by + Shuo Chen). + * oid_get_numeric_string() used to truncate the output without returning an + error if the output buffer was just 1 byte too small. + * dhm_parse_dhm() (hence dhm_parse_dhmfile()) did not set dhm->len. + * Calling pk_debug() on an RSA-alt key would segfault. + * pk_get_size() and pk_get_len() were off by a factor 8 for RSA-alt keys. + * Potential buffer overwrite in pem_write_buffer() because of low length + indication (found by Thijs Alkemade) + * EC curves constants, which should be only in ROM since 1.3.3, were also + stored in RAM due to missing 'const's (found by Gergely Budai). + += PolarSSL 1.3.5 released on 2014-03-26 +Features + * HMAC-DRBG as a separate module + * Option to set the Curve preference order (disabled by default) + * Single Platform compatilibity layer (for memory / printf / fprintf) + * Ability to provide alternate timing implementation + * Ability to force the entropy module to use SHA-256 as its basis + (POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) + * Testing script ssl-opt.sh added for testing 'live' ssl option + interoperability against OpenSSL and PolarSSL + * Support for reading EC keys that use SpecifiedECDomain in some cases. + * Entropy module now supports seed writing and reading + +Changes + * Deprecated the Memory layer + * entropy_add_source(), entropy_update_manual() and entropy_gather() + now thread-safe if POLARSSL_THREADING_C defined + * Improvements to the CMake build system, contributed by Julian Ospald. + * Work around a bug of the version of Clang shipped by Apple with Mavericks + that prevented bignum.c from compiling. (Reported by Rafael Baptista.) + * Revamped the compat.sh interoperatibility script to include support for + testing against GnuTLS + * Deprecated ssl_set_own_cert_rsa() and ssl_set_own_cert_rsa_alt() + * Improvements to tests/Makefile, contributed by Oden Eriksson. + +Security + * Forbid change of server certificate during renegotiation to prevent + "triple handshake" attack when authentication mode is 'optional' (the + attack was already impossible when authentication is required). + * Check notBefore timestamp of certificates and CRLs from the future. + * Forbid sequence number wrapping + * Fixed possible buffer overflow with overlong PSK + * Possible remotely-triggered out-of-bounds memory access fixed (found by + TrustInSoft) + +Bugfix + * ecp_gen_keypair() does more tries to prevent failure because of + statistics + * Fixed bug in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations + * Fixed testing with out-of-source builds using cmake + * Fixed version-major intolerance in server + * Fixed CMake symlinking on out-of-source builds + * Fixed dependency issues in test suite + * Programs rsa_sign_pss and rsa_verify_pss were not using PSS since 1.3.0 + * Bignum's MIPS-32 assembly was used on MIPS-64, causing chaos. (Found by + Alex Wilson.) + * ssl_cache was creating entries when max_entries=0 if TIMING_C was enabled. + * m_sleep() was sleeping twice too long on most Unix platforms. + * Fixed bug with session tickets and non-blocking I/O in the unlikely case + send() would return an EAGAIN error when sending the ticket. + * ssl_cache was leaking memory when reusing a timed out entry containing a + client certificate. + * ssl_srv was leaking memory when client presented a timed out ticket + containing a client certificate + * ssl_init() was leaving a dirty pointer in ssl_context if malloc of + out_ctr failed + * ssl_handshake_init() was leaving dirty pointers in subcontexts if malloc + of one of them failed + * Fix typo in rsa_copy() that impacted PKCS#1 v2 contexts + * x509_get_current_time() uses localtime_r() to prevent thread issues + += PolarSSL 1.3.4 released on 2014-01-27 +Features + * Support for the Koblitz curves: secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1 + * Support for RIPEMD-160 + * Support for AES CFB8 mode + * Support for deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979) + +Bugfix + * Potential memory leak in bignum_selftest() + * Replaced expired test certificate + * ssl_mail_client now terminates lines with CRLF, instead of LF + * net module handles timeouts on blocking sockets better (found by Tilman + Sauerbeck) + * Assembly format fixes in bn_mul.h + +Security + * Missing MPI_CHK calls added around unguarded mpi calls (found by + TrustInSoft) + += PolarSSL 1.3.3 released on 2013-12-31 +Features + * EC key generation support in gen_key app + * Support for adhering to client ciphersuite order preference + (POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + * Support for Curve25519 + * Support for ECDH-RSA and ECDH-ECDSA key exchanges and ciphersuites + * Support for IPv6 in the NET module + * AES-NI support for AES, AES-GCM and AES key scheduling + * SSL Pthread-based server example added (ssl_pthread_server) + +Changes + * gen_prime() speedup + * Speedup of ECP multiplication operation + * Relaxed some SHA2 ciphersuite's version requirements + * Dropped use of readdir_r() instead of readdir() with threading support + * More constant-time checks in the RSA module + * Split off curves from ecp.c into ecp_curves.c + * Curves are now stored fully in ROM + * Memory usage optimizations in ECP module + * Removed POLARSSL_THREADING_DUMMY + +Bugfix + * Fixed bug in mpi_set_bit() on platforms where t_uint is wider than int + * Fixed X.509 hostname comparison (with non-regular characters) + * SSL now gracefully handles missing RNG + * Missing defines / cases for RSA_PSK key exchange + * crypt_and_hash app checks MAC before final decryption + * Potential memory leak in ssl_ticket_keys_init() + * Memory leak in benchmark application + * Fixed x509_crt_parse_path() bug on Windows platforms + * Added missing MPI_CHK() around some statements in mpi_div_mpi() (found by + TrustInSoft) + * Fixed potential overflow in certificate size verification in + ssl_write_certificate() (found by TrustInSoft) + +Security + * Possible remotely-triggered out-of-bounds memory access fixed (found by + TrustInSoft) + += PolarSSL 1.3.2 released on 2013-11-04 +Features + * PK tests added to test framework + * Added optional optimization for NIST MODP curves (POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + * Support for Camellia-GCM mode and ciphersuites + +Changes + * Padding checks in cipher layer are now constant-time + * Value comparisons in SSL layer are now constant-time + * Support for serialNumber, postalAddress and postalCode in X509 names + * SSL Renegotiation was refactored + +Bugfix + * More stringent checks in cipher layer + * Server does not send out extensions not advertised by client + * Prevent possible alignment warnings on casting from char * to 'aligned *' + * Misc fixes and additions to dependency checks + * Const correctness + * cert_write with selfsign should use issuer_name as subject_name + * Fix ECDSA corner case: missing reduction mod N (found by DualTachyon) + * Defines to handle UEFI environment under MSVC + * Server-side initiated renegotiations send HelloRequest + += PolarSSL 1.3.1 released on 2013-10-15 +Features + * Support for Brainpool curves and TLS ciphersuites (RFC 7027) + * Support for ECDHE-PSK key-exchange and ciphersuites + * Support for RSA-PSK key-exchange and ciphersuites + +Changes + * RSA blinding locks for a smaller amount of time + * TLS compression only allocates working buffer once + * Introduced POLARSSL_HAVE_READDIR_R for systems without it + * config.h is more script-friendly + +Bugfix + * Missing MSVC defines added + * Compile errors with POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT + * Header files with 'polarssl/' + * Const correctness + * Possible naming collision in dhm_context + * Better support for MSVC + * threading_set_alt() name + * Added missing x509write_crt_set_version() + += PolarSSL 1.3.0 released on 2013-10-01 +Features + * Elliptic Curve Cryptography module added + * Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman module added + * Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman support for SSL/TLS + (ECDHE-based ciphersuites) + * Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm support for SSL/TLS + (ECDSA-based ciphersuites) + * Ability to specify allowed ciphersuites based on the protocol version. + * PSK and DHE-PSK based ciphersuites added + * Memory allocation abstraction layer added + * Buffer-based memory allocator added (no malloc() / free() / HEAP usage) + * Threading abstraction layer added (dummy / pthread / alternate) + * Public Key abstraction layer added + * Parsing Elliptic Curve keys + * Parsing Elliptic Curve certificates + * Support for max_fragment_length extension (RFC 6066) + * Support for truncated_hmac extension (RFC 6066) + * Support for zeros-and-length (ANSI X.923) padding, one-and-zeros + (ISO/IEC 7816-4) padding and zero padding in the cipher layer + * Support for session tickets (RFC 5077) + * Certificate Request (CSR) generation with extensions (key_usage, + ns_cert_type) + * X509 Certificate writing with extensions (basic_constraints, + issuer_key_identifier, etc) + * Optional blinding for RSA, DHM and EC + * Support for multiple active certificate / key pairs in SSL servers for + the same host (Not to be confused with SNI!) + +Changes + * Ability to enable / disable SSL v3 / TLS 1.0 / TLS 1.1 / TLS 1.2 + individually + * Introduced separate SSL Ciphersuites module that is based on + Cipher and MD information + * Internals for SSL module adapted to have separate IV pointer that is + dynamically set (Better support for hardware acceleration) + * Moved all OID functionality to a separate module. RSA function + prototypes for the RSA sign and verify functions changed as a result + * Split up the GCM module into a starts/update/finish cycle + * Client and server now filter sent and accepted ciphersuites on minimum + and maximum protocol version + * Ability to disable server_name extension (RFC 6066) + * Renamed error_strerror() to the less conflicting polarssl_strerror() + (Ability to keep old as well with POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC) + * SHA2 renamed to SHA256, SHA4 renamed to SHA512 and functions accordingly + * All RSA operations require a random generator for blinding purposes + * X509 core refactored + * x509_crt_verify() now case insensitive for cn (RFC 6125 6.4) + * Also compiles / runs without time-based functions (!POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME) + * Support faulty X509 v1 certificates with extensions + (POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) + +Bugfix + * Fixed parse error in ssl_parse_certificate_request() + * zlib compression/decompression skipped on empty blocks + * Support for AIX header locations in net.c module + * Fixed file descriptor leaks + +Security + * RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks + (found by Cyril Arnaud and Pierre-Alain Fouque) + + += Version 1.2.14 released 2015-05-?? + +Security + * Fix potential invalid memory read in the server, that allows a client to + crash it remotely (found by Caj Larsson). + * Fix potential invalid memory read in certificate parsing, that allows a + client to crash the server remotely if client authentication is enabled + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Add countermeasure against "Lucky 13 strikes back" cache-based attack, + https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2714625 + +Bugfix + * Fix bug in Via Padlock support (found by Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos). + * Fix hardclock() (only used in the benchmarking program) with some + versions of mingw64 (found by kxjhlele). + * Fix warnings from mingw64 in timing.c (found by kxjklele). + * Fix potential unintended sign extension in asn1_get_len() on 64-bit + platforms (found with Coverity Scan). + += Version 1.2.13 released 2015-02-16 +Note: Although PolarSSL has been renamed to mbed TLS, no changes reflecting + this will be made in the 1.2 branch at this point. + +Security + * Fix remotely-triggerable uninitialised pointer dereference caused by + crafted X.509 certificate (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask + for a client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix remotely-triggerable memory leak caused by crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix potential stack overflow while parsing crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix buffer overread of size 1 when parsing crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate). + +Bugfix + * Fix potential undefined behaviour in Camellia. + * Fix memory leaks in PKCS#5 and PKCS#12. + * Stack buffer overflow if ctr_drbg_update() is called with too large + add_len (found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson) (not triggerable remotely). + * Fix bug in MPI/bignum on s390/s390x (reported by Dan Horák) (introduced + in 1.2.12). + * Fix unchecked return code in x509_crt_parse_path() on Windows (found by + Peter Vaskovic). + * Fix assembly selection for MIPS64 (thanks to James Cowgill). + * ssl_get_verify_result() now works even if the handshake was aborted due + to a failed verification (found by Fredrik Axelsson). + * Skip writing and parsing signature_algorithm extension if none of the + key exchanges enabled needs certificates. This fixes a possible interop + issue with some servers when a zero-length extension was sent. (Reported + by Peter Dettman.) + * On a 0-length input, base64_encode() did not correctly set output length + (found by Hendrik van den Boogaard). + +Changes + * Blind RSA private operations even when POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT is defined. + * Forbid repeated extensions in X.509 certificates. + * Add compile-time option POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA to limit the + length of an X.509 verification chain (default = 8). += Version 1.2.12 released 2014-10-24 + +Security + * Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing some X.509 certificates + (server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate). + (Found using Codenomicon Defensics.) + +Bugfix + * Fix potential bad read in parsing ServerHello (found by Adrien + Vialletelle). + * ssl_close_notify() could send more than one message in some circumstances + with non-blocking I/O. + * x509_crt_parse() did not increase total_failed on PEM error + * Fix compiler warnings on iOS (found by Sander Niemeijer). + * Don't print uninitialised buffer in ssl_mail_client (found by Marc Abel). + * Fix net_accept() regarding non-blocking sockets (found by Luca Pesce). + * ssl_read() could return non-application data records on server while + renegotation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received. + * Fix warnings from Clang's scan-build (contributed by Alfred Klomp). + +Changes + * X.509 certificates with more than one AttributeTypeAndValue per + RelativeDistinguishedName are not accepted any more. + * ssl_read() now returns POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ rather than + POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE on harmless alerts. + * Accept spaces at end of line or end of buffer in base64_decode(). + += Version 1.2.11 released 2014-07-11 +Features + * Entropy module now supports seed writing and reading + +Changes + * Introduced POLARSSL_HAVE_READDIR_R for systems without it + * Improvements to the CMake build system, contributed by Julian Ospald. + * Work around a bug of the version of Clang shipped by Apple with Mavericks + that prevented bignum.c from compiling. (Reported by Rafael Baptista.) + * Improvements to tests/Makefile, contributed by Oden Eriksson. + * Use UTC time to check certificate validity. + * Reject certificates with times not in UTC, per RFC 5280. + * Migrate zeroizing of data to polarssl_zeroize() instead of memset() + against unwanted compiler optimizations + +Security + * Forbid change of server certificate during renegotiation to prevent + "triple handshake" attack when authentication mode is optional (the + attack was already impossible when authentication is required). + * Check notBefore timestamp of certificates and CRLs from the future. + * Forbid sequence number wrapping + * Prevent potential NULL pointer dereference in ssl_read_record() (found by + TrustInSoft) + * Fix length checking for AEAD ciphersuites (found by Codenomicon). + It was possible to crash the server (and client) using crafted messages + when a GCM suite was chosen. + +Bugfix + * Fixed X.509 hostname comparison (with non-regular characters) + * SSL now gracefully handles missing RNG + * crypt_and_hash app checks MAC before final decryption + * Fixed x509_crt_parse_path() bug on Windows platforms + * Added missing MPI_CHK() around some statements in mpi_div_mpi() (found by + TrustInSoft) + * Fixed potential overflow in certificate size verification in + ssl_write_certificate() (found by TrustInSoft) + * Fix ASM format in bn_mul.h + * Potential memory leak in bignum_selftest() + * Replaced expired test certificate + * ssl_mail_client now terminates lines with CRLF, instead of LF + * Fix bug in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations + * Fixed testing with out-of-source builds using cmake + * Fixed version-major intolerance in server + * Fixed CMake symlinking on out-of-source builds + * Bignum's MIPS-32 assembly was used on MIPS-64, causing chaos. (Found by + Alex Wilson.) + * ssl_init() was leaving a dirty pointer in ssl_context if malloc of + out_ctr failed + * ssl_handshake_init() was leaving dirty pointers in subcontexts if malloc + of one of them failed + * x509_get_current_time() uses localtime_r() to prevent thread issues + * Some example server programs were not sending the close_notify alert. + * Potential memory leak in mpi_exp_mod() when error occurs during + calculation of RR. + * Improve interoperability by not writing extension length in ClientHello + when no extensions are present (found by Matthew Page) + * rsa_check_pubkey() now allows an E up to N + * On OpenBSD, use arc4random_buf() instead of rand() to prevent warnings + * mpi_fill_random() was creating numbers larger than requested on + big-endian platform when size was not an integer number of limbs + * Fix detection of DragonflyBSD in net.c (found by Markus Pfeiffer) + * Stricter check on SSL ClientHello internal sizes compared to actual packet + size (found by TrustInSoft) + * Fix preprocessor checks for bn_mul PPC asm (found by Barry K. Nathan). + * Use \n\t rather than semicolons for bn_mul asm, since some assemblers + interpret semicolons as comment delimiters (found by Barry K. Nathan). + * Disable broken Sparc64 bn_mul assembly (found by Florian Obser). + * Fix base64_decode() to return and check length correctly (in case of + tight buffers) + += Version 1.2.10 released 2013-10-07 +Changes + * Changed RSA blinding to a slower but thread-safe version + +Bugfix + * Fixed memory leak in RSA as a result of introduction of blinding + * Fixed ssl_pkcs11_decrypt() prototype + * Fixed MSVC project files + += Version 1.2.9 released 2013-10-01 +Changes + * x509_verify() now case insensitive for cn (RFC 6125 6.4) + +Bugfix + * Fixed potential memory leak when failing to resume a session + * Fixed potential file descriptor leaks (found by Remi Gacogne) + * Minor fixes + +Security + * Fixed potential heap buffer overflow on large hostname setting + * Fixed potential negative value misinterpretation in load_file() + * RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks + (found by Cyril Arnaud and Pierre-Alain Fouque) + += Version 1.2.8 released 2013-06-19 +Features + * Parsing of PKCS#8 encrypted private key files + * PKCS#12 PBE and derivation functions + * Centralized module option values in config.h to allow user-defined + settings without editing header files by using POLARSSL_CONFIG_OPTIONS + +Changes + * HAVEGE random generator disabled by default + * Internally split up x509parse_key() into a (PEM) handler function + and specific DER parser functions for the PKCS#1 and unencrypted + PKCS#8 private key formats + * Added mechanism to provide alternative implementations for all + symmetric cipher and hash algorithms (e.g. POLARSSL_AES_ALT in + config.h) + * PKCS#5 module added. Moved PBKDF2 functionality inside and deprecated + old PBKDF2 module + +Bugfix + * Secure renegotiation extension should only be sent in case client + supports secure renegotiation + * Fixed offset for cert_type list in ssl_parse_certificate_request() + * Fixed const correctness issues that have no impact on the ABI + * x509parse_crt() now better handles PEM error situations + * ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly + instead of the x509parse_crt() wrapper that can also parse PEM + certificates + * x509parse_crtpath() is now reentrant and uses more portable stat() + * Fixed bignum.c and bn_mul.h to support Thumb2 and LLVM compiler + * Fixed values for 2-key Triple DES in cipher layer + * ssl_write_certificate_request() can handle empty ca_chain + +Security + * A possible DoS during the SSL Handshake, due to faulty parsing of + PEM-encoded certificates has been fixed (found by Jack Lloyd) + += Version 1.2.7 released 2013-04-13 +Features + * Ability to specify allowed ciphersuites based on the protocol version. + +Changes + * Default Blowfish keysize is now 128-bits + * Test suites made smaller to accommodate Raspberry Pi + +Bugfix + * Fix for MPI assembly for ARM + * GCM adapted to support sizes > 2^29 + += Version 1.2.6 released 2013-03-11 +Bugfix + * Fixed memory leak in ssl_free() and ssl_reset() for active session + * Corrected GCM counter incrementation to use only 32-bits instead of + 128-bits (found by Yawning Angel) + * Fixes for 64-bit compilation with MS Visual Studio + * Fixed net_bind() for specified IP addresses on little endian systems + * Fixed assembly code for ARM (Thumb and regular) for some compilers + +Changes + * Internally split up rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(), rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(), + rsa_pkcs1_sign() and rsa_pkcs1_verify() to separate PKCS#1 v1.5 and + PKCS#1 v2.1 functions + * Added support for custom labels when using rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt() + or rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt() + * Re-added handling for SSLv2 Client Hello when the define + POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is set + * The SSL session cache module (ssl_cache) now also retains peer_cert + information (not the entire chain) + +Security + * Removed further timing differences during SSL message decryption in + ssl_decrypt_buf() + * Removed timing differences due to bad padding from + rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() and rsa_pkcs1_decrypt() for PKCS#1 v1.5 + operations + += Version 1.2.5 released 2013-02-02 +Changes + * Allow enabling of dummy error_strerror() to support some use-cases + * Debug messages about padding errors during SSL message decryption are + disabled by default and can be enabled with POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + * Sending of security-relevant alert messages that do not break + interoperability can be switched on/off with the flag + POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + +Security + * Removed timing differences during SSL message decryption in + ssl_decrypt_buf() due to badly formatted padding + += Version 1.2.4 released 2013-01-25 +Changes + * More advanced SSL ciphersuite representation and moved to more dynamic + SSL core + * Added ssl_handshake_step() to allow single stepping the handshake process + +Bugfix + * Memory leak when using RSA_PKCS_V21 operations fixed + * Handle future version properly in ssl_write_certificate_request() + * Correctly handle CertificateRequest message in client for <= TLS 1.1 + without DN list + += Version 1.2.3 released 2012-11-26 +Bugfix + * Server not always sending correct CertificateRequest message + += Version 1.2.2 released 2012-11-24 +Changes + * Added p_hw_data to ssl_context for context specific hardware acceleration + data + * During verify trust-CA is only checked for expiration and CRL presence + +Bugfixes + * Fixed client authentication compatibility + * Fixed dependency on POLARSSL_SHA4_C in SSL modules + += Version 1.2.1 released 2012-11-20 +Changes + * Depth that the certificate verify callback receives is now numbered + bottom-up (Peer cert depth is 0) + +Bugfixes + * Fixes for MSVC6 + * Moved mpi_inv_mod() outside POLARSSL_GENPRIME + * Allow R and A to point to same mpi in mpi_div_mpi (found by Manuel + Pégourié-Gonnard) + * Fixed possible segfault in mpi_shift_r() (found by Manuel + Pégourié-Gonnard) + * Added max length check for rsa_pkcs1_sign with PKCS#1 v2.1 + += Version 1.2.0 released 2012-10-31 +Features + * Added support for NULL cipher (POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) and weak + ciphersuites (POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES). They are disabled by + default! + * Added support for wildcard certificates + * Added support for multi-domain certificates through the X509 Subject + Alternative Name extension + * Added preliminary ASN.1 buffer writing support + * Added preliminary X509 Certificate Request writing support + * Added key_app_writer example application + * Added cert_req example application + * Added base Galois Counter Mode (GCM) for AES + * Added TLS 1.2 support (RFC 5246) + * Added GCM suites to TLS 1.2 (RFC 5288) + * Added commandline error code convertor (util/strerror) + * Added support for Hardware Acceleration hooking in SSL/TLS + * Added OpenSSL / PolarSSL compatibility script (tests/compat.sh) and + example application (programs/ssl/o_p_test) (requires OpenSSL) + * Added X509 CA Path support + * Added Thumb assembly optimizations + * Added DEFLATE compression support as per RFC3749 (requires zlib) + * Added blowfish algorithm (Generic and cipher layer) + * Added PKCS#5 PBKDF2 key derivation function + * Added Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) + * Added predefined DHM groups from RFC 5114 + * Added simple SSL session cache implementation + * Added ServerName extension parsing (SNI) at server side + * Added option to add minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version + +Changes + * Removed redundant POLARSSL_DEBUG_MSG define + * AES code only check for Padlock once + * Fixed const-correctness mpi_get_bit() + * Documentation for mpi_lsb() and mpi_msb() + * Moved out_msg to out_hdr + 32 to support hardware acceleration + * Changed certificate verify behaviour to comply with RFC 6125 section 6.3 + to not match CN if subjectAltName extension is present (Closes ticket #56) + * Cipher layer cipher_mode_t POLARSSL_MODE_CFB128 is renamed to + POLARSSL_MODE_CFB, to also handle different block size CFB modes. + * Removed handling for SSLv2 Client Hello (as per RFC 5246 recommendation) + * Revamped session resumption handling + * Generalized external private key implementation handling (like PKCS#11) + in SSL/TLS + * Revamped x509_verify() and the SSL f_vrfy callback implementations + * Moved from unsigned long to fixed width uint32_t types throughout code + * Renamed ciphersuites naming scheme to IANA reserved names + +Bugfix + * Fixed handling error in mpi_cmp_mpi() on longer B values (found by + Hui Dong) + * Fixed potential heap corruption in x509_name allocation + * Fixed single RSA test that failed on Big Endian systems (Closes ticket #54) + * mpi_exp_mod() now correctly handles negative base numbers (Closes ticket + #52) + * Handle encryption with private key and decryption with public key as per + RFC 2313 + * Handle empty certificate subject names + * Prevent reading over buffer boundaries on X509 certificate parsing + * mpi_add_abs() now correctly handles adding short numbers to long numbers + with carry rollover (found by Ruslan Yushchenko) + * Handle existence of OpenSSL Trust Extensions at end of X.509 DER blob + * Fixed MPI assembly for SPARC64 platform + +Security + * Fixed potential memory zeroization on miscrafted RSA key (found by Eloi + Vanderbeken) + += Version 1.1.8 released on 2013-10-01 +Bugfix + * Fixed potential memory leak when failing to resume a session + * Fixed potential file descriptor leaks + +Security + * Potential buffer-overflow for ssl_read_record() (independently found by + both TrustInSoft and Paul Brodeur of Leviathan Security Group) + * Potential negative value misinterpretation in load_file() + * Potential heap buffer overflow on large hostname setting + += Version 1.1.7 released on 2013-06-19 +Changes + * HAVEGE random generator disabled by default + +Bugfix + * x509parse_crt() now better handles PEM error situations + * ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly + instead of the x509parse_crt() wrapper that can also parse PEM + certificates + * Fixed values for 2-key Triple DES in cipher layer + * ssl_write_certificate_request() can handle empty ca_chain + +Security + * A possible DoS during the SSL Handshake, due to faulty parsing of + PEM-encoded certificates has been fixed (found by Jack Lloyd) + += Version 1.1.6 released on 2013-03-11 +Bugfix + * Fixed net_bind() for specified IP addresses on little endian systems + +Changes + * Allow enabling of dummy error_strerror() to support some use-cases + * Debug messages about padding errors during SSL message decryption are + disabled by default and can be enabled with POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + +Security + * Removed timing differences during SSL message decryption in + ssl_decrypt_buf() + * Removed timing differences due to bad padding from + rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() and rsa_pkcs1_decrypt() for PKCS#1 v1.5 + operations + += Version 1.1.5 released on 2013-01-16 +Bugfix + * Fixed MPI assembly for SPARC64 platform + * Handle existence of OpenSSL Trust Extensions at end of X.509 DER blob + * mpi_add_abs() now correctly handles adding short numbers to long numbers + with carry rollover + * Moved mpi_inv_mod() outside POLARSSL_GENPRIME + * Prevent reading over buffer boundaries on X509 certificate parsing + * mpi_exp_mod() now correctly handles negative base numbers (Closes ticket + #52) + * Fixed possible segfault in mpi_shift_r() (found by Manuel + Pégourié-Gonnard) + * Allow R and A to point to same mpi in mpi_div_mpi (found by Manuel + Pégourié-Gonnard) + * Added max length check for rsa_pkcs1_sign with PKCS#1 v2.1 + * Memory leak when using RSA_PKCS_V21 operations fixed + * Handle encryption with private key and decryption with public key as per + RFC 2313 + * Fixes for MSVC6 + +Security + * Fixed potential memory zeroization on miscrafted RSA key (found by Eloi + Vanderbeken) + += Version 1.1.4 released on 2012-05-31 +Bugfix + * Correctly handle empty SSL/TLS packets (Found by James Yonan) + * Fixed potential heap corruption in x509_name allocation + * Fixed single RSA test that failed on Big Endian systems (Closes ticket #54) + += Version 1.1.3 released on 2012-04-29 +Bugfix + * Fixed random MPI generation to not generate more size than requested. + += Version 1.1.2 released on 2012-04-26 +Bugfix + * Fixed handling error in mpi_cmp_mpi() on longer B values (found by + Hui Dong) + +Security + * Fixed potential memory corruption on miscrafted client messages (found by + Frama-C team at CEA LIST) + * Fixed generation of DHM parameters to correct length (found by Ruslan + Yushchenko) + += Version 1.1.1 released on 2012-01-23 +Bugfix + * Check for failed malloc() in ssl_set_hostname() and x509_get_entries() + (Closes ticket #47, found by Hugo Leisink) + * Fixed issues with Intel compiler on 64-bit systems (Closes ticket #50) + * Fixed multiple compiler warnings for VS6 and armcc + * Fixed bug in CTR_CRBG selftest + += Version 1.1.0 released on 2011-12-22 +Features + * Added ssl_session_reset() to allow better multi-connection pools of + SSL contexts without needing to set all non-connection-specific + data and pointers again. Adapted ssl_server to use this functionality. + * Added ssl_set_max_version() to allow clients to offer a lower maximum + supported version to a server to help buggy server implementations. + (Closes ticket #36) + * Added cipher_get_cipher_mode() and cipher_get_cipher_operation() + introspection functions (Closes ticket #40) + * Added CTR_DRBG based on AES-256-CTR (NIST SP 800-90) random generator + * Added a generic entropy accumulator that provides support for adding + custom entropy sources and added some generic and platform dependent + entropy sources + +Changes + * Documentation for AES and Camellia in modes CTR and CFB128 clarified. + * Fixed rsa_encrypt and rsa_decrypt examples to use public key for + encryption and private key for decryption. (Closes ticket #34) + * Inceased maximum size of ASN1 length reads to 32-bits. + * Added an EXPLICIT tag number parameter to x509_get_ext() + * Added a separate CRL entry extension parsing function + * Separated the ASN.1 parsing code from the X.509 specific parsing code. + So now there is a module that is controlled with POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C. + * Changed the defined key-length of DES ciphers in cipher.h to include the + parity bits, to prevent mistakes in copying data. (Closes ticket #33) + * Loads of minimal changes to better support WINCE as a build target + (Credits go to Marco Lizza) + * Added POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE definition to allow easier time to memory + trade-off + * Introduced POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE and POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS for MPI size + management (Closes ticket #44) + * Changed the used random function pointer to more flexible format. Renamed + havege_rand() to havege_random() to prevent mistakes. Lots of changes as + a consequence in library code and programs + * Moved all examples programs to use the new entropy and CTR_DRBG + * Added permissive certificate parsing to x509parse_crt() and + x509parse_crtfile(). With permissive parsing the parsing does not stop on + encountering a parse-error. Beware that the meaning of return values has + changed! + * All error codes are now negative. Even on mermory failures and IO errors. + +Bugfix + * Fixed faulty HMAC-MD2 implementation. Found by dibac. (Closes + ticket #37) + * Fixed a bug where the CRL parser expected an EXPLICIT ASN.1 tag + before version numbers + * Allowed X509 key usage parsing to accept 4 byte values instead of the + standard 1 byte version sometimes used by Microsoft. (Closes ticket #38) + * Fixed incorrect behaviour in case of RSASSA-PSS with a salt length + smaller than the hash length. (Closes ticket #41) + * If certificate serial is longer than 32 octets, serial number is now + appended with '....' after first 28 octets + * Improved build support for s390x and sparc64 in bignum.h + * Fixed MS Visual C++ name clash with int64 in sha4.h + * Corrected removal of leading "00:" in printing serial numbers in + certificates and CRLs + += Version 1.0.0 released on 2011-07-27 +Features + * Expanded cipher layer with support for CFB128 and CTR mode + * Added rsa_encrypt and rsa_decrypt simple example programs. + +Changes + * The generic cipher and message digest layer now have normal error + codes instead of integers + +Bugfix + * Undid faulty bug fix in ssl_write() when flushing old data (Ticket + #18) + += Version 0.99-pre5 released on 2011-05-26 +Features + * Added additional Cipher Block Modes to symmetric ciphers + (AES CTR, Camellia CTR, XTEA CBC) including the option to + enable and disable individual modes when needed + * Functions requiring File System functions can now be disabled + by undefining POLARSSL_FS_IO + * A error_strerror function() has been added to translate between + error codes and their description. + * Added mpi_get_bit() and mpi_set_bit() individual bit setter/getter + functions. + * Added ssl_mail_client and ssl_fork_server as example programs. + +Changes + * Major argument / variable rewrite. Introduced use of size_t + instead of int for buffer lengths and loop variables for + better unsigned / signed use. Renamed internal bigint types + t_int and t_dbl to t_uint and t_udbl in the process + * mpi_init() and mpi_free() now only accept a single MPI + argument and do not accept variable argument lists anymore. + * The error codes have been remapped and combining error codes + is now done with a PLUS instead of an OR as error codes + used are negative. + * Changed behaviour of net_read(), ssl_fetch_input() and ssl_recv(). + net_recv() now returns 0 on EOF instead of + POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET. ssl_fetch_input() returns + POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF on an EOF from its f_recv() function. + ssl_read() returns 0 if a POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF is received + after the handshake. + * Network functions now return POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ or + POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE instead of the ambiguous + POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TRY_AGAIN + += Version 0.99-pre4 released on 2011-04-01 +Features + * Added support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding and thus support + for the RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. + * Reading of Public Key files incorporated into default x509 + functionality as well. + * Added mpi_fill_random() for centralized filling of big numbers + with random data (Fixed ticket #10) + +Changes + * Debug print of MPI now removes leading zero octets and + displays actual bit size of the value. + * x509parse_key() (and as a consequence x509parse_keyfile()) + does not zeroize memory in advance anymore. Use rsa_init() + before parsing a key or keyfile! + +Bugfix + * Debug output of MPI's now the same independent of underlying + platform (32-bit / 64-bit) (Fixes ticket #19, found by Mads + Kiilerich and Mihai Militaru) + * Fixed bug in ssl_write() when flushing old data (Fixed ticket + #18, found by Nikolay Epifanov) + * Fixed proper handling of RSASSA-PSS verification with variable + length salt lengths + += Version 0.99-pre3 released on 2011-02-28 +This release replaces version 0.99-pre2 which had possible copyright issues. +Features + * Parsing PEM private keys encrypted with DES and AES + are now supported as well (Fixes ticket #5) + * Added crl_app program to allow easy reading and + printing of X509 CRLs from file + +Changes + * Parsing of PEM files moved to separate module (Fixes + ticket #13). Also possible to remove PEM support for + systems only using DER encoding + +Bugfixes + * Corrected parsing of UTCTime dates before 1990 and + after 1950 + * Support more exotic OID's when parsing certificates + (found by Mads Kiilerich) + * Support more exotic name representations when parsing + certificates (found by Mads Kiilerich) + * Replaced the expired test certificates + * Do not bail out if no client certificate specified. Try + to negotiate anonymous connection (Fixes ticket #12, + found by Boris Krasnovskiy) + +Security fixes + * Fixed a possible Man-in-the-Middle attack on the + Diffie Hellman key exchange (thanks to Larry Highsmith, + Subreption LLC) + += Version 0.99-pre1 released on 2011-01-30 +Features +Note: Most of these features have been donated by Fox-IT + * Added Doxygen source code documentation parts + * Added reading of DHM context from memory and file + * Improved X509 certificate parsing to include extended + certificate fields, including Key Usage + * Improved certificate verification and verification + against the available CRLs + * Detection for DES weak keys and parity bits added + * Improvements to support integration in other + applications: + + Added generic message digest and cipher wrapper + + Improved information about current capabilities, + status, objects and configuration + + Added verification callback on certificate chain + verification to allow external blacklisting + + Additional example programs to show usage + * Added support for PKCS#11 through the use of the + libpkcs11-helper library + +Changes + * x509parse_time_expired() checks time in addition to + the existing date check + * The ciphers member of ssl_context and the cipher member + of ssl_session have been renamed to ciphersuites and + ciphersuite respectively. This clarifies the difference + with the generic cipher layer and is better naming + altogether + += Version 0.14.0 released on 2010-08-16 +Features + * Added support for SSL_EDH_RSA_AES_128_SHA and + SSL_EDH_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_SHA ciphersuites + * Added compile-time and run-time version information + * Expanded ssl_client2 arguments for more flexibility + * Added support for TLS v1.1 + +Changes + * Made Makefile cleaner + * Removed dependency on rand() in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(). + Now using random fuction provided to function and + changed the prototype of rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(), + rsa_init() and rsa_gen_key(). + * Some SSL defines were renamed in order to avoid + future confusion + +Bug fixes + * Fixed CMake out of source build for tests (found by + kkert) + * rsa_check_private() now supports PKCS1v2 keys as well + * Fixed deadlock in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt() on failing random + generator + += Version 0.13.1 released on 2010-03-24 +Bug fixes + * Fixed Makefile in library that was mistakenly merged + * Added missing const string fixes + += Version 0.13.0 released on 2010-03-21 +Features + * Added option parsing for host and port selection to + ssl_client2 + * Added support for GeneralizedTime in X509 parsing + * Added cert_app program to allow easy reading and + printing of X509 certificates from file or SSL + connection. + +Changes + * Added const correctness for main code base + * X509 signature algorithm determination is now + in a function to allow easy future expansion + * Changed symmetric cipher functions to + identical interface (returning int result values) + * Changed ARC4 to use separate input/output buffer + * Added reset function for HMAC context as speed-up + for specific use-cases + +Bug fixes + * Fixed bug resulting in failure to send the last + certificate in the chain in ssl_write_certificate() and + ssl_write_certificate_request() (found by fatbob) + * Added small fixes for compiler warnings on a Mac + (found by Frank de Brabander) + * Fixed algorithmic bug in mpi_is_prime() (found by + Smbat Tonoyan) + += Version 0.12.1 released on 2009-10-04 +Changes + * Coverage test definitions now support 'depends_on' + tagging system. + * Tests requiring specific hashing algorithms now honor + the defines. + +Bug fixes + * Changed typo in #ifdef in x509parse.c (found + by Eduardo) + += Version 0.12.0 released on 2009-07-28 +Features + * Added CMake makefiles as alternative to regular Makefiles. + * Added preliminary Code Coverage tests for AES, ARC4, + Base64, MPI, SHA-family, MD-family, HMAC-SHA-family, + Camellia, DES, 3-DES, RSA PKCS#1, XTEA, Diffie-Hellman + and X509parse. + +Changes + * Error codes are not (necessarily) negative. Keep + this is mind when checking for errors. + * RSA_RAW renamed to SIG_RSA_RAW for consistency. + * Fixed typo in name of POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * Changed interface for AES and Camellia setkey functions + to indicate invalid key lengths. + +Bug fixes + * Fixed include location of endian.h on FreeBSD (found by + Gabriel) + * Fixed include location of endian.h and name clash on + Apples (found by Martin van Hensbergen) + * Fixed HMAC-MD2 by modifying md2_starts(), so that the + required HMAC ipad and opad variables are not cleared. + (found by code coverage tests) + * Prevented use of long long in bignum if + POLARSSL_HAVE_LONGLONG not defined (found by Giles + Bathgate). + * Fixed incorrect handling of negative strings in + mpi_read_string() (found by code coverage tests). + * Fixed segfault on handling empty rsa_context in + rsa_check_pubkey() and rsa_check_privkey() (found by + code coverage tests). + * Fixed incorrect handling of one single negative input + value in mpi_add_abs() (found by code coverage tests). + * Fixed incorrect handling of negative first input + value in mpi_sub_abs() (found by code coverage tests). + * Fixed incorrect handling of negative first input + value in mpi_mod_mpi() and mpi_mod_int(). Resulting + change also affects mpi_write_string() (found by code + coverage tests). + * Corrected is_prime() results for 0, 1 and 2 (found by + code coverage tests). + * Fixed Camellia and XTEA for 64-bit Windows systems. + += Version 0.11.1 released on 2009-05-17 + * Fixed missing functionality for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA384, + SHA-512 in rsa_pkcs1_sign() + += Version 0.11.0 released on 2009-05-03 + * Fixed a bug in mpi_gcd() so that it also works when both + input numbers are even and added testcases to check + (found by Pierre Habouzit). + * Added support for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 + one way hash functions with the PKCS#1 v1.5 signing and + verification. + * Fixed minor bug regarding mpi_gcd located within the + POLARSSL_GENPRIME block. + * Fixed minor memory leak in x509parse_crt() and added better + handling of 'full' certificate chains (found by Mathias + Olsson). + * Centralized file opening and reading for x509 files into + load_file() + * Made definition of net_htons() endian-clean for big endian + systems (Found by Gernot). + * Undefining POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM now also handles prevents asm in + padlock and timing code. + * Fixed an off-by-one buffer allocation in ssl_set_hostname() + responsible for crashes and unwanted behaviour. + * Added support for Certificate Revocation List (CRL) parsing. + * Added support for CRL revocation to x509parse_verify() and + SSL/TLS code. + * Fixed compatibility of XTEA and Camellia on a 64-bit system + (found by Felix von Leitner). + += Version 0.10.0 released on 2009-01-12 + * Migrated XySSL to PolarSSL + * Added XTEA symmetric cipher + * Added Camellia symmetric cipher + * Added support for ciphersuites: SSL_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_SHA, + SSL_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_SHA and SSL_EDH_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_SHA + * Fixed dangerous bug that can cause a heap overflow in + rsa_pkcs1_decrypt (found by Christophe Devine) + +================================================================ +XySSL ChangeLog + += Version 0.9 released on 2008-03-16 + + * Added support for ciphersuite: SSL_RSA_AES_128_SHA + * Enabled support for large files by default in aescrypt2.c + * Preliminary openssl wrapper contributed by David Barrett + * Fixed a bug in ssl_write() that caused the same payload to + be sent twice in non-blocking mode when send returns EAGAIN + * Fixed ssl_parse_client_hello(): session id and challenge must + not be swapped in the SSLv2 ClientHello (found by Greg Robson) + * Added user-defined callback debug function (Krystian Kolodziej) + * Before freeing a certificate, properly zero out all cert. data + * Fixed the "mode" parameter so that encryption/decryption are + not swapped on PadLock; also fixed compilation on older versions + of gcc (bug reported by David Barrett) + * Correctly handle the case in padlock_xcryptcbc() when input or + output data is non-aligned by falling back to the software + implementation, as VIA Nehemiah cannot handle non-aligned buffers + * Fixed a memory leak in x509parse_crt() which was reported by Greg + Robson-Garth; some x509write.c fixes by Pascal Vizeli, thanks to + Matthew Page who reported several bugs + * Fixed x509_get_ext() to accept some rare certificates which have + an INTEGER instead of a BOOLEAN for BasicConstraints::cA. + * Added support on the client side for the TLS "hostname" extension + (patch contributed by David Patino) + * Make x509parse_verify() return BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH when an empty + string is passed as the CN (bug reported by spoofy) + * Added an option to enable/disable the BN assembly code + * Updated rsa_check_privkey() to verify that (D*E) = 1 % (P-1)*(Q-1) + * Disabled obsolete hash functions by default (MD2, MD4); updated + selftest and benchmark to not test ciphers that have been disabled + * Updated x509parse_cert_info() to correctly display byte 0 of the + serial number, setup correct server port in the ssl client example + * Fixed a critical denial-of-service with X.509 cert. verification: + peer may cause xyssl to loop indefinitely by sending a certificate + for which the RSA signature check fails (bug reported by Benoit) + * Added test vectors for: AES-CBC, AES-CFB, DES-CBC and 3DES-CBC, + HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 + * Fixed HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512 (thanks to Josh Sinykin) + * Modified ssl_parse_client_key_exchange() to protect against + Daniel Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, as well + as the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack + * Updated rsa_gen_key() so that ctx->N is always nbits in size + * Fixed assembly PPC compilation errors on Mac OS X, thanks to + David Barrett and Dusan Semen + += Version 0.8 released on 2007-10-20 + + * Modified the HMAC functions to handle keys larger + than 64 bytes, thanks to Stephane Desneux and gary ng + * Fixed ssl_read_record() to properly update the handshake + message digests, which fixes IE6/IE7 client authentication + * Cleaned up the XYSSL* #defines, suggested by Azriel Fasten + * Fixed net_recv(), thanks to Lorenz Schori and Egon Kocjan + * Added user-defined callbacks for handling I/O and sessions + * Added lots of debugging output in the SSL/TLS functions + * Added preliminary X.509 cert. writing by Pascal Vizeli + * Added preliminary support for the VIA PadLock routines + * Added AES-CFB mode of operation, contributed by chmike + * Added an SSL/TLS stress testing program (ssl_test.c) + * Updated the RSA PKCS#1 code to allow choosing between + RSA_PUBLIC and RSA_PRIVATE, as suggested by David Barrett + * Updated ssl_read() to skip 0-length records from OpenSSL + * Fixed the make install target to comply with *BSD make + * Fixed a bug in mpi_read_binary() on 64-bit platforms + * mpi_is_prime() speedups, thanks to Kevin McLaughlin + * Fixed a long standing memory leak in mpi_is_prime() + * Replaced realloc with malloc in mpi_grow(), and set + the sign of zero as positive in mpi_init() (reported + by Jonathan M. McCune) + += Version 0.7 released on 2007-07-07 + + * Added support for the MicroBlaze soft-core processor + * Fixed a bug in ssl_tls.c which sometimes prevented SSL + connections from being established with non-blocking I/O + * Fixed a couple bugs in the VS6 and UNIX Makefiles + * Fixed the "PIC register ebx clobbered in asm" bug + * Added HMAC starts/update/finish support functions + * Added the SHA-224, SHA-384 and SHA-512 hash functions + * Fixed the net_set_*block routines, thanks to Andreas + * Added a few demonstration programs: md5sum, sha1sum, + dh_client, dh_server, rsa_genkey, rsa_sign, rsa_verify + * Added new bignum import and export helper functions + * Rewrote README.txt in program/ssl/ca to better explain + how to create a test PKI + += Version 0.6 released on 2007-04-01 + + * Ciphers used in SSL/TLS can now be disabled at compile + time, to reduce the memory footprint on embedded systems + * Added multiply assembly code for the TriCore and modified + havege_struct for this processor, thanks to David Patiño + * Added multiply assembly code for 64-bit PowerPCs, + thanks to Peking University and the OSU Open Source Lab + * Added experimental support of Quantum Cryptography + * Added support for autoconf, contributed by Arnaud Cornet + * Fixed "long long" compilation issues on IA-64 and PPC64 + * Fixed a bug introduced in xyssl-0.5/timing.c: hardclock + was not being correctly defined on ARM and MIPS + += Version 0.5 released on 2007-03-01 + + * Added multiply assembly code for SPARC and Alpha + * Added (beta) support for non-blocking I/O operations + * Implemented session resuming and client authentication + * Fixed some portability issues on WinCE, MINIX 3, Plan9 + (thanks to Benjamin Newman), HP-UX, FreeBSD and Solaris + * Improved the performance of the EDH key exchange + * Fixed a bug that caused valid packets with a payload + size of 16384 bytes to be rejected + += Version 0.4 released on 2007-02-01 + + * Added support for Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange + * Added multiply asm code for SSE2, ARM, PPC, MIPS and M68K + * Various improvement to the modular exponentiation code + * Rewrote the headers to generate the API docs with doxygen + * Fixed a bug in ssl_encrypt_buf (incorrect padding was + generated) and in ssl_parse_client_hello (max. client + version was not properly set), thanks to Didier Rebeix + * Fixed another bug in ssl_parse_client_hello: clients with + cipherlists larger than 96 bytes were incorrectly rejected + * Fixed a couple memory leak in x509_read.c + += Version 0.3 released on 2007-01-01 + + * Added server-side SSLv3 and TLSv1.0 support + * Multiple fixes to enhance the compatibility with g++, + thanks to Xosé Antón Otero Ferreira + * Fixed a bug in the CBC code, thanks to dowst; also, + the bignum code is no longer dependent on long long + * Updated rsa_pkcs1_sign to handle arbitrary large inputs + * Updated timing.c for improved compatibility with i386 + and 486 processors, thanks to Arnaud Cornet + += Version 0.2 released on 2006-12-01 + + * Updated timing.c to support ARM and MIPS arch + * Updated the MPI code to support 8086 on MSVC 1.5 + * Added the copyright notice at the top of havege.h + * Fixed a bug in sha2_hmac, thanks to newsoft/Wenfang Zhang + * Fixed a bug reported by Adrian Rüegsegger in x509_read_key + * Fixed a bug reported by Torsten Lauter in ssl_read_record + * Fixed a bug in rsa_check_privkey that would wrongly cause + valid RSA keys to be dismissed (thanks to oldwolf) + * Fixed a bug in mpi_is_prime that caused some primes to fail + the Miller-Rabin primality test + + I'd also like to thank Younès Hafri for the CRUX linux port, + Khalil Petit who added XySSL into pkgsrc and Arnaud Cornet + who maintains the Debian package :-) + += Version 0.1 released on 2006-11-01 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/ChangeLog.d/00README.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/ChangeLog.d/00README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2ea73d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/ChangeLog.d/00README.md @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +# Pending changelog entry directory + +This directory contains changelog entries that have not yet been merged +to the changelog file ([`../ChangeLog`](../ChangeLog)). + +## What requires a changelog entry? + +Write a changelog entry if there is a user-visible change. This includes: + +* Bug fixes in the library or in sample programs: fixing a security hole, + fixing broken behavior, fixing the build in some configuration or on some + platform, etc. +* New features in the library, new sample programs, or new platform support. +* Changes in existing behavior. These should be rare. Changes in features + that are documented as experimental may or may not be announced, depending + on the extent of the change and how widely we expect the feature to be used. + +We generally don't include changelog entries for: + +* Documentation improvements. +* Performance improvements, unless they are particularly significant. +* Changes to parts of the code base that users don't interact with directly, + such as test code and test data. + +Until Mbed TLS 2.24.0, we required changelog entries in more cases. +Looking at older changelog entries is good practice for how to write a +changelog entry, but not for deciding whether to write one. + +## Changelog entry file format + +A changelog entry file must have the extension `*.txt` and must have the +following format: + +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Security + * Change description. + * Another change description. + +Features + * Yet another change description. This is a long change description that + spans multiple lines. + * Yet again another change description. + +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The permitted changelog entry categories are as follows: + + + API changes + Default behavior changes + Requirement changes + New deprecations + Removals + Features + Security + Bugfix + Changes + +Use “Changes” for anything that doesn't fit in the other categories. + +## How to write a changelog entry + +Each entry starts with three spaces, an asterisk and a space. Continuation +lines start with 5 spaces. Lines wrap at 79 characters. + +Write full English sentences with proper capitalization and punctuation. Use +the present tense. Use the imperative where applicable. For example: “Fix a +bug in mbedtls_xxx() ….” + +Include GitHub issue numbers where relevant. Use the format “#1234” for an +Mbed TLS issue. Add other external references such as CVE numbers where +applicable. + +Credit bug reporters where applicable. + +**Explain why, not how**. Remember that the audience is the users of the +library, not its developers. In particular, for a bug fix, explain the +consequences of the bug, not how the bug was fixed. For a new feature, explain +why one might be interested in the feature. For an API change or a deprecation, +explain how to update existing applications. + +See [existing entries](../ChangeLog) for examples. + +## How `ChangeLog` is updated + +Run [`../scripts/assemble_changelog.py`](../scripts/assemble_changelog.py) +from a Git working copy +to move the entries from files in `ChangeLog.d` to the main `ChangeLog` file. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/DartConfiguration.tcl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/DartConfiguration.tcl new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dfa0f071 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/DartConfiguration.tcl @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Site: localhost +BuildName: mbed TLS-test +CoverageCommand: /usr/bin/gcov +MemoryCheckCommand: /usr/bin/valgrind diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/LICENSE b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/LICENSE new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d6456956 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/LICENSE @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ + + Apache License + Version 2.0, January 2004 + http://www.apache.org/licenses/ + + TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION + + 1. 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MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! ****\n +NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2=**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES ****\n +NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3=**** AND IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE ****\n + +NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING=\n$(WARNING_BORDER)$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1)$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2)$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3)$(WARNING_BORDER) + +WARNING_BORDER_LONG =**********************************************************************************\n +CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1=**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY defined! ****\n +CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L2=**** Using 128-bit keys for CTR_DRBG limits the security of generated ****\n +CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L3=**** keys and operations that use random values generated to 128-bit security ****\n + +CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING=\n$(WARNING_BORDER_LONG)$(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1)$(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L2)$(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L3)$(WARNING_BORDER_LONG) + +# Post build steps +post_build: +ifndef WINDOWS + + # If 128-bit keys are configured for CTR_DRBG, display an appropriate warning + -scripts/config.py get MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY && ([ $$? -eq 0 ]) && \ + echo '$(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING)' + + # If NULL Entropy is configured, display an appropriate warning + -scripts/config.py get MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY && ([ $$? -eq 0 ]) && \ + echo '$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING)' +endif + +clean: + $(MAKE) -C library clean + $(MAKE) -C programs clean + $(MAKE) -C tests clean +ifndef WINDOWS + find . \( -name \*.gcno -o -name \*.gcda -o -name \*.info \) -exec rm {} + +endif + +check: lib tests + $(MAKE) -C tests check + +test: check + +ifndef WINDOWS +# note: for coverage testing, build with: +# make CFLAGS='--coverage -g3 -O0' +covtest: + $(MAKE) check + programs/test/selftest + tests/compat.sh + tests/ssl-opt.sh + +lcov: + rm -rf Coverage + lcov --capture --initial --directory library -o files.info + lcov --rc lcov_branch_coverage=1 --capture --directory library -o tests.info + lcov --rc lcov_branch_coverage=1 --add-tracefile files.info --add-tracefile tests.info -o all.info + lcov --rc lcov_branch_coverage=1 --remove all.info -o final.info '*.h' + gendesc tests/Descriptions.txt -o descriptions + genhtml --title "mbed TLS" --description-file descriptions --keep-descriptions --legend --branch-coverage -o Coverage final.info + rm -f files.info tests.info all.info final.info descriptions + +apidoc: + mkdir -p apidoc + cd doxygen && doxygen mbedtls.doxyfile + +apidoc_clean: + rm -rf apidoc +endif + +## Editor navigation files +C_SOURCE_FILES = $(wildcard \ + 3rdparty/*/include/*/*.h 3rdparty/*/include/*/*/*.h 3rdparty/*/include/*/*/*/*.h \ + 3rdparty/*/*.c 3rdparty/*/*/*.c 3rdparty/*/*/*/*.c 3rdparty/*/*/*/*/*.c \ + include/*/*.h \ + library/*.[hc] \ + programs/*/*.[hc] \ + tests/include/*/*.h tests/include/*/*/*.h \ + tests/src/*.c tests/src/*/*.c \ + tests/suites/*.function \ +) +# Exuberant-ctags invocation. Other ctags implementations may require different options. +CTAGS = ctags --langmap=c:+.h.function --line-directives=no -o +tags: $(C_SOURCE_FILES) + $(CTAGS) $@ $(C_SOURCE_FILES) +TAGS: $(C_SOURCE_FILES) + etags --no-line-directive -o $@ $(C_SOURCE_FILES) +global: GPATH GRTAGS GSYMS GTAGS +GPATH GRTAGS GSYMS GTAGS: $(C_SOURCE_FILES) + ls $(C_SOURCE_FILES) | gtags -f - --gtagsconf .globalrc +cscope: cscope.in.out cscope.po.out cscope.out +cscope.in.out cscope.po.out cscope.out: $(C_SOURCE_FILES) + cscope -bq -u -Iinclude -Ilibrary $(patsubst %,-I%,$(wildcard 3rdparty/*/include)) -Itests/include $(C_SOURCE_FILES) +.PHONY: cscope global diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/README.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..df85ff24 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +README for Mbed TLS +=================== + +Mbed TLS is a C library that implements cryptographic primitives, X.509 certificate manipulation and the SSL/TLS and DTLS protocols. Its small code footprint makes it suitable for embedded systems. + +Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the [PSA Cryptography API](#psa-cryptography-api). This is currently a preview for evaluation purposes only. + +Configuration +------------- + +Mbed TLS should build out of the box on most systems. Some platform specific options are available in the fully documented configuration file `include/mbedtls/config.h`, which is also the place where features can be selected. This file can be edited manually, or in a more programmatic way using the Python 3 script `scripts/config.py` (use `--help` for usage instructions). + +Compiler options can be set using conventional environment variables such as `CC` and `CFLAGS` when using the Make and CMake build system (see below). + +We provide some non-standard configurations focused on specific use cases in the `configs/` directory. You can read more about those in `configs/README.txt` + +Documentation +------------- + +Documentation for the Mbed TLS interfaces in the default library configuration is available as part of the [Mbed TLS documentation](https://tls.mbed.org/api/). + +To generate a local copy of the library documentation in HTML format, tailored to your compile-time configuration: + +1. Make sure that [Doxygen](http://www.doxygen.nl/) is installed. We use version 1.8.11 but slightly older or more recent versions should work. +1. Run `make apidoc`. +1. Browse `apidoc/index.html` or `apidoc/modules.html`. + +For other sources of documentation, see the [SUPPORT](SUPPORT.md) document. + +Compiling +--------- + +There are currently three active build systems used within Mbed TLS releases: + +- GNU Make +- CMake +- Microsoft Visual Studio (Microsoft Visual Studio 2013 or later) + +The main systems used for development are CMake and GNU Make. Those systems are always complete and up-to-date. The others should reflect all changes present in the CMake and Make build system, although features may not be ported there automatically. + +The Make and CMake build systems create three libraries: libmbedcrypto, libmbedx509, and libmbedtls. Note that libmbedtls depends on libmbedx509 and libmbedcrypto, and libmbedx509 depends on libmbedcrypto. As a result, some linkers will expect flags to be in a specific order, for example the GNU linker wants `-lmbedtls -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto`. + +### Tool versions + +You need the following tools to build the library with the provided makefiles: + +* GNU Make or a build tool that CMake supports. +* A C99 toolchain (compiler, linker, archiver). We actively test with GCC 5.4, Clang 3.8, IAR8 and Visual Studio 2013. More recent versions should work. Slightly older versions may work. +* Python 3 to generate the test code. +* Perl to run the tests. + +### Make + +We require GNU Make. To build the library and the sample programs, GNU Make and a C compiler are sufficient. Some of the more advanced build targets require some Unix/Linux tools. + +We intentionally only use a minimum of functionality in the makefiles in order to keep them as simple and independent of different toolchains as possible, to allow users to more easily move between different platforms. Users who need more features are recommended to use CMake. + +In order to build from the source code using GNU Make, just enter at the command line: + + make + +In order to run the tests, enter: + + make check + +The tests need Python to be built and Perl to be run. If you don't have one of them installed, you can skip building the tests with: + + make no_test + +You'll still be able to run a much smaller set of tests with: + + programs/test/selftest + +In order to build for a Windows platform, you should use `WINDOWS_BUILD=1` if the target is Windows but the build environment is Unix-like (for instance when cross-compiling, or compiling from an MSYS shell), and `WINDOWS=1` if the build environment is a Windows shell (for instance using mingw32-make) (in that case some targets will not be available). + +Setting the variable `SHARED` in your environment will build shared libraries in addition to the static libraries. Setting `DEBUG` gives you a debug build. You can override `CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS` by setting them in your environment or on the make command line; compiler warning options may be overridden separately using `WARNING_CFLAGS`. Some directory-specific options (for example, `-I` directives) are still preserved. + +Please note that setting `CFLAGS` overrides its default value of `-O2` and setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` overrides its default value (starting with `-Wall -Wextra`), so if you just want to add some warning options to the default ones, you can do so by setting `CFLAGS=-O2 -Werror` for example. Setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` is useful when you want to get rid of its default content (for example because your compiler doesn't accept `-Wall` as an option). Directory-specific options cannot be overridden from the command line. + +Depending on your platform, you might run into some issues. Please check the Makefiles in `library/`, `programs/` and `tests/` for options to manually add or remove for specific platforms. You can also check [the Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://tls.mbed.org/kb) for articles on your platform or issue. + +In case you find that you need to do something else as well, please let us know what, so we can add it to the [Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://tls.mbed.org/kb). + +### CMake + +In order to build the source using CMake in a separate directory (recommended), just enter at the command line: + + mkdir /path/to/build_dir && cd /path/to/build_dir + cmake /path/to/mbedtls_source + cmake --build . + +In order to run the tests, enter: + + ctest + +The test suites need Python to be built and Perl to be executed. If you don't have one of these installed, you'll want to disable the test suites with: + + cmake -DENABLE_TESTING=Off /path/to/mbedtls_source + +If you disabled the test suites, but kept the programs enabled, you can still run a much smaller set of tests with: + + programs/test/selftest + +To configure CMake for building shared libraries, use: + + cmake -DUSE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY=On /path/to/mbedtls_source + +There are many different build modes available within the CMake buildsystem. Most of them are available for gcc and clang, though some are compiler-specific: + +- `Release`. This generates the default code without any unnecessary information in the binary files. +- `Debug`. This generates debug information and disables optimization of the code. +- `Coverage`. This generates code coverage information in addition to debug information. +- `ASan`. This instruments the code with AddressSanitizer to check for memory errors. (This includes LeakSanitizer, with recent version of gcc and clang.) (With recent version of clang, this mode also instruments the code with UndefinedSanitizer to check for undefined behaviour.) +- `ASanDbg`. Same as ASan but slower, with debug information and better stack traces. +- `MemSan`. This instruments the code with MemorySanitizer to check for uninitialised memory reads. Experimental, needs recent clang on Linux/x86\_64. +- `MemSanDbg`. Same as MemSan but slower, with debug information, better stack traces and origin tracking. +- `Check`. This activates the compiler warnings that depend on optimization and treats all warnings as errors. + +Switching build modes in CMake is simple. For debug mode, enter at the command line: + + cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug /path/to/mbedtls_source + +To list other available CMake options, use: + + cmake -LH + +Note that, with CMake, you can't adjust the compiler or its flags after the +initial invocation of cmake. This means that `CC=your_cc make` and `make +CC=your_cc` will *not* work (similarly with `CFLAGS` and other variables). +These variables need to be adjusted when invoking cmake for the first time, +for example: + + CC=your_cc cmake /path/to/mbedtls_source + +If you already invoked cmake and want to change those settings, you need to +remove the build directory and create it again. + +Note that it is possible to build in-place; this will however overwrite the +provided Makefiles (see `scripts/tmp_ignore_makefiles.sh` if you want to +prevent `git status` from showing them as modified). In order to do so, from +the Mbed TLS source directory, use: + + cmake . + make + +If you want to change `CC` or `CFLAGS` afterwards, you will need to remove the +CMake cache. This can be done with the following command using GNU find: + + find . -iname '*cmake*' -not -name CMakeLists.txt -exec rm -rf {} + + +You can now make the desired change: + + CC=your_cc cmake . + make + +Regarding variables, also note that if you set CFLAGS when invoking cmake, +your value of CFLAGS doesn't override the content provided by cmake (depending +on the build mode as seen above), it's merely prepended to it. + +#### Mbed TLS as a subproject + +Mbed TLS supports being built as a CMake subproject. One can +use `add_subdirectory()` from a parent CMake project to include Mbed TLS as a +subproject. + +### Microsoft Visual Studio + +The build files for Microsoft Visual Studio are generated for Visual Studio 2010. + +The solution file `mbedTLS.sln` contains all the basic projects needed to build the library and all the programs. The files in tests are not generated and compiled, as these need Python and perl environments as well. However, the selftest program in `programs/test/` is still available. + +Example programs +---------------- + +We've included example programs for a lot of different features and uses in [`programs/`](programs/README.md). +Please note that the goal of these sample programs is to demonstrate specific features of the library, and the code may need to be adapted to build a real-world application. + +Tests +----- + +Mbed TLS includes an elaborate test suite in `tests/` that initially requires Python to generate the tests files (e.g. `test\_suite\_mpi.c`). These files are generated from a `function file` (e.g. `suites/test\_suite\_mpi.function`) and a `data file` (e.g. `suites/test\_suite\_mpi.data`). The `function file` contains the test functions. The `data file` contains the test cases, specified as parameters that will be passed to the test function. + +For machines with a Unix shell and OpenSSL (and optionally GnuTLS) installed, additional test scripts are available: + +- `tests/ssl-opt.sh` runs integration tests for various TLS options (renegotiation, resumption, etc.) and tests interoperability of these options with other implementations. +- `tests/compat.sh` tests interoperability of every ciphersuite with other implementations. +- `tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl` test builds in various reduced configurations. +- `tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl` test builds in configurations with a single key exchange enabled +- `tests/scripts/all.sh` runs a combination of the above tests, plus some more, with various build options (such as ASan, full `config.h`, etc). + +Porting Mbed TLS +---------------- + +Mbed TLS can be ported to many different architectures, OS's and platforms. Before starting a port, you may find the following Knowledge Base articles useful: + +- [Porting Mbed TLS to a new environment or OS](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS) +- [What external dependencies does Mbed TLS rely on?](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/what-external-dependencies-does-mbedtls-rely-on) +- [How do I configure Mbed TLS](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/compiling-and-building/how-do-i-configure-mbedtls) + +Mbed TLS is mostly written in portable C99; however, it has a few platform requirements that go beyond the standard, but are met by most modern architectures: + +- Bytes must be 8 bits. +- All-bits-zero must be a valid representation of a null pointer. +- Signed integers must be represented using two's complement. +- `int` and `size_t` must be at least 32 bits wide. +- The types `uint8_t`, `uint16_t`, `uint32_t` and their signed equivalents must be available. + +PSA cryptography API +-------------------- + +### PSA API design + +Arm's [Platform Security Architecture (PSA)](https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-architectures/platform-security-architecture) is a holistic set of threat models, security analyses, hardware and firmware architecture specifications, and an open source firmware reference implementation. PSA provides a recipe, based on industry best practice, that allows security to be consistently designed in, at both a hardware and firmware level. + +The [PSA cryptography API](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/psa/#application-programming-interface) provides access to a set of cryptographic primitives. It has a dual purpose. First, it can be used in a PSA-compliant platform to build services, such as secure boot, secure storage and secure communication. Second, it can also be used independently of other PSA components on any platform. + +The design goals of the PSA cryptography API include: + +* The API distinguishes caller memory from internal memory, which allows the library to be implemented in an isolated space for additional security. Library calls can be implemented as direct function calls if isolation is not desired, and as remote procedure calls if isolation is desired. +* The structure of internal data is hidden to the application, which allows substituting alternative implementations at build time or run time, for example, in order to take advantage of hardware accelerators. +* All access to the keys happens through key identifiers, which allows support for external cryptoprocessors that is transparent to applications. +* The interface to algorithms is generic, favoring algorithm agility. +* The interface is designed to be easy to use and hard to accidentally misuse. + +Arm welcomes feedback on the design of the API. If you think something could be improved, please open an issue on our Github repository. Alternatively, if you prefer to provide your feedback privately, please email us at [`mbed-crypto@arm.com`](mailto:mbed-crypto@arm.com). All feedback received by email is treated confidentially. + +### PSA API documentation + +A browsable copy of the PSA Cryptography API documents is available on the [PSA cryptography interfaces documentation portal](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/psa/#application-programming-interface) in [PDF](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/PSA_Cryptography_API_Specification.pdf) and [HTML](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/index.html) formats. + +### PSA implementation in Mbed TLS + +Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the PSA Cryptography API. +This implementation is not yet as mature as the rest of the library. Some parts of the code have not been reviewed as thoroughly, and some parts of the PSA implementation are not yet well optimized for code size. + +The X.509 and TLS code can use PSA cryptography for a limited subset of operations. To enable this support, activate the compilation option `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` in `config.h`. + +There are currently a few deviations where the library does not yet implement the latest version of the specification. Please refer to the [compliance issues on Github](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbed-crypto/labels/compliance) for an up-to-date list. + +### Upcoming features + +Future releases of this library will include: + +* A driver programming interface, which makes it possible to use hardware accelerators instead of the default software implementation for chosen algorithms. +* Support for external keys to be stored and manipulated exclusively in a separate cryptoprocessor. +* A configuration mechanism to compile only the algorithms you need for your application. +* A wider set of cryptographic algorithms. + +License +------- + +Unless specifically indicated otherwise in a file, Mbed TLS files are provided under the [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) license. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for the full text of this license. Contributors must accept that their contributions are made under both the Apache-2.0 AND [GPL-2.0-or-later](https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0-or-later.html) licenses. This enables LTS (Long Term Support) branches of the software to be provided under either the Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later licenses. + +Contributing +------------ + +We gratefully accept bug reports and contributions from the community. Please see the [contributing guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details on how to do this. + +Contact +------- + +* To report a security vulnerability in Mbed TLS, please email . For more information, see [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). +* To report a bug or request a feature in Mbed TLS, please [file an issue on GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/new/choose). +* Please see [`SUPPORT.md`](SUPPORT.md) for other channels for discussion and support about Mbed TLS. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/SECURITY.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/SECURITY.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..26b77abe --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/SECURITY.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +## Reporting Vulneratibilities + +If you think you have found an Mbed TLS security vulnerability, then please +send an email to the security team at +. + +## Security Incident Handling Process + +Our security process is detailed in our +[security +center](https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/security-center/). + +Its primary goal is to ensure fixes are ready to be deployed when the issue +goes public. + +## Maintained branches + +Only the maintained branches, as listed in [`BRANCHES.md`](BRANCHES.md), +get security fixes. +Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/SUPPORT.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/SUPPORT.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dab7ac54 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/SUPPORT.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +## Documentation + +Here are some useful sources of information about using Mbed TLS: + +- API documentation, see the [Documentation section of the + README](README.md#License); +- the `docs` directory in the source tree; +- the [Mbed TLS knowledge Base](https://tls.mbed.org/kb); +- the [Mbed TLS mailing-list + archives](https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org/). + +## Asking Questions + +If you can't find your answer in the above sources, please use the [Mbed TLS +mailing list](https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman3/lists/mbed-tls.lists.trustedfirmware.org). diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/README.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/README.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..933fa7f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/README.txt @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +This directory contains example configuration files. + +The examples are generally focused on a particular usage case (eg, support for +a restricted number of ciphersuites) and aim at minimizing resource usage for +this target. They can be used as a basis for custom configurations. + +These files are complete replacements for the default config.h. To use one of +them, you can pick one of the following methods: + +1. Replace the default file include/mbedtls/config.h with the chosen one. + (Depending on your compiler, you may need to adjust the line with + #include "mbedtls/check_config.h" then.) + +2. Define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and adjust the include path accordingly. + For example, using make: + + CFLAGS="-I$PWD/configs -DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE=''" make + + Or, using cmake: + + find . -iname '*cmake*' -not -name CMakeLists.txt -exec rm -rf {} + + CFLAGS="-I$PWD/configs -DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE=''" cmake . + make + +Note that the second method also works if you want to keep your custom +configuration file outside the mbed TLS tree. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..78b75c86 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +/** + * \file config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h + * + * \brief Small configuration for DTLS 1.2 with PSK and AES-CCM ciphersuites + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Minimal configuration for DTLS 1.2 with PSK and AES-CCM ciphersuites + * + * Distinguishing features: + * - Optimized for small code size, low bandwidth (on an unreliable transport), + * and low RAM usage. + * - No asymmetric cryptography (no certificates, no Diffie-Hellman key + * exchange). + * - Fully modern and secure (provided the pre-shared keys are generated and + * stored securely). + * - Very low record overhead with CCM-8. + * - Includes several optional DTLS features typically used in IoT. + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +/* System support */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME /* Optionally used in Hello messages */ +/* Other MBEDTLS_HAVE_XXX flags irrelevant for this configuration */ + +/* Mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + +/* TLS protocol feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + +/* + * Use only CCM_8 ciphersuites, and + * save ROM and a few bytes of RAM by specifying our own ciphersuite list + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + +/* + * Save RAM at the expense of interoperability: do this only if you control + * both ends of the connection! (See comments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".) + * The optimal size here depends on the typical size of records. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 256 + +/* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/* Save some RAM by adjusting to your exact needs */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 16 /* 128-bits keys are generally enough */ + +/* + * You should adjust this to the exact number of sources you're using: default + * is the "platform_entropy_poll" source plus a weak clock source, but you may + * want to add other ones. Minimum is 3 for the entropy test suite. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 3 + +/* These defines are present so that the config modifying scripts can enable + * them during tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/* Error messages and TLS debugging traces + * (huge code size increase, needed for tests/ssl-opt.sh) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +//#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3216e17f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/** + * \file config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h + * + * \brief Minimal configuration for TLS 1.2 with PSK and AES-CCM ciphersuites + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Minimal configuration for TLS 1.2 with PSK and AES-CCM ciphersuites + * + * Distinguishing features: + * - Optimized for small code size, low bandwidth (on a reliable transport), + * and low RAM usage. + * - No asymmetric cryptography (no certificates, no Diffie-Hellman key + * exchange). + * - Fully modern and secure (provided the pre-shared keys are generated and + * stored securely). + * - Very low record overhead with CCM-8. + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +/* System support */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME /* Optionally used in Hello messages */ +/* Other MBEDTLS_HAVE_XXX flags irrelevant for this configuration */ + +/* Mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + +/* TLS protocol feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + +/* + * Use only CCM_8 ciphersuites, and + * save ROM and a few bytes of RAM by specifying our own ciphersuite list + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + +/* + * Save RAM at the expense of interoperability: do this only if you control + * both ends of the connection! (See comments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".) + * The optimal size here depends on the typical size of records. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 1024 + +/* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/* Save some RAM by adjusting to your exact needs */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 16 /* 128-bits keys are generally enough */ + +/* + * You should adjust this to the exact number of sources you're using: default + * is the "platform_entropy_poll" source, but you may want to add other ones + * Minimum is 2 for the entropy test suite. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 2 + +/* These defines are present so that the config modifying scripts can enable + * them during tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/* Error messages and TLS debugging traces + * (huge code size increase, needed for tests/ssl-opt.sh) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +//#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..78e31d54 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/** + * \file config-mini-tls1_1.h + * + * \brief Minimal configuration for TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Minimal configuration for TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), implementing only the + * required ciphersuite: MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +/* System support */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/* mbed TLS feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + +/* mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + +/* For test certificates */ +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + +/* For testing with compat.sh */ +#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO + +/* These defines are present so that the config modifying scripts can enable + * them during tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/* With MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, importing an RSA key requires MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#endif +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +/* Error messages and TLS debugging traces + * (huge code size increase, needed for tests/ssl-opt.sh) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +//#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-no-entropy.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-no-entropy.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..63f9411a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-no-entropy.h @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/** + * \file config-no-entropy.h + * + * \brief Minimal configuration of features that do not require an entropy source + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Minimal configuration of features that do not require an entropy source + * Distinguishing features: + * - no entropy module + * - no TLS protocol implementation available due to absence of an entropy + * source + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +/* System support */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/* mbed TLS feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + +/* mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + +/* Miscellaneous options */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-suite-b.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-suite-b.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29897fd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-suite-b.h @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/** + * \file config-suite-b.h + * + * \brief Minimal configuration for TLS NSA Suite B Profile (RFC 6460) + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Minimal configuration for TLS NSA Suite B Profile (RFC 6460) + * + * Distinguishing features: + * - no RSA or classic DH, fully based on ECC + * - optimized for low RAM usage + * + * Possible improvements: + * - if 128-bit security is enough, disable secp384r1 and SHA-512 + * - use embedded certs in DER format and disable PEM_PARSE_C and BASE64_C + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +/* System support */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/* mbed TLS feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + +/* mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + +/* For test certificates */ +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + +/* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/* Save RAM by adjusting to our exact needs */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 48 // 48 bytes for a 384-bit elliptic curve + +/* Save RAM at the expense of speed, see ecp.h */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 2 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 0 + +/* Significant speed benefit at the expense of some ROM */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + +/* + * You should adjust this to the exact number of sources you're using: default + * is the "mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll" source, but you may want to add other ones. + * Minimum is 2 for the entropy test suite. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 2 + +/* Save ROM and a few bytes of RAM by specifying our own ciphersuite list */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, \ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + +/* + * Save RAM at the expense of interoperability: do this only if you control + * both ends of the connection! (See comments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".) + * The minimum size here depends on the certificate chain used as well as the + * typical size of records. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 1024 + +/* These defines are present so that the config modifying scripts can enable + * them during tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/* With USE_PSA_CRYPTO, some PK operations also need PK_WRITE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#endif + +/* Error messages and TLS debugging traces + * (huge code size increase, needed for tests/ssl-opt.sh) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +//#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-symmetric-only.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-symmetric-only.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f05a0d7c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-symmetric-only.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/** + * \file config-symmetric-only.h + * + * \brief Configuration without any asymmetric cryptography. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +/* System support */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + +/* Mbed Crypto feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY +#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED +#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + +/* Mbed Crypto modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C +#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" + +#include "check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-thread.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-thread.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..de24158a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/configs/config-thread.h @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/** + * \file config-thread.h + * + * \brief Minimal configuration for using TLS as part of Thread + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Minimal configuration for using TLS a part of Thread + * http://threadgroup.org/ + * + * Distinguishing features: + * - no RSA or classic DH, fully based on ECC + * - no X.509 + * - support for experimental EC J-PAKE key exchange + * + * See README.txt for usage instructions. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +/* System support */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + +/* mbed TLS feature support */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + +/* mbed TLS modules */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + +/* For tests using ssl-opt.sh */ +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + +/* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/* Save RAM by adjusting to our exact needs */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 32 // 32 bytes for a 256-bit elliptic curve + +/* Save ROM and a few bytes of RAM by specifying our own ciphersuite list */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + +/* These defines are present so that the config modifying scripts can enable + * them during tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/dco.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/dco.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8201f992 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/dco.txt @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +Developer Certificate of Origin +Version 1.1 + +Copyright (C) 2004, 2006 The Linux Foundation and its contributors. +1 Letterman Drive +Suite D4700 +San Francisco, CA, 94129 + +Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this +license document, but changing it is not allowed. + + +Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1 + +By making a contribution to this project, I certify that: + +(a) The contribution was created in whole or in part by me and I + have the right to submit it under the open source license + indicated in the file; or + +(b) The contribution is based upon previous work that, to the best + of my knowledge, is covered under an appropriate open source + license and I have the right under that license to submit that + work with modifications, whether created in whole or in part + by me, under the same open source license (unless I am + permitted to submit under a different license), as indicated + in the file; or + +(c) The contribution was provided directly to me by some other + person who certified (a), (b) or (c) and I have not modified + it. + +(d) I understand and agree that this project and the contribution + are public and that a record of the contribution (including all + personal information I submit with it, including my sign-off) is + maintained indefinitely and may be redistributed consistent with + this project or the open source license(s) involved. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..23f832b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +*.html +*.pdf diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/Makefile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d8db2e06 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +PANDOC = pandoc + +default: all + +all_markdown = \ + mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md \ + testing/driver-interface-test-strategy.md \ + testing/invasive-testing.md \ + testing/test-framework.md \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +html: $(all_markdown:.md=.html) +pdf: $(all_markdown:.md=.pdf) +all: html pdf + +.SUFFIXES: +.SUFFIXES: .md .html .pdf + +.md.html: + $(PANDOC) -o $@ $< +.md.pdf: + $(PANDOC) -o $@ $< + +clean: + rm -f *.html *.pdf + rm -f testing/*.html testing/*.pdf diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d630e8e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md @@ -0,0 +1,465 @@ +Mbed Crypto storage specification +================================= + +This document specifies how Mbed Crypto uses storage. + +Mbed Crypto may be upgraded on an existing device with the storage preserved. Therefore: + +1. Any change may break existing installations and may require an upgrade path. +1. This document retains historical information about all past released versions. Do not remove information from this document unless it has always been incorrect or it is about a version that you are sure was never released. + +Mbed Crypto 0.1.0 +----------------- + +Tags: mbedcrypto-0.1.0b, mbedcrypto-0.1.0b2 + +Released in November 2018.
+Integrated in Mbed OS 5.11. + +Supported backends: + +* [PSA ITS](#file-namespace-on-its-for-0.1.0) +* [C stdio](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-0.1.0) + +Supported features: + +* [Persistent transparent keys](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0) designated by a [slot number](#key-names-for-0.1.0). +* [Nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0) on ITS only. + +This is a beta release, and we do not promise backward compatibility, with one exception: + +> On Mbed OS, if a device has a nonvolatile random seed file produced with Mbed OS 5.11.x and is upgraded to a later version of Mbed OS, the nonvolatile random seed file is preserved or upgraded. + +We do not make any promises regarding key storage, or regarding the nonvolatile random seed file on other platforms. + +### Key names for 0.1.0 + +Information about each key is stored in a dedicated file whose name is constructed from the key identifier. The way in which the file name is constructed depends on the storage backend. The content of the file is described [below](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0). + +The valid values for a key identifier are the range from 1 to 0xfffeffff. This limitation on the range is not documented in user-facing documentation: according to the user-facing documentation, arbitrary 32-bit values are valid. + +The code uses the following constant in an internal header (note that despite the name, this value is actually one plus the maximum permitted value): + + #define PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER 0xffff0000 + +There is a shared namespace for all callers. + +### Key file format for 0.1.0 + +All integers are encoded in little-endian order in 8-bit bytes. + +The layout of a key file is: + +* magic (8 bytes): `"PSA\0KEY\0"` +* version (4 bytes): 0 +* type (4 bytes): `psa_key_type_t` value +* policy usage flags (4 bytes): `psa_key_usage_t` value +* policy usage algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value +* key material length (4 bytes) +* key material: output of `psa_export_key` +* Any trailing data is rejected on load. + +### Nonvolatile random seed file format for 0.1.0 + +The nonvolatile random seed file contains a seed for the random generator. If present, it is rewritten at each boot as part of the random generator initialization. + +The file format is just the seed as a byte string with no metadata or encoding of any kind. + +### File namespace on ITS for 0.1.0 + +Assumption: ITS provides a 32-bit file identifier namespace. The Crypto service can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace. + +* File 0: unused. +* Files 1 through 0xfffeffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-0.1.0). +* File 0xffffff52 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`): [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0). +* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffff51, 0xffffff53 through 0xffffffff: unused. + +### File namespace on stdio for 0.1.0 + +Assumption: C stdio, allowing names containing lowercase letters, digits and underscores, of length up to 23. + +An undocumented build-time configuration value `CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION` allows storing the key files in a directory other than the current directory. This value is simply prepended to the file name (so it must end with a directory separator to put the keys in a different directory). + +* `CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION "psa_key_slot_0"`: used as a temporary file. Must be writable. May be overwritten or deleted if present. +* `sprintf(CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION "psa_key_slot_%lu", key_id)` [content](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0) of the [key whose identifier](#key-names-for-0.1.0) is `key_id`. +* Other files: unused. + +Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 +----------------- + +Tags: mbedcrypto-1.0.0d4, mbedcrypto-1.0.0 + +Released in February 2019.
+Integrated in Mbed OS 5.12. + +Supported integrations: + +* [PSA platform](#file-namespace-on-a-psa-platform-for-1.0.0) +* [library using PSA ITS](#file-namespace-on-its-as-a-library-for-1.0.0) +* [library using C stdio](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-1.0.0) + +Supported features: + +* [Persistent transparent keys](#key-file-format-for-1.0.0) designated by a [key identifier and owner](#key-names-for-1.0.0). +* [Nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-1.0.0) on ITS only. + +Backward compatibility commitments: TBD + +### Key names for 1.0.0 + +Information about each key is stored in a dedicated file designated by the key identifier. In integrations where there is no concept of key owner (in particular, in library integrations), the key identifier is exactly the key identifier as defined in the PSA Cryptography API specification (`psa_key_id_t`). In integrations where there is a concept of key owner (integration into a service for example), the key identifier is made of an owner identifier (its semantics and type are integration specific) and of the key identifier (`psa_key_id_t`) from the key owner point of view. + +The way in which the file name is constructed from the key identifier depends on the storage backend. The content of the file is described [below](#key-file-format-for-1.0.0). + +* Library integration: the key file name is just the key identifier as defined in the PSA crypto specification. This is a 32-bit value. +* PSA service integration: the key file name is `(uint64_t)owner_uid << 32 | key_id` where `key_id` is the key identifier from the owner point of view and `owner_uid` (of type `int32_t`) is the calling partition identifier provided to the server by the partition manager. This is a 64-bit value. + +### Key file format for 1.0.0 + +The layout is identical to [0.1.0](#key-file-format-for-0.1.0) so far. However note that the encoding of key types, algorithms and key material has changed, therefore the storage format is not compatible (despite using the same value in the version field so far). + +### Nonvolatile random seed file format for 1.0.0 + +The nonvolatile random seed file contains a seed for the random generator. If present, it is rewritten at each boot as part of the random generator initialization. + +The file format is just the seed as a byte string with no metadata or encoding of any kind. + +This is unchanged since [the feature was introduced in Mbed Crypto 0.1.0](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0). + +### File namespace on a PSA platform for 1.0.0 + +Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The Crypto service can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace. + +Assumption: the owner identifier is a nonzero value of type `int32_t`. + +* Files 0 through 0xffffff51, 0xffffff53 through 0xffffffff: unused, reserved for internal use of the crypto library or crypto service. +* File 0xffffff52 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`): [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0). +* Files 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-1.0.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-1.0.0). The upper 32 bits determine the owner. + +### File namespace on ITS as a library for 1.0.0 + +Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The entity using the crypto library can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace. + +This is a library integration, so there is no owner. The key file identifier is identical to the key identifier. + +* File 0: unused. +* Files 1 through 0xfffeffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-1.0.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-1.0.0). +* File 0xffffff52 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`): [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-1.0.0). +* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffff51, 0xffffff53 through 0xffffffff, 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffffffff: unused. + +### File namespace on stdio for 1.0.0 + +This is a library integration, so there is no owner. The key file identifier is identical to the key identifier. + +[Identical to 0.1.0](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-0.1.0). + +### Upgrade from 0.1.0 to 1.0.0. + +* Delete files 1 through 0xfffeffff, which contain keys in a format that is no longer supported. + +### Suggested changes to make before 1.0.0 + +The library integration and the PSA platform integration use different sets of file names. This is annoyingly non-uniform. For example, if we want to store non-key files, we have room in different ranges (0 through 0xffffffff on a PSA platform, 0xffff0000 through 0xffffffffffffffff in a library integration). + +It would simplify things to always have a 32-bit owner, with a nonzero value, and thus reserve the range 0–0xffffffff for internal library use. + +Mbed Crypto 1.1.0 +----------------- + +Tags: mbedcrypto-1.1.0 + +Released in early June 2019.
+Integrated in Mbed OS 5.13. + +Changes since [1.0.0](#mbed-crypto-1.0.0): + +* The stdio backend for storage has been replaced by an implementation of [PSA ITS over stdio](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-1.1.0). +* [Some changes in the key file format](#key-file-format-for-1.1.0). + +### File namespace on stdio for 1.1.0 + +Assumption: C stdio, allowing names containing lowercase letters, digits and underscores, of length up to 23. + +An undocumented build-time configuration value `PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX` allows storing the key files in a directory other than the current directory. This value is simply prepended to the file name (so it must end with a directory separator to put the keys in a different directory). + +* `PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile.psa_its"`: used as a temporary file. Must be writable. May be overwritten or deleted if present. +* `sprintf(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "%016llx.psa_its", key_id)`: a key or non-key file. The `key_id` in the name is the 64-bit file identifier, which is the [key identifier](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) for a key file or some reserved identifier for a non-key file (currently: only the [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-1.0.0)). The contents of the file are: + * Magic header (8 bytes): `"PSA\0ITS\0"` + * File contents. + +### Key file format for 1.1.0 + +The key file format is identical to [1.0.0](#key-file-format-for-1.0.0), except for the following changes: + +* A new policy field, marked as [NEW:1.1.0] below. +* The encoding of key types, algorithms and key material has changed, therefore the storage format is not compatible (despite using the same value in the version field so far). + +A self-contained description of the file layout follows. + +All integers are encoded in little-endian order in 8-bit bytes. + +The layout of a key file is: + +* magic (8 bytes): `"PSA\0KEY\0"` +* version (4 bytes): 0 +* type (4 bytes): `psa_key_type_t` value +* policy usage flags (4 bytes): `psa_key_usage_t` value +* policy usage algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value +* policy enrollment algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value [NEW:1.1.0] +* key material length (4 bytes) +* key material: output of `psa_export_key` +* Any trailing data is rejected on load. + +Mbed Crypto TBD +--------------- + +Tags: TBD + +Released in TBD 2019.
+Integrated in Mbed OS TBD. + +### Changes introduced in TBD + +* The layout of a key file now has a lifetime field before the type field. +* Key files can store references to keys in a secure element. In such key files, the key material contains the slot number. + +### File namespace on a PSA platform on TBD + +Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The Crypto service can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace. + +Assumption: the owner identifier is a nonzero value of type `int32_t`. + +* Files 0 through 0xfffeffff: unused. +* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffffff: reserved for internal use of the crypto library or crypto service. See [non-key files](#non-key-files-on-tbd). +* Files 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-1.0.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-1.0.0). The upper 32 bits determine the owner. + +### File namespace on ITS as a library on TBD + +Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The entity using the crypto library can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace. + +This is a library integration, so there is no owner. The key file identifier is identical to the key identifier. + +* File 0: unused. +* Files 1 through 0xfffeffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-1.0.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-1.0.0). +* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffffff: reserved for internal use of the crypto library or crypto service. See [non-key files](#non-key-files-on-tbd). +* Files 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffffffff: unused. + +### Non-key files on TBD + +File identifiers in the range 0xffff0000 through 0xffffffff are reserved for internal use in Mbed Crypto. + +* Files 0xfffffe02 through 0xfffffeff (`PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + lifetime`): secure element driver storage. The content of the file is the secure element driver's persistent data. +* File 0xffffff52 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`): [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-1.0.0). +* File 0xffffff54 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID`): [transaction file](#transaction-file-format-for-tbd). +* Other files are unused and reserved for future use. + +### Key file format for TBD + +All integers are encoded in little-endian order in 8-bit bytes except where otherwise indicated. + +The layout of a key file is: + +* magic (8 bytes): `"PSA\0KEY\0"`. +* version (4 bytes): 0. +* lifetime (4 bytes): `psa_key_lifetime_t` value. +* type (4 bytes): `psa_key_type_t` value. +* policy usage flags (4 bytes): `psa_key_usage_t` value. +* policy usage algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value. +* policy enrollment algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value. +* key material length (4 bytes). +* key material: + * For a transparent key: output of `psa_export_key`. + * For an opaque key (unified driver interface): driver-specific opaque key blob. + * For an opaque key (key in a secure element): slot number (8 bytes), in platform endianness. +* Any trailing data is rejected on load. + +### Transaction file format for TBD + +The transaction file contains data about an ongoing action that cannot be completed atomically. It exists only if there is an ongoing transaction. + +All integers are encoded in platform endianness. + +All currently existing transactions concern a key in a secure element. + +The layout of a transaction file is: + +* type (2 bytes): the [transaction type](#transaction-types-on-tbd). +* unused (2 bytes) +* lifetime (4 bytes): `psa_key_lifetime_t` value that corresponds to a key in a secure element. +* slot number (8 bytes): `psa_key_slot_number_t` value. This is the unique designation of the key for the secure element driver. +* key identifier (4 bytes in a library integration, 8 bytes on a PSA platform): the internal representation of the key identifier. On a PSA platform, this encodes the key owner in the same way as [in file identifiers for key files](#file-namespace-on-a-psa-platform-on-tbd)). + +#### Transaction types on TBD + +* 0x0001: key creation. The following locations may or may not contain data about the key that is being created: + * The slot in the secure element designated by the slot number. + * The file containing the key metadata designated by the key identifier. + * The driver persistent data. +* 0x0002: key destruction. The following locations may or may not still contain data about the key that is being destroyed: + * The slot in the secure element designated by the slot number. + * The file containing the key metadata designated by the key identifier. + * The driver persistent data. + +Mbed Crypto TBD +--------------- + +Tags: TBD + +Released in TBD 2020.
+Integrated in Mbed OS TBD. + +### Changes introduced in TBD + +* The type field has been split into a type and a bits field of 2 bytes each. + +### Key file format for TBD + +All integers are encoded in little-endian order in 8-bit bytes except where otherwise indicated. + +The layout of a key file is: + +* magic (8 bytes): `"PSA\0KEY\0"`. +* version (4 bytes): 0. +* lifetime (4 bytes): `psa_key_lifetime_t` value. +* type (2 bytes): `psa_key_type_t` value. +* bits (2 bytes): `psa_key_bits_t` value. +* policy usage flags (4 bytes): `psa_key_usage_t` value. +* policy usage algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value. +* policy enrollment algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value. +* key material length (4 bytes). +* key material: + * For a transparent key: output of `psa_export_key`. + * For an opaque key (unified driver interface): driver-specific opaque key blob. + * For an opaque key (key in a secure element): slot number (8 bytes), in platform endianness. +* Any trailing data is rejected on load. + +Mbed TLS 2.25.0 +--------------- + +Tags: `mbedtls-2.25.0`, `mbedtls-2.26.0`, `mbedtls-2.27.0`, `mbedtls-2.28.0` (continued in early 3.x releases) + +First released in December 2020. + +Note: this is the first version that is officially supported. The version number is still 0. + +Backward compatibility commitments: we promise backward compatibility for stored keys when Mbed TLS is upgraded from x to y if x >= 2.25 and y < 4. See [`BRANCHES.md`](../../BRANCHES.md) for more details. + +Supported integrations: + +* [PSA platform](#file-namespace-on-a-psa-platform-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0) +* [library using PSA ITS](#file-namespace-on-its-as-a-library-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0) +* [library using C stdio](#file-namespace-on-stdio-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) + +Supported features: + +* [Persistent keys](#key-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) designated by a [key identifier and owner](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0). Keys can be: + * Transparent, stored in the export format. + * Opaque, using the unified driver interface with statically registered drivers (`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS`). The driver determines the content of the opaque key blob. + * Opaque, using the deprecated secure element interface with dynamically registered drivers (`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C`). The driver picks a slot number which is stored in the place of the key material. +* [Nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) on ITS only. + +### Changes introduced in Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +* The numerical encodings of `psa_key_type_t`, `psa_key_usage_t` and `psa_algorithm_t` have changed. + +### File namespace on a PSA platform on Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The Crypto service can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace. + +Assumption: the owner identifier is a nonzero value of type `int32_t`. + +* Files 0 through 0xfffeffff: unused. +* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffffff: reserved for internal use of the crypto library or crypto service. See [non-key files](#non-key-files-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0). +* Files 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0). The upper 32 bits determine the owner. + +### File namespace on ITS as a library on Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +Assumption: ITS provides a 64-bit file identifier namespace. The entity using the crypto library can use arbitrary file identifiers and no other part of the system accesses the same file identifier namespace. + +This is a library integration, so there is no owner. The key file identifier is identical to the key identifier. + +* File 0: unused. +* Files 1 through 0xfffeffff: [content](#key-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) of the [key whose identifier is the file identifier](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0). +* Files 0xffff0000 through 0xffffffff: reserved for internal use of the crypto library or crypto service. See [non-key files](#non-key-files-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0). +* Files 0x100000000 through 0xffffffffffffffff: unused. + +### File namespace on stdio for Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +Assumption: C stdio, allowing names containing lowercase letters, digits and underscores, of length up to 23. + +An undocumented build-time configuration value `PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX` allows storing the key files in a directory other than the current directory. This value is simply prepended to the file name (so it must end with a directory separator to put the keys in a different directory). + +* `PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile.psa_its"`: used as a temporary file. Must be writable. May be overwritten or deleted if present. +* `sprintf(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "%016llx.psa_its", key_id)`: a key or non-key file. The `key_id` in the name is the 64-bit file identifier, which is the [key identifier](#key-names-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0) for a key file or some reserved identifier for a [non-key file](#non-key-files-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0). The contents of the file are: + * Magic header (8 bytes): `"PSA\0ITS\0"` + * File contents. + +### Key names for Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +Information about each key is stored in a dedicated file designated by the key identifier. In integrations where there is no concept of key owner (in particular, in library integrations), the key identifier is exactly the key identifier as defined in the PSA Cryptography API specification (`psa_key_id_t`). In integrations where there is a concept of key owner (integration into a service for example), the key identifier is made of an owner identifier (its semantics and type are integration specific) and of the key identifier (`psa_key_id_t`) from the key owner point of view. + +The way in which the file name is constructed from the key identifier depends on the storage backend. The content of the file is described [below](#key-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0). + +* Library integration: the key file name is just the key identifier as defined in the PSA crypto specification. This is a 32-bit value which must be in the range 0x00000001..0x3fffffff (`PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN`..`PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX`). +* PSA service integration: the key file name is `(uint64_t)owner_uid << 32 | key_id` where `key_id` is the key identifier from the owner point of view and `owner_uid` (of type `int32_t`) is the calling partition identifier provided to the server by the partition manager. This is a 64-bit value. + +### Key file format for Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +All integers are encoded in little-endian order in 8-bit bytes except where otherwise indicated. + +The layout of a key file is: + +* magic (8 bytes): `"PSA\0KEY\0"`. +* version (4 bytes): 0. +* lifetime (4 bytes): `psa_key_lifetime_t` value. +* type (2 bytes): `psa_key_type_t` value. +* bits (2 bytes): `psa_key_bits_t` value. +* policy usage flags (4 bytes): `psa_key_usage_t` value. +* policy usage algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value. +* policy enrollment algorithm (4 bytes): `psa_algorithm_t` value. +* key material length (4 bytes). +* key material: + * For a transparent key: output of `psa_export_key`. + * For an opaque key (unified driver interface): driver-specific opaque key blob. + * For an opaque key (key in a dynamic secure element): slot number (8 bytes), in platform endianness. +* Any trailing data is rejected on load. + +### Non-key files on Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +File identifiers that are outside the range of persistent key identifiers are reserved for internal use by the library. The only identifiers currently in use have the owner id (top 32 bits) set to 0. + +* Files 0xfffffe02 through 0xfffffeff (`PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + lifetime`): dynamic secure element driver storage. The content of the file is the secure element driver's persistent data. +* File 0xffffff52 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`): [nonvolatile random seed](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0). +* File 0xffffff54 (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID`): [transaction file](#transaction-file-format-for-mbed-tls-2.25.0). +* Other files are unused and reserved for future use. + +### Nonvolatile random seed file format for Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +[Identical to Mbed Crypto 0.1.0](#nonvolatile-random-seed-file-format-for-0.1.0). + +### Transaction file format for Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +The transaction file contains data about an ongoing action that cannot be completed atomically. It exists only if there is an ongoing transaction. + +All integers are encoded in platform endianness. + +All currently existing transactions concern a key in a dynamic secure element. + +The layout of a transaction file is: + +* type (2 bytes): the [transaction type](#transaction-types-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0). +* unused (2 bytes) +* lifetime (4 bytes): `psa_key_lifetime_t` value that corresponds to a key in a secure element. +* slot number (8 bytes): `psa_key_slot_number_t` value. This is the unique designation of the key for the secure element driver. +* key identifier (4 bytes in a library integration, 8 bytes on a PSA platform): the internal representation of the key identifier. On a PSA platform, this encodes the key owner in the same way as [in file identifiers for key files](#file-namespace-on-a-psa-platform-on-mbed-tls-2.25.0)). + +#### Transaction types on Mbed TLS 2.25.0 + +* 0x0001: key creation. The following locations may or may not contain data about the key that is being created: + * The slot in the secure element designated by the slot number. + * The file containing the key metadata designated by the key identifier. + * The driver persistent data. +* 0x0002: key destruction. The following locations may or may not still contain data about the key that is being destroyed: + * The slot in the secure element designated by the slot number. + * The file containing the key metadata designated by the key identifier. + * The driver persistent data. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/psa-crypto-implementation-structure.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/psa-crypto-implementation-structure.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cd4d427b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/psa-crypto-implementation-structure.md @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +PSA Cryptograpy API implementation and PSA driver interface +=========================================================== + +## Introduction + +The [PSA Cryptography API specification](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/psa/#application-programming-interface) defines an interface to cryptographic operations for which the Mbed TLS library provides a reference implementation. The PSA Cryptography API specification is complemented by the PSA driver interface specification which defines an interface for cryptoprocessor drivers. + +This document describes the high level organization of the Mbed TLS PSA Cryptography API implementation which is tightly related to the PSA driver interface. + +## High level organization of the Mbed TLS PSA Cryptography API implementation +In one sentence, the Mbed TLS PSA Cryptography API implementation is made of a core and PSA drivers as defined in the PSA driver interface. The key point is that software cryptographic operations are organized as PSA drivers: they interact with the core through the PSA driver interface. + +### Rationale + +* Addressing software and hardware cryptographic implementations through the same C interface reduces the core code size and its call graph complexity. The core and its dispatching to software and hardware implementations are consequently easier to test and validate. +* The organization of the software cryptographic implementations in drivers promotes modularization of those implementations. +* As hardware capabilities, software cryptographic functionalities can be described by a JSON driver description file as defined in the PSA driver interface. +* Along with JSON driver description files, the PSA driver specification defines the deliverables for a driver to be included into the Mbed TLS PSA Cryptography implementation. This provides a natural framework to integrate third party or alternative software implementations of cryptographic operations. + +## The Mbed TLS PSA Cryptography API implementation core + +The core implements all the APIs as defined in the PSA Cryptography API specification but does not perform on its own any cryptographic operation. The core relies on PSA drivers to actually +perform the cryptographic operations. The core is responsible for: + +* the key store. +* checking PSA API arguments and translating them into valid arguments for the necessary calls to the PSA driver interface. +* dispatching the cryptographic operations to the appropriate PSA drivers. + +The sketch of an Mbed TLS PSA cryptographic API implementation is thus: +```C +psa_status_t psa_api( ... ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + /* Pre driver interface call processing: validation of arguments, building + * of arguments for the call to the driver interface, ... */ + + ... + + /* Call to the driver interface */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_( ... ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Post driver interface call processing: validation of the values returned + * by the driver, finalization of the values to return to the caller, + * clean-up in case of error ... */ +} +``` +The code of most PSA APIs is expected to match precisely the above layout. However, it is likely that the code structure of some APIs will be more complicated with several calls to the driver interface, mainly to encompass a larger variety of hardware designs. For example, to encompass hardware accelerators that are capable of verifying a MAC and those that are only capable of computing a MAC, the psa_mac_verify() API could call first psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify() and then fallback to psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute(). + +The implementations of `psa_driver_wrapper_` functions are generated by the build system based on the JSON driver description files of the various PSA drivers making up the Mbed TLS PSA Cryptography API implementation. The implementations are generated in a psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c C file and the function prototypes declared in a psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h header file. + +The psa_driver_wrapper_() functions dispatch cryptographic operations to accelerator drivers, secure element drivers as well as to the software implementations of cryptographic operations. + +Note that the implementation allows to build the library with only a C compiler by shipping a generated file corresponding to a pure software implementation. The driver entry points and their code in this generated file are guarded by pre-processor directives based on PSA_WANT_xyz macros (see [Conditional inclusion of cryptographic mechanism through the PSA API in Mbed TLS](psa-conditional-inclusion-c.html). That way, it is possible to compile and include in the library only the desired cryptographic operations. + +### Key creation + +Key creation implementation in Mbed TLS PSA core is articulated around three internal functions: psa_start_key_creation(), psa_finish_key_creation() and psa_fail_key_creation(). Implementations of key creation PSA APIs, namely psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key() and psa_copy_key() go by the following sequence: + 1. Check the input parameters. + 2. Call psa_start_key_creation() that allocates a key slot, prepares it with the specified key attributes, and in case of a volatile key assign it a volatile key identifier. + 3. Generate or copy the key material into the key slot. This entails the allocation of the buffer to store the key material. + 4. Call psa_finish_key_creation() that mostly saves persistent keys into persistent storage. + +In case of any error occurring at step 3 or 4, psa_fail_key_creation() is called. It wipes and cleans the slot especially the key material: reset to zero of the RAM memory that contained the key material, free the allocated buffer. + + +## Mbed TLS PSA Cryptography API implementation drivers + +A driver of the Mbed TLS PSA Cryptography API implementation (Mbed TLS PSA driver in the following) is a driver in the sense that it is compliant with the PSA driver interface specification. But it is not an actual driver that drives some hardware. It implements cryptographic operations purely in software. + +An Mbed TLS PSA driver C file is named psa_crypto_.c and its associated header file psa_crypto_.h. The functions implementing a driver entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification are named as mbedtls_psa__(). As an example, the psa_crypto_rsa.c and psa_crypto_rsa.h are the files containing the Mbed TLS PSA driver implementing RSA cryptographic operations. This RSA driver implements among other entry points the "import_key" entry point. The function implementing this entry point is named mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key(). diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/driver-interface-test-strategy.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/driver-interface-test-strategy.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a726c43e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/driver-interface-test-strategy.md @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +# Mbed Crypto driver interface test strategy + +This document describes the test strategy for the driver interfaces in Mbed Crypto. Mbed Crypto has interfaces for secure element drivers, accelerator drivers and entropy drivers. This document is about testing Mbed Crypto itself; testing drivers is out of scope. + +The driver interfaces are standardized through PSA Cryptography functional specifications. + +## Secure element driver interface testing + +### Secure element driver interfaces + +#### Opaque driver interface + +The [unified driver interface](../../proposed/psa-driver-interface.md) supports both transparent drivers (for accelerators) and opaque drivers (for secure elements). + +Drivers exposing this interface need to be registered at compile time by declaring their JSON description file. + +#### Dynamic secure element driver interface + +The dynamic secure element driver interface (SE interface for short) is defined by [`psa/crypto_se_driver.h`](../../../include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h). This is an interface between Mbed Crypto and one or more third-party drivers. + +The SE interface consists of one function provided by Mbed Crypto (`psa_register_se_driver`) and many functions that drivers must implement. To make a driver usable by Mbed Crypto, the initialization code must call `psa_register_se_driver` with a structure that describes the driver. The structure mostly contains function pointers, pointing to the driver's methods. All calls to a driver function are triggered by a call to a PSA crypto API function. + +### SE driver interface unit tests + +This section describes unit tests that must be implemented to validate the secure element driver interface. Note that a test case may cover multiple requirements; for example a “good case” test can validate that the proper function is called, that it receives the expected inputs and that it produces the expected outputs. + +Many SE driver interface unit tests could be covered by running the existing API tests with a key in a secure element. + +#### SE driver registration + +This applies to dynamic drivers only. + +* Test `psa_register_se_driver` with valid and with invalid arguments. +* Make at least one failing call to `psa_register_se_driver` followed by a successful call. +* Make at least one test that successfully registers the maximum number of drivers and fails to register one more. + +#### Dispatch to SE driver + +For each API function that can lead to a driver call (more precisely, for each driver method call site, but this is practically equivalent): + +* Make at least one test with a key in a secure element that checks that the driver method is called. A few API functions involve multiple driver methods; these should validate that all the expected driver methods are called. +* Make at least one test with a key that is not in a secure element that checks that the driver method is not called. +* Make at least one test with a key in a secure element with a driver that does not have the requisite method (i.e. the method pointer is `NULL`) but has the substructure containing that method, and check that the return value is `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`. +* Make at least one test with a key in a secure element with a driver that does not have the substructure containing that method (i.e. the pointer to the substructure is `NULL`), and check that the return value is `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`. +* At least one test should register multiple drivers with a key in each driver and check that the expected driver is called. This does not need to be done for all operations (use a white-box approach to determine if operations may use different code paths to choose the driver). +* At least one test should register the same driver structure with multiple lifetime values and check that the driver receives the expected lifetime value. + +Some methods only make sense as a group (for example a driver that provides the MAC methods must provide all or none). In those cases, test with all of them null and none of them null. + +#### SE driver inputs + +For each API function that can lead to a driver call (more precisely, for each driver method call site, but this is practically equivalent): + +* Wherever the specification guarantees parameters that satisfy certain preconditions, check these preconditions whenever practical. +* If the API function can take parameters that are invalid and must not reach the driver, call the API function with such parameters and verify that the driver method is not called. +* Check that the expected inputs reach the driver. This may be implicit in a test that checks the outputs if the only realistic way to obtain the correct outputs is to start from the expected inputs (as is often the case for cryptographic material, but not for metadata). + +#### SE driver outputs + +For each API function that leads to a driver call, call it with parameters that cause a driver to be invoked and check how Mbed Crypto handles the outputs. + +* Correct outputs. +* Incorrect outputs such as an invalid output length. +* Expected errors (e.g. `PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE` from a signature verification method). +* Unexpected errors. At least test that if the driver returns `PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR`, this is propagated correctly. + +Key creation functions invoke multiple methods and need more complex error handling: + +* Check the consequence of errors detected at each stage (slot number allocation or validation, key creation method, storage accesses). +* Check that the storage ends up in the expected state. At least make sure that no intermediate file remains after a failure. + +#### Persistence of SE keys + +The following tests must be performed at least one for each key creation method (import, generate, ...). + +* Test that keys in a secure element survive `psa_close_key(); psa_open_key()`. +* Test that keys in a secure element survive `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); psa_crypto_init()`. +* Test that the driver's persistent data survives `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); psa_crypto_init()`. +* Test that `psa_destroy_key()` does not leave any trace of the key. + +#### Resilience for SE drivers + +Creating or removing a key in a secure element involves multiple storage modifications (M1, ..., Mn). If the operation is interrupted by a reset at any point, it must be either rolled back or completed. + +* For each potential interruption point (before M1, between M1 and M2, ..., after Mn), call `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); psa_crypto_init()` at that point and check that this either rolls back or completes the operation that was started. +* This must be done for each key creation method and for key destruction. +* This must be done for each possible flow, including error cases (e.g. a key creation that fails midway due to `OUT_OF_MEMORY`). +* The recovery during `psa_crypto_init` can itself be interrupted. Test those interruptions too. +* Two things need to be tested: the key that is being created or destroyed, and the driver's persistent storage. +* Check both that the storage has the expected content (this can be done by e.g. using a key that is supposed to be present) and does not have any unexpected content (for keys, this can be done by checking that `psa_open_key` fails with `PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST`). + +This requires instrumenting the storage implementation, either to force it to fail at each point or to record successive storage states and replay each of them. Each `psa_its_xxx` function call is assumed to be atomic. + +### SE driver system tests + +#### Real-world use case + +We must have at least one driver that is close to real-world conditions: + +* With its own source tree. +* Running on actual hardware. +* Run the full driver validation test suite (which does not yet exist). +* Run at least one test application (e.g. the Mbed OS TLS example). + +This requirement shall be fulfilled by the [Microchip ATECC508A driver](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-os-atecc608a/). + +#### Complete driver + +We should have at least one driver that covers the whole interface: + +* With its own source tree. +* Implementing all the methods. +* Run the full driver validation test suite (which does not yet exist). + +A PKCS#11 driver would be a good candidate. It would be useful as part of our product offering. + +## Transparent driver interface testing + +The [unified driver interface](../../proposed/psa-driver-interface.md) defines interfaces for accelerators. + +### Test requirements + +#### Requirements for transparent driver testing + +Every cryptographic mechanism for which a transparent driver interface exists (key creation, cryptographic operations, …) must be exercised in at least one build. The test must verify that the driver code is called. + +#### Requirements for fallback + +The driver interface includes a fallback mechanism so that a driver can reject a request at runtime and let another driver handle the request. For each entry point, there must be at least three test runs with two or more drivers available with driver A configured to fall back to driver B, with one run where A returns `PSA_SUCCESS`, one where A returns `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED` and B is invoked, and one where A returns a different error and B is not invoked. + +## Entropy and randomness interface testing + +TODO diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/invasive-testing.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/invasive-testing.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..de611a56 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/invasive-testing.md @@ -0,0 +1,367 @@ +# Mbed TLS invasive testing strategy + +## Introduction + +In Mbed TLS, we use black-box testing as much as possible: test the documented behavior of the product, in a realistic environment. However this is not always sufficient. + +The goal of this document is to identify areas where black-box testing is insufficient and to propose solutions. + +This is a test strategy document, not a test plan. A description of exactly what is tested is out of scope. + +This document is structured as follows: + +* [“Rules”](#rules) gives general rules and is written for brevity. +* [“Requirements”](#requirements) explores the reasons why invasive testing is needed and how it should be done. +* [“Possible approaches”](#possible-approaches) discusses some general methods for non-black-box testing. +* [“Solutions”](#solutions) explains how we currently solve, or intend to solve, specific problems. + +### TLS + +This document currently focuses on data structure manipulation and storage, which is what the crypto/keystore and X.509 parts of the library are about. More work is needed to fully take TLS into account. + +## Rules + +Always follow these rules unless you have a good reason not to. If you deviate, document the rationale somewhere. + +See the section [“Possible approaches”](#possible-approaches) for a rationale. + +### Interface design for testing + +Do not add test-specific interfaces if there's a practical way of doing it another way. All public interfaces should be useful in at least some configurations. Features with a significant impact on the code size or attack surface should have a compile-time guard. + +### Reliance on internal details + +In unit tests and in test programs, it's ok to include header files from `library/`. Do not define non-public interfaces in public headers (`include/mbedtls` has `*_internal.h` headers for legacy reasons, but this approach is deprecated). In contrast, sample programs must not include header files from `library/`. + +Sometimes it makes sense to have unit tests on functions that aren't part of the public API. Declare such functions in `library/*.h` and include the corresponding header in the test code. If the function should be `static` for optimization but can't be `static` for testing, declare it as `MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE`, and make the tests that use it depend on `MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS` (see [“rules for compile-time options”](#rules-for-compile-time-options)). + +If test code or test data depends on internal details of the library and not just on its documented behavior, add a comment in the code that explains the dependency. For example: + +> ``` +> /* This test file is specific to the ITS implementation in PSA Crypto +> * on top of stdio. It expects to know what the stdio name of a file is +> * based on its keystore name. +> */ +> ``` + +> ``` +> # This test assumes that PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS (currently 65536-8 bits = 8191 bytes +> # and not expected to be raised any time soon) is less than the maximum +> # output from HKDF-SHA512 (255*64 = 16320 bytes). +> ``` + +### Rules for compile-time options + +If the most practical way to test something is to add code to the product that is only useful for testing, do so, but obey the following rules. For more information, see the [rationale](#guidelines-for-compile-time-options). + +* **Only use test-specific code when necessary.** Anything that can be tested through the documented API must be tested through the documented API. +* **Test-specific code must be guarded by `#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)`**. Do not create fine-grained guards for test-specific code. +* **Do not use `MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS` for security checks or assertions.** Security checks belong in the product. +* **Merely defining `MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS` must not change the behavior**. It may define extra functions. It may add fields to structures, but if so, make it very clear that these fields have no impact on non-test-specific fields. +* **Where tests must be able to change the behavior, do it by function substitution.** See [“rules for function substitution”](#rules-for-function-substitution) for more details. + +#### Rules for function substitution + +This section explains how to replace a library function `mbedtls_foo()` by alternative code for test purposes. That is, library code calls `mbedtls_foo()`, and there is a mechanism to arrange for these calls to invoke different code. + +Often `mbedtls_foo` is a macro which is defined to be a system function (like `mbedtls_calloc` or `mbedtls_fopen`), which we replace to mock or wrap the system function. This is useful to simulate I/O failure, for example. Note that if the macro can be replaced at compile time to support alternative platforms, the test code should be compatible with this compile-time configuration so that it works on these alternative platforms as well. + +Sometimes the substitutable function is a `static inline` function that does nothing (not a macro, to avoid accidentally skipping side effects in its parameters), to provide a hook for test code; such functions should have a name that starts with the prefix `mbedtls_test_hook_`. In such cases, the function should generally not modify its parameters, so any pointer argument should be const. The function should return void. + +With `MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS` set, `mbedtls_foo` is a global variable of function pointer type. This global variable is initialized to the system function, or to a function that does nothing. The global variable is defined in a header in the `library` directory such as `psa_crypto_invasive.h`. This is similar to the platform function configuration mechanism with `MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_xxx_ALT`. + +In unit test code that needs to modify the internal behavior: + +* The test function (or the whole test file) must depend on `MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS`. +* At the beginning of the test function, set the global function pointers to the desired value. +* In the test function's cleanup code, restore the global function pointers to their default value. + +## Requirements + +### General goals + +We need to balance the following goals, which are sometimes contradictory. + +* Coverage: we need to test behaviors which are not easy to trigger by using the API or which cannot be triggered deterministically, for example I/O failures. +* Correctness: we want to test the actual product, not a modified version, since conclusions drawn from a test of a modified product may not apply to the real product. +* Effacement: the product should not include features that are solely present for test purposes, since these increase the attack surface and the code size. +* Portability: tests should work on every platform. Skipping tests on certain platforms may hide errors that are only apparent on such platforms. +* Maintainability: tests should only enforce the documented behavior of the product, to avoid extra work when the product's internal or implementation-specific behavior changes. We should also not give the impression that whatever the tests check is guaranteed behavior of the product which cannot change in future versions. + +Where those goals conflict, we should at least mitigate the goals that cannot be fulfilled, and document the architectural choices and their rationale. + +### Problem areas + +#### Allocation + +Resource allocation can fail, but rarely does so in a typical test environment. How does the product cope if some allocations fail? + +Resources include: + +* Memory. +* Files in storage (PSA API only — in the Mbed TLS API, black-box unit tests are sufficient). +* Key slots (PSA API only). +* Key slots in a secure element (PSA SE HAL). +* Communication handles (PSA crypto service only). + +#### Storage + +Storage can fail, either due to hardware errors or to active attacks on trusted storage. How does the code cope if some storage accesses fail? + +We also need to test resilience: if the system is reset during an operation, does it restart in a correct state? + +#### Cleanup + +When code should clean up resources, how do we know that they have truly been cleaned up? + +* Zeroization of confidential data after use. +* Freeing memory. +* Freeing key slots. +* Freeing key slots in a secure element. +* Deleting files in storage (PSA API only). + +#### Internal data + +Sometimes it is useful to peek or poke internal data. + +* Check consistency of internal data (e.g. output of key generation). +* Check the format of files (which matters so that the product can still read old files after an upgrade). +* Inject faults and test corruption checks inside the product. + +## Possible approaches + +Key to requirement tables: + +* ++ requirement is fully met +* \+ requirement is mostly met +* ~ requirement is partially met but there are limitations +* ! requirement is somewhat problematic +* !! requirement is very problematic + +### Fine-grained public interfaces + +We can include all the features we want to test in the public interface. Then the tests can be truly black-box. The limitation of this approach is that this requires adding a lot of interfaces that are not useful in production. These interfaces have costs: they increase the code size, the attack surface, and the testing burden (exponentially, because we need to test all these interfaces in combination). + +As a rule, we do not add public interfaces solely for testing purposes. We only add public interfaces if they are also useful in production, at least sometimes. For example, the main purpose of `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free` is to clean up all resources in tests, but this is also useful in production in some applications that only want to use PSA Crypto during part of their lifetime. + +Mbed TLS traditionally has very fine-grained public interfaces, with many platform functions that can be substituted (`MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_xxx` macros). PSA Crypto has more opacity and less platform substitution macros. + +| Requirement | Analysis | +| ----------- | -------- | +| Coverage | ~ Many useful tests are not reasonably achievable | +| Correctness | ++ Ideal | +| Effacement | !! Requires adding many otherwise-useless interfaces | +| Portability | ++ Ideal; the additional interfaces may be useful for portability beyond testing | +| Maintainability | !! Combinatorial explosion on the testing burden | +| | ! Public interfaces must remain for backward compatibility even if the test architecture changes | + +### Fine-grained undocumented interfaces + +We can include all the features we want to test in undocumented interfaces. Undocumented interfaces are described in public headers for the sake of the C compiler, but are described as “do not use” in comments (or not described at all) and are not included in Doxygen-rendered documentation. This mitigates some of the downsides of [fine-grained public interfaces](#fine-grained-public-interfaces), but not all. In particular, the extra interfaces do increase the code size, the attack surface and the test surface. + +Mbed TLS traditionally has a few internal interfaces, mostly intended for cross-module abstraction leakage rather than for testing. For the PSA API, we favor [internal interfaces](#internal-interfaces). + +| Requirement | Analysis | +| ----------- | -------- | +| Coverage | ~ Many useful tests are not reasonably achievable | +| Correctness | ++ Ideal | +| Effacement | !! Requires adding many otherwise-useless interfaces | +| Portability | ++ Ideal; the additional interfaces may be useful for portability beyond testing | +| Maintainability | ! Combinatorial explosion on the testing burden | + +### Internal interfaces + +We can write tests that call internal functions that are not exposed in the public interfaces. This is nice when it works, because it lets us test the unchanged product without compromising the design of the public interface. + +A limitation is that these interfaces must exist in the first place. If they don't, this has mostly the same downside as public interfaces: the extra interfaces increase the code size and the attack surface for no direct benefit to the product. + +Another limitation is that internal interfaces need to be used correctly. We may accidentally rely on internal details in the tests that are not necessarily always true (for example that are platform-specific). We may accidentally use these internal interfaces in ways that don't correspond to the actual product. + +This approach is mostly portable since it only relies on C interfaces. A limitation is that the test-only interfaces must not be hidden at link time (but link-time hiding is not something we currently do). Another limitation is that this approach does not work for users who patch the library by replacing some modules; this is a secondary concern since we do not officially offer this as a feature. + +| Requirement | Analysis | +| ----------- | -------- | +| Coverage | ~ Many useful tests require additional internal interfaces | +| Correctness | + Does not require a product change | +| | ~ The tests may call internal functions in a way that does not reflect actual usage inside the product | +| Effacement | ++ Fine as long as the internal interfaces aren't added solely for test purposes | +| Portability | + Fine as long as we control how the tests are linked | +| | ~ Doesn't work if the users rewrite an internal module | +| Maintainability | + Tests interfaces that are documented; dependencies in the tests are easily noticed when changing these interfaces | + +### Static analysis + +If we guarantee certain properties through static analysis, we don't need to test them. This puts some constraints on the properties: + +* We need to have confidence in the specification (but we can gain this confidence by evaluating the specification on test data). +* This does not work for platform-dependent properties unless we have a formal model of the platform. + +| Requirement | Analysis | +| ----------- | -------- | +| Coverage | ~ Good for platform-independent properties, if we can guarantee them statically | +| Correctness | + Good as long as we have confidence in the specification | +| Effacement | ++ Zero impact on the code | +| Portability | ++ Zero runtime burden | +| Maintainability | ~ Static analysis is hard, but it's also helpful | + +### Compile-time options + +If there's code that we want to have in the product for testing, but not in production, we can add a compile-time option to enable it. This is very powerful and usually easy to use, but comes with a major downside: we aren't testing the same code anymore. + +| Requirement | Analysis | +| ----------- | -------- | +| Coverage | ++ Most things can be tested that way | +| Correctness | ! Difficult to ensure that what we test is what we run | +| Effacement | ++ No impact on the product when built normally or on the documentation, if done right | +| | ! Risk of getting “no impact” wrong | +| Portability | ++ It's just C code so it works everywhere | +| | ~ Doesn't work if the users rewrite an internal module | +| Maintainability | + Test interfaces impact the product source code, but at least they're clearly marked as such in the code | + +#### Guidelines for compile-time options + +* **Minimize the number of compile-time options.**
+ Either we're testing or we're not. Fine-grained options for testing would require more test builds, especially if combinatorics enters the play. +* **Merely enabling the compile-time option should not change the behavior.**
+ When building in test mode, the code should have exactly the same behavior. Changing the behavior should require some action at runtime (calling a function or changing a variable). +* **Minimize the impact on code**.
+ We should not have test-specific conditional compilation littered through the code, as that makes the code hard to read. + +### Runtime instrumentation + +Some properties can be tested through runtime instrumentation: have the compiler or a similar tool inject something into the binary. + +* Sanitizers check for certain bad usage patterns (ASan, MSan, UBSan, Valgrind). +* We can inject external libraries at link time. This can be a way to make system functions fail. + +| Requirement | Analysis | +| ----------- | -------- | +| Coverage | ! Limited scope | +| Correctness | + Instrumentation generally does not affect the program's functional behavior | +| Effacement | ++ Zero impact on the code | +| Portability | ~ Depends on the method | +| Maintainability | ~ Depending on the instrumentation, this may require additional builds and scripts | +| | + Many properties come for free, but some require effort (e.g. the test code itself must be leak-free to avoid false positives in a leak detector) | + +### Debugger-based testing + +If we want to do something in a test that the product isn't capable of doing, we can use a debugger to read or modify the memory, or hook into the code at arbitrary points. + +This is a very powerful approach, but it comes with limitations: + +* The debugger may introduce behavior changes (e.g. timing). If we modify data structures in memory, we may do so in a way that the code doesn't expect. +* Due to compiler optimizations, the memory may not have the layout that we expect. +* Writing reliable debugger scripts is hard. We need to have confidence that we're testing what we mean to test, even in the face of compiler optimizations. Languages such as gdb make it hard to automate even relatively simple things such as finding the place(s) in the binary corresponding to some place in the source code. +* Debugger scripts are very much non-portable. + +| Requirement | Analysis | +| ----------- | -------- | +| Coverage | ++ The sky is the limit | +| Correctness | ++ The code is unmodified, and tested as compiled (so we even detect compiler-induced bugs) | +| | ! Compiler optimizations may hinder | +| | ~ Modifying the execution may introduce divergence | +| Effacement | ++ Zero impact on the code | +| Portability | !! Not all environments have a debugger, and even if they do, we'd need completely different scripts for every debugger | +| Maintainability | ! Writing reliable debugger scripts is hard | +| | !! Very tight coupling with the details of the source code and even with the compiler | + +## Solutions + +This section lists some strategies that are currently used for invasive testing, or planned to be used. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. + +### Memory management + +#### Zeroization testing + +Goal: test that `mbedtls_platform_zeroize` does wipe the memory buffer. + +Solution ([debugger](#debugger-based-testing)): implemented in `tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb`. + +Rationale: this cannot be tested by adding C code, because the danger is that the compiler optimizes the zeroization away, and any C code that observes the zeroization would cause the compiler not to optimize it away. + +#### Memory cleanup + +Goal: test the absence of memory leaks. + +Solution ([instrumentation](#runtime-instrumentation)): run tests with ASan. (We also use Valgrind, but it's slower than ASan, so we favor ASan.) + +Since we run many test jobs with a memory leak detector, each test function or test program must clean up after itself. Use the cleanup code (after the `exit` label in test functions) to free any memory that the function may have allocated. + +#### Robustness against memory allocation failure + +Solution: TODO. We don't test this at all at this point. + +#### PSA key store memory cleanup + +Goal: test the absence of resource leaks in the PSA key store code, in particular that `psa_close_key` and `psa_destroy_key` work correctly. + +Solution ([internal interface](#internal-interfaces)): in most tests involving PSA functions, the cleanup code explicitly calls `PSA_DONE()` instead of `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free()`. `PSA_DONE` fails the test if the key store in memory is not empty. + +Note there must also be tests that call `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free` with keys still open, to verify that it does close all keys. + +`PSA_DONE` is a macro defined in `psa_crypto_helpers.h` which uses `mbedtls_psa_get_stats()` to get information about the keystore content before calling `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free()`. This feature is mostly but not exclusively useful for testing, and may be moved under `MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS`. + +### PSA storage + +#### PSA storage cleanup on success + +Goal: test that no stray files are left over in the key store after a test that succeeded. + +Solution: TODO. Currently the various test suites do it differently. + +#### PSA storage cleanup on failure + +Goal: ensure that no stray files are left over in the key store even if a test has failed (as that could cause other tests to fail). + +Solution: TODO. Currently the various test suites do it differently. + +#### PSA storage resilience + +Goal: test the resilience of PSA storage against power failures. + +Solution: TODO. + +See the [secure element driver interface test strategy](driver-interface-test-strategy.html) for more information. + +#### Corrupted storage + +Goal: test the robustness against corrupted storage. + +Solution ([internal interface](#internal-interfaces)): call `psa_its` functions to modify the storage. + +#### Storage read failure + +Goal: test the robustness against read errors. + +Solution: TODO + +#### Storage write failure + +Goal: test the robustness against write errors (`STORAGE_FAILURE` or `INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE`). + +Solution: TODO + +#### Storage format stability + +Goal: test that the storage format does not change between versions (or if it does, an upgrade path must be provided). + +Solution ([internal interface](#internal-interfaces)): call internal functions to inspect the content of the file. + +Note that the storage format is defined not only by the general layout, but also by the numerical values of encodings for key types and other metadata. For numerical values, there is a risk that we would accidentally modify a single value or a few values, so the tests should be exhaustive. This probably requires some compile-time analysis (perhaps the automation for `psa_constant_names` can be used here). TODO + +### Other fault injection + +#### PSA crypto init failure + +Goal: test the failure of `psa_crypto_init`. + +Solution ([compile-time option](#compile-time-options)): replace entropy initialization functions by functions that can fail. This is the only failure point for `psa_crypto_init` that is present in all builds. + +When we implement the PSA entropy driver interface, this should be reworked to use the entropy driver interface. + +#### PSA crypto data corruption + +The PSA crypto subsystem has a few checks to detect corrupted data in memory. We currently don't have a way to exercise those checks. + +Solution: TODO. To corrupt a multipart operation structure, we can do it by looking inside the structure content, but only when running without isolation. To corrupt the key store, we would need to add a function to the library or to use a debugger. + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/psa-storage-format-testing.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/psa-storage-format-testing.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5514dfab --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/psa-storage-format-testing.md @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +# Mbed TLS PSA keystore format stability testing strategy + +## Introduction + +The PSA crypto subsystem includes a persistent key store. It is possible to create a persistent key and read it back later. This must work even if Mbed TLS has been upgraded in the meantime (except for deliberate breaks in the backward compatibility of the storage). + +The goal of this document is to define a test strategy for the key store that not only validates that it's possible to load a key that was saved with the version of Mbed TLS under test, but also that it's possible to load a key that was saved with previous versions of Mbed TLS. + +Interoperability is not a goal: PSA crypto implementations are not intended to have compatible storage formats. Downgrading is not required to work. + +## General approach + +### Limitations of a direct approach + +The goal of storage format stability testing is: as a user of Mbed TLS, I want to store a key under version V and read it back under version W, with W ≥ V. + +Doing the testing this way would be difficult because we'd need to have version V of Mbed TLS available when testing version W. + +An alternative, semi-direct approach consists of generating test data under version V, and reading it back under version W. Done naively, this would require keeping a large amount of test data (full test coverage multiplied by the number of versions that we want to preserve backward compatibility with). + +### Save-and-compare approach + +Importing and saving a key is deterministic. Therefore we can ensure the stability of the storage format by creating test cases under a version V of Mbed TLS, where the test case parameters include both the parameters to pass to key creation and the expected state of the storage after the key is created. The test case creates a key as indicated by the parameters, then compares the actual state of the storage with the expected state. + +In addition, the test case also loads the key and checks that it has the expected data and metadata. Import-and-save testing and load-and-check testing can be split into separate test functions with the same payloads. + +If the test passes with version V, this means that the test data is consistent with what the implementation does. When the test later runs under version W ≥ V, it creates and reads back a storage state which is known to be identical to the state that V would have produced. Thus, this approach validates that W can read storage states created by V. + +Note that it is the combination of import-and-save passing on version V and load-and-check passing on version W with the same data that proves that version W can read back what version V wrote. From the perspective of a particular version of the library, the import-and-save tests guarantee forward compatibility while the load-and-check tests guarantee backward compatibility. + +Use a similar approach for files other than keys where possible and relevant. + +### Keeping up with storage format evolution + +Test cases should normally not be removed from the code base: if something has worked before, it should keep working in future versions, so we should keep testing it. + +This cannot be enforced solely by looking at a single version of Mbed TLS, since there would be no indication that more test cases used to exist. It can only be enforced through review of library changes. The review is be assisted by a tool that compares the old and the new version, which is implemented in `scripts/abi_check.py`. This tool fails the CI if load-and-check test case disappears (changed test cases are raised as false positives). + +If the way certain keys are stored changes, and we don't deliberately decide to stop supporting old keys (which should only be done by retiring a version of the storage format), then we should keep the corresponding test cases in load-only mode: create a file with the expected content, load it and check the data that it contains. + +## Storage architecture overview + +The PSA subsystem provides storage on top of the PSA trusted storage interface. The state of the storage is a mapping from file identifier (a 64-bit number) to file content (a byte array). These files include: + +* [Key files](#key-storage) (files containing one key's metadata and, except for some secure element keys, key material). +* The [random generator injected seed or state file](#random-generator-state) (`PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID`). +* [Storage transaction file](#storage-transaction-resumption). +* [Driver state files](#driver-state-files). + +For a more detailed description, refer to the [Mbed Crypto storage specification](../mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md). + +In addition, Mbed TLS includes an implementation of the PSA trusted storage interface on top of C stdio. This document addresses the test strategy for [PSA ITS over file](#psa-its-over-file) in a separate section below. + +## Key storage testing + +This section describes the desired test cases for keys created with the current storage format version. When the storage format changes, if backward compatibility is desired, old test data should be kept as described under [“Keeping up with storage format evolution”](#keeping-up-with-storage-format-evolution). + +### Keystore layout + +Objective: test that the key file name corresponds to the key identifier. + +Method: Create a key with a given identifier (using `psa_import_key`) and verify that a file with the expected name is created, and no other. Repeat for different identifiers. + +### General key format + +Objective: test the format of the key file: which field goes where and how big it is. + +Method: Create a key with certain metadata with `psa_import_key`. Read the file content and validate that it has the expected layout, deduced from the storage specification. Repeat with different metadata. Ensure that there are test cases covering all fields. + +### Enumeration of test cases for keys + +Objective: ensure that the coverage is sufficient to have assurance that all keys are stored correctly. This requires a sufficient selection of key types, sizes, policies, etc. + +In particular, the tests must validate that each `PSA_xxx` constant that is stored in a key is covered by at least one test case: + +* Lifetimes: `PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_xxx`, `PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_xxx`, `PSA_KEY_LOCATION_xxx`. +* Usage flags: `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx`. +* Algorithms in policies: `PSA_ALG_xxx`. +* Key types: `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx`, `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`, `PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx`. + +In addition, the coverage of key material must ensure that any variation in key representation is detected. See [“Considerations on key material representations”](#Considerations-on-key-material-representations) for considerations regarding key types. + +Method: Each test case creates a key with `psa_import_key`, purges it from memory, then reads it back and exercises it. + +Generate test cases automatically based on an enumeration of available constants and some knowledge of what attributes (sizes, algorithms, …) and content to use for keys of a certain type. + +### Testing with alternative lifetime values + +Objective: have test coverage for lifetimes other than the default persistent lifetime (`PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT`). + +Method: + +* For alternative locations: have tests conditional on the presence of a driver for that location. +* For alternative persistence levels: have load-and-check tests for supported persistence levels. We may also want to have negative tests ensuring that keys with a not-supported persistence level are not accidentally created. + +### Considerations on key material representations + +The risks of incompatibilities in key representations depends on the key type and on the presence of drivers. Compatibility of and with drivers is currently out of scope of this document. + +Some types only have one plausible representation. Others admit alternative plausible representations (different encodings, or non-canonical representations). +Here are some areas to watch for, with an identified risk of incompatibilities. + +* HMAC keys longer than the block size: pre-hashed or not? +* DES keys: was parity enforced? +* RSA keys: can invalid DER encodings (e.g. leading zeros, ignored sign bit) have been stored? +* RSA private keys: can invalid CRT parameters have been stored? +* Montgomery private keys: were they stored in masked form? + +## Random generator state + +TODO + +## Driver state files + +Not yet implemented. + +TODO + +## Storage transaction resumption + +Only relevant for secure element support. Not yet fully implemented. + +TODO + +## PSA ITS over file + +TODO diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/test-framework.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/test-framework.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c4178fa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/test-framework.md @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +# Mbed TLS test framework + +This document is an overview of the Mbed TLS test framework and test tools. + +This document is incomplete. You can help by expanding it. + +## Unit tests + +See + +### Unit test descriptions + +Each test case has a description which succinctly describes for a human audience what the test does. The first non-comment line of each paragraph in a `.data` file is the test description. The following rules and guidelines apply: + +* Test descriptions may not contain semicolons, line breaks and other control characters, or non-ASCII characters.
+ Rationale: keep the tools that process test descriptions (`generate_test_code.py`, [outcome file](#outcome-file) tools) simple. +* Test descriptions must be unique within a `.data` file. If you can't think of a better description, the convention is to append `#1`, `#2`, etc.
+ Rationale: make it easy to relate a failure log to the test data. Avoid confusion between cases in the [outcome file](#outcome-file). +* Test descriptions should be a maximum of **66 characters**.
+ Rationale: 66 characters is what our various tools assume (leaving room for 14 more characters on an 80-column line). Longer descriptions may be truncated or may break a visual alignment.
+ We have a lot of test cases with longer descriptions, but they should be avoided. At least please make sure that the first 66 characters describe the test uniquely. +* Make the description descriptive. “foo: x=2, y=4” is more descriptive than “foo #2”. “foo: 0**Note:** To generate a random key, use `psa_generate_key()` instead of `psa_generate_random()`. + +This example shows how to generate ten bytes of random data by calling `psa_generate_random()`: +```C + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t random[10] = { 0 }; + + printf("Generate random...\t"); + fflush(stdout); + + /* Initialize PSA Crypto */ + status = psa_crypto_init(); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to initialize PSA Crypto\n"); + return; + } + + status = psa_generate_random(random, sizeof(random)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to generate a random value\n"); + return; + } + + printf("Generated random data\n"); + + /* Clean up */ + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); +``` + +### Deriving a new key from an existing key + +Mbed Crypto provides a key derivation API that lets you derive new keys from +existing ones. The key derivation API has functions to take inputs, including +other keys and data, and functions to generate outputs, such as new keys or +other data. + +You must first initialize and set up a key derivation context, +provided with a key and, optionally, other data. Then, use the key derivation context to either read derived data to a buffer or send derived data directly to a key slot. + +See the documentation for the particular algorithm (such as HKDF or the TLS1.2 PRF) for +information about which inputs to pass when, and when you can obtain which outputs. + +**Prerequisites to working with the key derivation APIs:** +* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init()`. +* Use a key with the appropriate attributes set: + * Usage flags set for key derivation (`PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE`) + * Key type set to `PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE`. + * Algorithm set to a key derivation algorithm + (for example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)`). + +**To derive a new AES-CTR 128-bit encryption key into a given key slot using HKDF +with a given key, salt and info:** + +1. Set up the key derivation context using the `psa_key_derivation_setup()` +function, specifying the derivation algorithm `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)`. +1. Provide an optional salt with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`. +1. Provide info with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`. +1. Provide a secret with `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, referencing a key that + can be used for key derivation. +1. Set the key attributes desired for the new derived key. We'll set + the `PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT` usage flag and the `PSA_ALG_CTR` algorithm for this + example. +1. Derive the key by calling `psa_key_derivation_output_key()`. +1. Clean up the key derivation context. + +At this point, the derived key slot holds a new 128-bit AES-CTR encryption key +derived from the key, salt and info provided: +```C + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + static const unsigned char key[] = { + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b }; + static const unsigned char salt[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, + 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c }; + static const unsigned char info[] = { + 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, + 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9 }; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t derived_bits = 128; + size_t capacity = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(derived_bits); + psa_key_id_t base_key; + psa_key_id_t derived_key; + + printf("Derive a key (HKDF)...\t"); + fflush(stdout); + + /* Initialize PSA Crypto */ + status = psa_crypto_init(); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to initialize PSA Crypto\n"); + return; + } + + /* Import a key for use in key derivation. If such a key has already been + * generated or imported, you can skip this part. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE); + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, sizeof(key), &base_key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to import a key\n"); + return; + } + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + /* Derive a key */ + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to begin key derivation\n"); + return; + } + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(&operation, capacity); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to set capacity\n"); + return; + } + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + salt, sizeof(salt)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to input salt (extract)\n"); + return; + } + status = psa_key_derivation_input_key(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + base_key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to input key (extract)\n"); + return; + } + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + info, sizeof(info)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to input info (expand)\n"); + return; + } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_CTR); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 128); + status = psa_key_derivation_output_key(&attributes, &operation, + &derived_key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to derive key\n"); + return; + } + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + printf("Derived key\n"); + + /* Clean up key derivation operation */ + psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation); + + /* Destroy the keys */ + psa_destroy_key(derived_key); + psa_destroy_key(base_key); + + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); +``` + +### Authenticating and encrypting or decrypting a message + +Mbed Crypto provides a simple way to authenticate and encrypt with associated data (AEAD), supporting the `PSA_ALG_CCM` algorithm. + +**Prerequisites to working with the AEAD cipher APIs:** +* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init()`. +* The key attributes for the key used for derivation must have the `PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT` or `PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT` usage flags. + +This example shows how to authenticate and encrypt a message: +```C + psa_status_t status; + static const uint8_t key[] = { + 0xC0, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xC3, 0xC4, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0xC7, + 0xC8, 0xC9, 0xCA, 0xCB, 0xCC, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xCF }; + static const uint8_t nonce[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B }; + static const uint8_t additional_data[] = { + 0xEC, 0x46, 0xBB, 0x63, 0xB0, 0x25, + 0x20, 0xC3, 0x3C, 0x49, 0xFD, 0x70 }; + static const uint8_t input_data[] = { + 0xB9, 0x6B, 0x49, 0xE2, 0x1D, 0x62, 0x17, 0x41, + 0x63, 0x28, 0x75, 0xDB, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x92, 0x43, + 0xD2, 0xD7, 0xC2 }; + uint8_t *output_data = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + size_t tag_length = 16; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key_id; + + printf("Authenticate encrypt...\t"); + fflush(stdout); + + /* Initialize PSA Crypto */ + status = psa_crypto_init(); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to initialize PSA Crypto\n"); + return; + } + + output_size = sizeof(input_data) + tag_length; + output_data = (uint8_t *)malloc(output_size); + if (!output_data) { + printf("Out of memory\n"); + return; + } + + /* Import a key */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_CCM); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 128); + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, sizeof(key), &key_id); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + /* Authenticate and encrypt */ + status = psa_aead_encrypt(key_id, PSA_ALG_CCM, + nonce, sizeof(nonce), + additional_data, sizeof(additional_data), + input_data, sizeof(input_data), + output_data, output_size, + &output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to authenticate and encrypt\n"); + return; + } + + printf("Authenticated and encrypted\n"); + + /* Clean up */ + free(output_data); + + /* Destroy the key */ + psa_destroy_key(key_id); + + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); +``` + +This example shows how to authenticate and decrypt a message: + +```C + psa_status_t status; + static const uint8_t key_data[] = { + 0xC0, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xC3, 0xC4, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0xC7, + 0xC8, 0xC9, 0xCA, 0xCB, 0xCC, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xCF }; + static const uint8_t nonce[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B }; + static const uint8_t additional_data[] = { + 0xEC, 0x46, 0xBB, 0x63, 0xB0, 0x25, + 0x20, 0xC3, 0x3C, 0x49, 0xFD, 0x70 }; + static const uint8_t input_data[] = { + 0x20, 0x30, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xED, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x3C, 0xBA, 0xEE, + 0x0F, 0xC8, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xCD, 0x89, 0x54, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x3F, 0x28, 0x9A, + 0xA1, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0xB8, 0x09, 0xCD, 0x7C, 0xE1, 0x46, 0xE9, 0x98 }; + uint8_t *output_data = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key_id; + + printf("Authenticate decrypt...\t"); + fflush(stdout); + + /* Initialize PSA Crypto */ + status = psa_crypto_init(); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to initialize PSA Crypto\n"); + return; + } + + output_size = sizeof(input_data); + output_data = (uint8_t *)malloc(output_size); + if (!output_data) { + printf("Out of memory\n"); + return; + } + + /* Import a key */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_CCM); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, 128); + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key_data, sizeof(key_data), &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to import a key\n"); + return; + } + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + /* Authenticate and decrypt */ + status = psa_aead_decrypt(key_id, PSA_ALG_CCM, + nonce, sizeof(nonce), + additional_data, sizeof(additional_data), + input_data, sizeof(input_data), + output_data, output_size, + &output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to authenticate and decrypt %ld\n", status); + return; + } + + printf("Authenticated and decrypted\n"); + + /* Clean up */ + free(output_data); + + /* Destroy the key */ + psa_destroy_key(key_id); + + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); +``` + +### Generating and exporting keys + +Mbed Crypto provides a simple way to generate a key or key pair. + +**Prerequisites to using key generation and export APIs:** +* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init()`. + +**To generate an ECDSA key:** +1. Set the desired key attributes for key generation by calling + `psa_set_key_algorithm()` with the chosen ECDSA algorithm (such as + `PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)`). You only want to export the public key, not the key pair (or private key); therefore, do not set `PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT`. +1. Generate a key by calling `psa_generate_key()`. +1. Export the generated public key by calling `psa_export_public_key()`: +```C + enum { + key_bits = 256, + }; + psa_status_t status; + size_t exported_length = 0; + static uint8_t exported[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)]; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key_id; + + printf("Generate a key pair...\t"); + fflush(stdout); + + /* Initialize PSA Crypto */ + status = psa_crypto_init(); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to initialize PSA Crypto\n"); + return; + } + + /* Generate a key */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, + PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1)); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, key_bits); + status = psa_generate_key(&attributes, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to generate key\n"); + return; + } + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, exported, sizeof(exported), + &exported_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + printf("Failed to export public key %ld\n", status); + return; + } + + printf("Exported a public key\n"); + + /* Destroy the key */ + psa_destroy_key(key_id); + + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); +``` + +### More about the PSA Crypto API + +For more information about the PSA Crypto API, please see the [PSA Cryptography API Specification](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/index.html). diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/Makefile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c314640 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +PANDOC = pandoc + +default: all + +all_markdown = \ + psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md \ + psa-driver-developer-guide.md \ + psa-driver-integration-guide.md \ + psa-driver-interface.md \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +html: $(all_markdown:.md=.html) +pdf: $(all_markdown:.md=.pdf) +all: html pdf + +.SUFFIXES: +.SUFFIXES: .md .html .pdf + +.md.html: + $(PANDOC) -o $@ $< +.md.pdf: + $(PANDOC) -o $@ $< + +clean: + rm -f *.html *.pdf diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/README b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..09eae9ae --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/README @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +The documents in this directory are proposed specifications for Mbed +TLS features. They are not implemented yet, or only partially +implemented. Please follow activity on the `development` branch of +Mbed TLS if you are interested in these features. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2ddba7fb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +Conditional inclusion of cryptographic mechanism through the PSA API in Mbed TLS +================================================================================ + +This document is a proposed interface for deciding at build time which cryptographic mechanisms to include in the PSA Cryptography interface. + +This is currently a proposal for Mbed TLS. It is not currently on track for standardization in PSA. + +## Introduction + +### Purpose of this specification + +The [PSA Cryptography API specification](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/psa/#application-programming-interface) specifies the interface between a PSA Cryptography implementation and an application. The interface defines a number of categories of cryptographic algorithms (hashes, MAC, signatures, etc.). In each category, a typical implementation offers many algorithms (e.g. for signatures: RSA-PKCS#1v1.5, RSA-PSS, ECDSA). When building the implementation for a specific use case, it is often desirable to include only a subset of the available cryptographic mechanisms, primarily in order to reduce the code footprint of the compiled system. + +The present document proposes a way for an application using the PSA cryptography interface to declare which mechanisms it requires. + +### Conditional inclusion of legacy cryptography modules + +Mbed TLS offers a way to select which cryptographic mechanisms are included in a build through its configuration file (`config.h`). This mechanism is based on two main sets of symbols: `MBEDTLS_xxx_C` controls the availability of the mechanism to the application, and `MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT` controls the availability of an alternative implementation, so the software implementation is only included if `MBEDTLS_xxx_C` is defined but not `MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT`. + +### PSA evolution + +In the PSA cryptography interface, the **core** (built-in implementations of cryptographic mechanisms) can be augmented with drivers. **Transparent drivers** replace the built-in implementation of a cryptographic mechanism (or, with **fallback**, the built-in implementation is tried if the driver only has partial support for the mechanism). **Opaque drivers** implement cryptographic mechanisms on keys which are stored in a separate domain such as a secure element, for which the core only does key management and dispatch using wrapped key blobs or key identifiers. + +The current model is difficult to adapt to the PSA interface for several reasons. The `MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT` symbols are somewhat inconsistent, and in particular do not work well for asymmetric cryptography. For example, many parts of the ECC code have no `MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT` symbol, so a platform with ECC acceleration that can perform all ECDSA and ECDH operations in the accelerator would still embark the `bignum` module and large parts of the `ecp_curves`, `ecp` and `ecdsa` modules. Also the availability of a transparent driver for a mechanism does not translate directly to `MBEDTLS_xxx` symbols. + +### Requirements + +[Req.interface] The application can declare which cryptographic mechanisms it needs. + +[Req.inclusion] If the application does not require a mechanism, a suitably configured Mbed TLS build must not include it. The granularity of mechanisms must work for typical use cases and has [acceptable limitations](#acceptable-limitations). + +[Req.drivers] If a PSA driver is available in the build, a suitably configured Mbed TLS build must not include the corresponding software code (unless a software fallback is needed). + +[Req.c] The configuration mechanism consists of C preprocessor definitions, and the build does not require tools other than a C compiler. This is necessary to allow building an application and Mbed TLS in development environments that do not allow third-party tools. + +[Req.adaptability] The implementation of the mechanism must be adaptable with future evolution of the PSA cryptography specifications and Mbed TLS. Therefore the interface must remain sufficiently simple and abstract. + +### Acceptable limitations + +[Limitation.matrix] If a mechanism is defined by a combination of algorithms and key types, for example a block cipher mode (CBC, CTR, CFB, …) and a block permutation (AES, CAMELLIA, ARIA, …), there is no requirement to include only specific combinations. + +[Limitation.direction] For mechanisms that have multiple directions (for example encrypt/decrypt, sign/verify), there is no requirement to include only one direction. + +[Limitation.size] There is no requirement to include only support for certain key sizes. + +[Limitation.multipart] Where there are multiple ways to perform an operation, for example single-part and multi-part, there is no mechanism to select only one or a subset of the possible ways. + +## Interface + +### PSA Crypto configuration file + +The PSA Crypto configuration file `psa/crypto_config.h` defines a series of symbols of the form `PSA_WANT_xxx` where `xxx` describes the feature that the symbol enables. The symbols are documented in the section [“PSA Crypto configuration symbols”](#psa-crypto-configuration-symbols) below. + +The symbol `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` in `mbedtls/config.h` determines whether `psa/crypto_config.h` is used. + +* If `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` is unset, which is the default at least in Mbed TLS 2.x versions, things are as they are today: the PSA subsystem includes generic code unconditionally, and includes support for specific mechanisms conditionally based on the existing `MBEDTLS_xxx_` symbols. +* If `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` is set, the necessary software implementations of cryptographic algorithms are included based on both the content of the PSA Crypto configuration file and the Mbed TLS configuration file. For example, the code in `aes.c` is enabled if either `mbedtls/config.h` contains `MBEDTLS_AES_C` or `psa/crypto_config.h` contains `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES`. + +### PSA Crypto configuration symbols + +#### Configuration symbol syntax + +A PSA Crypto configuration symbol is a C preprocessor symbol whose name starts with `PSA_WANT_`. + +* If the symbol is not defined, the corresponding feature is not included. +* If the symbol is defined to a preprocessor expression with the value `1`, the corresponding feature is included. +* If the symbol is defined with a different value, the behavior is currently undefined and reserved for future use. + +#### Configuration symbol usage + +The presence of a symbol `PSA_WANT_xxx` in the Mbed TLS configuration determines whether a feature is available through the PSA API. These symbols should be used in any place that requires conditional compilation based on the availability of a cryptographic mechanism through the PSA API, including: + +* In Mbed TLS test code. +* In Mbed TLS library code using `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`, for example in TLS to determine which cipher suites to enable. +* In application code that provides additional features based on cryptographic capabilities, for example additional key parsing and formatting functions, or cipher suite availability for network protocols. + +#### Configuration symbol semantics + +If a feature is not requested for inclusion in the PSA Crypto configuration file, it may still be included in the build, either because the feature has been requested in some other way, or because the library does not support the exclusion of this feature. Mbed TLS should make a best effort to support the exclusion of all features, but in some cases this may be judged too much effort for too little benefit. + +#### Configuration symbols for key types + +For each constant or constructor macro of the form `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx`, the symbol **`PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx`** indicates that support for this key type is desired. + +For asymmetric cryptography, `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR` determines whether private-key operations are desired, and `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_PUBLIC_KEY` determines whether public-key operations are desired. `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR` implicitly enables `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_PUBLIC_KEY`: there is no way to only include private-key operations (which typically saves little code). + +#### Configuration symbols for elliptic curves + +For elliptic curve key types, only the specified curves are included. To include a curve, include a symbol of the form **`PSA_WANT_ECC_family_size`**. For example: `PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256` for secp256r1, `PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255` for Curve25519. It is an error to require an ECC key type but no curve, and Mbed TLS will reject this at compile time. + +Rationale: this is a deviation of the general principle that `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` would have a corresponding symbol `PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`. This deviation is justified by the fact that it is very common to wish to include only certain curves in a family, and that can lead to a significant gain in code size. + +#### Configuration symbols for Diffie-Hellman groups + +There are no configuration symbols for Diffie-Hellman groups (`PSA_DH_GROUP_xxx`). + +Rationale: Finite-field Diffie-Hellman code is usually not specialized for any particular group, so reducing the number of available groups at compile time only saves a little code space. Constrained implementations tend to omit FFDH anyway, so the small code size gain is not important. + +#### Configuration symbols for algorithms + +For each constant or constructor macro of the form `PSA_ALG_xxx`, the symbol **`PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx`** indicates that support for this algorithm is desired. + +For parametrized algorithms, the `PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx` symbol indicates whether the base mechanism is supported. Parameters must themselves be included through their own `PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx` symbols. It is an error to include a base mechanism without at least one possible parameter, and Mbed TLS will reject this at compile time. For example, `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA` requires the inclusion of randomized ECDSA for all hash algorithms whose corresponding symbol `PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx` is enabled. + +## Implementation + +### Additional non-public symbols + +#### Accounting for transparent drivers + +In addition to the [configuration symbols](#psa-crypto-configuration-symbols), we need two parallel or mostly parallel sets of symbols: + +* **`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_xxx`** indicates whether a fully-featured, fallback-free transparent driver is available. +* **`MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_xxx`** indicates whether the software implementation is needed. + +`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_xxx` is one of the outputs of the transpilation of a driver description, alongside the glue code for calling the drivers. + +`MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_xxx` is enabled when `PSA_WANT_xxx` is enabled and `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_xxx` is disabled. + +These symbols are not part of the public interface of Mbed TLS towards applications or to drivers, regardless of whether the symbols are actually visible. + +### Architecture of symbol definitions + +#### New-style definition of configuration symbols + +When `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` is set, the header file `mbedtls/config.h` needs to define all the `MBEDTLS_xxx_C` configuration symbols, including the ones deduced from the PSA Crypto configuration. It does this by including the new header file **`mbedtls/config_psa.h`**, which defines the `MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_xxx` symbols and deduces the corresponding `MBEDTLS_xxx_C` (and other) symbols. + +`mbedtls/config_psa.h` includes `psa/crypto_config.h`, the user-editable file that defines application requirements. + +#### Old-style definition of configuration symbols + +When `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` is not set, the configuration of Mbed TLS works as before, and the inclusion of non-PSA code only depends on `MBEDTLS_xxx` symbols defined (or not) in `mbedtls/config.h`. Furthermore, the new header file **`mbedtls/config_psa.h`** deduces PSA configuration symbols (`PSA_WANT_xxx`, `MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_xxx`) from classic configuration symbols (`MBEDTLS_xxx`). + +The `PSA_WANT_xxx` definitions in `mbedtls/config_psa.h` are needed not only to build the PSA parts of the library, but also to build code that uses these parts. This includes structure definitions in `psa/crypto_struct.h`, size calculations in `psa/crypto_sizes.h`, and application code that's specific to a given cryptographic mechanism. In Mbed TLS itself, code under `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` and conditional compilation guards in tests and sample programs need `PSA_WANT_xxx`. + +Since some existing applications use a handwritten `mbedtls/config.h` or an edited copy of `mbedtls/config.h` from an earlier version of Mbed TLS, `mbedtls/config_psa.h` must be included via an already existing header that is not `mbedtls/config.h`, so it is included via `psa/crypto.h` (for example from `psa/crypto_platform.h`). + +#### Summary of definitions of configuration symbols + +Whether `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` is set or not, `mbedtls/config_psa.h` includes `mbedtls/crypto_drivers.h`, a header file generated by the transpilation of the driver descriptions. It defines `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_xxx` symbols according to the availability of transparent drivers without fallback. + +The following table summarizes where symbols are defined depending on the configuration mode. + +* (U) indicates a symbol that is defined by the user (application). +* (D) indicates a symbol that is deduced from other symbols by code that ships with Mbed TLS. +* (G) indicates a symbol that is generated from driver descriptions. + +| Symbols | With `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` | Without `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` | +| ------------------------- | -------------------------------- | ----------------------------------- | +| `MBEDTLS_xxx_C` | `mbedtls/config.h` (U) or | `mbedtls/config.h` (U) | +| | `mbedtls/config_psa.h` (D) | | +| `PSA_WANT_xxx` | `psa/crypto_config.h` (U) | `mbedtls/config_psa.h` (D) | +| `MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_xxx` | `mbedtls/config_psa.h` (D) | `mbedtls/config_psa.h` (D) | +| `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_xxx` | `mbedtls/crypto_drivers.h` (G) | N/A | + +#### Visibility of internal symbols + +Ideally, the `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_xxx` and `MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_xxx` symbols should not be visible to application code or driver code, since they are not part of the public interface of the library. However these symbols are needed to deduce whether to include library modules (for example `MBEDTLS_AES_C` has to be enabled if `MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES` is enabled), which makes it difficult to keep them private. + +#### Compile-time checks + +The header file **`library/psa_check_config.h`** applies sanity checks to the configuration, throwing `#error` if something is wrong. + +A mechanism similar to `mbedtls/check_config.h` detects errors such as enabling ECDSA but no curve. + +Since configuration symbols must be undefined or 1, any other value should trigger an `#error`. + +#### Automatic generation of preprocessor symbol manipulations + +A lot of the preprocessor symbol manipulation is systematic calculations that analyze the configuration. `mbedtls/config_psa.h` and `library/psa_check_config.h` should be generated automatically, in the same manner as `version_features.c`. + +### Structure of PSA Crypto library code + +#### Conditional inclusion of library entry points + +An entry point can be eliminated entirely if no algorithm requires it. + +#### Conditional inclusion of mechanism-specific code + +Code that is specific to certain key types or to certain algorithms must be guarded by the applicable symbols: `PSA_WANT_xxx` for code that is independent of the application, and `MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_xxx` for code that calls an Mbed TLS software implementation. + +## PSA standardization + +### JSON configuration mechanism + +At the time of writing, the preferred configuration mechanism for a PSA service is in JSON syntax. The translation from JSON to build instructions is not specified by PSA. + +For PSA Crypto, the preferred configuration mechanism would be similar to capability specifications of transparent drivers. The same JSON properties that are used to mean “this driver can perform that mechanism” in a driver description would be used to mean “the application wants to perform that mechanism” in the application configuration. + +### From JSON to C + +The JSON capability language allows a more fine-grained selection than the C mechanism proposed here. For example, it allows requesting only single-part mechanisms, only certain key sizes, or only certain combinations of algorithms and key types. + +The JSON capability language can be translated approximately to the boolean symbol mechanism proposed here. The approximation considers a feature to be enabled if any part of it is enabled. For example, if there is a capability for AES-CTR and one for CAMELLIA-GCM, the translation to boolean symbols will also include AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-CTR. If there is a capability for AES-128, the translation will also include AES-192 and AES-256. + +The boolean symbol mechanism proposed here can be translated to a list of JSON capabilities: for each included algorithm, include a capability with that algorithm, the key types that apply to that algorithm, no size restriction, and all the entry points that apply to that algorithm. + +## Open questions + +### Open questions about the interface + +#### Naming of symbols + +The names of [elliptic curve symbols](#configuration-symbols-for-elliptic-curves) are a bit weird: `SECP_R1_256` instead of `SECP256R1`, `MONTGOMERY_255` instead of `CURVE25519`. Should we make them more classical, but less systematic? + +#### Impossible combinations + +What does it mean to have `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA` enabled but with only Curve25519? Is it a mandatory error? + +#### Diffie-Hellman + +Way to request only specific groups? Not a priority: constrained devices don't do FFDH. Specify it as may change in future versions. + +#### Coexistence with the current Mbed TLS configuration + +The two mechanisms have very different designs. Is there serious potential for confusion? Do we understand how the combinations work? + +### Open questions about the design + +#### Algorithms without a key type or vice versa + +Is it realistic to mandate a compile-time error if a key type is required, but no matching algorithm, or vice versa? Is it always the right thing, for example if there is an opaque driver that manipulates this key type? + +#### Opaque-only mechanisms + +If a mechanism should only be supported in an opaque driver, what does the core need to know about it? Do we have all the information we need? + +This is especially relevant to suppress a mechanism completely if there is no matching algorithm. For example, if there is no transparent implementation of RSA or ECDSA, `psa_sign_hash` and `psa_verify_hash` may still be needed if there is an opaque signature driver. + +### Open questions about the implementation + +#### Testability + +Is this proposal decently testable? There are a lot of combinations. What combinations should we test? + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-developer-guide.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-developer-guide.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70cb9d39 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-developer-guide.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +PSA Cryptoprocessor driver developer's guide +============================================ + +**This is a specification of work in progress. The implementation is not yet merged into Mbed TLS.** + +This document describes how to write drivers of cryptoprocessors such as accelerators and secure elements for the PSA cryptography subsystem of Mbed TLS. + +This document focuses on behavior that is specific to Mbed TLS. For a reference of the interface between Mbed TLS and drivers, refer to the [PSA Cryptoprocessor Driver Interface specification](psa-driver-interface.html). + +The interface is not fully implemented in Mbed TLS yet and is disabled by default. You can enable the experimental work in progress by setting `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` in the compile-time configuration. Please note that the interface may still change: until further notice, we do not guarantee backward compatibility with existing driver code when `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` is enabled. + +## Introduction + +### Purpose + +The PSA cryptography driver interface provides a way to build Mbed TLS with additional code that implements certain cryptographic primitives. This is primarily intended to support platform-specific hardware. + +There are two types of drivers: + +* **Transparent** drivers implement cryptographic operations on keys that are provided in cleartext at the beginning of each operation. They are typically used for hardware **accelerators**. When a transparent driver is available for a particular combination of parameters (cryptographic algorithm, key type and size, etc.), it is used instead of the default software implementation. Transparent drivers can also be pure software implementations that are distributed as plug-ins to a PSA Crypto implementation. +* **Opaque** drivers implement cryptographic operations on keys that can only be used inside a protected environment such as a **secure element**, a hardware security module, a smartcard, a secure enclave, etc. An opaque driver is invoked for the specific key location that the driver is registered for: the dispatch is based on the key's lifetime. + +### Deliverables for a driver + +To write a driver, you need to implement some functions with C linkage, and to declare these functions in a **driver description file**. The driver description file declares which functions the driver implements and what cryptographic mechanisms they support. Depending on the driver type, you may also need to define some C types and macros in a header file. + +The concrete syntax for a driver description file is JSON. The structure of this JSON file is specified in the section [“Driver description syntax”](psa-driver-interface.html#driver-description-syntax) of the PSA cryptography driver interface specification. + +A driver therefore consists of: + +* A driver description file (in JSON format). +* C header files defining the types required by the driver description. The names of these header files is declared in the driver description file. +* An object file compiled for the target platform defining the functions required by the driver description. Implementations may allow drivers to be provided as source files and compiled with the core instead of being pre-compiled. + +## Driver C interfaces + +Mbed TLS calls driver entry points [as specified in the PSA Cryptography Driver Interface specification](psa-driver-interface.html#driver-entry-points) except as otherwise indicated in this section. + +## Building and testing your driver + + + +## Dependencies on the Mbed TLS configuration + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-integration-guide.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-integration-guide.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bfd765ea --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-integration-guide.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +Building Mbed TLS with PSA cryptoprocessor drivers +================================================== + +**This is a specification of work in progress. The implementation is not yet merged into Mbed TLS.** + +This document describes how to build Mbed TLS with additional cryptoprocessor drivers that follow the PSA cryptoprocessor driver interface. + +The interface is not fully implemented in Mbed TLS yet and is disabled by default. You can enable the experimental work in progress by setting `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` in the compile-time configuration. Please note that the interface may still change: until further notice, we do not guarantee backward compatibility with existing driver code when `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` is enabled. + +## Introduction + +The PSA cryptography driver interface provides a way to build Mbed TLS with additional code that implements certain cryptographic primitives. This is primarily intended to support platform-specific hardware. + +Note that such drivers are only available through the PSA cryptography API (crypto functions beginning with `psa_`, and X.509 and TLS interfaces that reference PSA types). + +Concretely speaking, a driver consists of one or more **driver description files** in JSON format and some code to include in the build. The driver code can either be provided in binary form as additional object file to link, or in source form. + +## How to build Mbed TLS with drivers + +To build Mbed TLS with drivers: + +1. Activate `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS` in the library configuration. + + ``` + cd /path/to/mbedtls + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + ``` + +2. Pass the driver description files through the Make variable `PSA_DRIVERS` when building the library. + + ``` + cd /path/to/mbedtls + make PSA_DRIVERS="/path/to/acme/driver.json /path/to/nadir/driver.json" lib + ``` + +3. Link your application with the implementation of the driver functions. + + ``` + cd /path/to/application + ld myapp.o -L/path/to/acme -lacmedriver -L/path/to/nadir -lnadirdriver -L/path/to/mbedtls -lmbedcrypto + ``` + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..23274c74 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md @@ -0,0 +1,1002 @@ +PSA Cryptoprocessor Driver Interface +==================================== + +This document describes an interface for cryptoprocessor drivers in the PSA cryptography API. This interface complements the [PSA Cryptography API specification](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/psa/#application-programming-interface), which describes the interface between a PSA Cryptography implementation and an application. + +This specification is work in progress and should be considered to be in a beta stage. There is ongoing work to implement this interface in Mbed TLS, which is the reference implementation of the PSA Cryptography API. At this stage, Arm does not expect major changes, but minor changes are expected based on experience from the first implementation and on external feedback. + +## Introduction + +### Purpose of the driver interface + +The PSA Cryptography API defines an interface that allows applications to perform cryptographic operations in a uniform way regardless of how the operations are performed. Under the hood, different keys may be stored and used in different hardware or in different logical partitions, and different algorithms may involve different hardware or software components. + +The driver interface allows implementations of the PSA Cryptography API to be built compositionally. An implementation of the PSA Cryptography API is composed of a **core** and zero or more **drivers**. The core handles key management, enforces key usage policies, and dispatches cryptographic operations either to the applicable driver or to built-in code. + +Functions in the PSA Cryptography API invoke functions in the core. Code from the core calls drivers as described in the present document. + +### Types of drivers + +The PSA Cryptography driver interface supports two types of cryptoprocessors, and accordingly two types of drivers. + +* **Transparent** drivers implement cryptographic operations on keys that are provided in cleartext at the beginning of each operation. They are typically used for hardware **accelerators**. When a transparent driver is available for a particular combination of parameters (cryptographic algorithm, key type and size, etc.), it is used instead of the default software implementation. Transparent drivers can also be pure software implementations that are distributed as plug-ins to a PSA Cryptography implementation (for example, an alternative implementation with different performance characteristics, or a certified implementation). +* **Opaque** drivers implement cryptographic operations on keys that can only be used inside a protected environment such as a **secure element**, a hardware security module, a smartcard, a secure enclave, etc. An opaque driver is invoked for the specific [key location](#lifetimes-and-locations) that the driver is registered for: the dispatch is based on the key's lifetime. + +### Requirements + +The present specification was designed to fulfill the following high-level requirements. + +[Req.plugins] It is possible to combine multiple drivers from different providers into the same implementation, without any prior arrangement other than choosing certain names and values from disjoint namespaces. + +[Req.compile] It is possible to compile the code of each driver and of the core separately, and link them together. A small amount of glue code may need to be compiled once the list of drivers is available. + +[Req.types] Support drivers for the following types of hardware: accelerators that operate on keys in cleartext; cryptoprocessors that can wrap keys with a built-in keys but not store user keys; and cryptoprocessors that store key material. + +[Req.portable] The interface between drivers and the core does not involve any platform-specific consideration. Driver calls are simple C function calls. Interactions with platform-specific hardware happen only inside the driver (and in fact a driver need not involve any hardware at all). + +[Req.location] Applications can tell which location values correspond to which secure element drivers. + +[Req.fallback] Accelerator drivers can specify that they do not fully support a cryptographic mechanism and that a fallback to core code may be necessary. Conversely, if an accelerator fully supports cryptographic mechanism, the core must be able to omit code for this mechanism. + +[Req.mechanisms] Drivers can specify which mechanisms they support. A driver's code will not be invoked for cryptographic mechanisms that it does not support. + +## Overview of drivers + +### Deliverables for a driver + +To write a driver, you need to implement some functions with C linkage, and to declare these functions in a **driver description file**. The driver description file declares which functions the driver implements and what cryptographic mechanisms they support. If the driver description references custom types, macros or constants, you also need to provide C header files defining those elements. + +The concrete syntax for a driver description file is JSON. The structure of this JSON file is specified in the section [“Driver description syntax”](#driver-description-syntax). + +A driver therefore consists of: + +* A driver description file (in JSON format). +* C header files defining the types required by the driver description. The names of these header files are declared in the driver description file. +* An object file compiled for the target platform defining the entry point functions specified by the driver description. Implementations may allow drivers to be provided as source files and compiled with the core instead of being pre-compiled. + +How to provide the driver description file, the C header files and the object code is implementation-dependent. + +### Driver description syntax + +The concrete syntax for a driver description file is JSON. + +#### Driver description list + +PSA Cryptography core implementations should support multiple drivers. The driver description files are passed to the implementation as an ordered list in an unspecified manner. This may be, for example, a list of file names passed on a command line, or a JSON list whose elements are individual driver descriptions. + +#### Driver description top-level element + +A driver description is a JSON object containing the following properties: + +* `"prefix"` (mandatory, string). This must be a valid prefix for a C identifier. All the types and functions provided by the driver have a name that starts with this prefix unless overridden with a `"name"` element in the applicable capability as described below. +* `"type"` (mandatory, string). One of `"transparent"` or `"opaque"`. +* `"headers"` (optional, array of strings). A list of header files. These header files must define the types, macros and constants referenced by the driver description. They may declare the entry point functions, but this is not required. They may include other PSA headers and standard headers of the platform. Whether they may include other headers is implementation-specific. If omitted, the list of headers is empty. The header files must be present at the specified location relative to a directory on the compiler's include path when compiling glue code between the core and the drivers. +* `"capabilities"` (mandatory, array of [capabilities](#driver-description-capability)). +A list of **capabilities**. Each capability describes a family of functions that the driver implements for a certain class of cryptographic mechanisms. +* `"key_context"` (not permitted for transparent drivers, mandatory for opaque drivers): information about the [representation of keys](#key-format-for-opaque-drivers). +* `"persistent_state_size"` (not permitted for transparent drivers, optional for opaque drivers, integer or string). The size in bytes of the [persistent state of the driver](#opaque-driver-persistent-state). This may be either a non-negative integer or a C constant expression of type `size_t`. +* `"location"` (not permitted for transparent drivers, optional for opaque drivers, integer or string). The [location value](#lifetimes-and-locations) for which this driver is invoked. In other words, this determines the lifetimes for which the driver is invoked. This may be either a non-negative integer or a C constant expression of type `psa_key_location_t`. + +### Driver description capability + +#### Capability syntax + +A capability declares a family of functions that the driver implements for a certain class of cryptographic mechanisms. The capability specifies which key types and algorithms are covered and the names of the types and functions that implement it. + +A capability is a JSON object containing the following properties: + +* `"entry_points"` (mandatory, list of strings). Each element is the name of a [driver entry point](#driver-entry-points) or driver entry point family. An entry point is a function defined by the driver. If specified, the core will invoke this capability of the driver only when performing one of the specified operations. The driver must implement all the specified entry points, as well as the types if applicable. +* `"algorithms"` (optional, list of strings). Each element is an [algorithm specification](#algorithm-specifications). If specified, the core will invoke this capability of the driver only when performing one of the specified algorithms. If omitted, the core will invoke this capability for all applicable algorithms. +* `"key_types"` (optional, list of strings). Each element is a [key type specification](#key-type-specifications). If specified, the core will invoke this capability of the driver only for operations involving a key with one of the specified key types. If omitted, the core will invoke this capability of the driver for all applicable key types. +* `"key_sizes"` (optional, list of integers). If specified, the core will invoke this capability of the driver only for operations involving a key with one of the specified key sizes. If omitted, the core will invoke this capability of the driver for all applicable key sizes. Key sizes are expressed in bits. +* `"names"` (optional, object). A mapping from entry point names described by the `"entry_points"` property, to the name of the C function in the driver that implements the corresponding function. If a function is not listed here, name of the driver function that implements it is the driver's prefix followed by an underscore (`_`) followed by the function name. If this property is omitted, it is equivalent to an empty object (so each entry point *suffix* is implemented by a function called *prefix*`_`*suffix*). +* `"fallback"` (optional for transparent drivers, not permitted for opaque drivers, boolean). If present and true, the driver may return `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`, in which case the core should call another driver or use built-in code to perform this operation. If absent or false, the driver is expected to fully support the mechanisms described by this capability. See the section “[Fallback](#fallback)” for more information. + +#### Capability semantics + +When the PSA Cryptography implementation performs a cryptographic mechanism, it invokes available driver entry points as described in the section [“Driver entry points”](#driver-entry-points). + +A driver is considered available for a cryptographic mechanism that invokes a given entry point if all of the following conditions are met: + +* The driver specification includes a capability whose `"entry_points"` list either includes the entry point or includes an entry point family that includes the entry point. +* If the mechanism involves an algorithm: + * either the capability does not have an `"algorithms"` property; + * or the value of the capability's `"algorithms"` property includes an [algorithm specification](#algorithm-specifications) that matches this algorithm. +* If the mechanism involves a key: + * either the key is transparent (its location is `PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE`) and the driver is transparent; + * or the key is opaque (its location is not `PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE`) and the driver is an opaque driver whose location is the key's location. +* If the mechanism involves a key: + * either the capability does not have a `"key_types"` property; + * or the value of the capability's `"key_types"` property includes a [key type specification](#key-type-specifications) that matches this algorithm. +* If the mechanism involves a key: + * either the capability does not have a `"key_sizes"` property; + * or the value of the capability's `"key_sizes"` property includes the key's size. + +If a driver includes multiple applicable capabilities for a given combination of entry point, algorithm, key type and key size, and all the capabilities map the entry point to the same function name, the driver is considered available for this cryptographic mechanism. If a driver includes multiple applicable capabilities for a given combination of entry point, algorithm, key type and key size, and at least two of these capabilities map the entry point to the different function names, the driver specification is invalid. + +If multiple transparent drivers have applicable capabilities for a given combination of entry point, algorithm, key type and key size, the first matching driver in the [specification list](#driver-description-list) is invoked. If the capability has [fallback](#fallback) enabled and the first driver returns `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`, the next matching driver is invoked, and so on. + +If multiple opaque drivers have the same location, the list of driver specifications is invalid. + +#### Capability examples + +Example 1: the following capability declares that the driver can perform deterministic ECDSA signatures (but not signature verification) using any hash algorithm and any curve that the core supports. If the prefix of this driver is `"acme"`, the function that performs the signature is called `acme_sign_hash`. +``` +{ + "entry_points": ["sign_hash"], + "algorithms": ["PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)"], +} +``` + +Example 2: the following capability declares that the driver can perform deterministic ECDSA signatures using SHA-256 or SHA-384 with a SECP256R1 or SECP384R1 private key (with either hash being possible in combination with either curve). If the prefix of this driver is `"acme"`, the function that performs the signature is called `acme_sign_hash`. +``` +{ + "entry_points": ["sign_hash"], + "algorithms": ["PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)", + "PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)"], + "key_types": ["PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1)"], + "key_sizes": [256, 384] +} +``` + +### Algorithm and key specifications + +#### Algorithm specifications + +An algorithm specification is a string consisting of a `PSA_ALG_xxx` macro that specifies a cryptographic algorithm or an algorithm wildcard policy defined by the PSA Cryptography API. If the macro takes arguments, the string must have the syntax of a C macro call and each argument must be an algorithm specification or a decimal or hexadecimal literal with no suffix, depending on the expected type of argument. + +Spaces are optional after commas. Whether other whitespace is permitted is implementation-specific. + +Valid examples: +``` +PSA_ALG_SHA_256 +PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)) +PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) +``` + +#### Key type specifications + +An algorithm specification is a string consisting of a `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx` macro that specifies a key type defined by the PSA Cryptography API. If the macro takes an argument, the string must have the syntax of a C macro call and each argument must be the name of a constant of suitable type (curve or group). + +The name `_` may be used instead of a curve or group to indicate that the capability concerns all curves or groups. + +Valid examples: +``` +PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES +PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) +PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(_) +``` + +### Driver entry points + +#### Overview of driver entry points + +Drivers define functions, each of which implements an aspect of a capability of a driver, such as a cryptographic operation, a part of a cryptographic operation, or a key management action. These functions are called the **entry points** of the driver. Most driver entry points correspond to a particular function in the PSA Cryptography API. For example, if a call to `psa_sign_hash()` is dispatched to a driver, it invokes the driver's `sign_hash` function. + +All driver entry points return a status of type `psa_status_t` which should use the status codes documented for PSA services in general and for PSA Cryptography in particular: `PSA_SUCCESS` indicates that the function succeeded, and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` values indicate that an error occurred. + +The signature of a driver entry point generally looks like the signature of the PSA Cryptography API that it implements, with some modifications. This section gives an overview of modifications that apply to whole classes of entry points. Refer to the reference section for each entry point or entry point family for details. + +* For entry points that operate on an existing key, the `psa_key_id_t` parameter is replaced by a sequence of three parameters that describe the key: + 1. `const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes`: the key attributes. + 2. `const uint8_t *key_buffer`: a key material or key context buffer. + 3. `size_t key_buffer_size`: the size of the key buffer in bytes. + + For transparent drivers, the key buffer contains the key material, in the same format as defined for `psa_export_key()` and `psa_export_public_key()` in the PSA Cryptography API. For opaque drivers, the content of the key buffer is entirely up to the driver. + +* For entry points that involve a multi-part operation, the operation state type (`psa_XXX_operation_t`) is replaced by a driver-specific operation state type (*prefix*`_XXX_operation_t`). + +* For entry points that are involved in key creation, the `psa_key_id_t *` output parameter is replaced by a sequence of parameters that convey the key context: + 1. `uint8_t *key_buffer`: a buffer for the key material or key context. + 2. `size_t key_buffer_size`: the size of the key buffer in bytes. + 2. `size_t *key_buffer_length`: the length of the data written to the key buffer in bytes. + +Some entry points are grouped in families that must be implemented as a whole. If a driver supports an entry point family, it must provide all the entry points in the family. + +Drivers can also have entry points related to random generation. A transparent driver can provide a [random generation interface](#random-generation-entry-points). Separately, transparent and opaque drivers can have [entropy collection entry points](#entropy-collection-entry-point). + +#### General considerations on driver entry point parameters + +Buffer parameters for driver entry points obey the following conventions: + +* An input buffer has the type `const uint8_t *` and is immediately followed by a parameter of type `size_t` that indicates the buffer size. +* An output buffer has the type `uint8_t *` and is immediately followed by a parameter of type `size_t` that indicates the buffer size. A third parameter of type `size_t *` is provided to report the actual length of the data written in the buffer if the function succeeds. +* An in-out buffer has the type `uint8_t *` and is immediately followed by a parameter of type `size_t` that indicates the buffer size. In-out buffers are only used when the input and the output have the same length. + +Buffers of size 0 may be represented with either a null pointer or a non-null pointer. + +Input buffers and other input-only parameters (`const` pointers) may be in read-only memory. Overlap is possible between input buffers, and between an input buffer and an output buffer, but not between two output buffers or between a non-buffer parameter and another parameter. + +#### Driver entry points for single-part cryptographic operations + +The following driver entry points perform a cryptographic operation in one shot (single-part operation): + +* `"hash_compute"` (transparent drivers only): calculation of a hash. Called by `psa_hash_compute()` and `psa_hash_compare()`. To verify a hash with `psa_hash_compare()`, the core calls the driver's `"hash_compute"` entry point and compares the result with the reference hash value. +* `"mac_compute"`: calculation of a MAC. Called by `psa_mac_compute()` and possibly `psa_mac_verify()`. To verify a mac with `psa_mac_verify()`, the core calls an applicable driver's `"mac_verify"` entry point if there is one, otherwise the core calls an applicable driver's `"mac_compute"` entry point and compares the result with the reference MAC value. +* `"mac_verify"`: verification of a MAC. Called by `psa_mac_verify()`. This entry point is mainly useful for drivers of secure elements that verify a MAC without revealing the correct MAC. Although transparent drivers may implement this entry point in addition to `"mac_compute"`, it is generally not useful because the core can call the `"mac_compute"` entry point and compare with the expected MAC value. +* `"cipher_encrypt"`: unauthenticated symmetric cipher encryption. Called by `psa_cipher_encrypt()`. +* `"cipher_decrypt"`: unauthenticated symmetric cipher decryption. Called by `psa_cipher_decrypt()`. +* `"aead_encrypt"`: authenticated encryption with associated data. Called by `psa_aead_encrypt()`. +* `"aead_decrypt"`: authenticated decryption with associated data. Called by `psa_aead_decrypt()`. +* `"asymmetric_encrypt"`: asymmetric encryption. Called by `psa_asymmetric_encrypt()`. +* `"asymmetric_decrypt"`: asymmetric decryption. Called by `psa_asymmetric_decrypt()`. +* `"sign_hash"`: signature of an already calculated hash. Called by `psa_sign_hash()` and possibly `psa_sign_message()`. To sign a message with `psa_sign_message()`, the core calls an applicable driver's `"sign_message"` entry point if there is one, otherwise the core calls an applicable driver's `"hash_compute"` entry point followed by an applicable driver's `"sign_hash"` entry point. +* `"verify_hash"`: verification of an already calculated hash. Called by `psa_verify_hash()` and possibly `psa_verify_message()`. To verify a message with `psa_verify_message()`, the core calls an applicable driver's `"verify_message"` entry point if there is one, otherwise the core calls an applicable driver's `"hash_compute"` entry point followed by an applicable driver's `"verify_hash"` entry point. +* `"sign_message"`: signature of a message. Called by `psa_sign_message()`. +* `"verify_message"`: verification of a message. Called by `psa_verify_message()`. +* `"key_agreement"`: key agreement without a subsequent key derivation. Called by `psa_raw_key_agreement()` and possibly `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. + +### Driver entry points for multi-part operations + +#### General considerations on multi-part operations + +The entry points that implement each step of a multi-part operation are grouped into a family. A driver that implements a multi-part operation must define all of the entry points in this family as well as a type that represents the operation context. The lifecycle of a driver operation context is similar to the lifecycle of an API operation context: + +1. The core initializes operation context objects to either all-bits-zero or to logical zero (`{0}`), at its discretion. +1. The core calls the `xxx_setup` entry point for this operation family. If this fails, the core destroys the operation context object without calling any other driver entry point on it. +1. The core calls other entry points that manipulate the operation context object, respecting the constraints. +1. If any entry point fails, the core calls the driver's `xxx_abort` entry point for this operation family, then destroys the operation context object without calling any other driver entry point on it. +1. If a “finish” entry point fails, the core destroys the operation context object without calling any other driver entry point on it. The finish entry points are: *prefix*`_mac_sign_finish`, *prefix*`_mac_verify_finish`, *prefix*`_cipher_fnish`, *prefix*`_aead_finish`, *prefix*`_aead_verify`. + +If a driver implements a multi-part operation but not the corresponding single-part operation, the core calls the driver's multipart operation entry points to perform the single-part operation. + +#### Multi-part operation entry point family `"hash_multipart"` + +This family corresponds to the calculation of a hash in multiple steps. + +This family applies to transparent drivers only. + +This family requires the following type and entry points: + +* Type `"hash_operation_t"`: the type of a hash operation context. It must be possible to copy a hash operation context byte by byte, therefore hash operation contexts must not contain any embedded pointers (except pointers to global data that do not change after the setup step). +* `"hash_setup"`: called by `psa_hash_setup()`. +* `"hash_update"`: called by `psa_hash_update()`. +* `"hash_finish"`: called by `psa_hash_finish()` and `psa_hash_verify()`. +* `"hash_abort"`: called by all multi-part hash functions of the PSA Cryptography API. + +To verify a hash with `psa_hash_verify()`, the core calls the driver's *prefix*`_hash_finish` entry point and compares the result with the reference hash value. + +For example, a driver with the prefix `"acme"` that implements the `"hash_multipart"` entry point family must define the following type and entry points (assuming that the capability does not use the `"names"` property to declare different type and entry point names): + +``` +typedef ... acme_hash_operation_t; +psa_status_t acme_hash_setup(acme_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); +psa_status_t acme_hash_update(acme_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); +psa_status_t acme_hash_finish(acme_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); +psa_status_t acme_hash_abort(acme_hash_operation_t *operation); +``` + +#### Operation family `"mac_multipart"` + +TODO + +#### Operation family `"mac_verify_multipart"` + +TODO + +#### Operation family `"cipher_encrypt_multipart"` + +TODO + +#### Operation family `"cipher_decrypt_multipart"` + +TODO + +#### Operation family `"aead_encrypt_multipart"` + +TODO + +#### Operation family `"aead_decrypt_multipart"` + +TODO + +#### Operation family `"key_derivation"` + +This family requires the following type and entry points: + +* Type `"key_derivation_operation_t"`: the type of a key derivation operation context. +* `"key_derivation_setup"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_setup()`. +* `"key_derivation_set_capacity"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_set_capacity()`. The core will always enforce the capacity, therefore this function does not need to do anything for algorithms where the output stream only depends on the effective generated length and not on the capacity. +* `"key_derivation_input_bytes"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()` and `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`. For transparent drivers, when processing a call to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, the core always calls the applicable driver's `"key_derivation_input_bytes"` entry point. +* `"key_derivation_input_key"` (opaque drivers only) +* `"key_derivation_output_bytes"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_output_bytes()`; also by `psa_key_derivation_output_key()` for transparent drivers. +* `"key_derivation_output_key"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_output_key()` for transparent drivers when deriving an asymmetric key pair, and also for opaque drivers. +* `"key_derivation_abort"`: called by all key derivation functions of the PSA Cryptography API. + +TODO: key input and output for opaque drivers; deterministic key generation for transparent drivers + +TODO + +### Driver entry points for key management + +The driver entry points for key management differ significantly between [transparent drivers](#key-management-with-transparent-drivers) and [opaque drivers](#key-management-with-opaque-drivers). This section describes common elements. Refer to the applicable section for each driver type for more information. + +The entry points that create or format key data have the following prototypes for a driver with the prefix `"acme"`: + +``` +psa_status_t acme_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits); // additional parameter, see below +psa_status_t acme_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); +``` + +TODO: derivation, copy + +* The key attributes (`attributes`) have the same semantics as in the PSA Cryptography application interface. +* For the `"import_key"` entry point, the input in the `data` buffer is either the export format or an implementation-specific format that the core documents as an acceptable input format for `psa_import_key()`. +* The size of the key data buffer `key_buffer` is sufficient for the internal representation of the key. For a transparent driver, this is the key's [export format](#key-format-for-transparent-drivers). For an opaque driver, this is the size determined from the driver description and the key attributes, as specified in the section [“Key format for opaque drivers”](#key-format-for-opaque-drivers). +* For an opaque driver with an `"allocate_key"` entry point, the content of the key data buffer on entry is the output of that entry point. +* The `"import_key"` entry point must determine or validate the key size and set `*bits` as described in the section [“Key size determination on import”](#key-size-determination-on-import) below. + +All key creation entry points must ensure that the resulting key is valid as specified in the section [“Key validation”](#key-validation) below. This is primarily important for import entry points since the key data comes from the application. + +#### Key size determination on import + +The `"import_key"` entry point must determine or validate the key size. +The PSA Cryptography API exposes the key size as part of the key attributes. +When importing a key, the key size recorded in the key attributes can be either a size specified by the caller of the API (who may not be trusted), or `0` which indicates that the size must be calculated from the data. + +When the core calls the `"import_key"` entry point to process a call to `psa_import_key`, it passes an `attributes` structure such that `psa_get_key_bits(attributes)` is the size passed by the caller of `psa_import_key`. If this size is `0`, the `"import_key"` entry point must set the `bits` input-output parameter to the correct key size. The semantics of `bits` is as follows: + +* The core sets `*bits` to `psa_get_key_bits(attributes)` before calling the `"import_key"` entry point. +* If `*bits == 0`, the driver must determine the key size from the data and set `*bits` to this size. If the key size cannot be determined from the data, the driver must return `PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT` (as of version 1.0 of the PSA Cryptography API specification, it is possible to determine the key size for all standard key types). +* If `*bits != 0`, the driver must check the value of `*bits` against the data and return `PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT` if it does not match. If the driver entry point changes `*bits` to a different value but returns `PSA_SUCCESS`, the core will consider the key as invalid and the import will fail. + +#### Key validation + +Key creation entry points must produce valid key data. Key data is _valid_ if operations involving the key are guaranteed to work functionally and not to cause indirect security loss. Operation functions are supposed to receive valid keys, and should not have to check and report invalid keys. For example: + +* If a cryptographic mechanism is defined as having keying material of a certain size, or if the keying material involves integers that have to be in a certain range, key creation must ensure that the keying material has an appropriate size and falls within an appropriate range. +* If a cryptographic operation involves a division by an integer which is provided as part of a key, key creation must ensure that this integer is nonzero. +* If a cryptographic operation involves two keys A and B (or more), then the creation of A must ensure that using it does not risk compromising B. This applies even if A's policy does not explicitly allow a problematic operation, but A is exportable. In particular, public keys that can potentially be used for key agreement are considered invalid and must not be created if they risk compromising the private key. +* On the other hand, it is acceptable for import to accept a key that cannot be verified as valid if using this key would at most compromise the key itself and material that is secured with this key. For example, RSA key import does not need to verify that the primes are actually prime. Key import may accept an insecure key if the consequences of the insecurity are no worse than a leak of the key prior to its import. + +With opaque drivers, the key context can only be used by code from the same driver, so key validity is primarily intended to report key creation errors at creation time rather than during an operation. With transparent drivers, the key context can potentially be used by code from a different provider, so key validity is critical for interoperability. + +This section describes some minimal validity requirements for standard key types. + +* For symmetric key types, check that the key size is suitable for the type. +* For DES (`PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES`), additionally verify the parity bits. +* For RSA (`PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY`, `PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR`), check the syntax of the key and make sanity checks on its components. TODO: what sanity checks? Value ranges (e.g. p < n), sanity checks such as parity, minimum and maximum size, what else? +* For elliptic curve private keys (`PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR`), check the size and range. TODO: what else? +* For elliptic curve public keys (`PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY`), check the size and range, and that the point is on the curve. TODO: what else? + +### Entropy collection entry point + +A driver can declare an entropy source by providing a `"get_entropy"` entry point. This entry point has the following prototype for a driver with the prefix `"acme"`: + +``` +psa_status_t acme_get_entropy(uint32_t flags, + size_t *estimate_bits, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size); +``` + +The semantics of the parameters is as follows: + +* `flags`: a bit-mask of [entropy collection flags](#entropy-collection-flags). +* `estimate_bits`: on success, an estimate of the amount of entropy that is present in the `output` buffer, in bits. This must be at least `1` on success. The value is ignored on failure. Drivers should return a conservative estimate, even in circumstances where the quality of the entropy source is degraded due to environmental conditions (e.g. undervolting, low temperature, etc.). +* `output`: on success, this buffer contains non-deterministic data with an estimated entropy of at least `*estimate_bits` bits. When the entropy is coming from a hardware peripheral, this should preferably be raw or lightly conditioned measurements from a physical process, such that statistical tests run over a sufficiently large amount of output can confirm the entropy estimates. But this specification also permits entropy sources that are fully conditioned, for example when the PSA Cryptography system is running as an application in an operating system and `"get_entropy"` returns data from the random generator in the operating system's kernel. +* `output_size`: the size of the `output` buffer in bytes. This size should be large enough to allow a driver to pass unconditioned data with a low density of entropy; for example a peripheral that returns eight bytes of data with an estimated one bit of entropy cannot provide meaningful output in less than 8 bytes. + +Note that there is no output parameter indicating how many bytes the driver wrote to the buffer. Such an output length indication is not necessary because the entropy may be located anywhere in the buffer, so the driver may write less than `output_size` bytes but the core does not need to know this. The output parameter `estimate_bits` contains the amount of entropy, expressed in bits, which may be significantly less than `output_size * 8`. + +The entry point may return the following statuses: + +* `PSA_SUCCESS`: success. The output buffer contains some entropy. +* `PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY`: no entropy is available without blocking. This is only permitted if the `PSA_DRIVER_GET_ENTROPY_BLOCK` flag is clear. The core may call `get_entropy` again later, giving time for entropy to be gathered or for adverse environmental conditions to be rectified. +* Other error codes indicate a transient or permanent failure of the entropy source. + +Unlike most other entry points, if multiple transparent drivers include a `"get_entropy"` point, the core will call all of them (as well as the entry points from opaque drivers). Fallback is not applicable to `"get_entropy"`. + +#### Entropy collection flags + +* `PSA_DRIVER_GET_ENTROPY_BLOCK`: If this flag is set, the driver should block until it has at least one bit of entropy. If this flag is clear, the driver should avoid blocking if no entropy is readily available. +* `PSA_DRIVER_GET_ENTROPY_KEEPALIVE`: This flag is intended to help with energy management for entropy-generating peripherals. If this flag is set, the driver should expect another call to `acme_get_entropy` after a short time. If this flag is clear, the core is not expecting to call the `"get_entropy"` entry point again within a short amount of time (but it may do so nonetheless). + +#### Entropy collection and blocking + +The intent of the `BLOCK` and `KEEPALIVE` [flags](#entropy-collection-flags) is to support drivers for TRNG (True Random Number Generator, i.e. an entropy source peripheral) that have a long ramp-up time, especially on platforms with multiple entropy sources. + +Here is a suggested call sequence for entropy collection that leverages these flags: + +1. The core makes a first round of calls to `"get_entropy"` on every source with the `BLOCK` flag clear and the `KEEPALIVE` flag set, so that drivers can prepare the TRNG peripheral. +2. The core makes a second round of calls with the `BLOCK` flag set and the `KEEPALIVE` flag clear to gather needed entropy. +3. If the second round does not collect enough entropy, the core makes more similar rounds, until the total amount of collected entropy is sufficient. + +### Miscellaneous driver entry points + +#### Driver initialization + +A driver may declare an `"init"` entry point in a capability with no algorithm, key type or key size. If so, the core calls this entry point once during the initialization of the PSA Cryptography subsystem. If the init entry point of any driver fails, the initialization of the PSA Cryptography subsystem fails. + +When multiple drivers have an init entry point, the order in which they are called is unspecified. It is also unspecified whether other drivers' `"init"` entry points are called if one or more init entry point fails. + +On platforms where the PSA Cryptography implementation is a subsystem of a single application, the initialization of the PSA Cryptography subsystem takes place during the call to `psa_crypto_init()`. On platforms where the PSA Cryptography implementation is separate from the application or applications, the initialization of the PSA Cryptography subsystem takes place before or during the first time an application calls `psa_crypto_init()`. + +The init entry point does not take any parameter. + +### Combining multiple drivers + +To declare a cryptoprocessor can handle both cleartext and wrapped keys, you need to provide two driver descriptions, one for a transparent driver and one for an opaque driver. You can use the mapping in capabilities' `"names"` property to arrange for multiple driver entry points to map to the same C function. + +## Transparent drivers + +### Key format for transparent drivers + +The format of a key for transparent drivers is the same as in applications. Refer to the documentation of [`psa_export_key()`](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/management.html#c.psa_export_key) and [`psa_export_public_key()`](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/management.html#c.psa_export_public_key) in the PSA Cryptography API specification. For custom key types defined by an implementation, refer to the documentation of that implementation. + +### Key management with transparent drivers + +Transparent drivers may provide the following key management entry points: + +* [`"import_key"`](#key-import-with-transparent-drivers): called by `psa_import_key()`, only when importing a key pair or a public key (key such that `PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC` is true). +* `"generate_key"`: called by `psa_generate_key()`, only when generating a key pair (key such that `PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR` is true). +* `"key_derivation_output_key"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_output_key()`, only when deriving a key pair (key such that `PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR` is true). +* `"export_public_key"`: called by the core to obtain the public key of a key pair. The core may call this function at any time to obtain the public key, which can be for `psa_export_public_key()` but also at other times, including during a cryptographic operation that requires the public key such as a call to `psa_verify_message()` on a key pair object. + +Transparent drivers are not involved when exporting, copying or destroying keys, or when importing, generating or deriving symmetric keys. + +#### Key import with transparent drivers + +As discussed in [the general section about key management entry points](#driver-entry-points-for-key-management), the key import entry points has the following prototype for a driver with the prefix `"acme"`: +``` +psa_status_t acme_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits); +``` + +This entry point has several roles: + +1. Parse the key data in the input buffer `data`. The driver must support the export format for the key types that the entry point is declared for. It may support additional formats as specified in the description of [`psa_import_key()`](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/management.html#c.psa_export_key) in the PSA Cryptography API specification. +2. Validate the key data. The necessary validation is described in the section [“Key validation with transparent drivers”](#key-validation-with-transparent-drivers) above. +3. [Determine the key size](#key-size-determination-on-import) and output it through `*bits`. +4. Copy the validated key data from `data` to `key_buffer`. The output must be in the canonical format documented for [`psa_export_key()`](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/management.html#c.psa_export_key) or [`psa_export_public_key()`](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/management.html#c.psa_export_public_key), so if the input is not in this format, the entry point must convert it. + +### Random generation entry points + +A transparent driver may provide an operation family that can be used as a cryptographic random number generator. The random generation mechanism must obey the following requirements: + +* The random output must be of cryptographic quality, with a uniform distribution. Therefore, if the random generator includes an entropy source, this entropy source must be fed through a CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator). +* Random generation is expected to be fast. (If a device can provide entropy but is slow at generating random data, declare it as an [entropy driver](#entropy-collection-entry-point) instead.) +* The random generator should be able to incorporate entropy provided by an outside source. If it isn't, the random generator can only be used if it's the only entropy source on the platform. (A random generator peripheral can be declared as an [entropy source](#entropy-collection-entry-point) instead of a random generator; this way the core will combine it with other entropy sources.) +* The random generator may either be deterministic (in the sense that it always returns the same data when given the same entropy inputs) or non-deterministic (including its own entropy source). In other words, this interface is suitable both for PRNG (pseudo-random number generator, also known as DRBG (deterministic random bit generator)) and for NRBG (non-deterministic random bit generator). + +If no driver implements the random generation entry point family, the core provides an unspecified random generation mechanism. + +This operation family requires the following type, entry points and parameters (TODO: where exactly are the parameters in the JSON structure?): + +* Type `"random_context_t"`: the type of a random generation context. +* `"init_random"` (entry point, optional): if this function is present, [the core calls it once](#random-generator-initialization) after allocating a `"random_context_t"` object. +* `"add_entropy"` (entry point, optional): the core calls this function to [inject entropy](#entropy-injection). This entry point is optional if the driver is for a peripheral that includes an entropy source of its own, however [random generator drivers without entropy injection](#random-generator-drivers-without-entropy-injection) have limited portability since they can only be used on platforms with no other entropy source. This entry point is mandatory if `"initial_entropy_size"` is nonzero. +* `"get_random"` (entry point, mandatory): the core calls this function whenever it needs to [obtain random data](#the-get_random-entry-point). +* `"initial_entropy_size"` (integer, mandatory): the minimum number of bytes of entropy that the core must supply before the driver can output random data. This can be `0` if the driver is for a peripheral that includes an entropy source of its own. +* `"reseed_entropy_size"` (integer, optional): the minimum number of bytes of entropy that the core should supply via [`"add_entropy"`](#entropy-injection) when the driver runs out of entropy. This value is also a hint for the size to supply if the core makes additional calls to `"add_entropy"`, for example to enforce prediction resistance. If omitted, the core should pass an amount of entropy corresponding to the expected security strength of the device (for example, pass 32 bytes of entropy when reseeding to achieve a security strength of 256 bits). If specified, the core should pass the larger of `"reseed_entropy_size"` and the amount corresponding to the security strength. + +Random generation is not parametrized by an algorithm. The choice of algorithm is up to the driver. + +#### Random generator initialization + +The `"init_random"` entry point has the following prototype for a driver with the prefix `"acme"`: + +``` +psa_status_t acme_init_random(acme_random_context_t *context); +``` + +The core calls this entry point once after allocating a random generation context. Initially, the context object is all-bits-zero. + +If a driver does not have an `"init_random"` entry point, the context object passed to the first call to `"add_entropy"` or `"get_random"` will be all-bits-zero. + +#### Entropy injection + +The `"add_entropy"` entry point has the following prototype for a driver with the prefix `"acme"`: + +``` +psa_status_t acme_add_entropy(acme_random_context_t *context, + const uint8_t *entropy, + size_t entropy_size); +``` + +The semantics of the parameters is as follows: + +* `context`: a random generation context. On the first call to `"add_entropy"`, this object has been initialized by a call to the driver's `"init_random"` entry point if one is present, and to all-bits-zero otherwise. +* `entropy`: a buffer containing full-entropy data to seed the random generator. “Full-entropy” means that the data is uniformly distributed and independent of any other observable quantity. +* `entropy_size`: the size of the `entropy` buffer in bytes. It is guaranteed to be at least `1`, but it may be smaller than the amount of entropy that the driver needs to deliver random data, in which case the core will call the `"add_entropy"` entry point again to supply more entropy. + +The core calls this function to supply entropy to the driver. The driver must mix this entropy into its internal state. The driver must mix the whole supplied entropy, even if there is more than what the driver requires, to ensure that all entropy sources are mixed into the random generator state. The driver may mix additional entropy of its own. + +The core may call this function at any time. For example, to enforce prediction resistance, the core can call `"add_entropy"` immediately after each call to `"get_random"`. The core must call this function in two circumstances: + +* Before the first call to the `"get_random"` entry point, to supply `"initial_entropy_size"` bytes of entropy. +* After a call to the `"get_random"` entry point returns less than the required amount of random data, to supply at least `"reseed_entropy_size"` bytes of entropy. + +When the driver requires entropy, the core can supply it with one or more successive calls to the `"add_entropy"` entry point. If the required entropy size is zero, the core does not need to call `"add_entropy"`. + +#### Combining entropy sources with a random generation driver + +This section provides guidance on combining one or more [entropy sources](#entropy-collection-entry-point) (each having a `"get_entropy"` entry point) with a random generation driver (with an `"add_entropy"` entry point). + +Note that `"get_entropy"` returns data with an estimated amount of entropy that is in general less than the buffer size. The core must apply a mixing algorithm to the output of `"get_entropy"` to obtain full-entropy data. + +For example, the core may use a simple mixing scheme based on a pseudorandom function family $(F_k)$ with an $E$-bit output where $E = 8 \cdot \mathtt{entropy_size}$ and $\mathtt{entropy_size}$ is the desired amount of entropy in bytes (typically the random driver's `"initial_entropy_size"` property for the initial seeding and the `"reseed_entropy_size"` property for subsequent reseeding). The core calls the `"get_entropy"` points of the available entropy drivers, outputting a string $s_i$ and an entropy estimate $e_i$ on the $i$th call. It does so until the total entropy estimate $e_1 + e_2 + \ldots + e_n$ is at least $E$. The core then calculates $F_k(0)$ where $k = s_1 || s_2 || \ldots || s_n$. This value is a string of $\mathtt{entropy_size}$, and since $(F_k)$ is a pseudorandom function family, $F_k(0)$ is uniformly distributed over strings of $\mathtt{entropy_size}$ bytes. Therefore $F_k(0)$ is a suitable value to pass to `"add_entropy"`. + +Note that the mechanism above is only given as an example. Implementations may choose a different mechanism, for example involving multiple pools or intermediate compression functions. + +#### Random generator drivers without entropy injection + +Random generator drivers should have the capability to inject additional entropy through the `"add_entropy"` entry point. This ensures that the random generator depends on all the entropy sources that are available on the platform. A driver where a call to `"add_entropy"` does not affect the state of the random generator is not compliant with this specification. + +However, a driver may omit the `"add_entropy"` entry point. This limits the driver's portability: implementations of the PSA Cryptography specification may reject drivers without an `"add_entropy"` entry point, or only accept such drivers in certain configurations. In particular, the `"add_entropy"` entry point is required if: + +* the integration of PSA Cryptography includes an entropy source that is outside the driver; or +* the core saves random data in persistent storage to be preserved across platform resets. + +#### The `"get_random"` entry point + +The `"get_random"` entry point has the following prototype for a driver with the prefix `"acme"`: + +``` +psa_status_t acme_get_random(acme_random_context_t *context, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); +``` + +The semantics of the parameters is as follows: + +* `context`: a random generation context. If the driver's `"initial_entropy_size"` property is nonzero, the core must have called `"add_entropy"` at least once with a total of at least `"initial_entropy_size"` bytes of entropy before it calls `"get_random"`. Alternatively, if the driver's `"initial_entropy_size"` property is zero and the core did not call `"add_entropy"`, or if the driver has no `"add_entropy"` entry point, the core must have called `"init_random"` if present, and otherwise the context is all-bits zero. +* `output`: on success (including partial success), the first `*output_length` bytes of this buffer contain cryptographic-quality random data. The output is not used on error. +* `output_size`: the size of the `output` buffer in bytes. +* `*output_length`: on success (including partial success), the number of bytes of random data that the driver has written to the `output` buffer. This is preferably `output_size`, but the driver is allowed to return less data if it runs out of entropy as described below. The core sets this value to 0 on entry. The value is not used on error. + +The driver may return the following status codes: + +* `PSA_SUCCESS`: the `output` buffer contains `*output_length` bytes of cryptographic-quality random data. Note that this may be less than `output_size`; in this case the core should call the driver's `"add_entropy"` method to supply at least `"reseed_entropy_size"` bytes of entropy before calling `"get_random"` again. +* `PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY`: the core must supply additional entropy by calling the `"add_entropy"` entry point with at least `"reseed_entropy_size"` bytes. +* `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`: the random generator is not available. This is only permitted if the driver specification for random generation has the [fallback property](#fallback) enabled. +* Other error codes such as `PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE` or `PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE` indicate a transient or permanent error. + +### Fallback + +Sometimes cryptographic accelerators only support certain cryptographic mechanisms partially. The capability description language allows specifying some restrictions, including restrictions on key sizes, but it cannot cover all the possibilities that may arise in practice. Furthermore, it may be desirable to deploy the same binary image on different devices, only some of which have a cryptographic accelerators. +For these purposes, a transparent driver can declare that it only supports a [capability](#driver-description-capability) partially, by setting the capability's `"fallback"` property to true. + +If a transparent driver entry point is part of a capability which has a true `"fallback"` property and returns `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`, the core will call the next transparent driver that supports the mechanism, if there is one. The core considers drivers in the order given by the [driver description list](#driver-description-list). + +If all the available drivers have fallback enabled and return `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`, the core will perform the operation using built-in code. +As soon as a driver returns any value other than `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED` (`PSA_SUCCESS` or a different error code), this value is returned to the application, without attempting to call any other driver or built-in code. + +If a transparent driver entry point is part of a capability where the `"fallback"` property is false or omitted, the core should not include any other code for this capability, whether built in or in another transparent driver. + +## Opaque drivers + +Opaque drivers allow a PSA Cryptography implementation to delegate cryptographic operations to a separate environment that might not allow exporting key material in cleartext. The opaque driver interface is designed so that the core never inspects the representation of a key. The opaque driver interface is designed to support two subtypes of cryptoprocessors: + +* Some cryptoprocessors do not have persistent storage for individual keys. The representation of a key is the key material wrapped with a master key which is located in the cryptoprocessor and never exported from it. The core stores this wrapped key material on behalf of the cryptoprocessor. +* Some cryptoprocessors have persistent storage for individual keys. The representation of a key is an identifier such as label or slot number. The core stores this identifier. + +### Key format for opaque drivers + +The format of a key for opaque drivers is an opaque blob. The content of this blob is fully up to the driver. The core merely stores this blob. + +Note that since the core stores the key context blob as it is in memory, it must only contain data that is meaningful after a reboot. In particular, it must not contain any pointers or transient handles. + +The `"key_context"` property in the [driver description](#driver-description-top-level-element) specifies how to calculate the size of the key context as a function of the key type and size. This is an object with the following properties: + +* `"base_size"` (integer or string, optional): this many bytes are included in every key context. If omitted, this value defaults to 0. +* `"key_pair_size"` (integer or string, optional): this many bytes are included in every key context for a key pair. If omitted, this value defaults to 0. +* `"public_key_size"` (integer or string, optional): this many bytes are included in every key context for a public key. If omitted, this value defaults to 0. +* `"symmetric_factor"` (integer or string, optional): every key context for a symmetric key includes this many times the key size. If omitted, this value defaults to 0. +* `"store_public_key"` (boolean, optional): If specified and true, for a key pair, the key context includes space for the public key. If omitted or false, no additional space is added for the public key. +* `"size_function"` (string, optional): the name of a function that returns the number of bytes that the driver needs in a key context for a key. This may be a pointer to function. This must be a C identifier; more complex expressions are not permitted. If the core uses this function, it supersedes all the other properties except for `"builtin_key_size"` (where applicable, if present). +* `"builtin_key_size"` (integer or string, optional): If specified, this overrides all other methods (including the `"size_function"` entry point) to determine the size of the key context for [built-in keys](#built-in-keys). This allows drivers to efficiently represent application keys as wrapped key material, but built-in keys by an internal identifier that takes up less space. + +The integer properties must be C language constants. A typical value for `"base_size"` is `sizeof(acme_key_context_t)` where `acme_key_context_t` is a type defined in a driver header file. + +#### Size of a dynamically allocated key context + +If the core supports dynamic allocation for the key context and chooses to use it, and the driver specification includes the `"size_function"` property, the size of the key context is at least +``` +size_function(key_type, key_bits) +``` +where `size_function` is the function named in the `"size_function"` property, `key_type` is the key type and `key_bits` is the key size in bits. The prototype of the size function is +``` +size_t size_function(psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits); +``` + +#### Size of a statically allocated key context + +If the core does not support dynamic allocation for the key context or chooses not to use it, or if the driver specification does not include the `"size_function"` property, the size of the key context for a key of type `key_type` and of size `key_bits` bits is: + +* For a key pair (`PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(key_type)` is true): + ``` + base_size + key_pair_size + public_key_overhead + ``` + where `public_key_overhead = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_type, key_bits)` if the `"store_public_key"` property is true and `public_key_overhead = 0` otherwise. + +* For a public key (`PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type)` is true): + ``` + base_size + public_key_size + ``` + +* For a symmetric key (not a key pair or public key): + ``` + base_size + symmetric_factor * key_bytes + ``` + where `key_bytes = ((key_bits + 7) / 8)` is the key size in bytes. + +#### Key context size for a secure element with storage + +If the key is stored in the secure element and the driver only needs to store a label for the key, use `"base_size"` as the size of the label plus any other metadata that the driver needs to store, and omit the other properties. + +If the key is stored in the secure element, but the secure element does not store the public part of a key pair and cannot recompute it on demand, additionally use the `"store_public_key"` property with the value `true`. Note that this only influences the size of the key context: the driver code must copy the public key to the key context and retrieve it on demand in its `export_public_key` entry point. + +#### Key context size for a secure element without storage + +If the key is stored in wrapped form outside the secure element, and the wrapped form of the key plus any metadata has up to *N* bytes of overhead, use *N* as the value of the `"base_size"` property and set the `"symmetric_factor"` property to 1. Set the `"key_pair_size"` and `"public_key_size"` properties appropriately for the largest supported key pair and the largest supported public key respectively. + +### Key management with opaque drivers + +Opaque drivers may provide the following key management entry points: + +* `"export_key"`: called by `psa_export_key()`, or by `psa_copy_key()` when copying a key from or to a different [location](#lifetimes-and-locations). +* `"export_public_key"`: called by the core to obtain the public key of a key pair. The core may call this entry point at any time to obtain the public key, which can be for `psa_export_public_key()` but also at other times, including during a cryptographic operation that requires the public key such as a call to `psa_verify_message()` on a key pair object. +* `"import_key"`: called by `psa_import_key()`, or by `psa_copy_key()` when copying a key from another location. +* `"generate_key"`: called by `psa_generate_key()`. +* `"key_derivation_output_key"`: called by `psa_key_derivation_output_key()`. +* `"copy_key"`: called by `psa_copy_key()` when copying a key within the same [location](#lifetimes-and-locations). +* `"get_builtin_key"`: called by functions that access a key to retrieve information about a [built-in key](#built-in-keys). + +In addition, secure elements that store the key material internally must provide the following two entry points: + +* `"allocate_key"`: called by `psa_import_key()`, `psa_generate_key()`, `psa_key_derivation_output_key()` or `psa_copy_key()` before creating a key in the location of this driver. +* `"destroy_key"`: called by `psa_destroy_key()`. + +#### Key creation in a secure element without storage + +This section describes the key creation process for secure elements that do not store the key material. The driver must obtain a wrapped form of the key material which the core will store. A driver for such a secure element has no `"allocate_key"` or `"destroy_key"` entry point. + +When creating a key with an opaque driver which does not have an `"allocate_key"` or `"destroy_key"` entry point: + +1. The core allocates memory for the key context. +2. The core calls the driver's import, generate, derive or copy entry point. +3. The core saves the resulting wrapped key material and any other data that the key context may contain. + +To destroy a key, the core simply destroys the wrapped key material, without invoking driver code. + +#### Key management in a secure element with storage + +This section describes the key creation and key destruction processes for secure elements that have persistent storage for the key material. A driver for such a secure element has two mandatory entry points: + +* `"allocate_key"`: this function obtains an internal identifier for the key. This may be, for example, a unique label or a slot number. +* `"destroy_key"`: this function invalidates the internal identifier and destroys the associated key material. + +These functions have the following prototypes for a driver with the prefix `"acme"`: +``` +psa_status_t acme_allocate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size); +psa_status_t acme_destroy_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size); +``` + +When creating a persistent key with an opaque driver which has an `"allocate_key"` entry point: + +1. The core calls the driver's `"allocate_key"` entry point. This function typically allocates an internal identifier for the key without modifying the state of the secure element and stores the identifier in the key context. This function should not modify the state of the secure element. It may modify the copy of the persistent state of the driver in memory. + +1. The core saves the key context to persistent storage. + +1. The core calls the driver's key creation entry point. + +1. The core saves the updated key context to persistent storage. + +If a failure occurs after the `"allocate_key"` step but before the call to the second driver entry point, the core will do one of the following: + +* Fail the creation of the key without indicating this to the driver. This can happen, in particular, if the device loses power immediately after the key allocation entry point returns. +* Call the driver's `"destroy_key"` entry point. + +To destroy a key, the core calls the driver's `"destroy_key"` entry point. + +Note that the key allocation and destruction entry points must not rely solely on the key identifier in the key attributes to identify a key. Some implementations of the PSA Cryptography API store keys on behalf of multiple clients, and different clients may use the same key identifier to designate different keys. The manner in which the core distinguishes keys that have the same identifier but are part of the key namespace for different clients is implementation-dependent and is not accessible to drivers. Some typical strategies to allocate an internal key identifier are: + +* Maintain a set of free slot numbers which is stored either in the secure element or in the driver's persistent storage. To allocate a key slot, find a free slot number, mark it as occupied and store the number in the key context. When the key is destroyed, mark the slot number as free. +* Maintain a monotonic counter with a practically unbounded range in the secure element or in the driver's persistent storage. To allocate a key slot, increment the counter and store the current value in the key context. Destroying a key does not change the counter. + +TODO: explain constraints on how the driver updates its persistent state for resilience + +TODO: some of the above doesn't apply to volatile keys + +#### Key creation entry points in opaque drivers + +The key creation entry points have the following prototypes for a driver with the prefix `"acme"`: + +``` +psa_status_t acme_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits); +psa_status_t acme_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); +``` + +If the driver has an [`"allocate_key"` entry point](#key-management-in-a-secure-element-with-storage), the core calls the `"allocate_key"` entry point with the same attributes on the same key buffer before calling the key creation entry point. + +TODO: derivation, copy + +#### Key export entry points in opaque drivers + +The key export entry points have the following prototypes for a driver with the prefix `"acme"`: + +``` +psa_status_t acme_export_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); +psa_status_t acme_export_public_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); +``` + +The core will only call `acme_export_public_key` on a private key. Drivers implementers may choose to store the public key in the key context buffer or to recalculate it on demand. If the key context includes the public key, it needs to have an adequate size; see [“Key format for opaque drivers”](#key-format-for-opaque-drivers). + +The core guarantees that the size of the output buffer (`data_size`) is sufficient to export any key with the given attributes. The driver must set `*data_length` to the exact size of the exported key. + +### Opaque driver persistent state + +The core maintains persistent state on behalf of an opaque driver. This persistent state consists of a single byte array whose size is given by the `"persistent_state_size"` property in the [driver description](#driver-description-top-level-element). + +The core loads the persistent state in memory before it calls the driver's [init entry point](#driver-initialization). It is adjusted to match the size declared by the driver, in case a driver upgrade changes the size: + +* The first time the driver is loaded on a system, the persistent state is all-bits-zero. +* If the stored persistent state is smaller than the declared size, the core pads the persistent state with all-bits-zero at the end. +* If the stored persistent state is larger than the declared size, the core truncates the persistent state to the declared size. + +The core provides the following callback functions, which an opaque driver may call while it is processing a call from the driver: +``` +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_get_persistent_state(uint_8_t **persistent_state_ptr); +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_commit_persistent_state(size_t from, size_t length); +``` + +`psa_crypto_driver_get_persistent_state` sets `*persistent_state_ptr` to a pointer to the first byte of the persistent state. This pointer remains valid during a call to a driver entry point. Once the entry point returns, the pointer is no longer valid. The core guarantees that calls to `psa_crypto_driver_get_persistent_state` within the same entry point return the same address for the persistent state, but this address may change between calls to an entry point. + +`psa_crypto_driver_commit_persistent_state` updates the persistent state in persistent storage. Only the portion at byte offsets `from` inclusive to `from + length` exclusive is guaranteed to be updated; it is unspecified whether changes made to other parts of the state are taken into account. The driver must call this function after updating the persistent state in memory and before returning from the entry point, otherwise it is unspecified whether the persistent state is updated. + +The core will not update the persistent state in storage while an entry point is running except when the entry point calls `psa_crypto_driver_commit_persistent_state`. It may update the persistent state in storage after an entry point returns. + +In a multithreaded environment, the driver may only call these two functions from the thread that is executing the entry point. + +#### Built-in keys + +Opaque drivers may declare built-in keys. Built-in keys can be accessed, but not created, through the PSA Cryptography API. + +A built-in key is identified by its location and its **slot number**. Drivers that support built-in keys must provide a `"get_builtin_key"` entry point to retrieve the key data and metadata. The core calls this entry point when it needs to access the key, typically because the application requested an operation on the key. The core may keep information about the key in cache, and successive calls to access the same slot number should return the same data. This entry point has the following prototype: + +``` +psa_status_t acme_get_builtin_key(psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); +``` + +If this function returns `PSA_SUCCESS` or `PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL`, it must fill `attributes` with the attributes of the key (except for the key identifier). On success, this function must also fill `key_buffer` with the key context. + +On entry, `psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes)` is the location at which the driver was declared and a persistence level with which the platform is attempting to register the key. The driver entry point may choose to change the lifetime (`psa_set_key_lifetime(attributes, lifetime)`) of the reported key attributes to one with the same location but a different persistence level, in case the driver has more specific knowledge about the actual persistence level of the key which is being retrieved. For example, if a driver knows it cannot delete a key, it may override the persistence level in the lifetime to `PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY`. The standard attributes other than the key identifier and lifetime have the value conveyed by `PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT`. + +The output parameter `key_buffer` points to a writable buffer of `key_buffer_size` bytes. If the driver has a [`"builtin_key_size"` property](#key-format-for-opaque-drivers) property, `key_buffer_size` has this value, otherwise `key_buffer_size` has the value determined from the key type and size. + +Typically, for a built-in key, the key context is a reference to key material that is kept inside the secure element, similar to the format returned by [`"allocate_key"`](#key-management-in-a-secure-element-with-storage). A driver may have built-in keys even if it doesn't have an `"allocate_key"` entry point. + +This entry point may return the following status values: + +* `PSA_SUCCESS`: the requested key exists, and the output parameters `attributes` and `key_buffer` contain the key metadata and key context respectively, and `*key_buffer_length` contains the length of the data written to `key_buffer`. +* `PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL`: `key_buffer_size` is insufficient. In this case, the driver must pass the key's attributes in `*attributes`. In particular, `get_builtin_key(slot_number, &attributes, NULL, 0)` is a way for the core to obtain the key's attributes. +* `PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST`: the requested key does not exist. +* Other error codes such as `PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE` or `PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE` indicate a transient or permanent error. + +The core will pass authorized requests to destroy a built-in key to the [`"destroy_key"`](#key-management-in-a-secure-element-with-storage) entry point if there is one. If built-in keys must not be destroyed, it is up to the driver to reject such requests. + +## How to use drivers from an application + +### Using transparent drivers + +Transparent drivers linked into the library are automatically used for the mechanisms that they implement. + +### Using opaque drivers + +Each opaque driver is assigned a [location](#lifetimes-and-locations). The driver is invoked for all actions that use a key in that location. A key's location is indicated by its lifetime. The application chooses the key's lifetime when it creates the key. + +For example, the following snippet creates an AES-GCM key which is only accessible inside the secure element designated by the location `PSA_KEY_LOCATION_acme`. +``` +psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; +psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_acme)); +psa_set_key_identifier(&attributes, 42); +psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); +psa_set_key_size(&attributes, 128); +psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_GCM); +psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); +psa_key_id_t key; +psa_generate_key(&attributes, &key); +``` + +## Using opaque drivers from an application + +### Lifetimes and locations + +The PSA Cryptography API, version 1.0.0, defines [lifetimes](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/attributes.html?highlight=psa_key_lifetime_t#c.psa_key_lifetime_t) as an attribute of a key that indicates where the key is stored and which application and system actions will create and destroy it. The lifetime is expressed as a 32-bit value (`typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t`). An upcoming version of the PSA Cryptography API defines more structure for lifetime values to separate these two aspects of the lifetime: + +* Bits 0–7 are a _persistence level_. This value indicates what device management actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates whether the key is volatile or persistent. +* Bits 8–31 are a _location indicator_. This value indicates where the key material is stored and where operations on the key are performed. Location values can be stored in a variable of type `psa_key_location_t`. + +An opaque driver is attached to a specific location. Keys in the default location (`PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE = 0`) are transparent: the core has direct access to the key material. For keys in a location that is managed by an opaque driver, only the secure element has access to the key material and can perform operations on the key, while the core only manipulates a wrapped form of the key or an identifier of the key. + +### Creating a key in a secure element + +The core defines a compile-time constant for each opaque driver indicating its location called `PSA_KEY_LOCATION_`*prefix* where *prefix* is the value of the `"prefix"` property in the driver description. For convenience, Mbed TLS also declares a compile-time constant for the corresponding lifetime with the default persistence called `PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_`*prefix*. Therefore, to declare an opaque key in the location with the prefix `foo` with the default persistence, call `psa_set_key_lifetime` during the key creation as follows: +``` +psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_foo); +``` + +To declare a volatile key: +``` +psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_foo, + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE)); +``` + +Generally speaking, to declare a key with a specified persistence: +``` +psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_foo, + persistence)); +``` + +## Open questions + +### Value representation + +#### Integers + +It would be better if there was a uniform requirement on integer values. Do they have to be JSON integers? C preprocessor integers (which could be e.g. a macro defined in some header file)? C compile-time constants (allowing `sizeof`)? + +This choice is partly driven by the use of the values, so they might not be uniform. Note that if the value can be zero and it's plausible that the core would want to statically allocate an array of the given size, the core needs to know whether the value is 0 so that it could use code like +``` +#if ACME_FOO_SIZE != 0 + uint8_t foo[ACME_FOO_SIZE]; +#endif +``` + +### Driver declarations + +#### Declaring driver entry points + +The core may want to provide declarations for the driver entry points so that it can compile code using them. At the time of writing this paragraph, the driver headers must define types but there is no obligation for them to declare functions. The core knows what the function names and argument types are, so it can generate prototypes. + +It should be ok for driver functions to be function-like macros or function pointers. + +#### Driver location values + +How does a driver author decide which location values to use? It should be possible to combine drivers from different sources. Use the same vendor assignment as for PSA services? + +Can the driver assembly process generate distinct location values as needed? This can be convenient, but it's also risky: if you upgrade a device, you need the location values to be the same between builds. + +The current plan is for Arm to maintain a registry of vendors and assign a location namespace to each vendor. Parts of the namespace would be reserved for implementations and integrators. + +#### Multiple transparent drivers + +When multiple transparent drivers implement the same mechanism, which one is called? The first one? The last one? Unspecified? Or is this an error (excluding capabilities with fallback enabled)? + +The current choice is that the first one is used, which allows having a preference order on drivers, but may mask integration errors. + +### Driver function interfaces + +#### Driver function parameter conventions + +Should 0-size buffers be guaranteed to have a non-null pointers? + +Should drivers really have to cope with overlap? + +Should the core guarantee that the output buffer size has the size indicated by the applicable buffer size macro (which may be an overestimation)? + +### Partial computations in drivers + +#### Substitution points + +Earlier drafts of the driver interface had a concept of _substitution points_: places in the calculation where a driver may be called. Some hardware doesn't do the whole calculation, but only the “main” part. This goes both for transparent and opaque drivers. Some common examples: + +* A processor that performs the RSA exponentiation, but not the padding. The driver should be able to leverage the padding code in the core. +* A processor that performs a block cipher operation only for a single block, or only in ECB mode, or only in CTR mode. The core would perform the block mode (CBC, CTR, CCM, ...). + +This concept, or some other way to reuse portable code such as specifying inner functions like `psa_rsa_pad` in the core, should be added to the specification. + +### Key management + +#### Mixing drivers in key derivation + +How does `psa_key_derivation_output_key` work when the extraction part and the expansion part use different drivers? + +#### Public key calculation + +ECC key pairs are represented as the private key value only. The public key needs to be calculated from that. Both transparent drivers and opaque drivers provide a function to calculate the public key (`"export_public_key"`). + +The specification doesn't mention when the public key might be calculated. The core may calculate it on creation, on demand, or anything in between. Opaque drivers have a choice of storing the public key in the key context or calculating it on demand and can convey whether the core should store the public key with the `"store_public_key"` property. Is this good enough or should the specification include non-functional requirements? + +#### Symmetric key validation with transparent drivers + +Should the entry point be called for symmetric keys as well? + +#### Support for custom import formats + +[“Driver entry points for key management”](#driver-entry-points-for-key-management) states that the input to `"import_key"` can be an implementation-defined format. Is this a good idea? It reduces driver portability, since a core that accepts a custom format would not work with a driver that doesn't accept this format. On the other hand, if a driver accepts a custom format, the core should let it through because the driver presumably handles it more efficiently (in terms of speed and code size) than the core could. + +Allowing custom formats also causes a problem with import: the core can't know the size of the key representation until it knows the bit-size of the key, but determining the bit-size of the key is part of the job of the `"import_key"` entry point. For standard key types, this could plausibly be an issue for RSA private keys, where an implementation might accept a custom format that omits the CRT parameters (or that omits *d*). + +### Opaque drivers + +#### Opaque driver persistent state + +The driver is allowed to update the state at any time. Is this ok? + +An example use case for updating the persistent state at arbitrary times is to renew a key that is used to encrypt communications between the application processor and the secure element. + +`psa_crypto_driver_get_persistent_state` does not identify the calling driver, so the driver needs to remember which driver it's calling. This may require a thread-local variable in a multithreaded core. Is this ok? + +### Randomness + +#### Input to `"add_entropy"` + +Should the input to the [`"add_entropy"` entry point](#entropy-injection) be a full-entropy buffer (with data from all entropy sources already mixed), raw entropy direct from the entropy sources, or give the core a choice? + +* Raw data: drivers must implement entropy mixing. `"add_entropy"` needs an extra parameter to indicate the amount of entropy in the data. The core must not do any conditioning. +* Choice: drivers must implement entropy mixing. `"add_entropy"` needs an extra parameter to indicate the amount of entropy in the data. The core may do conditioning if it wants, but doesn't have to. +* Full entropy: drivers don't need to do entropy mixing. + +#### Flags for `"get_entropy"` + +Are the [entropy collection flags](#entropy-collection-flags) well-chosen? + +#### Random generator instantiations + +May the core instantiate a random generation context more than once? In other words, can there be multiple objects of type `acme_random_context_t`? + +Functionally, one RNG is as good as any. If the core wants some parts of the system to use a deterministic generator for reproducibility, it can't use this interface anyway, since the RNG is not necessarily deterministic. However, for performance on multiprocessor systems, a multithreaded core could prefer to use one RNG instance per thread. + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/use-psa-crypto.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/use-psa-crypto.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6ec2dcaa --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/docs/use-psa-crypto.md @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +This document describes the compile-time configuration option +`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` from a user's perspective, more specifically its +current effects as well as the parts that aren't covered yet. + +Current effects +=============== + +General limitations +------------------- + +Compile-time: enabling `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` requires +`MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE` and +`MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER` to be disabled. + +Effect: `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` currently has no effect on TLS 1.3 (which is +itself experimental and only partially supported so far): TLS 1.3 always uses +the legacy APIs even when this option is set. + +Stability: any API that's only available when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is +defined is considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any +time. Said otherwise, these APIs are explicitly excluded from the usual API +stability promises. + +New APIs / API extensions +------------------------- + +Some of these APIs are meant for the application to use in place of +pre-existing APIs, in order to get access to the benefits; in the sub-sections +below these are indicated by "Use in (X.509 and) TLS: opt-in", meaning that +this requires changes to the application code for the (X.509 and) TLS layers +to pick up the improvements. + +Some of these APIs are mostly meant for internal use by the TLS (and X.509) +layers; they are indicated below by "Use in (X.509 and) TLS: automatic", +meaning that no changes to the application code are required for the TLS (and +X.509) layers to pick up the improvements. + +### PSA-held (opaque) keys in the PK layer + +There is a new API function `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()` that can be used to +wrap a PSA keypair into a PK context. The key can be used for private-key +operations and its public part can be exported. + +Benefits: isolation of long-term secrets, use of PSA Crypto drivers. + +Limitations: only for private keys, only ECC. (That is, only ECDSA signature +generation. Note: currently this will use randomized ECDSA while Mbed TLS uses +deterministic ECDSA by default.) The following operations are not supported +with a context set this way, while they would be available with a normal +`ECKEY` context: `mbedtls_pk_verify()`, `mbedtls_pk_check_pair()`, +`mbedtls_pk_debug()`. + +Use in X.509 and TLS: opt-in. The application needs to construct the PK context +using the new API in order to get the benefits; it can then pass the +resulting context to the following existing APIs: + +- `mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert()` or `mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert()` to use the + key together with a certificate for ECDSA-based key exchanges (note: while +this is supported on both sides, it's currently only tested client-side); +- `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key()` to generate a CSR (certificate signature + request). + +In the TLS and X.509 API, there are two other functions which accept a key or +keypair as a PK context: `mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key()` and +`mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key()`. Use of opaque contexts here probably +works but is so far untested. + +### PSA-held (opaque) keys for TLS pre-shared keys (PSK) + +There are two new API functions `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` and +`mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()`. Call one of these from an application to +register a PSA key for use with a PSK key exchange. + +Benefits: isolation of long-term secrets. + +Limitations: the key can only be used with "pure" +PSK key exchanges (ciphersuites starting with `TLS_PSK_WITH_`), to the +exclusion of RSA-PSK, DHE-PSK and ECDHE-PSK key exchanges. It is the responsibility of +the user to make sure that when provisioning an opaque pre-shared key, the +only PSK ciphersuites that can be negotiated are "pure" PSK; other XXX-PSK key +exchanges will result in a handshake failure with the handshake function +returning `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE`. + +Use in TLS: opt-in. The application needs to register the key using the new +APIs to get the benefits. + +### PSA-based operations in the Cipher layer + +There is a new API function `mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()` to set up a context +that will call PSA to store the key and perform the operations. + +Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers; partial isolation of short-term secrets +(still generated outside of PSA, but then held by PSA). + +Limitations: the key is still passed in the clear by the application. The +multi-part APIs are not supported, only the one-shot APIs. The only modes +supported are ECB, CBC without padding, GCM and CCM (this excludes stream +ciphers and ChachaPoly); the only cipher supported is AES (this excludes Aria, +Camellia, and ChachaPoly). (Note: ECB is currently not tested.) (Note: it is +possible to perform multiple one-shot operations with the same context; +however this is not unit-tested, only tested via usage in TLS.) + +Use in TLS: automatic. Used when the cipher and mode is supported (with +gracious fallback to the legacy API otherwise) in all places where a cipher is +used. There are two such places: in `ssl_tls.c` for record protection, and in +`ssl_ticket.c` for protecting tickets we issue. + +Internal changes +---------------- + +All of these internal changes are active as soon as `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` +is enabled, no change required on the application side. + +### TLS: cipher operations based on PSA + +See "PSA-based operations in the Cipher layer" above. + +### PK layer: ECDSA verification based on PSA + +Scope: `mbedtls_pk_verify()` will call to PSA for ECDSA signature +verification. + +Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers. + +Use in TLS and X.509: in all places where an ECDSA signature is verified. + +### TLS: ECDHE computation based on PSA + +Scope: Client-side, for ECDHE-RSA and ECDHE-ECDSA key exchanges, the +computation of the ECDHE key exchange is done by PSA. + +Limitations: client-side only, ECDHE-PSK not covered + +Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers. + +### TLS: handshake hashes and PRF computed with PSA + +Scope: with TLS 1.2, the following are computed with PSA: +- the running handshake hashes; +- the hash of the ServerKeyExchange part that is signed; +- the `verify_data` part of the Finished message; +- the TLS PRF. + +Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers. + +### X.509: some hashes computed with PSA + +Scope: the following hashes are computed with PSA: +- when verifying a certificate chain, hash of the child for verifying the + parent's signature; +- when writing a CSR, hash of the request for self-signing the request. + +Benefits: use of PSA Crypto drivers. + +Parts that are not covered yet +============================== + +This is only a high-level overview, grouped by theme + +TLS: 1.3 experimental support +----------------------------- + +No part of the experimental support for TLS 1.3 is covered at the moment. + +TLS: key exchanges / asymmetric crypto +-------------------------------------- + +The following key exchanges are not covered at all: + +- RSA +- DHE-RSA +- DHE-PSK +- RSA-PSK +- ECDHE-PSK +- ECDH-RSA +- ECDH-ECDSA +- ECJPAKE + +The following key exchanges are only partially covered: + +- ECDHE-RSA: RSA operations are not covered and, server-side, the ECDHE + operation isn't either +- ECDHE-ECDSA: server-side, the ECDHE operation isn't covered. (ECDSA + signature generation is only covered if using `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`.) + +PSK if covered when the application uses `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()` or +`mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()`. + +TLS: symmetric crypto +--------------------- + +- some ciphers not supported via PSA yet: ARIA, Camellia, ChachaPoly (silent + fallback to the legacy APIs) +- the HMAC part of the CBC and NULL ciphersuites +- the HMAC computation in `ssl_cookie.c` + +X.509 +----- + +- most hash operations are still done via the legacy API, except the few that + are documented above as using PSA +- RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation (from PSA-held keys) +- RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification +- RSA-PSS signature verification diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_encdec.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_encdec.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..46fb04fe --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_encdec.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/** + * \file doc_encdec.h + * + * \brief Encryption/decryption module documentation file. + */ +/* + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/** + * @addtogroup encdec_module Encryption/decryption module + * + * The Encryption/decryption module provides encryption/decryption functions. + * One can differentiate between symmetric and asymmetric algorithms; the + * symmetric ones are mostly used for message confidentiality and the asymmetric + * ones for key exchange and message integrity. + * Some symmetric algorithms provide different block cipher modes, mainly + * Electronic Code Book (ECB) which is used for short (64-bit) messages and + * Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) which provides the structure needed for longer + * messages. In addition the Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB-128) stream cipher mode, + * Counter mode (CTR) and Galois Counter Mode (GCM) are implemented for + * specific algorithms. + * + * All symmetric encryption algorithms are accessible via the generic cipher layer + * (see \c mbedtls_cipher_setup()). + * + * The asymmetric encryptrion algorithms are accessible via the generic public + * key layer (see \c mbedtls_pk_init()). + * + * The following algorithms are provided: + * - Symmetric: + * - AES (see \c mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(), \c mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(), \c mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128() and + * \c mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr()). + * - ARCFOUR (see \c mbedtls_arc4_crypt()). + * - Blowfish / BF (see \c mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(), \c mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc(), + * \c mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64() and \c mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr()) + * - Camellia (see \c mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(), \c mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(), + * \c mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128() and \c mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr()). + * - DES/3DES (see \c mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(), \c mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(), \c mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb() + * and \c mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc()). + * - GCM (AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM) (see \c mbedtls_gcm_init()) + * - XTEA (see \c mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb()). + * - Asymmetric: + * - Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (see \c mbedtls_dhm_read_public(), \c mbedtls_dhm_make_public() + * and \c mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret()). + * - RSA (see \c mbedtls_rsa_public() and \c mbedtls_rsa_private()). + * - Elliptic Curves over GF(p) (see \c mbedtls_ecp_point_init()). + * - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) (see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_init()). + * - Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) (see \c mbedtls_ecdh_init()). + * + * This module provides encryption/decryption which can be used to provide + * secrecy. + * + * It also provides asymmetric key functions which can be used for + * confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. + */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_hashing.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_hashing.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aaa0c789 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_hashing.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/** + * \file doc_hashing.h + * + * \brief Hashing module documentation file. + */ +/* + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/** + * @addtogroup hashing_module Hashing module + * + * The Message Digest (MD) or Hashing module provides one-way hashing + * functions. Such functions can be used for creating a hash message + * authentication code (HMAC) when sending a message. Such a HMAC can be used + * in combination with a private key for authentication, which is a message + * integrity control. + * + * All hash algorithms can be accessed via the generic MD layer (see + * \c mbedtls_md_setup()) + * + * The following hashing-algorithms are provided: + * - MD2, MD4, MD5 128-bit one-way hash functions by Ron Rivest. + * - SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384/512 160-bit or more one-way hash functions by + * NIST and NSA. + * + * This module provides one-way hashing which can be used for authentication. + */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e454a19b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/** + * \file doc_mainpage.h + * + * \brief Main page documentation file. + */ +/* + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/** + * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.28.1 source code documentation + * + * This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS. It was + * automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in + * mbed TLS's source code using Doxygen. (See + * http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/ for more information on Doxygen) + * + * mbed TLS has a simple setup: it provides the ingredients for an SSL/TLS + * implementation. These ingredients are listed as modules in the + * \ref mainpage_modules "Modules section". This "Modules section" introduces + * the high-level module concepts used throughout this documentation.\n + * Some examples of mbed TLS usage can be found in the \ref mainpage_examples + * "Examples section". + * + * @section mainpage_modules Modules + * + * mbed TLS supports SSLv3 up to TLSv1.2 communication by providing the + * following: + * - TCP/IP communication functions: listen, connect, accept, read/write. + * - SSL/TLS communication functions: init, handshake, read/write. + * - X.509 functions: CRT, CRL and key handling + * - Random number generation + * - Hashing + * - Encryption/decryption + * + * Above functions are split up neatly into logical interfaces. These can be + * used separately to provide any of the above functions or to mix-and-match + * into an SSL server/client solution that utilises a X.509 PKI. Examples of + * such implementations are amply provided with the source code. + * + * Note that mbed TLS does not provide a control channel or (multiple) session + * handling without additional work from the developer. + * + * @section mainpage_examples Examples + * + * Example server setup: + * + * \b Prerequisites: + * - X.509 certificate and private key + * - session handling functions + * + * \b Setup: + * - Load your certificate and your private RSA key (X.509 interface) + * - Setup the listening TCP socket (TCP/IP interface) + * - Accept incoming client connection (TCP/IP interface) + * - Initialise as an SSL-server (SSL/TLS interface) + * - Set parameters, e.g. authentication, ciphers, CA-chain, key exchange + * - Set callback functions RNG, IO, session handling + * - Perform an SSL-handshake (SSL/TLS interface) + * - Read/write data (SSL/TLS interface) + * - Close and cleanup (all interfaces) + * + * Example client setup: + * + * \b Prerequisites: + * - X.509 certificate and private key + * - X.509 trusted CA certificates + * + * \b Setup: + * - Load the trusted CA certificates (X.509 interface) + * - Load your certificate and your private RSA key (X.509 interface) + * - Setup a TCP/IP connection (TCP/IP interface) + * - Initialise as an SSL-client (SSL/TLS interface) + * - Set parameters, e.g. authentication mode, ciphers, CA-chain, session + * - Set callback functions RNG, IO + * - Perform an SSL-handshake (SSL/TLS interface) + * - Verify the server certificate (SSL/TLS interface) + * - Write/read data (SSL/TLS interface) + * - Close and cleanup (all interfaces) + */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_rng.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_rng.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b298d3ba --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_rng.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/** + * \file doc_rng.h + * + * \brief Random number generator (RNG) module documentation file. + */ +/* + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/** + * @addtogroup rng_module Random number generator (RNG) module + * + * The Random number generator (RNG) module provides random number + * generation, see \c mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(). + * + * The block-cipher counter-mode based deterministic random + * bit generator (CTR_DBRG) as specified in NIST SP800-90. It needs an external + * source of entropy. For these purposes \c mbedtls_entropy_func() can be used. + * This is an implementation based on a simple entropy accumulator design. + * + * The other number generator that is included is less strong and uses the + * HAVEGE (HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion) software heuristic + * which considered unsafe for primary usage, but provides additional random + * to the entropy pool if enables. + * + * Meaning that there seems to be no practical algorithm that can guess + * the next bit with a probability larger than 1/2 in an output sequence. + * + * This module can be used to generate random numbers. + */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_ssltls.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_ssltls.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6961124e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_ssltls.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/** + * \file doc_ssltls.h + * + * \brief SSL/TLS communication module documentation file. + */ +/* + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/** + * @addtogroup ssltls_communication_module SSL/TLS communication module + * + * The SSL/TLS communication module provides the means to create an SSL/TLS + * communication channel. + * + * The basic provisions are: + * - initialise an SSL/TLS context (see \c mbedtls_ssl_init()). + * - perform an SSL/TLS handshake (see \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake()). + * - read/write (see \c mbedtls_ssl_read() and \c mbedtls_ssl_write()). + * - notify a peer that connection is being closed (see \c mbedtls_ssl_close_notify()). + * + * Many aspects of such a channel are set through parameters and callback + * functions: + * - the endpoint role: client or server. + * - the authentication mode. Should verification take place. + * - the Host-to-host communication channel. A TCP/IP module is provided. + * - the random number generator (RNG). + * - the ciphers to use for encryption/decryption. + * - session control functions. + * - X.509 parameters for certificate-handling and key exchange. + * + * This module can be used to create an SSL/TLS server and client and to provide a basic + * framework to setup and communicate through an SSL/TLS communication channel.\n + * Note that you need to provide for several aspects yourself as mentioned above. + */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_tcpip.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_tcpip.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a705de14 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_tcpip.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/** + * \file doc_tcpip.h + * + * \brief TCP/IP communication module documentation file. + */ +/* + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/** + * @addtogroup tcpip_communication_module TCP/IP communication module + * + * The TCP/IP communication module provides for a channel of + * communication for the \link ssltls_communication_module SSL/TLS communication + * module\endlink to use. + * In the TCP/IP-model it provides for communication up to the Transport + * (or Host-to-host) layer. + * SSL/TLS resides on top of that, in the Application layer, and makes use of + * its basic provisions: + * - listening on a port (see \c mbedtls_net_bind()). + * - accepting a connection (through \c mbedtls_net_accept()). + * - read/write (through \c mbedtls_net_recv()/\c mbedtls_net_send()). + * - close a connection (through \c mbedtls_net_close()). + * + * This way you have the means to, for example, implement and use an UDP or + * IPSec communication solution as a basis. + * + * This module can be used at server- and clientside to provide a basic + * means of communication over the internet. + */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_x509.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_x509.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90496750 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/input/doc_x509.h @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/** + * \file doc_x509.h + * + * \brief X.509 module documentation file. + */ +/* + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/** + * @addtogroup x509_module X.509 module + * + * The X.509 module provides X.509 support for reading, writing and verification + * of certificates. + * In summary: + * - X.509 certificate (CRT) reading (see \c mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(), + * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), \c mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file()). + * - X.509 certificate revocation list (CRL) reading (see + * \c mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(), \c mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(), + * and \c mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file()). + * - X.509 certificate signature verification (see \c + * mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() and \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(). + * - X.509 certificate writing and certificate request writing (see + * \c mbedtls_x509write_crt_der() and \c mbedtls_x509write_csr_der()). + * + * This module can be used to build a certificate authority (CA) chain and + * verify its signature. It is also used to generate Certificate Signing + * Requests and X.509 certificates just as a CA would do. + */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f1800813 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.28.1" +OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = ../apidoc/ +FULL_PATH_NAMES = NO +OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C = YES +EXTRACT_ALL = YES +EXTRACT_PRIVATE = YES +EXTRACT_STATIC = YES +CASE_SENSE_NAMES = NO +INPUT = ../include input +FILE_PATTERNS = *.h +RECURSIVE = YES +EXCLUDE_SYMLINKS = YES +EXCLUDE_PATTERNS = *_internal.h *_wrap.h +SOURCE_BROWSER = YES +REFERENCED_BY_RELATION = YES +REFERENCES_RELATION = YES +ALPHABETICAL_INDEX = NO +HTML_OUTPUT = . +HTML_TIMESTAMP = YES +SEARCHENGINE = YES +GENERATE_LATEX = NO +INCLUDE_PATH = ../include +CLASS_DIAGRAMS = NO +HAVE_DOT = YES +DOT_GRAPH_MAX_NODES = 200 +MAX_DOT_GRAPH_DEPTH = 1000 +DOT_TRANSPARENT = YES diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bf67d02e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Makefile +*.sln +*.vcxproj +mbedtls/check_config diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..62c0f620 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +option(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS "Install mbed TLS headers." ON) + +if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS) + + file(GLOB headers "mbedtls/*.h") + file(GLOB psa_headers "psa/*.h") + + install(FILES ${headers} + DESTINATION include/mbedtls + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) + + install(FILES ${psa_headers} + DESTINATION include/psa + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) + +endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS) + +# Make config.h available in an out-of-source build. ssl-opt.sh requires it. +if (ENABLE_TESTING AND NOT ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR} STREQUAL ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}) + link_to_source(mbedtls) + link_to_source(psa) +endif() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..401ac39d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h @@ -0,0 +1,689 @@ +/** + * \file aes.h + * + * \brief This file contains AES definitions and functions. + * + * The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a FIPS-approved + * cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect electronic + * data. + * + * The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can + * encrypt and decrypt information. For more information, see + * FIPS Publication 197: Advanced Encryption Standard and + * ISO/IEC 18033-2:2006: Information technology -- Security + * techniques -- Encryption algorithms -- Part 2: Asymmetric + * ciphers. + * + * The AES-XTS block mode is standardized by NIST SP 800-38E + * + * and described in detail by IEEE P1619 + * . + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_AES_H +#define MBEDTLS_AES_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include + +/* padlock.c and aesni.c rely on these values! */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT 1 /**< AES encryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT 0 /**< AES decryption. */ + +/* Error codes in range 0x0020-0x0022 */ +/** Invalid key length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x0020 +/** Invalid data input length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0022 + +/* Error codes in range 0x0021-0x0025 */ +/** Invalid input data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0021 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0023 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** AES hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0025 + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The AES context-type definition. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_aes_context +{ + int nr; /*!< The number of rounds. */ + uint32_t *rk; /*!< AES round keys. */ + uint32_t buf[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can + hold 32 extra Bytes, which can be used for + one of the following purposes: +
  • Alignment if VIA padlock is + used.
    • +
  • Simplifying key expansion in the 256-bit + case by generating an extra round key. +
*/ +} +mbedtls_aes_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/** + * \brief The AES XTS context-type definition. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context +{ + mbedtls_aes_context crypt; /*!< The AES context to use for AES block + encryption or decryption. */ + mbedtls_aes_context tweak; /*!< The AES context used for tweak + computation. */ +} mbedtls_aes_xts_context; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ +#include "aes_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified AES context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES context. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to clear. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified AES XTS context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES XTS context. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to clear. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/** + * \brief This function sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The size of data passed in bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
    • + *
  • 192 bits
    • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the decryption key. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
    • + *
  • 192 bits
    • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/** + * \brief This function prepares an XTS context for encryption and + * sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1 + * concatenated with the XTS key2. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)
    • + *
  • 512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function prepares an XTS context for decryption and + * sets the decryption key. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1 + * concatenated with the XTS key2. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)
    • + *
  • 512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES single-block encryption or + * decryption operation. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode parameter + * (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in + * the \p input parameter. + * + * mbedtls_aes_init(), and either mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() or + * mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec() must be called before the first + * call to this API with the same context. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and at least \c 16 Bytes long. + * \param output The buffer where the output data will be written. + * It must be writeable and at least \c 16 Bytes long. + + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-CBC encryption or decryption operation + * on full blocks. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in + * the \p input parameter. + * + * It can be called as many times as needed, until all the input + * data is processed. mbedtls_aes_init(), and either + * mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() or mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec() must be called + * before the first call to this API with the same context. + * + * \note This function operates on full blocks, that is, the input size + * must be a multiple of the AES block size of \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the IV, you should + * either save it manually or use the cipher module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a + * multiple of the block size (\c 16 Bytes). + * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + * on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-XTS encryption or decryption + * operation for an entire XTS data unit. + * + * AES-XTS encrypts or decrypts blocks based on their location as + * defined by a data unit number. The data unit number must be + * provided by \p data_unit. + * + * NIST SP 800-38E limits the maximum size of a data unit to 2^20 + * AES blocks. If the data unit is larger than this, this function + * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to use for AES XTS operations. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length of a data unit in Bytes. This can be any + * length between 16 bytes and 2^24 bytes inclusive + * (between 1 and 2^20 block cipher blocks). + * \param data_unit The address of the data unit encoded as an array of 16 + * bytes in little-endian format. For disk encryption, this + * is typically the index of the block device sector that + * contains the data. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data (which is an entire + * data unit). This function reads \p length Bytes from \p + * input. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data (which is an entire + * data unit). This function writes \p length Bytes to \p + * output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if \p length is + * smaller than an AES block in size (16 Bytes) or if \p + * length is larger than 2^20 blocks (16 MiB). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-CFB128 encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer + * defined in the \p input parameter. + * + * For CFB, you must set up the context with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(), + * regardless of whether you are performing an encryption or decryption + * operation, that is, regardless of the \p mode parameter. This is + * because CFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and + * decryption. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you must either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). + * It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-CFB8 encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined + * in the \p input parameter. + * + * Due to the nature of CFB, you must use the same key schedule for + * both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you must + * use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() for + * both #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param length The length of the input data. + * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode) + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * For OFB, you must set up the context with + * mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(), regardless of whether you are + * performing an encryption or decryption operation. This is + * because OFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and + * decryption. + * + * The OFB operation is identical for encryption or decryption, + * therefore no operation mode needs to be specified. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of iv, the Initialisation Vector, is + * updated so that you can call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was encrypted + * in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage, by initialising + * iv_off to 0 before the first call, and preserving its value + * between calls. + * + * For non-streaming use, the iv should be initialised on each call + * to a unique value, and iv_off set to 0 on each call. + * + * If you need to retain the contents of the initialisation vector, + * you must either save it manually or use the cipher module + * instead. + * + * \warning For the OFB mode, the initialisation vector must be unique + * every encryption operation. Reuse of an initialisation vector + * will compromise security. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data. + * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). + * It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-CTR encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule + * for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you + * must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() + * for both #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * + * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so + * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with + * the same nonce and key. + * + * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: + * + * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over + * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to + * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and + * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p + * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be + * updated by this function. + * + * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128 + * blocks of data with the same key. + * + * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p + * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a + * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one + * updated by this function internally. + * + * For example, you might reserve the first 12 bytes for the + * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that + * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to + * set the first 12 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce + * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p + * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most + * 2**96 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. + * + * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct + * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. + * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message + * counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, but this + * limits the number of messages that can be securely encrypted: + * for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should not encrypt + * more than 2**32 messages with the same key. + * + * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and + * that an AES block is 16 bytes. + * + * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its + * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be + * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data. + * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block, for + * resuming within the current cipher stream. The + * offset pointer should be 0 at the start of a stream. + * It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. + * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This is + * overwritten by the function. + * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +/** + * \brief Internal AES block encryption function. This is only + * exposed to allow overriding it using + * \c MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption. + * \param input The plaintext block. + * \param output The output (ciphertext) block. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Internal AES block decryption function. This is only + * exposed to allow overriding it using see + * \c MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption. + * \param input The ciphertext block. + * \param output The output (plaintext) block. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Deprecated internal AES block encryption function + * without return value. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption. + * \param input Plaintext block. + * \param output Output (ciphertext) block. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Deprecated internal AES block decryption function + * without return value. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption. + * \param input Ciphertext block. + * \param output Output (plaintext) block. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* aes.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1d22f59 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +/** + * \file aesni.h + * + * \brief AES-NI for hardware AES acceleration on some Intel processors + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ( defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) ) && \ + ! defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Internal function to detect the AES-NI feature in CPUs. + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param what The feature to detect + * (MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES or MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL) + * + * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_has_support( unsigned int what ); + +/** + * \brief Internal AES-NI AES-ECB block encryption and decryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param input 16-byte input block + * \param output 16-byte output block + * + * \return 0 on success (cannot fail) + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param c Result + * \param a First operand + * \param b Second operand + * + * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as + * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec. + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes + * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher + * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption) + * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one) + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr ); + +/** + * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written + * \param key Encryption key + * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f4b0f9f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +/** + * \file arc4.h + * + * \brief The ARCFOUR stream cipher + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ARC4_H +#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** ARC4 hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0019 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief ARC4 context structure + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_arc4_context +{ + int x; /*!< permutation index */ + int y; /*!< permutation index */ + unsigned char m[256]; /*!< permutation table */ +} +mbedtls_arc4_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ +#include "arc4_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize ARC4 context + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context to be initialized + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_arc4_init( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear ARC4 context + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context to be cleared + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_arc4_free( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief ARC4 key schedule + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context to be setup + * \param key the secret key + * \param keylen length of the key, in bytes + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_arc4_setup( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen ); + +/** + * \brief ARC4 cipher function + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context + * \param length length of the input data + * \param input buffer holding the input data + * \param output buffer for the output data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_arc4_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* arc4.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d294c47f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +/** + * \file aria.h + * + * \brief ARIA block cipher + * + * The ARIA algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt and + * decrypt information. It is defined by the Korean Agency for + * Technology and Standards (KATS) in KS X 1213:2004 (in + * Korean, but see http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/index-e.html in English) + * and also described by the IETF in RFC 5794. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ARIA_H +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT 1 /**< ARIA encryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT 0 /**< ARIA decryption. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< ARIA block size in bytes. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS 16 /**< Maximum number of rounds in ARIA. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_KEYSIZE 32 /**< Maximum size of an ARIA key in bytes. */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( -0x005C ) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +/** Bad input data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x005C + +/** Invalid data input length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x005A + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** ARIA hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0058 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The ARIA context-type definition. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_aria_context +{ + unsigned char nr; /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */ + /*! The ARIA round keys. */ + uint32_t rk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4]; +} +mbedtls_aria_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ +#include "aria_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified ARIA context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_aria_init( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified ARIA context. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized ARIA context. + */ +void mbedtls_aria_free( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound. + * This must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The size of \p key in Bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
    • + *
  • 192 bits
    • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the decryption key. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound. + * This must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
    • + *
  • 192 bits
    • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an ARIA single-block encryption or + * decryption operation. + * + * It performs encryption or decryption (depending on whether + * the key was set for encryption on decryption) on the input + * data buffer defined in the \p input parameter. + * + * mbedtls_aria_init(), and either mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() or + * mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec() must be called before the first + * call to this API with the same context. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param input The 16-Byte buffer holding the input data. + * \param output The 16-Byte buffer holding the output data. + + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CBC encryption or decryption operation + * on full blocks. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in + * the \p input parameter. + * + * It can be called as many times as needed, until all the input + * data is processed. mbedtls_aria_init(), and either + * mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() or mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec() must be called + * before the first call to this API with the same context. + * + * \note This function operates on aligned blocks, that is, the input size + * must be a multiple of the ARIA block size of 16 Bytes. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the IV, you should + * either save it manually or use the cipher module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a + * multiple of the block size (16 Bytes). + * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use). + * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/** + * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CFB128 encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer + * defined in the \p input parameter. + * + * For CFB, you must set up the context with mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(), + * regardless of whether you are performing an encryption or decryption + * operation, that is, regardless of the \p mode parameter. This is + * because CFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and + * decryption. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you must either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). + * This must not be larger than 15. + * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/** + * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CTR encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * This function performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer + * defined in the \p input parameter. + * + * Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule + * for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you + * must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() + * for both #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT. + * + * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so + * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with + * the same nonce and key. + * + * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: + * + * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over + * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to + * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and + * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p + * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be + * updated by this function. + * + * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128 + * blocks of data with the same key. + * + * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p + * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a + * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one + * updated by this function internally. + * + * For example, you might reserve the first 12 bytes for the + * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that + * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to + * set the first 12 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce + * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p + * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most + * 2**96 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. + * + * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct + * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. + * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message + * counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, but this + * limits the number of messages that can be securely encrypted: + * for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should not encrypt + * more than 2**32 messages with the same key. + * + * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and + * that an ARIA block is 16 bytes. + * + * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its + * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be + * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * \param nc_off The offset in Bytes in the current \p stream_block, + * for resuming within the current cipher stream. The + * offset pointer should be \c 0 at the start of a + * stream. This must not be larger than \c 15 Bytes. + * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must point to + * a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This must + * point to a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes. + * This is overwritten by the function. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, or \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* aria.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5117fc7a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h @@ -0,0 +1,616 @@ +/** + * \file asn1.h + * + * \brief Generic ASN.1 parsing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_H +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup asn1_module + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \name ASN1 Error codes + * These error codes are OR'ed to X509 error codes for + * higher error granularity. + * ASN1 is a standard to specify data structures. + * \{ + */ +/** Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA -0x0060 +/** ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -0x0062 +/** Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH -0x0064 +/** Actual length differs from expected length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH -0x0066 +/** Data is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -0x0068 +/** Memory allocation failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED -0x006A +/** Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x006C + +/** \} name ASN1 Error codes */ + +/** + * \name DER constants + * These constants comply with the DER encoded ASN.1 type tags. + * DER encoding uses hexadecimal representation. + * An example DER sequence is:\n + * - 0x02 -- tag indicating INTEGER + * - 0x01 -- length in octets + * - 0x05 -- value + * Such sequences are typically read into \c ::mbedtls_x509_buf. + * \{ + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN 0x01 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER 0x02 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING 0x03 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x04 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL 0x05 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID 0x06 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED 0x0A +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING 0x0C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x10 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET 0x11 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING 0x13 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING 0x14 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING 0x16 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME 0x17 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME 0x18 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING 0x1C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING 0x1E +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE 0x00 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED 0x20 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 0x80 + +/* Slightly smaller way to check if tag is a string tag + * compared to canonical implementation. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG( tag ) \ + ( ( tag ) < 32u && ( \ + ( ( 1u << ( tag ) ) & ( ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) ) != 0 ) ) + +/* + * Bit masks for each of the components of an ASN.1 tag as specified in + * ITU X.690 (08/2015), section 8.1 "General rules for encoding", + * paragraph 8.1.2.2: + * + * Bit 8 7 6 5 1 + * +-------+-----+------------+ + * | Class | P/C | Tag number | + * +-------+-----+------------+ + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK 0xC0 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_PC_MASK 0x20 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK 0x1F + +/** \} name DER constants */ + +/** Returns the size of the binary string, without the trailing \\0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) - 1) + +/** + * Compares an mbedtls_asn1_buf structure to a reference OID. + * + * Only works for 'defined' oid_str values (MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1), you cannot use a + * 'unsigned char *oid' here! + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(oid_str, oid_buf) \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf)->len ) || \ + memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf)->p, (oid_buf)->len) != 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(oid_str, oid_buf, oid_buf_len) \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf_len) ) || \ + memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf), (oid_buf_len) ) != 0 ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN1 using DER. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_buf +{ + int tag; /**< ASN1 type, e.g. MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. */ + size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ + unsigned char *p; /**< ASN1 data, e.g. in ASCII. */ +} +mbedtls_asn1_buf; + +/** + * Container for ASN1 bit strings. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_bitstring +{ + size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ + unsigned char unused_bits; /**< Number of unused bits at the end of the string */ + unsigned char *p; /**< Raw ASN1 data for the bit string */ +} +mbedtls_asn1_bitstring; + +/** + * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence +{ + mbedtls_asn1_buf buf; /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ +} +mbedtls_asn1_sequence; + +/** + * Container for a sequence or list of 'named' ASN.1 data items + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data +{ + mbedtls_asn1_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ + mbedtls_asn1_buf val; /**< The named value. */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ + unsigned char next_merged; /**< Merge next item into the current one? */ +} +mbedtls_asn1_named_data; + +/** + * \brief Get the length of an ASN.1 element. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the length. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the first byte of the length, + * i.e. immediately after the tag. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length + * read from the ASN.1 input. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element + * would end beyond \p end. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparsable. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_len( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ); + +/** + * \brief Get the tag and length of the element. + * Check for the requested tag. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the tag and length. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length + * read from the ASN.1 input. + * \param tag The expected tag. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the data does not start + * with the requested tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element + * would end beyond \p end. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparsable. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len, int tag ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve a boolean ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param val On success, the parsed value (\c 0 or \c 1). + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 BOOLEAN. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param val On success, the parsed value. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does + * not fit in an \c int. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve an enumerated ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param val On success, the parsed value. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 ENUMERATED. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does + * not fit in an \c int. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param bs On success, ::mbedtls_asn1_bitstring information about + * the parsed value. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains + * extra data after a valid BIT STRING. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag without unused bits and its + * value. + * Updates the pointer to the beginning of the bit/octet string. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * of the content of the BIT STRING. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param len On success, \c *len is the length of the content in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input starts with + * a valid BIT STRING with a nonzero number of unused bits. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ); + +/** + * \brief Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF ". + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full sequence tag. + * + * This function allocates memory for the sequence elements. You can free + * the allocated memory with mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(). + * + * \note On error, this function may return a partial list in \p cur. + * You must set `cur->next = NULL` before calling this function! + * Otherwise it is impossible to distinguish a previously non-null + * pointer from a pointer to an object allocated by this function. + * + * \note If the sequence is empty, this function does not modify + * \c *cur. If the sequence is valid and non-empty, this + * function sets `cur->buf.tag` to \p tag. This allows + * callers to distinguish between an empty sequence and + * a one-element sequence. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param cur A ::mbedtls_asn1_sequence which this function fills. + * When this function returns, \c *cur is the head of a linked + * list. Each node in this list is allocated with + * mbedtls_calloc() apart from \p cur itself, and should + * therefore be freed with mbedtls_free(). + * The list describes the content of the sequence. + * The head of the list (i.e. \c *cur itself) describes the + * first element, `*cur->next` describes the second element, etc. + * For each element, `buf.tag == tag`, `buf.len` is the length + * of the content of the content of the element, and `buf.p` + * points to the first byte of the content (i.e. immediately + * past the length of the element). + * Note that list elements may be allocated even on error. + * \param tag Each element of the sequence must have this tag. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains + * extra data after a valid SEQUENCE OF \p tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts with + * an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag that + * is different from \p tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, + int tag ); +/** + * \brief Free a heap-allocated linked list presentation of + * an ASN.1 sequence, including the first element. + * + * There are two common ways to manage the memory used for the representation + * of a parsed ASN.1 sequence: + * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` with mbedtls_calloc(). + * Pass this node as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(). + * When you have finished processing the sequence, + * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head`. + * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` in any manner, + * for example on the stack. Make sure that `head->next == NULL`. + * Pass `head` as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(). + * When you have finished processing the sequence, + * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head->cur`, + * then free `head` itself in the appropriate manner. + * + * \param seq The address of the first sequence component. This may + * be \c NULL, in which case this functions returns + * immediately. + */ +void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free( mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq ); + +/** + * \brief Traverse an ASN.1 SEQUENCE container and + * call a callback for each entry. + * + * This function checks that the input is a SEQUENCE of elements that + * each have a "must" tag, and calls a callback function on the elements + * that have a "may" tag. + * + * For example, to validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of `tag1` and call + * `cb` on each element, use + * ``` + * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xff, tag1, 0, 0, cb, ctx); + * ``` + * + * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of ANY and call `cb` on + * each element, use + * ``` + * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0, 0, 0, 0, cb, ctx); + * ``` + * + * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of CHOICE {NULL, OCTET STRING} + * and call `cb` on each element that is an OCTET STRING, use + * ``` + * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xfe, 0x04, 0xff, 0x04, cb, ctx); + * ``` + * + * The callback is called on the elements with a "may" tag from left to + * right. If the input is not a valid SEQUENCE of elements with a "must" tag, + * the callback is called on the elements up to the leftmost point where + * the input is invalid. + * + * \warning This function is still experimental and may change + * at any time. + * + * \param p The address of the pointer to the beginning of + * the ASN.1 SEQUENCE header. This is updated to + * point to the end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container + * on a successful invocation. + * \param end The end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container. + * \param tag_must_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within + * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_must_value. + * \param tag_must_val The required value of each ASN.1 tag found in the + * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_must_mask. + * Mismatching tags lead to an error. + * For example, a value of \c 0 for both \p tag_must_mask + * and \p tag_must_val means that every tag is allowed, + * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_must_mask means + * that \p tag_must_val is the only allowed tag. + * \param tag_may_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within + * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_may_value. + * \param tag_may_val The desired value of each ASN.1 tag found in the + * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_may_mask. + * Mismatching tags will be silently ignored. + * For example, a value of \c 0 for \p tag_may_mask and + * \p tag_may_val means that any tag will be considered, + * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_may_mask means + * that all tags with value different from \p tag_may_val + * will be ignored. + * \param cb The callback to trigger for each component + * in the ASN.1 SEQUENCE that matches \p tag_may_val. + * The callback function is called with the following + * parameters: + * - \p ctx. + * - The tag of the current element. + * - A pointer to the start of the current element's + * content inside the input. + * - The length of the content of the current element. + * If the callback returns a non-zero value, + * the function stops immediately, + * forwarding the callback's return value. + * \param ctx The context to be passed to the callback \p cb. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful the entire ASN.1 SEQUENCE + * was traversed without parsing or callback errors. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input + * contains extra data after a valid SEQUENCE + * of elements with an accepted tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts + * with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag + * that is not accepted. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE. + * \return A non-zero error code forwarded from the callback + * \p cb in case the latter returns a non-zero value. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val, + unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val, + int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, + unsigned char* start, size_t len ), + void *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param X On success, the parsed value. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does + * not fit in an \c int. + * \return An MPI error code if the parsed value is too large. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +/** + * \brief Retrieve an AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 sequence. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full + * AlgorithmIdentifier. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID. + * \param params The buffer to receive the parameters. + * This is zeroized if there are no parameters. + * + * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve an AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 sequence with NULL or no + * params. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full + * AlgorithmIdentifier. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID. + * + * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg ); + +/** + * \brief Find a specific named_data entry in a sequence or list based on + * the OID. + * + * \param list The list to seek through + * \param oid The OID to look for + * \param len Size of the OID + * + * \return NULL if not found, or a pointer to the existing entry. + */ +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Free a mbedtls_asn1_named_data entry + * + * \param entry The named data entry to free. + * This function calls mbedtls_free() on + * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p`. + */ +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *entry ); + +/** + * \brief Free all entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list. + * + * \param head Pointer to the head of the list of named data entries to free. + * This function calls mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data() and + * mbedtls_free() on each list element and + * sets \c *head to \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head ); + +/** \} name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures */ +/** \} addtogroup asn1_module */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* asn1.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..44afae0e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +/** + * \file asn1write.h + * + * \brief ASN.1 buffer writing functionality + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(g, f) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( ret = (f) ) < 0 ) \ + return( ret ); \ + else \ + (g) += ret; \ + } while( 0 ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param len The length value to write. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + size_t len ); +/** + * \brief Write an ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param tag The tag to write. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char tag ); + +/** + * \brief Write raw buffer data. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The data buffer to write. + * \param size The length of the data buffer. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Write a arbitrary-precision number (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param X The MPI to write. + * It must be non-negative. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_mpi *X ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +/** + * \brief Write a NULL tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL) with zero data + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ); + +/** + * \brief Write an OID tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param oid The OID to write. + * \param oid_len The length of the OID. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write an AlgorithmIdentifier sequence in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param oid The OID of the algorithm to write. + * \param oid_len The length of the algorithm's OID. + * \param par_len The length of the parameters, which must be already written. + * If 0, NULL parameters are added + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + size_t par_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a boolean tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) and value + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param boolean The boolean value to write, either \c 0 or \c 1. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + int boolean ); + +/** + * \brief Write an int tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) and value + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param val The integer value to write. + * It must be non-negative. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ); + +/** + * \brief Write an enum tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED) and value + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param val The integer value to write. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ); + +/** + * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using a specific + * string encoding tag. + + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param tag The string encoding tag to write, e.g. + * #MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + int tag, const char *text, + size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the PrintableString + * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING). + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a UTF8 string in ASN.1 format using the UTF8String + * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING). + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the IA5String + * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING). + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a bitstring tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and + * value in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The bitstring to write. + * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ); + +/** + * \brief This function writes a named bitstring tag + * (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and value in ASN.1 format. + * + * As stated in RFC 5280 Appendix B, trailing zeroes are + * omitted when encoding named bitstrings in DER. + * + * \note This function works backwards within the data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer which is used for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The bitstring to write. + * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t bits ); + +/** + * \brief Write an octet string tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) + * and value in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The buffer holding the data to write. + * \param size The length of the data buffer \p buf. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +/** + * \brief Create or find a specific named_data entry for writing in a + * sequence or list based on the OID. If not already in there, + * a new entry is added to the head of the list. + * Warning: Destructive behaviour for the val data! + * + * \param list The pointer to the location of the head of the list to seek + * through (will be updated in case of a new entry). + * \param oid The OID to look for. + * \param oid_len The size of the OID. + * \param val The associated data to store. If this is \c NULL, + * no data is copied to the new or existing buffer. + * \param val_len The minimum length of the data buffer needed. + * If this is 0, do not allocate a buffer for the associated + * data. + * If the OID was already present, enlarge, shrink or free + * the existing buffer to fit \p val_len. + * + * \return A pointer to the new / existing entry on success. + * \return \c NULL if if there was a memory allocation error. + */ +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **list, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf4149e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/** + * \file base64.h + * + * \brief RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_H +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/** Output buffer too small. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x002A +/** Invalid character in input. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER -0x002C + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Encode a buffer into base64 format + * + * \param dst destination buffer + * \param dlen size of the destination buffer + * \param olen number of bytes written + * \param src source buffer + * \param slen amount of data to be encoded + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * *olen is always updated to reflect the amount + * of data that has (or would have) been written. + * If that length cannot be represented, then no data is + * written to the buffer and *olen is set to the maximum + * length representable as a size_t. + * + * \note Call this function with dlen = 0 to obtain the + * required buffer size in *olen + */ +int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ); + +/** + * \brief Decode a base64-formatted buffer + * + * \param dst destination buffer (can be NULL for checking size) + * \param dlen size of the destination buffer + * \param olen number of bytes written + * \param src source buffer + * \param slen amount of data to be decoded + * + * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER if the input data is + * not correct. *olen is always updated to reflect the amount + * of data that has (or would have) been written. + * + * \note Call this function with *dst = NULL or dlen = 0 to obtain + * the required buffer size in *olen + */ +int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_base64_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* base64.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dd594c51 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h @@ -0,0 +1,1063 @@ +/** + * \file bignum.h + * + * \brief Multi-precision integer library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +/** An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x0002 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0004 +/** There is an invalid character in the digit string. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER -0x0006 +/** The buffer is too small to write to. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0008 +/** The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE -0x000A +/** The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO -0x000C +/** The input arguments are not acceptable. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE -0x000E +/** Memory allocation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED -0x0010 + +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( ret = (f) ) != 0 ) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Maximum size MPIs are allowed to grow to in number of limbs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS 10000 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) +/* + * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 6 + * Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6. + * + * Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used + * for the sliding window calculation. (So 64 by default) + * + * Reduction in size, reduces speed. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) +/* + * Maximum size of MPIs allowed in bits and bytes for user-MPIs. + * ( Default: 512 bytes => 4096 bits, Maximum tested: 2048 bytes => 16384 bits ) + * + * Note: Calculations can temporarily result in larger MPIs. So the number + * of limbs required (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) is higher. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ( 8 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) /**< Maximum number of bits for usable MPIs. */ + +/* + * When reading from files with mbedtls_mpi_read_file() and writing to files with + * mbedtls_mpi_write_file() the buffer should have space + * for a (short) label, the MPI (in the provided radix), the newline + * characters and the '\0'. + * + * By default we assume at least a 10 char label, a minimum radix of 10 + * (decimal) and a maximum of 4096 bit numbers (1234 decimal chars). + * Autosized at compile time for at least a 10 char label, a minimum radix + * of 10 (decimal) for a number of MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS size. + * + * This used to be statically sized to 1250 for a maximum of 4096 bit + * numbers (1234 decimal chars). + * + * Calculate using the formula: + * MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE = ceil(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS / ln(10) * ln(2)) + + * LabelSize + 6 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 ( 100 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) +#define MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 332 +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ( ((MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 + MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 - 1) / MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100) + 10 + 6 ) + +/* + * Define the base integer type, architecture-wise. + * + * 32 or 64-bit integer types can be forced regardless of the underlying + * architecture by defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 or MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + * respectively and undefining MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM. + * + * Double-width integers (e.g. 128-bit in 64-bit architectures) can be + * disabled by defining MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + #if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_AMD64) + /* Always choose 64-bit when using MSC */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #elif defined(__GNUC__) && ( \ + defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || \ + defined(__ia64__) || defined(__alpha__) || \ + ( defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__) ) || \ + defined(__s390x__) || defined(__mips64) || \ + defined(__aarch64__) ) + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ + typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI))); + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ + #elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && defined(__aarch64__) + /* + * __ARMCC_VERSION is defined for both armcc and armclang and + * __aarch64__ is only defined by armclang when compiling 64-bit code + */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ + typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl; + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ + #elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + /* Force 64-bit integers with unknown compiler */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + /* Default to 32-bit compilation */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ + typedef int32_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint32_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl; + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief MPI structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_mpi +{ + int s; /*!< Sign: -1 if the mpi is negative, 1 otherwise */ + size_t n; /*!< total # of limbs */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; /*!< pointer to limbs */ +} +mbedtls_mpi; + +/** + * \brief Initialize an MPI context. + * + * This makes the MPI ready to be set or freed, + * but does not define a value for the MPI. + * + * \param X The MPI context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_init( mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of an MPI context. + * + * \param X The MPI context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is + * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized MPI. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_free( mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief Enlarge an MPI to the specified number of limbs. + * + * \note This function does nothing if the MPI is + * already large enough. + * + * \param X The MPI to grow. It must be initialized. + * \param nblimbs The target number of limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_grow( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ); + +/** + * \brief This function resizes an MPI downwards, keeping at least the + * specified number of limbs. + * + * If \c X is smaller than \c nblimbs, it is resized up + * instead. + * + * \param X The MPI to shrink. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param nblimbs The minimum number of limbs to keep. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * (this can only happen when resizing up). + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ); + +/** + * \brief Make a copy of an MPI. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \note The limb-buffer in the destination MPI is enlarged + * if necessary to hold the value in the source MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); + +/** + * \brief Swap the contents of two MPIs. + * + * \param X The first MPI. It must be initialized. + * \param Y The second MPI. It must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of MPI which doesn't + * reveal whether the condition was true or not. + * + * \param X The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point + * to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the + * assignment or not. Possible values: + * * \c 1: Perform the assignment `X = Y`. + * * \c 0: Keep the original value of \p X. + * + * \note This function is equivalent to + * `if( assign ) mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, Y );` + * except that it avoids leaking any information about whether + * the assignment was done or not (the above code may leak + * information through branch prediction and/or memory access + * patterns analysis). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap which doesn't + * reveal whether the condition was true or not. + * + * \param X The first MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param Y The second MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform + * the swap or not. Possible values: + * * \c 1: Swap the values of \p X and \p Y. + * * \c 0: Keep the original values of \p X and \p Y. + * + * \note This function is equivalent to + * if( assign ) mbedtls_mpi_swap( X, Y ); + * except that it avoids leaking any information about whether + * the assignment was done or not (the above code may leak + * information through branch prediction and/or memory access + * patterns analysis). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign ); + +/** + * \brief Store integer value in MPI. + * + * \param X The MPI to set. This must be initialized. + * \param z The value to use. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ); + +/** + * \brief Get a specific bit from an MPI. + * + * \param X The MPI to query. This must be initialized. + * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to query. + * + * \return \c 0 or \c 1 on success, depending on whether bit \c pos + * of \c X is unset or set. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos ); + +/** + * \brief Modify a specific bit in an MPI. + * + * \note This function will grow the target MPI if necessary to set a + * bit to \c 1 in a not yet existing limb. It will not grow if + * the bit should be set to \c 0. + * + * \param X The MPI to modify. This must be initialized. + * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to modify. + * \param val The desired value of bit \c pos: \c 0 or \c 1. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val ); + +/** + * \brief Return the number of bits of value \c 0 before the + * least significant bit of value \c 1. + * + * \note This is the same as the zero-based index of + * the least significant bit of value \c 1. + * + * \param X The MPI to query. + * + * \return The number of bits of value \c 0 before the least significant + * bit of value \c 1 in \p X. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief Return the number of bits up to and including the most + * significant bit of value \c 1. + * + * * \note This is same as the one-based index of the most + * significant bit of value \c 1. + * + * \param X The MPI to query. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return The number of bits up to and including the most + * significant bit of value \c 1. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief Return the total size of an MPI value in bytes. + * + * \param X The MPI to use. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \note The value returned by this function may be less than + * the number of bytes used to store \p X internally. + * This happens if and only if there are trailing bytes + * of value zero. + * + * \return The least number of bytes capable of storing + * the absolute value of \p X. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_size( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief Import an MPI from an ASCII string. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base of the input string. + * \param s Null-terminated string buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ); + +/** + * \brief Export an MPI to an ASCII string. + * + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base of the output string. + * \param buf The buffer to write the string to. This must be writable + * buffer of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The available size in Bytes of \p buf. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of the string + * written, including the final \c NULL byte. This must + * not be \c NULL. + * + * \note You can call this function with `buflen == 0` to obtain the + * minimum required buffer size in `*olen`. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer \p buf + * is too small to hold the value of \p X in the desired base. + * In this case, `*olen` is nonetheless updated to contain the + * size of \p buf required for a successful call. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Read an MPI from a line in an opened file. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base of the string representation used + * in the source line. + * \param fin The input file handle to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * + * \note On success, this function advances the file stream + * to the end of the current line or to EOF. + * + * The function returns \c 0 on an empty line. + * + * Leading whitespaces are ignored, as is a + * '0x' prefix for radix \c 16. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the file read buffer + * is too small. + * \return Another negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ); + +/** + * \brief Export an MPI into an opened file. + * + * \param p A string prefix to emit prior to the MPI data. + * For example, this might be a label, or "0x" when + * printing in base \c 16. This may be \c NULL if no prefix + * is needed. + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base to be used in the emitted string. + * \param fout The output file handle. This may be \c NULL, in which case + * the output is written to \c stdout. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, + int radix, FILE *fout ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/** + * \brief Import an MPI from unsigned big endian binary data. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian. + * Always fills the whole buffer, which will start with zeros + * if the number is smaller. + * + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p X. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian. + * Always fills the whole buffer, which will end with zeros + * if the number is smaller. + * + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p X. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a left-shift on an MPI: X <<= count + * + * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a right-shift on an MPI: X >>= count + * + * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ); + +/** + * \brief Compare the absolute values of two MPIs. + * + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 1 if `|X|` is greater than `|Y|`. + * \return \c -1 if `|X|` is lesser than `|Y|`. + * \return \c 0 if `|X|` is equal to `|Y|`. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); + +/** + * \brief Compare two MPIs. + * + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p Y. + * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p Y. + * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p Y. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); + +/** + * \brief Check if an MPI is less than the other in constant time. + * + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI + * with the same allocated length as Y. + * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI + * with the same allocated length as X. + * \param ret The result of the comparison: + * \c 1 if \p X is less than \p Y. + * \c 0 if \p X is greater than or equal to \p Y. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the allocated length of + * the two input MPIs is not the same. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret ); + +/** + * \brief Compare an MPI with an integer. + * + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param z The integer value to compare \p X to. + * + * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p z. + * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p z. + * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p z. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ); + +/** + * \brief Perform an unsigned addition of MPIs: X = |A| + |B| + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform an unsigned subtraction of MPIs: X = |A| - |B| + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is greater than \p A. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a signed addition of MPIs: X = A + B + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of MPIs: X = A - B + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a signed addition of an MPI and an integer: X = A + b + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param b The second summand. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of an MPI and an integer: + * X = A - b + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param b The subtrahend. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a multiplication of two MPIs: X = A * B + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a multiplication of an MPI with an unsigned integer: + * X = A * b + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param b The second factor. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a division with remainder of two MPIs: + * A = Q * B + R + * + * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * quotient is not needed. + * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * remainder is not needed. + * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param B The divisor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a division with remainder of an MPI by an integer: + * A = Q * b + R + * + * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * quotient is not needed. + * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * remainder is not needed. + * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param b The divisor. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a modular reduction. R = A mod B + * + * \param R The destination MPI for the residue value. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The base of the modular reduction. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is negative. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a modular reduction with respect to an integer. + * r = A mod b + * + * \param r The address at which to store the residue. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of. + * This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param b The integer base of the modular reduction. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p b is negative. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The base of the exponentiation. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param E The exponent MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param N The base for the modular reduction. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * \param prec_RR A helper MPI depending solely on \p N which can be used to + * speed-up multiple modular exponentiations for the same value + * of \p N. This may be \c NULL. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized MPI. If it hasn't been used after + * the call to mbedtls_mpi_init(), this function will compute + * the helper value and store it in \p prec_RR for reuse on + * subsequent calls to this function. Otherwise, the function + * will assume that \p prec_RR holds the helper value set by a + * previous call to mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(), and reuse it. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \c N is negative or + * even, or if \c E is negative. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failures. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR ); + +/** + * \brief Fill an MPI with a number of random bytes. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param size The number of random bytes to generate. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on failure. + * + * \note The bytes obtained from the RNG are interpreted + * as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can + * be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param min The minimum value to return. + * It must be nonnegative. + * \param N The upper bound of the range, exclusive. + * In other words, this is one plus the maximum value to return. + * \p N must be strictly larger than \p min. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p min or \p N is invalid + * or if they are incompatible. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + * \return Another negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi_sint min, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Compute the greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) + * + * \param G The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first operand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second operand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Compute the modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The MPI to calculate the modular inverse of. This must point + * to an initialized MPI. + * \param N The base of the modular inversion. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N is less than + * or equal to one. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p has no modular inverse + * with respect to \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *N ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Perform a Miller-Rabin primality test with error + * probability of 2-80. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows + * specifying the number of Miller-Rabin rounds. + * + * \param X The MPI to check for primality. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a + * context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Miller-Rabin primality test. + * + * \warning If \p X is potentially generated by an adversary, for example + * when validating cryptographic parameters that you didn't + * generate yourself and that are supposed to be prime, then + * \p rounds should be at least the half of the security + * strength of the cryptographic algorithm. On the other hand, + * if \p X is chosen uniformly or non-adversarially (as is the + * case when mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime calls this function), then + * \p rounds can be much lower. + * + * \param X The MPI to check for primality. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param rounds The number of bases to perform the Miller-Rabin primality + * test for. The probability of returning 0 on a composite is + * at most 2-2*\p rounds. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use + * a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +/** + * \brief Flags for mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime() + * + * Each of these flags is a constraint on the result X returned by + * mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(). + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH = 0x0001, /**< (X-1)/2 is prime too */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR = 0x0002, /**< lower error rate from 2-80 to 2-128 */ +} mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t; + +/** + * \brief Generate a prime number. + * + * \param X The destination MPI to store the generated prime in. + * This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param nbits The required size of the destination MPI in bits. + * This must be between \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS. + * \param flags A mask of flags of type #mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use + * a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful, in which case \p X holds a + * probably prime number. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if `nbits` is not between + * \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* bignum.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d5f80992 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/** + * \file blowfish.h + * + * \brief Blowfish block cipher + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS 448 +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS 32 +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS 16 /**< Rounds to use. When increasing this value, make sure to extend the initialisation vectors */ +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE 8 /* Blowfish uses 64 bit blocks */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( -0x0016 ) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +/** Bad input data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0016 + +/** Invalid data input length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0018 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Blowfish hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0017 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief Blowfish context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_blowfish_context +{ + uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2]; /*!< Blowfish round keys */ + uint32_t S[4][256]; /*!< key dependent S-boxes */ +} +mbedtls_blowfish_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ +#include "blowfish_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a Blowfish context. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be initialized. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_blowfish_init( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear a Blowfish context. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be cleared. + * This may be \c NULL, in which case this function + * returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized Blowfish context. + */ +void mbedtls_blowfish_free( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish key schedule operation. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to perform the key schedule on. + * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of + * length \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be between + * \c 32 and \c 448 and a multiple of \c 8. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \c 8 Bytes. + * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer + * of size \c 8 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be + * multiple of \c 8. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of length \c 8 Bytes. It is updated by this function. + * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p length Bytes. + * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv_off The offset in the initialization vector. + * The value pointed to must be smaller than \c 8 Bytes. + * It is updated by this function to support the aforementioned + * streaming usage. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of size \c 8 Bytes. It is updated after use. + * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p length Bytes. + * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so + * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with + * the same nonce and key. + * + * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: + * + * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over + * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to + * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and + * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p + * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be + * updated by this function. + * + * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**64 + * blocks of data with the same key. + * + * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p + * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a + * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one + * updated by this function internally. + * + * For example, you might reserve the first 4 bytes for the + * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that + * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to + * set the first 4 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce + * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p + * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most + * 2**32 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. + * + * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct + * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. + * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message + * counter. + * + * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and + * that a Blowfish block is 8 bytes. + * + * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its + * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be + * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param nc_off The offset in the current stream_block (for resuming + * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer + * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream and must be + * smaller than \c 8. It is updated by this function. + * \param nonce_counter The 64-bit nonce and counter. This must point to a + * read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must point to + * a read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. + * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of + * length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* blowfish.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..31137cd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h @@ -0,0 +1,978 @@ +/** + * \file bn_mul.h + * + * \brief Multi-precision integer library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Multiply source vector [s] with b, add result + * to destination vector [d] and set carry c. + * + * Currently supports: + * + * . IA-32 (386+) . AMD64 / EM64T + * . IA-32 (SSE2) . Motorola 68000 + * . PowerPC, 32-bit . MicroBlaze + * . PowerPC, 64-bit . TriCore + * . SPARC v8 . ARM v3+ + * . Alpha . MIPS32 + * . C, longlong . C, generic + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H +#define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + + +/* + * Conversion macros for embedded constants: + * build lists of mbedtls_mpi_uint's from lists of unsigned char's grouped by 8, 4 or 2 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, 0, 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ), \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( e, f, g, h ) + +#else /* 64-bits */ + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (e) << 32 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (f) << 40 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (g) << 48 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (h) << 56 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) + +#endif /* bits in mbedtls_mpi_uint */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) + +#ifndef asm +#define asm __asm +#endif + +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) + +/* + * Disable use of the i386 assembly code below if option -O0, to disable all + * compiler optimisations, is passed, detected with __OPTIMIZE__ + * This is done as the number of registers used in the assembly code doesn't + * work with the -O0 option. + */ +#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" \ + "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" \ + "movl %6, %%edi \n\t" \ + "movl %7, %%ecx \n\t" \ + "movl %8, %%ebx \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "lodsl \n\t" \ + "mull %%ebx \n\t" \ + "addl %%ecx, %%eax \n\t" \ + "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ + "addl (%%edi), %%eax \n\t" \ + "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ + "movl %%edx, %%ecx \n\t" \ + "stosl \n\t" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + +#define MULADDC_HUIT \ + "movd %%ecx, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%ebx, %%mm0 \n\t" \ + "movd (%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd (%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "movd 4(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "movd 8(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "movd 12(%%esi), %%mm7 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm7 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 4(%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm4, %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "movd 8(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm6, %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "movd 12(%%edi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm4, %%mm7 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, (%%edi) \n\t" \ + "movd 16(%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 20(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 24(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 4(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 28(%%esi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 16(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 8(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm7, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 20(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 12(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 24(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 16(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm4, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 28(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 20(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm6, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 24(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 28(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "addl $32, %%edi \n\t" \ + "addl $32, %%esi \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, %%ecx \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "emms \n\t" \ + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ + "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ + "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ + ); + +#else + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ + "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ + "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ + ); +#endif /* SSE2 */ +#endif /* i386 */ + +#if defined(__amd64__) || defined (__x86_64__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "movq (%%rsi), %%rax\n" \ + "mulq %%rbx\n" \ + "addq $8, %%rsi\n" \ + "addq %%rcx, %%rax\n" \ + "movq %%r8, %%rcx\n" \ + "adcq $0, %%rdx\n" \ + "nop \n" \ + "addq %%rax, (%%rdi)\n" \ + "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx\n" \ + "addq $8, %%rdi\n" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ + : "b" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ + : "rax", "rdx", "r8" \ + ); + +#endif /* AMD64 */ + +#if defined(__aarch64__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldr x4, [%2], #8 \n\t" \ + "ldr x5, [%1] \n\t" \ + "mul x6, x4, %4 \n\t" \ + "umulh x7, x4, %4 \n\t" \ + "adds x5, x5, x6 \n\t" \ + "adc x7, x7, xzr \n\t" \ + "adds x5, x5, %0 \n\t" \ + "adc %0, x7, xzr \n\t" \ + "str x5, [%1], #8 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + : "+r" (c), "+r" (d), "+r" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ + : "r" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ + : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc" \ + ); + +#endif /* Aarch64 */ + +#if defined(__mc68020__) || defined(__mcpu32__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "movl %3, %%a2 \n\t" \ + "movl %4, %%a3 \n\t" \ + "movl %5, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "movl %6, %%d2 \n\t" \ + "moveq #0, %%d0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "moveq #0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "movl %%d3, %0 \n\t" \ + "movl %%a3, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%a2, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "d0", "d1", "d2", "d3", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ + ); + +#define MULADDC_HUIT \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" + +#endif /* MC68000 */ + +#if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__ppc64__) + +#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "ld r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "ld r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "ld r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, -8 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, -8 \n\t" \ + "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldu r7, 8(r3) \n\t" \ + "mulld r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhdu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ + "ld r7, 8(r4) \n\t" \ + "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ + "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ + "stdu r8, 8(r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, 8 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 8 \n\t" \ + "std r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "std r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "std r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + + +#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, -8 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, -8 \n\t" \ + "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldu %%r7, 8(%%r3) \n\t" \ + "mulld %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhdu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r7, 8(%%r4) \n\t" \ + "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ + "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ + "stdu %%r8, 8(%%r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, 8 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, 8 \n\t" \ + "std %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "std %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "std %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + +#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) /* end PPC64/begin PPC32 */ + +#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lwz r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "lwz r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "lwz r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "lwz r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, -4 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, -4 \n\t" \ + "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "lwzu r7, 4(r3) \n\t" \ + "mullw r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhwu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ + "lwz r7, 4(r4) \n\t" \ + "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ + "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ + "stwu r8, 4(r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 4 \n\t" \ + "stw r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "stw r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "stw r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + +#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lwz %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, -4 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, -4 \n\t" \ + "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "lwzu %%r7, 4(%%r3) \n\t" \ + "mullw %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhwu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r7, 4(%%r4) \n\t" \ + "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ + "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ + "stwu %%r8, 4(%%r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, 4 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, 4 \n\t" \ + "stw %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "stw %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "stw %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + +#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#endif /* PPC32 */ + +/* + * The Sparc(64) assembly is reported to be broken. + * Disable it for now, until we're able to fix it. + */ +#if 0 && defined(__sparc__) +#if defined(__sparc64__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldx %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ldx %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ + "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ + "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" + + #define MULADDC_STOP \ + "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ + "stx %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ + "stx %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ + "o5" \ + ); + +#else /* __sparc64__ */ + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ld %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ + "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ + "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ + "st %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ + "st %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ + "o5" \ + ); + +#endif /* __sparc64__ */ +#endif /* __sparc__ */ + +#if defined(__microblaze__) || defined(microblaze) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lwi r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "lwi r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "lwi r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "lwi r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "andi r7, r6, 0xffff \n\t" \ + "bsrli r6, r6, 16 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "lhui r8, r3, 0 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ + "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ + "mul r10, r9, r6 \n\t" \ + "mul r11, r8, r7 \n\t" \ + "mul r12, r9, r7 \n\t" \ + "mul r13, r8, r6 \n\t" \ + "bsrli r8, r10, 16 \n\t" \ + "bsrli r9, r11, 16 \n\t" \ + "add r13, r13, r8 \n\t" \ + "add r13, r13, r9 \n\t" \ + "bslli r10, r10, 16 \n\t" \ + "bslli r11, r11, 16 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ + "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r11 \n\t" \ + "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "lwi r10, r4, 0 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ + "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r5 \n\t" \ + "addc r5, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "swi r12, r4, 0 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "swi r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "swi r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "swi r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", \ + "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13" \ + ); + +#endif /* MicroBlaze */ + +#if defined(__tricore__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld.a %%a2, %3 \n\t" \ + "ld.a %%a3, %4 \n\t" \ + "ld.w %%d4, %5 \n\t" \ + "ld.w %%d1, %6 \n\t" \ + "xor %%d5, %%d5 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ld.w %%d0, [%%a2+] \n\t" \ + "madd.u %%e2, %%e4, %%d0, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "ld.w %%d0, [%%a3] \n\t" \ + "addx %%d2, %%d2, %%d0 \n\t" \ + "addc %%d3, %%d3, 0 \n\t" \ + "mov %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "st.w [%%a3+], %%d2 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "st.w %0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "st.a %1, %%a3 \n\t" \ + "st.a %2, %%a2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "d0", "d1", "e2", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ + ); + +#endif /* TriCore */ + +/* + * Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about + * our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. + * + * On the other hand, -fomit-frame-pointer is implied by any -Ox options with + * x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by + * clang and armcc5 under the same conditions). + * + * So, only use the optimized assembly below for optimized build, which avoids + * the build error and is pretty reasonable anyway. + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) +#define MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7 +#endif + +#if defined(__arm__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7) + +#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ + "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ + "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ + "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" \ + "lsr r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r9, r7 \n\t" \ + "lsl r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r7, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r8, r7 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldmia r0!, {r6} \n\t" \ + "lsr r7, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsl r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r4, r8 \n\t" \ + "mul r4, r6 \n\t" \ + "mov r3, r9 \n\t" \ + "mul r6, r3 \n\t" \ + "mov r5, r9 \n\t" \ + "mul r5, r7 \n\t" \ + "mov r3, r8 \n\t" \ + "mul r7, r3 \n\t" \ + "lsr r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ + "lsr r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r2 \n\t" \ + "mov r2, #0 \n\t" \ + "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + "lsl r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ + "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + "lsl r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ + "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + "ldr r3, [r1] \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ + "adc r2, r5 \n\t" \ + "stmia r1!, {r4} \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ + "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ + "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ + "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "cc" \ + ); + +#elif (__ARM_ARCH >= 6) && \ + defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldr r0, [%0], #4 \n\t" \ + "ldr r1, [%1] \n\t" \ + "umaal r1, %2, %3, r0 \n\t" \ + "str r1, [%1], #4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + : "=r" (s), "=r" (d), "=r" (c) \ + : "r" (b), "0" (s), "1" (d), "2" (c) \ + : "r0", "r1", "memory" \ + ); + +#else + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ + "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ + "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ + "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldr r4, [r0], #4 \n\t" \ + "mov r5, #0 \n\t" \ + "ldr r6, [r1] \n\t" \ + "umlal r2, r5, r3, r4 \n\t" \ + "adds r7, r6, r2 \n\t" \ + "adc r2, r5, #0 \n\t" \ + "str r7, [r1], #4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ + "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ + "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ + "r6", "r7", "cc" \ + ); + +#endif /* Thumb */ + +#endif /* ARMv3 */ + +#if defined(__alpha__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldq $1, %3 \n\t" \ + "ldq $2, %4 \n\t" \ + "ldq $3, %5 \n\t" \ + "ldq $4, %6 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldq $6, 0($1) \n\t" \ + "addq $1, 8, $1 \n\t" \ + "mulq $6, $4, $7 \n\t" \ + "umulh $6, $4, $6 \n\t" \ + "addq $7, $3, $7 \n\t" \ + "cmpult $7, $3, $3 \n\t" \ + "ldq $5, 0($2) \n\t" \ + "addq $7, $5, $7 \n\t" \ + "cmpult $7, $5, $5 \n\t" \ + "stq $7, 0($2) \n\t" \ + "addq $2, 8, $2 \n\t" \ + "addq $6, $3, $3 \n\t" \ + "addq $5, $3, $3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "stq $3, %0 \n\t" \ + "stq $2, %1 \n\t" \ + "stq $1, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "$1", "$2", "$3", "$4", "$5", "$6", "$7" \ + ); +#endif /* Alpha */ + +#if defined(__mips__) && !defined(__mips64) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lw $10, %3 \n\t" \ + "lw $11, %4 \n\t" \ + "lw $12, %5 \n\t" \ + "lw $13, %6 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "lw $14, 0($10) \n\t" \ + "multu $13, $14 \n\t" \ + "addi $10, $10, 4 \n\t" \ + "mflo $14 \n\t" \ + "mfhi $9 \n\t" \ + "addu $14, $12, $14 \n\t" \ + "lw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ + "sltu $12, $14, $12 \n\t" \ + "addu $15, $14, $15 \n\t" \ + "sltu $14, $15, $14 \n\t" \ + "addu $12, $12, $9 \n\t" \ + "sw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ + "addu $12, $12, $14 \n\t" \ + "addi $11, $11, 4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "sw $12, %0 \n\t" \ + "sw $11, %1 \n\t" \ + "sw $10, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15", "lo", "hi" \ + ); + +#endif /* MIPS */ +#endif /* GNUC */ + +#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + __asm mov esi, s \ + __asm mov edi, d \ + __asm mov ecx, c \ + __asm mov ebx, b + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + __asm lodsd \ + __asm mul ebx \ + __asm add eax, ecx \ + __asm adc edx, 0 \ + __asm add eax, [edi] \ + __asm adc edx, 0 \ + __asm mov ecx, edx \ + __asm stosd + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + +#define EMIT __asm _emit + +#define MULADDC_HUIT \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC9 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC3 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x1F \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x16 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x04 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x08 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF8 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5F EMIT 0x04 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDC \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x08 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xEE \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x67 EMIT 0x0C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xFC \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0F \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x56 EMIT 0x10 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x14 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x18 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x04 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5E EMIT 0x1C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD8 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCD \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x10 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xD5 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x08 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCF \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x14 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xE5 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x0C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x18 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xF5 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x10 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCC \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x1C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDD \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x14 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCE \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x18 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x1C \ + EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC7 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC6 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0xC9 + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x77 \ + __asm mov c, ecx \ + __asm mov d, edi \ + __asm mov s, esi \ + +#else + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + __asm mov c, ecx \ + __asm mov d, edi \ + __asm mov s, esi \ + +#endif /* SSE2 */ +#endif /* MSVC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_CORE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ +{ \ + mbedtls_t_udbl r; \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1; + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + r = *(s++) * (mbedtls_t_udbl) b; \ + r0 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) r; \ + r1 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( r >> biL ); \ + r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ + r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ + c = r1; *(d++) = r0; + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ +} + +#else +#define MULADDC_INIT \ +{ \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint s0, s1, b0, b1; \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1, rx, ry; \ + b0 = ( b << biH ) >> biH; \ + b1 = ( b >> biH ); + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + s0 = ( *s << biH ) >> biH; \ + s1 = ( *s >> biH ); s++; \ + rx = s0 * b1; r0 = s0 * b0; \ + ry = s1 * b0; r1 = s1 * b1; \ + r1 += ( rx >> biH ); \ + r1 += ( ry >> biH ); \ + rx <<= biH; ry <<= biH; \ + r0 += rx; r1 += (r0 < rx); \ + r0 += ry; r1 += (r0 < ry); \ + r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ + r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ + c = r1; *(d++) = r0; + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ +} + +#endif /* C (generic) */ +#endif /* C (longlong) */ + +#endif /* bn_mul.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d39d932f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +/** + * \file camellia.h + * + * \brief Camellia block cipher + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT 0 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( -0x0024 ) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +/** Bad input data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0024 + +/** Invalid data input length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0026 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Camellia hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0027 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief CAMELLIA context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_camellia_context +{ + int nr; /*!< number of rounds */ + uint32_t rk[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */ +} +mbedtls_camellia_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ +#include "camellia_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a CAMELLIA context. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be initialized. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_camellia_init( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear a CAMELLIA context. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_camellia_free( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for encryption. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key to use. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128, + * \c 192 or \c 256. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for decryption. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128, + * \c 192 or \c 256. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \c 16 Bytes. + * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer + * of size \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length in Bytes of the input data \p input. + * This must be a multiple of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated to allow streaming + * use as explained above. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must point to a + * readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must point to a + * writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + * operation. + * + * \note Due to the nature of CFB mode, you should use the same + * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls + * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via + * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode + * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input. Any value is allowed. + * \param iv_off The current offset in the IV. This must be smaller + * than \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to allow + * the aforementioned streaming usage. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to + * allow the aforementioned streaming usage. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer to hold the output data. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * *note Due to the nature of CTR mode, you should use the same + * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls + * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via + * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode + * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * + * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so + * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with + * the same nonce and key. + * + * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: + * + * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over + * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to + * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and + * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p + * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be + * updated by this function. + * + * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128 + * blocks of data with the same key. + * + * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p + * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a + * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one + * updated by this function internally. + * + * For example, you might reserve the first \c 12 Bytes for the + * per-message nonce, and the last \c 4 Bytes for internal use. + * In that case, before calling this function on a new message you + * need to set the first \c 12 Bytes of \p nonce_counter to your + * chosen nonce value, the last four to \c 0, and \p nc_off to \c 0 + * (which will cause \p stream_block to be ignored). That way, you + * can encrypt at most \c 2**96 messages of up to \c 2**32 blocks + * each with the same key. + * + * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct + * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be + * unique. The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a + * message counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, + * but this limits the number of messages that can be securely + * encrypted: for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should + * not encrypt more than 2**32 messages with the same key. + * + * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and + * that a CAMELLIA block is \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its + * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be + * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * Any value is allowed. + * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block (for resuming + * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer to + * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream. It is updated + * at the end of this call. + * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must be a read/write + * buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must be a + * read/write buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The input data stream. This must be a readable buffer of + * size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The output data stream. This must be a writable buffer + * of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* camellia.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ece5a901 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +/** + * \file ccm.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for the CCM authenticated encryption + * mode for block ciphers. + * + * CCM combines Counter mode encryption with CBC-MAC authentication + * for 128-bit block ciphers. + * + * Input to CCM includes the following elements: + *
  • Payload - data that is both authenticated and encrypted.
    • + *
  • Associated data (Adata) - data that is authenticated but not + * encrypted, For example, a header.
    • + *
  • Nonce - A unique value that is assigned to the payload and the + * associated data.
+ * + * Definition of CCM: + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf + * RFC 3610 "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)" + * + * Related: + * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption" + * + * Definition of CCM*: + * IEEE 802.15.4 - IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks + * Integer representation is fixed most-significant-octet-first order and + * the representation of octets is most-significant-bit-first order. This is + * consistent with RFC 3610. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CCM_H +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +/** Bad input parameters to the function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D +/** Authenticated decryption failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x000F + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** CCM hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0011 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The CCM context-type definition. The CCM context is passed + * to the APIs called. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ +} +mbedtls_ccm_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ +#include "ccm_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified CCM context, + * to make references valid, and prepare the context + * for mbedtls_ccm_setkey() or mbedtls_ccm_free(). + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the CCM context set in the + * \p ctx parameter and sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must be an initialized + * context. + * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. + * \param key The encryption key. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param keybits The key size in bits. This must be acceptable by the cipher. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified CCM context + * and underlying cipher sub-context. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the function + * has no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using CCM. + * + * \note The tag is written to a separate buffer. To concatenate + * the \p tag with the \p output, as done in RFC-3610: + * Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM), use + * \p tag = \p output + \p length, and make sure that the + * output buffer is at least \p length + \p tag_len wide. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * \param add The additional data field. If \p add_len is greater than + * zero, \p add must be a readable buffer of at least that + * length. + * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: + * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using CCM*. + * + * \note The tag is written to a separate buffer. To concatenate + * the \p tag with the \p output, as done in RFC-3610: + * Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM), use + * \p tag = \p output + \p length, and make sure that the + * output buffer is at least \p length + \p tag_len wide. + * + * \note When using this function in a variable tag length context, + * the tag length has to be encoded into the \p iv passed to + * this function. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p add_len Bytes. + * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: + * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * + * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is no + * longer authenticated. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a CCM authenticated decryption of a + * buffer. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least that \p add_len Bytes.. + * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: + * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. This indicates that the message is authentic. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on calculation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a CCM* authenticated decryption of a + * buffer. + * + * \note When using this function in a variable tag length context, + * the tag length has to be decoded from \p iv and passed to + * this function as \p tag_len. (\p tag needs to be adjusted + * accordingly.) + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least that \p add_len Bytes. + * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field in Bytes. + * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * + * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is nos + * longer authenticated. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on calculation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/** + * \brief The CCM checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c93c741c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/** + * \file certs.h + * + * \brief Sample certificates and DHM parameters for testing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CERTS_H +#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* List of all PEM-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL; + * PEM encoded if MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C is enabled, DER encoded + * otherwise. */ +extern const char * mbedtls_test_cas[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[]; + +/* List of all DER-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL */ +extern const unsigned char * mbedtls_test_cas_der[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +/* Concatenation of all CA certificates in PEM format if available */ +extern const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * CA test certificates + */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; + +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding + * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 + * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA + * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ + +extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_crt; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_key; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_pwd; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len; + +/* + * Server test certificates + */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; + +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding + * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 + * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA + * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ + +extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_crt; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_key; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_pwd; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_len; + +/* + * Client test certificates + */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem[]; + +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_len; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding + * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA + * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ + +extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_crt; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_key; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_pwd; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_len; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* certs.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03b48714 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +/** + * \file chacha20.h + * + * \brief This file contains ChaCha20 definitions and functions. + * + * ChaCha20 is a stream cipher that can encrypt and decrypt + * information. ChaCha was created by Daniel Bernstein as a variant of + * its Salsa cipher https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf + * ChaCha20 is the variant with 20 rounds, that was also standardized + * in RFC 7539. + * + * \author Daniel King + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/** Invalid input parameter(s). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0051 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be + * used. */ +/** Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0053 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0055 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + +typedef struct mbedtls_chacha20_context +{ + uint32_t state[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */ + uint8_t keystream8[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */ + size_t keystream_bytes_used; /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */ +} +mbedtls_chacha20_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ +#include "chacha20_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified ChaCha20 context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * It is usually followed by calls to + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_setkey() and + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts(), then one or more calls to + * to \c mbedtls_chacha20_update(), and finally to + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_free(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_chacha20_init( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified + * ChaCha20 context. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized context. + * + */ +void mbedtls_chacha20_free( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the encryption/decryption key. + * + * \note After using this function, you must also call + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts() to set a nonce before you + * start encrypting/decrypting data with + * \c mbedtls_chacha_update(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption/decryption key. This must be \c 32 Bytes + * in length. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or key is NULL. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the nonce and initial counter value. + * + * \note A ChaCha20 context can be re-used with the same key by + * calling this function to change the nonce. + * + * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key. + * This would void any confidentiality guarantees for the + * messages encrypted with the same nonce and key. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the nonce should be bound. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size. + * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or nonce is + * NULL. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_starts( mbedtls_chacha20_context* ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts or decrypts data. + * + * Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, the same operation is + * used for encrypting and decrypting data. + * + * \note The \p input and \p output pointers must either be equal or + * point to non-overlapping buffers. + * + * \note \c mbedtls_chacha20_setkey() and + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts() must be called at least once + * to setup the context before this function can be called. + * + * \note This function can be called multiple times in a row in + * order to encrypt of decrypt data piecewise with the same + * key and nonce. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key and nonce. + * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_update( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + size_t size, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts or decrypts data with ChaCha20 and + * the given key and nonce. + * + * Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, the same operation is + * used for encrypting and decrypting data. + * + * \warning You must never use the same (key, nonce) pair more than + * once. This would void any confidentiality guarantees for + * the messages encrypted with the same nonce and key. + * + * \note The \p input and \p output pointers must either be equal or + * point to non-overlapping buffers. + * + * \param key The encryption/decryption key. + * This must be \c 32 Bytes in length. + * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size. + * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0. + * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter, + size_t size, + const unsigned char* input, + unsigned char* output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief The ChaCha20 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed568bc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +/** + * \file chachapoly.h + * + * \brief This file contains the AEAD-ChaCha20-Poly1305 definitions and + * functions. + * + * ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an algorithm for Authenticated Encryption + * with Associated Data (AEAD) that can be used to encrypt and + * authenticate data. It is based on ChaCha20 and Poly1305 by Daniel + * Bernstein and was standardized in RFC 7539. + * + * \author Daniel King + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/* for shared error codes */ +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" + +/** The requested operation is not permitted in the current state. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE -0x0054 +/** Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED -0x0056 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, /**< The mode value for performing encryption. */ + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT /**< The mode value for performing decryption. */ +} +mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" + +typedef struct mbedtls_chachapoly_context +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_context chacha20_ctx; /**< The ChaCha20 context. */ + mbedtls_poly1305_context poly1305_ctx; /**< The Poly1305 context. */ + uint64_t aad_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */ + uint64_t ciphertext_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */ + int state; /**< The current state of the context. */ + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */ +} +mbedtls_chachapoly_context; + +#else /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ +#include "chachapoly_alt.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. It must be followed by a call to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey() before any operation can be + * done, and to \c mbedtls_chachapoly_free() once all + * operations with that context have been finished. + * + * In order to encrypt or decrypt full messages at once, for + * each message you should make a single call to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_crypt_and_tag() or + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(). + * + * In order to encrypt messages piecewise, for each + * message you should make a call to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(), then 0 or more calls to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(), then 0 or more calls to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), then one call to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(). + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged! Always + * use \c mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt() when possible! + * + * If however this is not possible because the data is too + * large to fit in memory, you need to: + * + * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts() and (if needed) + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad() as above, + * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update() multiple times and + * ensure its output (the plaintext) is NOT used in any other + * way than placing it in temporary storage at this point, + * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_finish() to compute the + * authentication tag and compared it in constant time to the + * tag received with the ciphertext. + * + * If the tags are not equal, you must immediately discard + * all previous outputs of \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), + * otherwise you can now safely use the plaintext. + * + * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to initialize. Must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_chachapoly_init( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified + * ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + * + * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function is a no-op. + */ +void mbedtls_chachapoly_free( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the ChaCha20-Poly1305 + * symmetric encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to which the key should be + * bound. This must be initialized. + * \param key The \c 256 Bit (\c 32 Bytes) key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption or + * decryption operation. + * + * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key. + * This would void any confidentiality and authenticity + * guarantees for the messages encrypted with the same nonce + * and key. + * + * \note If the context is being used for AAD only (no data to + * encrypt or decrypt) then \p mode can be set to any value. + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the + * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param nonce The nonce/IV to use for the message. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 12 Bytes. + * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT (discouraged, see warning). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds additional data to be authenticated + * into an ongoing ChaCha20-Poly1305 operation. + * + * The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), also called + * Associated Data (AD) is only authenticated but not + * encrypted nor included in the encrypted output. It is + * usually transmitted separately from the ciphertext or + * computed locally by each party. + * + * \note This function is called before data is encrypted/decrypted. + * I.e. call this function to process the AAD before calling + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(). + * + * You may call this function multiple times to process + * an arbitrary amount of AAD. It is permitted to call + * this function 0 times, if no AAD is used. + * + * This function cannot be called any more if data has + * been processed by \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), + * or if the context has been finished. + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the + * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param aad_len The length in Bytes of the AAD. The length has no + * restrictions. + * \param aad Buffer containing the AAD. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if \p ctx or \p aad are NULL. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE + * if the operations has not been started or has been + * finished, or if the AAD has been finished. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len ); + +/** + * \brief Thus function feeds data to be encrypted or decrypted + * into an on-going ChaCha20-Poly1305 + * operation. + * + * The direction (encryption or decryption) depends on the + * mode that was given when calling + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(). + * + * You may call this function multiple times to process + * an arbitrary amount of data. It is permitted to call + * this function 0 times, if no data is to be encrypted + * or decrypted. + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the + * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param len The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`. + * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data is + * written. This must be able to hold \p len bytes. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE + * if the operation has not been started or has been + * finished. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function finished the ChaCha20-Poly1305 operation and + * generates the MAC (authentication tag). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param mac The buffer to where the 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC is written. + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the + * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE + * if the operation has not been started or has been + * finished. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a complete ChaCha20-Poly1305 + * authenticated encryption with the previously-set key. + * + * \note Before using this function, you must set the key with + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(). + * + * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key. + * This would void any confidentiality and authenticity + * guarantees for the messages encrypted with the same nonce + * and key. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key). + * This must be initialized. + * \param length The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt. + * \param nonce The 96-bit (12 bytes) nonce/IV to use. + * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated + * data (AAD). This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. + * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process. + * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data + * is written. This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param tag The buffer to where the computed 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC + * is written. This must not be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char tag[16] ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a complete ChaCha20-Poly1305 + * authenticated decryption with the previously-set key. + * + * \note Before using this function, you must set the key with + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key). + * \param length The length (in Bytes) of the data to decrypt. + * \param nonce The \c 96 Bit (\c 12 bytes) nonce/IV to use. + * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated data (AAD). + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. + * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication tag. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer containing the data to decrypt. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The buffer to where the decrypted data is written. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED + * if the data was not authentic. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char tag[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief The ChaCha20-Poly1305 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..be5c548e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,936 @@ +/** + * \file check_config.h + * + * \brief Consistency checks for configuration options + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * It is recommended to include this file from your config.h + * in order to catch dependency issues early. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H + +/* + * We assume CHAR_BIT is 8 in many places. In practice, this is true on our + * target platforms, so not an issue, but let's just be extra sure. + */ +#include +#if CHAR_BIT != 8 +#error "mbed TLS requires a platform with 8-bit chars" +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is required on Windows" +#endif + +/* Fix the config here. Not convenient to put an #ifdef _WIN32 in config.h as + * it would confuse config.py. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#endif /* _WIN32 */ + +#if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) +#error "The NET module is not available for mbed OS - please use the network functions provided by Mbed OS" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ + !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) +#error "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING only works with GCC and Clang" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME does not make sense" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_DHM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) ) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative or PSA-based ECP implementation" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but not MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED defined, but MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT not disabled" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) ) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !( \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C requires a DRBG module unless MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined or an alternative implementation is used" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 64) +#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) ) \ + && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 32) +#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN) +#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer" +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but entropy sources too" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && ( \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && ( \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK defined, but no alternative implementation enabled" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) +#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) &&\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO must be defined if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO is" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO must be defined if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO is" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ||\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + !( ( ( defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) ) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) ) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites (missing RNG)" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) && \ + ! ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ + ! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is not compatible with actual entropy sources" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is not compatible with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined, but it cannot coexist with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO." +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C in configuration with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and \ + MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C requires MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C to be defined." +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C and MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 defined, \ + but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but none of the PKCS1 versions enabled" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) ) +#error "One or more versions of the TLS protocol are enabled " \ + "but no key exchange methods defined with MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_xxxx" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)) +#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)) +#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1))) +#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX > 255 +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > 255 +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) +#error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) +#error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) +#error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C defined, single threading implementation required" +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) && !defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 && MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) ) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32/MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif /* (MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +/* + * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this + * workaround since this is included by every single file before the + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in empty translation units. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_iso_c_forbids_empty_translation_units; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d83da88 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,1102 @@ +/** + * \file cipher.h + * + * \brief This file contains an abstraction interface for use with the cipher + * primitives provided by the library. It provides a common interface to all of + * the available cipher operations. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM +#endif + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/** The selected feature is not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x6080 +/** Bad input parameters. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x6100 +/** Failed to allocate memory. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -0x6180 +/** Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING -0x6200 +/** Decryption of block requires a full block. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED -0x6280 +/** Authentication failed (for AEAD modes). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED -0x6300 +/** The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x6380 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** Cipher hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x6400 + +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN 0x01 /**< Cipher accepts IVs of variable length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN 0x02 /**< Cipher accepts keys of variable length. */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Supported cipher types. + * + * \warning RC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger + * ciphers instead. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE = 0, /**< Placeholder to mark the end of cipher ID lists. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL, /**< The identity cipher, treated as a stream cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, /**< The AES cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, /**< The DES cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, /**< The Triple DES cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, /**< The Blowfish cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, /**< The RC4 cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, /**< The ChaCha20 cipher. */ +} mbedtls_cipher_id_t; + +/** + * \brief Supported {cipher type, cipher mode} pairs. + * + * \warning RC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger + * ciphers instead. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE = 0, /**< Placeholder to mark the end of cipher-pair lists. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, /**< The identity stream cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, /**< DES cipher with ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, /**< DES cipher with CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, /**< Blowfish cipher with ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, /**< Blowfish cipher with CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, /**< Blowfish cipher with CFB64 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, /**< Blowfish cipher with CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, /**< RC4 cipher with 128-bit mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, /**< AES 192-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in XTS block mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in XTS block mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, /**< ChaCha20 stream cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, /**< ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KW mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KW mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KW mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KWP mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KWP mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KWP mode. */ +} mbedtls_cipher_type_t; + +/** Supported cipher modes. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, /**< The SP800-38F KW mode */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, /**< The SP800-38F KWP mode */ +} mbedtls_cipher_mode_t; + +/** Supported cipher padding types. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 = 0, /**< PKCS7 padding (default). */ + MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS, /**< ISO/IEC 7816-4 padding. */ + MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN, /**< ANSI X.923 padding. */ + MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS, /**< Zero padding (not reversible). */ + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE, /**< Never pad (full blocks only). */ +} mbedtls_cipher_padding_t; + +/** Type of operation. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE = -1, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT = 0, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT, +} mbedtls_operation_t; + +enum { + /** Undefined key length. */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE = 0, + /** Key length, in bits (including parity), for DES keys. */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES = 64, + /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in two-key EDE. */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE = 128, + /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in three-key EDE. */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 = 192, +}; + +/** Maximum length of any IV, in Bytes. */ +/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. + * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH defined + * in ssl_internal.h. */ +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 + +/** Maximum block size of any cipher, in Bytes. */ +/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. + * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined + * in ssl_internal.h. */ +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 + +/** Maximum key length, in Bytes. */ +/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. + * For now, only check whether XTS is enabled which uses 64 Byte keys, + * and use 32 Bytes as an upper bound for the maximum key length otherwise. + * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined + * in ssl_internal.h, which however deliberately ignores the case of XTS + * since the latter isn't used in SSL/TLS. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/** + * Base cipher information (opaque struct). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t; + +/** + * CMAC context (opaque struct). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t mbedtls_cmac_context_t; + +/** + * Cipher information. Allows calling cipher functions + * in a generic way. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t +{ + /** Full cipher identifier. For example, + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC. + */ + mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + + /** The cipher mode. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. */ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + + /** The cipher key length, in bits. This is the + * default length for variable sized ciphers. + * Includes parity bits for ciphers like DES. + */ + unsigned int key_bitlen; + + /** Name of the cipher. */ + const char * name; + + /** IV or nonce size, in Bytes. + * For ciphers that accept variable IV sizes, + * this is the recommended size. + */ + unsigned int iv_size; + + /** Bitflag comprised of MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN and + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN indicating whether the + * cipher supports variable IV or variable key sizes, respectively. + */ + int flags; + + /** The block size, in Bytes. */ + unsigned int block_size; + + /** Struct for base cipher information and functions. */ + const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *base; + +} mbedtls_cipher_info_t; + +/** + * Generic cipher context. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t +{ + /** Information about the associated cipher. */ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + /** Key length to use. */ + int key_bitlen; + + /** Operation that the key of the context has been + * initialized for. + */ + mbedtls_operation_t operation; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + /** Padding functions to use, if relevant for + * the specific cipher mode. + */ + void (*add_padding)( unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len ); + int (*get_padding)( unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len ); +#endif + + /** Buffer for input that has not been processed yet. */ + unsigned char unprocessed_data[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + + /** Number of Bytes that have not been processed yet. */ + size_t unprocessed_len; + + /** Current IV or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode, data unit (or sector) number + * for XTS-mode. */ + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + + /** IV size in Bytes, for ciphers with variable-length IVs. */ + size_t iv_size; + + /** The cipher-specific context. */ + void *cipher_ctx; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + /** CMAC-specific context. */ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /** Indicates whether the cipher operations should be performed + * by Mbed TLS' own crypto library or an external implementation + * of the PSA Crypto API. + * This is unset if the cipher context was established through + * mbedtls_cipher_setup(), and set if it was established through + * mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(). + */ + unsigned char psa_enabled; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +} mbedtls_cipher_context_t; + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported + * by the generic cipher module. + * + * For any cipher identifier in the returned list, you can + * obtain the corresponding generic cipher information structure + * via mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(), which can then be used + * to prepare a cipher context via mbedtls_cipher_setup(). + * + * + * \return A statically-allocated array of cipher identifiers + * of type cipher_type_t. The last entry is zero. + */ +const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information + * structure associated with the given cipher name. + * + * \param cipher_name Name of the cipher to search for. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * + * \return The cipher information structure associated with the + * given \p cipher_name. + * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher_name ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information + * structure associated with the given cipher type. + * + * \param cipher_type Type of the cipher to search for. + * + * \return The cipher information structure associated with the + * given \p cipher_type. + * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information + * structure associated with the given cipher ID, + * key size and mode. + * + * \param cipher_id The ID of the cipher to search for. For example, + * #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES. + * \param key_bitlen The length of the key in bits. + * \param mode The cipher mode. For example, #MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. + * + * \return The cipher information structure associated with the + * given \p cipher_id. + * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a \p cipher_context as NONE. + * + * \param ctx The context to be initialized. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_cipher_init( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees and clears the cipher-specific + * context of \p ctx. Freeing \p ctx itself remains the + * responsibility of the caller. + * + * \param ctx The context to be freed. If this is \c NULL, the + * function has no effect, otherwise this must point to an + * initialized context. + */ +void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); + + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for + * use with the given cipher primitive. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. This must be initialized. + * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the + * cipher-specific context fails. + * + * \internal Currently, the function also clears the structure. + * In future versions, the caller will be required to call + * mbedtls_cipher_init() on the structure first. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for + * PSA-based use with the given cipher primitive. + * + * \note See #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for information on PSA. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be \c NULL. + * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. + * \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the + * authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() or + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() must provide + * the same tag length. + * For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the + * cipher-specific context fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/** + * \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The block size of the underlying cipher. + * \return \c 0 if \p ctx has not been initialized. + */ +static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return 0; + + return ctx->cipher_info->block_size; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the mode of operation for + * the cipher. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The mode of operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. + */ +static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE; + + return ctx->cipher_info->mode; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the size of the IV or nonce + * of the cipher, in Bytes. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The recommended IV size if no IV has been set. + * \return \c 0 for ciphers not using an IV or a nonce. + * \return The actual size if an IV has been set. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return 0; + + if( ctx->iv_size != 0 ) + return (int) ctx->iv_size; + + return (int) ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the type of the given cipher. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The type of the cipher. + * \return #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. + */ +static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( + ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; + + return ctx->cipher_info->type; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the name of the given cipher + * as a string. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The name of the cipher. + * \return NULL if \p ctx has not been not initialized. + */ +static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return 0; + + return ctx->cipher_info->name; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the key length of the cipher. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The key length of the cipher in bits. + * \return #MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE if ctx \p has not been + * initialized. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( + ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE; + + return (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the operation of the given cipher. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The type of operation: #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT. + * \return #MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. + */ +static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( + ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE; + + return ctx->operation; +} + +/** + * \brief This function sets the key to use with the given context. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a cipher information structure. + * \param key The key to use. This must be a readable buffer of at + * least \p key_bitlen Bits. + * \param key_bitlen The key length to use, in Bits. + * \param operation The operation that the key will be used for: + * #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_operation_t operation ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) +/** + * \brief This function sets the padding mode, for cipher modes + * that use padding. + * + * The default passing mode is PKCS7 padding. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a cipher information structure. + * \param mode The padding mode. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + * if the selected padding mode is not supported. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the cipher mode + * does not support padding. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + +/** + * \brief This function sets the initialization vector (IV) + * or nonce. + * + * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these + * ciphers, this function has no effect. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a cipher information structure. + * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. This + * must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. + * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function resets the cipher state. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +/** + * \brief This function adds additional data for AEAD ciphers. + * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. + * This must be called exactly once, after + * mbedtls_cipher_reset(). + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * \param ad The additional data to use. This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +/** + * \brief The generic cipher update function. It encrypts or + * decrypts using the given cipher context. Writes as + * many block-sized blocks of data as possible to output. + * Any data that cannot be written immediately is either + * added to the next block, or flushed when + * mbedtls_cipher_finish() is called. + * Exception: For MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, expects a single block + * in size. For example, 16 Bytes for AES. + * + * \note If the underlying cipher is used in GCM mode, all calls + * to this function, except for the last one before + * mbedtls_cipher_finish(), must have \p ilen as a + * multiple of the block size of the cipher. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to + * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the + * same buffer as \p input. + * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the + * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE on an + * unsupported mode for a cipher. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, + size_t *olen ); + +/** + * \brief The generic cipher finalization function. If data still + * needs to be flushed from an incomplete block, the data + * contained in it is padded to the size of + * the last block, and written to the \p output buffer. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key. + * \param output The buffer to write data to. This needs to be a writable + * buffer of at least \p block_size Bytes. + * \param olen The length of the data written to the \p output buffer. + * This may not be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED on decryption + * expecting a full block but not receiving one. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING on invalid padding + * while decrypting. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +/** + * \brief This function writes a tag for AEAD ciphers. + * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. + * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized, + * bound to a key, and have just completed a cipher + * operation through mbedtls_cipher_finish() the tag for + * which should be written. + * \param tag The buffer to write the tag to. This must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to write. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks the tag for AEAD ciphers. + * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. + * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * \param tag The buffer holding the tag. This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to check. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +/** + * \brief The generic all-in-one encryption/decryption function, + * for all ciphers except AEAD constructs. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len + * Bytes. + * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. + * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size + * IV. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to + * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the + * same buffer as \p input. + * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the + * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * + * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these + * ciphers, use \p iv = NULL and \p iv_len = 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED on decryption + * expecting a full block but not receiving one. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING on invalid padding + * while decrypting. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +/** + * \brief The generic authenticated encryption (AEAD) function. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + * + * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key + * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the + * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must + * not be \c NULL. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note + * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. + * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. This + * must match the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher + * used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * + * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up + * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required + * that \c tag == output + ilen. That is, the tag must be + * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; + +/** + * \brief The generic authenticated decryption (AEAD) function. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). + * + * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key + * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). + * + * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer + * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being + * used, making this interface safer. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the + * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must + * not be \c NULL. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note + * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag. This must match + * the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used, and in + * particular must not be \c 0. + * + * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up + * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required + * that \c tag == input + len. That is, the tag must be + * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +/** + * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. + * + * \note For AEAD modes, the tag will be appended to the + * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. + * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p + * iv_len is \c 0. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must + * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and + * must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen + \p tag_len. + * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen + 8 + * (rounded up to a multiple of 8 if KWP is used); + * \p ilen + 15 is always a safe value. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by + * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. + * + * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer + * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being + * used, making this interface safer. + * + * \note For AEAD modes, the tag must be appended to the + * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. + * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p + * iv_len is \c 0. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must + * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. For AEAD ciphers this + * must be at least \p tag_len. For NIST_KW this must be + * at least \c 8. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and + * may be \c NULL if \p output_len is \c 0. + * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen - \p tag_len. + * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen - 8. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag_len The actual length of the authentication tag. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by + * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2484c01c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/** + * \file cipher_internal.h + * + * \brief Cipher wrappers. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Base cipher information. The non-mode specific functions and values. + */ +struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t +{ + /** Base Cipher type (e.g. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) */ + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher; + + /** Encrypt using ECB */ + int (*ecb_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /** Encrypt using CBC */ + int (*cbc_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + /** Encrypt using CFB (Full length) */ + int (*cfb_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + /** Encrypt using OFB (Full length) */ + int (*ofb_func)( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + /** Encrypt using CTR */ + int (*ctr_func)( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + /** Encrypt or decrypt using XTS. */ + int (*xts_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + /** Encrypt using STREAM */ + int (*stream_func)( void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); +#endif + + /** Set key for encryption purposes */ + int (*setkey_enc_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ); + + /** Set key for decryption purposes */ + int (*setkey_dec_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen); + + /** Allocate a new context */ + void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void ); + + /** Free the given context */ + void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx ); + +}; + +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info; +} mbedtls_cipher_definition_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET = 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts which */ + /* use raw key material internally imported */ + /* as a volatile key, and which hence need */ + /* to destroy that key when the context is */ + /* freed. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_NOT_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts */ + /* which use a key provided by the */ + /* user, and which hence will not be */ + /* destroyed when the context is freed. */ +} mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership; + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t slot; + mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state; +} mbedtls_cipher_context_psa; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[]; + +extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[]; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8934886a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +/** + * \file cmac.h + * + * \brief This file contains CMAC definitions and functions. + * + * The Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Mode for + * Authentication is defined in RFC-4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CMAC_H +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** CMAC hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x007A + +#define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 +#define MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE 8 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) + +/** + * The CMAC context structure. + */ +struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t +{ + /** The internal state of the CMAC algorithm. */ + unsigned char state[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + /** Unprocessed data - either data that was not block aligned and is still + * pending processing, or the final block. */ + unsigned char unprocessed_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + /** The length of data pending processing. */ + size_t unprocessed_len; +}; + +#else /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ +#include "cmac_alt.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function starts a new CMAC computation + * by setting the CMAC key, and preparing to authenticate + * the input data. + * It must be called with an initialized cipher context. + * + * Once this function has completed, data can be supplied + * to the CMAC computation by calling + * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(). + * + * To start a CMAC computation using the same key as a previous + * CMAC computation, use mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(). + * + * \note When the CMAC implementation is supplied by an alternate + * implementation (through #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT), some ciphers + * may not be supported by that implementation, and thus + * return an error. Alternate implementations must support + * AES-128 and AES-256, and may support AES-192 and 3DES. + * + * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation, initialized + * as one of the following types: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + * or MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB. + * \param key The CMAC key. + * \param keybits The length of the CMAC key in bits. + * Must be supported by the cipher. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing CMAC + * computation. + * + * The CMAC computation must have previously been started + * by calling mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts() or + * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset(). + * + * Call this function as many times as needed to input the + * data to be authenticated. + * Once all of the required data has been input, + * call mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish() to obtain the result + * of the CMAC operation. + * + * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if parameter verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes an ongoing CMAC operation, and + * writes the result to the output buffer. + * + * It should be followed either by + * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset(), which starts another CMAC + * operation with the same key, or mbedtls_cipher_free(), + * which clears the cipher context. + * + * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation. + * \param output The output buffer for the CMAC checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if parameter verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a new CMAC operation with the same + * key as the previous one. + * + * It should be called after finishing the previous CMAC + * operation with mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(). + * After calling this function, + * call mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update() to supply the new + * CMAC operation with data. + * + * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if parameter verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the full generic CMAC + * on the input buffer with the provided key. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The CMAC result is calculated as + * output = generic CMAC(cmac key, input buffer). + * + * \note When the CMAC implementation is supplied by an alternate + * implementation (through #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT), some ciphers + * may not be supported by that implementation, and thus + * return an error. Alternate implementations must support + * AES-128 and AES-256, and may support AES-192 and 3DES. + * + * \param cipher_info The cipher information. + * \param key The CMAC key. + * \param keylen The length of the CMAC key in bits. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the generic CMAC result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if parameter verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac( const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/** + * \brief This function implements the AES-CMAC-PRF-128 pseudorandom + * function, as defined in + * RFC-4615: The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based + * Message Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 + * (AES-CMAC-PRF-128) Algorithm for the Internet Key + * Exchange Protocol (IKE). + * + * \param key The key to use. + * \param key_len The key length in Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the generated 16 Bytes of + * pseudorandom output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char output[16] ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) +/** + * \brief The CMAC checkup routine. + * + * \note In case the CMAC routines are provided by an alternative + * implementation (i.e. #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is defined), the + * checkup routine will succeed even if the implementation does + * not support the less widely used AES-192 or 3DES primitives. + * The self-test requires at least AES-128 and AES-256 to be + * supported by the underlying implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cmac_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40177512 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h @@ -0,0 +1,2529 @@ +/** + * \file compat-1.3.h + * + * \brief Compatibility definitions for using mbed TLS with client code written + * for the PolarSSL naming conventions. + * + * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "Including compat-1.3.h is deprecated" +#endif + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H +#define MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H + +/* + * config.h options + */ +#if defined MBEDTLS_AESNI_C +#define POLARSSL_AESNI_C MBEDTLS_AESNI_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +#define POLARSSL_AES_ALT MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define POLARSSL_AES_C MBEDTLS_AES_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES +#define POLARSSL_AES_ROM_TABLES MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT +#define POLARSSL_ARC4_ALT MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +#define POLARSSL_ARC4_C MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define POLARSSL_BASE64_C MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_C MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT +#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_ALT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_C MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_ALT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY +#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define POLARSSL_CCM_C MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CERTS_C +#define POLARSSL_CERTS_C MBEDTLS_CERTS_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_C MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED +#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING +#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +#define POLARSSL_DES_ALT MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_C +#define POLARSSL_DES_C MBEDTLS_DES_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#define POLARSSL_DHM_C MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define POLARSSL_ECDH_C MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_C MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define POLARSSL_ECP_C MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM +#define POLARSSL_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS +#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +#define POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES +#define POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_C MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +#define POLARSSL_ERROR_C MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY +#define POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_FS_IO +#define POLARSSL_FS_IO MBEDTLS_FS_IO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#define POLARSSL_GCM_C MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#define POLARSSL_GENPRIME MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C +#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_C MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_SSE2 MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD2_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_C +#define POLARSSL_MD2_C MBEDTLS_MD2_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD2_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD4_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_C +#define POLARSSL_MD4_C MBEDTLS_MD4_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD4_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD5_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#define POLARSSL_MD5_C MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD5_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define POLARSSL_MD_C MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BACKTRACE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_NET_C +#define POLARSSL_NET_C MBEDTLS_NET_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES +#define POLARSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY +#define POLARSSL_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define POLARSSL_OID_C MBEDTLS_OID_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C +#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_C MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_PEM_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C +#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_C MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_C MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_C MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define POLARSSL_PK_C MBEDTLS_PK_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED +#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT +#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_PK_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_MEMORY MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FREE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN +#define POLARSSL_PSK_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +#define POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_C MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define POLARSSL_RSA_C MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT +#define POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +#define POLARSSL_SELF_TEST MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA1_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#define POLARSSL_SHA1_C MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA256_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define POLARSSL_SHA256_C MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA512_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#define POLARSSL_SHA512_C MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES +#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN +#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT +#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL +#define POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT +#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +#define POLARSSL_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +#define POLARSSL_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +#define POLARSSL_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL +#define POLARSSL_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_DTLS MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +#define POLARSSL_SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_TLS_C MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +#define POLARSSL_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_ALT MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_C +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_C MBEDTLS_THREADING_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_PTHREAD MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT +#define POLARSSL_TIMING_ALT MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_C +#define POLARSSL_TIMING_C MBEDTLS_TIMING_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_C +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_C MBEDTLS_VERSION_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_FEATURES MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 +#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION +#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE +#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CREATE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA +#define POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT +#define POLARSSL_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_USE_C MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT +#define POLARSSL_XTEA_ALT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_C +#define POLARSSL_XTEA_C MBEDTLS_XTEA_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +#define POLARSSL_ZLIB_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +#endif + +/* + * Misc names (macros, types, functions, enum constants...) + */ +#define AES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT +#define AES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT +#define ASN1_BIT_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING +#define ASN1_BMP_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING +#define ASN1_BOOLEAN MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN +#define ASN1_CHK_ADD MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD +#define ASN1_CONSTRUCTED MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED +#define ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC +#define ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME +#define ASN1_IA5_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING +#define ASN1_INTEGER MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER +#define ASN1_NULL MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL +#define ASN1_OCTET_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING +#define ASN1_OID MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID +#define ASN1_PRIMITIVE MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE +#define ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING +#define ASN1_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE +#define ASN1_SET MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET +#define ASN1_T61_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING +#define ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING +#define ASN1_UTC_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME +#define ASN1_UTF8_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING +#define BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH +#define BADCERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED +#define BADCERT_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE +#define BADCERT_MISSING MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING +#define BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED +#define BADCERT_OTHER MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER +#define BADCERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED +#define BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY +#define BADCRL_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED +#define BADCRL_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE +#define BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED +#define BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE +#define BLOWFISH_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT +#define BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT +#define BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS +#define BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS +#define BLOWFISH_ROUNDS MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS +#define CAMELLIA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT +#define CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT +#define COLLECT_SIZE MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE +#define CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE +#define CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN +#define CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS +#define CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE +#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT +#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +#define CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF +#define CTR_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON +#define CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL +#define CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN +#define DEPRECATED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#define DES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT +#define DES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT +#define DES_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE +#define ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE +#define ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER +#define ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE +#define ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES +#define ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK +#define ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE +#define ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM +#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL +#define EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS +#define EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES +#define EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS +#define EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL +#define EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY +#define EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME +#define EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE +#define EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS +#define EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE +#define EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS +#define EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS +#define EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME +#define EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS +#define EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define GCM_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT +#define GCM_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT +#define KU_CRL_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN +#define KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT +#define KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE +#define KU_KEY_AGREEMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT +#define KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN +#define KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT +#define KU_NON_REPUDIATION MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION +#define LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 +#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC +#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS +#define MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE +#define MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE +#define MPI_CHK MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK +#define NET_PROTO_TCP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP +#define NET_PROTO_UDP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 +#define OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_AT +#define OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN +#define OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY +#define OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER +#define OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER +#define OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME +#define OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS +#define OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY +#define OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION +#define OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT +#define OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS +#define OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE +#define OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM +#define OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER +#define OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE +#define OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME +#define OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE +#define OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER +#define OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS +#define OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM +#define OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES +#define OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH +#define OID_CMP MBEDTLS_OID_CMP +#define OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING +#define OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US +#define OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS +#define OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER +#define OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC +#define OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 +#define OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 +#define OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH +#define OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED +#define OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 +#define OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION +#define OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL +#define OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_GOV +#define OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 +#define OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE +#define OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY +#define OID_ISO_CCITT_DS MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS +#define OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG +#define OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY +#define OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG +#define OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES +#define OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME +#define OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE +#define OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_KP +#define OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 +#define OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS +#define OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE +#define OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL +#define OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL +#define OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL +#define OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT +#define OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE +#define OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE +#define OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT +#define OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE +#define OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL +#define OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL +#define OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME +#define OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING +#define OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG +#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG +#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 +#define OID_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION +#define OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 +#define OID_ORG_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM +#define OID_ORG_DOD MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD +#define OID_ORG_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV +#define OID_ORG_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE +#define OID_ORG_OIW MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW +#define OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY +#define OID_ORG_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST +#define OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS +#define OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 +#define OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 +#define OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 +#define OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 +#define OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 +#define OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 +#define OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 +#define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 +#define OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 +#define OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 +#define OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ +#define OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL +#define OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX +#define OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS +#define OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS +#define OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD +#define OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS +#define OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY +#define OID_RSA_SHA_OBS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS +#define OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH +#define OID_SIZE MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE +#define OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME +#define OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS +#define OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST +#define OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING +#define PADLOCK_ACE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE +#define PADLOCK_ALIGN16 MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16 +#define PADLOCK_PHE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE +#define PADLOCK_PMM MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM +#define PADLOCK_RNG MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG +#define PKCS12_DERIVE_IV MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV +#define PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY +#define PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY +#define PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT +#define PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT +#define PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT +#define PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT +#define POLARSSL_AESNI_AES MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES +#define POLARSSL_AESNI_CLMUL MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL +#define POLARSSL_AESNI_H MBEDTLS_AESNI_H +#define POLARSSL_AES_H MBEDTLS_AES_H +#define POLARSSL_ARC4_H MBEDTLS_ARC4_H +#define POLARSSL_ASN1_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_H +#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H +#define POLARSSL_BASE64_H MBEDTLS_BASE64_H +#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_H MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H +#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_H MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H +#define POLARSSL_BN_MUL_H MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H +#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_H MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H +#define POLARSSL_CCM_H MBEDTLS_CCM_H +#define POLARSSL_CERTS_H MBEDTLS_CERTS_H +#define POLARSSL_CHECK_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H +#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS +#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG +#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ARC4_128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_3DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H +#define POLARSSL_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H +#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_H MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H +#define POLARSSL_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT +#define POLARSSL_DES_H MBEDTLS_DES_H +#define POLARSSL_DHM_H MBEDTLS_DHM_H +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P +#define POLARSSL_ECDH_H MBEDTLS_ECDH_H +#define POLARSSL_ECDH_OURS MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS +#define POLARSSL_ECDH_THEIRS MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS +#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_H MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_MAX MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_H MBEDTLS_ECP_H +#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN +#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE +#define POLARSSL_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_POLL_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR +#define POLARSSL_ERROR_H MBEDTLS_ERROR_H +#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER +#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO +#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION +#define POLARSSL_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_GCM_H MBEDTLS_GCM_H +#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_H MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT32 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_UDBL MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86_64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES +#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE +#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 +#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE +#define POLARSSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_MD2_H MBEDTLS_MD2_H +#define POLARSSL_MD4_H MBEDTLS_MD4_H +#define POLARSSL_MD5_H MBEDTLS_MD5_H +#define POLARSSL_MD_H MBEDTLS_MD_H +#define POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_MD_MD2 MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 +#define POLARSSL_MD_MD4 MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 +#define POLARSSL_MD_MD5 MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 +#define POLARSSL_MD_NONE MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +#define POLARSSL_MD_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA1 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA224 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA256 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA512 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#define POLARSSL_MD_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H +#define POLARSSL_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC +#define POLARSSL_MODE_CCM MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM +#define POLARSSL_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB +#define POLARSSL_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR +#define POLARSSL_MODE_ECB MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB +#define POLARSSL_MODE_GCM MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM +#define POLARSSL_MODE_NONE MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE +#define POLARSSL_MODE_OFB MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB +#define POLARSSL_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM +#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS +#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 +#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_LIMBS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS +#define POLARSSL_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_NET_H MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H +#define POLARSSL_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG +#define POLARSSL_OID_H MBEDTLS_OID_H +#define POLARSSL_OPERATION_NONE MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_NONE MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_H MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H +#define POLARSSL_PEM_H MBEDTLS_PEM_H +#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_H MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H +#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_H MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H +#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_H MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H +#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP +#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS +#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI +#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE +#define POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA +#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY +#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY_DH MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH +#define POLARSSL_PK_H MBEDTLS_PK_H +#define POLARSSL_PK_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_NONE +#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA MBEDTLS_PK_RSA +#define POLARSSL_PK_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS +#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PK_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_H MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H +#define POLARSSL_PREMASTER_SIZE MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_H MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H +#define POLARSSL_RSA_H MBEDTLS_RSA_H +#define POLARSSL_SHA1_H MBEDTLS_SHA1_H +#define POLARSSL_SHA256_H MBEDTLS_SHA256_H +#define POLARSSL_SHA512_H MBEDTLS_SHA512_H +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H +#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H +#define POLARSSL_SSL_H MBEDTLS_SSL_H +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_H MBEDTLS_THREADING_H +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_IMPL MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#define POLARSSL_TIMING_H MBEDTLS_TIMING_H +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_H MBEDTLS_VERSION_H +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MAJOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MINOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_PATCH MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING_FULL MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H +#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_H MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H +#define POLARSSL_X509_H MBEDTLS_X509_H +#define POLARSSL_XTEA_H MBEDTLS_XTEA_H +#define RSA_CRYPT MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT +#define RSA_PKCS_V15 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 +#define RSA_PKCS_V21 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 +#define RSA_PRIVATE MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE +#define RSA_PUBLIC MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC +#define RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY +#define RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN +#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL +#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED +#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED +#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED +#define SSL_ARC4_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED +#define SSL_ARC4_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED +#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN ( ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ) < ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) ) \ + ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ) : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) ) +#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES +#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT +#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED +#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN +#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN +#define SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND +#define SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND +#define SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES +#define SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE +#define SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +#define SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO +#define SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD +#define SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE +#define SSL_COMPRESS_NULL MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL +#define SSL_DEBUG_BUF MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF +#define SSL_DEBUG_CRT MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT +#define SSL_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP +#define SSL_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI +#define SSL_DEBUG_MSG MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG +#define SSL_DEBUG_RET MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET +#define SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME +#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX +#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN +#define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO +#define SSL_ETM_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED +#define SSL_ETM_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED +#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED +#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED +#define SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +#define SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS +#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER +#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP +#define SSL_HASH_MD5 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 +#define SSL_HASH_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE +#define SSL_HASH_SHA1 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 +#define SSL_HASH_SHA224 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 +#define SSL_HASH_SHA256 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 +#define SSL_HASH_SHA384 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 +#define SSL_HASH_SHA512 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 +#define SSL_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST +#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE +#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO +#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define SSL_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED +#define SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST +#define SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST +#define SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET +#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO +#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE +#define SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE +#define SSL_IS_CLIENT MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT +#define SSL_IS_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK +#define SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK +#define SSL_IS_SERVER MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER +#define SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE +#define SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_MAC_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD +#define SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 +#define SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE +#define SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION +#define SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION +#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 +#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 +#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 +#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +#define SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION +#define SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION +#define SSL_MSG_ALERT MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT +#define SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA +#define SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +#define SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE +#define SSL_PADDING_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING +#define SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT +#define SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED +#define SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING +#define SSL_RETRANS_SENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING +#define SSL_RETRANS_WAITING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING +#define SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE +#define SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +#define SSL_SERVER_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT +#define SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET +#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED +#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED +#define SSL_SIG_ANON MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON +#define SSL_SIG_ECDSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA +#define SSL_SIG_RSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA +#define SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM +#define SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM +#define SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN +#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED +#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED +#define SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN +#define SSL_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE +#define SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL +#define SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_EXT_ALPN MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN +#define TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +#define TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +#define TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#define TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO +#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME +#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME +#define TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET +#define TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG +#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES +#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS +#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT +#define TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define X509_CRT_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 +#define X509_CRT_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 +#define X509_CRT_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 +#define X509_FORMAT_DER MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER +#define X509_FORMAT_PEM MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM +#define X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE +#define X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN +#define X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN +#define XTEA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT +#define XTEA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT +#define _asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring +#define _asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf +#define _asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data +#define _asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence +#define _ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context +#define _ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry +#define _ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t +#define _ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context +#define _ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item +#define _ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params +#define _ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert +#define _ssl_premaster_secret mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret +#define _ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session +#define _ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform +#define _x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl +#define _x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry +#define _x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt +#define _x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr +#define _x509_time mbedtls_x509_time +#define _x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert +#define _x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr +#define aes_context mbedtls_aes_context +#define aes_crypt_cbc mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc +#define aes_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128 +#define aes_crypt_cfb8 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8 +#define aes_crypt_ctr mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr +#define aes_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb +#define aes_free mbedtls_aes_free +#define aes_init mbedtls_aes_init +#define aes_self_test mbedtls_aes_self_test +#define aes_setkey_dec mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec +#define aes_setkey_enc mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc +#define aesni_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb +#define aesni_gcm_mult mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult +#define aesni_inverse_key mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key +#define aesni_setkey_enc mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc +#define aesni_supports mbedtls_aesni_has_support +#define alarmed mbedtls_timing_alarmed +#define arc4_context mbedtls_arc4_context +#define arc4_crypt mbedtls_arc4_crypt +#define arc4_free mbedtls_arc4_free +#define arc4_init mbedtls_arc4_init +#define arc4_self_test mbedtls_arc4_self_test +#define arc4_setup mbedtls_arc4_setup +#define asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring +#define asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf +#define asn1_find_named_data mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data +#define asn1_free_named_data mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data +#define asn1_free_named_data_list mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list +#define asn1_get_alg mbedtls_asn1_get_alg +#define asn1_get_alg_null mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null +#define asn1_get_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring +#define asn1_get_bitstring_null mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null +#define asn1_get_bool mbedtls_asn1_get_bool +#define asn1_get_int mbedtls_asn1_get_int +#define asn1_get_len mbedtls_asn1_get_len +#define asn1_get_mpi mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi +#define asn1_get_sequence_of mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of +#define asn1_get_tag mbedtls_asn1_get_tag +#define asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data +#define asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence +#define asn1_store_named_data mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data +#define asn1_write_algorithm_identifier mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier +#define asn1_write_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring +#define asn1_write_bool mbedtls_asn1_write_bool +#define asn1_write_ia5_string mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string +#define asn1_write_int mbedtls_asn1_write_int +#define asn1_write_len mbedtls_asn1_write_len +#define asn1_write_mpi mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi +#define asn1_write_null mbedtls_asn1_write_null +#define asn1_write_octet_string mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string +#define asn1_write_oid mbedtls_asn1_write_oid +#define asn1_write_printable_string mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string +#define asn1_write_raw_buffer mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer +#define asn1_write_tag mbedtls_asn1_write_tag +#define base64_decode mbedtls_base64_decode +#define base64_encode mbedtls_base64_encode +#define base64_self_test mbedtls_base64_self_test +#define blowfish_context mbedtls_blowfish_context +#define blowfish_crypt_cbc mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc +#define blowfish_crypt_cfb64 mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64 +#define blowfish_crypt_ctr mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr +#define blowfish_crypt_ecb mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb +#define blowfish_free mbedtls_blowfish_free +#define blowfish_init mbedtls_blowfish_init +#define blowfish_setkey mbedtls_blowfish_setkey +#define camellia_context mbedtls_camellia_context +#define camellia_crypt_cbc mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc +#define camellia_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128 +#define camellia_crypt_ctr mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr +#define camellia_crypt_ecb mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb +#define camellia_free mbedtls_camellia_free +#define camellia_init mbedtls_camellia_init +#define camellia_self_test mbedtls_camellia_self_test +#define camellia_setkey_dec mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec +#define camellia_setkey_enc mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc +#define ccm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt +#define ccm_context mbedtls_ccm_context +#define ccm_encrypt_and_tag mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag +#define ccm_free mbedtls_ccm_free +#define ccm_init mbedtls_ccm_init +#define ccm_self_test mbedtls_ccm_self_test +#define cipher_auth_decrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt +#define cipher_auth_encrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt +#define cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t +#define cipher_check_tag mbedtls_cipher_check_tag +#define cipher_context_t mbedtls_cipher_context_t +#define cipher_crypt mbedtls_cipher_crypt +#define cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definition_t +#define cipher_definitions mbedtls_cipher_definitions +#define cipher_finish mbedtls_cipher_finish +#define cipher_free mbedtls_cipher_free +#define cipher_get_block_size mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size +#define cipher_get_cipher_mode mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode +#define cipher_get_iv_size mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size +#define cipher_get_key_size mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen +#define cipher_get_name mbedtls_cipher_get_name +#define cipher_get_operation mbedtls_cipher_get_operation +#define cipher_get_type mbedtls_cipher_get_type +#define cipher_id_t mbedtls_cipher_id_t +#define cipher_info_from_string mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string +#define cipher_info_from_type mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type +#define cipher_info_from_values mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values +#define cipher_info_t mbedtls_cipher_info_t +#define cipher_init mbedtls_cipher_init +#define cipher_init_ctx mbedtls_cipher_setup +#define cipher_list mbedtls_cipher_list +#define cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_mode_t +#define cipher_padding_t mbedtls_cipher_padding_t +#define cipher_reset mbedtls_cipher_reset +#define cipher_set_iv mbedtls_cipher_set_iv +#define cipher_set_padding_mode mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode +#define cipher_setkey mbedtls_cipher_setkey +#define cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type_t +#define cipher_update mbedtls_cipher_update +#define cipher_update_ad mbedtls_cipher_update_ad +#define cipher_write_tag mbedtls_cipher_write_tag +#define ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context +#define ctr_drbg_free mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free +#define ctr_drbg_init mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init +#define ctr_drbg_random mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random +#define ctr_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add +#define ctr_drbg_reseed mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed +#define ctr_drbg_self_test mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test +#define ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len +#define ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance +#define ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval +#define ctr_drbg_update mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update +#define ctr_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file +#define ctr_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file +#define debug_print_buf mbedtls_debug_print_buf +#define debug_print_crt mbedtls_debug_print_crt +#define debug_print_ecp mbedtls_debug_print_ecp +#define debug_print_mpi mbedtls_debug_print_mpi +#define debug_print_msg mbedtls_debug_print_msg +#define debug_print_ret mbedtls_debug_print_ret +#define debug_set_threshold mbedtls_debug_set_threshold +#define des3_context mbedtls_des3_context +#define des3_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc +#define des3_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb +#define des3_free mbedtls_des3_free +#define des3_init mbedtls_des3_init +#define des3_set2key_dec mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec +#define des3_set2key_enc mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc +#define des3_set3key_dec mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec +#define des3_set3key_enc mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc +#define des_context mbedtls_des_context +#define des_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc +#define des_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb +#define des_free mbedtls_des_free +#define des_init mbedtls_des_init +#define des_key_check_key_parity mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity +#define des_key_check_weak mbedtls_des_key_check_weak +#define des_key_set_parity mbedtls_des_key_set_parity +#define des_self_test mbedtls_des_self_test +#define des_setkey_dec mbedtls_des_setkey_dec +#define des_setkey_enc mbedtls_des_setkey_enc +#define dhm_calc_secret mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret +#define dhm_context mbedtls_dhm_context +#define dhm_free mbedtls_dhm_free +#define dhm_init mbedtls_dhm_init +#define dhm_make_params mbedtls_dhm_make_params +#define dhm_make_public mbedtls_dhm_make_public +#define dhm_parse_dhm mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm +#define dhm_parse_dhmfile mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile +#define dhm_read_params mbedtls_dhm_read_params +#define dhm_read_public mbedtls_dhm_read_public +#define dhm_self_test mbedtls_dhm_self_test +#define ecdh_calc_secret mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret +#define ecdh_compute_shared mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared +#define ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context +#define ecdh_free mbedtls_ecdh_free +#define ecdh_gen_public mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public +#define ecdh_get_params mbedtls_ecdh_get_params +#define ecdh_init mbedtls_ecdh_init +#define ecdh_make_params mbedtls_ecdh_make_params +#define ecdh_make_public mbedtls_ecdh_make_public +#define ecdh_read_params mbedtls_ecdh_read_params +#define ecdh_read_public mbedtls_ecdh_read_public +#define ecdh_side mbedtls_ecdh_side +#define ecdsa_context mbedtls_ecdsa_context +#define ecdsa_free mbedtls_ecdsa_free +#define ecdsa_from_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair +#define ecdsa_genkey mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey +#define ecdsa_info mbedtls_ecdsa_info +#define ecdsa_init mbedtls_ecdsa_init +#define ecdsa_read_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature +#define ecdsa_sign mbedtls_ecdsa_sign +#define ecdsa_sign_det mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det +#define ecdsa_verify mbedtls_ecdsa_verify +#define ecdsa_write_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature +#define ecdsa_write_signature_det mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det +#define eckey_info mbedtls_eckey_info +#define eckeydh_info mbedtls_eckeydh_info +#define ecp_check_privkey mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey +#define ecp_check_pub_priv mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv +#define ecp_check_pubkey mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey +#define ecp_copy mbedtls_ecp_copy +#define ecp_curve_info mbedtls_ecp_curve_info +#define ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id +#define ecp_curve_info_from_name mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name +#define ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id +#define ecp_curve_list mbedtls_ecp_curve_list +#define ecp_gen_key mbedtls_ecp_gen_key +#define ecp_gen_keypair mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair +#define ecp_group mbedtls_ecp_group +#define ecp_group_copy mbedtls_ecp_group_copy +#define ecp_group_free mbedtls_ecp_group_free +#define ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_group_id +#define ecp_group_init mbedtls_ecp_group_init +#define ecp_grp_id_list mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list +#define ecp_is_zero mbedtls_ecp_is_zero +#define ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecp_keypair +#define ecp_keypair_free mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free +#define ecp_keypair_init mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init +#define ecp_mul mbedtls_ecp_mul +#define ecp_point mbedtls_ecp_point +#define ecp_point_free mbedtls_ecp_point_free +#define ecp_point_init mbedtls_ecp_point_init +#define ecp_point_read_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary +#define ecp_point_read_string mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string +#define ecp_point_write_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary +#define ecp_self_test mbedtls_ecp_self_test +#define ecp_set_zero mbedtls_ecp_set_zero +#define ecp_tls_read_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group +#define ecp_tls_read_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point +#define ecp_tls_write_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group +#define ecp_tls_write_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point +#define ecp_use_known_dp mbedtls_ecp_group_load +#define entropy_add_source mbedtls_entropy_add_source +#define entropy_context mbedtls_entropy_context +#define entropy_free mbedtls_entropy_free +#define entropy_func mbedtls_entropy_func +#define entropy_gather mbedtls_entropy_gather +#define entropy_init mbedtls_entropy_init +#define entropy_self_test mbedtls_entropy_self_test +#define entropy_update_manual mbedtls_entropy_update_manual +#define entropy_update_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file +#define entropy_write_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file +#define error_strerror mbedtls_strerror +#define f_source_ptr mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr +#define gcm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt +#define gcm_context mbedtls_gcm_context +#define gcm_crypt_and_tag mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag +#define gcm_finish mbedtls_gcm_finish +#define gcm_free mbedtls_gcm_free +#define gcm_init mbedtls_gcm_init +#define gcm_self_test mbedtls_gcm_self_test +#define gcm_starts mbedtls_gcm_starts +#define gcm_update mbedtls_gcm_update +#define get_timer mbedtls_timing_get_timer +#define hardclock mbedtls_timing_hardclock +#define hardclock_poll mbedtls_hardclock_poll +#define havege_free mbedtls_havege_free +#define havege_init mbedtls_havege_init +#define havege_poll mbedtls_havege_poll +#define havege_random mbedtls_havege_random +#define havege_state mbedtls_havege_state +#define hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context +#define hmac_drbg_free mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free +#define hmac_drbg_init mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init +#define hmac_drbg_random mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random +#define hmac_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add +#define hmac_drbg_reseed mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed +#define hmac_drbg_self_test mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test +#define hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len +#define hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance +#define hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval +#define hmac_drbg_update mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update +#define hmac_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file +#define hmac_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file +#define hr_time mbedtls_timing_hr_time +#define key_exchange_type_t mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t +#define md mbedtls_md +#define md2 mbedtls_md2 +#define md2_context mbedtls_md2_context +#define md2_finish mbedtls_md2_finish +#define md2_free mbedtls_md2_free +#define md2_info mbedtls_md2_info +#define md2_init mbedtls_md2_init +#define md2_process mbedtls_md2_process +#define md2_self_test mbedtls_md2_self_test +#define md2_starts mbedtls_md2_starts +#define md2_update mbedtls_md2_update +#define md4 mbedtls_md4 +#define md4_context mbedtls_md4_context +#define md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish +#define md4_free mbedtls_md4_free +#define md4_info mbedtls_md4_info +#define md4_init mbedtls_md4_init +#define md4_process mbedtls_md4_process +#define md4_self_test mbedtls_md4_self_test +#define md4_starts mbedtls_md4_starts +#define md4_update mbedtls_md4_update +#define md5 mbedtls_md5 +#define md5_context mbedtls_md5_context +#define md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish +#define md5_free mbedtls_md5_free +#define md5_info mbedtls_md5_info +#define md5_init mbedtls_md5_init +#define md5_process mbedtls_md5_process +#define md5_self_test mbedtls_md5_self_test +#define md5_starts mbedtls_md5_starts +#define md5_update mbedtls_md5_update +#define md_context_t mbedtls_md_context_t +#define md_file mbedtls_md_file +#define md_finish mbedtls_md_finish +#define md_free mbedtls_md_free +#define md_get_name mbedtls_md_get_name +#define md_get_size mbedtls_md_get_size +#define md_get_type mbedtls_md_get_type +#define md_hmac mbedtls_md_hmac +#define md_hmac_finish mbedtls_md_hmac_finish +#define md_hmac_reset mbedtls_md_hmac_reset +#define md_hmac_starts mbedtls_md_hmac_starts +#define md_hmac_update mbedtls_md_hmac_update +#define md_info_from_string mbedtls_md_info_from_string +#define md_info_from_type mbedtls_md_info_from_type +#define md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t +#define md_init mbedtls_md_init +#define md_init_ctx mbedtls_md_init_ctx +#define md_list mbedtls_md_list +#define md_process mbedtls_md_process +#define md_starts mbedtls_md_starts +#define md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_t +#define md_update mbedtls_md_update +#define memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get +#define memory_buffer_alloc_free mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free +#define memory_buffer_alloc_init mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init +#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get +#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset +#define memory_buffer_alloc_self_test mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test +#define memory_buffer_alloc_status mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status +#define memory_buffer_alloc_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify +#define memory_buffer_set_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify +#define mpi mbedtls_mpi +#define mpi_add_abs mbedtls_mpi_add_abs +#define mpi_add_int mbedtls_mpi_add_int +#define mpi_add_mpi mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi +#define mpi_cmp_abs mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs +#define mpi_cmp_int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int +#define mpi_cmp_mpi mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi +#define mpi_copy mbedtls_mpi_copy +#define mpi_div_int mbedtls_mpi_div_int +#define mpi_div_mpi mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi +#define mpi_exp_mod mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod +#define mpi_fill_random mbedtls_mpi_fill_random +#define mpi_free mbedtls_mpi_free +#define mpi_gcd mbedtls_mpi_gcd +#define mpi_gen_prime mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime +#define mpi_get_bit mbedtls_mpi_get_bit +#define mpi_grow mbedtls_mpi_grow +#define mpi_init mbedtls_mpi_init +#define mpi_inv_mod mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod +#define mpi_is_prime mbedtls_mpi_is_prime +#define mpi_lsb mbedtls_mpi_lsb +#define mpi_lset mbedtls_mpi_lset +#define mpi_mod_int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int +#define mpi_mod_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi +#define mpi_msb mbedtls_mpi_bitlen +#define mpi_mul_int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int +#define mpi_mul_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi +#define mpi_read_binary mbedtls_mpi_read_binary +#define mpi_read_file mbedtls_mpi_read_file +#define mpi_read_string mbedtls_mpi_read_string +#define mpi_safe_cond_assign mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign +#define mpi_safe_cond_swap mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap +#define mpi_self_test mbedtls_mpi_self_test +#define mpi_set_bit mbedtls_mpi_set_bit +#define mpi_shift_l mbedtls_mpi_shift_l +#define mpi_shift_r mbedtls_mpi_shift_r +#define mpi_shrink mbedtls_mpi_shrink +#define mpi_size mbedtls_mpi_size +#define mpi_sub_abs mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs +#define mpi_sub_int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int +#define mpi_sub_mpi mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi +#define mpi_swap mbedtls_mpi_swap +#define mpi_write_binary mbedtls_mpi_write_binary +#define mpi_write_file mbedtls_mpi_write_file +#define mpi_write_string mbedtls_mpi_write_string +#define net_accept mbedtls_net_accept +#define net_bind mbedtls_net_bind +#define net_close mbedtls_net_free +#define net_connect mbedtls_net_connect +#define net_recv mbedtls_net_recv +#define net_recv_timeout mbedtls_net_recv_timeout +#define net_send mbedtls_net_send +#define net_set_block mbedtls_net_set_block +#define net_set_nonblock mbedtls_net_set_nonblock +#define net_usleep mbedtls_net_usleep +#define oid_descriptor_t mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t +#define oid_get_attr_short_name mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name +#define oid_get_cipher_alg mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg +#define oid_get_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp +#define oid_get_extended_key_usage mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage +#define oid_get_md_alg mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg +#define oid_get_numeric_string mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string +#define oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp +#define oid_get_oid_by_md mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md +#define oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg +#define oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg +#define oid_get_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg +#define oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg +#define oid_get_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg +#define oid_get_sig_alg_desc mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc +#define oid_get_x509_ext_type mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type +#define operation_t mbedtls_operation_t +#define padlock_supports mbedtls_padlock_has_support +#define padlock_xcryptcbc mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc +#define padlock_xcryptecb mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb +#define pem_context mbedtls_pem_context +#define pem_free mbedtls_pem_free +#define pem_init mbedtls_pem_init +#define pem_read_buffer mbedtls_pem_read_buffer +#define pem_write_buffer mbedtls_pem_write_buffer +#define pk_can_do mbedtls_pk_can_do +#define pk_check_pair mbedtls_pk_check_pair +#define pk_context mbedtls_pk_context +#define pk_debug mbedtls_pk_debug +#define pk_debug_item mbedtls_pk_debug_item +#define pk_debug_type mbedtls_pk_debug_type +#define pk_decrypt mbedtls_pk_decrypt +#define pk_ec mbedtls_pk_ec +#define pk_encrypt mbedtls_pk_encrypt +#define pk_free mbedtls_pk_free +#define pk_get_len mbedtls_pk_get_len +#define pk_get_name mbedtls_pk_get_name +#define pk_get_size mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen +#define pk_get_type mbedtls_pk_get_type +#define pk_info_from_type mbedtls_pk_info_from_type +#define pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t +#define pk_init mbedtls_pk_init +#define pk_init_ctx mbedtls_pk_setup +#define pk_init_ctx_rsa_alt mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt +#define pk_load_file mbedtls_pk_load_file +#define pk_parse_key mbedtls_pk_parse_key +#define pk_parse_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile +#define pk_parse_public_key mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key +#define pk_parse_public_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile +#define pk_parse_subpubkey mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey +#define pk_rsa mbedtls_pk_rsa +#define pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func +#define pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func +#define pk_rsa_alt_sign_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func +#define pk_rsassa_pss_options mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options +#define pk_sign mbedtls_pk_sign +#define pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_type_t +#define pk_verify mbedtls_pk_verify +#define pk_verify_ext mbedtls_pk_verify_ext +#define pk_write_key_der mbedtls_pk_write_key_der +#define pk_write_key_pem mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem +#define pk_write_pubkey mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey +#define pk_write_pubkey_der mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der +#define pk_write_pubkey_pem mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem +#define pkcs11_context mbedtls_pkcs11_context +#define pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt +#define pkcs11_priv_key_free mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free +#define pkcs11_priv_key_init mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind +#define pkcs11_sign mbedtls_pkcs11_sign +#define pkcs11_x509_cert_init mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind +#define pkcs12_derivation mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation +#define pkcs12_pbe mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe +#define pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 +#define pkcs5_pbes2 mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2 +#define pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac +#define pkcs5_self_test mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test +#define platform_entropy_poll mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll +#define platform_set_exit mbedtls_platform_set_exit +#define platform_set_fprintf mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf +#define platform_set_printf mbedtls_platform_set_printf +#define platform_set_snprintf mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf +#define polarssl_exit mbedtls_exit +#define polarssl_fprintf mbedtls_fprintf +#define polarssl_free mbedtls_free +#define polarssl_mutex_free mbedtls_mutex_free +#define polarssl_mutex_init mbedtls_mutex_init +#define polarssl_mutex_lock mbedtls_mutex_lock +#define polarssl_mutex_unlock mbedtls_mutex_unlock +#define polarssl_printf mbedtls_printf +#define polarssl_snprintf mbedtls_snprintf +#define polarssl_strerror mbedtls_strerror +#define ripemd160 mbedtls_ripemd160 +#define ripemd160_context mbedtls_ripemd160_context +#define ripemd160_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_finish +#define ripemd160_free mbedtls_ripemd160_free +#define ripemd160_info mbedtls_ripemd160_info +#define ripemd160_init mbedtls_ripemd160_init +#define ripemd160_process mbedtls_ripemd160_process +#define ripemd160_self_test mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test +#define ripemd160_starts mbedtls_ripemd160_starts +#define ripemd160_update mbedtls_ripemd160_update +#define rsa_alt_context mbedtls_rsa_alt_context +#define rsa_alt_info mbedtls_rsa_alt_info +#define rsa_check_privkey mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey +#define rsa_check_pub_priv mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv +#define rsa_check_pubkey mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey +#define rsa_context mbedtls_rsa_context +#define rsa_copy mbedtls_rsa_copy +#define rsa_free mbedtls_rsa_free +#define rsa_gen_key mbedtls_rsa_gen_key +#define rsa_info mbedtls_rsa_info +#define rsa_init mbedtls_rsa_init +#define rsa_pkcs1_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt +#define rsa_pkcs1_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt +#define rsa_pkcs1_sign mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign +#define rsa_pkcs1_verify mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify +#define rsa_private mbedtls_rsa_private +#define rsa_public mbedtls_rsa_public +#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt +#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt +#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt +#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt +#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign +#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify +#define rsa_rsassa_pss_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign +#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify +#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext +#define rsa_self_test mbedtls_rsa_self_test +#define rsa_set_padding mbedtls_rsa_set_padding +#define safer_memcmp mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp +#define set_alarm mbedtls_set_alarm +#define sha1 mbedtls_sha1 +#define sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context +#define sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish +#define sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free +#define sha1_info mbedtls_sha1_info +#define sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init +#define sha1_process mbedtls_sha1_process +#define sha1_self_test mbedtls_sha1_self_test +#define sha1_starts mbedtls_sha1_starts +#define sha1_update mbedtls_sha1_update +#define sha224_info mbedtls_sha224_info +#define sha256 mbedtls_sha256 +#define sha256_context mbedtls_sha256_context +#define sha256_finish mbedtls_sha256_finish +#define sha256_free mbedtls_sha256_free +#define sha256_info mbedtls_sha256_info +#define sha256_init mbedtls_sha256_init +#define sha256_process mbedtls_sha256_process +#define sha256_self_test mbedtls_sha256_self_test +#define sha256_starts mbedtls_sha256_starts +#define sha256_update mbedtls_sha256_update +#define sha384_info mbedtls_sha384_info +#define sha512 mbedtls_sha512 +#define sha512_context mbedtls_sha512_context +#define sha512_finish mbedtls_sha512_finish +#define sha512_free mbedtls_sha512_free +#define sha512_info mbedtls_sha512_info +#define sha512_init mbedtls_sha512_init +#define sha512_process mbedtls_sha512_process +#define sha512_self_test mbedtls_sha512_self_test +#define sha512_starts mbedtls_sha512_starts +#define sha512_update mbedtls_sha512_update +#define source_state mbedtls_entropy_source_state +#define ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context +#define ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry +#define ssl_cache_free mbedtls_ssl_cache_free +#define ssl_cache_get mbedtls_ssl_cache_get +#define ssl_cache_init mbedtls_ssl_cache_init +#define ssl_cache_set mbedtls_ssl_cache_set +#define ssl_cache_set_max_entries mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries +#define ssl_cache_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout +#define ssl_check_cert_usage mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage +#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_id mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id +#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_string mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string +#define ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t +#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec +#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk +#define ssl_close_notify mbedtls_ssl_close_notify +#define ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context +#define ssl_cookie_check mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check +#define ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t +#define ssl_cookie_ctx mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx +#define ssl_cookie_free mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free +#define ssl_cookie_init mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init +#define ssl_cookie_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout +#define ssl_cookie_setup mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup +#define ssl_cookie_write mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write +#define ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t +#define ssl_derive_keys mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys +#define ssl_dtls_replay_check mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check +#define ssl_dtls_replay_update mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update +#define ssl_fetch_input mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input +#define ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item +#define ssl_flush_output mbedtls_ssl_flush_output +#define ssl_free mbedtls_ssl_free +#define ssl_get_alpn_protocol mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol +#define ssl_get_bytes_avail mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail +#define ssl_get_ciphersuite mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite +#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id +#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_name mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name +#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg +#define ssl_get_peer_cert mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert +#define ssl_get_record_expansion mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion +#define ssl_get_session mbedtls_ssl_get_session +#define ssl_get_verify_result mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result +#define ssl_get_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version +#define ssl_handshake mbedtls_ssl_handshake +#define ssl_handshake_client_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step +#define ssl_handshake_free mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free +#define ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params +#define ssl_handshake_server_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step +#define ssl_handshake_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step +#define ssl_handshake_wrapup mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup +#define ssl_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len +#define ssl_hs_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len +#define ssl_hw_record_activate mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate +#define ssl_hw_record_finish mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish +#define ssl_hw_record_init mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init +#define ssl_hw_record_read mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read +#define ssl_hw_record_reset mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset +#define ssl_hw_record_write mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write +#define ssl_init mbedtls_ssl_init +#define ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert +#define ssl_legacy_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation +#define ssl_list_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites +#define ssl_md_alg_from_hash mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash +#define ssl_optimize_checksum mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum +#define ssl_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_own_cert +#define ssl_own_key mbedtls_ssl_own_key +#define ssl_parse_certificate mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate +#define ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec +#define ssl_parse_finished mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished +#define ssl_pk_alg_from_sig mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig +#define ssl_pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt +#define ssl_pkcs11_key_len mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len +#define ssl_pkcs11_sign mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign +#define ssl_psk_derive_premaster mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster +#define ssl_read mbedtls_ssl_read +#define ssl_read_record mbedtls_ssl_read_record +#define ssl_read_version mbedtls_ssl_read_version +#define ssl_recv_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed +#define ssl_renegotiate mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate +#define ssl_resend mbedtls_ssl_resend +#define ssl_reset_checksum mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum +#define ssl_send_alert_message mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message +#define ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure +#define ssl_send_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed +#define ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session +#define ssl_session_free mbedtls_ssl_session_free +#define ssl_session_init mbedtls_ssl_session_init +#define ssl_session_reset mbedtls_ssl_session_reset +#define ssl_set_alpn_protocols mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols +#define ssl_set_arc4_support mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support +#define ssl_set_authmode mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode +#define ssl_set_bio mbedtls_ssl_set_bio +#define ssl_set_ca_chain mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain +#define ssl_set_cbc_record_splitting mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting +#define ssl_set_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites +#define ssl_set_ciphersuites_for_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version +#define ssl_set_client_transport_id mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id +#define ssl_set_curves mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves +#define ssl_set_dbg mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg +#define ssl_set_dh_param mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param +#define ssl_set_dh_param_ctx mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx +#define ssl_set_dtls_anti_replay mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay +#define ssl_set_dtls_badmac_limit mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit +#define ssl_set_dtls_cookies mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies +#define ssl_set_encrypt_then_mac mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac +#define ssl_set_endpoint mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint +#define ssl_set_extended_master_secret mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret +#define ssl_set_fallback mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback +#define ssl_set_handshake_timeout mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout +#define ssl_set_hostname mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname +#define ssl_set_max_frag_len mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len +#define ssl_set_max_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version +#define ssl_set_min_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version +#define ssl_set_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert +#define ssl_set_psk mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk +#define ssl_set_psk_cb mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb +#define ssl_set_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation +#define ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced +#define ssl_set_renegotiation_period mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period +#define ssl_set_rng mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng +#define ssl_set_session mbedtls_ssl_set_session +#define ssl_set_session_cache mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache +#define ssl_set_session_tickets mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets +#define ssl_set_sni mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni +#define ssl_set_transport mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport +#define ssl_set_truncated_hmac mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac +#define ssl_set_verify mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify +#define ssl_sig_from_pk mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk +#define ssl_states mbedtls_ssl_states +#define ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform +#define ssl_transform_free mbedtls_ssl_transform_free +#define ssl_write mbedtls_ssl_write +#define ssl_write_certificate mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate +#define ssl_write_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec +#define ssl_write_finished mbedtls_ssl_write_finished +#define ssl_write_record mbedtls_ssl_write_record +#define ssl_write_version mbedtls_ssl_write_version +#define supported_ciphers mbedtls_cipher_supported +#define t_sint mbedtls_mpi_sint +#define t_udbl mbedtls_t_udbl +#define t_uint mbedtls_mpi_uint +#define test_ca_crt mbedtls_test_ca_crt +#define test_ca_crt_ec mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec +#define test_ca_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa +#define test_ca_key mbedtls_test_ca_key +#define test_ca_key_ec mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec +#define test_ca_key_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa +#define test_ca_list mbedtls_test_cas_pem +#define test_ca_pwd mbedtls_test_ca_pwd +#define test_ca_pwd_ec mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec +#define test_ca_pwd_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa +#define test_cli_crt mbedtls_test_cli_crt +#define test_cli_crt_ec mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec +#define test_cli_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa +#define test_cli_key mbedtls_test_cli_key +#define test_cli_key_ec mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec +#define test_cli_key_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa +#define test_srv_crt mbedtls_test_srv_crt +#define test_srv_crt_ec mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec +#define test_srv_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa +#define test_srv_key mbedtls_test_srv_key +#define test_srv_key_ec mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec +#define test_srv_key_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa +#define threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_mutex_t +#define threading_set_alt mbedtls_threading_set_alt +#define timing_self_test mbedtls_timing_self_test +#define version_check_feature mbedtls_version_check_feature +#define version_get_number mbedtls_version_get_number +#define version_get_string mbedtls_version_get_string +#define version_get_string_full mbedtls_version_get_string_full +#define x509_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring +#define x509_buf mbedtls_x509_buf +#define x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl +#define x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry +#define x509_crl_free mbedtls_x509_crl_free +#define x509_crl_info mbedtls_x509_crl_info +#define x509_crl_init mbedtls_x509_crl_init +#define x509_crl_parse mbedtls_x509_crl_parse +#define x509_crl_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der +#define x509_crl_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file +#define x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt +#define x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage +#define x509_crt_check_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage +#define x509_crt_free mbedtls_x509_crt_free +#define x509_crt_info mbedtls_x509_crt_info +#define x509_crt_init mbedtls_x509_crt_init +#define x509_crt_parse mbedtls_x509_crt_parse +#define x509_crt_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der +#define x509_crt_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file +#define x509_crt_parse_path mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path +#define x509_crt_revoked mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked +#define x509_crt_verify mbedtls_x509_crt_verify +#define x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr +#define x509_csr_free mbedtls_x509_csr_free +#define x509_csr_info mbedtls_x509_csr_info +#define x509_csr_init mbedtls_x509_csr_init +#define x509_csr_parse mbedtls_x509_csr_parse +#define x509_csr_parse_der mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der +#define x509_csr_parse_file mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file +#define x509_dn_gets mbedtls_x509_dn_gets +#define x509_get_alg mbedtls_x509_get_alg +#define x509_get_alg_null mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null +#define x509_get_ext mbedtls_x509_get_ext +#define x509_get_name mbedtls_x509_get_name +#define x509_get_rsassa_pss_params mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params +#define x509_get_serial mbedtls_x509_get_serial +#define x509_get_sig mbedtls_x509_get_sig +#define x509_get_sig_alg mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg +#define x509_get_time mbedtls_x509_get_time +#define x509_key_size_helper mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper +#define x509_name mbedtls_x509_name +#define x509_self_test mbedtls_x509_self_test +#define x509_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence +#define x509_serial_gets mbedtls_x509_serial_gets +#define x509_set_extension mbedtls_x509_set_extension +#define x509_sig_alg_gets mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets +#define x509_string_to_names mbedtls_x509_string_to_names +#define x509_time mbedtls_x509_time +#define x509_time_expired mbedtls_x509_time_is_past +#define x509_time_future mbedtls_x509_time_is_future +#define x509_write_extensions mbedtls_x509_write_extensions +#define x509_write_names mbedtls_x509_write_names +#define x509_write_sig mbedtls_x509_write_sig +#define x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert +#define x509write_crt_der mbedtls_x509write_crt_der +#define x509write_crt_free mbedtls_x509write_crt_free +#define x509write_crt_init mbedtls_x509write_crt_init +#define x509write_crt_pem mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem +#define x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier +#define x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints +#define x509write_crt_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension +#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key +#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name +#define x509write_crt_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage +#define x509write_crt_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg +#define x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type +#define x509write_crt_set_serial mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial +#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key +#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier +#define x509write_crt_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name +#define x509write_crt_set_validity mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity +#define x509write_crt_set_version mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version +#define x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr +#define x509write_csr_der mbedtls_x509write_csr_der +#define x509write_csr_free mbedtls_x509write_csr_free +#define x509write_csr_init mbedtls_x509write_csr_init +#define x509write_csr_pem mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem +#define x509write_csr_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension +#define x509write_csr_set_key mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key +#define x509write_csr_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage +#define x509write_csr_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg +#define x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type +#define x509write_csr_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name +#define xtea_context mbedtls_xtea_context +#define xtea_crypt_cbc mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc +#define xtea_crypt_ecb mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb +#define xtea_free mbedtls_xtea_free +#define xtea_init mbedtls_xtea_init +#define xtea_self_test mbedtls_xtea_self_test +#define xtea_setup mbedtls_xtea_setup + +#endif /* compat-1.3.h */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cd6eb66 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h @@ -0,0 +1,4127 @@ +/** + * \file config.h + * + * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable + * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global + * memory footprint. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: System support + * + * This section sets system specific settings. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * The compiler has support for asm(). + * + * Requires support for asm() in compiler. + * + * Used in: + * library/aria.c + * library/timing.c + * include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h + * + * Required by: + * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Comment to disable the use of assembly code. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + * + * The platform lacks support for double-width integer division (64-bit + * division on a 32-bit platform, 128-bit division on a 64-bit platform). + * + * Used in: + * include/mbedtls/bignum.h + * library/bignum.c + * + * The bignum code uses double-width division to speed up some operations. + * Double-width division is often implemented in software that needs to + * be linked with the program. The presence of a double-width integer + * type is usually detected automatically through preprocessor macros, + * but the automatic detection cannot know whether the code needs to + * and can be linked with an implementation of division for that type. + * By default division is assumed to be usable if the type is present. + * Uncomment this option to prevent the use of double-width division. + * + * Note that division for the native integer type is always required. + * Furthermore, a 64-bit type is always required even on a 32-bit + * platform, but it need not support multiplication or division. In some + * cases it is also desirable to disable some double-width operations. For + * example, if double-width division is implemented in software, disabling + * it can reduce code size in some embedded targets. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + * + * The platform lacks support for 32x32 -> 64-bit multiplication. + * + * Used in: + * library/poly1305.c + * + * Some parts of the library may use multiplication of two unsigned 32-bit + * operands with a 64-bit result in order to speed up computations. On some + * platforms, this is not available in hardware and has to be implemented in + * software, usually in a library provided by the toolchain. + * + * Sometimes it is not desirable to have to link to that library. This option + * removes the dependency of that library on platforms that lack a hardware + * 64-bit multiplier by embedding a software implementation in Mbed TLS. + * + * Note that depending on the compiler, this may decrease performance compared + * to using the library function provided by the toolchain. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + * + * CPU supports SSE2 instruction set. + * + * Uncomment if the CPU supports SSE2 (IA-32 specific). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * System has time.h and time(). + * The time does not need to be correct, only time differences are used, + * by contrast with MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * Defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME allows you to specify MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT, + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME. + * + * Comment if your system does not support time functions. + * + * \note If MBEDTLS_TIMING_C is set - to enable the semi-portable timing + * interface - timing.c will include time.h on suitable platforms + * regardless of the setting of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME, unless + * MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT is used. See timing.c for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below). + * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least + * the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of + * X.509 certificates. + * + * Comment if your system does not have a correct clock. + * + * \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that + * behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to + * the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information. + * + * \note It is possible to configure an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + * + * Enable the memory allocation layer. + * + * By default mbed TLS uses the system-provided calloc() and free(). + * This allows different allocators (self-implemented or provided) to be + * provided to the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY without the + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACROs will provide + * "mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free()" allowing you to set an alternative calloc() and + * free() function pointer at runtime. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY and specifying + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC,FREE}_MACROs will allow you to specify the + * alternate function at compile time. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of alternative memory allocators. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + * + * Do not assign standard functions in the platform layer (e.g. calloc() to + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and printf() to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) + * + * This makes sure there are no linking errors on platforms that do not support + * these functions. You will HAVE to provide alternatives, either at runtime + * via the platform_set_xxx() functions or at compile time by setting + * the MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_XXX defines, or enabling a + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Uncomment to prevent default assignment of standard functions in the + * platform layer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS support the + * function in the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT, mbed TLS will + * provide a function "mbedtls_platform_set_printf()" that allows you to set an + * alternative printf function pointer. + * + * All these define require MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C to be defined! + * + * \note MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT is required on Windows; + * it will be enabled automatically by check_config.h + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot be defined at the same time as + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO! + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base + * platform function + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + * + * Mark deprecated functions and features so that they generate a warning if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * This only works with GCC and Clang. With other compilers, you may want to + * use MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Remove deprecated functions and features so that they generate an error if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + * + * This configuration option controls whether the library validates more of + * the parameters passed to it. + * + * When this flag is not defined, the library only attempts to validate an + * input parameter if: (1) they may come from the outside world (such as the + * network, the filesystem, etc.) or (2) not validating them could result in + * internal memory errors such as overflowing a buffer controlled by the + * library. On the other hand, it doesn't attempt to validate parameters whose + * values are fully controlled by the application (such as pointers). + * + * When this flag is defined, the library additionally attempts to validate + * parameters that are fully controlled by the application, and should always + * be valid if the application code is fully correct and trusted. + * + * For example, when a function accepts as input a pointer to a buffer that may + * contain untrusted data, and its documentation mentions that this pointer + * must not be NULL: + * - The pointer is checked to be non-NULL only if this option is enabled. + * - The content of the buffer is always validated. + * + * When this flag is defined, if a library function receives a parameter that + * is invalid: + * 1. The function will invoke the macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). + * 2. If MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() did not terminate the program, the function + * will immediately return. If the function returns an Mbed TLS error code, + * the error code in this case is MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * When defining this flag, you also need to arrange a definition for + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). You can do this by any of the following methods: + * - By default, the library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call a + * function mbedtls_param_failed(), but the library does not define this + * function. If you do not make any other arrangements, you must provide + * the function mbedtls_param_failed() in your application. + * See `platform_util.h` for its prototype. + * - If you enable the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT, then the + * library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(\c cond) to be `assert(cond)`. + * You can still supply an alternative definition of + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), which may call `assert`. + * - If you define a macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() before including `config.h` + * or you uncomment the definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() in `config.h`, + * the library will call the macro that you defined and will not supply + * its own version. Note that if MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() calls `assert`, + * you need to enable #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source + * files include ``. + * + * Uncomment to enable validation of application-controlled parameters. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + * + * Allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`, and make it default to + * `assert`. This macro is only used if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is defined. + * + * If this macro is not defined, then MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() defaults to + * calling a function mbedtls_param_failed(). See the documentation of + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for details. + * + * Uncomment to allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + +/** \} name SECTION: System support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support + * + * This section sets support for features that are or are not needed + * within the modules that are enabled. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + * + * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), + * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay() + * + * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled. + * + * You will need to provide a header "timing_alt.h" and an implementation at + * compile time. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto, an arithmetic or hash + * module (e.g. platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep + * in mind that the function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces the whole module. If you only want to replace one of the + * functions, use one of the MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, mbed TLS will no longer + * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base + * function declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from + * "aes.h" to include the new function definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * module. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their + * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend + * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message + * digests and ciphers instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT + +/* + * When replacing the elliptic curve module, please consider, that it is + * implemented with two .c files: + * - ecp.c + * - ecp_curves.c + * You can replace them very much like all the other MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT + * macros as described above. The only difference is that you have to make sure + * that you provide functionality for both .c files. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use you + * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in + * mind that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces only one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT, mbed TLS will + * no longer provide the mbedtls_sha1_process() function, but it will still provide + * the other function (using your mbedtls_sha1_process() function) and the definition + * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible + * with this definition. + * + * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are + * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt, + * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should + * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt + * must stay untouched. + * + * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then it is recommended to also set + * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES + * tables. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use + * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding + * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests + * and ciphers instead. + * + * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are + * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the + * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore + * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating + * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative + * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() + * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is + * desirable). + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * + * Expose a part of the internal interface of the Elliptic Curve Point module. + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternative core implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic. Keep in mind + * that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This partially replaces one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT flag. The original implementation + * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the + * alternative. + * + * The original implementation can in addition be removed by setting the + * MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK option, in which case any function for which the + * corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT macro is defined will not be + * able to fallback to curves not supported by the alternative implementation. + * + * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * and implementing the following functions: + * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( + * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the + * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0 + * otherwise. + * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free are + * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to + * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions. + * + * Example: In case you set MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac() + * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac() if the group + * for the operation is supported by your implementation (i.e. your + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable() function returns 1 for this group). If the + * group is not supported by your implementation, then the original mbed TLS + * implementation of ecp_double_jac() is used instead, unless this fallback + * behaviour is disabled by setting MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK (in which case + * ecp_double_jac() will return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE). + * + * The function prototypes and the definition of mbedtls_ecp_group and + * mbedtls_ecp_point will not change based on MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT, so your + * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp__function_name__ must be compatible + * with their definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + */ +/* Required for all the functions in this section */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT +/* Turn off software fallback for curves not supported in hardware */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK +/* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT +/* Support for curves with Montgomery arithmetic */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + * + * Enables testing and use of mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources. + * This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has + * been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the + * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches). + * + * WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable + * only for development. + * Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library. + * + * Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + * + * Uncomment this macro to let mbed TLS use your own implementation of a + * hardware entropy collector. + * + * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same + * prototype as declared in entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first argument. + * + * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + * + * Use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * + * Uncomment this macro to use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * Comment this macro to generate AES tables in RAM at runtime. + * + * Tradeoff: Using precomputed ROM tables reduces RAM usage by ~8kb + * (or ~2kb if \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES is used) and reduces the + * initialization time before the first AES operation can be performed. + * It comes at the cost of additional ~8kb ROM use (resp. ~2kb if \c + * MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES below is used), and potentially degraded + * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + * + * Use less ROM/RAM for AES tables. + * + * Uncommenting this macro omits 75% of the AES tables from + * ROM / RAM (depending on the value of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + * by computing their values on the fly during operations + * (the tables are entry-wise rotations of one another). + * + * Tradeoff: Uncommenting this reduces the RAM / ROM footprint + * by ~6kb but at the cost of more arithmetic operations during + * runtime. Specifically, one has to compare 4 accesses within + * different tables to 4 accesses with additional arithmetic + * operations within the same table. The performance gain/loss + * depends on the system and memory details. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + * + * Use less ROM for the Camellia implementation (saves about 768 bytes). + * + * Uncomment this macro to use less memory for Camellia. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING + * + * If this macro is defined, emit a compile-time warning if application code + * calls a function without checking its return value, but the return value + * should generally be checked in portable applications. + * + * This is only supported on platforms where #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN is + * implemented. Otherwise this option has no effect. + * + * Uncomment to get warnings on using fallible functions without checking + * their return value. + * + * \note This feature is a work in progress. + * Warnings will be added to more functions in the future. + * + * \note A few functions are considered critical, and ignoring the return + * value of these functions will trigger a warning even if this + * macro is not defined. To completely disable return value check + * warnings, define #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN with an empty expansion. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + * + * Enable Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + * + * Enable Cipher Feedback mode (CFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + * + * Enable Counter Block Cipher mode (CTR) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + * + * Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + * + * Enable Xor-encrypt-xor with ciphertext stealing mode (XTS) for AES. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + * + * Enable NULL cipher. + * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for + * encryption or channels without any security! + * + * Requires MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES as well to enable + * the following ciphersuites: + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable the NULL cipher and ciphersuites + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 + * + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_XXX: Uncomment or comment macros to add support for + * specific padding modes in the cipher layer with cipher modes that support + * padding (e.g. CBC) + * + * If you disable all padding modes, only full blocks can be used with CBC. + * + * Enable padding modes in the cipher layer. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + * + * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module. + * By default, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Enable weak ciphersuites in SSL / TLS. + * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for + * channels with virtually no security at all! + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites: + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable weak ciphersuites + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Remove RC4 ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. + * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on RC4 from the default list as + * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible to + * enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including them + * explicitly. + * + * Uncomment this macro to remove RC4 ciphersuites by default. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Remove 3DES ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. + * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on 3DES from the default list as + * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible + * to enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including + * them explicitly. + * + * A man-in-the-browser attacker can recover authentication tokens sent through + * a TLS connection using a 3DES based cipher suite (see "On the Practical + * (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers" by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan + * Leurent, see https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf). If this attack falls + * in your threat model or you are unsure, then you should keep this option + * enabled to remove 3DES based cipher suites. + * + * Comment this macro to keep 3DES in the default ciphersuite list. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP_XXXX_ENABLED: Enables specific curves within the Elliptic Curve + * module. By default all supported curves are enabled. + * + * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it + */ +/* Short Weierstrass curves (supporting ECP, ECDH, ECDSA) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +/* Montgomery curves (supporting ECP) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + * + * Enable specific 'modulo p' routines for each NIST prime. + * Depending on the prime and architecture, makes operations 4 to 8 times + * faster on the corresponding curve. + * + * Comment this macro to disable NIST curves optimisation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + * + * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an + * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect + * against some side-channel attacks. + * + * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the + * DRBG modules. For very constrained implementations that don't require this + * protection (for example, because you're only doing signature verification, + * so not manipulating any secret, or because local/physical side-channel + * attacks are outside your threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of + * that dependency. + * + * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some + * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for + * your use case. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + * + * Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed. + * + * This allows various functions to pause by returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in + * order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is + * controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum + * number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information. + * + * This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking + * for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations. + * + * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of + * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with + * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT + * and MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + * + * Use a backward compatible ECDH context. + * + * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context + * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes + * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, + * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. + + * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller + * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it + * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. + * The new format is incompatible with applications that access + * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. + * + * Define this macro if you enable MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE or if you + * want to access ECDH context fields directly. Otherwise you should + * comment out this macro definition. + * + * This option has no effect if #MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is not enabled. + * + * \note This configuration option is experimental. Future versions of the + * library may modify the way the ECDH context layout is configured + * and may modify the layout of the new context type. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + * + * Enable deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979). + * Standard ECDSA is "fragile" in the sense that lack of entropy when signing + * may result in a compromise of the long-term signing key. This is avoided by + * the deterministic variant. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-only based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C, + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECJPAKE based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the + * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification + * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + * + * Enhance support for reading EC keys using variants of SEC1 not allowed by + * RFC 5915 and RFC 5480. + * + * Currently this means parsing the SpecifiedECDomain choice of EC + * parameters (only known groups are supported, not arbitrary domains, to + * avoid validation issues). + * + * Disable if you only need to support RFC 5915 + 5480 key formats. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + * + * Enable a dummy error function to make use of mbedtls_strerror() in + * third party libraries easier when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is disabled + * (no effect when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled). + * + * You can safely disable this if MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled, or if you're + * not using mbedtls_strerror() or error_strerror() in your application. + * + * Disable if you run into name conflicts and want to really remove the + * mbedtls_strerror() + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + * + * Enable the prime-number generation code. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_FS_IO + * + * Enable functions that use the filesystem. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + * + * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific, + * mbedtls_timing_hardclock and HAVEGE based poll functions. + * + * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an + * application. + * + * Uncomment this macro to prevent loading of default entropy functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + * + * Do not use built-in platform entropy functions. + * This is useful if your platform does not support + * standards like the /dev/urandom or Windows CryptoAPI. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the built-in platform entropy functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + * + * Force the entropy accumulator to use a SHA-256 accumulator instead of the + * default SHA-512 based one (if both are available). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * On 32-bit systems SHA-256 can be much faster than SHA-512. Use this option + * if you have performance concerns. + * + * This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + * Enable the non-volatile (NV) seed file-based entropy source. + * (Also enables the NV seed read/write functions in the platform layer) + * + * This is crucial (if not required) on systems that do not have a + * cryptographic entropy source (in hardware or kernel) available. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * \note The read/write functions that are used by the entropy source are + * determined in the platform layer, and can be modified at runtime and/or + * compile-time depending on the flags (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_*) used. + * + * \note If you use the default implementation functions that read a seedfile + * with regular fopen(), please make sure you make a seedfile with the + * proper name (defined in MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) and at + * least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes in size that can be read from + * and written to or you will get an entropy source error! The default + * implementation will only use the first MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * bytes from the file. + * + * \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is + * given to an external source, to update it. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + +/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + * + * Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier. + * + * The owner of a key is identified by a value of type ::mbedtls_key_owner_id_t + * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t. + * + * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed + * without notice. It is incompatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + * + * Enable debugging of buffer allocator memory issues. Automatically prints + * (to stderr) all (fatal) messages on memory allocation issues. Enables + * function for 'debug output' of allocated memory. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Uncomment this macro to let the buffer allocator print out error messages. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + * + * Include backtrace information with each allocated block. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * GLIBC-compatible backtrace() an backtrace_symbols() support + * + * Uncomment this macro to include backtrace information + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + * + * Support external private RSA keys (eg from a HSM) in the PK layer. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for external private RSA keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + * + * Enable support for platform built-in keys. If you enable this feature, + * you must implement the function mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key(). + * See the documentation of that function for more information. + * + * Built-in keys are typically derived from a hardware unique key or + * stored in a secure element. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * + * Enable support for PSA crypto client. + * + * \note This option allows to include the code necessary for a PSA + * crypto client when the PSA crypto implementation is not included in + * the library (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled). The code included is the + * code to set and get PSA key attributes. + * The development of PSA drivers partially relying on the library to + * fulfill the hardware gaps is another possible usage of this option. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + * + * Enable support for the experimental PSA crypto driver interface. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + * + * Make the PSA Crypto module use an external random generator provided + * by a driver, instead of Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * If you enable this option, you must configure the type + * ::mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t in psa/crypto_platform.h + * and define a function called mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * with the following prototype: + * ``` + * psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + * mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + * uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + * ); + * ``` + * The \c context value is initialized to 0 before the first call. + * The function must fill the \c output buffer with \p output_size bytes + * of random data and set \c *output_length to \p output_size. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning If you enable this option, code that uses the PSA cryptography + * interface will not use any of the entropy sources set up for + * the entropy module, nor the NV seed that MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * enables. + * + * \note This option is experimental and may be removed without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure + * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a + * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process + * Environment). + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + * + * Enable support for entropy injection at first boot. This feature is + * required on systems that do not have a built-in entropy source (TRNG). + * This feature is currently not supported on systems that have a built-in + * entropy source. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + * + * Do not use the Chinese Remainder Theorem + * for the RSA private operation. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + * + * Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonable compromise between + * performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at + * the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of + * mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about + * 30%. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-512 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA512. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 + * + * Disable the SHA-384 option of the SHA-512 module. Use this to save some + * code size on devices that don't use SHA-384. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Uncomment to disable SHA-384 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + * + * Enable sending of alert messages in case of encountered errors as per RFC. + * If you choose not to send the alert messages, mbed TLS can still communicate + * with other servers, only debugging of failures is harder. + * + * The advantage of not sending alert messages, is that no information is given + * about reasons for failures thus preventing adversaries of gaining intel. + * + * Enable sending of all alert messages + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + * + * Enable the function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() which can be used to check + * the validity and authenticity of an incoming record, to verify that it has + * not been seen before. These checks are performed without modifying the + * externally visible state of the SSL context. + * + * See mbedtls_ssl_check_record() for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable support for record checking. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + * + * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension + * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes + * in the underlying transport. + * + * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`, + * `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. + * See the corresponding documentation for more information. + * + * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state. + * We make no stability promises for the availability + * or the shape of the API controlled by this option. + * + * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured + * through the options + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + * + * Enable asynchronous external private key operations in SSL. This allows + * you to configure an SSL connection to call an external cryptographic + * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the + * operation inside the library. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + * + * Enable serialization of the TLS context structures, through use of the + * functions mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load(). + * + * This pair of functions allows one side of a connection to serialize the + * context associated with the connection, then free or re-use that context + * while the serialized state is persisted elsewhere, and finally deserialize + * that state to a live context for resuming read/write operations on the + * connection. From a protocol perspective, the state of the connection is + * unaffected, in particular this is entirely transparent to the peer. + * + * Note: this is distinct from TLS session resumption, which is part of the + * protocol and fully visible by the peer. TLS session resumption enables + * establishing new connections associated to a saved session with shorter, + * lighter handshakes, while context serialization is a local optimization in + * handling a single, potentially long-lived connection. + * + * Enabling these APIs makes some SSL structures larger, as 64 extra bytes are + * saved after the handshake to allow for more efficient serialization, so if + * you don't need this feature you'll save RAM by disabling it. + * + * Comment to disable the context serialization APIs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + * + * Enable the debug messages in SSL module for all issues. + * Debug messages have been disabled in some places to prevent timing + * attacks due to (unbalanced) debugging function calls. + * + * If you need all error reporting you should enable this during debugging, + * but remove this for production servers that should log as well. + * + * Uncomment this macro to report all debug messages on errors introducing + * a timing side-channel. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + * + * Enable support for Encrypt-then-MAC, RFC 7366. + * + * This allows peers that both support it to use a more robust protection for + * ciphersuites using CBC, providing deep resistance against timing attacks + * on the padding or underlying cipher. + * + * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + * + * Enable support for RFC 7627: Session Hash and Extended Master Secret + * Extension. + * + * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake family of + * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable + * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the + * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV + * + * Enable support for RFC 7507: Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) + * for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks. + * + * For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support + * only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients + * implements a fallback strategy. + * + * For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which + * is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to + * interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * + * This option controls the availability of the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + * giving access to the peer's certificate after completion of the handshake. + * + * Unless you need mbedtls_ssl_peer_cert() in your application, it is + * recommended to disable this option for reduced RAM usage. + * + * \note If this option is disabled, mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() is still + * defined, but always returns \c NULL. + * + * \note This option has no influence on the protection against the + * triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will + * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation, + * for example by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate. + * + * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate + * after the handshake. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL + * + * Enable hooking functions in SSL module for hardware acceleration of + * individual records. + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable hooking functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + * + * Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in SSLv3 and TLS 1.0. + * + * This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk + * of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records. + * + * Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + * + * Enable support for TLS renegotiation. + * + * The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived + * connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake. + * If you don't need renegotiation, it's probably better to disable it, since + * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to + * misuse/misunderstand. + * + * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation. + * + * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware + * of the Renegotiation Indication Extension (RFC 5746) used to + * prevent the SSL renegotiation attack (see RFC 5746 Sect. 1). + * (See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation for the + * configuration of this extension). + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + * + * Enable support for receiving and parsing SSLv2 Client Hello messages for the + * SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable support for SSLv2 Client Hello messages. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + * + * Pick the ciphersuite according to the client's preferences rather than ours + * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * + * Uncomment this macro to respect client's ciphersuite order + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + * + * Enable support for SSL 3.0. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL 3.0 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.0. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA1_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * (Depends on ciphersuites) + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + * + * This macro is used to selectively enable experimental parts + * of the code that contribute to the ongoing development of + * the prototype TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 implementation, and provide + * no other purpose. + * + * \warning TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 aren't yet supported in Mbed TLS, + * and no feature exposed through this macro is part of the + * public API. In particular, features under the control + * of this macro are experimental and don't come with any + * stability guarantees. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable experimental and partial + * functionality specific to TLS 1.3. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions). + * + * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0, + * and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + * + * Enable support for RFC 7301 Application Layer Protocol Negotiation. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for ALPN. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + * + * Enable support for the anti-replay mechanism in DTLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * \warning Disabling this is often a security risk! + * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay() for details. + * + * Comment this to disable anti-replay in DTLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Enable support for HelloVerifyRequest on DTLS servers. + * + * This feature is highly recommended to prevent DTLS servers being used as + * amplifiers in DoS attacks against other hosts. It should always be enabled + * unless you know for sure amplification cannot be a problem in the + * environment in which your server operates. + * + * \warning Disabling this can be a security risk! (see above) + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Comment this to disable support for HelloVerifyRequest. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + * + * Enable support for negotiation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) + * through the use_srtp extension. + * + * \note This feature provides the minimum functionality required + * to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP and to allow the derivation of + * the associated SRTP packet protection key material. + * In particular, the SRTP packet protection itself, as well as the + * demultiplexing of RTP and DTLS packets at the datagram layer + * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature. + * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating + * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb() should be used to implement + * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705 + * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs). + * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack. + * + * Setting this option enables the runtime API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles() + * through which the supported DTLS-SRTP protection + * profiles can be configured. You must call this API at + * runtime if you wish to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment this to enable support for use_srtp extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + * + * Enable server-side support for clients that reconnect from the same port. + * + * Some clients unexpectedly close the connection and try to reconnect using the + * same source port. This needs special support from the server to handle the + * new connection securely, as described in section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347. This + * flag enables that support. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Comment this to disable support for clients reusing the source port. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT + * + * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC. + * + * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + * + * Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL. + * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a + * session store remains the responsibility of the application, though). + * Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing + * tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example + * callbacks are provided by MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + * + * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret. + * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for key export + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 server name indication (SNI) in SSL. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for server name indication in SSL + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 truncated HMAC in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT + * + * Fallback to old (pre-2.7), non-conforming implementation of the truncated + * HMAC extension which also truncates the HMAC key. Note that this option is + * only meant for a transitory upgrade period and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \warning The old implementation is non-compliant and has a security weakness + * (2^80 brute force attack on the HMAC key used for a single, + * uninterrupted connection). This should only be enabled temporarily + * when (1) the use of truncated HMAC is essential in order to save + * bandwidth, and (2) the peer is an Mbed TLS stack that doesn't use + * the fixed implementation yet (pre-2.7). + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment to fallback to old, non-compliant truncated HMAC implementation. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + * + * When this option is enabled, the SSL buffer will be resized automatically + * based on the negotiated maximum fragment length in each direction. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test + * suites can then be run normally. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for + * testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be + * done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when + * using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + * + * Enable features for invasive testing such as introspection functions and + * hooks for fault injection. This enables additional unit tests. + * + * Merely enabling this feature should not change the behavior of the product. + * It only adds new code, and new branching points where the default behavior + * is the same as when this feature is disabled. + * However, this feature increases the attack surface: there is an added + * risk of vulnerabilities, and more gadgets that can make exploits easier. + * Therefore this feature must never be enabled in production. + * + * See `docs/architecture/testing/mbed-crypto-invasive-testing.md` for more + * information. + * + * Uncomment to enable invasive tests. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + * + * Provide your own alternate threading implementation. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to allow your own alternate threading implementation. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + * + * Enable the pthread wrapper layer for the threading layer. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to enable pthread mutexes. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + * + * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, and + * enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. + * + * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed + * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts + * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not + * break backwards compatibility. + * + * \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description of what this + * option currently does, and of parts that are not affected by it so far. + * + * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs which are currently + * considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any time. + * That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual + * promises of API stability. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * + * This setting allows support for cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA + * API to be configured separately from support through the mbedtls API. + * + * When this option is disabled, the PSA API exposes the cryptographic + * mechanisms that can be implemented on top of the `mbedtls_xxx` API + * configured with `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols. + * + * When this option is enabled, the PSA API exposes the cryptographic + * mechanisms requested by the `PSA_WANT_XXX` symbols defined in + * include/psa/crypto_config.h. The corresponding `MBEDTLS_XXX` settings are + * automatically enabled if required (i.e. if no PSA driver provides the + * mechanism). You may still freely enable additional `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols + * in config.h. + * + * If the symbol #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE is defined, it specifies + * an alternative header to include instead of include/psa/crypto_config.h. + * + * If you enable this option and write your own configuration file, you must + * include mbedtls/config_psa.h in your configuration file. The default + * provided mbedtls/config.h contains the necessary inclusion. + * + * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since + * it is not completed. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + * + * Allow run-time checking of compile-time enabled features. Thus allowing users + * to check at run-time if the library is for instance compiled with threading + * support via mbedtls_version_check_feature(). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 + * + * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate + * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate. + * + * Uncomment to prevent an error. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + * + * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate + * and encountering an unknown critical extension. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, enabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Uncomment to prevent an error. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + * + * If set, this enables the X.509 API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` + * and the SSL API `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` which allow users to configure + * the set of trusted certificates through a callback instead of a linked + * list. + * + * This is useful for example in environments where a large number of trusted + * certificates is present and storing them in a linked list isn't efficient + * enough, or when the set of trusted certificates changes frequently. + * + * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE + * + * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension (CA and leaf certificates). + * + * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused + * (intermediate) CA and leaf certificates. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Comment to skip keyUsage checking for both CA and leaf certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + * + * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (leaf certificates). + * + * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused certificates. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Comment to skip extendedKeyUsage checking for certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + * + * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS + * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1). + * + * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT + * + * If set, the SSL/TLS module uses ZLIB to support compression and + * decompression of packet data. + * + * \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the + * CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if + * CRIME or similar exploits may be applicable to your use case. + * + * \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS. + * + * \deprecated This feature is deprecated and will be removed + * in the next major revision of the library. + * + * Used in: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This feature requires zlib library and headers to be present. + * + * Uncomment to enable use of ZLIB + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +/** \} name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS modules + * + * This section enables or disables entire modules in mbed TLS + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * + * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64. + * + * Module: library/aesni.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86-64 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * Enable the AES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ctr_drbg.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * + * PEM_PARSE uses AES for decrypting encrypted keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * + * Enable the ARCFOUR stream cipher. + * + * Module: library/arc4.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoidng dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger ciphers instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 parser. + * + * Module: library/asn1.c + * Caller: library/x509.c + * library/dhm.c + * library/pkcs12.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 writer. + * + * Module: library/asn1write.c + * Caller: library/ecdsa.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * Enable the Base64 module. + * + * Module: library/base64.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * + * This module is required for PEM support (required by X.509). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + * + * Enable the multi-precision integer library. + * + * Module: library/bignum.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/ecp.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_internal.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C + * + * Enable the Blowfish block cipher. + * + * Module: library/blowfish.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * Enable the Camellia block cipher. + * + * Module: library/camellia.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * Enable the ARIA block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aria.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C + * + * Enable the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode for 128-bit block cipher. + * + * Module: library/ccm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are + * enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C + * + * Enable the test certificates. + * + * Module: library/certs.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20 stream cipher. + * + * Module: library/chacha20.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * Module: library/chachapoly.c + * + * This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + * + * Enable the generic cipher layer. + * + * Module: library/cipher.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + * + * Enable the CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) mode for block + * ciphers. + * + * \note When #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is active, meaning that the underlying + * implementation of the CMAC algorithm is provided by an alternate + * implementation, that alternate implementation may opt to not support + * AES-192 or 3DES as underlying block ciphers for the CMAC operation. + * + * Module: library/cmac.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator. + * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. + * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above. + * + * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG, + * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy. + * See ctr_drbg.h for more details. + * + * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + * + * Enable the debug functions. + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + * Enable the DES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/des.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * + * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys. + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module. + * + * Module: library/dhm.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library. + * + * Module: library/ecdh.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve DSA library. + * + * Module: library/ecdsa.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, + * and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED for a + * short Weierstrass curve. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library. + * + * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the + * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification + * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * + * Module: library/ecjpake.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECJPAKE + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve over GF(p) library. + * + * Module: library/ecp.c + * Caller: library/ecdh.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/ecjpake.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + * + * Enable the platform-specific entropy code. + * + * Module: library/entropy.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * This module provides a generic entropy pool + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + * + * Enable error code to error string conversion. + * + * Module: library/error.c + * Caller: + * + * This module enables mbedtls_strerror(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_C + * + * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). + * + * Module: library/gcm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other + * requisites are enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + * + * Enable the HAVEGE random generator. + * + * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is not suitable for virtualized + * environments + * + * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is dependent on timing and specific + * processor traits. It is therefore not advised to use HAVEGE as + * your applications primary random generator or primary entropy pool + * input. As a secondary input to your entropy pool, it IS able add + * the (limited) extra entropy it provides. + * + * Module: library/havege.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the HAVEGE random generator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + * + * Enable the HKDF algorithm (RFC 5869). + * + * Module: library/hkdf.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code + * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the HMAC_DRBG random generator. + * + * Module: library/hmac_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + * + * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, + * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes + * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. + * + * Module: library/nist_kw.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Enable the generic message digest layer. + * + * Module: library/md.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_C + * + * Enable the MD2 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md2.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs. + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD4_C + * + * Enable the MD4 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md4.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs. + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * + * Enable the MD5 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md5.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2 + * depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking + * MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded + * encrypted keys. + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Enable the buffer allocator implementation that makes use of a (stack) + * based buffer to 'allocate' dynamic memory. (replaces calloc() and free() + * calls) + * + * Module: library/memory_buffer_alloc.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY (to use it within mbed TLS) + * + * Enable this module to enable the buffer memory allocator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NET_C + * + * Enable the TCP and UDP over IPv6/IPv4 networking routines. + * + * \note This module only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, BSD and OS X) + * and Windows. For other platforms, you'll want to disable it, and write your + * own networking callbacks to be passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/net_sockets.c + * + * This module provides networking routines. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_OID_C + * + * Enable the OID database. + * + * Module: library/oid.c + * Caller: library/asn1write.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/x509.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * This modules translates between OIDs and internal values. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Enable VIA Padlock support on x86. + * + * Module: library/padlock.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + * + * Enable PEM decoding / parsing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + * + * Enable PEM encoding / writing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for encoding / writing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key layer. + * + * Module: library/pk.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key parser. + * + * Module: library/pkparse.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key writer. + * + * Module: library/pkwrite.c + * Caller: library/x509write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + * + * Enable PKCS#5 functions. + * + * Module: library/pkcs5.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + * + * Enable wrapper for PKCS#11 smartcard support via the pkcs11-helper library. + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Module: library/pkcs11.c + * Caller: library/pk.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * This module enables SSL/TLS PKCS #11 smartcard support. + * Requires the presence of the PKCS#11 helper library (libpkcs11-helper) + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + * + * Enable PKCS#12 PBE functions. + * Adds algorithms for parsing PKCS#8 encrypted private keys + * + * Module: library/pkcs12.c + * Caller: library/pkparse.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * Can use: MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * + * This module enables PKCS#12 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable the platform abstraction layer that allows you to re-assign + * functions like calloc(), free(), snprintf(), printf(), fprintf(), exit(). + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C enables to use of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT + * or MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO directives, allowing the functions mentioned + * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively. + * + * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2) + * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. + * + * Module: library/platform.c + * Caller: Most other .c files + * + * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + * + * Enable the Poly1305 MAC algorithm. + * + * Module: library/poly1305.c + * Caller: library/chachapoly.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * + * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + * + * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture + * cryptography API. + * + * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided + * for API evaluation and testing purposes only. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, + * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of + * the PSA ITS interface + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + * + * Enable the emulation of the Platform Security Architecture + * Internal Trusted Storage (PSA ITS) over files. + * + * Module: library/psa_its_file.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_FS_IO + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + * + * Enable the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/ripemd160.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem. + * + * Module: library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_internal.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Enable the SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha1.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2 + * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256. + * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + * + * Enable simple SSL cache implementation. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cache.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + * + * Enable basic implementation of DTLS cookies for hello verification. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cookie.c + * Caller: + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + * + * Enable an implementation of TLS server-side callbacks for session tickets. + * + * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS client code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cli.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS client support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS server code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS server support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_tls.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Enable the threading abstraction layer. + * By default mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or that + * contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts + * between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race + * conditions. See also our Knowledge Base article about threading: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading + * + * Module: library/threading.c + * + * This allows different threading implementations (self-implemented or + * provided). + * + * You will have to enable either MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT or + * MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD. + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of mutexes within mbed TLS + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * + * Enable the semi-portable timing interface. + * + * \note The provided implementation only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, + * BSD and OS X) and Windows. On other platforms, you can either disable that + * module and provide your own implementations of the callbacks needed by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS, or leave it enabled and provide + * your own implementation of the whole module by setting + * \c MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT in the current file. + * + * \note The timing module will include time.h on suitable platforms + * regardless of the setting of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME, unless + * MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT is used. See timing.c for more information. + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/timing.c + * Caller: library/havege.c + * + * This module is used by the HAVEGE random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Enable run-time version information. + * + * Module: library/version.c + * + * This module provides run-time version information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for using certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509.c + * Caller: library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, + * MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 certificate parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 CRL parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crl.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 CRL parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_csr.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is used for reading X.509 certificate request. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for creating certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_create.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate creation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR). + * + * Module: library/x509_csr_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate request writing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + * + * Enable the XTEA block cipher. + * + * Module: library/xtea.c + * Caller: + */ +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + +/** \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: General configuration options + * + * This section contains Mbed TLS build settings that are not associated + * with a particular module. + * + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"mbedtls/config.h"`. + * This header file specifies the compile-time configuration of Mbed TLS. + * Unlike other configuration options, this one must be defined on the + * compiler command line: a definition in `config.h` would have no effect. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE "mbedtls/config.h" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included after + * `"mbedtls/config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE. + * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability + * to undefine options that are enabled by default. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"psa/crypto_config.h"`. + * This header file specifies which cryptographic mechanisms are available + * through the PSA API when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, and + * is not used when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE "psa/crypto_config.h" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included after + * `"psa/crypto_config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE. + * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability + * to undefine options that are enabled by default. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null" + +/** \} name SECTION: General configuration options */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module configuration options + * + * This section allows for the setting of module specific sizes and + * configuration options. The default values are already present in the + * relevant header files and should suffice for the regular use cases. + * + * Our advice is to enable options and change their values here + * only if you have a good reason and know the consequences. + * \{ + */ +/* The Doxygen documentation here is used when a user comments out a + * setting and runs doxygen themselves. On the other hand, when we typeset + * the full documentation including disabled settings, the documentation + * in specific modules' header files is used if present. When editing this + * file, make sure that each option is documented in exactly one place, + * plus optionally a same-line Doxygen comment here if there is a Doxygen + * comment in the specific module. */ + +/* MPI / BIGNUM options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ + +/* CTR_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 /**< Amount of entropy used per seed by default (48 with SHA-512, 32 with SHA-256) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* HMAC_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* ECP options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< Maximum bit size of groups. Normally determined automatically from the configured curves. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< Maximum window size used */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */ + +/* Entropy options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Default minimum number of bytes required for the hardware entropy source mbedtls_hardware_poll() before entropy is released */ + +/* Memory buffer allocator options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */ + +/* Platform options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR /**< Header to include if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS is defined. Don't define if no header is needed. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< Default allocator to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< Default free to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" /**< Seed file to read/write with default implementation */ + +/* To Use Function Macros MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C must be enabled */ +/* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot both be defined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ + +/** + * \brief This macro is invoked by the library when an invalid parameter + * is detected that is only checked with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + * (see the documentation of that option for context). + * + * When you leave this undefined here, the library provides + * a default definition. If the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + * is defined, the default definition is `assert(cond)`, + * otherwise the default definition calls a function + * mbedtls_param_failed(). This function is declared in + * `platform_util.h` for the benefit of the library, but + * you need to define in your application. + * + * When you define this here, this replaces the default + * definition in platform_util.h (which no longer declares the + * function mbedtls_param_failed()) and it is your responsibility + * to make sure this macro expands to something suitable (in + * particular, that all the necessary declarations are visible + * from within the library - you can ensure that by providing + * them in this file next to the macro definition). + * If you define this macro to call `assert`, also define + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source files + * include ``. + * + * Note that you may define this macro to expand to nothing, in + * which case you don't have to worry about declarations or + * definitions. However, you will then be notified about invalid + * parameters only in non-void functions, and void function will + * just silently return early on invalid parameters, which + * partially negates the benefits of enabling + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS in the first place, so is discouraged. + * + * \param cond The expression that should evaluate to true, but doesn't. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN + * + * This macro is used at the beginning of the declaration of a function + * to indicate that its return value should be checked. It should + * instruct the compiler to emit a warning or an error if the function + * is called without checking its return value. + * + * There is a default implementation for popular compilers in platform_util.h. + * You can override the default implementation by defining your own here. + * + * If the implementation here is empty, this will effectively disable the + * checking of functions' return values. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__)) + +/** \def MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN + * + * This macro requires one argument, which should be a C function call. + * If that function call would cause a #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN warning, this + * warning is suppressed. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( result ) ((void) !(result)) + +/* PSA options */ +/** + * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the + * PSA crypto subsystem. + * + * If this option is unset: + * - If CTR_DRBG is available, the PSA subsystem uses it rather than HMAC_DRBG. + * - Otherwise, the PSA subsystem uses HMAC_DRBG with either + * #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 or #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 based on availability and + * on unspecified heuristics. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + * Restrict the PSA library to supporting a maximum amount of simultaneously + * loaded keys. A loaded key is a key stored by the PSA Crypto core as a + * volatile key, or a persistent key which is loaded temporarily by the + * library as part of a crypto operation in flight. + * + * If this option is unset, the library will fall back to a default value of + * 32 keys. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 + +/* SSL Cache options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */ + +/* SSL options */ + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers + * in such a way that both are capable of holding the specified amount of + * plaintext data, regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * To configure incoming and outgoing I/O buffers separately, use + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + * which overwrite the value set by this option. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of both + * incoming and outgoing I/O buffers. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the incoming TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * If this option is undefined, it inherits its value from + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer + * independently of the outgoing I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for incoming DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for outgoing DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * in TLS 1.3. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of outgoing plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the outgoing TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * If this option undefined, it inherits its value from + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping + * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification. + * + * The minimum required outward buffer size is determined by the handshake + * protocol's usage. Handshaking will fail if the outward buffer is too small. + * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any + * certificate data which is sent during the handshake. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer + * independently of the incoming I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING + * + * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of + * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering. + * + * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size, + * together with its reassembly bitmap. + * + * A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default) + * should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows + * to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate) + * while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 + +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ + +/** \def MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID + * + * At the time of writing, the CID extension has not been assigned its + * final value. Set this configuration option to make Mbed TLS use a + * different value. + * + * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of + * this option to match evolving standards and usage. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 + +/** + * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference. + * + * \warning No dependency checking is done on that field! This option can only + * be used to restrict the set of available ciphersuites. It is your + * responsibility to make sure the needed modules are active. + * + * Use this to save a few hundred bytes of ROM (default ordering of all + * available ciphersuites) and a few to a few hundred bytes of RAM. + * + * The value below is only an example, not the default. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + +/* X509 options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ + +/** + * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake + * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1 + * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes. + * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by + * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use + * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default + * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general + * warning applies nonetheless: + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is a widely used function across the library to + * zero a block of memory. The implementation is expected to be secure in the + * sense that it has been written to prevent the compiler from removing calls + * to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() as part of redundant code elimination + * optimizations. However, it is difficult to guarantee that calls to + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized by the compiler as older + * versions of the C language standards do not provide a secure implementation + * of memset(). Therefore, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT enables users to + * configure their own implementation of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), for + * example by using directives specific to their compiler, features from newer + * C standards (e.g using memset_s() in C11) or calling a secure memset() from + * their system (e.g explicit_bzero() in BSD). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The + * library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as + * gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target + * system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to + * using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to + * gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex + * if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the + * library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However, + * if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will + * unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + * supplied at compile time. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT + +/** + * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest + * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH + * contexts and therefore is a compatibility break for applications that access + * fields of a mbedtls_ecdh_context structure directly. See also + * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT in include/mbedtls/ecdh.h. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED + +/** \} name SECTION: Module configuration options */ + +/* Target and application specific configurations + * + * Allow user to override any previous default. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1bf750ad --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h @@ -0,0 +1,831 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_psa.h + * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options takes settings defined in + * include/mbedtls/config.h and include/psa/crypto_config.h and uses + * those definitions to define symbols used in the library code. + * + * Users and integrators should not edit this file, please edit + * include/mbedtls/config.h for MBETLS_XXX settings or + * include/psa/crypto_config.h for PSA_WANT_XXX settings. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE +#else +#include "psa/crypto_config.h" +#endif +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* De facto synonyms */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +#endif + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Require built-in implementations based on PSA requirements */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD2) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD4) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* If any of the block modes are requested that don't have an + * associated HW assist, define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE for checking + * in the block cipher key types. */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB)) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC)) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE 1 +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM)) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C +#endif /*PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ + +/* If any of the software block ciphers are selected, define + * PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER, which can be used in any of these + * situations. */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#error "CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +/* + * Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4249). + */ +#error "Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +/* + * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541). + */ +#error "SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Infer PSA requirements from Mbed TLS capabilities */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +/* + * Ensure PSA_WANT_* defines are setup properly if MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * is not defined + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 1 + +// Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +#endif + +/* Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4249) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +#endif + +/* SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +/* These features are always enabled. */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5de57a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H + +#include + + +/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to the standard memcmp function, but is likely to be + * compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param a Pointer to the first buffer. + * \param b Pointer to the second buffer. + * \param n The number of bytes to compare in the buffer. + * + * \return Zero if the content of the two buffer is the same, + * otherwise non-zero. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e68237a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h @@ -0,0 +1,611 @@ +/** + * \file ctr_drbg.h + * + * \brief This file contains definitions and functions for the + * CTR_DRBG pseudorandom generator. + * + * CTR_DRBG is a standardized way of building a PRNG from a block-cipher + * in counter mode operation, as defined in NIST SP 800-90A: + * Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random + * Bit Generators. + * + * The Mbed TLS implementation of CTR_DRBG uses AES-256 (default) or AES-128 + * (if \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled at compile time) + * as the underlying block cipher, with a derivation function. + * + * The security strength as defined in NIST SP 800-90A is + * 128 bits when AES-128 is used (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY enabled) + * and 256 bits otherwise, provided that #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN is + * kept at its default value (and not overridden in config.h) and that the + * DRBG instance is set up with default parameters. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more + * information. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/** The entropy source failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0034 +/** The requested random buffer length is too big. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -0x0036 +/** The input (entropy + additional data) is too large. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0038 +/** Read or write error in file. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003A + +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< The block size used by the cipher. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 16 +/**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher. + * + * Compile-time choice: 16 bytes (128 bits) + * because #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled. + */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 32 +/**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher. + * + * Compile-time choice: 32 bytes (256 bits) + * because \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled. + */ +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 8 ) /**< The key size for the DRBG operation, in bits. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) /**< The seed length, calculated as (counter + AES key). */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them using the compiler command + * line. + * \{ + */ + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + * + * \brief The amount of entropy used per seed by default, in bytes. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) +/** This is 48 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-512 + * (\c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is disabled). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 + +#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ + +/** This is 32 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-256 + * (the SHA512 module is disabled or + * \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is enabled). + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +/** \warning To achieve a 256-bit security strength, you must pass a nonce + * to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(). + */ +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 32 +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 +/**< The interval before reseed is performed by default. */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 +/**< The maximum number of additional input Bytes. */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 +/**< The maximum number of requested Bytes per call. */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 +/**< The maximum size of seed or reseed buffer in bytes. */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF 0 +/**< Prediction resistance is disabled. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON 1 +/**< Prediction resistance is enabled. */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 +/** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source. + * + * This is \c 0 because a single read from the entropy source is sufficient + * to include a nonce. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN 0 +#else +/** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source. + * + * This is half of the default entropy length because a single read from + * the entropy source does not provide enough material to form a nonce. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + 1 ) / 2 +#endif + +/** + * \brief The CTR_DRBG context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context +{ + unsigned char counter[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */ + int reseed_counter; /*!< The reseed counter. + * This is the number of requests that have + * been made since the last (re)seeding, + * minus one. + * Before the initial seeding, this field + * contains the amount of entropy in bytes + * to use as a nonce for the initial seeding, + * or -1 if no nonce length has been explicitly + * set (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + */ + int prediction_resistance; /*!< This determines whether prediction + resistance is enabled, that is + whether to systematically reseed before + each random generation. */ + size_t entropy_len; /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each + seed or reseed operation, in bytes. */ + int reseed_interval; /*!< The reseed interval. + * This is the maximum number of requests + * that can be made between reseedings. */ + + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; /*!< The AES context. */ + + /* + * Callbacks (Entropy) + */ + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + /*!< The entropy callback function. */ + + void *p_entropy; /*!< The context for the entropy function. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if f_entropy != NULL. + * This means that the mutex is initialized during the initial seeding + * in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() and freed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * + * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it + * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. + */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} +mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context; + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the CTR_DRBG context, + * and prepares it for mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() + * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * + * \note The reseed interval is + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL by default. + * You can override it by calling + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval(). + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function seeds and sets up the CTR_DRBG + * entropy source for future reseeds. + * + * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is + * to use the entropy module: + * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func(); + * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized + * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default + * entropy sources). + * + * The entropy length is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN by default. + * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(). + * + * The entropy nonce length is: + * - \c 0 if the entropy length is at least 3/2 times the entropy length, + * which guarantees that the security strength is the maximum permitted + * by the key size and entropy length according to NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1; + * - Half the entropy length otherwise. + * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). + * With the default entropy length, the entropy nonce length is + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN. + * + * You can provide a nonce and personalization string in addition to the + * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. + * See SP 800-90A §8.6.7 for more details about nonces. + * + * The _seed_material_ value passed to the derivation function in + * the CTR_DRBG Instantiate Process described in NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2 + * is the concatenation of the following strings: + * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy + * length. + */ +#if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN == 0 +/** + * - If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() has been called, a string + * obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the specified length. + */ +#else +/** + * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy nonce + * length. If the entropy nonce length is \c 0, this function does not + * make a second call to \p f_entropy. + */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * after this function returns successfully, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * - The \p custom string. + * + * \note To achieve the nominal security strength permitted + * by CTR_DRBG, the entropy length must be: + * - at least 16 bytes for a 128-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128); + * - at least 32 bytes for a 256-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256). + * + * In addition, if you do not pass a nonce in \p custom, + * the sum of the entropy length + * and the entropy nonce length must be: + * - at least 24 bytes for a 128-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128); + * - at least 48 bytes for a 256-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256). + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to seed. + * It must have been initialized with + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). + * After a successful call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), + * you may not call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() again on + * the same context unless you call + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free() and mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init() + * again first. + * After a failed call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), + * you must call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the + * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the + * length of the buffer. + * \p f_entropy is always called with a buffer size + * less than or equal to the entropy length. + * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * This must be at most + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + * - #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to clear. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off. + * The default value is off. + * + * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of + * every call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() + * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(). + * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient + * throughput. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each + * seed or reseed. + * + * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. + * + * \note The security strength of CTR_DRBG is bounded by the + * entropy length. Thus: + * - When using AES-256 + * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled, + * which is the default), + * \p len must be at least 32 (in bytes) + * to achieve a 256-bit strength. + * - When using AES-128 + * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled) + * \p len must be at least 16 (in bytes) + * to achieve a 128-bit strength. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + * and at most the maximum length accepted by the + * entropy function that is set in the context. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed + * as a nonce for the initial seeding. + * + * Call this function before calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() to read + * a nonce from the entropy source during the initial seeding. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param len The amount of entropy to grab for the nonce, in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + * and at most the maximum length accepted by the + * entropy function that is set in the context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if \p len is + * more than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if the initial seeding has already taken place. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the reseed interval. + * + * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function + * is called again. + * + * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param interval The reseed interval. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int interval ); + +/** + * \brief This function reseeds the CTR_DRBG context, that is + * extracts data from the entropy source. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. Can be \c NULL. + * \param len The length of the additional data. + * This must be less than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len + * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length + * configured for the context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. This must not be + * \c NULL unless \p add_len is \c 0. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. This must be at + * most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if + * \p add_len is more than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. + * \return An error from the underlying AES cipher on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function updates a CTR_DRBG instance with additional + * data and uses it to generate random data. + * + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * \param additional Additional data to update. Can be \c NULL, in which + * case the additional data is empty regardless of + * the value of \p add_len. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data + * if \p additional is not \c NULL. + * This must be less than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + * and less than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len + * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length + * configured for the context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function uses CTR_DRBG to generate random data. + * + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ); + + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() + * in 2.16.0. + * + * \note If \p add_len is greater than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT, only the first + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT Bytes are used. + * The remaining Bytes are silently discarded. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional data. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ); +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief This function writes a seed file. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed + * failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); + +/** + * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed + * is added to this instance. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on + * reseed failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing + * seed file is too large. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The CTR_DRBG checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ctr_drbg.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4fc4662d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +/** + * \file debug.h + * + * \brief Functions for controlling and providing debug output from the library. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_STRIP_PARENS( ... ) __VA_ARGS__ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( level, args ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_STRIP_PARENS args ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( level, text, ret ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_ret( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, ret ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( level, text, buf, len ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_buf( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, buf, len ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( level, text, X ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, X ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( level, text, X ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, X ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( level, text, crt ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_crt( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, crt ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( level, ecdh, attr ) \ + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, ecdh, attr ) +#endif + +#else /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( level, args ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( level, text, ret ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( level, text, buf, len ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( level, text, X ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( level, text, X ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( level, text, crt ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( level, ecdh, attr ) do { } while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE + * + * Mark a function as having printf attributes, and thus enable checking + * via -wFormat and other flags. This does nothing on builds with compilers + * that do not support the format attribute + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +#if defined(__has_attribute) +#if __has_attribute(format) +#if defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \ + __attribute__((__format__ (gnu_printf, string_index, first_to_check))) +#else /* defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \ + __attribute__((format(printf, string_index, first_to_check))) +#endif +#else /* __has_attribute(format) */ +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) +#endif /* __has_attribute(format) */ +#else /* defined(__has_attribute) */ +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) +#endif + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + * + * MBEDTLS_PRINTF_xxx: Due to issues with older window compilers + * and MinGW we need to define the printf specifier for size_t + * and long long per platform. + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +#if (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) + #include + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET PRIuPTR + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "I64d" +#else /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */ + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "zu" + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "lld" +#endif /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Set the threshold error level to handle globally all debug output. + * Debug messages that have a level over the threshold value are + * discarded. + * (Default value: 0 = No debug ) + * + * \param threshold threshold level of messages to filter on. Messages at a + * higher level will be discarded. + * - Debug levels + * - 0 No debug + * - 1 Error + * - 2 State change + * - 3 Informational + * - 4 Verbose + */ +void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( int threshold ); + +/** + * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used + * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl + * context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the message has occurred in + * \param line line number the message has occurred at + * \param format format specifier, in printf format + * \param ... variables used by the format specifier + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *format, ... ) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); + +/** + * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text the name of the function that returned the error + * \param ret the return code value + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, int ret ); + +/** + * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function + * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the + * variable or buffer name + * \param buf the buffer to be outputted + * \param len length of the buffer + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the MPI variable + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the ECP point + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output + * \param crt X.509 certificate structure + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, +} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; + +/** + * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug + * output. This function is always used through the + * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file + * and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param ecdh the ECDH context + * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* debug.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..325aab53 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +/** + * \file des.h + * + * \brief DES block cipher + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DES_H +#define MBEDTLS_DES_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT 0 + +/** The data input has an invalid length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0032 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** DES hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0033 + +#define MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE 8 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief DES context structure + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_des_context +{ + uint32_t sk[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ +} +mbedtls_des_context; + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_des3_context +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */ +} +mbedtls_des3_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ +#include "des_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize DES context + * + * \param ctx DES context to be initialized + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +void mbedtls_des_init( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear DES context + * + * \param ctx DES context to be cleared + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +void mbedtls_des_free( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize Triple-DES context + * + * \param ctx DES3 context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_des3_init( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear Triple-DES context + * + * \param ctx DES3 context to be cleared + */ +void mbedtls_des3_free( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set key parity on the given key to odd. + * + * DES keys are 56 bits long, but each byte is padded with + * a parity bit to allow verification. + * + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +void mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief Check that key parity on the given key is odd. + * + * DES keys are 56 bits long, but each byte is padded with + * a parity bit to allow verification. + * + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 is parity was ok, 1 if parity was not correct. + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief Check that key is not a weak or semi-weak DES key + * + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 if no weak key was found, 1 if a weak key was identified. + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) + * + * \param ctx DES context to be initialized + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) + * + * \param ctx DES context to be initialized + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, encryption) + * + * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized + * \param key 16-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ); + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, decryption) + * + * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized + * \param key 16-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ); + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, encryption) + * + * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized + * \param key 24-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ); + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, decryption) + * + * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized + * \param key 24-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ); + +/** + * \brief DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + * + * \param ctx DES context + * \param input 64-bit input block + * \param output 64-bit output block + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx DES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT + * \param length length of the input data + * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) + * \param input buffer holding the input data + * \param output buffer holding the output data + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/** + * \brief 3DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + * + * \param ctx 3DES context + * \param input 64-bit input block + * \param output 64-bit output block + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief 3DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx 3DES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT + * \param length length of the input data + * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) + * \param input buffer holding the input data + * \param output buffer holding the output data + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/** + * \brief Internal function for key expansion. + * (Only exposed to allow overriding it, + * see MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) + * + * \param SK Round keys + * \param key Base key + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32], + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* des.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c4b15a2c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h @@ -0,0 +1,1103 @@ +/** + * \file dhm.h + * + * \brief This file contains Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) key exchange + * definitions and functions. + * + * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) key exchange is defined in + * RFC-2631: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method and + * Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #3: Diffie + * Hellman Key Agreement Standard. + * + * RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for + * Internet Key Exchange (IKE) defines a number of standardized + * Diffie-Hellman groups for IKE. + * + * RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF + * Standards defines a number of standardized Diffie-Hellman + * groups that can be used. + * + * \warning The security of the DHM key exchange relies on the proper choice + * of prime modulus - optimally, it should be a safe prime. The usage + * of non-safe primes both decreases the difficulty of the underlying + * discrete logarithm problem and can lead to small subgroup attacks + * leaking private exponent bits when invalid public keys are used + * and not detected. This is especially relevant if the same DHM + * parameters are reused for multiple key exchanges as in static DHM, + * while the criticality of small-subgroup attacks is lower for + * ephemeral DHM. + * + * \warning For performance reasons, the code does neither perform primality + * nor safe primality tests, nor the expensive checks for invalid + * subgroups. Moreover, even if these were performed, non-standardized + * primes cannot be trusted because of the possibility of backdoors + * that can't be effectively checked for. + * + * \warning Diffie-Hellman-Merkle is therefore a security risk when not using + * standardized primes generated using a trustworthy ("nothing up + * my sleeve") method, such as the RFC 3526 / 7919 primes. In the TLS + * protocol, DH parameters need to be negotiated, so using the default + * primes systematically is not always an option. If possible, use + * Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), which has better performance, + * and for which the TLS protocol mandates the use of standard + * parameters. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DHM_H +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +/* + * DHM Error codes + */ +/** Bad input parameters. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x3080 +/** Reading of the DHM parameters failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED -0x3100 +/** Making of the DHM parameters failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED -0x3180 +/** Reading of the public values failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x3200 +/** Making of the public value failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x3280 +/** Calculation of the DHM secret failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED -0x3300 +/** The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3380 +/** Allocation of memory failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3400 +/** Read or write of file failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3480 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** DHM hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3500 + +/** Setting the modulus and generator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED -0x3580 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + +/** + * \brief The DHM context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_dhm_context +{ + size_t len; /*!< The size of \p P in Bytes. */ + mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi G; /*!< The generator. */ + mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< Our secret value. */ + mbedtls_mpi GX; /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi GY; /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi K; /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi pX; /*!< The previous \c X. */ +} +mbedtls_dhm_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ +#include "dhm_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the DHM context. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses the DHM parameters in a + * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message + * (DHM modulus, generator, and public key). + * + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client + * sets up its DHM context from the server's public + * DHM key material. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param p On input, *p must be the start of the input buffer. + * On output, *p is updated to point to the end of the data + * that has been read. On success, this is the first byte + * past the end of the ServerKeyExchange parameters. + * On error, this is the point at which an error has been + * detected, which is usually not useful except to debug + * failures. + * \param end The end of the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a DHM key pair and exports its + * public part together with the DHM parameters in the format + * used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message. + * + * \note This function assumes that the DHM parameters \c ctx->P + * and \c ctx->G have already been properly set. For that, use + * mbedtls_dhm_set_group() below in conjunction with + * mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() and mbedtls_mpi_read_string(). + * + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server generates + * and exports its DHM key material. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized + * and have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not + * already have imported the peer's public key. + * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes + * written on success. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * sufficient size to hold the reduced binary presentation of + * the modulus, the generator and the public key, each wrapped + * with a 2-byte length field. It is the responsibility of the + * caller to ensure that enough space is available. Refer to + * mbedtls_mpi_size() to computing the byte-size of an MPI. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the prime modulus and generator. + * + * \note This function can be used to set \c ctx->P, \c ctx->G + * in preparation for mbedtls_dhm_make_params(). + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to configure. This must be initialized. + * \param P The MPI holding the DHM prime modulus. This must be + * an initialized MPI. + * \param G The MPI holding the DHM generator. This must be an + * initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *G ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports the raw public value of the peer. + * + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server imports + * the Client's public DHM key. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and have + * its DHM parameters set, e.g. via mbedtls_dhm_set_group(). + * It may or may not already have generated its own private key. + * \param input The input buffer containing the \c G^Y value of the peer. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The size of the input buffer \p input in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a DHM key pair and exports + * the raw public key in big-endian format. + * + * \note The destination buffer is always fully written + * so as to contain a big-endian representation of G^X mod P. + * If it is larger than \c ctx->len, it is padded accordingly + * with zero-bytes at the beginning. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and + * have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not already + * have imported the peer's public key. + * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes. + * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * size \p olen Bytes. + * \param olen The length of the destination buffer. This must be at least + * equal to `ctx->len` (the size of \c P). + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret + * \c (G^Y)^X mod \c P. + * + * \note If \p f_rng is not \c NULL, it is used to blind the input as + * a countermeasure against timing attacks. Blinding is used + * only if our private key \c X is re-used, and not used + * otherwise. We recommend always passing a non-NULL + * \p f_rng argument. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized + * and have its own private key generated and the peer's + * public key imported. + * \param output The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This + * must be a writable buffer of size \p output_size Bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the destination buffer. This must be at + * least the size of \c ctx->len (the size of \c P). + * \param olen On exit, holds the actual number of Bytes written. + * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may + * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng + * doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees and clears the components + * of a DHM context. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to free and clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized DHM context. + */ +void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief This function parses DHM parameters in PEM or DER format. + * + * \param dhm The DHM context to import the DHM parameters into. + * This must be initialized. + * \param dhmin The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of + * length \p dhminlen Bytes. + * \param dhminlen The size of the input buffer \p dhmin, including the + * terminating \c NULL Byte for PEM data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX error + * code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, + size_t dhminlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief This function loads and parses DHM parameters from a file. + * + * \param dhm The DHM context to load the parameters to. + * This must be initialized. + * \param path The filename to read the DHM parameters from. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The DMH checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +/** + * RFC 3526, RFC 5114 and RFC 7919 standardize a number of + * Diffie-Hellman groups, some of which are included here + * for use within the SSL/TLS module and the user's convenience + * when configuring the Diffie-Hellman parameters by hand + * through \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param. + * + * The following lists the source of the above groups in the standards: + * - RFC 5114 section 2.2: 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup + * - RFC 3526 section 3: 2048-bit MODP Group + * - RFC 3526 section 4: 3072-bit MODP Group + * - RFC 3526 section 5: 4096-bit MODP Group + * - RFC 7919 section A.1: ffdhe2048 + * - RFC 7919 section A.2: ffdhe3072 + * - RFC 7919 section A.3: ffdhe4096 + * - RFC 7919 section A.4: ffdhe6144 + * - RFC 7919 section A.5: ffdhe8192 + * + * The constants with suffix "_p" denote the chosen prime moduli, while + * the constants with suffix "_g" denote the chosen generator + * of the associated prime field. + * + * The constants further suffixed with "_bin" are provided in binary format, + * while all other constants represent null-terminated strings holding the + * hexadecimal presentation of the respective numbers. + * + * The primes from RFC 3526 and RFC 7919 have been generating by the following + * trust-worthy procedure: + * - Fix N in { 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 } and consider the N-bit number + * the first and last 64 bits are all 1, and the remaining N - 128 bits of + * which are 0x7ff...ff. + * - Add the smallest multiple of the first N - 129 bits of the binary expansion + * of pi (for RFC 5236) or e (for RFC 7919) to this intermediate bit-string + * such that the resulting integer is a safe-prime. + * - The result is the respective RFC 3526 / 7919 prime, and the corresponding + * generator is always chosen to be 2 (which is a square for these prime, + * hence the corresponding subgroup has order (p-1)/2 and avoids leaking a + * bit in the private exponent). + * + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +/** + * \warning The origin of the primes in RFC 5114 is not documented and + * their use therefore constitutes a security risk! + * + * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated and are + * likely to be removed in a future version of the library without + * replacement. + */ + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the + * 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined + * in RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with + * IETF Standards. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "AD107E1E9123A9D0D660FAA79559C51FA20D64E5683B9FD1" \ + "B54B1597B61D0A75E6FA141DF95A56DBAF9A3C407BA1DF15" \ + "EB3D688A309C180E1DE6B85A1274A0A66D3F8152AD6AC212" \ + "9037C9EDEFDA4DF8D91E8FEF55B7394B7AD5B7D0B6C12207" \ + "C9F98D11ED34DBF6C6BA0B2C8BBC27BE6A00E0A0B9C49708" \ + "B3BF8A317091883681286130BC8985DB1602E714415D9330" \ + "278273C7DE31EFDC7310F7121FD5A07415987D9ADC0A486D" \ + "CDF93ACC44328387315D75E198C641A480CD86A1B9E587E8" \ + "BE60E69CC928B2B9C52172E413042E9B23F10B0E16E79763" \ + "C9B53DCF4BA80A29E3FB73C16B8E75B97EF363E2FFA31F71" \ + "CF9DE5384E71B81C0AC4DFFE0C10E64F" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP + * Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined in RFC-5114: + * Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF Standards. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "AC4032EF4F2D9AE39DF30B5C8FFDAC506CDEBE7B89998CAF" \ + "74866A08CFE4FFE3A6824A4E10B9A6F0DD921F01A70C4AFA" \ + "AB739D7700C29F52C57DB17C620A8652BE5E9001A8D66AD7" \ + "C17669101999024AF4D027275AC1348BB8A762D0521BC98A" \ + "E247150422EA1ED409939D54DA7460CDB5F6C6B250717CBE" \ + "F180EB34118E98D119529A45D6F834566E3025E316A330EF" \ + "BB77A86F0C1AB15B051AE3D428C8F8ACB70A8137150B8EEB" \ + "10E183EDD19963DDD9E263E4770589EF6AA21E7F5F2FF381" \ + "B539CCE3409D13CD566AFBB48D6C019181E1BCFE94B30269" \ + "EDFE72FE9B6AA4BD7B5A0F1C71CFFF4C19C418E1F6EC0179" \ + "81BC087F2A7065B384B890D3191F2BFA" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 2048-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + * + * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 3625 are deprecated and + * superseded by the corresponding macros providing them as + * binary constants. Their hex-encoded constants are likely + * to be removed in a future version of the library. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ + "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ + "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ + "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ + "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ + "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ + "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ + "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ + "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ + "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ + "15728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 3072-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3072: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ + "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ + "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ + "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ + "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ + "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ + "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ + "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ + "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ + "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ + "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ + "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ + "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ + "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ + "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ + "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A93AD2CAFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 3072-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 4096-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ + "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ + "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ + "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ + "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ + "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ + "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ + "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ + "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ + "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ + "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ + "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ + "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ + "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ + "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ + "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D7" \ + "88719A10BDBA5B2699C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA" \ + "2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6" \ + "287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2233BA186515BE7ED" \ + "1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127D5B05AA9" \ + "93B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199" \ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 4096-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * Trustworthy DHM parameters in binary form + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \ + 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \ + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \ + 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \ + 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \ + 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \ + 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \ + 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \ + 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \ + 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \ + 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \ + 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \ + 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \ + 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \ + 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \ + 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \ + 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \ + 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \ + 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \ + 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \ + 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \ + 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \ + 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \ + 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \ + 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \ + 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \ + 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \ + 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \ + 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \ + 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \ + 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \ + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \ + 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \ + 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \ + 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \ + 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \ + 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \ + 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \ + 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \ + 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \ + 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \ + 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \ + 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \ + 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \ + 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \ + 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \ + 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \ + 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \ + 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \ + 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \ + 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \ + 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \ + 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \ + 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \ + 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \ + 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \ + 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \ + 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \ + 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, \ + 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, \ + 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, \ + 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, \ + 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, \ + 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, \ + 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, \ + 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, \ + 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, \ + 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, \ + 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, \ + 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, \ + 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, \ + 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, \ + 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, \ + 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, \ + 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xCA, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \ + 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \ + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \ + 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \ + 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \ + 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \ + 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \ + 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \ + 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \ + 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \ + 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \ + 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \ + 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \ + 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \ + 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \ + 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \ + 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \ + 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \ + 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \ + 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \ + 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \ + 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \ + 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \ + 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \ + 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \ + 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \ + 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \ + 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \ + 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \ + 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, \ + 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, \ + 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, \ + 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, \ + 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, \ + 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, \ + 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, \ + 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, \ + 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, \ + 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, \ + 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, \ + 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, \ + 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, \ + 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, \ + 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, \ + 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, \ + 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01, \ + 0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7, \ + 0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26, \ + 0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C, \ + 0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA, \ + 0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8, \ + 0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9, \ + 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6, \ + 0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D, \ + 0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2, \ + 0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED, \ + 0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF, \ + 0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C, \ + 0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9, \ + 0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1, \ + 0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F, \ + 0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x06, 0x31, 0x99, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0x37, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \ + 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \ + 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \ + 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \ + 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \ + 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \ + 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \ + 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \ + 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \ + 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \ + 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \ + 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \ + 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \ + 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \ + 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \ + 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \ + 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x65, 0x5F, 0x6A, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \ + 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \ + 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \ + 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \ + 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \ + 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \ + 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \ + 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \ + 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \ + 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \ + 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \ + 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \ + 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \ + 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \ + 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \ + 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \ + 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, \ + 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, \ + 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, \ + 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, \ + 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, \ + 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, \ + 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, \ + 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, \ + 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, \ + 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, \ + 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, \ + 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, \ + 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 0xE3, \ + 0x0A, 0xBE, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x6E, \ + 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xC3, \ + 0x58, 0x7E, 0x38, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xB4, \ + 0x76, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x94, 0xB2, 0xBB, 0xC1, \ + 0x94, 0xC6, 0x65, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x92, \ + 0xEE, 0xAA, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x1B, 0xF6, \ + 0xB3, 0xA7, 0x39, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x61, 0x16, 0x82, \ + 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0x58, 0x47, 0xA6, 0x7C, 0xBE, \ + 0xF9, 0xC9, 0x09, 0x1B, 0x46, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x8C, \ + 0xD7, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x74, 0x6A, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0x5E, \ + 0x62, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x31, 0x15, 0x62, 0xA8, 0x46, \ + 0x50, 0x5D, 0xC8, 0x2D, 0xB8, 0x54, 0x33, 0x8A, \ + 0xE4, 0x9F, 0x52, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x5B, 0x91, 0x17, \ + 0x8C, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0xD5, 0xCA, 0xCE, 0xF4, 0x03, \ + 0xEC, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x2B, 0x04, \ + 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x71, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0x6B, 0x80, 0xD6, \ + 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x4A, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x69, \ + 0x62, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x26, 0xD4, 0x31, 0x61, 0xC1, \ + 0xA4, 0x1D, 0x57, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x38, 0xDA, 0xD4, \ + 0xA4, 0x0E, 0x32, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0x0E, 0x65, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \ + 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \ + 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \ + 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \ + 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \ + 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \ + 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \ + 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \ + 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \ + 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \ + 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \ + 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \ + 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \ + 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \ + 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \ + 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \ + 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, \ + 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, \ + 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, \ + 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, \ + 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, \ + 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, \ + 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, \ + 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, \ + 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, \ + 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, \ + 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, \ + 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, \ + 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 0xE3, \ + 0x0A, 0xBE, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x6E, \ + 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xC3, \ + 0x58, 0x7E, 0x38, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xB4, \ + 0x76, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x94, 0xB2, 0xBB, 0xC1, \ + 0x94, 0xC6, 0x65, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x92, \ + 0xEE, 0xAA, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x1B, 0xF6, \ + 0xB3, 0xA7, 0x39, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x61, 0x16, 0x82, \ + 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0x58, 0x47, 0xA6, 0x7C, 0xBE, \ + 0xF9, 0xC9, 0x09, 0x1B, 0x46, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x8C, \ + 0xD7, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x74, 0x6A, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0x5E, \ + 0x62, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x31, 0x15, 0x62, 0xA8, 0x46, \ + 0x50, 0x5D, 0xC8, 0x2D, 0xB8, 0x54, 0x33, 0x8A, \ + 0xE4, 0x9F, 0x52, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x5B, 0x91, 0x17, \ + 0x8C, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0xD5, 0xCA, 0xCE, 0xF4, 0x03, \ + 0xEC, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x2B, 0x04, \ + 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x71, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0x6B, 0x80, 0xD6, \ + 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x4A, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x69, \ + 0x62, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x26, 0xD4, 0x31, 0x61, 0xC1, \ + 0xA4, 0x1D, 0x57, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x38, 0xDA, 0xD4, \ + 0xA4, 0x0E, 0x32, 0x9C, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0x6A, 0xAA, \ + 0x36, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x38, \ + 0x1E, 0x42, 0x5A, 0x31, 0xD9, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x64, \ + 0xFD, 0xB2, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x50, 0x9D, 0x43, \ + 0x68, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x69, 0xED, 0xD1, 0xCC, 0x5E, \ + 0x0B, 0x8C, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0xF6, 0x4B, 0x10, 0xEF, \ + 0x86, 0xB6, 0x31, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0x88, 0x29, \ + 0x55, 0x5B, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7C, 0x93, 0x26, 0x65, \ + 0xCB, 0x2C, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0xC0, 0x1B, 0xD7, 0x02, \ + 0x29, 0x38, 0x88, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xE4, \ + 0x54, 0x50, 0x4A, 0xC7, 0x8B, 0x75, 0x82, 0x82, \ + 0x28, 0x46, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0x35, 0xC3, 0x5F, 0x5C, \ + 0x59, 0x16, 0x0C, 0xC0, 0x46, 0xFD, 0x82, 0x51, \ + 0x54, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x8C, 0x9C, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x22, \ + 0xBB, 0x70, 0x99, 0x87, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x0E, 0x74, \ + 0x51, 0xA8, 0xA9, 0x31, 0x09, 0x70, 0x3F, 0xEE, \ + 0x1C, 0x21, 0x7E, 0x6C, 0x38, 0x26, 0xE5, 0x2C, \ + 0x51, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x42, 0x3C, 0xFC, \ + 0x99, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0x16, 0x50, 0xC1, 0x21, 0x7B, \ + 0x62, 0x48, 0x16, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x9A, 0x95, 0xF9, \ + 0xD5, 0xB8, 0x01, 0x94, 0x88, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0xA0, \ + 0xA1, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x75, 0xA5, 0x77, 0xE2, 0x31, \ + 0x83, 0xF8, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x3F, 0x2F, 0xA4, 0x57, \ + 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x8C, 0xE0, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x4F, 0xE8, \ + 0xB6, 0x85, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x72, 0xB0, 0xA6, 0x6E, \ + 0xDE, 0xD2, 0xFB, 0xAB, 0xFB, 0xE5, 0x8A, 0x30, \ + 0xFA, 0xFA, 0xBE, 0x1C, 0x5D, 0x71, 0xA8, 0x7E, \ + 0x2F, 0x74, 0x1E, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0xFE, 0x86, 0xFE, \ + 0xA6, 0xBB, 0xFD, 0xE5, 0x30, 0x67, 0x7F, 0x0D, \ + 0x97, 0xD1, 0x1D, 0x49, 0xF7, 0xA8, 0x44, 0x3D, \ + 0x08, 0x22, 0xE5, 0x06, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x61, 0x4E, \ + 0x01, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x94, 0x83, 0x8F, 0xF8, 0x8C, \ + 0xD6, 0x8C, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x4C, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#endif /* dhm.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..05855cdf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h @@ -0,0 +1,446 @@ +/** + * \file ecdh.h + * + * \brief This file contains ECDH definitions and functions. + * + * The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol is an anonymous + * key agreement protocol allowing two parties to establish a shared + * secret over an insecure channel. Each party must have an + * elliptic-curve public–private key pair. + * + * For more information, see NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 2: Recommendation for + * Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm + * Cryptography. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDH_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) +#undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +#include "everest/everest.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Defines the source of the imported EC key. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS, /**< Our key. */ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS, /**< The key of the peer. */ +} mbedtls_ecdh_side; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +/** + * Defines the ECDH implementation used. + * + * Later versions of the library may add new variants, therefore users should + * not make any assumptions about them. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE = 0, /*!< Implementation not defined. */ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0,/*!< The default Mbed TLS implementation */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST /*!< Everest implementation */ +#endif +} mbedtls_ecdh_variant; + +/** + * The context used by the default ECDH implementation. + * + * Later versions might change the structure of this context, therefore users + * should not make any assumptions about the structure of + * mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ +#endif +} mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; +#endif + +/** + * + * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same + * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type + * should not be shared between multiple threads. + * \brief The ECDH context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ + int point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi _d; /*!< The previous \p d. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + int restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#else + uint8_t point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages + as defined in RFC 4492. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;/*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_ecdh_variant var; /*!< The ECDH implementation/structure used. */ + union + { + mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed mbed_ecdh; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest everest_ecdh; +#endif + } ctx; /*!< Implementation-specific context. The + context in use is specified by the \c var + field. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + uint8_t restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. Functions of + an alternative implementation not supporting + restartable mode must return + MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED error + if this flag is set. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ +} +mbedtls_ecdh_context; + +/** + * \brief Check whether a given group can be used for ECDH. + * + * \param gid The ECP group ID to check. + * + * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an ECDH keypair on an elliptic + * curve. + * + * This function performs the first of two core computations + * implemented during the ECDH key exchange. The second core + * computation is performed by mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(). + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have + * domain parameters loaded, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(). + * \param d The destination MPI (private key). + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The destination point (public key). + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function computes the shared secret. + * + * This function performs the second of two core computations + * implemented during the ECDH key exchange. The first core + * computation is performed by mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(). + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement + * countermeasures against side-channel attacks. + * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul(). + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have + * domain parameters loaded, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(). + * \param z The destination MPI (shared secret). + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The public key from another party. + * This must be initialized. + * \param d Our secret exponent (private key). + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization + * of intermediate results during the ECP computations is + * not needed (discouraged). See the documentation of + * mbedtls_ecp_mul() for more. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a + * context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an ECDH context. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up the ECDH context with the information + * given. + * + * This function should be called after mbedtls_ecdh_init() but + * before mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(). There is no need to call + * this function before mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(). + * + * This is the first function used by a TLS server for ECDHE + * ciphersuites. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized. + * \param grp_id The group id of the group to set up the context for. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees a context. + * + * \param ctx The context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function does nothing. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized ECDH context. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an EC key pair and exports its + * in the format used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake + * message. + * + * This is the second function used by a TLS server for ECDHE + * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup().) + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup(). + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. + * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses the ECDHE parameters in a + * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message. + * + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client + * sets up its ECDHE context from the server's public + * ECDHE key material. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDHE context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param buf On input, \c *buf must be the start of the input buffer. + * On output, \c *buf is updated to point to the end of the + * data that has been read. On success, this is the first byte + * past the end of the ServerKeyExchange parameters. + * On error, this is the point at which an error has been + * detected, which is usually not useful except to debug + * failures. + * \param end The end of the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an ECDH context from an EC key. + * + * It is used by clients and servers in place of the + * ServerKeyEchange for static ECDH, and imports ECDH + * parameters from the EC key information of a certificate. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized. + * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized. + * \param side Defines the source of the key. Possible values are: + * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS: The key is ours. + * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS: The key is that of the peer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a public key and exports it + * as a TLS ClientKeyExchange payload. + * + * This is the second function used by a TLS client for ECDH(E) + * ciphersuites. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a group, the latter usually by + * mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(). + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The size of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses and processes the ECDHE payload of a + * TLS ClientKeyExchange message. + * + * This is the third function used by a TLS server for ECDH(E) + * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup() and + * mbedtls_ecdh_make_params().) + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup(). + * \param buf The pointer to the ClientKeyExchange payload. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret. + * + * This is the last function used by both TLS client + * and servers. + * + * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement + * countermeasures against side-channel attacks. + * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul(). + * + * \see ecp.h + + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and have its own private key generated and the peer's + * public key imported. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of + * Bytes written on success. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This + * must be a writable buffer of size \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may + * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng + * doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief This function enables restartable EC computations for this + * context. (Default: disabled.) + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() + * + * \note It is not possible to safely disable restartable + * computations once enabled, except by free-ing the context, + * which cancels possible in-progress operations. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ecdh.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..264a638b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,626 @@ +/** + * \file ecdsa.h + * + * \brief This file contains ECDSA definitions and functions. + * + * The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in + * Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): + * SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography. + * The use of ECDSA for TLS is defined in RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve + * Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS). + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +/** + * \brief Maximum ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size + * + * \param bits Curve size in bits + * \return Maximum signature size in bytes + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument + * is one. It may evaluate its argument multiple times. + */ +/* + * Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { + * r INTEGER, + * s INTEGER + * } + * + * For each of r and s, the value (V) may include an extra initial "0" bit. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( bits ) \ + ( /*T,L of SEQUENCE*/ ( ( bits ) >= 61 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \ + /*T,L of r,s*/ 2 * ( ( ( bits ) >= 127 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \ + /*V of r,s*/ ( ( bits ) + 8 ) / 8 ) ) + +/** The maximal size of an ECDSA signature in Bytes. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief The ECDSA context structure. + * + * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same + * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type + * should not be shared between multiple threads. + */ +typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_verify() + * + * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx; + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign() + * + * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign_det() + * + * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx; +#endif + +/** + * \brief General context for resuming ECDSA operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx ecp; /*!< base context for ECP restart and + shared administrative info */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ver; /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *sig; /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *det; /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */ +#endif +} mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ +typedef void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/** + * \brief This function checks whether a given group can be used + * for ECDSA. + * + * \param gid The ECP group ID to check. + * + * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ); + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message. + * + * \note The deterministic version implemented in + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is usually preferred. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated + * as defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized. + * \param buf The content to be signed. This is usually the hash of + * the original data to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX + * or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. + * + * For more information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic + * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic + * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for + * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of + * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For + * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead. + * + * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different + * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still + * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on + * each execution. This means that this blinding does not + * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining + * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks + * that exploit relationships between secret data.) + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized + * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). + * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. + * + * For more information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic + * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic + * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized + * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). + * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. + * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +/** + * \brief This function verifies the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.4, step 3. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param buf The hashed content that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param Q The public key to use for verification. This must be + * initialized and setup. + * \param r The first integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. + * \param s The second integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the signature + * is invalid. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure for any other reason. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s); + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it + * to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: + * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for + * Transport Layer Security (TLS). + * + * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in + * multiple threads. + * + * \note The deterministic version is used if + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is defined. For more + * information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic Usage + * of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic + * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example + * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). + * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. + * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a + * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the + * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if + * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of + * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset. Otherwise, + * it is used only for blinding and may be set to \c NULL, but + * doing so is DEPRECATED. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it + * to a buffer, in a restartable way. + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() + * + * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() + * but it can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example + * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). + * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. + * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a + * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the + * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if + * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of + * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset. Otherwise, + * it is unused and may be set to \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable + * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an + * initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function computes an ECDSA signature and writes + * it to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: + * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for + * Transport Layer Security (TLS). + * + * The deterministic version is defined in RFC-6979: + * Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) + * and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). + * + * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in + * multiple threads. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() in + * Mbed TLS version 2.0 and later. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example + * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). + * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a + * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the + * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if + * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of + * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +/** + * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.4, step 3. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and public key bound to it. + * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p size Bytes. + * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash. + * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid + * signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure for any other reason. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen ); + +/** + * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature, + * in a restartable way. + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature() + * + * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature() + * but it can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and public key bound to it. + * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p size Bytes. + * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash. + * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable + * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an + * initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid + * signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure for any other reason. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an ECDSA keypair on the given curve. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to store the keypair in. + * This must be initialized. + * \param gid The elliptic curve to use. One of the various + * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macros depending on configuration. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an ECDSA context from an EC key pair. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to setup. This must be initialized. + * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized and hold + * a private-public key pair or a public key. In the former + * case, the ECDSA context may be used for signature creation + * and verification after this call. In the latter case, it + * may be used for signature verification. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an ECDSA context. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees an ECDSA context. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to free. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it + * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it + * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ecdsa.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3564ff8d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h @@ -0,0 +1,275 @@ +/** + * \file ecjpake.h + * + * \brief Elliptic curve J-PAKE + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H + +/* + * J-PAKE is a password-authenticated key exchange that allows deriving a + * strong shared secret from a (potentially low entropy) pre-shared + * passphrase, with forward secrecy and mutual authentication. + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_Authenticated_Key_Exchange_by_Juggling + * + * This file implements the Elliptic Curve variant of J-PAKE, + * as defined in Chapter 7.4 of the Thread v1.0 Specification, + * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/ + * + * As the J-PAKE algorithm is inherently symmetric, so is our API. + * Each party needs to send its first round message, in any order, to the + * other party, then each sends its second round message, in any order. + * The payloads are serialized in a way suitable for use in TLS, but could + * also be use outside TLS. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Roles in the EC J-PAKE exchange + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT = 0, /**< Client */ + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, /**< Server */ +} mbedtls_ecjpake_role; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) +/** + * EC J-PAKE context structure. + * + * J-PAKE is a symmetric protocol, except for the identifiers used in + * Zero-Knowledge Proofs, and the serialization of the second message + * (KeyExchange) as defined by the Thread spec. + * + * In order to benefit from this symmetry, we choose a different naming + * convention from the Thread v1.0 spec. Correspondence is indicated in the + * description as a pair C: client name, S: server name + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; /**< Hash to use */ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /**< Elliptic curve */ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; /**< Are we client or server? */ + int point_format; /**< Format for point export */ + + mbedtls_ecp_point Xm1; /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xm2; /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xp1; /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xp2; /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xp; /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */ + + mbedtls_mpi xm1; /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */ + mbedtls_mpi xm2; /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */ + + mbedtls_mpi s; /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */ +} mbedtls_ecjpake_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ +#include "ecjpake_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize an ECJPAKE context. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_init( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set up an ECJPAKE context for use. + * + * \note Currently the only values for hash/curve allowed by the + * standard are #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256/#MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to set up. This must be initialized. + * \param role The role of the caller. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT or #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER. + * \param hash The identifier of the hash function to use, + * for example #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256. + * \param curve The identifier of the elliptic curve to use, + * for example #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. + * \param secret The pre-shared secret (passphrase). This must be + * a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need + * only be valid for the duration of this call. + * \param len The length of the pre-shared secret \p secret. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve, + const unsigned char *secret, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Check if an ECJPAKE context is ready for use. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to check. This must be + * initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 if the context is ready for use. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_check( const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Generate and write the first round message + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension, + * excluding extension type and length bytes). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be + * initialized and set up. + * \param buf The buffer to write the contents to. This must be a + * writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number + * of Bytes written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Read and process the first round message + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension, + * excluding extension type and length bytes). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized + * and set up. + * \param buf The buffer holding the first round message. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Generate and write the second round message + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, + * set up, and already have performed round one. + * \param buf The buffer to write the round two contents to. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The size of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes + * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Read and process the second round message + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized + * and set up and already have performed round one. + * \param buf The buffer holding the second round message. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Derive the shared secret + * (TLS: Pre-Master Secret). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, + * set up and have performed both round one and two. + * \param buf The buffer to write the derived secret to. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes + * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This clears an ECJPAKE context and frees any + * embedded data structure. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to free. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECJPAKE context. + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_free( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + + +#endif /* ecjpake.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64a0bccd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -0,0 +1,1311 @@ +/** + * \file ecp.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for Elliptic Curves over GF(P) (ECP). + * + * The use of ECP in cryptography and TLS is defined in + * Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1 + * Elliptic Curve Cryptography and + * RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites + * for Transport Layer Security (TLS). + * + * RFC-2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) defines ECP + * group types. + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +/* + * ECP error codes + */ +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x4F80 +/** The buffer is too small to write to. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x4F00 +/** The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x4E80 +/** The signature is not valid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4E00 +/** Memory allocation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED -0x4D80 +/** Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED -0x4D00 +/** Invalid private or public key. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -0x4C80 +/** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x4C00 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** The ECP hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4B80 + +/** Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS -0x4B00 + +/* Flags indicating whether to include code that is specific to certain + * types of curves. These flags are for internal library use only. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Domain-parameter identifiers: curve, subgroup, and generator. + * + * \note Only curves over prime fields are supported. + * + * \warning This library does not support validation of arbitrary domain + * parameters. Therefore, only standardized domain parameters from trusted + * sources should be used. See mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + */ +/* Note: when adding a new curve: + * - Add it at the end of this enum, otherwise you'll break the ABI by + * changing the numerical value for existing curves. + * - Increment MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX below if needed. + * - Update the calculation of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN below. + * - Add the corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx_ENABLED macro definition to + * config.h. + * - List the curve as a dependency of MBEDTLS_ECP_C and + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C if supported in check_config.h. + * - Add the curve to the appropriate curve type macro + * MBEDTLS_ECP_yyy_ENABLED above. + * - Add the necessary definitions to ecp_curves.c. + * - Add the curve to the ecp_supported_curves array in ecp.c. + * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c if applicable. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0, /*!< Curve not defined. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 192-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 224-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 256-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 384-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 521-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 256-bit Brainpool curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 384-bit Brainpool curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 512-bit Brainpool curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, /*!< Domain parameters for Curve25519. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 192-bit "Koblitz" curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 224-bit "Koblitz" curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 256-bit "Koblitz" curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, /*!< Domain parameters for Curve448. */ +} mbedtls_ecp_group_id; + +/** + * The number of supported curves, plus one for #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. + * + * \note Montgomery curves are currently excluded. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX 12 + +/* + * Curve types + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x + b */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x^2 + x */ +} mbedtls_ecp_curve_type; + +/** + * Curve information, for use by other modules. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; /*!< An internal identifier. */ + uint16_t tls_id; /*!< The TLS NamedCurve identifier. */ + uint16_t bit_size; /*!< The curve size in bits. */ + const char *name; /*!< A human-friendly name. */ +} mbedtls_ecp_curve_info; + +/** + * \brief The ECP point structure, in Jacobian coordinates. + * + * \note All functions expect and return points satisfying + * the following condition: Z == 0 or + * Z == 1. Other values of \p Z are + * used only by internal functions. + * The point is zero, or "at infinity", if Z == 0. + * Otherwise, \p X and \p Y are its standard (affine) + * coordinates. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_point +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi Y; /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi Z; /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */ +} +mbedtls_ecp_point; + +/* Determine the minimum safe value of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 0 +/* Note: the curves must be listed in DECREASING size! */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 521 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 448 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 255 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 225 // n is slightly above 2^224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 192 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 192 +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C enabled, but no curve?" +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) +/* + * default mbed TLS elliptic curve arithmetic implementation + * + * (in case MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined then the developer has to provide an + * alternative implementation for the whole module and it will replace this + * one.) + */ + +/** + * \brief The ECP group structure. + * + * We consider two types of curve equations: + *
  • Short Weierstrass: y^2 = x^3 + A x + B mod P + * (SEC1 + RFC-4492)
    • + *
  • Montgomery: y^2 = x^3 + A x^2 + x mod P (Curve25519, + * Curve448)
+ * In both cases, the generator (\p G) for a prime-order subgroup is fixed. + * + * For Short Weierstrass, this subgroup is the whole curve, and its + * cardinality is denoted by \p N. Our code requires that \p N is an + * odd prime as mbedtls_ecp_mul() requires an odd number, and + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() requires that it is prime for blinding purposes. + * + * For Montgomery curves, we do not store \p A, but (A + 2) / 4, + * which is the quantity used in the formulas. Additionally, \p nbits is + * not the size of \p N but the required size for private keys. + * + * If \p modp is NULL, reduction modulo \p P is done using a generic algorithm. + * Otherwise, \p modp must point to a function that takes an \p mbedtls_mpi in the + * range of 0..2^(2*pbits)-1, and transforms it in-place to an integer + * which is congruent mod \p P to the given MPI, and is close enough to \p pbits + * in size, so that it may be efficiently brought in the 0..P-1 range by a few + * additions or subtractions. Therefore, it is only an approximative modular + * reduction. It must return 0 on success and non-zero on failure. + * + * \note Alternative implementations must keep the group IDs distinct. If + * two group structures have the same ID, then they must be + * identical. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; /*!< An internal group identifier. */ + mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus of the base field. */ + mbedtls_mpi A; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p A in the equation. For + Montgomery curves: (A + 2) / 4. */ + mbedtls_mpi B; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p B in the equation. + For Montgomery curves: unused. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /*!< The generator of the subgroup used. */ + mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The order of \p G. */ + size_t pbits; /*!< The number of bits in \p P.*/ + size_t nbits; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: The number of bits in \p P. + For Montgomery curves: the number of bits in the + private keys. */ + unsigned int h; /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ + int (*modp)(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction + mod \p P (see above).*/ + int (*t_pre)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + int (*t_post)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + void *t_data; /*!< Unused. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */ + size_t T_size; /*!< The number of pre-computed points. */ +} +mbedtls_ecp_group; + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS) + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS < MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is smaller than the largest supported curve" +#endif + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN + +#else +/* MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is not relevant without MBEDTLS_ECP_C, but set it + * to a nonzero value so that code that unconditionally allocates an array + * of a size based on it keeps working if built without ECC support. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 1 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ( ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7 ) / 8 ) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1 ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) +/* + * Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication. + * Default: a point where higher memory usage yields diminishing performance + * returns. + * Minimum value: 2. Maximum value: 7. + * + * Result is an array of at most ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) ) + * points used for point multiplication. This value is directly tied to EC + * peak memory usage, so decreasing it by one should roughly cut memory usage + * by two (if large curves are in use). + * + * Reduction in size may reduce speed, but larger curves are impacted first. + * Sample performances (in ECDHE handshakes/s, with FIXED_POINT_OPTIM = 1): + * w-size: 6 5 4 3 2 + * 521 145 141 135 120 97 + * 384 214 209 198 177 146 + * 256 320 320 303 262 226 + * 224 475 475 453 398 342 + * 192 640 640 633 587 476 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< The maximum window size used. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM) +/* + * Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication. + * + * This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the + * multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in + * ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4. + * + * The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2. + * + * Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */ + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +#include "ecp_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for multiplication + * + * \note Opaque struct + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx; + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecp_muladd() + * + * \note Opaque struct + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx; + +/** + * \brief General context for resuming ECC operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + unsigned ops_done; /*!< current ops count */ + unsigned depth; /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *rsm; /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ma; /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */ +} mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; + +/* + * Operation counts for restartable functions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK 3 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_check_pubkey() */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL 8 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_double_jac() */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD 11 /*!< basic ops count for see ecp_add_mixed() */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV 120 /*!< empirical equivalent for mpi_mod_inv() */ + +/** + * \brief Internal; for restartable functions in other modules. + * Check and update basic ops budget. + * + * \param grp Group structure + * \param rs_ctx Restart context + * \param ops Number of basic ops to do + * + * \return \c 0 if doing \p ops basic ops is still allowed, + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + unsigned ops ); + +/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, rs_ctx, \ + (unsigned) (ops) ) ); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */ + +/* We want to declare restartable versions of existing functions anyway */ +typedef void mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/** + * \brief The ECP key-pair structure. + * + * A generic key-pair that may be used for ECDSA and fixed ECDH, for example. + * + * \note Members are deliberately in the same order as in the + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_keypair +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */ + mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< our secret value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< our public value */ +} +mbedtls_ecp_keypair; + +/* + * Point formats, from RFC 4492's enum ECPointFormat + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED 0 /**< Uncompressed point format. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED 1 /**< Compressed point format. */ + +/* + * Some other constants from RFC 4492 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE 3 /**< The named_curve of ECCurveType. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of basic operations done in a row. + * + * If more operations are needed to complete a computation, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS will be returned by the + * function performing the computation. It is then the + * caller's responsibility to either call again with the same + * parameters until it returns 0 or an error code; or to free + * the restart context if the operation is to be aborted. + * + * It is strictly required that all input parameters and the + * restart context be the same on successive calls for the + * same operation, but output parameters need not be the + * same; they must not be used until the function finally + * returns 0. + * + * This only applies to functions whose documentation + * mentions they may return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS for functions in the + * SSL module). For functions that accept a "restart context" + * argument, passing NULL disables restart and makes the + * function equivalent to the function with the same name + * with \c _restartable removed. For functions in the ECDH + * module, restart is disabled unless the function accepts + * an "ECDH context" argument and + * mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart() was previously called on + * that context. For function in the SSL module, restart is + * only enabled for specific sides and key exchanges + * (currently only for clients and ECDHE-ECDSA). + * + * \param max_ops Maximum number of basic operations done in a row. + * Default: 0 (unlimited). + * Lower (non-zero) values mean ECC functions will block for + * a lesser maximum amount of time. + * + * \note A "basic operation" is defined as a rough equivalent of a + * multiplication in GF(p) for the NIST P-256 curve. + * As an indication, with default settings, a scalar + * multiplication (full run of \c mbedtls_ecp_mul()) is: + * - about 3300 basic operations for P-256 + * - about 9400 basic operations for P-384 + * + * \note Very low values are not always respected: sometimes + * functions need to block for a minimum number of + * operations, and will do so even if max_ops is set to a + * lower value. That minimum depends on the curve size, and + * can be made lower by decreasing the value of + * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE. As an indication, here is the + * lowest effective value for various curves and values of + * that parameter (w for short): + * w=6 w=5 w=4 w=3 w=2 + * P-256 208 208 160 136 124 + * P-384 682 416 320 272 248 + * P-521 1364 832 640 544 496 + * + * \note This setting is currently ignored by Curve25519. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( unsigned max_ops ); + +/** + * \brief Check if restart is enabled (max_ops != 0) + * + * \return \c 0 if \c max_ops == 0 (restart disabled) + * \return \c 1 otherwise (restart enabled) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled( void ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Get the type of a curve + */ +mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the information defined in + * mbedtls_ecp_curve_info() for all supported curves. + * + * \note This function returns information about all curves + * supported by the library. Some curves may not be + * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() + * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is + * supported for ECDH or ECDSA. + * + * \return A statically allocated array. The last entry is 0. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( void ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the list of internal group + * identifiers of all supported curves in the order of + * preference. + * + * \note This function returns information about all curves + * supported by the library. Some curves may not be + * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() + * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is + * supported for ECDH or ECDSA. + * + * \return A statically allocated array, + * terminated with MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list( void ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves curve information from an internal + * group identifier. + * + * \param grp_id An \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX value. + * + * \return The associated curve information on success. + * \return NULL on failure. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves curve information from a TLS + * NamedCurve value. + * + * \param tls_id An \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX value. + * + * \return The associated curve information on success. + * \return NULL on failure. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( uint16_t tls_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves curve information from a + * human-readable name. + * + * \param name The human-readable name. + * + * \return The associated curve information on success. + * \return NULL on failure. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a point as zero. + * + * \param pt The point to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_init( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an ECP group context + * without loading any domain parameters. + * + * \note After this function is called, domain parameters + * for various ECP groups can be loaded through the + * mbedtls_ecp_group_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group() + * functions. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_init( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a key pair as an invalid one. + * + * \param key The key pair to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of a point. + * + * \param pt The point to free. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of an ECP group. + * + * \param grp The group to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP group. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of a key pair. + * + * \param key The key pair to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP key pair. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to initialize. This must + * not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized restart context. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/** + * \brief This function copies the contents of point \p Q into + * point \p P. + * + * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized. + * \param Q The source point. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code for other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); + +/** + * \brief This function copies the contents of group \p src into + * group \p dst. + * + * \param dst The destination group. This must be initialized. + * \param src The source group. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets a point to the point at infinity. + * + * \param pt The point to set. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks if a point is the point at infinity. + * + * \param pt The point to test. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 1 if the point is zero. + * \return \c 0 if the point is non-zero. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function compares two points. + * + * \note This assumes that the points are normalized. Otherwise, + * they may compare as "not equal" even if they are. + * + * \param P The first point to compare. This must be initialized. + * \param Q The second point to compare. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 if the points are equal. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the points are not equal. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports a non-zero point from two ASCII + * strings. + * + * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized. + * \param radix The numeric base of the input. + * \param x The first affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string. + * \param y The second affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, + const char *x, const char *y ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports a point into unsigned binary data. + * + * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param P The point to export. This must be initialized. + * \param format The point format. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. + * (For groups without these formats, this parameter is + * ignored. But it still has to be either of the above + * values.) + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer + * is too small to hold the point. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format + * or the export for the given group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports a point from unsigned binary data. + * + * \note This function does not check that the point actually + * belongs to the given group, see mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey() + * for that. + * + * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param P The destination context to import the point to. + * This must be initialized. + * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the import for the + * given group is not implemented. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports a point from a TLS ECPoint record. + * + * \note On function return, \p *buf is updated to point immediately + * after the ECPoint record. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param pt The destination point. + * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param len The length of the buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on initialization + * failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports a point as a TLS ECPoint record + * defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param pt The point to be exported. This must be initialized. + * \param format The point format to use. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length in Bytes + * of the data written. + * \param buf The target buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the target buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer + * is too small to hold the exported point. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context + * from a standardized set of domain parameters. + * + * \note The index should be a value of the NamedCurve enum, + * as defined in RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography + * (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS), + * usually in the form of an \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macro. + * + * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized. + * \param id The identifier of the domain parameter set to load. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p id doesn't + * correspond to a known group. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context from a TLS + * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + * + * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after + * the ECParameters record on exit. + * + * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized. + * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not + * recognized. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function extracts an elliptic curve group ID from a + * TLS ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + * + * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after + * the ECParameters record on exit. + * + * \param grp The address at which to store the group id. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not + * recognized. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, + size_t len ); +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve as a TLS + * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to be exported. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The buffer to write to. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output + * buffer is too small to hold the exported group. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a scalar multiplication of a point + * by an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P. + * + * It is not thread-safe to use same group in multiple threads. + * + * \note To prevent timing attacks, this function + * executes the exact same sequence of base-field + * operations for any valid \p m. It avoids any if-branch or + * array index depending on the value of \p m. + * + * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize + * intermediate results to prevent potential timing attacks + * targeting these results. We recommend always providing + * a non-NULL \p f_rng. The overhead is negligible. + * Note: unless #MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined, when + * \p f_rng is NULL, an internal RNG (seeded from the value + * of \p m) will be used instead. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization + * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private + * key, or \p P is not a valid public key. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs multiplication of a point by + * an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P in a restartable way. + * + * \see mbedtls_ecp_mul() + * + * \note This function does the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_mul(), but + * it can return early and restart according to the limit set + * with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization + * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private + * key, or \p P is not a valid public key. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two + * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q + * + * It is not thread-safe to use same group in multiple threads. + * + * \note In contrast to mbedtls_ecp_mul(), this function does not + * guarantee a constant execution flow and timing. + * + * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves. + * It may not be included in builds without any short + * Weierstrass curve. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P. + * This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized. + * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q. + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n. + * This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not + * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public + * keys. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not + * designate a short Weierstrass curve. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two + * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q in a + * restartable way. + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd() + * + * \note This function works the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd(), + * but it can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves. + * It may not be included in builds without any short + * Weierstrass curve. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P. + * This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized. + * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q. + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n. + * This must be initialized. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not + * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public + * keys. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not + * designate a short Weierstrass curve. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +/** + * \brief This function checks that a point is a valid public key + * on this curve. + * + * It only checks that the point is non-zero, has + * valid coordinates and lies on the curve. It does not verify + * that it is indeed a multiple of \p G. This additional + * check is computationally more expensive, is not required + * by standards, and should not be necessary if the group + * used has a small cofactor. In particular, it is useless for + * the NIST groups which all have a cofactor of 1. + * + * \note This function uses bare components rather than an + * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure, to ease use with other + * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. + * + * \param grp The ECP group the point should belong to. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param pt The point to check. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid public key. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not + * a valid public key for the given curve. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks that an \p mbedtls_mpi is a + * valid private key for this curve. + * + * \note This function uses bare components rather than an + * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other + * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. + * + * \param grp The ECP group the private key should belong to. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param d The integer to check. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid private key. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not a valid + * private key for the given curve. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a private key. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to generate a private key for. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code + * on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a keypair with a configurable base + * point. + * + * \note This function uses bare components rather than an + * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other + * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param G The base point to use. This must be initialized + * and belong to \p grp. It replaces the default base + * point \c grp->G used by mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(). + * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The destination point (public part). + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code + * on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an ECP keypair. + * + * \note This function uses bare components rather than an + * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other + * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The destination point (public part). + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code + * on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an ECP key. + * + * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. + * \param key The destination key. This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code + * on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key. + * + * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. + * \param key The destination key. + * \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the + * key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte + * string for Montgomery curves.) + * \param buflen The length of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY error if the key is + * invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for + * the group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_read_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key. + * + * \param key The private key. + * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation + * of the key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte + * string for Montgomery curves.) + * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key + representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for + * the group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks that the keypair objects + * \p pub and \p prv have the same group and the + * same public point, and that the private key in + * \p prv is consistent with the public key. + * + * \param pub The keypair structure holding the public key. This + * must be initialized. If it contains a private key, that + * part is ignored. + * \param prv The keypair structure holding the full keypair. + * This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, meaning that the keys are valid and match. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keys are invalid or do not match. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on calculation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The ECP checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ecp.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a47a8ff --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +/** + * \file ecp_internal.h + * + * \brief Function declarations for alternative implementation of elliptic curve + * point arithmetic. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * [1] BERNSTEIN, Daniel J. Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records. + * + * + * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis + * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and + * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. + * + * + * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to + * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology + * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. + * + * + * [4] Certicom Research. SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters. + * + * + * [5] HANKERSON, Darrel, MENEZES, Alfred J., VANSTONE, Scott. Guide to Elliptic + * Curve Cryptography. + * + * [6] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-4. + * + * + * [7] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer + * Security (TLS), RFC 4492. + * + * + * [8] + * + * [9] COHEN, Henri. A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory. + * Springer Science & Business Media, 1 Aug 2000 + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + +/** + * \brief Indicate if the Elliptic Curve Point module extension can + * handle the group. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the elliptic curve group that will be the + * basis of the cryptographic computations. + * + * \return Non-zero if successful. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief Initialise the Elliptic Curve Point module extension. + * + * If mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable returns true for a + * group, this function has to be able to initialise the + * module for it. + * + * This module can be a driver to a crypto hardware + * accelerator, for which this could be an initialise function. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the group the module needs to be + * initialised for. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief Frees and deallocates the Elliptic Curve Point module + * extension. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the group the module was initialised for. + */ +void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) +/** + * \brief Randomize jacobian coordinates: + * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l. + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param pt The point on the curve to be randomised, given with Jacobian + * coordinates. + * + * \param f_rng A function pointer to the random number generator. + * + * \param p_rng A pointer to the random number generator state. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) +/** + * \brief Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates. + * + * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), + * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. + * + * This function is used only as a subrutine of + * ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, + * (3) P == Q. + * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in + * ecp_mul_comb(): + * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base + * point, the factor being less than its order, so none of + * them is zero; + * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even + * multiple, due to the choice of precomputed points in the + * modified comb method. + * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. + * + * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as + * meaning 1. + * + * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.22: + * 1A := 8M + 3S + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. + * + * \param P Pointer to the first summand, given with Jacobian + * coordinates + * + * \param Q Pointer to the second summand, given with affine + * coordinates. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates. + * + * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) + * 4M + 4S (A == -3) + * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise + * when the implementation is based on the "dbl-1998-cmo-2" + * doubling formulas in [8] and standard optimizations are + * applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. + * + * \param P Pointer to the point that has to be doubled, given with + * Jacobian coordinates. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) + * points. + * + * Using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P + * the cost is: + * 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S + * (See for example Algorithm 10.3.4. in [9]) + * + * This function is used only as a subrutine of + * ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is + * zero! + * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param T Array of pointers to the points to normalise. + * + * \param t_len Number of elements in the array. + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * an error if one of the points is zero. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t t_len ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1. + * + * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.2.1: + * 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param pt pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an + * input/output parameter. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Randomize projective x/z coordinates: + * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l + * + * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve + * + * \param P the point on the curve to be randomised given with + * projective coordinates. This is an input/output parameter. + * + * \param f_rng a function pointer to the random number generator + * + * \param p_rng a pointer to the random number generator state + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1. + * + * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve + * + * \param P pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an + * input/output parameter. + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P ); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#endif /* ecp_internal.h */ + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40259ebc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +/** + * \file entropy.h + * + * \brief Entropy accumulator implementation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#endif + +/** Critical entropy source failure. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x003C +/** No more sources can be added. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -0x003E +/** No sources have been added to poll. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED -0x0040 +/** No strong sources have been added to poll. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE -0x003D +/** Read/write error in file. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003F + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 64 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-512) */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 32 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-256) */ +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum size of seed we read from seed file */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES + +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG 1 /**< Entropy source is strong */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK 0 /**< Entropy source is weak */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback pointer + * + * \param data Callback-specific data pointer + * \param output Data to fill + * \param len Maximum size to provide + * \param olen The actual amount of bytes put into the buffer (Can be 0) + * + * \return 0 if no critical failures occurred, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED otherwise + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr)(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, + size_t *olen); + +/** + * \brief Entropy source state + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_source_state +{ + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source; /**< The entropy source callback */ + void * p_source; /**< The callback data pointer */ + size_t size; /**< Amount received in bytes */ + size_t threshold; /**< Minimum bytes required before release */ + int strong; /**< Is the source strong? */ +} +mbedtls_entropy_source_state; + +/** + * \brief Entropy context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_context +{ + int accumulator_started; /* 0 after init. + * 1 after the first update. + * -1 after free. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + mbedtls_sha512_context accumulator; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR) + mbedtls_sha256_context accumulator; +#endif + int source_count; /* Number of entries used in source. */ + mbedtls_entropy_source_state source[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + mbedtls_havege_state havege_data; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + int initial_entropy_run; +#endif +} +mbedtls_entropy_context; + +/** + * \brief Initialize the context + * + * \param ctx Entropy context to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the data in the context + * + * \param ctx Entropy context to free + */ +void mbedtls_entropy_free( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Adds an entropy source to poll + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * \param f_source Entropy function + * \param p_source Function data + * \param threshold Minimum required from source before entropy is released + * ( with mbedtls_entropy_func() ) (in bytes) + * \param strong MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG or + * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK. + * At least one strong source needs to be added. + * Weaker sources (such as the cycle counter) can be used as + * a complement. + * + * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source, void *p_source, + size_t threshold, int strong ); + +/** + * \brief Trigger an extra gather poll for the accumulator + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_gather( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve entropy from the accumulator + * (Maximum length: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param data Entropy context + * \param output Buffer to fill + * \param len Number of bytes desired, must be at most MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Add data to the accumulator manually + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * \param data Data to add + * \param len Length of data + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +/** + * \brief Trigger an update of the seed file in NV by using the + * current entropy pool. + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Write a seed file + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * \param path Name of the file + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ); + +/** + * \brief Read and update a seed file. Seed is added to this + * instance. No more than MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE bytes are + * read from the seed file. The rest is ignored. + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * \param path Name of the file + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * This module self-test also calls the entropy self-test, + * mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(); + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_self_test( int verbose ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * Verifies the integrity of the hardware entropy source + * provided by the function 'mbedtls_hardware_poll()'. + * + * Note this is the only hardware entropy source that is known + * at link time, and other entropy sources configured + * dynamically at runtime by the function + * mbedtls_entropy_add_source() will not be tested. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* entropy.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1d7491a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/** + * \file entropy_poll.h + * + * \brief Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE 32 /**< Minimum for HAVEGE */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK 4 /**< Minimum for mbedtls_timing_hardclock() */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */ +#endif + +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback that provides 0 entropy. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback + */ +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +/** + * \brief HAVEGE based entropy poll callback + * + * Requires an HAVEGE state as its data pointer. + */ +int mbedtls_havege_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +/** + * \brief mbedtls_timing_hardclock-based entropy poll callback + */ +int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source + * + * \warning This is not provided by mbed TLS! + * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in config.h. + * + * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. + */ +int mbedtls_hardware_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback for a non-volatile seed file + * + * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. + */ +int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* entropy_poll.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..50f25385 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +/** + * \file error.h + * + * \brief Error to string translation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ERROR_H +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/** + * Error code layout. + * + * Currently we try to keep all error codes within the negative space of 16 + * bits signed integers to support all platforms (-0x0001 - -0x7FFF). In + * addition we'd like to give two layers of information on the error if + * possible. + * + * For that purpose the error codes are segmented in the following manner: + * + * 16 bit error code bit-segmentation + * + * 1 bit - Unused (sign bit) + * 3 bits - High level module ID + * 5 bits - Module-dependent error code + * 7 bits - Low level module errors + * + * For historical reasons, low-level error codes are divided in even and odd, + * even codes were assigned first, and -1 is reserved for other errors. + * + * Low-level module errors (0x0002-0x007E, 0x0001-0x007F) + * + * Module Nr Codes assigned + * ERROR 2 0x006E 0x0001 + * MPI 7 0x0002-0x0010 + * GCM 3 0x0012-0x0014 0x0013-0x0013 + * BLOWFISH 3 0x0016-0x0018 0x0017-0x0017 + * THREADING 3 0x001A-0x001E + * AES 5 0x0020-0x0022 0x0021-0x0025 + * CAMELLIA 3 0x0024-0x0026 0x0027-0x0027 + * XTEA 2 0x0028-0x0028 0x0029-0x0029 + * BASE64 2 0x002A-0x002C + * OID 1 0x002E-0x002E 0x000B-0x000B + * PADLOCK 1 0x0030-0x0030 + * DES 2 0x0032-0x0032 0x0033-0x0033 + * CTR_DBRG 4 0x0034-0x003A + * ENTROPY 3 0x003C-0x0040 0x003D-0x003F + * NET 13 0x0042-0x0052 0x0043-0x0049 + * ARIA 4 0x0058-0x005E + * ASN1 7 0x0060-0x006C + * CMAC 1 0x007A-0x007A + * PBKDF2 1 0x007C-0x007C + * HMAC_DRBG 4 0x0003-0x0009 + * CCM 3 0x000D-0x0011 + * ARC4 1 0x0019-0x0019 + * MD2 1 0x002B-0x002B + * MD4 1 0x002D-0x002D + * MD5 1 0x002F-0x002F + * RIPEMD160 1 0x0031-0x0031 + * SHA1 1 0x0035-0x0035 0x0073-0x0073 + * SHA256 1 0x0037-0x0037 0x0074-0x0074 + * SHA512 1 0x0039-0x0039 0x0075-0x0075 + * CHACHA20 3 0x0051-0x0055 + * POLY1305 3 0x0057-0x005B + * CHACHAPOLY 2 0x0054-0x0056 + * PLATFORM 2 0x0070-0x0072 + * + * High-level module nr (3 bits - 0x0...-0x7...) + * Name ID Nr of Errors + * PEM 1 9 + * PKCS#12 1 4 (Started from top) + * X509 2 20 + * PKCS5 2 4 (Started from top) + * DHM 3 11 + * PK 3 15 (Started from top) + * RSA 4 11 + * ECP 4 10 (Started from top) + * MD 5 5 + * HKDF 5 1 (Started from top) + * SSL 5 2 (Started from 0x5F00) + * CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080) + * SSL 6 24 (Started from top, plus 0x6000) + * SSL 7 32 + * + * Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.) + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Generic error */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR -0x0001 +/** This is a bug in the library */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E + +/** + * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together. + * + * Wrapper macro for mbedtls_error_add(). See that function for + * more details. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( high, low ) \ + mbedtls_error_add( high, low, __FILE__, __LINE__ ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +/** + * \brief Testing hook called before adding/combining two error codes together. + * Only used when invasive testing is enabled via MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS. + */ +extern void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)( int, int, const char *, int ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together. + * + * This function can be called directly however it is usually + * called via the #MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD macro. + * + * While a value of zero is not a negative error code, it is still an + * error code (that denotes success) and can be combined with both a + * negative error code or another value of zero. + * + * \note When invasive testing is enabled via #MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS, also try to + * call \link mbedtls_test_hook_error_add \endlink. + * + * \param high high-level error code. See error.h for more details. + * \param low low-level error code. See error.h for more details. + * \param file file where this error code addition occurred. + * \param line line where this error code addition occurred. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_error_add( int high, int low, + const char *file, int line ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if( *mbedtls_test_hook_error_add != NULL ) + ( *mbedtls_test_hook_error_add )( high, low, file, line ); +#endif + (void)file; + (void)line; + + return( high + low ); +} + +/** + * \brief Translate a mbed TLS error code into a string representation, + * Result is truncated if necessary and always includes a terminating + * null byte. + * + * \param errnum error code + * \param buffer buffer to place representation in + * \param buflen length of the buffer + */ +void mbedtls_strerror( int errnum, char *buffer, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Translate the high-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string + * representation. + * + * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller + * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for + * logging purposes. + * + * \param error_code error code + * + * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error + * code is unknown. + */ +const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code ); + +/** + * \brief Translate the low-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string + * representation. + * + * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller + * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for + * logging purposes. + * + * \param error_code error code + * + * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error + * code is unknown. + */ +const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* error.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9723a17b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +/** + * \file gcm.h + * + * \brief This file contains GCM definitions and functions. + * + * The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for 128-bit block ciphers is defined + * in D. McGrew, J. Viega, The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation + * (GCM), Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. + * + * For more information on GCM, see NIST SP 800-38D: Recommendation for + * Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GCM_H +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT 0 + +/** Authenticated decryption failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x0012 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** GCM hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0013 + +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -0x0014 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + +/** + * \brief The GCM context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ + uint64_t HL[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */ + uint64_t HH[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */ + uint64_t len; /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */ + uint64_t add_len; /*!< The total length of the additional data. */ + unsigned char base_ectr[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */ + unsigned char y[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */ + unsigned char buf[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */ + int mode; /*!< The operation to perform: + #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. */ +} +mbedtls_gcm_context; + +#else /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ +#include "gcm_alt.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified GCM context, + * to make references valid, and prepares the context + * for mbedtls_gcm_setkey() or mbedtls_gcm_free(). + * + * The function does not bind the GCM context to a particular + * cipher, nor set the key. For this purpose, use + * mbedtls_gcm_setkey(). + * + * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function associates a GCM context with a + * cipher algorithm and a key. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. + * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of at + * least \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The key size in bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
    • + *
  • 192 bits
    • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs GCM encryption or decryption of a buffer. + * + * \note For encryption, the output buffer can be the same as the + * input buffer. For decryption, the output buffer cannot be + * the same as input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output + * buffer must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. + * + * \warning When this function performs a decryption, it outputs the + * authentication tag and does not verify that the data is + * authentic. You should use this function to perform encryption + * only. For decryption, use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context to use for encryption or decryption. This + * must be initialized. + * \param mode The operation to perform: + * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT to perform authenticated encryption. + * The ciphertext is written to \p output and the + * authentication tag is written to \p tag. + * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT to perform decryption. + * The plaintext is written to \p output and the + * authentication tag is written to \p tag. + * Note that this mode is not recommended, because it does + * not verify the authenticity of the data. For this reason, + * you should use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead of + * calling this function in decryption mode. + * \param length The length of the input data, which is equal to the length + * of the output data. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the IV. + * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at + * least that size in Bytes. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that + * size in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least that + * size in Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. + * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if the encryption or decryption was performed + * successfully. Note that in #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT mode, + * this does not indicate that the data is authentic. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are + * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the encryption + * or decryption failed. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t tag_len, + unsigned char *tag ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a GCM authenticated decryption of a + * buffer. + * + * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as + * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer + * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param length The length of the ciphertext to decrypt, which is also + * the length of the decrypted plaintext. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the IV. + * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at + * least that size in Bytes. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. + * \param tag The buffer holding the tag to verify. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to verify. + * \param input The buffer holding the ciphertext. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that + * size. + * \param output The buffer for holding the decrypted plaintext. If \p length + * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at + * least that size. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful and authenticated. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are + * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the decryption + * failed. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *tag, + size_t tag_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a GCM encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the IV. + * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL + * if \p add_len is \c 0. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, + * \p add may be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing GCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * ` The function expects input to be a multiple of 16 + * Bytes. Only the last call before calling + * mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes. + * + * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as + * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer + * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of + * 16 except in the last call before mbedtls_gcm_finish(). + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that + * size in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is + * greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at + * least that size in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the GCM operation and generates + * the authentication tag. + * + * It wraps up the GCM stream, and generates the + * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least + * four. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, + size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying + * cipher sub-context. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the call has + * no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The GCM checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + + +#endif /* gcm.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d27039e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/** + * \file havege.h + * + * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H +#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE 1024 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief HAVEGE state structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_havege_state +{ + uint32_t PT1, PT2, offset[2]; + uint32_t pool[MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE]; + uint32_t WALK[8192]; +} +mbedtls_havege_state; + +/** + * \brief HAVEGE initialization + * + * \param hs HAVEGE state to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_havege_init( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ); + +/** + * \brief Clear HAVEGE state + * + * \param hs HAVEGE state to be cleared + */ +void mbedtls_havege_free( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ); + +/** + * \brief HAVEGE rand function + * + * \param p_rng A HAVEGE state + * \param output Buffer to fill + * \param len Length of buffer + * + * \return 0 + */ +int mbedtls_havege_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t len ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* havege.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..111d960e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/** + * \file hkdf.h + * + * \brief This file contains the HKDF interface. + * + * The HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) is + * specified by RFC 5869. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_HKDF_H +#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +/** + * \name HKDF Error codes + * \{ + */ +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5F80 +/** \} name */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief This is the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function + * (HKDF). + * + * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the hash + * function output in bytes. + * \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value); + * if the salt is not provided, a string of all zeros of + * md.size length is used as the salt. + * \param salt_len The length in bytes of the optional \p salt. + * \param ikm The input keying material. + * \param ikm_len The length in bytes of \p ikm. + * \param info An optional context and application specific information + * string. This can be a zero-length string. + * \param info_len The length of \p info in bytes. + * \param okm The output keying material of \p okm_len bytes. + * \param okm_len The length of the output keying material in bytes. This + * must be less than or equal to 255 * md.size bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid. + * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying + * MD layer. + */ +int mbedtls_hkdf( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt, + size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, + unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ); + +/** + * \brief Take the input keying material \p ikm and extract from it a + * fixed-length pseudorandom key \p prk. + * + * \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been + * studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3 + * key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use + * \c mbedtls_hkdf instead. + * + * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the + * hash function output in bytes. + * \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value); + * if the salt is not provided, a string of all zeros + * of md.size length is used as the salt. + * \param salt_len The length in bytes of the optional \p salt. + * \param ikm The input keying material. + * \param ikm_len The length in bytes of \p ikm. + * \param[out] prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid. + * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying + * MD layer. + */ +int mbedtls_hkdf_extract( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, + const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + unsigned char *prk ); + +/** + * \brief Expand the supplied \p prk into several additional pseudorandom + * keys, which is the output of the HKDF. + * + * \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been + * studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3 + * key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use + * \c mbedtls_hkdf instead. + * + * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the hash + * function output in bytes. + * \param prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes. \p prk is + * usually the output from the HKDF extract step. + * \param prk_len The length in bytes of \p prk. + * \param info An optional context and application specific information + * string. This can be a zero-length string. + * \param info_len The length of \p info in bytes. + * \param okm The output keying material of \p okm_len bytes. + * \param okm_len The length of the output keying material in bytes. This + * must be less than or equal to 255 * md.size bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid. + * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying + * MD layer. + */ +int mbedtls_hkdf_expand( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, + size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info, + size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* hkdf.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d372b97 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h @@ -0,0 +1,474 @@ +/** + * \file hmac_drbg.h + * + * \brief The HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator. + * + * This module implements the HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator described + * in NIST SP 800-90A: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using + * Deterministic Random Bit Generators. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/* + * Error codes + */ +/** Too many random requested in single call. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -0x0003 +/** Input too large (Entropy + additional). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0005 +/** Read/write error in file. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x0007 +/** The entropy source failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0009 + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF 0 /**< No prediction resistance */ +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON 1 /**< Prediction resistance enabled */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * HMAC_DRBG context. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context +{ + /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitly, + * but is implied by the HMAC context */ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */ + unsigned char V[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */ + int reseed_counter; /*!< reseed counter */ + + /* Administrative state */ + size_t entropy_len; /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */ + int prediction_resistance; /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic + reseed before every random generation) */ + int reseed_interval; /*!< reseed interval */ + + /* Callbacks */ + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */ + void *p_entropy; /*!< context for the entropy function */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if + * md_ctx->md_info != NULL. This means that the mutex is initialized + * during the initial seeding in mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() or + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() and freed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * + * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it + * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. + */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context; + +/** + * \brief HMAC_DRBG context initialization. + * + * This function makes the context ready for mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(), + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(). + * + * \note The reseed interval is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL + * by default. Override this value by calling + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(). + * + * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief HMAC_DRBG initial seeding. + * + * Set the initial seed and set up the entropy source for future reseeds. + * + * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is + * to use the entropy module: + * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func(); + * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized + * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default + * entropy sources). + * + * You can provide a personalization string in addition to the + * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. + * + * \note By default, the security strength as defined by NIST is: + * - 128 bits if \p md_info is SHA-1; + * - 192 bits if \p md_info is SHA-224; + * - 256 bits if \p md_info is SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. + * Note that SHA-256 is just as efficient as SHA-224. + * The security strength can be reduced if a smaller + * entropy length is set with + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). + * + * \note The default entropy length is the security strength + * (converted from bits to bytes). You can override + * it by calling mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). + * + * \note During the initial seeding, this function calls + * the entropy source to obtain a nonce + * whose length is half the entropy length. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * after this function returns successfully, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be seeded. + * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. + * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the + * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the + * length of the buffer. + * \p f_entropy is always called with a length that is + * less than or equal to the entropy length. + * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + * and also at most + * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len * 3 / 2 + * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length + * described above. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is + * invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough + * memory to allocate context data. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if the call to \p f_entropy failed. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Initialisation of simplified HMAC_DRBG (never reseeds). + * + * This function is meant for use in algorithms that need a pseudorandom + * input such as deterministic ECDSA. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * after this function returns successfully, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised. + * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. + * \param data Concatenation of the initial entropy string and + * the additional data. + * \param data_len Length of \p data in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is + * invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough + * memory to allocate context data. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off. + * The default value is off. + * + * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of + * every call to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() + * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(). + * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient + * throughput. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each + * seed or reseed. + * + * See the documentation of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() for the default value. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Set the reseed interval. + * + * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() + * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function + * is called again. + * + * The default value is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param interval The reseed interval. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + int interval ); + +/** + * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. + * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, or an error from the underlying + * hash calculation. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function reseeds the HMAC_DRBG context, that is + * extracts data from the entropy source. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data + * and \p len should be \c 0. + * \param len The length of the additional data. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + * and also at most + * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len + * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length + * (see mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len()). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if a call to the entropy function failed. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function updates an HMAC_DRBG instance with additional + * data and uses it to generate random data. + * + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + * \param additional Additional data to update with. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data + * and \p add_len should be \c 0. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if a call to the entropy source failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if + * \p output_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if + * \p add_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function uses HMAC_DRBG to generate random data. + * + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param out_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if a call to the entropy source failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if + * \p out_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context to free. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ); + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() + * in 2.16.0. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. + * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief This function writes a seed file. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed + * failure. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); + +/** + * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed + * is added to this instance. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on + * reseed failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing + * seed file is too large. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief The HMAC_DRBG Checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return \c 1 if the test failed. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* hmac_drbg.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..84fafd2a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h @@ -0,0 +1,493 @@ + /** + * \file md.h + * + * \brief This file contains the generic message-digest wrapper. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_H + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +/** The selected feature is not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x5080 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5100 +/** Failed to allocate memory. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED -0x5180 +/** Opening or reading of file failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x5200 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** MD hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x5280 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Supported message digests. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and + * their use constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE=0, /**< None. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, /**< The MD2 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, /**< The MD4 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, /**< The MD5 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */ +} mbedtls_md_type_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 64 /* longest known is SHA512 */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 or less */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#endif + +/** + * Opaque struct defined in md_internal.h. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t; + +/** + * The generic message-digest context. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md_context_t +{ + /** Information about the associated message digest. */ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + /** The digest-specific context. */ + void *md_ctx; + + /** The HMAC part of the context. */ + void *hmac_ctx; +} mbedtls_md_context_t; + +/** + * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the + * generic digest module. + * + * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes. + * + * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element + * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the + * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t. + * The last entry is 0. + */ +const int *mbedtls_md_list( void ); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the message-digest information + * associated with the given digest name. + * + * \param md_name The name of the digest to search for. + * + * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_name. + * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name ); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the message-digest information + * associated with the given digest type. + * + * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. + * + * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_type. + * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a message-digest context without + * binding it to a particular message-digest algorithm. + * + * This function should always be called first. It prepares the + * context for mbedtls_md_setup() for binding it to a + * message-digest algorithm. + */ +void mbedtls_md_init( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears the internal structure of \p ctx and + * frees any embedded internal structure, but does not free + * \p ctx itself. + * + * If you have called mbedtls_md_setup() on \p ctx, you must + * call mbedtls_md_free() when you are no longer using the + * context. + * Calling this function if you have previously + * called mbedtls_md_init() and nothing else is optional. + * You must not call this function if you have not called + * mbedtls_md_init(). + */ +void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, + * and allocates internal structures. + * + * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or mbedtls_md_free(). + * Makes it necessary to call mbedtls_md_free() later. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md_setup() in 2.0.0 + * + * \param ctx The context to set up. + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_md_init_ctx( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, + * and allocates internal structures. + * + * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or + * mbedtls_md_free(). Makes it necessary to call + * mbedtls_md_free() later. + * + * \param ctx The context to set up. + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * \param hmac Defines if HMAC is used. 0: HMAC is not used (saves some memory), + * or non-zero: HMAC is used with this context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac ); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of an message-digest + * context. + * + * \note You must call mbedtls_md_setup() on \c dst before calling + * this function. + * + * \note The two contexts must have the same type, + * for example, both are SHA-256. + * + * \warning This function clones the message-digest state, not the + * HMAC state. + * + * \param dst The destination context. + * \param src The context to be cloned. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, + const mbedtls_md_context_t *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function extracts the message-digest size from the + * message-digest information structure. + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return The size of the message-digest output in Bytes. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ); + +/** + * \brief This function extracts the message-digest type from the + * message-digest information structure. + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return The type of the message digest. + */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ); + +/** + * \brief This function extracts the message-digest name from the + * message-digest information structure. + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return The name of the message digest. + */ +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a message-digest computation. + * + * You must call this function after setting up the context + * with mbedtls_md_setup(), and before passing data with + * mbedtls_md_update(). + * + * \param ctx The generic message-digest context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * message-digest computation. + * + * You must call mbedtls_md_starts() before calling this + * function. You may call this function multiple times. + * Afterwards, call mbedtls_md_finish(). + * + * \param ctx The generic message-digest context. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the digest operation, + * and writes the result to the output buffer. + * + * Call this function after a call to mbedtls_md_starts(), + * followed by any number of calls to mbedtls_md_update(). + * Afterwards, you may either clear the context with + * mbedtls_md_free(), or call mbedtls_md_starts() to reuse + * the context for another digest operation with the same + * algorithm. + * + * \param ctx The generic message-digest context. + * \param output The buffer for the generic message-digest checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the message-digest of a buffer, + * with respect to a configurable message-digest algorithm + * in a single call. + * + * The result is calculated as + * Output = message_digest(input buffer). + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The generic message-digest checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief This function calculates the message-digest checksum + * result of the contents of the provided file. + * + * The result is calculated as + * Output = message_digest(file contents). + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * \param path The input file name. + * \param output The generic message-digest checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR on an I/O error accessing + * the file pointed by \p path. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info was NULL. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/** + * \brief This function sets the HMAC key and prepares to + * authenticate a new message. + * + * Call this function after mbedtls_md_setup(), to use + * the MD context for an HMAC calculation, then call + * mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to provide the input data, and + * mbedtls_md_hmac_finish() to get the HMAC value. + * + * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC + * context. + * \param key The HMAC secret key. + * \param keylen The length of the HMAC key in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing HMAC + * computation. + * + * Call mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() or mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() + * before calling this function. + * You may call this function multiple times to pass the + * input piecewise. + * Afterwards, call mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(). + * + * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC + * context. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the HMAC operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * Call this function after mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and + * mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to get the HMAC value. Afterwards + * you may either call mbedtls_md_free() to clear the context, + * or call mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() to reuse the context with + * the same HMAC key. + * + * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC + * context. + * \param output The generic HMAC checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output); + +/** + * \brief This function prepares to authenticate a new message with + * the same key as the previous HMAC operation. + * + * You may call this function after mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(). + * Afterwards call mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to pass the new + * input. + * + * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC + * context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the full generic HMAC + * on the input buffer with the provided key. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The HMAC result is calculated as + * output = generic HMAC(hmac key, input buffer). + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * \param key The HMAC secret key. + * \param keylen The length of the HMAC secret key in Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The generic HMAC result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ); + +/* Internal use */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f3d5cf4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/** + * \file md2.h + * + * \brief MD2 message digest algorithm (hash function) + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests + * instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD2_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD2_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** MD2 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002B + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief MD2 context structure + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md2_context +{ + unsigned char cksum[16]; /*!< checksum of the data block */ + unsigned char state[48]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[16]; /*!< data block being processed */ + size_t left; /*!< amount of data in buffer */ +} +mbedtls_md2_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ +#include "md2_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize MD2 context + * + * \param ctx MD2 context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md2_init( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear MD2 context + * + * \param ctx MD2 context to be cleared + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md2_free( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD2 context + * + * \param dst The destination context + * \param src The context to be cloned + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md2_clone( mbedtls_md2_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md2_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 process buffer + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_update_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 final digest + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * \param output MD2 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_internal_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief MD2 context setup + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_starts( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 process buffer + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_update_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_update( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 final digest + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * \param output MD2 checksum result + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_finish( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md2_process() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD2 checksum result + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD2 checksum result + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_md2.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0238c672 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +/** + * \file md4.h + * + * \brief MD4 message digest algorithm (hash function) + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests + * instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD4_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD4_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** MD4 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002D + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief MD4 context structure + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md4_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ +} +mbedtls_md4_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ +#include "md4_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize MD4 context + * + * \param ctx MD4 context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md4_init( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear MD4 context + * + * \param ctx MD4 context to be cleared + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md4_free( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD4 context + * + * \param dst The destination context + * \param src The context to be cloned + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md4_clone( mbedtls_md4_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md4_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + */ +int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 process buffer + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md4_update_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 final digest + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param output MD4 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief MD4 context setup + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_starts( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 process buffer + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_update_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_update( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 final digest + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param output MD4 checksum result + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_finish( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md4_process() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD4 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md4_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD4 checksum result + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md4_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_md4.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..73e4dd2c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +/** + * \file md5.h + * + * \brief MD5 message digest algorithm (hash function) + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message + * digests instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD5_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** MD5 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002F + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief MD5 context structure + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md5_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ +} +mbedtls_md5_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ +#include "md5_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize MD5 context + * + * \param ctx MD5 context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md5_init( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear MD5 context + * + * \param ctx MD5 context to be cleared + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md5_free( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD5 context + * + * \param dst The destination context + * \param src The context to be cloned + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md5_clone( mbedtls_md5_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md5_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 process buffer + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 final digest + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param output MD5 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_internal_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief MD5 context setup + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 process buffer + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_update_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 final digest + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param output MD5 checksum result + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md5_process() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD5 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD5 checksum result + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_md5.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f33cdf60 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/** + * \file md_internal.h + * + * \brief Message digest wrappers. + * + * \warning This in an internal header. Do not include directly. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Message digest information. + * Allows message digest functions to be called in a generic way. + */ +struct mbedtls_md_info_t +{ + /** Name of the message digest */ + const char * name; + + /** Digest identifier */ + mbedtls_md_type_t type; + + /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char size; + + /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char block_size; +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info; +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info; +#endif +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info; +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3954b36a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/** + * \file memory_buffer_alloc.h + * + * \brief Buffer-based memory allocator + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE (1 << 1) +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS (MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC | MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Initialize use of stack-based memory allocator. + * The stack-based allocator does memory management inside the + * presented buffer and does not call calloc() and free(). + * It sets the global mbedtls_calloc() and mbedtls_free() pointers + * to its own functions. + * (Provided mbedtls_calloc() and mbedtls_free() are thread-safe if + * MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is defined) + * + * \note This code is not optimized and provides a straight-forward + * implementation of a stack-based memory allocator. + * + * \param buf buffer to use as heap + * \param len size of the buffer + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Free the mutex for thread-safety and clear remaining memory + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( void ); + +/** + * \brief Determine when the allocator should automatically verify the state + * of the entire chain of headers / meta-data. + * (Default: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE) + * + * \param verify One of MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC, + * MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE or MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify( int verify ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) +/** + * \brief Print out the status of the allocated memory (primarily for use + * after a program should have de-allocated all memory) + * Prints out a list of 'still allocated' blocks and their stack + * trace if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE is defined. + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status( void ); + +/** + * \brief Get the peak heap usage so far + * + * \param max_used Peak number of bytes in use or committed. This + * includes bytes in allocated blocks too small to split + * into smaller blocks but larger than the requested size. + * \param max_blocks Peak number of blocks in use, including free and used + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get( size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks ); + +/** + * \brief Reset peak statistics + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset( void ); + +/** + * \brief Get the current heap usage + * + * \param cur_used Current number of bytes in use or committed. This + * includes bytes in allocated blocks too small to split + * into smaller blocks but larger than the requested size. + * \param cur_blocks Current number of blocks in use, including free and used + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( size_t *cur_used, size_t *cur_blocks ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +/** + * \brief Verifies that all headers in the memory buffer are correct + * and contain sane values. Helps debug buffer-overflow errors. + * + * Prints out first failure if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG is defined. + * Prints out full header information if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + * is defined. (Includes stack trace information for each block if + * MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE is defined as well). + * + * \return 0 if verified, 1 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify( void ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* memory_buffer_alloc.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..66921887 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/** + * \file net.h + * + * \brief Deprecated header file that includes net_sockets.h + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "Deprecated header file: Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ceb7d5f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +/** + * \file net_sockets.h + * + * \brief Network sockets abstraction layer to integrate Mbed TLS into a + * BSD-style sockets API. + * + * The network sockets module provides an example integration of the + * Mbed TLS library into a BSD sockets implementation. The module is + * intended to be an example of how Mbed TLS can be integrated into a + * networking stack, as well as to be Mbed TLS's network integration + * for its supported platforms. + * + * The module is intended only to be used with the Mbed TLS library and + * is not intended to be used by third party application software + * directly. + * + * The supported platforms are as follows: + * * Microsoft Windows and Windows CE + * * POSIX/Unix platforms including Linux, OS X + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H +#define MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#include +#include + +/** Failed to open a socket. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED -0x0042 +/** The connection to the given server / port failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED -0x0044 +/** Binding of the socket failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED -0x0046 +/** Could not listen on the socket. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED -0x0048 +/** Could not accept the incoming connection. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED -0x004A +/** Reading information from the socket failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED -0x004C +/** Sending information through the socket failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED -0x004E +/** Connection was reset by peer. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET -0x0050 +/** Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST -0x0052 +/** Buffer is too small to hold the data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0043 +/** The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x0045 +/** Polling the net context failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED -0x0047 +/** Input invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0049 + +#define MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG 10 /**< The backlog that listen() should use. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP 0 /**< The TCP transport protocol */ +#define MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP 1 /**< The UDP transport protocol */ + +#define MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ 1 /**< Used in \c mbedtls_net_poll to check for pending data */ +#define MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE 2 /**< Used in \c mbedtls_net_poll to check if write possible */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Wrapper type for sockets. + * + * Currently backed by just a file descriptor, but might be more in the future + * (eg two file descriptors for combined IPv4 + IPv6 support, or additional + * structures for hand-made UDP demultiplexing). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_net_context +{ + int fd; /**< The underlying file descriptor */ +} +mbedtls_net_context; + +/** + * \brief Initialize a context + * Just makes the context ready to be used or freed safely. + * + * \param ctx Context to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_net_init( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Initiate a connection with host:port in the given protocol + * + * \param ctx Socket to use + * \param host Host to connect to + * \param port Port to connect to + * \param proto Protocol: MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP or MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP + * + * \return 0 if successful, or one of: + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED + * + * \note Sets the socket in connected mode even with UDP. + */ +int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, const char *port, int proto ); + +/** + * \brief Create a receiving socket on bind_ip:port in the chosen + * protocol. If bind_ip == NULL, all interfaces are bound. + * + * \param ctx Socket to use + * \param bind_ip IP to bind to, can be NULL + * \param port Port number to use + * \param proto Protocol: MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP or MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP + * + * \return 0 if successful, or one of: + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED + * + * \note Regardless of the protocol, opens the sockets and binds it. + * In addition, make the socket listening if protocol is TCP. + */ +int mbedtls_net_bind( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *port, int proto ); + +/** + * \brief Accept a connection from a remote client + * + * \param bind_ctx Relevant socket + * \param client_ctx Will contain the connected client socket + * \param client_ip Will contain the client IP address, can be NULL + * \param buf_size Size of the client_ip buffer + * \param ip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written, + * can be NULL if client_ip is null + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if buf_size is too small, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if bind_fd was set to + * non-blocking and accept() would block. + */ +int mbedtls_net_accept( mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, + mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len ); + +/** + * \brief Check and wait for the context to be ready for read/write + * + * \note The current implementation of this function uses + * select() and returns an error if the file descriptor + * is \c FD_SETSIZE or greater. + * + * \param ctx Socket to check + * \param rw Bitflag composed of MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ and + * MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE specifying the events + * to wait for: + * - If MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ is set, the function + * will return as soon as the net context is available + * for reading. + * - If MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE is set, the function + * will return as soon as the net context is available + * for writing. + * \param timeout Maximal amount of time to wait before returning, + * in milliseconds. If \c timeout is zero, the + * function returns immediately. If \c timeout is + * -1u, the function blocks potentially indefinitely. + * + * \return Bitmask composed of MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ/WRITE + * on success or timeout, or a negative return code otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout ); + +/** + * \brief Set the socket blocking + * + * \param ctx Socket to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a non-zero error code + */ +int mbedtls_net_set_block( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set the socket non-blocking + * + * \param ctx Socket to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a non-zero error code + */ +int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Portable usleep helper + * + * \param usec Amount of microseconds to sleep + * + * \note Real amount of time slept will not be less than + * select()'s timeout granularity (typically, 10ms). + */ +void mbedtls_net_usleep( unsigned long usec ); + +/** + * \brief Read at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs, + * the actual amount read is returned. + * + * \param ctx Socket + * \param buf The buffer to write to + * \param len Maximum length of the buffer + * + * \return the number of bytes received, + * or a non-zero error code; with a non-blocking socket, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ indicates read() would block. + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Write at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs, + * the actual amount read is returned. + * + * \param ctx Socket + * \param buf The buffer to read from + * \param len The length of the buffer + * + * \return the number of bytes sent, + * or a non-zero error code; with a non-blocking socket, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE indicates write() would block. + */ +int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Read at most 'len' characters, blocking for at most + * 'timeout' seconds. If no error occurs, the actual amount + * read is returned. + * + * \note The current implementation of this function uses + * select() and returns an error if the file descriptor + * is \c FD_SETSIZE or greater. + * + * \param ctx Socket + * \param buf The buffer to write to + * \param len Maximum length of the buffer + * \param timeout Maximum number of milliseconds to wait for data + * 0 means no timeout (wait forever) + * + * \return The number of bytes received if successful. + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out. + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal. + * Another negative error code (MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_xxx) + * for other failures. + * + * \note This function will block (until data becomes available or + * timeout is reached) even if the socket is set to + * non-blocking. Handling timeouts with non-blocking reads + * requires a different strategy. + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + uint32_t timeout ); + +/** + * \brief Closes down the connection and free associated data + * + * \param ctx The context to close + */ +void mbedtls_net_close( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Gracefully shutdown the connection and free associated data + * + * \param ctx The context to free + */ +void mbedtls_net_free( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* net_sockets.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f3e64a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +/** + * \file nist_kw.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for key wrapping (KW) and key wrapping with + * padding (KWP) as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf + * + * Key wrapping specifies a deterministic authenticated-encryption mode + * of operation, according to NIST SP 800-38F: Recommendation for + * Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping. Its + * purpose is to protect cryptographic keys. + * + * Its equivalent is RFC 3394 for KW, and RFC 5649 for KWP. + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3394 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5649 + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H +#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW = 0, + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP = 1 +} mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The key wrapping context-type definition. The key wrapping context is passed + * to the APIs called. + * + * \note The definition of this type may change in future library versions. + * Don't make any assumptions on this context! + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ +} mbedtls_nist_kw_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_NIST_key wrapping_ALT */ +#include "nist_kw_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified key wrapping context + * to make references valid and prepare the context + * for mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey() or mbedtls_nist_kw_free(). + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context to initialize. + * + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_init( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the key wrapping context set in the + * \p ctx parameter and sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context. + * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. Only AES is supported. + * \param key The Key Encryption Key (KEK). + * \param keybits The KEK size in bits. This must be acceptable by the cipher. + * \param is_wrap Specify whether the operation within the context is wrapping or unwrapping + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for any invalid input. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for 128-bit block ciphers + * which are not supported. + * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher. + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits, + const int is_wrap ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified key wrapping context + * and underlying cipher sub-context. + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context to clear. + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_free( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using key wrapping. + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context to use for encryption. + * \param mode The key wrapping mode to use (MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW or MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP) + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes. + * The input uses units of 8 Bytes called semiblocks. + *
  • For KW mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 16 and 2^57-8 inclusive.
    • + *
  • For KWP mode: any length between 1 and 2^32-1 inclusive.
+ * \param[out] output The buffer holding the output data. + *
  • For KW mode: Must be at least 8 bytes larger than \p in_len.
    • + *
  • For KWP mode: Must be at least 8 bytes larger rounded up to a multiple of + * 8 bytes for KWP (15 bytes at most).
+ * \param[out] out_len The number of bytes written to the output buffer. \c 0 on failure. + * \param[in] out_size The capacity of the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for invalid input length. + * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher. + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t* out_len, size_t out_size ); + +/** + * \brief This function decrypts a buffer using key wrapping. + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context to use for decryption. + * \param mode The key wrapping mode to use (MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW or MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP) + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes. + * The input uses units of 8 Bytes called semiblocks. + * The input must be a multiple of semiblocks. + *
  • For KW mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 24 and 2^57 inclusive.
    • + *
  • For KWP mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 16 and 2^32 inclusive.
+ * \param[out] output The buffer holding the output data. + * The output buffer's minimal length is 8 bytes shorter than \p in_len. + * \param[out] out_len The number of bytes written to the output buffer. \c 0 on failure. + * For KWP mode, the length could be up to 15 bytes shorter than \p in_len, + * depending on how much padding was added to the data. + * \param[in] out_size The capacity of the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for invalid input length. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED for verification failure of the ciphertext. + * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher. + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t* out_len, size_t out_size); + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/** + * \brief The key wrapping checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01862178 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h @@ -0,0 +1,649 @@ +/** + * \file oid.h + * + * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_OID_H +#define MBEDTLS_OID_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#endif + +/** OID is not found. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -0x002E +/** output buffer is too small */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x000B + +/* This is for the benefit of X.509, but defined here in order to avoid + * having a "backwards" include of x.509.h here */ +/* + * X.509 extension types (internal, arbitrary values for bitsets) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 1) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE (1 << 2) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES (1 << 3) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS (1 << 4) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME (1 << 5) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME (1 << 6) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS (1 << 7) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 8) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 9) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 10) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE (1 << 11) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS (1 << 12) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY (1 << 13) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL (1 << 14) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE (1 << 16) + +/* + * Top level OID tuples + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES "\x2a" /* {iso(1) member-body(2)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG "\x2b" /* {iso(1) identified-organization(3)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x55" /* {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY "\x60" /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)} */ + +/* + * ISO Member bodies OID parts + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US "\x86\x48" /* {us(840)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY "\x86\xf7\x0d" /* {rsadsi(113549)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US \ + MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY /* {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 "\xce\x3d" /* ansi-X9-62(10045) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US \ + MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 + +/* + * ISO Identified organization OID parts + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD "\x06" /* {dod(6)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x0e" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x03" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG "\x02" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x1a" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM "\x81\x04" /* certicom(132) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST "\x24" /* teletrust(36) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST + +/* + * ISO ITU OID parts + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION "\x01" /* {organization(1)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV "\x65" /* {gov(101)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE "\x86\xF8\x42" /* {netscape(113730)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE /* Netscape OID {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) netscape(113730)} */ + +/* ISO arc for standard certificate and CRL extensions */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x1D" /**< id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_GOV "\x03\x04" /** { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) */ + +/** + * Private Internet Extensions + * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + * security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD "\x01" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x05\x05\x07" + +/* + * Arc for standard naming attributes + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x04" /**< id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x03" /**< id-at-commonName AttributeType:= {id-at 3} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x04" /**< id-at-surName AttributeType:= {id-at 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x05" /**< id-at-serialNumber AttributeType:= {id-at 5} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x06" /**< id-at-countryName AttributeType:= {id-at 6} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x07" /**< id-at-locality AttributeType:= {id-at 7} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x08" /**< id-at-state AttributeType:= {id-at 8} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0A" /**< id-at-organizationName AttributeType:= {id-at 10} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0B" /**< id-at-organizationalUnitName AttributeType:= {id-at 11} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0C" /**< id-at-title AttributeType:= {id-at 12} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x10" /**< id-at-postalAddress AttributeType:= {id-at 16} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x11" /**< id-at-postalCode AttributeType:= {id-at 17} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2A" /**< id-at-givenName AttributeType:= {id-at 42} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2B" /**< id-at-initials AttributeType:= {id-at 43} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2C" /**< id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 44} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2D" /**< id-at-uniqueIdentifier AttributeType:= {id-at 45} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2E" /**< id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 46} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x41" /**< id-at-pseudonym AttributeType:= {id-at 65} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x19" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) domainComponent(25)} */ + +/* + * OIDs for standard certificate extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x23" /**< id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x0E" /**< id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x0F" /**< id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x20" /**< id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x21" /**< id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x11" /**< id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x12" /**< id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x09" /**< id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x13" /**< id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x1E" /**< id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x24" /**< id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x25" /**< id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x1F" /**< id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x36" /**< id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x2E" /**< id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } */ + +/* + * Certificate policies + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES "\x00" /**< anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } */ + +/* + * Netscape certificate extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE "\x01" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x01" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x02" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x03" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x04" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x07" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x08" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x0C" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x0D" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE "\x02" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE "\x05" + +/* + * OIDs for CRL extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x10" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x14" /**< id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 } */ + +/* + * X.509 v3 Extended key usage OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE "\x00" /**< anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x03" /**< id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x01" /**< id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x02" /**< id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x03" /**< id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x04" /**< id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x08" /**< id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x09" /**< id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } */ + +/** + * Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network + * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + * private(4) enterprise(1) WiSUN(45605) FieldAreaNetwork(1) } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x04\x01\x82\xe4\x25\x01" + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ON MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x08" /**< id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ON "\x04" /**< id-on-hardwareModuleName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on 4 } */ + +/* + * PKCS definition OIDs + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x01" /**< pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x01" /**< pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x05" /**< pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x09" /**< pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x0c" /**< pkcs-12 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 12 } */ + +/* + * PKCS#1 OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x01" /**< rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x02" /**< md2WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 2 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x03" /**< md4WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 3 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x04" /**< md5WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x05" /**< sha1WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0e" /**< sha224WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 14 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0b" /**< sha256WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 11 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0c" /**< sha384WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 12 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0d" /**< sha512WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 13 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS "\x2B\x0E\x03\x02\x1D" + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 "\x01" /**< emailAddress AttributeType ::= { pkcs-9 1 } */ + +/* RFC 4055 */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0a" /**< id-RSASSA-PSS ::= { pkcs-1 10 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x08" /**< id-mgf1 ::= { pkcs-1 8 } */ + +/* + * Digest algorithms + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x02" /**< id-mbedtls_md2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x04" /**< id-mbedtls_md4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x05" /**< id-mbedtls_md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 /**< id-mbedtls_sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x04" /**< id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x01" /**< id-mbedtls_sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x02" /**< id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x03" /**< id-mbedtls_sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x02\x01" /**< id-ripemd160 OBJECT IDENTIFIER :: { iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) hashAlgorithm(2) ripemd160(1) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x07" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 7 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x08" /**< id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x09" /**< id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0A" /**< id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0B" /**< id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } */ + +/* + * Encryption algorithms + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x07" /**< desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 7 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x03\x07" /**< des-ede3-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) -- us(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 7 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x01" /** aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 1 } */ + +/* + * Key Wrapping algorithms + */ +/* + * RFC 5649 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES128_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x05" /** id-aes128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES128_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x08" /** id-aes128-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 8 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES192_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x19" /** id-aes192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 25 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES192_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x1c" /** id-aes192-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 28 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES256_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x2d" /** id-aes256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 45 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES256_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x30" /** id-aes256-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 48 } */ +/* + * PKCS#5 OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0c" /**< id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0d" /**< id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0e" /**< id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14} */ + +/* + * PKCS#5 PBES1 algorithms + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x01" /**< pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x04" /**< pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x03" /**< pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x06" /**< pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0a" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0b" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11} */ + +/* + * PKCS#8 OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 "\x0e" /**< extensionRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 14} */ + +/* + * PKCS#12 PBE OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 "\x01" /**< pkcs-12PbeIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 1} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x01" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 1} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x02" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 2} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x03" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 3} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x04" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x05" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 5} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x06" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 6} */ + +/* + * EC key algorithms from RFC 5480 + */ + +/* id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x02\01" + +/* id-ecDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) + * schemes(1) ecdh(12) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x01\x0c" + +/* + * ECParameters namedCurve identifiers, from RFC 5480, RFC 5639, and SEC2 + */ + +/* secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x03\x01\x01" + +/* secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x21" + +/* secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x03\x01\x07" + +/* secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x22" + +/* secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x23" + +/* secp192k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 31 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x1f" + +/* secp224k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 32 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x20" + +/* secp256k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 10 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x0a" + +/* RFC 5639 4.1 + * ecStdCurvesAndGeneration OBJECT IDENTIFIER::= {iso(1) + * identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) signature- + * algorithm(3) ecSign(2) 8} + * ellipticCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ecStdCurvesAndGeneration 1} + * versionOne OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ellipticCurve 1} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x03\x02\x08\x01\x01" + +/* brainpoolP256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 7} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x07" + +/* brainpoolP384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 11} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x0B" + +/* brainpoolP512r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 13} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x0D" + +/* + * SEC1 C.1 + * + * prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-fieldType 1 } + * id-fieldType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-X9-62 fieldType(1)} + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x01" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE "\x01" + +/* + * ECDSA signature identifiers, from RFC 5480 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x04" /* signatures(4) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG "\x03" /* ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) */ + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG "\x01" + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) + * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x01" + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) + * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x02" + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) + * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x03" + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) + * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x04" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Base OID descriptor structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t +{ + const char *asn1; /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */ + size_t asn1_len; /*!< length of asn1 */ + const char *name; /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */ + const char *description; /*!< human friendly description */ +} mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t; + +/** + * \brief Translate an ASN.1 OID into its numeric representation + * (e.g. "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D" into "1.2.840.113549") + * + * \param buf buffer to put representation in + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param oid OID to translate + * + * \return Length of the string written (excluding final NULL) or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL in case of error + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ); + +/** + * \brief Translate an X.509 extension OID into local values + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param ext_type place to store the extension type + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, int *ext_type ); + +/** + * \brief Translate an X.509 attribute type OID into the short name + * (e.g. the OID for an X520 Common Name into "CN") + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param short_name place to store the string pointer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **short_name ); + +/** + * \brief Translate PublicKeyAlgorithm OID into pk_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param pk_alg place to store public key algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Translate pk_type into PublicKeyAlgorithm OID + * + * \param pk_alg Public key type to look for + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, + const char **oid, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * \brief Translate NamedCurve OID into an EC group identifier + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param grp_id place to store group id + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ); + +/** + * \brief Translate EC group identifier into NamedCurve OID + * + * \param grp_id EC group identifier + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + const char **oid, size_t *olen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/** + * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into md_type and pk_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm + * \param pk_alg place to store public key algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into description + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param desc place to store string pointer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); + +/** + * \brief Translate md_type and pk_type into SignatureAlgorithm OID + * + * \param md_alg message digest algorithm + * \param pk_alg public key algorithm + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const char **oid, size_t *olen ); + +/** + * \brief Translate hash algorithm OID into md_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Translate hmac algorithm OID into md_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param md_hmac place to store message hmac algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_hmac ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +/** + * \brief Translate Extended Key Usage OID into description + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param desc place to store string pointer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); + +/** + * \brief Translate certificate policies OID into description + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param desc place to store string pointer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); + +/** + * \brief Translate md_type into hash algorithm OID + * + * \param md_alg message digest algorithm + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const char **oid, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +/** + * \brief Translate encryption algorithm OID into cipher_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param cipher_alg place to store cipher algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +/** + * \brief Translate PKCS#12 PBE algorithm OID into md_type and + * cipher_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm + * \param cipher_alg place to store cipher algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* oid.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/padlock.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/padlock.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..624d02df --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/padlock.h @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +/** + * \file padlock.h + * + * \brief VIA PadLock ACE for HW encryption/decryption supported by some + * processors + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + +/** Input data should be aligned. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(address_sanitizer) +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN +#endif +#endif + +/* Some versions of ASan result in errors about not enough registers */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN) + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 +#endif + +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG 0x000C +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE 0x00C0 +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE 0x0C00 +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM 0x3000 + +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(x) (uint32_t *) (16 + ((int32_t) (x) & ~15)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Internal PadLock detection routine + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param feature The feature to detect + * + * \return non-zero if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature ); + +/** + * \brief Internal PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param input 16-byte input block + * \param output 16-byte output block + * + * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Internal PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param length length of the input data + * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) + * \param input buffer holding the input data + * \param output buffer holding the output data + * + * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* HAVE_X86 */ + +#endif /* padlock.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..daa71c88 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/** + * \file pem.h + * + * \brief Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PEM_H +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/** + * \name PEM Error codes + * These error codes are returned in case of errors reading the + * PEM data. + * \{ + */ +/** No PEM header or footer found. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT -0x1080 +/** PEM string is not as expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA -0x1100 +/** Failed to allocate memory. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x1180 +/** RSA IV is not in hex-format. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV -0x1200 +/** Unsupported key encryption algorithm. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG -0x1280 +/** Private key password can't be empty. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -0x1300 +/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x1380 +/** Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x1400 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x1480 +/** \} name PEM Error codes */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief PEM context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pem_context +{ + unsigned char *buf; /*!< buffer for decoded data */ + size_t buflen; /*!< length of the buffer */ + unsigned char *info; /*!< buffer for extra header information */ +} +mbedtls_pem_context; + +/** + * \brief PEM context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_pem_init( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Read a buffer for PEM information and store the resulting + * data into the specified context buffers. + * + * \param ctx context to use + * \param header header string to seek and expect + * \param footer footer string to seek and expect + * \param data source data to look in (must be nul-terminated) + * \param pwd password for decryption (can be NULL) + * \param pwdlen length of password + * \param use_len destination for total length used (set after header is + * correctly read, so unless you get + * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT, use_len is + * the length to skip) + * + * \note Attempts to check password correctness by verifying if + * the decrypted text starts with an ASN.1 sequence of + * appropriate length + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *data, + const unsigned char *pwd, + size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len ); + +/** + * \brief PEM context memory freeing + * + * \param ctx context to be freed + */ +void mbedtls_pem_free( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a buffer of PEM information from a DER encoded + * buffer. + * + * \param header The header string to write. + * \param footer The footer string to write. + * \param der_data The DER data to encode. + * \param der_len The length of the DER data \p der_data in Bytes. + * \param buf The buffer to write to. + * \param buf_len The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total length written + * or required (if \p buf_len is not enough). + * + * \note You may pass \c NULL for \p buf and \c 0 for \p buf_len + * to request the length of the resulting PEM buffer in + * `*olen`. + * + * \note This function may be called with overlapping \p der_data + * and \p buf buffers. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't large + * enough to hold the PEM buffer. In this case, `*olen` holds + * the required minimum size of \p buf. + * \return Another PEM or BASE64 error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* pem.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c9a13f48 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -0,0 +1,918 @@ +/** + * \file pk.h + * + * \brief Public Key abstraction layer + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/** Memory allocation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3F80 +/** Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x3F00 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x3E80 +/** Read/write of file failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3E00 +/** Unsupported key version */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION -0x3D80 +/** Invalid key tag or value. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3D00 +/** Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG -0x3C80 +/** Private key password can't be empty. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -0x3C00 +/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x3B80 +/** The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY -0x3B00 +/** The algorithm tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG -0x3A80 +/** Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -0x3A00 +/** Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x3980 +/** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x3900 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** PK hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3880 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Public key types + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_PK_NONE=0, + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, + MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, + MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, +} mbedtls_pk_type_t; + +/** + * \brief Options for RSASSA-PSS signature verification. + * See \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext() + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options +{ + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; + int expected_salt_len; + +} mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options; + +/** + * \brief Maximum size of a signature made by mbedtls_pk_sign(). + */ +/* We need to set MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE to the maximum signature + * size among the supported signature types. Do it by starting at 0, + * then incrementally increasing to be large enough for each supported + * signature mechanism. + * + * The resulting value can be 0, for example if MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is enabled + * (which allows the pk module to be included) but neither MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * nor MBEDTLS_RSA_C nor any opaque signature mechanism (PSA or RSA_ALT). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE 0 + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) ) && \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* For RSA, the signature can be as large as the bignum module allows. + * For RSA_ALT, the signature size is not necessarily tied to what the + * bignum module can do, but in the absence of any specific setting, + * we use that (rsa_alt_sign_wrap in pk_wrap will check). */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \ + MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* For ECDSA, the ecdsa module exports a constant for the maximum + * signature size. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is the maximum size of a signature made + * through the PSA API in the PSA representation. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#endif + +#if PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11 > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* The Mbed TLS representation is different for ECDSA signatures: + * PSA uses the raw concatenation of r and s, + * whereas Mbed TLS uses the ASN.1 representation (SEQUENCE of two INTEGERs). + * Add the overhead of ASN.1: up to (1+2) + 2 * (1+2+1) for the + * types, lengths (represented by up to 2 bytes), and potential leading + * zeros of the INTEGERs and the SEQUENCE. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ( PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11 ) +#endif +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ + +/** + * \brief Types for interfacing with the debug module + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI, + MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP, +} mbedtls_pk_debug_type; + +/** + * \brief Item to send to the debug module + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item +{ + mbedtls_pk_debug_type type; + const char *name; + void *value; +} mbedtls_pk_debug_item; + +/** Maximum number of item send for debugging, plus 1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS 3 + +/** + * \brief Public key information and operations + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t; + +/** + * \brief Public key container + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key information */ + void * pk_ctx; /**< Underlying public key context */ +} mbedtls_pk_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Context for resuming operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key information */ + void * rs_ctx; /**< Underlying restart context */ +} mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ +typedef void mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/** + * \brief Types for RSA-alt abstraction + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); +typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func)( void *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ); +typedef size_t (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func)( void *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +/** + * \brief Return information associated with the given PK type + * + * \param pk_type PK type to search for. + * + * \return The PK info associated with the type or NULL if not found. + */ +const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize a #mbedtls_pk_context (as NONE). + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a #mbedtls_pk_context. + * + * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * + * \note For contexts that have been set up with + * mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(), this does not free the underlying + * PSA key and you still need to call psa_destroy_key() + * independently if you want to destroy that key. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context + * + * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a PK context with the information given + * and allocates the type-specific PK subcontext. + * + * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set + * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE). + * \param info Information to use + * + * \return 0 on success, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure. + * + * \note For contexts holding an RSA-alt key, use + * \c mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt() instead. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Initialize a PK context to wrap a PSA key. + * + * \note This function replaces mbedtls_pk_setup() for contexts + * that wrap a (possibly opaque) PSA key instead of + * storing and manipulating the key material directly. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. It must be empty (type NONE). + * \param key The PSA key to wrap, which must hold an ECC key pair + * (see notes below). + * + * \note The wrapped key must remain valid as long as the + * wrapping PK context is in use, that is at least between + * the point this function is called and the point + * mbedtls_pk_free() is called on this context. The wrapped + * key might then be independently used or destroyed. + * + * \note This function is currently only available for ECC key + * pairs (that is, ECC keys containing private key material). + * Support for other key types may be added later. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input + * (context already used, invalid key identifier). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the key is not an + * ECC key pair. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const psa_key_id_t key ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/** + * \brief Initialize an RSA-alt context + * + * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set + * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE). + * \param key RSA key pointer + * \param decrypt_func Decryption function + * \param sign_func Signing function + * \param key_len_func Function returning key length in bytes + * + * \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the + * context wasn't already initialized as RSA_ALT. + * + * \note This function replaces \c mbedtls_pk_setup() for RSA-alt. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void * key, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +/** + * \brief Get the size in bits of the underlying key + * + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. + * + * \return Key size in bits, or 0 on error + */ +size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Get the length in bytes of the underlying key + * + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. + * + * \return Key length in bytes, or 0 on error + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_pk_get_len( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + return( ( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( ctx ) + 7 ) / 8 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Tell if a context can do the operation given by type + * + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. + * \param type The desired type. + * + * \return 1 if the context can do operations on the given type. + * \return 0 if the context cannot do the operations on the given + * type. This is always the case for a context that has + * been initialized but not set up, or that has been + * cleared with mbedtls_pk_free(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_can_do( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); + +/** + * \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param sig Signature to verify + * \param sig_len Signature length + * + * \return 0 on success (signature is valid), + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid + * signature in sig but its length is less than \p siglen, + * or a specific error code. + * + * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * Use \c mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, ... ) + * to verify RSASSA_PSS signatures. + * + * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg + * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. + * + * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0 + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); + +/** + * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_verify() + * + * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), but can + * return early and restart according to the limit set with + * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC + * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param sig Signature to verify + * \param sig_len Signature length + * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Verify signature, with options. + * (Includes verification of the padding depending on type.) + * + * \param type Signature type (inc. possible padding type) to verify + * \param options Pointer to type-specific options, or NULL + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param sig Signature to verify + * \param sig_len Signature length + * + * \return 0 on success (signature is valid), + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if the PK context can't be + * used for this type of signatures, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid + * signature in sig but its length is less than \p siglen, + * or a specific error code. + * + * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg + * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. + * + * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0 + * + * \note If type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, then options must point + * to a mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options structure, + * otherwise it must be NULL. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); + +/** + * \brief Make signature, including padding if relevant. + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param sig Place to write the signature. + * It must have enough room for the signature. + * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. + * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough + * given the key type. + * \param sig_len On successful return, + * the number of bytes written to \p sig. + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. + * + * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * There is no interface in the PK module to make RSASSA-PSS + * signatures yet. + * + * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg + * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. + * + * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0. + * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_sign() + * + * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(), but can + * return early and restart according to the limit set with + * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC + * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) + * \param sig Place to write the signature. + * It must have enough room for the signature. + * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. + * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough + * given the key type. + * \param sig_len On successful return, + * the number of bytes written to \p sig. + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_sign(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Decrypt message (including padding if relevant). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. + * \param input Input to decrypt + * \param ilen Input size + * \param output Decrypted output + * \param olen Decrypted message length + * \param osize Size of the output buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt message (including padding if relevant). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param input Message to encrypt + * \param ilen Message size + * \param output Encrypted output + * \param olen Encrypted output length + * \param osize Size of the output buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Check if a public-private pair of keys matches. + * + * \param pub Context holding a public key. + * \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not + * be checked - in that case they may or may not match. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid. + * \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv ); + +/** + * \brief Export debug information + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. + * \param items Place to write debug items + * + * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA + */ +int mbedtls_pk_debug( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ); + +/** + * \brief Access the type name + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. + * + * \return Type name on success, or "invalid PK" + */ +const char * mbedtls_pk_get_name( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Get the key type + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. + * + * \return Type on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE for a context that has not been set up. + */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/** + * Quick access to an RSA context inside a PK context. + * + * \warning This function can only be used when the type of the context, as + * returned by mbedtls_pk_get_type(), is #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA. + * Ensuring that is the caller's responsibility. + * Alternatively, you can check whether this function returns NULL. + * + * \return The internal RSA context held by the PK context, or NULL. + */ +static inline mbedtls_rsa_context *mbedtls_pk_rsa( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) +{ + switch( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).pk_ctx ); + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * Quick access to an EC context inside a PK context. + * + * \warning This function can only be used when the type of the context, as + * returned by mbedtls_pk_get_type(), is #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + * #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA. + * Ensuring that is the caller's responsibility. + * Alternatively, you can check whether this function returns NULL. + * + * \return The internal EC context held by the PK context, or NULL. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) +{ + switch( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).pk_ctx ); + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) +/** \ingroup pk_module */ +/** + * \brief Parse a private key in PEM or DER format + * + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param key Input buffer to parse. + * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no + * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must + * contain a null-terminated string. + * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes. + * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte, + * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`. + * \param pwd Optional password for decryption. + * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key. + * Pass a string of \p pwdlen bytes if expecting an encrypted + * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. + * The empty password is not supported. + * \param pwdlen Size of the password in bytes. + * Ignored if \p pwd is \c NULL. + * + * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised + * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a + * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). + * + * \note The key is also checked for correctness. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ); + +/** \ingroup pk_module */ +/** + * \brief Parse a public key in PEM or DER format + * + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param key Input buffer to parse. + * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no + * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must + * contain a null-terminated string. + * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes. + * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte, + * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`. + * + * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised + * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a + * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). + * + * \note The key is also checked for correctness. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** \ingroup pk_module */ +/** + * \brief Load and parse a private key + * + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param path filename to read the private key from + * \param password Optional password to decrypt the file. + * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key. + * Pass a null-terminated string if expecting an encrypted + * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. + * The empty password is not supported. + * + * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised + * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a + * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). + * + * \note The key is also checked for correctness. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const char *path, const char *password ); + +/** \ingroup pk_module */ +/** + * \brief Load and parse a public key + * + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param path filename to read the public key from + * + * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised + * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If + * you need a specific key type, check the result with + * mbedtls_pk_can_do(). + * + * \note The key is also checked for correctness. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 DER structure + * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the + * return value to determine where you should start + * using the buffer + * + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key. + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * + * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific + * error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +/** + * \brief Write a public key to a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure + * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the + * return value to determine where you should start + * using the buffer + * + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * + * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific + * error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a public key to a PEM string + * + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. + * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a + * terminating null byte. + * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +/** + * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 PEM string + * + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key. + * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a + * terminating null byte. + * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ + +/* + * WARNING: Low-level functions. You probably do not want to use these unless + * you are certain you do ;) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Parse a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure + * + * \param p the position in the ASN.1 data + * \param end end of the buffer + * \param pk The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a subjectPublicKey to ASN.1 data + * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * + * \param p reference to current position pointer + * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) + * \param key PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. + * + * \return the length written or a negative error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *key ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ + +/* + * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you + * know you do. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Turn an EC key into an opaque one. + * + * \warning This is a temporary utility function for tests. It might + * change or be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \note Only ECDSA keys are supported so far. Signing with the + * specified hash is the only allowed use of that key. + * + * \param pk Input: the EC key to import to a PSA key. + * Output: a PK context wrapping that PSA key. + * \param key Output: a PSA key identifier. + * It's the caller's responsibility to call + * psa_destroy_key() on that key identifier after calling + * mbedtls_pk_free() on the PK context. + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm to allow for use with that key. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An Mbed TLS error code otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_id_t *key, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47f77677 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/** + * \file pk_internal.h + * + * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +struct mbedtls_pk_info_t +{ + /** Public key type */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t type; + + /** Type name */ + const char *name; + + /** Get key size in bits */ + size_t (*get_bitlen)( const void * ); + + /** Tell if the context implements this type (e.g. ECKEY can do ECDSA) */ + int (*can_do)( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); + + /** Verify signature */ + int (*verify_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); + + /** Make signature */ + int (*sign_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /** Verify signature (restartable) */ + int (*verify_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ); + + /** Make signature (restartable) */ + int (*sign_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /** Decrypt message */ + int (*decrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + + /** Encrypt message */ + int (*encrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + + /** Check public-private key pair */ + int (*check_pair_func)( const void *pub, const void *prv ); + + /** Allocate a new context */ + void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void ); + + /** Free the given context */ + void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /** Allocate the restart context */ + void * (*rs_alloc_func)( void ); + + /** Free the restart context */ + void (*rs_free_func)( void *rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /** Interface with the debug module */ + void (*debug_func)( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ); + +}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* Container for RSA-alt */ +typedef struct +{ + void *key; + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func; + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func; + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func; +} mbedtls_rsa_alt_context; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info; +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3530ee16 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs11.h + * + * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" + +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +/** + * Context for PKCS #11 private keys. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs11_context +{ + pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert; + int len; +} mbedtls_pkcs11_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * Initialize a mbedtls_pkcs11_context. + * (Just making memory references valid.) + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_init( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx ); + +/** + * Fill in a mbed TLS certificate, based on the given PKCS11 helper certificate. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * + * \param cert X.509 certificate to fill + * \param pkcs11h_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate + * + * \return 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert ); + +/** + * Set up a mbedtls_pkcs11_context storing the given certificate. Note that the + * mbedtls_pkcs11_context will take over control of the certificate, freeing it when + * done. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * + * \param priv_key Private key structure to fill. + * \param pkcs11_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate + * + * \return 0 on success + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind( + mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, + pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ); + +/** + * Free the contents of the given private key context. Note that the structure + * itself is not freed. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * + * \param priv_key Private key structure to cleanup + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free( + mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key ); + +/** + * \brief Do an RSA private key decrypt, then remove the message + * padding + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \param ctx PKCS #11 context + * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature + * \param input buffer holding the encrypted data + * \param output buffer that will hold the plaintext + * \param olen will contain the plaintext length + * \param output_max_len maximum length of the output buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code + * + * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size + * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used) otherwise + * an error is thrown. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); + +/** + * \brief Do a private RSA to sign a message digest + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \param ctx PKCS #11 context + * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature + * \param md_alg a MBEDTLS_MD_XXX (use MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data) + * \param hashlen message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only) + * \param hash buffer holding the message digest + * \param sig buffer that will hold the ciphertext + * + * \return 0 if the signing operation was successful, + * or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code + * + * \note The "sig" buffer must be as large as the size + * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used). + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * SSL/TLS wrappers for PKCS#11 functions + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt( void *ctx, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + return mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, olen, input, output, + output_max_len ); +} + +/** + * \brief This function signs a message digest using RSA. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This parameter is unused. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. This parameter is unused. + * \param mode The operation to run. This must be set to + * MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's + * signature. + * \param md_alg The message digest algorithm. One of the MBEDTLS_MD_XXX + * must be passed to this function and MBEDTLS_MD_NONE can be + * used for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only). + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. + * \param sig The buffer that will hold the ciphertext. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + * + * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size of + * ctx->N. For example, 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is + * used. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign( void *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ) +{ + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +} + +/** + * This function gets the length of the private key. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. + * + * \return The length of the private key. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len( void *ctx ) +{ + return ( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx )->len; +} + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d9e85b1d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs12.h + * + * \brief PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +#include + +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x1F80 +/** Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x1F00 +/** PBE ASN.1 data not as expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT -0x1E80 +/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x1E00 + +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY 1 /**< encryption/decryption key */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV 2 /**< initialization vector */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY 3 /**< integrity / MAC key */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT 1 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + +/** + * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) + * for pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 + * + * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12PbeParams structure + * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT + * \param pwd the password used (may be NULL if no password is used) + * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) + * \param input the input data + * \param len data length + * \param output the output buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t len, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) + * for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's + * + * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12 PbeParams structure + * \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT + * \param cipher_type the cipher used + * \param md_type the mbedtls_md used + * \param pwd Latin1-encoded password used. This may only be \c NULL when + * \p pwdlen is 0. No null terminator should be used. + * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) + * \param input the input data + * \param len data length + * \param output the output buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t len, + unsigned char *output ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief The PKCS#12 derivation function uses a password and a salt + * to produce pseudo-random bits for a particular "purpose". + * + * Depending on the given id, this function can produce an + * encryption/decryption key, an initialization vector or an + * integrity key. + * + * \param data buffer to store the derived data in + * \param datalen length of buffer to fill + * \param pwd The password to use. For compliance with PKCS#12 §B.1, this + * should be a BMPString, i.e. a Unicode string where each + * character is encoded as 2 bytes in big-endian order, with + * no byte order mark and with a null terminator (i.e. the + * last two bytes should be 0x00 0x00). + * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0). + * \param salt Salt buffer to use This may only be \c NULL when + * \p saltlen is 0. + * \param saltlen length of the salt (may be zero) + * \param mbedtls_md mbedtls_md type to use during the derivation + * \param id id that describes the purpose (can be + * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY, #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV or + * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY) + * \param iterations number of iterations + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MD, BIGNUM type error. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, + mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md, int id, int iterations ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* pkcs12.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..696930f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs5.h + * + * \brief PKCS#5 functions + * + * \author Mathias Olsson + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#include +#include + +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x2f80 +/** Unexpected ASN.1 data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT -0x2f00 +/** Requested encryption or digest alg not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x2e80 +/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x2e00 + +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT 1 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + +/** + * \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function + * + * \param pbe_params the ASN.1 algorithm parameters + * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT + * \param pwd password to use when generating key + * \param pwdlen length of password + * \param data data to process + * \param datalen length of data + * \param output output buffer + * + * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *output ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC + * + * \param ctx Generic HMAC context + * \param password Password to use when generating key + * \param plen Length of password + * \param salt Salt to use when generating key + * \param slen Length of salt + * \param iteration_count Iteration count + * \param key_length Length of generated key in bytes + * \param output Generated key. Must be at least as big as key_length + * + * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* pkcs5.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..06dd192e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h @@ -0,0 +1,421 @@ +/** + * \file platform.h + * + * \brief This file contains the definitions and functions of the + * Mbed TLS platform abstraction layer. + * + * The platform abstraction layer removes the need for the library + * to directly link to standard C library functions or operating + * system services, making the library easier to port and embed. + * Application developers and users of the library can provide their own + * implementations of these functions, or implementations specific to + * their platform, which can be statically linked to the library or + * dynamically configured at runtime. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +/** Hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070 +/** The requested feature is not supported by the platform */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +/* The older Microsoft Windows common runtime provides non-conforming + * implementations of some standard library functions, including snprintf + * and vsnprintf. This affects MSVC and MinGW builds. + */ +#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) +#include +#include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */ +#endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */ +#endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< The default \c printf function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< The default \c fprintf function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< The default \c calloc function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< The default \c free function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< The default \c exit function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< The default \c time function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS /**< The default exit value to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE /**< The default exit value to use. */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR) +#include MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ + + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +/* + * The function pointers for calloc and free. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_free MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO +#define mbedtls_calloc MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO +#else +/* For size_t */ +#include +extern void *mbedtls_calloc( size_t n, size_t size ); +extern void mbedtls_free( void *ptr ); + +/** + * \brief This function dynamically sets the memory-management + * functions used by the library, during runtime. + * + * \param calloc_func The \c calloc function implementation. + * \param free_func The \c free function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ), + void (*free_func)( void * ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO */ +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACRO */ + +/* + * The function pointers for fprintf + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) +/* We need FILE * */ +#include +extern int (*mbedtls_fprintf)( FILE *stream, const char *format, ... ); + +/** + * \brief This function dynamically configures the fprintf + * function that is called when the + * mbedtls_fprintf() function is invoked by the library. + * + * \param fprintf_func The \c fprintf function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf( int (*fprintf_func)( FILE *stream, const char *, + ... ) ); +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_fprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ + +/* + * The function pointers for printf + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) +extern int (*mbedtls_printf)( const char *format, ... ); + +/** + * \brief This function dynamically configures the snprintf + * function that is called when the mbedtls_snprintf() + * function is invoked by the library. + * + * \param printf_func The \c printf function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_printf( int (*printf_func)( const char *, ... ) ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_printf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ + +/* + * The function pointers for snprintf + * + * The snprintf implementation should conform to C99: + * - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer + * (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched) + * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when + * the destination buffer is too short. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) +/* For Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */ +int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) +extern int (*mbedtls_snprintf)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, ... ); + +/** + * \brief This function allows configuring a custom + * \c snprintf function pointer. + * + * \param snprintf_func The \c snprintf function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, ... ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_snprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_snprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ + +/* + * The function pointers for vsnprintf + * + * The vsnprintf implementation should conform to C99: + * - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer + * (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched) + * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when + * the destination buffer is too short. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#include +/* For Older Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */ +int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) +#include +extern int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, va_list arg ); + +/** + * \brief Set your own snprintf function pointer + * + * \param vsnprintf_func The \c vsnprintf function implementation + * + * \return \c 0 + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, va_list arg ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + +/* + * The function pointers for exit + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) +extern void (*mbedtls_exit)( int status ); + +/** + * \brief This function dynamically configures the exit + * function that is called when the mbedtls_exit() + * function is invoked by the library. + * + * \param exit_func The \c exit function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_exit( void (*exit_func)( int status ) ); +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_exit MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ + +/* + * The default exit values + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS) +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS +#else +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE) +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE +#else +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE 1 +#endif + +/* + * The function pointers for reading from and writing a seed file to + * Non-Volatile storage (NV) in a platform-independent way + * + * Only enabled when the NV seed entropy source is enabled + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* Internal standard platform definitions */ +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) +extern int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_read)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); +extern int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_write)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function allows configuring custom seed file writing and + * reading functions. + * + * \param nv_seed_read_func The seed reading function implementation. + * \param nv_seed_write_func The seed writing function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( + int (*nv_seed_read_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ), + int (*nv_seed_write_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) + ); +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_nv_seed_read MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO +#define mbedtls_nv_seed_write MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_nv_seed_read mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read +#define mbedtls_nv_seed_write mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) + +/** + * \brief The platform context structure. + * + * \note This structure may be used to assist platform-specific + * setup or teardown operations. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_platform_context +{ + char dummy; /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */ +} +mbedtls_platform_context; + +#else +#include "platform_alt.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function performs any platform-specific initialization + * operations. + * + * \note This function should be called before any other library functions. + * + * Its implementation is platform-specific, and unless + * platform-specific code is provided, it does nothing. + * + * \note The usage and necessity of this function is dependent on the platform. + * + * \param ctx The platform context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_setup( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ); +/** + * \brief This function performs any platform teardown operations. + * + * \note This function should be called after every other Mbed TLS module + * has been correctly freed using the appropriate free function. + * + * Its implementation is platform-specific, and unless + * platform-specific code is provided, it does nothing. + * + * \note The usage and necessity of this function is dependent on the platform. + * + * \param ctx The platform context. + * + */ +void mbedtls_platform_teardown( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* platform.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..94055711 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/** + * \file platform_time.h + * + * \brief mbed TLS Platform time abstraction + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * The time_t datatype + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) +typedef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO mbedtls_time_t; +#else +/* For time_t */ +#include +typedef time_t mbedtls_time_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */ + +/* + * The function pointers for time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) +extern mbedtls_time_t (*mbedtls_time)( mbedtls_time_t* time ); + +/** + * \brief Set your own time function pointer + * + * \param time_func the time function implementation + * + * \return 0 + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_time( mbedtls_time_t (*time_func)( mbedtls_time_t* time ) ); +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_time MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_time time +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* platform_time.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cd112ab5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +/** + * \file platform_util.h + * + * \brief Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS + * library. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#include +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) +/* Allow the user to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED to something like assert + * (which is what our config.h suggests). */ +#include +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED) +/** An alternative definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED has been set in config.h. + * + * This flag can be used to check whether it is safe to assume that + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() will expand to a call to mbedtls_param_failed(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) +#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) +#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ +#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) \ + mbedtls_param_failed( #cond, __FILE__, __LINE__ ) + +/** + * \brief User supplied callback function for parameter validation failure. + * See #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for context. + * + * This function will be called unless an alternative treatment + * is defined through the #MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED macro. + * + * This function can return, and the operation will be aborted, or + * alternatively, through use of setjmp()/longjmp() can resume + * execution in the application code. + * + * \param failure_condition The assertion that didn't hold. + * \param file The file where the assertion failed. + * \param line The line in the file where the assertion failed. + */ +void mbedtls_param_failed( const char *failure_condition, + const char *file, + int line ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ + +/* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, ret ) \ + do { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ); \ + return( ret ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + do { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ); \ + return; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ + +/* Internal macros meant to be called only from within the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, ret ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) do { } while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ + +/* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +/* Deliberately don't (yet) export MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED here + * to avoid conflict with other headers which define and use + * it, too. We might want to move all these definitions here at + * some point for uniformity. */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const * mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t; +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) \ + ( (mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t) ( VAL ) ) +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef int mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t; +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL ) \ + ( (mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t) ( VAL ) ) +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#else /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* Implementation of the check-return facility. + * See the user documentation in config.h. + * + * Do not use this macro directly to annotate function: instead, + * use one of MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL or MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL + * depending on how important it is to check the return value. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN) +#if defined(__GNUC__) +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__)) +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1700 +#include +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN _Check_return_ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN +#endif +#endif + +/** Critical-failure function + * + * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function + * indicates that its return value should be checked in all applications. + * Omitting the check is very likely to indicate a bug in the application + * and will result in a compile-time warning if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN + * is implemented for the compiler in use. + * + * \note The use of this macro is a work in progress. + * This macro may be added to more functions in the future. + * Such an extension is not considered an API break, provided that + * there are near-unavoidable circumstances under which the function + * can fail. For example, signature/MAC/AEAD verification functions, + * and functions that require a random generator, are considered + * return-check-critical. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN + +/** Ordinary-failure function + * + * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function + * indicates that its return value should be generally be checked in portable + * applications. Omitting the check will result in a compile-time warning if + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN is implemented for the compiler in use and + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING is enabled in the compile-time configuration. + * + * You can use #MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN to explicitly ignore the return value + * of a function that is annotated with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN. + * + * \note The use of this macro is a work in progress. + * This macro will be added to more functions in the future. + * Eventually this should appear before most functions returning + * an error code (as \c int in the \c mbedtls_xxx API or + * as ::psa_status_t in the \c psa_xxx API). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN +#else +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +#endif + +/** Benign-failure function + * + * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function + * indicates that it is rarely useful to check its return value. + * + * This macro has an empty expansion. It exists for documentation purposes: + * a #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_OPTIONAL annotation indicates that the function + * has been analyzed for return-check usefulness, whereas the lack of + * an annotation indicates that the function has not been analyzed and its + * return-check usefulness is unknown. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_OPTIONAL + +/** \def MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN + * + * Call this macro with one argument, a function call, to suppress a warning + * from #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN due to that function call. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN) +/* GCC doesn't silence the warning with just (void)(result). + * (void)!(result) is known to work up at least up to GCC 10, as well + * as with Clang and MSVC. + * + * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-3.4.6/gcc/Non_002dbugs.html + * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/40576003/ignoring-warning-wunused-result + * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66425#c34 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN(result) ( (void) !( result ) ) +#endif + +/** + * \brief Securely zeroize a buffer + * + * The function is meant to wipe the data contained in a buffer so + * that it can no longer be recovered even if the program memory + * is later compromised. Call this function on sensitive data + * stored on the stack before returning from a function, and on + * sensitive data stored on the heap before freeing the heap + * object. + * + * It is extremely difficult to guarantee that calls to + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() are not removed by aggressive + * compiler optimizations in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed + * TLS provides the configuration option + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for + * their platform and needs + * + * \param buf Buffer to be zeroized + * \param len Length of the buffer in bytes + * + */ +void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific implementation of gmtime_r() + * + * The function is a thread-safe abstraction that behaves + * similarly to the gmtime_r() function from Unix/POSIX. + * + * Mbed TLS will try to identify the underlying platform and + * make use of an appropriate underlying implementation (e.g. + * gmtime_r() for POSIX and gmtime_s() for Windows). If this is + * not possible, then gmtime() will be used. In this case, calls + * from the library to gmtime() will be guarded by the mutex + * mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is + * enabled. It is recommended that calls from outside the library + * are also guarded by this mutex. + * + * If MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, then Mbed TLS will + * unconditionally use the alternative implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() supplied by the user at compile time. + * + * \param tt Pointer to an object containing time (in seconds) since the + * epoch to be converted + * \param tm_buf Pointer to an object where the results will be stored + * + * \return Pointer to an object of type struct tm on success, otherwise + * NULL + */ +struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt, + struct tm *tm_buf ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a69ede98 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +/** + * \file poly1305.h + * + * \brief This file contains Poly1305 definitions and functions. + * + * Poly1305 is a one-time message authenticator that can be used to + * authenticate messages. Poly1305-AES was created by Daniel + * Bernstein https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf The generic + * Poly1305 algorithm (not tied to AES) was also standardized in RFC + * 7539. + * + * \author Daniel King + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/** Invalid input parameter(s). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0057 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be + * used. */ +/** Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0059 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x005B + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + +typedef struct mbedtls_poly1305_context +{ + uint32_t r[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t s[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t acc[5]; /** The accumulator number. */ + uint8_t queue[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */ + size_t queue_len; /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */ +} +mbedtls_poly1305_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ +#include "poly1305_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified Poly1305 context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * It is usually followed by a call to + * \c mbedtls_poly1305_starts(), then one or more calls to + * \c mbedtls_poly1305_update(), then one call to + * \c mbedtls_poly1305_finish(), then finally + * \c mbedtls_poly1305_free(). + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to initialize. This must + * not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_poly1305_init( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified + * Poly1305 context. + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized Poly1305 context. + */ +void mbedtls_poly1305_free( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the one-time authentication key. + * + * \warning The key must be unique and unpredictable for each + * invocation of Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to which the key should be bound. + * This must be initialized. + * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_starts( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This functions feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * Poly1305 computation. + * + * It is called between \c mbedtls_cipher_poly1305_starts() and + * \c mbedtls_cipher_poly1305_finish(). + * It can be called repeatedly to process a stream of data. + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * Any value is accepted. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_update( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates the Poly1305 Message + * Authentication Code (MAC). + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_finish( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the Poly1305 MAC of the input + * buffer with the provided key. + * + * \warning The key must be unique and unpredictable for each + * invocation of Poly1305. + * + * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * Any value is accepted. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must be + * a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_mac( const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char mac[16] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief The Poly1305 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af7a809e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -0,0 +1,512 @@ +/** + * \file psa_util.h + * + * \brief Utility functions for the use of the PSA Crypto library. + * + * \warning This function is not part of the public API and may + * change at any time. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" + +#include + +/* Translations for symmetric crypto. */ + +static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher ) +{ + switch( cipher ) + { + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB: + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); + + /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */ + /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */ + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen ) +{ + switch( mode ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB: + return( PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + if( taglen == 0 ) + return( PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ); + else + return( 0 ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +static inline psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( + mbedtls_operation_t op ) +{ + switch( op ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT: + return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT: + return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +/* Translations for hashing. */ + +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + switch( md_alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( PSA_ALG_MD2 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( PSA_ALG_MD4 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( PSA_ALG_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: + return( 0 ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +/* Translations for ECC. */ + +static inline int mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( + psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t bits, + char const **oid, size_t *oid_len ) +{ + switch( curve ) + { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case 192: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case 224: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case 256: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case 384: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case 521: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + } + break; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case 192: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case 224: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case 256: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + } + break; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case 256: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case 384: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case 512: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + } + break; + } + (void) oid; + (void) oid_len; + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + + +/* Translations for PK layer */ + +static inline int mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( psa_status_t status ) +{ + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return( 0 ); + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + /* All other failures */ + case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE: + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: + case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + default: /* We return the same as for the 'other failures', + * but list them separately nonetheless to indicate + * which failure conditions we have considered. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } +} + +/* Translations for ECC */ + +/* This function transforms an ECC group identifier from + * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8 + * into a PSA ECC group identifier. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( + uint16_t tls_ecc_grp_reg_id, size_t *bits ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_ecc_grp_reg_id ); + if( curve_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( curve_info->grp_id, bits ) ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* This function takes a buffer holding an EC public key + * exported through psa_export_public_key(), and converts + * it into an ECPoint structure to be put into a ClientKeyExchange + * message in an ECDHE exchange. + * + * Both the present and the foreseeable future format of EC public keys + * used by PSA have the ECPoint structure contained in the exported key + * as a subbuffer, and the function merely selects this subbuffer instead + * of making a copy. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( unsigned char *src, + size_t srclen, + unsigned char **dst, + size_t *dstlen ) +{ + *dst = src; + *dstlen = srclen; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* This function takes a buffer holding an ECPoint structure + * (as contained in a TLS ServerKeyExchange message for ECDHE + * exchanges) and converts it into a format that the PSA key + * agreement API understands. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( unsigned char const *src, + size_t srclen, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dstlen, + size_t *olen ) +{ + if( srclen > dstlen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( dst, src, srclen ); + *olen = srclen; + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* Expose whatever RNG the PSA subsystem uses to applications using the + * mbedtls_xxx API. The declarations and definitions here need to be + * consistent with the implementation in library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h. + * See that file for implementation documentation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* The type of a `f_rng` random generator function that many library functions + * take. + * + * This type name is not part of the Mbed TLS stable API. It may be renamed + * or moved without warning. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_f_rng_t( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_size ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + +/** The random generator function for the PSA subsystem. + * + * This function is suitable as the `f_rng` random generator function + * parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. Use #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE + * to obtain the \p p_rng parameter. + * + * The implementation of this function depends on the configuration of the + * library. + * + * \note Depending on the configuration, this may be a function or + * a pointer to a function. + * + * \note This function may only be used if the PSA crypto subsystem is active. + * This means that you must call psa_crypto_init() before any call to + * this function, and you must not call this function after calling + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + * + * \param p_rng The random generator context. This must be + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE. No other state is + * supported. + * \param output The buffer to fill. It must have room for + * \c output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The number of bytes to write to \p output. + * This function may fail if \p output_size is too + * large. It is guaranteed to accept any output size + * requested by Mbed TLS library functions. The + * maximum request size depends on the library + * configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An `MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_xxx`, + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_xxx, + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_xxx` or + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_xxx` on error. + */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size ); + +/** The random generator state for the PSA subsystem. + * + * This macro expands to an expression which is suitable as the `p_rng` + * random generator state parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. + * It must be used in combination with the random generator function + * mbedtls_psa_get_random(). + * + * The implementation of this macro depends on the configuration of the + * library. Do not make any assumption on its nature. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL + +#else /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random; +#endif +extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state + +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..63270d12 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +/** + * \file ripemd160.h + * + * \brief RIPE MD-160 message digest + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0031 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ripemd160_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t state[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ +} +mbedtls_ripemd160_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ +#include "ripemd160_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize RIPEMD-160 context + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_ripemd160_init( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear RIPEMD-160 context + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context to be cleared + */ +void mbedtls_ripemd160_free( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clone (the state of) an RIPEMD-160 context + * + * \param dst The destination context + * \param src The context to be cloned + */ +void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, + const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( + mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_update( + mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( + mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( + mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_ripemd160.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..062df73a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,1351 @@ +/** + * \file rsa.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for the RSA public-key cryptosystem. + * + * The RSA public-key cryptosystem is defined in Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v1.5: RSA Encryption + * and Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: + * RSA Cryptography Specifications. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/* + * RSA Error codes + */ +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x4080 +/** Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING -0x4100 +/** Something failed during generation of a key. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED -0x4180 +/** Key failed to pass the validity check of the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED -0x4200 +/** The public key operation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x4280 +/** The private key operation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED -0x4300 +/** The PKCS#1 verification failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4380 +/** The output buffer for decryption is not large enough. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -0x4400 +/** The random generator failed to generate non-zeros. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -0x4480 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION -0x4500 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** RSA hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4580 + +/* + * RSA constants + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC 0 /**< Request private key operation. */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE 1 /**< Request public key operation. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 0 /**< Use PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 1 /**< Use PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN 1 /**< Identifier for RSA signature operations. */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT 2 /**< Identifier for RSA encryption and decryption operations. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY -1 + +/* + * The above constants may be used even if the RSA module is compile out, + * eg for alternative (PKCS#11) RSA implementations in the PK layers. + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The RSA context structure. + * + * \note Direct manipulation of the members of this structure + * is deprecated. All manipulation should instead be done through + * the public interface functions. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_rsa_context +{ + int ver; /*!< Reserved for internal purposes. + * Do not set this field in application + * code. Its meaning might change without + * notice. */ + size_t len; /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */ + + mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The public modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi E; /*!< The public exponent. */ + + mbedtls_mpi D; /*!< The private exponent. */ + mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The first prime factor. */ + mbedtls_mpi Q; /*!< The second prime factor. */ + + mbedtls_mpi DP; /*!< D % (P - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi DQ; /*!< D % (Q - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi QP; /*!< 1 / (Q % P). */ + + mbedtls_mpi RN; /*!< cached R^2 mod N. */ + + mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< cached R^2 mod P. */ + mbedtls_mpi RQ; /*!< cached R^2 mod Q. */ + + mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The cached blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */ + + int padding; /*!< Selects padding mode: + #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 for 1.5 padding and + #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for OAEP or PSS. */ + int hash_id; /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type, + as specified in md.h for use in the MGF + mask generating function used in the + EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS encodings. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized iff ver != 0. */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */ +#endif +} +mbedtls_rsa_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ +#include "rsa_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an RSA context. + * + * \note Set padding to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for the RSAES-OAEP + * encryption scheme and the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme. + * + * \note The \p hash_id parameter is ignored when using + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 padding. + * + * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private key + * operations, since there might be security concerns in + * mixing padding modes. For public key operations it is + * a default value, which can be overridden by calling specific + * \c rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c rsa_rsassa_xxx functions. + * + * \note The hash selected in \p hash_id is always used for OEAP + * encryption. For PSS signatures, it is always used for + * making signatures, but can be overridden for verifying them. + * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overridden. + * + * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. + * \param hash_id The hash identifier of ::mbedtls_md_type_t type, if + * \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. It is unused + * otherwise. + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int padding, + int hash_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports a set of core parameters into an + * RSA context. + * + * \note This function can be called multiple times for successive + * imports, if the parameters are not simultaneously present. + * + * Any sequence of calls to this function should be followed + * by a call to mbedtls_rsa_complete(), which checks and + * completes the provided information to a ready-for-use + * public or private RSA key. + * + * \note See mbedtls_rsa_complete() for more information on which + * parameters are necessary to set up a private or public + * RSA key. + * + * \note The imported parameters are copied and need not be preserved + * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in. + * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. + * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports core RSA parameters, in raw big-endian + * binary format, into an RSA context. + * + * \note This function can be called multiple times for successive + * imports, if the parameters are not simultaneously present. + * + * Any sequence of calls to this function should be followed + * by a call to mbedtls_rsa_complete(), which checks and + * completes the provided information to a ready-for-use + * public or private RSA key. + * + * \note See mbedtls_rsa_complete() for more information on which + * parameters are necessary to set up a private or public + * RSA key. + * + * \note The imported parameters are copied and need not be preserved + * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in. + * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. + * \param N_len The Byte length of \p N; it is ignored if \p N == NULL. + * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P; it ns ignored if \p P == NULL. + * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param Q_len The Byte length of \p Q; it is ignored if \p Q == NULL. + * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * \param D_len The Byte length of \p D; it is ignored if \p D == NULL. + * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * \param E_len The Byte length of \p E; it is ignored if \p E == NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function completes an RSA context from + * a set of imported core parameters. + * + * To setup an RSA public key, precisely \p N and \p E + * must have been imported. + * + * To setup an RSA private key, sufficient information must + * be present for the other parameters to be derivable. + * + * The default implementation supports the following: + *
  • Derive \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, \p E.
    • + *
  • Derive \p N, \p D from \p P, \p Q, \p E.
+ * Alternative implementations need not support these. + * + * If this function runs successfully, it guarantees that + * the RSA context can be used for RSA operations without + * the risk of failure or crash. + * + * \warning This function need not perform consistency checks + * for the imported parameters. In particular, parameters that + * are not needed by the implementation might be silently + * discarded and left unchecked. To check the consistency + * of the key material, see mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(). + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context holding imported parameters. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the attempted derivations + * failed. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports the core parameters of an RSA key. + * + * If this function runs successfully, the non-NULL buffers + * pointed to by \p N, \p P, \p Q, \p D, and \p E are fully + * written, with additional unused space filled leading by + * zero Bytes. + * + * Possible reasons for returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
    + *
  • An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which + * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should + * not export it into RAM.
    • + *
  • A SW or HW implementation might not support a certain + * deduction. For example, \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, + * and \p E if the former are not part of the + * implementation.
+ * + * If the function fails due to an unsupported operation, + * the RSA context stays intact and remains usable. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * \param N The MPI to hold the RSA modulus. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param P The MPI to hold the first prime factor of \p N. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param Q The MPI to hold the second prime factor of \p N. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param D The MPI to hold the private exponent. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param E The MPI to hold the public exponent. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the + * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing + * functionality or because of security policies. + * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, + mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports core parameters of an RSA key + * in raw big-endian binary format. + * + * If this function runs successfully, the non-NULL buffers + * pointed to by \p N, \p P, \p Q, \p D, and \p E are fully + * written, with additional unused space filled leading by + * zero Bytes. + * + * Possible reasons for returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
    + *
  • An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which + * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should + * not export it into RAM.
    • + *
  • A SW or HW implementation might not support a certain + * deduction. For example, \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, + * and \p E if the former are not part of the + * implementation.
+ * If the function fails due to an unsupported operation, + * the RSA context stays intact and remains usable. + * + * \note The length parameters are ignored if the corresponding + * buffer pointers are NULL. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * \param N The Byte array to store the RSA modulus, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param N_len The size of the buffer for the modulus. + * \param P The Byte array to hold the first prime factor of \p N, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param P_len The size of the buffer for the first prime factor. + * \param Q The Byte array to hold the second prime factor of \p N, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param Q_len The size of the buffer for the second prime factor. + * \param D The Byte array to hold the private exponent, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param D_len The size of the buffer for the private exponent. + * \param E The Byte array to hold the public exponent, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param E_len The size of the buffer for the public exponent. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the + * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing + * functionality or because of security policies. + * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char *E, size_t E_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports CRT parameters of a private RSA key. + * + * \note Alternative RSA implementations not using CRT-parameters + * internally can implement this function based on + * mbedtls_rsa_deduce_opt(). + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * \param DP The MPI to hold \c D modulo `P-1`, + * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. + * \param DQ The MPI to hold \c D modulo `Q-1`, + * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. + * \param QP The MPI to hold modular inverse of \c Q modulo \c P, + * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA + * context. See mbedtls_rsa_init() for details. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to be configured. + * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. + * \param hash_id The #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 hash identifier. + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + int hash_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the length of RSA modulus in Bytes. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * + * \return The length of the RSA modulus in Bytes. + * + */ +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an RSA keypair. + * + * \note mbedtls_rsa_init() must be called before this function, + * to set up the RSA context. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context used to hold the key. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for key generation. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * \param nbits The size of the public key in bits. + * \param exponent The public exponent to use. For example, \c 65537. + * This must be odd and greater than \c 1. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + unsigned int nbits, int exponent ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks if a context contains at least an RSA + * public key. + * + * If the function runs successfully, it is guaranteed that + * enough information is present to perform an RSA public key + * operation using mbedtls_rsa_public(). + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks if a context contains an RSA private key + * and perform basic consistency checks. + * + * \note The consistency checks performed by this function not only + * ensure that mbedtls_rsa_private() can be called successfully + * on the given context, but that the various parameters are + * mutually consistent with high probability, in the sense that + * mbedtls_rsa_public() and mbedtls_rsa_private() are inverses. + * + * \warning This function should catch accidental misconfigurations + * like swapping of parameters, but it cannot establish full + * trust in neither the quality nor the consistency of the key + * material that was used to setup the given RSA context: + *
  • Consistency: Imported parameters that are irrelevant + * for the implementation might be silently dropped. If dropped, + * the current function does not have access to them, + * and therefore cannot check them. See mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * If you want to check the consistency of the entire + * content of an PKCS1-encoded RSA private key, for example, you + * should use mbedtls_rsa_validate_params() before setting + * up the RSA context. + * Additionally, if the implementation performs empirical checks, + * these checks substantiate but do not guarantee consistency.
    • + *
  • Quality: This function is not expected to perform + * extended quality assessments like checking that the prime + * factors are safe. Additionally, it is the responsibility of the + * user to ensure the trustworthiness of the source of his RSA + * parameters, which goes beyond what is effectively checkable + * by the library.
+ * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks a public-private RSA key pair. + * + * It checks each of the contexts, and makes sure they match. + * + * \param pub The initialized RSA context holding the public key. + * \param prv The initialized RSA context holding the private key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an RSA public key operation. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \note This function does not handle message padding. + * + * \note Make sure to set \p input[0] = 0 or ensure that + * input is smaller than \p N. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an RSA private key operation. + * + * \note Blinding is used if and only if a PRNG is provided. + * + * \note If blinding is used, both the base of exponentiation + * and the exponent are blinded, providing protection + * against some side-channel attacks. + * + * \warning It is deprecated and a security risk to not provide + * a PRNG here and thereby prevent the use of blinding. + * Future versions of the library may enforce the presence + * of a PRNG. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is discouraged + * and deprecated to pass \c NULL here, in which case + * blinding will be omitted. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to pass to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function adds the message padding, then performs an RSA + * operation. + * + * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 encryption + * operation using the \p mode from the context. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is mandatory for PKCS#1 v2.1 padding + * encoding, and for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding encoding when used + * with \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. For PKCS#1 v1.5 + * padding encoding and \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * it is used for blinding and should be provided in this + * case; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. May be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't + * need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption operation + * (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCRYPT). + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is needed for padding generation + * if \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (discouraged), it is used for + * blinding and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private(). + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng + * doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 OAEP encryption + * operation (RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT). + * + * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size + * of ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is needed for padding + * generation and must be provided. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len + * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. + * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the plaintext buffer \p input in Bytes. + * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an RSA operation, then removes the + * message padding. + * + * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption + * operation using the \p mode from the context. + * + * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be + * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N (for example, + * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used) to be able to hold an + * arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not large enough to + * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, + * the function returns \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. + * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + * operation (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-DECRYPT). + * + * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be + * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for example, + * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to hold an + * arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not large enough to + * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, + * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. + * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 OAEP decryption + * operation (RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT). + * + * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be + * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for + * example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to + * hold an arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not + * large enough to hold the decryption of the particular + * ciphertext provided, the function returns + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len + * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. + * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. + * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a private RSA operation to sign + * a message digest using PKCS#1. + * + * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 + * signature using the \p mode from the context. + * + * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size + * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. + * + * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on + * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on + * \p md_alg and \p hash_id. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v2.1, + * this must be provided. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v1.5 and + * \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, it is used for blinding + * and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more + * more. It is ignored otherwise. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature + * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN). + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature + * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). + * + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling + * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() + * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * encoding operation and for the mask generation function + * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the + * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. + * + * \note This function enforces that the provided salt length complies + * with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 + * step 3. The constraint is that the hash length plus the salt + * length plus 2 bytes must be at most the key length. If this + * constraint is not met, this function returns + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param saltlen The length of the salt that should be used. + * If passed #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, the function will use + * the largest possible salt length up to the hash length, + * which is the largest permitted by some standards including + * FIPS 186-4 §5.5. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature + * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). + * + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling + * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() + * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * encoding operation and for the mask generation function + * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the + * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. + * + * \note This function always uses the maximum possible salt size, + * up to the length of the payload hash. This choice of salt + * size complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1 + * v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. Furthermore this function enforces a + * minimum salt size which is the hash size minus 2 bytes. If + * this minimum size is too large given the key size (the salt + * size, plus the hash size, plus 2 bytes must be no more than + * the key size in bytes), this function returns + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a public RSA operation and checks + * the message digest. + * + * This is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 + * verification using the mode from the context. + * + * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on + * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \p md_alg and + * \p hash_id. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 verification + * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY). + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification + * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). + * + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling + * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() + * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * encoding operation and for the mask generation function + * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the + * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. If the \c hash_id set in \p ctx is + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, the \p md_alg parameter is used. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification + * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). + * + * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size + * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. + * + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling + * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() + * afterwards) is ignored. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param mgf1_hash_id The message digest algorithm used for the + * verification operation and the mask generation + * function (MGF1). For more details on the encoding + * operation and the mask generation function, consult + * RFC-3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards + * (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. + * \param expected_salt_len The length of the salt used in padding. Use + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY to accept any salt length. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id, + int expected_salt_len, + const unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function copies the components of an RSA context. + * + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The source context. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of an RSA key. + * + * \param ctx The RSA context to free. May be \c NULL, in which case + * this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized RSA context. + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The RSA checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* rsa.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d55492bb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/** + * \file rsa_internal.h + * + * \brief Context-independent RSA helper functions + * + * This module declares some RSA-related helper functions useful when + * implementing the RSA interface. These functions are provided in a separate + * compilation unit in order to make it easy for designers of alternative RSA + * implementations to use them in their own code, as it is conceived that the + * functionality they provide will be necessary for most complete + * implementations. + * + * End-users of Mbed TLS who are not providing their own alternative RSA + * implementations should not use these functions directly, and should instead + * use only the functions declared in rsa.h. + * + * The interface provided by this module will be maintained through LTS (Long + * Term Support) branches of Mbed TLS, but may otherwise be subject to change, + * and must be considered an internal interface of the library. + * + * There are two classes of helper functions: + * + * (1) Parameter-generating helpers. These are: + * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes + * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent + * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt + * Each of these functions takes a set of core RSA parameters and + * generates some other, or CRT related parameters. + * + * (2) Parameter-checking helpers. These are: + * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_params + * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt + * They take a set of core or CRT related RSA parameters and check their + * validity. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + +/** + * \brief Compute RSA prime moduli P, Q from public modulus N=PQ + * and a pair of private and public key. + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ, with P, Q to be found + * \param E RSA public exponent + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param P Pointer to MPI holding first prime factor of N on success + * \param Q Pointer to MPI holding second prime factor of N on success + * + * \return + * - 0 if successful. In this case, P and Q constitute a + * factorization of N. + * - A non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note It is neither checked that P, Q are prime nor that + * D, E are modular inverses wrt. P-1 and Q-1. For that, + * use the helper function \c mbedtls_rsa_validate_params. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( mbedtls_mpi const *N, mbedtls_mpi const *E, + mbedtls_mpi const *D, + mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q ); + +/** + * \brief Compute RSA private exponent from + * prime moduli and public key. + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param E RSA public exponent + * \param D Pointer to MPI holding the private exponent on success. + * + * \return + * - 0 if successful. In this case, D is set to a simultaneous + * modular inverse of E modulo both P-1 and Q-1. + * - A non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check whether P and Q are primes. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( mbedtls_mpi const *P, + mbedtls_mpi const *Q, + mbedtls_mpi const *E, + mbedtls_mpi *D ); + + +/** + * \brief Generate RSA-CRT parameters + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param P First prime factor of N + * \param Q Second prime factor of N + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param DP Output variable for D modulo P-1 + * \param DQ Output variable for D modulo Q-1 + * \param QP Output variable for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. + * + * \return 0 on success, non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check whether P, Q are + * prime and whether D is a valid private exponent. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, + mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ); + + +/** + * \brief Check validity of core RSA parameters + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ + * \param P First prime factor of N + * \param Q Second prime factor of N + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param E RSA public exponent + * \param f_rng PRNG to be used for primality check, or NULL + * \param p_rng PRNG context for f_rng, or NULL + * + * \return + * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied + * if all relevant parameters are provided: + * - P prime if f_rng != NULL (%) + * - Q prime if f_rng != NULL (%) + * - 1 < N = P * Q + * - 1 < D, E < N + * - D and E are modular inverses modulo P-1 and Q-1 + * (%) This is only done if MBEDTLS_GENPRIME is defined. + * - A non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments + * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with + * (-,P,-,-,-) and a PRNG amounts to a primality check for P. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Check validity of RSA CRT parameters + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param DP MPI to check for D modulo P-1 + * \param DQ MPI to check for D modulo P-1 + * \param QP MPI to check for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. + * + * \return + * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied: + * - D = DP mod P-1 if P, D, DP != NULL + * - Q = DQ mod P-1 if P, D, DQ != NULL + * - QP = Q^-1 mod P if P, Q, QP != NULL + * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if check failed, + * potentially including \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX if some + * MPI calculations failed. + * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if insufficient + * data was provided to check DP, DQ or QP. + * + * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments + * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with the + * parameters (P, -, D, DP, -, -) will check DP = D mod P-1. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, + const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* rsa_internal.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c3251b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +/** + * \file sha1.h + * + * \brief This file contains SHA-1 definitions and functions. + * + * The Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) cryptographic hash function is defined in + * FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. We recommend considering stronger message + * digests instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA1_H +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0035 +/** SHA-1 input data was malformed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0073 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The SHA-1 context structure. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_sha1_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t state[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ +} +mbedtls_sha1_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ +#include "sha1_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a SHA-1 context. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * + */ +void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a SHA-1 context. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it is + * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized + * SHA-1 context. + * + */ +void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-1 context. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param dst The SHA-1 context to clone to. This must be initialized. + * \param src The SHA-1 context to clone from. This must be initialized. + * + */ +void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha1_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 + * checksum calculation. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized and + * have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +/** + * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param data The data block being processed. This must be a + * readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 + * checksum calculation. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_update_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and + * have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and + * have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +/** + * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha1_process() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The data block being processed. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 64 bytes. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-1 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-1(input buffer). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-1 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-1(input buffer). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable + * buffer of size \c 20 Bytes. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The SHA-1 checkup routine. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_sha1.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b54be21 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ +/** + * \file sha256.h + * + * \brief This file contains SHA-224 and SHA-256 definitions and functions. + * + * The Secure Hash Algorithms 224 and 256 (SHA-224 and SHA-256) cryptographic + * hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA256_H +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0037 +/** SHA-256 input data was malformed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0074 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The SHA-256 context structure. + * + * The structure is used both for SHA-256 and for SHA-224 + * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_sha256_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ + int is224; /*!< Determines which function to use: + 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */ +} +mbedtls_sha256_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ +#include "sha256_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a SHA-256 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a SHA-256 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized SHA-256 context. + */ +void mbedtls_sha256_free( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-256 context. + * + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha256_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is224 This determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-256 checksum calculation. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This function processes a single data block within + * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for + * internal use only. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + int is224 ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-256 checksum calculation. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_update_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to use. This must be + * initialized and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized and + * have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be + * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This function processes a single data block within + * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for + * internal use only. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be + * a readable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 + * checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-256 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-256(input buffer). + * + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[32], + int is224 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum + * of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-256 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-256(input buffer). + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be + * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be either + * \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[32], + int is224 ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The SHA-224 and SHA-256 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_sha256.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cca47c2f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/** + * \file sha512.h + * \brief This file contains SHA-384 and SHA-512 definitions and functions. + * + * The Secure Hash Algorithms 384 and 512 (SHA-384 and SHA-512) cryptographic + * hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA512_H +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0039 +/** SHA-512 input data was malformed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0075 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The SHA-512 context structure. + * + * The structure is used both for SHA-384 and for SHA-512 + * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_sha512_context +{ + uint64_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint64_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char buffer[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + int is384; /*!< Determines which function to use: + 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */ +#endif +} +mbedtls_sha512_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ +#include "sha512_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a SHA-512 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to initialize. This must + * not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a SHA-512 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it + * is not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized + * SHA-512 context. + */ +void mbedtls_sha512_free( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-512 context. + * + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha512_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must + * be \c 0, or the function will return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-512 checksum calculation. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ); + +/** + * \brief This function processes a single data block within + * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. + * This function is for internal use only. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This + * must be a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[128] ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either + * \c 0 for SHA-512 or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must + * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + int is384 ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-512 checksum calculation. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_update_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must + * be a writable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ); + +/** + * \brief This function processes a single data block within + * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. This function is for + * internal use only. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be + * a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_process( + mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[128] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 + * checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-512 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-512(input buffer). + * + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be + * a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either + * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must + * be \c 0, or the function will return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[64], + int is384 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 + * checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-512 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-512(input buffer). + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a + * readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either + * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must + * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[64], + int is384 ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + + /** + * \brief The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_sha512.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5064ec56 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,4427 @@ +/** + * \file ssl.h + * + * \brief SSL/TLS functions. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#endif + +/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due + * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap + * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and will be removed in the next major revision of the library" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and cannot be used if MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED is set" +#endif + +#include "zlib.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * SSL Error codes + */ +/** The requested feature is not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x7080 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x7100 +/** Verification of the message MAC failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -0x7180 +/** An invalid SSL record was received. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200 +/** The connection indicated an EOF. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280 +/** An unknown cipher was received. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -0x7300 +/** The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -0x7380 +/** No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400 +/** No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480 +/** Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -0x7500 +/** The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -0x7580 +/** The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600 +/** No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -0x7680 +/** An unexpected message was received from our peer. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700 +/** A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780 +/** Verification of our peer failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -0x7800 +/** The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880 +/** Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -0x7900 +/** Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -0x7980 +/** Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00 +/** Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -0x7A80 +/** Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7B00 +/** Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -0x7B80 +/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7C00 +/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP -0x7C80 +/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS -0x7D00 +/** Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -0x7D80 +/** Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -0x7E00 +/** Processing of the Finished handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED -0x7E80 +/** Memory allocation failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -0x7F00 +/** Hardware acceleration function returned with error */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x7F80 +/** Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -0x6F80 +/** Processing of the compression / decompression failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED -0x6F00 +/** Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80 +/** Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x6E00 +/** Session ticket has expired. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -0x6D80 +/** Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x6D00 +/** Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -0x6C80 +/** Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR -0x6C00 +/** A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING -0x6B80 +/** Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -0x6B00 +/** DTLS client must retry for hello verification */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -0x6A80 +/** A buffer is too small to receive or write a message */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x6A00 +/** None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE -0x6980 +/** No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -0x6900 +/** Connection requires a write call. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -0x6880 +/** The operation timed out. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -0x6800 +/** The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT -0x6780 +/** Record header looks valid but is not expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700 +/** The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680 +/** Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 +/** Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580 +/** The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500 +/** Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480 +/** An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID -0x6000 +/** An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH -0x5F00 +/** A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000 +/** Invalid value in SSL config */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80 + +/* + * Various constants + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 0 /*!< SSL v3.0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 /*!< TLS v1.0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 /*!< TLS v1.1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 (experimental) */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM 0 /*!< TLS */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of a protocol name in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN 65535 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of list in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ + +/* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c + * NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE 0 /*!< don't use this extension */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 1 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^9 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 2 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^10 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 3 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^11 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 4 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^12 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID 5 /*!< first invalid value */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET 3 /* Used only for sni_authmode */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED -1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT 16 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN 10 /* 80 bits, rfc 6066 section 7 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED 1 + +/* + * Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds. + * RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000 + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ +#endif + +/* + * Maximum fragment length in bytes, + * determines the size of each of the two internal I/O buffers. + * + * Note: the RFC defines the default size of SSL / TLS messages. If you + * change the value here, other clients / servers may not be able to + * communicate with you anymore. Only change this value if you control + * both sides of the connection and have it reduced at both sides, or + * if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your + * peers are using it too! + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /**< Size of the input / output buffer */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#endif + +/* + * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of + * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 +#endif + +/* + * Maximum length of CIDs for incoming and outgoing messages. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +/* + * Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 36 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12 +#endif + +/* + * Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE 0x5600 /**< RFC 7507 section 2 */ + +/* + * Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2) + * RFC 5246 section 7.4.1.4.1 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 5 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 6 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA 3 + +/* + * Client Certificate Types + * RFC 5246 section 7.4.4 plus RFC 4492 section 5.5 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN 64 + +/* + * Message, alert and handshake types + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT 21 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE 22 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA 23 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID 25 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 /* 0x00 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10 /* 0x0A */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20 /* 0x14 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21 /* 0x15 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22 /* 0x16 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30 /* 0x1E */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40 /* 0x28 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT 41 /* 0x29 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT 42 /* 0x2A */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT 43 /* 0x2B */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED 44 /* 0x2C */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED 45 /* 0x2D */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN 46 /* 0x2E */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47 /* 0x2F */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA 48 /* 0x30 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED 49 /* 0x31 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR 50 /* 0x32 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR 51 /* 0x33 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60 /* 0x3C */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* 0x46 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* 0x47 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* 0x50 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* 0x56 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED 90 /* 0x5A */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* 0x64 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT 110 /* 0x6E */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 /* 0x70 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* 0x73 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* 0x78 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE 14 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED 20 + +/* + * TLS extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME 0 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 0 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC 4 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 10 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 11 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP 14 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN 16 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22 /* 0x16 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 0x0017 /* 23 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET 35 + +/* The value of the CID extension is still TBD as of + * draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05). + * + * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of + * this option to match evolving standards and usage. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* TBD */ +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP 256 /* experimental */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF01 + +/* + * Size defines + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */ +#endif + +/* Dummy type used only for its size */ +union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_rsa[48]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.1 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_dhm[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.2 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_ecdh[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; /* RFC 4492 5.10 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_psk[4 + 2 * MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 2 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_dhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 3 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_rsa_psk[52 + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 4 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_ecdhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 5489 2 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_ecjpake[32]; /* Thread spec: SHA-256 output */ +#endif +}; + +#define MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE sizeof( union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * SSL state machine + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT, +} +mbedtls_ssl_states; + +/* + * The tls_prf function types. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 +} +mbedtls_tls_prf_types; +/** + * \brief Callback type: send data on the network. + * + * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking. + * + * \param ctx Context for the send callback (typically a file descriptor) + * \param buf Buffer holding the data to send + * \param len Length of the data to send + * + * \return The callback must return the number of bytes sent if any, + * or a non-zero error code. + * If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * must be returned when the operation would block. + * + * \note The callback is allowed to send fewer bytes than requested. + * It must always return the number of bytes actually sent. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_send_t( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network. + * + * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking. + * + * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file + * descriptor) + * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to + * \param len Length of the receive buffer + * + * \returns If data has been received, the positive number of bytes received. + * \returns \c 0 if the connection has been closed. + * \returns If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ + * must be returned when the operation would block. + * \returns Another negative error code on other kinds of failures. + * + * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the + * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually + * received and written to the buffer. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_t( void *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network, with timeout + * + * \note That callback must block until data is received, or the + * timeout delay expires, or the operation is interrupted by a + * signal. + * + * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file descriptor) + * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to + * \param len Length of the receive buffer + * \param timeout Maximum nomber of millisecondes to wait for data + * 0 means no timeout (potentially waiting forever) + * + * \return The callback must return the number of bytes received, + * or a non-zero error code: + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out, + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal. + * + * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the + * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually + * received and written to the buffer. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t( void *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + uint32_t timeout ); +/** + * \brief Callback type: set a pair of timers/delays to watch + * + * \param ctx Context pointer + * \param int_ms Intermediate delay in milliseconds + * \param fin_ms Final delay in milliseconds + * 0 cancels the current timer. + * + * \note This callback must at least store the necessary information + * for the associated \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t callback to + * return correct information. + * + * \note If using a event-driven style of programming, an event must + * be generated when the final delay is passed. The event must + * cause a call to \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the proper + * SSL context to be scheduled. Care must be taken to ensure + * that at most one such call happens at a time. + * + * \note Only one timer at a time must be running. Calling this + * function while a timer is running must cancel it. Cancelled + * timers must not generate any event. + */ +typedef void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t( void * ctx, + uint32_t int_ms, + uint32_t fin_ms ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: get status of timers/delays + * + * \param ctx Context pointer + * + * \return This callback must return: + * -1 if cancelled (fin_ms == 0), + * 0 if none of the delays have passed, + * 1 if only the intermediate delay has passed, + * 2 if the final delay has passed. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t( void * ctx ); + +/* Defined below */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config; + +/* Defined in ssl_internal.h */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Callback type: start external signature operation. + * + * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start + * a signature decryption operation using an + * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains + * the public key; it is up to the callback function to + * determine how to access the associated private key. + * + * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and + * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows + * the handshake step to be non-blocking. + * + * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain + * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this + * function must save the contents of \p hash if the value + * is needed for later processing, because the \p hash buffer + * is no longer valid after this function returns. + * + * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() + * to store an operation context for later retrieval + * by the resume or cancel callback. + * + * \note For RSA signatures, this function must produce output + * that is consistent with PKCS#1 v1.5 in the same way as + * mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(). Before the private key operation, + * apply the padding steps described in RFC 8017, section 9.2 + * "EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5" as follows. + * - If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5 + * encoding, treating \p hash as the DigestInfo to be + * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting + * from step 3, with `T = hash` and `tLen = hash_len`. + * - If `md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE`, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5 + * encoding, treating \p hash as the hash to be encoded and + * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting + * from step 2, with `digestAlgorithm` obtained by calling + * mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md() on \p md_alg. + * + * \note For ECDSA signatures, the output format is the DER encoding + * `Ecdsa-Sig-Value` defined in + * [RFC 4492 section 5.4](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.4). + * + * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be + * modified other than via + * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(). + * \param cert Certificate containing the public key. + * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL + * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this + * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback + * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then + * this callback determines what certificate is used. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm. + * \param hash Buffer containing the hash. This buffer is + * no longer valid when the function returns. + * \param hash_len Size of the \c hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL + * stack should call the resume callback immediately. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation + * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return + * immediately without calling the resume callback yet. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external + * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will + * use the private key object instead. + * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is + * propagated up the call chain. The callback should + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as + * directed in the documentation of this callback. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, + size_t hash_len ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: start external decryption operation. + * + * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start + * an RSA decryption operation using an + * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains + * the public key; it is up to the callback function to + * determine how to access the associated private key. + * + * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and + * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows + * the handshake step to be non-blocking. + * + * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain + * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this + * function must save the contents of \p input if the value + * is needed for later processing, because the \p input buffer + * is no longer valid after this function returns. + * + * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() + * to store an operation context for later retrieval + * by the resume or cancel callback. + * + * \warning RSA decryption as used in TLS is subject to a potential + * timing side channel attack first discovered by Bleichenbacher + * in 1998. This attack can be remotely exploitable + * in practice. To avoid this attack, you must ensure that + * if the callback performs an RSA decryption, the time it + * takes to execute and return the result does not depend + * on whether the RSA decryption succeeded or reported + * invalid padding. + * + * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be + * modified other than via + * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(). + * \param cert Certificate containing the public key. + * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL + * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this + * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback + * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then + * this callback determines what certificate is used. + * \param input Buffer containing the input ciphertext. This buffer + * is no longer valid when the function returns. + * \param input_len Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL + * stack should call the resume callback immediately. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation + * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return + * immediately without calling the resume callback yet. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external + * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will + * use the private key object instead. + * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is + * propagated up the call chain. The callback should + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as + * directed in the documentation of this callback. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief Callback type: resume external operation. + * + * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to resume + * an external operation started by the + * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t or + * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t callback. + * + * This function typically checks the status of a pending + * request or causes the request queue to make progress, and + * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows + * the handshake step to be non-blocking. + * + * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() + * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback. + * It may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() to modify + * this context. + * + * Note that when this function returns a status other than + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, it must free any + * resources associated with the operation. + * + * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be + * modified other than via + * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(). + * \param output Buffer containing the output (signature or decrypted + * data) on success. + * \param output_len On success, number of bytes written to \p output. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if output of the operation is available in the + * \p output buffer. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation + * is still in progress. Subsequent requests for progress + * on the SSL connection will call the resume callback + * again. + * \return Any other error means that the operation is aborted. + * The SSL handshake is aborted. The callback should + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as + * directed in the documentation of this callback. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *output, + size_t *output_len, + size_t output_size ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: cancel external operation. + * + * This callback is called if an SSL connection is closed + * while an asynchronous operation is in progress. Note that + * this callback is not called if the + * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t callback has run and has + * returned a value other than + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, since in that case + * the asynchronous operation has already completed. + * + * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() + * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback. + * + * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be + * modified. + */ +typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20 +#else +/* This is already checked in check_config.h, but be sure. */ +#error "Bad configuration - need SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512 enabled to compute digest of peer CRT." +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED && + !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH 255 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH 4 +/* + * For code readability use a typedef for DTLS-SRTP profiles + * + * Use_srtp extension protection profiles values as defined in + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + * + * Reminder: if this list is expanded mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + * must be updated too. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 ( (uint16_t) 0x0001) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 ( (uint16_t) 0x0002) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80 ( (uint16_t) 0x0005) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32 ( (uint16_t) 0x0006) +/* This one is not iana defined, but for code readability. */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ( (uint16_t) 0x0000) + +typedef uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile; + +typedef struct mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info_t +{ + /*! The SRTP profile that was negotiated. */ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + /*! The length of mki_value. */ + uint16_t mki_len; + /*! The mki_value used, with max size of 256 bytes. */ + unsigned char mki_value[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH]; +} +mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * This structure is used for storing current session data. + * + * Note: when changing this definition, we need to check and update: + * - in tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function: + * ssl_populate_session() and ssl_serialize_session_save_load() + * - in library/ssl_tls.c: + * mbedtls_ssl_session_init() and mbedtls_ssl_session_free() + * mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and ssl_session_load() + * ssl_session_copy() + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_session +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + unsigned char mfl_code; /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t start; /*!< starting time */ +#endif + int ciphersuite; /*!< chosen ciphersuite */ + int compression; /*!< chosen compression */ + size_t id_len; /*!< session id length */ + unsigned char id[32]; /*!< session identifier */ + unsigned char master[48]; /*!< the master secret */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_x509_crt *peer_cert; /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT + * changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */ + unsigned char *peer_cert_digest; + size_t peer_cert_digest_len; + mbedtls_md_type_t peer_cert_digest_type; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + uint32_t verify_result; /*!< verification result */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned char *ticket; /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */ + size_t ticket_len; /*!< session ticket length */ + uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< ticket lifetime hint */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + int trunc_hmac; /*!< flag for truncated hmac activation */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif +}; + +/** + * SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_config +{ + /* Group items by size and reorder them to maximize usage of immediate offset access. */ + + /* + * Numerical settings (char) + */ + + unsigned char max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version used */ + unsigned char max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version used */ + unsigned char min_major_ver; /*!< min. major version used */ + unsigned char min_minor_ver; /*!< min. minor version used */ + + /* + * Flags (could be bit-fields to save RAM, but separate bytes make + * the code smaller on architectures with an instruction for direct + * byte access). + */ + + uint8_t endpoint /*bool*/; /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ + uint8_t transport /*bool*/; /*!< stream (TLS) or datagram (DTLS) */ + uint8_t authmode /*2 bits*/; /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */ + /* needed even with renego disabled for LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE */ + uint8_t allow_legacy_renegotiation /*2 bits*/; /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + uint8_t arc4_disabled /*bool*/; /*!< blacklist RC4 ciphersuites? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + uint8_t mfl_code /*3 bits*/; /*!< desired fragment length */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + uint8_t encrypt_then_mac /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + uint8_t extended_ms /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + uint8_t anti_replay /*bool*/; /*!< detect and prevent replay? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + uint8_t cbc_record_splitting /*bool*/; /*!< do cbc record splitting */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + uint8_t disable_renegotiation /*bool*/; /*!< disable renegotiation? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + uint8_t trunc_hmac /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate truncated hmac? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint8_t session_tickets /*bool*/; /*!< use session tickets? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + uint8_t fallback /*bool*/; /*!< is this a fallback? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + uint8_t cert_req_ca_list /*bool*/; /*!< enable sending CA list in + Certificate Request messages? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t ignore_unexpected_cid /*bool*/; /*!< Determines whether DTLS + * record with unexpected CID + * should lead to failure. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + uint8_t dtls_srtp_mki_support /*bool*/; /*!< support having mki_value + in the use_srtp extension? */ +#endif + + /* + * Numerical settings (int or larger) + */ + + uint32_t read_timeout; /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint32_t hs_timeout_min; /*!< initial value of the handshake + retransmission timeout (ms) */ + uint32_t hs_timeout_max; /*!< maximum value of the handshake + retransmission timeout (ms) */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renego_max_records; /*!< grace period for renegotiation */ + unsigned char renego_period[8]; /*!< value of the record counters + that triggers renegotiation */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + unsigned int badmac_limit; /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned int dhm_min_bitlen; /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */ +#endif + + /* + * Pointers + */ + + const int *ciphersuite_list[4]; /*!< allowed ciphersuites per version */ + + /** Callback for printing debug output */ + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); + void *p_dbg; /*!< context for the debug function */ + + /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + + /** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */ + int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *); + /** Callback to store a session into the cache */ + int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *); + void *p_cache; /*!< context for cache callbacks */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /** Callback for setting cert according to SNI extension */ + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_sni; /*!< context for SNI callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /** Callback to retrieve PSK key from identity */ + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_psk; /*!< context for PSK callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /** Callback to create & write a cookie for ClientHello verification */ + int (*f_cookie_write)( void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t ); + /** Callback to verify validity of a ClientHello cookie */ + int (*f_cookie_check)( void *, const unsigned char *, size_t, + const unsigned char *, size_t ); + void *p_cookie; /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /** Callback to create & write a session ticket */ + int (*f_ticket_write)( void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *, + unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *, uint32_t * ); + /** Callback to parse a session ticket into a session structure */ + int (*f_ticket_parse)( void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_ticket; /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ + int (*f_export_keys)( void *, const unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t ); + /** Callback to export key block, master secret, + * tls_prf and random bytes. Should replace f_export_keys */ + int (*f_export_keys_ext)( void *, const unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t, + const unsigned char[32], const unsigned char[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types ); + void *p_export_keys; /*!< context for key export callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + size_t cid_len; /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *cert_profile; /*!< verification profile */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb; + void *p_ca_cb; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign_start; /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt_start; /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume; /*!< resume asynchronous operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel; /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */ + void *p_async_config_data; /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + const int *sig_hashes; /*!< allowed signature hashes */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list; /*!< allowed curves */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_mpi dhm_P; /*!< prime modulus for DHM */ + mbedtls_mpi dhm_G; /*!< generator for DHM */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field + * should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been + * configured, this has value \c 0. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + unsigned char *psk; /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should + * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK + * have been configured, this has value NULL. */ + size_t psk_len; /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL. */ + + unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * This is set if and only if either + * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */ + size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< The length of PSK identity. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque + * is not \c 0. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const char **alpn_list; /*!< ordered list of protocols */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + /*! ordered list of supported srtp profile */ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *dtls_srtp_profile_list; + /*! number of supported profiles */ + size_t dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +}; + +struct mbedtls_ssl_context +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; /*!< configuration information */ + + /* + * Miscellaneous + */ + int state; /*!< SSL handshake: current state */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renego_status; /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */ + int renego_records_seen; /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS, + number of retransmissions of request if + renego_max_records is < 0 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + int major_ver; /*!< equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 */ + int minor_ver; /*!< either 0 (SSL3) or 1 (TLS1.0) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + unsigned badmac_seen; /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */ +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send; /*!< Callback for network send */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv; /*!< Callback for network receive */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout; + /*!< Callback for network receive with timeout */ + + void *p_bio; /*!< context for I/O operations */ + + /* + * Session layer + */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session_in; /*!< current session data (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session_out; /*!< current session data (out) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session; /*!< negotiated session data */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session_negotiate; /*!< session data in negotiation */ + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake; /*!< params required only during + the handshake process */ + + /* + * Record layer transformations + */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_in; /*!< current transform params (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_out; /*!< current transform params (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform; /*!< negotiated transform params */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_negotiate; /*!< transform params in negotiation */ + + /* + * Timers + */ + void *p_timer; /*!< context for the timer callbacks */ + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer; /*!< set timer callback */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer; /*!< get timer callback */ + + /* + * Record layer (incoming data) + */ + unsigned char *in_buf; /*!< input buffer */ + unsigned char *in_ctr; /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter + TLS: maintained by us + DTLS: read from peer */ + unsigned char *in_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char *in_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + unsigned char *in_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *in_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *in_msg; /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */ + unsigned char *in_offt; /*!< read offset in application data */ + + int in_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t in_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t in_left; /*!< amount of data read so far */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len; /*!< length of input buffer */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint16_t in_epoch; /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */ + size_t next_record_offset; /*!< offset of the next record in datagram + (equal to in_left if none) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + uint64_t in_window_top; /*!< last validated record seq_num */ + uint64_t in_window; /*!< bitmask for replay detection */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + + size_t in_hslen; /*!< current handshake message length, + including the handshake header */ + int nb_zero; /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ + + int keep_current_message; /*!< drop or reuse current message + on next call to record layer? */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint8_t disable_datagram_packing; /*!< Disable packing multiple records + * within a single datagram. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Record layer (outgoing data) + */ + unsigned char *out_buf; /*!< output buffer */ + unsigned char *out_ctr; /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */ + unsigned char *out_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char *out_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + unsigned char *out_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *out_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *out_msg; /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */ + + int out_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t out_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t out_left; /*!< amount of data not yet written */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len; /*!< length of output buffer */ +#endif + + unsigned char cur_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint16_t mtu; /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + unsigned char *compress_buf; /*!< zlib data buffer */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + signed char split_done; /*!< current record already split? */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ + + /* + * PKI layer + */ + int client_auth; /*!< flag for client auth. */ + + /* + * User settings + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + char *hostname; /*!< expected peer CN for verification + (and SNI if available) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const char *alpn_chosen; /*!< negotiated protocol */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + /* + * use_srtp extension + */ + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info dtls_srtp_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + /* + * Information for DTLS hello verify + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + unsigned char *cli_id; /*!< transport-level ID of the client */ + size_t cli_id_len; /*!< length of cli_id */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* + * Secure renegotiation + */ + /* needed to know when to send extension on server */ + int secure_renegotiation; /*!< does peer support legacy or + secure renegotiation */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + size_t verify_data_len; /*!< length of verify data stored */ + char own_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ + char peer_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* CID configuration to use in subsequent handshakes. */ + + /*! The next incoming CID, chosen by the user and applying to + * all subsequent handshakes. This may be different from the + * CID currently used in case the user has re-configured the CID + * after an initial handshake. */ + unsigned char own_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ]; + uint8_t own_cid_len; /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */ + uint8_t negotiate_cid; /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should + * be negotiated in the next handshake or not. + * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED + * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( 1 ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ + +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, + size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, + size_t maclen); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int direction ); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +/** + * \brief Return the name of the ciphersuite associated with the + * given ID + * + * \param ciphersuite_id SSL ciphersuite ID + * + * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( const int ciphersuite_id ); + +/** + * \brief Return the ID of the ciphersuite associated with the + * given name + * + * \param ciphersuite_name SSL ciphersuite name + * + * \return the ID with the ciphersuite or 0 if not found + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( const char *ciphersuite_name ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize an SSL context + * Just makes the context ready for mbedtls_ssl_setup() or + * mbedtls_ssl_free() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Set up an SSL context for use + * + * \note No copy of the configuration context is made, it can be + * shared by many mbedtls_ssl_context structures. + * + * \warning The conf structure will be accessed during the session. + * It must not be modified or freed as long as the session + * is active. + * + * \warning This function must be called exactly once per context. + * Calling mbedtls_ssl_setup again is not supported, even + * if no session is active. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param conf SSL configuration to use + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if + * memory allocation failed + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); + +/** + * \brief Reset an already initialized SSL context for re-use + * while retaining application-set variables, function + * pointers and data. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Set the current endpoint type + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param endpoint must be MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint ); + +/** + * \brief Set the transport type (TLS or DTLS). + * Default: TLS + * + * \note For DTLS, you must either provide a recv callback that + * doesn't block, or one that handles timeouts, see + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). You also need to provide timer + * callbacks with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param transport transport type: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport ); + +/** + * \brief Set the certificate verification mode + * Default: NONE on server, REQUIRED on client + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param authmode can be: + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE: peer certificate is not checked + * (default on server) + * (insecure on client) + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL: peer certificate is checked, however the + * handshake continues even if verification failed; + * mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() can be called after the + * handshake is complete. + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED: peer *must* present a valid certificate, + * handshake is aborted if verification failed. + * (default on client) + * + * \note On client, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED is the recommended mode. + * With MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, the user needs to call mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() at + * the right time(s), which may not be obvious, while REQUIRED always perform + * the verification as soon as possible. For example, REQUIRED was protecting + * against the "triple handshake" attack even before it was found. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Set the verification callback (Optional). + * + * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each + * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted + * root. For more information, please see the documentation of + * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). + * + * \note For per context callbacks and contexts, please use + * mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() instead. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to use. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification. + * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief Set the random number generator callback + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Set the debug callback + * + * The callback has the following argument: + * void * opaque context for the callback + * int debug level + * const char * file name + * int line number + * const char * message + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param f_dbg debug function + * \param p_dbg debug parameter + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), + void *p_dbg ); + +/** + * \brief Set the underlying BIO callbacks for write, read and + * read-with-timeout. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param p_bio parameter (context) shared by BIO callbacks + * \param f_send write callback + * \param f_recv read callback + * \param f_recv_timeout blocking read callback with timeout. + * + * \note One of f_recv or f_recv_timeout can be NULL, in which case + * the other is used. If both are non-NULL, f_recv_timeout is + * used and f_recv is ignored (as if it were NULL). + * + * \note The two most common use cases are: + * - non-blocking I/O, f_recv != NULL, f_recv_timeout == NULL + * - blocking I/O, f_recv == NULL, f_recv_timeout != NULL + * + * \note For DTLS, you need to provide either a non-NULL + * f_recv_timeout callback, or a f_recv that doesn't block. + * + * \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_send_t, + * \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_t and \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t for + * the conventions those callbacks must follow. + * + * \note On some platforms, net_sockets.c provides + * \c mbedtls_net_send(), \c mbedtls_net_recv() and + * \c mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() that are suitable to be used + * here. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_bio, + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + + +/** + * \brief Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID) + * extension in the next handshake. + * + * Reference: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of + * DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the + * underlying transport (changed IP and Port metadata) by + * adding explicit connection identifiers (CIDs) to the + * headers of encrypted DTLS records. The desired CIDs are + * configured by the application layer and are exchanged in + * new `ClientHello` / `ServerHello` extensions during the + * handshake, where each side indicates the CID it wants the + * peer to use when writing encrypted messages. The CIDs are + * put to use once records get encrypted: the stack discards + * any incoming records that don't include the configured CID + * in their header, and adds the peer's requested CID to the + * headers of outgoing messages. + * + * This API enables or disables the use of the CID extension + * in the next handshake and sets the value of the CID to + * be used for incoming messages. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure. This must be initialized. + * \param enable This value determines whether the CID extension should + * be used or not. Possible values are: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED to enable the use of the CID. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (default) to disable the use + * of the CID. + * \param own_cid The address of the readable buffer holding the CID we want + * the peer to use when sending encrypted messages to us. + * This may be \c NULL if \p own_cid_len is \c 0. + * This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * \param own_cid_len The length of \p own_cid. + * This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * + * \note The value of \p own_cid_len must match the value of the + * \c len parameter passed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid() + * when configuring the ::mbedtls_ssl_config that \p ssl + * is bound to. + * + * \note This CID configuration applies to subsequent handshakes + * performed on the SSL context \p ssl, but does not trigger + * one. You still have to call `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()` + * (for the initial handshake) or `mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()` + * (for a renegotiation handshake) explicitly after a + * successful call to this function to run the handshake. + * + * \note This call cannot guarantee that the use of the CID + * will be successfully negotiated in the next handshake, + * because the peer might not support it. Specifically: + * - On the Client, enabling the use of the CID through + * this call implies that the `ClientHello` in the next + * handshake will include the CID extension, thereby + * offering the use of the CID to the server. Only if + * the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too, + * the CID extension will actually be put to use. + * - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through + * this call implies that that the server will look for + * the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client, + * and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its + * `ServerHello`. + * + * \note To check whether the use of the CID was negotiated + * after the subsequent handshake has completed, please + * use the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(). + * + * \warning If the use of the CID extension is enabled in this call + * and the subsequent handshake negotiates its use, Mbed TLS + * will silently drop every packet whose CID does not match + * the CID configured in \p own_cid. It is the responsibility + * of the user to adapt the underlying transport to take care + * of CID-based demultiplexing before handing datagrams to + * Mbed TLS. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the CID configuration + * applies to the next handshake. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int enable, + unsigned char const *own_cid, + size_t own_cid_len ); + +/** + * \brief Get information about the use of the CID extension + * in the current connection. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension + * is currently in use or not. If the CID is in use, + * `*enabled` is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + * otherwise, it is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * \param peer_cid The address of the buffer in which to store the CID + * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used). + * This may be \c NULL in case the value of peer CID + * isn't needed. If it is not \c NULL, \p peer_cid_len + * must not be \c NULL. + * \param peer_cid_len The address at which to store the size of the CID + * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used). + * This is also the number of Bytes in \p peer_cid that + * have been written. + * This may be \c NULL in case the length of the peer CID + * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p peer_cid must be + * \c NULL, too. + * + * \note This applies to the state of the CID negotiated in + * the last complete handshake. If a handshake is in + * progress, this function will attempt to complete + * the handshake first. + * + * \note If CID extensions have been exchanged but both client + * and server chose to use an empty CID, this function + * sets `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED + * (the rationale for this is that the resulting + * communication is the same as if the CID extensions + * hadn't been used). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ], + size_t *peer_cid_len ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +/** + * \brief Set the Maximum Transport Unit (MTU). + * Special value: 0 means unset (no limit). + * This represents the maximum size of a datagram payload + * handled by the transport layer (usually UDP) as determined + * by the network link and stack. In practice, this controls + * the maximum size datagram the DTLS layer will pass to the + * \c f_send() callback set using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). + * + * \note The limit on datagram size is converted to a limit on + * record payload by subtracting the current overhead of + * encapsulation and encryption/authentication if any. + * + * \note This can be called at any point during the connection, for + * example when a Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU) + * estimate becomes available from other sources, + * such as lower (or higher) protocol layers. + * + * \note This setting only controls the size of the packets we send, + * and does not restrict the size of the datagrams we're + * willing to receive. Client-side, you can request the + * server to use smaller records with \c + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(). + * + * \note If both a MTU and a maximum fragment length have been + * configured (or negotiated with the peer), the resulting + * lower limit on record payload (see first note) is used. + * + * \note This can only be used to decrease the maximum size + * of datagrams (hence records, see first note) sent. It + * cannot be used to increase the maximum size of records over + * the limit set by #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will + * result in an error when trying to send data. + * + * \note Using record compression together with a non-zero MTU value + * will result in an error when trying to send data. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Set a connection-specific verification callback (optional). + * + * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each + * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted + * root. For more information, please see the documentation of + * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). + * + * \note This call is analogous to mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() but + * binds the verification callback and context to an SSL context + * as opposed to an SSL configuration. + * If mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() and mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() + * are both used, mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() takes precedence. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification. + * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief Set the timeout period for mbedtls_ssl_read() + * (Default: no timeout.) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param timeout Timeout value in milliseconds. + * Use 0 for no timeout (default). + * + * \note With blocking I/O, this will only work if a non-NULL + * \c f_recv_timeout was set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). + * With non-blocking I/O, this will only work if timer + * callbacks were set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). + * + * \note With non-blocking I/O, you may also skip this function + * altogether and handle timeouts at the application layer. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) +/** + * \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record + * that has not been seen before. (DTLS only). + * + * This function does not change the user-visible state + * of the SSL context. Its sole purpose is to provide + * an indication of the legitimacy of an incoming record. + * + * This can be useful e.g. in distributed server environments + * using the DTLS Connection ID feature, in which connections + * might need to be passed between service instances on a change + * of peer address, but where such disruptive operations should + * only happen after the validity of incoming records has been + * confirmed. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param buf The address of the buffer holding the record to be checked. + * This must be a read/write buffer of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \note This routine only checks whether the provided buffer begins + * with a valid and authentic record that has not been seen + * before, but does not check potential data following the + * initial record. In particular, it is possible to pass DTLS + * datagrams containing multiple records, in which case only + * the first record is checked. + * + * \note This function modifies the input buffer \p buf. If you need + * to preserve the original record, you have to maintain a copy. + * + * \return \c 0 if the record is valid and authentic and has not been + * seen before. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if the check completed + * successfully but the record was found to be not authentic. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the check completed + * successfully but the record was found to be invalid for + * a reason different from authenticity checking. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD if the check completed + * successfully but the record was found to be unexpected + * in the state of the SSL context, including replayed records. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * In this case, the SSL context becomes unusable and needs + * to be freed or reset before reuse. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + +/** + * \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.) + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param p_timer parameter (context) shared by timer callbacks + * \param f_set_timer set timer callback + * \param f_get_timer get timer callback. Must return: + * + * \note See the documentation of \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t and + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t for the conventions this pair of + * callbacks must follow. + * + * \note On some platforms, timing.c provides + * \c mbedtls_timing_set_delay() and + * \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay() that are suitable for using + * here, except if using an event-driven style. + * + * \note See also the "DTLS tutorial" article in our knowledge base. + * https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/dtls-tutorial + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: generate and write session ticket + * + * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do. + * This callback should generate an encrypted and + * authenticated ticket for the session and write it to the + * output buffer. Here, ticket means the opaque ticket part + * of the NewSessionTicket structure of RFC 5077. + * + * \param p_ticket Context for the callback + * \param session SSL session to be written in the ticket + * \param start Start of the output buffer + * \param end End of the output buffer + * \param tlen On exit, holds the length written + * \param lifetime On exit, holds the lifetime of the ticket in seconds + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t( void *p_ticket, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *tlen, + uint32_t *lifetime ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +/** + * \brief Callback type: Export key block and master secret + * + * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS + * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and + * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys + * should not be used directly except as an input to a key + * derivation function. + * + * \param p_expkey Context for the callback + * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes) + * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3 + * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). + * \param maclen MAC length + * \param keylen Key length + * \param ivlen IV length + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t( void *p_expkey, + const unsigned char *ms, + const unsigned char *kb, + size_t maclen, + size_t keylen, + size_t ivlen ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: Export key block, master secret, + * handshake randbytes and the tls_prf function + * used to derive keys. + * + * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS + * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and + * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys + * should not be used directly except as an input to a key + * derivation function. + * + * \param p_expkey Context for the callback. + * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes). + * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3. + * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). + * \param maclen MAC length. + * \param keylen Key length. + * \param ivlen IV length. + * \param client_random The client random bytes. + * \param server_random The server random bytes. + * \param tls_prf_type The tls_prf enum type. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t( void *p_expkey, + const unsigned char *ms, + const unsigned char *kb, + size_t maclen, + size_t keylen, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char client_random[32], + const unsigned char server_random[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +/** + * \brief Callback type: parse and load session ticket + * + * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do. + * This callback should parse a session ticket as generated + * by the corresponding mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t function, + * and, if the ticket is authentic and valid, load the + * session. + * + * \note The implementation is allowed to modify the first len + * bytes of the input buffer, eg to use it as a temporary + * area for the decrypted ticket contents. + * + * \param p_ticket Context for the callback + * \param session SSL session to be loaded + * \param buf Start of the buffer containing the ticket + * \param len Length of the ticket. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if not authentic, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED if expired, or + * any other non-zero code for other failures. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t( void *p_ticket, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Configure SSL session ticket callbacks (server only). + * (Default: none.) + * + * \note On server, session tickets are enabled by providing + * non-NULL callbacks. + * + * \note On client, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param f_ticket_write Callback for writing a ticket + * \param f_ticket_parse Callback for parsing a ticket + * \param p_ticket Context shared by the two callbacks + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, + void *p_ticket ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +/** + * \brief Configure key export callback. + * (Default: none.) + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param f_export_keys Callback for exporting keys + * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys ); + +/** + * \brief Configure extended key export callback. + * (Default: none.) + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t. + * \warning Exported key material must not be used for any purpose + * before the (D)TLS handshake is completed + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param f_export_keys_ext Callback for exporting keys + * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, + void *p_export_keys ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +/** + * \brief Configure asynchronous private key operation callbacks. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param f_async_sign Callback to start a signature operation. See + * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t + * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the + * external processor does not support any signature + * operation; in this case the private key object + * associated with the certificate will be used. + * \param f_async_decrypt Callback to start a decryption operation. See + * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t + * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the + * external processor does not support any decryption + * operation; in this case the private key object + * associated with the certificate will be used. + * \param f_async_resume Callback to resume an asynchronous operation. See + * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t + * for more information. This may not be \c NULL unless + * \p f_async_sign and \p f_async_decrypt are both + * \c NULL. + * \param f_async_cancel Callback to cancel an asynchronous operation. See + * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t + * for more information. This may be \c NULL if + * no cleanup is needed. + * \param config_data A pointer to configuration data which can be + * retrieved with + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(). The + * library stores this value without dereferencing it. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, + void *config_data ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the configuration data set by + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \return The configuration data set by + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). + */ +void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context. + * + * \note This function may only be called while a handshake + * is in progress. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to access. + * + * \return The asynchronous operation user context that was last + * set during the current handshake. If + * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() has not yet been + * called during the current handshake, this function returns + * \c NULL. + */ +void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context. + * + * \note This function may only be called while a handshake + * is in progress. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to access. + * \param ctx The new value of the asynchronous operation user context. + * Call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() later during the + * same handshake to retrieve this value. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +/** + * \brief Callback type: generate a cookie + * + * \param ctx Context for the callback + * \param p Buffer to write to, + * must be updated to point right after the cookie + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the output buffer + * \param info Client ID info that was passed to + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() + * \param ilen Length of info in bytes + * + * \return The callback must return 0 on success, + * or a negative error code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t( void *ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: verify a cookie + * + * \param ctx Context for the callback + * \param cookie Cookie to verify + * \param clen Length of cookie + * \param info Client ID info that was passed to + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() + * \param ilen Length of info in bytes + * + * \return The callback must return 0 if cookie is valid, + * or a negative error code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t clen, + const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Register callbacks for DTLS cookies + * (Server only. DTLS only.) + * + * Default: dummy callbacks that fail, in order to force you to + * register working callbacks (and initialize their context). + * + * To disable HelloVerifyRequest, register NULL callbacks. + * + * \warning Disabling hello verification allows your server to be used + * for amplification in DoS attacks against other hosts. + * Only disable if you known this can't happen in your + * particular environment. + * + * \note See comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() about handling + * the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED that is expected + * on the first handshake attempt when this is enabled. + * + * \note This is also necessary to handle client reconnection from + * the same port as described in RFC 6347 section 4.2.8 (only + * the variant with cookies is supported currently). See + * comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_read() for details. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param f_cookie_write Cookie write callback + * \param f_cookie_check Cookie check callback + * \param p_cookie Context for both callbacks + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, + void *p_cookie ); + +/** + * \brief Set client's transport-level identification info. + * (Server only. DTLS only.) + * + * This is usually the IP address (and port), but could be + * anything identify the client depending on the underlying + * network stack. Used for HelloVerifyRequest with DTLS. + * This is *not* used to route the actual packets. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param info Transport-level info identifying the client (eg IP + port) + * \param ilen Length of info in bytes + * + * \note An internal copy is made, so the info buffer can be reused. + * + * \return 0 on success, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used on client, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if out of memory. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *info, + size_t ilen ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +/** + * \brief Enable or disable anti-replay protection for DTLS. + * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.) + * Default: enabled. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param mode MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED. + * + * \warning Disabling this is a security risk unless the application + * protocol handles duplicated packets in a safe way. You + * should not disable this without careful consideration. + * However, if your application already detects duplicated + * packets and needs information about them to adjust its + * transmission strategy, then you'll want to disable this. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) +/** + * \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC + * before terminating the connection. + * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.) + * Default: 0 (disabled). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param limit Limit, or 0 to disable. + * + * \note If the limit is N, then the connection is terminated when + * the Nth non-authentic record is seen. + * + * \note Records with an invalid header are not counted, only the + * ones going through the authentication-decryption phase. + * + * \note This is a security trade-off related to the fact that it's + * often relatively easy for an active attacker to inject UDP + * datagrams. On one hand, setting a low limit here makes it + * easier for such an attacker to forcibly terminated a + * connection. On the other hand, a high limit or no limit + * might make us waste resources checking authentication on + * many bogus packets. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +/** + * \brief Allow or disallow packing of multiple handshake records + * within a single datagram. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure. + * \param allow_packing This determines whether datagram packing may + * be used or not. A value of \c 0 means that every + * record will be sent in a separate datagram; a + * value of \c 1 means that, if space permits, + * multiple handshake messages (including CCS) belonging to + * a single flight may be packed within a single datagram. + * + * \note This is enabled by default and should only be disabled + * for test purposes, or if datagram packing causes + * interoperability issues with peers that don't support it. + * + * \note Allowing datagram packing reduces the network load since + * there's less overhead if multiple messages share the same + * datagram. Also, it increases the handshake efficiency + * since messages belonging to a single datagram will not + * be reordered in transit, and so future message buffering + * or flight retransmission (if no buffering is used) as + * means to deal with reordering are needed less frequently. + * + * \note Application records are not affected by this option and + * are currently always sent in separate datagrams. + * + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned allow_packing ); + +/** + * \brief Set retransmit timeout values for the DTLS handshake. + * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param min Initial timeout value in milliseconds. + * Default: 1000 (1 second). + * \param max Maximum timeout value in milliseconds. + * Default: 60000 (60 seconds). + * + * \note Default values are from RFC 6347 section 4.2.4.1. + * + * \note The 'min' value should typically be slightly above the + * expected round-trip time to your peer, plus whatever time + * it takes for the peer to process the message. For example, + * if your RTT is about 600ms and you peer needs up to 1s to + * do the cryptographic operations in the handshake, then you + * should set 'min' slightly above 1600. Lower values of 'min' + * might cause spurious resends which waste network resources, + * while larger value of 'min' will increase overall latency + * on unreliable network links. + * + * \note The more unreliable your network connection is, the larger + * your max / min ratio needs to be in order to achieve + * reliable handshakes. + * + * \note Messages are retransmitted up to log2(ceil(max/min)) times. + * For example, if min = 1s and max = 5s, the retransmit plan + * goes: send ... 1s -> resend ... 2s -> resend ... 4s -> + * resend ... 5s -> give up and return a timeout error. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min, uint32_t max ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Set the session cache callbacks (server-side only) + * If not set, no session resuming is done (except if session + * tickets are enabled too). + * + * The session cache has the responsibility to check for stale + * entries based on timeout. See RFC 5246 for recommendations. + * + * Warning: session.peer_cert is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer on + * connection shutdown, so do not cache the pointer! Either set + * it to NULL or make a full copy of the certificate. + * + * The get callback is called once during the initial handshake + * to enable session resuming. The get function has the + * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_session *session) + * If a valid entry is found, it should fill the master of + * the session object with the cached values and return 0, + * return 1 otherwise. Optionally peer_cert can be set as well + * if it is properly present in cache entry. + * + * The set callback is called once during the initial handshake + * to enable session resuming after the entire handshake has + * been finished. The set function has the following parameters: + * (void *parameter, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session). The function + * should create a cache entry for future retrieval based on + * the data in the session structure and should keep in mind + * that the mbedtls_ssl_session object presented (and all its referenced + * data) is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer when the connection is + * terminated. It is recommended to add metadata to determine if + * an entry is still valid in the future. Return 0 if + * successfully cached, return 1 otherwise. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param p_cache parameter (context) for both callbacks + * \param f_get_cache session get callback + * \param f_set_cache session set callback + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p_cache, + int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), + int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Request resumption of session (client-side only) + * Session data is copied from presented session structure. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param session session context + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or + * arguments are otherwise invalid + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/** + * \brief Load serialized session data into a session structure. + * On client, this can be used for loading saved sessions + * before resuming them with mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). + * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations + * of session cache or session tickets. + * + * \warning If a peer certificate chain is associated with the session, + * the serialized state will only contain the peer's + * end-entity certificate and the result of the chain + * verification (unless verification was disabled), but not + * the rest of the chain. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * \see mbedtls_ssl_set_session() + * + * \param session The session structure to be populated. It must have been + * initialised with mbedtls_ssl_session_init() but not + * populated yet. + * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized session data. It must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data + * was generated in a different version or configuration of + * Mbed TLS. + * \return Another negative value for other kinds of errors (for + * example, unsupported features in the embedded certificate). + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Save session structure as serialized data in a buffer. + * On client, this can be used for saving session data, + * potentially in non-volatile storage, for resuming later. + * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations + * of session cache or session tickets. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load() + * \see mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer() + * + * \param session The session structure to be saved. + * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a + * writeable buffer of at least \p len bytes, or may be \c + * NULL if \p len is \c 0. + * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf. + * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have + * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * + * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of + * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible + * to determine the necessary size by calling this function + * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ); + +/** + * \brief Get a pointer to the current session structure, for example + * to serialize it. + * + * \warning Ownership of the session remains with the SSL context, and + * the returned pointer is only guaranteed to be valid until + * the next API call operating on the same \p ssl context. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * + * \param ssl The SSL context. + * + * \return A pointer to the current session if successful. + * \return \c NULL if no session is active. + */ +const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference + * order. First in the list has the highest preference. + * (Overrides all version-specific lists) + * + * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain + * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. + * + * Note: The server uses its own preferences + * over the preference of the client unless + * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE is defined! + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL 1 +/** + * \brief Specify the length of Connection IDs for incoming + * encrypted DTLS records, as well as the behaviour + * on unexpected CIDs. + * + * By default, the CID length is set to \c 0, + * and unexpected CIDs are silently ignored. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify. + * \param len The length in Bytes of the CID fields in encrypted + * DTLS records using the CID mechanism. This must + * not be larger than #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX. + * \param ignore_other_cids This determines the stack's behaviour when + * receiving a record with an unexpected CID. + * Possible values are: + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE + * In this case, the record is silently ignored. + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL + * In this case, the stack fails with the specific + * error code #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID. + * + * \note The CID specification allows implementations to either + * use a common length for all incoming connection IDs or + * allow variable-length incoming IDs. Mbed TLS currently + * requires a common length for all connections sharing the + * same SSL configuration; this allows simpler parsing of + * record headers. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p own_cid_len + * is too large. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len, + int ignore_other_cids ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +/** + * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the + * preference order for a specific version of the protocol. + * (Only useful on the server side) + * + * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain + * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites + * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + * supported) + * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * + * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 + * and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites, + int major, int minor ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Set the X.509 security profile used for verification + * + * \note The restrictions are enforced for all certificates in the + * chain. However, signatures in the handshake are not covered + * by this setting but by \b mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param profile Profile to use + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ); + +/** + * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for notes regarding the + * parameters ca_chain (maps to trust_ca for that function) + * and ca_crl. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs) + * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/** + * \brief Set the trusted certificate callback. + * + * This API allows to register the set of trusted certificates + * through a callback, instead of a linked list as configured + * by mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(). + * + * This is useful for example in contexts where a large number + * of CAs are used, and the inefficiency of maintaining them + * in a linked list cannot be tolerated. It is also useful when + * the set of trusted CAs needs to be modified frequently. + * + * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t` for + * more information. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. + * \param f_ca_cb The trusted certificate callback to use when verifying + * certificate chains. + * \param p_ca_cb The context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb (for example, + * a reference to a trusted CA database). + * + * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(): + * Any call to this function overwrites the values set through + * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() or + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(). + * + * \note This API is incompatible with CA indication in + * CertificateRequest messages: A server-side SSL context which + * is bound to an SSL configuration that uses a CA callback + * configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), and which requires + * client authentication, will send an empty CA list in the + * corresponding CertificateRequest message. + * + * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(): + * If an SSL context is bound to an SSL configuration which uses + * CA callbacks configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), then + * calls to mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() have no effect. + * + * \note The use of this API disables the use of restartable ECC + * during X.509 CRT signature verification (but doesn't affect + * other uses). + * + * \warning This API is incompatible with the use of CRLs. Any call to + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() unsets CRLs configured through + * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(). + * + * \warning In multi-threaded environments, the callback \p f_ca_cb + * must be thread-safe, and it is the user's responsibility + * to guarantee this (for example through a mutex + * contained in the callback context pointed to by \p p_ca_cb). + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +/** + * \brief Set own certificate chain and private key + * + * \note own_cert should contain in order from the bottom up your + * certificate chain. The top certificate (self-signed) + * can be omitted. + * + * \note On server, this function can be called multiple times to + * provision more than one cert/key pair (eg one ECDSA, one + * RSA with SHA-256, one RSA with SHA-1). An adequate + * certificate will be selected according to the client's + * advertised capabilities. In case multiple certificates are + * adequate, preference is given to the one set by the first + * call to this function, then second, etc. + * + * \note On client, only the first call has any effect. That is, + * only one client certificate can be provisioned. The + * server's preferences in its CertificateRequest message will + * be ignored and our only cert will be sent regardless of + * whether it matches those preferences - the server can then + * decide what it wants to do with it. + * + * \note The provided \p pk_key needs to match the public key in the + * first certificate in \p own_cert, or all handshakes using + * that certificate will fail. It is your responsibility + * to ensure that; this function will not perform any check. + * You may use mbedtls_pk_check_pair() in order to perform + * this check yourself, but be aware that this function can + * be computationally expensive on some key types. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param own_cert own public certificate chain + * \param pk_key own private key + * + * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Configure a pre-shared key (PSK) and identity + * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually + * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. + * + * \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback + * takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function. + * + * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. + * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() more + * than once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. + * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting + * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, + * but feedback is welcomed. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. + * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use. + * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. + * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity. + * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity + * in bytes. + * + * \note The PSK and its identity are copied internally and + * hence need not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime + * of the SSL configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Configure an opaque pre-shared key (PSK) and identity + * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually + * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. + * + * \note An opaque PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in + * the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK + * configured by this function. + * + * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. + * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() more than + * once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. + * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting + * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, + * but feedback is welcomed. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. + * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. + * Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully + * called again, the key slot \p psk must be populated with a + * key of type PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy + * allows its use for the key derivation algorithm applied + * in the handshake. + * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity. + * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity + * in bytes. + * + * \note The PSK identity hint is copied internally and hence need + * not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime of the + * SSL configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + psa_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/** + * \brief Set the pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake. + * + * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback, + * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(). + * + * \note A PSK set by this function takes precedence over a PSK + * configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for. + * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key. + * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Set an opaque pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake. + * + * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback, + * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(). + * + * \note An opaque PSK set by this function takes precedence over an + * opaque PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for. + * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. + * For the duration of the current handshake, the key slot + * must be populated with a key of type + * PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy allows its + * use for the key derivation algorithm + * applied in the handshake. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_key_id_t psk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/** + * \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only). + * + * If set, the PSK callback is called for each + * handshake where a PSK-based ciphersuite was negotiated. + * The caller provides the identity received and wants to + * receive the actual PSK data and length. + * + * The callback has the following parameters: + * - \c void*: The opaque pointer \p p_psk. + * - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which + * the operation applies. + * - \c const unsigned char*: The PSK identity + * selected by the client. + * - \c size_t: The length of the PSK identity + * selected by the client. + * + * If a valid PSK identity is found, the callback should use + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() + * on the SSL context to set the correct PSK and return \c 0. + * Any other return value will result in a denied PSK identity. + * + * \note A dynamic PSK (i.e. set by the PSK callback) takes + * precedence over a static PSK (i.e. set by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()). + * This means that if you set a PSK callback using this + * function, you don't need to set a PSK using + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()). + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. + * \param f_psk The callback for selecting and setting the PSK based + * in the PSK identity chosen by the client. + * \param p_psk A pointer to an opaque structure to be passed to + * the callback, for example a PSK store. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_psk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values, + * read as hexadecimal strings (server-side only) + * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus + * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator + * + * \deprecated Superseded by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin. + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const char *dhm_P, + const char *dhm_G ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values + * from big-endian binary presentations. + * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]_BIN) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus in big-endian binary form + * \param P_len Length of DHM modulus + * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator in big-endian binary form + * \param G_len Length of DHM generator + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, + const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len ); + +/** + * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values, + * read from existing context (server-side only) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param dhm_ctx Diffie-Hellman-Merkle context + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters. + * (Client-side only.) + * (Default: 1024 bits.) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param bitlen Minimum bit length of the DHM prime + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned int bitlen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * \brief Set the allowed curves in order of preference. + * (Default: all defined curves in order of decreasing size, + * except that Montgomery curves come last. This order + * is likely to change in a future version.) + * + * On server: this only affects selection of the ECDHE curve; + * the curves used for ECDH and ECDSA are determined by the + * list of available certificates instead. + * + * On client: this affects the list of curves offered for any + * use. The server can override our preference order. + * + * Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in + * ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate. + * + * \note This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the + * certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile() + * for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key + * will be accepted only if it is allowed both by this list + * and by the cert profile. + * + * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference + * (preferred curve first). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param curves Ordered list of allowed curves, + * terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake. + * (Default: all SHA-2 hashes, largest first. Also SHA-1 if + * the compile-time option + * `MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE` is enabled.) + * + * \note This only affects which hashes are offered and can be used + * for signatures during the handshake. Hashes for message + * authentication and the TLS PRF are controlled by the + * ciphersuite, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). Hashes + * used for certificate signature are controlled by the + * verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(). + * + * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference + * (preferred hash first). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param hashes Ordered list of allowed signature hashes, + * terminated by \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Set or reset the hostname to check against the received + * server certificate. It sets the ServerName TLS extension, + * too, if that extension is enabled. (client-side only) + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param hostname the server hostname, may be NULL to clear hostname + + * \note Maximum hostname length MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN. + * + * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on + * allocation failure, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * too long input hostname. + * + * Hostname set to the one provided on success (cleared + * when NULL). On allocation failure hostname is cleared. + * On too long input failure, old hostname is unchanged. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +/** + * \brief Set own certificate and key for the current handshake + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() but for use within + * the SNI callback. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param own_cert own public certificate chain + * \param pk_key own private key + * + * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ); + +/** + * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate for the + * current handshake + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() but for use within + * the SNI callback. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs) + * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ); + +/** + * \brief Set authmode for the current handshake. + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode() but for use within + * the SNI callback. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param authmode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode ); + +/** + * \brief Set server side ServerName TLS extension callback + * (optional, server-side only). + * + * If set, the ServerName callback is called whenever the + * server receives a ServerName TLS extension from the client + * during a handshake. The ServerName callback has the + * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + * const unsigned char *hostname, size_t len). If a suitable + * certificate is found, the callback must set the + * certificate(s) and key(s) to use with \c + * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() (can be called repeatedly), + * and may optionally adjust the CA and associated CRL with \c + * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() as well as the client + * authentication mode with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(), + * then must return 0. If no matching name is found, the + * callback must either set a default cert, or + * return non-zero to abort the handshake at this point. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param f_sni verification function + * \param p_sni verification parameter + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_sni ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set the EC J-PAKE password for current handshake. + * + * \note An internal copy is made, and destroyed as soon as the + * handshake is completed, or when the SSL context is reset or + * freed. + * + * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place + * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret) + * \param pw_len length of pw in bytes + * + * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len ); +#endif /*MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +/** + * \brief Set the supported Application Layer Protocols. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param protos Pointer to a NULL-terminated list of supported protocols, + * in decreasing preference order. The pointer to the list is + * recorded by the library for later reference as required, so + * the lifetime of the table must be at least as long as the + * lifetime of the SSL configuration structure. + * + * \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos ); + +/** + * \brief Get the name of the negotiated Application Layer Protocol. + * This function should be called after the handshake is + * completed. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Protocol name, or NULL if no protocol was negotiated. + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile profile ) +{ + switch( profile ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80" ); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" ); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" ); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32" ); + default: break; + } + return( "" ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +/** + * \brief Manage support for mki(master key id) value + * in use_srtp extension. + * MKI is an optional part of SRTP used for key management + * and re-keying. See RFC3711 section 3.1 for details. + * The default value is + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to manage mki support. + * \param support_mki_value Enable or disable mki usage. Values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED + * or #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value ); + +/** + * \brief Set the supported DTLS-SRTP protection profiles. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param profiles Pointer to a List of MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET terminated + * supported protection profiles + * in decreasing preference order. + * The pointer to the list is recorded by the library + * for later reference as required, so the lifetime + * of the table must be at least as long as the lifetime + * of the SSL configuration structure. + * The list must not hold more than + * MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH elements + * (excluding the terminating MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET). + * + * \return 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the list of + * protection profiles is incorrect. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles + ( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles ); + +/** + * \brief Set the mki_value for the current DTLS-SRTP session. + * + * \param ssl SSL context to use. + * \param mki_value The MKI value to set. + * \param mki_len The length of the MKI value. + * + * \note This function is relevant on client side only. + * The server discovers the mki value during handshake. + * A mki value set on server side using this function + * is ignored. + * + * \return 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len ); +/** + * \brief Get the negotiated DTLS-SRTP information: + * Protection profile and MKI value. + * + * \warning This function must be called after the handshake is + * completed. The value returned by this function must + * not be trusted or acted upon before the handshake completes. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \param dtls_srtp_info The negotiated DTLS-SRTP information: + * - Protection profile in use. + * A direct mapping of the iana defined value for protection + * profile on an uint16_t. + http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + * #MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET if the use of SRTP was not negotiated + * or peer's Hello packet was not parsed yet. + * - mki size and value( if size is > 0 ). + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side + * and/or accepted at the server side + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION) + * + * \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions. + * + * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ); + +/** + * \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version + * (Default: TLS 1.0) + * + * \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and + * SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored. + * + * \note MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 (SSL v3) should be avoided. + * + * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Set the fallback flag (client-side only). + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK). + * + * \note Set to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK when preparing a fallback + * connection, that is a connection with max_version set to a + * lower value than the value you're willing to use. Such + * fallback connections are not recommended but are sometimes + * necessary to interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) + * servers. + * + * \warning You should NOT set this to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK for + * non-fallback connections! This would appear to work for a + * while, then cause failures when the server is upgraded to + * support a newer TLS version. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param fallback MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +/** + * \brief Enable or disable Encrypt-then-MAC + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) + * + * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security + * improvement, and should not cause any interoperability + * issue (used only if the peer supports it too). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param etm MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +/** + * \brief Enable or disable Extended Master Secret negotiation. + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) + * + * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security fix to the + * protocol, and should not cause any interoperability issue + * (used only if the peer supports it too). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param ems MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +/** + * \brief Disable or enable support for RC4 + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED) + * + * \warning Use of RC4 in DTLS/TLS has been prohibited by RFC 7465 + * for security reasons. Use at your own risk. + * + * \note This function is deprecated and will be removed in + * a future version of the library. + * RC4 is disabled by default at compile time and needs to be + * actively enabled for use with legacy systems. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param arc4 MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in + * CertificateRequest messages. + * (Default: do send) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param cert_req_ca_list MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/** + * \brief Set the maximum fragment length to emit and/or negotiate. + * (Typical: the smaller of #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, usually `2^14` bytes) + * (Server: set maximum fragment length to emit, + * usually negotiated by the client during handshake) + * (Client: set maximum fragment length to emit *and* + * negotiate with the server during handshake) + * (Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) + * + * \note On the client side, the maximum fragment length extension + * *will not* be used, unless the maximum fragment length has + * been set via this function to a value different than + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE. + * + * \note With TLS, this currently only affects ApplicationData (sent + * with \c mbedtls_ssl_read()), not handshake messages. + * With DTLS, this affects both ApplicationData and handshake. + * + * \note This sets the maximum length for a record's payload, + * excluding record overhead that will be added to it, see + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(). + * + * \note For DTLS, it is also possible to set a limit for the total + * size of datagrams passed to the transport layer, including + * record overhead, see \c mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param mfl_code Code for maximum fragment length (allowed values: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096) + * + * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +/** + * \brief Activate negotiation of truncated HMAC + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param truncate Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +/** + * \brief Enable / Disable 1/n-1 record splitting + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED) + * + * \note Only affects SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, not higher versions. + * Does not affect non-CBC ciphersuites in any version. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param split MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Enable / Disable session tickets (client only). + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED.) + * + * \note On server, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param use_tickets Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/** + * \brief Enable / Disable renegotiation support for connection when + * initiated by peer + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) + * + * \warning It is recommended to always disable renegotiation unless you + * know you need it and you know what you're doing. In the + * past, there have been several issues associated with + * renegotiation or a poor understanding of its properties. + * + * \note Server-side, enabling renegotiation also makes the server + * susceptible to a resource DoS by a malicious client. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param renegotiation Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/** + * \brief Prevent or allow legacy renegotiation. + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION allows connections to + * be established even if the peer does not support + * secure renegotiation, but does not allow renegotiation + * to take place if not secure. + * (Interoperable and secure option) + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION allows renegotiations + * with non-upgraded peers. Allowing legacy renegotiation + * makes the connection vulnerable to specific man in the + * middle attacks. (See RFC 5746) + * (Most interoperable and least secure option) + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE breaks off connections + * if peer does not support secure renegotiation. Results + * in interoperability issues with non-upgraded peers + * that do not support renegotiation altogether. + * (Most secure option, interoperability issues) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param allow_legacy Prevent or allow (SSL_NO_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, + * SSL_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/** + * \brief Enforce renegotiation requests. + * (Default: enforced, max_records = 16) + * + * When we request a renegotiation, the peer can comply or + * ignore the request. This function allows us to decide + * whether to enforce our renegotiation requests by closing + * the connection if the peer doesn't comply. + * + * However, records could already be in transit from the peer + * when the request is emitted. In order to increase + * reliability, we can accept a number of records before the + * expected handshake records. + * + * The optimal value is highly dependent on the specific usage + * scenario. + * + * \note With DTLS and server-initiated renegotiation, the + * HelloRequest is retransmitted every time mbedtls_ssl_read() times + * out or receives Application Data, until: + * - max_records records have beens seen, if it is >= 0, or + * - the number of retransmits that would happen during an + * actual handshake has been reached. + * Please remember the request might be lost a few times + * if you consider setting max_records to a really low value. + * + * \warning On client, the grace period can only happen during + * mbedtls_ssl_read(), as opposed to mbedtls_ssl_write() and mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() + * which always behave as if max_record was 0. The reason is, + * if we receive application data from the server, we need a + * place to write it, which only happens during mbedtls_ssl_read(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param max_records Use MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED if you don't want to + * enforce renegotiation, or a non-negative value to enforce + * it but allow for a grace period of max_records records. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records ); + +/** + * \brief Set record counter threshold for periodic renegotiation. + * (Default: 2^48 - 1) + * + * Renegotiation is automatically triggered when a record + * counter (outgoing or incoming) crosses the defined + * threshold. The default value is meant to prevent the + * connection from being closed when the counter is about to + * reached its maximal value (it is not allowed to wrap). + * + * Lower values can be used to enforce policies such as "keys + * must be refreshed every N packets with cipher X". + * + * The renegotiation period can be disabled by setting + * conf->disable_renegotiation to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED. + * + * \note When the configured transport is + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM the maximum renegotiation + * period is 2^48 - 1, and for MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + * the maximum renegotiation period is 2^64 - 1. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param period The threshold value: a big-endian 64-bit number. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char period[8] ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/** + * \brief Check if there is data already read from the + * underlying transport but not yet processed. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return 0 if nothing's pending, 1 otherwise. + * + * \note This is different in purpose and behaviour from + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail in that it considers + * any kind of unprocessed data, not only unread + * application data. If \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes + * returns a non-zero value, this function will + * also signal pending data, but the converse does + * not hold. For example, in DTLS there might be + * further records waiting to be processed from + * the current underlying transport's datagram. + * + * \note If this function returns 1 (data pending), this + * does not imply that a subsequent call to + * \c mbedtls_ssl_read will provide any data; + * e.g., the unprocessed data might turn out + * to be an alert or a handshake message. + * + * \note This function is useful in the following situation: + * If the SSL/TLS module successfully returns from an + * operation - e.g. a handshake or an application record + * read - and you're awaiting incoming data next, you + * must not immediately idle on the underlying transport + * to have data ready, but you need to check the value + * of this function first. The reason is that the desired + * data might already be read but not yet processed. + * If, in contrast, a previous call to the SSL/TLS module + * returned MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, it is not necessary + * to call this function, as the latter error code entails + * that all internal data has been processed. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the number of application data bytes + * remaining to be read from the current record. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return How many bytes are available in the application + * data record read buffer. + * + * \note When working over a datagram transport, this is + * useful to detect the current datagram's boundary + * in case \c mbedtls_ssl_read has written the maximal + * amount of data fitting into the input buffer. + * + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the result of the certificate verification + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * + * \return \c 0 if the certificate verification was successful. + * \return \c -1u if the result is not available. This may happen + * e.g. if the handshake aborts early, or a verification + * callback returned a fatal error. + * \return A bitwise combination of \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX + * and \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX failure flags; see x509.h. + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the current SSL version (SSLv3/TLSv1/etc) + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return a string containing the SSL version + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record + * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding) + * + * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) + * when record compression is enabled. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if compression is + * enabled, which makes expansion much less predictable + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured + * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the + * configured value and the negotiated one. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment + * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function + * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * \brief This function is a deprecated approach to getting the max + * fragment length. Its an alias for + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(), as the behaviour + * is the same. See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() for + * more detail. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +/** + * \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes. + * This takes into account the config.h setting \c + * MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, the configured and negotiated + * max fragment length extension if used, and for DTLS the + * path MTU as configured and current record expansion. + * + * \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if + * called with a larger length value. + * With TLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will fragment the input if + * necessary and return the number of bytes written; it is up + * to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in + * order to send the remaining bytes if any. + * + * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) + * when record compression is enabled. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum payload for an outgoing record, + * or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. This must be initialized and setup. + * + * \return The current peer certificate, if available. + * The returned certificate is owned by the SSL context and + * is valid only until the next call to the SSL API. + * \return \c NULL if no peer certificate is available. This might + * be because the chosen ciphersuite doesn't use CRTs + * (PSK-based ciphersuites, for example), or because + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE has been disabled, + * allowing the stack to free the peer's CRT to save memory. + * + * \note For one-time inspection of the peer's certificate during + * the handshake, consider registering an X.509 CRT verification + * callback through mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() instead of calling + * this function. Using mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() also comes at + * the benefit of allowing you to influence the verification + * process, for example by masking expected and tolerated + * verification failures. + * + * \warning You must not use the pointer returned by this function + * after any further call to the SSL API, including + * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write(); this is + * because the pointer might change during renegotiation, + * which happens transparently to the user. + * If you want to use the certificate across API calls, + * you must make a copy. + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Save session in order to resume it later (client-side only) + * Session data is copied to presented session structure. + * + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param session session context + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or + * arguments are otherwise invalid. + * + * \note Only the server certificate is copied, and not the full chain, + * so you should not attempt to validate the certificate again + * by calling \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() on it. + * Instead, you should use the results from the verification + * in the original handshake by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() + * after loading the session again into a new SSL context + * using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). + * + * \note Once the session object is not needed anymore, you should + * free it by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_session_free(). + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/** + * \brief Perform the SSL handshake + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to + * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying + * transport - in this case you must call this function again + * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous + * operation is in progress (see + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you + * must call this function again when the operation is ready. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic + * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - + * in this case you must call this function again to complete + * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use + * and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in + * this case you must stop using the context (see below). + * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using + * the context (see below). + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than + * \c 0, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, + * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() + * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current + * connection must be closed. + * + * \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging + * purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an + * actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context. + * + * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS: + * If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram + * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed, + * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport + * signal a new event. This is not true for a successful handshake, + * in which case the datagram of the underlying transport that is + * currently being processed might or might not contain further + * DTLS records. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake + * + * \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at + * the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not + * call this function if state is MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return See mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it + * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before + * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection + * must be closed. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/** + * \brief Initiate an SSL renegotiation on the running connection. + * Client: perform the renegotiation right now. + * Server: request renegotiation, which will be performed + * during the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read() if honored by + * client. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return 0 if successful, or any mbedtls_ssl_handshake() return + * value except #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT that can't + * happen during a renegotiation. + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it + * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before + * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection + * must be closed. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/** + * \brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param buf buffer that will hold the data + * \param len maximum number of bytes to read + * + * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful. + * \return \c 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed + * without sending a CloseNotify beforehand, which might happen + * because of various reasons (internal error of an underlying + * stack, non-conformant peer not sending a CloseNotify and + * such) - in this case you must stop using the context + * (see below). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY if the underlying + * transport is still functional, but the peer has + * acknowledged to not send anything anymore. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to + * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying + * transport - in this case you must call this function again + * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous + * operation is in progress (see + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you + * must call this function again when the operation is ready. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic + * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - + * in this case you must call this function again to complete + * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server + * side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a + * new connection using the same source port. See below. + * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using + * the context (see below). + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than + * a positive value, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT, + * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, + * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() + * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current + * connection must be closed. + * + * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT + * (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client + * is initiating a new connection using the same source port. + * You can either treat that as a connection close and wait + * for the client to resend a ClientHello, or directly + * continue with \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the same + * context (as it has been reset internally). Either way, you + * must make sure this is seen by the application as a new + * connection: application state, if any, should be reset, and + * most importantly the identity of the client must be checked + * again. WARNING: not validating the identity of the client + * again, or not transmitting the new identity to the + * application layer, would allow authentication bypass! + * + * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS: + * - If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram + * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed, + * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport + * signal a new event. + * - This function may return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even if data was + * initially available on the underlying transport, as this data may have + * been only e.g. duplicated messages or a renegotiation request. + * Therefore, you must be prepared to receive MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even + * when reacting to an incoming-data event from the underlying transport. + * - On success, the datagram of the underlying transport that is currently + * being processed may contain further DTLS records. You should call + * \c mbedtls_ssl_check_pending to check for remaining records. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes + * + * \warning This function will do partial writes in some cases. If the + * return value is non-negative but less than length, the + * function must be called again with updated arguments: + * buf + ret, len - ret (if ret is the return value) until + * it returns a value equal to the last 'len' argument. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param buf buffer holding the data + * \param len how many bytes must be written + * + * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if + * successful (may be less than \p len). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to + * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying + * transport - in this case you must call this function again + * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous + * operation is in progress (see + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you + * must call this function again when the operation is ready. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic + * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - + * in this case you must call this function again to complete + * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using + * the context (see below). + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than + * a non-negative value, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, + * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() + * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current + * connection must be closed. + * + * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ, + * it must be called later with the *same* arguments, + * until it returns a value greater that or equal to 0. When + * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be + * some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not + * yet sent. + * + * \note If the requested length is greater than the maximum + * fragment length (either the built-in limit or the one set + * or negotiated with the peer), then: + * - with TLS, less bytes than requested are written. + * - with DTLS, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA is returned. + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() may be used to + * query the active maximum fragment length. + * + * \note Attempting to write 0 bytes will result in an empty TLS + * application record being sent. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Send an alert message + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level The alert level of the message + * (MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING or MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL) + * \param message The alert message (SSL_ALERT_MSG_*) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code. + * + * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or + * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it + * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char level, + unsigned char message ); +/** + * \brief Notify the peer that the connection is being closed + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code. + * + * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or + * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it + * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL context and clear memory + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +/** + * \brief Save an active connection as serialized data in a buffer. + * This allows the freeing or re-using of the SSL context + * while still picking up the connection later in a way that + * it entirely transparent to the peer. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_load() + * + * \note This feature is currently only available under certain + * conditions, see the documentation of the return value + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA for details. + * + * \note When this function succeeds, it calls + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on \p ssl which as a result is + * no longer associated with the connection that has been + * serialized. This avoids creating copies of the connection + * state. You're then free to either re-use the context + * structure for a different connection, or call + * mbedtls_ssl_free() on it. See the documentation of + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() for more details. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to save. On success, it is no longer + * associated with the connection that has been serialized. + * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a + * writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c + * NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0. + * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf. + * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have + * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * + * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of + * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible + * to determine the necessary size by calling this function + * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. However, + * the value of \p olen is only guaranteed to be correct when + * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or + * \c 0. If the return value is different, then the value of + * \p olen is undefined. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * while resetting the context. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a handshake is in + * progress, or there is pending data for reading or sending, + * or the connection does not use DTLS 1.2 with an AEAD + * ciphersuite, or renegotiation is enabled. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ); + +/** + * \brief Load serialized connection data to an SSL context. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() + * + * \warning The same serialized data must never be loaded into more + * that one context. In order to ensure that, after + * successfully loading serialized data to an SSL context, you + * should immediately destroy or invalidate all copies of the + * serialized data that was loaded. Loading the same data in + * more than one context would cause severe security failures + * including but not limited to loss of confidentiality. + * + * \note Before calling this function, the SSL context must be + * prepared in one of the two following ways. The first way is + * to take a context freshly initialised with + * mbedtls_ssl_init() and call mbedtls_ssl_setup() on it with + * the same ::mbedtls_ssl_config structure that was used in + * the original connection. The second way is to + * call mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on a context that was + * previously prepared as above but used in the meantime. + * Either way, you must not use the context to perform a + * handshake between calling mbedtls_ssl_setup() or + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and calling this function. You + * may however call other setter functions in that time frame + * as indicated in the note below. + * + * \note Before or after calling this function successfully, you + * also need to configure some connection-specific callbacks + * and settings before you can use the connection again + * (unless they were already set before calling + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and the values are suitable for + * the present connection). Specifically, you want to call + * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() and + * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). All other SSL setter functions + * are not necessary to call, either because they're only used + * in handshakes, or because the setting is already saved. You + * might choose to call them anyway, for example in order to + * share code between the cases of establishing a new + * connection and the case of loading an already-established + * connection. + * + * \note If you have new information about the path MTU, you want to + * call mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() after calling this function, as + * otherwise this function would overwrite your + * newly-configured value with the value that was active when + * the context was saved. + * + * \note When this function returns an error code, it calls + * mbedtls_ssl_free() on \p ssl. In this case, you need to + * prepare the context with the usual sequence starting with a + * call to mbedtls_ssl_init() if you want to use it again. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context structure to be populated. It must have + * been prepared as described in the note above. + * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized connection data. It must + * be a readable buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data + * comes from a different Mbed TLS version or build. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize an SSL configuration context + * Just makes the context ready for + * mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() or mbedtls_ssl_config_free(). + * + * \note You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() unless you + * manually set all of the relevant fields yourself. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); + +/** + * \brief Load reasonable default SSL configuration values. + * (You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_init() first.) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param endpoint MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER + * \param transport MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS, or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS + * \param preset a MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_XXX value + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport() for notes on DTLS. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation error. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int endpoint, int transport, int preset ); + +/** + * \brief Free an SSL configuration context + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_free( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize SSL session structure + * + * \param session SSL session + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL session including the + * peer certificate and clear memory + * + * \note A session object can be freed even if the SSL context + * that was used to retrieve the session is still in use. + * + * \param session SSL session + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); + +/** + * \brief TLS-PRF function for key derivation. + * + * \param prf The tls_prf type function type to be used. + * \param secret Secret for the key derivation function. + * \param slen Length of the secret. + * \param label String label for the key derivation function, + * terminated with null character. + * \param random Random bytes. + * \param rlen Length of the random bytes buffer. + * \param dstbuf The buffer holding the derived key. + * \param dlen Length of the output buffer. + * + * \return 0 on success. An SSL specific error on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..02eab96d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_cache.h + * + * \brief SSL session cache implementation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /*!< 1 day */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /*!< Maximum entries in cache */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry; + +/** + * \brief This structure is used for storing cache entries + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t timestamp; /*!< entry timestamp */ +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_session session; /*!< entry session */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_x509_buf peer_cert; /*!< entry peer_cert */ +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *next; /*!< chain pointer */ +}; + +/** + * \brief Cache context + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context +{ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *chain; /*!< start of the chain */ + int timeout; /*!< cache entry timeout */ + int max_entries; /*!< maximum entries */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ +#endif +}; + +/** + * \brief Initialize an SSL cache context + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ); + +/** + * \brief Cache get callback implementation + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param data SSL cache context + * \param session session to retrieve entry for + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); + +/** + * \brief Cache set callback implementation + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param data SSL cache context + * \param session session to store entry for + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +/** + * \brief Set the cache timeout + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT (1 day)) + * + * A timeout of 0 indicates no timeout. + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + * \param timeout cache entry timeout in seconds + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of cache entries + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES (50)) + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + * \param max cache entry maximum + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int max ); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in a cache context and clear memory + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_cache.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93c32a5e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h @@ -0,0 +1,556 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ciphersuites.h + * + * \brief SSL Ciphersuites for mbed TLS + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Supported ciphersuites (Official IANA names) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x01 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x02 /**< Weak! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x04 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x05 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x09 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0A + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x15 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x16 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2C /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2D /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2E /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x2F + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x33 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x35 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x39 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x3B /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x3C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x3D /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x41 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x45 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x67 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x6B /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x84 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x88 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8B +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x8C +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x8D + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8E +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8F +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x90 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x91 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x92 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x93 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x94 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x95 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x9C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x9D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x9E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x9F /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xA8 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xA9 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xAA /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xAB /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xAC /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xAD /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xAE +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xAF +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB0 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB1 /**< Weak! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xB2 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xB3 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB4 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB5 /**< Weak! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xB6 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xB7 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB8 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB9 /**< Weak! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xBA /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xBE /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC0 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC4 /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC001 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC002 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC003 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC006 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC007 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC008 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC00B /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC00C /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC00D /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC010 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC011 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC025 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC026 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC029 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC02A /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC033 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC034 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039 /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC03C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC03D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC044 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC045 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC048 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC049 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04A /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC050 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC051 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC052 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC053 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC05C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC05D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC05E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC05F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC060 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC061 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC062 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC063 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC064 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC065 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC066 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC067 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC068 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC069 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06A /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC070 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC071 /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079 /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07A /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC086 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC087 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC088 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC089 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08A /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08D /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC090 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC091 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC092 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC093 /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC094 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC095 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC096 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC097 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC098 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC099 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A0 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A1 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A2 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A3 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0A4 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0A5 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0A6 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0A7 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A8 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A9 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AA /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AB /**< TLS 1.2 */ +/* The last two are named with PSK_DHE in the RFC, which looks like a typo */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0AC /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0AD /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AE /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AF /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0FF /**< experimental */ + +/* RFC 7905 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA8 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA9 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAA /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAB /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAC /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAD /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAE /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +/* Reminder: update mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret when adding a new key exchange. + * Reminder: update MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__xxx below + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE, +} mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t; + +/* Key exchanges using a certificate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges involving server signature in ServerKeyExchange */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using ECDH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges that don't involve ephemeral keys */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges that involve ephemeral keys */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using a PSK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using DHE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using ECDHE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED +#endif + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK 0x01 /**< Weak ciphersuite flag */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG 0x02 /**< Short authentication tag, + eg for CCM_8 */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS 0x04 /**< Can't be used with DTLS */ + +/** + * \brief This structure is used for storing ciphersuite information + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t +{ + int id; + const char * name; + + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher; + mbedtls_md_type_t mac; + mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_exchange; + + int min_major_ver; + int min_minor_ver; + int max_major_ver; + int max_minor_ver; + + unsigned char flags; +}; + +const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ); + +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string( const char *ciphersuite_name ); +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( int ciphersuite_id ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); +#endif + +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_ciphersuites.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2aa37317 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_cookie.h + * + * \brief DTLS cookie callbacks implementation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Context for the default cookie functions. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t hmac_ctx; /*!< context for the HMAC portion */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + unsigned long serial; /*!< serial number for expiration */ +#endif + unsigned long timeout; /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, + or in number of tickets issued */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx; + +/** + * \brief Initialize cookie context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Setup cookie context (generate keys) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Set expiration delay for cookies + * (Default MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT) + * + * \param ctx Cookie context + * \param delay Delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies + * issued in the meantime. + * 0 to disable expiration (NOT recommended) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long delay ); + +/** + * \brief Free cookie context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Generate cookie, see \c mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t + */ +mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write; + +/** + * \brief Verify cookie, see \c mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t + */ +mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_cookie.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..46ade67b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,1352 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/* Determine minimum supported version */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + +/* Determine maximum supported version */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ + +/* + * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 + * + * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, + * but is distinct for resends. + * + * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 + +/* + * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: + * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256) + * and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if + * enabled. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 1024 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 0 +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.0-1.2 (as + * opposed to the very different CBC construct used in SSLv3) is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ + ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ) + +/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 + +/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for + RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes + (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \ + : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \ + ) + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 + +/* + * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds + */ + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." +#endif + +/* Calculate buffer sizes */ + +/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes + long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the + implicit sequence number. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ + + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) ) +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ + + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) +{ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) +{ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} +#endif + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +/* Compression buffer holds both IN and OUT buffers, so should be size of the larger */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ( \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) \ + ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + : MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ) +#endif + +/* + * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content + * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because + * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) + +/** + * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero + * otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need ) +{ + return( ( cur > end ) || ( need > (size_t)( end - cur ) ) ); +} + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, + * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \ + do { \ + if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \ + { \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t +{ + /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable + * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's + * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function - + * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures + * to hash algorithms. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t rsa; + mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa; +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); + +/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from + * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those + * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled + * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is + * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. + * + * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, + * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} + * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into + * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. + * + * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH + * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here + * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations + * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the + * computation of the maximum key length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 + +/** + * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) + * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set +{ + /*! The key for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; + /*! The key for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; + /*! The IV for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; + /*! The IV for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; + + size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and + * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ + size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and + * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ +}; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; + +/* + * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params +{ + /* + * Handshake specific crypto variables + */ + + uint8_t max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/ + uint8_t max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/ + uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ + uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ + enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ + ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ + } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ + size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */ +#endif + + size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ + + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; + + void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); + void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ +#endif + +/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due + * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap + * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type; + uint16_t ecdh_bits; + psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey; + unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ + size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ + size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + struct + { + size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated + * buffers used for message buffering. */ + + uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has + * been seen in the current flight. */ + + struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer + { + unsigned is_valid : 1; + unsigned is_fragmented : 1; + unsigned is_complete : 1; + unsigned char *data; + size_t data_len; + } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; + + struct + { + unsigned char *data; + size_t len; + unsigned epoch; + } future_record; + + } buffering; + + unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ + unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ + + unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie + Srv: unused */ + unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length + Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ + + uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ + unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ + unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the + flight being received */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for + resending messages */ + unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter + for resending messages */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ + + uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension + * has been negotiated. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */ + uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of + * \c peer_cid. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Checksum contexts + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_context fin_md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context fin_sha1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256; +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512; +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */ + unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; + /*!< premaster secret */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the + * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). + * The library does not use it internally. */ + void *user_async_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +}; + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; + +/* + * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records + * + * There are the following general types of record transformations: + * - Stream transformations (TLS versions <= 1.2 only) + * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher + * to the authenticated message. + * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions <= 1.2 only) + * In addition to the distinction of the order of encryption and + * authentication, there's a fundamental difference between the + * handling in SSL3 & TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2: For SSL3 + * and TLS 1.0, the final IV after processing a record is used + * as the IV for the next record. No explicit IV is contained + * in an encrypted record. The IV for the first record is extracted + * at key extraction time. In contrast, for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, no + * IV is generated at key extraction time, but every encrypted + * record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was encrypted. + * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions >= 1.2 only) + * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one + * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second + * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. + * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained + * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte + * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number + * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation + * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction + * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the + * latter to the encrypted record. + * + * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext + * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true + * content type. + * + * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: + * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. + * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. + * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. + * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. + * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, + * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. + * - For some transformations (currently AEAD and CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0) + * an implicit IV. It may be static (e.g. AEAD) or dynamic (e.g. CBC) + * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- + * dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). + * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. + * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. + * - The length of the authentication tag. + * + * Note: Except for CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, these parameters are + * constant across multiple encryption/decryption operations. + * For CBC, the implicit IV needs to be updated after each + * operation. + * + * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: + * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in + * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the + * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines + * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if + * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM + * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. + * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but + * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts + * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts + * are unused for AEAD transformations. + * - For stream/CBC transformations and versions > SSL3, the + * MAC keys are not stored explicitly but maintained within + * md_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - For stream/CBC transformations and version SSL3, the MAC + * keys are stored explicitly in mac_enc, mac_dec and have + * a fixed size of 20 bytes. These fields are unused for + * AEAD transformations or transformations >= TLS 1.0. + * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within + * the transformation context, its contents are stored within + * iv_{enc/dec}. + * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. + * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations + * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the + * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be + * different from the underlying cipher's block length + * in this case. + * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only + * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is + * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in + * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. + * Note: For CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, the fields iv_{enc/dec} + * still store IV's for continued use across multiple transformations, + * so it is not true that fixed_ivlen == 0 means that iv_{enc/dec} are + * not being used! + * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version + * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. + * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. + * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the + * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused + * in other transformations. + * + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_transform +{ + /* + * Session specific crypto layer + */ + size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ + size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ + size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ + size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ + size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ + + unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ + unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + /* Needed only for SSL v3.0 secret */ + unsigned char mac_enc[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (enc) */ + unsigned char mac_dec[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (dec) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ + int minor_ver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t in_cid_len; + uint8_t out_cid_len; + unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; + unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Session specific compression layer + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + z_stream ctx_deflate; /*!< compression context */ + z_stream ctx_inflate; /*!< decompression context */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the + * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */ + unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +}; + +/* + * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. + * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 ); +#else + (void) transform; + return( 1 ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Internal representation of record frames + * + * Instances come in two flavors: + * (1) Encrypted + * These always have data_offset = 0 + * (2) Unencrypted + * These have data_offset set to the amount of + * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, + * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV + * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used + * (e.g. for CBC in TLS 1.0, or stream ciphers). + * + * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case + * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to + * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the + * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to + * make space for the fixed IV. + * + */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. + * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by + * the 6-byte sequence number. + * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array + * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely + * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do + * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of + * MAC computations. */ + uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ + uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. + * Convert to internal presentation of versions + * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and + * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). + * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ + + unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ + size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ + size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ + size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ + unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +} mbedtls_record; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * List of certificate + private key pairs + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ + mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * List of handshake messages kept around for resending + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item +{ + unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ + size_t len; /*!< length of p */ + unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ); +/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); +/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); + +/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear + * memory + * + * \param transform SSL transform context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear + * memory + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Update record layer + * + * This function roughly separates the implementation + * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation + * of the secure transport. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest + * should be automatically updated in case + * a handshake message is found. + * + * \return 0 or non-zero error code. + * + * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here + * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: + * + * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying + * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into + * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which + * conceptually provides the following: + * + * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports + * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. + * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport + * for application data. + * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform + * securing the contents. + * + * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: + * + * a Updating + * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] + * + * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: + * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application + * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers + * provide access to the data for the user to process it. + * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically + * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers + * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application + * data (2) is user-controlled. + * + * b Reading of application data + * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] + * + * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data + * is different from the automatic consumption of control + * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. + * + * c Tracking availability of application data + * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] + * + * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for + * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer + * provides functionality for checking how much application + * data is still available in the internal buffer. + * + * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. + * + * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the + * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic + * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything + * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. + * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the + * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. + * + * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the + * record layer, but the current implementation deviates + * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of + * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record + * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which + * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility + * following the above definition. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ); + +/** + * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() + * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len ) +{ + if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0 ) + { + *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + } + + else if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0 ) + { + *psk = ssl->conf->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + } + + else + { + *psk = NULL; + *psk_len = 0; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK + * callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() + * Return an opaque PSK + */ +static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ); + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ); + + return( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ); +#endif + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_md_type_t md ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + ( const uint16_t srtp_profile_value ) +{ + switch( srtp_profile_value ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return srtp_profile_value; + default: break; + } + return( MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + else + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + else + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert ); +} + +/* + * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: + * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). + * + * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we + * check a cert we received from them)! + * + * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, + unsigned char ver[2] ); +void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, + const unsigned char ver[2] ); + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + return( 13 ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + return( 5 ); + } +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) ); +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 12 ); +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return( 4 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif + +/* Visible for testing purposes only */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec ); + +/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 2 ); +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_internal.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8221051b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ticket.h + * + * \brief TLS server ticket callbacks implementation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/* + * This implementation of the session ticket callbacks includes key + * management, rotating the keys periodically in order to preserve forward + * secrecy, when MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME is defined. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Information for session ticket protection + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key +{ + unsigned char name[4]; /*!< random key identifier */ + uint32_t generation_time; /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */ +} +mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key; + +/** + * \brief Context for session ticket handling functions + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context +{ + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key keys[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */ + unsigned char active; /*!< index of the currently active key */ + + uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */ + + /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} +mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context; + +/** + * \brief Initialize a ticket context. + * (Just make it ready for mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup() + * or mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free().) + * + * \param ctx Context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Prepare context to be actually used + * + * \param ctx Context to be set up + * \param f_rng RNG callback function + * \param p_rng RNG callback context + * \param cipher AEAD cipher to use for ticket protection. + * Recommended value: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM. + * \param lifetime Tickets lifetime in seconds + * Recommended value: 86400 (one day). + * + * \note It is highly recommended to select a cipher that is at + * least as strong as the strongest ciphersuite + * supported. Usually that means a 256-bit key. + * + * \note The lifetime of the keys is twice the lifetime of tickets. + * It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not + * to negate the benefits of forward secrecy. + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX error code + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, + uint32_t lifetime ); + +/** + * \brief Implementation of the ticket write callback + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t for description + */ +mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write; + +/** + * \brief Implementation of the ticket parse callback + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description + */ +mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse; + +/** + * \brief Free a context's content and zeroize it. + * + * \param ctx Context to be cleaned up + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_ticket.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d147c73f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/** + * \file threading.h + * + * \brief Threading abstraction layer + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_THREADING_H +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be + * used. */ +/** The selected feature is not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x001A + +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x001C +/** Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR -0x001E + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +#include +typedef struct mbedtls_threading_mutex_t +{ + pthread_mutex_t mutex; + /* is_valid is 0 after a failed init or a free, and nonzero after a + * successful init. This field is not considered part of the public + * API of Mbed TLS and may change without notice. */ + char is_valid; +} mbedtls_threading_mutex_t; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) +/* You should define the mbedtls_threading_mutex_t type in your header */ +#include "threading_alt.h" + +/** + * \brief Set your alternate threading implementation function + * pointers and initialize global mutexes. If used, this + * function must be called once in the main thread before any + * other mbed TLS function is called, and + * mbedtls_threading_free_alt() must be called once in the main + * thread after all other mbed TLS functions. + * + * \note mutex_init() and mutex_free() don't return a status code. + * If mutex_init() fails, it should leave its argument (the + * mutex) in a state such that mutex_lock() will fail when + * called with this argument. + * + * \param mutex_init the init function implementation + * \param mutex_free the free function implementation + * \param mutex_lock the lock function implementation + * \param mutex_unlock the unlock function implementation + */ +void mbedtls_threading_set_alt( void (*mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + void (*mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + int (*mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + int (*mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) ); + +/** + * \brief Free global mutexes. + */ +void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/* + * The function pointers for mutex_init, mutex_free, mutex_ and mutex_unlock + * + * All these functions are expected to work or the result will be undefined. + */ +extern void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); +extern void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); +extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); +extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); + +/* + * Global mutexes + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) +/* This mutex may or may not be used in the default definition of + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(), but in order to determine that, + * we need to check POSIX features, hence modify _POSIX_C_SOURCE. + * With the current approach, this declaration is orphaned, lacking + * an accompanying definition, in case mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + * doesn't need it, but that's not a problem. */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* threading.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b7290cfc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/** + * \file timing.h + * + * \brief Portable interface to timeouts and to the CPU cycle counter + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_TIMING_H +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief timer structure + */ +struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time +{ + unsigned char opaque[32]; +}; + +/** + * \brief Context for mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay() + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_timing_delay_context +{ + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time timer; + uint32_t int_ms; + uint32_t fin_ms; +} mbedtls_timing_delay_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ +#include "timing_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ + +extern volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed; + +/** + * \brief Return the CPU cycle counter value + * + * \warning This is only a best effort! Do not rely on this! + * In particular, it is known to be unreliable on virtual + * machines. + * + * \note This value starts at an unspecified origin and + * may wrap around. + */ +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ); + +/** + * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds + * + * \param val points to a timer structure + * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. + * + * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When + * restarting, this is always 0. + * + * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. + * + * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not + * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence + * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = + * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately + * the delay since the first reset. + */ +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ); + +/** + * \brief Setup an alarm clock + * + * \param seconds delay before the "mbedtls_timing_alarmed" flag is set + * (must be >=0) + * + * \warning Only one alarm at a time is supported. In a threaded + * context, this means one for the whole process, not one per + * thread. + */ +void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ); + +/** + * \brief Set a pair of delays to watch + * (See \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay().) + * + * \param data Pointer to timing data. + * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct. + * \param int_ms First (intermediate) delay in milliseconds. + * The effect if int_ms > fin_ms is unspecified. + * \param fin_ms Second (final) delay in milliseconds. + * Pass 0 to cancel the current delay. + * + * \note To set a single delay, either use \c mbedtls_timing_set_timer + * directly or use this function with int_ms == fin_ms. + */ +void mbedtls_timing_set_delay( void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms ); + +/** + * \brief Get the status of delays + * (Memory helper: number of delays passed.) + * + * \param data Pointer to timing data + * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct. + * + * \return -1 if cancelled (fin_ms = 0), + * 0 if none of the delays are passed, + * 1 if only the intermediate delay is passed, + * 2 if the final delay is passed. + */ +int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_timing_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* timing.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..44adcbfe --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +/** + * \file version.h + * + * \brief Run-time version information + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * This set of compile-time defines and run-time variables can be used to + * determine the version number of the mbed TLS library used. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_VERSION_H +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/** + * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts. + * Major, Minor, Patchlevel + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 28 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 1 + +/** + * The single version number has the following structure: + * MMNNPP00 + * Major version | Minor version | Patch version + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0100 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.1" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.28.1" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Get the version number. + * + * \return The constructed version number in the format + * MMNNPP00 (Major, Minor, Patch). + */ +unsigned int mbedtls_version_get_number( void ); + +/** + * Get the version string ("x.y.z"). + * + * \param string The string that will receive the value. + * (Should be at least 9 bytes in size) + */ +void mbedtls_version_get_string( char *string ); + +/** + * Get the full version string ("mbed TLS x.y.z"). + * + * \param string The string that will receive the value. The mbed TLS version + * string will use 18 bytes AT MOST including a terminating + * null byte. + * (So the buffer should be at least 18 bytes to receive this + * version string). + */ +void mbedtls_version_get_string_full( char *string ); + +/** + * \brief Check if support for a feature was compiled into this + * mbed TLS binary. This allows you to see at runtime if the + * library was for instance compiled with or without + * Multi-threading support. + * + * \note only checks against defines in the sections "System + * support", "mbed TLS modules" and "mbed TLS feature + * support" in config.h + * + * \param feature The string for the define to check (e.g. "MBEDTLS_AES_C") + * + * \return 0 if the feature is present, + * -1 if the feature is not present and + * -2 if support for feature checking as a whole was not + * compiled in. + */ +int mbedtls_version_check_feature( const char *feature ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ + +#endif /* version.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..31b78df3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h @@ -0,0 +1,380 @@ +/** + * \file x509.h + * + * \brief X.509 generic defines and structures + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA) +/** + * Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. + * That is, maximum length of the chain, excluding the end-entity certificate + * and the trusted root certificate. + * + * Set this to a low value to prevent an adversary from making you waste + * resources verifying an overlong certificate chain. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 +#endif + +/** + * \name X509 Error codes + * \{ + */ +/** Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x2080 +/** Requested OID is unknown. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID -0x2100 +/** The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT -0x2180 +/** The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION -0x2200 +/** The serial tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL -0x2280 +/** The algorithm tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG -0x2300 +/** The name tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME -0x2380 +/** The date tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE -0x2400 +/** The signature tag or value invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE -0x2480 +/** The extension tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS -0x2500 +/** CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION -0x2580 +/** Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG -0x2600 +/** Signature algorithms do not match. (see \c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH -0x2680 +/** Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED -0x2700 +/** Format not recognized as DER or PEM. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT -0x2780 +/** Input invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x2800 +/** Allocation of memory failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -0x2880 +/** Read/write of file failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x2900 +/** Destination buffer is too small. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x2980 +/** A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 +/** \} name X509 Error codes */ + +/** + * \name X509 Verify codes + * \{ + */ +/* Reminder: update x509_crt_verify_strings[] in library/x509_crt.c */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED 0x01 /**< The certificate validity has expired. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED 0x02 /**< The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL). */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH 0x04 /**< The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED 0x08 /**< The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED 0x10 /**< The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED 0x20 /**< The CRL is expired. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING 0x40 /**< Certificate was missing. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY 0x80 /**< Certificate verification was skipped. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER 0x0100 /**< Other reason (can be used by verify callback) */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE 0x0200 /**< The certificate validity starts in the future. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE 0x0400 /**< The CRL is from the future */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE 0x0800 /**< Usage does not match the keyUsage extension. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE 0x1000 /**< Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE 0x2000 /**< Usage does not match the nsCertType extension. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD 0x4000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK 0x8000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA). */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY 0x010000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short). */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD 0x020000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK 0x040000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA). */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY 0x080000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short). */ + +/** \} name X509 Verify codes */ +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +/* + * X.509 v3 Subject Alternative Name types. + * otherName [0] OtherName, + * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + * dNSName [2] IA5String, + * x400Address [3] ORAddress, + * directoryName [4] Name, + * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME 0 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME 2 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_X400_ADDRESS_NAME 3 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME 4 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_EDI_PARTY_NAME 5 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER 6 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS 7 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_REGISTERED_ID 8 + +/* + * X.509 v3 Key Usage Extension flags + * Reminder: update x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (0x80) /* bit 0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION (0x40) /* bit 1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT (0x20) /* bit 2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT (0x10) /* bit 3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT (0x08) /* bit 4 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN (0x04) /* bit 5 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN (0x02) /* bit 6 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY (0x01) /* bit 7 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY (0x8000) /* bit 8 */ + +/* + * Netscape certificate types + * (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/tech-notes/tn3.html) + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT (0x80) /* bit 0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER (0x40) /* bit 1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL (0x20) /* bit 2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING (0x10) /* bit 3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED (0x08) /* bit 4 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA (0x04) /* bit 5 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA (0x02) /* bit 6 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA (0x01) /* bit 7 */ + +/* + * X.509 extension types + * + * Comments refer to the status for using certificates. Status can be + * different for writing certificates or reading CRLs or CSRs. + * + * Those are defined in oid.h as oid.c needs them in a data structure. Since + * these were previously defined here, let's have aliases for compatibility. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME /* Supported (DNS) */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS /* Supported */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE + +/* + * Storage format identifiers + * Recognized formats: PEM and DER + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE 256 /**< Maximum value size of a DN entry */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ */ + +/** + * \name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN1 using DER. + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_buf mbedtls_x509_buf; + +/** + * Container for ASN1 bit strings. + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring; + +/** + * Container for ASN1 named information objects. + * It allows for Relative Distinguished Names (e.g. cn=localhost,ou=code,etc.). + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_x509_name; + +/** + * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence; + +/** Container for date and time (precision in seconds). */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time +{ + int year, mon, day; /**< Date. */ + int hour, min, sec; /**< Time. */ +} +mbedtls_x509_time; + +/** \} name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs */ + +/** + * \brief Store the certificate DN in printable form into buf; + * no more than size characters will be written. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param dn The X509 name to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ); + +/** + * \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf; + * no more than size characters will be written. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param serial The X509 serial to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ); + +/** + * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time + * and tell if it's in the past. + * + * \note Intended usage is "if( is_past( valid_to ) ) ERROR". + * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. + * + * \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check + * + * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred, + * 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ); + +/** + * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time + * and tell if it's in the future. + * + * \note Intended usage is "if( is_future( valid_from ) ) ERROR". + * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. + * + * \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check + * + * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred, + * 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ); + +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_x509_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +/* + * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you + * know you do. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) +int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, + int *salt_len ); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, + void **sig_opts ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *t ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag ); +int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const void *sig_opts ); +int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name ); +int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name ); +int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len ); +int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ); +int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ); +int mbedtls_x509_write_sig( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t size ); + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF \ + do { \ + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \ + \ + n -= (size_t) ret; \ + p += (size_t) ret; \ + } while( 0 ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* x509.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..92220090 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/** + * \file x509_crl.h + * + * \brief X.509 certificate revocation list parsing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ */ + +/** + * \name Structures and functions for parsing CRLs + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Certificate revocation list entry. + * Contains the CA-specific serial numbers and revocation dates. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry +{ + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; + + mbedtls_x509_buf serial; + + mbedtls_x509_time revocation_date; + + mbedtls_x509_buf entry_ext; + + struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *next; +} +mbedtls_x509_crl_entry; + +/** + * Certificate revocation list structure. + * Every CRL may have multiple entries. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl +{ + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ + + int version; /**< CRL version (1=v1, 2=v2) */ + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< CRL signature type identifier */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). */ + + mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ + + mbedtls_x509_time this_update; + mbedtls_x509_time next_update; + + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry entry; /**< The CRL entries containing the certificate revocation times for this CA. */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf crl_ext; + + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid2; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig; + mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + + struct mbedtls_x509_crl *next; +} +mbedtls_x509_crl; + +/** + * \brief Parse a DER-encoded CRL and append it to the chained list + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in DER format + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); +/** + * \brief Parse one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list + * + * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in PEM or DER format + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Load one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list + * + * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param path filename to read the CRLs from (in PEM or DER encoding) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/** + * \brief Returns an informational string about the CRL. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param prefix A line prefix + * \param crl The X509 CRL to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize a CRL (chain) + * + * \param crl CRL chain to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_init( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); + +/** + * \brief Unallocate all CRL data + * + * \param crl CRL chain to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_free( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); + +/** \} name Structures and functions for parsing CRLs */ +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_x509_crl.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f2885a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h @@ -0,0 +1,1097 @@ +/** + * \file x509_crt.h + * + * \brief X.509 certificate parsing and writing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Container for an X.509 certificate. The certificate may be chained. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt +{ + int own_buffer; /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned + * by the structure or not. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ + + int version; /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */ + mbedtls_x509_buf serial; /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ + + mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ + mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ + + mbedtls_x509_time valid_from; /**< Start time of certificate validity. */ + mbedtls_x509_time valid_to; /**< End time of certificate validity. */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf pk_raw; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */ + mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */ + + mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */ + + int ext_types; /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ + int ca_istrue; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */ + int max_pathlen; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */ + + unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + + mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */ + + unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf sig; /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + + struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */ +} +mbedtls_x509_crt; + +/** + * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name +{ + /** + * The type_id is an OID as defined in RFC 5280. + * To check the value of the type id, you should use + * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf. + */ + mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */ + union + { + /** + * From RFC 4108 section 5: + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + */ + struct + { + mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */ + } + hardware_module_name; + } + value; +} +mbedtls_x509_san_other_name; + +/** + * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, according to type + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name +{ + int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */ + union { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */ + } + san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */ +} +mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; + +/** + * Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp) + * Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( id ) ( 1 << ( (id) - 1 ) ) + +/** + * Security profile for certificate verification. + * + * All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile +{ + uint32_t allowed_mds; /**< MDs for signatures */ + uint32_t allowed_pks; /**< PK algs for public keys; + * this applies to all certificates + * in the provided chain. */ + uint32_t allowed_curves; /**< Elliptic curves for ECDSA */ + uint32_t rsa_min_bitlen; /**< Minimum size for RSA keys */ +} +mbedtls_x509_crt_profile; + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 0 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 1 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 32 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN 15 + +#if !defined( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN ) +#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 +#endif + +/** + * Container for writing a certificate (CRT) + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert +{ + int version; + mbedtls_mpi serial; + mbedtls_pk_context *subject_key; + mbedtls_pk_context *issuer_key; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *issuer; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + char not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + char not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; +} +mbedtls_x509write_cert; + +/** + * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + uint32_t flags; +} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item; + +/** + * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 ) + +/** + * Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain() + */ +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item items[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE]; + unsigned len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* This stores the list of potential trusted signers obtained from + * the CA callback used for the CRT verification, if configured. + * We must track it somewhere because the callback passes its + * ownership to the caller. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca_cb_result; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/** + * \brief Context for resuming X.509 verify operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + /* for check_signature() */ + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx pk; + + /* for find_parent_in() */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *fallback_parent; + int fallback_signature_is_good; + + /* for find_parent() */ + int parent_is_trusted; /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */ + + /* for verify_chain() */ + enum { + x509_crt_rs_none, + x509_crt_rs_find_parent, + } in_progress; /* none if no operation is in progress */ + int self_cnt; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; + +} mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ +typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * Default security profile. Should provide a good balance between security + * and compatibility with current deployments. + * + * This profile permits: + * - SHA2 hashes. + * - All supported elliptic curves. + * - RSA with 2048 bits and above. + * + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this profile, for example if + * new curves are added to the library. New minor versions of Mbed TLS will + * not reduce this profile unless serious security concerns require it. + */ +extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; + +/** + * Expected next default profile. Recommended for new deployments. + * Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for allowing RSA-2048. + */ +extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; + +/** + * NSA Suite B profile. + */ +extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it + * to the end of the provided chained list. + * + * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. + * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point + * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through + * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). + * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \note This function makes an internal copy of the CRT buffer + * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused + * after this call returns. To avoid duplicating the CRT + * buffer (at the cost of stricter lifetime constraints), + * use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() instead. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief The type of certificate extension callbacks. + * + * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine when + * it encounters either an unsupported extension or a + * "certificate policies" extension containing any + * unsupported certificate policies. + * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback + * in other cases, if and when the need arises. + * + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * \param crt The certificate being parsed. + * \param oid The OID of the extension. + * \param critical Whether the extension is critical. + * \param p Pointer to the start of the extension value + * (the content of the OCTET STRING). + * \param end End of extension value. + * + * \note The callback must fail and return a negative error code + * if it can not parse or does not support the extension. + * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. + * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips + * the extension and continues parsing. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t)( void *p_ctx, + mbedtls_x509_crt const *crt, + mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid, + int critical, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it + * to the end of the provided chained list. + * + * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. + * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point + * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through + * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). + * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. + * \param make_copy When not zero this function makes an internal copy of the + * CRT buffer \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed + * or reused after this call returns. + * When zero this function avoids duplicating the CRT buffer + * by taking temporary ownership thereof until the CRT + * is destroyed (like mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy()) + * \param cb A callback invoked for every unsupported certificate + * extension. + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * + * \note This call is functionally equivalent to + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), and/or + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() + * but it calls the callback with every unsupported + * certificate extension and additionally the + * "certificate policies" extension if it contains any + * unsupported certificate policies. + * The callback must return a negative error code if it + * does not know how to handle such an extension. + * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. + * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips + * the extension and continues parsing. + * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback + * in other cases, if and when the need arises. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it + * to the end of the provided chained list. This is a + * variant of mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der() which takes + * temporary ownership of the CRT buffer until the CRT + * is destroyed. + * + * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. + * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point + * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through + * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). + * \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded + * certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be + * retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the + * CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed + * through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free(). + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \note This call is functionally equivalent to + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), but it avoids creating a + * copy of the input buffer at the cost of stronger lifetime + * constraints. This is useful in constrained environments + * where duplication of the CRT cannot be tolerated. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Parse one DER-encoded or one or more concatenated PEM-encoded + * certificates and add them to the chained list. + * + * For CRTs in PEM encoding, the function parses permissively: + * if at least one certificate can be parsed, the function + * returns the number of certificates for which parsing failed + * (hence \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully). + * If no certificate could be parsed, the function returns + * the first (negative) error encountered during parsing. + * + * PEM encoded certificates may be interleaved by other data + * such as human readable descriptions of their content, as + * long as the certificates are enclosed in the PEM specific + * '-----{BEGIN/END} CERTIFICATE-----' delimiters. + * + * \param chain The chain to which to add the parsed certificates. + * \param buf The buffer holding the certificate data in PEM or DER format. + * For certificates in PEM encoding, this may be a concatenation + * of multiple certificates; for DER encoding, the buffer must + * comprise exactly one certificate. + * \param buflen The size of \p buf, including the terminating \c NULL byte + * in case of PEM encoded data. + * + * \return \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully. + * \return The (positive) number of certificates that couldn't + * be parsed if parsing was partly successful (see above). + * \return A negative X509 or PEM error code otherwise. + * + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Load one or more certificates and add them + * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some + * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number + * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete + * correctly, the first error is returned. + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param path filename to read the certificates from + * + * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number + * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ); + +/** + * \brief Load one or more certificate files from a path and add them + * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some + * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number + * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete + * correctly, the first error is returned. + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param path directory / folder to read the certificate files from + * + * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number + * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +/** + * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames + * extension. + * + * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject + * alternative name. + * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation + * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw. + * + * \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name + * as defined in RFC 4180 is supported. + * + * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of + * subject alternative name. For example, after successful + * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the + * \p crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to + * this function. + * + * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the + * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the + * lifetime of the certificate. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported + * SAN type. + * \return Another negative value for any other failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san ); +/** + * \brief Returns an informational string about the + * certificate. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param prefix A line prefix + * \param crt The X509 certificate to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); + +/** + * \brief Returns an informational string about the + * verification status of a certificate. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param prefix A line prefix + * \param flags Verification flags created by mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + uint32_t flags ); + +/** + * \brief Verify a chain of certificates. + * + * The verify callback is a user-supplied callback that + * can clear / modify / add flags for a certificate. If set, + * the verification callback is called for each + * certificate in the chain (from the trust-ca down to the + * presented crt). The parameters for the callback are: + * (void *parameter, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth, + * int *flags). With the flags representing current flags for + * that specific certificate and the certificate depth from + * the bottom (Peer cert depth = 0). + * + * All flags left after returning from the callback + * are also returned to the application. The function should + * return 0 for anything (including invalid certificates) + * other than fatal error, as a non-zero return code + * immediately aborts the verification process. For fatal + * errors, a specific error code should be used (different + * from MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED which should not + * be returned at this point), or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR + * can be used if no better code is available. + * + * \note In case verification failed, the results can be displayed + * using \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info() + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() with the + * default security profile. + * + * \note It is your responsibility to provide up-to-date CRLs for + * all trusted CAs. If no CRL is provided for the CA that was + * used to sign the certificate, CRL verification is skipped + * silently, that is *without* setting any flag. + * + * \note The \c trust_ca list can contain two types of certificates: + * (1) those of trusted root CAs, so that certificates + * chaining up to those CAs will be trusted, and (2) + * self-signed end-entity certificates to be trusted (for + * specific peers you know) - in that case, the self-signed + * certificate doesn't need to have the CA bit set. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. + * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This will be checked to be + * present in the certificate's subjectAltNames extension or, + * if this extension is absent, as a CN component in its + * Subject name. Currently only DNS names are supported. This + * may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * + * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the + * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the + * certificate chain verification failed. In this case, + * \c *flags will have one or more + * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX + * flags set. + * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error + * encountered during the verification process. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); + +/** + * \brief Verify a chain of certificates with respect to + * a configurable security profile. + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(), but with explicit + * security profile. + * + * \note The restrictions on keys (RSA minimum size, allowed curves + * for ECDSA) apply to all certificates: trusted root, + * intermediate CAs if any, and end entity certificate. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. + * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. + * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the + * CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * + * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the + * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the + * certificate chain verification failed. In this case, + * \c *flags will have one or more + * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX + * flags set. + * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error + * encountered during the verification process. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); + +/** + * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile() + * + * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile() + * but can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. + * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. + * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the + * CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be set to \c NULL + * to disable restartable ECC. + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(), or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief The type of trusted certificate callbacks. + * + * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the CRT + * verification routine mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb() + * when looking for trusted signers of a given certificate. + * + * On success, the callback returns a list of trusted + * certificates to be considered as potential signers + * for the input certificate. + * + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * \param child The certificate for which to search a potential signer. + * This will point to a readable certificate. + * \param candidate_cas The address at which to store the address of the first + * entry in the generated linked list of candidate signers. + * This will not be \c NULL. + * + * \note The callback must only return a non-zero value on a + * fatal error. If, in contrast, the search for a potential + * signer completes without a single candidate, the + * callback must return \c 0 and set \c *candidate_cas + * to \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *candidate_cas points + * to a heap-allocated linked list of instances of + * ::mbedtls_x509_crt, and ownership of this list is passed + * to the caller. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t)( void *p_ctx, + mbedtls_x509_crt const *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt **candidate_cas ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/** + * \brief Version of \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() which + * uses a callback to acquire the list of trusted CA + * certificates. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param f_ca_cb The callback to be used to query for potential signers + * of a given child certificate. See the documentation of + * ::mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t for more information. + * \param p_ca_cb The opaque context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb. + * \param profile The security profile for the verification. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the + * CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) +/** + * \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension. + * + * \param crt Leaf certificate used. + * \param usage Intended usage(s) (eg MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT + * before using the certificate to perform an RSA key + * exchange). + * + * \note Except for decipherOnly and encipherOnly, a bit set in the + * usage argument means this bit MUST be set in the + * certificate. For decipherOnly and encipherOnly, it means + * that bit MAY be set. + * + * \return 0 is these uses of the certificate are allowed, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keyUsage extension + * is present but does not match the usage argument. + * + * \note You should only call this function on leaf certificates, on + * (intermediate) CAs the keyUsage extension is automatically + * checked by \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + unsigned int usage ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) +/** + * \brief Check usage of certificate against extendedKeyUsage. + * + * \param crt Leaf certificate used. + * \param usage_oid Intended usage (eg MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH or + * MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH). + * \param usage_len Length of usage_oid (eg given by MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE()). + * + * \return 0 if this use of the certificate is allowed, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if not. + * + * \note Usually only makes sense on leaf certificates. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const char *usage_oid, + size_t usage_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Verify the certificate revocation status + * + * \param crt a certificate to be verified + * \param crl the CRL to verify against + * + * \return 1 if the certificate is revoked, 0 otherwise + * + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a certificate (chain) + * + * \param crt Certificate chain to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); + +/** + * \brief Unallocate all certificate data + * + * \param crt Certificate chain to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/** \} name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Initialize a CRT writing context + * + * \param ctx CRT context to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set the version for a Certificate + * Default: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param version version to set (MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 or + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3) + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version ); + +/** + * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate. + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param serial serial number to set + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial ); + +/** + * \brief Set the validity period for a Certificate + * Timestamps should be in string format for UTC timezone + * i.e. "YYYYMMDDhhmmss" + * e.g. "20131231235959" for December 31st 2013 + * at 23:59:59 + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param not_before not_before timestamp + * \param not_after not_after timestamp + * + * \return 0 if timestamp was parsed successfully, or + * a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *not_before, + const char *not_after ); + +/** + * \brief Set the issuer name for a Certificate + * Issuer names should contain a comma-separated list + * of OID types and values: + * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS CA" + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param issuer_name issuer name to set + * + * \return 0 if issuer name was parsed successfully, or + * a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *issuer_name ); + +/** + * \brief Set the subject name for a Certificate + * Subject names should contain a comma-separated list + * of OID types and values: + * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS Server 1" + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param subject_name subject name to set + * + * \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or + * a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *subject_name ); + +/** + * \brief Set the subject public key for the certificate + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param key public key to include + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ); + +/** + * \brief Set the issuer key used for signing the certificate + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param key private key to sign with + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ); + +/** + * \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param md_alg MD algorithm to use + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the + * CRT + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param oid OID of the extension + * \param oid_len length of the OID + * \param critical if the extension is critical (per the RFC's definition) + * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING + * \param val_len length of the value data + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ); + +/** + * \brief Set the basicConstraints extension for a CRT + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param is_ca is this a CA certificate + * \param max_pathlen maximum length of certificate chains below this + * certificate (only for CA certificates, -1 is + * unlimited) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int is_ca, int max_pathlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +/** + * \brief Set the subjectKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT + * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key() has been + * called before + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set the authorityKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT + * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key() has been + * called before + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +/** + * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param key_usage key usage flags to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned int key_usage ); + +/** + * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ); + +/** + * \brief Free the contents of a CRT write context + * + * \param ctx CRT context to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 DER structure + * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the + * return value to determine where you should start + * using the buffer + * + * \param ctx certificate to write away + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific + * error code + * + * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the + * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable + * for countermeasures against timing attacks). + * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 PEM string + * + * \param ctx certificate to write away + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code + * + * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the + * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable + * for countermeasures against timing attacks). + * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ + +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_x509_crt.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a1c0461 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +/** + * \file x509_csr.h + * + * \brief X.509 certificate signing request parsing and writing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ */ + +/** + * \name Structures and functions for X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Certificate Signing Request (CSR) structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr +{ + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf cri; /**< The raw CertificateRequestInfo body (DER). */ + + int version; /**< CSR version (1=v1). */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ + + mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig; + mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ +} +mbedtls_x509_csr; + +/** + * Container for writing a CSR + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_csr +{ + mbedtls_pk_context *key; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; +} +mbedtls_x509write_csr; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in DER format + * + * \note CSR attributes (if any) are currently silently ignored. + * + * \param csr CSR context to fill + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), DER or PEM format + * + * \note See notes for \c mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der() + * + * \param csr CSR context to fill + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) + * + * \note See notes for \c mbedtls_x509_csr_parse() + * + * \param csr CSR context to fill + * \param path filename to read the CSR from + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/** + * \brief Returns an informational string about the + * CSR. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param prefix A line prefix + * \param csr The X509 CSR to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize a CSR + * + * \param csr CSR to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_init( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); + +/** + * \brief Unallocate all CSR data + * + * \param csr CSR to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_free( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ + +/** \} name Structures and functions for X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Initialize a CSR context + * + * \param ctx CSR context to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set the subject name for a CSR + * Subject names should contain a comma-separated list + * of OID types and values: + * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS Server 1" + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param subject_name subject name to set + * + * \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or + * a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *subject_name ); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a CSR (public key will be included, + * private key used to sign the CSR when writing it) + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param key Asymmetric key to include + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ); + +/** + * \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param md_alg MD algorithm to use + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param key_usage key usage flags to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + * + * \note The decipherOnly flag from the Key Usage + * extension is represented by bit 8 (i.e. + * 0x8000), which cannot typically be represented + * in an unsigned char. Therefore, the flag + * decipherOnly (i.e. + * #MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY) cannot be set using this + * function. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage ); + +/** + * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ); + +/** + * \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the + * CSR + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param oid OID of the extension + * \param oid_len length of the OID + * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING + * \param val_len length of the value data + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ); + +/** + * \brief Free the contents of a CSR context + * + * \param ctx CSR context to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Write a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a + * DER structure + * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the + * return value to determine where you should start + * using the buffer + * + * \param ctx CSR to write away + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific + * error code + * + * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the + * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable + * for countermeasures against timing attacks). + * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a + * PEM string + * + * \param ctx CSR to write away + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code + * + * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the + * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable + * for countermeasures against timing attacks). + * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ + +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_x509_csr.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4bdc711f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/** + * \file xtea.h + * + * \brief XTEA block cipher (32-bit) + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_XTEA_H +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT 0 + +/** The data input has an invalid length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0028 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** XTEA hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0029 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief XTEA context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_xtea_context +{ + uint32_t k[4]; /*!< key */ +} +mbedtls_xtea_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ +#include "xtea_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize XTEA context + * + * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_xtea_init( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear XTEA context + * + * \param ctx XTEA context to be cleared + */ +void mbedtls_xtea_free( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief XTEA key schedule + * + * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized + * \param key the secret key + */ +void mbedtls_xtea_setup( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16] ); + +/** + * \brief XTEA cipher function + * + * \param ctx XTEA context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT + * \param input 8-byte input block + * \param output 8-byte output block + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief XTEA CBC cipher function + * + * \param ctx XTEA context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT + * \param length the length of input, multiple of 8 + * \param iv initialization vector for CBC mode + * \param input input block + * \param output output block + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the length % 8 != 0 + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* xtea.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d6d3e4f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h @@ -0,0 +1,3910 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto.h + * \brief Platform Security Architecture cryptography module + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_H + +#include "crypto_platform.h" + +#include + +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ block contains mock definitions for things that + * must be defined in the crypto_platform.h header. These mock definitions + * are present in this file as a convenience to generate pretty-printed + * documentation that includes those definitions. */ + +/** \defgroup platform Implementation-specific definitions + * @{ + */ + +/**@}*/ +#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* The file "crypto_types.h" declares types that encode errors, + * algorithms, key types, policies, etc. */ +#include "crypto_types.h" + +/** \defgroup version API version + * @{ + */ + +/** + * The major version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 + +/** + * The minor version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR 0 + +/**@}*/ + +/* The file "crypto_values.h" declares macros to build and analyze values + * of integral types defined in "crypto_types.h". */ +#include "crypto_values.h" + +/** \defgroup initialization Library initialization + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Library initialization. + * + * Applications must call this function before calling any other + * function in this module. + * + * Applications may call this function more than once. Once a call + * succeeds, subsequent calls are guaranteed to succeed. + * + * If the application calls other functions before calling psa_crypto_init(), + * the behavior is undefined. Implementations are encouraged to either perform + * the operation as if the library had been initialized or to return + * #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE or some other applicable error. In particular, + * implementations should not return a success status if the lack of + * initialization may have security implications, for example due to improper + * seeding of the random number generator. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** \def PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key attribute structure + * of type #psa_key_attributes_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a key attributes structure. + */ +static psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void); + +/** Declare a key as persistent and set its key identifier. + * + * If the attribute structure currently declares the key as volatile (which + * is the default content of an attribute structure), this function sets + * the lifetime attribute to #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. + * + * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given + * value in the structure. + * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute + * structure is passed to a key creation function such as + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param key The persistent identifier for the key. + */ +static void psa_set_key_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER +/** Set the owner identifier of a key. + * + * When key identifiers encode key owner identifiers, psa_set_key_id() does + * not allow to define in key attributes the owner of volatile keys as + * psa_set_key_id() enforces the key to be persistent. + * + * This function allows to set in key attributes the owner identifier of a + * key. It is intended to be used for volatile keys. For persistent keys, + * it is recommended to use the PSA Cryptography API psa_set_key_id() to define + * the owner of a key. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param owner The key owner identifier. + */ +static void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner ); +#endif + +/** Set the location of a persistent key. + * + * To make a key persistent, you must give it a persistent key identifier + * with psa_set_key_id(). By default, a key that has a persistent identifier + * is stored in the default storage area identifier by + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. Call this function to choose a storage + * area, or to explicitly declare the key as volatile. + * + * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given + * value in the structure. + * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute + * structure is passed to a key creation function such as + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param lifetime The lifetime for the key. + * If this is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, the + * key will be volatile, and the key identifier + * attribute is reset to 0. + */ +static void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime); + +/** Retrieve the key identifier from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The persistent identifier stored in the attribute structure. + * This value is unspecified if the attribute structure declares + * the key as volatile. + */ +static mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the lifetime from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The lifetime value stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare usage flags for a key. + * + * Usage flags are part of a key's usage policy. They encode what + * kind of operations are permitted on the key. For more details, + * refer to the documentation of the type #psa_key_usage_t. + * + * This function overwrites any usage flags + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param usage_flags The usage flags to write. + */ +static void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags); + +/** Retrieve the usage flags from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The usage flags stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare the permitted algorithm policy for a key. + * + * The permitted algorithm policy of a key encodes which algorithm or + * algorithms are permitted to be used with this key. The following + * algorithm policies are supported: + * - 0 does not allow any cryptographic operation with the key. The key + * may be used for non-cryptographic actions such as exporting (if + * permitted by the usage flags). + * - An algorithm value permits this particular algorithm. + * - An algorithm wildcard built from #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH allows the specified + * signature scheme with any hash algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC allows + * any MAC algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CMAC) which + * generates/verifies a MAC length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG + * allows any AEAD algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CCM) which + * generates/verifies a tag length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. + * + * This function overwrites any algorithm policy + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param alg The permitted algorithm policy to write. + */ +static void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + + +/** Retrieve the algorithm policy from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The algorithm stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare the type of a key. + * + * This function overwrites any key type + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param type The key type to write. + * If this is 0, the key type in \p attributes + * becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type); + + +/** Declare the size of a key. + * + * This function overwrites any key size previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param bits The key size in bits. + * If this is 0, the key size in \p attributes + * becomes unspecified. Keys of size 0 are + * not supported. + */ +static void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t bits); + +/** Retrieve the key type from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The key type stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the key size from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The key size stored in the attribute structure, in bits. + */ +static size_t psa_get_key_bits(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the attributes of a key. + * + * This function first resets the attribute structure as with + * psa_reset_key_attributes(). It then copies the attributes of + * the given key into the given attribute structure. + * + * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. + * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, + * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to query. + * \param[in,out] attributes On success, the attributes of the key. + * On failure, equivalent to a + * freshly-initialized structure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Reset a key attribute structure to a freshly initialized state. + * + * You must initialize the attribute structure as described in the + * documentation of the type #psa_key_attributes_t before calling this + * function. Once the structure has been initialized, you may call this + * function at any time. + * + * This function frees any auxiliary resources that the structure + * may contain. + * + * \param[in,out] attributes The attribute structure to reset. + */ +void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_management Key management + * @{ + */ + +/** Remove non-essential copies of key material from memory. + * + * If the key identifier designates a volatile key, this functions does not do + * anything and returns successfully. + * + * If the key identifier designates a persistent key, then this function will + * free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key + * data in persistent storage is not affected and the key can still be used. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to purge. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key material will have been removed from memory if it is not + * currently required. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** Make a copy of a key. + * + * Copy key material from one location to another. + * + * This function is primarily useful to copy a key from one location + * to another, since it populates a key using the material from + * another key which may have a different lifetime. + * + * This function may be used to share a key with a different party, + * subject to implementation-defined restrictions on key sharing. + * + * The policy on the source key must have the usage flag + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY set. + * This flag is sufficient to permit the copy if the key has the lifetime + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. + * Some secure elements do not provide a way to copy a key without + * making it extractable from the secure element. If a key is located + * in such a secure element, then the key must have both usage flags + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY and #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT in order to make + * a copy of the key outside the secure element. + * + * The resulting key may only be used in a way that conforms to + * both the policy of the original key and the policy specified in + * the \p attributes parameter: + * - The usage flags on the resulting key are the bitwise-and of the + * usage flags on the source policy and the usage flags in \p attributes. + * - If both allow the same algorithm or wildcard-based + * algorithm policy, the resulting key has the same algorithm policy. + * - If either of the policies allows an algorithm and the other policy + * allows a wildcard-based algorithm policy that includes this algorithm, + * the resulting key allows the same algorithm. + * - If the policies do not allow any algorithm in common, this function + * fails with the status #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. + * + * The effect of this function on implementation-defined attributes is + * implementation-defined. + * + * \param source_key The key to copy. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. If a private or secret key is + * being copied outside of a secure element it must + * also allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * They are used as follows: + * - The key type and size may be 0. If either is + * nonzero, it must match the corresponding + * attribute of the source key. + * - The key location (the lifetime and, for + * persistent keys, the key identifier) is + * used directly. + * - The policy constraints (usage flags and + * algorithm policy) are combined from + * the source key and \p attributes so that + * both sets of restrictions apply, as + * described in the documentation of this function. + * \param[out] target_key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p source_key is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The lifetime or identifier in \p attributes are invalid, or + * the policy constraints on the source and specified in + * \p attributes are incompatible, or + * \p attributes specifies a key type or key size + * which does not match the attributes of the source key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The source key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY usage flag, or + * the source key is not exportable and its lifetime does not + * allow copying it to the target's lifetime. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key); + + +/** + * \brief Destroy a key. + * + * This function destroys a key from both volatile + * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall + * make a best effort to ensure that that the key material cannot be recovered. + * + * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees + * resources associated with the key. + * + * If a key is currently in use in a multipart operation, then destroying the + * key will cause the multipart operation to fail. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to erase. If this is \c 0, do nothing and + * return #PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p key was a valid identifier and the key material that it + * referred to has been erased. Alternatively, \p key is \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key cannot be erased because it is + * read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid identifier nor \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * There was an failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor. + * The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a + * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was + * written by an incompatible version of the library. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The storage is corrupted. Implementations shall make a best effort + * to erase key material even in this stage, however applications + * should be aware that it may be impossible to guarantee that the + * key material is not recoverable in such cases. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * An unexpected condition which is not a storage corruption or + * a communication failure occurred. The cryptoprocessor may have + * been compromised. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup import_export Key import and export + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Import a key in binary format. + * + * This function supports any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the + * documentation of psa_export_public_key() for the format of public keys + * and to the documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for + * other key types. + * + * The key data determines the key size. The attributes may optionally + * specify a key size; in this case it must match the size determined + * from the key data. A key size of 0 in \p attributes indicates that + * the key size is solely determined by the key data. + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to import a key of size 0. + * + * This specification supports a single format for each key type. + * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard + * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats + * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to + * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted + * according to a different format. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * The key size is always determined from the + * \p data buffer. + * If the key size in \p attributes is nonzero, + * it must be equal to the size from \p data. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier to the newly created key. + * For persistent keys, this is the key identifier + * defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. The content of this + * buffer is interpreted according to the type declared + * in \p attributes. + * All implementations must support at least the format + * described in the documentation + * of psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() for + * the chosen type. Implementations may allow other + * formats, but should be conservative: implementations + * should err on the side of rejecting content if it + * may be erroneous (e.g. wrong type or truncated data). + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular persistent location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid, or + * the key data is not correctly formatted, or + * the size in \p attributes is nonzero and does not match the size + * of the key data. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + + + +/** + * \brief Export a key in binary format. + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an equivalent object. + * + * If the implementation of psa_import_key() supports other formats + * beyond the format specified here, the output from psa_export_key() + * must use the representation specified here, not the original + * representation. + * + * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: + * + * - For symmetric keys (including MAC keys), the format is the + * raw bytes of the key. + * - For DES, the key data consists of 8 bytes. The parity bits must be + * correct. + * - For Triple-DES, the format is the concatenation of the + * two or three DES keys. + * - For RSA key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), the format + * is the non-encrypted DER encoding of the representation defined by + * PKCS\#1 (RFC 8017) as `RSAPrivateKey`, version 0. + * ``` + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER, -- must be 0 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * } + * ``` + * - For elliptic curve key pairs (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR is true), the format is + * a representation of the private value as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string + * where `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size + * of the order of the curve's coordinate field. This byte string is + * in little-endian order for Montgomery curves (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), and in big-endian order for Weierstrass + * curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`, `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` + * and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`). + * For Weierstrass curves, this is the content of the `privateKey` field of + * the `ECPrivateKey` format defined by RFC 5915. For Montgomery curves, + * the format is defined by RFC 7748, and output is masked according to §5. + * For twisted Edwards curves, the private key is as defined by RFC 8032 + * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448). + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange key pairs (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR is true), the + * format is the representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte + * string. The length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes + * (leading zeroes are not stripped). + * - For public keys (key types for which #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY is + * true), the format is the same as for psa_export_public_key(). + * + * The policy on the key must have the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT set. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to export. It must allow the + * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, unless it is a public + * key. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT flag. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c type, \c bits) + * where \c type is the key type + * and \c bits is the key size in bits. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an object that is equivalent to the public key. + * + * This specification supports a single format for each key type. + * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard + * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats + * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to + * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted + * according to a different format. + * + * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: + * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the DER encoding of + * the representation defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.1 as `RSAPublicKey`. + * ``` + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + * ``` + * - For elliptic curve keys on a twisted Edwards curve (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true and #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY + * returns #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS), the public key is as defined + * by RFC 8032 + * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448). + * - For other elliptic curve public keys (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true), the format is the uncompressed + * representation defined by SEC1 §2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint. + * Let `m` be the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of + * `q` for a curve over `F_q`. The representation consists of: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange public keys (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY is true), + * the format is the representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a + * big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the length of the + * base prime `p` in bytes. + * + * Exporting a public key object or the public part of a key pair is + * always permitted, regardless of the key's usage flags. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to export. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is neither a public key nor a key pair. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(#PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\c type), \c bits) + * where \c type is the key type + * and \c bits is the key size in bits. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + + + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup hash Message digests + * @{ + */ + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message. + * + * \note To verify the hash of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_hash_compare() instead. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p hash_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message and compare it with a + * reference value. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected hash. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p input_length or \p hash_length do not match the hash size for \p alg + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart hash operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a hash operation object, the application must + * initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_hash_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_hash_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ +typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a hash operation object + * of type #psa_hash_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a hash operation object. + */ +static psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a multipart hash operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest) + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_hash_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm. + * -# Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish(). + * To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_hash_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_hash_abort(). The + * application may call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify(). + * - A call to psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_hash_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart hash operation. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect + * a specific value for the hash. Call psa_hash_verify() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * hash values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid hash and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the + * hash algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) + * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with + * an expected value. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then + * compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a + * parameter to this function. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual hash and the expected hash is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected hash. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length); + +/** Abort a hash operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_hash_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_hash_abort(), psa_hash_finish() or + * psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation); + +/** Clone a hash operation. + * + * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to + * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent + * to calling psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same + * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then + * psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that + * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the + * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of + * the objects do not affect the other object. + * + * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. + * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. + * It must be initialized but not active. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup MAC Message authentication codes + * @{ + */ + +/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message. + * + * \note To verify the MAC of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p mac_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected value. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must + * initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_mac_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_mac_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ +typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type + * #psa_mac_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a MAC operation object. + */ +static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation. + * + * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC + * (message authentication code) of a byte string. + * To verify the MAC of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead. + * + * The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish + * calculating the MAC value and retrieve it. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The + * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: + * - A successful call to psa_mac_sign_finish(). + * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must remain valid until the operation terminates. + * It must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation. + * + * This function sets up the verification of the MAC + * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value. + * + * The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish + * calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against + * the expected value. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The + * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: + * - A successful call to psa_mac_verify_finish(). + * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must remain valid until the operation terminates. + * It must allow the usage + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c key is not compatible with \c alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() + * before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to + * the MAC calculation. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect + * a specific value for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. This is always + * #PSA_MAC_LENGTH(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size respectively of the key and \c alg is the + * MAC algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign + * operation), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with + * an expected value. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then + * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a + * parameter to this function. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected MAC. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify + * operation), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** Abort a MAC operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_mac_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_mac_abort(), psa_mac_sign_finish() or + * psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup cipher Symmetric ciphers + * @{ + */ + +/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * This function encrypts a message with a random IV (initialization + * vector). Use the multipart operation interface with a + * #psa_cipher_operation_t object to provide other forms of IV. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * The output contains the IV followed by + * the ciphertext proper. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * This function decrypts a message encrypted with a symmetric cipher. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to decrypt. + * This consists of the IV followed by the + * ciphertext proper. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the plaintext is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_cipher_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ +typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a cipher operation object of + * type #psa_cipher_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a cipher operation object. + */ +static psa_cipher_operation_t psa_cipher_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with a symmetric cipher + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call either psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to + * generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use + * psa_cipher_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing + * requires a specific IV value. + * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. + * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The + * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). + * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with a symmetric cipher + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the IV (initialization vector) for the + * decryption. If the IV is prepended to the ciphertext, you can call + * psa_cipher_update() on a buffer containing the IV followed by the + * beginning of the message. + * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. + * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The + * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). + * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Generate an IV for a symmetric encryption operation. + * + * This function generates a random IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption operation as appropriate + * for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] iv Buffer where the generated IV is to be written. + * \param iv_size Size of the \p iv buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] iv_length On success, the number of bytes of the + * generated IV. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p iv buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no IV set), + * or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length); + +/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires + * a non-random IV. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. + * \param iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active cipher + * encrypt operation, with no IV set), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(). + * The choice of setup function determines whether this function + * encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. If the algorithm requires an IV, call psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * (recommended when encrypting) or psa_cipher_set_iv(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set + * if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or + * psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. The choice + * of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or + * decrypts its input. + * + * This function finishes the encryption or decryption of the message + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * psa_cipher_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set + * if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Abort a cipher operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #psa_cipher_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_cipher_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_cipher_abort() or psa_cipher_finish() + * is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup aead Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) + * @{ + */ + +/** Process an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the + * operation. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and + * encrypted. + * \param plaintext_length Size of \p plaintext in bytes. + * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is not + * part of this output. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag + * are defined as separate outputs, the + * authentication tag is appended to the + * encrypted data. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \p alg, \p plaintext_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of \p key. + * - #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD + * encryption. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output + * in the \p ciphertext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p ciphertext_size is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg, + * \p plaintext_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length); + +/** Process an authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the + * operation. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag + * are defined as separate inputs, the buffer + * must contain the encrypted data followed + * by the authentication tag. + * \param ciphertext_length Size of \p ciphertext in bytes. + * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \p alg, \p ciphertext_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of \p key. + * - #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * plaintext size of any supported AEAD + * decryption. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output + * in the \p plaintext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The ciphertext is not authentic. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p plaintext_size is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg, + * \p ciphertext_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length) can be used + * to determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart AEAD operations. + * + * Before calling any function on an AEAD operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_aead_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_aead_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ +typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of + * type #psa_aead_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object. + */ +static psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with authentication + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the + * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and + * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() + * for details. + * -# Call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to + * generate or set the nonce. You should use + * psa_aead_generate_nonce() unless the protocol you are implementing + * requires a specific nonce value. + * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message to encrypt each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The + * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_aead_finish(). + * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with authentication + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the + * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and + * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() + * for details. + * -# Call psa_aead_set_nonce() with the nonce for the decryption. + * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the ciphertext to decrypt each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The + * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_aead_verify(). + * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or the + * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Generate a random nonce for an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * This function generates a random nonce for the authenticated encryption + * operation with an appropriate size for the chosen algorithm, key type + * and key size. + * + * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] nonce Buffer where the generated nonce is to be + * written. + * \param nonce_size Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] nonce_length On success, the number of bytes of the + * generated nonce. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p nonce buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active aead encrypt + * operation, with no nonce set), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_size, + size_t *nonce_length); + +/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_nonce() + * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires + * a non-random IV. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no nonce + * set), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length); + +/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. + * + * The application must call this function before calling + * psa_aead_update_ad() or psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for + * the operation requires it. If the algorithm does not require it, + * calling this function is optional, but if this function is called + * then the implementation must enforce the lengths. + * + * You may call this function before or after setting the nonce with + * psa_aead_set_nonce() or psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required. + * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling + * this function is not required. + * - For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional + * authenticated data in bytes. + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and + * psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update() must not have been + * called yet), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length); + +/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation. + * + * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted. + * + * You may call this function multiple times to pass successive fragments + * of the additional data. You may not call this function after passing + * data to encrypt or decrypt with psa_aead_update(). + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until + * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * treat the input as untrusted and prepare to undo any action that + * depends on the input if psa_aead_verify() returns an error status. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of + * additional data. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input length overflows the additional data length that + * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce + * set, have lengths set if required by the algorithm, and + * psa_aead_update() must not have been called yet), or the library + * has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation. + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * The choice of setup function determines whether this function + * encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * 3. Call psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until + * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS: + * - Do not use the output in any way other than storing it in a + * confidential location. If you take any action that depends + * on the tentative decrypted data, this action will need to be + * undone if the input turns out not to be valid. Furthermore, + * if an adversary can observe that this action took place + * (for example through timing), they may be able to use this + * fact as an oracle to decrypt any message encrypted with the + * same key. + * - In particular, do not copy the output anywhere but to a + * memory or storage space that you have exclusive access to. + * + * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any + * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process + * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but + * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent + * call to psa_aead_update(), psa_aead_finish() or psa_aead_verify() + * provides sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed + * in this way is bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg, \p input_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is + * the algorithm that were used to set up the + * operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * input_length) evaluates to the maximum + * output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or + * the total input length overflows the plaintext length that + * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce + * set, and have lengths set if required by the algorithm), or the + * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the + * inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * + * This function has two output buffers: + * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from + * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * - \p tag contains the authentication tag. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] ciphertext Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext + * is to be written. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned ciphertext. + * \param[out] tag Buffer where the authentication tag is + * to be written. + * \param tag_size Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c + * key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where + * \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size of the key, and \c alg is the + * algorithm that were used in the call to + * psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum tag size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] tag_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned tag. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p ciphertext or \p tag buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the + * required \p ciphertext buffer size. #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type, + * \c key_bits, \c alg) or #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to + * determine the required \p tag buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or + * the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is + * less than the plaintext length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active encryption + * operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length); + +/** Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authenticated decryption of the message + * components: + * + * - The additional data consisting of the concatenation of the inputs + * passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update_ad(). + * - The ciphertext consisting of the concatenation of the inputs passed to + * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * - The tag passed to this function call. + * + * If the authentication tag is correct, this function outputs any remaining + * plaintext and reports success. If the authentication tag is not correct, + * this function returns #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual tag and the expected tag is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] plaintext Buffer where the last part of the plaintext + * is to be written. This is the remaining data + * from previous calls to psa_aead_update() + * that could not be processed until the end + * of the input. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned plaintext. + * \param[in] tag Buffer containing the authentication tag. + * \param tag_length Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculations were successful, but the authentication tag is + * not correct. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p plaintext buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the + * required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or + * the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is + * less than the plaintext length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active decryption + * operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_length); + +/** Abort an AEAD operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #psa_aead_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_aead_abort(), psa_aead_finish() or + * psa_aead_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized AEAD operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup asymmetric Asymmetric cryptography + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. + * + * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use + * a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to + * psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the + * hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with the type of + * \p key. + * \param[in] input The input message to sign. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The required signature size is + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size respectively of key. + * - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum signature size of any supported + * signature algorithm. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, + * or it does not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t * signature_length ); + +/** \brief Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using + * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm. + * + * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification + * algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message + * and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash(). + * PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm + * to use. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair. The key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with the type of + * \p key. + * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, + * or it does not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed signature + * is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key. + * + * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must + * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute(). + * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash + * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) + * to determine the hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature of a hash or short message using a public key. + * + * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must + * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute(). + * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash + * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) + * to determine the hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must be a public key or an asymmetric key pair. The + * key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of \p key. + * \param[in] input The message to encrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** + * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of \p key. + * \param[in] input The message to decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_derivation Key derivation and pseudorandom generation + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of the state data structure for key derivation operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a key derivation operation object, the + * application must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_derivation_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_key_derivation_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. + */ +typedef struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key derivation operation + * object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a key derivation operation object. + */ +static psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a key derivation operation. + * + * A key derivation algorithm takes some inputs and uses them to generate + * a byte stream in a deterministic way. + * This byte stream can be used to produce keys and other + * cryptographic material. + * + * To derive a key: + * -# Start with an initialized object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + * -# Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to select the algorithm. + * -# Provide the inputs for the key derivation by calling + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key() + * as appropriate. Which inputs are needed, in what order, and whether + * they may be keys and if so of what type depends on the algorithm. + * -# Optionally set the operation's maximum capacity with + * psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(). You may do this before, in the middle + * of or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory + * because the output depends on the maximum capacity. + * -# To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + * To derive a byte string for a different purpose, call + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(). + * Successive calls to these functions use successive output bytes + * calculated by the key derivation algorithm. + * -# Clean up the key derivation operation object with + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * If this function returns an error, the key derivation operation object is + * not changed. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_key_derivation_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to derive a key of size 0. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object + * to set up. It must + * have been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param alg The key derivation algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c alg is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Retrieve the current capacity of a key derivation operation. + * + * The capacity of a key derivation is the maximum number of bytes that it can + * return. When you get *N* bytes of output from a key derivation operation, + * this reduces its capacity by *N*. + * + * \param[in] operation The operation to query. + * \param[out] capacity On success, the capacity of the operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity); + +/** Set the maximum capacity of a key derivation operation. + * + * The capacity of a key derivation operation is the maximum number of bytes + * that the key derivation operation can return from this point onwards. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to modify. + * \param capacity The new capacity of the operation. + * It must be less or equal to the operation's + * current capacity. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p capacity is larger than the operation's current capacity. + * In this case, the operation object remains valid and its capacity + * remains unchanged. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or the + * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity); + +/** Use the maximum possible capacity for a key derivation operation. + * + * Use this value as the capacity argument when setting up a key derivation + * to indicate that the operation should have the maximum possible capacity. + * The value of the maximum possible capacity depends on the key derivation + * algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY ((size_t)(-1)) + +/** Provide an input for key derivation or key agreement. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function passes direct inputs, which is usually correct for + * non-secret inputs. To pass a secret input, which should be in a key + * object, call psa_key_derivation_input_key() instead of this function. + * Refer to the documentation of individual step types + * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) + * for more information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param[in] data Input data to use. + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or + * \c step does not allow direct inputs. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +/** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function obtains input from a key object, which is usually correct for + * secret inputs or for non-secret personalization strings kept in the key + * store. To pass a non-secret parameter which is not in the key store, + * call psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() instead of this function. + * Refer to the documentation of individual step types + * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) + * for more information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param key Identifier of the key. It must have an + * appropriate type for step and must allow the + * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or + * \c step does not allow key inputs of the given type + * or does not allow key inputs at all. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key + * derivation. + * + * A key agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key \p private_key + * a public key \p peer_key. + * The result of this function is passed as input to a key derivation. + * The output of this key derivation can be extracted by reading from the + * resulting operation to produce keys and other cryptographic material. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() with a + * key agreement and derivation algorithm + * \c alg (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) is true + * and #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) + * is false). + * The operation must be ready for an + * input of the type given by \p step. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. The peer key must be in the + * same format that psa_import_key() accepts for the + * public key type corresponding to the type of + * private_key. That is, this function performs the + * equivalent of + * #psa_import_key(..., + * `peer_key`, `peer_key_length`) where + * with key attributes indicating the public key + * type corresponding to the type of `private_key`. + * For example, for EC keys, this means that peer_key + * is interpreted as a point on the curve that the + * private key is on. The standard formats for public + * keys are documented in the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c private_key is not compatible with \c alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \c alg or not compatible with + * \c private_key, or \c step does not allow an input resulting + * from a key agreement. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this key agreement \p step, + * or the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length); + +/** Read some data from a key derivation operation. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * return those bytes. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the requested number of bytes from the + * stream. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output will be written. + * \param output_length Number of bytes to output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case, + * no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm + * and uses those bytes to generate a key deterministically. + * The key's location, usage policy, type and size are taken from + * \p attributes. + * + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads as many bytes as required from the + * stream. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * How much output is produced and consumed from the operation, and how + * the key is derived, depends on the key type and on the key size + * (denoted \c bits below): + * + * - For key types for which the key is an arbitrary sequence of bytes + * of a given size, this function is functionally equivalent to + * calling #psa_key_derivation_output_bytes + * and passing the resulting output to #psa_import_key. + * However, this function has a security benefit: + * if the implementation provides an isolation boundary then + * the key material is not exposed outside the isolation boundary. + * As a consequence, for these key types, this function always consumes + * exactly (\c bits / 8) bytes from the operation. + * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC. + * + * - For ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a + * Montgomery curve), this function always draws a byte string whose + * length is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits + * accordingly. That is: + * + * - Curve25519 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): draw a 32-byte + * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. + * - Curve448 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): draw a 56-byte + * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. + * + * - For key types for which the key is represented by a single sequence of + * \c bits bits with constraints as to which bit sequences are acceptable, + * this function draws a byte string of length (\c bits / 8) bytes rounded + * up to the nearest whole number of bytes. If the resulting byte string + * is acceptable, it becomes the key, otherwise the drawn bytes are discarded. + * This process is repeated until an acceptable byte string is drawn. + * The byte string drawn from the operation is interpreted as specified + * for the output produced by psa_export_key(). + * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES. + * Force-set the parity bits, but discard forbidden weak keys. + * For 2-key and 3-key triple-DES, the three keys are generated + * successively (for example, for 3-key triple-DES, + * if the first 8 bytes specify a weak key and the next 8 bytes do not, + * discard the first 8 bytes, use the next 8 bytes as the first key, + * and continue reading output from the operation to derive the other + * two keys). + * - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(\c group) + * where \c group designates any Diffie-Hellman group) and + * ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a + * Weierstrass curve). + * For these key types, interpret the byte string as integer + * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range + * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain + * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, + * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). + * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. + * This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically + * the methods titled "key-pair generation by testing candidates" + * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.1.4 for Diffie-Hellman, + * in FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2 for DSA, and + * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.2.2 or + * FIPS 186-4 §B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys. + * + * - For other key types, including #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, + * the way in which the operation output is consumed is + * implementation-defined. + * + * In all cases, the data that is read is discarded from the operation. + * The operation's capacity is decreased by the number of bytes read. + * + * For algorithms that take an input step #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + * the input to that step must be provided with psa_key_derivation_input_key(). + * Future versions of this specification may include additional restrictions + * on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * There was not enough data to create the desired key. + * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to + * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input was not provided through + * a key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/** Abort a key derivation operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c + * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused + * for another operation by calling psa_key_derivation_setup() again. + * + * This function may be called at any time after the operation + * object has been initialized as described in #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + * + * In particular, it is valid to call psa_key_derivation_abort() twice, or to + * call psa_key_derivation_abort() on an operation that has not been set up. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation); + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret. + * + * \warning The raw result of a key agreement algorithm such as finite-field + * Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases and should + * not be used directly as key material. It should instead be passed as + * input to a key derivation algorithm. To chain a key agreement with + * a key derivation, use psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() and other + * functions from the key derivation interface. + * + * \param alg The key agreement algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg) + * is true). + * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. It must be + * in the same format that psa_import_key() + * accepts. The standard formats for public + * keys are documented in the documentation + * of psa_export_public_key(). + * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p output_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup random Random generation + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Generate random bytes. + * + * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status + * and MUST NOT use the content of the output buffer if the return + * status is not #PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \note To generate a key, use psa_generate_key() instead. + * + * \param[out] output Output buffer for the generated data. + * \param output_size Number of bytes to generate and output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size); + +/** + * \brief Generate a key or key pair. + * + * The key is generated randomly. + * Its location, usage policy, type and size are taken from \p attributes. + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to generate a key of size 0. + * + * The following type-specific considerations apply: + * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the public exponent is 65537. + * The modulus is a product of two probabilistic primes + * between 2^{n-1} and 2^n where n is the bit size specified in the + * attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +/* The file "crypto_sizes.h" contains definitions for size calculation + * macros whose definitions are implementation-specific. */ +#include "crypto_sizes.h" + +/* The file "crypto_struct.h" contains definitions for + * implementation-specific structs that are declared above. */ +#include "crypto_struct.h" + +/* The file "crypto_extra.h" contains vendor-specific definitions. This + * can include vendor-defined algorithms, extra functions, etc. */ +#include "crypto_extra.h" + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a875b237 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which need to + * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'composite' algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H + +#include + +/* + * MAC multi-part operation definitions. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +typedef struct +{ + /** The HMAC algorithm in use */ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + /** The hash context. */ + struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx; + /** The HMAC part of the context. */ + uint8_t opad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, {0}} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + union + { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t hmac; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cmac; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + } ctx; +} mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96c45290 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which do not + * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'primitive' algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H + +#include + +/* + * Hash multi-part operation definitions. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + union + { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + mbedtls_md2_context md2; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + mbedtls_md4_context md4; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + mbedtls_md5_context md5; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + mbedtls_ripemd160_context ripemd160; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; +#endif + } ctx; +} mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} + +/* + * Cipher multi-part operation definitions. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +typedef struct { + /* Context structure for the Mbed TLS cipher implementation. */ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + uint8_t iv_length; + uint8_t block_length; + union { + unsigned int dummy; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher; + } ctx; +} mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, {0}} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..09ac4883 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,528 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_compat.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Backward compatibility aliases + * + * This header declares alternative names for macro and functions. + * New application code should not use these names. + * These names may be removed in a future version of Mbed Crypto. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * To support both openless APIs and psa_open_key() temporarily, define + * psa_key_handle_t to be equal to mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. Do not mark the + * type and its utility macros and functions deprecated yet. This will be done + * in a subsequent phase. + */ +typedef mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_handle_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT + +/** Check whether an handle is null. + * + * \param handle Handle + * + * \return Non-zero if the handle is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_key_handle_is_null( psa_key_handle_t handle ) +{ + return( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( handle ) ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +/* + * Mechanism for declaring deprecated values + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED +#endif + +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_deprecated_size_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_status_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_status_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_key_usage_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_ecc_family_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_dh_family_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_dh_family_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_ecc_family_t psa_ecc_curve_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_dh_family_t psa_dh_group_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_algorithm_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_GROUP PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY + +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( type, value ) \ + ( (mbedtls_deprecated_##type) ( value ) ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto error code definitions (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta2) + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ) +#define PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ) +#define PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ) +#define PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto numerical encodings (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_key_usage_t, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_key_usage_t, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto size calculation macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) ) +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE( key_type, key_bits ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits ) ) +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( type ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( type ) ) +#define PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE ) +#define PSA_HASH_SIZE( alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ) +#define PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg ) ) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto function names (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED static inline psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_sign( psa_key_handle_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + return psa_sign_hash( key, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, signature_size, signature_length ); +} + +MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED static inline psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_verify( psa_key_handle_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + return psa_verify_hash( key, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, signature_length ); +} + +/* + * Size-specific elliptic curve families. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT239K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + +/* + * Curves that changed name due to PSA specification. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_MONTGOMERY \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + +/* + * Finite-field Diffie-Hellman families. + */ +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE2048 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE3072 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE4096 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE6144 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE8192 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) + +/* + * Diffie-Hellman families that changed name due to PSA specification. + */ +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_RFC7919 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_CUSTOM \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto stream cipher algorithms (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ARC4 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ) +#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ) + +/* + * Renamed AEAD tag length macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH( aead_alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG( aead_alg ) ) +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( aead_alg, tag_length ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( aead_alg, tag_length ) ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA AEAD output size macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ + +/** The tag size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The tag size for the specified algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified + * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of + * the ciphertext, return 0. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_1_ARG( alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ? \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) : \ + 0 ) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the ciphertext may be smaller. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG( alg, plaintext_length ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ? \ + (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) : \ + 0 ) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the plaintext may be smaller. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG( alg, ciphertext_length ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) && \ + (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) ? \ + (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) : \ + 0 ) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller + * in any given call. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible + * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be + * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the + * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG( alg, input_length ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER( alg ) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length) ) : \ + (input_length) ) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an + * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG( alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER( alg ) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE : \ + 0 ) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an + * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG( alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER( alg ) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE : \ + 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** Open a handle to an existing persistent key. + * + * Open a handle to a persistent key. A key is persistent if it was created + * with a lifetime other than #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. A persistent key + * always has a nonzero key identifier, set with psa_set_key_id() when + * creating the key. Implementations may provide additional pre-provisioned + * keys that can be opened with psa_open_key(). Such keys have an application + * key identifier in the vendor range, as documented in the description of + * #psa_key_id_t. + * + * The application must eventually close the handle with psa_close_key() or + * psa_destroy_key() to release associated resources. If the application dies + * without calling one of these functions, the implementation should perform + * the equivalent of a call to psa_close_key(). + * + * Some implementations permit an application to open the same key multiple + * times. If this is successful, each call to psa_open_key() will return a + * different key handle. + * + * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 + * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the + * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is + * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not + * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. + * + * \note Applications that rely on opening a key multiple times will not be + * portable to implementations that only permit a single key handle to be + * opened. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. + * + * + * \param key The persistent identifier of the key. + * \param[out] handle On success, a handle to the key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. The application can now use the value of `*handle` + * to access the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * The implementation does not have sufficient resources to open the + * key. This can be due to reaching an implementation limit on the + * number of open keys, the number of open key handles, or available + * memory. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no persistent key with key identifier \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not a valid persistent key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The specified key exists, but the application does not have the + * permission to access it. Note that this specification does not + * define any way to create such a key, but it may be possible + * through implementation-specific means. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_open_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_handle_t *handle ); + +/** Close a key handle. + * + * If the handle designates a volatile key, this will destroy the key material + * and free all associated resources, just like psa_destroy_key(). + * + * If this is the last open handle to a persistent key, then closing the handle + * will free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key + * data in persistent storage is not affected and can be opened again later + * with a call to psa_open_key(). + * + * Closing the key handle makes the handle invalid, and the key handle + * must not be used again by the application. + * + * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 + * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the + * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is + * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not + * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. + * + * \note If the key handle was used to set up an active + * :ref:\`multipart operation \`, then closing the + * key handle can cause the multipart operation to fail. Applications should + * maintain the key handle until after the multipart operation has finished. + * + * \param handle The key handle to close. + * If this is \c 0, do nothing and return \c PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p handle was a valid handle or \c 0. It is now closed. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f261e013 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_config.h + * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +/** + * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in config.h, + * this file determines which cryptographic mechanisms are enabled + * through the PSA Cryptography API (\c psa_xxx() functions). + * + * To enable a cryptographic mechanism, uncomment the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * To disable a cryptographic mechanism, comment out the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * The names of cryptographic mechanisms correspond to values + * defined in psa/crypto_values.h, with the prefix \c PSA_WANT_ instead + * of \c PSA_. + * + * Note that many cryptographic mechanisms involve two symbols: one for + * the key type (\c PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx) and one for the algorithm + * (\c PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx). Mechanisms with additional parameters may involve + * additional symbols. + */ +#else +/** + * When \c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled in config.h, + * this file is not used, and cryptographic mechanisms are supported + * through the PSA API if and only if they are supported through the + * mbedtls_xxx API. + */ +#endif +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +/* + * CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +/* PBKDF2-HMAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + * Note: when adding support, also adjust include/mbedtls/config_psa.h */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +/* + * Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4249). Thus, do not enable it by + * default. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +/* + * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541). Thus, do not enable it by + * default. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..26363c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_driver_common.h + * \brief Definitions for all PSA crypto drivers + * + * This file contains common definitions shared by all PSA crypto drivers. + * Do not include it directly: instead, include the header file(s) for + * the type(s) of driver that you are implementing. For example, if + * you are writing a dynamically registered driver for a secure element, + * include `psa/crypto_se_driver.h`. + * + * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for + * driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a + * standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions + * comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not + * intended to be called by application developers. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H + +#include +#include + +/* Include type definitions (psa_status_t, psa_algorithm_t, + * psa_key_type_t, etc.) and macros to build and analyze values + * of these types. */ +#include "crypto_types.h" +#include "crypto_values.h" +/* Include size definitions which are used to size some arrays in operation + * structures. */ +#include + +/** For encrypt-decrypt functions, whether the operation is an encryption + * or a decryption. */ +typedef enum { + PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_DECRYPT, + PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_ENCRYPT +} psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a7220091 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'composite' + * operations, i.e. those operations which need to make use of other operations + * from the primitives (crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h) + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t; +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t; +typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the + * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts. + * + * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names + * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_mac_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2bb01ed4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'primitive' + * operations, i.e. those operations which do not rely on other contexts. + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH */ + +typedef struct { + unsigned int initialised : 1; + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t ctx; +} mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + { 0, MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT } + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the + * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts. + * + * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names + * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_hash_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_cipher_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a48a4bb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h @@ -0,0 +1,816 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_extra.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS vendor extensions + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include "crypto_types.h" +#include "crypto_compat.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* UID for secure storage seed */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52 + +/* See config.h for definition */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 +#endif + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Declare the enrollment algorithm for a key. + * + * An operation on a key may indifferently use the algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_algorithm() or with this function. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param alg2 A second algorithm that the key may be used + * for, in addition to the algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_algorithm(). + * + * \warning Setting an enrollment algorithm is not recommended, because + * using the same key with different algorithms can allow some + * attacks based on arithmetic relations between different + * computations made with the same key, or can escalate harmless + * side channels into exploitable ones. Use this function only + * if it is necessary to support a protocol for which it has been + * verified that the usage of the key with multiple algorithms + * is safe. + */ +static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg2) +{ + attributes->core.policy.alg2 = alg2; +} + +/** Retrieve the enrollment algorithm policy from key attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The enrollment algorithm stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.policy.alg2 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + +/** Retrieve the slot number where a key is stored. + * + * A slot number is only defined for keys that are stored in a secure + * element. + * + * This information is only useful if the secure element is not entirely + * managed through the PSA Cryptography API. It is up to the secure + * element driver to decide how PSA slot numbers map to any other interface + * that the secure element may have. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number containing the key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key is located in a secure element, and \p *slot_number + * indicates the slot number that contains it. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller is not permitted to query the slot number. + * Mbed Crypto currently does not return this error. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is not located in a secure element. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ); + +/** Choose the slot number where a key is stored. + * + * This function declares a slot number in the specified attribute + * structure. + * + * A slot number is only meaningful for keys that are stored in a secure + * element. It is up to the secure element driver to decide how PSA slot + * numbers map to any other interface that the secure element may have. + * + * \note Setting a slot number in key attributes for a key creation can + * cause the following errors when creating the key: + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if the selected secure element does + * not support choosing a specific slot number. + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED if the caller is not permitted to + * choose slot numbers in general or to choose this specific slot. + * - #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the chosen slot number is not + * valid in general or not valid for this specific key. + * - #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS if there is already a key in the + * selected slot. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param slot_number The slot number to set. + */ +static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + attributes->core.flags |= MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; + attributes->slot_number = slot_number; +} + +/** Remove the slot number attribute from a key attribute structure. + * + * This function undoes the action of psa_set_key_slot_number(). + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + */ +static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + attributes->core.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; +} + +/** Register a key that is already present in a secure element. + * + * The key must be located in a secure element designated by the + * lifetime field in \p attributes, in the slot set with + * psa_set_key_slot_number() in the attribute structure. + * This function makes the key available through the key identifier + * specified in \p attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the existing key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully registered. + * Note that depending on the design of the driver, this may or may + * not guarantee that a key actually exists in the designated slot + * and is compatible with the specified attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a key with the identifier specified in + * \p attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The secure element driver for the specified lifetime does not + * support registering a key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The identifier in \p attributes is invalid, namely the identifier is + * not in the user range, or + * \p attributes specifies a lifetime which is not located + * in a secure element, or no slot number is specified in \p attributes, + * or the specified slot number is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller is not authorized to register the specified key slot. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** + * \brief Library deinitialization. + * + * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer, + * including the whole key store. + * + * This is an Mbed TLS extension. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( void ); + +/** \brief Statistics about + * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. + * + * \note The content of this structure is not part of the stable API and ABI + * of Mbed Crypto and may change arbitrarily from version to version. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_psa_stats_s +{ + /** Number of slots containing key material for a volatile key. */ + size_t volatile_slots; + /** Number of slots containing key material for a key which is in + * internal persistent storage. */ + size_t persistent_slots; + /** Number of slots containing a reference to a key in a + * secure element. */ + size_t external_slots; + /** Number of slots which are occupied, but do not contain + * key material yet. */ + size_t half_filled_slots; + /** Number of slots that contain cache data. */ + size_t cache_slots; + /** Number of slots that are not used for anything. */ + size_t empty_slots; + /** Number of slots that are locked. */ + size_t locked_slots; + /** Largest key id value among open keys in internal persistent storage. */ + psa_key_id_t max_open_internal_key_id; + /** Largest key id value among open keys in secure elements. */ + psa_key_id_t max_open_external_key_id; +} mbedtls_psa_stats_t; + +/** \brief Get statistics about + * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. + * + * \note When Mbed Crypto is built as part of a service, with isolation + * between the application and the keystore, the service may or + * may not expose this function. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_get_stats( mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats ); + +/** + * \brief Inject an initial entropy seed for the random generator into + * secure storage. + * + * This function injects data to be used as a seed for the random generator + * used by the PSA Crypto implementation. On devices that lack a trusted + * entropy source (preferably a hardware random number generator), + * the Mbed PSA Crypto implementation uses this value to seed its + * random generator. + * + * On devices without a trusted entropy source, this function must be + * called exactly once in the lifetime of the device. On devices with + * a trusted entropy source, calling this function is optional. + * In all cases, this function may only be called before calling any + * other function in the PSA Crypto API, including psa_crypto_init(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, it populates a file in + * persistent storage. Once the file has been created, this function + * can no longer succeed. + * + * If any error occurs, this function does not change the system state. + * You can call this function again after correcting the reason for the + * error if possible. + * + * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status. + * + * \warning If you use this function, you should use it as part of a + * factory provisioning process. The value of the injected seed + * is critical to the security of the device. It must be + * *secret*, *unpredictable* and (statistically) *unique per device*. + * You should be generate it randomly using a cryptographically + * secure random generator seeded from trusted entropy sources. + * You should transmit it securely to the device and ensure + * that its value is not leaked or stored anywhere beyond the + * needs of transmitting it from the point of generation to + * the call of this function, and erase all copies of the value + * once this function returns. + * + * This is an Mbed TLS extension. + * + * \note This function is only available on the following platforms: + * * If the compile-time option MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is enabled. + * Note that you must provide compatible implementations of + * mbedtls_nv_seed_read and mbedtls_nv_seed_write. + * * In a client-server integration of PSA Cryptography, on the client side, + * if the server supports this feature. + * \param[in] seed Buffer containing the seed value to inject. + * \param[in] seed_size Size of the \p seed buffer. + * The size of the seed in bytes must be greater + * or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM + * and #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE. + * It must be less or equal to + * #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The seed value was injected successfully. The random generator + * of the PSA Crypto implementation is now ready for use. + * You may now call psa_crypto_init() and use the PSA Crypto + * implementation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p seed_size is out of range. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * There was a failure reading or writing from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The library has already been initialized. It is no longer + * possible to call this function. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size); + +/** \addtogroup crypto_types + * @{ + */ + +/** DSA public key. + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte + * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p` + * in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4002) + +/** DSA key pair (private and public key). + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The + * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes + * are not stripped). + * + * Deterministic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows + * FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer + * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range + * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain + * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, + * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). + * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. + * + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7002) + +/** Whether a key type is an DSA key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000400) +/** DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4, + * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000500) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG +/** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of + * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ + PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) + + +/* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from + * the API definition. */ +#undef PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ + PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** Custom Diffie-Hellman group. + * + * For keys of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM), the group data comes + * from domain parameters set by psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). + */ +#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x7e) + + +/** + * \brief Set domain parameters for a key. + * + * Some key types require additional domain parameters in addition to + * the key type identifier and the key size. Use this function instead + * of psa_set_key_type() when you need to specify domain parameters. + * + * The format for the required domain parameters varies based on the key type. + * + * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the domain parameter data consists of the public exponent, + * represented as a big-endian integer with no leading zeros. + * This information is used when generating an RSA key pair. + * When importing a key, the public exponent is read from the imported + * key data and the exponent recorded in the attribute structure is ignored. + * As an exception, the public exponent 65537 is represented by an empty + * byte string. + * - For DSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the `Dss-Params` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.2. + * ``` + * Dss-Params ::= SEQUENCE { + * p INTEGER, + * q INTEGER, + * g INTEGER + * } + * ``` + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange keys + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM)), the + * `DomainParameters` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.3. + * ``` + * DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { + * p INTEGER, -- odd prime, p=jq +1 + * g INTEGER, -- generator, g + * q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 + * j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- subgroup factor + * validationParams ValidationParams OPTIONAL + * } + * ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE { + * seed BIT STRING, + * pgenCounter INTEGER + * } + * ``` + * + * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. + * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, + * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. + * + * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change + * in future versions of the library. + * + * \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where the specified domain + * parameters will be stored. + * If this function fails, the content of + * \p attributes is not modified. + * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value). + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key domain parameters. + * The content of this buffer is interpreted + * according to \p type as described above. + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +/** + * \brief Get domain parameters for a key. + * + * Get the domain parameters for a key with this function, if any. The format + * of the domain parameters written to \p data is specified in the + * documentation for psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). + * + * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change + * in future versions of the library. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * \param[out] data On success, the key domain parameters. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * The buffer is guaranteed to be large + * enough if its size in bytes is at least + * the value given by + * PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(). + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key domain parameters data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** Safe output buffer size for psa_get_key_domain_parameters(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change + * in future versions of the library. + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_get_key_domain_parameters() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported + * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a + * sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? sizeof(int) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(key_type) ? PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0) +#define PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 3 /*without optional parts*/) +#define PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 2 /*p, g*/ + 34 /*q*/) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions + * @{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA. + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier + * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \param[out] bits On success, the bit size of the curve. + * + * \return The corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). + * \return \c 0 on failure (\p grpid is not recognized). + */ +static inline psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, + size_t *bits ) +{ + switch( grpid ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + *bits = 192; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + *bits = 224; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + *bits = 521; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + *bits = 512; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + *bits = 255; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + *bits = 192; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + *bits = 224; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + *bits = 256; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + *bits = 448; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); + default: + *bits = 0; + return( 0 ); + } +} + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). + * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. + * \param bits_is_sloppy If true, \p bits may be the bit-length rounded up + * to the nearest multiple of 8. This allows the caller + * to infer the exact curve from the length of a key + * which is supplied as a byte string. + * + * \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier + * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \c curve is not recognized. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p bits is not + * correct for \p curve. + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( psa_ecc_family_t curve, + size_t bits, + int bits_is_sloppy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_external_rng External random generator + * @{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** External random generator function, implemented by the platform. + * + * When the compile-time option #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG is enabled, + * this function replaces Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules for all + * random generation triggered via PSA crypto interfaces. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * \param[in,out] context Pointer to the random generator context. + * This is all-bits-zero on the first call + * and preserved between successive calls. + * \param[out] output Output buffer. On success, this buffer + * contains random data with a uniform + * distribution. + * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, set this value to \p output_size. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. The output buffer contains \p output_size bytes of + * cryptographic-quality random data, and \c *output_length is + * set to \p output_size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * The random generator requires extra entropy and there is no + * way to obtain entropy under current environment conditions. + * This error should not happen under normal circumstances since + * this function is responsible for obtaining as much entropy as + * it needs. However implementations of this function may return + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY if there is no way to obtain + * entropy without blocking indefinitely. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * A failure of the random generator hardware that isn't covered + * by #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_builtin_keys Built-in keys + * @{ + */ + +/** The minimum value for a key identifier that is built into the + * implementation. + * + * The range of key identifiers from #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + * to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX within the range from + * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN and #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX and must not intersect + * with any other set of implementation-chosen key identifiers. + * + * This value is part of the library's ABI since changing it would invalidate + * the values of built-in key identifiers in applications. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fff0000) + +/** The maximum value for a key identifier that is built into the + * implementation. + * + * See #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fffefff) + +/** A slot number identifying a key in a driver. + * + * Values of this type are used to identify built-in keys. + */ +typedef uint64_t psa_drv_slot_number_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) +/** Test whether a key identifier belongs to the builtin key range. + * + * \param key_id Key identifier to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The key identifier is a builtin key identifier. + * \retval 0 + * The key identifier is not a builtin key identifier. + */ +static inline int psa_key_id_is_builtin( psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + return( ( key_id >= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ) && + ( key_id <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX ) ); +} + +/** Platform function to obtain the location and slot number of a built-in key. + * + * An application-specific implementation of this function must be provided if + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled. This would typically be provided + * as part of a platform's system image. + * + * #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(\p key_id) needs to be in the range from + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX. + * + * In a multi-application configuration + * (\c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER is defined), + * this function should check that #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(\p key_id) + * is allowed to use the given key. + * + * \param key_id The key ID for which to retrieve the + * location and slot attributes. + * \param[out] lifetime On success, the lifetime associated with the key + * corresponding to \p key_id. Lifetime is a + * combination of which driver contains the key, + * and with what persistence level the key is + * intended to be used. If the platform + * implementation does not contain specific + * information about the intended key persistence + * level, the persistence level may be reported as + * #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number known to the driver + * registered at the lifetime location reported + * through \p lifetime which corresponds to the + * requested built-in key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The requested key identifier designates a built-in key. + * In a multi-application configuration, the requested owner + * is allowed to access it. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * The requested key identifier is not a built-in key which is known + * to this function. If a key exists in the key storage with this + * identifier, the data from the storage will be used. + * \return (any other error) + * Any other error is propagated to the function that requested the key. + * Common errors include: + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: the key exists but the requested owner + * is not allowed to access it. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + psa_key_lifetime_t *lifetime, + psa_drv_slot_number_t *slot_number ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +/** @} */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..66f46879 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_platform.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS platform definitions + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains platform-dependent type definitions. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that + * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the + * module implements. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H + +/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it + * in each of its header files. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/* Translate between classic MBEDTLS_xxx feature symbols and PSA_xxx + * feature symbols. */ +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" + +/* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */ +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + +/* Building for the PSA Crypto service on a PSA platform, a key owner is a PSA + * partition identifier. + * + * The function psa_its_identifier_of_slot() in psa_crypto_storage.c that + * translates a key identifier to a key storage file name assumes that + * mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is an 32 bits integer. This function thus needs + * reworking if mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is not defined as a 32 bits integer + * here anymore. + */ +typedef int32_t mbedtls_key_owner_id_t; + +/** Compare two key owner identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key owner identifier. + * \param id2 Second key owner identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key owner identifiers are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal( mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id1, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id2 ) +{ + return( id1 == id2 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/* + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is being built for SPM + * (Secure Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two + * parts: NSPE (Non-Secure Processing Environment) and SPE (Secure Processing + * Environment). When building for the SPE, an additional header file should be + * included. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE 1 +#include "crypto_spe.h" +#endif // MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** The type of the context passed to mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). + * + * Mbed TLS initializes the context to all-bits-zero before calling + * mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() for the first time. + * + * The definition of this type in the Mbed TLS source code is for + * demonstration purposes. Implementers of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * are expected to replace it with a custom definition. + */ +typedef struct { + uintptr_t opaque[2]; +} mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1dc8f9b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h @@ -0,0 +1,1395 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_se_driver.h + * \brief PSA external cryptoprocessor driver module + * + * This header declares types and function signatures for cryptography + * drivers that access key material via opaque references. + * This is meant for cryptoprocessors that have a separate key storage from the + * space in which the PSA Crypto implementation runs, typically secure + * elements (SEs). + * + * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver HAL (hardware abstraction layer), + * containing functions for driver developers to implement to enable hardware + * to be called in a standardized way by a PSA Cryptography API + * implementation. The functions comprising the driver HAL, which driver + * authors implement, are not intended to be called by application developers. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H + +#include "crypto_driver_common.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \defgroup se_init Secure element driver initialization + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief Driver context structure + * + * Driver functions receive a pointer to this structure. + * Each registered driver has one instance of this structure. + * + * Implementations must include the fields specified here and + * may include other fields. + */ +typedef struct { + /** A read-only pointer to the driver's persistent data. + * + * Drivers typically use this persistent data to keep track of + * which slot numbers are available. This is only a guideline: + * drivers may use the persistent data for any purpose, keeping + * in mind the restrictions on when the persistent data is saved + * to storage: the persistent data is only saved after calling + * certain functions that receive a writable pointer to the + * persistent data. + * + * The core allocates a memory buffer for the persistent data. + * The pointer is guaranteed to be suitably aligned for any data type, + * like a pointer returned by `malloc` (but the core can use any + * method to allocate the buffer, not necessarily `malloc`). + * + * The size of this buffer is in the \c persistent_data_size field of + * this structure. + * + * Before the driver is initialized for the first time, the content of + * the persistent data is all-bits-zero. After a driver upgrade, if the + * size of the persistent data has increased, the original data is padded + * on the right with zeros; if the size has decreased, the original data + * is truncated to the new size. + * + * This pointer is to read-only data. Only a few driver functions are + * allowed to modify the persistent data. These functions receive a + * writable pointer. These functions are: + * - psa_drv_se_t::p_init + * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate + * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy + * + * The PSA Cryptography core saves the persistent data from one + * session to the next. It does this before returning from API functions + * that call a driver method that is allowed to modify the persistent + * data, specifically: + * - psa_crypto_init() causes a call to psa_drv_se_t::p_init, and may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy to complete an action + * that was interrupted by a power failure. + * - Key creation functions cause a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate, and may cause a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy in case an error occurs. + * - psa_destroy_key() causes a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy. + */ + const void *const persistent_data; + + /** The size of \c persistent_data in bytes. + * + * This is always equal to the value of the `persistent_data_size` field + * of the ::psa_drv_se_t structure when the driver is registered. + */ + const size_t persistent_data_size; + + /** Driver transient data. + * + * The core initializes this value to 0 and does not read or modify it + * afterwards. The driver may store whatever it wants in this field. + */ + uintptr_t transient_data; +} psa_drv_se_context_t; + +/** \brief A driver initialization function. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param location The location value for which this driver + * is registered. The driver will be invoked + * for all keys whose lifetime is in this + * location. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The driver is operational. + * The core will update the persistent data in storage. + * \return + * Any other return value prevents the driver from being used in + * this session. + * The core will NOT update the persistent data in storage. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_init_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_location_t location); + +#if defined(__DOXYGEN_ONLY__) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* Mbed Crypto with secure element support enabled defines this type in + * crypto_types.h because it is also visible to applications through an + * implementation-specific extension. + * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible + * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ +/** An internal designation of a key slot between the core part of the + * PSA Crypto implementation and the driver. The meaning of this value + * is driver-dependent. */ +typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; +#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ || !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_mac Secure Element Message Authentication Codes + * Generation and authentication of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using + * a secure element can be done either as a single function call (via the + * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t` functions), or in + * parts using the following sequence: + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` + * - ... + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t` + * + * If a previously started secure element MAC operation needs to be terminated, + * it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t`. Failure to do so may + * result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined + * behavior. + */ +/**@{*/ +/** \brief A function that starts a secure element MAC operation for a PSA + * Crypto Driver implementation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the + * hardware-specific MAC context + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the + * operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used to underly the MAC + * operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm); + +/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element MAC + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously-established MAC operation to be + * updated + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended + * to the MAC operation + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_update_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length); + +/** \brief a function that completes a previously started secure element MAC + * operation by returning the resulting MAC. + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started MAC operation to be + * finished + * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be + * placed + * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the buffer that has been + * allocated for the `output` buffer + * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `p_mac` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *p_mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element MAC + * operation by comparing the resulting MAC against a provided value + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously + * started MAC operation to be fiinished + * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC + * will be compared against + * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the value stored in `p_mac` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each + * other + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did + * not match the provided MAC + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that aborts a previous started secure element MAC + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously + * started MAC operation to be aborted + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t)(void *op_context); + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one + * command and returns the calculated MAC + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `p_input` + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used + * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC + * operation + * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be + * placed + * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer + * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *p_mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one + * command and compares the resulting MAC against a provided value + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `input` + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used + * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC + * operation + * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC will + * be compared against + * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of `mac` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each + * other + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did + * not match the provided MAC + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to + * perform secure element MAC operations + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate the table as appropriate + * upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as + * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t`), it should be set to NULL. + * + * Driver implementers should ensure that they implement all of the functions + * that make sense for their hardware, and that they provide a full solution + * (for example, if they support `p_setup`, they should also support + * `p_update` and at least one of `p_finish` or `p_finish_verify`). + * + */ +typedef struct { + /**The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element MAC context + * structure + */ + size_t context_size; + /** Function that performs a MAC setup operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t p_setup; + /** Function that performs a MAC update operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_update_t p_update; + /** Function that completes a MAC operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t p_finish; + /** Function that completes a MAC operation with a verify check + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t p_finish_verify; + /** Function that aborts a previoustly started MAC operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t p_abort; + /** Function that performs a MAC operation in one call + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t p_mac; + /** Function that performs a MAC and verify operation in one call + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t p_mac_verify; +} psa_drv_se_mac_t; +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_cipher Secure Element Symmetric Ciphers + * + * Encryption and Decryption using secure element keys in block modes other + * than ECB must be done in multiple parts, using the following flow: + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t` (optional depending upon block mode) + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` + * - ... + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t` + * + * If a previously started secure element Cipher operation needs to be + * terminated, it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t`. Failure + * to do so may result in allocated resources not being freed or in other + * undefined behavior. + * + * In situations where a PSA Cryptographic API implementation is using a block + * mode not-supported by the underlying hardware or driver, it can construct + * the block mode itself, while calling the `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t` function + * for the cipher operations. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that provides the cipher setup function for a + * secure element driver + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the + * hardware-specific cipher context. + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the + * operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher + * operation + * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt + * or decrypt + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction); + +/** \brief A function that sets the initialization vector (if + * necessary) for an secure element cipher operation + * + * Rationale: The `psa_se_cipher_*` operation in the PSA Cryptographic API has + * two IV functions: one to set the IV, and one to generate it internally. The + * generate function is not necessary for the drivers to implement as the PSA + * Crypto implementation can do the generation using its RNG features. + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that contains the previously set up + * hardware-specific cipher context + * \param[in] p_iv A buffer containing the initialization vector + * \param[in] iv_length The size (in bytes) of the `p_iv` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_iv, + size_t iv_length); + +/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be + * encrypted/decrypted + * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to + * by `p_input` + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the + * output will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the + * `p_output` buffer + * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number + * of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_size, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output + * will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` + * buffer + * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** \brief A function that aborts a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t)(void *op_context); + +/** \brief A function that performs the ECB block mode for secure element + * cipher operations + * + * Note: this function should only be used with implementations that do not + * provide a needed higher-level operation. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher operation + * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt or + * decrypt + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be + * encrypted/decrypted + * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to by + * `p_input` + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output + * will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` + * buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_size, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * cipher operations using secure elements. + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as + * `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t`), it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element cipher + * context structure + */ + size_t context_size; + /** Function that performs a cipher setup operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t p_setup; + /** Function that sets a cipher IV (if necessary) */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t p_set_iv; + /** Function that performs a cipher update operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t p_update; + /** Function that completes a cipher operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t p_finish; + /** Function that aborts a cipher operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t p_abort; + /** Function that performs ECB mode for a cipher operation + * (Danger: ECB mode should not be used directly by clients of the PSA + * Crypto Client API) + */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t p_ecb; +} psa_drv_se_cipher_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_asymmetric Secure Element Asymmetric Cryptography + * + * Since the amount of data that can (or should) be encrypted or signed using + * asymmetric keys is limited by the key size, asymmetric key operations using + * keys in a secure element must be done in single function calls. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** + * \brief A function that signs a hash or short message with a private key in + * a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible + * with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_hash The hash to sign + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_signature Buffer where the signature is to be written + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *p_signature_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that verifies the signature a hash or short message using + * an asymmetric public key in a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_hash The hash whose signature is to be verified + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_signature Buffer containing the signature to verify + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that encrypts a short message with an asymmetric public + * key in a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_input The message to encrypt + * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass `NULL`. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass `NULL`. + * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes + * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. + * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written + * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *p_salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that decrypts a short message with an asymmetric private + * key in a secure element. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_input The message to decrypt + * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass `NULL`. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass `NULL`. + * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes + * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. + * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written + * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *p_salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * asymmetric cryptographic operations using secure elements. + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that performs an asymmetric sign operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t p_sign; + /** Function that performs an asymmetric verify operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t p_verify; + /** Function that performs an asymmetric encrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t p_encrypt; + /** Function that performs an asymmetric decrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t p_decrypt; +} psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_aead Secure Element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data + * Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) operations with secure + * elements must be done in one function call. While this creates a burden for + * implementers as there must be sufficient space in memory for the entire + * message, it prevents decrypted data from being made available before the + * authentication operation is complete and the data is known to be authentic. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element authenticated encryption + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use. + * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) + * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use + * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that will be + * authenticated but not encrypted + * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes + * \param[in] p_plaintext Data that will be authenticated and + * encrypted + * \param[in] plaintext_length Size of `p_plaintext` in bytes + * \param[out] p_ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is + * not part of this output. For algorithms + * where the encrypted data and the + * authentication tag are defined as + * separate outputs, the authentication + * tag is appended to the encrypted data. + * \param[in] ciphertext_size Size of the `p_ciphertext` buffer in + * bytes + * \param[out] p_ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in + * the `p_ciphertext` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + const uint8_t *p_nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *p_additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *p_plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *p_ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *p_ciphertext_length); + +/** A function that peforms a secure element authenticated decryption operation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use + * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) + * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use + * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that has been + * authenticated but not encrypted + * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes + * \param[in] p_ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. + * For algorithms where the encrypted data + * and the authentication tag are defined + * as separate inputs, the buffer must + * contain the encrypted data followed by + * the authentication tag. + * \param[in] ciphertext_length Size of `p_ciphertext` in bytes + * \param[out] p_plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data + * \param[in] plaintext_size Size of the `p_plaintext` buffer in + * bytes + * \param[out] p_plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in + * the `p_plaintext` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + const uint8_t *p_nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *p_additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *p_ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *p_plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *p_plaintext_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * secure element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data operations + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that performs the AEAD encrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t p_encrypt; + /** Function that performs the AEAD decrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t p_decrypt; +} psa_drv_se_aead_t; +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_key_management Secure Element Key Management + * Currently, key management is limited to importing keys in the clear, + * destroying keys, and exporting keys in the clear. + * Whether a key may be exported is determined by the key policies in place + * on the key slot. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** An enumeration indicating how a key is created. + */ +typedef enum +{ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, /**< During psa_import_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, /**< During psa_generate_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, /**< During psa_key_derivation_output_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, /**< During psa_copy_key() */ + +#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ + /** A key is being registered with mbedtls_psa_register_se_key(). + * + * The core only passes this value to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number, not to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate. The call to + * `p_validate_slot_number` is not followed by any other call to the + * driver: the key is considered successfully registered if the call to + * `p_validate_slot_number` succeeds, or if `p_validate_slot_number` is + * null. + * + * With this creation method, the driver must return #PSA_SUCCESS if + * the given attributes are compatible with the existing key in the slot, + * and #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST if the driver can determine that there + * is no key with the specified slot number. + * + * This is an Mbed Crypto extension. + */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, +#endif +} psa_key_creation_method_t; + +/** \brief A function that allocates a slot for a key. + * + * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core + * first calls this function to determine a valid slot number, + * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. + * In nominal conditions (that is, if no error occurs), + * the effect of a call to a key creation function in the PSA Cryptography + * API with a lifetime that places the key in a secure element is the + * following: + * -# The core calls psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate + * (or in some implementations + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number). The driver + * selects (or validates) a suitable slot number given the key attributes + * and the state of the secure element. + * -# The core calls a key creation function in the driver. + * + * The key creation functions in the PSA Cryptography API are: + * - psa_import_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. + * - psa_generate_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. + * - psa_key_derivation_output_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t::p_derive. + * - psa_copy_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_export. + * + * In case of errors, other behaviors are possible. + * - If the PSA Cryptography subsystem dies after the first step, + * for example because the device has lost power abruptly, + * the second step may never happen, or may happen after a reset + * and re-initialization. Alternatively, after a reset and + * re-initialization, the core may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that + * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. + * - If an error occurs, the core may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that + * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. + * + * Errors and system resets also have an impact on the driver's persistent + * data. If a reset happens before the overall key creation process is + * completed (before or after the second step above), it is unspecified + * whether the persistent data after the reset is identical to what it + * was before or after the call to `p_allocate` (or `p_validate_slot_number`). + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. + * \param method The way in which the key is being created. + * \param[out] key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * The core will record \c *key_slot as the key slot where the key + * is stored and will update the persistent data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t *key_slot); + +/** \brief A function that determines whether a slot number is valid + * for a key. + * + * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core + * first calls this function to validate the choice of slot number, + * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. + * See the documentation of #psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more details. + * + * As of the PSA Cryptography API specification version 1.0, there is no way + * for applications to trigger a call to this function. However some + * implementations offer the capability to create or declare a key in + * a specific slot via implementation-specific means, generally for the + * sake of initial device provisioning or onboarding. Such a mechanism may + * be added to a future version of the PSA Cryptography API specification. + * + * This function may update the driver's persistent data through + * \p persistent_data. The core will save the updated persistent data at the + * end of the key creation process. See the description of + * ::psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. + * \param method The way in which the key is being created. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot where the key is to be stored. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The given slot number is valid for a key with the given + * attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The given slot number is not valid for a key with the + * given attributes. This includes the case where the slot + * number is not valid at all. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a key with the specified slot number. + * Drivers may choose to return this error from the key + * creation function instead. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); + +/** \brief A function that imports a key into a secure element in binary format + * + * This function can support any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the + * documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for each key type. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, + * the key type and the usage policy. + * Drivers should not access the key size stored + * in the attributes: it may not match the + * data passed in \p data. + * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), + * psa_get_key_type(), + * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this + * information. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits On success, the key size in bits. The driver + * must determine this value after parsing the + * key according to the key type. + * This value is not used if the function fails. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_import_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *bits); + +/** + * \brief A function that destroys a secure element key and restore the slot to + * its default state + * + * This function destroys the content of the key from a secure element. + * Implementations shall make a best effort to ensure that any previous content + * of the slot is unrecoverable. + * + * This function returns the specified slot to its default state. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param key_slot The key slot to erase. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The slot's content, if any, has been erased. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); + +/** + * \brief A function that exports a secure element key in binary format + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an equivalent object. + * + * If a key is created with `psa_import_key()` and then exported with + * this function, it is not guaranteed that the resulting data is + * identical: the implementation may choose a different representation + * of the same key if the format permits it. + * + * This function should generate output in the same format that + * `psa_export_key()` does. Refer to the + * documentation of `psa_export_key()` for the format for each key type. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key Slot whose content is to be exported. This must + * be an occupied key slot. + * \param[out] p_data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the `p_data` buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] p_data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_export_key_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key, + uint8_t *p_data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *p_data_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that generates a symmetric or asymmetric key on a secure + * element + * + * If the key type \c type recorded in \p attributes + * is asymmetric (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(\c type) = 1), + * the driver may export the public key at the time of generation, + * in the format documented for psa_export_public_key() by writing it + * to the \p pubkey buffer. + * This is optional, intended for secure elements that output the + * public key at generation time and that cannot export the public key + * later. Drivers that do not need this feature should leave + * \p *pubkey_length set to 0 and should + * implement the psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public function. + * Some implementations do not support this feature, in which case + * \p pubkey is \c NULL and \p pubkey_size is 0. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, + * the key type and size, and the usage policy. + * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), + * psa_get_key_type(), psa_get_key_bits(), + * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this + * information. + * \param[out] pubkey A buffer where the driver can write the + * public key, when generating an asymmetric + * key pair. + * This is \c NULL when generating a symmetric + * key or if the core does not support + * exporting the public key at generation time. + * \param pubkey_size The size of the `pubkey` buffer in bytes. + * This is 0 when generating a symmetric + * key or if the core does not support + * exporting the public key at generation time. + * \param[out] pubkey_length On entry, this is always 0. + * On success, the number of bytes written to + * \p pubkey. If this is 0 or unchanged on return, + * the core will not read the \p pubkey buffer, + * and will instead call the driver's + * psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public + * function to export the public key when needed. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_generate_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, size_t *pubkey_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure + * element key management + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that allocates a slot for a key. */ + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t p_allocate; + /** Function that checks the validity of a slot for a key. */ + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t p_validate_slot_number; + /** Function that performs a key import operation */ + psa_drv_se_import_key_t p_import; + /** Function that performs a generation */ + psa_drv_se_generate_key_t p_generate; + /** Function that performs a key destroy operation */ + psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t p_destroy; + /** Function that performs a key export operation */ + psa_drv_se_export_key_t p_export; + /** Function that performs a public key export operation */ + psa_drv_se_export_key_t p_export_public; +} psa_drv_se_key_management_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup driver_derivation Secure Element Key Derivation and Agreement + * Key derivation is the process of generating new key material using an + * existing key and additional parameters, iterating through a basic + * cryptographic function, such as a hash. + * Key agreement is a part of cryptographic protocols that allows two parties + * to agree on the same key value, but starting from different original key + * material. + * The flows are similar, and the PSA Crypto Driver Model uses the same functions + * for both of the flows. + * + * There are two different final functions for the flows, + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` and `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export`. + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` is used when the key material should be + * placed in a slot on the hardware and not exposed to the caller. + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export` is used when the key material should be + * returned to the PSA Cryptographic API implementation. + * + * Different key derivation algorithms require a different number of inputs. + * Instead of having an API that takes as input variable length arrays, which + * can be problemmatic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed + * to the driver via a function, `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral`, that + * is called multiple times with different `collateral_id`s. Thus, for a key + * derivation algorithm that required 3 parameter inputs, the flow would look + * something like: + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(kdf_algorithm, source_key, dest_key_size_bytes); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_0, + * p_collateral_0, + * collateral_0_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_1, + * p_collateral_1, + * collateral_1_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_2, + * p_collateral_2, + * collateral_2_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive(); + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + * + * key agreement example: + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(alg, source_key. dest_key_size_bytes); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(DHE_PUBKEY, p_pubkey, pubkey_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export(p_session_key, + * session_key_size, + * &session_key_length); + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that Sets up a secure element key derivation operation by + * specifying the algorithm and the source key sot + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] kdf_alg The algorithm to be used for the key derivation + * \param[in] source_key The key to be used as the source material for + * the key derivation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_slot_number_t source_key); + +/** \brief A function that provides collateral (parameters) needed for a secure + * element key derivation or key agreement operation + * + * Since many key derivation algorithms require multiple parameters, it is + * expected that this function may be called multiple times for the same + * operation, each with a different algorithm-specific `collateral_id` + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] collateral_id An ID for the collateral being provided + * \param[in] p_collateral A buffer containing the collateral data + * \param[in] collateral_size The size in bytes of the collateral + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t)(void *op_context, + uint32_t collateral_id, + const uint8_t *p_collateral, + size_t collateral_size); + +/** \brief A function that performs the final secure element key derivation + * step and place the generated key material in a slot + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] dest_key The slot where the generated key material + * should be placed + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t)(void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t dest_key); + +/** \brief A function that performs the final step of a secure element key + * agreement and place the generated key material in a buffer + * + * \param[out] p_output Buffer in which to place the generated key + * material + * \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of `p_output` + * \param[out] p_output_length Upon success, contains the number of bytes of + * key material placed in `p_output` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure + * element key derivation and agreement + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The driver-specific size of the key derivation context */ + size_t context_size; + /** Function that performs a key derivation setup */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t p_setup; + /** Function that sets key derivation collateral */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t p_collateral; + /** Function that performs a final key derivation step */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t p_derive; + /** Function that perforsm a final key derivation or agreement and + * exports the key */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t p_export; +} psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_registration Secure element driver registration + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** A structure containing pointers to all the entry points of a + * secure element driver. + * + * Future versions of this specification may add extra substructures at + * the end of this structure. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The version of the driver HAL that this driver implements. + * This is a protection against loading driver binaries built against + * a different version of this specification. + * Use #PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION. + */ + uint32_t hal_version; + + /** The size of the driver's persistent data in bytes. + * + * This can be 0 if the driver does not need persistent data. + * + * See the documentation of psa_drv_se_context_t::persistent_data + * for more information about why and how a driver can use + * persistent data. + */ + size_t persistent_data_size; + + /** The driver initialization function. + * + * This function is called once during the initialization of the + * PSA Cryptography subsystem, before any other function of the + * driver is called. If this function returns a failure status, + * the driver will be unusable, at least until the next system reset. + * + * If this field is \c NULL, it is equivalent to a function that does + * nothing and returns #PSA_SUCCESS. + */ + psa_drv_se_init_t p_init; + + const psa_drv_se_key_management_t *key_management; + const psa_drv_se_mac_t *mac; + const psa_drv_se_cipher_t *cipher; + const psa_drv_se_aead_t *aead; + const psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t *asymmetric; + const psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t *derivation; +} psa_drv_se_t; + +/** The current version of the secure element driver HAL. + */ +/* 0.0.0 patchlevel 5 */ +#define PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION 0x00000005 + +/** Register an external cryptoprocessor (secure element) driver. + * + * This function is only intended to be used by driver code, not by + * application code. In implementations with separation between the + * PSA cryptography module and applications, this function should + * only be available to callers that run in the same memory space as + * the cryptography module, and should not be exposed to applications + * running in a different memory space. + * + * This function may be called before psa_crypto_init(). It is + * implementation-defined whether this function may be called + * after psa_crypto_init(). + * + * \note Implementations store metadata about keys including the lifetime + * value, which contains the driver's location indicator. Therefore, + * from one instantiation of the PSA Cryptography + * library to the next one, if there is a key in storage with a certain + * lifetime value, you must always register the same driver (or an + * updated version that communicates with the same secure element) + * with the same location value. + * + * \param location The location value through which this driver will + * be exposed to applications. + * This driver will be used for all keys such that + * `location == #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime )`. + * The value #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE is reserved + * and may not be used for drivers. Implementations + * may reserve other values. + * \param[in] methods The method table of the driver. This structure must + * remain valid for as long as the cryptography + * module keeps running. It is typically a global + * constant. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * The driver was successfully registered. Applications can now + * use \p location to access keys through the methods passed to + * this function. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * This function was called after the initialization of the + * cryptography module, and this implementation does not support + * driver registration at this stage. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a registered driver for this value of \p location. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p location is a reserved value. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * `methods->hal_version` is not supported by this implementation. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( + psa_key_location_t location, + const psa_drv_se_t *methods); + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d453220 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h @@ -0,0 +1,1171 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_sizes.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS buffer size macros + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains the definitions of macros that are useful to + * compute buffer sizes. The signatures and semantics of these macros + * are standardized, but the definitions are not, because they depend on + * the available algorithms and, in some cases, on permitted tolerances + * on buffer sizes. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that + * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the + * module implements. + * + * Macros that compute sizes whose values do not depend on the + * implementation are in crypto.h. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H + +/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it + * in each of its header files. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7) / 8) +#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8) + +#define PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(block_size, length) \ + (((length) + (block_size) - 1) / (block_size) * (block_size)) + +/** The size of the output of psa_hash_finish(), in bytes. + * + * This is also the hash size that psa_hash_verify() expects. + * + * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true), or an HMAC algorithm + * (#PSA_ALG_HMAC(\c hash_alg) where \c hash_alg is a + * hash algorithm). + * + * \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm. + * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD2 ? 16 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD4 ? 16 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64 : \ + 0) + +/** The input block size of a hash algorithm, in bytes. + * + * Hash algorithms process their input data in blocks. Hash operations will + * retain any partial blocks until they have enough input to fill the block or + * until the operation is finished. + * This affects the output from psa_hash_suspend(). + * + * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The block size in bytes for the specified hash algorithm. + * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + * An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a + * hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support. + */ +#define PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD2 ? 16 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD4 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 128 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 128 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 128 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 128 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 144 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 136 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 104 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 72 : \ + 0) + +/** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of a hash. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a hash in bytes. + */ +/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-226, + * 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for + * HMAC-SHA3-512. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64 +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 +#else +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32 +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#endif + +/** \def PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of a MAC. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a MAC in bytes. + */ +/* All non-HMAC MACs have a maximum size that's smaller than the + * minimum possible value of PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in this implementation. */ +/* Note that the encoding of truncated MAC algorithms limits this value + * to 64 bytes. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + +/** The length of a tag for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to store the + * tag output from psa_aead_finish(). + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type The type of the AEAD key. + * \param key_bits The size of the AEAD key in bits. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The tag length for the specified algorithm and key. + * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified + * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of + * the ciphertext, return 0. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + ((void) (key_bits), 0)) + +/** The maximum tag size for all supported AEAD algorithms, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE 16 + +/* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. + * + * Mbed TLS does not set a hard limit on the size of RSA keys: any key + * whose parameters fit in a bignum is accepted. However large keys can + * induce a large memory usage and long computation times. Unlike other + * auxiliary macros in this file and in crypto.h, which reflect how the + * library is configured, this macro defines how the library is + * configured. This implementation refuses to import or generate an + * RSA key whose size is larger than the value defined here. + * + * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different + * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */ +#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096 + +/* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 +#else +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0 +#endif + +/** This macro returns the maximum supported length of the PSK for the + * TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS key derivation + * (#PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(\c hash_alg)). + * + * The maximum supported length does not depend on the chosen hash algorithm. + * + * Quoting RFC 4279, Sect 5.3: + * TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support + * arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary + * PSKs up to 64 octets in length. Supporting longer identities and + * keys is RECOMMENDED. + * + * Therefore, no implementation should define a value smaller than 64 + * for #PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE. + */ +#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE 128 + +/** The maximum size of a block cipher. */ +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE 16 + +/** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes. + * + * This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify_finish() expects. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type The type of the MAC key. + * \param key_bits The size of the MAC key in bits. + * \param alg A MAC algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The MAC size for the specified algorithm with + * the specified key parameters. + * \return 0 if the MAC algorithm is not recognized. + * \return Either 0 or the correct size for a MAC algorithm that + * the implementation recognizes, but does not support. + * \return Unspecified if the key parameters are not consistent + * with the algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ? PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg) : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) ? PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)) : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + ((void)(key_type), (void)(key_bits), 0)) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the ciphertext may be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, + * \p plaintext_length). + * + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length) \ + ((plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE) + + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the plaintext may be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, ciphertext_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) ? \ + (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, + * \p ciphertext_length). + * + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the ciphertext in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length) \ + (ciphertext_length) + +/** The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to + * store the nonce output from #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to + * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), + * just the default size that is generated by #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with + * algorithm \p alg. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, + * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) == 16 ? \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) ? 13 : \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12 : \ + 0 : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ? 12 : \ + 0) + +/** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and + * AEAD algorithms, in bytes. + * + * This is equal to or greater than any value that #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH() + * may return. + * + * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to + * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), + * just the largest size that may be generated by + * #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 13 + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller + * in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible + * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be + * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the + * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), (input_length)) : \ + (input_length) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length))) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an + * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an + * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +#define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ + 2 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1 : \ + 11 /*PKCS#1v1.5*/) + +/** + * \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size + * + * \param curve_bits Curve size in bits. + * \return Signature size in bytes. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. + */ +#define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2) + +/** Sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_hash(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a signature using a key + * of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the signature may be smaller + * (some algorithms produce a variable-size signature). + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The signature algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_sign_hash() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? ((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + ((void)alg, 0)) + +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +/** \def PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of an asymmetric signature. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a signature in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ + PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a ciphertext produced using + * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the ciphertext may be smaller, depending + * on the algorithm. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ + ((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), for any + * supported asymmetric encryption. + * + * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +/* This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a plaintext produced using + * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the plaintext may be smaller, depending + * on the algorithm. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(), for any + * supported asymmetric decryption. + * + * This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. + * + * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) + +/* Maximum size of the ASN.1 encoding of an INTEGER with the specified + * number of bits. + * + * This definition assumes that bits <= 2^19 - 9 so that the length field + * is at most 3 bytes. The length of the encoding is the length of the + * bit string padded to a whole number of bytes plus: + * - 1 type byte; + * - 1 to 3 length bytes; + * - 0 to 1 bytes of leading 0 due to the sign bit. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(bits) \ + ((bits) / 8 + 5) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA public key. + * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32. + * + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - n : INTEGER; + * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair. + * Assumes thatthe public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size + * difference between the two primes is at most 1 bit. + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, -- 0 + * modulus INTEGER, -- N-bit + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- 32-bit + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- N-bit + * prime1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * prime2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * coefficient INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * } + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 3 bytes of version; + * - 7 half-size INTEGERs plus 2 full-size INTEGERs, + * overapproximated as 9 half-size INTEGERS; + * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (9 * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2 + 1) + 14) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA public key. + * + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- contains DSAPublicKey + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters Dss-Params } -- SEQUENCE of 3 INTEGERs + * DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, Y + * + * - 3 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 1 + 1 + 7 bytes of algorithm (DSA OID); + * - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead; + * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); + * - 1 + 1 + 32 bytes for 1 sub-size INTEGER (q <= 256 bits). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 59) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA key pair. + * + * DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, -- 0 + * prime INTEGER, -- p + * subprime INTEGER, -- q + * generator INTEGER, -- g + * public INTEGER, -- y + * private INTEGER, -- x + * } + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 3 bytes of version; + * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); + * - 2 * (1 + 1 + 32) bytes for 2 sub-size INTEGERs (q, x <= 256 bits). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 75) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC public key. + * + * The representation of an ECC public key is: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - where m is the bit size associated with the curve. + * + * - 1 byte + 2 * point size. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC key pair. + * + * An ECC key pair is represented by the secret value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_key() or + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export + * a key by querying the key type and size at runtime. + * \code{c} + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * psa_status_t status; + * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); + * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits); + * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); + * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); + * size_t buffer_length; + * status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * \endcode + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_public_key(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export + * a public key by querying the key type and size at runtime. + * \code{c} + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * psa_status_t status; + * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); + * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits); + * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); + * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); + * size_t buffer_length; + * status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * \endcode + * + * \param key_type A public key or key pair key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_export_public_key() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not + * supported, return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, + * the return value is unspecified. + * + * If the parameters are valid and supported, + * return the same result as + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + * \p #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\p key_type), + * \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0) + +/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is + * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() to export any + * asymmetric key pair, regardless of the exact key type and key size. + * + * See also #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric public key. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is + * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() or + * psa_export_public_key() to export any asymmetric public key, + * regardless of the exact key type and key size. + * + * See also #PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_raw_key_agreement() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that + * is not supported, return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, + * the return value is unspecified. + */ +/* FFDH is not yet supported in PSA. */ +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + 0) + +/** Maximum size of the output from psa_raw_key_agreement(). + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is the + * maximum size of the output any raw key agreement algorithm, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) + +/** The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes. + * + * The IV that is generated as part of a call to #psa_cipher_encrypt() is always + * the default IV length for the algorithm. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to + * store the IV output from #psa_cipher_generate_iv() when using + * a multi-part cipher operation. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The default IV size for the specified key type and algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not use an IV, return 0. + * If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, + * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) > 1 && \ + ((alg) == PSA_ALG_CTR || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CFB || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_OFB || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_XTS || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12 : \ + 0) + +/** The maximum IV size for all supported cipher algorithms, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(). + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16 + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + (input_length) + 1) + \ + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : 0) : \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (input_length) + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \ + 0)) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, \ + (input_length) + 1) + \ + PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) && \ + ((key_type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ + (input_length) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (input_length) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ + (((alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + input_length) : \ + (input_length)) : 0) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, input_length)) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_cipher_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient + * ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in + * any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..511b3973 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -0,0 +1,478 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_struct.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS structured type implementations + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains the definitions of some data structures with + * implementation-specific definitions. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, it is expected that the front-end and the back-end + * would have different versions of this file. + * + *

Design notes about multipart operation structures

+ * + * For multipart operations without driver delegation support, each multipart + * operation structure contains a `psa_algorithm_t alg` field which indicates + * which specific algorithm the structure is for. When the structure is not in + * use, `alg` is 0. Most of the structure consists of a union which is + * discriminated by `alg`. + * + * For multipart operations with driver delegation support, each multipart + * operation structure contains an `unsigned int id` field indicating which + * driver got assigned to do the operation. When the structure is not in use, + * 'id' is 0. The structure contains also a driver context which is the union + * of the contexts of all drivers able to handle the type of multipart + * operation. + * + * Note that when `alg` or `id` is 0, the content of other fields is undefined. + * In particular, it is not guaranteed that a freshly-initialized structure + * is all-zero: we initialize structures to something like `{0, 0}`, which + * is only guaranteed to initializes the first member of the union; + * GCC and Clang initialize the whole structure to 0 (at the time of writing), + * but MSVC and CompCert don't. + * + * In Mbed Crypto, multipart operation structures live independently from + * the key. This allows Mbed Crypto to free the key objects when destroying + * a key slot. If a multipart operation needs to remember the key after + * the setup function returns, the operation structure needs to contain a + * copy of the key. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it + * in each of its header files. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" + +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the primitive + * algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h" + +struct psa_hash_operation_s +{ + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h. + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. the driver context is not active, in use). */ + unsigned int id; + psa_driver_hash_context_t ctx; +}; + +#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +struct psa_cipher_operation_s +{ + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int id; + + unsigned int iv_required : 1; + unsigned int iv_set : 1; + + uint8_t default_iv_length; + + psa_driver_cipher_context_t ctx; +}; + +#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the composite + * algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h" + +struct psa_mac_operation_s +{ + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int id; + uint8_t mac_size; + unsigned int is_sign : 1; + psa_driver_mac_context_t ctx; +}; + +#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +struct psa_aead_operation_s +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + unsigned int key_set : 1; + unsigned int iv_set : 1; + uint8_t iv_size; + uint8_t block_size; + union + { + unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher; + } ctx; +}; + +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t *info; + size_t info_length; +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + uint8_t offset_in_block; + uint8_t block_number; + unsigned int state : 2; + unsigned int info_set : 1; + uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t prk[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + struct psa_mac_operation_s hmac; +} psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +typedef enum +{ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET, /* seed has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET, /* key has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET, /* label has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */ +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t; + +typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_s +{ +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + + /* Indicates how many bytes in the current HMAC block have + * not yet been read by the user. */ + uint8_t left_in_block; + + /* The 1-based number of the block. */ + uint8_t block_number; + + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t state; + + uint8_t *secret; + size_t secret_length; + uint8_t *seed; + size_t seed_length; + uint8_t *label; + size_t label_length; + + uint8_t Ai[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + /* `HMAC_hash( prk, A(i) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */ + uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +struct psa_key_derivation_s +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + unsigned int can_output_key : 1; + size_t capacity; + union + { + /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ + uint8_t dummy; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t hkdf; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t tls12_prf; +#endif + } ctx; +}; + +/* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_key_derivation_s v = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +struct psa_key_policy_s +{ + psa_key_usage_t usage; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_algorithm_t alg2; +}; +typedef struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT {0, 0, 0} +static inline struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_key_policy_s v = PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +/* The type used internally for key sizes. + * Public interfaces use size_t, but internally we use a smaller type. */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_bits_t; +/* The maximum value of the type used to represent bit-sizes. + * This is used to mark an invalid key size. */ +#define PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE ( (psa_key_bits_t) ( -1 ) ) +/* The maximum size of a key in bits. + * Currently defined as the maximum that can be represented, rounded down + * to a whole number of bytes. + * This is an uncast value so that it can be used in preprocessor + * conditionals. */ +#define PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 0xfff8 + +/** A mask of flags that can be stored in key attributes. + * + * This type is also used internally to store flags in slots. Internal + * flags are defined in library/psa_crypto_core.h. Internal flags may have + * the same value as external flags if they are properly handled during + * key creation and in psa_get_key_attributes. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_attributes_flag_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER \ + ( (psa_key_attributes_flag_t) 0x0001 ) + +/* A mask of key attribute flags used externally only. + * Only meant for internal checks inside the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY ( \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER | \ + 0 ) + +/* A mask of key attribute flags used both internally and externally. + * Currently there aren't any. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ( \ + 0 ) + +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_type_t type; + psa_key_bits_t bits; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; + psa_key_policy_t policy; + psa_key_attributes_flag_t flags; +} psa_core_key_attributes_t; + +#define PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, 0} + +struct psa_key_attributes_s +{ + psa_core_key_attributes_t core; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + void *domain_parameters; + size_t domain_parameters_size; +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, 0, NULL, 0} +#else +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, NULL, 0} +#endif + +static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_key_attributes_s v = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = attributes->core.lifetime; + + attributes->core.id = key; + + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + attributes->core.lifetime = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ) ); + } +} + +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.id ); +} + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER +static inline void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner ) +{ + attributes->core.id.owner = owner; +} +#endif + +static inline void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) +{ + attributes->core.lifetime = lifetime; + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + attributes->core.id.key_id = 0; +#else + attributes->core.id = 0; +#endif + } +} + +static inline psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.lifetime ); +} + +static inline void psa_extend_key_usage_flags( psa_key_usage_t *usage_flags ) +{ + if( *usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) + *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; + + if( *usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) + *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags) +{ + psa_extend_key_usage_flags( &usage_flags ); + attributes->core.policy.usage = usage_flags; +} + +static inline psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.policy.usage ); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + attributes->core.policy.alg = alg; +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.policy.alg ); +} + +/* This function is declared in crypto_extra.h, which comes after this + * header file, but we need the function here, so repeat the declaration. */ +psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +static inline void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type) +{ + if( attributes->domain_parameters == NULL ) + { + /* Common case: quick path */ + attributes->core.type = type; + } + else + { + /* Call the bigger function to free the old domain parameters. + * Ignore any errors which may arise due to type requiring + * non-default domain parameters, since this function can't + * report errors. */ + (void) psa_set_key_domain_parameters( attributes, type, NULL, 0 ); + } +} + +static inline psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.type ); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t bits) +{ + if( bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + attributes->core.bits = PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE; + else + attributes->core.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; +} + +static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.bits ); +} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8f23021a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,464 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_types.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: type aliases. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver + * header file. + * + * This file contains portable definitions of integral types for properties + * of cryptographic keys, designations of cryptographic algorithms, and + * error codes returned by the library. + * + * This header file does not declare any function. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H + +#include "crypto_platform.h" + +/* If MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined, make sure MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * is defined as well to include all PSA code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#include + +/** \defgroup error Error codes + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Function return status. + * + * This is either #PSA_SUCCESS (which is zero), indicating success, + * or a small negative value indicating that an error occurred. Errors are + * encoded as one of the \c PSA_ERROR_xxx values defined here. */ +/* If #PSA_SUCCESS is already defined, it means that #psa_status_t + * is also defined in an external header, so prevent its multiple + * definition. + */ +#ifndef PSA_SUCCESS +typedef int32_t psa_status_t; +#endif + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of a key type. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx`. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t; + +/** The type of PSA elliptic curve family identifiers. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`. + * + * The curve identifier is required to create an ECC key using the + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY() + * macros. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t; + +/** The type of PSA Diffie-Hellman group family identifiers. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx`. + * + * The group identifier is required to create an Diffie-Hellman key using the + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY() + * macros. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_ALG_xxx`. + * + * For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type + * does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers + * based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher + * mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded + * via #psa_key_type_t. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes + * @{ + */ + +/** Encoding of key lifetimes. + * + * The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and what system actions + * may create and destroy it. + * + * Lifetime values have the following structure: + * - Bits 0-7 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(\c lifetime)): + * persistence level. This value indicates what device management + * actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates + * whether the key is _volatile_ or _persistent_. + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + * - Bits 8-31 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(\c lifetime)): + * location indicator. This value indicates which part of the system + * has access to the key material and can perform operations using the key. + * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. + * + * Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance + * terminates or on a power reset of the device. Persistent keys are + * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an + * integration-specific device management event occurs (for example, + * a factory reset). + * + * Persistent keys have a key identifier of type #mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. + * This identifier remains valid throughout the lifetime of the key, + * even if the application instance that created the key terminates. + * The application can call psa_open_key() to open a persistent key that + * it created previously. + * + * The default lifetime of a key is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. The lifetime + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT is supported if persistent storage is + * available. Other lifetime values may be supported depending on the + * library configuration. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_xxx`. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t; + +/** Encoding of key persistence levels. + * + * What distinguishes different persistence levels is what device management + * events may cause keys to be destroyed. _Volatile_ keys are destroyed + * by a power reset. Persistent keys may be destroyed by events such as + * a transfer of ownership or a factory reset. What management events + * actually affect persistent keys at different levels is outside the + * scope of the PSA Cryptography specification. + * + * The PSA Cryptography specification defines the following values of + * persistence levels: + * - \c 0 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE: volatile key. + * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when + * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key + * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. + * - \c 1 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT: + * persistent key with a default lifetime. + * - \c 2-254: currently not supported by Mbed TLS. + * - \c 255 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY: + * read-only or write-once key. + * A key with this persistence level cannot be destroyed. + * Mbed TLS does not currently offer a way to create such keys, but + * integrations of Mbed TLS can use it for built-in keys that the + * application cannot modify (for example, a hardware unique key (HUK)). + * + * \note Key persistence levels are 8-bit values. Key management + * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which + * encode the persistence as the lower 8 bits of a 32-bit value. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t; + +/** Encoding of key location indicators. + * + * If an integration of Mbed TLS can make calls to external + * cryptoprocessors such as secure elements, the location of a key + * indicates which secure element performs the operations on the key. + * Depending on the design of the secure element, the key + * material may be stored either in the secure element, or + * in wrapped (encrypted) form alongside the key metadata in the + * primary local storage. + * + * The PSA Cryptography API specification defines the following values of + * location indicators: + * - \c 0: primary local storage. + * This location is always available. + * The primary local storage is typically the same storage area that + * contains the key metadata. + * - \c 1: primary secure element. + * Integrations of Mbed TLS should support this value if there is a secure + * element attached to the operating environment. + * As a guideline, secure elements may provide higher resistance against + * side channel and physical attacks than the primary local storage, but may + * have restrictions on supported key types, sizes, policies and operations + * and may have different performance characteristics. + * - \c 2-0x7fffff: other locations defined by a PSA specification. + * The PSA Cryptography API does not currently assign any meaning to these + * locations, but future versions of that specification or other PSA + * specifications may do so. + * - \c 0x800000-0xffffff: vendor-defined locations. + * No PSA specification will assign a meaning to locations in this range. + * + * \note Key location indicators are 24-bit values. Key management + * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which + * encode the location as the upper 24 bits of a 32-bit value. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t; + +/** Encoding of identifiers of persistent keys. + * + * - Applications may freely choose key identifiers in the range + * #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX. + * - The implementation may define additional key identifiers in the range + * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX. + * - 0 is reserved as an invalid key identifier. + * - Key identifiers outside these ranges are reserved for future use. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to how values are allocated must require careful + * consideration to allow backward compatibility. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t; + +/** Encoding of key identifiers as seen inside the PSA Crypto implementation. + * + * When PSA Crypto is built as a library inside an application, this type + * is identical to #psa_key_id_t. When PSA Crypto is built as a service + * that can store keys on behalf of multiple clients, this type + * encodes the #psa_key_id_t value seen by each client application as + * well as extra information that identifies the client that owns + * the key. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. +*/ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) +typedef psa_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ +/* Implementation-specific: The Mbed Cryptography library can be built as + * part of a multi-client service that exposes the PSA Cryptograpy API in each + * client and encodes the client identity in the key identifier argument of + * functions such as psa_open_key(). + */ +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_id_t key_id; + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner; +} mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup policy Key policies + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed as bitwise-ors of macros + * called `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx`. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup attributes Key attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of a structure containing key attributes. + * + * This is an opaque structure that can represent the metadata of a key + * object. Metadata that can be stored in attributes includes: + * - The location of the key in storage, indicated by its key identifier + * and its lifetime. + * - The key's policy, comprising usage flags and a specification of + * the permitted algorithm(s). + * - Information about the key itself: the key type and its size. + * - Additional implementation-defined attributes. + * + * The actual key material is not considered an attribute of a key. + * Key attributes do not contain information that is generally considered + * highly confidential. + * + * An attribute structure works like a simple data structure where each function + * `psa_set_key_xxx` sets a field and the corresponding function + * `psa_get_key_xxx` retrieves the value of the corresponding field. + * However, a future version of the library may report values that are + * equivalent to the original one, but have a different encoding. Invalid + * values may be mapped to different, also invalid values. + * + * An attribute structure may contain references to auxiliary resources, + * for example pointers to allocated memory or indirect references to + * pre-calculated values. In order to free such resources, the application + * must call psa_reset_key_attributes(). As an exception, calling + * psa_reset_key_attributes() on an attribute structure is optional if + * the structure has only been modified by the following functions + * since it was initialized or last reset with psa_reset_key_attributes(): + * - psa_set_key_id() + * - psa_set_key_lifetime() + * - psa_set_key_type() + * - psa_set_key_bits() + * - psa_set_key_usage_flags() + * - psa_set_key_algorithm() + * + * Before calling any function on a key attribute structure, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + * memset(&attributes, 0, sizeof(attributes)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_attributes_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + * attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + * \endcode + * + * A freshly initialized attribute structure contains the following + * values: + * + * - lifetime: #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. + * - key identifier: 0 (which is not a valid key identifier). + * - type: \c 0 (meaning that the type is unspecified). + * - key size: \c 0 (meaning that the size is unspecified). + * - usage flags: \c 0 (which allows no usage except exporting a public key). + * - algorithm: \c 0 (which allows no cryptographic usage, but allows + * exporting). + * + * A typical sequence to create a key is as follows: + * -# Create and initialize an attribute structure. + * -# If the key is persistent, call psa_set_key_id(). + * Also call psa_set_key_lifetime() to place the key in a non-default + * location. + * -# Set the key policy with psa_set_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_set_key_algorithm(). + * -# Set the key type with psa_set_key_type(). + * Skip this step if copying an existing key with psa_copy_key(). + * -# When generating a random key with psa_generate_key() or deriving a key + * with psa_key_derivation_output_key(), set the desired key size with + * psa_set_key_bits(). + * -# Call a key creation function: psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). This function reads + * the attribute structure, creates a key with these attributes, and + * outputs a key identifier to the newly created key. + * -# The attribute structure is now no longer necessary. + * You may call psa_reset_key_attributes(), although this is optional + * with the workflow presented here because the attributes currently + * defined in this specification do not require any additional resources + * beyond the structure itself. + * + * A typical sequence to query a key's attributes is as follows: + * -# Call psa_get_key_attributes(). + * -# Call `psa_get_key_xxx` functions to retrieve the attribute(s) that + * you are interested in. + * -# Call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free any resources that may be + * used by the attribute structure. + * + * Once a key has been created, it is impossible to change its attributes. + */ +typedef struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_t; + + +#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* Mbed Crypto defines this type in crypto_types.h because it is also + * visible to applications through an implementation-specific extension. + * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible + * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ +typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +#endif /* !__DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx`. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t; + +/**@}*/ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8b3a815a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h @@ -0,0 +1,2371 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_values.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver + * header file. + * + * This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze + * values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys, + * designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by + * the library. + * + * Note that many of the constants defined in this file are embedded in + * the persistent key store, as part of key metadata (including usage + * policies). As a consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage + * format version changes). + * + * This header file only defines preprocessor macros. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H + +/** \defgroup error Error codes + * @{ + */ + +/* PSA error codes */ + +/* Error codes are standardized across PSA domains (framework, crypto, storage, + * etc.). Do not change the values in this section or even the expansions + * of each macro: it must be possible to `#include` both this header + * and some other PSA component's headers in the same C source, + * which will lead to duplicate definitions of the `PSA_SUCCESS` and + * `PSA_ERROR_xxx` macros, which is ok if and only if the macros expand + * to the same sequence of tokens. + * + * If you must add a new + * value, check with the Arm PSA framework group to pick one that other + * domains aren't already using. */ + +/** The action was completed successfully. */ +#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0) + +/** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined + * failure cause. + * + * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard + * error codes are applicable. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ((psa_status_t)-132) + +/** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported + * by this implementation. + * + * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration + * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized. + * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as + * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ((psa_status_t)-134) + +/** The requested action is denied by a policy. + * + * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters + * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly + * denies the requested operation. + * + * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a + * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are + * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function + * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or + * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ((psa_status_t)-133) + +/** An output buffer is too small. + * + * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function + * description to determine a sufficient buffer size. + * + * Implementations should preferably return this error code only + * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output + * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this + * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition + * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((psa_status_t)-138) + +/** Asking for an item that already exists + * + * Implementations should return this error, when attempting + * to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ((psa_status_t)-139) + +/** Asking for an item that doesn't exist + * + * Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like + * a key) does not exist. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ((psa_status_t)-140) + +/** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state. + * + * Multipart operations return this error when one of the + * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function + * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate + * that a key either exists or not, + * but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * as applicable. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a + * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * instead. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ((psa_status_t)-137) + +/** The parameters passed to the function are invalid. + * + * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or + * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a + * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * instead. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ((psa_status_t)-135) + +/** There is not enough runtime memory. + * + * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this + * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ((psa_status_t)-141) + +/** There is not enough persistent storage. + * + * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if + * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition, + * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this + * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for + * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ((psa_status_t)-142) + +/** There was a communication failure inside the implementation. + * + * This can indicate a communication failure between the application + * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and + * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure + * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause. + * + * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined + * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations + * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever + * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external + * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before + * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145) + +/** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss. + * + * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted. + * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory + * (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error + * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use + * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is + * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE). + * + * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was + * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no + * longer be readable from storage. + * + * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure + * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global + * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other + * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but + * its integrity cannot be guaranteed. + * + * Implementations should only use this error code to report a + * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should + * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be + * reported using this error code. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-146) + +/** A hardware failure was detected. + * + * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the + * cause. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-147) + +/** A tampering attempt was detected. + * + * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee + * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains + * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function + * and should enter a safe failure state. + * + * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid + * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates + * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending + * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals, + * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application. + * + * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach + * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still + * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code + * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that + * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed, + * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now + * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code + * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to + * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE, + * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE, + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code + * instead). + * + * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations + * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of + * the application itself. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ((psa_status_t)-151) + +/** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed + * for the requested action. + * + * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator. + * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not + * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such + * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute + * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that + * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure + * to certain attacks. + * + * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init() + * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient + * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically + * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return + * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded + * during normal operation. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148) + +/** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect. + * + * Verification functions return this error if the verification + * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified + * was determined to be incorrect. + * + * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return + * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149) + +/** The decrypted padding is incorrect. + * + * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that + * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding + * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer + * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain + * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of + * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not + * to reveal whether the padding is invalid. + * + * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding + * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer. + * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not + * depend on the validity of the padding. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150) + +/** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting + * to read from a resource. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143) + +/** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136) + +/** Stored data has been corrupted. + * + * This error indicates that some persistent storage has suffered corruption. + * It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific error + * codes: + * + * - A corruption of volatile memory - use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED. + * - A communication error between the cryptoprocessor and its external + * storage - use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE. + * - When the storage is in a valid state but is full - use + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE. + * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use + * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE. + * - When the stored data is not valid - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID. + * + * \note A storage corruption does not indicate that any data that was + * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data might no + * longer be readable from storage. + * + * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the + * global integrity of the keystore. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152) + +/** Data read from storage is not valid for the implementation. + * + * This error indicates that some data read from storage does not have a valid + * format. It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific + * error codes: + * + * - When the storage or stored data is corrupted - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * - An invalid argument to the API - use #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * + * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a + * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was + * written by an incompatible version of the library. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ((psa_status_t)-153) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types + * @{ + */ + +/* Note that key type values, including ECC family and DH group values, are + * embedded in the persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a + * consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage format version + * changes). + */ + +/** An invalid key type value. + * + * Zero is not the encoding of any key type. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t)0x0000) + +/** Vendor-defined key type flag. + * + * Key types defined by this standard will never have the + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types + * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should + * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t)0x8000) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x7000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW ((psa_key_type_t)0x1000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t)0x2000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7000) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x3000) + +/** Whether a key type is vendor-defined. + * + * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) + +/** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes. + * + * This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC) + +/** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK \ + & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) +/** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) +/** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public + * part. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR) +/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type. + * + * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. + * + * \param type A public key type or key pair type. + * + * \return The corresponding key pair type. + * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, + * the return value is undefined. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) +/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type. + * + * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. + * + * \param type A public key type or key pair type. + * + * \return The corresponding public key type. + * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, + * the return value is undefined. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) + +/** Raw data. + * + * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation. + * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t)0x1001) + +/** HMAC key. + * + * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be + * used for. + * + * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash. + * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where + * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t)0x1100) + +/** A secret for key derivation. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t)0x1200) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher. + * + * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or + * 32 bytes (AES-256). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2400) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the + * ARIA block cipher. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2406) + +/** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES). + * + * The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or + * 192 bits (3-key 3DES). + * + * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly + * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES + * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2301) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the + * Camellia block cipher. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2403) + +/** Key for the ARC4 stream cipher (also known as RC4 or ARCFOUR). + * + * Note that ARC4 is weak and deprecated and should only be used in + * legacy protocols. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2002) + +/** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539. + * + * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, + * and should reject other sizes. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2004) + +/** RSA public key. + * + * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4001) +/** RSA key pair (private and public key). + * + * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7001) +/** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x4100) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x7100) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x00ff) +/** Elliptic curve key pair. + * + * The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve, + * i.e. the bit size of *q* for a curve over a field *Fq*. + * See the documentation of `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families for details. + * + * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that + * identifies the ECC curve to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve)) +/** Elliptic curve public key. + * + * The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding + * private key (see #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR and the documentation of + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families). + * + * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that + * identifies the ECC curve to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve)) + +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + +/** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +/** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17) + +/** SEC random curves over prime fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12) +/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b) + +/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27) + +/** SEC random curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22) + +/** SEC additional random curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curve: + * sect163r2. + * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b) + +/** Brainpool P random curves. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1, + * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1. + * It is defined in RFC 5639. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30) + +/** Curve25519 and Curve448. + * + * This family comprises the following Montgomery curves: + * - 255-bit: Bernstein et al., + * _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006. + * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve. + * - 448-bit: Hamburg, + * _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. + * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41) + +/** The twisted Edwards curves Ed25519 and Ed448. + * + * These curves are suitable for EdDSA (#PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA for both curves, + * #PSA_ALG_ED25519PH for the 255-bit curve, + * #PSA_ALG_ED448PH for the 448-bit curve). + * + * This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves: + * - 255-bit: Edwards25519, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent + * to Curve25519. + * Bernstein et al., _Twisted Edwards curves_, Africacrypt 2008. + * - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent + * to Curve448. + * Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x4200) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x7200) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x00ff) +/** Diffie-Hellman key pair. + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group)) +/** Diffie-Hellman public key. + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group)) + +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + +/** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +/** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A. + * + * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits): + * 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support + * all of these sizes or only a subset. + */ +#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03) + +#define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) \ + (((type) >> 8) & 7) +/** The block size of a block cipher. + * + * \param type A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t). + * + * \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher. + * The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported + * cipher key type. + * + * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block + * cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR). + * This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be + * used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update() + * might buffer for future processing in general. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times. + */ +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ + 1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \ + 0u) + +/* Note that algorithm values are embedded in the persistent key store, + * as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they must not be changed + * (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** Vendor-defined algorithm flag. + * + * Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG + * bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with + * the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure + * used by standard encodings whenever practical. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x80000000) + +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x7f000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09000000) + +/** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined. + * + * See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption + * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm, + * also known as public-key signature algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, + * also known as public-key encryption algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +/** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */ +#define PSA_ALG_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0) + +#define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x000000ff) +/** MD2 */ +#define PSA_ALG_MD2 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000001) +/** MD4 */ +#define PSA_ALG_MD4 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000002) +/** MD5 */ +#define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000003) +/** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */ +#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000004) +/** SHA1 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000005) +/** SHA2-224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000008) +/** SHA2-256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000009) +/** SHA2-384 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000a) +/** SHA2-512 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000b) +/** SHA2-512/224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000c) +/** SHA2-512/256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000d) +/** SHA3-224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000010) +/** SHA3-256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000011) +/** SHA3-384 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000012) +/** SHA3-512 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000013) +/** The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output. + * + * This is the prehashing for Ed448ph (see #PSA_ALG_ED448PH). For other + * scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3/SHAKE is desired, SHA3-512 + * has the same output size and a (theoretically) higher security strength. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000015) + +/** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm. + * + * This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy + * for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key + * may then be used to perform operations using the same signature + * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash. + * + * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros: + * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT, + * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA. + * Then you may create and use a key as follows: + * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example: + * ``` + * psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY + * psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)); + * ``` + * - Import or generate key material. + * - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing + * an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each + * call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash. + * ``` + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...); + * ``` + * + * This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are + * parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build + * an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true. + * + * This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to + * perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x020000ff) + +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00c00000) +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03800000) +/** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm. + * + * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm. + * + * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE) + +/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to + * PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is + * truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm, + * whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can + * reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation + * to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation + * is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */ +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) +#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16 + +/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or + * equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00008000) + +/** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm. + * + * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC + * algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm + * consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value + * for the untruncated algorithm. + * + * \note This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that + * are not valid, either because the specified length is larger + * than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is + * smaller than permitted by the implementation. + * + * \note It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that + * is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated + * algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm + * for policy comparison purposes. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated + * MAC algorithm. + * \param mac_length Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes. + * This must be at most the full length of the MAC + * and must be at least an implementation-specified + * minimum. The implementation-specified minimum + * shall not be zero. + * + * \return The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified + * length. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or + * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \ + (((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ + ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK)) + +/** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated + * MAC algorithm. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated + * MAC algorithm. + * + * \return The corresponding base MAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \ + ((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) + +/** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). + * + * \return Length of the truncated MAC in bytes. + * \return 0 if \p mac_alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \ + (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET) + +/** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC + * length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard + * algorithm's minimum MAC length. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the + * smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). + * \param min_mac_length Desired minimum length of the message authentication + * code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated + * length of the MAC and must be at least 1. + * + * \return The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC + * algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or + * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \ + ( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00000) +/** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher + * + * \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases. + * A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00100) +/** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */ +#define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00200) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ + PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00800000) +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher. + * + * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages + * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated + * from a key. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) + +/** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm. + * + * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type. + * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20. + * - To use ARC4, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04800100) + +/** The CTR stream cipher mode. + * + * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher. + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with + * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes). + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01000) + +/** The CFB stream cipher mode. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01100) + +/** The OFB stream cipher mode. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01200) + +/** The XTS cipher mode. + * + * XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at + * least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input + * does not need to be a whole number of blocks. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0440ff00) + +/** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding. + * + * \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data + * except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications + * only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the + * implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide + * the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access + * to ECB. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a + * multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher. + * + * ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a + * multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404400) + +/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths + * are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404000) + +/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) §10.3. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404100) + +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on + * a block cipher, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) + +/** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500100) + +/** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500200) + +/** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539. + * + * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, + * and should reject other sizes. + * + * Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05100500) + +/* In the encoding of a AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to + * PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag. + * The constants for default lengths follow this encoding. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16 + +/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one + * encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00008000) + +/** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm. + * + * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD + * algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes. + * Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation + * of the ciphertext. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) + * is true). + * \param tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes. + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified + * length. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid + * for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \ + (((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ + ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK)) + +/** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) + * is true). + * + * \return The tag length specified by the input algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \ + (((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> \ + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET ) + +/** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default + * tag length for that algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \ + 0) +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, ref) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, 0) == \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ? \ + ref : + +/** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific + * algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the + * wildcard algorithm. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the + * smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). + * \param min_tag_length Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in + * bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest + * allowed tag length of the algorithm. + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1 + * or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \ + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000200) +/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. + * + * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by + * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), §9.2 + * steps 3–6. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000300) +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06001300) +/** RSA PSS signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with + * a salt length equal to the length of the hash. The specified + * hash algorithm is used to hash the input message, to create the + * salted hash, and for the mask generation. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** RSA PSS signature with hashing with relaxed verification. + * + * This algorithm has the same behavior as #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS when signing, + * but allows an arbitrary salt length (including \c 0) when verifying a + * signature. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with standard salt. + * + * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg), + * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or + * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not + * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with any salt. + * + * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg), + * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or + * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not + * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS. + * + * This includes any of the RSA PSS algorithm variants, regardless of the + * constraints on salt length. + * + * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg) or + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg), + * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or + * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not + * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg)) + +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000600) +/** ECDSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62, + * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). + * + * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of + * the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of + * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length + * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented + * in big-endian order (most significant octet first). + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** ECDSA signature without hashing. + * + * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but + * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be + * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an + * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with + * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit + * the curve size. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000700) +/** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979. + * + * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(). + * + * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures + * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the + * same private key are accepted. In other words, + * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from + * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature + * algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00000100) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ + PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without prehashing (PureEdDSA), + * using standard parameters. + * + * Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification + * because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the + * context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add + * suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts. + * + * PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve. + * In this specification, the following curves are supported: + * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255-bit: Ed25519 as specified + * in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards25519. + * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. + * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448-bit: Ed448 as specified + * in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards448. + * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the + * SHAKE256 output. + * + * This algorithm can be used with psa_sign_message() and + * psa_verify_message(). Since there is no prehashing, it cannot be used + * with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(). + * + * The signature format is the concatenation of R and S as defined by + * RFC 8032 §5.1.6 and §5.2.6 (a 64-byte string for Ed25519, a 114-byte + * string for Ed448). + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000800) + +#define PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000900) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), + * using SHA-512 and the Edwards25519 curve. + * + * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. + * + * This algorithm is Ed25519 as specified in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards25519. + * The prehash is SHA-512. + * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. + * + * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, + * you can either: + * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; + * - or calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message + * with psa_hash_compute() + * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), + * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHA_512, + * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). + * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or + * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH \ + (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHA_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), + * using SHAKE256 and the Edwards448 curve. + * + * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. + * + * This algorithm is Ed448 as specified in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards448. + * The prehash is the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output. + * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the + * SHAKE256 output. + * + * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, + * you can either: + * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; + * - or calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message + * with psa_hash_compute() + * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), + * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512, + * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). + * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or + * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ED448PH \ + (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/* Default definition, to be overridden if the library is extended with + * more hash-and-sign algorithms that we want to keep out of this header + * file. */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0 + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used + * with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash(). + * + * This encompasses all strict hash-and-sign algorithms categorized by + * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(), as well as algorithms that follow the + * paradigm more loosely: + * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (expects its input to be an encoded hash) + * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (doesn't specify what kind of hash the input is) + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a + * hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used + * to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm. + * This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used + * with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a + * message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used + * to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature + * algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm. + * + * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms + * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that + * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the + * hash value and the key. Hash-and-sign algorithms encode the hash + * used for the hashing step, and you can call #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH + * to extract this algorithm. + * + * Thus, for a hash-and-sign algorithm, + * `psa_sign_message(key, alg, input, ...)` is equivalent to + * ``` + * psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), input, ..., hash, ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, ..., signature, ...); + * ``` + * Most usefully, separating the hash from the signature allows the hash + * to be calculated in multiple steps with psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(). Likewise psa_verify_message() is equivalent to + * calculating the hash and then calling psa_verify_hash(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) && \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) != 0) + +/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm. + * + * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is + * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use + * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing + * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message + * itself. + * + * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign + * algorithm. + * \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not + * follow the hash-and-sign structure. + * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or + * if it is not supported by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ + 0) + +/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000200) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000300) +/** RSA OAEP encryption. + * + * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1. + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use + * for MGF1. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ + 0) + +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000100) +/** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm. + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step. + * It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step. + * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. + * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before + * starting to generate output. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HKDF algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm. + * + * HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash + * function and the HMAC construction. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000200) +/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * + * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule, + * specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be + * used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * passed in the order given here: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. + * + * For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the + * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random, + * and the label is "key expansion". + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the + * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000300) +/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm. + * + * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived + * from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding + * (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5). + * The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256 + * or SHA-384. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * passed in the order given here: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. + * + * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is + * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the + * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random, + * and the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret". + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the + * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xfe00ffff) +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xffff0000) + +/** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with + * a key derivation. + * + * \param ka_alg A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such + * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true). + * \param kdf_alg A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such + * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding key agreement and derivation + * algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a + * supported key derivation algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \ + ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg)) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm. + * + * A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify + * a key derivation function. + * Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with + * a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are + * constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && \ + PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg))) + +/** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm. + * + * The shared secret produced by key agreement is + * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format. + * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p` + * in bits. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09010000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm. + * + * This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as + * finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH) + +/** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm. + * + * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of + * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where + * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the + * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8, + * the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret + * is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian + * or big-endian depending on the curve type. + * + * - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in little-endian byte order. + * The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519. + * - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in big-endian byte order. + * The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`. + * - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in big-endian byte order. + * The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09020000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman + * algorithm. + * + * This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as + * elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm, + * 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard. + * + * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in + * a policy, not to perform an operation. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding. + * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for + * an operation). + * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes + * @{ + */ + +/* Note that location and persistence level values are embedded in the + * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they + * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** The default lifetime for volatile keys. + * + * A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed. + * The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset. + * + * A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the + * PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice. + * If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory, + * it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the + * key material if the calling application terminates. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000000) + +/** The default lifetime for persistent keys. + * + * A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or + * until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does + * not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but integrations may + * provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset, + * to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application). + * + * This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling + * application. Integrations of Mbed TLS may support other persistent lifetimes. + * See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000001) + +/** The persistence level of volatile keys. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t)0x00) + +/** The default persistence level for persistent keys. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t)0x01) + +/** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t)0xff) + +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \ + ((psa_key_persistence_t)((lifetime) & 0x000000ff)) + +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \ + ((psa_key_location_t)((lifetime) >> 8)) + +/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile. + * + * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when + * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key + * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. + * + * A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are + * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an + * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example, + * a factory reset). + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type + * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). + * + * \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \ + (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE) + +/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is read-only. + * + * Read-only keys cannot be created or destroyed through the PSA Crypto API. + * They must be created through platform-specific means that bypass the API. + * + * Some platforms may offer ways to destroy read-only keys. For example, + * consider a platform with multiple levels of privilege, where a + * low-privilege application can use a key but is not allowed to destroy + * it, and the platform exposes the key to the application with a read-only + * lifetime. High-privilege code can destroy the key even though the + * application sees the key as read-only. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type + * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). + * + * \return \c 1 if the key is read-only, otherwise \c 0. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime) \ + (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY) + +/** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location. + * + * \param persistence The persistence level + * (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t). + * \param location The location indicator + * (value of type ::psa_key_location_t). + * + * \return The constructed lifetime value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \ + ((location) << 8 | (persistence)) + +/** The local storage area for persistent keys. + * + * This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent + * keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor. + * + * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t)0x000000) + +#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_location_t)0x800000) + +/* Note that key identifier values are embedded in the + * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they + * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** The null key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL ((psa_key_id_t)0) +/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x00000001) +/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x3fffffff) +/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x40000000) +/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fffffff) + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ( (psa_key_id_t)0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ( id ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( id ) ( 0 ) + +/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. + * + * \param unused Unused parameter. + * \param key_id Identifier of the key. + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( + unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + (void)unused; + + return( key_id ); +} + +/** Compare two key identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key identifier. + * \param id2 Second key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2 ) +{ + return( id1 == id2 ); +} + +/** Check whether a key identifier is null. + * + * \param key Key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + return( key == 0 ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ( (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 } ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ( ( id ).key_id ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( id ) ( ( id ).owner ) + +/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. + * + * \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner. + * \param key_id Identifier of the key. + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + return( (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .key_id = key_id, + .owner = owner_id } ); +} + +/** Compare two key identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key identifier. + * \param id2 Second key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2 ) +{ + return( ( id1.key_id == id2.key_id ) && + mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal( id1.owner, id2.owner ) ); +} + +/** Check whether a key identifier is null. + * + * \param key Key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + return( key.key_id == 0 ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup policy Key policies + * @{ + */ + +/* Note that key usage flags are embedded in the + * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they + * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** Whether the key may be exported. + * + * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported + * regardless of the value of this permission flag. + * + * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not + * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor, + * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface. + * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form + * where it is encrypted by another key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000001) + +/** Whether the key may be copied. + * + * This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key + * with the same policy or a more restrictive policy. + * + * For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which + * enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure + * element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. + * Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it. + * For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY + * is sufficient to permit the copy. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000002) + +/** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation, + * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation, + * or for an asymmetric encryption operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000100) + +/** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation, + * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation, + * or for an asymmetric decryption operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000200) + +/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for + * an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the + * key’s type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000400) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for + * an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise + * permitted by the key’s type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000800) + +/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation + * or for an asymmetric signature operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00001000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation + * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation, + * if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00002000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00004000) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation + * @{ + */ + +/* Key input steps are not embedded in the persistent storage, so you can + * change them if needed: it's only an ABI change. */ + +/** A secret input for key derivation. + * + * This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE + * (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key()) + * or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement + * (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()). + * + * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to + * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation + * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), not psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0101) + +/** A label for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0201) + +/** A salt for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0202) + +/** An information string for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0203) + +/** A seed for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0204) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros + * @{ + */ + +/* Helper macros */ + +/** Check if two AEAD algorithm identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm + * regardless of the tag length they encode. + * + * \param aead_alg_1 An AEAD algorithm identifier. + * \param aead_alg_2 An AEAD algorithm identifier. + * + * \return 1 if both identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm, + * 0 otherwise. + * Unspecified if neither \p aead_alg_1 nor \p aead_alg_2 are + * a supported AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(aead_alg_1, aead_alg_2) \ + (!(((aead_alg_1) ^ (aead_alg_2)) & \ + ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG))) + +/**@}*/ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a63a63a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.o +libmbed* +*.sln +*.vcxproj diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fb0b5e13 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +option(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build mbed TLS static library." ON) +option(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build mbed TLS shared library." OFF) +option(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD "Explicitly link mbed TLS library to pthread." OFF) +option(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE "Explicitly link mbed TLS library to trusted_storage." OFF) + +# Set the project root directory if it's not already defined, as may happen if +# the library folder is included directly by a parent project, without +# including the top level CMakeLists.txt. +if(NOT DEFINED MBEDTLS_DIR) + set(MBEDTLS_DIR ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}) +endif() + +set(src_crypto + aes.c + aesni.c + arc4.c + aria.c + asn1parse.c + asn1write.c + base64.c + bignum.c + blowfish.c + camellia.c + ccm.c + chacha20.c + chachapoly.c + cipher.c + cipher_wrap.c + constant_time.c + cmac.c + ctr_drbg.c + des.c + dhm.c + ecdh.c + ecdsa.c + ecjpake.c + ecp.c + ecp_curves.c + entropy.c + entropy_poll.c + error.c + gcm.c + havege.c + hkdf.c + hmac_drbg.c + md.c + md2.c + md4.c + md5.c + memory_buffer_alloc.c + mps_reader.c + mps_trace.c + nist_kw.c + oid.c + padlock.c + pem.c + pk.c + pk_wrap.c + pkcs12.c + pkcs5.c + pkparse.c + pkwrite.c + platform.c + platform_util.c + poly1305.c + psa_crypto.c + psa_crypto_aead.c + psa_crypto_cipher.c + psa_crypto_client.c + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c + psa_crypto_ecp.c + psa_crypto_hash.c + psa_crypto_mac.c + psa_crypto_rsa.c + psa_crypto_se.c + psa_crypto_slot_management.c + psa_crypto_storage.c + psa_its_file.c + ripemd160.c + rsa.c + rsa_internal.c + sha1.c + sha256.c + sha512.c + threading.c + timing.c + version.c + version_features.c + xtea.c +) + +list(APPEND src_crypto ${thirdparty_src}) + +set(src_x509 + certs.c + pkcs11.c + x509.c + x509_create.c + x509_crl.c + x509_crt.c + x509_csr.c + x509write_crt.c + x509write_csr.c +) + +set(src_tls + debug.c + net_sockets.c + ssl_cache.c + ssl_ciphersuites.c + ssl_cli.c + ssl_cookie.c + ssl_msg.c + ssl_srv.c + ssl_ticket.c + ssl_tls.c + ssl_tls13_keys.c +) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-prototypes") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-prototypes -Wdocumentation -Wno-documentation-deprecated-sync -Wunreachable-code") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + +if(WIN32) + set(libs ${libs} ws2_32) +endif(WIN32) + +if(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES "Darwin") + SET(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_CREATE " Scr ") + SET(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_CREATE " Scr ") + SET(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_FINISH " -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c ") + SET(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_FINISH " -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c ") +endif() + +if(HAIKU) + set(libs ${libs} network) +endif(HAIKU) + +if(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + set(libs ${libs} pkcs11-helper) +endif(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + +if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + set(libs ${libs} ${ZLIB_LIBRARIES}) +endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +if(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD) + set(libs ${libs} pthread) +endif() + +if(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE) + set(libs ${libs} trusted_storage) +endif() + +if (NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + message(FATAL_ERROR "Need to choose static or shared mbedtls build!") +endif(NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +set(mbedtls_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedtls") +set(mbedx509_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedx509") +set(mbedcrypto_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedcrypto") + +set(mbedtls_target ${mbedtls_target} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(mbedx509_target ${mbedx509_target} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(mbedcrypto_target ${mbedcrypto_target} PARENT_SCOPE) + +if (USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + set(mbedtls_static_target ${mbedtls_target}) + set(mbedx509_static_target ${mbedx509_target}) + set(mbedcrypto_static_target ${mbedcrypto_target}) +endif() + +set(target_libraries ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target}) + +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + string(APPEND mbedtls_static_target "_static") + string(APPEND mbedx509_static_target "_static") + string(APPEND mbedcrypto_static_target "_static") + + list(APPEND target_libraries + ${mbedcrypto_static_target} + ${mbedx509_static_target} + ${mbedtls_static_target}) +endif() + +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto}) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) + + add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509}) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedx509) + target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_static_target}) + + add_library(${mbedtls_static_target} STATIC ${src_tls}) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedtls) + target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_static_target}) +endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}) + add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto}) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.1 SOVERSION 7) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) + + add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509}) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.1 SOVERSION 1) + target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + + add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls}) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.1 SOVERSION 14) + target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target}) +endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +foreach(target IN LISTS target_libraries) + # Include public header files from /include and other directories + # declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt. Include private header files + # from /library and others declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt. + # /library needs to be listed explicitly when building .c files outside + # of /library (which currently means: under /3rdparty). + target_include_directories(${target} + PUBLIC ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include/ + PUBLIC ${thirdparty_inc_public} + PRIVATE ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/ + PRIVATE ${thirdparty_inc}) + target_compile_definitions(${target} + PRIVATE ${thirdparty_def}) + install(TARGETS ${target} + DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR} + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) +endforeach(target) + +set(lib_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}lib") + +add_custom_target(${lib_target} DEPENDS ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target}) +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + add_dependencies(${lib_target} ${mbedcrypto_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target} ${mbedtls_static_target}) +endif() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/Makefile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..54b0651d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ + +# Also see "include/mbedtls/config.h" + +CFLAGS ?= -O2 +WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral +LDFLAGS ?= + +# Include ../include for public headers and . for private headers. +# Note that . needs to be included explicitly for the sake of library +# files that are not in the /library directory (which currently means +# under /3rdparty). +LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I. -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_LDFLAGS = + +ifdef DEBUG +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -g3 +endif + +# MicroBlaze specific options: +# CFLAGS += -mno-xl-soft-mul -mxl-barrel-shift + +# To compile on Plan9: +# CFLAGS += -D_BSD_EXTENSION + +# if were running on Windows build for Windows +ifdef WINDOWS +WINDOWS_BUILD=1 +else ifeq ($(shell uname -s),Darwin) +ifeq ($(AR),ar) +APPLE_BUILD ?= 1 +endif +endif + +# To compile as a shared library: +ifdef SHARED +# all code is position-indep with mingw, avoid warning about useless flag +ifndef WINDOWS_BUILD +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -fPIC -fpic +endif +endif + +SOEXT_TLS=so.14 +SOEXT_X509=so.1 +SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.7 + +# Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept +# the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar) +AR_DASH ?= - + +ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)src +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) +ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)Src +RLFLAGS = -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c +RL ?= ranlib +endif +endif + +DLEXT ?= so +ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD +# Windows shared library extension: +DLEXT = dll +else ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) +# Mac OS X shared library extension: +DLEXT = dylib +endif +endif + +OBJS_CRYPTO= \ + aes.o \ + aesni.o \ + arc4.o \ + aria.o \ + asn1parse.o \ + asn1write.o \ + base64.o \ + bignum.o \ + blowfish.o \ + camellia.o \ + ccm.o \ + chacha20.o \ + chachapoly.o \ + cipher.o \ + cipher_wrap.o \ + cmac.o \ + constant_time.o \ + ctr_drbg.o \ + des.o \ + dhm.o \ + ecdh.o \ + ecdsa.o \ + ecjpake.o \ + ecp.o \ + ecp_curves.o \ + entropy.o \ + entropy_poll.o \ + error.o \ + gcm.o \ + havege.o \ + hkdf.o \ + hmac_drbg.o \ + md.o \ + md2.o \ + md4.o \ + md5.o \ + memory_buffer_alloc.o \ + mps_reader.o \ + mps_trace.o \ + nist_kw.o \ + oid.o \ + padlock.o \ + pem.o \ + pk.o \ + pk_wrap.o \ + pkcs12.o \ + pkcs5.o \ + pkparse.o \ + pkwrite.o \ + platform.o \ + platform_util.o \ + poly1305.o \ + psa_crypto.o \ + psa_crypto_aead.o \ + psa_crypto_cipher.o \ + psa_crypto_client.o \ + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.o \ + psa_crypto_ecp.o \ + psa_crypto_hash.o \ + psa_crypto_mac.o \ + psa_crypto_rsa.o \ + psa_crypto_se.o \ + psa_crypto_slot_management.o \ + psa_crypto_storage.o \ + psa_its_file.o \ + ripemd160.o \ + rsa.o \ + rsa_internal.o \ + sha1.o \ + sha256.o \ + sha512.o \ + threading.o \ + timing.o \ + version.o \ + version_features.o \ + xtea.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +include ../3rdparty/Makefile.inc +LOCAL_CFLAGS+=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) +OBJS_CRYPTO+=$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) + +OBJS_X509= \ + certs.o \ + pkcs11.o \ + x509.o \ + x509_create.o \ + x509_crl.o \ + x509_crt.o \ + x509_csr.o \ + x509write_crt.o \ + x509write_csr.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +OBJS_TLS= \ + debug.o \ + net_sockets.o \ + ssl_cache.o \ + ssl_ciphersuites.o \ + ssl_cli.o \ + ssl_cookie.o \ + ssl_msg.o \ + ssl_srv.o \ + ssl_ticket.o \ + ssl_tls.o \ + ssl_tls13_keys.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +.SILENT: + +.PHONY: all static shared clean + +ifndef SHARED +all: static +else +all: shared static +endif + +static: libmbedcrypto.a libmbedx509.a libmbedtls.a + +shared: libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) + +# Windows builds under Mingw can fail if make tries to create archives in the same +# directory at the same time - see https://bugs.launchpad.net/gcc-arm-embedded/+bug/1848002. +# This forces builds of the .a files to be serialised. +ifdef WINDOWS +libmbedtls.a: | libmbedx509.a +libmbedx509.a: | libmbedcrypto.a +endif + +# tls +libmbedtls.a: $(OBJS_TLS) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_TLS) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS): $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.so + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedtls.so: libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ + +libmbedtls.dylib: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dylib + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedtls.dll: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dll + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +# x509 +libmbedx509.a: $(OBJS_X509) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_X509) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509): $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.so + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedx509.so: libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ + +libmbedx509.dylib: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dylib + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedx509.dll: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dll + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +# crypto +libmbedcrypto.a: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO): $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedcrypto.so: libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ + +libmbedcrypto.dylib: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedcrypto.dll: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +.c.o: + echo " CC $<" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ -c $< + +clean: +ifndef WINDOWS + rm -f *.o libmbed* + rm -f $(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) +else + if exist *.o del /Q /F *.o + if exist libmbed* del /Q /F libmbed* + del /Q /F del_errors_out_if_the_file_list_is_empty_but_not_if_a_file_does_not_exist $(subst /,\,$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS)) +endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/aes.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/aes.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03d8b7ea --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/aes.c @@ -0,0 +1,2189 @@ +/* + * FIPS-197 compliant AES implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The AES block cipher was designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/rijndael/Rijndael.pdf + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) +#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define AES_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define AES_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) ) +static int aes_padlock_ace = -1; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) +/* + * Forward S-box + */ +static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +{ + 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, + 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, + 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, + 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, + 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, + 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15, + 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, + 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, + 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, + 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, + 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, + 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF, + 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, + 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, + 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, + 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, + 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, + 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73, + 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, + 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, + 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, + 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, + 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, + 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08, + 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, + 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, + 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, + 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, + 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, + 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF, + 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, + 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16 +}; + +/* + * Forward tables + */ +#define FT \ +\ + V(A5,63,63,C6), V(84,7C,7C,F8), V(99,77,77,EE), V(8D,7B,7B,F6), \ + V(0D,F2,F2,FF), V(BD,6B,6B,D6), V(B1,6F,6F,DE), V(54,C5,C5,91), \ + V(50,30,30,60), V(03,01,01,02), V(A9,67,67,CE), V(7D,2B,2B,56), \ + V(19,FE,FE,E7), V(62,D7,D7,B5), V(E6,AB,AB,4D), V(9A,76,76,EC), \ + V(45,CA,CA,8F), V(9D,82,82,1F), V(40,C9,C9,89), V(87,7D,7D,FA), \ + V(15,FA,FA,EF), V(EB,59,59,B2), V(C9,47,47,8E), V(0B,F0,F0,FB), \ + V(EC,AD,AD,41), V(67,D4,D4,B3), V(FD,A2,A2,5F), V(EA,AF,AF,45), \ + V(BF,9C,9C,23), V(F7,A4,A4,53), V(96,72,72,E4), V(5B,C0,C0,9B), \ + V(C2,B7,B7,75), V(1C,FD,FD,E1), V(AE,93,93,3D), V(6A,26,26,4C), \ + V(5A,36,36,6C), V(41,3F,3F,7E), V(02,F7,F7,F5), V(4F,CC,CC,83), \ + V(5C,34,34,68), V(F4,A5,A5,51), V(34,E5,E5,D1), V(08,F1,F1,F9), \ + V(93,71,71,E2), V(73,D8,D8,AB), V(53,31,31,62), V(3F,15,15,2A), \ + V(0C,04,04,08), V(52,C7,C7,95), V(65,23,23,46), V(5E,C3,C3,9D), \ + V(28,18,18,30), V(A1,96,96,37), V(0F,05,05,0A), V(B5,9A,9A,2F), \ + V(09,07,07,0E), V(36,12,12,24), V(9B,80,80,1B), V(3D,E2,E2,DF), \ + V(26,EB,EB,CD), V(69,27,27,4E), V(CD,B2,B2,7F), V(9F,75,75,EA), \ + V(1B,09,09,12), V(9E,83,83,1D), V(74,2C,2C,58), V(2E,1A,1A,34), \ + V(2D,1B,1B,36), V(B2,6E,6E,DC), V(EE,5A,5A,B4), V(FB,A0,A0,5B), \ + V(F6,52,52,A4), V(4D,3B,3B,76), V(61,D6,D6,B7), V(CE,B3,B3,7D), \ + V(7B,29,29,52), V(3E,E3,E3,DD), V(71,2F,2F,5E), V(97,84,84,13), \ + V(F5,53,53,A6), V(68,D1,D1,B9), V(00,00,00,00), V(2C,ED,ED,C1), \ + V(60,20,20,40), V(1F,FC,FC,E3), V(C8,B1,B1,79), V(ED,5B,5B,B6), \ + V(BE,6A,6A,D4), V(46,CB,CB,8D), V(D9,BE,BE,67), V(4B,39,39,72), \ + V(DE,4A,4A,94), V(D4,4C,4C,98), V(E8,58,58,B0), V(4A,CF,CF,85), \ + V(6B,D0,D0,BB), V(2A,EF,EF,C5), V(E5,AA,AA,4F), V(16,FB,FB,ED), \ + V(C5,43,43,86), V(D7,4D,4D,9A), V(55,33,33,66), V(94,85,85,11), \ + V(CF,45,45,8A), V(10,F9,F9,E9), V(06,02,02,04), V(81,7F,7F,FE), \ + V(F0,50,50,A0), V(44,3C,3C,78), V(BA,9F,9F,25), V(E3,A8,A8,4B), \ + V(F3,51,51,A2), V(FE,A3,A3,5D), V(C0,40,40,80), V(8A,8F,8F,05), \ + V(AD,92,92,3F), V(BC,9D,9D,21), V(48,38,38,70), V(04,F5,F5,F1), \ + V(DF,BC,BC,63), V(C1,B6,B6,77), V(75,DA,DA,AF), V(63,21,21,42), \ + V(30,10,10,20), V(1A,FF,FF,E5), V(0E,F3,F3,FD), V(6D,D2,D2,BF), \ + V(4C,CD,CD,81), V(14,0C,0C,18), V(35,13,13,26), V(2F,EC,EC,C3), \ + V(E1,5F,5F,BE), V(A2,97,97,35), V(CC,44,44,88), V(39,17,17,2E), \ + V(57,C4,C4,93), V(F2,A7,A7,55), V(82,7E,7E,FC), V(47,3D,3D,7A), \ + V(AC,64,64,C8), V(E7,5D,5D,BA), V(2B,19,19,32), V(95,73,73,E6), \ + V(A0,60,60,C0), V(98,81,81,19), V(D1,4F,4F,9E), V(7F,DC,DC,A3), \ + V(66,22,22,44), V(7E,2A,2A,54), V(AB,90,90,3B), V(83,88,88,0B), \ + V(CA,46,46,8C), V(29,EE,EE,C7), V(D3,B8,B8,6B), V(3C,14,14,28), \ + V(79,DE,DE,A7), V(E2,5E,5E,BC), V(1D,0B,0B,16), V(76,DB,DB,AD), \ + V(3B,E0,E0,DB), V(56,32,32,64), V(4E,3A,3A,74), V(1E,0A,0A,14), \ + V(DB,49,49,92), V(0A,06,06,0C), V(6C,24,24,48), V(E4,5C,5C,B8), \ + V(5D,C2,C2,9F), V(6E,D3,D3,BD), V(EF,AC,AC,43), V(A6,62,62,C4), \ + V(A8,91,91,39), V(A4,95,95,31), V(37,E4,E4,D3), V(8B,79,79,F2), \ + V(32,E7,E7,D5), V(43,C8,C8,8B), V(59,37,37,6E), V(B7,6D,6D,DA), \ + V(8C,8D,8D,01), V(64,D5,D5,B1), V(D2,4E,4E,9C), V(E0,A9,A9,49), \ + V(B4,6C,6C,D8), V(FA,56,56,AC), V(07,F4,F4,F3), V(25,EA,EA,CF), \ + V(AF,65,65,CA), V(8E,7A,7A,F4), V(E9,AE,AE,47), V(18,08,08,10), \ + V(D5,BA,BA,6F), V(88,78,78,F0), V(6F,25,25,4A), V(72,2E,2E,5C), \ + V(24,1C,1C,38), V(F1,A6,A6,57), V(C7,B4,B4,73), V(51,C6,C6,97), \ + V(23,E8,E8,CB), V(7C,DD,DD,A1), V(9C,74,74,E8), V(21,1F,1F,3E), \ + V(DD,4B,4B,96), V(DC,BD,BD,61), V(86,8B,8B,0D), V(85,8A,8A,0F), \ + V(90,70,70,E0), V(42,3E,3E,7C), V(C4,B5,B5,71), V(AA,66,66,CC), \ + V(D8,48,48,90), V(05,03,03,06), V(01,F6,F6,F7), V(12,0E,0E,1C), \ + V(A3,61,61,C2), V(5F,35,35,6A), V(F9,57,57,AE), V(D0,B9,B9,69), \ + V(91,86,86,17), V(58,C1,C1,99), V(27,1D,1D,3A), V(B9,9E,9E,27), \ + V(38,E1,E1,D9), V(13,F8,F8,EB), V(B3,98,98,2B), V(33,11,11,22), \ + V(BB,69,69,D2), V(70,D9,D9,A9), V(89,8E,8E,07), V(A7,94,94,33), \ + V(B6,9B,9B,2D), V(22,1E,1E,3C), V(92,87,87,15), V(20,E9,E9,C9), \ + V(49,CE,CE,87), V(FF,55,55,AA), V(78,28,28,50), V(7A,DF,DF,A5), \ + V(8F,8C,8C,03), V(F8,A1,A1,59), V(80,89,89,09), V(17,0D,0D,1A), \ + V(DA,BF,BF,65), V(31,E6,E6,D7), V(C6,42,42,84), V(B8,68,68,D0), \ + V(C3,41,41,82), V(B0,99,99,29), V(77,2D,2D,5A), V(11,0F,0F,1E), \ + V(CB,B0,B0,7B), V(FC,54,54,A8), V(D6,BB,BB,6D), V(3A,16,16,2C) + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##a##b##c##d +static const uint32_t FT0[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##b##c##d##a +static const uint32_t FT1[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##c##d##a##b +static const uint32_t FT2[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##d##a##b##c +static const uint32_t FT3[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#undef FT + +/* + * Reverse S-box + */ +static const unsigned char RSb[256] = +{ + 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, + 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, + 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, + 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, + 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, + 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, + 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, + 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, + 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, + 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, + 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84, + 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, + 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, + 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, + 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, + 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, + 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73, + 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, + 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, + 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, + 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, + 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, + 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4, + 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, + 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, + 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, + 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, + 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, + 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, + 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, + 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D +}; + +/* + * Reverse tables + */ +#define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define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##a##b##c##d +static const uint32_t RT0[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##b##c##d##a +static const uint32_t RT1[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##c##d##a##b +static const uint32_t RT2[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##d##a##b##c +static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#undef RT + +/* + * Round constants + */ +static const uint32_t RCON[10] = +{ + 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008, + 0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080, + 0x0000001B, 0x00000036 +}; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ + +/* + * Forward S-box & tables + */ +static unsigned char FSb[256]; +static uint32_t FT0[256]; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) +static uint32_t FT1[256]; +static uint32_t FT2[256]; +static uint32_t FT3[256]; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +/* + * Reverse S-box & tables + */ +static unsigned char RSb[256]; +static uint32_t RT0[256]; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) +static uint32_t RT1[256]; +static uint32_t RT2[256]; +static uint32_t RT3[256]; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +/* + * Round constants + */ +static uint32_t RCON[10]; + +/* + * Tables generation code + */ +#define ROTL8(x) ( ( (x) << 8 ) & 0xFFFFFFFF ) | ( (x) >> 24 ) +#define XTIME(x) ( ( (x) << 1 ) ^ ( ( (x) & 0x80 ) ? 0x1B : 0x00 ) ) +#define MUL(x,y) ( ( (x) && (y) ) ? pow[(log[(x)]+log[(y)]) % 255] : 0 ) + +static int aes_init_done = 0; + +static void aes_gen_tables( void ) +{ + int i, x, y, z; + int pow[256]; + int log[256]; + + /* + * compute pow and log tables over GF(2^8) + */ + for( i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++ ) + { + pow[i] = x; + log[x] = i; + x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ^ XTIME( x ) ); + } + + /* + * calculate the round constants + */ + for( i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++ ) + { + RCON[i] = (uint32_t) x; + x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( XTIME( x ) ); + } + + /* + * generate the forward and reverse S-boxes + */ + FSb[0x00] = 0x63; + RSb[0x63] = 0x00; + + for( i = 1; i < 256; i++ ) + { + x = pow[255 - log[i]]; + + y = x; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y ^ 0x63; + + FSb[i] = (unsigned char) x; + RSb[x] = (unsigned char) i; + } + + /* + * generate the forward and reverse tables + */ + for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) + { + x = FSb[i]; + y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( XTIME( x ) ); + z = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( y ^ x ); + + FT0[i] = ( (uint32_t) y ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) x << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) x << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) z << 24 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + FT1[i] = ROTL8( FT0[i] ); + FT2[i] = ROTL8( FT1[i] ); + FT3[i] = ROTL8( FT2[i] ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + + x = RSb[i]; + + RT0[i] = ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0E, x ) ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x09, x ) << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0D, x ) << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0B, x ) << 24 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + RT1[i] = ROTL8( RT0[i] ); + RT2[i] = ROTL8( RT1[i] ); + RT3[i] = ROTL8( RT2[i] ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + } +} + +#undef ROTL8 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + +#define ROTL8(x) ( (uint32_t)( ( x ) << 8 ) + (uint32_t)( ( x ) >> 24 ) ) +#define ROTL16(x) ( (uint32_t)( ( x ) << 16 ) + (uint32_t)( ( x ) >> 16 ) ) +#define ROTL24(x) ( (uint32_t)( ( x ) << 24 ) + (uint32_t)( ( x ) >> 8 ) ) + +#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx] +#define AES_RT1(idx) ROTL8( RT0[idx] ) +#define AES_RT2(idx) ROTL16( RT0[idx] ) +#define AES_RT3(idx) ROTL24( RT0[idx] ) + +#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx] +#define AES_FT1(idx) ROTL8( FT0[idx] ) +#define AES_FT2(idx) ROTL16( FT0[idx] ) +#define AES_FT3(idx) ROTL24( FT0[idx] ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx] +#define AES_RT1(idx) RT1[idx] +#define AES_RT2(idx) RT2[idx] +#define AES_RT3(idx) RT3[idx] + +#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx] +#define AES_FT1(idx) FT1[idx] +#define AES_FT2(idx) FT2[idx] +#define AES_FT3(idx) FT3[idx] + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) +{ + AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) +{ + AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->crypt ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->tweak ); +} + +void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->crypt ); + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->tweak ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/* + * AES key schedule (encryption) + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + unsigned int i; + uint32_t *RK; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + switch( keybits ) + { + case 128: ctx->nr = 10; break; + case 192: ctx->nr = 12; break; + case 256: ctx->nr = 14; break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + if( aes_init_done == 0 ) + { + aes_gen_tables(); + aes_init_done = 1; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) + if( aes_padlock_ace == -1 ) + aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support( MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE ); + + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + ctx->rk = RK = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( ctx->buf ); + else +#endif + ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) + return( mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( (unsigned char *) ctx->rk, key, keybits ) ); +#endif + + for( i = 0; i < ( keybits >> 5 ); i++ ) + { + RK[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, i << 2 ); + } + + switch( ctx->nr ) + { + case 10: + + for( i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4 ) + { + RK[4] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[3] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[3] ) ] << 24 ); + + RK[5] = RK[1] ^ RK[4]; + RK[6] = RK[2] ^ RK[5]; + RK[7] = RK[3] ^ RK[6]; + } + break; + + case 12: + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6 ) + { + RK[6] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[5] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[5] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[5] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[5] ) ] << 24 ); + + RK[7] = RK[1] ^ RK[6]; + RK[8] = RK[2] ^ RK[7]; + RK[9] = RK[3] ^ RK[8]; + RK[10] = RK[4] ^ RK[9]; + RK[11] = RK[5] ^ RK[10]; + } + break; + + case 14: + + for( i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8 ) + { + RK[8] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[7] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[7] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[7] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[7] ) ] << 24 ); + + RK[9] = RK[1] ^ RK[8]; + RK[10] = RK[2] ^ RK[9]; + RK[11] = RK[3] ^ RK[10]; + + RK[12] = RK[4] ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[11] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[11] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[11] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[11] ) ] << 24 ); + + RK[13] = RK[5] ^ RK[12]; + RK[14] = RK[6] ^ RK[13]; + RK[15] = RK[7] ^ RK[14]; + } + break; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ + +/* + * AES key schedule (decryption) + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int i, j, ret; + mbedtls_aes_context cty; + uint32_t *RK; + uint32_t *SK; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + mbedtls_aes_init( &cty ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) + if( aes_padlock_ace == -1 ) + aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support( MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE ); + + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + ctx->rk = RK = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( ctx->buf ); + else +#endif + ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf; + + /* Also checks keybits */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &cty, key, keybits ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ctx->nr = cty.nr; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) + { + mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( (unsigned char *) ctx->rk, + (const unsigned char *) cty.rk, ctx->nr ); + goto exit; + } +#endif + + SK = cty.rk + cty.nr * 4; + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + + for( i = ctx->nr - 1, SK -= 8; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8 ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++ ) + { + *RK++ = AES_RT0( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *SK ) ] ) ^ + AES_RT1( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *SK ) ] ) ^ + AES_RT2( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *SK ) ] ) ^ + AES_RT3( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *SK ) ] ); + } + } + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &cty ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits, + const unsigned char **key1, + unsigned int *key1bits, + const unsigned char **key2, + unsigned int *key2bits ) +{ + const unsigned int half_keybits = keybits / 2; + const unsigned int half_keybytes = half_keybits / 8; + + switch( keybits ) + { + case 256: break; + case 512: break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + } + + *key1bits = half_keybits; + *key2bits = half_keybits; + *key1 = &key[0]; + *key2 = &key[half_keybytes]; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *key1, *key2; + unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, + &key2, &key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for the encryption mode. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set crypt key for encryption. */ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits ); +} + +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *key1, *key2; + unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, + &key2, &key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for encryption. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set crypt key for decryption. */ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#define AES_FROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ + do \ + { \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y3 ) ); \ + \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y0 ) ); \ + \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y1 ) ); \ + \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y2 ) ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define AES_RROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ + do \ + { \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y1 ) ); \ + \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y2 ) ); \ + \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y3 ) ); \ + \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y0 ) ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * AES-ECB block encryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + struct + { + uint32_t X[4]; + uint32_t Y[4]; + } t; + + t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; + + for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + { + AES_FROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + AES_FROUND( t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3] ); + } + + AES_FROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + + t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[0] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[1] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[2] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[3] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[1] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[2] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[0] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[2] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[0] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[1] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[3] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[0] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[1] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[2] ) ] << 24 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * AES-ECB block decryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + struct + { + uint32_t X[4]; + uint32_t Y[4]; + } t; + + t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; + + for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + { + AES_RROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + AES_RROUND( t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3] ); + } + + AES_RROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + + t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[0] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[2] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[1] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[1] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[0] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[2] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[2] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[1] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[0] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[3] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[3] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[2] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[1] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[0] ) ] << 24 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) + return( mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + { + if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to + // unaccelerated mode + // + } +#endif + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) + return( mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); + else + return( mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * AES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[16]; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + if( length % 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + { + if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to + // unaccelerated mode + // + } +#endif + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + memcpy( iv, output, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + +typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16]; + +/* + * GF(2^128) multiplication function + * + * This function multiplies a field element by x in the polynomial field + * representation. It uses 64-bit word operations to gain speed but compensates + * for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little + * endian machines. + */ +static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( unsigned char r[16], + const unsigned char x[16] ) +{ + uint64_t a, b, ra, rb; + + a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 0 ); + b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 8 ); + + ra = ( a << 1 ) ^ 0x0087 >> ( 8 - ( ( b >> 63 ) << 3 ) ); + rb = ( a >> 63 ) | ( b << 1 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( ra, r, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( rb, r, 8 ); +} + +/* + * AES-XTS buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t blocks = length / 16; + size_t leftover = length % 16; + unsigned char tweak[16]; + unsigned char prev_tweak[16]; + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( data_unit != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + /* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */ + if( length < 16 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + + /* NIST SP 800-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */ + if( length > ( 1 << 20 ) * 16 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + + /* Compute the tweak. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->tweak, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + data_unit, tweak ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + while( blocks-- ) + { + size_t i; + + if( leftover && ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) && blocks == 0 ) + { + /* We are on the last block in a decrypt operation that has + * leftover bytes, so we need to use the next tweak for this block, + * and this tweak for the lefover bytes. Save the current tweak for + * the leftovers and then update the current tweak for use on this, + * the last full block. */ + memcpy( prev_tweak, tweak, sizeof( tweak ) ); + mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + tmp[i] = input[i] ^ tweak[i]; + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = tmp[i] ^ tweak[i]; + + /* Update the tweak for the next block. */ + mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak ); + + output += 16; + input += 16; + } + + if( leftover ) + { + /* If we are on the leftover bytes in a decrypt operation, we need to + * use the previous tweak for these bytes (as saved in prev_tweak). */ + unsigned char *t = mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ? prev_tweak : tweak; + + /* We are now on the final part of the data unit, which doesn't divide + * evenly by 16. It's time for ciphertext stealing. */ + size_t i; + unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16; + + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each + * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the + * remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds + * are the same). */ + for( i = 0; i < leftover; i++ ) + { + output[i] = prev_output[i]; + tmp[i] = input[i] ^ t[i]; + } + + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block for input in this + * round. */ + for( ; i < 16; i++ ) + tmp[i] = prev_output[i] ^ t[i]; + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return ret; + + /* Write the result back to the previous block, overriding the previous + * output we copied. */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + prev_output[i] = tmp[i] ^ t[i]; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * AES-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + if( n > 15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] ); + iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + else + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * AES-CFB8 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char c; + unsigned char ov[17]; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + while( length-- ) + { + memcpy( ov, iv, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + ov[16] = *input; + + c = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[0] ^ *input++ ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) + ov[16] = c; + + memcpy( iv, ov + 1, 16 ); + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +/* + * AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode) buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + if( n > 15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + *output++ = *input++ ^ iv[n]; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *iv_off = n; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * AES-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c, i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + + if ( n > 0x0F ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 16; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *nc_off = n; + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * AES test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/rijndael-vals.zip + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_dec[3][16] = +{ + { 0x44, 0x41, 0x6A, 0xC2, 0xD1, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x58, + 0x33, 0x03, 0x91, 0x7E, 0x6B, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0xE0 }, + { 0x48, 0xE3, 0x1E, 0x9E, 0x25, 0x67, 0x18, 0xF2, + 0x92, 0x29, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x19, 0xF1, 0x5B, 0xA4 }, + { 0x05, 0x8C, 0xCF, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x2D, + 0x1F, 0x6F, 0x56, 0x58, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x4A, 0xDE } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_enc[3][16] = +{ + { 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x2C, 0xC0, 0xDA, 0x8D, 0x73, + 0x45, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x03, 0xBE, 0x29, 0x7F }, + { 0xF3, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x2A, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x83, 0x11, + 0x38, 0xF0, 0x41, 0x56, 0x06, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x14 }, + { 0x8B, 0x79, 0xEE, 0xCC, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xEE, 0x5D, + 0xFF, 0x30, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x21, 0x63, 0x6D, 0xA4 } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_dec[3][16] = +{ + { 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x53, 0x73, + 0xDF, 0x70, 0x6E, 0x73, 0xF7, 0xC9, 0xAF, 0x86 }, + { 0x5D, 0xF6, 0x78, 0xDD, 0x17, 0xBA, 0x4E, 0x75, + 0xB6, 0x17, 0x68, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x7B }, + { 0x48, 0x04, 0xE1, 0x81, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x75, + 0x19, 0xA3, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x57, 0x31, 0x04, 0x13 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[3][16] = +{ + { 0x8A, 0x05, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x09, 0x5A, 0xF4, 0x84, + 0x8A, 0x08, 0xD3, 0x28, 0xD3, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x3D }, + { 0x7B, 0xD9, 0x66, 0xD5, 0x3A, 0xD8, 0xC1, 0xBB, + 0x85, 0xD2, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE8, 0x7B, 0xB1, 0x04 }, + { 0xFE, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x65, 0x3E, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xB5, + 0x6F, 0xCD, 0x88, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x8F, 0xF0 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * AES-CFB128 test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[3][32] = +{ + { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, + 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, + { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, + 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, + { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, + 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, + 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_iv[16] = +{ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_pt[64] = +{ + 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, + 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A, + 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, + 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51, + 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, + 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF, + 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17, + 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = +{ + { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, + 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, + 0xC8, 0xA6, 0x45, 0x37, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xA9, 0x3F, + 0xCD, 0xE3, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x9F, 0x1C, 0xE5, 0x8B, + 0x26, 0x75, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xA3, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0x40, + 0xB1, 0x80, 0x8C, 0xF1, 0x87, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0xDF, + 0xC0, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x35, 0x7C, 0x5D, 0x1C, 0x0E, + 0xEA, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0xE6 }, + { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, + 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, + 0x67, 0xCE, 0x7F, 0x7F, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21, + 0x96, 0x1A, 0x2B, 0x70, 0x17, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0x7A, + 0x2E, 0x1E, 0x8A, 0x1D, 0xD5, 0x9B, 0x88, 0xB1, + 0xC8, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0xED, 0x1E, 0xFA, 0xC4, 0xC9, + 0xC0, 0x5F, 0x9F, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0x83, 0x4F, 0xA0, + 0x42, 0xAE, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x4B, 0x09, 0xFF }, + { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B, + 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60, + 0x39, 0xFF, 0xED, 0x14, 0x3B, 0x28, 0xB1, 0xC8, + 0x32, 0x11, 0x3C, 0x63, 0x31, 0xE5, 0x40, 0x7B, + 0xDF, 0x10, 0x13, 0x24, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0x92, + 0xA1, 0x3E, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x26, 0x7A, 0xE2, 0xF9, + 0x75, 0xA3, 0x85, 0x74, 0x1A, 0xB9, 0xCE, 0xF8, + 0x20, 0x31, 0x62, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xB1, 0xE4, 0x71 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +/* + * AES-OFB test vectors from: + * + * https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[3][32] = +{ + { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, + 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, + { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, + 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, + { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, + 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, + 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_iv[16] = +{ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_pt[64] = +{ + 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, + 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A, + 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, + 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51, + 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, + 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF, + 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17, + 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = +{ + { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, + 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, + 0x77, 0x89, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x16, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x03, + 0xf5, 0x3c, 0x52, 0xda, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0xd8, 0x25, + 0x97, 0x40, 0x05, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0x5f, 0xec, 0xf6, + 0x43, 0x44, 0xf7, 0xa8, 0x22, 0x60, 0xed, 0xcc, + 0x30, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x28, 0xf6, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x78, + 0x66, 0xa5, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x5e }, + { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, + 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, + 0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c, + 0x09, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x10, 0x04, 0x01, + 0x8d, 0x9a, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xf6, 0x59, 0x6f, + 0x55, 0x9c, 0x6d, 0x4d, 0xaf, 0x59, 0xa5, 0xf2, + 0x6d, 0x9f, 0x20, 0x08, 0x57, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x3e, + 0x9c, 0xac, 0x52, 0x4b, 0xd9, 0xac, 0xc9, 0x2a }, + { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B, + 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60, + 0x4f, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0x67, 0x40, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x3a, + 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xd8, 0x2a, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0x8d, + 0x71, 0xab, 0x47, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xed, + 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0xba, 0x97, 0xc4, 0x08, + 0x01, 0x26, 0x14, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xf3, 0x7b, 0xe8, + 0x53, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x8b, 0xe7, 0x40, 0xe4, 0x84 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * AES-CTR test vectors from: + * + * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3686.html + */ + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[3][16] = +{ + { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC, + 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E }, + { 0x7E, 0x24, 0x06, 0x78, 0x17, 0xFA, 0xE0, 0xD7, + 0x43, 0xD6, 0xCE, 0x1F, 0x32, 0x53, 0x91, 0x63 }, + { 0x76, 0x91, 0xBE, 0x03, 0x5E, 0x50, 0x20, 0xA8, + 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0x6C, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x59, + 0xDA, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x27, 0x77, 0x7F, 0x3F, + 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = +{ + { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62, + 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_ct[3][48] = +{ + { 0xE4, 0x09, 0x5D, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xA7, 0xB3, 0x79, + 0x2D, 0x61, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x13, 0x11, 0xB8 }, + { 0x51, 0x04, 0xA1, 0x06, 0x16, 0x8A, 0x72, 0xD9, + 0x79, 0x0D, 0x41, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0xDA, 0xD3, 0x88, + 0xEB, 0x2E, 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x46, 0xDA, 0x57, 0xC8, + 0xFC, 0xE6, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x91, 0x41, 0xBE, 0x28 }, + { 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x9F, 0x2F, 0xFD, 0xD9, + 0xCF, 0x46, 0x52, 0xE9, 0xEF, 0xDB, 0x72, 0xD7, + 0x45, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x2B, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x78, 0x36, + 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x5C, 0xEA, 0xAE, 0xF3, 0x10, 0x53, + 0x25, 0xB2, 0x07, 0x2F } +}; + +static const int aes_test_ctr_len[3] = + { 16, 32, 36 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/* + * AES-XTS test vectors from: + * + * IEEE P1619/D16 Annex B + * https://web.archive.org/web/20150629024421/http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf + * (Archived from original at http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf) + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_key[][32] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }, + { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc, 0xfb, 0xfa, 0xf9, 0xf8, + 0xf7, 0xf6, 0xf5, 0xf4, 0xf3, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xf0, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_pt32[][32] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }, + { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_ct32[][32] = +{ + { 0x91, 0x7c, 0xf6, 0x9e, 0xbd, 0x68, 0xb2, 0xec, + 0x9b, 0x9f, 0xe9, 0xa3, 0xea, 0xdd, 0xa6, 0x92, + 0xcd, 0x43, 0xd2, 0xf5, 0x95, 0x98, 0xed, 0x85, + 0x8c, 0x02, 0xc2, 0x65, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x2e }, + { 0xc4, 0x54, 0x18, 0x5e, 0x6a, 0x16, 0x93, 0x6e, + 0x39, 0x33, 0x40, 0x38, 0xac, 0xef, 0x83, 0x8b, + 0xfb, 0x18, 0x6f, 0xff, 0x74, 0x80, 0xad, 0xc4, + 0x28, 0x93, 0x82, 0xec, 0xd6, 0xd3, 0x94, 0xf0 }, + { 0xaf, 0x85, 0x33, 0x6b, 0x59, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0x1a, + 0x90, 0x0b, 0x2e, 0xb2, 0x1e, 0xc9, 0x49, 0xd2, + 0x92, 0xdf, 0x4c, 0x04, 0x7e, 0x0b, 0x21, 0x53, + 0x21, 0x86, 0xa5, 0x97, 0x1a, 0x22, 0x7a, 0x89 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_data_unit[][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 0, i, j, u, mode; + unsigned int keybits; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char buf[64]; + const unsigned char *aes_tests; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + unsigned char iv[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char prv[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + size_t offset; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + int len; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + unsigned char nonce_counter[16]; + unsigned char stream_block[16]; +#endif + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + memset( key, 0, 32 ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * ECB mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memset( buf, 0, 16 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, keybits ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_dec[u]; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_enc[u]; + } + + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx, mode, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* + * CBC mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memset( iv , 0, 16 ); + memset( prv, 0, 16 ); + memset( buf, 0, 16 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, keybits ); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_dec[u]; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_enc[u]; + } + + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + { + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) + { + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + memcpy( tmp, prv, 16 ); + memcpy( prv, buf, 16 ); + memcpy( buf, tmp, 16 ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ctx, mode, 16, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + } + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + /* + * CFB128 mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16 ); + memcpy( key, aes_test_cfb128_key[u], keybits / 8 ); + + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_cfb128_ct[u], 64 ); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_pt; + } + else + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_cfb128_pt, 64 ); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_ct[u]; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, mode, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 64 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + /* + * OFB mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16 ); + memcpy( key, aes_test_ofb_key[u], keybits / 8 ); + + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_ofb_ct[u], 64 ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_pt; + } + else + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_ofb_pt, 64 ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_ct[u]; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &ctx, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 64 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + /* + * CTR mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CTR-128 (%s): ", + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( nonce_counter, aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16 ); + memcpy( key, aes_test_ctr_key[u], 16 ); + + offset = 0; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, 128 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + len = aes_test_ctr_len[u]; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_ctr_ct[u], len ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_pt[u]; + } + else + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_ctr_pt[u], len ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_ct[u]; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( &ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, + stream_block, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_xts_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_xts_key); + mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx_xts; + + /* + * XTS mode + */ + mbedtls_aes_xts_init( &ctx_xts ); + + for( i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++ ) + { + const unsigned char *data_unit; + u = i >> 1; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-XTS-128 (%s): ", + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memset( key, 0, sizeof( key ) ); + memcpy( key, aes_test_xts_key[u], 32 ); + data_unit = aes_test_xts_data_unit[u]; + + len = sizeof( *aes_test_xts_ct32 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( &ctx_xts, key, 256 ); + if( ret != 0) + goto exit; + memcpy( buf, aes_test_xts_ct32[u], len ); + aes_tests = aes_test_xts_pt32[u]; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( &ctx_xts, key, 256 ); + if( ret != 0) + goto exit; + memcpy( buf, aes_test_xts_pt32[u], len ); + aes_tests = aes_test_xts_ct32[u]; + } + + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &ctx_xts, mode, len, data_unit, + buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + mbedtls_aes_xts_free( &ctx_xts ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: + if( ret != 0 && verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/aesni.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/aesni.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..996292ff --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/aesni.c @@ -0,0 +1,464 @@ +/* + * AES-NI support functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * [AES-WP] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-aes-instructions-set + * [CLMUL-WP] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-carry-less-multiplication-instruction-and-its-usage-for-computing-the-gcm-mode/ + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#warning "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is known to cause spurious error reports with some memory sanitizers as they do not understand the assembly code." +#endif +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" + +#include + +#ifndef asm +#define asm __asm +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + +/* + * AES-NI support detection routine + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_has_support( unsigned int what ) +{ + static int done = 0; + static unsigned int c = 0; + + if( ! done ) + { + asm( "movl $1, %%eax \n\t" + "cpuid \n\t" + : "=c" (c) + : + : "eax", "ebx", "edx" ); + done = 1; + } + + return( ( c & what ) != 0 ); +} + +/* + * Binutils needs to be at least 2.19 to support AES-NI instructions. + * Unfortunately, a lot of users have a lower version now (2014-04). + * Emit bytecode directly in order to support "old" version of gas. + * + * Opcodes from the Intel architecture reference manual, vol. 3. + * We always use registers, so we don't need prefixes for memory operands. + * Operand macros are in gas order (src, dst) as opposed to Intel order + * (dst, src) in order to blend better into the surrounding assembly code. + */ +#define AESDEC ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDE," +#define AESDECLAST ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDF," +#define AESENC ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDC," +#define AESENCLAST ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDD," +#define AESIMC ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDB," +#define AESKEYGENA ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0xDF," +#define PCLMULQDQ ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0x44," + +#define xmm0_xmm0 "0xC0" +#define xmm0_xmm1 "0xC8" +#define xmm0_xmm2 "0xD0" +#define xmm0_xmm3 "0xD8" +#define xmm0_xmm4 "0xE0" +#define xmm1_xmm0 "0xC1" +#define xmm1_xmm2 "0xD1" + +/* + * AES-NI AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + asm( "movdqu (%3), %%xmm0 \n\t" // load input + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key 0 + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // round 0 + "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key + "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // normal rounds = nr - 1 + "test %2, %2 \n\t" // mode? + "jz 2f \n\t" // 0 = decrypt + + "1: \n\t" // encryption loop + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key + AESENC xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // do round + "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key + "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // loop + "jnz 1b \n\t" + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key + AESENCLAST xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // last round + "jmp 3f \n\t" + + "2: \n\t" // decryption loop + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" + AESDEC xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // do round + "add $16, %1 \n\t" + "subl $1, %0 \n\t" + "jnz 2b \n\t" + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key + AESDECLAST xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // last round + + "3: \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%4) \n\t" // export output + : + : "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->rk), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output) + : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1" ); + + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128) + * Based on [CLMUL-WP] algorithms 1 (with equation 27) and 5. + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16] ) +{ + unsigned char aa[16], bb[16], cc[16]; + size_t i; + + /* The inputs are in big-endian order, so byte-reverse them */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + aa[i] = a[15 - i]; + bb[i] = b[15 - i]; + } + + asm( "movdqu (%0), %%xmm0 \n\t" // a1:a0 + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // b1:b0 + + /* + * Caryless multiplication xmm2:xmm1 = xmm0 * xmm1 + * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 1 (p. 13). + */ + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // copy of b1:b0 + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same + PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm1 ",0x00 \n\t" // a0*b0 = c1:c0 + PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm2 ",0x11 \n\t" // a1*b1 = d1:d0 + PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm3 ",0x10 \n\t" // a0*b1 = e1:e0 + PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm4 ",0x01 \n\t" // a1*b0 = f1:f0 + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm4 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0+f0 + "movdqa %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same + "psrldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // 0:e1+f1 + "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // e0+f0:0 + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // d1:d0+e1+f1 + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // c1+e0+f1:c0 + + /* + * Now shift the result one bit to the left, + * taking advantage of [CLMUL-WP] eq 27 (p. 20) + */ + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1:r0 + "movdqa %%xmm2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3:r2 + "psllq $1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1:r0<<1 + "psllq $1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1:r2<<1 + "psrlq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63 + "psrlq $63, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3>>63:r2>>63 + "movdqa %%xmm3, %%xmm5 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63 + "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r0>>63:0 + "pslldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r2>>63:0 + "psrldq $8, %%xmm5 \n\t" // 0:r1>>63 + "por %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1|r0>>63:r0<<1 + "por %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1 + "por %%xmm5, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1|r1>>63 + + /* + * Now reduce modulo the GCM polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 + * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 5 (p. 20). + * Currently xmm2:xmm1 holds x3:x2:x1:x0 (already shifted). + */ + /* Step 2 (1) */ + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1:x0 + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm5 \n\t" // same + "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1<<63:x0<<63 = stuff:a + "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // x1<<62:x0<<62 = stuff:b + "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // x1<<57:x0<<57 = stuff:c + + /* Step 2 (2) */ + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b + "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b+c + "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // a+b+c:0 + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // x1+a+b+c:x0 = d:x0 + + /* Steps 3 and 4 */ + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm0 \n\t" // d:x0 + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same + "psrlq $1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1:x0>>1 = e1:e0' + "psrlq $2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // f1:x0>>2 = f1:f0' + "psrlq $7, %%xmm5 \n\t" // g1:x0>>7 = g1:g0' + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0'+f0' + "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0'+f0'+g0' + // e0'+f0'+g0' is almost e0+f0+g0, ex\tcept for some missing + // bits carried from d. Now get those\t bits back in. + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm3 \n\t" // d:x0 + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same + "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63:stuff + "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // d<<62:stuff + "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // d<<57:stuff + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63+d<<62:stuff + "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // missing bits of d:stuff + "psrldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // 0:missing bits of d + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0+f0+g0 + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // h1:h0 + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // x3+h1:x2+h0 + + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%2) \n\t" // done + : + : "r" (aa), "r" (bb), "r" (cc) + : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "xmm3", "xmm4", "xmm5" ); + + /* Now byte-reverse the outputs */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + c[i] = cc[15 - i]; + + return; +} + +/* + * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr ) +{ + unsigned char *ik = invkey; + const unsigned char *fk = fwdkey + 16 * nr; + + memcpy( ik, fk, 16 ); + + for( fk -= 16, ik += 16; fk > fwdkey; fk -= 16, ik += 16 ) + asm( "movdqu (%0), %%xmm0 \n\t" + AESIMC xmm0_xmm0 "\n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%1) \n\t" + : + : "r" (fk), "r" (ik) + : "memory", "xmm0" ); + + memcpy( ik, fk, 16 ); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, 128-bit case + */ +static void aesni_setkey_enc_128( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key ) +{ + asm( "movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" // copy the original key + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" // as round key 0 + "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine + + /* + * Finish generating the next round key. + * + * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0 and xmm1 is X:stuff:stuff:stuff + * with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON. + * + * On exit, xmm0 is r7:r6:r5:r4 + * with r4 = X + r0, r5 = r4 + r1, r6 = r5 + r2, r7 = r6 + r3 + * and those are written to the round key buffer. + */ + "1: \n\t" + "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X:X:X:X + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // r2:r1:r0:0 + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:r5:r4 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // etc + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // update xmm0 for next time! + "add $16, %0 \n\t" // point to next round key + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" // write it + "ret \n\t" + + /* Main "loop" */ + "2: \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x01 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x02 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x04 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x08 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x10 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x20 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x40 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x80 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x1B \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x36 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + : + : "r" (rk), "r" (key) + : "memory", "cc", "0" ); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, 192-bit case + */ +static void aesni_setkey_enc_192( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key ) +{ + asm( "movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" // copy original round key + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movq 16(%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" + "movq %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "add $8, %0 \n\t" + "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine + + /* + * Finish generating the next 6 quarter-keys. + * + * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, xmm1 is stuff:stuff:r5:r4 + * and xmm2 is stuff:stuff:X:stuff with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON. + * + * On exit, xmm0 is r9:r8:r7:r6 and xmm1 is stuff:stuff:r11:r10 + * and those are written to the round key buffer. + */ + "1: \n\t" + "pshufd $0x55, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" // X:X:X:X + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // etc + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // update xmm0 = r9:r8:r7:r6 + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r9:r9:r9:r9 + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // stuff:stuff:r9+r5:r10 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r2:r1:r0:0 + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t" // xmm1 = stuff:stuff:r11:r10 + "movq %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "add $8, %0 \n\t" + "ret \n\t" + + "2: \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x01 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x02 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x04 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x08 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x10 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x20 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x40 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x80 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + + : + : "r" (rk), "r" (key) + : "memory", "cc", "0" ); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, 256-bit case + */ +static void aesni_setkey_enc_256( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key ) +{ + asm( "movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movdqu 16(%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine + + /* + * Finish generating the next two round keys. + * + * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, xmm1 is r7:r6:r5:r4 and + * xmm2 is X:stuff:stuff:stuff with X = rot( sub( r7 )) ^ RCON + * + * On exit, xmm0 is r11:r10:r9:r8 and xmm1 is r15:r14:r13:r12 + * and those have been written to the output buffer. + */ + "1: \n\t" + "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + + /* Set xmm2 to stuff:Y:stuff:stuff with Y = subword( r11 ) + * and proceed to generate next round key from there */ + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm2 ",0x00 \n\t" + "pshufd $0xaa, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "ret \n\t" + + /* + * Main "loop" - Generating one more key than necessary, + * see definition of mbedtls_aes_context.buf + */ + "2: \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x01 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x02 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x04 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x08 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x10 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x20 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x40 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + : + : "r" (rk), "r" (key) + : "memory", "cc", "0" ); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits ) +{ + switch( bits ) + { + case 128: aesni_setkey_enc_128( rk, key ); break; + case 192: aesni_setkey_enc_192( rk, key ); break; + case 256: aesni_setkey_enc_256( rk, key ); break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/arc4.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/arc4.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b34dc5e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/arc4.c @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +/* + * An implementation of the ARCFOUR algorithm + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ARCFOUR algorithm was publicly disclosed on 94/09. + * + * http://groups.google.com/group/sci.crypt/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) + +void mbedtls_arc4_init( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_arc4_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_arc4_free( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_arc4_context ) ); +} + +/* + * ARC4 key schedule + */ +void mbedtls_arc4_setup( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen ) +{ + int i, j, a; + unsigned int k; + unsigned char *m; + + ctx->x = 0; + ctx->y = 0; + m = ctx->m; + + for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) + m[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + j = k = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < 256; i++, k++ ) + { + if( k >= keylen ) k = 0; + + a = m[i]; + j = ( j + a + key[k] ) & 0xFF; + m[i] = m[j]; + m[j] = (unsigned char) a; + } +} + +/* + * ARC4 cipher function + */ +int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int x, y, a, b; + size_t i; + unsigned char *m; + + x = ctx->x; + y = ctx->y; + m = ctx->m; + + for( i = 0; i < length; i++ ) + { + x = ( x + 1 ) & 0xFF; a = m[x]; + y = ( y + a ) & 0xFF; b = m[y]; + + m[x] = (unsigned char) b; + m[y] = (unsigned char) a; + + output[i] = (unsigned char) + ( input[i] ^ m[(unsigned char)( a + b )] ); + } + + ctx->x = x; + ctx->y = y; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * ARC4 tests vectors as posted by Eric Rescorla in sep. 1994: + * + * http://groups.google.com/group/comp.security.misc/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 + */ +static const unsigned char arc4_test_key[3][8] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } +}; + +static const unsigned char arc4_test_pt[3][8] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } +}; + +static const unsigned char arc4_test_ct[3][8] = +{ + { 0x75, 0xB7, 0x87, 0x80, 0x99, 0xE0, 0xC5, 0x96 }, + { 0x74, 0x94, 0xC2, 0xE7, 0x10, 0x4B, 0x08, 0x79 }, + { 0xDE, 0x18, 0x89, 0x41, 0xA3, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x3A } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_arc4_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char ibuf[8]; + unsigned char obuf[8]; + mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; + + mbedtls_arc4_init( &ctx ); + + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARC4 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + memcpy( ibuf, arc4_test_pt[i], 8 ); + + mbedtls_arc4_setup( &ctx, arc4_test_key[i], 8 ); + mbedtls_arc4_crypt( &ctx, 8, ibuf, obuf ); + + if( memcmp( obuf, arc4_test_ct[i], 8 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_arc4_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/aria.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/aria.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc05c4a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/aria.c @@ -0,0 +1,1058 @@ +/* + * ARIA implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * This implementation is based on the following standards: + * [1] http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/doc/ARIA-specification-e.pdf + * [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5794 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ARIA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( B A D C ), i.e. swap pairs of bytes + * + * This is submatrix P1 in [1] Appendix B.1 + * + * Common compilers fail to translate this to minimal number of instructions, + * so let's provide asm versions for common platforms with C fallback. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#if defined(__arm__) /* rev16 available from v6 up */ +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) && \ + __ARM_ARCH >= 6 +static inline uint32_t aria_p1( uint32_t x ) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm( "rev16 %0, %1" : "=l" (r) : "l" (x) ); + return( r ); +} +#define ARIA_P1 aria_p1 +#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && __ARMCC_VERSION < 6000000 && \ + ( __TARGET_ARCH_ARM >= 6 || __TARGET_ARCH_THUMB >= 3 ) +static inline uint32_t aria_p1( uint32_t x ) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm( "rev16 r, x" ); + return( r ); +} +#define ARIA_P1 aria_p1 +#endif +#endif /* arm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__) +/* I couldn't find an Intel equivalent of rev16, so two instructions */ +#define ARIA_P1(x) ARIA_P2( ARIA_P3( x ) ) +#endif /* x86 gnuc */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && GNUC */ +#if !defined(ARIA_P1) +#define ARIA_P1(x) ((((x) >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF) ^ (((x) & 0x00FF00FF) << 8)) +#endif + +/* + * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( C D A B ), i.e. rotate by 16 bits + * + * This is submatrix P2 in [1] Appendix B.1 + * + * Common compilers will translate this to a single instruction. + */ +#define ARIA_P2(x) (((x) >> 16) ^ ((x) << 16)) + +/* + * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( D C B A ), i.e. change endianness + * + * This is submatrix P3 in [1] Appendix B.1 + * + * Some compilers fail to translate this to a single instruction, + * so let's provide asm versions for common platforms with C fallback. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#if defined(__arm__) /* rev available from v6 up */ +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) && \ + __ARM_ARCH >= 6 +static inline uint32_t aria_p3( uint32_t x ) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm( "rev %0, %1" : "=l" (r) : "l" (x) ); + return( r ); +} +#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 +#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && __ARMCC_VERSION < 6000000 && \ + ( __TARGET_ARCH_ARM >= 6 || __TARGET_ARCH_THUMB >= 3 ) +static inline uint32_t aria_p3( uint32_t x ) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm( "rev r, x" ); + return( r ); +} +#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 +#endif +#endif /* arm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__) +static inline uint32_t aria_p3( uint32_t x ) +{ + __asm( "bswap %0" : "=r" (x) : "0" (x) ); + return( x ); +} +#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 +#endif /* x86 gnuc */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && GNUC */ +#if !defined(ARIA_P3) +#define ARIA_P3(x) ARIA_P2( ARIA_P1 ( x ) ) +#endif + +/* + * ARIA Affine Transform + * (a, b, c, d) = state in/out + * + * If we denote the first byte of input by 0, ..., the last byte by f, + * then inputs are: a = 0123, b = 4567, c = 89ab, d = cdef. + * + * Reading [1] 2.4 or [2] 2.4.3 in columns and performing simple + * rearrangements on adjacent pairs, output is: + * + * a = 3210 + 4545 + 6767 + 88aa + 99bb + dccd + effe + * = 3210 + 4567 + 6745 + 89ab + 98ba + dcfe + efcd + * b = 0101 + 2323 + 5476 + 8998 + baab + eecc + ffdd + * = 0123 + 2301 + 5476 + 89ab + ba98 + efcd + fedc + * c = 0022 + 1133 + 4554 + 7667 + ab89 + dcdc + fefe + * = 0123 + 1032 + 4567 + 7654 + ab89 + dcfe + fedc + * d = 1001 + 2332 + 6644 + 7755 + 9898 + baba + cdef + * = 1032 + 2301 + 6745 + 7654 + 98ba + ba98 + cdef + * + * Note: another presentation of the A transform can be found as the first + * half of App. B.1 in [1] in terms of 4-byte operators P1, P2, P3 and P4. + * The implementation below uses only P1 and P2 as they are sufficient. + */ +static inline void aria_a( uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, + uint32_t *c, uint32_t *d ) +{ + uint32_t ta, tb, tc; + ta = *b; // 4567 + *b = *a; // 0123 + *a = ARIA_P2( ta ); // 6745 + tb = ARIA_P2( *d ); // efcd + *d = ARIA_P1( *c ); // 98ba + *c = ARIA_P1( tb ); // fedc + ta ^= *d; // 4567+98ba + tc = ARIA_P2( *b ); // 2301 + ta = ARIA_P1( ta ) ^ tc ^ *c; // 2301+5476+89ab+fedc + tb ^= ARIA_P2( *d ); // ba98+efcd + tc ^= ARIA_P1( *a ); // 2301+7654 + *b ^= ta ^ tb; // 0123+2301+5476+89ab+ba98+efcd+fedc OUT + tb = ARIA_P2( tb ) ^ ta; // 2301+5476+89ab+98ba+cdef+fedc + *a ^= ARIA_P1( tb ); // 3210+4567+6745+89ab+98ba+dcfe+efcd OUT + ta = ARIA_P2( ta ); // 0123+7654+ab89+dcfe + *d ^= ARIA_P1( ta ) ^ tc; // 1032+2301+6745+7654+98ba+ba98+cdef OUT + tc = ARIA_P2( tc ); // 0123+5476 + *c ^= ARIA_P1( tc ) ^ ta; // 0123+1032+4567+7654+ab89+dcfe+fedc OUT +} + +/* + * ARIA Substitution Layer SL1 / SL2 + * (a, b, c, d) = state in/out + * (sa, sb, sc, sd) = 256 8-bit S-Boxes (see below) + * + * By passing sb1, sb2, is1, is2 as S-Boxes you get SL1 + * By passing is1, is2, sb1, sb2 as S-Boxes you get SL2 + */ +static inline void aria_sl( uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, + uint32_t *c, uint32_t *d, + const uint8_t sa[256], const uint8_t sb[256], + const uint8_t sc[256], const uint8_t sd[256] ) +{ + *a = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *a ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *a ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *a ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *a ) ]) << 24); + *b = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *b ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *b ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *b ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *b ) ]) << 24); + *c = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *c ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *c ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *c ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *c ) ]) << 24); + *d = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *d ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *d ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *d ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *d ) ]) << 24); +} + +/* + * S-Boxes + */ +static const uint8_t aria_sb1[256] = +{ + 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, + 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, + 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, + 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15, + 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, + 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, + 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, + 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF, + 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, + 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, + 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, + 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73, + 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, + 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, + 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, + 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08, + 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, + 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, + 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, + 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF, + 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, + 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16 +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_sb2[256] = +{ + 0xE2, 0x4E, 0x54, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x4A, 0xCC, 0x62, 0x0D, 0x6A, 0x46, + 0x3C, 0x4D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x5E, 0xFA, 0x64, 0xCB, 0xB4, 0x97, 0xBE, 0x2B, + 0xBC, 0x77, 0x2E, 0x03, 0xD3, 0x19, 0x59, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x06, 0x41, 0x6B, + 0x55, 0xF0, 0x99, 0x69, 0xEA, 0x9C, 0x18, 0xAE, 0x63, 0xDF, 0xE7, 0xBB, + 0x00, 0x73, 0x66, 0xFB, 0x96, 0x4C, 0x85, 0xE4, 0x3A, 0x09, 0x45, 0xAA, + 0x0F, 0xEE, 0x10, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x7F, 0xF4, 0x29, 0xAC, 0xCF, 0xAD, 0x91, + 0x8D, 0x78, 0xC8, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xCE, 0xCD, 0x08, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x38, + 0x5C, 0x83, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x47, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x93, 0xA4, 0x12, 0x53, + 0xFF, 0x87, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x36, 0x21, 0x58, 0x48, 0x01, 0x8E, 0x37, 0x74, + 0x32, 0xCA, 0xE9, 0xB1, 0xB7, 0xAB, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0xC4, 0x56, 0x42, 0x26, + 0x07, 0x98, 0x60, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xB9, 0x11, 0x40, 0xEC, 0x20, 0x8C, 0xBD, + 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x84, 0x04, 0x49, 0x23, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x1F, 0x13, 0xDC, + 0xD8, 0xC0, 0x9E, 0x57, 0xE3, 0xC3, 0x7B, 0x65, 0x3B, 0x02, 0x8F, 0x3E, + 0xE8, 0x25, 0x92, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xDD, 0xFD, 0x17, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xD4, 0x9A, + 0x7E, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x67, 0xFE, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x43, 0xA7, 0xE1, 0xD0, 0xF5, + 0x68, 0xF2, 0x1B, 0x34, 0x70, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x79, 0x86, 0xA8, + 0x30, 0xC6, 0x51, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xF6, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0x24, + 0x16, 0x82, 0x5F, 0xDA, 0xE6, 0x75, 0xA2, 0xEF, 0x2C, 0xB2, 0x1C, 0x9F, + 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x80, 0x0A, 0x72, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x6C, 0x90, 0x0B, 0x5B, 0x33, + 0x7D, 0x5A, 0x52, 0xF3, 0x61, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0xB0, 0xD6, 0x3F, 0x7C, 0x6D, + 0xED, 0x14, 0xE0, 0xA5, 0x3D, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xDE, 0x71, 0x1A, + 0xAF, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0x81 +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_is1[256] = +{ + 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, + 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, + 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, + 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, + 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, + 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, + 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84, + 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, + 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, + 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, + 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73, + 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, + 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, + 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, + 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4, + 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, + 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, + 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, + 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, + 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, + 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_is2[256] = +{ + 0x30, 0x68, 0x99, 0x1B, 0x87, 0xB9, 0x21, 0x78, 0x50, 0x39, 0xDB, 0xE1, + 0x72, 0x09, 0x62, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0xA0, 0xCC, 0xA3, + 0x2A, 0x1D, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xD6, 0x20, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0x81, 0x65, 0xF5, 0x89, + 0xCB, 0x9D, 0x77, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x43, 0x56, 0x17, 0xD4, 0x40, 0x1A, 0x4D, + 0xC0, 0x63, 0x6C, 0xE3, 0xB7, 0xC8, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x53, 0xAA, 0x38, 0x98, + 0x0C, 0xF4, 0x9B, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x22, 0x76, 0xAF, 0xDD, 0x3A, 0x0B, 0x58, + 0x67, 0x88, 0x06, 0xC3, 0x35, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x8B, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0xE6, 0x5F, + 0x02, 0x24, 0x75, 0x93, 0x66, 0x1E, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x54, 0xD8, 0x10, 0xCE, + 0x7A, 0xE8, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x12, 0x97, 0x32, 0xAB, 0xB4, 0x27, 0x0A, 0x23, + 0xDF, 0xEF, 0xCA, 0xD9, 0xB8, 0xFA, 0xDC, 0x31, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0xAD, 0x19, + 0x49, 0xBD, 0x51, 0x96, 0xEE, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x41, 0xDA, 0xFF, 0xCD, 0x55, + 0x86, 0x36, 0xBE, 0x61, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xBB, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x48, 0x69, 0x9A, + 0xE0, 0x47, 0x9E, 0x5C, 0x04, 0x4B, 0x34, 0x15, 0x79, 0x26, 0xA7, 0xDE, + 0x29, 0xAE, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x84, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0xBA, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB0, + 0xBF, 0xA4, 0x3B, 0x71, 0x44, 0x46, 0x2B, 0xFC, 0xEB, 0x6F, 0xD5, 0xF6, + 0x14, 0xFE, 0x7C, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFD, 0x2F, 0x18, 0x83, 0x16, 0xA5, + 0x91, 0x1F, 0x05, 0x95, 0x74, 0xA9, 0xC1, 0x5B, 0x4A, 0x85, 0x6D, 0x13, + 0x07, 0x4F, 0x4E, 0x45, 0xB2, 0x0F, 0xC9, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xBC, 0xEC, 0x73, + 0x90, 0x7B, 0xCF, 0x59, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x94, + 0x37, 0x9F, 0xD0, 0x2E, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0x28, 0x3F, 0x80, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xD3, + 0x25, 0x8A, 0xB5, 0xE7, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xEA, 0xF7, 0x4C, 0x11, 0x33, + 0x03, 0xA2, 0xAC, 0x60 +}; + +/* + * Helper for key schedule: r = FO( p, k ) ^ x + */ +static void aria_fo_xor( uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t p[4], + const uint32_t k[4], const uint32_t x[4] ) +{ + uint32_t a, b, c, d; + + a = p[0] ^ k[0]; + b = p[1] ^ k[1]; + c = p[2] ^ k[2]; + d = p[3] ^ k[3]; + + aria_sl( &a, &b, &c, &d, aria_sb1, aria_sb2, aria_is1, aria_is2 ); + aria_a( &a, &b, &c, &d ); + + r[0] = a ^ x[0]; + r[1] = b ^ x[1]; + r[2] = c ^ x[2]; + r[3] = d ^ x[3]; +} + +/* + * Helper for key schedule: r = FE( p, k ) ^ x + */ +static void aria_fe_xor( uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t p[4], + const uint32_t k[4], const uint32_t x[4] ) +{ + uint32_t a, b, c, d; + + a = p[0] ^ k[0]; + b = p[1] ^ k[1]; + c = p[2] ^ k[2]; + d = p[3] ^ k[3]; + + aria_sl( &a, &b, &c, &d, aria_is1, aria_is2, aria_sb1, aria_sb2 ); + aria_a( &a, &b, &c, &d ); + + r[0] = a ^ x[0]; + r[1] = b ^ x[1]; + r[2] = c ^ x[2]; + r[3] = d ^ x[3]; +} + +/* + * Big endian 128-bit rotation: r = a ^ (b <<< n), used only in key setup. + * + * We chose to store bytes into 32-bit words in little-endian format (see + * MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE / MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE ) so we need to reverse + * bytes here. + */ +static void aria_rot128( uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t a[4], + const uint32_t b[4], uint8_t n ) +{ + uint8_t i, j; + uint32_t t, u; + + const uint8_t n1 = n % 32; // bit offset + const uint8_t n2 = n1 ? 32 - n1 : 0; // reverse bit offset + + j = ( n / 32 ) % 4; // initial word offset + t = ARIA_P3( b[j] ); // big endian + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) + { + j = ( j + 1 ) % 4; // get next word, big endian + u = ARIA_P3( b[j] ); + t <<= n1; // rotate + t |= u >> n2; + t = ARIA_P3( t ); // back to little endian + r[i] = a[i] ^ t; // store + t = u; // move to next word + } +} + +/* + * Set encryption key + */ +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) +{ + /* round constant masks */ + const uint32_t rc[3][4] = + { + { 0xB7C17C51, 0x940A2227, 0xE8AB13FE, 0xE06E9AFA }, + { 0xCC4AB16D, 0x20C8219E, 0xD5B128FF, 0xB0E25DEF }, + { 0x1D3792DB, 0x70E92621, 0x75972403, 0x0EC9E804 } + }; + + int i; + uint32_t w[4][4], *w2; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + if( keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Copy key to W0 (and potential remainder to W1) */ + w[0][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 0 ); + w[0][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 4 ); + w[0][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 8 ); + w[0][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 12 ); + + memset( w[1], 0, 16 ); + if( keybits >= 192 ) + { + w[1][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 16 ); // 192 bit key + w[1][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 20 ); + } + if( keybits == 256 ) + { + w[1][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 24 ); // 256 bit key + w[1][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 28 ); + } + + i = ( keybits - 128 ) >> 6; // index: 0, 1, 2 + ctx->nr = 12 + 2 * i; // no. rounds: 12, 14, 16 + + aria_fo_xor( w[1], w[0], rc[i], w[1] ); // W1 = FO(W0, CK1) ^ KR + i = i < 2 ? i + 1 : 0; + aria_fe_xor( w[2], w[1], rc[i], w[0] ); // W2 = FE(W1, CK2) ^ W0 + i = i < 2 ? i + 1 : 0; + aria_fo_xor( w[3], w[2], rc[i], w[1] ); // W3 = FO(W2, CK3) ^ W1 + + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) // create round keys + { + w2 = w[(i + 1) & 3]; + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[i ], w[i], w2, 128 - 19 ); + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[i + 4], w[i], w2, 128 - 31 ); + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[i + 8], w[i], w2, 61 ); + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[i + 12], w[i], w2, 31 ); + } + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[16], w[0], w[1], 19 ); + + /* w holds enough info to reconstruct the round keys */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( w, sizeof( w ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set decryption key + */ +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int i, j, k, ret; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( ctx, key, keybits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* flip the order of round keys */ + for( i = 0, j = ctx->nr; i < j; i++, j-- ) + { + for( k = 0; k < 4; k++ ) + { + uint32_t t = ctx->rk[i][k]; + ctx->rk[i][k] = ctx->rk[j][k]; + ctx->rk[j][k] = t; + } + } + + /* apply affine transform to middle keys */ + for( i = 1; i < ctx->nr; i++ ) + { + aria_a( &ctx->rk[i][0], &ctx->rk[i][1], + &ctx->rk[i][2], &ctx->rk[i][3] ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Encrypt a block + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + uint32_t a, b, c, d; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); + b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); + c = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); + d = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); + + i = 0; + while( 1 ) + { + a ^= ctx->rk[i][0]; + b ^= ctx->rk[i][1]; + c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; + d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; + i++; + + aria_sl( &a, &b, &c, &d, aria_sb1, aria_sb2, aria_is1, aria_is2 ); + aria_a( &a, &b, &c, &d ); + + a ^= ctx->rk[i][0]; + b ^= ctx->rk[i][1]; + c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; + d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; + i++; + + aria_sl( &a, &b, &c, &d, aria_is1, aria_is2, aria_sb1, aria_sb2 ); + if( i >= ctx->nr ) + break; + aria_a( &a, &b, &c, &d ); + } + + /* final key mixing */ + a ^= ctx->rk[i][0]; + b ^= ctx->rk[i][1]; + c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; + d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( a, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( b, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( c, output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( d, output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Initialize context */ +void mbedtls_aria_init( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ) +{ + ARIA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_aria_context ) ); +} + +/* Clear context */ +void mbedtls_aria_free( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_aria_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * ARIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; + + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + + if( length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output ); + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + + input += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output ); + memcpy( iv, output, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + + input += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * ARIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + unsigned char c; + size_t n; + + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited + * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this + * outside of parameter validation. */ + if( n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, iv, iv ); + + c = *input++; + *output++ = c ^ iv[n]; + iv[n] = c; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + else + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, iv, iv ); + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * ARIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c, i; + size_t n; + + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited + * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this + * outside of parameter validation. */ + if( n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) { + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, nonce_counter, + stream_block ); + + for( i = MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *nc_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Basic ARIA ECB test vectors from RFC 5794 + */ +static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_key[32] = // test key +{ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, // 128 bit + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, // 192 bit + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F // 256 bit +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_pt[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = // plaintext +{ + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // same for all + 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF // key sizes +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_ct[3][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = // ciphertext +{ + { 0xD7, 0x18, 0xFB, 0xD6, 0xAB, 0x64, 0x4C, 0x73, // 128 bit + 0x9D, 0xA9, 0x5F, 0x3B, 0xE6, 0x45, 0x17, 0x78 }, + { 0x26, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x18, 0x05, 0xDB, 0xE7, 0xAA, // 192 bit + 0x25, 0xA4, 0x68, 0xCE, 0x26, 0x3A, 0x9E, 0x79 }, + { 0xF9, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0xC7, 0x9F, 0xB7, 0x2E, 0x2F, // 256 bit + 0x2B, 0x8F, 0x80, 0xC1, 0x97, 0x2D, 0x24, 0xFC } +}; + +/* + * Mode tests from "Test Vectors for ARIA" Version 1.0 + * http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/doc/ARIA-testvector-e.pdf + */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_key[32] = +{ + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // 128 bit + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // 192 bit + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff // 256 bit +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_test2_pt[48] = +{ + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, // same for all + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, +}; +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = +{ + 0x0f, 0x1e, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x5a, 0x69, 0x78, // same for CBC, CFB + 0x87, 0x96, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0xe1, 0xf0 // CTR has zero IV +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_cbc_ct[3][48] = // CBC ciphertext +{ + { 0x49, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x60, 0xb1, 0x49, 0x09, 0x10, // 128-bit key + 0x9c, 0xef, 0x0d, 0x22, 0xa9, 0x26, 0x81, 0x34, + 0xfa, 0xdf, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x31, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x64, + 0x5f, 0xba, 0x75, 0x01, 0x8b, 0xdb, 0x15, 0x38, + 0xb5, 0x33, 0x34, 0x63, 0x4b, 0xbf, 0x7d, 0x4c, + 0xd4, 0xb5, 0x37, 0x70, 0x33, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x15 }, + { 0xaf, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0x23, 0x97, 0x4b, 0x53, 0x3c, // 192-bit key + 0x67, 0x2a, 0x82, 0x62, 0x64, 0xea, 0x78, 0x5f, + 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x7f, 0x78, 0x0d, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0xf1, + 0xe0, 0x96, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x23, 0x86, 0xd5, + 0x14, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xe7, 0x72, 0x59, 0xde, 0x92, + 0xdd, 0x11, 0x02, 0xff, 0xab, 0x08, 0x6c, 0x1e }, + { 0x52, 0x3a, 0x8a, 0x80, 0x6a, 0xe6, 0x21, 0xf1, // 256-bit key + 0x55, 0xfd, 0xd2, 0x8d, 0xbc, 0x34, 0xe1, 0xab, + 0x7b, 0x9b, 0x42, 0x43, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xef, + 0xb9, 0x6e, 0x23, 0xb1, 0x3f, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0x52, + 0xf3, 0x61, 0x85, 0xd5, 0x0a, 0xd0, 0x02, 0xc5, + 0xf6, 0x01, 0xbe, 0xe5, 0x49, 0x3f, 0x11, 0x8b } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_cfb_ct[3][48] = // CFB ciphertext +{ + { 0x37, 0x20, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x38, // 128-bit key + 0x34, 0x06, 0xb0, 0x9f, 0x0a, 0x05, 0xa2, 0x00, + 0xc0, 0x7c, 0x21, 0xe6, 0x37, 0x0f, 0x41, 0x3a, + 0x5d, 0x13, 0x25, 0x00, 0xa6, 0x82, 0x85, 0x01, + 0x7c, 0x61, 0xb4, 0x34, 0xc7, 0xb7, 0xca, 0x96, + 0x85, 0xa5, 0x10, 0x71, 0x86, 0x1e, 0x4d, 0x4b }, + { 0x41, 0x71, 0xf7, 0x19, 0x2b, 0xf4, 0x49, 0x54, // 192-bit key + 0x94, 0xd2, 0x73, 0x61, 0x29, 0x64, 0x0f, 0x5c, + 0x4d, 0x87, 0xa9, 0xa2, 0x13, 0x66, 0x4c, 0x94, + 0x48, 0x47, 0x7c, 0x6e, 0xcc, 0x20, 0x13, 0x59, + 0x8d, 0x97, 0x66, 0x95, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0xc3, 0x86, + 0x8f, 0x17, 0xe3, 0x6e, 0xf6, 0x6f, 0xd8, 0x4b }, + { 0x26, 0x83, 0x47, 0x05, 0xb0, 0xf2, 0xc0, 0xe2, // 256-bit key + 0x58, 0x8d, 0x4a, 0x7f, 0x09, 0x00, 0x96, 0x35, + 0xf2, 0x8b, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x8c, 0x31, 0xf8, 0x70, + 0xec, 0x1e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x66, 0xfa, + 0x40, 0x2d, 0xd9, 0xc2, 0x02, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x0c, + 0x45, 0x17, 0xd1, 0x96, 0xb1, 0x4d, 0x4c, 0xe1 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_ctr_ct[3][48] = // CTR ciphertext +{ + { 0xac, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0xe8, 0x05, 0xa0, 0xbf, 0x1c, // 128-bit key + 0x57, 0xc8, 0x54, 0x50, 0x1a, 0xf6, 0x0f, 0xa1, + 0x14, 0x97, 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x45, 0x19, 0xde, 0xa1, + 0x56, 0x9e, 0x91, 0xe5, 0xb5, 0xcc, 0xae, 0x2f, + 0xf3, 0xbf, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0x97, 0x5f, 0x45, 0x71, + 0xf4, 0x8b, 0xe1, 0x91, 0x61, 0x35, 0x46, 0xc3 }, + { 0x08, 0x62, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xfe, 0x56, 0x9c, 0x19, // 192-bit key + 0xba, 0x7a, 0xf3, 0x76, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0xd1, 0xce, + 0xf4, 0xd1, 0x99, 0x26, 0x3e, 0x99, 0x9d, 0xde, + 0x14, 0x08, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0xa7, 0x56, 0x0b, 0x79, + 0xa4, 0xc6, 0xb4, 0x56, 0xb8, 0x70, 0x7d, 0xce, + 0x75, 0x1f, 0x98, 0x54, 0xf1, 0x88, 0x93, 0xdf }, + { 0x30, 0x02, 0x6c, 0x32, 0x96, 0x66, 0x14, 0x17, // 256-bit key + 0x21, 0x17, 0x8b, 0x99, 0xc0, 0xa1, 0xf1, 0xb2, + 0xf0, 0x69, 0x40, 0x25, 0x3f, 0x7b, 0x30, 0x89, + 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x0e, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0xc8, 0x8f, + 0x59, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0xd7, 0xee, 0x41, 0xd7, + 0x13, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x72, 0x61, 0xe3, 0x48, 0xf1 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#define ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL \ + { \ + if( verbose ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ + goto exit; \ + } else { \ + if( verbose ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); \ + } + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i; + uint8_t blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + int ret = 1; + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) + size_t j; +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) + uint8_t buf[48], iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; +#endif + + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * Test set 1 + */ + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + /* test ECB encryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-ECB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_pt, blk ); + if( memcmp( blk, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) != 0 ) + ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL; + + /* test ECB decryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-ECB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], blk ); + if( memcmp( blk, aria_test1_ecb_pt, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) != 0 ) + ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL; + } + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + /* + * Test set 2 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + /* Test CBC encryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CBC-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + memset( buf, 0x55, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, 48, iv, + aria_test2_pt, buf ); + if( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_cbc_ct[i], 48 ) != 0 ) + ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL; + + /* Test CBC decryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CBC-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, 48, iv, + aria_test2_cbc_ct[i], buf ); + if( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_pt, 48 ) != 0 ) + ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL; + } + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + /* Test CFB encryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CFB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + memset( buf, 0x55, sizeof( buf ) ); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, 48, &j, iv, + aria_test2_pt, buf ); + if( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_cfb_ct[i], 48 ) != 0 ) + ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL; + + /* Test CFB decryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CFB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) ); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, 48, &j, + iv, aria_test2_cfb_ct[i], buf ); + if( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_pt, 48 ) != 0 ) + ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL; + } + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + /* Test CTR encryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CTR-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memset( iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); // IV = 0 + memset( buf, 0x55, sizeof( buf ) ); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, 48, &j, iv, blk, + aria_test2_pt, buf ); + if( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_ctr_ct[i], 48 ) != 0 ) + ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL; + + /* Test CTR decryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CTR-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memset( iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); // IV = 0 + memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) ); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, 48, &j, iv, blk, + aria_test2_ctr_ct[i], buf ); + if( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_pt, 48 ) != 0 ) + ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL; + } + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..22747d3b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +/* + * Generic ASN.1 parsing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +/* + * ASN.1 DER decoding routines + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_len( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ) +{ + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + if( ( **p & 0x80 ) == 0 ) + *len = *(*p)++; + else + { + switch( **p & 0x7F ) + { + case 1: + if( ( end - *p ) < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + *len = (*p)[1]; + (*p) += 2; + break; + + case 2: + if( ( end - *p ) < 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + *len = ( (size_t)(*p)[1] << 8 ) | (*p)[2]; + (*p) += 3; + break; + + case 3: + if( ( end - *p ) < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + *len = ( (size_t)(*p)[1] << 16 ) | + ( (size_t)(*p)[2] << 8 ) | (*p)[3]; + (*p) += 4; + break; + + case 4: + if( ( end - *p ) < 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + *len = ( (size_t)(*p)[1] << 24 ) | ( (size_t)(*p)[2] << 16 ) | + ( (size_t)(*p)[3] << 8 ) | (*p)[4]; + (*p) += 5; + break; + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + } + } + + if( *len > (size_t) ( end - *p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len, int tag ) +{ + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + if( **p != tag ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + + (*p)++; + + return( mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, len ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( len != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + + *val = ( **p != 0 ) ? 1 : 0; + (*p)++; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int asn1_get_tagged_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int tag, int *val ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, tag ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * len==0 is malformed (0 must be represented as 020100 for INTEGER, + * or 0A0100 for ENUMERATED tags + */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + /* This is a cryptography library. Reject negative integers. */ + if( ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + + /* Skip leading zeros. */ + while( len > 0 && **p == 0 ) + { + ++( *p ); + --len; + } + + /* Reject integers that don't fit in an int. This code assumes that + * the int type has no padding bit. */ + if( len > sizeof( int ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + if( len == sizeof( int ) && ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + + *val = 0; + while( len-- > 0 ) + { + *val = ( *val << 8 ) | **p; + (*p)++; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + return( asn1_get_tagged_int( p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER, val) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + return( asn1_get_tagged_int( p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED, val) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, *p, len ); + + *p += len; + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Certificate type is a single byte bitstring */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &bs->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Check length, subtract one for actual bit string length */ + if( bs->len < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + bs->len -= 1; + + /* Get number of unused bits, ensure unused bits <= 7 */ + bs->unused_bits = **p; + if( bs->unused_bits > 7 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + (*p)++; + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + bs->p = *p; + *p += bs->len; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Traverse an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF " + * and call a callback for each entry found. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val, + unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val, + int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ), + void *ctx ) +{ + int ret; + size_t len; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + unsigned char const tag = *(*p)++; + + if( ( tag & tag_must_mask ) != tag_must_val ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( tag & tag_may_mask ) == tag_may_val ) + { + if( cb != NULL ) + { + ret = cb( ctx, tag, *p, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } + + *p += len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Get a bit string without unused bits + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( *len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + --( *len ); + + if( **p != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + ++( *p ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free( mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq ) +{ + while( seq != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next = seq->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq, sizeof( *seq ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq ); + seq = next; + } +} + +typedef struct +{ + int tag; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur; +} asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t; + +static int asn1_get_sequence_of_cb( void *ctx, + int tag, + unsigned char *start, + size_t len ) +{ + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *cb_ctx = + (asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *) ctx; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = + cb_ctx->cur; + + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + cur->next = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + cur->buf.p = start; + cur->buf.len = len; + cur->buf.tag = tag; + + cb_ctx->cur = cur; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF " + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, + int tag) +{ + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t cb_ctx = { tag, cur }; + memset( cur, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + return( mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + p, end, 0xFF, tag, 0, 0, + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb, &cb_ctx ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + alg->tag = **p; + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &alg->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + alg->p = *p; + *p += alg->len; + + if( *p == end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( params, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + params->tag = **p; + (*p)++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, ¶ms->len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + params->p = *p; + *p += params->len; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + + memset( ¶ms, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, alg, ¶ms ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && params.tag != 0 ) || params.len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur ) +{ + if( cur == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_free( cur->oid.p ); + mbedtls_free( cur->val.p ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cur, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_named_data ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + + while( ( cur = *head ) != NULL ) + { + *head = cur->next; + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( cur ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + } +} + +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len ) +{ + while( list != NULL ) + { + if( list->oid.len == len && + memcmp( list->oid.p, oid, len ) == 0 ) + { + break; + } + + list = list->next; + } + + return( list ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..afa26a6b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c @@ -0,0 +1,485 @@ +/* + * ASN.1 buffer writing functionality + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +{ + if( len < 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = (unsigned char) len; + return( 1 ); + } + + if( len <= 0xFF ) + { + if( *p - start < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = (unsigned char) len; + *--(*p) = 0x81; + return( 2 ); + } + + if( len <= 0xFFFF ) + { + if( *p - start < 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ); + *--(*p) = 0x82; + return( 3 ); + } + + if( len <= 0xFFFFFF ) + { + if( *p - start < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( len ); + *--(*p) = 0x83; + return( 4 ); + } + +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + if( len <= 0xFFFFFFFF ) +#endif + { + if( *p - start < 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( len ); + *--(*p) = 0x84; + return( 5 ); + } + +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag ) +{ + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = tag; + + return( 1 ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + size_t len = 0; + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = size; + (*p) -= len; + memcpy( *p, buf, len ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + // Write the MPI + // + len = mbedtls_mpi_size( X ); + + /* DER represents 0 with a sign bit (0=nonnegative) and 7 value bits, not + * as 0 digits. We need to end up with 020100, not with 0200. */ + if( len == 0 ) + len = 1; + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + (*p) -= len; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( X, *p, len ) ); + + // DER format assumes 2s complement for numbers, so the leftmost bit + // should be 0 for positive numbers and 1 for negative numbers. + // + if( X->s ==1 && **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + + ret = (int) len; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + // Write NULL + // + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, 0) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, + (const unsigned char *) oid, oid_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len , mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len , mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + size_t par_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( par_len == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_null( p, start ) ); + else + len += par_len; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, oid_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = (boolean) ? 255 : 0; + len++; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +static int asn1_write_tagged_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val, int tag ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + do + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + len += 1; + *--(*p) = val & 0xff; + val >>= 8; + } + while( val > 0 ); + + if( **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, tag ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ) +{ + return( asn1_write_tagged_int( p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ) +{ + return( asn1_write_tagged_int( p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int tag, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, + (const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, tag ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING, text, text_len) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING, text, text_len) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t bits ) +{ + size_t unused_bits, byte_len; + const unsigned char *cur_byte; + unsigned char cur_byte_shifted; + unsigned char bit; + + byte_len = ( bits + 7 ) / 8; + unused_bits = ( byte_len * 8 ) - bits; + + /* + * Named bitstrings require that trailing 0s are excluded in the encoding + * of the bitstring. Trailing 0s are considered part of the 'unused' bits + * when encoding this value in the first content octet + */ + if( bits != 0 ) + { + cur_byte = buf + byte_len - 1; + cur_byte_shifted = *cur_byte >> unused_bits; + + for( ; ; ) + { + bit = cur_byte_shifted & 0x1; + cur_byte_shifted >>= 1; + + if( bit != 0 ) + break; + + bits--; + if( bits == 0 ) + break; + + if( bits % 8 == 0 ) + cur_byte_shifted = *--cur_byte; + } + } + + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( p, start, buf, bits ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + size_t unused_bits, byte_len; + + byte_len = ( bits + 7 ) / 8; + unused_bits = ( byte_len * 8 ) - bits; + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < byte_len + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = byte_len + 1; + + /* Write the bitstring. Ensure the unused bits are zeroed */ + if( byte_len > 0 ) + { + byte_len--; + *--( *p ) = buf[byte_len] & ~( ( 0x1 << unused_bits ) - 1 ); + ( *p ) -= byte_len; + memcpy( *p, buf, byte_len ); + } + + /* Write unused bits */ + *--( *p ) = (unsigned char)unused_bits; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, buf, size ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + + +/* This is a copy of the ASN.1 parsing function mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(), + * which is replicated to avoid a dependency ASN1_WRITE_C on ASN1_PARSE_C. */ +static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data( + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len ) +{ + while( list != NULL ) + { + if( list->oid.len == len && + memcmp( list->oid.p, oid, len ) == 0 ) + { + break; + } + + list = list->next; + } + + return( list ); +} + +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( + mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + + if( ( cur = asn1_find_named_data( *head, oid, oid_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + // Add new entry if not present yet based on OID + // + cur = (mbedtls_asn1_named_data*)mbedtls_calloc( 1, + sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_named_data) ); + if( cur == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + cur->oid.len = oid_len; + cur->oid.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, oid_len ); + if( cur->oid.p == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur ); + return( NULL ); + } + + memcpy( cur->oid.p, oid, oid_len ); + + cur->val.len = val_len; + if( val_len != 0 ) + { + cur->val.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, val_len ); + if( cur->val.p == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->oid.p ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + return( NULL ); + } + } + + cur->next = *head; + *head = cur; + } + else if( val_len == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->val.p ); + cur->val.p = NULL; + } + else if( cur->val.len != val_len ) + { + /* + * Enlarge existing value buffer if needed + * Preserve old data until the allocation succeeded, to leave list in + * a consistent state in case allocation fails. + */ + void *p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, val_len ); + if( p == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_free( cur->val.p ); + cur->val.p = p; + cur->val.len = val_len; + } + + if( val != NULL && val_len != 0 ) + memcpy( cur->val.p, val, val_len ); + + return( cur ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/base64.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/base64.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..83daa0bc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/base64.c @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +/* + * RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ + +/* + * Encode a buffer into base64 format + */ +int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ) +{ + size_t i, n; + int C1, C2, C3; + unsigned char *p; + + if( slen == 0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + n = slen / 3 + ( slen % 3 != 0 ); + + if( n > ( BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX - 1 ) / 4 ) + { + *olen = BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + n *= 4; + + if( ( dlen < n + 1 ) || ( NULL == dst ) ) + { + *olen = n + 1; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + n = ( slen / 3 ) * 3; + + for( i = 0, p = dst; i < n; i += 3 ) + { + C1 = *src++; + C2 = *src++; + C3 = *src++; + + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) + & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) ) + & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( C3 & 0x3F ); + } + + if( i < slen ) + { + C1 = *src++; + C2 = ( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) ? *src++ : 0; + + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) + & 0x3F ); + + if( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F ); + else *p++ = '='; + + *p++ = '='; + } + + *olen = p - dst; + *p = 0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Decode a base64-formatted buffer + */ +int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ) +{ + size_t i; /* index in source */ + size_t n; /* number of digits or trailing = in source */ + uint32_t x; /* value accumulator */ + unsigned accumulated_digits = 0; + unsigned equals = 0; + int spaces_present = 0; + unsigned char *p; + + /* First pass: check for validity and get output length */ + for( i = n = 0; i < slen; i++ ) + { + /* Skip spaces before checking for EOL */ + spaces_present = 0; + while( i < slen && src[i] == ' ' ) + { + ++i; + spaces_present = 1; + } + + /* Spaces at end of buffer are OK */ + if( i == slen ) + break; + + if( ( slen - i ) >= 2 && + src[i] == '\r' && src[i + 1] == '\n' ) + continue; + + if( src[i] == '\n' ) + continue; + + /* Space inside a line is an error */ + if( spaces_present ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + + if( src[i] > 127 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + + if( src[i] == '=' ) + { + if( ++equals > 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + } + else + { + if( equals != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + if( mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( src[i] ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + } + n++; + } + + if( n == 0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + /* The following expression is to calculate the following formula without + * risk of integer overflow in n: + * n = ( ( n * 6 ) + 7 ) >> 3; + */ + n = ( 6 * ( n >> 3 ) ) + ( ( 6 * ( n & 0x7 ) + 7 ) >> 3 ); + n -= equals; + + if( dst == NULL || dlen < n ) + { + *olen = n; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + equals = 0; + for( x = 0, p = dst; i > 0; i--, src++ ) + { + if( *src == '\r' || *src == '\n' || *src == ' ' ) + continue; + + x = x << 6; + if( *src == '=' ) + ++equals; + else + x |= mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( *src ); + + if( ++accumulated_digits == 4 ) + { + accumulated_digits = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x ); + if( equals <= 1 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x ); + if( equals <= 0 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + } + } + + *olen = p - dst; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char base64_test_dec[64] = +{ + 0x24, 0x48, 0x6E, 0x56, 0x87, 0x62, 0x5A, 0xBD, + 0xBF, 0x17, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0xC4, 0x17, 0x1A, 0x01, + 0x94, 0xED, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0x11, 0xB3, 0xD7, 0x09, + 0x0C, 0xB6, 0xE9, 0x10, 0x6F, 0x22, 0xEE, 0x13, + 0xCA, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x05, 0x76, 0xC9, 0xFA, 0x31, + 0x6C, 0x08, 0x34, 0xFF, 0x8D, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x38, + 0x00, 0x43, 0xE9, 0x54, 0x97, 0xAF, 0x50, 0x4B, + 0xD1, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x95, 0x31, 0x5A, 0x0B, 0x97 +}; + +static const unsigned char base64_test_enc[] = + "JEhuVodiWr2/F9mixBcaAZTtjx4Rs9cJDLbpEG8i7hPK" + "swcFdsn6MWwINP+Nwmw4AEPpVJevUEvRQbqVMVoLlw=="; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_base64_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + size_t len; + const unsigned char *src; + unsigned char buffer[128]; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " Base64 encoding test: " ); + + src = base64_test_dec; + + if( mbedtls_base64_encode( buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &len, src, 64 ) != 0 || + memcmp( base64_test_enc, buffer, 88 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n Base64 decoding test: " ); + + src = base64_test_enc; + + if( mbedtls_base64_decode( buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &len, src, 88 ) != 0 || + memcmp( base64_test_dec, buffer, 64 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/bignum.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/bignum.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32578e2c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/bignum.c @@ -0,0 +1,3093 @@ +/* + * Multi-precision integer library + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this Multi-precision + * Integer library: + * + * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + * [2] Multi-Precision Math + * Tom St Denis + * https://github.com/libtom/libtommath/blob/develop/tommath.pdf + * + * [3] GNU Multi-Precision Arithmetic Library + * https://gmplib.org/manual/index.html + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define MPI_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ +#define biH (ciL << 2) /* half limb size */ + +#define MPI_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ + +/* + * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs + * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows + */ +#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ( (i) / biL + ( (i) % biL != 0 ) ) +#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ( (i) / ciL + ( (i) % ciL != 0 ) ) + +/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ +static void mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( mbedtls_mpi_uint *v, size_t n ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( v, ciL * n ); +} + +/* + * Initialize one MPI + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_init( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); + + X->s = 1; + X->n = 0; + X->p = NULL; +} + +/* + * Unallocate one MPI + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_free( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + if( X == NULL ) + return; + + if( X->p != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); + mbedtls_free( X->p ); + } + + X->s = 1; + X->n = 0; + X->p = NULL; +} + +/* + * Enlarge to the specified number of limbs + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_grow( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( X->n < nblimbs ) + { + if( ( p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint*)mbedtls_calloc( nblimbs, ciL ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( X->p != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, X->p, X->n * ciL ); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); + mbedtls_free( X->p ); + } + + X->n = nblimbs; + X->p = p; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Resize down as much as possible, + * while keeping at least the specified number of limbs + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t i; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + /* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */ + if( X->n <= nblimbs ) + return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, nblimbs ) ); + /* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */ + + for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i] != 0 ) + break; + i++; + + if( i < nblimbs ) + i = nblimbs; + + if( ( p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint*)mbedtls_calloc( i, ciL ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( X->p != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, X->p, i * ciL ); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); + mbedtls_free( X->p ); + } + + X->n = i; + X->p = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Resize X to have exactly n limbs and set it to 0. */ +static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs ) +{ + if( limbs == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + else if( X->n == limbs ) + { + memset( X->p, 0, limbs * ciL ); + X->s = 1; + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) ); + } +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of Y into X. + * + * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed. + * + * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API, + * but some code in the bignum module relies on this property, for example + * in mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + if( X == Y ) + return( 0 ); + + if( Y->n == 0 ) + { + if( X->n != 0 ) + { + X->s = 1; + memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); + } + return( 0 ); + } + + for( i = Y->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + if( Y->p[i] != 0 ) + break; + i++; + + X->s = Y->s; + + if( X->n < i ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i ) ); + } + else + { + memset( X->p + i, 0, ( X->n - i ) * ciL ); + } + + memcpy( X->p, Y->p, i * ciL ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Swap the contents of X and Y + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE( Y != NULL ); + + memcpy( &T, X, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + memcpy( X, Y, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + memcpy( Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); +} + +/* + * Set value from integer + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, 1 ) ); + memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); + + X->p[0] = ( z < 0 ) ? -z : z; + X->s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Get a specific bit + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( X->n * biL <= pos ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ( X->p[pos / biL] >> ( pos % biL ) ) & 0x01 ); +} + +/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ +#define GET_BYTE( X, i ) \ + ( ( ( X )->p[( i ) / ciL] >> ( ( ( i ) % ciL ) * 8 ) ) & 0xff ) + +/* + * Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1 + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t off = pos / biL; + size_t idx = pos % biL; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( val != 0 && val != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( X->n * biL <= pos ) + { + if( val == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, off + 1 ) ); + } + + X->p[off] &= ~( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0x01 << idx ); + X->p[off] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) val << idx; + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Return the number of less significant zero-bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + size_t i, j, count = 0; + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL, 0 ); + + for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) + for( j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++ ) + if( ( ( X->p[i] >> j ) & 1 ) != 0 ) + return( count ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Count leading zero bits in a given integer + */ +static size_t mbedtls_clz( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ + size_t j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1); + + for( j = 0; j < biL; j++ ) + { + if( x & mask ) break; + + mask >>= 1; + } + + return j; +} + +/* + * Return the number of bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + size_t i, j; + + if( X->n == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i] != 0 ) + break; + + j = biL - mbedtls_clz( X->p[i] ); + + return( ( i * biL ) + j ); +} + +/* + * Return the total size in bytes + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_size( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + return( ( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) + 7 ) >> 3 ); +} + +/* + * Convert an ASCII character to digit value + */ +static int mpi_get_digit( mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, int radix, char c ) +{ + *d = 255; + + if( c >= 0x30 && c <= 0x39 ) *d = c - 0x30; + if( c >= 0x41 && c <= 0x46 ) *d = c - 0x37; + if( c >= 0x61 && c <= 0x66 ) *d = c - 0x57; + + if( *d >= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) radix ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Import from an ASCII string + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j, slen, n; + int sign = 1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint d; + mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + if( s[0] == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( s[0] == '-' ) + { + ++s; + sign = -1; + } + + slen = strlen( s ); + + if( radix == 16 ) + { + if( slen > MPI_SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( slen << 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + + for( i = slen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i - 1] ) ); + X->p[j / ( 2 * ciL )] |= d << ( ( j % ( 2 * ciL ) ) << 2 ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < slen; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T, X, radix ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, &T, d ) ); + } + } + + if( sign < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) != 0 ) + X->s = -1; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Helper to write the digits high-order first. + */ +static int mpi_write_hlp( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char **p, const size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + size_t length = 0; + char *p_end = *p + buflen; + + do + { + if( length >= buflen ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, radix ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( X, NULL, X, radix ) ); + /* + * Write the residue in the current position, as an ASCII character. + */ + if( r < 0xA ) + *(--p_end) = (char)( '0' + r ); + else + *(--p_end) = (char)( 'A' + ( r - 0xA ) ); + + length++; + } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) != 0 ); + + memmove( *p, p_end, length ); + *p += length; + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export into an ASCII string + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t n; + char *p; + mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + n = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); /* Number of bits necessary to present `n`. */ + if( radix >= 4 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of 4-adic digits necessary to present + * `n`. If radix > 4, this might be a strict + * overapproximation of the number of + * radix-adic digits needed to present `n`. */ + if( radix >= 16 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of hexadecimal digits necessary to + * present `n`. */ + + n += 1; /* Terminating null byte */ + n += 1; /* Compensate for the divisions above, which round down `n` + * in case it's not even. */ + n += 1; /* Potential '-'-sign. */ + n += ( n & 1 ); /* Make n even to have enough space for hexadecimal writing, + * which always uses an even number of hex-digits. */ + + if( buflen < n ) + { + *olen = n; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + p = buf; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + if( X->s == -1 ) + { + *p++ = '-'; + buflen--; + } + + if( radix == 16 ) + { + int c; + size_t i, j, k; + + for( i = X->n, k = 0; i > 0; i-- ) + { + for( j = ciL; j > 0; j-- ) + { + c = ( X->p[i - 1] >> ( ( j - 1 ) << 3) ) & 0xFF; + + if( c == 0 && k == 0 && ( i + j ) != 2 ) + continue; + + *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c / 16]; + *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c % 16]; + k = 1; + } + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T, X ) ); + + if( T.s == -1 ) + T.s = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( &T, radix, &p, buflen ) ); + } + + *p++ = '\0'; + *olen = p - buf; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Read X from an opened file + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint d; + size_t slen; + char *p; + /* + * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, + * newline characters and '\0' + */ + char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( fin != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); + if( fgets( s, sizeof( s ) - 1, fin ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + slen = strlen( s ); + if( slen == sizeof( s ) - 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\n' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } + if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\r' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } + + p = s + slen; + while( p-- > s ) + if( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, *p ) != 0 ) + break; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( X, radix, p + 1 ) ); +} + +/* + * Write X into an opened file (or stdout if fout == NULL) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n, slen, plen; + /* + * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, + * newline characters and '\0' + */ + char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_string( X, radix, s, sizeof( s ) - 2, &n ) ); + + if( p == NULL ) p = ""; + + plen = strlen( p ); + slen = strlen( s ); + s[slen++] = '\r'; + s[slen++] = '\n'; + + if( fout != NULL ) + { + if( fwrite( p, 1, plen, fout ) != plen || + fwrite( s, 1, slen, fout ) != slen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + else + mbedtls_printf( "%s%s", p, s ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + +/* Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint + * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. */ + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ + uint8_t i; + unsigned char *x_ptr; + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = 0; + + for( i = 0, x_ptr = (unsigned char*) &x; i < ciL; i++, x_ptr++ ) + { + tmp <<= CHAR_BIT; + tmp |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) *x_ptr; + } + + return( tmp ); +} + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ +#if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) + +/* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ +#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ ) + return( x ); +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ */ + +#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ ) + +/* For GCC and Clang, have builtins for byte swapping. */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) +#define have_bswap +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && \ + __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) +#define have_bswap +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(have_bswap) + /* The compiler is hopefully able to statically evaluate this! */ + switch( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) ) + { + case 4: + return( __builtin_bswap32(x) ); + case 8: + return( __builtin_bswap64(x) ); + } +#endif +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ */ +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ */ + + /* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order + * or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */ + return( mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( x ) ); +} + +static void mpi_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint * const p, size_t limbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; + if( limbs == 0 ) + return; + + /* + * Traverse limbs and + * - adapt byte-order in each limb + * - swap the limbs themselves. + * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right + * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger + * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the + * indices coincide in the last iteration). + */ + for( cur_limb_left = p, cur_limb_right = p + ( limbs - 1 ); + cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; + cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right-- ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, + * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ + tmp = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_left ); + *cur_limb_left = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_right ); + *cur_limb_right = tmp; + } +} + +/* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < buflen; i++ ) + X->p[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i]) << ((i % ciL) << 3); + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - buflen; + unsigned char *Xp; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + + /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source or destination argument, + * even if buflen is 0. */ + if( buflen != 0 ) + { + Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p; + memcpy( Xp + overhead, buf, buflen ); + + mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); + } + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + size_t i; + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + } + else + { + bytes_to_copy = buflen; + + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) + { + if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) + buf[i] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ + memset( buf + stored_bytes, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t stored_bytes; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + unsigned char *p; + size_t i; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial + * null bytes and record the position at which to start + * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution + * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the + * number. */ + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + p = buf + buflen - stored_bytes; + memset( buf, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); + } + else + { + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + bytes_to_copy = buflen; + p = buf; + for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) + { + if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) + p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Left-shift: X <<= count + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, v0, t1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + v0 = count / (biL ); + t1 = count & (biL - 1); + + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) + count; + + if( X->n * biL < i ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, BITS_TO_LIMBS( i ) ) ); + + ret = 0; + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if( v0 > 0 ) + { + for( i = X->n; i > v0; i-- ) + X->p[i - 1] = X->p[i - v0 - 1]; + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + X->p[i - 1] = 0; + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if( t1 > 0 ) + { + for( i = v0; i < X->n; i++ ) + { + r1 = X->p[i] >> (biL - t1); + X->p[i] <<= t1; + X->p[i] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Right-shift: X >>= count + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) +{ + size_t i, v0, v1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + v0 = count / biL; + v1 = count & (biL - 1); + + if( v0 > X->n || ( v0 == X->n && v1 > 0 ) ) + return mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ); + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if( v0 > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < X->n - v0; i++ ) + X->p[i] = X->p[i + v0]; + + for( ; i < X->n; i++ ) + X->p[i] = 0; + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if( v1 > 0 ) + { + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + { + r1 = X->p[i - 1] << (biL - v1); + X->p[i - 1] >>= v1; + X->p[i - 1] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare unsigned values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + size_t i, j; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + for( j = Y->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( Y->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( i == 0 && j == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( i > j ) return( 1 ); + if( j > i ) return( -1 ); + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + if( X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1] ) return( 1 ); + if( X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] ) return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare signed values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + size_t i, j; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + for( j = Y->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( Y->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( i == 0 && j == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( i > j ) return( X->s ); + if( j > i ) return( -Y->s ); + + if( X->s > 0 && Y->s < 0 ) return( 1 ); + if( Y->s > 0 && X->s < 0 ) return( -1 ); + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + if( X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1] ) return( X->s ); + if( X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] ) return( -X->s ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare signed values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi Y; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + *p = ( z < 0 ) ? -z : z; + Y.s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + Y.n = 1; + Y.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( X, &Y ) ); +} + +/* + * Unsigned addition: X = |A| + |B| (HAC 14.7) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *o, *p, c, tmp; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + if( X == B ) + { + const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T; + } + + if( X != A ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); + + /* + * X should always be positive as a result of unsigned additions. + */ + X->s = 1; + + for( j = B->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) ); + + o = B->p; p = X->p; c = 0; + + /* + * tmp is used because it might happen that p == o + */ + for( i = 0; i < j; i++, o++, p++ ) + { + tmp= *o; + *p += c; c = ( *p < c ); + *p += tmp; c += ( *p < tmp ); + } + + while( c != 0 ) + { + if( i >= X->n ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i + 1 ) ); + p = X->p + i; + } + + *p += c; c = ( *p < c ); i++; p++; + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/** + * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction. + * + * Calculate l - r where l and r have the same size. + * This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `l < r`, and 0 otherwise). + * + * d may be aliased to l or r. + * + * \param n Number of limbs of \p d, \p l and \p r. + * \param[out] d The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] l The left operand. + * \param[in] r The right operand. + * + * \return 1 if `l < r`. + * 0 if `l >= r`. + */ +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *l, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t, z; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + z = ( l[i] < c ); t = l[i] - c; + c = ( t < r[i] ) + z; d[i] = t - r[i]; + } + + return( c ); +} + +/* + * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + for( n = B->n; n > 0; n-- ) + if( B->p[n - 1] != 0 ) + break; + if( n > A->n ) + { + /* B >= (2^ciL)^n > A */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, A->n ) ); + + /* Set the high limbs of X to match A. Don't touch the lower limbs + * because X might be aliased to B, and we must not overwrite the + * significant digits of B. */ + if( A->n > n ) + memcpy( X->p + n, A->p + n, ( A->n - n ) * ciL ); + if( X->n > A->n ) + memset( X->p + A->n, 0, ( X->n - A->n ) * ciL ); + + carry = mpi_sub_hlp( n, X->p, A->p, B->p ); + if( carry != 0 ) + { + /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */ + for( ; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++ ) + --X->p[n]; + /* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result + * is negative. */ + if( n == X->n ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } + --X->p[n]; + } + + /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */ + X->s = 1; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Signed addition: X = A + B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret, s; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + s = A->s; + if( A->s * B->s < 0 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, A, B ) ); + X->s = s; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, B, A ) ); + X->s = -s; + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( X, A, B ) ); + X->s = s; + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Signed subtraction: X = A - B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret, s; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + s = A->s; + if( A->s * B->s > 0 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, A, B ) ); + X->s = s; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, B, A ) ); + X->s = -s; + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( X, A, B ) ); + X->s = s; + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Signed addition: X = A + b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; + B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); +} + +/* + * Signed subtraction: X = A - b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; + B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); +} + +/** Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication. + * + * Add \p b * \p s to \p d. + * + * \param i The number of limbs of \p s. + * \param[in] s A bignum to multiply, of size \p i. + * It may overlap with \p d, but only if + * \p d <= \p s. + * Its leading limb must not be \c 0. + * \param[in,out] d The bignum to add to. + * It must be sufficiently large to store the + * result of the multiplication. This means + * \p i + 1 limbs if \p d[\p i - 1] started as 0 and \p b + * is not known a priori. + * \param b A scalar to multiply. + */ +static +#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__arm__) +/* + * Apple LLVM version 4.2 (clang-425.0.24) (based on LLVM 3.2svn) + * appears to need this to prevent bad ARM code generation at -O3. + */ +__attribute__ ((noinline)) +#endif +void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t = 0; + +#if defined(MULADDC_HUIT) + for( ; i >= 8; i -= 8 ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_HUIT + MULADDC_STOP + } + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } +#else /* MULADDC_HUIT */ + for( ; i >= 16; i -= 16 ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } + + for( ; i >= 8; i -= 8 ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } +#endif /* MULADDC_HUIT */ + + t++; + + while( c != 0 ) + { + *d += c; c = ( *d < c ); d++; + } +} + +/* + * Baseline multiplication: X = A * B (HAC 14.12) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; + int result_is_zero = 0; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); + + if( X == A ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); A = &TA; } + if( X == B ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); B = &TB; } + + for( i = A->n; i > 0; i-- ) + if( A->p[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + if( i == 0 ) + result_is_zero = 1; + + for( j = B->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + if( j == 0 ) + result_is_zero = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i + j ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + + for( ; j > 0; j-- ) + mpi_mul_hlp( i, A->p, X->p + j - 1, B->p[j - 1] ); + + /* If the result is 0, we don't shortcut the operation, which reduces + * but does not eliminate side channels leaking the zero-ness. We do + * need to take care to set the sign bit properly since the library does + * not fully support an MPI object with a value of 0 and s == -1. */ + if( result_is_zero ) + X->s = 1; + else + X->s = A->s * B->s; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Baseline multiplication: X = A * b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + /* mpi_mul_hlp can't deal with a leading 0. */ + size_t n = A->n; + while( n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0 ) + --n; + + /* The general method below doesn't work if n==0 or b==0. By chance + * calculating the result is trivial in those cases. */ + if( b == 0 || n == 0 ) + { + return( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + } + + /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mpi_mul_hlp */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If + * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same + * number of limbs as A and the call to grow() is not required since + * copy() will take care of the growth if needed. However, experimentally, + * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer + * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the + * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly + * grow to its final size. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); + mpi_mul_hlp( n, A->p, X->p, b - 1 ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Unsigned integer divide - double mbedtls_mpi_uint dividend, u1/u0, and + * mbedtls_mpi_uint divisor, d + */ +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint u1, + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, mbedtls_mpi_uint d, mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + mbedtls_t_udbl dividend, quotient; +#else + const mbedtls_mpi_uint radix = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint uint_halfword_mask = ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH ) - 1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint d0, d1, q0, q1, rAX, r0, quotient; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0_msw, u0_lsw; + size_t s; +#endif + + /* + * Check for overflow + */ + if( 0 == d || u1 >= d ) + { + if (r != NULL) *r = ~0; + + return ( ~0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + dividend = (mbedtls_t_udbl) u1 << biL; + dividend |= (mbedtls_t_udbl) u0; + quotient = dividend / d; + if( quotient > ( (mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL ) - 1 ) + quotient = ( (mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL ) - 1; + + if( r != NULL ) + *r = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( dividend - (quotient * d ) ); + + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) quotient; +#else + + /* + * Algorithm D, Section 4.3.1 - The Art of Computer Programming + * Vol. 2 - Seminumerical Algorithms, Knuth + */ + + /* + * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1 + */ + s = mbedtls_clz( d ); + d = d << s; + + u1 = u1 << s; + u1 |= ( u0 >> ( biL - s ) ) & ( -(mbedtls_mpi_sint)s >> ( biL - 1 ) ); + u0 = u0 << s; + + d1 = d >> biH; + d0 = d & uint_halfword_mask; + + u0_msw = u0 >> biH; + u0_lsw = u0 & uint_halfword_mask; + + /* + * Find the first quotient and remainder + */ + q1 = u1 / d1; + r0 = u1 - d1 * q1; + + while( q1 >= radix || ( q1 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_msw ) ) + { + q1 -= 1; + r0 += d1; + + if ( r0 >= radix ) break; + } + + rAX = ( u1 * radix ) + ( u0_msw - q1 * d ); + q0 = rAX / d1; + r0 = rAX - q0 * d1; + + while( q0 >= radix || ( q0 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_lsw ) ) + { + q0 -= 1; + r0 += d1; + + if ( r0 >= radix ) break; + } + + if (r != NULL) + *r = ( rAX * radix + u0_lsw - q0 * d ) >> s; + + quotient = q1 * radix + q0; + + return quotient; +#endif +} + +/* + * Division by mbedtls_mpi: A = Q * B + R (HAC 14.20) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n, t, k; + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; + mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); + /* + * Avoid dynamic memory allocations for constant-size T2. + * + * T2 is used for comparison only and the 3 limbs are assigned explicitly, + * so nobody increase the size of the MPI and we're safe to use an on-stack + * buffer. + */ + T2.s = 1; + T2.n = sizeof( TP2 ) / sizeof( *TP2 ); + T2.p = TP2; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) < 0 ) + { + if( Q != NULL ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( Q, 0 ) ); + if( R != NULL ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( R, A ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &X, A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Y, B ) ); + X.s = Y.s = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &Z, A->n + 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Z, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T1, A->n + 2 ) ); + + k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &Y ) % biL; + if( k < biL - 1 ) + { + k = biL - 1 - k; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &X, k ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &Y, k ) ); + } + else k = 0; + + n = X.n - 1; + t = Y.n - 1; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &Y, biL * ( n - t ) ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &Y ) >= 0 ) + { + Z.p[n - t]++; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &Y ) ); + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Y, biL * ( n - t ) ) ); + + for( i = n; i > t ; i-- ) + { + if( X.p[i] >= Y.p[t] ) + Z.p[i - t - 1] = ~0; + else + { + Z.p[i - t - 1] = mbedtls_int_div_int( X.p[i], X.p[i - 1], + Y.p[t], NULL); + } + + T2.p[0] = ( i < 2 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2]; + T2.p[1] = ( i < 1 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1]; + T2.p[2] = X.p[i]; + + Z.p[i - t - 1]++; + do + { + Z.p[i - t - 1]--; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &T1, 0 ) ); + T1.p[0] = ( t < 1 ) ? 0 : Y.p[t - 1]; + T1.p[1] = Y.p[t]; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &T1, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T1, &T2 ) > 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &Y, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T1, biL * ( i - t - 1 ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 0 ) < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T1, &Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T1, biL * ( i - t - 1 ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + Z.p[i - t - 1]--; + } + } + + if( Q != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &Z ) ); + Q->s = A->s * B->s; + } + + if( R != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &X, k ) ); + X.s = A->s; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( R, &X ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 0 ) == 0 ) + R->s = 1; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( TP2, sizeof( TP2 ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Division by int: A = Q * b + R + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; + B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( Q, R, A, &B ) ); +} + +/* + * Modulo: R = A mod B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( NULL, R, A, B ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 0 ) < 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( R, R, B ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( R, B ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( R, R, B ) ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Modulo: r = A mod b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + if( b == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); + + if( b < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); + + /* + * handle trivial cases + */ + if( b == 1 || A->n == 0 ) + { + *r = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + if( b == 2 ) + { + *r = A->p[0] & 1; + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * general case + */ + for( i = A->n, y = 0; i > 0; i-- ) + { + x = A->p[i - 1]; + y = ( y << biH ) | ( x >> biH ); + z = y / b; + y -= z * b; + + x <<= biH; + y = ( y << biH ) | ( x >> biH ); + z = y / b; + y -= z * b; + } + + /* + * If A is negative, then the current y represents a negative value. + * Flipping it to the positive side. + */ + if( A->s < 0 && y != 0 ) + y = b - y; + + *r = y; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis) + */ +static void mpi_montg_init( mbedtls_mpi_uint *mm, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint x, m0 = N->p[0]; + unsigned int i; + + x = m0; + x += ( ( m0 + 2 ) & 4 ) << 1; + + for( i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2 ) + x *= ( 2 - ( m0 * x ) ); + + *mm = ~x + 1; +} + +/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) + * + * \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must have at least as many limbs as N + * (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored. + * On successful completion, A contains the result of + * the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where + * R = (2^ciL)^n. + * \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N + * (B->n <= N->n). + * \param[in] N The modulo. N must be odd. + * \param mm The value calculated by `mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`. + * This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL. + * \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage. + * It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 2 + * (T->n >= 2 * (N->n + 1)). + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * Note that unlike the usual convention in the library + * for `const mbedtls_mpi*`, the content of T can change. + */ +static void mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi *T ) +{ + size_t i, n, m; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, u1, *d; + + memset( T->p, 0, T->n * ciL ); + + d = T->p; + n = N->n; + m = ( B->n < n ) ? B->n : n; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + /* + * T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL + */ + u0 = A->p[i]; + u1 = ( d[0] + u0 * B->p[0] ) * mm; + + mpi_mul_hlp( m, B->p, d, u0 ); + mpi_mul_hlp( n, N->p, d, u1 ); + + *d++ = u0; d[n + 1] = 0; + } + + /* At this point, d is either the desired result or the desired result + * plus N. We now potentially subtract N, avoiding leaking whether the + * subtraction is performed through side channels. */ + + /* Copy the n least significant limbs of d to A, so that + * A = d if d < N (recall that N has n limbs). */ + memcpy( A->p, d, n * ciL ); + /* If d >= N then we want to set A to d - N. To prevent timing attacks, + * do the calculation without using conditional tests. */ + /* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */ + d[n] += 1; + d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp( n, d, d, N->p ); + /* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is. + * If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction + * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d. + * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */ + mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] ); +} + +/* + * Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N + * + * See mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the parameters. + */ +static void mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1; + mbedtls_mpi U; + + U.n = U.s = (int) z; + U.p = &z; + + mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ); +} + +/** + * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, T[idx]) except it + * reads the entire table in order to avoid leaking the value of idx to an + * attacker able to observe memory access patterns. + * + * \param[out] R Where to write the selected MPI. + * \param[in] T The table to read from. + * \param[in] T_size The number of elements in the table. + * \param[in] idx The index of the element to select; + * this must satisfy 0 <= idx < T_size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +static int mpi_select( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *T, size_t T_size, size_t idx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for( size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( R, &T[i], + (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N (HAC 14.85) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t wbits, wsize, one = 1; + size_t i, j, nblimbs; + size_t bufsize, nbits; + mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state; + mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], WW, Apos; + int neg; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( E != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 || ( N->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Init temps and window size + */ + mpi_montg_init( &mm, N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Apos ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &WW ); + memset( W, 0, sizeof( W ) ); + + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ); + + wsize = ( i > 671 ) ? 6 : ( i > 239 ) ? 5 : + ( i > 79 ) ? 4 : ( i > 23 ) ? 3 : 1; + +#if( MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 ) + if( wsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) + wsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE; +#endif + + j = N->n + 1; + /* All W[i] and X must have at least N->n limbs for the mpi_montmul() + * and mpi_montred() calls later. Here we ensure that W[1] and X are + * large enough, and later we'll grow other W[i] to the same length. + * They must not be shrunk midway through this function! + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], j ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T, j * 2 ) ); + + /* + * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end) + */ + neg = ( A->s == -1 ); + if( neg ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Apos, A ) ); + Apos.s = 1; + A = &Apos; + } + + /* + * If 1st call, pre-compute R^2 mod N + */ + if( prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &RR, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &RR, N->n * 2 * biL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &RR, &RR, N ) ); + + if( prec_RR != NULL ) + memcpy( prec_RR, &RR, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + } + else + memcpy( &RR, prec_RR, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + + /* + * W[1] = A * R^2 * R^-1 mod N = A * R mod N + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( A, N ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &W[1], A, N ) ); + /* This should be a no-op because W[1] is already that large before + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(), but it's necessary to avoid an overflow + * in mpi_montmul() below, so let's make sure. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], N->n + 1 ) ); + } + else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[1], A ) ); + + /* Note that this is safe because W[1] always has at least N->n limbs + * (it grew above and was preserved by mbedtls_mpi_copy()). */ + mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ); + + /* + * X = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &RR ) ); + mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); + + if( wsize > 1 ) + { + /* + * W[1 << (wsize - 1)] = W[1] ^ (wsize - 1) + */ + j = one << ( wsize - 1 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[j], N->n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[j], &W[1] ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < wsize - 1; i++ ) + mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T ); + + /* + * W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1] + */ + for( i = j + 1; i < ( one << wsize ); i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[i], N->n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[i], &W[i - 1] ) ); + + mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T ); + } + } + + nblimbs = E->n; + bufsize = 0; + nbits = 0; + wbits = 0; + state = 0; + + while( 1 ) + { + if( bufsize == 0 ) + { + if( nblimbs == 0 ) + break; + + nblimbs--; + + bufsize = sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) << 3; + } + + bufsize--; + + ei = (E->p[nblimbs] >> bufsize) & 1; + + /* + * skip leading 0s + */ + if( ei == 0 && state == 0 ) + continue; + + if( ei == 0 && state == 1 ) + { + /* + * out of window, square X + */ + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); + continue; + } + + /* + * add ei to current window + */ + state = 2; + + nbits++; + wbits |= ( ei << ( wsize - nbits ) ); + + if( nbits == wsize ) + { + /* + * X = X^wsize R^-1 mod N + */ + for( i = 0; i < wsize; i++ ) + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); + + /* + * X = X * W[wbits] R^-1 mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, (size_t) 1 << wsize, wbits ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, &WW, N, mm, &T ); + + state--; + nbits = 0; + wbits = 0; + } + } + + /* + * process the remaining bits + */ + for( i = 0; i < nbits; i++ ) + { + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); + + wbits <<= 1; + + if( ( wbits & ( one << wsize ) ) != 0 ) + mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T ); + } + + /* + * X = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N + */ + mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); + + if( neg && E->n != 0 && ( E->p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) + { + X->s = -1; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, N, X ) ); + } + +cleanup: + + for( i = ( one << ( wsize - 1 ) ); i < ( one << wsize ); i++ ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[i] ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[1] ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Apos ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &WW ); + + if( prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) (HAC 14.54) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t lz, lzt; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); + + lz = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ); + lzt = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ); + + /* The loop below gives the correct result when A==0 but not when B==0. + * So have a special case for B==0. Leverage the fact that we just + * calculated the lsb and lsb(B)==0 iff B is odd or 0 to make the test + * slightly more efficient than cmp_int(). */ + if( lzt == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &TB, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, A ); + goto cleanup; + } + + if( lzt < lz ) + lz = lzt; + + TA.s = TB.s = 1; + + /* We mostly follow the procedure described in HAC 14.54, but with some + * minor differences: + * - Sequences of multiplications or divisions by 2 are grouped into a + * single shift operation. + * - The procedure in HAC assumes that 0 < TB <= TA. + * - The condition TB <= TA is not actually necessary for correctness. + * TA and TB have symmetric roles except for the loop termination + * condition, and the shifts at the beginning of the loop body + * remove any significance from the ordering of TA vs TB before + * the shifts. + * - If TA = 0, the loop goes through 0 iterations and the result is + * correctly TB. + * - The case TB = 0 was short-circuited above. + * + * For the correctness proof below, decompose the original values of + * A and B as + * A = sa * 2^a * A' with A'=0 or A' odd, and sa = +-1 + * B = sb * 2^b * B' with B'=0 or B' odd, and sb = +-1 + * Then gcd(A, B) = 2^{min(a,b)} * gcd(A',B'), + * and gcd(A',B') is odd or 0. + * + * At the beginning, we have TA = |A| and TB = |B| so gcd(A,B) = gcd(TA,TB). + * The code maintains the following invariant: + * gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k (I) + */ + + /* Proof that the loop terminates: + * At each iteration, either the right-shift by 1 is made on a nonzero + * value and the nonnegative integer bitlen(TA) + bitlen(TB) decreases + * by at least 1, or the right-shift by 1 is made on zero and then + * TA becomes 0 which ends the loop (TB cannot be 0 if it is right-shifted + * since in that case TB is calculated from TB-TA with the condition TB>TA). + */ + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &TA, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + /* Divisions by 2 preserve the invariant (I). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ) ) ); + + /* Set either TA or TB to |TA-TB|/2. Since TA and TB are both odd, + * TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result. + * Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB + * also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2 + * also divides TB, and any odd divisor of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also + * divides TA. + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TA, &TB ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TA, &TA, &TB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, 1 ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TB, &TB, &TA ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, 1 ) ); + } + /* Note that one of TA or TB is still odd. */ + } + + /* By invariant (I), gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k. + * At the loop exit, TA = 0, so gcd(TA,TB) = TB. + * - If there was at least one loop iteration, then one of TA or TB is odd, + * and TA = 0, so TB is odd and gcd(TA,TB) = gcd(A',B'). In this case, + * lz = min(a,b) so gcd(A,B) = 2^lz * TB. + * - If there was no loop iteration, then A was 0, and gcd(A,B) = B. + * In this case, lz = 0 and B = TB so gcd(A,B) = B = 2^lz * TB as well. + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &TB, lz ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, &TB ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. + * X must already have room for those bytes. + * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for + * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and mbedtls_mpi_random()). + * The size and sign of X are unchanged. + * n_bytes must not be 0. + */ +static int mpi_fill_random_internal( + mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t n_bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( n_bytes ); + const size_t overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - n_bytes; + + if( X->n < limbs ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( X->p, 0, overhead ); + memset( (unsigned char *) X->p + limbs * ciL, 0, ( X->n - limbs ) * ciL ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, (unsigned char *) X->p + overhead, n_bytes ) ); + mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Fill X with size bytes of random. + * + * Use a temporary bytes representation to make sure the result is the same + * regardless of the platform endianness (useful when f_rng is actually + * deterministic, eg for tests). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( size ); + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + ret = mpi_fill_random_internal( X, size, f_rng, p_rng ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi_sint min, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + int count; + unsigned lt_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0; + size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ); + size_t n_bytes = ( n_bits + 7 ) / 8; + mbedtls_mpi lower_bound; + + if( min < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, min ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing + * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will + * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). + * + * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating + * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with + * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, + * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has + * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. + * + * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible + * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but + * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N + * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of + * failure is macroscopic. + */ + count = ( n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &lower_bound ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs + * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros. + * This is necessary for the mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() check. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &lower_bound, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &lower_bound, min ) ); + + /* + * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: + * - use the same byte ordering; + * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; + * - try until result is in the desired range. + * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. + */ + do + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random_internal( X, n_bytes, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits ) ); + + if( --count == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, &lower_bound, <_lower ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, N, <_upper ) ); + } + while( lt_lower != 0 || lt_upper == 0 ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &lower_bound ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N (HAC 14.61 / 14.64) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 1 ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TU ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TV ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &V1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &V2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, A, N ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &TA, A, N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TU, &TA ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TV, N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &U1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &U2, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &V1, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &V2, 1 ) ); + + do + { + while( ( TU.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TU, 1 ) ); + + if( ( U1.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 || ( U2.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &U1, &U1, &TB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U2, &U2, &TA ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &U1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &U2, 1 ) ); + } + + while( ( TV.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TV, 1 ) ); + + if( ( V1.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 || ( V2.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &V1, &V1, &TB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V2, &V2, &TA ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &V1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &V2, 1 ) ); + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TU, &TV ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &TU, &TU, &TV ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U1, &U1, &V1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U2, &U2, &V2 ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &TV, &TV, &TU ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V1, &V1, &U1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V2, &V2, &U2 ) ); + } + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &TU, 0 ) != 0 ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &V1, 0 ) < 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &V1, &V1, N ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &V1, N ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V1, &V1, N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &V1 ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TU ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TV ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &V1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V2 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + +static const int small_prime[] = +{ + 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, + 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, + 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, + 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, + 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, + 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, + 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, + 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, + 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, + 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, + 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, + 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, + 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, + 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, + 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, + 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, + 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, + 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, + 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, + 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, + 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997, -103 +}; + +/* + * Small divisors test (X must be positive) + * + * Return values: + * 0: no small factor (possible prime, more tests needed) + * 1: certain prime + * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: certain non-prime + * other negative: error + */ +static int mpi_check_small_factors( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + + if( ( X->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + + for( i = 0; small_prime[i] > 0; i++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, small_prime[i] ) <= 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, small_prime[i] ) ); + + if( r == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Miller-Rabin pseudo-primality test (HAC 4.24) + */ +static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret, count; + size_t i, j, k, s; + mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); + + /* + * W = |X| - 1 + * R = W >> lsb( W ) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &W, X, 1 ) ); + s = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &W ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R, &W ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &R, s ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < rounds; i++ ) + { + /* + * pick a random A, 1 < A < |X| - 1 + */ + count = 0; + do { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A ); + k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W ); + if (j > k) { + A.p[A.n - 1] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << ( k - ( A.n - 1 ) * biL - 1 ) ) - 1; + } + + if (count++ > 30) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + } while ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) <= 0 ); + + /* + * A = A^R mod |X| + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &A, &A, &R, X, &RR ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) + continue; + + j = 1; + while( j < s && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * A = A * A mod |X| + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &A, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &A, &T, X ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) + break; + + j++; + } + + /* + * not prime if A != |X| - 1 or A == 1 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Pseudo-primality test: small factors, then Miller-Rabin + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi XX; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + XX.s = 1; + XX.n = X->n; + XX.p = X->p; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 0 ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 1 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 2 ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &XX ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == 1 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ret ); + } + + return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80 + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + /* + * In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most + * 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty + * here as well. + */ + return( mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, 40, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} +#endif + +/* + * Prime number generation + * + * To generate an RSA key in a way recommended by FIPS 186-4, both primes must + * be either 1024 bits or 1536 bits long, and flags must contain + * MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 +// ceil(2^63.5) +#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f333f9de6485ULL +#else +// ceil(2^31.5) +#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f334U +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + size_t k, n; + int rounds; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + mbedtls_mpi Y; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + if( nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + + n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( nbits ); + + if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR ) == 0 ) + { + /* + * 2^-80 error probability, number of rounds chosen per HAC, table 4.4 + */ + rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 3 : + ( nbits >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 350 ) ? 8 : + ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 ); + } + else + { + /* + * 2^-100 error probability, number of rounds computed based on HAC, + * fact 4.48 + */ + rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1450 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 1150 ) ? 5 : + ( nbits >= 1000 ) ? 6 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 7 : + ( nbits >= 750 ) ? 8 : ( nbits >= 500 ) ? 13 : + ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 28 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 40 : 51 ); + } + + while( 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( X, n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + /* make sure generated number is at least (nbits-1)+0.5 bits (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 steps 4.4, 5.5) */ + if( X->p[n-1] < CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 ) continue; + + k = n * biL; + if( k > nbits ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, k - nbits ) ); + X->p[0] |= 1; + + if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ); + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + /* + * An necessary condition for Y and X = 2Y + 1 to be prime + * is X = 2 mod 3 (which is equivalent to Y = 2 mod 3). + * Make sure it is satisfied, while keeping X = 3 mod 4 + */ + + X->p[0] |= 2; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, 3 ) ); + if( r == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 8 ) ); + else if( r == 1 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 4 ) ); + + /* Set Y = (X-1) / 2, which is X / 2 because X is odd */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Y, X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Y, 1 ) ); + + while( 1 ) + { + /* + * First, check small factors for X and Y + * before doing Miller-Rabin on any of them + */ + if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( X ) ) == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &Y ) ) == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) + == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) + == 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Next candidates. We want to preserve Y = (X-1) / 2 and + * Y = 1 mod 2 and Y = 2 mod 3 (eq X = 3 mod 4 and X = 2 mod 3) + * so up Y by 6 and X by 12. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 12 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &Y, &Y, 6 ) ); + } + } + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#define GCD_PAIR_COUNT 3 + +static const int gcd_pairs[GCD_PAIR_COUNT][3] = +{ + { 693, 609, 21 }, + { 1764, 868, 28 }, + { 768454923, 542167814, 1 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret, i; + mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, X, Y, U, V; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &V ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &A, 16, + "EFE021C2645FD1DC586E69184AF4A31E" \ + "D5F53E93B5F123FA41680867BA110131" \ + "944FE7952E2517337780CB0DB80E61AA" \ + "E7C8DDC6C5C6AADEB34EB38A2F40D5E6" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &E, 16, + "B2E7EFD37075B9F03FF989C7C5051C20" \ + "34D2A323810251127E7BF8625A4F49A5" \ + "F3E27F4DA8BD59C47D6DAABA4C8127BD" \ + "5B5C25763222FEFCCFC38B832366C29E" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &N, 16, + "0066A198186C18C10B2F5ED9B522752A" \ + "9830B69916E535C8F047518A889A43A5" \ + "94B6BED27A168D31D4A52F88925AA8F5" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &X, &A, &N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "602AB7ECA597A3D6B56FF9829A5E8B85" \ + "9E857EA95A03512E2BAE7391688D264A" \ + "A5663B0341DB9CCFD2C4C5F421FEC814" \ + "8001B72E848A38CAE1C65F78E56ABDEF" \ + "E12D3C039B8A02D6BE593F0BBBDA56F1" \ + "ECF677152EF804370C1A305CAF3B5BF1" \ + "30879B56C61DE584A0F53A2447A51E" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #1 (mul_mpi): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &X, &Y, &A, &N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "256567336059E52CAE22925474705F39A94" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &V, 16, + "6613F26162223DF488E9CD48CC132C7A" \ + "0AC93C701B001B092E4E5B9F73BCD27B" \ + "9EE50D0657C77F374E903CDFA4C642" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #2 (div_mpi): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &V ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &X, &A, &E, &N, NULL ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "36E139AEA55215609D2816998ED020BB" \ + "BD96C37890F65171D948E9BC7CBAA4D9" \ + "325D24D6A3C12710F10A09FA08AB87" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #3 (exp_mod): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &X, &A, &N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "003A0AAEDD7E784FC07D8F9EC6E3BFD5" \ + "C3DBA76456363A10869622EAC2DD84EC" \ + "C5B8A74DAC4D09E03B5E0BE779F2DF61" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #4 (inv_mod): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #5 (simple gcd): " ); + + for( i = 0; i < GCD_PAIR_COUNT; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &X, gcd_pairs[i][0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Y, gcd_pairs[i][1] ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &A, &X, &Y ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, gcd_pairs[i][2] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed at %d\n", i ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 && verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..621e9f76 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c @@ -0,0 +1,667 @@ +/* + * Blowfish implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The Blowfish block cipher was designed by Bruce Schneier in 1993. + * http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html + * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowfish_%28cipher%29 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define BLOWFISH_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +static const uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2] = { + 0x243F6A88L, 0x85A308D3L, 0x13198A2EL, 0x03707344L, + 0xA4093822L, 0x299F31D0L, 0x082EFA98L, 0xEC4E6C89L, + 0x452821E6L, 0x38D01377L, 0xBE5466CFL, 0x34E90C6CL, + 0xC0AC29B7L, 0xC97C50DDL, 0x3F84D5B5L, 0xB5470917L, + 0x9216D5D9L, 0x8979FB1BL +}; + +/* declarations of data at the end of this file */ +static const uint32_t S[4][256]; + +static uint32_t F( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t x ) +{ + unsigned short a, b, c, d; + uint32_t y; + + d = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + x >>= 8; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + x >>= 8; + b = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + x >>= 8; + a = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + y = ctx->S[0][a] + ctx->S[1][b]; + y = y ^ ctx->S[2][c]; + y = y + ctx->S[3][d]; + + return( y ); +} + +static void blowfish_enc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr ) +{ + uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; + short i; + + Xl = *xl; + Xr = *xr; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS; ++i ) + { + Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; + Xr = F( ctx, Xl ) ^ Xr; + + temp = Xl; + Xl = Xr; + Xr = temp; + } + + temp = Xl; + Xl = Xr; + Xr = temp; + + Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS]; + Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1]; + + *xl = Xl; + *xr = Xr; +} + +static void blowfish_dec( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr ) +{ + uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; + short i; + + Xl = *xl; + Xr = *xr; + + for( i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1; i > 1; --i ) + { + Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; + Xr = F( ctx, Xl ) ^ Xr; + + temp = Xl; + Xl = Xr; + Xr = temp; + } + + temp = Xl; + Xl = Xr; + Xr = temp; + + Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[1]; + Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[0]; + + *xl = Xl; + *xr = Xr; +} + +void mbedtls_blowfish_init( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ) +{ + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_blowfish_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_blowfish_free( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_blowfish_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Blowfish key schedule + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + unsigned int i, j, k; + uint32_t data, datal, datar; + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + if( keybits < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS || + keybits > MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS || + keybits % 8 != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + keybits >>= 3; + + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 256; j++ ) + ctx->S[i][j] = S[i][j]; + } + + j = 0; + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; ++i ) + { + data = 0x00000000; + for( k = 0; k < 4; ++k ) + { + data = ( data << 8 ) | key[j++]; + if( j >= keybits ) + j = 0; + } + ctx->P[i] = P[i] ^ data; + } + + datal = 0x00000000; + datar = 0x00000000; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i += 2 ) + { + blowfish_enc( ctx, &datal, &datar ); + ctx->P[i] = datal; + ctx->P[i + 1] = datar; + } + + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 256; j += 2 ) + { + blowfish_enc( ctx, &datal, &datar ); + ctx->S[i][j] = datal; + ctx->S[i][j + 1] = datar; + } + } + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE] ) +{ + uint32_t X0, X1; + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + X0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + X1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) + { + blowfish_dec( ctx, &X0, &X1 ); + } + else /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT */ + { + blowfish_enc( ctx, &X0, &X1 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X0, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X1, output, 4 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE]; + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( length % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ); + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE;i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ); + + input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); + memcpy( iv, output, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ); + + input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c; + size_t n; + + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + if( n >= 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] ); + iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; + + n = ( n + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + else + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * Blowfish CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c, i; + size_t n; + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + if( n >= 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) { + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, + stream_block ); + + for( i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + + *nc_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +static const uint32_t S[4][256] = { + { 0xD1310BA6L, 0x98DFB5ACL, 0x2FFD72DBL, 0xD01ADFB7L, + 0xB8E1AFEDL, 0x6A267E96L, 0xBA7C9045L, 0xF12C7F99L, + 0x24A19947L, 0xB3916CF7L, 0x0801F2E2L, 0x858EFC16L, + 0x636920D8L, 0x71574E69L, 0xA458FEA3L, 0xF4933D7EL, + 0x0D95748FL, 0x728EB658L, 0x718BCD58L, 0x82154AEEL, + 0x7B54A41DL, 0xC25A59B5L, 0x9C30D539L, 0x2AF26013L, + 0xC5D1B023L, 0x286085F0L, 0xCA417918L, 0xB8DB38EFL, + 0x8E79DCB0L, 0x603A180EL, 0x6C9E0E8BL, 0xB01E8A3EL, + 0xD71577C1L, 0xBD314B27L, 0x78AF2FDAL, 0x55605C60L, + 0xE65525F3L, 0xAA55AB94L, 0x57489862L, 0x63E81440L, + 0x55CA396AL, 0x2AAB10B6L, 0xB4CC5C34L, 0x1141E8CEL, + 0xA15486AFL, 0x7C72E993L, 0xB3EE1411L, 0x636FBC2AL, + 0x2BA9C55DL, 0x741831F6L, 0xCE5C3E16L, 0x9B87931EL, + 0xAFD6BA33L, 0x6C24CF5CL, 0x7A325381L, 0x28958677L, + 0x3B8F4898L, 0x6B4BB9AFL, 0xC4BFE81BL, 0x66282193L, + 0x61D809CCL, 0xFB21A991L, 0x487CAC60L, 0x5DEC8032L, + 0xEF845D5DL, 0xE98575B1L, 0xDC262302L, 0xEB651B88L, + 0x23893E81L, 0xD396ACC5L, 0x0F6D6FF3L, 0x83F44239L, + 0x2E0B4482L, 0xA4842004L, 0x69C8F04AL, 0x9E1F9B5EL, + 0x21C66842L, 0xF6E96C9AL, 0x670C9C61L, 0xABD388F0L, + 0x6A51A0D2L, 0xD8542F68L, 0x960FA728L, 0xAB5133A3L, + 0x6EEF0B6CL, 0x137A3BE4L, 0xBA3BF050L, 0x7EFB2A98L, + 0xA1F1651DL, 0x39AF0176L, 0x66CA593EL, 0x82430E88L, + 0x8CEE8619L, 0x456F9FB4L, 0x7D84A5C3L, 0x3B8B5EBEL, + 0xE06F75D8L, 0x85C12073L, 0x401A449FL, 0x56C16AA6L, + 0x4ED3AA62L, 0x363F7706L, 0x1BFEDF72L, 0x429B023DL, + 0x37D0D724L, 0xD00A1248L, 0xDB0FEAD3L, 0x49F1C09BL, + 0x075372C9L, 0x80991B7BL, 0x25D479D8L, 0xF6E8DEF7L, + 0xE3FE501AL, 0xB6794C3BL, 0x976CE0BDL, 0x04C006BAL, + 0xC1A94FB6L, 0x409F60C4L, 0x5E5C9EC2L, 0x196A2463L, + 0x68FB6FAFL, 0x3E6C53B5L, 0x1339B2EBL, 0x3B52EC6FL, + 0x6DFC511FL, 0x9B30952CL, 0xCC814544L, 0xAF5EBD09L, + 0xBEE3D004L, 0xDE334AFDL, 0x660F2807L, 0x192E4BB3L, + 0xC0CBA857L, 0x45C8740FL, 0xD20B5F39L, 0xB9D3FBDBL, + 0x5579C0BDL, 0x1A60320AL, 0xD6A100C6L, 0x402C7279L, + 0x679F25FEL, 0xFB1FA3CCL, 0x8EA5E9F8L, 0xDB3222F8L, + 0x3C7516DFL, 0xFD616B15L, 0x2F501EC8L, 0xAD0552ABL, + 0x323DB5FAL, 0xFD238760L, 0x53317B48L, 0x3E00DF82L, + 0x9E5C57BBL, 0xCA6F8CA0L, 0x1A87562EL, 0xDF1769DBL, + 0xD542A8F6L, 0x287EFFC3L, 0xAC6732C6L, 0x8C4F5573L, + 0x695B27B0L, 0xBBCA58C8L, 0xE1FFA35DL, 0xB8F011A0L, + 0x10FA3D98L, 0xFD2183B8L, 0x4AFCB56CL, 0x2DD1D35BL, + 0x9A53E479L, 0xB6F84565L, 0xD28E49BCL, 0x4BFB9790L, + 0xE1DDF2DAL, 0xA4CB7E33L, 0x62FB1341L, 0xCEE4C6E8L, + 0xEF20CADAL, 0x36774C01L, 0xD07E9EFEL, 0x2BF11FB4L, + 0x95DBDA4DL, 0xAE909198L, 0xEAAD8E71L, 0x6B93D5A0L, + 0xD08ED1D0L, 0xAFC725E0L, 0x8E3C5B2FL, 0x8E7594B7L, + 0x8FF6E2FBL, 0xF2122B64L, 0x8888B812L, 0x900DF01CL, + 0x4FAD5EA0L, 0x688FC31CL, 0xD1CFF191L, 0xB3A8C1ADL, + 0x2F2F2218L, 0xBE0E1777L, 0xEA752DFEL, 0x8B021FA1L, + 0xE5A0CC0FL, 0xB56F74E8L, 0x18ACF3D6L, 0xCE89E299L, + 0xB4A84FE0L, 0xFD13E0B7L, 0x7CC43B81L, 0xD2ADA8D9L, + 0x165FA266L, 0x80957705L, 0x93CC7314L, 0x211A1477L, + 0xE6AD2065L, 0x77B5FA86L, 0xC75442F5L, 0xFB9D35CFL, + 0xEBCDAF0CL, 0x7B3E89A0L, 0xD6411BD3L, 0xAE1E7E49L, + 0x00250E2DL, 0x2071B35EL, 0x226800BBL, 0x57B8E0AFL, + 0x2464369BL, 0xF009B91EL, 0x5563911DL, 0x59DFA6AAL, + 0x78C14389L, 0xD95A537FL, 0x207D5BA2L, 0x02E5B9C5L, + 0x83260376L, 0x6295CFA9L, 0x11C81968L, 0x4E734A41L, + 0xB3472DCAL, 0x7B14A94AL, 0x1B510052L, 0x9A532915L, + 0xD60F573FL, 0xBC9BC6E4L, 0x2B60A476L, 0x81E67400L, + 0x08BA6FB5L, 0x571BE91FL, 0xF296EC6BL, 0x2A0DD915L, + 0xB6636521L, 0xE7B9F9B6L, 0xFF34052EL, 0xC5855664L, + 0x53B02D5DL, 0xA99F8FA1L, 0x08BA4799L, 0x6E85076AL }, + { 0x4B7A70E9L, 0xB5B32944L, 0xDB75092EL, 0xC4192623L, + 0xAD6EA6B0L, 0x49A7DF7DL, 0x9CEE60B8L, 0x8FEDB266L, + 0xECAA8C71L, 0x699A17FFL, 0x5664526CL, 0xC2B19EE1L, + 0x193602A5L, 0x75094C29L, 0xA0591340L, 0xE4183A3EL, + 0x3F54989AL, 0x5B429D65L, 0x6B8FE4D6L, 0x99F73FD6L, + 0xA1D29C07L, 0xEFE830F5L, 0x4D2D38E6L, 0xF0255DC1L, + 0x4CDD2086L, 0x8470EB26L, 0x6382E9C6L, 0x021ECC5EL, + 0x09686B3FL, 0x3EBAEFC9L, 0x3C971814L, 0x6B6A70A1L, + 0x687F3584L, 0x52A0E286L, 0xB79C5305L, 0xAA500737L, + 0x3E07841CL, 0x7FDEAE5CL, 0x8E7D44ECL, 0x5716F2B8L, + 0xB03ADA37L, 0xF0500C0DL, 0xF01C1F04L, 0x0200B3FFL, + 0xAE0CF51AL, 0x3CB574B2L, 0x25837A58L, 0xDC0921BDL, + 0xD19113F9L, 0x7CA92FF6L, 0x94324773L, 0x22F54701L, + 0x3AE5E581L, 0x37C2DADCL, 0xC8B57634L, 0x9AF3DDA7L, + 0xA9446146L, 0x0FD0030EL, 0xECC8C73EL, 0xA4751E41L, + 0xE238CD99L, 0x3BEA0E2FL, 0x3280BBA1L, 0x183EB331L, + 0x4E548B38L, 0x4F6DB908L, 0x6F420D03L, 0xF60A04BFL, + 0x2CB81290L, 0x24977C79L, 0x5679B072L, 0xBCAF89AFL, + 0xDE9A771FL, 0xD9930810L, 0xB38BAE12L, 0xDCCF3F2EL, + 0x5512721FL, 0x2E6B7124L, 0x501ADDE6L, 0x9F84CD87L, + 0x7A584718L, 0x7408DA17L, 0xBC9F9ABCL, 0xE94B7D8CL, + 0xEC7AEC3AL, 0xDB851DFAL, 0x63094366L, 0xC464C3D2L, + 0xEF1C1847L, 0x3215D908L, 0xDD433B37L, 0x24C2BA16L, + 0x12A14D43L, 0x2A65C451L, 0x50940002L, 0x133AE4DDL, + 0x71DFF89EL, 0x10314E55L, 0x81AC77D6L, 0x5F11199BL, + 0x043556F1L, 0xD7A3C76BL, 0x3C11183BL, 0x5924A509L, + 0xF28FE6EDL, 0x97F1FBFAL, 0x9EBABF2CL, 0x1E153C6EL, + 0x86E34570L, 0xEAE96FB1L, 0x860E5E0AL, 0x5A3E2AB3L, + 0x771FE71CL, 0x4E3D06FAL, 0x2965DCB9L, 0x99E71D0FL, + 0x803E89D6L, 0x5266C825L, 0x2E4CC978L, 0x9C10B36AL, + 0xC6150EBAL, 0x94E2EA78L, 0xA5FC3C53L, 0x1E0A2DF4L, + 0xF2F74EA7L, 0x361D2B3DL, 0x1939260FL, 0x19C27960L, + 0x5223A708L, 0xF71312B6L, 0xEBADFE6EL, 0xEAC31F66L, + 0xE3BC4595L, 0xA67BC883L, 0xB17F37D1L, 0x018CFF28L, + 0xC332DDEFL, 0xBE6C5AA5L, 0x65582185L, 0x68AB9802L, + 0xEECEA50FL, 0xDB2F953BL, 0x2AEF7DADL, 0x5B6E2F84L, + 0x1521B628L, 0x29076170L, 0xECDD4775L, 0x619F1510L, + 0x13CCA830L, 0xEB61BD96L, 0x0334FE1EL, 0xAA0363CFL, + 0xB5735C90L, 0x4C70A239L, 0xD59E9E0BL, 0xCBAADE14L, + 0xEECC86BCL, 0x60622CA7L, 0x9CAB5CABL, 0xB2F3846EL, + 0x648B1EAFL, 0x19BDF0CAL, 0xA02369B9L, 0x655ABB50L, + 0x40685A32L, 0x3C2AB4B3L, 0x319EE9D5L, 0xC021B8F7L, + 0x9B540B19L, 0x875FA099L, 0x95F7997EL, 0x623D7DA8L, + 0xF837889AL, 0x97E32D77L, 0x11ED935FL, 0x16681281L, + 0x0E358829L, 0xC7E61FD6L, 0x96DEDFA1L, 0x7858BA99L, + 0x57F584A5L, 0x1B227263L, 0x9B83C3FFL, 0x1AC24696L, + 0xCDB30AEBL, 0x532E3054L, 0x8FD948E4L, 0x6DBC3128L, + 0x58EBF2EFL, 0x34C6FFEAL, 0xFE28ED61L, 0xEE7C3C73L, + 0x5D4A14D9L, 0xE864B7E3L, 0x42105D14L, 0x203E13E0L, + 0x45EEE2B6L, 0xA3AAABEAL, 0xDB6C4F15L, 0xFACB4FD0L, + 0xC742F442L, 0xEF6ABBB5L, 0x654F3B1DL, 0x41CD2105L, + 0xD81E799EL, 0x86854DC7L, 0xE44B476AL, 0x3D816250L, + 0xCF62A1F2L, 0x5B8D2646L, 0xFC8883A0L, 0xC1C7B6A3L, + 0x7F1524C3L, 0x69CB7492L, 0x47848A0BL, 0x5692B285L, + 0x095BBF00L, 0xAD19489DL, 0x1462B174L, 0x23820E00L, + 0x58428D2AL, 0x0C55F5EAL, 0x1DADF43EL, 0x233F7061L, + 0x3372F092L, 0x8D937E41L, 0xD65FECF1L, 0x6C223BDBL, + 0x7CDE3759L, 0xCBEE7460L, 0x4085F2A7L, 0xCE77326EL, + 0xA6078084L, 0x19F8509EL, 0xE8EFD855L, 0x61D99735L, + 0xA969A7AAL, 0xC50C06C2L, 0x5A04ABFCL, 0x800BCADCL, + 0x9E447A2EL, 0xC3453484L, 0xFDD56705L, 0x0E1E9EC9L, + 0xDB73DBD3L, 0x105588CDL, 0x675FDA79L, 0xE3674340L, + 0xC5C43465L, 0x713E38D8L, 0x3D28F89EL, 0xF16DFF20L, + 0x153E21E7L, 0x8FB03D4AL, 0xE6E39F2BL, 0xDB83ADF7L }, + { 0xE93D5A68L, 0x948140F7L, 0xF64C261CL, 0x94692934L, + 0x411520F7L, 0x7602D4F7L, 0xBCF46B2EL, 0xD4A20068L, + 0xD4082471L, 0x3320F46AL, 0x43B7D4B7L, 0x500061AFL, + 0x1E39F62EL, 0x97244546L, 0x14214F74L, 0xBF8B8840L, + 0x4D95FC1DL, 0x96B591AFL, 0x70F4DDD3L, 0x66A02F45L, + 0xBFBC09ECL, 0x03BD9785L, 0x7FAC6DD0L, 0x31CB8504L, + 0x96EB27B3L, 0x55FD3941L, 0xDA2547E6L, 0xABCA0A9AL, + 0x28507825L, 0x530429F4L, 0x0A2C86DAL, 0xE9B66DFBL, + 0x68DC1462L, 0xD7486900L, 0x680EC0A4L, 0x27A18DEEL, + 0x4F3FFEA2L, 0xE887AD8CL, 0xB58CE006L, 0x7AF4D6B6L, + 0xAACE1E7CL, 0xD3375FECL, 0xCE78A399L, 0x406B2A42L, + 0x20FE9E35L, 0xD9F385B9L, 0xEE39D7ABL, 0x3B124E8BL, + 0x1DC9FAF7L, 0x4B6D1856L, 0x26A36631L, 0xEAE397B2L, + 0x3A6EFA74L, 0xDD5B4332L, 0x6841E7F7L, 0xCA7820FBL, + 0xFB0AF54EL, 0xD8FEB397L, 0x454056ACL, 0xBA489527L, + 0x55533A3AL, 0x20838D87L, 0xFE6BA9B7L, 0xD096954BL, + 0x55A867BCL, 0xA1159A58L, 0xCCA92963L, 0x99E1DB33L, + 0xA62A4A56L, 0x3F3125F9L, 0x5EF47E1CL, 0x9029317CL, + 0xFDF8E802L, 0x04272F70L, 0x80BB155CL, 0x05282CE3L, + 0x95C11548L, 0xE4C66D22L, 0x48C1133FL, 0xC70F86DCL, + 0x07F9C9EEL, 0x41041F0FL, 0x404779A4L, 0x5D886E17L, + 0x325F51EBL, 0xD59BC0D1L, 0xF2BCC18FL, 0x41113564L, + 0x257B7834L, 0x602A9C60L, 0xDFF8E8A3L, 0x1F636C1BL, + 0x0E12B4C2L, 0x02E1329EL, 0xAF664FD1L, 0xCAD18115L, + 0x6B2395E0L, 0x333E92E1L, 0x3B240B62L, 0xEEBEB922L, + 0x85B2A20EL, 0xE6BA0D99L, 0xDE720C8CL, 0x2DA2F728L, + 0xD0127845L, 0x95B794FDL, 0x647D0862L, 0xE7CCF5F0L, + 0x5449A36FL, 0x877D48FAL, 0xC39DFD27L, 0xF33E8D1EL, + 0x0A476341L, 0x992EFF74L, 0x3A6F6EABL, 0xF4F8FD37L, + 0xA812DC60L, 0xA1EBDDF8L, 0x991BE14CL, 0xDB6E6B0DL, + 0xC67B5510L, 0x6D672C37L, 0x2765D43BL, 0xDCD0E804L, + 0xF1290DC7L, 0xCC00FFA3L, 0xB5390F92L, 0x690FED0BL, + 0x667B9FFBL, 0xCEDB7D9CL, 0xA091CF0BL, 0xD9155EA3L, + 0xBB132F88L, 0x515BAD24L, 0x7B9479BFL, 0x763BD6EBL, + 0x37392EB3L, 0xCC115979L, 0x8026E297L, 0xF42E312DL, + 0x6842ADA7L, 0xC66A2B3BL, 0x12754CCCL, 0x782EF11CL, + 0x6A124237L, 0xB79251E7L, 0x06A1BBE6L, 0x4BFB6350L, + 0x1A6B1018L, 0x11CAEDFAL, 0x3D25BDD8L, 0xE2E1C3C9L, + 0x44421659L, 0x0A121386L, 0xD90CEC6EL, 0xD5ABEA2AL, + 0x64AF674EL, 0xDA86A85FL, 0xBEBFE988L, 0x64E4C3FEL, + 0x9DBC8057L, 0xF0F7C086L, 0x60787BF8L, 0x6003604DL, + 0xD1FD8346L, 0xF6381FB0L, 0x7745AE04L, 0xD736FCCCL, + 0x83426B33L, 0xF01EAB71L, 0xB0804187L, 0x3C005E5FL, + 0x77A057BEL, 0xBDE8AE24L, 0x55464299L, 0xBF582E61L, + 0x4E58F48FL, 0xF2DDFDA2L, 0xF474EF38L, 0x8789BDC2L, + 0x5366F9C3L, 0xC8B38E74L, 0xB475F255L, 0x46FCD9B9L, + 0x7AEB2661L, 0x8B1DDF84L, 0x846A0E79L, 0x915F95E2L, + 0x466E598EL, 0x20B45770L, 0x8CD55591L, 0xC902DE4CL, + 0xB90BACE1L, 0xBB8205D0L, 0x11A86248L, 0x7574A99EL, + 0xB77F19B6L, 0xE0A9DC09L, 0x662D09A1L, 0xC4324633L, + 0xE85A1F02L, 0x09F0BE8CL, 0x4A99A025L, 0x1D6EFE10L, + 0x1AB93D1DL, 0x0BA5A4DFL, 0xA186F20FL, 0x2868F169L, + 0xDCB7DA83L, 0x573906FEL, 0xA1E2CE9BL, 0x4FCD7F52L, + 0x50115E01L, 0xA70683FAL, 0xA002B5C4L, 0x0DE6D027L, + 0x9AF88C27L, 0x773F8641L, 0xC3604C06L, 0x61A806B5L, + 0xF0177A28L, 0xC0F586E0L, 0x006058AAL, 0x30DC7D62L, + 0x11E69ED7L, 0x2338EA63L, 0x53C2DD94L, 0xC2C21634L, + 0xBBCBEE56L, 0x90BCB6DEL, 0xEBFC7DA1L, 0xCE591D76L, + 0x6F05E409L, 0x4B7C0188L, 0x39720A3DL, 0x7C927C24L, + 0x86E3725FL, 0x724D9DB9L, 0x1AC15BB4L, 0xD39EB8FCL, + 0xED545578L, 0x08FCA5B5L, 0xD83D7CD3L, 0x4DAD0FC4L, + 0x1E50EF5EL, 0xB161E6F8L, 0xA28514D9L, 0x6C51133CL, + 0x6FD5C7E7L, 0x56E14EC4L, 0x362ABFCEL, 0xDDC6C837L, + 0xD79A3234L, 0x92638212L, 0x670EFA8EL, 0x406000E0L }, + { 0x3A39CE37L, 0xD3FAF5CFL, 0xABC27737L, 0x5AC52D1BL, + 0x5CB0679EL, 0x4FA33742L, 0xD3822740L, 0x99BC9BBEL, + 0xD5118E9DL, 0xBF0F7315L, 0xD62D1C7EL, 0xC700C47BL, + 0xB78C1B6BL, 0x21A19045L, 0xB26EB1BEL, 0x6A366EB4L, + 0x5748AB2FL, 0xBC946E79L, 0xC6A376D2L, 0x6549C2C8L, + 0x530FF8EEL, 0x468DDE7DL, 0xD5730A1DL, 0x4CD04DC6L, + 0x2939BBDBL, 0xA9BA4650L, 0xAC9526E8L, 0xBE5EE304L, + 0xA1FAD5F0L, 0x6A2D519AL, 0x63EF8CE2L, 0x9A86EE22L, + 0xC089C2B8L, 0x43242EF6L, 0xA51E03AAL, 0x9CF2D0A4L, + 0x83C061BAL, 0x9BE96A4DL, 0x8FE51550L, 0xBA645BD6L, + 0x2826A2F9L, 0xA73A3AE1L, 0x4BA99586L, 0xEF5562E9L, + 0xC72FEFD3L, 0xF752F7DAL, 0x3F046F69L, 0x77FA0A59L, + 0x80E4A915L, 0x87B08601L, 0x9B09E6ADL, 0x3B3EE593L, + 0xE990FD5AL, 0x9E34D797L, 0x2CF0B7D9L, 0x022B8B51L, + 0x96D5AC3AL, 0x017DA67DL, 0xD1CF3ED6L, 0x7C7D2D28L, + 0x1F9F25CFL, 0xADF2B89BL, 0x5AD6B472L, 0x5A88F54CL, + 0xE029AC71L, 0xE019A5E6L, 0x47B0ACFDL, 0xED93FA9BL, + 0xE8D3C48DL, 0x283B57CCL, 0xF8D56629L, 0x79132E28L, + 0x785F0191L, 0xED756055L, 0xF7960E44L, 0xE3D35E8CL, + 0x15056DD4L, 0x88F46DBAL, 0x03A16125L, 0x0564F0BDL, + 0xC3EB9E15L, 0x3C9057A2L, 0x97271AECL, 0xA93A072AL, + 0x1B3F6D9BL, 0x1E6321F5L, 0xF59C66FBL, 0x26DCF319L, + 0x7533D928L, 0xB155FDF5L, 0x03563482L, 0x8ABA3CBBL, + 0x28517711L, 0xC20AD9F8L, 0xABCC5167L, 0xCCAD925FL, + 0x4DE81751L, 0x3830DC8EL, 0x379D5862L, 0x9320F991L, + 0xEA7A90C2L, 0xFB3E7BCEL, 0x5121CE64L, 0x774FBE32L, + 0xA8B6E37EL, 0xC3293D46L, 0x48DE5369L, 0x6413E680L, + 0xA2AE0810L, 0xDD6DB224L, 0x69852DFDL, 0x09072166L, + 0xB39A460AL, 0x6445C0DDL, 0x586CDECFL, 0x1C20C8AEL, + 0x5BBEF7DDL, 0x1B588D40L, 0xCCD2017FL, 0x6BB4E3BBL, + 0xDDA26A7EL, 0x3A59FF45L, 0x3E350A44L, 0xBCB4CDD5L, + 0x72EACEA8L, 0xFA6484BBL, 0x8D6612AEL, 0xBF3C6F47L, + 0xD29BE463L, 0x542F5D9EL, 0xAEC2771BL, 0xF64E6370L, + 0x740E0D8DL, 0xE75B1357L, 0xF8721671L, 0xAF537D5DL, + 0x4040CB08L, 0x4EB4E2CCL, 0x34D2466AL, 0x0115AF84L, + 0xE1B00428L, 0x95983A1DL, 0x06B89FB4L, 0xCE6EA048L, + 0x6F3F3B82L, 0x3520AB82L, 0x011A1D4BL, 0x277227F8L, + 0x611560B1L, 0xE7933FDCL, 0xBB3A792BL, 0x344525BDL, + 0xA08839E1L, 0x51CE794BL, 0x2F32C9B7L, 0xA01FBAC9L, + 0xE01CC87EL, 0xBCC7D1F6L, 0xCF0111C3L, 0xA1E8AAC7L, + 0x1A908749L, 0xD44FBD9AL, 0xD0DADECBL, 0xD50ADA38L, + 0x0339C32AL, 0xC6913667L, 0x8DF9317CL, 0xE0B12B4FL, + 0xF79E59B7L, 0x43F5BB3AL, 0xF2D519FFL, 0x27D9459CL, + 0xBF97222CL, 0x15E6FC2AL, 0x0F91FC71L, 0x9B941525L, + 0xFAE59361L, 0xCEB69CEBL, 0xC2A86459L, 0x12BAA8D1L, + 0xB6C1075EL, 0xE3056A0CL, 0x10D25065L, 0xCB03A442L, + 0xE0EC6E0EL, 0x1698DB3BL, 0x4C98A0BEL, 0x3278E964L, + 0x9F1F9532L, 0xE0D392DFL, 0xD3A0342BL, 0x8971F21EL, + 0x1B0A7441L, 0x4BA3348CL, 0xC5BE7120L, 0xC37632D8L, + 0xDF359F8DL, 0x9B992F2EL, 0xE60B6F47L, 0x0FE3F11DL, + 0xE54CDA54L, 0x1EDAD891L, 0xCE6279CFL, 0xCD3E7E6FL, + 0x1618B166L, 0xFD2C1D05L, 0x848FD2C5L, 0xF6FB2299L, + 0xF523F357L, 0xA6327623L, 0x93A83531L, 0x56CCCD02L, + 0xACF08162L, 0x5A75EBB5L, 0x6E163697L, 0x88D273CCL, + 0xDE966292L, 0x81B949D0L, 0x4C50901BL, 0x71C65614L, + 0xE6C6C7BDL, 0x327A140AL, 0x45E1D006L, 0xC3F27B9AL, + 0xC9AA53FDL, 0x62A80F00L, 0xBB25BFE2L, 0x35BDD2F6L, + 0x71126905L, 0xB2040222L, 0xB6CBCF7CL, 0xCD769C2BL, + 0x53113EC0L, 0x1640E3D3L, 0x38ABBD60L, 0x2547ADF0L, + 0xBA38209CL, 0xF746CE76L, 0x77AFA1C5L, 0x20756060L, + 0x85CBFE4EL, 0x8AE88DD8L, 0x7AAAF9B0L, 0x4CF9AA7EL, + 0x1948C25CL, 0x02FB8A8CL, 0x01C36AE4L, 0xD6EBE1F9L, + 0x90D4F869L, 0xA65CDEA0L, 0x3F09252DL, 0xC208E69FL, + 0xB74E6132L, 0xCE77E25BL, 0x578FDFE3L, 0x3AC372E6L } +}; + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/camellia.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/camellia.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29d730ab --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/camellia.c @@ -0,0 +1,1087 @@ +/* + * Camellia implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The Camellia block cipher was designed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric + * Corporation. + * + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/01espec.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +static const unsigned char SIGMA_CHARS[6][8] = +{ + { 0xa0, 0x9e, 0x66, 0x7f, 0x3b, 0xcc, 0x90, 0x8b }, + { 0xb6, 0x7a, 0xe8, 0x58, 0x4c, 0xaa, 0x73, 0xb2 }, + { 0xc6, 0xef, 0x37, 0x2f, 0xe9, 0x4f, 0x82, 0xbe }, + { 0x54, 0xff, 0x53, 0xa5, 0xf1, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0x1c }, + { 0x10, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x68, 0x2d, 0x1d }, + { 0xb0, 0x56, 0x88, 0xc2, 0xb3, 0xe6, 0xc1, 0xfd } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) + +static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +{ + 112,130, 44,236,179, 39,192,229,228,133, 87, 53,234, 12,174, 65, + 35,239,107,147, 69, 25,165, 33,237, 14, 79, 78, 29,101,146,189, + 134,184,175,143,124,235, 31,206, 62, 48,220, 95, 94,197, 11, 26, + 166,225, 57,202,213, 71, 93, 61,217, 1, 90,214, 81, 86,108, 77, + 139, 13,154,102,251,204,176, 45,116, 18, 43, 32,240,177,132,153, + 223, 76,203,194, 52,126,118, 5,109,183,169, 49,209, 23, 4,215, + 20, 88, 58, 97,222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15,156, 22, 83, 24,242, 34, + 254, 68,207,178,195,181,122,145, 36, 8,232,168, 96,252,105, 80, + 170,208,160,125,161,137, 98,151, 84, 91, 30,149,224,255,100,210, + 16,196, 0, 72,163,247,117,219,138, 3,230,218, 9, 63,221,148, + 135, 92,131, 2,205, 74,144, 51,115,103,246,243,157,127,191,226, + 82,155,216, 38,200, 55,198, 59,129,150,111, 75, 19,190, 99, 46, + 233,121,167,140,159,110,188,142, 41,245,249,182, 47,253,180, 89, + 120,152, 6,106,231, 70,113,186,212, 37,171, 66,136,162,141,250, + 114, 7,185, 85,248,238,172, 10, 54, 73, 42,104, 60, 56,241,164, + 64, 40,211,123,187,201, 67,193, 21,227,173,244,119,199,128,158 +}; + +#define SBOX1(n) FSb[(n)] +#define SBOX2(n) (unsigned char)((FSb[(n)] >> 7 ^ FSb[(n)] << 1) & 0xff) +#define SBOX3(n) (unsigned char)((FSb[(n)] >> 1 ^ FSb[(n)] << 7) & 0xff) +#define SBOX4(n) FSb[((n) << 1 ^ (n) >> 7) &0xff] + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ + +static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +{ + 112, 130, 44, 236, 179, 39, 192, 229, 228, 133, 87, 53, 234, 12, 174, 65, + 35, 239, 107, 147, 69, 25, 165, 33, 237, 14, 79, 78, 29, 101, 146, 189, + 134, 184, 175, 143, 124, 235, 31, 206, 62, 48, 220, 95, 94, 197, 11, 26, + 166, 225, 57, 202, 213, 71, 93, 61, 217, 1, 90, 214, 81, 86, 108, 77, + 139, 13, 154, 102, 251, 204, 176, 45, 116, 18, 43, 32, 240, 177, 132, 153, + 223, 76, 203, 194, 52, 126, 118, 5, 109, 183, 169, 49, 209, 23, 4, 215, + 20, 88, 58, 97, 222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15, 156, 22, 83, 24, 242, 34, + 254, 68, 207, 178, 195, 181, 122, 145, 36, 8, 232, 168, 96, 252, 105, 80, + 170, 208, 160, 125, 161, 137, 98, 151, 84, 91, 30, 149, 224, 255, 100, 210, + 16, 196, 0, 72, 163, 247, 117, 219, 138, 3, 230, 218, 9, 63, 221, 148, + 135, 92, 131, 2, 205, 74, 144, 51, 115, 103, 246, 243, 157, 127, 191, 226, + 82, 155, 216, 38, 200, 55, 198, 59, 129, 150, 111, 75, 19, 190, 99, 46, + 233, 121, 167, 140, 159, 110, 188, 142, 41, 245, 249, 182, 47, 253, 180, 89, + 120, 152, 6, 106, 231, 70, 113, 186, 212, 37, 171, 66, 136, 162, 141, 250, + 114, 7, 185, 85, 248, 238, 172, 10, 54, 73, 42, 104, 60, 56, 241, 164, + 64, 40, 211, 123, 187, 201, 67, 193, 21, 227, 173, 244, 119, 199, 128, 158 +}; + +static const unsigned char FSb2[256] = +{ + 224, 5, 88, 217, 103, 78, 129, 203, 201, 11, 174, 106, 213, 24, 93, 130, + 70, 223, 214, 39, 138, 50, 75, 66, 219, 28, 158, 156, 58, 202, 37, 123, + 13, 113, 95, 31, 248, 215, 62, 157, 124, 96, 185, 190, 188, 139, 22, 52, + 77, 195, 114, 149, 171, 142, 186, 122, 179, 2, 180, 173, 162, 172, 216, 154, + 23, 26, 53, 204, 247, 153, 97, 90, 232, 36, 86, 64, 225, 99, 9, 51, + 191, 152, 151, 133, 104, 252, 236, 10, 218, 111, 83, 98, 163, 46, 8, 175, + 40, 176, 116, 194, 189, 54, 34, 56, 100, 30, 57, 44, 166, 48, 229, 68, + 253, 136, 159, 101, 135, 107, 244, 35, 72, 16, 209, 81, 192, 249, 210, 160, + 85, 161, 65, 250, 67, 19, 196, 47, 168, 182, 60, 43, 193, 255, 200, 165, + 32, 137, 0, 144, 71, 239, 234, 183, 21, 6, 205, 181, 18, 126, 187, 41, + 15, 184, 7, 4, 155, 148, 33, 102, 230, 206, 237, 231, 59, 254, 127, 197, + 164, 55, 177, 76, 145, 110, 141, 118, 3, 45, 222, 150, 38, 125, 198, 92, + 211, 242, 79, 25, 63, 220, 121, 29, 82, 235, 243, 109, 94, 251, 105, 178, + 240, 49, 12, 212, 207, 140, 226, 117, 169, 74, 87, 132, 17, 69, 27, 245, + 228, 14, 115, 170, 241, 221, 89, 20, 108, 146, 84, 208, 120, 112, 227, 73, + 128, 80, 167, 246, 119, 147, 134, 131, 42, 199, 91, 233, 238, 143, 1, 61 +}; + +static const unsigned char FSb3[256] = +{ + 56, 65, 22, 118, 217, 147, 96, 242, 114, 194, 171, 154, 117, 6, 87, 160, + 145, 247, 181, 201, 162, 140, 210, 144, 246, 7, 167, 39, 142, 178, 73, 222, + 67, 92, 215, 199, 62, 245, 143, 103, 31, 24, 110, 175, 47, 226, 133, 13, + 83, 240, 156, 101, 234, 163, 174, 158, 236, 128, 45, 107, 168, 43, 54, 166, + 197, 134, 77, 51, 253, 102, 88, 150, 58, 9, 149, 16, 120, 216, 66, 204, + 239, 38, 229, 97, 26, 63, 59, 130, 182, 219, 212, 152, 232, 139, 2, 235, + 10, 44, 29, 176, 111, 141, 136, 14, 25, 135, 78, 11, 169, 12, 121, 17, + 127, 34, 231, 89, 225, 218, 61, 200, 18, 4, 116, 84, 48, 126, 180, 40, + 85, 104, 80, 190, 208, 196, 49, 203, 42, 173, 15, 202, 112, 255, 50, 105, + 8, 98, 0, 36, 209, 251, 186, 237, 69, 129, 115, 109, 132, 159, 238, 74, + 195, 46, 193, 1, 230, 37, 72, 153, 185, 179, 123, 249, 206, 191, 223, 113, + 41, 205, 108, 19, 100, 155, 99, 157, 192, 75, 183, 165, 137, 95, 177, 23, + 244, 188, 211, 70, 207, 55, 94, 71, 148, 250, 252, 91, 151, 254, 90, 172, + 60, 76, 3, 53, 243, 35, 184, 93, 106, 146, 213, 33, 68, 81, 198, 125, + 57, 131, 220, 170, 124, 119, 86, 5, 27, 164, 21, 52, 30, 28, 248, 82, + 32, 20, 233, 189, 221, 228, 161, 224, 138, 241, 214, 122, 187, 227, 64, 79 +}; + +static const unsigned char FSb4[256] = +{ + 112, 44, 179, 192, 228, 87, 234, 174, 35, 107, 69, 165, 237, 79, 29, 146, + 134, 175, 124, 31, 62, 220, 94, 11, 166, 57, 213, 93, 217, 90, 81, 108, + 139, 154, 251, 176, 116, 43, 240, 132, 223, 203, 52, 118, 109, 169, 209, 4, + 20, 58, 222, 17, 50, 156, 83, 242, 254, 207, 195, 122, 36, 232, 96, 105, + 170, 160, 161, 98, 84, 30, 224, 100, 16, 0, 163, 117, 138, 230, 9, 221, + 135, 131, 205, 144, 115, 246, 157, 191, 82, 216, 200, 198, 129, 111, 19, 99, + 233, 167, 159, 188, 41, 249, 47, 180, 120, 6, 231, 113, 212, 171, 136, 141, + 114, 185, 248, 172, 54, 42, 60, 241, 64, 211, 187, 67, 21, 173, 119, 128, + 130, 236, 39, 229, 133, 53, 12, 65, 239, 147, 25, 33, 14, 78, 101, 189, + 184, 143, 235, 206, 48, 95, 197, 26, 225, 202, 71, 61, 1, 214, 86, 77, + 13, 102, 204, 45, 18, 32, 177, 153, 76, 194, 126, 5, 183, 49, 23, 215, + 88, 97, 27, 28, 15, 22, 24, 34, 68, 178, 181, 145, 8, 168, 252, 80, + 208, 125, 137, 151, 91, 149, 255, 210, 196, 72, 247, 219, 3, 218, 63, 148, + 92, 2, 74, 51, 103, 243, 127, 226, 155, 38, 55, 59, 150, 75, 190, 46, + 121, 140, 110, 142, 245, 182, 253, 89, 152, 106, 70, 186, 37, 66, 162, 250, + 7, 85, 238, 10, 73, 104, 56, 164, 40, 123, 201, 193, 227, 244, 199, 158 +}; + +#define SBOX1(n) FSb[(n)] +#define SBOX2(n) FSb2[(n)] +#define SBOX3(n) FSb3[(n)] +#define SBOX4(n) FSb4[(n)] + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ + +static const unsigned char shifts[2][4][4] = +{ + { + { 1, 1, 1, 1 }, /* KL */ + { 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* KR */ + { 1, 1, 1, 1 }, /* KA */ + { 0, 0, 0, 0 } /* KB */ + }, + { + { 1, 0, 1, 1 }, /* KL */ + { 1, 1, 0, 1 }, /* KR */ + { 1, 1, 1, 0 }, /* KA */ + { 1, 1, 0, 1 } /* KB */ + } +}; + +static const signed char indexes[2][4][20] = +{ + { + { 0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 38, 39, + 36, 37, 23, 20, 21, 22, 27, -1, -1, 26 }, /* KL -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, /* KR -> RK */ + { 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, + 18, 19, -1, 24, 25, -1, 31, 28, 29, 30 }, /* KA -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 } /* KB -> RK */ + }, + { + { 0, 1, 2, 3, 61, 62, 63, 60, -1, -1, + -1, -1, 27, 24, 25, 26, 35, 32, 33, 34 }, /* KL -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, + 18, 19, -1, -1, -1, -1, 39, 36, 37, 38 }, /* KR -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 58, 59, + 56, 57, 31, 28, 29, 30, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, /* KA -> RK */ + { 4, 5, 6, 7, 65, 66, 67, 64, 20, 21, + 22, 23, -1, -1, -1, -1, 43, 40, 41, 42 } /* KB -> RK */ + } +}; + +static const signed char transposes[2][20] = +{ + { + 21, 22, 23, 20, + -1, -1, -1, -1, + 18, 19, 16, 17, + 11, 8, 9, 10, + 15, 12, 13, 14 + }, + { + 25, 26, 27, 24, + 29, 30, 31, 28, + 18, 19, 16, 17, + -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1 + } +}; + +/* Shift macro for 128 bit strings with rotation smaller than 32 bits (!) */ +#define ROTL(DEST, SRC, SHIFT) \ +{ \ + (DEST)[0] = (SRC)[0] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[1] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + (DEST)[1] = (SRC)[1] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[2] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + (DEST)[2] = (SRC)[2] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[3] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + (DEST)[3] = (SRC)[3] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[0] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ +} + +#define FL(XL, XR, KL, KR) \ +{ \ + (XR) = ((((XL) & (KL)) << 1) | (((XL) & (KL)) >> 31)) ^ (XR); \ + (XL) = ((XR) | (KR)) ^ (XL); \ +} + +#define FLInv(YL, YR, KL, KR) \ +{ \ + (YL) = ((YR) | (KR)) ^ (YL); \ + (YR) = ((((YL) & (KL)) << 1) | (((YL) & (KL)) >> 31)) ^ (YR); \ +} + +#define SHIFT_AND_PLACE(INDEX, OFFSET) \ +{ \ + TK[0] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 0]; \ + TK[1] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 1]; \ + TK[2] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 2]; \ + TK[3] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 3]; \ + \ + for( i = 1; i <= 4; i++ ) \ + if( shifts[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i -1] ) \ + ROTL(TK + i * 4, TK, ( 15 * i ) % 32); \ + \ + for( i = 0; i < 20; i++ ) \ + if( indexes[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i] != -1 ) { \ + RK[indexes[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i]] = TK[ i ]; \ + } \ +} + +static void camellia_feistel( const uint32_t x[2], const uint32_t k[2], + uint32_t z[2]) +{ + uint32_t I0, I1; + I0 = x[0] ^ k[0]; + I1 = x[1] ^ k[1]; + + I0 = ((uint32_t) SBOX1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( I0 )) << 24) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( I0 )) << 16) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( I0 )) << 8) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX4( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( I0 )) ); + I1 = ((uint32_t) SBOX2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( I1 )) << 24) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( I1 )) << 16) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX4( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( I1 )) << 8) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( I1 )) ); + + I0 ^= (I1 << 8) | (I1 >> 24); + I1 ^= (I0 << 16) | (I0 >> 16); + I0 ^= (I1 >> 8) | (I1 << 24); + I1 ^= (I0 >> 8) | (I0 << 24); + + z[0] ^= I1; + z[1] ^= I0; +} + +void mbedtls_camellia_init( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ) +{ + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_camellia_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_camellia_free( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_camellia_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Camellia key schedule (encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int idx; + size_t i; + uint32_t *RK; + unsigned char t[64]; + uint32_t SIGMA[6][2]; + uint32_t KC[16]; + uint32_t TK[20]; + + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + RK = ctx->rk; + + memset( t, 0, 64 ); + memset( RK, 0, sizeof(ctx->rk) ); + + switch( keybits ) + { + case 128: ctx->nr = 3; idx = 0; break; + case 192: + case 256: ctx->nr = 4; idx = 1; break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < keybits / 8; ++i ) + t[i] = key[i]; + + if( keybits == 192 ) { + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + t[24 + i] = ~t[16 + i]; + } + + /* + * Prepare SIGMA values + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) { + SIGMA[i][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( SIGMA_CHARS[i], 0 ); + SIGMA[i][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( SIGMA_CHARS[i], 4 ); + } + + /* + * Key storage in KC + * Order: KL, KR, KA, KB + */ + memset( KC, 0, sizeof(KC) ); + + /* Store KL, KR */ + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + KC[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( t, i * 4 ); + + /* Generate KA */ + for( i = 0; i < 4; ++i ) + KC[8 + i] = KC[i] ^ KC[4 + i]; + + camellia_feistel( KC + 8, SIGMA[0], KC + 10 ); + camellia_feistel( KC + 10, SIGMA[1], KC + 8 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 4; ++i ) + KC[8 + i] ^= KC[i]; + + camellia_feistel( KC + 8, SIGMA[2], KC + 10 ); + camellia_feistel( KC + 10, SIGMA[3], KC + 8 ); + + if( keybits > 128 ) { + /* Generate KB */ + for( i = 0; i < 4; ++i ) + KC[12 + i] = KC[4 + i] ^ KC[8 + i]; + + camellia_feistel( KC + 12, SIGMA[4], KC + 14 ); + camellia_feistel( KC + 14, SIGMA[5], KC + 12 ); + } + + /* + * Generating subkeys + */ + + /* Manipulating KL */ + SHIFT_AND_PLACE( idx, 0 ); + + /* Manipulating KR */ + if( keybits > 128 ) { + SHIFT_AND_PLACE( idx, 1 ); + } + + /* Manipulating KA */ + SHIFT_AND_PLACE( idx, 2 ); + + /* Manipulating KB */ + if( keybits > 128 ) { + SHIFT_AND_PLACE( idx, 3 ); + } + + /* Do transpositions */ + for( i = 0; i < 20; i++ ) { + if( transposes[idx][i] != -1 ) { + RK[32 + 12 * idx + i] = RK[transposes[idx][i]]; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Camellia key schedule (decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int idx, ret; + size_t i; + mbedtls_camellia_context cty; + uint32_t *RK; + uint32_t *SK; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + mbedtls_camellia_init( &cty ); + + /* Also checks keybits */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &cty, key, keybits ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ctx->nr = cty.nr; + idx = ( ctx->nr == 4 ); + + RK = ctx->rk; + SK = cty.rk + 24 * 2 + 8 * idx * 2; + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + + for( i = 22 + 8 * idx, SK -= 6; i > 0; i--, SK -= 4 ) + { + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + } + + SK -= 2; + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &cty ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Camellia-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int NR; + uint32_t *RK, X[4]; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + ( (void) mode ); + + NR = ctx->nr; + RK = ctx->rk; + + X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 8 ); + X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 12 ); + + X[0] ^= *RK++; + X[1] ^= *RK++; + X[2] ^= *RK++; + X[3] ^= *RK++; + + while( NR ) { + --NR; + camellia_feistel( X, RK, X + 2 ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X + 2, RK, X ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X, RK, X + 2 ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X + 2, RK, X ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X, RK, X + 2 ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X + 2, RK, X ); + RK += 2; + + if( NR ) { + FL(X[0], X[1], RK[0], RK[1]); + RK += 2; + FLInv(X[2], X[3], RK[0], RK[1]); + RK += 2; + } + } + + X[2] ^= *RK++; + X[3] ^= *RK++; + X[0] ^= *RK++; + X[1] ^= *RK++; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[2], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[3], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[0], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[1], output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * Camellia-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + unsigned char temp[16]; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( length % 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 16 ); + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); + memcpy( iv, output, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * Camellia-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c; + size_t n; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + if( n >= 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] ); + iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + else + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * Camellia-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c, i; + size_t n; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + if( n >= 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) { + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, + stream_block ); + + for( i = 16; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *nc_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Camellia test vectors from: + * + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/technology.html: + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/cryptrec/intermediate.txt + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/cryptrec/t_camellia.txt + * (For each bitlength: Key 0, Nr 39) + */ +#define CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB 2 + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_key[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][32] = +{ + { + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } + }, + { + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } + }, + { + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } + }, +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_plain[CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][16] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_cipher[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][16] = +{ + { + { 0x67, 0x67, 0x31, 0x38, 0x54, 0x96, 0x69, 0x73, + 0x08, 0x57, 0x06, 0x56, 0x48, 0xea, 0xbe, 0x43 }, + { 0x38, 0x3C, 0x6C, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0xDE, + 0x25, 0xCD, 0x47, 0x0B, 0xF7, 0x74, 0xA3, 0x31 } + }, + { + { 0xb4, 0x99, 0x34, 0x01, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xf8, + 0x4e, 0xe5, 0xce, 0xe7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0x09, 0xb9 }, + { 0xD1, 0x76, 0x3F, 0xC0, 0x19, 0xD7, 0x7C, 0xC9, + 0x30, 0xBF, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x6F, 0x7C, 0x93, 0x64 } + }, + { + { 0x9a, 0xcc, 0x23, 0x7d, 0xff, 0x16, 0xd7, 0x6c, + 0x20, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x91, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0x75, 0x09 }, + { 0x05, 0x03, 0xFB, 0x10, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0x7C, + 0xF4, 0x5D, 0x8C, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x47, 0x43, 0x35 } + } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC 3 + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_key[3][32] = +{ + { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, + 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C } + , + { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, + 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B } + , + { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, + 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, + 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_iv[16] = + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F } +; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_plain[CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC][16] = +{ + { 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, + 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A }, + { 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, + 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51 }, + { 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, + 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF } + +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_cipher[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC][16] = +{ + { + { 0x16, 0x07, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x36, 0xBB, 0xF0, + 0x0D, 0xAE, 0xB0, 0xB5, 0x03, 0xC8, 0x31, 0xAB }, + { 0xA2, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0x67, 0x16, 0x29, 0xEF, 0x78, + 0x40, 0xC5, 0xA5, 0xDF, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x48, 0x87 }, + { 0x0F, 0x06, 0x16, 0x50, 0x08, 0xCF, 0x8B, 0x8B, + 0x5A, 0x63, 0x58, 0x63, 0x62, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x54 } + }, + { + { 0x2A, 0x48, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x5A, 0xC4, 0xA1, 0xA2, + 0x40, 0x59, 0x55, 0xFD, 0x21, 0x95, 0xCF, 0x93 }, + { 0x5D, 0x5A, 0x86, 0x9B, 0xD1, 0x4C, 0xE5, 0x42, + 0x64, 0xF8, 0x92, 0xA6, 0xDD, 0x2E, 0xC3, 0xD5 }, + { 0x37, 0xD3, 0x59, 0xC3, 0x34, 0x98, 0x36, 0xD8, + 0x84, 0xE3, 0x10, 0xAD, 0xDF, 0x68, 0xC4, 0x49 } + }, + { + { 0xE6, 0xCF, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xC0, 0x2B, 0x13, 0x4A, + 0x4D, 0x2C, 0x0B, 0x67, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x3E, 0xDA }, + { 0x36, 0xCB, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x4B, 0x40, + 0x70, 0xB1, 0xB7, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0x21, 0xEB, 0x50 }, + { 0xE3, 0x1A, 0x60, 0x55, 0x29, 0x7D, 0x96, 0xCA, + 0x33, 0x30, 0xCD, 0xF1, 0xB1, 0x86, 0x0A, 0x83 } + } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * Camellia-CTR test vectors from: + * + * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc5528.html + */ + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_key[3][16] = +{ + { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC, + 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E }, + { 0x7E, 0x24, 0x06, 0x78, 0x17, 0xFA, 0xE0, 0xD7, + 0x43, 0xD6, 0xCE, 0x1F, 0x32, 0x53, 0x91, 0x63 }, + { 0x76, 0x91, 0xBE, 0x03, 0x5E, 0x50, 0x20, 0xA8, + 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0x6C, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x59, + 0xDA, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x27, 0x77, 0x7F, 0x3F, + 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = +{ + { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62, + 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_ct[3][48] = +{ + { 0xD0, 0x9D, 0xC2, 0x9A, 0x82, 0x14, 0x61, 0x9A, + 0x20, 0x87, 0x7C, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x0B, 0x3F }, + { 0xDB, 0xF3, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0xC0, 0x83, 0x96, 0xD4, + 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x90, 0x77, 0x65, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x44, + 0x2B, 0x8E, 0x8E, 0x0F, 0x31, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xA7, + 0x2C, 0x74, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x53, 0x60, 0xE0, 0x48 }, + { 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x1F, 0xCD, 0xCB, 0x75, 0xEB, 0x88, + 0x2F, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0x85, 0xCF, 0x73, + 0x9C, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0x73, 0xF1, + 0x4F, 0x2D, 0x5D, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x98, 0x89, 0xCD, + 0xDF, 0x50, 0x86, 0x96 } +}; + +static const int camellia_test_ctr_len[3] = + { 16, 32, 36 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, u, v; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char buf[64]; + unsigned char src[16]; + unsigned char dst[16]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char iv[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + size_t offset, len; + unsigned char nonce_counter[16]; + unsigned char stream_block[16]; +#endif + int ret = 1; + + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + + mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx ); + memset( key, 0, 32 ); + + for( j = 0; j < 6; j++ ) { + u = j >> 1; + v = j & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CAMELLIA-ECB-%3d (%s): ", 128 + u * 64, + (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + + for( i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB; i++ ) { + memcpy( key, camellia_test_ecb_key[u][i], 16 + 8 * u ); + + if( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) { + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, 128 + u * 64 ); + memcpy( src, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16 ); + } else { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, 128 + u * 64 ); + memcpy( src, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16 ); + } + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( &ctx, v, src, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, dst, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* + * CBC mode + */ + for( j = 0; j < 6; j++ ) + { + u = j >> 1; + v = j & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CAMELLIA-CBC-%3d (%s): ", 128 + u * 64, + ( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( src, camellia_test_cbc_iv, 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_cbc_iv, 16 ); + memcpy( key, camellia_test_cbc_key[u], 16 + 8 * u ); + + if( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) { + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, 128 + u * 64 ); + } else { + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, 128 + u * 64 ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC; i++ ) { + + if( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) { + memcpy( iv , src, 16 ); + memcpy( src, camellia_test_cbc_cipher[u][i], 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_cbc_plain[i], 16 ); + } else { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ + memcpy( iv , dst, 16 ); + memcpy( src, camellia_test_cbc_plain[i], 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_cbc_cipher[u][i], 16 ); + } + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 16, iv, src, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, dst, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + /* + * CTR mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + v = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CAMELLIA-CTR-128 (%s): ", + ( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( nonce_counter, camellia_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16 ); + memcpy( key, camellia_test_ctr_key[u], 16 ); + + offset = 0; + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, 128 ); + + if( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) + { + len = camellia_test_ctr_len[u]; + memcpy( buf, camellia_test_ctr_ct[u], len ); + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( &ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, stream_block, + buf, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, camellia_test_ctr_pt[u], len ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + else + { + len = camellia_test_ctr_len[u]; + memcpy( buf, camellia_test_ctr_pt[u], len ); + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( &ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, stream_block, + buf, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, camellia_test_ctr_ct[u], len ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ccm.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ccm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a21a37f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ccm.c @@ -0,0 +1,546 @@ +/* + * NIST SP800-38C compliant CCM implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Definition of CCM: + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf + * RFC 3610 "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)" + * + * Related: + * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption" + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) + +#define CCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ) +#define CCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define CCM_ENCRYPT 0 +#define CCM_DECRYPT 1 + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ) +{ + CCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + if( cipher_info->block_size != 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Macros for common operations. + * Results in smaller compiled code than static inline functions. + */ + +/* + * Update the CBC-MAC state in y using a block in b + * (Always using b as the source helps the compiler optimise a bit better.) + */ +#define UPDATE_CBC_MAC \ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) \ + y[i] ^= b[i]; \ + \ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, y, 16, y, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \ + return( ret ); + +/* + * Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR + * Warning: using b for temporary storage! src and dst must not be b! + * This avoids allocating one more 16 bytes buffer while allowing src == dst. + */ +#define CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, len ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr, \ + 16, b, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \ + { \ + return( ret ); \ + } \ + \ + for( i = 0; i < (len); i++ ) \ + (dst)[i] = (src)[i] ^ b[i]; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Authenticated encryption or decryption + */ +static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + unsigned char q; + size_t len_left, olen; + unsigned char b[16]; + unsigned char y[16]; + unsigned char ctr[16]; + const unsigned char *src; + unsigned char *dst; + + /* + * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1 + * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code. + * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block) + * + * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4). + */ + if( tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + /* Also implies q is within bounds */ + if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + if( add_len >= 0xFF00 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len; + + /* + * First block B_0: + * 0 .. 0 flags + * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) + * iv_len+1 .. 15 length + * + * With flags as (bits): + * 7 0 + * 6 add present? + * 5 .. 3 (t - 2) / 2 + * 2 .. 0 q - 1 + */ + b[0] = 0; + b[0] |= ( add_len > 0 ) << 6; + b[0] |= ( ( tag_len - 2 ) / 2 ) << 3; + b[0] |= q - 1; + + memcpy( b + 1, iv, iv_len ); + + for( i = 0, len_left = length; i < q; i++, len_left >>= 8 ) + b[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len_left ); + + if( len_left > 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + + /* Start CBC-MAC with first block */ + memset( y, 0, 16 ); + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + + /* + * If there is additional data, update CBC-MAC with + * add_len, add, 0 (padding to a block boundary) + */ + if( add_len > 0 ) + { + size_t use_len; + len_left = add_len; + src = add; + + memset( b, 0, 16 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( add_len, b, 0 ); + + use_len = len_left < 16 - 2 ? len_left : 16 - 2; + memcpy( b + 2, src, use_len ); + len_left -= use_len; + src += use_len; + + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + + while( len_left > 0 ) + { + use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left; + + memset( b, 0, 16 ); + memcpy( b, src, use_len ); + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + + len_left -= use_len; + src += use_len; + } + } + + /* + * Prepare counter block for encryption: + * 0 .. 0 flags + * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) + * iv_len+1 .. 15 counter (initially 1) + * + * With flags as (bits): + * 7 .. 3 0 + * 2 .. 0 q - 1 + */ + ctr[0] = q - 1; + memcpy( ctr + 1, iv, iv_len ); + memset( ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, q ); + ctr[15] = 1; + + /* + * Authenticate and {en,de}crypt the message. + * + * The only difference between encryption and decryption is + * the respective order of authentication and {en,de}cryption. + */ + len_left = length; + src = input; + dst = output; + + while( len_left > 0 ) + { + size_t use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left; + + if( mode == CCM_ENCRYPT ) + { + memset( b, 0, 16 ); + memcpy( b, src, use_len ); + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + } + + CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, use_len ); + + if( mode == CCM_DECRYPT ) + { + memset( b, 0, 16 ); + memcpy( b, dst, use_len ); + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + } + + dst += use_len; + src += use_len; + len_left -= use_len; + + /* + * Increment counter. + * No need to check for overflow thanks to the length check above. + */ + for( i = 0; i < q; i++ ) + if( ++ctr[15-i] != 0 ) + break; + } + + /* + * Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag + */ + for( i = 0; i < q; i++ ) + ctr[15-i] = 0; + + CTR_CRYPT( y, y, 16 ); + memcpy( tag, y, tag_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Authenticated encryption + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, + add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( tag_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + return( mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add, + add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Authenticated decryption + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + unsigned char i; + int diff; + + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, check_tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ ) + diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i]; + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + if( tag_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + return( mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add, + add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * Examples 1 to 3 from SP800-38C Appendix C + */ + +#define NB_TESTS 3 +#define CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN 24 +#define CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN 32 +/* + * The data is the same for all tests, only the used length changes + */ +static const unsigned char key_test_data[] = { + 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, + 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f +}; + +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[] = { + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b +}; + +static const unsigned char ad_test_data[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 +}; + +static const unsigned char msg_test_data[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN] = { + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, + 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, + 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, +}; + +static const size_t iv_len_test_data [NB_TESTS] = { 7, 8, 12 }; +static const size_t add_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 8, 16, 20 }; +static const size_t msg_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 16, 24 }; +static const size_t tag_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 6, 8 }; + +static const unsigned char res_test_data[NB_TESTS][CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN] = { + { 0x71, 0x62, 0x01, 0x5b, 0x4d, 0xac, 0x25, 0x5d }, + { 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0x51, 0xea, 0x5f, 0x62, + 0x08, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x92, 0x07, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x3d, + 0x1f, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xbf, 0xac, 0xcd }, + { 0xe3, 0xb2, 0x01, 0xa9, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x1a, 0x7a, + 0x9b, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xec, 0xcd, 0x97, 0xe7, 0x0b, + 0x61, 0x76, 0xaa, 0xd9, 0xa4, 0x42, 0x8a, 0xa5, + 0x48, 0x43, 0x92, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0x99, 0x51 } +}; + +int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + /* + * Some hardware accelerators require the input and output buffers + * would be in RAM, because the flash is not accessible. + * Use buffers on the stack to hold the test vectors data. + */ + unsigned char plaintext[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN]; + unsigned char ciphertext[CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN]; + size_t i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + if( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key_test_data, + 8 * sizeof key_test_data ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CCM: setup failed" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < NB_TESTS; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CCM-AES #%u: ", (unsigned int) i + 1 ); + + memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN ); + memset( ciphertext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN ); + memcpy( plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i] ); + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], + plaintext, ciphertext, + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i] ); + + if( ret != 0 || + memcmp( ciphertext, res_test_data[i], + msg_len_test_data[i] + tag_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN ); + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], + ciphertext, plaintext, + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i] ); + + if( ret != 0 || + memcmp( plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/certs.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/certs.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5695e3c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/certs.c @@ -0,0 +1,1746 @@ +/* + * X.509 test certificates + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + +/* + * Test CA Certificates + * + * We define test CA certificates for each choice of the following parameters: + * - PEM or DER encoding + * - SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash + * - RSA or EC key + * + * Things to add: + * - multiple EC curve types + * + */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIICBDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQAwPjELMAkGA1UE\r\n" \ + "BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0\r\n" \ + "IEVDIENBMB4XDTE5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFoXDTI5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFowPjELMAkGA1UE\r\n" \ + "BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0\r\n" \ + "IEVDIENBMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEw9orNEE3WC+HVv78ibopQ0tO\r\n" \ + "4G7DDldTMzlY1FK0kZU5CyPfXxckYkj8GpUpziwth8KIUoCv1mqrId240xxuWLjK\r\n" \ + "6LJpjvNBrSnDtF91p0dv1RkpVWmaUzsgtGYWYDMeo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/\r\n" \ + "MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSdbSAkSQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSdbSAk\r\n" \ + "SQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAA2gAMGUCMFHKrjAPpHB0BN1a\r\n" \ + "LH8TwcJ3vh0AxeKZj30mRdOKBmg/jLS3rU3g8VQBHpn8sOTTBwIxANxPO5AerimZ\r\n" \ + "hCjMe0d4CTHf1gFZMF70+IqEP+o5VHsIp2Cqvflb0VGWFC5l9a4cQg==\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x04, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x88, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, \ + 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, \ + 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, \ + 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, \ + 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, \ + 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, \ + 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, \ + 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, \ + 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, \ + 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, \ + 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, \ + 0x00, 0x22, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xda, 0x2b, 0x34, 0x41, 0x37, \ + 0x58, 0x2f, 0x87, 0x56, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x89, 0xba, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x4e, \ + 0xe0, 0x6e, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x57, 0x53, 0x33, 0x39, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xb4, \ + 0x91, 0x95, 0x39, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xdf, 0x5f, 0x17, 0x24, 0x62, 0x48, 0xfc, \ + 0x1a, 0x95, 0x29, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x87, 0xc2, 0x88, 0x52, 0x80, 0xaf, \ + 0xd6, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0x1c, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xb8, 0xca, \ + 0xe8, 0xb2, 0x69, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xad, 0x29, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x75, \ + 0xa7, 0x47, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x19, 0x29, 0x55, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x53, 0x3b, 0x20, \ + 0xb4, 0x66, 0x16, 0x60, 0x33, 0x1e, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, \ + 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x9d, \ + 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, \ + 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, \ + 0x49, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, \ + 0xdb, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ + 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, \ + 0x30, 0x51, 0xca, 0xae, 0x30, 0x0f, 0xa4, 0x70, 0x74, 0x04, 0xdd, 0x5a, \ + 0x2c, 0x7f, 0x13, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0x77, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x00, 0xc5, 0xe2, 0x99, \ + 0x8f, 0x7d, 0x26, 0x45, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x06, 0x68, 0x3f, 0x8c, 0xb4, 0xb7, \ + 0xad, 0x4d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0x54, 0x01, 0x1e, 0x99, 0xfc, 0xb0, 0xe4, 0xd3, \ + 0x07, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0xdc, 0x4f, 0x3b, 0x90, 0x1e, 0xae, 0x29, 0x99, \ + 0x84, 0x28, 0xcc, 0x7b, 0x47, 0x78, 0x09, 0x31, 0xdf, 0xd6, 0x01, 0x59, \ + 0x30, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0xf8, 0x8a, 0x84, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x39, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x08, \ + 0xa7, 0x60, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xf9, 0x5b, 0xd1, 0x51, 0x96, 0x14, 0x2e, 0x65, \ + 0xf5, 0xae, 0x1c, 0x42 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc */ +#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" \ + "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,307EAB469933D64E\r\n" \ + "\r\n" \ + "IxbrRmKcAzctJqPdTQLA4SWyBYYGYJVkYEna+F7Pa5t5Yg/gKADrFKcm6B72e7DG\r\n" \ + "ihExtZI648s0zdYw6qSJ74vrPSuWDe5qm93BqsfVH9svtCzWHW0pm1p0KTBCFfUq\r\n" \ + "UsuWTITwJImcnlAs1gaRZ3sAWm7cOUidL0fo2G0fYUFNcYoCSLffCFTEHBuPnagb\r\n" \ + "a77x/sY1Bvii8S9/XhDTb6pTMx06wzrm\r\n" \ + "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM "PolarSSLTest" + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der */ +#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x81, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x30, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x0e, \ + 0xa0, 0x71, 0xf0, 0x57, 0x10, 0x33, 0xa3, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x86, 0xc1, 0xa6, \ + 0x11, 0x5d, 0x6d, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xe1, 0x29, 0x76, 0x45, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x6f, \ + 0x23, 0xab, 0x44, 0x20, 0xea, 0x64, 0x7b, 0x85, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xe7, 0x85, \ + 0x95, 0xaa, 0x74, 0xd6, 0xd1, 0xa4, 0x5e, 0xea, 0xa0, 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, \ + 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0xa1, 0x64, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3, \ + 0xda, 0x2b, 0x34, 0x41, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2f, 0x87, 0x56, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x89, \ + 0xba, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x4e, 0xe0, 0x6e, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x57, 0x53, 0x33, \ + 0x39, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x91, 0x95, 0x39, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xdf, 0x5f, \ + 0x17, 0x24, 0x62, 0x48, 0xfc, 0x1a, 0x95, 0x29, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x87, \ + 0xc2, 0x88, 0x52, 0x80, 0xaf, 0xd6, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xb8, 0xd3, \ + 0x1c, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xb8, 0xca, 0xe8, 0xb2, 0x69, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xad, \ + 0x29, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x75, 0xa7, 0x47, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x19, 0x29, 0x55, \ + 0x69, 0x9a, 0x53, 0x3b, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x16, 0x60, 0x33, 0x1e \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ + "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ + "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ + "mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ + "50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ + "YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ + "R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ + "KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ + "UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/\r\n" \ + "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA\r\n" \ + "A4IBAQA4qFSCth2q22uJIdE4KGHJsJjVEfw2/xn+MkTvCMfxVrvmRvqCtjE4tKDl\r\n" \ + "oK4MxFOek07oDZwvtAT9ijn1hHftTNS7RH9zd/fxNpfcHnMZXVC4w4DNA1fSANtW\r\n" \ + "5sY1JB5Je9jScrsLSS+mAjyv0Ow3Hb2Bix8wu7xNNrV5fIf7Ubm+wt6SqEBxu3Kb\r\n" \ + "+EfObAT4huf3czznhH3C17ed6NSbXwoXfby7stWUDeRJv08RaFOykf/Aae7bY5PL\r\n" \ + "yTVrkAnikMntJ9YI+hNNYt3inqq11A5cN0+rVTst8UKCxzQ4GpvroSwPKTFkbMw4\r\n" \ + "/anT1dVxr/BtwJfiESoK3/4CeXR1\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt.der + * using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ + 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ + 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ + 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ + 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ + 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ + 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ + 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ + 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ + 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ + 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ + 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ + 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ + 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ + 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ + 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ + 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ + 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ + 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ + 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ + 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ + 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ + 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ + 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ + 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ + 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ + 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ + 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ + 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ + 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x38, 0xa8, 0x54, 0x82, 0xb6, 0x1d, 0xaa, \ + 0xdb, 0x6b, 0x89, 0x21, 0xd1, 0x38, 0x28, 0x61, 0xc9, 0xb0, 0x98, 0xd5, \ + 0x11, 0xfc, 0x36, 0xff, 0x19, 0xfe, 0x32, 0x44, 0xef, 0x08, 0xc7, 0xf1, \ + 0x56, 0xbb, 0xe6, 0x46, 0xfa, 0x82, 0xb6, 0x31, 0x38, 0xb4, 0xa0, 0xe5, \ + 0xa0, 0xae, 0x0c, 0xc4, 0x53, 0x9e, 0x93, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0x2f, \ + 0xb4, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x8a, 0x39, 0xf5, 0x84, 0x77, 0xed, 0x4c, 0xd4, 0xbb, \ + 0x44, 0x7f, 0x73, 0x77, 0xf7, 0xf1, 0x36, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x1e, 0x73, 0x19, \ + 0x5d, 0x50, 0xb8, 0xc3, 0x80, 0xcd, 0x03, 0x57, 0xd2, 0x00, 0xdb, 0x56, \ + 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x35, 0x24, 0x1e, 0x49, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xd2, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x0b, \ + 0x49, 0x2f, 0xa6, 0x02, 0x3c, 0xaf, 0xd0, 0xec, 0x37, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x81, \ + 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x30, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0x4d, 0x36, 0xb5, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x87, 0xfb, \ + 0x51, 0xb9, 0xbe, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x40, 0x71, 0xbb, 0x72, 0x9b, \ + 0xf8, 0x47, 0xce, 0x6c, 0x04, 0xf8, 0x86, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x3c, 0xe7, \ + 0x84, 0x7d, 0xc2, 0xd7, 0xb7, 0x9d, 0xe8, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0x5f, 0x0a, 0x17, \ + 0x7d, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x94, 0x0d, 0xe4, 0x49, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x11, \ + 0x68, 0x53, 0xb2, 0x91, 0xff, 0xc0, 0x69, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x63, 0x93, 0xcb, \ + 0xc9, 0x35, 0x6b, 0x90, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x90, 0xc9, 0xed, 0x27, 0xd6, 0x08, \ + 0xfa, 0x13, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xdd, 0xe2, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x0e, 0x5c, \ + 0x37, 0x4f, 0xab, 0x55, 0x3b, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0x42, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x34, 0x38, \ + 0x1a, 0x9b, 0xeb, 0xa1, 0x2c, 0x0f, 0x29, 0x31, 0x64, 0x6c, 0xcc, 0x38, \ + 0xfd, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x71, 0xaf, 0xf0, 0x6d, 0xc0, 0x97, 0xe2, \ + 0x11, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xdf, 0xfe, 0x02, 0x79, 0x74, 0x75 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ + "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ + "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ + "mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ + "50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ + "YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ + "R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ + "KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ + "UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/\r\n" \ + "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUA\r\n" \ + "A4IBAQABE3OEPfEd/bcJW5ZdU3/VgPNS4tMzh8gnJP/V2FcvFtGylMpQq6YnEBYI\r\n" \ + "yBHAL4DRvlMY5rnXGBp3ODR8MpqHC6AquRTCLzjS57iYff//4QFQqW9n92zctspv\r\n" \ + "czkaPKgjqo1No3Uq0Xaz10rcxyTUPrf5wNVRZ2V0KvllvAAVSzbI4mpdUXztjhST\r\n" \ + "S5A2BeWQAAOr0zq1F7TSRVJpJs7jmB2ai/igkh1IAjcuwV6VwlP+sbw0gjQ0NpGM\r\n" \ + "iHpnlzRAi/tIbtOvMIGOBU2TIfax/5jq1agUx5aPmT5TWAiJPOOP6l5xXnDwxeYS\r\n" \ + "NWqiX9GyusBZjezaCaHabjDLU0qQ\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ + 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ + 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ + 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ + 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ + 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ + 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ + 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ + 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ + 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ + 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ + 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ + 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ + 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ + 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ + 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ + 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ + 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ + 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ + 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ + 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ + 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ + 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ + 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ + 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ + 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ + 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ + 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ + 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ + 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x13, 0x73, 0x84, 0x3d, 0xf1, 0x1d, \ + 0xfd, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x5b, 0x96, 0x5d, 0x53, 0x7f, 0xd5, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x52, \ + 0xe2, 0xd3, 0x33, 0x87, 0xc8, 0x27, 0x24, 0xff, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0x57, 0x2f, \ + 0x16, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0x94, 0xca, 0x50, 0xab, 0xa6, 0x27, 0x10, 0x16, 0x08, \ + 0xc8, 0x11, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0xbe, 0x53, 0x18, 0xe6, 0xb9, 0xd7, \ + 0x18, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x38, 0x34, 0x7c, 0x32, 0x9a, 0x87, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0x2a, \ + 0xb9, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x38, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0xb8, 0x98, 0x7d, 0xff, 0xff, \ + 0xe1, 0x01, 0x50, 0xa9, 0x6f, 0x67, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0xdc, 0xb6, 0xca, 0x6f, \ + 0x73, 0x39, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xa8, 0x23, 0xaa, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0x75, 0x2a, \ + 0xd1, 0x76, 0xb3, 0xd7, 0x4a, 0xdc, 0xc7, 0x24, 0xd4, 0x3e, 0xb7, 0xf9, \ + 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x51, 0x67, 0x65, 0x74, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x65, 0xbc, 0x00, 0x15, \ + 0x4b, 0x36, 0xc8, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x5d, 0x51, 0x7c, 0xed, 0x8e, 0x14, 0x93, \ + 0x4b, 0x90, 0x36, 0x05, 0xe5, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0xab, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0xb5, \ + 0x17, 0xb4, 0xd2, 0x45, 0x52, 0x69, 0x26, 0xce, 0xe3, 0x98, 0x1d, 0x9a, \ + 0x8b, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x92, 0x1d, 0x48, 0x02, 0x37, 0x2e, 0xc1, 0x5e, 0x95, \ + 0xc2, 0x53, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xbc, 0x34, 0x82, 0x34, 0x34, 0x36, 0x91, 0x8c, \ + 0x88, 0x7a, 0x67, 0x97, 0x34, 0x40, 0x8b, 0xfb, 0x48, 0x6e, 0xd3, 0xaf, \ + 0x30, 0x81, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x21, 0xf6, 0xb1, 0xff, 0x98, 0xea, \ + 0xd5, 0xa8, 0x14, 0xc7, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x99, 0x3e, 0x53, 0x58, 0x08, 0x89, \ + 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x8f, 0xea, 0x5e, 0x71, 0x5e, 0x70, 0xf0, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0x12, \ + 0x35, 0x6a, 0xa2, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0xba, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x8d, 0xec, 0xda, \ + 0x09, 0xa1, 0xda, 0x6e, 0x30, 0xcb, 0x53, 0x4a, 0x90 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca.key */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca.key */ +#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" \ + "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,A8A95B05D5B7206B\r\n" \ + "\r\n" \ + "9Qd9GeArejl1GDVh2lLV1bHt0cPtfbh5h/5zVpAVaFpqtSPMrElp50Rntn9et+JA\r\n" \ + "7VOyboR+Iy2t/HU4WvA687k3Bppe9GwKHjHhtl//8xFKwZr3Xb5yO5JUP8AUctQq\r\n" \ + "Nb8CLlZyuUC+52REAAthdWgsX+7dJO4yabzUcQ22Tp9JSD0hiL43BlkWYUNK3dAo\r\n" \ + "PZlmiptjnzVTjg1MxsBSydZinWOLBV8/JQgxSPo2yD4uEfig28qbvQ2wNIn0pnAb\r\n" \ + "GxnSAOazkongEGfvcjIIs+LZN9gXFhxcOh6kc4Q/c99B7QWETwLLkYgZ+z1a9VY9\r\n" \ + "gEU7CwCxYCD+h9hY6FPmsK0/lC4O7aeRKpYq00rPPxs6i7phiexg6ax6yTMmArQq\r\n" \ + "QmK3TAsJm8V/J5AWpLEV6jAFgRGymGGHnof0DXzVWZidrcZJWTNuGEX90nB3ee2w\r\n" \ + "PXJEFWKoD3K3aFcSLdHYr3mLGxP7H9ThQai9VsycxZKS5kwvBKQ//YMrmFfwPk8x\r\n" \ + "vTeY4KZMaUrveEel5tWZC94RSMKgxR6cyE1nBXyTQnDOGbfpNNgBKxyKbINWoOJU\r\n" \ + "WJZAwlsQn+QzCDwpri7+sV1mS3gBE6UY7aQmnmiiaC2V3Hbphxct/en5QsfDOt1X\r\n" \ + "JczSfpRWLlbPznZg8OQh/VgCMA58N5DjOzTIK7sJJ5r+94ZBTCpgAMbF588f0NTR\r\n" \ + "KCe4yrxGJR7X02M4nvD4IwOlpsQ8xQxZtOSgXv4LkxvdU9XJJKWZ/XNKJeWztxSe\r\n" \ + "Z1vdTc2YfsDBA2SEv33vxHx2g1vqtw8SjDRT2RaQSS0QuSaMJimdOX6mTOCBKk1J\r\n" \ + "9Q5mXTrER+/LnK0jEmXsBXWA5bqqVZIyahXSx4VYZ7l7w/PHiUDtDgyRhMMKi4n2\r\n" \ + "iQvQcWSQTjrpnlJbca1/DkpRt3YwrvJwdqb8asZU2VrNETh5x0QVefDRLFiVpif/\r\n" \ + "tUaeAe/P1F8OkS7OIZDs1SUbv/sD2vMbhNkUoCms3/PvNtdnvgL4F0zhaDpKCmlT\r\n" \ + "P8vx49E7v5CyRNmED9zZg4o3wmMqrQO93PtTug3Eu9oVx1zPQM1NVMyBa2+f29DL\r\n" \ + "1nuTCeXdo9+ni45xx+jAI4DCwrRdhJ9uzZyC6962H37H6D+5naNvClFR1s6li1Gb\r\n" \ + "nqPoiy/OBsEx9CaDGcqQBp5Wme/3XW+6z1ISOx+igwNTVCT14mHdBMbya0eIKft5\r\n" \ + "X+GnwtgEMyCYyyWuUct8g4RzErcY9+yW9Om5Hzpx4zOuW4NPZgPDTgK+t2RSL/Yq\r\n" \ + "rE1njrgeGYcVeG3f+OftH4s6fPbq7t1A5ZgUscbLMBqr9tK+OqygR4EgKBPsH6Cz\r\n" \ + "L6zlv/2RV0qAHvVuDJcIDIgwY5rJtINEm32rhOeFNJwZS5MNIC1czXZx5//ugX7l\r\n" \ + "I4sy5nbVhwSjtAk8Xg5dZbdTZ6mIrb7xqH+fdakZor1khG7bC2uIwibD3cSl2XkR\r\n" \ + "wN48lslbHnqqagr6Xm1nNOSVl8C/6kbJEsMpLhAezfRtGwvOucoaE+WbeUNolGde\r\n" \ + "P/eQiddSf0brnpiLJRh7qZrl9XuqYdpUqnoEdMAfotDOID8OtV7gt8a48ad8VPW2\r\n" \ + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM "PolarSSLTest" + +/* This was generated from test-ca.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/test-ca.key.der */ +#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ + 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, 0x86, 0xde, \ + 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, 0x99, 0xd4, \ + 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, 0x9b, 0xc5, \ + 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, 0xc0, 0x8d, \ + 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, 0x93, 0xe8, \ + 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, 0xe7, 0x40, \ + 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, 0xf9, 0x3e, \ + 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, 0x29, 0x00, \ + 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, 0xbd, 0x83, \ + 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, 0x60, 0xc3, \ + 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, 0x32, 0xbe, \ + 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, 0xfb, 0xf5, \ + 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, 0xee, 0xe2, \ + 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x47, 0xb1, \ + 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, 0xf1, 0x79, \ + 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x27, \ + 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, 0xa1, 0x30, \ + 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xd1, \ + 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, 0x09, 0xea, \ + 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, 0xc9, 0xab, \ + 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, 0x9e, 0x99, \ + 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x00, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x34, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0xc9, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x84, \ + 0xdc, 0x37, 0x45, 0xe1, 0x63, 0xad, 0xb8, 0xb6, 0x75, 0xb1, 0xc7, 0x35, \ + 0xb4, 0x77, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x77, 0xf9, 0x7e, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0xd1, 0xb7, \ + 0xcb, 0xa9, 0x5a, 0xc1, 0x87, 0xda, 0x5a, 0xfa, 0x17, 0xe4, 0xd5, 0x38, \ + 0x03, 0xde, 0x68, 0x98, 0x81, 0xec, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xe9, 0x2c, \ + 0xf3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x32, 0x17, 0x7f, 0x33, 0x81, 0xe8, 0x38, 0x72, 0xd5, \ + 0x9c, 0xfa, 0x4e, 0xfb, 0x26, 0xf5, 0x15, 0x0b, 0xaf, 0x84, 0x66, 0xab, \ + 0x02, 0xe0, 0x18, 0xd5, 0x91, 0x7c, 0xd6, 0x8f, 0xc9, 0x4b, 0x76, 0x08, \ + 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x81, 0x68, 0x30, 0xe1, 0xfa, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x10, \ + 0x03, 0x35, 0x3e, 0xc5, 0xca, 0x58, 0x20, 0x8a, 0x21, 0x18, 0x38, 0xa0, \ + 0x0f, 0xed, 0xc4, 0xbb, 0x45, 0x6f, 0xf5, 0x84, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x4e, \ + 0x9d, 0x58, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x35, 0x35, 0x69, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0xc4, 0xf2, 0xc1, \ + 0x48, 0x04, 0x20, 0x51, 0xb9, 0x6b, 0xa4, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x84, 0x88, \ + 0x43, 0x48, 0x99, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0xa4, 0x97, 0xd6, 0xd6, 0x18, 0xf6, 0xec, \ + 0x5c, 0xd1, 0x31, 0x49, 0xc9, 0xf2, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0x4d, 0xef, 0x09, 0x02, \ + 0xfe, 0x7d, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0xaf, 0x2b, 0x83, 0x94, 0x22, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x3e, \ + 0x66, 0xf5, 0xe0, 0x57, 0xdc, 0xf2, 0xed, 0x2c, 0x3e, 0x81, 0x74, 0x76, \ + 0x1e, 0x96, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x1e, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x14, 0x31, 0xd0, 0x74, 0xf0, \ + 0xf4, 0x07, 0xbd, 0xc3, 0xd1, 0x22, 0xc2, 0xa8, 0x95, 0x92, 0x06, 0x7f, \ + 0x43, 0x02, 0x91, 0xbc, 0xdd, 0x23, 0x01, 0x89, 0x94, 0x20, 0x44, 0x64, \ + 0xf5, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xe8, 0x69, 0xa5, 0x29, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x50, \ + 0x9c, 0xe3, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x75, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x29, 0x3e, \ + 0xaa, 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x59, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0xe6, 0x47, 0xd5, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0xe3, \ + 0xf1, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0xe9, 0x83, 0x5f, 0x10, 0x9f, 0x63, 0xec, 0x04, 0x44, \ + 0xcc, 0x3f, 0xf8, 0xd9, 0x3a, 0x17, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0xfe, 0xd8, 0x4d, 0xcd, \ + 0x46, 0x54, 0x74, 0xbf, 0x0a, 0xc4, 0x67, 0x9c, 0xa7, 0xd8, 0x89, 0x65, \ + 0x4c, 0xfd, 0x58, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x0f, 0xf4, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x55, 0xb0, 0x1d, \ + 0xed, 0xa7, 0x39, 0xfc, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x75, 0x3a, 0xa3, 0x98, 0xa7, \ + 0x45, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x65, 0xfb, 0x80, 0x23, 0xe6, 0xff, 0xfd, \ + 0x99, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0x6b, 0xff, 0x5e, 0x93, 0x66, 0xdf, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0xc3, \ + 0xf6, 0x38, 0x2e, 0xff, 0x69, 0xb5, 0xac, 0xae, 0xbb, 0xc6, 0x71, 0x16, \ + 0x6b, 0xd0, 0xf8, 0x22, 0xd9, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x20, 0xd2, 0xe2, 0x3a, \ + 0x70, 0x4b, 0xde, 0xab, 0x2f, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xda, 0x51, 0x9b, \ + 0xb8, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0x14, 0x75, 0x58, 0x40, 0x8d, 0x27, 0x70, 0xfa, 0x31, \ + 0x48, 0xb0, 0x20, 0x21, 0x34, 0xfa, 0x4c, 0x57, 0xa8, 0x11, 0x88, 0xf3, \ + 0xa7, 0xae, 0x21, 0xe9, 0xb6, 0x2b, 0xd1, 0xcd, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xd8, 0x0c, \ + 0x8a, 0x76, 0x22, 0x35, 0x44, 0xce, 0x3f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x79, \ + 0xa7, 0x31, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x34, 0xb6, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0x3b, \ + 0xf3, 0x78, 0x5a, 0x04, 0x83, 0x33, 0x3e, 0xa2, 0xe2, 0x81, 0x82, 0x13, \ + 0xd4, 0x35, 0x17, 0x63, 0x9b, 0x9e, 0xc4, 0x8d, 0x91, 0x4c, 0x03, 0x77, \ + 0xc7, 0x71, 0x5b, 0xee, 0x83, 0x6d, 0xd5, 0x78, 0x88, 0xf6, 0x2c, 0x79, \ + 0xc2, 0x4a, 0xb4, 0x79, 0x90, 0x70, 0xbf, 0xdf, 0x34, 0x56, 0x96, 0x71, \ + 0xe3, 0x0e, 0x68, 0x91, 0xbc, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xbe, 0x45, 0xd7, \ + 0xfc, 0x30, 0xfd, 0x01, 0x3b, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd2, 0x9f, 0x2a, \ + 0xb7, 0x38, 0x19, 0xc7, 0x17, 0x95, 0x73, 0x78, 0xae, 0xf5, 0xcb, 0x75, \ + 0x83, 0x7f, 0x19, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x86, 0xfb, 0x4a, 0x15, 0x9a, 0xb6, 0x17, \ + 0x04, 0x49, 0x07, 0x8d, 0xf6, 0x66, 0x4a, 0x06, 0xf6, 0x05, 0xa7, 0xdf, \ + 0x66, 0x82, 0x3c, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1d, 0x57, 0x89, 0x33, 0x5f, 0x9c, 0x05, \ + 0x75, 0x7f, 0xf3, 0x5d, 0xdc, 0x34, 0x65, 0x72, 0x85, 0x22, 0xa4, 0x14, \ + 0x1b, 0x41, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xd0, 0x9e, 0x69, 0xd5, 0xeb, 0x38, 0x74, 0x70, \ + 0x43, 0xdc, 0xd9, 0x50, 0xe4, 0x97, 0x6d, 0x73, 0xd6, 0xfb, 0xc8, 0xa7, \ + 0xfa, 0xb4, 0xc2, 0xc4, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0x0c, 0xd5, 0x9f, 0x79, 0xb3, 0x54, \ + 0xc2, 0xb7, 0x6c, 0x3d, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x78, 0x5a, \ + 0x33, 0x2a, 0xb8, 0x0c, 0x6d, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xf2, 0x62, 0xd3, 0x42, 0xd0, \ + 0xbd, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0xa5, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd4, 0xa9, 0x90, \ + 0x15, 0xde, 0xbf, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xfb, 0xa1, 0xc2, 0xe4, 0x83, \ + 0xe3, 0x79, 0x65, 0x22, 0xd3, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x6c, 0x4d, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x22, \ + 0xb1, 0x60, 0xe7, 0x3a, 0x00, 0xb1, 0x38, 0xa2, 0xab, 0x0f, 0xb4, 0x6c, \ + 0xaa, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x34, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0x40, 0x78, 0x53, 0xb2, 0xf9, 0x23, \ + 0xea, 0xa0, 0x9a, 0xea, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0xa6, 0xaf, 0xdf, 0x29, 0x09, \ + 0x4b, 0x06, 0x1e, 0x31, 0xad, 0x17, 0xda, 0xd8, 0xd1, 0xe9, 0x33, 0xab, \ + 0x5b, 0x18, 0x08, 0x5b, 0x87, 0xf8, 0xa5, 0x1f, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0xdc, 0xd8, \ + 0xed, 0x97, 0x57, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x73, 0xd6, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x01, 0xa6, 0x9b, \ + 0x48, 0x8e, 0x7a, 0xb4, 0xbb, 0xe5, 0x88, 0x91, 0xc5, 0x2a, 0xdf, 0x4b, \ + 0xba, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0x03, 0x97, 0x77, 0x2f, 0x47, 0x7e, 0x51, 0x0c, \ + 0xae, 0x65, 0x8d, 0xde, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x20, 0x24, 0x0f, 0xd2, \ + 0xaf, 0xc2, 0x28, 0x3b, 0x97, 0x20, 0xb2, 0x92, 0x49, 0xeb, 0x09, 0x68, \ + 0x40, 0xb2, 0xbe, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x83, 0x94, 0x34, 0x38, 0xd6, 0xc9, 0xec, \ + 0x34, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x41, 0x6d, 0x5c, 0x42, 0x94, 0xf7, 0x04, 0xfc, 0x32, \ + 0x39, 0x69, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0xfb, 0x3e, 0x61, 0x98, 0xc0, 0x80, 0xd8, 0x36, \ + 0x47, 0xc3, 0x6d, 0xc2, 0x2e, 0xe7, 0x81, 0x2a, 0x17, 0x34, 0x64, 0x30, \ + 0x4e, 0x96, 0xbb, 0x26, 0x16, 0xb9, 0x41, 0x36, 0xfe, 0x8a, 0xd6, 0x53, \ + 0x7c, 0xaa, 0xec, 0x39, 0x42, 0x50, 0xef, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0x01, 0x28, 0x32, \ + 0xca, 0x6d, 0xf5, 0x9a, 0x1e, 0x9f, 0x37, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0x38, 0x20, 0x22, \ + 0x91, 0x8c, 0xcd, 0x95, 0x02, 0xf2, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x1a, 0xb4, 0x43, 0xf0, \ + 0x19, 0xdf, 0x65, 0xc0, 0x92, 0xe7, 0x9d, 0x2f, 0x09, 0xe7, 0xec, 0x69, \ + 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x8f, 0x0d \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* + * Test server Certificates + * + * Test server certificates are defined for each choice + * of the following parameters: + * - PEM or DER encoding + * - SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash + * - RSA or EC key + * + * Things to add: + * - multiple EC curve types + */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server5.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/server5.crt */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIICHzCCAaWgAwIBAgIBCTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1BvbGFyc3NsIFRlc3QgRUMgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTMwOTI0MTU1MjA0WhcNMjMwOTIyMTU1MjA0WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMTCWxvY2FsaG9zdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEG\r\n" \ + "CCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDfMVtl2CR5acj7HWS3/IG7ufPkGkXTQrRS192giWWKSTuUA\r\n" \ + "2CMR/+ov0jRdXRa9iojCa3cNVc2KKg76Aci07f+jgZ0wgZowCQYDVR0TBAIwADAd\r\n" \ + "BgNVHQ4EFgQUUGGlj9QH2deCAQzlZX+MY0anE74wbgYDVR0jBGcwZYAUnW0gJEkB\r\n" \ + "PyvLeLUZvH4kydv7NnyhQqRAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xh\r\n" \ + "clNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQYIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAoG\r\n" \ + "CCqGSM49BAMCA2gAMGUCMQCaLFzXptui5WQN8LlO3ddh1hMxx6tzgLvT03MTVK2S\r\n" \ + "C12r0Lz3ri/moSEpNZWqPjkCMCE2f53GXcYLqyfyJR078c/xNSUU5+Xxl7VZ414V\r\n" \ + "fGa5kHvHARBPc8YAIVIqDvHH1Q==\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/server5.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/server5.crt.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xa5, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x09, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ + 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, \ + 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ + 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x33, 0x30, 0x39, 0x32, 0x34, 0x31, 0x35, 0x35, 0x32, 0x30, 0x34, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x33, 0x30, 0x39, 0x32, 0x32, 0x31, 0x35, 0x35, \ + 0x32, 0x30, 0x34, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, \ + 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x59, \ + 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, \ + 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, \ + 0x04, 0x37, 0xcc, 0x56, 0xd9, 0x76, 0x09, 0x1e, 0x5a, 0x72, 0x3e, 0xc7, \ + 0x59, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x20, 0x6e, 0xee, 0x7c, 0xf9, 0x06, 0x91, 0x74, 0xd0, \ + 0xad, 0x14, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x68, 0x22, 0x59, 0x62, 0x92, 0x4e, 0xe5, 0x00, \ + 0xd8, 0x23, 0x11, 0xff, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xd2, 0x34, 0x5d, 0x5d, 0x16, 0xbd, \ + 0x8a, 0x88, 0xc2, 0x6b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0x55, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xfa, \ + 0x01, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0xed, 0xff, 0xa3, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x30, 0x81, 0x9a, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x50, 0x61, 0xa5, \ + 0x8f, 0xd4, 0x07, 0xd9, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0c, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x8c, \ + 0x63, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x13, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x6e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, \ + 0x04, 0x67, 0x30, 0x65, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, \ + 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, \ + 0x36, 0x7c, 0xa1, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x40, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ + 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ + 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x03, 0x13, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, \ + 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x82, 0x09, \ + 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, \ + 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, \ + 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0x9a, 0x2c, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0xa6, 0xdb, 0xa2, \ + 0xe5, 0x64, 0x0d, 0xf0, 0xb9, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd7, 0x61, 0xd6, 0x13, 0x31, \ + 0xc7, 0xab, 0x73, 0x80, 0xbb, 0xd3, 0xd3, 0x73, 0x13, 0x54, 0xad, 0x92, \ + 0x0b, 0x5d, 0xab, 0xd0, 0xbc, 0xf7, 0xae, 0x2f, 0xe6, 0xa1, 0x21, 0x29, \ + 0x35, 0x95, 0xaa, 0x3e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x30, 0x21, 0x36, 0x7f, 0x9d, 0xc6, \ + 0x5d, 0xc6, 0x0b, 0xab, 0x27, 0xf2, 0x25, 0x1d, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xcf, 0xf1, \ + 0x35, 0x25, 0x14, 0xe7, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x97, 0xb5, 0x59, 0xe3, 0x5e, 0x15, \ + 0x7c, 0x66, 0xb9, 0x90, 0x7b, 0xc7, 0x01, 0x10, 0x4f, 0x73, 0xc6, 0x00, \ + 0x21, 0x52, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xf1, 0xc7, 0xd5 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server5.key. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/server5.key */ +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "MHcCAQEEIPEqEyB2AnCoPL/9U/YDHvdqXYbIogTywwyp6/UfDw6noAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" \ + "AwEHoUQDQgAEN8xW2XYJHlpyPsdZLf8gbu58+QaRdNCtFLX3aCJZYpJO5QDYIxH/\r\n" \ + "6i/SNF1dFr2KiMJrdw1VzYoqDvoByLTt/w==\r\n" \ + "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/server5.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/server5.key.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xf1, 0x2a, 0x13, 0x20, 0x76, \ + 0x02, 0x70, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xbf, 0xfd, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x03, 0x1e, 0xf7, 0x6a, \ + 0x5d, 0x86, 0xc8, 0xa2, 0x04, 0xf2, 0xc3, 0x0c, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0x1f, \ + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x37, 0xcc, 0x56, \ + 0xd9, 0x76, 0x09, 0x1e, 0x5a, 0x72, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0x59, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x20, \ + 0x6e, 0xee, 0x7c, 0xf9, 0x06, 0x91, 0x74, 0xd0, 0xad, 0x14, 0xb5, 0xf7, \ + 0x68, 0x22, 0x59, 0x62, 0x92, 0x4e, 0xe5, 0x00, 0xd8, 0x23, 0x11, 0xff, \ + 0xea, 0x2f, 0xd2, 0x34, 0x5d, 0x5d, 0x16, 0xbd, 0x8a, 0x88, 0xc2, 0x6b, \ + 0x77, 0x0d, 0x55, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xfa, 0x01, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0xed, \ + 0xff \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ + "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ + "AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ + "owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ + "NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ + "tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ + "hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ + "HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ + "VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ + "FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC465FJh\r\n" \ + "Pqel7zJngHIHJrqj/wVAxGAFOTF396XKATGAp+HRCqJ81Ry60CNK1jDzk8dv6M6U\r\n" \ + "HoS7RIFiM/9rXQCbJfiPD5xMTejZp5n5UYHAmxsxDaazfA5FuBhkfokKK6jD4Eq9\r\n" \ + "1C94xGKb6X4/VkaPF7cqoBBw/bHxawXc0UEPjqayiBpCYU/rJoVZgLqFVP7Px3sv\r\n" \ + "a1nOrNx8rPPI1hJ+ZOg8maiPTxHZnBVLakSSLQy/sWeWyazO1RnrbxjrbgQtYKz0\r\n" \ + "e3nwGpu1w13vfckFmUSBhHXH7AAS/HpKC4IH7G2GAk3+n8iSSN71sZzpxonQwVbo\r\n" \ + "pMZqLmbBm/7WPLc=\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt.der. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x37, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, \ + 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, \ + 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, \ + 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, \ + 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, \ + 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, \ + 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, \ + 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, \ + 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, \ + 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, \ + 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, \ + 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, \ + 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, \ + 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, \ + 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, \ + 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, \ + 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, \ + 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, \ + 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, \ + 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, \ + 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, \ + 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, \ + 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, \ + 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xa5, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xb8, 0xdc, \ + 0xdf, 0x60, 0x0f, 0x50, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x60, 0xa8, 0x64, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0x8b, \ + 0x43, 0x93, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, \ + 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, \ + 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, \ + 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, \ + 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x2e, 0x3a, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x61, \ + 0x3e, 0xa7, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x32, 0x67, 0x80, 0x72, 0x07, 0x26, 0xba, 0xa3, \ + 0xff, 0x05, 0x40, 0xc4, 0x60, 0x05, 0x39, 0x31, 0x77, 0xf7, 0xa5, 0xca, \ + 0x01, 0x31, 0x80, 0xa7, 0xe1, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x1c, 0xba, \ + 0xd0, 0x23, 0x4a, 0xd6, 0x30, 0xf3, 0x93, 0xc7, 0x6f, 0xe8, 0xce, 0x94, \ + 0x1e, 0x84, 0xbb, 0x44, 0x81, 0x62, 0x33, 0xff, 0x6b, 0x5d, 0x00, 0x9b, \ + 0x25, 0xf8, 0x8f, 0x0f, 0x9c, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0xe8, 0xd9, 0xa7, 0x99, 0xf9, \ + 0x51, 0x81, 0xc0, 0x9b, 0x1b, 0x31, 0x0d, 0xa6, 0xb3, 0x7c, 0x0e, 0x45, \ + 0xb8, 0x18, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x89, 0x0a, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0xc3, 0xe0, 0x4a, 0xbd, \ + 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x78, 0xc4, 0x62, 0x9b, 0xe9, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x56, 0x46, 0x8f, \ + 0x17, 0xb7, 0x2a, 0xa0, 0x10, 0x70, 0xfd, 0xb1, 0xf1, 0x6b, 0x05, 0xdc, \ + 0xd1, 0x41, 0x0f, 0x8e, 0xa6, 0xb2, 0x88, 0x1a, 0x42, 0x61, 0x4f, 0xeb, \ + 0x26, 0x85, 0x59, 0x80, 0xba, 0x85, 0x54, 0xfe, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0x7b, 0x2f, \ + 0x6b, 0x59, 0xce, 0xac, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0xac, 0xf3, 0xc8, 0xd6, 0x12, 0x7e, \ + 0x64, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xa8, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0x11, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0x15, 0x4b, \ + 0x6a, 0x44, 0x92, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xbf, 0xb1, 0x67, 0x96, 0xc9, 0xac, 0xce, \ + 0xd5, 0x19, 0xeb, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x2d, 0x60, 0xac, 0xf4, \ + 0x7b, 0x79, 0xf0, 0x1a, 0x9b, 0xb5, 0xc3, 0x5d, 0xef, 0x7d, 0xc9, 0x05, \ + 0x99, 0x44, 0x81, 0x84, 0x75, 0xc7, 0xec, 0x00, 0x12, 0xfc, 0x7a, 0x4a, \ + 0x0b, 0x82, 0x07, 0xec, 0x6d, 0x86, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xfe, 0x9f, 0xc8, 0x92, \ + 0x48, 0xde, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0x89, 0xd0, 0xc1, 0x56, 0xe8, \ + 0xa4, 0xc6, 0x6a, 0x2e, 0x66, 0xc1, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0xd6, 0x3c, 0xb7 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM tests/data_files/server2.crt */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ +"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ +"MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ +"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ +"MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ +"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ +"AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ +"owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ +"NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ +"tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ +"hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ +"HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ +"VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ +"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJklg3Q4\r\n" \ +"cB7v7BzsxM/vLyKccO6op0/gZzM4ghuLq2Y32kl0sM6kSNUUmduuq3u/+GmUZN2A\r\n" \ +"O/7c+Hw7hDFEIvZk98aBGjCLqn3DmgHIv8ToQ67nellQxx2Uj309PdgjNi/r9HOc\r\n" \ +"KNAYPbBcg6MJGWWj2TI6vNaceios/DhOYx5V0j5nfqSJ/pnU0g9Ign2LAhgYpGJE\r\n" \ +"iEM9wW7hEMkwmk0h/sqZsrJsGH5YsF/VThSq/JVO1e2mZH2vruyZKJVBq+8tDNYp\r\n" \ +"HkK6tSyVYQhzIt3StMJWKMl/o5k2AYz6tSC164+1oG+ML3LWg8XrGKa91H4UOKap\r\n" \ +"Awgk0+4m0T25cNs=\r\n" \ +"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt.der. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/server2.crt.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x37, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, \ + 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, \ + 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, \ + 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, \ + 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, \ + 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, \ + 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, \ + 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, \ + 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, \ + 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, \ + 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, \ + 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, \ + 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, \ + 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, \ + 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, \ + 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, \ + 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, \ + 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, \ + 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, \ + 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, \ + 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, \ + 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, \ + 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, \ + 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xa5, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xb8, 0xdc, \ + 0xdf, 0x60, 0x0f, 0x50, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x60, 0xa8, 0x64, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0x8b, \ + 0x43, 0x93, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, \ + 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, \ + 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, \ + 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ + 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x73, 0x0b, 0x4a, 0xc5, \ + 0xcb, 0xa0, 0xde, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x1c, 0x76, 0x04, 0x2b, 0x13, 0x0d, 0xc0, \ + 0x84, 0x11, 0xc5, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x35, 0x7a, 0x77, 0xb8, \ + 0x20, 0x14, 0x82, 0xee, 0x54, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xb0, 0x52, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xce, \ + 0x59, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x51, 0x69, 0xfe, 0xd3, 0x2f, 0xe9, 0x09, 0xe7, 0x85, \ + 0x92, 0xd8, 0xba, 0xb1, 0xeb, 0xc5, 0x76, 0x5d, 0x61, 0x2d, 0xe9, 0x86, \ + 0xb5, 0xde, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x3f, 0x53, 0x28, 0x42, 0x86, 0x83, 0x73, 0x43, \ + 0xe0, 0x04, 0x5f, 0x07, 0x90, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9f, 0x6e, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xbc, \ + 0x58, 0x19, 0x22, 0xc2, 0xeb, 0x39, 0x72, 0x51, 0x92, 0xd7, 0xb4, 0x1d, \ + 0x75, 0x2f, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0x2b, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xdb, 0x50, 0xae, 0xe2, 0xf1, \ + 0xd4, 0x4d, 0x5b, 0x3c, 0xbb, 0x41, 0x2b, 0x2a, 0xa4, 0xe2, 0x4a, 0x02, \ + 0xe5, 0x60, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0xa6, 0xcc, 0x06, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x89, \ + 0x4e, 0x96, 0x30, 0x22, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0x58, 0x4d, 0xc3, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x6e, \ + 0x50, 0x1e, 0x8c, 0x65, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0x17, 0x35, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x43, 0xb2, \ + 0x29, 0xb7, 0xa8, 0x5e, 0x35, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x60, 0x42, 0x1a, 0x01, 0xcb, \ + 0xcb, 0x0b, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc1, 0x90, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xd1, 0x2c, \ + 0x02, 0xf4, 0x76, 0x41, 0xa4, 0xcb, 0x4b, 0x15, 0x98, 0x71, 0xf9, 0x35, \ + 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x34, 0x96, 0x91, 0xbe, 0x32, 0x67, 0x2d, 0x6b, \ + 0xd3, 0x55, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x01, 0x50, 0xb4, 0xe3, 0x62, 0x78, 0x6c, 0x11, \ + 0x15, 0xa5, 0x2a, 0x11, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x1c, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x10, 0x65, 0x60, \ + 0x87, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0x69, 0x59, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0xeb, 0xc1, 0xfe, 0x6b, \ + 0xe2, 0x63, 0x78, 0x95, 0x6e, 0xe0, 0x2d, 0xd7, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xa8 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.key. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/server2.key */ +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwU2j3efNHdEE10lyuJmsDnjkOjxKzzoTFtBa5M2jAIin7h5r\r\n" \ + "lqdStJDvLXJ6PiSa/LY0rCT1d+AmZIycsCh9odrqjObJHJa8/sEEUrM21KP64bF2\r\n" \ + "2JDBYbRmUjaiJlOqq3ReB30Zgtsq2B+g2Q0cLUlm91slc0boC4pPaQy1AJDh2oIQ\r\n" \ + "Zn2uVCuLZXmRoeJhw81ASQjuaAzxi4bSRr/QuKoRAx5/VqgaHkQYDw+Fi9qLRF7i\r\n" \ + "GMZiL8dmjfpd2H3zJ4kpAcWQDj8n8TDISg7v1t7HxydrxwU9esQCPJodPg/oNJhb\r\n" \ + "y3NLUpbYEaIsgIhpOVrTD7DeWS8Rx/fqEgEwlwIDAQABAoIBAQCXR0S8EIHFGORZ\r\n" \ + "++AtOg6eENxD+xVs0f1IeGz57Tjo3QnXX7VBZNdj+p1ECvhCE/G7XnkgU5hLZX+G\r\n" \ + "Z0jkz/tqJOI0vRSdLBbipHnWouyBQ4e/A1yIJdlBtqXxJ1KE/ituHRbNc4j4kL8Z\r\n" \ + "/r6pvwnTI0PSx2Eqs048YdS92LT6qAv4flbNDxMn2uY7s4ycS4Q8w1JXnCeaAnYm\r\n" \ + "WYI5wxO+bvRELR2Mcz5DmVnL8jRyml6l6582bSv5oufReFIbyPZbQWlXgYnpu6He\r\n" \ + "GTc7E1zKYQGG/9+DQUl/1vQuCPqQwny0tQoX2w5tdYpdMdVm+zkLtbajzdTviJJa\r\n" \ + "TWzL6lt5AoGBAN86+SVeJDcmQJcv4Eq6UhtRr4QGMiQMz0Sod6ettYxYzMgxtw28\r\n" \ + "CIrgpozCc+UaZJLo7UxvC6an85r1b2nKPCLQFaggJ0H4Q0J/sZOhBIXaoBzWxveK\r\n" \ + "nupceKdVxGsFi8CDy86DBfiyFivfBj+47BbaQzPBj7C4rK7UlLjab2rDAoGBAN2u\r\n" \ + "AM2gchoFiu4v1HFL8D7lweEpi6ZnMJjnEu/dEgGQJFjwdpLnPbsj4c75odQ4Gz8g\r\n" \ + "sw9lao9VVzbusoRE/JGI4aTdO0pATXyG7eG1Qu+5Yc1YGXcCrliA2xM9xx+d7f+s\r\n" \ + "mPzN+WIEg5GJDYZDjAzHG5BNvi/FfM1C9dOtjv2dAoGAF0t5KmwbjWHBhcVqO4Ic\r\n" \ + "BVvN3BIlc1ue2YRXEDlxY5b0r8N4XceMgKmW18OHApZxfl8uPDauWZLXOgl4uepv\r\n" \ + "whZC3EuWrSyyICNhLY21Ah7hbIEBPF3L3ZsOwC+UErL+dXWLdB56Jgy3gZaBeW7b\r\n" \ + "vDrEnocJbqCm7IukhXHOBK8CgYEAwqdHB0hqyNSzIOGY7v9abzB6pUdA3BZiQvEs\r\n" \ + "3LjHVd4HPJ2x0N8CgrBIWOE0q8+0hSMmeE96WW/7jD3fPWwCR5zlXknxBQsfv0gP\r\n" \ + "3BC5PR0Qdypz+d+9zfMf625kyit4T/hzwhDveZUzHnk1Cf+IG7Q+TOEnLnWAWBED\r\n" \ + "ISOWmrUCgYAFEmRxgwAc/u+D6t0syCwAYh6POtscq9Y0i9GyWk89NzgC4NdwwbBH\r\n" \ + "4AgahOxIxXx2gxJnq3yfkJfIjwf0s2DyP0kY2y6Ua1OeomPeY9mrIS4tCuDQ6LrE\r\n" \ + "TB6l9VGoxJL4fyHnZb8L5gGvnB1bbD8cL6YPaDiOhcRseC9vBiEuVg==\r\n" \ + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This was generated from tests/data_files/server2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/server2.key.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ + 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, \ + 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, \ + 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, \ + 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, \ + 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, \ + 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, \ + 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, \ + 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, \ + 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, \ + 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, \ + 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, \ + 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, \ + 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, \ + 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, \ + 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, \ + 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, \ + 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, \ + 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, \ + 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, \ + 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, \ + 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, \ + 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x01, 0x00, 0x97, 0x47, 0x44, 0xbc, 0x10, 0x81, 0xc5, 0x18, 0xe4, 0x59, \ + 0xfb, 0xe0, 0x2d, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x10, 0xdc, 0x43, 0xfb, 0x15, 0x6c, \ + 0xd1, 0xfd, 0x48, 0x78, 0x6c, 0xf9, 0xed, 0x38, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x09, 0xd7, \ + 0x5f, 0xb5, 0x41, 0x64, 0xd7, 0x63, 0xfa, 0x9d, 0x44, 0x0a, 0xf8, 0x42, \ + 0x13, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x5e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x53, 0x98, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x86, \ + 0x67, 0x48, 0xe4, 0xcf, 0xfb, 0x6a, 0x24, 0xe2, 0x34, 0xbd, 0x14, 0x9d, \ + 0x2c, 0x16, 0xe2, 0xa4, 0x79, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xec, 0x81, 0x43, 0x87, 0xbf, \ + 0x03, 0x5c, 0x88, 0x25, 0xd9, 0x41, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0xf1, 0x27, 0x52, 0x84, \ + 0xfe, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x73, 0x88, 0xf8, 0x90, 0xbf, 0x19, \ + 0xfe, 0xbe, 0xa9, 0xbf, 0x09, 0xd3, 0x23, 0x43, 0xd2, 0xc7, 0x61, 0x2a, \ + 0xb3, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xd4, 0xbd, 0xd8, 0xb4, 0xfa, 0xa8, 0x0b, 0xf8, \ + 0x7e, 0x56, 0xcd, 0x0f, 0x13, 0x27, 0xda, 0xe6, 0x3b, 0xb3, 0x8c, 0x9c, \ + 0x4b, 0x84, 0x3c, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x27, 0x9a, 0x02, 0x76, 0x26, \ + 0x59, 0x82, 0x39, 0xc3, 0x13, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x2d, 0x1d, 0x8c, \ + 0x73, 0x3e, 0x43, 0x99, 0x59, 0xcb, 0xf2, 0x34, 0x72, 0x9a, 0x5e, 0xa5, \ + 0xeb, 0x9f, 0x36, 0x6d, 0x2b, 0xf9, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xd1, 0x78, 0x52, 0x1b, \ + 0xc8, 0xf6, 0x5b, 0x41, 0x69, 0x57, 0x81, 0x89, 0xe9, 0xbb, 0xa1, 0xde, \ + 0x19, 0x37, 0x3b, 0x13, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x61, 0x01, 0x86, 0xff, 0xdf, 0x83, \ + 0x41, 0x49, 0x7f, 0xd6, 0xf4, 0x2e, 0x08, 0xfa, 0x90, 0xc2, 0x7c, 0xb4, \ + 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x17, 0xdb, 0x0e, 0x6d, 0x75, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0x31, 0xd5, 0x66, \ + 0xfb, 0x39, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0xcd, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x88, 0x92, 0x5a, \ + 0x4d, 0x6c, 0xcb, 0xea, 0x5b, 0x79, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xdf, 0x3a, \ + 0xf9, 0x25, 0x5e, 0x24, 0x37, 0x26, 0x40, 0x97, 0x2f, 0xe0, 0x4a, 0xba, \ + 0x52, 0x1b, 0x51, 0xaf, 0x84, 0x06, 0x32, 0x24, 0x0c, 0xcf, 0x44, 0xa8, \ + 0x77, 0xa7, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x8c, 0x58, 0xcc, 0xc8, 0x31, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0xbc, \ + 0x08, 0x8a, 0xe0, 0xa6, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x73, 0xe5, 0x1a, 0x64, 0x92, 0xe8, \ + 0xed, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0x0b, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0xf5, 0x6f, 0x69, 0xca, \ + 0x3c, 0x22, 0xd0, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x20, 0x27, 0x41, 0xf8, 0x43, 0x42, 0x7f, \ + 0xb1, 0x93, 0xa1, 0x04, 0x85, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x1c, 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xf7, 0x8a, \ + 0x9e, 0xea, 0x5c, 0x78, 0xa7, 0x55, 0xc4, 0x6b, 0x05, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0x83, \ + 0xcb, 0xce, 0x83, 0x05, 0xf8, 0xb2, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xdf, 0x06, 0x3f, 0xb8, \ + 0xec, 0x16, 0xda, 0x43, 0x33, 0xc1, 0x8f, 0xb0, 0xb8, 0xac, 0xae, 0xd4, \ + 0x94, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x6f, 0x6a, 0xc3, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xdd, 0xae, \ + 0x00, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x8a, 0xee, 0x2f, 0xd4, 0x71, 0x4b, \ + 0xf0, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xc1, 0xe1, 0x29, 0x8b, 0xa6, 0x67, 0x30, 0x98, 0xe7, \ + 0x12, 0xef, 0xdd, 0x12, 0x01, 0x90, 0x24, 0x58, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x92, 0xe7, \ + 0x3d, 0xbb, 0x23, 0xe1, 0xce, 0xf9, 0xa1, 0xd4, 0x38, 0x1b, 0x3f, 0x20, \ + 0xb3, 0x0f, 0x65, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x55, 0x57, 0x36, 0xee, 0xb2, 0x84, 0x44, \ + 0xfc, 0x91, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xa4, 0xdd, 0x3b, 0x4a, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x7c, 0x86, \ + 0xed, 0xe1, 0xb5, 0x42, 0xef, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xcd, 0x58, 0x19, 0x77, 0x02, \ + 0xae, 0x58, 0x80, 0xdb, 0x13, 0x3d, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0x9d, 0xed, 0xff, 0xac, \ + 0x98, 0xfc, 0xcd, 0xf9, 0x62, 0x04, 0x83, 0x91, 0x89, 0x0d, 0x86, 0x43, \ + 0x8c, 0x0c, 0xc7, 0x1b, 0x90, 0x4d, 0xbe, 0x2f, 0xc5, 0x7c, 0xcd, 0x42, \ + 0xf5, 0xd3, 0xad, 0x8e, 0xfd, 0x9d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x17, 0x4b, 0x79, \ + 0x2a, 0x6c, 0x1b, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xc1, 0x85, 0xc5, 0x6a, 0x3b, 0x82, 0x1c, \ + 0x05, 0x5b, 0xcd, 0xdc, 0x12, 0x25, 0x73, 0x5b, 0x9e, 0xd9, 0x84, 0x57, \ + 0x10, 0x39, 0x71, 0x63, 0x96, 0xf4, 0xaf, 0xc3, 0x78, 0x5d, 0xc7, 0x8c, \ + 0x80, 0xa9, 0x96, 0xd7, 0xc3, 0x87, 0x02, 0x96, 0x71, 0x7e, 0x5f, 0x2e, \ + 0x3c, 0x36, 0xae, 0x59, 0x92, 0xd7, 0x3a, 0x09, 0x78, 0xb9, 0xea, 0x6f, \ + 0xc2, 0x16, 0x42, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x96, 0xad, 0x2c, 0xb2, 0x20, 0x23, 0x61, \ + 0x2d, 0x8d, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x1e, 0xe1, 0x6c, 0x81, 0x01, 0x3c, 0x5d, 0xcb, \ + 0xdd, 0x9b, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0x94, 0x12, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x75, 0x8b, \ + 0x74, 0x1e, 0x7a, 0x26, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x81, 0x96, 0x81, 0x79, 0x6e, 0xdb, \ + 0xbc, 0x3a, 0xc4, 0x9e, 0x87, 0x09, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0xa6, 0xec, 0x8b, 0xa4, \ + 0x85, 0x71, 0xce, 0x04, 0xaf, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x47, \ + 0x07, 0x48, 0x6a, 0xc8, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x20, 0xe1, 0x98, 0xee, 0xff, 0x5a, \ + 0x6f, 0x30, 0x7a, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x40, 0xdc, 0x16, 0x62, 0x42, 0xf1, 0x2c, \ + 0xdc, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x55, 0xde, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x9d, 0xb1, 0xd0, 0xdf, 0x02, \ + 0x82, 0xb0, 0x48, 0x58, 0xe1, 0x34, 0xab, 0xcf, 0xb4, 0x85, 0x23, 0x26, \ + 0x78, 0x4f, 0x7a, 0x59, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x8c, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x3d, 0x6c, 0x02, \ + 0x47, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0x5e, 0x49, 0xf1, 0x05, 0x0b, 0x1f, 0xbf, 0x48, 0x0f, \ + 0xdc, 0x10, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x1d, 0x10, 0x77, 0x2a, 0x73, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xbd, \ + 0xcd, 0xf3, 0x1f, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x64, 0xca, 0x2b, 0x78, 0x4f, 0xf8, 0x73, \ + 0xc2, 0x10, 0xef, 0x79, 0x95, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x79, 0x35, 0x09, 0xff, 0x88, \ + 0x1b, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x4c, 0xe1, 0x27, 0x2e, 0x75, 0x80, 0x58, 0x11, 0x03, \ + 0x21, 0x23, 0x96, 0x9a, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x05, 0x12, 0x64, 0x71, \ + 0x83, 0x00, 0x1c, 0xfe, 0xef, 0x83, 0xea, 0xdd, 0x2c, 0xc8, 0x2c, 0x00, \ + 0x62, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xdb, 0x1c, 0xab, 0xd6, 0x34, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0xb2, \ + 0x5a, 0x4f, 0x3d, 0x37, 0x38, 0x02, 0xe0, 0xd7, 0x70, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0x47, \ + 0xe0, 0x08, 0x1a, 0x84, 0xec, 0x48, 0xc5, 0x7c, 0x76, 0x83, 0x12, 0x67, \ + 0xab, 0x7c, 0x9f, 0x90, 0x97, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x07, 0xf4, 0xb3, 0x60, 0xf2, \ + 0x3f, 0x49, 0x18, 0xdb, 0x2e, 0x94, 0x6b, 0x53, 0x9e, 0xa2, 0x63, 0xde, \ + 0x63, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x21, 0x2e, 0x2d, 0x0a, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xe8, 0xba, 0xc4, \ + 0x4c, 0x1e, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0x51, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0x92, 0xf8, 0x7f, 0x21, 0xe7, \ + 0x65, 0xbf, 0x0b, 0xe6, 0x01, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0x1d, 0x5b, 0x6c, 0x3f, 0x1c, \ + 0x2f, 0xa6, 0x0f, 0x68, 0x38, 0x8e, 0x85, 0xc4, 0x6c, 0x78, 0x2f, 0x6f, \ + 0x06, 0x21, 0x2e, 0x56 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* + * Test client Certificates + * + * Test client certificates are defined for each choice + * of the following parameters: + * - PEM or DER encoding + * - RSA or EC key + * + * Things to add: + * - hash type + * - multiple EC curve types + */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli2.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/cli2.crt */ +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIB3zCCAWOgAwIBAgIBDTAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw\r\n" \ + "DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAwwTUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQTAe\r\n" \ + "Fw0xOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaFw0yOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaMEExCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw\r\n" \ + "DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEfMB0GA1UEAwwWUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBDbGllbnQg\r\n" \ + "MjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABFflrrFz39Osu5O4gf8Sru7mU6zO\r\n" \ + "VVP2NA7MLuNjJQvfmOLzXGA2lsDVGBRw5X+f1UtFGOWwbNVc+JaPh3Cj5MejTTBL\r\n" \ + "MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHoAX4Zk/OBd5REQO7LmO8QmP8/iMB8GA1Ud\r\n" \ + "IwQYMBaAFJ1tICRJAT8ry3i1Gbx+JMnb+zZ8MAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQADaAAwZQIx\r\n" \ + "AMqme4DKMldUlplDET9Q6Eptre7uUWKhsLOF+zPkKDlfzpIkJYEFgcloDHGYw80u\r\n" \ + "IgIwNftyPXsabTqMM7iEHgVpX/GRozKklY9yQI/5eoA6gGW7Y+imuGR/oao5ySOb\r\n" \ + "a9Vk\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xdf, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x63, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ + 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ + 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ + 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ + 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, \ + 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, \ + 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x41, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ + 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ + 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x03, 0x0c, 0x16, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ + 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, \ + 0x32, 0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, \ + 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, \ + 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, \ + 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, \ + 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, \ + 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, \ + 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, 0xc7, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, \ + 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, \ + 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x7a, 0x00, \ + 0x5f, 0x86, 0x64, 0xfc, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xe5, 0x11, 0x10, 0x3b, 0xb2, 0xe6, \ + 0x3b, 0xc4, 0x26, 0x3f, 0xcf, 0xe2, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, \ + 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, \ + 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, \ + 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x31, \ + 0x00, 0xca, 0xa6, 0x7b, 0x80, 0xca, 0x32, 0x57, 0x54, 0x96, 0x99, 0x43, \ + 0x11, 0x3f, 0x50, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0x6d, 0xad, 0xee, 0xee, 0x51, 0x62, 0xa1, \ + 0xb0, 0xb3, 0x85, 0xfb, 0x33, 0xe4, 0x28, 0x39, 0x5f, 0xce, 0x92, 0x24, \ + 0x25, 0x81, 0x05, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x98, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x2e, \ + 0x22, 0x02, 0x30, 0x35, 0xfb, 0x72, 0x3d, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x3a, 0x8c, \ + 0x33, 0xb8, 0x84, 0x1e, 0x05, 0x69, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x32, 0xa4, \ + 0x95, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x40, 0x8f, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x80, 0x3a, 0x80, 0x65, 0xbb, \ + 0x63, 0xe8, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xc9, 0x23, 0x9b, \ + 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x64 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli2.key. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/cli2.key */ +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "MHcCAQEEIPb3hmTxZ3/mZI3vyk7p3U3wBf+WIop6hDhkFzJhmLcqoAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" \ + "AwEHoUQDQgAEV+WusXPf06y7k7iB/xKu7uZTrM5VU/Y0Dswu42MlC9+Y4vNcYDaW\r\n" \ + "wNUYFHDlf5/VS0UY5bBs1Vz4lo+HcKPkxw==\r\n" \ + "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/cli2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/cli2.key.der */ +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x64, 0xf1, \ + 0x67, 0x7f, 0xe6, 0x64, 0x8d, 0xef, 0xca, 0x4e, 0xe9, 0xdd, 0x4d, 0xf0, \ + 0x05, 0xff, 0x96, 0x22, 0x8a, 0x7a, 0x84, 0x38, 0x64, 0x17, 0x32, 0x61, \ + 0x98, 0xb7, 0x2a, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, \ + 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, \ + 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, \ + 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, \ + 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, \ + 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, \ + 0xc7 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt */ +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIDPzCCAiegAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ + "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n" \ + "BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f\r\n" \ + "M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu\r\n" \ + "1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEw\r\n" \ + "MjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v\r\n" \ + "4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx/\r\n" \ + "/DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB\r\n" \ + "o00wSzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITAf\r\n" \ + "BgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\r\n" \ + "AQEAXidv1d4pLlBiKWED95rMycBdgDcgyNqJxakFkRfRyA2y1mlyTn7uBXRkNLY5\r\n" \ + "ZFzK82GCjk2Q2OD4RZSCPAJJqLpHHU34t71ciffvy2KK81YvrxczRhMAE64i+qna\r\n" \ + "yP3Td2XuWJR05PVPoSemsNELs9gWttdnYy3ce+EY2Y0n7Rsi7982EeLIAA7H6ca4\r\n" \ + "2Es/NUH//JZJT32OP0doMxeDRA+vplkKqTLLWf7dX26LIriBkBaRCgR5Yv9LBPFc\r\n" \ + "NOtpzu/LbrY7QFXKJMI+JXDudCsOn8KCmiA4d6Emisqfh3V3485l7HEQNcvLTxlD\r\n" \ + "6zDQyi0/ykYUYZkwQTK1N2Nvlw==\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This was generated from tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der + using `xxd -i.` */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x3f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x27, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1a, 0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x11, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, \ + 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x32, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, \ + 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ + 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc8, 0x74, 0xc4, 0xcc, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb5, 0x79, 0xe9, \ + 0x45, 0xd9, 0x14, 0x60, 0xb0, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x1e, 0x9f, \ + 0x33, 0xad, 0x0d, 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x56, 0x65, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x44, 0xd9, \ + 0xcc, 0x66, 0x85, 0x07, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x27, 0xb0, 0x4a, 0x35, 0xd0, 0x63, \ + 0x9e, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0x1b, 0xb7, 0xda, 0xf0, 0x7e, 0xab, 0xee, 0x0c, 0x10, \ + 0x93, 0x86, 0x49, 0x18, 0x34, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x2e, \ + 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x77, 0x29, 0x84, 0x61, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x50, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x95, \ + 0x48, 0x70, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x4d, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x13, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xed, \ + 0xe6, 0x43, 0xea, 0x42, 0x14, 0xeb, 0x74, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xed, 0x1f, 0xd4, \ + 0x57, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0xed, 0xd2, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x71, 0x30, \ + 0x32, 0x30, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0xf6, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x56, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xf2, \ + 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x3d, 0x67, 0x91, 0x88, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xb2, 0xdf, 0x7d, \ + 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x0c, 0x77, 0xff, 0xec, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x8f, 0xbf, 0xc2, \ + 0x7f, 0xca, 0xad, 0x6c, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x8d, 0xd9, 0x8b, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x6f, \ + 0xe0, 0x9b, 0xf8, 0x10, 0x56, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x8e, 0x13, 0x15, 0xe6, 0x34, \ + 0x04, 0x66, 0xc7, 0xee, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x0e, 0x6a, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x09, 0x9a, \ + 0x06, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x65, 0x71, 0xf8, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xfe, \ + 0x3c, 0x8b, 0x35, 0x04, 0x67, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x85, 0xfc, 0x7f, \ + 0xfc, 0x36, 0x6b, 0xb5, 0xe9, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0x03, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xb3, 0x3d, \ + 0x00, 0xcf, 0xaf, 0x76, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x56, 0x83, 0x6a, 0xd2, 0xa8, 0xd4, \ + 0xe7, 0x50, 0x71, 0xe6, 0xb5, 0x36, 0x05, 0x77, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x7b, 0xc8, \ + 0xe4, 0xc4, 0xfd, 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x21, 0x5f, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, \ + 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, \ + 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, \ + 0x04, 0x14, 0x71, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x73, 0x72, 0x40, 0x2f, 0x54, 0x76, 0x5e, \ + 0x33, 0xfc, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xf1, 0xdd, 0x6b, 0x46, 0x21, 0x30, 0x1f, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, \ + 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, \ + 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, \ + 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x5e, 0x27, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0xde, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x50, 0x62, \ + 0x29, 0x61, 0x03, 0xf7, 0x9a, 0xcc, 0xc9, 0xc0, 0x5d, 0x80, 0x37, 0x20, \ + 0xc8, 0xda, 0x89, 0xc5, 0xa9, 0x05, 0x91, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0xb2, \ + 0xd6, 0x69, 0x72, 0x4e, 0x7e, 0xee, 0x05, 0x74, 0x64, 0x34, 0xb6, 0x39, \ + 0x64, 0x5c, 0xca, 0xf3, 0x61, 0x82, 0x8e, 0x4d, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xe0, 0xf8, \ + 0x45, 0x94, 0x82, 0x3c, 0x02, 0x49, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x47, 0x1d, 0x4d, 0xf8, \ + 0xb7, 0xbd, 0x5c, 0x89, 0xf7, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x62, 0x8a, 0xf3, 0x56, 0x2f, \ + 0xaf, 0x17, 0x33, 0x46, 0x13, 0x00, 0x13, 0xae, 0x22, 0xfa, 0xa9, 0xda, \ + 0xc8, 0xfd, 0xd3, 0x77, 0x65, 0xee, 0x58, 0x94, 0x74, 0xe4, 0xf5, 0x4f, \ + 0xa1, 0x27, 0xa6, 0xb0, 0xd1, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0xd8, 0x16, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x67, \ + 0x63, 0x2d, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0xe1, 0x18, 0xd9, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xed, 0x1b, 0x22, \ + 0xef, 0xdf, 0x36, 0x11, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xc7, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0xb8, \ + 0xd8, 0x4b, 0x3f, 0x35, 0x41, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x96, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0x8e, \ + 0x3f, 0x47, 0x68, 0x33, 0x17, 0x83, 0x44, 0x0f, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x59, 0x0a, \ + 0xa9, 0x32, 0xcb, 0x59, 0xfe, 0xdd, 0x5f, 0x6e, 0x8b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x81, \ + 0x90, 0x16, 0x91, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x79, 0x62, 0xff, 0x4b, 0x04, 0xf1, 0x5c, \ + 0x34, 0xeb, 0x69, 0xce, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x6e, 0xb6, 0x3b, 0x40, 0x55, 0xca, \ + 0x24, 0xc2, 0x3e, 0x25, 0x70, 0xee, 0x74, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x9f, 0xc2, 0x82, \ + 0x9a, 0x20, 0x38, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x26, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x9f, 0x87, 0x75, 0x77, \ + 0xe3, 0xce, 0x65, 0xec, 0x71, 0x10, 0x35, 0xcb, 0xcb, 0x4f, 0x19, 0x43, \ + 0xeb, 0x30, 0xd0, 0xca, 0x2d, 0x3f, 0xca, 0x46, 0x14, 0x61, 0x99, 0x30, \ + 0x41, 0x32, 0xb5, 0x37, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x97 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key */ +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6fM60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaF\r\n" \ + "B9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1\r\n" \ + "bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEwMjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9\r\n" \ + "Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH\r\n" \ + "7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx//DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+v\r\n" \ + "dqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQABAoIBAGdNtfYDiap6bzst\r\n" \ + "yhCiI8m9TtrhZw4MisaEaN/ll3XSjaOG2dvV6xMZCMV+5TeXDHOAZnY18Yi18vzz\r\n" \ + "4Ut2TnNFzizCECYNaA2fST3WgInnxUkV3YXAyP6CNxJaCmv2aA0yFr2kFVSeaKGt\r\n" \ + "ymvljNp2NVkvm7Th8fBQBO7I7AXhz43k0mR7XmPgewe8ApZOG3hstkOaMvbWAvWA\r\n" \ + "zCZupdDjZYjOJqlA4eEA4H8/w7F83r5CugeBE8LgEREjLPiyejrU5H1fubEY+h0d\r\n" \ + "l5HZBJ68ybTXfQ5U9o/QKA3dd0toBEhhdRUDGzWtjvwkEQfqF1reGWj/tod/gCpf\r\n" \ + "DFi6X0ECgYEA4wOv/pjSC3ty6TuOvKX2rOUiBrLXXv2JSxZnMoMiWI5ipLQt+RYT\r\n" \ + "VPafL/m7Dn6MbwjayOkcZhBwk5CNz5A6Q4lJ64Mq/lqHznRCQQ2Mc1G8eyDF/fYL\r\n" \ + "Ze2pLvwP9VD5jTc2miDfw+MnvJhywRRLcemDFP8k4hQVtm8PMp3ZmNECgYEA4gz7\r\n" \ + "wzObR4gn8ibe617uQPZjWzUj9dUHYd+in1gwBCIrtNnaRn9I9U/Q6tegRYpii4ys\r\n" \ + "c176NmU+umy6XmuSKV5qD9bSpZWG2nLFnslrN15Lm3fhZxoeMNhBaEDTnLT26yoi\r\n" \ + "33gp0mSSWy94ZEqipms+ULF6sY1ZtFW6tpGFoy8CgYAQHhnnvJflIs2ky4q10B60\r\n" \ + "ZcxFp3rtDpkp0JxhFLhiizFrujMtZSjYNm5U7KkgPVHhLELEUvCmOnKTt4ap/vZ0\r\n" \ + "BxJNe1GZH3pW6SAvGDQpl9sG7uu/vTFP+lCxukmzxB0DrrDcvorEkKMom7ZCCRvW\r\n" \ + "KZsZ6YeH2Z81BauRj218kQKBgQCUV/DgKP2985xDTT79N08jUo3hTP5MVYCCuj/+\r\n" \ + "UeEw1TvZcx3LJby7P6Xad6a1/BqveaGyFKIfEFIaBUBItk801sDDpDaYc4gL00Xc\r\n" \ + "7lFuBHOZkxJYlss5QrGpuOEl9ZwUt5IrFLBdYaKqNHzNVC1pCPfb/JyH6Dr2HUxq\r\n" \ + "gxUwAQKBgQCcU6G2L8AG9d9c0UpOyL1tMvFe5Ttw0KjlQVdsh1MP6yigYo9DYuwu\r\n" \ + "bHFVW2r0dBTqegP2/KTOxKzaHfC1qf0RGDsUoJCNJrd1cwoCLG8P2EF4w3OBrKqv\r\n" \ + "8u4ytY0F+Vlanj5lm3TaoHSVF1+NWPyOTiwevIECGKwSxvlki4fDAA==\r\n" \ + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"/* END FILE */ + +/* This was generated from tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key.der */ +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ + 0xc8, 0x74, 0xc4, 0xcc, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb5, 0x79, 0xe9, 0x45, 0xd9, 0x14, \ + 0x60, 0xb0, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x1e, 0x9f, 0x33, 0xad, 0x0d, \ + 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x56, 0x65, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x44, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0x66, 0x85, \ + 0x07, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x27, 0xb0, 0x4a, 0x35, 0xd0, 0x63, 0x9e, 0x0a, 0x6e, \ + 0x1b, 0xb7, 0xda, 0xf0, 0x7e, 0xab, 0xee, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x93, 0x86, 0x49, \ + 0x18, 0x34, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x77, \ + 0x29, 0x84, 0x61, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x50, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x95, 0x48, 0x70, 0xf5, \ + 0x6e, 0x4d, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x13, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xed, 0xe6, 0x43, 0xea, \ + 0x42, 0x14, 0xeb, 0x74, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xed, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x57, 0x4e, 0xa9, \ + 0xf3, 0xa8, 0xed, 0xd2, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x71, 0x30, 0x32, 0x30, 0xd5, \ + 0xd3, 0xf6, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x56, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x3d, \ + 0x67, 0x91, 0x88, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xb2, 0xdf, 0x7d, 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x0c, \ + 0x77, 0xff, 0xec, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x8f, 0xbf, 0xc2, 0x7f, 0xca, 0xad, \ + 0x6c, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x8d, 0xd9, 0x8b, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x6f, 0xe0, 0x9b, 0xf8, \ + 0x10, 0x56, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x8e, 0x13, 0x15, 0xe6, 0x34, 0x04, 0x66, 0xc7, \ + 0xee, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x0e, 0x6a, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x09, 0x9a, 0x06, 0x67, 0xf4, \ + 0x65, 0x71, 0xf8, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x3c, 0x8b, 0x35, \ + 0x04, 0x67, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x85, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0xfc, 0x36, 0x6b, \ + 0xb5, 0xe9, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0x03, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xb3, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xcf, 0xaf, \ + 0x76, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x56, 0x83, 0x6a, 0xd2, 0xa8, 0xd4, 0xe7, 0x50, 0x71, \ + 0xe6, 0xb5, 0x36, 0x05, 0x77, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x7b, 0xc8, 0xe4, 0xc4, 0xfd, \ + 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x21, 0x5f, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x00, 0x67, 0x4d, 0xb5, 0xf6, 0x03, 0x89, 0xaa, 0x7a, 0x6f, 0x3b, 0x2d, \ + 0xca, 0x10, 0xa2, 0x23, 0xc9, 0xbd, 0x4e, 0xda, 0xe1, 0x67, 0x0e, 0x0c, \ + 0x8a, 0xc6, 0x84, 0x68, 0xdf, 0xe5, 0x97, 0x75, 0xd2, 0x8d, 0xa3, 0x86, \ + 0xd9, 0xdb, 0xd5, 0xeb, 0x13, 0x19, 0x08, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0x37, 0x97, \ + 0x0c, 0x73, 0x80, 0x66, 0x76, 0x35, 0xf1, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0xfc, 0xf3, \ + 0xe1, 0x4b, 0x76, 0x4e, 0x73, 0x45, 0xce, 0x2c, 0xc2, 0x10, 0x26, 0x0d, \ + 0x68, 0x0d, 0x9f, 0x49, 0x3d, 0xd6, 0x80, 0x89, 0xe7, 0xc5, 0x49, 0x15, \ + 0xdd, 0x85, 0xc0, 0xc8, 0xfe, 0x82, 0x37, 0x12, 0x5a, 0x0a, 0x6b, 0xf6, \ + 0x68, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x16, 0xbd, 0xa4, 0x15, 0x54, 0x9e, 0x68, 0xa1, 0xad, \ + 0xca, 0x6b, 0xe5, 0x8c, 0xda, 0x76, 0x35, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0xe1, \ + 0xf1, 0xf0, 0x50, 0x04, 0xee, 0xc8, 0xec, 0x05, 0xe1, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0xe4, \ + 0xd2, 0x64, 0x7b, 0x5e, 0x63, 0xe0, 0x7b, 0x07, 0xbc, 0x02, 0x96, 0x4e, \ + 0x1b, 0x78, 0x6c, 0xb6, 0x43, 0x9a, 0x32, 0xf6, 0xd6, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x80, \ + 0xcc, 0x26, 0x6e, 0xa5, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x65, 0x88, 0xce, 0x26, 0xa9, 0x40, \ + 0xe1, 0xe1, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x7f, 0x3f, 0xc3, 0xb1, 0x7c, 0xde, 0xbe, 0x42, \ + 0xba, 0x07, 0x81, 0x13, 0xc2, 0xe0, 0x11, 0x11, 0x23, 0x2c, 0xf8, 0xb2, \ + 0x7a, 0x3a, 0xd4, 0xe4, 0x7d, 0x5f, 0xb9, 0xb1, 0x18, 0xfa, 0x1d, 0x1d, \ + 0x97, 0x91, 0xd9, 0x04, 0x9e, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xb4, 0xd7, 0x7d, 0x0e, 0x54, \ + 0xf6, 0x8f, 0xd0, 0x28, 0x0d, 0xdd, 0x77, 0x4b, 0x68, 0x04, 0x48, 0x61, \ + 0x75, 0x15, 0x03, 0x1b, 0x35, 0xad, 0x8e, 0xfc, 0x24, 0x11, 0x07, 0xea, \ + 0x17, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x19, 0x68, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x87, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x2a, 0x5f, \ + 0x0c, 0x58, 0xba, 0x5f, 0x41, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xe3, 0x03, 0xaf, \ + 0xfe, 0x98, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x7b, 0x72, 0xe9, 0x3b, 0x8e, 0xbc, 0xa5, 0xf6, \ + 0xac, 0xe5, 0x22, 0x06, 0xb2, 0xd7, 0x5e, 0xfd, 0x89, 0x4b, 0x16, 0x67, \ + 0x32, 0x83, 0x22, 0x58, 0x8e, 0x62, 0xa4, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0xf9, 0x16, 0x13, \ + 0x54, 0xf6, 0x9f, 0x2f, 0xf9, 0xbb, 0x0e, 0x7e, 0x8c, 0x6f, 0x08, 0xda, \ + 0xc8, 0xe9, 0x1c, 0x66, 0x10, 0x70, 0x93, 0x90, 0x8d, 0xcf, 0x90, 0x3a, \ + 0x43, 0x89, 0x49, 0xeb, 0x83, 0x2a, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0x87, 0xce, 0x74, 0x42, \ + 0x41, 0x0d, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x51, 0xbc, 0x7b, 0x20, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xf6, 0x0b, \ + 0x65, 0xed, 0xa9, 0x2e, 0xfc, 0x0f, 0xf5, 0x50, 0xf9, 0x8d, 0x37, 0x36, \ + 0x9a, 0x20, 0xdf, 0xc3, 0xe3, 0x27, 0xbc, 0x98, 0x72, 0xc1, 0x14, 0x4b, \ + 0x71, 0xe9, 0x83, 0x14, 0xff, 0x24, 0xe2, 0x14, 0x15, 0xb6, 0x6f, 0x0f, \ + 0x32, 0x9d, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xd1, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x0c, 0xfb, \ + 0xc3, 0x33, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x88, 0x27, 0xf2, 0x26, 0xde, 0xeb, 0x5e, 0xee, \ + 0x40, 0xf6, 0x63, 0x5b, 0x35, 0x23, 0xf5, 0xd5, 0x07, 0x61, 0xdf, 0xa2, \ + 0x9f, 0x58, 0x30, 0x04, 0x22, 0x2b, 0xb4, 0xd9, 0xda, 0x46, 0x7f, 0x48, \ + 0xf5, 0x4f, 0xd0, 0xea, 0xd7, 0xa0, 0x45, 0x8a, 0x62, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0xac, \ + 0x73, 0x5e, 0xfa, 0x36, 0x65, 0x3e, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xba, 0x5e, 0x6b, 0x92, \ + 0x29, 0x5e, 0x6a, 0x0f, 0xd6, 0xd2, 0xa5, 0x95, 0x86, 0xda, 0x72, 0xc5, \ + 0x9e, 0xc9, 0x6b, 0x37, 0x5e, 0x4b, 0x9b, 0x77, 0xe1, 0x67, 0x1a, 0x1e, \ + 0x30, 0xd8, 0x41, 0x68, 0x40, 0xd3, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0xf6, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x22, \ + 0xdf, 0x78, 0x29, 0xd2, 0x64, 0x92, 0x5b, 0x2f, 0x78, 0x64, 0x4a, 0xa2, \ + 0xa6, 0x6b, 0x3e, 0x50, 0xb1, 0x7a, 0xb1, 0x8d, 0x59, 0xb4, 0x55, 0xba, \ + 0xb6, 0x91, 0x85, 0xa3, 0x2f, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x10, 0x1e, 0x19, 0xe7, \ + 0xbc, 0x97, 0xe5, 0x22, 0xcd, 0xa4, 0xcb, 0x8a, 0xb5, 0xd0, 0x1e, 0xb4, \ + 0x65, 0xcc, 0x45, 0xa7, 0x7a, 0xed, 0x0e, 0x99, 0x29, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x61, \ + 0x14, 0xb8, 0x62, 0x8b, 0x31, 0x6b, 0xba, 0x33, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x28, 0xd8, \ + 0x36, 0x6e, 0x54, 0xec, 0xa9, 0x20, 0x3d, 0x51, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0xc4, \ + 0x52, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x72, 0x93, 0xb7, 0x86, 0xa9, 0xfe, 0xf6, 0x74, \ + 0x07, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x7b, 0x51, 0x99, 0x1f, 0x7a, 0x56, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x2f, \ + 0x18, 0x34, 0x29, 0x97, 0xdb, 0x06, 0xee, 0xeb, 0xbf, 0xbd, 0x31, 0x4f, \ + 0xfa, 0x50, 0xb1, 0xba, 0x49, 0xb3, 0xc4, 0x1d, 0x03, 0xae, 0xb0, 0xdc, \ + 0xbe, 0x8a, 0xc4, 0x90, 0xa3, 0x28, 0x9b, 0xb6, 0x42, 0x09, 0x1b, 0xd6, \ + 0x29, 0x9b, 0x19, 0xe9, 0x87, 0x87, 0xd9, 0x9f, 0x35, 0x05, 0xab, 0x91, \ + 0x8f, 0x6d, 0x7c, 0x91, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x94, 0x57, 0xf0, 0xe0, \ + 0x28, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xf3, 0x9c, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x3e, 0xfd, 0x37, 0x4f, 0x23, \ + 0x52, 0x8d, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0xfe, 0x4c, 0x55, 0x80, 0x82, 0xba, 0x3f, 0xfe, \ + 0x51, 0xe1, 0x30, 0xd5, 0x3b, 0xd9, 0x73, 0x1d, 0xcb, 0x25, 0xbc, 0xbb, \ + 0x3f, 0xa5, 0xda, 0x77, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0x79, 0xa1, 0xb2, \ + 0x14, 0xa2, 0x1f, 0x10, 0x52, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x40, 0x48, 0xb6, 0x4f, 0x34, \ + 0xd6, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xa4, 0x36, 0x98, 0x73, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xd3, 0x45, 0xdc, \ + 0xee, 0x51, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x73, 0x99, 0x93, 0x12, 0x58, 0x96, 0xcb, 0x39, \ + 0x42, 0xb1, 0xa9, 0xb8, 0xe1, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x9c, 0x14, 0xb7, 0x92, 0x2b, \ + 0x14, 0xb0, 0x5d, 0x61, 0xa2, 0xaa, 0x34, 0x7c, 0xcd, 0x54, 0x2d, 0x69, \ + 0x08, 0xf7, 0xdb, 0xfc, 0x9c, 0x87, 0xe8, 0x3a, 0xf6, 0x1d, 0x4c, 0x6a, \ + 0x83, 0x15, 0x30, 0x01, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9c, 0x53, 0xa1, 0xb6, \ + 0x2f, 0xc0, 0x06, 0xf5, 0xdf, 0x5c, 0xd1, 0x4a, 0x4e, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x6d, \ + 0x32, 0xf1, 0x5e, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0x70, 0xd0, 0xa8, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x57, 0x6c, \ + 0x87, 0x53, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x28, 0xa0, 0x62, 0x8f, 0x43, 0x62, 0xec, 0x2e, \ + 0x6c, 0x71, 0x55, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xf4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xea, 0x7a, 0x03, 0xf6, \ + 0xfc, 0xa4, 0xce, 0xc4, 0xac, 0xda, 0x1d, 0xf0, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0xfd, 0x11, \ + 0x18, 0x3b, 0x14, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x8d, 0x26, 0xb7, 0x75, 0x73, 0x0a, 0x02, \ + 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0xd8, 0x41, 0x78, 0xc3, 0x73, 0x81, 0xac, 0xaa, 0xaf, \ + 0xf2, 0xee, 0x32, 0xb5, 0x8d, 0x05, 0xf9, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x9e, 0x3e, 0x65, \ + 0x9b, 0x74, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x74, 0x95, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x8d, 0x58, 0xfc, 0x8e, \ + 0x4e, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0xbc, 0x81, 0x02, 0x18, 0xac, 0x12, 0xc6, 0xf9, 0x64, \ + 0x8b, 0x87, 0xc3, 0x00 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* + * + * Test certificates and keys as C variables + * + */ + +/* + * CA + */ + +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM; + +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der[] = + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der[] = + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_len = 0; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_len = 0; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der ); + +/* + * Server + */ + +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem[] = ""; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem[] = ""; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM; + +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der[] = + TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der[] = + TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_len = 0; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_len = 0; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der ); + +/* + * Client + */ + +const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem[] = ""; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem[] = ""; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM; + +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der ); + +/* + * + * Definitions of test CRTs without specification of all parameters, choosing + * them automatically according to the config. For example, mbedtls_test_ca_crt + * is one of mbedtls_test_ca_crt_{rsa|ec}_{sha1|sha256}_{pem|der}. + * + */ + +/* + * Dispatch between PEM and DER according to config + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + +/* PEM encoded test CA certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM +#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM +#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM +#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM + +/* PEM encoded test server certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM +#define TEST_SRV_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM + +/* PEM encoded test client certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM +#define TEST_CLI_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +/* DER encoded test CA certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER +#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER +#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER +#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER + +/* DER encoded test server certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER +#define TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER +#define TEST_SRV_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER + +/* DER encoded test client certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER +#define TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER +#define TEST_CLI_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_CA_PWD_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[] = TEST_CA_PWD_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC; + +const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec[] = TEST_SRV_PWD_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC; + +const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec[] = TEST_CLI_PWD_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256 ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1 ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa ) -1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256 ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1 ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec ); + +/* + * Dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 +#else +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa ); + +/* + * Dispatch between RSA and EC + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + +#define TEST_CA_KEY TEST_CA_KEY_RSA +#define TEST_CA_PWD TEST_CA_PWD_RSA +#define TEST_CA_CRT TEST_CA_CRT_RSA + +#define TEST_SRV_KEY TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA +#define TEST_SRV_PWD TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA +#define TEST_SRV_CRT TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA + +#define TEST_CLI_KEY TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA +#define TEST_CLI_PWD TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA +#define TEST_CLI_CRT TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA + +#else /* no RSA, so assume ECDSA */ + +#define TEST_CA_KEY TEST_CA_KEY_EC +#define TEST_CA_PWD TEST_CA_PWD_EC +#define TEST_CA_CRT TEST_CA_CRT_EC + +#define TEST_SRV_KEY TEST_SRV_KEY_EC +#define TEST_SRV_PWD TEST_SRV_PWD_EC +#define TEST_SRV_CRT TEST_SRV_CRT_EC + +#define TEST_CLI_KEY TEST_CLI_KEY_EC +#define TEST_CLI_PWD TEST_CLI_PWD_EC +#define TEST_CLI_CRT TEST_CLI_CRT_EC +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +/* API stability forces us to declare + * mbedtls_test_{ca|srv|cli}_{key|pwd|crt} + * as pointers. */ +static const char test_ca_key[] = TEST_CA_KEY; +static const char test_ca_pwd[] = TEST_CA_PWD; +static const char test_ca_crt[] = TEST_CA_CRT; + +static const char test_srv_key[] = TEST_SRV_KEY; +static const char test_srv_pwd[] = TEST_SRV_PWD; +static const char test_srv_crt[] = TEST_SRV_CRT; + +static const char test_cli_key[] = TEST_CLI_KEY; +static const char test_cli_pwd[] = TEST_CLI_PWD; +static const char test_cli_crt[] = TEST_CLI_CRT; + +const char *mbedtls_test_ca_key = test_ca_key; +const char *mbedtls_test_ca_pwd = test_ca_pwd; +const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt = test_ca_crt; + +const char *mbedtls_test_srv_key = test_srv_key; +const char *mbedtls_test_srv_pwd = test_srv_pwd; +const char *mbedtls_test_srv_crt = test_srv_crt; + +const char *mbedtls_test_cli_key = test_cli_key; +const char *mbedtls_test_cli_pwd = test_cli_pwd; +const char *mbedtls_test_cli_crt = test_cli_crt; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len = + sizeof( test_ca_key ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len = + sizeof( test_ca_pwd ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len = + sizeof( test_ca_crt ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len = + sizeof( test_srv_key ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_len = + sizeof( test_srv_pwd ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len = + sizeof( test_srv_crt ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len = + sizeof( test_cli_key ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_len = + sizeof( test_cli_pwd ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len = + sizeof( test_cli_crt ); + +/* + * + * Lists of certificates + * + */ + +/* List of CAs in PEM or DER, depending on config */ +const char * mbedtls_test_cas[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec, +#endif + NULL +}; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1 ), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256 ), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ), +#endif + 0 +}; + +/* List of all available CA certificates in DER format */ +const unsigned char * mbedtls_test_cas_der[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + NULL +}; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der ), +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der ), +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der ), +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + 0 +}; + +/* Concatenation of all available CA certificates in PEM format */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[] = +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + ""; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cas_pem ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..658f0469 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c @@ -0,0 +1,558 @@ +/** + * \file chacha20.c + * + * \brief ChaCha20 cipher. + * + * \author Daniel King + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define ROTL32( value, amount ) \ + ( (uint32_t) ( (value) << (amount) ) | ( (value) >> ( 32 - (amount) ) ) ) + +#define CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX ( 12U ) + +#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ( 4U * 16U ) + +/** + * \brief ChaCha20 quarter round operation. + * + * The quarter round is defined as follows (from RFC 7539): + * 1. a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; + * 2. c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12; + * 3. a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; + * 4. c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7; + * + * \param state ChaCha20 state to modify. + * \param a The index of 'a' in the state. + * \param b The index of 'b' in the state. + * \param c The index of 'c' in the state. + * \param d The index of 'd' in the state. + */ +static inline void chacha20_quarter_round( uint32_t state[16], + size_t a, + size_t b, + size_t c, + size_t d ) +{ + /* a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; */ + state[a] += state[b]; + state[d] ^= state[a]; + state[d] = ROTL32( state[d], 16 ); + + /* c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12 */ + state[c] += state[d]; + state[b] ^= state[c]; + state[b] = ROTL32( state[b], 12 ); + + /* a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; */ + state[a] += state[b]; + state[d] ^= state[a]; + state[d] = ROTL32( state[d], 8 ); + + /* c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7; */ + state[c] += state[d]; + state[b] ^= state[c]; + state[b] = ROTL32( state[b], 7 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Perform the ChaCha20 inner block operation. + * + * This function performs two rounds: the column round and the + * diagonal round. + * + * \param state The ChaCha20 state to update. + */ +static void chacha20_inner_block( uint32_t state[16] ) +{ + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 0, 4, 8, 12 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 1, 5, 9, 13 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 2, 6, 10, 14 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 3, 7, 11, 15 ); + + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 0, 5, 10, 15 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 1, 6, 11, 12 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 2, 7, 8, 13 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 3, 4, 9, 14 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Generates a keystream block. + * + * \param initial_state The initial ChaCha20 state (key, nonce, counter). + * \param keystream Generated keystream bytes are written to this buffer. + */ +static void chacha20_block( const uint32_t initial_state[16], + unsigned char keystream[64] ) +{ + uint32_t working_state[16]; + size_t i; + + memcpy( working_state, + initial_state, + CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ); + + for( i = 0U; i < 10U; i++ ) + chacha20_inner_block( working_state ); + + working_state[ 0] += initial_state[ 0]; + working_state[ 1] += initial_state[ 1]; + working_state[ 2] += initial_state[ 2]; + working_state[ 3] += initial_state[ 3]; + working_state[ 4] += initial_state[ 4]; + working_state[ 5] += initial_state[ 5]; + working_state[ 6] += initial_state[ 6]; + working_state[ 7] += initial_state[ 7]; + working_state[ 8] += initial_state[ 8]; + working_state[ 9] += initial_state[ 9]; + working_state[10] += initial_state[10]; + working_state[11] += initial_state[11]; + working_state[12] += initial_state[12]; + working_state[13] += initial_state[13]; + working_state[14] += initial_state[14]; + working_state[15] += initial_state[15]; + + for( i = 0U; i < 16; i++ ) + { + size_t offset = i * 4U; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(working_state[i], keystream, offset); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( working_state, sizeof( working_state ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_chacha20_init( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ) +{ + CHACHA20_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->state, sizeof( ctx->state ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->keystream8, sizeof( ctx->keystream8 ) ); + + /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */ + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; +} + +void mbedtls_chacha20_free( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_chacha20_context ) ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ) +{ + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + /* ChaCha20 constants - the string "expand 32-byte k" */ + ctx->state[0] = 0x61707865; + ctx->state[1] = 0x3320646e; + ctx->state[2] = 0x79622d32; + ctx->state[3] = 0x6b206574; + + /* Set key */ + ctx->state[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 0 ); + ctx->state[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 4 ); + ctx->state[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 8 ); + ctx->state[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 12 ); + ctx->state[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 16 ); + ctx->state[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 20 ); + ctx->state[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 24 ); + ctx->state[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 28 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_starts( mbedtls_chacha20_context* ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter ) +{ + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + + /* Counter */ + ctx->state[12] = counter; + + /* Nonce */ + ctx->state[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( nonce, 0 ); + ctx->state[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( nonce, 4 ); + ctx->state[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( nonce, 8 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->keystream8, sizeof( ctx->keystream8 ) ); + + /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */ + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_update( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + size_t size, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + size_t offset = 0U; + size_t i; + + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( size == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( size == 0 || output != NULL ); + + /* Use leftover keystream bytes, if available */ + while( size > 0U && ctx->keystream_bytes_used < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ) + { + output[offset] = input[offset] + ^ ctx->keystream8[ctx->keystream_bytes_used]; + + ctx->keystream_bytes_used++; + offset++; + size--; + } + + /* Process full blocks */ + while( size >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ) + { + /* Generate new keystream block and increment counter */ + chacha20_block( ctx->state, ctx->keystream8 ); + ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; + + for( i = 0U; i < 64U; i += 8U ) + { + output[offset + i ] = input[offset + i ] ^ ctx->keystream8[i ]; + output[offset + i+1] = input[offset + i+1] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+1]; + output[offset + i+2] = input[offset + i+2] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+2]; + output[offset + i+3] = input[offset + i+3] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+3]; + output[offset + i+4] = input[offset + i+4] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+4]; + output[offset + i+5] = input[offset + i+5] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+5]; + output[offset + i+6] = input[offset + i+6] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+6]; + output[offset + i+7] = input[offset + i+7] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+7]; + } + + offset += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + size -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + /* Last (partial) block */ + if( size > 0U ) + { + /* Generate new keystream block and increment counter */ + chacha20_block( ctx->state, ctx->keystream8 ); + ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; + + for( i = 0U; i < size; i++) + { + output[offset + i] = input[offset + i] ^ ctx->keystream8[i]; + } + + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = size; + + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter, + size_t data_len, + const unsigned char* input, + unsigned char* output ) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( data_len == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( data_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + + mbedtls_chacha20_init( &ctx ); + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( &ctx, key ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts( &ctx, nonce, counter ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx, data_len, input, output ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_chacha20_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_keys[2][32] = +{ + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }, + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_nonces[2][12] = +{ + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }, + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02 + } +}; + +static const uint32_t test_counters[2] = +{ + 0U, + 1U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_input[2][375] = +{ + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }, + { + 0x41, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6d, + 0x69, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x6f, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, + 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6e, + 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x72, + 0x69, 0x62, 0x75, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x66, + 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x70, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x69, + 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x72, + 0x20, 0x70, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, + 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, + 0x20, 0x49, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x65, + 0x74, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x74, 0x20, + 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x52, 0x46, 0x43, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x73, + 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, + 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x77, 0x69, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, + 0x20, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, + 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, + 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x61, 0x63, 0x74, 0x69, + 0x76, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, + 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, + 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x22, 0x49, + 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, + 0x72, 0x69, 0x62, 0x75, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, + 0x22, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x53, 0x75, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, + 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, + 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x75, + 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x20, + 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, + 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, + 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, + 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, + 0x77, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, + 0x77, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, + 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x63, + 0x74, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x63, + 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, + 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61, + 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, + 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6f, + 0x72, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x63, 0x65, 0x2c, + 0x20, 0x77, 0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x64, 0x64, 0x72, 0x65, + 0x73, 0x73, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_output[2][375] = +{ + { + 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90, + 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28, + 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a, + 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7, + 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d, + 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37, + 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c, + 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86 + }, + { + 0xa3, 0xfb, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0x2f, 0xde, + 0x4f, 0x37, 0x6c, 0xa2, 0x3e, 0x82, 0x73, 0x70, + 0x41, 0x60, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0x4f, 0x4f, 0x57, 0xbd, + 0x8c, 0xff, 0x2c, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0x79, 0x55, 0xec, + 0x2a, 0x97, 0x94, 0x8b, 0xd3, 0x72, 0x29, 0x15, + 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xd3, 0x37, 0xf7, 0xd3, 0x70, 0x05, + 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x96, 0xd6, 0x47, 0xb7, 0xc3, 0x9f, + 0x56, 0xe0, 0x31, 0xca, 0x5e, 0xb6, 0x25, 0x0d, + 0x40, 0x42, 0xe0, 0x27, 0x85, 0xec, 0xec, 0xfa, + 0x4b, 0x4b, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0xea, 0xd0, 0x44, 0x0e, + 0x20, 0xb6, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x09, 0xd8, 0x81, 0xa7, + 0xc6, 0x13, 0x2f, 0x42, 0x0e, 0x52, 0x79, 0x50, + 0x42, 0xbd, 0xfa, 0x77, 0x73, 0xd8, 0xa9, 0x05, + 0x14, 0x47, 0xb3, 0x29, 0x1c, 0xe1, 0x41, 0x1c, + 0x68, 0x04, 0x65, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xa6, 0xc4, 0x05, + 0xb7, 0x76, 0x4d, 0x5e, 0x87, 0xbe, 0xa8, 0x5a, + 0xd0, 0x0f, 0x84, 0x49, 0xed, 0x8f, 0x72, 0xd0, + 0xd6, 0x62, 0xab, 0x05, 0x26, 0x91, 0xca, 0x66, + 0x42, 0x4b, 0xc8, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0x0e, 0xa4, + 0x1f, 0x43, 0xab, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xd3, 0x25, 0x9d, + 0xc4, 0xb2, 0xd0, 0xdf, 0xb4, 0x8a, 0x6c, 0x91, + 0x39, 0xdd, 0xd7, 0xf7, 0x69, 0x66, 0xe9, 0x28, + 0xe6, 0x35, 0x55, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0x6c, 0x5c, 0x87, + 0x9d, 0x7b, 0x35, 0xd4, 0x9e, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0x2b, + 0x08, 0x71, 0xcd, 0xac, 0x63, 0x89, 0x39, 0xe2, + 0x5e, 0x8a, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0xf9, 0xd5, 0x28, 0x0f, + 0xa8, 0xca, 0x32, 0x8b, 0x35, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x76, + 0x59, 0x89, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0x3d, 0xaa, 0x8b, 0x6c, + 0xcc, 0x3a, 0xaf, 0x9f, 0x39, 0x79, 0xc9, 0x2b, + 0x37, 0x20, 0xfc, 0x88, 0xdc, 0x95, 0xed, 0x84, + 0xa1, 0xbe, 0x05, 0x9c, 0x64, 0x99, 0xb9, 0xfd, + 0xa2, 0x36, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0x18, 0xb0, 0x4b, 0x0b, + 0xc3, 0x9c, 0x1e, 0x87, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x3b, 0xfe, + 0x55, 0x69, 0x75, 0x3f, 0x88, 0x12, 0x8c, 0xc0, + 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x9b, 0x63, 0xd1, 0xa1, 0x6f, 0x80, + 0xef, 0x25, 0x54, 0xd7, 0x18, 0x9c, 0x41, 0x1f, + 0x58, 0x69, 0xca, 0x52, 0xc5, 0xb8, 0x3f, 0xa3, + 0x6f, 0xf2, 0x16, 0xb9, 0xc1, 0xd3, 0x00, 0x62, + 0xbe, 0xbc, 0xfd, 0x2d, 0xc5, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x91, + 0x19, 0x34, 0xfd, 0xa7, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xf6, 0xe6, + 0x98, 0xce, 0xd7, 0x59, 0xc3, 0xff, 0x9b, 0x64, + 0x77, 0x33, 0x8f, 0x3d, 0xa4, 0xf9, 0xcd, 0x85, + 0x14, 0xea, 0x99, 0x82, 0xcc, 0xaf, 0xb3, 0x41, + 0xb2, 0x38, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xd1, 0xab, + 0x7a, 0xc6, 0x1d, 0xd2, 0x9c, 0x6f, 0x21, 0xba, + 0x5b, 0x86, 0x2f, 0x37, 0x30, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0xfd, + 0xc4, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x6c, 0x22, 0xf2, 0x21 + } +}; + +static const size_t test_lengths[2] = +{ + 64U, + 375U +}; + +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + +#define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ! ( cond ) ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf args; \ + \ + return( -1 ); \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + unsigned char output[381]; + unsigned i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for( i = 0U; i < 2U; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ChaCha20 test %u ", i ); + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( test_keys[i], + test_nonces[i], + test_counters[i], + test_lengths[i], + test_input[i], + output ); + + ASSERT( 0 == ret, ( "error code: %i\n", ret ) ); + + ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( output, test_output[i], test_lengths[i] ), + ( "failed (output)\n" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dc75b203 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c @@ -0,0 +1,524 @@ +/** + * \file chachapoly.c + * + * \brief ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction based on RFC 7539. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT ( 0 ) +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ( 1 ) +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT ( 2 ) /* Encrypting or decrypting */ +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_FINISHED ( 3 ) + +/** + * \brief Adds nul bytes to pad the AAD for Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + */ +static int chachapoly_pad_aad( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) +{ + uint32_t partial_block_len = (uint32_t) ( ctx->aad_len % 16U ); + unsigned char zeroes[15]; + + if( partial_block_len == 0U ) + return( 0 ); + + memset( zeroes, 0, sizeof( zeroes ) ); + + return( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, + zeroes, + 16U - partial_block_len ) ); +} + +/** + * \brief Adds nul bytes to pad the ciphertext for Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + */ +static int chachapoly_pad_ciphertext( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) +{ + uint32_t partial_block_len = (uint32_t) ( ctx->ciphertext_len % 16U ); + unsigned char zeroes[15]; + + if( partial_block_len == 0U ) + return( 0 ); + + memset( zeroes, 0, sizeof( zeroes ) ); + return( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, + zeroes, + 16U - partial_block_len ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_chachapoly_init( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) +{ + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_chacha20_init( &ctx->chacha20_ctx ); + mbedtls_poly1305_init( &ctx->poly1305_ctx ); + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; + ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; +} + +void mbedtls_chachapoly_free( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_chacha20_free( &ctx->chacha20_ctx ); + mbedtls_poly1305_free( &ctx->poly1305_ctx ); + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; + ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, key ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char poly1305_key[64]; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + + /* Set counter = 0, will be update to 1 when generating Poly1305 key */ + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, nonce, 0U ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Generate the Poly1305 key by getting the ChaCha20 keystream output with + * counter = 0. This is the same as encrypting a buffer of zeroes. + * Only the first 256-bits (32 bytes) of the key is used for Poly1305. + * The other 256 bits are discarded. + */ + memset( poly1305_key, 0, sizeof( poly1305_key ) ); + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, sizeof( poly1305_key ), + poly1305_key, poly1305_key ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_starts( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, poly1305_key ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD; + ctx->mode = mode; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( poly1305_key, 64U ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len ) +{ + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL ); + + if( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + + ctx->aad_len += aad_len; + + return( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, aad, aad_len ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( len == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( len == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( ( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) && + ( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + } + + if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) + { + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT; + + ret = chachapoly_pad_aad( ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ctx->ciphertext_len += len; + + if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, len, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, output, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else /* DECRYPT */ + { + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, input, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, len, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char len_block[16]; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); + + if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + } + + if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) + { + ret = chachapoly_pad_aad( ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT ) + { + ret = chachapoly_pad_ciphertext( ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_FINISHED; + + /* The lengths of the AAD and ciphertext are processed by + * Poly1305 as the final 128-bit block, encoded as little-endian integers. + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->aad_len, len_block, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->ciphertext_len, len_block, 8); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, len_block, 16U ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, mac ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char tag[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( ctx, nonce, mode ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( ctx, aad, aad_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_update( ctx, length, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( ctx, tag ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char tag[16] ) +{ + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + return( chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, + length, nonce, aad, aad_len, + input, output, tag ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char tag[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + size_t i; + int diff; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( ctx, + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT, length, nonce, + aad, aad_len, input, output, check_tag ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < sizeof( check_tag ); i++ ) + diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i]; + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_key[1][32] = +{ + { + 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, + 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f, + 0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97, + 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_nonce[1][12] = +{ + { + 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* 32-bit common part */ + 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47 /* 64-bit IV */ + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_aad[1][12] = +{ + { + 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, + 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7 + } +}; + +static const size_t test_aad_len[1] = +{ + 12U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_input[1][114] = +{ + { + 0x4c, 0x61, 0x64, 0x69, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x47, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x6c, + 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x73, + 0x73, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x27, 0x39, 0x39, + 0x3a, 0x20, 0x49, 0x66, 0x20, 0x49, 0x20, 0x63, + 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x66, + 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x20, 0x6f, + 0x6e, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x69, 0x70, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x75, 0x74, 0x75, + 0x72, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x73, + 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, + 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, + 0x74, 0x2e + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_output[1][114] = +{ + { + 0xd3, 0x1a, 0x8d, 0x34, 0x64, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xdb, + 0x7b, 0x86, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0x53, 0xef, 0x7e, 0xc2, + 0xa4, 0xad, 0xed, 0x51, 0x29, 0x6e, 0x08, 0xfe, + 0xa9, 0xe2, 0xb5, 0xa7, 0x36, 0xee, 0x62, 0xd6, + 0x3d, 0xbe, 0xa4, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xa9, 0x67, 0x12, + 0x82, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0x69, 0xda, 0x92, 0x72, 0x8b, + 0x1a, 0x71, 0xde, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x06, 0x0b, 0x29, + 0x05, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xb6, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x3b, 0x36, + 0x92, 0xdd, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x2d, 0x77, 0x8b, 0x8c, + 0x98, 0x03, 0xae, 0xe3, 0x28, 0x09, 0x1b, 0x58, + 0xfa, 0xb3, 0x24, 0xe4, 0xfa, 0xd6, 0x75, 0x94, + 0x55, 0x85, 0x80, 0x8b, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd7, 0xbc, + 0x3f, 0xf4, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x8e, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x9d, + 0xe5, 0x76, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x86, 0xce, 0xc6, 0x4b, + 0x61, 0x16 + } +}; + +static const size_t test_input_len[1] = +{ + 114U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_mac[1][16] = +{ + { + 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x0b, 0x59, 0x4f, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x6a, + 0x7e, 0x90, 0x2e, 0xcb, 0xd0, 0x60, 0x06, 0x91 + } +}; + +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + +#define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ! ( cond ) ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf args; \ + \ + return( -1 ); \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx; + unsigned i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output[200]; + unsigned char mac[16]; + + for( i = 0U; i < 1U; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ChaCha20-Poly1305 test %u ", i ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &ctx ); + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &ctx, test_key[i] ); + ASSERT( 0 == ret, ( "setkey() error code: %i\n", ret ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, + test_input_len[i], + test_nonce[i], + test_aad[i], + test_aad_len[i], + test_input[i], + output, + mac ); + + ASSERT( 0 == ret, ( "crypt_and_tag() error code: %i\n", ret ) ); + + ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( output, test_output[i], test_input_len[i] ), + ( "failure (wrong output)\n" ) ); + + ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( mac, test_mac[i], 16U ), + ( "failure (wrong MAC)\n" ) ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7ad16a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/** + * \file check_crypto_config.h + * + * \brief Consistency checks for PSA configuration options + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * It is recommended to include this file from your crypto_config.h + * in order to catch dependency issues early. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/cipher.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3b4bd29 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,1637 @@ +/** + * \file cipher.c + * + * \brief Generic cipher wrapper for mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#define CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CIPHER_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +static int supported_init = 0; + +const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + int *type; + + if( ! supported_init ) + { + def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; + type = mbedtls_cipher_supported; + + while( def->type != 0 ) + *type++ = (*def++).type; + + *type = 0; + + supported_init = 1; + } + + return( mbedtls_cipher_supported ); +} + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + + for( def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++ ) + if( def->type == cipher_type ) + return( def->info ); + + return( NULL ); +} + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( + const char *cipher_name ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + + if( NULL == cipher_name ) + return( NULL ); + + for( def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++ ) + if( ! strcmp( def->info->name, cipher_name ) ) + return( def->info ); + + return( NULL ); +} + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( + const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + + for( def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++ ) + if( def->info->base->cipher == cipher_id && + def->info->key_bitlen == (unsigned) key_bitlen && + def->info->mode == mode ) + return( def->info ); + + return( NULL ); +} + +void mbedtls_cipher_init( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + if( ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + if( cipher_psa->slot_state == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED ) + { + /* xxx_free() doesn't allow to return failures. */ + (void) psa_destroy_key( cipher_psa->slot ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cipher_psa, sizeof( *cipher_psa ) ); + mbedtls_free( cipher_psa ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) ); + return; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + if( ctx->cmac_ctx ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->cmac_ctx, + sizeof( mbedtls_cmac_context_t ) ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->cmac_ctx ); + } +#endif + + if( ctx->cipher_ctx ) + ctx->cipher_info->base->ctx_free_func( ctx->cipher_ctx ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); + + if( NULL == ( ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_info->base->ctx_alloc_func() ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + /* + * Ignore possible errors caused by a cipher mode that doesn't use padding + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 ); +#else + (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *cipher_psa; + + if( NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are + * supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */ + alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( cipher_info->mode, taglen ); + if( alg == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + if( mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( cipher_info->type ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); + + cipher_psa = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa ) ); + if( cipher_psa == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + cipher_psa->alg = alg; + ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_psa; + ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; + ctx->psa_enabled = 1; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_operation_t operation ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT || + operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + size_t const key_bytelen = ( (size_t) key_bitlen + 7 ) / 8; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + /* PSA Crypto API only accepts byte-aligned keys. */ + if( key_bitlen % 8 != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Don't allow keys to be set multiple times. */ + if( cipher_psa->slot_state != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + ctx->cipher_info->type ); + if( key_type == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + /* Mbed TLS' cipher layer doesn't enforce the mode of operation + * (encrypt vs. decrypt): it is possible to setup a key for encryption + * and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this + * are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + /* mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( operation ); */ + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, cipher_psa->alg ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, key, key_bytelen, + &cipher_psa->slot ); + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + break; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + /* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to + * destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */ + cipher_psa->slot_state = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED; + + ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; + ctx->operation = operation; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN ) == 0 && + (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen != key_bitlen ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; + ctx->operation = operation; + + /* + * For OFB, CFB and CTR mode always use the encryption key schedule + */ + if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == operation || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + return( ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_enc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen ) ); + } + + if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation ) + return( ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_dec_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen ) ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ) +{ + size_t actual_iv_size; + + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */ + if( iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ( ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN ) != 0 ) + actual_iv_size = iv_len; + else + { + actual_iv_size = ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; + + /* avoid reading past the end of input buffer */ + if( actual_iv_size > iv_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + if ( ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 ) + { + /* Even though the actual_iv_size is overwritten with a correct value + * of 12 from the cipher info, return an error to indicate that + * the input iv_len is wrong. */ + if( iv_len != 12 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if ( 0 != mbedtls_chacha20_starts( (mbedtls_chacha20_context*)ctx->cipher_ctx, + iv, + 0U ) ) /* Initial counter value */ + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 && + iv_len != 12 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif +#endif + + if ( actual_iv_size != 0 ) + { + memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size ); + ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* We don't support resetting PSA-based + * cipher contexts, yet. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + return( mbedtls_gcm_starts( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->operation, + ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, ad, ad_len ) ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + int result; + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; + + mode = ( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) + ? MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT + : MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT; + + result = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->iv, + mode ); + if ( result != 0 ) + return( result ); + + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ad, ad_len ) ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t block_size; + + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + *olen = 0; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ); + if ( 0 == block_size ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + } + + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ) + { + if( ilen != block_size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED ); + + *olen = ilen; + + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ecb_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ) + { + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_gcm_update( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, input, + output ) ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + { + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_update( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, input, output ) ); + } +#endif + + if( input == output && + ( ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 || ilen % block_size ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + size_t copy_len = 0; + + /* + * If there is not enough data for a full block, cache it. + */ + if( ( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && NULL != ctx->add_padding && + ilen <= block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len ) || + ( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && NULL == ctx->add_padding && + ilen < block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len ) || + ( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT && + ilen < block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len ) ) + { + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), input, + ilen ); + + ctx->unprocessed_len += ilen; + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * Process cached data first + */ + if( 0 != ctx->unprocessed_len ) + { + copy_len = block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len; + + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), input, + copy_len ); + + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, block_size, ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen += block_size; + output += block_size; + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + + input += copy_len; + ilen -= copy_len; + } + + /* + * Cache final, incomplete block + */ + if( 0 != ilen ) + { + /* Encryption: only cache partial blocks + * Decryption w/ padding: always keep at least one whole block + * Decryption w/o padding: only cache partial blocks + */ + copy_len = ilen % block_size; + if( copy_len == 0 && + ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && + NULL != ctx->add_padding) + { + copy_len = block_size; + } + + memcpy( ctx->unprocessed_data, &( input[ilen - copy_len] ), + copy_len ); + + ctx->unprocessed_len += copy_len; + ilen -= copy_len; + } + + /* + * Process remaining full blocks + */ + if( ilen ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, ilen, ctx->iv, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen += ilen; + } + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cfb_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, + input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ofb_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ctr_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS ) + { + if( ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 ) { + /* We can only process an entire data unit at a time. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->xts_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, ilen, ctx->iv, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->stream_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +/* + * PKCS7 (and PKCS5) padding: fill with ll bytes, with ll = padding_len + */ +static void add_pkcs_padding( unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t data_len ) +{ + size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len; + unsigned char i; + + for( i = 0; i < padding_len; i++ ) + output[data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padding_len; +} + +static int get_pkcs_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + size_t i, pad_idx; + unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0; + + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + padding_len = input[input_len - 1]; + *data_len = input_len - padding_len; + + /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */ + bad |= padding_len > input_len; + bad |= padding_len == 0; + + /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len, + * so pick input_len, which is usually 8 or 16 (one block) */ + pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; + for( i = 0; i < input_len; i++ ) + bad |= ( input[i] ^ padding_len ) * ( i >= pad_idx ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * ( bad != 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) +/* + * One and zeros padding: fill with 80 00 ... 00 + */ +static void add_one_and_zeros_padding( unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len, size_t data_len ) +{ + size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len; + unsigned char i = 0; + + output[data_len] = 0x80; + for( i = 1; i < padding_len; i++ ) + output[data_len + i] = 0x00; +} + +static int get_one_and_zeros_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char done = 0, prev_done, bad; + + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + bad = 0x80; + *data_len = 0; + for( i = input_len; i > 0; i-- ) + { + prev_done = done; + done |= ( input[i - 1] != 0 ); + *data_len |= ( i - 1 ) * ( done != prev_done ); + bad ^= input[i - 1] * ( done != prev_done ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * ( bad != 0 ) ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) +/* + * Zeros and len padding: fill with 00 ... 00 ll, where ll is padding length + */ +static void add_zeros_and_len_padding( unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len, size_t data_len ) +{ + size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len; + unsigned char i = 0; + + for( i = 1; i < padding_len; i++ ) + output[data_len + i - 1] = 0x00; + output[output_len - 1] = (unsigned char) padding_len; +} + +static int get_zeros_and_len_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + size_t i, pad_idx; + unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0; + + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + padding_len = input[input_len - 1]; + *data_len = input_len - padding_len; + + /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */ + bad |= padding_len > input_len; + bad |= padding_len == 0; + + /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len */ + pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; + for( i = 0; i < input_len - 1; i++ ) + bad |= input[i] * ( i >= pad_idx ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * ( bad != 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) +/* + * Zero padding: fill with 00 ... 00 + */ +static void add_zeros_padding( unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len, size_t data_len ) +{ + size_t i; + + for( i = data_len; i < output_len; i++ ) + output[i] = 0x00; +} + +static int get_zeros_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char done = 0, prev_done; + + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *data_len = 0; + for( i = input_len; i > 0; i-- ) + { + prev_done = done; + done |= ( input[i-1] != 0 ); + *data_len |= i * ( done != prev_done ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ + +/* + * No padding: don't pad :) + * + * There is no add_padding function (check for NULL in mbedtls_cipher_finish) + * but a trivial get_padding function + */ +static int get_no_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *data_len = input_len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + *olen = 0; + + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if ( ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) || + ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + if( ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED ); + + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + int ret = 0; + + if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == ctx->operation ) + { + /* check for 'no padding' mode */ + if( NULL == ctx->add_padding ) + { + if( 0 != ctx->unprocessed_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + ctx->add_padding( ctx->unprocessed_data, mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( ctx ), + ctx->unprocessed_len ); + } + else if( mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ) != ctx->unprocessed_len ) + { + /* + * For decrypt operations, expect a full block, + * or an empty block if no padding + */ + if( NULL == ctx->add_padding && 0 == ctx->unprocessed_len ) + return( 0 ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED ); + } + + /* cipher block */ + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ), ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Set output size for decryption */ + if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == ctx->operation ) + return( ctx->get_padding( output, mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ), + olen ) ); + + /* Set output size for encryption */ + *olen = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ); + return( 0 ); + } +#else + ((void) output); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) +int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( NULL == ctx->cipher_info || MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding + * schemes, we currently don't make them + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + if( mode != MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + switch( mode ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7: + ctx->add_padding = add_pkcs_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_pkcs_padding; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS: + ctx->add_padding = add_one_and_zeros_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_one_and_zeros_padding; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN: + ctx->add_padding = add_zeros_and_len_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_zeros_and_len_padding; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS: + ctx->add_padding = add_zeros_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_zeros_padding; + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE: + ctx->add_padding = NULL; + ctx->get_padding = get_no_padding; + break; + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT != ctx->operation ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + return( mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + tag, tag_len ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ + if ( tag_len != 16U ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag ) ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT != ctx->operation ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. It would make sense + * to return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT or perhaps + * MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, but at the time I write this our + * unit tests assume 0. */ + ret = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + if( tag_len > sizeof( check_tag ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( + (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + check_tag, tag_len ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */ + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ + if ( tag_len != sizeof( check_tag ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, check_tag ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */ + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( check_tag, tag_len ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +/* + * Packet-oriented wrapper for non-AEAD modes + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t finish_olen; + + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t part_len; + + if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) + { + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg ); + } + else if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) + { + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg ); + } + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* In the following, we can immediately return on an error, + * because the PSA Crypto API guarantees that cipher operations + * are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(), + * and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ) + { + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_op, iv, iv_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_cipher_update( &cipher_op, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + status = psa_cipher_finish( &cipher_op, + output + *olen, ilen - *olen, + &part_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + *olen += part_len; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( ctx, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen, + &finish_olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + *olen += finish_olen; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + */ +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if( output == NULL || tag != output + ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + status = psa_aead_encrypt( cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, + output, ilen + tag_len, olen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + *olen -= tag_len; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, output, tag_len, tag ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output, + tag, tag_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ + if ( ( iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size ) || + ( tag_len != 16U ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, iv, ad, ad_len, input, output, tag ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + */ +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if( input == NULL || tag != input + ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + status = psa_aead_decrypt( cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen + tag_len, + output, ilen, olen ); + if( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ); + else if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *olen = ilen; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + tag, tag_len, input, output ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *olen = ilen; + ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, output, tag, tag_len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ + if ( ( iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size ) || + ( tag_len != 16U ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, ad, ad_len, tag, input, output ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + tag, tag_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + tag, tag_len ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) + { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( output_len < ilen + tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + output + ilen, tag_len ); + *olen += tag_len; + return( ret ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) + { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( ilen < tag_len || output_len < ilen - tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen - tag_len, output, olen, + input + ilen - tag_len, tag_len ) ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..57eb3cb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,2406 @@ +/** + * \file cipher_wrap.c + * + * \brief Generic cipher wrapper for mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + +#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +/* shared by all GCM ciphers */ +static void *gcm_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_gcm_init( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void gcm_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_gcm_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +/* shared by all CCM ciphers */ +static void *ccm_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ccm_init( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void ccm_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +static int aes_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, input, output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int aes_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input, + output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int aes_crypt_cfb128_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv_off, iv, + input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +static int aes_crypt_ofb_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, length, iv_off, + iv, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int aes_crypt_ctr_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, nonce_counter, + stream_block, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int aes_crypt_xts_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + int mode; + + switch( operation ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT: + mode = MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT: + mode = MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( xts_ctx, mode, length, + data_unit, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +static int aes_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static int aes_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static void * aes_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_context *aes = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); + + if( aes == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_aes_init( aes ); + + return( aes ); +} + +static void aes_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_free( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + aes_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + aes_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + aes_crypt_cfb128_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + aes_crypt_ofb_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + aes_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + aes_setkey_enc_wrap, + aes_setkey_dec_wrap, + aes_ctx_alloc, + aes_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 128, + "AES-128-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 192, + "AES-192-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 256, + "AES-256-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 128, + "AES-128-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 192, + "AES-192-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 256, + "AES-256-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 128, + "AES-128-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 192, + "AES-192-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 256, + "AES-256-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ofb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + 128, + "AES-128-OFB", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ofb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + 192, + "AES-192-OFB", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ofb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + 256, + "AES-256-OFB", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 128, + "AES-128-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 192, + "AES-192-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 256, + "AES-256-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int xts_aes_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + return( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( xts_ctx, key, key_bitlen ) ); +} + +static int xts_aes_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + return( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( xts_ctx, key, key_bitlen ) ); +} + +static void *xts_aes_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *xts_ctx ) ); + + if( xts_ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_aes_xts_init( xts_ctx ); + + return( xts_ctx ); +} + +static void xts_aes_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + + if( xts_ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_aes_xts_free( xts_ctx ); + mbedtls_free( xts_ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t xts_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + aes_crypt_xts_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + xts_aes_setkey_enc_wrap, + xts_aes_setkey_dec_wrap, + xts_aes_ctx_alloc, + xts_aes_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_xts_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + 256, + "AES-128-XTS", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &xts_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_xts_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + 512, + "AES-256-XTS", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &xts_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +static int gcm_aes_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_gcm_setkey( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, + gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, + gcm_ctx_alloc, + gcm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 128, + "AES-128-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 192, + "AES-192-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 256, + "AES-256-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +static int ccm_aes_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_ccm_setkey( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, + ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, + ccm_ctx_alloc, + ccm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 128, + "AES-128-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 192, + "AES-192-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 256, + "AES-256-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + +static int camellia_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, input, + output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int camellia_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, + input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int camellia_crypt_cfb128_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, length, + iv_off, iv, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, + nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +static int camellia_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static int camellia_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static void * camellia_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_camellia_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_camellia_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void camellia_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_camellia_free( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t camellia_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + camellia_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + camellia_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + camellia_crypt_cfb128_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + camellia_setkey_enc_wrap, + camellia_setkey_dec_wrap, + camellia_ctx_alloc, + camellia_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +static int gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_gcm_setkey( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_camellia_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, + gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, + gcm_ctx_alloc, + gcm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +static int ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_ccm_setkey( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_camellia_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, + ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, + ccm_ctx_alloc, + ccm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + +static int aria_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + (void) operation; + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, input, + output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int aria_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, + input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int aria_crypt_cfb128_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, operation, length, + iv_off, iv, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int aria_crypt_ctr_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, + nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +static int aria_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static int aria_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static void * aria_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_aria_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_aria_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_aria_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void aria_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_aria_free( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aria_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + aria_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + aria_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + aria_crypt_cfb128_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + aria_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + aria_setkey_enc_wrap, + aria_setkey_dec_wrap, + aria_ctx_alloc, + aria_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 128, + "ARIA-128-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 192, + "ARIA-192-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 256, + "ARIA-256-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 128, + "ARIA-128-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 192, + "ARIA-192-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 256, + "ARIA-256-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 128, + "ARIA-128-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 192, + "ARIA-192-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 256, + "ARIA-256-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 128, + "ARIA-128-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 192, + "ARIA-192-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 256, + "ARIA-256-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +static int gcm_aria_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_gcm_setkey( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aria_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, + gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, + gcm_ctx_alloc, + gcm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 128, + "ARIA-128-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 192, + "ARIA-192-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 256, + "ARIA-256-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +static int ccm_aria_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_ccm_setkey( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aria_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, + ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, + ccm_ctx_alloc, + ccm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 128, + "ARIA-128-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 192, + "ARIA-192-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 256, + "ARIA-256-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + +static int des_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + ((void) operation); + return mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, input, output ); +} + +static int des3_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + ((void) operation); + return mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, input, output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int des_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input, + output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int des3_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input, + output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +static int des_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des3_set2key_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des3_set2key_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des3_set3key_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des3_set3key_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static void * des_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_des_context *des = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_des_context ) ); + + if( des == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_des_init( des ); + + return( des ); +} + +static void des_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_des_free( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static void * des3_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_des3_context *des3; + des3 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_des3_context ) ); + + if( des3 == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_des3_init( des3 ); + + return( des3 ); +} + +static void des3_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_des3_free( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, + des_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + des_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + des_setkey_enc_wrap, + des_setkey_dec_wrap, + des_ctx_alloc, + des_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES, + "DES-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 8, + &des_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES, + "DES-CBC", + 8, + 0, + 8, + &des_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, + des3_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + des3_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + des3_set2key_enc_wrap, + des3_set2key_dec_wrap, + des3_ctx_alloc, + des3_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE, + "DES-EDE-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 8, + &des_ede_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE, + "DES-EDE-CBC", + 8, + 0, + 8, + &des_ede_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede3_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, + des3_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + des3_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + des3_set3key_enc_wrap, + des3_set3key_dec_wrap, + des3_ctx_alloc, + des3_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3, + "DES-EDE3-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 8, + &des_ede3_info +}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3, + "DES-EDE3-CBC", + 8, + 0, + 8, + &des_ede3_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + +static int blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, input, + output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, + input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, + iv_off, iv, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, + nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +static int blowfish_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static void * blowfish_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_blowfish_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_blowfish_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void blowfish_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_blowfish_free( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t blowfish_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, + blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + blowfish_setkey_wrap, + blowfish_setkey_wrap, + blowfish_ctx_alloc, + blowfish_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 128, + "BLOWFISH-ECB", + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, + 8, + &blowfish_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 128, + "BLOWFISH-CBC", + 8, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, + 8, + &blowfish_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cfb64_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 128, + "BLOWFISH-CFB64", + 8, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, + 8, + &blowfish_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 128, + "BLOWFISH-CTR", + 8, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, + 8, + &blowfish_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +static int arc4_crypt_stream_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + return( mbedtls_arc4_crypt( (mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, length, input, output ) ); +} + +static int arc4_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + /* we get key_bitlen in bits, arc4 expects it in bytes */ + if( key_bitlen % 8 != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_arc4_setup( (mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen / 8 ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static void * arc4_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_arc4_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_arc4_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void arc4_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_arc4_free( (mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t arc4_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + arc4_crypt_stream_wrap, +#endif + arc4_setkey_wrap, + arc4_setkey_wrap, + arc4_ctx_alloc, + arc4_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t arc4_128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + 128, + "ARC4-128", + 0, + 0, + 1, + &arc4_base_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + +static int chacha20_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + if( key_bitlen != 256U ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if ( 0 != mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( (mbedtls_chacha20_context*)ctx, key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int chacha20_stream_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( ctx, length, input, output ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static void * chacha20_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_chacha20_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_chacha20_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void chacha20_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_free( (mbedtls_chacha20_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chacha20_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + chacha20_stream_wrap, +#endif + chacha20_setkey_wrap, + chacha20_setkey_wrap, + chacha20_ctx_alloc, + chacha20_ctx_free +}; +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chacha20_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + 256, + "CHACHA20", + 12, + 0, + 1, + &chacha20_base_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + +static int chachapoly_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + if( key_bitlen != 256U ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if ( 0 != mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*)ctx, key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void * chachapoly_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_chachapoly_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void chachapoly_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chachapoly_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + chachapoly_setkey_wrap, + chachapoly_setkey_wrap, + chachapoly_ctx_alloc, + chachapoly_ctx_free +}; +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chachapoly_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, + 256, + "CHACHA20-POLY1305", + 12, + 0, + 1, + &chachapoly_base_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +static int null_crypt_stream( void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + memmove( output, input, length ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static int null_setkey( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) key); + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void * null_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + return( (void *) 1 ); +} + +static void null_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + ((void) ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t null_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + null_crypt_stream, +#endif + null_setkey, + null_setkey, + null_ctx_alloc, + null_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t null_cipher_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + 0, + "NULL", + 0, + 0, + 1, + &null_base_info +}; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +static void *kw_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_nist_kw_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void kw_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 1 ); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_unwrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 0 ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t kw_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + kw_aes_setkey_wrap, + kw_aes_setkey_unwrap, + kw_ctx_alloc, + kw_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 128, + "AES-128-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 192, + "AES-192-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 256, + "AES-256-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 128, + "AES-128-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 192, + "AES-192-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 256, + "AES-256-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, &aes_128_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, &aes_192_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, &aes_256_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, &aes_128_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, &aes_192_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, &aes_256_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, &aes_128_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, &aes_192_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, &aes_256_cfb128_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, &aes_128_ofb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, &aes_192_ofb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, &aes_256_ofb_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, &aes_128_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, &aes_192_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, &aes_256_ctr_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, &aes_128_xts_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, &aes_256_xts_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, &aes_128_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, &aes_192_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, &aes_256_gcm_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, &aes_128_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, &aes_192_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, &aes_256_ccm_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, &arc4_128_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, &blowfish_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, &blowfish_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, &blowfish_cfb64_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, &blowfish_ctr_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, &camellia_128_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, &camellia_192_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, &camellia_256_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, &camellia_128_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, &camellia_192_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, &camellia_256_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, &camellia_128_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, &camellia_192_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, &camellia_256_cfb128_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, &camellia_128_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, &camellia_192_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, &camellia_256_ctr_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, &camellia_128_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, &camellia_192_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, &camellia_256_gcm_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, &camellia_128_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, &camellia_192_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, &camellia_256_ccm_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, &aria_128_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, &aria_192_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, &aria_256_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, &aria_128_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, &aria_192_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, &aria_256_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, &aria_128_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, &aria_192_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, &aria_256_cfb128_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, &aria_128_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, &aria_192_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, &aria_256_ctr_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, &aria_128_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, &aria_192_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, &aria_256_gcm_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, &aria_128_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, &aria_192_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, &aria_256_ccm_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, &des_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, &des_ede_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, &des_ede3_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, &des_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, &des_ede_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, &des_ede3_cbc_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, &chacha20_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &chachapoly_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, &aes_128_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, &aes_192_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, &aes_256_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, &aes_128_nist_kwp_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, &aes_192_nist_kwp_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, &aes_256_nist_kwp_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, &null_cipher_info }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, NULL } +}; + +#define NUM_CIPHERS ( sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions) / \ + sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0]) ) +int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS]; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/cmac.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/cmac.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3cc49d10 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/cmac.c @@ -0,0 +1,1087 @@ +/** + * \file cmac.c + * + * \brief NIST SP800-38B compliant CMAC implementation for AES and 3DES + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * - NIST SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The + * CMAC Mode for Authentication + * http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf + * + * - RFC 4493 - The AES-CMAC Algorithm + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493 + * + * - RFC 4615 - The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message + * Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 (AES-CMAC-PRF-128) + * Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4615 + * + * Additional test vectors: ISO/IEC 9797-1 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Multiplication by u in the Galois field of GF(2^n) + * + * As explained in NIST SP 800-38B, this can be computed: + * + * If MSB(p) = 0, then p = (p << 1) + * If MSB(p) = 1, then p = (p << 1) ^ R_n + * with R_64 = 0x1B and R_128 = 0x87 + * + * Input and output MUST NOT point to the same buffer + * Block size must be 8 bytes or 16 bytes - the block sizes for DES and AES. + */ +static int cmac_multiply_by_u( unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t blocksize ) +{ + const unsigned char R_128 = 0x87; + const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B; + unsigned char R_n, mask; + unsigned char overflow = 0x00; + int i; + + if( blocksize == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { + R_n = R_128; + } + else if( blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { + R_n = R_64; + } + else + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + for( i = (int)blocksize - 1; i >= 0; i-- ) + { + output[i] = input[i] << 1 | overflow; + overflow = input[i] >> 7; + } + + /* mask = ( input[0] >> 7 ) ? 0xff : 0x00 + * using bit operations to avoid branches */ + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + mask = - ( input[0] >> 7 ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + output[ blocksize - 1 ] ^= R_n & mask; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Generate subkeys + * + * - as specified by RFC 4493, section 2.3 Subkey Generation Algorithm + */ +static int cmac_generate_subkeys( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char* K1, unsigned char* K2 ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + size_t olen, block_size; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( L, sizeof( L ) ); + + block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + + /* Calculate Ek(0) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, L, block_size, L, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Generate K1 and K2 + */ + if( ( ret = cmac_multiply_by_u( K1, L , block_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = cmac_multiply_by_u( K2, K1 , block_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( L, sizeof( L ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) +static void cmac_xor_block( unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input1, + const unsigned char *input2, + const size_t block_size ) +{ + size_t idx; + + for( idx = 0; idx < block_size; idx++ ) + output[ idx ] = input1[ idx ] ^ input2[ idx ]; +} + +/* + * Create padded last block from (partial) last block. + * + * We can't use the padding option from the cipher layer, as it only works for + * CBC and we use ECB mode, and anyway we need to XOR K1 or K2 in addition. + */ +static void cmac_pad( unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX], + size_t padded_block_len, + const unsigned char *last_block, + size_t last_block_len ) +{ + size_t j; + + for( j = 0; j < padded_block_len; j++ ) + { + if( j < last_block_len ) + padded_block[j] = last_block[j]; + else if( j == last_block_len ) + padded_block[j] = 0x80; + else + padded_block[j] = 0x00; + } +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keybits ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; + int retval; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( retval = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( ctx, key, (int)keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + return( retval ); + + type = ctx->cipher_info->type; + + switch( type ) + { + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB: + break; + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Allocated and initialise in the cipher context memory for the CMAC + * context */ + cmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_cmac_context_t ) ); + if( cmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->cmac_ctx = cmac_ctx; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cmac_ctx->state, sizeof( cmac_ctx->state ) ); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t* cmac_ctx; + unsigned char *state; + int ret = 0; + size_t n, j, olen, block_size; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || input == NULL || + ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; + block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + state = ctx->cmac_ctx->state; + + /* Is there data still to process from the last call, that's greater in + * size than a block? */ + if( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 && + ilen > block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len ) + { + memcpy( &cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block[cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len], + input, + block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len ); + + cmac_xor_block( state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, state, block_size, state, + &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + input += block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len; + ilen -= block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len; + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + } + + /* n is the number of blocks including any final partial block */ + n = ( ilen + block_size - 1 ) / block_size; + + /* Iterate across the input data in block sized chunks, excluding any + * final partial or complete block */ + for( j = 1; j < n; j++ ) + { + cmac_xor_block( state, input, state, block_size ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, state, block_size, state, + &olen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ilen -= block_size; + input += block_size; + } + + /* If there is data left over that wasn't aligned to a block */ + if( ilen > 0 ) + { + memcpy( &cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block[cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len], + input, + ilen ); + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len += ilen; + } + +exit: + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t* cmac_ctx; + unsigned char *state, *last_block; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen, block_size; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL || + output == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; + block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + state = cmac_ctx->state; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K1, sizeof( K1 ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K2, sizeof( K2 ) ); + cmac_generate_subkeys( ctx, K1, K2 ); + + last_block = cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block; + + /* Calculate last block */ + if( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len < block_size ) + { + cmac_pad( M_last, block_size, last_block, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len ); + cmac_xor_block( M_last, M_last, K2, block_size ); + } + else + { + /* Last block is complete block */ + cmac_xor_block( M_last, last_block, K1, block_size ); + } + + + cmac_xor_block( state, M_last, state, block_size ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, state, block_size, state, + &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( output, state, block_size ); + +exit: + /* Wipe the generated keys on the stack, and any other transients to avoid + * side channel leakage */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K1, sizeof( K1 ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K2, sizeof( K2 ) ); + + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, + sizeof( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block ) ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( state, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t* cmac_ctx; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; + + /* Reset the internal state */ + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, + sizeof( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cmac_ctx->state, + sizeof( cmac_ctx->state ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac( const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &ctx, key, keylen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, input, ilen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &ctx, output ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * Implementation of AES-CMAC-PRF-128 defined in RFC 4615 + */ +int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( const unsigned char *key, size_t key_length, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + unsigned char zero_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char int_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if( key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } + + if( key_length == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { + /* Use key as is */ + memcpy( int_key, key, MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); + } + else + { + memset( zero_key, 0, MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, zero_key, 128, key, + key_length, int_key ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, int_key, 128, input, in_len, + output ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( int_key, sizeof( int_key ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * CMAC test data for SP800-38B + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/AES_CMAC.pdf + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/TDES_CMAC.pdf + * + * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 test data from RFC 4615 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4615#page-4 + */ + +#define NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY 4 +#define NB_PRF_TESTS 3 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +/* All CMAC test inputs are truncated from the same 64 byte buffer. */ +static const unsigned char test_message[] = { + /* PT */ + 0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, + 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, + 0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, + 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51, + 0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11, + 0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52, 0xef, + 0xf6, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17, + 0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10 +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* Truncation point of message for AES CMAC tests */ +static const unsigned int aes_message_lengths[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY] = { + /* Mlen */ + 0, + 16, + 20, + 64 +}; + +/* CMAC-AES128 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char aes_128_key[16] = { + 0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c +}; +static const unsigned char aes_128_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0xfb, 0xee, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x35, 0x71, 0x33, 0x66, + 0x7c, 0x85, 0xe0, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x36, 0xa8, 0xde + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0xf7, 0xdd, 0xac, 0x30, 0x6a, 0xe2, 0x66, 0xcc, + 0xf9, 0x0b, 0xc1, 0x1e, 0xe4, 0x6d, 0x51, 0x3b + } +}; +static const unsigned char aes_128_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Example #1 */ + 0xbb, 0x1d, 0x69, 0x29, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x37, 0x28, + 0x7f, 0xa3, 0x7d, 0x12, 0x9b, 0x75, 0x67, 0x46 + }, + { + /* Example #2 */ + 0x07, 0x0a, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6b, 0x4d, 0x41, 0x44, + 0xf7, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd0, 0x4a, 0x28, 0x7c + }, + { + /* Example #3 */ + 0x7d, 0x85, 0x44, 0x9e, 0xa6, 0xea, 0x19, 0xc8, + 0x23, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x78, 0x83, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xde + }, + { + /* Example #4 */ + 0x51, 0xf0, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0x7e, 0x3b, 0x9d, 0x92, + 0xfc, 0x49, 0x74, 0x17, 0x79, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xfe + } +}; + +/* CMAC-AES192 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char aes_192_key[24] = { + 0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, + 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b +}; +static const unsigned char aes_192_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0x44, 0x8a, 0x5b, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x51, 0x4b, 0x27, + 0x3e, 0xe6, 0x43, 0x9d, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x96 + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x89, 0x14, 0xb6, 0x39, 0x26, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x4e, + 0x7d, 0xcc, 0x87, 0x3b, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x45, 0x2c + } +}; +static const unsigned char aes_192_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Example #1 */ + 0xd1, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x46, 0xad, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0xe5, + 0x31, 0xca, 0xc4, 0x83, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x93, 0x67 + }, + { + /* Example #2 */ + 0x9e, 0x99, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x31, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x90, + 0x06, 0x62, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x84 + }, + { + /* Example #3 */ + 0x3d, 0x75, 0xc1, 0x94, 0xed, 0x96, 0x07, 0x04, + 0x44, 0xa9, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0xc7, 0x40, 0xec, 0xf8 + }, + { + /* Example #4 */ + 0xa1, 0xd5, 0xdf, 0x0e, 0xed, 0x79, 0x0f, 0x79, + 0x4d, 0x77, 0x58, 0x96, 0x59, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0x11 + } +}; + +/* CMAC-AES256 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char aes_256_key[32] = { + 0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, + 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7, + 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4 +}; +static const unsigned char aes_256_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0xca, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x03, 0x29, 0x9e, 0xed, 0xac, + 0x2e, 0x9a, 0x99, 0x80, 0x86, 0x21, 0x50, 0x2f + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x95, 0xa3, 0xda, 0x06, 0x53, 0x3d, 0xdb, 0x58, + 0x5d, 0x35, 0x33, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x42, 0xa0, 0xd9 + } +}; +static const unsigned char aes_256_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Example #1 */ + 0x02, 0x89, 0x62, 0xf6, 0x1b, 0x7b, 0xf8, 0x9e, + 0xfc, 0x6b, 0x55, 0x1f, 0x46, 0x67, 0xd9, 0x83 + }, + { + /* Example #2 */ + 0x28, 0xa7, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, + 0xbd, 0x4b, 0xf2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0xc3, 0x5c + }, + { + /* Example #3 */ + 0x15, 0x67, 0x27, 0xdc, 0x08, 0x78, 0x94, 0x4a, + 0x02, 0x3c, 0x1f, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0xad, 0x6d, 0x93 + }, + { + /* Example #4 */ + 0xe1, 0x99, 0x21, 0x90, 0x54, 0x9f, 0x6e, 0xd5, + 0x69, 0x6a, 0x2c, 0x05, 0x6c, 0x31, 0x54, 0x10 + } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +/* Truncation point of message for 3DES CMAC tests */ +static const unsigned int des3_message_lengths[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY] = { + 0, + 16, + 20, + 32 +}; + +/* CMAC-TDES (Generation) - 2 Key Test Data */ +static const unsigned char des3_2key_key[24] = { + /* Key1 */ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + /* Key2 */ + 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xEF, 0x01, + /* Key3 */ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef +}; +static const unsigned char des3_2key_subkeys[2][8] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0x0d, 0xd2, 0xcb, 0x7a, 0x3d, 0x88, 0x88, 0xd9 + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x1b, 0xa5, 0x96, 0xf4, 0x7b, 0x11, 0x11, 0xb2 + } +}; +static const unsigned char des3_2key_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Sample #1 */ + 0x79, 0xce, 0x52, 0xa7, 0xf7, 0x86, 0xa9, 0x60 + }, + { + /* Sample #2 */ + 0xcc, 0x18, 0xa0, 0xb7, 0x9a, 0xf2, 0x41, 0x3b + }, + { + /* Sample #3 */ + 0xc0, 0x6d, 0x37, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x10, 0x19, 0x69 + }, + { + /* Sample #4 */ + 0x9c, 0xd3, 0x35, 0x80, 0xf9, 0xb6, 0x4d, 0xfb + } +}; + +/* CMAC-TDES (Generation) - 3 Key Test Data */ +static const unsigned char des3_3key_key[24] = { + /* Key1 */ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0xef, + /* Key2 */ + 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, + /* Key3 */ + 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23 +}; +static const unsigned char des3_3key_subkeys[2][8] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0x9d, 0x74, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x33, 0x17, 0x96, 0xc0 + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x3a, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x72, 0x66, 0x2f, 0x2d, 0x9b + } +}; +static const unsigned char des3_3key_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Sample #1 */ + 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xd3, 0x7d, 0xf9, 0x36, 0xc5, 0x50 + }, + { + /* Sample #2 */ + 0x30, 0x23, 0x9c, 0xf1, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x09 + }, + { + /* Sample #3 */ + 0x6c, 0x9f, 0x3e, 0xe4, 0x92, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0xe2 + }, + { + /* Sample #4 */ + 0x99, 0x42, 0x9b, 0xd0, 0xbF, 0x79, 0x04, 0xe5 + } +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* AES AES-CMAC-PRF-128 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char PRFK[] = { + /* Key */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0xed, 0xcb +}; + +/* Sizes in bytes */ +static const size_t PRFKlen[NB_PRF_TESTS] = { + 18, + 16, + 10 +}; + +/* Message */ +static const unsigned char PRFM[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 +}; + +static const unsigned char PRFT[NB_PRF_TESTS][16] = { + { + 0x84, 0xa3, 0x48, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x5d, 0x23, 0x5b, + 0xab, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x0d, 0x2b, 0x4d, 0xa0, 0x9a + }, + { + 0x98, 0x0a, 0xe8, 0x7b, 0x5f, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0x52, + 0x14, 0xf5, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0x45, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0x2d + }, + { + 0x29, 0x0d, 0x9e, 0x11, 0x2e, 0xdb, 0x09, 0xee, + 0x14, 0x1f, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0x2f, 0x3d + } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +static int cmac_test_subkeys( int verbose, + const char* testname, + const unsigned char* key, + int keybits, + const unsigned char* subkeys, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, + int block_size, + int num_tests ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < num_tests; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC subkey #%d: ", testname, i + 1 ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "test execution failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key, keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 may be unavailable. This should not cause the selftest + * function to fail. */ + if( ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) && + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB ) { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + goto next_test; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "test execution failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = cmac_generate_subkeys( &ctx, K1, K2 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( ret = memcmp( K1, subkeys, block_size ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = memcmp( K2, &subkeys[block_size], block_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +next_test: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + } + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + +exit: + return( ret ); +} + +static int cmac_test_wth_cipher( int verbose, + const char* testname, + const unsigned char* key, + int keybits, + const unsigned char* messages, + const unsigned int message_lengths[4], + const unsigned char* expected_result, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, + int block_size, + int num_tests ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } + + for( i = 0; i < num_tests; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC #%d: ", testname, i + 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, key, keybits, messages, + message_lengths[i], output ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 and/or 3DES may be unavailable. This should not cause + * the selftest function to fail. */ + if( ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) && + ( cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB || + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB ) ) { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = memcmp( output, &expected_result[i * block_size], block_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +static int test_aes128_cmac_prf( int verbose ) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + for( i = 0; i < NB_PRF_TESTS; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " AES CMAC 128 PRF #%d: ", i ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( PRFK, PRFKlen[i], PRFM, 20, output ); + if( ret != 0 || + memcmp( output, PRFT[i], MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) != 0 ) + { + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); + } + else if( verbose != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + } + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +int mbedtls_cmac_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + /* AES-128 */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "AES 128", + aes_128_key, + 128, + (const unsigned char*)aes_128_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher( verbose, + "AES 128", + aes_128_key, + 128, + test_message, + aes_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)aes_128_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* AES-192 */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "AES 192", + aes_192_key, + 192, + (const unsigned char*)aes_192_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher( verbose, + "AES 192", + aes_192_key, + 192, + test_message, + aes_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)aes_192_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* AES-256 */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "AES 256", + aes_256_key, + 256, + (const unsigned char*)aes_256_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher ( verbose, + "AES 256", + aes_256_key, + 256, + test_message, + aes_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)aes_256_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + /* 3DES 2 key */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "3DES 2 key", + des3_2key_key, + 192, + (const unsigned char*)des3_2key_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher( verbose, + "3DES 2 key", + des3_2key_key, + 192, + test_message, + des3_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)des3_2key_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* 3DES 3 key */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "3DES 3 key", + des3_3key_key, + 192, + (const unsigned char*)des3_3key_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher( verbose, + "3DES 3 key", + des3_3key_key, + 192, + test_message, + des3_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)des3_3key_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if( ( ret = test_aes128_cmac_prf( verbose ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/common.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c0647241 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/** + * \file common.h + * + * \brief Utility macros for internal use in the library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#else +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#endif + +#include + +/** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests. + * + * If a function is only used inside its own source file and should be + * declared `static` to allow the compiler to optimize for code size, + * but that function has unit tests, define it with + * ``` + * MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_foo(...) { ... } + * ``` + * and declare it in a header in the `library/` directory with + * ``` + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + * int mbedtls_foo(...); + * #endif + * ``` + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +#else +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE static +#endif + +/** Byte Reading Macros + * + * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th + * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( x ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 8 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 16 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 24 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 32 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 40 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 48 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 56 ) & 0xff ) ) + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data , offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] ) \ + | ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] << 56 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 48 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 40 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 32 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 4] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 5] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 6] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 7] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 7] << 56 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 6] << 48 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 5] << 40 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 4] << 32 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( n ); \ +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e276d23c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c @@ -0,0 +1,832 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + + /* + * The following functions are implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#include "constant_time_invasive.h" +#endif + +#include + +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n ) +{ + size_t i; + volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; + volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; + volatile unsigned char diff = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. + * This avoids IAR compiler warning: + * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ + unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; + diff |= x ^ y; + } + + return( (int)diff ); +} + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison: + * - if \p x < \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 + * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return All-bits-one if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise zero. + */ +static size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */ + const size_t sub = x - y; + + /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */ + const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 ); + + /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */ + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask( sub1 ); + + return( mask ); +} + +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + return( ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( x, y ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +/* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise. + * + * Constant flow with respect to c. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c ) +{ + /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ + unsigned low_mask = ( (unsigned) c - low ) >> 8; + /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ + unsigned high_mask = ( (unsigned) high - c ) >> 8; + return( ~( low_mask | high_mask ) & 0xff ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ + const size_t diff = x ^ y; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ + const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff ); + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ + const unsigned diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return( 1 ^ diff1 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** Constant-flow "greater than" comparison: + * return x > y + * + * This is equivalent to \p x > \p y, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return 1 if \p x greater than \p y, otherwise 0. + */ +static unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_gt( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (y - x). */ + return( ( y - x ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint ret; + mbedtls_mpi_uint cond; + + /* + * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. + */ + cond = ( x ^ y ); + /* + * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and + * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> ( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return (unsigned) ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0 ) +{ + unsigned mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( condition ); + return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Select between two sign values without branches. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0` but uses only bit + * operations in order to avoid branches. + * + * \note if1 and if0 must be either 1 or -1, otherwise the result + * is undefined. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 The first sign; must be either +1 or -1. + * \param if0 The second sign; must be either +1 or -1. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. + * */ +static int mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( unsigned char condition, + int if1, + int if0 ) +{ + /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonably assume about + * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned + * by taking advantage of the fact that if1 and if0 are either +1 or -1. */ + unsigned uif1 = if1 + 1; + unsigned uif0 = if0 + 1; + + /* condition was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are uif1 and uif0 */ + const unsigned mask = condition << 1; + + /* select uif1 or uif0 */ + unsigned ur = ( uif0 & ~mask ) | ( uif1 & mask ); + + /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */ + return( (int) ur - 1 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, + unsigned char condition ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* all-bits 1 if condition is 1, all-bits 0 if condition is 0 */ + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -condition; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( unsigned char value ) +{ + unsigned char digit = 0; + /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with + * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change digit. */ + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 0, 25, value ) & ( 'A' + value ); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 26, 51, value ) & ( 'a' + value - 26 ); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 52, 61, value ) & ( '0' + value - 52 ); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 62, 62, value ) & '+'; + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 63, 63, value ) & '/'; + return( digit ); +} + +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c ) +{ + unsigned char val = 0; + /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with + * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus + * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 'A', 'Z', c ) & ( c - 'A' + 0 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 'a', 'z', c ) & ( c - 'a' + 26 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '0', '9', c ) & ( c - '0' + 52 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '+', '+', c ) & ( c - '+' + 62 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '/', '/', c ) & ( c - '/' + 63 + 1 ); + /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is + * a digit with the value v. */ + return( val - 1 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. + * + * `mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally + * equivalent to + * ``` + * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); + * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset); + * ``` + * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing) + * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at + * the expense of performance. + * + * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param total Total size of the buffer. + * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. + */ +static void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( void *start, + size_t total, + size_t offset ) +{ + volatile unsigned char *buf = start; + size_t i, n; + if( total == 0 ) + return; + for( i = 0; i < total; i++ ) + { + unsigned no_op = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( total - offset, i ); + /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last + * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and + * zero out the last byte. */ + for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ ) + { + unsigned char current = buf[n]; + unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; + buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, current, next ); + } + buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t len, + size_t c1, + size_t c2 ) +{ + /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ + const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( c1, c2 ); + const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_mask( equal ); + + /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */ + for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); +} + +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t offset, + size_t offset_min, + size_t offset_max, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t offsetval; + + for( offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++ ) + { + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( dest, src + offsetval, len, + offsetval, offset ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() + * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. + * + * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to + * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen + * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info ); + /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, + * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ + const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; + const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; + const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; + const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + + unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_md_context_t aux; + size_t offset; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init( &aux ); + +#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \ + do { \ + ret = (func_call); \ + if( ret != 0 ) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while( 0 ) + + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) ); + + /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, + * so we can start directly with the message */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) ); + + /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is + * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and + * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't + * check the return status properly. */ + memset( output, '!', hash_size ); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ ) + { + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) ); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size, + offset, data_len_secret ); + + if( offset < max_data_len ) + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) ); + } + + /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) ); + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); + + /* Done, get ready for next time */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ); + +#undef MD_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free( &aux ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + +/* + * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information + * about whether the assignment was made or not. + * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_ARM64) && (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103) +/* + * MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See: + * https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989 + */ +__declspec(noinline) +#endif +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char assign ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ + limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( assign );; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); + + X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( assign, Y->s, X->s ); + + mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign ); + + for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ ) + X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information + * about whether the swap was made or not. + * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to + * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char swap ) +{ + int ret, s; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + if( X == Y ) + return( 0 ); + + /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */ + limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( swap ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) ); + + s = X->s; + X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, Y->s, X->s ); + Y->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, s, Y->s ); + + + for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) + { + tmp = X->p[i]; + X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask ); + Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( tmp & limb_mask ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compare signed values in constant time + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret ) +{ + size_t i; + /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */ + unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL ); + + if( X->n != Y->n ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + /* + * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0. + * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. + */ + X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1; + Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1; + + /* + * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. + * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it + * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). + */ + cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative ); + *ret = cond & X_is_negative; + + /* + * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still + * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already. + */ + done = cond; + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + { + /* + * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both + * X and Y are negative. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] ); + *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative; + done |= cond; + + /* + * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both + * X and Y are positive. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] ); + *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative ); + done |= cond; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( int mode, + unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, plaintext_max_size; + + /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must + * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than + * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise + * this would open the execution of the function to + * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle + * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory + * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access + * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to + * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared + * branch predictor). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + unsigned bad = 0; + unsigned char pad_done = 0; + size_t plaintext_size = 0; + unsigned output_too_large; + + plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ) ? ilen - 11 + : output_max_len; + + /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant + * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ + bad |= input[0]; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ) + { + /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ + bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ + for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) + { + pad_done |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char)-input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; + pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; + } + } + else + { + /* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */ + bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. + * If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */ + for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) + { + pad_done |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( input[i], 0, 1 ); + pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 ); + bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, input[i] ^ 0xFF ); + } + } + + /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ + bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 ); + + /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ + bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt( 8, pad_count ); + + /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of + * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding + * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the + * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output + * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding + * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the + * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) ); + + /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output + * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ + output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( plaintext_size, + plaintext_max_size ); + + /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: + * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). + * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted + * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. + * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ + ret = - (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, + mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large, + - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, + 0 ) ); + + /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the + * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. + * We need to copy the same amount of data + * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to + * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or + * through memory or cache access patterns. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( bad | output_too_large ); + for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ ) + input[i] &= ~bad; + + /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. + * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because + * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity + * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large, + (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) plaintext_size ); + + /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in + * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from + * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that + * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the + * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive + * information. */ + mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size ); + + /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output + * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer + * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined + * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the + * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext + * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other + * secrets. */ + if( output_max_len != 0 ) + memcpy( output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size ); + + /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case + * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen + * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent + * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ + *olen = plaintext_size; + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a550b38f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#endif + +#include + + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -1 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison: + * - if \p x >= \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 + * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return All-bits-one if \p x is greater or equal than \p y, + * otherwise zero. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x, + size_t y ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +/** Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison: + * return x == y + * + * This is equivalent to \p x == \p y, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return 1 if \p x equals to \p y, otherwise 0. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x, + size_t y ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to \p x < \p y, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise 0. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +/** Choose between two integer values without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition is nonzero. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition is zero. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Conditionally assign a value without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `if ( condition ) dest = src`, but is likely + * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param n \p dest and \p src must be arrays of limbs of size n. + * \param dest The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point + * to an initialized MPI. + * \param src The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * \param condition Condition to test, must be 0 or 1. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, + unsigned char condition ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param value A value in the range 0..63. + * + * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( unsigned char value ); + +/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value. + * + * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), + * return -1. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param c A base64 digit. + * + * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c. + */ +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Conditional memcpy without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `if ( c1 == c2 ) memcpy(dest, src, len)`, but is likely + * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param dest The pointer to conditionally copy to. + * \param src The pointer to copy from. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. + * \param len The number of bytes to copy. + * \param c1 The first value to analyze in the condition. + * \param c2 The second value to analyze in the condition. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t len, + size_t c1, size_t c2 ); + +/** Copy data from a secret position with constant flow. + * + * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p + * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p + * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. + * Functionally equivalent to `memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)`. + * + * \note This function reads from \p dest, but the value that + * is read does not influence the result and this + * function's behavior is well-defined regardless of the + * contents of the buffers. This may result in false + * positives from static or dynamic analyzers, especially + * if \p dest is not initialized. + * + * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param src The base of the source buffer. This must point to a + * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len + * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. + * \param offset The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. + * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater + * than \p offset_max. + * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset. + * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset. + * \param len The number of bytes to copy. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t offset, + size_t offset_min, + size_t offset_max, + size_t len ); + +/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. + * + * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p + * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not + * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p + * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p + * max_data_len bytes from \p data. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured + * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the + * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. + * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after + * the computation is complete to prepare for the + * next computation. + * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being + * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p add_data_len bytes. + * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. + * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the + * message. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p max_data_len bytes. + * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. + * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no + * greater than \p max_data_len. + * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to + * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the + * HMAC value. + * + * \retval 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED + * The hardware accelerator failed. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). + * + * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value + * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen + * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which + * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. + * + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 + * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" + * by the terminology. + * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. + * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the + * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p output_max_len bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( int mode, + unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4620ca13 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/** + * \file constant_time_invasive.h + * + * \brief Constant-time module: interfaces for invasive testing only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when + * building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, + * return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * + * \param low The value to analyze. + * \param high The value to analyze. + * \param c The value to analyze. + * + * \return All-bits-one if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, otherwise zero. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a00d66ce --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,898 @@ +/* + * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90revised_March2007.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +/* + * CTR_DRBG context initialization + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); + /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly. + * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */ + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; + + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +/* + * This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL ) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->aes_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ) +{ + ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ) +{ + ctx->entropy_len = len; +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ) +{ + /* If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() has already been called, it's + * too late. Return the error code that's closest to making sense. */ + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); +#if SIZE_MAX > INT_MAX + /* This shouldn't be an issue because + * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible + * configuration, but make sure anyway. */ + if( len > INT_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); +#endif + + /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the + * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't + * used until after the initial seeding. */ + /* Due to the capping of len above, the value fits in an int. */ + ctx->reseed_counter = (int) len; + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int interval ) +{ + ctx->reseed_interval = interval; +} + +static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) +{ + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; + unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + unsigned char *p, *iv; + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; + int ret = 0; + + int i, j; + size_t buf_len, use_len; + + if( data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); + + /* + * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer + * IV = Counter (in 32-bits) padded to 16 with zeroes + * S = Length input string (in 32-bits) || Length of output (in 32-bits) || + * data || 0x80 + * (Total is padded to a multiple of 16-bytes with zeroes) + */ + p = buf + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( data_len, p, 0); + p += 4 + 3; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; + memcpy( p, data, data_len ); + p[data_len] = 0x80; + + buf_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 8 + data_len + 1; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++ ) + key[i] = i; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data + */ + for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + p = buf; + memset( chain, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + use_len = buf_len; + + while( use_len > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) + chain[i] ^= p[i]; + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + use_len -= ( use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + chain, chain ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + } + + memcpy( tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + + /* + * Update IV + */ + buf[3]++; + } + + /* + * Do final encryption with reduced data + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; + p = output; + + for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + iv, iv ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + memcpy( p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + } +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &aes_ctx ); + /* + * tidy up the stack + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( chain, sizeof( chain ) ); + if( 0 != ret ) + { + /* + * wipe partial seed from memory + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Update (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.2) + * ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, provided_data) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Update(provided_data, Key, V) + * with inputs and outputs + * ctx->aes_ctx = Key + * ctx->counter = V + */ +static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] ) +{ + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char *p = tmp; + int i, j; + int ret = 0; + + memset( tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); + + for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + /* + * Increase counter + */ + for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* + * Crypt counter block + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + } + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++ ) + tmp[i] ^= data[i]; + + /* + * Update key and counter + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, + * security_strength) -> initial_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx->counter = all-bits-0 + * ctx->aes_ctx = context from all-bits-0 key + * additional[:add_len] = entropy_input || nonce || personalization_string + * and with outputs + * ctx = initial_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) +{ + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( add_len == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) +{ + /* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match + * block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */ + if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT; + (void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input) + * -> new_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx contains working_state + * additional[:len] = additional_input + * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy + * for (ctx->entropy_len + nonce_len) bytes + * and with output + * ctx contains new_working_state + */ +static int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t len, + size_t nonce_len ) +{ + unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; + size_t seedlen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + if( nonce_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len - nonce_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); + + /* Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state. */ + if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; + + /* Gather entropy for a nonce if requested. */ + if( nonce_len != 0 ) + { + if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed + seedlen, nonce_len ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += nonce_len; + } + + /* Add additional data if provided. */ + if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); + seedlen += len; + } + + /* Reduce to 384 bits. */ + if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( seed, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Update state. */ + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, seed ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + ctx->reseed_counter = 1; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, sizeof( seed ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) ); +} + +/* Return a "good" nonce length for CTR_DRBG. The chosen nonce length + * is sufficient to achieve the maximum security strength given the key + * size and entropy length. If there is enough entropy in the initial + * call to the entropy function to serve as both the entropy input and + * the nonce, don't make a second call to get a nonce. */ +static size_t good_nonce_len( size_t entropy_len ) +{ + if( entropy_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 ) + return( 0 ); + else + return( ( entropy_len + 1 ) / 2 ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, + * security_strength) -> initial_working_state + * with inputs + * custom[:len] = nonce || personalization_string + * where entropy_input comes from f_entropy for ctx->entropy_len bytes + * and with outputs + * ctx = initial_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; + size_t nonce_len; + + memset( key, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); + + /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->aes_ctx ); + + ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; + ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; + + if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 ) + ctx->entropy_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; + /* ctx->reseed_counter contains the desired amount of entropy to + * grab for a nonce (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + * If it's -1, indicating that the entropy nonce length was not set + * explicitly, use a sufficiently large nonce for security. */ + nonce_len = ( ctx->reseed_counter >= 0 ? + (size_t) ctx->reseed_counter : + good_nonce_len( ctx->entropy_len ) ); + + /* Initialize with an empty key. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Do the initial seeding. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, custom, len, + nonce_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.5.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional[:add_len]) + * -> working_state_after_reseed + * if required, then + * CTR_DRBG_Generate(working_state_after_reseed, + * requested_number_of_bits, additional_input) + * -> status, returned_bits, new_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx contains working_state + * requested_number_of_bits = 8 * output_len + * additional[:add_len] = additional_input + * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy + * and with outputs + * status = SUCCESS (this function does the reseed internally) + * returned_bits = output[:output_len] + * ctx contains new_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char *p = output; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + int i; + size_t use_len; + + if( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); + + if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + memset( add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); + + if( ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval || + ctx->prediction_resistance ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + add_len = 0; + } + + if( add_len > 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + while( output_len > 0 ) + { + /* + * Increase counter + */ + for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* + * Crypt counter block + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len; + /* + * Copy random block to destination + */ + memcpy( p, tmp, use_len ); + p += use_len; + output_len -= use_len; + } + + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ctx->reseed_counter++; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, output_len, NULL, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + else + { + ret = 0; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + fclose( f ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f = NULL; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + unsigned char c; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); + if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + goto exit; + } + if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + fclose( f ); + f = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + if( f != NULL ) + fclose( f ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* The CTR_DRBG NIST test vectors used here are available at + * https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip + * + * The parameters used to derive the test data are: + * + * [AES-128 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 128] + * [NonceLen = 64] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 128] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + * [AES-256 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 256] + * [NonceLen = 128] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 256] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = + { 0x04, 0xd9, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xdc, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xbb, + 0xf1, 0x08, 0x77, 0x2b, 0x9e, 0x08, 0xca, 0x92, + 0x65, 0x16, 0xda, 0x99, 0xa2, 0x59, 0xf3, 0xe8, + 0x38, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x51, 0x70, 0x7b, 0x20, + 0xec, 0x53, 0xd0, 0x66, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xe3, 0xb0, + 0xe0, 0x86, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xad, + 0xf7, 0xef, 0x06, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xe8 }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = + { 0x07, 0x0d, 0x59, 0x63, 0x98, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x45, + 0x27, 0x38, 0x22, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xa9, + 0x74, 0x18, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x20, + 0x4a, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x85, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6f, + 0x00, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xda, 0xed, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x5c }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = + { 0xbf, 0xa4, 0x9a, 0x8f, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xb1, 0x7a, + 0x9d, 0xfa, 0x45, 0xed, 0x21, 0x52, 0xb3, 0xad }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = + { 0x4e, 0x61, 0x79, 0xd4, 0xc2, 0x72, 0xa1, 0x4c, + 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x0f }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = + { 0xc9, 0x0a, 0xaf, 0x85, 0x89, 0x71, 0x44, 0x66, + 0x4f, 0x25, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xde, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0xff, + 0x52, 0x5a, 0x1b, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x10, + 0x1f, 0xef, 0x1e, 0x62, 0x23, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x30, + 0xc9, 0x0d, 0xad, 0x69, 0xb4, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0xf4, + 0x87, 0x42, 0xd5, 0xae, 0x5e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0xcc, + 0xd9, 0xfd, 0x0b, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0x06, + 0x37, 0x36, 0x0f, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xcf }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = + { 0x31, 0xc9, 0x91, 0x09, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x10, 0x13, + 0x3c, 0xd3, 0x96, 0xf9, 0xbc, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xc0, + 0x7c, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x99, 0xaf, + 0xd7, 0xf2, 0x36, 0xfd, 0x40, 0x1a, 0x8b, 0xf2, + 0x33, 0x38, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x83, 0xb7, + 0xa2, 0x53, 0xdc, 0xee, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf2, + 0xee, 0x96, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x02, + 0x76, 0x70, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x69, 0xd1, 0x3b, 0xe8 }; +#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = + { 0xca, 0x58, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xcb, 0x49, + 0xd4, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x39, 0x50, 0xd9, 0x8a, + 0x6a, 0xb3, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xdf, 0x74, 0xd5, 0x85, + 0x8f, 0xd1, 0xba, 0x64, 0x54, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x1e, + 0xc5, 0xea, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x15, + 0x09, 0x20, 0x92, 0x42, 0x32, 0x36, 0x45, 0x45, + 0x7d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6b, 0xcf, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xc8, + 0x2f, 0x9f, 0xbc, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0x2c, + 0xb7, 0x16, 0xd1, 0x80, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xb3, + 0x88, 0x1b, 0x21, 0x45, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7f, 0xce, + 0xc8, 0x92, 0x35, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xd9, 0x1d, 0x8e, + 0x12, 0x38, 0xac, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x38, 0x18, 0x76, + 0x9c, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xd4, 0x13, 0xb6, 0x2c, 0x77, + 0xc0, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x44, 0x95, 0xbe }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = + { 0x4c, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x86, 0x73, 0x34, 0x6d, 0x9d, + 0x50, 0xc9, 0x22, 0xe4, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0xfc, 0xd0, + 0x90, 0xad, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0x3b, 0xa4, 0x73, + 0x27, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x5c, + 0x01, 0x69, 0x62, 0xa7, 0xfd, 0x27, 0x87, 0xa2, + 0x4b, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x47, 0xef, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf1, + 0xb7, 0xec, 0x46, 0x07, 0x23, 0x63, 0x83, 0x4a, + 0x1b, 0x01, 0x33, 0xf2, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x91, 0xdb, + 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x51, 0xf2, 0x3e, 0x3a, + 0x8b, 0x1f, 0xdc, 0x03, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xc7, 0xe7 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = + { 0x5a, 0x70, 0x95, 0xe9, 0x81, 0x40, 0x52, 0x33, + 0x91, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x75, 0xd6, 0x19, 0x9d, 0x1e, + 0xad, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xa7, 0xde, 0x6c, 0x1f, 0xe0, + 0xea, 0x18, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x06, 0x20, 0xe9 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = + { 0x88, 0xee, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x29, + 0x4b, 0xda, 0xcd, 0x60, 0x99, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xbf, + 0x55, 0xec, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x71, 0xe5, 0xeb, + 0xcb, 0x45, 0x75, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0xa6, 0x8a, 0x6b }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = + { 0xce, 0x2f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x39, 0x85, + 0x04, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x31, 0xc6, 0x1d, + 0x9b, 0x5a, 0x59, 0xf8, 0x7e, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x62, + 0x7b, 0x65, 0x11, 0x55, 0x10, 0xeb, 0x9e, 0x3d, + 0xa4, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x74, 0xdb, + 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x23, 0x63, 0x21, 0xd0, 0x39, + 0xf9, 0xa7, 0xc4, 0x52, 0x84, 0x3b, 0x49, 0x40, + 0x72, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xdb, 0xc3, 0x43 }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = + { 0xa5, 0x51, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x90, 0xbe, 0xf3, 0xad, + 0xaf, 0x28, 0xf6, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xf3, + 0xd6, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0xd0, 0x46, 0x7b, + 0x0c, 0x75, 0xf5, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x1e, 0x97, 0x14, + 0x75, 0xb2, 0x7c, 0xae, 0x03, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x54, + 0xe2, 0xf4, 0x09, 0x66, 0xea, 0x33, 0x64, 0x30, + 0x40, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x0f, 0xe6, 0x77, 0x87, 0x3a, + 0xf8, 0x09, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x02, 0x98 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +static size_t test_offset; +static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = data; + memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len ); + test_offset += len; + return( 0 ); +} + +#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ + return( 1 ); \ + } + +#define SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH 64 + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[ sizeof( result_pr ) ]; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = True) + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : " ); + + test_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, + ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, + (void *) entropy_source_pr, + pers_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + /* + * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = FALSE) + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = FALSE): " ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + test_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, + ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, + (void *) entropy_source_nopr, + pers_nopr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/debug.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/debug.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1086008 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/debug.c @@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ +/* + * Debugging routines + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#define DEBUG_BUF_SIZE 512 + +static int debug_threshold = 0; + +void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( int threshold ) +{ + debug_threshold = threshold; +} + +/* + * All calls to f_dbg must be made via this function + */ +static inline void debug_send_line( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + /* + * If in a threaded environment, we need a thread identifier. + * Since there is no portable way to get one, use the address of the ssl + * context instead, as it shouldn't be shared between threads. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + char idstr[20 + DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; /* 0x + 16 nibbles + ': ' */ + mbedtls_snprintf( idstr, sizeof( idstr ), "%p: %s", (void*)ssl, str ); + ssl->conf->f_dbg( ssl->conf->p_dbg, level, file, line, idstr ); +#else + ssl->conf->f_dbg( ssl->conf->p_dbg, level, file, line, str ); +#endif +} + +MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6) +void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *format, ... ) +{ + va_list argp; + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + va_start( argp, format ); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); + va_end( argp ); + + if( ret >= 0 && ret < DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1 ) + { + str[ret] = '\n'; + str[ret + 1] = '\0'; + } + + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, int ret ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + /* + * With non-blocking I/O and examples that just retry immediately, + * the logs would be quickly flooded with WANT_READ, so ignore that. + * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since is is usually rare. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ) + return; + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s() returned %d (-0x%04x)\n", + text, ret, (unsigned int) -ret ); + + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + char txt[17]; + size_t i, idx = 0; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "dumping '%s' (%u bytes)\n", + text, (unsigned int) len ); + + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + idx = 0; + memset( txt, 0, sizeof( txt ) ); + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + if( i >= 4096 ) + break; + + if( i % 16 == 0 ) + { + if( i > 0 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %s\n", txt ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + idx = 0; + memset( txt, 0, sizeof( txt ) ); + } + + idx += mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "%04x: ", + (unsigned int) i ); + + } + + idx += mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %02x", + (unsigned int) buf[i] ); + txt[i % 16] = ( buf[i] > 31 && buf[i] < 127 ) ? buf[i] : '.' ; + } + + if( len > 0 ) + { + for( /* i = i */; i % 16 != 0; i++ ) + idx += mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " " ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %s\n", txt ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s(X)", text ); + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->X ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s(Y)", text ); + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->Y ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + size_t bitlen; + size_t idx = 0; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + NULL == X || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "value of '%s' (%u bits) is:\n", + text, (unsigned) bitlen ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + if( bitlen == 0 ) + { + str[0] = ' '; str[1] = '0'; str[2] = '0'; + idx = 3; + } + else + { + int n; + for( n = (int) ( ( bitlen - 1 ) / 8 ); n >= 0; n-- ) + { + size_t limb_offset = n / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + size_t offset_in_limb = n % sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + unsigned char octet = + ( X->p[limb_offset] >> ( offset_in_limb * 8 ) ) & 0xff; + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %02x", octet ); + idx += 3; + /* Wrap lines after 16 octets that each take 3 columns */ + if( idx >= 3 * 16 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "\n" ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + idx = 0; + } + } + } + + if( idx != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "\n" ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void debug_print_pk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_pk_debug_item items[MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS]; + char name[16]; + + memset( items, 0, sizeof( items ) ); + + if( mbedtls_pk_debug( pk, items ) != 0 ) + { + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, + "invalid PK context\n" ); + return; + } + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS; i++ ) + { + if( items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE ) + return; + + mbedtls_snprintf( name, sizeof( name ), "%s%s", text, items[i].name ); + name[sizeof( name ) - 1] = '\0'; + + if( items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI ) + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value ); + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP ) + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value ); + else +#endif + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, + "should not happen\n" ); + } +} + +static void debug_print_line_by_line( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + const char *start, *cur; + + start = text; + for( cur = text; *cur != '\0'; cur++ ) + { + if( *cur == '\n' ) + { + size_t len = cur - start + 1; + if( len > DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1 ) + len = DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1; + + memcpy( str, start, len ); + str[len] = '\0'; + + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + start = cur + 1; + } + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + int i = 0; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + NULL == crt || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + while( crt != NULL ) + { + char buf[1024]; + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s #%d:\n", text, ++i ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_info( buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, "", crt ); + debug_print_line_by_line( ssl, level, file, line, buf ); + + debug_print_pk( ssl, level, file, line, "crt->", &crt->pk ); + + crt = crt->next; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +static void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, + int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + const mbedtls_ecdh_context* ctx = ecdh; +#else + const mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed* ctx = &ecdh->ctx.mbed_ecdh; +#endif + + switch( attr ) + { + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q: + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Q", + &ctx->Q ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP: + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Qp", + &ctx->Qp ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z: + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: z", + &ctx->z ); + break; + default: + break; + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal( ssl, level, file, line, ecdh, attr ); +#else + switch( ecdh->var ) + { + default: + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal( ssl, level, file, line, ecdh, + attr ); + } +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/des.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/des.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91d22b5d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/des.c @@ -0,0 +1,1062 @@ +/* + * FIPS-46-3 compliant Triple-DES implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * DES, on which TDES is based, was originally designed by Horst Feistel + * at IBM in 1974, and was adopted as a standard by NIST (formerly NBS). + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) + +/* + * Expanded DES S-boxes + */ +static const uint32_t SB1[64] = +{ + 0x01010400, 0x00000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010404, + 0x01010004, 0x00010404, 0x00000004, 0x00010000, + 0x00000400, 0x01010400, 0x01010404, 0x00000400, + 0x01000404, 0x01010004, 0x01000000, 0x00000004, + 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00010400, + 0x00010400, 0x01010000, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, + 0x00010004, 0x01000004, 0x01000004, 0x00010004, + 0x00000000, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01000000, + 0x00010000, 0x01010404, 0x00000004, 0x01010000, + 0x01010400, 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x00000400, + 0x01010004, 0x00010000, 0x00010400, 0x01000004, + 0x00000400, 0x00000004, 0x01000404, 0x00010404, + 0x01010404, 0x00010004, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, + 0x01000004, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01010400, + 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00000000, + 0x00010004, 0x00010400, 0x00000000, 0x01010004 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB2[64] = +{ + 0x80108020, 0x80008000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, + 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, 0x80008020, + 0x80000020, 0x80108020, 0x80108000, 0x80000000, + 0x80008000, 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, + 0x00108000, 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x00000000, + 0x80000000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, 0x80100000, + 0x00100020, 0x80000020, 0x00000000, 0x00108000, + 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x80100000, 0x00008020, + 0x00000000, 0x00108020, 0x80100020, 0x00100000, + 0x80008020, 0x80100000, 0x80108000, 0x00008000, + 0x80100000, 0x80008000, 0x00000020, 0x80108020, + 0x00108020, 0x00000020, 0x00008000, 0x80000000, + 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x00100000, 0x80000020, + 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x80000020, 0x00100020, + 0x00108000, 0x00000000, 0x80008000, 0x00008020, + 0x80000000, 0x80100020, 0x80108020, 0x00108000 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB3[64] = +{ + 0x00000208, 0x08020200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, + 0x08000200, 0x00000000, 0x00020208, 0x08000200, + 0x00020008, 0x08000008, 0x08000008, 0x00020000, + 0x08020208, 0x00020008, 0x08020000, 0x00000208, + 0x08000000, 0x00000008, 0x08020200, 0x00000200, + 0x00020200, 0x08020000, 0x08020008, 0x00020208, + 0x08000208, 0x00020200, 0x00020000, 0x08000208, + 0x00000008, 0x08020208, 0x00000200, 0x08000000, + 0x08020200, 0x08000000, 0x00020008, 0x00000208, + 0x00020000, 0x08020200, 0x08000200, 0x00000000, + 0x00000200, 0x00020008, 0x08020208, 0x08000200, + 0x08000008, 0x00000200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, + 0x08000208, 0x00020000, 0x08000000, 0x08020208, + 0x00000008, 0x00020208, 0x00020200, 0x08000008, + 0x08020000, 0x08000208, 0x00000208, 0x08020000, + 0x00020208, 0x00000008, 0x08020008, 0x00020200 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB4[64] = +{ + 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, + 0x00802080, 0x00800081, 0x00800001, 0x00002001, + 0x00000000, 0x00802000, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, + 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00800080, 0x00800001, + 0x00000001, 0x00002000, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, + 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002001, 0x00002080, + 0x00800081, 0x00000001, 0x00002080, 0x00800080, + 0x00002000, 0x00802080, 0x00802081, 0x00000081, + 0x00800080, 0x00800001, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, + 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00802000, + 0x00002080, 0x00800080, 0x00800081, 0x00000001, + 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, + 0x00802081, 0x00000081, 0x00000001, 0x00002000, + 0x00800001, 0x00002001, 0x00802080, 0x00800081, + 0x00002001, 0x00002080, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, + 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002000, 0x00802080 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB5[64] = +{ + 0x00000100, 0x02080100, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, + 0x00080000, 0x00000100, 0x40000000, 0x02080000, + 0x40080100, 0x00080000, 0x02000100, 0x40080100, + 0x42000100, 0x42080000, 0x00080100, 0x40000000, + 0x02000000, 0x40080000, 0x40080000, 0x00000000, + 0x40000100, 0x42080100, 0x42080100, 0x02000100, + 0x42080000, 0x40000100, 0x00000000, 0x42000000, + 0x02080100, 0x02000000, 0x42000000, 0x00080100, + 0x00080000, 0x42000100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, + 0x40000000, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, 0x40080100, + 0x02000100, 0x40000000, 0x42080000, 0x02080100, + 0x40080100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, 0x42080000, + 0x42080100, 0x00080100, 0x42000000, 0x42080100, + 0x02080000, 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x42000000, + 0x00080100, 0x02000100, 0x40000100, 0x00080000, + 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x02080100, 0x40000100 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB6[64] = +{ + 0x20000010, 0x20400000, 0x00004000, 0x20404010, + 0x20400000, 0x00000010, 0x20404010, 0x00400000, + 0x20004000, 0x00404010, 0x00400000, 0x20000010, + 0x00400010, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, + 0x00000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00004000, + 0x00404000, 0x20004010, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, + 0x20400010, 0x00000000, 0x00404010, 0x20404000, + 0x00004010, 0x00404000, 0x20404000, 0x20000000, + 0x20004000, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, 0x00404000, + 0x20404010, 0x00400000, 0x00004010, 0x20000010, + 0x00400000, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, + 0x20000010, 0x20404010, 0x00404000, 0x20400000, + 0x00404010, 0x20404000, 0x00000000, 0x20400010, + 0x00000010, 0x00004000, 0x20400000, 0x00404010, + 0x00004000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00000000, + 0x20404000, 0x20000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB7[64] = +{ + 0x00200000, 0x04200002, 0x04000802, 0x00000000, + 0x00000800, 0x04000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, + 0x04200802, 0x00200000, 0x00000000, 0x04000002, + 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x04200002, 0x00000802, + 0x04000800, 0x00200802, 0x00200002, 0x04000800, + 0x04000002, 0x04200000, 0x04200800, 0x00200002, + 0x04200000, 0x00000800, 0x00000802, 0x04200802, + 0x00200800, 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x00200800, + 0x04000000, 0x00200800, 0x00200000, 0x04000802, + 0x04000802, 0x04200002, 0x04200002, 0x00000002, + 0x00200002, 0x04000000, 0x04000800, 0x00200000, + 0x04200800, 0x00000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, + 0x00000802, 0x04000002, 0x04200802, 0x04200000, + 0x00200800, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x04200802, + 0x00000000, 0x00200802, 0x04200000, 0x00000800, + 0x04000002, 0x04000800, 0x00000800, 0x00200002 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB8[64] = +{ + 0x10001040, 0x00001000, 0x00040000, 0x10041040, + 0x10000000, 0x10001040, 0x00000040, 0x10000000, + 0x00040040, 0x10040000, 0x10041040, 0x00041000, + 0x10041000, 0x00041040, 0x00001000, 0x00000040, + 0x10040000, 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00001040, + 0x00041000, 0x00040040, 0x10040040, 0x10041000, + 0x00001040, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x10040040, + 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00041040, 0x00040000, + 0x00041040, 0x00040000, 0x10041000, 0x00001000, + 0x00000040, 0x10040040, 0x00001000, 0x00041040, + 0x10001000, 0x00000040, 0x10000040, 0x10040000, + 0x10040040, 0x10000000, 0x00040000, 0x10001040, + 0x00000000, 0x10041040, 0x00040040, 0x10000040, + 0x10040000, 0x10001000, 0x10001040, 0x00000000, + 0x10041040, 0x00041000, 0x00041000, 0x00001040, + 0x00001040, 0x00040040, 0x10000000, 0x10041000 +}; + +/* + * PC1: left and right halves bit-swap + */ +static const uint32_t LHs[16] = +{ + 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000100, 0x00000101, + 0x00010000, 0x00010001, 0x00010100, 0x00010101, + 0x01000000, 0x01000001, 0x01000100, 0x01000101, + 0x01010000, 0x01010001, 0x01010100, 0x01010101 +}; + +static const uint32_t RHs[16] = +{ + 0x00000000, 0x01000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010000, + 0x00000100, 0x01000100, 0x00010100, 0x01010100, + 0x00000001, 0x01000001, 0x00010001, 0x01010001, + 0x00000101, 0x01000101, 0x00010101, 0x01010101, +}; + +/* + * Initial Permutation macro + */ +#define DES_IP(X,Y) \ + do \ + { \ + T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \ + T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \ + T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \ + T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \ + (Y) = (((Y) << 1) | ((Y) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= T; \ + (X) = (((X) << 1) | ((X) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Final Permutation macro + */ +#define DES_FP(X,Y) \ + do \ + { \ + (X) = (((X) << 31) | ((X) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= T; \ + (Y) = (((Y) << 31) | ((Y) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \ + T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \ + T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \ + T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * DES round macro + */ +#define DES_ROUND(X,Y) \ + do \ + { \ + T = *SK++ ^ (X); \ + (Y) ^= SB8[ (T ) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB6[ (T >> 8) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB4[ (T >> 16) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB2[ (T >> 24) & 0x3F ]; \ + \ + T = *SK++ ^ (((X) << 28) | ((X) >> 4)); \ + (Y) ^= SB7[ (T ) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB5[ (T >> 8) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB3[ (T >> 16) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB1[ (T >> 24) & 0x3F ]; \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define SWAP(a,b) \ + do \ + { \ + uint32_t t = (a); (a) = (b); (b) = t; t = 0; \ + } while( 0 ) + +void mbedtls_des_init( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_des_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_des_free( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_des_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_des3_init( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_des3_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_des3_free( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_des3_context ) ); +} + +static const unsigned char odd_parity_table[128] = { 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, + 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, + 47, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81, + 82, 84, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 112, + 115, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128, 131, 133, 134, 137, 138, 140, + 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, + 171, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, 188, 191, 193, 194, 196, + 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 208, 211, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 223, 224, + 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 239, 241, 242, 244, 247, 248, 251, 253, + 254 }; + +void mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE; i++ ) + key[i] = odd_parity_table[key[i] / 2]; +} + +/* + * Check the given key's parity, returns 1 on failure, 0 on SUCCESS + */ +int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE; i++ ) + if( key[i] != odd_parity_table[key[i] / 2] ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Table of weak and semi-weak keys + * + * Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weak_key + * + * Weak: + * Alternating ones + zeros (0x0101010101010101) + * Alternating 'F' + 'E' (0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE) + * '0xE0E0E0E0F1F1F1F1' + * '0x1F1F1F1F0E0E0E0E' + * + * Semi-weak: + * 0x011F011F010E010E and 0x1F011F010E010E01 + * 0x01E001E001F101F1 and 0xE001E001F101F101 + * 0x01FE01FE01FE01FE and 0xFE01FE01FE01FE01 + * 0x1FE01FE00EF10EF1 and 0xE01FE01FF10EF10E + * 0x1FFE1FFE0EFE0EFE and 0xFE1FFE1FFE0EFE0E + * 0xE0FEE0FEF1FEF1FE and 0xFEE0FEE0FEF1FEF1 + * + */ + +#define WEAK_KEY_COUNT 16 + +static const unsigned char weak_key_table[WEAK_KEY_COUNT][MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }, + { 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE }, + { 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E }, + { 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1 }, + + { 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E }, + { 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01 }, + { 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1 }, + { 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01 }, + { 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE }, + { 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01 }, + { 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1 }, + { 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E }, + { 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE }, + { 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E }, + { 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE }, + { 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1 } +}; + +int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + for( i = 0; i < WEAK_KEY_COUNT; i++ ) + if( memcmp( weak_key_table[i], key, MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE) == 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) +void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32], const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t X, Y, T; + + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( key, 0 ); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( key, 4 ); + + /* + * Permuted Choice 1 + */ + T = ((Y >> 4) ^ X) & 0x0F0F0F0F; X ^= T; Y ^= (T << 4); + T = ((Y ) ^ X) & 0x10101010; X ^= T; Y ^= (T ); + + X = (LHs[ (X ) & 0xF] << 3) | (LHs[ (X >> 8) & 0xF ] << 2) + | (LHs[ (X >> 16) & 0xF] << 1) | (LHs[ (X >> 24) & 0xF ] ) + | (LHs[ (X >> 5) & 0xF] << 7) | (LHs[ (X >> 13) & 0xF ] << 6) + | (LHs[ (X >> 21) & 0xF] << 5) | (LHs[ (X >> 29) & 0xF ] << 4); + + Y = (RHs[ (Y >> 1) & 0xF] << 3) | (RHs[ (Y >> 9) & 0xF ] << 2) + | (RHs[ (Y >> 17) & 0xF] << 1) | (RHs[ (Y >> 25) & 0xF ] ) + | (RHs[ (Y >> 4) & 0xF] << 7) | (RHs[ (Y >> 12) & 0xF ] << 6) + | (RHs[ (Y >> 20) & 0xF] << 5) | (RHs[ (Y >> 28) & 0xF ] << 4); + + X &= 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y &= 0x0FFFFFFF; + + /* + * calculate subkeys + */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + if( i < 2 || i == 8 || i == 15 ) + { + X = ((X << 1) | (X >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y = ((Y << 1) | (Y >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + } + else + { + X = ((X << 2) | (X >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y = ((Y << 2) | (Y >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + } + + *SK++ = ((X << 4) & 0x24000000) | ((X << 28) & 0x10000000) + | ((X << 14) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 18) & 0x02080000) + | ((X << 6) & 0x01000000) | ((X << 9) & 0x00200000) + | ((X >> 1) & 0x00100000) | ((X << 10) & 0x00040000) + | ((X << 2) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 10) & 0x00010000) + | ((Y >> 13) & 0x00002000) | ((Y >> 4) & 0x00001000) + | ((Y << 6) & 0x00000800) | ((Y >> 1) & 0x00000400) + | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000200) | ((Y ) & 0x00000100) + | ((Y >> 5) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 10) & 0x00000010) + | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000008) | ((Y >> 18) & 0x00000004) + | ((Y >> 26) & 0x00000002) | ((Y >> 24) & 0x00000001); + + *SK++ = ((X << 15) & 0x20000000) | ((X << 17) & 0x10000000) + | ((X << 10) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 22) & 0x04000000) + | ((X >> 2) & 0x02000000) | ((X << 1) & 0x01000000) + | ((X << 16) & 0x00200000) | ((X << 11) & 0x00100000) + | ((X << 3) & 0x00080000) | ((X >> 6) & 0x00040000) + | ((X << 15) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 4) & 0x00010000) + | ((Y >> 2) & 0x00002000) | ((Y << 8) & 0x00001000) + | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000808) | ((Y >> 9) & 0x00000400) + | ((Y ) & 0x00000200) | ((Y << 7) & 0x00000100) + | ((Y >> 7) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000011) + | ((Y << 2) & 0x00000004) | ((Y >> 21) & 0x00000002); + } +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ + +/* + * DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + mbedtls_des_setkey( ctx->sk, key ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + mbedtls_des_setkey( ctx->sk, key ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i += 2 ) + { + SWAP( ctx->sk[i ], ctx->sk[30 - i] ); + SWAP( ctx->sk[i + 1], ctx->sk[31 - i] ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void des3_set2key( uint32_t esk[96], + uint32_t dsk[96], + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE*2] ) +{ + int i; + + mbedtls_des_setkey( esk, key ); + mbedtls_des_setkey( dsk + 32, key + 8 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 32; i += 2 ) + { + dsk[i ] = esk[30 - i]; + dsk[i + 1] = esk[31 - i]; + + esk[i + 32] = dsk[62 - i]; + esk[i + 33] = dsk[63 - i]; + + esk[i + 64] = esk[i ]; + esk[i + 65] = esk[i + 1]; + + dsk[i + 64] = dsk[i ]; + dsk[i + 65] = dsk[i + 1]; + } +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set2key( ctx->sk, sk, key ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sk, sizeof( sk ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set2key( sk, ctx->sk, key ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sk, sizeof( sk ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void des3_set3key( uint32_t esk[96], + uint32_t dsk[96], + const unsigned char key[24] ) +{ + int i; + + mbedtls_des_setkey( esk, key ); + mbedtls_des_setkey( dsk + 32, key + 8 ); + mbedtls_des_setkey( esk + 64, key + 16 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 32; i += 2 ) + { + dsk[i ] = esk[94 - i]; + dsk[i + 1] = esk[95 - i]; + + esk[i + 32] = dsk[62 - i]; + esk[i + 33] = dsk[63 - i]; + + dsk[i + 64] = esk[30 - i]; + dsk[i + 65] = esk[31 - i]; + } +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set3key( ctx->sk, sk, key ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sk, sizeof( sk ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set3key( sk, ctx->sk, key ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sk, sizeof( sk ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) +int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t X, Y, T, *SK; + + SK = ctx->sk; + + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + + DES_IP( X, Y ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + DES_ROUND( Y, X ); + DES_ROUND( X, Y ); + } + + DES_FP( Y, X ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( Y, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X, output, 4 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[8]; + + if( length % 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + memcpy( iv, output, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + else /* MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT */ + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 8 ); + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/* + * 3DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t X, Y, T, *SK; + + SK = ctx->sk; + + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + + DES_IP( X, Y ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + DES_ROUND( Y, X ); + DES_ROUND( X, Y ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + DES_ROUND( X, Y ); + DES_ROUND( Y, X ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + DES_ROUND( Y, X ); + DES_ROUND( X, Y ); + } + + DES_FP( Y, X ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( Y, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X, output, 4 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * 3DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[8]; + + if( length % 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + memcpy( iv, output, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + else /* MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT */ + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 8 ); + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * DES and 3DES test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/des/tripledes-vectors.zip + */ +static const unsigned char des3_test_keys[24] = +{ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, + 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x01, + 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x01, 0x23 +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_buf[8] = +{ + 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74 +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_dec[3][8] = +{ + { 0x37, 0x2B, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x52, 0x65, 0xB0, 0x59 }, + { 0xC2, 0x10, 0x19, 0x9C, 0x38, 0x5A, 0x65, 0xA1 }, + { 0xA2, 0x70, 0x56, 0x68, 0x69, 0xE5, 0x15, 0x1D } +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_enc[3][8] = +{ + { 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x97, 0xEA, 0x84, 0x26, 0x73, 0xFB }, + { 0xB3, 0x92, 0x4D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB5, 0x42, 0x93 }, + { 0xDA, 0x37, 0x64, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x6F, 0x62, 0x6F } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const unsigned char des3_test_iv[8] = +{ + 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x90, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_dec[3][8] = +{ + { 0x58, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xEF, 0x85, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9A }, + { 0x5F, 0xC8, 0x78, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x92, 0xD9, 0x54 }, + { 0x25, 0xF9, 0x75, 0x85, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x48, 0xBF } +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_enc[3][8] = +{ + { 0x91, 0x1C, 0x6D, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA7, 0xC3, 0x4D }, + { 0x60, 0x1A, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x66, 0xF1 }, + { 0xA1, 0x50, 0x0F, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x64, 0x76 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, u, v, ret = 0; + mbedtls_des_context ctx; + mbedtls_des3_context ctx3; + unsigned char buf[8]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char prv[8]; + unsigned char iv[8]; +#endif + + mbedtls_des_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_des3_init( &ctx3 ); + /* + * ECB mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + v = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " DES%c-ECB-%3d (%s): ", + ( u == 0 ) ? ' ' : '3', 56 + u * 56, + ( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( buf, des3_test_buf, 8 ); + + switch( i ) + { + case 0: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 1: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 2: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 3: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 4: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 5: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + default: + return( 1 ); + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) + { + if( u == 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, buf, buf ); + else + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( &ctx3, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + if( ( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp( buf, des3_test_ecb_dec[u], 8 ) != 0 ) || + ( v != MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp( buf, des3_test_ecb_enc[u], 8 ) != 0 ) ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* + * CBC mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + v = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " DES%c-CBC-%3d (%s): ", + ( u == 0 ) ? ' ' : '3', 56 + u * 56, + ( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( iv, des3_test_iv, 8 ); + memcpy( prv, des3_test_iv, 8 ); + memcpy( buf, des3_test_buf, 8 ); + + switch( i ) + { + case 0: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 1: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 2: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 3: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 4: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 5: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + default: + return( 1 ); + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) + { + if( u == 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); + else + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + } + else + { + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) + { + unsigned char tmp[8]; + + if( u == 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); + else + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + memcpy( tmp, prv, 8 ); + memcpy( prv, buf, 8 ); + memcpy( buf, tmp, 8 ); + } + + memcpy( buf, prv, 8 ); + } + + if( ( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp( buf, des3_test_cbc_dec[u], 8 ) != 0 ) || + ( v != MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp( buf, des3_test_cbc_enc[u], 8 ) != 0 ) ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_des3_free( &ctx3 ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + ret = 1; + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/dhm.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/dhm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..88e148bb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/dhm.c @@ -0,0 +1,719 @@ +/* + * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm: + * + * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 12 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + +#define DHM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define DHM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it + */ +static int dhm_read_bignum( mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret, n; + + if( end - *p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; + (*p) += 2; + + if( (int)( end - *p ) < n ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ) ); + + (*p) += n; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Verify sanity of parameter with regards to P + * + * Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2 + * + * This means that we need to return an error if + * public_param < 2 or public_param > P-2 + * + * For more information on the attack, see: + * http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf + * http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643 + */ +static int dhm_check_range( const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi U; + int ret = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &U, P, 2 ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( param, 2 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) > 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); + return( ret ); +} + +void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) +{ + DHM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL && *p != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->P, p, end ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->G, p, end ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->GY, p, end ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Pick a random R in the range [2, M-2] for blinding or key generation. + */ +static int dhm_random_below( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( R, 3, M, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( R, R, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +static int dhm_make_common( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( x_size < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( (unsigned) x_size < mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + } + else + { + /* Generate X as large as possible ( <= P - 2 ) */ + ret = dhm_random_below( &ctx->X, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Calculate GX = G^X mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X, + &ctx->P , &ctx->RP ) ); + + if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + size_t n1, n2, n3; + unsigned char *p; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Export P, G, GX. RFC 5246 §4.4 states that "leading zero octets are + * not required". We omit leading zeros for compactness. + */ +#define DHM_MPI_EXPORT( X, n ) \ + do { \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( ( X ), \ + p + 2, \ + ( n ) ) ); \ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + p += ( n ); \ + } while( 0 ) + + n1 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); + n2 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->G ); + n3 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->GX ); + + p = output; + DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->P , n1 ); + DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->G , n2 ); + DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->GX, n3 ); + + *olen = p - output; + + ctx->len = n1; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Set prime modulus and generator + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *G ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->G, G ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret ) ); + } + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Import the peer's public value G^Y + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + + if( ilen < 1 || ilen > ctx->len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->GY, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Create own private value X and export G^X + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + if( olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->GX, output, olen ) ); + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ); + return( ret ); +} + + +/* + * Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of: + * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, + * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer + * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. + */ +static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi R; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + + /* + * Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used, + * but remember it to use blinding next time. + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->pX ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->pX, &ctx->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vf, 1 ) ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * Ok, we need blinding. Can we re-use existing values? + * If yes, just update them by squaring them. + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * We need to generate blinding values from scratch + */ + + /* Vi = random( 2, P-2 ) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P + * First compute Vi^-1 = R * (R Vi)^-1, (avoiding leaks from inv_mod), + * then elevate to the Xth power. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &R, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Derive and export the shared secret (G^Y)^X mod P + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi GYb; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( output_size < ctx->len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &GYb ); + + /* Blind peer's value */ + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_update_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P ) ); + } + else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &GYb, &ctx->GY ) ); + + /* Do modular exponentiation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X, + &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); + + /* Unblind secret value */ + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) ); + } + + /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory + * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */ + *olen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->K ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->K, output, *olen ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &GYb ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free the components of a DHM key + */ +void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->pX ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GY ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GX ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->X ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +/* + * Parse DHM parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, + size_t dhminlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhmin != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( dhminlen == 0 || dhmin[dhminlen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----", + "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----", + dhmin, NULL, 0, &dhminlen ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + dhminlen = pem.buflen; + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + goto exit; + + p = ( ret == 0 ) ? pem.buf : (unsigned char *) dhmin; +#else + p = (unsigned char *) dhmin; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + end = p + dhminlen; + + /* + * DHParams ::= SEQUENCE { + * prime INTEGER, -- P + * generator INTEGER, -- g + * privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); + goto exit; + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->P ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->G ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( p != end ) + { + /* This might be the optional privateValueLength. + * If so, we can cleanly discard it */ + mbedtls_mpi rec; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &rec ); + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &rec ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &rec ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); + goto exit; + } + if ( p != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = 0; + + dhm->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &dhm->P ); + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); +#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_dhm_free( dhm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + * + * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. + * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced + * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. + */ +static int load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) +{ + FILE *f; + long size; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); + if( ( size = ftell( f ) ) == -1 ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); + + *n = (size_t) size; + + if( *n + 1 == 0 || + ( *buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *n + 1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n ) + { + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buf, *n + 1 ); + mbedtls_free( *buf ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + if( strstr( (const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN " ) != NULL ) + ++*n; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Load and parse DHM parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( dhm, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = +"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n" +"MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh\r\n" +"1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32\r\n" +"9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC\r\n" +"-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n"; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = { + 0x30, 0x81, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x44, + 0x3a, 0x09, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x3a, 0x39, 0xa9, 0x79, 0x79, 0x7d, 0x07, 0x0d, + 0xf5, 0x33, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x38, 0xbe, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xf3, + 0xc7, 0x14, 0x55, 0x33, 0x28, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x80, 0x9b, 0xe1, + 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x9f, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x54, 0x43, 0x18, + 0x82, 0x53, 0xa9, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x68, 0x18, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa9, 0xde, 0x5a, + 0x40, 0xd3, 0x62, 0xe5, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x74, 0x74, 0xc1, + 0x25, 0xc1, 0x99, 0x27, 0x2c, 0x8f, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0xea, 0x73, 0x3d, 0xf6, + 0xf6, 0x62, 0xc9, 0x2a, 0xe7, 0x65, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd1, 0x0c, 0x64, + 0xe6, 0xa5, 0x09, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x7f, 0xc6, 0xea, 0x73, 0xd0, 0xdc, 0xa8, + 0x56, 0x9b, 0xe2, 0xba, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x23, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x2f, + 0x49, 0x75, 0xb3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_dhm_params ); + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; + + mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " DHM parameter load: " ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( &dhm, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_dhm_params, + mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..60c6e429 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,729 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + * RFC 4492 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECDH_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +typedef mbedtls_ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; +#endif + +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ctx->grp.id ); +#else + return( ctx->grp_id ); +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ) +{ + /* At this time, all groups support ECDH. */ + (void) gid; + return( 1 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) +/* + * Generate public key (restartable version) + * + * Note: this internal function relies on its caller preserving the value of + * the output parameter 'd' across continuation calls. This would not be + * acceptable for a public function but is OK here as we control call sites. + */ +static int ecdh_gen_public_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* If multiplication is in progress, we already generated a privkey */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL ) +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, Q, d, &grp->G, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate public key + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + return( ecdh_gen_public_restartable( grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) +/* + * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1) + */ +static int ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &P, d, Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &P ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( z, &P.X ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1) + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( z != NULL ); + return( ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( grp, z, Q, d, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ + +static void ecdh_init_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ctx->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Qp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->z ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->rs ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + ecdh_init_internal( ctx ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->_d ); +#else + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdh_context ) ); + + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE; +#endif + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ctx->restart_enabled = 0; +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_setup_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, grp_id ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Setup context + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_setup_internal( ctx, grp_id ) ); +#else + switch( grp_id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST; + ctx->grp_id = grp_id; + return( mbedtls_everest_setup( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, grp_id ) ); +#endif + default: + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0; + ctx->grp_id = grp_id; + ecdh_init_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh ); + return( ecdh_setup_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, grp_id ) ); + } +#endif +} + +static void ecdh_free_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ctx->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Qp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->z ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->rs ); +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Enable restartable operations for context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->restart_enabled = 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->_d ); + ecdh_free_internal( ctx ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + mbedtls_everest_free( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh ); + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + ecdh_free_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh ); + break; + default: + break; + } + + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE; + ctx->grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_make_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, int point_format, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t grp_len, pt_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if( ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( restart_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &ctx->grp, &grp_len, buf, + blen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + buf += grp_len; + blen -= grp_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format, + &pt_len, buf, blen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + *olen = grp_len + pt_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_make_params_internal( ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_make_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_make_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, + ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_read_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, buf, + end - *buf ) ); +} + +/* + * Read the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( &grp_id, buf, end - *buf ) ) + != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( ctx, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_read_params_internal( ctx, buf, end ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_read_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, end) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_read_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + buf, end ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_get_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* If it's not our key, just import the public part as Qp */ + if( side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Qp, &key->Q ) ); + + /* Our key: import public (as Q) and private parts */ + if( side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Get parameters from a keypair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS || + side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ); + + if( mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( ctx ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + { + /* This is the first call to get_params(). Set up the context + * for use with the group. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( ctx, key->grp.id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else + { + /* This is not the first call to get_params(). Check that the + * current key's group is the same as the context's, which was set + * from the first key's group. */ + if( mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( ctx ) != key->grp.id ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_get_params_internal( ctx, key, side ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + { + mbedtls_everest_ecdh_side s = side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ? + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_OURS : + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_THEIRS; + return( mbedtls_everest_get_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + key, s) ); + } +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_get_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + key, side ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_make_public_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, int point_format, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if( ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( restart_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + return mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format, olen, + buf, blen ); +} + +/* + * Setup and export the client public value + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_make_public_internal( ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_make_public( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_make_public_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, + ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_read_public_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, &p, + blen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( (size_t)( p - buf ) != blen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse and import the client's public value + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_read_public_internal( ctx, buf, blen ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_read_public( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, blen ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_read_public_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + buf, blen ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_calc_secret_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, + size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( restart_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ( ret = ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, + &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng, + rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, + &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->z ) > blen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *olen = ctx->grp.pbits / 8 + ( ( ctx->grp.pbits % 8 ) != 0 ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &ctx->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &ctx->z, buf, *olen ); + + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->z, buf, *olen ); +} + +/* + * Derive and export the shared secret + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_calc_secret_internal( ctx, olen, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_calc_secret( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_calc_secret_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, buf, + blen, f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..640eb24a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,1012 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve DSA + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECDSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_verify() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver +{ + mbedtls_mpi u1, u2; /* intermediate values */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_ver_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_ver_muladd, /* muladd step */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_ver_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u2 ); + ctx->state = ecdsa_ver_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a verify restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_ver_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u2 ); + + ecdsa_restart_ver_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig +{ + int sign_tries; + int key_tries; + mbedtls_mpi k; /* per-signature random */ + mbedtls_mpi r; /* r value */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_sig_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_sig_mul, /* doing ecp_mul() */ + ecdsa_sig_modn, /* mod N computations */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify sign sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_sig_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ctx->sign_tries = 0; + ctx->key_tries = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->k ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->r ); + ctx->state = ecdsa_sig_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a sign restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_sig_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->k ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->r ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign_det() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; /* DRBG state */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_det_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_det_sign, /* make signature */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify sign_det sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_det_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx->rng_ctx ); + ctx->state = ecdsa_det_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a sign_det restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_det_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx->rng_ctx ); + + ecdsa_restart_det_init( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ECP ( rs_ctx == NULL ? NULL : &rs_ctx->ecp ) + +/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */ +#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, ECDSA_RS_ECP, ops ) ); + +/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) do { \ + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ecp.depth++ == 0 ) \ + rs_ctx->ecp.ops_done = 0; \ + \ + /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ + if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ + rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + { \ + rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) ); \ + if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + \ + ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) do { \ + /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) \ + { \ + ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) \ + rs_ctx->ecp.depth--; \ +} while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ECP NULL + +#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx +#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/* + * Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len + * SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3 + */ +static int derive_mpi( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( x, buf, use_size ) ); + if( use_size * 8 > grp->nbits ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits ) ); + + /* While at it, reduce modulo N */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( x, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( x, x, &grp->N ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC || !ECDSA_SIGN_ALT || !ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) +/* + * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3) + * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message) + */ +static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret, key_tries, sign_tries; + int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi k, e, t; + mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r; + + /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t ); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER( sig ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + { + /* redirect to our context */ + p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries; + p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries; + pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k; + pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r; + + /* jump to current step */ + if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul ) + goto mul; + if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn ) + goto modn; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + *p_sign_tries = 0; + do + { + if( (*p_sign_tries)++ > 10 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair + * and set r = xR mod n + */ + *p_key_tries = 0; + do + { + if( (*p_key_tries)++ > 10 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul; + +mul: +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G, + f_rng_blind, + p_rng_blind, + ECDSA_RS_ECP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) ); + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn; + +modn: +#endif + /* + * Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop + * (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t) + */ + ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4 ); + + /* + * Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) ); + + /* + * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step, + * avoiding a potential timing leak. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng_blind, + p_rng_blind ) ); + + /* + * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, pr, d ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pk, pk, &t ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pk, pk, &grp->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, pk, &grp->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) ); + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + mbedtls_mpi_copy( r, pr ); +#endif + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t ); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( sig ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ) +{ + switch( gid ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: return 0; +#endif +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: return 0; +#endif + default: return 1; + } +} + +/* + * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + + /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ + return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/* + * Deterministic signature wrapper + */ +static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx; + unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_mpi h; + + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx ); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL ) + { + /* redirect to our context */ + p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx; + + /* jump to current step */ + if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign ) + goto sign; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL ) + rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign; + +sign: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + (void) f_rng_blind; + (void) p_rng_blind; + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng ); +#else + if( f_rng_blind != NULL ) + ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx ); + else + { + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* + * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a + * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid + * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the + * risk that they leak this way. + */ + const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT"; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind ); + p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info, + data, 2 * grp_len ); + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det, + (const unsigned char*) blind_label, + strlen( blind_label ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind ); + goto cleanup; + } +#else + /* + * In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store + * the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every + * restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of + * the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the + * restartable feature. + * + * Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the + * price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic + * ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as + * successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still + * a valid ECDSA signature. + */ + p_rng_blind_det = p_rng; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* + * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and + * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information + * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL + * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should + * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed. + */ + ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det, + rs_ctx ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind ); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +cleanup: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Deterministic signature wrappers + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + + return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng_blind ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng_blind != NULL ); + + return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/* + * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4) + * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message) + */ +static int ecdsa_verify_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 ); + + /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER( ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL ) + { + /* redirect to our context */ + pu1 = &rs_ctx->ver->u1; + pu2 = &rs_ctx->ver->u2; + + /* jump to current step */ + if( rs_ctx->ver->state == ecdsa_ver_muladd ) + goto muladd; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* + * Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) ); + + /* + * Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n + */ + ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu1, &e, &s_inv ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu1, pu1, &grp->N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu2, r, &s_inv ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu2, pu2, &grp->N ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ver->state = ecdsa_ver_muladd; + +muladd: +#endif + /* + * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp, + &R, pu1, &grp->G, pu2, Q, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op) + * Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) ); + + /* + * Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 ); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( ver ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + + return( ecdsa_verify_restartable( grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +/* + * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1 + */ +static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = {0}; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf ); + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, s ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, r ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + memcpy( sig, p, len ); + *slen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compute and write signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#else + (void) md_alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + (void) rs_ctx; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#else + /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compute and write signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( + ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, + NULL, NULL ) ); +} +#endif + +/* + * Read and check signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( + ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Restartable read and check signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig; + const unsigned char *end = sig + slen; + size_t len; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p + len != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) + (void) rs_ctx; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#else + if( ( ret = ecdsa_verify_restartable( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + + /* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature. + * Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific + * error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */ + if( p != end ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) +/* + * Generate key pair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, + &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ + +/* + * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( ctx ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->ecp ); + + ctx->ver = NULL; + ctx->sig = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + ctx->det = NULL; +#endif +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->ecp ); + + ecdsa_restart_ver_free( ctx->ver ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->ver ); + ctx->ver = NULL; + + ecdsa_restart_sig_free( ctx->sig ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->sig ); + ctx->sig = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + ecdsa_restart_det_free( ctx->det ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->det ); + ctx->det = NULL; +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0b9bffb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c @@ -0,0 +1,1141 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve J-PAKE + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References in the code are to the Thread v1.0 Specification, + * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/ + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * Convert a mbedtls_ecjpake_role to identifier string + */ +static const char * const ecjpake_id[] = { + "client", + "server" +}; + +#define ID_MINE ( ecjpake_id[ ctx->role ] ) +#define ID_PEER ( ecjpake_id[ 1 - ctx->role ] ) + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_init( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->md_info = NULL; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ctx->grp ); + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xm1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xm2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xp1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xp2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xp ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->xm1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->xm2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->s ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_free( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + ctx->md_info = NULL; + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ctx->grp ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xm1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xm2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xp1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xp2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xp ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->xm1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->xm2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->s ); +} + +/* + * Setup context + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve, + const unsigned char *secret, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT || + role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( secret != NULL || len == 0 ); + + ctx->role = role; + + if( ( ctx->md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, curve ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->s, secret, len ) ); + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check if context is ready for use + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_check( const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( ctx->md_info == NULL || + ctx->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || + ctx->s.p == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Write a point plus its length to a buffer + */ +static int ecjpake_write_len_point( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Need at least 4 for length plus 1 for point */ + if( end < *p || end - *p < 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( grp, P, pf, + &len, *p + 4, end - ( *p + 4 ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( len, *p, 0 ); + + *p += 4 + len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Size of the temporary buffer for ecjpake_hash: + * 3 EC points plus their length, plus ID and its length (4 + 6 bytes) + */ +#define ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN ( 3 * ( 4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ) + 4 + 6 ) + +/* + * Compute hash for ZKP (7.4.2.2.2.1) + */ +static int ecjpake_hash( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *V, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + mbedtls_mpi *h ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN]; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + sizeof( buf ); + const size_t id_len = strlen( id ); + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + /* Write things to temporary buffer */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_write_len_point( &p, end, grp, pf, G ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_write_len_point( &p, end, grp, pf, V ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_write_len_point( &p, end, grp, pf, X ) ); + + if( end - p < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( id_len, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < id_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( p, id, id_len ); + p += id_len; + + /* Compute hash */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash ) ); + + /* Turn it into an integer mod n */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( h, hash, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( h, h, &grp->N ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Parse a ECShnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) and verify it (7.4.2.3.3) + */ +static int ecjpake_zkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + const unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point V, VV; + mbedtls_mpi r, h; + size_t r_len; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &V ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &VV ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); + + /* + * struct { + * ECPoint V; + * opaque r<1..2^8-1>; + * } ECSchnorrZKP; + */ + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( grp, &V, p, end - *p ) ); + + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < 1 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + r_len = *(*p)++; + + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < r_len || r_len == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &r, *p, r_len ) ); + *p += r_len; + + /* + * Verification + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_hash( md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( (mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, + &VV, &h, X, &r, G ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( &VV, &V ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &V ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &VV ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate ZKP (7.4.2.3.2) and write it as ECSchnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) + */ +static int ecjpake_zkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_mpi *x, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point V; + mbedtls_mpi v; + mbedtls_mpi h; /* later recycled to hold r */ + size_t len; + + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &V ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &v ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); + + /* Compute signature */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( (mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, + G, &v, &V, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_hash( md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &h, &h, x ) ); /* x*h */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &h, &v, &h ) ); /* v - x*h */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &h, &h, &grp->N ) ); /* r */ + + /* Write it out */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( grp, &V, + pf, &len, *p, end - *p ) ); + *p += len; + + len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &h ); /* actually r */ + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < 1 + len || len > 255 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + + *(*p)++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, *p, len ) ); /* r */ + *p += len; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &V ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &v ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Parse a ECJPAKEKeyKP (7.4.2.2.1) and check proof + * Output: verified public key X + */ +static int ecjpake_kkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + const unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * struct { + * ECPoint X; + * ECSchnorrZKP zkp; + * } ECJPAKEKeyKP; + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( grp, X, p, end - *p ) ); + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( X ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_zkp_read( md_info, grp, pf, G, X, id, p, end ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate an ECJPAKEKeyKP + * Output: the serialized structure, plus private/public key pair + */ +static int ecjpake_kkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *x, + mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Generate key (7.4.2.3.1) and write it out */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( (mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, G, x, X, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( grp, X, + pf, &len, *p, end - *p ) ); + *p += len; + + /* Generate and write proof */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_zkp_write( md_info, grp, pf, G, x, X, id, + p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs + * Outputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb + */ +static int ecjpake_kkpp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb, + const char *id, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + /* + * struct { + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp_pair_list[2]; + * } ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList; + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_read( md_info, grp, pf, G, Xa, id, &p, end ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_read( md_info, grp, pf, G, Xb, id, &p, end ) ); + + if( p != end ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList + * Outputs: the serialized structure, plus two private/public key pairs + */ +static int ecjpake_kkpp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *xm1, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa, + mbedtls_mpi *xm2, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb, + const char *id, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_write( md_info, grp, pf, G, xm1, Xa, id, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_write( md_info, grp, pf, G, xm2, Xb, id, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + *olen = p - buf; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read and process the first round message + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + return( ecjpake_kkpp_read( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + &ctx->grp.G, + &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, ID_PEER, + buf, len ) ); +} + +/* + * Generate and write the first round message + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + return( ecjpake_kkpp_write( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + &ctx->grp.G, + &ctx->xm1, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->Xm2, + ID_MINE, buf, len, olen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Compute the sum of three points R = A + B + C + */ +static int ecjpake_ecp_add3( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *A, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *B, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *C ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi one; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &one ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &one, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, R, &one, A, &one, B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, R, &one, R, &one, C ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &one ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read and process second round message (C: 7.4.2.5, S: 7.4.2.6) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GB, S: GA */ + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &G ); + + /* + * Server: GA = X3 + X4 + X1 (7.4.2.6.1) + * Client: GB = X1 + X2 + X3 (7.4.2.5.1) + * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xm2 + Xp1 + * We need that before parsing in order to check Xp as we read it + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_ecp_add3( &ctx->grp, &G, + &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->Xp1 ) ); + + /* + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; // only client reading server msg + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp; + * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams; + */ + if( ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( &grp, &p, len ) ); + if( grp.id != ctx->grp.id ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_read( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + ctx->point_format, + &G, &ctx->Xp, ID_PEER, &p, end ) ); + + if( p != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &G ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compute R = +/- X * S mod N, taking care not to leak S + */ +static int ecjpake_mul_secret( mbedtls_mpi *R, int sign, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *S, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi b; /* Blinding value, then s + N * blinding */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &b ); + + /* b = s + rnd-128-bit * N */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &b, 16, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &b, &b, N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &b, &b, S ) ); + + /* R = sign * X * b mod N */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( R, X, &b ) ); + R->s *= sign; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( R, R, N ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &b ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate and write the second round message (S: 7.4.2.5, C: 7.4.2.6) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GA, S: GB */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xm; /* C: Xc, S: Xs */ + mbedtls_mpi xm; /* C: xc, S: xs */ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + size_t ec_len; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &G ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Xm ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &xm ); + + /* + * First generate private/public key pair (S: 7.4.2.5.1, C: 7.4.2.6.1) + * + * Client: GA = X1 + X3 + X4 | xs = x2 * s | Xc = xc * GA + * Server: GB = X3 + X1 + X2 | xs = x4 * s | Xs = xs * GB + * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xp1 + Xp2 | xm = xm2 * s | Xm = xm * G + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_ecp_add3( &ctx->grp, &G, + &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, &ctx->Xm1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_mul_secret( &xm, 1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, + &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &Xm, &xm, &G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* + * Now write things out + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; // only server writing its message + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp; + * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams; + */ + if( ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER ) + { + if( end < p ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &ctx->grp, &ec_len, + p, end - p ) ); + p += ec_len; + } + + if( end < p ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &Xm, + ctx->point_format, &ec_len, p, end - p ) ); + p += ec_len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_zkp_write( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + ctx->point_format, + &G, &xm, &Xm, ID_MINE, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + *olen = p - buf; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &G ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Xm ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &xm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Derive PMS (7.4.2.7 / 7.4.2.8) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point K; + mbedtls_mpi m_xm2_s, one; + unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t x_bytes; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + if( len < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &m_xm2_s ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &one ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &one, 1 ) ); + + /* + * Client: K = ( Xs - X4 * x2 * s ) * x2 + * Server: K = ( Xc - X2 * x4 * s ) * x4 + * Unified: K = ( Xp - Xp2 * xm2 * s ) * xm2 + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_mul_secret( &m_xm2_s, -1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, + &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( &ctx->grp, &K, + &one, &ctx->Xp, + &m_xm2_s, &ctx->Xp2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &K, &ctx->xm2, &K, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* PMS = SHA-256( K.X ) */ + x_bytes = ( ctx->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &K.X, kx, x_bytes ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( ctx->md_info, kx, x_bytes, buf ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &m_xm2_s ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &one ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#undef ID_MINE +#undef ID_PEER + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + (void) verbose; + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_password[] = { + 0x74, 0x68, 0x72, 0x65, 0x61, 0x64, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x61, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x74, + 0x65, 0x73, 0x74 +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x1[] = { + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, + 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, + 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x21 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x2[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x3[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x4[] = { + 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, + 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8, + 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe1 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_one[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0xac, 0xcf, 0x01, 0x06, 0xef, 0x85, 0x8f, 0xa2, 0xd9, 0x19, + 0x33, 0x13, 0x46, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x8b, 0xba, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0x44, + 0xe5, 0xc7, 0x89, 0x28, 0x79, 0x14, 0x61, 0x87, 0xdd, 0x26, 0x66, 0xad, + 0xa7, 0x81, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x11, 0x13, 0x72, 0x25, 0x1a, 0x89, 0x10, 0x62, + 0x1f, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xf1, 0x28, 0xac, 0x48, 0xe3, 0x81, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0xf9, + 0x06, 0x07, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x94, 0xa4, 0x41, 0x04, 0x1d, 0xd0, 0xbd, 0x5d, + 0x45, 0x66, 0xc9, 0xbe, 0xd9, 0xce, 0x7d, 0xe7, 0x01, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0x2e, + 0x08, 0xe8, 0x4b, 0x73, 0x04, 0x66, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x03, 0xc7, 0x9e, + 0xb9, 0x82, 0x17, 0x22, 0x36, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0x72, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0xbf, 0x73, + 0x61, 0x0d, 0x34, 0xde, 0x44, 0x24, 0x6e, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0xc0, 0x5a, 0x22, + 0x36, 0xfb, 0x66, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x3d, 0x74, 0x49, 0x30, 0x8b, 0xab, 0xce, + 0x20, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x16, 0x66, 0x29, 0x92, 0xe9, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x25, 0x00, + 0x2f, 0x11, 0xb1, 0x50, 0x87, 0xb8, 0x27, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0x94, 0x5b, + 0xf7, 0xa2, 0x99, 0x5d, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x98, 0x34, 0x58, 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e, + 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62, + 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5, + 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb, + 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35, + 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0, + 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2e, 0xd1, 0xeb, + 0xfc, 0x18, 0x16, 0xaf, 0x4f, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x55, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xca, 0x47, + 0xb2, 0xa0, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x7c, 0xaf, 0x11, 0x79, 0xea, 0x3f, 0xe1, 0x39, + 0x5b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x61, 0x96, 0x40, 0x16, 0xfa, 0xba, 0xf7, 0x2c, 0x97, + 0x56, 0x95, 0xd9, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x40, + 0x63, 0x4e, 0xd5, 0x97, 0x64, 0x93, 0x77, 0x87, 0xbe, 0x20, 0xbc, 0x4d, + 0xee, 0xbb, 0xf9, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x0a, 0x33, 0x5f, 0x04, 0x6c, 0xa3, 0xaa, + 0x94, 0x1e, 0x45, 0x86, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0xad, 0xef, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x3d, + 0x8b, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x44, 0x3e, 0xf0 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_one[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, + 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62, 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, + 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, + 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb, 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, + 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35, 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, + 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0x09, 0xf8, 0x5b, 0x3d, + 0x20, 0xeb, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x64, 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x64, + 0x28, 0xfe, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x28, 0x7a, 0xa3, 0x65, 0xf1, 0x31, 0xf4, 0x36, + 0x0f, 0xf3, 0x86, 0xd8, 0x46, 0x89, 0x8b, 0xc4, 0xb4, 0x15, 0x83, 0xc2, + 0xa5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0x65, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x42, 0x74, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xec, + 0x0a, 0x4f, 0xfe, 0x2f, 0x27, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x0a, 0x1d, 0x8f, 0xb5, 0x16, + 0x20, 0x93, 0x4d, 0x74, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xe5, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0x24, 0xfd, 0x96, + 0x30, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x17, 0xbf, 0x13, 0x1a, 0xfa, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xa9, 0xd3, + 0x3d, 0x11, 0x98, 0xd9, 0x05, 0x19, 0x37, 0x35, 0x14, 0x41, 0x04, 0x19, + 0x0a, 0x07, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xfa, 0x4b, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xee, 0x0f, + 0x06, 0xae, 0xb5, 0x44, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xdd, 0xaa, 0xbe, 0xdf, 0x70, 0xf8, + 0x62, 0x33, 0x21, 0x33, 0x2c, 0x54, 0xf3, 0x55, 0xf0, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0xc7, + 0x83, 0xed, 0x35, 0x9e, 0x5d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x37, 0x7a, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0xea, + 0x7a, 0xce, 0x47, 0x3c, 0x9c, 0x11, 0x2b, 0x41, 0xcc, 0xd4, 0x1a, 0xc5, + 0x6a, 0x56, 0x12, 0x41, 0x04, 0x36, 0x0a, 0x1c, 0xea, 0x33, 0xfc, 0xe6, + 0x41, 0x15, 0x64, 0x58, 0xe0, 0xa4, 0xea, 0xc2, 0x19, 0xe9, 0x68, 0x31, + 0xe6, 0xae, 0xbc, 0x88, 0xb3, 0xf3, 0x75, 0x2f, 0x93, 0xa0, 0x28, 0x1d, + 0x1b, 0xf1, 0xfb, 0x10, 0x60, 0x51, 0xdb, 0x96, 0x94, 0xa8, 0xd6, 0xe8, + 0x62, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x13, 0x24, 0xa3, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0x78, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xee, + 0x4f, 0x7c, 0x59, 0x19, 0x99, 0x65, 0xa8, 0xdd, 0x4a, 0x20, 0x91, 0x84, + 0x7d, 0x2d, 0x22, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0xaa, 0x2a, 0x3f, 0xb3, 0x3f, + 0xd2, 0xd1, 0xe0, 0x55, 0xa0, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x61, 0xec, 0xfb, 0x8d, 0x80, + 0xec, 0x00, 0xc2, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0x12 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_two[] = { + 0x03, 0x00, 0x17, 0x41, 0x04, 0x0f, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x5d, 0x11, 0x23, + 0xe0, 0xef, 0x9f, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0x59, 0x0a, 0x1f, 0x4d, 0x7c, + 0xed, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x58, 0x6e, 0x8f, 0x2a, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xeb, 0x2f, + 0xda, 0x43, 0x28, 0xa2, 0x0b, 0x07, 0xd8, 0xfd, 0x66, 0x76, 0x54, 0xca, + 0x18, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0x32, 0xa3, 0x33, 0xa0, 0x84, 0x54, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x26, + 0xee, 0x88, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0xaa, 0xa7, 0xa6, 0x41, 0x04, 0x55, + 0x16, 0xea, 0x3e, 0x54, 0xa0, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xce, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x38, + 0xd3, 0x83, 0x37, 0x00, 0x29, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0xe4, 0x45, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xd6, + 0x01, 0xb4, 0x08, 0xa2, 0x4a, 0xe6, 0x46, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0xc9, 0x05, 0xb9, + 0xeb, 0x03, 0xb5, 0xd3, 0x69, 0x1c, 0x13, 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x3f, 0x1c, 0xd4, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0xec, 0x39, 0x22, 0x18, 0xa5, 0x9e, 0xd2, + 0x43, 0xd3, 0xc8, 0x20, 0xff, 0x72, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0x70, 0xb8, 0x8c, 0xb8, + 0x6f, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x34, 0xc6, 0x86, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xcd, 0x79, 0x06, 0xdd, + 0x7c, 0x9b, 0xce, 0x35, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x08, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x26, 0x83, 0x6c +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_two[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0x69, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x5e, 0x90, 0xce, 0x3f, 0x12, 0x46, + 0x74, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x07, 0xe9, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x1d, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0xc5, 0xcb, + 0x98, 0x8b, 0x58, 0xc3, 0x10, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x72, + 0x0b, 0x45, 0x54, 0x1c, 0x83, 0xee, 0x88, 0x41, 0x19, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0xce, + 0xd8, 0x6e, 0x33, 0x12, 0xd4, 0x36, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x98, + 0x9a, 0xba, 0x4a, 0xff, 0xd1, 0xee, 0x41, 0x04, 0x07, 0x7e, 0x8c, 0x31, + 0xe2, 0x0e, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xc1, 0x35, 0x93, 0xe6, 0x9f, 0x15, + 0xbe, 0x85, 0xc2, 0x7d, 0x68, 0xcd, 0x09, 0xcc, 0xb8, 0xc4, 0x18, 0x36, + 0x08, 0x91, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0x3d, 0x40, 0x9f, 0xac, 0x39, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe8, + 0x2f, 0x72, 0x92, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0x0d, 0x23, 0xe0, 0x55, 0x91, 0x3f, 0x45, + 0xa5, 0x2b, 0x85, 0xdd, 0x8a, 0x20, 0x52, 0xe9, 0xe1, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x4d, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x1f, 0x19, 0x48, 0x35, 0x35, 0xa6, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x58, + 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x00, 0x03, 0xba, 0xf2, 0x14, 0x62, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0x82, + 0xcc, 0x38, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xae, 0x60, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x4c +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = { + 0xf3, 0xd4, 0x7f, 0x59, 0x98, 0x44, 0xdb, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x69, 0xbb, 0xe7, + 0x98, 0x1e, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x31, 0xfd, 0x74, 0x3b, 0xf2, 0x2e, 0x98, 0xf9, + 0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51 +}; + +/* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */ +static int ecjpake_test_load( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1, + const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len2 ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm1, xm1, len1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm2, xm2, len2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm1, + &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->xm2, + &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +/* For tests we don't need a secure RNG; + * use the LGC from Numerical Recipes for simplicity */ +static int ecjpake_lgc( void *p, unsigned char *out, size_t len ) +{ + static uint32_t x = 42; + (void) p; + + while( len > 0 ) + { + size_t use_len = len > 4 ? 4 : len; + x = 1664525 * x + 1013904223; + memcpy( out, &x, use_len ); + out += use_len; + len -= use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define TEST_ASSERT( x ) \ + do { \ + if( x ) \ + ret = 0; \ + else \ + { \ + ret = 1; \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecjpake_context cli; + mbedtls_ecjpake_context srv; + unsigned char buf[512], pms[32]; + size_t len, pmslen; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &cli ); + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &srv ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #0 (setup): " ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &cli, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + ecjpake_test_password, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_password ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &srv, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + ecjpake_test_password, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_password ) ) == 0 ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #1 (random handshake): " ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &cli, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &cli, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &cli, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &cli, + pms, sizeof( pms ), &pmslen, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &cli, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == pmslen ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, pms, len ) == 0 ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + /* 'reference handshake' tests can only be run against implementations + * for which we have 100% control over how the random ephemeral keys + * are generated. This is only the case for the internal mbed TLS + * implementation, so these tests are skipped in case the internal + * implementation is swapped out for an alternative one. */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #2 (reference handshake): " ); + + /* Simulate generation of round one */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_test_load( &cli, + ecjpake_test_x1, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x1 ), + ecjpake_test_x2, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x2 ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_test_load( &srv, + ecjpake_test_x3, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x3 ), + ecjpake_test_x4, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x4 ) ) ); + + /* Read round one */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &srv, + ecjpake_test_cli_one, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_cli_one ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &cli, + ecjpake_test_srv_one, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_srv_one ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Skip generation of round two, read round two */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &cli, + ecjpake_test_srv_two, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_srv_two ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &srv, + ecjpake_test_cli_two, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_cli_two ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Server derives PMS */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == sizeof( ecjpake_test_pms ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len ) == 0 ); + + memset( buf, 0, len ); /* Avoid interferences with next step */ + + /* Client derives PMS */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &cli, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == sizeof( ecjpake_test_pms ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len ) == 0 ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &cli ); + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &srv ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#undef TEST_ASSERT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecp.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..890f364a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecp.c @@ -0,0 +1,3604 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): generic functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + * GECC = Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone + * FIPS 186-3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf + * RFC 4492 for the related TLS structures and constants + * RFC 7748 for the Curve448 and Curve25519 curve definitions + * + * [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * + * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis + * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and + * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. + * + * + * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to + * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology + * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/** + * \brief Function level alternative implementation. + * + * The MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT macro enables alternative implementations to + * replace certain functions in this module. The alternative implementations are + * typically hardware accelerators and need to activate the hardware before the + * computation starts and deactivate it after it finishes. The + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() functions serve + * this purpose. + * + * To preserve the correct functionality the following conditions must hold: + * + * - The alternative implementation must be activated by + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() before any of the replaceable functions is + * called. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() must \b only be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() must \b not be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - Public functions must not return while the alternative implementation is + * activated. + * - Replaceable functions are guarded by \c MBEDTLS_ECP_XXX_ALT macros and + * before calling them an \code if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + * \endcode ensures that the alternative implementation supports the current + * group. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" + +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECP_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#else +#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications. + * Used to test resistance of point multiplication to simple timing attacks. + */ +static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) +/* + * Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for + * side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was + * that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but + * unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with + * no opportunity for the user to do anything about it. + * + * The obvious strategies for addressing that include: + * - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments; + * - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules. + * + * Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is + * have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar. + * + * The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with + * HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +/* DRBG context type */ +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; + +/* DRBG context init */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG context free */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG function */ +static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) ); +} + +/* DRBG context seeding */ +static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + /* The list starts with strong hashes */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + + if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, + secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +/* DRBG context type */ +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; + +/* DRBG context init */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG context free */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG function */ +static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does, + * we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy + * function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string. + * (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are + * concatenated before being used to update the secret state.) + */ +static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + (void) ctx; + memset( out, 0, len ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* DRBG context seeding */ +static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + + if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, + secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL, + secret_bytes, secret_len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#else +#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." +#endif /* DRBG modules */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row. + * + * Default value 0 means that ECC operations will not yield. + * Note that regardless of the value of ecp_max_ops, always at + * least one step is performed before yielding. + * + * Setting ecp_max_ops=1 can be suitable for testing purposes + * as it will interrupt computation at all possible points. + */ +static unsigned ecp_max_ops = 0; + +/* + * Set ecp_max_ops + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( unsigned max_ops ) +{ + ecp_max_ops = max_ops; +} + +/* + * Check if restart is enabled + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled( void ) +{ + return( ecp_max_ops != 0 ); +} + +/* + * Restart sub-context for ecp_mul_comb() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* current intermediate result */ + size_t i; /* current index in various loops, 0 outside */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /* table for precomputed points */ + unsigned char T_size; /* number of points in table T */ + enum { /* what were we doing last time we returned? */ + ecp_rsm_init = 0, /* nothing so far, dummy initial state */ + ecp_rsm_pre_dbl, /* precompute 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl, /* normalize precomputed 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_add, /* precompute remaining points by adding */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add, /* normalize all precomputed points */ + ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */ + ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */ + } state; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; + unsigned char drbg_seeded; +#endif +}; + +/* + * Init restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->R ); + ctx->i = 0; + ctx->T = NULL; + ctx->T_size = 0; + ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_init( &ctx->drbg_ctx ); + ctx->drbg_seeded = 0; +#endif +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx ) +{ + unsigned char i; + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->R ); + + if( ctx->T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < ctx->T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( ctx->T + i ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->T ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_free( &ctx->drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + ecp_restart_rsm_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Restart context for ecp_muladd() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; /* mP value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* R intermediate result */ + enum { /* what should we do next? */ + ecp_rsma_mul1 = 0, /* first multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_mul2, /* second multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_add, /* addition */ + ecp_rsma_norm, /* normalization */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->mP ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->R ); + ctx->state = ecp_rsma_mul1; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->mP ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->R ); + + ecp_restart_ma_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + ctx->ops_done = 0; + ctx->depth = 0; + ctx->rsm = NULL; + ctx->ma = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + ecp_restart_rsm_free( ctx->rsm ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->rsm ); + + ecp_restart_ma_free( ctx->ma ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->ma ); + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Check if we can do the next step + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + unsigned ops ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ecp_max_ops != 0 ) + { + /* scale depending on curve size: the chosen reference is 256-bit, + * and multiplication is quadratic. Round to the closest integer. */ + if( grp->pbits >= 512 ) + ops *= 4; + else if( grp->pbits >= 384 ) + ops *= 2; + + /* Avoid infinite loops: always allow first step. + * Because of that, however, it's not generally true + * that ops_done <= ecp_max_ops, so the check + * ops_done > ecp_max_ops below is mandatory. */ + if( ( rs_ctx->ops_done != 0 ) && + ( rs_ctx->ops_done > ecp_max_ops || + ops > ecp_max_ops - rs_ctx->ops_done ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + + /* update running count */ + rs_ctx->ops_done += ops; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_ENTER( SUB ) do { \ + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 ) \ + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; \ + \ + /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ + if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ + rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + { \ + rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) ); \ + if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) do { \ + /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) \ + { \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) \ + rs_ctx->depth--; \ +} while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define ECP_RS_ENTER( sub ) (void) rs_ctx; +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE( sub ) (void) rs_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * List of supported curves: + * - internal ID + * - TLS NamedCurve ID (RFC 4492 sec. 5.1.1, RFC 7071 sec. 2, RFC 8446 sec. 4.2.7) + * - size in bits + * - readable name + * + * Curves are listed in order: largest curves first, and for a given size, + * fastest curves first. This provides the default order for the SSL module. + * + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new curves! + */ +static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, 25, 521, "secp521r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, 28, 512, "brainpoolP512r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, 24, 384, "secp384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, 27, 384, "brainpoolP384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, 23, 256, "secp256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, 22, 256, "secp256k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, 26, 256, "brainpoolP256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, 21, 224, "secp224r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, 20, 224, "secp224k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, 19, 192, "secp192r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, 18, 192, "secp192k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, 29, 256, "x25519" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, 30, 448, "x448" }, +#endif + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define ECP_NB_CURVES sizeof( ecp_supported_curves ) / \ + sizeof( ecp_supported_curves[0] ) + +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_supported_grp_id[ECP_NB_CURVES]; + +/* + * List of supported curves and associated info + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( void ) +{ + return( ecp_supported_curves ); +} + +/* + * List of supported curves, group ID only + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list( void ) +{ + static int init_done = 0; + + if( ! init_done ) + { + size_t i = 0; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + ecp_supported_grp_id[i++] = curve_info->grp_id; + } + ecp_supported_grp_id[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + + init_done = 1; + } + + return( ecp_supported_grp_id ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info for the internal identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( curve_info->grp_id == grp_id ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the TLS identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( uint16_t tls_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( curve_info->tls_id == tls_id ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the name + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + if( name == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( strcmp( curve_info->name, name ) == 0 ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the type of a curve + */ +mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + if( grp->G.X.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE ); + + if( grp->G.Y.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ); +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_init( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( pt != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->X ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Y ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Z ); +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_init( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( grp != NULL ); + + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->A ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->B ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &grp->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->N ); + grp->pbits = 0; + grp->nbits = 0; + grp->h = 0; + grp->modp = NULL; + grp->t_pre = NULL; + grp->t_post = NULL; + grp->t_data = NULL; + grp->T = NULL; + grp->T_size = 0; +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( key != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &key->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &key->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &key->Q ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + if( pt == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->X ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Y ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Z ) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + size_t i; + + if( grp == NULL ) + return; + + if( grp->h != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->B ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->N ); + } + + if( grp->T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->T[i] ); + mbedtls_free( grp->T ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( grp, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_group ) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + if( key == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &key->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &key->Q ); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->X, &Q->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a group object + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( dst, src->id ) ); +} + +/* + * Set point to zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->X , 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Y , 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z , 0 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Tell if a point is zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare two points lazily + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &Q->X ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Import a non-zero point from ASCII strings + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, + const char *x, const char *y ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( x != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( y != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->X, radix, x ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->Y, radix, y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export a point into unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.3 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ); + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + (void) format; /* Montgomery curves always use the same point format */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + *olen = plen; + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &P->X, buf, plen ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + /* + * Common case: P == 0 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + if( buflen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x00; + *olen = 1; + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = 2 * plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x04; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + } + else if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x02 + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &P->Y, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + } + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + if( ilen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + if( plen != ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &pt->X, buf, plen ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &pt->Y ); + + if( grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + /* Set most significant bit to 0 as prescribed in RFC7748 §5 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &pt->X, plen * 8 - 1, 0 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + if( buf[0] == 0x00 ) + { + if( ilen == 1 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( pt ) ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( buf[0] != 0x04 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ilen != 2 * plen + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->Y, + buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import a point from a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + unsigned char data_len; + const unsigned char *buf_start; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + /* + * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data) + */ + if( buf_len < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + data_len = *(*buf)++; + if( data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len - 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Save buffer start for read_binary and update buf + */ + buf_start = *buf; + *buf += data_len; + + return( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, pt, buf_start, data_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Export a point as a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ); + + /* + * buffer length must be at least one, for our length byte + */ + if( blen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( grp, pt, format, + olen, buf + 1, blen - 1) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * write length to the first byte and update total length + */ + buf[0] = (unsigned char) *olen; + ++*olen; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set a group from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( &grp_id, buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, grp_id ) ); +} + +/* + * Read a group id from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) and convert it to + * mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + /* + * We expect at least three bytes (see below) + */ + if( len < 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled + */ + if( *(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + tls_id = *(*buf)++; + tls_id <<= 8; + tls_id |= *(*buf)++; + + if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + *grp = curve_info->grp_id; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Write the ECParameters record corresponding to a group (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp->id ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * We are going to write 3 bytes (see below) + */ + *olen = 3; + if( blen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* + * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve + */ + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( curve_info->tls_id, buf, 0 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Wrapper around fast quasi-modp functions, with fall-back to mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi. + * See the documentation of struct mbedtls_ecp_group. + * + * This function is in the critial loop for mbedtls_ecp_mul, so pay attention to perf. + */ +static int ecp_modp( mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( grp->modp == NULL ) + return( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); + + /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ + if( ( N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) != 0 ) || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > 2 * grp->pbits ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( grp->modp( N ) ); + + /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ + while( N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( N, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) + /* we known P, N and the result are positive */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( N, N, &grp->P ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Fast mod-p functions expect their argument to be in the 0..p^2 range. + * + * In order to guarantee that, we need to ensure that operands of + * mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi are in the 0..p range. So, after each operation we will + * bring the result back to this range. + * + * The following macros are shortcuts for doing that. + */ + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, general case, to use after mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#define INC_MUL_COUNT mul_count++; +#else +#define INC_MUL_COUNT +#endif + +#define MOD_MUL( N ) \ + do \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_modp( &(N), grp ) ); \ + INC_MUL_COUNT \ + } while( 0 ) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_MUL( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi + * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0 + */ +#define MOD_SUB( N ) \ + while( (N).s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &(N), 0 ) != 0 ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) ) || \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) ) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_SUB( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int. + * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and + * a bit faster. + */ +#define MOD_ADD( N ) \ + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &(N), &grp->P ) >= 0 ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + size_t count ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( X, count ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in + * Jacobian coordinates. + * + * For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with countermeasures against + * SPA, hence timing attacks. + */ + +/* + * Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1 (GECC 3.2.1) + * Cost: 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S + */ +static int ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pt ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi Zi, ZZi; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); + + /* + * X = X / Z^2 mod p + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &Zi, &pt->Z, &grp->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ZZi ) ); + + /* + * Y = Y / Z^3 mod p + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &Zi ) ); + + /* + * Z = 1 + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) points, + * using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P. + * (See for example Cohen's "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number + * Theory", Algorithm 10.3.4.) + * + * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is zero! + * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Cost: 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S + */ +static int ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t T_size ) +{ + if( T_size < 2 ) + return( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, *T ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, T, T_size ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi *c, u, Zi, ZZi; + + if( ( c = mbedtls_calloc( T_size, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_mpi_init( &c[i] ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &u ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); + + /* + * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &c[0], &T[0]->Z ) ); + for( i = 1; i < T_size; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z ) ); + } + + /* + * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &u, &c[T_size-1], &grp->P ) ); + + for( i = T_size - 1; ; i-- ) + { + /* + * Zi = 1 / Z_i mod p + * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_i) mod P + */ + if( i == 0 ) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Zi, &u ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &Zi, &u, &c[i-1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &u, &u, &T[i]->Z ) ); + } + + /* + * proceed as in normalize() + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &Zi ) ); + + /* + * Post-precessing: reclaim some memory by shrinking coordinates + * - not storing Z (always 1) + * - shrinking other coordinates, but still keeping the same number of + * limbs as P, as otherwise it will too likely be regrown too fast. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shrink( &T[i]->X, grp->P.n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shrink( &T[i]->Y, grp->P.n ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T[i]->Z ); + + if( i == 0 ) + break; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &u ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi ); + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &c[i] ); + mbedtls_free( c ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Conditional point inversion: Q -> -Q = (Q.X, -Q.Y, Q.Z) without leak. + * "inv" must be 0 (don't invert) or 1 (invert) or the result will be invalid + */ +static int ecp_safe_invert_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + unsigned char inv ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char nonzero; + mbedtls_mpi mQY; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mQY ); + + /* Use the fact that -Q.Y mod P = P - Q.Y unless Q.Y == 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &mQY, &grp->P, &Q->Y ) ); + nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Y, 0 ) != 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &Q->Y, &mQY, inv & nonzero ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mQY ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates + * + * Based on http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian.html#doubling-dbl-1998-cmo-2 . + * + * We follow the variable naming fairly closely. The formula variations that trade a MUL for a SQR + * (plus a few ADDs) aren't useful as our bignum implementation doesn't distinguish squaring. + * + * Standard optimizations are applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. + * + * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) + * 4M + 4S (A == -3) + * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise + */ +static int ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + dbl_count++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi M, S, T, U; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if( grp->A.p == NULL ) + { + /* M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &T, &P->X, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &U, &P->X, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &T, &U ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); + } + else + { + /* M = 3.X^2 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->X, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); + + /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &grp->A, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + /* M += A.Z^4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &S, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &T, &grp->A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &M, &M, &S ) ); + } + } + + /* S = 4.X.Y^2 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &P->Y, &P->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &T, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->X, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &S, 1 ) ); + + /* U = 8.Y^4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &U, &T, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &U, 1 ) ); + + /* T = M^2 - 2.S */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &M, &M ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T, &T, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T, &T, &S ) ); + + /* S = M(S - T) - U */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S, &S, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &S, &M ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S, &S, &U ) ); + + /* U = 2.Y.Z */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &U, &P->Y, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &U, 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Z, &U ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates (GECC 3.22) + * + * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), + * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. + * + * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, (3) P == Q. + * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in ecp_mul_comb(): + * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base point, the factor + * being less than its order, so none of them is zero; + * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even multiple, + * due to the choice of precomputed points in the modified comb method. + * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. + * + * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as meaning 1. + * + * Cost: 1A := 8M + 3S + */ +static int ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + add_count++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, P, Q ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi T1, T2, T3, T4, X, Y, Z; + + /* + * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1) + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, Q ) ); + + if( Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + + /* + * Make sure Q coordinates are normalized + */ + if( Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T3 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T4 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T1, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T2, &T1, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T1, &T1, &Q->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T2, &T2, &Q->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T1, &T1, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T2, &T2, &P->Y ) ); + + /* Special cases (2) and (3) */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &T1, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &T2, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ); + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( R ); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &Z, &P->Z, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T1, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T4, &T3, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T1, &T3 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &T1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &X, &T2, &T2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &X, &X, &T4 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &T2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T4, &T4, &P->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &Y, &T3, &T4 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Z, &Z ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T2 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T3 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T4 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Randomize jacobian coordinates: + * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l + * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_jac(). + * + * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. + */ +static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( grp, pt, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l, ll; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ll ); + + /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Z = l * Z */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l ) ); + + /* X = l^2 * X */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ll, &l, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ll ) ); + + /* Y = l^3 * Y */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ll, &ll, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ll ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ll ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Check and define parameters used by the comb method (see below for details) + */ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 2 || MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE > 7 +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE out of bounds" +#endif + +/* d = ceil( n / w ) */ +#define COMB_MAX_D ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 1 ) / 2 + +/* number of precomputed points */ +#define COMB_MAX_PRE ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) ) + +/* + * Compute the representation of m that will be used with our comb method. + * + * The basic comb method is described in GECC 3.44 for example. We use a + * modified version that provides resistance to SPA by avoiding zero + * digits in the representation as in [3]. We modify the method further by + * requiring that all K_i be odd, which has the small cost that our + * representation uses one more K_i, due to carries, but saves on the size of + * the precomputed table. + * + * Summary of the comb method and its modifications: + * + * - The goal is to compute m*P for some w*d-bit integer m. + * + * - The basic comb method splits m into the w-bit integers + * x[0] .. x[d-1] where x[i] consists of the bits in m whose + * index has residue i modulo d, and computes m * P as + * S[x[0]] + 2 * S[x[1]] + .. + 2^(d-1) S[x[d-1]], where + * S[i_{w-1} .. i_0] := i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + i_0 P. + * + * - If it happens that, say, x[i+1]=0 (=> S[x[i+1]]=0), one can replace the sum by + * .. + 2^{i-1} S[x[i-1]] - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} S[x[i]] + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] .., + * thereby successively converting it into a form where all summands + * are nonzero, at the cost of negative summands. This is the basic idea of [3]. + * + * - More generally, even if x[i+1] != 0, we can first transform the sum as + * .. - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} ( S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] ) + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] .., + * and then replace S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] = S[x[i] ^ x[i+1]] + 2 S[x[i] & x[i+1]]. + * Performing and iterating this procedure for those x[i] that are even + * (keeping track of carry), we can transform the original sum into one of the form + * S[x'[0]] +- 2 S[x'[1]] +- .. +- 2^{d-1} S[x'[d-1]] + 2^d S[x'[d]] + * with all x'[i] odd. It is therefore only necessary to know S at odd indices, + * which is why we are only computing half of it in the first place in + * ecp_precompute_comb and accessing it with index abs(i) / 2 in ecp_select_comb. + * + * - For the sake of compactness, only the seven low-order bits of x[i] + * are used to represent its absolute value (K_i in the paper), and the msb + * of x[i] encodes the sign (s_i in the paper): it is set if and only if + * if s_i == -1; + * + * Calling conventions: + * - x is an array of size d + 1 + * - w is the size, ie number of teeth, of the comb, and must be between + * 2 and 7 (in practice, between 2 and MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) + * - m is the MPI, expected to be odd and such that bitlength(m) <= w * d + * (the result will be incorrect if these assumptions are not satisfied) + */ +static void ecp_comb_recode_core( unsigned char x[], size_t d, + unsigned char w, const mbedtls_mpi *m ) +{ + size_t i, j; + unsigned char c, cc, adjust; + + memset( x, 0, d+1 ); + + /* First get the classical comb values (except for x_d = 0) */ + for( i = 0; i < d; i++ ) + for( j = 0; j < w; j++ ) + x[i] |= mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, i + d * j ) << j; + + /* Now make sure x_1 .. x_d are odd */ + c = 0; + for( i = 1; i <= d; i++ ) + { + /* Add carry and update it */ + cc = x[i] & c; + x[i] = x[i] ^ c; + c = cc; + + /* Adjust if needed, avoiding branches */ + adjust = 1 - ( x[i] & 0x01 ); + c |= x[i] & ( x[i-1] * adjust ); + x[i] = x[i] ^ ( x[i-1] * adjust ); + x[i-1] |= adjust << 7; + } +} + +/* + * Precompute points for the adapted comb method + * + * Assumption: T must be able to hold 2^{w - 1} elements. + * + * Operation: If i = i_{w-1} ... i_1 is the binary representation of i, + * sets T[i] = i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + P. + * + * Cost: d(w-1) D + (2^{w-1} - 1) A + 1 N(w-1) + 1 N(2^{w-1} - 1) + * + * Note: Even comb values (those where P would be omitted from the + * sum defining T[i] above) are not needed in our adaption + * the comb method. See ecp_comb_recode_core(). + * + * This function currently works in four steps: + * (1) [dbl] Computation of intermediate T[i] for 2-power values of i + * (2) [norm_dbl] Normalization of coordinates of these T[i] + * (3) [add] Computation of all T[i] + * (4) [norm_add] Normalization of all T[i] + * + * Step 1 can be interrupted but not the others; together with the final + * coordinate normalization they are the largest steps done at once, depending + * on the window size. Here are operation counts for P-256: + * + * step (2) (3) (4) + * w = 5 142 165 208 + * w = 4 136 77 160 + * w = 3 130 33 136 + * w = 2 124 11 124 + * + * So if ECC operations are blocking for too long even with a low max_ops + * value, it's useful to set MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE to a lower value in order + * to minimize maximum blocking time. + */ +static int ecp_precompute_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point T[], const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + unsigned char w, size_t d, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + size_t j = 0; + const unsigned char T_size = 1U << ( w - 1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + { + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl ) + goto dbl; + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl ) + goto norm_dbl; + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_add ) + goto add; + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add ) + goto norm_add; + } +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + { + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_dbl; + + /* initial state for the loop */ + rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0; + } + +dbl: +#endif + /* + * Set T[0] = P and + * T[2^{l-1}] = 2^{dl} P for l = 1 .. w-1 (this is not the final value) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &T[0], P ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0 ) + j = rs_ctx->rsm->i; + else +#endif + j = 0; + + for( ; j < d * ( w - 1 ); j++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL ); + + i = 1U << ( j / d ); + cur = T + i; + + if( j % d == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( cur, T + ( i >> 1 ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_jac( grp, cur, cur ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl; + +norm_dbl: +#endif + /* + * Normalize current elements in T. As T has holes, + * use an auxiliary array of pointers to elements in T. + */ + j = 0; + for( i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1 ) + TT[j++] = T + i; + + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, TT, j ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_add; + +add: +#endif + /* + * Compute the remaining ones using the minimal number of additions + * Be careful to update T[2^l] only after using it! + */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ( T_size - 1 ) * MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD ); + + for( i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1 ) + { + j = i; + while( j-- ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i] ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add; + +norm_add: +#endif + /* + * Normalize final elements in T. Even though there are no holes now, we + * still need the auxiliary array for homogeneity with the previous + * call. Also, skip T[0] which is already normalised, being a copy of P. + */ + for( j = 0; j + 1 < T_size; j++ ) + TT[j] = T + j + 1; + + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, TT, j ) ); + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl ) + rs_ctx->rsm->i = j; + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Select precomputed point: R = sign(i) * T[ abs(i) / 2 ] + * + * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background + */ +static int ecp_select_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size, + unsigned char i ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char ii, j; + + /* Ignore the "sign" bit and scale down */ + ii = ( i & 0x7Fu ) >> 1; + + /* Read the whole table to thwart cache-based timing attacks */ + for( j = 0; j < T_size; j++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii ) ); + } + + /* Safely invert result if i is "negative" */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_safe_invert_jac( grp, R, i >> 7 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Core multiplication algorithm for the (modified) comb method. + * This part is actually common with the basic comb method (GECC 3.44) + * + * Cost: d A + d D + 1 R + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size, + const unsigned char x[], size_t d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point Txi; + size_t i; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Txi ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + rs_ctx->rsm->state != ecp_rsm_comb_core ) + { + rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0; + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_comb_core; + } + + /* new 'if' instead of nested for the sake of the 'else' branch */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0 ) + { + /* restore current index (R already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R) */ + i = rs_ctx->rsm->i; + } + else +#endif + { + /* Start with a non-zero point and randomize its coordinates */ + i = d; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, R, T, T_size, x[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng != 0 ) +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + } + + while( i != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD ); + --i; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_jac( grp, R, R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, &Txi, T, T_size, x[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, R, &Txi ) ); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Txi ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + rs_ctx->rsm->i = i; + /* no need to save R, already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R */ + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Recode the scalar to get constant-time comb multiplication + * + * As the actual scalar recoding needs an odd scalar as a starting point, + * this wrapper ensures that by replacing m by N - m if necessary, and + * informs the caller that the result of multiplication will be negated. + * + * This works because we only support large prime order for Short Weierstrass + * curves, so N is always odd hence either m or N - m is. + * + * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background. + */ +static int ecp_comb_recode_scalar( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1], + size_t d, + unsigned char w, + unsigned char *parity_trick ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi M, mm; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mm ); + + /* N is always odd (see above), just make extra sure */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &grp->N, 0 ) != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* do we need the parity trick? */ + *parity_trick = ( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 0 ) == 0 ); + + /* execute parity fix in constant time */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &M, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &mm, &grp->N, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &M, &mm, *parity_trick ) ); + + /* actual scalar recoding */ + ecp_comb_recode_core( k, d, w, &M ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mm ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Perform comb multiplication (for short Weierstrass curves) + * once the auxiliary table has been pre-computed. + * + * Scalar recoding may use a parity trick that makes us compute -m * P, + * if that is the case we'll need to recover m * P at the end. + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T, + unsigned char T_size, + unsigned char w, + size_t d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char parity_trick; + unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1]; + mbedtls_ecp_point *RR = R; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + { + RR = &rs_ctx->rsm->R; + + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_final_norm ) + goto final_norm; + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_comb_recode_scalar( grp, m, k, d, w, + &parity_trick ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb_core( grp, RR, T, T_size, k, d, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_safe_invert_jac( grp, RR, parity_trick ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_final_norm; + +final_norm: + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV ); +#endif + /* + * Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng != 0 ) +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, RR ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, RR ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Pick window size based on curve size and whether we optimize for base point + */ +static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + unsigned char p_eq_g ) +{ + unsigned char w; + + /* + * Minimize the number of multiplications, that is minimize + * 10 * d * w + 18 * 2^(w-1) + 11 * d + 7 * w, with d = ceil( nbits / w ) + * (see costs of the various parts, with 1S = 1M) + */ + w = grp->nbits >= 384 ? 5 : 4; + + /* + * If P == G, pre-compute a bit more, since this may be re-used later. + * Just adding one avoids upping the cost of the first mul too much, + * and the memory cost too. + */ + if( p_eq_g ) + w++; + + /* + * Make sure w is within bounds. + * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.) + */ +#if( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 ) + if( w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE ) + w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE; +#endif + if( w >= grp->nbits ) + w = 2; + + return( w ); +} + +/* + * Multiplication using the comb method - for curves in short Weierstrass form + * + * This function is mainly responsible for administrative work: + * - managing the restart context if enabled + * - managing the table of precomputed points (passed between the below two + * functions): allocation, computation, ownership transfer, freeing. + * + * It delegates the actual arithmetic work to: + * ecp_precompute_comb() and ecp_mul_comb_with_precomp() + * + * See comments on ecp_comb_recode_core() regarding the computation strategy. + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char w, p_eq_g, i; + size_t d; + unsigned char T_size = 0, T_ok = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_point *T = NULL; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; + + ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + ECP_RS_ENTER( rsm ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + /* Adjust pointers */ + f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + p_rng = &rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_ctx; + else +#endif + p_rng = &drbg_ctx; + + /* Initialize internal DRBG if necessary */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL || + rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded == 0 ) +#endif + { + const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( p_rng, m, m_len ) ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded = 1; +#endif + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Is P the base point ? */ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 + p_eq_g = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &grp->G.Y ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &grp->G.X ) == 0 ); +#else + p_eq_g = 0; +#endif + + /* Pick window size and deduce related sizes */ + w = ecp_pick_window_size( grp, p_eq_g ); + T_size = 1U << ( w - 1 ); + d = ( grp->nbits + w - 1 ) / w; + + /* Pre-computed table: do we have it already for the base point? */ + if( p_eq_g && grp->T != NULL ) + { + /* second pointer to the same table, will be deleted on exit */ + T = grp->T; + T_ok = 1; + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* Pre-computed table: do we have one in progress? complete? */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->T != NULL ) + { + /* transfer ownership of T from rsm to local function */ + T = rs_ctx->rsm->T; + rs_ctx->rsm->T = NULL; + rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = 0; + + /* This effectively jumps to the call to mul_comb_after_precomp() */ + T_ok = rs_ctx->rsm->state >= ecp_rsm_comb_core; + } + else +#endif + /* Allocate table if we didn't have any */ + { + T = mbedtls_calloc( T_size, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_point ) ); + if( T == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &T[i] ); + + T_ok = 0; + } + + /* Compute table (or finish computing it) if not done already */ + if( !T_ok ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_precompute_comb( grp, T, P, w, d, rs_ctx ) ); + + if( p_eq_g ) + { + /* almost transfer ownership of T to the group, but keep a copy of + * the pointer to use for calling the next function more easily */ + grp->T = T; + grp->T_size = T_size; + } + } + + /* Actual comb multiplication using precomputed points */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( grp, R, m, + T, T_size, w, d, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + +cleanup: + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + /* does T belong to the group? */ + if( T == grp->T ) + T = NULL; + + /* does T belong to the restart context? */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && T != NULL ) + { + /* transfer ownership of T from local function to rsm */ + rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = T_size; + rs_ctx->rsm->T = T; + T = NULL; + } +#endif + + /* did T belong to us? then let's destroy it! */ + if( T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &T[i] ); + mbedtls_free( T ); + } + + /* don't free R while in progress in case R == P */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) +#endif + /* prevent caller from using invalid value */ + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( R ); + + ECP_RS_LEAVE( rsm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/* + * For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective + * coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is + * internally represented as X / Z. + * + * For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder. + */ + +/* + * Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1 + * Cost: 1M + 1I + */ +static int ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, P ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &P->Z, &P->Z, &grp->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->X, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Randomize projective x/z coordinates: + * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l + * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_mxz(). + * + * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. + * Cost: 2M + */ +static int ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); + + /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->X, &P->X, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->Z, &P->Z, &l ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Double-and-add: R = 2P, S = P + Q, with d = X(P - Q), + * for Montgomery curves in x/z coordinates. + * + * http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/montgom/xz/ladder/mladd-1987-m.op3 + * with + * d = X1 + * P = (X2, Z2) + * Q = (X3, Z3) + * R = (X4, Z4) + * S = (X5, Z5) + * and eliminating temporary variables tO, ..., t4. + * + * Cost: 5M + 4S + */ +static int ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, S, P, Q, d ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &B ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &CB ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &A, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &AA, &A, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &B, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &BB, &B, &B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &E, &AA, &BB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &C, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &D, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &DA, &D, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &CB, &C, &B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &S->X, &DA, &CB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->X, &S->X, &S->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S->Z, &DA, &CB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->Z, &S->Z, &S->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->Z, d, &S->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->X, &AA, &BB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->Z, &grp->A, &E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &R->Z, &BB, &R->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->Z, &E, &R->Z ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &B ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &CB ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Multiplication with Montgomery ladder in x/z coordinates, + * for curves in Montgomery form + */ +static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + unsigned char b; + mbedtls_ecp_point RP; + mbedtls_mpi PX; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; + + ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &PX ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &drbg_ctx, m, m_len ) ); + f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; + p_rng = &drbg_ctx; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Save PX and read from P before writing to R, in case P == R */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &PX, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &RP, P ) ); + + /* Set R to zero in modified x/z coordinates */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->X, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 0 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R->Y ); + + /* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */ + MOD_ADD( RP.X ); + + /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng != NULL ) +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */ + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( m ); /* one past the (zero-based) most significant bit */ + while( i-- > 0 ) + { + b = mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, i ); + /* + * if (b) R = 2R + P else R = 2R, + * which is: + * if (b) double_add( RP, R, RP, R ) + * else double_add( R, RP, R, RP ) + * but using safe conditional swaps to avoid leaks + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->X, &RP.X, b ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->X, &RP.X, b ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) ); + } + + /* + * Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng != NULL ) +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) ); + +cleanup: +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &PX ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 ) + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* skip argument check when restarting */ + if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL ) +#endif + { + /* check_privkey is free */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK ); + + /* Common sanity checks */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ); + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( is_grp_capable ) + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) + rs_ctx->depth--; +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * Check that an affine point is valid as a public key, + * short weierstrass curves (SEC1 3.2.3.1) + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS; + + /* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Y, 0 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->X, &grp->P ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->Y, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &RHS ); + + /* + * YY = Y^2 + * RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X ) ); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if( grp->A.p == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &RHS, &RHS, 3 ) ); MOD_SUB( RHS ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &YY, &RHS ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &RHS ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 0, m == 1 and m == -1 + * NOT constant-time - ONLY for short Weierstrass! + */ +static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( R ) ); + } + else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + } + else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, -1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R->Y, 0 ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &R->Y, &grp->P, &R->Y ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, R, m, P, + NULL, NULL, rs_ctx ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Restartable linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pmP = &mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pR = R; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) != MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &mP ); + + ECP_RS_ENTER( ma ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + { + /* redirect intermediate results to restart context */ + pmP = &rs_ctx->ma->mP; + pR = &rs_ctx->ma->R; + + /* jump to next operation */ + if( rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_mul2 ) + goto mul2; + if( rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_add ) + goto add; + if( rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_norm ) + goto norm; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, pmP, m, P, rs_ctx ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_mul2; + +mul2: +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, pR, n, Q, rs_ctx ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_add; + +add: +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, pR, pmP, pR ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_norm; + +norm: +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pR ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, pR ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( is_grp_capable ) + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &mP ); + + ECP_RS_LEAVE( ma ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)} +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) +/* + * Constants for the two points other than 0, 1, -1 (mod p) in + * https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate + * See ecp_check_pubkey_x25519(). + */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_1[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x56, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32, 0xb1, 0xfd ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_2[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5f, 0x9c, 0x95, 0xbc, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xb1, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x83, 0xef, 0x5b ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x44, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0x58, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xd8, 0x22, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x11, 0x57 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_1 ); +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_2 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that the input point is not one of the low-order points. + * This is recommended by the "May the Fourth" paper: + * https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806.pdf + * Those points are never sent by an honest peer. + */ +static int ecp_check_bad_points_mx( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi XmP; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &XmP ); + + /* Reduce X mod P so that we only need to check values less than P. + * We know X < 2^256 so we can proceed by subtraction. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &XmP, X ) ); + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, P ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &XmP, &XmP, P ) ); + + /* Check against the known bad values that are less than P. For Curve448 + * these are 0, 1 and -1. For Curve25519 we check the values less than P + * from the following list: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XmP, 1 ) <= 0 ) /* takes care of 0 and 1 */ + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + } +#else + (void) grp_id; +#endif + + /* Final check: check if XmP + 1 is P (final because it changes XmP!) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &XmP, &XmP, 1 ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, P ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &XmP ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check validity of a public key for Montgomery curves with x-only schemes + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + /* [Curve25519 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */ + /* Allow any public value, if it's too big then we'll just reduce it mod p + * (RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 3). */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &pt->X ) > ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + /* Implicit in all standards (as they don't consider negative numbers): + * X must be non-negative. This is normally ensured by the way it's + * encoded for transmission, but let's be extra sure. */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + return( ecp_check_bad_points_mx( &pt->X, &grp->P, grp->id ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that a point is valid as a public key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + /* Must use affine coordinates */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return( ecp_check_pubkey_mx( grp, pt ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( ecp_check_pubkey_sw( grp, pt ) ); +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Check that an mbedtls_mpi is valid as a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 0 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 1 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) - 1 != grp->nbits ) /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + /* see [Curve25519] page 5 */ + if( grp->nbits == 254 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 2 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + /* see SEC1 3.2 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + else + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t high_bit, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + size_t n_random_bytes = high_bit / 8 + 1; + + /* [Curve25519] page 5 */ + /* Generate a (high_bit+1)-bit random number by generating just enough + * random bytes, then shifting out extra bits from the top (necessary + * when (high_bit+1) is not a multiple of 8). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_random_bytes, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_random_bytes - high_bit - 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, high_bit, 1 ) ); + + /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for + Curve25519 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) ); + if( high_bit == 254 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( + const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_random( d, 1, N, f_rng, p_rng ); + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + default: + return( ret ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Generate a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( &grp->N, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Generate a keypair with configurable base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate key pair, wrapper for conventional base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( grp, &grp->G, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Generate a keypair, prettier wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32 +/* + * Read a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_read_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* + * If it is Curve25519 curve then mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 + */ + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen != ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + /* Set the three least significant bits to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 1, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 2, 0 ) ); + + /* Set the most significant bit to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 0 ) + ); + + /* Set the second most significant bit to 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 2, 1 ) + ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &key->grp, &key->d ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Write a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + if( key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen < ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + + +/* + * Check a public-private key pair + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + + if( pub->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || + pub->grp.id != prv->grp.id || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + + /* mbedtls_ecp_mul() needs a non-const group... */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &grp, &prv->grp ); + + /* Also checks d is valid */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve. + * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents + * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */ +static int self_test_adjust_exponent( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *m ) +{ + int ret = 0; + switch( grp->id ) + { + /* If Curve25519 is available, then that's what we use for the + * Montgomery test, so we don't need the adjustment code. */ +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + /* Move highest bit from 254 to N-1. Setting bit N-1 is + * necessary to enforce the highest-bit-set constraint. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, 254, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits, 1 ) ); + /* Copy second-highest bit from 253 to N-2. This is not + * necessary but improves the test variety a bit. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits - 1, + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 253 ) ) ); + break; +#endif +#endif /* ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) */ + default: + /* Non-Montgomery curves and Curve25519 need no adjustment. */ + (void) grp; + (void) m; + goto cleanup; + } +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* Calculate R = m.P for each m in exponents. Check that the number of + * basic operations doesn't depend on the value of m. */ +static int self_test_point( int verbose, + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const char *const *exponents, + size_t n_exponents ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i = 0; + unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) ); + + for( i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++ ) + { + add_c_prev = add_count; + dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; + mul_c_prev = mul_count; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) ); + + if( add_count != add_c_prev || + dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || + mul_count != mul_c_prev ) + { + ret = 1; + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + if( verbose != 0 ) + { + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i ); + else + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; + mbedtls_mpi m; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Exponents especially adapted for secp192k1, which has the lowest + * order n of all supported curves (secp192r1 is in a slightly larger + * field but the order of its base point is slightly smaller). */ + const char *sw_exponents[] = + { + "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8C", /* n - 1 */ + "5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */ + "400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */ + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */ + "555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */ + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + const char *m_exponents[] = + { + /* Valid private values for Curve25519. In a build with Curve448 + * but not Curve25519, they will be adjusted in + * self_test_adjust_exponent(). */ + "4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "5C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C30", + "5715ECCE24583F7A7023C24164390586842E816D7280A49EF6DF4EAE6B280BF8", + "41A2B017516F6D254E1F002BCCBADD54BE30F8CEC737A0E912B4963B6BA74460", + "5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555550", + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8", + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &m ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ) ); +#else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id ) ); +#endif + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " ); + /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " ); + /* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */ + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &P, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count): " ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ) ); +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED is defined, but no curve is supported for self-test" +#endif + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + m_exponents, + sizeof( m_exponents ) / sizeof( m_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +cleanup: + + if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &m ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2199be64 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -0,0 +1,1480 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" + +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECP_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)} + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) + +/* + * Note: the constants are in little-endian order + * to be directly usable in MPIs + */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp192r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp224r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp256r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp384r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp521r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x51, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xC6, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x18, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x03, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x05, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x07, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +/* + * Create an MPI from embedded constants + * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof mbedtls_mpi_uint) + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_load( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len ) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = len / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; +} + +/* + * Set an MPI to static value 1 + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_set1( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint one[] = { 1 }; + X->s = 1; + X->n = 1; + X->p = one; +} + +/* + * Make group available from embedded constants + */ +static int ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen) +{ + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->P, p, plen ); + if( a != NULL ) + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->A, a, alen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->B, b, blen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->N, n, nlen ); + + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.X, gx, gxlen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.Y, gy, gylen ); + ecp_mpi_set1( &grp->G.Z ); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); + + grp->h = 1; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* Forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif + +#define NIST_MODP( P ) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P; +#else +#define NIST_MODP( P ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +/* Additional forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +#define LOAD_GROUP_A( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ + G ## _a, sizeof( G ## _a ), \ + G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ + G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) ) + +#define LOAD_GROUP( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ + NULL, 0, \ + G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ + G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) ) +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42; +static const unsigned char curve25519_part_of_n[] = { + 0x14, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0xA2, 0xF7, 0x9C, 0xD6, + 0x58, 0x12, 0x63, 0x1A, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xED, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve25519( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->A, curve25519_a24 ) ); + + /* P = 2^255 - 19 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 255 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 19 ) ); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + /* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->N, + curve25519_part_of_n, sizeof( curve25519_part_of_n ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 252, 1 ) ); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 9 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 254; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA; +static const unsigned char curve448_part_of_n[] = { + 0x83, 0x35, 0xDC, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0x24, + 0xB6, 0x51, 0x29, 0xC9, 0x6F, 0xDE, 0x93, + 0x3D, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x70, 0xAA, 0xDC, + 0x87, 0x3D, 0x6D, 0x54, 0xA7, 0xBB, 0x0D, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve448( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi Ns; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Ns ); + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->A, curve448_a24 ) ); + + /* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 5 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); + + /* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 446, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Ns, + curve448_part_of_n, sizeof( curve448_part_of_n ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &grp->N, &grp->N, &Ns ) ); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 447; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Ns ); + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Set a group using well-known domain parameters + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( grp ); + + grp->id = id; + + switch( id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + NIST_MODP( p192 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp192r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + NIST_MODP( p224 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp224r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + NIST_MODP( p256 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp256r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + NIST_MODP( p384 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp384r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + NIST_MODP( p521 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp521r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1; + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp192k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1; + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp224k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1; + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp256k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP256r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP384r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP512r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255; + return( ecp_use_curve25519( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448; + return( ecp_use_curve448( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + + default: + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* + * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves. + * + * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct + * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our + * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and + * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and + * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2, + * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left, + * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk. + * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros, + * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach. + * + * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits. + * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can + * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it. + */ + +/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */ +static inline void add64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) +{ + unsigned char i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++, src++ ) + { + *dst += c; c = ( *dst < c ); + *dst += *src; c += ( *dst < *src ); + } + *carry += c; +} + +/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */ +static inline void carry64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) +{ + unsigned char i; + for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++ ) + { + *dst += *carry; + *carry = ( *dst < *carry ); + } +} + +#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) +#define A( i ) N->p + (i) * WIDTH +#define ADD( i ) add64( p, A( i ), &c ) +#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64( p, &c ) +#define LAST p += WIDTH; *p = c; while( ++p < end ) *p = 0 + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; + + /* Make sure we have enough blocks so that A(5) is legal */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, 6 * WIDTH ) ); + + p = N->p; + end = p + N->n; + + ADD( 3 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5 + ADD( 3 ); ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5 + ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); LAST; // A2 += A4 + A5 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#undef WIDTH +#undef A +#undef ADD +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same + * general structure is used here, but with additional complications: + * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions. + */ + +/* + * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits. + * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI, + * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192. + * + * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks, + * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done. + * + * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks. + */ +#define LOAD32 cur = A( i ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n +#define A( j ) N->p[j] +#define STORE32 N->p[i] = cur; + +#else /* 64-bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n * 2 +#define A( j ) (j) % 2 ? (uint32_t)( N->p[(j)/2] >> 32 ) : \ + (uint32_t)( N->p[(j)/2] ) +#define STORE32 \ + if( i % 2 ) { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + N->p[i/2] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur) << 32; \ + } else { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + N->p[i/2] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; \ + } + +#endif /* sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) */ + +/* + * Helpers for addition and subtraction of chunks, with signed carry. + */ +static inline void add32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) +{ + *dst += src; + *carry += ( *dst < src ); +} + +static inline void sub32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) +{ + *carry -= ( *dst < src ); + *dst -= src; +} + +#define ADD( j ) add32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); +#define SUB( j ) sub32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ + +/* + * Helpers for the main 'loop' + */ +#define INIT( b ) \ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; \ + signed char c = 0, cc; \ + uint32_t cur; \ + size_t i = 0, bits = (b); \ + /* N is the size of the product of two b-bit numbers, plus one */ \ + /* limb for fix_negative */ \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, ( b ) * 2 / biL + 1 ) ); \ + LOAD32; + +#define NEXT \ + STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \ + cc = c; c = 0; \ + if( cc < 0 ) \ + sub32( &cur, -cc, &c ); \ + else \ + add32( &cur, cc, &c ); \ + +#define LAST \ + STORE32; i++; \ + cur = c > 0 ? c : 0; STORE32; \ + cur = 0; while( ++i < MAX32 ) { STORE32; } \ + if( c < 0 ) mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( N, c, bits ); + +/* + * If the result is negative, we get it in the form + * c * 2^bits + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits' + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Set N := 2^bits - 1 - N. We know that 0 <= N < 2^bits, so + * set the absolute value to 0xfff...fff - N. There is no carry + * since we're subtracting from all-bits-one. */ + for( i = 0; i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++ ) + { + N->p[i] = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint)0 - N->p[i]; + } + /* Add 1, taking care of the carry. */ + i = 0; + do + ++N->p[i]; + while( N->p[i++] == 0 && i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + /* Invert the sign. + * Now N = N0 - 2^bits where N0 is the initial value of N. */ + N->s = -1; + + /* Add |c| * 2^bits to the absolute value. Since c and N are + * negative, this adds c * 2^bits. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint msw = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + if( bits == 224 ) + msw <<= 32; +#endif + N->p[bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint)] += msw; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 224 ); + + SUB( 7 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11 + SUB( 8 ); SUB( 12 ); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12 + SUB( 9 ); SUB( 13 ); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13 + SUB( 10 ); ADD( 7 ); ADD( 11 ); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11 + SUB( 11 ); ADD( 8 ); ADD( 12 ); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12 + SUB( 12 ); ADD( 9 ); ADD( 13 ); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13 + SUB( 13 ); ADD( 10 ); LAST; // A6 += -A13 + A10 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 256 ); + + ADD( 8 ); ADD( 9 ); + SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD( 9 ); ADD( 10 ); + SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD( 10 ); ADD( 11 ); + SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 11 ); ADD( 11 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); + SUB( 15 ); SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); + SUB( 9 ); SUB( 10 ); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); + SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); + SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 8 ); + SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); LAST; // A7 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 384 ); + + ADD( 12 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 20 ); + SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD( 13 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 12 ); SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 14 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 13 ); SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 15 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 21 ); + SUB( 14 ); SUB( 22 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD( 21 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 22 ); + SUB( 15 ); SUB( 23 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD( 22 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 16 ); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD( 23 ); ADD( 23 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 22 ); + SUB( 17 ); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD( 19 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 18 ); NEXT; // A7 + + ADD( 20 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 16 ); + SUB( 19 ); NEXT; // A8 + + ADD( 21 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 17 ); + SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A9 + + ADD( 22 ); ADD( 19 ); ADD( 18 ); + SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A10 + + ADD( 23 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 19 ); + SUB( 22 ); LAST; // A11 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#undef A +#undef LOAD32 +#undef STORE32 +#undef MAX32 +#undef INIT +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Here we have an actual Mersenne prime, so things are more straightforward. + * However, chunks are aligned on a 'weird' boundary (521 bits). + */ + +/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_WIDTH ( 521 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) + +/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_MASK 0x01FF + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + * Write N as A1 + 2^521 A0, return A0 + A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P521_WIDTH + 1]; + /* Worst case for the size of M is when mbedtls_mpi_uint is 16 bits: + * we need to hold bits 513 to 1056, which is 34 limbs, that is + * P521_WIDTH + 1. Otherwise P521_WIDTH is enough. */ + + if( N->n < P521_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P521_WIDTH - 1 ); + if( M.n > P521_WIDTH + 1 ) + M.n = P521_WIDTH + 1; + M.p = Mp; + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P521_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 521 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); + + /* N = A0 */ + N->p[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK; + for( i = P521_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#undef P521_WIDTH +#undef P521_MASK +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P255_WIDTH ( 255 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * Write N as A0 + 2^255 A1, return A0 + 19 * A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH + 2]; + + if( N->n < P255_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P255_WIDTH - 1 ); + if( M.n > P255_WIDTH + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + M.p = Mp; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P255_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 255 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); + M.n++; /* Make room for multiplication by 19 */ + + /* N = A0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( N, 255, 0 ) ); + for( i = P255_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + 19 * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &M, 19 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P448_WIDTH ( 448 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) + +/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ +#define DIV_ROUND_UP( X, Y ) ( ( ( X ) + ( Y ) - 1 ) / ( Y ) ) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN ( 28 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP( 28, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) +#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ( ( P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 ) - 224 ) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write N as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return + * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference + * implementation of Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather + * than a generic bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on + * 32-bit machines by splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the + * arithmetic using the limbs directly as we do for the NIST primes above, + * but for 64-bit targets it should use half the number of operations if we do + * the reduction with 224-bit limbs, since mpi_add_mpi will then use 64-bit adds. + */ +static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, Q; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P448_WIDTH + 1], Qp[P448_WIDTH]; + + if( N->n <= P448_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P448_WIDTH ); + if( M.n > P448_WIDTH ) + /* Shouldn't be called with N larger than 2^896! */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + M.p = Mp; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof( Mp ) ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P448_WIDTH, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + + /* N = A0 */ + for( i = P448_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N += A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); + + /* Q = B1, N += B1 */ + Q = M; + Q.p = Qp; + memcpy( Qp, Mp, sizeof( Qp ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Q, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &Q ) ); + + /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224, N += M */ + if( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) > 4 ) + Mp[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1 ) >> ( P224_UNUSED_BITS ); + for( i = P224_WIDTH_MAX; i < M.n; ++i ) + Mp[i] = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &M, &M, &Q ) ); + M.n = P448_WIDTH + 1; /* Make room for shifted carry bit from the addition */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &M, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R, + * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves. + * + * Write N as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1. + * Actually do two passes, since R is big. + */ +#define P_KOBLITZ_MAX ( 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Max limbs in P +#define P_KOBLITZ_R ( 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Limbs in R +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz( mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, + size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, R; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P_KOBLITZ_MAX + P_KOBLITZ_R + 1]; + + if( N->n < p_limbs ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Init R */ + R.s = 1; + R.p = Rp; + R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R; + + /* Common setup for M */ + M.s = 1; + M.p = Mp; + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); + if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) + M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + if( shift != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if( mask != 0 ) + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + + /* Second pass */ + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); + if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) + M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + if( shift != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if( mask != 0 ) + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x0100001119 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 192 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 4, 1, 32, 0xFFFFFFFF ) ); +#else + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 224 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..71c77027 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/** + * \file ecp_invasive.h + * + * \brief ECP module: interfaces for invasive testing only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when + * building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* Preconditions: + * - bits is a multiple of 64 or is 224 + * - c is -1 or -2 + * - 0 <= N < 2^bits + * - N has room for bits plus one limb + * + * Behavior: + * Set N to c * 2^bits + old_value_of_N. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/** Generate a private key on a Montgomery curve (Curve25519 or Curve448). + * + * This function implements key generation for the set of secret keys + * specified in [Curve25519] p. 5 and in [Curve448]. The resulting value + * has the lower bits masked but is not necessarily canonical. + * + * \note - [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * - [RFC7748] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748 + * + * \p high_bit The position of the high-order bit of the key to generate. + * This is the bit-size of the key minus 1: + * 254 for Curve25519 or 447 for Curve448. + * \param d The randomly generated key. This is a number of size + * exactly \p n_bits + 1 bits, with the least significant bits + * masked as specified in [Curve25519] and in [RFC7748] §5. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_xxx or MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t n_bits, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/entropy.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/entropy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12fd3b9b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/entropy.c @@ -0,0 +1,737 @@ +/* + * Entropy accumulator implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) +#warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " +#warning "**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES " +#warning "**** THIS BUILD IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE " +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#endif + +#define ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP 256 /**< Maximum amount to loop before error */ + +void mbedtls_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->source_count = 0; + memset( ctx->source, 0, sizeof( ctx->source ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + ctx->accumulator_started = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx->accumulator ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx->accumulator ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + mbedtls_havege_init( &ctx->havege_data ); +#endif + + /* Reminder: Update ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG in the test files + * when adding more strong entropy sources here. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_null_entropy_poll, NULL, + 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardclock_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_havege_poll, &ctx->havege_data, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ +} + +void mbedtls_entropy_free( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + /* If the context was already free, don't call free() again. + * This is important for mutexes which don't allow double-free. */ + if( ctx->accumulator_started == -1 ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + mbedtls_havege_free( &ctx->havege_data ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx->accumulator ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx->accumulator ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0; +#endif + ctx->source_count = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->source, sizeof( ctx->source ) ); + ctx->accumulator_started = -1; +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source, void *p_source, + size_t threshold, int strong ) +{ + int idx, ret = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + idx = ctx->source_count; + if( idx >= MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES; + goto exit; + } + + ctx->source[idx].f_source = f_source; + ctx->source[idx].p_source = p_source; + ctx->source[idx].threshold = threshold; + ctx->source[idx].strong = strong; + + ctx->source_count++; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Entropy accumulator update + */ +static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned char header[2]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t use_len = len; + const unsigned char *p = data; + int ret = 0; + + if( use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret( data, len, tmp, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret( data, len, tmp, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif + p = tmp; + use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + header[0] = source_id; + header[1] = use_len & 0xFF; + + /* + * Start the accumulator if this has not already happened. Note that + * it is sufficient to start the accumulator here only because all calls to + * gather entropy eventually execute this code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + if( ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && + ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + else + ctx->accumulator_started = 1; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, header, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len ); +#else + if( ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && + ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + else + ctx->accumulator_started = 1; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, header, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len ); +#endif + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = entropy_update( ctx, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL, data, len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Run through the different sources to add entropy to our accumulator + */ +static int entropy_gather_internal( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + int i; + int have_one_strong = 0; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER]; + size_t olen; + + if( ctx->source_count == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED ); + + /* + * Run through our entropy sources + */ + for( i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++ ) + { + if( ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ) + have_one_strong = 1; + + olen = 0; + if( ( ret = ctx->source[i].f_source( ctx->source[i].p_source, + buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Add if we actually gathered something + */ + if( olen > 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = entropy_update( ctx, (unsigned char) i, + buf, olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ctx->source[i].size += olen; + } + } + + if( have_one_strong == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Thread-safe wrapper for entropy_gather_internal() + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_gather( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = entropy_gather_internal( ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) +{ + int ret, count = 0, i, thresholds_reached; + size_t strong_size; + mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx = (mbedtls_entropy_context *) data; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if( len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + /* Update the NV entropy seed before generating any entropy for outside + * use. + */ + if( ctx->initial_entropy_run == 0 ) + { + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 1; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + /* + * Always gather extra entropy before a call + */ + do + { + if( count++ > ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = entropy_gather_internal( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + thresholds_reached = 1; + strong_size = 0; + for( i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++ ) + { + if( ctx->source[i].size < ctx->source[i].threshold ) + thresholds_reached = 0; + if( ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ) + strong_size += ctx->source[i].size; + } + } + while( ! thresholds_reached || strong_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + /* + * Note that at this stage it is assumed that the accumulator was started + * in a previous call to entropy_update(). If this is not guaranteed, the + * code below will fail. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy + */ + mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx->accumulator ); + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx->accumulator ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Perform second SHA-512 on entropy + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + buf, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; +#else /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy + */ + mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx->accumulator ); + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx->accumulator ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Perform second SHA-256 on entropy + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + buf, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ + + for( i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++ ) + ctx->source[i].size = 0; + + memcpy( output, buf, len ); + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + /* Read new seed and write it to NV */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( mbedtls_nv_seed_write( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + /* Manually update the remaining stream with a separator value to diverge */ + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f = NULL; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, f ) != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( f != NULL ) + fclose( f ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ]; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); + n = (size_t) ftell( f ); + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); + + if( n > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ) + n = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE; + + if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + else + ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, n ); + + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) +/* + * Dummy source function + */ +static int entropy_dummy_source( void *data, unsigned char *output, + size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + ((void) data); + + memset( output, 0x2a, len ); + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + +static int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t entropy_len = 0; + size_t olen = 0; + size_t attempts = buf_len; + + while( attempts > 0 && entropy_len < buf_len ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hardware_poll( NULL, buf + entropy_len, + buf_len - entropy_len, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + entropy_len += olen; + attempts--; + } + + if( entropy_len < buf_len ) + { + ret = 1; + } + + return( ret ); +} + + +static int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits( const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len ) +{ + unsigned char set= 0xFF; + unsigned char unset = 0x00; + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < buf_len; i++ ) + { + set &= buf[i]; + unset |= buf[i]; + } + + return( set == 0xFF || unset == 0x00 ); +} + +/* + * A test to ensure hat the entropy sources are functioning correctly + * and there is no obvious failure. The test performs the following checks: + * - The entropy source is not providing only 0s (all bits unset) or 1s (all + * bits set). + * - The entropy source is not providing values in a pattern. Because the + * hardware could be providing data in an arbitrary length, this check polls + * the hardware entropy source twice and compares the result to ensure they + * are not equal. + * - The error code returned by the entropy source is not an error. + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char buf0[2 * sizeof( unsigned long long int )]; + unsigned char buf1[2 * sizeof( unsigned long long int )]; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ENTROPY_BIAS test: " ); + + memset( buf0, 0x00, sizeof( buf0 ) ); + memset( buf1, 0x00, sizeof( buf1 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather( buf0, sizeof( buf0 ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather( buf1, sizeof( buf1 ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Make sure that the returned values are not all 0 or 1 */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits( buf0, sizeof( buf0 ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits( buf1, sizeof( buf1 ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Make sure that the entropy source is not returning values in a + * pattern */ + ret = memcmp( buf0, buf1, sizeof( buf0 ) ) == 0; + +cleanup: + if( verbose != 0 ) + { + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + else + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + } + + return( ret != 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ + +/* + * The actual entropy quality is hard to test, but we can at least + * test that the functions don't cause errors and write the correct + * amount of data to buffers. + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 1; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; + unsigned char acc[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; + size_t i, j; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ENTROPY test: " ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + + /* First do a gather to make sure we have default sources */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_gather( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, entropy_dummy_source, NULL, 16, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( &ctx, buf, sizeof buf ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * To test that mbedtls_entropy_func writes correct number of bytes: + * - use the whole buffer and rely on ASan to detect overruns + * - collect entropy 8 times and OR the result in an accumulator: + * any byte should then be 0 with probably 2^(-64), so requiring + * each of the 32 or 64 bytes to be non-zero has a false failure rate + * of at most 2^(-58) which is acceptable. + */ + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( &ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( buf ); j++ ) + acc[j] |= buf[j]; + } + + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( buf ); j++ ) + { + if( acc[j] == 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test( 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif + +cleanup: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + { + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + else + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + } + + return( ret != 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c1e0937 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +/* + * Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) +/* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) +#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400 +#endif +#include +#include + +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + HCRYPTPROV provider; + ((void) data); + *olen = 0; + + if( CryptAcquireContext( &provider, NULL, NULL, + PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT ) == FALSE ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + if( CryptGenRandom( provider, (DWORD) len, output ) == FALSE ) + { + CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 ); + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Test for Linux getrandom() support. + * Since there is no wrapper in the libc yet, use the generic syscall wrapper + * available in GNU libc and compatible libc's (eg uClibc). + */ +#if ((defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__)) || defined(__midipix__)) +#include +#include +#if defined(SYS_getrandom) +#define HAVE_GETRANDOM +#include + +static int getrandom_wrapper( void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags ) +{ + /* MemSan cannot understand that the syscall writes to the buffer */ +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) + memset( buf, 0, buflen ); +#endif +#endif + return( syscall( SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags ) ); +} +#endif /* SYS_getrandom */ +#endif /* __linux__ || __midipix__ */ + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) +#include +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || \ + (defined(__DragonFly__) && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) +#include +#include +#define HAVE_GETRANDOM +static int getrandom_wrapper( void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags ) +{ + return getrandom( buf, buflen, flags ); +} +#endif /* (__FreeBSD__ && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || + (__DragonFly__ && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __DragonFly__ */ + +/* + * Some BSD systems provide KERN_ARND. + * This is equivalent to reading from /dev/urandom, only it doesn't require an + * open file descriptor, and provides up to 256 bytes per call (basically the + * same as getentropy(), but with a longer history). + * + * Documentation: https://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?sysctl+7 + */ +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) +#include +#include +#if defined(KERN_ARND) +#define HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND + +static int sysctl_arnd_wrapper( unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int name[2]; + size_t len; + + name[0] = CTL_KERN; + name[1] = KERN_ARND; + + while( buflen > 0 ) + { + len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen; + if( sysctl(name, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1 ) + return( -1 ); + buflen -= len; + buf += len; + } + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* KERN_ARND */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __NetBSD__ */ + +#include + +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t read_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) data); + +#if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) + ret = getrandom_wrapper( output, len, 0 ); + if( ret >= 0 ) + { + *olen = ret; + return( 0 ); + } + else if( errno != ENOSYS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + /* Fall through if the system call isn't known. */ +#else + ((void) ret); +#endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND) + ((void) file); + ((void) read_len); + if( sysctl_arnd_wrapper( output, len ) == -1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + *olen = len; + return( 0 ); +#else + + *olen = 0; + + file = fopen( "/dev/urandom", "rb" ); + if( file == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + read_len = fread( output, 1, len, file ); + if( read_len != len ) + { + fclose( file ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + fclose( file ); + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +#endif /* HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND */ +} +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) +int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + ((void) data); + ((void) output); + + *olen = 0; + if( len < sizeof(unsigned char) ) + return( 0 ); + + output[0] = 0; + *olen = sizeof(unsigned char); + return( 0 ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned long timer = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); + ((void) data); + *olen = 0; + + if( len < sizeof(unsigned long) ) + return( 0 ); + + memcpy( output, &timer, sizeof(unsigned long) ); + *olen = sizeof(unsigned long); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +int mbedtls_havege_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) data; + *olen = 0; + + if( mbedtls_havege_random( hs, output, len ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE; + ((void) data); + + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + if( mbedtls_nv_seed_read( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + if( len < use_len ) + use_len = len; + + memcpy( output, buf, use_len ); + *olen = use_len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/error.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/error.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..afad3890 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/error.c @@ -0,0 +1,980 @@ +/* + * Error message information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#endif + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) +#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" +#endif + + +const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code ) +{ + int high_level_error_code; + + if( error_code < 0 ) + error_code = -error_code; + + /* Extract the high-level part from the error code. */ + high_level_error_code = error_code & 0xFF80; + + switch( high_level_error_code ) + { + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CIPHER - Bad input parameters" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING): + return( "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED): + return( "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT): + return( "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Cipher hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "DHM - Bad input parameters" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Making of the public value failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "DHM - Read or write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "DHM - DHM hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "ECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "ECP - The signature is not valid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "ECP - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED): + return( "ECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY): + return( "ECP - Invalid private or public key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): + return( "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "ECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "MD - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "MD - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "MD - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD - MD hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT): + return( "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA): + return( "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV): + return( "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG): + return( "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED): + return( "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PK - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PK - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "PK - Read/write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "PK - Unsupported key version" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PK - Invalid key tag or value" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG): + return( "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED): + return( "PK - Private key password can't be empty" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY): + return( "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG): + return( "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE): + return( "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "PK - PK hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING): + return( "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED): + return( "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED): + return( "RSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the library" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The public key operation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The private key operation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE): + return( "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION): + return( "RSA - The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "RSA - RSA hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "SSL - The requested feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC): + return( "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD): + return( "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF): + return( "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER): + return( "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN): + return( "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG): + return( "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE): + return( "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE): + return( "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY): + return( "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST): + return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY): + return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED): + return( "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH): + return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION): + return( "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET): + return( "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED): + return( "SSL - Session ticket has expired" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): + return( "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY): + return( "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR): + return( "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING): + return( "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO): + return( "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE): + return( "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ): + return( "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE): + return( "SSL - Connection requires a write call" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT): + return( "SSL - The operation timed out" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT): + return( "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD): + return( "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL): + return( "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH): + return( "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING): + return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID): + return( "SSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH): + return( "SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG): + return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID): + return( "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL): + return( "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG): + return( "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME): + return( "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE): + return( "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE): + return( "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS): + return( "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION): + return( "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG): + return( "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH): + return( "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT): + return( "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "X509 - Input invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "X509 - Read/write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR): + return( "X509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ + + default: + break; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code ) +{ + int low_level_error_code; + + if( error_code < 0 ) + error_code = -error_code; + + /* Extract the low-level part from the error code. */ + low_level_error_code = error_code & ~0xFF80; + + switch( low_level_error_code ) + { + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH): + return( "AES - Invalid key length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "AES - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "AES - Invalid input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "AES - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "AES - AES hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "ARC4 - ARC4 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "ARIA - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "ARIA - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "ARIA - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "ARIA - ARIA hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA): + return( "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG): + return( "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH): + return( "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH): + return( "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA): + return( "ASN1 - Data is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL): + return( "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER): + return( "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER): + return( "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE): + return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO): + return( "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE): + return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "BLOWFISH - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "BLOWFISH - Blowfish hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CAMELLIA - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CAMELLIA - Camellia hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT): + return( "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CCM - CCM hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "CHACHA20 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CHACHA20 - Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE): + return( "CHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current state" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CMAC - CMAC hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too big" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too large" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "CTR_DRBG - Read or write error in file" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "DES - The data input has an invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "DES - DES hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES): + return( "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED): + return( "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE): + return( "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR): + return( "ERROR - Generic error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED): + return( "ERROR - This is a bug in the library" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "GCM - GCM hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT): + return( "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "HKDF - Bad input parameters to function" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD2 - MD2 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD4 - MD4 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD5 - MD5 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED): + return( "NET - Failed to open a socket" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED): + return( "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED): + return( "NET - Binding of the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED): + return( "NET - Could not listen on the socket" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED): + return( "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED): + return( "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED): + return( "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET): + return( "NET - Connection was reset by peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST): + return( "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT): + return( "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED): + return( "NET - Polling the net context failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "NET - Input invalid" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND): + return( "OID - OID is not found" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL): + return( "OID - output buffer is too small" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED): + return( "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED): + return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "POLY1305 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "POLY1305 - Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "RIPEMD160 - RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "THREADING - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR): + return( "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "XTEA - XTEA hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ + + default: + break; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t len; + int use_ret; + const char * high_level_error_description = NULL; + const char * low_level_error_description = NULL; + + if( buflen == 0 ) + return; + + memset( buf, 0x00, buflen ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + ret = -ret; + + if( ret & 0xFF80 ) + { + use_ret = ret & 0xFF80; + + // Translate high level error code. + high_level_error_description = mbedtls_high_level_strerr( ret ); + + if( high_level_error_description == NULL ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret ); + else + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", high_level_error_description ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + // Early return in case of a fatal error - do not try to translate low + // level code. + if(use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE)) + return; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + } + + use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80; + + if( use_ret == 0 ) + return; + + // If high level code is present, make a concatenation between both + // error strings. + // + len = strlen( buf ); + + if( len > 0 ) + { + if( buflen - len < 5 ) + return; + + mbedtls_snprintf( buf + len, buflen - len, " : " ); + + buf += len + 3; + buflen -= len + 3; + } + + // Translate low level error code. + low_level_error_description = mbedtls_low_level_strerr( ret ); + + if( low_level_error_description == NULL ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret ); + else + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", low_level_error_description ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +/* + * Provide an non-function in case MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is not defined + */ +void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + ((void) ret); + + if( buflen > 0 ) + buf[0] = '\0'; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)( int, int, const char *, int ); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C || MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/gcm.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/gcm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..43a5e1be --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/gcm.c @@ -0,0 +1,1003 @@ +/* + * NIST SP800-38D compliant GCM implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf + * + * See also: + * [MGV] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf + * + * We use the algorithm described as Shoup's method with 4-bit tables in + * [MGV] 4.1, pp. 12-13, to enhance speed without using too much memory. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define GCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ) +#define GCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * Initialize a context + */ +void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) +{ + GCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Precompute small multiples of H, that is set + * HH[i] || HL[i] = H times i, + * where i is seen as a field element as in [MGV], ie high-order bits + * correspond to low powers of P. The result is stored in the same way, that + * is the high-order bit of HH corresponds to P^0 and the low-order bit of HL + * corresponds to P^127. + */ +static int gcm_gen_table( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret, i, j; + uint64_t hi, lo; + uint64_t vl, vh; + unsigned char h[16]; + size_t olen = 0; + + memset( h, 0, 16 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* pack h as two 64-bits ints, big-endian */ + hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 0 ); + lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 4 ); + vh = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; + + hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 8 ); + lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 12 ); + vl = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; + + /* 8 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->HL[8] = vl; + ctx->HH[8] = vh; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + /* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */ + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL ) ) + return( 0 ); +#endif + + /* 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->HH[0] = 0; + ctx->HL[0] = 0; + + for( i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1 ) + { + uint32_t T = ( vl & 1 ) * 0xe1000000U; + vl = ( vh << 63 ) | ( vl >> 1 ); + vh = ( vh >> 1 ) ^ ( (uint64_t) T << 32); + + ctx->HL[i] = vl; + ctx->HH[i] = vh; + } + + for( i = 2; i <= 8; i *= 2 ) + { + uint64_t *HiL = ctx->HL + i, *HiH = ctx->HH + i; + vh = *HiH; + vl = *HiL; + for( j = 1; j < i; j++ ) + { + HiH[j] = vh ^ ctx->HH[j]; + HiL[j] = vl ^ ctx->HL[j]; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( keybits == 128 || keybits == 192 || keybits == 256 ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + if( cipher_info->block_size != 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = gcm_gen_table( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Shoup's method for multiplication use this table with + * last4[x] = x times P^128 + * where x and last4[x] are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV] + */ +static const uint64_t last4[16] = +{ + 0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, + 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0, + 0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560, + 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0 +}; + +/* + * Sets output to x times H using the precomputed tables. + * x and output are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV]. + */ +static void gcm_mult( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int i = 0; + unsigned char lo, hi, rem; + uint64_t zh, zl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL ) ) { + unsigned char h[16]; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HH[8] >> 32, h, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HH[8], h, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HL[8] >> 32, h, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HL[8], h, 12 ); + + mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( output, x, h ); + return; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */ + + lo = x[15] & 0xf; + + zh = ctx->HH[lo]; + zl = ctx->HL[lo]; + + for( i = 15; i >= 0; i-- ) + { + lo = x[i] & 0xf; + hi = ( x[i] >> 4 ) & 0xf; + + if( i != 15 ) + { + rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; + zl = ( zh << 60 ) | ( zl >> 4 ); + zh = ( zh >> 4 ); + zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + zh ^= ctx->HH[lo]; + zl ^= ctx->HL[lo]; + + } + + rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; + zl = ( zh << 60 ) | ( zl >> 4 ); + zh = ( zh >> 4 ); + zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + zh ^= ctx->HH[hi]; + zl ^= ctx->HL[hi]; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zh >> 32, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zh, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zl >> 32, output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zl, output, 12 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char work_buf[16]; + size_t i; + const unsigned char *p; + size_t use_len, olen = 0; + uint64_t iv_bits; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + + /* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ + /* IV is not allowed to be zero length */ + if( iv_len == 0 || + ( (uint64_t) iv_len ) >> 61 != 0 || + ( (uint64_t) add_len ) >> 61 != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + } + + memset( ctx->y, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->y) ); + memset( ctx->buf, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->buf) ); + + ctx->mode = mode; + ctx->len = 0; + ctx->add_len = 0; + + if( iv_len == 12 ) + { + memcpy( ctx->y, iv, iv_len ); + ctx->y[15] = 1; + } + else + { + memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 ); + iv_bits = (uint64_t)iv_len * 8; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( iv_bits, work_buf, 8 ); + + p = iv; + while( iv_len > 0 ) + { + use_len = ( iv_len < 16 ) ? iv_len : 16; + + for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) + ctx->y[i] ^= p[i]; + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y ); + + iv_len -= use_len; + p += use_len; + } + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + ctx->y[i] ^= work_buf[i]; + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, + ctx->base_ectr, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + ctx->add_len = add_len; + p = add; + while( add_len > 0 ) + { + use_len = ( add_len < 16 ) ? add_len : 16; + + for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + + add_len -= use_len; + p += use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char ectr[16]; + size_t i; + const unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *out_p = output; + size_t use_len, olen = 0; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( output > input && (size_t) ( output - input ) < length ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes + * Also check for possible overflow */ + if( ctx->len + length < ctx->len || + (uint64_t) ctx->len + length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + } + + ctx->len += length; + + p = input; + while( length > 0 ) + { + use_len = ( length < 16 ) ? length : 16; + + for( i = 16; i > 12; i-- ) + if( ++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, + &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) + { + if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; + out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i]; + if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= out_p[i]; + } + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + + length -= use_len; + p += use_len; + out_p += use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, + size_t tag_len ) +{ + unsigned char work_buf[16]; + size_t i; + uint64_t orig_len; + uint64_t orig_add_len; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + + orig_len = ctx->len * 8; + orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8; + + if( tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + memcpy( tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len ); + + if( orig_len || orig_add_len ) + { + memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len >> 32 ), work_buf, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len ), work_buf, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len >> 32 ), work_buf, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len ), work_buf, 12 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= work_buf[i]; + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + + for( i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ ) + tag[i] ^= ctx->buf[i]; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t tag_len, + unsigned char *tag ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( ctx, length, input, output ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( ctx, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *tag, + size_t tag_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + size_t i; + int diff; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, tag_len, check_tag ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ ) + diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i]; + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * AES-GCM test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/gcmtestvectors.zip + */ +#define MAX_TESTS 6 + +static const int key_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, + 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08, + 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, + 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08 }, +}; + +static const size_t iv_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 12, 12, 12, 12, 8, 60 }; + +static const int iv_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2 }; + +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad, + 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88 }, + { 0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, + 0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa, + 0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1, + 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28, + 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39, + 0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54, + 0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57, + 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b }, +}; + +static const size_t add_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 0, 20, 20, 20 }; + +static const int add_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char additional_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +{ + { 0x00 }, + { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, + 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 }, +}; + +static const size_t pt_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 16, 64, 60, 60, 60 }; + +static const int pt_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char pt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, + 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, + 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, + 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, + 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, + 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, + 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, + 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = +{ + { 0x00 }, + { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92, + 0xf3, 0x28, 0xc2, 0xb9, 0x71, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x78 }, + { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, + 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, + 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, + 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, + 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, + 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, + 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, + 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91, 0x47, 0x3f, 0x59, 0x85 }, + { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, + 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, + 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, + 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, + 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, + 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, + 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, + 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91 }, + { 0x61, 0x35, 0x3b, 0x4c, 0x28, 0x06, 0x93, 0x4a, + 0x77, 0x7f, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x55, + 0x69, 0x9b, 0x2a, 0x71, 0x4f, 0xcd, 0xc6, 0xf8, + 0x37, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xf9, 0x7b, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x23, + 0x73, 0x80, 0x69, 0x00, 0xe4, 0x9f, 0x24, 0xb2, + 0x2b, 0x09, 0x75, 0x44, 0xd4, 0x89, 0x6b, 0x42, + 0x49, 0x89, 0xb5, 0xe1, 0xeb, 0xac, 0x0f, 0x07, + 0xc2, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x98 }, + { 0x8c, 0xe2, 0x49, 0x98, 0x62, 0x56, 0x15, 0xb6, + 0x03, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0x94, + 0xbe, 0x91, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xa2, 0x11, 0xa8, + 0xba, 0x26, 0x2a, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xa7, + 0x01, 0xe4, 0xa9, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x90, + 0xcc, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x81, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0x7c, 0x6f, + 0xd6, 0x28, 0x75, 0xd2, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x17, 0x03, + 0x4c, 0x34, 0xae, 0xe5 }, + { 0x00 }, + { 0x98, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x07, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x41, + 0x1c, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x43, 0x84, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x00 }, + { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, + 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, + 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, + 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, + 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, + 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, + 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, + 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10, 0xac, 0xad, 0xe2, 0x56 }, + { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, + 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, + 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, + 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, + 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, + 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, + 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, + 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10 }, + { 0x0f, 0x10, 0xf5, 0x99, 0xae, 0x14, 0xa1, 0x54, + 0xed, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x25, 0x32, 0x4d, 0xb8, + 0xc5, 0x66, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf2, 0xbb, 0xb3, 0x4f, + 0x83, 0x47, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0x50, 0x70, 0x57, + 0xfd, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xdf, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1f, 0x75, + 0xc6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xd4, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xd1, 0xc9, + 0xe9, 0x3a, 0x19, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0x8b, 0x47, 0x3f, + 0xa0, 0xf0, 0x62, 0xf7 }, + { 0xd2, 0x7e, 0x88, 0x68, 0x1c, 0xe3, 0x24, 0x3c, + 0x48, 0x30, 0x16, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xf9, 0xff, + 0x1d, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xb4, 0x47, 0xef, + 0x6e, 0xf7, 0xb7, 0x98, 0x28, 0x66, 0x6e, 0x45, + 0x81, 0xe7, 0x90, 0x12, 0xaf, 0x34, 0xdd, 0xd9, + 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x37, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x29, 0x2d, 0xb3, + 0xe6, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x67, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x22, 0xe7, + 0xe9, 0xb7, 0x37, 0x3b }, + { 0x00 }, + { 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e, + 0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18 }, + { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, + 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, + 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, + 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, + 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, + 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, + 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, + 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62, 0x89, 0x80, 0x15, 0xad }, + { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, + 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, + 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, + 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, + 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, + 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, + 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, + 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62 }, + { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0xca, 0x78, 0x7d, 0x32, + 0xae, 0x47, 0xc1, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0x98, 0x44, 0xcb, + 0xaf, 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x4d, 0x0b, 0x97, 0x6a, 0xfa, + 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xf7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xba, 0x9d, 0xe0, + 0xfe, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xd3, 0x39, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xf0, + 0x95, 0x4c, 0xc2, 0x36, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x78, + 0x62, 0xac, 0x43, 0x0e, 0x64, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x99, + 0xf4, 0x7c, 0x9b, 0x1f }, + { 0x5a, 0x8d, 0xef, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x9e, 0x53, 0xf1, + 0xf7, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x53, 0x65, 0x9e, 0x2a, 0x20, + 0xee, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0xaf, 0xde, 0x64, 0x19, + 0xa0, 0x58, 0xab, 0x4f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6b, 0xf4, + 0x0f, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x45, + 0x2d, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0xde, + 0xa2, 0x41, 0x89, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0x2e, + 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f }, +}; + +static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = +{ + { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61, + 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a }, + { 0xab, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xd4, 0x2c, 0xec, 0x13, 0xbd, + 0xf5, 0x3a, 0x67, 0xb2, 0x12, 0x57, 0xbd, 0xdf }, + { 0x4d, 0x5c, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x64, 0xa6, + 0x2c, 0xf3, 0x5a, 0xbd, 0x2b, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0xb4 }, + { 0x5b, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xbc, 0x32, 0x21, 0xa5, 0xdb, + 0x94, 0xfa, 0xe9, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x1a, 0x47 }, + { 0x36, 0x12, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x3b, 0x07, 0x85, + 0x56, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0x4a, 0xac, 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xcb }, + { 0x61, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0xae, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0xfa, + 0x46, 0x2a, 0xf4, 0x3c, 0x16, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x50 }, + { 0xcd, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x73, 0xf7, 0x4b, + 0xa0, 0x0e, 0xd1, 0xf3, 0x12, 0x57, 0x24, 0x35 }, + { 0x2f, 0xf5, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x03, 0x39, 0x27, 0xab, + 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x75, 0x14, 0xf0, 0xfb }, + { 0x99, 0x24, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x73, 0x36, 0xbf, + 0xb1, 0x18, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x4a, 0x14 }, + { 0x25, 0x19, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x80, 0xf1, 0x47, 0x8f, + 0x37, 0xba, 0x55, 0xbd, 0x6d, 0x27, 0x61, 0x8c }, + { 0x65, 0xdc, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xcf, 0x62, 0x3a, 0x24, + 0x09, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0x0d, 0x35, 0x33, 0xf8 }, + { 0xdc, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xff, 0x29, 0x1c, 0x25, 0xbb, + 0xb8, 0x56, 0x8f, 0xc3, 0xd3, 0x76, 0xa6, 0xd9 }, + { 0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9, + 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b }, + { 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0xa7, 0x99, 0x99, 0x6b, 0xf0, + 0x26, 0x5b, 0x98, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x19 }, + { 0xb0, 0x94, 0xda, 0xc5, 0xd9, 0x34, 0x71, 0xbd, + 0xec, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x22, 0x70, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x6c }, + { 0x76, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0xce, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x17, 0x68, + 0xcd, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x53, 0xbb, 0x2d, 0x55, 0x1b }, + { 0x3a, 0x33, 0x7d, 0xbf, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x92, 0xc4, + 0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13, 0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2 }, + { 0xa4, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x66, 0xee, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0xb0, + 0xc8, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0x9a }, +}; + +int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[64]; + unsigned char tag_buf[16]; + int i, j, ret; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + + for( j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) + { + int key_len = 128 + 64 * j; + + for( i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", + key_len, i, "enc" ); + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len ); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && key_len == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + break; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf, 16, tag_buf ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + /* Allow alternative implementations to only support 12-byte nonces. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && + iv_len_test_data[i] != 12 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + break; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) */ + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if ( memcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", + key_len, i, "dec" ); + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf, 16, tag_buf ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", + key_len, i, "enc" ); + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) + { + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32, + buf + 32 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", + key_len, i, "dec" ); + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) + { + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32, + buf + 32 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + ret = 0; + +exit: + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/havege.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/havege.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a360a15 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/havege.c @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +/** + * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The HAVEGE RNG was designed by Andre Seznec in 2002. + * + * http://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/publi.php + * + * Contact: seznec(at)irisa_dot_fr - orocheco(at)irisa_dot_fr + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ + * On average, one iteration accesses two 8-word blocks in the havege WALK + * table, and generates 16 words in the RES array. + * + * The data read in the WALK table is updated and permuted after each use. + * The result of the hardware clock counter read is used for this update. + * + * 25 conditional tests are present. The conditional tests are grouped in + * two nested groups of 12 conditional tests and 1 test that controls the + * permutation; on average, there should be 6 tests executed and 3 of them + * should be mispredicted. + * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ + */ + +#define SWAP(X,Y) { uint32_t *T = (X); (X) = (Y); (Y) = T; } + +#define TST1_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; +#define TST2_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; + +#define TST1_LEAVE U1++; } +#define TST2_LEAVE U2++; } + +#define ONE_ITERATION \ + \ + PTEST = PT1 >> 20; \ + \ + TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ + TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ + TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ + \ + TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ + TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ + TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ + \ + PTX = (PT1 >> 18) & 7; \ + PT1 &= 0x1FFF; \ + PT2 &= 0x1FFF; \ + CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ + \ + i = 0; \ + A = &WALK[PT1 ]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ + B = &WALK[PT2 ]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ + C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 1]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ + D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 4]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ + \ + IN = (*A >> (1)) ^ (*A << (31)) ^ CLK; \ + *A = (*B >> (2)) ^ (*B << (30)) ^ CLK; \ + *B = IN ^ U1; \ + *C = (*C >> (3)) ^ (*C << (29)) ^ CLK; \ + *D = (*D >> (4)) ^ (*D << (28)) ^ CLK; \ + \ + A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ + B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ + C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ + D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ + \ + if( PTEST & 1 ) SWAP( A, C ); \ + \ + IN = (*A >> (5)) ^ (*A << (27)) ^ CLK; \ + *A = (*B >> (6)) ^ (*B << (26)) ^ CLK; \ + *B = IN; CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ + *C = (*C >> (7)) ^ (*C << (25)) ^ CLK; \ + *D = (*D >> (8)) ^ (*D << (24)) ^ CLK; \ + \ + A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 4]; \ + B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 1]; \ + \ + PTEST = PT2 >> 1; \ + \ + PT2 = (RES[(i - 8) ^ PTY] ^ WALK[PT2 ^ PTY ^ 7]); \ + PT2 = ((PT2 & 0x1FFF) & (~8)) ^ ((PT1 ^ 8) & 0x8); \ + PTY = (PT2 >> 10) & 7; \ + \ + TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ + TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ + TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ + \ + TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ + TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ + TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ + \ + C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 5]; \ + D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 5]; \ + \ + RES[i++] ^= *A; \ + RES[i++] ^= *B; \ + RES[i++] ^= *C; \ + RES[i++] ^= *D; \ + \ + IN = (*A >> ( 9)) ^ (*A << (23)) ^ CLK; \ + *A = (*B >> (10)) ^ (*B << (22)) ^ CLK; \ + *B = IN ^ U2; \ + *C = (*C >> (11)) ^ (*C << (21)) ^ CLK; \ + *D = (*D >> (12)) ^ (*D << (20)) ^ CLK; \ + \ + A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ + B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ + C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ + D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ + \ + IN = (*A >> (13)) ^ (*A << (19)) ^ CLK; \ + *A = (*B >> (14)) ^ (*B << (18)) ^ CLK; \ + *B = IN; \ + *C = (*C >> (15)) ^ (*C << (17)) ^ CLK; \ + *D = (*D >> (16)) ^ (*D << (16)) ^ CLK; \ + \ + PT1 = ( RES[( i - 8 ) ^ PTX] ^ \ + WALK[PT1 ^ PTX ^ 7] ) & (~1); \ + PT1 ^= (PT2 ^ 0x10) & 0x10; \ + \ + for( n++, i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) \ + hs->pool[n % MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE] ^= RES[i]; + +/* + * Entropy gathering function + */ +static void havege_fill( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) +{ + size_t n = 0; + size_t i; + uint32_t U1, U2, *A, *B, *C, *D; + uint32_t PT1, PT2, *WALK, RES[16]; + uint32_t PTX, PTY, CLK, PTEST, IN; + + WALK = hs->WALK; + PT1 = hs->PT1; + PT2 = hs->PT2; + + PTX = U1 = 0; + PTY = U2 = 0; + + (void)PTX; + + memset( RES, 0, sizeof( RES ) ); + + while( n < MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE * 4 ) + { + ONE_ITERATION + ONE_ITERATION + ONE_ITERATION + ONE_ITERATION + } + + hs->PT1 = PT1; + hs->PT2 = PT2; + + hs->offset[0] = 0; + hs->offset[1] = MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE / 2; +} + +/* + * HAVEGE initialization + */ +void mbedtls_havege_init( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) +{ + memset( hs, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_havege_state ) ); + + havege_fill( hs ); +} + +void mbedtls_havege_free( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) +{ + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs, sizeof( mbedtls_havege_state ) ); +} + +/* + * HAVEGE rand function + */ +int mbedtls_havege_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + uint32_t val; + size_t use_len; + mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) p_rng; + unsigned char *p = buf; + + while( len > 0 ) + { + use_len = len; + if( use_len > sizeof( val ) ) + use_len = sizeof( val ); + + if( hs->offset[1] >= MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE ) + havege_fill( hs ); + + val = hs->pool[hs->offset[0]++]; + val ^= hs->pool[hs->offset[1]++]; + + memcpy( p, &val, use_len ); + + len -= use_len; + p += use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5013729d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +/* + * HKDF implementation -- RFC 5869 + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + +#include +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +int mbedtls_hkdf( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt, + size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, + unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char prk[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md, prk, mbedtls_md_get_size( md ), + info, info_len, okm, okm_len ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( prk, sizeof( prk ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_hkdf_extract( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, + const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + unsigned char *prk ) +{ + unsigned char null_salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { '\0' }; + + if( salt == NULL ) + { + size_t hash_len; + + if( salt_len != 0 ) + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + + if( hash_len == 0 ) + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + salt = null_salt; + salt_len = hash_len; + } + + return( mbedtls_md_hmac( md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_hkdf_expand( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, + size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info, + size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ) +{ + size_t hash_len; + size_t where = 0; + size_t n; + size_t t_len = 0; + size_t i; + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + unsigned char t[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + if( okm == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + + if( prk_len < hash_len || hash_len == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( info == NULL ) + { + info = (const unsigned char *) ""; + info_len = 0; + } + + n = okm_len / hash_len; + + if( okm_len % hash_len != 0 ) + { + n++; + } + + /* + * Per RFC 5869 Section 2.3, okm_len must not exceed + * 255 times the hash length + */ + if( n > 255 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + memset( t, 0, hash_len ); + + /* + * Compute T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N) + * Where T(N) is defined in RFC 5869 Section 2.3 + */ + for( i = 1; i <= n; i++ ) + { + size_t num_to_copy; + unsigned char c = i & 0xff; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, prk, prk_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, t, t_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, info, info_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + /* The constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a single octet. + * */ + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, &c, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, t ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + num_to_copy = i != n ? hash_len : okm_len - where; + memcpy( okm + where, t, num_to_copy ); + where += hash_len; + t_len = hash_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( t, sizeof( t ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..de970688 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,629 @@ +/* + * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication. + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf + * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012). + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG context initialization + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) ); + + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2) + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) +{ + size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); + unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1; + unsigned char sep[1]; + unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ ) + { + /* Step 1 or 4 */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + sep, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( rounds == 2 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Step 2 or 5 */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K, sizeof( K ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) +{ + (void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA) + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + /* + * Set initial working state. + * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the + * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + memset( ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Internal function used both for seeding and reseeding the DRBG. + * Comments starting with arabic numbers refer to section 10.1.2.4 + * of SP800-90A, while roman numbers refer to section 9.2. + */ +static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len, + int use_nonce ) +{ + unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; + size_t seedlen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + { + size_t total_entropy_len; + + if( use_nonce == 0 ) + total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len; + else + total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2; + + /* III. Check input length */ + if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || + total_entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + } + } + + memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); + + /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */ + if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, + seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; + + /* For initial seeding, allow adding of nonce generated + * from the entropy source. See Sect 8.6.7 in SP800-90A. */ + if( use_nonce ) + { + /* Note: We don't merge the two calls to f_entropy() in order + * to avoid requesting too much entropy from f_entropy() + * at once. Specifically, if the underlying digest is not + * SHA-1, 3 / 2 * entropy_len is at least 36 Bytes, which + * is larger than the maximum of 32 Bytes that our own + * entropy source implementation can emit in a single + * call in configurations disabling SHA-512. */ + if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, + seed + seedlen, + ctx->entropy_len / 2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len / 2; + } + + + /* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */ + if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); + seedlen += len; + } + + /* 2. Update state */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */ + ctx->reseed_counter = 1; + +exit: + /* 4. Done */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, seedlen ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 + 9.2 + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) +{ + return( hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) ); +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1) + * + * The nonce is not passed as a separate parameter but extracted + * from the entropy source as suggested in 8.6.7. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t md_size; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* + * Set initial working state. + * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the + * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_size ); + + ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; + ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; + + if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 ) + { + /* + * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by + * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2, + * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength. + * + * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.) + */ + ctx->entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */ + md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */ + 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */ + } + + if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, custom, len, + 1 /* add nonce */ ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set prediction resistance + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ) +{ + ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; +} + +/* + * Set entropy length grabbed for seeding + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ) +{ + ctx->entropy_len = len; +} + +/* + * Set reseed interval + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval ) +{ + ctx->reseed_interval = interval; +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data: + * 10.1.2.5 (arabic) + 9.3 (Roman) + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t out_len, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; + size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); + size_t left = out_len; + unsigned char *out = output; + + /* II. Check request length */ + if( out_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); + + /* III. Check input length */ + if( add_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + /* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */ + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */ + ( ctx->prediction_resistance == MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON || + ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ) ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + add_len = 0; /* VII.4 */ + } + + /* 2. Use additional data if any */ + if( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, + additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */ + while( left != 0 ) + { + size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + memcpy( out, ctx->V, use_len ); + out += use_len; + left -= use_len; + } + + /* 6. Update */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, + additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* 7. Update reseed counter */ + ctx->reseed_counter++; + +exit: + /* 8. Done */ + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG random function + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, out_len, NULL, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ + if( ctx->md_ctx.md_info != NULL ) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx->md_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) ); + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) != sizeof( buf ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + fclose( f ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f = NULL; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + unsigned char c; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); + if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + goto exit; + } + if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + fclose( f ); + f = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + if( f != NULL ) + fclose( f ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +/* Dummy checkup routine */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + (void) verbose; + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +#define OUTPUT_LEN 80 + +/* From a NIST PR=true test vector */ +static const unsigned char entropy_pr[] = { + 0xa0, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x58, 0xf1, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x4f, + 0xf7, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xef, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x02, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x11, + 0x48, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xfe, 0x69, 0xab, 0x5a, 0xee, 0x42, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0x42, + 0x17, 0x60, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x13, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xa3, + 0x7b, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x54, 0x75, 0x69, 0x51, 0xe4 }; +static const unsigned char result_pr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { + 0x9a, 0x00, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0x31, 0xec, 0xb1, 0x39, + 0x9b, 0x60, 0x81, 0x48, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x3c, 0x1e, 0x94, + 0x10, 0x10, 0x98, 0x12, 0x93, 0x25, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0x2d, 0x54, + 0x73, 0x19, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x89, 0x25, 0x19, 0x95, 0x5e, + 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x01, 0xab, + 0x46, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x09, 0xa6, 0x71, 0x88, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x40, 0xee, 0xf3, + 0xe1, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x9b, 0x44, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x44 }; + +/* From a NIST PR=false test vector */ +static const unsigned char entropy_nopr[] = { + 0x79, 0x34, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xdd, 0xa5, 0x79, 0x95, 0x57, 0x86, 0x66, + 0x21, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x83, 0x11, 0x46, 0x73, 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x35, 0xc8, + 0xc7, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x74, 0xe3, + 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0xdf }; +static const unsigned char result_nopr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { + 0xc6, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0xab, 0x7f, + 0xec, 0x5a, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x15, 0x9c, 0xa6, + 0xac, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x83, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x0a, + 0xff, 0xb1, 0x0d, 0x71, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0x73, 0x22, 0xec, + 0x1a, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x12, 0x27, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xfd, + 0xb5, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x34, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xbb, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xed, 0x49, + 0xe8, 0x5f, 0x13, 0x0f, 0xc8, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xb7 }; + +/* "Entropy" from buffer */ +static size_t test_offset; +static int hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = data; + memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len ); + test_offset += len; + return( 0 ); +} + +#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ + return( 1 ); \ + } + +/* + * Checkup routine for HMAC_DRBG with SHA-1 + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[OUTPUT_LEN]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * PR = True + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = True) : " ); + + test_offset = 0; + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, + hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_pr, + NULL, 0 ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + /* + * PR = False + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = False) : " ); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + test_offset = 0; + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, + hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_nopr, + NULL, 0 ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a10a8356 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md.c @@ -0,0 +1,890 @@ +/** + * \file md.c + * + * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info = { + "MD2", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, + 16, + 16, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info = { + "MD4", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, + 16, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { + "MD5", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, + 16, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { + "RIPEMD160", + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + 20, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { + "SHA1", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 20, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { + "SHA224", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + 28, + 64, +}; + +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { + "SHA256", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + 32, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { + "SHA384", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + 48, + 128, +}; +#endif + +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { + "SHA512", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + 64, + 128, +}; +#endif + +/* + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! + */ +static const int supported_digests[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; + +const int *mbedtls_md_list( void ) +{ + return( supported_digests ); +} + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name ) +{ + if( NULL == md_name ) + return( NULL ); + + /* Get the appropriate digest information */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + if( !strcmp( "MD2", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + if( !strcmp( "MD4", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + if( !strcmp( "MD5", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + if( !strcmp( "RIPEMD160", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( !strcmp( "SHA1", md_name ) || !strcmp( "SHA", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( !strcmp( "SHA224", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); + if( !strcmp( "SHA256", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( !strcmp( "SHA384", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); +#endif + if( !strcmp( "SHA512", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); +#endif + return( NULL ); +} + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type ) +{ + switch( md_type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( &mbedtls_md2_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( &mbedtls_md4_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( &mbedtls_md5_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( &mbedtls_ripemd160_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( &mbedtls_sha1_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( &mbedtls_sha224_info ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( &mbedtls_sha256_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( &mbedtls_sha384_info ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( &mbedtls_sha512_info ); +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} + +void mbedtls_md_init( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return; + + if( ctx->md_ctx != NULL ) + { + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + break; + } + mbedtls_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + } + + if( ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->hmac_ctx, + 2 * ctx->md_info->block_size ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->hmac_ctx ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, + const mbedtls_md_context_t *src ) +{ + if( dst == NULL || dst->md_info == NULL || + src == NULL || src->md_info == NULL || + dst->md_info != src->md_info ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + switch( src->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_md_init_ctx( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + return mbedtls_md_setup( ctx, md_info, 1 ); +} +#endif + +#define ALLOC( type ) \ + do { \ + ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_##type##_context ) ); \ + if( ctx->md_ctx == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + mbedtls_##type##_init( ctx->md_ctx ); \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL || ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ctx->md_info = md_info; + ctx->md_ctx = NULL; + ctx->hmac_ctx = NULL; + + switch( md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + ALLOC( md2 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + ALLOC( md4 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + ALLOC( md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + ALLOC( ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + ALLOC( sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + ALLOC( sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + ALLOC( sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( hmac != 0 ) + { + ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 2, md_info->block_size ); + if( ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_md_free( ctx ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#undef ALLOC + +int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f; + size_t n; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + while( ( n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) ) > 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, buf, n ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ferror( f ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; + else + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, output ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + fclose( f ); + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *ipad, *opad; + size_t i; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( keylen > (size_t) ctx->md_info->block_size ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + keylen = ctx->md_info->size; + key = sum; + } + + ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; + opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; + + memset( ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size ); + memset( opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size ); + + for( i = 0; i < keylen; i++ ) + { + ipad[i] = (unsigned char)( ipad[i] ^ key[i] ); + opad[i] = (unsigned char)( opad[i] ^ key[i] ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, + ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sum, sizeof( sum ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, input, ilen ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *opad; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, tmp ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, opad, + ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, tmp, + ctx->md_info->size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *ipad; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, ctx->md_info->block_size ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return md_info->size; +} + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + + return md_info->type; +} + +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return md_info->name; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md2.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md2.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7264e303 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md2.c @@ -0,0 +1,360 @@ +/* + * RFC 1115/1319 compliant MD2 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The MD2 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1989. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1115.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) + +static const unsigned char PI_SUBST[256] = +{ + 0x29, 0x2E, 0x43, 0xC9, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0x7C, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x36, + 0x54, 0xA1, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x06, 0x13, 0x62, 0xA7, 0x05, 0xF3, + 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x73, 0x8C, 0x98, 0x93, 0x2B, 0xD9, 0xBC, 0x4C, + 0x82, 0xCA, 0x1E, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x3C, 0xFD, 0xD4, 0xE0, 0x16, + 0x67, 0x42, 0x6F, 0x18, 0x8A, 0x17, 0xE5, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x4E, + 0xC4, 0xD6, 0xDA, 0x9E, 0xDE, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xFB, 0xF5, 0x8E, + 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xEE, 0x7A, 0xA9, 0x68, 0x79, 0x91, 0x15, 0xB2, + 0x07, 0x3F, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x10, 0x89, 0x0B, 0x22, 0x5F, 0x21, + 0x80, 0x7F, 0x5D, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x90, 0x32, 0x27, 0x35, 0x3E, + 0xCC, 0xE7, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x97, 0x03, 0xFF, 0x19, 0x30, 0xB3, + 0x48, 0xA5, 0xB5, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x5E, 0x92, 0x2A, 0xAC, 0x56, + 0xAA, 0xC6, 0x4F, 0xB8, 0x38, 0xD2, 0x96, 0xA4, 0x7D, 0xB6, + 0x76, 0xFC, 0x6B, 0xE2, 0x9C, 0x74, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x45, 0x9D, + 0x70, 0x59, 0x64, 0x71, 0x87, 0x20, 0x86, 0x5B, 0xCF, 0x65, + 0xE6, 0x2D, 0xA8, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x60, 0x25, 0xAD, 0xAE, 0xB0, + 0xB9, 0xF6, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x61, 0x69, 0x34, 0x40, 0x7E, 0x0F, + 0x55, 0x47, 0xA3, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x51, 0xAF, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x5C, + 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xBA, 0xC5, 0xEA, 0x26, 0x2C, 0x53, 0x0D, 0x6E, + 0x85, 0x28, 0x84, 0x09, 0xD3, 0xDF, 0xCD, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x81, + 0x4D, 0x52, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x37, 0xC8, 0x6C, 0xC1, 0xAB, 0xFA, + 0x24, 0xE1, 0x7B, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0xB1, 0x4A, 0x78, 0x88, + 0x95, 0x8B, 0xE3, 0x63, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0xD5, 0xFE, + 0x3B, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x39, 0xF2, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x66, 0x58, + 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xA6, 0x77, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x75, 0x4B, 0x0A, + 0x31, 0x44, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x8F, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0xDB, 0x99, + 0x8D, 0x33, 0x9F, 0x11, 0x83, 0x14 +}; + +void mbedtls_md2_init( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md2_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md2_free( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md2_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md2_clone( mbedtls_md2_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md2_context *src ) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * MD2 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx->cksum, 0, 16 ); + memset( ctx->state, 0, 46 ); + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 16 ); + ctx->left = 0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2_starts( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + int i, j; + unsigned char t = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + ctx->state[i + 16] = ctx->buffer[i]; + ctx->state[i + 32] = + (unsigned char)( ctx->buffer[i] ^ ctx->state[i]); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 18; i++ ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 48; j++ ) + { + ctx->state[j] = (unsigned char) + ( ctx->state[j] ^ PI_SUBST[t] ); + t = ctx->state[j]; + } + + t = (unsigned char)( t + i ); + } + + t = ctx->cksum[15]; + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + ctx->cksum[i] = (unsigned char) + ( ctx->cksum[i] ^ PI_SUBST[ctx->buffer[i] ^ t] ); + t = ctx->cksum[i]; + } + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * MD2 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_md2_update_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + + while( ilen > 0 ) + { + if( ilen > 16 - ctx->left ) + fill = 16 - ctx->left; + else + fill = ilen; + + memcpy( ctx->buffer + ctx->left, input, fill ); + + ctx->left += fill; + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + + if( ctx->left == 16 ) + { + ctx->left = 0; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2_update( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_md2_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * MD2 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + unsigned char x; + + x = (unsigned char)( 16 - ctx->left ); + + for( i = ctx->left; i < 16; i++ ) + ctx->buffer[i] = x; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memcpy( ctx->buffer, ctx->cksum, 16 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memcpy( output, ctx->state, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2_finish( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ + +/* + * output = MD2( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_md2_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md2_context ctx; + + mbedtls_md2_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md2_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_md2_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md2_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * RFC 1319 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char md2_test_str[7][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } +}; + +static const size_t md2_test_strlen[7] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char md2_test_sum[7][16] = +{ + { 0x83, 0x50, 0xE5, 0xA3, 0xE2, 0x4C, 0x15, 0x3D, + 0xF2, 0x27, 0x5C, 0x9F, 0x80, 0x69, 0x27, 0x73 }, + { 0x32, 0xEC, 0x01, 0xEC, 0x4A, 0x6D, 0xAC, 0x72, + 0xC0, 0xAB, 0x96, 0xFB, 0x34, 0xC0, 0xB5, 0xD1 }, + { 0xDA, 0x85, 0x3B, 0x0D, 0x3F, 0x88, 0xD9, 0x9B, + 0x30, 0x28, 0x3A, 0x69, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0xD6, 0xBB }, + { 0xAB, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x0B, + 0x21, 0x9F, 0xF3, 0x30, 0x31, 0xFE, 0x06, 0xB0 }, + { 0x4E, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x02, 0x92, 0xAB, + 0x5A, 0x41, 0x08, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x47, 0x94, 0x0B }, + { 0xDA, 0x33, 0xDE, 0xF2, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xF1, 0x39, + 0x75, 0x35, 0x28, 0x46, 0xC3, 0x03, 0x38, 0xCD }, + { 0xD5, 0x97, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x0D, + 0xC9, 0x80, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x66, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xD8 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_md2_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char md2sum[16]; + + for( i = 0; i < 7; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MD2 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md2_ret( md2_test_str[i], md2_test_strlen[i], md2sum ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( md2sum, md2_test_sum[i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md4.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md4.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eaa679a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md4.c @@ -0,0 +1,461 @@ +/* + * RFC 1186/1320 compliant MD4 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The MD4 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1990. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1186.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) + +void mbedtls_md4_init( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md4_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md4_free( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md4_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md4_clone( mbedtls_md4_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md4_context *src ) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * MD4 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4_starts( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; + } local; + + local.X[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 0 ); + local.X[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 4 ); + local.X[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 8 ); + local.X[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 12 ); + local.X[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 16 ); + local.X[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 20 ); + local.X[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 24 ); + local.X[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 28 ); + local.X[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 32 ); + local.X[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 36 ); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 40 ); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 44 ); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 48 ); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 52 ); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 56 ); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 60 ); + +#define S(x,n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) + + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + +#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z))) +#define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + (x); \ + (a) = S((a),(s)); \ + } while( 0 ) + + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 0], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 1], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 2], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[ 3], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 4], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 5], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 6], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[ 7], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 8], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 9], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[11], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[12], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[13], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[14], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 19 ); + +#undef P +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (z))) +#define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + (x) + 0x5A827999; \ + (a) = S((a),(s)); \ + } while( 0 ) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 0], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 4], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 8], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 1], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 5], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 9], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 2], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 6], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 3], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 7], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[11], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 13 ); + +#undef P +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + (x) + 0x6ED9EBA1; \ + (a) = S((a),(s)); \ + } while( 0 ) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 0], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 8], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 4], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 2], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[10], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 6], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 1], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 9], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 5], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 3], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[11], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 7], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 15 ); + +#undef F +#undef P + + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * MD4 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_md4_update_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), + (void *) input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), + (void *) input, ilen ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4_update( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +static const unsigned char md4_padding[64] = +{ + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * MD4 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t last, padn; + uint32_t high, low; + unsigned char msglen[8]; + + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); + + last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + padn = ( last < 56 ) ? ( 56 - last ) : ( 120 - last ); + + ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx, (unsigned char *)md4_padding, padn ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx, msglen, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4_finish( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ + +/* + * output = MD4( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_md4_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md4_context ctx; + + mbedtls_md4_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_md4_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md4_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * RFC 1320 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char md4_test_str[7][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } +}; + +static const size_t md4_test_strlen[7] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char md4_test_sum[7][16] = +{ + { 0x31, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xE0, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0xE9, 0x31, + 0xB7, 0x3C, 0x59, 0xD7, 0xE0, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xC0 }, + { 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xB3, 0x1D, 0xE3, 0x3E, 0x46, + 0x24, 0x5E, 0x05, 0xFB, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0xFB, 0x24 }, + { 0xA4, 0x48, 0x01, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x21, 0xD8, 0x52, + 0x5F, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0x7A, 0xA6, 0x72, 0x9D }, + { 0xD9, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x64, 0x54, 0x9F, 0xE8, + 0x18, 0x87, 0x48, 0x06, 0xE1, 0xC7, 0x01, 0x4B }, + { 0xD7, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x30, 0x8A, 0xA5, 0xBB, 0xCD, + 0xEE, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x63, 0xDF, 0x41, 0x2D, 0xA9 }, + { 0x04, 0x3F, 0x85, 0x82, 0xF2, 0x41, 0xDB, 0x35, + 0x1C, 0xE6, 0x27, 0xE1, 0x53, 0xE7, 0xF0, 0xE4 }, + { 0xE3, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x38, 0xF2, 0x19, + 0x9C, 0x3E, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x4F, 0xCC, 0x05, 0x36 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_md4_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char md4sum[16]; + + for( i = 0; i < 7; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MD4 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md4_ret( md4_test_str[i], md4_test_strlen[i], md4sum ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( md4sum, md4_test_sum[i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md5.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md5.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b53fcf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/md5.c @@ -0,0 +1,475 @@ +/* + * RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The MD5 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + +void mbedtls_md5_init( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md5_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md5_free( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md5_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md5_clone( mbedtls_md5_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md5_context *src ) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * MD5 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; + } local; + + local.X[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 0 ); + local.X[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 4 ); + local.X[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 8 ); + local.X[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 12 ); + local.X[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 16 ); + local.X[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 20 ); + local.X[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 24 ); + local.X[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 28 ); + local.X[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 32 ); + local.X[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 36 ); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 40 ); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 44 ); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 48 ); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 52 ); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 56 ); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 60 ); + +#define S(x,n) \ + ( ( (x) << (n) ) | ( ( (x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> ( 32 - (n) ) ) ) + +#define P(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + local.X[(k)] + (t); \ + (a) = S((a),(s)) + (b); \ + } while( 0 ) + + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + +#define F(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821 ); + +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((y) ^ ((z) & ((x) ^ (y)))) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 10, 9, 0x02441453 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A ); + +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665 ); + +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((y) ^ ((x) | ~(z))) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391 ); + +#undef F + + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * MD5 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * MD5 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if( used <= 56 ) + { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used ); + } + else + { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 56 ); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( low, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( high, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Output final state + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ + +/* + * output = MD5( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_md5_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md5_context ctx; + + mbedtls_md5_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * RFC 1321 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char md5_test_buf[7][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } +}; + +static const size_t md5_test_buflen[7] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char md5_test_sum[7][16] = +{ + { 0xD4, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0xD9, 0x8F, 0x00, 0xB2, 0x04, + 0xE9, 0x80, 0x09, 0x98, 0xEC, 0xF8, 0x42, 0x7E }, + { 0x0C, 0xC1, 0x75, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xF1, 0xB6, 0xA8, + 0x31, 0xC3, 0x99, 0xE2, 0x69, 0x77, 0x26, 0x61 }, + { 0x90, 0x01, 0x50, 0x98, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xB0, + 0xD6, 0x96, 0x3F, 0x7D, 0x28, 0xE1, 0x7F, 0x72 }, + { 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x7C, 0xB7, 0x93, 0x8D, + 0x52, 0x5A, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xAA, 0xF1, 0x61, 0xD0 }, + { 0xC3, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0xD7, 0x61, 0x92, 0xE4, 0x00, + 0x7D, 0xFB, 0x49, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0x67, 0xE1, 0x3B }, + { 0xD1, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x98, 0xD2, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xF5, + 0xA5, 0x61, 0x1C, 0x2C, 0x9F, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x9F }, + { 0x57, 0xED, 0xF4, 0xA2, 0x2B, 0xE3, 0xC9, 0x55, + 0xAC, 0x49, 0xDA, 0x2E, 0x21, 0x07, 0xB6, 0x7A } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_md5_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char md5sum[16]; + + for( i = 0; i < 7; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MD5 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md5_ret( md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( md5sum, md5_test_sum[i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc62324b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,744 @@ +/* + * Buffer-based memory allocator + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" + +/* No need for the header guard as MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + is dependent upon MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#define MAGIC1 0xFF00AA55 +#define MAGIC2 0xEE119966 +#define MAX_BT 20 + +typedef struct _memory_header memory_header; +struct _memory_header +{ + size_t magic1; + size_t size; + size_t alloc; + memory_header *prev; + memory_header *next; + memory_header *prev_free; + memory_header *next_free; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + char **trace; + size_t trace_count; +#endif + size_t magic2; +}; + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + memory_header *first; + memory_header *first_free; + int verify; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + size_t alloc_count; + size_t free_count; + size_t total_used; + size_t maximum_used; + size_t header_count; + size_t maximum_header_count; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} +buffer_alloc_ctx; + +static buffer_alloc_ctx heap; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) +static void debug_header( memory_header *hdr ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + size_t i; +#endif + + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "HDR: PTR(%10zu), PREV(%10zu), NEXT(%10zu), " + "ALLOC(%zu), SIZE(%10zu)\n", + (size_t) hdr, (size_t) hdr->prev, (size_t) hdr->next, + hdr->alloc, hdr->size ); + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, " FPREV(%10zu), FNEXT(%10zu)\n", + (size_t) hdr->prev_free, (size_t) hdr->next_free ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "TRACE: \n" ); + for( i = 0; i < hdr->trace_count; i++ ) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "%s\n", hdr->trace[i] ); + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "\n" ); +#endif +} + +static void debug_chain( void ) +{ + memory_header *cur = heap.first; + + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "\nBlock list\n" ); + while( cur != NULL ) + { + debug_header( cur ); + cur = cur->next; + } + + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Free list\n" ); + cur = heap.first_free; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + debug_header( cur ); + cur = cur->next_free; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +static int verify_header( memory_header *hdr ) +{ + if( hdr->magic1 != MAGIC1 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: MAGIC1 mismatch\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( hdr->magic2 != MAGIC2 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: MAGIC2 mismatch\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( hdr->alloc > 1 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: alloc has illegal value\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( hdr->prev != NULL && hdr->prev == hdr->next ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: prev == next\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( hdr->prev_free != NULL && hdr->prev_free == hdr->next_free ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: prev_free == next_free\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int verify_chain( void ) +{ + memory_header *prv = heap.first, *cur; + + if( prv == NULL || verify_header( prv ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: verification of first header " + "failed\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( heap.first->prev != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: verification failed: " + "first->prev != NULL\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + cur = heap.first->next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( verify_header( cur ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: verification of header " + "failed\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( cur->prev != prv ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: verification failed: " + "cur->prev != prv\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + prv = cur; + cur = cur->next; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void *buffer_alloc_calloc( size_t n, size_t size ) +{ + memory_header *new, *cur = heap.first_free; + unsigned char *p; + void *ret; + size_t original_len, len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + void *trace_buffer[MAX_BT]; + size_t trace_cnt; +#endif + + if( heap.buf == NULL || heap.first == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + original_len = len = n * size; + + if( n == 0 || size == 0 || len / n != size ) + return( NULL ); + else if( len > (size_t)-MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + return( NULL ); + + if( len % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + { + len -= len % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + len += MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + } + + // Find block that fits + // + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( cur->size >= len ) + break; + + cur = cur->next_free; + } + + if( cur == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + if( cur->alloc != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: block in free_list but allocated " + "data\n" ); +#endif + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.alloc_count++; +#endif + + // Found location, split block if > memory_header + 4 room left + // + if( cur->size - len < sizeof(memory_header) + + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + { + cur->alloc = 1; + + // Remove from free_list + // + if( cur->prev_free != NULL ) + cur->prev_free->next_free = cur->next_free; + else + heap.first_free = cur->next_free; + + if( cur->next_free != NULL ) + cur->next_free->prev_free = cur->prev_free; + + cur->prev_free = NULL; + cur->next_free = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.total_used += cur->size; + if( heap.total_used > heap.maximum_used ) + heap.maximum_used = heap.total_used; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + trace_cnt = backtrace( trace_buffer, MAX_BT ); + cur->trace = backtrace_symbols( trace_buffer, trace_cnt ); + cur->trace_count = trace_cnt; +#endif + + if( ( heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC ) && verify_chain() != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + + ret = (unsigned char *) cur + sizeof( memory_header ); + memset( ret, 0, original_len ); + + return( ret ); + } + + p = ( (unsigned char *) cur ) + sizeof(memory_header) + len; + new = (memory_header *) p; + + new->size = cur->size - len - sizeof(memory_header); + new->alloc = 0; + new->prev = cur; + new->next = cur->next; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + new->trace = NULL; + new->trace_count = 0; +#endif + new->magic1 = MAGIC1; + new->magic2 = MAGIC2; + + if( new->next != NULL ) + new->next->prev = new; + + // Replace cur with new in free_list + // + new->prev_free = cur->prev_free; + new->next_free = cur->next_free; + if( new->prev_free != NULL ) + new->prev_free->next_free = new; + else + heap.first_free = new; + + if( new->next_free != NULL ) + new->next_free->prev_free = new; + + cur->alloc = 1; + cur->size = len; + cur->next = new; + cur->prev_free = NULL; + cur->next_free = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.header_count++; + if( heap.header_count > heap.maximum_header_count ) + heap.maximum_header_count = heap.header_count; + heap.total_used += cur->size; + if( heap.total_used > heap.maximum_used ) + heap.maximum_used = heap.total_used; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + trace_cnt = backtrace( trace_buffer, MAX_BT ); + cur->trace = backtrace_symbols( trace_buffer, trace_cnt ); + cur->trace_count = trace_cnt; +#endif + + if( ( heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC ) && verify_chain() != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + + ret = (unsigned char *) cur + sizeof( memory_header ); + memset( ret, 0, original_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static void buffer_alloc_free( void *ptr ) +{ + memory_header *hdr, *old = NULL; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) ptr; + + if( ptr == NULL || heap.buf == NULL || heap.first == NULL ) + return; + + if( p < heap.buf || p >= heap.buf + heap.len ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: mbedtls_free() outside of managed " + "space\n" ); +#endif + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + } + + p -= sizeof(memory_header); + hdr = (memory_header *) p; + + if( verify_header( hdr ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + + if( hdr->alloc != 1 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: mbedtls_free() on unallocated " + "data\n" ); +#endif + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + } + + hdr->alloc = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.free_count++; + heap.total_used -= hdr->size; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + free( hdr->trace ); + hdr->trace = NULL; + hdr->trace_count = 0; +#endif + + // Regroup with block before + // + if( hdr->prev != NULL && hdr->prev->alloc == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.header_count--; +#endif + hdr->prev->size += sizeof(memory_header) + hdr->size; + hdr->prev->next = hdr->next; + old = hdr; + hdr = hdr->prev; + + if( hdr->next != NULL ) + hdr->next->prev = hdr; + + memset( old, 0, sizeof(memory_header) ); + } + + // Regroup with block after + // + if( hdr->next != NULL && hdr->next->alloc == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.header_count--; +#endif + hdr->size += sizeof(memory_header) + hdr->next->size; + old = hdr->next; + hdr->next = hdr->next->next; + + if( hdr->prev_free != NULL || hdr->next_free != NULL ) + { + if( hdr->prev_free != NULL ) + hdr->prev_free->next_free = hdr->next_free; + else + heap.first_free = hdr->next_free; + + if( hdr->next_free != NULL ) + hdr->next_free->prev_free = hdr->prev_free; + } + + hdr->prev_free = old->prev_free; + hdr->next_free = old->next_free; + + if( hdr->prev_free != NULL ) + hdr->prev_free->next_free = hdr; + else + heap.first_free = hdr; + + if( hdr->next_free != NULL ) + hdr->next_free->prev_free = hdr; + + if( hdr->next != NULL ) + hdr->next->prev = hdr; + + memset( old, 0, sizeof(memory_header) ); + } + + // Prepend to free_list if we have not merged + // (Does not have to stay in same order as prev / next list) + // + if( old == NULL ) + { + hdr->next_free = heap.first_free; + if( heap.first_free != NULL ) + heap.first_free->prev_free = hdr; + heap.first_free = hdr; + } + + if( ( heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE ) && verify_chain() != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify( int verify ) +{ + heap.verify = verify; +} + +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify( void ) +{ + return verify_chain(); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status( void ) +{ + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "Current use: %zu blocks / %zu bytes, max: %zu blocks / " + "%zu bytes (total %zu bytes), alloc / free: %zu / %zu\n", + heap.header_count, heap.total_used, + heap.maximum_header_count, heap.maximum_used, + heap.maximum_header_count * sizeof( memory_header ) + + heap.maximum_used, + heap.alloc_count, heap.free_count ); + + if( heap.first->next == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "All memory de-allocated in stack buffer\n" ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Memory currently allocated:\n" ); + debug_chain(); + } +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get( size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks ) +{ + *max_used = heap.maximum_used; + *max_blocks = heap.maximum_header_count; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset( void ) +{ + heap.maximum_used = 0; + heap.maximum_header_count = 0; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( size_t *cur_used, size_t *cur_blocks ) +{ + *cur_used = heap.total_used; + *cur_blocks = heap.header_count; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +static void *buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed( size_t n, size_t size ) +{ + void *buf; + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &heap.mutex ) != 0 ) + return( NULL ); + buf = buffer_alloc_calloc( n, size ); + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &heap.mutex ) ) + return( NULL ); + return( buf ); +} + +static void buffer_alloc_free_mutexed( void *ptr ) +{ + /* We have no good option here, but corrupting the heap seems + * worse than losing memory. */ + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &heap.mutex ) ) + return; + buffer_alloc_free( ptr ); + (void) mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &heap.mutex ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + memset( &heap, 0, sizeof( buffer_alloc_ctx ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &heap.mutex ); + mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed, + buffer_alloc_free_mutexed ); +#else + mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( buffer_alloc_calloc, buffer_alloc_free ); +#endif + + if( len < sizeof( memory_header ) + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + return; + else if( (size_t)buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + { + /* Adjust len first since buf is used in the computation */ + len -= MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE + - (size_t)buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + buf += MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE + - (size_t)buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + } + + memset( buf, 0, len ); + + heap.buf = buf; + heap.len = len; + + heap.first = (memory_header *)buf; + heap.first->size = len - sizeof( memory_header ); + heap.first->magic1 = MAGIC1; + heap.first->magic2 = MAGIC2; + heap.first_free = heap.first; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &heap.mutex ); +#endif + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &heap, sizeof(buffer_alloc_ctx) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +static int check_pointer( void *p ) +{ + if( p == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( (size_t) p % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int check_all_free( void ) +{ + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.total_used != 0 || +#endif + heap.first != heap.first_free || + (void *) heap.first != (void *) heap.buf ) + { + return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define TEST_ASSERT( condition ) \ + if( ! (condition) ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ + \ + ret = 1; \ + goto cleanup; \ + } + +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned char *p, *q, *r, *end; + int ret = 0; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MBA test #1 (basic alloc-free cycle): " ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ); + q = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 128 ); + r = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 16 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( p ) == 0 && + check_pointer( q ) == 0 && + check_pointer( r ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_free( r ); + mbedtls_free( q ); + mbedtls_free( p ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_all_free( ) == 0 ); + + /* Memorize end to compare with the next test */ + end = heap.buf + heap.len; + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MBA test #2 (buf not aligned): " ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf + 1, sizeof( buf ) - 1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( heap.buf + heap.len == end ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ); + q = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 128 ); + r = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 16 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( p ) == 0 && + check_pointer( q ) == 0 && + check_pointer( r ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_free( r ); + mbedtls_free( q ); + mbedtls_free( p ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_all_free( ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MBA test #3 (full): " ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( buf ) - sizeof( memory_header ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( p ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ) == NULL ); + + mbedtls_free( p ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( buf ) - 2 * sizeof( memory_header ) - 16 ); + q = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 16 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( p ) == 0 && check_pointer( q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ) == NULL ); + + mbedtls_free( q ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_calloc( 1, 17 ) == NULL ); + + mbedtls_free( p ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_all_free( ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..668876cc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_common.h + * + * \brief Common functions and macros used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H + +#include "mps_error.h" + +#include + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Configuration + * + * \{ + */ + +/*! This flag controls whether the MPS-internal components + * (reader, writer, Layer 1-3) perform validation of the + * expected abstract state at the entry of API calls. + * + * Context: All MPS API functions impose assumptions/preconditions on the + * context on which they operate. For example, every structure has a notion of + * state integrity which is established by `xxx_init()` and preserved by any + * calls to the MPS API which satisfy their preconditions and either succeed, + * or fail with an error code which is explicitly documented to not corrupt + * structure integrity (such as WANT_READ and WANT_WRITE); + * apart from `xxx_init()` any function assumes state integrity as a + * precondition (but usually more). If any of the preconditions is violated, + * the function's behavior is entirely undefined. + * In addition to state integrity, all MPS structures have a more refined + * notion of abstract state that the API operates on. For example, all layers + * have a notion of 'abstract read state' which indicates if incoming data has + * been passed to the user, e.g. through mps_l2_read_start() for Layer 2 + * or mps_l3_read() in Layer 3. After such a call, it doesn't make sense to + * call these reading functions again until the incoming data has been + * explicitly 'consumed', e.g. through mps_l2_read_consume() for Layer 2 or + * mps_l3_read_consume() on Layer 3. However, even if it doesn't make sense, + * it's a design choice whether the API should fail gracefully on such + * non-sensical calls or not, and that's what this option is about: + * + * This option determines whether the expected abstract state + * is part of the API preconditions or not: If the option is set, + * then the abstract state is not part of the precondition and is + * thus required to be validated by the implementation. If an unexpected + * abstract state is encountered, the implementation must fail gracefully + * with error #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED. + * Conversely, if this option is not set, then the expected abstract state + * is included in the preconditions of the respective API calls, and + * an implementation's behaviour is undefined if the abstract state is + * not as expected. + * + * For example: Enabling this makes mps_l2_read_done() fail if + * no incoming record is currently open; disabling this would + * lead to undefined behavior in this case. + * + * Comment this to remove state validation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION + +/*! This flag enables/disables assertions on the internal state of MPS. + * + * Assertions are sanity checks that should never trigger when MPS + * is used within the bounds of its API and preconditions. + * + * Enabling this increases security by limiting the scope of + * potential bugs, but comes at the cost of increased code size. + * + * Note: So far, there is no guiding principle as to what + * expected conditions merit an assertion, and which don't. + * + * Comment this to disable assertions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + +/*! This flag controls whether tracing for MPS should be enabled. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string ); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + ( cond ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string ); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW( cond, string ) do {} while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Configuration */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Common types + * + * Various common types used throughout MPS. + * \{ + */ + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in MPS structures. + * + * This is an unsigned integer type that should be large enough to + * hold the length of any buffer or message processed by MPS. + * + * The reason to pick a value as small as possible here is + * to reduce the size of MPS structures. + * + * \warning Care has to be taken when using a narrower type + * than ::mbedtls_mps_size_t here because of + * potential truncation during conversion. + * + * \warning Handshake messages in TLS may be up to 2^24 ~ 16Mb in size. + * If mbedtls_mps_[opt_]stored_size_t is smaller than that, the + * maximum handshake message is restricted accordingly. + * + * For now, we use the default type of size_t throughout, and the use of + * smaller types or different types for ::mbedtls_mps_size_t and + * ::mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t is not yet supported. + * + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX ( (mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t) -1 ) + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in the MPS API + * and implementation. + * + * This must be at least as wide as ::mbedtls_stored_size_t but + * may be chosen to be strictly larger if more suitable for the + * target architecture. + * + * For example, in a test build for ARM Thumb, using uint_fast16_t + * instead of uint16_t reduced the code size from 1060 Byte to 962 Byte, + * so almost 10%. + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX ( (mbedtls_mps_size_t) -1 ) + +#if MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX > MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX +#error "Misconfiguration of mbedtls_mps_size_t and mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t." +#endif + +/* \} SECTION: Common types */ + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f78d9a05 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_error.h + * + * \brief Error codes used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H + + +/* TODO: The error code allocation needs to be revisited: + * + * - Should we make (some of) the MPS Reader error codes public? + * If so, we need to adjust MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR() to hit + * a gap in the Mbed TLS public error space. + * If not, we have to make sure we don't forward those errors + * at the level of the public API -- no risk at the moment as + * long as MPS is an experimental component not accessible from + * public API. + */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS general error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE ( 0 ) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + ( -( MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE | (code) ) ) + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR( 0x1 ) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR( 0x2 ) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS general error codes */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE ( 1 << 8 ) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + ( -( MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE | (code) ) ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because + * the user hasn't yet read and committed all of it. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x1 ) + +/*! An invalid argument was passed to the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x2 ) + +/*! An attempt to move a reader to consuming mode through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * after pausing failed because the provided data is not sufficient to serve the + * read requests that led to the pausing. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x3 ) + +/*! A get request failed because not enough data is available in the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x4 ) + +/*!< A get request after pausing and reactivating the reader failed because + * the request is not in line with the request made prior to pausing. The user + * must not change it's 'strategy' after pausing and reactivating a reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x5 ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the reader + * has no accumulator it can use to backup the data that hasn't been processed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x6 ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the + * accumulator passed to the reader is not large enough to hold both the + * data that hasn't been processed and the excess of the last read-request. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x7 ) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9af5073c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c @@ -0,0 +1,564 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Reader implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mps_reader.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) +static int mbedtls_mps_trace_id = MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ + +/* + * GENERAL NOTE ON CODING STYLE + * + * The following code intentionally separates memory loads + * and stores from other operations (arithmetic or branches). + * This leads to the introduction of many local variables + * and significantly increases the C-code line count, but + * should not increase the size of generated assembly. + * + * The reason for this is twofold: + * (1) It will ease verification efforts using the VST + * (Verified Software Toolchain) + * whose program logic cannot directly reason + * about instructions containing a load or store in + * addition to other operations (e.g. *p = *q or + * tmp = *p + 42). + * (2) Operating on local variables and writing the results + * back to the target contexts on success only + * allows to maintain structure invariants even + * on failure - this in turn has two benefits: + * (2.a) If for some reason an error code is not caught + * and operation continues, functions are nonetheless + * called with sane contexts, reducing the risk + * of dangerous behavior. + * (2.b) Randomized testing is easier if structures + * remain intact even in the face of failing + * and/or non-sensical calls. + * Moreover, it might even reduce code-size because + * the compiler need not write back temporary results + * to memory in case of failure. + * + */ + +static inline int mps_reader_is_accumulating( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining; + if( rd->acc == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + return( acc_remaining > 0 ); +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_producing( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + unsigned char *frag = rd->frag; + return( frag == NULL ); +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_consuming( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + return( !mps_reader_is_producing( rd ) ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset; + + if( acc == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + frag_offset = rd->acc_share.frag_offset; + return( frag_offset ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset, end; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + end = rd->end; + + return( end < frag_offset ); +} + +static inline void mps_reader_zero( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + /* A plain memset() would likely be more efficient, + * but the current way of zeroing makes it harder + * to overlook fields which should not be zero-initialized. + * It's also more suitable for FV efforts since it + * doesn't require reasoning about structs being + * interpreted as unstructured binary blobs. */ + static mbedtls_mps_reader const zero = + { .frag = NULL, + .frag_len = 0, + .commit = 0, + .end = 0, + .pending = 0, + .acc = NULL, + .acc_len = 0, + .acc_available = 0, + .acc_share = { .acc_remaining = 0 } + }; + *rd = zero; +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len ) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_init" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Accumulator size: %u bytes", (unsigned) acc_len ); + mps_reader_zero( rd ); + rd->acc = acc; + rd->acc_len = acc_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_free" ); + mps_reader_zero( rd ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *new_frag, + mbedtls_mps_size_t new_frag_len ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t copy_to_acc; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Fragment length: %u bytes", (unsigned) new_frag_len ); + + if( new_frag == NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_producing( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() requires reader to be in producing mode" ); + + if( mps_reader_is_accumulating( rd ) ) + { + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available = rd->acc_available; + + /* Skip over parts of the accumulator that have already been filled. */ + acc += acc_available; + + copy_to_acc = acc_remaining; + if( copy_to_acc > new_frag_len ) + copy_to_acc = new_frag_len; + + /* Copy new contents to accumulator. */ + memcpy( acc, new_frag, copy_to_acc ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Copy new data of size %u of %u into accumulator at offset %u", + (unsigned) copy_to_acc, (unsigned) new_frag_len, (unsigned) acc_available ); + + /* Check if, with the new fragment, we have enough data. */ + acc_remaining -= copy_to_acc; + if( acc_remaining > 0 ) + { + /* We need to accumulate more data. Stay in producing mode. */ + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = acc_remaining; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE ); + } + + /* We have filled the accumulator: Move to consuming mode. */ + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Enough data available to serve user request" ); + + /* Remember overlap of accumulator and fragment. */ + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = acc_available; + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + } + else /* Not accumulating */ + { + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = 0; + } + + rd->frag = new_frag; + rd->frag_len = new_frag_len; + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen ) +{ + unsigned char *frag; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_len, frag_offset, end, frag_fetched, frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_get" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Bytes requested: %u", (unsigned) desired ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_get() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + end = rd->end; + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + + /* Check if we're still serving from the accumulator. */ + if( mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator( rd ) ) + { + /* Illustration of supported and unsupported cases: + * + * - Allowed #1 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +-----v-------v-------------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Allowed #2 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +----------v----------------v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Not allowed #1 (could be served, but we don't actually use it): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +------v-------------v------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * + * - Not allowed #2 (can't be served with a contiguous buffer): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end + desired + * | | + * +------v--------------------+ v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * In case of Allowed #2 we're switching to serve from + * `frag` starting from the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + */ + + unsigned char *acc; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the accumulator" ); + if( frag_offset - end < desired ) + { + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available; + acc_available = rd->acc_available; + if( acc_available - end != desired ) + { + /* It might be possible to serve some of these situations by + * making additional space in the accumulator, removing those + * parts that have already been committed. + * On the other hand, this brings additional complexity and + * enlarges the code size, while there doesn't seem to be a use + * case where we don't attempt exactly the same `get` calls when + * resuming on a reader than what we tried before pausing it. + * If we believe we adhere to this restricted usage throughout + * the library, this check is a good opportunity to + * validate this. */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS ); + } + } + + acc = rd->acc; + acc += end; + + *buffer = acc; + if( buflen != NULL ) + *buflen = desired; + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); + } + + /* Attempt to serve the request from the current fragment */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the current fragment." ); + + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + frag_fetched = end - frag_offset; /* The amount of data from the current + * fragment that has already been passed + * to the user. */ + frag_remaining = frag_len - frag_fetched; /* Remaining data in fragment */ + + /* Check if we can serve the read request from the fragment. */ + if( frag_remaining < desired ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There's not enough data in the current fragment " + "to serve the request." ); + /* There's not enough data in the current fragment, + * so either just RETURN what we have or fail. */ + if( buflen == NULL ) + { + if( frag_remaining > 0 ) + { + rd->pending = desired - frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Remember to collect %u bytes before re-opening", + (unsigned) rd->pending ); + } + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + } + + desired = frag_remaining; + } + + /* There's enough data in the current fragment to serve the + * (potentially modified) read request. */ + + frag = rd->frag; + frag += frag_fetched; + + *buffer = frag; + if( buflen != NULL ) + *buflen = desired; + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t end; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + end = rd->end; + rd->commit = end; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + int *paused ) +{ + unsigned char *frag, *acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t pending, commit; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len, frag_offset, frag_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim" ); + + if( paused != NULL ) + *paused = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + frag = rd->frag; + acc = rd->acc; + pending = rd->pending; + commit = rd->commit; + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + + if( pending == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No unsatisfied read-request has been logged." ); + + /* Check if there's data left to be consumed. */ + if( commit < frag_offset || commit - frag_offset < frag_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There is data left to be consumed." ); + rd->end = commit; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT ); + } + + rd->acc_available = 0; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment has been fully processed and committed." ); + } + else + { + int overflow; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_len; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len_needed; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There has been an unsatisfied read with %u bytes overhead.", + (unsigned) pending ); + + if( acc == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No accumulator present" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR ); + } + acc_len = rd->acc_len; + + /* Check if the upper layer has already fetched + * and committed the contents of the accumulator. */ + if( commit < frag_offset ) + { + /* No, accumulator is still being processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = 0; + frag_backup_len = frag_len; + acc_backup_offset = commit; + acc_backup_len = frag_offset - commit; + } + else + { + /* Yes, the accumulator is already processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = commit - frag_offset; + frag_backup_len = frag_len - frag_backup_offset; + acc_backup_offset = 0; + acc_backup_len = 0; + } + + backup_len = acc_backup_len + frag_backup_len; + acc_len_needed = backup_len + pending; + + overflow = 0; + overflow |= ( backup_len < acc_backup_len ); + overflow |= ( acc_len_needed < backup_len ); + + if( overflow || acc_len < acc_len_needed ) + { + /* Except for the different return code, we behave as if + * there hadn't been a call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * since the last commit. */ + rd->end = commit; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "The accumulator is too small to handle the backup." ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Size: %u", (unsigned) acc_len ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Needed: %u (%u + %u)", + (unsigned) acc_len_needed, + (unsigned) backup_len, (unsigned) pending ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment backup: %u", (unsigned) frag_backup_len ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Accumulator backup: %u", (unsigned) acc_backup_len ); + + /* Move uncommitted parts from the accumulator to the front + * of the accumulator. */ + memmove( acc, acc + acc_backup_offset, acc_backup_len ); + + /* Copy uncmmitted parts of the current fragment to the + * accumulator. */ + memcpy( acc + acc_backup_len, + frag + frag_backup_offset, frag_backup_len ); + + rd->acc_available = backup_len; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = pending; + + if( paused != NULL ) + *paused = 1; + } + + rd->frag = NULL; + rd->frag_len = 0; + + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Final state: aa %u, al %u, ar %u", + (unsigned) rd->acc_available, (unsigned) rd->acc_len, + (unsigned) rd->acc_share.acc_remaining ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..427c1bd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h @@ -0,0 +1,382 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_reader.h + * + * \brief This file defines reader objects, which together with their + * sibling writer objects form the basis for the communication + * between the various layers of the Mbed TLS messaging stack, + * as well as the communication between the messaging stack and + * the (D)TLS handshake protocol implementation. + * + * Readers provide a means of transferring incoming data from + * a 'producer' providing it in chunks of arbitrary size, to + * a 'consumer' which fetches and processes it in chunks of + * again arbitrary, and potentially different, size. + * + * Readers can thus be seen as datagram-to-stream converters, + * and they abstract away the following two tasks from the user: + * 1. The pointer arithmetic of stepping through a producer- + * provided chunk in smaller chunks. + * 2. The merging of incoming data chunks in case the + * consumer requests data in larger chunks than what the + * producer provides. + * + * The basic abstract flow of operation is the following: + * - Initially, the reader is in 'producing mode'. + * - The producer hands an incoming data buffer to the reader, + * moving it from 'producing' to 'consuming' mode. + * - The consumer subsequently fetches and processes the buffer + * content. Once that's done -- or partially done and a consumer's + * request can't be fulfilled -- the producer revokes the reader's + * access to the incoming data buffer, putting the reader back to + * producing mode. + * - The producer subsequently gathers more incoming data and hands + * it to the reader until it switches back to consuming mode + * if enough data is available for the last consumer request to + * be satisfiable. + * - Repeat the above. + * + * The abstract states of the reader from the producer's and + * consumer's perspective are as follows: + * + * - From the perspective of the consumer, the state of the + * reader consists of the following: + * - A byte stream representing (concatenation of) the data + * received through calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * - A marker within that byte stream indicating which data + * can be considered processed, and hence need not be retained, + * when the reader is passed back to the producer via + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * The marker is set via mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() + * which places it at the end of the current byte stream. + * The consumer need not be aware of the distinction between consumer + * and producer mode, because it only interfaces with the reader + * when the latter is in consuming mode. + * + * - From the perspective of the producer, the reader's state is one of: + * - Attached: The reader is in consuming mode. + * - Unset: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the reader, + * and all previously handed incoming data buffers have been + * fully processed. More data needs to be fed into the reader + * via mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * + * - Accumulating: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the + * reader, but some data from the previous incoming data + * buffer hasn't been processed yet and is internally + * held back. + * The Attached state belongs to consuming mode, while the Unset and + * Accumulating states belong to producing mode. + * + * Transitioning from the Unset or Accumulating state to Attached is + * done via successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(), while + * transitioning from Attached to either Unset or Accumulating (depending + * on what has been processed) is done via mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * + * The following diagram depicts the producer-state progression: + * + * +------------------+ reclaim + * | Unset +<-------------------------------------+ get + * +--------|---------+ | +------+ + * | | | | + * | | | | + * | feed +---------+---+--+ | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | Attached | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | feed, enough data available +---------+---+--+ | + * | to serve previous consumer request | | | + * | | | | + * +--------+---------+ | +------+ + * +----> Accumulating |<-------------------------------------+ commit + * | +---+--------------+ reclaim, previous read request + * | | couldn't be fulfilled + * | | + * +--------+ + * feed, need more data to serve + * previous consumer request + * | + * | + * producing mode | consuming mode + * | + * + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_READER_H +#define MBEDTLS_READER_H + +#include + +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_error.h" + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader; +typedef struct mbedtls_mps_reader mbedtls_mps_reader; + +/* + * Structure definitions + */ + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader +{ + unsigned char *frag; /*!< The fragment of incoming data managed by + * the reader; it is provided to the reader + * through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). The reader + * does not own the fragment and does not + * perform any allocation operations on it, + * but does have read and write access to it. + * + * The reader is in consuming mode if + * and only if \c frag is not \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_len; + /*!< The length of the current fragment. + * Must be 0 if \c frag == \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t commit; + /*!< The offset of the last commit, relative + * to the first byte in the fragment, if + * no accumulator is present. If an accumulator + * is present, it is viewed as a prefix to the + * current fragment, and this variable contains + * an offset from the beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t end; + /*!< The offset of the end of the last chunk + * passed to the user through a call to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), relative to the first + * byte in the fragment, if no accumulator is + * present. If an accumulator is present, it is + * viewed as a prefix to the current fragment, and + * this variable contains an offset from the + * beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t pending; + /*!< The amount of incoming data missing on the + * last call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In particular, it is \c 0 if the last call + * was successful. + * If a reader is reclaimed after an + * unsuccessful call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * this variable is used to have the reader + * remember how much data should be accumulated + * so that the call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * succeeds next time. + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + + /* The accumulator is only needed if we need to be able to pause + * the reader. A few bytes could be saved by moving this to a + * separate struct and using a pointer here. */ + + unsigned char *acc; /*!< The accumulator is used to gather incoming + * data if a read-request via mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * cannot be served from the current fragment. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_len; + /*!< The total size of the accumulator. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_available; + /*!< The number of bytes currently gathered in + * the accumulator. This is both used in + * producing and in consuming mode: + * While producing, it is increased until + * it reaches the value of \c acc_remaining below. + * While consuming, it is used to judge if a + * get request can be served from the + * accumulator or not. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_len. */ + union + { + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_remaining; + /*!< This indicates the amount of data still + * to be gathered in the accumulator. It is + * only used in producing mode. + * Must be at most acc_len - acc_available. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_offset; + /*!< If an accumulator is present and in use, this + * field indicates the offset of the current + * fragment from the beginning of the + * accumulator. If no accumulator is present + * or the accumulator is not in use, this is \c 0. + * It is only used in consuming mode. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_available. */ + } acc_share; +}; + +/* + * API organization: + * A reader object is usually prepared and maintained + * by some lower layer and passed for usage to an upper + * layer, and the API naturally splits according to which + * layer is supposed to use the respective functions. + */ + +/* + * Maintenance API (Lower layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be initialized. + * \param acc The buffer to be used as a temporary accumulator + * in case get requests through mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * exceed the buffer provided by mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * This buffer is owned by the caller and exclusive use + * for reading and writing is given to the reader for the + * duration of the reader's lifetime. It is thus the caller's + * responsibility to maintain (and not touch) the buffer for + * the lifetime of the reader, and to properly zeroize and + * free the memory after the reader has been destroyed. + * \param acc_len The size in Bytes of \p acc. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len ); + +/** + * \brief Free a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be freed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader ); + +/** + * \brief Pass chunk of data for the reader to manage. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in producing mode. + * \param buf The buffer to be managed by the reader. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the reader will be + * moved to consuming mode and obtains read access + * of \p buf until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() + * is called. It is the responsibility of the caller + * to ensure that the \p buf persists and is not changed + * between successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * and mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE if more input data is + * required to fulfill a previous request to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In this case, the reader remains in producing mode and + * takes no ownership of the provided buffer (an internal copy + * is made instead). + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on + * different kinds of failures. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *buf, + mbedtls_mps_size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Reclaim reader's access to the current input buffer. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in consuming mode. + * \param paused If not \c NULL, the integer at address \p paused will be + * modified to indicate whether the reader has been paused + * (value \c 1) or not (value \c 0). Pausing happens if there + * is uncommitted data and a previous request to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has exceeded the bounds of the + * input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + int *paused ); + +/* + * Usage API (Upper layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Request data from the reader. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must + * be in consuming mode. + * \param desired The desired amount of data to be read, in Bytes. + * \param buffer The address to store the buffer pointer in. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buflen The address to store the actual buffer + * length in, or \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *buf holds the + * address of a buffer of size \c *buflen + * (if \c buflen != \c NULL) or \c desired + * (if \c buflen == \c NULL). The user has read access + * to the buffer and guarantee of stability of the data + * until the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA if there is not enough + * data available to serve the get request. In this case, the + * reader remains intact and in consuming mode, and the consumer + * should retry the call after a successful cycle of + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * If, after such a cycle, the consumer requests a different + * amount of data, the result is implementation-defined; + * progress is guaranteed only if the same amount of data + * is requested after a mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and + * mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() cycle. + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error + * code for different kinds of failure. + * + * \note Passing \c NULL as \p buflen is a convenient way to + * indicate that fragmentation is not tolerated. + * It's functionally equivalent to passing a valid + * address as buflen and checking \c *buflen == \c desired + * afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Mark data obtained from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() as processed. + * + * This call indicates that all data received from prior calls to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has been or will have been + * processed when mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called, + * and thus need not be backed up. + * + * This function has no user observable effect until + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. In particular, + * buffers received from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() remain + * valid until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_READER_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6026a071 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Trace module + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mps_common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +#include "mps_trace.h" +#include + +static int trace_depth = 0; + +#define color_default "\x1B[0m" +#define color_red "\x1B[1;31m" +#define color_green "\x1B[1;32m" +#define color_yellow "\x1B[1;33m" +#define color_blue "\x1B[1;34m" +#define color_magenta "\x1B[1;35m" +#define color_cyan "\x1B[1;36m" +#define color_white "\x1B[1;37m" + +static char const * colors[] = +{ + color_default, + color_green, + color_yellow, + color_magenta, + color_cyan, + color_blue, + color_white +}; + +#define MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE 100 + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( int id, int line, const char *format, ... ) +{ + int ret; + char str[MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE]; + va_list argp; + va_start( argp, format ); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( str, MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); + va_end( argp ); + + if( ret >= 0 && ret < MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE ) + { + str[ret] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( "[%d|L%d]: %s\n", id, line, str ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth() +{ + return trace_depth; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth() +{ + trace_depth--; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth() +{ + trace_depth++; +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color( int id ) +{ + if( id > (int) ( sizeof( colors ) / sizeof( *colors ) ) ) + return; + printf( "%s", colors[ id ] ); +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty ) +{ + if( level > 0 ) + { + while( --level ) + printf( "| " ); + + printf( "| " ); + } + + switch( ty ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT: + mbedtls_printf( "@ " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL: + mbedtls_printf( "+--> " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR: + mbedtls_printf( "E " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN: + mbedtls_printf( "< " ); + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7c236011 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_trace.h + * + * \brief Tracing module for MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +/* + * Adapt this to enable/disable tracing output + * from the various layers of the MPS. + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER + +/* + * To use the existing trace module, only change + * MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_XXX above, but don't modify the + * rest of this file. + */ + +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN +} mbedtls_mps_trace_type; + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER 5 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER 6 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER ) + +/* We have to avoid globals because E-ACSL chokes on them... + * Wrap everything in stub functions. */ +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth( void ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth( void ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth( void ); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color( int id ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty ); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( int id, int line, const char *format, ... ); + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( type, ... ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth(), type ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color( mbedtls_mps_trace_id ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( mbedtls_mps_trace_id, __LINE__, __VA_ARGS__ ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color( 0 ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( ... ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, __VA_ARGS__ ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth(); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END( val ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN, "%d (-%#04x)", \ + (int) (val), -((unsigned)(val)) ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth(); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( val ) \ + do { \ + /* Breaks tail recursion. */ \ + int ret__ = val; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END( ret__ ); \ + return( ret__ ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( type, ... ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( ... ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END do { } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( val ) return( val ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8c765e1c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c @@ -0,0 +1,715 @@ +/* + * TCP/IP or UDP/IP networking functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must + * be set before config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. + * Harmless on other platforms. */ +#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif +#ifndef _XOPEN_SOURCE +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 /* sockaddr_storage */ +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + +#define IS_EINTR( ret ) ( ( ret ) == WSAEINTR ) + +#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) +/* Enables getaddrinfo() & Co */ +#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501 +#endif + +#include + +#include +#include +#if (_WIN32_WINNT < 0x0501) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if defined(_WIN32_WCE) +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2.lib" ) +#else +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2_32.lib" ) +#endif +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ + +#define read(fd,buf,len) recv( fd, (char*)( buf ), (int)( len ), 0 ) +#define write(fd,buf,len) send( fd, (char*)( buf ), (int)( len ), 0 ) +#define close(fd) closesocket(fd) + +static int wsa_init_done = 0; + +#else /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define IS_EINTR( ret ) ( ( ret ) == EINTR ) + +#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* Some MS functions want int and MSVC warns if we pass size_t, + * but the standard functions use socklen_t, so cast only for MSVC */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#define MSVC_INT_CAST (int) +#else +#define MSVC_INT_CAST +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include +#endif + +#include + +/* + * Prepare for using the sockets interface + */ +static int net_prepare( void ) +{ +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + WSADATA wsaData; + + if( wsa_init_done == 0 ) + { + if( WSAStartup( MAKEWORD(2,0), &wsaData ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED ); + + wsa_init_done = 1; + } +#else +#if !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + signal( SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN ); +#endif +#endif + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Return 0 if the file descriptor is valid, an error otherwise. + * If for_select != 0, check whether the file descriptor is within the range + * allowed for fd_set used for the FD_xxx macros and the select() function. + */ +static int check_fd( int fd, int for_select ) +{ + if( fd < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + (void) for_select; +#else + /* A limitation of select() is that it only works with file descriptors + * that are strictly less than FD_SETSIZE. This is a limitation of the + * fd_set type. Error out early, because attempting to call FD_SET on a + * large file descriptor is a buffer overflow on typical platforms. */ + if( for_select && fd >= FD_SETSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED ); +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a context + */ +void mbedtls_net_init( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +/* + * Initiate a TCP connection with host:port and the given protocol + */ +int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, + const char *port, int proto ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; + + if( ( ret = net_prepare() ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Do name resolution with both IPv6 and IPv4 */ + memset( &hints, 0, sizeof( hints ) ); + hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + + if( getaddrinfo( host, port, &hints, &addr_list ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST ); + + /* Try the sockaddrs until a connection succeeds */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + for( cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next ) + { + ctx->fd = (int) socket( cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype, + cur->ai_protocol ); + if( ctx->fd < 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + if( connect( ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen ) == 0 ) + { + ret = 0; + break; + } + + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED; + } + + freeaddrinfo( addr_list ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Create a listening socket on bind_ip:port + */ +int mbedtls_net_bind( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *port, int proto ) +{ + int n, ret; + struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; + + if( ( ret = net_prepare() ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Bind to IPv6 and/or IPv4, but only in the desired protocol */ + memset( &hints, 0, sizeof( hints ) ); + hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + if( bind_ip == NULL ) + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + + if( getaddrinfo( bind_ip, port, &hints, &addr_list ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST ); + + /* Try the sockaddrs until a binding succeeds */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + for( cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next ) + { + ctx->fd = (int) socket( cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype, + cur->ai_protocol ); + if( ctx->fd < 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + n = 1; + if( setsockopt( ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (const char *) &n, sizeof( n ) ) != 0 ) + { + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + if( bind( ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen ) != 0 ) + { + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED; + continue; + } + + /* Listen only makes sense for TCP */ + if( proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) + { + if( listen( ctx->fd, MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG ) != 0 ) + { + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED; + continue; + } + } + + /* Bind was successful */ + ret = 0; + break; + } + + freeaddrinfo( addr_list ); + + return( ret ); + +} + +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) +/* + * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket + * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value. + */ +static int net_would_block( const mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + return( WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK ); +} +#else +/* + * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket + * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value. + * + * Note: on a blocking socket this function always returns 0! + */ +static int net_would_block( const mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + int err = errno; + + /* + * Never return 'WOULD BLOCK' on a blocking socket + */ + if( ( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) & O_NONBLOCK ) != O_NONBLOCK ) + { + errno = err; + return( 0 ); + } + + switch( errno = err ) + { +#if defined EAGAIN + case EAGAIN: +#endif +#if defined EWOULDBLOCK && EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN + case EWOULDBLOCK: +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Accept a connection from a remote client + */ +int mbedtls_net_accept( mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, + mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int type; + + struct sockaddr_storage client_addr; + +#if defined(__socklen_t_defined) || defined(_SOCKLEN_T) || \ + defined(_SOCKLEN_T_DECLARED) || defined(__DEFINED_socklen_t) || \ + defined(socklen_t) || (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L) + socklen_t n = (socklen_t) sizeof( client_addr ); + socklen_t type_len = (socklen_t) sizeof( type ); +#else + int n = (int) sizeof( client_addr ); + int type_len = (int) sizeof( type ); +#endif + + /* Is this a TCP or UDP socket? */ + if( getsockopt( bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE, + (void *) &type, &type_len ) != 0 || + ( type != SOCK_STREAM && type != SOCK_DGRAM ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ); + } + + if( type == SOCK_STREAM ) + { + /* TCP: actual accept() */ + ret = client_ctx->fd = (int) accept( bind_ctx->fd, + (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n ); + } + else + { + /* UDP: wait for a message, but keep it in the queue */ + char buf[1] = { 0 }; + + ret = (int) recvfrom( bind_ctx->fd, buf, sizeof( buf ), MSG_PEEK, + (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + if( ret == SOCKET_ERROR && + WSAGetLastError() == WSAEMSGSIZE ) + { + /* We know buf is too small, thanks, just peeking here */ + ret = 0; + } +#endif + } + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + if( net_would_block( bind_ctx ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ); + } + + /* UDP: hijack the listening socket to communicate with the client, + * then bind a new socket to accept new connections */ + if( type != SOCK_STREAM ) + { + struct sockaddr_storage local_addr; + int one = 1; + + if( connect( bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, n ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ); + + client_ctx->fd = bind_ctx->fd; + bind_ctx->fd = -1; /* In case we exit early */ + + n = sizeof( struct sockaddr_storage ); + if( getsockname( client_ctx->fd, + (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, &n ) != 0 || + ( bind_ctx->fd = (int) socket( local_addr.ss_family, + SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP ) ) < 0 || + setsockopt( bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (const char *) &one, sizeof( one ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED ); + } + + if( bind( bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, n ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED ); + } + } + + if( client_ip != NULL ) + { + if( client_addr.ss_family == AF_INET ) + { + struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &client_addr; + *ip_len = sizeof( addr4->sin_addr.s_addr ); + + if( buf_size < *ip_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *ip_len ); + } + else + { + struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &client_addr; + *ip_len = sizeof( addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr ); + + if( buf_size < *ip_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *ip_len); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set the socket blocking or non-blocking + */ +int mbedtls_net_set_block( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + u_long n = 0; + return( ioctlsocket( ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n ) ); +#else + return( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) & ~O_NONBLOCK ) ); +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + u_long n = 1; + return( ioctlsocket( ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n ) ); +#else + return( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) | O_NONBLOCK ) ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Check if data is available on the socket + */ + +int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct timeval tv; + + fd_set read_fds; + fd_set write_fds; + + int fd = ctx->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) + /* Ensure that memory sanitizers consider read_fds and write_fds as + * initialized even on platforms such as Glibc/x86_64 where FD_ZERO + * is implemented in assembly. */ + memset( &read_fds, 0, sizeof( read_fds ) ); + memset( &write_fds, 0, sizeof( write_fds ) ); +#endif +#endif + + FD_ZERO( &read_fds ); + if( rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ ) + { + rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ; + FD_SET( fd, &read_fds ); + } + + FD_ZERO( &write_fds ); + if( rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE ) + { + rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE; + FD_SET( fd, &write_fds ); + } + + if( rw != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = ( timeout % 1000 ) * 1000; + + do + { + ret = select( fd + 1, &read_fds, &write_fds, NULL, + timeout == (uint32_t) -1 ? NULL : &tv ); + } + while( IS_EINTR( ret ) ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED ); + + ret = 0; + if( FD_ISSET( fd, &read_fds ) ) + ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ; + if( FD_ISSET( fd, &write_fds ) ) + ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE; + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Portable usleep helper + */ +void mbedtls_net_usleep( unsigned long usec ) +{ +#if defined(_WIN32) + Sleep( ( usec + 999 ) / 1000 ); +#else + struct timeval tv; + tv.tv_sec = usec / 1000000; +#if defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \ + ( defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__) ) + tv.tv_usec = (suseconds_t) usec % 1000000; +#else + tv.tv_usec = usec % 1000000; +#endif + select( 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Read at most 'len' characters + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = (int) read( fd, buf, len ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + if( net_would_block( ctx ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if( WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); +#else + if( errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); + + if( errno == EINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#endif + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read at most 'len' characters, blocking for at most 'timeout' ms + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, uint32_t timeout ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct timeval tv; + fd_set read_fds; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + FD_ZERO( &read_fds ); + FD_SET( fd, &read_fds ); + + tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = ( timeout % 1000 ) * 1000; + + ret = select( fd + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, timeout == 0 ? NULL : &tv ); + + /* Zero fds ready means we timed out */ + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if( WSAGetLastError() == WSAEINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#else + if( errno == EINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#endif + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED ); + } + + /* This call will not block */ + return( mbedtls_net_recv( ctx, buf, len ) ); +} + +/* + * Write at most 'len' characters + */ +int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = (int) write( fd, buf, len ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + if( net_would_block( ctx ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if( WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); +#else + if( errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); + + if( errno == EINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); +#endif + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_close( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx->fd == -1 ) + return; + + close( ctx->fd ); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +/* + * Gracefully close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_free( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx->fd == -1 ) + return; + + shutdown( ctx->fd, 2 ); + close( ctx->fd ); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1aea0b63 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c @@ -0,0 +1,713 @@ +/* + * Implementation of NIST SP 800-38F key wrapping, supporting KW and KWP modes + * only + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Definition of Key Wrapping: + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf + * RFC 3394 "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm" + * RFC 5649 "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm" + * + * Note: RFC 3394 defines different methodology for intermediate operations for + * the wrapping and unwrapping operation than the definition in NIST SP 800-38F. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) + +#define KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH 8 +#define MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT 3 + +/*! The 64-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KW mode. */ +static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV1[] = {0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6}; +/*! The 32-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KWP mode. */ +static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV2[] = {0xA6, 0x59, 0x59, 0xA6}; + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_init( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_nist_kw_context ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits, + const int is_wrap ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, + keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( cipher_info->block_size != 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * SP 800-38F currently defines AES cipher as the only block cipher allowed: + * "For KW and KWP, the underlying block cipher shall be approved, and the + * block size shall be 128 bits. Currently, the AES block cipher, with key + * lengths of 128, 192, or 256 bits, is the only block cipher that fits + * this profile." + * Currently we don't support other 128 bit block ciphers for key wrapping, + * such as Camellia and Aria. + */ + if( cipher != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, + is_wrap ? MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT : + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) + ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_free( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_nist_kw_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper function for Xoring the uint64_t "t" with the encrypted A. + * Defined in NIST SP 800-38F section 6.1 + */ +static void calc_a_xor_t( unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], uint64_t t ) +{ + size_t i = 0; + for( i = 0; i < sizeof( t ); i++ ) + { + A[i] ^= ( t >> ( ( sizeof( t ) - 1 - i ) * 8 ) ) & 0xff; + } +} + +/* + * KW-AE as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.2 + * KWP-AE as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.3 + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t semiblocks = 0; + size_t s; + size_t olen, padlen = 0; + uint64_t t = 0; + unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + + *out_len = 0; + /* + * Generate the String to work on + */ + if( mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW ) + { + if( out_size < in_len + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the plaintext length for KW + * must be between 2 to 2^54-1 semiblocks inclusive. + */ + if( in_len < 16 || +#if SIZE_MAX > 0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFF8 + in_len > 0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFF8 || +#endif + in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memcpy( output, NIST_KW_ICV1, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memmove( output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, input, in_len ); + } + else + { + if( in_len % 8 != 0 ) + { + padlen = ( 8 - ( in_len % 8 ) ); + } + + if( out_size < in_len + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + padlen ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the plaintext length for KWP + * must be between 1 and 2^32-1 octets inclusive. + */ + if( in_len < 1 +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + || in_len > 0xFFFFFFFF +#endif + ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memcpy( output, NIST_KW_ICV2, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( in_len & 0xffffffff ), output, + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + + memcpy( output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, input, in_len ); + memset( output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + in_len, 0, padlen ); + } + semiblocks = ( ( in_len + padlen ) / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) + 1; + + s = 6 * ( semiblocks - 1 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP + && in_len <= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) + { + memcpy( inbuff, output, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, + inbuff, 16, output, &olen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + unsigned char *A = output; + + /* + * Do the wrapping function W, as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.1 + */ + if( semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate intermediate values */ + for( t = 1; t <= s; t++ ) + { + memcpy( inbuff, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memcpy( inbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, R2, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, + inbuff, 16, outbuff, &olen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + memcpy( A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + calc_a_xor_t( A, t ); + + memcpy( R2, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + R2 += KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + if( R2 >= output + ( semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) ) + R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } + } + + *out_len = semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0) + { + memset( output, 0, semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( inbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * W-1 function as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.2 + * This function assumes the following: + * 1. Output buffer is at least of size ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH. + * 2. The input buffer is of size semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH. + * 3. Minimal number of semiblocks is 3. + * 4. A is a buffer to hold the first semiblock of the input buffer. + */ +static int unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t semiblocks, + unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], + unsigned char *output, size_t* out_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + const size_t s = 6 * ( semiblocks - 1 ); + size_t olen; + uint64_t t = 0; + unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char *R = NULL; + *out_len = 0; + + if( semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memcpy( A, input, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memmove( output, input + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + + /* Calculate intermediate values */ + for( t = s; t >= 1; t-- ) + { + calc_a_xor_t( A, t ); + + memcpy( inbuff, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memcpy( inbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, R, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, + inbuff, 16, outbuff, &olen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + memcpy( A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + /* Set R as LSB64 of outbuff */ + memcpy( R, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + if( R == output ) + R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + else + R -= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } + + *out_len = ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0) + memset( output, 0, ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( inbuff, sizeof( inbuff ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( outbuff, sizeof( outbuff ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * KW-AD as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.2 + * KWP-AD as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.3 + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i, olen; + unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH]; + unsigned char diff, bad_padding = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + if( out_size < in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW ) + { + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the ciphertext length for KW + * must be between 3 to 2^54 semiblocks inclusive. + */ + if( in_len < 24 || +#if SIZE_MAX > 0x200000000000000 + in_len > 0x200000000000000 || +#endif + in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + ret = unwrap( ctx, input, in_len / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, + A, output, out_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */ + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + } + else if( mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP ) + { + size_t padlen = 0; + uint32_t Plen; + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the ciphertext length for KWP + * must be between 2 to 2^29 semiblocks inclusive. + */ + if( in_len < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 || +#if SIZE_MAX > 0x100000000 + in_len > 0x100000000 || +#endif + in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( in_len == KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 ) + { + unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, 16, outbuff, &olen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + memcpy( A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memcpy( output, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( outbuff, sizeof( outbuff ) ); + *out_len = KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } + else + { + /* in_len >= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 3 */ + ret = unwrap( ctx, input, in_len / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, + A, output, out_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */ + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + Plen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + + /* + * Plen is the length of the plaintext, when the input is valid. + * If Plen is larger than the plaintext and padding, padlen will be + * larger than 8, because of the type wrap around. + */ + padlen = in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - Plen; + if ( padlen > 7 ) + { + padlen &= 7; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + /* Check padding in "constant-time" */ + for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; i++ ) + { + if( i >= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen ) + diff |= output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i]; + else + bad_padding |= output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i]; + } + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + memset( output + Plen, 0, padlen ); + *out_len = Plen; + } + else + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + { + memset( output, 0, *out_len ); + *out_len = 0; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &bad_padding, sizeof( bad_padding) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &diff, sizeof( diff ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( A, sizeof( A ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +#define KW_TESTS 3 + +/* + * Test vectors taken from NIST + * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/CAVP-TESTING-BLOCK-CIPHER-MODES#KW + */ +static const unsigned int key_len[KW_TESTS] = { 16, 24, 32 }; + +static const unsigned char kw_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { + { 0x75, 0x75, 0xda, 0x3a, 0x93, 0x60, 0x7c, 0xc2, + 0xbf, 0xd8, 0xce, 0xc7, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0xd9, 0xa6 }, + { 0x2d, 0x85, 0x26, 0x08, 0x1d, 0x02, 0xfb, 0x5b, + 0x85, 0xf6, 0x9a, 0xc2, 0x86, 0xec, 0xd5, 0x7d, + 0x40, 0xdf, 0x5d, 0xf3, 0x49, 0x47, 0x44, 0xd3 }, + { 0x11, 0x2a, 0xd4, 0x1b, 0x48, 0x56, 0xc7, 0x25, + 0x4a, 0x98, 0x48, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xdd, 0x78, 0x33, + 0x5b, 0x03, 0x9a, 0x48, 0xa8, 0x96, 0x2c, 0x4d, + 0x1c, 0xb7, 0x8e, 0xab, 0xd5, 0xda, 0xd7, 0x88 } +}; + +static const unsigned char kw_msg[KW_TESTS][40] = { + { 0x42, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0xea, + 0xc9, 0x5a, 0x06, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xed, 0x3f }, + { 0x95, 0xc1, 0x1b, 0xf5, 0x35, 0x3a, 0xfe, 0xdb, + 0x98, 0xfd, 0xd6, 0xc8, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0x6d, + 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x74, 0xb4, 0x99, 0x0f, 0xdc, 0x45, + 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x15, 0x8f, 0x51, 0xce, 0x62, 0x9d, + 0xe2, 0xaf, 0x26, 0xe3, 0x25, 0x0e, 0x6b, 0x4c }, + { 0x1b, 0x20, 0xbf, 0x19, 0x90, 0xb0, 0x65, 0xd7, + 0x98, 0xe1, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x64, 0xad, 0x50, 0xa8, + 0x74, 0x74, 0x92, 0xba, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x4d, 0xd1 } +}; + +static const size_t kw_msg_len[KW_TESTS] = { 16, 40, 24 }; +static const size_t kw_out_len[KW_TESTS] = { 24, 48, 32 }; +static const unsigned char kw_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { + { 0x03, 0x1f, 0x6b, 0xd7, 0xe6, 0x1e, 0x64, 0x3d, + 0xf6, 0x85, 0x94, 0x81, 0x6f, 0x64, 0xca, 0xa3, + 0xf5, 0x6f, 0xab, 0xea, 0x25, 0x48, 0xf5, 0xfb }, + { 0x44, 0x3c, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x09, 0x83, 0x71, 0x91, + 0x3e, 0x5c, 0x81, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xa0, 0x42, 0xec, + 0x68, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x24, 0x3a, 0x4d, + 0x6c, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x15, 0x63, 0xe8, + 0xa1, 0x4a, 0x55, 0x8e, 0x09, 0x64, 0x16, 0x19, + 0xbf, 0x03, 0xfc, 0xaf, 0x90, 0xb1, 0xfc, 0x2d }, + { 0xba, 0x8a, 0x25, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x7d, + 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x40, 0xec, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x3d, 0x87, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0xda, 0xdc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x05, 0xd9, + 0x16, 0x58, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0xf6, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0x12 } +}; + +static const unsigned char kwp_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { + { 0x78, 0x65, 0xe2, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x21, 0x65, 0x9a, + 0xb4, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x62, 0x9c, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0xc4 }, + { 0xf5, 0xf8, 0x96, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x2f, 0x4a, 0x98, + 0x23, 0xef, 0x16, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x05, 0xd7, + 0xde, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0x66, 0x26, 0x96, 0xa2, 0x58 }, + { 0x95, 0xda, 0x27, 0x00, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xd9, 0xa5, + 0x25, 0x54, 0xee, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x38, 0x6f, + 0x5b, 0x94, 0xa1, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xd8, 0xa4, 0xae, + 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xab, 0x5f, 0x22, 0x5a } +}; + +static const unsigned char kwp_msg[KW_TESTS][31] = { + { 0xbd, 0x68, 0x43, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x37, 0x8d, 0xc8, + 0x96 }, + { 0x6c, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x85, 0x18, 0x40, 0x97, 0xeb, + 0xd5, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x19, + 0x14, 0x7b, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x5f, 0x96, 0x43, 0x66, + 0x91, 0x56, 0x75, 0x8c, 0x13, 0x16, 0x8f }, + { 0xd1 } +}; +static const size_t kwp_msg_len[KW_TESTS] = { 9, 31, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char kwp_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { + { 0x41, 0xec, 0xa9, 0x56, 0xd4, 0xaa, 0x04, 0x7e, + 0xb5, 0xcf, 0x4e, 0xfe, 0x65, 0x96, 0x61, 0xe7, + 0x4d, 0xb6, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xe2, 0x35, 0x00 }, + { 0x4e, 0x9b, 0xc2, 0xbc, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x1e, 0x13, + 0xd3, 0x35, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x6a, 0x88, + 0xfa, 0x87, 0x53, 0x66, 0x15, 0xbb, 0x8e, 0x63, + 0x8b, 0xcc, 0x81, 0x66, 0x84, 0x68, 0x17, 0x90, + 0x67, 0xcf, 0xa9, 0x8a, 0x9d, 0x0e, 0x33, 0x26 }, + { 0x06, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xe6, 0xf3, 0x24, 0x8c, 0xfd, + 0xcf, 0x26, 0x75, 0x07, 0xfa, 0x00, 0x1b, 0xc4 } +}; +static const size_t kwp_out_len[KW_TESTS] = { 24, 40, 16 }; + +int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx; + unsigned char out[48]; + size_t olen; + int i; + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx ); + + for( i = 0; i < KW_TESTS; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KW-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8 ); + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KW: setup failed " ); + + goto end; + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( &ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, kw_msg[i], + kw_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof( out ) ); + if( ret != 0 || kw_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp( out, kw_res[i], kw_out_len[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed. "); + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0 ) ) + != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KW: setup failed "); + + goto end; + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( &ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, + out, olen, out, &olen, sizeof( out ) ); + + if( ret != 0 || olen != kw_msg_len[i] || + memcmp( out, kw_msg[i], kw_msg_len[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " passed\n" ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < KW_TESTS; i++ ) + { + olen = sizeof( out ); + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KWP-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8 ); + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kwp_key[i], + key_len[i] * 8, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KWP: setup failed " ); + + goto end; + } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( &ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, kwp_msg[i], + kwp_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof( out ) ); + + if( ret != 0 || kwp_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp( out, kwp_res[i], kwp_out_len[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed. "); + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kwp_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0 ) ) + != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KWP: setup failed "); + + goto end; + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( &ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, out, + olen, out, &olen, sizeof( out ) ); + + if( ret != 0 || olen != kwp_msg_len[i] || + memcmp( out, kwp_msg[i], kwp_msg_len[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed. "); + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " passed\n" ); + } +end: + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/oid.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/oid.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..19c8ac20 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/oid.c @@ -0,0 +1,767 @@ +/** + * \file oid.c + * + * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#endif + +/* + * Macro to automatically add the size of #define'd OIDs + */ +#define ADD_LEN(s) s, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(s) + +/* + * Macro to generate an internal function for oid_XXX_from_asn1() (used by + * the other functions) + */ +#define FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1( TYPE_T, NAME, LIST ) \ + static const TYPE_T * oid_ ## NAME ## _from_asn1( \ + const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) \ + { \ + const TYPE_T *p = (LIST); \ + const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *cur = \ + (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ + if( p == NULL || oid == NULL ) return( NULL ); \ + while( cur->asn1 != NULL ) { \ + if( cur->asn1_len == oid->len && \ + memcmp( cur->asn1, oid->p, oid->len ) == 0 ) { \ + return( p ); \ + } \ + p++; \ + cur = (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ + } \ + return( NULL ); \ + } + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from the + * descriptor of an mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ +int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1 ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ + if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ + *ATTR1 = data->descriptor.ATTR1; \ + return( 0 ); \ +} + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from an + * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ +int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1 ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ + if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ + *ATTR1 = data->ATTR1; \ + return( 0 ); \ +} + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving two attributes from an + * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \ +int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE * ATTR2 ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ + if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ + *(ATTR1) = data->ATTR1; \ + *(ATTR2) = data->ATTR2; \ + return( 0 ); \ +} + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on a single + * attribute from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ +int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, const char **oid, size_t *olen ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ + while( cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL ) { \ + if( cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) ) { \ + *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ + *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ + return( 0 ); \ + } \ + cur++; \ + } \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ +} + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on two + * attributes from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \ +int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE ATTR2, const char **oid , \ + size_t *olen ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ + while( cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL ) { \ + if( cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) && cur->ATTR2 == (ATTR2) ) { \ + *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ + *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ + return( 0 ); \ + } \ + cur++; \ + } \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ +} + +/* + * For X520 attribute types + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + const char *short_name; +} oid_x520_attr_t; + +static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN ), "id-at-commonName", "Common Name" }, + "CN", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY ), "id-at-countryName", "Country" }, + "C", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY ), "id-at-locality", "Locality" }, + "L", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE ), "id-at-state", "State" }, + "ST", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION ),"id-at-organizationName", "Organization" }, + "O", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT ), "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit" }, + "OU", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL ), "emailAddress", "E-mail address" }, + "emailAddress", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER ),"id-at-serialNumber", "Serial number" }, + "serialNumber", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS ),"id-at-postalAddress", "Postal address" }, + "postalAddress", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE ), "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code" }, + "postalCode", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME ), "id-at-surName", "Surname" }, + "SN", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME ), "id-at-givenName", "Given name" }, + "GN", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS ), "id-at-initials", "Initials" }, + "initials", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER ), "id-at-generationQualifier", "Generation qualifier" }, + "generationQualifier", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE ), "id-at-title", "Title" }, + "title", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER ),"id-at-dnQualifier", "Distinguished Name qualifier" }, + "dnQualifier", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM ), "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym" }, + "pseudonym", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT ), "id-domainComponent", "Domain component" }, + "DC", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER ), "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", "Unique Identifier" }, + "uniqueIdentifier", + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL, + } +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x520_attr_t, x520_attr, oid_x520_attr_type) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name, oid_x520_attr_t, x520_attr, const char *, short_name) + +/* + * For X509 extensions + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + int ext_type; +} oid_x509_ext_t; + +static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ), "id-ce-basicConstraints", "Basic Constraints" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-extKeyUsage", "Extended Key Usage" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ), "id-ce-subjectAltName", "Subject Alt Name" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), "id-netscape-certtype", "Netscape Certificate Type" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES ), "id-ce-certificatePolicies", "Certificate Policies" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + 0, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, oid_x509_ext) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type, oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, int, ext_type) + +static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_ext_key_usage[] = +{ + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ), "id-kp-serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH ), "id-kp-clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING ), "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION ), "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING ), "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING ), "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN ), "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)" }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, oid_ext_key_usage) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, const char *, description) + +static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_certificate_policies[] = +{ + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY ), "anyPolicy", "Any Policy" }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, oid_certificate_policies) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, const char *, description) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/* + * For SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +} oid_sig_alg_t; + +static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 ), "md2WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD2" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 ), "md4WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD4" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 ), "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 ), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 ), "sha224WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-224" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 ), "sha256WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-256" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 ), "sha384WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-384" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 ), "sha512WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-512" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS ), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS ), "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, oid_sig_alg) +FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, const char *, description) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, oid_sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +/* + * For PublicKeyInfo (PKCS1, RFC 5480) + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +} oid_pk_alg_t; + +static const oid_pk_alg_t oid_pk_alg[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA ), "rsaEncryption", "RSA" }, + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED ), "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key" }, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH ), "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH" }, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, oid_pk_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg, oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg, oid_pk_alg_t, oid_pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * For namedCurve (RFC 5480) + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +} oid_ecp_grp_t; + +static const oid_ecp_grp_t oid_ecp_grp[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 ), "secp192r1", "secp192r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 ), "secp224r1", "secp224r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 ), "secp256r1", "secp256r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 ), "secp384r1", "secp384r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 ), "secp521r1", "secp521r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 ), "secp192k1", "secp192k1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 ), "secp224k1", "secp224k1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 ), "secp256k1", "secp256k1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 ), "brainpoolP256r1","brainpool256r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 ), "brainpoolP384r1","brainpool384r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 ), "brainpoolP512r1","brainpool512r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, oid_ecp_grp) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp_t, oid_ecp_grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +/* + * For PKCS#5 PBES2 encryption algorithm + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; +} oid_cipher_alg_t; + +static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC ), "desCBC", "DES-CBC" }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC ), "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC" }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t, cipher_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/* + * For digestAlgorithm + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; +} oid_md_alg_t; + +static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 ), "id-md2", "MD2" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 ), "id-md4", "MD4" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 ), "id-md5", "MD5" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 ), "id-sha1", "SHA-1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 ), "id-sha224", "SHA-224" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 ), "id-sha256", "SHA-256" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 ), "id-sha384", "SHA-384" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 ), "id-sha512", "SHA-512" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 ), "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, oid_md_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg, oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md, oid_md_alg_t, oid_md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) + +/* + * For HMAC digestAlgorithm + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_hmac; +} oid_md_hmac_t; + +static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 ), "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 ), "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256 ), "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384 ), "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512 ), "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, oid_md_hmac) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac, oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_hmac) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +/* + * For PKCS#12 PBEs + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; +} oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t; + +static const oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC ), "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC ), "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pbe_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t, cipher_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ + +#define OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF \ + do { \ + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); \ + \ + n -= (size_t) ret; \ + p += (size_t) ret; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* Return the x.y.z.... style numeric string for the given OID */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, + const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n; + unsigned int value; + char *p; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + /* First byte contains first two dots */ + if( oid->len > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%d.%d", oid->p[0] / 40, oid->p[0] % 40 ); + OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + value = 0; + for( i = 1; i < oid->len; i++ ) + { + /* Prevent overflow in value. */ + if( ( ( value << 7 ) >> 7 ) != value ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + value <<= 7; + value += oid->p[i] & 0x7F; + + if( !( oid->p[i] & 0x80 ) ) + { + /* Last byte */ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ".%u", value ); + OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + value = 0; + } + } + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/padlock.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/padlock.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..83733741 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/padlock.c @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +/* + * VIA PadLock support functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * This implementation is based on the VIA PadLock Programming Guide: + * + * http://www.via.com.tw/en/downloads/whitepapers/initiatives/padlock/ + * programming_guide.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + +#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" + +#include + +#ifndef asm +#define asm __asm +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) + +/* + * PadLock detection routine + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature ) +{ + static int flags = -1; + int ebx = 0, edx = 0; + + if( flags == -1 ) + { + asm( "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" + "movl $0xC0000000, %%eax \n\t" + "cpuid \n\t" + "cmpl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" + "movl $0, %%edx \n\t" + "jb 1f \n\t" + "movl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" + "cpuid \n\t" + "1: \n\t" + "movl %%edx, %1 \n\t" + "movl %2, %%ebx \n\t" + : "=m" (ebx), "=m" (edx) + : "m" (ebx) + : "eax", "ecx", "edx" ); + + flags = edx; + } + + return( flags & feature ); +} + +/* + * PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ebx = 0; + uint32_t *rk; + uint32_t *blk; + uint32_t *ctrl; + unsigned char buf[256]; + + rk = ctx->rk; + blk = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( buf ); + memcpy( blk, input, 16 ); + + ctrl = blk + 4; + *ctrl = 0x80 | ctx->nr | ( ( ctx->nr + ( mode^1 ) - 10 ) << 9 ); + + asm( "pushfl \n\t" + "popfl \n\t" + "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" + "movl $1, %%ecx \n\t" + "movl %2, %%edx \n\t" + "movl %3, %%ebx \n\t" + "movl %4, %%esi \n\t" + "movl %4, %%edi \n\t" + ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8 \n\t" + "movl %1, %%ebx \n\t" + : "=m" (ebx) + : "m" (ebx), "m" (ctrl), "m" (rk), "m" (blk) + : "memory", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" ); + + memcpy( output, blk, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ebx = 0; + size_t count; + uint32_t *rk; + uint32_t *iw; + uint32_t *ctrl; + unsigned char buf[256]; + + if( ( (long) input & 15 ) != 0 || + ( (long) output & 15 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED ); + + rk = ctx->rk; + iw = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( buf ); + memcpy( iw, iv, 16 ); + + ctrl = iw + 4; + *ctrl = 0x80 | ctx->nr | ( ( ctx->nr + ( mode ^ 1 ) - 10 ) << 9 ); + + count = ( length + 15 ) >> 4; + + asm( "pushfl \n\t" + "popfl \n\t" + "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" + "movl %2, %%ecx \n\t" + "movl %3, %%edx \n\t" + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" + "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" + "movl %6, %%edi \n\t" + "movl %7, %%eax \n\t" + ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0 \n\t" + "movl %1, %%ebx \n\t" + : "=m" (ebx) + : "m" (ebx), "m" (count), "m" (ctrl), + "m" (rk), "m" (input), "m" (output), "m" (iw) + : "memory", "eax", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" ); + + memcpy( iv, iw, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pem.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pem.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fcfde947 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pem.c @@ -0,0 +1,489 @@ +/* + * Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_pem_init( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_pem_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) ) +/* + * Read a 16-byte hex string and convert it to binary + */ +static int pem_get_iv( const unsigned char *s, unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ) +{ + size_t i, j, k; + + memset( iv, 0, iv_len ); + + for( i = 0; i < iv_len * 2; i++, s++ ) + { + if( *s >= '0' && *s <= '9' ) j = *s - '0'; else + if( *s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F' ) j = *s - '7'; else + if( *s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f' ) j = *s - 'W'; else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV ); + + k = ( ( i & 1 ) != 0 ) ? j : j << 4; + + iv[i >> 1] = (unsigned char)( iv[i >> 1] | k ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int pem_pbkdf1( unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_context md5_ctx; + unsigned char md5sum[16]; + size_t use_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5_ctx ); + + /* + * key[ 0..15] = MD5(pwd || IV) + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, iv, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5_ctx, md5sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( keylen <= 16 ) + { + memcpy( key, md5sum, keylen ); + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( key, md5sum, 16 ); + + /* + * key[16..23] = MD5(key[ 0..15] || pwd || IV]) + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, md5sum, 16 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, iv, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5_ctx, md5sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + use_len = 16; + if( keylen < 32 ) + use_len = keylen - 16; + + memcpy( key + 16, md5sum, use_len ); + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( md5sum, 16 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +/* + * Decrypt with DES-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation + */ +static int pem_des_decrypt( unsigned char des_iv[8], + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + mbedtls_des_context des_ctx; + unsigned char des_key[8]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_des_init( &des_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = pem_pbkdf1( des_key, 8, des_iv, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &des_ctx, des_key ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &des_ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, buflen, + des_iv, buf, buf ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free( &des_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( des_key, 8 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Decrypt with 3DES-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation + */ +static int pem_des3_decrypt( unsigned char des3_iv[8], + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + mbedtls_des3_context des3_ctx; + unsigned char des3_key[24]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_des3_init( &des3_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = pem_pbkdf1( des3_key, 24, des3_iv, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &des3_ctx, des3_key ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &des3_ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, buflen, + des3_iv, buf, buf ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des3_free( &des3_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( des3_key, 24 ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * Decrypt with AES-XXX-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation + */ +static int pem_aes_decrypt( unsigned char aes_iv[16], unsigned int keylen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; + unsigned char aes_key[32]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = pem_pbkdf1( aes_key, keylen, aes_iv, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &aes_ctx, aes_key, keylen * 8 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, buflen, + aes_iv, buf, buf ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &aes_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( aes_key, keylen ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + +int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *pwd, + size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len ) +{ + int ret, enc; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + const unsigned char *s1, *s2, *end; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) ) + unsigned char pem_iv[16]; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; +#else + ((void) pwd); + ((void) pwdlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + s1 = (unsigned char *) strstr( (const char *) data, header ); + + if( s1 == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ); + + s2 = (unsigned char *) strstr( (const char *) data, footer ); + + if( s2 == NULL || s2 <= s1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ); + + s1 += strlen( header ); + if( *s1 == ' ' ) s1++; + if( *s1 == '\r' ) s1++; + if( *s1 == '\n' ) s1++; + else return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ); + + end = s2; + end += strlen( footer ); + if( *end == ' ' ) end++; + if( *end == '\r' ) end++; + if( *end == '\n' ) end++; + *use_len = end - data; + + enc = 0; + + if( s2 - s1 >= 22 && memcmp( s1, "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED", 22 ) == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) ) + enc++; + + s1 += 22; + if( *s1 == '\r' ) s1++; + if( *s1 == '\n' ) s1++; + else return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA ); + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + if( s2 - s1 >= 23 && memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,", 23 ) == 0 ) + { + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC; + + s1 += 23; + if( s2 - s1 < 16 || pem_get_iv( s1, pem_iv, 8 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV ); + + s1 += 16; + } + else if( s2 - s1 >= 18 && memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: DES-CBC,", 18 ) == 0 ) + { + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC; + + s1 += 18; + if( s2 - s1 < 16 || pem_get_iv( s1, pem_iv, 8) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV ); + + s1 += 16; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if( s2 - s1 >= 14 && memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-", 14 ) == 0 ) + { + if( s2 - s1 < 22 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG ); + else if( memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 ) + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC; + else if( memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 ) + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC; + else if( memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 ) + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC; + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG ); + + s1 += 22; + if( s2 - s1 < 32 || pem_get_iv( s1, pem_iv, 16 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV ); + + s1 += 32; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + + if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG ); + + if( *s1 == '\r' ) s1++; + if( *s1 == '\n' ) s1++; + else return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + } + + if( s1 >= s2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA ); + + ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( NULL, 0, &len, s1, s2 - s1 ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret ) ); + + if( ( buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( buf, len, &len, s1, s2 - s1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret ) ); + } + + if( enc != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) ) + if( pwd == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + } + + ret = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC ) + ret = pem_des3_decrypt( pem_iv, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); + else if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC ) + ret = pem_des_decrypt( pem_iv, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC ) + ret = pem_aes_decrypt( pem_iv, 16, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); + else if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC ) + ret = pem_aes_decrypt( pem_iv, 24, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); + else if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC ) + ret = pem_aes_decrypt( pem_iv, 32, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * The result will be ASN.1 starting with a SEQUENCE tag, with 1 to 3 + * length bytes (allow 4 to be sure) in all known use cases. + * + * Use that as a heuristic to try to detect password mismatches. + */ + if( len <= 2 || buf[0] != 0x30 || buf[1] > 0x83 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + } +#else + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + } + + ctx->buf = buf; + ctx->buflen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_pem_free( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ) +{ + if ( ctx->buf != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->buf, ctx->buflen ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->buf ); + } + mbedtls_free( ctx->info ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_pem_context ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *encode_buf = NULL, *c, *p = buf; + size_t len = 0, use_len, add_len = 0; + + mbedtls_base64_encode( NULL, 0, &use_len, der_data, der_len ); + add_len = strlen( header ) + strlen( footer ) + ( use_len / 64 ) + 1; + + if( use_len + add_len > buf_len ) + { + *olen = use_len + add_len; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + if( use_len != 0 && + ( ( encode_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, use_len ) ) == NULL ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_encode( encode_buf, use_len, &use_len, der_data, + der_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( encode_buf ); + return( ret ); + } + + memcpy( p, header, strlen( header ) ); + p += strlen( header ); + c = encode_buf; + + while( use_len ) + { + len = ( use_len > 64 ) ? 64 : use_len; + memcpy( p, c, len ); + use_len -= len; + p += len; + c += len; + *p++ = '\n'; + } + + memcpy( p, footer, strlen( footer ) ); + p += strlen( footer ); + + *p++ = '\0'; + *olen = p - buf; + + /* Clean any remaining data previously written to the buffer */ + memset( buf + *olen, 0, buf_len - *olen ); + + mbedtls_free( encode_buf ); + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pk.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pk.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..05cc2134 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pk.c @@ -0,0 +1,642 @@ +/* + * Public Key abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * Initialise a mbedtls_pk_context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->pk_ctx = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free (the components of) a mbedtls_pk_context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + if ( ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func( ctx->pk_ctx ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL || + ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func == NULL ) + { + return; + } + + ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func( ctx->rs_ctx ); + + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Get pk_info structure from type + */ +const mbedtls_pk_info_t * mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type ) +{ + switch( pk_type ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( &mbedtls_rsa_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return( &mbedtls_eckey_info ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + return( &mbedtls_eckeydh_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return( &mbedtls_ecdsa_info ); +#endif + /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT omitted on purpose */ + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} + +/* + * Initialise context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( info == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Initialise a PSA-wrapping context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const psa_key_id_t key ) +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * const info = &mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t *pk_ctx; + psa_key_type_t type; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + /* Current implementation of can_do() relies on this. */ + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ; + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + pk_ctx = (psa_key_id_t *) ctx->pk_ctx; + *pk_ctx = key; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* + * Initialize an RSA-alt context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void * key, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = &mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx->pk_ctx; + + rsa_alt->key = key; + rsa_alt->decrypt_func = decrypt_func; + rsa_alt->sign_func = sign_func; + rsa_alt->key_len_func = key_len_func; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given type + */ +int mbedtls_pk_can_do( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + /* A context with null pk_info is not set up yet and can't do anything. + * For backward compatibility, also accept NULL instead of a context + * pointer. */ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->can_do( type ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify + */ +static inline int pk_hashlen_helper( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + if( *hash_len != 0 && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if ( *hash_len != 0 && *hash_len != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + return ( -1 ); + + *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Helper to set up a restart context if needed + */ +static int pk_restart_setup( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx, + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ) +{ + /* Don't do anything if already set up or invalid */ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Should never happen when we're called */ + if( info->rs_alloc_func == NULL || info->rs_free_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ctx->rs_ctx = info->rs_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Verify a signature (restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL || + pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && + mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && + ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func != NULL ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx->rs_ctx ); + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx ); + + return( ret ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify a signature + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify a signature with options + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx, type ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + if( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + if( options == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options; + + if( sig_len < mbedtls_pk_get_len( ctx ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ), + NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, + pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, + pss_opts->expected_salt_len, + sig ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len( ctx ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + } + + /* General case: no options */ + if( options != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_pk_verify( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Make a signature (restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL || + pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && + mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && + ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func != NULL ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx->rs_ctx ); + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx ); + + return( ret ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->sign_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Make a signature + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + return( mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Decrypt message + */ +int mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL || ilen == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL || osize == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func( ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Encrypt message + */ +int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL || ilen == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL || osize == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func( ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Check public-private key pair + */ +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + + if( pub->pk_info == NULL || + prv->pk_info == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT ) + { + if( pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + else + { + if( pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + + return( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func( pub->pk_ctx, prv->pk_ctx ) ); +} + +/* + * Get key size in bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + /* For backward compatibility, accept NULL or a context that + * isn't set up yet, and return a fake value that should be safe. */ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen( ctx->pk_ctx ) ); +} + +/* + * Export debug information + */ +int mbedtls_pk_debug( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx->pk_info->debug_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + ctx->pk_info->debug_func( ctx->pk_ctx, items ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Access the PK type name + */ +const char *mbedtls_pk_get_name( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( "invalid PK" ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->name ); +} + +/* + * Access the PK type + */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->type ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Load the key to a PSA key slot, + * then turn the PK context into a wrapper for that key slot. + * + * Currently only works for EC private keys. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_id_t *key, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + ((void) pk); + ((void) key); + ((void) hash_alg); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); +#else + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec; + unsigned char d[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t d_len; + psa_ecc_family_t curve_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + size_t bits; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* export the private key material in the format PSA wants */ + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + ec = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ); + d_len = ( ec->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, d, d_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + curve_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ec->grp.id, &bits ); + key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( curve_id ); + + /* prepare the key attributes */ + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) ); + + /* import private key into PSA */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_import_key( &attributes, d, d_len, key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* make PK context wrap the key slot */ + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + + return( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( pk, *key ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..107e912a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,1069 @@ +/* + * Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */ +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static int rsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ); +} + +static size_t rsa_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + return( 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ); +} + +static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + if( sig_len < rsa_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, NULL, NULL, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* The buffer contains a valid signature followed by extra data. + * We have a special error code for that so that so that callers can + * use mbedtls_pk_verify() to check "Does the buffer start with a + * valid signature?" and not just "Does the buffer contain a valid + * signature?". */ + if( sig_len > rsa_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int rsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ); +} + +static int rsa_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + + if( ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) ); +} + +static int rsa_encrypt_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + *olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + + if( *olen > osize ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + ilen, input, output ) ); +} + +static int rsa_check_pair_wrap( const void *pub, const void *prv ) +{ + return( mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub, + (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv ) ); +} + +static void *rsa_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_rsa_init( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, 0, 0 ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void rsa_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_free( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static void rsa_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) +{ + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; + items->name = "rsa.N"; + items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->N ); + + items++; + + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; + items->name = "rsa.E"; + items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->E ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + "RSA", + rsa_get_bitlen, + rsa_can_do, + rsa_verify_wrap, + rsa_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + rsa_decrypt_wrap, + rsa_encrypt_wrap, + rsa_check_pair_wrap, + rsa_alloc_wrap, + rsa_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + rsa_debug, +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Generic EC key + */ +static int eckey_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +static size_t eckey_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + return( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->grp.pbits ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +/* Forward declarations */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); + +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 ) + ret = ecdsa_verify_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ); + + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int eckey_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 ) + ret = ecdsa_sign_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ); + + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* Forward declarations */ +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ); + +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx ); + +/* + * Restart context for ECDSA operations with ECKEY context + * + * We need to store an actual ECDSA context, as we need to pass the same to + * the underlying ecdsa function, so we can't create it on the fly every time. + */ +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ecdsa_rs; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_ctx; +} eckey_restart_ctx; + +static void *eckey_rs_alloc( void ) +{ + eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx; + + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( eckey_restart_ctx ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + { + rs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx ); + } + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void eckey_rs_free( void *ctx ) +{ + eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx; + + if( ctx == NULL) + return; + + rs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx ); + + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if( rs == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if( rs == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub, + (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv ) ); +} + +static void *eckey_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void eckey_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static void eckey_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) +{ + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP; + items->name = "eckey.Q"; + items->value = &( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->Q ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + "EC", + eckey_get_bitlen, + eckey_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + eckey_verify_wrap, + eckey_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + eckey_verify_rs_wrap, + eckey_sign_rs_wrap, +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + NULL, + NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + NULL, + NULL, + eckey_check_pair, + eckey_alloc_wrap, + eckey_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + eckey_rs_alloc, + eckey_rs_free, +#endif + eckey_debug, +}; + +/* + * EC key restricted to ECDH + */ +static int eckeydh_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + "EC_DH", + eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */ + eckeydh_can_do, + NULL, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + NULL, + NULL, + eckey_check_pair, + eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ + eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +static int ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of + * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA. + */ +static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int( unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *to, size_t to_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t unpadded_len, padding_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( from, end, &unpadded_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + while( unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00 ) + { + ( *from )++; + unpadded_len--; + } + + if( unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len; + memset( to, 0x00, padding_len ); + memcpy( to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len ); + ( *from ) += unpadded_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers + * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least + * twice as big as int_size. + */ +static int extract_ecdsa_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tmp_size; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &tmp_size, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Extract r */ + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig, int_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + /* Extract s */ + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig + int_size, int_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key_id = 0; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_pk_context key; + int key_len; + /* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */ + unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p; + mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits ); + const size_t signature_part_size = ( ctx->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8; + ((void) md_alg); + + if( curve == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context; + * re-construct one to make it happy */ + key.pk_info = &pk_info; + key.pk_ctx = ctx; + p = buf + sizeof( buf ); + key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &p, buf, &key ); + if( key_len <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( curve ) ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, psa_sig_md ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, + buf + sizeof( buf ) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* We don't need the exported key anymore and can + * reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */ + if( 2 * signature_part_size > sizeof( buf ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + p = (unsigned char*) sig; + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig( &p, sig + sig_len, buf, + signature_part_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + + if( psa_verify_hash( key_id, psa_sig_md, + hash, hash_len, + buf, 2 * signature_part_size ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p != sig + sig_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + goto cleanup; + } + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + return( ret ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) md_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) md_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx ) ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void ecdsa_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void ecdsa_rs_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + "ECDSA", + eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */ + ecdsa_can_do, + ecdsa_verify_wrap, + ecdsa_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap, + ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap, +#endif + NULL, + NULL, + eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */ + ecdsa_alloc_wrap, + ecdsa_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ecdsa_rs_alloc, + ecdsa_rs_free, +#endif + eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* + * Support for alternative RSA-private implementations + */ + +static int rsa_alt_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); +} + +static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + + return( 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) ); +} + +static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ); + if( *sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( rsa_alt->sign_func( rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ); +} + +static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if( ilen != rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( rsa_alt->decrypt_func( rsa_alt->key, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv ) +{ + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char hash[32]; + size_t sig_len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( rsa_alt_get_bitlen( prv ) != rsa_get_bitlen( pub ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + + memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof( hash ) ); + + if( ( ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap( (void *) prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, &sig_len, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( rsa_verify_wrap( (void *) pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof( hash ), sig, sig_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void rsa_alt_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, + "RSA-alt", + rsa_alt_get_bitlen, + rsa_alt_can_do, + NULL, + rsa_alt_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + rsa_alt_check_pair, +#else + NULL, +#endif + rsa_alt_alloc_wrap, + rsa_alt_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + NULL, +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) ); + + /* no _init() function to call, an calloc() already zeroized */ + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void pk_opaque_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; + size_t bits; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( *key, &attributes ) ) + return( 0 ); + + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + return( bits ); +} + +static int pk_opaque_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + /* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs, + * as checked by setup_psa(). + * Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + +/* + * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer + * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer. + * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(). + * + * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer + * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end + * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start + */ +static int asn1_write_mpibuf( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + size_t n_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( (size_t)( *p - start ) < n_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = n_len; + *p -= len; + memmove( *p, start, len ); + + /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. + * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect + * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */ + while( len > 0 && **p == 0x00 ) + { + ++(*p); + --len; + } + + /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. + * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */ + if( **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence. + * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of + * MPIs, and in-place. + * + * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding + * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding + * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer + */ +static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + size_t buf_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2; + unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig + rs_len, rs_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig, rs_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, sig, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, sig, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + memmove( sig, p, len ); + *sig_len = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + ((void) ctx); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) hash); + ((void) hash_len); + ((void) sig); + ((void) sig_len); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ) ); + size_t buf_len; + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA has its own RNG */ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + /* PSA needs an output buffer of known size, but our API doesn't provide + * that information. Assume that the buffer is large enough for a + * maximal-length signature with that key (otherwise the application is + * buggy anyway). */ + status = psa_get_key_attributes( *key, &attributes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) ); + buf_len = MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + if( buf_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* make the signature */ + status = psa_sign_hash( *key, alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, buf_len, sig_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) ); + + /* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */ + return( pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( sig, sig_len, buf_len ) ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + "Opaque", + pk_opaque_get_bitlen, + pk_opaque_can_do, + NULL, /* verify - will be done later */ + pk_opaque_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */ + NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */ +#endif + NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */ + NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */ + NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */ + pk_opaque_alloc_wrap, + pk_opaque_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */ + NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */ +#endif + NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */ +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4deccf3f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs11.c + * + * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/pkcs11.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include + +void mbedtls_pkcs11_init( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_pkcs11_context ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ) +{ + int ret = 1; + unsigned char *cert_blob = NULL; + size_t cert_blob_size = 0; + + if( cert == NULL ) + { + ret = 2; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob( pkcs11_cert, NULL, + &cert_blob_size ) != CKR_OK ) + { + ret = 3; + goto cleanup; + } + + cert_blob = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cert_blob_size ); + if( NULL == cert_blob ) + { + ret = 4; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob( pkcs11_cert, cert_blob, + &cert_blob_size ) != CKR_OK ) + { + ret = 5; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( 0 != mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( cert, cert_blob, cert_blob_size ) ) + { + ret = 6; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + if( NULL != cert_blob ) + mbedtls_free( cert_blob ); + + return( ret ); +} + + +int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, + pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ) +{ + int ret = 1; + mbedtls_x509_crt cert; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cert ); + + if( priv_key == NULL ) + goto cleanup; + + if( 0 != mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( &cert, pkcs11_cert ) ) + goto cleanup; + + priv_key->len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( &cert.pk ); + priv_key->pkcs11h_cert = pkcs11_cert; + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cert ); + + return( ret ); +} + +void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key ) +{ + if( NULL != priv_key ) + pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificate( priv_key->pkcs11h_cert ); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + size_t input_len, output_len; + + if( NULL == ctx ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + output_len = input_len = ctx->len; + + if( input_len < 16 || input_len > output_max_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Determine size of output buffer */ + if( pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny( ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, + input_len, NULL, &output_len ) != CKR_OK ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( output_len > output_max_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ); + + if( pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny( ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, + input_len, output, &output_len ) != CKR_OK ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + *olen = output_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + size_t sig_len = 0, asn_len = 0, oid_size = 0; + unsigned char *p = sig; + const char *oid; + + if( NULL == ctx ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + asn_len = 10 + oid_size; + } + + sig_len = ctx->len; + if( hashlen > sig_len || asn_len > sig_len || + hashlen + asn_len > sig_len ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + /* + * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + * digest Digest } + * + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * Digest ::= OCTET STRING + */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x04 + oid_size ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + *p++ = oid_size & 0xFF; + memcpy( p, oid, oid_size ); + p += oid_size; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + *p++ = hashlen; + } + + memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); + + if( pkcs11h_certificate_signAny( ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, sig, + asn_len + hashlen, sig, &sig_len ) != CKR_OK ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cacf7dba --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c @@ -0,0 +1,404 @@ +/* + * PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The PKCS #12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard v1.1 + * + * http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pkcs/files/h11301-wp-pkcs-12v1-1-personal-information-exchange-syntax.pdf + * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1-1.asn + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + +static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params( mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char **p = ¶ms->p; + const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; + + /* + * pkcs-12PbeParams ::= SEQUENCE { + * salt OCTET STRING, + * iterations INTEGER + * } + * + */ + if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &salt->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + salt->p = *p; + *p += salt->len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, iterations ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN 128 + +static int pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen ) +{ + int ret, iterations = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_buf salt; + size_t i; + unsigned char unipwd[PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN * 2 + 2]; + + if( pwdlen > PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( &salt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); + memset( &unipwd, 0, sizeof(unipwd) ); + + if( ( ret = pkcs12_parse_pbe_params( pbe_params, &salt, + &iterations ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + for( i = 0; i < pwdlen; i++ ) + unipwd[i * 2 + 1] = pwd[i]; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( key, keylen, unipwd, pwdlen * 2 + 2, + salt.p, salt.len, md_type, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY, iterations ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( iv == NULL || ivlen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( iv, ivlen, unipwd, pwdlen * 2 + 2, + salt.p, salt.len, md_type, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV, iterations ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +#undef PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN + +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len, + unsigned char *output ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + ((void) pbe_params); + ((void) mode); + ((void) pwd); + ((void) pwdlen); + ((void) data); + ((void) len); + ((void) output); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char key[16]; + mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; + ((void) mode); + + mbedtls_arc4_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv( pbe_params, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + pwd, pwdlen, + key, 16, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_arc4_setup( &ctx, key, 16 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_arc4_crypt( &ctx, len, data, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + mbedtls_arc4_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret, keylen = 0; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char iv[16]; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; + size_t olen = 0; + + if( pwd == NULL && pwdlen != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + + if( ( ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv( pbe_params, md_type, pwd, pwdlen, + key, keylen, + iv, cipher_info->iv_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &cipher_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, (mbedtls_operation_t) mode ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_ctx, iv, cipher_info->iv_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset( &cipher_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &cipher_ctx, data, len, + output, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( &cipher_ctx, output + olen, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( iv, sizeof( iv ) ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &cipher_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +static void pkcs12_fill_buffer( unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + const unsigned char *filler, size_t fill_len ) +{ + unsigned char *p = data; + size_t use_len; + + if( filler != NULL && fill_len != 0 ) + { + while( data_len > 0 ) + { + use_len = ( data_len > fill_len ) ? fill_len : data_len; + memcpy( p, filler, use_len ); + p += use_len; + data_len -= use_len; + } + } + else + { + /* If either of the above are not true then clearly there is nothing + * that this function can do. The function should *not* be called + * under either of those circumstances, as you could end up with an + * incorrect output but for safety's sake, leaving the check in as + * otherwise we could end up with memory corruption.*/ + } +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int id, int iterations ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int j; + + unsigned char diversifier[128]; + unsigned char salt_block[128], pwd_block[128], hash_block[128]; + unsigned char hash_output[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char c; + int use_password = 0; + int use_salt = 0; + + size_t hlen, use_len, v, i; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + + // This version only allows max of 64 bytes of password or salt + if( datalen > 128 || pwdlen > 64 || saltlen > 64 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( pwd == NULL && pwdlen != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( salt == NULL && saltlen != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + use_password = ( pwd && pwdlen != 0 ); + use_salt = ( salt && saltlen != 0 ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + if( hlen <= 32 ) + v = 64; + else + v = 128; + + memset( diversifier, (unsigned char) id, v ); + + if( use_salt != 0 ) + { + pkcs12_fill_buffer( salt_block, v, salt, saltlen ); + } + + if( use_password != 0 ) + { + pkcs12_fill_buffer( pwd_block, v, pwd, pwdlen ); + } + + p = data; + while( datalen > 0 ) + { + // Calculate hash( diversifier || salt_block || pwd_block ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, diversifier, v ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( use_salt != 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, salt_block, v )) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + if( use_password != 0) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, pwd_block, v )) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, hash_output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + // Perform remaining ( iterations - 1 ) recursive hash calculations + for( i = 1; i < (size_t) iterations; i++ ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, hash_output, hlen, hash_output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + use_len = ( datalen > hlen ) ? hlen : datalen; + memcpy( p, hash_output, use_len ); + datalen -= use_len; + p += use_len; + + if( datalen == 0 ) + break; + + // Concatenating copies of hash_output into hash_block (B) + pkcs12_fill_buffer( hash_block, v, hash_output, hlen ); + + // B += 1 + for( i = v; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++hash_block[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( use_salt != 0 ) + { + // salt_block += B + c = 0; + for( i = v; i > 0; i-- ) + { + j = salt_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( j ); + salt_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( j ); + } + } + + if( use_password != 0 ) + { + // pwd_block += B + c = 0; + for( i = v; i > 0; i-- ) + { + j = pwd_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( j ); + pwd_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( j ); + } + } + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( salt_block, sizeof( salt_block ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( pwd_block, sizeof( pwd_block ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hash_block, sizeof( hash_block ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hash_output, sizeof( hash_output ) ); + + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2b014d91 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c @@ -0,0 +1,420 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs5.c + * + * \brief PKCS#5 functions + * + * \author Mathias Olsson + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * PKCS#5 includes PBKDF2 and more + * + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898 (Specification) + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6070 (Test vectors) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations, + int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid; + unsigned char *p = params->p; + const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; + + if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + /* + * PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE { + * salt OCTET STRING, + * iterationCount INTEGER, + * keyLength INTEGER OPTIONAL + * prf AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT algid-hmacWithSHA1 + * } + * + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &salt->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + salt->p = p; + p += salt->len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, iterations ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, keylen ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( &p, end, &prf_alg_oid ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac( &prf_alg_oid, md_type ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret, iterations = 0, keylen = 0; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_asn1_buf kdf_alg_oid, enc_scheme_oid, kdf_alg_params, enc_scheme_params; + mbedtls_asn1_buf salt; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + unsigned char key[32], iv[32]; + size_t olen = 0; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; + + p = pbe_params->p; + end = p + pbe_params->len; + + /* + * PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE { + * keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}}, + * encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}} + * } + */ + if( pbe_params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &kdf_alg_oid, + &kdf_alg_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + // Only PBKDF2 supported at the moment + // + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, &kdf_alg_oid ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ( ret = pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( &kdf_alg_params, + &salt, &iterations, &keylen, + &md_type ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &enc_scheme_oid, + &enc_scheme_params ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg( &enc_scheme_oid, &cipher_alg ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_alg ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + /* + * The value of keylen from pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params() is ignored + * since it is optional and we don't know if it was set or not + */ + keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + + if( enc_scheme_params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING || + enc_scheme_params.len != cipher_info->iv_size ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &cipher_ctx ); + + memcpy( iv, enc_scheme_params.p, enc_scheme_params.len ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &md_ctx, pwd, pwdlen, salt.p, salt.len, + iterations, keylen, key ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, + (mbedtls_operation_t) mode ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &cipher_ctx, iv, enc_scheme_params.len, + data, datalen, output, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &cipher_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int j; + unsigned int i; + unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + size_t use_len; + unsigned char *out_p = output; + unsigned char counter[4]; + + memset( counter, 0, 4 ); + counter[3] = 1; + +#if UINT_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + if( iteration_count > 0xFFFFFFFF ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( ctx, password, plen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + while( key_length ) + { + // U1 ends up in work + // + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, work ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + memcpy( md1, work, md_size ); + + for( i = 1; i < iteration_count; i++ ) + { + // U2 ends up in md1 + // + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, md1, md_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, md1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + // U1 xor U2 + // + for( j = 0; j < md_size; j++ ) + work[j] ^= md1[j]; + } + + use_len = ( key_length < md_size ) ? key_length : md_size; + memcpy( out_p, work, use_len ); + + key_length -= (uint32_t) use_len; + out_p += use_len; + + for( i = 4; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + +cleanup: + /* Zeroise buffers to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( work, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( md1, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " PBKDF2 (SHA1): skipped\n\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +#define MAX_TESTS 6 + +static const size_t plen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 8, 8, 8, 24, 9 }; + +static const unsigned char password_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +{ + "password", + "password", + "password", + "passwordPASSWORDpassword", + "pass\0word", +}; + +static const size_t slen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 4, 4, 4, 36, 5 }; + +static const unsigned char salt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][40] = +{ + "salt", + "salt", + "salt", + "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", + "sa\0lt", +}; + +static const uint32_t it_cnt_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 1, 2, 4096, 4096, 4096 }; + +static const uint32_t key_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 20, 20, 20, 25, 16 }; + +static const unsigned char result_key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +{ + { 0x0c, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x0e, 0x71, + 0xf3, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x12, 0x06, + 0x2f, 0xe0, 0x37, 0xa6 }, + { 0xea, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x4d, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x8c, + 0xcd, 0x1e, 0xd9, 0x2a, 0xce, 0x1d, 0x41, 0xf0, + 0xd8, 0xde, 0x89, 0x57 }, + { 0x4b, 0x00, 0x79, 0x01, 0xb7, 0x65, 0x48, 0x9a, + 0xbe, 0xad, 0x49, 0xd9, 0x26, 0xf7, 0x21, 0xd0, + 0x65, 0xa4, 0x29, 0xc1 }, + { 0x3d, 0x2e, 0xec, 0x4f, 0xe4, 0x1c, 0x84, 0x9b, + 0x80, 0xc8, 0xd8, 0x36, 0x62, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x4a, + 0x8b, 0x29, 0x1a, 0x96, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0xf0, 0x70, + 0x38 }, + { 0x56, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0xa7, 0x55, 0x48, 0x09, 0x9d, + 0xcc, 0x37, 0xd7, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xc3 }, +}; + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t sha1_ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *info_sha1; + int ret, i; + unsigned char key[64]; + + mbedtls_md_init( &sha1_ctx ); + + info_sha1 = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); + if( info_sha1 == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &sha1_ctx, info_sha1, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + for( i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " PBKDF2 (SHA1) #%d: ", i ); + + ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &sha1_ctx, password_test_data[i], + plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i], + slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i], + key_len_test_data[i], key ); + if( ret != 0 || + memcmp( result_key_test_data[i], key, key_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &sha1_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ea5c6b69 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c @@ -0,0 +1,1545 @@ +/* + * Public Key layer for parsing key files and structures + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + * + * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. + * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced + * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) +{ + FILE *f; + long size; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); + if( ( size = ftell( f ) ) == -1 ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); + + *n = (size_t) size; + + if( *n + 1 == 0 || + ( *buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *n + 1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n ) + { + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buf, *n ); + mbedtls_free( *buf ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + if( strstr( (const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN " ) != NULL ) + ++*n; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Load and parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const char *path, const char *pwd ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( pwd == NULL ) + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0 ); + else + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, + (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen( pwd ) ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Load and parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( ctx, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* Minimally parse an ECParameters buffer to and mbedtls_asn1_buf + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + * } + */ +static int pk_get_ecparams( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ( end - *p < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + /* Tag may be either OID or SEQUENCE */ + params->tag = **p; + if( params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + && params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) +#endif + ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + params->p = *p; + *p += params->len; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) +/* + * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and (mostly) fill the group with it. + * WARNING: the resulting group should only be used with + * pk_group_id_from_specified(), since its base point may not be set correctly + * if it was encoded compressed. + * + * SpecifiedECDomain ::= SEQUENCE { + * version SpecifiedECDomainVersion(ecdpVer1 | ecdpVer2 | ecdpVer3, ...), + * fieldID FieldID {{FieldTypes}}, + * curve Curve, + * base ECPoint, + * order INTEGER, + * cofactor INTEGER OPTIONAL, + * hash HashAlgorithm OPTIONAL, + * ... + * } + * + * We only support prime-field as field type, and ignore hash and cofactor. + */ +static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = params->p; + const unsigned char * const end = params->p + params->len; + const unsigned char *end_field, *end_curve; + size_t len; + int ver; + + /* SpecifiedECDomainVersion ::= INTEGER { 1, 2, 3 } */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &ver ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ver < 1 || ver > 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + /* + * FieldID { FIELD-ID:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE { -- Finite field + * fieldType FIELD-ID.&id({IOSet}), + * parameters FIELD-ID.&Type({IOSet}{@fieldType}) + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end_field = p + len; + + /* + * FIELD-ID ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER + * FieldTypes FIELD-ID ::= { + * { Prime-p IDENTIFIED BY prime-field } | + * { Characteristic-two IDENTIFIED BY characteristic-two-field } + * } + * prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-fieldType 1 } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_field, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( len != MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD ) || + memcmp( p, MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD, len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + p += len; + + /* Prime-p ::= INTEGER -- Field of size p. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end_field, &grp->P ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + if( p != end_field ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Curve ::= SEQUENCE { + * a FieldElement, + * b FieldElement, + * seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * -- Shall be present if used in SpecifiedECDomain + * -- with version equal to ecdpVer2 or ecdpVer3 + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end_curve = p + len; + + /* + * FieldElement ::= OCTET STRING + * containing an integer in the case of a prime field + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->A, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->B, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + /* Ignore seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) == 0 ) + p += len; + + if( p != end_curve ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, &grp->G, + ( const unsigned char *) p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * If we can't read the point because it's compressed, cheat by + * reading only the X coordinate and the parity bit of Y. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE || + ( p[0] != 0x02 && p[0] != 0x03 ) || + len != mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ) + 1 || + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->G.X, p + 1, len - 1 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Y, p[0] - 2 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + } + + p += len; + + /* + * order INTEGER + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &grp->N ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); + + /* + * Allow optional elements by purposefully not enforcing p == end here. + */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Find the group id associated with an (almost filled) group as generated by + * pk_group_from_specified(), or return an error if unknown. + */ +static int pk_group_id_from_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_group ref; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *id; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ref ); + + for( id = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); *id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; id++ ) + { + /* Load the group associated to that id */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ref ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ref, *id ) ); + + /* Compare to the group we were given, starting with easy tests */ + if( grp->pbits == ref.pbits && grp->nbits == ref.nbits && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->P, &ref.P ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->A, &ref.A ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->B, &ref.B ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->N, &ref.N ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->G.X, &ref.G.X ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->G.Z, &ref.G.Z ) == 0 && + /* For Y we may only know the parity bit, so compare only that */ + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &grp->G.Y, 0 ) == mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ref.G.Y, 0 ) ) + { + break; + } + + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ref ); + + *grp_id = *id; + + if( ret == 0 && *id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and find the associated group ID + */ +static int pk_group_id_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + + if( ( ret = pk_group_from_specified( params, &grp ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = pk_group_id_from_group( &grp, grp_id ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ + +/* + * Use EC parameters to initialise an EC group + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + */ +static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + if( params->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp( params, &grp_id ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE ); + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + if( ( ret = pk_group_id_from_specified( params, &grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); +#endif + } + + /* + * grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match + */ + if( grp->id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && grp->id != grp_id ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * EC public key is an EC point + * + * The caller is responsible for clearing the structure upon failure if + * desired. Take care to pass along the possible ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + * return code of mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary() and leave p in a usable state. + */ +static int pk_get_ecpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &key->grp, &key->Q, + (const unsigned char *) *p, end - *p ) ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &key->grp, &key->Q ); + } + + /* + * We know mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary consumed all bytes or failed + */ + *p = (unsigned char *) end; + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +static int pk_get_rsapubkey( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* Import N */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY ); + + *p += len; + + /* Import E */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, *p, len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY ); + + *p += len; + + if( mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY ); + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +/* Get a PK algorithm identifier + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + */ +static int pk_get_pk_alg( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid; + + memset( params, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, &alg_oid, params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg( &alg_oid, pk_alg ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + /* + * No parameters with RSA (only for EC) + */ + if( *pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA && + ( ( params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && params->tag != 0 ) || + params->len != 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_params; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( *p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pk != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = pk_get_pk_alg( p, end, &pk_alg, &alg_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( p, end, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ) ); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + ret = pk_use_ecparams( &alg_params, &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = pk_get_ecpubkey( p, end, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ) ); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + + if( ret == 0 && *p != end ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( p, end, X ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key + */ +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + end = p + keylen; + + /* + * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( version != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION ); + } + + /* Import N */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import E */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import D */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import P */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import Q */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DP, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import DQ */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DQ, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import QP */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->QP, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +#else + /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ + if( ( ret & 0xff80 ) == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key + */ +static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int version, pubkey_done; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = p + keylen; + unsigned char *end2; + + /* + * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 + * + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), + * privateKey OCTET STRING, + * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( version != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &eck->d, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + pubkey_done = 0; + if( p != end ) + { + /* + * Is 'parameters' present? + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_get_ecparams( &p, p + len, ¶ms) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_use_ecparams( ¶ms, &eck->grp ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + } + + if( p != end ) + { + /* + * Is 'publickey' present? If not, or if we can't read it (eg because it + * is compressed), create it from the private key. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1 ) ) == 0 ) + { + end2 = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( &p, end2, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( p + len != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + if( ( ret = pk_get_ecpubkey( &p, end2, eck ) ) == 0 ) + pubkey_done = 1; + else + { + /* + * The only acceptable failure mode of pk_get_ecpubkey() above + * is if the point format is not recognized. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + } + + if( ! pubkey_done && + ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul( &eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &eck->grp, &eck->d ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* + * Parse an unencrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key + * + * Notes: + * + * - This function does not own the key buffer. It is the + * responsibility of the caller to take care of zeroizing + * and freeing it after use. + * + * - The function is responsible for freeing the provided + * PK context on failure. + * + */ +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char* key, + size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = p + keylen; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; + + /* + * This function parses the PrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8 v1.2 = RFC 5208) + * + * PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, + * privateKey PrivateKey, + * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL } + * + * Version ::= INTEGER + * PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING + * + * The PrivateKey OCTET STRING is a SEC1 ECPrivateKey + */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( version != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = pk_get_pk_alg( &p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( len < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + return( ret ); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_use_ecparams( ¶ms, &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + return( ret ); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse an encrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key + * + * To save space, the decryption happens in-place on the given key buffer. + * Also, while this function may modify the keybuffer, it doesn't own it, + * and instead it is the responsibility of the caller to zeroize and properly + * free it after use. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + int ret, decrypted = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_asn1_buf pbe_alg_oid, pbe_params; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; +#endif + + p = key; + end = p + keylen; + + if( pwdlen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + + /* + * This function parses the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8) + * + * EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * encryptionAlgorithm EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, + * encryptedData EncryptedData + * } + * + * EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * EncryptedData ::= OCTET STRING + * + * The EncryptedData OCTET STRING is a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo + * + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &pbe_alg_oid, &pbe_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + buf = p; + + /* + * Decrypt EncryptedData with appropriate PBE + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + if( mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg( &pbe_alg_oid, &md_alg, &cipher_alg ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( &pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, + cipher_alg, md_alg, + pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); + } + + decrypted = 1; + } + else if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128, &pbe_alg_oid ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( &pbe_params, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, + pwd, pwdlen, + p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + // Best guess for password mismatch when using RC4. If first tag is + // not MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE + // + if( *buf != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + + decrypted = 1; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2, &pbe_alg_oid ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( &pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen, + p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); + } + + decrypted = 1; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + { + ((void) pwd); + } + + if( decrypted == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, buf, len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + +/* + * Parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + size_t len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pk != NULL ); + if( keylen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, pwd, pwdlen, &len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, pwd, pwdlen, &len ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen, + pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#else + ((void) pwd); + ((void) pwdlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * At this point we only know it's not a PEM formatted key. Could be any + * of the known DER encoded private key formats + * + * We try the different DER format parsers to see if one passes without + * error + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + { + unsigned char *key_copy; + + if( ( key_copy = mbedtls_calloc( 1, keylen ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( key_copy, key, keylen ); + + ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, key_copy, keylen, + pwd, pwdlen ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_copy, keylen ); + mbedtls_free( key_copy ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + + ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, key, keylen ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 && + pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), key, keylen ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ); + if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 && + pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), + key, keylen ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + /* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_ECP_C isn't, + * it is ok to leave the PK context initialized but not + * freed: It is the caller's responsibility to call pk_init() + * before calling this function, and to call pk_free() + * when it fails. If MBEDTLS_ECP_C is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * isn't, this leads to mbedtls_pk_free() being called + * twice, once here and once by the caller, but this is + * also ok and in line with the mbedtls_pk_free() calls + * on failed PEM parsing attempts. */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); +} + +/* + * Parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + size_t len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( keylen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL || keylen == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", + "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + p = pem.buf; + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( ctx, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + + if ( ( ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( &p, p + pem.buflen, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ) ) ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_pk_free( ctx ); + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----", + "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + p = pem.buf; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, p + pem.buflen, ctx ); + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( ctx, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p = (unsigned char *)key; + ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( &p, p + keylen, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + mbedtls_pk_free( ctx ); + if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + p = (unsigned char *) key; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, p + keylen, ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..566153dd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c @@ -0,0 +1,623 @@ +/* + * Public Key layer for writing key files and structures + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +static int pk_write_rsa_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + /* Export E */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( p, start, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( p, start, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * EC public key is an EC point + */ +static int pk_write_ec_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &ec->grp, &ec->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *p -= len; + memcpy( *p, buf, len ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * } + */ +static int pk_write_ec_param( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const char *oid; + size_t oid_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp( ec->grp.id, &oid, &oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, oid_len ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8) + */ +static int pk_write_ec_private( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t byte_length = ( ec->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key( ec, tmp, byte_length ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( p, start, tmp, byte_length ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, byte_length ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( *p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( start != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_rsa_pubkey( p, start, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *key ) ) ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_pubkey( p, start, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE ) + { + size_t buffer_size; + psa_key_id_t* key_id = (psa_key_id_t*) key->pk_ctx; + + if ( *p < start ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + buffer_size = (size_t)( *p - start ); + if ( psa_export_public_key( *key_id, start, buffer_size, &len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else + { + *p -= len; + memmove( *p, start, len ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *c; + size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; + const char *oid; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + c = buf + size; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, key ) ); + + if( c - buf < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } + */ + *--c = 0; + len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); + + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, pk_write_ec_param( &c, buf, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE ) + { + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_id_t key_id; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + size_t bits; + + key_id = *((psa_key_id_t*) key->pk_ctx ); + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( key_type ); + if( curve == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + ret = mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( curve, bits, &oid, &oid_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + /* Write EC algorithm parameters; that's akin + * to pk_write_ec_param() above. */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( &c, buf, + oid, oid_len ) ); + + /* The rest of the function works as for legacy EC contexts. */ + pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( pk_type, &oid, + &oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( &c, buf, oid, oid_len, + par_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *c; + size_t len = 0; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + c = buf + size; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( *key ); + + /* + * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + /* Export QP */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export DQ */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export DP */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export Q */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export P */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export D */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export E */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, + buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ); + size_t pub_len = 0, par_len = 0; + + /* + * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 + * + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), + * privateKey OCTET STRING, + * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * } + */ + + /* publicKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, pk_write_ec_pubkey( &c, buf, ec ) ); + + if( c - buf < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + *--c = 0; + pub_len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, pub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, pub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1 ) ); + len += pub_len; + + /* parameters */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, pk_write_ec_param( &c, buf, ec ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, par_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ); + len += par_len; + + /* privateKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_private( &c, buf, ec ) ); + + /* version */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + +#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" +#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + +/* + * Max sizes of key per types. Shown as tag + len (+ content). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSA public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (rsa oid) + * + 1 + 1 (params null) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } 1 + 3 + (1 + below) + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * } + */ +#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) + +/* + * RSA private keys: + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * version Version, 1 + 1 + 1 + * modulus INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * privateExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * prime1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * prime2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * coefficient INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL 0 (not supported) + * } + */ +#define MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 ( MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE / 2 + \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE % 2 ) +#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 47 + 3 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE \ + + 5 * MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * EC public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 7 (ec oid) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (namedCurve oid) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING 1 + 2 + 1 [1] + * + 1 (point format) [1] + * + 2 * ECP_MAX (coords) [1] + * } + */ +#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + +/* + * EC private keys: + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * version INTEGER , 1 + 1 + 1 + * privateKey OCTET STRING, 1 + 1 + ECP_MAX + * parameters [0] ECParameters OPTIONAL, 1 + 1 + (1 + 1 + 9) + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL 1 + 2 + [1] above + * } + */ +#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 29 + 3 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ( RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ) +#define PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ( RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ) + +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output_buf[PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t olen = 0; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || size == 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( key, output_buf, + sizeof(output_buf) ) ) < 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY, + output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output_buf[PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + const char *begin, *end; + size_t olen = 0; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || size == 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( key, output_buf, sizeof(output_buf) ) ) < 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC; + } + else +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( begin, end, + output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/platform.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/platform.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e742fde7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/platform.c @@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +/* + * Platform abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* The compile time configuration of memory allocation via the macros + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO takes precedence over the runtime + * configuration via mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(). So, omit everything + * related to the latter if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO are defined. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) +static void *platform_calloc_uninit( size_t n, size_t size ) +{ + ((void) n); + ((void) size); + return( NULL ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC platform_calloc_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) +static void platform_free_uninit( void *ptr ) +{ + ((void) ptr); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE platform_free_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE */ + +static void * (*mbedtls_calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC; +static void (*mbedtls_free_func)( void * ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE; + +void * mbedtls_calloc( size_t nmemb, size_t size ) +{ + return (*mbedtls_calloc_func)( nmemb, size ); +} + +void mbedtls_free( void * ptr ) +{ + (*mbedtls_free_func)( ptr ); +} + +int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ), + void (*free_func)( void * ) ) +{ + mbedtls_calloc_func = calloc_func; + mbedtls_free_func = free_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY && + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) +#include +int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + va_list argp; + + va_start( argp, fmt ); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp ); + va_end( argp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_snprintf_uninit( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, ... ) +{ + ((void) s); + ((void) n); + ((void) format); + return( 0 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF platform_snprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_snprintf)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + ... ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + ... ) ) +{ + mbedtls_snprintf = snprintf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#include +int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */ + if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(_TRUNCATE) + ret = vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, arg ); +#else + ret = vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, arg ); + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n ) + { + s[n-1] = '\0'; + ret = -1; + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_vsnprintf_uninit( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, va_list arg ) +{ + ((void) s); + ((void) n); + ((void) format); + ((void) arg); + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF platform_vsnprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + va_list arg ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + va_list arg ) ) +{ + mbedtls_vsnprintf = vsnprintf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_printf_uninit( const char *format, ... ) +{ + ((void) format); + return( 0 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF platform_printf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_printf)( const char *, ... ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_printf( int (*printf_func)( const char *, ... ) ) +{ + mbedtls_printf = printf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_fprintf_uninit( FILE *stream, const char *format, ... ) +{ + ((void) stream); + ((void) format); + return( 0 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF platform_fprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_fprintf)( FILE *, const char *, ... ) = + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf( int (*fprintf_func)( FILE *, const char *, ... ) ) +{ + mbedtls_fprintf = fprintf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static void platform_exit_uninit( int status ) +{ + ((void) status); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT platform_exit_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT */ + +void (*mbedtls_exit)( int status ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_exit( void (*exit_func)( int status ) ) +{ + mbedtls_exit = exit_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static mbedtls_time_t platform_time_uninit( mbedtls_time_t* timer ) +{ + ((void) timer); + return( 0 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME platform_time_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME */ + +mbedtls_time_t (*mbedtls_time)( mbedtls_time_t* timer ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_time( mbedtls_time_t (*time_func)( mbedtls_time_t* timer ) ) +{ + mbedtls_time = time_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* Default implementations for the platform independent seed functions use + * standard libc file functions to read from and write to a pre-defined filename + */ +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t n; + + if( ( file = fopen( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( n = fread( buf, 1, buf_len, file ) ) != buf_len ) + { + fclose( file ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, buf_len ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( file ); + return( (int)n ); +} + +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t n; + + if( ( file = fopen( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE, "w" ) ) == NULL ) + return -1; + + if( ( n = fwrite( buf, 1, buf_len, file ) ) != buf_len ) + { + fclose( file ); + return -1; + } + + fclose( file ); + return( (int)n ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_nv_seed_read_uninit( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ platform_nv_seed_read_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_nv_seed_write_uninit( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE platform_nv_seed_write_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE */ + +int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_read)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) = + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ; +int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_write)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) = + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( + int (*nv_seed_read_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ), + int (*nv_seed_write_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) ) +{ + mbedtls_nv_seed_read = nv_seed_read_func; + mbedtls_nv_seed_write = nv_seed_write_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) +/* + * Placeholder platform setup that does nothing by default + */ +int mbedtls_platform_setup( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ) +{ + (void)ctx; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Placeholder platform teardown that does nothing by default + */ +void mbedtls_platform_teardown( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ) +{ + (void)ctx; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98fe5deb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS + * library. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before + * config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#include +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) +/* + * This implementation should never be optimized out by the compiler + * + * This implementation for mbedtls_platform_zeroize() was inspired from Colin + * Percival's blog article at: + * + * http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-04-how-to-zero-a-buffer.html + * + * It uses a volatile function pointer to the standard memset(). Because the + * pointer is volatile the compiler expects it to change at + * any time and will not optimize out the call that could potentially perform + * other operations on the input buffer instead of just setting it to 0. + * Nevertheless, as pointed out by davidtgoldblatt on Hacker News + * (refer to http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-05-erratum.html for + * details), optimizations of the following form are still possible: + * + * if( memset_func != memset ) + * memset_func( buf, 0, len ); + * + * Note that it is extremely difficult to guarantee that + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers + * in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed TLS also provides the configuration + * option MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for their + * platform and needs. + */ +static void * (* const volatile memset_func)( void *, int, size_t ) = memset; + +void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( len == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + if( len > 0 ) + memset_func( buf, 0, len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ + defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ + defined(__MACH__))) +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + +#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long + * preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in + * platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and + * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so + * we keep it private by only defining it in this file + */ +#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) +#define PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME +#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ + +#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) */ + +struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt, + struct tm *tm_buf ) +{ +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + return( ( gmtime_s( tm_buf, tt ) == 0 ) ? tm_buf : NULL ); +#elif !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) + return( gmtime_r( tt, tm_buf ) ); +#else + struct tm *lt; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 ) + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + lt = gmtime( tt ); + + if( lt != NULL ) + { + memcpy( tm_buf, lt, sizeof( struct tm ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 ) + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return( ( lt == NULL ) ? NULL : tm_buf ); +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7375a0c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c @@ -0,0 +1,538 @@ +/** + * \file poly1305.c + * + * \brief Poly1305 authentication algorithm. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define POLY1305_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ( 16U ) + +/* + * Our implementation is tuned for 32-bit platforms with a 64-bit multiplier. + * However we provided an alternative for platforms without such a multiplier. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) +static uint64_t mul64( uint32_t a, uint32_t b ) +{ + /* a = al + 2**16 ah, b = bl + 2**16 bh */ + const uint16_t al = (uint16_t) a; + const uint16_t bl = (uint16_t) b; + const uint16_t ah = a >> 16; + const uint16_t bh = b >> 16; + + /* ab = al*bl + 2**16 (ah*bl + bl*bh) + 2**32 ah*bh */ + const uint32_t lo = (uint32_t) al * bl; + const uint64_t me = (uint64_t)( (uint32_t) ah * bl ) + (uint32_t) al * bh; + const uint32_t hi = (uint32_t) ah * bh; + + return( lo + ( me << 16 ) + ( (uint64_t) hi << 32 ) ); +} +#else +static inline uint64_t mul64( uint32_t a, uint32_t b ) +{ + return( (uint64_t) a * b ); +} +#endif + + +/** + * \brief Process blocks with Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context. + * \param nblocks Number of blocks to process. Note that this + * function only processes full blocks. + * \param input Buffer containing the input block(s). + * \param needs_padding Set to 0 if the padding bit has already been + * applied to the input data before calling this + * function. Otherwise, set this parameter to 1. + */ +static void poly1305_process( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + size_t nblocks, + const unsigned char *input, + uint32_t needs_padding ) +{ + uint64_t d0, d1, d2, d3; + uint32_t acc0, acc1, acc2, acc3, acc4; + uint32_t r0, r1, r2, r3; + uint32_t rs1, rs2, rs3; + size_t offset = 0U; + size_t i; + + r0 = ctx->r[0]; + r1 = ctx->r[1]; + r2 = ctx->r[2]; + r3 = ctx->r[3]; + + rs1 = r1 + ( r1 >> 2U ); + rs2 = r2 + ( r2 >> 2U ); + rs3 = r3 + ( r3 >> 2U ); + + acc0 = ctx->acc[0]; + acc1 = ctx->acc[1]; + acc2 = ctx->acc[2]; + acc3 = ctx->acc[3]; + acc4 = ctx->acc[4]; + + /* Process full blocks */ + for( i = 0U; i < nblocks; i++ ) + { + /* The input block is treated as a 128-bit little-endian integer */ + d0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 0 ); + d1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 4 ); + d2 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 8 ); + d3 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 12 ); + + /* Compute: acc += (padded) block as a 130-bit integer */ + d0 += (uint64_t) acc0; + d1 += (uint64_t) acc1 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + d2 += (uint64_t) acc2 + ( d1 >> 32U ); + d3 += (uint64_t) acc3 + ( d2 >> 32U ); + acc0 = (uint32_t) d0; + acc1 = (uint32_t) d1; + acc2 = (uint32_t) d2; + acc3 = (uint32_t) d3; + acc4 += (uint32_t) ( d3 >> 32U ) + needs_padding; + + /* Compute: acc *= r */ + d0 = mul64( acc0, r0 ) + + mul64( acc1, rs3 ) + + mul64( acc2, rs2 ) + + mul64( acc3, rs1 ); + d1 = mul64( acc0, r1 ) + + mul64( acc1, r0 ) + + mul64( acc2, rs3 ) + + mul64( acc3, rs2 ) + + mul64( acc4, rs1 ); + d2 = mul64( acc0, r2 ) + + mul64( acc1, r1 ) + + mul64( acc2, r0 ) + + mul64( acc3, rs3 ) + + mul64( acc4, rs2 ); + d3 = mul64( acc0, r3 ) + + mul64( acc1, r2 ) + + mul64( acc2, r1 ) + + mul64( acc3, r0 ) + + mul64( acc4, rs3 ); + acc4 *= r0; + + /* Compute: acc %= (2^130 - 5) (partial remainder) */ + d1 += ( d0 >> 32 ); + d2 += ( d1 >> 32 ); + d3 += ( d2 >> 32 ); + acc0 = (uint32_t) d0; + acc1 = (uint32_t) d1; + acc2 = (uint32_t) d2; + acc3 = (uint32_t) d3; + acc4 = (uint32_t) ( d3 >> 32 ) + acc4; + + d0 = (uint64_t) acc0 + ( acc4 >> 2 ) + ( acc4 & 0xFFFFFFFCU ); + acc4 &= 3U; + acc0 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc1 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + acc1 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc2 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + acc2 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc3 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + acc3 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc4 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + acc4 = (uint32_t) d0; + + offset += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + ctx->acc[0] = acc0; + ctx->acc[1] = acc1; + ctx->acc[2] = acc2; + ctx->acc[3] = acc3; + ctx->acc[4] = acc4; +} + +/** + * \brief Compute the Poly1305 MAC + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context. + * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. Must be + * big enough to contain the 16-byte MAC. + */ +static void poly1305_compute_mac( const mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ) +{ + uint64_t d; + uint32_t g0, g1, g2, g3, g4; + uint32_t acc0, acc1, acc2, acc3, acc4; + uint32_t mask; + uint32_t mask_inv; + + acc0 = ctx->acc[0]; + acc1 = ctx->acc[1]; + acc2 = ctx->acc[2]; + acc3 = ctx->acc[3]; + acc4 = ctx->acc[4]; + + /* Before adding 's' we ensure that the accumulator is mod 2^130 - 5. + * We do this by calculating acc - (2^130 - 5), then checking if + * the 131st bit is set. If it is, then reduce: acc -= (2^130 - 5) + */ + + /* Calculate acc + -(2^130 - 5) */ + d = ( (uint64_t) acc0 + 5U ); + g0 = (uint32_t) d; + d = ( (uint64_t) acc1 + ( d >> 32 ) ); + g1 = (uint32_t) d; + d = ( (uint64_t) acc2 + ( d >> 32 ) ); + g2 = (uint32_t) d; + d = ( (uint64_t) acc3 + ( d >> 32 ) ); + g3 = (uint32_t) d; + g4 = acc4 + (uint32_t) ( d >> 32U ); + + /* mask == 0xFFFFFFFF if 131st bit is set, otherwise mask == 0 */ + mask = (uint32_t) 0U - ( g4 >> 2U ); + mask_inv = ~mask; + + /* If 131st bit is set then acc=g, otherwise, acc is unmodified */ + acc0 = ( acc0 & mask_inv ) | ( g0 & mask ); + acc1 = ( acc1 & mask_inv ) | ( g1 & mask ); + acc2 = ( acc2 & mask_inv ) | ( g2 & mask ); + acc3 = ( acc3 & mask_inv ) | ( g3 & mask ); + + /* Add 's' */ + d = (uint64_t) acc0 + ctx->s[0]; + acc0 = (uint32_t) d; + d = (uint64_t) acc1 + ctx->s[1] + ( d >> 32U ); + acc1 = (uint32_t) d; + d = (uint64_t) acc2 + ctx->s[2] + ( d >> 32U ); + acc2 = (uint32_t) d; + acc3 += ctx->s[3] + (uint32_t) ( d >> 32U ); + + /* Compute MAC (128 least significant bits of the accumulator) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc0, mac, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc1, mac, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc2, mac, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc3, mac, 12 ); +} + +void mbedtls_poly1305_init( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ) +{ + POLY1305_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_poly1305_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_poly1305_free( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_poly1305_context ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_starts( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ) +{ + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + /* r &= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ + ctx->r[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 0 ) & 0x0FFFFFFFU; + ctx->r[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 4 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + ctx->r[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 8 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + ctx->r[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 12 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + + ctx->s[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 16 ); + ctx->s[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 20 ); + ctx->s[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 24 ); + ctx->s[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 28 ); + + /* Initial accumulator state */ + ctx->acc[0] = 0U; + ctx->acc[1] = 0U; + ctx->acc[2] = 0U; + ctx->acc[3] = 0U; + ctx->acc[4] = 0U; + + /* Queue initially empty */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->queue, sizeof( ctx->queue ) ); + ctx->queue_len = 0U; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_update( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + size_t offset = 0U; + size_t remaining = ilen; + size_t queue_free_len; + size_t nblocks; + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ( remaining > 0U ) && ( ctx->queue_len > 0U ) ) + { + queue_free_len = ( POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES - ctx->queue_len ); + + if( ilen < queue_free_len ) + { + /* Not enough data to complete the block. + * Store this data with the other leftovers. + */ + memcpy( &ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len], + input, + ilen ); + + ctx->queue_len += ilen; + + remaining = 0U; + } + else + { + /* Enough data to produce a complete block */ + memcpy( &ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len], + input, + queue_free_len ); + + ctx->queue_len = 0U; + + poly1305_process( ctx, 1U, ctx->queue, 1U ); /* add padding bit */ + + offset += queue_free_len; + remaining -= queue_free_len; + } + } + + if( remaining >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ) + { + nblocks = remaining / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + + poly1305_process( ctx, nblocks, &input[offset], 1U ); + + offset += nblocks * POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + remaining %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + if( remaining > 0U ) + { + /* Store partial block */ + ctx->queue_len = remaining; + memcpy( ctx->queue, &input[offset], remaining ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_finish( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ) +{ + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); + + /* Process any leftover data */ + if( ctx->queue_len > 0U ) + { + /* Add padding bit */ + ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len] = 1U; + ctx->queue_len++; + + /* Pad with zeroes */ + memset( &ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len], + 0, + POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES - ctx->queue_len ); + + poly1305_process( ctx, 1U, /* Process 1 block */ + ctx->queue, 0U ); /* Already padded above */ + } + + poly1305_compute_mac( ctx, mac ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_mac( const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char mac[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + mbedtls_poly1305_init( &ctx ); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_starts( &ctx, key ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx, input, ilen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx, mac ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_poly1305_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_keys[2][32] = +{ + { + 0x85, 0xd6, 0xbe, 0x78, 0x57, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x33, + 0x7f, 0x44, 0x52, 0xfe, 0x42, 0xd5, 0x06, 0xa8, + 0x01, 0x03, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0x0d, 0xb2, 0xfd, + 0x4a, 0xbf, 0xf6, 0xaf, 0x41, 0x49, 0xf5, 0x1b + }, + { + 0x1c, 0x92, 0x40, 0xa5, 0xeb, 0x55, 0xd3, 0x8a, + 0xf3, 0x33, 0x88, 0x86, 0x04, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xf0, + 0x47, 0x39, 0x17, 0xc1, 0x40, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x09, + 0x9d, 0xca, 0x5c, 0xbc, 0x20, 0x70, 0x75, 0xc0 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_data[2][127] = +{ + { + 0x43, 0x72, 0x79, 0x70, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x67, 0x72, + 0x61, 0x70, 0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x46, 0x6f, + 0x72, 0x75, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x52, 0x65, 0x73, 0x65, + 0x61, 0x72, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, 0x47, 0x72, 0x6f, + 0x75, 0x70 + }, + { + 0x27, 0x54, 0x77, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, 0x62, 0x72, + 0x69, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x67, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, + 0x6c, 0x69, 0x74, 0x68, 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, + 0x76, 0x65, 0x73, 0x0a, 0x44, 0x69, 0x64, 0x20, + 0x67, 0x79, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, + 0x20, 0x67, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x77, + 0x61, 0x62, 0x65, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x41, 0x6c, 0x6c, + 0x20, 0x6d, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x73, 0x79, 0x20, 0x77, + 0x65, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x62, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x67, 0x6f, 0x76, 0x65, + 0x73, 0x2c, 0x0a, 0x41, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x75, + 0x74, 0x67, 0x72, 0x61, 0x62, 0x65, 0x2e + } +}; + +static const size_t test_data_len[2] = +{ + 34U, + 127U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_mac[2][16] = +{ + { + 0xa8, 0x06, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x51, 0x36, 0xc6, + 0xc2, 0x2b, 0x8b, 0xaf, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x27, 0xa9 + }, + { + 0x45, 0x41, 0x66, 0x9a, 0x7e, 0xaa, 0xee, 0x61, + 0xe7, 0x08, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0xeb, 0x62 + } +}; + +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + +#define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ! ( cond ) ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf args; \ + \ + return( -1 ); \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_poly1305_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + unsigned char mac[16]; + unsigned i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for( i = 0U; i < 2U; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " Poly1305 test %u ", i ); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_mac( test_keys[i], + test_data[i], + test_data_len[i], + mac ); + ASSERT( 0 == ret, ( "error code: %i\n", ret ) ); + + ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( mac, test_mac[i], 16U ), ( "failed (mac)\n" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8df26f0d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,5502 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "check_crypto_config.h" +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +/* Include internal declarations that are useful for implementing persistently + * stored keys. */ +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) ) + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Global data, support functions and library management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static int key_type_is_raw_bytes( psa_key_type_t type ) +{ + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED( type ) ); +} + +/* Values for psa_global_data_t::rng_state */ +#define RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED 0 +#define RNG_INITIALIZED 1 +#define RNG_SEEDED 2 + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned initialized : 1; + unsigned rng_state : 2; + mbedtls_psa_random_context_t rng; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state = + &global_data.rng.drbg; +#endif + +#define GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED \ + if( global_data.initialized == 0 ) \ + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error( int ret ) +{ + /* Mbed TLS error codes can combine a high-level error code and a + * low-level error code. The low-level error usually reflects the + * root cause better, so dispatch on that preferably. */ + int low_level_ret = - ( -ret & 0x007f ); + switch( low_level_ret != 0 ? low_level_ret : ret ) + { + case 0: + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA: +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT: + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + +#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) ) + /* Only check CTR_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a CTR_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + /* Only check HMAC_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a HMAC_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); + } +} + + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( psa_ecc_family_t curve, + size_t bits, + int bits_is_sloppy ) +{ + switch( curve ) + { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) + case 192: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) + case 224: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + case 256: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + case 384: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + case 521: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ); + case 528: + if( bits_is_sloppy ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ); + break; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) + case 256: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) + case 384: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) + case 512: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ); +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) + case 255: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ); + case 256: + if( bits_is_sloppy ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) + case 448: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ); +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) + case 192: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) + case 224: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) + case 256: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 ); +#endif + } + break; + } + + (void) bits_is_sloppy; + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ + +static psa_status_t validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( psa_key_type_t type, + size_t bits ) +{ + /* Check that the bit size is acceptable for the key type */ + switch( type ) + { + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE: + break; +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: + if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + if( bits != 64 && bits != 128 && bits != 192 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4: + if( bits < 8 || bits > 2048 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + if( bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Check whether a given key type is valid for use with a given MAC algorithm + * + * Upon successful return of this function, the behavior of #PSA_MAC_LENGTH + * when called with the validated \p algorithm and \p key_type is well-defined. + * + * \param[in] algorithm The specific MAC algorithm (can be wildcard). + * \param[in] key_type The key type of the key to be used with the + * \p algorithm. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The \p key_type is valid for use with the \p algorithm + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The \p key_type is not valid for use with the \p algorithm + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type ) +{ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( algorithm ) ) + { + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC( algorithm ) ) + { + /* Check that we're calling PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH with a cipher + * key. */ + if( ( key_type & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ) == + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ) + { + /* PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH returns 1 for stream ciphers and + * the block length (larger than 1) for block ciphers. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) > 1 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length ) +{ + if( slot->key.data != NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + + slot->key.data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buffer_length ); + if( slot->key.data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + slot->key.bytes = buffer_length; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t* data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, + data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + memcpy( slot->key.data, data, data_length ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + /* zero-length keys are never supported. */ + if( data_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) + { + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ); + + /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion hasn't overflown. */ + if( data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit + * size fits in its representation type. */ + if( ( *bits ) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type, *bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Copy the key material. */ + memcpy( key_buffer, data, data_length ); + *key_buffer_length = data_length; + (void)key_buffer_size; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits ) ); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits ) ); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +/** Calculate the intersection of two algorithm usage policies. + * + * Return 0 (which allows no operation) on incompatibility. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg1, + psa_algorithm_t alg2 ) +{ + /* Common case: both sides actually specify the same policy. */ + if( alg1 == alg2 ) + return( alg1 ); + /* If the policies are from the same hash-and-sign family, check + * if one is a wildcard. If so the other has the specific algorithm. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg1 ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg2 ) && + ( alg1 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == ( alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg1 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + return( alg2 ); + if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg2 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + return( alg1 ); + } + /* If the policies are from the same AEAD family, check whether + * one of them is a minimum-tag-length wildcard. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg2 ) && + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg1, 0 ) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg2, 0 ) ) ) + { + size_t alg1_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg1 ); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg2 ); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + alg1, restricted_len ) ); + } + /* If only one is a wildcard, return specific algorithm if compatible. */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ) + { + return( alg2 ); + } + if( ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ) + { + return( alg1 ); + } + } + /* If the policies are from the same MAC family, check whether one + * of them is a minimum-MAC-length policy. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg2 ) && + ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg1 ) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg2 ) ) ) + { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the base + * algorithm of alg1 and alg2 are the same, we only need this once. */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( alg1, key_type ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Get the (exact or at-least) output lengths for both sides of the + * requested intersection. None of the currently supported algorithms + * have an output length dependent on the actual key size, so setting it + * to a bogus value of 0 is currently OK. + * + * Note that for at-least-this-length wildcard algorithms, the output + * length is set to the shortest allowed length, which allows us to + * calculate the most restrictive tag length for the intersection. */ + size_t alg1_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg1 ); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg2 ); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg1, restricted_len ) ); + } + + /* If only one is an at-least-this-length policy, the intersection would + * be the other (fixed-length) policy as long as said fixed length is + * equal to or larger than the shortest allowed length. */ + if( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ? alg2 : 0 ); + } + if( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ? alg1 : 0 ); + } + + /* If none of them are wildcards, check whether they define the same tag + * length. This is still possible here when one is default-length and + * the other specific-length. Ensure to always return the + * specific-length version for the intersection. */ + if( alg1_len == alg2_len ) + return( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg1, alg1_len ) ); + } + /* If the policies are incompatible, allow nothing. */ + return( 0 ); +} + +static int psa_key_algorithm_permits( psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, + psa_algorithm_t requested_alg ) +{ + /* Common case: the policy only allows requested_alg. */ + if( requested_alg == policy_alg ) + return( 1 ); + /* If policy_alg is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash, + * and requested_alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash, + * then requested_alg is compliant with policy_alg. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( requested_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( policy_alg ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + { + return( ( policy_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == + ( requested_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ); + } + /* If policy_alg is a wildcard AEAD algorithm of the same base as + * the requested algorithm, check the requested tag length to be + * equal-length or longer than the wildcard-specified length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( requested_alg ) && + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, 0 ) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( requested_alg, 0 ) ) && + ( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( requested_alg ) ); + } + /* If policy_alg is a MAC algorithm of the same base as the requested + * algorithm, check whether their MAC lengths are compatible. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( requested_alg ) && + ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg ) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ) ) + { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the policy + * and requested algorithms are the same, we only need this once. */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( policy_alg, key_type ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Get both the requested output length for the algorithm which is to be + * verified, and the default output length for the base algorithm. + * Note that none of the currently supported algorithms have an output + * length dependent on actual key size, so setting it to a bogus value + * of 0 is currently OK. */ + size_t requested_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, requested_alg ); + size_t default_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ); + + /* If the policy is default-length, only allow an algorithm with + * a declared exact-length matching the default. */ + if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == 0 ) + return( requested_output_length == default_output_length ); + + /* If the requested algorithm is default-length, allow it if the policy + * length exactly matches the default length. */ + if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( requested_alg ) == 0 && + PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == default_output_length ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + + /* If policy_alg is an at-least-this-length wildcard MAC algorithm, + * check for the requested MAC length to be equal to or longer than the + * minimum allowed length. */ + if( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= + requested_output_length ); + } + } + /* If policy_alg is a generic key agreement operation, then using it for + * a key derivation with that key agreement should also be allowed. This + * behaviour is expected to be defined in a future specification version. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( requested_alg ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( requested_alg ) == + policy_alg ); + } + /* If it isn't explicitly permitted, it's forbidden. */ + return( 0 ); +} + +/** Test whether a policy permits an algorithm. + * + * The caller must test usage flags separately. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being validated, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \retval PSA_SUCCESS When \p alg is a specific algorithm + * allowed by the \p policy. + * \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT When \p alg is not a specific algorithm + * \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED When \p alg is a specific algorithm, but + * the \p policy does not allow it. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_policy_permits( const psa_key_policy_t *policy, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + /* '0' is not a valid algorithm */ + if( alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* A requested algorithm cannot be a wildcard. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg, alg ) || + psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg2, alg ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); +} + +/** Restrict a key policy based on a constraint. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being restricted, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \param[in] key_type The key type for which to restrict the policy + * \param[in,out] policy The policy to restrict. + * \param[in] constraint The policy constraint to apply. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \c *policy contains the intersection of the original value of + * \c *policy and \c *constraint. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c key_type, \c *policy and \c *constraint are incompatible. + * \c *policy is unchanged. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_key_policy_t *policy, + const psa_key_policy_t *constraint ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg, + constraint->alg ); + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg2 = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg2, + constraint->alg2 ); + if( intersection_alg == 0 && policy->alg != 0 && constraint->alg != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + if( intersection_alg2 == 0 && policy->alg2 != 0 && constraint->alg2 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + policy->usage &= constraint->usage; + policy->alg = intersection_alg; + policy->alg2 = intersection_alg2; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints + * and lock it. + * + * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is + * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is + * zero, the algorithm is not checked. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + slot = *p_slot; + + /* Enforce that usage policy for the key slot contains all the flags + * required by the usage parameter. There is one exception: public + * keys can always be exported, so we treat public key objects as + * if they had the export flag. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) ) + usage &= ~PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + + if( ( slot->attr.policy.usage & usage ) != usage ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto error; + } + + /* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algorithm. */ + if( alg != 0 ) + { + status = psa_key_policy_permits( &slot->attr.policy, + slot->attr.type, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto error; + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( status ); +} + +/** Get a key slot containing a transparent key and lock it. + * + * A transparent key is a key for which the key material is directly + * available, as opposed to a key in a secure element and/or to be used + * by a secure element. + * + * This is a temporary function that may be used instead of + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() when there is no opaque key support + * for a cryptographic operation. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the + * caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, p_slot, + usage, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( (*p_slot)->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + psa_unlock_key_slot( *p_slot ); + *p_slot = NULL; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + /* Data pointer will always be either a valid pointer or NULL in an + * initialized slot, so we can just free it. */ + if( slot->key.data != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); + + mbedtls_free( slot->key.data ); + slot->key.data = NULL; + slot->key.bytes = 0; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * Persistent storage is not affected. */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); + + /* + * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, + * do our best to report an unexpected lock counter: if available + * call MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED that may terminate execution (if called as + * part of the execution of a test suite this will stop the test suite + * execution). + */ + if( slot->lock_count != 1 ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( slot->lock_count == 1 ); +#endif + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe + * because all multipart operation objects are independent from + * the key slot: if they need to access the key after the setup + * phase, they have a copy of the key. Note that this means that + * key material can linger until all operations are completed. */ + /* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has + * been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not + * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. */ + memset( slot, 0, sizeof( *slot ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + psa_status_t status; /* status of the last operation */ + psa_status_t overall_status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + /* + * Get the description of the key in a key slot. In case of a persistent + * key, this will load the key description from persistent memory if not + * done yet. We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if + * the key is operated by an SE or not and this information is needed by + * the current implementation. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* + * If the key slot containing the key description is under access by the + * library (apart from the present access), the key cannot be destroyed + * yet. For the time being, just return in error. Eventually (to be + * implemented), the key should be destroyed when all accesses have + * stopped. + */ + if( slot->lock_count > 1 ) + { + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + return( PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); + } + + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + /* Refuse the destruction of a read-only key (which may or may not work + * if we attempt it, depending on whether the key is merely read-only + * by policy or actually physically read-only). + * Just do the best we can, which is to wipe the copy in memory + * (done in this function's cleanup code). */ + overall_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( slot->attr.lifetime ); + if( driver != NULL ) + { + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things: + * remove the key file in internal storage, destroy the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. Start a transaction that will encompass these + * three actions. */ + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY ); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + /* We should still try to destroy the key in the secure + * element and the key metadata in storage. This is especially + * important if the error is that the storage is full. + * But how to do it exactly without risking an inconsistent + * state after a reset? + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/215 + */ + overall_status = status; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_destroy_se_key( driver, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + status = psa_destroy_persistent_key( slot->attr.id ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + + /* TODO: other slots may have a copy of the same key. We should + * invalidate them. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/214 + */ + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +exit: + status = psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from wiping over a storage error */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + return( overall_status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +static psa_status_t psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi mpi; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t *buffer = NULL; + size_t buflen; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mpi ); + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &mpi ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &mpi, 65537 ) == 0 ) + { + /* It's the default value, which is reported as an empty string, + * so there's nothing to do. */ + goto exit; + } + + buflen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &mpi ); + buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buflen ); + if( buffer == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &mpi, buffer, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + attributes->domain_parameters = buffer; + attributes->domain_parameters_size = buflen; + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mpi ); + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_free( buffer ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +/** Retrieve all the publicly-accessible attributes of a key. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + psa_reset_key_attributes( attributes ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, 0, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + attributes->core = slot->attr; + attributes->core.flags &= ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( psa_get_se_driver_entry( slot->attr.lifetime ) != NULL ) + psa_set_key_slot_number( attributes, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( slot->attr.type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY: + /* TODO: reporting the public exponent for opaque keys + * is not yet implemented. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/216 + */ + if( ! psa_key_lifetime_is_external( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + break; + + status = psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( rsa, + attributes ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + } + break; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + default: + /* Nothing else to do. */ + break; + } + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_reset_key_attributes( attributes ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ) +{ + if( attributes->core.flags & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER ) + { + *slot_number = attributes->slot_number; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +static psa_status_t psa_export_key_buffer_internal( const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + if( key_buffer_size > data_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + memcpy( data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); + memset( data + key_buffer_size, 0, + data_size - key_buffer_size ); + *data_length = key_buffer_size; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { + return( psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } + else + { + /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but + it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit + support for exporting certain key types. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if( data_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Export requires the EXPORT flag. There is an exception for public keys, + * which don't require any flag, but + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() takes care of this. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + /* Exporting public -> public */ + return( psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private RSA key to public. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private ECC key to public */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + } + else + { + /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but + it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit + support for exporting certain key types. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if( data_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Exporting a public key doesn't require a usage flag. */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, 0, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length ); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +#if defined(static_assert) +static_assert( ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) == 0, + "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both external-only and dual-use" ); +static_assert( ( PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) == 0, + "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and dual-use" ); +static_assert( ( PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY ) == 0, + "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and external-only" ); +#endif + +/** Validate that a key policy is internally well-formed. + * + * This function only rejects invalid policies. It does not validate the + * consistency of the policy with respect to other attributes of the key + * such as the key type. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_policy( const psa_key_policy_t *policy ) +{ + if( ( policy->usage & ~( PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Validate the internal consistency of key attributes. + * + * This function only rejects invalid attribute values. If does not + * validate the consistency of the attributes with any key data that may + * be involved in the creation of the key. + * + * Call this function early in the key creation process. + * + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = psa_get_key_id( attributes ); + + status = psa_validate_key_location( lifetime, p_drv ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_validate_key_persistence( lifetime ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + if( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + if( !psa_is_valid_key_id( psa_get_key_id( attributes ), 0 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + status = psa_validate_key_policy( &attributes->core.policy ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Refuse to create overly large keys. + * Note that this doesn't trigger on import if the attributes don't + * explicitly specify a size (so psa_get_key_bits returns 0), so + * psa_import_key() needs its own checks. */ + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Reject invalid flags. These should not be reachable through the API. */ + if( attributes->core.flags & ~ ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Prepare a key slot to receive key material. + * + * This function allocates a key slot and sets its metadata. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * This function is intended to be used as follows: + * -# Call psa_start_key_creation() to allocate a key slot, prepare + * it with the specified attributes, and in case of a volatile key assign it + * a volatile key identifier. + * -# Populate the slot with the key material. + * -# Call psa_finish_key_creation() to finalize the creation of the slot. + * In case of failure at any step, stop the sequence and call + * psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * On success, the key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the caller + * to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * \param method An identification of the calling function. + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the prepared slot. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key slot is ready to receive key material. + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) method; + *p_drv = NULL; + + status = psa_validate_key_attributes( attributes, p_drv ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_get_empty_key_slot( &volatile_key_id, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + slot = *p_slot; + + /* We're storing the declared bit-size of the key. It's up to each + * creation mechanism to verify that this information is correct. + * It's automatically correct for mechanisms that use the bit-size as + * an input (generate, device) but not for those where the bit-size + * is optional (import, copy). In case of a volatile key, assign it the + * volatile key identifier associated to the slot returned to contain its + * definition. */ + + slot->attr = attributes->core; + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + slot->attr.id = volatile_key_id; +#else + slot->attr.id.key_id = volatile_key_id; +#endif + } + + /* Erase external-only flags from the internal copy. To access + * external-only flags, query `attributes`. Thanks to the check + * in psa_validate_key_attributes(), this leaves the dual-use + * flags and any internal flag that psa_get_empty_key_slot() + * may have set. */ + slot->attr.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things + * when creating or registering a persistent key: + * create the key file in internal storage, create the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. This is done by starting a transaction that will + * encompass these three actions. + * For registering a volatile key, we just need to find an appropriate + * slot number inside the SE. Since the key is designated volatile, creating + * a transaction is not required. */ + /* The first thing to do is to find a slot number for the new key. + * We save the slot number in persistent storage as part of the + * transaction data. It will be needed to recover if the power + * fails during the key creation process, to clean up on the secure + * element side after restarting. Obtaining a slot number from the + * secure element driver updates its persistent state, but we do not yet + * save the driver's persistent state, so that if the power fails, + * we can roll back to a state where the key doesn't exist. */ + if( *p_drv != NULL ) + { + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + status = psa_find_se_slot_for_key( attributes, method, *p_drv, + &slot_number ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( attributes->core.lifetime ) ) + { + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = slot_number; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + return( status ); + } + } + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, (uint8_t *)( &slot_number ), sizeof( slot_number ) ); + } + + if( *p_drv == NULL && method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER ) + { + /* Key registration only makes sense with a secure element. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Finalize the creation of a key once its key material has been set. + * + * This entails writing the key to persistent storage. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. + * + * If the finalization succeeds, the function unlocks the key slot (it was + * locked by psa_start_key_creation()) and the key slot cannot be accessed + * anymore as part of the key creation process. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + * \param[out] key On success, identifier of the key. Note that the + * key identifier is also stored in the key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully created. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + (void) slot; + (void) driver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t data; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number = + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ; + +#if defined(static_assert) + static_assert( sizeof( slot_number ) == + sizeof( data.slot_number ), + "Slot number size does not match psa_se_key_data_storage_t" ); +#endif + memcpy( &data.slot_number, &slot_number, sizeof( slot_number ) ); + status = psa_save_persistent_key( &slot->attr, + (uint8_t*) &data, + sizeof( data ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + { + /* Key material is saved in export representation in the slot, so + * just pass the slot buffer for storage. */ + status = psa_save_persistent_key( &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes ); + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Finish the transaction for a key creation. This does not + * happen when registering an existing key. Detect this case + * by checking whether a transaction is in progress (actual + * creation of a persistent key in a secure element requires a transaction, + * but registration or volatile key creation doesn't use one). */ + if( driver != NULL && + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type == PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ) + { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_persistent_key( slot->attr.id ); + return( status ); + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *key = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + + return( status ); +} + +/** Abort the creation of a key. + * + * You may call this function after calling psa_start_key_creation(), + * or after psa_finish_key_creation() fails. In other circumstances, this + * function may not clean up persistent storage. + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + */ +static void psa_fail_key_creation( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + (void) driver; + + if( slot == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* TODO: If the key has already been created in the secure + * element, and the failure happened later (when saving metadata + * to internal storage), we need to destroy the key in the secure + * element. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/217 + */ + + /* Abort the ongoing transaction if any (there may not be one if + * the creation process failed before starting one, or if the + * key creation is a registration of a key in a secure element). + * Earlier functions must already have done what it takes to undo any + * partial creation. All that's left is to update the transaction data + * itself. */ + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); +} + +/** Validate optional attributes during key creation. + * + * Some key attributes are optional during key creation. If they are + * specified in the attributes structure, check that they are consistent + * with the data in the slot. + * + * This function should be called near the end of key creation, after + * the slot in memory is fully populated but before saving persistent data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_optional_attributes( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + if( attributes->core.type != 0 ) + { + if( attributes->core.type != slot->attr.type ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi actual, required; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &required ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &actual ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto rsa_exit; + ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &required, + attributes->domain_parameters, + attributes->domain_parameters_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto rsa_exit; + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &actual, &required ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + rsa_exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &actual ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &required ); + if( ret != 0) + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + if( attributes->core.bits != 0 ) + { + if( attributes->core.bits != slot->attr.bits ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t bits; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject zero-length symmetric keys (including raw data key objects). + * This also rejects any key which might be encoded as an empty string, + * which is never valid. */ + if( data_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element + * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to + * hold the generated key material. */ + if( slot->key.data == NULL ) + { + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + bits = slot->attr.bits; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( attributes, + data, data_length, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( slot->attr.bits == 0 ) + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + else if( bits != slot->attr.bits ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes( slot, attributes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Leaving attributes unspecified is not currently supported. + * It could make sense to query the key type and size from the + * secure element, but not all secure elements support this + * and the driver HAL doesn't currently support it. */ + if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, &key ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + /* Registration doesn't keep the key in RAM. */ + psa_close_key( key ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +static psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material( const psa_key_slot_t *source, + psa_key_slot_t *target ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( target, + source->key.data, + source->key.bytes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + target->attr.type = source->attr.type; + target->attr.bits = source->attr.bits; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *specified_attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *source_slot = NULL; + psa_key_slot_t *target_slot = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = *specified_attributes; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + + *target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + source_key, &source_slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes( source_slot, + specified_attributes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_restrict_key_policy( source_slot->attr.type, + &actual_attributes.core.policy, + &source_slot->attr.policy ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, &actual_attributes, + &target_slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + /* Copying to a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( actual_attributes.core.lifetime ) ) + { + /* + * Copying through an opaque driver is not implemented yet, consider + * a lifetime with an external location as an invalid parameter for + * now. + */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_copy_key_material( source_slot, target_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_finish_key_creation( target_slot, driver, target_key ); +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( target_slot, driver ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( source_slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Message digests */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_hash_abort( psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( operation ); + operation->id = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_setup( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->id != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Ensure all of the context is zeroized, since PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT only + * directly zeroes the int-sized dummy member of the context union. */ + memset( &operation->ctx, 0, sizeof( operation->ctx ) ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( operation, alg ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort( operation ); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_update( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if( input_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( operation, input, input_length ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + *hash_length = 0; + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + psa_hash_abort( operation ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_verify( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length ) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_finish( + operation, + actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ), + &actual_hash_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( actual_hash_length != hash_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort(operation); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compute( psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + *hash_length = 0; + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compare( psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length ) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, + actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), + &actual_hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + if( actual_hash_length != hash_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_clone( const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + if( source_operation->id == 0 || + target_operation->id != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( source_operation, + target_operation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort( target_operation ); + + return( status ); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* MAC */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_mac_abort( psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( operation ); + operation->mac_size = 0; + operation->is_sign = 0; + operation->id = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *mac_size ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type( attributes ); + size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( attributes ); + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm */ + status = psa_mac_key_can_do( alg, key_type ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Get the output length for the algorithm and key combination */ + *mac_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + + if( *mac_size < 4 ) + { + /* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be + * brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist, + * so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still + * too small for security. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( *mac_size > PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) ) ) + { + /* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length than the full length + * of the algorithm. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + if( *mac_size > PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ) + { + /* PSA_MAC_LENGTH returns the correct length even for a MAC algorithm + * that is disabled in the compile-time configuration. The result can + * therefore be larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which does take the + * configuration into account. In this case, force a return of + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED here. Otherwise psa_mac_verify(), or + * psa_mac_compute(mac_size=PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE), would return + * PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL for an unsupported algorithm whose MAC size + * is larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which is misleading and which breaks + * systematically generated tests. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + int is_sign ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->id != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, + &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( alg, &attributes, + &operation->mac_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + operation->is_sign = is_sign; + /* Dispatch the MAC setup call with validated input */ + if( is_sign ) + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + } + else + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 1 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 0 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_update( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if( input_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( operation, + input, input_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( ! operation->is_sign ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Sanity check. This will guarantee that mac_size != 0 (and so mac != NULL) + * once all the error checks are done. */ + if( operation->mac_size == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( mac_size < operation->mac_size ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( operation, + mac, operation->mac_size, + mac_length ); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation->mac_size = 0; + } + + if( mac_size > operation->mac_size ) + memset( &mac[operation->mac_size], '!', + mac_size - operation->mac_size ); + + abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->is_sign ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->mac_size != mac_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( operation, + mac, mac_length ); + +exit: + abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length, + int is_sign ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, + &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( alg, &attributes, + &operation_mac_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( mac_size < operation_mac_size ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + input, input_length, + mac, operation_mac_size, mac_length ); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation_mac_size = 0; + } + if( mac_size > operation_mac_size ) + memset( &mac[operation_mac_size], '!', mac_size - operation_mac_size ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_compute( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + return( psa_mac_compute_internal( key, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length, 1 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_mac_length; + + status = psa_mac_compute_internal( key, alg, + input, input_length, + actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ), + &actual_mac_length, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( mac_length != actual_mac_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length ) != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) ); + + return ( status ); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_verify_check_alg( int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + if( input_is_message ) + { + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) + { + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else + { + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t * signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *signature_length = 0; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees + * that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the input + * buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have + * to be a hash.) */ + if( signature_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + alg ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + if( input_is_message ) + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + } + else + { + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + } + + +exit: + /* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error, + * the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid signature + * (barring an attack on the signature and deliberately-crafted input), + * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + memset( signature + *signature_length, '!', + signature_size - *signature_length ); + else + memset( signature, '!', signature_size ); + /* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call + * memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */ + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + alg ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + if( input_is_message ) + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length ); + } + else + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length ); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); + +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) + { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + return psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t * signature_length ) +{ + return psa_sign_internal( + key, 1, alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) + { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + return psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + return psa_verify_internal( + key, 1, alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + if( attributes->core.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_size; + (void)signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + return psa_sign_internal( + key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + return psa_verify_internal( + key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +static void psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH( alg ); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg ); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) && salt_length != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( ! ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto rsa_exit; + + if( output_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + if( alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + input_length, + input, + output ) ); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } + else + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( alg, rsa ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + salt, salt_length, + input_length, + input, + output ) ); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } + else + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *output_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } + else + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) && salt_length != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( input_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + + if( alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size ) ); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } + else + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( alg, rsa ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + salt, salt_length, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size ) ); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } + else + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } + else + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Symmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_usage_t usage = ( cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->id != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, usage, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Initialize the operation struct members, except for id. The id member + * is used to indicate to psa_cipher_abort that there are resources to free, + * so we only set it (in the driver wrapper) after resources have been + * allocated/initialized. */ + operation->iv_set = 0; + if( alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ) + operation->iv_required = 0; + else if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ) + operation->iv_required = 0; + else + operation->iv_required = 1; + operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + /* Try doing the operation through a driver before using software fallback. */ + if( cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + else + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t default_iv_length; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_set || ! operation->iv_required ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + default_iv_length = operation->default_iv_length; + if( iv_size < default_iv_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + if( default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random( local_iv, default_iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( operation, + local_iv, default_iv_length ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + memcpy( iv, local_iv, default_iv_length ); + *iv_length = default_iv_length; + operation->iv_set = 1; + } + else + { + *iv_length = 0; + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_set || ! operation->iv_required ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( operation, + iv, + iv_length ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->iv_set = 1; + else + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( operation, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( operation, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( psa_cipher_abort( operation ) ); + else + { + *output_length = 0; + (void) psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( operation ); + + operation->id = 0; + operation->iv_set = 0; + operation->iv_required = 0; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t default_iv_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ); + if( default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if( default_iv_length > 0 ) + { + if( output_size < default_iv_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random( local_iv, default_iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, local_iv, default_iv_length, input, input_length, + output + default_iv_length, output_size - default_iv_length, + output_length ); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = unlock_status; + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( default_iv_length > 0 ) + memcpy( output, local_iv, default_iv_length ); + *output_length += default_iv_length; + } + else + *output_length = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + if( input_length < PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = unlock_status; + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + *output_length = 0; + + return( status ); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* AEAD */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *ciphertext_length = 0; + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && ciphertext_size != 0 ) + memset( ciphertext, 0, ciphertext_size ); + + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *plaintext_length = 0; + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && plaintext_size != 0 ) + memset( plaintext, 0, plaintext_size ); + + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( status ); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Generators */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#define AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF +#endif /* At least one builtin KDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const uint8_t *hmac_key, + size_t hmac_key_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( hmac_key_length ) ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + + operation->is_sign = 1; + operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( operation, + &attributes, + hmac_key, hmac_key_length, + PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ) ); + + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* KDF algorithms reliant on HMAC */ + +#define HKDF_STATE_INIT 0 /* no input yet */ +#define HKDF_STATE_STARTED 1 /* got salt */ +#define HKDF_STATE_KEYED 2 /* got key */ +#define HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT 3 /* output started */ + +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation ) +{ + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( operation->alg ) ) + return( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( operation->alg ) ); + else + return( operation->alg ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( operation ); + if( kdf_alg == 0 ) + { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.hkdf.info ); + status = psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + /* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */ + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret_length ); + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret ); + } + + if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed_length ); + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed ); + } + + if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label_length ); + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label ); + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + + /* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */ + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation, sizeof( *operation ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + { + /* This is a blank key derivation operation. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + *capacity = operation->capacity; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity ) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + if( capacity > operation->capacity ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + operation->capacity = capacity; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) +/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. This performs a chunk + * of the expand phase of the HKDF algorithm. */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length ) +{ + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status; + + if( hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || ! hkdf->info_set ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT; + + while( output_length != 0 ) + { + /* Copy what remains of the current block */ + uint8_t n = hash_length - hkdf->offset_in_block; + if( n > output_length ) + n = (uint8_t) output_length; + memcpy( output, hkdf->output_block + hkdf->offset_in_block, n ); + output += n; + output_length -= n; + hkdf->offset_in_block += n; + if( output_length == 0 ) + break; + /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if( hkdf->block_number == 0xff ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* We need a new block */ + ++hkdf->block_number; + hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + hkdf->prk, + hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( hkdf->block_number != 1 ) + { + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->info, + hkdf->info_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + &hkdf->block_number, 1 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + sizeof( hkdf->output_block ), + &hmac_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( alg ); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_mac_operation_t hmac = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status, cleanup_status; + + /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if( tls12_prf->block_number == 0xff ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + /* We need a new block */ + ++tls12_prf->block_number; + tls12_prf->left_in_block = hash_length; + + /* Recall the definition of the TLS-1.2-PRF from RFC 5246: + * + * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) + * + * P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... + * + * A(0) = seed + * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) + * + * The `psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation` structure saves the block + * `HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed)` from which the output + * is currently extracted as `output_block` and where i is + * `block_number`. + */ + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Calculate A(i) where i = tls12_prf->block_number. */ + if( tls12_prf->block_number == 1 ) + { + /* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)), where A(0) = seed. (The RFC overloads + * the variable seed and in this instance means it in the context of the + * P_hash function, where seed = label + seed.) */ + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, + tls12_prf->label, + tls12_prf->label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, + tls12_prf->seed, + tls12_prf->seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + /* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */ + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac, + tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length ); + if( hmac_output_length != hash_length ) + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Calculate HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + label + seed). */ + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac, + tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + +cleanup: + cleanup_status = psa_mac_abort( &hmac ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = cleanup_status; + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH( alg ); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t offset, length; + + switch( tls12_prf->state ) + { + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET: + tls12_prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT; + break; + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT: + break; + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + while( output_length != 0 ) + { + /* Check if we have fully processed the current block. */ + if( tls12_prf->left_in_block == 0 ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( tls12_prf, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + continue; + } + + if( tls12_prf->left_in_block > output_length ) + length = (uint8_t) output_length; + else + length = tls12_prf->left_in_block; + + offset = hash_length - tls12_prf->left_in_block; + memcpy( output, tls12_prf->output_block + offset, length ); + output += length; + output_length -= length; + tls12_prf->left_in_block -= length; + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( operation ); + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + { + /* This is a blank operation. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + if( output_length > operation->capacity ) + { + operation->capacity = 0; + /* Go through the error path to wipe all confidential data now + * that the operation object is useless. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + if( output_length == 0 && operation->capacity == 0 ) + { + /* Edge case: this is a finished operation, and 0 bytes + * were requested. The right error in this case could + * be either INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY or BAD_STATE. Return + * INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY, which is right for a finished + * operation, for consistency with the case when + * output_length > 0. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); + } + operation->capacity -= output_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ); + status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( &operation->ctx.hkdf, hash_alg, + output, output_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + kdf_alg, output, + output_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + { + (void) kdf_alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* Preserve the algorithm upon errors, but clear all sensitive state. + * This allows us to differentiate between exhausted operations and + * blank operations, so we can return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE on blank + * operations. */ + psa_algorithm_t alg = operation->alg; + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + operation->alg = alg; + memset( output, '!', output_length ); + } + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) +static void psa_des_set_key_parity( uint8_t *data, size_t data_size ) +{ + if( data_size >= 8 ) + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( data ); + if( data_size >= 16 ) + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( data + 8 ); + if( data_size >= 24 ) + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( data + 16 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_key_internal( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation ) +{ + uint8_t *data = NULL; + size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ); + psa_status_t status; + + if( ! key_type_is_raw_bytes( slot->attr.type ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, bytes ); + if( data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( operation, data, bytes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ) + psa_des_set_key_parity( data, bytes ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, bytes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( &attributes, + data, bytes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits ); + if( bits != slot->attr.bits ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( ! operation->can_output_key ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + /* Deriving a key in a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + status = psa_generate_derived_key_internal( slot, + attributes->core.bits, + operation ); + } + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + return( status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key derivation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) +static int is_kdf_alg_supported( psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + return( 0 ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hash_try_support( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ); + psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg ) +{ + /* Make sure that operation->ctx is properly zero-initialised. (Macro + * initialisers for this union leave some bytes unspecified.) */ + memset( &operation->ctx, 0, sizeof( operation->ctx ) ); + + /* Make sure that kdf_alg is a supported key derivation algorithm. */ + if( ! is_kdf_alg_supported( kdf_alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* All currently supported key derivation algorithms are based on a + * hash algorithm. */ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ); + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + if( hash_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise + * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially + * risk-prone. */ + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support( hash_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) && + ! ( hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_try_support( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_ECDH ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#endif + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if( operation->alg != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( alg ); + status = psa_key_agreement_try_support( ka_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( operation, kdf_alg ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( operation, alg ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } + else + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->alg = alg; + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) +static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + switch( step ) + { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + else + { + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + data, data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + /* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */ + if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + NULL, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + } + if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + data, data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->prk, + sizeof( hkdf->prk ), + &data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + hkdf->block_number = 0; + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: + if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + if( hkdf->info_set ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + hkdf->info_length = data_length; + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( hkdf->info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + memcpy( hkdf->info, data, data_length ); + } + hkdf->info_set = 1; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + prf->seed = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( prf->seed == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + memcpy( prf->seed, data, data_length ); + prf->seed_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_key( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + prf->secret = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( prf->secret == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + memcpy( prf->secret, data, data_length ); + prf->secret_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_label( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + prf->label = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( prf->label == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + memcpy( prf->label, data, data_length ); + prf->label_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + switch( step ) + { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + return( psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( prf, data, data_length ) ); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + return( psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, data, data_length ) ); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + return( psa_tls12_prf_set_label( prf, data, data_length ) ); + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t pms[ 4 + 2 * PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE ]; + uint8_t *cur = pms; + + if( data_length > PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Quoting RFC 4279, Section 2: + * + * The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets + * long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second + * uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself. + */ + + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( data_length ); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( data_length ); + memset( cur, 0, data_length ); + cur += data_length; + *cur++ = pms[0]; + *cur++ = pms[1]; + memcpy( cur, data, data_length ); + cur += data_length; + + status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, pms, cur - pms ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( pms, sizeof( pms ) ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + { + return( psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( prf, + data, data_length ) ); + } + + return( psa_tls12_prf_input( prf, step, data, data_length ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +/** Check whether the given key type is acceptable for the given + * input step of a key derivation. + * + * Secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE. + * Non-secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + * Both secret and non-secret inputs can alternatively have the type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, which is never the type of a key object, meaning + * that the input was passed as a buffer rather than via a key object. + */ +static int psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type ) +{ + switch( step ) + { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + break; + } + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( operation ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( step, key_type ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_hkdf_input( &operation->ctx.hkdf, + PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ), + step, data, data_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_tls12_prf_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + { + /* This can't happen unless the operation object was not initialized */ + (void) data; + (void) data_length; + (void) kdf_alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + return( psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, + data, data_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + return( status ); + } + + /* Passing a key object as a SECRET input unlocks the permission + * to output to a key object. */ + if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + operation->can_output_key = 1; + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, + step, slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key agreement */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_ecdh( const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *our_key, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; + psa_status_t status; + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( our_key->grp.id, &bits ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve), + bits, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + &their_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh, + shared_secret_length, + shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + if( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) != *shared_secret_length ) + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_size ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( their_key ); + mbedtls_free( their_key ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + +#define PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length ) +{ + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) + case PSA_ALG_ECDH: + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( private_key->attr.type ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + private_key->attr.type, + private_key->attr.bits, + private_key->key.data, + private_key->key.bytes, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_key_agreement_ecdh( peer_key, peer_key_length, + ecp, + shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + default: + (void) private_key; + (void) peer_key; + (void) peer_key_length; + (void) shared_secret; + (void) shared_secret_size; + (void) shared_secret_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +/* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort() + * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_internal( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE]; + size_t shared_secret_length = 0; + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( operation->alg ); + + /* Step 1: run the secret agreement algorithm to generate the shared + * secret. */ + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( ka_alg, + private_key, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + sizeof( shared_secret ), + &shared_secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Step 2: set up the key derivation to generate key material from + * the shared secret. A shared secret is permitted wherever a key + * of type DERIVE is permitted. */ + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_length ); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_length ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( operation->alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_key_agreement_internal( operation, step, + slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + else + { + /* If a private key has been added as SECRET, we allow the derived + * key material to be used as a key in PSA Crypto. */ + if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + operation->can_output_key = 1; + } + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement( psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is in general an upper bound + * for the output size. The PSA specification only guarantees that this + * function works if output_size >= PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(...), + * but it might be nice to allow smaller buffers if the output fits. + * At the time of writing this comment, with only ECDH implemented, + * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot. + * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily + * be exact for it as well. */ + size_t expected_length = + PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE( slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits ); + if( output_size < expected_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( alg, slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + output, output_size, + output_length ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* If an error happens and is not handled properly, the output + * may be used as a key to protect sensitive data. Arrange for such + * a key to be random, which is likely to result in decryption or + * verification errors. This is better than filling the buffer with + * some constant data such as zeros, which would result in the data + * being protected with a reproducible, easily knowable key. + */ + psa_generate_random( output, output_size ); + *output_length = output_size; + } + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/** Initialize the PSA random generator. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_init( mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset( rng, 0, sizeof( *rng ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Set default configuration if + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources() hasn't been called. */ + if( rng->entropy_init == NULL ) + rng->entropy_init = mbedtls_entropy_init; + if( rng->entropy_free == NULL ) + rng->entropy_free = mbedtls_entropy_free; + + rng->entropy_init( &rng->entropy ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + /* The PSA entropy injection feature depends on using NV seed as an entropy + * source. Add NV seed as an entropy source for PSA entropy injection. */ + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &rng->entropy, + mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif + + mbedtls_psa_drbg_init( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA random generator. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_free( mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset( rng, 0, sizeof( *rng ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + mbedtls_psa_drbg_free( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ); + rng->entropy_free( &rng->entropy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Seed the PSA random generator. + */ +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_random_seed( mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + /* Do nothing: the external RNG seeds itself. */ + (void) rng; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + const unsigned char drbg_seed[] = "PSA"; + int ret = mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed( &rng->entropy, + drbg_seed, sizeof( drbg_seed ) - 1 ); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_random( uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size ) +{ + GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( &global_data.rng, + output, output_size, + &output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + /* Breaking up a request into smaller chunks is currently not supported + * for the extrernal RNG interface. */ + if( output_length != output_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + while( output_size > 0 ) + { + size_t request_size = + ( output_size > MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST ? + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST : + output_size ); + int ret = mbedtls_psa_get_random( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output, request_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + output_size -= request_size; + output += request_size; + } + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/* Wrapper function allowing the classic API to use the PSA RNG. + * + * `mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, ...)` calls + * `psa_generate_random(...)`. The state parameter is ignored since the + * PSA API doesn't support passing an explicit state. + * + * In the non-external case, psa_generate_random() calls an + * `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random` function which has exactly the same signature + * and semantics as mbedtls_psa_get_random(). As an optimization, + * instead of doing this back-and-forth between the PSA API and the + * classic API, psa_crypto_random_impl.h defines `mbedtls_psa_get_random` + * as a constant function pointer to `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random`. + */ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +int mbedtls_psa_get_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size ) +{ + /* This function takes a pointer to the RNG state because that's what + * classic mbedtls functions using an RNG expect. The PSA RNG manages + * its own state internally and doesn't let the caller access that state. + * So we just ignore the state parameter, and in practice we'll pass + * NULL. */ + (void) p_rng; + psa_status_t status = psa_generate_random( output, output_size ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( 0 ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size ) +{ + if( global_data.initialized ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + if( ( ( seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM ) || + ( seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) || + ( seed_size > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy( seed, seed_size ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +/** Validate the key type and size for key generation + * + * \param type The key type + * \param bits The number of bits of the key + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key type and size are valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) + { + status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type, bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + else +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + if( bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Accept only byte-aligned keys, for the same reasons as + * in psa_import_rsa_key(). */ + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + /* To avoid empty block, return successfully here. */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + if( ( attributes->domain_parameters == NULL ) && + ( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) + { + status = psa_generate_random( key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ) + psa_des_set_key_parity( key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + } + else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + if ( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + * defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) + if ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + { + (void)key_buffer_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t key_buffer_size; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Reject any attempt to create a public key. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(attributes->core.type) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element + * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to + * hold the generated key material. */ + if( slot->key.data == NULL ) + { + if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ) == + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ) + { + status = psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + attributes->core.type, attributes->core.bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + key_buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits ); + } + else + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + attributes, &key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, &slot->key.bytes ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + return( status ); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Module setup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ), + void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) ) +{ + if( global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + global_data.rng.entropy_init = entropy_init; + global_data.rng.entropy_free = entropy_free; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( void ) +{ + psa_wipe_all_key_slots( ); + if( global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED ) + { + mbedtls_psa_random_free( &global_data.rng ); + } + /* Wipe all remaining data, including configuration. + * In particular, this sets all state indicator to the value + * indicating "uninitialized". */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &global_data, sizeof( global_data ) ); + + /* Terminate drivers */ + psa_driver_wrapper_free( ); +} + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) +/** Recover a transaction that was interrupted by a power failure. + * + * This function is called during initialization, before psa_crypto_init() + * returns. If this function returns a failure status, the initialization + * fails. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_recover_transaction( + const psa_crypto_transaction_t *transaction ) +{ + switch( transaction->unknown.type ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY: + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY: + /* TODO - fall through to the failure case until this + * is implemented. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/218 + */ + default: + /* We found an unsupported transaction in the storage. + * We don't know what state the storage is in. Give up. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + } +} +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + /* Double initialization is explicitly allowed. */ + if( global_data.initialized != 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + /* Initialize and seed the random generator. */ + mbedtls_psa_random_init( &global_data.rng ); + global_data.rng_state = RNG_INITIALIZED; + status = mbedtls_psa_random_seed( &global_data.rng ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + global_data.rng_state = RNG_SEEDED; + + status = psa_initialize_key_slots( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Init drivers */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + status = psa_crypto_load_transaction( ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + status = psa_crypto_recover_transaction( &psa_crypto_transaction ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + } + else if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + { + /* There's no transaction to complete. It's all good. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + + /* All done. */ + global_data.initialized = 1; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..16a3711b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c @@ -0,0 +1,397 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t core_alg; + uint8_t tag_length; + union + { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + mbedtls_ccm_context ccm; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + mbedtls_gcm_context gcm; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + mbedtls_chachapoly_context chachapoly; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + } ctx; +} aead_operation_t; + +#define AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, {0}} + +static void psa_aead_abort_internal( aead_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->core_alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &operation->ctx.ccm ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + mbedtls_gcm_free( &operation->ctx.gcm ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &operation->ctx.chachapoly ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + } +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( + aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t key_bits; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id; + size_t full_tag_length = 0; + + key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( alg, + attributes->core.type, key_bits, + &cipher_id ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + switch( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 0 ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ): + operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CCM; + full_tag_length = 16; + /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( attributes->core.type ) != 16 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &operation->ctx.ccm ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &operation->ctx.ccm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ): + operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + full_tag_length = 16; + /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( attributes->core.type ) != 16 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &operation->ctx.gcm ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &operation->ctx.gcm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0 ): + operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; + full_tag_length = 16; + /* We only support the default tag length. */ + if( alg != PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &operation->ctx.chachapoly ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &operation->ctx.chachapoly, + key_buffer ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + default: + (void) status; + (void) key_buffer; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( attributes->core.type, + key_bits, alg ) + > full_tag_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + operation->tag_length = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( attributes->core.type, + key_bits, + alg ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t *tag; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* For all currently supported modes, the tag is at the end of the + * ciphertext. */ + if( ciphertext_size < ( plaintext_length + operation.tag_length ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + tag = ciphertext + plaintext_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.ccm, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + tag, operation.tag_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.gcm, + MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + operation.tag_length, tag ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + { + if( nonce_length != 12 ) + { + if( nonce_length == 8 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + else + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation.tag_length != 16 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.chachapoly, + plaintext_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, + ciphertext, + tag ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) tag; + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + (void) additional_data; + (void) additional_data_length; + (void) plaintext; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *ciphertext_length = plaintext_length + operation.tag_length; + +exit: + psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +/* Locate the tag in a ciphertext buffer containing the encrypted data + * followed by the tag. Return the length of the part preceding the tag in + * *plaintext_length. This is the size of the plaintext in modes where + * the encrypted data has the same size as the plaintext, such as + * CCM and GCM. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag( size_t tag_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + size_t plaintext_size, + const uint8_t **p_tag ) +{ + size_t payload_length; + if( tag_length > ciphertext_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + payload_length = ciphertext_length - tag_length; + if( payload_length > plaintext_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + *p_tag = ciphertext + payload_length; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + const uint8_t *tag = NULL; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag( operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext_size, &tag ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.ccm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + ciphertext, plaintext, + tag, operation.tag_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.gcm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, plaintext ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + { + if( nonce_length != 12 ) + { + if( nonce_length == 8 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + else + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation.tag_length != 16 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.chachapoly, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, + ciphertext, + plaintext ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + (void) additional_data; + (void) additional_data_length; + (void) plaintext; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + +exit: + psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aab0f835 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H + +#include + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_encrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and encrypted. + * \param plaintext_length Size of plaintext in bytes. + * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is not + * part of this output. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag are + * defined as separate outputs, the + * authentication tag is appended to the + * encrypted data. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the ciphertext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * plaintext_length) where key_type is the type + * of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD + * encryption. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * ciphertext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * ciphertext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ); + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_decrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. For algorithms where the encrypted + * data and the authentication tag are defined + * as separate inputs, the buffer contains + * encrypted data followed by the authentication + * tag. + * \param ciphertext_length Size of ciphertext in bytes. + * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the plaintext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * ciphertext_length) where key_type is the + * type of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * plaintext size of any supported AEAD + * decryption. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * plaintext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The cipher is not authentic. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * plaintext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..574c1843 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,589 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t* cipher_id ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id_tmp; + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ) + alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 0 ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ) + { + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) + case PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) + case PSA_ALG_CTR: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) + case PSA_ALG_CFB: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) + case PSA_ALG_OFB: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + case PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ): + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ): + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0 ): + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY; + break; +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } + } + else if( alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + else + return( NULL ); + + switch( key_type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + /* key_bits is 64 for Single-DES, 128 for two-key Triple-DES, + * and 192 for three-key Triple-DES. */ + if( key_bits == 64 ) + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES; + else + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES; + /* mbedtls doesn't recognize two-key Triple-DES as an algorithm, + * but two-key Triple-DES is functionally three-key Triple-DES + * with K1=K3, so that's how we present it to mbedtls. */ + if( key_bits == 128 ) + key_bits = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20; + break; +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } + if( cipher_id != NULL ) + *cipher_id = cipher_id_tmp; + + return( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher_id_tmp, + (int) key_bits, mode ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t key_bits; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = NULL; + psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->core.type; + + (void)key_buffer_size; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cipher ); + + operation->alg = alg; + key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( alg, key_type, + key_bits, NULL ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cipher, cipher_info ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && key_bits == 128 ) + { + /* Two-key Triple-DES is 3-key Triple-DES with K1=K3 */ + uint8_t keys[24]; + memcpy( keys, key_buffer, 16 ); + memcpy( keys + 16, key_buffer, 8 ); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &operation->ctx.cipher, + keys, + 192, cipher_operation ); + } + else +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &operation->ctx.cipher, key_buffer, + (int) key_bits, cipher_operation ); + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + switch( alg ) + { + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ); + break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 ); + break; + default: + /* The algorithm doesn't involve padding. */ + ret = 0; + break; + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + + operation->block_length = ( PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER( alg ) ? 1 : + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) ); + operation->iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( key_type, alg ); + +exit: + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length ) +{ + if( iv_length != operation->iv_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &operation->ctx.cipher, + iv, iv_length ) ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +/** Process input for which the algorithm is set to ECB mode. + * + * This requires manual processing, since the PSA API is defined as being + * able to process arbitrary-length calls to psa_cipher_update() with ECB mode, + * but the underlying mbedtls_cipher_update only takes full blocks. + * + * \param ctx The mbedtls cipher context to use. It must have been + * set up for ECB. + * \param[in] input The input plaintext or ciphertext to process. + * \param input_length The number of bytes to process from \p input. + * This does not need to be aligned to a block boundary. + * If there is a partial block at the end of the input, + * it is stored in \p ctx for future processing. + * \param output The buffer where the output is written. It must be + * at least `BS * floor((p + input_length) / BS)` bytes + * long, where `p` is the number of bytes in the + * unprocessed partial block in \p ctx (with + * `0 <= p <= BS - 1`) and `BS` is the block size. + * \param output_length On success, the number of bytes written to \p output. + * \c 0 on error. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS or an error from a hardware accelerator + */ +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_update_ecb( + mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + size_t internal_output_length = 0; + *output_length = 0; + + if( input_length == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + goto exit; + } + + if( ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 ) + { + /* Fill up to block size, and run the block if there's a full one. */ + size_t bytes_to_copy = block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len; + + if( input_length < bytes_to_copy ) + bytes_to_copy = input_length; + + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), + input, bytes_to_copy ); + input_length -= bytes_to_copy; + input += bytes_to_copy; + ctx->unprocessed_len += bytes_to_copy; + + if( ctx->unprocessed_len == block_size ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length ) ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + output += internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + } + } + + while( input_length >= block_size ) + { + /* Run all full blocks we have, one by one */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length ) ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + input_length -= block_size; + input += block_size; + + output += internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + } + + if( input_length > 0 ) + { + /* Save unprocessed bytes for later processing */ + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), + input, input_length ); + ctx->unprocessed_len += input_length; + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_output_size; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER( operation->alg ) ) + { + /* Take the unprocessed partial block left over from previous + * update calls, if any, plus the input to this call. Remove + * the last partial block, if any. You get the data that will be + * output in this call. */ + expected_output_size = + ( operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len + input_length ) + / operation->block_length * operation->block_length; + } + else + { + expected_output_size = input_length; + } + + if( output_size < expected_output_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ) + { + /* mbedtls_cipher_update has an API inconsistency: it will only + * process a single block at a time in ECB mode. Abstract away that + * inconsistency here to match the PSA API behaviour. */ + status = psa_cipher_update_ecb( &operation->ctx.cipher, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */ + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update( &operation->ctx.cipher, input, + input_length, output, output_length ) ); + + if( *output_length > output_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + uint8_t temp_output_buffer[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + + if( operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len != 0 ) + { + if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING || + operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_finish( &operation->ctx.cipher, + temp_output_buffer, + output_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( *output_length == 0 ) + ; /* Nothing to copy. Note that output may be NULL in this case. */ + else if( output_size >= *output_length ) + memcpy( output, temp_output_buffer, *output_length ); + else + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( temp_output_buffer, + sizeof( temp_output_buffer ) ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( operation->alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cipher ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t update_output_length, finish_output_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( iv_length > 0 ) + { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv, iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, &update_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation, output + update_output_length, + output_size - update_output_length, + &finish_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + *output_length = update_output_length + finish_output_length; + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + else + mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t olength, accumulated_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( operation.iv_length > 0 ) + { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + input, operation.iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation, input + operation.iv_length, + input_length - operation.iv_length, + output, output_size, &olength ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + accumulated_length = olength; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation, output + accumulated_length, + output_size - accumulated_length, + &olength ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + *output_length = accumulated_length + olength; + +exit: + if ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + else + mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fae98473 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H + +#include +#include + +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param key_type PSA key type + * \param key_bits Size of the key in bits + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS cipher information of the cipher algorithm. + * \c NULL if the PSA cipher algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id ); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_set_iv entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_set_iv entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. + * \param[in] iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. It is guaranteed by + * the core to be less or equal to + * PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length ); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_update entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_update entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); + +/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); + +/** Abort a cipher operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_abort entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_abort entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ); + +/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV for encryption. The + * IV has been generated by the core. + * \param[in] iv_length Size of the \p iv in bytes. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in,out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size \p iv_length is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the iv and the ciphertext. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..629feb7d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto client code + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +void psa_reset_key_attributes( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + mbedtls_free( attributes->domain_parameters ); + memset( attributes, 0, sizeof( *attributes ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + uint8_t *copy = NULL; + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + copy = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( copy == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + memcpy( copy, data, data_length ); + } + /* After this point, this function is guaranteed to succeed, so it + * can start modifying `*attributes`. */ + + if( attributes->domain_parameters != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( attributes->domain_parameters ); + attributes->domain_parameters = NULL; + attributes->domain_parameters_size = 0; + } + + attributes->domain_parameters = copy; + attributes->domain_parameters_size = data_length; + attributes->core.type = type; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size > data_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + *data_length = attributes->domain_parameters_size; + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) + memcpy( data, attributes->domain_parameters, + attributes->domain_parameters_size ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4420ec25 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -0,0 +1,535 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto core internal interfaces + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +/** Constant-time buffer comparison + * + * \param[in] a Left-hand buffer for comparison. + * \param[in] b Right-hand buffer for comparison. + * \param n Amount of bytes to compare. + * + * \return 0 if the buffer contents are equal, non-zero otherwise + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( + const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t n ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char diff = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + diff |= a[i] ^ b[i]; + + return( diff ); +} + +/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material + * and metadata for one key. + */ +typedef struct +{ + psa_core_key_attributes_t attr; + + /* + * Number of locks on the key slot held by the library. + * + * This counter is incremented by one each time a library function + * retrieves through one of the dedicated internal API a pointer to the + * key slot. + * + * This counter is decremented by one each time a library function stops + * accessing the key slot and states it by calling the + * psa_unlock_key_slot() API. + * + * This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library + * may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following + * scenarios: + * . In case of key slot starvation, all key slots contain the description + * of a key, and the library asks for the description of a persistent + * key not present in the key slots, the key slots currently accessed by + * the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the + * persistent key. + * . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close + * or purge or destroy a key while it is in used by the library through + * another thread. + */ + size_t lock_count; + + /* Dynamically allocated key data buffer. + * Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */ + struct key_data + { + uint8_t *data; + size_t bytes; + } key; +} psa_key_slot_t; + +/* A mask of key attribute flags used only internally. + * Currently there aren't any. */ +#define PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY ( \ + 0 ) + +/** Test whether a key slot is occupied. + * + * A key slot is occupied iff the key type is nonzero. This works because + * no valid key can have 0 as its key type. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. + * + * \return 1 if the slot is occupied, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_is_key_slot_occupied( const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( slot->attr.type != 0 ); +} + +/** Test whether a key slot is locked. + * + * A key slot is locked iff its lock counter is strictly greater than 0. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. + * + * \return 1 if the slot is locked, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_is_key_slot_locked( const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( slot->lock_count > 0 ); +} + +/** Retrieve flags from psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to query. + * \param mask The mask of bits to extract. + * + * \return The key attribute flags in the given slot, + * bitwise-anded with \p mask. + */ +static inline uint16_t psa_key_slot_get_flags( const psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask ) +{ + return( slot->attr.flags & mask ); +} + +/** Set flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. + * \param mask The mask of bits to modify. + * \param value The new value of the selected bits. + */ +static inline void psa_key_slot_set_flags( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask, + uint16_t value ) +{ + slot->attr.flags = ( ( ~mask & slot->attr.flags ) | + ( mask & value ) ); +} + +/** Turn on flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. + * \param mask The mask of bits to set. + */ +static inline void psa_key_slot_set_bits_in_flags( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask ) +{ + slot->attr.flags |= mask; +} + +/** Turn off flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. + * \param mask The mask of bits to clear. + */ +static inline void psa_key_slot_clear_bits( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask ) +{ + slot->attr.flags &= ~mask; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** Get the SE slot number of a key from the key slot storing its description. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to query. This must be a key slot storing + * the description of a key of a dynamically registered + * secure element, otherwise the behaviour is undefined. + */ +static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)( slot->key.data ) ) ); +} +#endif + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * + * Persistent storage is not affected. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. This includes the case of a key slot that was + * already fully wiped. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ); + +/** Try to allocate a buffer to an empty key slot. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to attach buffer to. + * \param[in] buffer_length Requested size of the buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The buffer has been successfully allocated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * Trying to allocate a buffer to a non-empty key slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length ); + +/** Wipe key data from a slot. Preserves metadata such as the policy. */ +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( psa_key_slot_t *slot ); + +/** Copy key data (in export format) into an empty key slot. + * + * This function assumes that the slot does not contain + * any key material yet. On failure, the slot content is unchanged. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to copy the key into. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key material. + * \param data_length Size of the key buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key has been copied successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation of the + * copy buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There was other key material already present in the slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ); + +/** Convert an mbed TLS error code to a PSA error code + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param ret An mbed TLS-thrown error code + * + * \return The corresponding PSA error code + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error( int ret ); + +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param key_type PSA key type + * \param key_bits Size of the key in bits + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS cipher information of the cipher algorithm. + * \c NULL if the PSA cipher algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id ); + +/** Import a key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer to contain the key data in output + * format upon successful return. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +/** Export a key in binary format + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver export_key + * entry point. This function behaves as an export_key entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Generate a key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key size in bits or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/** Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_message entry point. This function behaves as a sign_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_sign_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The input message to sign. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using + * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_message entry point. This function behaves as a verify_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_verify_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with a private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c455ecb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c @@ -0,0 +1,1865 @@ +/* + * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available + * and appropriate accelerator. + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + +/* Include test driver definition when running tests */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Repeat above block for each JSON-declared driver during autogeneration */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + +/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. + * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. + * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID (2) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID (3) +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style + * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_init( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + status = psa_init_all_se_drivers( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + + (void) status; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +void psa_driver_wrapper_free( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Unregister all secure element drivers, so that we restart from + * a pristine state. */ + psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_test_transparent_free( ); + mbedtls_test_opaque_free( ); +#endif +} + +/* Start delegation functions */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_sign_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_verify_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_sign == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_sign( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_sign_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_verify == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_verify( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + return( psa_verify_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +/** Get the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key + * associated with an opaque driver without storage. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The minimum size for a buffer to contain the key material has been + * returned successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->core.type; + size_t key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + + *key_buffer_size = 0; + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Emulate property 'builtin_key_size' */ + if( psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( + psa_get_key_id( attributes ) ) ) ) + { + *key_buffer_size = sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_size_function( key_type, key_bits ); + return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + + default: + (void)key_type; + (void)key_bits; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + size_t pubkey_length = 0; /* We don't support this feature yet */ + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_generate == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined as being in SE, but we have no way to generate it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->key_management->p_generate( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, NULL, 0, &pubkey_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + /* Transparent drivers are limited to generating asymmetric keys */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + /* Cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Software fallback */ + status = psa_generate_key_internal( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_import == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* The driver should set the number of key bits, however in + * case it doesn't, we initialize bits to an invalid value. */ + *bits = PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS + 1; + status = drv->key_management->p_import( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, data, data_length, bits ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( (*bits) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key( + attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_import_key_into_slot( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); + + default: + /* Importing a key with external storage in not yet supported. + * Return in error indicating that the lifetime is not valid. */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + return( psa_export_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export_public == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export_public( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_export_public_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + default: + (void) slot_number; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) key_buffer_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } +} + +/* + * Cipher functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + iv, + iv_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/* + * Hashing functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + (void) status; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try setup on accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_setup( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + /* Nothing left to try if we fall through here */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( + const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + switch( source_operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( &source_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_clone( + &source_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) target_operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_update( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_abort( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + + +/* + * MAC functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + (void) status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7cb88a0b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h @@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ +/* + * Function signatures for functionality that can be provided by + * cryptographic accelerators. + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* + * Initialization and termination functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_init( void ); +void psa_driver_wrapper_free( void ); + +/* + * Signature functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +/* + * Key handling functions + */ + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/* + * Cipher functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ); + +/* + * Hashing functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( + const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation ); + +/* + * AEAD functions + */ + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ); + +/* + * MAC functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H */ + +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..db6682c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -0,0 +1,472 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + size_t curve_bytes = data_length; + int explicit_bits = ( curve_bits != 0 ); + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ) != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* A Weierstrass public key is represented as: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. + * So its data length is 2m+1 where m is the curve size in bits. + */ + if( ( data_length & 1 ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + curve_bytes = data_length / 2; + + /* Montgomery public keys are represented in compressed format, meaning + * their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + + /* Private keys are represented in uncompressed private random integer + * format, meaning their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + } + + if( explicit_bits ) + { + /* With an explicit bit-size, the data must have the matching length. */ + if( curve_bytes != PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( curve_bits ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + /* We need to infer the bit-size from the data. Since the only + * information we have is the length in bytes, the value of curve_bits + * at this stage is rounded up to the nearest multiple of 8. */ + curve_bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( curve_bytes ); + } + + /* Allocate and initialize a key representation. */ + ecp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) ); + if( ecp == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ecp ); + + /* Load the group. */ + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ), + curve_bits, !explicit_bits ); + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + { + /* We can't distinguish between a nonsensical family/size combination + * (which would warrant PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT) and a + * well-regarded curve that Mbed TLS just doesn't know about (which + * would warrant PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED). For uniformity with how + * curves that Mbed TLS knows about but for which support is disabled + * at build time, return NOT_SUPPORTED. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp->grp, grp_id ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Load the key material. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + /* Load the public value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + data, + data_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Check that the point is on the curve. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + else + { + /* Load and validate the secret value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_read_key( ecp->grp.id, + ecp, + data, + data_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + *p_ecp = ecp; +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + } + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits, + data, + data_length, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( attributes->core.type ) == + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits + 1; + else + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits; + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format. There is currently no support + * for other input formats then the export format, so this is a 1-1 + * copy operation. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( attributes->core.type, + ecp, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); +exit: + /* Always free the PK object (will also free contained ECP context) */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + /* Check whether the public part is loaded */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) ) + { + /* Calculate the public key */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + data_length, + data, + data_size ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + memset( data, 0, data_size ); + + return( status ); + } + else + { + if( data_size < PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key( ecp, + data, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ) ) ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *data_length = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ); + else + memset( data, 0, data_size ); + + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + attributes->core.type, attributes->core.bits, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( attributes->core.type ) ), + ecp, data, data_size, data_length ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( + attributes->core.type ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = + mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( curve, attributes->core.bits, 0 ); + + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp; + + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || curve_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &ecp ); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( grp_id, &ecp, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key( &ecp, key_buffer, key_buffer_size ) ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *key_buffer_length = key_buffer_size; + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* ECDSA sign/verify */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + if( signature_size < 2 * curve_bytes ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg ); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( + &ecp->grp, &r, &s, + &ecp->d, hash, + hash_length, md_alg, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); +#else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } + else + { + (void) alg; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ecp->grp, &r, &s, &ecp->d, + hash, hash_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &r, + signature, + curve_bytes ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes ) ); +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + if( ret == 0 ) + *signature_length = 2 * curve_bytes; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + (void)alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + if( signature_length != 2 * curve_bytes ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &r, + signature, + curve_bytes ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes ) ); + + /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ecp->grp, hash, hash_length, + &ecp->Q, &r, &s ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..feddd8a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal ECP representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] curve_bits The nominal bit-size of the curve. + * It must be consistent with the representation + * passed in \p data. + * This can be 0, in which case the bit-size + * is inferred from \p data_length (which is possible + * for all key types and representation formats + * formats that are currently supported or will + * be in the foreseeable future). + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_ecp Returns a pointer to an ECP context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( psa_key_type_t type, + size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp ); + +/** Import an ECP key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +/** Export an ECP key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] ecp The internal ECP representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ); + +/** Export an ECP public key or the public part of an ECP key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Generate an ECP key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the ECP key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with ECDSA. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the ECC key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Verify an ECDSA hash or short message signature. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..337e557b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,489 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + return( &mbedtls_md2_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + return( &mbedtls_md4_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + return( &mbedtls_md5_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + return( &mbedtls_ripemd160_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + return( &mbedtls_sha1_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + return( &mbedtls_sha224_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + return( &mbedtls_sha256_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + return( &mbedtls_sha384_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + return( &mbedtls_sha512_info ); +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->alg ) + { + case 0: + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_free( &operation->ctx.md2 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_free( &operation->ctx.md4 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free( &operation->ctx.md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( &operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_free( &operation->ctx.sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + operation->alg = 0; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->alg != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_init( &operation->ctx.md2 ); + ret = mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.md2 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_init( &operation->ctx.md4 ); + ret = mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.md4 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_init( &operation->ctx.md5 ); + ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_init( &operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_init( &operation->ctx.sha1 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_init( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, 1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_init( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, 0 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_init( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, 1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_init( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, 0 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ? + PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED : + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + if( ret == 0 ) + operation->alg = alg; + else + mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( operation ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + switch( source_operation->alg ) + { + case 0: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md2, + &source_operation->ctx.md2 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md4, + &source_operation->ctx.md4 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md5, + &source_operation->ctx.md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( &target_operation->ctx.ripemd160, + &source_operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha1, + &source_operation->ctx.sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) source_operation; + (void) target_operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + target_operation->alg = source_operation->alg; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch( operation->alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + ret = mbedtls_md2_update_ret( &operation->ctx.md2, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( &operation->ctx.md4, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &operation->ctx.md5, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( &operation->ctx.ripemd160, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha1, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t actual_hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( operation->alg ); + + /* Fill the output buffer with something that isn't a valid hash + * (barring an attack on the hash and deliberately-crafted input), + * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ + *hash_length = hash_size; + /* If hash_size is 0 then hash may be NULL and then the + * call to memset would have undefined behavior. */ + if( hash_size != 0 ) + memset( hash, '!', hash_size ); + + if( hash_size < actual_hash_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + switch( operation->alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + ret = mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.md2, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + ret = mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.md4, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.md5, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.ripemd160, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha1, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, hash ); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *hash_length = actual_hash_length; + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *hash_length = hash_size; + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_update( &operation, input, input_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( &operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +exit: + abort_status = mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( abort_status ); + else + return( status ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b99b9428 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H + +#include + +#include + +/** Get Mbed TLS MD information of a hash algorithm given its PSA identifier + * + * \param[in] alg PSA hash algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS MD information of the hash algorithm. \c NULL if the + * PSA hash algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p hash_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Set up a multipart hash operation using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). The + * core may call mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the core must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or mbedtls_psa_hash_verify(). + * - A call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized to all-zero and not yet be in use. + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** Clone an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_clone + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_clone entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to + * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent + * to calling mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same + * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then + * mbedtls_psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that + * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the + * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of + * the objects do not affect the other object. + * + * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. + * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. + * It must be initialized but not active. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +/** Finish the calculation of the Mbed TLS-calculated hash of a message. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_hash_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the + * hash algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) + * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ); + +/** Abort an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_abort + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_abort entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(), mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or + * mbedtls_psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1e5a4071 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_invasive.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: invasive interfaces for test only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They MUST NOT be made available to clients over IPC in integrations + * with isolation, and they SHOULD NOT be made available in library + * integrations except when building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#else +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** \brief Configure entropy sources. + * + * This function may only be called before a call to psa_crypto_init(), + * or after a call to mbedtls_psa_crypto_free() and before any + * subsequent call to psa_crypto_init(). + * + * This function is only intended for test purposes. The functionality + * it provides is also useful for system integrators, but + * system integrators should configure entropy drivers instead of + * breaking through to the Mbed TLS API. + * + * \param entropy_init Function to initialize the entropy context + * and set up the desired entropy sources. + * It is called by psa_crypto_init(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_init(). + * This function cannot report failures directly. + * To indicate a failure, set the entropy context + * to a state where mbedtls_entropy_func() will + * return an error. + * \param entropy_free Function to free the entropy context + * and associated resources. + * It is called by mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_free(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller does not have the permission to configure + * entropy sources. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has already been initialized. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ), + void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a3f49a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_its.h + * \brief Interface of trusted storage that crypto is built on. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \brief Flags used when creating a data entry + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_storage_create_flags_t; + +/** \brief A type for UIDs used for identifying data + */ +typedef uint64_t psa_storage_uid_t; + +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NONE 0 /**< No flags to pass */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE (1 << 0) /**< The data associated with the uid will not be able to be modified or deleted. Intended to be used to set bits in `psa_storage_create_flags_t`*/ + +/** + * \brief A container for metadata associated with a specific uid + */ +struct psa_storage_info_t +{ + uint32_t size; /**< The size of the data associated with a uid **/ + psa_storage_create_flags_t flags; /**< The flags set when the uid was created **/ +}; + +/** Flag indicating that \ref psa_storage_create and \ref psa_storage_set_extended are supported */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_SUPPORT_SET_EXTENDED (1 << 0) + +/** \brief PSA storage specific error codes + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149) +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152) + +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 /**< The major version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented on significant updates that may include breaking changes */ +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MINOR 1 /**< The minor version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented in small updates that are unlikely to include breaking changes */ + +/** + * \brief create a new or modify an existing uid/value pair + * + * \param[in] uid the identifier for the data + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of the data in `p_data` + * \param[in] p_data A buffer containing the data + * \param[in] create_flags The flags that the data will be stored with + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was already created with PSA_STORAGE_WRITE_ONCE_FLAG + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The operation failed because one or more of the flags provided in `create_flags` is not supported or is not valid + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE The operation failed because there was insufficient space on the storage medium + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_set(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the value associated with a provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[in] data_offset The starting offset of the data requested + * \param[in] data_length the amount of data requested (and the minimum allocated size of the `p_data` buffer) + * \param[out] p_data The buffer where the data will be placed upon successful completion + * \param[out] p_data_length The amount of data returned in the p_data buffer + * + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`, `p_data_length`) + * is invalid. For example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access. + * In addition, this can also happen if an invalid offset was provided. + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the metadata about the provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[out] p_info A pointer to the `psa_storage_info_t` struct that will be populated with the metadata + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided uid value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_info`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info); + +/** + * \brief Remove the provided key and its associated data from the storage + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided key value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided key value was created with PSA_STORAGE_WRITE_ONCE_FLAG + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_remove(psa_storage_uid_t uid); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dcf065a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,499 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_abort_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hmac->opad, sizeof( hmac->opad ) ); + return( psa_hash_abort( &hmac->hash_ctx ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_setup_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ) +{ + uint8_t ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t i; + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_status_t status; + + hmac->alg = hash_alg; + + /* Sanity checks on block_size, to guarantee that there won't be a buffer + * overflow below. This should never trigger if the hash algorithm + * is implemented correctly. */ + /* The size checks against the ipad and opad buffers cannot be written + * `block_size > sizeof( ipad ) || block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad )` + * because that triggers -Wlogical-op on GCC 7.3. */ + if( block_size > sizeof( ipad ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( block_size < hash_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( key_length > block_size ) + { + status = psa_hash_compute( hash_alg, key, key_length, + ipad, sizeof( ipad ), &key_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + } + /* A 0-length key is not commonly used in HMAC when used as a MAC, + * but it is permitted. It is common when HMAC is used in HKDF, for + * example. Don't call `memcpy` in the 0-length because `key` could be + * an invalid pointer which would make the behavior undefined. */ + else if( key_length != 0 ) + memcpy( ipad, key, key_length ); + + /* ipad contains the key followed by garbage. Xor and fill with 0x36 + * to create the ipad value. */ + for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ ) + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + memset( ipad + key_length, 0x36, block_size - key_length ); + + /* Copy the key material from ipad to opad, flipping the requisite bits, + * and filling the rest of opad with the requisite constant. */ + for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ ) + hmac->opad[i] = ipad[i] ^ 0x36 ^ 0x5C; + memset( hmac->opad + key_length, 0x5C, block_size - key_length ); + + status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, ipad, block_size ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ipad, sizeof( ipad ) ); + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_update_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + return( psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, data, data_length ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_finish_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size ) +{ + uint8_t tmp[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hmac->alg; + size_t hash_size = 0; + size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + /* From here on, tmp needs to be wiped. */ + + status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, hmac->opad, block_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + memcpy( mac, tmp, mac_size ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, hash_size ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) +static psa_status_t cmac_setup( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + /* Mbed TLS CMAC does not accept 3DES with only two keys, nor does it accept + * to do CMAC with pure DES, so return NOT_SUPPORTED here. */ + if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && + ( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 64 || + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 128 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif + + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t * cipher_info = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + PSA_ALG_CMAC, + psa_get_key_type( attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ), + NULL ); + + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cmac, cipher_info ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &operation->ctx.cmac, + key_buffer, + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) ); +exit: + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + +/* Initialize this driver's MAC operation structure. Once this function has been + * called, mbedtls_psa_mac_abort can run and will do the right thing. */ +static psa_status_t mac_init( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + operation->alg = alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cmac ); + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + /* We'll set up the hash operation later in psa_hmac_setup_internal. */ + operation->ctx.hmac.alg = 0; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + (void) operation; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cmac ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + psa_hmac_abort_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + goto bad_state; + } + + operation->alg = 0; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +bad_state: + /* If abort is called on an uninitialized object, we can't trust + * anything. Wipe the object in case it contains confidential data. + * This may result in a memory leak if a pointer gets overwritten, + * but it's too late to do anything about this. */ + memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) ); + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->alg != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + status = mac_init( operation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + /* Key buffer size for CMAC is dictated by the key bits set on the + * attributes, and previously validated by the core on key import. */ + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = cmac_setup( operation, attributes, key_buffer ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) ) + { + status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &operation->ctx.cmac, + input, input_length ) ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + return( psa_hmac_update_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, + input, input_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_finish_internal( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_size ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + uint8_t tmp[PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &operation->ctx.cmac, tmp ); + if( ret == 0 ) + memcpy( mac, tmp, mac_size ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + return( psa_hmac_finish_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, + mac, mac_size ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal( operation, mac, mac_size ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *mac_length = mac_size; + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Consistency check: requested MAC length fits our local buffer */ + if( mac_length > sizeof( actual_mac ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal( operation, actual_mac, mac_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, mac_length ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + + status = psa_mac_setup( &operation, + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( input_length > 0 ) + { + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_update( &operation, input, input_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal( &operation, mac, mac_size ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *mac_length = mac_size; + +exit: + mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC || MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a821e741 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H + +#include + +/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p mac_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_verify_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_verify_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core aborts the + * operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to + * the MAC calculation. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Output size requested for the MAC algorithm. The PSA + * core guarantees this is a valid MAC length for the + * algorithm and key combination passed to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup(). It also guarantees the + * \p mac buffer is large enough to contain the + * requested output size. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes output to buffer + * \p mac, which will be equal to the requested length + * \p mac_size. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. A sufficient buffer size + * can be determined by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with + * an expected value using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * mac_verify_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * mac_verify_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this + * function. This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by + * concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). It then compares the calculated MAC with the + * expected MAC passed as a parameter to this function. + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Length in bytes of the expected MAC value. The PSA + * core guarantees that this length is a valid MAC + * length for the algorithm and key combination passed + * to mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected MAC. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +/** Abort a MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() again. + * + * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in + * #mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(), + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and + * has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c4c09a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_random_impl.h + * + * \brief PSA crypto random generator implementation abstraction. + * + * The definitions here need to be consistent with the declarations + * in include/mbedtls/psa_util.h. This file contains some redundant + * declarations to increase the chance that a compiler will detect + * inconsistencies if one file is changed without updating the other, + * but not all potential inconsistencies can be enforced, so make sure + * to check the public declarations and contracts in + * include/mbedtls/psa_util.h if you modify this file. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + +#include +#include // only for error codes +#include + +typedef mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +/* Trivial wrapper around psa_generate_random(). */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size ); + +/* The PSA RNG API doesn't need any externally maintained state. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +/* Choose a DRBG based on configuration and availability */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff +/* Looks like a 64-bit system, so prefer SHA-512. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#else +/* Looks like a 32-bit system, so prefer SHA-256. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#endif +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#else +#error "No hash algorithm available for HMAC_DBRG." +#endif + +#else +#error "No DRBG module available for the psa_crypto module." +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +/** Initialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_init( mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( p_rng ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( p_rng ); +#endif +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_free( mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( p_rng ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( p_rng ); +#endif +} + +/** The type of the PSA random generator context. + * + * The random generator context is composed of an entropy context and + * a DRBG context. + */ +typedef struct +{ + void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t drbg; +} mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +/* Defined in include/mbedtls/psa_util.h so that it's visible to + * application code. The declaration here is redundant, but included + * as a safety net to make it more likely that a future change that + * accidentally causes the implementation to diverge from the interface + * will be noticed. */ +/* Do not include the declaration under MSVC because it doesn't accept it + * ("error C2370: 'mbedtls_psa_get_random' : redefinition; different storage class"). + * Observed with Visual Studio 2013. A known bug apparently: + * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/8146541/duplicate-external-static-declarations-not-allowed-in-visual-studio + */ +#if !defined(_MSC_VER) +static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random; +#endif + +/** The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to + * return. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#endif + +/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state. + * + * This variable is only intended to be used through the macro + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE. + */ +/* psa_crypto.c sets this variable to a pointer to the DRBG state in the + * global PSA crypto state. */ +/* The type `mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t` is defined in + * include/mbedtls/psa_util.h so that `mbedtls_psa_random_state` can be + * declared there and be visible to application code. */ +extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; + +/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state. + * + * This macro expands to an expression that is suitable as the \c p_rng + * parameter to pass to mbedtls_psa_get_random(). + * + * This macro exists in all configurations where the psa_crypto module is + * enabled. Its expansion depends on the configuration. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state + +/** Seed the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param entropy An entropy context to read the seed from. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An Mbed TLS error code (\c MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx) on failure. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed( + mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + mbedtls_entropy_func, + entropy, + custom, len ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE ); + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + md_info, + mbedtls_entropy_func, + entropy, + custom, len ) ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bafb55c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,530 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +/* Mbed TLS doesn't support non-byte-aligned key sizes (i.e. key sizes + * that are not a multiple of 8) well. For example, there is only + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(), which returns a number of bytes, and no + * way to return the exact bit size of a key. + * To keep things simple, reject non-byte-aligned key sizes. */ +static psa_status_t psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi n; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &n ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &n, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &n ) % 8 != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + mbedtls_mpi_free( &n ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_pk_context ctx; + size_t bits; + mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx ); + + /* Parse the data. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &ctx, data, data_length, NULL, 0 ) ); + else + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &ctx, data, data_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* We have something that the pkparse module recognizes. If it is a + * valid RSA key, store it. */ + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &ctx ) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS + * supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example, + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */ + bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ) ) ); + if( bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Copy out the pointer to the RSA context, and reset the PK context + * such that pk_free doesn't free the RSA context we just grabbed. */ + *p_rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ); + ctx.pk_info = NULL; + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + data, + data_length, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + *bits = (psa_key_bits_t) PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ); + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format, such that we can store export + * representation in the key slot. Export representation in case of RSA is + * the smallest representation that's allowed as input, so a straight-up + * allocation of the same size as the input buffer will be large enough. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( attributes->core.type, + rsa, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); +exit: + /* Always free the RSA object */ + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + int ret; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + uint8_t *pos = data + data_size; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + pk.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info; + pk.pk_ctx = rsa; + + /* PSA Crypto API defines the format of an RSA key as a DER-encoded + * representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a + * private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( &pk, data, data_size ); + else + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &pos, data, &pk ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + /* Clean up in case pk_write failed halfway through. */ + memset( data, 0, data_size ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + + /* The mbedtls_pk_xxx functions write to the end of the buffer. + * Move the data to the beginning and erase remaining data + * at the original location. */ + if( 2 * (size_t) ret <= data_size ) + { + memcpy( data, data + data_size - ret, ret ); + memset( data + data_size - ret, 0, ret ); + } + else if( (size_t) ret < data_size ) + { + memmove( data, data + data_size - ret, ret ); + memset( data + ret, 0, data_size - ret ); + } + + *data_length = ret; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else + (void) type; + (void) rsa; + (void) data; + (void) data_size; + (void) data_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + attributes->core.type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY, + rsa, + data, + data_size, + data_length ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_read_exponent( const uint8_t *domain_parameters, + size_t domain_parameters_size, + int *exponent ) +{ + size_t i; + uint32_t acc = 0; + + if( domain_parameters_size == 0 ) + { + *exponent = 65537; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + /* Mbed TLS encodes the public exponent as an int. For simplicity, only + * support values that fit in a 32-bit integer, which is larger than + * int on just about every platform anyway. */ + if( domain_parameters_size > sizeof( acc ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + for( i = 0; i < domain_parameters_size; i++ ) + acc = ( acc << 8 ) | domain_parameters[i]; + if( acc > INT_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + *exponent = acc; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int exponent; + + status = psa_rsa_read_exponent( attributes->domain_parameters, + attributes->domain_parameters_size, + &exponent ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( &rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + (unsigned int)attributes->core.bits, + exponent ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( attributes->core.type, + &rsa, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + * defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Sign/verify hashes */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + +/* Decode the hash algorithm from alg and store the mbedtls encoding in + * md_alg. Verify that the hash length is acceptable. */ +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type( psa_algorithm_t alg, + size_t hash_length, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg ); + *md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + + /* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length + * parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an + * overflow later. */ +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( hash_length > UINT_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +#endif + + /* For signatures using a hash, the hash length must be correct. */ + if( alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW ) + { + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) != hash_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( signature_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + *signature_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) +static int rsa_pss_expected_salt_len( psa_algorithm_t alg, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + size_t hash_length ) +{ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT( alg ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY ); + /* Otherwise: standard salt length, i.e. largest possible salt length + * up to the hash length. */ + int klen = (int) mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); // known to fit + int hlen = (int) hash_length; // known to fit + int room = klen - 2 - hlen; + if( room < 0 ) + return( 0 ); // there is no valid signature in this case anyway + else if( room > hlen ) + return( hlen ); + else + return( room ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( signature_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) ) + { + int slen = rsa_pss_expected_salt_len( alg, rsa, hash_length ); + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + md_alg, + slen, + signature ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Mbed TLS distinguishes "invalid padding" from "valid padding but + * the rest of the signature is invalid". This has little use in + * practice and PSA doesn't report this distinction. */ + status = ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ) ? + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE : + mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b76613e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal RSA representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_rsa Returns a pointer to an RSA context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa ); + +/** Import an RSA key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +/** Export an RSA key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] rsa The internal RSA representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ); + +/** Export a public RSA key or the public part of an RSA key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Generate an RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the RSA key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with an RSA private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the RSA key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..56678d6a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c @@ -0,0 +1,383 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver lookup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* This structure is identical to psa_drv_se_context_t declared in + * `crypto_se_driver.h`, except that some parts are writable here + * (non-const, or pointer to non-const). */ +typedef struct +{ + void *persistent_data; + size_t persistent_data_size; + uintptr_t transient_data; +} psa_drv_se_internal_context_t; + +struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s +{ + psa_key_location_t location; + const psa_drv_se_t *methods; + union + { + psa_drv_se_internal_context_t internal; + psa_drv_se_context_t context; + } u; +}; + +static psa_se_drv_table_entry_t driver_table[PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS]; + +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + size_t i; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + /* In the driver table, location=0 means an entry that isn't used. + * No driver has a location of 0 because it's a reserved value + * (which designates transparent keys). Make sure we never return + * a driver entry for location 0. */ + if( location == 0 ) + return( NULL ); + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + if( driver_table[i].location == location ) + return( &driver_table[i] ); + } + return( NULL ); +} + +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + return( driver->methods ); +} + +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + return( &driver->u.context ); +} + +int psa_get_se_driver( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context) +{ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( lifetime ); + if( p_methods != NULL ) + *p_methods = ( driver ? driver->methods : NULL ); + if( p_drv_context != NULL ) + *p_drv_context = ( driver ? &driver->u.context : NULL ); + return( driver != NULL ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Persistent data management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_storage_uid_t *uid ) +{ + if( driver->location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX + /* ITS file sizes are limited to 32 bits. */ + if( driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size > UINT32_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif + + /* See the documentation of PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. */ + *uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + driver->location; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + size_t length; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( driver, &uid ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Read the amount of persistent data that the driver requests. + * If the data in storage is larger, it is truncated. If the data + * in storage is smaller, silently keep what is already at the end + * of the output buffer. */ + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return( psa_its_get( uid, 0, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + &length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( driver, &uid ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return( psa_its_set( uid, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + 0 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data( psa_key_location_t location ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + if( location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + location; + return( psa_its_remove( uid ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_location_t key_location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* If the location is wrong, it's a bug in the library. */ + if( driver->location != key_location ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + /* If the driver doesn't support key creation in any way, give up now. */ + if( driver->methods->key_management == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( psa_get_key_slot_number( attributes, slot_number ) == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* The application wants to use a specific slot. Allow it if + * the driver supports it. On a system with isolation, + * the crypto service must check that the application is + * permitted to request this slot. */ + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t p_validate_slot_number = + driver->methods->key_management->p_validate_slot_number; + if( p_validate_slot_number == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + status = p_validate_slot_number( &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + *slot_number ); + } + else if( method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER ) + { + /* The application didn't specify a slot number. This doesn't + * make sense when registering a slot. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + /* The application didn't tell us which slot to use. Let the driver + * choose. This is the normal case. */ + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t p_allocate = + driver->methods->key_management->p_allocate; + if( p_allocate == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + status = p_allocate( &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + slot_number ); + } + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key( psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t storage_status; + /* Normally a missing method would mean that the action is not + * supported. But psa_destroy_key() is not supposed to return + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: if you can create a key, you should + * be able to destroy it. The only use case for a driver that + * does not have a way to destroy keys at all is if the keys are + * locked in a read-only state: we can use the keys but not + * destroy them. Hence, if the driver doesn't support destroying + * keys, it's really a lack of permission. */ + if( driver->methods->key_management == NULL || + driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + status = driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + slot_number ); + storage_status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? storage_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers( void ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = &driver_table[i]; + if( driver->location == 0 ) + continue; /* skipping unused entry */ + const psa_drv_se_t *methods = psa_get_se_driver_methods( driver ); + if( methods->p_init != NULL ) + { + psa_status_t status = methods->p_init( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + driver->location ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + } + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver registration */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( + psa_key_location_t location, + const psa_drv_se_t *methods) +{ + size_t i; + psa_status_t status; + + if( methods->hal_version != PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + /* Driver table entries are 0-initialized. 0 is not a valid driver + * location because it means a transparent key. */ +#if defined(static_assert) + static_assert( PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE == 0, + "Secure element support requires 0 to mean a local key" ); +#endif + if( location == PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + if( location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + if( driver_table[i].location == 0 ) + break; + /* Check that location isn't already in use up to the first free + * entry. Since entries are created in order and never deleted, + * there can't be a used entry after the first free entry. */ + if( driver_table[i].location == location ) + return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + } + if( i == PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + driver_table[i].location = location; + driver_table[i].methods = methods; + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data_size = + methods->persistent_data_size; + + if( methods->persistent_data_size != 0 ) + { + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, methods->persistent_data_size ); + if( driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data == NULL ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + /* Load the driver's persistent data. On first use, the persistent + * data does not exist in storage, and is initialized to + * all-bits-zero by the calloc call just above. */ + status = psa_load_se_persistent_data( &driver_table[i] ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + goto error; + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +error: + memset( &driver_table[i], 0, sizeof( driver_table[i] ) ); + return( status ); +} + +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( void ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + if( driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data != NULL ) + mbedtls_free( driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data ); + } + memset( driver_table, 0, sizeof( driver_table ) ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..71042616 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +/** The maximum location value that this implementation supports + * for a secure element. + * + * This is not a characteristic that each PSA implementation has, but a + * limitation of the current implementation due to the constraints imposed + * by storage. See #PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. + * + * The minimum location value for a secure element is 1, like on any + * PSA implementation (0 means a transparent key). + */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION 255 + +/** The base of the range of ITS file identifiers for secure element + * driver persistent data. + * + * We use a slice of the implementation reserved range 0xffff0000..0xffffffff, + * specifically the range 0xfffffe00..0xfffffeff. The length of this range + * drives the value of #PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION. The identifier 0xfffffe00 is + * actually not used since it corresponds to #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + * which doesn't have a driver. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE ( (psa_key_id_t) 0xfffffe00 ) + +/** The maximum number of registered secure element driver locations. */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS 4 + +/** Unregister all secure element drivers. + * + * \warning Do not call this function while the library is in the initialized + * state. This function is only intended to be called at the end + * of mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + */ +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( void ); + +/** Initialize all secure element drivers. + * + * Called from psa_crypto_init(). + */ +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers( void ); + +/** A structure that describes a registered secure element driver. + * + * A secure element driver table entry contains a pointer to the + * driver's method table as well as the driver context structure. + */ +typedef struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s psa_se_drv_table_entry_t; + +/** Return the secure element driver information for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * \param[out] p_methods On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *methods points to its method table. + * Otherwise \c *methods is \c NULL. + * \param[out] p_drv_context On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *drv_context points to its context + * structure. + * Otherwise \c *drv_context is \c NULL. + * + * \retval 1 + * \p lifetime corresponds to a registered driver. + * \retval 0 + * \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +int psa_get_se_driver( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context); + +/** Return the secure element driver table entry for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * + * \return The driver table entry for \p lifetime, or + * \p NULL if \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ); + +/** Return the method table for a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return The driver's method table. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Return the context of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return A pointer to the driver context. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Find a free slot for a key that is to be created. + * + * This function calls the relevant method in the driver to find a suitable + * slot for a key with the given attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes Metadata about the key that is about to be created. + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to query. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, a slot number that is free in this + * secure element. + */ +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ); + +/** Destoy a key in a secure element. + * + * This function calls the relevant driver method to destroy a key + * and updates the driver's persistent data. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key( psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ); + +/** Load the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to load from storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Save the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to save to storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Destroy the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * This is currently only used for testing. + * + * \param[in] location The location identifier for the driver whose + * persistent data is to be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data( psa_key_location_t location ); + + +/** The storage representation of a key whose data is in a secure element. + */ +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t slot_number[sizeof( psa_key_slot_number_t )]; +} psa_se_key_data_storage_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6f69fc88 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -0,0 +1,586 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) ) + +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT]; + unsigned key_slots_initialized : 1; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +int psa_is_valid_key_id( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok ) +{ + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ); + + if( ( PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN <= key_id ) && + ( key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ) ) + return( 1 ); + + if( vendor_ok && + ( PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN <= key_id ) && + ( key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/** Get the description in memory of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are + * stored in key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot + * containing the description of a key given its identifier. + * + * The function searches the key slots containing the description of the key + * with \p key identifier. The function does only read accesses to the key + * slots. The function does not load any persistent key thus does not access + * any storage. + * + * For volatile key identifiers, only one key slot is queried as a volatile + * key with identifier key_id can only be stored in slot of index + * ( key_id - #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ). + * + * On success, the function locks the key slot. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The pointer to the key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key was returned. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key in the key slots. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ); + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if( psa_key_id_is_volatile( key_id ) ) + { + slot = &global_data.key_slots[ key_id - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ]; + + /* + * Check if both the PSA key identifier key_id and the owner + * identifier of key match those of the key slot. + * + * Note that, if the key slot is not occupied, its PSA key identifier + * is equal to zero. This is an invalid value for a PSA key identifier + * and thus cannot be equal to the valid PSA key identifier key_id. + */ + status = mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key, slot->attr.id ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + else + { + if ( !psa_is_valid_key_id( key, 1 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key, slot->attr.id ) ) + break; + } + status = ( slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + status = psa_lock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *p_slot = slot; + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots( void ) +{ + /* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both + * guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which + * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. */ + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots( void ) +{ + size_t slot_idx; + + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + slot->lock_count = 1; + (void) psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); + } + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; +} + +psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot( psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unlocked_persistent_key_slot; + + if( ! global_data.key_slots_initialized ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto error; + } + + selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot = NULL; + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + if( ! psa_is_key_slot_occupied( slot ) ) + { + selected_slot = slot; + break; + } + + if( ( unlocked_persistent_key_slot == NULL ) && + ( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) && + ( ! psa_is_key_slot_locked( slot ) ) ) + unlocked_persistent_key_slot = slot; + } + + /* + * If there is no unused key slot and there is at least one unlocked key + * slot containing the description of a persistent key, recycle the first + * such key slot we encountered. If we later need to operate on the + * persistent key we are evicting now, we will reload its description from + * storage. + */ + if( ( selected_slot == NULL ) && + ( unlocked_persistent_key_slot != NULL ) ) + { + selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot; + selected_slot->lock_count = 1; + psa_wipe_key_slot( selected_slot ); + } + + if( selected_slot != NULL ) + { + status = psa_lock_key_slot( selected_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto error; + + *volatile_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + + ( (psa_key_id_t)( selected_slot - global_data.key_slots ) ); + *p_slot = selected_slot; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + *volatile_key_id = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) +static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_data_length = 0; + + status = psa_load_persistent_key( &slot->attr, + &key_data, &key_data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Special handling is required for loading keys associated with a + * dynamically registered SE interface. */ + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + if( psa_get_se_driver( slot->attr.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t *data; + + if( key_data_length != sizeof( *data ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + data = (psa_se_key_data_storage_t *) key_data; + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, data->slot_number, sizeof( data->slot_number ) ); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( slot, key_data, key_data_length ); + +exit: + psa_free_persistent_key_data( key_data, key_data_length ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + +static psa_status_t psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE; + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number = 0; + size_t key_buffer_size = 0; + size_t key_buffer_length = 0; + + if( ! psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( slot->attr.id ) ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } + + /* Check the platform function to see whether this key actually exists */ + status = mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + slot->attr.id, &lifetime, &slot_number ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Set required key attributes to ensure get_builtin_key can retrieve the + * full attributes. */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, slot->attr.id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + + /* Get the full key attributes from the driver in order to be able to + * calculate the required buffer size. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + NULL, 0, NULL ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + { + /* Builtin keys cannot be defined by the attributes alone */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + return( status ); + } + + /* If the key should exist according to the platform, then ask the driver + * what its expected size is. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( &attributes, + &key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Allocate a buffer of the required size and load the builtin key directly + * into the (now properly sized) slot buffer. */ + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, &key_buffer_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Copy actual key length and core attributes into the slot on success */ + slot->key.bytes = key_buffer_length; + slot->attr = attributes.core; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *p_slot = NULL; + if( ! global_data.key_slots_initialized ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* + * On success, the pointer to the slot is passed directly to the caller + * thus no need to unlock the key slot here. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( key, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( status ); + + /* Loading keys from storage requires support for such a mechanism */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; + + status = psa_get_empty_key_slot( &volatile_key_id, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + (*p_slot)->attr.id = key; + (*p_slot)->attr.lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT; + + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Load keys in the 'builtin' range through their own interface */ + status = psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot( *p_slot ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + status = psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot( *p_slot ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_wipe_key_slot( *p_slot ); + if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + else + /* Add implicit usage flags. */ + psa_extend_key_usage_flags( &(*p_slot)->attr.policy.usage ); + + return( status ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + if( slot == NULL ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + if( slot->lock_count > 0 ) + { + slot->lock_count--; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + /* + * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, + * do our best to report if the lock counter is equal to zero: if + * available call MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED that may terminate execution (if + * called as part of the execution of a unit test suite this will stop the + * test suite execution). + */ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( slot->lock_count > 0 ); +#endif + + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) +{ + if ( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( lifetime ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Check whether a driver is registered against this lifetime */ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( lifetime ); + if( driver != NULL ) + { + if (p_drv != NULL) + *p_drv = driver; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + (void) p_drv; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + /* Key location for external keys gets checked by the wrapper */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + /* No support for external lifetimes at all, or dynamic interface + * did not find driver for requested lifetime. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + } + else + /* Local/internal keys are always valid */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + /* Volatile keys are always supported */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else + { + /* Persistent keys require storage support */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY( lifetime ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + else + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_open_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + if( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ) + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + + return( status ); + } + + *handle = key; + + return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) ); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + (void) key; + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_close_key( psa_key_handle_t handle ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + if( psa_key_handle_is_null( handle ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( handle, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + + return( status ); + } + if( slot->lock_count <= 1 ) + return( psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ) ); + else + return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_purge_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( key, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) && + ( slot->lock_count <= 1 ) ) + return( psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ) ); + else + return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_psa_get_stats( mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats ) +{ + size_t slot_idx; + + memset( stats, 0, sizeof( *stats ) ); + + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + const psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + if( psa_is_key_slot_locked( slot ) ) + { + ++stats->locked_slots; + } + if( ! psa_is_key_slot_occupied( slot ) ) + { + ++stats->empty_slots; + continue; + } + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + ++stats->volatile_slots; + else + { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( slot->attr.id ); + ++stats->persistent_slots; + if( id > stats->max_open_internal_key_id ) + stats->max_open_internal_key_id = id; + } + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( slot->attr.lifetime ) != + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ) + { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( slot->attr.id ); + ++stats->external_slots; + if( id > stats->max_open_external_key_id ) + stats->max_open_external_key_id = id; + } + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d539bdd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +/** Range of volatile key identifiers. + * + * The last #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT identifiers of the implementation + * range of key identifiers are reserved for volatile key identifiers. + * A volatile key identifier is equal to #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN plus the + * index of the key slot containing the volatile key definition. + */ + +/** The minimum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ( PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX - \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + 1 ) + +/** The maximum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** Test whether a key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * + * \param key_id Key identifier to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * \retval 0 + * The key identifier is not a volatile key identifier. + */ +static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile( psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + return( ( key_id >= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ) && + ( key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX ) ); +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are stored in + * key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of a key given its identifier. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p *p_slot contains a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of the key identified by \p key. + * The key slot counter has been incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been initialized. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \p key is a persistent key identifier. The implementation does not + * have sufficient resources to load the persistent key. This can be + * due to a lack of empty key slot, or available memory. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ); + +/** Initialize the key slot structures. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Currently this function always succeeds. + */ +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots( void ); + +/** Delete all data from key slots in memory. + * + * This does not affect persistent storage. */ +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots( void ); + +/** Find a free key slot. + * + * This function returns a key slot that is available for use and is in its + * ground state (all-bits-zero). On success, the key slot is locked. It is + * the responsibility of the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not + * access it anymore. + * + * \param[out] volatile_key_id On success, volatile key identifier + * associated to the returned slot. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot( psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ); + +/** Lock a key slot. + * + * This function increments the key slot lock counter by one. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + The key slot lock counter was incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The lock counter already reached its maximum value and was not + * increased. + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + if( slot->lock_count >= SIZE_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + slot->lock_count++; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Unlock a key slot. + * + * This function decrements the key slot lock counter by one. + * + * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot + * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns + * successfully without doing anything in that case. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot lock counter has been + * decremented successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The lock counter was equal to 0. + * + */ +psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ); + +/** Test whether a lifetime designates a key in an external cryptoprocessor. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The lifetime designates an external key. There should be a + * registered driver for this lifetime, otherwise the key cannot + * be created or manipulated. + * \retval 0 + * The lifetime designates a key that is volatile or in internal + * storage. + */ +static inline int psa_key_lifetime_is_external( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + return( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ) + != PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ); +} + +/** Validate a key's location. + * + * This function checks whether the key's attributes point to a location that + * is known to the PSA Core, and returns the driver function table if the key + * is to be found in an external location. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * \param[out] p_drv On success, when a key is located in external + * storage, returns a pointer to the driver table + * associated with the key's storage location. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ); + +/** Validate the persistence of a key. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The key is persistent but persistent keys + * are not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ); + +/** Validate a key identifier. + * + * \param[in] key The key identifier. + * \param[in] vendor_ok Non-zero to indicate that key identifiers in the + * vendor range are allowed, volatile key identifiers + * excepted \c 0 otherwise. + * + * \retval <> 0 if the key identifier is valid, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_is_valid_key_id( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6c8321fa --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c @@ -0,0 +1,490 @@ +/* + * PSA persistent key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key storage */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* Determine a file name (ITS file identifier) for the given key identifier. + * The file name must be distinct from any file that is used for a purpose + * other than storing a key. Currently, the only such file is the random seed + * file whose name is PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID and whose value is + * 0xFFFFFF52. */ +static psa_storage_uid_t psa_its_identifier_of_slot( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + /* Encode the owner in the upper 32 bits. This means that if + * owner values are nonzero (as they are on a PSA platform), + * no key file will ever have a value less than 0x100000000, so + * the whole range 0..0xffffffff is available for non-key files. */ + uint32_t unsigned_owner_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( key ); + return( ( (uint64_t) unsigned_owner_id << 32 ) | + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ) ); +#else + /* Use the key id directly as a file name. + * psa_is_key_id_valid() in psa_crypto_slot_management.c + * is responsible for ensuring that key identifiers do not have a + * value that is reserved for non-key files. */ + return( key ); +#endif +} + +/** + * \brief Load persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function reads data from a storage backend and returns the data in a + * buffer. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be loaded. This + * should be an occupied storage location. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \c data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_load( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + size_t data_length = 0; + + status = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_its_get( data_identifier, 0, (uint32_t) data_size, data, &data_length ); + if( data_size != data_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + return( status ); +} + +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + + if( ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( 0 ); + return( 1 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Store persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function stores the given data buffer to a persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be stored. This + * should be an unoccupied storage location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the data to be stored. + * \param data_length The number of bytes + * that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_store( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + if( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key ) == 1 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + + status = psa_its_set( data_identifier, (uint32_t) data_length, data, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + } + + status = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( data_identifier_info.size != data_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* Remove the file in case we managed to create it but something + * went wrong. It's ok if the file doesn't exist. If the file exists + * but the removal fails, we're already reporting an error so there's + * nothing else we can do. */ + (void) psa_its_remove( data_identifier ); + } + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + if( psa_its_remove( data_identifier ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( ret != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** + * \brief Get data length for given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier whose stored data length + * is to be obtained. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + *data_length = (size_t) data_identifier_info.size; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** + * Persistent key storage magic header. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER "PSA\0KEY" +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ( sizeof( PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER ) ) + +typedef struct { + uint8_t magic[PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH]; + uint8_t version[4]; + uint8_t lifetime[sizeof( psa_key_lifetime_t )]; + uint8_t type[2]; + uint8_t bits[2]; + uint8_t policy[sizeof( psa_key_policy_t )]; + uint8_t data_len[4]; + uint8_t key_data[]; +} psa_persistent_key_storage_format; + +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage( const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data ) +{ + psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (psa_persistent_key_storage_format *) storage_data; + + memcpy( storage_format->magic, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( 0, storage_format->version, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->lifetime, storage_format->lifetime, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( (uint16_t) attr->type, storage_format->type, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( (uint16_t) attr->bits, storage_format->bits, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.usage, storage_format->policy, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.alg, storage_format->policy, sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.alg2, storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( data_length, storage_format->data_len, 0 ); + memcpy( storage_format->key_data, data, data_length ); +} + +static psa_status_t check_magic_header( const uint8_t *data ) +{ + if( memcmp( data, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, + PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *)storage_data; + uint32_t version; + + if( storage_data_length < sizeof(*storage_format) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + status = check_magic_header( storage_data ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->version, 0 ); + if( version != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + *key_data_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->data_len, 0 ); + if( *key_data_length > ( storage_data_length - sizeof(*storage_format) ) || + *key_data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + if( *key_data_length == 0 ) + { + *key_data = NULL; + } + else + { + *key_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *key_data_length ); + if( *key_data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + memcpy( *key_data, storage_format->key_data, *key_data_length ); + } + + attr->lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->lifetime, 0 ); + attr->type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( storage_format->type, 0 ); + attr->bits = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( storage_format->bits, 0 ); + attr->policy.usage = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->policy, 0 ); + attr->policy.alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->policy, sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + attr->policy.alg2 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key( const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length ) +{ + size_t storage_data_length; + uint8_t *storage_data; + psa_status_t status; + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if( data == NULL || data_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ); + storage_data_length = data_length + sizeof( psa_persistent_key_storage_format ); + + storage_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, storage_data_length ); + if( storage_data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + psa_format_key_data_for_storage( data, data_length, attr, storage_data ); + + status = psa_crypto_storage_store( attr->id, + storage_data, storage_data_length ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( storage_data, storage_data_length ); + mbedtls_free( storage_data ); + + return( status ); +} + +void psa_free_persistent_key_data( uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length ) +{ + if( key_data != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_data, key_data_length ); + } + mbedtls_free( key_data ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key( psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *loaded_data; + size_t storage_data_length = 0; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = attr->id; + + status = psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( key, &storage_data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + loaded_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, storage_data_length ); + + if( loaded_data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + status = psa_crypto_storage_load( key, loaded_data, storage_data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( loaded_data, storage_data_length, + data, data_length, attr ); + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && + ( *data == NULL || *data_length == 0 ) ) + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( loaded_data, storage_data_length ); + mbedtls_free( loaded_data ); + return( status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Transactions */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction( void ) +{ + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + psa_status_t status; + status = psa_its_get_info( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, &p_info ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* This shouldn't happen: we're trying to start a transaction while + * there is still a transaction that hasn't been replayed. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + else if( status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( status ); + return( psa_its_set( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, + sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ), + &psa_crypto_transaction, + 0 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t length; + status = psa_its_get( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, 0, + sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ), + &psa_crypto_transaction, &length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( length != sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID ); + /* Whether or not updating the storage succeeded, the transaction is + * finished now. It's too late to go back, so zero out the in-memory + * data. */ + memset( &psa_crypto_transaction, 0, sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ) ); + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generator state */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy( const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, &p_info ); + + if( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST == status ) /* No seed exists */ + { + status = psa_its_set( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, seed_size, seed, 0 ); + } + else if( PSA_SUCCESS == status ) + { + /* You should not be here. Seed needs to be injected only once */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..970e1083 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h @@ -0,0 +1,399 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_storage.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include +#include + +/* Limit the maximum key size in storage. This should have no effect + * since the key size is limited in memory. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) ) +/* Sanity check: a file size must fit in 32 bits. Allow a generous + * 64kB of metadata. */ +#if PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000 +#error PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000 +#endif + +/** The maximum permitted persistent slot number. + * + * In Mbed Crypto 0.1.0b: + * - Using the file backend, all key ids are ok except 0. + * - Using the ITS backend, all key ids are ok except 0xFFFFFF52 + * (#PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID) for which the file contains the + * device's random seed (if this feature is enabled). + * - Only key ids from 1 to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT are actually used. + * + * Since we need to preserve the random seed, avoid using that key slot. + * Reserve a whole range of key slots just in case something else comes up. + * + * This limitation will probably become moot when we implement client + * separation for key storage. + */ +#define PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** + * \brief Checks if persistent data is stored for the given key slot number + * + * This function checks if any key data or metadata exists for the key slot in + * the persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier to check. + * + * \retval 0 + * No persistent data present for slot number + * \retval 1 + * Persistent data present for slot number + */ +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +/** + * \brief Format key data and metadata and save to a location for given key + * slot. + * + * This function formats the key data and metadata and saves it to a + * persistent storage backend. The storage location corresponding to the + * key slot must be empty, otherwise this function will fail. This function + * should be called after loading the key into an internal slot to ensure the + * persistent key is not saved into a storage location corresponding to an + * already occupied non-persistent key, as well as ensuring the key data is + * validated. + * + * Note: This function will only succeed for key buffers which are not + * empty. If passed a NULL pointer or zero-length, the function will fail + * with #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. + * + * \param[in] attr The attributes of the key to save. + * The key identifier field in the attributes + * determines the key's location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key( const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Parses key data and metadata and load persistent key for given + * key slot number. + * + * This function reads from a storage backend, parses the key data and + * metadata and writes them to the appropriate output parameters. + * + * Note: This function allocates a buffer and returns a pointer to it through + * the data parameter. On successful return, the pointer is guaranteed to be + * valid and the buffer contains at least one byte of data. + * psa_free_persistent_key_data() must be called on the data buffer + * afterwards to zeroize and free this buffer. + * + * \param[in,out] attr On input, the key identifier field identifies + * the key to load. Other fields are ignored. + * On success, the attribute structure contains + * the key metadata that was loaded from storage. + * \param[out] data Pointer to an allocated key data buffer on return. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key( psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Remove persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to remove + * from persistent storage. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully removed, + * or the key did not exist. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +/** + * \brief Free the temporary buffer allocated by psa_load_persistent_key(). + * + * This function must be called at some point after psa_load_persistent_key() + * to zeroize and free the memory allocated to the buffer in that function. + * + * \param key_data Buffer for the key data. + * \param key_data_length Size of the key data buffer. + * + */ +void psa_free_persistent_key_data( uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Formats key data and metadata for persistent storage + * + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length Length of the key data buffer. + * \param[in] attr The core attributes of the key. + * \param[out] storage_data Output buffer for the formatted data. + * + */ +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage( const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data ); + +/** + * \brief Parses persistent storage data into key data and metadata + * + * \param[in] storage_data Buffer for the storage data. + * \param storage_data_length Length of the storage data buffer + * \param[out] key_data On output, pointer to a newly allocated buffer + * containing the key data. This must be freed + * using psa_free_persistent_key_data() + * \param[out] key_data_length Length of the key data buffer + * \param[out] attr On success, the attribute structure is filled + * with the loaded key metadata. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + */ +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** This symbol is defined if transaction support is required. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +/** The type of transaction that is in progress. + */ +/* This is an integer type rather than an enum for two reasons: to support + * unknown values when loading a transaction file, and to ensure that the + * type has a known size. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_crypto_transaction_type_t; + +/** No transaction is in progress. + * + * This has the value 0, so zero-initialization sets a transaction's type to + * this value. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_NONE ( (psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0000 ) + +/** A key creation transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are created atomically in storage + * (simple file creation), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ( (psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0001 ) + +/** A key destruction transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are destroyed atomically in storage + * (simple file deletion), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY ( (psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0002 ) + +/** Transaction data. + * + * This type is designed to be serialized by writing the memory representation + * and reading it back on the same device. + * + * \note The transaction mechanism is designed for a single active transaction + * at a time. The transaction object is #psa_crypto_transaction. + * + * \note If an API call starts a transaction, it must complete this transaction + * before returning to the application. + * + * The lifetime of a transaction is the following (note that only one + * transaction may be active at a time): + * + * -# Call psa_crypto_prepare_transaction() to initialize the transaction + * object in memory and declare the type of transaction that is starting. + * -# Fill in the type-specific fields of #psa_crypto_transaction. + * -# Call psa_crypto_save_transaction() to start the transaction. This + * saves the transaction data to internal storage. + * -# Perform the work of the transaction by modifying files, contacting + * external entities, or whatever needs doing. Note that the transaction + * may be interrupted by a power failure, so you need to have a way + * recover from interruptions either by undoing what has been done + * so far or by resuming where you left off. + * -# If there are intermediate stages in the transaction, update + * the fields of #psa_crypto_transaction and call + * psa_crypto_save_transaction() again when each stage is reached. + * -# When the transaction is over, call psa_crypto_stop_transaction() to + * remove the transaction data in storage and in memory. + * + * If the system crashes while a transaction is in progress, psa_crypto_init() + * calls psa_crypto_load_transaction() and takes care of completing or + * rewinding the transaction. This is done in psa_crypto_recover_transaction() + * in psa_crypto.c. If you add a new type of transaction, be + * sure to add code for it in psa_crypto_recover_transaction(). + */ +typedef union +{ + /* Each element of this union must have the following properties + * to facilitate serialization and deserialization: + * + * - The element is a struct. + * - The first field of the struct is `psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type`. + * - Elements of the struct are arranged such a way that there is + * no padding. + */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_unknown_s + { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + uint32_t unused2; + uint64_t unused3; + uint64_t unused4; + } unknown; + /* ::type is #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY or + * #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY. */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_key_s + { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; + } key; +} psa_crypto_transaction_t; + +/** The single active transaction. + */ +extern psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +/** Prepare for a transaction. + * + * There must not be an ongoing transaction. + * + * \param type The type of transaction to start. + */ +static inline void psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type ) +{ + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type = type; +} + +/** Save the transaction data to storage. + * + * You may call this function multiple times during a transaction to + * atomically update the transaction state. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction( void ); + +/** Load the transaction data from storage, if any. + * + * This function is meant to be called from psa_crypto_init() to recover + * in case a transaction was interrupted by a system crash. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The data about the ongoing transaction has been loaded to + * #psa_crypto_transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no ongoing transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction( void ); + +/** Indicate that the current transaction is finished. + * + * Call this function at the very end of transaction processing. + * This function does not "commit" or "abort" the transaction: the storage + * subsystem has no concept of "commit" and "abort", just saving and + * removing the transaction information in storage. + * + * This function erases the transaction data in storage (if any) and + * resets the transaction data in memory. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * There was transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There was no transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * It was impossible to determine whether there was transaction data + * in storage, or the transaction data could not be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction( void ); + +/** The ITS file identifier for the transaction data. + * + * 0xffffffNN = special file; 0x74 = 't' for transaction. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID ( (psa_key_id_t) 0xffffff74 ) + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +/** Backend side of mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(). + * + * This function stores the supplied data into the entropy seed file. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The entropy seed file already exists. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy( const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f0587209 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +/* + * PSA ITS simulator over stdio files. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if !defined(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "" +#endif + +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%08x%08x" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ".psa_its" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH \ + ( sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX ) - 1 + /*prefix without terminating 0*/ \ + 16 + /*UID (64-bit number in hex)*/ \ + sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ) - 1 + /*suffix without terminating 0*/ \ + 1 /*terminating null byte*/ ) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP \ + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX + +/* The maximum value of psa_storage_info_t.size */ +#define PSA_ITS_MAX_SIZE 0xffffffff + +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING "PSA\0ITS\0" +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH 8 + +/* As rename fails on Windows if the new filepath already exists, + * use MoveFileExA with the MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING flag instead. + * Returns 0 on success, nonzero on failure. */ +#if defined(_WIN32) +#define rename_replace_existing( oldpath, newpath ) \ + ( ! MoveFileExA( oldpath, newpath, MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING ) ) +#else +#define rename_replace_existing( oldpath, newpath ) rename( oldpath, newpath ) +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t magic[PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH]; + uint8_t size[sizeof( uint32_t )]; + uint8_t flags[sizeof( psa_storage_create_flags_t )]; +} psa_its_file_header_t; + +static void psa_its_fill_filename( psa_storage_uid_t uid, char *filename ) +{ + /* Break up the UID into two 32-bit pieces so as not to rely on + * long long support in snprintf. */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH, + "%s" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%s", + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX, + (unsigned) ( uid >> 32 ), + (unsigned) ( uid & 0xffffffff ), + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_its_read_file( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info, + FILE **p_stream ) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + *p_stream = NULL; + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + *p_stream = fopen( filename, "rb" ); + if( *p_stream == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + + n = fread( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), *p_stream ); + if( n != sizeof( header ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ); + if( memcmp( header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, + PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ); + + p_info->size = ( header.size[0] | + header.size[1] << 8 | + header.size[2] << 16 | + header.size[3] << 24 ); + p_info->flags = ( header.flags[0] | + header.flags[1] << 8 | + header.flags[2] << 16 | + header.flags[3] << 24 ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + status = psa_its_read_file( uid, p_info, &stream ); + if( stream != NULL ) + fclose( stream ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + size_t n; + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + + status = psa_its_read_file( uid, &info, &stream ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if( data_offset + data_length < data_offset ) + goto exit; +#if SIZE_MAX < 0xffffffff + if( data_offset + data_length > SIZE_MAX ) + goto exit; +#endif + if( data_offset + data_length > info.size ) + goto exit; + + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#if LONG_MAX < 0xffffffff + while( data_offset > LONG_MAX ) + { + if( fseek( stream, LONG_MAX, SEEK_CUR ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + data_offset -= LONG_MAX; + } +#endif + if( fseek( stream, data_offset, SEEK_CUR ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + n = fread( p_data, 1, data_length, stream ); + if( n != data_length ) + goto exit; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if( p_data_length != NULL ) + *p_data_length = n; + +exit: + if( stream != NULL ) + fclose( stream ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_set( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags ) +{ + if( uid == 0 ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + } + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream = NULL; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + memcpy( header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( data_length, header.size, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( create_flags, header.flags, 0 ); + + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + stream = fopen( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, "wb" ); + if( stream == NULL ) + goto exit; + + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + n = fwrite( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), stream ); + if( n != sizeof( header ) ) + goto exit; + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + n = fwrite( p_data, 1, data_length, stream ); + if( n != data_length ) + goto exit; + } + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + if( stream != NULL ) + { + int ret = fclose( stream ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + } + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( rename_replace_existing( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, filename ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + } + /* The temporary file may still exist, but only in failure cases where + * we're already reporting an error. So there's nothing we can do on + * failure. If the function succeeded, and in some error cases, the + * temporary file doesn't exist and so remove() is expected to fail. + * Thus we just ignore the return status of remove(). */ + (void) remove( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_remove( psa_storage_uid_t uid ) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream; + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + stream = fopen( filename, "rb" ); + if( stream == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + fclose( stream ); + if( remove( filename ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aed7322c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c @@ -0,0 +1,536 @@ +/* + * RIPE MD-160 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The RIPEMD-160 algorithm was designed by RIPE in 1996 + * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html + * http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/RIPEMD-160 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_init( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_free( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, + const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *src ) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) +/* + * Process one block + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t A, B, C, D, E, Ap, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, X[16]; + } local; + + local.X[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 0 ); + local.X[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 4 ); + local.X[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 8 ); + local.X[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 12 ); + local.X[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 16 ); + local.X[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 20 ); + local.X[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 24 ); + local.X[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 28 ); + local.X[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 32 ); + local.X[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 36 ); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 40 ); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 44 ); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 48 ); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 52 ); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 56 ); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 60 ); + + local.A = local.Ap = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = local.Bp = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = local.Cp = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = local.Dp = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = local.Ep = ctx->state[4]; + +#define F1( x, y, z ) ( (x) ^ (y) ^ (z) ) +#define F2( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) & (y) ) | ( ~(x) & (z) ) ) +#define F3( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) | ~(y) ) ^ (z) ) +#define F4( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) & (z) ) | ( (y) & ~(z) ) ) +#define F5( x, y, z ) ( (x) ^ ( (y) | ~(z) ) ) + +#define S( x, n ) ( ( (x) << (n) ) | ( (x) >> (32 - (n)) ) ) + +#define P( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, f, k ) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += f( (b), (c), (d) ) + local.X[r] + (k); \ + (a) = S( (a), (s) ) + (e); \ + (c) = S( (c), 10 ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define P2( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, rp, sp ) \ + do \ + { \ + P( (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (r), (s), F, K ); \ + P( a ## p, b ## p, c ## p, d ## p, e ## p, \ + (rp), (sp), Fp, Kp ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define F F1 +#define K 0x00000000 +#define Fp F5 +#define Kp 0x50A28BE6 + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 11, 5, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 14, 14, 9 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 15, 7, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 12, 0, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 5, 9, 13 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 5, 8, 2, 15 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 7, 11, 15 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 9, 4, 5 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 11, 13, 7 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 13, 6, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 14, 15, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 15, 8, 11 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 6, 1, 14 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 7, 10, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 9, 3, 12 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 15, 8, 12, 6 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F2 +#define K 0x5A827999 +#define Fp F4 +#define Kp 0x5C4DD124 + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 7, 6, 9 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 6, 11, 13 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 8, 3, 15 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 13, 7, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 11, 0, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 9, 13, 8 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 7, 5, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 15, 10, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 7, 14, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 12, 15, 7 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 15, 8, 12 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 9, 12, 7 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 11, 4, 6 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 7, 9, 15 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 13, 1, 13 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 12, 2, 11 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F3 +#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 +#define Fp F3 +#define Kp 0x6D703EF3 + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 11, 15, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 10, 13, 5, 7 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 6, 1, 15 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 7, 3, 11 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 14, 7, 8 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 9, 14, 6 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 13, 6, 6 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 15, 9, 14 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 14, 11, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 8, 8, 13 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 13, 12, 5 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 6, 6, 2, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 5, 10, 13 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 12, 0, 13 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 7, 4, 7 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 5, 13, 5 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F4 +#define K 0x8F1BBCDC +#define Fp F2 +#define Kp 0x7A6D76E9 + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 11, 8, 15 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 12, 6, 5 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 14, 4, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 15, 1, 11 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 14, 3, 14 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 15, 11, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 9, 15, 6 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 8, 0, 14 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 9, 5, 6 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 14, 12, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 5, 2, 12 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 15, 6, 13, 9 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 14, 8, 9, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 6, 7, 5 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 5, 10, 15 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 12, 14, 8 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F5 +#define K 0xA953FD4E +#define Fp F1 +#define Kp 0x00000000 + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 9, 12, 8 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 15, 15, 5 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 10, 12 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 11, 4, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 6, 1, 12 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 8, 5, 5 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 13, 8, 14 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 12, 7, 6 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 5, 6, 8 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 12, 2, 13 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 3, 13, 13, 6 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 8, 14, 14, 5 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 11, 0, 15 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 8, 3, 13 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 15, 5, 9, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 6, 11, 11 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + + local.C = ctx->state[1] + local.C + local.Dp; + ctx->state[1] = ctx->state[2] + local.D + local.Ep; + ctx->state[2] = ctx->state[3] + local.E + local.Ap; + ctx->state[3] = ctx->state[4] + local.A + local.Bp; + ctx->state[4] = ctx->state[0] + local.B + local.Cp; + ctx->state[0] = local.C; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160_update( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = +{ + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t last, padn; + uint32_t high, low; + unsigned char msglen[8]; + + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); + + last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + padn = ( last < 56 ) ? ( 56 - last ) : ( 120 - last ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx, ripemd160_padding, padn ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx, msglen, 8 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ + +/* + * output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ripemd160_context ctx; + + mbedtls_ripemd160_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Test vectors from the RIPEMD-160 paper and + * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html#HMAC + */ +#define TESTS 8 +static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_str[TESTS][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" }, +}; + +static const size_t ripemd160_test_strlen[TESTS] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 56, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_md[TESTS][20] = +{ + { 0x9c, 0x11, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0x54, 0x61, 0x28, + 0x08, 0x97, 0x7e, 0xe8, 0xf5, 0x48, 0xb2, 0x25, 0x8d, 0x31 }, + { 0x0b, 0xdc, 0x9d, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x6b, 0x3e, 0xe9, 0xda, 0xae, + 0x34, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0xf4, 0xdc, 0x83, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xfe }, + { 0x8e, 0xb2, 0x08, 0xf7, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x7a, 0x9b, 0x04, + 0x4a, 0x8e, 0x98, 0xc6, 0xb0, 0x87, 0xf1, 0x5a, 0x0b, 0xfc }, + { 0x5d, 0x06, 0x89, 0xef, 0x49, 0xd2, 0xfa, 0xe5, 0x72, 0xb8, + 0x81, 0xb1, 0x23, 0xa8, 0x5f, 0xfa, 0x21, 0x59, 0x5f, 0x36 }, + { 0xf7, 0x1c, 0x27, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x69, 0x2c, 0x1b, 0x56, 0xbb, + 0xdc, 0xeb, 0x5b, 0x9d, 0x28, 0x65, 0xb3, 0x70, 0x8d, 0xbc }, + { 0x12, 0xa0, 0x53, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0x0c, 0x88, 0xe4, 0x05, + 0xa0, 0x6c, 0x27, 0xdc, 0xf4, 0x9a, 0xda, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x2b }, + { 0xb0, 0xe2, 0x0b, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x16, 0x64, 0x02, 0x86, 0xed, + 0x3a, 0x87, 0xa5, 0x71, 0x30, 0x79, 0xb2, 0x1f, 0x51, 0x89 }, + { 0x9b, 0x75, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x57, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0x39, 0xf4, 0xdb, + 0xd3, 0x32, 0x3c, 0xab, 0x82, 0xbf, 0x63, 0x32, 0x6b, 0xfb }, +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char output[20]; + + memset( output, 0, sizeof output ); + + for( i = 0; i < TESTS; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " RIPEMD-160 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( ripemd160_test_str[i], + ripemd160_test_strlen[i], output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( output, ripemd160_test_md[i], 20 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/rsa.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1f6ddb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,2589 @@ +/* + * The RSA public-key cryptosystem + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the RSA algorithm: + * + * [1] A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems + * R Rivest, A Shamir, and L Adleman + * http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RSA78 + * + * [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + * [3] Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks + * Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and + * Stefan Mangard + * https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define RSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define RSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->N, N ) ) != 0 ) || + ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 ) || + ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->Q, Q ) ) != 0 ) || + ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->D, D ) ) != 0 ) || + ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->E, E ) ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } + + if( N != NULL ) + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( N != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) ); + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); + } + + if( P != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) ); + + if( Q != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) ); + + if( D != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) ); + + if( E != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) ); + +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Checks whether the context fields are set in such a way + * that the RSA primitives will be able to execute without error. + * It does *not* make guarantees for consistency of the parameters. + */ +static int rsa_check_context( mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv, + int blinding_needed ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* blinding_needed is only used for NO_CRT to decide whether + * P,Q need to be present or not. */ + ((void) blinding_needed); +#endif + + if( ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ) || + ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * 1. Modular exponentiation needs positive, odd moduli. + */ + + /* Modular exponentiation wrt. N is always used for + * RSA public key operations. */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->N, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* Modular exponentiation for P and Q is only + * used for private key operations and if CRT + * is used. */ + if( is_priv && + ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->Q, 0 ) == 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* + * 2. Exponents must be positive + */ + + /* Always need E for public key operations */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* For private key operations, use D or DP & DQ + * as (unblinded) exponents. */ + if( is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#else + if( is_priv && + ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) <= 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either, + * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been + * done as part of 1. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if( is_priv && blinding_needed && + ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif + + /* It wouldn't lead to an error if it wasn't satisfied, + * but check for QP >= 1 nonetheless. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if( is_priv && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) <= 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret = 0; + int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP; +#endif + int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + have_N = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_P = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_Q = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 ); +#endif + + /* + * Check whether provided parameters are enough + * to deduce all others. The following incomplete + * parameter sets for private keys are supported: + * + * (1) P, Q missing. + * (2) D and potentially N missing. + * + */ + + n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E; + pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E; + d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E; + is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E; + + /* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */ + is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing; + + if( !is_priv && !is_pub ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Step 1: Deduce N if P, Q are provided. + */ + + if( !have_N && have_P && have_Q ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, + &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); + } + + /* + * Step 2: Deduce and verify all remaining core parameters. + */ + + if( pq_missing ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( &ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D, + &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + + } + else if( d_missing ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( &ctx->P, + &ctx->Q, + &ctx->E, + &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } + } + + /* + * Step 3: Deduce all additional parameters specific + * to our current RSA implementation. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* + * Step 3: Basic sanity checks + */ + + return( rsa_check_context( ctx, is_priv, 1 ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char *E, size_t E_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + int is_priv; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + /* Check if key is private or public */ + is_priv = + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0; + + if( !is_priv ) + { + /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, + * something must be wrong. */ + if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + } + + if( N != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) ); + + if( P != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) ); + + if( Q != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) ); + + if( D != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) ); + + if( E != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, + mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int is_priv; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + /* Check if key is private or public */ + is_priv = + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0; + + if( !is_priv ) + { + /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, + * something must be wrong. */ + if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + } + + /* Export all requested core parameters. */ + + if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( N, &ctx->N ) ) != 0 ) || + ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( P, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) || + ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) || + ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( D, &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) || + ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( E, &ctx->E ) ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Export CRT parameters + * This must also be implemented if CRT is not used, for being able to + * write DER encoded RSA keys. The helper function mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt + * can be used in this case. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int is_priv; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + /* Check if key is private or public */ + is_priv = + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0; + + if( !is_priv ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* Export all requested blinding parameters. */ + if( ( DP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DP, &ctx->DP ) ) != 0 ) || + ( DQ != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DQ, &ctx->DQ ) ) != 0 ) || + ( QP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( QP, &ctx->QP ) ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + DP, DQ, QP ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Initialize an RSA context + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int padding, + int hash_id ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE( padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || + padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); + + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( ctx, padding, hash_id ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been + * initialized and will need to be freed. */ + ctx->ver = 1; + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Set padding for an existing RSA context + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + int hash_id ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE( padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || + padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ); + + ctx->padding = padding; + ctx->hash_id = hash_id; +} + +/* + * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus + */ + +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + return( ctx->len ); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + +/* + * Generate an RSA keypair + * + * This generation method follows the RSA key pair generation procedure of + * FIPS 186-4 if 2^16 < exponent < 2^256 and nbits = 2048 or nbits = 3072. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + unsigned int nbits, int exponent ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi H, G, L; + int prime_quality = 0; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + /* + * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of + * the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error + * rate of 2^-80 is sufficient. + */ + if( nbits > 1024 ) + prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &H ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + + if( nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that: + * 1. |P-Q| > 2^( nbits / 2 - 100 ) + * 2. GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 + * 3. E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) > 2^( nbits / 2 ) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->E, exponent ) ); + + do + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1, + prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, + prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &H ) <= ( ( nbits >= 200 ) ? ( ( nbits >> 1 ) - 99 ) : 0 ) ) + continue; + + /* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P > Q */ + if( H.s < 0 ) + mbedtls_mpi_swap( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ); + + /* Temporarily replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); + + /* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a)) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 ) + continue; + + /* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &L, NULL, &H, &G ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->D ) <= ( ( nbits + 1 ) / 2 ) ) // (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(a)) + continue; + + break; + } + while( 1 ); + + /* Restore P,Q */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* + * DP = D mod (P - 1) + * DQ = D mod (Q - 1) + * QP = Q^-1 mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Double-check */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( ctx ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &H ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_free( ctx ); + + if( ( -ret & ~0x7f ) == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + +/* + * Check a public RSA key + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) < 128 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->E, 0 ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->E ) < 2 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->E, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check for the consistency of all fields in an RSA private key context + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) != 0 || + rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */ ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, + &ctx->D, &ctx->E, NULL, NULL ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + else if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check if contexts holding a public and private key match + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( pub ) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( prv ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->N, &prv->N ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->E, &prv->E ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Do an RSA public key operation + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + mbedtls_mpi T; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + olen = ctx->len; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) ); + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of: + * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, + * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer + * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. + */ +static int rsa_prepare_blinding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret, count = 0; + mbedtls_mpi R; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + + if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL ) + { + /* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */ + do { + if( count++ > 10 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); + + /* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R + * are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know + * which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them. + * (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */ + ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + goto cleanup; + + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + + /* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); + + /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N + * (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); + + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple + * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there, + * the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3]. + * + * Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n) + * observations on average. + * + * For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has + * to make 2^112 observations on average. + * + * (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048 + * bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys. + * Thus in this sense with 28 byte blinding the security is not reduced by + * side-channel attacks like the one in [3]) + * + * This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a + * single trace. + */ +#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28 + +/* + * Do an RSA private key operation + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + /* Temporary holding the result */ + mbedtls_mpi T; + + /* Temporaries holding P-1, Q-1 and the + * exponent blinding factor, respectively. */ + mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* Temporaries holding the results mod p resp. mod q. */ + mbedtls_mpi TP, TQ; + + /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for + * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */ + mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; + + /* Pointers to actual exponents to be used - either the unblinded + * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ + mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP; + mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ; +#else + /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */ + mbedtls_mpi D_blind; + + /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded + * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ + mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double + * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ + mbedtls_mpi I, C; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, + f_rng != NULL /* blinding y/n */ ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + /* MPI Initialization */ + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind ); +#else + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind ); +#endif + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TQ ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &I ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); + + /* End of MPI initialization */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &I, &T ) ); + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { + /* + * Blinding + * T = T * Vi mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); + + /* + * Exponent blinding + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* + * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) ); + + D = &D_blind; +#else + /* + * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind, + &ctx->DP ) ); + + DP = &DP_blind; + + /* + * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, + &ctx->DQ ) ); + + DQ = &DQ_blind; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); +#else + /* + * Faster decryption using the CRT + * + * TP = input ^ dP mod P + * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) ); + + /* + * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &TP, &TQ ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->QP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &TP, &ctx->P ) ); + + /* + * T = TQ + T * Q + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &TQ, &TP ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { + /* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); + } + + /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &C, &T, &ctx->E, + &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &C, &I ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + olen = ctx->len; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) ); + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind ); +#else + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind ); +#endif + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TQ ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &I ); + + if( ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/** + * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer. + * + * \param dst buffer to mask + * \param dlen length of destination buffer + * \param src source of the mask generation + * \param slen length of the source buffer + * \param md_ctx message digest context to use + */ +static int mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, + size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx ) +{ + unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char counter[4]; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned int hlen; + size_t i, use_len; + int ret = 0; + + memset( mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + memset( counter, 0, 4 ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info ); + + /* Generate and apply dbMask */ + p = dst; + + while( dlen > 0 ) + { + use_len = hlen; + if( dlen < hlen ) + use_len = dlen; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, src, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, mask ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < use_len; ++i ) + *p++ ^= mask[i]; + + counter[3]++; + + dlen -= use_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mask, sizeof( mask ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + size_t olen; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = output; + unsigned int hlen; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + olen = ctx->len; + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* first comparison checks for overflow */ + if( ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( output, 0, olen ); + + *p++ = 0; + + /* Generate a random octet string seed */ + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); + + p += hlen; + + /* Construct DB */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, p ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + p += hlen; + p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen; + *p++ = 1; + if( ilen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, input, ilen ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ + if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */ + if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + size_t nb_pad, olen; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = output; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + olen = ctx->len; + + /* first comparison checks for overflow */ + if( ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen; + + *p++ = 0; + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + { + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + + while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) + { + int rng_dl = 100; + + do { + ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 ); + } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 ); + + /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ + if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); + + p++; + } + } + else + { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; + + while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) + *p++ = 0xFF; + } + + *p++ = 0; + if( ilen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, input, ilen ); + + return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + switch( ctx->padding ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen, + input, output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + ilen, input, output ); +#endif + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t ilen, i, pad_len; + unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned int hlen; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + /* + * Parameters sanity checks + */ + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ilen = ctx->len; + + if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + // checking for integer underflow + if( 2 * hlen + 2 > ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * RSA operation + */ + ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Unmask data and generate lHash + */ + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */ + if( ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 || + /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */ + ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + /* Generate lHash */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, lhash ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Check contents, in "constant-time" + */ + p = buf; + bad = 0; + + bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */ + + p += hlen; /* Skip seed */ + + /* Check lHash */ + for( i = 0; i < hlen; i++ ) + bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++; + + /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer + * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */ + pad_len = 0; + pad_done = 0; + for( i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++ ) + { + pad_done |= p[i]; + pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; + } + + p += pad_len; + bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01; + + /* + * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not + * (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the + * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between + * the different error conditions. + */ + if( bad != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; + goto cleanup; + } + + *olen = ilen - (p - buf); + if( *olen != 0 ) + memcpy( output, p, *olen ); + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( lhash, sizeof( lhash ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t ilen; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + ilen = ctx->len; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( mode, buf, ilen, + output, output_max_len, olen ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + switch( ctx->padding ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen, + input, output, output_max_len ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + olen, input, output, + output_max_len ); +#endif + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + size_t olen; + unsigned char *p = sig; + unsigned char *salt = NULL; + size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t msb; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + olen = ctx->len; + + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + /* Gather length of hash to sign */ + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) + { + /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size. + * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length + * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not + * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is + * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most + * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */ + min_slen = hlen - 2; + if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 ) + slen = hlen; + else + slen = olen - hlen - 2; + } + else if ( (saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else + { + slen = (size_t) saltlen; + } + + memset( sig, 0, olen ); + + /* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */ + msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; + p += olen - hlen - slen - 2; + *p++ = 0x01; + + /* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */ + salt = p; + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); + + p += slen; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, p ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ + if( msb % 8 == 0 ) + offset = 1; + + /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ + if( ( ret = mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; + sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb ); + + p += hlen; + *p++ = 0xBC; + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) ); +} + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with + * the option to pass in the salt length. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig ); +} + + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function + */ + +/* Construct a PKCS v1.5 encoding of a hashed message + * + * This is used both for signature generation and verification. + * + * Parameters: + * - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash; + * MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed. + * - hashlen: Length of hash in case hashlen is MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data. + * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message. + * - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message. + * + * Assumptions: + * - hash has size hashlen if md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hash has size corresponding to md_alg if md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len. + * + */ +static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + size_t dst_len, + unsigned char *dst ) +{ + size_t oid_size = 0; + size_t nb_pad = dst_len; + unsigned char *p = dst; + const char *oid = NULL; + + /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */ + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a + * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */ + if( 8 + hashlen + oid_size >= 0x80 || + 10 + hashlen < hashlen || + 10 + hashlen + oid_size < 10 + hashlen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Static bounds check: + * - Need 10 bytes for five tag-length pairs. + * (Insist on 1-byte length encodings to protect against variants of + * Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification) + * - Need hashlen bytes for hash + * - Need oid_size bytes for hash alg OID. + */ + if( nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + nb_pad -= 10 + hashlen + oid_size; + } + else + { + if( nb_pad < hashlen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + nb_pad -= hashlen; + } + + /* Need space for signature header and padding delimiter (3 bytes), + * and 8 bytes for the minimal padding */ + if( nb_pad < 3 + 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + nb_pad -= 3; + + /* Now nb_pad is the amount of memory to be filled + * with padding, and at least 8 bytes long. */ + + /* Write signature header and padding */ + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; + memset( p, 0xFF, nb_pad ); + p += nb_pad; + *p++ = 0; + + /* Are we signing raw data? */ + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Signing hashed data, add corresponding ASN.1 structure + * + * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + * digest Digest } + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * Digest ::= OCTET STRING + * + * Schematic: + * TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-OID + LEN [ OID ] + * TAG-NULL + LEN [ NULL ] ] + * TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ] + */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x04 + oid_size ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + *p++ = (unsigned char) oid_size; + memcpy( p, oid, oid_size ); + p += oid_size; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + *p++ = (unsigned char) hashlen; + memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); + p += hashlen; + + /* Just a sanity-check, should be automatic + * after the initial bounds check. */ + if( p != dst + dst_len ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( dst, dst_len ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Prepare PKCS1-v1.5 encoding (padding and hash identifier) + */ + + if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, + ctx->len, sig ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Call respective RSA primitive + */ + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + { + /* Skip verification on a public key operation */ + return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) ); + } + + /* Private key operation + * + * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a + * temporary buffer and check it before returning it. + */ + + sig_try = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len ); + if( sig_try == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + verif = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len ); + if( verif == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( sig_try ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sig_try, ctx->len ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( verif, ctx->len ); + mbedtls_free( sig_try ); + mbedtls_free( verif ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + memset( sig, '!', ctx->len ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + switch( ctx->padding ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +#endif + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id, + int expected_salt_len, + const unsigned char *sig ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t siglen; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *hash_start; + unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char zeros[8]; + unsigned int hlen; + size_t observed_salt_len, msb; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + siglen = ctx->len; + + if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p = buf; + + if( buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + /* Gather length of hash to sign */ + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mgf1_hash_id ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + memset( zeros, 0, 8 ); + + /* + * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits + */ + msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; + + if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ + if( msb % 8 == 0 ) + { + p++; + siglen -= 1; + } + + if( siglen < hlen + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb ); + + while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 ) + p++; + + if( *p++ != 0x01 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + goto exit; + } + + observed_salt_len = hash_start - p; + + if( expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY && + observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Generate H = Hash( M' ) + */ + ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, result ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ) +{ + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + mgf1_hash_id = ( ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id + : md_alg; + + return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, + mgf1_hash_id, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + sig ) ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t sig_len; + unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + sig_len = ctx->len; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash. + */ + + if( ( encoded = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL || + ( encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len, + encoded_expected ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash. + */ + + ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, encoded ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Compare + */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected, + sig_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + + if( encoded != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded, sig_len ); + mbedtls_free( encoded ); + } + + if( encoded_expected != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded_expected, sig_len ); + mbedtls_free( encoded_expected ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + switch( ctx->padding ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +#endif + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } +} + +/* + * Copy the components of an RSA key + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL ); + + dst->len = src->len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->N, &src->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->E, &src->E ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->D, &src->D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->P, &src->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Q, &src->Q ) ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DP, &src->DP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DQ, &src->DQ ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->QP, &src->QP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RP, &src->RP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RQ, &src->RQ ) ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RN, &src->RN ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vi, &src->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vf, &src->Vf ) ); + + dst->padding = src->padding; + dst->hash_id = src->hash_id; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_rsa_free( dst ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Free the components of an RSA key + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RN ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->D ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->E ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->N ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RQ ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->QP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DQ ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DP ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Free the mutex, but only if it hasn't been freed already. */ + if( ctx->ver != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); + ctx->ver = 0; + } +#endif +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" + +/* + * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes + */ +#define KEY_LEN 128 + +#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \ + "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \ + "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \ + "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \ + "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \ + "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \ + "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \ + "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79" + +#define RSA_E "10001" + +#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \ + "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \ + "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \ + "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \ + "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \ + "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \ + "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \ + "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D" + +#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \ + "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \ + "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \ + "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57" + +#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \ + "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \ + "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \ + "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF" + +#define PT_LEN 24 +#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \ + "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) +{ +#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) + size_t i; + + if( rng_state != NULL ) + rng_state = NULL; + + for( i = 0; i < len; ++i ) + output[i] = rand(); +#else + if( rng_state != NULL ) + rng_state = NULL; + + arc4random_buf( output, len ); +#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */ + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + size_t len; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN]; + unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN]; + unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi K; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &rsa ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " RSA key validation: " ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &rsa ) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : " ); + + memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext, + rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted, + sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " PKCS#1 data sign : " ); + + if( mbedtls_sha1_ret( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, NULL, NULL, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + ((void) verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d6ba97a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c @@ -0,0 +1,486 @@ +/* + * Helper functions for the RSA module + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" + +/* + * Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents + * + * Summary of algorithm: + * Setting F := lcm(P-1,Q-1), the idea is as follows: + * + * (a) For any 1 <= X < N with gcd(X,N)=1, we have X^F = 1 modulo N, so X^(F/2) + * is a square root of 1 in Z/NZ. Since Z/NZ ~= Z/PZ x Z/QZ by CRT and the + * square roots of 1 in Z/PZ and Z/QZ are +1 and -1, this leaves the four + * possibilities X^(F/2) = (+-1, +-1). If it happens that X^(F/2) = (-1,+1) + * or (+1,-1), then gcd(X^(F/2) + 1, N) will be equal to one of the prime + * factors of N. + * + * (b) If we don't know F/2 but (F/2) * K for some odd (!) K, then the same + * construction still applies since (-)^K is the identity on the set of + * roots of 1 in Z/NZ. + * + * The public and private key primitives (-)^E and (-)^D are mutually inverse + * bijections on Z/NZ if and only if (-)^(DE) is the identity on Z/NZ, i.e. + * if and only if DE - 1 is a multiple of F, say DE - 1 = F * L. + * Splitting L = 2^t * K with K odd, we have + * + * DE - 1 = FL = (F/2) * (2^(t+1)) * K, + * + * so (F / 2) * K is among the numbers + * + * (DE - 1) >> 1, (DE - 1) >> 2, ..., (DE - 1) >> ord + * + * where ord is the order of 2 in (DE - 1). + * We can therefore iterate through these numbers apply the construction + * of (a) and (b) above to attempt to factor N. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( mbedtls_mpi const *N, + mbedtls_mpi const *E, mbedtls_mpi const *D, + mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + uint16_t attempt; /* Number of current attempt */ + uint16_t iter; /* Number of squares computed in the current attempt */ + + uint16_t order; /* Order of 2 in DE - 1 */ + + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Holds largest odd divisor of DE - 1 */ + mbedtls_mpi K; /* Temporary holding the current candidate */ + + const unsigned char primes[] = { 2, + 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, + 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, + 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, + 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, + 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, + 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, + 229, 233, 239, 241, 251 + }; + + const size_t num_primes = sizeof( primes ) / sizeof( *primes ); + + if( P == NULL || Q == NULL || P->p != NULL || Q->p != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( D, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( D, N ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( E, N ) >= 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * Initializations and temporary changes + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + /* T := DE - 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, D, E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &T, &T, 1 ) ); + + if( ( order = (uint16_t) mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &T ) ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* After this operation, T holds the largest odd divisor of DE - 1. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &T, order ) ); + + /* + * Actual work + */ + + /* Skip trying 2 if N == 1 mod 8 */ + attempt = 0; + if( N->p[0] % 8 == 1 ) + attempt = 1; + + for( ; attempt < num_primes; ++attempt ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_lset( &K, primes[attempt] ); + + /* Check if gcd(K,N) = 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( P, &K, N ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) != 0 ) + continue; + + /* Go through K^T + 1, K^(2T) + 1, K^(4T) + 1, ... + * and check whether they have nontrivial GCD with N. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &K, &K, &T, N, + Q /* temporarily use Q for storing Montgomery + * multiplication helper values */ ) ); + + for( iter = 1; iter <= order; ++iter ) + { + /* If we reach 1 prematurely, there's no point + * in continuing to square K */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 1 ) == 0 ) + break; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( P, &K, N ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) == 1 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( P, N ) == -1 ) + { + /* + * Have found a nontrivial divisor P of N. + * Set Q := N / P. + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( Q, NULL, N, P ) ); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, &K, &K ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, N ) ); + } + + /* + * If we get here, then either we prematurely aborted the loop because + * we reached 1, or K holds primes[attempt]^(DE - 1) mod N, which must + * be 1 if D,E,N were consistent. + * Check if that's the case and abort if not, to avoid very long, + * yet eventually failing, computations if N,D,E were not sane. + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + break; + } + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Given P, Q and the public exponent E, deduce D. + * This is essentially a modular inversion. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( mbedtls_mpi const *P, + mbedtls_mpi const *Q, + mbedtls_mpi const *E, + mbedtls_mpi *D ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + + if( D == NULL || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( D, 0 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( Q, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + + /* Temporarily put K := P-1 and L := Q-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &L, Q, 1 ) ); + + /* Temporarily put D := gcd(P-1, Q-1) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( D, &K, &L ) ); + + /* K := LCM(P-1, Q-1) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, &K, &L ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &K, NULL, &K, D ) ); + + /* Compute modular inverse of E in LCM(P-1, Q-1) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( D, E, &K ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, + const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + + /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ + if( DP != NULL ) + { + if( P == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DP, D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ + if( DQ != NULL ) + { + if( Q == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DQ, D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ + if( QP != NULL ) + { + if( P == NULL || Q == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, QP, Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, P ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + +cleanup: + + /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ + if( ret != 0 && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check that core RSA parameters are sane. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + + /* + * Step 1: If PRNG provided, check that P and Q are prime + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + /* + * When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error + * rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as + * well. + */ + if( f_rng != NULL && P != NULL && + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( P, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL && + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } +#else + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + + /* + * Step 2: Check that 1 < N = P * Q + */ + + if( P != NULL && Q != NULL && N != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, P, Q ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &K, N ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* + * Step 3: Check and 1 < D, E < N if present. + */ + + if( N != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL ) + { + if ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( D, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( D, N ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( E, N ) >= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* + * Step 4: Check that D, E are inverse modulo P-1 and Q-1 + */ + + if( P != NULL && Q != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( Q, 1 ) <= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Compute DE-1 mod P-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, D, E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &L, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, &L ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Compute DE-1 mod Q-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, D, E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &L, Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, &L ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); + + /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, + mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi K; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + + /* DP = D mod P-1 */ + if( DP != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DP, D, &K ) ); + } + + /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ + if( DQ != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DQ, D, &K ) ); + } + + /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ + if( QP != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( QP, Q, P ) ); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/sha1.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/sha1.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0a5edafa --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/sha1.c @@ -0,0 +1,553 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-1 compliant SHA-1 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SHA-1 standard was published by NIST in 1993. + * + * http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + +#define SHA1_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + +void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha1_context *src ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-1 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; + } local; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); + + local.W[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 0 ); + local.W[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 ); + local.W[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 8 ); + local.W[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 12 ); + local.W[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 16 ); + local.W[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 20 ); + local.W[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 24 ); + local.W[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 28 ); + local.W[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 32 ); + local.W[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 36 ); + local.W[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 40 ); + local.W[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 44 ); + local.W[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 48 ); + local.W[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 52 ); + local.W[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 56 ); + local.W[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 60 ); + +#define S(x,n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) + +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + local.temp = local.W[( (t) - 3 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[( (t) - 8 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[( (t) - 14 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[ (t) & 0x0F], \ + ( local.W[(t) & 0x0F] = S(local.temp,1) ) \ + ) + +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,x) \ + do \ + { \ + (e) += S((a),5) + F((b),(c),(d)) + K + (x); \ + (b) = S((b),30); \ + } while( 0 ) + + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = ctx->state[4]; + +#define F(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) +#define K 0x5A827999 + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[0] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[1] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[2] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[3] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[4] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[5] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[6] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[7] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[8] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[9] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[10] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[11] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[12] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[13] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[14] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[15] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(16) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(17) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(18) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(19) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(20) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(21) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(22) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(23) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(24) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(25) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(26) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(27) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(28) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(29) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(30) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(31) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(32) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(33) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(34) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(35) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(36) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(37) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(38) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(39) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define K 0x8F1BBCDC + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(40) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(41) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(42) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(43) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(44) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(45) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(46) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(47) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(48) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(49) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(50) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(51) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(52) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(53) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(54) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(55) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(56) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(57) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(58) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(59) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define K 0xCA62C1D6 + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(60) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(61) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(62) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(63) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(64) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(65) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(66) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(67) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(68) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(69) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(70) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(71) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(72) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(73) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(74) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(75) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(76) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(77) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(78) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(79) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + ctx->state[4] += local.E; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * SHA-1 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * SHA-1 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if( used <= 56 ) + { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used ); + } + else + { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 56 ); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Output final state + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-1( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + mbedtls_sha1_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * FIPS-180-1 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha1_test_buf[3][57] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha1_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 56, 1000 +}; + +static const unsigned char sha1_test_sum[3][20] = +{ + { 0xA9, 0x99, 0x3E, 0x36, 0x47, 0x06, 0x81, 0x6A, 0xBA, 0x3E, + 0x25, 0x71, 0x78, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xD8, 0x9D }, + { 0x84, 0x98, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x1C, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xAE, + 0x4A, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x29, 0xE5, 0xE5, 0x46, 0x70, 0xF1 }, + { 0x34, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x3C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x1E, + 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xDB, 0xAD, 0x27, 0x31, 0x65, 0x34, 0x01, 0x6F } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; + + mbedtls_sha1_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * SHA-1 + */ + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " SHA-1 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( i == 2 ) + { + memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); + + for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, buf, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, sha1_test_buf[i], + sha1_test_buflen[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &ctx, sha1sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( sha1sum, sha1_test_sum[i], 20 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + goto exit; + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/sha256.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/sha256.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..db675efd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/sha256.c @@ -0,0 +1,585 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-256 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SHA-256 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define SHA256_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + +void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA256_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha256_free( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha256_context *src ) +{ + SHA256_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-256 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ) +{ + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); + + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + if( is224 == 0 ) + { + /* SHA-256 */ + ctx->state[0] = 0x6A09E667; + ctx->state[1] = 0xBB67AE85; + ctx->state[2] = 0x3C6EF372; + ctx->state[3] = 0xA54FF53A; + ctx->state[4] = 0x510E527F; + ctx->state[5] = 0x9B05688C; + ctx->state[6] = 0x1F83D9AB; + ctx->state[7] = 0x5BE0CD19; + } + else + { + /* SHA-224 */ + ctx->state[0] = 0xC1059ED8; + ctx->state[1] = 0x367CD507; + ctx->state[2] = 0x3070DD17; + ctx->state[3] = 0xF70E5939; + ctx->state[4] = 0xFFC00B31; + ctx->state[5] = 0x68581511; + ctx->state[6] = 0x64F98FA7; + ctx->state[7] = 0xBEFA4FA4; + } + + ctx->is224 = is224; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + int is224 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx, is224 ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) +static const uint32_t K[] = +{ + 0x428A2F98, 0x71374491, 0xB5C0FBCF, 0xE9B5DBA5, + 0x3956C25B, 0x59F111F1, 0x923F82A4, 0xAB1C5ED5, + 0xD807AA98, 0x12835B01, 0x243185BE, 0x550C7DC3, + 0x72BE5D74, 0x80DEB1FE, 0x9BDC06A7, 0xC19BF174, + 0xE49B69C1, 0xEFBE4786, 0x0FC19DC6, 0x240CA1CC, + 0x2DE92C6F, 0x4A7484AA, 0x5CB0A9DC, 0x76F988DA, + 0x983E5152, 0xA831C66D, 0xB00327C8, 0xBF597FC7, + 0xC6E00BF3, 0xD5A79147, 0x06CA6351, 0x14292967, + 0x27B70A85, 0x2E1B2138, 0x4D2C6DFC, 0x53380D13, + 0x650A7354, 0x766A0ABB, 0x81C2C92E, 0x92722C85, + 0xA2BFE8A1, 0xA81A664B, 0xC24B8B70, 0xC76C51A3, + 0xD192E819, 0xD6990624, 0xF40E3585, 0x106AA070, + 0x19A4C116, 0x1E376C08, 0x2748774C, 0x34B0BCB5, + 0x391C0CB3, 0x4ED8AA4A, 0x5B9CCA4F, 0x682E6FF3, + 0x748F82EE, 0x78A5636F, 0x84C87814, 0x8CC70208, + 0x90BEFFFA, 0xA4506CEB, 0xBEF9A3F7, 0xC67178F2, +}; + +#define SHR(x,n) (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (n)) +#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR(x,n) | ((x) << (32 - (n)))) + +#define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 7) ^ ROTR(x,18) ^ SHR(x, 3)) +#define S1(x) (ROTR(x,17) ^ ROTR(x,19) ^ SHR(x,10)) + +#define S2(x) (ROTR(x, 2) ^ ROTR(x,13) ^ ROTR(x,22)) +#define S3(x) (ROTR(x, 6) ^ ROTR(x,11) ^ ROTR(x,25)) + +#define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) + +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + local.W[t] = S1(local.W[(t) - 2]) + local.W[(t) - 7] + \ + S0(local.W[(t) - 15]) + local.W[(t) - 16] \ + ) + +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ + } while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; + uint32_t A[8]; + } local; + + unsigned int i; + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) + for( i = 0; i < 64; i++ ) + { + if( i < 16 ) + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 * i ); + else + R( i ); + + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); + + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 * i ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i += 8 ) + { + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i+0], K[i+0] ); + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i+1], K[i+1] ); + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i+2], K[i+2] ); + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i+3], K[i+3] ); + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i+4], K[i+4] ); + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i+5], K[i+5] ); + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i+6], K[i+6] ); + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i+7], K[i+7] ); + } + + for( i = 16; i < 64; i += 8 ) + { + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], R(i+0), K[i+0] ); + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], R(i+1), K[i+1] ); + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], R(i+2), K[i+2] ); + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], R(i+3), K[i+3] ); + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], R(i+4), K[i+4] ); + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], R(i+5), K[i+5] ); + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], R(i+6), K[i+6] ); + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], R(i+7), K[i+7] ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * SHA-256 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * SHA-256 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if( used <= 56 ) + { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used ); + } + else + { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 56 ); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Output final state + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[5], output, 20 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[6], output, 24 ); + + if( ctx->is224 == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[7], output, 28 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-256( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[32], + int is224 ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx, is224 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[32], + int is224 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, is224 ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * FIPS-180-2 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha256_test_buf[3][57] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha256_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 56, 1000 +}; + +static const unsigned char sha256_test_sum[6][32] = +{ + /* + * SHA-224 test vectors + */ + { 0x23, 0x09, 0x7D, 0x22, 0x34, 0x05, 0xD8, 0x22, + 0x86, 0x42, 0xA4, 0x77, 0xBD, 0xA2, 0x55, 0xB3, + 0x2A, 0xAD, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0xBD, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xF7, + 0xE3, 0x6C, 0x9D, 0xA7 }, + { 0x75, 0x38, 0x8B, 0x16, 0x51, 0x27, 0x76, 0xCC, + 0x5D, 0xBA, 0x5D, 0xA1, 0xFD, 0x89, 0x01, 0x50, + 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x45, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0xF5, 0x8B, 0x19, + 0x52, 0x52, 0x25, 0x25 }, + { 0x20, 0x79, 0x46, 0x55, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xD8, + 0xBB, 0xB4, 0xC1, 0xEA, 0x97, 0x61, 0x8A, 0x4B, + 0xF0, 0x3F, 0x42, 0x58, 0x19, 0x48, 0xB2, 0xEE, + 0x4E, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67 }, + + /* + * SHA-256 test vectors + */ + { 0xBA, 0x78, 0x16, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0x01, 0xCF, 0xEA, + 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xDE, 0x5D, 0xAE, 0x22, 0x23, + 0xB0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xA3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7A, 0x9C, + 0xB4, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x61, 0xF2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xAD }, + { 0x24, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0x61, 0xD2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xB8, + 0xE5, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0C, 0x3E, 0x60, 0x39, + 0xA3, 0x3C, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xFF, 0x21, 0x67, + 0xF6, 0xEC, 0xED, 0xD4, 0x19, 0xDB, 0x06, 0xC1 }, + { 0xCD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0x5C, 0x99, 0x14, 0xFB, 0x92, + 0x81, 0xA1, 0xC7, 0xE2, 0x84, 0xD7, 0x3E, 0x67, + 0xF1, 0x80, 0x9A, 0x48, 0xA4, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0E, + 0x04, 0x6D, 0x39, 0xCC, 0xC7, 0x11, 0x2C, 0xD0 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char sha256sum[32]; + mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; + + buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1024, sizeof(unsigned char) ); + if( NULL == buf ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Buffer allocation failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx ); + + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + j = i % 3; + k = i < 3; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " SHA-%d test #%d: ", 256 - k * 32, j + 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( j == 2 ) + { + memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); + + for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, buf, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, sha256_test_buf[j], + sha256_test_buflen[j] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx, sha256sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + + if( memcmp( sha256sum, sha256_test_sum[i], 32 - k * 4 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + goto exit; + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/sha512.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/sha512.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..02a135ca --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/sha512.c @@ -0,0 +1,660 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-384/512 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SHA-512 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__WATCOMC__) + #define UL64(x) x##ui64 +#else + #define UL64(x) x##ULL +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define SHA512_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) +static void sha512_put_uint64_be( uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i ) +{ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, b, i); +} +#else +#define sha512_put_uint64_be MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + +void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA512_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha512_free( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha512_context *src ) +{ + SHA512_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-512 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) +{ + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); +#else + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); +#endif + + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + if( is384 == 0 ) + { + /* SHA-512 */ + ctx->state[0] = UL64(0x6A09E667F3BCC908); + ctx->state[1] = UL64(0xBB67AE8584CAA73B); + ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x3C6EF372FE94F82B); + ctx->state[3] = UL64(0xA54FF53A5F1D36F1); + ctx->state[4] = UL64(0x510E527FADE682D1); + ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x9B05688C2B3E6C1F); + ctx->state[6] = UL64(0x1F83D9ABFB41BD6B); + ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x5BE0CD19137E2179); + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#else + /* SHA-384 */ + ctx->state[0] = UL64(0xCBBB9D5DC1059ED8); + ctx->state[1] = UL64(0x629A292A367CD507); + ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x9159015A3070DD17); + ctx->state[3] = UL64(0x152FECD8F70E5939); + ctx->state[4] = UL64(0x67332667FFC00B31); + ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x8EB44A8768581511); + ctx->state[6] = UL64(0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7); + ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + ctx->is384 = is384; +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + int is384 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx, is384 ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) + +/* + * Round constants + */ +static const uint64_t K[80] = +{ + UL64(0x428A2F98D728AE22), UL64(0x7137449123EF65CD), + UL64(0xB5C0FBCFEC4D3B2F), UL64(0xE9B5DBA58189DBBC), + UL64(0x3956C25BF348B538), UL64(0x59F111F1B605D019), + UL64(0x923F82A4AF194F9B), UL64(0xAB1C5ED5DA6D8118), + UL64(0xD807AA98A3030242), UL64(0x12835B0145706FBE), + UL64(0x243185BE4EE4B28C), UL64(0x550C7DC3D5FFB4E2), + UL64(0x72BE5D74F27B896F), UL64(0x80DEB1FE3B1696B1), + UL64(0x9BDC06A725C71235), UL64(0xC19BF174CF692694), + UL64(0xE49B69C19EF14AD2), UL64(0xEFBE4786384F25E3), + UL64(0x0FC19DC68B8CD5B5), UL64(0x240CA1CC77AC9C65), + UL64(0x2DE92C6F592B0275), UL64(0x4A7484AA6EA6E483), + UL64(0x5CB0A9DCBD41FBD4), UL64(0x76F988DA831153B5), + UL64(0x983E5152EE66DFAB), UL64(0xA831C66D2DB43210), + UL64(0xB00327C898FB213F), UL64(0xBF597FC7BEEF0EE4), + UL64(0xC6E00BF33DA88FC2), UL64(0xD5A79147930AA725), + UL64(0x06CA6351E003826F), UL64(0x142929670A0E6E70), + UL64(0x27B70A8546D22FFC), UL64(0x2E1B21385C26C926), + UL64(0x4D2C6DFC5AC42AED), UL64(0x53380D139D95B3DF), + UL64(0x650A73548BAF63DE), UL64(0x766A0ABB3C77B2A8), + UL64(0x81C2C92E47EDAEE6), UL64(0x92722C851482353B), + UL64(0xA2BFE8A14CF10364), UL64(0xA81A664BBC423001), + UL64(0xC24B8B70D0F89791), UL64(0xC76C51A30654BE30), + UL64(0xD192E819D6EF5218), UL64(0xD69906245565A910), + UL64(0xF40E35855771202A), UL64(0x106AA07032BBD1B8), + UL64(0x19A4C116B8D2D0C8), UL64(0x1E376C085141AB53), + UL64(0x2748774CDF8EEB99), UL64(0x34B0BCB5E19B48A8), + UL64(0x391C0CB3C5C95A63), UL64(0x4ED8AA4AE3418ACB), + UL64(0x5B9CCA4F7763E373), UL64(0x682E6FF3D6B2B8A3), + UL64(0x748F82EE5DEFB2FC), UL64(0x78A5636F43172F60), + UL64(0x84C87814A1F0AB72), UL64(0x8CC702081A6439EC), + UL64(0x90BEFFFA23631E28), UL64(0xA4506CEBDE82BDE9), + UL64(0xBEF9A3F7B2C67915), UL64(0xC67178F2E372532B), + UL64(0xCA273ECEEA26619C), UL64(0xD186B8C721C0C207), + UL64(0xEADA7DD6CDE0EB1E), UL64(0xF57D4F7FEE6ED178), + UL64(0x06F067AA72176FBA), UL64(0x0A637DC5A2C898A6), + UL64(0x113F9804BEF90DAE), UL64(0x1B710B35131C471B), + UL64(0x28DB77F523047D84), UL64(0x32CAAB7B40C72493), + UL64(0x3C9EBE0A15C9BEBC), UL64(0x431D67C49C100D4C), + UL64(0x4CC5D4BECB3E42B6), UL64(0x597F299CFC657E2A), + UL64(0x5FCB6FAB3AD6FAEC), UL64(0x6C44198C4A475817) +}; + +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[128] ) +{ + int i; + struct + { + uint64_t temp1, temp2, W[80]; + uint64_t A[8]; + } local; + + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); + +#define SHR(x,n) ((x) >> (n)) +#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR((x),(n)) | ((x) << (64 - (n)))) + +#define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 1) ^ ROTR(x, 8) ^ SHR(x, 7)) +#define S1(x) (ROTR(x,19) ^ ROTR(x,61) ^ SHR(x, 6)) + +#define S2(x) (ROTR(x,28) ^ ROTR(x,34) ^ ROTR(x,39)) +#define S3(x) (ROTR(x,14) ^ ROTR(x,18) ^ ROTR(x,41)) + +#define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) + +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ + } while( 0 ) + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + for( i = 0; i < 80; i++ ) + { + if( i < 16 ) + { + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, i << 3 ); + } + else + { + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; + } + + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); + + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, i << 3 ); + } + + for( ; i < 80; i++ ) + { + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; + } + + i = 0; + do + { + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + } + while( i < 80 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[128] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * SHA-512 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + unsigned int left; + + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = (unsigned int) (ctx->total[0] & 0x7F); + fill = 128 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint64_t) ilen; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint64_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 128 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 128; + ilen -= 128; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * SHA-512 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned used; + uint64_t high, low; + + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 16 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x7F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if( used <= 112 ) + { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 112 - used ); + } + else + { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 128 - used ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 112 ); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 61 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + sha512_put_uint64_be( high, ctx->buffer, 112 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( low, ctx->buffer, 120 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Output final state + */ + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[1], output, 8 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[2], output, 16 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[3], output, 24 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[4], output, 32 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[5], output, 40 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( ctx->is384 == 0 ) +#endif + { + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[6], output, 48 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[7], output, 56 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-512( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[64], + int is384 ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); +#else + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); +#endif + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx, is384 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[64], + int is384 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, is384 ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * FIPS-180-2 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha512_test_buf[3][113] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu" }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha512_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 112, 1000 +}; + +static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + /* + * SHA-384 test vectors + */ + { 0xCB, 0x00, 0x75, 0x3F, 0x45, 0xA3, 0x5E, 0x8B, + 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x3D, 0x69, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x07, + 0x27, 0x2C, 0x32, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0xD1, 0x63, + 0x1A, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x5A, 0x43, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xED, + 0x80, 0x86, 0x07, 0x2B, 0xA1, 0xE7, 0xCC, 0x23, + 0x58, 0xBA, 0xEC, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC8, 0x25, 0xA7 }, + { 0x09, 0x33, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xF7, 0x11, 0x47, 0xE8, + 0x3D, 0x19, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x82, 0xCD, 0x1B, 0x47, + 0x53, 0x11, 0x1B, 0x17, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x05, 0xD2, + 0x2F, 0xA0, 0x80, 0x86, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0x12, + 0xFC, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0x1A, 0x55, 0x7E, 0x2D, 0xB9, + 0x66, 0xC3, 0xE9, 0xFA, 0x91, 0x74, 0x60, 0x39 }, + { 0x9D, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x71, 0x64, 0x74, 0xCB, + 0x08, 0x6E, 0x83, 0x4E, 0x31, 0x0A, 0x4A, 0x1C, + 0xED, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF2, 0x48, 0x52, + 0x79, 0x72, 0xCE, 0xC5, 0x70, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0x5B, + 0x07, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0xDC, 0x38, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xEB, + 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 }, +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ + + /* + * SHA-512 test vectors + */ + { 0xDD, 0xAF, 0x35, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7A, 0xBA, + 0xCC, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xAE, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31, + 0x12, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0x4E, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x7E, 0xA2, + 0x0A, 0x9E, 0xEE, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, + 0x21, 0x92, 0x99, 0x2A, 0x27, 0x4F, 0xC1, 0xA8, + 0x36, 0xBA, 0x3C, 0x23, 0xA3, 0xFE, 0xEB, 0xBD, + 0x45, 0x4D, 0x44, 0x23, 0x64, 0x3C, 0xE8, 0x0E, + 0x2A, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0x4F, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA4, 0x9F }, + { 0x8E, 0x95, 0x9B, 0x75, 0xDA, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xDA, + 0x8C, 0xF4, 0xF7, 0x28, 0x14, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x3F, + 0x8F, 0x77, 0x79, 0xC6, 0xEB, 0x9F, 0x7F, 0xA1, + 0x72, 0x99, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0xB6, 0x88, 0x90, 0x18, + 0x50, 0x1D, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x49, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xE4, + 0x33, 0x1B, 0x99, 0xDE, 0xC4, 0xB5, 0x43, 0x3A, + 0xC7, 0xD3, 0x29, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0xDD, 0x26, 0x54, + 0x5E, 0x96, 0xE5, 0x5B, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xE9, 0x09 }, + { 0xE7, 0x18, 0x48, 0x3D, 0x0C, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x64, + 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x42, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x15, 0xB4, 0x63, + 0x8E, 0x1F, 0x98, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x20, 0x44, 0x28, + 0x56, 0x32, 0xA8, 0x03, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0x73, 0xEB, + 0xDE, 0x0F, 0xF2, 0x44, 0x87, 0x7E, 0xA6, 0x0A, + 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x43, 0x2C, 0xE5, 0x77, 0xC3, 0x1B, + 0xEB, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0x49, 0xAA, 0x2E, + 0x4E, 0xAD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0xC0, 0x9B } +}; + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( a ) ( sizeof( a ) / sizeof( ( a )[0] ) ) + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char sha512sum[64]; + mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; + + buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1024, sizeof(unsigned char) ); + if( NULL == buf ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Buffer allocation failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx ); + + for( i = 0; i < (int) ARRAY_LENGTH(sha512_test_sum); i++ ) + { + j = i % 3; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + k = i < 3; +#else + k = 0; +#endif + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - k * 128, j + 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( j == 2 ) + { + memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); + + for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, buf, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, sha512_test_buf[j], + sha512_test_buflen[j] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx, sha512sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( sha512sum, sha512_test_sum[i], 64 - k * 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + goto exit; + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#undef ARRAY_LENGTH + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32188cf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ +/* + * SSL session cache implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * These session callbacks use a simple chained list + * to store and retrieve the session information. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" + +#include + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ) +{ + memset( cache, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context ) ); + + cache->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT; + cache->max_entries = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &cache->mutex ); +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + int ret = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *entry; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + + cur = cache->chain; + entry = NULL; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + entry = cur; + cur = cur->next; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( cache->timeout != 0 && + (int) ( t - entry->timestamp ) > cache->timeout ) + continue; +#endif + + if( session->id_len != entry->session.id_len || + memcmp( session->id, entry->session.id, + entry->session.id_len ) != 0 ) + { + continue; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( session, &entry->session ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* + * Restore peer certificate (without rest of the original chain) + */ + if( entry->peer_cert.p != NULL ) + { + /* `session->peer_cert` is NULL after the call to + * mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(), because cache entries + * have the `peer_cert` field set to NULL. */ + + if( ( session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, + sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( session->peer_cert, entry->peer_cert.p, + entry->peer_cert.len ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) + ret = 1; +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + int ret = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ), oldest = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *old = NULL; +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; + int count = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + cur = cache->chain; + prv = NULL; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + count++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( cache->timeout != 0 && + (int) ( t - cur->timestamp ) > cache->timeout ) + { + cur->timestamp = t; + break; /* expired, reuse this slot, update timestamp */ + } +#endif + + if( memcmp( session->id, cur->session.id, cur->session.id_len ) == 0 ) + break; /* client reconnected, keep timestamp for session id */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( oldest == 0 || cur->timestamp < oldest ) + { + oldest = cur->timestamp; + old = cur; + } +#endif + + prv = cur; + cur = cur->next; + } + + if( cur == NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + /* + * Reuse oldest entry if max_entries reached + */ + if( count >= cache->max_entries ) + { + if( old == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + cur = old; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + /* + * Reuse first entry in chain if max_entries reached, + * but move to last place + */ + if( count >= cache->max_entries ) + { + if( cache->chain == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + cur = cache->chain; + cache->chain = cur->next; + cur->next = NULL; + prv->next = cur; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + else + { + /* + * max_entries not reached, create new entry + */ + cur = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry) ); + if( cur == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( prv == NULL ) + cache->chain = cur; + else + prv->next = cur; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + cur->timestamp = t; +#endif + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* + * If we're reusing an entry, free its certificate first + */ + if( cur->peer_cert.p != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->peer_cert.p ); + memset( &cur->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* Copy the entire session; this temporarily makes a copy of the + * X.509 CRT structure even though we only want to store the raw CRT. + * This inefficiency will go away as soon as we implement on-demand + * parsing of CRTs, in which case there's no need for the `peer_cert` + * field anymore in the first place, and we're done after this call. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( &cur->session, session ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* If present, free the X.509 structure and only store the raw CRT data. */ + if( cur->session.peer_cert != NULL ) + { + cur->peer_cert.p = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len ); + if( cur->peer_cert.p == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( cur->peer_cert.p, + cur->session.peer_cert->raw.p, + cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len ); + cur->peer_cert.len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cur->session.peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( cur->session.peer_cert ); + cur->session.peer_cert = NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) + ret = 1; +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout ) +{ + if( timeout < 0 ) timeout = 0; + + cache->timeout = timeout; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int max ) +{ + if( max < 0 ) max = 0; + + cache->max_entries = max; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; + + cur = cache->chain; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + prv = cur; + cur = cur->next; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &prv->session ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_free( prv->peer_cert.p ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + mbedtls_free( prv ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &cache->mutex ); +#endif + cache->chain = NULL; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ceec77ef --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c @@ -0,0 +1,2373 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ciphersuites.c + * + * \brief SSL ciphersuites for mbed TLS + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#include + +#undef HAVE_SHA384 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#define HAVE_SHA384 +#endif + +/* + * Ordered from most preferred to least preferred in terms of security. + * + * Current rule (except RC4 and 3DES, weak and null which come last): + * 1. By key exchange: + * Forward-secure non-PSK > forward-secure PSK > ECJPAKE > other non-PSK > other PSK + * 2. By key length and cipher: + * ChaCha > AES-256 > Camellia-256 > ARIA-256 > AES-128 > Camellia-128 > ARIA-128 + * 3. By cipher mode when relevant GCM > CCM > CBC > CCM_8 + * 4. By hash function used when relevant + * 5. By key exchange/auth again: EC > non-EC + */ +static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) + MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES, +#else + /* Chacha-Poly ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + + /* All AES-256 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-256 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + + /* All ARIA-256 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + /* All AES-128 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-128 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + + /* All ARIA-128 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The PSK ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The ECJPAKE suite */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + + /* All AES-256 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-256 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + /* All ARIA-256 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + /* All AES-128 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-128 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* All ARIA-128 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The RSA PSK suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The PSK suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* 3DES suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + + /* RC4 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + + /* Weak suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + + /* NULL suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES */ + 0 +}; + +static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C && + MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + + + { 0, "", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) +const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ) +{ + return( ciphersuite_preference ); +} +#else +#define MAX_CIPHERSUITES sizeof( ciphersuite_definitions ) / \ + sizeof( ciphersuite_definitions[0] ) +static int supported_ciphersuites[MAX_CIPHERSUITES]; +static int supported_init = 0; + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ciphersuite_is_removed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info ) +{ + (void)cs_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) + if( cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) + if( cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB || + cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC ) + { + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ) +{ + /* + * On initial call filter out all ciphersuites not supported by current + * build based on presence in the ciphersuite_definitions. + */ + if( supported_init == 0 ) + { + const int *p; + int *q; + + for( p = ciphersuite_preference, q = supported_ciphersuites; + *p != 0 && q < supported_ciphersuites + MAX_CIPHERSUITES - 1; + p++ ) + { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info; + if( ( cs_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( *p ) ) != NULL && + !ciphersuite_is_removed( cs_info ) ) + { + *(q++) = *p; + } + } + *q = 0; + + supported_init = 1; + } + + return( supported_ciphersuites ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES */ + +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string( + const char *ciphersuite_name ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur = ciphersuite_definitions; + + if( NULL == ciphersuite_name ) + return( NULL ); + + while( cur->id != 0 ) + { + if( 0 == strcmp( cur->name, ciphersuite_name ) ) + return( cur ); + + cur++; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( int ciphersuite ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur = ciphersuite_definitions; + + while( cur->id != 0 ) + { + if( cur->id == ciphersuite ) + return( cur ); + + cur++; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( const int ciphersuite_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur; + + cur = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite_id ); + + if( cur == NULL ) + return( "unknown" ); + + return( cur->name ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( const char *ciphersuite_name ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur; + + cur = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string( ciphersuite_name ); + + if( cur == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return( cur->id ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ); + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + } +} + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..72351c97 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c @@ -0,0 +1,4609 @@ +/* + * SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#include + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t hostname_len; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->hostname == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s", + ssl->hostname ) ); + + hostname_len = strlen( ssl->hostname ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, hostname_len + 9 ); + + /* + * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) + * + * In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an + * extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The + * "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain + * "ServerNameList" where: + * + * struct { + * NameType name_type; + * select (name_type) { + * case host_name: HostName; + * } name; + * } ServerName; + * + * enum { + * host_name(0), (255) + * } NameType; + * + * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> + * } ServerNameList; + * + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len + 5, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len + 3, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + memcpy( p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len ); + + *olen = hostname_len + 9; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + /* We're always including an TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the + * initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation + * info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */ + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len ); + + /* + * Secure renegotiation + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len ); + + memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); + + *olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/* + * Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t sig_alg_len = 0; + const int *md; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6; +#endif + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->max_minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + sig_alg_len += 2; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + sig_alg_len += 2; +#endif + if( sig_alg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "length in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too big" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } + } + + /* Empty signature algorithms list, this is a configuration error. */ + if( sig_alg_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, sig_alg_len + 6 ); + + /* + * Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2) + */ + sig_alg_len = 0; + + for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( *md ); + sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( *md ); + sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; +#endif + } + + /* + * enum { + * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), + * sha512(6), (255) + * } HashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } + * SignatureAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sig_alg_len + 2, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sig_alg_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = 6 + sig_alg_len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6; + size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id; + + *olen = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; + *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + grp_id++ ) + { + info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); + if( info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "invalid curve in ssl configuration" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } + elliptic_curve_len += 2; + + if( elliptic_curve_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "malformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in config" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } + } + + /* Empty elliptic curve list, this is a configuration error. */ + if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + elliptic_curve_len ); + + elliptic_curve_len = 0; + + for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; + *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + grp_id++ ) + { + info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); + elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( info->tls_id ); + elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( info->tls_id ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( elliptic_curve_len + 2, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( elliptic_curve_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + (void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */ + + *olen = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 2; + + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + *olen = 6; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t kkpp_len; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */ + if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + /* + * We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification. + * We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance + * and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content. + */ + if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL || + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , + "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len ); + if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "allocation failed" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len ); + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" ) ); + + kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p + 2, end, kkpp_len ); + + memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = kkpp_len + 4; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + *olen = 0; + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding CID extension" ) ); + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) ); + + /* Add extension ID + size */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 1; + + *p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code; + + *olen = 5; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); + + /* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 + tlen ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = 4; + + if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen ) ); + + memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen ); + + *olen += tlen; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t alpnlen = 0; + const char **cur; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) ); + + for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) + alpnlen += strlen( *cur ) + 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + alpnlen ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + + /* Skip writing extension and list length for now */ + p += 4; + + for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) + { + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of + * protocol names is less than 255. + */ + *p = (unsigned char)strlen( *cur ); + memcpy( p + 1, *cur, *p ); + p += 1 + *p; + } + + *olen = p - buf; + + /* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 6, buf, 4 ); + + /* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 4, buf, 2 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + /* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length, + * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ), + * 1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value + */ + ext_len = 2 + 2 * ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + 1 + mki_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) ); + + /* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes + * - the extension tag (2 bytes) + * - the extension length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, ext_len + 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + /* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */ + /* micro-optimization: + * the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + * which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0 + * For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments + * *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + * >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + */ + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ); + + for( protection_profiles_index=0; + protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; + protection_profiles_index++ ) + { + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] ); + if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x", + profile_value ) ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + } + else + { + /* + * Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles + * is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, " + "illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d", + ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] + ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + } + + *p++ = mki_len & 0xFF; + + if( mki_len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len ); + /* + * Increment p to point to the current position. + */ + p += mki_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } + + /* + * total extension length: extension type (2 bytes) + * + extension length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + 2 * number of protection profiles + * + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte) + * + mki value + */ + *olen = p - buf; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * Generate random bytes for ClientHello + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t; +#endif + + /* + * When responding to a verify request, MUST reuse random (RFC 6347 4.2.1) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie != NULL ) + { + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( t, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) t ) ); +#else + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. + * + * \param suite_info cipher suite to validate + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param min_minor_ver Minimal minor version to accept a cipher suite + * \param max_minor_ver Maximal minor version to accept a cipher suite + * + * \return 0 if valid, else 1 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_info, + const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl, + int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver ) +{ + (void) ssl; + if( suite_info == NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > max_minor_ver || + suite_info->max_minor_ver < min_minor_ver ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && + suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + + /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && + ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0; + + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p, *q; + const unsigned char *end; + + unsigned char offer_compress; + const int *ciphersuites; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + int uses_ec = 0; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client hello" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) +#endif + { + ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->min_major_ver; + ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->min_minor_ver; + } + + if( ssl->conf->max_major_ver == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "configured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + buf = ssl->out_msg; + end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + /* + * Check if there's enough space for the first part of the ClientHello + * consisting of the 38 bytes described below, the session identifier (at + * most 32 bytes) and its length (1 byte). + * + * Use static upper bounds instead of the actual values + * to allow the compiler to optimize this away. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 ); + + /* + * The 38 first bytes of the ClientHello: + * 0 . 0 handshake type (written later) + * 1 . 3 handshake length (written later) + * 4 . 5 highest version supported + * 6 . 9 current UNIX time + * 10 . 37 random bytes + * + * The current UNIX time (4 bytes) and following 28 random bytes are written + * by ssl_generate_random() into ssl->handshake->randbytes buffer and then + * copied from there into the output buffer. + */ + + p = buf + 4; + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, max version: [%d:%d]", + buf[4], buf[5] ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_generate_random( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_generate_random", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 32 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32 ); + p += 32; + + /* + * 38 . 38 session id length + * 39 . 39+n session id + * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) + * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist + * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) + * .. . .. compression methods + * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. extensions + */ + n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + if( n < 16 || n > 32 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || +#endif + ssl->handshake->resume == 0 ) + { + n = 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + /* + * RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY + * generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello." + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) +#endif + { + if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL && + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0 ) + { + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, + ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32 ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + /* + * The first check of the output buffer size above ( + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 );) + * has checked that there is enough space in the output buffer for the + * session identifier length byte and the session identifier (n <= 32). + */ + *p++ = (unsigned char) n; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); + + /* + * With 'n' being the length of the session identifier + * + * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) + * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist + * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) + * .. . .. compression methods + * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. extensions + */ + + /* + * DTLS cookie + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 1 ); + + if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no verify cookie to send" ) ); + *p++ = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie", + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); + + *p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); + memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); + p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Ciphersuite list + */ + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + + /* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */ + n = 0; + q = p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + p += 2; + + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) + { + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuites[i] ); + + if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ciphersuite_info, ssl, + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) != 0 ) + continue; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", + (unsigned int)ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( ciphersuite_info ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + + n++; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ciphersuites[i], p, 0 ); + p += 2; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) ); + + /* + * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + n++; + } + + /* Some versions of OpenSSL don't handle it correctly if not at end */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + if( ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + n++; + } +#endif + + *q++ = (unsigned char)( n >> 7 ); + *q++ = (unsigned char)( n << 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + offer_compress = 1; +#else + offer_compress = 0; +#endif + + /* + * We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come + * in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one. + * We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is + * an actual need for it. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + offer_compress = 0; +#endif + + if( offer_compress ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 3 ); + *p++ = 2; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + } + + /* First write extensions, then the total length */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + + /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added + * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( uses_ec ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; + + if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_alpn_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + + /* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */ + ((void) olen); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ext_len ) ); + + if( ext_len > 0 ) + { + /* No need to check for space here, because the extension + * writing functions already took care of that. */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + ext_len; + } + + ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client hello" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ + if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || + buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1, + ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len, + ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + /* + * server should use the extension only if we did, + * and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1) + */ + if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE || + len != 1 || + buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED || + len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t peer_cid_len; + + if( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + /* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */ + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension unexpected" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( len == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; + + if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( len != peer_cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || + len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || + len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED || + len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_size; + const unsigned char *p; + + if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + list_size = buf[0]; + + p = buf + 1; + while( list_size > 0 ) + { + if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + list_size--; + p++; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no point format in common" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */ + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache ); + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_len, name_len; + const char **p; + + /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */ + if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + * + * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName" + */ + + /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ + if( len < 4 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + if( list_len != len - 2 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + name_len = buf[2]; + if( name_len != list_len - 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ + for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ ) + { + if( name_len == strlen( *p ) && + memcmp( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *p; + return( 0 ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i, mki_len = 0; + uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + * + */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* + * Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile (2 bytes) + * + mki_len(1 byte) + * and optional srtp_mki + */ + if( ( len < 5 ) || ( len != ( buf[4] + 5u ) ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + + /* + * get the server protection profile + */ + + /* + * protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only + * one protection profile in server Hello + */ + if( ( buf[0] != 0 ) || ( buf[1] != 2 ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + + server_protection_profile_value = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; + server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + server_protection_profile_value ); + if( server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection ) ) ); + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* + * Check we have the server profile in our list + */ + for( i=0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) + { + if( server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection ) ) ); + break; + } + } + + /* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */ + if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep + * one as negotiated */ + if( len == 5 ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0; + } + + /* + * RFC5764: + * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response + * that is different than the one the client offered, then the client + * MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert. + */ + if( len > 5 && ( buf[4] != mki_len || + ( memcmp( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len ) ) ) ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } +#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( len > 5 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } +#endif + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + int major_ver, minor_ver; + unsigned char cookie_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) ); + + /* Check that there is enough room for: + * - 2 bytes of version + * - 1 byte of cookie_len + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion server_version; + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + * } HelloVerifyRequest; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 ); + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, p ); + p += 2; + + /* + * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (TLS 1.1) + * even is lower than our min version. + */ + if( major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || + major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || + minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server version" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + } + + cookie_len = *p++; + if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "cookie length does not match incoming message size" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie ); + + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cookie_len ); + if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, p, cookie_len ); + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len; + + /* Start over at ClientHello */ + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( ssl ); + + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse hello verify request" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret, i; + size_t n; + size_t ext_len; + unsigned char *buf, *ext; + unsigned char comp; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + int accept_comp; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; +#endif + int handshake_failure = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* No alert on a read error. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + buf = ssl->in_msg; + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->renego_records_seen++; + + if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 && + ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation requested, but not honored by server" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-handshake message during renegotiation" ) ); + + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received hello verify request" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) ); + return( ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( ssl ) ); + } + else + { + /* We made it through the verification process */ + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie ); + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = NULL; + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) || + buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * 0 . 1 server_version + * 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time) + * 34 . 34 session_id length = n + * 35 . 34+n session_id + * 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite + * 37+n . 37+n compression_method + * + * 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional) + * 40+n . .. extensions + */ + buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", buf + 0, 2 ); + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, buf + 0 ); + + if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || + ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver || + ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || + ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]", + ssl->conf->min_major_ver, + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, + ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", + ( (unsigned long) buf[2] << 24 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[3] << 16 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[4] << 8 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[5] ) ) ); + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 ); + + n = buf[34]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 ); + + if( n > 32 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 39 + n ) + { + ext_len = ( ( buf[38 + n] << 8 ) + | ( buf[39 + n] ) ); + + if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + } + else if( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 38 + n ) + { + ext_len = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* ciphersuite (used later) */ + i = ( buf[35 + n] << 8 ) | buf[36 + n]; + + /* + * Read and check compression + */ + comp = buf[37 + n]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + accept_comp = 0; + else +#endif + accept_comp = 1; + + if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL && + ( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE || accept_comp == 0 ) ) +#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) +#endif/* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + /* + * Initialize update checksum functions + */ + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i ); + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int)i ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n ); + + /* + * Check if the session can be resumed + */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 || n == 0 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || +#endif + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i || + ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp || + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n || + memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 ) + { + ssl->state++; + ssl->handshake->resume = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#endif + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i; + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n; + memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ); + } + else + { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", + ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", + buf[37 + n] ) ); + + /* + * Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello. + */ + i = 0; + while( 1 ) + { + if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i++] == + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) + { + break; + } + } + + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); + if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->minor_ver ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1; + } +#endif + + if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + && comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; + + ext = buf + 40 + n; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, + ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len ) ); + + while( ext_len ) + { + unsigned int ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 ) + | ( ext[1] ) ); + unsigned int ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 ) + | ( ext[3] ) ); + + if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + switch( ext_id ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiation_info_seen = 1; +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4, + ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated_hmac extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, + ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt_then_mac extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session_ticket extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) ); + } + + ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; + ext += 4 + ext_size; + + if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + } + + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() has to be called after the parsing of the + * extensions. It sets the transform data for the resumed session which in + * case of DTLS includes the server CID extracted from the CID extension. + */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* + * Renegotiation security checks + */ + if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + if( handshake_failure == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t dhm_actual_bitlen; + + /* + * Ephemeral DH parameters: + * + * struct { + * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; + * } ServerDHParams; + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, ( "mbedtls_dhm_read_params" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); + if( dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u", + dhm_actual_bitlen, + ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id; +#else + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id; +#endif + + curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id ); + if( curve_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, grp_id ) != 0 ) +#else + if( ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits < 163 || + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits > 521 ) +#endif + return( -1 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + size_t ecdh_bits = 0; + uint8_t ecpoint_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* + * Parse ECC group + */ + + if( end - *p < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */ + if( *(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ + tls_id = *(*p)++; + tls_id <<= 8; + tls_id |= *(*p)++; + + /* Check it's a curve we offered */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id( ssl, tls_id ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */ + if( ( handshake->ecdh_psa_type = + mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( tls_id, &ecdh_bits ) ) == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + if( ecdh_bits > 0xffff ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits; + + /* + * Put peer's ECDH public key in the format understood by PSA. + */ + + ecpoint_len = *(*p)++; + if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < ecpoint_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + if( mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( + *p, ecpoint_len, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, + sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ), + &handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + *p += ecpoint_len; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + /* + * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + (const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + uint16_t len; + ((void) ssl); + + /* + * PSK parameters: + * + * opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; + */ + if( end - (*p) < 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1]; + *p += 2; + + if( end - (*p) < len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + /* + * Note: we currently ignore the PKS identity hint, as we only allow one + * PSK to be provisionned on the client. This could be changed later if + * someone needs that feature. + */ + *p += len; + ret = 0; + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) +/* + * Generate a pre-master secret and encrypt it with the server's RSA key + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t offset, size_t *olen, + size_t pms_offset ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2; + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; + + if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small for encrypted pms" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Generate (part of) the pre-master as + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion client_version; + * opaque random[46]; + * } PreMasterSecret; + */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_rng", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* + * Now write it out, encrypted + */ + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk, + p, ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( len_bytes == 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen, ssl->out_msg, offset ); + *olen += 2; + } +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, + mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg ) +{ + ((void) ssl); + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + *pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + + /* Only in TLS 1.2 */ + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( (*p) + 2 > end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* + * Get hash algorithm + */ + if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + /* + * Get signature algorithm + */ + if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + /* + * Check if the hash is acceptable + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, *md_alg ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", *(p)[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", + (*p)[1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d", + (*p)[0] ) ); + *p += 2; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good + * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use below. */ + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + + peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key, + MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + ((void) p); + ((void) end); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + ((void) p); + ((void) end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing ) + { + goto start_processing; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* + * ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server + * doesn't use a psk_identity_hint + */ + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ) + { + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + { + /* Current message is probably either + * CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server key exchange message must not be skipped" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing; + +start_processing: +#endif + p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } /* FALLTHROUGH */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + ; /* nothing more to do */ + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p, end - p ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + size_t sig_len, hashlen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +#else + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#endif + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + size_t params_len = p - params; + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; + + /* + * Handle the digitally-signed structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end, + &md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( pk_alg != + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + + /* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */ + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Read signature + */ + + if( p > end - 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; + + if( p != end - sig_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len ); + + /* + * Compute the hash that has been signed + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + hashlen = 36; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params, + params_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen, + params, params_len, + md_alg ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* + * Verify signature + */ + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk, + md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif + return( ret ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +exit: + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); + + if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t n = 0; + size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); + + if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + ssl->state++; + ssl->client_auth = ( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request", + ssl->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) ); + + if( ssl->client_auth == 0 ) + { + /* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + goto exit; + } + + /* + * struct { + * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only + * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + * + * Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just + * ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a + * certificate. + * + * We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out + * if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway, + * and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate + * the connection when it doesn't like our certificate. + * + * Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this + * point we only have one hash available (see comments in + * write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have. + * + * However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least + * superficially sane. + */ + buf = ssl->in_msg; + + /* certificate_types */ + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } + cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )]; + n = cert_type_len; + + /* + * In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf: + * * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of + * SSL is 3), + * * distinguished name length otherwise. + * Both reach at most the index: + * ...hdr_len + 2 + n, + * therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that + * regardless of the actual code path. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } + + /* supported_signature_algorithms */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + size_t sig_alg_len = + ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 ) + | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + unsigned char* sig_alg; + size_t i; +#endif + + /* + * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below: + * sig_alg[i + 1], + * where: + * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n, + * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1. + * Therefore the furthest access is: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1], + * which reduces to: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], + * which is one less than we need the buf to be. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + + 3 + n + sig_alg_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n; + for( i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d", + sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) ); + } +#endif + + n += 2 + sig_alg_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* certificate_authorities */ + dn_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 ) + | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) ); + + n += dn_len; + if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } + +exit: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) || + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ); + } + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello done" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + size_t header_len; + size_t content_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ) + { + /* + * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P + */ + content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4 ); + header_len = 6; + + ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + unsigned char own_pubkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t own_pubkey_len; + unsigned char *own_pubkey_ecpoint; + size_t own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; + + header_len = 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) ); + + /* + * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange. + */ + + /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by + * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While + * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes + * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not + * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF. + * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation + * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits ); + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes, + &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA + * and convert it to ECPoint format used in ClientKeyExchange. */ + status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, sizeof( own_pubkey ), + &own_pubkey_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( own_pubkey, + own_pubkey_len, + &own_pubkey_ecpoint, + &own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ) != 0 ) + { + psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + /* Copy ECPoint structure to outgoing message buffer. */ + ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1, + own_pubkey_ecpoint, own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ); + content_len = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len + 1; + + /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */ + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ), + &ssl->handshake->pmslen ); + + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) + { + /* + * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value + */ + header_len = 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + { + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret ) + goto ecdh_calc_secret; + + mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx ); + } +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret; + } + +ecdh_calc_secret: + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n; +#endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + /* + * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; + */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, + * and we check that the server's choice is among the + * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + header_len = 4; + content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + + if( header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len ); + + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len, + ssl->conf->psk_identity, + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ); + header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) + { + content_len = 0; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* + * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P) + */ + content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + + if( header_len + 2 + content_len > + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len ); + + ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* + * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public; + */ + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, + "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) + { + header_len = 4; + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + header_len = 4; + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->out_msg + header_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, + &content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + { + ((void) ciphersuite_info); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client key exchange" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + size_t n = 0, offset = 0; + unsigned char hash[48]; + unsigned char *hash_start = hash; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + size_t hashlen; + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign ) + { + goto sign; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ssl->client_auth == 0 || mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for certificate" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + /* + * Make a signature of the handshake digests + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign; + +sign: +#endif + + ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &hashlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque md5_hash[16]; + * opaque sha_hash[20]; + * }; + * + * md5_hash + * MD5(handshake_messages); + * + * sha_hash + * SHA(handshake_messages); + */ + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + + /* + * For ECDSA, default hash is SHA-1 only + */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + { + hash_start += 16; + hashlen -= 16; + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; + * }; + * + * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the + * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature + * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message. + * + * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this + * shortcut. + * + * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and + * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server + * side. + */ + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; + } + else + { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; + } + ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) ); + + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; + offset = 2; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), + md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, + ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, ssl->out_msg, offset + 4 ); + + ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate verify" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t lifetime; + size_t ticket_len; + unsigned char *ticket; + const unsigned char *msg; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse new session ticket" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; + * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + * 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint + * 4 . 5 ticket_len (n) + * 6 . 5+n ticket content + */ + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET || + ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); + } + + msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + + lifetime = ( ((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) | + ( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] ); + + ticket_len = ( msg[4] << 8 ) | ( msg[5] ); + + if( ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) != ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len ) ); + + /* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + + /* + * Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want + * to send a ticket after all, so just forget it + */ + if( ticket_len == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket, + ssl->session->ticket_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket ); + ssl->session->ticket = NULL; + ssl->session->ticket_len = 0; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket ); + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0; + + if( ( ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ticket alloc failed" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + memcpy( ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + + /* + * RFC 5077 section 3.4: + * "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it + * discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello." + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket in use, discarding session id" ) ); + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse new session ticket" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/* + * SSL handshake -- client side -- single step + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client state: %d", ssl->state ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used + * by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) + { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + } +#endif + + switch( ssl->state ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + break; + + /* + * ==> ClientHello + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = ssl_write_client_hello( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * <== ServerHello + * Certificate + * ( ServerKeyExchange ) + * ( CertificateRequest ) + * ServerHelloDone + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_parse_server_hello( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * ==> ( Certificate/Alert ) + * ClientKeyExchange + * ( CertificateVerify ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_write_client_key_exchange( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * <== ( NewSessionTicket ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( ssl ); + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) ); + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl ); + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3781796b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +/* + * DTLS cookie callbacks implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * These session callbacks use a simple chained list + * to store and retrieve the session information. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +/* + * If DTLS is in use, then at least one of SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 is + * available. Try SHA-256 first, 512 wastes resources since we need to stay + * with max 32 bytes of cookie for DTLS 1.0 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 +#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 32 +#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 +#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 48 +#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 +#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 20 +#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 20 +#else +#error "DTLS hello verify needs SHA-1 or SHA-2" +#endif + +/* + * Cookies are formed of a 4-bytes timestamp (or serial number) and + * an HMAC of timestamp and client ID. + */ +#define COOKIE_LEN ( 4 + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ) + +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx->hmac_ctx ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ctx->serial = 0; +#endif + ctx->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long delay ) +{ + ctx->timeout = delay; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx->hmac_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char key[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; + + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, key, sizeof( key ) ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->hmac_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_type( COOKIE_MD ), 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->hmac_ctx, key, sizeof( key ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Generate the HMAC part of a cookie + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *hmac_ctx, + const unsigned char time[4], + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + unsigned char hmac_out[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( *p, end, COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ); + + if( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( hmac_ctx ) != 0 || + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( hmac_ctx, time, 4 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( hmac_ctx, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 || + mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( hmac_ctx, hmac_out ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( *p, hmac_out, COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ); + *p += COOKIE_HMAC_LEN; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Generate cookie for DTLS ClientHello verification + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write( void *p_ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; + unsigned long t; + + if( ctx == NULL || cli_id == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( *p, end, COOKIE_LEN ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + t = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#else + t = ctx->serial++; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, *p, 0); + *p += 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret ) ); +#endif + + ret = ssl_cookie_hmac( &ctx->hmac_ctx, *p - 4, + p, end, cli_id, cli_id_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ) ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check a cookie + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check( void *p_ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + unsigned char ref_hmac[COOKIE_HMAC_LEN]; + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *p = ref_hmac; + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; + unsigned long cur_time, cookie_time; + + if( ctx == NULL || cli_id == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( cookie_len != COOKIE_LEN ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret ) ); +#endif + + if( ssl_cookie_hmac( &ctx->hmac_ctx, cookie, + &p, p + sizeof( ref_hmac ), + cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 ) + ret = -1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); + } +#endif + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + cur_time = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#else + cur_time = ctx->serial; +#endif + + cookie_time = ( (unsigned long) cookie[0] << 24 ) | + ( (unsigned long) cookie[1] << 16 ) | + ( (unsigned long) cookie[2] << 8 ) | + ( (unsigned long) cookie[3] ); + + if( ctx->timeout != 0 && cur_time - cookie_time > ctx->timeout ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e47c5388 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -0,0 +1,5991 @@ +/* + * Generic SSL/TLS messaging layer functions + * (record layer + retransmission state machine) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, + * and became an IETF standard in 1999. + * + * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); + +/* + * Start a timer. + * Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ) +{ + if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL ) + return; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs ) ); + ssl->f_set_timer( ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs ); +} + +/* + * Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) ); + return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "record buffer", buf, buflen ); + + /* We don't support record checking in TLS because + * (a) there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it, and + * (b) In SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, CBC record decryption has state + * and we'd need to backup the transform here. + */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + else + { + mbedtls_record rec; + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, buf, buflen, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "ssl_parse_record_header", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ssl->transform_in != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +exit: + /* On success, we have decrypted the buffer in-place, so make + * sure we don't leak any plaintext data. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, buflen ); + + /* For the purpose of this API, treat messages with unexpected CID + * as well as such from future epochs as unexpected. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + +#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0 +#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */ +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot ); +static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + if( mtu != 0 && mtu < out_buf_len ) + return( mtu ); + + return( out_buf_len ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left; + size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( ssl ); + + /* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone + * past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */ + if( bytes_written > mtu ) + { + /* Should never happen... */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t remaining, expansion; + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( max_len > mfl ) + max_len = mfl; + + /* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension + * only limits the maximum record payload size, so in theory + * we would be allowed to pack multiple records of payload size + * MFL into a single datagram. However, this would mean that there's + * no way to explicitly communicate MTU restrictions to the peer. + * + * The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never + * write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead. + */ + if( max_len <= ssl->out_left ) + return( 0 ); + + max_len -= ssl->out_left; +#endif + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + remaining = (size_t) ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + expansion = (size_t) ret; + + if( remaining <= expansion ) + return( 0 ); + + remaining -= expansion; + if( remaining >= max_len ) + remaining = max_len; + + return( (int) remaining ); +} + +/* + * Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range, + * returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + uint32_t new_timeout; + + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) + return( -1 ); + + /* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1 + * in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first + * retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes. + * This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be + * delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work + * on most non-IP stacks too. */ + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min ) + { + ssl->handshake->mtu = 508; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu ) ); + } + + new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + + /* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */ + if( new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout || + new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) + { + new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max; + } + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, + size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, + size_t maclen ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +/* + * Encryption/decryption functions + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length( size_t len, + size_t granularity ) +{ + return( ( granularity - ( len + 1 ) % granularity ) % granularity ); +} + +/* This functions transforms a (D)TLS plaintext fragment and a record content + * type into an instance of the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. This is used + * in DTLS 1.2 + CID and within TLS 1.3 to allow flexible padding and to protect + * a record's content type. + * + * struct { + * opaque content[DTLSPlaintext.length]; + * ContentType real_type; + * uint8 zeros[length_of_padding]; + * } (D)TLSInnerPlaintext; + * + * Input: + * - `content`: The beginning of the buffer holding the + * plaintext to be wrapped. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * - `max_len`: The number of Bytes available starting from + * `content`. This must be `>= *content_size`. + * - `rec_type`: The desired record content type. + * + * Output: + * - `content`: The beginning of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * + * Returns: + * - `0` on success. + * - A negative error code if `max_len` didn't offer enough space + * for the expansion. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_build_inner_plaintext( unsigned char *content, + size_t *content_size, + size_t remaining, + uint8_t rec_type, + size_t pad ) +{ + size_t len = *content_size; + + /* Write real content type */ + if( remaining == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + content[ len ] = rec_type; + len++; + remaining--; + + if( remaining < pad ) + return( -1 ); + memset( content + len, 0, pad ); + len += pad; + remaining -= pad; + + *content_size = len; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* This function parses a (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for details. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( unsigned char const *content, + size_t *content_size, + uint8_t *rec_type ) +{ + size_t remaining = *content_size; + + /* Determine length of padding by skipping zeroes from the back. */ + do + { + if( remaining == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + remaining--; + } while( content[ remaining ] == 0 ); + + *content_size = remaining; + *rec_type = content[ remaining ]; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled, + * and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */ +static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data, + size_t *add_data_len, + mbedtls_record *rec, + unsigned minor_ver ) +{ + /* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + + * TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length; + * + * For the CID extension, this is extended as follows + * (quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + DTLSPlaintext.type + + * DTLSPlaintext.version + + * cid + + * cid_length + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext; + * + * For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD + * and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead. + */ + + unsigned char *cur = add_data; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + { + ((void) minor_ver); + memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) ); + cur += sizeof( rec->ctr ); + } + + *cur = rec->type; + cur++; + + memcpy( cur, rec->ver, sizeof( rec->ver ) ); + cur += sizeof( rec->ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len ); + cur += rec->cid_len; + + *cur = rec->cid_len; + cur++; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 ); + cur += 2; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 ); + cur += 2; + } + + *add_data_len = cur - add_data; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + +#define SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES 20 /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */ + +/* + * SSLv3.0 MAC functions + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx, + const unsigned char *secret, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + const unsigned char *ctr, int type, + unsigned char out[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES] ) +{ + unsigned char header[11]; + unsigned char padding[48]; + int padlen; + int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info ); + int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_ctx->md_info ); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */ + if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ) + padlen = 48; + else + padlen = 40; + + memcpy( header, ctr, 8 ); + header[8] = (unsigned char) type; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, header, 9); + + memset( padding, 0x36, padlen ); + ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header, 11 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( padding, 0x5C, padlen ); + ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform ) +{ + return( transform->ivlen != transform->fixed_ivlen ); +} + +/* Compute IV := ( fixed_iv || 0 ) XOR ( 0 || dynamic_IV ) + * + * Concretely, this occurs in two variants: + * + * a) Fixed and dynamic IV lengths add up to total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv || dynamic_iv + * + * This variant is used in TLS 1.2 when used with GCM or CCM. + * + * b) Fixed IV lengths matches total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv XOR ( 0 || dynamic_iv ) + * + * This variant occurs in TLS 1.3 and for TLS 1.2 when using ChaChaPoly. + * + * See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_transform. + * + * This function has the precondition that + * + * dst_iv_len >= max( fixed_iv_len, dynamic_iv_len ) + * + * which has to be ensured by the caller. If this precondition + * violated, the behavior of this function is undefined. + */ +static void ssl_build_record_nonce( unsigned char *dst_iv, + size_t dst_iv_len, + unsigned char const *fixed_iv, + size_t fixed_iv_len, + unsigned char const *dynamic_iv, + size_t dynamic_iv_len ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */ + memset( dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len ); + memcpy( dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len ); + + dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len; + for( i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++ ) + dst_iv[i] ^= dynamic_iv[i]; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + int auth_done = 0; + unsigned char * data; + unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t add_data_len; + size_t post_avail; + + /* The SSL context is only used for debugging purposes! */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + /* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used + * for CBC transformations in TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. */ +#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) ) + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) ); + + if( transform == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no transform provided to encrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + if( rec == NULL + || rec->buf == NULL + || rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset + || rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + || rec->cid_len != 0 +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to encrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload", + data, rec->data_len ); + + mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + + if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->data_len, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* The following two code paths implement the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext + * structure present in TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 + CID. + * + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + * + * Note also that the two code paths cannot occur simultaneously + * since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There + * is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Add CID information + */ + rec->cid_len = transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy( rec->cid, transform->out_cid, transform->out_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "CID", rec->cid, rec->cid_len ); + + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + /* + * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + */ + if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset ); + + /* + * Add MAC before if needed + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || + ( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + && transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED +#endif + ) ) + { + if( post_avail < transform->maclen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + unsigned char mac[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ret = ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_enc, transform->mac_enc, + data, rec->data_len, rec->ctr, rec->type, mac ); + if( ret == 0 ) + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + add_data, add_data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + data, rec->data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + + hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen ); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + + /* + * Encrypt + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %d bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, 0 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; + int dynamic_iv_is_explicit = + ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ); + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if( post_avail < transform->taglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Build nonce for AEAD encryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + * However, since ChaChaPoly as well as all AEAD modes + * in TLS 1.3 use the record sequence number as the + * dynamic part of the nonce, we uniformly use the + * record sequence number here in all cases. + */ + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr ); + + ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ), + transform->iv_enc, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len ); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)", + iv, transform->ivlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)", + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including 0 bytes of padding", + rec->data_len ) ); + + /* + * Encrypt and authenticate + */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ + &rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag", + data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen, + transform->taglen ); + /* Account for authentication tag. */ + post_avail -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prefix record content with dynamic IV in case it is explicit. + */ + if( dynamic_iv_is_explicit != 0 ) + { + if( rec->data_offset < dynamic_iv_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( data - dynamic_iv_len, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len ); + rec->data_offset -= dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len += dynamic_iv_len; + } + + auth_done++; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t padlen, i; + size_t olen; + + /* Currently we're always using minimal padding + * (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */ + padlen = transform->ivlen - ( rec->data_len + 1 ) % transform->ivlen; + if( padlen == transform->ivlen ) + padlen = 0; + + /* Check there's enough space in the buffer for the padding. */ + if( post_avail < padlen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ ) + data[rec->data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padlen; + + rec->data_len += padlen + 1; + post_avail -= padlen + 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per + * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246) + */ + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Generate IV + */ + ret = f_rng( p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memcpy( data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, + transform->ivlen ); + + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen, + padlen + 1 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + transform->iv_enc, + transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* + * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1 + */ + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, transform->cipher_ctx_enc.iv, + transform->ivlen ); + } + else +#endif + { + data -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len += transform->ivlen; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( auth_done == 0 ) + { + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + /* + * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num + + * TLSCipherText.type + + * TLSCipherText.version + + * length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) + + * IV + // except for TLS 1.0 + * ENC(content + padding + padding_length)); + */ + + if( post_avail < transform->maclen) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, + rec, transform->minor_ver ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, + add_data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + data, rec->data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + + hmac_failed_etm_enabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "HMAC calculation failed", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if( auth_done != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + size_t olen; + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + int ret, auth_done = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1; +#endif + unsigned char* data; + unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t add_data_len; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) ); + if( rec == NULL || + rec->buf == NULL || + rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset || + rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to decrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Match record's CID with incoming CID. + */ + if( rec->cid_len != transform->in_cid_len || + memcmp( rec->cid, transform->in_cid, rec->cid_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + padlen = 0; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + transform->iv_dec, + transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; + + /* + * Extract dynamic part of nonce for AEAD decryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + */ + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr ); + if( ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ) == 1 ) + { + if( rec->data_len < dynamic_iv_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " ) < explicit_iv_len (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + dynamic_iv_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + dynamic_iv = data; + + data += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_offset += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len -= dynamic_iv_len; + } + else + { + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + } + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if( rec->data_len < transform->taglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < taglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + rec->data_len -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prepare nonce from dynamic and static parts. + */ + ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ), + transform->iv_dec, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len ); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len ); + + /* Because of the check above, we know that there are + * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceding data, and taglen + * bytes following data + data_len. This justifies + * the debug message and the invocation of + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ); + + /* + * Decrypt and authenticate + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ + transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + + return( ret ); + } + auth_done++; + + /* Double-check that AEAD decryption doesn't change content length. */ + if( olen != rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + size_t minlen = 0; + + /* + * Check immediate ciphertext sanity + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */ + minlen += transform->ivlen; + } +#endif + + /* Size considerations: + * + * - The CBC cipher text must not be empty and hence + * at least of size transform->ivlen. + * + * Together with the potential IV-prefix, this explains + * the first of the two checks below. + * + * - The record must contain a MAC, either in plain or + * encrypted, depending on whether Encrypt-then-MAC + * is used or not. + * - If it is, the message contains the IV-prefix, + * the CBC ciphertext, and the MAC. + * - If it is not, the padded plaintext, and hence + * the CBC ciphertext, has at least length maclen + 1 + * because there is at least the padding length byte. + * + * As the CBC ciphertext is not empty, both cases give the + * lower bound minlen + maclen + 1 on the record size, which + * we test for in the second check below. + */ + if( rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen || + rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < max( ivlen(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + "), maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") " + "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", rec->data_len, + transform->ivlen, + transform->maclen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + + /* + * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) + { + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); + + /* Update data_len in tandem with add_data. + * + * The subtraction is safe because of the previous check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1. + * + * Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at + * least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to + * mbedtls_ct_memcmp() below. + * + * Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + /* Calculate expected MAC. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len ); + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data, + add_data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + data, rec->data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, + transform->maclen ); + + /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */ + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect, + transform->maclen ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + auth_done++; + + hmac_failed_etm_enabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_hmac_xxx", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + + /* + * Check length sanity + */ + + /* We know from above that data_len > minlen >= 0, + * so the following check in particular implies that + * data_len >= minlen + ivlen ( = minlen or 2 * minlen ). */ + if( rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") %% ivlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") != 0", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up + */ + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */ + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen ); + + data += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* We still have data_len % ivlen == 0 and data_len >= ivlen here. */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Double-check that length hasn't changed during decryption. */ + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* + * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1, where CBC decryption of consecutive + * records is equivalent to CBC decryption of the concatenation + * of the records; in other words, IVs are maintained across + * record decryptions. + */ + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, transform->cipher_ctx_dec.iv, + transform->ivlen ); + } +#endif + + /* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having + * subtracted at most minlen and maclen up to this point, + * data_len > 0 (because of data_len % ivlen == 0, it's actually + * >= ivlen ). */ + padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1]; + + if( auth_done == 1 ) + { + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + rec->data_len, + padlen + 1 ); + correct &= mask; + padlen &= mask; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") + padlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ")", + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen, + padlen + 1 ) ); + } +#endif + + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen + padlen + 1 ); + correct &= mask; + padlen &= mask; + } + + padlen++; + + /* Regardless of the validity of the padding, + * we have data_len >= padlen here. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* This is the SSL 3.0 path, we don't have to worry about Lucky + * 13, because there's a strictly worse padding attack built in + * the protocol (known as part of POODLE), so we don't care if the + * code is not constant-time, in particular branches are OK. */ + if( padlen > transform->ivlen ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "should be no more than %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + padlen, transform->ivlen ) ); +#endif + correct = 0; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* The padding check involves a series of up to 256 + * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record + * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and + * validity of the padding, always perform exactly + * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account + * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + volatile unsigned char* const check = data; + + /* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above + * that the subtraction is safe. */ + size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen; + size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256; + size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks; + size_t idx; + + for( idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++ ) + { + /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) && + * (check[idx] == padlen - 1); + */ + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx ); + const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( check[idx], + padlen - 1 ); + pad_count += mask & equal; + } + correct &= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) ); +#endif + padlen &= mbedtls_ct_size_mask( correct ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0 + * and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid, + * padlen hasn't been changed and the previous assertion + * data_len >= padlen still holds. */ + rec->data_len -= padlen; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption", + data, rec->data_len ); +#endif + + /* + * Authenticate if not done yet. + * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( auth_done == 0 ) + { + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; + unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; + + /* If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen + * got reset to 1, and the initial check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1 + * guarantees that at this point we still + * have at least data_len >= maclen. + * + * If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len >= maclen + padlen + 1, then we have + * subtracted either padlen + 1 (if the padding was correct) + * or 0 (if the padding was incorrect) since then, + * hence data_len >= maclen in any case. + */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + ret = ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + transform->mac_dec, + data, rec->data_len, + rec->ctr, rec->type, + mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret ); + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + memcpy( mac_peer, data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* + * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of + * data_len over all padlen values. + * + * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did + * data_len -= padlen. + * + * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer + * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. + */ + const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen; + const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret ); + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data, + rec->data_len, + min_len, max_len, + transform->maclen ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen ); +#endif + + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect, + transform->maclen ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); +#endif + correct = 0; + } + auth_done++; + + hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_peer, transform->maclen ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Finally check the correct flag + */ + if( correct == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if( auth_done != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + /* Remove inner padding and infer true content type. */ + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#undef MAC_NONE +#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT +#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) +/* + * Compression/decompression functions + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg; + ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; + size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen; + unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> compress buf" ) ); + + if( len_pre == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before compression: output payload", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_in = msg_pre; + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_in = len_pre; + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_out = msg_post; + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out = out_buf_len - bytes_written; + + ret = deflate( &ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); + if( ret != Z_OK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform compression (%d)", ret ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); + } + + ssl->out_msglen = out_buf_len - + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after compression: output payload", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= compress buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg; + ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; + size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen; + unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decompress buf" ) ); + + if( len_pre == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before decompression: input payload", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre; + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre; + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post; + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = in_buf_len - header_bytes; + + ret = inflate( &ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); + if( ret != Z_OK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); + } + + ssl->in_msglen = in_buf_len - + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after decompression: input payload", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decompress buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. + * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. + * + * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are + * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code + * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). + * + * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but + * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, + * since we always read a whole datagram at once. + * + * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when + * they're done reading a record. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) ); + + if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " + "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + uint32_t timeout; + + /* + * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we + * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. + * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the + * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. + */ + + /* + * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable + */ + if( ssl->next_record_offset != 0 ) + { + if( ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset; + + if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->next_record_offset ) ); + memmove( ssl->in_hdr, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset, + ssl->in_left ); + } + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + + /* + * Done if we already have enough data. + */ + if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * A record can't be split across datagrams. If we need to read but + * are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something + * wrong. + */ + if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Don't even try to read if time's out already. + * This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages + * that will end up being dropped. + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timer has expired" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + } + else + { + len = in_buf_len - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ); + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + else + timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %lu ms", (unsigned long) timeout ) ); + + if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len, + timeout ); + else + ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake timeout" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + } + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->in_left = ret; + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + + while( ssl->in_left < nb_want ) + { + len = nb_want - ssl->in_left; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + else + { + if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) + { + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len, + ssl->conf->read_timeout ); + } + else + { + ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " were requested", + ret, len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->in_left += ret; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Flush any data not yet written + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) ); + + if( ssl->f_send == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " + "or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */ + if( ssl->out_left == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + while( ssl->out_left > 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", out_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) ); + + buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left; + ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", ret ); + + if( ret <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes were sent", + ret, ssl->out_left ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->out_left -= ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + } + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_flight_append" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message appended to flight", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + /* Allocate space for current message */ + if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + mbedtls_free( msg ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + /* Copy current handshake message with headers */ + memcpy( msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + msg->len = ssl->out_msglen; + msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype; + msg->next = NULL; + + /* Append to the current flight */ + if( ssl->handshake->flight == NULL ) + ssl->handshake->flight = msg; + else + { + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight; + while( cur->next != NULL ) + cur = cur->next; + cur->next = msg; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_flight_append" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free the current flight of handshake messages + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight; + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + + mbedtls_free( cur->p ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + + cur = next; + } +} + +/* + * Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; + unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8]; + + if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) ); + + /* Swap transforms */ + tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out; + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform; + + /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */ + memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8 ); + + /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) + { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Retransmit the current flight of messages. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Transmit or retransmit the current flight of messages. + * + * Need to remember the current message in case flush_output returns + * WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later. + * This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); + + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialise flight transmission" ) ); + + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12; + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING; + } + + while( ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL ) + { + size_t max_frag_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg; + + int const is_finished = + ( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ); + + uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? + SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; + + /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after + * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ. + * Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */ + if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) ); + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + max_frag_len = (size_t) ret; + + /* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */ + if( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( max_frag_len == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + continue; + } + + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len ); + ssl->out_msglen = cur->len; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len; + } + else + { + const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p; + const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12; + const size_t frag_off = p - ( cur->p + 12 ); + const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off; + size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len; + + if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) ) + { + if( is_finished ) + { + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + continue; + } + max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12; + + cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ? + max_hs_frag_len : rem_len; + + if( frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)", + (unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len, + (unsigned) max_hs_frag_len ) ); + } + + /* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented, + * copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields. + * Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */ + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 ); + + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( frag_off ); + ssl->out_msg[7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( frag_off ); + ssl->out_msg[8] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( frag_off ); + + ssl->out_msg[ 9] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msg[10] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msg[11] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( cur_hs_frag_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 ); + + /* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */ + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur_hs_frag_len; + } + + /* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */ + if( ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12; + } + else + { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL; + } + } + + /* Actually send the message out */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, force_flush ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Update state and set timer */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + else + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* We won't need to resend that one any more */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( ssl->handshake->flight ); + ssl->handshake->flight = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + + /* The next incoming flight will start with this msg_seq */ + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq = ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + + /* We don't want to remember CCS's across flight boundaries. */ + ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + + /* Clear future message buffering structure. */ + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); + + /* Cancel timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Handshake layer functions + */ + +/* + * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message. + * + * - fill in handshake headers + * - update handshake checksum + * - DTLS: save message for resending + * - then pass to the record layer + * + * DTLS: except for HelloRequest, messages are only queued, and will only be + * actually sent when calling flight_transmit() or resend(). + * + * Inputs: + * - ssl->out_msglen: 4 + actual handshake message len + * (4 is the size of handshake headers for TLS) + * - ssl->out_msg[0]: the handshake type (ClientHello, ServerHello, etc) + * - ssl->out_msg + 4: the handshake message body + * + * Outputs, ie state before passing to flight_append() or write_record(): + * - ssl->out_msglen: the length of the record contents + * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4; + const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write handshake message" ) ); + + /* + * Sanity checks + */ + if( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + /* In SSLv3, the client might send a NoCertificate alert. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ! ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && + ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + + /* Whenever we send anything different from a + * HelloRequest we should be in a handshake - double check. */ + if( ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) && + ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } +#endif + + /* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds + * of the outgoing record buffer. + * This should never fail as the various message + * writing functions must obey the bounds of the + * outgoing record buffer, but better be safe. + * + * Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here. + */ + if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_msglen, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Fill handshake headers + */ + if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( hs_len ); + ssl->out_msg[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( hs_len ); + ssl->out_msg[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( hs_len ); + + /* + * DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer, + * between the length field and the actual payload: + * uint16 message_seq; + * uint24 fragment_offset; + * uint24 fragment_length; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */ + if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + hs_len, + (size_t) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len ); + ssl->out_msglen += 8; + + /* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */ + if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq, ssl->out_msg, 4 ); + ++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ); + } + else + { + ssl->out_msg[4] = 0; + ssl->out_msg[5] = 0; + } + + /* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation, + * so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */ + memset( ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3 ); + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */ + if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + } + + /* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_flight_append( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_flight_append", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write handshake message" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Record layer functions + */ + +/* + * Write current record. + * + * Uses: + * - ssl->out_msgtype: type of the message (AppData, Handshake, Alert, CCS) + * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: record content + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + size_t len = ssl->out_msglen; + uint8_t flush = force_flush; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write record" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->transform_out != NULL && + ssl->session_out->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_compress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compress_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + len = ssl->out_msglen; + } +#endif /*MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write()" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + done = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + if( !done ) + { + unsigned i; + size_t protected_record_size; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + /* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption, + * as it may change when using the CID extension. */ + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 ); + + memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, ssl->out_len, 0); + + if( ssl->transform_out != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_record rec; + + rec.buf = ssl->out_iv; + rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf ); + rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen; + rec.data_offset = ssl->out_msg - rec.buf; + + memcpy( &rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver ); + rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The CID is set by mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(). */ + rec.cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_out, &rec, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec.data_offset != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Update the record content type and CID. */ + ssl->out_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID ) + memcpy( ssl->out_cid, rec.cid, rec.cid_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_msglen = len = rec.data_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->out_len, 0 ); + } + + protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed + * the remaining space in the datagram. */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( protected_record_size > (size_t) ret ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Now write the potentially updated record content type. */ + ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [%u:%u], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1], + ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size ); + + ssl->out_left += protected_record_size; + ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size; + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + + for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) + if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH ) + { + size_t remaining; + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + remaining = (size_t) ret; + if( remaining == 0 ) + { + flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( ( flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write record" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[11] ); +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[8] ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len; + + msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( frag_off > msg_len ) + return( -1 ); + + if( frag_len > msg_len - frag_off ) + return( -1 ); + + if( frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly) + */ +static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned int start_bits, end_bits; + + start_bits = 8 - ( offset % 8 ); + if( start_bits != 8 ) + { + size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8; + + /* Special case */ + if( len <= start_bits ) + { + for( ; len != 0; len-- ) + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - len ); + + /* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */ + return; + } + + offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */ + len -= start_bits; + + for( ; start_bits != 0; start_bits-- ) + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - 1 ); + } + + end_bits = len % 8; + if( end_bits != 0 ) + { + size_t last_byte_idx = ( offset + len ) / 8; + + len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */ + + for( ; end_bits != 0; end_bits-- ) + mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( 8 - end_bits ); + } + + memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 ); +} + +/* + * Check that bitmask is full + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len ) +{ + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ ) + if( mask[i] != 0xFF ) + return( -1 ); + + for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ ) + if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */ +static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( size_t msg_len, + unsigned add_bitmap ) +{ + size_t alloc_len; + + alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */ + alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */ + + if( add_bitmap ) + alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + ( msg_len % 8 != 0 ); /* Bitmap */ + + return( alloc_len ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[3] ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen =" + " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + + if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid handshake header" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ( ( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) || + ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) ) ) + { + if( recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid + * too many retransmissions. + * Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */ + if( recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, " + "message_seq = %u, start_of_flight = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: " + "message_seq = %u, expected = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + /* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */ + + /* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future + * messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and + * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the + * handshake logic layer. */ + if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */ + if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS handshake fragmentation not supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen ); + } + + /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + + /* Increment handshake sequence number */ + hs->in_msg_seq++; + + /* + * Clear up handshake buffering and reassembly structure. + */ + + /* Free first entry */ + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, 0 ); + + /* Shift all other entries */ + for( offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; + offset++, hs_buf++ ) + { + *hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1); + } + + /* Create a fresh last entry */ + memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * DTLS anti-replay: RFC 6347 4.1.2.6 + * + * in_window is a field of bits numbered from 0 (lsb) to 63 (msb). + * Bit n is set iff record number in_window_top - n has been seen. + * + * Usually, in_window_top is the last record number seen and the lsb of + * in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0 + * not seen yet). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl->in_window_top = 0; + ssl->in_window = 0; +} + +static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes( unsigned char *buf ) +{ + return( ( (uint64_t) buf[0] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[1] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[2] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[3] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[4] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t *record_in_ctr ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *original_in_ctr; + + // save original in_ctr + original_in_ctr = ssl->in_ctr; + + // use counter from record + ssl->in_ctr = record_in_ctr; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context const *) ssl ); + + // restore the counter + ssl->in_ctr = original_in_ctr; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); + uint64_t bit; + + if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); + + if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) + return( 0 ); + + bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if( bit >= 64 ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( ssl->in_window & ( (uint64_t) 1 << bit ) ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Update replay window on new validated record + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); + + if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) + return; + + if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) + { + /* Update window_top and the contents of the window */ + uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top; + + if( shift >= 64 ) + ssl->in_window = 1; + else + { + ssl->in_window <<= shift; + ssl->in_window |= 1; + } + + ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum; + } + else + { + /* Mark that number as seen in the current window */ + uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if( bit < 64 ) /* Always true, but be extra sure */ + ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, + * and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message. + * Both input and output include full DTLS headers. + * + * - if cookie is valid, return 0 + * - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not, + * fill obuf and set olen, then + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED + * - otherwise return a specific error code + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) +{ + size_t sid_len, cookie_len; + unsigned char *p; + + /* + * Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers, + * and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be + * done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks + * avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied, must be handshake + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied, must be 0 + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; (ignored) + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; (ignored) + * 14-16 uint24 length; (ignored) + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied, must be 0 + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; (ignored) + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version; (ignored) + * 27-58 Random random; (ignored) + * 59-xx SessionID session_id; 1 byte len + sid_len content + * 60+ opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; 1 byte len + content + * ... + * + * Minimum length is 61 bytes. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: in_len=%u", + (unsigned) in_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "cli_id", cli_id, cli_id_len ); + if( in_len < 61 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: record too short" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + if( in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 || + in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: not a good ClientHello" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( " type=%u epoch=%u fragment_offset=%u", + in[0], + (unsigned) in[3] << 8 | in[4], + (unsigned) in[19] << 16 | in[20] << 8 | in[21] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + sid_len = in[59]; + if( 59 + 1 + sid_len + 1 > in_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: sid_len=%u > %u", + (unsigned) sid_len, + (unsigned) in_len - 61 ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "sid received from network", + in + 60, sid_len ); + + cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len]; + if( 59 + 1 + sid_len + 1 + cookie_len > in_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: cookie_len=%u > %u", + (unsigned) cookie_len, + (unsigned) ( in_len - sid_len - 61 ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "cookie received from network", + in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len ); + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check( ssl->conf->p_cookie, + in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len, + cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: valid" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; olen - 13 + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; hello_verify_request + * 14-16 uint24 length; olen - 25 + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; olen - 25 + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version; 0xfe 0xff + * 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie + * + * Minimum length is 28. + */ + if( buf_len < 28 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Copy most fields and adapt others */ + memcpy( obuf, in, 25 ); + obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + obuf[25] = 0xfe; + obuf[26] = 0xff; + + /* Generate and write actual cookie */ + p = obuf + 28; + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write( ssl->conf->p_cookie, + &p, obuf + buf_len, + cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + *olen = p - obuf; + + /* Go back and fill length fields */ + obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 ); + + obuf[14] = obuf[22] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *olen - 25 ); + obuf[15] = obuf[23] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *olen - 25 ); + obuf[16] = obuf[24] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 25 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 13, obuf, 11 ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); +} + +/* + * Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet + * (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8). + * + * Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record + * that looks like a ClientHello. + * + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies, + * send back HelloVerifyRequest, then return 0 + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, + * reset the session of the current context, and + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT + * - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code + * + * This function is called (through ssl_check_client_reconnect()) when an + * unexpected record is found in ssl_get_next_record(), which will discard the + * record if we return 0, and bubble up the return value otherwise (this + * includes the case of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT and of unexpected + * errors, and is the right thing to do in both cases). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL || + ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL ) + { + /* If we can't use cookies to verify reachability of the peer, + * drop the record. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no cookie callbacks, " + "can't check reconnect validity" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + ssl, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len, + ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left, + ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + int send_ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_buf, len ); + /* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here. + * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later, + * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */ + send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret ); + (void) send_ret; + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_record_type( uint8_t record_type ) +{ + if( record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * ContentType type; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; // DTLS only + * uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS only + * uint16 length; + * + * Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected) + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected. + * + * With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will: + * 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0 + * 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD + * 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value + * 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else. + * Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received + * the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + int major_ver, minor_ver; + + size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0; + size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1; + + size_t const rec_hdr_version_offset = rec_hdr_type_offset + + rec_hdr_type_len; + size_t const rec_hdr_version_len = 2; + + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_len = 8; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint32_t rec_epoch; + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + + rec_hdr_version_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + size_t const rec_hdr_cid_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + size_t rec_hdr_cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + size_t rec_hdr_len_offset; /* To be determined */ + size_t const rec_hdr_len_len = 2; + + /* + * Check minimum lengths for record header. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + rec_hdr_version_len; + } + + if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_len + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record content type + */ + + rec->type = buf[ rec_hdr_type_offset ]; + + /* Check record content type */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + rec->cid_len = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->cid_len != 0 && + rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID ) + { + /* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID + * struct { + * ContentType special_type = tls12_cid; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; + * uint48 sequence_number; + * opaque cid[cid_length]; // Additional field compared to + * // default DTLS record format + * uint16 length; + * opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length]; + * } DTLSCiphertext; + */ + + /* So far, we only support static CID lengths + * fixed in the configuration. */ + rec_hdr_cid_len = ssl->conf->cid_len; + rec_hdr_len_offset += rec_hdr_cid_len; + + if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header including CID, length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* configured CID len is guaranteed at most 255, see + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX in check_config.h */ + rec->cid_len = (uint8_t) rec_hdr_cid_len; + memcpy( rec->cid, buf + rec_hdr_cid_offset, rec_hdr_cid_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type %u", + (unsigned) rec->type ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record version + */ + rec->ver[0] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 0 ]; + rec->ver[1] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 1 ]; + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, + &rec->ver[0] ); + + if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch: got %u, expected %u", + (unsigned) major_ver, + (unsigned) ssl->major_ver ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch: got %u, expected max %u", + (unsigned) minor_ver, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + /* + * Parse/Copy record sequence number. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Copy explicit record sequence number from input buffer. */ + memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], buf + rec_hdr_ctr_offset, + rec_hdr_ctr_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + /* Copy implicit record sequence number from SSL context structure. */ + memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], ssl->in_ctr, rec_hdr_ctr_len ); + } + + /* + * Parse record length. + */ + + rec->data_offset = rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len; + rec->data_len = ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 0 ] << 8 ) | + ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 1 ] << 0 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->type, + major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len ) ); + + rec->buf = buf; + rec->buf_len = rec->data_offset + rec->data_len; + + if( rec->data_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + + /* + * DTLS-related tests. + * Check epoch before checking length constraint because + * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec + * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message, + * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs + * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than + * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform. + * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently, + * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid + * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + rec_epoch = ( rec->ctr[0] << 8 ) | rec->ctr[1]; + + /* Check that the datagram is large enough to contain a record + * of the advertised length. */ + if( len < rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Datagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* Records from other, non-matching epochs are silently discarded. + * (The case of same-port Client reconnects must be considered in + * the caller). */ + if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: " + "expected %u, received %lu", + ssl->in_epoch, (unsigned long) rec_epoch ) ); + + /* Records from the next epoch are considered for buffering + * (concretely: early Finished messages). */ + if( rec_epoch == (unsigned) ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Consider record for buffering" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + /* For records from the correct epoch, check whether their + * sequence number has been seen before. */ + else if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl, + &rec->ctr[0] ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return( 0 ); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_client_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1]; + + /* + * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to + * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we + * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the + * fact that the record header len is 13 instead. + */ + if( rec_epoch == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_left > 13 && + ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect " + "from the same port" ) ); + return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * If applicable, decrypt record content + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record from network", + rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read()" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + done = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL ) + { + unsigned char const old_msg_type = rec->type; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, + rec ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID && + ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid + == MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ignoring unexpected CID" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + return( ret ); + } + + if( old_msg_type != rec->type ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "record type after decrypt (before %d): %d", + old_msg_type, rec->type ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt", + rec->buf + rec->data_offset, rec->data_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* We have already checked the record content type + * in ssl_parse_record_header(), failing or silently + * dropping the record in the case of an unknown type. + * + * Since with the use of CIDs, the record content type + * might change during decryption, re-check the record + * content type, but treat a failure as fatal this time. */ + if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if( rec->data_len == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + && rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + ssl->nb_zero++; + + /* + * Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack + * (excessive CPU consumption). + */ + if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty " + "messages, possible DoS attack" ) ); + /* Treat the records as if they were not properly authenticated, + * thereby failing the connection if we see more than allowed + * by the configured bad MAC threshold. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + } + else + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */ + } + else +#endif + { + unsigned i; + for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) + if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); + } +#endif + + /* Check actual (decrypted) record content length against + * configured maximum. */ + if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Read a record. + * + * Silently ignore non-fatal alert (and for DTLS, invalid records as well, + * RFC 6347 4.1.2.7) and continue reading until a valid record is found. + * + */ + +/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) ); + + if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 ) + { + do { + + ret = ssl_consume_current_message( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + int have_buffered = 0; + + /* We only check for buffered messages if the + * current datagram is fully consumed. */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 ) + { + if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 ) + have_buffered = 1; + } + + if( have_buffered == 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ) + continue; + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + /* Buffer future message */ + ret = ssl_buffer_message( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret || + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret ); + + if( 0 != ret ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + update_hs_digest == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "reuse previously read message" ) ); + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * hs_buf; + int ret = 0; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) ); + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + /* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before. + * If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */ + if( !hs->buffering.seen_ccs ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CCS not seen in the current flight" ) ); + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) ); + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->in_msglen = 1; + ssl->in_msg[0] = 1; + + /* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */ + ssl->in_left = 0; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + /* Debug only */ + { + unsigned offset; + for( offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) + { + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset]; + if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.", + hs->in_msg_seq + offset, + hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) ); + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + /* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the + * next handshake message. */ + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + if( ( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) && ( hs_buf->is_complete == 1 ) ) + { + /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */ + size_t msg_len = ( hs_buf->data[1] << 16 ) | + ( hs_buf->data[2] << 8 ) | + hs_buf->data[3]; + + /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered + * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */ + if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)", + hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12 ); + + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12; + ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12; + memcpy( ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen ); + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered", + hs->in_msg_seq ) ); + } + + ret = -1; + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_message" ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t desired ) +{ + int offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available", + (unsigned) desired ) ); + + /* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */ + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake + * message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space, + * starting with the most distant one. */ + for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1; + offset >= 0; offset-- ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message", + offset ) ); + + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, (uint8_t) offset ); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_buffer_message" ) ); + + switch( ssl->in_msgtype ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Remember CCS message" ) ); + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: + { + unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset; + unsigned recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12; + + /* We should never receive an old handshake + * message - double-check nonetheless. */ + if( recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + if( recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) + { + /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, + ( "Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, " + "buffering window %u - %u", + recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1 ) ); + + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ", + recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset ) ); + + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[ recv_msg_seq_offset ]; + + /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */ + if( !hs_buf->is_valid ) + { + size_t reassembly_buf_sz; + + hs_buf->is_fragmented = + ( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ); + + /* We copy the message back into the input buffer + * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large. + * This is an implementation-specific limitation + * and not one from the standard, hence it is not + * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */ + if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + /* Ignore message */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */ + if( hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered > + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( msg_len, + hs_buf->is_fragmented ); + + if( reassembly_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + if( recv_msg_seq_offset > 0 ) + { + /* If we can't buffer a future message because + * of space limitations -- ignore. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + goto exit; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + } + + if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " with bitmap) would exceed" + " the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- fail\n", + msg_len, + reassembly_buf_sz, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + msg_len ) ); + + hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz ); + if( hs_buf->data == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz; + + /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq, + * then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */ + memcpy( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6 ); + memset( hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3 ); + memcpy( hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3 ); + + hs_buf->is_valid = 1; + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz; + } + else + { + /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */ + if( memcmp( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Fragment header mismatch - ignore" ) ); + /* Ignore */ + goto exit; + } + } + + if( !hs_buf->is_complete ) + { + size_t frag_len, frag_off; + unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12; + + /* + * Check and copy current fragment + */ + + /* Validation of header fields already done in + * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */ + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + frag_off, frag_len ) ); + memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len ); + + if( hs_buf->is_fragmented ) + { + unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len; + ssl_bitmask_set( bitmask, frag_off, frag_len ); + hs_buf->is_complete = ( ssl_bitmask_check( bitmask, + msg_len ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + hs_buf->is_complete = 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message %scomplete", + hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet " ) ); + } + + break; + } + + default: + /* We don't buffer other types of messages. */ + break; + } + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_buffer_message" ) ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* + * Consume last content-layer message and potentially + * update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents' + * consumption state. + * + * (1) Handshake messages: + * Remove last handshake message, move content + * and adapt in_msglen. + * + * (2) Alert messages: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (3) Change cipher spec: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (4) Application data: + * Don't do anything - the record layer provides + * the application data as a stream transport + * and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only. + * + */ + + /* Case (1): Handshake messages */ + if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 ) + { + /* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data + * is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during + * ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */ + if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Get next Handshake message in the current record + */ + + /* Notes: + * (1) in_hslen is not necessarily the size of the + * current handshake content: If DTLS handshake + * fragmentation is used, that's the fragment + * size instead. Using the total handshake message + * size here is faulty and should be changed at + * some point. + * (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one + * has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen + * is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication. + * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation. + * The following check is therefore mandatory, and + * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion. + * Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of + * bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected + * sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + { + ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen; + memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, + ssl->in_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + } + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + } + /* Case (4): Application data */ + else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + /* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */ + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) + { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= + hs->buffering.future_record.len; + + mbedtls_free( hs->buffering.future_record.data ); + hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL; + } +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char * rec; + size_t rec_len; + unsigned rec_epoch; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 0 ); + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data; + rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len; + rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch; + + if( rec == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Only consider loading future records if the + * input buffer is empty. */ + if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); + + if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffered record not from current epoch." ) ); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" ) ); + + /* Double-check that the record is not too large */ + if( rec_len > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len ); + ssl->in_left = rec_len; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + +exit: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + /* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */ + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested + * in Finished messages). */ + if( rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */ + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */ + if( rec->buf_len > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + rec->buf_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Buffer record */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u", + ssl->in_epoch + 1U ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + + /* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records + * of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */ + hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1; + hs->buffering.future_record.len = rec->buf_len; + + hs->buffering.future_record.data = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, hs->buffering.future_record.len ); + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL ) + { + /* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a + * record from the next epoch, just ignore. */ + return( 0 ); + } + + memcpy( hs->buffering.future_record.data, rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += rec->buf_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_record rec; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* We might have buffered a future record; if so, + * and if the epoch matches now, load it. + * On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to + * the length of the buffered record, so that + * the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will + * essentially be no-ops. */ + ret = ssl_load_buffered_record( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Ensure that we have enough space available for the default form + * of TLS / DTLS record headers (5 Bytes for TLS, 13 Bytes for DTLS, + * with no space for CIDs counted in). */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, ssl->in_hdr, ssl->in_left, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + ret = ssl_buffer_future_record( ssl, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); + + /* Setup internal message pointers from record structure. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_len + 2; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + + ret = ssl_check_client_reconnect( ssl ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_client_reconnect", ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + /* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record " + "(header)" ) ); + } + else + { + /* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */ + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record " + "(header)" ) ); + } + + /* Get next record */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + else +#endif + { + return( ret ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Remember offset of next record within datagram. */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + if( ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "more than one record within datagram" ) ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + /* + * Fetch record contents from underlying transport. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, rec.buf_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->in_left = 0; + } + + /* + * Decrypt record contents. + */ + + if( ( ret = ssl_prepare_record_content( ssl, &rec ) ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Silently discard invalid records */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + /* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here + * probably means something went wrong in the handshake + * (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); + } +#endif + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + if( ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 && + ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "too many records with bad MAC" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } +#endif + + /* As above, invalid records cause + * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif + { + /* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); + } +#endif + return( ret ); + } + } + + + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + + /* The record content type may change during decryption, + * so re-read it. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; + /* Also update the input buffer, because unfortunately + * the server-side ssl_parse_client_hello() reparses the + * record header when receiving a ClientHello initiating + * a renegotiation. */ + ssl->in_hdr[0] = rec.type; + ssl->in_msg = rec.buf + rec.data_offset; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->in_len, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->transform_in != NULL && + ssl->session_in->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_decompress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decompress_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check actual (decompress) record content length against + * configured maximum. */ + if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Handle particular types of records + */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, content: %02x", + ssl->in_msg[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen != 2 ) + { + /* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert + to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't + currently support this. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%u:%u]", + ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); + + /* + * Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation + */ + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "is a fatal alert message (msg %d)", + ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a close notify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED) + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alert" ) ); + /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */ + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no_cert" ) ); + /* Will be handled in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() */ + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records, + * except at the beginning of renegotiations */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char level, + unsigned char message ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message )); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; + ssl->out_msglen = 2; + ssl->out_msg[0] = level; + ssl->out_msg[1] = message; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) ); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->out_msglen = 1; + ssl->out_msg[0] = 1; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1', + * so we don't need to check this here. */ + + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) ); + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); +#endif + + /* Increment epoch */ + if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); + /* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so + treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse change cipher spec" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next outgoing record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->out_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +static size_t ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform ) +{ + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + 8; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid; + if( transform != NULL ) + ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len; +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr - 8; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_len; +#endif + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5; + } + + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv; + /* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */ + if( transform != NULL ) + ssl->out_msg += ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( transform ); +} + +/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next incoming record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->in_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* This function sets the pointers to match the case + * of unprotected TLS/DTLS records, with both ssl->in_iv + * and ssl->in_msg pointing to the beginning of the record + * content. + * + * When decrypting a protected record, ssl->in_msg + * will be shifted to point to the beginning of the + * record plaintext. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* This sets the header pointers to match records + * without CID. When we receive a record containing + * a CID, the fields are shifted accordingly in + * ssl_parse_record_header(). */ + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len; +#endif + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5; + } + + /* This will be adjusted at record decryption time. */ + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv; +} + +/* + * Setup an SSL context + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8; + } + + /* Derive other internal pointers. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ ); + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers ( ssl ); +} + +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* + * Case A: We're currently holding back + * a message for further processing. + */ + + if( ssl->keep_current_message == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Case C: A handshake message is being processed. + */ + + if( ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * Case D: An application data message is being processed + */ + if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped. + * As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if + * we implement support for multiple alerts in single records. + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: nothing pending" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t transform_expansion = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; + unsigned block_size; + + size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ); + + if( transform == NULL ) + return( (int) out_hdr_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->session_out->compression != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif + + switch( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ) ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM: + transform_expansion = transform->minlen; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + + /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ + transform_expansion += transform->maclen; + + /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; + * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use + * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ + transform_expansion += block_size; + + /* For TLS 1.1 or higher, an explicit IV is added + * after the record header. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( transform->out_cid_len != 0 ) + transform_expansion += MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + return( (int)( out_hdr_len + transform_expansion ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/* + * Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t ep_len = mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); + int in_ctr_cmp; + int out_ctr_cmp; + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING || + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, + ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); + out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len, + ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); + + if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" ) ); + return( mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/* + * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is + * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through + * if an unexpected packet is received while the client + * is waiting for the ServerHello. + * + * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on + * the server-side as it is not treated as within + * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello + * after a renegotiation request.) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* Loop as long as no application data record is available */ + while( ssl->in_offt == NULL ) + { + /* Start timer if not already running */ + if( ssl->f_get_timer != NULL && + ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == -1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + /* + * OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) ); + + /* + * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. + * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. + * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) ); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + continue; + } +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) ); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + continue; + } +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ + if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || + ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) ) + { + /* + * Accept renegotiation request + */ + + /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + } +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + /* + * Refuse renegotiation + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so + we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */ + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + + /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been + * completed or not. The cases to consider are the following: + * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record + * has been read yet. + * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello. + * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting + * the ServerHello. + * In each of these case, looping will be the proper action: + * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check + * if it's application data. + * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data + * is present, hence continue is the same as break + * - For 3), the loop condition is satisfied and read_record + * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client + * when expecting the ServerHello. + */ + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 ) + { + if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, " + "but not honored by client" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + /* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + + /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer, + * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest. + * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch + * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + } + + n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen ) + ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + + memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n ); + ssl->in_msglen -= n; + + /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data + from the memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_offt, n ); + + if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) + { + /* all bytes consumed */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } + else + { + /* more data available */ + ssl->in_offt += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) ); + + return( (int) n ); +} + +/* + * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max + * fragment length and buffer size. + * + * According to RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1: + * + * Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are + * potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. + * + * Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the + * corresponding return code is 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl ); + const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret; + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( len > max_len ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) " + "maximum fragment length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + len, max_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else +#endif + len = max_len; + } + + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + { + /* + * The user has previously tried to send the data and + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially + * written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function + * (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + /* + * The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to + * copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure + * to keep track of partial writes + */ + ssl->out_msglen = len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, buf, len ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary. + * + * With non-blocking I/O, ssl_write_real() may return WANT_WRITE, + * then the caller will call us again with the same arguments, so + * remember whether we already did the split or not. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting == + MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED || + len <= 1 || + ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 || + mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc ) + != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + return( ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ) ); + } + + if( ssl->split_done == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, 1 ) ) <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + ssl->split_done = 1; + } + + if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf + 1, len - 1 ) ) <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + ssl->split_done = 0; + + return( ret + 1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ + +/* + * Write application data (public-facing wrapper) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) ); + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + ret = ssl_write_split( ssl, buf, len ); +#else + ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) ); + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write close notify" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ + if( transform == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + deflateEnd( &transform->ctx_deflate ); + inflateEnd( &transform->ctx_inflate ); +#endif + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + + for( offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, offset ); +} + +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot]; + + if( slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) + return; + + if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) + { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len ); + mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data ); + memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Convert version numbers to/from wire format + * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent. + * + * For TLS this is the identity. + * For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows: + * 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1) + * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, + unsigned char ver[2] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + --minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ + + ver[0] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( major - 2 ) ); + ver[1] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( minor - 1 ) ); + } + else +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + { + ver[0] = (unsigned char) major; + ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor; + } +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, + const unsigned char ver[2] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + *major = 255 - ver[0] + 2; + *minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1; + + if( *minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + ++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ + } + else +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + { + *major = ver[0]; + *minor = ver[1]; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2efb13cc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c @@ -0,0 +1,4855 @@ +/* + * SSLv3/TLSv1 server-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *info, + size_t ilen ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); + + if( ( ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ilen ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( ssl->cli_id, info, ilen ); + ssl->cli_id_len = ilen; + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, + void *p_cookie ) +{ + conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write; + conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check; + conf->p_cookie = p_cookie; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len; + const unsigned char *p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "parse ServerName extension" ) ); + + if( len < 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + servername_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); + if( servername_list_size + 2 != len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + p = buf + 2; + while( servername_list_size > 2 ) + { + hostname_len = ( ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2] ); + if( hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ) + { + ret = ssl->conf->f_sni( ssl->conf->p_sni, + ssl, p + 3, hostname_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + return( 0 ); + } + + servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3; + p += hostname_len + 3; + } + + if( servername_list_size != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->f_psk != NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + if( conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) + { + /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, + * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ + if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len || + buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, + ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* + * Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension: + * + * Currently, we are only considering the signature-algorithm extension + * to pick a ciphersuite which allows us to send the ServerKeyExchange + * message with a signature-hash combination that the user allows. + * + * We do *not* check whether all certificates in our certificate + * chain are signed with an allowed signature-hash pair. + * This needs to be done at a later stage. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t sig_alg_list_size; + + const unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_cur; + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_cur; + + if ( len < 2 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + sig_alg_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); + if( sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len || + sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message according + * to the constraints specified in this extension (see above), so it suffices + * to remember only one suitable hash for each possible signature algorithm. + * + * This will change when we also consider certificate signatures, + * in which case we will need to remember the whole signature-hash + * pair list from the extension. + */ + + for( p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2 ) + { + /* Silently ignore unknown signature or hash algorithms. */ + + if( ( sig_cur = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( p[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext" + " unknown sig alg encoding %d", p[1] ) ); + continue; + } + + /* Check if we support the hash the user proposes */ + md_cur = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( p[0] ); + if( md_cur == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" + " unknown hash alg encoding %d", p[0] ) ); + continue; + } + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_cur ) == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" + " match sig %u and hash %u", + (unsigned) sig_cur, (unsigned) md_cur ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: " + "hash alg %u not supported", (unsigned) md_cur ) ); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_size, our_size; + const unsigned char *p; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info, **curves; + + if ( len < 2 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); + if( list_size + 2 != len || + list_size % 2 != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ + if( ssl->handshake->curves != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, + * and leave room for a final 0 */ + our_size = list_size / 2 + 1; + if( our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX ) + our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; + + if( ( curves = mbedtls_calloc( our_size, sizeof( *curves ) ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + ssl->handshake->curves = curves; + + p = buf + 2; + while( list_size > 0 && our_size > 1 ) + { + curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1] ); + + if( curve_info != NULL ) + { + *curves++ = curve_info; + our_size--; + } + + list_size -= 2; + p += 2; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_size; + const unsigned char *p; + + if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + list_size = buf[0]; + + p = buf + 1; + while( list_size > 0 ) + { + if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + list_size--; + p++; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */ + ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t peer_cid_len; + + /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + if( len < 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; + + if( len != peer_cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */ + if( ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default + * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) + ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && + ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED && + ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); + + if( ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || + ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len ) ); + + if( len == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket rejected: renegotiating" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + /* + * Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed. + */ + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse( ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session, + buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is not authentic" ) ); + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is expired" ) ); + else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to + * inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4) + */ + session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + memcpy( &session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len ); + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); + + /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from ticket" ) ); + + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + + /* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len; + const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end; + const char **ours; + + /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + + /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ + if( len < 4 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + if( list_len != len - 2 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * Validate peer's list (lengths) + */ + start = buf + 2; + end = buf + len; + for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len ) + { + cur_len = *theirs++; + + /* Current identifier must fit in list */ + if( cur_len > (size_t)( end - theirs ) ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */ + if( cur_len == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + } + + /* + * Use our order of preference + */ + for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ ) + { + ours_len = strlen( *ours ); + for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len ) + { + cur_len = *theirs++; + + if( cur_len == ours_len && + memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours; + return( 0 ); + } + } + } + + /* If we get there, no match was found */ + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i,j; + size_t profile_length; + uint16_t mki_length; + /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */ + const size_t size_of_lengths = 3; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + + /* + * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte) + * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length + * and one of srtp_mki length + */ + if( len < size_of_lengths ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */ + profile_length = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + buf += 2; + + /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */ + if( profile_length > len - size_of_lengths || + profile_length % 2 != 0 ) /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */ + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + /* + * parse the extension list values are defined in + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + */ + for( j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2 ) + { + uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1]; + client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( protection_profile_value ); + + if( client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection ) ) ); + } + else + { + continue; + } + /* check if suggested profile is in our list */ + for( i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) + { + if( client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection ) ) ); + break; + } + } + if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + break; + } + buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */ + mki_length = *buf; + buf++; + + if( mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH || + mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED && + mki_length > 0 ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length; + + memcpy( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_key_curve( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **crv = curves; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id; + + while( *crv != NULL ) + { + if( (*crv)->grp_id == grp_id ) + return( 0 ); + crv++; + } + + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +/* + * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite, + * return 0 on success and -1 on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_pick_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * ciphersuite_info ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + uint32_t flags; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) + list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; + else +#endif + list = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite requires certificate" ) ); + + if( list == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server has no certificate" ) ); + return( -1 ); + } + + for( cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + flags = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", + cur->cert ); + + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &cur->cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: key type" ) ); + continue; + } + + /* + * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on + * keyUsage or other extensions. + * + * It also allows the user to provision different certificates for + * different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing + * and decrypting with the same RSA key. + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( cur->cert, ciphersuite_info, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: " + "(extended) key usage extension" ) ); + continue; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && + ssl_check_key_curve( &cur->cert->pk, ssl->handshake->curves ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: elliptic curve" ) ); + continue; + } +#endif + + /* + * Try to select a SHA-1 certificate for pre-1.2 clients, but still + * present them a SHA-higher cert rather than failing if it's the only + * one we got that satisfies the other conditions. + */ + if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + cur->cert->sig_md != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) + { + if( fallback == NULL ) + fallback = cur; + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate not preferred: " + "sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 client" ) ); + continue; + } + } + + /* If we get there, we got a winner */ + break; + } + + if( cur == NULL ) + cur = fallback; + + /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */ + if( cur != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "selected certificate chain, certificate", + ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert ); + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc + * Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; +#endif + + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( suite_id ); + if( suite_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", + (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name ) ); + + if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver || + suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: version" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) ) + return( 0 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && + suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: rc4" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake " + "not configured or ext missing" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( suite_info ) && + ( ssl->handshake->curves == NULL || + ssl->handshake->curves[0] == NULL ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: " + "no common elliptic curve" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't + * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && + ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether + * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info ); + if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_type ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " + "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /* + * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a + * certificate/key of a particular type: + * - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or + * - try the next ciphersuite if we don't + * This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list. + */ + if( ssl_pick_cert( ssl, suite_info ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: " + "no suitable certificate" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + + *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret, got_common_suite; + unsigned int i, j; + size_t n; + unsigned int ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len; + unsigned char *buf, *p; + const int *ciphersuites; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello v2" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client hello v2 illegal for renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + buf = ssl->in_hdr; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, 5 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message type: %d", + buf[2] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message len.: %d", + ( ( buf[0] & 0x7F ) << 8 ) | buf[1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, max. version: [%d:%d]", + buf[3], buf[4] ) ); + + /* + * SSLv2 Client Hello + * + * Record layer: + * 0 . 1 message length + * + * SSL layer: + * 2 . 2 message type + * 3 . 4 protocol version + */ + if( buf[2] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO || + buf[3] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + n = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1] ) & 0x7FFF; + + if( n < 17 || n > 512 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + ssl->minor_ver = ( buf[4] <= ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + ? buf[4] : ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; + + if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" + " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", + ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + } + + ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[3]; + ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[4]; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 2 + n ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf + 2, n ); + + buf = ssl->in_msg; + n = ssl->in_left - 5; + + /* + * 0 . 1 ciphersuitelist length + * 2 . 3 session id length + * 4 . 5 challenge length + * 6 . .. ciphersuitelist + * .. . .. session id + * .. . .. challenge + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, n ); + + ciph_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + sess_len = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; + chal_len = ( buf[4] << 8 ) | buf[5]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %u, sess_len: %u, chal_len: %u", + ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len ) ); + + /* + * Make sure each parameter length is valid + */ + if( ciph_len < 3 || ( ciph_len % 3 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( sess_len > 32 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( chal_len < 8 || chal_len > 32 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( n != 6 + ciph_len + sess_len + chal_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", + buf + 6, ciph_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", + buf + 6 + ciph_len, sess_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, challenge", + buf + 6 + ciph_len + sess_len, chal_len ); + + p = buf + 6 + ciph_len; + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; + memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, + sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ); + memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); + + p += sess_len; + memset( ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len ); + + /* + * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ + for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) + { + if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0 && p[2] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " + "during renegotiation" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + break; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) + { + if( p[0] == 0 && + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); + + if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + break; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ + + got_common_suite = 0; + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + ciphersuite_info = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) +#else + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) + for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) +#endif + { + if( p[0] != 0 || + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != ciphersuites[i] ) + continue; + + got_common_suite = 1; + + if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) + goto have_ciphersuite_v2; + } + + if( got_common_suite ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " + "but none of them usable" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); + } + +have_ciphersuite_v2: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + + /* + * SSLv2 Client Hello relevant renegotiation security checks + */ + if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->in_left = 0; + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello v2" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ + +/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during + ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is + not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret, got_common_suite; + size_t i, j; + size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset; + size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len; +#endif + unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; +#endif + int handshake_failure = 0; + const int *ciphersuites; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + int major, minor; + + /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present, + * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed + * signature-hash pairs. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +read_record_header: +#endif + /* + * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), + * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2 + * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) +#endif + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 5 ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* No alert on a read error. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + buf = ssl->in_hdr; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) +#endif + if( ( buf[0] & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + return( ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl ) ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) ); + + /* + * SSLv3/TLS Client Hello + * + * Record layer: + * 0 . 0 message type + * 1 . 2 protocol version + * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number + * 3 . 4 message length + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message type: %d", + buf[0] ) ); + + if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message len.: %d", + ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1] ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]", + buf[1], buf[2] ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1 ); + + /* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically + * "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the + * value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here + * is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */ + if( major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence + * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE +#endif + ) + { + /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ + if( ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record, discarding" ) ); + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + goto read_record_header; + } + + /* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */ + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + msg_len = ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + /* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ + msg_len = ssl->in_hslen; + } + else +#endif + { + if( msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ); + else +#endif + ssl->in_left = 0; + } + + buf = ssl->in_msg; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, msg_len ); + + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf, msg_len ); + + /* + * Handshake layer: + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 5 DTLS only: message sequence number + * 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset + * 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length + */ + if( msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0] ) ); + + if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake len.: %d", + ( buf[1] << 16 ) | ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ); + + if( buf[1] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message: %u != 0", + (unsigned) buf[1] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ + if( msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ( ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u", + (unsigned) msg_len, + (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), + (unsigned) ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* + * Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes, + * check sequence number on renego. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */ + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[5]; + + if( cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message_seq: " + "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; + } + else +#endif + { + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[5]; + ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq; + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1; + } + + /* + * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure + * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ( "fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u", + (unsigned) ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[8] ), + (unsigned) ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[11] ), + (unsigned) ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[3] ) ) ); + if( ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ClientHello fragmentation not supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + + /* + * ClientHello layer: + * 0 . 1 protocol version + * 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time) + * 34 . 35 session id length (1 byte) + * 35 . 34+x session id + * 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) + * 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie + * .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. ciphersuite list + * .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte) + * .. . .. compression alg. list + * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional) + * .. . .. extensions (optional) + */ + + /* + * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is + * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can + * read at least up to session id length without worrying. + */ + if( msg_len < 38 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * Check and save the protocol version + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, version", buf, 2 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, buf ); + + ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver; + ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver; + + if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || + ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" + " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", + ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + } + + if( ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver ) + { + ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->max_major_ver; + ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; + } + else if( ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; + + /* + * Save client random (inc. Unix time) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 ); + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 ); + + /* + * Check the session ID length and save session ID + */ + sess_len = buf[34]; + + if( sess_len > sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) || + sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len ) /* 2 for cipherlist length field */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; + memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, + sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ); + memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); + + /* + * Check the cookie length and content + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len; + cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset]; + + if( cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie", + buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE +#endif + ) + { + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check( ssl->conf->p_cookie, + buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification failed" ) ); + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 1; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification passed" ) ); + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + { + /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */ + if( cookie_len != 0 ) + { + /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification skipped" ) ); + } + + /* + * Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later) + */ + ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len; + + ciph_len = ( buf[ciph_offset + 0] << 8 ) + | ( buf[ciph_offset + 1] ); + + if( ciph_len < 2 || + ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */ + ( ciph_len % 2 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", + buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len ); + + /* + * Check the compression algorithms length and pick one + */ + comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len; + + comp_len = buf[comp_offset]; + + if( comp_len < 1 || + comp_len > 16 || + comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, compression", + buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + for( i = 0; i < comp_len; ++i ) + { + if( buf[comp_offset + 1 + i] == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; + break; + } + } +#endif + + /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; +#endif + + /* Do not parse the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) + { +#endif + /* + * Check the extension length + */ + ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len; + if( msg_len > ext_offset ) + { + if( msg_len < ext_offset + 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ext_len = ( buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8 ) + | ( buf[ext_offset + 1] ); + + if( msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + } + else + ext_len = 0; + + ext = buf + ext_offset + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len ); + + while( ext_len != 0 ) + { + unsigned int ext_id; + unsigned int ext_size; + if ( ext_len < 4 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 ) | ( ext[1] ) ); + ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 ) | ( ext[3] ) ); + + if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + switch( ext_id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ServerName extension" ) ); + if( ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL ) + break; + + ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiation_info_seen = 1; +#endif + + ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found signature_algorithms extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported elliptic curves extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported point formats extension" ) ); + ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT; + + ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max fragment length extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated hmac extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt then mac extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended master secret extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session ticket extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", + ext_id ) ); + } + + ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; + ext += 4 + ext_size; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) + { + if( MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); + + if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + break; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + + /* + * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client + * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations. + */ + if( sig_hash_alg_ext_present == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_default ) != 0 ) + md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, md_default ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + /* + * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ + for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) + { + if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " + "during renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } +#endif + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + break; + } + } + + /* + * Renegotiation security checks + */ + if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + if( handshake_failure == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * Search for a matching ciphersuite + * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions + * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.) + */ + got_common_suite = 0; + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + ciphersuite_info = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) +#else + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) + for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) +#endif + { + if( MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i] ) + continue; + + got_common_suite = 1; + + if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) + goto have_ciphersuite; + } + + if( got_common_suite ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " + "but none of them usable" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); + } + +have_ciphersuite: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + if( sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, + sig_alg ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d", + mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ) ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " + "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg ) ); + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding truncated hmac extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static void ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if + * the client hasn't offered it. */ + if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + return; + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding CID extension" ) ); + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL; + + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + + /* + * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension + * from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption + * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an + * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client." + */ + if( ( suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) == NULL || + ( cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( suite->cipher ) ) == NULL || + cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + } + + if( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding extended master secret " + "extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1 ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF; + + memcpy( p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); + p += ssl->verify_data_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); + p += ssl->verify_data_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x01; + *p++ = 0x00; + } + + *olen = p - buf; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 1; + + *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code; + + *olen = 5; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + ((void) ssl); + + if( ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & + MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT ) == 0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 2; + + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + *olen = 6; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t kkpp_len; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip costly computation if not needed */ + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + return; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); + + if( end - p < 4 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = kkpp_len + 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN ) +static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +{ + if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding alpn extension" ) ); + + /* + * 0 . 1 ext identifier + * 2 . 3 ext length + * 4 . 5 protocol list length + * 6 . 6 protocol name length + * 7 . 7+n protocol name + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, buf, 0); + + *olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 4, buf, 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 6, buf, 4 ); + + buf[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 7 ); + + memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t profile_value = 0; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) ) + { + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* The extension total size is 9 bytes : + * - 2 bytes for the extension tag + * - 2 bytes for the total size + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile + * - 1 byte for the mki length + * + the actual mki length + * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */ + if( (size_t)( end - buf ) < mki_len + 9 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); + return; + } + + /* extension */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, buf, 0 ); + /* + * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki ) + */ + ext_len = 5 + mki_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, buf, 2 ); + + /* protection profile length: 2 */ + buf[4] = 0x00; + buf[5] = 0x02; + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile ); + if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, buf, 6 ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "use_srtp extension invalid profile" ) ); + return; + } + + buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF; + memcpy( &buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len ); + + *olen = 9 + mki_len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; + unsigned char *cookie_len_byte; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello verify request" ) ); + + /* + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion server_version; + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + * } HelloVerifyRequest; + */ + + /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated + * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 ); + p += 2; + + /* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */ + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inconsistent cookie callbacks" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Skip length byte until we know the length */ + cookie_len_byte = p++; + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write( ssl->conf->p_cookie, + &p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_cookie_write", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + *cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char)( p - ( cookie_len_byte + 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte ); + + ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello verify request" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + +static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp; + mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + /* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). + * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume == 1 ) + return; + if( session->id_len == 0 ) + return; + if( ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL ) + return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + return; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session_tmp ); + + session_tmp.id_len = session->id_len; + memcpy( session_tmp.id, session->id, session->id_len ); + + ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, + &session_tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite || + session->compression != session_tmp.compression ) + { + /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Move semantics */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session ); + *session = session_tmp; + memset( &session_tmp, 0, sizeof( session_tmp ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) ); + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + +exit: + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session_tmp ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t; +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n; + unsigned char *buf, *p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client hello was not authenticated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) ); + + return( ssl_write_hello_verify_request( ssl ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + + if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG ); + } + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 5 protocol version + * 6 . 9 UNIX time() + * 10 . 37 random bytes + */ + buf = ssl->out_msg; + p = buf + 4; + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", + buf[4], buf[5] ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( t, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) t ) ); +#else + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += 28; + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32 ); + + ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( ssl ); + + if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 ) + { + /* + * New session, create a new session id, + * unless we're about to issue a session ticket + */ + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0; + memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32 ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + { + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id, + n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + /* + * Resuming a session + */ + n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* + * 38 . 38 session id length + * 39 . 38+n session id + * 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite + * 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg. + * 42+n . 43+n extensions length + * 44+n . 43+n+m extensions + */ + *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); + p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", + ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->session_negotiate->compression ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) ); + + /* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) + { +#endif + + /* + * First write extensions, then the total length + */ + ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if ( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) ) + { + ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ext_len ) ); + + if( ext_len > 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + ext_len; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + } +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ + size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ + unsigned char *buf, *p; + const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + int authmode; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET ) + authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; + else +#endif + authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) || + authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 4 cert type count + * 5 .. m-1 cert types + * m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only) + * m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only) + * n .. n+1 length of all DNs + * n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1 + * n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1 + * ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc. + */ + buf = ssl->out_msg; + p = buf + 4; + + /* + * Supported certificate types + * + * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; + * enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType; + */ + ct_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN; +#endif + + p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++; + p += ct_len; + + sa_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2) + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm; + * enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm; + */ + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + const int *cur; + + /* + * Supported signature algorithms + */ + for( cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++ ) + { + unsigned char hash = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( *cur ); + + if( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE == hash || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( ssl, hash ) ) + continue; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; + p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; + p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; +#endif + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sa_len, p, 0 ); + sa_len += 2; + p += sa_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* + * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; + */ + p += 2; + + total_dn_size = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED ) + { + /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned + * via a CA callback (configured through + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the + * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) + crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + else +#endif + crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + + while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) + { + /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length + * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */ + dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len; + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); + break; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( dn_size, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size ); + p += dn_size; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size ); + + total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size; + crt = crt->next; + } + } + + ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate request" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_context *own_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ); + + /* Check if the key is a transparent ECDH key. + * This also ensures that it is safe to call mbedtls_pk_ec(). */ + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( own_key ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY && + mbedtls_pk_get_type( own_key ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + mbedtls_pk_ec( *own_key ), + MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *signature_len ) +{ + /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the + * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange + * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. + * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing + * ssl->out_msglen. */ + unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2; + size_t sig_max_len = ( ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + - sig_start ); + int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl, + sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ + +/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including + * calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the + * signature and sending the message. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *signature_len ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ + + (void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + (void) signature_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ + + /* + * + * Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite. + * + */ + + /* + * - ECJPAKE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( + &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->out_msglen += len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + + /* + * For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support + * identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature, + * we use empty support identity hints here. + **/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + + /* + * - DHE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no DH parameters set" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * Ephemeral DH parameters: + * + * struct { + * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; + * } ServerDHParams; + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + &ssl->conf->dhm_P, + &ssl->conf->dhm_G ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( + &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen += len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */ + + /* + * - ECDHE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + /* + * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ + for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ ) + for( curve = ssl->handshake->curves; *curve != NULL; curve++ ) + if( (*curve)->grp_id == *gid ) + goto curve_matching_done; + +curve_matching_done: + if( curve == NULL || *curve == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no matching curve for ECDHE" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDHE curve: %s", (*curve)->name ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + (*curve)->grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( + &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len, + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen += len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */ + + /* + * + * Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the + * exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed; + size_t hashlen = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +#else + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: + * A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * to choose appropriate hash. + * B: For SSL3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 and ECDHE_ECDSA, use SHA1 + * (RFC 4492, Sec. 5.4) + * C: Otherwise, use MD5 + SHA1 (RFC 4346, Sec. 7.4.3) + */ + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ + if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || + ( md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, + sig_alg ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + /* (... because we choose a cipher suite + * only if there is a matching hash.) */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + /* B: Default hash SHA1 */ + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + { + /* C: MD5 + SHA1 */ + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg ) ); + + /* + * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + hashlen = 36; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, + dig_signed, + dig_signed_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen, + dig_signed, + dig_signed_len, + md_alg ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen ); + + /* + * 2.3: Compute and add the signature + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* + * For TLS 1.2, we need to specify signature and hash algorithm + * explicitly through a prefix to the signature. + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } DigitallySigned; + * + */ + + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = + mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = + mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_alg ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL ) + { + ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start( ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ), + md_alg, hash, hashlen ); + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: + /* act as if f_async_sign was null */ + break; + case 0: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return( ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, signature_len ) ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ); + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_sign_start", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the + * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange + * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. + * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing + * ssl->out_msglen. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), + md_alg, hash, hashlen, + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2, + signature_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, + ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites + * that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either + * way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state + * machine. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t signature_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server key exchange" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) + /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange + * is not needed. */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters + * from certificate at this point. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ + + /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use + * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write server key exchange" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing + * signature operation, resume signing. */ + if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming signature operation" ) ); + ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ + { + /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */ + ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len ); + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen + * to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message, + * out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be + * preserved. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange (pending)" ) ); + else + ssl->out_msglen = 0; + return( ret ); + } + + /* If there is a signature, write its length. + * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature + * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + if( signature_len != 0 ) + { + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( signature_len ); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( signature_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "my signature", + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, + signature_len ); + + /* Skip over the already-written signature */ + ssl->out_msglen += signature_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + + /* Add header and send. */ + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello done" ) ); + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello done" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t n; + + /* + * Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P + */ + if( *p + 2 > end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; + *p += 2; + + if( *p + n > end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); + } + + *p += n; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *peer_pms, + size_t *peer_pmslen, + size_t peer_pmssize ) +{ + int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl, + peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *peer_pms, + size_t *peer_pmslen, + size_t peer_pmssize ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ); + mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl )->pk; + size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( public_key ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing + * decryption operation, resume signing. */ + if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming decryption operation" ) ); + return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl, + peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + /* + * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + if ( p + 2 > end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + if( *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ) || + *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } +#endif + + if( p + len != end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + /* + * Decrypt the premaster secret + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL ) + { + ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start( ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ), + p, len ); + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: + /* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */ + break; + case 0: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl, + peer_pms, + peer_pmslen, + peer_pmssize ) ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ); + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no RSA private key" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( private_key, p, len, + peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + return( ret ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t pms_offset ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; + unsigned char ver[2]; + unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; + unsigned char mask; + size_t i, peer_pmslen; + unsigned int diff; + + /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than + * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't + * matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to + * ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0. + * But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This + * also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, + * even if it's an unsigned char). */ + peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0; + peer_pmslen = 0; + + ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, + peer_pms, + &peer_pmslen, + sizeof( peer_pms ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver, + ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, ver ); + + /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid + * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type + * attacks. */ + diff = (unsigned int) ret; + diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48; + diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0]; + diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1]; + + /* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */ + mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( diff ); + + /* + * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding + * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a + * bad_record_mac later in the handshake. + * To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must + * not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was + * successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret, + * regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not. + */ + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal + * anything about the RSA decryption. */ + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( diff != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); +#endif + + if( sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) < pms_offset || + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset < 48 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; + + /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without + * data-dependent branches. */ + for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ ) + pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = 0; + uint16_t n; + + if( ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + /* + * Receive client pre-shared key identity name + */ + if( end - *p < 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; + *p += 2; + + if( n == 0 || n > end - *p ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) + { + if( ssl->conf->f_psk( ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + else + { + /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear, + * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */ + if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ); + } + + *p += n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client key exchange" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) ) + if( ( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) && + ( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) ) + { + /* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous + * operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the + * record. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "will resume decryption of previously-read record" ) ); + } + else +#endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + p, end - p) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation automatically + * and skip the intermediate PMS. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) ); + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if ( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) + { + /* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to + * decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip + * directly to resuming this operation. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "PSK identity already parsed" ) ); + /* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms + * won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */ + p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif + + if( p != end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + p, end - p ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p, end - p ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client key exchange" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t i, sig_len; + unsigned char hash[48]; + unsigned char *hash_start = hash; + size_t hashlen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +#endif + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */ ); + if( 0 != ret ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->state++; + + /* Process the message contents */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* + * struct { + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } DigitallySigned; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + hashlen = 36; + + /* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + { + hash_start += 16; + hashlen -= 16; + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + /* + * Hash + */ + md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ssl->in_msg[i] ); + + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( ssl, ssl->in_msg[i] ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) + if( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg ) + hash_start += 16; +#endif + + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; + + i++; + + /* + * Signature + */ + if( ( pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( ssl->in_msg[i] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + /* + * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg + */ + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + i++; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + sig_len = ( ssl->in_msg[i] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+1]; + i += 2; + + if( i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + /* Calculate hash and verify signature */ + { + size_t dummy_hlen; + ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( peer_pk, + md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, + ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate verify" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tlen; + uint32_t lifetime; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write new session ticket" ) ); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + + /* + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; + * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + * 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified) + * 8 . 9 ticket_len (n) + * 10 . 9+n ticket content + */ + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write( ssl->conf->p_ticket, + ssl->session_negotiate, + ssl->out_msg + 10, + ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + &tlen, &lifetime ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret ); + tlen = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( lifetime, ssl->out_msg, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, ssl->out_msg, 8 ); + ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen; + + /* + * Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and + * ChangeCipherSpec share the same state. + */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write new session ticket" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/* + * SSL handshake -- server side -- single step + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server state: %d", ssl->state ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + switch( ssl->state ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + break; + + /* + * <== ClientHello + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl ); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); +#endif + + /* + * ==> ServerHello + * Certificate + * ( ServerKeyExchange ) + * ( CertificateRequest ) + * ServerHelloDone + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_write_server_hello( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_write_certificate_request( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * <== ( Certificate/Alert ) + * ClientKeyExchange + * ( CertificateVerify ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * ==> ( NewSessionTicket ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) + ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket( ssl ); + else +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) ); + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl ); + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e0126cc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +/* + * TLS server tickets callbacks implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif +} + +#define MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /* 256 bits */ + +#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4 +#define TICKET_IV_BYTES 12 +#define TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES 2 +#define TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES 16 + +#define TICKET_MIN_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES + \ + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) +#define TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES ) + +/* + * Generate/update a key + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_ticket_gen_key( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + unsigned char index ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES]; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key = ctx->keys + index; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + key->generation_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, key->name, sizeof( key->name ) ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* With GCM and CCM, same context can encrypt & decrypt */ + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &key->ctx, buf, + mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( &key->ctx ), + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Rotate/generate keys if necessary + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_ticket_update_keys( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ((void) ctx); +#else + if( ctx->ticket_lifetime != 0 ) + { + uint32_t current_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time( NULL ); + uint32_t key_time = ctx->keys[ctx->active].generation_time; + + if( current_time >= key_time && + current_time - key_time < ctx->ticket_lifetime ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + ctx->active = 1 - ctx->active; + + return( ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, ctx->active ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Setup context for actual use + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, + uint32_t lifetime ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + ctx->f_rng = f_rng; + ctx->p_rng = p_rng; + + ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM && + cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( cipher_info->key_bitlen > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, + cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + /* We don't yet expect to support all ciphers through PSA, + * so allow fallback to ordinary mbedtls_cipher_setup(). */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, + cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 0 ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Create session ticket, with the following structure: + * + * struct { + * opaque key_name[4]; + * opaque iv[12]; + * opaque encrypted_state<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque tag[16]; + * } ticket; + * + * The key_name, iv, and length of encrypted_state are the additional + * authenticated data. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *tlen, + uint32_t *ticket_lifetime ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; + unsigned char *key_name = start; + unsigned char *iv = start + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; + size_t clear_len, ciph_len; + + *tlen = 0; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* We need at least 4 bytes for key_name, 12 for IV, 2 for len 16 for tag, + * in addition to session itself, that will be checked when writing it. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( start, end, TICKET_MIN_LEN ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_update_keys( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + key = &ctx->keys[ctx->active]; + + *ticket_lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; + + memcpy( key_name, key->name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES ); + + if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Dump session state */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( session, + state, end - state, + &clear_len ) ) != 0 || + (unsigned long) clear_len > 65535 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( clear_len, state_len_bytes, 0 ); + + /* Encrypt and authenticate */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &key->ctx, + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + state, clear_len, + state, end - state, &ciph_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + if( ciph_len != clear_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + *tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len - TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES; + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Select key based on name + */ +static mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *ssl_ticket_select_key( + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + const unsigned char name[4] ) +{ + unsigned char i; + + for( i = 0; i < sizeof( ctx->keys ) / sizeof( *ctx->keys ); i++ ) + if( memcmp( name, ctx->keys[i].name, 4 ) == 0 ) + return( &ctx->keys[i] ); + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Load session ticket (see mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write for structure) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; + unsigned char *key_name = buf; + unsigned char *iv = buf + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; + size_t enc_len, clear_len; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( len < TICKET_MIN_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_update_keys( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1]; + + if( len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Select key */ + if( ( key = ssl_ticket_select_key( ctx, key_name ) ) == NULL ) + { + /* We can't know for sure but this is a likely option unless we're + * under attack - this is only informative anyway */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Decrypt and authenticate */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &key->ctx, + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + ticket, enc_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + ticket, enc_len, &clear_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + + goto cleanup; + } + if( clear_len != enc_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Actually load session */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load( session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + { + /* Check for expiration */ + mbedtls_time_t current_time = mbedtls_time( NULL ); + + if( current_time < session->start || + (uint32_t)( current_time - session->start ) > ctx->ticket_lifetime ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; + goto cleanup; + } + } +#endif + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->keys[0].ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->keys[1].ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7badec51 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -0,0 +1,7742 @@ +/* + * SSLv3/TLSv1 shared functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, + * and became an IETF standard in 1999. + * + * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +/* Top-level Connection ID API */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + size_t len, + int ignore_other_cid ) +{ + if( len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL && + ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->ignore_unexpected_cid = ignore_other_cid; + conf->cid_len = len; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int enable, + unsigned char const *own_cid, + size_t own_cid_len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->negotiate_cid = enable; + if( enable == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Disable use of CID extension." ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Enable use of CID extension." ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Own CID", own_cid, own_cid_len ); + + if( own_cid_len != ssl->conf->cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "CID length %u does not match CID length %u in config", + (unsigned) own_cid_len, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->cid_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->own_cid, own_cid, own_cid_len ); + /* Truncation is not an issue here because + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX at most 255. */ + ssl->own_cid_len = (uint8_t) own_cid_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ], + size_t *peer_cid_len ) +{ + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; + + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* We report MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED in case the CID extensions + * were used, but client and server requested the empty CID. + * This is indistinguishable from not using the CID extension + * in the first place. */ + if( ssl->transform_in->in_cid_len == 0 && + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( peer_cid_len != NULL ) + { + *peer_cid_len = ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len; + if( peer_cid != NULL ) + { + memcpy( peer_cid, ssl->transform_in->out_cid, + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len ); + } + } + + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/* + * Convert max_fragment_length codes to length. + * RFC 6066 says: + * enum{ + * 2^9(1), 2^10(2), 2^11(3), 2^12(4), (255) + * } MaxFragmentLength; + * and we add 0 -> extension unused + */ +static unsigned int ssl_mfl_code_to_length( int mfl ) +{ + switch( mfl ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE: + return ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512: + return 512; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024: + return 1024; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048: + return 2048; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096: + return 4096; + default: + return ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( dst ); + memcpy( dst, src, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + dst->ticket = NULL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( src->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + dst->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ); + if( dst->peer_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( dst->peer_cert ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( dst->peer_cert, src->peer_cert->raw.p, + src->peer_cert->raw.len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( dst->peer_cert ); + dst->peer_cert = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( src->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + dst->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->peer_cert_digest_len ); + if( dst->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( dst->peer_cert_digest, src->peer_cert_digest, + src->peer_cert_digest_len ); + dst->peer_cert_digest_type = src->peer_cert_digest_type; + dst->peer_cert_digest_len = src->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( src->ticket != NULL ) + { + dst->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->ticket_len ); + if( dst->ticket == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( dst->ticket, src->ticket, src->ticket_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int resize_buffer( unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old ) +{ + unsigned char* resized_buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len_new ); + if( resized_buffer == NULL ) + return -1; + + /* We want to copy len_new bytes when downsizing the buffer, and + * len_old bytes when upsizing, so we choose the smaller of two sizes, + * to fit one buffer into another. Size checks, ensuring that no data is + * lost, are done outside of this function. */ + memcpy( resized_buffer, *buffer, + ( len_new < *len_old ) ? len_new : *len_old ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buffer, *len_old ); + mbedtls_free( *buffer ); + + *buffer = resized_buffer; + *len_old = len_new; + + return 0; +} + +static void handle_buffer_resizing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing, + size_t in_buf_new_len, + size_t out_buf_new_len ) +{ + int modified = 0; + size_t written_in = 0, iv_offset_in = 0, len_offset_in = 0; + size_t written_out = 0, iv_offset_out = 0, len_offset_out = 0; + if( ssl->in_buf != NULL ) + { + written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; + iv_offset_in = ssl->in_iv - ssl->in_buf; + len_offset_in = ssl->in_len - ssl->in_buf; + if( downsizing ? + ssl->in_buf_len > in_buf_new_len && ssl->in_left < in_buf_new_len : + ssl->in_buf_len < in_buf_new_len ) + { + if( resize_buffer( &ssl->in_buf, in_buf_new_len, &ssl->in_buf_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "input buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating in_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + in_buf_new_len ) ); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + + if( ssl->out_buf != NULL ) + { + written_out = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; + iv_offset_out = ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf; + len_offset_out = ssl->out_len - ssl->out_buf; + if( downsizing ? + ssl->out_buf_len > out_buf_new_len && ssl->out_left < out_buf_new_len : + ssl->out_buf_len < out_buf_new_len ) + { + if( resize_buffer( &ssl->out_buf, out_buf_new_len, &ssl->out_buf_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "output buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating out_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + out_buf_new_len ) ); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + if( modified ) + { + /* Update pointers here to avoid doing it twice. */ + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + /* Fields below might not be properly updated with record + * splitting or with CID, so they are manually updated here. */ + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + written_out; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_buf + len_offset_out; + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_buf + iv_offset_out; + + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_buf + written_in; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_buf + len_offset_in; + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_buf + iv_offset_in; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ + +/* + * Key material generation + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl3_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + unsigned char padding[16]; + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + ((void)label); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + /* + * SSLv3: + * block = + * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'A' + secret + random ) ) + + * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'BB' + secret + random ) ) + + * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'CCC' + secret + random ) ) + + * ... + */ + for( i = 0; i < dlen / 16; i++ ) + { + memset( padding, (unsigned char) ('A' + i), 1 + i ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &sha1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, padding, 1 + i ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, secret, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, random, rlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, sha1sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, secret, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, sha1sum, 20 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, dstbuf + i * 16 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padding, sizeof( padding ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sha1sum, sizeof( sha1sum ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + size_t nb, hs; + size_t i, j, k; + const unsigned char *S1, *S2; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; + unsigned char h_i[20]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + + tmp_len = 20 + strlen( label ) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, tmp_len ); + if( tmp == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + hs = ( slen + 1 ) / 2; + S1 = secret; + S2 = secret + slen - hs; + + nb = strlen( label ); + memcpy( tmp + 20, label, nb ); + memcpy( tmp + 20 + nb, random, rlen ); + nb += rlen; + + /* + * First compute P_md5(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] + */ + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S1, hs ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += 16 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16 + nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + k = ( i + 16 > dlen ) ? dlen % 16 : 16; + + for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) + dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; + } + + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + /* + * XOR out with P_sha1(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] + */ + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S2, hs ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += 20 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, 20 + nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, 20 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + k = ( i + 20 > dlen ) ? dlen % 20 : 20; + + for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) + dstbuf[i + j] = (unsigned char)( dstbuf[i + j] ^ h_i[j] ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, tmp_len ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) ); + + mbedtls_free( tmp ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation( psa_key_derivation_operation_t* derivation, + psa_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const unsigned char* seed, size_t seed_length, + const unsigned char* label, size_t label_length, + size_t capacity ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup( derivation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + seed, seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + NULL, 0 ); + } + else + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key ); + } + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, + label, label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( derivation, capacity ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t master_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to + * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But + * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS, + * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret". + * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0, + * keep master_key=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands + * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */ + if( slen != 0 ) + { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + + status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation, + master_key, alg, + random, rlen, + (unsigned char const *) label, + (size_t) strlen( label ), + dlen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation, dstbuf, dlen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( master_key ) ) + status = psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + size_t nb; + size_t i, j, k, md_len; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; + unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + tmp_len = md_len + strlen( label ) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, tmp_len ); + if( tmp == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + nb = strlen( label ); + memcpy( tmp + md_len, label, nb ); + memcpy( tmp + md_len + nb, random, rlen ); + nb += rlen; + + /* + * Compute P_(secret, label + random)[0..dlen] + */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, secret, slen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += md_len ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, md_len + nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, md_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + k = ( i + md_len > dlen ) ? dlen % md_len : md_len; + + for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) + dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, tmp_len ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) ); + + mbedtls_free( tmp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha256( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + return( tls_prf_generic( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha384( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + return( tls_prf_generic( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char*, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char*, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char *, int ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char*, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) + { + /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, + * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type( mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( tls_prf == ssl3_prf ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3 ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( tls_prf == tls1_prf ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1 ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384 ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 ); + } + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL; + + switch( prf ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3: + tls_prf = ssl3_prf; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1: + tls_prf = tls1_prf; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( tls_prf( secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} + +/* Type for the TLS PRF */ +typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, + unsigned char *, size_t); + +/* + * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other + * necessary information. + * + * Parameters: + * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate + * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() + * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf() + * - [in] ciphersuite + * - [in] master + * - [in] encrypt_then_mac + * - [in] trunc_hmac + * - [in] compression + * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation + * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random + * - [in] minor_ver: SSL/TLS minor version + * - [in] endpoint: client or server + * - [in] ssl: optionally used for: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL: whole context (non-const) + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS: ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys + * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + int trunc_hmac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + int compression, +#endif + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + int minor_ver, + unsigned endpoint, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + const +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + int psa_fallthrough; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char keyblk[256]; + unsigned char *key1; + unsigned char *key2; + unsigned char *mac_enc; + unsigned char *mac_dec; + size_t mac_key_len = 0; + size_t iv_copy_len; + unsigned keylen; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + /* + * Some data just needs copying into the structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + transform->minor_ver = minor_ver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + memcpy( transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof( transform->randbytes ) ); +#endif + + /* + * Get various info structures + */ + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite ); + if( ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->cipher ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->mac ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "mbedtls_md info for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID + * extension has been negotiated. */ + if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" ) ); + + transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid, + transform->in_cid_len ); + + transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len; + memcpy( transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid, + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid, + transform->out_cid_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Compute key block using the PRF + */ + ret = tls_prf( master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite = %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ciphersuite ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "master secret", master, 48 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "key block", keyblk, 256 ); + + /* + * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. + */ + + keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + size_t explicit_ivlen; + + transform->maclen = 0; + mac_key_len = 0; + transform->taglen = + ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; + + /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs, but the length of the static parts vary + * with mode and version: + * - For GCM and CCM in TLS 1.2, there's a static IV of 4 Bytes + * (to be concatenated with a dynamically chosen IV of 8 Bytes) + * - For ChaChaPoly in TLS 1.2, and all modes in TLS 1.3, there's + * a static IV of 12 Bytes (to be XOR'ed with the 8 Byte record + * sequence number). + */ + transform->ivlen = 12; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + { + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + else + transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; + } + + /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ + explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; + transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); + goto end; + } + + /* Get MAC length */ + mac_key_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + transform->maclen = mac_key_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + /* + * If HMAC is to be truncated, we shall keep the leftmost bytes, + * (rfc 6066 page 13 or rfc 2104 section 4), + * so we only need to adjust the length here. + */ + if( trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) + { + transform->maclen = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) + /* Fall back to old, non-compliant version of the truncated + * HMAC implementation which also truncates the key + * (Mbed TLS versions from 1.3 to 2.6.0) */ + mac_key_len = transform->maclen; +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + + /* IV length */ + transform->ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size; + + /* Minimum length */ + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + transform->minlen = transform->maclen; + else + { + /* + * GenericBlockCipher: + * 1. if EtM is in use: one block plus MAC + * otherwise: * first multiple of blocklen greater than maclen + * 2. IV except for SSL3 and TLS 1.0 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) + { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + cipher_info->block_size; + } + else +#endif + { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + cipher_info->block_size + - transform->maclen % cipher_info->block_size; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || + minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + ; /* No need to adjust minlen */ + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || + minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u", + (unsigned) keylen, + (unsigned) transform->minlen, + (unsigned) transform->ivlen, + (unsigned) transform->maclen ) ); + + /* + * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + + mac_enc = keyblk; + mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; + + /* + * This is not used in TLS v1.1. + */ + iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len ); + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + + mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; + mac_dec = keyblk; + + /* + * This is not used in TLS v1.1. + */ + iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len ); + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + if( mac_key_len > sizeof( transform->mac_enc ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + + memcpy( transform->mac_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len ); + memcpy( transform->mac_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. + For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ + if( mac_key_len != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + mac_enc, mac_key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto end; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + mac_dec, mac_key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto end; + } + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init != NULL ) + { + ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init()" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init( ssl, key1, key2, keylen, + transform->iv_enc, transform->iv_dec, + iv_copy_len, + mac_enc, mac_dec, + mac_key_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init", ret ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + goto end; + } + } +#else + ((void) mac_dec); + ((void) mac_enc); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + if( ssl->conf->f_export_keys != NULL ) + { + ssl->conf->f_export_keys( ssl->conf->p_export_keys, + master, keyblk, + mac_key_len, keylen, + iv_copy_len ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext != NULL ) + { + ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext( ssl->conf->p_export_keys, + master, keyblk, + mac_key_len, keylen, + iv_copy_len, + randbytes + 32, + randbytes, + tls_prf_get_type( tls_prf ) ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + + /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. + * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where + * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates + * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based + * implementation currently doesn't. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info, transform->taglen ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup." ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 1; + } + } + else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + if( psa_fallthrough == 1 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. + * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where + * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates + * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based + * implementation currently doesn't. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info, transform->taglen ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup." ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 1; + } + } + else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + if( psa_fallthrough == 1 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, + cipher_info->key_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, + cipher_info->key_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); + goto end; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + + /* Initialize Zlib contexts */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Initializing zlib states" ) ); + + memset( &transform->ctx_deflate, 0, sizeof( transform->ctx_deflate ) ); + memset( &transform->ctx_inflate, 0, sizeof( transform->ctx_inflate ) ); + + if( deflateInit( &transform->ctx_deflate, + Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION ) != Z_OK || + inflateInit( &transform->ctx_inflate ) != Z_OK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to initialize compression" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED; + goto end; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +end: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( keyblk, sizeof( keyblk ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS 1.0/1.1 / TLS1.2 functions + * + * Inputs: + * - SSL/TLS minor version + * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2) + * + * Outputs: + * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + int minor_ver, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) ) + (void) hash; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = ssl3_prf; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_ssl; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_ssl; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls1_prf; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; + } + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compute master secret if needed + * + * Parameters: + * [in/out] handshake + * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf + * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque + * [out] premaster (cleared) + * [out] master + * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK + * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg + * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + (SSL3) session_negotiate) + * PSA-PSA: minor_ver, conf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_compute_master( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + unsigned char *master, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1: + * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */ + size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + unsigned char session_hash[48]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + + /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion. + * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret" + * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension + * is used. */ + char const *lbl = "master secret"; + + /* The salt for the KDF used for key expansion. + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used, + * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random + * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246). + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used, + * this is the transcript of the handshake so far. + * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */ + unsigned char const *salt = handshake->randbytes; + size_t salt_len = 64; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + if( handshake->resume != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if( handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED ) + { + lbl = "extended master secret"; + salt = session_hash; + handshake->calc_verify( ssl, session_hash, &salt_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash for extended master secret", + session_hash, salt_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t psk; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion" ) ); + + psk = mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( ssl ); + + if( hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation, psk, alg, + salt, salt_len, + (unsigned char const *) lbl, + (size_t) strlen( lbl ), + master_secret_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation, + master, + master_secret_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + else +#endif + { + ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, + lbl, salt, salt_len, + master, + master_secret_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret", + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster, + sizeof(handshake->premaster) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> derive keys" ) ); + + /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */ + ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs( ssl->handshake, + ssl->minor_ver, + ciphersuite_info->mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Compute master secret if needed */ + ret = ssl_compute_master( ssl->handshake, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compute_master", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Swap the client and server random values: + * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1) + * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */ + { + unsigned char tmp[64]; + memcpy( tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + } + + /* Populate transform structure */ + ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform_negotiate, + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + ssl->session_negotiate->compression, +#endif + ssl->handshake->tls_prf, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, + ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_populate_transform", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof( ssl->handshake->randbytes ) ); + + /* Allocate compression buffer */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE && + ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Allocating compression buffer" ) ); + ssl->compress_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ); + if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= derive keys" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + unsigned char pad_1[48]; + unsigned char pad_2[48]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify ssl" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); + + memset( pad_1, 0x36, 48 ); + memset( pad_2, 0x5C, 48 ); + + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, pad_1, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); + + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, pad_2, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, hash, 16 ); + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); + + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, pad_1, 40 ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); + + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &sha1 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, pad_2, 40 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, hash + 16, 20 ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); + + *hlen = 36; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify tls" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); + + *hlen = 36; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha256" ) ); + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, hash, 32, &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + + *hlen = 32; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify sha256" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 ); + mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, hash ); + + *hlen = 32; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha384" ) ); + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, hash, 48, &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + + *hlen = 48; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; + + mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify sha384" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 ); + mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &sha512, hash ); + + *hlen = 48; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ) +{ + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *end = p + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ); + const unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( ssl, &psk, &psk_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ) + { + /* + * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always + * checked before calling this function + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * PMS = struct { + * opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; + * }; + * with "other_secret" depending on the particular key exchange + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) + { + if( end - p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( p, 0, psk_len ); + p += psk_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + { + /* + * other_secret already set by the ClientKeyExchange message, + * and is 48 bytes long + */ + if( end - p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 48; + p += 48; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p + 2, end - ( p + 2 ), &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t zlen; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, + p + 2, end - ( p + 2 ), + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( zlen, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + zlen; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */ + if( end - p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( p, psk, psk_len ); + p += psk_len; + + ssl->handshake->pmslen = p - ssl->handshake->premaster; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max + * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ + if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records < 0 ) + { + uint32_t ratio = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max / ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min + 1; + unsigned char doublings = 1; + + while( ratio != 0 ) + { + ++doublings; + ratio >>= 1; + } + + if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > doublings ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "no longer retransmitting hello request" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + + return( ssl_write_hello_request( ssl ) ); +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_clear_peer_cert( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + /* Zeroization is not necessary. */ + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert_digest ); + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; + session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Handshake functions + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t i, n; + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + if( ssl->client_auth == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + /* + * If using SSLv3 and got no cert, send an Alert message + * (otherwise an empty Certificate message will be sent). + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + ssl->out_msglen = 2; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING; + ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got no certificate to send" ) ); + goto write_msg; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no certificate to send" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED ); + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "own certificate", mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) ); + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 6 length of all certs + * 7 . 9 length of cert. 1 + * 10 . n-1 peer certificate + * n . n+2 length of cert. 2 + * n+3 . ... upper level cert, etc. + */ + i = 7; + crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ); + + while( crt != NULL ) + { + n = crt->raw.len; + if( n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE ); + } + + ssl->out_msg[i ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); + ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); + ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); + + i += 3; memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n ); + i += n; crt = crt->next; + } + + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( i - 7 ); + ssl->out_msg[5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( i - 7 ); + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( i - 7 ); + + ssl->out_msglen = i; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +write_msg: +#endif + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert; + + if( peer_crt == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len ) + return( -1 ); + + return( memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len ) ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest; + mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( peer_cert_digest_type ); + unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN]; + size_t digest_len; + + if( peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( digest_info ); + if( digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN ) + return( -1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md( digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( memcmp( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/* + * Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and + * perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + int crt_cnt=0; +#endif + size_t i, n; + uint8_t alert; + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE || + ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + 3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + + /* + * Same message structure as in mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate() + */ + n = ( ssl->in_msg[i+1] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+2]; + + if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 || + ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */ + i += 3; + + /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */ + while( i < ssl->in_hslen ) + { + /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */ + if ( i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */ + if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */ + n = ( (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8 ) + | (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2]; + i += 3; + + if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( crt_cnt++ == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's + * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake, + * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse + * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation" ) ); + if( ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( ssl, + &ssl->in_msg[i], + n ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n ); +#else + /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse + * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + switch( ret ) + { + case 0: /*ok*/ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + default: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + crt_parse_der_failed: + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + i += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", chain ); + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + /* + * Check if the client sent an empty certificate + */ + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* Check if a certificate message is expected. + * Return either + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP + * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not. + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + } + } +#else + ((void) authmode); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int have_ca_chain = 0; + + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; + + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ssl->f_vrfy != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use context-specific verification callback" ) ); + f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use configuration-specific verification callback" ) ); + f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy; + } + + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL ) + { + ((void) rs_ctx); + have_ca_chain = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" ) ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( + chain, + ssl->conf->f_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->p_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) + { + ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; + } + else +#endif + { + ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; + } + + if( ca_chain != NULL ) + have_ca_chain = 1; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( + chain, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ); + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ); +#endif + + /* + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + { + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk; + + /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK. + * This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good + * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use here. */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) && + mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( chain, + ciphersuite_info, + ! ssl->conf->endpoint, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + } + + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) ) + { + ret = 0; + } + + if( have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + uint8_t alert; + + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; + else + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + alert ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ); + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE ), + start, len, + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; + + return( ret ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned char *end = start + len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */ + mbedtls_pk_init( &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey ); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &start, end, + &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* We should have parsed the public key before. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + int crt_expected; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET + ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode + : ssl->conf->authmode; +#else + const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; +#endif + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); + + crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( ssl, authmode ); + if( crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify ) + { + chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL; + goto crt_verify; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We + let it decide whether to alert. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( ssl ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; + + if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to + * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + chain = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + if( chain == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( chain ); + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl, chain ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; + +crt_verify: + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; +#endif + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl, authmode, + chain, rs_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + { + unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start; + size_t crt_len, pk_len; + + /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so + * these pointers point into the input buffer, + * and are hence still valid after freeing the + * CRT chain. */ + + crt_start = chain->raw.p; + crt_len = chain->raw.len; + + pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p; + pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len; + + /* Free the CRT structures before computing + * digest and copying the peer's public key. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain ); + mbedtls_free( chain ); + chain = NULL; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( ssl, crt_start, crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( ssl, pk_start, pk_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Pass ownership to session structure. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) ); + +exit: + + if( ret == 0 ) + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; + } +#endif + + if( chain != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain ); + mbedtls_free( chain ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ) +{ + ((void) ciphersuite_info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1; + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( ciphersuite_info->mac != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha256; + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return; + } +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa ); + psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa ); + psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} + +static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 , buf, len ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 , buf, len ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); +#endif +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); +#endif +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + const char *sender; + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + + unsigned char padbuf[48]; + unsigned char md5sum[16]; + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished ssl" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); + + /* + * SSLv3: + * hash = + * MD5( master + pad2 + + * MD5( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) + * + SHA1( master + pad2 + + * SHA1( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) + md5.state, sizeof( md5.state ) ); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) + sha1.state, sizeof( sha1.state ) ); +#endif + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ? "CLNT" + : "SRVR"; + + memset( padbuf, 0x36, 48 ); + + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, session->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, padbuf, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, md5sum ); + + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, session->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, padbuf, 40 ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, sha1sum ); + + memset( padbuf, 0x5C, 48 ); + + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, session->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, padbuf, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, md5sum, 16 ); + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, buf ); + + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &sha1 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, session->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, padbuf , 40 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, sha1sum, 20 ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, buf + 16 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, 36 ); + + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( md5sum, sizeof( md5sum ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sha1sum, sizeof( sha1sum ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + int len = 12; + const char *sender; + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + unsigned char padbuf[36]; + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); + + /* + * TLSv1: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * MD5( handshake ) + SHA1( handshake ) )[0..11] + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) + md5.state, sizeof( md5.state ) ); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) + sha1.state, sizeof( sha1.state ) ); +#endif + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, padbuf ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, padbuf + 16 ); + + ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, 36, buf, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); + + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + int len = 12; + const char *sender; + unsigned char padbuf[32]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha256" ) ); + + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32 ); +#else + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha256" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 ); + + /* + * TLSv1.2: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha2 state", (unsigned char *) + sha256.state, sizeof( sha256.state ) ); +#endif + + mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, padbuf ); + mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, 32, buf, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + int len = 12; + const char *sender; + unsigned char padbuf[48]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha384" ) ); + + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha384" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 ); + + /* + * TLSv1.2: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha512 state", (unsigned char *) + sha512.state, sizeof( sha512.state ) ); +#endif + /* mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret's output parameter is declared as a + * 64-byte buffer, but sice we're using SHA-384, we know that the + * output fits in 48 bytes. This is correct C, but GCC 11.1 warns + * about it. + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 11 +#pragma GCC diagnostic push +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow" +#endif + mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &sha512, padbuf ); +#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 11 +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif + + mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); +#endif + + ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, 48, buf, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup: final free" ) ); + + /* + * Free our handshake params + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + + /* + * Free the previous transform and switch in the current one + */ + if( ssl->transform ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); + } + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup: final free" ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int resume = ssl->handshake->resume; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + } +#endif + + /* + * Free the previous session and switch in the current one + */ + if( ssl->session ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + /* RFC 7366 3.1: keep the EtM state */ + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); + } + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + /* + * Add cache entry + */ + if( ssl->conf->f_set_cache != NULL && + ssl->session->id_len != 0 && + resume == 0 ) + { + if( ssl->conf->f_set_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cache did not store session" ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->flight != NULL ) + { + /* Cancel handshake timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: + * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip freeing handshake and transform" ) ); + } + else +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup" ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret, hash_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write finished" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate ); + + ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint ); + + /* + * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites + * may define some other value. Currently (early 2016), no defined + * ciphersuite does this (and this is unlikely to change as activity has + * moved to TLS 1.3 now) so we can keep the hardcoded 12 here. + */ + hash_len = ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) ? 36 : 12; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy( ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->out_msg + 4, hash_len ); +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen = 4 + hash_len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED; + + /* + * In case of session resuming, invert the client and server + * ChangeCipherSpec messages order. + */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; +#endif + } + else + ssl->state++; + + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for outbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for outbound data" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + unsigned char i; + + /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */ + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + + /* Set sequence_number to zero */ + memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, 0, 6 ); + + /* Increment epoch */ + for( i = 2; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, 8 ); + + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write finished" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 36 +#else +#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 12 +#endif + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int hash_len; + unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse finished" ) ); + + /* There is currently no ciphersuite using another length with TLS 1.2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + hash_len = 36; + else +#endif + hash_len = 12; + + ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto exit; + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + hash_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED; + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), + buf, hash_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy( ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len ); +#endif + + if( ssl->handshake->resume != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; +#endif + } + else + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse finished" ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, hash_len ); + return( ret ); +} + +static void ssl_handshake_params_init( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake ) +{ + memset( handshake, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_init( &handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_init( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); + mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_init( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); + mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( &handshake->hash_algs ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_init( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( &handshake->ecrs_ctx ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_init( &handshake->peer_pubkey ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ + memset( transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + memset( session, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handshake_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Clear old handshake information if present */ + if( ssl->transform_negotiate ) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + if( ssl->session_negotiate ) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + if( ssl->handshake ) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + + /* + * Either the pointers are now NULL or cleared properly and can be freed. + * Now allocate missing structures. + */ + if( ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL ) + { + ssl->transform_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) ); + } + + if( ssl->session_negotiate == NULL ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params) ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */ + + handle_buffer_resizing( ssl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); +#endif + + /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ + if( ssl->handshake == NULL || + ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed" ) ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + ssl->handshake = NULL; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + /* Initialize structures */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( ssl->session_negotiate ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + ssl_handshake_params_init( ssl->handshake ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* Dummy cookie callbacks for defaults */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_write_dummy( void *ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) p); + ((void) end); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) cookie); + ((void) cookie_len); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * Initialize an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + memset( ssl, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Setup an SSL context + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; + + ssl->conf = conf; + + /* + * Prepare base structures + */ + + /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, in_buf_len ); + if( ssl->in_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, out_buf_len ); + if( ssl->out_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + memset( &ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info) ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + goto error; + + return( 0 ); + +error: + mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf ); + + ssl->conf = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = 0; + ssl->out_buf_len = 0; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + + ssl->in_hdr = NULL; + ssl->in_ctr = NULL; + ssl->in_len = NULL; + ssl->in_iv = NULL; + ssl->in_msg = NULL; + + ssl->out_hdr = NULL; + ssl->out_ctr = NULL; + ssl->out_len = NULL; + ssl->out_iv = NULL; + ssl->out_msg = NULL; + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + * + * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. + * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + ((void) partial); +#endif + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + + /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + + ssl->verify_data_len = 0; + memset( ssl->own_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN ); + memset( ssl->peer_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN ); +#endif + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; + + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + + ssl->in_msgtype = 0; + ssl->in_msglen = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_epoch = 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); +#endif + + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + + ssl->out_msgtype = 0; + ssl->out_msglen = 0; + ssl->out_left = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + if( ssl->split_done != MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED ) + ssl->split_done = 0; +#endif + + memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) ); + + ssl->transform_in = NULL; + ssl->transform_out = NULL; + + ssl->session_in = NULL; + ssl->session_out = NULL; + + memset( ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( partial == 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + ssl->in_left = 0; + memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset()" ) ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + if( ssl->transform ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); + ssl->transform = NULL; + } + + if( ssl->session ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); + ssl->session = NULL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ssl->alpn_chosen = NULL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + if( partial == 0 ) +#endif + { + mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); + ssl->cli_id = NULL; + ssl->cli_id_len = 0; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); +} + +/* + * SSL set accessors + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint ) +{ + conf->endpoint = endpoint; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport ) +{ + conf->transport = transport; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode ) +{ + conf->anti_replay = mode; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit ) +{ + conf->badmac_limit = limit; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned allow_packing ) +{ + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = !allow_packing; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint32_t min, uint32_t max ) +{ + conf->hs_timeout_min = min; + conf->hs_timeout_max = max; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode ) +{ + conf->authmode = authmode; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + conf->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + conf->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + conf->f_rng = f_rng; + conf->p_rng = p_rng; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), + void *p_dbg ) +{ + conf->f_dbg = f_dbg; + conf->p_dbg = p_dbg; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_bio, + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout ) +{ + ssl->p_bio = p_bio; + ssl->f_send = f_send; + ssl->f_recv = f_recv; + ssl->f_recv_timeout = f_recv_timeout; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu ) +{ + ssl->mtu = mtu; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout ) +{ + conf->read_timeout = timeout; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer ) +{ + ssl->p_timer = p_timer; + ssl->f_set_timer = f_set_timer; + ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; + + /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p_cache, + int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), + int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *) ) +{ + conf->p_cache = p_cache; + conf->f_get_cache = f_get_cache; + conf->f_set_cache = f_set_cache; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || + session == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate, + session ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites ) +{ + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = ciphersuites; + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = ciphersuites; + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = ciphersuites; + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = ciphersuites; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites, + int major, int minor ) +{ + if( major != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + return; + + if( minor < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || minor > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + return; + + conf->ciphersuite_list[minor] = ciphersuites; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ) +{ + conf->cert_profile = profile; +} + +/* Append a new keycert entry to a (possibly empty) list */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_append_key_cert( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert **head, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *new_cert; + + new_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert ) ); + if( new_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + new_cert->cert = cert; + new_cert->key = key; + new_cert->next = NULL; + + /* Update head is the list was null, else add to the end */ + if( *head == NULL ) + { + *head = new_cert; + } + else + { + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = *head; + while( cur->next != NULL ) + cur = cur->next; + cur->next = new_cert; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ) +{ + return( ssl_append_key_cert( &conf->key_cert, own_cert, pk_key ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ) +{ + conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; + conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->f_ca_cb = NULL; + conf->p_ca_cb = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb ) +{ + conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb; + conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb; + + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->ca_chain = NULL; + conf->ca_crl = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ) +{ + return( ssl_append_key_cert( &ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert, + own_cert, pk_key ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain = ca_chain; + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode ) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_authmode = authmode; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +/* + * Set EC J-PAKE password for current handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len ) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; + + if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + else + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + + return( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + pw, pw_len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + +static void ssl_conf_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + { + /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + /* This and the following branch should never + * be taken simultaenously as we maintain the + * invariant that raw and opaque PSKs are never + * configured simultaneously. As a safeguard, + * though, `else` is omitted here. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( conf->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); + + mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } + + /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */ + if( conf->psk_identity != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +} + +/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset. + * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts + * to make a copy of it in the SSL config. + * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned char const *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ + if( psk_identity == NULL || + ( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 || + psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len ); + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; + memcpy( conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remove opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity */ + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + /* Check and set raw PSK */ + if( psk == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( psk_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + conf->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len ); + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static void ssl_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + { + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk, + ssl->handshake->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk ); + ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; + } +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ) +{ + if( psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_remove_psk( ssl ); + + if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ssl->handshake->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->psk, psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + psa_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Clear opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity, if present. */ + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + /* Check and set opaque PSK */ + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( psk ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + conf->psk_opaque = psk; + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, + psk_identity_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_key_id_t psk ) +{ + if( ( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( psk ) ) || + ( ssl->handshake == NULL ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_remove_psk( ssl ); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_psk ) +{ + conf->f_psk = f_psk; + conf->p_psk = p_psk; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, + const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_P, &dhm_ctx->P ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_G, &dhm_ctx->G ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/* + * Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned int bitlen ) +{ + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = bitlen; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes ) +{ + conf->sig_hashes = hashes; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Set the allowed elliptic curves + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list ) +{ + conf->curve_list = curve_list; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname ) +{ + /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ + size_t hostname_len = 0; + + /* Check if new hostname is valid before + * making any change to current one */ + if( hostname != NULL ) + { + hostname_len = strlen( hostname ); + + if( hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, + * so we can free it safely */ + + if( ssl->hostname != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->hostname, strlen( ssl->hostname ) ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->hostname ); + } + + /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ + + if( hostname == NULL ) + { + ssl->hostname = NULL; + } + else + { + ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc( 1, hostname_len + 1 ); + if( ssl->hostname == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len ); + + ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0'; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, + const unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_sni ) +{ + conf->f_sni = f_sni; + conf->p_sni = p_sni; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos ) +{ + size_t cur_len, tot_len; + const char **p; + + /* + * RFC 7301 3.1: "Empty strings MUST NOT be included and byte strings + * MUST NOT be truncated." + * We check lengths now rather than later. + */ + tot_len = 0; + for( p = protos; *p != NULL; p++ ) + { + cur_len = strlen( *p ); + tot_len += cur_len; + + if( ( cur_len == 0 ) || + ( cur_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN ) || + ( tot_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->alpn_list = protos; + + return( 0 ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( ssl->alpn_chosen ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value ) +{ + conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support = support_mki_value; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len ) +{ + if( mki_len > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_value, mki_len ); + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *p; + size_t list_size = 0; + + /* check the profiles list: all entry must be valid, + * its size cannot be more than the total number of supported profiles, currently 4 */ + for( p = profiles; *p != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET && + list_size <= MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH; + p++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( *p ) != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + list_size++; + } + else + { + /* unsupported value, stop parsing and set the size to an error value */ + list_size = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + 1; + } + } + + if( list_size > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH ) + { + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = NULL; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = 0; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = profiles; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = list_size; + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info ) +{ + dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + /* do not copy the mki value if there is no chosen profile */ + if( dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = 0; + } + else + { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + memcpy( dtls_srtp_info->mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ) +{ + conf->max_major_ver = major; + conf->max_minor_ver = minor; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ) +{ + conf->min_major_ver = major; + conf->min_minor_ver = minor; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback ) +{ + conf->fallback = fallback; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list ) +{ + conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm ) +{ + conf->encrypt_then_mac = etm; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems ) +{ + conf->extended_ms = ems; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4 ) +{ + conf->arc4_disabled = arc4; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code ) +{ + if( mfl_code >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID || + ssl_mfl_code_to_length( mfl_code ) > MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->mfl_code = mfl_code; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate ) +{ + conf->trunc_hmac = truncate; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split ) +{ + conf->cbc_record_splitting = split; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy ) +{ + conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation ) +{ + conf->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records ) +{ + conf->renego_max_records = max_records; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char period[8] ) +{ + memcpy( conf->renego_period, period, 8 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets ) +{ + conf->session_tickets = use_tickets; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, + void *p_ticket ) +{ + conf->f_ticket_write = f_ticket_write; + conf->f_ticket_parse = f_ticket_parse; + conf->p_ticket = p_ticket; +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys ) +{ + conf->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; + conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, + void *p_export_keys ) +{ + conf->f_export_keys_ext = f_export_keys_ext; + conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, + void *async_config_data ) +{ + conf->f_async_sign_start = f_async_sign; + conf->f_async_decrypt_start = f_async_decrypt; + conf->f_async_resume = f_async_resume; + conf->f_async_cancel = f_async_cancel; + conf->p_async_config_data = async_config_data; +} + +void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + return( conf->p_async_config_data ); +} + +void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + else + return( ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *ctx ) +{ + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx = ctx; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->session != NULL ) + return( ssl->session->verify_result ); + + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL ) + return( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ); + + return( 0xFFFFFFFF ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session->ciphersuite ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + switch( ssl->minor_ver ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: + return( "DTLSv1.0" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: + return( "DTLSv1.2" ); + + default: + return( "unknown (DTLS)" ); + } + } +#endif + + switch( ssl->minor_ver ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0: + return( "SSLv3.0" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1: + return( "TLSv1.0" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: + return( "TLSv1.1" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: + return( "TLSv1.2" ); + + default: + return( "unknown" ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t read_mfl; + + /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ) + { + return ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->conf->mfl_code ); + } + + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_out != NULL ) + { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ); + if( read_mfl < max_len ) + { + max_len = read_mfl; + } + } + + // During a handshake, use the value being negotiated + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL ) + { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ); + if( read_mfl < max_len ) + { + max_len = read_mfl; + } + } + + return( max_len ); +} + +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len; + + /* + * Assume mfl_code is correct since it was checked when set + */ + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->conf->mfl_code ); + + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_out != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ) < max_len ) + { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ); + } + + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ) < max_len ) + { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ); + } + + return( max_len ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) ) + return ( 0 ); + + if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0 ) + return( ssl->mtu ); + + if( ssl->mtu == 0 ) + return( ssl->handshake->mtu ); + + return( ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ? + ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + (void) ssl; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( max_len > mfl ) + max_len = mfl; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); + const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); + const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( mtu <= overhead ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "MTU too low for record expansion" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + if( max_len > mtu - overhead ) + max_len = mtu - overhead; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + return( (int) max_len ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + return( ssl->session->peer_cert ); +#else + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *dst ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL || + dst == NULL || + ssl->session == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return( ssl->session ); +} + +/* + * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version + * and structure of the ticket. + */ + +/* + * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing + * structure of serialized SSL sessions. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT 4 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 5 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 6 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ( (uint16_t) ( \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT ) ) ) + +static unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), +}; + +/* + * Serialize a session in the following format: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque session_format[2]; // version-specific 16-bit field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep + * these version+format bytes. + * + * // In this version, `session_format` determines + * // the setting of those compile-time + * // configuration options which influence + * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. + * uint64 start_time; + * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard + * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 + * opaque session_id[32]; + * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard + * uint32 verify_result; + * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert + * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard + * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * + * The order is the same as in the definition of the structure, except + * verify_result is put before peer_cert so that all mandatory fields come + * together in one block. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + + if( !omit_header ) + { + /* + * Add version identifier + */ + + used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + } + } + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + used += 8; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + start = (uint64_t) session->start; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( start, p, 0 ); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + used += 2 /* ciphersuite */ + + 1 /* compression */ + + 1 /* id_len */ + + sizeof( session->id ) + + sizeof( session->master ) + + 4; /* verify_result */ + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( session->ciphersuite, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->compression ); + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->id_len ); + memcpy( p, session->id, 32 ); + p += 32; + + memcpy( p, session->master, 48 ); + p += 48; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( session->verify_result, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + } + + /* + * Peer's end-entity certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) + cert_len = 0; + else + cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + + used += 3 + cert_len; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( cert_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( cert_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( cert_len ); + + if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len ); + p += cert_len; + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type; + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len; + memcpy( p, session->peer_cert_digest, + session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } + } + else + { + used += 2; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + *p++ = 0; + } + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket if any, plus associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */ + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( session->ticket_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( session->ticket_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->ticket_len ); + + if( session->ticket != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len ); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = session->mfl_code; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->trunc_hmac ) & 0xFF ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->encrypt_then_mac ); +#endif + + /* Done */ + *olen = used; + + if( used > buf_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + return( ssl_session_save( session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen ) ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + if( !omit_header ) + { + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH ); + } + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + } + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( 8 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + start = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; + + session->start = (time_t) start; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + if( 2 + 1 + 1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ciphersuite = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; + + session->compression = *p++; + + session->id_len = *p++; + memcpy( session->id, p, 32 ); + p += 32; + + memcpy( session->master, p, 48 ); + p += 48; + + session->verify_result = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; + + /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case + * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + session->peer_cert = NULL; +#else + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + session->ticket = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Peer certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */ + if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; + p += 3; + + if( cert_len != 0 ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( cert_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + + if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert, + p, cert_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + + p += cert_len; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */ + if( 2 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++; + + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0 ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( session->peer_cert_digest_type ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + if( session->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( session->peer_cert_digest, p, + session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket and associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; + p += 3; + + if( session->ticket_len != 0 ) + { + if( session->ticket_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->ticket_len ); + if( session->ticket == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len ); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + if( 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket_lifetime = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->mfl_code = *p++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->trunc_hmac = *p++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++; +#endif + + /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */ + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = ssl_session_load( session, 0, buf, len ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( ssl ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( ssl ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Perform the SSL handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Sanity checks */ + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "You must use " + "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> handshake" ) ); + + /* Main handshake loop */ + while( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( ssl ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + break; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= handshake" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Write HelloRequest to request renegotiation on server + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello request" ) ); + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello request" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * Actually renegotiate current connection, triggered by either: + * - any side: calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(), + * - client: receiving a HelloRequest during mbedtls_ssl_read(), + * - server: receiving any handshake message on server during mbedtls_ssl_read() after + * the initial handshake is completed. + * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue + * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> renegotiate" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* RFC 6347 4.2.2: "[...] the HelloRequest will have message_seq = 0 and + * the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1" */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = 1; + else + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = 1; + } +#endif + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= renegotiate" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Renegotiate current connection on client, + * or request renegotiation on server + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* On server, just send the request */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + + /* Did we already try/start sending HelloRequest? */ + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); + + return( ssl_write_hello_request( ssl ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /* + * On client, either start the renegotiation process or, + * if already in progress, continue the handshake + */ + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_key_cert_free( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free( cur ); + cur = next; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if( handshake == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) + { + ssl->conf->f_async_cancel( ssl ); + handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_free( &handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_free( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_free( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_free( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free( handshake->ecjpake_cache ); + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ + mbedtls_free( (void *) handshake->curves ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( handshake->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( handshake->psk ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /* + * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves + * since the belong to the SNI callback + */ + if( handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = handshake->sni_key_cert, *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free( cur ); + cur = next; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( &handshake->ecrs_ctx ); + if( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_free( &handshake->peer_pubkey ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + mbedtls_free( handshake->verify_cookie ); + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight ); + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake, + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS + * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have + * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not + * empty at this stage */ + handle_buffer_resizing( ssl, 1, mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( ssl ), + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( ssl ) ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + if( session == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_clear_peer_cert( session ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free( session->ticket ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ( (uint32_t) ( \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT ) | \ + 0u ) ) + +static unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), +}; + +/* + * Serialize a full SSL context + * + * The format of the serialized data is: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * // header + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these + * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.) + * + * // session sub-structure + * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * // transform sub-structure + * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random + * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value + * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use + * // fields from ssl_context + * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC + * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num + * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection + * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram + * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number + * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) + * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol + * + * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not + * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories: + * + * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0) + * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform) + * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS) + * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer) + * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t session_len; + int ret = 0; + + /* + * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in + * this function's documentation. + * + * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of + * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away + * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation. + */ + /* The initial handshake must be over */ + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Initial handshake isn't over" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Handshake isn't completed" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */ + if( ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Serialised structures aren't ready" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending incoming data" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending outgoing data" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Protocol must be DLTS, not TLS */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only DTLS is supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Version must be 1.2 */ + if( ssl->major_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( ssl->transform ) != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only AEAD ciphersuites supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Renegotiation must not be enabled" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif + + /* + * Version and format identifier + */ + used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + } + + /* + * Session (length + data) + */ + ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + return( ret ); + + used += 4 + session_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( session_len, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + + ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1, + p, session_len, &session_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += session_len; + } + + /* + * Transform + */ + used += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->randbytes, + sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + used += 2 + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + used += 4; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + used += 16; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( ssl->in_window_top, p, 0 ); + p += 8; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( ssl->in_window, p, 0 ); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 1; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + used += 8; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + p += 8; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 2; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->mtu, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen + ? (uint8_t) strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen ) + : 0; + + used += 1 + alpn_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = alpn_len; + + if( ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len ); + p += alpn_len; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * Done + */ + *olen = used; + + if( used > buf_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "saved context", buf, used ); + + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite + * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().) + */ +typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( int ciphersuite_id ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite_id ); + + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + return( tls_prf_sha384 ); +#else + (void) ciphersuite_id; +#endif + return( tls_prf_sha256 ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t session_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * The context should have been freshly setup or reset. + * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse. + * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're + * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.) + */ + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->session != NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at + * least check it matches the requirements for serializing. + */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->conf->max_major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->min_major_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || +#endif + 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "context to load", buf, len ); + + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH ); + } + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + + /* + * Session + */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session_len = ( (size_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (size_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (size_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (size_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; + + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < session_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ssl_session_load( ssl->session, 1, p, session_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + return( ret ); + } + + p += session_len; + + /* + * Transform + */ + + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + + /* Read random bytes and populate structure */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform, + ssl->session->ciphersuite, + ssl->session->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + ssl->session->trunc_hmac, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + ssl->session->compression, +#endif + ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( ssl->session->ciphersuite ), + p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */ + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Read connection IDs and store them */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->badmac_seen = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->in_window_top = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; + + ssl->in_window = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, 8 ); + p += 8; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->mtu = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + uint8_t alpn_len; + const char **cur; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + alpn_len = *p++; + + if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL ) + { + /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ + for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) + { + if( strlen( *cur ) == alpn_len && + memcmp( p, cur, alpn_len ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; + break; + } + } + } + + /* can only happen on conf mismatch */ + if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure + * + * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and + * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones. + */ + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; + + ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + ssl->minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + + /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to + * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->in_epoch = 1; +#endif + + /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated, + * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform + * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform() + * inappropriately. */ + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + } + + /* + * Done - should have consumed entire buffer + */ + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *context, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = ssl_context_load( context, buf, len ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_free( context ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +/* + * Free an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL ) + return; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> free" ) ); + + if( ssl->out_buf != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf ); + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + } + + if( ssl->in_buf != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf ); + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->compress_buf != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->compress_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->compress_buf ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->transform ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + } + + if( ssl->session ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( ssl->hostname != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->hostname, strlen( ssl->hostname ) ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->hostname ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish()" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish( ssl ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= free" ) ); + + /* Actually clear after last debug message */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Initialze mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + memset( conf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; +#endif + +static int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + 0 +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE +}; +#endif + +/* + * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int endpoint, int transport, int preset ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + + /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, + * but otherwise access member directly for efficiency */ + mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( conf, endpoint ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( conf, transport ); + + /* + * Things that are common to all presets + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED; +#endif + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + conf->arc4_disabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + conf->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + conf->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + conf->cbc_record_splitting = MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->f_cookie_write = ssl_cookie_write_dummy; + conf->f_cookie_check = ssl_cookie_check_dummy; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; + conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + conf->renego_max_records = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT; + memset( conf->renego_period, 0x00, 2 ); + memset( conf->renego_period + 2, 0xFF, 6 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + const unsigned char dhm_p[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; + const unsigned char dhm_g[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; + + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( conf, + dhm_p, sizeof( dhm_p ), + dhm_g, sizeof( dhm_g ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Preset-specific defaults + */ + switch( preset ) + { + /* + * NSA Suite B + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB: + conf->min_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; /* TLS 1.2 */ + conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; + conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; + + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = + ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + conf->curve_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_curves; +#endif + break; + + /* + * Default + */ + default: + conf->min_major_ver = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION > + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION ) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION : + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION; + conf->min_minor_ver = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION > + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION ) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION : + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION; + conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; + conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; +#endif + + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = + mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + conf->curve_list = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024; +#endif + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_free( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( conf->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } + + if( conf->psk_identity != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len ); + mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_key_cert_free( conf->key_cert ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) ) +/* + * Convert between MBEDTLS_PK_XXX and SSL_SIG_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA ); +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); +} + +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + switch( type ) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); + } +} + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ) +{ + switch( sig ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ) +{ + switch( sig_alg ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( set->rsa ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return( set->ecdsa ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + } +} + +/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + switch( sig_alg ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + if( set->rsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + set->rsa = md_alg; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + if( set->ecdsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + set->ecdsa = md_alg; + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + set->rsa = md_alg; + set->ecdsa = md_alg; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX + */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ) +{ + switch( hash ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + } +} + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_MD_XXX to MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ) +{ + switch( md ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Check if a curve proposed by the peer is in our list. + * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; + + if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ ) + if( *gid == grp_id ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Same as mbedtls_ssl_check_curve() but takes a TLS ID for the curve. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ); + if( curve_info == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + return( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, curve_info->grp_id ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Check if a hash proposed by the peer is in our list. + * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_md_type_t md ) +{ + const int *cur; + + if( ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + for( cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++ ) + if( *cur == (int) md ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + int usage = 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + const char *ext_oid; + size_t ext_len; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + ((void) cert); + ((void) cert_endpoint); + ((void) flags); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + if( cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + /* Server part of the key exchange */ + switch( ciphersuite->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; + break; + + /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */ + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + usage = 0; + } + } + else + { + /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */ + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + } + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( cert, usage ) != 0 ) + { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } +#else + ((void) ciphersuite); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + if( cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ); + } + else + { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH ); + } + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( cert, ext_oid, ext_len ) != 0 ) + { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; + + switch( md ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; + break; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; + } + + return 0; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + (void) ssl; + (void) md; + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_md5_context mbedtls_md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context mbedtls_sha1; + + mbedtls_md5_init( &mbedtls_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &mbedtls_sha1 ); + + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque md5_hash[16]; + * opaque sha_hash[20]; + * }; + * + * md5_hash + * MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random + * + ServerParams); + * sha_hash + * SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random + * + ServerParams); + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &mbedtls_md5 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_starts_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &mbedtls_md5, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &mbedtls_md5, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &mbedtls_md5, output ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_finish_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &mbedtls_sha1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &mbedtls_sha1, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &mbedtls_sha1, data, + data_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &mbedtls_sha1, + output + 16 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free( &mbedtls_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &mbedtls_sha1 ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + return( ret ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) ); + + if( ( status = psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, + hash_alg ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_setup", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, ssl->handshake->randbytes, + 64 ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, + data, data_len ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, + hashlen ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_finish", status ); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } + return( 0 ); +} + +#else + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + *hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform mbedtls-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque client_random[32]; + * opaque server_random[32]; + * ServerDHParams params; + * }; + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_starts", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret ); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3de6f03f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + .name = string, + +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = +{ + /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one + * character too long due to the 0-termination. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; + +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +/* + * This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows: + * + * struct HkdfLabel { + * uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material + * opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 " + * opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash + * }; + * + * Parameters: + * - desired_length: Length of expanded key material + * Even though the standard allows expansion to up to + * 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than + * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most + * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by + * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes. + * - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix + * The label length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 + * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). + * - (ctx, clen): context + context length + * The context length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure, + * This MUST be a writable buffer of size + * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes. + * - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of + * the HkdfLabel structure on success. + */ + +static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( label_len, context_len ) \ + ( 2 /* expansion length */ \ + + 1 /* label length */ \ + + label_len \ + + 1 /* context length */ \ + + context_len ) + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \ + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \ + sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) + +static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( + size_t desired_length, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen ) +{ + size_t total_label_len = + sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen; + size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len = + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( total_label_len, clen ); + + unsigned char *p = dst; + + /* Add the size of the expanded key material. + * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use + * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255 +#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ + value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN" +#endif + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( desired_length ); + + /* Add label incl. prefix */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( total_label_len ); + memcpy( p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) ); + p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix); + memcpy( p, label, llen ); + p += llen; + + /* Add context value */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( clen ); + if( clen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, ctx, clen ); + + /* Return total length to the caller. */ + *dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + unsigned char hkdf_label[ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN ]; + size_t hkdf_label_len; + + if( llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN ) + { + /* Should never happen since this is an internal + * function, and we know statically which labels + * are allowed. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) + { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN ) + { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( blen, + label, llen, + ctx, clen, + hkdf_label, + &hkdf_label_len ); + + return( mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md, + secret, slen, + hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len, + buf, blen ) ); +} + +/* + * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs: + * + * - One secret value per sender. + * - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated + * - The desired lengths of key and IV. + * + * The expansion itself is based on HKDF: + * + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length ) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length ) + * + * [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided + * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side + * keys in a single function call. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, + size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + client_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), + NULL, 0, + keys->client_write_key, key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + server_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), + NULL, 0, + keys->server_write_key, key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + client_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), + NULL, 0, + keys->client_write_iv, iv_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + server_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), + NULL, 0, + keys->server_write_iv, iv_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + keys->key_len = key_len; + keys->iv_len = iv_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char hashed_context[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md( md, ctx, clen, hashed_context ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + clen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + } + else + { + if( clen > sizeof(hashed_context) ) + { + /* This should never happen since this function is internal + * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly. + * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk + * of getting a stack overflow. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( hashed_context, ctx, clen ); + } + + return( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + secret, slen, + label, llen, + hashed_context, clen, + dstbuf, buflen ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t hlen, ilen; + unsigned char tmp_secret[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 }; + unsigned char tmp_input [ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 }; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + + /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") + * on the old secret. */ + if( secret_old != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + secret_old, hlen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( derived ), + NULL, 0, /* context */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + tmp_secret, hlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + } + + if( input != NULL ) + { + memcpy( tmp_input, input, input_len ); + ilen = input_len; + } + else + { + ilen = hlen; + } + + /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material. + * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material + * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */ + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, + tmp_secret, hlen, + tmp_input, ilen, + secret_new ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = 0; + + cleanup: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7089049c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H + +/* This requires MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( idx, name, string ) to be defined at + * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union + * below. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( finished , "finished" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( resumption , "resumption" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( traffic_upd , "traffic upd" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exporter , "exporter" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( key , "key" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( iv , "iv" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_hs_traffic, "c hs traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_ap_traffic, "c ap traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_e_traffic , "c e traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_hs_traffic, "s hs traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_ap_traffic, "s ap traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_e_traffic , "s e traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( e_exp_master, "e exp master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_master , "res master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exp_master , "exp master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( ext_binder , "ext binder" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_binder , "res binder" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( derived , "derived" ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + const unsigned char name [ sizeof(string) - 1 ]; + +union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels; + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( LABEL ) \ + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL, \ + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN \ + sizeof( union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union ) + +/* The maximum length of HKDF contexts used in the TLS 1.3 standard. + * Since contexts are always hashes of message transcripts, this can + * be approximated from above by the maximum hash size. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN \ + MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE + +/* Maximum desired length for expanded key material generated + * by HKDF-Expand-Label. + * + * Warning: If this ever needs to be increased, the implementation + * ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() in ssl_tls13_keys.c needs to be + * adjusted since it currently assumes that HKDF key expansion + * is never used with more than 255 Bytes of output. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN 255 + +/** + * \brief The \c HKDF-Expand-Label function from + * the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, Context, Length ) = + * HKDF-Expand( Secret, HkdfLabel, Length ) + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to use. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. + * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The \c Context argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p clen Bytes. + * \param clen The length of \p context in Bytes. + * \param buf The destination buffer to hold the expanded secret. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The desired size of the expanded secret in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function is part of the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * It extracts key and IV for the actual client/server traffic + * from the client/server traffic secrets. + * + * From RFC 8446: + * + * + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "key", "", key_length) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "iv", "", iv_length)* + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to be used + * for the HKDF-based expansion of the secret. + * \param client_secret The client traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * \param server_secret The server traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * \param slen Length of the secrets \p client_secret and + * \p server_secret in Bytes. + * \param key_len The desired length of the key to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param iv_len The desired length of the IV to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param keys The address of the structure holding the generated + * keys and IVs. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, + size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys ); + + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED 1 + +/** + * \brief The \c Derive-Secret function from the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * + * Derive-Secret( Secret, Label, Messages ) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, + * Hash( Messages ), + * Hash.Length ) ) + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. + * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The hash of the \c Messages argument to the + * \c Derive-Secret function, or the \c Messages argument + * itself, depending on \p context_already_hashed. + * \param clen The length of \p hash. + * \param ctx_hashed This indicates whether the \p ctx contains the hash of + * the \c Messages argument in the application of the + * \c Derive-Secret function + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED), or whether + * it is the content of \c Messages itself, in which case + * the function takes care of the hashing + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED). + * \param dstbuf The target buffer to write the output of + * \c Derive-Secret to. This must be a writable buffer of + * size \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of \p dstbuf in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Compute the next secret in the TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule proceeds as follows to compute + * the three main secrets during the handshake: The early + * secret for early data, the handshake secret for all + * other encrypted handshake messages, and the master + * secret for all application traffic. + * + * + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * (EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * 0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret + * + * + * Each of the three secrets in turn is the basis for further + * key derivations, such as the derivation of traffic keys and IVs; + * see e.g. mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * This function implements one step in this evolution of secrets: + * + * + * old_secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * input -> HKDF-Extract = new_secret + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret_old The address of the buffer holding the old secret + * on function entry. If not \c NULL, this must be a + * readable buffer whose size matches the output size + * of the hash function represented by \p hash_alg. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input The address of the buffer holding the additional + * input for the key derivation (e.g., the PSK or the + * ephemeral (EC)DH secret). If not \c NULL, this must be + * a readable buffer whose size \p input_len Bytes. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input_len The length of \p input in Bytes. + * \param secret_new The address of the buffer holding the new secret + * on function exit. This must be a writable buffer + * whose size matches the output size of the hash + * function represented by \p hash_alg. + * This may be the same as \p secret_old. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/threading.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/threading.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5e0aaa4f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/threading.c @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +/* + * Threading abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before + * config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) + +#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ + defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ + defined(__MACH__))) +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + +#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long + * preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in + * platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and + * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so + * we keep it private by only defining it in this file + */ + +#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) +#define THREADING_USE_GMTIME +#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ + +#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +static void threading_mutex_init_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + if( mutex == NULL ) + return; + + /* A nonzero value of is_valid indicates a successfully initialized + * mutex. This is a workaround for not being able to return an error + * code for this function. The lock/unlock functions return an error + * if is_valid is nonzero. The Mbed TLS unit test code uses this field + * to distinguish more states of the mutex; see + * tests/src/threading_helpers for details. */ + mutex->is_valid = pthread_mutex_init( &mutex->mutex, NULL ) == 0; +} + +static void threading_mutex_free_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + if( mutex == NULL || !mutex->is_valid ) + return; + + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy( &mutex->mutex ); + mutex->is_valid = 0; +} + +static int threading_mutex_lock_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + if( mutex == NULL || ! mutex->is_valid ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( pthread_mutex_lock( &mutex->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int threading_mutex_unlock_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + if( mutex == NULL || ! mutex->is_valid ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( pthread_mutex_unlock( &mutex->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_init_pthread; +void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_free_pthread; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_lock_pthread; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_unlock_pthread; + +/* + * With pthreads we can statically initialize mutexes + */ +#define MUTEX_INIT = { PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER, 1 } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) +static int threading_mutex_fail( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + ((void) mutex ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} +static void threading_mutex_dummy( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + ((void) mutex ); + return; +} + +void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_dummy; +void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_dummy; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_fail; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_fail; + +/* + * Set functions pointers and initialize global mutexes + */ +void mbedtls_threading_set_alt( void (*mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + void (*mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + int (*mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + int (*mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) ) +{ + mbedtls_mutex_init = mutex_init; + mbedtls_mutex_free = mutex_free; + mbedtls_mutex_lock = mutex_lock; + mbedtls_mutex_unlock = mutex_unlock; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ); +#endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Free global mutexes + */ +void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ); +#endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ); +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ + +/* + * Define global mutexes + */ +#ifndef MUTEX_INIT +#define MUTEX_INIT +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/timing.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/timing.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..57bc9bcc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/timing.c @@ -0,0 +1,529 @@ +/* + * Portable interface to the CPU cycle counter + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in config.h" +#endif + +#ifndef asm +#define asm __asm +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +#include +#include + +struct _hr_time +{ + LARGE_INTEGER start; +}; + +#else + +#include +#include +#include +/* time.h should be included independently of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME. If the + * platform matches the ifdefs above, it will be used. */ +#include +#include +struct _hr_time +{ + struct timeval start; +}; +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + ( defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86) ) || defined(__WATCOMC__) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long tsc; + __asm rdtsc + __asm mov [tsc], eax + return( tsc ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + ( _MSC_VER && _M_IX86 ) || __WATCOMC__ */ + +/* some versions of mingw-64 have 32-bit longs even on x84_64 */ +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__i386__) || ( \ + ( defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__) ) && __SIZEOF_LONG__ == 4 ) ) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long lo, hi; + asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) ); + return( lo ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __i386__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) ) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long lo, hi; + asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) ); + return( lo | ( hi << 32 ) ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && ( __amd64__ || __x86_64__ ) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) ) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long tbl, tbu0, tbu1; + + do + { + asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu0) ); + asm volatile( "mftb %0" : "=r" (tbl ) ); + asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu1) ); + } + while( tbu0 != tbu1 ); + + return( tbl ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && ( __powerpc__ || __ppc__ ) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc64__) + +#if defined(__OpenBSD__) +#warning OpenBSD does not allow access to tick register using software version instead +#else +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long tick; + asm volatile( "rdpr %%tick, %0;" : "=&r" (tick) ); + return( tick ); +} +#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */ +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __sparc64__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc__) && !defined(__sparc64__) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long tick; + asm volatile( ".byte 0x83, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00" ); + asm volatile( "mov %%g1, %0" : "=r" (tick) ); + return( tick ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __sparc__ && !__sparc64__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__alpha__) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long cc; + asm volatile( "rpcc %0" : "=r" (cc) ); + return( cc & 0xFFFFFFFF ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __alpha__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64__) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long itc; + asm volatile( "mov %0 = ar.itc" : "=r" (itc) ); + return( itc ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __ia64__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(_MSC_VER) && \ + !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + LARGE_INTEGER offset; + + QueryPerformanceCounter( &offset ); + + return( (unsigned long)( offset.QuadPart ) ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && _MSC_VER && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +static int hardclock_init = 0; +static struct timeval tv_init; + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + struct timeval tv_cur; + + if( hardclock_init == 0 ) + { + gettimeofday( &tv_init, NULL ); + hardclock_init = 1; + } + + gettimeofday( &tv_cur, NULL ); + return( ( tv_cur.tv_sec - tv_init.tv_sec ) * 1000000 + + ( tv_cur.tv_usec - tv_init.tv_usec ) ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK */ + +volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ) +{ + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; + + if( reset ) + { + QueryPerformanceCounter( &t->start ); + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + unsigned long delta; + LARGE_INTEGER now, hfreq; + QueryPerformanceCounter( &now ); + QueryPerformanceFrequency( &hfreq ); + delta = (unsigned long)( ( now.QuadPart - t->start.QuadPart ) * 1000ul + / hfreq.QuadPart ); + return( delta ); + } +} + +/* It's OK to use a global because alarm() is supposed to be global anyway */ +static DWORD alarmMs; + +static void TimerProc( void *TimerContext ) +{ + (void) TimerContext; + Sleep( alarmMs ); + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; + /* _endthread will be called implicitly on return + * That ensures execution of thread funcition's epilogue */ +} + +void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ) +{ + if( seconds == 0 ) + { + /* No need to create a thread for this simple case. + * Also, this shorcut is more reliable at least on MinGW32 */ + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; + return; + } + + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; + alarmMs = seconds * 1000; + (void) _beginthread( TimerProc, 0, NULL ); +} + +#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ) +{ + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; + + if( reset ) + { + gettimeofday( &t->start, NULL ); + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + unsigned long delta; + struct timeval now; + gettimeofday( &now, NULL ); + delta = ( now.tv_sec - t->start.tv_sec ) * 1000ul + + ( now.tv_usec - t->start.tv_usec ) / 1000; + return( delta ); + } +} + +static void sighandler( int signum ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; + signal( signum, sighandler ); +} + +void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; + signal( SIGALRM, sighandler ); + alarm( seconds ); + if( seconds == 0 ) + { + /* alarm(0) cancelled any previous pending alarm, but the + handler won't fire, so raise the flag straight away. */ + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; + } +} + +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Set delays to watch + */ +void mbedtls_timing_set_delay( void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; + + ctx->int_ms = int_ms; + ctx->fin_ms = fin_ms; + + if( fin_ms != 0 ) + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx->timer, 1 ); +} + +/* + * Get number of delays expired + */ +int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; + unsigned long elapsed_ms; + + if( ctx->fin_ms == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + elapsed_ms = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx->timer, 0 ); + + if( elapsed_ms >= ctx->fin_ms ) + return( 2 ); + + if( elapsed_ms >= ctx->int_ms ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Busy-waits for the given number of milliseconds. + * Used for testing mbedtls_timing_hardclock. + */ +static void busy_msleep( unsigned long msec ) +{ + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; + unsigned long i = 0; /* for busy-waiting */ + volatile unsigned long j; /* to prevent optimisation */ + + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 1 ); + + while( mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ) < msec ) + i++; + + j = i; + (void) j; +} + +#define FAIL do \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed at line %d\n", __LINE__ ); \ + mbedtls_printf( " cycles=%lu ratio=%lu millisecs=%lu secs=%lu hardfail=%d a=%lu b=%lu\n", \ + cycles, ratio, millisecs, secs, hardfail, \ + (unsigned long) a, (unsigned long) b ); \ + mbedtls_printf( " elapsed(hires)=%lu elapsed(ctx)=%lu status(ctx)=%d\n", \ + mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ), \ + mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx.timer, 0 ), \ + mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) ); \ + } \ + return( 1 ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Checkup routine + * + * Warning: this is work in progress, some tests may not be reliable enough + * yet! False positives may happen. + */ +int mbedtls_timing_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + unsigned long cycles = 0, ratio = 0; + unsigned long millisecs = 0, secs = 0; + int hardfail = 0; + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; + uint32_t a = 0, b = 0; + mbedtls_timing_delay_context ctx; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " TIMING tests note: will take some time!\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #1 (set_alarm / get_timer): " ); + + { + secs = 1; + + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 1 ); + + mbedtls_set_alarm( (int) secs ); + while( !mbedtls_timing_alarmed ) + ; + + millisecs = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ); + + /* For some reason on Windows it looks like alarm has an extra delay + * (maybe related to creating a new thread). Allow some room here. */ + if( millisecs < 800 * secs || millisecs > 1200 * secs + 300 ) + FAIL; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #2 (set/get_delay ): " ); + + { + a = 800; + b = 400; + mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, a, a + b ); /* T = 0 */ + + busy_msleep( a - a / 4 ); /* T = a - a/4 */ + if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 0 ) + FAIL; + + busy_msleep( a / 4 + b / 4 ); /* T = a + b/4 */ + if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 1 ) + FAIL; + + busy_msleep( b ); /* T = a + b + b/4 */ + if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 2 ) + FAIL; + } + + mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + busy_msleep( 200 ); + if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != -1 ) + FAIL; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #3 (hardclock / get_timer): " ); + + /* + * Allow one failure for possible counter wrapping. + * On a 4Ghz 32-bit machine the cycle counter wraps about once per second; + * since the whole test is about 10ms, it shouldn't happen twice in a row. + */ + +hard_test: + if( hardfail > 1 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed (ignored)\n" ); + + goto hard_test_done; + } + + /* Get a reference ratio cycles/ms */ + millisecs = 1; + cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); + busy_msleep( millisecs ); + cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; + ratio = cycles / millisecs; + + /* Check that the ratio is mostly constant */ + for( millisecs = 2; millisecs <= 4; millisecs++ ) + { + cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); + busy_msleep( millisecs ); + cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; + + /* Allow variation up to 20% */ + if( cycles / millisecs < ratio - ratio / 5 || + cycles / millisecs > ratio + ratio / 5 ) + { + hardfail++; + goto hard_test; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +hard_test_done: + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/version.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/version.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32a0d7d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/version.c @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Version information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include + +unsigned int mbedtls_version_get_number( void ) +{ + return( MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER ); +} + +void mbedtls_version_get_string( char *string ) +{ + memcpy( string, MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING, + sizeof( MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_version_get_string_full( char *string ) +{ + memcpy( string, MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL, + sizeof( MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/version_features.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/version_features.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40c95201 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/version_features.c @@ -0,0 +1,872 @@ +/* + * Version feature information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + +#include "mbedtls/version.h" + +#include + +static const char * const features[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) + "MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + "MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) + "MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + "MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) + "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) + "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) + "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DES_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + "MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + "MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) + "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) + "MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) + "MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) + "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) + "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + "MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + "MBEDTLS_GENPRIME", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + "MBEDTLS_FS_IO", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + "MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + "MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + "MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + "MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + "MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) + "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) + "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) + "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + "MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) + "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + "MBEDTLS_AES_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + "MBEDTLS_ARC4_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + "MBEDTLS_BASE64_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + "MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + "MBEDTLS_ARIA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + "MBEDTLS_CCM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + "MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + "MBEDTLS_DES_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + "MBEDTLS_DHM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + "MBEDTLS_ERROR_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + "MBEDTLS_GCM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + "MBEDTLS_MD_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + "MBEDTLS_MD2_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + "MBEDTLS_MD4_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + "MBEDTLS_MD5_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + "MBEDTLS_NET_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + "MBEDTLS_OID_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + "MBEDTLS_PK_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + "MBEDTLS_RSA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + "MBEDTLS_SHA1_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + "MBEDTLS_VERSION_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) + "MBEDTLS_XTEA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ + NULL +}; + +int mbedtls_version_check_feature( const char *feature ) +{ + const char * const *idx = features; + + if( *idx == NULL ) + return( -2 ); + + if( feature == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + while( *idx != NULL ) + { + if( !strcmp( *idx, feature ) ) + return( 0 ); + idx++; + } + return( -1 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3997ebd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509.c @@ -0,0 +1,1074 @@ +/* + * X.509 common functions for parsing and verification + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include +#endif + +#define CHECK(code) if( ( ret = ( code ) ) != 0 ){ return( ret ); } +#define CHECK_RANGE(min, max, val) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( val ) < ( min ) || ( val ) > ( max ) ) \ + { \ + return( ret ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + if( **p != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE | 2 ) && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + serial->tag = *(*p)++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &serial->len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, ret ) ); + + serial->p = *p; + *p += serial->len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Get an algorithm identifier without parameters (eg for signatures) + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( p, end, alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) parameters + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, alg, params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) +/* + * HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + * + * For HashAlgorithm, parameters MUST be NULL or absent. + */ +static int x509_get_hash_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *end; + mbedtls_x509_buf md_oid; + size_t len; + + /* Make sure we got a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ + if( alg->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + p = alg->p; + end = p + alg->len; + + if( p >= end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + /* Parse md_oid */ + md_oid.tag = *p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &md_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + md_oid.p = p; + p += md_oid.len; + + /* Get md_alg from md_oid */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &md_oid, md_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + /* Make sure params is absent of NULL */ + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 || len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE { + * hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1Identifier, + * maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1Identifier, + * saltLength [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 20, + * trailerField [3] INTEGER DEFAULT 1 } + * -- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit. + * + * RFC 4055 (which defines use of RSASSA-PSS in PKIX) states that the value + * of trailerField MUST be 1, and PKCS#1 v2.2 doesn't even define any other + * option. Enfore this at parsing time. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, + int *salt_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *end, *end2; + size_t len; + mbedtls_x509_buf alg_id, alg_params; + + /* First set everything to defaults */ + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + *mgf_md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + *salt_len = 20; + + /* Make sure params is a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ + if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + p = (unsigned char *) params->p; + end = p + params->len; + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * HashAlgorithm + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) == 0 ) + { + end2 = p + len; + + /* HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier (without parameters) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( &p, end2, &alg_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &alg_id, md_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * MaskGenAlgorithm + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1 ) ) == 0 ) + { + end2 = p + len; + + /* MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier (params = HashAlgorithm) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end2, &alg_id, &alg_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Only MFG1 is recognised for now */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1, &alg_id ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ) ); + + /* Parse HashAlgorithm */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_hash_alg( &alg_params, mgf_md ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( p != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * salt_len + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 2 ) ) == 0 ) + { + end2 = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, salt_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * trailer_field (if present, must be 1) + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3 ) ) == 0 ) + { + int trailer_field; + + end2 = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, &trailer_field ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + if( trailer_field != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + * type AttributeType, + * value AttributeValue } + * + * AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + */ +static int x509_get_attr_type_value( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + mbedtls_x509_buf *oid; + mbedtls_x509_buf *val; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + oid = &cur->oid; + oid->tag = **p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &oid->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); + + oid->p = *p; + *p += oid->len; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + if( **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + val = &cur->val; + val->tag = *(*p)++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &val->len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); + + val->p = *p; + *p += val->len; + + if( *p != end ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + cur->next = NULL; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- + * rdnSequence RDNSequence } + * + * RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + * + * RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + * SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue + * + * AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + * type AttributeType, + * value AttributeValue } + * + * AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + * + * The data structure is optimized for the common case where each RDN has only + * one element, which is represented as a list of AttributeTypeAndValue. + * For the general case we still use a flat list, but we mark elements of the + * same set so that they are "merged" together in the functions that consume + * this list, eg mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t set_len; + const unsigned char *end_set; + + /* don't use recursion, we'd risk stack overflow if not optimized */ + while( 1 ) + { + /* + * parse SET + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &set_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); + + end_set = *p + set_len; + + while( 1 ) + { + if( ( ret = x509_get_attr_type_value( p, end_set, cur ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( *p == end_set ) + break; + + /* Mark this item as being no the only one in a set */ + cur->next_merged = 1; + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + /* + * continue until end of SEQUENCE is reached + */ + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + cur = cur->next; + } +} + +static int x509_parse_int( unsigned char **p, size_t n, int *res ) +{ + *res = 0; + + for( ; n > 0; --n ) + { + if( ( **p < '0') || ( **p > '9' ) ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE ); + + *res *= 10; + *res += ( *(*p)++ - '0' ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *t ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + int month_len; + + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 9999, t->year ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 23, t->hour ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, t->min ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, t->sec ); + + switch( t->mon ) + { + case 1: case 3: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10: case 12: + month_len = 31; + break; + case 4: case 6: case 9: case 11: + month_len = 30; + break; + case 2: + if( ( !( t->year % 4 ) && t->year % 100 ) || + !( t->year % 400 ) ) + month_len = 29; + else + month_len = 28; + break; + default: + return( ret ); + } + CHECK_RANGE( 1, month_len, t->day ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse an ASN1_UTC_TIME (yearlen=2) or ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME (yearlen=4) + * field. + */ +static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, + mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Minimum length is 10 or 12 depending on yearlen + */ + if ( len < yearlen + 8 ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE ); + len -= yearlen + 8; + + /* + * Parse year, month, day, hour, minute + */ + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, yearlen, &tm->year ) ); + if ( 2 == yearlen ) + { + if ( tm->year < 50 ) + tm->year += 100; + + tm->year += 1900; + } + + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->mon ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->day ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->hour ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->min ) ); + + /* + * Parse seconds if present + */ + if ( len >= 2 ) + { + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->sec ) ); + len -= 2; + } + else + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE ); + + /* + * Parse trailing 'Z' if present + */ + if ( 1 == len && 'Z' == **p ) + { + (*p)++; + len--; + } + + /* + * We should have parsed all characters at this point + */ + if ( 0 != len ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE ); + + CHECK( x509_date_is_valid( tm ) ); + + return ( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Time ::= CHOICE { + * utcTime UTCTime, + * generalTime GeneralizedTime } + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len, year_len; + unsigned char tag; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + tag = **p; + + if( tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME ) + year_len = 2; + else if( tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) + year_len = 4; + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + (*p)++; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) ); + + return x509_parse_time( p, len, year_len, tm ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + int tag_type; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + tag_type = **p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, ret ) ); + + sig->tag = tag_type; + sig->len = len; + sig->p = *p; + + *p += len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Get signature algorithm from alg OID and optional parameters + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, + void **sig_opts ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( *sig_opts != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg( sig_oid, md_alg, pk_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG, ret ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if( *pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) + { + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + + pss_opts = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options ) ); + if( pss_opts == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( sig_params, + md_alg, + &pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, + &pss_opts->expected_salt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( pss_opts ); + return( ret ); + } + + *sig_opts = (void *) pss_opts; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + { + /* Make sure parameters are absent or NULL */ + if( ( sig_params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && sig_params->tag != 0 ) || + sig_params->len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 Extensions (No parsing of extensions, pointer should + * be either manually updated or extensions should be parsed!) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Extension structure use EXPLICIT tagging. That is, the actual + * `Extensions` structure is wrapped by a tag-length pair using + * the respective context-specific tag. */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &ext->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + ext->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag; + ext->p = *p; + end = *p + ext->len; + + /* + * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( end != *p + len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Store the name in printable form into buf; no more + * than size characters will be written + */ +int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j, n; + unsigned char c, merge = 0; + const mbedtls_x509_name *name; + const char *short_name = NULL; + char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE], *p; + + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); + + name = dn; + p = buf; + n = size; + + while( name != NULL ) + { + if( !name->oid.p ) + { + name = name->next; + continue; + } + + if( name != dn ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, merge ? " + " : ", " ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name( &name->oid, &short_name ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s=", short_name ); + else + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\?\?=" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + for( i = 0, j = 0; i < name->val.len; i++, j++ ) + { + if( j >= sizeof( s ) - 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + c = name->val.p[i]; + // Special characters requiring escaping, RFC 1779 + if( c && strchr( ",=+<>#;\"\\", c ) ) + { + if( j + 1 >= sizeof( s ) - 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + s[j++] = '\\'; + } + if( c < 32 || c >= 127 ) + s[j] = '?'; + else s[j] = c; + } + s[j] = '\0'; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s", s ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + merge = name->next_merged; + name = name->next; + } + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Store the serial in printable form into buf; no more + * than size characters will be written + */ +int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n, nr; + char *p; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + nr = ( serial->len <= 32 ) + ? serial->len : 28; + + for( i = 0; i < nr; i++ ) + { + if( i == 0 && nr > 1 && serial->p[i] == 0x0 ) + continue; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%02X%s", + serial->p[i], ( i < nr - 1 ) ? ":" : "" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + if( nr != serial->len ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "...." ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper for writing signature algorithms + */ +int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const void *sig_opts ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + char *p = buf; + size_t n = size; + const char *desc = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc( sig_oid, &desc ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "???" ); + else + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s", desc ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) + { + const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, *mgf_md_info; + + pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) sig_opts; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + mgf_md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id ); + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)", + md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info ) : "???", + mgf_md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( mgf_md_info ) : "???", + (unsigned int) pss_opts->expected_salt_len ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } +#else + ((void) pk_alg); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) sig_opts); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + + return( (int)( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper for writing "RSA key size", "EC key size", etc + */ +int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name ) +{ + char *p = buf; + size_t n = buf_size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s key size", name ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +/* + * Set the time structure to the current time. + * Return 0 on success, non-zero on failure. + */ +static int x509_get_current_time( mbedtls_x509_time *now ) +{ + struct tm *lt, tm_buf; + mbedtls_time_t tt; + int ret = 0; + + tt = mbedtls_time( NULL ); + lt = mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( &tt, &tm_buf ); + + if( lt == NULL ) + ret = -1; + else + { + now->year = lt->tm_year + 1900; + now->mon = lt->tm_mon + 1; + now->day = lt->tm_mday; + now->hour = lt->tm_hour; + now->min = lt->tm_min; + now->sec = lt->tm_sec; + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Return 0 if before <= after, 1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_check_time( const mbedtls_x509_time *before, const mbedtls_x509_time *after ) +{ + if( before->year > after->year ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon > after->mon ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon == after->mon && + before->day > after->day ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon == after->mon && + before->day == after->day && + before->hour > after->hour ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon == after->mon && + before->day == after->day && + before->hour == after->hour && + before->min > after->min ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon == after->mon && + before->day == after->day && + before->hour == after->hour && + before->min == after->min && + before->sec > after->sec ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_time now; + + if( x509_get_current_time( &now ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( x509_check_time( &now, to ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_time now; + + if( x509_get_current_time( &now ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( x509_check_time( from, &now ) ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ) +{ + ((void) to); + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ) +{ + ((void) from); + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_x509_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + uint32_t flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; + mbedtls_x509_crt clicert; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " X.509 certificate load: " ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &clicert ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &clicert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt, + mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_ca_crt, + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n X.509 signature verify: "); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( &clicert, &cacert, NULL, NULL, &flags, NULL, NULL ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n"); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert ); +#else + ((void) verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..056bbaa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c @@ -0,0 +1,374 @@ +/* + * X.509 base functions for creating certificates / CSRs + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" + +#include + +/* Structure linking OIDs for X.509 DN AttributeTypes to their + * string representations and default string encodings used by Mbed TLS. */ +typedef struct { + const char *name; /* String representation of AttributeType, e.g. + * "CN" or "emailAddress". */ + size_t name_len; /* Length of 'name', without trailing 0 byte. */ + const char *oid; /* String representation of OID of AttributeType, + * as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */ + int default_tag; /* The default character encoding used for the + * given attribute type, e.g. + * MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING for UTF-8. */ +} x509_attr_descriptor_t; + +#define ADD_STRLEN( s ) s, sizeof( s ) - 1 + +/* X.509 DN attributes from RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */ +static const x509_attr_descriptor_t x509_attrs[] = +{ + { ADD_STRLEN( "CN" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "commonName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "C" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "countryName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "O" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "organizationName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "L" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "locality" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "R" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "OU" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "organizationalUnitName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "ST" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "stateOrProvinceName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "emailAddress" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "serialNumber" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "postalAddress" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "postalCode" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "dnQualifier" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "title" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "surName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "SN" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "givenName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "GN" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "initials" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "pseudonym" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "generationQualifier" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "domainComponent" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "DC" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL } +}; + +static const x509_attr_descriptor_t *x509_attr_descr_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len ) +{ + const x509_attr_descriptor_t *cur; + + for( cur = x509_attrs; cur->name != NULL; cur++ ) + if( cur->name_len == name_len && + strncmp( cur->name, name, name_len ) == 0 ) + break; + + if ( cur->name == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return( cur ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name ) +{ + int ret = 0; + const char *s = name, *c = s; + const char *end = s + strlen( s ); + const char *oid = NULL; + const x509_attr_descriptor_t* attr_descr = NULL; + int in_tag = 1; + char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; + char *d = data; + + /* Clear existing chain if present */ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( head ); + + while( c <= end ) + { + if( in_tag && *c == '=' ) + { + if( ( attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name( s, c - s ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID; + goto exit; + } + + oid = attr_descr->oid; + s = c + 1; + in_tag = 0; + d = data; + } + + if( !in_tag && *c == '\\' && c != end ) + { + c++; + + /* Check for valid escaped characters */ + if( c == end || *c != ',' ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + goto exit; + } + } + else if( !in_tag && ( *c == ',' || c == end ) ) + { + mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur = + mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, strlen( oid ), + (unsigned char *) data, + d - data ); + + if(cur == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + // set tagType + cur->val.tag = attr_descr->default_tag; + + while( c < end && *(c + 1) == ' ' ) + c++; + + s = c + 1; + in_tag = 1; + } + + if( !in_tag && s != c + 1 ) + { + *(d++) = *c; + + if( d - data == MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + goto exit; + } + } + + c++; + } + +exit: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* The first byte of the value in the mbedtls_asn1_named_data structure is reserved + * to store the critical boolean for us + */ +int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + + if( ( cur = mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, oid_len, + NULL, val_len + 1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + cur->val.p[0] = critical; + memcpy( cur->val.p + 1, val, val_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + * SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue + * + * AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + * type AttributeType, + * value AttributeValue } + * + * AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + */ +static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur_name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const char *oid = (const char*)cur_name->oid.p; + size_t oid_len = cur_name->oid.len; + const unsigned char *name = cur_name->val.p; + size_t name_len = cur_name->val.len; + + // Write correct string tag and value + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( p, start, + cur_name->val.tag, + (const char *) name, + name_len ) ); + // Write OID + // + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, + oid_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur = first; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_name( p, start, cur ) ); + cur = cur->next; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_write_sig( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = size; + (*p) -= len; + memcpy( *p, sig, len ); + + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = 0; + len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); + + // Write OID + // + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( p, start, oid, + oid_len, 0 ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +static int x509_write_extension( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *ext ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, ext->val.p + 1, + ext->val.len - 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, ext->val.len - 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ); + + if( ext->val.p[0] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( p, start, 1 ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, ext->oid.p, + ext->oid.len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, ext->oid.len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING + * -- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value + * -- corresponding to the extension type identified + * -- by extnID + * } + */ +int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur_ext = first; + + while( cur_ext != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_extension( p, start, cur_ext ) ); + cur_ext = cur_ext->next; + } + + return( (int) len ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2d80420 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c @@ -0,0 +1,770 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certidicate Revocation List (CRL) parsing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#endif + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1) } + */ +static int x509_crl_get_version( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + *ver = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 CRL v2 extensions + * + * We currently don't parse any extension's content, but we do check that the + * list of extensions is well-formed and abort on critical extensions (that + * are unsupported as we don't support any extension so far) + */ +static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- if present, version MUST be v2 + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, ext, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end = ext->p + ext->len; + + while( *p < end ) + { + /* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING } + */ + int is_critical = 0; + const unsigned char *end_ext_data; + size_t len; + + /* Get enclosing sequence tag */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get OID (currently ignored) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + } + *p += len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, + &is_critical ) ) != 0 && + ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + } + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + /* Ignore data so far and just check its length */ + *p += len; + if( *p != end_ext_data ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* Abort on (unsupported) critical extensions */ + if( is_critical ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 CRL v2 entry extensions (no extensions parsed yet.) + */ +static int x509_get_crl_entry_ext( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + /* OPTIONAL */ + if( end <= *p ) + return( 0 ); + + ext->tag = **p; + ext->p = *p; + + /* + * Get CRL-entry extension sequence header + * crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL -- if present, MUST be v2 + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &ext->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + ext->p = NULL; + return( 0 ); + } + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + } + + end = *p + ext->len; + + if( end != *p + ext->len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + *p += len; + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 CRL Entries + */ +static int x509_get_entries( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t entry_len; + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur_entry = entry; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &entry_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ret ); + } + + end = *p + entry_len; + + while( *p < end ) + { + size_t len2; + const unsigned char *end2; + + cur_entry->raw.tag = **p; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len2, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + cur_entry->raw.p = *p; + cur_entry->raw.len = len2; + end2 = *p + len2; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( p, end2, &cur_entry->serial ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end2, + &cur_entry->revocation_date ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = x509_get_crl_entry_ext( p, end2, + &cur_entry->entry_ext ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( *p < end ) + { + cur_entry->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl_entry ) ); + + if( cur_entry->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + cur_entry = cur_entry->next; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse one CRLs in DER format and append it to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl = chain; + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( crl == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + + /* + * Add new CRL on the end of the chain if needed. + */ + while( crl->version != 0 && crl->next != NULL ) + crl = crl->next; + + if( crl->version != 0 && crl->next == NULL ) + { + crl->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl ) ); + + if( crl->next == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( crl->next ); + crl = crl->next; + } + + /* + * Copy raw DER-encoded CRL + */ + if( buflen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buflen ); + if( p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( p, buf, buflen ); + + crl->raw.p = p; + crl->raw.len = buflen; + + end = p + buflen; + + /* + * CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { + * tbsCertList TBSCertList, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + + if( len != (size_t) ( end - p ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + /* + * TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + crl->tbs.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + crl->tbs.len = end - crl->tbs.p; + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER OPTIONAL { v1(0), v2(1) } + * -- if present, MUST be v2 + * + * signature AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + if( ( ret = x509_crl_get_version( &p, end, &crl->version ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crl->sig_oid, &sig_params1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crl->version < 0 || crl->version > 1 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); + } + + crl->version++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crl->sig_oid, &sig_params1, + &crl->sig_md, &crl->sig_pk, + &crl->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG ); + } + + /* + * issuer Name + */ + crl->issuer_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crl->issuer ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + crl->issuer_raw.len = p - crl->issuer_raw.p; + + /* + * thisUpdate Time + * nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( &p, end, &crl->this_update ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( &p, end, &crl->next_update ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) && + ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* + * revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + * userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, + * revocationDate Time, + * crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- if present, MUST be v2 + * } OPTIONAL + */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_entries( &p, end, &crl->entry ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * crlExtensions EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- if present, MUST be v2 + */ + if( crl->version == 2 ) + { + ret = x509_get_crl_ext( &p, end, &crl->crl_ext ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + end = crl->raw.p + crl->raw.len; + + /* + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crl->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || + memcmp( crl->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crl->sig_oid.len ) != 0 || + sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || + ( sig_params1.len != 0 && + memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crl->sig ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse one or more CRLs and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len = 0; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; + int is_pem = 0; + + if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + do + { + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + + // Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated + // string + if( buflen == 0 || buf[buflen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----", + "-----END X509 CRL-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + is_pem = 1; + + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( chain, + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else if( is_pem ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + } + /* In the PEM case, buflen is 1 at the end, for the terminated NULL byte. + * And a valid CRL cannot be less than 1 byte anyway. */ + while( is_pem && buflen > 1 ); + + if( is_pem ) + return( 0 ); + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + return( mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load one or more CRLs and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( chain, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/* + * Return an informational string about the certificate. + */ +#define BEFORE_COLON 14 +#define BC "14" +/* + * Return an informational string about the CRL. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sCRL version : %d", + prefix, crl->version ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crl->issuer ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sthis update : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crl->this_update.year, crl->this_update.mon, + crl->this_update.day, crl->this_update.hour, + crl->this_update.min, crl->this_update.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%snext update : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crl->next_update.year, crl->next_update.mon, + crl->next_update.day, crl->next_update.hour, + crl->next_update.min, crl->next_update.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + entry = &crl->entry; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sRevoked certificates:", + prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + while( entry != NULL && entry->raw.len != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sserial number: ", + prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &entry->serial ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " revocation date: " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", + entry->revocation_date.year, entry->revocation_date.mon, + entry->revocation_date.day, entry->revocation_date.hour, + entry->revocation_date.min, entry->revocation_date.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + entry = entry->next; + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &crl->sig_oid, crl->sig_pk, crl->sig_md, + crl->sig_opts ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a CRL chain + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_init( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) +{ + memset( crl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all CRL data + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_free( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_cur = crl; + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_prv; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_cur; + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_prv; + + if( crl == NULL ) + return; + + do + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_free( crl_cur->sig_opts ); +#endif + + name_cur = crl_cur->issuer.next; + while( name_cur != NULL ) + { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + mbedtls_free( name_prv ); + } + + entry_cur = crl_cur->entry.next; + while( entry_cur != NULL ) + { + entry_prv = entry_cur; + entry_cur = entry_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( entry_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl_entry ) ); + mbedtls_free( entry_prv ); + } + + if( crl_cur->raw.p != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( crl_cur->raw.p, crl_cur->raw.len ); + mbedtls_free( crl_cur->raw.p ); + } + + crl_cur = crl_cur->next; + } + while( crl_cur != NULL ); + + crl_cur = crl; + do + { + crl_prv = crl_cur; + crl_cur = crl_cur->next; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( crl_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl ) ); + if( crl_prv != crl ) + mbedtls_free( crl_prv ); + } + while( crl_cur != NULL ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..911644b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c @@ -0,0 +1,3399 @@ +/* + * X.509 certificate parsing and verification + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + * + * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#include +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */ +#endif + +/* + * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + uint32_t flags; +} x509_crt_verify_chain_item; + +/* + * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root + */ +#define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 ) + +/* Default profile. Do not remove items unless there are serious security + * concerns. */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = +{ + /* Only SHA-2 hashes */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), + 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ + 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */ + 2048, +}; + +/* + * Next-default profile + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next = +{ + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), + 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 ), +#else + 0, +#endif + 2048, +}; + +/* + * NSA Suite B Profile + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb = +{ + /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ), + /* Only ECDSA */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ), +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ), +#else + 0, +#endif + 0, +}; + +/* + * Check md_alg against profile + * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_profile_check_md_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( md_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Check pk_alg against profile + * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg ) +{ + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( pk_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Check key against profile + * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ + const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) + { + if( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( pk ) >= profile->rsa_min_bitlen ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA || + pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) + { + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id; + + if( gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( gid ) ) != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); + } +#endif + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different + */ +static int x509_memcasecmp( const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char diff; + const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2; + + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i]; + + if( diff == 0 ) + continue; + + if( diff == 32 && + ( ( n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z' ) || + ( n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z' ) ) ) + { + continue; + } + + return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name ) +{ + size_t i; + size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn ); + + /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */ + if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' ) + return( -1 ); + + for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i ) + { + if( cn[i] == '.' ) + { + cn_idx = i; + break; + } + } + + if( cn_idx == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 && + x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding + * variations (but not all). + * + * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. + */ +static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b ) +{ + if( a->tag == b->tag && + a->len == b->len && + memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ( a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) && + ( b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) && + a->len == b->len && + x509_memcasecmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence). + * + * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm: + * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal, + * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation + * or space folding.) + * + * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. + */ +static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b ) +{ + /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */ + while( a != NULL || b != NULL ) + { + if( a == NULL || b == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + /* type */ + if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag || + a->oid.len != b->oid.len || + memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 ) + { + return( -1 ); + } + + /* value */ + if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + /* structure of the list of sets */ + if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged ) + return( -1 ); + + a = a->next; + b = b->next; + } + + /* a == NULL == b */ + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain + */ +static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain ) +{ + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++ ) + { + ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL; + ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1; + } + + ver_chain->len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ +static int x509_get_version( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + *ver = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + */ +static int x509_get_dates( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *from, + mbedtls_x509_time *to ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) ); + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, from ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, to ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed) + */ +static int x509_get_uid( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + uid->tag = **p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &uid->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | n ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( 0 ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + uid->p = *p; + *p += uid->len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ca_istrue, + int *max_pathlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* + * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { + * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } + */ + *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end, ca_istrue ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ca_istrue ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *ca_istrue != 0 ) + *ca_istrue = 1; + } + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer + * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */ + if( *max_pathlen == INT_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + (*max_pathlen)++; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_get_ns_cert_type( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( bs.len != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_get_key_usage( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( bs.len < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *key_usage = 0; + for( i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof( unsigned int ); i++ ) + { + *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId + * + * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + */ +static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ + if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + * + * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName + * + * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + * otherName [0] OtherName, + * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + * dNSName [2] IA5String, + * x400Address [3] ORAddress, + * directoryName [4] Name, + * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } + * + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { + * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, + * partyName [1] DirectoryString } + * + * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName + * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point. + */ +static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len, tag_len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; + unsigned char tag; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf; + memset( &dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof( dummy_san_buf ) ); + + tag = **p; + (*p)++; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK ) != + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } + + /* + * Check that the SAN is structured correctly. + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &(cur->buf), &dummy_san_buf ); + /* + * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, + * and clear the allocated sequences. + */ + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur = subject_alt_name->next; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + subject_alt_name->next = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + buf = &(cur->buf); + buf->tag = tag; + buf->p = *p; + buf->len = tag_len; + *p += buf->len; + } + + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } + * + * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } + * + * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation + * + * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, + * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } + * + * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, + * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } + * + * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers + * + * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } + * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } + * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } + * + * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) + * + * Qualifier ::= CHOICE { + * cPSuri CPSuri, + * userNotice UserNotice } + * + * CPSuri ::= IA5String + * + * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { + * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, + * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL } + * + * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { + * organization DisplayText, + * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } + * + * DisplayText ::= CHOICE { + * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), + * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), + * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), + * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } + * + * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point + * as defined in RFC 5280. + */ +static int x509_get_certificate_policies( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) +{ + int ret, parse_ret = 0; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Cannot be an empty sequence. + */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid; + const unsigned char *policy_end; + + /* + * Get the policy sequence + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + policy_end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + policy_oid.len = len; + policy_oid.p = *p; + + /* + * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy. + */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this + * extension is critical and MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + * is configured. + */ + parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + buf = &( cur->buf ); + buf->tag = policy_oid.tag; + buf->p = policy_oid.p; + buf->len = policy_oid.len; + + *p += len; + + /* + * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end + * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end. + */ + if( *p < policy_end ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + /* + * Skip the optional policy qualifiers. + */ + *p += len; + } + + if( *p != policy_end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( parse_ret ); +} + +/* + * X.509 v3 extensions + * + */ +static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_ext_data, *start_ext_octet, *end_ext_octet; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end = crt->v3_ext.p + crt->v3_ext.len; + while( *p < end ) + { + /* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING } + */ + mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = {0, 0, NULL}; + int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + int ext_type = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get extension ID */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + extn_oid.p = *p; + *p += extn_oid.len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 && + ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + start_ext_octet = *p; + end_ext_octet = *p + len; + + if( end_ext_octet != end_ext_data ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Detect supported extensions + */ + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */ + if( cb != NULL ) + { + ret = cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet ); + if( ret != 0 && is_critical ) + return( ret ); + *p = end_ext_octet; + continue; + } + + /* No parser found, skip extension */ + *p = end_ext_octet; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + if( is_critical ) + { + /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } +#endif + continue; + } + + /* Forbid repeated extensions */ + if( ( crt->ext_types & ext_type ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + crt->ext_types |= ext_type; + + switch( ext_type ) + { + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: + /* Parse basic constraints */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_basic_constraints( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse key usage */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse extended key usage */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: + /* Parse subject alt name */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: + /* Parse netscape certificate type */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: + /* Parse certificate policies type */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_certificate_policies( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension + * if it contains unsupported policies */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && cb != NULL && + cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, + start_ext_octet, end_ext_octet ) == 0 ) + break; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + if( is_critical ) + return( ret ); + else +#endif + /* + * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we + * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to + * the user to choose how to enforce the policies, + * unless the extension is critical. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + } + break; + + default: + /* + * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer + * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, + * skip the extension. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + if( is_critical ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + else +#endif + *p = end_ext_octet; + } + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format + */ +static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; + + memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */ + p = (unsigned char*) buf; + len = buflen; + end = p + len; + + /* + * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { + * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + + end = crt_end = p + len; + crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf; + if( make_copy != 0 ) + { + /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */ + crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len ); + if( crt->raw.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len ); + crt->own_buffer = 1; + + p += crt->raw.len - len; + end = crt_end = p + len; + } + else + { + crt->raw.p = (unsigned char*) buf; + crt->own_buffer = 0; + } + + /* + * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + crt->tbs.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p; + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + * + * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER + * + * signature AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_version( &p, end, &crt->version ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( &p, end, &crt->serial ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crt->sig_oid, + &sig_params1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); + } + + crt->version++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1, + &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk, + &crt->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * issuer Name + */ + crt->issuer_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->issuer ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p; + + /* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + * + */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_dates( &p, end, &crt->valid_from, + &crt->valid_to ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * subject Name + */ + crt->subject_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->subject ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p; + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + crt->pk_raw.p = p; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p; + + /* + * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 + * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 + * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- If present, version shall be v3 + */ + if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) + { + ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) + { + ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) + if( crt->version == 3 ) +#endif + { + ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + end = crt_end; + + /* + * } + * -- end of TBSCertificate + * + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || + memcmp( crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len ) != 0 || + sig_params1.tag != sig_params2.tag || + sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || + ( sig_params1.len != 0 && + memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crt->sig ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a + * chained list + */ +static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL; + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL ) + { + prev = crt; + crt = crt->next; + } + + /* + * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed. + */ + if( crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL ) + { + crt->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + + if( crt->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + prev = crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( crt->next ); + crt = crt->next; + } + + ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( prev ) + prev->next = NULL; + + if( crt != chain ) + mbedtls_free( crt ); + + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 0, NULL, NULL ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 1, NULL, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained + * list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0; + int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER; +#endif + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or + * one or more PEM certificates. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if( buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' && + strstr( (const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" ) != NULL ) + { + buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM; + } + + if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER ) + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); +#else + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; + + /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */ + while( buflen > 1 ) + { + size_t use_len; + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + + /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */ + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----", + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + } + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + { + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + + /* + * PEM header and footer were found + */ + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + + if( first_error == 0 ) + first_error = ret; + + total_failed++; + continue; + } + else + break; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen ); + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* + * Quit parsing on a memory error + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ) + return( ret ); + + if( first_error == 0 ) + first_error = ret; + + total_failed++; + continue; + } + + success = 1; + } + } + + if( success ) + return( total_failed ); + else if( first_error ) + return( first_error ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( chain, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + int w_ret; + WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH]; + char filename[MAX_PATH]; + char *p; + size_t len = strlen( path ); + + WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data; + HANDLE hFind; + + if( len > MAX_PATH - 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir) ); + memset( filename, 0, MAX_PATH ); + memcpy( filename, path, len ); + filename[len++] = '\\'; + p = filename + len; + filename[len++] = '*'; + + w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir, + MAX_PATH - 3 ); + if( w_ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hFind = FindFirstFileW( szDir, &file_data ); + if( hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + len = MAX_PATH - len; + do + { + memset( p, 0, len ); + + if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY ) + continue; + + w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, + lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ), + p, (int) len - 1, + NULL, NULL ); + if( w_ret == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, filename ); + if( w_ret < 0 ) + ret++; + else + ret += w_ret; + } + while( FindNextFileW( hFind, &file_data ) != 0 ); + + if( GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + +cleanup: + FindClose( hFind ); +#else /* _WIN32 */ + int t_ret; + int snp_ret; + struct stat sb; + struct dirent *entry; + char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN]; + DIR *dir = opendir( path ); + + if( dir == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) ) != 0 ) + { + closedir( dir ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + memset( &sb, 0, sizeof( sb ) ); + + while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL ) + { + snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf( entry_name, sizeof entry_name, + "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name ); + + if( snp_ret < 0 || (size_t)snp_ret >= sizeof entry_name ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + else if( stat( entry_name, &sb ) == -1 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( !S_ISREG( sb.st_mode ) ) + continue; + + // Ignore parse errors + // + t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, entry_name ); + if( t_ret < 0 ) + ret++; + else + ret += t_ret; + } + +cleanup: + closedir( dir ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#endif /* _WIN32 */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/* + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + * + * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, + * as defined in RFC 4108. + */ +static int x509_get_other_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; + const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; + mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; + + if( ( subject_alt_name->tag & + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) != + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ) ) + { + /* + * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". + */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + cur_oid.p = p; + cur_oid.len = len; + + /* + * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. + */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + if( p + len >= end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + p += len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; + + if( p + len >= end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + p += len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; + p += len; + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, + sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; + int parse_ret; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + memset( &san, 0, sizeof( san ) ); + parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &cur->buf, &san ); + if( parse_ret != 0 ) + { + if( parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + cur = cur->next; + continue; + } + + switch( san.type ) + { + /* + * otherName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, + &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ) != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( p, n, &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len >= n ) + { + *p = '\0'; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( p, other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p, + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len ); + p += other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; + + n -= other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; + + }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ + } + break; + + /* + * dNSName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if( san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n ) + { + *p = '\0'; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len ); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + + /* + * Type not supported, skip item. + */ + default: + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + break; + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *p = '\0'; + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + switch( san_buf->tag & + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) + { + /* + * otherName + */ + case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ): + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; + + ret = x509_get_other_name( san_buf, &other_name ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; + memcpy( &san->san.other_name, + &other_name, sizeof( other_name ) ); + + } + break; + + /* + * dNSName + */ + case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ): + { + memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; + + memcpy( &san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof( *san_buf ) ); + + } + break; + + /* + * Type not supported + */ + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ + { \ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s" i, sep ); \ + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ + sep = ", "; \ + } + +#define CERT_TYPE(type,name) \ + if( ns_cert_type & (type) ) \ + PRINT_ITEM( name ); + +static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA" ); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define KEY_USAGE(code,name) \ + if( key_usage & (code) ) \ + PRINT_ITEM( name ); + +static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only" ); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *desc; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage; + const char *sep = ""; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) + desc = "???"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + sep = ", "; + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_info_cert_policies( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *desc; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + const char *sep = ""; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) + desc = "???"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + sep = ", "; + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Return an informational string about the certificate. + */ +#define BEFORE_COLON 18 +#define BC "18" +int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + if( NULL == crt ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%scert. version : %d\n", + prefix, crt->version ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sserial number : ", + prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &crt->serial ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->issuer ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->subject ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissued on : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon, + crt->valid_from.day, crt->valid_from.hour, + crt->valid_from.min, crt->valid_from.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sexpires on : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon, + crt->valid_to.day, crt->valid_to.hour, + crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk, + crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + /* Key size */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, + mbedtls_pk_get_name( &crt->pk ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str, + (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &crt->pk ) ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + /* + * Optional extensions + */ + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix, + crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( crt->max_pathlen > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1 ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name( &p, &n, + &crt->subject_alt_names, + prefix ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_type( &p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_key_usage( &p, &n, crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage( &p, &n, + &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_policies( &p, &n, + &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +struct x509_crt_verify_string { + int code; + const char *string; +}; + +static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, "The certificate validity has expired" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, "The CRL is expired" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, "Certificate was missing" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, "Certificate verification was skipped" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, "The certificate validity starts in the future" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, "The CRL is from the future" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + uint32_t flags ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur; + char *p = buf; + size_t n = size; + + for( cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL ; cur++ ) + { + if( ( flags & cur->code ) == 0 ) + continue; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + flags ^= cur->code; + } + + if( flags != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sUnknown reason " + "(this should not happen)\n", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + unsigned int usage ) +{ + unsigned int usage_must, usage_may; + unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY + | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; + + if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + usage_must = usage & ~may_mask; + + if( ( ( crt->key_usage & ~may_mask ) & usage_must ) != usage_must ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + usage_may = usage & may_mask; + + if( ( ( crt->key_usage & may_mask ) | usage_may ) != usage_may ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const char *usage_oid, + size_t usage_len ) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; + + /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */ + if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list + */ + for( cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf; + + if( cur_oid->len == usage_len && + memcmp( cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) +/* + * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry; + + while( cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0 ) + { + if( crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len && + memcmp( crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL. + * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present. + */ +static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ) +{ + int flags = 0; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + if( ca == NULL ) + return( flags ); + + while( crl_list != NULL ) + { + if( crl_list->version == 0 || + x509_name_cmp( &crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject ) != 0 ) + { + crl_list = crl_list->next; + continue; + } + + /* + * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca, + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 ) + { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } +#endif + + /* + * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA + */ + if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_md ) != 0 ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD; + + if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_pk ) != 0 ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( crl_list->sig_md ); + if( mbedtls_md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) + { + /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } + + if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &ca->pk ) != 0 ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk, + crl_list->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 ) + { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } + + /* + * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out) + */ + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &crl_list->next_update ) ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED; + + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &crl_list->this_update ) ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE; + + /* + * Check if certificate is revoked + */ + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( crt, crl_list ) ) + { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED; + break; + } + + crl_list = crl_list->next; + } + + return( flags ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent + */ +static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t hash_len; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md ); + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ + if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); +#else + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( child->sig_md ); + + if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( -1 ); + + if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( -1 ); + } + + if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( -1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */ + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) + { + return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk, + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, + child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) ); + } +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + + return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk, + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, + child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) ); +} + +/* + * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'. + * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not. + * + * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate + */ +static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, + int top ) +{ + int need_ca_bit; + + /* Parent must be the issuer */ + if( x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &parent->subject ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */ + need_ca_bit = 1; + + /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */ + if( top && parent->version < 3 ) + need_ca_bit = 0; + + if( need_ca_bit && ! parent->ca_istrue ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + if( need_ca_bit && + mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN ) != 0 ) + { + return( -1 ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL. + * + * Here suitable is defined as: + * 1. subject name matches child's issuer + * 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs + * 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct + * (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported) + * 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied + * + * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first + * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is + * none). + * + * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted + * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods. + * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.) + * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is + * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that + * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here. + * + * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might + * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the + * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't + * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to + * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].) + * + * Arguments: + * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent + * - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents + * - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL) + * - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 + * - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top + * of the chain, 0 otherwise + * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far + * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far + * (will never be greater than path_cnt) + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations + * + * Return value: + * - 0 on success + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise + */ +static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( + mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates, + mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent, + int *r_signature_is_good, + int top, + unsigned path_cnt, + unsigned self_cnt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent; + int signature_is_good = 0, fallback_signature_is_good; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* did we have something in progress? */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL ) + { + /* restore saved state */ + parent = rs_ctx->parent; + fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent; + fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good; + + /* clear saved state */ + rs_ctx->parent = NULL; + rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; + rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + /* resume where we left */ + goto check_signature; + } +#endif + + fallback_parent = NULL; + fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + for( parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next ) + { + /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */ + if( x509_crt_check_parent( child, parent, top ) != 0 ) + continue; + + /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */ + if( parent->max_pathlen > 0 && + (size_t) parent->max_pathlen < 1 + path_cnt - self_cnt ) + { + continue; + } + + /* Signature */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +check_signature: +#endif + ret = x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent, rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->parent = parent; + rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent; + rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; + + return( ret ); + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + signature_is_good = ret == 0; + if( top && ! signature_is_good ) + continue; + + /* optional time check */ + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &parent->valid_to ) || + mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &parent->valid_from ) ) + { + if( fallback_parent == NULL ) + { + fallback_parent = parent; + fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; + } + + continue; + } + + *r_parent = parent; + *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; + + break; + } + + if( parent == NULL ) + { + *r_parent = fallback_parent; + *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL. + * + * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found + * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable). + * + * Arguments: + * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed + * by a chain of possible intermediates + * - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates + * - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL) + * - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0 + * - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 + * - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child) + * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far + * (will always be no greater than path_cnt) + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations + * + * Return value: + * - 0 on success + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise + */ +static int x509_crt_find_parent( + mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crt **parent, + int *parent_is_trusted, + int *signature_is_good, + unsigned path_cnt, + unsigned self_cnt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list; + + *parent_is_trusted = 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1 ) + { + *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted; + rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; + } +#endif + + while( 1 ) { + search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next; + + ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, search_list, + parent, signature_is_good, + *parent_is_trusted, + path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted; + return( ret ); + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */ + if( *parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0 ) + break; + + /* prepare second iteration */ + *parent_is_trusted = 0; + } + + /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */ + if( *parent == NULL ) + { + *parent_is_trusted = 0; + *signature_is_good = 0; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted + * + * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only + * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked) + */ +static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cur; + + /* must be self-issued */ + if( x509_name_cmp( &crt->issuer, &crt->subject ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */ + for( cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + if( crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len && + memcmp( crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + } + + /* too bad */ + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Build and verify a certificate chain + * + * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and + * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain + * EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj] + * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one, + * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible. + * + * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found. + * + * Special cases: + * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it + * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root + * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq + * + * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least: + * - trusted EE + * - EE -> trusted root + * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root + * - if relevant: EE untrusted + * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted + * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root). + * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is + * enough (but length 1 is not in general). + * + * Arguments: + * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn + * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp + * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile() + * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain + * Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise! + * Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume. + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations + * + * Return value: + * - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined + * - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined, + * even if it was found to be invalid + */ +static int x509_crt_verify_chain( + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can + * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t *flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; + mbedtls_x509_crt *child; + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; + int parent_is_trusted; + int child_is_trusted; + int signature_is_good; + unsigned self_cnt; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* resume if we had an operation in progress */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent ) + { + /* restore saved state */ + *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */ + self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt; + + /* restore derived state */ + cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1]; + child = cur->crt; + flags = &cur->flags; + + goto find_parent; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + child = crt; + self_cnt = 0; + parent_is_trusted = 0; + child_is_trusted = 0; + + while( 1 ) { + /* Add certificate to the verification chain */ + cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len]; + cur->crt = child; + cur->flags = 0; + ver_chain->len++; + flags = &cur->flags; + + /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */ + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED; + + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE; + + /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */ + if( child_is_trusted ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */ + if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD; + + if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; + + /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */ + if( ver_chain->len == 1 && + x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +find_parent: +#endif + + /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback, + * or use statically provided list. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( f_ca_cb != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + mbedtls_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; + + ret = f_ca_cb( p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + ((void) f_ca_cb); + ((void) p_ca_cb); + cur_trust_ca = trust_ca; + } + + /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ + ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, cur_trust_ca, &parent, + &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good, + ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent; + rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt; + rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */ + + return( ret ); + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + /* No parent? We're done here */ + if( parent == NULL ) + { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs. + * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO], + * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */ + if( ver_chain->len != 1 && + x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 ) + { + self_cnt++; + } + + /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA, + * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */ + if( ! parent_is_trusted && + ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA ) + { + /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* signature was checked while searching parent */ + if( ! signature_is_good ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; + + /* check size of signing key */ + if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &parent->pk ) != 0 ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */ + *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl( child, parent, ca_crl, profile ); +#else + (void) ca_crl; +#endif + + /* prepare for next iteration */ + child = parent; + parent = NULL; + child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted; + signature_is_good = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Check for CN match + */ +static int x509_crt_check_cn( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len ) +{ + /* try exact match */ + if( name->len == cn_len && + x509_memcasecmp( cn, name->p, cn_len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* try wildcard match */ + if( x509_check_wildcard( cn, name ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6 + */ +static int x509_crt_check_san( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len ) +{ + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) name->tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + + /* dNSName */ + if( san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ) + return( x509_crt_check_cn( name, cn, cn_len ) ); + + /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ + + /* Unrecognized type */ + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL! + */ +static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const char *cn, + uint32_t *flags ) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_name *name; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; + size_t cn_len = strlen( cn ); + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) + { + for( cur = &crt->subject_alt_names; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + if( x509_crt_check_san( &cur->buf, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) + break; + } + + if( cur == NULL ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; + } + else + { + for( name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next ) + { + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid ) == 0 && + x509_crt_check_cn( &name->val, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) + { + break; + } + } + + if( name == NULL ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; + } +} + +/* + * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback + */ +static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( + uint32_t *flags, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned i; + uint32_t cur_flags; + const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; + + for( i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i ) + { + cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1]; + cur_flags = cur->flags; + + if( NULL != f_vrfy ) + if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + *flags |= cur_flags; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version + * + * This function: + * - checks the requested CN (if any) + * - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key, + * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently + * - builds and verifies the chain + * - then calls the callback and merges the flags + * + * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb` + * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the + * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will + * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list + * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list + * of CRLs. + */ +static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; + uint32_t ee_flags; + + *flags = 0; + ee_flags = 0; + x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ver_chain ); + + if( profile == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + + /* check name if requested */ + if( cn != NULL ) + x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, &ee_flags ); + + /* Check the type and size of the key */ + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk ); + + if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 ) + ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; + + if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &crt->pk ) != 0 ) + ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + /* Check the chain */ + ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile, + &ver_chain, rs_ctx ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Merge end-entity flags */ + ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags; + + /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */ + ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); + +exit: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); + mbedtls_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); + ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( rs_ctx ); +#endif + + /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by + * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the + * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + *flags = (uint32_t) -1; + return( ret ); + } + + if( *flags != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); +} + + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, + cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback, + * not restartable). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, NULL, NULL, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ) ); +} + + +/* + * Initialize a certificate chain + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) +{ + memset( crt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all certificate data + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; + + if( crt == NULL ) + return; + + do + { + mbedtls_pk_free( &cert_cur->pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_free( cert_cur->sig_opts ); +#endif + + name_cur = cert_cur->issuer.next; + while( name_cur != NULL ) + { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + mbedtls_free( name_prv ); + } + + name_cur = cert_cur->subject.next; + while( name_cur != NULL ) + { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + mbedtls_free( name_prv ); + } + + seq_cur = cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + + seq_cur = cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + + seq_cur = cert_cur->certificate_policies.next; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + + if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len ); + mbedtls_free( cert_cur->raw.p ); + } + + cert_cur = cert_cur->next; + } + while( cert_cur != NULL ); + + cert_cur = crt; + do + { + cert_prv = cert_cur; + cert_cur = cert_cur->next; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + if( cert_prv != crt ) + mbedtls_free( cert_prv ); + } + while( cert_cur != NULL ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_restart_init( &ctx->pk ); + + ctx->parent = NULL; + ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; + ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; + + ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none; + ctx->self_cnt = 0; + x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ctx->ver_chain ); +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( &ctx->pk ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e259410d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#endif + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } + */ +static int x509_csr_get_version( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + *ver = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR in DER format + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params; + + memset( &sig_params, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( csr == NULL || buf == NULL || buflen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_x509_csr_init( csr ); + + /* + * first copy the raw DER data + */ + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len = buflen ); + + if( p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( p, buf, buflen ); + + csr->raw.p = p; + csr->raw.len = len; + end = p + len; + + /* + * CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + * certificationRequestInfo CertificationRequestInfo, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signature BIT STRING + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + + if( len != (size_t) ( end - p ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + /* + * CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + csr->cri.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + csr->cri.len = end - csr->cri.p; + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } + */ + if( ( ret = x509_csr_get_version( &p, end, &csr->version ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( csr->version != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); + } + + csr->version++; + + /* + * subject Name + */ + csr->subject_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &csr->subject ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + csr->subject_raw.len = p - csr->subject_raw.p; + + /* + * subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &csr->pk ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * attributes [0] Attributes + * + * The list of possible attributes is open-ended, though RFC 2985 + * (PKCS#9) defines a few in section 5.4. We currently don't support any, + * so we just ignore them. This is a safe thing to do as the worst thing + * that could happen is that we issue a certificate that does not match + * the requester's expectations - this cannot cause a violation of our + * signature policies. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + end = csr->raw.p + csr->raw.len; + + /* + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signature BIT STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &csr->sig_oid, &sig_params ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &csr->sig_oid, &sig_params, + &csr->sig_md, &csr->sig_pk, + &csr->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &csr->sig ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR, allowing for PEM or raw DER encoding + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( csr == NULL || buf == NULL || buflen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' ) + { + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + "-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded, parse the result + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( csr, pem.buf, pem.buflen ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + return( mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( csr, buf, buflen ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load a CSR into the structure + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( csr, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#define BEFORE_COLON 14 +#define BC "14" +/* + * Return an informational string about the CSR. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sCSR version : %d", + prefix, csr->version ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &csr->subject ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &csr->sig_oid, csr->sig_pk, csr->sig_md, + csr->sig_opts ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, + mbedtls_pk_get_name( &csr->pk ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits\n", prefix, key_size_str, + (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &csr->pk ) ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a CSR + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_init( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ) +{ + memset( csr, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_csr) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all CSR data + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_free( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; + + if( csr == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_pk_free( &csr->pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_free( csr->sig_opts ); +#endif + + name_cur = csr->subject.next; + while( name_cur != NULL ) + { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + mbedtls_free( name_prv ); + } + + if( csr->raw.p != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( csr->raw.p, csr->raw.len ); + mbedtls_free( csr->raw.p ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( csr, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_csr ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c5e9918 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c @@ -0,0 +1,543 @@ +/* + * X.509 certificate writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * References: + * - certificates: RFC 5280, updated by RFC 6818 + * - CSRs: PKCS#10 v1.7 aka RFC 2986 + * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->serial ); + ctx->version = MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->serial ); + + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->subject ); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->issuer ); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->extensions ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int version ) +{ + ctx->version = version; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + ctx->md_alg = md_alg; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + ctx->subject_key = key; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + ctx->issuer_key = key; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *subject_name ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->subject, subject_name ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *issuer_name ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->issuer, issuer_name ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *serial ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->serial, serial ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *not_before, + const char *not_after ) +{ + if( strlen( not_before ) != MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1 || + strlen( not_after ) != MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + strncpy( ctx->not_before, not_before, MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ); + strncpy( ctx->not_after , not_after , MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ); + ctx->not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1] = 'Z'; + ctx->not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1] = 'Z'; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_set_extension( &ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, + critical, val, val_len ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int is_ca, int max_pathlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[9]; + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); + size_t len = 0; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); + + if( is_ca && max_pathlen > 127 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( is_ca ) + { + if( max_pathlen >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, + max_pathlen ) ); + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( &c, buf, 1 ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ), + is_ca, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); + size_t len = 0; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, ctx->subject_key ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len, + buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + c = buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20; + len = 20; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ); + + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER ), + 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof( buf ); + size_t len = 0; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, ctx->issuer_key ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len, + buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + c = buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20; + len = 20; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( + ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER ), + 0, buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned int key_usage ) +{ + unsigned char buf[5] = {0}, ku[2] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned int allowed_bits = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; + + /* Check that nothing other than the allowed flags is set */ + if( ( key_usage & ~allowed_bits ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + c = buf + 5; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( key_usage, ku, 0 ); + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, ku, 9 ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + else if( ret < 3 || ret > 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), + 1, c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), + 0, c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *t, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + /* + * write MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME if year < 2050 (2 bytes shorter) + */ + if( t[0] < '2' || ( t[0] == '2' && t[1] == '0' && t[2] < '5' ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, + (const unsigned char *) t + 2, + size - 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, + (const unsigned char *) t, + size ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) ); + } + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *sig_oid; + size_t sig_oid_len = 0; + unsigned char *c, *c2; + unsigned char hash[64]; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; + + /* + * Prepare data to be signed at the end of the target buffer + */ + c = buf + size; + + /* Signature algorithm needed in TBS, and later for actual signature */ + + /* There's no direct way of extracting a signature algorithm + * (represented as an element of mbedtls_pk_type_t) from a PK instance. */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->issuer_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + else if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->issuer_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg( pk_alg, ctx->md_alg, + &sig_oid, &sig_oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension + */ + + /* Only for v3 */ + if( ctx->version == MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( &c, + buf, ctx->extensions ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3 ) ); + } + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( ctx->subject_key, + buf, c - buf ) ); + c -= pub_len; + len += pub_len; + + /* + * Subject ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, + ctx->subject ) ); + + /* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + */ + sub_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, + x509_write_time( &c, buf, ctx->not_after, + MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, + x509_write_time( &c, buf, ctx->not_before, + MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ) ); + + len += sub_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, sub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* + * Issuer ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, + ctx->issuer ) ); + + /* + * Signature ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( &c, buf, + sig_oid, strlen( sig_oid ), 0 ) ); + + /* + * Serial ::= INTEGER + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, + &ctx->serial ) ); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ + + /* Can be omitted for v1 */ + if( ctx->version != MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 ) + { + sub_len = 0; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, ctx->version ) ); + len += sub_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, sub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* + * Make signature + */ + + /* Compute hash of CRT. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, + len, hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->issuer_key, ctx->md_alg, + hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Move CRT to the front of the buffer to have space + * for the signature. */ + memmove( buf, c, len ); + c = buf + len; + + /* Add signature at the end of the buffer, + * making sure that it doesn't underflow + * into the CRT buffer. */ + c2 = buf + size; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sig_and_oid_len, mbedtls_x509_write_sig( &c2, c, + sig_oid, sig_oid_len, sig, sig_len ) ); + + /* + * Memory layout after this step: + * + * buf c=buf+len c2 buf+size + * [CRT0,...,CRTn, UNUSED, ..., UNUSED, SIG0, ..., SIGm] + */ + + /* Move raw CRT to just before the signature. */ + c = c2 - len; + memmove( c, buf, len ); + + len += sig_and_oid_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +#define PEM_BEGIN_CRT "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" +#define PEM_END_CRT "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *crt, + unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( crt, buf, size, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_CRT, PEM_END_CRT, + buf + size - ret, ret, + buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..afda9503 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c @@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certificate Signing Request writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * References: + * - CSRs: PKCS#10 v1.7 aka RFC 2986 + * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->subject ); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->extensions ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + ctx->md_alg = md_alg; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + ctx->key = key; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *subject_name ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->subject, subject_name ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_set_extension( &ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, + 0, val, val_len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage ) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &key_usage, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), + c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), + c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509write_csr_der_internal( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t size, + unsigned char *sig, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *sig_oid; + size_t sig_oid_len = 0; + unsigned char *c, *c2; + unsigned char hash[64]; + size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_len; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( ctx->md_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Write the CSR backwards starting from the end of buf */ + c = buf + size; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( &c, buf, + ctx->extensions ) ); + + if( len ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( + &c, buf, MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( ctx->key, + buf, c - buf ) ); + c -= pub_len; + len += pub_len; + + /* + * Subject ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, + ctx->subject ) ); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 0 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* + * Sign the written CSR data into the sig buffer + * Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, c, len ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + else if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg( pk_alg, ctx->md_alg, + &sig_oid, &sig_oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Move the written CSR data to the start of buf to create space for + * writing the signature into buf. + */ + memmove( buf, c, len ); + + /* + * Write sig and its OID into buf backwards from the end of buf. + * Note: mbedtls_x509_write_sig will check for c2 - ( buf + len ) < sig_len + * and return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if needed. + */ + c2 = buf + size; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sig_and_oid_len, + mbedtls_x509_write_sig( &c2, buf + len, sig_oid, sig_oid_len, + sig, sig_len ) ); + + /* + * Compact the space between the CSR data and signature by moving the + * CSR data to the start of the signature. + */ + c2 -= len; + memmove( c2, buf, len ); + + /* ASN encode the total size and tag the CSR data with it. */ + len += sig_and_oid_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c2, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c2, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* Zero the unused bytes at the start of buf */ + memset( buf, 0, c2 - buf); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, + size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *sig; + + if( ( sig = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) ) == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + ret = x509write_csr_der_internal( ctx, buf, size, sig, f_rng, p_rng ); + + mbedtls_free( sig ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#define PEM_BEGIN_CSR "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" +#define PEM_END_CSR "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( ctx, buf, size, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_CSR, PEM_END_CSR, + buf + size - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/xtea.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/xtea.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..77f6cb6f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/library/xtea.c @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +/* + * An 32-bit implementation of the XTEA algorithm + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) + +void mbedtls_xtea_init( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_xtea_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_xtea_free( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_xtea_context ) ); +} + +/* + * XTEA key schedule + */ +void mbedtls_xtea_setup( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16] ) +{ + int i; + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_xtea_context) ); + + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) + { + ctx->k[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( key, i << 2 ); + } +} + +/* + * XTEA encrypt function + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, + const unsigned char input[8], unsigned char output[8]) +{ + uint32_t *k, v0, v1, i; + + k = ctx->k; + + v0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + v1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT ) + { + uint32_t sum = 0, delta = 0x9E3779B9; + + for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ ) + { + v0 += (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); + sum += delta; + v1 += (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); + } + } + else /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT */ + { + uint32_t delta = 0x9E3779B9, sum = delta * 32; + + for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ ) + { + v1 -= (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); + sum -= delta; + v0 -= (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( v0, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( v1, output, 4 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * XTEA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int i; + unsigned char temp[8]; + + if( length % 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 8 ); + mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); + memcpy( iv, output, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * XTEA tests vectors (non-official) + */ + +static const unsigned char xtea_test_key[6][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, + 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, + 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, + 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } +}; + +static const unsigned char xtea_test_pt[6][8] = +{ + { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, + { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, + { 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x6e, 0x27, 0x89, 0x48, 0xd7, 0x7f }, + { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, + { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, + { 0x70, 0xe1, 0x22, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x4e, 0x76, 0x55 } +}; + +static const unsigned char xtea_test_ct[6][8] = +{ + { 0x49, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0xd0, 0x72, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xb5 }, + { 0xe7, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0x13, 0x74, 0x43, 0x41, 0xd8 }, + { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, + { 0xa0, 0x39, 0x05, 0x89, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xef, 0xa5 }, + { 0xed, 0x23, 0x37, 0x5a, 0x82, 0x1a, 0x8c, 0x2d }, + { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char buf[8]; + mbedtls_xtea_context ctx; + + mbedtls_xtea_init( &ctx ); + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " XTEA test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + memcpy( buf, xtea_test_pt[i], 8 ); + + mbedtls_xtea_setup( &ctx, xtea_test_key[i] ); + mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT, buf, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, xtea_test_ct[i], 8 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_xtea_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d4026071 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +# Ignore makefiles generated by CMake, but not the makefile that's checked in. +*/Makefile +!fuzz/Makefile + +*.sln +*.vcxproj + +*.o +*.exe + +aes/crypt_and_hash +hash/generic_sum +hash/hello +hash/md5sum +hash/sha1sum +hash/sha2sum +pkey/dh_client +pkey/dh_genprime +pkey/dh_server +pkey/ecdh_curve25519 +pkey/ecdsa +pkey/gen_key +pkey/key_app +pkey/key_app_writer +pkey/mpi_demo +pkey/pk_decrypt +pkey/pk_encrypt +pkey/pk_sign +pkey/pk_verify +pkey/rsa_decrypt +pkey/rsa_encrypt +pkey/rsa_genkey +pkey/rsa_sign +pkey/rsa_sign_pss +pkey/rsa_verify +pkey/rsa_verify_pss +psa/crypto_examples +psa/key_ladder_demo +psa/psa_constant_names +random/gen_entropy +random/gen_random_ctr_drbg +random/gen_random_havege +ssl/dtls_client +ssl/dtls_server +ssl/mini_client +ssl/ssl_client1 +ssl/ssl_client2 +ssl/ssl_context_info +ssl/ssl_fork_server +ssl/ssl_mail_client +ssl/ssl_pthread_server +ssl/ssl_server +ssl/ssl_server2 +test/benchmark +test/cpp_dummy_build +test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp +test/dlopen +test/ecp-bench +test/query_compile_time_config +test/selftest +test/ssl_cert_test +test/udp_proxy +test/zeroize +util/pem2der +util/strerror +x509/cert_app +x509/cert_req +x509/cert_write +x509/crl_app +x509/load_roots +x509/req_app + +# generated files +pkey/keyfile.key diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8492c61 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +add_subdirectory(aes) +if (NOT WIN32) + add_subdirectory(fuzz) +endif() +add_subdirectory(hash) +add_subdirectory(pkey) +add_subdirectory(psa) +add_subdirectory(random) +add_subdirectory(ssl) +add_subdirectory(test) +add_subdirectory(util) +add_subdirectory(x509) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/Makefile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2d0f7058 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ + +# To compile on SunOS: add "-lsocket -lnsl" to LDFLAGS +# To compile with PKCS11: add "-lpkcs11-helper" to LDFLAGS + +CFLAGS ?= -O2 +WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral +WARNING_CXXFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral +LDFLAGS ?= + +MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH:=../tests/src +MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS:=$(patsubst %.c,%.o,$(wildcard ${MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH}/*.c ${MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH}/drivers/*.c)) + +LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I../tests/include -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_CXXFLAGS = $(WARNING_CXXFLAGS) -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_LDFLAGS = ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS} \ + -L../library \ + -lmbedtls$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ + -lmbedx509$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ + -lmbedcrypto$(SHARED_SUFFIX) + +ifeq ($(shell uname -s),Linux) +DLOPEN_LDFLAGS ?= -ldl +else +DLOPEN_LDFLAGS ?= +endif + +include ../3rdparty/Makefile.inc +LOCAL_CFLAGS+=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) + +ifndef SHARED +MBEDLIBS=../library/libmbedcrypto.a ../library/libmbedx509.a ../library/libmbedtls.a +else +MBEDLIBS=../library/libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) ../library/libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) ../library/libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) +endif +DEP=${MBEDLIBS} ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS} + +ifdef DEBUG +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -g3 +endif + +# if we're running on Windows, build for Windows +ifdef WINDOWS +WINDOWS_BUILD=1 +endif + +ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD +DLEXT=dll +EXEXT=.exe +LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lws2_32 +ifdef SHARED +SHARED_SUFFIX=.$(DLEXT) +endif +else +DLEXT ?= so +EXEXT= +SHARED_SUFFIX= +endif + +# Zlib shared library extensions: +ifdef ZLIB +LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lz +endif + +# Only build the dlopen test in shared library builds, and not when building +# for Windows. +ifdef BUILD_DLOPEN +# Don't override the value +else ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD +BUILD_DLOPEN = +else ifdef SHARED +BUILD_DLOPEN = y +else +BUILD_DLOPEN = +endif + +APPS = \ + aes/crypt_and_hash$(EXEXT) \ + hash/generic_sum$(EXEXT) \ + hash/hello$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/dh_client$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/dh_genprime$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/dh_server$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/ecdh_curve25519$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/ecdsa$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/gen_key$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/key_app$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/key_app_writer$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/mpi_demo$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/pk_decrypt$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/pk_encrypt$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/pk_sign$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/pk_verify$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/rsa_decrypt$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/rsa_encrypt$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/rsa_genkey$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/rsa_sign$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/rsa_sign_pss$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/rsa_verify$(EXEXT) \ + pkey/rsa_verify_pss$(EXEXT) \ + psa/crypto_examples$(EXEXT) \ + psa/key_ladder_demo$(EXEXT) \ + psa/psa_constant_names$(EXEXT) \ + random/gen_entropy$(EXEXT) \ + random/gen_random_ctr_drbg$(EXEXT) \ + random/gen_random_havege$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/dtls_client$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/dtls_server$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/mini_client$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/ssl_client1$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/ssl_client2$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/ssl_context_info$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/ssl_fork_server$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/ssl_mail_client$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/ssl_server$(EXEXT) \ + ssl/ssl_server2$(EXEXT) \ + test/benchmark$(EXEXT) \ + test/query_compile_time_config$(EXEXT) \ + test/selftest$(EXEXT) \ + test/udp_proxy$(EXEXT) \ + test/zeroize$(EXEXT) \ + util/pem2der$(EXEXT) \ + util/strerror$(EXEXT) \ + x509/cert_app$(EXEXT) \ + x509/cert_req$(EXEXT) \ + x509/cert_write$(EXEXT) \ + x509/crl_app$(EXEXT) \ + x509/load_roots$(EXEXT) \ + x509/req_app$(EXEXT) \ +# End of APPS + +ifdef PTHREAD +APPS += ssl/ssl_pthread_server$(EXEXT) +endif + +ifdef BUILD_DLOPEN +APPS += test/dlopen +endif + +ifdef TEST_CPP +APPS += test/cpp_dummy_build$(EXEXT) +endif + +.SILENT: + +.PHONY: all clean list fuzz + +all: $(APPS) +ifndef WINDOWS +# APPS doesn't include the fuzzing programs, which aren't "normal" +# sample or test programs, and don't build with MSVC which is +# warning about fopen +all: fuzz +endif + +fuzz: ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS} + $(MAKE) -C fuzz THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) + +$(MBEDLIBS): + $(MAKE) -C ../library + +${MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS}: + $(MAKE) -C ../tests mbedtls_test + +aes/crypt_and_hash$(EXEXT): aes/crypt_and_hash.c $(DEP) + echo " CC aes/crypt_and_hash.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) aes/crypt_and_hash.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +hash/hello$(EXEXT): hash/hello.c $(DEP) + echo " CC hash/hello.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) hash/hello.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +hash/generic_sum$(EXEXT): hash/generic_sum.c $(DEP) + echo " CC hash/generic_sum.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) hash/generic_sum.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/dh_client$(EXEXT): pkey/dh_client.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/dh_client.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/dh_client.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/dh_genprime$(EXEXT): pkey/dh_genprime.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/dh_genprime.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/dh_genprime.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/dh_server$(EXEXT): pkey/dh_server.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/dh_server.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/dh_server.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/ecdh_curve25519$(EXEXT): pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/ecdsa$(EXEXT): pkey/ecdsa.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/ecdsa.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/ecdsa.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/gen_key$(EXEXT): pkey/gen_key.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/gen_key.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/gen_key.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/key_app$(EXEXT): pkey/key_app.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/key_app.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/key_app.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/key_app_writer$(EXEXT): pkey/key_app_writer.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/key_app_writer.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/key_app_writer.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/mpi_demo$(EXEXT): pkey/mpi_demo.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/mpi_demo.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/mpi_demo.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/pk_decrypt$(EXEXT): pkey/pk_decrypt.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/pk_decrypt.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/pk_decrypt.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/pk_encrypt$(EXEXT): pkey/pk_encrypt.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/pk_encrypt.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/pk_encrypt.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/pk_sign$(EXEXT): pkey/pk_sign.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/pk_sign.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/pk_sign.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/pk_verify$(EXEXT): pkey/pk_verify.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/pk_verify.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/pk_verify.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/rsa_genkey$(EXEXT): pkey/rsa_genkey.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/rsa_genkey.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/rsa_genkey.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/rsa_sign$(EXEXT): pkey/rsa_sign.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/rsa_sign.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/rsa_sign.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/rsa_verify$(EXEXT): pkey/rsa_verify.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/rsa_verify.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/rsa_verify.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/rsa_sign_pss$(EXEXT): pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/rsa_verify_pss$(EXEXT): pkey/rsa_verify_pss.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/rsa_verify_pss.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/rsa_verify_pss.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/rsa_decrypt$(EXEXT): pkey/rsa_decrypt.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/rsa_decrypt.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/rsa_decrypt.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +pkey/rsa_encrypt$(EXEXT): pkey/rsa_encrypt.c $(DEP) + echo " CC pkey/rsa_encrypt.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/rsa_encrypt.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +psa/key_ladder_demo$(EXEXT): psa/key_ladder_demo.c $(DEP) + echo " CC psa/key_ladder_demo.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) psa/key_ladder_demo.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +psa/psa_constant_names$(EXEXT): psa/psa_constant_names.c psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c $(DEP) + echo " CC psa/psa_constant_names.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) psa/psa_constant_names.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +random/gen_entropy$(EXEXT): random/gen_entropy.c $(DEP) + echo " CC random/gen_entropy.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) random/gen_entropy.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +random/gen_random_havege$(EXEXT): random/gen_random_havege.c $(DEP) + echo " CC random/gen_random_havege.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) random/gen_random_havege.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +random/gen_random_ctr_drbg$(EXEXT): random/gen_random_ctr_drbg.c $(DEP) + echo " CC random/gen_random_ctr_drbg.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) random/gen_random_ctr_drbg.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/dtls_client$(EXEXT): ssl/dtls_client.c $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/dtls_client.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/dtls_client.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/dtls_server$(EXEXT): ssl/dtls_server.c $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/dtls_server.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/dtls_server.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/ssl_client1$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_client1.c $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/ssl_client1.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_client1.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +SSL_TEST_OBJECTS = test/query_config.o ssl/ssl_test_lib.o +SSL_TEST_DEPS = $(SSL_TEST_OBJECTS) \ + test/query_config.h \ + ssl/ssl_test_lib.h \ + ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c \ + $(DEP) + +ssl/ssl_test_lib.o: ssl/ssl_test_lib.c ssl/ssl_test_lib.h $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/ssl_test_lib.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c ssl/ssl_test_lib.c -o $@ + +ssl/ssl_client2$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_client2.c $(SSL_TEST_DEPS) + echo " CC ssl/ssl_client2.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_client2.c $(SSL_TEST_OBJECTS) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/ssl_server$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_server.c $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/ssl_server.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_server.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/ssl_server2$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_server2.c $(SSL_TEST_DEPS) + echo " CC ssl/ssl_server2.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_server2.c $(SSL_TEST_OBJECTS) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/ssl_context_info$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_context_info.c test/query_config.o test/query_config.h $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/ssl_context_info.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_context_info.c test/query_config.o $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/ssl_fork_server$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_fork_server.c $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/ssl_fork_server.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_fork_server.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/ssl_pthread_server$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) -lpthread $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/ssl_mail_client$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_mail_client.c $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/ssl_mail_client.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_mail_client.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ssl/mini_client$(EXEXT): ssl/mini_client.c $(DEP) + echo " CC ssl/mini_client.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/mini_client.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +test/benchmark$(EXEXT): test/benchmark.c $(DEP) + echo " CC test/benchmark.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) test/benchmark.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp: test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh + echo " Gen test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp" + test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh + +test/cpp_dummy_build$(EXEXT): test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp $(DEP) + echo " CXX test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp" + $(CXX) $(LOCAL_CXXFLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS) test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +ifdef BUILD_DLOPEN +test/dlopen$(EXEXT): test/dlopen.c $(DEP) + echo " CC test/dlopen.c" +# Do not link any test objects (that would bring in a static dependency on +# libmbedcrypto at least). Do not link with libmbed* (that would defeat the +# purpose of testing dynamic loading). + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) test/dlopen.c $(LDFLAGS) $(DLOPEN_LDFLAGS) -o $@ +endif + +test/query_config.o: test/query_config.c test/query_config.h $(DEP) + echo " CC test/query_config.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c test/query_config.c -o $@ + +test/selftest$(EXEXT): test/selftest.c $(DEP) + echo " CC test/selftest.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) test/selftest.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +test/udp_proxy$(EXEXT): test/udp_proxy.c $(DEP) + echo " CC test/udp_proxy.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) test/udp_proxy.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +test/zeroize$(EXEXT): test/zeroize.c $(DEP) + echo " CC test/zeroize.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) test/zeroize.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +test/query_compile_time_config$(EXEXT): test/query_compile_time_config.c test/query_config.o test/query_config.h $(DEP) + echo " CC test/query_compile_time_config.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) test/query_compile_time_config.c test/query_config.o $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +util/pem2der$(EXEXT): util/pem2der.c $(DEP) + echo " CC util/pem2der.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) util/pem2der.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +util/strerror$(EXEXT): util/strerror.c $(DEP) + echo " CC util/strerror.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) util/strerror.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +x509/cert_app$(EXEXT): x509/cert_app.c $(DEP) + echo " CC x509/cert_app.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/cert_app.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +x509/cert_write$(EXEXT): x509/cert_write.c $(DEP) + echo " CC x509/cert_write.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/cert_write.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +x509/crl_app$(EXEXT): x509/crl_app.c $(DEP) + echo " CC x509/crl_app.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/crl_app.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +x509/cert_req$(EXEXT): x509/cert_req.c $(DEP) + echo " CC x509/cert_req.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/cert_req.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +x509/load_roots$(EXEXT): x509/load_roots.c $(DEP) + echo " CC x509/load_roots.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/load_roots.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +x509/req_app$(EXEXT): x509/req_app.c $(DEP) + echo " CC x509/req_app.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/req_app.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +psa/crypto_examples$(EXEXT): psa/crypto_examples.c $(DEP) + echo " CC psa/crypto_examples.c" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) psa/crypto_examples.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +clean: +ifndef WINDOWS + rm -f $(APPS) + -rm -f ssl/ssl_pthread_server$(EXEXT) + -rm -f test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp test/cpp_dummy_build$(EXEXT) + -rm -f test/dlopen$(EXEXT) +else + if exist *.o del /Q /F *.o + if exist *.exe del /Q /F *.exe + if exist test\cpp_dummy_build.cpp del /Q /F test\cpp_dummy_build.cpp +endif + $(MAKE) -C fuzz clean + +list: + echo $(APPS) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/README.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e9e9f577 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +Mbed TLS sample programs +======================== + +This subdirectory mostly contains sample programs that illustrate specific features of the library, as well as a few test and support programs. + +## Symmetric cryptography (AES) examples + +* [`aes/crypt_and_hash.c`](aes/crypt_and_hash.c): file encryption and authentication, demonstrating the generic cipher interface and the generic hash interface. + +## Hash (digest) examples + +* [`hash/generic_sum.c`](hash/generic_sum.c): file hash calculator and verifier, demonstrating the message digest (`md`) interface. + +* [`hash/hello.c`](hash/hello.c): hello-world program for MD5. + +## Public-key cryptography examples + +### Generic public-key cryptography (`pk`) examples + +* [`pkey/gen_key.c`](pkey/gen_key.c): generates a key for any of the supported public-key algorithms (RSA or ECC) and writes it to a file that can be used by the other pk sample programs. + +* [`pkey/key_app.c`](pkey/key_app.c): loads a PEM or DER public key or private key file and dumps its content. + +* [`pkey/key_app_writer.c`](pkey/key_app_writer.c): loads a PEM or DER public key or private key file and writes it to a new PEM or DER file. + +* [`pkey/pk_encrypt.c`](pkey/pk_encrypt.c), [`pkey/pk_decrypt.c`](pkey/pk_decrypt.c): loads a PEM or DER public/private key file and uses the key to encrypt/decrypt a short string through the generic public-key interface. + +* [`pkey/pk_sign.c`](pkey/pk_sign.c), [`pkey/pk_verify.c`](pkey/pk_verify.c): loads a PEM or DER private/public key file and uses the key to sign/verify a short string. + +### ECDSA and RSA signature examples + +* [`pkey/ecdsa.c`](pkey/ecdsa.c): generates an ECDSA key, signs a fixed message and verifies the signature. + +* [`pkey/rsa_encrypt.c`](pkey/rsa_encrypt.c), [`pkey/rsa_decrypt.c`](pkey/rsa_decrypt.c): loads an RSA public/private key and uses it to encrypt/decrypt a short string through the low-level RSA interface. + +* [`pkey/rsa_genkey.c`](pkey/rsa_genkey.c): generates an RSA key and writes it to a file that can be used with the other RSA sample programs. + +* [`pkey/rsa_sign.c`](pkey/rsa_sign.c), [`pkey/rsa_verify.c`](pkey/rsa_verify.c): loads an RSA private/public key and uses it to sign/verify a short string with the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 algorithm. + +* [`pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c`](pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c), [`pkey/rsa_verify_pss.c`](pkey/rsa_verify_pss.c): loads an RSA private/public key and uses it to sign/verify a short string with the RSASSA-PSS algorithm. + +### Diffie-Hellman key exchange examples + +* [`pkey/dh_client.c`](pkey/dh_client.c), [`pkey/dh_server.c`](pkey/dh_server.c): secure channel demonstrators (client, server). This pair of programs illustrates how to set up a secure channel using RSA for authentication and Diffie-Hellman to generate a shared AES session key. + +* [`pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c`](pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c): demonstration of a elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement. + +### Bignum (`mpi`) usage examples + +* [`pkey/dh_genprime.c`](pkey/dh_genprime.c): shows how to use the bignum (`mpi`) interface to generate Diffie-Hellman parameters. + +* [`pkey/mpi_demo.c`](pkey/mpi_demo.c): demonstrates operations on big integers. + +## Random number generator (RNG) examples + +* [`random/gen_entropy.c`](random/gen_entropy.c): shows how to use the default entropy sources to generate random data. + Note: most applications should only use the entropy generator to seed a cryptographic pseudorandom generator, as illustrated by `random/gen_random_ctr_drbg.c`. + +* [`random/gen_random_ctr_drbg.c`](random/gen_random_ctr_drbg.c): shows how to use the default entropy sources to seed a pseudorandom generator, and how to use the resulting random generator to generate random data. + +* [`random/gen_random_havege.c`](random/gen_random_havege.c): demonstrates the HAVEGE entropy collector. + +## SSL/TLS examples + +### SSL/TLS sample applications + +* [`ssl/dtls_client.c`](ssl/dtls_client.c): a simple DTLS client program, which sends one datagram to the server and reads one datagram in response. + +* [`ssl/dtls_server.c`](ssl/dtls_server.c): a simple DTLS server program, which expects one datagram from the client and writes one datagram in response. This program supports DTLS cookies for hello verification. + +* [`ssl/mini_client.c`](ssl/mini_client.c): a minimalistic SSL client, which sends a short string and disconnects. This is primarily intended as a benchmark; for a better example of a typical TLS client, see `ssl/ssl_client1.c`. + +* [`ssl/ssl_client1.c`](ssl/ssl_client1.c): a simple HTTPS client that sends a fixed request and displays the response. + +* [`ssl/ssl_fork_server.c`](ssl/ssl_fork_server.c): a simple HTTPS server using one process per client to send a fixed response. This program requires a Unix/POSIX environment implementing the `fork` system call. + +* [`ssl/ssl_mail_client.c`](ssl/ssl_mail_client.c): a simple SMTP-over-TLS or SMTP-STARTTLS client. This client sends an email with fixed content. + +* [`ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c`](ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c): a simple HTTPS server using one thread per client to send a fixed response. This program requires the pthread library. + +* [`ssl/ssl_server.c`](ssl/ssl_server.c): a simple HTTPS server that sends a fixed response. It serves a single client at a time. + +### SSL/TLS feature demonstrators + +Note: unlike most of the other programs under the `programs/` directory, these two programs are not intended as a basis for writing an application. They combine most of the features supported by the library, and most applications require only a few features. To write a new application, we recommended that you start with `ssl_client1.c` or `ssl_server.c`, and then look inside `ssl/ssl_client2.c` or `ssl/ssl_server2.c` to see how to use the specific features that your application needs. + +* [`ssl/ssl_client2.c`](ssl/ssl_client2.c): an HTTPS client that sends a fixed request and displays the response, with options to select TLS protocol features and Mbed TLS library features. + +* [`ssl/ssl_server2.c`](ssl/ssl_server2.c): an HTTPS server that sends a fixed response, with options to select TLS protocol features and Mbed TLS library features. + +In addition to providing options for testing client-side features, the `ssl_client2` program has options that allow you to trigger certain behaviors in the server. For example, there are options to select ciphersuites, or to force a renegotiation. These options are useful for testing the corresponding features in a TLS server. Likewise, `ssl_server2` has options to activate certain behaviors that are useful for testing a TLS client. + +## Test utilities + +* [`test/benchmark.c`](test/benchmark.c): benchmark for cryptographic algorithms. + +* [`test/selftest.c`](test/selftest.c): runs the self-test function in each library module. + +* [`test/udp_proxy.c`](test/udp_proxy.c): a UDP proxy that can inject certain failures (delay, duplicate, drop). Useful for testing DTLS. + +* [`test/zeroize.c`](test/zeroize.c): a test program for `mbedtls_platform_zeroize`, used by [`tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb`](tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb). + +## Development utilities + +* [`util/pem2der.c`](util/pem2der.c): a PEM to DER converter. Mbed TLS can read PEM files directly, but this utility can be useful for interacting with other tools or with minimal Mbed TLS builds that lack PEM support. + +* [`util/strerror.c`](util/strerror.c): prints the error description corresponding to an integer status returned by an Mbed TLS function. + +## X.509 certificate examples + +* [`x509/cert_app.c`](x509/cert_app.c): connects to a TLS server and verifies its certificate chain. + +* [`x509/cert_req.c`](x509/cert_req.c): generates a certificate signing request (CSR) for a private key. + +* [`x509/cert_write.c`](x509/cert_write.c): signs a certificate signing request, or self-signs a certificate. + +* [`x509/crl_app.c`](x509/crl_app.c): loads and dumps a certificate revocation list (CRL). + +* [`x509/req_app.c`](x509/req_app.c): loads and dumps a certificate signing request (CSR). + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..62a54c76 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +set(executables + crypt_and_hash +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) +endforeach() + +install(TARGETS ${executables} + DESTINATION "bin" + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..18bdf6cd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/aes/crypt_and_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,651 @@ +/* + * \brief Generic file encryption program using generic wrappers for configured + * security. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* Enable definition of fileno() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must be + * set before config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. + * Harmless on other platforms. */ +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) +#include +#endif +#else +#include +#include +#endif + +#define MODE_ENCRYPT 0 +#define MODE_DECRYPT 1 + +#define USAGE \ + "\n crypt_and_hash \n" \ + "\n : 0 = encrypt, 1 = decrypt\n" \ + "\n example: crypt_and_hash 0 file file.aes AES-128-CBC SHA1 hex:E76B2413958B00E193\n" \ + "\n" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C and/or MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1, i; + unsigned n; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + int mode; + size_t keylen, ilen, olen; + FILE *fkey, *fin = NULL, *fout = NULL; + + char *p; + unsigned char IV[16]; + unsigned char key[512]; + unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char buffer[1024]; + unsigned char output[1024]; + unsigned char diff; + + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; +#if defined(_WIN32_WCE) + long filesize, offset; +#elif defined(_WIN32) + LARGE_INTEGER li_size; + __int64 filesize, offset; +#else + off_t filesize, offset; +#endif + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &cipher_ctx ); + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + + /* + * Parse the command-line arguments. + */ + if( argc != 7 ) + { + const int *list; + + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + + mbedtls_printf( "Available ciphers:\n" ); + list = mbedtls_cipher_list(); + while( *list ) + { + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( *list ); + mbedtls_printf( " %s\n", cipher_info->name ); + list++; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\nAvailable message digests:\n" ); + list = mbedtls_md_list(); + while( *list ) + { + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( *list ); + mbedtls_printf( " %s\n", mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info ) ); + list++; + } + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + mode = atoi( argv[1] ); + + if( mode != MODE_ENCRYPT && mode != MODE_DECRYPT ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "invalid operation mode\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( strcmp( argv[2], argv[3] ) == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "input and output filenames must differ\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( fin = fopen( argv[2], "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fopen(%s,rb) failed\n", argv[2] ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( fout = fopen( argv[3], "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fopen(%s,wb+) failed\n", argv[3] ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Read the Cipher and MD from the command line + */ + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( argv[4] ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Cipher '%s' not found\n", argv[4] ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &cipher_ctx, cipher_info) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_setup failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_string( argv[5] ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Message Digest '%s' not found\n", argv[5] ); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_setup failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Read the secret key from file or command line + */ + if( ( fkey = fopen( argv[6], "rb" ) ) != NULL ) + { + keylen = fread( key, 1, sizeof( key ), fkey ); + fclose( fkey ); + } + else + { + if( memcmp( argv[6], "hex:", 4 ) == 0 ) + { + p = &argv[6][4]; + keylen = 0; + + while( sscanf( p, "%02X", (unsigned int*) &n ) > 0 && + keylen < (int) sizeof( key ) ) + { + key[keylen++] = (unsigned char) n; + p += 2; + } + } + else + { + keylen = strlen( argv[6] ); + + if( keylen > (int) sizeof( key ) ) + keylen = (int) sizeof( key ); + + memcpy( key, argv[6], keylen ); + } + } + +#if defined(_WIN32_WCE) + filesize = fseek( fin, 0L, SEEK_END ); +#else +#if defined(_WIN32) + /* + * Support large files (> 2Gb) on Win32 + */ + li_size.QuadPart = 0; + li_size.LowPart = + SetFilePointer( (HANDLE) _get_osfhandle( _fileno( fin ) ), + li_size.LowPart, &li_size.HighPart, FILE_END ); + + if( li_size.LowPart == 0xFFFFFFFF && GetLastError() != NO_ERROR ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "SetFilePointer(0,FILE_END) failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + filesize = li_size.QuadPart; +#else + if( ( filesize = lseek( fileno( fin ), 0, SEEK_END ) ) < 0 ) + { + perror( "lseek" ); + goto exit; + } +#endif +#endif + + if( fseek( fin, 0, SEEK_SET ) < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fseek(0,SEEK_SET) failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( mode == MODE_ENCRYPT ) + { + /* + * Generate the initialization vector as: + * IV = MD( filesize || filename )[0..15] + */ + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + buffer[i] = (unsigned char)( filesize >> ( i << 3 ) ); + + p = argv[2]; + + if( mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_starts() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, buffer, 8 ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, ( unsigned char * ) p, strlen( p ) ) + != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, digest ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_finish() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( IV, digest, 16 ); + + /* + * Append the IV at the beginning of the output. + */ + if( fwrite( IV, 1, 16, fout ) != 16 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fwrite(%d bytes) failed\n", 16 ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Hash the IV and the secret key together 8192 times + * using the result to setup the AES context and HMAC. + */ + memset( digest, 0, 32 ); + memcpy( digest, IV, 16 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8192; i++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "mbedtls_md_starts() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, digest, 32 ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "mbedtls_md_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, key, keylen ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "mbedtls_md_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, digest ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "mbedtls_md_finish() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + } + + if( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, digest, cipher_info->key_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey() returned error\n"); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_ctx, IV, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() returned error\n"); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_cipher_reset( &cipher_ctx ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_reset() returned error\n"); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, digest, 32 ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Encrypt and write the ciphertext. + */ + for( offset = 0; offset < filesize; offset += mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) ) + { + ilen = ( (unsigned int) filesize - offset > mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) ) ? + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) : (unsigned int) ( filesize - offset ); + + if( fread( buffer, 1, ilen, fin ) != ilen ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fread(%ld bytes) failed\n", (long) ilen ); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_cipher_update( &cipher_ctx, buffer, ilen, output, &olen ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_update() returned error\n"); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, output, olen ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_hmac_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( output, 1, olen, fout ) != olen ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fwrite(%ld bytes) failed\n", (long) olen ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( mbedtls_cipher_finish( &cipher_ctx, output, &olen ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_finish() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, output, olen ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_hmac_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( output, 1, olen, fout ) != olen ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fwrite(%ld bytes) failed\n", (long) olen ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Finally write the HMAC. + */ + if( mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, digest ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_hmac_finish() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( digest, 1, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), fout ) != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fwrite(%d bytes) failed\n", mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( mode == MODE_DECRYPT ) + { + /* + * The encrypted file must be structured as follows: + * + * 00 .. 15 Initialization Vector + * 16 .. 31 Encrypted Block #1 + * .. + * N*16 .. (N+1)*16 - 1 Encrypted Block #N + * (N+1)*16 .. (N+1)*16 + n Hash(ciphertext) + */ + if( filesize < 16 + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "File too short to be encrypted.\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Invalid cipher block size: 0. \n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Check the file size. + */ + if( cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM && + ( ( filesize - mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) % + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "File content not a multiple of the block size (%u).\n", + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx )); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Subtract the IV + HMAC length. + */ + filesize -= ( 16 + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ); + + /* + * Read the IV and original filesize modulo 16. + */ + if( fread( buffer, 1, 16, fin ) != 16 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fread(%d bytes) failed\n", 16 ); + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( IV, buffer, 16 ); + + /* + * Hash the IV and the secret key together 8192 times + * using the result to setup the AES context and HMAC. + */ + memset( digest, 0, 32 ); + memcpy( digest, IV, 16 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8192; i++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_starts() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, digest, 32 ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, key, keylen ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, digest ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_finish() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, digest, cipher_info->key_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_ctx, IV, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_cipher_reset( &cipher_ctx ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_reset() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, digest, 32 ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Decrypt and write the plaintext. + */ + for( offset = 0; offset < filesize; offset += mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) ) + { + ilen = ( (unsigned int) filesize - offset > mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) ) ? + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) : (unsigned int) ( filesize - offset ); + + if( fread( buffer, 1, ilen, fin ) != ilen ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fread(%u bytes) failed\n", + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &cipher_ctx ) ); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, buffer, ilen ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_hmac_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_cipher_update( &cipher_ctx, buffer, ilen, output, + &olen ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_update() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( output, 1, olen, fout ) != olen ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fwrite(%ld bytes) failed\n", (long) olen ); + goto exit; + } + } + + /* + * Verify the message authentication code. + */ + if( mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, digest ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_md_hmac_finish() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( fread( buffer, 1, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), fin ) != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fread(%d bytes) failed\n", mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ); + goto exit; + } + + /* Use constant-time buffer comparison */ + diff = 0; + for( i = 0; i < mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); i++ ) + diff |= digest[i] ^ buffer[i]; + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "HMAC check failed: wrong key, " + "or file corrupted.\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Write the final block of data + */ + if( mbedtls_cipher_finish( &cipher_ctx, output, &olen ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_cipher_finish() returned error\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( output, 1, olen, fout ) != olen ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "fwrite(%ld bytes) failed\n", (long) olen ); + goto exit; + } + } + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + if( fin ) + fclose( fin ); + if( fout ) + fclose( fout ); + + /* Zeroize all command line arguments to also cover + the case when the user has missed or reordered some, + in which case the key might not be in argv[6]. */ + for( i = 0; i < argc; i++ ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( argv[i], strlen( argv[i] ) ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( IV, sizeof( IV ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buffer, sizeof( buffer ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( digest, sizeof( digest ) ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &cipher_ctx ); + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C && MBEDTLS_MD_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5dc09605 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +fuzz_client +fuzz_dtlsclient +fuzz_dtlsserver +fuzz_privkey +fuzz_pubkey +fuzz_server +fuzz_x509crl +fuzz_x509crt +fuzz_x509csr diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd55e31e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +set(libs + ${mbedtls_target} +) + +if(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + set(libs ${libs} pkcs11-helper) +endif(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + +if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + set(libs ${libs} ${ZLIB_LIBRARIES}) +endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +find_library(FUZZINGENGINE_LIB FuzzingEngine) +if(FUZZINGENGINE_LIB) + project(fuzz CXX) +endif() + +set(executables_no_common_c + fuzz_privkey + fuzz_pubkey + fuzz_x509crl + fuzz_x509crt + fuzz_x509csr +) + +set(executables_with_common_c + fuzz_client + fuzz_dtlsclient + fuzz_dtlsserver + fuzz_server +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_no_common_c executables_with_common_c) + + set(exe_sources ${exe}.c $) + if(NOT FUZZINGENGINE_LIB) + list(APPEND exe_sources onefile.c) + endif() + + # This emulates "if ( ... IN_LIST ... )" which becomes available in CMake 3.3 + list(FIND executables_with_common_c ${exe} exe_index) + if(${exe_index} GREATER -1) + list(APPEND exe_sources common.c) + endif() + + add_executable(${exe} ${exe_sources}) + + if (NOT FUZZINGENGINE_LIB) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs}) + else() + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs} FuzzingEngine) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(${exe} PROPERTIES LINKER_LANGUAGE CXX) + endif() + +endforeach() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/Makefile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..084fc241 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH:=../../tests/src +MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS:=$(patsubst %.c,%.o,$(wildcard ${MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH}/*.c ${MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH}/drivers/*.c)) + +LOCAL_CFLAGS = -I../../tests/include -I../../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_LDFLAGS = ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS} \ + -L../../library \ + -lmbedtls$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ + -lmbedx509$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ + -lmbedcrypto$(SHARED_SUFFIX) + +LOCAL_CFLAGS += $(patsubst -I../%,-I../../%,$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES)) + +ifndef SHARED +DEP=../../library/libmbedcrypto.a ../../library/libmbedx509.a ../../library/libmbedtls.a +else +DEP=../../library/libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) ../../library/libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) ../../library/libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) +endif + + +DLEXT ?= so +EXEXT= +SHARED_SUFFIX= + +# Zlib shared library extensions: +ifdef ZLIB +LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lz +endif + +ifdef FUZZINGENGINE +LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lFuzzingEngine +endif + +# A test application is built for each suites/test_suite_*.data file. +# Application name is same as .data file's base name and can be +# constructed by stripping path 'suites/' and extension .data. +APPS = $(basename $(wildcard fuzz_*.c)) + +# Construct executable name by adding OS specific suffix $(EXEXT). +BINARIES := $(addsuffix $(EXEXT),$(APPS)) + +.SILENT: + +.PHONY: all check test clean + +all: $(BINARIES) + +$(DEP): + $(MAKE) -C ../../library + +C_FILES := $(addsuffix .c,$(APPS)) + +%.o: %.c + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + + +ifdef FUZZINGENGINE +$(BINARIES): %$(EXEXT): %.o common.o $(DEP) + echo " $(CC) common.o $< $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@" + $(CXX) common.o $< $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +else +$(BINARIES): %$(EXEXT): %.o common.o onefile.o $(DEP) + echo " $(CC) common.o onefile.o $< $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@" + $(CC) common.o onefile.o $< $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +endif + +clean: +ifndef WINDOWS + rm -rf $(BINARIES) *.o +else + if exist *.o del /Q /F *.o + if exist *.exe del /Q /F *.exe +endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/README.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aaef0301 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +What is it? +------ + +This directory contains fuzz targets. +Fuzz targets are simple codes using the library. +They are used with a so-called fuzz driver, which will generate inputs, try to process them with the fuzz target, and alert in case of an unwanted behavior (such as a buffer overflow for instance). + +These targets were meant to be used with oss-fuzz but can be used in other contexts. + +This code was contributed by Philippe Antoine ( Catena cyber ). + +How to run? +------ + +To run the fuzz targets like oss-fuzz: +``` +git clone https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz +cd oss-fuzz +python infra/helper.py build_image mbedtls +python infra/helper.py build_fuzzers --sanitizer address mbedtls +python infra/helper.py run_fuzzer mbedtls fuzz_client +``` +You can use `undefined` sanitizer as well as `address` sanitizer. +And you can run any of the fuzz targets like `fuzz_client`. + +To run the fuzz targets without oss-fuzz, you first need to install one libFuzzingEngine (libFuzzer for instance). +Then you need to compile the code with the compiler flags of the wished sanitizer. +``` +perl scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT +mkdir build +cd build +cmake .. +make +``` +Finally, you can run the targets like `./test/fuzz/fuzz_client`. + + +Corpus generation for network traffic targets +------ + +These targets use network traffic as inputs : +* client : simulates a client against (fuzzed) server traffic +* server : simulates a server against (fuzzed) client traffic +* dtls_client +* dtls_server + +They also use the last bytes as configuration options. + +To generate corpus for these targets, you can do the following, not fully automated steps : +* Build mbedtls programs ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 +* Run them one against the other with `reproducible` option turned on while capturing traffic into test.pcap +* Extract tcp payloads, for instance with tshark : `tshark -Tfields -e tcp.dstport -e tcp.payload -r test.pcap > test.txt` +* Run a dummy python script to output either client or server corpus file like `python dummy.py test.txt > test.cor` +* Finally, you can add the options by appending the last bytes to the file test.cor + +Here is an example of dummy.py for extracting payload from client to server (if we used `tcp.dstport` in tshark command) +``` +import sys +import binascii + +f = open(sys.argv[1]) +for l in f.readlines(): + portAndPl=l.split() + if len(portAndPl) == 2: + # determine client or server based on port + if portAndPl[0] == "4433": + print(binascii.unhexlify(portAndPl[1].replace(":",""))) +``` diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/common.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/common.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bea9f9ef --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +#include "common.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) +mbedtls_time_t dummy_constant_time( mbedtls_time_t* time ) +{ + (void) time; + return 0x5af2a056; +} +#endif + +void dummy_init() +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) + mbedtls_platform_set_time( dummy_constant_time ); +#else + fprintf(stderr, "Warning: fuzzing without constant time\n"); +#endif +} + +int dummy_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + //silence warning about unused parameter + (void) ctx; + (void) buf; + + //pretends we wrote everything ok + if( len > INT_MAX ) { + return( -1 ); + } + return( (int) len ); +} + +int fuzz_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + //reads from the buffer from fuzzer + fuzzBufferOffset_t * biomemfuzz = (fuzzBufferOffset_t *) ctx; + + if(biomemfuzz->Offset == biomemfuzz->Size) { + //EOF + return( 0 ); + } + if( len > INT_MAX ) { + return( -1 ); + } + if( len + biomemfuzz->Offset > biomemfuzz->Size ) { + //do not overflow + len = biomemfuzz->Size - biomemfuzz->Offset; + } + memcpy(buf, biomemfuzz->Data + biomemfuzz->Offset, len); + biomemfuzz->Offset += len; + return( (int) len ); +} + +int dummy_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + int ret; + size_t i; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + //use mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random to find bugs in it + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(p_rng, output, output_len); +#else + (void) p_rng; + ret = 0; +#endif + for (i=0; i +#include + +typedef struct fuzzBufferOffset +{ + const uint8_t *Data; + size_t Size; + size_t Offset; +} fuzzBufferOffset_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +mbedtls_time_t dummy_constant_time( mbedtls_time_t* time ); +#endif +void dummy_init(); + +int dummy_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); +int fuzz_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); +int dummy_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ); +int dummy_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ); +int fuzz_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + uint32_t timeout ); diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/corpuses/client 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zjAgvZTIv~qQq;2^hY(0Vy3?Fq+(kn+GaJNp>X^wQUPc}35Cm`f(v2#5(wPc2F$=>8 zWeGD_$W)lpj1syrglbmuHo7o~Dpv3oD$&9F=!K4@tY!z=c@I4(;SE-?9a^jlAO?U6 zn*fu@m+YzHf-VF?Q; zAp>#)xd$BOC`l;Z4CLo2#Hpj^o^wkFhE&cUp02V=<2=7GYU}9tu_W)$FORrBjoE{d z@Wt|V|5sB7iyyTXrWuz{)&{){i%w8x&Gqk?Y#D=fhU$0nHJw{-UFpi1h`zPFOnbA} zvk!%PbXkXIZ=6*~O#{2OX(K-Ys literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_client.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..270ae8a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "common.h" +#include +#include +#include + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +static int initialized = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +static mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; +#endif +const char *alpn_list[3]; + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +const unsigned char psk[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f +}; +const char psk_id[] = "Client_identity"; +#endif + +const char *pers = "fuzz_client"; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + int ret; + size_t len; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + fuzzBufferOffset_t biomemfuzz; + uint16_t options; + + if (initialized == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ) != 0) + return 1; +#endif + + alpn_list[0] = "HTTP"; + alpn_list[1] = "fuzzalpn"; + alpn_list[2] = NULL; + + dummy_init(); + + initialized = 1; + } + + //we take 1 byte as options input + if (Size < 2) { + return 0; + } + options = (Data[Size - 2] << 8) | Data[Size - 1]; + //Avoid warnings if compile options imply no options + (void) options; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + + if( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, dummy_entropy, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, strlen( pers ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (options & 2) { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf, psk, sizeof( psk ), + (const unsigned char *) psk_id, sizeof( psk_id ) - 1 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if (options & 4) { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); + } else +#endif + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( &conf, (options & 8) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( &conf, (options & 0x10) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( &conf, (options & 0x20) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( &conf, (options & 0x40) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( &conf, (options & 0x80) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( &conf, (options & 0x100) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if (options & 0x200) { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( &conf, alpn_list ); + } +#endif + //There may be other options to add : + // mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile, mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes + + srand(1); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, dummy_random, &ctr_drbg ); + + if( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if ((options & 1) == 0) { + if( mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, "localhost" ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } +#endif + + biomemfuzz.Data = Data; + biomemfuzz.Size = Size-2; + biomemfuzz.Offset = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &biomemfuzz, dummy_send, fuzz_recv, NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + //keep reading data from server until the end + do + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ) + continue; + else if( ret <= 0 ) + //EOF or error + break; + } + while( 1 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + +#else + (void) Data; + (void) Size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_client.options b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_client.options new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4d7340f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_client.options @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +[libfuzzer] +max_len = 1048575 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsclient.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsclient.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ff258bcc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsclient.c @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +static int initialized = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +static mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; +#endif + +const char *pers = "fuzz_dtlsclient"; +#endif +#endif // MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + + + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + int ret; + size_t len; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_timing_delay_context timer; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + fuzzBufferOffset_t biomemfuzz; + + if (initialized == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ) != 0) + return 1; +#endif + dummy_init(); + + initialized = 1; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + + srand(1); + if( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, dummy_entropy, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, strlen( pers ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL ); +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, dummy_random, &ctr_drbg ); + + if( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer, mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if( mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, "localhost" ) != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif + + biomemfuzz.Data = Data; + biomemfuzz.Size = Size; + biomemfuzz.Offset = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &biomemfuzz, dummy_send, fuzz_recv, fuzz_recv_timeout ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + //keep reading data from server until the end + do + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ) + continue; + else if( ret <= 0 ) + //EOF or error + break; + } + while( 1 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + +#else + (void) Data; + (void) Size; +#endif + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsclient.options b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsclient.options new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4d7340f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsclient.options @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +[libfuzzer] +max_len = 1048575 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4cde1fe6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +const char *pers = "fuzz_dtlsserver"; +const unsigned char client_ip[4] = {0x7F, 0, 0, 1}; +static int initialized = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +static mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert; +static mbedtls_pk_context pkey; +#endif +#endif +#endif // MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + int ret; + size_t len; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_timing_delay_context timer; + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx cookie_ctx; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + fuzzBufferOffset_t biomemfuzz; + + if (initialized == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len ) != 0) + return 1; + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ) != 0) + return 1; + if (mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 ) != 0) + return 1; +#endif + dummy_init(); + + initialized = 1; + } + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( &cookie_ctx ); + + if( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, dummy_entropy, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, strlen( pers ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + + if( mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + + srand(1); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, dummy_random, &ctr_drbg ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.next, NULL ); + if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif + + if( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( &cookie_ctx, dummy_random, &ctr_drbg ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( &conf, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check, &cookie_ctx ); + + if( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer, mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); + + biomemfuzz.Data = Data; + biomemfuzz.Size = Size; + biomemfuzz.Offset = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &biomemfuzz, dummy_send, fuzz_recv, fuzz_recv_timeout ); + if( mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( &ssl, client_ip, sizeof(client_ip) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { + biomemfuzz.Offset = ssl.next_record_offset; + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &biomemfuzz, dummy_send, fuzz_recv, fuzz_recv_timeout ); + if( mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( &ssl, client_ip, sizeof(client_ip) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + //keep reading data from server until the end + do + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ) + continue; + else if( ret <= 0 ) + //EOF or error + break; + } + while( 1 ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( &cookie_ctx ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + +#else + (void) Data; + (void) Size; +#endif + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.options b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.options new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4d7340f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.options @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +[libfuzzer] +max_len = 1048575 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6c968fd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +//4 Kb should be enough for every bug ;-) +#define MAX_LEN 0x1000 + + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + int ret; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + + if (Size > MAX_LEN) { + //only work on small inputs + Size = MAX_LEN; + } + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, Data, Size, NULL, 0 ); + if (ret == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &QP ); + + rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ); + if ( mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &N, &P, &Q, &D, &E ) != 0 ) { + abort(); + } + if ( mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, &DP, &DQ, &QP ) != 0 ) { + abort(); + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &QP ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec( pk ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = ecp->grp.id; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id ); + + /* If the curve is not supported, the key should not have been + * accepted. */ + if( curve_info == NULL ) + abort( ); + } + else +#endif + { + /* The key is valid but is not of a supported type. + * This should not happen. */ + abort( ); + } + } + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +#else + (void) Data; + (void) Size; +#endif //MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.options b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.options new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0824b19f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.options @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +[libfuzzer] +max_len = 65535 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pubkey.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pubkey.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e803504 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pubkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + int ret; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, Data, Size ); + if (ret == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &QP ); + + rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ); + if ( mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) != 0 ) { + abort(); + } + if ( mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &N, &P, &Q, &D, &E ) != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) { + abort(); + } + if ( mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, &DP, &DQ, &QP ) != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) { + abort(); + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &QP ); + + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec( pk ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = ecp->grp.id; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id ); + + /* If the curve is not supported, the key should not have been + * accepted. */ + if( curve_info == NULL ) + abort( ); + + /* It's a public key, so the private value should not have + * been changed from its initialization to 0. */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ecp->d, 0 ) != 0 ) + abort( ); + } + else +#endif + { + /* The key is valid but is not of a supported type. + * This should not happen. */ + abort( ); + } + } + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +#else + (void) Data; + (void) Size; +#endif //MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pubkey.options b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pubkey.options new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0824b19f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pubkey.options @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +[libfuzzer] +max_len = 65535 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..014f386e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" +#include "common.h" +#include +#include +#include + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +const char *pers = "fuzz_server"; +static int initialized = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +static mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert; +static mbedtls_pk_context pkey; +#endif +const char *alpn_list[3]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +const unsigned char psk[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f +}; +const char psk_id[] = "Client_identity"; +#endif +#endif // MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + int ret; + size_t len; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context ticket_ctx; +#endif + unsigned char buf[4096]; + fuzzBufferOffset_t biomemfuzz; + uint8_t options; + + //we take 1 byte as options input + if (Size < 1) { + return 0; + } + options = Data[Size - 1]; + + if (initialized == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len ) != 0) + return 1; + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ) != 0) + return 1; + if (mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 ) != 0) + return 1; +#endif + + alpn_list[0] = "HTTP"; + alpn_list[1] = "fuzzalpn"; + alpn_list[2] = NULL; + + dummy_init(); + + initialized = 1; + } + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( &ticket_ctx ); +#endif + + if( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, dummy_entropy, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, strlen( pers ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + + if( mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + srand(1); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, dummy_random, &ctr_drbg ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.next, NULL ); + if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( &conf, (options & 0x1) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if (options & 0x2) { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( &conf, alpn_list ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( options & 0x4 ) + { + if( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( &ticket_ctx, + dummy_random, &ctr_drbg, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, + 86400 ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( &conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse, + &ticket_ctx ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( &conf, (options & 0x8) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( &conf, (options & 0x10) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( &conf, (options & 0x20) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (options & 0x40) { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf, psk, sizeof( psk ), + (const unsigned char *) psk_id, sizeof( psk_id ) - 1 ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( &conf, (options & 0x80) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED : MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ); +#endif + + if( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + biomemfuzz.Data = Data; + biomemfuzz.Size = Size-1; + biomemfuzz.Offset = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &biomemfuzz, dummy_send, fuzz_recv, NULL ); + + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + //keep reading data from server until the end + do + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ) + continue; + else if( ret <= 0 ) + //EOF or error + break; + } + while( 1 ); + } + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( &ticket_ctx ); +#endif + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + +#else + (void) Data; + (void) Size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.options b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.options new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4d7340f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.options @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +[libfuzzer] +max_len = 1048575 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crl.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..02f521cc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crl.c @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#include +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + int ret; + mbedtls_x509_crl crl; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( &crl ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( &crl, Data, Size ); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_info( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, " ", &crl ); + } + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &crl ); +#else + (void) Data; + (void) Size; +#endif + + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crl.options b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crl.options new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0824b19f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crl.options @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +[libfuzzer] +max_len = 65535 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8f593a14 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crt.c @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#include +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + int ret; + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &crt, Data, Size ); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, " ", &crt ); + } + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +#else + (void) Data; + (void) Size; +#endif + + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crt.options b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crt.options new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0824b19f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509crt.options @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +[libfuzzer] +max_len = 65535 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509csr.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509csr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3cf28a6f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509csr.c @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#include +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + int ret; + mbedtls_x509_csr csr; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + + mbedtls_x509_csr_init( &csr ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( &csr, Data, Size ); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_info( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, " ", &csr ); + } + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( &csr ); +#else + (void) Data; + (void) Size; +#endif + + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509csr.options b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509csr.options new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0824b19f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/fuzz_x509csr.options @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +[libfuzzer] +max_len = 65535 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/onefile.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/onefile.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..58b0f83e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/fuzz/onefile.c @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +#include +#include +#include + +/* This file doesn't use any Mbed TLS function, but grab config.h anyway + * in case it contains platform-specific #defines related to malloc or + * stdio functions. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size); + +int main(int argc, char** argv) +{ + FILE * fp; + uint8_t *Data; + size_t Size; + + if (argc != 2) { + return 1; + } + //opens the file, get its size, and reads it into a buffer + fp = fopen(argv[1], "rb"); + if (fp == NULL) { + return 2; + } + if (fseek(fp, 0L, SEEK_END) != 0) { + fclose(fp); + return 2; + } + Size = ftell(fp); + if (Size == (size_t) -1) { + fclose(fp); + return 2; + } + if (fseek(fp, 0L, SEEK_SET) != 0) { + fclose(fp); + return 2; + } + Data = malloc(Size); + if (Data == NULL) { + fclose(fp); + return 2; + } + if (fread(Data, Size, 1, fp) != 1) { + free(Data); + fclose(fp); + return 2; + } + + //launch fuzzer + LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(Data, Size); + free(Data); + fclose(fp); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b2f2a1f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +set(executables + generic_sum + hello +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) +endforeach() + +install(TARGETS ${executables} + DESTINATION "bin" + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/hash/generic_sum.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/hash/generic_sum.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f73e5f83 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/hash/generic_sum.c @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/* + * generic message digest layer demonstration program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#include +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +static int generic_wrapper( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, char *filename, unsigned char *sum ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_md_file( md_info, filename, sum ); + + if( ret == 1 ) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "failed to open: %s\n", filename ); + + if( ret == 2 ) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "failed to read: %s\n", filename ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int generic_print( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, char *filename ) +{ + int i; + unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + if( generic_wrapper( md_info, filename, sum ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + for( i = 0; i < mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); i++ ) + mbedtls_printf( "%02x", sum[i] ); + + mbedtls_printf( " %s\n", filename ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static int generic_check( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, char *filename ) +{ + int i; + size_t n; + FILE *f; + int nb_err1, nb_err2; + int nb_tot1, nb_tot2; + unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + char line[1024]; + char diff; +#if defined(__clang_analyzer__) + char buf[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 1] = { }; +#else + char buf[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 1]; +#endif + + if( ( f = fopen( filename, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed to open: %s\n", filename ); + return( 1 ); + } + + nb_err1 = nb_err2 = 0; + nb_tot1 = nb_tot2 = 0; + + memset( line, 0, sizeof( line ) ); + + n = sizeof( line ); + + while( fgets( line, (int) n - 1, f ) != NULL ) + { + n = strlen( line ); + + if( n < (size_t) 2 * mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) + 4 ) + { + mbedtls_printf("No '%s' hash found on line.\n", mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info )); + continue; + } + + if( line[2 * mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info )] != ' ' || line[2 * mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) + 1] != ' ' ) + { + mbedtls_printf("No '%s' hash found on line.\n", mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info )); + continue; + } + + if( line[n - 1] == '\n' ) { n--; line[n] = '\0'; } + if( line[n - 1] == '\r' ) { n--; line[n] = '\0'; } + + nb_tot1++; + + if( generic_wrapper( md_info, line + 2 + 2 * mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), sum ) != 0 ) + { + nb_err1++; + continue; + } + + nb_tot2++; + + for( i = 0; i < mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); i++ ) + sprintf( buf + i * 2, "%02x", sum[i] ); + + /* Use constant-time buffer comparison */ + diff = 0; + for( i = 0; i < 2 * mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); i++ ) + diff |= line[i] ^ buf[i]; + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + nb_err2++; + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "wrong checksum: %s\n", line + 66 ); + } + + n = sizeof( line ); + } + + if( nb_err1 != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "WARNING: %d (out of %d) input files could " + "not be read\n", nb_err1, nb_tot1 ); + } + + if( nb_err2 != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "WARNING: %d (out of %d) computed checksums did " + "not match\n", nb_err2, nb_tot2 ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + return( nb_err1 != 0 || nb_err2 != 0 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1, i; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + + if( argc == 1 ) + { + const int *list; + + mbedtls_printf( "print mode: generic_sum ...\n" ); + mbedtls_printf( "check mode: generic_sum -c \n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\nAvailable message digests:\n" ); + list = mbedtls_md_list(); + while( *list ) + { + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( *list ); + mbedtls_printf( " %s\n", mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info ) ); + list++; + } + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + /* + * Read the MD from the command line + */ + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_string( argv[1] ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Message Digest '%s' not found\n", argv[1] ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + if( mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Failed to initialize context.\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + ret = 0; + if( argc == 4 && strcmp( "-c", argv[2] ) == 0 ) + { + ret |= generic_check( md_info, argv[3] ); + goto exit; + } + + for( i = 2; i < argc; i++ ) + ret |= generic_print( md_info, argv[i] ); + + if ( ret == 0 ) + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/hash/hello.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/hash/hello.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70bea420 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/hash/hello.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Classic "Hello, world" demonstration program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_MD5_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( void ) +{ + int i, ret; + unsigned char digest[16]; + char str[] = "Hello, world!"; + + mbedtls_printf( "\n MD5('%s') = ", str ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_ret( (unsigned char *) str, 13, digest ) ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + mbedtls_printf( "%02x", digest[i] ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n\n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9c6fe7d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +set(executables_mbedtls + dh_client + dh_server +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_mbedtls) + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedtls_target}) +endforeach() + +set(executables_mbedcrypto + dh_genprime + ecdh_curve25519 + ecdsa + gen_key + key_app + key_app_writer + mpi_demo + pk_encrypt + pk_decrypt + pk_sign + pk_verify + rsa_decrypt + rsa_encrypt + rsa_genkey + rsa_sign + rsa_sign_pss + rsa_verify + rsa_verify_pss +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_mbedcrypto) + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) +endforeach() + +install(TARGETS ${executables_mbedtls} ${executables_mbedcrypto} + DESTINATION "bin" + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_client.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f6c62260 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/* + * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange (client side) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include +#include +#endif + +#define SERVER_NAME "localhost" +#define SERVER_PORT "11999" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or MBEDTLS_DHM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C " + "and/or MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( void ) +{ + FILE *f; + + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + size_t n, buflen; + mbedtls_net_context server_fd; + + unsigned char *p, *end; + unsigned char buf[2048]; + unsigned char hash[32]; + const char *pers = "dh_client"; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; + mbedtls_aes_context aes; + + mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); + mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &aes ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + /* + * 1. Setup the RNG + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 2. Read the server's public RSA key + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading public key from rsa_pub.txt" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( f = fopen( "rsa_pub.txt", "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open rsa_pub.txt\n" \ + " ! Please run rsa_genkey first\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &rsa.N, 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &rsa.E, 16, f ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + + rsa.len = ( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &rsa.N ) + 7 ) >> 3; + + fclose( f ); + + /* + * 3. Initiate the connection + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Connecting to tcp/%s/%s", SERVER_NAME, + SERVER_PORT ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd, SERVER_NAME, + SERVER_PORT, MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 4a. First get the buffer length + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Receiving the server's DH parameters" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_recv( &server_fd, buf, 2 ) ) != 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + n = buflen = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + if( buflen < 1 || buflen > sizeof( buf ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Got an invalid buffer length\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 4b. Get the DHM parameters: P, G and Ys = G^Xs mod P + */ + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_recv( &server_fd, buf, n ) ) != (int) n ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + p = buf, end = buf + buflen; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &dhm, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_dhm_read_params returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( dhm.len < 64 || dhm.len > 512 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Invalid DHM modulus size\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 5. Check that the server's RSA signature matches + * the SHA-256 hash of (P,G,Ys) + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Verifying the server's RSA signature" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + p += 2; + + if( ( n = (size_t) ( end - p ) ) != rsa.len ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Invalid RSA signature size\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf, (int)( p - 2 - buf ), hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_sha1_ret returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 0, hash, p ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 6. Send our public value: Yc = G ^ Xc mod P + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Sending own public value to server" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + n = dhm.len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &dhm, (int) dhm.len, buf, n, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_dhm_make_public returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_send( &server_fd, buf, n ) ) != (int) n ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_send returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 7. Derive the shared secret: K = Ys ^ Xc mod P + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Shared secret: " ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &dhm, buf, sizeof( buf ), &n, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + for( n = 0; n < 16; n++ ) + mbedtls_printf( "%02x", buf[n] ); + + /* + * 8. Setup the AES-256 decryption key + * + * This is an overly simplified example; best practice is + * to hash the shared secret with a random value to derive + * the keying material for the encryption/decryption keys, + * IVs and MACs. + */ + mbedtls_printf( "...\n . Receiving and decrypting the ciphertext" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &aes, buf, 256 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_recv( &server_fd, buf, 16 ) ) != 16 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + buf[16] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Plaintext is \"%s\"\n\n", (char *) buf ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd ); + + mbedtls_aes_free( &aes ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C && MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && + MBEDTLS_NET_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && + MBEDTLS_FS_IO && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a481e329 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +/* + * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange (prime generation) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_GENPRIME not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include +#include + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: dh_genprime param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceprable parameters:\n" \ + " bits=%%d default: 2048\n" + +#define DFL_BITS 2048 + +/* + * Note: G = 4 is always a quadratic residue mod P, + * so it is a generator of order Q (with P = 2*Q+1). + */ +#define GENERATOR "4" + + +int main( int argc, char **argv ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_mpi G, P, Q; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + const char *pers = "dh_genprime"; + FILE *fout; + int nbits = DFL_BITS; + int i; + char *p, *q; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "bits" ) == 0 ) + { + nbits = atoi( q ); + if( nbits < 0 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + goto usage; + } + else + goto usage; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &G, 10, GENERATOR ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_string returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ! Generating large primes may take minutes!\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n . Generating the modulus, please wait..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + /* + * This can take a long time... + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &P, nbits, 1, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n . Verifying that Q = (P-1)/2 is prime..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q, &P, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_sub_int returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &Q, NULL, &Q, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_div_int returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( &Q, 50, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_is_prime returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n . Exporting the value in dh_prime.txt..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( fout = fopen( "dh_prime.txt", "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not create dh_prime.txt\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "P = ", &P, 16, fout ) != 0 ) || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "G = ", &G, 16, fout ) != 0 ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_write_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); + fclose( fout ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n\n" ); + fclose( fout ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_prime.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_prime.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..de0c2814 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_prime.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +P = 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 +G = 02 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_server.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_server.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8f032a3b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/dh_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +/* + * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange (server side) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include +#include +#endif + +#define SERVER_PORT "11999" +#define PLAINTEXT "==Hello there!==" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or MBEDTLS_DHM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C " + "and/or MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( void ) +{ + FILE *f; + + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + size_t n, buflen; + mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd; + + unsigned char buf[2048]; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char buf2[2]; + const char *pers = "dh_server"; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; + mbedtls_aes_context aes; + + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E; + + mbedtls_net_init( &listen_fd ); + mbedtls_net_init( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); + mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &aes ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + /* + * 1. Setup the RNG + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 2a. Read the server's private RSA key + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading private key from rsa_priv.txt" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( f = fopen( "rsa_priv.txt", "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open rsa_priv.txt\n" \ + " ! Please run rsa_genkey first\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &N , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &E , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &D , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &P , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &Q , 16, f ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + fclose( f ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &N, &P, &Q, &D, &E ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_import returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( &rsa ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_complete returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 2b. Get the DHM modulus and generator + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading DH parameters from dh_prime.txt" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( f = fopen( "dh_prime.txt", "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open dh_prime.txt\n" \ + " ! Please run dh_genprime first\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &dhm.P, 16, f ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &dhm.G, 16, f ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Invalid DH parameter file\n\n" ); + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + + fclose( f ); + + /* + * 3. Wait for a client to connect + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Waiting for a remote connection" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_bind( &listen_fd, NULL, SERVER_PORT, MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_accept( &listen_fd, &client_fd, + NULL, 0, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_accept returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 4. Setup the DH parameters (P,G,Ys) + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Sending the server's DH parameters" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &dhm, (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &dhm.P ), buf, &n, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_dhm_make_params returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 5. Sign the parameters and send them + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf, n, hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_sha1_ret returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + buf[n ] = (unsigned char)( rsa.len >> 8 ); + buf[n + 1] = (unsigned char)( rsa.len ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + 0, hash, buf + n + 2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + buflen = n + 2 + rsa.len; + buf2[0] = (unsigned char)( buflen >> 8 ); + buf2[1] = (unsigned char)( buflen ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_send( &client_fd, buf2, 2 ) ) != 2 || + ( ret = mbedtls_net_send( &client_fd, buf, buflen ) ) != (int) buflen ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_send returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 6. Get the client's public value: Yc = G ^ Xc mod P + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Receiving the client's public value" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + n = dhm.len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_recv( &client_fd, buf, n ) ) != (int) n ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &dhm, buf, dhm.len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_dhm_read_public returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 7. Derive the shared secret: K = Ys ^ Xc mod P + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Shared secret: " ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &dhm, buf, sizeof( buf ), &n, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + for( n = 0; n < 16; n++ ) + mbedtls_printf( "%02x", buf[n] ); + + /* + * 8. Setup the AES-256 encryption key + * + * This is an overly simplified example; best practice is + * to hash the shared secret with a random value to derive + * the keying material for the encryption/decryption keys + * and MACs. + */ + mbedtls_printf( "...\n . Encrypting and sending the ciphertext" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes, buf, 256 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + memcpy( buf, PLAINTEXT, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_send( &client_fd, buf, 16 ) ) != 16 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_send returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); + + mbedtls_aes_free( &aes ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C && MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && + MBEDTLS_NET_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && + MBEDTLS_FS_IO && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..65b206a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +/* + * Example ECDHE with Curve25519 program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C " + "not defined\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" + +#include + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx_cli, ctx_srv; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + unsigned char cli_to_srv[36], srv_to_cli[33]; + const char pers[] = "ecdh"; + + size_t srv_olen; + size_t cli_olen; + unsigned char secret_cli[32] = { 0 }; + unsigned char secret_srv[32] = { 0 }; + const unsigned char *p_cli_to_srv = cli_to_srv; + + ((void) argc); + ((void) argv); + + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ctx_cli ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ctx_srv ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + /* + * Initialize random number generation + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Seed the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, + &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + sizeof pers ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * Client: initialize context and generate keypair + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Set up client context, generate EC key pair..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &ctx_cli, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdh_setup returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &ctx_cli, &cli_olen, cli_to_srv, + sizeof( cli_to_srv ), + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdh_make_params returned %d\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * Server: initialize context and generate keypair + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Server: read params, generate public key..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ctx_srv, &p_cli_to_srv, + p_cli_to_srv + sizeof( cli_to_srv ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdh_read_params returned %d\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ctx_srv, &srv_olen, srv_to_cli, + sizeof( srv_to_cli ), + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdh_make_public returned %d\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * Client: read public key + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Client: read public key..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ctx_cli, srv_to_cli, + sizeof( srv_to_cli ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdh_read_public returned %d\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * Calculate secrets + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Calculate secrets..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ctx_cli, &cli_olen, secret_cli, + sizeof( secret_cli ), + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret returned %d\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ctx_srv, &srv_olen, secret_srv, + sizeof( secret_srv ), + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret returned %d\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * Verification: are the computed secrets equal? + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Check if both calculated secrets are equal..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = memcmp( secret_srv, secret_cli, srv_olen ); + if( ret != 0 || ( cli_olen != srv_olen ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Shared secrets not equal.\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ctx_srv ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ctx_cli ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1bbf8268 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +/* + * Example ECDSA program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" + +#include +#endif + +/* + * Uncomment to show key and signature details + */ +#define VERBOSE + +/* + * Uncomment to force use of a specific curve + */ +#define ECPARAMS MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +#if !defined(ECPARAMS) +#define ECPARAMS mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C and/or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else +#if defined(VERBOSE) +static void dump_buf( const char *title, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + size_t i; + + mbedtls_printf( "%s", title ); + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + mbedtls_printf("%c%c", "0123456789ABCDEF" [buf[i] / 16], + "0123456789ABCDEF" [buf[i] % 16] ); + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +} + +static void dump_pubkey( const char *title, mbedtls_ecdsa_context *key ) +{ + unsigned char buf[300]; + size_t len; + + if( mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &key->grp, &key->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &len, buf, sizeof buf ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf("internal error\n"); + return; + } + + dump_buf( title, buf, len ); +} +#else +#define dump_buf( a, b, c ) +#define dump_pubkey( a, b ) +#endif + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx_sign, ctx_verify; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + unsigned char message[100]; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN]; + size_t sig_len; + const char *pers = "ecdsa"; + ((void) argv); + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ctx_sign ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ctx_verify ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + memset( sig, 0, sizeof( sig ) ); + memset( message, 0x25, sizeof( message ) ); + + if( argc != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: ecdsa\n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Generate a key pair for signing + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n . Generating key pair..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( &ctx_sign, ECPARAMS, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok (key size: %d bits)\n", (int) ctx_sign.grp.pbits ); + + dump_pubkey( " + Public key: ", &ctx_sign ); + + /* + * Compute message hash + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Computing message hash..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret( message, sizeof( message ), hash, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_sha256_ret returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + dump_buf( " + Hash: ", hash, sizeof( hash ) ); + + /* + * Sign message hash + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Signing message hash..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( &ctx_sign, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, &sig_len, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_printf( " ok (signature length = %u)\n", (unsigned int) sig_len ); + + dump_buf( " + Signature: ", sig, sig_len ); + + /* + * Transfer public information to verifying context + * + * We could use the same context for verification and signatures, but we + * chose to use a new one in order to make it clear that the verifying + * context only needs the public key (Q), and not the private key (d). + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Preparing verification context..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx_verify.grp, &ctx_sign.grp ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecp_group_copy returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx_verify.Q, &ctx_sign.Q ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecp_copy returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Verify signature + */ + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n . Verifying signature..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx_verify, + hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ctx_verify ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ctx_sign ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && + ECPARAMS */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/gen_key.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/gen_key.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..63cc11ed --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/gen_key.c @@ -0,0 +1,450 @@ +/* + * Key generation application + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#if !defined(_WIN32) +#include + +#define DEV_RANDOM_THRESHOLD 32 + +int dev_random_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, + size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t ret, left = len; + unsigned char *p = output; + ((void) data); + + *olen = 0; + + file = fopen( "/dev/random", "rb" ); + if( file == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + while( left > 0 ) + { + /* /dev/random can return much less than requested. If so, try again */ + ret = fread( p, 1, left, file ); + if( ret == 0 && ferror( file ) ) + { + fclose( file ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + p += ret; + left -= ret; + sleep( 1 ); + } + fclose( file ); + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !_WIN32 */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define DFL_EC_CURVE mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id +#else +#define DFL_EC_CURVE 0 +#endif + +#if !defined(_WIN32) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#define USAGE_DEV_RANDOM \ + " use_dev_random=0|1 default: 0\n" +#else +#define USAGE_DEV_RANDOM "" +#endif /* !_WIN32 && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#define FORMAT_PEM 0 +#define FORMAT_DER 1 + +#define DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_PK_RSA +#define DFL_RSA_KEYSIZE 4096 +#define DFL_FILENAME "keyfile.key" +#define DFL_FORMAT FORMAT_PEM +#define DFL_USE_DEV_RANDOM 0 + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: gen_key param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " type=rsa|ec default: rsa\n" \ + " rsa_keysize=%%d default: 4096\n" \ + " ec_curve=%%s see below\n" \ + " filename=%%s default: keyfile.key\n" \ + " format=pem|der default: pem\n" \ + USAGE_DEV_RANDOM \ + "\n" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C" + "not defined.\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + int type; /* the type of key to generate */ + int rsa_keysize; /* length of key in bits */ + int ec_curve; /* curve identifier for EC keys */ + const char *filename; /* filename of the key file */ + int format; /* the output format to use */ + int use_dev_random; /* use /dev/random as entropy source */ +} opt; + +static int write_private_key( mbedtls_pk_context *key, const char *output_file ) +{ + int ret; + FILE *f; + unsigned char output_buf[16000]; + unsigned char *c = output_buf; + size_t len = 0; + + memset(output_buf, 0, 16000); + if( opt.format == FORMAT_PEM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( key, output_buf, 16000 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + len = strlen( (char *) output_buf ); + } + else + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( key, output_buf, 16000 ) ) < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + len = ret; + c = output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - len; + } + + if( ( f = fopen( output_file, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( fwrite( c, 1, len, f ) != len ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_pk_context key; + char buf[1024]; + int i; + char *p, *q; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + const char *pers = "gen_key"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; +#endif + + /* + * Set to sane values + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &QP ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &key ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + mbedtls_printf( " available ec_curve values:\n" ); + curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + mbedtls_printf( " %s (default)\n", curve_info->name ); + while( ( ++curve_info )->name != NULL ) + mbedtls_printf( " %s\n", curve_info->name ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + goto exit; + } + + opt.type = DFL_TYPE; + opt.rsa_keysize = DFL_RSA_KEYSIZE; + opt.ec_curve = DFL_EC_CURVE; + opt.filename = DFL_FILENAME; + opt.format = DFL_FORMAT; + opt.use_dev_random = DFL_USE_DEV_RANDOM; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "type" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "rsa" ) == 0 ) + opt.type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + else if( strcmp( q, "ec" ) == 0 ) + opt.type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "format" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "pem" ) == 0 ) + opt.format = FORMAT_PEM; + else if( strcmp( q, "der" ) == 0 ) + opt.format = FORMAT_DER; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "rsa_keysize" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.rsa_keysize = atoi( q ); + if( opt.rsa_keysize < 1024 || + opt.rsa_keysize > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + goto usage; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + else if( strcmp( p, "ec_curve" ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( q ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + opt.ec_curve = curve_info->grp_id; + } +#endif + else if( strcmp( p, "filename" ) == 0 ) + opt.filename = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "use_dev_random" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.use_dev_random = atoi( q ); + if( opt.use_dev_random < 0 || opt.use_dev_random > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else + goto usage; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); +#if !defined(_WIN32) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( opt.use_dev_random ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &entropy, dev_random_entropy_poll, + NULL, DEV_RANDOM_THRESHOLD, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_entropy_add_source returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf("\n Using /dev/random, so can take a long time! " ); + fflush( stdout ); + } +#endif /* !_WIN32 && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 1.1. Generate the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Generating the private key ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( &key, + mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( (mbedtls_pk_type_t) opt.type ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_setup returned -0x%04x", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + if( opt.type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_pk_rsa( key ), mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, + opt.rsa_keysize, 65537 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_gen_key returned -0x%04x", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( opt.type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( (mbedtls_ecp_group_id) opt.ec_curve, + mbedtls_pk_ec( key ), + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ecp_gen_key returned -0x%04x", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! key type not supported\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 1.2 Print the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n . Key information:\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( key ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export ( rsa, &N, &P, &Q, &D, &E ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, &DP, &DQ, &QP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! could not export RSA parameters\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "N: ", &N, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "E: ", &E, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "D: ", &D, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "P: ", &P, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q: ", &Q, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "DP: ", &DP, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "DQ: ", &DQ, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "QP: ", &QP, 16, NULL ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec( key ); + mbedtls_printf( "curve: %s\n", + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( ecp->grp.id )->name ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "X_Q: ", &ecp->Q.X, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Y_Q: ", &ecp->Q.Y, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "D: ", &ecp->d , 16, NULL ); + } + else +#endif + mbedtls_printf(" ! key type not supported\n"); + + /* + * 1.3 Export key + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Writing key to file..." ); + + if( ( ret = write_private_key( &key, opt.filename ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_printf( " - %s\n", buf ); +#else + mbedtls_printf("\n"); +#endif + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &QP ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( &key ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && + * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/key_app.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/key_app.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f39e5ce --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/key_app.c @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +/* + * Key reading application + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#include +#endif + +#define MODE_NONE 0 +#define MODE_PRIVATE 1 +#define MODE_PUBLIC 2 + +#define DFL_MODE MODE_NONE +#define DFL_FILENAME "keyfile.key" +#define DFL_PASSWORD "" +#define DFL_PASSWORD_FILE "" +#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0 + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: key_app param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " mode=private|public default: none\n" \ + " filename=%%s default: keyfile.key\n" \ + " password=%%s default: \"\"\n" \ + " password_file=%%s default: \"\"\n" \ + "\n" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + int mode; /* the mode to run the application in */ + const char *filename; /* filename of the key file */ + const char *password; /* password for the private key */ + const char *password_file; /* password_file for the private key */ +} opt; + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + char buf[1024]; + int i; + char *p, *q; + + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP; + + /* + * Set to sane values + */ + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &QP ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto cleanup; + } + + opt.mode = DFL_MODE; + opt.filename = DFL_FILENAME; + opt.password = DFL_PASSWORD; + opt.password_file = DFL_PASSWORD_FILE; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "mode" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "private" ) == 0 ) + opt.mode = MODE_PRIVATE; + else if( strcmp( q, "public" ) == 0 ) + opt.mode = MODE_PUBLIC; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "filename" ) == 0 ) + opt.filename = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "password" ) == 0 ) + opt.password = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "password_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.password_file = q; + else + goto usage; + } + + if( opt.mode == MODE_PRIVATE ) + { + if( strlen( opt.password ) && strlen( opt.password_file ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Error: cannot have both password and password_file\n" ); + goto usage; + } + + if( strlen( opt.password_file ) ) + { + FILE *f; + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the password file ..." ); + if( ( f = fopen( opt.password_file, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! fopen returned NULL\n" ); + goto cleanup; + } + if( fgets( buf, sizeof(buf), f ) == NULL ) + { + fclose( f ); + mbedtls_printf( "Error: fgets() failed to retrieve password\n" ); + goto cleanup; + } + fclose( f ); + + i = (int) strlen( buf ); + if( buf[i - 1] == '\n' ) buf[i - 1] = '\0'; + if( buf[i - 2] == '\r' ) buf[i - 2] = '\0'; + opt.password = buf; + } + + /* + * 1.1. Load the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the private key ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, opt.filename, opt.password ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.2 Print the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Key information ...\n" ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export ( rsa, &N, &P, &Q, &D, &E ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, &DP, &DQ, &QP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! could not export RSA parameters\n\n" ); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "N: ", &N, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "E: ", &E, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "D: ", &D, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "P: ", &P, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q: ", &Q, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "DP: ", &DP, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "DQ: ", &DQ, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "QP: ", &QP, 16, NULL ) ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec( pk ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(X): ", &ecp->Q.X, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(Y): ", &ecp->Q.Y, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(Z): ", &ecp->Q.Z, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "D : ", &ecp->d , 16, NULL ) ); + } + else +#endif + { + mbedtls_printf("Do not know how to print key information for this type\n" ); + goto cleanup; + } + } + else if( opt.mode == MODE_PUBLIC ) + { + /* + * 1.1. Load the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the public key ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &pk, opt.filename ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " . Key information ...\n" ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &N, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &E ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! could not export RSA parameters\n\n" ); + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "N: ", &N, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "E: ", &E, 16, NULL ) ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec( pk ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(X): ", &ecp->Q.X, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(Y): ", &ecp->Q.Y, 16, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(Z): ", &ecp->Q.Z, 16, NULL ) ); + } + else +#endif + { + mbedtls_printf("Do not know how to print key information for this type\n" ); + goto cleanup; + } + } + else + goto usage; + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +cleanup: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_printf( " ! Last error was: %s\n", buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &QP ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d531ea5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c @@ -0,0 +1,441 @@ +/* + * Key writing application + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#define USAGE_OUT \ + " output_file=%%s default: keyfile.pem\n" \ + " output_format=pem|der default: pem\n" +#else +#define USAGE_OUT \ + " output_file=%%s default: keyfile.der\n" \ + " output_format=der default: der\n" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#define DFL_OUTPUT_FILENAME "keyfile.pem" +#define DFL_OUTPUT_FORMAT OUTPUT_FORMAT_PEM +#else +#define DFL_OUTPUT_FILENAME "keyfile.der" +#define DFL_OUTPUT_FORMAT OUTPUT_FORMAT_DER +#endif + +#define DFL_MODE MODE_NONE +#define DFL_FILENAME "keyfile.key" +#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0 +#define DFL_OUTPUT_MODE OUTPUT_MODE_NONE + +#define MODE_NONE 0 +#define MODE_PRIVATE 1 +#define MODE_PUBLIC 2 + +#define OUTPUT_MODE_NONE 0 +#define OUTPUT_MODE_PRIVATE 1 +#define OUTPUT_MODE_PUBLIC 2 + +#define OUTPUT_FORMAT_PEM 0 +#define OUTPUT_FORMAT_DER 1 + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: key_app_writer param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " mode=private|public default: none\n" \ + " filename=%%s default: keyfile.key\n" \ + " output_mode=private|public default: none\n" \ + USAGE_OUT \ + "\n" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + int mode; /* the mode to run the application in */ + const char *filename; /* filename of the key file */ + int output_mode; /* the output mode to use */ + const char *output_file; /* where to store the constructed key file */ + int output_format; /* the output format to use */ +} opt; + +static int write_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *key, const char *output_file ) +{ + int ret; + FILE *f; + unsigned char output_buf[16000]; + unsigned char *c = output_buf; + size_t len = 0; + + memset(output_buf, 0, 16000); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + if( opt.output_format == OUTPUT_FORMAT_PEM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( key, output_buf, 16000 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + len = strlen( (char *) output_buf ); + } + else +#endif + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( key, output_buf, 16000 ) ) < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + len = ret; + c = output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - len; + } + + if( ( f = fopen( output_file, "w" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( fwrite( c, 1, len, f ) != len ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int write_private_key( mbedtls_pk_context *key, const char *output_file ) +{ + int ret; + FILE *f; + unsigned char output_buf[16000]; + unsigned char *c = output_buf; + size_t len = 0; + + memset(output_buf, 0, 16000); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + if( opt.output_format == OUTPUT_FORMAT_PEM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( key, output_buf, 16000 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + len = strlen( (char *) output_buf ); + } + else +#endif + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( key, output_buf, 16000 ) ) < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + len = ret; + c = output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - len; + } + + if( ( f = fopen( output_file, "w" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( fwrite( c, 1, len, f ) != len ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + char buf[200]; +#endif + int i; + char *p, *q; + + mbedtls_pk_context key; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP; + + /* + * Set to sane values + */ + mbedtls_pk_init( &key ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &QP ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.mode = DFL_MODE; + opt.filename = DFL_FILENAME; + opt.output_mode = DFL_OUTPUT_MODE; + opt.output_file = DFL_OUTPUT_FILENAME; + opt.output_format = DFL_OUTPUT_FORMAT; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "mode" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "private" ) == 0 ) + opt.mode = MODE_PRIVATE; + else if( strcmp( q, "public" ) == 0 ) + opt.mode = MODE_PUBLIC; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "output_mode" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "private" ) == 0 ) + opt.output_mode = OUTPUT_MODE_PRIVATE; + else if( strcmp( q, "public" ) == 0 ) + opt.output_mode = OUTPUT_MODE_PUBLIC; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "output_format" ) == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + if( strcmp( q, "pem" ) == 0 ) + opt.output_format = OUTPUT_FORMAT_PEM; + else +#endif + if( strcmp( q, "der" ) == 0 ) + opt.output_format = OUTPUT_FORMAT_DER; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "filename" ) == 0 ) + opt.filename = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "output_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.output_file = q; + else + goto usage; + } + + if( opt.mode == MODE_NONE && opt.output_mode != OUTPUT_MODE_NONE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\nCannot output a key without reading one.\n"); + goto exit; + } + + if( opt.mode == MODE_PUBLIC && opt.output_mode == OUTPUT_MODE_PRIVATE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\nCannot output a private key from a public key.\n"); + goto exit; + } + + if( opt.mode == MODE_PRIVATE ) + { + /* + * 1.1. Load the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the private key ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, opt.filename, NULL ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%04x", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.2 Print the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Key information ...\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( key ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export ( rsa, &N, &P, &Q, &D, &E ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, &DP, &DQ, &QP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! could not export RSA parameters\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "N: ", &N, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "E: ", &E, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "D: ", &D, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "P: ", &P, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q: ", &Q, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "DP: ", &DP, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "DQ: ", &DQ, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "QP: ", &QP, 16, NULL ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec( key ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(X): ", &ecp->Q.X, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(Y): ", &ecp->Q.Y, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(Z): ", &ecp->Q.Z, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "D : ", &ecp->d , 16, NULL ); + } + else +#endif + mbedtls_printf("key type not supported yet\n"); + + } + else if( opt.mode == MODE_PUBLIC ) + { + /* + * 1.1. Load the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the public key ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &key, opt.filename ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key returned -0x%04x", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.2 Print the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Key information ...\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( key ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &N, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &E ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! could not export RSA parameters\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "N: ", &N, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "E: ", &E, 16, NULL ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec( key ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(X): ", &ecp->Q.X, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(Y): ", &ecp->Q.Y, 16, NULL ); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q(Z): ", &ecp->Q.Z, 16, NULL ); + } + else +#endif + mbedtls_printf("key type not supported yet\n"); + } + else + goto usage; + + if( opt.output_mode == OUTPUT_MODE_PUBLIC ) + { + write_public_key( &key, opt.output_file ); + } + if( opt.output_mode == OUTPUT_MODE_PRIVATE ) + { + write_private_key( &key, opt.output_file ); + } + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_printf( " - %s\n", buf ); +#else + mbedtls_printf("\n"); +#endif + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &QP ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( &key ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/mpi_demo.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/mpi_demo.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8245d01b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/mpi_demo.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Simple MPI demonstration program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( void ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_mpi E, P, Q, N, H, D, X, Y, Z; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &H ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P, 10, "2789" ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &Q, 10, "3203" ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &E, 10, "257" ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &N, &P, &Q ) ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n Public key:\n\n" ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( " N = ", &N, 10, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( " E = ", &E, 10, NULL ) ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n Private key:\n\n" ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( " P = ", &P, 10, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( " Q = ", &Q, 10, NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P, &P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q, &Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P, &Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &D, &E, &H ) ); + + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( " D = E^-1 mod (P-1)*(Q-1) = ", + &D, 10, NULL ); +#else + mbedtls_printf("\nTest skipped (MBEDTLS_GENPRIME not defined).\n\n"); +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &X, 10, "55555" ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &Y, &X, &E, &N, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &Z, &Y, &D, &N, NULL ) ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n RSA operation:\n\n" ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( " X (plaintext) = ", &X, 10, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( " Y (ciphertext) = X^E mod N = ", &Y, 10, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_file( " Z (decrypted) = Y^D mod N = ", &Z, 10, NULL ) ); + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &H ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); + + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\nAn error occurred.\n" ); + } + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_decrypt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_decrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..810d6fb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_decrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +/* + * Public key-based simple decryption program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + unsigned c; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + size_t i, olen = 0; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + unsigned char result[1024]; + unsigned char buf[512]; + const char *pers = "mbedtls_pk_decrypt"; + ((void) argv); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + memset(result, 0, sizeof( result ) ); + + if( argc != 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: mbedtls_pk_decrypt \n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, + &entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading private key from '%s'", argv[1] ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, argv[1], "" ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Extract the RSA encrypted value from the text file + */ + if( ( f = fopen( "result-enc.txt", "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\n ! Could not open %s\n\n", "result-enc.txt" ); + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + i = 0; + while( fscanf( f, "%02X", (unsigned int*) &c ) > 0 && + i < (int) sizeof( buf ) ) + { + buf[i++] = (unsigned char) c; + } + + fclose( f ); + + /* + * Decrypt the encrypted RSA data and print the result. + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Decrypting the encrypted data" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &pk, buf, i, result, &olen, sizeof(result), + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_decrypt returned -0x%04x\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . OK\n\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( "The decrypted result is: '%s'\n\n", result ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_printf( " ! Last error was: %s\n", buf ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_encrypt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_encrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e629dc13 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_encrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* + * RSA simple data encryption program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + size_t i, olen = 0; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + unsigned char input[1024]; + unsigned char buf[512]; + const char *pers = "mbedtls_pk_encrypt"; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + if( argc != 3 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: mbedtls_pk_encrypt \n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, + &entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading public key from '%s'", argv[1] ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &pk, argv[1] ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( strlen( argv[2] ) > 100 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Input data larger than 100 characters.\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( input, argv[2], strlen( argv[2] ) ); + + /* + * Calculate the RSA encryption of the hash. + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Generating the encrypted value" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &pk, input, strlen( argv[2] ), + buf, &olen, sizeof(buf), + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_encrypt returned -0x%04x\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Write the signature into result-enc.txt + */ + if( ( f = fopen( "result-enc.txt", "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not create %s\n\n", + "result-enc.txt" ); + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + for( i = 0; i < olen; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( f, "%02X%s", buf[i], + ( i + 1 ) % 16 == 0 ? "\r\n" : " " ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Done (created \"%s\")\n\n", "result-enc.txt" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_printf( " ! Last error was: %s\n", buf ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && + MBEDTLS_FS_IO && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..451e3de9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +/* + * Public key-based signature creation program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#include +#include + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + char filename[512]; + const char *pers = "mbedtls_pk_sign"; + size_t olen = 0; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + if( argc != 3 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: mbedtls_pk_sign \n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading private key from '%s'", argv[1] ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, argv[1], "" ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not parse '%s'\n", argv[1] ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Compute the SHA-256 hash of the input file, + * then calculate the signature of the hash. + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Generating the SHA-256 signature" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_file( + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ), + argv[2], hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open or read %s\n\n", argv[2] ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hash, 0, buf, &olen, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_sign returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Write the signature into .sig + */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.sig", argv[2] ); + + if( ( f = fopen( filename, "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not create %s\n\n", filename ); + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, olen, f ) != olen ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! fwrite failed\n\n" ); + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Done (created \"%s\")\n\n", filename ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, (char *) buf, sizeof(buf) ); + mbedtls_printf( " ! Last error was: %s\n", buf ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && + MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_verify.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_verify.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ee722431 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/pk_verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * Public key-based signature verification program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#include +#include + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + size_t i; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + char filename[512]; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + if( argc != 3 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: mbedtls_pk_verify \n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading public key from '%s'", argv[1] ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &pk, argv[1] ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Extract the signature from the file + */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.sig", argv[2] ); + + if( ( f = fopen( filename, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\n ! Could not open %s\n\n", filename ); + goto exit; + } + + i = fread( buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f ); + + fclose( f ); + + /* + * Compute the SHA-256 hash of the input file and + * verify the signature + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Verifying the SHA-256 signature" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_file( + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ), + argv[2], hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open or read %s\n\n", argv[2] ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hash, 0, + buf, i ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_verify returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . OK (the signature is valid)\n\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, (char *) buf, sizeof(buf) ); + mbedtls_printf( " ! Last error was: %s\n", buf ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && + MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_decrypt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_decrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01bf3a62 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_decrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +/* + * RSA simple decryption program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include + +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + unsigned c; + size_t i; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + unsigned char result[1024]; + unsigned char buf[512]; + const char *pers = "rsa_decrypt"; + ((void) argv); + + memset(result, 0, sizeof( result ) ); + + if( argc != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: rsa_decrypt\n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &QP ); + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, + &entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading private key from rsa_priv.txt" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( f = fopen( "rsa_priv.txt", "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open rsa_priv.txt\n" \ + " ! Please run rsa_genkey first\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &N , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &E , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &D , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &P , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &Q , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &DP , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &DQ , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &QP , 16, f ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + fclose( f ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &N, &P, &Q, &D, &E ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_import returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( &rsa ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_complete returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Extract the RSA encrypted value from the text file + */ + if( ( f = fopen( "result-enc.txt", "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\n ! Could not open %s\n\n", "result-enc.txt" ); + goto exit; + } + + i = 0; + + while( fscanf( f, "%02X", (unsigned int*) &c ) > 0 && + i < (int) sizeof( buf ) ) + buf[i++] = (unsigned char) c; + + fclose( f ); + + if( i != rsa.len ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\n ! Invalid RSA signature format\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Decrypt the encrypted RSA data and print the result. + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Decrypting the encrypted data" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, + &ctr_drbg, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, &i, + buf, result, 1024 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . OK\n\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( "The decrypted result is: '%s'\n\n", result ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &QP ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_encrypt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_encrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ba012017 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_encrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +/* + * RSA simple data encryption program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + size_t i; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + unsigned char input[1024]; + unsigned char buf[512]; + const char *pers = "rsa_encrypt"; + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + + if( argc != 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: rsa_encrypt \n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, + &entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading public key from rsa_pub.txt" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( f = fopen( "rsa_pub.txt", "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open rsa_pub.txt\n" \ + " ! Please run rsa_genkey first\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &N, 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &E, 16, f ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + fclose( f ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_import returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( strlen( argv[1] ) > 100 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Input data larger than 100 characters.\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( input, argv[1], strlen( argv[1] ) ); + + /* + * Calculate the RSA encryption of the hash. + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Generating the RSA encrypted value" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, + &ctr_drbg, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + strlen( argv[1] ), input, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Write the signature into result-enc.txt + */ + if( ( f = fopen( "result-enc.txt", "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not create %s\n\n", "result-enc.txt" ); + goto exit; + } + + for( i = 0; i < rsa.len; i++ ) + mbedtls_fprintf( f, "%02X%s", buf[i], + ( i + 1 ) % 16 == 0 ? "\r\n" : " " ); + + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Done (created \"%s\")\n\n", "result-enc.txt" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && + MBEDTLS_FS_IO && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_genkey.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_genkey.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..26a89250 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_genkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +/* + * Example RSA key generation program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" + +#include +#include +#endif + +#define KEY_SIZE 2048 +#define EXPONENT 65537 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or MBEDTLS_GENPRIME and/or " + "MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( void ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP; + FILE *fpub = NULL; + FILE *fpriv = NULL; + const char *pers = "rsa_genkey"; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &QP ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n . Generating the RSA key [ %d-bit ]...", KEY_SIZE ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( &rsa, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, KEY_SIZE, + EXPONENT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_gen_key returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n . Exporting the public key in rsa_pub.txt...." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export ( &rsa, &N, &P, &Q, &D, &E ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( &rsa, &DP, &DQ, &QP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! could not export RSA parameters\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( fpub = fopen( "rsa_pub.txt", "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! could not open rsa_pub.txt for writing\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "N = ", &N, 16, fpub ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "E = ", &E, 16, fpub ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_write_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n . Exporting the private key in rsa_priv.txt..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( fpriv = fopen( "rsa_priv.txt", "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! could not open rsa_priv.txt for writing\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "N = " , &N , 16, fpriv ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "E = " , &E , 16, fpriv ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "D = " , &D , 16, fpriv ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "P = " , &P , 16, fpriv ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "Q = " , &Q , 16, fpriv ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "DP = ", &DP, 16, fpriv ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "DQ = ", &DQ, 16, fpriv ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "QP = ", &QP, 16, fpriv ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_write_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + if( fpub != NULL ) + fclose( fpub ); + + if( fpriv != NULL ) + fclose( fpriv ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &QP ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && + MBEDTLS_GENPRIME && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_priv.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_priv.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..254fcf85 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_priv.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +N = A1D46FBA2318F8DCEF16C280948B1CF27966B9B47225ED2989F8D74B45BD36049C0AAB5AD0FF003553BA843C8E12782FC5873BB89A3DC84B883D25666CD22BF3ACD5B675969F8BEBFBCAC93FDD927C7442B178B10D1DFF9398E52316AAE0AF74E594650BDC3C670241D418684593CDA1A7B9DC4F20D2FDC6F66344074003E211 +E = 010001 +D = 589552BB4F2F023ADDDD5586D0C8FD857512D82080436678D07F984A29D892D31F1F7000FC5A39A0F73E27D885E47249A4148C8A5653EF69F91F8F736BA9F84841C2D99CD8C24DE8B72B5C9BE0EDBE23F93D731749FEA9CFB4A48DD2B7F35A2703E74AA2D4DB7DE9CEEA7D763AF0ADA7AC176C4E9A22C4CDA65CEC0C65964401 +P = CD083568D2D46C44C40C1FA0101AF2155E59C70B08423112AF0C1202514BBA5210765E29FF13036F56C7495894D80CF8C3BAEE2839BACBB0B86F6A2965F60DB1 +Q = CA0EEEA5E710E8E9811A6B846399420E3AE4A4C16647E426DDF8BBBCB11CD3F35CE2E4B6BCAD07AE2C0EC2ECBFCC601B207CDD77B5673E16382B1130BF465261 +DP = 0D0E21C07BF434B4A83B116472C2147A11D8EB98A33CFBBCF1D275EF19D815941622435AAF3839B6C432CA53CE9E772CFBE1923A937A766FD93E96E6EDEC1DF1 +DQ = 269CEBE6305DFEE4809377F078C814E37B45AE6677114DFC4F76F5097E1F3031D592567AC55B9B98213B40ECD54A4D2361F5FAACA1B1F51F71E4690893C4F081 +QP = 97AC5BB885ABCA314375E9E4DB1BA4B2218C90619F61BD474F5785075ECA81750A735199A8C191FE2D3355E7CF601A70E5CABDE0E02C2538BB9FB4871540B3C1 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_pub.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_pub.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1e7ae0c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_pub.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +N = A1D46FBA2318F8DCEF16C280948B1CF27966B9B47225ED2989F8D74B45BD36049C0AAB5AD0FF003553BA843C8E12782FC5873BB89A3DC84B883D25666CD22BF3ACD5B675969F8BEBFBCAC93FDD927C7442B178B10D1DFF9398E52316AAE0AF74E594650BDC3C670241D418684593CDA1A7B9DC4F20D2FDC6F66344074003E211 +E = 010001 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c9522c8c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* + * RSA/SHA-256 signature creation program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#include +#include + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + size_t i; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + char filename[512]; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP; + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &QP ); + + if( argc != 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: rsa_sign \n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading private key from rsa_priv.txt" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( f = fopen( "rsa_priv.txt", "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open rsa_priv.txt\n" \ + " ! Please run rsa_genkey first\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &N , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &E , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &D , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &P , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &Q , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &DP , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &DQ , 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &QP , 16, f ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + fclose( f ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &N, &P, &Q, &D, &E ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_import returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( &rsa ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_complete returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Checking the private key" ); + fflush( stdout ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey failed with -0x%0x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Compute the SHA-256 hash of the input file, + * then calculate the RSA signature of the hash. + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Generating the RSA/SHA-256 signature" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_file( + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ), + argv[1], hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open or read %s\n\n", argv[1] ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + 20, hash, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign returned -0x%0x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Write the signature into .sig + */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.sig", argv[1] ); + + if( ( f = fopen( filename, "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not create %s\n\n", argv[1] ); + goto exit; + } + + for( i = 0; i < rsa.len; i++ ) + mbedtls_fprintf( f, "%02X%s", buf[i], + ( i + 1 ) % 16 == 0 ? "\r\n" : " " ); + + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Done (created \"%s\")\n\n", filename ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &QP ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && + MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9d5053a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* + * RSASSA-PSS/SHA-256 signature creation program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#include +#include + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + char filename[512]; + const char *pers = "rsa_sign_pss"; + size_t olen = 0; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + if( argc != 3 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: rsa_sign_pss \n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading private key from '%s'", argv[1] ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, argv[1], "" ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not read key from '%s'\n", argv[1] ); + mbedtls_printf( " ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Key is not an RSA key\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); + + /* + * Compute the SHA-256 hash of the input file, + * then calculate the RSA signature of the hash. + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Generating the RSA/SHA-256 signature" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_file( + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ), + argv[2], hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open or read %s\n\n", argv[2] ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hash, 0, buf, &olen, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_sign returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Write the signature into .sig + */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, 512, "%s.sig", argv[2] ); + + if( ( f = fopen( filename, "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not create %s\n\n", filename ); + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, olen, f ) != olen ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! fwrite failed\n\n" ); + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Done (created \"%s\")\n\n", filename ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && + MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fbc0779b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +/* + * RSA/SHA-256 signature verification program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#include +#include + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + unsigned c; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + size_t i; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + char filename[512]; + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + if( argc != 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: rsa_verify \n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading public key from rsa_pub.txt" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( f = fopen( "rsa_pub.txt", "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open rsa_pub.txt\n" \ + " ! Please run rsa_genkey first\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &rsa.N, 16, f ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &rsa.E, 16, f ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + + rsa.len = ( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &rsa.N ) + 7 ) >> 3; + + fclose( f ); + + /* + * Extract the RSA signature from the text file + */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.sig", argv[1] ); + + if( ( f = fopen( filename, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\n ! Could not open %s\n\n", filename ); + goto exit; + } + + i = 0; + while( fscanf( f, "%02X", (unsigned int*) &c ) > 0 && + i < (int) sizeof( buf ) ) + buf[i++] = (unsigned char) c; + + fclose( f ); + + if( i != rsa.len ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\n ! Invalid RSA signature format\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Compute the SHA-256 hash of the input file and + * verify the signature + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Verifying the RSA/SHA-256 signature" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_file( + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ), + argv[1], hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open or read %s\n\n", argv[1] ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 20, hash, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify returned -0x%0x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . OK (the signature is valid)\n\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && + MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_verify_pss.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_verify_pss.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..81b0fd64 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/pkey/rsa_verify_pss.c @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +/* + * RSASSA-PSS/SHA-256 signature verification program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#include +#include + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + size_t i; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + char filename[512]; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + if( argc != 3 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "usage: rsa_verify_pss \n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading public key from '%s'", argv[1] ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &pk, argv[1] ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not read key from '%s'\n", argv[1] ); + mbedtls_printf( " ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Key is not an RSA key\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); + + /* + * Extract the RSA signature from the file + */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, 512, "%s.sig", argv[2] ); + + if( ( f = fopen( filename, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\n ! Could not open %s\n\n", filename ); + goto exit; + } + + i = fread( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, f ); + + fclose( f ); + + /* + * Compute the SHA-256 hash of the input file and + * verify the signature + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Verifying the RSA/SHA-256 signature" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_file( + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ), + argv[2], hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not open or read %s\n\n", argv[2] ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hash, 0, + buf, i ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_verify returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . OK (the signature is valid)\n\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && + MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..23e85fea --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +set(executables + crypto_examples + key_ladder_demo + psa_constant_names +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) +endforeach() + +target_include_directories(psa_constant_names PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}) + +install(TARGETS ${executables} + DESTINATION "bin" + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) + +install(PROGRAMS + key_ladder_demo.sh + DESTINATION "bin") diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/crypto_examples.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/crypto_examples.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..935d657a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/crypto_examples.c @@ -0,0 +1,331 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include +#include +#include + +#define ASSERT( predicate ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ! ( predicate ) ) \ + { \ + printf( "\tassertion failed at %s:%d - '%s'\r\n", \ + __FILE__, __LINE__, #predicate); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } while ( 0 ) + +#define ASSERT_STATUS( actual, expected ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( actual ) != ( expected ) ) \ + { \ + printf( "\tassertion failed at %s:%d - " \ + "actual:%d expected:%d\r\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + (psa_status_t) actual, (psa_status_t) expected ); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } while ( 0 ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) +int main( void ) +{ + printf( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and/or MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC and/or MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR " + "and/or MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING " + "not defined and/or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER" + " defined.\r\n" ); + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +static psa_status_t cipher_operation( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_size, + size_t part_size, + uint8_t * output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t bytes_to_write = 0, bytes_written = 0, len = 0; + + *output_len = 0; + while( bytes_written != input_size ) + { + bytes_to_write = ( input_size - bytes_written > part_size ? + part_size : + input_size - bytes_written ); + + status = psa_cipher_update( operation, input + bytes_written, + bytes_to_write, output + *output_len, + output_size - *output_len, &len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + bytes_written += bytes_to_write; + *output_len += len; + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish( operation, output + *output_len, + output_size - *output_len, &len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + *output_len += len; + +exit: + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_encrypt( psa_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t * iv, + size_t iv_size, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_size, + size_t part_size, + uint8_t * output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t iv_len = 0; + + memset( &operation, 0, sizeof( operation ) ); + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, iv, iv_size, &iv_len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = cipher_operation( &operation, input, input_size, part_size, + output, output_size, output_len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_decrypt( psa_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * iv, + size_t iv_size, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_size, + size_t part_size, + uint8_t * output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + + memset( &operation, 0, sizeof( operation ) ); + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv, iv_size ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = cipher_operation( &operation, input, input_size, part_size, + output, output_size, output_len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t +cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_cbc_nopad_1_block( void ) +{ + enum { + block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ), + key_bits = 256, + part_size = block_size, + }; + const psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key = 0; + size_t output_len = 0; + uint8_t iv[block_size]; + uint8_t input[block_size]; + uint8_t encrypt[block_size]; + uint8_t decrypt[block_size]; + + status = psa_generate_random( input, sizeof( input ) ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, key_bits ); + + status = psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = cipher_encrypt( key, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ), + input, sizeof( input ), part_size, + encrypt, sizeof( encrypt ), &output_len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = cipher_decrypt( key, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ), + encrypt, output_len, part_size, + decrypt, sizeof( decrypt ), &output_len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = memcmp( input, decrypt, sizeof( input ) ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_cbc_pkcs7_multi( void ) +{ + enum { + block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ), + key_bits = 256, + input_size = 100, + part_size = 10, + }; + + const psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key = 0; + size_t output_len = 0; + uint8_t iv[block_size], input[input_size], + encrypt[input_size + block_size], decrypt[input_size + block_size]; + + status = psa_generate_random( input, sizeof( input ) ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, key_bits ); + + status = psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = cipher_encrypt( key, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ), + input, sizeof( input ), part_size, + encrypt, sizeof( encrypt ), &output_len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = cipher_decrypt( key, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ), + encrypt, output_len, part_size, + decrypt, sizeof( decrypt ), &output_len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = memcmp( input, decrypt, sizeof( input ) ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_ctr_multi( void ) +{ + enum { + block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ), + key_bits = 256, + input_size = 100, + part_size = 10, + }; + const psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_CTR; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key = 0; + size_t output_len = 0; + uint8_t iv[block_size], input[input_size], encrypt[input_size], + decrypt[input_size]; + + status = psa_generate_random( input, sizeof( input ) ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, key_bits ); + + status = psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = cipher_encrypt( key, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ), + input, sizeof( input ), part_size, + encrypt, sizeof( encrypt ), &output_len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = cipher_decrypt( key, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ), + encrypt, output_len, part_size, + decrypt, sizeof( decrypt ), &output_len ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = memcmp( input, decrypt, sizeof( input ) ); + ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( status ); +} + +static void cipher_examples( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + printf( "cipher encrypt/decrypt AES CBC no padding:\r\n" ); + status = cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_cbc_nopad_1_block( ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + printf( "\tsuccess!\r\n" ); + + printf( "cipher encrypt/decrypt AES CBC PKCS7 multipart:\r\n" ); + status = cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_cbc_pkcs7_multi( ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + printf( "\tsuccess!\r\n" ); + + printf( "cipher encrypt/decrypt AES CTR multipart:\r\n" ); + status = cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_ctr_multi( ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + printf( "\tsuccess!\r\n" ); +} + +int main( void ) +{ + ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) == PSA_SUCCESS ); + cipher_examples( ); +exit: + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C && MBEDTLS_AES_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d643492 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.c @@ -0,0 +1,707 @@ +/** + * PSA API key derivation demonstration + * + * This program calculates a key ladder: a chain of secret material, each + * derived from the previous one in a deterministic way based on a label. + * Two keys are identical if and only if they are derived from the same key + * using the same label. + * + * The initial key is called the master key. The master key is normally + * randomly generated, but it could itself be derived from another key. + * + * This program derives a series of keys called intermediate keys. + * The first intermediate key is derived from the master key using the + * first label passed on the command line. Each subsequent intermediate + * key is derived from the previous one using the next label passed + * on the command line. + * + * This program has four modes of operation: + * + * - "generate": generate a random master key. + * - "wrap": derive a wrapping key from the last intermediate key, + * and use that key to encrypt-and-authenticate some data. + * - "unwrap": derive a wrapping key from the last intermediate key, + * and use that key to decrypt-and-authenticate some + * ciphertext created by wrap mode. + * - "save": save the last intermediate key so that it can be reused as + * the master key in another run of the program. + * + * See the usage() output for the command line usage. See the file + * `key_ladder_demo.sh` for an example run. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* First include Mbed TLS headers to get the Mbed TLS configuration and + * platform definitions that we'll use in this program. Also include + * standard C headers for functions we'll use here. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" // for mbedtls_platform_zeroize + +#include + +/* If the build options we need are not enabled, compile a placeholder. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) +int main( void ) +{ + printf( "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or MBEDTLS_CCM_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO " + "not defined and/or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER " + "defined.\n" ); + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +/* The real program starts here. */ + +/* Run a system function and bail out if it fails. */ +#define SYS_CHECK( expr ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ! ( expr ) ) \ + { \ + perror( #expr ); \ + status = DEMO_ERROR; \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +/* Run a PSA function and bail out if it fails. */ +#define PSA_CHECK( expr ) \ + do \ + { \ + status = ( expr ); \ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) \ + { \ + printf( "Error %d at line %d: %s\n", \ + (int) status, \ + __LINE__, \ + #expr ); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +/* To report operational errors in this program, use an error code that is + * different from every PSA error code. */ +#define DEMO_ERROR 120 + +/* The maximum supported key ladder depth. */ +#define MAX_LADDER_DEPTH 10 + +/* Salt to use when deriving an intermediate key. */ +#define DERIVE_KEY_SALT ( (uint8_t *) "key_ladder_demo.derive" ) +#define DERIVE_KEY_SALT_LENGTH ( strlen( (const char*) DERIVE_KEY_SALT ) ) + +/* Salt to use when deriving a wrapping key. */ +#define WRAPPING_KEY_SALT ( (uint8_t *) "key_ladder_demo.wrap" ) +#define WRAPPING_KEY_SALT_LENGTH ( strlen( (const char*) WRAPPING_KEY_SALT ) ) + +/* Size of the key derivation keys (applies both to the master key and + * to intermediate keys). */ +#define KEY_SIZE_BYTES 40 + +/* Algorithm for key derivation. */ +#define KDF_ALG PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) + +/* Type and size of the key used to wrap data. */ +#define WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES +#define WRAPPING_KEY_BITS 128 + +/* Cipher mode used to wrap data. */ +#define WRAPPING_ALG PSA_ALG_CCM + +/* Nonce size used to wrap data. */ +#define WRAPPING_IV_SIZE 13 + +/* Header used in files containing wrapped data. We'll save this header + * directly without worrying about data representation issues such as + * integer sizes and endianness, because the data is meant to be read + * back by the same program on the same machine. */ +#define WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC "key_ladder_demo" // including trailing null byte +#define WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC_LENGTH ( sizeof( WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC ) ) +typedef struct +{ + char magic[WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC_LENGTH]; + size_t ad_size; /* Size of the additional data, which is this header. */ + size_t payload_size; /* Size of the encrypted data. */ + /* Store the IV inside the additional data. It's convenient. */ + uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_SIZE]; +} wrapped_data_header_t; + +/* The modes that this program can operate in (see usage). */ +enum program_mode +{ + MODE_GENERATE, + MODE_SAVE, + MODE_UNWRAP, + MODE_WRAP +}; + +/* Save a key to a file. In the real world, you may want to export a derived + * key sometimes, to share it with another party. */ +static psa_status_t save_key( psa_key_id_t key, + const char *output_file_name ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t key_data[KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; + size_t key_size; + FILE *key_file = NULL; + + PSA_CHECK( psa_export_key( key, + key_data, sizeof( key_data ), + &key_size ) ); + SYS_CHECK( ( key_file = fopen( output_file_name, "wb" ) ) != NULL ); + SYS_CHECK( fwrite( key_data, 1, key_size, key_file ) == key_size ); + SYS_CHECK( fclose( key_file ) == 0 ); + key_file = NULL; + +exit: + if( key_file != NULL) + fclose( key_file ); + return( status ); +} + +/* Generate a master key for use in this demo. + * + * Normally a master key would be non-exportable. For the purpose of this + * demo, we want to save it to a file, to avoid relying on the keystore + * capability of the PSA crypto library. */ +static psa_status_t generate( const char *key_file_name ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_key_id_t key = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, KDF_ALG ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( KEY_SIZE_BYTES ) ); + + PSA_CHECK( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ) ); + + PSA_CHECK( save_key( key, key_file_name ) ); + +exit: + (void) psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( status ); +} + +/* Load the master key from a file. + * + * In the real world, this master key would be stored in an internal memory + * and the storage would be managed by the keystore capability of the PSA + * crypto library. */ +static psa_status_t import_key_from_file( psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const char *key_file_name, + psa_key_id_t *master_key ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t key_data[KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; + size_t key_size; + FILE *key_file = NULL; + unsigned char extra_byte; + + SYS_CHECK( ( key_file = fopen( key_file_name, "rb" ) ) != NULL ); + SYS_CHECK( ( key_size = fread( key_data, 1, sizeof( key_data ), + key_file ) ) != 0 ); + if( fread( &extra_byte, 1, 1, key_file ) != 0 ) + { + printf( "Key file too large (max: %u).\n", + (unsigned) sizeof( key_data ) ); + status = DEMO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + SYS_CHECK( fclose( key_file ) == 0 ); + key_file = NULL; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data, key_size, master_key ) ); +exit: + if( key_file != NULL ) + fclose( key_file ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_data, sizeof( key_data ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* If the key creation hasn't happened yet or has failed, + * *master_key is null. psa_destroy_key( 0 ) is + * guaranteed to do nothing and return PSA_SUCCESS. */ + (void) psa_destroy_key( *master_key ); + *master_key = 0; + } + return( status ); +} + +/* Derive the intermediate keys, using the list of labels provided on + * the command line. On input, *key is the master key identifier. + * This function destroys the master key. On successful output, *key + * is the identifier of the final derived key. + */ +static psa_status_t derive_key_ladder( const char *ladder[], + size_t ladder_depth, + psa_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t i; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, KDF_ALG ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( KEY_SIZE_BYTES ) ); + + /* For each label in turn, ... */ + for( i = 0; i < ladder_depth; i++ ) + { + /* Start deriving material from the master key (if i=0) or from + * the current intermediate key (if i>0). */ + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, KDF_ALG ) ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + DERIVE_KEY_SALT, DERIVE_KEY_SALT_LENGTH ) ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_input_key( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + *key ) ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + (uint8_t*) ladder[i], strlen( ladder[i] ) ) ); + /* When the parent key is not the master key, destroy it, + * since it is no longer needed. */ + PSA_CHECK( psa_destroy_key( *key ) ); + *key = 0; + /* Derive the next intermediate key from the parent key. */ + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, &operation, + key ) ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ) ); + } + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_key( *key ); + *key = 0; + } + return( status ); +} + +/* Derive a wrapping key from the last intermediate key. */ +static psa_status_t derive_wrapping_key( psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_key_id_t derived_key, + psa_key_id_t *wrapping_key ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + *wrapping_key = 0; + + /* Set up a key derivation operation from the key derived from + * the master key. */ + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, KDF_ALG ) ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + WRAPPING_KEY_SALT, WRAPPING_KEY_SALT_LENGTH ) ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_input_key( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + derived_key ) ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + NULL, 0 ) ); + + /* Create the wrapping key. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, WRAPPING_ALG ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, WRAPPING_KEY_BITS ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, &operation, + wrapping_key ) ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t wrap_data( const char *input_file_name, + const char *output_file_name, + psa_key_id_t wrapping_key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *input_file = NULL; + FILE *output_file = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + long input_position; + size_t input_size; + size_t buffer_size = 0; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + size_t ciphertext_size; + wrapped_data_header_t header; + + /* Find the size of the data to wrap. */ + SYS_CHECK( ( input_file = fopen( input_file_name, "rb" ) ) != NULL ); + SYS_CHECK( fseek( input_file, 0, SEEK_END ) == 0 ); + SYS_CHECK( ( input_position = ftell( input_file ) ) != -1 ); +#if LONG_MAX > SIZE_MAX + if( input_position > SIZE_MAX ) + { + printf( "Input file too large.\n" ); + status = DEMO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } +#endif + input_size = input_position; + PSA_CHECK( psa_get_key_attributes( wrapping_key, &attributes ) ); + key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + buffer_size = + PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, WRAPPING_ALG, input_size ); + /* Check for integer overflow. */ + if( buffer_size < input_size ) + { + printf( "Input file too large.\n" ); + status = DEMO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + /* Load the data to wrap. */ + SYS_CHECK( fseek( input_file, 0, SEEK_SET ) == 0 ); + SYS_CHECK( ( buffer = calloc( 1, buffer_size ) ) != NULL ); + SYS_CHECK( fread( buffer, 1, input_size, input_file ) == input_size ); + SYS_CHECK( fclose( input_file ) == 0 ); + input_file = NULL; + + /* Construct a header. */ + memcpy( &header.magic, WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC, WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC_LENGTH ); + header.ad_size = sizeof( header ); + header.payload_size = input_size; + + /* Wrap the data. */ + PSA_CHECK( psa_generate_random( header.iv, WRAPPING_IV_SIZE ) ); + PSA_CHECK( psa_aead_encrypt( wrapping_key, WRAPPING_ALG, + header.iv, WRAPPING_IV_SIZE, + (uint8_t *) &header, sizeof( header ), + buffer, input_size, + buffer, buffer_size, + &ciphertext_size ) ); + + /* Write the output. */ + SYS_CHECK( ( output_file = fopen( output_file_name, "wb" ) ) != NULL ); + SYS_CHECK( fwrite( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), + output_file ) == sizeof( header ) ); + SYS_CHECK( fwrite( buffer, 1, ciphertext_size, + output_file ) == ciphertext_size ); + SYS_CHECK( fclose( output_file ) == 0 ); + output_file = NULL; + +exit: + if( input_file != NULL ) + fclose( input_file ); + if( output_file != NULL ) + fclose( output_file ); + if( buffer != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buffer, buffer_size ); + free( buffer ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t unwrap_data( const char *input_file_name, + const char *output_file_name, + psa_key_id_t wrapping_key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *input_file = NULL; + FILE *output_file = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + size_t ciphertext_size = 0; + size_t plaintext_size; + wrapped_data_header_t header; + unsigned char extra_byte; + + /* Load and validate the header. */ + SYS_CHECK( ( input_file = fopen( input_file_name, "rb" ) ) != NULL ); + SYS_CHECK( fread( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), + input_file ) == sizeof( header ) ); + if( memcmp( &header.magic, WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC, + WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC_LENGTH ) != 0 ) + { + printf( "The input does not start with a valid magic header.\n" ); + status = DEMO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + if( header.ad_size != sizeof( header ) ) + { + printf( "The header size is not correct.\n" ); + status = DEMO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + PSA_CHECK( psa_get_key_attributes( wrapping_key, &attributes) ); + key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes); + ciphertext_size = + PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, WRAPPING_ALG, header.payload_size ); + /* Check for integer overflow. */ + if( ciphertext_size < header.payload_size ) + { + printf( "Input file too large.\n" ); + status = DEMO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + /* Load the payload data. */ + SYS_CHECK( ( buffer = calloc( 1, ciphertext_size ) ) != NULL ); + SYS_CHECK( fread( buffer, 1, ciphertext_size, + input_file ) == ciphertext_size ); + if( fread( &extra_byte, 1, 1, input_file ) != 0 ) + { + printf( "Extra garbage after ciphertext\n" ); + status = DEMO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + SYS_CHECK( fclose( input_file ) == 0 ); + input_file = NULL; + + /* Unwrap the data. */ + PSA_CHECK( psa_aead_decrypt( wrapping_key, WRAPPING_ALG, + header.iv, WRAPPING_IV_SIZE, + (uint8_t *) &header, sizeof( header ), + buffer, ciphertext_size, + buffer, ciphertext_size, + &plaintext_size ) ); + if( plaintext_size != header.payload_size ) + { + printf( "Incorrect payload size in the header.\n" ); + status = DEMO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + /* Write the output. */ + SYS_CHECK( ( output_file = fopen( output_file_name, "wb" ) ) != NULL ); + SYS_CHECK( fwrite( buffer, 1, plaintext_size, + output_file ) == plaintext_size ); + SYS_CHECK( fclose( output_file ) == 0 ); + output_file = NULL; + +exit: + if( input_file != NULL ) + fclose( input_file ); + if( output_file != NULL ) + fclose( output_file ); + if( buffer != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buffer, ciphertext_size ); + free( buffer ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t run( enum program_mode mode, + const char *key_file_name, + const char *ladder[], size_t ladder_depth, + const char *input_file_name, + const char *output_file_name ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_key_id_t derivation_key = 0; + psa_key_id_t wrapping_key = 0; + + /* Initialize the PSA crypto library. */ + PSA_CHECK( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Generate mode is unlike the others. Generate the master key and exit. */ + if( mode == MODE_GENERATE ) + return( generate( key_file_name ) ); + + /* Read the master key. */ + PSA_CHECK( import_key_from_file( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, + KDF_ALG, + key_file_name, + &derivation_key ) ); + + /* Calculate the derived key for this session. */ + PSA_CHECK( derive_key_ladder( ladder, ladder_depth, + &derivation_key ) ); + + switch( mode ) + { + case MODE_SAVE: + PSA_CHECK( save_key( derivation_key, output_file_name ) ); + break; + case MODE_UNWRAP: + PSA_CHECK( derive_wrapping_key( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, + derivation_key, + &wrapping_key ) ); + PSA_CHECK( unwrap_data( input_file_name, output_file_name, + wrapping_key ) ); + break; + case MODE_WRAP: + PSA_CHECK( derive_wrapping_key( PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + derivation_key, + &wrapping_key ) ); + PSA_CHECK( wrap_data( input_file_name, output_file_name, + wrapping_key ) ); + break; + default: + /* Unreachable but some compilers don't realize it. */ + break; + } + +exit: + /* Destroy any remaining key. Deinitializing the crypto library would do + * this anyway since they are volatile keys, but explicitly destroying + * keys makes the code easier to reuse. */ + (void) psa_destroy_key( derivation_key ); + (void) psa_destroy_key( wrapping_key ); + /* Deinitialize the PSA crypto library. */ + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + return( status ); +} + +static void usage( void ) +{ + printf( "Usage: key_ladder_demo MODE [OPTION=VALUE]...\n" ); + printf( "Demonstrate the usage of a key derivation ladder.\n" ); + printf( "\n" ); + printf( "Modes:\n" ); + printf( " generate Generate the master key\n" ); + printf( " save Save the derived key\n" ); + printf( " unwrap Unwrap (decrypt) input with the derived key\n" ); + printf( " wrap Wrap (encrypt) input with the derived key\n" ); + printf( "\n" ); + printf( "Options:\n" ); + printf( " input=FILENAME Input file (required for wrap/unwrap)\n" ); + printf( " master=FILENAME File containing the master key (default: master.key)\n" ); + printf( " output=FILENAME Output file (required for save/wrap/unwrap)\n" ); + printf( " label=TEXT Label for the key derivation.\n" ); + printf( " This may be repeated multiple times.\n" ); + printf( " To get the same key, you must use the same master key\n" ); + printf( " and the same sequence of labels.\n" ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + const char *key_file_name = "master.key"; + const char *input_file_name = NULL; + const char *output_file_name = NULL; + const char *ladder[MAX_LADDER_DEPTH]; + size_t ladder_depth = 0; + int i; + enum program_mode mode; + psa_status_t status; + + if( argc <= 1 || + strcmp( argv[1], "help" ) == 0 || + strcmp( argv[1], "-help" ) == 0 || + strcmp( argv[1], "--help" ) == 0 ) + { + usage( ); + return( EXIT_SUCCESS ); + } + + for( i = 2; i < argc; i++ ) + { + char *q = strchr( argv[i], '=' ); + if( q == NULL ) + { + printf( "Missing argument to option %s\n", argv[i] ); + goto usage_failure; + } + *q = 0; + ++q; + if( strcmp( argv[i], "input" ) == 0 ) + input_file_name = q; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "label" ) == 0 ) + { + if( ladder_depth == MAX_LADDER_DEPTH ) + { + printf( "Maximum ladder depth %u exceeded.\n", + (unsigned) MAX_LADDER_DEPTH ); + return( EXIT_FAILURE ); + } + ladder[ladder_depth] = q; + ++ladder_depth; + } + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "master" ) == 0 ) + key_file_name = q; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "output" ) == 0 ) + output_file_name = q; + else + { + printf( "Unknown option: %s\n", argv[i] ); + goto usage_failure; + } + } + + if( strcmp( argv[1], "generate" ) == 0 ) + mode = MODE_GENERATE; + else if( strcmp( argv[1], "save" ) == 0 ) + mode = MODE_SAVE; + else if( strcmp( argv[1], "unwrap" ) == 0 ) + mode = MODE_UNWRAP; + else if( strcmp( argv[1], "wrap" ) == 0 ) + mode = MODE_WRAP; + else + { + printf( "Unknown action: %s\n", argv[1] ); + goto usage_failure; + } + + if( input_file_name == NULL && + ( mode == MODE_WRAP || mode == MODE_UNWRAP ) ) + { + printf( "Required argument missing: input\n" ); + return( DEMO_ERROR ); + } + if( output_file_name == NULL && + ( mode == MODE_SAVE || mode == MODE_WRAP || mode == MODE_UNWRAP ) ) + { + printf( "Required argument missing: output\n" ); + return( DEMO_ERROR ); + } + + status = run( mode, key_file_name, + ladder, ladder_depth, + input_file_name, output_file_name ); + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? + EXIT_SUCCESS : + EXIT_FAILURE ); + +usage_failure: + usage( ); + return( EXIT_FAILURE ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_MD_C && MBEDTLS_AES_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..67de0853 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.sh @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +set -e -u + +program="${0%/*}"/key_ladder_demo +files_to_clean= + +run () { + echo + echo "# $1" + shift + echo "+ $*" + "$@" +} + +if [ -e master.key ]; then + echo "# Reusing the existing master.key file." +else + files_to_clean="$files_to_clean master.key" + run "Generate a master key." \ + "$program" generate master=master.key +fi + +files_to_clean="$files_to_clean input.txt hello_world.wrap" +echo "Here is some input. See it wrapped." >input.txt +run "Derive a key and wrap some data with it." \ + "$program" wrap master=master.key label=hello label=world \ + input=input.txt output=hello_world.wrap + +files_to_clean="$files_to_clean hello_world.txt" +run "Derive the same key again and unwrap the data." \ + "$program" unwrap master=master.key label=hello label=world \ + input=hello_world.wrap output=hello_world.txt +run "Compare the unwrapped data with the original input." \ + cmp input.txt hello_world.txt + +files_to_clean="$files_to_clean hellow_orld.txt" +! run "Derive a different key and attempt to unwrap the data. This must fail." \ + "$program" unwrap master=master.key input=hello_world.wrap output=hellow_orld.txt label=hellow label=orld + +files_to_clean="$files_to_clean hello.key" +run "Save the first step of the key ladder, then load it as a master key and construct the rest of the ladder." \ + "$program" save master=master.key label=hello \ + input=hello_world.wrap output=hello.key +run "Check that we get the same key by unwrapping data made by the other key." \ + "$program" unwrap master=hello.key label=world \ + input=hello_world.wrap output=hello_world.txt + +# Cleanup +rm -f $files_to_clean diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/psa_constant_names.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/psa_constant_names.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..14d44944 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/psa_constant_names.c @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +/* This block is present to support Visual Studio builds prior to 2015 */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900 +#include +int snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... ) +{ + int ret; + va_list argp; + + /* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */ + if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + va_start( argp, fmt ); +#if defined(_TRUNCATE) && !defined(__MINGW32__) + ret = _vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, argp ); +#else + ret = _vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp ); + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n ) + { + s[n-1] = '\0'; + ret = -1; + } +#endif + va_end( argp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif + +/* There are different GET_HASH macros for different kinds of algorithms + * built from hashes, but the values are all constructed on the + * same model. */ +#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH) + +static void append(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size, + size_t *required_size, + const char *string, size_t length) +{ + *required_size += length; + if (*required_size < buffer_size) { + memcpy(*buffer, string, length); + *buffer += length; + } +} + +static void append_integer(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size, + size_t *required_size, + const char *format /*printf format for value*/, + unsigned long value) +{ + size_t n = snprintf(*buffer, buffer_size - *required_size, format, value); + if (n < buffer_size - *required_size) *buffer += n; + *required_size += n; +} + +/* The code of these function is automatically generated and included below. */ +static const char *psa_ecc_family_name(psa_ecc_family_t curve); +static const char *psa_dh_family_name(psa_dh_family_t group); +static const char *psa_hash_algorithm_name(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg); + +static void append_with_curve(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size, + size_t *required_size, + const char *string, size_t length, + psa_ecc_family_t curve) +{ + const char *family_name = psa_ecc_family_name(curve); + append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, string, length); + append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, "(", 1); + if (family_name != NULL) { + append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, + family_name, strlen(family_name)); + } else { + append_integer(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, + "0x%02x", curve); + } + append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, ")", 1); +} + +static void append_with_group(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size, + size_t *required_size, + const char *string, size_t length, + psa_dh_family_t group) +{ + const char *group_name = psa_dh_family_name(group); + append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, string, length); + append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, "(", 1); + if (group_name != NULL) { + append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, + group_name, strlen(group_name)); + } else { + append_integer(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, + "0x%02x", group); + } + append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, ")", 1); +} + +typedef const char *(*psa_get_algorithm_name_func_ptr)(psa_algorithm_t alg); + +static void append_with_alg(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size, + size_t *required_size, + psa_get_algorithm_name_func_ptr get_name, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + const char *name = get_name(alg); + if (name != NULL) { + append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, + name, strlen(name)); + } else { + append_integer(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, + "0x%08lx", alg); + } +} + +#include "psa_constant_names_generated.c" + +static int psa_snprint_status(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, + psa_status_t status) +{ + const char *name = psa_strerror(status); + if (name == NULL) { + return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, "%ld", (long) status); + } else { + size_t length = strlen(name); + if (length < buffer_size) { + memcpy(buffer, name, length + 1); + return (int) length; + } else { + return (int) buffer_size; + } + } +} + +static int psa_snprint_ecc_curve(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, + psa_ecc_family_t curve) +{ + const char *name = psa_ecc_family_name(curve); + if (name == NULL) { + return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, "0x%02x", (unsigned) curve); + } else { + size_t length = strlen(name); + if (length < buffer_size) { + memcpy(buffer, name, length + 1); + return (int) length; + } else { + return (int) buffer_size; + } + } +} + +static int psa_snprint_dh_group(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, + psa_dh_family_t group) +{ + const char *name = psa_dh_family_name(group); + if (name == NULL) { + return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, "0x%02x", (unsigned) group); + } else { + size_t length = strlen(name); + if (length < buffer_size) { + memcpy(buffer, name, length + 1); + return (int) length; + } else { + return (int) buffer_size; + } + } +} + +static void usage(const char *program_name) +{ + printf("Usage: %s TYPE VALUE [VALUE...]\n", + program_name == NULL ? "psa_constant_names" : program_name); + printf("Print the symbolic name whose numerical value is VALUE in TYPE.\n"); + printf("Supported types (with = between aliases):\n"); + printf(" alg=algorithm Algorithm (psa_algorithm_t)\n"); + printf(" curve=ecc_curve Elliptic curve identifier (psa_ecc_family_t)\n"); + printf(" group=dh_group Diffie-Hellman group identifier (psa_dh_family_t)\n"); + printf(" type=key_type Key type (psa_key_type_t)\n"); + printf(" usage=key_usage Key usage (psa_key_usage_t)\n"); + printf(" error=status Status code (psa_status_t)\n"); +} + +typedef enum { + TYPE_STATUS, +} signed_value_type; + +int process_signed(signed_value_type type, long min, long max, char **argp) +{ + for (; *argp != NULL; argp++) { + char buffer[200]; + char *end; + long value = strtol(*argp, &end, 0); + if (*end) { + printf("Non-numeric value: %s\n", *argp); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + if (value < min || (errno == ERANGE && value < 0)) { + printf("Value too small: %s\n", *argp); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + if (value > max || (errno == ERANGE && value > 0)) { + printf("Value too large: %s\n", *argp); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + switch (type) { + case TYPE_STATUS: + psa_snprint_status(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + (psa_status_t) value); + break; + } + puts(buffer); + } + + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} + +typedef enum { + TYPE_ALGORITHM, + TYPE_ECC_CURVE, + TYPE_DH_GROUP, + TYPE_KEY_TYPE, + TYPE_KEY_USAGE, +} unsigned_value_type; + +int process_unsigned(unsigned_value_type type, unsigned long max, char **argp) +{ + for (; *argp != NULL; argp++) { + char buffer[200]; + char *end; + unsigned long value = strtoul(*argp, &end, 0); + if (*end) { + printf("Non-numeric value: %s\n", *argp); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + if (value > max || errno == ERANGE) { + printf("Value out of range: %s\n", *argp); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + switch (type) { + case TYPE_ALGORITHM: + psa_snprint_algorithm(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + (psa_algorithm_t) value); + break; + case TYPE_ECC_CURVE: + psa_snprint_ecc_curve(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + (psa_ecc_family_t) value); + break; + case TYPE_DH_GROUP: + psa_snprint_dh_group(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + (psa_dh_family_t) value); + break; + case TYPE_KEY_TYPE: + psa_snprint_key_type(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + (psa_key_type_t) value); + break; + case TYPE_KEY_USAGE: + psa_snprint_key_usage(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + (psa_key_usage_t) value); + break; + } + puts(buffer); + } + + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + if (argc <= 1 || + !strcmp(argv[1], "help") || + !strcmp(argv[1], "--help")) + { + usage(argv[0]); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + if (!strcmp(argv[1], "error") || !strcmp(argv[1], "status")) { + /* There's no way to obtain the actual range of a signed type, + * so hard-code it here: psa_status_t is int32_t. */ + return process_signed(TYPE_STATUS, INT32_MIN, INT32_MAX, + argv + 2); + } else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "alg") || !strcmp(argv[1], "algorithm")) { + return process_unsigned(TYPE_ALGORITHM, (psa_algorithm_t) (-1), + argv + 2); + } else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "curve") || !strcmp(argv[1], "ecc_curve")) { + return process_unsigned(TYPE_ECC_CURVE, (psa_ecc_family_t) (-1), + argv + 2); + } else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "group") || !strcmp(argv[1], "dh_group")) { + return process_unsigned(TYPE_DH_GROUP, (psa_dh_family_t) (-1), + argv + 2); + } else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "type") || !strcmp(argv[1], "key_type")) { + return process_unsigned(TYPE_KEY_TYPE, (psa_key_type_t) (-1), + argv + 2); + } else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "usage") || !strcmp(argv[1], "key_usage")) { + return process_unsigned(TYPE_KEY_USAGE, (psa_key_usage_t) (-1), + argv + 2); + } else { + printf("Unknown type: %s\n", argv[1]); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..de297169 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c @@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ +/* Automatically generated by generate_psa_constant.py. DO NOT EDIT. */ + +static const char *psa_strerror(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS: return "PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS"; + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: return "PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE"; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: return "PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL"; + case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE: return "PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE"; + case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: return "PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED"; + case PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT: return "PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT"; + case PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID: return "PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID"; + case PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST: return "PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST"; + case PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR: return "PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR"; + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: return "PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE"; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA: return "PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA"; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY: return "PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY"; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: return "PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY"; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE: return "PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE"; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: return "PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT"; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE: return "PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE"; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING: return "PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING"; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE: return "PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE"; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: return "PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED"; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: return "PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED"; + case PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE: return "PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE"; + case PSA_SUCCESS: return "PSA_SUCCESS"; + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static const char *psa_ecc_family_name(psa_ecc_family_t curve) +{ + switch (curve) { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: return "PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1"; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: return "PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY"; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: return "PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1"; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: return "PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1"; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2: return "PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2"; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1: return "PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1"; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1: return "PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1"; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2: return "PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2"; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS: return "PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS"; + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static const char *psa_dh_family_name(psa_dh_family_t group) +{ + switch (group) { + case PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM: return "PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM"; + case PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919: return "PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919"; + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static const char *psa_hash_algorithm_name(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg) +{ + switch (hash_alg) { + case PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH: return "PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH"; + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH: return "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH"; + case PSA_ALG_MD2: return "PSA_ALG_MD2"; + case PSA_ALG_MD4: return "PSA_ALG_MD4"; + case PSA_ALG_MD5: return "PSA_ALG_MD5"; + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: return "PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: return "PSA_ALG_SHA3_224"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: return "PSA_ALG_SHA3_256"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: return "PSA_ALG_SHA3_384"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: return "PSA_ALG_SHA3_512"; + case PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512: return "PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: return "PSA_ALG_SHA_1"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: return "PSA_ALG_SHA_224"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: return "PSA_ALG_SHA_256"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: return "PSA_ALG_SHA_384"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: return "PSA_ALG_SHA_512"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224: return "PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224"; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256: return "PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256"; + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static const char *psa_ka_algorithm_name(psa_algorithm_t ka_alg) +{ + switch (ka_alg) { + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT: return "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT"; + case PSA_ALG_ECDH: return "PSA_ALG_ECDH"; + case PSA_ALG_FFDH: return "PSA_ALG_FFDH"; + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static int psa_snprint_key_type(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, + psa_key_type_t type) +{ + size_t required_size = 0; + switch (type) { + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES", 16); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4", 17); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA", 17); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA", 21); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR", 31); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR", 30); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY", 32); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW", 25); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC", 31); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20", 21); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE", 19); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES", 16); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE", 29); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE", 31); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR", 25); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY", 27); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE", 30); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE", 32); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC", 17); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE", 17); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA", 21); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR", 25); break; + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY", 27); break; + default: + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + append_with_curve(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR", 25, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type)); + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { + append_with_curve(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY", 27, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type)); + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + append_with_group(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR", 24, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type)); + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { + append_with_group(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY", 26, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type)); + } else { + return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, + "0x%04x", (unsigned) type); + } + break; + } + buffer[0] = 0; + return (int) required_size; +} + +#define NO_LENGTH_MODIFIER 0xfffffffflu +static int psa_snprint_algorithm(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + size_t required_size = 0; + psa_algorithm_t core_alg = alg; + unsigned long length_modifier = NO_LENGTH_MODIFIER; + if (PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg)) { + core_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(alg, 0); + if (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(", 33); + length_modifier = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg); + } else if (core_alg != alg) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(", 22); + length_modifier = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg); + } + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { + core_alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg); + if (core_alg == 0) { + /* For unknown AEAD algorithms, there is no "default tag length". */ + core_alg = alg; + } else if (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(", 43); + length_modifier = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); + } else if (core_alg != alg) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(", 32); + length_modifier = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); + } + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && + !PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + core_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(", 22); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_ka_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ", ", 2); + } + switch (core_alg) { + case PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH", 16); break; + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD", 21); break; + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION", 38); break; + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER", 23); break; + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH", 21); break; + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT", 30); break; + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION", 31); break; + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC", 20); break; + case PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN", 21); break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC", 15); break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING", 22); break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7", 17); break; + case PSA_ALG_CCM: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CCM", 11); break; + case PSA_ALG_CFB: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CFB", 11); break; + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305", 25); break; + case PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE", 23); break; + case PSA_ALG_CMAC: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CMAC", 12); break; + case PSA_ALG_CTR: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_CTR", 11); break; + case PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE", 30); break; + case PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE", 32); break; + case PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE", 16); break; + case PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING", 22); break; + case PSA_ALG_ECDH: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_ECDH", 12); break; + case PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY", 17); break; + case PSA_ALG_ED25519PH: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_ED25519PH", 17); break; + case PSA_ALG_ED448PH: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_ED448PH", 15); break; + case PSA_ALG_FFDH: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_FFDH", 12); break; + case PSA_ALG_GCM: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_GCM", 11); break; + case PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE", 23); break; + case PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE", 17); break; + case PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE", 17); break; + case PSA_ALG_MD2: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_MD2", 11); break; + case PSA_ALG_MD4: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_MD4", 11); break; + case PSA_ALG_MD5: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_MD5", 11); break; + case PSA_ALG_NONE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_NONE", 12); break; + case PSA_ALG_OFB: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_OFB", 11); break; + case PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA", 18); break; + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160", 17); break; + case PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE", 21); break; + case PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT", 26); break; + case PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW", 29); break; + case PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE", 29); break; + case PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE", 20); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA3_224", 16); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA3_256", 16); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA3_384", 16); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA3_512", 16); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512", 20); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA_1", 13); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA_224", 15); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA_256", 15); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA_384", 15); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA_512", 15); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224", 19); break; + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256", 19); break; + case PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER", 21); break; + case PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE", 22); break; + case PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE", 28); break; + case PSA_ALG_XTS: append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_XTS", 11); break; + default: + if (PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(", 25 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(", 27 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_DSA(", 11 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_ECDSA(", 13 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_HKDF(", 12 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_HMAC(", 12 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(", 16 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(", 25 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(", 15 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(", 24 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(", 17 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(", 23 + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else { + append_integer(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "0x%08lx", (unsigned long) core_alg); + } + break; + } + if (core_alg != alg) { + if (length_modifier != NO_LENGTH_MODIFIER) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ", ", 2); + append_integer(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "%lu", length_modifier); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } + buffer[0] = 0; + return (int) required_size; +} + +static int psa_snprint_key_usage(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, + psa_key_usage_t usage) +{ + size_t required_size = 0; + if (usage == 0) { + if (buffer_size > 1) { + buffer[0] = '0'; + buffer[1] = 0; + } else if (buffer_size == 1) { + buffer[0] = 0; + } + return 1; + } + if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY", 18); + usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + } + if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT", 21); + usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + } + if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE", 20); + usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE; + } + if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT", 21); + usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } + if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT", 20); + usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + } + if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH", 23); + usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH; + } + if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE", 26); + usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; + } + if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH", 25); + usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; + } + if (usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE", 28); + usage ^= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } + if (usage != 0) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append_integer(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "0x%08lx", (unsigned long) usage); + } else { + buffer[0] = 0; + } + return (int) required_size; +} + +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8df83658 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +set(executables + gen_entropy + gen_random_ctr_drbg + gen_random_havege +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) +endforeach() + +install(TARGETS ${executables} + DESTINATION "bin" + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/gen_entropy.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/gen_entropy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f27aaa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/gen_entropy.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/** + * \brief Use and generate multiple entropies calls into a file + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int i, k, ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if( argc < 2 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "usage: %s \n", argv[0] ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + if( ( f = fopen( argv[1], "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed to open '%s' for writing.\n", argv[1] ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + + for( i = 0, k = 768; i < k; i++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( &entropy, buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_entropy_func returned -%04X\n", + (unsigned int) ret ); + goto cleanup; + } + + fwrite( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); + + mbedtls_printf( "Generating %ldkb of data in file '%s'... %04.1f" \ + "%% done\r", (long)(sizeof(buf) * k / 1024), argv[1], (100 * (float) (i + 1)) / k ); + fflush( stdout ); + } + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + fclose( f ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/gen_random_ctr_drbg.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/gen_random_ctr_drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..158a3121 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/gen_random_ctr_drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/** + * \brief Use and generate random data into a file via the CTR_DBRG based on AES + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + int i, k, ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + if( argc < 2 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "usage: %s \n", argv[0] ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + if( ( f = fopen( argv[1], "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed to open '%s' for writing.\n", argv[1] ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, (const unsigned char *) "RANDOM_GEN", 10 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed: %d\n", ret ); + goto cleanup; + } + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctr_drbg, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( &ctr_drbg, "seedfile" ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Failed to open seedfile. Generating one.\n" ); + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( &ctr_drbg, "seedfile" ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file: %d\n", ret ); + goto cleanup; + } + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file: %d\n", ret ); + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + + for( i = 0, k = 768; i < k; i++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctr_drbg, buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf("failed!\n"); + goto cleanup; + } + + fwrite( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); + + mbedtls_printf( "Generating %ldkb of data in file '%s'... %04.1f" \ + "%% done\r", (long)(sizeof(buf) * k / 1024), argv[1], (100 * (float) (i + 1)) / k ); + fflush( stdout ); + } + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + + fclose( f ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/gen_random_havege.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/gen_random_havege.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e82e6276 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/random/gen_random_havege.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/** + * \brief Generate random data into a file + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" + +#include +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + FILE *f; + time_t t; + int i, k, ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_havege_state hs; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + + if( argc < 2 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "usage: %s \n", argv[0] ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + if( ( f = fopen( argv[1], "wb+" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed to open '%s' for writing.\n", argv[1] ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + mbedtls_havege_init( &hs ); + + t = time( NULL ); + + for( i = 0, k = 768; i < k; i++ ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_havege_random( &hs, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_havege_random returned -0x%04X", + ( unsigned int ) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + fwrite( buf, sizeof( buf ), 1, f ); + + mbedtls_printf( "Generating %ldkb of data in file '%s'... %04.1f" \ + "%% done\r", (long)(sizeof(buf) * k / 1024), argv[1], (100 * (float) (i + 1)) / k ); + fflush( stdout ); + } + + if( t == time( NULL ) ) + t--; + + mbedtls_printf(" \n "); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_havege_free( &hs ); + fclose( f ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dfc16a5b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +set(THREADS_USE_PTHREADS_WIN32 true) +find_package(Threads) + +set(libs + ${mbedtls_target} +) + +if(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + set(libs ${libs} pkcs11-helper) +endif(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + +if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + set(libs ${libs} ${ZLIB_LIBRARIES}) +endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +set(executables + dtls_client + dtls_server + mini_client + ssl_client1 + ssl_client2 + ssl_context_info + ssl_fork_server + ssl_mail_client + ssl_server + ssl_server2 +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) + set(extra_sources "") + if(exe STREQUAL "ssl_client2" OR exe STREQUAL "ssl_server2") + list(APPEND extra_sources + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../test/query_config.c) + endif() + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $ + ${extra_sources}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs}) + target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) +endforeach() + +set_property(TARGET ssl_client2 APPEND PROPERTY SOURCES + ssl_test_lib.c ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../test/query_config.c) +set_property(TARGET ssl_server2 APPEND PROPERTY SOURCES + ssl_test_lib.c ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../test/query_config.c) + +if(THREADS_FOUND) + add_executable(ssl_pthread_server ssl_pthread_server.c $) + target_link_libraries(ssl_pthread_server ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) + list(APPEND executables ssl_pthread_server) +endif(THREADS_FOUND) + +install(TARGETS ${executables} + DESTINATION "bin" + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/dtls_client.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/dtls_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8c302a0a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/dtls_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +/* + * Simple DTLS client demonstration program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and/or " + "MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_TIMING_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C and/or MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C not defined.\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +/* Uncomment out the following line to default to IPv4 and disable IPv6 */ +//#define FORCE_IPV4 + +#define SERVER_PORT "4433" +#define SERVER_NAME "localhost" + +#ifdef FORCE_IPV4 +#define SERVER_ADDR "127.0.0.1" /* Forces IPv4 */ +#else +#define SERVER_ADDR "::1" +#endif + +#define MESSAGE "Echo this" + +#define READ_TIMEOUT_MS 1000 +#define MAX_RETRY 5 + +#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0 + + +static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + ((void) level); + + mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str ); + fflush( (FILE *) ctx ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret, len; + mbedtls_net_context server_fd; + uint32_t flags; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + const char *pers = "dtls_client"; + int retry_left = MAX_RETRY; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; + mbedtls_timing_delay_context timer; + + ((void) argc); + ((void) argv); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( DEBUG_LEVEL ); +#endif + + /* + * 0. Initialize the RNG and the session data + */ + mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 0. Load certificates + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the CA root certificate ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok (%d skipped)\n", ret ); + + /* + * 1. Start the connection + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Connecting to udp/%s/%s...", SERVER_NAME, SERVER_PORT ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd, SERVER_ADDR, + SERVER_PORT, MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 2. Setup stuff + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the DTLS structure..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* OPTIONAL is usually a bad choice for security, but makes interop easier + * in this simplified example, in which the ca chain is hardcoded. + * Production code should set a proper ca chain and use REQUIRED. */ + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( &conf, READ_TIMEOUT_MS ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, SERVER_NAME ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &server_fd, + mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, mbedtls_net_recv_timeout ); + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer, mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 4. Handshake + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Performing the DTLS handshake..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 5. Verify the server certificate + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Verifying peer X.509 certificate..." ); + + /* In real life, we would have used MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED so that the + * handshake would not succeed if the peer's cert is bad. Even if we used + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, we would bail out here if ret != 0 */ + if( ( flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + char vrfy_buf[512]; + + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ), " ! ", flags ); + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf ); + } + else + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 6. Write the echo request + */ +send_request: + mbedtls_printf( " > Write to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sizeof( MESSAGE ) - 1; + + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, (unsigned char *) MESSAGE, len ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes written\n\n%s\n\n", len, MESSAGE ); + + /* + * 7. Read the echo response + */ + mbedtls_printf( " < Read from server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT: + mbedtls_printf( " timeout\n\n" ); + if( retry_left-- > 0 ) + goto send_request; + goto exit; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" ); + ret = 0; + goto close_notify; + + default: + mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s\n\n", len, buf ); + + /* + * 8. Done, cleanly close the connection + */ +close_notify: + mbedtls_printf( " . Closing the connection..." ); + + /* No error checking, the connection might be closed already */ + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + ret = 0; + + mbedtls_printf( " done\n" ); + + /* + * 9. Final clean-ups and exit + */ +exit: + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf( "Last error was: %d - %s\n\n", ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + /* Shell can not handle large exit numbers -> 1 for errors */ + if( ret < 0 ) + ret = 1; + + mbedtls_exit( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS && MBEDTLS_NET_C && + MBEDTLD_TIMING_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && + MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && + MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f71ec95 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,438 @@ +/* + * Simple DTLS server demonstration program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +/* Uncomment out the following line to default to IPv4 and disable IPv6 */ +//#define FORCE_IPV4 + +#ifdef FORCE_IPV4 +#define BIND_IP "0.0.0.0" /* Forces IPv4 */ +#else +#define BIND_IP "::" +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + +int main( void ) +{ + printf( "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C and/or MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C and/or MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C not defined.\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#endif + +#define READ_TIMEOUT_MS 10000 /* 10 seconds */ +#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0 + + +static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + ((void) level); + + mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str ); + fflush( (FILE *) ctx ); +} + +int main( void ) +{ + int ret, len; + mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + const char *pers = "dtls_server"; + unsigned char client_ip[16] = { 0 }; + size_t cliip_len; + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx cookie_ctx; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert; + mbedtls_pk_context pkey; + mbedtls_timing_delay_context timer; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context cache; +#endif + + mbedtls_net_init( &listen_fd ); + mbedtls_net_init( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( &cookie_ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( &cache ); +#endif + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( DEBUG_LEVEL ); +#endif + + /* + * 1. Load the certificates and private RSA key + */ + printf( "\n . Loading the server cert. and key..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + /* + * This demonstration program uses embedded test certificates. + * Instead, you may want to use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file() to read the + * server and CA certificates, as well as mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(). + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 2. Setup the "listening" UDP socket + */ + printf( " . Bind on udp/*/4433 ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_bind( &listen_fd, BIND_IP, "4433", MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 3. Seed the RNG + */ + printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 4. Setup stuff + */ + printf( " . Setting up the DTLS data..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( &conf, READ_TIMEOUT_MS ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( &conf, &cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set ); +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.next, NULL ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) ) != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( &cookie_ctx, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( &conf, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check, + &cookie_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer, mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); + + printf( " ok\n" ); + +reset: +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + printf("Last error was: %d - %s\n\n", ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ); + + /* + * 3. Wait until a client connects + */ + printf( " . Waiting for a remote connection ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_accept( &listen_fd, &client_fd, + client_ip, sizeof( client_ip ), &cliip_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_accept returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* For HelloVerifyRequest cookies */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( &ssl, + client_ip, cliip_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! " + "mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &client_fd, + mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, mbedtls_net_recv_timeout ); + + printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 5. Handshake + */ + printf( " . Performing the DTLS handshake..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + printf( " hello verification requested\n" ); + ret = 0; + goto reset; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto reset; + } + + printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 6. Read the echo Request + */ + printf( " < Read from client:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT: + printf( " timeout\n\n" ); + goto reset; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" ); + ret = 0; + goto close_notify; + + default: + printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto reset; + } + } + + len = ret; + printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s\n\n", len, buf ); + + /* + * 7. Write the 200 Response + */ + printf( " > Write to client:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf, len ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + len = ret; + printf( " %d bytes written\n\n%s\n\n", len, buf ); + + /* + * 8. Done, cleanly close the connection + */ +close_notify: + printf( " . Closing the connection..." ); + + /* No error checking, the connection might be closed already */ + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + ret = 0; + + printf( " done\n" ); + + goto reset; + + /* + * Final clean-ups and exit + */ +exit: + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + printf( "Last error was: %d - %s\n\n", ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( &cookie_ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( &cache ); +#endif + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + /* Shell can not handle large exit numbers -> 1 for errors */ + if( ret < 0 ) + ret = 1; + + mbedtls_exit( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C && MBEDTLS_NET_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C + && MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/mini_client.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/mini_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..888c2cc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/mini_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +/* + * Minimal SSL client, used for memory measurements. + * (meant to be used with config-suite-b.h or config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +/* + * We're creating and connecting the socket "manually" rather than using the + * NET module, in order to avoid the overhead of getaddrinfo() which tends to + * dominate memory usage in small configurations. For the sake of simplicity, + * only a Unix version is implemented. + * + * Warning: we are breaking some of the abstractions from the NET layer here. + * This is not a good example for general use. This programs has the specific + * goal of minimizing use of the libc functions on full-blown OSes. + */ +#if defined(unix) || defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || defined(__APPLE__) +#define UNIX +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) || \ + !defined(UNIX) + +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C and/or UNIX " + "not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Hardcoded values for server host and port + */ +#define PORT_BE 0x1151 /* 4433 */ +#define PORT_LE 0x5111 +#define ADDR_BE 0x7f000001 /* 127.0.0.1 */ +#define ADDR_LE 0x0100007f +#define HOSTNAME "localhost" /* for cert verification if enabled */ + +#define GET_REQUEST "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n" + +const char *pers = "mini_client"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +const unsigned char psk[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f +}; +const char psk_id[] = "Client_identity"; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* This is tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt, a CA using EC secp384r1 */ +const unsigned char ca_cert[] = { + 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x52, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xd7, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, + 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, + 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, + 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, + 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, + 0x13, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, + 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, + 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, + 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x33, 0x30, 0x39, + 0x32, 0x34, 0x31, 0x35, 0x34, 0x39, 0x34, 0x38, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, + 0x33, 0x30, 0x39, 0x32, 0x32, 0x31, 0x35, 0x34, 0x39, 0x34, 0x38, 0x5a, + 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, + 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, + 0x13, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, + 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, + 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, + 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, + 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, + 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xda, 0x2b, 0x34, 0x41, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2f, + 0x87, 0x56, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x89, 0xba, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x4e, 0xe0, 0x6e, + 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x57, 0x53, 0x33, 0x39, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x91, 0x95, + 0x39, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xdf, 0x5f, 0x17, 0x24, 0x62, 0x48, 0xfc, 0x1a, 0x95, + 0x29, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x87, 0xc2, 0x88, 0x52, 0x80, 0xaf, 0xd6, 0x6a, + 0xab, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0x1c, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xb8, 0xca, 0xe8, 0xb2, + 0x69, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xad, 0x29, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x75, 0xa7, 0x47, + 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x19, 0x29, 0x55, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x53, 0x3b, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x66, + 0x16, 0x60, 0x33, 0x1e, 0xa3, 0x81, 0xa0, 0x30, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x30, 0x1d, + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, + 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, + 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x6e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, + 0x04, 0x67, 0x30, 0x65, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, + 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, + 0x36, 0x7c, 0xa1, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x40, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, + 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, + 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, + 0x03, 0x13, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, + 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x82, 0x09, + 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, + 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, + 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, + 0x69, 0x00, 0x30, 0x66, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x62, 0x73, 0x56, + 0x28, 0x95, 0x00, 0x7d, 0x78, 0x12, 0x26, 0xd2, 0x71, 0x7b, 0x19, 0xf8, + 0x8a, 0x98, 0x3e, 0x92, 0xfe, 0x33, 0x9e, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xd2, 0xfe, 0x7a, + 0xb7, 0x87, 0x74, 0x3c, 0x2b, 0xb8, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x94, 0x0b, 0xa3, 0x67, + 0x77, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0xbe, 0xd1, 0x36, 0x32, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0xfd, 0x67, + 0x9c, 0x94, 0x23, 0x67, 0xc0, 0x56, 0xba, 0x4b, 0x33, 0x15, 0x00, 0xc6, + 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x31, 0x08, 0x2c, 0x9c, 0x8b, 0xda, 0xa9, 0x75, 0x23, 0x2f, + 0xb8, 0x28, 0xe7, 0xf2, 0x9c, 0x14, 0x3a, 0x40, 0x01, 0x5c, 0xaf, 0x0c, + 0xb2, 0xcf, 0x74, 0x7f, 0x30, 0x9f, 0x08, 0x43, 0xad, 0x20, +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +enum exit_codes +{ + exit_ok = 0, + ctr_drbg_seed_failed, + ssl_config_defaults_failed, + ssl_setup_failed, + hostname_failed, + socket_failed, + connect_failed, + x509_crt_parse_failed, + ssl_handshake_failed, + ssl_write_failed, +}; + + +int main( void ) +{ + int ret = exit_ok; + mbedtls_net_context server_fd; + struct sockaddr_in addr; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt ca; +#endif + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + /* + * 0. Initialize and setup stuff + */ + mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &ca ); +#endif + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, strlen( pers ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = ctr_drbg_seed_failed; + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) != 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_config_defaults_failed; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf, psk, sizeof( psk ), + (const unsigned char *) psk_id, sizeof( psk_id ) - 1 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( &ca, ca_cert, sizeof( ca_cert ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = x509_crt_parse_failed; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &ca, NULL ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); +#endif + + if( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) != 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_setup_failed; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, HOSTNAME ) != 0 ) + { + ret = hostname_failed; + goto exit; + } +#endif + + /* + * 1. Start the connection + */ + memset( &addr, 0, sizeof( addr ) ); + addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + + ret = 1; /* for endianness detection */ + addr.sin_port = *((char *) &ret) == ret ? PORT_LE : PORT_BE; + addr.sin_addr.s_addr = *((char *) &ret) == ret ? ADDR_LE : ADDR_BE; + ret = 0; + + if( ( server_fd.fd = socket( AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0 ) ) < 0 ) + { + ret = socket_failed; + goto exit; + } + + if( connect( server_fd.fd, + (const struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof( addr ) ) < 0 ) + { + ret = connect_failed; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &server_fd, mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) != 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_handshake_failed; + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 2. Write the GET request and close the connection + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, (const unsigned char *) GET_REQUEST, + sizeof( GET_REQUEST ) - 1 ) <= 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_write_failed; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ); + +exit: + mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &ca ); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( ret ); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_client1.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_client1.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..61a849c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_client1.c @@ -0,0 +1,318 @@ +/* + * SSL client demonstration program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C " + "not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" + +#include + +#define SERVER_PORT "4433" +#define SERVER_NAME "localhost" +#define GET_REQUEST "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n" + +#define DEBUG_LEVEL 1 + + +static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + ((void) level); + + mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str ); + fflush( (FILE *) ctx ); +} + +int main( void ) +{ + int ret = 1, len; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_net_context server_fd; + uint32_t flags; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + const char *pers = "ssl_client1"; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( DEBUG_LEVEL ); +#endif + + /* + * 0. Initialize the RNG and the session data + */ + mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 0. Initialize certificates + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the CA root certificate ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok (%d skipped)\n", ret ); + + /* + * 1. Start the connection + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Connecting to tcp/%s/%s...", SERVER_NAME, SERVER_PORT ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd, SERVER_NAME, + SERVER_PORT, MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 2. Setup stuff + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* OPTIONAL is not optimal for security, + * but makes interop easier in this simplified example */ + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, SERVER_NAME ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &server_fd, mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, NULL ); + + /* + * 4. Handshake + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 5. Verify the server certificate + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Verifying peer X.509 certificate..." ); + + /* In real life, we probably want to bail out when ret != 0 */ + if( ( flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + char vrfy_buf[512]; + + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ), " ! ", flags ); + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf ); + } + else + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 3. Write the GET request + */ + mbedtls_printf( " > Write to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, GET_REQUEST ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf, len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes written\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf ); + + /* + * 7. Read the HTTP response + */ + mbedtls_printf( " < Read from server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + do + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + continue; + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) + break; + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_read returned %d\n\n", ret ); + break; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "\n\nEOF\n\n" ); + break; + } + + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf ); + } + while( 1 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf("Last error was: %d - %s\n\n", ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_NET_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && + MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && + MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4f076602 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c @@ -0,0 +1,3093 @@ +/* + * SSL client with certificate authentication + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "ssl_test_lib.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#elif !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C not defined.\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/* Size of memory to be allocated for the heap, when using the library's memory + * management and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C is enabled. */ +#define MEMORY_HEAP_SIZE 120000 + +#define MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 20000 +#define MAX_REQUEST_SIZE_STR "20000" + +#define DFL_SERVER_NAME "localhost" +#define DFL_SERVER_ADDR NULL +#define DFL_SERVER_PORT "4433" +#define DFL_REQUEST_PAGE "/" +#define DFL_REQUEST_SIZE -1 +#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0 +#define DFL_CONTEXT_CRT_CB 0 +#define DFL_NBIO 0 +#define DFL_EVENT 0 +#define DFL_READ_TIMEOUT 0 +#define DFL_MAX_RESEND 0 +#define DFL_CA_FILE "" +#define DFL_CA_PATH "" +#define DFL_CRT_FILE "" +#define DFL_KEY_FILE "" +#define DFL_KEY_OPAQUE 0 +#define DFL_KEY_PWD "" +#define DFL_PSK "" +#define DFL_PSK_OPAQUE 0 +#define DFL_PSK_IDENTITY "Client_identity" +#define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW NULL +#define DFL_EC_MAX_OPS -1 +#define DFL_FORCE_CIPHER 0 +#define DFL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED +#define DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY -2 +#define DFL_RENEGOTIATE 0 +#define DFL_EXCHANGES 1 +#define DFL_MIN_VERSION -1 +#define DFL_MAX_VERSION -1 +#define DFL_ARC4 -1 +#define DFL_SHA1 -1 +#define DFL_AUTH_MODE -1 +#define DFL_MFL_CODE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE +#define DFL_TRUNC_HMAC -1 +#define DFL_RECSPLIT -1 +#define DFL_DHMLEN -1 +#define DFL_RECONNECT 0 +#define DFL_RECO_DELAY 0 +#define DFL_RECO_MODE 1 +#define DFL_CID_ENABLED 0 +#define DFL_CID_VALUE "" +#define DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO -1 +#define DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO NULL +#define DFL_RECONNECT_HARD 0 +#define DFL_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED +#define DFL_ALPN_STRING NULL +#define DFL_CURVES NULL +#define DFL_TRANSPORT MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM +#define DFL_HS_TO_MIN 0 +#define DFL_HS_TO_MAX 0 +#define DFL_DTLS_MTU -1 +#define DFL_DGRAM_PACKING 1 +#define DFL_FALLBACK -1 +#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS -1 +#define DFL_ETM -1 +#define DFL_SERIALIZE 0 +#define DFL_CONTEXT_FILE "" +#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE -1 +#define DFL_CA_CALLBACK 0 +#define DFL_EAP_TLS 0 +#define DFL_REPRODUCIBLE 0 +#define DFL_NSS_KEYLOG 0 +#define DFL_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE NULL +#define DFL_SKIP_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 +#define DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE 0 +#define DFL_USE_SRTP 0 +#define DFL_SRTP_FORCE_PROFILE 0 +#define DFL_SRTP_MKI "" + +#define GET_REQUEST "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\nExtra-header: " +#define GET_REQUEST_END "\r\n\r\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define USAGE_CONTEXT_CRT_CB \ + " context_crt_cb=%%d This determines whether the CRT verification callback is bound\n" \ + " to the SSL configuration of the SSL context.\n" \ + " Possible values:\n"\ + " - 0 (default): Use CRT callback bound to configuration\n" \ + " - 1: Use CRT callback bound to SSL context\n" +#else +#define USAGE_CONTEXT_CRT_CB "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#define USAGE_IO \ + " ca_file=%%s The single file containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \ + " default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \ + " use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \ + " ca_path=%%s The path containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \ + " default: \"\" (pre-loaded) (overrides ca_file)\n" \ + " use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \ + " crt_file=%%s Your own cert and chain (in bottom to top order, top may be omitted)\n" \ + " default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \ + " key_file=%%s default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n"\ + " key_pwd=%%s Password for key specified by key_file argument\n"\ + " default: none\n" +#else +#define USAGE_IO \ + " No file operations available (MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined)\n" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#define USAGE_IO "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \ + " key_opaque=%%d Handle your private key as if it were opaque\n" \ + " default: 0 (disabled)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define USAGE_CID \ + " cid=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension.\n" \ + " default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " cid_renego=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension during renegotiation.\n" \ + " default: same as 'cid' parameter\n" \ + " cid_val=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x).\n" \ + " default: \"\"\n" \ + " cid_val_renego=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x) after renegotiation.\n" \ + " default: same as 'cid_val' parameter\n" +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#define USAGE_CID "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#define USAGE_PSK_RAW \ + " psk=%%s default: \"\" (disabled)\n" \ + " The PSK values are in hex, without 0x.\n" \ + " psk_identity=%%s default: \"Client_identity\"\n" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT \ + " psk_opaque=%%d default: 0 (don't use opaque static PSK)\n" \ + " Enable this to store the PSK configured through command line\n" \ + " parameter `psk` in a PSA-based key slot.\n" \ + " Note: Currently only supported in conjunction with\n" \ + " the use of min_version to force TLS 1.2 and force_ciphersuite \n" \ + " to force a particular PSK-only ciphersuite.\n" \ + " Note: This is to test integration of PSA-based opaque PSKs with\n" \ + " Mbed TLS only. Production systems are likely to configure Mbed TLS\n" \ + " with prepopulated key slots instead of importing raw key material.\n" +#else +#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#define USAGE_PSK USAGE_PSK_RAW USAGE_PSK_SLOT +#else +#define USAGE_PSK "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +#define USAGE_CA_CALLBACK \ + " ca_callback=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " Enable this to use the trusted certificate callback function\n" +#else +#define USAGE_CA_CALLBACK "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define USAGE_TICKETS \ + " tickets=%%d default: 1 (enabled)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_TICKETS "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +#define USAGE_EAP_TLS \ + " eap_tls=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" +#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG \ + " nss_keylog=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " This cannot be used with eap_tls=1\n" +#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE \ + " nss_keylog_file=%%s\n" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +#define USAGE_SRTP \ + " use_srtp=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " This cannot be used with eap_tls=1 or "\ + " nss_keylog=1\n" \ + " srtp_force_profile=%%d default: 0 (all enabled)\n" \ + " available profiles:\n" \ + " 1 - SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80\n" \ + " 2 - SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32\n" \ + " 3 - SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80\n" \ + " 4 - SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32\n" \ + " mki=%%s default: \"\" (in hex, without 0x)\n" +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#define USAGE_SRTP "" +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ +#define USAGE_EAP_TLS "" +#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG "" +#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE "" +#define USAGE_SRTP "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \ + " trunc_hmac=%%d default: library default\n" +#else +#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \ + " max_frag_len=%%d default: 16384 (tls default)\n" \ + " options: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096\n" +#else +#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +#define USAGE_RECSPLIT \ + " recsplit=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_RECSPLIT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#define USAGE_DHMLEN \ + " dhmlen=%%d default: (library default: 1024 bits)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_DHMLEN +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +#define USAGE_ALPN \ + " alpn=%%s default: \"\" (disabled)\n" \ + " example: spdy/1,http/1.1\n" +#else +#define USAGE_ALPN "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define USAGE_CURVES \ + " curves=a,b,c,d default: \"default\" (library default)\n" \ + " example: \"secp521r1,brainpoolP512r1\"\n" \ + " - use \"none\" for empty list\n" \ + " - see mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()\n" \ + " for acceptable curve names\n" +#else +#define USAGE_CURVES "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +#define USAGE_DTLS \ + " dtls=%%d default: 0 (TLS)\n" \ + " hs_timeout=%%d-%%d default: (library default: 1000-60000)\n" \ + " range of DTLS handshake timeouts in millisecs\n" \ + " mtu=%%d default: (library default: unlimited)\n" \ + " dgram_packing=%%d default: 1 (allowed)\n" \ + " allow or forbid packing of multiple\n" \ + " records within a single datgram.\n" +#else +#define USAGE_DTLS "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) +#define USAGE_FALLBACK \ + " fallback=0/1 default: (library default: off)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_FALLBACK "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +#define USAGE_EMS \ + " extended_ms=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_EMS "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define USAGE_ETM \ + " etm=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_ETM "" +#endif + +#define USAGE_REPRODUCIBLE \ + " reproducible=0/1 default: 0 (disabled)\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +#define USAGE_RENEGO \ + " renegotiation=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " renegotiate=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_RENEGO "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#define USAGE_ECJPAKE \ + " ecjpake_pw=%%s default: none (disabled)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_ECJPAKE "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#define USAGE_ECRESTART \ + " ec_max_ops=%%s default: library default (restart disabled)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_ECRESTART "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION \ + " serialize=%%d default: 0 (do not serialize/deserialize)\n" \ + " options: 1 (serialize)\n" \ + " 2 (serialize with re-initialization)\n" \ + " context_file=%%s The file path to write a serialized connection\n"\ + " in the form of base64 code (serialize option\n" \ + " must be set)\n" \ + " default: \"\" (do nothing)\n" \ + " option: a file path\n" +#else +#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION "" +#endif + +/* USAGE is arbitrarily split to stay under the portable string literal + * length limit: 4095 bytes in C99. */ +#define USAGE1 \ + "\n usage: ssl_client2 param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " server_name=%%s default: localhost\n" \ + " server_addr=%%s default: given by name\n" \ + " server_port=%%d default: 4433\n" \ + " request_page=%%s default: \".\"\n" \ + " request_size=%%d default: about 34 (basic request)\n" \ + " (minimum: 0, max: " MAX_REQUEST_SIZE_STR ")\n" \ + " If 0, in the first exchange only an empty\n" \ + " application data message is sent followed by\n" \ + " a second non-empty message before attempting\n" \ + " to read a response from the server\n" \ + " debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " nbio=%%d default: 0 (blocking I/O)\n" \ + " options: 1 (non-blocking), 2 (added delays)\n" \ + " event=%%d default: 0 (loop)\n" \ + " options: 1 (level-triggered, implies nbio=1),\n" \ + " read_timeout=%%d default: 0 ms (no timeout)\n" \ + " max_resend=%%d default: 0 (no resend on timeout)\n" \ + " skip_close_notify=%%d default: 0 (send close_notify)\n" \ + "\n" \ + USAGE_DTLS \ + USAGE_CID \ + USAGE_SRTP \ + "\n" +#define USAGE2 \ + " auth_mode=%%s default: (library default: none)\n" \ + " options: none, optional, required\n" \ + USAGE_IO \ + USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \ + USAGE_CA_CALLBACK \ + "\n" \ + USAGE_PSK \ + USAGE_ECJPAKE \ + USAGE_ECRESTART \ + "\n" +#define USAGE3 \ + " allow_legacy=%%d default: (library default: no)\n" \ + USAGE_RENEGO \ + " exchanges=%%d default: 1\n" \ + " reconnect=%%d number of reconnections using session resumption\n" \ + " default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " reco_delay=%%d default: 0 seconds\n" \ + " reco_mode=%%d 0: copy session, 1: serialize session\n" \ + " default: 1\n" \ + " reconnect_hard=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + USAGE_TICKETS \ + USAGE_EAP_TLS \ + USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \ + USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \ + USAGE_CONTEXT_CRT_CB \ + USAGE_ALPN \ + USAGE_FALLBACK \ + USAGE_EMS \ + USAGE_ETM \ + USAGE_REPRODUCIBLE \ + USAGE_CURVES \ + USAGE_RECSPLIT \ + USAGE_DHMLEN \ + "\n" +#define USAGE4 \ + " arc4=%%d default: (library default: 0)\n" \ + " allow_sha1=%%d default: 0\n" \ + " min_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1)\n" \ + " max_version=%%s default: (library default: tls12)\n" \ + " force_version=%%s default: \"\" (none)\n" \ + " options: ssl3, tls1, tls1_1, tls12, dtls1, dtls12\n" \ + "\n" \ + " force_ciphersuite= default: all enabled\n"\ + " query_config= return 0 if the specified\n" \ + " configuration macro is defined and 1\n" \ + " otherwise. The expansion of the macro\n" \ + " is printed if it is defined\n" \ + USAGE_SERIALIZATION \ + " acceptable ciphersuite names:\n" + +#define ALPN_LIST_SIZE 10 +#define CURVE_LIST_SIZE 20 + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + const char *server_name; /* hostname of the server (client only) */ + const char *server_addr; /* address of the server (client only) */ + const char *server_port; /* port on which the ssl service runs */ + int debug_level; /* level of debugging */ + int nbio; /* should I/O be blocking? */ + int event; /* loop or event-driven IO? level or edge triggered? */ + uint32_t read_timeout; /* timeout on mbedtls_ssl_read() in milliseconds */ + int max_resend; /* DTLS times to resend on read timeout */ + const char *request_page; /* page on server to request */ + int request_size; /* pad request with header to requested size */ + const char *ca_file; /* the file with the CA certificate(s) */ + const char *ca_path; /* the path with the CA certificate(s) reside */ + const char *crt_file; /* the file with the client certificate */ + const char *key_file; /* the file with the client key */ + int key_opaque; /* handle private key as if it were opaque */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + int psk_opaque; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + int ca_callback; /* Use callback for trusted certificate list */ +#endif + const char *key_pwd; /* the password for the client key */ + const char *psk; /* the pre-shared key */ + const char *psk_identity; /* the pre-shared key identity */ + const char *ecjpake_pw; /* the EC J-PAKE password */ + int ec_max_ops; /* EC consecutive operations limit */ + int force_ciphersuite[2]; /* protocol/ciphersuite to use, or all */ + int renegotiation; /* enable / disable renegotiation */ + int allow_legacy; /* allow legacy renegotiation */ + int renegotiate; /* attempt renegotiation? */ + int renego_delay; /* delay before enforcing renegotiation */ + int exchanges; /* number of data exchanges */ + int min_version; /* minimum protocol version accepted */ + int max_version; /* maximum protocol version accepted */ + int arc4; /* flag for arc4 suites support */ + int allow_sha1; /* flag for SHA-1 support */ + int auth_mode; /* verify mode for connection */ + unsigned char mfl_code; /* code for maximum fragment length */ + int trunc_hmac; /* negotiate truncated hmac or not */ + int recsplit; /* enable record splitting? */ + int dhmlen; /* minimum DHM params len in bits */ + int reconnect; /* attempt to resume session */ + int reco_delay; /* delay in seconds before resuming session */ + int reco_mode; /* how to keep the session around */ + int reconnect_hard; /* unexpectedly reconnect from the same port */ + int tickets; /* enable / disable session tickets */ + const char *curves; /* list of supported elliptic curves */ + const char *alpn_string; /* ALPN supported protocols */ + int transport; /* TLS or DTLS? */ + uint32_t hs_to_min; /* Initial value of DTLS handshake timer */ + uint32_t hs_to_max; /* Max value of DTLS handshake timer */ + int dtls_mtu; /* UDP Maximum transport unit for DTLS */ + int fallback; /* is this a fallback connection? */ + int dgram_packing; /* allow/forbid datagram packing */ + int extended_ms; /* negotiate extended master secret? */ + int etm; /* negotiate encrypt then mac? */ + int context_crt_cb; /* use context-specific CRT verify callback */ + int eap_tls; /* derive EAP-TLS keying material? */ + int nss_keylog; /* export NSS key log material */ + const char *nss_keylog_file; /* NSS key log file */ + int cid_enabled; /* whether to use the CID extension or not */ + int cid_enabled_renego; /* whether to use the CID extension or not + * during renegotiation */ + const char *cid_val; /* the CID to use for incoming messages */ + int serialize; /* serialize/deserialize connection */ + const char *context_file; /* the file to write a serialized connection + * in the form of base64 code (serialize + * option must be set) */ + const char *cid_val_renego; /* the CID to use for incoming messages + * after renegotiation */ + int reproducible; /* make communication reproducible */ + int skip_close_notify; /* skip sending the close_notify alert */ + int query_config_mode; /* whether to read config */ + int use_srtp; /* Support SRTP */ + int force_srtp_profile; /* SRTP protection profile to use or all */ + const char *mki; /* The dtls mki value to use */ +} opt; + +#include "ssl_test_common_source.c" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static unsigned char peer_crt_info[1024]; + +/* + * Enabled if debug_level > 1 in code below + */ +static int my_verify( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + int depth, uint32_t *flags ) +{ + char buf[1024]; + ((void) data); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_info( buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, "", crt ); + if( depth == 0 ) + memcpy( peer_crt_info, buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( opt.debug_level == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\nVerify requested for (Depth %d):\n", depth ); + mbedtls_printf( "%s", buf ); + + if ( ( *flags ) == 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " This certificate has no flags\n" ); + else + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( buf, sizeof( buf ), " ! ", *flags ); + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +int report_cid_usage( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const char *additional_description ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t peer_cid_len; + int cid_negotiated; + + if( opt.transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Check if the use of a CID has been negotiated, + * but don't ask for the CID value and length. + * + * Note: Here and below, we're demonstrating the various ways + * in which mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid() can be called, + * depending on whether or not the length/value of the + * peer's CID is needed. + * + * An actual application, however, should use + * just one call to mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(). */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated, + NULL, NULL ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( cid_negotiated == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + if( opt.cid_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID was rejected by the server.\n", + additional_description ); + } + } + else + { + size_t idx=0; + mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated.\n", + additional_description ); + + /* Ask for just the length of the peer's CID. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated, + NULL, &peer_cid_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Ask for just length + value of the peer's CID. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated, + peer_cid, &peer_cid_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + return( ret ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Peer CID (length %u Bytes): ", + additional_description, + (unsigned) peer_cid_len ); + while( idx < peer_cid_len ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "%02x ", peer_cid[ idx ] ); + idx++; + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 0, len, tail_len, i, written, frags, retry_left; + int query_config_ret = 0; + mbedtls_net_context server_fd; + io_ctx_t io_ctx; + + unsigned char buf[MAX_REQUEST_SIZE + 1]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + unsigned char psk[MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; + size_t psk_len = 0; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char cid_renego[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + size_t cid_len = 0; + size_t cid_renego_len = 0; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const char *alpn_list[ALPN_LIST_SIZE]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + unsigned char alloc_buf[MEMORY_HEAP_SIZE]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve_list[CURVE_LIST_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_cur; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + unsigned char mki[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH]; + size_t mki_len=0; +#endif + + const char *pers = "ssl_client2"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + psa_key_id_t slot = 0; + psa_algorithm_t alg = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; +#endif + psa_status_t status; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_profile crt_profile_for_test = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; +#endif + rng_context_t rng; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session; + unsigned char *session_data = NULL; + size_t session_data_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_timing_delay_context timer; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + uint32_t flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; + mbedtls_x509_crt clicert; + mbedtls_pk_context pkey; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_id_t key_slot = 0; /* invalid key slot */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + char *p, *q; + const int *list; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + unsigned char *context_buf = NULL; + size_t context_buf_len; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + unsigned char eap_tls_keymaterial[16]; + unsigned char eap_tls_iv[8]; + const char* eap_tls_label = "client EAP encryption"; + eap_tls_keys eap_tls_keying; +#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) + /*! master keys and master salt for SRTP generated during handshake */ + unsigned char dtls_srtp_key_material[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH]; + const char* dtls_srtp_label = "EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp"; + dtls_srtp_keys dtls_srtp_keying; + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile default_profiles[] = { + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80, + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32, + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80, + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32, + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + test_hooks_init( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + + /* + * Make sure memory references are valid. + */ + mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + memset( &saved_session, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); + rng_init( &rng ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &clicert ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + memset( (void * ) alpn_list, 0, sizeof( alpn_list ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_crypto_init(); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Failed to initialize PSA Crypto implementation: %d\n", + (int) status ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + mbedtls_test_enable_insecure_external_rng( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = 1; + + mbedtls_printf( USAGE1 ); + mbedtls_printf( USAGE2 ); + mbedtls_printf( USAGE3 ); + mbedtls_printf( USAGE4 ); + + list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + while( *list ) + { + mbedtls_printf(" %-42s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) ); + list++; + if( !*list ) + break; + mbedtls_printf(" %s\n", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) ); + list++; + } + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + goto exit; + } + + opt.server_name = DFL_SERVER_NAME; + opt.server_addr = DFL_SERVER_ADDR; + opt.server_port = DFL_SERVER_PORT; + opt.debug_level = DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL; + opt.cid_enabled = DFL_CID_ENABLED; + opt.cid_val = DFL_CID_VALUE; + opt.cid_enabled_renego = DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO; + opt.cid_val_renego = DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO; + opt.nbio = DFL_NBIO; + opt.event = DFL_EVENT; + opt.context_crt_cb = DFL_CONTEXT_CRT_CB; + opt.read_timeout = DFL_READ_TIMEOUT; + opt.max_resend = DFL_MAX_RESEND; + opt.request_page = DFL_REQUEST_PAGE; + opt.request_size = DFL_REQUEST_SIZE; + opt.ca_file = DFL_CA_FILE; + opt.ca_path = DFL_CA_PATH; + opt.crt_file = DFL_CRT_FILE; + opt.key_file = DFL_KEY_FILE; + opt.key_opaque = DFL_KEY_OPAQUE; + opt.key_pwd = DFL_KEY_PWD; + opt.psk = DFL_PSK; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + opt.psk_opaque = DFL_PSK_OPAQUE; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + opt.ca_callback = DFL_CA_CALLBACK; +#endif + opt.psk_identity = DFL_PSK_IDENTITY; + opt.ecjpake_pw = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW; + opt.ec_max_ops = DFL_EC_MAX_OPS; + opt.force_ciphersuite[0]= DFL_FORCE_CIPHER; + opt.renegotiation = DFL_RENEGOTIATION; + opt.allow_legacy = DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY; + opt.renegotiate = DFL_RENEGOTIATE; + opt.exchanges = DFL_EXCHANGES; + opt.min_version = DFL_MIN_VERSION; + opt.max_version = DFL_MAX_VERSION; + opt.arc4 = DFL_ARC4; + opt.allow_sha1 = DFL_SHA1; + opt.auth_mode = DFL_AUTH_MODE; + opt.mfl_code = DFL_MFL_CODE; + opt.trunc_hmac = DFL_TRUNC_HMAC; + opt.recsplit = DFL_RECSPLIT; + opt.dhmlen = DFL_DHMLEN; + opt.reconnect = DFL_RECONNECT; + opt.reco_delay = DFL_RECO_DELAY; + opt.reco_mode = DFL_RECO_MODE; + opt.reconnect_hard = DFL_RECONNECT_HARD; + opt.tickets = DFL_TICKETS; + opt.alpn_string = DFL_ALPN_STRING; + opt.curves = DFL_CURVES; + opt.transport = DFL_TRANSPORT; + opt.hs_to_min = DFL_HS_TO_MIN; + opt.hs_to_max = DFL_HS_TO_MAX; + opt.dtls_mtu = DFL_DTLS_MTU; + opt.fallback = DFL_FALLBACK; + opt.extended_ms = DFL_EXTENDED_MS; + opt.etm = DFL_ETM; + opt.dgram_packing = DFL_DGRAM_PACKING; + opt.serialize = DFL_SERIALIZE; + opt.context_file = DFL_CONTEXT_FILE; + opt.eap_tls = DFL_EAP_TLS; + opt.reproducible = DFL_REPRODUCIBLE; + opt.nss_keylog = DFL_NSS_KEYLOG; + opt.nss_keylog_file = DFL_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE; + opt.skip_close_notify = DFL_SKIP_CLOSE_NOTIFY; + opt.query_config_mode = DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE; + opt.use_srtp = DFL_USE_SRTP; + opt.force_srtp_profile = DFL_SRTP_FORCE_PROFILE; + opt.mki = DFL_SRTP_MKI; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "server_name" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_name = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "server_addr" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_addr = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "server_port" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_port = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "dtls" ) == 0 ) + { + int t = atoi( q ); + if( t == 0 ) + opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM; + else if( t == 1 ) + opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "debug_level" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.debug_level = atoi( q ); + if( opt.debug_level < 0 || opt.debug_level > 65535 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "context_crt_cb" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.context_crt_cb = atoi( q ); + if( opt.context_crt_cb != 0 && opt.context_crt_cb != 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "nbio" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.nbio = atoi( q ); + if( opt.nbio < 0 || opt.nbio > 2 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "event" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.event = atoi( q ); + if( opt.event < 0 || opt.event > 2 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "read_timeout" ) == 0 ) + opt.read_timeout = atoi( q ); + else if( strcmp( p, "max_resend" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.max_resend = atoi( q ); + if( opt.max_resend < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "request_page" ) == 0 ) + opt.request_page = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "request_size" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.request_size = atoi( q ); + if( opt.request_size < 0 || + opt.request_size > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "ca_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.ca_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "ca_path" ) == 0 ) + opt.ca_path = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "crt_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.crt_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "key_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "key_pwd" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_pwd = q; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + else if( strcmp( p, "key_opaque" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_opaque = atoi( q ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + else if( strcmp( p, "cid" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cid_enabled = atoi( q ); + if( opt.cid_enabled != 0 && opt.cid_enabled != 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "cid_renego" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cid_enabled_renego = atoi( q ); + if( opt.cid_enabled_renego != 0 && opt.cid_enabled_renego != 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cid_val = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val_renego" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cid_val_renego = q; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + else if( strcmp( p, "psk" ) == 0 ) + opt.psk = q; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + else if( strcmp( p, "psk_opaque" ) == 0 ) + opt.psk_opaque = atoi( q ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + else if( strcmp( p, "ca_callback" ) == 0) + opt.ca_callback = atoi( q ); +#endif + else if( strcmp( p, "psk_identity" ) == 0 ) + opt.psk_identity = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "ecjpake_pw" ) == 0 ) + opt.ecjpake_pw = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "ec_max_ops" ) == 0 ) + opt.ec_max_ops = atoi( q ); + else if( strcmp( p, "force_ciphersuite" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.force_ciphersuite[0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( q ); + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] == 0 ) + { + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + opt.force_ciphersuite[1] = 0; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiation" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.renegotiation = (atoi( q )) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED : + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "allow_legacy" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case -1: + opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE; + break; + case 0: + opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION; + break; + case 1: + opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION; + break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiate" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.renegotiate = atoi( q ); + if( opt.renegotiate < 0 || opt.renegotiate > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "exchanges" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.exchanges = atoi( q ); + if( opt.exchanges < 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "reconnect" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.reconnect = atoi( q ); + if( opt.reconnect < 0 || opt.reconnect > 2 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "reco_delay" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.reco_delay = atoi( q ); + if( opt.reco_delay < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "reco_mode" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.reco_mode = atoi( q ); + if( opt.reco_mode < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "reconnect_hard" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.reconnect_hard = atoi( q ); + if( opt.reconnect_hard < 0 || opt.reconnect_hard > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "tickets" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.tickets = atoi( q ); + if( opt.tickets < 0 || opt.tickets > 2 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "alpn" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.alpn_string = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "fallback" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.fallback = MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK; break; + case 1: opt.fallback = MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "extended_ms" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: + opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED; + break; + case 1: + opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; + break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "curves" ) == 0 ) + opt.curves = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "etm" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; break; + case 1: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "min_version" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 || + strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls12" ) == 0 || + strcmp( q, "dtls12" ) == 0 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "max_version" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 ) + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 ) + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 || + strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 ) + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls12" ) == 0 || + strcmp( q, "dtls12" ) == 0 ) + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "arc4" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; break; + case 1: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "allow_sha1" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.allow_sha1 = 0; break; + case 1: opt.allow_sha1 = 1; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "force_version" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "tls12" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "dtls12" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM; + } + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "auth_mode" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "none" ) == 0 ) + opt.auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE; + else if( strcmp( q, "optional" ) == 0 ) + opt.auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL; + else if( strcmp( q, "required" ) == 0 ) + opt.auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "max_frag_len" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "512" ) == 0 ) + opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512; + else if( strcmp( q, "1024" ) == 0 ) + opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024; + else if( strcmp( q, "2048" ) == 0 ) + opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048; + else if( strcmp( q, "4096" ) == 0 ) + opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "trunc_hmac" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED; break; + case 1: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "hs_timeout" ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( p = strchr( q, '-' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *p++ = '\0'; + opt.hs_to_min = atoi( q ); + opt.hs_to_max = atoi( p ); + if( opt.hs_to_min == 0 || opt.hs_to_max < opt.hs_to_min ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "mtu" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.dtls_mtu = atoi( q ); + if( opt.dtls_mtu < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "dgram_packing" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.dgram_packing = atoi( q ); + if( opt.dgram_packing != 0 && + opt.dgram_packing != 1 ) + { + goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "recsplit" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.recsplit = atoi( q ); + if( opt.recsplit < 0 || opt.recsplit > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "dhmlen" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.dhmlen = atoi( q ); + if( opt.dhmlen < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "query_config" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.query_config_mode = 1; + query_config_ret = query_config( q ); + goto exit; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "serialize") == 0 ) + { + opt.serialize = atoi( q ); + if( opt.serialize < 0 || opt.serialize > 2) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "context_file") == 0 ) + { + opt.context_file = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "eap_tls" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.eap_tls = atoi( q ); + if( opt.eap_tls < 0 || opt.eap_tls > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "reproducible" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.reproducible = 1; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "nss_keylog" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.nss_keylog = atoi( q ); + if( opt.nss_keylog < 0 || opt.nss_keylog > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "nss_keylog_file" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.nss_keylog_file = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "skip_close_notify" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.skip_close_notify = atoi( q ); + if( opt.skip_close_notify < 0 || opt.skip_close_notify > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "use_srtp" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.use_srtp = atoi ( q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "srtp_force_profile" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.force_srtp_profile = atoi( q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "mki" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.mki = q; + } + else + goto usage; + } + + if( opt.nss_keylog != 0 && opt.eap_tls != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Error: eap_tls and nss_keylog options cannot be used together.\n" ); + goto usage; + } + + /* Event-driven IO is incompatible with the above custom + * receive and send functions, as the polling builds on + * refers to the underlying net_context. */ + if( opt.event == 1 && opt.nbio != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Warning: event-driven IO mandates nbio=1 - overwrite\n" ); + opt.nbio = 1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( opt.debug_level ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* + * Unhexify the pre-shared key if any is given + */ + if( strlen( opt.psk ) ) + { + if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( psk, sizeof( psk ), + opt.psk, &psk_len ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "pre-shared key not valid\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 ) + { + if( opt.psk == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "psk_opaque set but no psk to be imported specified.\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] > 0 ) + { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] ); + + if( opt.max_version != -1 && + ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver > opt.max_version ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + if( opt.min_version != -1 && + ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver < opt.min_version ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + + /* If the server selects a version that's not supported by + * this suite, then there will be no common ciphersuite... */ + if( opt.max_version == -1 || + opt.max_version > ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver ) + { + opt.max_version = ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver; + } + if( opt.min_version < ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver ) + { + opt.min_version = ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver; + /* DTLS starts with TLS 1.1 */ + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + opt.min_version < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + } + + /* Enable RC4 if needed and not explicitly disabled */ + if( ciphersuite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) + { + if( opt.arc4 == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "forced RC4 ciphersuite with RC4 disabled\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + + opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined (MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 ) + { + /* Determine KDF algorithm the opaque PSK will be used in. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( cid, sizeof( cid ), + opt.cid_val, &cid_len ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* Keep CID settings for renegotiation unless + * specified otherwise. */ + if( opt.cid_enabled_renego == DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO ) + opt.cid_enabled_renego = opt.cid_enabled; + if( opt.cid_val_renego == DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO ) + opt.cid_val_renego = opt.cid_val; + + if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( cid_renego, sizeof( cid_renego ), + opt.cid_val_renego, &cid_renego_len ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid\n" ); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( opt.curves != NULL ) + { + p = (char *) opt.curves; + i = 0; + + if( strcmp( p, "none" ) == 0 ) + { + curve_list[0] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "default" ) != 0 ) + { + /* Leave room for a final NULL in curve list */ + while( i < CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' ) + { + q = p; + + /* Terminate the current string */ + while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' ) + p++; + if( *p == ',' ) + *p++ = '\0'; + + if( ( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( q ) ) != NULL ) + { + curve_list[i++] = curve_cur->grp_id; + } + else + { + mbedtls_printf( "unknown curve %s\n", q ); + mbedtls_printf( "supported curves: " ); + for( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_cur->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_cur++ ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "%s ", curve_cur->name ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf("Number of curves: %d\n", i ); + + if( i == CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "curves list too long, maximum %d", + CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 ); + goto exit; + } + + curve_list[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if( opt.alpn_string != NULL ) + { + p = (char *) opt.alpn_string; + i = 0; + + /* Leave room for a final NULL in alpn_list */ + while( i < ALPN_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' ) + { + alpn_list[i++] = p; + + /* Terminate the current string and move on to next one */ + while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' ) + p++; + if( *p == ',' ) + *p++ = '\0'; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * 0. Initialize the RNG and the session data + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = rng_seed( &rng, opt.reproducible, pers ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /* + * 1.1. Load the trusted CA + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the CA root certificate ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) == 0 || + strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) == 0 ) + { + ret = 0; + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strlen( opt.ca_path ) ) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( &cacert, opt.ca_path ); + else if( strlen( opt.ca_file ) ) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &cacert, opt.ca_file ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas[i] != NULL; i++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas[i], + mbedtls_test_cas_len[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + break; + } + if( ret == 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas_der[i] != NULL; i++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( &cacert, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_der[i], + mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + break; + } + } +#else + { + ret = 1; + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok (%d skipped)\n", ret ); + + /* + * 1.2. Load own certificate and private key + * + * (can be skipped if client authentication is not required) + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the client cert. and key..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) == 0 ) + ret = 0; + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strlen( opt.crt_file ) ) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &clicert, opt.crt_file ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &clicert, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt, + mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len ); +#else + { + ret = 1; + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." ); + } +#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) == 0 ) + ret = 0; + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strlen( opt.key_file ) ) + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey, opt.key_file, opt.key_pwd ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key, + mbedtls_test_cli_key_len, NULL, 0 ); +#else + { + ret = 1; + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." ); + } +#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( opt.key_opaque != 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &pkey, &key_slot, + PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! " + "mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + mbedtls_printf( " ok (key type: %s)\n", mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pkey ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * 2. Start the connection + */ + if( opt.server_addr == NULL) + opt.server_addr = opt.server_name; + + mbedtls_printf( " . Connecting to %s/%s/%s...", + opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ? "tcp" : "udp", + opt.server_addr, opt.server_port ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd, + opt.server_addr, opt.server_port, + opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ? + MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP : MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( opt.nbio > 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( &server_fd ); + else + ret = mbedtls_net_set_block( &server_fd ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 3. Setup stuff + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + opt.transport, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /* The default algorithms profile disables SHA-1, but our tests still + rely on it heavily. */ + if( opt.allow_sha1 > 0 ) + { + crt_profile_for_test.allowed_mds |= MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( &conf, &crt_profile_for_test ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( &conf, ssl_sig_hashes_for_test ); + } + + if( opt.context_crt_cb == 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( &conf, my_verify, NULL ); + + memset( peer_crt_info, 0, sizeof( peer_crt_info ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 || opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 ) + { + if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 && + opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 && + cid_len != cid_renego_len ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "CID length must not change during renegotiation\n" ); + goto usage; + } + + if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 ) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( &conf, cid_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ); + else + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( &conf, cid_renego_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len returned -%#04x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if( opt.auth_mode != DFL_AUTH_MODE ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, opt.auth_mode ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( opt.hs_to_min != DFL_HS_TO_MIN || opt.hs_to_max != DFL_HS_TO_MAX ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( &conf, opt.hs_to_min, + opt.hs_to_max ); + + if( opt.dgram_packing != DFL_DGRAM_PACKING ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( &ssl, opt.dgram_packing ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( &conf, opt.mfl_code ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile forced_profile[] = + { opt.force_srtp_profile, MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET }; + if( opt.use_srtp == 1 ) + { + if( opt.force_srtp_profile != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles ( &conf, forced_profile ); + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles ( &conf, default_profiles ); + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! " + "mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + } + else if( opt.force_srtp_profile != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! must enable use_srtp to force srtp profile\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + if( opt.trunc_hmac != DFL_TRUNC_HMAC ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( &conf, opt.trunc_hmac ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if( opt.extended_ms != DFL_EXTENDED_MS ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( &conf, opt.extended_ms ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( opt.etm != DFL_ETM ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( &conf, opt.etm ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + if( opt.eap_tls != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( &conf, eap_tls_key_derivation, + &eap_tls_keying ); + } + else if( opt.nss_keylog != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( &conf, + nss_keylog_export, + NULL ); + } +#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) + else if( opt.use_srtp != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( &conf, dtls_srtp_key_derivation, + &dtls_srtp_keying ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + if( opt.recsplit != DFL_RECSPLIT ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( &conf, opt.recsplit + ? MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED + : MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + if( opt.dhmlen != DFL_DHMLEN ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( &conf, opt.dhmlen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if( opt.alpn_string != NULL ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( &conf, alpn_list ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } +#endif + + if (opt.reproducible) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) + mbedtls_platform_set_time( dummy_constant_time ); +#else + fprintf( stderr, "Warning: reproducible option used without constant time\n" ); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + } + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, rng_get, &rng ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( &conf, opt.read_timeout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( &conf, opt.tickets ); +#endif + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( &conf, opt.force_ciphersuite ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + if( opt.arc4 != DFL_ARC4 ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( &conf, opt.arc4 ); +#endif + + if( opt.allow_legacy != DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( &conf, opt.allow_legacy ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( &conf, opt.renegotiation ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) != 0 && + strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( opt.ca_callback != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( &conf, ca_callback, &cacert ); + else +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL ); + } + if( strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) != 0 && + strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) != 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &clicert, &pkey ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( opt.curves != NULL && + strcmp( opt.curves, "default" ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( &conf, curve_list ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 ) + { + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + + status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, psk, psk_len, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( &conf, slot, + (const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity, + strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( psk_len > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf, psk, psk_len, + (const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity, + strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + + if( opt.min_version != DFL_MIN_VERSION ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + opt.min_version ); + + if( opt.max_version != DFL_MAX_VERSION ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + opt.max_version ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + if( opt.fallback != DFL_FALLBACK ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( &conf, opt.fallback ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, opt.server_name ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( opt.ecjpake_pw != DFL_ECJPAKE_PW ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( &ssl, + (const unsigned char *) opt.ecjpake_pw, + strlen( opt.ecjpake_pw ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( opt.context_crt_cb == 1 ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( &ssl, my_verify, NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + io_ctx.ssl = &ssl; + io_ctx.net = &server_fd; + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &io_ctx, send_cb, recv_cb, + opt.nbio == 0 ? recv_timeout_cb : NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( &ssl, opt.cid_enabled, + cid, cid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( opt.dtls_mtu != DFL_DTLS_MTU ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( &ssl, opt.dtls_mtu ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer, mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( opt.ec_max_ops != DFL_EC_MAX_OPS ) + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( opt.ec_max_ops ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + if( opt.use_srtp != 0 && strlen( opt.mki ) != 0 ) + { + if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( mki, sizeof( mki ), + opt.mki,&mki_len ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "mki value not valid hex\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( &ssl, mki, + (uint16_t) strlen( opt.mki ) / 2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 4. Handshake + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ) + mbedtls_printf( + " Unable to verify the server's certificate. " + "Either it is invalid,\n" + " or you didn't set ca_file or ca_path " + "to an appropriate value.\n" + " Alternatively, you may want to use " + "auth_mode=optional for testing purposes.\n" ); + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + continue; +#endif + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + ret = idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + ret = idle( &server_fd, ret ); +#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n [ Protocol is %s ]\n [ Ciphersuite is %s ]\n", + mbedtls_ssl_get_version( &ssl ), + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( &ssl ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( &ssl ) ) >= 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is %d ]\n", ret ); + else + mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is unknown (compression) ]\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + mbedtls_printf( " [ Maximum input fragment length is %u ]\n", + (unsigned int) mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( &ssl ) ); + mbedtls_printf( " [ Maximum output fragment length is %u ]\n", + (unsigned int) mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( &ssl ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if( opt.alpn_string != NULL ) + { + const char *alp = mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( &ssl ); + mbedtls_printf( " [ Application Layer Protocol is %s ]\n", + alp ? alp : "(none)" ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + if( opt.eap_tls != 0 ) + { + size_t j = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( eap_tls_keying.tls_prf_type, + eap_tls_keying.master_secret, + sizeof( eap_tls_keying.master_secret ), + eap_tls_label, + eap_tls_keying.randbytes, + sizeof( eap_tls_keying.randbytes ), + eap_tls_keymaterial, + sizeof( eap_tls_keymaterial ) ) ) + != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " EAP-TLS key material is:" ); + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( eap_tls_keymaterial ); j++ ) + { + if( j % 8 == 0 ) + mbedtls_printf("\n "); + mbedtls_printf("%02x ", eap_tls_keymaterial[j] ); + } + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( eap_tls_keying.tls_prf_type, NULL, 0, + eap_tls_label, + eap_tls_keying.randbytes, + sizeof( eap_tls_keying.randbytes ), + eap_tls_iv, + sizeof( eap_tls_iv ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " EAP-TLS IV is:" ); + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( eap_tls_iv ); j++ ) + { + if( j % 8 == 0 ) + mbedtls_printf("\n "); + mbedtls_printf("%02x ", eap_tls_iv[j] ); + } + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + +#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) + else if( opt.use_srtp != 0 ) + { + size_t j = 0; + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info dtls_srtp_negotiation_result; + mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( &ssl, &dtls_srtp_negotiation_result ); + + if( dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile + == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Unable to negotiate " + "the use of DTLS-SRTP\n" ); + } + else + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( dtls_srtp_keying.tls_prf_type, + dtls_srtp_keying.master_secret, + sizeof( dtls_srtp_keying.master_secret ), + dtls_srtp_label, + dtls_srtp_keying.randbytes, + sizeof( dtls_srtp_keying.randbytes ), + dtls_srtp_key_material, + sizeof( dtls_srtp_key_material ) ) ) + != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " DTLS-SRTP key material is:" ); + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( dtls_srtp_key_material ); j++ ) + { + if( j % 8 == 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n " ); + mbedtls_printf( "%02x ", dtls_srtp_key_material[j] ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + /* produce a less readable output used to perform automatic checks + * - compare client and server output + * - interop test with openssl which client produces this kind of output + */ + mbedtls_printf( " Keying material: " ); + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( dtls_srtp_key_material ); j++ ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "%02X", dtls_srtp_key_material[j] ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + if ( dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.mki_len > 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " DTLS-SRTP mki value: " ); + for( j = 0; j < dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.mki_len; j++ ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "%02X", dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.mki_value[j] ); + } + } + else + { + mbedtls_printf( " DTLS-SRTP no mki value negotiated" ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + if( opt.reconnect != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf(" . Saving session for reuse..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( opt.reco_mode == 1 ) + { + /* free any previously saved data */ + if( session_data != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_data, session_data_len ); + mbedtls_free( session_data ); + session_data = NULL; + } + + /* get size of the buffer needed */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_save( mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( &ssl ), + NULL, 0, &session_data_len ); + session_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session_data_len ); + if( session_data == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! alloc %u bytes for session data\n", + (unsigned) session_data_len ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + /* actually save session data */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( &ssl ), + session_data, session_data_len, + &session_data_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_saved returned -0x%04x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + else + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_session( &ssl, &saved_session ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_session returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + if( opt.reco_mode == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ Saved %u bytes of session data]\n", + (unsigned) session_data_len ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /* + * 5. Verify the server certificate + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Verifying peer X.509 certificate..." ); + + if( ( flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + char vrfy_buf[512]; + + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ), + " ! ", flags ); + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf ); + } + else + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " . Peer certificate information ...\n" ); + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", peer_crt_info ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ret = report_cid_usage( &ssl, "initial handshake" ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( &ssl, opt.cid_enabled_renego, + cid_renego, + cid_renego_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( opt.renegotiate ) + { + /* + * Perform renegotiation (this must be done when the server is waiting + * for input from our side). + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Performing renegotiation..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + continue; +#endif + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &server_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + + } + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ret = report_cid_usage( &ssl, "after renegotiation" ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * 6. Write the GET request + */ + retry_left = opt.max_resend; +send_request: + mbedtls_printf( " > Write to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = mbedtls_snprintf( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, GET_REQUEST, + opt.request_page ); + tail_len = (int) strlen( GET_REQUEST_END ); + + /* Add padding to GET request to reach opt.request_size in length */ + if( opt.request_size != DFL_REQUEST_SIZE && + len + tail_len < opt.request_size ) + { + memset( buf + len, 'A', opt.request_size - len - tail_len ); + len += opt.request_size - len - tail_len; + } + + strncpy( (char *) buf + len, GET_REQUEST_END, sizeof( buf ) - len - 1 ); + len += tail_len; + + /* Truncate if request size is smaller than the "natural" size */ + if( opt.request_size != DFL_REQUEST_SIZE && + len > opt.request_size ) + { + len = opt.request_size; + + /* Still end with \r\n unless that's really not possible */ + if( len >= 2 ) buf[len - 2] = '\r'; + if( len >= 1 ) buf[len - 1] = '\n'; + } + + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) + { + written = 0; + frags = 0; + + do + { + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf + written, + len - written ) ) < 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &server_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + } + + frags++; + written += ret; + } + while( written < len ); + } + else /* Not stream, so datagram */ + { + while( 1 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf, len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + continue; +#endif + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + break; + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &server_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + } + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + + frags = 1; + written = ret; + + if( written < len ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " warning\n ! request didn't fit into single datagram and " + "was truncated to size %u", (unsigned) written ); + } + } + + buf[written] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes written in %d fragments\n\n%s\n", + written, frags, (char *) buf ); + + /* Send a non-empty request if request_size == 0 */ + if ( len == 0 ) + { + opt.request_size = DFL_REQUEST_SIZE; + goto send_request; + } + + /* + * 7. Read the HTTP response + */ + mbedtls_printf( " < Read from server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + /* + * TLS and DTLS need different reading styles (stream vs datagram) + */ + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) + { + do + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + continue; +#endif + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &server_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + continue; + } + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" ); + ret = 0; + goto close_notify; + + case 0: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET: + mbedtls_printf( " connection was reset by peer\n" ); + ret = 0; + goto reconnect; + + default: + mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + len = ret; + buf[len] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf ); + + /* End of message should be detected according to the syntax of the + * application protocol (eg HTTP), just use a dummy test here. */ + if( ret > 0 && buf[len-1] == '\n' ) + { + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + while( 1 ); + } + else /* Not stream, so datagram */ + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + while( 1 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + continue; +#endif + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + break; + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &server_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + } + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT: + mbedtls_printf( " timeout\n" ); + if( retry_left-- > 0 ) + goto send_request; + goto exit; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" ); + ret = 0; + goto close_notify; + + default: + mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + len = ret; + buf[len] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf ); + ret = 0; + } + + /* + * 7b. Simulate hard reset and reconnect from same port? + */ + if( opt.reconnect_hard != 0 ) + { + opt.reconnect_hard = 0; + + mbedtls_printf( " . Restarting connection from same port..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + memset( peer_crt_info, 0, sizeof( peer_crt_info ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_reset returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &server_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + goto send_request; + } + + /* + * 7c. Simulate serialize/deserialize and go back to data exchange + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + if( opt.serialize != 0 ) + { + size_t buf_len; + + mbedtls_printf( " . Serializing live connection..." ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( &ssl, NULL, 0, &buf_len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned " + "-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + + goto exit; + } + + if( ( context_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buf_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Couldn't allocate buffer for " + "serialized context" ); + + goto exit; + } + context_buf_len = buf_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( &ssl, context_buf, + buf_len, &buf_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned " + "-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* Save serialized context to the 'opt.context_file' as a base64 code */ + if( 0 < strlen( opt.context_file ) ) + { + FILE *b64_file; + uint8_t *b64_buf; + size_t b64_len; + + mbedtls_printf( " . Save serialized context to a file... " ); + + mbedtls_base64_encode( NULL, 0, &b64_len, context_buf, buf_len ); + + if( ( b64_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, b64_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! Couldn't allocate buffer for " + "the base64 code\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_encode( b64_buf, b64_len, &b64_len, + context_buf, buf_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_base64_encode returned " + "-0x%x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + mbedtls_free( b64_buf ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( b64_file = fopen( opt.context_file, "w" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! Cannot open '%s' for writing.\n", + opt.context_file ); + mbedtls_free( b64_buf ); + goto exit; + } + + if( b64_len != fwrite( b64_buf, 1, b64_len, b64_file ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! fwrite(%ld bytes) failed\n", + (long) b64_len ); + mbedtls_free( b64_buf ); + fclose( b64_file ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_free( b64_buf ); + fclose( b64_file ); + + mbedtls_printf( "ok\n" ); + } + + if( opt.serialize == 1 ) + { + /* nothing to do here, done by context_save() already */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Context has been reset... ok\n" ); + } + + if( opt.serialize == 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Freeing and reinitializing context..." ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned " + "-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( opt.nbio == 2 ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &server_fd, delayed_send, + delayed_recv, NULL ); + else + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &server_fd, mbedtls_net_send, + mbedtls_net_recv, + opt.nbio == 0 ? mbedtls_net_recv_timeout : NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer, + mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } + + mbedtls_printf( " . Deserializing connection..." ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_load( &ssl, context_buf, + buf_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_load returned " + "-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_free( context_buf ); + context_buf = NULL; + context_buf_len = 0; + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + + /* + * 7d. Continue doing data exchanges? + */ + if( --opt.exchanges > 0 ) + goto send_request; + + /* + * 8. Done, cleanly close the connection + */ +close_notify: + mbedtls_printf( " . Closing the connection..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + /* + * Most of the time sending a close_notify before closing is the right + * thing to do. However, when the server already knows how many messages + * are expected and closes the connection by itself, this alert becomes + * redundant. Sometimes with DTLS this redundancy becomes a problem by + * leading to a race condition where the server might close the connection + * before seeing the alert, and since UDP is connection-less when the + * alert arrives it will be seen as a new connection, which will fail as + * the alert is clearly not a valid ClientHello. This may cause spurious + * failures in tests that use DTLS and resumption with ssl_server2 in + * ssl-opt.sh, avoided by enabling skip_close_notify client-side. + */ + if( opt.skip_close_notify == 0 ) + { + /* No error checking, the connection might be closed already */ + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + ret = 0; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " done\n" ); + + /* + * 9. Reconnect? + */ +reconnect: + if( opt.reconnect != 0 ) + { + --opt.reconnect; + + mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + if( opt.reco_delay > 0 ) + mbedtls_net_usleep( 1000000 * opt.reco_delay ); +#endif + + mbedtls_printf( " . Reconnecting with saved session..." ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + memset( peer_crt_info, 0, sizeof( peer_crt_info ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_reset returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( opt.reco_mode == 1 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load( &saved_session, + session_data, + session_data_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_load returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session( &ssl, &saved_session ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_session returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd, + opt.server_addr, opt.server_port, + opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ? + MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP : MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( opt.nbio > 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( &server_fd ); + else + ret = mbedtls_net_set_block( &server_fd ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + goto send_request; + } + + /* + * Cleanup and exit + */ +exit: +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf("Last error was: -0x%X - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &saved_session ); + + if( session_data != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_data, session_data_len ); + mbedtls_free( session_data ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + if( context_buf != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( context_buf, context_buf_len ); + mbedtls_free( context_buf ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key( key_slot ); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 ) + { + /* This is ok even if the slot hasn't been + * initialized (we might have jumed here + * immediately because of bad cmd line params, + * for example). */ + status = psa_destroy_key( slot ); + if( ( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) && + ( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Failed to destroy key slot %u - error was %d", + (unsigned) slot, (int) status ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const char* message = mbedtls_test_helper_is_psa_leaking(); + if( message ) + { + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = 1; + mbedtls_printf( "PSA memory leak detected: %s\n", message); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* For builds with MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG psa crypto + * resources are freed by rng_free(). */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); +#endif + + rng_free( &rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if( test_hooks_failure_detected( ) ) + { + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = 1; + mbedtls_printf( "Test hooks detected errors.\n" ); + } + test_hooks_free( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(); +#endif + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ + +#if defined(_WIN32) + if( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); + } +#endif + + // Shell can not handle large exit numbers -> 1 for errors + if( ret < 0 ) + ret = 1; + + if( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) + mbedtls_exit( ret ); + else + mbedtls_exit( query_config_ret ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bb84f529 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c @@ -0,0 +1,1128 @@ +/* + * MbedTLS SSL context deserializer from base64 code + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" + +#include +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +int main( void ) +{ + printf("MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_ERROR_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C not defined.\n"); + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include +#endif +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" + +/* + * This program version + */ +#define PROG_NAME "ssl_context_info" +#define VER_MAJOR 0 +#define VER_MINOR 1 + +/* + * Flags copied from the Mbed TLS library. + */ +#define SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT ( 1 << 0 ) +#define SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT ( 1 << 1 ) +#define SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT ( 1 << 2 ) +#define SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT ( 1 << 3 ) +#define SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT ( 1 << 4 ) +#define SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT ( 1 << 5 ) +#define SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT ( 1 << 6 ) + +#define CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT ( 1 << 0 ) +#define CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT ( 1 << 1 ) +#define CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT ( 1 << 2 ) +#define CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT ( 1 << 3 ) + +#define TRANSFORM_RANDBYTE_LEN 64 + +/* + * Minimum and maximum number of bytes for specific data: context, sessions, + * certificates, tickets and buffers in the program. The context and session + * size values have been calculated based on the 'print_deserialized_ssl_context()' + * and 'print_deserialized_ssl_session()' content. + */ +#define MIN_CONTEXT_LEN 84 +#define MIN_SESSION_LEN 88 + +#define MAX_CONTEXT_LEN 875 /* without session data */ +#define MAX_SESSION_LEN 109 /* without certificate and ticket data */ +#define MAX_CERTIFICATE_LEN ( ( 1 << 24 ) - 1 ) +#define MAX_TICKET_LEN ( ( 1 << 24 ) - 1 ) + +#define MIN_SERIALIZED_DATA ( MIN_CONTEXT_LEN + MIN_SESSION_LEN ) +#define MAX_SERIALIZED_DATA ( MAX_CONTEXT_LEN + MAX_SESSION_LEN + \ + MAX_CERTIFICATE_LEN + MAX_TICKET_LEN ) + +#define MIN_BASE64_LEN ( MIN_SERIALIZED_DATA * 4 / 3 ) +#define MAX_BASE64_LEN ( MAX_SERIALIZED_DATA * 4 / 3 + 3 ) + +/* + * A macro that prevents from reading out of the ssl buffer range. + */ +#define CHECK_SSL_END( LEN ) \ +do \ +{ \ + if( end - ssl < (int)( LEN ) ) \ + { \ + printf_err( "%s", buf_ln_err ); \ + return; \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +/* + * Global values + */ +FILE *b64_file = NULL; /* file with base64 codes to deserialize */ +char conf_keep_peer_certificate = 1; /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE from mbedTLS configuration */ +char conf_dtls_proto = 1; /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS from mbedTLS configuration */ +char debug = 0; /* flag for debug messages */ +const char alloc_err[] = "Cannot allocate memory\n"; +const char buf_ln_err[] = "Buffer does not have enough data to complete the parsing\n"; + +/* + * Basic printing functions + */ +void print_version( ) +{ + printf( "%s v%d.%d\n", PROG_NAME, VER_MAJOR, VER_MINOR ); +} + +void print_usage( ) +{ + print_version(); + printf( "\nThis program is used to deserialize an Mbed TLS SSL session from the base64 code provided\n" + "in the text file. The program can deserialize many codes from one file, but they must be\n" + "separated, e.g. by a newline.\n\n" ); + printf( + "Usage:\n" + "\t-f path - Path to the file with base64 code\n" + "\t-v - Show version\n" + "\t-h - Show this usage\n" + "\t-d - Print more information\n" + "\t--keep-peer-cert=0 - Use this option if you know that the Mbed TLS library\n" + "\t has been compiled with the MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE\n" + "\t flag. You can also use it if there are some problems with reading\n" + "\t the information about certificate\n" + "\t--dtls-protocol=0 - Use this option if you know that the Mbed TLS library\n" + "\t has been compiled without the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS flag\n" + "\n" + ); +} + +void printf_dbg( const char *str, ... ) +{ + if( debug ) + { + va_list args; + va_start( args, str ); + printf( "debug: " ); + vprintf( str, args ); + fflush( stdout ); + va_end( args ); + } +} + +MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE( 1, 2 ) +void printf_err( const char *str, ... ) +{ + va_list args; + va_start( args, str ); + fflush( stdout ); + fprintf( stderr, "ERROR: " ); + vfprintf( stderr, str, args ); + fflush( stderr ); + va_end( args ); +} + +/* + * Exit from the program in case of error + */ +void error_exit() +{ + if( NULL != b64_file ) + { + fclose( b64_file ); + } + exit( -1 ); +} + +/* + * This function takes the input arguments of this program + */ +void parse_arguments( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int i = 1; + + if( argc < 2 ) + { + print_usage(); + error_exit(); + } + + while( i < argc ) + { + if( strcmp( argv[i], "-d" ) == 0 ) + { + debug = 1; + } + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "-h" ) == 0 ) + { + print_usage(); + } + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "-v" ) == 0 ) + { + print_version(); + } + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "-f" ) == 0 ) + { + if( ++i >= argc ) + { + printf_err( "File path is empty\n" ); + error_exit(); + } + + if( NULL != b64_file ) + { + printf_err( "Cannot specify more than one file with -f\n" ); + error_exit( ); + } + + if( ( b64_file = fopen( argv[i], "r" )) == NULL ) + { + printf_err( "Cannot find file \"%s\"\n", argv[i] ); + error_exit(); + } + } + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "--keep-peer-cert=0" ) == 0 ) + { + conf_keep_peer_certificate = 0; + } + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "--dtls-protocol=0" ) == 0 ) + { + conf_dtls_proto = 0; + } + else + { + print_usage(); + error_exit(); + } + + i++; + } +} + +/* + * This function prints base64 code to the stdout + */ +void print_b64( const uint8_t *b, size_t len ) +{ + size_t i = 0; + const uint8_t *end = b + len; + printf("\t"); + while( b < end ) + { + if( ++i > 75 ) + { + printf( "\n\t" ); + i = 0; + } + printf( "%c", *b++ ); + } + printf( "\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); +} + +/* + * This function prints hex code from the buffer to the stdout. + * + * /p b buffer with data to print + * /p len number of bytes to print + * /p in_line number of bytes in one line + * /p prefix prefix for the new lines + */ +void print_hex( const uint8_t *b, size_t len, + const size_t in_line, const char *prefix ) +{ + size_t i = 0; + const uint8_t *end = b + len; + + if( prefix == NULL ) + { + prefix = ""; + } + + while( b < end ) + { + if( ++i > in_line ) + { + printf( "\n%s", prefix ); + i = 1; + } + printf( "%02X ", (uint8_t) *b++ ); + } + printf("\n"); + fflush(stdout); +} + +/* + * Print the value of time_t in format e.g. 2020-01-23 13:05:59 + */ +void print_time( const uint64_t *time ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + char buf[20]; + struct tm *t = gmtime( (time_t*) time ); + static const char format[] = "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"; + if( NULL != t ) + { + strftime( buf, sizeof( buf ), format, t ); + printf( "%s\n", buf ); + } + else + { + printf( "unknown\n" ); + } +#else + (void) time; + printf( "not supported\n" ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Print the input string if the bit is set in the value + */ +void print_if_bit( const char *str, int bit, int val ) +{ + if( bit & val ) + { + printf( "\t%s\n", str ); + } +} + +/* + * Return pointer to hardcoded "enabled" or "disabled" depending on the input value + */ +const char * get_enabled_str( int is_en ) +{ + return ( is_en ) ? "enabled" : "disabled"; +} + +/* + * Return pointer to hardcoded MFL string value depending on the MFL code at the input + */ +const char * get_mfl_str( int mfl_code ) +{ + switch( mfl_code ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE: + return "none"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512: + return "512"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024: + return "1024"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048: + return "2048"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096: + return "4096"; + default: + return "error"; + } +} + +/* + * Read next base64 code from the 'b64_file'. The 'b64_file' must be opened + * previously. After each call to this function, the internal file position + * indicator of the global b64_file is advanced. + * + * Note - This function checks the size of the input buffer and if necessary, + * increases it to the maximum MAX_BASE64_LEN + * + * /p b64 pointer to the pointer of the buffer for input data + * /p max_len pointer to the current buffer capacity. It can be changed if + * the buffer needs to be increased + * + * \retval number of bytes written in to the b64 buffer or 0 in case no more + * data was found + */ +size_t read_next_b64_code( uint8_t **b64, size_t *max_len ) +{ + int valid_balance = 0; /* balance between valid and invalid characters */ + size_t len = 0; + char pad = 0; + int c = 0; + + while( EOF != c ) + { + char c_valid = 0; + + c = fgetc( b64_file ); + + if( pad > 0 ) + { + if( c == '=' && pad == 1 ) + { + c_valid = 1; + pad = 2; + } + } + else if( ( c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z' ) || + ( c >= 'a' && c <= 'z' ) || + ( c >= '0' && c <= '9' ) || + c == '+' || c == '/' ) + { + c_valid = 1; + } + else if( c == '=' ) + { + c_valid = 1; + pad = 1; + } + else if( c == '-' ) + { + c = '+'; + c_valid = 1; + } + else if( c == '_' ) + { + c = '/'; + c_valid = 1; + } + + if( c_valid ) + { + /* A string of characters that could be a base64 code. */ + valid_balance++; + + if( len < *max_len ) + { + ( *b64 )[ len++ ] = c; + } + else if( *max_len < MAX_BASE64_LEN ) + { + /* Current buffer is too small, but can be resized. */ + void *ptr; + size_t new_size = ( MAX_BASE64_LEN - 4096 > *max_len ) ? + *max_len + 4096 : MAX_BASE64_LEN; + + ptr = realloc( *b64, new_size ); + if( NULL == ptr ) + { + printf_err( alloc_err ); + return 0; + } + *b64 = ptr; + *max_len = new_size; + ( *b64 )[ len++ ] = c; + } + else + { + /* Too much data so it will be treated as invalid */ + len++; + } + } + else if( len > 0 ) + { + /* End of a string that could be a base64 code, but need to check + * that the length of the characters is correct. */ + + valid_balance--; + + if( len < MIN_CONTEXT_LEN ) + { + printf_dbg( "The code found is too small to be a SSL context.\n" ); + len = pad = 0; + } + else if( len > *max_len ) + { + printf_err( "The code found is too large by %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes.\n", + len - *max_len ); + len = pad = 0; + } + else if( len % 4 != 0 ) + { + printf_err( "The length of the base64 code found should be a multiple of 4.\n" ); + len = pad = 0; + } + else + { + /* Base64 code with valid character length. */ + return len; + } + } + else + { + valid_balance--; + } + + /* Detection of potentially wrong file format like: binary, zip, ISO, etc. */ + if( valid_balance < -100 ) + { + printf_err( "Too many bad symbols detected. File check aborted.\n" ); + return 0; + } + } + + printf_dbg( "End of file\n" ); + return 0; +} + +/* + * This function deserializes and prints to the stdout all obtained information + * about the certificates from provided data. + * + * /p ssl pointer to serialized certificate + * /p len number of bytes in the buffer +*/ +void print_deserialized_ssl_cert( const uint8_t *ssl, uint32_t len ) +{ + enum { STRLEN = 4096 }; + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + int ret; + char str[STRLEN]; + + printf( "\nCertificate:\n" ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( &crt, ssl, len ); + if( 0 != ret ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, str, STRLEN ); + printf_err( "Invalid format of X.509 - %s\n", str ); + printf( "Cannot deserialize:\n\t" ); + print_hex( ssl, len, 25, "\t" ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_x509_crt *current = &crt; + + while( current != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( str, STRLEN, "\t", current ); + if( 0 > ret ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, str, STRLEN ); + printf_err( "Cannot write to the output - %s\n", str ); + } + else + { + printf( "%s", str ); + } + + current = current->next; + + if( current ) + { + printf( "\n" ); + } + + } + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} + +/* + * This function deserializes and prints to the stdout all obtained information + * about the session from provided data. This function was built based on + * mbedtls_ssl_session_load(). mbedtls_ssl_session_load() could not be used + * due to dependencies on the mbedTLS configuration. + * + * The data structure in the buffer: + * uint64 start_time; + * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard + * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 + * opaque session_id[32]; + * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard + * uint32 verify_result; + * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert + * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard + * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * + * /p ssl pointer to serialized session + * /p len number of bytes in the buffer + * /p session_cfg_flag session configuration flags + */ +void print_deserialized_ssl_session( const uint8_t *ssl, uint32_t len, + int session_cfg_flag ) +{ + const struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * ciphersuite_info; + int ciphersuite_id; + uint32_t cert_len, ticket_len; + uint32_t verify_result, ticket_lifetime; + const uint8_t *end = ssl + len; + + printf( "\nSession info:\n" ); + + if( session_cfg_flag & SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT ) + { + uint64_t start; + CHECK_SSL_END( 8 ); + start = ( (uint64_t) ssl[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) ssl[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) ssl[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) ssl[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) ssl[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) ssl[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) ssl[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) ssl[7] ); + ssl += 8; + printf( "\tstart time : " ); + print_time( &start ); + } + + CHECK_SSL_END( 2 ); + ciphersuite_id = ( (int) ssl[0] << 8 ) | (int) ssl[1]; + printf_dbg( "Ciphersuite ID: %d\n", ciphersuite_id ); + ssl += 2; + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite_id ); + if( ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + { + printf_err( "Cannot find ciphersuite info\n" ); + } + else + { + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + printf( "\tciphersuite : %s\n", ciphersuite_info->name ); + printf( "\tcipher flags : 0x%02X\n", ciphersuite_info->flags ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->cipher ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + printf_err( "Cannot find cipher info\n" ); + } + else + { + printf( "\tcipher : %s\n", cipher_info->name ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->mac ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + { + printf_err( "Cannot find Message-Digest info\n" ); + } + else + { + printf( "\tMessage-Digest : %s\n", md_info->name ); + } + } + + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + printf( "\tcompression : %s\n", get_enabled_str( *ssl++ ) ); + + /* Note - Here we can get session ID length from serialized data, but we + * use hardcoded 32-bytes length. This approach was taken from + * 'mbedtls_ssl_session_load()'. */ + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 + 32 ); + printf_dbg( "Session id length: %u\n", (uint32_t) *ssl++ ); + printf( "\tsession ID : "); + print_hex( ssl, 32, 16, "\t " ); + ssl += 32; + + printf( "\tmaster secret : "); + CHECK_SSL_END( 48 ); + print_hex( ssl, 48, 16, "\t " ); + ssl += 48; + + CHECK_SSL_END( 4 ); + verify_result = ( (uint32_t) ssl[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[3] ); + ssl += 4; + printf( "\tverify result : 0x%08X\n", verify_result ); + + if( SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT & session_cfg_flag ) + { + if( conf_keep_peer_certificate ) + { + CHECK_SSL_END( 3 ); + cert_len = ( (uint32_t) ssl[0] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[1] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[2] ); + ssl += 3; + printf_dbg( "Certificate length: %u\n", cert_len ); + + if( cert_len > 0 ) + { + CHECK_SSL_END( cert_len ); + print_deserialized_ssl_cert( ssl, cert_len ); + ssl += cert_len; + } + } + else + { + printf( "\tPeer digest : " ); + + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + switch( (mbedtls_md_type_t) *ssl++ ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: + printf( "none\n" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + printf( "MD2\n" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + printf( "MD4\n" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + printf( "MD5\n" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + printf( "SHA1\n" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + printf( "SHA224\n" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + printf( "SHA256\n" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + printf( "SHA384\n" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + printf( "SHA512\n" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + printf( "RIPEMD160\n" ); + break; + default: + printf( "undefined or erroneous\n" ); + break; + } + + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + cert_len = (uint32_t) *ssl++; + printf_dbg( "Message-Digest length: %u\n", cert_len ); + + if( cert_len > 0 ) + { + printf( "\tPeer digest cert : " ); + CHECK_SSL_END( cert_len ); + print_hex( ssl, cert_len, 16, "\t " ); + ssl += cert_len; + } + } + } + + if( SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT & session_cfg_flag ) + { + printf( "\nTicket:\n" ); + + CHECK_SSL_END( 3 ); + ticket_len = ( (uint32_t) ssl[0] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[1] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[2] ); + ssl += 3; + printf_dbg( "Ticket length: %u\n", ticket_len ); + + if( ticket_len > 0 ) + { + printf( "\t" ); + CHECK_SSL_END( ticket_len ); + print_hex( ssl, ticket_len, 22, "\t" ); + ssl += ticket_len; + printf( "\n" ); + } + + CHECK_SSL_END( 4 ); + ticket_lifetime = ( (uint32_t) ssl[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[3] ); + ssl += 4; + printf( "\tlifetime : %u sec.\n", ticket_lifetime ); + } + + if( ssl < end ) + { + printf( "\nSession others:\n" ); + } + + if( SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT & session_cfg_flag ) + { + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + printf( "\tMFL : %s\n", get_mfl_str( *ssl++ ) ); + } + + if( SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT & session_cfg_flag ) + { + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + printf( "\tnegotiate truncated HMAC : %s\n", get_enabled_str( *ssl++ ) ); + } + + if( SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT & session_cfg_flag ) + { + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + printf( "\tEncrypt-then-MAC : %s\n", get_enabled_str( *ssl++ ) ); + } + + if( 0 != ( end - ssl ) ) + { + printf_err( "%i bytes left to analyze from session\n", (int32_t)( end - ssl ) ); + } +} + +/* + * This function deserializes and prints to the stdout all obtained information + * about the context from provided data. This function was built based on + * mbedtls_ssl_context_load(). mbedtls_ssl_context_load() could not be used + * due to dependencies on the mbedTLS configuration and the configuration of + * the context when serialization was created. + * + * The data structure in the buffer: + * // header + * uint8 version[3]; + * uint8 configuration[5]; + * // session sub-structure + * uint32_t session_len; + * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * // transform sub-structure + * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random + * uint8 in_cid_len; + * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value + * uint8 out_cid_len; + * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use + * // fields from ssl_context + * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC + * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num + * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection + * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram + * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number + * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) + * uint8 alpn_chosen_len; + * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol + * + * /p ssl pointer to serialized session + * /p len number of bytes in the buffer + */ +void print_deserialized_ssl_context( const uint8_t *ssl, size_t len ) +{ + const uint8_t *end = ssl + len; + uint32_t session_len; + int session_cfg_flag; + int context_cfg_flag; + + printf( "\nMbed TLS version:\n" ); + + CHECK_SSL_END( 3 + 2 + 3 ); + + printf( "\tmajor %u\n", (uint32_t) *ssl++ ); + printf( "\tminor %u\n", (uint32_t) *ssl++ ); + printf( "\tpath %u\n", (uint32_t) *ssl++ ); + + printf( "\nEnabled session and context configuration:\n" ); + + session_cfg_flag = ( (int) ssl[0] << 8 ) | ( (int) ssl[1] ); + ssl += 2; + + context_cfg_flag = ( (int) ssl[0] << 16 ) | + ( (int) ssl[1] << 8 ) | + ( (int) ssl[2] ) ; + ssl += 3; + + printf_dbg( "Session config flags 0x%04X\n", session_cfg_flag ); + printf_dbg( "Context config flags 0x%06X\n", context_cfg_flag ); + + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME", SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT, session_cfg_flag ); + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C", SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT, session_cfg_flag ); + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT, session_cfg_flag ); + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC", SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT, session_cfg_flag ); + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT, session_cfg_flag ); + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT, session_cfg_flag ); + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS and client", SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT, session_cfg_flag ); + + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT, context_cfg_flag ); + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT", CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT, context_cfg_flag ); + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT, context_cfg_flag ); + print_if_bit( "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN", CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT, context_cfg_flag ); + + CHECK_SSL_END( 4 ); + session_len = ( (uint32_t) ssl[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[3] ); + ssl += 4; + printf_dbg( "Session length %u\n", session_len ); + + CHECK_SSL_END( session_len ); + print_deserialized_ssl_session( ssl, session_len, session_cfg_flag ); + ssl += session_len; + + printf( "\nRandom bytes:\n\t"); + + CHECK_SSL_END( TRANSFORM_RANDBYTE_LEN ); + print_hex( ssl, TRANSFORM_RANDBYTE_LEN, 22, "\t" ); + ssl += TRANSFORM_RANDBYTE_LEN; + + printf( "\nContext others:\n" ); + + if( CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT & context_cfg_flag ) + { + uint8_t cid_len; + + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + cid_len = *ssl++; + printf_dbg( "In CID length %u\n", (uint32_t) cid_len ); + + printf( "\tin CID : " ); + if( cid_len > 0 ) + { + CHECK_SSL_END( cid_len ); + print_hex( ssl, cid_len, 20, "\t" ); + ssl += cid_len; + } + else + { + printf( "none\n" ); + } + + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + cid_len = *ssl++; + printf_dbg( "Out CID length %u\n", (uint32_t) cid_len ); + + printf( "\tout CID : " ); + if( cid_len > 0 ) + { + CHECK_SSL_END( cid_len ); + print_hex( ssl, cid_len, 20, "\t" ); + ssl += cid_len; + } + else + { + printf( "none\n" ); + } + } + + if( CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT & context_cfg_flag ) + { + uint32_t badmac_seen; + + CHECK_SSL_END( 4 ); + badmac_seen = ( (uint32_t) ssl[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) ssl[3] ); + ssl += 4; + printf( "\tbad MAC seen number : %u\n", badmac_seen ); + + /* value 'in_window_top' from mbedtls_ssl_context */ + printf( "\tlast validated record sequence no. : " ); + CHECK_SSL_END( 8 ); + print_hex( ssl, 8, 20, "" ); + ssl += 8; + + /* value 'in_window' from mbedtls_ssl_context */ + printf( "\tbitmask for replay detection : " ); + CHECK_SSL_END( 8 ); + print_hex( ssl, 8, 20, "" ); + ssl += 8; + } + + if( conf_dtls_proto ) + { + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + printf( "\tDTLS datagram packing : %s\n", + get_enabled_str( ! ( *ssl++ ) ) ); + } + + /* value 'cur_out_ctr' from mbedtls_ssl_context */ + printf( "\toutgoing record sequence no. : "); + CHECK_SSL_END( 8 ); + print_hex( ssl, 8, 20, "" ); + ssl += 8; + + if( conf_dtls_proto ) + { + uint16_t mtu; + CHECK_SSL_END( 2 ); + mtu = ( ssl[0] << 8 ) | ssl[1]; + ssl += 2; + printf( "\tMTU : %u\n", mtu ); + } + + + if( CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT & context_cfg_flag ) + { + uint8_t alpn_len; + + CHECK_SSL_END( 1 ); + alpn_len = *ssl++; + printf_dbg( "ALPN length %u\n", (uint32_t) alpn_len ); + + printf( "\tALPN negotiation : " ); + CHECK_SSL_END( alpn_len ); + if( alpn_len > 0 ) + { + if( strlen( (const char*) ssl ) == alpn_len ) + { + printf( "%s\n", ssl ); + } + else + { + printf( "\n" ); + printf_err( "\tALPN negotiation is incorrect\n" ); + } + ssl += alpn_len; + } + else + { + printf( "not selected\n" ); + } + } + + if( 0 != ( end - ssl ) ) + { + printf_err( "%i bytes left to analyze from context\n", (int32_t)( end - ssl ) ); + } + printf( "\n" ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + enum { SSL_INIT_LEN = 4096 }; + + uint32_t b64_counter = 0; + uint8_t *b64_buf = NULL; + uint8_t *ssl_buf = NULL; + size_t b64_max_len = SSL_INIT_LEN; + size_t ssl_max_len = SSL_INIT_LEN; + size_t ssl_len = 0; + + /* The 'b64_file' is opened when parsing arguments to check that the + * file name is correct */ + parse_arguments( argc, argv ); + + if( NULL != b64_file ) + { + b64_buf = malloc( SSL_INIT_LEN ); + ssl_buf = malloc( SSL_INIT_LEN ); + + if( NULL == b64_buf || NULL == ssl_buf ) + { + printf_err( alloc_err ); + fclose( b64_file ); + b64_file = NULL; + } + } + + while( NULL != b64_file ) + { + size_t b64_len = read_next_b64_code( &b64_buf, &b64_max_len ); + if( b64_len > 0) + { + int ret; + size_t ssl_required_len = b64_len * 3 / 4 + 1; + + /* Allocate more memory if necessary. */ + if( ssl_required_len > ssl_max_len ) + { + void *ptr = realloc( ssl_buf, ssl_required_len ); + if( NULL == ptr ) + { + printf_err( alloc_err ); + fclose( b64_file ); + b64_file = NULL; + break; + } + ssl_buf = ptr; + ssl_max_len = ssl_required_len; + } + + printf( "\nDeserializing number %u:\n", ++b64_counter ); + + printf( "\nBase64 code:\n" ); + print_b64( b64_buf, b64_len ); + + ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( ssl_buf, ssl_max_len, &ssl_len, b64_buf, b64_len ); + if( ret != 0) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, (char*) b64_buf, b64_max_len ); + printf_err( "base64 code cannot be decoded - %s\n", b64_buf ); + continue; + } + + if( debug ) + { + printf( "\nDecoded data in hex:\n\t"); + print_hex( ssl_buf, ssl_len, 25, "\t" ); + } + + print_deserialized_ssl_context( ssl_buf, ssl_len ); + + } + else + { + fclose( b64_file ); + b64_file = NULL; + } + } + + free( b64_buf ); + free( ssl_buf ); + + if( b64_counter > 0 ) + { + printf_dbg( "Finished. Found %u base64 codes\n", b64_counter ); + } + else + { + printf( "Finished. No valid base64 code found\n" ); + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a07179a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,423 @@ +/* + * SSL server demonstration program using fork() for handling multiple clients + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + ((void) argc); + ((void) argv); + + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_CERTS_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C " + "and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C and/or MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#elif defined(_WIN32) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("_WIN32 defined. This application requires fork() and signals " + "to work correctly.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +#include +#include + +#if !defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#endif + +#define HTTP_RESPONSE \ + "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n" \ + "

mbed TLS Test Server

\r\n" \ + "

Successful connection using: %s

\r\n" + +#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0 + + +static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + ((void) level); + + mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str ); + fflush( (FILE *) ctx ); +} + +int main( void ) +{ + int ret = 1, len, cnt = 0, pid; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + const char *pers = "ssl_fork_server"; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert; + mbedtls_pk_context pkey; + + mbedtls_net_init( &listen_fd ); + mbedtls_net_init( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + signal( SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN ); + + /* + * 0. Initial seeding of the RNG + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Initial seeding of the random generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1. Load the certificates and private RSA key + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the server cert. and key..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + /* + * This demonstration program uses embedded test certificates. + * Instead, you may want to use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file() to read the + * server and CA certificates, as well as mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(). + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1b. Prepare SSL configuration + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Configuring SSL..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.next, NULL ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 2. Setup the listening TCP socket + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Bind on https://localhost:4433/ ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_bind( &listen_fd, NULL, "4433", MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + while( 1 ) + { + /* + * 3. Wait until a client connects + */ + mbedtls_net_init( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + + mbedtls_printf( " . Waiting for a remote connection ...\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_accept( &listen_fd, &client_fd, + NULL, 0, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_net_accept returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * 3.5. Forking server thread + */ + + mbedtls_printf( " . Forking to handle connection ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + pid = fork(); + + if( pid < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf(" failed! fork returned %d\n\n", pid ); + goto exit; + } + + if( pid != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + mbedtls_net_close( &client_fd ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctr_drbg, + (const unsigned char *) "parent", + 6 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + continue; + } + + mbedtls_net_close( &listen_fd ); + + pid = getpid(); + + /* + * 4. Setup stuff + */ + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: Setting up the SSL data.\n", pid ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctr_drbg, + (const unsigned char *) "child", + 5 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( + "pid %d: SSL setup failed! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed returned %d\n\n", + pid, ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( + "pid %d: SSL setup failed! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d\n\n", + pid, ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &client_fd, mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, NULL ); + + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: SSL setup ok\n", pid ); + + /* + * 5. Handshake + */ + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: Performing the SSL/TLS handshake.\n", pid ); + fflush( stdout ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( + "pid %d: SSL handshake failed! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned %d\n\n", + pid, ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: SSL handshake ok\n", pid ); + + /* + * 6. Read the HTTP Request + */ + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: Start reading from client.\n", pid ); + fflush( stdout ); + + do + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + continue; + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: connection was closed gracefully\n", pid ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET: + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: connection was reset by peer\n", pid ); + break; + + default: + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: mbedtls_ssl_read returned %d\n", pid, ret ); + break; + } + + break; + } + + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: %d bytes read\n\n%s", pid, len, (char *) buf ); + + if( ret > 0 ) + break; + } + while( 1 ); + + /* + * 7. Write the 200 Response + */ + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: Start writing to client.\n", pid ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, HTTP_RESPONSE, + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( &ssl ) ); + + while( cnt++ < 100 ) + { + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf, len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ) + { + mbedtls_printf( + "pid %d: Write failed! peer closed the connection\n\n", pid ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( + "pid %d: Write failed! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", + pid, ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( "pid %d: %d bytes written\n\n%s\n", pid, len, (char *) buf ); + + mbedtls_net_usleep( 1000000 ); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ); + goto exit; + } + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_NET_C && + MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C && + ! _WIN32 */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fb965f67 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,859 @@ +/* + * SSL client for SMTP servers + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* Enable definition of gethostname() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must + * be set before config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. + * Harmless on other platforms. */ +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C " + "not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" + +#include +#include + +#if !defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) +#include +#include + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if defined(_WIN32_WCE) +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2.lib" ) +#else +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2_32.lib" ) +#endif +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ +#endif + +#define DFL_SERVER_NAME "localhost" +#define DFL_SERVER_PORT "465" +#define DFL_USER_NAME "user" +#define DFL_USER_PWD "password" +#define DFL_MAIL_FROM "" +#define DFL_MAIL_TO "" +#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0 +#define DFL_CA_FILE "" +#define DFL_CRT_FILE "" +#define DFL_KEY_FILE "" +#define DFL_FORCE_CIPHER 0 +#define DFL_MODE 0 +#define DFL_AUTHENTICATION 0 + +#define MODE_SSL_TLS 0 +#define MODE_STARTTLS 0 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#define USAGE_AUTH \ + " authentication=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " user_name=%%s default: \"" DFL_USER_NAME "\"\n" \ + " user_pwd=%%s default: \"" DFL_USER_PWD "\"\n" +#else +#define USAGE_AUTH \ + " authentication options disabled. (Require MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)\n" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#define USAGE_IO \ + " ca_file=%%s default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \ + " crt_file=%%s default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \ + " key_file=%%s default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_IO \ + " No file operations available (MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined)\n" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: ssl_mail_client param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " server_name=%%s default: " DFL_SERVER_NAME "\n" \ + " server_port=%%d default: " DFL_SERVER_PORT "\n" \ + " debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " mode=%%d default: 0 (SSL/TLS) (1 for STARTTLS)\n" \ + USAGE_AUTH \ + " mail_from=%%s default: \"\"\n" \ + " mail_to=%%s default: \"\"\n" \ + USAGE_IO \ + " force_ciphersuite= default: all enabled\n" \ + " acceptable ciphersuite names:\n" + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + const char *server_name; /* hostname of the server (client only) */ + const char *server_port; /* port on which the ssl service runs */ + int debug_level; /* level of debugging */ + int authentication; /* if authentication is required */ + int mode; /* SSL/TLS (0) or STARTTLS (1) */ + const char *user_name; /* username to use for authentication */ + const char *user_pwd; /* password to use for authentication */ + const char *mail_from; /* E-Mail address to use as sender */ + const char *mail_to; /* E-Mail address to use as recipient */ + const char *ca_file; /* the file with the CA certificate(s) */ + const char *crt_file; /* the file with the client certificate */ + const char *key_file; /* the file with the client key */ + int force_ciphersuite[2]; /* protocol/ciphersuite to use, or all */ +} opt; + +static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + ((void) level); + + mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str ); + fflush( (FILE *) ctx ); +} + +static int do_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret; + uint32_t flags; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + memset(buf, 0, 1024); + + /* + * 4. Handshake + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + mbedtls_strerror( ret, (char *) buf, 1024 ); +#endif + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned %d: %s\n\n", ret, buf ); + return( -1 ); + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n [ Ciphersuite is %s ]\n", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( ssl ) ); + + /* + * 5. Verify the server certificate + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Verifying peer X.509 certificate..." ); + + /* In real life, we probably want to bail out when ret != 0 */ + if( ( flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + char vrfy_buf[512]; + + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ), " ! ", flags ); + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf ); + } + else + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " . Peer certificate information ...\n" ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, " ", + mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( ssl ) ); + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int write_ssl_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret; + + mbedtls_printf("\n%s", buf); + while( len && ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( ssl, buf, len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret ); + return -1; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int write_ssl_and_get_response( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char data[128]; + char code[4]; + size_t i, idx = 0; + + mbedtls_printf("\n%s", buf); + while( len && ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( ssl, buf, len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret ); + return -1; + } + } + + do + { + len = sizeof( data ) - 1; + memset( data, 0, sizeof( data ) ); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( ssl, data, len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + continue; + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) + return -1; + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_read returned %d\n\n", ret ); + return -1; + } + + mbedtls_printf("\n%s", data); + len = ret; + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + if( data[i] != '\n' ) + { + if( idx < 4 ) + code[ idx++ ] = data[i]; + continue; + } + + if( idx == 4 && code[0] >= '0' && code[0] <= '9' && code[3] == ' ' ) + { + code[3] = '\0'; + return atoi( code ); + } + + idx = 0; + } + } + while( 1 ); +} + +static int write_and_get_response( mbedtls_net_context *sock_fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char data[128]; + char code[4]; + size_t i, idx = 0; + + mbedtls_printf("\n%s", buf); + if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_net_send( sock_fd, buf, len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_send returned %d\n\n", ret ); + return -1; + } + + do + { + len = sizeof( data ) - 1; + memset( data, 0, sizeof( data ) ); + ret = mbedtls_net_recv( sock_fd, data, len ); + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d\n\n", ret ); + return -1; + } + + data[len] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf("\n%s", data); + len = ret; + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + if( data[i] != '\n' ) + { + if( idx < 4 ) + code[ idx++ ] = data[i]; + continue; + } + + if( idx == 4 && code[0] >= '0' && code[0] <= '9' && code[3] == ' ' ) + { + code[3] = '\0'; + return atoi( code ); + } + + idx = 0; + } + } + while( 1 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1, len; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_net_context server_fd; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + unsigned char base[1024]; + /* buf is used as the destination buffer for printing base with the format: + * "%s\r\n". Hence, the size of buf should be at least the size of base + * plus 2 bytes for the \r and \n characters. + */ + unsigned char buf[sizeof( base ) + 2]; +#else + unsigned char buf[1024]; +#endif + char hostname[32]; + const char *pers = "ssl_mail_client"; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; + mbedtls_x509_crt clicert; + mbedtls_pk_context pkey; + int i; + size_t n; + char *p, *q; + const int *list; + + /* + * Make sure memory references are valid in case we exit early. + */ + mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + memset( &buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &clicert ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + + list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + while( *list ) + { + mbedtls_printf(" %s\n", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) ); + list++; + } + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + goto exit; + } + + opt.server_name = DFL_SERVER_NAME; + opt.server_port = DFL_SERVER_PORT; + opt.debug_level = DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL; + opt.authentication = DFL_AUTHENTICATION; + opt.mode = DFL_MODE; + opt.user_name = DFL_USER_NAME; + opt.user_pwd = DFL_USER_PWD; + opt.mail_from = DFL_MAIL_FROM; + opt.mail_to = DFL_MAIL_TO; + opt.ca_file = DFL_CA_FILE; + opt.crt_file = DFL_CRT_FILE; + opt.key_file = DFL_KEY_FILE; + opt.force_ciphersuite[0]= DFL_FORCE_CIPHER; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "server_name" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_name = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "server_port" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_port = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "debug_level" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.debug_level = atoi( q ); + if( opt.debug_level < 0 || opt.debug_level > 65535 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "authentication" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.authentication = atoi( q ); + if( opt.authentication < 0 || opt.authentication > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "mode" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.mode = atoi( q ); + if( opt.mode < 0 || opt.mode > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "user_name" ) == 0 ) + opt.user_name = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "user_pwd" ) == 0 ) + opt.user_pwd = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "mail_from" ) == 0 ) + opt.mail_from = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "mail_to" ) == 0 ) + opt.mail_to = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "ca_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.ca_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "crt_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.crt_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "key_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "force_ciphersuite" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.force_ciphersuite[0] = -1; + + opt.force_ciphersuite[0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( q ); + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] <= 0 ) + goto usage; + + opt.force_ciphersuite[1] = 0; + } + else + goto usage; + } + + /* + * 0. Initialize the RNG and the session data + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.1. Load the trusted CA + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the CA root certificate ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strlen( opt.ca_file ) ) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &cacert, opt.ca_file ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ); +#else + { + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_CERTS_C and/or MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C not defined."); + goto exit; + } +#endif + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok (%d skipped)\n", ret ); + + /* + * 1.2. Load own certificate and private key + * + * (can be skipped if client authentication is not required) + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the client cert. and key..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strlen( opt.crt_file ) ) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &clicert, opt.crt_file ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &clicert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt, + mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len ); +#else + { + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined."); + goto exit; + } +#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strlen( opt.key_file ) ) + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey, opt.key_file, "" ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key, + mbedtls_test_cli_key_len, NULL, 0 ); +#else + { + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_CERTS_C or MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C not defined."); + goto exit; + } +#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 2. Start the connection + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Connecting to tcp/%s/%s...", opt.server_name, + opt.server_port ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd, opt.server_name, + opt.server_port, MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 3. Setup stuff + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* OPTIONAL is not optimal for security, + * but makes interop easier in this simplified example */ + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout ); + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( &conf, opt.force_ciphersuite ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &clicert, &pkey ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, opt.server_name ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &server_fd, mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, NULL ); + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + if( opt.mode == MODE_SSL_TLS ) + { + if( do_handshake( &ssl ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + mbedtls_printf( " > Get header from server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = write_ssl_and_get_response( &ssl, buf, 0 ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 299 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " > Write EHLO to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + gethostname( hostname, 32 ); + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "EHLO %s\r\n", hostname ); + ret = write_ssl_and_get_response( &ssl, buf, len ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 299 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + else + { + mbedtls_printf( " > Get header from server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = write_and_get_response( &server_fd, buf, 0 ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 299 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " > Write EHLO to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + gethostname( hostname, 32 ); + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "EHLO %s\r\n", hostname ); + ret = write_and_get_response( &server_fd, buf, len ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 299 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " > Write STARTTLS to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + gethostname( hostname, 32 ); + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "STARTTLS\r\n" ); + ret = write_and_get_response( &server_fd, buf, len ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 299 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + if( do_handshake( &ssl ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + if( opt.authentication ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " > Write AUTH LOGIN to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "AUTH LOGIN\r\n" ); + ret = write_ssl_and_get_response( &ssl, buf, len ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 399 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " > Write username to server: %s", opt.user_name ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_base64_encode( base, sizeof( base ), &n, (const unsigned char *) opt.user_name, + strlen( opt.user_name ) ); + + if( ret != 0 ) { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_base64_encode returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "%s\r\n", base ); + ret = write_ssl_and_get_response( &ssl, buf, len ); + if( ret < 300 || ret > 399 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " > Write password to server: %s", opt.user_pwd ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_base64_encode( base, sizeof( base ), &n, (const unsigned char *) opt.user_pwd, + strlen( opt.user_pwd ) ); + + if( ret != 0 ) { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_base64_encode returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "%s\r\n", base ); + ret = write_ssl_and_get_response( &ssl, buf, len ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 399 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_printf( " > Write MAIL FROM to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "MAIL FROM:<%s>\r\n", opt.mail_from ); + ret = write_ssl_and_get_response( &ssl, buf, len ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 299 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " > Write RCPT TO to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "RCPT TO:<%s>\r\n", opt.mail_to ); + ret = write_ssl_and_get_response( &ssl, buf, len ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 299 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " > Write DATA to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "DATA\r\n" ); + ret = write_ssl_and_get_response( &ssl, buf, len ); + if( ret < 300 || ret > 399 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( " > Write content to server:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "From: %s\r\nSubject: mbed TLS Test mail\r\n\r\n" + "This is a simple test mail from the " + "mbed TLS mail client example.\r\n" + "\r\n" + "Enjoy!", opt.mail_from ); + ret = write_ssl_data( &ssl, buf, len ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, "\r\n.\r\n"); + ret = write_ssl_and_get_response( &ssl, buf, len ); + if( ret < 200 || ret > 299 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! server responded with %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf(" ok\n" ); + + mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_NET_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C ** + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c4c6ef10 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,533 @@ +/* + * SSL server demonstration program using pthread for handling multiple + * clients. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_CERTS_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C " + "and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C and/or MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD " + "and/or MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include +#include + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#endif + + +#define HTTP_RESPONSE \ + "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n" \ + "

mbed TLS Test Server

\r\n" \ + "

Successful connection using: %s

\r\n" + +#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0 + +#define MAX_NUM_THREADS 5 + +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t debug_mutex; + +static void my_mutexed_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + long int thread_id = (long int) pthread_self(); + + mbedtls_mutex_lock( &debug_mutex ); + + ((void) level); + mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: [ #%ld ] %s", + file, line, thread_id, str ); + fflush( (FILE *) ctx ); + + mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &debug_mutex ); +} + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_net_context client_fd; + int thread_complete; + const mbedtls_ssl_config *config; +} thread_info_t; + +typedef struct { + int active; + thread_info_t data; + pthread_t thread; +} pthread_info_t; + +static thread_info_t base_info; +static pthread_info_t threads[MAX_NUM_THREADS]; + +static void *handle_ssl_connection( void *data ) +{ + int ret, len; + thread_info_t *thread_info = (thread_info_t *) data; + mbedtls_net_context *client_fd = &thread_info->client_fd; + long int thread_id = (long int) pthread_self(); + unsigned char buf[1024]; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + + /* Make sure memory references are valid */ + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] Setting up SSL/TLS data\n", thread_id ); + + /* + * 4. Get the SSL context ready + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, thread_info->config ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] failed: mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%04x\n", + thread_id, ( unsigned int ) -ret ); + goto thread_exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, client_fd, mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, NULL ); + + /* + * 5. Handshake + */ + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] Performing the SSL/TLS handshake\n", thread_id ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] failed: mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%04x\n", + thread_id, ( unsigned int ) -ret ); + goto thread_exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] ok\n", thread_id ); + + /* + * 6. Read the HTTP Request + */ + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] < Read from client\n", thread_id ); + + do + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + continue; + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] connection was closed gracefully\n", + thread_id ); + goto thread_exit; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET: + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] connection was reset by peer\n", + thread_id ); + goto thread_exit; + + default: + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%04x\n", + thread_id, ( unsigned int ) -ret ); + goto thread_exit; + } + } + + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] %d bytes read\n=====\n%s\n=====\n", + thread_id, len, (char *) buf ); + + if( ret > 0 ) + break; + } + while( 1 ); + + /* + * 7. Write the 200 Response + */ + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] > Write to client:\n", thread_id ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, HTTP_RESPONSE, + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( &ssl ) ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf, len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] failed: peer closed the connection\n", + thread_id ); + goto thread_exit; + } + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] failed: mbedtls_ssl_write returned -0x%04x\n", + thread_id, ( unsigned int ) ret ); + goto thread_exit; + } + } + + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] %d bytes written\n=====\n%s\n=====\n", + thread_id, len, (char *) buf ); + + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] . Closing the connection...", thread_id ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ) ) < 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ #%ld ] failed: mbedtls_ssl_close_notify returned -0x%04x\n", + thread_id, ( unsigned int ) ret ); + goto thread_exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + ret = 0; + +thread_exit: + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf(" [ #%ld ] Last error was: -0x%04x - %s\n\n", + thread_id, ( unsigned int ) -ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_net_free( client_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + + thread_info->thread_complete = 1; + + return( NULL ); +} + +static int thread_create( mbedtls_net_context *client_fd ) +{ + int ret, i; + + /* + * Find in-active or finished thread slot + */ + for( i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_THREADS; i++ ) + { + if( threads[i].active == 0 ) + break; + + if( threads[i].data.thread_complete == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ main ] Cleaning up thread %d\n", i ); + pthread_join(threads[i].thread, NULL ); + memset( &threads[i], 0, sizeof(pthread_info_t) ); + break; + } + } + + if( i == MAX_NUM_THREADS ) + return( -1 ); + + /* + * Fill thread-info for thread + */ + memcpy( &threads[i].data, &base_info, sizeof(base_info) ); + threads[i].active = 1; + memcpy( &threads[i].data.client_fd, client_fd, sizeof( mbedtls_net_context ) ); + + if( ( ret = pthread_create( &threads[i].thread, NULL, handle_ssl_connection, + &threads[i].data ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int main( void ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd; + const char pers[] = "ssl_pthread_server"; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert; + mbedtls_x509_crt cachain; + mbedtls_pk_context pkey; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + unsigned char alloc_buf[100000]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context cache; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( &cache ); +#endif + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cachain ); + + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + memset( threads, 0, sizeof(threads) ); + mbedtls_net_init( &listen_fd ); + mbedtls_net_init( &client_fd ); + + mbedtls_mutex_init( &debug_mutex ); + + base_info.config = &conf; + + /* + * We use only a single entropy source that is used in all the threads. + */ + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + + /* + * 1. Load the certificates and private RSA key + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the server cert. and key..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + /* + * This demonstration program uses embedded test certificates. + * Instead, you may want to use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file() to read the + * server and CA certificates, as well as mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(). + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cachain, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1b. Seed the random number generator + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed: mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", + ( unsigned int ) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1c. Prepare SSL configuration + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL data...." ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed: mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%04x\n", + ( unsigned int ) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_mutexed_debug, stdout ); + + /* mbedtls_ssl_cache_get() and mbedtls_ssl_cache_set() are thread-safe if + * MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is set. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( &conf, &cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set ); +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cachain, NULL ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 2. Setup the listening TCP socket + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Bind on https://localhost:4433/ ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_bind( &listen_fd, NULL, "4433", MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + +reset: +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf( " [ main ] Last error was: -0x%04x - %s\n", ( unsigned int ) -ret, + error_buf ); + } +#endif + + /* + * 3. Wait until a client connects + */ + mbedtls_printf( " [ main ] Waiting for a remote connection\n" ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_accept( &listen_fd, &client_fd, + NULL, 0, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ main ] failed: mbedtls_net_accept returned -0x%04x\n", + ( unsigned int ) ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " [ main ] ok\n" ); + mbedtls_printf( " [ main ] Creating a new thread\n" ); + + if( ( ret = thread_create( &client_fd ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ main ] failed: thread_create returned %d\n", ret ); + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + goto reset; + } + + ret = 0; + goto reset; + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( &cache ); +#endif + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + + mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); + + mbedtls_mutex_free( &debug_mutex ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_NET_C && + MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && MBEDTLS_THREADING_C && + MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD && MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01243382 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,403 @@ +/* + * SSL server demonstration program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_CERTS_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C " + "and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C " + "and/or MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include +#include + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#endif + +#define HTTP_RESPONSE \ + "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n" \ + "

mbed TLS Test Server

\r\n" \ + "

Successful connection using: %s

\r\n" + +#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0 + + +static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + ((void) level); + + mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str ); + fflush( (FILE *) ctx ); +} + +int main( void ) +{ + int ret, len; + mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + const char *pers = "ssl_server"; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert; + mbedtls_pk_context pkey; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context cache; +#endif + + mbedtls_net_init( &listen_fd ); + mbedtls_net_init( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( &cache ); +#endif + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( DEBUG_LEVEL ); +#endif + + /* + * 1. Load the certificates and private RSA key + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the server cert. and key..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + /* + * This demonstration program uses embedded test certificates. + * Instead, you may want to use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file() to read the + * server and CA certificates, as well as mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(). + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_pem, + mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 2. Setup the listening TCP socket + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Bind on https://localhost:4433/ ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_bind( &listen_fd, NULL, "4433", MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 3. Seed the RNG + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 4. Setup stuff + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL data...." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( &conf, &cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set ); +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, srvcert.next, NULL ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + +reset: +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf("Last error was: %d - %s\n\n", ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ); + + /* + * 3. Wait until a client connects + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Waiting for a remote connection ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_accept( &listen_fd, &client_fd, + NULL, 0, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_accept returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &client_fd, mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, NULL ); + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 5. Handshake + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto reset; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 6. Read the HTTP Request + */ + mbedtls_printf( " < Read from client:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + do + { + len = sizeof( buf ) - 1; + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + continue; + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET: + mbedtls_printf( " connection was reset by peer\n" ); + break; + + default: + mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + break; + } + + break; + } + + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf ); + + if( ret > 0 ) + break; + } + while( 1 ); + + /* + * 7. Write the 200 Response + */ + mbedtls_printf( " > Write to client:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, HTTP_RESPONSE, + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( &ssl ) ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf, len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! peer closed the connection\n\n" ); + goto reset; + } + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + len = ret; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes written\n\n%s\n", len, (char *) buf ); + + mbedtls_printf( " . Closing the connection..." ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ) ) < 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_close_notify returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto reset; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + ret = 0; + goto reset; + +exit: + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf("Last error was: %d - %s\n\n", ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( &cache ); +#endif + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_NET_C && + MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6169a377 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c @@ -0,0 +1,4143 @@ +/* + * SSL client with options + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "ssl_test_lib.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#elif !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C not defined.\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#include + +#if !defined(_MSC_VER) +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#define SNI_OPTION +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h" +#endif + +/* Size of memory to be allocated for the heap, when using the library's memory + * management and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C is enabled. */ +#define MEMORY_HEAP_SIZE 120000 + +#define DFL_SERVER_ADDR NULL +#define DFL_SERVER_PORT "4433" +#define DFL_RESPONSE_SIZE -1 +#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0 +#define DFL_NBIO 0 +#define DFL_EVENT 0 +#define DFL_READ_TIMEOUT 0 +#define DFL_CA_FILE "" +#define DFL_CA_PATH "" +#define DFL_CRT_FILE "" +#define DFL_KEY_FILE "" +#define DFL_KEY_OPAQUE 0 +#define DFL_KEY_PWD "" +#define DFL_CRT_FILE2 "" +#define DFL_KEY_FILE2 "" +#define DFL_KEY_PWD2 "" +#define DFL_ASYNC_OPERATIONS "-" +#define DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY1 ( -1 ) +#define DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY2 ( -1 ) +#define DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_ERROR ( 0 ) +#define DFL_PSK "" +#define DFL_PSK_OPAQUE 0 +#define DFL_PSK_LIST_OPAQUE 0 +#define DFL_PSK_IDENTITY "Client_identity" +#define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW NULL +#define DFL_PSK_LIST NULL +#define DFL_FORCE_CIPHER 0 +#define DFL_VERSION_SUITES NULL +#define DFL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED +#define DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY -2 +#define DFL_RENEGOTIATE 0 +#define DFL_RENEGO_DELAY -2 +#define DFL_RENEGO_PERIOD ( (uint64_t)-1 ) +#define DFL_EXCHANGES 1 +#define DFL_MIN_VERSION -1 +#define DFL_MAX_VERSION -1 +#define DFL_ARC4 -1 +#define DFL_SHA1 -1 +#define DFL_CID_ENABLED 0 +#define DFL_CID_VALUE "" +#define DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO -1 +#define DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO NULL +#define DFL_AUTH_MODE -1 +#define DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED +#define DFL_MFL_CODE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE +#define DFL_TRUNC_HMAC -1 +#define DFL_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED +#define DFL_TICKET_TIMEOUT 86400 +#define DFL_CACHE_MAX -1 +#define DFL_CACHE_TIMEOUT -1 +#define DFL_SNI NULL +#define DFL_ALPN_STRING NULL +#define DFL_CURVES NULL +#define DFL_DHM_FILE NULL +#define DFL_TRANSPORT MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM +#define DFL_COOKIES 1 +#define DFL_ANTI_REPLAY -1 +#define DFL_HS_TO_MIN 0 +#define DFL_HS_TO_MAX 0 +#define DFL_DTLS_MTU -1 +#define DFL_BADMAC_LIMIT -1 +#define DFL_DGRAM_PACKING 1 +#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS -1 +#define DFL_ETM -1 +#define DFL_SERIALIZE 0 +#define DFL_CONTEXT_FILE "" +#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE -1 +#define DFL_CA_CALLBACK 0 +#define DFL_EAP_TLS 0 +#define DFL_REPRODUCIBLE 0 +#define DFL_NSS_KEYLOG 0 +#define DFL_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE NULL +#define DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE 0 +#define DFL_USE_SRTP 0 +#define DFL_SRTP_FORCE_PROFILE 0 +#define DFL_SRTP_SUPPORT_MKI 0 + +#define LONG_RESPONSE "

01-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \ + "02-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \ + "03-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \ + "04-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \ + "05-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \ + "06-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \ + "07-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah

\r\n" + +/* Uncomment LONG_RESPONSE at the end of HTTP_RESPONSE to test sending longer + * packets (for fragmentation purposes) */ +#define HTTP_RESPONSE \ + "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n" \ + "

mbed TLS Test Server

\r\n" \ + "

Successful connection using: %s

\r\n" // LONG_RESPONSE + +/* + * Size of the basic I/O buffer. Able to hold our default response. + */ +#define DFL_IO_BUF_LEN 200 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#define USAGE_IO \ + " ca_file=%%s The single file containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \ + " default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \ + " use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \ + " ca_path=%%s The path containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \ + " default: \"\" (pre-loaded) (overrides ca_file)\n" \ + " use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \ + " crt_file=%%s Your own cert and chain (in bottom to top order, top may be omitted)\n" \ + " default: see note after key_file2\n" \ + " key_file=%%s default: see note after key_file2\n" \ + " key_pwd=%%s Password for key specified by key_file argument\n"\ + " default: none\n" \ + " crt_file2=%%s Your second cert and chain (in bottom to top order, top may be omitted)\n" \ + " default: see note after key_file2\n" \ + " key_file2=%%s default: see note below\n" \ + " note: if neither crt_file/key_file nor crt_file2/key_file2 are used,\n" \ + " preloaded certificate(s) and key(s) are used if available\n" \ + " key_pwd2=%%s Password for key specified by key_file2 argument\n"\ + " default: none\n" \ + " dhm_file=%%s File containing Diffie-Hellman parameters\n" \ + " default: preloaded parameters\n" +#else +#define USAGE_IO \ + "\n" \ + " No file operations available (MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined)\n" \ + "\n" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#else +#define USAGE_IO "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \ + " key_opaque=%%d Handle your private keys as if they were opaque\n" \ + " default: 0 (disabled)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +#define USAGE_SSL_ASYNC \ + " async_operations=%%c... d=decrypt, s=sign (default: -=off)\n" \ + " async_private_delay1=%%d Asynchronous delay for key_file or preloaded key\n" \ + " async_private_delay2=%%d Asynchronous delay for key_file2 and sni\n" \ + " default: -1 (not asynchronous)\n" \ + " async_private_error=%%d Async callback error injection (default=0=none,\n" \ + " 1=start, 2=cancel, 3=resume, negative=first time only)" +#else +#define USAGE_SSL_ASYNC "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define USAGE_CID \ + " cid=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension.\n" \ + " default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " cid_renego=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension during renegotiation.\n" \ + " default: same as 'cid' parameter\n" \ + " cid_val=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x).\n" \ + " default: \"\"\n" \ + " cid_val_renego=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x) after renegotiation.\n" \ + " default: same as 'cid_val' parameter\n" +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#define USAGE_CID "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#define USAGE_PSK_RAW \ + " psk=%%s default: \"\" (disabled)\n" \ + " The PSK values are in hex, without 0x.\n" \ + " psk_list=%%s default: \"\"\n" \ + " A list of (PSK identity, PSK value) pairs.\n" \ + " The PSK values are in hex, without 0x.\n" \ + " id1,psk1[,id2,psk2[,...]]\n" \ + " psk_identity=%%s default: \"Client_identity\"\n" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT \ + " psk_opaque=%%d default: 0 (don't use opaque static PSK)\n" \ + " Enable this to store the PSK configured through command line\n" \ + " parameter `psk` in a PSA-based key slot.\n" \ + " Note: Currently only supported in conjunction with\n" \ + " the use of min_version to force TLS 1.2 and force_ciphersuite \n" \ + " to force a particular PSK-only ciphersuite.\n" \ + " Note: This is to test integration of PSA-based opaque PSKs with\n" \ + " Mbed TLS only. Production systems are likely to configure Mbed TLS\n" \ + " with prepopulated key slots instead of importing raw key material.\n" \ + " psk_list_opaque=%%d default: 0 (don't use opaque dynamic PSKs)\n" \ + " Enable this to store the list of dynamically chosen PSKs configured\n" \ + " through the command line parameter `psk_list` in PSA-based key slots.\n" \ + " Note: Currently only supported in conjunction with\n" \ + " the use of min_version to force TLS 1.2 and force_ciphersuite \n" \ + " to force a particular PSK-only ciphersuite.\n" \ + " Note: This is to test integration of PSA-based opaque PSKs with\n" \ + " Mbed TLS only. Production systems are likely to configure Mbed TLS\n" \ + " with prepopulated key slots instead of importing raw key material.\n" +#else +#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#define USAGE_PSK USAGE_PSK_RAW USAGE_PSK_SLOT +#else +#define USAGE_PSK "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +#define USAGE_CA_CALLBACK \ + " ca_callback=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " Enable this to use the trusted certificate callback function\n" +#else +#define USAGE_CA_CALLBACK "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define USAGE_TICKETS \ + " tickets=%%d default: 1 (enabled)\n" \ + " ticket_timeout=%%d default: 86400 (one day)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_TICKETS "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +#define USAGE_EAP_TLS \ + " eap_tls=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" +#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG \ + " nss_keylog=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " This cannot be used with eap_tls=1\n" +#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE \ + " nss_keylog_file=%%s\n" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +#define USAGE_SRTP \ + " use_srtp=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " srtp_force_profile=%%d default: 0 (all enabled)\n" \ + " available profiles:\n" \ + " 1 - SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80\n" \ + " 2 - SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32\n" \ + " 3 - SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80\n" \ + " 4 - SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32\n" \ + " support_mki=%%d default: 0 (not supported)\n" +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#define USAGE_SRTP "" +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ +#define USAGE_EAP_TLS "" +#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG "" +#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE "" +#define USAGE_SRTP "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) +#define USAGE_CACHE \ + " cache_max=%%d default: cache default (50)\n" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#define USAGE_CACHE_TIME \ + " cache_timeout=%%d default: cache default (1d)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_CACHE_TIME "" +#endif +#else +#define USAGE_CACHE "" +#define USAGE_CACHE_TIME "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ + +#if defined(SNI_OPTION) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) +#define SNI_CRL ",crl" +#else +#define SNI_CRL "" +#endif + +#define USAGE_SNI \ + " sni=%%s name1,cert1,key1,ca1"SNI_CRL",auth1[,...]\n" \ + " default: disabled\n" +#else +#define USAGE_SNI "" +#endif /* SNI_OPTION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \ + " max_frag_len=%%d default: 16384 (tls default)\n" \ + " options: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096\n" +#else +#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \ + " trunc_hmac=%%d default: library default\n" +#else +#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +#define USAGE_ALPN \ + " alpn=%%s default: \"\" (disabled)\n" \ + " example: spdy/1,http/1.1\n" +#else +#define USAGE_ALPN "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) +#define USAGE_COOKIES \ + " cookies=0/1/-1 default: 1 (enabled)\n" \ + " 0: disabled, -1: library default (broken)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_COOKIES "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +#define USAGE_ANTI_REPLAY \ + " anti_replay=0/1 default: (library default: enabled)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_ANTI_REPLAY "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) +#define USAGE_BADMAC_LIMIT \ + " badmac_limit=%%d default: (library default: disabled)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_BADMAC_LIMIT "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +#define USAGE_DTLS \ + " dtls=%%d default: 0 (TLS)\n" \ + " hs_timeout=%%d-%%d default: (library default: 1000-60000)\n" \ + " range of DTLS handshake timeouts in millisecs\n" \ + " mtu=%%d default: (library default: unlimited)\n" \ + " dgram_packing=%%d default: 1 (allowed)\n" \ + " allow or forbid packing of multiple\n" \ + " records within a single datgram.\n" +#else +#define USAGE_DTLS "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +#define USAGE_EMS \ + " extended_ms=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_EMS "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define USAGE_ETM \ + " etm=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_ETM "" +#endif + +#define USAGE_REPRODUCIBLE \ + " reproducible=0/1 default: 0 (disabled)\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +#define USAGE_RENEGO \ + " renegotiation=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " renegotiate=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " renego_delay=%%d default: -2 (library default)\n" \ + " renego_period=%%d default: (2^64 - 1 for TLS, 2^48 - 1 for DTLS)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_RENEGO "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#define USAGE_ECJPAKE \ + " ecjpake_pw=%%s default: none (disabled)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_ECJPAKE "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define USAGE_CURVES \ + " curves=a,b,c,d default: \"default\" (library default)\n" \ + " example: \"secp521r1,brainpoolP512r1\"\n" \ + " - use \"none\" for empty list\n" \ + " - see mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()\n" \ + " for acceptable curve names\n" +#else +#define USAGE_CURVES "" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION \ + " serialize=%%d default: 0 (do not serialize/deserialize)\n" \ + " options: 1 (serialize)\n" \ + " 2 (serialize with re-initialization)\n" \ + " context_file=%%s The file path to write a serialized connection\n"\ + " in the form of base64 code (serialize option\n" \ + " must be set)\n" \ + " default: \"\" (do nothing)\n" \ + " option: a file path\n" +#else +#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION "" +#endif + +/* USAGE is arbitrarily split to stay under the portable string literal + * length limit: 4095 bytes in C99. */ +#define USAGE1 \ + "\n usage: ssl_server2 param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " server_addr=%%s default: (all interfaces)\n" \ + " server_port=%%d default: 4433\n" \ + " debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " buffer_size=%%d default: 200 \n" \ + " (minimum: 1, max: 16385)\n" \ + " response_size=%%d default: about 152 (basic response)\n" \ + " (minimum: 0, max: 16384)\n" \ + " increases buffer_size if bigger\n"\ + " nbio=%%d default: 0 (blocking I/O)\n" \ + " options: 1 (non-blocking), 2 (added delays)\n" \ + " event=%%d default: 0 (loop)\n" \ + " options: 1 (level-triggered, implies nbio=1),\n" \ + " read_timeout=%%d default: 0 ms (no timeout)\n" \ + "\n" \ + USAGE_DTLS \ + USAGE_SRTP \ + USAGE_COOKIES \ + USAGE_ANTI_REPLAY \ + USAGE_BADMAC_LIMIT \ + "\n" +#define USAGE2 \ + " auth_mode=%%s default: (library default: none)\n" \ + " options: none, optional, required\n" \ + " cert_req_ca_list=%%d default: 1 (send ca list)\n" \ + " options: 1 (send ca list), 0 (don't send)\n" \ + USAGE_IO \ + USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \ + "\n" \ + USAGE_PSK \ + USAGE_CA_CALLBACK \ + USAGE_ECJPAKE \ + "\n" +#define USAGE3 \ + " allow_legacy=%%d default: (library default: no)\n" \ + USAGE_RENEGO \ + " exchanges=%%d default: 1\n" \ + "\n" \ + USAGE_TICKETS \ + USAGE_EAP_TLS \ + USAGE_REPRODUCIBLE \ + USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG \ + USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE \ + USAGE_CACHE \ + USAGE_CACHE_TIME \ + USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \ + USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \ + USAGE_ALPN \ + USAGE_EMS \ + USAGE_ETM \ + USAGE_CURVES \ + "\n" +#define USAGE4 \ + USAGE_SSL_ASYNC \ + USAGE_SNI \ + " arc4=%%d default: (library default: 0)\n" \ + " allow_sha1=%%d default: 0\n" \ + " min_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1)\n" \ + " max_version=%%s default: (library default: tls12)\n" \ + " force_version=%%s default: \"\" (none)\n" \ + " options: ssl3, tls1, tls1_1, tls12, dtls1, dtls12\n" \ + "\n" \ + " version_suites=a,b,c,d per-version ciphersuites\n" \ + " in order from ssl3 to tls12\n" \ + " default: all enabled\n" \ + " force_ciphersuite= default: all enabled\n" \ + " query_config= return 0 if the specified\n" \ + " configuration macro is defined and 1\n" \ + " otherwise. The expansion of the macro\n" \ + " is printed if it is defined\n" \ + USAGE_SERIALIZATION \ + " acceptable ciphersuite names:\n" + +#define ALPN_LIST_SIZE 10 +#define CURVE_LIST_SIZE 20 + +#define PUT_UINT64_BE(out_be,in_le,i) \ +{ \ + (out_be)[(i) + 0] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 56 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (out_be)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 48 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (out_be)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 40 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (out_be)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 32 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (out_be)[(i) + 4] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (out_be)[(i) + 5] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (out_be)[(i) + 6] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \ + (out_be)[(i) + 7] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 0 ) & 0xFF ); \ +} + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + const char *server_addr; /* address on which the ssl service runs */ + const char *server_port; /* port on which the ssl service runs */ + int debug_level; /* level of debugging */ + int nbio; /* should I/O be blocking? */ + int event; /* loop or event-driven IO? level or edge triggered? */ + uint32_t read_timeout; /* timeout on mbedtls_ssl_read() in milliseconds */ + int response_size; /* pad response with header to requested size */ + uint16_t buffer_size; /* IO buffer size */ + const char *ca_file; /* the file with the CA certificate(s) */ + const char *ca_path; /* the path with the CA certificate(s) reside */ + const char *crt_file; /* the file with the server certificate */ + const char *key_file; /* the file with the server key */ + int key_opaque; /* handle private key as if it were opaque */ + const char *key_pwd; /* the password for the server key */ + const char *crt_file2; /* the file with the 2nd server certificate */ + const char *key_file2; /* the file with the 2nd server key */ + const char *key_pwd2; /* the password for the 2nd server key */ + const char *async_operations; /* supported SSL asynchronous operations */ + int async_private_delay1; /* number of times f_async_resume needs to be called for key 1, or -1 for no async */ + int async_private_delay2; /* number of times f_async_resume needs to be called for key 2, or -1 for no async */ + int async_private_error; /* inject error in async private callback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + int psk_opaque; + int psk_list_opaque; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + int ca_callback; /* Use callback for trusted certificate list */ +#endif + const char *psk; /* the pre-shared key */ + const char *psk_identity; /* the pre-shared key identity */ + char *psk_list; /* list of PSK id/key pairs for callback */ + const char *ecjpake_pw; /* the EC J-PAKE password */ + int force_ciphersuite[2]; /* protocol/ciphersuite to use, or all */ + const char *version_suites; /* per-version ciphersuites */ + int renegotiation; /* enable / disable renegotiation */ + int allow_legacy; /* allow legacy renegotiation */ + int renegotiate; /* attempt renegotiation? */ + int renego_delay; /* delay before enforcing renegotiation */ + uint64_t renego_period; /* period for automatic renegotiation */ + int exchanges; /* number of data exchanges */ + int min_version; /* minimum protocol version accepted */ + int max_version; /* maximum protocol version accepted */ + int arc4; /* flag for arc4 suites support */ + int allow_sha1; /* flag for SHA-1 support */ + int auth_mode; /* verify mode for connection */ + int cert_req_ca_list; /* should we send the CA list? */ + unsigned char mfl_code; /* code for maximum fragment length */ + int trunc_hmac; /* accept truncated hmac? */ + int tickets; /* enable / disable session tickets */ + int ticket_timeout; /* session ticket lifetime */ + int cache_max; /* max number of session cache entries */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + int cache_timeout; /* expiration delay of session cache entries*/ +#endif + char *sni; /* string describing sni information */ + const char *curves; /* list of supported elliptic curves */ + const char *alpn_string; /* ALPN supported protocols */ + const char *dhm_file; /* the file with the DH parameters */ + int extended_ms; /* allow negotiation of extended MS? */ + int etm; /* allow negotiation of encrypt-then-MAC? */ + int transport; /* TLS or DTLS? */ + int cookies; /* Use cookies for DTLS? -1 to break them */ + int anti_replay; /* Use anti-replay for DTLS? -1 for default */ + uint32_t hs_to_min; /* Initial value of DTLS handshake timer */ + uint32_t hs_to_max; /* Max value of DTLS handshake timer */ + int dtls_mtu; /* UDP Maximum transport unit for DTLS */ + int dgram_packing; /* allow/forbid datagram packing */ + int badmac_limit; /* Limit of records with bad MAC */ + int eap_tls; /* derive EAP-TLS keying material? */ + int nss_keylog; /* export NSS key log material */ + const char *nss_keylog_file; /* NSS key log file */ + int cid_enabled; /* whether to use the CID extension or not */ + int cid_enabled_renego; /* whether to use the CID extension or not + * during renegotiation */ + const char *cid_val; /* the CID to use for incoming messages */ + int serialize; /* serialize/deserialize connection */ + const char *context_file; /* the file to write a serialized connection + * in the form of base64 code (serialize + * option must be set) */ + const char *cid_val_renego; /* the CID to use for incoming messages + * after renegotiation */ + int reproducible; /* make communication reproducible */ + int query_config_mode; /* whether to read config */ + int use_srtp; /* Support SRTP */ + int force_srtp_profile; /* SRTP protection profile to use or all */ + int support_mki; /* The dtls mki mki support */ +} opt; + +#include "ssl_test_common_source.c" + +/* + * Return authmode from string, or -1 on error + */ +static int get_auth_mode( const char *s ) +{ + if( strcmp( s, "none" ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ); + if( strcmp( s, "optional" ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ); + if( strcmp( s, "required" ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Used by sni_parse and psk_parse to handle coma-separated lists + */ +#define GET_ITEM( dst ) \ + do \ + { \ + (dst) = p; \ + while( *p != ',' ) \ + if( ++p > end ) \ + goto error; \ + *p++ = '\0'; \ + } while( 0 ) + +#if defined(SNI_OPTION) +typedef struct _sni_entry sni_entry; + +struct _sni_entry { + const char *name; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; + mbedtls_pk_context *key; + mbedtls_x509_crt* ca; + mbedtls_x509_crl* crl; + int authmode; + sni_entry *next; +}; + +void sni_free( sni_entry *head ) +{ + sni_entry *cur = head, *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cur->cert ); + mbedtls_free( cur->cert ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( cur->key ); + mbedtls_free( cur->key ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cur->ca ); + mbedtls_free( cur->ca ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( cur->crl ); + mbedtls_free( cur->crl ); +#endif + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free( cur ); + cur = next; + } +} + +/* + * Parse a string of sextuples name1,crt1,key1,ca1,crl1,auth1[,...] + * into a usable sni_entry list. For ca1, crl1, auth1, the special value + * '-' means unset. If ca1 is unset, then crl1 is ignored too. + * + * Modifies the input string! This is not production quality! + */ +sni_entry *sni_parse( char *sni_string ) +{ + sni_entry *cur = NULL, *new = NULL; + char *p = sni_string; + char *end = p; + char *crt_file, *key_file, *ca_file, *auth_str; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + char *crl_file; +#endif + + while( *end != '\0' ) + ++end; + *end = ','; + + while( p <= end ) + { + if( ( new = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( sni_entry ) ) ) == NULL ) + { + sni_free( cur ); + return( NULL ); + } + + GET_ITEM( new->name ); + GET_ITEM( crt_file ); + GET_ITEM( key_file ); + GET_ITEM( ca_file ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + GET_ITEM( crl_file ); +#endif + GET_ITEM( auth_str ); + + if( ( new->cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL || + ( new->key = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_context ) ) ) == NULL ) + goto error; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( new->cert ); + mbedtls_pk_init( new->key ); + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( new->cert, crt_file ) != 0 || + mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( new->key, key_file, "" ) != 0 ) + goto error; + + if( strcmp( ca_file, "-" ) != 0 ) + { + if( ( new->ca = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL ) + goto error; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( new->ca ); + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( new->ca, ca_file ) != 0 ) + goto error; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + if( strcmp( crl_file, "-" ) != 0 ) + { + if( ( new->crl = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl ) ) ) == NULL ) + goto error; + + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( new->crl ); + + if( mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( new->crl, crl_file ) != 0 ) + goto error; + } +#endif + + if( strcmp( auth_str, "-" ) != 0 ) + { + if( ( new->authmode = get_auth_mode( auth_str ) ) < 0 ) + goto error; + } + else + new->authmode = DFL_AUTH_MODE; + + new->next = cur; + cur = new; + } + + return( cur ); + +error: + sni_free( new ); + sni_free( cur ); + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * SNI callback. + */ +int sni_callback( void *p_info, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *name, size_t name_len ) +{ + const sni_entry *cur = (const sni_entry *) p_info; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( name_len == strlen( cur->name ) && + memcmp( name, cur->name, name_len ) == 0 ) + { + if( cur->ca != NULL ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain( ssl, cur->ca, cur->crl ); + + if( cur->authmode != DFL_AUTH_MODE ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( ssl, cur->authmode ); + + return( mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert( ssl, cur->cert, cur->key ) ); + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +#endif /* SNI_OPTION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + +typedef struct _psk_entry psk_entry; + +struct _psk_entry +{ + const char *name; + size_t key_len; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_id_t slot; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + psk_entry *next; +}; + +/* + * Free a list of psk_entry's + */ +int psk_free( psk_entry *head ) +{ + psk_entry *next; + + while( head != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_id_t const slot = head->slot; + + if( slot != 0 ) + { + status = psa_destroy_key( slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + next = head->next; + mbedtls_free( head ); + head = next; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse a string of pairs name1,key1[,name2,key2[,...]] + * into a usable psk_entry list. + * + * Modifies the input string! This is not production quality! + */ +psk_entry *psk_parse( char *psk_string ) +{ + psk_entry *cur = NULL, *new = NULL; + char *p = psk_string; + char *end = p; + char *key_hex; + + while( *end != '\0' ) + ++end; + *end = ','; + + while( p <= end ) + { + if( ( new = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( psk_entry ) ) ) == NULL ) + goto error; + + memset( new, 0, sizeof( psk_entry ) ); + + GET_ITEM( new->name ); + GET_ITEM( key_hex ); + + if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( new->key, MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN, + key_hex, &new->key_len ) != 0 ) + goto error; + + new->next = cur; + cur = new; + } + + return( cur ); + +error: + psk_free( new ); + psk_free( cur ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * PSK callback + */ +int psk_callback( void *p_info, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *name, size_t name_len ) +{ + psk_entry *cur = (psk_entry *) p_info; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( name_len == strlen( cur->name ) && + memcmp( name, cur->name, name_len ) == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( cur->slot != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( ssl, cur->slot ) ); + else +#endif + return( mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( ssl, cur->key, cur->key_len ) ); + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +static mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd; + +/* Interruption handler to ensure clean exit (for valgrind testing) */ +#if !defined(_WIN32) +static int received_sigterm = 0; +void term_handler( int sig ) +{ + ((void) sig); + received_sigterm = 1; + mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); /* causes mbedtls_net_accept() to abort */ + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); /* causes net_read() to abort */ +} +#endif + +/** Return true if \p ret is a status code indicating that there is an + * operation in progress on an SSL connection, and false if it indicates + * success or a fatal error. + * + * The possible operations in progress are: + * + * - A read, when the SSL input buffer does not contain a full message. + * - A write, when the SSL output buffer contains some data that has not + * been sent over the network yet. + * - An asynchronous callback that has not completed yet. */ +static int mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( int ret ) +{ + return( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< Certificate corresponding to the key */ + mbedtls_pk_context *pk; /*!< Private key */ + unsigned delay; /*!< Number of resume steps to go through */ + unsigned pk_owned : 1; /*!< Whether to free the pk object on exit */ +} ssl_async_key_slot_t; + +typedef enum { + SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_NONE = 0, /*!< Let the callbacks succeed */ + SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_START, /*!< Inject error during start */ + SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_CANCEL, /*!< Close the connection after async start */ + SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_RESUME, /*!< Inject error during resume */ +#define SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_MAX SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_RESUME +} ssl_async_inject_error_t; + +typedef struct +{ + ssl_async_key_slot_t slots[4]; /* key, key2, sni1, sni2 */ + size_t slots_used; + ssl_async_inject_error_t inject_error; + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_rng; +} ssl_async_key_context_t; + +int ssl_async_set_key( ssl_async_key_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + int pk_take_ownership, + unsigned delay ) +{ + if( ctx->slots_used >= sizeof( ctx->slots ) / sizeof( *ctx->slots ) ) + return( -1 ); + ctx->slots[ctx->slots_used].cert = cert; + ctx->slots[ctx->slots_used].pk = pk; + ctx->slots[ctx->slots_used].delay = delay; + ctx->slots[ctx->slots_used].pk_owned = pk_take_ownership; + ++ctx->slots_used; + return( 0 ); +} + +#define SSL_ASYNC_INPUT_MAX_SIZE 512 + +typedef enum +{ + ASYNC_OP_SIGN, + ASYNC_OP_DECRYPT, +} ssl_async_operation_type_t; +/* Note that the enum above and the array below need to be kept in sync! + * `ssl_async_operation_names[op]` is the name of op for each value `op` + * of type `ssl_async_operation_type_t`. */ +static const char *const ssl_async_operation_names[] = +{ + "sign", + "decrypt", +}; + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned slot; + ssl_async_operation_type_t operation_type; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + unsigned char input[SSL_ASYNC_INPUT_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t input_len; + unsigned remaining_delay; +} ssl_async_operation_context_t; + +static int ssl_async_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + ssl_async_operation_type_t op_type, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_len ) +{ + ssl_async_key_context_t *config_data = + mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( ssl->conf ); + unsigned slot; + ssl_async_operation_context_t *ctx = NULL; + const char *op_name = ssl_async_operation_names[op_type]; + + { + char dn[100]; + if( mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( dn, sizeof( dn ), &cert->subject ) > 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Async %s callback: looking for DN=%s\n", + op_name, dn ); + } + + /* Look for a private key that matches the public key in cert. + * Since this test code has the private key inside Mbed TLS, + * we call mbedtls_pk_check_pair to match a private key with the + * public key. */ + for( slot = 0; slot < config_data->slots_used; slot++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &cert->pk, + config_data->slots[slot].pk ) == 0 ) + break; + } + if( slot == config_data->slots_used ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Async %s callback: no key matches this certificate.\n", + op_name ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "Async %s callback: using key slot %u, delay=%u.\n", + op_name, slot, config_data->slots[slot].delay ); + + if( config_data->inject_error == SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_START ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Async %s callback: injected error\n", op_name ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + if( input_len > SSL_ASYNC_INPUT_MAX_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *ctx ) ); + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + ctx->slot = slot; + ctx->operation_type = op_type; + ctx->md_alg = md_alg; + memcpy( ctx->input, input, input_len ); + ctx->input_len = input_len; + ctx->remaining_delay = config_data->slots[slot].delay; + mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, ctx ); + + if( ctx->remaining_delay == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ); +} + +static int ssl_async_sign( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, + size_t hash_len ) +{ + return( ssl_async_start( ssl, cert, + ASYNC_OP_SIGN, md_alg, + hash, hash_len ) ); +} + +static int ssl_async_decrypt( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_len ) +{ + return( ssl_async_start( ssl, cert, + ASYNC_OP_DECRYPT, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + input, input_len ) ); +} + +static int ssl_async_resume( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *output, + size_t *output_len, + size_t output_size ) +{ + ssl_async_operation_context_t *ctx = mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( ssl ); + ssl_async_key_context_t *config_data = + mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( ssl->conf ); + ssl_async_key_slot_t *key_slot = &config_data->slots[ctx->slot]; + int ret; + const char *op_name; + + if( ctx->remaining_delay > 0 ) + { + --ctx->remaining_delay; + mbedtls_printf( "Async resume (slot %u): call %u more times.\n", + ctx->slot, ctx->remaining_delay ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + + switch( ctx->operation_type ) + { + case ASYNC_OP_DECRYPT: + ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( key_slot->pk, + ctx->input, ctx->input_len, + output, output_len, output_size, + config_data->f_rng, config_data->p_rng ); + break; + case ASYNC_OP_SIGN: + ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( key_slot->pk, + ctx->md_alg, + ctx->input, ctx->input_len, + output, output_len, + config_data->f_rng, config_data->p_rng ); + break; + default: + mbedtls_printf( "Async resume (slot %u): unknown operation type %ld. This shouldn't happen.\n", + ctx->slot, (long) ctx->operation_type ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + break; + } + + op_name = ssl_async_operation_names[ctx->operation_type]; + + if( config_data->inject_error == SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_RESUME ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Async resume callback: %s done but injected error\n", + op_name ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + mbedtls_printf( "Async resume (slot %u): %s done, status=%d.\n", + ctx->slot, op_name, ret ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); + return( ret ); +} + +static void ssl_async_cancel( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl_async_operation_context_t *ctx = mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( ssl ); + mbedtls_printf( "Async cancel callback.\n" ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +static psa_status_t psa_setup_psk_key_slot( psa_key_id_t *slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + unsigned char *psk, + size_t psk_len ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + + status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, psk, psk_len, slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + fprintf( stderr, "IMPORT\n" ); + return( status ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +int report_cid_usage( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const char *additional_description ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t peer_cid_len; + int cid_negotiated; + + if( opt.transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Check if the use of a CID has been negotiated */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated, + peer_cid, &peer_cid_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( cid_negotiated == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + if( opt.cid_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID was not offered by client.\n", + additional_description ); + } + } + else + { + size_t idx=0; + mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated.\n", + additional_description ); + mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Peer CID (length %u Bytes): ", + additional_description, + (unsigned) peer_cid_len ); + while( idx < peer_cid_len ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "%02x ", peer_cid[ idx ] ); + idx++; + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 0, len, written, frags, exchanges_left; + int query_config_ret = 0; + int version_suites[4][2]; + io_ctx_t io_ctx; + unsigned char* buf = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t alg = 0; + psa_key_id_t psk_slot = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char psk[MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; + size_t psk_len = 0; + psk_entry *psk_info = NULL; +#endif + const char *pers = "ssl_server2"; + unsigned char client_ip[16] = { 0 }; + size_t cliip_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx cookie_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_profile crt_profile_for_test = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; +#endif + rng_context_t rng; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_timing_delay_context timer; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + unsigned char renego_period[8] = { 0 }; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + uint32_t flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; + mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert; + mbedtls_pk_context pkey; + mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert2; + mbedtls_pk_context pkey2; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_id_t key_slot = 0; /* invalid key slot */ + psa_key_id_t key_slot2 = 0; /* invalid key slot */ +#endif + int key_cert_init = 0, key_cert_init2 = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + ssl_async_key_context_t ssl_async_keys; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context cache; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context ticket_ctx; +#endif +#if defined(SNI_OPTION) + sni_entry *sni_info = NULL; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve_list[CURVE_LIST_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info * curve_cur; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const char *alpn_list[ALPN_LIST_SIZE]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + unsigned char alloc_buf[MEMORY_HEAP_SIZE]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char cid_renego[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + size_t cid_len = 0; + size_t cid_renego_len = 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + unsigned char *context_buf = NULL; + size_t context_buf_len = 0; +#endif + + int i; + char *p, *q; + const int *list; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + unsigned char eap_tls_keymaterial[16]; + unsigned char eap_tls_iv[8]; + const char* eap_tls_label = "client EAP encryption"; + eap_tls_keys eap_tls_keying; +#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) + /*! master keys and master salt for SRTP generated during handshake */ + unsigned char dtls_srtp_key_material[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH]; + const char* dtls_srtp_label = "EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp"; + dtls_srtp_keys dtls_srtp_keying; + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile default_profiles[] = { + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80, + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32, + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80, + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32, + MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + size_t current_heap_memory, peak_heap_memory, heap_blocks; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + test_hooks_init( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + + /* + * Make sure memory references are valid in case we exit early. + */ + mbedtls_net_init( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_net_init( &listen_fd ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + rng_init( &rng ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert2 ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey2 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + memset( &ssl_async_keys, 0, sizeof( ssl_async_keys ) ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( &cache ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( &ticket_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + memset( (void *) alpn_list, 0, sizeof( alpn_list ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( &cookie_ctx ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_crypto_init(); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Failed to initialize PSA Crypto implementation: %d\n", + (int) status ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + mbedtls_test_enable_insecure_external_rng( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if !defined(_WIN32) + /* Abort cleanly on SIGTERM and SIGINT */ + signal( SIGTERM, term_handler ); + signal( SIGINT, term_handler ); +#endif + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = 1; + + mbedtls_printf( USAGE1 ); + mbedtls_printf( USAGE2 ); + mbedtls_printf( USAGE3 ); + mbedtls_printf( USAGE4 ); + + list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + while( *list ) + { + mbedtls_printf(" %-42s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) ); + list++; + if( !*list ) + break; + mbedtls_printf(" %s\n", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) ); + list++; + } + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + goto exit; + } + + opt.buffer_size = DFL_IO_BUF_LEN; + opt.server_addr = DFL_SERVER_ADDR; + opt.server_port = DFL_SERVER_PORT; + opt.debug_level = DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL; + opt.event = DFL_EVENT; + opt.response_size = DFL_RESPONSE_SIZE; + opt.nbio = DFL_NBIO; + opt.cid_enabled = DFL_CID_ENABLED; + opt.cid_enabled_renego = DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO; + opt.cid_val = DFL_CID_VALUE; + opt.cid_val_renego = DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO; + opt.read_timeout = DFL_READ_TIMEOUT; + opt.ca_file = DFL_CA_FILE; + opt.ca_path = DFL_CA_PATH; + opt.crt_file = DFL_CRT_FILE; + opt.key_file = DFL_KEY_FILE; + opt.key_opaque = DFL_KEY_OPAQUE; + opt.key_pwd = DFL_KEY_PWD; + opt.crt_file2 = DFL_CRT_FILE2; + opt.key_file2 = DFL_KEY_FILE2; + opt.key_pwd2 = DFL_KEY_PWD2; + opt.async_operations = DFL_ASYNC_OPERATIONS; + opt.async_private_delay1 = DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY1; + opt.async_private_delay2 = DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY2; + opt.async_private_error = DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_ERROR; + opt.psk = DFL_PSK; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + opt.psk_opaque = DFL_PSK_OPAQUE; + opt.psk_list_opaque = DFL_PSK_LIST_OPAQUE; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + opt.ca_callback = DFL_CA_CALLBACK; +#endif + opt.psk_identity = DFL_PSK_IDENTITY; + opt.psk_list = DFL_PSK_LIST; + opt.ecjpake_pw = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW; + opt.force_ciphersuite[0]= DFL_FORCE_CIPHER; + opt.version_suites = DFL_VERSION_SUITES; + opt.renegotiation = DFL_RENEGOTIATION; + opt.allow_legacy = DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY; + opt.renegotiate = DFL_RENEGOTIATE; + opt.renego_delay = DFL_RENEGO_DELAY; + opt.renego_period = DFL_RENEGO_PERIOD; + opt.exchanges = DFL_EXCHANGES; + opt.min_version = DFL_MIN_VERSION; + opt.max_version = DFL_MAX_VERSION; + opt.arc4 = DFL_ARC4; + opt.allow_sha1 = DFL_SHA1; + opt.auth_mode = DFL_AUTH_MODE; + opt.cert_req_ca_list = DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST; + opt.mfl_code = DFL_MFL_CODE; + opt.trunc_hmac = DFL_TRUNC_HMAC; + opt.tickets = DFL_TICKETS; + opt.ticket_timeout = DFL_TICKET_TIMEOUT; + opt.cache_max = DFL_CACHE_MAX; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + opt.cache_timeout = DFL_CACHE_TIMEOUT; +#endif + opt.sni = DFL_SNI; + opt.alpn_string = DFL_ALPN_STRING; + opt.curves = DFL_CURVES; + opt.dhm_file = DFL_DHM_FILE; + opt.transport = DFL_TRANSPORT; + opt.cookies = DFL_COOKIES; + opt.anti_replay = DFL_ANTI_REPLAY; + opt.hs_to_min = DFL_HS_TO_MIN; + opt.hs_to_max = DFL_HS_TO_MAX; + opt.dtls_mtu = DFL_DTLS_MTU; + opt.dgram_packing = DFL_DGRAM_PACKING; + opt.badmac_limit = DFL_BADMAC_LIMIT; + opt.extended_ms = DFL_EXTENDED_MS; + opt.etm = DFL_ETM; + opt.serialize = DFL_SERIALIZE; + opt.context_file = DFL_CONTEXT_FILE; + opt.eap_tls = DFL_EAP_TLS; + opt.reproducible = DFL_REPRODUCIBLE; + opt.nss_keylog = DFL_NSS_KEYLOG; + opt.nss_keylog_file = DFL_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE; + opt.query_config_mode = DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE; + opt.use_srtp = DFL_USE_SRTP; + opt.force_srtp_profile = DFL_SRTP_FORCE_PROFILE; + opt.support_mki = DFL_SRTP_SUPPORT_MKI; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "server_port" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_port = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "server_addr" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_addr = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "dtls" ) == 0 ) + { + int t = atoi( q ); + if( t == 0 ) + opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM; + else if( t == 1 ) + opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "debug_level" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.debug_level = atoi( q ); + if( opt.debug_level < 0 || opt.debug_level > 65535 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "nbio" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.nbio = atoi( q ); + if( opt.nbio < 0 || opt.nbio > 2 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "event" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.event = atoi( q ); + if( opt.event < 0 || opt.event > 2 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "read_timeout" ) == 0 ) + opt.read_timeout = atoi( q ); + else if( strcmp( p, "buffer_size" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.buffer_size = atoi( q ); + if( opt.buffer_size < 1 || opt.buffer_size > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "response_size" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.response_size = atoi( q ); + if( opt.response_size < 0 || opt.response_size > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN ) + goto usage; + if( opt.buffer_size < opt.response_size ) + opt.buffer_size = opt.response_size; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "ca_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.ca_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "ca_path" ) == 0 ) + opt.ca_path = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "crt_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.crt_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "key_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "key_pwd" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_pwd = q; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + else if( strcmp( p, "key_opaque" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_opaque = atoi( q ); +#endif + else if( strcmp( p, "crt_file2" ) == 0 ) + opt.crt_file2 = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "key_file2" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_file2 = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "key_pwd2" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_pwd2 = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "dhm_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.dhm_file = q; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + else if( strcmp( p, "async_operations" ) == 0 ) + opt.async_operations = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "async_private_delay1" ) == 0 ) + opt.async_private_delay1 = atoi( q ); + else if( strcmp( p, "async_private_delay2" ) == 0 ) + opt.async_private_delay2 = atoi( q ); + else if( strcmp( p, "async_private_error" ) == 0 ) + { + int n = atoi( q ); + if( n < -SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_MAX || + n > SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_MAX ) + { + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + opt.async_private_error = n; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + else if( strcmp( p, "cid" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cid_enabled = atoi( q ); + if( opt.cid_enabled != 0 && opt.cid_enabled != 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "cid_renego" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cid_enabled_renego = atoi( q ); + if( opt.cid_enabled_renego != 0 && opt.cid_enabled_renego != 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cid_val = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val_renego" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cid_val_renego = q; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + else if( strcmp( p, "psk" ) == 0 ) + opt.psk = q; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + else if( strcmp( p, "psk_opaque" ) == 0 ) + opt.psk_opaque = atoi( q ); + else if( strcmp( p, "psk_list_opaque" ) == 0 ) + opt.psk_list_opaque = atoi( q ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + else if( strcmp( p, "ca_callback" ) == 0) + opt.ca_callback = atoi( q ); +#endif + else if( strcmp( p, "psk_identity" ) == 0 ) + opt.psk_identity = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "psk_list" ) == 0 ) + opt.psk_list = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "ecjpake_pw" ) == 0 ) + opt.ecjpake_pw = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "force_ciphersuite" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.force_ciphersuite[0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( q ); + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] == 0 ) + { + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + opt.force_ciphersuite[1] = 0; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "curves" ) == 0 ) + opt.curves = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "version_suites" ) == 0 ) + opt.version_suites = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiation" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.renegotiation = (atoi( q )) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED : + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "allow_legacy" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case -1: + opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE; + break; + case 0: + opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION; + break; + case 1: + opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION; + break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiate" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.renegotiate = atoi( q ); + if( opt.renegotiate < 0 || opt.renegotiate > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "renego_delay" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.renego_delay = atoi( q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "renego_period" ) == 0 ) + { +#if defined(_MSC_VER) + opt.renego_period = _strtoui64( q, NULL, 10 ); +#else + if( sscanf( q, "%" SCNu64, &opt.renego_period ) != 1 ) + goto usage; +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ + if( opt.renego_period < 2 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "exchanges" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.exchanges = atoi( q ); + if( opt.exchanges < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "min_version" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 || + strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls12" ) == 0 || + strcmp( q, "dtls12" ) == 0 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "max_version" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 ) + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 ) + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 || + strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 ) + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + else if( strcmp( q, "tls12" ) == 0 || + strcmp( q, "dtls12" ) == 0 ) + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "arc4" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; break; + case 1: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "allow_sha1" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.allow_sha1 = 0; break; + case 1: opt.allow_sha1 = 1; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "force_version" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "tls12" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM; + } + else if( strcmp( q, "dtls12" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM; + } + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "auth_mode" ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( opt.auth_mode = get_auth_mode( q ) ) < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "cert_req_ca_list" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cert_req_ca_list = atoi( q ); + if( opt.cert_req_ca_list < 0 || opt.cert_req_ca_list > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "max_frag_len" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "512" ) == 0 ) + opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512; + else if( strcmp( q, "1024" ) == 0 ) + opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024; + else if( strcmp( q, "2048" ) == 0 ) + opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048; + else if( strcmp( q, "4096" ) == 0 ) + opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "alpn" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.alpn_string = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "trunc_hmac" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED; break; + case 1: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "extended_ms" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: + opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED; + break; + case 1: + opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; + break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "etm" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; break; + case 1: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "tickets" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.tickets = atoi( q ); + if( opt.tickets < 0 || opt.tickets > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "ticket_timeout" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.ticket_timeout = atoi( q ); + if( opt.ticket_timeout < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "cache_max" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cache_max = atoi( q ); + if( opt.cache_max < 0 ) + goto usage; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + else if( strcmp( p, "cache_timeout" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cache_timeout = atoi( q ); + if( opt.cache_timeout < 0 ) + goto usage; + } +#endif + else if( strcmp( p, "cookies" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.cookies = atoi( q ); + if( opt.cookies < -1 || opt.cookies > 1) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "anti_replay" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.anti_replay = atoi( q ); + if( opt.anti_replay < 0 || opt.anti_replay > 1) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "badmac_limit" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.badmac_limit = atoi( q ); + if( opt.badmac_limit < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "hs_timeout" ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( p = strchr( q, '-' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *p++ = '\0'; + opt.hs_to_min = atoi( q ); + opt.hs_to_max = atoi( p ); + if( opt.hs_to_min == 0 || opt.hs_to_max < opt.hs_to_min ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "mtu" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.dtls_mtu = atoi( q ); + if( opt.dtls_mtu < 0 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "dgram_packing" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.dgram_packing = atoi( q ); + if( opt.dgram_packing != 0 && + opt.dgram_packing != 1 ) + { + goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "sni" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.sni = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "query_config" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.query_config_mode = 1; + query_config_ret = query_config( q ); + goto exit; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "serialize") == 0 ) + { + opt.serialize = atoi( q ); + if( opt.serialize < 0 || opt.serialize > 2) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "context_file") == 0 ) + { + opt.context_file = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "eap_tls" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.eap_tls = atoi( q ); + if( opt.eap_tls < 0 || opt.eap_tls > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "reproducible" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.reproducible = 1; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "nss_keylog" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.nss_keylog = atoi( q ); + if( opt.nss_keylog < 0 || opt.nss_keylog > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "nss_keylog_file" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.nss_keylog_file = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "use_srtp" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.use_srtp = atoi ( q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "srtp_force_profile" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.force_srtp_profile = atoi( q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "support_mki" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.support_mki = atoi( q ); + } + else + goto usage; + } + + if( opt.nss_keylog != 0 && opt.eap_tls != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Error: eap_tls and nss_keylog options cannot be used together.\n" ); + goto usage; + } + + /* Event-driven IO is incompatible with the above custom + * receive and send functions, as the polling builds on + * refers to the underlying net_context. */ + if( opt.event == 1 && opt.nbio != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Warning: event-driven IO mandates nbio=1 - overwrite\n" ); + opt.nbio = 1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( opt.debug_level ); +#endif + + /* buf will alternatively contain the input read from the client and the + * response that's about to be sent, plus a null byte in each case. */ + size_t buf_content_size = opt.buffer_size; + /* The default response contains the ciphersuite name. Leave enough + * room for that plus some margin. */ + if( buf_content_size < strlen( HTTP_RESPONSE ) + 80 ) + { + buf_content_size = strlen( HTTP_RESPONSE ) + 80; + } + if( opt.response_size != DFL_RESPONSE_SIZE && + buf_content_size < (size_t) opt.response_size ) + { + buf_content_size = opt.response_size; + } + buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buf_content_size + 1 ); + if( buf == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Could not allocate %lu bytes\n", + (unsigned long) buf_content_size + 1 ); + ret = 3; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 ) + { + if( strlen( opt.psk ) == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "psk_opaque set but no psk to be imported specified.\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + } + + if( opt.psk_list_opaque != 0 ) + { + if( opt.psk_list == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "psk_slot set but no psk to be imported specified.\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] > 0 ) + { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] ); + + if( opt.max_version != -1 && + ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver > opt.max_version ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + if( opt.min_version != -1 && + ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver < opt.min_version ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + + /* If we select a version that's not supported by + * this suite, then there will be no common ciphersuite... */ + if( opt.max_version == -1 || + opt.max_version > ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver ) + { + opt.max_version = ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver; + } + if( opt.min_version < ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver ) + { + opt.min_version = ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver; + /* DTLS starts with TLS 1.1 */ + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + opt.min_version < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; + } + + /* Enable RC4 if needed and not explicitly disabled */ + if( ciphersuite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) + { + if( opt.arc4 == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED ) + { + mbedtls_printf("forced RC4 ciphersuite with RC4 disabled\n"); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + + opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 || opt.psk_list_opaque != 0 ) + { + /* Determine KDF algorithm the opaque PSK will be used in. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } + + if( opt.version_suites != NULL ) + { + const char *name[4] = { 0 }; + + /* Parse 4-element coma-separated list */ + for( i = 0, p = (char *) opt.version_suites; + i < 4 && *p != '\0'; + i++ ) + { + name[i] = p; + + /* Terminate the current string and move on to next one */ + while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' ) + p++; + if( *p == ',' ) + *p++ = '\0'; + } + + if( i != 4 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "too few values for version_suites\n" ); + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + memset( version_suites, 0, sizeof( version_suites ) ); + + /* Get the suites identifiers from their name */ + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) + { + version_suites[i][0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( name[i] ); + + if( version_suites[i][0] == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "unknown ciphersuite: '%s'\n", name[i] ); + ret = 2; + goto usage; + } + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( cid, sizeof( cid ), + opt.cid_val, &cid_len ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid hex\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + /* Keep CID settings for renegotiation unless + * specified otherwise. */ + if( opt.cid_enabled_renego == DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO ) + opt.cid_enabled_renego = opt.cid_enabled; + if( opt.cid_val_renego == DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO ) + opt.cid_val_renego = opt.cid_val; + + if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( cid_renego, sizeof( cid_renego ), + opt.cid_val_renego, &cid_renego_len ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid hex\n" ); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* + * Unhexify the pre-shared key and parse the list if any given + */ + if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( psk, sizeof( psk ), + opt.psk, &psk_len ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "pre-shared key not valid hex\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( opt.psk_list != NULL ) + { + if( ( psk_info = psk_parse( opt.psk_list ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "psk_list invalid" ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( opt.curves != NULL ) + { + p = (char *) opt.curves; + i = 0; + + if( strcmp( p, "none" ) == 0 ) + { + curve_list[0] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "default" ) != 0 ) + { + /* Leave room for a final NULL in curve list */ + while( i < CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' ) + { + q = p; + + /* Terminate the current string */ + while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' ) + p++; + if( *p == ',' ) + *p++ = '\0'; + + if( ( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( q ) ) != NULL ) + { + curve_list[i++] = curve_cur->grp_id; + } + else + { + mbedtls_printf( "unknown curve %s\n", q ); + mbedtls_printf( "supported curves: " ); + for( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_cur->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_cur++ ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "%s ", curve_cur->name ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf("Number of curves: %d\n", i ); + + if( i == CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "curves list too long, maximum %d", + CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 ); + goto exit; + } + + curve_list[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if( opt.alpn_string != NULL ) + { + p = (char *) opt.alpn_string; + i = 0; + + /* Leave room for a final NULL in alpn_list */ + while( i < ALPN_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' ) + { + alpn_list[i++] = p; + + /* Terminate the current string and move on to next one */ + while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' ) + p++; + if( *p == ',' ) + *p++ = '\0'; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * 0. Initialize the RNG and the session data + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = rng_seed( &rng, opt.reproducible, pers ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /* + * 1.1. Load the trusted CA + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the CA root certificate ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) == 0 || + strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) == 0 ) + { + ret = 0; + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strlen( opt.ca_path ) ) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( &cacert, opt.ca_path ); + else if( strlen( opt.ca_file ) ) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &cacert, opt.ca_file ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas[i] != NULL; i++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas[i], + mbedtls_test_cas_len[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + break; + } + if( ret == 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas_der[i] != NULL; i++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( &cacert, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_der[i], + mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + break; + } + } +#else + { + ret = 1; + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok (%d skipped)\n", ret ); + + /* + * 1.2. Load own certificate and private key + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the server cert. and key..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strlen( opt.crt_file ) && strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) != 0 ) + { + key_cert_init++; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &srvcert, opt.crt_file ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + if( strlen( opt.key_file ) && strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) != 0 ) + { + key_cert_init++; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey, opt.key_file, + opt.key_pwd ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + if( key_cert_init == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! crt_file without key_file or vice-versa\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( strlen( opt.crt_file2 ) && strcmp( opt.crt_file2, "none" ) != 0 ) + { + key_cert_init2++; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &srvcert2, opt.crt_file2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(2) returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + if( strlen( opt.key_file2 ) && strcmp( opt.key_file2, "none" ) != 0 ) + { + key_cert_init2++; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey2, opt.key_file2, + opt.key_pwd2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(2) returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + if( key_cert_init2 == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! crt_file2 without key_file2 or vice-versa\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } +#endif + if( key_cert_init == 0 && + strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) != 0 && + strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) != 0 && + key_cert_init2 == 0 && + strcmp( opt.crt_file2, "none" ) != 0 && + strcmp( opt.key_file2, "none" ) != 0 ) + { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + mbedtls_printf( "Not certificated or key provided, and \nMBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined!\n" ); + goto exit; +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + key_cert_init = 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &srvcert2, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! x509_crt_parse2 returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey2, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! pk_parse_key2 returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + key_cert_init2 = 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( opt.key_opaque != 0 ) + { + if ( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pkey ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &pkey, &key_slot, + PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! " + "mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if ( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pkey2 ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &pkey2, &key_slot2, + PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! " + "mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ + + mbedtls_printf( " ok (key types: %s - %s)\n", mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pkey ), mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pkey2 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( opt.dhm_file != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading DHM parameters..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( &dhm, opt.dhm_file ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile returned -0x%04X\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(SNI_OPTION) + if( opt.sni != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up SNI information..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( sni_info = sni_parse( opt.sni ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } +#endif /* SNI_OPTION */ + + /* + * 2. Setup the listening TCP socket + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Bind on %s://%s:%s/ ...", + opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ? "tcp" : "udp", + opt.server_addr ? opt.server_addr : "*", + opt.server_port ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_bind( &listen_fd, opt.server_addr, opt.server_port, + opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ? + MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP : MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_bind returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 3. Setup stuff + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + opt.transport, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /* The default algorithms profile disables SHA-1, but our tests still + rely on it heavily. Hence we allow it here. A real-world server + should use the default profile unless there is a good reason not to. */ + if( opt.allow_sha1 > 0 ) + { + crt_profile_for_test.allowed_mds |= MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( &conf, &crt_profile_for_test ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( &conf, ssl_sig_hashes_for_test ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + if( opt.auth_mode != DFL_AUTH_MODE ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, opt.auth_mode ); + + if( opt.cert_req_ca_list != DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( &conf, opt.cert_req_ca_list ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( opt.hs_to_min != DFL_HS_TO_MIN || opt.hs_to_max != DFL_HS_TO_MAX ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( &conf, opt.hs_to_min, opt.hs_to_max ); + + if( opt.dgram_packing != DFL_DGRAM_PACKING ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( &ssl, opt.dgram_packing ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( &conf, opt.mfl_code ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 || opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 ) + { + if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 && + opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 && + cid_len != cid_renego_len ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "CID length must not change during renegotiation\n" ); + goto usage; + } + + if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 ) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( &conf, cid_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ); + else + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( &conf, cid_renego_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len returned -%#04x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile forced_profile[] = { opt.force_srtp_profile, MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET }; + if( opt.use_srtp == 1 ) + { + if( opt.force_srtp_profile != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles( &conf, forced_profile ); + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles( &conf, default_profiles ); + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( &conf, + opt.support_mki ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED : + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED ); + + } + else if( opt.force_srtp_profile != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! must enable use_srtp to force srtp profile\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + if( opt.trunc_hmac != DFL_TRUNC_HMAC ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( &conf, opt.trunc_hmac ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if( opt.extended_ms != DFL_EXTENDED_MS ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( &conf, opt.extended_ms ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( opt.etm != DFL_ETM ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( &conf, opt.etm ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + if( opt.eap_tls != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( &conf, eap_tls_key_derivation, + &eap_tls_keying ); + } + else if( opt.nss_keylog != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( &conf, + nss_keylog_export, + NULL ); + } +#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) + else if( opt.use_srtp != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( &conf, dtls_srtp_key_derivation, + &dtls_srtp_keying ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if( opt.alpn_string != NULL ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( &conf, alpn_list ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } +#endif + + if (opt.reproducible) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) + mbedtls_platform_set_time( dummy_constant_time ); +#else + fprintf( stderr, "Warning: reproducible option used without constant time\n" ); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + } + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, rng_get, &rng ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + if( opt.cache_max != -1 ) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries( &cache, opt.cache_max ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( opt.cache_timeout != -1 ) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout( &cache, opt.cache_timeout ); +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( &conf, &cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( opt.tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( &ticket_ctx, + rng_get, &rng, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, + opt.ticket_timeout ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( &conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse, + &ticket_ctx ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + if( opt.cookies > 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( &cookie_ctx, + rng_get, &rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( &conf, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check, + &cookie_ctx ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + if( opt.cookies == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( &conf, NULL, NULL, NULL ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + { + ; /* Nothing to do */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( opt.anti_replay != DFL_ANTI_REPLAY ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( &conf, opt.anti_replay ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + if( opt.badmac_limit != DFL_BADMAC_LIMIT ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( &conf, opt.badmac_limit ); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( &conf, opt.force_ciphersuite ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + if( opt.arc4 != DFL_ARC4 ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( &conf, opt.arc4 ); +#endif + + if( opt.version_suites != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( &conf, version_suites[0], + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( &conf, version_suites[1], + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( &conf, version_suites[2], + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( &conf, version_suites[3], + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ); + } + + if( opt.allow_legacy != DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( &conf, opt.allow_legacy ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( &conf, opt.renegotiation ); + + if( opt.renego_delay != DFL_RENEGO_DELAY ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( &conf, opt.renego_delay ); + + if( opt.renego_period != DFL_RENEGO_PERIOD ) + { + PUT_UINT64_BE( renego_period, opt.renego_period, 0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period( &conf, renego_period ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) != 0 && + strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( opt.ca_callback != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( &conf, ca_callback, &cacert); + else +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL ); + } + if( key_cert_init ) + { + mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &pkey; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( opt.async_private_delay1 >= 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_async_set_key( &ssl_async_keys, &srvcert, pk, 0, + opt.async_private_delay1 ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Test error: ssl_async_set_key failed (%d)\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + pk = NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, pk ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + if( key_cert_init2 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &pkey2; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( opt.async_private_delay2 >= 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_async_set_key( &ssl_async_keys, &srvcert2, pk, 0, + opt.async_private_delay2 ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Test error: ssl_async_set_key failed (%d)\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + pk = NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert2, pk ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( opt.async_operations[0] != '-' ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *sign = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *decrypt = NULL; + const char *r; + for( r = opt.async_operations; *r; r++ ) + { + switch( *r ) + { + case 'd': + decrypt = ssl_async_decrypt; + break; + case 's': + sign = ssl_async_sign; + break; + } + } + ssl_async_keys.inject_error = ( opt.async_private_error < 0 ? + - opt.async_private_error : + opt.async_private_error ); + ssl_async_keys.f_rng = rng_get; + ssl_async_keys.p_rng = &rng; + mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( &conf, + sign, + decrypt, + ssl_async_resume, + ssl_async_cancel, + &ssl_async_keys ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(SNI_OPTION) + if( opt.sni != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni( &conf, sni_callback, sni_info ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( opt.async_private_delay2 >= 0 ) + { + sni_entry *cur; + for( cur = sni_info; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + ret = ssl_async_set_key( &ssl_async_keys, + cur->cert, cur->key, 1, + opt.async_private_delay2 ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Test error: ssl_async_set_key failed (%d)\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + cur->key = NULL; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( opt.curves != NULL && + strcmp( opt.curves, "default" ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( &conf, curve_list ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + + if( strlen( opt.psk ) != 0 && strlen( opt.psk_identity ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 ) + { + /* The algorithm has already been determined earlier. */ + status = psa_setup_psk_key_slot( &psk_slot, alg, psk, psk_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + fprintf( stderr, "SETUP FAIL\n" ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( &conf, psk_slot, + (const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity, + strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( psk_len > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf, psk, psk_len, + (const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity, + strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk returned -0x%04X\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + } + + if( opt.psk_list != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( opt.psk_list_opaque != 0 ) + { + psk_entry *cur_psk; + for( cur_psk = psk_info; cur_psk != NULL; cur_psk = cur_psk->next ) + { + + status = psa_setup_psk_key_slot( &cur_psk->slot, alg, + cur_psk->key, + cur_psk->key_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( &conf, psk_callback, psk_info ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + /* + * Use different group than default DHM group + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( opt.dhm_file != NULL ) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( &conf, &dhm ); +#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param returned -0x%04X\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } +#endif + + if( opt.min_version != DFL_MIN_VERSION ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, opt.min_version ); + + if( opt.max_version != DFL_MIN_VERSION ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, opt.max_version ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + io_ctx.ssl = &ssl; + io_ctx.net = &client_fd; + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &io_ctx, send_cb, recv_cb, + opt.nbio == 0 ? recv_timeout_cb : NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( &ssl, opt.cid_enabled, + cid, cid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( opt.dtls_mtu != DFL_DTLS_MTU ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( &ssl, opt.dtls_mtu ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer, mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); +#endif + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + +reset: +#if !defined(_WIN32) + if( received_sigterm ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " interrupted by SIGTERM (not in net_accept())\n" ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT ) + ret = 0; + + goto exit; + } +#endif + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! Client initiated reconnection from same port\n" ); + goto handshake; + } + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf("Last error was: %d - %s\n\n", ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ); + + /* + * 3. Wait until a client connects + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Waiting for a remote connection ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_accept( &listen_fd, &client_fd, + client_ip, sizeof( client_ip ), &cliip_len ) ) != 0 ) + { +#if !defined(_WIN32) + if( received_sigterm ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " interrupted by SIGTERM (in net_accept())\n" ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ) + ret = 0; + + goto exit; + } +#endif + + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_accept returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( opt.nbio > 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( &client_fd ); + else + ret = mbedtls_net_set_block( &client_fd ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( &conf, opt.read_timeout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( &ssl, + client_ip, cliip_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( opt.ecjpake_pw != DFL_ECJPAKE_PW ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( &ssl, + (const unsigned char *) opt.ecjpake_pw, + strlen( opt.ecjpake_pw ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 4. Handshake + */ +handshake: + mbedtls_printf( " . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl_async_keys.inject_error == SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_CANCEL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " cancelling on injected error\n" ); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + if( ! mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) ) + break; + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + ret = idle( &client_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + ret = idle( &client_fd, ret ); +#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + goto reset; + } + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " hello verification requested\n" ); + ret = 0; + goto reset; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ) + { + char vrfy_buf[512]; + flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( &ssl ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ), " ! ", flags ); + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( opt.async_private_error < 0 ) + /* Injected error only the first time round, to test reset */ + ssl_async_keys.inject_error = SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_NONE; +#endif + goto reset; + } + else /* ret == 0 */ + { + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n [ Protocol is %s ]\n [ Ciphersuite is %s ]\n", + mbedtls_ssl_get_version( &ssl ), mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( &ssl ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( &ssl ) ) >= 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is %d ]\n", ret ); + else + mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is unknown (compression) ]\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + mbedtls_printf( " [ Maximum input fragment length is %u ]\n", + (unsigned int) mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( &ssl ) ); + mbedtls_printf( " [ Maximum output fragment length is %u ]\n", + (unsigned int) mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( &ssl ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if( opt.alpn_string != NULL ) + { + const char *alp = mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( &ssl ); + mbedtls_printf( " [ Application Layer Protocol is %s ]\n", + alp ? alp : "(none)" ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /* + * 5. Verify the client certificate + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Verifying peer X.509 certificate..." ); + + if( ( flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + char vrfy_buf[512]; + + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ), " ! ", flags ); + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf ); + } + else + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( &ssl ) != NULL ) + { + char crt_buf[512]; + + mbedtls_printf( " . Peer certificate information ...\n" ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_info( crt_buf, sizeof( crt_buf ), " ", + mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( &ssl ) ); + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", crt_buf ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + if( opt.eap_tls != 0 ) + { + size_t j = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( eap_tls_keying.tls_prf_type, + eap_tls_keying.master_secret, + sizeof( eap_tls_keying.master_secret ), + eap_tls_label, + eap_tls_keying.randbytes, + sizeof( eap_tls_keying.randbytes ), + eap_tls_keymaterial, + sizeof( eap_tls_keymaterial ) ) ) + != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto reset; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " EAP-TLS key material is:" ); + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( eap_tls_keymaterial ); j++ ) + { + if( j % 8 == 0 ) + mbedtls_printf("\n "); + mbedtls_printf("%02x ", eap_tls_keymaterial[j] ); + } + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( eap_tls_keying.tls_prf_type, NULL, 0, + eap_tls_label, + eap_tls_keying.randbytes, + sizeof( eap_tls_keying.randbytes ), + eap_tls_iv, + sizeof( eap_tls_iv ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto reset; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " EAP-TLS IV is:" ); + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( eap_tls_iv ); j++ ) + { + if( j % 8 == 0 ) + mbedtls_printf("\n "); + mbedtls_printf("%02x ", eap_tls_iv[j] ); + } + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + +#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) + else if( opt.use_srtp != 0 ) + { + size_t j = 0; + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info dtls_srtp_negotiation_result; + mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( &ssl, &dtls_srtp_negotiation_result ); + + if( dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile + == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Unable to negotiate " + "the use of DTLS-SRTP\n" ); + } + else + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( dtls_srtp_keying.tls_prf_type, + dtls_srtp_keying.master_secret, + sizeof( dtls_srtp_keying.master_secret ), + dtls_srtp_label, + dtls_srtp_keying.randbytes, + sizeof( dtls_srtp_keying.randbytes ), + dtls_srtp_key_material, + sizeof( dtls_srtp_key_material ) ) ) + != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " DTLS-SRTP key material is:" ); + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( dtls_srtp_key_material ); j++ ) + { + if( j % 8 == 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n " ); + mbedtls_printf( "%02x ", dtls_srtp_key_material[j] ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + /* produce a less readable output used to perform automatic checks + * - compare client and server output + * - interop test with openssl which client produces this kind of output + */ + mbedtls_printf( " Keying material: " ); + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( dtls_srtp_key_material ); j++ ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "%02X", dtls_srtp_key_material[j] ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + if ( dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.mki_len > 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " DTLS-SRTP mki value: " ); + for( j = 0; j < dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.mki_len; j++ ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "%02X", dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.mki_value[j] ); + } + } + else + { + mbedtls_printf( " DTLS-SRTP no mki value negotiated" ); + } + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ret = report_cid_usage( &ssl, "initial handshake" ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( &ssl, opt.cid_enabled_renego, + cid_renego, cid_renego_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n", + ret ); + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( ¤t_heap_memory, &heap_blocks ); + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get( &peak_heap_memory, &heap_blocks ); + mbedtls_printf( "Heap memory usage after handshake: %lu bytes. Peak memory usage was %lu\n", + (unsigned long) current_heap_memory, (unsigned long) peak_heap_memory ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + + if( opt.exchanges == 0 ) + goto close_notify; + + exchanges_left = opt.exchanges; +data_exchange: + /* + * 6. Read the HTTP Request + */ + mbedtls_printf( " < Read from client:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + /* + * TLS and DTLS need different reading styles (stream vs datagram) + */ + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) + { + do + { + int terminated = 0; + len = opt.buffer_size; + memset( buf, 0, opt.buffer_size ); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + + if( mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) ) + { + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &client_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &client_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + + continue; + } + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" ); + goto close_notify; + + case 0: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET: + mbedtls_printf( " connection was reset by peer\n" ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET; + goto reset; + + default: + mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto reset; + } + } + + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( &ssl ) == 0 ) + { + len = ret; + buf[len] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s\n", len, (char *) buf ); + + /* End of message should be detected according to the syntax of the + * application protocol (eg HTTP), just use a dummy test here. */ + if( buf[len - 1] == '\n' ) + terminated = 1; + } + else + { + int extra_len, ori_len; + unsigned char *larger_buf; + + ori_len = ret; + extra_len = (int) mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( &ssl ); + + larger_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ori_len + extra_len + 1 ); + if( larger_buf == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! memory allocation failed\n" ); + ret = 1; + goto reset; + } + + memset( larger_buf, 0, ori_len + extra_len ); + memcpy( larger_buf, buf, ori_len ); + + /* This read should never fail and get the whole cached data */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, larger_buf + ori_len, extra_len ); + if( ret != extra_len || + mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( &ssl ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! mbedtls_ssl_read failed on cached data\n" ); + ret = 1; + goto reset; + } + + larger_buf[ori_len + extra_len] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read (%d + %d)\n\n%s\n", + ori_len + extra_len, ori_len, extra_len, + (char *) larger_buf ); + + /* End of message should be detected according to the syntax of the + * application protocol (eg HTTP), just use a dummy test here. */ + if( larger_buf[ori_len + extra_len - 1] == '\n' ) + terminated = 1; + + mbedtls_free( larger_buf ); + } + + if( terminated ) + { + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + while( 1 ); + } + else /* Not stream, so datagram */ + { + len = opt.buffer_size; + memset( buf, 0, opt.buffer_size ); + + do + { + /* Without the call to `mbedtls_ssl_check_pending`, it might + * happen that the client sends application data in the same + * datagram as the Finished message concluding the handshake. + * In this case, the application data would be ready to be + * processed while the underlying transport wouldn't signal + * any further incoming data. + * + * See the test 'Event-driven I/O: session-id resume, UDP packing' + * in tests/ssl-opt.sh. + */ + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( &ssl ) == 0 && + opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &client_fd, &timer, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#else + idle( &client_fd, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#endif + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len ); + + /* Note that even if `mbedtls_ssl_check_pending` returns true, + * it can happen that the subsequent call to `mbedtls_ssl_read` + * returns `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ`, because the pending messages + * might be discarded (e.g. because they are retransmissions). */ + } + while( mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) ); + + if( ret <= 0 ) + { + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" ); + ret = 0; + goto close_notify; + + default: + mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto reset; + } + } + + len = ret; + buf[len] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf ); + ret = 0; + } + + /* + * 7a. Request renegotiation while client is waiting for input from us. + * (only on the first exchange, to be able to test retransmission) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( opt.renegotiate && exchanges_left == opt.exchanges ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Requestion renegotiation..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ! mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto reset; + } + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &client_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &client_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ret = report_cid_usage( &ssl, "after renegotiation" ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * 7. Write the 200 Response + */ + mbedtls_printf( " > Write to client:" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + /* If the format of the response changes, make sure there is enough + * room in buf (buf_content_size calculation above). */ + len = sprintf( (char *) buf, HTTP_RESPONSE, + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( &ssl ) ); + + /* Add padding to the response to reach opt.response_size in length */ + if( opt.response_size != DFL_RESPONSE_SIZE && + len < opt.response_size ) + { + memset( buf + len, 'B', opt.response_size - len ); + len += opt.response_size - len; + } + + /* Truncate if response size is smaller than the "natural" size */ + if( opt.response_size != DFL_RESPONSE_SIZE && + len > opt.response_size ) + { + len = opt.response_size; + + /* Still end with \r\n unless that's really not possible */ + if( len >= 2 ) buf[len - 2] = '\r'; + if( len >= 1 ) buf[len - 1] = '\n'; + } + + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) + { + for( written = 0, frags = 0; written < len; written += ret, frags++ ) + { + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf + written, len - written ) ) + <= 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! peer closed the connection\n\n" ); + goto reset; + } + + if( ! mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto reset; + } + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &client_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &client_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + } + } + } + else /* Not stream, so datagram */ + { + while( 1 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf, len ); + + if( ! mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) ) + break; + + /* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */ + if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + idle( &client_fd, &timer, ret ); +#else + idle( &client_fd, ret ); +#endif + } + } + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto reset; + } + + frags = 1; + written = ret; + } + + buf[written] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes written in %d fragments\n\n%s\n", written, frags, (char *) buf ); + ret = 0; + + /* + * 7b. Simulate serialize/deserialize and go back to data exchange + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + if( opt.serialize != 0 ) + { + size_t buf_len; + + mbedtls_printf( " . Serializing live connection..." ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( &ssl, NULL, 0, &buf_len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned " + "-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + + goto exit; + } + + if( ( context_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buf_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Couldn't allocate buffer for " + "serialized context" ); + + goto exit; + } + context_buf_len = buf_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( &ssl, context_buf, + buf_len, &buf_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned " + "-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* Save serialized context to the 'opt.context_file' as a base64 code */ + if( 0 < strlen( opt.context_file ) ) + { + FILE *b64_file; + uint8_t *b64_buf; + size_t b64_len; + + mbedtls_printf( " . Save serialized context to a file... " ); + + mbedtls_base64_encode( NULL, 0, &b64_len, context_buf, buf_len ); + + if( ( b64_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, b64_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! Couldn't allocate buffer for " + "the base64 code\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_encode( b64_buf, b64_len, &b64_len, + context_buf, buf_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_base64_encode returned " + "-0x%x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + mbedtls_free( b64_buf ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( b64_file = fopen( opt.context_file, "w" ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! Cannot open '%s' for writing.\n", + opt.context_file ); + mbedtls_free( b64_buf ); + goto exit; + } + + if( b64_len != fwrite( b64_buf, 1, b64_len, b64_file ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! fwrite(%ld bytes) failed\n", + (long) b64_len ); + mbedtls_free( b64_buf ); + fclose( b64_file ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_free( b64_buf ); + fclose( b64_file ); + + mbedtls_printf( "ok\n" ); + } + + /* + * This simulates a workflow where you have a long-lived server + * instance, potentially with a pool of ssl_context objects, and you + * just want to re-use one while the connection is inactive: in that + * case you can just reset() it, and then it's ready to receive + * serialized data from another connection (or the same here). + */ + if( opt.serialize == 1 ) + { + /* nothing to do here, done by context_save() already */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Context has been reset... ok\n" ); + } + + /* + * This simulates a workflow where you have one server instance per + * connection, and want to release it entire when the connection is + * inactive, and spawn it again when needed again - this would happen + * between ssl_free() and ssl_init() below, together with any other + * teardown/startup code needed - for example, preparing the + * ssl_config again (see section 3 "setup stuff" in this file). + */ + if( opt.serialize == 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Freeing and reinitializing context..." ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned " + "-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * This illustrates the minimum amount of things you need to set + * up, however you could set up much more if desired, for example + * if you want to share your set up code between the case of + * establishing a new connection and this case. + */ + if( opt.nbio == 2 ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &client_fd, delayed_send, + delayed_recv, NULL ); + else + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &client_fd, mbedtls_net_send, + mbedtls_net_recv, + opt.nbio == 0 ? mbedtls_net_recv_timeout : NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer, + mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } + + mbedtls_printf( " . Deserializing connection..." ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_load( &ssl, context_buf, + buf_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_load returned " + "-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_free( context_buf ); + context_buf = NULL; + context_buf_len = 0; + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + + /* + * 7c. Continue doing data exchanges? + */ + if( --exchanges_left > 0 ) + goto data_exchange; + + /* + * 8. Done, cleanly close the connection + */ +close_notify: + mbedtls_printf( " . Closing the connection..." ); + + /* No error checking, the connection might be closed already */ + do ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ); + while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + ret = 0; + + mbedtls_printf( " done\n" ); + + goto reset; + + /* + * Cleanup and exit + */ +exit: +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( ret != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf("Last error was: -0x%X - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, error_buf ); + } +#endif + + if( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Cleaning up..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + } + + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( &cache ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( &ticket_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( &cookie_ctx ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + if( context_buf != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( context_buf, context_buf_len ); + mbedtls_free( context_buf ); +#endif + +#if defined(SNI_OPTION) + sni_free( sni_info ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + ret = psk_free( psk_info ); + if( ( ret != 0 ) && ( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) ) + mbedtls_printf( "Failed to list of opaque PSKs - error was %d\n", ret ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &srvcert ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &srvcert2 ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey2 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key( key_slot ); + psa_destroy_key( key_slot2 ); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + for( i = 0; (size_t) i < ssl_async_keys.slots_used; i++ ) + { + if( ssl_async_keys.slots[i].pk_owned ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( ssl_async_keys.slots[i].pk ); + mbedtls_free( ssl_async_keys.slots[i].pk ); + ssl_async_keys.slots[i].pk = NULL; + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 ) + { + /* This is ok even if the slot hasn't been + * initialized (we might have jumed here + * immediately because of bad cmd line params, + * for example). */ + status = psa_destroy_key( psk_slot ); + if( ( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) && + ( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Failed to destroy key slot %u - error was %d", + (unsigned) psk_slot, (int) status ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const char* message = mbedtls_test_helper_is_psa_leaking(); + if( message ) + { + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = 1; + mbedtls_printf( "PSA memory leak detected: %s\n", message); + } +#endif + + /* For builds with MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG psa crypto + * resources are freed by rng_free(). */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); +#endif + + rng_free( &rng ); + + mbedtls_free( buf ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + /* Let test hooks detect errors such as resource leaks. + * Don't do it in query_config mode, because some test code prints + * information to stdout and this gets mixed with the regular output. */ + if( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) + { + if( test_hooks_failure_detected( ) ) + { + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = 1; + mbedtls_printf( "Test hooks detected errors.\n" ); + } + } + test_hooks_free( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(); +#endif + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ + + if( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " done.\n" ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + } + + // Shell can not handle large exit numbers -> 1 for errors + if( ret < 0 ) + ret = 1; + + if( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) + mbedtls_exit( ret ); + else + mbedtls_exit( query_config_ret ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f5d86804 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_test_common_source.c @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +/* + * Common source code for SSL test programs. This file is included by + * both ssl_client2.c and ssl_server2.c and is intended for source + * code that is textually identical in both programs, but that cannot be + * compiled separately because it refers to types or macros that are + * different in the two programs, or because it would have an incomplete + * type. + * + * This file is meant to be #include'd and cannot be compiled separately. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +int eap_tls_key_derivation( void *p_expkey, + const unsigned char *ms, + const unsigned char *kb, + size_t maclen, + size_t keylen, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char client_random[32], + const unsigned char server_random[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type ) +{ + eap_tls_keys *keys = (eap_tls_keys *)p_expkey; + + ( ( void ) kb ); + memcpy( keys->master_secret, ms, sizeof( keys->master_secret ) ); + memcpy( keys->randbytes, client_random, 32 ); + memcpy( keys->randbytes + 32, server_random, 32 ); + keys->tls_prf_type = tls_prf_type; + + if( opt.debug_level > 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf("exported maclen is %u\n", (unsigned)maclen); + mbedtls_printf("exported keylen is %u\n", (unsigned)keylen); + mbedtls_printf("exported ivlen is %u\n", (unsigned)ivlen); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +int nss_keylog_export( void *p_expkey, + const unsigned char *ms, + const unsigned char *kb, + size_t maclen, + size_t keylen, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char client_random[32], + const unsigned char server_random[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type ) +{ + char nss_keylog_line[ 200 ]; + size_t const client_random_len = 32; + size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + size_t len = 0; + size_t j; + int ret = 0; + + ((void) p_expkey); + ((void) kb); + ((void) maclen); + ((void) keylen); + ((void) ivlen); + ((void) server_random); + ((void) tls_prf_type); + + len += sprintf( nss_keylog_line + len, + "%s", "CLIENT_RANDOM " ); + + for( j = 0; j < client_random_len; j++ ) + { + len += sprintf( nss_keylog_line + len, + "%02x", client_random[j] ); + } + + len += sprintf( nss_keylog_line + len, " " ); + + for( j = 0; j < master_secret_len; j++ ) + { + len += sprintf( nss_keylog_line + len, + "%02x", ms[j] ); + } + + len += sprintf( nss_keylog_line + len, "\n" ); + nss_keylog_line[ len ] = '\0'; + + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + mbedtls_printf( "---------------- NSS KEYLOG -----------------\n" ); + mbedtls_printf( "%s", nss_keylog_line ); + mbedtls_printf( "---------------------------------------------\n" ); + + if( opt.nss_keylog_file != NULL ) + { + FILE *f; + + if( ( f = fopen( opt.nss_keylog_file, "a" ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( nss_keylog_line, 1, len, f ) != len ) + { + ret = -1; + fclose( f ); + goto exit; + } + + fclose( f ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( nss_keylog_line, + sizeof( nss_keylog_line ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) +int dtls_srtp_key_derivation( void *p_expkey, + const unsigned char *ms, + const unsigned char *kb, + size_t maclen, + size_t keylen, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char client_random[32], + const unsigned char server_random[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type ) +{ + dtls_srtp_keys *keys = (dtls_srtp_keys *)p_expkey; + + ( ( void ) kb ); + memcpy( keys->master_secret, ms, sizeof( keys->master_secret ) ); + memcpy( keys->randbytes, client_random, 32 ); + memcpy( keys->randbytes + 32, server_random, 32 ); + keys->tls_prf_type = tls_prf_type; + + if( opt.debug_level > 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "exported maclen is %u\n", (unsigned) maclen ); + mbedtls_printf( "exported keylen is %u\n", (unsigned) keylen ); + mbedtls_printf( "exported ivlen is %u\n", (unsigned) ivlen ); + } + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) +int ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char const *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int my_ret = 0, ret_cr1, ret_cr2; + unsigned char *tmp_buf; + + /* Record checking may modify the input buffer, + * so make a copy. */ + tmp_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len ); + if( tmp_buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + memcpy( tmp_buf, buf, len ); + + ret_cr1 = mbedtls_ssl_check_record( ssl, tmp_buf, len ); + if( ret_cr1 != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + /* Test-only: Make sure that mbedtls_ssl_check_record() + * doesn't alter state. */ + memcpy( tmp_buf, buf, len ); /* Restore buffer */ + ret_cr2 = mbedtls_ssl_check_record( ssl, tmp_buf, len ); + if( ret_cr2 != ret_cr1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() returned inconsistent results.\n" ); + my_ret = -1; + goto cleanup; + } + + switch( ret_cr1 ) + { + case 0: + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD: + if( opt.debug_level > 1 ) + mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected invalid record.\n" ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC: + if( opt.debug_level > 1 ) + mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected unauthentic record.\n" ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD: + if( opt.debug_level > 1 ) + mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected unexpected record.\n" ); + break; + + default: + mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() failed fatally with -%#04x.\n", (unsigned int) -ret_cr1 ); + my_ret = -1; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Regardless of the outcome, forward the record to the stack. */ + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free( tmp_buf ); + + return( my_ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + +int recv_cb( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + io_ctx_t *io_ctx = (io_ctx_t*) ctx; + size_t recv_len; + int ret; + + if( opt.nbio == 2 ) + ret = delayed_recv( io_ctx->net, buf, len ); + else + ret = mbedtls_net_recv( io_ctx->net, buf, len ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + recv_len = (size_t) ret; + + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Here's the place to do any datagram/record checking + * in between receiving the packet from the underlying + * transport and passing it on to the TLS stack. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) + if( ssl_check_record( io_ctx->ssl, buf, recv_len ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + } + + return( (int) recv_len ); +} + +int recv_timeout_cb( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + uint32_t timeout ) +{ + io_ctx_t *io_ctx = (io_ctx_t*) ctx; + int ret; + size_t recv_len; + + ret = mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( io_ctx->net, buf, len, timeout ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + recv_len = (size_t) ret; + + if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Here's the place to do any datagram/record checking + * in between receiving the packet from the underlying + * transport and passing it on to the TLS stack. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) + if( ssl_check_record( io_ctx->ssl, buf, recv_len ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + } + + return( (int) recv_len ); +} + +int send_cb( void *ctx, unsigned char const *buf, size_t len ) +{ + io_ctx_t *io_ctx = (io_ctx_t*) ctx; + + if( opt.nbio == 2 ) + return( delayed_send( io_ctx->net, buf, len ) ); + + return( mbedtls_net_send( io_ctx->net, buf, len ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int ssl_sig_hashes_for_test[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + /* Allow SHA-1 as we use it extensively in tests. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70cddfa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +/* + * Common code library for SSL test programs. + * + * In addition to the functions in this file, there is shared source code + * that cannot be compiled separately in "ssl_test_common_source.c". + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "ssl_test_lib.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#include "test/helpers.h" +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE) + +void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + const char *p, *basename; + + /* Extract basename from file */ + for( p = basename = file; *p != '\0'; p++ ) + if( *p == '/' || *p == '\\' ) + basename = p + 1; + + mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: |%d| %s", + basename, line, level, str ); + fflush( (FILE *) ctx ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +mbedtls_time_t dummy_constant_time( mbedtls_time_t* time ) +{ + (void) time; + return 0x5af2a056; +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) +static int dummy_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) +{ + size_t i; + int ret; + (void) data; + + ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( data, output, len ); + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + //replace result with pseudo random + output[i] = (unsigned char) rand(); + } + return( ret ); +} +#endif + +void rng_init( rng_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) + (void) rng; + psa_crypto_init( ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &rng->drbg ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng->drbg ); +#else +#error "No DRBG available" +#endif + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &rng->entropy ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ +} + +int rng_seed( rng_context_t *rng, int reproducible, const char *pers ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( reproducible ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO does not support reproducible mode.\n" ); + return( -1 ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) + /* The PSA crypto RNG does its own seeding. */ + (void) rng; + (void) pers; + if( reproducible ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "The PSA RNG does not support reproducible mode.\n" ); + return( -1 ); + } + return( 0 ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ + int ( *f_entropy )( void *, unsigned char *, size_t ) = + ( reproducible ? dummy_entropy : mbedtls_entropy_func ); + + if ( reproducible ) + srand( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + int ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &rng->drbg, + f_entropy, &rng->entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; +#else +#error "No message digest available for HMAC_DRBG" +#endif + int ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &rng->drbg, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ), + f_entropy, &rng->entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ); +#else /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) */ +#error "No DRBG available" +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) */ + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%x\n", + (unsigned int) -ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +void rng_free( rng_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) + (void) rng; + /* Deinitialize the PSA crypto subsystem. This deactivates all PSA APIs. + * This is ok because none of our applications try to do any crypto after + * deinitializing the RNG. */ + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &rng->drbg ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng->drbg ); +#else +#error "No DRBG available" +#endif + + mbedtls_entropy_free( &rng->entropy ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ +} + +int rng_get( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) + (void) p_rng; + return( mbedtls_psa_get_random( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output, output_len ) ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ + rng_context_t *rng = p_rng; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &rng->drbg, output, output_len ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &rng->drbg, output, output_len ) ); +#else +#error "No DRBG available" +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +int ca_callback( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt const *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt **candidates ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca = (mbedtls_x509_crt *) data; + mbedtls_x509_crt *first; + + /* This is a test-only implementation of the CA callback + * which always returns the entire list of trusted certificates. + * Production implementations managing a large number of CAs + * should use an efficient presentation and lookup for the + * set of trusted certificates (such as a hashtable) and only + * return those trusted certificates which satisfy basic + * parental checks, such as the matching of child `Issuer` + * and parent `Subject` field or matching key identifiers. */ + ((void) child); + + first = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + if( first == NULL ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( first ); + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( first, ca->raw.p, ca->raw.len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + + while( ca->next != NULL ) + { + ca = ca->next; + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( first, ca->raw.p, ca->raw.len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + } + +exit: + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( first ); + mbedtls_free( first ); + first = NULL; + } + + *candidates = first; + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +int delayed_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + static int first_try = 1; + int ret; + + if( first_try ) + { + first_try = 0; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_net_recv( ctx, buf, len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ) + first_try = 1; /* Next call will be a new operation */ + return( ret ); +} + +int delayed_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + static int first_try = 1; + int ret; + + if( first_try ) + { + first_try = 0; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_net_send( ctx, buf, len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + first_try = 1; /* Next call will be a new operation */ + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +int idle( mbedtls_net_context *fd, + int idle_reason ) +#else +int idle( mbedtls_net_context *fd, + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *timer, + int idle_reason ) +#endif +{ + int ret; + int poll_type = 0; + + if( idle_reason == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + poll_type = MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE; + else if( idle_reason == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ) + poll_type = MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + else + return( 0 ); +#endif + + while( 1 ) + { + /* Check if timer has expired */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + if( timer != NULL && + mbedtls_timing_get_delay( timer ) == 2 ) + { + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + + /* Check if underlying transport became available */ + if( poll_type != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_net_poll( fd, poll_type, 0 ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ret == poll_type ) + break; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +void test_hooks_init( void ) +{ + mbedtls_test_info_reset( ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_init( ); +#endif +} + +int test_hooks_failure_detected( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) + /* Errors are reported via mbedtls_test_info. */ + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check( ); +#endif + + if( mbedtls_test_info.result != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS ) + return( 1 ); + return( 0 ); +} + +void test_hooks_free( void ) +{ +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE) */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a412dae --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.h @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +/* + * Common code for SSL test programs + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PROGRAMS_SSL_SSL_TEST_LIB_H +#define MBEDTLS_PROGRAMS_SSL_SSL_TEST_LIB_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#undef HAVE_RNG +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) ) +#define HAVE_RNG +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#define HAVE_RNG +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) +#define HAVE_RNG +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE \ + "MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or " \ + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C not defined, " \ + "and/or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined.\n" +#elif !defined(HAVE_RNG) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE \ + "No random generator is available.\n" +#else +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE + +#undef HAVE_RNG + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#endif + +#include + +#include "../test/query_config.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + +typedef struct eap_tls_keys +{ + unsigned char master_secret[48]; + unsigned char randbytes[64]; + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type; +} eap_tls_keys; + +#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) + +/* Supported SRTP mode needs a maximum of : + * - 16 bytes for key (AES-128) + * - 14 bytes SALT + * One for sender, one for receiver context + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH 60 + +typedef struct dtls_srtp_keys +{ + unsigned char master_secret[48]; + unsigned char randbytes[64]; + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type; +} dtls_srtp_keys; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl; + mbedtls_net_context *net; +} io_ctx_t; + +void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +mbedtls_time_t dummy_constant_time( mbedtls_time_t* time ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* If MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG is defined, the SSL test programs will use + * mbedtls_psa_get_random() rather than entropy+DRBG as a random generator. + * + * The constraints are: + * - Without the entropy module, the PSA RNG is the only option. + * - Without at least one of the DRBG modules, the PSA RNG is the only option. + * - The PSA RNG does not support explicit seeding, so it is incompatible with + * the reproducible mode used by test programs. + * - For good overall test coverage, there should be at least one configuration + * where the test programs use the PSA RNG while the PSA RNG is itself based + * on entropy+DRBG, and at least one configuration where the test programs + * do not use the PSA RNG even though it's there. + * + * A simple choice that meets the constraints is to use the PSA RNG whenever + * MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. There's no real technical reason the + * choice to use the PSA RNG in the test programs and the choice to use + * PSA crypto when TLS code needs crypto have to be tied together, but it + * happens to be a good match. It's also a good match from an application + * perspective: either PSA is preferred for TLS (both for crypto and for + * random generation) or it isn't. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG +#endif + +/** A context for random number generation (RNG). + */ +typedef struct +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG) + unsigned char dummy; +#else /* MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context drbg; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context drbg; +#else +#error "No DRBG available" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG */ +} rng_context_t; + +/** Initialize the RNG. + * + * This function only initializes the memory used by the RNG context. + * Before using the RNG, it must be seeded with rng_seed(). + */ +void rng_init( rng_context_t *rng ); + +/* Seed the random number generator. + * + * \param rng The RNG context to use. It must have been initialized + * with rng_init(). + * \param reproducible If zero, seed the RNG from entropy. + * If nonzero, use a fixed seed, so that the program + * will produce the same sequence of random numbers + * each time it is invoked. + * \param pers A null-terminated string. Different values for this + * string cause the RNG to emit different output for + * the same seed. + * + * return 0 on success, a negative value on error. + */ +int rng_seed( rng_context_t *rng, int reproducible, const char *pers ); + +/** Deinitialize the RNG. Free any embedded resource. + * + * \param rng The RNG context to deinitialize. It must have been + * initialized with rng_init(). + */ +void rng_free( rng_context_t *rng ); + +/** Generate random data. + * + * This function is suitable for use as the \c f_rng argument to Mbed TLS + * library functions. + * + * \param p_rng The random generator context. This must be a pointer to + * a #rng_context_t structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An Mbed TLS error code on error. + */ +int rng_get( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/* The test implementation of the PSA external RNG is insecure. When + * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG is enabled, before using any PSA crypto + * function that makes use of an RNG, you must call + * mbedtls_test_enable_insecure_external_rng(). */ +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +int ca_callback( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt const *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt **candidates ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +/* + * Test recv/send functions that make sure each try returns + * WANT_READ/WANT_WRITE at least once before succeeding + */ +int delayed_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); +int delayed_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/* + * Wait for an event from the underlying transport or the timer + * (Used in event-driven IO mode). + */ +int idle( mbedtls_net_context *fd, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *timer, +#endif + int idle_reason ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +/** Initialize whatever test hooks are enabled by the compile-time + * configuration and make sense for the TLS test programs. */ +void test_hooks_init( void ); + +/** Check if any test hooks detected a problem. + * + * If a problem was detected, it's ok for the calling program to keep going, + * but it should ultimately exit with an error status. + * + * \note When implementing a test hook that detects errors on its own + * (as opposed to e.g. leaving the error for a memory sanitizer to + * report), make sure to print a message to standard error either at + * the time the problem is detected or during the execution of this + * function. This function does not indicate what problem was detected, + * so printing a message is the only way to provide feedback in the + * logs of the calling program. + * + * \return Nonzero if a problem was detected. + * \c 0 if no problem was detected. + */ +int test_hooks_failure_detected( void ); + +/** Free any resources allocated for the sake of test hooks. + * + * Call this at the end of the program so that resource leak analyzers + * don't complain. + */ +void test_hooks_free( void ); + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE conditions: else */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PROGRAMS_SSL_SSL_TEST_LIB_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..403797ce --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +set(libs + ${mbedtls_target} +) + +if(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + set(libs ${libs} pkcs11-helper) +endif(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + +if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + set(libs ${libs} ${ZLIB_LIBRARIES}) +endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +set(executables_libs + selftest + udp_proxy +) + +set(executables_mbedcrypto + benchmark + query_compile_time_config + zeroize +) + +if(TEST_CPP) + set(cpp_dummy_build_cpp "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cpp_dummy_build.cpp") + set(generate_cpp_dummy_build "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh") + add_custom_command( + OUTPUT "${cpp_dummy_build_cpp}" + COMMAND "${generate_cpp_dummy_build}" "${cpp_dummy_build_cpp}" + DEPENDS "${generate_cpp_dummy_build}" + WORKING_DIRECTORY "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}" + ) + add_executable(cpp_dummy_build "${cpp_dummy_build_cpp}") + target_include_directories(cpp_dummy_build PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../include) + target_link_libraries(cpp_dummy_build ${mbedcrypto_target}) +endif() + +if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND + NOT ${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES "[Ww][Ii][Nn]") + add_executable(dlopen "dlopen.c") + target_include_directories(dlopen PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../include) + target_link_libraries(dlopen ${CMAKE_DL_LIBS}) +endif() + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_libs executables_mbedcrypto) + set(extra_sources "") + if(exe STREQUAL "query_compile_time_config") + list(APPEND extra_sources + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/query_config.c) + endif() + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $ + ${extra_sources}) + + # This emulates "if ( ... IN_LIST ... )" which becomes available in CMake 3.3 + list(FIND executables_libs ${exe} exe_index) + if (${exe_index} GREATER -1) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs}) + else() + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + endif() +endforeach() + +install(TARGETS ${executables_libs} ${executables_mbedcrypto} + DESTINATION "bin" + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/benchmark.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/benchmark.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cfde5dd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/benchmark.c @@ -0,0 +1,1116 @@ +/* + * Benchmark demonstration program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_TIMING_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" + +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" + +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#endif + +/* + * For heap usage estimates, we need an estimate of the overhead per allocated + * block. ptmalloc2/3 (used in gnu libc for instance) uses 2 size_t per block, + * so use that as our baseline. + */ +#define MEM_BLOCK_OVERHEAD ( 2 * sizeof( size_t ) ) + +/* + * Size to use for the alloc buffer if MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C is defined. + */ +#define HEAP_SIZE (1u << 16) /* 64k */ + +#define BUFSIZE 1024 +#define HEADER_FORMAT " %-24s : " +#define TITLE_LEN 25 + +#define OPTIONS \ + "md4, md5, ripemd160, sha1, sha256, sha512,\n" \ + "arc4, des3, des, camellia, blowfish, chacha20,\n" \ + "aes_cbc, aes_gcm, aes_ccm, aes_xts, chachapoly,\n" \ + "aes_cmac, des3_cmac, poly1305\n" \ + "havege, ctr_drbg, hmac_drbg\n" \ + "rsa, dhm, ecdsa, ecdh.\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) +#define PRINT_ERROR \ + mbedtls_strerror( ret, ( char * )tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); \ + mbedtls_printf( "FAILED: %s\n", tmp ); +#else +#define PRINT_ERROR \ + mbedtls_printf( "FAILED: -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); +#endif + +#define TIME_AND_TSC( TITLE, CODE ) \ +do { \ + unsigned long ii, jj, tsc; \ + int ret = 0; \ + \ + mbedtls_printf( HEADER_FORMAT, TITLE ); \ + fflush( stdout ); \ + \ + mbedtls_set_alarm( 1 ); \ + for( ii = 1; ret == 0 && ! mbedtls_timing_alarmed; ii++ ) \ + { \ + ret = CODE; \ + } \ + \ + tsc = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ + for( jj = 0; ret == 0 && jj < 1024; jj++ ) \ + { \ + ret = CODE; \ + } \ + \ + if( ret != 0 ) \ + { \ + PRINT_ERROR; \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_printf( "%9lu KiB/s, %9lu cycles/byte\n", \ + ii * BUFSIZE / 1024, \ + ( mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - tsc ) \ + / ( jj * BUFSIZE ) ); \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + +/* How much space to reserve for the title when printing heap usage results. + * Updated manually as the output of the following command: + * + * sed -n 's/.*[T]IME_PUBLIC.*"\(.*\)",/\1/p' programs/test/benchmark.c | + * awk '{print length+3}' | sort -rn | head -n1 + * + * This computes the maximum length of a title +3, because we appends "/s" and + * want at least one space. (If the value is too small, the only consequence + * is poor alignment.) */ +#define TITLE_SPACE 17 + +#define MEMORY_MEASURE_INIT \ + size_t max_used, max_blocks, max_bytes; \ + size_t prv_used, prv_blocks; \ + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( &prv_used, &prv_blocks ); \ + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset( ); + +#define MEMORY_MEASURE_PRINT( title_len ) \ + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get( &max_used, &max_blocks ); \ + ii = TITLE_SPACE > (title_len) ? TITLE_SPACE - (title_len) : 1; \ + while( ii-- ) mbedtls_printf( " " ); \ + max_used -= prv_used; \ + max_blocks -= prv_blocks; \ + max_bytes = max_used + MEM_BLOCK_OVERHEAD * max_blocks; \ + mbedtls_printf( "%6u heap bytes", (unsigned) max_bytes ); + +#else +#define MEMORY_MEASURE_INIT +#define MEMORY_MEASURE_PRINT( title_len ) +#endif + +#define TIME_PUBLIC( TITLE, TYPE, CODE ) \ +do { \ + unsigned long ii; \ + int ret; \ + MEMORY_MEASURE_INIT; \ + \ + mbedtls_printf( HEADER_FORMAT, TITLE ); \ + fflush( stdout ); \ + mbedtls_set_alarm( 3 ); \ + \ + ret = 0; \ + for( ii = 1; ! mbedtls_timing_alarmed && ! ret ; ii++ ) \ + { \ + CODE; \ + } \ + \ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_printf( "Feature Not Supported. Skipping.\n" ); \ + ret = 0; \ + } \ + else if( ret != 0 ) \ + { \ + PRINT_ERROR; \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_printf( "%6lu " TYPE "/s", ii / 3 ); \ + MEMORY_MEASURE_PRINT( sizeof( TYPE ) + 1 ); \ + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) +{ + size_t use_len; + int rnd; + + if( rng_state != NULL ) + rng_state = NULL; + + while( len > 0 ) + { + use_len = len; + if( use_len > sizeof(int) ) + use_len = sizeof(int); + + rnd = rand(); + memcpy( output, &rnd, use_len ); + output += use_len; + len -= use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( R ) \ + { \ + int CHECK_AND_CONTINUE_ret = ( R ); \ + if( CHECK_AND_CONTINUE_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED ) { \ + mbedtls_printf( "Feature not supported. Skipping.\n" ); \ + continue; \ + } \ + else if( CHECK_AND_CONTINUE_ret != 0 ) { \ + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); \ + } \ + } + +/* + * Clear some memory that was used to prepare the context + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +void ecp_clear_precomputed( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + if( grp->T != NULL ) + { + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->T[i] ); + mbedtls_free( grp->T ); + } + grp->T = NULL; + grp->T_size = 0; +} +#else +#define ecp_clear_precomputed( g ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static int set_ecp_curve( const char *string, mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *found = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( string ); + if( found != NULL ) + { + *curve = *found; + return( 1 ); + } + else + return( 0 ); +} +#endif + +unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; + +typedef struct { + char md4, md5, ripemd160, sha1, sha256, sha512, + arc4, des3, des, + aes_cbc, aes_gcm, aes_ccm, aes_xts, chachapoly, + aes_cmac, des3_cmac, + aria, camellia, blowfish, chacha20, + poly1305, + havege, ctr_drbg, hmac_drbg, + rsa, dhm, ecdsa, ecdh; +} todo_list; + + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int i; + unsigned char tmp[200]; + char title[TITLE_LEN]; + todo_list todo; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + unsigned char alloc_buf[HEAP_SIZE] = { 0 }; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info single_curve[2] = { + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL }, + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL }, + }; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_list = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + (void) curve_list; /* Unused in some configurations where no benchmark uses ECC */ +#endif + + if( argc <= 1 ) + { + memset( &todo, 1, sizeof( todo ) ); + } + else + { + memset( &todo, 0, sizeof( todo ) ); + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + if( strcmp( argv[i], "md4" ) == 0 ) + todo.md4 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "md5" ) == 0 ) + todo.md5 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ripemd160" ) == 0 ) + todo.ripemd160 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "sha1" ) == 0 ) + todo.sha1 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "sha256" ) == 0 ) + todo.sha256 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "sha512" ) == 0 ) + todo.sha512 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "arc4" ) == 0 ) + todo.arc4 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "des3" ) == 0 ) + todo.des3 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "des" ) == 0 ) + todo.des = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aes_cbc" ) == 0 ) + todo.aes_cbc = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aes_xts" ) == 0 ) + todo.aes_xts = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aes_gcm" ) == 0 ) + todo.aes_gcm = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aes_ccm" ) == 0 ) + todo.aes_ccm = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "chachapoly" ) == 0 ) + todo.chachapoly = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aes_cmac" ) == 0 ) + todo.aes_cmac = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "des3_cmac" ) == 0 ) + todo.des3_cmac = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aria" ) == 0 ) + todo.aria = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "camellia" ) == 0 ) + todo.camellia = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "blowfish" ) == 0 ) + todo.blowfish = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "chacha20" ) == 0 ) + todo.chacha20 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "poly1305" ) == 0 ) + todo.poly1305 = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "havege" ) == 0 ) + todo.havege = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ctr_drbg" ) == 0 ) + todo.ctr_drbg = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "hmac_drbg" ) == 0 ) + todo.hmac_drbg = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "rsa" ) == 0 ) + todo.rsa = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "dhm" ) == 0 ) + todo.dhm = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ecdsa" ) == 0 ) + todo.ecdsa = 1; + else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ecdh" ) == 0 ) + todo.ecdh = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + else if( set_ecp_curve( argv[i], single_curve ) ) + curve_list = single_curve; +#endif + else + { + mbedtls_printf( "Unrecognized option: %s\n", argv[i] ); + mbedtls_printf( "Available options: " OPTIONS ); + } + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof( alloc_buf ) ); +#endif + memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0xBB, sizeof( tmp ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + if( todo.md4 ) + TIME_AND_TSC( "MD4", mbedtls_md4_ret( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + if( todo.md5 ) + TIME_AND_TSC( "MD5", mbedtls_md5_ret( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + if( todo.ripemd160 ) + TIME_AND_TSC( "RIPEMD160", mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( todo.sha1 ) + TIME_AND_TSC( "SHA-1", mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( todo.sha256 ) + TIME_AND_TSC( "SHA-256", mbedtls_sha256_ret( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp, 0 ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if( todo.sha512 ) + TIME_AND_TSC( "SHA-512", mbedtls_sha512_ret( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp, 0 ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + if( todo.arc4 ) + { + mbedtls_arc4_context arc4; + mbedtls_arc4_init( &arc4 ); + mbedtls_arc4_setup( &arc4, tmp, 32 ); + TIME_AND_TSC( "ARC4", mbedtls_arc4_crypt( &arc4, BUFSIZE, buf, buf ) ); + mbedtls_arc4_free( &arc4 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( todo.des3 ) + { + mbedtls_des3_context des3; + mbedtls_des3_init( &des3 ); + if( mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &des3, tmp ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + TIME_AND_TSC( "3DES", + mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &des3, MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); + mbedtls_des3_free( &des3 ); + } + + if( todo.des ) + { + mbedtls_des_context des; + mbedtls_des_init( &des ); + if( mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &des, tmp ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + TIME_AND_TSC( "DES", + mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &des, MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); + mbedtls_des_free( &des ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + if( todo.des3_cmac ) + { + unsigned char output[8]; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( "3DES-CMAC", + mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, tmp, 192, buf, + BUFSIZE, output ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( todo.aes_cbc ) + { + int keysize; + mbedtls_aes_context aes; + mbedtls_aes_init( &aes ); + for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "AES-CBC-%d", keysize ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes, tmp, keysize ) ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( title, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); + } + mbedtls_aes_free( &aes ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + if( todo.aes_xts ) + { + int keysize; + mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx; + + mbedtls_aes_xts_init( &ctx ); + for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 128 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "AES-XTS-%d", keysize ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( &ctx, tmp, keysize * 2 ) ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( title, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, + tmp, buf, buf ) ); + + mbedtls_aes_xts_free( &ctx ); + } + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( todo.aes_gcm ) + { + int keysize; + mbedtls_gcm_context gcm; + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &gcm ); + for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "AES-GCM-%d", keysize ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &gcm, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, tmp, keysize ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( title, + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &gcm, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, + 12, NULL, 0, buf, buf, 16, tmp ) ); + + mbedtls_gcm_free( &gcm ); + } + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if( todo.aes_ccm ) + { + int keysize; + mbedtls_ccm_context ccm; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ccm ); + for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "AES-CCM-%d", keysize ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ccm, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, tmp, keysize ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( title, + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ccm, BUFSIZE, tmp, + 12, NULL, 0, buf, buf, tmp, 16 ) ); + + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ccm ); + } + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( todo.chachapoly ) + { + mbedtls_chachapoly_context chachapoly; + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &chachapoly ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "ChaCha20-Poly1305" ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &chachapoly, tmp ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( title, + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &chachapoly, + BUFSIZE, tmp, NULL, 0, buf, buf, tmp ) ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &chachapoly ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + if( todo.aes_cmac ) + { + unsigned char output[16]; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type; + int keysize; + + for( keysize = 128, cipher_type = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB; + keysize <= 256; + keysize += 64, cipher_type++ ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "AES-CMAC-%d", keysize ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( title, + mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, tmp, keysize, + buf, BUFSIZE, output ) ); + } + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + TIME_AND_TSC( "AES-CMAC-PRF-128", + mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( tmp, 16, buf, BUFSIZE, + output ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( todo.aria ) + { + int keysize; + mbedtls_aria_context aria; + mbedtls_aria_init( &aria ); + for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "ARIA-CBC-%d", keysize ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &aria, tmp, keysize ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( title, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &aria, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); + } + mbedtls_aria_free( &aria ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( todo.camellia ) + { + int keysize; + mbedtls_camellia_context camellia; + mbedtls_camellia_init( &camellia ); + for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "CAMELLIA-CBC-%d", keysize ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &camellia, tmp, keysize ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( title, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( &camellia, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, + BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); + } + mbedtls_camellia_free( &camellia ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + if ( todo.chacha20 ) + { + TIME_AND_TSC( "ChaCha20", mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( buf, buf, 0U, BUFSIZE, buf, buf ) ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + if ( todo.poly1305 ) + { + TIME_AND_TSC( "Poly1305", mbedtls_poly1305_mac( buf, buf, BUFSIZE, buf ) ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( todo.blowfish ) + { + int keysize; + mbedtls_blowfish_context blowfish; + mbedtls_blowfish_init( &blowfish ); + + for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "BLOWFISH-CBC-%d", keysize ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &blowfish, tmp, keysize ); + + TIME_AND_TSC( title, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( &blowfish, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, + tmp, buf, buf ) ); + } + + mbedtls_blowfish_free( &blowfish ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + if( todo.havege ) + { + mbedtls_havege_state hs; + mbedtls_havege_init( &hs ); + TIME_AND_TSC( "HAVEGE", mbedtls_havege_random( &hs, buf, BUFSIZE ) ); + mbedtls_havege_free( &hs ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + if( todo.ctr_drbg ) + { + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + if( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit(1); + TIME_AND_TSC( "CTR_DRBG (NOPR)", + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctr_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + if( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit(1); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctr_drbg, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); + TIME_AND_TSC( "CTR_DRBG (PR)", + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctr_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + if( todo.hmac_drbg ) + { + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context hmac_drbg; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &hmac_drbg ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) ) == NULL ) + mbedtls_exit(1); + + if( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &hmac_drbg, md_info, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit(1); + TIME_AND_TSC( "HMAC_DRBG SHA-1 (NOPR)", + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &hmac_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) ); + + if( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &hmac_drbg, md_info, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit(1); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &hmac_drbg, + MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ); + TIME_AND_TSC( "HMAC_DRBG SHA-1 (PR)", + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &hmac_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) ) == NULL ) + mbedtls_exit(1); + + if( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &hmac_drbg, md_info, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit(1); + TIME_AND_TSC( "HMAC_DRBG SHA-256 (NOPR)", + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &hmac_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) ); + + if( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &hmac_drbg, md_info, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit(1); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &hmac_drbg, + MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ); + TIME_AND_TSC( "HMAC_DRBG SHA-256 (PR)", + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &hmac_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) ); +#endif + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &hmac_drbg ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + if( todo.rsa ) + { + int keysize; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + for( keysize = 2048; keysize <= 4096; keysize *= 2 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "RSA-%d", keysize ); + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( &rsa, myrand, NULL, keysize, 65537 ); + + TIME_PUBLIC( title, " public", + buf[0] = 0; + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( &rsa, buf, buf ) ); + + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "private", + buf[0] = 0; + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( &rsa, myrand, NULL, buf, buf ) ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + if( todo.dhm ) + { + int dhm_sizes[] = { 2048, 3072 }; + static const unsigned char dhm_P_2048[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_P_3072[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_2048[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_3072[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G_BIN; + + const unsigned char *dhm_P[] = { dhm_P_2048, dhm_P_3072 }; + const size_t dhm_P_size[] = { sizeof( dhm_P_2048 ), + sizeof( dhm_P_3072 ) }; + + const unsigned char *dhm_G[] = { dhm_G_2048, dhm_G_3072 }; + const size_t dhm_G_size[] = { sizeof( dhm_G_2048 ), + sizeof( dhm_G_3072 ) }; + + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; + size_t olen; + for( i = 0; (size_t) i < sizeof( dhm_sizes ) / sizeof( dhm_sizes[0] ); i++ ) + { + mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &dhm.P, dhm_P[i], + dhm_P_size[i] ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &dhm.G, dhm_G[i], + dhm_G_size[i] ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + } + + dhm.len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &dhm.P ); + mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &dhm, (int) dhm.len, buf, dhm.len, myrand, NULL ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dhm.GY, &dhm.GX ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "DHE-%d", dhm_sizes[i] ); + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "handshake", + ret |= mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &dhm, (int) dhm.len, buf, dhm.len, + myrand, NULL ); + ret |= mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &dhm, buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen, myrand, NULL ) ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "DH-%d", dhm_sizes[i] ); + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "handshake", + ret |= mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &dhm, buf, sizeof( buf ), &olen, myrand, NULL ) ); + + mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm ); + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( todo.ecdsa ) + { + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + size_t sig_len; + + memset( buf, 0x2A, sizeof( buf ) ); + + for( curve_info = curve_list; + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( curve_info->grp_id ) ) + continue; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); + + if( mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( &ecdsa, curve_info->grp_id, myrand, NULL ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + ecp_clear_precomputed( &ecdsa.grp ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "ECDSA-%s", + curve_info->name ); + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "sign", + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( &ecdsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, buf, curve_info->bit_size, + tmp, &sig_len, myrand, NULL ) ); + + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); + } + + for( curve_info = curve_list; + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( curve_info->grp_id ) ) + continue; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); + + if( mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( &ecdsa, curve_info->grp_id, myrand, NULL ) != 0 || + mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( &ecdsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, buf, curve_info->bit_size, + tmp, &sig_len, myrand, NULL ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + } + ecp_clear_precomputed( &ecdsa.grp ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "ECDSA-%s", + curve_info->name ); + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "verify", + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ecdsa, buf, curve_info->bit_size, + tmp, sig_len ) ); + + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + if( todo.ecdh ) + { + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; + mbedtls_mpi z; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info montgomery_curve_list[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, 0, 0, "Curve25519" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, 0, 0, "Curve448" }, +#endif + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, 0 } + }; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + size_t olen; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *selected_montgomery_curve_list = + montgomery_curve_list; + + if( curve_list == (const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info*) &single_curve ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + if( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, curve_list->grp_id ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + selected_montgomery_curve_list = single_curve; + else /* empty list */ + selected_montgomery_curve_list = single_curve + 1; + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + } + + for( curve_info = curve_list; + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( ! mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( curve_info->grp_id ) ) + continue; + + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh ); + + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecdh.grp, curve_info->grp_id ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ecdh, &olen, buf, sizeof( buf), + myrand, NULL ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ecdh.Qp, &ecdh.Q ) ); + ecp_clear_precomputed( &ecdh.grp ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "ECDHE-%s", + curve_info->name ); + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "handshake", + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ecdh, &olen, buf, sizeof( buf), + myrand, NULL ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh, &olen, buf, sizeof( buf ), + myrand, NULL ) ) ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh ); + } + + /* Montgomery curves need to be handled separately */ + for ( curve_info = selected_montgomery_curve_list; + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &z ); + + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecdh.grp, curve_info->grp_id ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ecdh.grp, &ecdh.d, &ecdh.Qp, myrand, NULL ) ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof(title), "ECDHE-%s", + curve_info->name ); + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "handshake", + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ecdh.grp, &ecdh.d, &ecdh.Q, + myrand, NULL ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ecdh.grp, &z, &ecdh.Qp, &ecdh.d, + myrand, NULL ) ) ); + + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &z ); + } + + for( curve_info = curve_list; + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( ! mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( curve_info->grp_id ) ) + continue; + + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh ); + + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecdh.grp, curve_info->grp_id ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ecdh, &olen, buf, sizeof( buf), + myrand, NULL ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ecdh.Qp, &ecdh.Q ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ecdh, &olen, buf, sizeof( buf), + myrand, NULL ) ); + ecp_clear_precomputed( &ecdh.grp ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "ECDH-%s", + curve_info->name ); + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "handshake", + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh, &olen, buf, sizeof( buf ), + myrand, NULL ) ) ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh ); + } + + /* Montgomery curves need to be handled separately */ + for ( curve_info = selected_montgomery_curve_list; + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++) + { + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &z ); + + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecdh.grp, curve_info->grp_id ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ecdh.grp, &ecdh.d, &ecdh.Qp, + myrand, NULL ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ecdh.grp, &ecdh.d, &ecdh.Q, myrand, NULL ) ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof(title), "ECDH-%s", + curve_info->name ); + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "handshake", + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ecdh.grp, &z, &ecdh.Qp, &ecdh.d, + myrand, NULL ) ) ); + + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &z ); + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + if( todo.ecdh ) + { + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_srv, ecdh_cli; + unsigned char buf_srv[BUFSIZE], buf_cli[BUFSIZE]; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + size_t olen; + + for( curve_info = curve_list; + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( ! mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( curve_info->grp_id ) ) + continue; + + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh_srv ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh_cli ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "ECDHE-%s", curve_info->name ); + TIME_PUBLIC( title, "full handshake", + const unsigned char * p_srv = buf_srv; + + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &ecdh_srv, curve_info->grp_id ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &ecdh_srv, &olen, buf_srv, sizeof( buf_srv ), myrand, NULL ) ); + + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ecdh_cli, &p_srv, p_srv + olen ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ecdh_cli, &olen, buf_cli, sizeof( buf_cli ), myrand, NULL ) ); + + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ecdh_srv, buf_cli, olen ) ); + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh_srv, &olen, buf_srv, sizeof( buf_srv ), myrand, NULL ) ); + + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh_cli, &olen, buf_cli, sizeof( buf_cli ), myrand, NULL ) ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh_cli ); + + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh_srv ); + ); + + } + } +#endif + + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/cmake_subproject/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/cmake_subproject/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..464833b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/cmake_subproject/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +build +Makefile +cmake_subproject diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a9fcfde2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 2.6) + +# Test the target renaming support by adding a prefix to the targets built +set(MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX subproject_test_) + +# We use the parent Mbed TLS directory as the MBEDTLS_DIR for this test. Other +# projects that use Mbed TLS as a subproject are likely to add by their own +# relative paths. +set(MBEDTLS_DIR ../../../) + +# Add Mbed TLS as a subdirectory. +add_subdirectory(${MBEDTLS_DIR} build) + +# Link against all the Mbed TLS libraries. Verifies that the targets have been +# created using the specified prefix +set(libs + subproject_test_mbedcrypto + subproject_test_mbedx509 + subproject_test_mbedtls +) + +add_executable(cmake_subproject cmake_subproject.c) +target_link_libraries(cmake_subproject ${libs}) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/cmake_subproject/cmake_subproject.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/cmake_subproject/cmake_subproject.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d81830d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/cmake_subproject/cmake_subproject.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Simple program to test that CMake builds with Mbed TLS as a subdirectory + * work correctly. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#include "mbedtls/version.h" + +/* The main reason to build this is for testing the CMake build, so the program + * doesn't need to do very much. It calls a single library function to ensure + * linkage works, but that is all. */ +int main() +{ + /* This version string is 18 bytes long, as advised by version.h. */ + char version[18]; + + mbedtls_version_get_string_full( version ); + + mbedtls_printf( "Built against %s\n", version ); + + return( 0 ); +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/dlopen.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/dlopen.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..62c85544 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/dlopen.c @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +/* + * Test dynamic loading of libmbed* + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#endif + +#if defined(__APPLE__) +#define SO_SUFFIX ".dylib" +#else +#define SO_SUFFIX ".so" +#endif + +#define CRYPTO_SO_FILENAME "libmbedcrypto" SO_SUFFIX +#define X509_SO_FILENAME "libmbedx509" SO_SUFFIX +#define TLS_SO_FILENAME "libmbedtls" SO_SUFFIX + +#include + +#define CHECK_DLERROR( function, argument ) \ + do \ + { \ + char *CHECK_DLERROR_error = dlerror ( ); \ + if( CHECK_DLERROR_error != NULL ) \ + { \ + fprintf( stderr, "Dynamic loading error for %s(%s): %s\n", \ + function, argument, CHECK_DLERROR_error ); \ + mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int main( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + unsigned n; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + void *tls_so = dlopen( TLS_SO_FILENAME, RTLD_NOW ); + CHECK_DLERROR( "dlopen", TLS_SO_FILENAME ); + const int *( *ssl_list_ciphersuites )( void ) = + dlsym( tls_so, "mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites" ); + CHECK_DLERROR( "dlsym", "mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites" ); + const int *ciphersuites = ssl_list_ciphersuites( ); + for( n = 0; ciphersuites[n] != 0; n++ ) + /* nothing to do, we're just counting */; + mbedtls_printf( "dlopen(%s): %u ciphersuites\n", + TLS_SO_FILENAME, n ); + dlclose( tls_so ); + CHECK_DLERROR( "dlclose", TLS_SO_FILENAME ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + void *x509_so = dlopen( X509_SO_FILENAME, RTLD_NOW ); + CHECK_DLERROR( "dlopen", X509_SO_FILENAME ); + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile = + dlsym( x509_so, "mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default" ); + CHECK_DLERROR( "dlsym", "mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default" ); + mbedtls_printf( "dlopen(%s): Allowed md mask: %08x\n", + X509_SO_FILENAME, (unsigned) profile->allowed_mds ); + dlclose( x509_so ); + CHECK_DLERROR( "dlclose", X509_SO_FILENAME ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + void *crypto_so = dlopen( CRYPTO_SO_FILENAME, RTLD_NOW ); + CHECK_DLERROR( "dlopen", CRYPTO_SO_FILENAME ); + const int *( *md_list )( void ) = + dlsym( crypto_so, "mbedtls_md_list" ); + CHECK_DLERROR( "dlsym", "mbedtls_md_list" ); + const int *mds = md_list( ); + for( n = 0; mds[n] != 0; n++ ) + /* nothing to do, we're just counting */; + mbedtls_printf( "dlopen(%s): %u hashes\n", + CRYPTO_SO_FILENAME, n ); + dlclose( crypto_so ); + CHECK_DLERROR( "dlclose", CRYPTO_SO_FILENAME ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + + return( 0 ); +} + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/dlopen_demo.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/dlopen_demo.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..2dde3ebe --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/dlopen_demo.sh @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Run the shared library dynamic loading demo program. +# This is only expected to work when Mbed TLS is built as a shared library. + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +set -e -u + +program_dir="${0%/*}" +program="$program_dir/dlopen" +top_dir="$program_dir/../.." +library_dir="$top_dir/library" + +# ELF-based Unix-like (Linux, *BSD, Solaris, ...) +if [ -n "${LD_LIBRARY_PATH-}" ]; then + LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$library_dir:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH" +else + LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$library_dir" +fi +export LD_LIBRARY_PATH + +# OSX/macOS +if [ -n "${DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH-}" ]; then + DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH="$library_dir:$DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH" +else + DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH="$library_dir" +fi +export DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH + +echo "Running dynamic loading test program: $program" +echo "Loading libraries from: $library_dir" +"$program" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..90a181d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/generate_cpp_dummy_build.sh @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +DEFAULT_OUTPUT_FILE=programs/test/cpp_dummy_build.cpp + +if [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then + cat <&2 "This script must be run from an Mbed TLS source tree." + exit 3 +fi + +print_cpp >"${1:-$DEFAULT_OUTPUT_FILE}" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/query_compile_time_config.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/query_compile_time_config.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17e82a62 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/query_compile_time_config.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Query the Mbed TLS compile time configuration + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#define USAGE \ + "usage: %s [ | -l ]\n\n" \ + "This program takes one command line argument which corresponds to\n" \ + "the string representation of a Mbed TLS compile time configuration.\n" \ + "The value 0 will be returned if this configuration is defined in the\n" \ + "Mbed TLS build and the macro expansion of that configuration will be\n" \ + "printed (if any). Otherwise, 1 will be returned.\n" \ + "-l\tPrint all available configuration.\n" +#include +#include "query_config.h" + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + if ( argc != 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( USAGE, argv[0] ); + return( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); + } + + if( strcmp( argv[1], "-l" ) == 0 ) + { + list_config(); + return( 0 ); + } + + return( query_config( argv[1] ) ); +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/query_config.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/query_config.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..33131016 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/query_config.c @@ -0,0 +1,4265 @@ +/* + * Query Mbed TLS compile time configurations from config.h + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "query_config.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +/* + * Include all the headers with public APIs in case they define a macro to its + * default value when that configuration is not set in the config.h. + */ +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/pkcs11.h" +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" + +#include + +/* + * Helper macros to convert a macro or its expansion into a string + * WARNING: This does not work for expanding function-like macros. However, + * Mbed TLS does not currently have configuration options used in this fashion. + */ +#define MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR(macro) MACRO_NAME_TO_STR(macro) +#define MACRO_NAME_TO_STR(macro) \ + mbedtls_printf( "%s", strlen( #macro "" ) > 0 ? #macro "\n" : "" ) + +#define STRINGIFY(macro) #macro +#define OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(macro) mbedtls_printf( #macro "%s\n", \ + ( STRINGIFY(macro) "" )[0] != 0 ? "=" STRINGIFY(macro) : "" ) + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +/* + * Visual Studio throws the warning 4003 because many Mbed TLS feature macros + * are defined empty. This means that from the preprocessor's point of view + * the macro MBEDTLS_EXPANSION_TO_STR is being invoked without arguments as + * some macros expand to nothing. We suppress that specific warning to get a + * clean build and to ensure that tests treating warnings as errors do not + * fail. + */ +#pragma warning(push) +#pragma warning(disable:4003) +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ + +int query_config( const char *config ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_AES_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_AES_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DES_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DES_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_GENPRIME", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_GENPRIME ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_FS_IO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_FS_IO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_AESNI_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_AES_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_AES_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ARC4_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ARC4_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_BASE64_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_BASE64_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ARIA_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ARIA_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CCM_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CCM_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CERTS_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CMAC_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DES_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DES_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_DHM_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_DHM_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDH_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ERROR_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ERROR_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_GCM_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_GCM_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HKDF_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD2_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD2_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD4_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD4_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MD5_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MD5_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_NET_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_NET_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_OID_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_OID_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PK_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PK_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_RSA_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_RSA_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA1_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA1_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA256_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SHA512_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SHA512_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_THREADING_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TIMING_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_VERSION_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_VERSION_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_XTEA_C", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_XTEA_C ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + if( strcmp( "MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED", config ) == 0 ) + { + MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED */ + + /* If the symbol is not found, return an error */ + return( 1 ); +} + +void list_config( void ) +{ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_FS_IO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_AES_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CCM_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DES_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_DHM_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_GCM_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD2_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD4_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MD5_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_NET_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_OID_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PK_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_RSA_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED */ + + +} +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning(pop) +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/query_config.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/query_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bcc348e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/query_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Query Mbed TLS compile time configurations from config.h + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PROGRAMS_TEST_QUERY_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_PROGRAMS_TEST_QUERY_CONFIG_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/** Check whether a given configuration symbol is enabled. + * + * \param config The symbol to query (e.g. "MBEDTLS_RSA_C"). + * \return \c 0 if the symbol was defined at compile time + * (in MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE or config.h), + * \c 1 otherwise. + * + * \note This function is defined in `programs/test/query_config.c` + * which is automatically generated by + * `scripts/generate_query_config.pl`. + */ +int query_config( const char *config ); + +/** List all enabled configuration symbols + * + * \note This function is defined in `programs/test/query_config.c` + * which is automatically generated by + * `scripts/generate_query_config.pl`. + */ +void list_config( void ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PROGRAMS_TEST_QUERY_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/selftest.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/selftest.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..393d7376 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/selftest.c @@ -0,0 +1,498 @@ +/* + * Self-test demonstration program + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#endif + + +#if defined MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +/* Sanity check for malloc. This is not expected to fail, and is rather + * intended to display potentially useful information about the platform, + * in particular the behavior of malloc(0). */ +static int calloc_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int failures = 0; + void *empty1 = mbedtls_calloc( 0, 1 ); + void *empty2 = mbedtls_calloc( 0, 1 ); + void *buffer1 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ); + void *buffer2 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ); + + if( empty1 == NULL && empty2 == NULL ) + { + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(0): passed (NULL)\n" ); + } + else if( empty1 == NULL || empty2 == NULL ) + { + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(0): failed (mix of NULL and non-NULL)\n" ); + ++failures; + } + else if( empty1 == empty2 ) + { + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(0): passed (same non-null)\n" ); + } + else + { + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(0): passed (distinct non-null)\n" ); + } + + if( buffer1 == NULL || buffer2 == NULL ) + { + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(1): failed (NULL)\n" ); + ++failures; + } + else if( buffer1 == buffer2 ) + { + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(1): failed (same buffer twice)\n" ); + ++failures; + } + else + { + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(1): passed\n" ); + } + + mbedtls_free( buffer1 ); + buffer1 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ); + if( buffer1 == NULL ) + { + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(1 again): failed (NULL)\n" ); + ++failures; + } + else + { + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " CALLOC(1 again): passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + mbedtls_free( empty1 ); + mbedtls_free( empty2 ); + mbedtls_free( buffer1 ); + mbedtls_free( buffer2 ); + return( failures ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +static int test_snprintf( size_t n, const char *ref_buf, int ref_ret ) +{ + int ret; + char buf[10] = "xxxxxxxxx"; + const char ref[10] = "xxxxxxxxx"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( buf, n, "%s", "123" ); + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n ) + ret = -1; + + if( strncmp( ref_buf, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) != 0 || + ref_ret != ret || + memcmp( buf + n, ref + n, sizeof( buf ) - n ) != 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int run_test_snprintf( void ) +{ + return( test_snprintf( 0, "xxxxxxxxx", -1 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 1, "", -1 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 2, "1", -1 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 3, "12", -1 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 4, "123", 3 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 5, "123", 3 ) != 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check if a seed file is present, and if not create one for the entropy + * self-test. If this fails, we attempt the test anyway, so no error is passed + * back. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) && !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) +static void create_entropy_seed_file( void ) +{ + int result; + size_t output_len = 0; + unsigned char seed_value[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + /* Attempt to read the entropy seed file. If this fails - attempt to write + * to the file to ensure one is present. */ + result = mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read( seed_value, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + if( 0 == result ) + return; + + result = mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( NULL, + seed_value, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + &output_len ); + if( 0 != result ) + return; + + if( MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE != output_len ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write( seed_value, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); +} +#endif + +int mbedtls_entropy_self_test_wrapper( int verbose ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) && !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + create_entropy_seed_file( ); +#endif + return( mbedtls_entropy_self_test( verbose ) ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free_and_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + if( verbose != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status( ); +#endif + } + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); + return( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test( verbose ) ); +} +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + const char *name; + int ( *function )( int ); +} selftest_t; + +const selftest_t selftests[] = +{ + {"calloc", calloc_self_test}, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + {"md2", mbedtls_md2_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + {"md4", mbedtls_md4_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + {"md5", mbedtls_md5_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + {"ripemd160", mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + {"sha1", mbedtls_sha1_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + {"sha256", mbedtls_sha256_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + {"sha512", mbedtls_sha512_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + {"arc4", mbedtls_arc4_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + {"des", mbedtls_des_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + {"aes", mbedtls_aes_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + {"gcm", mbedtls_gcm_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + {"ccm", mbedtls_ccm_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + {"nist_kw", mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + {"cmac", mbedtls_cmac_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + {"chacha20", mbedtls_chacha20_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + {"poly1305", mbedtls_poly1305_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + {"chacha20-poly1305", mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + {"base64", mbedtls_base64_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + {"mpi", mbedtls_mpi_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + {"rsa", mbedtls_rsa_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) + {"x509", mbedtls_x509_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) + {"xtea", mbedtls_xtea_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + {"camellia", mbedtls_camellia_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + {"aria", mbedtls_aria_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + {"ctr_drbg", mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + {"hmac_drbg", mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + {"ecp", mbedtls_ecp_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + {"ecjpake", mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + {"dhm", mbedtls_dhm_self_test}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + {"entropy", mbedtls_entropy_self_test_wrapper}, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + {"pkcs5", mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test}, +#endif +/* Slower test after the faster ones */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + {"timing", mbedtls_timing_self_test}, +#endif +/* Heap test comes last */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + {"memory_buffer_alloc", mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free_and_self_test}, +#endif + {NULL, NULL} +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + const selftest_t *test; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + char **argp; + int v = 1; /* v=1 for verbose mode */ + int exclude_mode = 0; + int suites_tested = 0, suites_failed = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + unsigned char buf[1000000]; +#endif + void *pointer; + + /* + * The C standard doesn't guarantee that all-bits-0 is the representation + * of a NULL pointer. We do however use that in our code for initializing + * structures, which should work on every modern platform. Let's be sure. + */ + memset( &pointer, 0, sizeof( void * ) ); + if( pointer != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "all-bits-zero is not a NULL pointer\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); + } + + /* + * Make sure we have a snprintf that correctly zero-terminates + */ + if( run_test_snprintf() != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "the snprintf implementation is broken\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); + } + + for( argp = argv + ( argc >= 1 ? 1 : argc ); *argp != NULL; ++argp ) + { + if( strcmp( *argp, "--quiet" ) == 0 || + strcmp( *argp, "-q" ) == 0 ) + { + v = 0; + } + else if( strcmp( *argp, "--exclude" ) == 0 || + strcmp( *argp, "-x" ) == 0 ) + { + exclude_mode = 1; + } + else + break; + } + + if( v != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf, sizeof(buf) ); +#endif + + if( *argp != NULL && exclude_mode == 0 ) + { + /* Run the specified tests */ + for( ; *argp != NULL; argp++ ) + { + for( test = selftests; test->name != NULL; test++ ) + { + if( !strcmp( *argp, test->name ) ) + { + if( test->function( v ) != 0 ) + { + suites_failed++; + } + suites_tested++; + break; + } + } + if( test->name == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Test suite %s not available -> failed\n\n", *argp ); + suites_failed++; + } + } + } + else + { + /* Run all the tests except excluded ones */ + for( test = selftests; test->name != NULL; test++ ) + { + if( exclude_mode ) + { + char **excluded; + for( excluded = argp; *excluded != NULL; ++excluded ) + { + if( !strcmp( *excluded, test->name ) ) + break; + } + if( *excluded ) + { + if( v ) + mbedtls_printf( " Skip: %s\n", test->name ); + continue; + } + } + if( test->function( v ) != 0 ) + { + suites_failed++; + } + suites_tested++; + } + } + +#else + (void) exclude_mode; + mbedtls_printf( " MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST not defined.\n" ); +#endif + + if( v != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Executed %d test suites\n\n", suites_tested ); + + if( suites_failed > 0) + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ %d tests FAIL ]\n\n", suites_failed ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_printf( " [ All tests PASS ]\n\n" ); + } +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + } + + if( suites_failed > 0) + mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); + + mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ); +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/udp_proxy.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/udp_proxy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..48970e9a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/udp_proxy.c @@ -0,0 +1,1028 @@ +/* + * UDP proxy: emulate an unreliable UDP connection for DTLS testing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Warning: this is an internal utility program we use for tests. + * It does break some abstractions from the NET layer, and is thus NOT an + * example of good general usage. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#endif +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_NET_C not defined.\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +#include + +/* For select() */ +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) +#include +#include +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if defined(_WIN32_WCE) +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2.lib" ) +#else +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2_32.lib" ) +#endif +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ +#else /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +#define MAX_MSG_SIZE 16384 + 2048 /* max record/datagram size */ + +#define DFL_SERVER_ADDR "localhost" +#define DFL_SERVER_PORT "4433" +#define DFL_LISTEN_ADDR "localhost" +#define DFL_LISTEN_PORT "5556" +#define DFL_PACK 0 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +#define USAGE_PACK \ + " pack=%%d default: 0 (don't pack)\n" \ + " options: t > 0 (pack for t milliseconds)\n" +#else +#define USAGE_PACK +#endif + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: udp_proxy param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " server_addr=%%s default: localhost\n" \ + " server_port=%%d default: 4433\n" \ + " listen_addr=%%s default: localhost\n" \ + " listen_port=%%d default: 4433\n" \ + "\n" \ + " duplicate=%%d default: 0 (no duplication)\n" \ + " duplicate about 1:N packets randomly\n" \ + " delay=%%d default: 0 (no delayed packets)\n" \ + " delay about 1:N packets randomly\n" \ + " delay_ccs=0/1 default: 0 (don't delay ChangeCipherSpec)\n" \ + " delay_cli=%%s Handshake message from client that should be\n"\ + " delayed. Possible values are 'ClientHello',\n" \ + " 'Certificate', 'CertificateVerify', and\n" \ + " 'ClientKeyExchange'.\n" \ + " May be used multiple times, even for the same\n"\ + " message, in which case the respective message\n"\ + " gets delayed multiple times.\n" \ + " delay_srv=%%s Handshake message from server that should be\n"\ + " delayed. Possible values are 'HelloRequest',\n"\ + " 'ServerHello', 'ServerHelloDone', 'Certificate'\n"\ + " 'ServerKeyExchange', 'NewSessionTicket',\n"\ + " 'HelloVerifyRequest' and ''CertificateRequest'.\n"\ + " May be used multiple times, even for the same\n"\ + " message, in which case the respective message\n"\ + " gets delayed multiple times.\n" \ + " drop=%%d default: 0 (no dropped packets)\n" \ + " drop about 1:N packets randomly\n" \ + " mtu=%%d default: 0 (unlimited)\n" \ + " drop packets larger than N bytes\n" \ + " bad_ad=0/1 default: 0 (don't add bad ApplicationData)\n" \ + " bad_cid=%%d default: 0 (don't corrupt Connection IDs)\n" \ + " duplicate 1:N packets containing a CID,\n" \ + " modifying CID in first instance of the packet.\n" \ + " protect_hvr=0/1 default: 0 (don't protect HelloVerifyRequest)\n" \ + " protect_len=%%d default: (don't protect packets of this size)\n" \ + " inject_clihlo=0/1 default: 0 (don't inject fake ClientHello)\n" \ + "\n" \ + " seed=%%d default: (use current time)\n" \ + USAGE_PACK \ + "\n" + +/* + * global options + */ + +#define MAX_DELAYED_HS 10 + +static struct options +{ + const char *server_addr; /* address to forward packets to */ + const char *server_port; /* port to forward packets to */ + const char *listen_addr; /* address for accepting client connections */ + const char *listen_port; /* port for accepting client connections */ + + int duplicate; /* duplicate 1 in N packets (none if 0) */ + int delay; /* delay 1 packet in N (none if 0) */ + int delay_ccs; /* delay ChangeCipherSpec */ + char* delay_cli[MAX_DELAYED_HS]; /* handshake types of messages from + * client that should be delayed. */ + uint8_t delay_cli_cnt; /* Number of entries in delay_cli. */ + char* delay_srv[MAX_DELAYED_HS]; /* handshake types of messages from + * server that should be delayed. */ + uint8_t delay_srv_cnt; /* Number of entries in delay_srv. */ + int drop; /* drop 1 packet in N (none if 0) */ + int mtu; /* drop packets larger than this */ + int bad_ad; /* inject corrupted ApplicationData record */ + unsigned bad_cid; /* inject corrupted CID record */ + int protect_hvr; /* never drop or delay HelloVerifyRequest */ + int protect_len; /* never drop/delay packet of the given size*/ + int inject_clihlo; /* inject fake ClientHello after handshake */ + unsigned pack; /* merge packets into single datagram for + * at most \c merge milliseconds if > 0 */ + unsigned int seed; /* seed for "random" events */ +} opt; + +static void exit_usage( const char *name, const char *value ) +{ + if( value == NULL ) + mbedtls_printf( " unknown option or missing value: %s\n", name ); + else + mbedtls_printf( " option %s: illegal value: %s\n", name, value ); + + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); +} + +static void get_options( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int i; + char *p, *q; + + opt.server_addr = DFL_SERVER_ADDR; + opt.server_port = DFL_SERVER_PORT; + opt.listen_addr = DFL_LISTEN_ADDR; + opt.listen_port = DFL_LISTEN_PORT; + opt.pack = DFL_PACK; + /* Other members default to 0 */ + + opt.delay_cli_cnt = 0; + opt.delay_srv_cnt = 0; + memset( opt.delay_cli, 0, sizeof( opt.delay_cli ) ); + memset( opt.delay_srv, 0, sizeof( opt.delay_srv ) ); + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + exit_usage( p, NULL ); + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "server_addr" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_addr = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "server_port" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_port = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "listen_addr" ) == 0 ) + opt.listen_addr = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "listen_port" ) == 0 ) + opt.listen_port = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "duplicate" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.duplicate = atoi( q ); + if( opt.duplicate < 0 || opt.duplicate > 20 ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "delay" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.delay = atoi( q ); + if( opt.delay < 0 || opt.delay > 20 || opt.delay == 1 ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "delay_ccs" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.delay_ccs = atoi( q ); + if( opt.delay_ccs < 0 || opt.delay_ccs > 1 ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "delay_cli" ) == 0 || + strcmp( p, "delay_srv" ) == 0 ) + { + uint8_t *delay_cnt; + char **delay_list; + size_t len; + char *buf; + + if( strcmp( p, "delay_cli" ) == 0 ) + { + delay_cnt = &opt.delay_cli_cnt; + delay_list = opt.delay_cli; + } + else + { + delay_cnt = &opt.delay_srv_cnt; + delay_list = opt.delay_srv; + } + + if( *delay_cnt == MAX_DELAYED_HS ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " too many uses of %s: only %d allowed\n", + p, MAX_DELAYED_HS ); + exit_usage( p, NULL ); + } + + len = strlen( q ); + buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len + 1 ); + if( buf == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " Allocation failure\n" ); + exit( 1 ); + } + memcpy( buf, q, len + 1 ); + + delay_list[ (*delay_cnt)++ ] = buf; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "drop" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.drop = atoi( q ); + if( opt.drop < 0 || opt.drop > 20 || opt.drop == 1 ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "pack" ) == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + opt.pack = (unsigned) atoi( q ); +#else + mbedtls_printf( " option pack only defined if MBEDTLS_TIMING_C is enabled\n" ); + exit( 1 ); +#endif + } + else if( strcmp( p, "mtu" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.mtu = atoi( q ); + if( opt.mtu < 0 || opt.mtu > MAX_MSG_SIZE ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "bad_ad" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.bad_ad = atoi( q ); + if( opt.bad_ad < 0 || opt.bad_ad > 1 ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + else if( strcmp( p, "bad_cid" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.bad_cid = (unsigned) atoi( q ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + else if( strcmp( p, "protect_hvr" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.protect_hvr = atoi( q ); + if( opt.protect_hvr < 0 || opt.protect_hvr > 1 ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "protect_len" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.protect_len = atoi( q ); + if( opt.protect_len < 0 ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "inject_clihlo" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.inject_clihlo = atoi( q ); + if( opt.inject_clihlo < 0 || opt.inject_clihlo > 1 ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "seed" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.seed = atoi( q ); + if( opt.seed == 0 ) + exit_usage( p, q ); + } + else + exit_usage( p, NULL ); + } +} + +static const char *msg_type( unsigned char *msg, size_t len ) +{ + if( len < 1 ) return( "Invalid" ); + switch( msg[0] ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: return( "ChangeCipherSpec" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT: return( "Alert" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA: return( "ApplicationData" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID: return( "CID" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: break; /* See below */ + default: return( "Unknown" ); + } + + if( len < 13 + 12 ) return( "Invalid handshake" ); + + /* + * Our handshake message are less than 2^16 bytes long, so they should + * have 0 as the first byte of length, frag_offset and frag_length. + * Otherwise, assume they are encrypted. + */ + if( msg[14] || msg[19] || msg[22] ) return( "Encrypted handshake" ); + + switch( msg[13] ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST: return( "HelloRequest" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO: return( "ClientHello" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO: return( "ServerHello" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return( "HelloVerifyRequest" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: return( "NewSessionTicket" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE: return( "Certificate" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: return( "ServerKeyExchange" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: return( "CertificateRequest" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: return( "ServerHelloDone" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: return( "CertificateVerify" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: return( "ClientKeyExchange" ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED: return( "Finished" ); + default: return( "Unknown handshake" ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +/* Return elapsed time in milliseconds since the first call */ +static unsigned ellapsed_time( void ) +{ + static int initialized = 0; + static struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; + + if( initialized == 0 ) + { + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 1 ); + initialized = 1; + return( 0 ); + } + + return( mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ) ); +} + +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_net_context *ctx; + + const char *description; + + unsigned packet_lifetime; + unsigned num_datagrams; + + unsigned char data[MAX_MSG_SIZE]; + size_t len; + +} ctx_buffer; + +static ctx_buffer outbuf[2]; + +static int ctx_buffer_flush( ctx_buffer *buf ) +{ + int ret; + + mbedtls_printf( " %05u flush %s: %u bytes, %u datagrams, last %u ms\n", + ellapsed_time(), buf->description, + (unsigned) buf->len, buf->num_datagrams, + ellapsed_time() - buf->packet_lifetime ); + + ret = mbedtls_net_send( buf->ctx, buf->data, buf->len ); + + buf->len = 0; + buf->num_datagrams = 0; + + return( ret ); +} + +static unsigned ctx_buffer_time_remaining( ctx_buffer *buf ) +{ + unsigned const cur_time = ellapsed_time(); + + if( buf->num_datagrams == 0 ) + return( (unsigned) -1 ); + + if( cur_time - buf->packet_lifetime >= opt.pack ) + return( 0 ); + + return( opt.pack - ( cur_time - buf->packet_lifetime ) ); +} + +static int ctx_buffer_append( ctx_buffer *buf, + const unsigned char * data, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret; + + if( len > (size_t) INT_MAX ) + return( -1 ); + + if( len > sizeof( buf->data ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! buffer size %u too large (max %u)\n", + (unsigned) len, (unsigned) sizeof( buf->data ) ); + return( -1 ); + } + + if( sizeof( buf->data ) - buf->len < len ) + { + if( ( ret = ctx_buffer_flush( buf ) ) <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "ctx_buffer_flush failed with -%#04x", (unsigned int) -ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + memcpy( buf->data + buf->len, data, len ); + + buf->len += len; + if( ++buf->num_datagrams == 1 ) + buf->packet_lifetime = ellapsed_time(); + + return( (int) len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + +static int dispatch_data( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, + const unsigned char * data, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + ctx_buffer *buf = NULL; + if( opt.pack > 0 ) + { + if( outbuf[0].ctx == ctx ) + buf = &outbuf[0]; + else if( outbuf[1].ctx == ctx ) + buf = &outbuf[1]; + + if( buf == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + return( ctx_buffer_append( buf, data, len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + + ret = mbedtls_net_send( ctx, data, len ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "net_send returned -%#04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + } + return( ret ); +} + +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_net_context *dst; + const char *way; + const char *type; + unsigned len; + unsigned char buf[MAX_MSG_SIZE]; +} packet; + +/* Print packet. Outgoing packets come with a reason (forward, dupl, etc.) */ +void print_packet( const packet *p, const char *why ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + if( why == NULL ) + mbedtls_printf( " %05u dispatch %s %s (%u bytes)\n", + ellapsed_time(), p->way, p->type, p->len ); + else + mbedtls_printf( " %05u dispatch %s %s (%u bytes): %s\n", + ellapsed_time(), p->way, p->type, p->len, why ); +#else + if( why == NULL ) + mbedtls_printf( " dispatch %s %s (%u bytes)\n", + p->way, p->type, p->len ); + else + mbedtls_printf( " dispatch %s %s (%u bytes): %s\n", + p->way, p->type, p->len, why ); +#endif + + fflush( stdout ); +} + +/* + * In order to test the server's behaviour when receiving a ClientHello after + * the connection is established (this could be a hard reset from the client, + * but the server must not drop the existing connection before establishing + * client reachability, see RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8), we memorize the first + * ClientHello we see (which can't have a cookie), then replay it after the + * first ApplicationData record - then we're done. + * + * This is controlled by the inject_clihlo option. + * + * We want an explicit state and a place to store the packet. + */ +typedef enum { + ICH_INIT, /* haven't seen the first ClientHello yet */ + ICH_CACHED, /* cached the initial ClientHello */ + ICH_INJECTED, /* ClientHello already injected, done */ +} inject_clihlo_state_t; + +static inject_clihlo_state_t inject_clihlo_state; +static packet initial_clihlo; + +int send_packet( const packet *p, const char *why ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_net_context *dst = p->dst; + + /* save initial ClientHello? */ + if( opt.inject_clihlo != 0 && + inject_clihlo_state == ICH_INIT && + strcmp( p->type, "ClientHello" ) == 0 ) + { + memcpy( &initial_clihlo, p, sizeof( packet ) ); + inject_clihlo_state = ICH_CACHED; + } + + /* insert corrupted CID record? */ + if( opt.bad_cid != 0 && + strcmp( p->type, "CID" ) == 0 && + ( rand() % opt.bad_cid ) == 0 ) + { + unsigned char buf[MAX_MSG_SIZE]; + memcpy( buf, p->buf, p->len ); + + /* The CID resides at offset 11 in the DTLS record header. */ + buf[11] ^= 1; + print_packet( p, "modified CID" ); + + if( ( ret = dispatch_data( dst, buf, p->len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! dispatch returned %d\n", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* insert corrupted ApplicationData record? */ + if( opt.bad_ad && + strcmp( p->type, "ApplicationData" ) == 0 ) + { + unsigned char buf[MAX_MSG_SIZE]; + memcpy( buf, p->buf, p->len ); + + if( p->len <= 13 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! can't corrupt empty AD record" ); + } + else + { + ++buf[13]; + print_packet( p, "corrupted" ); + } + + if( ( ret = dispatch_data( dst, buf, p->len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! dispatch returned %d\n", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + print_packet( p, why ); + if( ( ret = dispatch_data( dst, p->buf, p->len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! dispatch returned %d\n", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Don't duplicate Application Data, only handshake covered */ + if( opt.duplicate != 0 && + strcmp( p->type, "ApplicationData" ) != 0 && + rand() % opt.duplicate == 0 ) + { + print_packet( p, "duplicated" ); + + if( ( ret = dispatch_data( dst, p->buf, p->len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! dispatch returned %d\n", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* Inject ClientHello after first ApplicationData */ + if( opt.inject_clihlo != 0 && + inject_clihlo_state == ICH_CACHED && + strcmp( p->type, "ApplicationData" ) == 0 ) + { + print_packet( &initial_clihlo, "injected" ); + + if( ( ret = dispatch_data( dst, initial_clihlo.buf, + initial_clihlo.len ) ) <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! dispatch returned %d\n", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + inject_clihlo_state = ICH_INJECTED; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define MAX_DELAYED_MSG 5 +static size_t prev_len; +static packet prev[MAX_DELAYED_MSG]; + +void clear_pending( void ) +{ + memset( &prev, 0, sizeof( prev ) ); + prev_len = 0; +} + +void delay_packet( packet *delay ) +{ + if( prev_len == MAX_DELAYED_MSG ) + return; + + memcpy( &prev[prev_len++], delay, sizeof( packet ) ); +} + +int send_delayed() +{ + uint8_t offset; + int ret; + for( offset = 0; offset < prev_len; offset++ ) + { + ret = send_packet( &prev[offset], "delayed" ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + clear_pending(); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Avoid dropping or delaying a packet that was already dropped or delayed + * ("held") twice: this only results in uninteresting timeouts. We can't rely + * on type to identify packets, since during renegotiation they're all + * encrypted. So, rely on size mod 2048 (which is usually just size). + * + * We only hold packets at the level of entire datagrams, not at the level + * of records. In particular, if the peer changes the way it packs multiple + * records into a single datagram, we don't necessarily count the number of + * times a record has been held correctly. However, the only known reason + * why a peer would change datagram packing is disabling the latter on + * retransmission, in which case we'd hold involved records at most + * HOLD_MAX + 1 times. + */ +static unsigned char held[2048] = { 0 }; +#define HOLD_MAX 2 + +int handle_message( const char *way, + mbedtls_net_context *dst, + mbedtls_net_context *src ) +{ + int ret; + packet cur; + size_t id; + + uint8_t delay_idx; + char ** delay_list; + uint8_t delay_list_len; + + /* receive packet */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_recv( src, cur.buf, sizeof( cur.buf ) ) ) <= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " ! mbedtls_net_recv returned %d\n", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + cur.len = ret; + cur.type = msg_type( cur.buf, cur.len ); + cur.way = way; + cur.dst = dst; + print_packet( &cur, NULL ); + + id = cur.len % sizeof( held ); + + if( strcmp( way, "S <- C" ) == 0 ) + { + delay_list = opt.delay_cli; + delay_list_len = opt.delay_cli_cnt; + } + else + { + delay_list = opt.delay_srv; + delay_list_len = opt.delay_srv_cnt; + } + + /* Check if message type is in the list of messages + * that should be delayed */ + for( delay_idx = 0; delay_idx < delay_list_len; delay_idx++ ) + { + if( delay_list[ delay_idx ] == NULL ) + continue; + + if( strcmp( delay_list[ delay_idx ], cur.type ) == 0 ) + { + /* Delay message */ + delay_packet( &cur ); + + /* Remove entry from list */ + mbedtls_free( delay_list[delay_idx] ); + delay_list[delay_idx] = NULL; + + return( 0 ); + } + } + + /* do we want to drop, delay, or forward it? */ + if( ( opt.mtu != 0 && + cur.len > (unsigned) opt.mtu ) || + ( opt.drop != 0 && + strcmp( cur.type, "CID" ) != 0 && + strcmp( cur.type, "ApplicationData" ) != 0 && + ! ( opt.protect_hvr && + strcmp( cur.type, "HelloVerifyRequest" ) == 0 ) && + cur.len != (size_t) opt.protect_len && + held[id] < HOLD_MAX && + rand() % opt.drop == 0 ) ) + { + ++held[id]; + } + else if( ( opt.delay_ccs == 1 && + strcmp( cur.type, "ChangeCipherSpec" ) == 0 ) || + ( opt.delay != 0 && + strcmp( cur.type, "CID" ) != 0 && + strcmp( cur.type, "ApplicationData" ) != 0 && + ! ( opt.protect_hvr && + strcmp( cur.type, "HelloVerifyRequest" ) == 0 ) && + cur.len != (size_t) opt.protect_len && + held[id] < HOLD_MAX && + rand() % opt.delay == 0 ) ) + { + ++held[id]; + delay_packet( &cur ); + } + else + { + /* forward and possibly duplicate */ + if( ( ret = send_packet( &cur, "forwarded" ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* send previously delayed messages if any */ + ret = send_delayed(); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + uint8_t delay_idx; + + mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd, server_fd; + +#if defined( MBEDTLS_TIMING_C ) + struct timeval tm; +#endif + + struct timeval *tm_ptr = NULL; + + int nb_fds; + fd_set read_fds; + + mbedtls_net_init( &listen_fd ); + mbedtls_net_init( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd ); + + get_options( argc, argv ); + + /* + * Decisions to drop/delay/duplicate packets are pseudo-random: dropping + * exactly 1 in N packets would lead to problems when a flight has exactly + * N packets: the same packet would be dropped on every resend. + * + * In order to be able to reproduce problems reliably, the seed may be + * specified explicitly. + */ + if( opt.seed == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + opt.seed = (unsigned int) mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#else + opt.seed = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Pseudo-random seed: %u\n", opt.seed ); + } + + srand( opt.seed ); + + /* + * 0. "Connect" to the server + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Connect to server on UDP/%s/%s ...", + opt.server_addr, opt.server_port ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd, opt.server_addr, opt.server_port, + MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1. Setup the "listening" UDP socket + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Bind on UDP/%s/%s ...", + opt.listen_addr, opt.listen_port ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_bind( &listen_fd, opt.listen_addr, opt.listen_port, + MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 2. Wait until a client connects + */ +accept: + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + + mbedtls_printf( " . Waiting for a remote connection ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_accept( &listen_fd, &client_fd, + NULL, 0, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_accept returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 3. Forward packets forever (kill the process to terminate it) + */ + clear_pending(); + memset( held, 0, sizeof( held ) ); + + nb_fds = client_fd.fd; + if( nb_fds < server_fd.fd ) + nb_fds = server_fd.fd; + if( nb_fds < listen_fd.fd ) + nb_fds = listen_fd.fd; + ++nb_fds; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + if( opt.pack > 0 ) + { + outbuf[0].ctx = &server_fd; + outbuf[0].description = "S <- C"; + outbuf[0].num_datagrams = 0; + outbuf[0].len = 0; + + outbuf[1].ctx = &client_fd; + outbuf[1].description = "S -> C"; + outbuf[1].num_datagrams = 0; + outbuf[1].len = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + + while( 1 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + if( opt.pack > 0 ) + { + unsigned max_wait_server, max_wait_client, max_wait; + max_wait_server = ctx_buffer_time_remaining( &outbuf[0] ); + max_wait_client = ctx_buffer_time_remaining( &outbuf[1] ); + + max_wait = (unsigned) -1; + + if( max_wait_server == 0 ) + ctx_buffer_flush( &outbuf[0] ); + else + max_wait = max_wait_server; + + if( max_wait_client == 0 ) + ctx_buffer_flush( &outbuf[1] ); + else + { + if( max_wait_client < max_wait ) + max_wait = max_wait_client; + } + + if( max_wait != (unsigned) -1 ) + { + tm.tv_sec = max_wait / 1000; + tm.tv_usec = ( max_wait % 1000 ) * 1000; + + tm_ptr = &tm; + } + else + { + tm_ptr = NULL; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + + FD_ZERO( &read_fds ); + FD_SET( server_fd.fd, &read_fds ); + FD_SET( client_fd.fd, &read_fds ); + FD_SET( listen_fd.fd, &read_fds ); + + if( ( ret = select( nb_fds, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, tm_ptr ) ) < 0 ) + { + perror( "select" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( FD_ISSET( listen_fd.fd, &read_fds ) ) + goto accept; + + if( FD_ISSET( client_fd.fd, &read_fds ) ) + { + if( ( ret = handle_message( "S <- C", + &server_fd, &client_fd ) ) != 0 ) + goto accept; + } + + if( FD_ISSET( server_fd.fd, &read_fds ) ) + { + if( ( ret = handle_message( "S -> C", + &client_fd, &server_fd ) ) != 0 ) + goto accept; + } + + } + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { + char error_buf[100]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); + mbedtls_printf( "Last error was: -0x%04X - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, error_buf ); + fflush( stdout ); + } +#endif + + for( delay_idx = 0; delay_idx < MAX_DELAYED_HS; delay_idx++ ) + { + mbedtls_free( opt.delay_cli[delay_idx] ); + mbedtls_free( opt.delay_srv[delay_idx] ); + } + + mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); + mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/udp_proxy_wrapper.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/udp_proxy_wrapper.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..27de0139 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/udp_proxy_wrapper.sh @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# -*-sh-basic-offset: 4-*- +# Usage: udp_proxy_wrapper.sh [PROXY_PARAM...] -- [SERVER_PARAM...] +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +set -u + +MBEDTLS_BASE="$(dirname -- "$0")/../.." +TPXY_BIN="$MBEDTLS_BASE/programs/test/udp_proxy" +SRV_BIN="$MBEDTLS_BASE/programs/ssl/ssl_server2" + +: ${VERBOSE:=0} + +stop_proxy() { + if [ -n "${tpxy_pid:-}" ]; then + echo + echo " * Killing proxy (pid $tpxy_pid) ..." + kill $tpxy_pid + fi +} + +stop_server() { + if [ -n "${srv_pid:-}" ]; then + echo + echo " * Killing server (pid $srv_pid) ..." + kill $srv_pid >/dev/null 2>/dev/null + fi +} + +cleanup() { + stop_server + stop_proxy + exit 129 +} + +trap cleanup INT TERM HUP + +# Extract the proxy parameters +tpxy_cmd_snippet='"$TPXY_BIN"' +while [ $# -ne 0 ] && [ "$1" != "--" ]; do + tail="$1" quoted="" + while [ -n "$tail" ]; do + case "$tail" in + *\'*) quoted="${quoted}${tail%%\'*}'\\''" tail="${tail#*\'}";; + *) quoted="${quoted}${tail}"; tail=; false;; + esac + done + tpxy_cmd_snippet="$tpxy_cmd_snippet '$quoted'" + shift +done +unset tail quoted +if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then + echo " * No server arguments (must be preceded by \" -- \") - exit" + exit 3 +fi +shift + +dtls_enabled= +ipv6_in_use= +server_port_orig= +server_addr_orig= +for param; do + case "$param" in + server_port=*) server_port_orig="${param#*=}";; + server_addr=*:*) server_addr_orig="${param#*=}"; ipv6_in_use=1;; + server_addr=*) server_addr_orig="${param#*=}";; + dtls=[!0]*) dtls_enabled=1;; + esac +done + +if [ -z "$dtls_enabled" ] || [ -n "$ipv6_in_use" ]; then + echo >&2 "$0: Couldn't find DTLS enabling, or IPv6 is in use - immediate fallback to server application..." + if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then + echo "[ $SRV_BIN $* ]" + fi + exec "$SRV_BIN" "$@" +fi + +if [ -z "$server_port_orig" ]; then + server_port_orig=4433 +fi +echo " * Server port: $server_port_orig" +tpxy_cmd_snippet="$tpxy_cmd_snippet \"listen_port=\$server_port_orig\"" +tpxy_cmd_snippet="$tpxy_cmd_snippet \"server_port=\$server_port\"" + +if [ -n "$server_addr_orig" ]; then + echo " * Server address: $server_addr_orig" + tpxy_cmd_snippet="$tpxy_cmd_snippet \"server_addr=\$server_addr_orig\"" + tpxy_cmd_snippet="$tpxy_cmd_snippet \"listen_addr=\$server_addr_orig\"" +fi + +server_port=$(( server_port_orig + 1 )) +set -- "$@" "server_port=$server_port" +echo " * Intermediate port: $server_port" + +echo " * Start proxy in background ..." +if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then + echo "[ $tpxy_cmd_snippet ]" +fi +eval exec "$tpxy_cmd_snippet" >/dev/null 2>&1 & +tpxy_pid=$! + +if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then + echo " * Proxy ID: $TPXY_PID" +fi + +echo " * Starting server ..." +if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then + echo "[ $SRV_BIN $* ]" +fi + +exec "$SRV_BIN" "$@" >&2 & +srv_pid=$! + +wait $srv_pid + +stop_proxy +return 0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/zeroize.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/zeroize.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f315f3b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/test/zeroize.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Zeroize application for debugger-driven testing + * + * This is a simple test application used for debugger-driven testing to check + * whether calls to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() are being eliminated by compiler + * optimizations. This application is used by the GDB script at + * tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb: the script sets a breakpoint at the last + * return statement in the main() function of this program. The debugger + * facilities are then used to manually inspect the memory and verify that the + * call to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() was not eliminated. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#define BUFFER_LEN 1024 + +void usage( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "Zeroize is a simple program to assist with testing\n" ); + mbedtls_printf( "the mbedtls_platform_zeroize() function by using the\n" ); + mbedtls_printf( "debugger. This program takes a file as input and\n" ); + mbedtls_printf( "prints the first %d characters. Usage:\n\n", BUFFER_LEN ); + mbedtls_printf( " zeroize \n" ); +} + +int main( int argc, char** argv ) +{ + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + FILE *fp; + char buf[BUFFER_LEN]; + char *p = buf; + char *end = p + BUFFER_LEN; + int c; + + if( argc != 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "This program takes exactly 1 argument\n" ); + usage(); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + fp = fopen( argv[1], "r" ); + if( fp == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Could not open file '%s'\n", argv[1] ); + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); + } + + while( ( c = fgetc( fp ) ) != EOF && p < end - 1 ) + *p++ = (char)c; + *p = '\0'; + + if( p - buf != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf ); + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + } + else + mbedtls_printf( "The file is empty!\n" ); + + fclose( fp ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); // GDB_BREAK_HERE -- don't remove this comment! +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a11212e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +set(libs + ${mbedcrypto_target} +) + +set(executables + pem2der + strerror +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs}) +endforeach() + +install(TARGETS ${executables} + DESTINATION "bin" + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/util/pem2der.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/util/pem2der.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2fd0fcb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/util/pem2der.c @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +/* + * Convert PEM to DER + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#define DFL_FILENAME "file.pem" +#define DFL_OUTPUT_FILENAME "file.der" + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: pem2der param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " filename=%%s default: file.pem\n" \ + " output_file=%%s default: file.der\n" \ + "\n" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BASE64_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + const char *filename; /* filename of the input file */ + const char *output_file; /* where to store the output */ +} opt; + +int convert_pem_to_der( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret; + const unsigned char *s1, *s2, *end = input + ilen; + size_t len = 0; + + s1 = (unsigned char *) strstr( (const char *) input, "-----BEGIN" ); + if( s1 == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + s2 = (unsigned char *) strstr( (const char *) input, "-----END" ); + if( s2 == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + s1 += 10; + while( s1 < end && *s1 != '-' ) + s1++; + while( s1 < end && *s1 == '-' ) + s1++; + if( *s1 == '\r' ) s1++; + if( *s1 == '\n' ) s1++; + + if( s2 <= s1 || s2 > end ) + return( -1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( NULL, 0, &len, (const unsigned char *) s1, s2 - s1 ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ) + return( ret ); + + if( len > *olen ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( output, len, &len, (const unsigned char *) s1, + s2 - s1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + */ +static int load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) +{ + FILE *f; + long size; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); + if( ( size = ftell( f ) ) == -1 ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( -1 ); + } + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); + + *n = (size_t) size; + + if( *n + 1 == 0 || + ( *buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *n + 1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( -1 ); + } + + if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n ) + { + fclose( f ); + free( *buf ); + *buf = NULL; + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Write buffer to a file + */ +static int write_file( const char *path, unsigned char *buf, size_t n ) +{ + FILE *f; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, n, f ) != n ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( f ); + return( 0 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + unsigned char *pem_buffer = NULL; + unsigned char der_buffer[4096]; + char buf[1024]; + size_t pem_size, der_size = sizeof(der_buffer); + int i; + char *p, *q; + + /* + * Set to sane values + */ + memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); + memset( der_buffer, 0, sizeof(der_buffer) ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.filename = DFL_FILENAME; + opt.output_file = DFL_OUTPUT_FILENAME; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "filename" ) == 0 ) + opt.filename = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "output_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.output_file = q; + else + goto usage; + } + + /* + * 1.1. Load the PEM file + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the PEM file ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = load_file( opt.filename, &pem_buffer, &pem_size ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); +#endif + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! load_file returned %d - %s\n\n", ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.2. Convert from PEM to DER + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Converting from PEM to DER ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = convert_pem_to_der( pem_buffer, pem_size, der_buffer, &der_size ) ) != 0 ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); +#endif + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! convert_pem_to_der %d - %s\n\n", ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.3. Write the DER file + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Writing the DER file ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = write_file( opt.output_file, der_buffer, der_size ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); +#endif + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! write_file returned %d - %s\n\n", ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + free( pem_buffer ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/util/strerror.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/util/strerror.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b7e4483 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/util/strerror.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * Translate error code to error string + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: strerror \n" \ + "\n where can be a decimal or hexadecimal (starts with 0x or -0x)\n" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_ERROR_C and/or MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + long int val; + char *end = argv[1]; + + if( argc != 2 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); + } + + val = strtol( argv[1], &end, 10 ); + if( *end != '\0' ) + { + val = strtol( argv[1], &end, 16 ); + if( *end != '\0' ) + { + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + if( val > 0 ) + val = -val; + + if( val != 0 ) + { + char error_buf[200]; + mbedtls_strerror( val, error_buf, 200 ); + mbedtls_printf("Last error was: -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -val, error_buf ); + } + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( val ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/wince_main.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/wince_main.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..851012c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/wince_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* + * Windows CE console application entry point + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if defined(_WIN32_WCE) + +#include + +extern int main( int, const char ** ); + +int _tmain( int argc, _TCHAR* targv[] ) +{ + char **argv; + int i; + + argv = ( char ** ) calloc( argc, sizeof( char * ) ); + + for ( i = 0; i < argc; i++ ) { + size_t len; + len = _tcslen( targv[i] ) + 1; + argv[i] = ( char * ) calloc( len, sizeof( char ) ); + wcstombs( argv[i], targv[i], len ); + } + + return main( argc, argv ); +} + +#endif /* defined(_WIN32_WCE) */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b1c3196 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +set(libs + ${mbedx509_target} +) + +if(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + set(libs ${libs} pkcs11-helper) +endif(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + +if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + set(libs ${libs} ${ZLIB_LIBRARIES}) +endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +set(executables + cert_app + cert_req + cert_write + crl_app + load_roots + req_app +) + +foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) + add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs}) +endforeach() + +target_link_libraries(cert_app ${mbedtls_target}) + +install(TARGETS ${executables} + DESTINATION "bin" + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/cert_app.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/cert_app.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89b25a83 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/cert_app.c @@ -0,0 +1,502 @@ +/* + * Certificate reading application + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#define MODE_NONE 0 +#define MODE_FILE 1 +#define MODE_SSL 2 + +#define DFL_MODE MODE_NONE +#define DFL_FILENAME "cert.crt" +#define DFL_CA_FILE "" +#define DFL_CRL_FILE "" +#define DFL_CA_PATH "" +#define DFL_SERVER_NAME "localhost" +#define DFL_SERVER_PORT "4433" +#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0 +#define DFL_PERMISSIVE 0 + +#define USAGE_IO \ + " ca_file=%%s The single file containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \ + " default: \"\" (none)\n" \ + " crl_file=%%s The single CRL file you want to use\n" \ + " default: \"\" (none)\n" \ + " ca_path=%%s The path containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \ + " default: \"\" (none) (overrides ca_file)\n" + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: cert_app param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " mode=file|ssl default: none\n" \ + " filename=%%s default: cert.crt\n" \ + USAGE_IO \ + " server_name=%%s default: localhost\n" \ + " server_port=%%d default: 4433\n" \ + " debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " permissive=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + "\n" + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + int mode; /* the mode to run the application in */ + const char *filename; /* filename of the certificate file */ + const char *ca_file; /* the file with the CA certificate(s) */ + const char *crl_file; /* the file with the CRL to use */ + const char *ca_path; /* the path with the CA certificate(s) reside */ + const char *server_name; /* hostname of the server (client only) */ + const char *server_port; /* port on which the ssl service runs */ + int debug_level; /* level of debugging */ + int permissive; /* permissive parsing */ +} opt; + +static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + ((void) level); + + mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str ); + fflush( (FILE *) ctx ); +} + +static int my_verify( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int depth, uint32_t *flags ) +{ + char buf[1024]; + ((void) data); + + mbedtls_printf( "\nVerify requested for (Depth %d):\n", depth ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_info( buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, "", crt ); + mbedtls_printf( "%s", buf ); + + if ( ( *flags ) == 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " This certificate has no flags\n" ); + else + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( buf, sizeof( buf ), " ! ", *flags ); + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_net_context server_fd; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; + mbedtls_x509_crl cacrl; + int i, j; + uint32_t flags; + int verify = 0; + char *p, *q; + const char *pers = "cert_app"; + + /* + * Set to sane values + */ + mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( &cacrl ); +#else + /* Zeroize structure as CRL parsing is not supported and we have to pass + it to the verify function */ + memset( &cacrl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl) ); +#endif + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.mode = DFL_MODE; + opt.filename = DFL_FILENAME; + opt.ca_file = DFL_CA_FILE; + opt.crl_file = DFL_CRL_FILE; + opt.ca_path = DFL_CA_PATH; + opt.server_name = DFL_SERVER_NAME; + opt.server_port = DFL_SERVER_PORT; + opt.debug_level = DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL; + opt.permissive = DFL_PERMISSIVE; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + for( j = 0; p + j < q; j++ ) + { + if( argv[i][j] >= 'A' && argv[i][j] <= 'Z' ) + argv[i][j] |= 0x20; + } + + if( strcmp( p, "mode" ) == 0 ) + { + if( strcmp( q, "file" ) == 0 ) + opt.mode = MODE_FILE; + else if( strcmp( q, "ssl" ) == 0 ) + opt.mode = MODE_SSL; + else + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "filename" ) == 0 ) + opt.filename = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "ca_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.ca_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "crl_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.crl_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "ca_path" ) == 0 ) + opt.ca_path = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "server_name" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_name = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "server_port" ) == 0 ) + opt.server_port = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "debug_level" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.debug_level = atoi( q ); + if( opt.debug_level < 0 || opt.debug_level > 65535 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "permissive" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.permissive = atoi( q ); + if( opt.permissive < 0 || opt.permissive > 1 ) + goto usage; + } + else + goto usage; + } + + /* + * 1.1. Load the trusted CA + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the CA root certificate ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( strlen( opt.ca_path ) ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( &cacert, opt.ca_path ) ) < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + verify = 1; + } + else if( strlen( opt.ca_file ) ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &cacert, opt.ca_file ) ) < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + verify = 1; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok (%d skipped)\n", ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + if( strlen( opt.crl_file ) ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( &cacrl, opt.crl_file ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crl_parse returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); + goto exit; + } + + verify = 1; + } +#endif + + if( opt.mode == MODE_FILE ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cur = &crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + + /* + * 1.1. Load the certificate(s) + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the certificate(s) ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, opt.filename ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + goto exit; + } + + if( opt.permissive == 0 && ret > 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse failed to parse %d certificates\n\n", ret ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.2 Print the certificate(s) + */ + while( cur != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Peer certificate information ...\n" ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, " ", + cur ); + if( ret == -1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_info returned %d\n\n", ret ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + /* + * 1.3 Verify the certificate + */ + if( verify ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Verifying X.509 certificate..." ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( &crt, &cacert, &cacrl, NULL, &flags, + my_verify, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + char vrfy_buf[512]; + + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ), " ! ", flags ); + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf ); + } + else + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + } + else if( opt.mode == MODE_SSL ) + { + /* + * 1. Initialize the RNG and the session data + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret ); + goto ssl_exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( opt.debug_level ); +#endif + + /* + * 2. Start the connection + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . SSL connection to tcp/%s/%s...", opt.server_name, + opt.server_port ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd, opt.server_name, + opt.server_port, MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto ssl_exit; + } + + /* + * 3. Setup stuff + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( verify ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( &conf, my_verify, NULL ); + } + else + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto ssl_exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, opt.server_name ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto ssl_exit; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &server_fd, mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, NULL ); + + /* + * 4. Handshake + */ + while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto ssl_exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 5. Print the certificate + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_printf( " . Peer certificate information ... skipped\n" ); +#else + mbedtls_printf( " . Peer certificate information ...\n" ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, " ", + mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( &ssl ) ); + if( ret == -1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_info returned %d\n\n", ret ); + goto ssl_exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl ); + +ssl_exit: + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); + } + else + goto usage; + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &cacrl ); +#endif + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_NET_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && + MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/cert_req.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/cert_req.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e8241a32 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/cert_req.c @@ -0,0 +1,403 @@ +/* + * Certificate request generation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C " + "not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#define DFL_FILENAME "keyfile.key" +#define DFL_PASSWORD NULL +#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0 +#define DFL_OUTPUT_FILENAME "cert.req" +#define DFL_SUBJECT_NAME "CN=Cert,O=mbed TLS,C=UK" +#define DFL_KEY_USAGE 0 +#define DFL_FORCE_KEY_USAGE 0 +#define DFL_NS_CERT_TYPE 0 +#define DFL_FORCE_NS_CERT_TYPE 0 +#define DFL_MD_ALG MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: cert_req param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " filename=%%s default: keyfile.key\n" \ + " password=%%s default: NULL\n" \ + " debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " output_file=%%s default: cert.req\n" \ + " subject_name=%%s default: CN=Cert,O=mbed TLS,C=UK\n" \ + " key_usage=%%s default: (empty)\n" \ + " Comma-separated-list of values:\n" \ + " digital_signature\n" \ + " non_repudiation\n" \ + " key_encipherment\n" \ + " data_encipherment\n" \ + " key_agreement\n" \ + " key_cert_sign\n" \ + " crl_sign\n" \ + " force_key_usage=0/1 default: off\n" \ + " Add KeyUsage even if it is empty\n" \ + " ns_cert_type=%%s default: (empty)\n" \ + " Comma-separated-list of values:\n" \ + " ssl_client\n" \ + " ssl_server\n" \ + " email\n" \ + " object_signing\n" \ + " ssl_ca\n" \ + " email_ca\n" \ + " object_signing_ca\n" \ + " force_ns_cert_type=0/1 default: off\n" \ + " Add NsCertType even if it is empty\n" \ + " md=%%s default: SHA256\n" \ + " possible values:\n" \ + " MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD160, SHA1,\n" \ + " SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512\n" \ + "\n" + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + const char *filename; /* filename of the key file */ + const char *password; /* password for the key file */ + int debug_level; /* level of debugging */ + const char *output_file; /* where to store the constructed key file */ + const char *subject_name; /* subject name for certificate request */ + unsigned char key_usage; /* key usage flags */ + int force_key_usage; /* Force adding the KeyUsage extension */ + unsigned char ns_cert_type; /* NS cert type */ + int force_ns_cert_type; /* Force adding NsCertType extension */ + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; /* Hash algorithm used for signature. */ +} opt; + +int write_certificate_request( mbedtls_x509write_csr *req, const char *output_file, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + FILE *f; + unsigned char output_buf[4096]; + size_t len = 0; + + memset( output_buf, 0, 4096 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( req, output_buf, 4096, f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + len = strlen( (char *) output_buf ); + + if( ( f = fopen( output_file, "w" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( fwrite( output_buf, 1, len, f ) != len ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_pk_context key; + char buf[1024]; + int i; + char *p, *q, *r; + mbedtls_x509write_csr req; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + const char *pers = "csr example app"; + + /* + * Set to sane values + */ + mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( &req ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &key ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.filename = DFL_FILENAME; + opt.password = DFL_PASSWORD; + opt.debug_level = DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL; + opt.output_file = DFL_OUTPUT_FILENAME; + opt.subject_name = DFL_SUBJECT_NAME; + opt.key_usage = DFL_KEY_USAGE; + opt.force_key_usage = DFL_FORCE_KEY_USAGE; + opt.ns_cert_type = DFL_NS_CERT_TYPE; + opt.force_ns_cert_type = DFL_FORCE_NS_CERT_TYPE; + opt.md_alg = DFL_MD_ALG; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "filename" ) == 0 ) + opt.filename = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "password" ) == 0 ) + opt.password = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "output_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.output_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "debug_level" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.debug_level = atoi( q ); + if( opt.debug_level < 0 || opt.debug_level > 65535 ) + goto usage; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "subject_name" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.subject_name = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "md" ) == 0 ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_string( q ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + opt.md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "key_usage" ) == 0 ) + { + while( q != NULL ) + { + if( ( r = strchr( q, ',' ) ) != NULL ) + *r++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( q, "digital_signature" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + else if( strcmp( q, "non_repudiation" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION; + else if( strcmp( q, "key_encipherment" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; + else if( strcmp( q, "data_encipherment" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT; + else if( strcmp( q, "key_agreement" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; + else if( strcmp( q, "key_cert_sign" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN; + else if( strcmp( q, "crl_sign" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN; + else + goto usage; + + q = r; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "force_key_usage" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.force_key_usage = 0; break; + case 1: opt.force_key_usage = 1; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "ns_cert_type" ) == 0 ) + { + while( q != NULL ) + { + if( ( r = strchr( q, ',' ) ) != NULL ) + *r++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( q, "ssl_client" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT; + else if( strcmp( q, "ssl_server" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER; + else if( strcmp( q, "email" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL; + else if( strcmp( q, "object_signing" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING; + else if( strcmp( q, "ssl_ca" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA; + else if( strcmp( q, "email_ca" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA; + else if( strcmp( q, "object_signing_ca" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA; + else + goto usage; + + q = r; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "force_ns_cert_type" ) == 0 ) + { + switch( atoi( q ) ) + { + case 0: opt.force_ns_cert_type = 0; break; + case 1: opt.force_ns_cert_type = 1; break; + default: goto usage; + } + } + else + goto usage; + } + + mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( &req, opt.md_alg ); + + if( opt.key_usage || opt.force_key_usage == 1 ) + mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( &req, opt.key_usage ); + + if( opt.ns_cert_type || opt.force_ns_cert_type == 1 ) + mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( &req, opt.ns_cert_type ); + + /* + * 0. Seed the PRNG + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.0. Check the subject name for validity + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Checking subject name..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( &req, opt.subject_name ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name returned %d", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.1. Load the key + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the private key ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, opt.filename, opt.password ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned %d", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( &req, &key ); + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.2. Writing the request + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Writing the certificate request ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = write_certificate_request( &req, opt.output_file, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! write_certifcate_request %d", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + + if( exit_code != MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_printf( " - %s\n", buf ); +#else + mbedtls_printf("\n"); +#endif + } + + mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( &req ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &key ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/cert_write.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/cert_write.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..18174d80 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/cert_write.c @@ -0,0 +1,808 @@ +/* + * Certificate generation and signing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ERROR_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) +#define USAGE_CSR \ + " request_file=%%s default: (empty)\n" \ + " If request_file is specified, subject_key,\n" \ + " subject_pwd and subject_name are ignored!\n" +#else +#define USAGE_CSR "" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ + +#define DFL_ISSUER_CRT "" +#define DFL_REQUEST_FILE "" +#define DFL_SUBJECT_KEY "subject.key" +#define DFL_ISSUER_KEY "ca.key" +#define DFL_SUBJECT_PWD "" +#define DFL_ISSUER_PWD "" +#define DFL_OUTPUT_FILENAME "cert.crt" +#define DFL_SUBJECT_NAME "CN=Cert,O=mbed TLS,C=UK" +#define DFL_ISSUER_NAME "CN=CA,O=mbed TLS,C=UK" +#define DFL_NOT_BEFORE "20010101000000" +#define DFL_NOT_AFTER "20301231235959" +#define DFL_SERIAL "1" +#define DFL_SELFSIGN 0 +#define DFL_IS_CA 0 +#define DFL_MAX_PATHLEN -1 +#define DFL_KEY_USAGE 0 +#define DFL_NS_CERT_TYPE 0 +#define DFL_VERSION 3 +#define DFL_AUTH_IDENT 1 +#define DFL_SUBJ_IDENT 1 +#define DFL_CONSTRAINTS 1 +#define DFL_DIGEST MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: cert_write param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + USAGE_CSR \ + " subject_key=%%s default: subject.key\n" \ + " subject_pwd=%%s default: (empty)\n" \ + " subject_name=%%s default: CN=Cert,O=mbed TLS,C=UK\n" \ + "\n" \ + " issuer_crt=%%s default: (empty)\n" \ + " If issuer_crt is specified, issuer_name is\n" \ + " ignored!\n" \ + " issuer_name=%%s default: CN=CA,O=mbed TLS,C=UK\n" \ + "\n" \ + " selfsign=%%d default: 0 (false)\n" \ + " If selfsign is enabled, issuer_name and\n" \ + " issuer_key are required (issuer_crt and\n" \ + " subject_* are ignored\n" \ + " issuer_key=%%s default: ca.key\n" \ + " issuer_pwd=%%s default: (empty)\n" \ + " output_file=%%s default: cert.crt\n" \ + " serial=%%s default: 1\n" \ + " not_before=%%s default: 20010101000000\n"\ + " not_after=%%s default: 20301231235959\n"\ + " is_ca=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \ + " max_pathlen=%%d default: -1 (none)\n" \ + " md=%%s default: SHA256\n" \ + " Supported values (if enabled):\n" \ + " MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD160, SHA1,\n" \ + " SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512\n" \ + " version=%%d default: 3\n" \ + " Possible values: 1, 2, 3\n"\ + " subject_identifier=%%s default: 1\n" \ + " Possible values: 0, 1\n" \ + " (Considered for v3 only)\n"\ + " authority_identifier=%%s default: 1\n" \ + " Possible values: 0, 1\n" \ + " (Considered for v3 only)\n"\ + " basic_constraints=%%d default: 1\n" \ + " Possible values: 0, 1\n" \ + " (Considered for v3 only)\n"\ + " key_usage=%%s default: (empty)\n" \ + " Comma-separated-list of values:\n" \ + " digital_signature\n" \ + " non_repudiation\n" \ + " key_encipherment\n" \ + " data_encipherment\n" \ + " key_agreement\n" \ + " key_cert_sign\n" \ + " crl_sign\n" \ + " (Considered for v3 only)\n"\ + " ns_cert_type=%%s default: (empty)\n" \ + " Comma-separated-list of values:\n" \ + " ssl_client\n" \ + " ssl_server\n" \ + " email\n" \ + " object_signing\n" \ + " ssl_ca\n" \ + " email_ca\n" \ + " object_signing_ca\n" \ + "\n" + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + const char *issuer_crt; /* filename of the issuer certificate */ + const char *request_file; /* filename of the certificate request */ + const char *subject_key; /* filename of the subject key file */ + const char *issuer_key; /* filename of the issuer key file */ + const char *subject_pwd; /* password for the subject key file */ + const char *issuer_pwd; /* password for the issuer key file */ + const char *output_file; /* where to store the constructed CRT */ + const char *subject_name; /* subject name for certificate */ + const char *issuer_name; /* issuer name for certificate */ + const char *not_before; /* validity period not before */ + const char *not_after; /* validity period not after */ + const char *serial; /* serial number string */ + int selfsign; /* selfsign the certificate */ + int is_ca; /* is a CA certificate */ + int max_pathlen; /* maximum CA path length */ + int authority_identifier; /* add authority identifier to CRT */ + int subject_identifier; /* add subject identifier to CRT */ + int basic_constraints; /* add basic constraints ext to CRT */ + int version; /* CRT version */ + mbedtls_md_type_t md; /* Hash used for signing */ + unsigned char key_usage; /* key usage flags */ + unsigned char ns_cert_type; /* NS cert type */ +} opt; + +int write_certificate( mbedtls_x509write_cert *crt, const char *output_file, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + FILE *f; + unsigned char output_buf[4096]; + size_t len = 0; + + memset( output_buf, 0, 4096 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( crt, output_buf, 4096, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + len = strlen( (char *) output_buf ); + + if( ( f = fopen( output_file, "w" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( fwrite( output_buf, 1, len, f ) != len ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + mbedtls_x509_crt issuer_crt; + mbedtls_pk_context loaded_issuer_key, loaded_subject_key; + mbedtls_pk_context *issuer_key = &loaded_issuer_key, + *subject_key = &loaded_subject_key; + char buf[1024]; + char issuer_name[256]; + int i; + char *p, *q, *r; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + char subject_name[256]; + mbedtls_x509_csr csr; +#endif + mbedtls_x509write_cert crt; + mbedtls_mpi serial; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + const char *pers = "crt example app"; + + /* + * Set to sane values + */ + mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( &crt ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &loaded_issuer_key ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &loaded_subject_key ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &serial ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_csr_init( &csr ); +#endif + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &issuer_crt ); + memset( buf, 0, 1024 ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.issuer_crt = DFL_ISSUER_CRT; + opt.request_file = DFL_REQUEST_FILE; + opt.subject_key = DFL_SUBJECT_KEY; + opt.issuer_key = DFL_ISSUER_KEY; + opt.subject_pwd = DFL_SUBJECT_PWD; + opt.issuer_pwd = DFL_ISSUER_PWD; + opt.output_file = DFL_OUTPUT_FILENAME; + opt.subject_name = DFL_SUBJECT_NAME; + opt.issuer_name = DFL_ISSUER_NAME; + opt.not_before = DFL_NOT_BEFORE; + opt.not_after = DFL_NOT_AFTER; + opt.serial = DFL_SERIAL; + opt.selfsign = DFL_SELFSIGN; + opt.is_ca = DFL_IS_CA; + opt.max_pathlen = DFL_MAX_PATHLEN; + opt.key_usage = DFL_KEY_USAGE; + opt.ns_cert_type = DFL_NS_CERT_TYPE; + opt.version = DFL_VERSION - 1; + opt.md = DFL_DIGEST; + opt.subject_identifier = DFL_SUBJ_IDENT; + opt.authority_identifier = DFL_AUTH_IDENT; + opt.basic_constraints = DFL_CONSTRAINTS; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "request_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.request_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "subject_key" ) == 0 ) + opt.subject_key = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "issuer_key" ) == 0 ) + opt.issuer_key = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "subject_pwd" ) == 0 ) + opt.subject_pwd = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "issuer_pwd" ) == 0 ) + opt.issuer_pwd = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "issuer_crt" ) == 0 ) + opt.issuer_crt = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "output_file" ) == 0 ) + opt.output_file = q; + else if( strcmp( p, "subject_name" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.subject_name = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "issuer_name" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.issuer_name = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "not_before" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.not_before = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "not_after" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.not_after = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "serial" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.serial = q; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "authority_identifier" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.authority_identifier = atoi( q ); + if( opt.authority_identifier != 0 && + opt.authority_identifier != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "subject_identifier" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.subject_identifier = atoi( q ); + if( opt.subject_identifier != 0 && + opt.subject_identifier != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "basic_constraints" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.basic_constraints = atoi( q ); + if( opt.basic_constraints != 0 && + opt.basic_constraints != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "md" ) == 0 ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_string( q ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + opt.md = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "version" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.version = atoi( q ); + if( opt.version < 1 || opt.version > 3 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + opt.version--; + } + else if( strcmp( p, "selfsign" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.selfsign = atoi( q ); + if( opt.selfsign < 0 || opt.selfsign > 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "is_ca" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.is_ca = atoi( q ); + if( opt.is_ca < 0 || opt.is_ca > 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "max_pathlen" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.max_pathlen = atoi( q ); + if( opt.max_pathlen < -1 || opt.max_pathlen > 127 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "key_usage" ) == 0 ) + { + while( q != NULL ) + { + if( ( r = strchr( q, ',' ) ) != NULL ) + *r++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( q, "digital_signature" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + else if( strcmp( q, "non_repudiation" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION; + else if( strcmp( q, "key_encipherment" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; + else if( strcmp( q, "data_encipherment" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT; + else if( strcmp( q, "key_agreement" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; + else if( strcmp( q, "key_cert_sign" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN; + else if( strcmp( q, "crl_sign" ) == 0 ) + opt.key_usage |= MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN; + else + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + + q = r; + } + } + else if( strcmp( p, "ns_cert_type" ) == 0 ) + { + while( q != NULL ) + { + if( ( r = strchr( q, ',' ) ) != NULL ) + *r++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( q, "ssl_client" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT; + else if( strcmp( q, "ssl_server" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER; + else if( strcmp( q, "email" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL; + else if( strcmp( q, "object_signing" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING; + else if( strcmp( q, "ssl_ca" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA; + else if( strcmp( q, "email_ca" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA; + else if( strcmp( q, "object_signing_ca" ) == 0 ) + opt.ns_cert_type |= MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA; + else + { + mbedtls_printf( "Invalid argument for option %s\n", p ); + goto usage; + } + + q = r; + } + } + else + goto usage; + } + + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + + /* + * 0. Seed the PRNG + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d - %s\n", + ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + // Parse serial to MPI + // + mbedtls_printf( " . Reading serial number..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &serial, 10, opt.serial ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_string " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + // Parse issuer certificate if present + // + if( !opt.selfsign && strlen( opt.issuer_crt ) ) + { + /* + * 1.0.a. Load the certificates + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the issuer certificate ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &issuer_crt, opt.issuer_crt ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( issuer_name, sizeof(issuer_name), + &issuer_crt.subject ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_dn_gets " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.issuer_name = issuer_name; + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + // Parse certificate request if present + // + if( !opt.selfsign && strlen( opt.request_file ) ) + { + /* + * 1.0.b. Load the CSR + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the certificate request ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( &csr, opt.request_file ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( subject_name, sizeof(subject_name), + &csr.subject ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_dn_gets " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.subject_name = subject_name; + subject_key = &csr.pk; + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * 1.1. Load the keys + */ + if( !opt.selfsign && !strlen( opt.request_file ) ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the subject key ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &loaded_subject_key, opt.subject_key, + opt.subject_pwd ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } + + mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the issuer key ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &loaded_issuer_key, opt.issuer_key, + opt.issuer_pwd ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile " + "returned -x%02x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + // Check if key and issuer certificate match + // + if( strlen( opt.issuer_crt ) ) + { + if( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &issuer_crt.pk, issuer_key ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! issuer_key does not match " + "issuer certificate\n\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + if( opt.selfsign ) + { + opt.subject_name = opt.issuer_name; + subject_key = issuer_key; + } + + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( &crt, subject_key ); + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( &crt, issuer_key ); + + /* + * 1.0. Check the names for validity + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( &crt, opt.subject_name ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( &crt, opt.issuer_name ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " . Setting certificate values ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( &crt, opt.version ); + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( &crt, opt.md ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( &crt, &serial ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( &crt, opt.not_before, opt.not_after ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + if( opt.version == MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 && + opt.basic_constraints != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Adding the Basic Constraints extension ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( &crt, opt.is_ca, + opt.max_pathlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! x509write_crt_set_basic_contraints " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( opt.version == MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 && + opt.subject_identifier != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Adding the Subject Key Identifier ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( &crt ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject" + "_key_identifier returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } + + if( opt.version == MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 && + opt.authority_identifier != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Adding the Authority Key Identifier ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( &crt ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_" + "key_identifier returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + + if( opt.version == MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 && + opt.key_usage != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Adding the Key Usage extension ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( &crt, opt.key_usage ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } + + if( opt.version == MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 && + opt.ns_cert_type != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " . Adding the NS Cert Type extension ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( &crt, opt.ns_cert_type ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type " + "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + } + + /* + * 1.2. Writing the certificate + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . Writing the certificate..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + if( ( ret = write_certificate( &crt, opt.output_file, + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 ); + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! write_certificate -0x%04x - %s\n\n", + (unsigned int) -ret, buf ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( &csr ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &issuer_crt ); + mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &loaded_subject_key ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &loaded_issuer_key ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &serial ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && + MBEDTLS_FS_IO && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && + MBEDTLS_ERROR_C && MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/crl_app.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/crl_app.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ffb539fd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/crl_app.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * CRL reading application + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#define DFL_FILENAME "crl.pem" +#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0 + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: crl_app param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " filename=%%s default: crl.pem\n" \ + "\n" + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + const char *filename; /* filename of the certificate file */ +} opt; + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + unsigned char buf[100000]; + mbedtls_x509_crl crl; + int i; + char *p, *q; + + /* + * Set to sane values + */ + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( &crl ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.filename = DFL_FILENAME; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "filename" ) == 0 ) + opt.filename = q; + else + goto usage; + } + + /* + * 1.1. Load the CRL + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the CRL ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( &crl, opt.filename ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &crl ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.2 Print the CRL + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . CRL information ...\n" ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_info( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, " ", &crl ); + if( ret == -1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crl_info returned %d\n\n", ret ); + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &crl ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &crl ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C && + MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/load_roots.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/load_roots.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a40949e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/load_roots.c @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +/* + * Root CA reading application + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * This file is provided under the Apache License 2.0, or the + * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later. + * + * ********** + * Apache License 2.0: + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * ********** + * + * ********** + * GNU General Public License v2.0 or later: + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along + * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + * + * ********** + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#define DFL_ITERATIONS 1 +#define DFL_PRIME_CACHE 1 + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: load_roots param=<>... [--] FILE...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " iterations=%%d Iteration count (not including cache priming); default: 1\n" \ + " prime=%%d Prime the disk read cache? Default: 1 (yes)\n" \ + "\n" + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + const char **filenames; /* NULL-terminated list of file names */ + unsigned iterations; /* Number of iterations to time */ + int prime_cache; /* Prime the disk read cache? */ +} opt; + + +int read_certificates( const char *const *filenames ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt cas; + int ret = 0; + const char *const *cur; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cas ); + + for( cur = filenames; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &cas, *cur ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + char error_message[200]; + mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_message, sizeof( error_message ) ); + printf( "\n%s: -0x%04x (%s)\n", + *cur, (unsigned) -ret, error_message ); +#else + printf( "\n%s: -0x%04x\n", + *cur, (unsigned) -ret ); +#endif + goto exit; + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cas ); + return( ret == 0 ); +} + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + unsigned i, j; + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time timer; + unsigned long ms; + + if( argc <= 1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.filenames = NULL; + opt.iterations = DFL_ITERATIONS; + opt.prime_cache = DFL_PRIME_CACHE; + + for( i = 1; i < (unsigned) argc; i++ ) + { + char *p = argv[i]; + char *q = NULL; + + if( strcmp( p, "--" ) == 0 ) + break; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + break; + *q++ = '\0'; + + for( j = 0; p + j < q; j++ ) + { + if( argv[i][j] >= 'A' && argv[i][j] <= 'Z' ) + argv[i][j] |= 0x20; + } + + if( strcmp( p, "iterations" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.iterations = atoi( q ); + } + else if( strcmp( p, "prime" ) == 0 ) + { + opt.iterations = atoi( q ) != 0; + } + else + { + mbedtls_printf( "Unknown option: %s\n", p ); + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + } + + opt.filenames = (const char**) argv + i; + if( *opt.filenames == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "Missing list of certificate files to parse\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "Parsing %u certificates", argc - i ); + if( opt.prime_cache ) + { + if( ! read_certificates( opt.filenames ) ) + goto exit; + mbedtls_printf( " " ); + } + + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &timer, 1 ); + for( i = 1; i <= opt.iterations; i++ ) + { + if( ! read_certificates( opt.filenames ) ) + goto exit; + mbedtls_printf( "." ); + } + ms = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &timer, 0 ); + mbedtls_printf( "\n%u iterations -> %lu ms\n", opt.iterations, ms ); + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* necessary configuration */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/req_app.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/req_app.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0256a763 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/programs/x509/req_app.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * Certificate request reading application + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int main( void ) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit( 0 ); +} +#else + +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#define DFL_FILENAME "cert.req" +#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0 + +#define USAGE \ + "\n usage: req_app param=<>...\n" \ + "\n acceptable parameters:\n" \ + " filename=%%s default: cert.req\n" \ + "\n" + + +/* + * global options + */ +struct options +{ + const char *filename; /* filename of the certificate request */ +} opt; + +int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) +{ + int ret = 1; + int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; + unsigned char buf[100000]; + mbedtls_x509_csr csr; + int i; + char *p, *q; + + /* + * Set to sane values + */ + mbedtls_x509_csr_init( &csr ); + + if( argc == 0 ) + { + usage: + mbedtls_printf( USAGE ); + goto exit; + } + + opt.filename = DFL_FILENAME; + + for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) + { + p = argv[i]; + if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL ) + goto usage; + *q++ = '\0'; + + if( strcmp( p, "filename" ) == 0 ) + opt.filename = q; + else + goto usage; + } + + /* + * 1.1. Load the CSR + */ + mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the CSR ..." ); + fflush( stdout ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( &csr, opt.filename ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( &csr ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" ); + + /* + * 1.2 Print the CSR + */ + mbedtls_printf( " . CSR information ...\n" ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_info( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, " ", &csr ); + if( ret == -1 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_csr_info returned %d\n\n", ret ); + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( &csr ); + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf ); + + exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS; + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( &csr ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); getchar(); +#endif + + mbedtls_exit( exit_code ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C && + MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/abi_check.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/abi_check.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..c2288432 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/abi_check.py @@ -0,0 +1,673 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""This script compares the interfaces of two versions of Mbed TLS, looking +for backward incompatibilities between two different Git revisions within +an Mbed TLS repository. It must be run from the root of a Git working tree. + +### How the script works ### + +For the source (API) and runtime (ABI) interface compatibility, this script +is a small wrapper around the abi-compliance-checker and abi-dumper tools, +applying them to compare the header and library files. + +For the storage format, this script compares the automatically generated +storage tests and the manual read tests, and complains if there is a +reduction in coverage. A change in test data will be signaled as a +coverage reduction since the old test data is no longer present. A change in +how test data is presented will be signaled as well; this would be a false +positive. + +The results of the API/ABI comparison are either formatted as HTML and stored +at a configurable location, or are given as a brief list of problems. +Returns 0 on success, 1 on non-compliance, and 2 if there is an error +while running the script. + +### How to interpret non-compliance ### + +This script has relatively common false positives. In many scenarios, it only +reports a pass if there is a strict textual match between the old version and +the new version, and it reports problems where there is a sufficient semantic +match but not a textual match. This section lists some common false positives. +This is not an exhaustive list: in the end what matters is whether we are +breaking a backward compatibility goal. + +**API**: the goal is that if an application works with the old version of the +library, it can be recompiled against the new version and will still work. +This is normally validated by comparing the declarations in `include/*/*.h`. +A failure is a declaration that has disappeared or that now has a different +type. + + * It's ok to change or remove macros and functions that are documented as + for internal use only or as experimental. + * It's ok to rename function or macro parameters as long as the semantics + has not changed. + * It's ok to change or remove structure fields that are documented as + private. + * It's ok to add fields to a structure that already had private fields + or was documented as extensible. + +**ABI**: the goal is that if an application was built against the old version +of the library, the same binary will work when linked against the new version. +This is normally validated by comparing the symbols exported by `libmbed*.so`. +A failure is a symbol that is no longer exported by the same library or that +now has a different type. + + * All ABI changes are acceptable if the library version is bumped + (see `scripts/bump_version.sh`). + * ABI changes that concern functions which are declared only inside the + library directory, and not in `include/*/*.h`, are acceptable only if + the function was only ever used inside the same library (libmbedcrypto, + libmbedx509, libmbedtls). As a counter example, if the old version + of libmbedtls calls mbedtls_foo() from libmbedcrypto, and the new version + of libmbedcrypto no longer has a compatible mbedtls_foo(), this does + require a version bump for libmbedcrypto. + +**Storage format**: the goal is to check that persistent keys stored by the +old version can be read by the new version. This is normally validated by +comparing the `*read*` test cases in `test_suite*storage_format*.data`. +A failure is a storage read test case that is no longer present with the same +function name and parameter list. + + * It's ok if the same test data is present, but its presentation has changed, + for example if a test function is renamed or has different parameters. + * It's ok if redundant tests are removed. + +**Generated test coverage**: the goal is to check that automatically +generated tests have as much coverage as before. This is normally validated +by comparing the test cases that are automatically generated by a script. +A failure is a generated test case that is no longer present with the same +function name and parameter list. + + * It's ok if the same test data is present, but its presentation has changed, + for example if a test function is renamed or has different parameters. + * It's ok if redundant tests are removed. + +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import glob +import os +import re +import sys +import traceback +import shutil +import subprocess +import argparse +import logging +import tempfile +import fnmatch +from types import SimpleNamespace + +import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET + + +class AbiChecker: + """API and ABI checker.""" + + def __init__(self, old_version, new_version, configuration): + """Instantiate the API/ABI checker. + + old_version: RepoVersion containing details to compare against + new_version: RepoVersion containing details to check + configuration.report_dir: directory for output files + configuration.keep_all_reports: if false, delete old reports + configuration.brief: if true, output shorter report to stdout + configuration.check_abi: if true, compare ABIs + configuration.check_api: if true, compare APIs + configuration.check_storage: if true, compare storage format tests + configuration.skip_file: path to file containing symbols and types to skip + """ + self.repo_path = "." + self.log = None + self.verbose = configuration.verbose + self._setup_logger() + self.report_dir = os.path.abspath(configuration.report_dir) + self.keep_all_reports = configuration.keep_all_reports + self.can_remove_report_dir = not (os.path.exists(self.report_dir) or + self.keep_all_reports) + self.old_version = old_version + self.new_version = new_version + self.skip_file = configuration.skip_file + self.check_abi = configuration.check_abi + self.check_api = configuration.check_api + if self.check_abi != self.check_api: + raise Exception('Checking API without ABI or vice versa is not supported') + self.check_storage_tests = configuration.check_storage + self.brief = configuration.brief + self.git_command = "git" + self.make_command = "make" + + @staticmethod + def check_repo_path(): + if not all(os.path.isdir(d) for d in ["include", "library", "tests"]): + raise Exception("Must be run from Mbed TLS root") + + def _setup_logger(self): + self.log = logging.getLogger() + if self.verbose: + self.log.setLevel(logging.DEBUG) + else: + self.log.setLevel(logging.INFO) + self.log.addHandler(logging.StreamHandler()) + + @staticmethod + def check_abi_tools_are_installed(): + for command in ["abi-dumper", "abi-compliance-checker"]: + if not shutil.which(command): + raise Exception("{} not installed, aborting".format(command)) + + def _get_clean_worktree_for_git_revision(self, version): + """Make a separate worktree with version.revision checked out. + Do not modify the current worktree.""" + git_worktree_path = tempfile.mkdtemp() + if version.repository: + self.log.debug( + "Checking out git worktree for revision {} from {}".format( + version.revision, version.repository + ) + ) + fetch_output = subprocess.check_output( + [self.git_command, "fetch", + version.repository, version.revision], + cwd=self.repo_path, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ) + self.log.debug(fetch_output.decode("utf-8")) + worktree_rev = "FETCH_HEAD" + else: + self.log.debug("Checking out git worktree for revision {}".format( + version.revision + )) + worktree_rev = version.revision + worktree_output = subprocess.check_output( + [self.git_command, "worktree", "add", "--detach", + git_worktree_path, worktree_rev], + cwd=self.repo_path, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ) + self.log.debug(worktree_output.decode("utf-8")) + version.commit = subprocess.check_output( + [self.git_command, "rev-parse", "HEAD"], + cwd=git_worktree_path, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ).decode("ascii").rstrip() + self.log.debug("Commit is {}".format(version.commit)) + return git_worktree_path + + def _update_git_submodules(self, git_worktree_path, version): + """If the crypto submodule is present, initialize it. + if version.crypto_revision exists, update it to that revision, + otherwise update it to the default revision""" + update_output = subprocess.check_output( + [self.git_command, "submodule", "update", "--init", '--recursive'], + cwd=git_worktree_path, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ) + self.log.debug(update_output.decode("utf-8")) + if not (os.path.exists(os.path.join(git_worktree_path, "crypto")) + and version.crypto_revision): + return + + if version.crypto_repository: + fetch_output = subprocess.check_output( + [self.git_command, "fetch", version.crypto_repository, + version.crypto_revision], + cwd=os.path.join(git_worktree_path, "crypto"), + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ) + self.log.debug(fetch_output.decode("utf-8")) + crypto_rev = "FETCH_HEAD" + else: + crypto_rev = version.crypto_revision + + checkout_output = subprocess.check_output( + [self.git_command, "checkout", crypto_rev], + cwd=os.path.join(git_worktree_path, "crypto"), + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ) + self.log.debug(checkout_output.decode("utf-8")) + + def _build_shared_libraries(self, git_worktree_path, version): + """Build the shared libraries in the specified worktree.""" + my_environment = os.environ.copy() + my_environment["CFLAGS"] = "-g -Og" + my_environment["SHARED"] = "1" + if os.path.exists(os.path.join(git_worktree_path, "crypto")): + my_environment["USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE"] = "1" + make_output = subprocess.check_output( + [self.make_command, "lib"], + env=my_environment, + cwd=git_worktree_path, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ) + self.log.debug(make_output.decode("utf-8")) + for root, _dirs, files in os.walk(git_worktree_path): + for file in fnmatch.filter(files, "*.so"): + version.modules[os.path.splitext(file)[0]] = ( + os.path.join(root, file) + ) + + @staticmethod + def _pretty_revision(version): + if version.revision == version.commit: + return version.revision + else: + return "{} ({})".format(version.revision, version.commit) + + def _get_abi_dumps_from_shared_libraries(self, version): + """Generate the ABI dumps for the specified git revision. + The shared libraries must have been built and the module paths + present in version.modules.""" + for mbed_module, module_path in version.modules.items(): + output_path = os.path.join( + self.report_dir, "{}-{}-{}.dump".format( + mbed_module, version.revision, version.version + ) + ) + abi_dump_command = [ + "abi-dumper", + module_path, + "-o", output_path, + "-lver", self._pretty_revision(version), + ] + abi_dump_output = subprocess.check_output( + abi_dump_command, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ) + self.log.debug(abi_dump_output.decode("utf-8")) + version.abi_dumps[mbed_module] = output_path + + @staticmethod + def _normalize_storage_test_case_data(line): + """Eliminate cosmetic or irrelevant details in storage format test cases.""" + line = re.sub(r'\s+', r'', line) + return line + + def _read_storage_tests(self, + directory, + filename, + is_generated, + storage_tests): + """Record storage tests from the given file. + + Populate the storage_tests dictionary with test cases read from + filename under directory. + """ + at_paragraph_start = True + description = None + full_path = os.path.join(directory, filename) + with open(full_path) as fd: + for line_number, line in enumerate(fd, 1): + line = line.strip() + if not line: + at_paragraph_start = True + continue + if line.startswith('#'): + continue + if at_paragraph_start: + description = line.strip() + at_paragraph_start = False + continue + if line.startswith('depends_on:'): + continue + # We've reached a test case data line + test_case_data = self._normalize_storage_test_case_data(line) + if not is_generated: + # In manual test data, only look at read tests. + function_name = test_case_data.split(':', 1)[0] + if 'read' not in function_name.split('_'): + continue + metadata = SimpleNamespace( + filename=filename, + line_number=line_number, + description=description + ) + storage_tests[test_case_data] = metadata + + @staticmethod + def _list_generated_test_data_files(git_worktree_path): + """List the generated test data files.""" + output = subprocess.check_output( + ['tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py', '--list'], + cwd=git_worktree_path, + ).decode('ascii') + return [line for line in output.split('\n') if line] + + def _get_storage_format_tests(self, version, git_worktree_path): + """Record the storage format tests for the specified git version. + + The storage format tests are the test suite data files whose name + contains "storage_format". + + The version must be checked out at git_worktree_path. + + This function creates or updates the generated data files. + """ + # Existing test data files. This may be missing some automatically + # generated files if they haven't been generated yet. + storage_data_files = set(glob.glob( + 'tests/suites/test_suite_*storage_format*.data' + )) + # Discover and (re)generate automatically generated data files. + to_be_generated = set() + for filename in self._list_generated_test_data_files(git_worktree_path): + if 'storage_format' in filename: + storage_data_files.add(filename) + to_be_generated.add(filename) + subprocess.check_call( + ['tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py'] + sorted(to_be_generated), + cwd=git_worktree_path, + ) + for test_file in sorted(storage_data_files): + self._read_storage_tests(git_worktree_path, + test_file, + test_file in to_be_generated, + version.storage_tests) + + def _cleanup_worktree(self, git_worktree_path): + """Remove the specified git worktree.""" + shutil.rmtree(git_worktree_path) + worktree_output = subprocess.check_output( + [self.git_command, "worktree", "prune"], + cwd=self.repo_path, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ) + self.log.debug(worktree_output.decode("utf-8")) + + def _get_abi_dump_for_ref(self, version): + """Generate the interface information for the specified git revision.""" + git_worktree_path = self._get_clean_worktree_for_git_revision(version) + self._update_git_submodules(git_worktree_path, version) + if self.check_abi: + self._build_shared_libraries(git_worktree_path, version) + self._get_abi_dumps_from_shared_libraries(version) + if self.check_storage_tests: + self._get_storage_format_tests(version, git_worktree_path) + self._cleanup_worktree(git_worktree_path) + + def _remove_children_with_tag(self, parent, tag): + children = parent.getchildren() + for child in children: + if child.tag == tag: + parent.remove(child) + else: + self._remove_children_with_tag(child, tag) + + def _remove_extra_detail_from_report(self, report_root): + for tag in ['test_info', 'test_results', 'problem_summary', + 'added_symbols', 'affected']: + self._remove_children_with_tag(report_root, tag) + + for report in report_root: + for problems in report.getchildren()[:]: + if not problems.getchildren(): + report.remove(problems) + + def _abi_compliance_command(self, mbed_module, output_path): + """Build the command to run to analyze the library mbed_module. + The report will be placed in output_path.""" + abi_compliance_command = [ + "abi-compliance-checker", + "-l", mbed_module, + "-old", self.old_version.abi_dumps[mbed_module], + "-new", self.new_version.abi_dumps[mbed_module], + "-strict", + "-report-path", output_path, + ] + if self.skip_file: + abi_compliance_command += ["-skip-symbols", self.skip_file, + "-skip-types", self.skip_file] + if self.brief: + abi_compliance_command += ["-report-format", "xml", + "-stdout"] + return abi_compliance_command + + def _is_library_compatible(self, mbed_module, compatibility_report): + """Test if the library mbed_module has remained compatible. + Append a message regarding compatibility to compatibility_report.""" + output_path = os.path.join( + self.report_dir, "{}-{}-{}.html".format( + mbed_module, self.old_version.revision, + self.new_version.revision + ) + ) + try: + subprocess.check_output( + self._abi_compliance_command(mbed_module, output_path), + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT + ) + except subprocess.CalledProcessError as err: + if err.returncode != 1: + raise err + if self.brief: + self.log.info( + "Compatibility issues found for {}".format(mbed_module) + ) + report_root = ET.fromstring(err.output.decode("utf-8")) + self._remove_extra_detail_from_report(report_root) + self.log.info(ET.tostring(report_root).decode("utf-8")) + else: + self.can_remove_report_dir = False + compatibility_report.append( + "Compatibility issues found for {}, " + "for details see {}".format(mbed_module, output_path) + ) + return False + compatibility_report.append( + "No compatibility issues for {}".format(mbed_module) + ) + if not (self.keep_all_reports or self.brief): + os.remove(output_path) + return True + + @staticmethod + def _is_storage_format_compatible(old_tests, new_tests, + compatibility_report): + """Check whether all tests present in old_tests are also in new_tests. + + Append a message regarding compatibility to compatibility_report. + """ + missing = frozenset(old_tests.keys()).difference(new_tests.keys()) + for test_data in sorted(missing): + metadata = old_tests[test_data] + compatibility_report.append( + 'Test case from {} line {} "{}" has disappeared: {}'.format( + metadata.filename, metadata.line_number, + metadata.description, test_data + ) + ) + compatibility_report.append( + 'FAIL: {}/{} storage format test cases have changed or disappeared.'.format( + len(missing), len(old_tests) + ) if missing else + 'PASS: All {} storage format test cases are preserved.'.format( + len(old_tests) + ) + ) + compatibility_report.append( + 'Info: number of storage format tests cases: {} -> {}.'.format( + len(old_tests), len(new_tests) + ) + ) + return not missing + + def get_abi_compatibility_report(self): + """Generate a report of the differences between the reference ABI + and the new ABI. ABI dumps from self.old_version and self.new_version + must be available.""" + compatibility_report = ["Checking evolution from {} to {}".format( + self._pretty_revision(self.old_version), + self._pretty_revision(self.new_version) + )] + compliance_return_code = 0 + + if self.check_abi: + shared_modules = list(set(self.old_version.modules.keys()) & + set(self.new_version.modules.keys())) + for mbed_module in shared_modules: + if not self._is_library_compatible(mbed_module, + compatibility_report): + compliance_return_code = 1 + + if self.check_storage_tests: + if not self._is_storage_format_compatible( + self.old_version.storage_tests, + self.new_version.storage_tests, + compatibility_report): + compliance_return_code = 1 + + for version in [self.old_version, self.new_version]: + for mbed_module, mbed_module_dump in version.abi_dumps.items(): + os.remove(mbed_module_dump) + if self.can_remove_report_dir: + os.rmdir(self.report_dir) + self.log.info("\n".join(compatibility_report)) + return compliance_return_code + + def check_for_abi_changes(self): + """Generate a report of ABI differences + between self.old_rev and self.new_rev.""" + self.check_repo_path() + if self.check_api or self.check_abi: + self.check_abi_tools_are_installed() + self._get_abi_dump_for_ref(self.old_version) + self._get_abi_dump_for_ref(self.new_version) + return self.get_abi_compatibility_report() + + +def run_main(): + try: + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( + description=__doc__ + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-v", "--verbose", action="store_true", + help="set verbosity level", + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-r", "--report-dir", type=str, default="reports", + help="directory where reports are stored, default is reports", + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-k", "--keep-all-reports", action="store_true", + help="keep all reports, even if there are no compatibility issues", + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-o", "--old-rev", type=str, help="revision for old version.", + required=True, + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-or", "--old-repo", type=str, help="repository for old version." + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-oc", "--old-crypto-rev", type=str, + help="revision for old crypto submodule." + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-ocr", "--old-crypto-repo", type=str, + help="repository for old crypto submodule." + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-n", "--new-rev", type=str, help="revision for new version", + required=True, + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-nr", "--new-repo", type=str, help="repository for new version." + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-nc", "--new-crypto-rev", type=str, + help="revision for new crypto version" + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-ncr", "--new-crypto-repo", type=str, + help="repository for new crypto submodule." + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-s", "--skip-file", type=str, + help=("path to file containing symbols and types to skip " + "(typically \"-s identifiers\" after running " + "\"tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh --internal\")") + ) + parser.add_argument( + "--check-abi", + action='store_true', default=True, + help="Perform ABI comparison (default: yes)" + ) + parser.add_argument("--no-check-abi", action='store_false', dest='check_abi') + parser.add_argument( + "--check-api", + action='store_true', default=True, + help="Perform API comparison (default: yes)" + ) + parser.add_argument("--no-check-api", action='store_false', dest='check_api') + parser.add_argument( + "--check-storage", + action='store_true', default=True, + help="Perform storage tests comparison (default: yes)" + ) + parser.add_argument("--no-check-storage", action='store_false', dest='check_storage') + parser.add_argument( + "-b", "--brief", action="store_true", + help="output only the list of issues to stdout, instead of a full report", + ) + abi_args = parser.parse_args() + if os.path.isfile(abi_args.report_dir): + print("Error: {} is not a directory".format(abi_args.report_dir)) + parser.exit() + old_version = SimpleNamespace( + version="old", + repository=abi_args.old_repo, + revision=abi_args.old_rev, + commit=None, + crypto_repository=abi_args.old_crypto_repo, + crypto_revision=abi_args.old_crypto_rev, + abi_dumps={}, + storage_tests={}, + modules={} + ) + new_version = SimpleNamespace( + version="new", + repository=abi_args.new_repo, + revision=abi_args.new_rev, + commit=None, + crypto_repository=abi_args.new_crypto_repo, + crypto_revision=abi_args.new_crypto_rev, + abi_dumps={}, + storage_tests={}, + modules={} + ) + configuration = SimpleNamespace( + verbose=abi_args.verbose, + report_dir=abi_args.report_dir, + keep_all_reports=abi_args.keep_all_reports, + brief=abi_args.brief, + check_abi=abi_args.check_abi, + check_api=abi_args.check_api, + check_storage=abi_args.check_storage, + skip_file=abi_args.skip_file + ) + abi_check = AbiChecker(old_version, new_version, configuration) + return_code = abi_check.check_for_abi_changes() + sys.exit(return_code) + except Exception: # pylint: disable=broad-except + # Print the backtrace and exit explicitly so as to exit with + # status 2, not 1. + traceback.print_exc() + sys.exit(2) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + run_main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/apidoc_full.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/apidoc_full.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..03bbb642 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/apidoc_full.sh @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Generate doxygen documentation with a full config.h (this ensures that every +# available flag is documented, and avoids warnings about documentation +# without a corresponding #define). +# +# /!\ This must not be a Makefile target, as it would create a race condition +# when multiple targets are invoked in the same parallel build. +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +set -eu + +CONFIG_H='include/mbedtls/config.h' + +if [ -r $CONFIG_H ]; then :; else + echo "$CONFIG_H not found" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +CONFIG_BAK=${CONFIG_H}.bak +cp -p $CONFIG_H $CONFIG_BAK + +scripts/config.py realfull +make apidoc + +mv $CONFIG_BAK $CONFIG_H diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/assemble_changelog.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/assemble_changelog.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..b742cc8c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/assemble_changelog.py @@ -0,0 +1,526 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 + +"""Assemble Mbed TLS change log entries into the change log file. + +Add changelog entries to the first level-2 section. +Create a new level-2 section for unreleased changes if needed. +Remove the input files unless --keep-entries is specified. + +In each level-3 section, entries are sorted in chronological order +(oldest first). From oldest to newest: +* Merged entry files are sorted according to their merge date (date of + the merge commit that brought the commit that created the file into + the target branch). +* Committed but unmerged entry files are sorted according to the date + of the commit that adds them. +* Uncommitted entry files are sorted according to their modification time. + +You must run this program from within a git working directory. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import argparse +from collections import OrderedDict, namedtuple +import datetime +import functools +import glob +import os +import re +import subprocess +import sys + +class InputFormatError(Exception): + def __init__(self, filename, line_number, message, *args, **kwargs): + message = '{}:{}: {}'.format(filename, line_number, + message.format(*args, **kwargs)) + super().__init__(message) + +class CategoryParseError(Exception): + def __init__(self, line_offset, error_message): + self.line_offset = line_offset + self.error_message = error_message + super().__init__('{}: {}'.format(line_offset, error_message)) + +class LostContent(Exception): + def __init__(self, filename, line): + message = ('Lost content from {}: "{}"'.format(filename, line)) + super().__init__(message) + +# The category names we use in the changelog. +# If you edit this, update ChangeLog.d/README.md. +STANDARD_CATEGORIES = ( + 'API changes', + 'Default behavior changes', + 'Requirement changes', + 'New deprecations', + 'Removals', + 'Features', + 'Security', + 'Bugfix', + 'Changes', +) + +# The maximum line length for an entry +MAX_LINE_LENGTH = 80 + +CategoryContent = namedtuple('CategoryContent', [ + 'name', 'title_line', # Title text and line number of the title + 'body', 'body_line', # Body text and starting line number of the body +]) + +class ChangelogFormat: + """Virtual class documenting how to write a changelog format class.""" + + @classmethod + def extract_top_version(cls, changelog_file_content): + """Split out the top version section. + + If the top version is already released, create a new top + version section for an unreleased version. + + Return ``(header, top_version_title, top_version_body, trailer)`` + where the "top version" is the existing top version section if it's + for unreleased changes, and a newly created section otherwise. + To assemble the changelog after modifying top_version_body, + concatenate the four pieces. + """ + raise NotImplementedError + + @classmethod + def version_title_text(cls, version_title): + """Return the text of a formatted version section title.""" + raise NotImplementedError + + @classmethod + def split_categories(cls, version_body): + """Split a changelog version section body into categories. + + Return a list of `CategoryContent` the name is category title + without any formatting. + """ + raise NotImplementedError + + @classmethod + def format_category(cls, title, body): + """Construct the text of a category section from its title and body.""" + raise NotImplementedError + +class TextChangelogFormat(ChangelogFormat): + """The traditional Mbed TLS changelog format.""" + + _unreleased_version_text = '= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx' + @classmethod + def is_released_version(cls, title): + # Look for an incomplete release date + return not re.search(r'[0-9x]{4}-[0-9x]{2}-[0-9x]?x', title) + + _top_version_re = re.compile(r'(?:\A|\n)(=[^\n]*\n+)(.*?\n)(?:=|$)', + re.DOTALL) + @classmethod + def extract_top_version(cls, changelog_file_content): + """A version section starts with a line starting with '='.""" + m = re.search(cls._top_version_re, changelog_file_content) + top_version_start = m.start(1) + top_version_end = m.end(2) + top_version_title = m.group(1) + top_version_body = m.group(2) + if cls.is_released_version(top_version_title): + top_version_end = top_version_start + top_version_title = cls._unreleased_version_text + '\n\n' + top_version_body = '' + return (changelog_file_content[:top_version_start], + top_version_title, top_version_body, + changelog_file_content[top_version_end:]) + + @classmethod + def version_title_text(cls, version_title): + return re.sub(r'\n.*', version_title, re.DOTALL) + + _category_title_re = re.compile(r'(^\w.*)\n+', re.MULTILINE) + @classmethod + def split_categories(cls, version_body): + """A category title is a line with the title in column 0.""" + if not version_body: + return [] + title_matches = list(re.finditer(cls._category_title_re, version_body)) + if not title_matches or title_matches[0].start() != 0: + # There is junk before the first category. + raise CategoryParseError(0, 'Junk found where category expected') + title_starts = [m.start(1) for m in title_matches] + body_starts = [m.end(0) for m in title_matches] + body_ends = title_starts[1:] + [len(version_body)] + bodies = [version_body[body_start:body_end].rstrip('\n') + '\n' + for (body_start, body_end) in zip(body_starts, body_ends)] + title_lines = [version_body[:pos].count('\n') for pos in title_starts] + body_lines = [version_body[:pos].count('\n') for pos in body_starts] + return [CategoryContent(title_match.group(1), title_line, + body, body_line) + for title_match, title_line, body, body_line + in zip(title_matches, title_lines, bodies, body_lines)] + + @classmethod + def format_category(cls, title, body): + # `split_categories` ensures that each body ends with a newline. + # Make sure that there is additionally a blank line between categories. + if not body.endswith('\n\n'): + body += '\n' + return title + '\n' + body + +class ChangeLog: + """An Mbed TLS changelog. + + A changelog file consists of some header text followed by one or + more version sections. The version sections are in reverse + chronological order. Each version section consists of a title and a body. + + The body of a version section consists of zero or more category + subsections. Each category subsection consists of a title and a body. + + A changelog entry file has the same format as the body of a version section. + + A `ChangelogFormat` object defines the concrete syntax of the changelog. + Entry files must have the same format as the changelog file. + """ + + # Only accept dotted version numbers (e.g. "3.1", not "3"). + # Refuse ".x" in a version number where x is a letter: this indicates + # a version that is not yet released. Something like "3.1a" is accepted. + _version_number_re = re.compile(r'[0-9]+\.[0-9A-Za-z.]+') + _incomplete_version_number_re = re.compile(r'.*\.[A-Za-z]') + _only_url_re = re.compile(r'^\s*\w+://\S+\s*$') + _has_url_re = re.compile(r'.*://.*') + + def add_categories_from_text(self, filename, line_offset, + text, allow_unknown_category): + """Parse a version section or entry file.""" + try: + categories = self.format.split_categories(text) + except CategoryParseError as e: + raise InputFormatError(filename, line_offset + e.line_offset, + e.error_message) + for category in categories: + if not allow_unknown_category and \ + category.name not in self.categories: + raise InputFormatError(filename, + line_offset + category.title_line, + 'Unknown category: "{}"', + category.name) + + body_split = category.body.splitlines() + + for line_number, line in enumerate(body_split, 1): + if not self._only_url_re.match(line) and \ + len(line) > MAX_LINE_LENGTH: + long_url_msg = '. URL exceeding length limit must be alone in its line.' \ + if self._has_url_re.match(line) else "" + raise InputFormatError(filename, + category.body_line + line_number, + 'Line is longer than allowed: ' + 'Length {} (Max {}){}', + len(line), MAX_LINE_LENGTH, + long_url_msg) + + self.categories[category.name] += category.body + + def __init__(self, input_stream, changelog_format): + """Create a changelog object. + + Populate the changelog object from the content of the file + input_stream. + """ + self.format = changelog_format + whole_file = input_stream.read() + (self.header, + self.top_version_title, top_version_body, + self.trailer) = self.format.extract_top_version(whole_file) + # Split the top version section into categories. + self.categories = OrderedDict() + for category in STANDARD_CATEGORIES: + self.categories[category] = '' + offset = (self.header + self.top_version_title).count('\n') + 1 + self.add_categories_from_text(input_stream.name, offset, + top_version_body, True) + + def add_file(self, input_stream): + """Add changelog entries from a file. + """ + self.add_categories_from_text(input_stream.name, 1, + input_stream.read(), False) + + def write(self, filename): + """Write the changelog to the specified file. + """ + with open(filename, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as out: + out.write(self.header) + out.write(self.top_version_title) + for title, body in self.categories.items(): + if not body: + continue + out.write(self.format.format_category(title, body)) + out.write(self.trailer) + + +@functools.total_ordering +class EntryFileSortKey: + """This classes defines an ordering on changelog entry files: older < newer. + + * Merged entry files are sorted according to their merge date (date of + the merge commit that brought the commit that created the file into + the target branch). + * Committed but unmerged entry files are sorted according to the date + of the commit that adds them. + * Uncommitted entry files are sorted according to their modification time. + + This class assumes that the file is in a git working directory with + the target branch checked out. + """ + + # Categories of files. A lower number is considered older. + MERGED = 0 + COMMITTED = 1 + LOCAL = 2 + + @staticmethod + def creation_hash(filename): + """Return the git commit id at which the given file was created. + + Return None if the file was never checked into git. + """ + hashes = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'log', '--format=%H', + '--follow', + '--', filename]) + m = re.search('(.+)$', hashes.decode('ascii')) + if not m: + # The git output is empty. This means that the file was + # never checked in. + return None + # The last commit in the log is the oldest one, which is when the + # file was created. + return m.group(0) + + @staticmethod + def list_merges(some_hash, target, *options): + """List merge commits from some_hash to target. + + Pass options to git to select which commits are included. + """ + text = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'rev-list', + '--merges', *options, + '..'.join([some_hash, target])]) + return text.decode('ascii').rstrip('\n').split('\n') + + @classmethod + def merge_hash(cls, some_hash): + """Return the git commit id at which the given commit was merged. + + Return None if the given commit was never merged. + """ + target = 'HEAD' + # List the merges from some_hash to the target in two ways. + # The ancestry list is the ones that are both descendants of + # some_hash and ancestors of the target. + ancestry = frozenset(cls.list_merges(some_hash, target, + '--ancestry-path')) + # The first_parents list only contains merges that are directly + # on the target branch. We want it in reverse order (oldest first). + first_parents = cls.list_merges(some_hash, target, + '--first-parent', '--reverse') + # Look for the oldest merge commit that's both on the direct path + # and directly on the target branch. That's the place where some_hash + # was merged on the target branch. See + # https://stackoverflow.com/questions/8475448/find-merge-commit-which-include-a-specific-commit + for commit in first_parents: + if commit in ancestry: + return commit + return None + + @staticmethod + def commit_timestamp(commit_id): + """Return the timestamp of the given commit.""" + text = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'show', '-s', + '--format=%ct', + commit_id]) + return datetime.datetime.utcfromtimestamp(int(text)) + + @staticmethod + def file_timestamp(filename): + """Return the modification timestamp of the given file.""" + mtime = os.stat(filename).st_mtime + return datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(mtime) + + def __init__(self, filename): + """Determine position of the file in the changelog entry order. + + This constructor returns an object that can be used with comparison + operators, with `sort` and `sorted`, etc. Older entries are sorted + before newer entries. + """ + self.filename = filename + creation_hash = self.creation_hash(filename) + if not creation_hash: + self.category = self.LOCAL + self.datetime = self.file_timestamp(filename) + return + merge_hash = self.merge_hash(creation_hash) + if not merge_hash: + self.category = self.COMMITTED + self.datetime = self.commit_timestamp(creation_hash) + return + self.category = self.MERGED + self.datetime = self.commit_timestamp(merge_hash) + + def sort_key(self): + """"Return a concrete sort key for this entry file sort key object. + + ``ts1 < ts2`` is implemented as ``ts1.sort_key() < ts2.sort_key()``. + """ + return (self.category, self.datetime, self.filename) + + def __eq__(self, other): + return self.sort_key() == other.sort_key() + + def __lt__(self, other): + return self.sort_key() < other.sort_key() + + +def check_output(generated_output_file, main_input_file, merged_files): + """Make sanity checks on the generated output. + + The intent of these sanity checks is to have reasonable confidence + that no content has been lost. + + The sanity check is that every line that is present in an input file + is also present in an output file. This is not perfect but good enough + for now. + """ + with open(generated_output_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as out_fd: + generated_output = set(out_fd) + with open(main_input_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as in_fd: + for line in in_fd: + if line not in generated_output: + raise LostContent('original file', line) + for merged_file in merged_files: + with open(merged_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as in_fd: + for line in in_fd: + if line not in generated_output: + raise LostContent(merged_file, line) + +def finish_output(changelog, output_file, input_file, merged_files): + """Write the changelog to the output file. + + The input file and the list of merged files are used only for sanity + checks on the output. + """ + if os.path.exists(output_file) and not os.path.isfile(output_file): + # The output is a non-regular file (e.g. pipe). Write to it directly. + output_temp = output_file + else: + # The output is a regular file. Write to a temporary file, + # then move it into place atomically. + output_temp = output_file + '.tmp' + changelog.write(output_temp) + check_output(output_temp, input_file, merged_files) + if output_temp != output_file: + os.rename(output_temp, output_file) + +def remove_merged_entries(files_to_remove): + for filename in files_to_remove: + os.remove(filename) + +def list_files_to_merge(options): + """List the entry files to merge, oldest first. + + "Oldest" is defined by `EntryFileSortKey`. + """ + files_to_merge = glob.glob(os.path.join(options.dir, '*.txt')) + files_to_merge.sort(key=EntryFileSortKey) + return files_to_merge + +def merge_entries(options): + """Merge changelog entries into the changelog file. + + Read the changelog file from options.input. + Read entries to merge from the directory options.dir. + Write the new changelog to options.output. + Remove the merged entries if options.keep_entries is false. + """ + with open(options.input, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as input_file: + changelog = ChangeLog(input_file, TextChangelogFormat) + files_to_merge = list_files_to_merge(options) + if not files_to_merge: + sys.stderr.write('There are no pending changelog entries.\n') + return + for filename in files_to_merge: + with open(filename, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as input_file: + changelog.add_file(input_file) + finish_output(changelog, options.output, options.input, files_to_merge) + if not options.keep_entries: + remove_merged_entries(files_to_merge) + +def show_file_timestamps(options): + """List the files to merge and their timestamp. + + This is only intended for debugging purposes. + """ + files = list_files_to_merge(options) + for filename in files: + ts = EntryFileSortKey(filename) + print(ts.category, ts.datetime, filename) + +def set_defaults(options): + """Add default values for missing options.""" + output_file = getattr(options, 'output', None) + if output_file is None: + options.output = options.input + if getattr(options, 'keep_entries', None) is None: + options.keep_entries = (output_file is not None) + +def main(): + """Command line entry point.""" + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument('--dir', '-d', metavar='DIR', + default='ChangeLog.d', + help='Directory to read entries from' + ' (default: ChangeLog.d)') + parser.add_argument('--input', '-i', metavar='FILE', + default='ChangeLog', + help='Existing changelog file to read from and augment' + ' (default: ChangeLog)') + parser.add_argument('--keep-entries', + action='store_true', dest='keep_entries', default=None, + help='Keep the files containing entries' + ' (default: remove them if --output/-o is not specified)') + parser.add_argument('--no-keep-entries', + action='store_false', dest='keep_entries', + help='Remove the files containing entries after they are merged' + ' (default: remove them if --output/-o is not specified)') + parser.add_argument('--output', '-o', metavar='FILE', + help='Output changelog file' + ' (default: overwrite the input)') + parser.add_argument('--list-files-only', + action='store_true', + help=('Only list the files that would be processed ' + '(with some debugging information)')) + options = parser.parse_args() + set_defaults(options) + if options.list_files_only: + show_file_timestamps(options) + return + merge_entries(options) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/bump_version.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/bump_version.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..df629e92 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/bump_version.sh @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# Sets the version numbers in the source code to those given. +# +# Usage: bump_version.sh [ --version ] [ --so-crypto ] +# [ --so-x509 ] [ --so-tls ] +# [ -v | --verbose ] [ -h | --help ] +# + +VERSION="" +SOVERSION="" + +# Parse arguments +# +until [ -z "$1" ] +do + case "$1" in + --version) + # Version to use + shift + VERSION=$1 + ;; + --so-crypto) + shift + SO_CRYPTO=$1 + ;; + --so-x509) + shift + SO_X509=$1 + ;; + --so-tls) + shift + SO_TLS=$1 + ;; + -v|--verbose) + # Be verbose + VERBOSE="1" + ;; + -h|--help) + # print help + echo "Usage: $0" + echo -e " -h|--help\t\tPrint this help." + echo -e " --version \tVersion to bump to." + echo -e " --so-crypto \tSO version to bump libmbedcrypto to." + echo -e " --so-x509 \tSO version to bump libmbedx509 to." + echo -e " --so-tls \tSO version to bump libmbedtls to." + echo -e " -v|--verbose\t\tVerbose." + exit 1 + ;; + *) + # print error + echo "Unknown argument: '$1'" + exit 1 + ;; + esac + shift +done + +if [ "X" = "X$VERSION" ]; +then + echo "No version specified. Unable to continue." + exit 1 +fi + +[ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping VERSION in library/CMakeLists.txt" +sed -e "s/ VERSION [0-9.]\{1,\}/ VERSION $VERSION/g" < library/CMakeLists.txt > tmp +mv tmp library/CMakeLists.txt + +if [ "X" != "X$SO_CRYPTO" ]; +then + [ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping SOVERSION for libmbedcrypto in library/CMakeLists.txt" + sed -e "/mbedcrypto/ s/ SOVERSION [0-9]\{1,\}/ SOVERSION $SO_CRYPTO/g" < library/CMakeLists.txt > tmp + mv tmp library/CMakeLists.txt + + [ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping SOVERSION for libmbedcrypto in library/Makefile" + sed -e "s/SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.[0-9]\{1,\}/SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.$SO_CRYPTO/g" < library/Makefile > tmp + mv tmp library/Makefile +fi + +if [ "X" != "X$SO_X509" ]; +then + [ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping SOVERSION for libmbedx509 in library/CMakeLists.txt" + sed -e "/mbedx509/ s/ SOVERSION [0-9]\{1,\}/ SOVERSION $SO_X509/g" < library/CMakeLists.txt > tmp + mv tmp library/CMakeLists.txt + + [ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping SOVERSION for libmbedx509 in library/Makefile" + sed -e "s/SOEXT_X509=so.[0-9]\{1,\}/SOEXT_X509=so.$SO_X509/g" < library/Makefile > tmp + mv tmp library/Makefile +fi + +if [ "X" != "X$SO_TLS" ]; +then + [ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping SOVERSION for libmbedtls in library/CMakeLists.txt" + sed -e "/mbedtls/ s/ SOVERSION [0-9]\{1,\}/ SOVERSION $SO_TLS/g" < library/CMakeLists.txt > tmp + mv tmp library/CMakeLists.txt + + [ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping SOVERSION for libmbedtls in library/Makefile" + sed -e "s/SOEXT_TLS=so.[0-9]\{1,\}/SOEXT_TLS=so.$SO_TLS/g" < library/Makefile > tmp + mv tmp library/Makefile +fi + +[ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping VERSION in include/mbedtls/version.h" +read MAJOR MINOR PATCH <<<$(IFS="."; echo $VERSION) +VERSION_NR="$( printf "0x%02X%02X%02X00" $MAJOR $MINOR $PATCH )" +cat include/mbedtls/version.h | \ + sed -e "s/_VERSION_MAJOR .\{1,\}/_VERSION_MAJOR $MAJOR/" | \ + sed -e "s/_VERSION_MINOR .\{1,\}/_VERSION_MINOR $MINOR/" | \ + sed -e "s/_VERSION_PATCH .\{1,\}/_VERSION_PATCH $PATCH/" | \ + sed -e "s/_VERSION_NUMBER .\{1,\}/_VERSION_NUMBER $VERSION_NR/" | \ + sed -e "s/_VERSION_STRING .\{1,\}/_VERSION_STRING \"$VERSION\"/" | \ + sed -e "s/_VERSION_STRING_FULL .\{1,\}/_VERSION_STRING_FULL \"mbed TLS $VERSION\"/" \ + > tmp +mv tmp include/mbedtls/version.h + +[ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping version in tests/suites/test_suite_version.data" +sed -e "s/version:\".\{1,\}/version:\"$VERSION\"/g" < tests/suites/test_suite_version.data > tmp +mv tmp tests/suites/test_suite_version.data + +[ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Bumping PROJECT_NAME in doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile and doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h" +for i in doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h; +do + sed -e "s/mbed TLS v[0-9\.]\{1,\}/mbed TLS v$VERSION/g" < $i > tmp + mv tmp $i +done + +[ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Re-generating library/error.c" +scripts/generate_errors.pl + +[ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Re-generating programs/test/query_config.c" +scripts/generate_query_config.pl + +[ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Re-generating library/version_features.c" +scripts/generate_features.pl + +[ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Re-generating visualc files" +scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/ci.requirements.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/ci.requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b96a8d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/ci.requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# Python package requirements for Mbed TLS testing. + +# Any package used by a script in this repository must be listed here +# or in one of the included files. Normally there should be a minimum +# version constraint; the CI will test with the minimum version. + +# Use a known version of Pylint, because new versions tend to add warnings +# that could start rejecting our code. +# 2.4.4 is the version in Ubuntu 20.04. It supports Python >=3.5. +pylint == 2.4.4 + +# Use the earliest version of mypy that works with our code base. +# See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/3953 . +mypy >= 0.780 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/config.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/config.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..5dd89d22 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/config.pl @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl +# Backward compatibility redirection + +## Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +## SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +## +## Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +## not use this file except in compliance with the License. +## You may obtain a copy of the License at +## +## http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +## +## Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +## distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +## WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +## See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +## limitations under the License. + +my $py = $0; +$py =~ s/\.pl$/.py/ or die "Unable to determine the name of the Python script"; +exec 'python3', $py, @ARGV; +print STDERR "$0: python3: $!. Trying python instead.\n"; +exec 'python', $py, @ARGV; +print STDERR "$0: python: $!\n"; +exit 127; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/config.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/config.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..91e37adf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/config.py @@ -0,0 +1,565 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 + +"""Mbed TLS configuration file manipulation library and tool + +Basic usage, to read the Mbed TLS or Mbed Crypto configuration: + config = ConfigFile() + if 'MBEDTLS_RSA_C' in config: print('RSA is enabled') +""" + +## Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +## SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +## +## Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +## not use this file except in compliance with the License. +## You may obtain a copy of the License at +## +## http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +## +## Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +## distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +## WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +## See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +## limitations under the License. + +import os +import re + +class Setting: + """Representation of one Mbed TLS config.h setting. + + Fields: + * name: the symbol name ('MBEDTLS_xxx'). + * value: the value of the macro. The empty string for a plain #define + with no value. + * active: True if name is defined, False if a #define for name is + present in config.h but commented out. + * section: the name of the section that contains this symbol. + """ + # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods + def __init__(self, active, name, value='', section=None): + self.active = active + self.name = name + self.value = value + self.section = section + +class Config: + """Representation of the Mbed TLS configuration. + + In the documentation of this class, a symbol is said to be *active* + if there is a #define for it that is not commented out, and *known* + if there is a #define for it whether commented out or not. + + This class supports the following protocols: + * `name in config` is `True` if the symbol `name` is active, `False` + otherwise (whether `name` is inactive or not known). + * `config[name]` is the value of the macro `name`. If `name` is inactive, + raise `KeyError` (even if `name` is known). + * `config[name] = value` sets the value associated to `name`. `name` + must be known, but does not need to be set. This does not cause + name to become set. + """ + + def __init__(self): + self.settings = {} + + def __contains__(self, name): + """True if the given symbol is active (i.e. set). + + False if the given symbol is not set, even if a definition + is present but commented out. + """ + return name in self.settings and self.settings[name].active + + def all(self, *names): + """True if all the elements of names are active (i.e. set).""" + return all(self.__contains__(name) for name in names) + + def any(self, *names): + """True if at least one symbol in names are active (i.e. set).""" + return any(self.__contains__(name) for name in names) + + def known(self, name): + """True if a #define for name is present, whether it's commented out or not.""" + return name in self.settings + + def __getitem__(self, name): + """Get the value of name, i.e. what the preprocessor symbol expands to. + + If name is not known, raise KeyError. name does not need to be active. + """ + return self.settings[name].value + + def get(self, name, default=None): + """Get the value of name. If name is inactive (not set), return default. + + If a #define for name is present and not commented out, return + its expansion, even if this is the empty string. + + If a #define for name is present but commented out, return default. + """ + if name in self.settings: + return self.settings[name].value + else: + return default + + def __setitem__(self, name, value): + """If name is known, set its value. + + If name is not known, raise KeyError. + """ + self.settings[name].value = value + + def set(self, name, value=None): + """Set name to the given value and make it active. + + If value is None and name is already known, don't change its value. + If value is None and name is not known, set its value to the empty + string. + """ + if name in self.settings: + if value is not None: + self.settings[name].value = value + self.settings[name].active = True + else: + self.settings[name] = Setting(True, name, value=value) + + def unset(self, name): + """Make name unset (inactive). + + name remains known if it was known before. + """ + if name not in self.settings: + return + self.settings[name].active = False + + def adapt(self, adapter): + """Run adapter on each known symbol and (de)activate it accordingly. + + `adapter` must be a function that returns a boolean. It is called as + `adapter(name, active, section)` for each setting, where `active` is + `True` if `name` is set and `False` if `name` is known but unset, + and `section` is the name of the section containing `name`. If + `adapter` returns `True`, then set `name` (i.e. make it active), + otherwise unset `name` (i.e. make it known but inactive). + """ + for setting in self.settings.values(): + setting.active = adapter(setting.name, setting.active, + setting.section) + +def is_full_section(section): + """Is this section affected by "config.py full" and friends?""" + return section.endswith('support') or section.endswith('modules') + +def realfull_adapter(_name, active, section): + """Activate all symbols found in the global and boolean feature sections. + + This is intended for building the documentation, including the + documentation of settings that are activated by defining an optional + preprocessor macro. + + Do not activate definitions in the section containing symbols that are + supposed to be defined and documented in their own module. + """ + if section == 'Module configuration options': + return active + return True + +# The goal of the full configuration is to have everything that can be tested +# together. This includes deprecated or insecure options. It excludes: +# * Options that require additional build dependencies or unusual hardware. +# * Options that make testing less effective. +# * Options that are incompatible with other options, or more generally that +# interact with other parts of the code in such a way that a bulk enabling +# is not a good way to test them. +# * Options that remove features. +EXCLUDE_FROM_FULL = frozenset([ + #pylint: disable=line-too-long + 'MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY', # interacts with ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + 'MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED', # conflicts with deprecated options + 'MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING', # conflicts with deprecated options + 'MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED', # influences the use of ECDH in TLS + 'MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK', # removes internal ECP implementation + 'MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG', # removes a feature + 'MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE', # incompatible with USE_PSA_CRYPTO + 'MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256', # interacts with CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY + 'MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2', # hardware dependency + 'MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE', # depends on MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + 'MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C', # makes sanitizers (e.g. ASan) less effective + 'MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG', # depends on MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + 'MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION', # influences anything that uses bignum + 'MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES', # removes a feature + 'MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY', # removes a feature + 'MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION', # influences anything that uses bignum + 'MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C', # build dependency (libpkcs11-helper) + 'MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS', # removes a feature + 'MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG', # toggles old/new style PSA config + 'MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG', # behavior change + build dependency + 'MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER', # incompatible with USE_PSA_CRYPTO + 'MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM', # platform dependency (PSA SPM) + 'MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY', # build dependency (hook functions) + 'MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES', # removes a feature + 'MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES', # removes a feature + 'MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT', # influences the use of RSA in X.509 and TLS + 'MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384', # removes a feature + 'MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL', # build dependency (hook functions) + 'MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN', # build dependency (clang+memsan) + 'MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND', # build dependency (valgrind headers) + 'MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY', # removes a feature + 'MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION', # influences the use of X.509 in TLS + 'MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT', # build dependency (libz) +]) + +def is_seamless_alt(name): + """Whether the xxx_ALT symbol should be included in the full configuration. + + Include alternative implementations of platform functions, which are + configurable function pointers that default to the built-in function. + This way we test that the function pointers exist and build correctly + without changing the behavior, and tests can verify that the function + pointers are used by modifying those pointers. + + Exclude alternative implementations of library functions since they require + an implementation of the relevant functions and an xxx_alt.h header. + """ + if name == 'MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT': + # Similar to non-platform xxx_ALT, requires platform_alt.h + return False + return name.startswith('MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_') + +def include_in_full(name): + """Rules for symbols in the "full" configuration.""" + if name in EXCLUDE_FROM_FULL: + return False + if name.endswith('_ALT'): + return is_seamless_alt(name) + return True + +def full_adapter(name, active, section): + """Config adapter for "full".""" + if not is_full_section(section): + return active + return include_in_full(name) + +# The baremetal configuration excludes options that require a library or +# operating system feature that is typically not present on bare metal +# systems. Features that are excluded from "full" won't be in "baremetal" +# either (unless explicitly turned on in baremetal_adapter) so they don't +# need to be repeated here. +EXCLUDE_FROM_BAREMETAL = frozenset([ + #pylint: disable=line-too-long + 'MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED', # requires a filesystem and FS_IO or alternate NV seed hooks + 'MBEDTLS_FS_IO', # requires a filesystem + 'MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C', # requires a clock + 'MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME', # requires a clock + 'MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE', # requires a clock + 'MBEDTLS_NET_C', # requires POSIX-like networking + 'MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT', # requires FILE* from stdio.h + 'MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT', # requires a filesystem and ENTROPY_NV_SEED + 'MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT', # requires a clock and HAVE_TIME + 'MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C', # requires a filesystem and PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + 'MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C', # requires a filesystem + 'MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C', # requires a filesystem + 'MBEDTLS_THREADING_C', # requires a threading interface + 'MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD', # requires pthread + 'MBEDTLS_TIMING_C', # requires a clock +]) + +def keep_in_baremetal(name): + """Rules for symbols in the "baremetal" configuration.""" + if name in EXCLUDE_FROM_BAREMETAL: + return False + return True + +def baremetal_adapter(name, active, section): + """Config adapter for "baremetal".""" + if not is_full_section(section): + return active + if name == 'MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY': + # No OS-provided entropy source + return True + return include_in_full(name) and keep_in_baremetal(name) + +# This set contains options that are mostly for debugging or test purposes, +# and therefore should be excluded when doing code size measurements. +# Options that are their own module (such as MBEDTLS_CERTS_C and +# MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) are not listed and therefore will be included when doing +# code size measurements. +EXCLUDE_FOR_SIZE = frozenset([ + 'MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS', # increases the size of many modules + 'MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT', # no effect without MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + 'MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C', # large code size increase in TLS + 'MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST', # increases the size of many modules + 'MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS', # only useful with the hosted test framework, increases code size +]) + +def baremetal_size_adapter(name, active, section): + if name in EXCLUDE_FOR_SIZE: + return False + return baremetal_adapter(name, active, section) + +def include_in_crypto(name): + """Rules for symbols in a crypto configuration.""" + if name.startswith('MBEDTLS_X509_') or \ + name.startswith('MBEDTLS_SSL_') or \ + name.startswith('MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_'): + return False + if name in [ + 'MBEDTLS_CERTS_C', # part of libmbedx509 + 'MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C', # part of libmbedtls + 'MBEDTLS_NET_C', # part of libmbedtls + 'MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C', # part of libmbedx509 + ]: + return False + return True + +def crypto_adapter(adapter): + """Modify an adapter to disable non-crypto symbols. + + ``crypto_adapter(adapter)(name, active, section)`` is like + ``adapter(name, active, section)``, but unsets all X.509 and TLS symbols. + """ + def continuation(name, active, section): + if not include_in_crypto(name): + return False + if adapter is None: + return active + return adapter(name, active, section) + return continuation + +DEPRECATED = frozenset([ + 'MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3', + 'MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO', +]) + +def no_deprecated_adapter(adapter): + """Modify an adapter to disable deprecated symbols. + + ``no_deprecated_adapter(adapter)(name, active, section)`` is like + ``adapter(name, active, section)``, but unsets all deprecated symbols + and sets ``MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED``. + """ + def continuation(name, active, section): + if name == 'MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED': + return True + if name in DEPRECATED: + return False + if adapter is None: + return active + return adapter(name, active, section) + return continuation + +class ConfigFile(Config): + """Representation of the Mbed TLS configuration read for a file. + + See the documentation of the `Config` class for methods to query + and modify the configuration. + """ + + _path_in_tree = 'include/mbedtls/config.h' + default_path = [_path_in_tree, + os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + os.pardir, + _path_in_tree), + os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(os.path.dirname(__file__))), + _path_in_tree)] + + def __init__(self, filename=None): + """Read the Mbed TLS configuration file.""" + if filename is None: + for candidate in self.default_path: + if os.path.lexists(candidate): + filename = candidate + break + else: + raise Exception('Mbed TLS configuration file not found', + self.default_path) + super().__init__() + self.filename = filename + self.current_section = 'header' + with open(filename, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as file: + self.templates = [self._parse_line(line) for line in file] + self.current_section = None + + def set(self, name, value=None): + if name not in self.settings: + self.templates.append((name, '', '#define ' + name + ' ')) + super().set(name, value) + + _define_line_regexp = (r'(?P\s*)' + + r'(?P(//\s*)?)' + + r'(?P#\s*define\s+)' + + r'(?P\w+)' + + r'(?P(?:\((?:\w|\s|,)*\))?)' + + r'(?P\s*)' + + r'(?P.*)') + _section_line_regexp = (r'\s*/?\*+\s*[\\@]name\s+SECTION:\s*' + + r'(?P
.*)[ */]*') + _config_line_regexp = re.compile(r'|'.join([_define_line_regexp, + _section_line_regexp])) + def _parse_line(self, line): + """Parse a line in config.h and return the corresponding template.""" + line = line.rstrip('\r\n') + m = re.match(self._config_line_regexp, line) + if m is None: + return line + elif m.group('section'): + self.current_section = m.group('section') + return line + else: + active = not m.group('commented_out') + name = m.group('name') + value = m.group('value') + template = (name, + m.group('indentation'), + m.group('define') + name + + m.group('arguments') + m.group('separator')) + self.settings[name] = Setting(active, name, value, + self.current_section) + return template + + def _format_template(self, name, indent, middle): + """Build a line for config.h for the given setting. + + The line has the form "#define " + where is "#define ". + """ + setting = self.settings[name] + value = setting.value + if value is None: + value = '' + # Normally the whitespace to separate the symbol name from the + # value is part of middle, and there's no whitespace for a symbol + # with no value. But if a symbol has been changed from having a + # value to not having one, the whitespace is wrong, so fix it. + if value: + if middle[-1] not in '\t ': + middle += ' ' + else: + middle = middle.rstrip() + return ''.join([indent, + '' if setting.active else '//', + middle, + value]).rstrip() + + def write_to_stream(self, output): + """Write the whole configuration to output.""" + for template in self.templates: + if isinstance(template, str): + line = template + else: + line = self._format_template(*template) + output.write(line + '\n') + + def write(self, filename=None): + """Write the whole configuration to the file it was read from. + + If filename is specified, write to this file instead. + """ + if filename is None: + filename = self.filename + with open(filename, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as output: + self.write_to_stream(output) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + def main(): + """Command line config.h manipulation tool.""" + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=""" + Mbed TLS and Mbed Crypto configuration file manipulation tool. + """) + parser.add_argument('--file', '-f', + help="""File to read (and modify if requested). + Default: {}. + """.format(ConfigFile.default_path)) + parser.add_argument('--force', '-o', + action='store_true', + help="""For the set command, if SYMBOL is not + present, add a definition for it.""") + parser.add_argument('--write', '-w', metavar='FILE', + help="""File to write to instead of the input file.""") + subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest='command', + title='Commands') + parser_get = subparsers.add_parser('get', + help="""Find the value of SYMBOL + and print it. Exit with + status 0 if a #define for SYMBOL is + found, 1 otherwise. + """) + parser_get.add_argument('symbol', metavar='SYMBOL') + parser_set = subparsers.add_parser('set', + help="""Set SYMBOL to VALUE. + If VALUE is omitted, just uncomment + the #define for SYMBOL. + Error out of a line defining + SYMBOL (commented or not) is not + found, unless --force is passed. + """) + parser_set.add_argument('symbol', metavar='SYMBOL') + parser_set.add_argument('value', metavar='VALUE', nargs='?', + default='') + parser_unset = subparsers.add_parser('unset', + help="""Comment out the #define + for SYMBOL. Do nothing if none + is present.""") + parser_unset.add_argument('symbol', metavar='SYMBOL') + + def add_adapter(name, function, description): + subparser = subparsers.add_parser(name, help=description) + subparser.set_defaults(adapter=function) + add_adapter('baremetal', baremetal_adapter, + """Like full, but exclude features that require platform + features such as file input-output.""") + add_adapter('baremetal_size', baremetal_size_adapter, + """Like baremetal, but exclude debugging features. + Useful for code size measurements.""") + add_adapter('full', full_adapter, + """Uncomment most features. + Exclude alternative implementations and platform support + options, as well as some options that are awkward to test. + """) + add_adapter('full_no_deprecated', no_deprecated_adapter(full_adapter), + """Uncomment most non-deprecated features. + Like "full", but without deprecated features. + """) + add_adapter('realfull', realfull_adapter, + """Uncomment all boolean #defines. + Suitable for generating documentation, but not for building.""") + add_adapter('crypto', crypto_adapter(None), + """Only include crypto features. Exclude X.509 and TLS.""") + add_adapter('crypto_baremetal', crypto_adapter(baremetal_adapter), + """Like baremetal, but with only crypto features, + excluding X.509 and TLS.""") + add_adapter('crypto_full', crypto_adapter(full_adapter), + """Like full, but with only crypto features, + excluding X.509 and TLS.""") + + args = parser.parse_args() + config = ConfigFile(args.file) + if args.command is None: + parser.print_help() + return 1 + elif args.command == 'get': + if args.symbol in config: + value = config[args.symbol] + if value: + sys.stdout.write(value + '\n') + return 0 if args.symbol in config else 1 + elif args.command == 'set': + if not args.force and args.symbol not in config.settings: + sys.stderr.write("A #define for the symbol {} " + "was not found in {}\n" + .format(args.symbol, config.filename)) + return 1 + config.set(args.symbol, value=args.value) + elif args.command == 'unset': + config.unset(args.symbol) + else: + config.adapt(args.adapter) + config.write(args.write) + return 0 + + # Import modules only used by main only if main is defined and called. + # pylint: disable=wrong-import-position + import argparse + import sys + sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/error.fmt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/error.fmt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3be94bd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/error.fmt @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* + * Error message information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#endif + +#include +#include + +HEADER_INCLUDED + +const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code ) +{ + int high_level_error_code; + + if( error_code < 0 ) + error_code = -error_code; + + /* Extract the high-level part from the error code. */ + high_level_error_code = error_code & 0xFF80; + + switch( high_level_error_code ) + { + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ +HIGH_LEVEL_CODE_CHECKS + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ + + default: + break; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code ) +{ + int low_level_error_code; + + if( error_code < 0 ) + error_code = -error_code; + + /* Extract the low-level part from the error code. */ + low_level_error_code = error_code & ~0xFF80; + + switch( low_level_error_code ) + { + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ +LOW_LEVEL_CODE_CHECKS + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ + + default: + break; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t len; + int use_ret; + const char * high_level_error_description = NULL; + const char * low_level_error_description = NULL; + + if( buflen == 0 ) + return; + + memset( buf, 0x00, buflen ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + ret = -ret; + + if( ret & 0xFF80 ) + { + use_ret = ret & 0xFF80; + + // Translate high level error code. + high_level_error_description = mbedtls_high_level_strerr( ret ); + + if( high_level_error_description == NULL ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret ); + else + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", high_level_error_description ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + // Early return in case of a fatal error - do not try to translate low + // level code. + if(use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE)) + return; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + } + + use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80; + + if( use_ret == 0 ) + return; + + // If high level code is present, make a concatenation between both + // error strings. + // + len = strlen( buf ); + + if( len > 0 ) + { + if( buflen - len < 5 ) + return; + + mbedtls_snprintf( buf + len, buflen - len, " : " ); + + buf += len + 3; + buflen -= len + 3; + } + + // Translate low level error code. + low_level_error_description = mbedtls_low_level_strerr( ret ); + + if( low_level_error_description == NULL ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret ); + else + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", low_level_error_description ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +/* + * Provide an non-function in case MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is not defined + */ +void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + ((void) ret); + + if( buflen > 0 ) + buf[0] = '\0'; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)( int, int, const char *, int ); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C || MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..04c54661 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/* + * Query Mbed TLS compile time configurations from config.h + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "query_config.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +/* + * Include all the headers with public APIs in case they define a macro to its + * default value when that configuration is not set in the config.h. + */ +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/pkcs11.h" +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" + +#include + +/* + * Helper macros to convert a macro or its expansion into a string + * WARNING: This does not work for expanding function-like macros. However, + * Mbed TLS does not currently have configuration options used in this fashion. + */ +#define MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR(macro) MACRO_NAME_TO_STR(macro) +#define MACRO_NAME_TO_STR(macro) \ + mbedtls_printf( "%s", strlen( #macro "" ) > 0 ? #macro "\n" : "" ) + +#define STRINGIFY(macro) #macro +#define OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE(macro) mbedtls_printf( #macro "%s\n", \ + ( STRINGIFY(macro) "" )[0] != 0 ? "=" STRINGIFY(macro) : "" ) + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +/* + * Visual Studio throws the warning 4003 because many Mbed TLS feature macros + * are defined empty. This means that from the preprocessor's point of view + * the macro MBEDTLS_EXPANSION_TO_STR is being invoked without arguments as + * some macros expand to nothing. We suppress that specific warning to get a + * clean build and to ensure that tests treating warnings as errors do not + * fail. + */ +#pragma warning(push) +#pragma warning(disable:4003) +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ + +int query_config( const char *config ) +{ +CHECK_CONFIG /* If the symbol is not found, return an error */ + return( 1 ); +} + +void list_config( void ) +{ + LIST_CONFIG +} +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning(pop) +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/rename-1.3-2.0.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/rename-1.3-2.0.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e599ac59 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/rename-1.3-2.0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2174 @@ +AES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT +AES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT +ASN1_BIT_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING +ASN1_BMP_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING +ASN1_BOOLEAN MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN +ASN1_CHK_ADD MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD +ASN1_CONSTRUCTED MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED +ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC +ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME +ASN1_IA5_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING +ASN1_INTEGER MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER +ASN1_NULL MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL +ASN1_OCTET_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING +ASN1_OID MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID +ASN1_PRIMITIVE MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE +ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING +ASN1_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE +ASN1_SET MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET +ASN1_T61_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING +ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING +ASN1_UTC_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME +ASN1_UTF8_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING +BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH +BADCERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED +BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE +BADCERT_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE +BADCERT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE +BADCERT_MISSING MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING +BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED +BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE +BADCERT_OTHER MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER +BADCERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED +BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY +BADCRL_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED +BADCRL_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE +BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED +BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE +BLOWFISH_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT +BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT +BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS +BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS +BLOWFISH_ROUNDS MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS +CAMELLIA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT +CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT +COLLECT_SIZE MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE +CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE +CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN +CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS +CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE +CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT +CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF +CTR_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON +CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL +CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN +DEPRECATED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +DES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT +DES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT +DES_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE +ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE +ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER +ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE +ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES +ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK +ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE +ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM +ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL +EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER +EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS +EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES +EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS +EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL +EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY +EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME +EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE +EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS +EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE +EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS +EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS +EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME +EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS +EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER +GCM_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT +GCM_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT +KU_CRL_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN +KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT +KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE +KU_KEY_AGREEMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT +KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN +KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT +KU_NON_REPUDIATION MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION +LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 +MD_CONTEXT_T_INIT MBEDTLS_MD_CONTEXT_T_INIT +MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC +MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS +MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE +MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE +MPI_CHK MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK +NET_PROTO_TCP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP +NET_PROTO_UDP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP +NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL +NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA +NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING +NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA +NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED +NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA +NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT +NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER +OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 +OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE +OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD +OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG +OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 +OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_AT +OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN +OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY +OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER +OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER +OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME +OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS +OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY +OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION +OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT +OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS +OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE +OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM +OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER +OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE +OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME +OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE +OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER +OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER +OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS +OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM +OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES +OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH +OID_CMP MBEDTLS_OID_CMP +OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING +OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US +OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS +OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER +OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC +OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC +OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 +OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 +OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 +OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 +OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 +OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 +OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 +OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 +OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT +OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 +OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 +OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 +OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 +OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 +OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH +OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED +OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 +OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 +OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 +OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 +OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 +OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 +OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 +OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 +OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 +OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 +OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 +OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 +OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION +OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL +OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_GOV +OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 +OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE +OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY +OID_ISO_CCITT_DS MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS +OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG +OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY +OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG +OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES +OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME +OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE +OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_KP +OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 +OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS +OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE +OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL +OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL +OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL +OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT +OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE +OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE +OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT +OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE +OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL +OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL +OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME +OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING +OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG +OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG +OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 +OID_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION +OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 +OID_ORG_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM +OID_ORG_DOD MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD +OID_ORG_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV +OID_ORG_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE +OID_ORG_OIW MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW +OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY +OID_ORG_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST +OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS +OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 +OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 +OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE +OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC +OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC +OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC +OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC +OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 +OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 +OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 +OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 +OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 +OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA +OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 +OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 +OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 +OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 +OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 +OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 +OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 +OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC +OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC +OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC +OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC +OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC +OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC +OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 +OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 +OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 +OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ +OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL +OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX +OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS +OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS +OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD +OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS +OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY +OID_RSA_SHA_OBS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS +OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH +OID_SIZE MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE +OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME +OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS +OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER +OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST +OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING +PADLOCK_ACE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE +PADLOCK_ALIGN16 MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16 +PADLOCK_PHE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE +PADLOCK_PMM MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM +PADLOCK_RNG MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG +PKCS12_DERIVE_IV MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV +PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY +PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY +PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT +PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT +PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT +PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT +POLARSSL_AESNI_AES MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES +POLARSSL_AESNI_C MBEDTLS_AESNI_C +POLARSSL_AESNI_CLMUL MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL +POLARSSL_AESNI_H MBEDTLS_AESNI_H +POLARSSL_AES_ALT MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +POLARSSL_AES_C MBEDTLS_AES_C +POLARSSL_AES_H MBEDTLS_AES_H +POLARSSL_AES_ROM_TABLES MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES +POLARSSL_ARC4_ALT MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT +POLARSSL_ARC4_C MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +POLARSSL_ARC4_H MBEDTLS_ARC4_H +POLARSSL_ASN1_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_H +POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H +POLARSSL_BASE64_C MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +POLARSSL_BASE64_H MBEDTLS_BASE64_H +POLARSSL_BIGNUM_C MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +POLARSSL_BIGNUM_H MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H +POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_ALT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT +POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_C MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_H MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H +POLARSSL_BN_MUL_H MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H +POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_ALT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_H MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H +POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY +POLARSSL_CCM_C MBEDTLS_CCM_C +POLARSSL_CCM_H MBEDTLS_CCM_H +POLARSSL_CERTS_C MBEDTLS_CERTS_C +POLARSSL_CERTS_H MBEDTLS_CERTS_H +POLARSSL_CHECK_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H +POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS +POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG +POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_ARC4_128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR +POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_C MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H +POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_3DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES +POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES +POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH +POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA +POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES +POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE +POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL +POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD +POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM +POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING +POLARSSL_CIPHER_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE +POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL +POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN +POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN +POLARSSL_CIPHER_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H +POLARSSL_CONFIG_FILE MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +POLARSSL_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H +POLARSSL_DEBUG_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +POLARSSL_DEBUG_DFL_MODE MBEDTLS_DEBUG_DFL_MODE +POLARSSL_DEBUG_H MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H +POLARSSL_DEBUG_LOG_FULL MBEDTLS_DEBUG_LOG_FULL +POLARSSL_DEBUG_LOG_RAW MBEDTLS_DEBUG_LOG_RAW +POLARSSL_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT +POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED +POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING +POLARSSL_DES_ALT MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +POLARSSL_DES_C MBEDTLS_DES_C +POLARSSL_DES_H MBEDTLS_DES_H +POLARSSL_DHM_C MBEDTLS_DHM_C +POLARSSL_DHM_H MBEDTLS_DHM_H +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC2409_MODP_1024_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC2409_MODP_1024_G +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC2409_MODP_1024_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC2409_MODP_1024_P +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_1024_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_1024_G +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_1024_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_1024_P +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G +POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P +POLARSSL_ECDH_C MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +POLARSSL_ECDH_H MBEDTLS_ECDH_H +POLARSSL_ECDH_OURS MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS +POLARSSL_ECDH_THEIRS MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS +POLARSSL_ECDSA_C MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +POLARSSL_ECDSA_H MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H +POLARSSL_ECP_C MBEDTLS_ECP_C +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_MAX MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 +POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +POLARSSL_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM +POLARSSL_ECP_H MBEDTLS_ECP_H +POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS +POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN +POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +POLARSSL_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED +POLARSSL_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED +POLARSSL_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE +POLARSSL_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE +POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES +POLARSSL_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT +POLARSSL_ENTROPY_C MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 +POLARSSL_ENTROPY_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H +POLARSSL_ENTROPY_POLL_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H +POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR +POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR +POLARSSL_ERROR_C MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +POLARSSL_ERROR_H MBEDTLS_ERROR_H +POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_BC +POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY +POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH +POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL +POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH +POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER +POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH +POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH +POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT +POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED +POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING +POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG +POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG +POLARSSL_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT +POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY +POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES +POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED +POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT +POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG +POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG +POLARSSL_ERR_MD2_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_MD4_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_MD5_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO +POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER +POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE +POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ +POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE +POLARSSL_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL +POLARSSL_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND +POLARSSL_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED +POLARSSL_ERR_PBKDF2_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PBKDF2_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV +POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT +POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED +POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG +POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT +POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT +POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE +POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG +POLARSSL_ERR_RIPEMD160_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING +POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE +POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_SHA1_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_SHA256_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_SHA512_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY +POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO +POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG +POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION +POLARSSL_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +POLARSSL_FS_IO MBEDTLS_FS_IO +POLARSSL_GCM_C MBEDTLS_GCM_C +POLARSSL_GCM_H MBEDTLS_GCM_H +POLARSSL_GENPRIME MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +POLARSSL_HAVEGE_C MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C +POLARSSL_HAVEGE_H MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H +POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +POLARSSL_HAVE_INT16 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT16 +POLARSSL_HAVE_INT32 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 +POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 +POLARSSL_HAVE_INT8 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT8 +POLARSSL_HAVE_IPV6 MBEDTLS_HAVE_IPV6 +POLARSSL_HAVE_LONGLONG MBEDTLS_HAVE_LONGLONG +POLARSSL_HAVE_SSE2 MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 +POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME +POLARSSL_HAVE_UDBL MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL +POLARSSL_HAVE_X86 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 +POLARSSL_HAVE_X86_64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 +POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H +POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT +POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF +POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON +POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED +POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES +POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE +POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 +POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE +POLARSSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +POLARSSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH +POLARSSL_MD2_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT +POLARSSL_MD2_C MBEDTLS_MD2_C +POLARSSL_MD2_H MBEDTLS_MD2_H +POLARSSL_MD4_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT +POLARSSL_MD4_C MBEDTLS_MD4_C +POLARSSL_MD4_H MBEDTLS_MD4_H +POLARSSL_MD5_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +POLARSSL_MD5_C MBEDTLS_MD5_C +POLARSSL_MD5_H MBEDTLS_MD5_H +POLARSSL_MD_C MBEDTLS_MD_C +POLARSSL_MD_H MBEDTLS_MD_H +POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE +POLARSSL_MD_MD2 MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 +POLARSSL_MD_MD4 MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 +POLARSSL_MD_MD5 MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 +POLARSSL_MD_NONE MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +POLARSSL_MD_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 +POLARSSL_MD_SHA1 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 +POLARSSL_MD_SHA224 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 +POLARSSL_MD_SHA256 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 +POLARSSL_MD_SHA512 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +POLARSSL_MD_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H +POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE +POLARSSL_MEMORY_BACKTRACE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE +POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C +POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H +POLARSSL_MEMORY_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_C +POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG +POLARSSL_MEMORY_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_H +POLARSSL_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC +POLARSSL_MODE_CCM MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM +POLARSSL_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB +POLARSSL_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR +POLARSSL_MODE_ECB MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB +POLARSSL_MODE_GCM MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM +POLARSSL_MODE_NONE MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE +POLARSSL_MODE_OFB MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB +POLARSSL_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM +POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS +POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 +POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_LIMBS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS +POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE +POLARSSL_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE +POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE +POLARSSL_NET_C MBEDTLS_NET_C +POLARSSL_NET_H MBEDTLS_NET_H +POLARSSL_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG +POLARSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES +POLARSSL_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY +POLARSSL_OID_C MBEDTLS_OID_C +POLARSSL_OID_H MBEDTLS_OID_H +POLARSSL_OPERATION_NONE MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE +POLARSSL_PADDING_NONE MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE +POLARSSL_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +POLARSSL_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 +POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS +POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +POLARSSL_PADLOCK_C MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C +POLARSSL_PADLOCK_H MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H +POLARSSL_PBKDF2_C MBEDTLS_PBKDF2_C +POLARSSL_PBKDF2_H MBEDTLS_PBKDF2_H +POLARSSL_PEM_H MBEDTLS_PEM_H +POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +POLARSSL_PEM_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C +POLARSSL_PKCS11_C MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C +POLARSSL_PKCS11_H MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H +POLARSSL_PKCS12_C MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +POLARSSL_PKCS12_H MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H +POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +POLARSSL_PKCS5_C MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +POLARSSL_PKCS5_H MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H +POLARSSL_PK_C MBEDTLS_PK_C +POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP +POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS +POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI +POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE +POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA +POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY +POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY_DH MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH +POLARSSL_PK_H MBEDTLS_PK_H +POLARSSL_PK_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_NONE +POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED +POLARSSL_PK_RSA MBEDTLS_PK_RSA +POLARSSL_PK_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS +POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT +POLARSSL_PK_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H +POLARSSL_PK_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_H MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_MALLOC_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_MACRO +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_MEMORY MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FREE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MALLOC MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF +POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF +POLARSSL_PREMASTER_SIZE MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE +POLARSSL_PSK_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN +POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_C MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_H MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H +POLARSSL_RSA_C MBEDTLS_RSA_C +POLARSSL_RSA_H MBEDTLS_RSA_H +POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT +POLARSSL_SELF_TEST MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +POLARSSL_SHA1_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +POLARSSL_SHA1_C MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +POLARSSL_SHA1_H MBEDTLS_SHA1_H +POLARSSL_SHA256_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +POLARSSL_SHA256_C MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +POLARSSL_SHA256_H MBEDTLS_SHA256_H +POLARSSL_SHA512_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +POLARSSL_SHA512_C MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +POLARSSL_SHA512_H MBEDTLS_SHA512_H +POLARSSL_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV +POLARSSL_SSL_ALERT_MESSAGES MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MESSAGES +POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN +POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H +POLARSSL_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING +POLARSSL_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H +POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C +POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H +POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT +POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL +POLARSSL_SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATION +POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT +POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +POLARSSL_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +POLARSSL_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +POLARSSL_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +POLARSSL_SSL_H MBEDTLS_SSL_H +POLARSSL_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL +POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_DTLS MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 +POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 +POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +POLARSSL_SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +POLARSSL_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION +POLARSSL_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS +POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE +POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO +POLARSSL_SSL_TLS_C MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +POLARSSL_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +POLARSSL_THREADING_ALT MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT +POLARSSL_THREADING_C MBEDTLS_THREADING_C +POLARSSL_THREADING_H MBEDTLS_THREADING_H +POLARSSL_THREADING_IMPL MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +POLARSSL_THREADING_PTHREAD MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD +POLARSSL_TIMING_ALT MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT +POLARSSL_TIMING_C MBEDTLS_TIMING_C +POLARSSL_TIMING_H MBEDTLS_TIMING_H +POLARSSL_VERSION_C MBEDTLS_VERSION_C +POLARSSL_VERSION_FEATURES MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES +POLARSSL_VERSION_H MBEDTLS_VERSION_H +POLARSSL_VERSION_MAJOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR +POLARSSL_VERSION_MINOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR +POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER +POLARSSL_VERSION_PATCH MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH +POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING +POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING_FULL MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL +POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 +POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION 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MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 +RSA_PRIVATE MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE +RSA_PUBLIC MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC +RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY +RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN +SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL +SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING +SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED +SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT +SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC +SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED +SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED +SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN +SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY +SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR +SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE +SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED +SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR 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MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY +SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME +SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT +SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT +SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED +SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED +SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED +SSL_ARC4_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED +SSL_ARC4_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED +SSL_BUFFER_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN +SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES +SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT +SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED +SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED +SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN +SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN +SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND +SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND +SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES +SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE +SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED +SSL_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO +SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD +SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE +SSL_COMPRESS_NULL MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL +SSL_DEBUG_BUF MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF +SSL_DEBUG_CRT MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT +SSL_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP +SSL_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI +SSL_DEBUG_MSG MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG +SSL_DEBUG_RET MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET +SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME +SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 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MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO +SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +SSL_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED +SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST +SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST +SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET +SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO +SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE +SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE +SSL_IS_CLIENT MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT +SSL_IS_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK +SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK +SSL_IS_SERVER MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER +SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION +SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE +SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION +SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION +SSL_MAC_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD +SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 +SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 +SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 +SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 +SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 +SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID +SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE +SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION +SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION +SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 +SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 +SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 +SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION +SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION +SSL_MSG_ALERT MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT +SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA 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MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED +SSL_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO +SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE +SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT +SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET +SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED +SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED +SSL_SIG_ANON MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON +SSL_SIG_ECDSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA +SSL_SIG_RSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA +SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM +SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM +SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN +SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED +SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED +SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN +SSL_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE +SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL +SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 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MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 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MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +TLS_EXT_ALPN MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN +TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO +TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME +TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME +TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET +TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG +TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES +TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS +TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT +TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC +TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 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MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN +X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN +XTEA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT +XTEA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT +_asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring +_asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf +_asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data +_asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence +_ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context +_ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry +_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t +_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context +_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item +_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params +_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert +_ssl_premaster_secret mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret +_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session +_ssl_ticket_keys mbedtls_ssl_ticket_keys +_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform +_x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl +_x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry +_x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt +_x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr +_x509_time mbedtls_x509_time +_x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert +_x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr +aes_context mbedtls_aes_context +aes_crypt_cbc mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc +aes_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128 +aes_crypt_cfb8 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8 +aes_crypt_ctr mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr +aes_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb +aes_free mbedtls_aes_free +aes_init mbedtls_aes_init +aes_self_test mbedtls_aes_self_test +aes_setkey_dec mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec +aes_setkey_enc mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc +aesni_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb +aesni_gcm_mult mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult +aesni_inverse_key mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key +aesni_setkey_enc mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc +aesni_supports mbedtls_aesni_has_support +alarmed mbedtls_timing_alarmed +arc4_context mbedtls_arc4_context +arc4_crypt mbedtls_arc4_crypt +arc4_free mbedtls_arc4_free +arc4_init mbedtls_arc4_init +arc4_self_test mbedtls_arc4_self_test +arc4_setup mbedtls_arc4_setup +asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring +asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf +asn1_find_named_data mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data +asn1_free_named_data mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data +asn1_free_named_data_list mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list +asn1_get_alg mbedtls_asn1_get_alg +asn1_get_alg_null mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null +asn1_get_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring +asn1_get_bitstring_null mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null +asn1_get_bool mbedtls_asn1_get_bool +asn1_get_int mbedtls_asn1_get_int +asn1_get_len mbedtls_asn1_get_len +asn1_get_mpi mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi +asn1_get_sequence_of mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of +asn1_get_tag mbedtls_asn1_get_tag +asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data +asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence +asn1_store_named_data mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data +asn1_write_algorithm_identifier mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier +asn1_write_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring +asn1_write_bool mbedtls_asn1_write_bool +asn1_write_ia5_string mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string +asn1_write_int mbedtls_asn1_write_int +asn1_write_len mbedtls_asn1_write_len +asn1_write_mpi mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi +asn1_write_null mbedtls_asn1_write_null +asn1_write_octet_string mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string +asn1_write_oid mbedtls_asn1_write_oid +asn1_write_printable_string mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string +asn1_write_raw_buffer mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer +asn1_write_tag mbedtls_asn1_write_tag +base64_decode mbedtls_base64_decode +base64_encode mbedtls_base64_encode +base64_self_test mbedtls_base64_self_test +blowfish_context mbedtls_blowfish_context +blowfish_crypt_cbc mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc +blowfish_crypt_cfb64 mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64 +blowfish_crypt_ctr mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr +blowfish_crypt_ecb mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb +blowfish_free mbedtls_blowfish_free +blowfish_init mbedtls_blowfish_init +blowfish_setkey mbedtls_blowfish_setkey +camellia_context mbedtls_camellia_context +camellia_crypt_cbc mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc +camellia_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128 +camellia_crypt_ctr mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr +camellia_crypt_ecb mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb +camellia_free mbedtls_camellia_free +camellia_init mbedtls_camellia_init +camellia_self_test mbedtls_camellia_self_test +camellia_setkey_dec mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec +camellia_setkey_enc mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc +ccm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt +ccm_context mbedtls_ccm_context +ccm_encrypt_and_tag mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag +ccm_free mbedtls_ccm_free +ccm_init mbedtls_ccm_init +ccm_self_test mbedtls_ccm_self_test +cipher_auth_decrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt +cipher_auth_encrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt +cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t +cipher_check_tag mbedtls_cipher_check_tag +cipher_context_t mbedtls_cipher_context_t +cipher_crypt mbedtls_cipher_crypt +cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definition_t +cipher_definitions mbedtls_cipher_definitions +cipher_finish mbedtls_cipher_finish +cipher_free mbedtls_cipher_free +cipher_free_ctx mbedtls_cipher_free_ctx +cipher_get_block_size mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size +cipher_get_cipher_mode mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode +cipher_get_iv_size mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size +cipher_get_key_size mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen +cipher_get_name mbedtls_cipher_get_name +cipher_get_operation mbedtls_cipher_get_operation +cipher_get_type mbedtls_cipher_get_type +cipher_id_t mbedtls_cipher_id_t +cipher_info_from_string mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string +cipher_info_from_type mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type +cipher_info_from_values mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values +cipher_info_t mbedtls_cipher_info_t +cipher_init mbedtls_cipher_init +cipher_init_ctx mbedtls_cipher_setup +cipher_list mbedtls_cipher_list +cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_mode_t +cipher_padding_t mbedtls_cipher_padding_t +cipher_reset mbedtls_cipher_reset +cipher_self_test mbedtls_cipher_self_test +cipher_set_iv mbedtls_cipher_set_iv +cipher_set_padding_mode mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode +cipher_setkey mbedtls_cipher_setkey +cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type_t +cipher_update mbedtls_cipher_update +cipher_update_ad mbedtls_cipher_update_ad +cipher_write_tag mbedtls_cipher_write_tag +ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context +ctr_drbg_free mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free +ctr_drbg_init mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init +ctr_drbg_init_entropy_len mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init_entropy_len +ctr_drbg_random mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random +ctr_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add +ctr_drbg_reseed mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed +ctr_drbg_self_test mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test +ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len +ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance +ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval +ctr_drbg_update mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update +ctr_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file +ctr_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file +debug_fmt mbedtls_debug_fmt +debug_print_buf mbedtls_debug_print_buf +debug_print_crt mbedtls_debug_print_crt +debug_print_ecp mbedtls_debug_print_ecp +debug_print_mpi mbedtls_debug_print_mpi +debug_print_msg mbedtls_debug_print_msg +debug_print_ret mbedtls_debug_print_ret +debug_set_log_mode mbedtls_debug_set_log_mode +debug_set_threshold mbedtls_debug_set_threshold +des3_context mbedtls_des3_context +des3_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc +des3_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb +des3_free mbedtls_des3_free +des3_init mbedtls_des3_init +des3_set2key_dec mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec +des3_set2key_enc mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc +des3_set3key_dec mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec +des3_set3key_enc mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc +des_context mbedtls_des_context +des_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc +des_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb +des_free mbedtls_des_free +des_init mbedtls_des_init +des_key_check_key_parity mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity +des_key_check_weak mbedtls_des_key_check_weak +des_key_set_parity mbedtls_des_key_set_parity +des_self_test mbedtls_des_self_test +des_setkey_dec mbedtls_des_setkey_dec +des_setkey_enc mbedtls_des_setkey_enc +dhm_calc_secret mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret +dhm_context mbedtls_dhm_context +dhm_free mbedtls_dhm_free +dhm_init mbedtls_dhm_init +dhm_make_params mbedtls_dhm_make_params +dhm_make_public mbedtls_dhm_make_public +dhm_parse_dhm mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm +dhm_parse_dhmfile mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile +dhm_read_params mbedtls_dhm_read_params +dhm_read_public mbedtls_dhm_read_public +dhm_self_test mbedtls_dhm_self_test +ecdh_calc_secret mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret +ecdh_compute_shared mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared +ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context +ecdh_free mbedtls_ecdh_free +ecdh_gen_public mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public +ecdh_get_params mbedtls_ecdh_get_params +ecdh_init mbedtls_ecdh_init +ecdh_make_params mbedtls_ecdh_make_params +ecdh_make_public mbedtls_ecdh_make_public +ecdh_read_params mbedtls_ecdh_read_params +ecdh_read_public mbedtls_ecdh_read_public +ecdh_self_test mbedtls_ecdh_self_test +ecdh_side mbedtls_ecdh_side +ecdsa_context mbedtls_ecdsa_context +ecdsa_free mbedtls_ecdsa_free +ecdsa_from_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair +ecdsa_genkey mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey +ecdsa_info mbedtls_ecdsa_info +ecdsa_init mbedtls_ecdsa_init +ecdsa_read_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature +ecdsa_self_test mbedtls_ecdsa_self_test +ecdsa_sign mbedtls_ecdsa_sign +ecdsa_sign_det mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det +ecdsa_verify mbedtls_ecdsa_verify +ecdsa_write_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature +ecdsa_write_signature_det mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det +eckey_info mbedtls_eckey_info +eckeydh_info mbedtls_eckeydh_info +ecp_add mbedtls_ecp_add +ecp_check_privkey mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey +ecp_check_pub_priv mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv +ecp_check_pubkey mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey +ecp_copy mbedtls_ecp_copy +ecp_curve_info mbedtls_ecp_curve_info +ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id +ecp_curve_info_from_name mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name +ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id +ecp_curve_list mbedtls_ecp_curve_list +ecp_gen_key mbedtls_ecp_gen_key +ecp_gen_keypair mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair +ecp_group mbedtls_ecp_group +ecp_group_copy mbedtls_ecp_group_copy +ecp_group_free mbedtls_ecp_group_free +ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_group_id +ecp_group_init mbedtls_ecp_group_init +ecp_group_read_string mbedtls_ecp_group_read_string +ecp_grp_id_list mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list +ecp_is_zero mbedtls_ecp_is_zero +ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecp_keypair +ecp_keypair_free mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free +ecp_keypair_init mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init +ecp_mul mbedtls_ecp_mul +ecp_point mbedtls_ecp_point +ecp_point_free mbedtls_ecp_point_free +ecp_point_init mbedtls_ecp_point_init +ecp_point_read_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary +ecp_point_read_string mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string +ecp_point_write_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary +ecp_self_test mbedtls_ecp_self_test +ecp_set_zero mbedtls_ecp_set_zero +ecp_sub mbedtls_ecp_sub +ecp_tls_read_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group +ecp_tls_read_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point +ecp_tls_write_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group +ecp_tls_write_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point +ecp_use_known_dp mbedtls_ecp_group_load +entropy_add_source mbedtls_entropy_add_source +entropy_context mbedtls_entropy_context +entropy_free mbedtls_entropy_free +entropy_func mbedtls_entropy_func +entropy_gather mbedtls_entropy_gather +entropy_init mbedtls_entropy_init +entropy_self_test mbedtls_entropy_self_test +entropy_update_manual mbedtls_entropy_update_manual +entropy_update_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file +entropy_write_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file +error_strerror mbedtls_strerror +f_source_ptr mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr +gcm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt +gcm_context mbedtls_gcm_context +gcm_crypt_and_tag mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag +gcm_finish mbedtls_gcm_finish +gcm_free mbedtls_gcm_free +gcm_init mbedtls_gcm_init +gcm_self_test mbedtls_gcm_self_test +gcm_starts mbedtls_gcm_starts +gcm_update mbedtls_gcm_update +get_timer mbedtls_timing_get_timer +hardclock mbedtls_timing_hardclock +hardclock_poll mbedtls_hardclock_poll +havege_free mbedtls_havege_free +havege_init mbedtls_havege_init +havege_poll mbedtls_havege_poll +havege_random mbedtls_havege_random +havege_state mbedtls_havege_state +hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context +hmac_drbg_free mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free +hmac_drbg_init mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init +hmac_drbg_init_buf mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init_buf +hmac_drbg_random mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random +hmac_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add +hmac_drbg_reseed mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed +hmac_drbg_self_test mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test +hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len +hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance +hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval +hmac_drbg_update mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update +hmac_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file +hmac_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file +hr_time mbedtls_timing_hr_time +key_exchange_type_t mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t +m_sleep mbedtls_timing_m_sleep +md mbedtls_md +md2 mbedtls_md2 +md2_context mbedtls_md2_context +md2_file mbedtls_md2_file +md2_finish mbedtls_md2_finish +md2_free mbedtls_md2_free +md2_hmac mbedtls_md2_hmac +md2_hmac_finish mbedtls_md2_hmac_finish +md2_hmac_reset mbedtls_md2_hmac_reset +md2_hmac_starts mbedtls_md2_hmac_starts +md2_hmac_update mbedtls_md2_hmac_update +md2_info mbedtls_md2_info +md2_init mbedtls_md2_init +md2_process mbedtls_md2_process +md2_self_test mbedtls_md2_self_test +md2_starts mbedtls_md2_starts +md2_update mbedtls_md2_update +md4 mbedtls_md4 +md4_context mbedtls_md4_context +md4_file mbedtls_md4_file +md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish +md4_free mbedtls_md4_free +md4_hmac mbedtls_md4_hmac +md4_hmac_finish mbedtls_md4_hmac_finish +md4_hmac_reset mbedtls_md4_hmac_reset +md4_hmac_starts mbedtls_md4_hmac_starts +md4_hmac_update mbedtls_md4_hmac_update +md4_info mbedtls_md4_info +md4_init mbedtls_md4_init +md4_process mbedtls_md4_process +md4_self_test mbedtls_md4_self_test +md4_starts mbedtls_md4_starts +md4_update mbedtls_md4_update +md5 mbedtls_md5 +md5_context mbedtls_md5_context +md5_file mbedtls_md5_file +md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish +md5_free mbedtls_md5_free +md5_hmac mbedtls_md5_hmac +md5_hmac_finish mbedtls_md5_hmac_finish +md5_hmac_reset mbedtls_md5_hmac_reset +md5_hmac_starts mbedtls_md5_hmac_starts +md5_hmac_update mbedtls_md5_hmac_update +md5_info mbedtls_md5_info +md5_init mbedtls_md5_init +md5_process mbedtls_md5_process +md5_self_test mbedtls_md5_self_test +md5_starts mbedtls_md5_starts +md5_update mbedtls_md5_update +md_context_t mbedtls_md_context_t +md_file mbedtls_md_file +md_finish mbedtls_md_finish +md_free mbedtls_md_free +md_free_ctx mbedtls_md_free_ctx +md_get_name mbedtls_md_get_name +md_get_size mbedtls_md_get_size +md_get_type mbedtls_md_get_type +md_hmac mbedtls_md_hmac +md_hmac_finish mbedtls_md_hmac_finish +md_hmac_reset mbedtls_md_hmac_reset +md_hmac_starts mbedtls_md_hmac_starts +md_hmac_update mbedtls_md_hmac_update +md_info_from_string mbedtls_md_info_from_string +md_info_from_type mbedtls_md_info_from_type +md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t +md_init mbedtls_md_init +md_init_ctx mbedtls_md_init_ctx +md_list mbedtls_md_list +md_process mbedtls_md_process +md_starts mbedtls_md_starts +md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_t +md_update mbedtls_md_update +memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get +memory_buffer_alloc_free mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free +memory_buffer_alloc_init mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init +memory_buffer_alloc_max_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get +memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset +memory_buffer_alloc_self_test mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test +memory_buffer_alloc_status mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status +memory_buffer_alloc_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify +memory_buffer_set_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify +memory_set_own mbedtls_memory_set_own +mpi mbedtls_mpi +mpi_add_abs mbedtls_mpi_add_abs +mpi_add_int mbedtls_mpi_add_int +mpi_add_mpi mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi +mpi_cmp_abs mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs +mpi_cmp_int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int +mpi_cmp_mpi mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi +mpi_copy mbedtls_mpi_copy +mpi_div_int mbedtls_mpi_div_int +mpi_div_mpi mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi +mpi_exp_mod mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod +mpi_fill_random mbedtls_mpi_fill_random +mpi_free mbedtls_mpi_free +mpi_gcd mbedtls_mpi_gcd +mpi_gen_prime mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime +mpi_get_bit mbedtls_mpi_get_bit +mpi_grow mbedtls_mpi_grow +mpi_init mbedtls_mpi_init +mpi_inv_mod mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod +mpi_is_prime mbedtls_mpi_is_prime +mpi_lsb mbedtls_mpi_lsb +mpi_lset mbedtls_mpi_lset +mpi_mod_int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int +mpi_mod_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi +mpi_msb mbedtls_mpi_bitlen +mpi_mul_int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int +mpi_mul_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi +mpi_read_binary mbedtls_mpi_read_binary +mpi_read_file mbedtls_mpi_read_file +mpi_read_string mbedtls_mpi_read_string +mpi_safe_cond_assign mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign +mpi_safe_cond_swap mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap +mpi_self_test mbedtls_mpi_self_test +mpi_set_bit mbedtls_mpi_set_bit +mpi_shift_l mbedtls_mpi_shift_l +mpi_shift_r mbedtls_mpi_shift_r +mpi_shrink mbedtls_mpi_shrink +mpi_size mbedtls_mpi_size +mpi_sub_abs mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs +mpi_sub_int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int +mpi_sub_mpi mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi +mpi_swap mbedtls_mpi_swap +mpi_write_binary mbedtls_mpi_write_binary +mpi_write_file mbedtls_mpi_write_file +mpi_write_string mbedtls_mpi_write_string +net_accept mbedtls_net_accept +net_bind mbedtls_net_bind +net_close mbedtls_net_free +net_connect mbedtls_net_connect +net_recv mbedtls_net_recv +net_recv_timeout mbedtls_net_recv_timeout +net_send mbedtls_net_send +net_set_block mbedtls_net_set_block +net_set_nonblock mbedtls_net_set_nonblock +net_usleep mbedtls_net_usleep +oid_descriptor_t mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t +oid_get_attr_short_name mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name +oid_get_cipher_alg mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg +oid_get_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp +oid_get_extended_key_usage mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage +oid_get_md_alg mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg +oid_get_numeric_string mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string +oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp +oid_get_oid_by_md mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md +oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg +oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg +oid_get_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg +oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg +oid_get_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg +oid_get_sig_alg_desc mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc +oid_get_x509_ext_type mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type +operation_t mbedtls_operation_t +padlock_supports mbedtls_padlock_has_support +padlock_xcryptcbc mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc +padlock_xcryptecb mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb +pem_context mbedtls_pem_context +pem_free mbedtls_pem_free +pem_init mbedtls_pem_init +pem_read_buffer mbedtls_pem_read_buffer +pem_write_buffer mbedtls_pem_write_buffer +pk_can_do mbedtls_pk_can_do +pk_check_pair mbedtls_pk_check_pair +pk_context mbedtls_pk_context +pk_debug mbedtls_pk_debug +pk_debug_item mbedtls_pk_debug_item +pk_debug_type mbedtls_pk_debug_type +pk_decrypt mbedtls_pk_decrypt +pk_ec mbedtls_pk_ec +pk_encrypt mbedtls_pk_encrypt +pk_free mbedtls_pk_free +pk_get_len mbedtls_pk_get_len +pk_get_name mbedtls_pk_get_name +pk_get_size mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen +pk_get_type mbedtls_pk_get_type +pk_info_from_type mbedtls_pk_info_from_type +pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t +pk_init mbedtls_pk_init +pk_init_ctx mbedtls_pk_setup +pk_init_ctx_rsa_alt mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt +pk_load_file mbedtls_pk_load_file +pk_parse_key mbedtls_pk_parse_key +pk_parse_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile +pk_parse_public_key mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key +pk_parse_public_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile +pk_parse_subpubkey mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey +pk_rsa mbedtls_pk_rsa +pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func +pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func +pk_rsa_alt_sign_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func +pk_rsassa_pss_options mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options +pk_sign mbedtls_pk_sign +pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_type_t +pk_verify mbedtls_pk_verify +pk_verify_ext mbedtls_pk_verify_ext +pk_write_key_der mbedtls_pk_write_key_der +pk_write_key_pem mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem +pk_write_pubkey mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey +pk_write_pubkey_der mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der +pk_write_pubkey_pem mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem +pkcs11_context mbedtls_pkcs11_context +pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt +pkcs11_priv_key_free mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free +pkcs11_priv_key_init mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind +pkcs11_sign mbedtls_pkcs11_sign +pkcs11_x509_cert_init mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind +pkcs12_derivation mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation +pkcs12_pbe mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe +pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 +pkcs5_pbes2 mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2 +pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac +pkcs5_self_test mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test +platform_entropy_poll mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll +platform_set_exit mbedtls_platform_set_exit +platform_set_fprintf mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf +platform_set_malloc_free mbedtls_platform_set_malloc_free +platform_set_printf mbedtls_platform_set_printf +platform_set_snprintf mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf +polarssl_exit mbedtls_exit +polarssl_fprintf mbedtls_fprintf +polarssl_free mbedtls_free +polarssl_malloc mbedtls_malloc +polarssl_mutex_free mbedtls_mutex_free +polarssl_mutex_init mbedtls_mutex_init +polarssl_mutex_lock mbedtls_mutex_lock +polarssl_mutex_unlock mbedtls_mutex_unlock +polarssl_printf mbedtls_printf +polarssl_snprintf mbedtls_snprintf +polarssl_strerror mbedtls_strerror +ripemd160 mbedtls_ripemd160 +ripemd160_context mbedtls_ripemd160_context +ripemd160_file mbedtls_ripemd160_file +ripemd160_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_finish +ripemd160_free mbedtls_ripemd160_free +ripemd160_hmac mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac +ripemd160_hmac_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac_finish +ripemd160_hmac_reset mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac_reset +ripemd160_hmac_starts mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac_starts +ripemd160_hmac_update mbedtls_ripemd160_hmac_update +ripemd160_info mbedtls_ripemd160_info +ripemd160_init mbedtls_ripemd160_init +ripemd160_process mbedtls_ripemd160_process +ripemd160_self_test mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test +ripemd160_starts mbedtls_ripemd160_starts +ripemd160_update mbedtls_ripemd160_update +rsa_alt_context mbedtls_rsa_alt_context +rsa_alt_info mbedtls_rsa_alt_info +rsa_check_privkey mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey +rsa_check_pub_priv mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv +rsa_check_pubkey mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey +rsa_context mbedtls_rsa_context +rsa_copy mbedtls_rsa_copy +rsa_decrypt_func mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func +rsa_free mbedtls_rsa_free +rsa_gen_key mbedtls_rsa_gen_key +rsa_info mbedtls_rsa_info +rsa_init mbedtls_rsa_init +rsa_key_len_func mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func +rsa_pkcs1_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt +rsa_pkcs1_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt +rsa_pkcs1_sign mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign +rsa_pkcs1_verify mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify +rsa_private mbedtls_rsa_private +rsa_public mbedtls_rsa_public +rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt +rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt +rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt +rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt +rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign +rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify +rsa_rsassa_pss_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign +rsa_rsassa_pss_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify +rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext +rsa_self_test mbedtls_rsa_self_test +rsa_set_padding mbedtls_rsa_set_padding +rsa_sign_func mbedtls_rsa_sign_func +safer_memcmp mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp +set_alarm mbedtls_set_alarm +sha1 mbedtls_sha1 +sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context +sha1_file mbedtls_sha1_file +sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish +sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free +sha1_hmac mbedtls_sha1_hmac +sha1_hmac_finish mbedtls_sha1_hmac_finish +sha1_hmac_reset mbedtls_sha1_hmac_reset +sha1_hmac_starts mbedtls_sha1_hmac_starts +sha1_hmac_update mbedtls_sha1_hmac_update +sha1_info mbedtls_sha1_info +sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init +sha1_process mbedtls_sha1_process +sha1_self_test mbedtls_sha1_self_test +sha1_starts mbedtls_sha1_starts +sha1_update mbedtls_sha1_update +sha224_info mbedtls_sha224_info +sha256 mbedtls_sha256 +sha256_context mbedtls_sha256_context +sha256_file mbedtls_sha256_file +sha256_finish mbedtls_sha256_finish +sha256_free mbedtls_sha256_free +sha256_hmac mbedtls_sha256_hmac +sha256_hmac_finish mbedtls_sha256_hmac_finish +sha256_hmac_reset mbedtls_sha256_hmac_reset +sha256_hmac_starts mbedtls_sha256_hmac_starts +sha256_hmac_update mbedtls_sha256_hmac_update +sha256_info mbedtls_sha256_info +sha256_init mbedtls_sha256_init +sha256_process mbedtls_sha256_process +sha256_self_test mbedtls_sha256_self_test +sha256_starts mbedtls_sha256_starts +sha256_update mbedtls_sha256_update +sha384_info mbedtls_sha384_info +sha512 mbedtls_sha512 +sha512_context mbedtls_sha512_context +sha512_file mbedtls_sha512_file +sha512_finish mbedtls_sha512_finish +sha512_free mbedtls_sha512_free +sha512_hmac mbedtls_sha512_hmac +sha512_hmac_finish mbedtls_sha512_hmac_finish +sha512_hmac_reset mbedtls_sha512_hmac_reset +sha512_hmac_starts mbedtls_sha512_hmac_starts +sha512_hmac_update mbedtls_sha512_hmac_update +sha512_info mbedtls_sha512_info +sha512_init mbedtls_sha512_init +sha512_process mbedtls_sha512_process +sha512_self_test mbedtls_sha512_self_test +sha512_starts mbedtls_sha512_starts +sha512_update mbedtls_sha512_update +source_state mbedtls_entropy_source_state +ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context +ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry +ssl_cache_free mbedtls_ssl_cache_free +ssl_cache_get mbedtls_ssl_cache_get +ssl_cache_init mbedtls_ssl_cache_init +ssl_cache_set mbedtls_ssl_cache_set +ssl_cache_set_max_entries mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries +ssl_cache_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout +ssl_check_cert_usage mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage +ssl_ciphersuite_from_id mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id +ssl_ciphersuite_from_string mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string +ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t +ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec +ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk +ssl_close_notify mbedtls_ssl_close_notify +ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context +ssl_cookie_check mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check +ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t +ssl_cookie_ctx mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx +ssl_cookie_free mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free +ssl_cookie_init mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init +ssl_cookie_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout +ssl_cookie_setup mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup +ssl_cookie_write mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write +ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t +ssl_curve_is_acceptable mbedtls_ssl_curve_is_acceptable +ssl_derive_keys mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys +ssl_dtls_replay_check mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check +ssl_dtls_replay_update mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update +ssl_fetch_input mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input +ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item +ssl_flush_output mbedtls_ssl_flush_output +ssl_free mbedtls_ssl_free +ssl_get_alpn_protocol mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol +ssl_get_bytes_avail mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail +ssl_get_ciphersuite mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite +ssl_get_ciphersuite_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id +ssl_get_ciphersuite_name mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name +ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg +ssl_get_peer_cert mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert +ssl_get_record_expansion mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion +ssl_get_session mbedtls_ssl_get_session +ssl_get_verify_result mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result +ssl_get_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version +ssl_handshake mbedtls_ssl_handshake +ssl_handshake_client_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step +ssl_handshake_free mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free +ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params +ssl_handshake_server_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step +ssl_handshake_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step +ssl_handshake_wrapup mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup +ssl_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len +ssl_hs_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len +ssl_hw_record_activate mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate +ssl_hw_record_finish mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish +ssl_hw_record_init mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init +ssl_hw_record_read mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read +ssl_hw_record_reset mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset +ssl_hw_record_write mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write +ssl_init mbedtls_ssl_init +ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert +ssl_legacy_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation +ssl_list_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites +ssl_md_alg_from_hash mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash +ssl_optimize_checksum mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum +ssl_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_own_cert +ssl_own_key mbedtls_ssl_own_key +ssl_parse_certificate mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate +ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec +ssl_parse_finished mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished +ssl_pk_alg_from_sig mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig +ssl_pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt +ssl_pkcs11_key_len mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len +ssl_pkcs11_sign mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign +ssl_psk_derive_premaster mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster +ssl_read mbedtls_ssl_read +ssl_read_record mbedtls_ssl_read_record +ssl_read_version mbedtls_ssl_read_version +ssl_recv_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed +ssl_renegotiate mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate +ssl_resend mbedtls_ssl_resend +ssl_reset_checksum mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum +ssl_send_alert_message mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message +ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure +ssl_send_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed +ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session +ssl_session_free mbedtls_ssl_session_free +ssl_session_init mbedtls_ssl_session_init +ssl_session_reset mbedtls_ssl_session_reset +ssl_set_alpn_protocols mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols +ssl_set_arc4_support mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support +ssl_set_authmode mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode +ssl_set_bio mbedtls_ssl_set_bio +ssl_set_ca_chain mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain +ssl_set_cbc_record_splitting mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting +ssl_set_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites +ssl_set_ciphersuites_for_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version +ssl_set_client_transport_id mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id +ssl_set_curves mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves +ssl_set_dbg mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg +ssl_set_dh_param mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param +ssl_set_dh_param_ctx mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx +ssl_set_dtls_anti_replay mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay +ssl_set_dtls_badmac_limit mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit +ssl_set_dtls_cookies mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies +ssl_set_encrypt_then_mac mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac +ssl_set_endpoint mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint +ssl_set_extended_master_secret mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret +ssl_set_fallback mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback +ssl_set_handshake_timeout mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout +ssl_set_hostname mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname +ssl_set_max_frag_len mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len +ssl_set_max_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version +ssl_set_min_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version +ssl_set_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert +ssl_set_own_cert_alt mbedtls_ssl_set_own_cert_alt +ssl_set_own_cert_rsa mbedtls_ssl_set_own_cert_rsa +ssl_set_psk mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk +ssl_set_psk_cb mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb +ssl_set_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation +ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced +ssl_set_renegotiation_period mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period +ssl_set_rng mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng +ssl_set_session mbedtls_ssl_set_session +ssl_set_session_cache mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache +ssl_set_session_ticket_lifetime mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_ticket_lifetime +ssl_set_session_tickets mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets +ssl_set_sni mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni +ssl_set_transport mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport +ssl_set_truncated_hmac mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac +ssl_set_verify mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify +ssl_sig_from_pk mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk +ssl_states mbedtls_ssl_states +ssl_ticket_keys mbedtls_ssl_ticket_keys +ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform +ssl_transform_free mbedtls_ssl_transform_free +ssl_write mbedtls_ssl_write +ssl_write_certificate mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate +ssl_write_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec +ssl_write_finished mbedtls_ssl_write_finished +ssl_write_record mbedtls_ssl_write_record +ssl_write_version mbedtls_ssl_write_version +supported_ciphers mbedtls_cipher_supported +t_sint mbedtls_mpi_sint +t_udbl mbedtls_t_udbl +t_uint mbedtls_mpi_uint +test_ca_crt mbedtls_test_ca_crt +test_ca_crt_ec mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec +test_ca_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa +test_ca_key mbedtls_test_ca_key +test_ca_key_ec mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec +test_ca_key_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa +test_ca_list mbedtls_test_cas_pem +test_ca_pwd mbedtls_test_ca_pwd +test_ca_pwd_ec mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec +test_ca_pwd_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa +test_cli_crt mbedtls_test_cli_crt +test_cli_crt_ec mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec +test_cli_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa +test_cli_key mbedtls_test_cli_key +test_cli_key_ec mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec +test_cli_key_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa +test_dhm_params mbedtls_test_dhm_params +test_srv_crt mbedtls_test_srv_crt +test_srv_crt_ec mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec +test_srv_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa +test_srv_key mbedtls_test_srv_key +test_srv_key_ec mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec +test_srv_key_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa +threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_mutex_t +threading_set_alt mbedtls_threading_set_alt +timing_self_test mbedtls_timing_self_test +version_check_feature mbedtls_version_check_feature +version_get_number mbedtls_version_get_number +version_get_string mbedtls_version_get_string +version_get_string_full mbedtls_version_get_string_full +x509_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring +x509_buf mbedtls_x509_buf +x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl +x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry +x509_crl_free mbedtls_x509_crl_free +x509_crl_info mbedtls_x509_crl_info +x509_crl_init mbedtls_x509_crl_init +x509_crl_parse mbedtls_x509_crl_parse +x509_crl_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der +x509_crl_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file +x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt +x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage +x509_crt_check_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage +x509_crt_free mbedtls_x509_crt_free +x509_crt_info mbedtls_x509_crt_info +x509_crt_init mbedtls_x509_crt_init +x509_crt_parse mbedtls_x509_crt_parse +x509_crt_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der +x509_crt_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file +x509_crt_parse_path mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path +x509_crt_revoked mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked +x509_crt_verify mbedtls_x509_crt_verify +x509_crt_verify_info mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info +x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr +x509_csr_free mbedtls_x509_csr_free +x509_csr_info mbedtls_x509_csr_info +x509_csr_init mbedtls_x509_csr_init +x509_csr_parse mbedtls_x509_csr_parse +x509_csr_parse_der mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der +x509_csr_parse_file mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file +x509_dn_gets mbedtls_x509_dn_gets +x509_get_alg mbedtls_x509_get_alg +x509_get_alg_null mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null +x509_get_ext mbedtls_x509_get_ext +x509_get_name mbedtls_x509_get_name +x509_get_rsassa_pss_params mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params +x509_get_serial mbedtls_x509_get_serial +x509_get_sig mbedtls_x509_get_sig +x509_get_sig_alg mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg +x509_get_time mbedtls_x509_get_time +x509_key_size_helper mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper +x509_name mbedtls_x509_name +x509_oid_get_description mbedtls_x509_oid_get_description +x509_oid_get_numeric_string mbedtls_x509_oid_get_numeric_string +x509_self_test mbedtls_x509_self_test +x509_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence +x509_serial_gets mbedtls_x509_serial_gets +x509_set_extension mbedtls_x509_set_extension +x509_sig_alg_gets mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets +x509_string_to_names mbedtls_x509_string_to_names +x509_time mbedtls_x509_time +x509_time_expired mbedtls_x509_time_is_past +x509_time_future mbedtls_x509_time_is_future +x509_write_extensions mbedtls_x509_write_extensions +x509_write_names mbedtls_x509_write_names +x509_write_sig mbedtls_x509_write_sig +x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert +x509write_crt_der mbedtls_x509write_crt_der +x509write_crt_free mbedtls_x509write_crt_free +x509write_crt_init mbedtls_x509write_crt_init +x509write_crt_pem mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem +x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier +x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints +x509write_crt_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension +x509write_crt_set_issuer_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key +x509write_crt_set_issuer_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name +x509write_crt_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage +x509write_crt_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg +x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type +x509write_crt_set_serial mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial +x509write_crt_set_subject_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key +x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier +x509write_crt_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name +x509write_crt_set_validity mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity +x509write_crt_set_version mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version +x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr +x509write_csr_der mbedtls_x509write_csr_der +x509write_csr_free mbedtls_x509write_csr_free +x509write_csr_init mbedtls_x509write_csr_init +x509write_csr_pem mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem +x509write_csr_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension +x509write_csr_set_key mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key +x509write_csr_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage +x509write_csr_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg +x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type +x509write_csr_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name +xtea_context mbedtls_xtea_context +xtea_crypt_cbc mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc +xtea_crypt_ecb mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb +xtea_free mbedtls_xtea_free +xtea_init mbedtls_xtea_init +xtea_self_test mbedtls_xtea_self_test +xtea_setup mbedtls_xtea_setup diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d4bf7744 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Version feature information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + +#include "mbedtls/version.h" + +#include + +static const char * const features[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) +FEATURE_DEFINES +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ + NULL +}; + +int mbedtls_version_check_feature( const char *feature ) +{ + const char * const *idx = features; + + if( *idx == NULL ) + return( -2 ); + + if( feature == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + while( *idx != NULL ) + { + if( !strcmp( *idx, feature ) ) + return( 0 ); + idx++; + } + return( -1 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs2010-app-template.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs2010-app-template.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17719605 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs2010-app-template.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + + Win32Proj + + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES + + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES + + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES + + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES + + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs2010-main-template.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs2010-main-template.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8f1d0601 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs2010-main-template.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + Win32Proj + mbedTLS + + + + StaticLibrary + true + Unicode + + + StaticLibrary + true + Unicode + + + StaticLibrary + false + true + Unicode + + + StaticLibrary + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + _USRDLL;MBEDTLS_EXPORTS;KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES + + CompileAsC + + + Windows + true + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + _USRDLL;MBEDTLS_EXPORTS;KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES + + CompileAsC + + + Windows + true + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;_USRDLL;MBEDTLS_EXPORTS;KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES + + + + Windows + true + true + true + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + WIN64;NDEBUG;_WINDOWS;_USRDLL;MBEDTLS_EXPORTS;KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES + + + + Windows + true + true + true + + + +HEADER_ENTRIES + + +SOURCE_ENTRIES + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs2010-sln-template.sln b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs2010-sln-template.sln new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c7ad2b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs2010-sln-template.sln @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ + +Microsoft Visual Studio Solution File, Format Version 11.00 +# Visual C++ Express 2010 +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "mbedTLS", "mbedTLS.vcxproj", "{46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}" +EndProject +APP_ENTRIES +Global + GlobalSection(SolutionConfigurationPlatforms) = preSolution + Debug|Win32 = Debug|Win32 + Debug|x64 = Debug|x64 + Release|Win32 = Release|Win32 + Release|x64 = Release|x64 + EndGlobalSection + GlobalSection(ProjectConfigurationPlatforms) = postSolution + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|x64 + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64 + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64 +CONF_ENTRIES + EndGlobalSection + GlobalSection(SolutionProperties) = preSolution + HideSolutionNode = FALSE + EndGlobalSection +EndGlobal diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs6-app-template.dsp b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs6-app-template.dsp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ff7c00e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs6-app-template.dsp @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +# Microsoft Developer Studio Project File - Name="" - Package Owner=<4> +# Microsoft Developer Studio Generated Build File, Format Version 6.00 +# ** DO NOT EDIT ** + +# TARGTYPE "Win32 (x86) Console Application" 0x0103 + +CFG= - Win32 Debug +!MESSAGE This is not a valid makefile. To build this project using NMAKE, +!MESSAGE use the Export Makefile command and run +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE NMAKE /f ".mak". +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE You can specify a configuration when running NMAKE +!MESSAGE by defining the macro CFG on the command line. For example: +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE NMAKE /f ".mak" CFG=" - Win32 Debug" +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE Possible choices for configuration are: +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE " - Win32 Release" (based on "Win32 (x86) Console Application") +!MESSAGE " - Win32 Debug" (based on "Win32 (x86) Console Application") +!MESSAGE + +# Begin Project +# PROP AllowPerConfigDependencies 0 +# PROP Scc_ProjName "" +# PROP Scc_LocalPath "" +CPP=cl.exe +RSC=rc.exe + +!IF "$(CFG)" == " - Win32 Release" + +# PROP BASE Use_MFC 0 +# PROP BASE Use_Debug_Libraries 0 +# PROP BASE Output_Dir "" +# PROP BASE Intermediate_Dir "temp" +# PROP BASE Target_Dir "" +# PROP Use_MFC 0 +# PROP Use_Debug_Libraries 0 +# PROP Output_Dir "" +# PROP Intermediate_Dir "temp" +# PROP Target_Dir "" +# ADD BASE CPP /nologo /W3 /GX /O2 /D "WIN32" /D "NDEBUG" /D "_CONSOLE" /D "_MBCS" /YX /FD /c +# ADD CPP /nologo /W3 /GX /O2 /D "WIN32" /D "NDEBUG" /D "_CONSOLE" /D "_MBCS" /YX /FD /c +# ADD BASE RSC /l 0x40c /d "NDEBUG" +# ADD RSC /l 0x40c /d "NDEBUG" +BSC32=bscmake.exe +# ADD BASE BSC32 /nologo +# ADD BSC32 /nologo +LINK32=link.exe +# ADD BASE LINK32 kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib /nologo /subsystem:console /machine:I386 +# ADD LINK32 kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib /nologo /subsystem:console /machine:I386 + +!ELSEIF "$(CFG)" == " - Win32 Debug" + +# PROP BASE Use_MFC 0 +# PROP BASE Use_Debug_Libraries 1 +# PROP BASE Output_Dir "" +# PROP BASE Intermediate_Dir "temp" +# PROP BASE Target_Dir "" +# PROP Use_MFC 0 +# PROP Use_Debug_Libraries 1 +# PROP Output_Dir "" +# PROP Intermediate_Dir "temp" +# PROP Target_Dir "" +# ADD BASE CPP /nologo /W3 /Gm /GX /Z7 /Od /D "WIN32" /D "_DEBUG" /D "_CONSOLE" /D "_MBCS" /YX /FD /GZ /c +# ADD CPP /nologo /W3 /Gm /GX /Z7 /Od /D "WIN32" /D "_DEBUG" /D "_CONSOLE" /D "_MBCS" /YX /FD /GZ /c +# ADD BASE RSC /l 0x40c /d "_DEBUG" +# ADD RSC /l 0x40c /d "_DEBUG" +BSC32=bscmake.exe +# ADD BASE BSC32 /nologo +# ADD BSC32 /nologo +LINK32=link.exe +# ADD BASE LINK32 kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib /nologo /subsystem:console /debug /machine:I386 /pdbtype:sept +# ADD LINK32 kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib /nologo /subsystem:console /debug /machine:I386 /pdbtype:sept + +!ENDIF + +# Begin Target + +# Name " - Win32 Release" +# Name " - Win32 Debug" +# Begin Group "Source Files" + +# PROP Default_Filter "cpp;c;cxx;rc;def;r;odl;idl;hpj;bat" +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=..\..\programs\.c +# ADD CPP /I "../../include" +# End Source File +# End Group +# Begin Group "Header Files" + +# PROP Default_Filter "h;hpp;hxx;hm;inl" +# End Group +# Begin Group "Resource Files" + +# PROP Default_Filter "ico;cur;bmp;dlg;rc2;rct;bin;rgs;gif;jpg;jpeg;jpe" +# End Group +# End Target +# End Project diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs6-main-template.dsp b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs6-main-template.dsp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f4d5c41 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs6-main-template.dsp @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +# Microsoft Developer Studio Project File - Name="mbedtls" - Package Owner=<4> +# Microsoft Developer Studio Generated Build File, Format Version 6.00 +# ** DO NOT EDIT ** + +# TARGTYPE "Win32 (x86) Static Library" 0x0104 + +CFG=mbedtls - Win32 Debug +!MESSAGE This is not a valid makefile. To build this project using NMAKE, +!MESSAGE use the Export Makefile command and run +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE NMAKE /f "mbedtls.mak". +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE You can specify a configuration when running NMAKE +!MESSAGE by defining the macro CFG on the command line. For example: +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE NMAKE /f "mbedtls.mak" CFG="mbedtls - Win32 Debug" +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE Possible choices for configuration are: +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE "mbedtls - Win32 Release" (based on "Win32 (x86) Static Library") +!MESSAGE "mbedtls - Win32 Debug" (based on "Win32 (x86) Static Library") +!MESSAGE + +# Begin Project +# PROP AllowPerConfigDependencies 0 +# PROP Scc_ProjName "" +# PROP Scc_LocalPath "" +CPP=cl.exe +RSC=rc.exe + +!IF "$(CFG)" == "mbedtls - Win32 Release" + +# PROP BASE Use_MFC 0 +# PROP BASE Use_Debug_Libraries 0 +# PROP BASE Output_Dir "" +# PROP BASE Intermediate_Dir "temp" +# PROP BASE Target_Dir "" +# PROP Use_MFC 0 +# PROP Use_Debug_Libraries 0 +# PROP Output_Dir "" +# PROP Intermediate_Dir "temp" +# PROP Target_Dir "" +# ADD BASE CPP /nologo /W3 /GX /O2 /D "WIN32" /D "NDEBUG" /D "_MBCS" /D "_LIB" /YX /FD /c +# ADD CPP /nologo /W3 /GX /O2 /I "../../include" /D "NDEBUG" /D "WIN32" /D "_MBCS" /D "_LIB" /YX /FD /c +# ADD BASE RSC /l 0x40c /d "NDEBUG" +# ADD RSC /l 0x40c /d "NDEBUG" +BSC32=bscmake.exe +# ADD BASE BSC32 /nologo +# ADD BSC32 /nologo +LIB32=link.exe -lib +# ADD BASE LIB32 /nologo +# ADD LIB32 /nologo + +!ELSEIF "$(CFG)" == "mbedtls - Win32 Debug" + +# PROP BASE Use_MFC 0 +# PROP BASE Use_Debug_Libraries 1 +# PROP BASE Output_Dir "" +# PROP BASE Intermediate_Dir "temp" +# PROP BASE Target_Dir "" +# PROP Use_MFC 0 +# PROP Use_Debug_Libraries 1 +# PROP Output_Dir "" +# PROP Intermediate_Dir "temp" +# PROP Target_Dir "" +# ADD BASE CPP /nologo /W3 /GX /Z7 /Od /D "WIN32" /D "_DEBUG" /D "_MBCS" /D "_LIB" /YX /FD /GZ /c +# ADD CPP /nologo /W3 /GX /Z7 /Od /I "../../include" /D "_DEBUG" /D "WIN32" /D "_MBCS" /D "_LIB" /YX /FD /GZ /c +# ADD BASE RSC /l 0x40c /d "_DEBUG" +# ADD RSC /l 0x40c /d "_DEBUG" +BSC32=bscmake.exe +# ADD BASE BSC32 /nologo +# ADD BSC32 /nologo +LIB32=link.exe -lib +# ADD BASE LIB32 /nologo +# ADD LIB32 /nologo + +!ENDIF + +# Begin Target + +# Name "mbedtls - Win32 Release" +# Name "mbedtls - Win32 Debug" +# Begin Group "Source Files" + +# PROP Default_Filter "cpp;c;cxx;rc;def;r;odl;idl;hpj;bat" +SOURCE_ENTRIES +# End Group +# Begin Group "Header Files" + +# PROP Default_Filter "h;hpp;hxx;hm;inl" +HEADER_ENTRIES +# End Group +# End Target +# End Project diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs6-workspace-template.dsw b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs6-workspace-template.dsw new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b2e262d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/data_files/vs6-workspace-template.dsw @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +Microsoft Developer Studio Workspace File, Format Version 6.00 +# WARNING: DO NOT EDIT OR DELETE THIS WORKSPACE FILE! + +APP_ENTRIES +############################################################################### + +Global: + +Package=<5> +{{{ +}}} + +Package=<3> +{{{ +}}} + +############################################################################### + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/ecc-heap.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/ecc-heap.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..f16de834 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/ecc-heap.sh @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Measure heap usage (and performance) of ECC operations with various values of +# the relevant tunable compile-time parameters. +# +# Usage (preferably on a 32-bit platform): +# cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release . +# scripts/ecc-heap.sh | tee ecc-heap.log +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +set -eu + +CONFIG_H='include/mbedtls/config.h' + +if [ -r $CONFIG_H ]; then :; else + echo "$CONFIG_H not found" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if grep -i cmake Makefile >/dev/null; then :; else + echo "Needs Cmake" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if git status | grep -F $CONFIG_H >/dev/null 2>&1; then + echo "config.h not clean" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +CONFIG_BAK=${CONFIG_H}.bak +cp $CONFIG_H $CONFIG_BAK + +cat << EOF >$CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C // ECDSA benchmark needs it +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C // SHA256 requires this for now +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + +// NIST curves >= 256 bits +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +// SECP "koblitz-like" curve >= 256 bits +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +// Brainpool curves (no specialised "mod p" routine) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +// Montgomery curves +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + +#include "check_config.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM // just make things a bit faster +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM // faster and less allocations + +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 +EOF + +for F in 0 1; do + for W in 2 3 4; do + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE $W + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM $F + make benchmark >/dev/null 2>&1 + echo "fixed point optim = $F, max window size = $W" + echo "--------------------------------------------" + programs/test/benchmark ecdh ecdsa + done +done + +# cleanup + +mv $CONFIG_BAK $CONFIG_H +make clean diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/find-mem-leak.cocci b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/find-mem-leak.cocci new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8179e2b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/find-mem-leak.cocci @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +@@ +expression x, y; +statement S; +@@ + x = mbedtls_calloc(...); + y = mbedtls_calloc(...); + ... +* if (x == NULL || y == NULL) + S + +@@ +expression x, y; +statement S; +@@ + if ( +* (x = mbedtls_calloc(...)) == NULL + || +* (y = mbedtls_calloc(...)) == NULL + ) + S diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/footprint.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/footprint.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..4d7be7a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/footprint.sh @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# This script determines ROM size (or code size) for the standard mbed TLS +# configurations, when built for a Cortex M3/M4 target. +# +# Configurations included: +# default include/mbedtls/config.h +# thread configs/config-thread.h +# suite-b configs/config-suite-b.h +# psk configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h +# +# Usage: footprint.sh +# +set -eu + +CONFIG_H='include/mbedtls/config.h' + +if [ -r $CONFIG_H ]; then :; else + echo "$CONFIG_H not found" >&2 + echo "This script needs to be run from the root of" >&2 + echo "a git checkout or uncompressed tarball" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if grep -i cmake Makefile >/dev/null; then + echo "Not compatible with CMake" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if which arm-none-eabi-gcc >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else + echo "You need the ARM-GCC toolchain in your path" >&2 + echo "See https://launchpad.net/gcc-arm-embedded/" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +ARMGCC_FLAGS='-Os -march=armv7-m -mthumb' +OUTFILE='00-footprint-summary.txt' + +log() +{ + echo "$@" + echo "$@" >> "$OUTFILE" +} + +doit() +{ + NAME="$1" + FILE="$2" + + log "" + log "$NAME ($FILE):" + + cp $CONFIG_H ${CONFIG_H}.bak + if [ "$FILE" != $CONFIG_H ]; then + cp "$FILE" $CONFIG_H + fi + + { + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_NET_C || true + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_TIMING_C || true + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_FS_IO || true + scripts/config.py --force set MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY || true + } >/dev/null 2>&1 + + make clean >/dev/null + CC=arm-none-eabi-gcc AR=arm-none-eabi-ar LD=arm-none-eabi-ld \ + CFLAGS="$ARMGCC_FLAGS" make lib >/dev/null + + OUT="size-${NAME}.txt" + arm-none-eabi-size -t library/libmbed*.a > "$OUT" + log "$( head -n1 "$OUT" )" + log "$( tail -n1 "$OUT" )" + + cp ${CONFIG_H}.bak $CONFIG_H +} + +# truncate the file just this time +echo "(generated by $0)" > "$OUTFILE" +echo "" >> "$OUTFILE" + +log "Footprint of standard configurations (minus net_sockets.c, timing.c, fs_io)" +log "for bare-metal ARM Cortex-M3/M4 microcontrollers." + +VERSION_H="include/mbedtls/version.h" +MBEDTLS_VERSION=$( sed -n 's/.*VERSION_STRING *"\(.*\)"/\1/p' $VERSION_H ) +if git rev-parse HEAD >/dev/null; then + GIT_HEAD=$( git rev-parse HEAD | head -c 10 ) + GIT_VERSION=" (git head: $GIT_HEAD)" +else + GIT_VERSION="" +fi + +log "" +log "mbed TLS $MBEDTLS_VERSION$GIT_VERSION" +log "$( arm-none-eabi-gcc --version | head -n1 )" +log "CFLAGS=$ARMGCC_FLAGS" + +doit default include/mbedtls/config.h +doit thread configs/config-thread.h +doit suite-b configs/config-suite-b.h +doit psk configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h + +zip mbedtls-footprint.zip "$OUTFILE" size-*.txt >/dev/null diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_errors.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_errors.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..65383fa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_errors.pl @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# Generate error.c +# +# Usage: ./generate_errors.pl or scripts/generate_errors.pl without arguments, +# or generate_errors.pl include_dir data_dir error_file +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use strict; +use warnings; + +my ($include_dir, $data_dir, $error_file); + +if( @ARGV ) { + die "Invalid number of arguments" if scalar @ARGV != 3; + ($include_dir, $data_dir, $error_file) = @ARGV; + + -d $include_dir or die "No such directory: $include_dir\n"; + -d $data_dir or die "No such directory: $data_dir\n"; +} else { + $include_dir = 'include/mbedtls'; + $data_dir = 'scripts/data_files'; + $error_file = 'library/error.c'; + + unless( -d $include_dir && -d $data_dir ) { + chdir '..' or die; + -d $include_dir && -d $data_dir + or die "Without arguments, must be run from root or scripts\n" + } +} + +my $error_format_file = $data_dir.'/error.fmt'; + +my @low_level_modules = qw( AES ARC4 ARIA ASN1 BASE64 BIGNUM BLOWFISH + CAMELLIA CCM CHACHA20 CHACHAPOLY CMAC CTR_DRBG DES + ENTROPY ERROR GCM HKDF HMAC_DRBG MD2 MD4 MD5 + NET OID PADLOCK PBKDF2 PLATFORM POLY1305 RIPEMD160 + SHA1 SHA256 SHA512 THREADING XTEA ); +my @high_level_modules = qw( CIPHER DHM ECP MD + PEM PK PKCS12 PKCS5 + RSA SSL X509 ); + +undef $/; + +open(FORMAT_FILE, "$error_format_file") or die "Opening error format file '$error_format_file': $!"; +my $error_format = ; +close(FORMAT_FILE); + +my @files = <$include_dir/*.h>; +my @necessary_include_files; +my @matches; +foreach my $file (@files) { + open(FILE, "$file"); + my $content = ; + close FILE; + my $found = 0; + while ($content =~ m[ + # Both the before-comment and the after-comment are optional. + # Only the comment content is a regex capture group. The comment + # start and end parts are outside the capture group. + (?:/\*[*!](?!<) # Doxygen before-comment start + ((?:[^*]|\*+[^*/])*) # $1: Comment content (no */ inside) + \*/)? # Comment end + \s*\#\s*define\s+(MBEDTLS_ERR_\w+) # $2: name + \s+\-(0[Xx][0-9A-Fa-f]+)\s* # $3: value (without the sign) + (?:/\*[*!]< # Doxygen after-comment start + ((?:[^*]|\*+[^*/])*) # $4: Comment content (no */ inside) + \*/)? # Comment end + ]gsx) { + my ($before, $name, $value, $after) = ($1, $2, $3, $4); + # Discard Doxygen comments that are coincidentally present before + # an error definition but not attached to it. This is ad hoc, based + # on what actually matters (or mattered at some point). + undef $before if defined($before) && $before =~ /\s*\\name\s/s; + die "Description neither before nor after $name in $file\n" + if !defined($before) && !defined($after); + die "Description both before and after $name in $file\n" + if defined($before) && defined($after); + my $description = (defined($before) ? $before : $after); + $description =~ s/^\s+//; + $description =~ s/\n( *\*)? */ /g; + $description =~ s/\.?\s+$//; + push @matches, [$name, $value, $description]; + ++$found; + } + if ($found) { + my $include_name = $file; + $include_name =~ s!.*/!!; + push @necessary_include_files, $include_name; + } +} + +my $ll_old_define = ""; +my $hl_old_define = ""; + +my $ll_code_check = ""; +my $hl_code_check = ""; + +my $headers = ""; +my %included_headers; + +my %error_codes_seen; + +foreach my $match (@matches) +{ + my ($error_name, $error_code, $description) = @$match; + + die "Duplicated error code: $error_code ($error_name)\n" + if( $error_codes_seen{$error_code}++ ); + + $description =~ s/\\/\\\\/g; + + my ($module_name) = $error_name =~ /^MBEDTLS_ERR_([^_]+)/; + + # Fix faulty ones + $module_name = "BIGNUM" if ($module_name eq "MPI"); + $module_name = "CTR_DRBG" if ($module_name eq "CTR"); + $module_name = "HMAC_DRBG" if ($module_name eq "HMAC"); + + my $define_name = $module_name; + $define_name = "X509_USE,X509_CREATE" if ($define_name eq "X509"); + $define_name = "ASN1_PARSE" if ($define_name eq "ASN1"); + $define_name = "SSL_TLS" if ($define_name eq "SSL"); + $define_name = "PEM_PARSE,PEM_WRITE" if ($define_name eq "PEM"); + + my $include_name = $module_name; + $include_name =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/; + + # Fix faulty ones + $include_name = "net_sockets" if ($module_name eq "NET"); + + $included_headers{"${include_name}.h"} = $module_name; + + my $found_ll = grep $_ eq $module_name, @low_level_modules; + my $found_hl = grep $_ eq $module_name, @high_level_modules; + if (!$found_ll && !$found_hl) + { + printf("Error: Do not know how to handle: $module_name\n"); + exit 1; + } + + my $code_check; + my $old_define; + my $white_space; + my $first; + + if ($found_ll) + { + $code_check = \$ll_code_check; + $old_define = \$ll_old_define; + $white_space = ' '; + } + else + { + $code_check = \$hl_code_check; + $old_define = \$hl_old_define; + $white_space = ' '; + } + + if ($define_name ne ${$old_define}) + { + if (${$old_define} ne "") + { + ${$code_check} .= "#endif /* "; + $first = 0; + foreach my $dep (split(/,/, ${$old_define})) + { + ${$code_check} .= " || " if ($first++); + ${$code_check} .= "MBEDTLS_${dep}_C"; + } + ${$code_check} .= " */\n\n"; + } + + ${$code_check} .= "#if "; + $headers .= "#if " if ($include_name ne ""); + $first = 0; + foreach my $dep (split(/,/, ${define_name})) + { + ${$code_check} .= " || " if ($first); + $headers .= " || " if ($first++); + + ${$code_check} .= "defined(MBEDTLS_${dep}_C)"; + $headers .= "defined(MBEDTLS_${dep}_C)" if + ($include_name ne ""); + } + ${$code_check} .= "\n"; + $headers .= "\n#include \"mbedtls/${include_name}.h\"\n". + "#endif\n\n" if ($include_name ne ""); + ${$old_define} = $define_name; + } + + ${$code_check} .= "${white_space}case -($error_name):\n". + "${white_space} return( \"$module_name - $description\" );\n" +}; + +if ($ll_old_define ne "") +{ + $ll_code_check .= "#endif /* "; + my $first = 0; + foreach my $dep (split(/,/, $ll_old_define)) + { + $ll_code_check .= " || " if ($first++); + $ll_code_check .= "MBEDTLS_${dep}_C"; + } + $ll_code_check .= " */\n"; +} +if ($hl_old_define ne "") +{ + $hl_code_check .= "#endif /* "; + my $first = 0; + foreach my $dep (split(/,/, $hl_old_define)) + { + $hl_code_check .= " || " if ($first++); + $hl_code_check .= "MBEDTLS_${dep}_C"; + } + $hl_code_check .= " */\n"; +} + +$error_format =~ s/HEADER_INCLUDED\n/$headers/g; +$error_format =~ s/LOW_LEVEL_CODE_CHECKS\n/$ll_code_check/g; +$error_format =~ s/HIGH_LEVEL_CODE_CHECKS\n/$hl_code_check/g; + +open(ERROR_FILE, ">$error_file") or die "Opening destination file '$error_file': $!"; +print ERROR_FILE $error_format; +close(ERROR_FILE); + +my $errors = 0; +for my $include_name (@necessary_include_files) +{ + if (not $included_headers{$include_name}) + { + print STDERR "The header file \"$include_name\" defines error codes but has not been included!\n"; + ++$errors; + } +} + +exit !!$errors; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_features.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_features.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..74a95279 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_features.pl @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use strict; + +my ($include_dir, $data_dir, $feature_file); + +if( @ARGV ) { + die "Invalid number of arguments" if scalar @ARGV != 3; + ($include_dir, $data_dir, $feature_file) = @ARGV; + + -d $include_dir or die "No such directory: $include_dir\n"; + -d $data_dir or die "No such directory: $data_dir\n"; +} else { + $include_dir = 'include/mbedtls'; + $data_dir = 'scripts/data_files'; + $feature_file = 'library/version_features.c'; + + unless( -d $include_dir && -d $data_dir ) { + chdir '..' or die; + -d $include_dir && -d $data_dir + or die "Without arguments, must be run from root or scripts\n" + } +} + +my $feature_format_file = $data_dir.'/version_features.fmt'; + +my @sections = ( "System support", "mbed TLS modules", + "mbed TLS feature support" ); + +my $line_separator = $/; +undef $/; + +open(FORMAT_FILE, "$feature_format_file") or die "Opening feature format file '$feature_format_file': $!"; +my $feature_format = ; +close(FORMAT_FILE); + +$/ = $line_separator; + +open(CONFIG_H, "$include_dir/config.h") || die("Failure when opening config.h: $!"); + +my $feature_defines = ""; +my $in_section = 0; + +while (my $line = ) +{ + next if ($in_section && $line !~ /#define/ && $line !~ /SECTION/); + next if (!$in_section && $line !~ /SECTION/); + + if ($in_section) { + if ($line =~ /SECTION/) { + $in_section = 0; + next; + } + + my ($define) = $line =~ /#define (\w+)/; + $feature_defines .= "#if defined(${define})\n"; + $feature_defines .= " \"${define}\",\n"; + $feature_defines .= "#endif /* ${define} */\n"; + } + + if (!$in_section) { + my ($section_name) = $line =~ /SECTION: ([\w ]+)/; + my $found_section = grep $_ eq $section_name, @sections; + + $in_section = 1 if ($found_section); + } +}; + +$feature_format =~ s/FEATURE_DEFINES\n/$feature_defines/g; + +open(ERROR_FILE, ">$feature_file") or die "Opening destination file '$feature_file': $!"; +print ERROR_FILE $feature_format; +close(ERROR_FILE); diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_psa_constants.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_psa_constants.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..71afd02c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_psa_constants.py @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 + +"""Generate psa_constant_names_generated.c +which is included by programs/psa/psa_constant_names.c. +The code generated by this module is only meant to be used in the context +of that program. + +An argument passed to this script will modify the output directory where the +file is written: +* by default (no arguments passed): writes to programs/psa/ +* OUTPUT_FILE_DIR passed: writes to OUTPUT_FILE_DIR/ +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import os +import sys + +from mbedtls_dev import macro_collector + +OUTPUT_TEMPLATE = '''\ +/* Automatically generated by generate_psa_constant.py. DO NOT EDIT. */ + +static const char *psa_strerror(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + %(status_cases)s + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static const char *psa_ecc_family_name(psa_ecc_family_t curve) +{ + switch (curve) { + %(ecc_curve_cases)s + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static const char *psa_dh_family_name(psa_dh_family_t group) +{ + switch (group) { + %(dh_group_cases)s + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static const char *psa_hash_algorithm_name(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg) +{ + switch (hash_alg) { + %(hash_algorithm_cases)s + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static const char *psa_ka_algorithm_name(psa_algorithm_t ka_alg) +{ + switch (ka_alg) { + %(ka_algorithm_cases)s + default: return NULL; + } +} + +static int psa_snprint_key_type(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, + psa_key_type_t type) +{ + size_t required_size = 0; + switch (type) { + %(key_type_cases)s + default: + %(key_type_code)s{ + return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, + "0x%%04x", (unsigned) type); + } + break; + } + buffer[0] = 0; + return (int) required_size; +} + +#define NO_LENGTH_MODIFIER 0xfffffffflu +static int psa_snprint_algorithm(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + size_t required_size = 0; + psa_algorithm_t core_alg = alg; + unsigned long length_modifier = NO_LENGTH_MODIFIER; + if (PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg)) { + core_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(alg, 0); + if (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(", 33); + length_modifier = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg); + } else if (core_alg != alg) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(", 22); + length_modifier = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg); + } + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { + core_alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg); + if (core_alg == 0) { + /* For unknown AEAD algorithms, there is no "default tag length". */ + core_alg = alg; + } else if (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(", 43); + length_modifier = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); + } else if (core_alg != alg) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(", 32); + length_modifier = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); + } + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && + !PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + core_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(", 22); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_ka_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ", ", 2); + } + switch (core_alg) { + %(algorithm_cases)s + default: + %(algorithm_code)s{ + append_integer(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "0x%%08lx", (unsigned long) core_alg); + } + break; + } + if (core_alg != alg) { + if (length_modifier != NO_LENGTH_MODIFIER) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ", ", 2); + append_integer(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "%%lu", length_modifier); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } + buffer[0] = 0; + return (int) required_size; +} + +static int psa_snprint_key_usage(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, + psa_key_usage_t usage) +{ + size_t required_size = 0; + if (usage == 0) { + if (buffer_size > 1) { + buffer[0] = '0'; + buffer[1] = 0; + } else if (buffer_size == 1) { + buffer[0] = 0; + } + return 1; + } +%(key_usage_code)s + if (usage != 0) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append_integer(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "0x%%08lx", (unsigned long) usage); + } else { + buffer[0] = 0; + } + return (int) required_size; +} + +/* End of automatically generated file. */ +''' + +KEY_TYPE_FROM_CURVE_TEMPLATE = '''if (%(tester)s(type)) { + append_with_curve(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "%(builder)s", %(builder_length)s, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type)); + } else ''' + +KEY_TYPE_FROM_GROUP_TEMPLATE = '''if (%(tester)s(type)) { + append_with_group(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "%(builder)s", %(builder_length)s, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type)); + } else ''' + +ALGORITHM_FROM_HASH_TEMPLATE = '''if (%(tester)s(core_alg)) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "%(builder)s(", %(builder_length)s + 1); + append_with_alg(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + psa_hash_algorithm_name, + PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg)); + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1); + } else ''' + +BIT_TEST_TEMPLATE = '''\ + if (%(var)s & %(flag)s) { + if (required_size != 0) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3); + } + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "%(flag)s", %(length)d); + %(var)s ^= %(flag)s; + }\ +''' + +class CaseBuilder(macro_collector.PSAMacroCollector): + """Collect PSA crypto macro definitions and write value recognition functions. + + 1. Call `read_file` on the input header file(s). + 2. Call `write_file` to write ``psa_constant_names_generated.c``. + """ + + def __init__(self): + super().__init__(include_intermediate=True) + + @staticmethod + def _make_return_case(name): + return 'case %(name)s: return "%(name)s";' % {'name': name} + + @staticmethod + def _make_append_case(name): + template = ('case %(name)s: ' + 'append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "%(name)s", %(length)d); ' + 'break;') + return template % {'name': name, 'length': len(name)} + + @staticmethod + def _make_bit_test(var, flag): + return BIT_TEST_TEMPLATE % {'var': var, + 'flag': flag, + 'length': len(flag)} + + def _make_status_cases(self): + return '\n '.join(map(self._make_return_case, + sorted(self.statuses))) + + def _make_ecc_curve_cases(self): + return '\n '.join(map(self._make_return_case, + sorted(self.ecc_curves))) + + def _make_dh_group_cases(self): + return '\n '.join(map(self._make_return_case, + sorted(self.dh_groups))) + + def _make_key_type_cases(self): + return '\n '.join(map(self._make_append_case, + sorted(self.key_types))) + + @staticmethod + def _make_key_type_from_curve_code(builder, tester): + return KEY_TYPE_FROM_CURVE_TEMPLATE % {'builder': builder, + 'builder_length': len(builder), + 'tester': tester} + + @staticmethod + def _make_key_type_from_group_code(builder, tester): + return KEY_TYPE_FROM_GROUP_TEMPLATE % {'builder': builder, + 'builder_length': len(builder), + 'tester': tester} + + def _make_ecc_key_type_code(self): + d = self.key_types_from_curve + make = self._make_key_type_from_curve_code + return ''.join([make(k, d[k]) for k in sorted(d.keys())]) + + def _make_dh_key_type_code(self): + d = self.key_types_from_group + make = self._make_key_type_from_group_code + return ''.join([make(k, d[k]) for k in sorted(d.keys())]) + + def _make_hash_algorithm_cases(self): + return '\n '.join(map(self._make_return_case, + sorted(self.hash_algorithms))) + + def _make_ka_algorithm_cases(self): + return '\n '.join(map(self._make_return_case, + sorted(self.ka_algorithms))) + + def _make_algorithm_cases(self): + return '\n '.join(map(self._make_append_case, + sorted(self.algorithms))) + + @staticmethod + def _make_algorithm_from_hash_code(builder, tester): + return ALGORITHM_FROM_HASH_TEMPLATE % {'builder': builder, + 'builder_length': len(builder), + 'tester': tester} + + def _make_algorithm_code(self): + d = self.algorithms_from_hash + make = self._make_algorithm_from_hash_code + return ''.join([make(k, d[k]) for k in sorted(d.keys())]) + + def _make_key_usage_code(self): + return '\n'.join([self._make_bit_test('usage', bit) + for bit in sorted(self.key_usage_flags)]) + + def write_file(self, output_file): + """Generate the pretty-printer function code from the gathered + constant definitions. + """ + data = {} + data['status_cases'] = self._make_status_cases() + data['ecc_curve_cases'] = self._make_ecc_curve_cases() + data['dh_group_cases'] = self._make_dh_group_cases() + data['key_type_cases'] = self._make_key_type_cases() + data['key_type_code'] = (self._make_ecc_key_type_code() + + self._make_dh_key_type_code()) + data['hash_algorithm_cases'] = self._make_hash_algorithm_cases() + data['ka_algorithm_cases'] = self._make_ka_algorithm_cases() + data['algorithm_cases'] = self._make_algorithm_cases() + data['algorithm_code'] = self._make_algorithm_code() + data['key_usage_code'] = self._make_key_usage_code() + output_file.write(OUTPUT_TEMPLATE % data) + +def generate_psa_constants(header_file_names, output_file_name): + collector = CaseBuilder() + for header_file_name in header_file_names: + with open(header_file_name, 'rb') as header_file: + collector.read_file(header_file) + temp_file_name = output_file_name + '.tmp' + with open(temp_file_name, 'w') as output_file: + collector.write_file(output_file) + os.replace(temp_file_name, output_file_name) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + if not os.path.isdir('programs') and os.path.isdir('../programs'): + os.chdir('..') + # Allow to change the directory where psa_constant_names_generated.c is written to. + OUTPUT_FILE_DIR = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) == 2 else "programs/psa" + generate_psa_constants(['include/psa/crypto_values.h', + 'include/psa/crypto_extra.h'], + OUTPUT_FILE_DIR + '/psa_constant_names_generated.c') diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_query_config.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_query_config.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..53282699 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_query_config.pl @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env perl + +# Generate query_config.c +# +# The file query_config.c contains a C function that can be used to check if +# a configuration macro is defined and to retrieve its expansion in string +# form (if any). This facilitates querying the compile time configuration of +# the library, for example, for testing. +# +# The query_config.c is generated from the current configuration at +# include/mbedtls/config.h. The idea is that the config.h contains ALL the +# compile time configurations available in Mbed TLS (commented or uncommented). +# This script extracts the configuration macros from the config.h and this +# information is used to automatically generate the body of the query_config() +# function by using the template in scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt. +# +# Usage: ./scripts/generate_query_config.pl without arguments +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use strict; + +my $config_file = "./include/mbedtls/config.h"; + +my $query_config_format_file = "./scripts/data_files/query_config.fmt"; +my $query_config_file = "./programs/test/query_config.c"; + +# Excluded macros from the generated query_config.c. For example, macros that +# have commas or function-like macros cannot be transformed into strings easily +# using the preprocessor, so they should be excluded or the preprocessor will +# throw errors. +my @excluded = qw( +MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES +MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED +); +my $excluded_re = join '|', @excluded; + +open(CONFIG_FILE, "$config_file") or die "Opening config file '$config_file': $!"; + +# This variable will contain the string to replace in the CHECK_CONFIG of the +# format file +my $config_check = ""; +my $list_config = ""; + +while (my $line = ) { + if ($line =~ /^(\/\/)?\s*#\s*define\s+(MBEDTLS_\w+).*/) { + my $name = $2; + + # Skip over the macro that prevents multiple inclusion + next if "MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H" eq $name; + + # Skip over the macro if it is in the ecluded list + next if $name =~ /$excluded_re/; + + $config_check .= "#if defined($name)\n"; + $config_check .= " if( strcmp( \"$name\", config ) == 0 )\n"; + $config_check .= " {\n"; + $config_check .= " MACRO_EXPANSION_TO_STR( $name );\n"; + $config_check .= " return( 0 );\n"; + $config_check .= " }\n"; + $config_check .= "#endif /* $name */\n"; + $config_check .= "\n"; + + $list_config .= "#if defined($name)\n"; + $list_config .= " OUTPUT_MACRO_NAME_VALUE($name);\n"; + $list_config .= "#endif /* $name */\n"; + $list_config .= "\n"; + } +} + +# Read the full format file into a string +local $/; +open(FORMAT_FILE, "$query_config_format_file") or die "Opening query config format file '$query_config_format_file': $!"; +my $query_config_format = ; +close(FORMAT_FILE); + +# Replace the body of the query_config() function with the code we just wrote +$query_config_format =~ s/CHECK_CONFIG/$config_check/g; +$query_config_format =~ s/LIST_CONFIG/$list_config/g; + +# Rewrite the query_config.c file +open(QUERY_CONFIG_FILE, ">$query_config_file") or die "Opening destination file '$query_config_file': $!"; +print QUERY_CONFIG_FILE $query_config_format; +close(QUERY_CONFIG_FILE); diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..d11041c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# Generate main file, individual apps and solution files for MS Visual Studio +# 2010 +# +# Must be run from mbedTLS root or scripts directory. +# Takes no argument. +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use warnings; +use strict; +use Digest::MD5 'md5_hex'; + +my $vsx_dir = "visualc/VS2010"; +my $vsx_ext = "vcxproj"; +my $vsx_app_tpl_file = "scripts/data_files/vs2010-app-template.$vsx_ext"; +my $vsx_main_tpl_file = "scripts/data_files/vs2010-main-template.$vsx_ext"; +my $vsx_main_file = "$vsx_dir/mbedTLS.$vsx_ext"; +my $vsx_sln_tpl_file = "scripts/data_files/vs2010-sln-template.sln"; +my $vsx_sln_file = "$vsx_dir/mbedTLS.sln"; + +my $programs_dir = 'programs'; +my $mbedtls_header_dir = 'include/mbedtls'; +my $psa_header_dir = 'include/psa'; +my $source_dir = 'library'; +my $test_source_dir = 'tests/src'; +my $test_header_dir = 'tests/include/test'; +my $test_drivers_header_dir = 'tests/include/test/drivers'; +my $test_drivers_source_dir = 'tests/src/drivers'; + +my @thirdparty_header_dirs = qw( + 3rdparty/everest/include/everest +); +my @thirdparty_source_dirs = qw( + 3rdparty/everest/library + 3rdparty/everest/library/kremlib + 3rdparty/everest/library/legacy +); + +# Directories to add to the include path. +# Order matters in case there are files with the same name in more than +# one directory: the compiler will use the first match. +my @include_directories = qw( + include + 3rdparty/everest/include/ + 3rdparty/everest/include/everest + 3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010 + 3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib + tests/include +); +my $include_directories = join(';', map {"../../$_"} @include_directories); + +# Directories to add to the include path when building the library, but not +# when building tests or applications. +my @library_include_directories = qw( + library +); +my $library_include_directories = + join(';', map {"../../$_"} (@library_include_directories, + @include_directories)); + +my @excluded_files = qw( + 3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519.c +); +my %excluded_files = (); +foreach (@excluded_files) { $excluded_files{$_} = 1 } + +# Need windows line endings! +my $vsx_hdr_tpl = <\r +EOT +my $vsx_src_tpl = <\r +EOT + +my $vsx_sln_app_entry_tpl = <; + close $fh; + + return $content; +} + +sub content_to_file { + my ($content, $filename) = @_; + + open my $fh, '>', $filename or die "Could not write to $filename\n"; + print $fh $content; + close $fh; +} + +sub gen_app_guid { + my ($path) = @_; + + my $guid = md5_hex( "mbedTLS:$path" ); + $guid =~ s/(.{8})(.{4})(.{4})(.{4})(.{12})/\U{$1-$2-$3-$4-$5}/; + + return $guid; +} + +sub gen_app { + my ($path, $template, $dir, $ext) = @_; + + my $guid = gen_app_guid( $path ); + $path =~ s!/!\\!g; + (my $appname = $path) =~ s/.*\\//; + + my $srcs = ""; + if( $appname eq "ssl_client2" or $appname eq "ssl_server2" or + $appname eq "query_compile_time_config" ) { + $srcs .= "\r\n "; + } + if( $appname eq "ssl_client2" or $appname eq "ssl_server2" ) { + $srcs .= "\r\n "; + } + + my $content = $template; + $content =~ s//$srcs/g; + $content =~ s//$appname/g; + $content =~ s//$guid/g; + $content =~ s/INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES\r\n/$include_directories/g; + + content_to_file( $content, "$dir/$appname.$ext" ); +} + +sub get_app_list { + my $app_list = `cd $programs_dir && make list`; + die "make list failed: $!\n" if $?; + + return split /\s+/, $app_list; +} + +sub gen_app_files { + my @app_list = @_; + + my $vsx_tpl = slurp_file( $vsx_app_tpl_file ); + + for my $app ( @app_list ) { + gen_app( $app, $vsx_tpl, $vsx_dir, $vsx_ext ); + } +} + +sub gen_entry_list { + my ($tpl, @names) = @_; + + my $entries; + for my $name (@names) { + (my $entry = $tpl) =~ s/{NAME}/$name/g; + $entries .= $entry; + } + + return $entries; +} + +sub gen_main_file { + my ($headers, $sources, + $hdr_tpl, $src_tpl, + $main_tpl, $main_out) = @_; + + my $header_entries = gen_entry_list( $hdr_tpl, @$headers ); + my $source_entries = gen_entry_list( $src_tpl, @$sources ); + + my $out = slurp_file( $main_tpl ); + $out =~ s/SOURCE_ENTRIES\r\n/$source_entries/m; + $out =~ s/HEADER_ENTRIES\r\n/$header_entries/m; + $out =~ s/INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES\r\n/$library_include_directories/g; + + content_to_file( $out, $main_out ); +} + +sub gen_vsx_solution { + my (@app_names) = @_; + + my ($app_entries, $conf_entries); + for my $path (@app_names) { + my $guid = gen_app_guid( $path ); + (my $appname = $path) =~ s!.*/!!; + + my $app_entry = $vsx_sln_app_entry_tpl; + $app_entry =~ s/{APPNAME}/$appname/g; + $app_entry =~ s/{GUID}/$guid/g; + + $app_entries .= $app_entry; + + my $conf_entry = $vsx_sln_conf_entry_tpl; + $conf_entry =~ s/{GUID}/$guid/g; + + $conf_entries .= $conf_entry; + } + + my $out = slurp_file( $vsx_sln_tpl_file ); + $out =~ s/APP_ENTRIES\r\n/$app_entries/m; + $out =~ s/CONF_ENTRIES\r\n/$conf_entries/m; + + content_to_file( $out, $vsx_sln_file ); +} + +sub del_vsx_files { + unlink glob "'$vsx_dir/*.$vsx_ext'"; + unlink $vsx_main_file; + unlink $vsx_sln_file; +} + +sub main { + if( ! check_dirs() ) { + chdir '..' or die; + check_dirs or die "Must but run from mbedTLS root or scripts dir\n"; + } + + # Remove old files to ensure that, for example, project files from deleted + # apps are not kept + del_vsx_files(); + + my @app_list = get_app_list(); + my @header_dirs = ( + $mbedtls_header_dir, + $psa_header_dir, + $test_header_dir, + $test_drivers_header_dir, + $source_dir, + @thirdparty_header_dirs, + ); + my @headers = (map { <$_/*.h> } @header_dirs); + my @source_dirs = ( + $source_dir, + $test_source_dir, + $test_drivers_source_dir, + @thirdparty_source_dirs, + ); + my @sources = (map { <$_/*.c> } @source_dirs); + + @headers = grep { ! $excluded_files{$_} } @headers; + @sources = grep { ! $excluded_files{$_} } @sources; + map { s!/!\\!g } @headers; + map { s!/!\\!g } @sources; + + gen_app_files( @app_list ); + + gen_main_file( \@headers, \@sources, + $vsx_hdr_tpl, $vsx_src_tpl, + $vsx_main_tpl_file, $vsx_main_file ); + + gen_vsx_solution( @app_list ); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/maintainer.requirements.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/maintainer.requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..87341405 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/maintainer.requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Python packages that are not used by any script in this repository, +# but are likely to be useful to Mbed TLS maintainers. + +-r ci.requirements.txt + +# For source code analyses +clang + +# For building some test vectors +pycryptodomex +pycryptodome-test-vectors diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/massif_max.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/massif_max.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..eaf56aee --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/massif_max.pl @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# Parse a massif.out.xxx file and output peak total memory usage +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use warnings; +use strict; + +use utf8; +use open qw(:std utf8); + +die unless @ARGV == 1; + +my @snaps; +open my $fh, '<', $ARGV[0] or die; +{ local $/ = 'snapshot='; @snaps = <$fh>; } +close $fh or die; + +my ($max, $max_heap, $max_he, $max_stack) = (0, 0, 0, 0); +for (@snaps) +{ + my ($heap, $heap_extra, $stack) = m{ + mem_heap_B=(\d+)\n + mem_heap_extra_B=(\d+)\n + mem_stacks_B=(\d+) + }xm; + next unless defined $heap; + my $total = $heap + $heap_extra + $stack; + if( $total > $max ) { + ($max, $max_heap, $max_he, $max_stack) = ($total, $heap, $heap_extra, $stack); + } +} + +printf "$max (heap $max_heap+$max_he, stack $max_stack)\n"; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/asymmetric_key_data.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/asymmetric_key_data.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6fd6223f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/asymmetric_key_data.py @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +"""Sample key material for asymmetric key types. + +Meant for use in crypto_knowledge.py. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import binascii +import re +from typing import Dict + +STR_TRANS_REMOVE_BLANKS = str.maketrans('', '', ' \t\n\r') + +def unhexlify(text: str) -> bytes: + return binascii.unhexlify(text.translate(STR_TRANS_REMOVE_BLANKS)) + +def construct_asymmetric_key_data(src) -> Dict[str, Dict[int, bytes]]: + """Split key pairs into separate table entries and convert hex to bytes. + + Input format: src[abbreviated_type][size] = (private_key_hex, public_key_hex) + Output format: dst['PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx'][size] = key_bytes + """ + dst = {} #type: Dict[str, Dict[int, bytes]] + for typ in src: + private = 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_' + re.sub(r'(\(|\Z)', r'_KEY_PAIR\1', typ, 1) + public = 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_' + re.sub(r'(\(|\Z)', r'_PUBLIC_KEY\1', typ, 1) + dst[private] = {} + dst[public] = {} + for size in src[typ]: + dst[private][size] = unhexlify(src[typ][size][0]) + dst[public][size] = unhexlify(src[typ][size][1]) + return dst + +## These are valid keys that don't try to exercise any edge cases. They're +## either test vectors from some specification, or randomly generated. All +## pairs consist of a private key and its public key. +#pylint: disable=line-too-long +ASYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA = construct_asymmetric_key_data({ + 'ECC(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1)': { + 192: ("297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228", + "0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5"), + 224: ("0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8", + "042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d"), + 256: ("7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9", + "045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d"), + }, + 'ECC(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1)': { + 225: ("872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995", + "046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160"), + 256: ("49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee", + "047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"), + 384: ("3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a", + "04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"), + 521: ("01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae", + "04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1"), + }, + 'ECC(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2)': { + 160: ("00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e", + "049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b"), + }, + 'ECC(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1)': { + 163: ("03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71", + "0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9"), + 233: ("41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8", + "0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f"), + 239: ("1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61", + "04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d"), + 283: ("006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0", + "0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3"), + 409: ("3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8", + "04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b"), + 571: ("005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51", + "04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a"), + }, + 'ECC(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1)': { + 163: ("009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50", + "0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb"), + 233: ("00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f", + "0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d"), + 283: ("004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad", + "04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765"), + 409: ("00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64", + "0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22"), + 571: ("026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1", + "040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74"), + }, + 'ECC(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2)': { + 163: ("0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34", + "0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f"), + }, + 'ECC(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1)': { + 160: ("69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac", + "04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c"), + 192: ("1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f", + "043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88"), + 224: ("a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c", + "045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc"), + 256: ("2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff", + "04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d"), + 320: ("61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead", + "049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd"), + 384: ("3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb", + "04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a"), + 512: ("372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2", + "0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a"), + }, + 'ECC(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY)': { + 255: ("70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a", + "8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a"), + 448: ("e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1", + "c0d3a5a2b416a573dc9909f92f134ac01323ab8f8e36804e578588ba2d09fe7c3e737f771ca112825b548a0ffded6d6a2fd09a3e77dec30e"), + }, + 'ECC(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS)': { + 255: ("9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60", + "d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a"), + 448: ("6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b", + "5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180"), + }, + 'RSA': { + 1024: (""" +3082025e + 020100 + 02818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3 + 0203010001 + 02818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1 + 024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113 + 024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091 + 024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d + 024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1 + 024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24 +""", """ + 308189 + 02818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3 + 0203010001 +"""), + 1536: (""" +3082037b + 020100 + 0281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc35 + 0203010001 + 0281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1 + 026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9 + 026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd + 026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b1 + 0260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751 + 026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf +""", """ +3081c9 + 0281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc35 + 0203010001 +"""), + }, +}) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/c_build_helper.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/c_build_helper.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c587a16 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/c_build_helper.py @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +"""Generate and run C code. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import os +import platform +import subprocess +import sys +import tempfile + +def remove_file_if_exists(filename): + """Remove the specified file, ignoring errors.""" + if not filename: + return + try: + os.remove(filename) + except OSError: + pass + +def create_c_file(file_label): + """Create a temporary C file. + + * ``file_label``: a string that will be included in the file name. + + Return ```(c_file, c_name, exe_name)``` where ``c_file`` is a Python + stream open for writing to the file, ``c_name`` is the name of the file + and ``exe_name`` is the name of the executable that will be produced + by compiling the file. + """ + c_fd, c_name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='tmp-{}-'.format(file_label), + suffix='.c') + exe_suffix = '.exe' if platform.system() == 'Windows' else '' + exe_name = c_name[:-2] + exe_suffix + remove_file_if_exists(exe_name) + c_file = os.fdopen(c_fd, 'w', encoding='ascii') + return c_file, c_name, exe_name + +def generate_c_printf_expressions(c_file, cast_to, printf_format, expressions): + """Generate C instructions to print the value of ``expressions``. + + Write the code with ``c_file``'s ``write`` method. + + Each expression is cast to the type ``cast_to`` and printed with the + printf format ``printf_format``. + """ + for expr in expressions: + c_file.write(' printf("{}\\n", ({}) {});\n' + .format(printf_format, cast_to, expr)) + +def generate_c_file(c_file, + caller, header, + main_generator): + """Generate a temporary C source file. + + * ``c_file`` is an open stream on the C source file. + * ``caller``: an informational string written in a comment at the top + of the file. + * ``header``: extra code to insert before any function in the generated + C file. + * ``main_generator``: a function called with ``c_file`` as its sole argument + to generate the body of the ``main()`` function. + """ + c_file.write('/* Generated by {} */' + .format(caller)) + c_file.write(''' +#include +''') + c_file.write(header) + c_file.write(''' +int main(void) +{ +''') + main_generator(c_file) + c_file.write(''' return 0; +} +''') + +def get_c_expression_values( + cast_to, printf_format, + expressions, + caller=__name__, file_label='', + header='', include_path=None, + keep_c=False, +): # pylint: disable=too-many-arguments + """Generate and run a program to print out numerical values for expressions. + + * ``cast_to``: a C type. + * ``printf_format``: a printf format suitable for the type ``cast_to``. + * ``header``: extra code to insert before any function in the generated + C file. + * ``expressions``: a list of C language expressions that have the type + ``cast_to``. + * ``include_path``: a list of directories containing header files. + * ``keep_c``: if true, keep the temporary C file (presumably for debugging + purposes). + + Return the list of values of the ``expressions``. + """ + if include_path is None: + include_path = [] + c_name = None + exe_name = None + try: + c_file, c_name, exe_name = create_c_file(file_label) + generate_c_file( + c_file, caller, header, + lambda c_file: generate_c_printf_expressions(c_file, + cast_to, printf_format, + expressions) + ) + c_file.close() + cc = os.getenv('CC', 'cc') + subprocess.check_call([cc] + + ['-I' + dir for dir in include_path] + + ['-o', exe_name, c_name]) + if keep_c: + sys.stderr.write('List of {} tests kept at {}\n' + .format(caller, c_name)) + else: + os.remove(c_name) + output = subprocess.check_output([exe_name]) + return output.decode('ascii').strip().split('\n') + finally: + remove_file_if_exists(exe_name) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/crypto_knowledge.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/crypto_knowledge.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2173d10f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/crypto_knowledge.py @@ -0,0 +1,534 @@ +"""Knowledge about cryptographic mechanisms implemented in Mbed TLS. + +This module is entirely based on the PSA API. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import enum +import re +from typing import FrozenSet, Iterable, List, Optional, Tuple + +from mbedtls_dev.asymmetric_key_data import ASYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA + + +def short_expression(original: str, level: int = 0) -> str: + """Abbreviate the expression, keeping it human-readable. + + If `level` is 0, just remove parts that are implicit from context, + such as a leading ``PSA_KEY_TYPE_``. + For larger values of `level`, also abbreviate some names in an + unambiguous, but ad hoc way. + """ + short = original + short = re.sub(r'\bPSA_(?:ALG|ECC_FAMILY|KEY_[A-Z]+)_', r'', short) + short = re.sub(r' +', r'', short) + if level >= 1: + short = re.sub(r'PUBLIC_KEY\b', r'PUB', short) + short = re.sub(r'KEY_PAIR\b', r'PAIR', short) + short = re.sub(r'\bBRAINPOOL_P', r'BP', short) + short = re.sub(r'\bMONTGOMERY\b', r'MGM', short) + short = re.sub(r'AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG\b', r'AEAD_SHORT', short) + short = re.sub(r'\bDETERMINISTIC_', r'DET_', short) + short = re.sub(r'\bKEY_AGREEMENT\b', r'KA', short) + short = re.sub(r'_PSK_TO_MS\b', r'_PSK2MS', short) + return short + + +BLOCK_CIPHERS = frozenset(['AES', 'ARIA', 'CAMELLIA', 'DES']) +BLOCK_MAC_MODES = frozenset(['CBC_MAC', 'CMAC']) +BLOCK_CIPHER_MODES = frozenset([ + 'CTR', 'CFB', 'OFB', 'XTS', 'CCM_STAR_NO_TAG', + 'ECB_NO_PADDING', 'CBC_NO_PADDING', 'CBC_PKCS7', +]) +BLOCK_AEAD_MODES = frozenset(['CCM', 'GCM']) + +class EllipticCurveCategory(enum.Enum): + """Categorization of elliptic curve families. + + The category of a curve determines what algorithms are defined over it. + """ + + SHORT_WEIERSTRASS = 0 + MONTGOMERY = 1 + TWISTED_EDWARDS = 2 + + @staticmethod + def from_family(family: str) -> 'EllipticCurveCategory': + if family == 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY': + return EllipticCurveCategory.MONTGOMERY + if family == 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS': + return EllipticCurveCategory.TWISTED_EDWARDS + # Default to SW, which most curves belong to. + return EllipticCurveCategory.SHORT_WEIERSTRASS + + +class KeyType: + """Knowledge about a PSA key type.""" + + def __init__(self, name: str, params: Optional[Iterable[str]] = None) -> None: + """Analyze a key type. + + The key type must be specified in PSA syntax. In its simplest form, + `name` is a string 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx' which is the name of a PSA key + type macro. For key types that take arguments, the arguments can + be passed either through the optional argument `params` or by + passing an expression of the form 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx(param1, ...)' + in `name` as a string. + """ + + self.name = name.strip() + """The key type macro name (``PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx``). + + For key types constructed from a macro with arguments, this is the + name of the macro, and the arguments are in `self.params`. + """ + if params is None: + if '(' in self.name: + m = re.match(r'(\w+)\s*\((.*)\)\Z', self.name) + assert m is not None + self.name = m.group(1) + params = m.group(2).split(',') + self.params = (None if params is None else + [param.strip() for param in params]) + """The parameters of the key type, if there are any. + + None if the key type is a macro without arguments. + """ + assert re.match(r'PSA_KEY_TYPE_\w+\Z', self.name) + + self.expression = self.name + """A C expression whose value is the key type encoding.""" + if self.params is not None: + self.expression += '(' + ', '.join(self.params) + ')' + + m = re.match(r'PSA_KEY_TYPE_(\w+)', self.name) + assert m + self.head = re.sub(r'_(?:PUBLIC_KEY|KEY_PAIR)\Z', r'', m.group(1)) + """The key type macro name, with common prefixes and suffixes stripped.""" + + self.private_type = re.sub(r'_PUBLIC_KEY\Z', r'_KEY_PAIR', self.name) + """The key type macro name for the corresponding key pair type. + + For everything other than a public key type, this is the same as + `self.name`. + """ + + def short_expression(self, level: int = 0) -> str: + """Abbreviate the expression, keeping it human-readable. + + See `crypto_knowledge.short_expression`. + """ + return short_expression(self.expression, level=level) + + def is_public(self) -> bool: + """Whether the key type is for public keys.""" + return self.name.endswith('_PUBLIC_KEY') + + ECC_KEY_SIZES = { + 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1': (192, 224, 256), + 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1': (225, 256, 384, 521), + 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2': (160,), + 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1': (163, 233, 239, 283, 409, 571), + 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1': (163, 233, 283, 409, 571), + 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2': (163,), + 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1': (160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512), + 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY': (255, 448), + 'PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS': (255, 448), + } + KEY_TYPE_SIZES = { + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES': (128, 192, 256), # exhaustive + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4': (8, 128, 2048), # extremes + sensible + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA': (128, 192, 256), # exhaustive + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA': (128, 192, 256), # exhaustive + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20': (256,), # exhaustive + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE': (120, 128), # sample + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES': (64, 128, 192), # exhaustive + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC': (128, 160, 224, 256, 384, 512), # standard size for each supported hash + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA': (8, 40, 128), # sample + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR': (1024, 1536), # small sample + } + def sizes_to_test(self) -> Tuple[int, ...]: + """Return a tuple of key sizes to test. + + For key types that only allow a single size, or only a small set of + sizes, these are all the possible sizes. For key types that allow a + wide range of sizes, these are a representative sample of sizes, + excluding large sizes for which a typical resource-constrained platform + may run out of memory. + """ + if self.private_type == 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR': + assert self.params is not None + return self.ECC_KEY_SIZES[self.params[0]] + return self.KEY_TYPE_SIZES[self.private_type] + + # "48657265006973206b6579a064617461" + DATA_BLOCK = b'Here\000is key\240data' + def key_material(self, bits: int) -> bytes: + """Return a byte string containing suitable key material with the given bit length. + + Use the PSA export representation. The resulting byte string is one that + can be obtained with the following code: + ``` + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, `self.expression`); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, `bits`); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); + psa_generate_key(&attributes, &id); + psa_export_key(id, `material`, ...); + ``` + """ + if self.expression in ASYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA: + if bits not in ASYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA[self.expression]: + raise ValueError('No key data for {}-bit {}' + .format(bits, self.expression)) + return ASYMMETRIC_KEY_DATA[self.expression][bits] + if bits % 8 != 0: + raise ValueError('Non-integer number of bytes: {} bits for {}' + .format(bits, self.expression)) + length = bits // 8 + if self.name == 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES': + # "644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904" + des3 = b'dEs kEy\001dEs kEy\002dEs kEy\004' + return des3[:length] + return b''.join([self.DATA_BLOCK] * (length // len(self.DATA_BLOCK)) + + [self.DATA_BLOCK[:length % len(self.DATA_BLOCK)]]) + + def can_do(self, alg: 'Algorithm') -> bool: + """Whether this key type can be used for operations with the given algorithm. + + This function does not currently handle key derivation or PAKE. + """ + #pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-return-statements + if alg.is_wildcard: + return False + if alg.is_invalid_truncation(): + return False + if self.head == 'HMAC' and alg.head == 'HMAC': + return True + if self.head == 'DES': + # 64-bit block ciphers only allow a reduced set of modes. + return alg.head in [ + 'CBC_NO_PADDING', 'CBC_PKCS7', + 'ECB_NO_PADDING', + ] + if self.head in BLOCK_CIPHERS and \ + alg.head in frozenset.union(BLOCK_MAC_MODES, + BLOCK_CIPHER_MODES, + BLOCK_AEAD_MODES): + if alg.head in ['CMAC', 'OFB'] and \ + self.head in ['ARIA', 'CAMELLIA']: + return False # not implemented in Mbed TLS + return True + if self.head == 'CHACHA20' and alg.head == 'CHACHA20_POLY1305': + return True + if self.head in {'ARC4', 'CHACHA20'} and \ + alg.head == 'STREAM_CIPHER': + return True + if self.head == 'RSA' and alg.head.startswith('RSA_'): + return True + if alg.category == AlgorithmCategory.KEY_AGREEMENT and \ + self.is_public(): + # The PSA API does not use public key objects in key agreement + # operations: it imports the public key as a formatted byte string. + # So a public key object with a key agreement algorithm is not + # a valid combination. + return False + if self.head == 'ECC': + assert self.params is not None + eccc = EllipticCurveCategory.from_family(self.params[0]) + if alg.head == 'ECDH' and \ + eccc in {EllipticCurveCategory.SHORT_WEIERSTRASS, + EllipticCurveCategory.MONTGOMERY}: + return True + if alg.head == 'ECDSA' and \ + eccc == EllipticCurveCategory.SHORT_WEIERSTRASS: + return True + if alg.head in {'PURE_EDDSA', 'EDDSA_PREHASH'} and \ + eccc == EllipticCurveCategory.TWISTED_EDWARDS: + return True + return False + + +class AlgorithmCategory(enum.Enum): + """PSA algorithm categories.""" + # The numbers are aligned with the category bits in numerical values of + # algorithms. + HASH = 2 + MAC = 3 + CIPHER = 4 + AEAD = 5 + SIGN = 6 + ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION = 7 + KEY_DERIVATION = 8 + KEY_AGREEMENT = 9 + PAKE = 10 + + def requires_key(self) -> bool: + """Whether operations in this category are set up with a key.""" + return self not in {self.HASH, self.KEY_DERIVATION} + + def is_asymmetric(self) -> bool: + """Whether operations in this category involve asymmetric keys.""" + return self in { + self.SIGN, + self.ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION, + self.KEY_AGREEMENT + } + + +class AlgorithmNotRecognized(Exception): + def __init__(self, expr: str) -> None: + super().__init__('Algorithm not recognized: ' + expr) + self.expr = expr + + +class Algorithm: + """Knowledge about a PSA algorithm.""" + + @staticmethod + def determine_base(expr: str) -> str: + """Return an expression for the "base" of the algorithm. + + This strips off variants of algorithms such as MAC truncation. + + This function does not attempt to detect invalid inputs. + """ + m = re.match(r'PSA_ALG_(?:' + r'(?:TRUNCATED|AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH)_MAC|' + r'AEAD_WITH_(?:SHORTENED|AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH)_TAG' + r')\((.*),[^,]+\)\Z', expr) + if m: + expr = m.group(1) + return expr + + @staticmethod + def determine_head(expr: str) -> str: + """Return the head of an algorithm expression. + + The head is the first (outermost) constructor, without its PSA_ALG_ + prefix, and with some normalization of similar algorithms. + """ + m = re.match(r'PSA_ALG_(?:DETERMINISTIC_)?(\w+)', expr) + if not m: + raise AlgorithmNotRecognized(expr) + head = m.group(1) + if head == 'KEY_AGREEMENT': + m = re.match(r'PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT\s*\(\s*PSA_ALG_(\w+)', expr) + if not m: + raise AlgorithmNotRecognized(expr) + head = m.group(1) + head = re.sub(r'_ANY\Z', r'', head) + if re.match(r'ED[0-9]+PH\Z', head): + head = 'EDDSA_PREHASH' + return head + + CATEGORY_FROM_HEAD = { + 'SHA': AlgorithmCategory.HASH, + 'SHAKE256_512': AlgorithmCategory.HASH, + 'MD': AlgorithmCategory.HASH, + 'RIPEMD': AlgorithmCategory.HASH, + 'ANY_HASH': AlgorithmCategory.HASH, + 'HMAC': AlgorithmCategory.MAC, + 'STREAM_CIPHER': AlgorithmCategory.CIPHER, + 'CHACHA20_POLY1305': AlgorithmCategory.AEAD, + 'DSA': AlgorithmCategory.SIGN, + 'ECDSA': AlgorithmCategory.SIGN, + 'EDDSA': AlgorithmCategory.SIGN, + 'PURE_EDDSA': AlgorithmCategory.SIGN, + 'RSA_PSS': AlgorithmCategory.SIGN, + 'RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN': AlgorithmCategory.SIGN, + 'RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT': AlgorithmCategory.ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION, + 'RSA_OAEP': AlgorithmCategory.ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION, + 'HKDF': AlgorithmCategory.KEY_DERIVATION, + 'TLS12_PRF': AlgorithmCategory.KEY_DERIVATION, + 'TLS12_PSK_TO_MS': AlgorithmCategory.KEY_DERIVATION, + 'PBKDF': AlgorithmCategory.KEY_DERIVATION, + 'ECDH': AlgorithmCategory.KEY_AGREEMENT, + 'FFDH': AlgorithmCategory.KEY_AGREEMENT, + # KEY_AGREEMENT(...) is a key derivation with a key agreement component + 'KEY_AGREEMENT': AlgorithmCategory.KEY_DERIVATION, + 'JPAKE': AlgorithmCategory.PAKE, + } + for x in BLOCK_MAC_MODES: + CATEGORY_FROM_HEAD[x] = AlgorithmCategory.MAC + for x in BLOCK_CIPHER_MODES: + CATEGORY_FROM_HEAD[x] = AlgorithmCategory.CIPHER + for x in BLOCK_AEAD_MODES: + CATEGORY_FROM_HEAD[x] = AlgorithmCategory.AEAD + + def determine_category(self, expr: str, head: str) -> AlgorithmCategory: + """Return the category of the given algorithm expression. + + This function does not attempt to detect invalid inputs. + """ + prefix = head + while prefix: + if prefix in self.CATEGORY_FROM_HEAD: + return self.CATEGORY_FROM_HEAD[prefix] + if re.match(r'.*[0-9]\Z', prefix): + prefix = re.sub(r'_*[0-9]+\Z', r'', prefix) + else: + prefix = re.sub(r'_*[^_]*\Z', r'', prefix) + raise AlgorithmNotRecognized(expr) + + @staticmethod + def determine_wildcard(expr) -> bool: + """Whether the given algorithm expression is a wildcard. + + This function does not attempt to detect invalid inputs. + """ + if re.search(r'\bPSA_ALG_ANY_HASH\b', expr): + return True + if re.search(r'_AT_LEAST_', expr): + return True + return False + + def __init__(self, expr: str) -> None: + """Analyze an algorithm value. + + The algorithm must be expressed as a C expression containing only + calls to PSA algorithm constructor macros and numeric literals. + + This class is only programmed to handle valid expressions. Invalid + expressions may result in exceptions or in nonsensical results. + """ + self.expression = re.sub(r'\s+', r'', expr) + self.base_expression = self.determine_base(self.expression) + self.head = self.determine_head(self.base_expression) + self.category = self.determine_category(self.base_expression, self.head) + self.is_wildcard = self.determine_wildcard(self.expression) + + def is_key_agreement_with_derivation(self) -> bool: + """Whether this is a combined key agreement and key derivation algorithm.""" + if self.category != AlgorithmCategory.KEY_AGREEMENT: + return False + m = re.match(r'PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT\(\w+,\s*(.*)\)\Z', self.expression) + if not m: + return False + kdf_alg = m.group(1) + # Assume kdf_alg is either a valid KDF or 0. + return not re.match(r'(?:0[Xx])?0+\s*\Z', kdf_alg) + + + def short_expression(self, level: int = 0) -> str: + """Abbreviate the expression, keeping it human-readable. + + See `crypto_knowledge.short_expression`. + """ + return short_expression(self.expression, level=level) + + HASH_LENGTH = { + 'PSA_ALG_MD5': 16, + 'PSA_ALG_SHA_1': 20, + } + HASH_LENGTH_BITS_RE = re.compile(r'([0-9]+)\Z') + @classmethod + def hash_length(cls, alg: str) -> int: + """The length of the given hash algorithm, in bytes.""" + if alg in cls.HASH_LENGTH: + return cls.HASH_LENGTH[alg] + m = cls.HASH_LENGTH_BITS_RE.search(alg) + if m: + return int(m.group(1)) // 8 + raise ValueError('Unknown hash length for ' + alg) + + PERMITTED_TAG_LENGTHS = { + 'PSA_ALG_CCM': frozenset([4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16]), + 'PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305': frozenset([16]), + 'PSA_ALG_GCM': frozenset([4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]), + } + MAC_LENGTH = { + 'PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC': 16, # actually the block cipher length + 'PSA_ALG_CMAC': 16, # actually the block cipher length + } + HMAC_RE = re.compile(r'PSA_ALG_HMAC\((.*)\)\Z') + @classmethod + def permitted_truncations(cls, base: str) -> FrozenSet[int]: + """Permitted output lengths for the given MAC or AEAD base algorithm. + + For a MAC algorithm, this is the set of truncation lengths that + Mbed TLS supports. + For an AEAD algorithm, this is the set of truncation lengths that + are permitted by the algorithm specification. + """ + if base in cls.PERMITTED_TAG_LENGTHS: + return cls.PERMITTED_TAG_LENGTHS[base] + max_length = cls.MAC_LENGTH.get(base, None) + if max_length is None: + m = cls.HMAC_RE.match(base) + if m: + max_length = cls.hash_length(m.group(1)) + if max_length is None: + raise ValueError('Unknown permitted lengths for ' + base) + return frozenset(range(4, max_length + 1)) + + TRUNCATED_ALG_RE = re.compile( + r'(?PPSA_ALG_(?:AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG|TRUNCATED_MAC))' + r'\((?P.*),' + r'(?P0[Xx][0-9A-Fa-f]+|[1-9][0-9]*|0[0-7]*)[LUlu]*\)\Z') + def is_invalid_truncation(self) -> bool: + """False for a MAC or AEAD algorithm truncated to an invalid length. + + True for a MAC or AEAD algorithm truncated to a valid length or to + a length that cannot be determined. True for anything other than + a truncated MAC or AEAD. + """ + m = self.TRUNCATED_ALG_RE.match(self.expression) + if m: + base = m.group('base') + to_length = int(m.group('length'), 0) + permitted_lengths = self.permitted_truncations(base) + if to_length not in permitted_lengths: + return True + return False + + def can_do(self, category: AlgorithmCategory) -> bool: + """Whether this algorithm can perform operations in the given category. + """ + if category == self.category: + return True + if category == AlgorithmCategory.KEY_DERIVATION and \ + self.is_key_agreement_with_derivation(): + return True + return False + + def usage_flags(self, public: bool = False) -> List[str]: + """The list of usage flags describing operations that can perform this algorithm. + + If public is true, only return public-key operations, not private-key operations. + """ + if self.category == AlgorithmCategory.HASH: + flags = [] + elif self.category == AlgorithmCategory.MAC: + flags = ['SIGN_HASH', 'SIGN_MESSAGE', + 'VERIFY_HASH', 'VERIFY_MESSAGE'] + elif self.category == AlgorithmCategory.CIPHER or \ + self.category == AlgorithmCategory.AEAD: + flags = ['DECRYPT', 'ENCRYPT'] + elif self.category == AlgorithmCategory.SIGN: + flags = ['VERIFY_HASH', 'VERIFY_MESSAGE'] + if not public: + flags += ['SIGN_HASH', 'SIGN_MESSAGE'] + elif self.category == AlgorithmCategory.ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION: + flags = ['ENCRYPT'] + if not public: + flags += ['DECRYPT'] + elif self.category == AlgorithmCategory.KEY_DERIVATION or \ + self.category == AlgorithmCategory.KEY_AGREEMENT: + flags = ['DERIVE'] + else: + raise AlgorithmNotRecognized(self.expression) + return ['PSA_KEY_USAGE_' + flag for flag in flags] diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/macro_collector.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/macro_collector.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..21c08eda --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/macro_collector.py @@ -0,0 +1,547 @@ +"""Collect macro definitions from header files. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import itertools +import re +from typing import Dict, IO, Iterable, Iterator, List, Optional, Pattern, Set, Tuple, Union + + +class ReadFileLineException(Exception): + def __init__(self, filename: str, line_number: Union[int, str]) -> None: + message = 'in {} at {}'.format(filename, line_number) + super(ReadFileLineException, self).__init__(message) + self.filename = filename + self.line_number = line_number + + +class read_file_lines: + # Dear Pylint, conventionally, a context manager class name is lowercase. + # pylint: disable=invalid-name,too-few-public-methods + """Context manager to read a text file line by line. + + ``` + with read_file_lines(filename) as lines: + for line in lines: + process(line) + ``` + is equivalent to + ``` + with open(filename, 'r') as input_file: + for line in input_file: + process(line) + ``` + except that if process(line) raises an exception, then the read_file_lines + snippet annotates the exception with the file name and line number. + """ + def __init__(self, filename: str, binary: bool = False) -> None: + self.filename = filename + self.file = None #type: Optional[IO[str]] + self.line_number = 'entry' #type: Union[int, str] + self.generator = None #type: Optional[Iterable[Tuple[int, str]]] + self.binary = binary + def __enter__(self) -> 'read_file_lines': + self.file = open(self.filename, 'rb' if self.binary else 'r') + self.generator = enumerate(self.file) + return self + def __iter__(self) -> Iterator[str]: + assert self.generator is not None + for line_number, content in self.generator: + self.line_number = line_number + yield content + self.line_number = 'exit' + def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_value, exc_traceback) -> None: + if self.file is not None: + self.file.close() + if exc_type is not None: + raise ReadFileLineException(self.filename, self.line_number) \ + from exc_value + + +class PSAMacroEnumerator: + """Information about constructors of various PSA Crypto types. + + This includes macro names as well as information about their arguments + when applicable. + + This class only provides ways to enumerate expressions that evaluate to + values of the covered types. Derived classes are expected to populate + the set of known constructors of each kind, as well as populate + `self.arguments_for` for arguments that are not of a kind that is + enumerated here. + """ + #pylint: disable=too-many-instance-attributes + + def __init__(self) -> None: + """Set up an empty set of known constructor macros. + """ + self.statuses = set() #type: Set[str] + self.lifetimes = set() #type: Set[str] + self.locations = set() #type: Set[str] + self.persistence_levels = set() #type: Set[str] + self.algorithms = set() #type: Set[str] + self.ecc_curves = set() #type: Set[str] + self.dh_groups = set() #type: Set[str] + self.key_types = set() #type: Set[str] + self.key_usage_flags = set() #type: Set[str] + self.hash_algorithms = set() #type: Set[str] + self.mac_algorithms = set() #type: Set[str] + self.ka_algorithms = set() #type: Set[str] + self.kdf_algorithms = set() #type: Set[str] + self.aead_algorithms = set() #type: Set[str] + self.sign_algorithms = set() #type: Set[str] + # macro name -> list of argument names + self.argspecs = {} #type: Dict[str, List[str]] + # argument name -> list of values + self.arguments_for = { + 'mac_length': [], + 'min_mac_length': [], + 'tag_length': [], + 'min_tag_length': [], + } #type: Dict[str, List[str]] + # Whether to include intermediate macros in enumerations. Intermediate + # macros serve as category headers and are not valid values of their + # type. See `is_internal_name`. + # Always false in this class, may be set to true in derived classes. + self.include_intermediate = False + + def is_internal_name(self, name: str) -> bool: + """Whether this is an internal macro. Internal macros will be skipped.""" + if not self.include_intermediate: + if name.endswith('_BASE') or name.endswith('_NONE'): + return True + if '_CATEGORY_' in name: + return True + return name.endswith('_FLAG') or name.endswith('_MASK') + + def gather_arguments(self) -> None: + """Populate the list of values for macro arguments. + + Call this after parsing all the inputs. + """ + self.arguments_for['hash_alg'] = sorted(self.hash_algorithms) + self.arguments_for['mac_alg'] = sorted(self.mac_algorithms) + self.arguments_for['ka_alg'] = sorted(self.ka_algorithms) + self.arguments_for['kdf_alg'] = sorted(self.kdf_algorithms) + self.arguments_for['aead_alg'] = sorted(self.aead_algorithms) + self.arguments_for['sign_alg'] = sorted(self.sign_algorithms) + self.arguments_for['curve'] = sorted(self.ecc_curves) + self.arguments_for['group'] = sorted(self.dh_groups) + self.arguments_for['persistence'] = sorted(self.persistence_levels) + self.arguments_for['location'] = sorted(self.locations) + self.arguments_for['lifetime'] = sorted(self.lifetimes) + + @staticmethod + def _format_arguments(name: str, arguments: Iterable[str]) -> str: + """Format a macro call with arguments. + + The resulting format is consistent with + `InputsForTest.normalize_argument`. + """ + return name + '(' + ', '.join(arguments) + ')' + + _argument_split_re = re.compile(r' *, *') + @classmethod + def _argument_split(cls, arguments: str) -> List[str]: + return re.split(cls._argument_split_re, arguments) + + def distribute_arguments(self, name: str) -> Iterator[str]: + """Generate macro calls with each tested argument set. + + If name is a macro without arguments, just yield "name". + If name is a macro with arguments, yield a series of + "name(arg1,...,argN)" where each argument takes each possible + value at least once. + """ + try: + if name not in self.argspecs: + yield name + return + argspec = self.argspecs[name] + if argspec == []: + yield name + '()' + return + argument_lists = [self.arguments_for[arg] for arg in argspec] + arguments = [values[0] for values in argument_lists] + yield self._format_arguments(name, arguments) + # Dear Pylint, enumerate won't work here since we're modifying + # the array. + # pylint: disable=consider-using-enumerate + for i in range(len(arguments)): + for value in argument_lists[i][1:]: + arguments[i] = value + yield self._format_arguments(name, arguments) + arguments[i] = argument_lists[i][0] + except BaseException as e: + raise Exception('distribute_arguments({})'.format(name)) from e + + def distribute_arguments_without_duplicates( + self, seen: Set[str], name: str + ) -> Iterator[str]: + """Same as `distribute_arguments`, but don't repeat seen results.""" + for result in self.distribute_arguments(name): + if result not in seen: + seen.add(result) + yield result + + def generate_expressions(self, names: Iterable[str]) -> Iterator[str]: + """Generate expressions covering values constructed from the given names. + + `names` can be any iterable collection of macro names. + + For example: + * ``generate_expressions(['PSA_ALG_CMAC', 'PSA_ALG_HMAC'])`` + generates ``'PSA_ALG_CMAC'`` as well as ``'PSA_ALG_HMAC(h)'`` for + every known hash algorithm ``h``. + * ``macros.generate_expressions(macros.key_types)`` generates all + key types. + """ + seen = set() #type: Set[str] + return itertools.chain(*( + self.distribute_arguments_without_duplicates(seen, name) + for name in names + )) + + +class PSAMacroCollector(PSAMacroEnumerator): + """Collect PSA crypto macro definitions from C header files. + """ + + def __init__(self, include_intermediate: bool = False) -> None: + """Set up an object to collect PSA macro definitions. + + Call the read_file method of the constructed object on each header file. + + * include_intermediate: if true, include intermediate macros such as + PSA_XXX_BASE that do not designate semantic values. + """ + super().__init__() + self.include_intermediate = include_intermediate + self.key_types_from_curve = {} #type: Dict[str, str] + self.key_types_from_group = {} #type: Dict[str, str] + self.algorithms_from_hash = {} #type: Dict[str, str] + + @staticmethod + def algorithm_tester(name: str) -> str: + """The predicate for whether an algorithm is built from the given constructor. + + The given name must be the name of an algorithm constructor of the + form ``PSA_ALG_xxx`` which is used as ``PSA_ALG_xxx(yyy)`` to build + an algorithm value. Return the corresponding predicate macro which + is used as ``predicate(alg)`` to test whether ``alg`` can be built + as ``PSA_ALG_xxx(yyy)``. The predicate is usually called + ``PSA_ALG_IS_xxx``. + """ + prefix = 'PSA_ALG_' + assert name.startswith(prefix) + midfix = 'IS_' + suffix = name[len(prefix):] + if suffix in ['DSA', 'ECDSA']: + midfix += 'RANDOMIZED_' + elif suffix == 'RSA_PSS': + suffix += '_STANDARD_SALT' + return prefix + midfix + suffix + + def record_algorithm_subtype(self, name: str, expansion: str) -> None: + """Record the subtype of an algorithm constructor. + + Given a ``PSA_ALG_xxx`` macro name and its expansion, if the algorithm + is of a subtype that is tracked in its own set, add it to the relevant + set. + """ + # This code is very ad hoc and fragile. It should be replaced by + # something more robust. + if re.match(r'MAC(?:_|\Z)', name): + self.mac_algorithms.add(name) + elif re.match(r'KDF(?:_|\Z)', name): + self.kdf_algorithms.add(name) + elif re.search(r'0x020000[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}', expansion): + self.hash_algorithms.add(name) + elif re.search(r'0x03[0-9A-Fa-f]{6}', expansion): + self.mac_algorithms.add(name) + elif re.search(r'0x05[0-9A-Fa-f]{6}', expansion): + self.aead_algorithms.add(name) + elif re.search(r'0x09[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}0000', expansion): + self.ka_algorithms.add(name) + elif re.search(r'0x08[0-9A-Fa-f]{6}', expansion): + self.kdf_algorithms.add(name) + + # "#define" followed by a macro name with either no parameters + # or a single parameter and a non-empty expansion. + # Grab the macro name in group 1, the parameter name if any in group 2 + # and the expansion in group 3. + _define_directive_re = re.compile(r'\s*#\s*define\s+(\w+)' + + r'(?:\s+|\((\w+)\)\s*)' + + r'(.+)') + _deprecated_definition_re = re.compile(r'\s*MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED') + + def read_line(self, line): + """Parse a C header line and record the PSA identifier it defines if any. + This function analyzes lines that start with "#define PSA_" + (up to non-significant whitespace) and skips all non-matching lines. + """ + # pylint: disable=too-many-branches + m = re.match(self._define_directive_re, line) + if not m: + return + name, parameter, expansion = m.groups() + expansion = re.sub(r'/\*.*?\*/|//.*', r' ', expansion) + if parameter: + self.argspecs[name] = [parameter] + if re.match(self._deprecated_definition_re, expansion): + # Skip deprecated values, which are assumed to be + # backward compatibility aliases that share + # numerical values with non-deprecated values. + return + if self.is_internal_name(name): + # Macro only to build actual values + return + elif (name.startswith('PSA_ERROR_') or name == 'PSA_SUCCESS') \ + and not parameter: + self.statuses.add(name) + elif name.startswith('PSA_KEY_TYPE_') and not parameter: + self.key_types.add(name) + elif name.startswith('PSA_KEY_TYPE_') and parameter == 'curve': + self.key_types_from_curve[name] = name[:13] + 'IS_' + name[13:] + elif name.startswith('PSA_KEY_TYPE_') and parameter == 'group': + self.key_types_from_group[name] = name[:13] + 'IS_' + name[13:] + elif name.startswith('PSA_ECC_FAMILY_') and not parameter: + self.ecc_curves.add(name) + elif name.startswith('PSA_DH_FAMILY_') and not parameter: + self.dh_groups.add(name) + elif name.startswith('PSA_ALG_') and not parameter: + if name in ['PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE', + 'PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE']: + # Ad hoc skipping of duplicate names for some numerical values + return + self.algorithms.add(name) + self.record_algorithm_subtype(name, expansion) + elif name.startswith('PSA_ALG_') and parameter == 'hash_alg': + self.algorithms_from_hash[name] = self.algorithm_tester(name) + elif name.startswith('PSA_KEY_USAGE_') and not parameter: + self.key_usage_flags.add(name) + else: + # Other macro without parameter + return + + _nonascii_re = re.compile(rb'[^\x00-\x7f]+') + _continued_line_re = re.compile(rb'\\\r?\n\Z') + def read_file(self, header_file): + for line in header_file: + m = re.search(self._continued_line_re, line) + while m: + cont = next(header_file) + line = line[:m.start(0)] + cont + m = re.search(self._continued_line_re, line) + line = re.sub(self._nonascii_re, rb'', line).decode('ascii') + self.read_line(line) + + +class InputsForTest(PSAMacroEnumerator): + # pylint: disable=too-many-instance-attributes + """Accumulate information about macros to test. +enumerate + This includes macro names as well as information about their arguments + when applicable. + """ + + def __init__(self) -> None: + super().__init__() + self.all_declared = set() #type: Set[str] + # Identifier prefixes + self.table_by_prefix = { + 'ERROR': self.statuses, + 'ALG': self.algorithms, + 'ECC_CURVE': self.ecc_curves, + 'DH_GROUP': self.dh_groups, + 'KEY_LIFETIME': self.lifetimes, + 'KEY_LOCATION': self.locations, + 'KEY_PERSISTENCE': self.persistence_levels, + 'KEY_TYPE': self.key_types, + 'KEY_USAGE': self.key_usage_flags, + } #type: Dict[str, Set[str]] + # Test functions + self.table_by_test_function = { + # Any function ending in _algorithm also gets added to + # self.algorithms. + 'key_type': [self.key_types], + 'block_cipher_key_type': [self.key_types], + 'stream_cipher_key_type': [self.key_types], + 'ecc_key_family': [self.ecc_curves], + 'ecc_key_types': [self.ecc_curves], + 'dh_key_family': [self.dh_groups], + 'dh_key_types': [self.dh_groups], + 'hash_algorithm': [self.hash_algorithms], + 'mac_algorithm': [self.mac_algorithms], + 'cipher_algorithm': [], + 'hmac_algorithm': [self.mac_algorithms, self.sign_algorithms], + 'aead_algorithm': [self.aead_algorithms], + 'key_derivation_algorithm': [self.kdf_algorithms], + 'key_agreement_algorithm': [self.ka_algorithms], + 'asymmetric_signature_algorithm': [self.sign_algorithms], + 'asymmetric_signature_wildcard': [self.algorithms], + 'asymmetric_encryption_algorithm': [], + 'other_algorithm': [], + 'lifetime': [self.lifetimes], + } #type: Dict[str, List[Set[str]]] + mac_lengths = [str(n) for n in [ + 1, # minimum expressible + 4, # minimum allowed by policy + 13, # an odd size in a plausible range + 14, # an even non-power-of-two size in a plausible range + 16, # same as full size for at least one algorithm + 63, # maximum expressible + ]] + self.arguments_for['mac_length'] += mac_lengths + self.arguments_for['min_mac_length'] += mac_lengths + aead_lengths = [str(n) for n in [ + 1, # minimum expressible + 4, # minimum allowed by policy + 13, # an odd size in a plausible range + 14, # an even non-power-of-two size in a plausible range + 16, # same as full size for at least one algorithm + 63, # maximum expressible + ]] + self.arguments_for['tag_length'] += aead_lengths + self.arguments_for['min_tag_length'] += aead_lengths + + def add_numerical_values(self) -> None: + """Add numerical values that are not supported to the known identifiers.""" + # Sets of names per type + self.algorithms.add('0xffffffff') + self.ecc_curves.add('0xff') + self.dh_groups.add('0xff') + self.key_types.add('0xffff') + self.key_usage_flags.add('0x80000000') + + # Hard-coded values for unknown algorithms + # + # These have to have values that are correct for their respective + # PSA_ALG_IS_xxx macros, but are also not currently assigned and are + # not likely to be assigned in the near future. + self.hash_algorithms.add('0x020000fe') # 0x020000ff is PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + self.mac_algorithms.add('0x03007fff') + self.ka_algorithms.add('0x09fc0000') + self.kdf_algorithms.add('0x080000ff') + # For AEAD algorithms, the only variability is over the tag length, + # and this only applies to known algorithms, so don't test an + # unknown algorithm. + + def get_names(self, type_word: str) -> Set[str]: + """Return the set of known names of values of the given type.""" + return { + 'status': self.statuses, + 'algorithm': self.algorithms, + 'ecc_curve': self.ecc_curves, + 'dh_group': self.dh_groups, + 'key_type': self.key_types, + 'key_usage': self.key_usage_flags, + }[type_word] + + # Regex for interesting header lines. + # Groups: 1=macro name, 2=type, 3=argument list (optional). + _header_line_re = \ + re.compile(r'#define +' + + r'(PSA_((?:(?:DH|ECC|KEY)_)?[A-Z]+)_\w+)' + + r'(?:\(([^\n()]*)\))?') + # Regex of macro names to exclude. + _excluded_name_re = re.compile(r'_(?:GET|IS|OF)_|_(?:BASE|FLAG|MASK)\Z') + # Additional excluded macros. + _excluded_names = set([ + # Macros that provide an alternative way to build the same + # algorithm as another macro. + 'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG', + 'PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC', + # Auxiliary macro whose name doesn't fit the usual patterns for + # auxiliary macros. + 'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE', + ]) + def parse_header_line(self, line: str) -> None: + """Parse a C header line, looking for "#define PSA_xxx".""" + m = re.match(self._header_line_re, line) + if not m: + return + name = m.group(1) + self.all_declared.add(name) + if re.search(self._excluded_name_re, name) or \ + name in self._excluded_names or \ + self.is_internal_name(name): + return + dest = self.table_by_prefix.get(m.group(2)) + if dest is None: + return + dest.add(name) + if m.group(3): + self.argspecs[name] = self._argument_split(m.group(3)) + + _nonascii_re = re.compile(rb'[^\x00-\x7f]+') #type: Pattern + def parse_header(self, filename: str) -> None: + """Parse a C header file, looking for "#define PSA_xxx".""" + with read_file_lines(filename, binary=True) as lines: + for line in lines: + line = re.sub(self._nonascii_re, rb'', line).decode('ascii') + self.parse_header_line(line) + + _macro_identifier_re = re.compile(r'[A-Z]\w+') + def generate_undeclared_names(self, expr: str) -> Iterable[str]: + for name in re.findall(self._macro_identifier_re, expr): + if name not in self.all_declared: + yield name + + def accept_test_case_line(self, function: str, argument: str) -> bool: + #pylint: disable=unused-argument + undeclared = list(self.generate_undeclared_names(argument)) + if undeclared: + raise Exception('Undeclared names in test case', undeclared) + return True + + @staticmethod + def normalize_argument(argument: str) -> str: + """Normalize whitespace in the given C expression. + + The result uses the same whitespace as + ` PSAMacroEnumerator.distribute_arguments`. + """ + return re.sub(r',', r', ', re.sub(r' +', r'', argument)) + + def add_test_case_line(self, function: str, argument: str) -> None: + """Parse a test case data line, looking for algorithm metadata tests.""" + sets = [] + if function.endswith('_algorithm'): + sets.append(self.algorithms) + if function == 'key_agreement_algorithm' and \ + argument.startswith('PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT('): + # We only want *raw* key agreement algorithms as such, so + # exclude ones that are already chained with a KDF. + # Keep the expression as one to test as an algorithm. + function = 'other_algorithm' + sets += self.table_by_test_function[function] + if self.accept_test_case_line(function, argument): + for s in sets: + s.add(self.normalize_argument(argument)) + + # Regex matching a *.data line containing a test function call and + # its arguments. The actual definition is partly positional, but this + # regex is good enough in practice. + _test_case_line_re = re.compile(r'(?!depends_on:)(\w+):([^\n :][^:\n]*)') + def parse_test_cases(self, filename: str) -> None: + """Parse a test case file (*.data), looking for algorithm metadata tests.""" + with read_file_lines(filename) as lines: + for line in lines: + m = re.match(self._test_case_line_re, line) + if m: + self.add_test_case_line(m.group(1), m.group(2)) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_storage.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_storage.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a06dce13 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_storage.py @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +"""Knowledge about the PSA key store as implemented in Mbed TLS. + +Note that if you need to make a change that affects how keys are +stored, this may indicate that the key store is changing in a +backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward compatibility +before changing how test data is constructed or validated. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import re +import struct +from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Set, Union +import unittest + +from mbedtls_dev import c_build_helper + + +class Expr: + """Representation of a C expression with a known or knowable numerical value.""" + + def __init__(self, content: Union[int, str]): + if isinstance(content, int): + digits = 8 if content > 0xffff else 4 + self.string = '{0:#0{1}x}'.format(content, digits + 2) + self.value_if_known = content #type: Optional[int] + else: + self.string = content + self.unknown_values.add(self.normalize(content)) + self.value_if_known = None + + value_cache = {} #type: Dict[str, int] + """Cache of known values of expressions.""" + + unknown_values = set() #type: Set[str] + """Expressions whose values are not present in `value_cache` yet.""" + + def update_cache(self) -> None: + """Update `value_cache` for expressions registered in `unknown_values`.""" + expressions = sorted(self.unknown_values) + values = c_build_helper.get_c_expression_values( + 'unsigned long', '%lu', + expressions, + header=""" + #include + """, + include_path=['include']) #type: List[str] + for e, v in zip(expressions, values): + self.value_cache[e] = int(v, 0) + self.unknown_values.clear() + + @staticmethod + def normalize(string: str) -> str: + """Put the given C expression in a canonical form. + + This function is only intended to give correct results for the + relatively simple kind of C expression typically used with this + module. + """ + return re.sub(r'\s+', r'', string) + + def value(self) -> int: + """Return the numerical value of the expression.""" + if self.value_if_known is None: + if re.match(r'([0-9]+|0x[0-9a-f]+)\Z', self.string, re.I): + return int(self.string, 0) + normalized = self.normalize(self.string) + if normalized not in self.value_cache: + self.update_cache() + self.value_if_known = self.value_cache[normalized] + return self.value_if_known + +Exprable = Union[str, int, Expr] +"""Something that can be converted to a C expression with a known numerical value.""" + +def as_expr(thing: Exprable) -> Expr: + """Return an `Expr` object for `thing`. + + If `thing` is already an `Expr` object, return it. Otherwise build a new + `Expr` object from `thing`. `thing` can be an integer or a string that + contains a C expression. + """ + if isinstance(thing, Expr): + return thing + else: + return Expr(thing) + + +class Key: + """Representation of a PSA crypto key object and its storage encoding. + """ + + LATEST_VERSION = 0 + """The latest version of the storage format.""" + + def __init__(self, *, + version: Optional[int] = None, + id: Optional[int] = None, #pylint: disable=redefined-builtin + lifetime: Exprable = 'PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT', + type: Exprable, #pylint: disable=redefined-builtin + bits: int, + usage: Exprable, alg: Exprable, alg2: Exprable, + material: bytes #pylint: disable=used-before-assignment + ) -> None: + self.version = self.LATEST_VERSION if version is None else version + self.id = id #pylint: disable=invalid-name #type: Optional[int] + self.lifetime = as_expr(lifetime) #type: Expr + self.type = as_expr(type) #type: Expr + self.bits = bits #type: int + self.usage = as_expr(usage) #type: Expr + self.alg = as_expr(alg) #type: Expr + self.alg2 = as_expr(alg2) #type: Expr + self.material = material #type: bytes + + MAGIC = b'PSA\000KEY\000' + + @staticmethod + def pack( + fmt: str, + *args: Union[int, Expr] + ) -> bytes: #pylint: disable=used-before-assignment + """Pack the given arguments into a byte string according to the given format. + + This function is similar to `struct.pack`, but with the following differences: + * All integer values are encoded with standard sizes and in + little-endian representation. `fmt` must not include an endianness + prefix. + * Arguments can be `Expr` objects instead of integers. + * Only integer-valued elements are supported. + """ + return struct.pack('<' + fmt, # little-endian, standard sizes + *[arg.value() if isinstance(arg, Expr) else arg + for arg in args]) + + def bytes(self) -> bytes: + """Return the representation of the key in storage as a byte array. + + This is the content of the PSA storage file. When PSA storage is + implemented over stdio files, this does not include any wrapping made + by the PSA-storage-over-stdio-file implementation. + + Note that if you need to make a change in this function, + this may indicate that the key store is changing in a + backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward + compatibility before making any change here. + """ + header = self.MAGIC + self.pack('L', self.version) + if self.version == 0: + attributes = self.pack('LHHLLL', + self.lifetime, self.type, self.bits, + self.usage, self.alg, self.alg2) + material = self.pack('L', len(self.material)) + self.material + else: + raise NotImplementedError + return header + attributes + material + + def hex(self) -> str: + """Return the representation of the key as a hexadecimal string. + + This is the hexadecimal representation of `self.bytes`. + """ + return self.bytes().hex() + + def location_value(self) -> int: + """The numerical value of the location encoded in the key's lifetime.""" + return self.lifetime.value() >> 8 + + +class TestKey(unittest.TestCase): + # pylint: disable=line-too-long + """A few smoke tests for the functionality of the `Key` class.""" + + def test_numerical(self): + key = Key(version=0, + id=1, lifetime=0x00000001, + type=0x2400, bits=128, + usage=0x00000300, alg=0x05500200, alg2=0x04c01000, + material=b'@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO') + expected_hex = '505341004b45590000000000010000000024800000030000000250050010c00410000000404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f' + self.assertEqual(key.bytes(), bytes.fromhex(expected_hex)) + self.assertEqual(key.hex(), expected_hex) + + def test_names(self): + length = 0xfff8 // 8 # PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS in bytes + key = Key(version=0, + id=1, lifetime='PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT', + type='PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA', bits=length*8, + usage=0, alg=0, alg2=0, + material=b'\x00' * length) + expected_hex = '505341004b45590000000000010000000110f8ff000000000000000000000000ff1f0000' + '00' * length + self.assertEqual(key.bytes(), bytes.fromhex(expected_hex)) + self.assertEqual(key.hex(), expected_hex) + + def test_defaults(self): + key = Key(type=0x1001, bits=8, + usage=0, alg=0, alg2=0, + material=b'\x2a') + expected_hex = '505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000000000000000000000000010000002a' + self.assertEqual(key.bytes(), bytes.fromhex(expected_hex)) + self.assertEqual(key.hex(), expected_hex) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a46e420 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +"""Library for generating Mbed TLS test data. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import binascii +import os +import sys +from typing import Iterable, List, Optional + +from mbedtls_dev import typing_util + +def hex_string(data: bytes) -> str: + return '"' + binascii.hexlify(data).decode('ascii') + '"' + + +class MissingDescription(Exception): + pass + +class MissingFunction(Exception): + pass + +class TestCase: + """An Mbed TLS test case.""" + + def __init__(self, description: Optional[str] = None): + self.comments = [] #type: List[str] + self.description = description #type: Optional[str] + self.dependencies = [] #type: List[str] + self.function = None #type: Optional[str] + self.arguments = [] #type: List[str] + + def add_comment(self, *lines: str) -> None: + self.comments += lines + + def set_description(self, description: str) -> None: + self.description = description + + def set_dependencies(self, dependencies: List[str]) -> None: + self.dependencies = dependencies + + def set_function(self, function: str) -> None: + self.function = function + + def set_arguments(self, arguments: List[str]) -> None: + self.arguments = arguments + + def check_completeness(self) -> None: + if self.description is None: + raise MissingDescription + if self.function is None: + raise MissingFunction + + def write(self, out: typing_util.Writable) -> None: + """Write the .data file paragraph for this test case. + + The output starts and ends with a single newline character. If the + surrounding code writes lines (consisting of non-newline characters + and a final newline), you will end up with a blank line before, but + not after the test case. + """ + self.check_completeness() + assert self.description is not None # guide mypy + assert self.function is not None # guide mypy + out.write('\n') + for line in self.comments: + out.write('# ' + line + '\n') + out.write(self.description + '\n') + if self.dependencies: + out.write('depends_on:' + ':'.join(self.dependencies) + '\n') + out.write(self.function + ':' + ':'.join(self.arguments) + '\n') + +def write_data_file(filename: str, + test_cases: Iterable[TestCase], + caller: Optional[str] = None) -> None: + """Write the test cases to the specified file. + + If the file already exists, it is overwritten. + """ + if caller is None: + caller = os.path.basename(sys.argv[0]) + with open(filename, 'w') as out: + out.write('# Automatically generated by {}. Do not edit!\n' + .format(caller)) + for tc in test_cases: + tc.write(out) + out.write('\n# End of automatically generated file.\n') diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/typing_util.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/typing_util.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c344492 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/mbedtls_dev/typing_util.py @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +"""Auxiliary definitions used in type annotations. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +from typing import Any + +# The typing_extensions module is necessary for type annotations that are +# checked with mypy. It is only used for type annotations or to define +# things that are themselves only used for type annotations. It is not +# available on a default Python installation. Therefore, try loading +# what we need from it for the sake of mypy (which depends on, or comes +# with, typing_extensions), and if not define substitutes that lack the +# static type information but are good enough at runtime. +try: + from typing_extensions import Protocol #pylint: disable=import-error +except ImportError: + class Protocol: #type: ignore + #pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods + pass + +class Writable(Protocol): + """Abstract class for typing hints.""" + # pylint: disable=no-self-use,too-few-public-methods,unused-argument + def write(self, text: str) -> Any: + ... diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/memory.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/memory.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..9c3882de --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/memory.sh @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Measure memory usage of a minimal client using a small configuration +# Currently hardwired to ccm-psk and suite-b, may be expanded later +# +# Use different build options for measuring executable size and memory usage, +# since for memory we want debug information. +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +set -eu + +CONFIG_H='include/mbedtls/config.h' + +CLIENT='mini_client' + +CFLAGS_EXEC='-fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -Wl,--gc-section -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections' +CFLAGS_MEM=-g3 + +if [ -r $CONFIG_H ]; then :; else + echo "$CONFIG_H not found" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if grep -i cmake Makefile >/dev/null; then + echo "Not compatible with CMake" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if [ $( uname ) != Linux ]; then + echo "Only work on Linux" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if git status | grep -F $CONFIG_H >/dev/null 2>&1; then + echo "config.h not clean" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# make measurements with one configuration +# usage: do_config +do_config() +{ + NAME=$1 + UNSET_LIST=$2 + SERVER_ARGS=$3 + + echo "" + echo "config-$NAME:" + cp configs/config-$NAME.h $CONFIG_H + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + + for FLAG in $UNSET_LIST; do + scripts/config.py unset $FLAG + done + + grep -F SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN $CONFIG_H || echo 'SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN=16384' + + printf " Executable size... " + + make clean + CFLAGS=$CFLAGS_EXEC make OFLAGS=-Os lib >/dev/null 2>&1 + cd programs + CFLAGS=$CFLAGS_EXEC make OFLAGS=-Os ssl/$CLIENT >/dev/null + strip ssl/$CLIENT + stat -c '%s' ssl/$CLIENT + cd .. + + printf " Peak ram usage... " + + make clean + CFLAGS=$CFLAGS_MEM make OFLAGS=-Os lib >/dev/null 2>&1 + cd programs + CFLAGS=$CFLAGS_MEM make OFLAGS=-Os ssl/$CLIENT >/dev/null + cd .. + + ./ssl_server2 $SERVER_ARGS >/dev/null & + SRV_PID=$! + sleep 1; + + if valgrind --tool=massif --stacks=yes programs/ssl/$CLIENT >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + FAILED=0 + else + echo "client failed" >&2 + FAILED=1 + fi + + kill $SRV_PID + wait $SRV_PID + + scripts/massif_max.pl massif.out.* + mv massif.out.* massif-$NAME.$$ +} + +# preparation + +CONFIG_BAK=${CONFIG_H}.bak +cp $CONFIG_H $CONFIG_BAK + +rm -f massif.out.* + +printf "building server... " + +make clean +make lib >/dev/null 2>&1 +(cd programs && make ssl/ssl_server2) >/dev/null +cp programs/ssl/ssl_server2 . + +echo "done" + +# actual measurements + +do_config "ccm-psk-tls1_2" \ + "" \ + "psk=000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F" + +do_config "suite-b" \ + "MBEDTLS_BASE64_C MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_CERTS_C" \ + "" + +# cleanup + +mv $CONFIG_BAK $CONFIG_H +make clean +rm ssl_server2 + +exit $FAILED diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/min_requirements.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/min_requirements.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..01c9de13 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/min_requirements.py @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Install all the required Python packages, with the minimum Python version. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import argparse +import os +import re +import subprocess +import sys +import tempfile +import typing + +from typing import List, Optional +from mbedtls_dev import typing_util + +def pylint_doesn_t_notice_that_certain_types_are_used_in_annotations( + _list: List[typing.Any], +) -> None: + pass + + +class Requirements: + """Collect and massage Python requirements.""" + + def __init__(self) -> None: + self.requirements = [] #type: List[str] + + def adjust_requirement(self, req: str) -> str: + """Adjust a requirement to the minimum specified version.""" + # allow inheritance #pylint: disable=no-self-use + # If a requirement specifies a minimum version, impose that version. + req = re.sub(r'>=|~=', r'==', req) + return req + + def add_file(self, filename: str) -> None: + """Add requirements from the specified file. + + This method supports a subset of pip's requirement file syntax: + * One requirement specifier per line, which is passed to + `adjust_requirement`. + * Comments (``#`` at the beginning of the line or after whitespace). + * ``-r FILENAME`` to include another file. + """ + with open(filename) as fd: + for line in fd: + line = line.strip() + line = re.sub(r'(\A|\s+)#.*', r'', line) + if not line: + continue + m = re.match(r'-r\s+', line) + if m: + nested_file = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(filename), + line[m.end(0):]) + self.add_file(nested_file) + continue + self.requirements.append(self.adjust_requirement(line)) + + def write(self, out: typing_util.Writable) -> None: + """List the gathered requirements.""" + for req in self.requirements: + out.write(req + '\n') + + def install( + self, + pip_general_options: Optional[List[str]] = None, + pip_install_options: Optional[List[str]] = None, + ) -> None: + """Call pip to install the requirements.""" + if pip_general_options is None: + pip_general_options = [] + if pip_install_options is None: + pip_install_options = [] + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir: + # This is more complicated than it needs to be for the sake + # of Windows. Use a temporary file rather than the command line + # to avoid quoting issues. Use a temporary directory rather + # than NamedTemporaryFile because with a NamedTemporaryFile on + # Windows, the subprocess can't open the file because this process + # has an exclusive lock on it. + req_file_name = os.path.join(temp_dir, 'requirements.txt') + with open(req_file_name, 'w') as req_file: + self.write(req_file) + subprocess.check_call([sys.executable, '-m', 'pip'] + + pip_general_options + + ['install'] + pip_install_options + + ['-r', req_file_name]) + +DEFAULT_REQUIREMENTS_FILE = 'ci.requirements.txt' + +def main() -> None: + """Command line entry point.""" + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument('--no-act', '-n', + action='store_true', + help="Don't act, just print what will be done") + parser.add_argument('--pip-install-option', + action='append', dest='pip_install_options', + help="Pass this option to pip install") + parser.add_argument('--pip-option', + action='append', dest='pip_general_options', + help="Pass this general option to pip") + parser.add_argument('--user', + action='append_const', dest='pip_install_options', + const='--user', + help="Install to the Python user install directory" + " (short for --pip-install-option --user)") + parser.add_argument('files', nargs='*', metavar='FILE', + help="Requirement files" + " (default: {} in the script's directory)" \ + .format(DEFAULT_REQUIREMENTS_FILE)) + options = parser.parse_args() + if not options.files: + options.files = [os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + DEFAULT_REQUIREMENTS_FILE)] + reqs = Requirements() + for filename in options.files: + reqs.add_file(filename) + reqs.write(sys.stdout) + if not options.no_act: + reqs.install(pip_general_options=options.pip_general_options, + pip_install_options=options.pip_install_options) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/output_env.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/output_env.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..1d9e0fae --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/output_env.sh @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env sh + +# output_env.sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# To print out all the relevant information about the development environment. +# +# This includes: +# - architecture of the system +# - type and version of the operating system +# - version of make and cmake +# - version of armcc, clang, gcc-arm and gcc compilers +# - version of libc, clang, asan and valgrind if installed +# - version of gnuTLS and OpenSSL + +print_version() +{ + BIN="$1" + shift + ARGS="$1" + shift + VARIANT="$1" + shift + + if [ -n "$VARIANT" ]; then + VARIANT=" ($VARIANT)" + fi + + if ! type "$BIN" > /dev/null 2>&1; then + echo " * ${BIN##*/}$VARIANT: Not found." + return 0 + fi + + BIN=`which "$BIN"` + VERSION_STR=`$BIN $ARGS 2>&1` + + # Apply all filters + while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do + FILTER="$1" + shift + VERSION_STR=`echo "$VERSION_STR" | $FILTER` + done + + if [ -z "$VERSION_STR" ]; then + VERSION_STR="Version could not be determined." + fi + + echo " * ${BIN##*/}$VARIANT: ${BIN} : ${VERSION_STR} " +} + +echo "** Platform:" +echo + +if [ `uname -s` = "Linux" ]; then + echo "Linux variant" + lsb_release -d -c +else + echo "Unknown Unix variant" +fi + +echo + +print_version "uname" "-a" "" + +echo +echo +echo "** Tool Versions:" +echo + +print_version "make" "--version" "" "head -n 1" +echo + +print_version "cmake" "--version" "" "head -n 1" +echo + +if [ "${RUN_ARMCC:-1}" -ne 0 ]; then + : "${ARMC5_CC:=armcc}" + print_version "$ARMC5_CC" "--vsn" "" "head -n 2" + echo + + : "${ARMC6_CC:=armclang}" + print_version "$ARMC6_CC" "--vsn" "" "head -n 2" + echo +fi + +print_version "arm-none-eabi-gcc" "--version" "" "head -n 1" +echo + +print_version "gcc" "--version" "" "head -n 1" +echo + +print_version "clang" "--version" "" "head -n 2" +echo + +print_version "ldd" "--version" "" "head -n 1" +echo + +print_version "valgrind" "--version" "" +echo + +print_version "gdb" "--version" "" "head -n 1" +echo + +print_version "perl" "--version" "" "head -n 2" "grep ." +echo + +print_version "python" "--version" "" "head -n 1" +echo + +print_version "python3" "--version" "" "head -n 1" +echo + +# Find the installed version of Pylint. Installed as a distro package this can +# be pylint3 and as a PEP egg, pylint. In test scripts We prefer pylint over +# pylint3 +if type pylint >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + print_version "pylint" "--version" "" "sed /^.*config/d" "grep pylint" +elif type pylint3 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + print_version "pylint3" "--version" "" "sed /^.*config/d" "grep pylint" +else + echo " * pylint or pylint3: Not found." +fi +echo + +: ${OPENSSL:=openssl} +print_version "$OPENSSL" "version" "default" +echo + +if [ -n "${OPENSSL_LEGACY+set}" ]; then + print_version "$OPENSSL_LEGACY" "version" "legacy" +else + echo " * openssl (legacy): Not configured." +fi +echo + +if [ -n "${OPENSSL_NEXT+set}" ]; then + print_version "$OPENSSL_NEXT" "version" "next" +else + echo " * openssl (next): Not configured." +fi +echo + +: ${GNUTLS_CLI:=gnutls-cli} +print_version "$GNUTLS_CLI" "--version" "default" "head -n 1" +echo + +: ${GNUTLS_SERV:=gnutls-serv} +print_version "$GNUTLS_SERV" "--version" "default" "head -n 1" +echo + +if [ -n "${GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI+set}" ]; then + print_version "$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" "--version" "legacy" "head -n 1" +else + echo " * gnutls-cli (legacy): Not configured." +fi +echo + +if [ -n "${GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV+set}" ]; then + print_version "$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" "--version" "legacy" "head -n 1" +else + echo " * gnutls-serv (legacy): Not configured." +fi +echo + +echo " * Installed asan versions:" +if type dpkg-query >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + if ! dpkg-query -f '${Status} ${Package}: ${Version}\n' -W 'libasan*' | + awk '$3 == "installed" && $4 !~ /-/ {print $4, $5}' | + grep . + then + echo " No asan versions installed." + fi +else + echo " Unable to determine the asan version without dpkg." +fi +echo diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/rename.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/rename.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..9ea5f09c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/rename.pl @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# This script migrates application source code from the mbed TLS 1.3 API to the +# mbed TLS 2.0 API. +# +# The script processes the given source code and renames identifiers - functions +# types, enums etc, as +# +# Usage: rename.pl [-f datafile] [-s] [--] [filenames...] +# + +use warnings; +use strict; + +use utf8; +use Path::Class; +use open qw(:std utf8); + +my $usage = "Usage: $0 [-f datafile] [-s] [--] [filenames...]\n"; + +(my $datafile = $0) =~ s/rename.pl$/data_files\/rename-1.3-2.0.txt/; +my $do_strings = 0; + +while( @ARGV && $ARGV[0] =~ /^-/ ) { + my $opt = shift; + if( $opt eq '--' ) { + last; + } elsif( $opt eq '-f' ) { + $datafile = shift; + } elsif( $opt eq '-s' ) { + $do_strings = 1; shift; + } else { + die $usage; + } +} + +my %subst; +open my $nfh, '<', $datafile or die "Could not read $datafile\n"; +my $ident = qr/[_A-Za-z][_A-Za-z0-9]*/; +while( my $line = <$nfh> ) { + chomp $line; + my ( $old, $new ) = ( $line =~ /^($ident)\s+($ident)$/ ); + if( ! $old || ! $new ) { + die "$0: $datafile:$.: bad input '$line'\n"; + } + $subst{$old} = $new; +} +close $nfh or die; + +my $string = qr/"(?:\\.|[^\\"])*"/; +my $space = qr/\s+/; +my $idnum = qr/[a-zA-Z0-9_]+/; +my $symbols = qr/[-!#\$%&'()*+,.\/:;<=>?@[\\\]^_`{|}~]+|"/; + +my $lib_include_dir = dir($0)->parent->parent->subdir('include', 'mbedtls'); +my $lib_source_dir = dir($0)->parent->parent->subdir('library'); + +# if we replace inside strings, we don't consider them a token +my $token = $do_strings ? qr/$space|$idnum|$symbols/ + : qr/$string|$space|$idnum|$symbols/; + +my %warnings; + +# If no files were passed, exit... +if ( not defined($ARGV[0]) ){ die $usage; } + +while( my $filename = shift ) +{ + print STDERR "$filename... "; + + if( dir($filename)->parent eq $lib_include_dir || + dir($filename)->parent eq $lib_source_dir ) + { + die "Script cannot be executed on the mbed TLS library itself."; + } + + if( -d $filename ) { print STDERR "skip (directory)\n"; next } + + open my $rfh, '<', $filename or die; + my @lines = <$rfh>; + close $rfh or die; + + my @out; + for my $line (@lines) { + if( $line =~ /#include/ ) { + $line =~ s/polarssl/mbedtls/; + $line =~ s/POLARSSL/MBEDTLS/; + push( @out, $line ); + next; + } + + my @words = ($line =~ /$token/g); + my $checkline = join '', @words; + if( $checkline eq $line ) { + my @new = map { exists $subst{$_} ? $subst{$_} : $_ } @words; + push( @out, join '', @new ); + } else { + $warnings{$filename} = [] unless $warnings{$filename}; + push @{ $warnings{$filename} }, $line; + push( @out, $line ); + } + } + + open my $wfh, '>', $filename or die; + print $wfh $_ for @out; + close $wfh or die; + print STDERR "done\n"; +} + +if( %warnings ) { + print "\nWarning: lines skipped due to unexpected characters:\n"; + for my $filename (sort keys %warnings) { + print "in $filename:\n"; + print for @{ $warnings{$filename} }; + } +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/rm-calloc-cast.cocci b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/rm-calloc-cast.cocci new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89481c01 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/rm-calloc-cast.cocci @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +@rm_calloc_cast@ +expression x, n, m; +type T; +@@ + x = +- (T *) + mbedtls_calloc(n, m) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/tmp_ignore_makefiles.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/tmp_ignore_makefiles.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..558970f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/tmp_ignore_makefiles.sh @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +# Temporarily (de)ignore Makefiles generated by CMake to allow easier +# git development +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +IGNORE="" + +# Parse arguments +# +until [ -z "$1" ] +do + case "$1" in + -u|--undo) + IGNORE="0" + ;; + -v|--verbose) + # Be verbose + VERBOSE="1" + ;; + -h|--help) + # print help + echo "Usage: $0" + echo -e " -h|--help\t\tPrint this help." + echo -e " -u|--undo\t\tRemove ignores and continue tracking." + echo -e " -v|--verbose\t\tVerbose." + exit 1 + ;; + *) + # print error + echo "Unknown argument: '$1'" + exit 1 + ;; + esac + shift +done + +if [ "X" = "X$IGNORE" ]; +then + [ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Ignoring Makefiles" + git update-index --assume-unchanged Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile +else + [ $VERBOSE ] && echo "Tracking Makefiles" + git update-index --no-assume-unchanged Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile +fi diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/windows_msbuild.bat b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/windows_msbuild.bat new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cfb5f013 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/scripts/windows_msbuild.bat @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +@rem Build and test Mbed TLS with Visual Studio using msbuild. +@rem Usage: windows_msbuild [RETARGET] +@rem RETARGET: version of Visual Studio to emulate +@rem https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/how-to-modify-the-target-framework-and-platform-toolset + +@rem These parameters are hard-coded for now. +set "arch=x64" & @rem "x86" or "x64" +set "cfg=Release" & @rem "Debug" or "Release" +set "vcvarsall=C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\2017\BuildTools\VC\Auxiliary\Build\vcvarsall.bat" + +if not "%~1"=="" set "retarget=,PlatformToolset=%1" + +@rem If the %USERPROFILE%\Source directory exists, then running +@rem vcvarsall.bat will silently change the directory to that directory. +@rem Setting the VSCMD_START_DIR environment variable causes it to change +@rem to that directory instead. +set "VSCMD_START_DIR=%~dp0\..\visualc\VS2010" + +"%vcvarsall%" x64 && ^ +msbuild /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=%cfg%%retarget% /m mbedTLS.sln diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8f7315d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +*.sln +*.vcxproj + +*.log +/test_suite* +data_files/mpi_write +data_files/hmac_drbg_seed +data_files/ctr_drbg_seed +data_files/entropy_seed + +include/test/instrument_record_status.h + +src/*.o +src/drivers/*.o +src/libmbed* + +libtestdriver1/* diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/.jenkins/Jenkinsfile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/.jenkins/Jenkinsfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed04053d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/.jenkins/Jenkinsfile @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +mbedtls.run_job() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5dfddb71 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +set(libs + ${mbedtls_target} +) + +# Set the project root directory if it's not already defined, as may happen if +# the tests folder is included directly by a parent project, without including +# the top level CMakeLists.txt. +if(NOT DEFINED MBEDTLS_DIR) + set(MBEDTLS_DIR ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}) +endif() + +if(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + set(libs ${libs} pkcs11-helper) +endif(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + +if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + set(libs ${libs} ${ZLIB_LIBRARIES}) +endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +if(NOT MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE) + message(FATAL_ERROR "Cannot build test suites without Python 3") +endif() + +# Enable definition of various functions used throughout the testsuite +# (gethostname, strdup, fileno...) even when compiling with -std=c99. Harmless +# on non-POSIX platforms. +add_definitions("-D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L") + +# Test suites caught by SKIP_TEST_SUITES are built but not executed. +# "foo" as a skip pattern skips "test_suite_foo" and "test_suite_foo.bar" +# but not "test_suite_foobar". +string(REGEX REPLACE "[ ,;]" "|" SKIP_TEST_SUITES_REGEX "${SKIP_TEST_SUITES}") +string(REPLACE "." "\\." SKIP_TEST_SUITES_REGEX "${SKIP_TEST_SUITES_REGEX}") +set(SKIP_TEST_SUITES_REGEX "^(${SKIP_TEST_SUITES_REGEX})(\$|\\.)") + +function(add_test_suite suite_name) + if(ARGV1) + set(data_name ${ARGV1}) + else() + set(data_name ${suite_name}) + endif() + + add_custom_command( + OUTPUT test_suite_${data_name}.c + COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/generate_test_code.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${suite_name}.function -d ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data -t ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/main_test.function -p ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/host_test.function -s ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites --helpers-file ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/helpers.function -o . + DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/generate_test_code.py ${mbedtls_target} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/helpers.function ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/main_test.function ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/host_test.function ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${suite_name}.function ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/suites/test_suite_${data_name}.data + ) + + add_executable(test_suite_${data_name} test_suite_${data_name}.c $) + target_link_libraries(test_suite_${data_name} ${libs}) + # Include test-specific header files from ./include and private header + # files (used by some invasive tests) from ../library. Public header + # files are automatically included because the library targets declare + # them as PUBLIC. + target_include_directories(test_suite_${data_name} + PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include + PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../library) + + if(${data_name} MATCHES ${SKIP_TEST_SUITES_REGEX}) + message(STATUS "The test suite ${data_name} will not be executed.") + else() + add_test(${data_name}-suite test_suite_${data_name} --verbose) + endif() +endfunction(add_test_suite) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wno-unused-function") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wdocumentation -Wno-documentation-deprecated-sync -Wunreachable-code") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + +if(MSVC) + # If a warning level has been defined, suppress all warnings for test code + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} /W0") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} /WX-") +endif(MSVC) + +file(GLOB test_suites RELATIVE "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}" suites/*.data) +list(SORT test_suites) +foreach(test_suite ${test_suites}) + get_filename_component(data_name ${test_suite} NAME) + string(REGEX REPLACE "\\.data\$" "" data_name "${data_name}") + string(REPLACE "test_suite_" "" data_name "${data_name}") + string(REGEX MATCH "[^.]*" function_name "${data_name}") + add_test_suite(${function_name} ${data_name}) +endforeach(test_suite) + +# Make scripts and data files needed for testing available in an +# out-of-source build. +if (NOT ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR} STREQUAL ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}) + if(EXISTS "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/seedfile") + link_to_source(seedfile) + endif() + link_to_source(compat.sh) + link_to_source(context-info.sh) + link_to_source(data_files) + link_to_source(scripts) + link_to_source(ssl-opt.sh) + link_to_source(suites) +endif() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/Descriptions.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/Descriptions.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8b13bb39 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/Descriptions.txt @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +test_suites + The various 'test_suite_XXX' programs from the 'tests' directory, executed + using 'make check' (Unix make) or 'make test' (Cmake), include test cases + (reference test vectors, sanity checks, malformed input for parsing + functions, etc.) for all modules except the SSL modules. + +selftests + The 'programs/test/selftest' program runs the 'XXX_self_test()' functions + of each individual module. Most of them are included in the respective + test suite, but some slower ones are only included here. + +compat + The 'tests/compat.sh' script checks interoperability with OpenSSL and + GnuTLS (and ourselves!) for every common ciphersuite, in every TLS + version, both ways (client/server), using client authentication or not. + For each ciphersuite/version/side/authmode it performs a full handshake + and a small data exchange. + +ssl_opt + The 'tests/ssl-opt.sh' script checks various options and/or operations not + covered by compat.sh: session resumption (using session cache or tickets), + renegotiation, SNI, other extensions, etc. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/Makefile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6e232c97 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ + +# To compile on SunOS: add "-lsocket -lnsl" to LDFLAGS +# To compile with PKCS11: add "-lpkcs11-helper" to LDFLAGS + +CFLAGS ?= -O2 +WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral +LDFLAGS ?= + +# Set this to -v to see the details of failing test cases +TEST_FLAGS ?= $(if $(filter-out 0 OFF Off off NO No no FALSE False false N n,$(CTEST_OUTPUT_ON_FAILURE)),-v,) + +# Include public header files from ../include, test-specific header files +# from ./include, and private header files (used by some invasive tests) +# from ../library. +LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I./include -I../include -I../library -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_LDFLAGS = -L../library \ + -lmbedtls$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ + -lmbedx509$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ + -lmbedcrypto$(SHARED_SUFFIX) + +include ../3rdparty/Makefile.inc +LOCAL_CFLAGS+=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) + +# Enable definition of various functions used throughout the testsuite +# (gethostname, strdup, fileno...) even when compiling with -std=c99. Harmless +# on non-POSIX platforms. +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L + +ifndef SHARED +MBEDLIBS=../library/libmbedcrypto.a ../library/libmbedx509.a ../library/libmbedtls.a +else +MBEDLIBS=../library/libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) ../library/libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) ../library/libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) +endif + +ifdef DEBUG +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -g3 +endif + +ifdef RECORD_PSA_STATUS_COVERAGE_LOG +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -Werror -DRECORD_PSA_STATUS_COVERAGE_LOG +endif + +# if we're running on Windows, build for Windows +ifdef WINDOWS +WINDOWS_BUILD=1 +endif + +ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD +DLEXT=dll +EXEXT=.exe +LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lws2_32 +ifdef SHARED +SHARED_SUFFIX=.$(DLEXT) +endif +else +DLEXT ?= so +EXEXT= +SHARED_SUFFIX= +endif + +ifdef WINDOWS +PYTHON ?= python +else +PYTHON ?= $(shell if type python3 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then echo python3; else echo python; fi) +endif + +# Zlib shared library extensions: +ifdef ZLIB +LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lz +endif + +# A test application is built for each suites/test_suite_*.data file. +# Application name is same as .data file's base name and can be +# constructed by stripping path 'suites/' and extension .data. +APPS = $(basename $(subst suites/,,$(wildcard suites/test_suite_*.data))) + +# Construct executable name by adding OS specific suffix $(EXEXT). +BINARIES := $(addsuffix $(EXEXT),$(APPS)) + +.SILENT: + +.PHONY: all check test clean + +all: $(BINARIES) + +$(MBEDLIBS): + $(MAKE) -C ../library + +MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS=$(patsubst %.c,%.o,$(wildcard src/*.c src/drivers/*.c)) + +mbedtls_test: $(MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS) + +TEST_OBJS_DEPS = $(wildcard include/test/*.h include/test/*/*.h) +ifdef RECORD_PSA_STATUS_COVERAGE_LOG +# Explicitly depend on this header because on a clean copy of the source tree, +# it doesn't exist yet and must be generated as part of the build, and +# therefore the wildcard enumeration above doesn't include it. +TEST_OBJS_DEPS += include/test/instrument_record_status.h +endif + +# Rule to compile common test C files in src folder +src/%.o : src/%.c $(TEST_OBJS_DEPS) + echo " CC $<" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ -c $< + +src/drivers/%.o : src/drivers/%.c + echo " CC $<" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ -c $< + +C_FILES := $(addsuffix .c,$(APPS)) + +# Wildcard target for test code generation: +# A .c file is generated for each .data file in the suites/ directory. Each .c +# file depends on a .data and .function file from suites/ directory. Following +# nameing convention is followed: +# +# C file | Depends on +#----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# foo.c | suites/foo.function suites/foo.data +# foo.bar.c | suites/foo.function suites/foo.bar.data +# +# Note above that .c and .data files have same base name. +# However, corresponding .function file's base name is the word before first +# dot in .c file's base name. +# +.SECONDEXPANSION: +%.c: suites/$$(firstword $$(subst ., ,$$*)).function suites/%.data scripts/generate_test_code.py suites/helpers.function suites/main_test.function suites/host_test.function + echo " Gen $@" + $(PYTHON) scripts/generate_test_code.py -f suites/$(firstword $(subst ., ,$*)).function \ + -d suites/$*.data \ + -t suites/main_test.function \ + -p suites/host_test.function \ + -s suites \ + --helpers-file suites/helpers.function \ + -o . + + +$(BINARIES): %$(EXEXT): %.c $(MBEDLIBS) $(TEST_OBJS_DEPS) $(MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS) + echo " CC $<" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $< $(MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ + +clean: +ifndef WINDOWS + rm -rf $(BINARIES) *.c *.datax + rm -f src/*.o src/drivers/*.o src/libmbed* + rm -f include/test/instrument_record_status.h + rm -rf libtestdriver1 +else + if exist *.c del /Q /F *.c + if exist *.exe del /Q /F *.exe + if exist *.datax del /Q /F *.datax + if exist src/*.o del /Q /F src/*.o + if exist src/drivers/*.o del /Q /F src/drivers/*.o + if exist src/libmbed* del /Q /F src/libmed* + if exist include/test/instrument_record_status.h del /Q /F include/test/instrument_record_status.h +endif + +# Test suites caught by SKIP_TEST_SUITES are built but not executed. +check: $(BINARIES) + perl scripts/run-test-suites.pl $(TEST_FLAGS) --skip=$(SKIP_TEST_SUITES) + +test: check + +# Generate test library + +# Perl code that is executed to transform each original line from a library +# source file into the corresponding line in the test driver copy of the +# library. Add a LIBTESTDRIVER1_/libtestdriver1_ to mbedtls_xxx and psa_xxx +# symbols. +define libtestdriver1_rewrite := + s!^(\s*#\s*include\s*[\"<])(mbedtls|psa)/!$${1}libtestdriver1/include/$${2}/!; \ + next if /^\s*#\s*include/; \ + s/\b(?=MBEDTLS_|PSA_)/LIBTESTDRIVER1_/g; \ + s/\b(?=mbedtls_|psa_)/libtestdriver1_/g; +endef + +libtestdriver1.a: + # Copy the library and fake a 3rdparty Makefile include. + rm -Rf ./libtestdriver1 + mkdir ./libtestdriver1 + cp -Rf ../library ./libtestdriver1 + cp -Rf ../include ./libtestdriver1 + mkdir ./libtestdriver1/3rdparty + touch ./libtestdriver1/3rdparty/Makefile.inc + + # Set the test driver base (minimal) configuration. + cp ./include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h ./libtestdriver1/include/mbedtls/config.h + + # Set the PSA cryptography configuration for the test library. + # It is set from the copied include/psa/crypto_config.h of the Mbed TLS + # library the test library is intended to be linked with extended by + # ./include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h to + # mirror the PSA_ACCEL_* macros. + mv ./libtestdriver1/include/psa/crypto_config.h ./libtestdriver1/include/psa/crypto_config.h.bak + head -n -1 ./libtestdriver1/include/psa/crypto_config.h.bak > ./libtestdriver1/include/psa/crypto_config.h + cat ./include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h >> ./libtestdriver1/include/psa/crypto_config.h + echo "#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */" >> ./libtestdriver1/include/psa/crypto_config.h + + # Prefix MBEDTLS_* PSA_* symbols with LIBTESTDRIVER1_ as well as + # mbedtls_* psa_* symbols with libtestdriver1_ to avoid symbol clash + # when this test driver library is linked with the Mbed TLS library. + perl -pi -e '$(libtestdriver1_rewrite)' ./libtestdriver1/library/*.[ch] + perl -pi -e '$(libtestdriver1_rewrite)' ./libtestdriver1/include/*/*.h + + $(MAKE) -C ./libtestdriver1/library CFLAGS="-I../../ $(CFLAGS)" LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS)" libmbedcrypto.a + cp ./libtestdriver1/library/libmbedcrypto.a ../library/libtestdriver1.a + +ifdef RECORD_PSA_STATUS_COVERAGE_LOG +include/test/instrument_record_status.h: ../include/psa/crypto.h Makefile + echo " Gen $@" + sed <../include/psa/crypto.h >$@ -n 's/^psa_status_t \([A-Za-z0-9_]*\)(.*/#define \1(...) RECORD_STATUS("\1", \1(__VA_ARGS__))/p' +endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/compat-in-docker.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/compat-in-docker.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..aef0a072 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/compat-in-docker.sh @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +#!/bin/bash -eu + +# compat-in-docker.sh +# +# Purpose +# ------- +# This runs compat.sh in a Docker container. +# +# Notes for users +# --------------- +# If OPENSSL_CMD, GNUTLS_CLI, or GNUTLS_SERV are specified the path must +# correspond to an executable inside the Docker container. The special +# values "next" (OpenSSL only) and "legacy" are also allowed as shorthand +# for the installations inside the container. +# +# See also: +# - scripts/docker_env.sh for general Docker prerequisites and other information. +# - compat.sh for notes about invocation of that script. + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +source tests/scripts/docker_env.sh + +case "${OPENSSL_CMD:-default}" in + "legacy") export OPENSSL_CMD="/usr/local/openssl-1.0.1j/bin/openssl";; + "next") export OPENSSL_CMD="/usr/local/openssl-1.1.1a/bin/openssl";; + *) ;; +esac + +case "${GNUTLS_CLI:-default}" in + "legacy") export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-cli";; + "next") export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-cli";; + *) ;; +esac + +case "${GNUTLS_SERV:-default}" in + "legacy") export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-serv";; + "next") export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-serv";; + *) ;; +esac + +run_in_docker \ + -e M_CLI \ + -e M_SRV \ + -e GNUTLS_CLI \ + -e GNUTLS_SERV \ + -e OPENSSL_CMD \ + -e OSSL_NO_DTLS \ + tests/compat.sh \ + $@ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/compat.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/compat.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..560af59d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/compat.sh @@ -0,0 +1,1436 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# compat.sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# Test interoperbility with OpenSSL, GnuTLS as well as itself. +# +# Check each common ciphersuite, with each version, both ways (client/server), +# with and without client authentication. + +set -u + +# Limit the size of each log to 10 GiB, in case of failures with this script +# where it may output seemingly unlimited length error logs. +ulimit -f 20971520 + +# initialise counters +TESTS=0 +FAILED=0 +SKIPPED=0 +SRVMEM=0 + +# default commands, can be overridden by the environment +: ${M_SRV:=../programs/ssl/ssl_server2} +: ${M_CLI:=../programs/ssl/ssl_client2} +: ${OPENSSL_CMD:=openssl} # OPENSSL would conflict with the build system +: ${GNUTLS_CLI:=gnutls-cli} +: ${GNUTLS_SERV:=gnutls-serv} + +# do we have a recent enough GnuTLS? +if ( which $GNUTLS_CLI && which $GNUTLS_SERV ) >/dev/null 2>&1; then + G_VER="$( $GNUTLS_CLI --version | head -n1 )" + if echo "$G_VER" | grep '@VERSION@' > /dev/null; then # git version + PEER_GNUTLS=" GnuTLS" + else + eval $( echo $G_VER | sed 's/.* \([0-9]*\)\.\([0-9]\)*\.\([0-9]*\)$/MAJOR="\1" MINOR="\2" PATCH="\3"/' ) + if [ $MAJOR -lt 3 -o \ + \( $MAJOR -eq 3 -a $MINOR -lt 2 \) -o \ + \( $MAJOR -eq 3 -a $MINOR -eq 2 -a $PATCH -lt 15 \) ] + then + PEER_GNUTLS="" + else + PEER_GNUTLS=" GnuTLS" + if [ $MINOR -lt 4 ]; then + GNUTLS_MINOR_LT_FOUR='x' + fi + fi + fi +else + PEER_GNUTLS="" +fi + +# default values for options +# /!\ keep this synchronised with: +# - basic-build-test.sh +# - all.sh (multiple components) +MODES="tls1 tls1_1 tls12 dtls1 dtls12" # ssl3 not in default config +VERIFIES="NO YES" +TYPES="ECDSA RSA PSK" +FILTER="" +# exclude: +# - NULL: excluded from our default config + requires OpenSSL legacy +# - RC4, single-DES: requires legacy OpenSSL/GnuTLS versions +# - 3DES: not in default config +# - ARIA: not in default config.h + requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.1 +# - ChachaPoly: requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.0 +EXCLUDE='NULL\|DES\|RC4\|ARCFOUR\|ARIA\|CHACHA20-POLY1305' +VERBOSE="" +MEMCHECK=0 +PEERS="OpenSSL$PEER_GNUTLS mbedTLS" + +# hidden option: skip DTLS with OpenSSL +# (travis CI has a version that doesn't work for us) +: ${OSSL_NO_DTLS:=0} + +print_usage() { + echo "Usage: $0" + printf " -h|--help\tPrint this help.\n" + printf " -f|--filter\tOnly matching ciphersuites are tested (Default: '%s')\n" "$FILTER" + printf " -e|--exclude\tMatching ciphersuites are excluded (Default: '%s')\n" "$EXCLUDE" + printf " -m|--modes\tWhich modes to perform (Default: '%s')\n" "$MODES" + printf " -t|--types\tWhich key exchange type to perform (Default: '%s')\n" "$TYPES" + printf " -V|--verify\tWhich verification modes to perform (Default: '%s')\n" "$VERIFIES" + printf " -p|--peers\tWhich peers to use (Default: '%s')\n" "$PEERS" + printf " \tAlso available: GnuTLS (needs v3.2.15 or higher)\n" + printf " -M|--memcheck\tCheck memory leaks and errors.\n" + printf " -v|--verbose\tSet verbose output.\n" +} + +get_options() { + while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do + case "$1" in + -f|--filter) + shift; FILTER=$1 + ;; + -e|--exclude) + shift; EXCLUDE=$1 + ;; + -m|--modes) + shift; MODES=$1 + ;; + -t|--types) + shift; TYPES=$1 + ;; + -V|--verify) + shift; VERIFIES=$1 + ;; + -p|--peers) + shift; PEERS=$1 + ;; + -v|--verbose) + VERBOSE=1 + ;; + -M|--memcheck) + MEMCHECK=1 + ;; + -h|--help) + print_usage + exit 0 + ;; + *) + echo "Unknown argument: '$1'" + print_usage + exit 1 + ;; + esac + shift + done + + # sanitize some options (modes checked later) + VERIFIES="$( echo $VERIFIES | tr [a-z] [A-Z] )" + TYPES="$( echo $TYPES | tr [a-z] [A-Z] )" +} + +log() { + if [ "X" != "X$VERBOSE" ]; then + echo "" + echo "$@" + fi +} + +# is_dtls +is_dtls() +{ + test "$1" = "dtls1" -o "$1" = "dtls12" +} + +# minor_ver +minor_ver() +{ + case "$1" in + ssl3) + echo 0 + ;; + tls1) + echo 1 + ;; + tls1_1|dtls1) + echo 2 + ;; + tls12|dtls12) + echo 3 + ;; + *) + echo "error: invalid mode: $MODE" >&2 + # exiting is no good here, typically called in a subshell + echo -1 + esac +} + +filter() +{ + LIST="$1" + NEW_LIST="" + + if is_dtls "$MODE"; then + EXCLMODE="$EXCLUDE"'\|RC4\|ARCFOUR' + else + EXCLMODE="$EXCLUDE" + fi + + for i in $LIST; + do + NEW_LIST="$NEW_LIST $( echo "$i" | grep "$FILTER" | grep -v "$EXCLMODE" )" + done + + # normalize whitespace + echo "$NEW_LIST" | sed -e 's/[[:space:]][[:space:]]*/ /g' -e 's/^ //' -e 's/ $//' +} + +# OpenSSL 1.0.1h with -Verify wants a ClientCertificate message even for +# PSK ciphersuites with DTLS, which is incorrect, so disable them for now +check_openssl_server_bug() +{ + if test "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" && is_dtls "$MODE" && \ + echo "$1" | grep "^TLS-PSK" >/dev/null; + then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +filter_ciphersuites() +{ + if [ "X" != "X$FILTER" -o "X" != "X$EXCLUDE" ]; + then + # Ciphersuite for mbed TLS + M_CIPHERS=$( filter "$M_CIPHERS" ) + + # Ciphersuite for OpenSSL + O_CIPHERS=$( filter "$O_CIPHERS" ) + + # Ciphersuite for GnuTLS + G_CIPHERS=$( filter "$G_CIPHERS" ) + fi + + # For GnuTLS client -> mbed TLS server, + # we need to force IPv4 by connecting to 127.0.0.1 but then auth fails + if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ] && is_dtls "$MODE"; then + G_CIPHERS="" + fi +} + +reset_ciphersuites() +{ + M_CIPHERS="" + O_CIPHERS="" + G_CIPHERS="" +} + +# Ciphersuites that can be used with all peers. +# Since we currently have three possible peers, each ciphersuite should appear +# three times: in each peer's list (with the name that this peer uses). +add_common_ciphersuites() +{ + case $TYPE in + + "ECDSA") + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+NULL:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+ARCFOUR-128:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA \ + " + fi + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 \ + " + fi + ;; + + "RSA") + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +DHE-RSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +RSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +RSA:+ARCFOUR-128:+SHA1 \ + +RSA:+ARCFOUR-128:+MD5 \ + +RSA:+NULL:+MD5 \ + +RSA:+NULL:+SHA1 \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA \ + DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA \ + DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA \ + DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA \ + EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA \ + AES256-SHA \ + CAMELLIA256-SHA \ + AES128-SHA \ + CAMELLIA128-SHA \ + DES-CBC3-SHA \ + RC4-SHA \ + RC4-MD5 \ + NULL-MD5 \ + NULL-SHA \ + " + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+ARCFOUR-128:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+NULL:+SHA1 \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA \ + ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA \ + ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA \ + ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA \ + ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA \ + " + fi + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +RSA:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + NULL-SHA256 \ + AES128-SHA256 \ + DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 \ + AES256-SHA256 \ + DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 \ + ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 \ + ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 \ + AES128-GCM-SHA256 \ + DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 \ + AES256-GCM-SHA384 \ + DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 \ + ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 \ + ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 \ + " + fi + ;; + + "PSK") + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +PSK:+ARCFOUR-128:+SHA1 \ + +PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + PSK-RC4-SHA \ + PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA \ + PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA \ + " + ;; + esac +} + +# Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS and OpenSSL +# Each ciphersuite should appear two times, once with its OpenSSL name, once +# with its Mbed TLS name. +# +# NOTE: for some reason RSA-PSK doesn't work with OpenSSL, +# so RSA-PSK ciphersuites need to go in other sections, see +# https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/1419 +# +# ChachaPoly suites are here rather than in "common", as they were added in +# GnuTLS in 3.5.0 and the CI only has 3.4.x so far. +add_openssl_ciphersuites() +{ + case $TYPE in + + "ECDSA") + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA \ + ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA \ + ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA \ + ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA \ + ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA \ + " + fi + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 \ + ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 \ + ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 \ + ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384 \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256 \ + ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 \ + " + fi + ;; + + "RSA") + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + DES-CBC-SHA \ + EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA \ + " + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + ECDHE-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384 \ + DHE-RSA-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384 \ + ARIA256-GCM-SHA384 \ + ECDHE-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256 \ + DHE-RSA-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256 \ + ARIA128-GCM-SHA256 \ + DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 \ + ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 \ + " + fi + ;; + + "PSK") + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \ + " + O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS \ + DHE-PSK-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384 \ + DHE-PSK-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256 \ + PSK-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384 \ + PSK-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256 \ + DHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305 \ + ECDHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305 \ + PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305 \ + " + fi + ;; + esac +} + +# Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS and GnuTLS +# Each ciphersuite should appear two times, once with its GnuTLS name, once +# with its Mbed TLS name. +add_gnutls_ciphersuites() +{ + case $TYPE in + + "ECDSA") + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + " + fi + ;; + + "RSA") + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +RSA:+NULL:+SHA256 \ + " + fi + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +RSA:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +RSA:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +RSA:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD \ + +RSA:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD \ + +RSA:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + +RSA:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + +DHE-RSA:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + " + fi + ;; + + "PSK") + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +DHE-PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +DHE-PSK:+ARCFOUR-128:+SHA1 \ + " + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+ARCFOUR-128:+SHA1 \ + +RSA-PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +RSA-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +RSA-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA1 \ + +RSA-PSK:+ARCFOUR-128:+SHA1 \ + " + fi + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + " + G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +RSA-PSK:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +RSA-PSK:+AES-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +DHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +DHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +RSA-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-CBC:+SHA384 \ + +RSA-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-CBC:+SHA256 \ + +PSK:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +PSK:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +PSK:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD \ + +PSK:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-CCM:+AEAD \ + +PSK:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + +PSK:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-128-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + +DHE-PSK:+AES-256-CCM-8:+AEAD \ + +RSA-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +RSA-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +DHE-PSK:+CAMELLIA-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +RSA-PSK:+AES-256-GCM:+AEAD \ + +RSA-PSK:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+NULL:+SHA384 \ + +ECDHE-PSK:+NULL:+SHA256 \ + +PSK:+NULL:+SHA256 \ + +PSK:+NULL:+SHA384 \ + +DHE-PSK:+NULL:+SHA256 \ + +DHE-PSK:+NULL:+SHA384 \ + +RSA-PSK:+NULL:+SHA256 \ + +RSA-PSK:+NULL:+SHA384 \ + " + fi + ;; + esac +} + +# Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS (not currently supported by another +# peer usable in this script). This provide only very rudimentaty testing, as +# this is not interop testing, but it's better than nothing. +add_mbedtls_ciphersuites() +{ + case $TYPE in + + "ECDSA") + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + " + fi + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + " + fi + ;; + + "RSA") + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + " + fi + ;; + + "PSK") + # *PSK-NULL-SHA suites supported by GnuTLS 3.3.5 but not 3.2.15 + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA \ + " + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -gt 0 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA \ + " + fi + if [ `minor_ver "$MODE"` -ge 3 ] + then + M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \ + " + fi + ;; + esac +} + +setup_arguments() +{ + O_MODE="" + G_MODE="" + case "$MODE" in + "ssl3") + G_PRIO_MODE="+VERS-SSL3.0" + ;; + "tls1") + G_PRIO_MODE="+VERS-TLS1.0" + ;; + "tls1_1") + G_PRIO_MODE="+VERS-TLS1.1" + ;; + "tls12") + O_MODE="tls1_2" + G_PRIO_MODE="+VERS-TLS1.2" + ;; + "dtls1") + G_PRIO_MODE="+VERS-DTLS1.0" + G_MODE="-u" + ;; + "dtls12") + O_MODE="dtls1_2" + G_PRIO_MODE="+VERS-DTLS1.2" + G_MODE="-u" + ;; + *) + echo "error: invalid mode: $MODE" >&2 + exit 1; + esac + + # GnuTLS < 3.4 will choke if we try to allow CCM-8 + if [ -z "${GNUTLS_MINOR_LT_FOUR-}" ]; then + G_PRIO_CCM="+AES-256-CCM-8:+AES-128-CCM-8:" + else + G_PRIO_CCM="" + fi + + M_SERVER_ARGS="server_port=$PORT server_addr=0.0.0.0 force_version=$MODE arc4=1" + O_SERVER_ARGS="-accept $PORT -cipher NULL,ALL -$O_MODE" + G_SERVER_ARGS="-p $PORT --http $G_MODE" + G_SERVER_PRIO="NORMAL:${G_PRIO_CCM}+ARCFOUR-128:+NULL:+MD5:+PSK:+DHE-PSK:+ECDHE-PSK:+SHA256:+SHA384:+RSA-PSK:-VERS-TLS-ALL:$G_PRIO_MODE" + + # The default prime for `openssl s_server` depends on the version: + # * OpenSSL <= 1.0.2a: 512-bit + # * OpenSSL 1.0.2b to 1.1.1b: 1024-bit + # * OpenSSL >= 1.1.1c: 2048-bit + # Mbed TLS wants >=1024, so force that for older versions. Don't force + # it for newer versions, which reject a 1024-bit prime. Indifferently + # force it or not for intermediate versions. + case $($OPENSSL_CMD version) in + "OpenSSL 1.0"*) + O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -dhparam data_files/dhparams.pem" + ;; + esac + + # with OpenSSL 1.0.1h, -www, -WWW and -HTTP break DTLS handshakes + if is_dtls "$MODE"; then + O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS" + else + O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -www" + fi + + M_CLIENT_ARGS="server_port=$PORT server_addr=127.0.0.1 force_version=$MODE" + O_CLIENT_ARGS="-connect localhost:$PORT -$O_MODE" + G_CLIENT_ARGS="-p $PORT --debug 3 $G_MODE" + G_CLIENT_PRIO="NONE:$G_PRIO_MODE:+COMP-NULL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL" + + if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ]; + then + M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt auth_mode=required" + O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt -Verify 10" + G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt --require-client-cert" + + M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt auth_mode=required" + O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt -verify 10" + G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt" + else + # don't request a client cert at all + M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS ca_file=none auth_mode=none" + G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --disable-client-cert" + + M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS ca_file=none auth_mode=none" + O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS" + G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --insecure" + fi + + case $TYPE in + "ECDSA") + M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key" + O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -cert data_files/server5.crt -key data_files/server5.key" + G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server5.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server5.key" + + if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ]; then + M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=data_files/server6.crt key_file=data_files/server6.key" + O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -cert data_files/server6.crt -key data_files/server6.key" + G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server6.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server6.key" + else + M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=none key_file=none" + fi + ;; + + "RSA") + M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key" + O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key" + G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key" + + if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ]; then + M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=data_files/cert_sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server1.key" + O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -cert data_files/cert_sha256.crt -key data_files/server1.key" + G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/cert_sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server1.key" + else + M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=none key_file=none" + fi + ;; + + "PSK") + # give RSA-PSK-capable server a RSA cert + # (should be a separate type, but harder to close with openssl) + M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 ca_file=none crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key" + O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -psk 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 -nocert" + G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --pskpasswd data_files/passwd.psk" + + M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 crt_file=none key_file=none" + O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -psk 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70" + G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --pskusername Client_identity --pskkey=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70" + ;; + esac +} + +# is_mbedtls +is_mbedtls() { + echo "$1" | grep 'ssl_server2\|ssl_client2' > /dev/null +} + +# has_mem_err +has_mem_err() { + if ( grep -F 'All heap blocks were freed -- no leaks are possible' "$1" && + grep -F 'ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts' "$1" ) > /dev/null + then + return 1 # false: does not have errors + else + return 0 # true: has errors + fi +} + +# Wait for process $2 to be listening on port $1 +if type lsof >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + wait_server_start() { + START_TIME=$(date +%s) + if is_dtls "$MODE"; then + proto=UDP + else + proto=TCP + fi + while ! lsof -a -n -b -i "$proto:$1" -p "$2" >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; do + if [ $(( $(date +%s) - $START_TIME )) -gt $DOG_DELAY ]; then + echo "SERVERSTART TIMEOUT" + echo "SERVERSTART TIMEOUT" >> $SRV_OUT + break + fi + # Linux and *BSD support decimal arguments to sleep. On other + # OSes this may be a tight loop. + sleep 0.1 2>/dev/null || true + done + } +else + echo "Warning: lsof not available, wait_server_start = sleep" + wait_server_start() { + sleep 2 + } +fi + + +# start_server +# also saves name and command +start_server() { + case $1 in + [Oo]pen*) + SERVER_CMD="$OPENSSL_CMD s_server $O_SERVER_ARGS" + ;; + [Gg]nu*) + SERVER_CMD="$GNUTLS_SERV $G_SERVER_ARGS --priority $G_SERVER_PRIO" + ;; + mbed*) + SERVER_CMD="$M_SRV $M_SERVER_ARGS" + if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + SERVER_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $SERVER_CMD" + fi + ;; + *) + echo "error: invalid server name: $1" >&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + SERVER_NAME=$1 + + log "$SERVER_CMD" + echo "$SERVER_CMD" > $SRV_OUT + # for servers without -www or equivalent + while :; do echo bla; sleep 1; done | $SERVER_CMD >> $SRV_OUT 2>&1 & + PROCESS_ID=$! + + wait_server_start "$PORT" "$PROCESS_ID" +} + +# terminate the running server +stop_server() { + kill $PROCESS_ID 2>/dev/null + wait $PROCESS_ID 2>/dev/null + + if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + if is_mbedtls "$SERVER_CMD" && has_mem_err $SRV_OUT; then + echo " ! Server had memory errors" + SRVMEM=$(( $SRVMEM + 1 )) + return + fi + fi + + rm -f $SRV_OUT +} + +# kill the running server (used when killed by signal) +cleanup() { + rm -f $SRV_OUT $CLI_OUT + kill $PROCESS_ID >/dev/null 2>&1 + kill $WATCHDOG_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 + exit 1 +} + +# wait for client to terminate and set EXIT +# must be called right after starting the client +wait_client_done() { + CLI_PID=$! + + ( sleep "$DOG_DELAY"; echo "TIMEOUT" >> $CLI_OUT; kill $CLI_PID ) & + WATCHDOG_PID=$! + + wait $CLI_PID + EXIT=$? + + kill $WATCHDOG_PID + wait $WATCHDOG_PID + + echo "EXIT: $EXIT" >> $CLI_OUT +} + +# run_client +run_client() { + # announce what we're going to do + TESTS=$(( $TESTS + 1 )) + VERIF=$(echo $VERIFY | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]') + TITLE="`echo $1 | head -c1`->`echo $SERVER_NAME | head -c1`" + TITLE="$TITLE $MODE,$VERIF $2" + printf "%s " "$TITLE" + LEN=$(( 72 - `echo "$TITLE" | wc -c` )) + for i in `seq 1 $LEN`; do printf '.'; done; printf ' ' + + # should we skip? + if [ "X$SKIP_NEXT" = "XYES" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="NO" + echo "SKIP" + SKIPPED=$(( $SKIPPED + 1 )) + return + fi + + # run the command and interpret result + case $1 in + [Oo]pen*) + CLIENT_CMD="$OPENSSL_CMD s_client $O_CLIENT_ARGS -cipher $2" + log "$CLIENT_CMD" + echo "$CLIENT_CMD" > $CLI_OUT + printf 'GET HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n' | $CLIENT_CMD >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 & + wait_client_done + + if [ $EXIT -eq 0 ]; then + RESULT=0 + else + # If the cipher isn't supported... + if grep 'Cipher is (NONE)' $CLI_OUT >/dev/null; then + RESULT=1 + else + RESULT=2 + fi + fi + ;; + + [Gg]nu*) + # need to force IPv4 with UDP, but keep localhost for auth + if is_dtls "$MODE"; then + G_HOST="127.0.0.1" + else + G_HOST="localhost" + fi + CLIENT_CMD="$GNUTLS_CLI $G_CLIENT_ARGS --priority $G_PRIO_MODE:$2 $G_HOST" + log "$CLIENT_CMD" + echo "$CLIENT_CMD" > $CLI_OUT + printf 'GET HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n' | $CLIENT_CMD >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 & + wait_client_done + + if [ $EXIT -eq 0 ]; then + RESULT=0 + else + RESULT=2 + # interpret early failure, with a handshake_failure alert + # before the server hello, as "no ciphersuite in common" + if grep -F 'Received alert [40]: Handshake failed' $CLI_OUT; then + if grep -i 'SERVER HELLO .* was received' $CLI_OUT; then : + else + RESULT=1 + fi + fi >/dev/null + fi + ;; + + mbed*) + CLIENT_CMD="$M_CLI $M_CLIENT_ARGS force_ciphersuite=$2" + if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + CLIENT_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $CLIENT_CMD" + fi + log "$CLIENT_CMD" + echo "$CLIENT_CMD" > $CLI_OUT + $CLIENT_CMD >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 & + wait_client_done + + case $EXIT in + # Success + "0") RESULT=0 ;; + + # Ciphersuite not supported + "2") RESULT=1 ;; + + # Error + *) RESULT=2 ;; + esac + + if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + if is_mbedtls "$CLIENT_CMD" && has_mem_err $CLI_OUT; then + RESULT=2 + fi + fi + + ;; + + *) + echo "error: invalid client name: $1" >&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + echo "EXIT: $EXIT" >> $CLI_OUT + + # report and count result + case $RESULT in + "0") + echo PASS + ;; + "1") + echo SKIP + SKIPPED=$(( $SKIPPED + 1 )) + ;; + "2") + echo FAIL + cp $SRV_OUT c-srv-${TESTS}.log + cp $CLI_OUT c-cli-${TESTS}.log + echo " ! outputs saved to c-srv-${TESTS}.log, c-cli-${TESTS}.log" + + if [ "${LOG_FAILURE_ON_STDOUT:-0}" != 0 ]; then + echo " ! server output:" + cat c-srv-${TESTS}.log + echo " ! ===================================================" + echo " ! client output:" + cat c-cli-${TESTS}.log + fi + + FAILED=$(( $FAILED + 1 )) + ;; + esac + + rm -f $CLI_OUT +} + +# +# MAIN +# + +if cd $( dirname $0 ); then :; else + echo "cd $( dirname $0 ) failed" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +get_options "$@" + +# sanity checks, avoid an avalanche of errors +if [ ! -x "$M_SRV" ]; then + echo "Command '$M_SRV' is not an executable file" >&2 + exit 1 +fi +if [ ! -x "$M_CLI" ]; then + echo "Command '$M_CLI' is not an executable file" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if echo "$PEERS" | grep -i openssl > /dev/null; then + if which "$OPENSSL_CMD" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else + echo "Command '$OPENSSL_CMD' not found" >&2 + exit 1 + fi +fi + +if echo "$PEERS" | grep -i gnutls > /dev/null; then + for CMD in "$GNUTLS_CLI" "$GNUTLS_SERV"; do + if which "$CMD" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else + echo "Command '$CMD' not found" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + done +fi + +for PEER in $PEERS; do + case "$PEER" in + mbed*|[Oo]pen*|[Gg]nu*) + ;; + *) + echo "Unknown peers: $PEER" >&2 + exit 1 + esac +done + +# Pick a "unique" port in the range 10000-19999. +PORT="0000$$" +PORT="1$(echo $PORT | tail -c 5)" + +# Also pick a unique name for intermediate files +SRV_OUT="srv_out.$$" +CLI_OUT="cli_out.$$" + +# client timeout delay: be more patient with valgrind +if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + DOG_DELAY=30 +else + DOG_DELAY=10 +fi + +SKIP_NEXT="NO" + +trap cleanup INT TERM HUP + +for VERIFY in $VERIFIES; do + for MODE in $MODES; do + for TYPE in $TYPES; do + for PEER in $PEERS; do + + setup_arguments + + case "$PEER" in + + [Oo]pen*) + + if test "$OSSL_NO_DTLS" -gt 0 && is_dtls "$MODE"; then + continue; + fi + + # OpenSSL <1.0.2 doesn't support DTLS 1.2. Check if OpenSSL + # supports $O_MODE from the s_server help. (The s_client + # help isn't accurate as of 1.0.2g: it supports DTLS 1.2 + # but doesn't list it. But the s_server help seems to be + # accurate.) + if ! $OPENSSL_CMD s_server -help 2>&1 | grep -q "^ *-$O_MODE "; then + continue; + fi + + reset_ciphersuites + add_common_ciphersuites + add_openssl_ciphersuites + filter_ciphersuites + + if [ "X" != "X$M_CIPHERS" ]; then + start_server "OpenSSL" + for i in $M_CIPHERS; do + check_openssl_server_bug $i + run_client mbedTLS $i + done + stop_server + fi + + if [ "X" != "X$O_CIPHERS" ]; then + start_server "mbedTLS" + for i in $O_CIPHERS; do + run_client OpenSSL $i + done + stop_server + fi + + ;; + + [Gg]nu*) + + reset_ciphersuites + add_common_ciphersuites + add_gnutls_ciphersuites + filter_ciphersuites + + if [ "X" != "X$M_CIPHERS" ]; then + start_server "GnuTLS" + for i in $M_CIPHERS; do + run_client mbedTLS $i + done + stop_server + fi + + if [ "X" != "X$G_CIPHERS" ]; then + start_server "mbedTLS" + for i in $G_CIPHERS; do + run_client GnuTLS $i + done + stop_server + fi + + ;; + + mbed*) + + reset_ciphersuites + add_common_ciphersuites + add_openssl_ciphersuites + add_gnutls_ciphersuites + add_mbedtls_ciphersuites + filter_ciphersuites + + if [ "X" != "X$M_CIPHERS" ]; then + start_server "mbedTLS" + for i in $M_CIPHERS; do + run_client mbedTLS $i + done + stop_server + fi + + ;; + + *) + echo "Unknown peer: $PEER" >&2 + exit 1 + ;; + + esac + + done + done + done +done + +echo "------------------------------------------------------------------------" + +if [ $FAILED -ne 0 -o $SRVMEM -ne 0 ]; +then + printf "FAILED" +else + printf "PASSED" +fi + +if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + MEMREPORT=", $SRVMEM server memory errors" +else + MEMREPORT="" +fi + +PASSED=$(( $TESTS - $FAILED )) +echo " ($PASSED / $TESTS tests ($SKIPPED skipped$MEMREPORT))" + +FAILED=$(( $FAILED + $SRVMEM )) +exit $FAILED diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/configs/config-wrapper-malloc-0-null.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/configs/config-wrapper-malloc-0-null.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..add1a787 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/configs/config-wrapper-malloc-0-null.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* config.h wrapper that forces calloc(0) to return NULL. + * Used for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +/* Don't #define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H, let config.h do it. */ + +#include "mbedtls/config.h" + +#include + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC +static inline void *custom_calloc( size_t nmemb, size_t size ) +{ + if( nmemb == 0 || size == 0 ) + return( NULL ); + return( calloc( nmemb, size ) ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC custom_calloc +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6e7c154b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE for testing. + * Only used for a few test configurations. + * + * Typical usage (note multiple levels of quoting): + * make CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h\"'" + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST_ALL) + +/* Enable the use of the test driver in the library, and build the generic + * part of the test driver. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST + +/* Use the accelerator driver for all cryptographic mechanisms for which + * the test driver implemented. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD2 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD4 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST_ALL */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/context-info.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/context-info.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..34652984 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/context-info.sh @@ -0,0 +1,448 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# context-info.sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# This program is intended for testing the ssl_context_info program +# + +set -eu + +if ! cd "$(dirname "$0")"; then + exit 125 +fi + +# Variables + +THIS_SCRIPT_NAME=$(basename "$0") +PROG_PATH="../programs/ssl/ssl_context_info" +OUT_FILE="ssl_context_info.log" +IN_DIR="data_files/base64" + +USE_VALGRIND=0 + +T_COUNT=0 +T_PASSED=0 +T_FAILED=0 + + +# Functions + +print_usage() { + echo "Usage: $0 [options]" + printf " -h|--help\tPrint this help.\n" + printf " -m|--memcheck\tUse valgrind to check the memory.\n" +} + +# Print test name +print_name() { + printf "%s %.*s " "$1" $(( 71 - ${#1} )) \ + "........................................................................" +} + +# Print header to the test output file +print_header() +{ + date="$(date)" + echo "******************************************************************" > $2 + echo "* File created by: $THIS_SCRIPT_NAME" >> $2 + echo "* Test name: $1" >> $2 + echo "* Date: $date" >> $2 + echo "* Command: $3" >> $2 + echo "******************************************************************" >> $2 + echo "" >> $2 +} + +# Print footer at the end of file +print_footer() +{ + echo "" >> $1 + echo "******************************************************************" >> $1 + echo "* End command" >> $1 + echo "******************************************************************" >> $1 + echo "" >> $1 +} + +# Use the arguments of this script +get_options() { + while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do + case "$1" in + -h|--help) + print_usage + exit 0 + ;; + -m|--memcheck) + USE_VALGRIND=1 + ;; + *) + echo "Unknown argument: '$1'" + print_usage + exit 1 + ;; + esac + shift + done +} + +# Current test failed +fail() +{ + T_FAILED=$(( $T_FAILED + 1)) + FAIL_OUT="Fail.$T_FAILED""_$OUT_FILE" + + echo "FAIL" + echo " Error: $1" + + cp -f "$OUT_FILE" "$FAIL_OUT" + echo "Error: $1" >> "$FAIL_OUT" +} + +# Current test passed +pass() +{ + T_PASSED=$(( $T_PASSED + 1)) + echo "PASS" +} + +# Usage: run_test [ -arg ] [option [...]] +# Options: -m +# -n +# -u +run_test() +{ + TEST_NAME="$1" + RUN_CMD="$PROG_PATH -f $IN_DIR/$2" + + if [ "-arg" = "$3" ]; then + RUN_CMD="$RUN_CMD $4" + shift 4 + else + shift 2 + fi + + # prepend valgrind to our commands if active + if [ "$USE_VALGRIND" -gt 0 ]; then + RUN_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $RUN_CMD" + fi + + T_COUNT=$(( $T_COUNT + 1)) + print_name "$TEST_NAME" + + # run tested program + print_header "$TEST_NAME" "$OUT_FILE" "$RUN_CMD" + eval "$RUN_CMD" >> "$OUT_FILE" 2>&1 + print_footer "$OUT_FILE" + + # check valgrind's results + if [ "$USE_VALGRIND" -gt 0 ]; then + if ! ( grep -F 'All heap blocks were freed -- no leaks are possible' "$OUT_FILE" && + grep -F 'ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts' "$OUT_FILE" ) > /dev/null + then + fail "Memory error detected" + return + fi + fi + + # check other assertions + # lines beginning with == are added by valgrind, ignore them, because we already checked them before + # lines with 'Serious error when reading debug info', are valgrind issues as well + # lines beginning with * are added by this script, ignore too + while [ $# -gt 0 ] + do + case $1 in + "-m") + if grep -v '^==' "$OUT_FILE" | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep -v "^*" | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then :; else + fail "pattern '$2' MUST be present in the output" + return + fi + ;; + + "-n") + if grep -v '^==' "$OUT_FILE" | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep -v "^*" | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then + fail "pattern '$2' MUST NOT be present in the output" + return + fi + ;; + + "-u") + if [ $(grep -v '^==' "$OUT_FILE"| grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep -v "^*" | grep "$2" | wc -l) -ne 1 ]; then + fail "lines following pattern '$2' must be once in the output" + return + fi + ;; + + *) + echo "Unknown test: $1" >&2 + exit 1 + esac + shift 2 + done + + rm -f "$OUT_FILE" + + pass +} + +get_options "$@" + +# Tests + +run_test "Default configuration, server" \ + "srv_def.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "major.* 2$" \ + -u "minor.* 21$" \ + -u "path.* 0$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS and client$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN$" \ + -u "ciphersuite.* TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256$" \ + -u "cipher flags.* 0x00$" \ + -u "Message-Digest.* SHA256$" \ + -u "compression.* disabled$" \ + -u "DTLS datagram packing.* enabled$" \ + -n "Certificate" \ + -n "bytes left to analyze from context" + +run_test "Default configuration, client" \ + "cli_def.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "major.* 2$" \ + -u "minor.* 21$" \ + -u "path.* 0$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS and client$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY$" \ + -u "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN$" \ + -u "ciphersuite.* TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256$" \ + -u "cipher flags.* 0x00$" \ + -u "Message-Digest.* SHA256$" \ + -u "compression.* disabled$" \ + -u "DTLS datagram packing.* enabled$" \ + -u "cert. version .* 3$" \ + -u "serial number.* 02$" \ + -u "issuer name.* C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA$" \ + -u "subject name.* C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost$" \ + -u "issued on.* 2019-02-10 14:44:06$" \ + -u "expires on.* 2029-02-10 14:44:06$" \ + -u "signed using.* RSA with SHA-256$" \ + -u "RSA key size.* 2048 bits$" \ + -u "basic constraints.* CA=false$" \ + -n "bytes left to analyze from context" + +run_test "Ciphersuite TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8, server" \ + "srv_ciphersuite.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "ciphersuite.* TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8$" \ + +run_test "Ciphersuite TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8, client" \ + "cli_ciphersuite.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "ciphersuite.* TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8$" \ + +run_test "No packing, server" \ + "srv_no_packing.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "DTLS datagram packing.* disabled" + +run_test "No packing, client" \ + "cli_no_packing.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "DTLS datagram packing.* disabled" + +run_test "DTLS CID, server" \ + "srv_cid.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "in CID.* DE AD" \ + -u "out CID.* BE EF" + +run_test "DTLS CID, client" \ + "cli_cid.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "in CID.* BE EF" \ + -u "out CID.* DE AD" + +run_test "No MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, server" \ + "srv_no_mfl.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH" + +run_test "No MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, client" \ + "cli_no_mfl.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH" + +run_test "No MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN, server" \ + "srv_no_alpn.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN" + +run_test "No MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN, client" \ + "cli_no_alpn.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN" + +run_test "No MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE, server" \ + "srv_no_keep_cert.txt" \ + -arg "--keep-peer-cert=0" \ + -u "ciphersuite.* TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256$" \ + -u "cipher flags.* 0x00" \ + -u "compression.* disabled" \ + -u "DTLS datagram packing.* enabled" \ + -n "ERROR" + +run_test "No MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE, client" \ + "cli_no_keep_cert.txt" \ + -arg "--keep-peer-cert=0" \ + -u "ciphersuite.* TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256$" \ + -u "cipher flags.* 0x00" \ + -u "compression.* disabled" \ + -u "DTLS datagram packing.* enabled" \ + -n "ERROR" + +run_test "No MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE, negative, server" \ + "srv_no_keep_cert.txt" \ + -m "Deserializing" \ + -m "ERROR" + +run_test "No MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE, negative, client" \ + "cli_no_keep_cert.txt" \ + -m "Deserializing" \ + -m "ERROR" + +run_test "Minimal configuration, server" \ + "srv_min_cfg.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS and client$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN$" \ + +run_test "Minimal configuration, client" \ + "cli_min_cfg.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS and client$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY$" \ + -n "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN$" \ + +run_test "MTU=10000" \ + "mtu_10000.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "MTU.* 10000$" + +run_test "MFL=1024" \ + "mfl_1024.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "MFL.* 1024$" + +run_test "Older version (v2.19.1)" \ + "v2.19.1.txt" \ + -n "ERROR" \ + -u "major.* 2$" \ + -u "minor.* 19$" \ + -u "path.* 1$" \ + -u "ciphersuite.* TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8$" \ + -u "Message-Digest.* SHA256$" \ + -u "compression.* disabled$" \ + -u "serial number.* 01:70:AF:40:B4:E6$" \ + -u "issuer name.* CN=ca$" \ + -u "subject name.* L=160001, OU=acc1, CN=device01$" \ + -u "issued on.* 2020-03-06 09:50:18$" \ + -u "expires on.* 2056-02-26 09:50:18$" \ + -u "signed using.* ECDSA with SHA256$" \ + -u "lifetime.* 0 sec.$" \ + -u "MFL.* none$" \ + -u "negotiate truncated HMAC.* disabled$" \ + -u "Encrypt-then-MAC.* enabled$" \ + -u "DTLS datagram packing.* enabled$" \ + -u "verify result.* 0x00000000$" \ + -n "bytes left to analyze from context" + +run_test "Wrong base64 format" \ + "def_bad_b64.txt" \ + -m "ERROR" \ + -u "The length of the base64 code found should be a multiple of 4" \ + -n "bytes left to analyze from context" + +run_test "Too much data at the beginning of base64 code" \ + "def_b64_too_big_1.txt" \ + -m "ERROR" \ + -n "The length of the base64 code found should be a multiple of 4" \ + +run_test "Too much data in the middle of base64 code" \ + "def_b64_too_big_2.txt" \ + -m "ERROR" \ + -n "The length of the base64 code found should be a multiple of 4" \ + +run_test "Too much data at the end of base64 code" \ + "def_b64_too_big_3.txt" \ + -m "ERROR" \ + -n "The length of the base64 code found should be a multiple of 4" \ + -u "bytes left to analyze from context" + +run_test "Empty file as input" \ + "empty.txt" \ + -u "Finished. No valid base64 code found" + +run_test "Not empty file without base64 code" \ + "../../context-info.sh" \ + -n "Deserializing" + +run_test "Binary file instead of text file" \ + "../../../programs/ssl/ssl_context_info" \ + -m "ERROR" \ + -u "Too many bad symbols detected. File check aborted" \ + -n "Deserializing" + +run_test "Decoder continues past 0xff character" \ + "def_b64_ff.bin" \ + -n "No valid base64" \ + -u "ciphersuite.* TLS-" + + +# End of tests + +echo +if [ $T_FAILED -eq 0 ]; then + echo "PASSED ( $T_COUNT tests )" +else + echo "FAILED ( $T_FAILED / $T_COUNT tests )" +fi + +exit $T_FAILED diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/.gitignore b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d16c04c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +cli-rsa.csr +server2-rsa.csr +test-ca.csr diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/Makefile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49db4cab --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,1183 @@ +## This file contains a record of how some of the test data was +## generated. The final build products are committed to the repository +## as well to make sure that the test data is identical. You do not +## need to use this makefile unless you're extending mbed TLS's tests. + +## Many data files were generated prior to the existence of this +## makefile, so the method of their generation was not recorded. + +## Note that in addition to depending on the version of the data +## generation tool, many of the build outputs are randomized, so +## running this makefile twice would not produce the same results. + +## Tools +OPENSSL ?= openssl +FAKETIME ?= faketime + +TOP_DIR = ../.. +MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE ?= $(TOP_DIR)/programs/x509/cert_write +MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ ?= $(TOP_DIR)/programs/x509/cert_req + + +## Build the generated test data. Note that since the final outputs +## are committed to the repository, this target should do nothing on a +## fresh checkout. Furthermore, since the generation is randomized, +## re-running the same targets may result in differing files. The goal +## of this makefile is primarily to serve as a record of how the +## targets were generated in the first place. +default: all_final + +all_intermediate := # temporary files +all_final := # files used by tests + + + +################################################################ +#### Generate certificates from existing keys +################################################################ + +test_ca_crt = test-ca.crt +test_ca_key_file_rsa = test-ca.key +test_ca_pwd_rsa = PolarSSLTest +test_ca_config_file = test-ca.opensslconf + +test-ca.req.sha256: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) password=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA" md=SHA256 +all_intermediate += test-ca.req.sha256 + +test-ca.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) test-ca.req.sha256 + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) is_ca=1 serial=3 request_file=test-ca.req.sha256 selfsign=1 issuer_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA" issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144400 not_after=20290210144400 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += test-ca.crt + +test-ca.crt.der: test-ca.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +all_final += test-ca.crt.der + +test-ca.key.der: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" +all_final += test-ca.key.der + +test-ca-sha1.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) test-ca.req.sha256 + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) is_ca=1 serial=3 request_file=test-ca.req.sha256 selfsign=1 issuer_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA" issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144400 not_after=20290210144400 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += test-ca-sha1.crt + +test-ca-sha1.crt.der: test-ca-sha1.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += test-ca-sha1.crt.der + +test-ca-sha256.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) test-ca.req.sha256 + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) is_ca=1 serial=3 request_file=test-ca.req.sha256 selfsign=1 issuer_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA" issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144400 not_after=20290210144400 md=SHA256 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += test-ca-sha256.crt + +test-ca-sha256.crt.der: test-ca-sha256.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += test-ca-sha256.crt.der + +test-ca_utf8.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -nodes -key $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 3 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -sha1 -days 3653 -utf8 -subj "/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA" -out $@ +all_final += test-ca_utf8.crt + +test-ca_printable.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -nodes -key $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 3 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -sha1 -days 3653 -subj "/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA" -out $@ +all_final += test-ca_printable.crt + +test-ca_uppercase.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -nodes -key $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 3 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -sha1 -days 3653 -subj "/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA" -out $@ +all_final += test-ca_uppercase.crt + +test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt = test-ca-alt.key + +cert_example_multi.csr: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) req -new -subj "/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=www.example.com" -set_serial 17 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions dns_alt_names -days 3650 -key rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem -out $@ + +cert_example_multi.crt: cert_example_multi.csr + $(OPENSSL) x509 -req -CA $(test_ca_crt) -CAkey $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -extfile $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions dns_alt_names -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 17 -days 3653 -sha256 -in $< > $@ + +$(test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt):test-ca.opensslconf + $(OPENSSL) genrsa -out $@ 2048 +test-ca-alt.csr: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt) $(test_ca_config_file) + $(OPENSSL) req -new -config $(test_ca_config_file) -key $(test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt) -subj "/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA" -out $@ +all_intermediate += test-ca-alt.csr +test-ca-alt.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt) $(test_ca_config_file) test-ca-alt.csr + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -key $(test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt) -set_serial 0 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-ca-alt.csr -out $@ +all_final += test-ca-alt.crt +test-ca-alt-good.crt: test-ca-alt.crt test-ca-sha256.crt + cat test-ca-alt.crt test-ca-sha256.crt > $@ +all_final += test-ca-alt-good.crt +test-ca-good-alt.crt: test-ca-alt.crt test-ca-sha256.crt + cat test-ca-sha256.crt test-ca-alt.crt > $@ +all_final += test-ca-good-alt.crt + +test_ca_crt_file_ec = test-ca2.crt +test_ca_key_file_ec = test-ca2.key + +test-ca2.req.sha256: $(test_ca_key_file_ec) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$(test_ca_key_file_ec) subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" md=SHA256 +all_intermediate += test-ca2.req.sha256 + +test-ca2.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_ec) test-ca2.req.sha256 + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) is_ca=1 serial=13926223505202072808 request_file=test-ca2.req.sha256 selfsign=1 issuer_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_ec) not_before=20190210144400 not_after=20290210144400 md=SHA256 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += test-ca.crt + +test-ca-any_policy.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) test-ca.req.sha256 + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions v3_any_policy_ca -key $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 0 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-ca.req.sha256 -out $@ +all_final += test-ca-any_policy.crt + +test-ca-any_policy_ec.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_ec) test-ca.req_ec.sha256 + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions v3_any_policy_ca -key $(test_ca_key_file_ec) -set_serial 0 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-ca.req_ec.sha256 -out $@ +all_final += test-ca-any_policy_ec.crt + +test-ca-any_policy_with_qualifier.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) test-ca.req.sha256 + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions v3_any_policy_qualifier_ca -key $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 0 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-ca.req.sha256 -out $@ +all_final += test-ca-any_policy_with_qualifier.crt + +test-ca-any_policy_with_qualifier_ec.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_ec) test-ca.req_ec.sha256 + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions v3_any_policy_qualifier_ca -key $(test_ca_key_file_ec) -set_serial 0 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-ca.req_ec.sha256 -out $@ +all_final += test-ca-any_policy_with_qualifier_ec.crt + +test-ca-multi_policy.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) test-ca.req.sha256 + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions v3_multi_policy_ca -key $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 0 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-ca.req.sha256 -out $@ +all_final += test-ca-multi_policy.crt + +test-ca-multi_policy_ec.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_ec) test-ca.req_ec.sha256 + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions v3_multi_policy_ca -key $(test_ca_key_file_ec) -set_serial 0 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-ca.req_ec.sha256 -out $@ +all_final += test-ca-multi_policy_ec.crt + +test-ca-unsupported_policy.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) test-ca.req.sha256 + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions v3_unsupported_policy_ca -key $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 0 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-ca.req.sha256 -out $@ +all_final += test-ca-unsupported_policy.crt + +test-ca-unsupported_policy_ec.crt: $(test_ca_key_file_ec) test-ca.req_ec.sha256 + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions v3_unsupported_policy_ca -key $(test_ca_key_file_ec) -set_serial 0 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-ca.req_ec.sha256 -out $@ +all_final += test-ca-unsupported_policy_ec.crt + +test-ca.req_ec.sha256: $(test_ca_key_file_ec) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$(test_ca_key_file_ec) subject_name="C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" md=SHA256 +all_intermediate += test-ca.req_ec.sha256 + +test-ca2.crt.der: $(test_ca_crt_file_ec) + $(OPENSSL) x509 -in $(test_ca_crt_file_ec) -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += test-ca2.crt.der + +test-ca2.key.der: $(test_ca_key_file_ec) + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $(test_ca_key_file_ec) -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += test-ca2.key.der + +test_ca_crt_cat12 = test-ca_cat12.crt +$(test_ca_crt_cat12): $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_crt_file_ec) + cat $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_crt_file_ec) > $@ +all_final += $(test_ca_crt_cat12) + +test_ca_crt_cat21 = test-ca_cat21.crt +$(test_ca_crt_cat21): $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_crt_file_ec) + cat $(test_ca_crt_file_ec) $(test_ca_crt) > $@ +all_final += $(test_ca_crt_cat21) + +test-int-ca.csr: test-int-ca.key $(test_ca_config_file) + $(OPENSSL) req -new -config $(test_ca_config_file) -key test-int-ca.key -subj "/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate CA" -out $@ +all_intermediate += test-int-ca.csr +test-int-ca-exp.crt: $(test_ca_crt_file_ec) $(test_ca_key_file_ec) $(test_ca_config_file) test-int-ca.csr + $(FAKETIME) -f -3653d $(OPENSSL) x509 -req -extfile $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions v3_ca -CA $(test_ca_crt_file_ec) -CAkey $(test_ca_key_file_ec) -set_serial 14 -days 3653 -sha256 -in test-int-ca.csr -out $@ +all_final += test-int-ca-exp.crt + +enco-cert-utf8str.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) subject_key=rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem subject_name="CN=dw.yonan.net" issuer_crt=enco-ca-prstr.pem issuer_key=rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@ + +crl-idp.pem: $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) $(test_ca_config_file) + $(OPENSSL) ca -gencrl -batch -cert $(test_ca_crt) -keyfile $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -key $(test_ca_pwd_rsa) -config $(test_ca_config_file) -name test_ca -md sha256 -crldays 3653 -crlexts crl_ext_idp -out $@ +all_final += crl-idp.pem +crl-idpnc.pem: $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) $(test_ca_config_file) + $(OPENSSL) ca -gencrl -batch -cert $(test_ca_crt) -keyfile $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -key $(test_ca_pwd_rsa) -config $(test_ca_config_file) -name test_ca -md sha256 -crldays 3653 -crlexts crl_ext_idp_nc -out $@ +all_final += crl-idpnc.pem + +cli_crt_key_file_rsa = cli-rsa.key +cli_crt_extensions_file = cli.opensslconf + +cli-rsa.csr: $(cli_crt_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Client 2" md=SHA1 +all_intermediate += cli-rsa.csr + +cli-rsa-sha1.crt: cli-rsa.csr + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=$< serial=4 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@ + +cli-rsa-sha256.crt: cli-rsa.csr + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=$< serial=4 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA256 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cli-rsa-sha256.crt + +cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der: cli-rsa-sha256.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der + +cli-rsa-sha256-badalg.crt.der: cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der + hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/06092A864886F70D01010B0500/06092A864886F70D01010B0900/2" | xxd -r -p > $@ +all_final += cli-rsa-sha256-badalg.crt.der + +cli-rsa.key.der: $(cli_crt_key_file_rsa) + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += cli-rsa.key.der + +test_ca_int_rsa1 = test-int-ca.crt + +server7.csr: server7.key + $(OPENSSL) req -new -key server7.key -subj "/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=localhost" -out $@ +all_intermediate += server7.csr +server7-expired.crt: server7.csr $(test_ca_int_rsa1) + $(FAKETIME) -f -3653d $(OPENSSL) x509 -req -extfile $(cli_crt_extensions_file) -extensions cli-rsa -CA $(test_ca_int_rsa1) -CAkey test-int-ca.key -set_serial 16 -days 3653 -sha256 -in server7.csr | cat - $(test_ca_int_rsa1) > $@ +all_final += server7-expired.crt +server7-future.crt: server7.csr $(test_ca_int_rsa1) + $(FAKETIME) -f +3653d $(OPENSSL) x509 -req -extfile $(cli_crt_extensions_file) -extensions cli-rsa -CA $(test_ca_int_rsa1) -CAkey test-int-ca.key -set_serial 16 -days 3653 -sha256 -in server7.csr | cat - $(test_ca_int_rsa1) > $@ +all_final += server7-future.crt +server7-badsign.crt: server7.crt $(test_ca_int_rsa1) + { head -n-2 $<; tail -n-2 $< | sed -e '1s/0\(=*\)$$/_\1/' -e '1s/[^_=]\(=*\)$$/0\1/' -e '1s/_/1/'; cat $(test_ca_int_rsa1); } > $@ +all_final += server7-badsign.crt +server7_int-ca-exp.crt: server7.crt test-int-ca-exp.crt + cat server7.crt test-int-ca-exp.crt > $@ +all_final += server7_int-ca-exp.crt + +cli2.req.sha256: cli2.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test Client 2" md=SHA256 + +all_final += server1.req.sha1 +cli2.crt: cli2.req.sha256 + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=cli2.req.sha256 serial=13 selfsign=0 issuer_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test EC CA" issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_ec) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144400 not_after=20290210144400 md=SHA256 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cli2.crt + +cli2.crt.der: cli2.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += cli2.crt.der + +cli2.key.der: cli2.key + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += cli2.key.der + +server5_pwd_ec = PolarSSLTest + +server5.crt.der: server5.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += server5.crt.der + +server5.key.der: server5.key + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += server5.key.der + +server5.key.enc: server5.key + $(OPENSSL) ec -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(server5_pwd_ec)" +all_final += server5.key.enc + +server5-ss-expired.crt: server5.key + $(FAKETIME) -f -3653d $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=mbed TLS/OU=testsuite/CN=localhost" -days 3653 -sha256 -key $< -out $@ +all_final += server5-ss-expired.crt + +# try to forge a copy of test-int-ca3 with different key +server5-ss-forgeca.crt: server5.key + $(FAKETIME) '2015-09-01 14:08:43' $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=mbed TLS/CN=mbed TLS Test intermediate CA 3" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions noext_ca -days 3650 -sha256 -key $< -out $@ +all_final += server5-ss-forgeca.crt + +server5-othername.crt: server5.key + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS othername SAN" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions othername_san -days 3650 -sha256 -key $< -out $@ + +server5-unsupported_othername.crt: server5.key + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS unsupported othername SAN" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions unsupoported_othername_san -days 3650 -sha256 -key $< -out $@ + +server5-fan.crt: server5.key + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS FAN" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions fan_cert -days 3650 -sha256 -key server5.key -out $@ + +server5-tricky-ip-san.crt: server5.key + $(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS Tricky IP SAN" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions tricky_ip_san -days 3650 -sha256 -key server5.key -out $@ +all_final += server5-tricky-ip-san.crt + +server10-badsign.crt: server10.crt + { head -n-2 $<; tail -n-2 $< | sed -e '1s/0\(=*\)$$/_\1/' -e '1s/[^_=]\(=*\)$$/0\1/' -e '1s/_/1/'; } > $@ +all_final += server10-badsign.crt +server10-bs_int3.pem: server10-badsign.crt test-int-ca3.crt + cat server10-badsign.crt test-int-ca3.crt > $@ +all_final += server10-bs_int3.pem +test-int-ca3-badsign.crt: test-int-ca3.crt + { head -n-2 $<; tail -n-2 $< | sed -e '1s/0\(=*\)$$/_\1/' -e '1s/[^_=]\(=*\)$$/0\1/' -e '1s/_/1/'; } > $@ +all_final += test-int-ca3-badsign.crt +server10_int3-bs.pem: server10.crt test-int-ca3-badsign.crt + cat server10.crt test-int-ca3-badsign.crt > $@ +all_final += server10_int3-bs.pem + +rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.pem: server8.key + $(OPENSSL) rsa -in $< -outform PEM -RSAPublicKey_out -out $@ +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.pem + +rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -RSAPublicKey_in -in $< -outform DER -RSAPublicKey_out -out $@ +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.der + +rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.pem: server8.key + $(OPENSSL) rsa -in $< -outform PEM -pubout -out $@ +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.der: rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -pubin -in $< -outform DER -pubout -out $@ +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.der + +################################################################ +#### Generate various RSA keys +################################################################ + +### Password used for PKCS1-encoded encrypted RSA keys +keys_rsa_basic_pwd = testkey + +### Password used for PKCS8-encoded encrypted RSA keys +keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd = PolarSSLTest + +### Basic 1024-, 2048- and 4096-bit unencrypted RSA keys from which +### all other encrypted RSA keys are derived. +rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem: + $(OPENSSL) genrsa -out $@ 1024 +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem +rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem: + $(OPENSSL) genrsa -out $@ 2048 +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem +rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem: + $(OPENSSL) genrsa -out $@ 4096 +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + +### +### PKCS1-encoded, encrypted RSA keys +### + +### 1024-bit +rsa_pkcs1_1024_des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -des -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_1024_des.pem +rsa_pkcs1_1024_3des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -des3 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_1024_3des.pem +rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes128.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes128 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes128.pem +rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes192.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes192 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes192.pem +rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes256.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes256.pem +keys_rsa_enc_basic_1024: rsa_pkcs1_1024_des.pem rsa_pkcs1_1024_3des.pem rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes128.pem rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes192.pem rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes256.pem + +# 2048-bit +rsa_pkcs1_2048_des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -des -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_2048_des.pem +rsa_pkcs1_2048_3des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -des3 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_2048_3des.pem +rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes128.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes128 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes128.pem +rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes192.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes192 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes192.pem +rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes256.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes256.pem +keys_rsa_enc_basic_2048: rsa_pkcs1_2048_des.pem rsa_pkcs1_2048_3des.pem rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes128.pem rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes192.pem rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes256.pem + +# 4096-bit +rsa_pkcs1_4096_des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -des -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_4096_des.pem +rsa_pkcs1_4096_3des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -des3 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_4096_3des.pem +rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes128.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes128 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes128.pem +rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes192.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes192 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes192.pem +rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes256.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_basic_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes256.pem +keys_rsa_enc_basic_4096: rsa_pkcs1_4096_des.pem rsa_pkcs1_4096_3des.pem rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes128.pem rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes192.pem rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes256.pem + +### +### PKCS8-v1 encoded, encrypted RSA keys +### + +### 1024-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-3DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-3DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_1024_3des: rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.pem rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.der + +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-2DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-2DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_1024_2des: rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.pem rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.der + +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_1024_rc4_128: rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.pem rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.der + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_1024: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_1024_3des keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_1024_2des keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_1024_rc4_128 + +### 2048-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-3DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-3DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_2048_3des: rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.pem rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.der + +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-2DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-2DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_2048_2des: rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.pem rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.der + +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_2048_rc4_128: rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.pem rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.der + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_2048: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_2048_3des keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_2048_2des keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_2048_rc4_128 + +### 4096-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-3DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-3DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_4096_3des: rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.pem rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.der + +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-2DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-2DES +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_4096_2des: rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.pem rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.der + +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" -topk8 -v1 PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_4096_rc4_128: rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.pem rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.der + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_4096: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_4096_3des keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_4096_2des keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_4096_rc4_128 + +### +### PKCS8-v2 encoded, encrypted RSA keys, no PRF specified (default for OpenSSL1.0: hmacWithSHA1) +### + +### 1024-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des + +### 2048-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des + +### 4096-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des + +### +### PKCS8-v2 encoded, encrypted RSA keys, PRF hmacWithSHA224 +### + +### 1024-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des_sha224: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des_sha224: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_sha224: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des_sha224 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des_sha224 + +### 2048-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des_sha224: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des_sha224: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_sha224: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des_sha224 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des_sha224 + +### 4096-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des_sha224: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA224 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des_sha224: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_sha224: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des_sha224 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des_sha224 + +### +### PKCS8-v2 encoded, encrypted RSA keys, PRF hmacWithSHA256 +### + +### 1024-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des_sha256: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des_sha256: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_sha256: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des_sha256 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des_sha256 + +### 2048-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des_sha256: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des_sha256: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_sha256: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des_sha256 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des_sha256 + +### 4096-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des_sha256: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA256 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des_sha256: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_sha256: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des_sha256 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des_sha256 + +### +### PKCS8-v2 encoded, encrypted RSA keys, PRF hmacWithSHA384 +### + +### 1024-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_sha384: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des_sha384 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des_sha384 + +### 2048-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_sha384: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des_sha384 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des_sha384 + +### 4096-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_sha384: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des_sha384 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des_sha384 + +### +### PKCS8-v2 encoded, encrypted RSA keys, PRF hmacWithSHA512 +### + +### 1024-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des_sha512: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.pem: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des_sha512: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_sha512: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_3des_sha512 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_des_sha512 + +### 2048-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des_sha512: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des_sha512: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_sha512: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des_sha512 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_des_sha512 + +### 4096-bit +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des3 -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des_sha512: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.pem: rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA512 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des_sha512: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.pem + +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_sha512: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_3des_sha512 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_des_sha512 + +### +### Rules to generate all RSA keys from a particular class +### + +### Generate basic unencrypted RSA keys +keys_rsa_unenc: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem + +### Generate PKCS1-encoded encrypted RSA keys +keys_rsa_enc_basic: keys_rsa_enc_basic_1024 keys_rsa_enc_basic_2048 keys_rsa_enc_basic_4096 + +### Generate PKCS8-v1 encrypted RSA keys +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_1024 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_2048 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_4096 + +### Generate PKCS8-v2 encrypted RSA keys +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_sha224 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_sha224 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_sha224 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_sha256 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_sha256 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_sha256 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_sha384 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_sha384 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_sha384 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024_sha512 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_sha512 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096_sha512 + +### Generate all RSA keys +keys_rsa_all: keys_rsa_unenc keys_rsa_enc_basic keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2 + +################################################################ +#### Generate various EC keys +################################################################ + +### +### PKCS8 encoded +### + +ec_prv.pk8.der: + $(OPENSSL) genpkey -algorithm EC -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime192v1 -pkeyopt ec_param_enc:named_curve -out $@ -outform DER +all_final += ec_prv.pk8.der + +# ### Instructions for creating `ec_prv.pk8nopub.der`, +# ### `ec_prv.pk8nopubparam.der`, and `ec_prv.pk8param.der` by hand from +# ### `ec_prv.pk8.der`. +# +# These instructions assume you are familiar with ASN.1 DER encoding and can +# use a hex editor to manipulate DER. +# +# The relevant ASN.1 definitions for a PKCS#8 encoded Elliptic Curve key are: +# +# PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { +# version Version, +# privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, +# privateKey PrivateKey, +# attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL +# } +# +# AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { +# algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, +# parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL +# } +# +# ECParameters ::= CHOICE { +# namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER +# -- implicitCurve NULL +# -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain +# } +# +# ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { +# version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), +# privateKey OCTET STRING, +# parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, +# publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL +# } +# +# `ec_prv.pk8.der` as generatde above by OpenSSL should have the following +# fields: +# +# * privateKeyAlgorithm namedCurve +# * privateKey.parameters NOT PRESENT +# * privateKey.publicKey PRESENT +# * attributes NOT PRESENT +# +# # ec_prv.pk8nopub.der +# +# Take `ec_prv.pk8.der` and remove `privateKey.publicKey`. +# +# # ec_prv.pk8nopubparam.der +# +# Take `ec_prv.pk8nopub.der` and add `privateKey.parameters`, the same value as +# `privateKeyAlgorithm.namedCurve`. Don't forget to add the explicit tag. +# +# # ec_prv.pk8param.der +# +# Take `ec_prv.pk8.der` and add `privateKey.parameters`, the same value as +# `privateKeyAlgorithm.namedCurve`. Don't forget to add the explicit tag. + +ec_prv.pk8.pem: ec_prv.pk8.der + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -inform DER -out $@ +all_final += ec_prv.pk8.pem +ec_prv.pk8nopub.pem: ec_prv.pk8nopub.der + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -inform DER -out $@ +all_final += ec_prv.pk8nopub.pem +ec_prv.pk8nopubparam.pem: ec_prv.pk8nopubparam.der + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -inform DER -out $@ +all_final += ec_prv.pk8nopubparam.pem +ec_prv.pk8param.pem: ec_prv.pk8param.der + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -inform DER -out $@ +all_final += ec_prv.pk8param.pem + +################################################################ +### Generate CSRs for X.509 write test suite +################################################################ + +server1.req.sha1: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA1 +all_final += server1.req.sha1 + +server1.req.md4: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=MD4 +all_final += server1.req.md4 + +server1.req.md5: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=MD5 +all_final += server1.req.md5 + +server1.req.sha224: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA224 +all_final += server1.req.sha224 + +server1.req.sha256: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA256 +all_final += server1.req.sha256 + +server1.req.sha384: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA384 +all_final += server1.req.sha384 + +server1.req.sha512: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA512 +all_final += server1.req.sha512 + +server1.req.cert_type: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< ns_cert_type=ssl_server subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA1 +all_final += server1.req.cert_type + +server1.req.key_usage: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< key_usage=digital_signature,non_repudiation,key_encipherment subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA1 +all_final += server1.req.key_usage + +server1.req.ku-ct: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< key_usage=digital_signature,non_repudiation,key_encipherment ns_cert_type=ssl_server subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA1 +all_final += server1.req.ku-ct + +server1.req.key_usage_empty: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA1 force_key_usage=1 +all_final += server1.req.key_usage_empty + +server1.req.cert_type_empty: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA1 force_ns_cert_type=1 +all_final += server1.req.cert_type_empty + +server1.req.commas.sha256: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL\, Commas,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA256 +all_final += server1.req.commas.sha256 + +# server2* + +server2_pwd_ec = PolarSSLTest + +server2.req.sha256: server2.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=localhost" md=SHA256 +all_intermediate += server2.req.sha256 + +server2.crt.der: server2.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +all_final += server2.crt.der + +server2-sha256.crt.der: server2-sha256.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +all_final += server2-sha256.crt.der + +server2.key.der: server2.key + $(OPENSSL) pkey -in $< -out $@ -inform PEM -outform DER +all_final += server2.key.der + +server2.key.enc: server2.key + $(OPENSSL) rsa -aes256 -in $< -out $@ -passout "pass:$(server2_pwd_ec)" +all_final += server2.key.enc + +# server5* + +# The use of 'Server 1' in the DN is intentional here, as the DN is hardcoded in the x509_write test suite.' +server5.req.ku.sha1: server5.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< key_usage=digital_signature,non_repudiation subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1" md=SHA1 +all_final += server5.req.ku.sha1 + +################################################################ +### Generate certificates for CRT write check tests +################################################################ + +### The test files use the Mbed TLS generated certificates server1*.crt, +### but for comparison with OpenSSL also rules for OpenSSL-generated +### certificates server1*.crt.openssl are offered. +### +### Known differences: +### * OpenSSL encodes trailing zero-bits in bit-strings occurring in X.509 extension +### as unused bits, while Mbed TLS doesn't. + +test_ca_server1_db = test-ca.server1.db +test_ca_server1_serial = test-ca.server1.serial +test_ca_server1_config_file = test-ca.server1.opensslconf + +# server1* + +server1.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@ +server1.noauthid.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 authority_identifier=0 version=3 output_file=$@ +server1.crt.der: server1.crt + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 authority_identifier=0 version=3 output_file=$@ +server1.der: server1.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +server1.commas.crt: server1.key server1.req.commas.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.commas.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += server1.crt server1.noauthid.crt server1.crt.der server1.commas.crt + +server1.key_usage.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 key_usage=digital_signature,non_repudiation,key_encipherment version=3 output_file=$@ +server1.key_usage_noauthid.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 key_usage=digital_signature,non_repudiation,key_encipherment authority_identifier=0 version=3 output_file=$@ +server1.key_usage.der: server1.key_usage.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +all_final += server1.key_usage.crt server1.key_usage_noauthid.crt server1.key_usage.der + +server1.cert_type.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 ns_cert_type=ssl_server version=3 output_file=$@ +server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 ns_cert_type=ssl_server authority_identifier=0 version=3 output_file=$@ +server1.cert_type.der: server1.cert_type.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +all_final += server1.cert_type.crt server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt server1.cert_type.der + +server1.v1.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=1 output_file=$@ +server1.v1.der: server1.v1.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +all_final += server1.v1.crt server1.v1.der + +server1.ca.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 is_ca=1 version=3 output_file=$@ +server1.ca_noauthid.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 authority_identifier=0 is_ca=1 version=3 output_file=$@ +server1.ca.der: server1.ca.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +all_final += server1.ca.crt server1.ca_noauthid.crt server1.ca.der + +server1_ca.crt: server1.crt $(test_ca_crt) + cat server1.crt $(test_ca_crt) > $@ +all_final += server1_ca.crt + +cert_sha1.crt: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) subject_key=server1.key subject_name="C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA1" serial=7 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cert_sha1.crt + +cert_sha224.crt: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) subject_key=server1.key subject_name="C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA224" serial=8 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA224 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cert_sha224.crt + +cert_sha256.crt: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) subject_key=server1.key subject_name="C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA256" serial=9 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA256 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cert_sha256.crt + +cert_sha384.crt: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) subject_key=server1.key subject_name="C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA384" serial=10 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA384 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cert_sha384.crt + +cert_sha512.crt: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) subject_key=server1.key subject_name="C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA512" serial=11 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA512 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cert_sha512.crt + +cert_example_wildcard.crt: server1.key + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) subject_key=server1.key subject_name="C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=*.example.com" serial=12 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cert_example_wildcard.crt + +# OpenSSL-generated certificates for comparison +# Also provide certificates in DER format to allow +# direct binary comparison using e.g. dumpasn1 +server1.crt.openssl server1.key_usage.crt.openssl server1.cert_type.crt.openssl: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) $(test_ca_server1_config_file) + echo "01" > $(test_ca_server1_serial) + rm -f $(test_ca_server1_db) + touch $(test_ca_server1_db) + $(OPENSSL) ca -batch -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -config $(test_ca_server1_config_file) -in server1.req.sha256 -extensions v3_ext -extfile $@.v3_ext -out $@ +server1.der.openssl: server1.crt.openssl + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +server1.key_usage.der.openssl: server1.key_usage.crt.openssl + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +server1.cert_type.der.openssl: server1.cert_type.crt.openssl + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ + +server1.v1.crt.openssl: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) $(test_ca_server1_config_file) + echo "01" > $(test_ca_server1_serial) + rm -f $(test_ca_server1_db) + touch $(test_ca_server1_db) + $(OPENSSL) ca -batch -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -config $(test_ca_server1_config_file) -in server1.req.sha256 -out $@ +server1.v1.der.openssl: server1.v1.crt.openssl + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ + +# To revoke certificate in the openssl database: +# +# $(OPENSSL) ca -gencrl -batch -cert $(test_ca_crt) -keyfile $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -key $(test_ca_pwd_rsa) -config $(test_ca_server1_config_file) -md sha256 -crldays 365 -revoke server1.crt + +crl.pem: $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) $(test_ca_config_file) + $(OPENSSL) ca -gencrl -batch -cert $(test_ca_crt) -keyfile $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -key $(test_ca_pwd_rsa) -config $(test_ca_server1_config_file) -md sha1 -crldays 3653 -out $@ + +crl-futureRevocationDate.pem: $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) $(test_ca_config_file) test-ca.server1.future-crl.db test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf + $(FAKETIME) '2028-12-31' $(OPENSSL) ca -gencrl -config test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf -crldays 365 -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -out $@ + +server1_all: crl.pem crl-futureRevocationDate.pem server1.crt server1.noauthid.crt server1.crt.openssl server1.v1.crt server1.v1.crt.openssl server1.key_usage.crt server1.key_usage_noauthid.crt server1.key_usage.crt.openssl server1.cert_type.crt server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt server1.cert_type.crt.openssl server1.der server1.der.openssl server1.v1.der server1.v1.der.openssl server1.key_usage.der server1.key_usage.der.openssl server1.cert_type.der server1.cert_type.der.openssl + +# server2* + +server2.crt: server2.req.sha256 + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server2.req.sha256 serial=2 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += server2.crt + +server2.der: server2.crt + $(OPENSSL) x509 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ +all_final += server2.crt server2.der + +server2-sha256.crt: server2.req.sha256 + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server2.req.sha256 serial=2 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA256 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += server2-sha256.crt + +# MD2, MD4, MD5 test certificates + +cert_md_test_key = $(cli_crt_key_file_rsa) + +cert_md2.csr: $(cert_md_test_key) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Cert MD2" md=MD2 +all_intermediate += cert_md2.csr + +cert_md2.crt: cert_md2.csr + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=$< serial=9 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20000101121212 not_after=20300101121212 md=MD2 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cert_md2.crt + +cert_md4.csr: $(cert_md_test_key) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Cert MD4" md=MD4 +all_intermediate += cert_md4.csr + +cert_md4.crt: cert_md4.csr + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=$< serial=5 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20000101121212 not_after=20300101121212 md=MD4 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cert_md4.crt + +cert_md5.csr: $(cert_md_test_key) + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_REQ) output_file=$@ filename=$< subject_name="C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Cert MD5" md=MD5 +all_intermediate += cert_md5.csr + +cert_md5.crt: cert_md5.csr + $(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=$< serial=6 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20000101121212 not_after=20300101121212 md=MD5 version=3 output_file=$@ +all_final += cert_md5.crt + +################################################################ +#### Diffie-Hellman parameters +################################################################ + +dh.998.pem: + $(OPENSSL) dhparam -out $@ -text 998 + +dh.999.pem: + $(OPENSSL) dhparam -out $@ -text 999 + +################################################################ +#### Meta targets +################################################################ + +all_final: $(all_final) +all: $(all_intermediate) $(all_final) + +.PHONY: default all_final all +.PHONY: keys_rsa_all +.PHONY: keys_rsa_unenc keys_rsa_enc_basic +.PHONY: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2 +.PHONY: keys_rsa_enc_basic_1024 keys_rsa_enc_basic_2048 keys_rsa_enc_basic_4096 +.PHONY: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_1024 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_1024 +.PHONY: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_2048 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048 +.PHONY: keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v1_4096 keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_4096 +.PHONY: server1_all + +# These files should not be committed to the repository. +list_intermediate: + @printf '%s\n' $(all_intermediate) | sort +# These files should be committed to the repository so that the test data is +# available upon checkout without running a randomized process depending on +# third-party tools. +list_final: + @printf '%s\n' $(all_final) | sort +.PHONY: list_intermediate list_final + +## Remove intermediate files +clean: + rm -f $(all_intermediate) +## Remove all build products, even the ones that are committed +neat: clean + rm -f $(all_final) +.PHONY: clean neat diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/Readme-x509.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/Readme-x509.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..84c775fd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/Readme-x509.txt @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +This documents the X.509 CAs, certificates, and CRLS used for testing. + +Certification authorities +------------------------- + +There are two main CAs for use as trusted roots: +- test-ca.crt aka "C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA" + uses a RSA-2048 key + test-ca-sha1.crt and test-ca-sha256.crt use the same key, signed with + different hashes. +- test-ca2*.crt aka "C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" + uses an EC key with NIST P-384 (aka secp384r1) + variants used to test the keyUsage extension +The files test-ca_cat12 and test-ca_cat21 contain them concatenated both ways. + +Two intermediate CAs are signed by them: +- test-int-ca.crt "C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate CA" + uses RSA-4096, signed by test-ca2 + - test-int-ca-exp.crt is a copy that is expired +- test-int-ca2.crt "C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate EC CA" + uses an EC key with NIST P-384, signed by test-ca + +A third intermediate CA is signed by test-int-ca2.crt: +- test-int-ca3.crt "C=UK, O=mbed TLS, CN=mbed TLS Test intermediate CA 3" + uses an EC key with NIST P-256, signed by test-int-ca2 + +Finally, other CAs for specific purposes: +- enco-ca-prstr.pem: has its CN encoded as a printable string, but child cert + enco-cert-utf8str.pem has its issuer's CN encoded as a UTF-8 string. +- test-ca-v1.crt: v1 "CA", signs + server1-v1.crt: v1 "intermediate CA", signs + server2-v1*.crt: EE cert (without of with chain in same file) +- keyUsage.decipherOnly.crt: has the decipherOnly keyUsage bit set + +End-entity certificates +----------------------- + +Short information fields: + +- name or pattern +- issuing CA: 1 -> test-ca.crt + 2 -> test-ca2.crt + I1 -> test-int-ca.crt + I2 -> test-int-ca2.crt + I3 -> test-int-ca3.crt + O -> other +- key type: R -> RSA, E -> EC +- C -> there is a CRL revoking this cert (see below) +- L -> CN=localhost (useful for local test servers) +- P1, P2 if the file includes parent (resp. parent + grandparent) +- free-form comments + +List of certificates: + +- cert_example_multi*.crt: 1/O R: subjectAltName +- cert_example_wildcard.crt: 1 R: wildcard in subject's CN +- cert_md*.crt, cert_sha*.crt: 1 R: signature hash +- cert_v1_with_ext.crt: 1 R: v1 with extensions (illegal) +- cli2.crt: 2 E: basic +- cli-rsa.key, cli-rsa-*.crt: RSA key used for test clients, signed by + the RSA test CA. +- enco-cert-utf8str.pem: see enco-ca-prstr.pem above +- server1*.crt: 1* R C* P1*: misc *(server1-v1 see test-ca-v1.crt above) + *CRL for: .cert_type.crt, .crt, .key_usage.crt, .v1.crt + P1 only for _ca.crt +- server2-v1*.crt: O R: see test-ca-v1.crt above +- server2*.crt: 1 R L: misc +- server3.crt: 1 E L: EC cert signed by RSA CA +- server4.crt: 2 R L: RSA cert signed by EC CA +- server5*.crt: 2* E L: misc *(except -selfsigned and -ss-*) + -sha*: hashes + .eku*: extendeKeyUsage (cli/srv = www client/server, cs = codesign, etc) + .ku*: keyUsage (ds = signatures, ke/ka = key exchange/agreement) + .req*: CSR, not certificate + -der*: trailing bytes in der (?) + -badsign.crt: S5 with corrupted signature + -expired.crt: S5 with "not after" date in the past + -future.crt: S5 with "not before" date in the future + -selfsigned.crt: Self-signed cert with S5 key + -ss-expired.crt: Self-signed cert with S5 key, expired + -ss-forgeca.crt: Copy of test-int-ca3 self-signed with S5 key +- server6-ss-child.crt: O E: "child" of non-CA server5-selfsigned +- server6.crt, server6.pem: 2 E L C: revoked +- server7.crt: I1 E L P1(usually): EC signed by RSA signed by EC + -badsign.crt: S7 with corrupted signature + I1 + -expired.crt: S7 with "not after" date in the past + I1 + -future.crt: S7 with "not before" date in the future + I1 + _int-ca-exp.crt: S7 + expired I1 + _int-ca.crt: S7 + I1 + _int-ca_ca2.crt: S7 + I1 + 2 + _all_space.crt: S7 + I1 both with misplaced spaces (invalid PEM) + _pem_space.crt: S7 with misplaced space (invalid PEM) + I1 + _trailing_space.crt: S7 + I1 both with trailing space (valid PEM) + _spurious_int-ca.crt: S7 + I2(spurious) + I1 +- server8*.crt: I2 R L: RSA signed by EC signed by RSA (P1 for _int-ca2) +- server9*.crt: 1 R C* L P1*: signed using RSASSA-PSS + *CRL for: 9.crt, -badsign, -with-ca (P1) +- server10.crt: I3 E L + -badsign.crt: S10 with corrupted signature + -bs_int3.pem: S10-badsign + I3 + _int3-bs.pem: S10 + I3-badsign + _int3_int-ca2.crt: S10 + I3 + I2 + _int3_int-ca2_ca.crt: S10 + I3 + I2 + 1 + _int3_spurious_int-ca2.crt: S10 + I3 + I1(spurious) + I2 + +Certificate revocation lists +---------------------------- + +Signing CA in parentheses (same meaning as certificates). + +- crl-ec-sha*.pem: (2) server6.crt +- crl-future.pem: (2) server6.crt + unknown +- crl-rsa-pss-*.pem: (1) server9{,badsign,with-ca}.crt + cert_sha384.crt + unknown +- crl.pem, crl-futureRevocationDate.pem, crl_expired.pem: (1) server1{,.cert_type,.key_usage,.v1}.crt + unknown +- crl_md*.pem: crl_sha*.pem: (1) same as crl.pem +- crt_cat_*.pem: (1+2) concatenations in various orders: + ec = crl-ec-sha256.pem, ecfut = crl-future.pem + rsa = crl.pem, rsabadpem = same with pem error, rsaexp = crl_expired.pem + +Note: crl_future would revoke server9 and cert_sha384.crt if signed by CA 1 + crl-rsa-pss* would revoke server6.crt if signed by CA 2 + +Generation +---------- + +Newer test files have been generated through commands in the Makefile. The +resulting files are committed to the repository so that the tests can +run without having to re-do the generation and so that the output is the +same for everyone (the generation process is randomized). + +The origin of older certificates has not been recorded. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_cid.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_cid.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8048aecb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_cid.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Client, CID 0xBEEF 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 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_ciphersuite.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_ciphersuite.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bf364708 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_ciphersuite.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 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 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_def.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_def.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..793da2b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_def.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Client context with default MbedTLS configuration 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 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_min_cfg.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_min_cfg.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..152b4741 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_min_cfg.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Minimal configuration +AhUAAAMAAAAAAAOeAAAAAF6LZlLMqAAgUGktPmpSPbzRPipeCpYJtp5SNIIjTr3R121WF9AeWN4tmKbRhhv+yPMjY0yWPrHLy7lLLhwNFBwCD6eQ0ULZZ15Fi2Rhae/4ZkAR0BN2iCMAAAAAAAM7MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTNowCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKzNtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kMtQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8PhYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjyaHT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC465FJhPqel7zJngHIHJrqj/wVAxGAFOTF396XKATGAp+HRCqJ81Ry60CNK1jDzk8dv6M6UHoS7RIFiM/9rXQCbJfiPD5xMTejZp5n5UYHAmxsxDaazfA5FuBhkfokKK6jD4Eq91C94xGKb6X4/VkaPF7cqoBBw/bHxawXc0UEPjqayiBpCYU/rJoVZgLqFVP7Px3sva1nOrNx8rPPI1hJ+ZOg8maiPTxHZnBVLakSSLQy/sWeWyazO1RnrbxjrbgQtYKz0e3nwGpu1w13vfckFmUSBhHXH7AAS/HpKC4IH7G2GAk3+n8iSSN71sZzpxonQwVbopMZqLmbBm/7WPLdei2ZSQwLppTqzs7kieOYQR6DjJItmQ0N/RS3+zTr9wF6LZlL6SQpLewmyja7jXyOWuUqJ6zJQ5b7FfA4PxthlAAABAAAAAAACAAA= diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_alpn.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_alpn.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..25923f64 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_alpn.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +// Without MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN 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 + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_keep_cert.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_keep_cert.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..76d0c3c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_keep_cert.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Without MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE +AhUAAAMAAAAAAACCAAAAAF6MKhTMqAAgSKCqXrcrmjqOBpxsGO3itQB09YgsSJwXmZB12QlB+wwhiof0mzAN0hupkLxu4Yyc9SgyFoEDPKJk8TiRo8bO2rkEfPItB5lUFkJwzdeuGVMAAAAABiCAy8MWqlj4vnIv0mswJvB35hyCOYWZ+fcZ6t5LzZgXPl6MKhRs69b+psiGUAo8OK3fU4HKOHNdi36tk22+ScctXowqFEyvzGcvbtI0VfWLKlOlDv+SwC08ZdCNa+RBZ/AAAAEAAAAAAAIAAA== diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_mfl.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_mfl.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d06891c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_mfl.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Without MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 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 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_packing.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_packing.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..112b1b6e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/cli_no_packing.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Without DTLS packing 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 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_ff.bin b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_ff.bin new file mode 100644 index 00000000..66aa8271 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_ff.bin @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +// Ensure that the b64 parser continues after encountering a 0xFF +// character. Note that this byte is invalid UTF-8, making this +// entire file invalid UTF-8. Use care when editing. +// -> <- +AhUAAH8AAA4AAABtAAAAAF6HQx3MqAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACG2QbHbUj8eGpdx5KVIebiwk0jvRj9/3m6BOSzpA7qBXeEunhqr3D11NE7ciGjeHMAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAV6HQx248L77RH0Z973tSYNQ8zBsz861CZG5/T09TJz3XodDHe/iJ+cgXb5An3zTdnTBtw3EWAb68T+gCE33GN8AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAwAAAQAAAAAAAgAAAA== diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_1.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_1.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47be05c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_1.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Context with added '1234' at the beginning to simulate too much data in the base64 code +1234AhUAAH8AAA4AAAQ8AAAAAF6HQx3MqAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACG2QbHbUj8eGpdx5KVIebiwk0jvRj9/3m6BOSzpA7qBXeEunhqr3D11NE7ciGjeHMAAAAAAAM7MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNMTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTNowCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKzNtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kMtQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8PhYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjyaHT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC465FJhPqel7zJngHIHJrqj/wVAxGAFOTF396XKATGAp+HRCqJ81Ry60CNK1jDzk8dv6M6UHoS7RIFiM/9rXQCbJfiPD5xMTejZp5n5UYHAmxsxDaazfA5FuBhkfokKK6jD4Eq91C94xGKb6X4/VkaPF7cqoBBw/bHxawXc0UEPjqayiBpCYU/rJoVZgLqFVP7Px3sva1nOrNx8rPPI1hJ+ZOg8maiPTxHZnBVLakSSLQy/sWeWyazO1RnrbxjrbgQtYKz0e3nwGpu1w13vfckFmUSBhHXH7AAS/HpKC4IH7G2GAk3+n8iSSN71sZzpxonQwVbopMZqLmbBm/7WPLcAAJTfQC2Ek91INP5ihHNzImPOAHJCk+YTO/pQuEnNWwXbdmKAi+IRp671iAwtpkjSxCBXVzKX925F1A66caCOQptlw+9zFukDQgblM2JyAJLG0j6B4RtBTDWJ8ZTMUPHUoLJoEpm8APZgRi//DMRyCKP9pbBLGlDzgUvl0w11LzBAlJHkWau5NoqQBlG7w4HFrKweovskAAFRgAAAAF6HQx248L77RH0Z973tSYNQ8zBsz861CZG5/T09TJz3XodDHe/iJ+cgXb5An3zTdnTBtw3EWAb68T+gCE33GN8AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAwAAAQAAAAAAAgAAAA== diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_2.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_2.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7ec1dd04 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_2.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Context with added '1234' in the middle of code to simulate too much data 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 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_3.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_3.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..514754ce --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_b64_too_big_3.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Context with added '1234' before '==' add the end to simulate too much data in the base64 code 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 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_bad_b64.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_bad_b64.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7776588 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/def_bad_b64.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Context with added extra 'A' before '==' add the end to simulate bad length of base64 code 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 diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/README.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/empty.txt similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/README.md rename to components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/empty.txt diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/mfl_1024.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/mfl_1024.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b56044a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/mfl_1024.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// MFL=1024 +AhUAAH8AAA4AAABtAAAAAF6K+GLMqAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACHeeQKPVt9RpB8nLTB6C2AhxRzB0r/OBbXbMPm6jb1rkR+qrXZAUFRvGfGxlqqGWwAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAIAAV6K+GJIXNnpKTr9HZQW6WEH7YSYhhRRqOO6xvf8QL6/Xor4YhOxOJYk23w3AwDvVAofeWnVAfJnExe5ipdSxnAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAwAAAQAAAAAAAgAAAA=== diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/mtu_10000.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/mtu_10000.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..67645390 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/mtu_10000.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// MTU=10000 +AhUAAH8AAA4AAABtAAAAAF6LDkzMqAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABx06kxYooMLGPyUMoB46EF2zTJzmZEM4le5aKihcHpFEfgrX/eWQZFWa7cak79ihwAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAV6LDkz9bigMk9q0WiDmgYhX8ppbfgbtMCfruvVQNiFWXosOTJ3R2+J+TaSChmjtS8sD+y1Zruhe/SJE7y9D+5YAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAwAAAQAAAAAAAicQAA== diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_cid.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_cid.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..69aad5f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_cid.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Server, CID 0xDEAD +AhUAAH8AAA8AAABtAAAAAF6MZUPMqAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABh7h8/aprLN1fS0KwLkZzKcsa5LNtDW7sYu7d1z7fNetuRjLJpX/A1mTSqeBY7li8AAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAV6MZUNak74BhbcgvZ2M8WhZKjQyCix7GJzRs4SqnD7iXoxlQ7YXjsVI0K/xyMOJPkT9ZcPEi/2jHGIte1ZduW4C3q0Cvu8AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAIAAAAAAAAABwAAAQAAAAAAAwAAAA== diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_ciphersuite.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_ciphersuite.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7e939062 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_ciphersuite.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 +AhUAAH8AAA4AAABtAAAAAF6K4ynAoQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADLBIQUrrPh7jxYz9e55cJvfpOkuBf2ZiVovlYa1Dkwbimp5q/CoWIn48C0x3Yj6N0AAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAV6K4yksMvMV19qRq+eNokGn0j9Q5tjE88EK8jfM7gksXorjKR6zhXhttFGIFkNNAmmKuuDQGVmX1yCoHiJFonUAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAwAAAQAAAAAAAgAAAA== diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_def.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_def.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca814619 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_def.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Server context with default MbedTLS configuration +AhUAAH8AAA4AAABtAAAAAF6HQx3MqAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACG2QbHbUj8eGpdx5KVIebiwk0jvRj9/3m6BOSzpA7qBXeEunhqr3D11NE7ciGjeHMAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAV6HQx248L77RH0Z973tSYNQ8zBsz861CZG5/T09TJz3XodDHe/iJ+cgXb5An3zTdnTBtw3EWAb68T+gCE33GN8AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAwAAAQAAAAAAAgAAAA== diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_min_cfg.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_min_cfg.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..77272f52 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_min_cfg.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Minimal configuration +AhUAAAMAAAAAAABjAAAAAF6LZlLMqAAgUGktPmpSPbzRPipeCpYJtp5SNIIjTr3R121WF9AeWN4tmKbRhhv+yPMjY0yWPrHLy7lLLhwNFBwCD6eQ0ULZZ15Fi2Rhae/4ZkAR0BN2iCMAAACAAAAAXotmUkMC6aU6s7O5InjmEEeg4ySLZkNDf0Ut/s06/cBei2ZS+kkKS3sJso2u418jlrlKiesyUOW+xXwOD8bYZQAAAQAAAAAAAgAA diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_alpn.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_alpn.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..10ddd0c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_alpn.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Without MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN +AhUAAH8AAAYAAABtAAAAAF6LDSzMqAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB1lCUO8B/805UzCOLZzWDAEA8anfLpbuWTrnFSR2puZktvEiR8nXdATN0yKS94oSAAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAV6LDSwWt0QWgmNg4Zv2yYhf4Pdexpi/QTIqWyD2AQVjXosNLLK1vz/upFHrJlizjH5uSBUJCpQZJczrBgxBmGoAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAwAAAQAAAAAAAgAA diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_keep_cert.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_keep_cert.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..be834b9e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_keep_cert.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Without MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE +AhUAAAMAAAAAAABiAAAAAF6MKhTMqAAgSKCqXrcrmjqOBpxsGO3itQB09YgsSJwXmZB12QlB+wwhiof0mzAN0hupkLxu4Yyc9SgyFoEDPKJk8TiRo8bO2rkEfPItB5lUFkJwzdeuGVMAAACAAABejCoUbOvW/qbIhlAKPDit31OByjhzXYt+rZNtvknHLV6MKhRMr8xnL27SNFX1iypTpQ7/ksAtPGXQjWvkQWfwAAABAAAAAAACAAA= diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_mfl.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_mfl.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e254403a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_mfl.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Without MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +AhUAAHcAAA4AAABsAAAAAF6LDLPMqAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA0fzGzO1ysljMgZr4gduigvRXr2AK5X8j8c6vHTOpc2ncFS3UN2ojwD2tOaM3+/XIAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABXosMs1xs+Mj8BIL6v01qtHWV7w+psxGwLctaGSSL0aZeiwyzskPeDCL0isOzh+JoPgzS/mVtMc0GykGpZaFBugAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAADAAABAAAAAAACAAAA diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_packing.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_packing.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bcc4228b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/srv_no_packing.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Without DTLS packing +AhUAAH8AAA4AAABtAAAAAF6LCM/MqAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACfl0tXNmshIQEqiEflQGnVUKkIFl1on/Mu0pjWes3XwQgdwmy9xMzpVyYU5gBOsOEAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAV6LCM+1uRpyaoyfzuNGBJK9DgBWIWtrPpu7KM8qsC/FXosIz/YIPhveZ8Z4IR0g/McAMQwzQoK5tScSE0DD3BwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAwEAAQAAAAAAAgAAAA== diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/v2.19.1.txt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/v2.19.1.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c07bd9d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/base64/v2.19.1.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +// Context creaded by MbedTLS v.2.19.1 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 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/bitstring-in-dn.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/bitstring-in-dn.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c50bd668 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/bitstring-in-dn.pem @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIEATCCAumgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBxMRMwEQYDVQQDDApUZXN0 +IENBIDAxMREwDwYDVQQIDAhFY25pdm9ycDELMAkGA1UEBhMCWFgxHjAcBgkqhkiG +9w0BCQEWD3RjYUBleGFtcGxlLmNvbTEaMBgGA1UECgwRVGVzdCBDQSBBdXRob3Jp +dHkwHhcNMTUwMzExMTIwNjUxWhcNMjUwMzA4MTIwNjUxWjCBmzELMAkGA1UEBhMC +WFgxDDAKBgNVBAoMA3RjYTERMA8GA1UECAwIRWNuaXZvcnAxDDAKBgNVBAsMA1RD +QTEPMA0GA1UEAwwGQ2xpZW50MSEwHwYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhJjbGllbnRAZXhhbXBs +ZS5jb20xEzARBgNVBAUTCjcxMDEwMTIyNTUxFDASBgNVBC0DCwA3MTAxMDEyMjU1 +MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAnQS0JLb8Dqy8V2mszkWk +V8c/NPQcG3ivueXZHqOT9JTiPqrigGcLHtlmlaJ0aUUxix7q60aOds041TFyeknT +SUFYY4ppOhiP+fOpWKPv4ZMwhSI2XzcgYhQSNHV0lIG1we9RAAfumomDMq7oMJhb +EGf0ihibbwZXPUwBlm10GaB4K93PNY8Bz4ekBxzQ1WJkQ5LGsQnVZSuLnvp5dWSe +J2axxyY4hPXR30jzEyZvy4kv4nzAu5lqZ5XKLrRO4TKwZrtr+CCPVkPJRE36rWYt +tQaJEEpNOo0ZPpTtG6F8/tGh5r8jFx/f6wG+nyANJJ98kEP8i6TPjRrg+697mLcd +iQIDAQABo3kwdzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMDYGA1UdHwQvMC0wK6ApoCeGJWh0dHA6Ly9j +cmwuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vdGVzdF9jYV8wMS5jcmwwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUH +AwIwHQYDVR0RBBYwFIESY2xpZW50QGV4YW1wbGUuY29tMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUA +A4IBAQBySELCnU8/PtGIG3dwhJENOSU5R7w8jpRXxHCuSBR+W6nuUCISz+z+EdF/ +A7AOJDASuS+4gkrSSmQhGFpf7E5VbF8trVZhLAZrXqKMcUreKH6v0I8MAUXmIs3G +tqiBGf7pSYJN9DvVOOgANjdy6THuUzYv5qSvBZ4pNYEfHSlMNrV7niynd8dgPOML +pA7GUfv5k2mMkMbSD15pTMgcavrBKYgyqcvF1C3qghfoL5+i38H8sKzF8hy7wHtE +ESHtBq20RYA3m0UcA0e64GcanO2Ps/AQVBc7qMeHbqnqj3uUhtTkQcMUWnMgy1NR +5RbzoLMOxq7hoOCyIaQeM/wgxeGE +-----END CERTIFICATE----- +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAnQS0JLb8Dqy8V2mszkWkV8c/NPQcG3ivueXZHqOT9JTiPqri +gGcLHtlmlaJ0aUUxix7q60aOds041TFyeknTSUFYY4ppOhiP+fOpWKPv4ZMwhSI2 +XzcgYhQSNHV0lIG1we9RAAfumomDMq7oMJhbEGf0ihibbwZXPUwBlm10GaB4K93P +NY8Bz4ekBxzQ1WJkQ5LGsQnVZSuLnvp5dWSeJ2axxyY4hPXR30jzEyZvy4kv4nzA +u5lqZ5XKLrRO4TKwZrtr+CCPVkPJRE36rWYttQaJEEpNOo0ZPpTtG6F8/tGh5r8j +Fx/f6wG+nyANJJ98kEP8i6TPjRrg+697mLcdiQIDAQABAoIBAF7i3MnjGmbz080v +OxJb23iAG54wdlvTjr3UPGTbjSmcXyxnsADQRFQcJHYAekCzY8EiqewL80OvuMx8 +2SU1P81hA70Dg5tsBHWT3Z6HUwsKG6QYjKr1cUhTwLyazhyAVgogSN6v7GzO9M3I +DOBw8Xb0mz5oqGVre4S7TapN8n8ZG5oWm0XKGACXy0KbzY0KvWdkUzumFQ8X/ARE +FsWyu+O69EbMqZRUKu45SrcubsdVGjOwseZHkmp5V6pc6Q/OrTHZqXJtDva5UIRq ++Lof5scy9jiwwRnM/klvh23mz0ySU4YA3645m5KqyWR4YJCR1MnMANmXUSeYWfYz +19+R1gECgYEAzm83lI7eIhTH38H0/jFpf3R7vNjPX3TR5waa4EXsCxhTOpoL89mR +iNmzH0aOC4OR8rz/9PCnwmtH1lyQ4r/RokBmCp3pBxeWSlenFfV3rLCeEDo0Q/OL +SX5DL4IbZD0VmNDt606WS7AEv93GhpN03Anw6kgHQUm1l030PR9DYZECgYEAwrgO +/RyB/Ehw7smlysZb2sn1lvd6z8fg+pcu8ZNRKODaYCCOb8p1lnHrnIQdEmjhlmVp +HAEuJ5jxCb+lyruV+dlx+0W/p6lHtKr0iBHG8EFkHnjN6Y+59Qu0HfSm0pZw7Ftr +QcUDPuDJkTVUAvrZqciWlwzTWCC9KYXtasT+AHkCgYEAnP80dAUbpyvKvr/RxShr +JYW/PWZegChmIp+BViOXWvDLC3xwrqm+5yc59QVBrjwH2WYn+26zB0dzwPFxNyHP +GuiDMnvZ54zmve9foXGn7Gv+KjU53pvwSJqAGjeHAXr7W9c5uoVwBGv/kLPn8h1e ++KGO2X6iFeMq+cFNiNan9iECgYBj+oGnsKWFVeS2ls8LyMGNGzmAZF2opiZ8RHgU +DeIULS+zP8Qi3j92GdQyLxuGQlfiEvvfJzP9nOfWa5LC/4JIIUAHFo8LlT1+JHEe +FJKi9dBkXP7NN8DxcyruXpnxctFUarQttuytslmMt2cFiKuOI7I+qJUzoMu/sEZx +FeidcQKBgQCuralmtbl4nxjn3aR/ZgFTAKCL9WaJPh5hFJ9q4UuWxJdBX5z3Ey3/ +70ehLKYPumjmZtXynzz4BTWj1W9X+tgj/499uzV6LdQERGjT6WVy8xR9RELWW0an +N9N1IAc4qTSjbI4EIMwMBSAoFfCux/jfDkG4g+RDnpV92sqxz2CtKg== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_example_multi.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_example_multi.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0e3295dc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_example_multi.crt @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIICojCCAYqgAwIBAgIBETANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTkwNzEwMTEyNzUyWhcNMjkwNzEwMTEyNzUyWjA6MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGDAWBgNVBAMMD3d3dy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCBnzANBgkq +hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAxziSxcP0cBAIa/gTNezzARyKJQ+VgjYeqh6W +ElUarPh7dTMLcFcznNmV8U1MRDfIvsSgP+RkPNPzyQJDPcN8W455qgmEroITNwq/ +hWm9KjVibLH+5KzgQrJBfHvknScUmywHa45DPT9sdjpGmhxwDSWdvAjHQPzYAjdi +/33r/C0CAwEAAaM2MDQwMgYDVR0RBCswKYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb22CC2V4YW1wbGUu +bmV0gg0qLmV4YW1wbGUub3JnMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCJbFizurHz804x +6NbsvsPPgLcESq0OcGOEXOCOe8seZqomhSYTXtHBzrFtRp2/gmtORq2oapoDDiq+ +I+xRLJYsUBut2NdkZmEIRSW4n4sXJwqb0fXTTkd7EAXBvGNWbERab5Sbf84oqd4t +yjjz2u+Hvx8hZCHJG2V9qg3zaw5zJT1AfAsMbjXqi8CfU7U+Fcor+O3GeuUVgpJC +QCXb2Qjj3ZmrCvGZA9x59XtnEN6m2O4pWkmqR/Z7MlQrZzQ80vcQMk9+qoKIr2EJ +RcJhAtE+dLV19IlccwsDlGx5kT5N5zSYLK9nARV1/AjK48bUxGH353A1Y2MCfy0E +dXDReJa1 +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_example_multi_nocn.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_example_multi_nocn.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1634846e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_example_multi_nocn.crt @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIB/TCCAWagAwIBAgIJAPfGf/jpqWP5MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMA0xCzAJBgNV +BAYTAk5MMB4XDTE0MDEyMjEwMDQzM1oXDTI0MDEyMjEwMDQzM1owDTELMAkGA1UE +BhMCTkwwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAN0Rip+ZurBoyirqO2pt +WZftTslU5A3uzqB9oB6q6A7CuxNA24oSjokTJKXF9frY9ZDXyMrLxf6THa/aEiNz +UnlGGrqgVyt2FjGzqK/nOJsIi2OZOgol7kXSGFi6uZMa7dRYmmMbN/z3FAifhWVJ +81kybdHg6G3eUu1mtKkL2kCVAgMBAAGjZTBjMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwCwYDVR0PBAQD +AgXgMEkGA1UdEQRCMECCHHd3dy5zaG90b2thbi1icmF1bnNjaHdlaWcuZGWCFHd3 +dy5tYXNzaW1vLWFiYXRlLmV1hwTAqAEBhwTAqEWQMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4GB +ABjx1ytrqCyFC5/0cjWnbLK9vsvLny2ZikDewfRxqJ5zAxGWLqHOr1SmUmu2DrvB +bkT9g5z19+iMhPnzJz1x7Q2m7WTIJTuUPK+hKZJATDLNhZ86h5Nkw8k9YzKcOrPm +EIqsy55CSgLU0ntljqSBvSb4ifrF1NnIWej2lSfN6r+3 +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_example_wildcard.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_example_wildcard.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ab417c58 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_example_wildcard.crt @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDOzCCAiOgAwIBAgIBDDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA4MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxFjAUBgNVBAMMDSouZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wggEiMA0GCSqG +SIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCpAh89QGrVVVOL/TbugmUuFWFeib+46EWQ +2+6IFlLT8UNQR5YSWWSHa/0r4Eb5c77dz5LhkVvtZqBviSl5RYDQg2rVQUN3Xzl8 +CQRHgrBXOXDto+wVGR6oMwhHwQVCqf1Mw7Tf3QYfTRBRQGdzEw9A+G2BJV8KsVPG +MH4VOaz5Wu5/kp6mBVvnE5eFtSOS2dQkBtUJJYl1B92mGo8/CRm+rWUsZOuVm9z+ +QV4XptpsW2nMAroULBYknErczdD3Umdz8S2gI/1+9DHKLXDKiQsE2y6mT3Buns69 +WIniU1meblqSZeKIPwyUGaPd5eidlRPtKdurcBLcWsprF6tSglSxAgMBAAGjTTBL +MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFB901j8pwXR0RTsFEiw9qL1DWQKmMB8GA1Ud 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a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_md2.csr b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_md2.csr new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8c39bdb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_md2.csr @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- +MIICgTCCAWkCAQAwPDELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRow +GAYDVQQDDBFQb2xhclNTTCBDZXJ0IE1EMjCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP +ADCCAQoCggEBAMh0xMy5+bV56UXZFGCwfbuT8msenzOtDY+KPFZl5dxE2cxmhQfV ++CewSjXQY54Kbhu32vB+q+4MEJOGSRg086gq0lf1LtQvdymEYU2CUI+nlUhw9W5N +stUTw9Ia7eZD6kIU63TqwO0f1FdOqfOo7dLgwTBxMDIw1dP2CNBWT0aO8l/5PWeR +iDAuQrLfffvlDHf/7DHAeI+/wn/KrWwh1o3Zi2qOb+Cb+BBWzLOOExXmNARmx+75 +Ng5qlfYJmgZn9GVx+MqksSXg/jyLNQRnuuBPdoX8f/w2a7XpzS0DYk6zPQDPr3ag +aVaDatKo1OdQcea1NgV3BW17yOTE/UzVIV8CAwEAAaAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUA +A4IBAQBPUqodRcH2ZUa8A3fQX/nxrIwWiLmQ9BaOI6G7vzEWVE1sxmkrHP+pXgi9 +1eFceN9xUBKEd+LmUPmHpObZ4nwRSprFj3DeIXpn9aSBr+jGY8RaaC9cMkaSq5Mb 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/cert_md4.csr @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- +MIICgTCCAWkCAQAwPDELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRow +GAYDVQQDDBFQb2xhclNTTCBDZXJ0IE1ENDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP +ADCCAQoCggEBAMh0xMy5+bV56UXZFGCwfbuT8msenzOtDY+KPFZl5dxE2cxmhQfV ++CewSjXQY54Kbhu32vB+q+4MEJOGSRg086gq0lf1LtQvdymEYU2CUI+nlUhw9W5N +stUTw9Ia7eZD6kIU63TqwO0f1FdOqfOo7dLgwTBxMDIw1dP2CNBWT0aO8l/5PWeR +iDAuQrLfffvlDHf/7DHAeI+/wn/KrWwh1o3Zi2qOb+Cb+BBWzLOOExXmNARmx+75 +Ng5qlfYJmgZn9GVx+MqksSXg/jyLNQRnuuBPdoX8f/w2a7XpzS0DYk6zPQDPr3ag +aVaDatKo1OdQcea1NgV3BW17yOTE/UzVIV8CAwEAAaAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAwUA +A4IBAQAztRb+vAecvhelhszzCctzmhGs4TGmr9h4zddZoQ8dTdy1OCsnmU+yz3oh +oiQjy7UPLt8DS2ZKhGhvwPvtwFh5icMWQVnv2kE4Evz8xJT12VRw+U6L5rfKmf/L +mVNxsuk17MDyBcMlwuNk+CHrYVdrXhSWUH3UCQQUH1iqqBMKmNiPa1UGU0budZ9X +HZjn9uqyyOGy8l3hffqjDxsDjZyBDf5aqKIdnvukdrUiacPdUYVF0fwK8d1/1PA9 +dA4JjTvz+tTK6mL9Ic9Pv+64v1vwMU4Qu8IJHk5x3I0e7KuK2A/lK6az2Vb6FAh6 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file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..acba6a027604b8c80da7e9179c04a4316477e9fa GIT binary patch literal 121 zcmV-<0EYiCcLD(c1R(bJhGg+)f97P3@5)Z;-A(WX|CS<(dW1M+7cya(w<@3t1_&yK zNX|V20SBQ(13~} c${ME}.pem + + rm ${ME}.csr + i=$((i+1)) +done diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir1/test-ca.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir1/test-ca.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c1d14cd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir1/test-ca.crt @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: 0 (0x0) + Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA + Validity + Not Before: Feb 12 14:44:00 2011 GMT + Not After : Feb 12 14:44:00 2021 GMT + Subject: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) + Modulus (2048 bit): + 00:c0:df:37:fc:17:bb:e0:96:9d:3f:86:de:96:32: + 7d:44:a5:16:a0:cd:21:f1:99:d4:ec:ea:cb:7c:18: + 58:08:94:a5:ec:9b:c5:8b:df:1a:1e:99:38:99:87: + 1e:7b:c0:8d:39:df:38:5d:70:78:07:d3:9e:d9:93: + e8:b9:72:51:c5:ce:a3:30:52:a9:f2:e7:40:70:14: + cb:44:a2:72:0b:c2:e5:40:f9:3e:e5:a6:0e:b3:f9: + ec:4a:63:c0:b8:29:00:74:9c:57:3b:a8:a5:04:90: + 71:f1:bd:83:d9:3f:d6:a5:e2:3c:2a:8f:ef:27:60: + c3:c6:9f:cb:ba:ec:60:7d:b7:e6:84:32:be:4f:fb: + 58:26:22:03:5b:d4:b4:d5:fb:f5:e3:96:2e:70:c0: + e4:2e:bd:fc:2e:ee:e2:41:55:c0:34:2e:7d:24:72: + 69:cb:47:b1:14:40:83:7d:67:f4:86:f6:31:ab:f1: + 79:a4:b2:b5:2e:12:f9:84:17:f0:62:6f:27:3e:13: + 58:b1:54:0d:21:9a:73:37:a1:30:cf:6f:92:dc:f6: + e9:fc:ac:db:2e:28:d1:7e:02:4b:23:a0:15:f2:38: + 65:64:09:ea:0c:6e:8e:1b:17:a0:71:c8:b3:9b:c9: + ab:e9:c3:f2:cf:87:96:8f:80:02:32:9e:99:58:6f: + a2:d5 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: + CA:TRUE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + B4:5A:E4:A5:B3:DE:D2:52:F6:B9:D5:A6:95:0F:EB:3E:BC:C7:FD:FF + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + keyid:B4:5A:E4:A5:B3:DE:D2:52:F6:B9:D5:A6:95:0F:EB:3E:BC:C7:FD:FF + DirName:/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA + serial:00 + + Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption + b8:fd:54:d8:00:54:90:8b:25:b0:27:dd:95:cd:a2:f7:84:07: + 1d:87:89:4a:c4:78:11:d8:07:b5:d7:22:50:8e:48:eb:62:7a: + 32:89:be:63:47:53:ff:b6:be:f1:2e:8c:54:c0:99:3f:a0:b9: + 37:23:72:5f:0d:46:59:8f:d8:47:cd:97:4c:9f:07:0c:12:62: + 09:3a:24:e4:36:d9:e9:2c:da:38:d0:73:75:61:d7:c1:6c:26: + 8b:9b:e0:d5:dc:67:ed:8c:6b:33:d7:74:22:3c:4c:db:b5:8d: + 2a:ce:2c:0d:08:59:05:09:05:a6:39:9f:b3:67:1b:e2:83:e5: + e1:8f:53:f6:67:93:c7:f9:6f:76:44:58:12:e8:3a:d4:97:e7: + e9:c0:3e:a8:7a:72:3d:87:53:1f:e5:2c:84:84:e7:9a:9e:7f: + 66:d9:1f:9b:f5:13:48:b0:4d:14:d1:de:b2:24:d9:78:7d:f5: + 35:cc:58:19:d1:d2:99:ef:4d:73:f8:1f:89:d4:5a:d0:52:ce: + 09:f5:b1:46:51:6a:00:8e:3b:cc:6f:63:01:00:99:ed:9d:a6: + 08:60:cd:32:18:d0:73:e0:58:71:d9:e5:d2:53:d7:8d:d0:ca: + e9:5d:2a:0a:0d:5d:55:ec:21:50:17:16:e6:06:4a:cd:5e:de: + f7:e0:e9:54 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G +CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx +mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny +50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n +YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL +R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu +KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj +gZUwgZIwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH +/f8wYwYDVR0jBFwwWoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f+hP6Q9MDsxCzAJBgNV +BAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEZMBcGA1UEAxMQUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVz +dCBDQYIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAuP1U2ABUkIslsCfdlc2i94QHHYeJ +SsR4EdgHtdciUI5I62J6Mom+Y0dT/7a+8S6MVMCZP6C5NyNyXw1GWY/YR82XTJ8H +DBJiCTok5DbZ6SzaONBzdWHXwWwmi5vg1dxn7YxrM9d0IjxM27WNKs4sDQhZBQkF +pjmfs2cb4oPl4Y9T9meTx/lvdkRYEug61Jfn6cA+qHpyPYdTH+UshITnmp5/Ztkf +m/UTSLBNFNHesiTZeH31NcxYGdHSme9Nc/gfidRa0FLOCfWxRlFqAI47zG9jAQCZ +7Z2mCGDNMhjQc+BYcdnl0lPXjdDK6V0qCg1dVewhUBcW5gZKzV7e9+DpVA== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir2/test-ca.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir2/test-ca.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c1d14cd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir2/test-ca.crt @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: 0 (0x0) + Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA + Validity + Not Before: Feb 12 14:44:00 2011 GMT + Not After : Feb 12 14:44:00 2021 GMT + Subject: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) + Modulus (2048 bit): + 00:c0:df:37:fc:17:bb:e0:96:9d:3f:86:de:96:32: + 7d:44:a5:16:a0:cd:21:f1:99:d4:ec:ea:cb:7c:18: + 58:08:94:a5:ec:9b:c5:8b:df:1a:1e:99:38:99:87: + 1e:7b:c0:8d:39:df:38:5d:70:78:07:d3:9e:d9:93: + e8:b9:72:51:c5:ce:a3:30:52:a9:f2:e7:40:70:14: + cb:44:a2:72:0b:c2:e5:40:f9:3e:e5:a6:0e:b3:f9: + ec:4a:63:c0:b8:29:00:74:9c:57:3b:a8:a5:04:90: + 71:f1:bd:83:d9:3f:d6:a5:e2:3c:2a:8f:ef:27:60: + c3:c6:9f:cb:ba:ec:60:7d:b7:e6:84:32:be:4f:fb: + 58:26:22:03:5b:d4:b4:d5:fb:f5:e3:96:2e:70:c0: + e4:2e:bd:fc:2e:ee:e2:41:55:c0:34:2e:7d:24:72: + 69:cb:47:b1:14:40:83:7d:67:f4:86:f6:31:ab:f1: + 79:a4:b2:b5:2e:12:f9:84:17:f0:62:6f:27:3e:13: + 58:b1:54:0d:21:9a:73:37:a1:30:cf:6f:92:dc:f6: + e9:fc:ac:db:2e:28:d1:7e:02:4b:23:a0:15:f2:38: + 65:64:09:ea:0c:6e:8e:1b:17:a0:71:c8:b3:9b:c9: + ab:e9:c3:f2:cf:87:96:8f:80:02:32:9e:99:58:6f: + a2:d5 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: + CA:TRUE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + B4:5A:E4:A5:B3:DE:D2:52:F6:B9:D5:A6:95:0F:EB:3E:BC:C7:FD:FF + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + keyid:B4:5A:E4:A5:B3:DE:D2:52:F6:B9:D5:A6:95:0F:EB:3E:BC:C7:FD:FF + DirName:/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA + serial:00 + + Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption + b8:fd:54:d8:00:54:90:8b:25:b0:27:dd:95:cd:a2:f7:84:07: + 1d:87:89:4a:c4:78:11:d8:07:b5:d7:22:50:8e:48:eb:62:7a: + 32:89:be:63:47:53:ff:b6:be:f1:2e:8c:54:c0:99:3f:a0:b9: + 37:23:72:5f:0d:46:59:8f:d8:47:cd:97:4c:9f:07:0c:12:62: + 09:3a:24:e4:36:d9:e9:2c:da:38:d0:73:75:61:d7:c1:6c:26: + 8b:9b:e0:d5:dc:67:ed:8c:6b:33:d7:74:22:3c:4c:db:b5:8d: + 2a:ce:2c:0d:08:59:05:09:05:a6:39:9f:b3:67:1b:e2:83:e5: + e1:8f:53:f6:67:93:c7:f9:6f:76:44:58:12:e8:3a:d4:97:e7: + e9:c0:3e:a8:7a:72:3d:87:53:1f:e5:2c:84:84:e7:9a:9e:7f: + 66:d9:1f:9b:f5:13:48:b0:4d:14:d1:de:b2:24:d9:78:7d:f5: + 35:cc:58:19:d1:d2:99:ef:4d:73:f8:1f:89:d4:5a:d0:52:ce: + 09:f5:b1:46:51:6a:00:8e:3b:cc:6f:63:01:00:99:ed:9d:a6: + 08:60:cd:32:18:d0:73:e0:58:71:d9:e5:d2:53:d7:8d:d0:ca: + e9:5d:2a:0a:0d:5d:55:ec:21:50:17:16:e6:06:4a:cd:5e:de: + f7:e0:e9:54 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G +CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx +mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny +50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n +YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL +R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu +KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj +gZUwgZIwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH +/f8wYwYDVR0jBFwwWoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f+hP6Q9MDsxCzAJBgNV +BAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEZMBcGA1UEAxMQUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVz +dCBDQYIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAuP1U2ABUkIslsCfdlc2i94QHHYeJ +SsR4EdgHtdciUI5I62J6Mom+Y0dT/7a+8S6MVMCZP6C5NyNyXw1GWY/YR82XTJ8H +DBJiCTok5DbZ6SzaONBzdWHXwWwmi5vg1dxn7YxrM9d0IjxM27WNKs4sDQhZBQkF +pjmfs2cb4oPl4Y9T9meTx/lvdkRYEug61Jfn6cA+qHpyPYdTH+UshITnmp5/Ztkf +m/UTSLBNFNHesiTZeH31NcxYGdHSme9Nc/gfidRa0FLOCfWxRlFqAI47zG9jAQCZ +7Z2mCGDNMhjQc+BYcdnl0lPXjdDK6V0qCg1dVewhUBcW5gZKzV7e9+DpVA== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir2/test-ca2.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir2/test-ca2.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d41a420e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir2/test-ca2.crt @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIICUjCCAdegAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYT +Ak5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBF +QyBDQTAeFw0xMzA5MjQxNTQ5NDhaFw0yMzA5MjIxNTQ5NDhaMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYT +Ak5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBF +QyBDQTB2MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IABMPaKzRBN1gvh1b+/Im6KUNLTuBu +ww5XUzM5WNRStJGVOQsj318XJGJI/BqVKc4sLYfCiFKAr9ZqqyHduNMcbli4yuiy +aY7zQa0pw7RfdadHb9UZKVVpmlM7ILRmFmAzHqOBoDCBnTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUnW0g +JEkBPyvLeLUZvH4kydv7NnwwbgYDVR0jBGcwZYAUnW0gJEkBPyvLeLUZvH4kydv7 +NnyhQqRAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UE +AxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQYIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8w +CgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDaQAwZgIxAMO0YnNWKJUAfXgSJtJxexn4ipg+kv4znuR50v56 +t4d0PCu412mUC6Nnd7izvtE2MgIxAP1nnJQjZ8BWukszFQDG48wxCCyci9qpdSMv +uCjn8pwUOkABXK8Mss90fzCfCEOtIA== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir3/Readme b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir3/Readme new file mode 100644 index 00000000..189dadc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir3/Readme @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +This is just to make sure files that don't parse as certs are ignored. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir3/test-ca.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir3/test-ca.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c1d14cd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir3/test-ca.crt @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: 0 (0x0) + Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA + Validity + Not Before: Feb 12 14:44:00 2011 GMT + Not After : Feb 12 14:44:00 2021 GMT + Subject: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) + Modulus (2048 bit): + 00:c0:df:37:fc:17:bb:e0:96:9d:3f:86:de:96:32: + 7d:44:a5:16:a0:cd:21:f1:99:d4:ec:ea:cb:7c:18: + 58:08:94:a5:ec:9b:c5:8b:df:1a:1e:99:38:99:87: + 1e:7b:c0:8d:39:df:38:5d:70:78:07:d3:9e:d9:93: + e8:b9:72:51:c5:ce:a3:30:52:a9:f2:e7:40:70:14: + cb:44:a2:72:0b:c2:e5:40:f9:3e:e5:a6:0e:b3:f9: + ec:4a:63:c0:b8:29:00:74:9c:57:3b:a8:a5:04:90: + 71:f1:bd:83:d9:3f:d6:a5:e2:3c:2a:8f:ef:27:60: + c3:c6:9f:cb:ba:ec:60:7d:b7:e6:84:32:be:4f:fb: + 58:26:22:03:5b:d4:b4:d5:fb:f5:e3:96:2e:70:c0: + e4:2e:bd:fc:2e:ee:e2:41:55:c0:34:2e:7d:24:72: + 69:cb:47:b1:14:40:83:7d:67:f4:86:f6:31:ab:f1: + 79:a4:b2:b5:2e:12:f9:84:17:f0:62:6f:27:3e:13: + 58:b1:54:0d:21:9a:73:37:a1:30:cf:6f:92:dc:f6: + e9:fc:ac:db:2e:28:d1:7e:02:4b:23:a0:15:f2:38: + 65:64:09:ea:0c:6e:8e:1b:17:a0:71:c8:b3:9b:c9: + ab:e9:c3:f2:cf:87:96:8f:80:02:32:9e:99:58:6f: + a2:d5 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: + CA:TRUE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + B4:5A:E4:A5:B3:DE:D2:52:F6:B9:D5:A6:95:0F:EB:3E:BC:C7:FD:FF + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + keyid:B4:5A:E4:A5:B3:DE:D2:52:F6:B9:D5:A6:95:0F:EB:3E:BC:C7:FD:FF + DirName:/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA + serial:00 + + Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption + b8:fd:54:d8:00:54:90:8b:25:b0:27:dd:95:cd:a2:f7:84:07: + 1d:87:89:4a:c4:78:11:d8:07:b5:d7:22:50:8e:48:eb:62:7a: + 32:89:be:63:47:53:ff:b6:be:f1:2e:8c:54:c0:99:3f:a0:b9: + 37:23:72:5f:0d:46:59:8f:d8:47:cd:97:4c:9f:07:0c:12:62: + 09:3a:24:e4:36:d9:e9:2c:da:38:d0:73:75:61:d7:c1:6c:26: + 8b:9b:e0:d5:dc:67:ed:8c:6b:33:d7:74:22:3c:4c:db:b5:8d: + 2a:ce:2c:0d:08:59:05:09:05:a6:39:9f:b3:67:1b:e2:83:e5: + e1:8f:53:f6:67:93:c7:f9:6f:76:44:58:12:e8:3a:d4:97:e7: + e9:c0:3e:a8:7a:72:3d:87:53:1f:e5:2c:84:84:e7:9a:9e:7f: + 66:d9:1f:9b:f5:13:48:b0:4d:14:d1:de:b2:24:d9:78:7d:f5: + 35:cc:58:19:d1:d2:99:ef:4d:73:f8:1f:89:d4:5a:d0:52:ce: + 09:f5:b1:46:51:6a:00:8e:3b:cc:6f:63:01:00:99:ed:9d:a6: + 08:60:cd:32:18:d0:73:e0:58:71:d9:e5:d2:53:d7:8d:d0:ca: + e9:5d:2a:0a:0d:5d:55:ec:21:50:17:16:e6:06:4a:cd:5e:de: + f7:e0:e9:54 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G +CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx +mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny +50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n +YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL +R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu +KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj +gZUwgZIwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH +/f8wYwYDVR0jBFwwWoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f+hP6Q9MDsxCzAJBgNV +BAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEZMBcGA1UEAxMQUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVz +dCBDQYIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAuP1U2ABUkIslsCfdlc2i94QHHYeJ +SsR4EdgHtdciUI5I62J6Mom+Y0dT/7a+8S6MVMCZP6C5NyNyXw1GWY/YR82XTJ8H +DBJiCTok5DbZ6SzaONBzdWHXwWwmi5vg1dxn7YxrM9d0IjxM27WNKs4sDQhZBQkF +pjmfs2cb4oPl4Y9T9meTx/lvdkRYEug61Jfn6cA+qHpyPYdTH+UshITnmp5/Ztkf +m/UTSLBNFNHesiTZeH31NcxYGdHSme9Nc/gfidRa0FLOCfWxRlFqAI47zG9jAQCZ +7Z2mCGDNMhjQc+BYcdnl0lPXjdDK6V0qCg1dVewhUBcW5gZKzV7e9+DpVA== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir3/test-ca2.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir3/test-ca2.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d41a420e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir3/test-ca2.crt @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIICUjCCAdegAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYT +Ak5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBF +QyBDQTAeFw0xMzA5MjQxNTQ5NDhaFw0yMzA5MjIxNTQ5NDhaMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYT +Ak5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBF +QyBDQTB2MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IABMPaKzRBN1gvh1b+/Im6KUNLTuBu +ww5XUzM5WNRStJGVOQsj318XJGJI/BqVKc4sLYfCiFKAr9ZqqyHduNMcbli4yuiy +aY7zQa0pw7RfdadHb9UZKVVpmlM7ILRmFmAzHqOBoDCBnTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUnW0g +JEkBPyvLeLUZvH4kydv7NnwwbgYDVR0jBGcwZYAUnW0gJEkBPyvLeLUZvH4kydv7 +NnyhQqRAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UE +AxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQYIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8w +CgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDaQAwZgIxAMO0YnNWKJUAfXgSJtJxexn4ipg+kv4znuR50v56 +t4d0PCu412mUC6Nnd7izvtE2MgIxAP1nnJQjZ8BWukszFQDG48wxCCyci9qpdSMv +uCjn8pwUOkABXK8Mss90fzCfCEOtIA== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/Readme b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/Readme new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f1f610b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/Readme @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +This directory contains the certificates for the tests targeting the enforcement of the policy indicated by the *pathLenConstraint* field. All leaf elements were generated with *is_ca* unset and all roots with the *selfsign=1* option. + +1. zero pathlen constraint on an intermediate CA (invalid) +``` +cert11.crt -> cert12.crt (max_pathlen=0) -> cert13.crt -> cert14.crt +``` + +2. zero pathlen constraint on the root CA (invalid) +``` +cert21.crt (max_pathlen=0) -> cert22.crt -> cert23.crt +``` + +3. nonzero pathlen constraint on the root CA (invalid) +``` +cert31.crt (max_pathlen=1) -> cert32.crt -> cert33.crt -> cert34.crt +``` + +4. nonzero pathlen constraint on an intermediate CA (invalid) +``` +cert41.crt -> cert42.crt (max_pathlen=1) -> cert43.crt -> cert44.crt -> cert45.crt +``` + +5. nonzero pathlen constraint on an intermediate CA with maximum number of elements in the chain (valid) +``` +cert51.crt -> cert52.crt (max_pathlen=1) -> cert53.crt -> cert54.crt +``` + +6. nonzero pathlen constraint on the root CA with maximum number of elements in the chain (valid) +``` +cert61.crt (max_pathlen=1) -> cert62.crt -> cert63.crt +``` + +7. pathlen constraint on the root CA with maximum number of elements and a self signed certificate in the chain (valid) +(This situation happens for example when a root of some hierarchy gets integrated into another hierarchy. In this case the certificates issued before the integration will have an intermadiate self signed certificate in their chain) +``` +cert71.crt (max_pathlen=1) -> cert72.crt -> cert73.crt (self signed) -> cert74.crt -> cert74.crt +``` + +8. zero pathlen constraint on first intermediate CA (valid) +``` +cert81.crt -> cert82.crt (max_pathlen=0) -> cert83.crt +``` + +9. zero pathlen constraint on trusted root (valid) +``` +cert91.crt (max_pathlen=0) -> cert92.crt +``` diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert11.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert11.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3077c3da --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert11.crt @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIC9zCCAd+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDEwtUZXN0 +IHJvb3QgMjAeFw0wMTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaFw0zMDEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMBYxFDASBgNV +BAMTC1Rlc3Qgcm9vdCAyMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA +hqLw+KDH8+tkX9hphnydOZFoueGTY5v8WdYI6KZXoIln9IAu4Rmb6M59uLziXurg +VKuwBqOkbUZsIY0NOA6C8FpdjZL1di8Viq669vBBs9c+x9hKpx8/VVcZfTaGgqni +h5XiivQynBQ4E2KOxEQ+VjUMDqIBHYG1VXWs4KMkAeJsqDYHtmS4XsC9TXTIri5S +9IX4mE5A9+ngSTo0/6Sjwcd27uO2IQHXDC7jkxX5OH5jFPAqsVKTYDeWlCU7bvbr +iy1H9Z9uCl+M7unbAl8BKQ8leOnno3KO3lQQAPGP2EFRT0XMuUXJnfydPbzMa9FY +ufB1I8zCBZviPvO/Of3yrwIDAQABo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQEBMB0GA1UdDgQW +BBSUHSH6gjrYFZnS1gDvk7BpfwTKwDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSUHSH6gjrYFZnS1gDv +k7BpfwTKwDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEATLqZGFEBO+2IiHjkn7pBkAuktmHm +jkkuFLONwe0vlxZFaabaFqSgkoS5eZ50D0dmuUkpJRNMnGK1B/ja5RewtAdxD6us +VT8JpeWYkhxaSIHjUW95jJLMVr17it8jHawI05tD26nqDjTq3C2rM4ExpAaK/Dgv +83ZHe4IdvenkXckDMIjmSsK0GfomZmKvmnfxhg4FnQvZGI48JJUqPA2dHxRhUyr4 +ohBmH5Xi5oLICd85GRi8YqD00agKL99EjGulaKNEdsQkrC4ZvY6QDV0EEnbu8b4R +GfiA42UWN2dKNSqNhBOrP9g5yTcIWXh1Dwpd1Z9vhBCwmBegPqqM5IM1dQ== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert12.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert12.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd88c2d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert12.crt @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDCjCCAfKgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDEwtUZXN0 +IHJvb3QgMjAeFw0wMTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaFw0zMDEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMCYxJDAiBgNV +BAMTG1Rlc3QgaW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIG1heHBhdGggMTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB +BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANJrP7/Y+KjupvlgaOmQYArfGuoh3CzcdPe/mlhq+fxD +8U9qzgSVuVR+FpNZi9DyMljMBrWV1OnZI+cVCDYYkNMa3IkV+AkzJGqwcSBKE+6N +RXZvv+I4xbGymdSSaT6Kh1PgPVk/EYNfLFF30pBsycjM81aMtZgW6aA9xCSp0r8W +XkZodsrJUQerDh/7VmDVEeKanZog8auvrvs/ENiA8d4p/75lOIER4nLz6SSn5Eqy +uXzNCwmT5PVwWStXbDD7EBs3rOtR2VNWQ9o6QdfKQOe/SkIddZr1IWGEJ8JHjtNo +jxcYO67A+Jgp1Jwjk+83eRICs0hlWyeHWfBlbOVIKLcCAwEAAaNTMFEwDwYDVR0T +BAgwBgEBAQIBADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUyw8Phy/FAvifGQ+G6HWkMiWzyqUwHwYDVR0j +BBgwFoAUlB0h+oI62BWZ0tYA75OwaX8EysAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBACFS +6tFy9TpVMUfh1mkr3rFEVtho0NJkRhJW8z2PTmKQa069S9gS+U6+CsqwvM1y3yyh +Pt2q34fhhhbQ+gS8iAm+zvQtBsys3frfVkeKmRzxWDh2LnT+tJi/xtqdlULua5NB +21So46HdlceDTuv2vUbrHgxUS/IEjIL6OZZ0Sc6S6YybvGSioGsRUHO2k2IiOnUa +C+hpBvOkXScnItfdMKAAce71CsZeN97sbxeNIMBDiX9bSy+dZLscEhRwBUABiNr/ +sYdYvIpbrFXowjMtBdac+vvhcem7dkCrCdsGylGINWhE2tC9hKmFkFXo4mu/AGDS +M4/59TlMeK8X+WZ9zBs= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert13.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert13.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac01a22c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert13.crt @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAmMSQwIgYDVQQDExtUZXN0 +IGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBtYXhwYXRoIDEwHhcNMDEwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNMzAxMjMx +MjM1OTU5WjAmMSQwIgYDVQQDExtUZXN0IGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBtYXhwYXRoIDIw +ggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCs0qdKXytu/GTKpa2H0CE3 +OPSIMM2hiYbavzUroyL+hFv9XVoxh5CGnVUxK7B9ifVvzyElrcV7tjuIlGwp1hLH +tx/YU22xksI/n5/NS/qrxkK5xjwEWB9lx93rwLK0QnfjYRZrir7yySoBKi6IlHOv +GOwl0V/JAslMWwUZlFmvYvoCWSWGrDAkxWVnHq+HoZ7YoM/bdJdsIIJYe3tt7L8D +cJVP5dQ8jSs8/Ehm8BbG339r3B7v/KdK8zuoMig9ag/YOu9jOb0QvYC2HdZoL4WV +N+7aasTQmDGWGOt7fk7AEl0EI8lDvr2O/5q6ad9jRCkxyq3lJwRy+M3MdVKgA1On +AgMBAAGjUDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAQEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFM6u5Gkjkxb8PDdQIGKD +D8t1Zv/9MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMsPD4cvxQL4nxkPhuh1pDIls8qlMA0GCSqGSIb3 +DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCLpKATt01DUM8wCiDFVSpmpiCBqxnLRfQuY+ta1p+f15LME+cT +94lwaYCfCBtXQYwiuVFYdK8ztWEStPg6BecMLPB2K9gO/talxUoVDumsmR83p+2y +8YJmFHyjr+BShsjP9paCjUQkJiMOiWRpNFNpScv0IOHmb8NLER3vX/tCmxyVHPg/ +7tBpDXRD6jOyajYH4KUx6wddcYWb63N9sApVpRHNaqpUKjuiQwfUFZjA7AyK/FUS +/cO3++uq+CkZhBu8vupaznXD4h0E28GbZgvu/F0edB7f0Q5DpnuDJ6HFMYl3A2mM +m8pqKNnRYGCtQwppBYVsoBisga2ymtNud7K+ +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert14.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert14.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49e1cbb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert14.crt @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDDDCCAfSgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAmMSQwIgYDVQQDExtUZXN0 +IGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBtYXhwYXRoIDIwHhcNMDEwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNMzAxMjMx +MjM1OTU5WjAeMRwwGgYDVQQDExNUZXN0IGxlYWYgaW52YWxpZCAzMIIBIjANBgkq +hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAw6Vc/T2GYTWj7nGZcy2voZyeWkFyfDIy +oexyJe8eyuWX+YqaSCra1JMcww0Jy8e9/6/aI9ezd1d73eZDcW5h61tagCpBki+W +dYh+FJfCdDdPnSkitWOBLKBK21AQ9dxePvkQBEanDdAk2IwasydCoHEiSCqwXNEz +jVJPL38ibbLf9sNO3kk6zOFA3QqVSTJ4BddNh9bHL7y106ekfMhrfyTzSpo3Wj0V +20ThmJZ1NuwYRl3j1XHALP0t8Cp2ZLbXuFsTWqTFNzXj+gWM8b2IfZqmqcew5poZ +4aDkjXXOizRxDPxCHp7rLz9xv1pIIBxady0YWp+w9vxLxFF6rYBLtQIDAQABo00w +SzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQoF/qrn9WnKV3zOnCwMl99Uhmx8DAfBgNV +HSMEGDAWgBTOruRpI5MW/Dw3UCBigw/LdWb//TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA 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00000000..5dcd65de --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert22.crt @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDBzCCAe+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDEwtUZXN0 +IHJvb3QgMjAeFw0wMTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaFw0zMDEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMCYxJDAiBgNV +BAMTG1Rlc3QgaW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIG1heHBhdGggMTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB +BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANpGlBMXdo8cO9oqUw/b6PMwiMNV8LCe6wB9VKHPa6OG +Q0o8Xqktgwnh1rojgpMhbCApE7UXeMr6ZGq/NtqmO1hO5adV5JehWZyvg7j4EBpG +g8iWo0jNpKMJ0Yx1uBkkljEdZLTHa4bK/zy2NKqDNS2yWs9/M5+xw5XE2ecAg7FT +cXhf3q50V+M6T2IaQ9BxntTyCT8IIF2eRM/t9Y944s9Rfzm/KQVKRYPudX7YhTt9 +iqCJB4JoqYhs3HEO0wPkJxY4KBTUCN94s+7jUFdRrYxe+8Ya6tIYWqD38i5qdGhY +xrVey1LatsDJQ2EgNYobM/LjoCLK1WUssEqf0OU2bi0CAwEAAaNQME4wDAYDVR0T +BAUwAwEBATAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOBl8edVm/H5xdS2EGEeLzftZ/DUwHwYDVR0jBBgw +FoAUjgXdXx9NGPa+UvHBC4//SE+ARpQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAFwZriTu +DKkiDHFfz3UX4fIxYTHCi4TveYZGPeTbxhBb3XZC5qDF4T5HvCTSkG9+oFfZzI1a 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert31.crt @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIC+jCCAeKgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDEwtUZXN0 +IHJvb3QgMjAeFw0wMTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaFw0zMDEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMBYxFDASBgNV +BAMTC1Rlc3Qgcm9vdCAyMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA +mTX2sHY42Ord9gWyB6GcdlLjjE+4zBJ1BoDpMnvJ89niMTuZTq1ViMp/B6RuTH+2 +YF3+riZYQDH9yM/8rgvAUIvK9STaq19Zrm0mnfQUo9yKdkfoJ+XvWuvK6f+NkAMg +xfhAD6eSupigTvov/w2IT8rS0dxo4KF6hKBL2aYlXhiEyi/NmsEPZWvVh+qk3L/Q +GSwpgC+DhVoQzFRofUdK9O9MkgR675iftaFDvyi7F0fxrSLfB/Wy4cgRYzIW6pyN +2sXWivKdLI3bgB01ffdbO17ZAGILK1whO29/bX6hbH09Y/H7jR2vjy+KP9N0PEa3 +7SBymlokB3A8wq/LWPYPeQIDAQABo1MwUTAPBgNVHRMECDAGAQEBAgEBMB0GA1Ud +DgQWBBSOBd1fH00Y9r5S8cELj/9IT4BGlDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSOBd1fH00Y9r5S +8cELj/9IT4BGlDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAB9nLaqxsBW0isDaBGNJyzH9O +WqYY0hex9tm3UqygfE9b9aahykpkowQIzh4D9Xpbd0hZGVlK/sw2qsKj6gDOiMtL +uWs4gaFNWIQqhVsTzL88c7XaW55n+TRQdVZyy38DZVWphte1Mumc9WB8N15rZTDh 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a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert51.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert51.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7065c942 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert51.crt @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIC9zCCAd+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDEwtUZXN0 +IHJvb3QgNDAeFw0wMTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaFw0zMDEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMBYxFDASBgNV +BAMTC1Rlc3Qgcm9vdCA0MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA +mTX2sHY42Ord9gWyB6GcdlLjjE+4zBJ1BoDpMnvJ89niMTuZTq1ViMp/B6RuTH+2 +YF3+riZYQDH9yM/8rgvAUIvK9STaq19Zrm0mnfQUo9yKdkfoJ+XvWuvK6f+NkAMg +xfhAD6eSupigTvov/w2IT8rS0dxo4KF6hKBL2aYlXhiEyi/NmsEPZWvVh+qk3L/Q +GSwpgC+DhVoQzFRofUdK9O9MkgR675iftaFDvyi7F0fxrSLfB/Wy4cgRYzIW6pyN +2sXWivKdLI3bgB01ffdbO17ZAGILK1whO29/bX6hbH09Y/H7jR2vjy+KP9N0PEa3 +7SBymlokB3A8wq/LWPYPeQIDAQABo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQEBMB0GA1UdDgQW +BBSOBd1fH00Y9r5S8cELj/9IT4BGlDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSOBd1fH00Y9r5S8cEL 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert53.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8e5d192b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert53.crt @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAmMSQwIgYDVQQDExtUZXN0 +IGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBtYXhwYXRoIDEwHhcNMDEwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhcNMzAxMjMx +MjM1OTU5WjAmMSQwIgYDVQQDExtUZXN0IGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBtYXhwYXRoIDIw +ggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCKAaAcY1Y2QRZYWft5pTiQ +LZaNHdG1wGyhbUyVCd1S/BZQeBxt8iDueHro6LpeXcioAyMePUnQQ8ZzBN+Yt1pG +83fwqNMyHf8WIWutQvQw2CIbGORO2FaCx9XgL+Le9ENMJb7ZQwV13r7PuHAV/6V1 +OwI/1Cn73cZ2uyWu8BHZbSqMctQsAkaT/pbPEUbrF4KB2GSigM+mux+Vkn9w3VK6 +pNg5pUwCP0lqi9K1RNWEXyi4NQumrR+IEiaiV05twZ1oBaWBGXSTw12hIulZ3/v6 +GLiwfk9I5mr7yDWVDdyCsTu1rhfen+Lp4ClyfWHISRPL1mko4W9leczgPWPz4pIp +AgMBAAGjUDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAQEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFMI3a8MtjW1x6dPPJGaV +LhMF7bGKMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFDgZfHnVZvx+cXUthBhHi837Wfw1MA0GCSqGSIb3 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mode 100644 index 00000000..8c2af4c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert61.crt @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIC+jCCAeKgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDEwtUZXN0 +IHJvb3QgMjAeFw0wMTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaFw0zMDEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMBYxFDASBgNV +BAMTC1Rlc3Qgcm9vdCAyMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA +mTX2sHY42Ord9gWyB6GcdlLjjE+4zBJ1BoDpMnvJ89niMTuZTq1ViMp/B6RuTH+2 +YF3+riZYQDH9yM/8rgvAUIvK9STaq19Zrm0mnfQUo9yKdkfoJ+XvWuvK6f+NkAMg +xfhAD6eSupigTvov/w2IT8rS0dxo4KF6hKBL2aYlXhiEyi/NmsEPZWvVh+qk3L/Q +GSwpgC+DhVoQzFRofUdK9O9MkgR675iftaFDvyi7F0fxrSLfB/Wy4cgRYzIW6pyN +2sXWivKdLI3bgB01ffdbO17ZAGILK1whO29/bX6hbH09Y/H7jR2vjy+KP9N0PEa3 +7SBymlokB3A8wq/LWPYPeQIDAQABo1MwUTAPBgNVHRMECDAGAQEBAgEBMB0GA1Ud +DgQWBBSOBd1fH00Y9r5S8cELj/9IT4BGlDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSOBd1fH00Y9r5S +8cELj/9IT4BGlDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAB9nLaqxsBW0isDaBGNJyzH9O +WqYY0hex9tm3UqygfE9b9aahykpkowQIzh4D9Xpbd0hZGVlK/sw2qsKj6gDOiMtL 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+-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert91.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert91.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d4605a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert91.crt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBqTCCAUygAwIBAgIBWzAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMDExDzANBgNVBAMTBlJvb3Qg +OTERMA8GA1UEChMIbWJlZCBUTFMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMB4XDTAxMDEwMTAwMDAw +MFoXDTMwMTIzMTIzNTk1OVowMTEPMA0GA1UEAxMGUm9vdCA5MREwDwYDVQQKEwht +YmVkIFRMUzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVUswWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATh +D2SmdS6D7cYi2vGMyuCdol/OOUN2di2pS2wfSI/MsY/Z4O9iNHqbXQP6l+hcT5ap +daycs7r6ZPNqmWM7b16go1MwUTAPBgNVHRMECDAGAQH/AgEAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRb +zVrcAxddj0i0DEqvTGT8F37bizAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRbzVrcAxddj0i0DEqvTGT8 +F37bizAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAA0kAMEYCIQDbrSV4ndH0vAR3HqJfBn8NT8zdvMjB +qSJes6Qwa42b2wIhAKyoH0H+b1Svw8pMkvUYF4ElH5Cnn7gxb7Wl3arc0+hQ +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert92.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert92.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49b53a5b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/dir4/cert92.crt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBoTCCAUWgAwIBAgIBXDAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMDExDzANBgNVBAMTBlJvb3Qg +OTERMA8GA1UEChMIbWJlZCBUTFMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMB4XDTAxMDEwMTAwMDAw +MFoXDTMwMTIzMTIzNTk1OVowMDEOMAwGA1UEAxMFRUUgOTIxETAPBgNVBAoTCG1i +ZWQgVExTMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABC9E +tK1pE8Ei8vgScunyjx50C+qDsQS8D2RhGHC4VkE2yyiFxJA/ynhoeXTKZsHuEWI9 +CfOSvk0RrTWf9nr0pTGjTTBLMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLqsN52tAf1k +XlzxQmdD5qG6Sy6PMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFFvNWtwDF12PSLQMSq9MZPwXftuLMAwG +CCqGSM49BAMCBQADSAAwRQIgXlfKqhkhXgK112Eycl+Z5NHM+6aqXE7i9j7IyGfk +ikICIQDBYNGbpSx82XG+IS/h4AWNTa4Hs6rmWvQDWJum7NrzMQ== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_224_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_224_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ebb83a02 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_224_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MGgCAQEEHGhJ+X0QZvaZd1ljfH44mUZM7j7HrJcGU6C+B0KgBwYFK4EEACGhPAM6 +AAQWk6KQ9/C1cf4rQdXYSwEydjH0qGD5lfozLAl/VBkrsQ8AET8q/7E8GiTORJFF +calUQK4BSgDL9w== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_224_pub.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_224_pub.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2da54a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_224_pub.pem @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +ME4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACEDOgAEFpOikPfwtXH+K0HV2EsBMnYx9Khg+ZX6 +MywJf1QZK7EPABE/Kv+xPBokzkSRRXGpVECuAUoAy/c= +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5141e30b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MHcCAQEEIIcex4mqXsQamUKTVf8vXmTAJrQvGjh5mXG8p9+OR4xAoAoGCCqGSM49 +AwEHoUQDQgAEqJ2HQjPpc6fDwE/vSa6U35USXawkTo98y4U6NsAl+rOGuqMPEFXf +P1Srm/Jrzwa/RuppRL5kgyAsGJTUmwZEzQ== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_256_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_256_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e42dd4a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_256_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MHcCAQEEIEnJqMGMS4hWOMQxzx3xyZQTFgm1gNT9Q6DKsX2y8T7uoAoGCCqGSM49 +AwEHoUQDQgAEd3Jlb4FLOZJ51eHxeB+sbwmaPFyhsONTUYNLCLZeC1clkM2vj3aT +YbzzSs/BHl4HToQmvd4Evm5lOUVElhfeRQ== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_256_pub.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_256_pub.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..701da02f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_256_pub.pem @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEd3Jlb4FLOZJ51eHxeB+sbwmaPFyh +sONTUYNLCLZeC1clkM2vj3aTYbzzSs/BHl4HToQmvd4Evm5lOUVElhfeRQ== +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_384_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_384_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7890759b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_384_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MIGkAgEBBDA/XY2b4oC1aWzFzJ+Uz4r35rYd1lkrKrKzpMYHRQQX7DJ9zcrtfBAF +PXGaBXTwp2qgBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAATZxmK1C6KcpHmQRQ4EOur08MabFWdtES9i +KnHJMFmvmZaRxWgNK0TREVedsS9KQTou1cRfz7Z7W2PgC5Hr5Z0JprGsLAxCgqoS +MX7VkU+Zm8SIuxMug0LMNvLKXjN5x0c= +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_384_pub.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_384_pub.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..de95382e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_384_pub.pem @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAE2cZitQuinKR5kEUOBDrq9PDGmxVnbREv +YipxyTBZr5mWkcVoDStE0RFXnbEvSkE6LtXEX8+2e1tj4AuR6+WdCaaxrCwMQoKq +EjF+1ZFPmZvEiLsTLoNCzDbyyl4zecdH +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_521_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_521_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..144bb44b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_521_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MIHcAgEBBEIBsbatB7t55zINpZhg6ijgVShPYFjyed5mbgbUNdKve9oo2Z+ke33Q +lj4WsAcweO6LijjZZqWC9G0Z/5XfOtloWq6gBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAAd4ULV +T2nrA47kt6+dPKB3Nv2c9xnrNU1ph57n88E2+w+/nwj4a+X6Eo7BoFHT5sZD6Fra +j/rPNmPCYL0shEtvVgDO6OSKnmXQnK3YnyNd7gXzuKZGvnFfH2fVtDTg/yOh/Afv +d0AZPkDu/287zf12WqkVUDNST+TyBfVETiksTC9qwQ== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_521_pub.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_521_pub.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..26bc5c51 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_521_pub.pem @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MIGbMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjA4GGAAQAHeFC1U9p6wOO5LevnTygdzb9nPcZ +6zVNaYee5/PBNvsPv58I+Gvl+hKOwaBR0+bGQ+ha2o/6zzZjwmC9LIRLb1YAzujk +ip5l0Jyt2J8jXe4F87imRr5xXx9n1bQ04P8jofwH73dAGT5A7v9vO839dlqpFVAz +Uk/k8gX1RE4pLEwvasE= +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..427b7ad4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MIHcAgEBBEIAOXdk7W+Hf5L7Hc9fKe44wmpaRNs5ERFTkv5CrlXv/Bu3y28M673q +vBNo7a/UE/6NNQHu2pQODEYFpMg6R34b5SigBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAFUMHXV +KPA4vkMgq+pFgDoH96XoM517gF2GJFV6h2gLhykzIHL/otAyEpAStw7MBvbU0V21 +ixB+hjqzO7Snxaj9mwB8g87OKxm5eGfsqvJNPdJ0RZ/EKy06Ukg6KThlhQeyrtIk +g5PTCrPnNszlffAy6/jCOe3Moi59g15H13sSzwfX6g== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp256_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp256_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9d6a867c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp256_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MHgCAQEEICFh1vLbdlJvpiwW81aoDwHzL3dnhLNqqZeZqLdmIID/oAsGCSskAwMC +CAEBB6FEA0IABHaMjK5KvKYwbbDtgbDEpiFcN4Bm7G1hbBRuE/HH34CblqtpEcJ9 +igIznwkmhA5VI209HvviZp0JDkxMZg+tqR0= +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp256_pub.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp256_pub.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f738623d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp256_pub.pem @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MFowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQEHA0IABHaMjK5KvKYwbbDtgbDEpiFcN4Bm +7G1hbBRuE/HH34CblqtpEcJ9igIznwkmhA5VI209HvviZp0JDkxMZg+tqR0= +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp384_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp384_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34e82db7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp384_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MIGoAgEBBDA92S51DZDX05/BiFzYrRLqlEHyK5M0tNllICrbFEjOJMWAioXdmvwi +mvCjEk91W8ugCwYJKyQDAwIIAQELoWQDYgAEcZ+dCTpifg01A4XGYc6/AMYZI1Zv +6QBqMQevHYcbxrtomF/XIuoyvjFvjng7fNGVd4X2bPwMsZXdXJmo56uqhIVTpYTf +0rSOdtRF/gDdi+WQlth31GltI7S8jbFHJOZq +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp384_pub.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp384_pub.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eb202e21 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp384_pub.pem @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MHowFAYHKoZIzj0CAQYJKyQDAwIIAQELA2IABHGfnQk6Yn4NNQOFxmHOvwDGGSNW +b+kAajEHrx2HG8a7aJhf1yLqMr4xb454O3zRlXeF9mz8DLGV3VyZqOerqoSFU6WE +39K0jnbURf4A3YvlkJbYd9RpbSO0vI2xRyTmag== +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp512_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp512_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a30c622d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp512_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MIHaAgEBBEA3LJd49p9ybLyj9KJo8WtNYX0QKA15pqApzVGHn+EBKTTf5TlUVTN9 +9pBtx9bS7qTbsgZcAij3Oz7XFkgOfXHSoAsGCSskAwMCCAEBDaGBhQOBggAEOLfs +krYcXGx/vCik7HWdSPzU4uN03v1cSWilTb73UQ5ReIb7/DjqOapSk1nXCnFWw108 +usfOd2vbJR3WS85xI0Qk7nBJ7tBy8NvE15mW4XXVV+JjdjrpcJXAgec+fbLjitw9 +TJoEh7Ht6HbcH8phyQLpodhyK4YSko8YokhFWRo= +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp512_pub.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp512_pub.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ff5d0729 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/ec_bp512_pub.pem @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MIGbMBQGByqGSM49AgEGCSskAwMCCAEBDQOBggAEOLfskrYcXGx/vCik7HWdSPzU +4uN03v1cSWilTb73UQ5ReIb7/DjqOapSk1nXCnFWw108usfOd2vbJR3WS85xI0Qk 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+my @lines = map {chomp; s/([\\"])/\\$1/g; "\"$_\\r\\n\""} ; + +if (defined $pp_name) { + foreach ("#define $pp_name", @lines[0..@lines-2]) { + printf "%-72s\\\n", $_; + } + print "$lines[@lines-1]\n"; + print "const char $name\[\] = $pp_name;\n"; +} else { + print "const char $name\[\] ="; + foreach (@lines) { + print "\n$_"; + } + print ";\n"; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa4096_prv.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa4096_prv.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b674aa0b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa4096_prv.pem @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIJKQIBAAKCAgEA5F2mqEsdntPAEij6HfCYnKiLMGnm6PcfsaFYeFYO1EufOjN5 +ZJP90cr3CrCnN9JOAdpBbTpzA0RcIcAdWBzvNNAtIMvSfi22WJYVjzD0Bvs2rCYH +76Yc6vfx7y9zXZcanh8S/2t7B64xmxOWL4RE+f8HWTijAWlyUFDk+DuJWpQK2o0b +hE4S8mX+uUl3afNW5CiPsRky1N1v4a7/J2b7cG+7pDWUcjnvmNCN84v+gSucXfKg 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+6emXq24/25UNIRw/tRKAtvXbA7mduOyAzRLjoizhj6u8MAf1lIaghIeQaDjTfLRO +qA+hTe1kh/v2vKu/lqIqcMIu0Ykn4owsDMOspsOl7AKUNwedIxvd+/KjXmgjJzFA +1kSx+0qnuoRxWMKl4qDeLHTGn7eF7C96H/VxfuN/clpSI5LQg+Xe1vStcnKECSHa +9V6o8+As2jzPZvR0li2N1b3IRZrwKOmFN337LYiVO6PfVYlBIENCTzoubWEAoqHd +aXWxUQKCAQEAuMDYuLMnbeeQfuM1BGUVPcNHpKnUHCCtX0aMIi+UFxmH4Vj+vxiq +YqRmPMovCMUus7vo6xOiN1EOHfHrChH/QfejBCKW/+GvUt9/sPVs+/jTI675OwZz +IwmwW/8X4oek1SE4aV/EgcfScKWDmX5C2X3d/fDlbaHuewwlsoeOOjy0BeDqU2vd +FckTxNwAGc0YIFurMz/C37LIl9OjtM4CCxjNJD+UHUN1x1IdFqiGKCtw1KUM6IZr +OkLHcAyevzrSlORhb3cWylWlOocsoBlcr+MmTA2C4LRzZ25aBdEUQnbnNMlkJmz5 +7o+zxDwtWrk7IY7hORLLh5EgJh9ktX85zQKCAQAZILSp21azS3KzKdAvq5u2KVAV +GumDf1douO5o+5HjV2Kcf5tkzj4A1ffVZKt7auZCNURAG4jaNIccScZBz33EtCuB +wvRQp5f8DN9EQH4yjaNIbPkFrKzgz5AY08n10PBm+X3cY48P27oR/IDfr2wVtCAE +UufjLZCkuUjdCFD1wJSCj7LNwjZURuCTocvtaa7HEqnjW9VB4aAbdtf53WRsbYwt +ZFEWVp8sYc917I6OUJFQcT7jxbv4kbUAXICLaLtaLW2bWfdRtFQSo08pmZAKxxCv +6Vu5VLZ8LGLVkpie8FEaYd/89gEsHh6HgY9LsJN7WxoaJn1sLmEtmyw9xRSW +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa4096_pub.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa4096_pub.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..15d13d3d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa4096_pub.pem @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEA5F2mqEsdntPAEij6HfCY +nKiLMGnm6PcfsaFYeFYO1EufOjN5ZJP90cr3CrCnN9JOAdpBbTpzA0RcIcAdWBzv +NNAtIMvSfi22WJYVjzD0Bvs2rCYH76Yc6vfx7y9zXZcanh8S/2t7B64xmxOWL4RE ++f8HWTijAWlyUFDk+DuJWpQK2o0bhE4S8mX+uUl3afNW5CiPsRky1N1v4a7/J2b7 +cG+7pDWUcjnvmNCN84v+gSucXfKg/LiAnZgY7xih2ePEhkkIqn6kU0cVBQj1cZ7h +XGRaZ/MnqZ2y+KjiuFot2saNk/v0vjjW+xOx76qJV99LtN/1qvCYnO1RqMv2EM8W +hErLcgiRrihzaz3a2GaumL30CcNixrEXRyEjFaO/klqkpuZRHTtyUnkvhUkPUHuH +n45XPxZ7a2XRyrSbFyyS0amTjQwQCveSRiJFjK5TZ56CVGKF/DmuLSHeTY3vwi+W +XVdKMYQ6Zi9jwFJo/S4TRpzp+DTSH68FrFRqE1+qIVyWQjmhWxuvPhqVkG0IT7CZ +0M8lWesysyI759f5D8DhEp/KbWLDeXWCzcNSbgWGHW5JA+fCV7+8m0PqodIy5D8L +hwm2tI5dA6Qcro8X127RWVaVsN8LIzdf1THXfnZIm1fDBNUfhXapKfnFV8EvALFX +2Gy8M3kZQ3slaGegILfqRKcCAwEAAQ== +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa512.key b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa512.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1fd7987c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa512.key @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBOwIBAAJBALB20jJQgW+aqwIwfkUrl/DK51mDabQWJOivx5caWaE4kvZLB+qm +7JKMFgstbsj50N1bY8izrAdntPZciS9WwQ8CAwEAAQJAKYfNcIoB7II6PQmsrhrU +Z5dZW3fSKNANX7X/A1DwR0DlF8uZnpWsWbYcRoXX7QjvepZqc54wryhW55Wlm6yI +AQIhAOJIaLjSpbHjzzcJQ7mylxn2WGIlbJPPzJ9OaFZCZQvxAiEAx6OEAvl6JKa6 +6a+N2Wvhtcgb4qqR6UHQGJQYGJz5nP8CIAvgoR6ScAAWZRoOcm+c4DGMrLb6H+ji +T2tNQkzEz2kBAiEAmw34GStU36STpa6RGJ4+tyZN6jWakDVqf7x+HpfFE1cCIQDc +KzXIxec2taye4OeIa1v4W/MigMmYE9w93Uw/Qi3azA== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa521.key b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa521.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0b940aa6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa521.key @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBPQIBAAJCATG2mGDzy5v4XqNY/fK9KZDxt3qA1qT9+BekPdiWvffdJq+KwCN/ +Um4NM7EFyXH9vU/6ns6Z/EafMez0Kej1YsHDAgMBAAECQCdoYjwdMSHp4kksL5Aa +0kDc58ni0chy9IgXo+FHjTVmR9DkaZANrwfVvYMJxqYCZo0im1Dw7ZJBUDJQNXnl +ZokCIRiSk66I24AWa7XGUFvatVwXWi2ACE4QEKqzWQe1mQ24/wIhDHD1TCKpqucA +XDI+1N7EHs+fN4CfTSWe8FPGiK6q3VM9AiESrKKLi/q011U4KeS8SfR2blDcL2cg +XFkuQWqxzzLoGOUCIQmgl5E0+Ypwe0zc7NYZFDarf4+ZjqxKQnXCvk0irMHcGQIh +EVPli6RQb3Gcx7vXJHltzSTno7NElzBDRMBVUlBmVxAJ +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa522.key b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa522.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..18fbe70c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa522.key @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBPgIBAAJCAtMCdT492ij0L02fkshkdCDqb7yXwQ+EmLlmqVPzV2mNZYEGDf4y +yKuY20vFzirN8MHm5ASnWhMoJVDBqjfTzci/AgMBAAECQU05ffxf7uVg74yC9tKg +qCa746NpMh3OM+HZrUxiOXv0sJMRXNEPD5HNLtgcNY6MI5NYbUvkOXktnFZpxWYP +TH7BAiEeFJGs5Z6gRd2v/IbYLMFDHgjqho04INGTOvnyI7lGVKUCIRgJM7moFuoM +UrKTmJK1uOzauWEykCKgc6BGH6TGZoEWkwIhBzQn2v82qO1ydOYGKRk2w2sa+Yd1 +pH5/kkHqf+m8QjKdAiEQ9eVW+4J30wxD0JyX4b1E/S5UpN5KYNhWX0US+6D3NBsC +IRxePzdQlutZWg0Cnku3QE1tOLBCFlP7QVVl5FbKcY5H5w== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa528.key b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa528.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd463b54 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa528.key @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBRQIBAAJDAOMcJG1GSFmEJh/RdMqz1DVzRGAuzXk8R9vlQlLTe7NQvGNDWbGV +FVQggORySktnIpG+V8dkj1Finq7yNOhH2ZzGXwIDAQABAkMAsWYyLglQSlwnS4NZ +L1z4zieTqW3lomWr2+BgxkHbxl2w0Rx4L+Ezp+YK6mhtIQWNkoytPvWJJMS7Jrkg +agMAHQJBAiIA+F1y5GO0Bv+igsNLXwwtbCqs8hAkavU9W8egt/oDbhzbAiIA6hds +PZp/s1X7n7dwfmebSs+3vLZFuQfifN8XZLw0CXHNAiEuEzgDQrPdMIN3er96zImI +rYoUBgabiQ9u/WPFfa4xOU0CIgDDYC089Tfjy72pPgcr2PkpZVhqro5esg/8PI5f +yxx7TXkCIgCYoE8Y5IxomtL1ub1AQzPe9UyyUGzQB1yWeiloJh6LjxA= +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_3des.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_3des.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1bc87c9d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_3des.pem @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,4A004A85A2D2D627 + +Ls3vMslumxSeBR4o+oncq359q0k0rDTO5FIFxcw7psy6ggd9Vpr3AdIq9qvevmuB +2t1KtlcHoI+Wi+PkpukHCpCvM0Kju19PQuNSvn6eFtR9VOwgk6x+j9x9ZeZp0Qks +BgsGzGubqdN3ze7CEwYGM6CvVpoP3qNC9hR6IogZ9VPTjZ0vM92cm4foSDSABxGt +Q37bLE1OKOfcCTvqx7/r+4U5Z47okeXvOS/Hf7yzayF9ZHuS0hCr+jGWl7qBWNyE +Ze7ITQ19RA7YS2nlvCvq/8rfduQsJyZTV0gIultM3tZ9qNwr1i5yp7Iq4U6O8SGC +cR/95R0Z8PMN2DSXoMJBsSRbK32r2GXJoGjvg+4R0UoTbc1MhUTtsoclIz98lsHk +zVxgPMzk4mEmQGaKVp/wa1ji+9joTkcv3cALHxTtNcE/dElAHBYjjJ7r9V4uAv3t +jay7R8SIPPh7iyuY4NTtDA5m8yyBKt7v6K5hb2WhT4aucWXHYTize+TxSTpekhrG +J0EEz5zhWsrLhXHV1KcGDIHVXlMnu7LCGyVNFCWKRBXIbZaujed0xwWgjfXKbkYd +MKePX76g5OyKFGGcv5KUknlQJhoRElrSz6pywbpwkl0Xqc1dusy1sZ9b5Uh6zjNc +r5sBvj1k7iK27bzdEuL1I3DEcUdmXLNF3dehNo4v5WQL5iBePLoFSxyL8EJkMQOx +fpwoutPzE7l71To1zmE3pmFdZbEXTfjcfqkRy9b4t57gUuo1UEhYYxoB0D0i+BkH +T0ZmJl4Qp2euaaMqYYN2E9FJAyrmpwBMvtgs5oprXRR6geZweT+J9g== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes128.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes128.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f76290f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes128.pem @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,BF176C0F284E2E5F3D50F9C82D9CF950 + +AS/03rvTNYSsPzqtLr13jwrSOVaTUYniMzj42/4psKVTmrI7Kaiujsa2bjI5Ae7S +HDAumVDdRCDO/AV5qL7iJ0iJ+PqOh6aL89PktcYjkgx6XK8FDOq1wl+dPLjmrsYn +oRyRcEllZigBZRbYpnuKZOQ25vnHxGeZ5A4dLm3zUXoMnNXs1h0rPDix/Yd2AbTh +p371Ac6LC8i3KlOIvjlzCFaOWQNwCkffutXDb+TN86xF9+DkJ0bxHhWhHvf9+fI7 +XJFgLAeCpIUMCdhdqwVqr4Y5X0NBA3spmftK4iILn32+RHfLBshRwompMD1mo4Jd +ueEY2P57z7fNxeCaHww7r+OUdZbySauuAmwWHEoA4NxDXAX7c/1/PoPKOI8Y1OPB +00bKQtzGE+FSJQjRzK/n9mIZQFS0A+H54EZ1Iu/ojTpEzmzzE0TR+75lZyfqaf9D +BhQcyjgkwnJpJ2S+u/ssJl0vpC4bKGqs/r3eWmLJQYvZuPKPqorCAUab/ta+dYfi +gxD1DjBCdosbUOolIsjJfsejSuhEQulpaI61DWeMMap5UvzfZLLrQ5kJuibi8XqM +oQioenXf8gPc/FOFiLAAzLKtNjmAgD4tNdA3exmkHwKj8ds+HHS/2FmF+oJ2LR3O +tmO+cov3ZReOVp7wzR6lctG1b2WoVRu3kzwzoOik+SFBnR1v5z3uEggJV6/cyfKm +U3KzhOkrghOjonAqw9+H+Q9hLO8d76cDAwyDB3KxLO9yzdpukB3f+wS+RgaTdrxc +oMSiXklsO9Ro9NIYzYKABjQ1tDLeY8SOOidoLJrrXltJNDKZSVLR3edyk1rZEFXf +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes192.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes192.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c819c020 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes192.pem @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,B83D6A5D09E192044299B9D06C41BDA7 + +DQvNvAQflmShH/6aRopfKpdKCerQBAf4RYC7+MZLYaUxXUuUzFuIuUyEmNbgsvny +ARfFtjCL07e+SGJ31hdR/BM8wWgv3v5P5+VyAnd64vUP0R2mFl92CZVxzcXw2TAf +PbxDrgmiFxv9WfUsa2aDkDhQjKYb4qlLv1WFc1UM68jLiL8W5UBWKKQFnCivcORD +GlsGTSxMq3YXW0QQQ5x47/4uWaXROLnIuRW7ZSeCi0wgG+RkBW1yUH6plhhSb/Aa +EnHqsAlCMZDLwrkgeSnmsMSTpbUcCKfiZmJB5sJeJX3RVwZ6l04MHMBtWh9b5fIZ +4ieSeDJfHqtUgJ9ie8JcLHuNsUxu5Crzjv6yuZ5su6P+YSMsNhHtOBUXAaSunRh1 +1brw1eG7E6qCnRYr7YyvtKhppDXLHf4sB8tdumTCHhBdxxUd49+SrmY8pznkNjAz +Zhfky0/GKe+fTTMzHNjtw9/qhj0NllUpA6SyptMM1vWe62OkcQYSYeH81btdR22H +Kubx1iYMx2hr6dsvM1+BWP8CmtD6wFEhIMBNKYcg/AWHA/NMpd7E2HTmviXBdEVA +4xMh9fTx0cJ9YnNBuVgNNPGSJJLa7JGWdfdCUpTY6S0YEvTQw+1letrVbW3xumW2 +Tk/G/dS0t41QJuaW1sv9DkJJcl1696PSI4ysDJx9Y8LtV1+DzvdlxSyJdg3mJHEL +qC6bCvj9IhjLsrTDWPuwXjIPl2ycG5FGtAn79pJhlDJzKJZKsbzmQJAvD5jj99l5 +ZiJ1UkmVdsFeQLxU9hsKD2Cvpl9/tdhUvLaZ0UPl43c5XaBSwcT9eztiLUXGivzc +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes256.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes256.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9450ec15 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes256.pem @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,28A56EB102CAFF494BF4AFB55C4ED52A + +5yOXbxDDgomJtRFC9iBL819dU/vCOe0JlwdyQOQbagd1Efj7oErrMuVZJOl18d/o +2G6OtjqlynzoeqkTwE0yJEyRMLz6CIZp0wHGoDMyT4Oe86uGh3ki9ZqIWlgxt+mA +7e1RApFnZOCzmHCGZNCqdSNUV5G/cs7or6Gd9HvdKSCdxffPptE6FaaY8OX4737P +pr7svylp569Secz6MO1Rds7eOPEjAZBJyDSah2AMIiEMJxGrZ662iFo/3S1MuDOY +/xoDHtP/Vo3ep6D8Fp24PeJ4/iocu6hmhAIO4j+zLN6uow/Wu+D8kBKMhtrUtnHO +AoP6sjkNOsMg7fbTEqTrXHkOw92PbZSBbwsgB5z6kKeTCYVDBHUaDDlOTbCxw+t8 +PH6IOrQXUIPl7dt2ilfLjqgzpw4T+RCYp1xgM1ZIsoCspUpizmMTPwtn7fuIjUHb +copBjLOT4tUx7itVi2tTAMvtiW9mrHVI8xgpqSiTz2Hg4uMCFlxkglrwp1yIUClY +BtMGL7qA/l/gmhHRYDpkzf+ewuTeOImyyfEnAawVT3+G6p3tf/Cs9RVgUCnCrFHa +/BuYhGTtTV+R6F7+3yRk/XORp9R3K4BbgWHHma2dB0zYIFDXYtlrODUyQ362Tv1q +JNFis2PbtNB7DRKrB/KtteWtg32mSaTL446a0HCF0VpFB/nq0wEPCvghed5KYHSR +PzoegmnjkDikgid4O/RhcOC5+qEykNalddhQOY6CxJEwVTAviHbQAyW3eP1AnIa+ ++Ifc2o67i57bkLLlg0pqHITlz1+g7SWDj7Aix2Y68zWZVL3n+e/wzqbdYqMVxiGz +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e26eac3c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIICXAIBAAKBgQDHOJLFw/RwEAhr+BM17PMBHIolD5WCNh6qHpYSVRqs+Ht1Mwtw +VzOc2ZXxTUxEN8i+xKA/5GQ80/PJAkM9w3xbjnmqCYSughM3Cr+Fab0qNWJssf7k +rOBCskF8e+SdJxSbLAdrjkM9P2x2OkaaHHANJZ28CMdA/NgCN2L/fev8LQIDAQAB +AoGBAL2/t6Qf6PDXhH350apaHnYfjcCQ4FEeZQSZj0y0vGylW0mcrbd5hxJM+BDW +E98h1tVEiHFygrqhEiCRRCROzmDhjlPVymxBXP+Jev4xeV5mvf2PzgwOR8MTdbFo +dOSI6t9bhpCyp0Ln8eQzGXtuWsH6arJsyJJ9JzCrzeI48sjNAkEA+lgGSPNyWHZW +E0zdtznvGphYKPMuDUTGzm1gTZ0oes6qjr4OA9rD3NTGHVW1FVLq63leTiqK8sOS +uJduIauW4wJBAMu4214tyhB720BuLH7vD0mCKipzD0cEuAdf3NEel3KZxnHD4AK+ +xeiEfFCstMg5uMCNLkShGjMZ5zNfRIqxfa8CQDJjW0h9r6s8jlCuLQY/I/A/b6c2 +YzOKf1V3UGXu1wH47P10JZADDV86eHHZGWykVuJ0eFXVXEhGsxZybFlcly8CQDet +Ks7fZsUAhJhkQ+bhAOWPHGUDkx5OrNjfGyNP4AYi/rgi1zsI1l/IrY0C1lmOZO7C +5u08tkNXBfflRn89KOMCQAwCFgbZqd/VDFyemqwMZAXp+Y1HvGeZI0pr3vBJzO3W +OvIa0KckJ793UjS6Iijfnyy9pWmKJLdKEMe/AtSRDi0= +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_des.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_des.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9eafbb6d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_des.pem @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: DES-CBC,B23EB871129DD92A + +F6S1xLJn+qc/BVv7/0RjykUUqvLR12OcChmOFo3hboC5omWrmPzhhy1IS9XuVZuy +1gFiqMQwwLcvp5jtMvWTw2kW9zKVcnRiuzlc/wV07bpYS4YV7chi7aGp2+5oUhvV +Ea9HgFQbx6ZYARk/bcFpejLsptiUBu2gNyy6FC+Bwov36H51y+f3tJIl51ImWnGQ +R1HMDtLuzHTb31CmWvXCYf14IT3gowxvpO8smaqoYOIw4XeSzprBKMgqXL69/qjk ++et4W4/zG0p5R4WlKBaReXJ2C57xvSTmbaqbCjIYroshlPo9csPAwFtRrWi4Aqv5 +j9OELmZzgK745QnL3IkqsjQuS+Luqg8s4OFifcwBLSVpo2pWhdJnKk40cai8QLpr +St8e3BHGZPdxacC04cTc8zN8Xr7r76lZ7h+ppksx0uoTV2U0+3caMqyyByuF5If+ +RUYXOJ0Y2jUMUYdid3k+C0bn5VbChFCxniv10LpJZ24Nt4RKEYy+2VhIQ+FuAbQ/ +dSMJdqBP4TTBu0DzCmqaGvgjjKLTFF635hzP+cFvaFWhVOY2v4tkV+4zkvBUKzss +Ef3ZwhDses56/KTI54GUJqWxNK+a1ekor3tr1IUMPzeaApzUSRXusT62QMBOW0q9 +8lSNcAywvWrlcZ127J2zZMrk0SKo1jNNzYKWt0e9XpqMWAq07SlUL0MJCt/KYw6J +1eXT+xE9H5FEZvQkBFCHYyAyq54P3yrWV9y01xi0y3ruBf50i7k/IrAtE9c1FZda +2h5qh0GNAEiGRr8bbh3A3wugidwAVoHQeuMnAsShf+5gj8Np7W9kEQ== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_3des.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_3des.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac7ef3c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_3des.pem @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,3F3828FEA9BF197C + +30fgMPEIKER2VH64TsY5lk8ICdP0prc+UiW/tjbQL+2APptirB5SDRAtuwTvbFRc 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4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,4D279F635142BFE952A71E8EE6D14B0D + +6+qW0XUu06eXe0jjSsmRGySu1KXnEjg+682sUbxOk//2YitaMx8wMQqRQvT9Uusp +lW7tYOz47wiz2UrJXKo8Rxow3B38wW7vwjh/Xaw4m6DlcID8Ho3ubN1n9Or9goi9 +Kg3NYtrIWac5njywFzf17TIlxmbHg3wF98c0bKRInBGZxVcEtbcdRiM0ZSst4IAm +xi7vEwHHyo7d3cBJoItJ/1kELqHmwFoWZj2wlXCVEHUU5pFfK5WY7uq5P9FQFBmI +et0IeCCdysZyRmS8Y6BY5cWv2u9mccIvvazQev8H3W8hQ/LS418yYenqd8CAuvct +N0tTpVhV+jXxPwV1+F29kpkburnHrbDN+ZUIVaAdea/yNMC+bcoEypnpT6D1m2ig +ouV7jecJSOxhaDh4h1JccR6Pu2DOWTDpn6pxUrCIo4+2lVbLXOeDS8ClhFf5VzX0 +D+5ZOAdm/LSQIOBXBtqOJ2qDBJINZgpQlRDvo8wDHchslDChTNKdvzjgr/hxdPeE +tAf33lXR0TgqX2vhwbpjqMX2Zi+7VL8ylcjWITdderiNDueDpy7UN45f+0DVhNfT +JIleuqNl09tL34unugpM+QSzgJ0odHpZ1VXkr7zgSFOYau6/drlexS61KXsqk6x0 +rs+n9ssgVqS3HCne0l8I4VOejutBLAVGOXoz7EC9PtS+iYavetnEcqf4SBPHikrn +j67x/wz7jlEsSCyYA8SfPJY1wcKgfKaSU+w2XxAo5bMBjb3QiBYRSvb67q+DtO8K +hUnZMqdbvzFIyXfP4/5WGhBe7ho0dQrtVT+PcCxknMMQ+kyQp+f+jbddLCvcKQFa +Dlvw4XpMR4Ee2ukkaWpXAc6ES301NnXoAwlvKAkThfRDHwGckGfiEIunEZN5l1TK 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes192.pem @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,9253446D0CFFFA0AA50C251F129E6148 + +CrtEJsyM72x0zqFnS3qGqTF8JtaUgKe7EkBRoDt5iEowPZFjPM6QILEsBQLAcG4J +RKi3My1S2nBweRpEvTYZHHzHXsO4UyTCNfeIDl7F1lJ4lO+SB/kBkjAWUTcdT+h/ +x5F6F+dZDMKgYvDjvvZfQyl+x3aDd0y2ZqWQWJEvqH/uGQK921d7sdDFclwDVrUT +YWjF91KNzycRaOvTHjX9X/bW4UZZif9KTZSKSr71zOX16YHU7aIWJH+OPD/DSylf +dbhZAVwRBlCsUxckkReg7u13D93jlOlgP0ufvpDAeR1y+jumLOeWddiMBtRtFUPj +IfS2RPcyP8NQnv09tru+ra6KqRJnT6SKRGS3/+cgXGIirwNz0PbYYN0BCIOh12Co +sK7gzCbVrbLLLSLuENsC4NeihK4WBe0NqZDU9BMqZ/ardjwhiT2InM+hZC+HbltV +4h2k/We2LSP3rAU9a7v6ve7U4OI1kFEGn+sNPuDb03C7IkIA3ThASh3gPq1nKs7O +uWQ6SINnZiPXDvlqZiQHzFipF4OBRRxvlYyly7IBdbIfw46cT4dnQh9uBqSadVq7 +dUf25ouFP6uvnmaZ9gEWvpa5yEafb4+x4io4CLbHPp/pPIgOJKIv2Olh5biN8IhM +BdO0surr+BHFogjjfh7p47yFNx3N4E+wc9wmEAzNgWijqq/btu6GxYkBltSwbh4X +8SSwfWrRxmY9+n4zIyehFJ/Q4VCsVTz2meyAc1hCyi21XWm8uBSA55DHmGXrrxwh +j4VQBzn6qYsWJPjvBfwluq0OOKjfniaoa8QiH3+Evmjyfs4wWaSDXOdxAZFvA8JG +oqiuFPuQwmsFLxrVsL9UMPj8U++zHahqOWzCFzrd3LlUrEAE6NRrzLmB5RPcdACM +cgoEgFRR6l81ZWOC+aM+vDyc1u15iOrYhbtgfeeUmj75nJQ3TLXDRv+BryRtP2Wd +kI6lNUL9M8QzqYfJqfKzJ9mKEGa5iuDH1RcWr7cOv8xZtq+ZrzI3BvWMeYs3CTpg +PFgKGg3uWvF6uwq6MQJIXU5K9AZtZE33oH0CQtDjSUVdrFyWgNmDgMGgMZlCeynC +y/82/qCO3xiFUoK53sh7Qv9Qa0xtIeWsRrZyutyxQQv9Lq5xuiOnqL29TL+GVPJm +/wztj2ElsxqPMgnDHJHjixBBC9POX3yHciDAiuXIukz3u6bsPhBfZKwZ6IhsKTVs +R1XMadx8g4kHiv1GnbK0/jlZDC+ne1C5yJg5F0n3X9lx0KJ0tlNe2N2/mWeVd0Eu +mIQq9fLYTrOguE6bSSp6sMzmtpm00Ef3GHSXsf3cWVOFRMEWGLJklDoPgPr/rSke +QwLb0U/in/NOqmO1gfl9y70XM2zJDDDPrSN+SDf7zEu9Y7R6KmHsT4wbcC/LnSbM +/TOodgWOBti4h9EybHc5udSMMSyQxBedAh7I0OkCyBDgXXyQv2g0ak3EgMMlaUHV +8Gtf6y2g4Kwh5DPpJJIJ/kxgsicO6XbSGOm/Ya7i67MBaG3TBZ74B4T/urEYYc2X +X2p8+n3RGXG6BKOQcXR195GWwwjxy+HI6hzXGO41Q7mrs1mOsUvk66VXYFFLpEcK +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes256.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes256.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2e396e1d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes256.pem @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,44804F408DA69A39B0DF6B8E84F4F663 + +zEIU+VIoZQIfjf55n7N2sCz7QOOZbVdvEacGnjOEh6NoZ41R4F+bio5HthVcq8qo +hyKUcZaPm3+2AceL/xfdx00pq52GqYVl41MSDTiKwCBE8ulCiHmh9bMZHPToAysC +sQlXWDP1FIcmILk+/OnorPLpsox2Is8CELgVfkd9j/ytCMA0TPVEqxqJzrmwp76p +vP2MWS65MIoDFnLHcabHdZZQlTP5DdRj3AlNfHqUMIGygzs0vEmpHjHttOFW9mMF +HIQ2x+Sznragg9ExjVgW4BgTD5SrXKAEDUcMv64w6VCE8Tox1QaWbKoWKEPMFBnZ +HH7uVQJnptFFgJ7cKd6xu+TynEMe4X6iR5GAqPIqd1rhjWFxkQb7zCUy9PukFHlH +uZ3kSLVGV2FDFWN0Hy1R0rfrEFOXc07dwg5lp6AXG7NziJoMChSS2ipAbXo2uE3G +PdIw6nAR/abyZqtwlyZD1jO2R8WIXYiGUeeXhC0C7OO73J7IZnZox6bbVemFyZw1 +AKgDGjuaEbBC2jBEt3TE5/Aaefef+/nm7MENF9BJlPF465H1ZfFbE3PRf+2eVPf2 +Q/dsfxKFG+Ui86qcXjBjex5BvC2kfMqXumdoTlEx24FGFCRUHB5dmnWRUejglJ9Y +QWfolL6ccre3LPYDSmGAnAzfSB8yCqtvsvT92NDFsSsO6KYBy6grhnvv0ieVcUh+ +iDQa5f80fB7ugitliOPPBzWjt5P9FDJJ7Ht2Fpbor0Ig/JKngyTfTRVjTh15PEMc +kYHFFoeT9r5w/4wABsh6/REnuiahcJlcUadN8js/zrPPXAoAjZGfpvin0uv6haBL +Qh9OHLSw/61J2EP7Jx1IL1TPBCBSsuNb4PLT4e3kqq6GVJNRHCMRpN35ytZr4pqj +lkEgl1uVVeOgJYWr8jMDWrCh9ih6xBCxGCb7SSUmeRU7FUJ+ybBbvfsnMWn1TJZX +Bee2PTac6JkXNdDgM/Pe+B/wCFR3clg0ptmr13hmLqmkbCMxkpCVCM+vPA01GNgc +MjYIxTNxB470tKva3jWqC86ffsvvmZb9eTEog/cfCABscX3Y2ufYl71t49tIOs8X +5AXE6GdJDCqJhyE9pDkt2prxeoDSh7tcDnxjb6JfAhvmNORrjv1hI9mmC+IT8F// +QrqxIxBjgKszkFeG7dS5MHo16FCsawCJyl87Dyq+51KTyqeqsXBvODsNT7FnrBmg +Hho96pEJQ4y0YqP/aXNo89fVfYM3hbdUS9XtN6xh4N4vXI6sNVS9NQzfZTcrtGAM +H6IE/AEYp4htKeFUM+QQsPZI/EcgL5e5GP7BA7xrx5L4T94kHIjz69iKSd1zNKT6 +KhOWNsWzHZABOnpYQPvsjjDeIG9/u0ryXYGtH5dwX/z3VvIz2mQ0w14OIw2KzVYu +KGUpGXRvSx+o7QYulVh1Q4BrA03bSaKtmYnCzpaKKslCBXxbQlTIvL2hlienA63T +V9l9edsJCtzElSfJteqc2uh5oVDkGkgUkfmrY1b/8RHKKbjeEKHOEZB2ZxMTT3mk +RGx6HBKoLSG5jC4TjjUcAIY0NAmJRLsabrBTDLBUqxnMZroF75Id9KaZHSa74x+Z +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d9476348 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAqFVn+bKgHDTGFY6QU25+HlEP7ppDRC320hNPs91pri4VZrjL +hOD4/N7sAoWTZiIOGCo5pJ+OztG7GA2B5tC9/cmdSN8UAXR8YO49+8ZqN4g9Ox6q +91E42Rq5A9aCMkr7wm5Ym3cK9dZGXHVa4QsROdnoaIKpu3UbbjYOrmQSXXzEkTiX +wMTIsXz8SclaRYNhHtnv6CKAIm1sTP4a3GyGeCzBW40zknNcgTqHo6J3FLw1AENY +iaQEeXqTOxq3MFWm0HQFoJC4IND54RiARCo7+qJe+aqMGPwIIzQEXRIQVVcG3lvU +8lUyTPpegYb2O4zdRrCE7GCpBBe137NmJcZMtQIDAQABAoIBABl8JKu3EWpzyvGE +jfEzr0BjwWe8TybJVq7jYZO3l8JZE8BjhdxuOwP9s/mFw5UY3s1lxyhXR8WkFxFD 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+2y1z3QKBgQDF1Fd/BqSCKA3WM0+3Bf7Mu4l40CKmzjFpVGALTQIscfE4kUiymXna +DLWearAGdiGpWLD9Wq6/hBC+LLQXQ0zckITz3L2Lh5IJBoysOc2R+N2BHdSvVlti +sF7IbcMbszEf8rtt2+ZosApwouLjqtb//15r8CfKiUKDRYNP3OBN2A== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_des.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_des.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c2968338 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_des.pem @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: DES-CBC,A21ED2721C71226F + +KC/2MeXdBpU0LCzk1qh2ZkN4f/GNMR2iqyUYYqGdcXGe2tiw1ge21cH9+TPrwX9n +oHFPLGstWmCZDpp6ogyDLR5YD4pcCYrVaqKtHVaNnkuGj2ShMef8ql7c+xcXpWDH +ptya071WCyQO7yifUMj0KzSgN7evDjn7m94sbmBQ7T0hWhmKs9WiBDHqEG4zDsfC +StmDtaXoILmmruCrVgvGWAlCTfye4mBaqXvFjNl4xATLn/Nksk0TgmFijrRP0ynm ++J2shgJGyHvwSgwiX7bkOqhJrEZqI9v/ob2slaG9Kod5NUXiHKxnZjdqcH6PC4i9 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U{&}EdlZvrj>9Fo^0s{d60Wn65O8@`> literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9040cb04 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.pem @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY----- +MIIBCgKCAQEA2xx/LgvNv87RdRCgorjOfariBeB62ERjj7W9wLAZuTe4GUoO8V10 +gGdGhwbeW38GA73BjV4HFdRb9Nzlzz35wREsrmq5ir0dZ2YX6k692xWagofk8HjD +o4WHsP2fqZlf4zPszOoLtWFe8Ul+P6Mt6gEMzEKadpvE0DfTsRcBYQEWWX4cF8NT +/dFyy0xgFdp94uqtUO+O4ovUandV1nDZa7vx7jkEOKO94tHgZmvinEeZ6Sjmtvwu +ymdDhOjVg9admGsBPoHcPHrK+fOc99YoGyd4fMPQ1WOngTSJrSVqvfLq7fpX/OU0 +xsEPcS3SCBAbrURB4P55oGOTirFd6bDubwIDAQAB +-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_3des.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_3des.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6de58fb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_3des.pem @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,08A2EE4A627B9219 + +BZXLuKYuOupeUZGJPIIiGd1dFXaBiFNmczkwjADQeQPb5rzf89n2d7N1442YkJ5q +nIvyHoezi2er4bhxUX6ToftGdd9X/WeAbuW3QfzlLccf69RgLpKjWasKRlws27WE +ighuRsgPK+UO2CzR1PSBi2OIRdAsUFhUx4IN1oSMPcx5eR3jglH+jrFwv7oOclmz +KBWxAKBguVOFpYfbjy77Oa1sainVFIZMeXOqkOSggfX+kmHg9Vk+AgkCAhM7iy5m +u/2uYjL1Fp3OUuMcnjWG3GAurKAfquWcifF3GSzH6lLyJllC/RnsUwB034J5PHB0 +KrfHipJyIqFSj+lOizDteA65EoT576+4VOpts0aCc5sZeouQS28nyOVKbOtaAXJL +seQbR26RoAw6ngD8JZAFw4QrhekKRPKzkTq8s5E8QplW/Q+G2P4gmn7WeKDQGHW+ +8FJtBd3kmzIydaM8TkdgZOBaNPAvkRdJfPcce1xdhCOVfI+jM2ZrUjGNjGlVChLv +P9cKwP1KgzUVb/jYEboD8d+ia3xwOfB2sfNS7mDoTWeJzle7zl3Np2IVNpND6zpy +eP4sTjSMDJNGZI34aGkGQEBCznX/ssCT00CVLS4tikQQvHGGasHVqn12gTn+c4yl +ranvfJ72h8DIpHenIQdvzRhTHG1wqIn1SpLOxxRzUCtGUuSWmbTk2Hxxk8xZUoNu 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+JIFSVyPYxUWg5B0kCOLhihe2aBP2Gi3+VoWbNoRiqH7dV6refqZG1CPf4RzKJdT2 +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes256.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes256.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e2fc2e26 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes256.pem @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,52B3A521A4BE45F79E26667FB6F79A81 + +m10sgThu0xP1wMx+664P/NHSZSjTW63ntAUwVsCfpWamzPLGWOQwGqhfTP7FF8Aj +ckgoYL9Gryulm4/YLH4lh78/beGVYbY+dhOiQoJ284J28v1hGbwr7jRITuabKted +PSqD8UEWqHRmJojDe9yznbfAKjdRyBapQg9qrbKsuumq9KKmEb/7kXKIy0eEe2lS +U0/aGFlPh2jpyLuV16K5NbeIZBzyuowZWcF12AI6gc+axP33gpWPDoNqP1PLluT3 +LFx7o/1S0mMpVNQ9GUcxk8X3mngJi89AyUVoby1YIffGEQWKM/lqbl4/uztVRaH+ +ZL6d/loOmIV3FqDs4RlDTUGMbauvur3BroH/sFNNfsPv0L60U5ZqNVWpJSLdiyzT 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96933cf8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_clear.pem @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIJKAIBAAKCAgEAzoPnqYh/7ETGmdNWcczq73FW++HfSm1PdeJqi9VlaQHvm4TZ +hj3JZAp3iw/DyQFiKDRGwukLbroWrQ5tGnksEmuLWYiinaCnApVLqgw3crzCTBoO +XoRwyj9mE7I8D2NyjBwak/Q3mnbqAouNVNtE2WAqBzEHNIBvub1BuIhh9MzqQViB +4SFLyuOzfSPfuRWO0/7RkykoiYC0o12SY+fALP12PMSqwsSuzTXaPNUBI94ScwZO +MAc8ey7jomUKPnEZRASBwCNaC+NYr5RlR4JP2hqozma0nbzndPwPdYZ2m4uZnTzP ++2Y9FbP2brRYCkMbPOmnt0g2CjiDdw1J0UHbFT9OOVXTmFYrGu/BlF3sX7akLz8l ++4EWQ97acGQ2goPk1wpiaoxFAujZsCGWGSdEWEM6LEmY6Jr/2cyX4Elw4+Q7Ljxp +DRN6jc3QFoui62bkKqozqPs+1yu93vPe8GRHIHxCzNTa3oDsE4MVX+boc/CY12nK +9uDkBjpwL4L8/FRFSMDbqiVlCnwqkQZhfutzgD64IMy0B2FhbvaPM+22OEEHVEb2 +hq/Gbs4y6aPQP4VtIWe+UrFh0FUIR0xayGnME+blxD2Px9oJ3KpJ2IEG9ulxtHXe +Lzw5jgC584s4wFJz8R2DL/js1dbNXiSQZnNOau0J2srz7w2XFo1puGxY9UsCAwEA 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sC2GC$>h1bh{N*&p!4GjQ(g+Y6twcfK{&}EdlZvrj>9Fo^0s{d60qM1nivR!s literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.pem b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f1e29cc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.pem @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA2xx/LgvNv87RdRCgorjO +fariBeB62ERjj7W9wLAZuTe4GUoO8V10gGdGhwbeW38GA73BjV4HFdRb9Nzlzz35 +wREsrmq5ir0dZ2YX6k692xWagofk8HjDo4WHsP2fqZlf4zPszOoLtWFe8Ul+P6Mt +6gEMzEKadpvE0DfTsRcBYQEWWX4cF8NT/dFyy0xgFdp94uqtUO+O4ovUandV1nDZ +a7vx7jkEOKO94tHgZmvinEeZ6SjmtvwuymdDhOjVg9admGsBPoHcPHrK+fOc99Yo +Gyd4fMPQ1WOngTSJrSVqvfLq7fpX/OU0xsEPcS3SCBAbrURB4P55oGOTirFd6bDu +bwIDAQAB +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.der 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PRIVATE KEY----- +MIICojAcBgoqhkiG9w0BDAEEMA4ECAvRaVQoz78HAgIIAASCAoBiIDDzD49HEwvC +COrRrODVgYMJ4+jy08j0yQoyjjcLRt2TCMdNZ6F6ATuc7YUQhcvJIVT8RLGxluJ9 +Biolgd5Ur3elFFl/8D4jSR7x9zmEFq6fxDjrkcbb1vK/1pth9Cqfh7FXQgD6Dlmp +2Y1YTdrelZTQs0hRZye0YmQB/qpBs+1VY+zkSNvKtlJZqPYnKawMxD9Dif7glpDV +ndpZvNXDbbRy3vLq8k0rKRIJQ7mLjmAA+3kgRRtUhCSTbvUs9oIGqgq7xm60mcAz +yG4LfRQ2khZSQTK47PENsDoZrazioZ6F4d7qmB/peLWuvqVdpBY6gADecxJoGq5a +4qvZy5srgYvOFfGi8T3L88mJc38U2WQ2s/eHsmSzC7EmXapNE3OE6qwDfn3bkOF4 +odksNaz0IoK+msaUc1eweExE97ERlNKo+XuJeO7Q3rjO4+JkFINONbpfFJoSmZEm +XX15ZYFFkYZ5eI36zOpX4ilHmTFmXq7BOmNz8hHWwmKUSVx8JsdvpMDbl7bfTtxU +sTzS5LIgbxpP1n/RdTRe03ALuCFIyD/bFdbjH0tzzKChV8Y9OIHFt9aLDMU/br5i +tRQFh1D5baGV2atoXi080s4iiAm/ZN95btvLOs0C+ixHpolgHsVwrkJgKIzdQKCb +4CSHYst3/4Q/3KTm4Cp4uslKgVD2fbnSWMmHnN70kERG2kTLkCexS/Hht7YDU3WV +g0xSRKbmedpYJ0N4pSvpIwQKAaoBWpgUVjcWOnadLNFHz7rnpwDw5cfhWBKyOor+ +1YxRhpPCLzec7UG9dYu403ATh5nbhxnmz8JkUqumSt/fvfC7j8RSWhNIsBvoiWxh +7SCrd1Z1 +-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1-nospace.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..932c236a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1-nospace.crt @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDhDCCAmygAwIBAgIBHzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTQwMzI2MDkyMzEyWhcNMjQwMzIzMDkyMzEyWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEHBvbGFyc3NsLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0G +CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCpAh89QGrVVVOL/TbugmUuFWFeib+4 +6EWQ2+6IFlLT8UNQR5YSWWSHa/0r4Eb5c77dz5LhkVvtZqBviSl5RYDQg2rVQUN3 +Xzl8CQRHgrBXOXDto+wVGR6oMwhHwQVCqf1Mw7Tf3QYfTRBRQGdzEw9A+G2BJV8K +sVPGMH4VOaz5Wu5/kp6mBVvnE5eFtSOS2dQkBtUJJYl1B92mGo8/CRm+rWUsZOuV +m9z+QV4XptpsW2nMAroULBYknErczdD3Umdz8S2gI/1+9DHKLXDKiQsE2y6mT3Bu +ns69WIniU1meblqSZeKIPwyUGaPd5eidlRPtKdurcBLcWsprF6tSglSxAgMBAAGj +gZIwgY8wCQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUH3TWPynBdHRFOwUSLD2ovUNZAqYw 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.ca_noauthid.crt @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDJDCCAgygAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIFNlcnZlciAxMIIBIjAN +BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqQIfPUBq1VVTi/027oJlLhVhXom/ +uOhFkNvuiBZS0/FDUEeWEllkh2v9K+BG+XO+3c+S4ZFb7Wagb4kpeUWA0INq1UFD +d185fAkER4KwVzlw7aPsFRkeqDMIR8EFQqn9TMO0390GH00QUUBncxMPQPhtgSVf +CrFTxjB+FTms+Vruf5KepgVb5xOXhbUjktnUJAbVCSWJdQfdphqPPwkZvq1lLGTr +lZvc/kFeF6babFtpzAK6FCwWJJxK3M3Q91Jnc/EtoCP9fvQxyi1wyokLBNsupk9w +bp7OvViJ4lNZnm5akmXiiD8MlBmj3eXonZUT7Snbq3AS3FrKaxerUoJUsQIDAQAB +ozIwMDAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBQfdNY/KcF0dEU7BRIsPai9 +Q1kCpjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAMblPCsjj6RJ8sOm54sdlSJOTGWEo/1LF +q1bJnKE3FXDeU8pbhEhpfsd2zcKdJxzp7Bg8Ms/xKBuOZhn/4C/n2FwZpEeAsS7J 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.cert_type.crt.openssl.v3_ext new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bd225ff7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.cert_type.crt.openssl.v3_ext @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +[v3_ext] +basicConstraints = CA:false +subjectKeyIdentifier=hash +authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid +nsCertType=server diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c3a66ea4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDMTCCAhmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G 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a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.commas.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.commas.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5acd2555 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.commas.crt @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDRzCCAi+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjBEMQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDEZMBcG +A1UECgwQUG9sYXJTU0wsIENvbW1hczEaMBgGA1UEAwwRUG9sYXJTU0wgU2VydmVy +IDEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCpAh89QGrVVVOL/Tbu +gmUuFWFeib+46EWQ2+6IFlLT8UNQR5YSWWSHa/0r4Eb5c77dz5LhkVvtZqBviSl5 +RYDQg2rVQUN3Xzl8CQRHgrBXOXDto+wVGR6oMwhHwQVCqf1Mw7Tf3QYfTRBRQGdz +Ew9A+G2BJV8KsVPGMH4VOaz5Wu5/kp6mBVvnE5eFtSOS2dQkBtUJJYl1B92mGo8/ +CRm+rWUsZOuVm9z+QV4XptpsW2nMAroULBYknErczdD3Umdz8S2gI/1+9DHKLXDK +iQsE2y6mT3Buns69WIniU1meblqSZeKIPwyUGaPd5eidlRPtKdurcBLcWsprF6tS 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file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c4f854a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.ext_ku.crt @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDpzCCAo+gAwIBAgIBITANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTQwNDAxMTQ0NDQzWhcNMjQwMzI5MTQ0NDQzWjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMTEVBvbGFyU1NMIFNlcnZlciAxMIIBIjAN +BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqQIfPUBq1VVTi/027oJlLhVhXom/ +uOhFkNvuiBZS0/FDUEeWEllkh2v9K+BG+XO+3c+S4ZFb7Wagb4kpeUWA0INq1UFD +d185fAkER4KwVzlw7aPsFRkeqDMIR8EFQqn9TMO0390GH00QUUBncxMPQPhtgSVf +CrFTxjB+FTms+Vruf5KepgVb5xOXhbUjktnUJAbVCSWJdQfdphqPPwkZvq1lLGTr +lZvc/kFeF6babFtpzAK6FCwWJJxK3M3Q91Jnc/EtoCP9fvQxyi1wyokLBNsupk9w +bp7OvViJ4lNZnm5akmXiiD8MlBmj3eXonZUT7Snbq3AS3FrKaxerUoJUsQIDAQAB +o4G0MIGxMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFB901j8pwXR0RTsFEiw9qL1DWQKm +MGMGA1UdIwRcMFqAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/oT+kPTA7MQswCQYDVQQG 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-0,0 +1,20 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDLjCCAhagAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIFNlcnZlciAxMIIBIjAN +BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqQIfPUBq1VVTi/027oJlLhVhXom/ +uOhFkNvuiBZS0/FDUEeWEllkh2v9K+BG+XO+3c+S4ZFb7Wagb4kpeUWA0INq1UFD +d185fAkER4KwVzlw7aPsFRkeqDMIR8EFQqn9TMO0390GH00QUUBncxMPQPhtgSVf +CrFTxjB+FTms+Vruf5KepgVb5xOXhbUjktnUJAbVCSWJdQfdphqPPwkZvq1lLGTr +lZvc/kFeF6babFtpzAK6FCwWJJxK3M3Q91Jnc/EtoCP9fvQxyi1wyokLBNsupk9w +bp7OvViJ4lNZnm5akmXiiD8MlBmj3eXonZUT7Snbq3AS3FrKaxerUoJUsQIDAQAB +ozwwOjAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQfdNY/KcF0dEU7BRIsPai9Q1kCpjAO +BgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBeAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJVYcBoNiXBLOY53sJcH +1X0oQA/KMVODJP1+rr/e6SuyROVgqUfFA/7Hn5evb94Ftxlb0d8uOlpoHWtyaRVw +JR3tKCGiyiSzAS5tXiioOYt6fLDg9B2mpvFqa9ISqsvzbR3aNj/8uM7ni/aSxjhf 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.pubkey @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqQIfPUBq1VVTi/027oJl +LhVhXom/uOhFkNvuiBZS0/FDUEeWEllkh2v9K+BG+XO+3c+S4ZFb7Wagb4kpeUWA +0INq1UFDd185fAkER4KwVzlw7aPsFRkeqDMIR8EFQqn9TMO0390GH00QUUBncxMP +QPhtgSVfCrFTxjB+FTms+Vruf5KepgVb5xOXhbUjktnUJAbVCSWJdQfdphqPPwkZ +vq1lLGTrlZvc/kFeF6babFtpzAK6FCwWJJxK3M3Q91Jnc/EtoCP9fvQxyi1wyokL +BNsupk9wbp7OvViJ4lNZnm5akmXiiD8MlBmj3eXonZUT7Snbq3AS3FrKaxerUoJU +sQIDAQAB +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.req.cert_type b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.req.cert_type new file mode 100644 index 00000000..39ff3fdb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.req.cert_type @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- +MIICpTCCAY0CAQAwPDELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRow 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.req.cert_type_empty new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70fd1113 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1.req.cert_type_empty @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- +MIICpDCCAYwCAQAwPDELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRow +GAYDVQQDDBFQb2xhclNTTCBTZXJ2ZXIgMTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP +ADCCAQoCggEBAKkCHz1AatVVU4v9Nu6CZS4VYV6Jv7joRZDb7ogWUtPxQ1BHlhJZ +ZIdr/SvgRvlzvt3PkuGRW+1moG+JKXlFgNCDatVBQ3dfOXwJBEeCsFc5cO2j7BUZ +HqgzCEfBBUKp/UzDtN/dBh9NEFFAZ3MTD0D4bYElXwqxU8YwfhU5rPla7n+SnqYF +W+cTl4W1I5LZ1CQG1QkliXUH3aYajz8JGb6tZSxk65Wb3P5BXhem2mxbacwCuhQs +FiScStzN0PdSZ3PxLaAj/X70McotcMqJCwTbLqZPcG6ezr1YieJTWZ5uWpJl4og/ +DJQZo93l6J2VE+0p26twEtxaymsXq1KCVLECAwEAAaAjMCEGCSqGSIb3DQEJDjEU +MBIwEAYJYIZIAYb4QgEBBAMDAQAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBACU0LLDBIMgG +B7gyNANHv42RovhQdzmUulqJPHNHx3v9G17F00bEykJb/r3awW6l5fhY/6oPydsY 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c3:c6:9f:cb:ba:ec:60:7d:b7:e6:84:32:be:4f:fb: + 58:26:22:03:5b:d4:b4:d5:fb:f5:e3:96:2e:70:c0: + e4:2e:bd:fc:2e:ee:e2:41:55:c0:34:2e:7d:24:72: + 69:cb:47:b1:14:40:83:7d:67:f4:86:f6:31:ab:f1: + 79:a4:b2:b5:2e:12:f9:84:17:f0:62:6f:27:3e:13: + 58:b1:54:0d:21:9a:73:37:a1:30:cf:6f:92:dc:f6: + e9:fc:ac:db:2e:28:d1:7e:02:4b:23:a0:15:f2:38: + 65:64:09:ea:0c:6e:8e:1b:17:a0:71:c8:b3:9b:c9: + ab:e9:c3:f2:cf:87:96:8f:80:02:32:9e:99:58:6f: + a2:d5 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: + CA:TRUE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + B4:5A:E4:A5:B3:DE:D2:52:F6:B9:D5:A6:95:0F:EB:3E:BC:C7:FD:FF + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + keyid:B4:5A:E4:A5:B3:DE:D2:52:F6:B9:D5:A6:95:0F:EB:3E:BC:C7:FD:FF + DirName:/C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA + serial:00 + + Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption + b8:fd:54:d8:00:54:90:8b:25:b0:27:dd:95:cd:a2:f7:84:07: + 1d:87:89:4a:c4:78:11:d8:07:b5:d7:22:50:8e:48:eb:62:7a: + 32:89:be:63:47:53:ff:b6:be:f1:2e:8c:54:c0:99:3f:a0:b9: 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a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server10_int3_spurious_int-ca2.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server10_int3_spurious_int-ca2.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c9d6715f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server10_int3_spurious_int-ca2.crt @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBWjCCAQCgAwIBAgIBSzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjBKMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzERMA8G +A1UEChMIbWJlZCBUTFMxKDAmBgNVBAMTH21iZWQgVExTIFRlc3QgaW50ZXJtZWRp +YXRlIENBIDMwHhcNMTUwOTAxMTM0NzU1WhcNMjUwODI5MTM0NzU1WjAUMRIwEAYD +VQQDEwlsb2NhbGhvc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAQcbffp2qXq +oZyychmoCRxzrd4Vu96m47NPBehtEC46aTeXgDnBdf++znABrAtfXBRNQz8ARIeY +Bmskr22rlKjyow0wCzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQDLc+Io +rg8VxEbCgVv8iH+kOIEn9MjhpvKzvwUoV+6rjQIgZU/RXAyc1a+H2+soGfNEIOBQ +AzO3pJx7WJAApZuBX1Q= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBtDCCATqgAwIBAgIBTTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjBLMQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G 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a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1_csr.opensslconf b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1_csr.opensslconf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6e7075ea --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1_csr.opensslconf @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +[ req ] +distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name +prompt = no +# Restrict to non-UTF8 PrintableStrings. +string_mask = nombstr + +[ req_distinguished_name ] +C = NL +O = PolarSSL +CN = PolarSSL Server 1 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1_pathlen_int_max-1.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1_pathlen_int_max-1.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4944844d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server1_pathlen_int_max-1.crt @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDSDCCAjCgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server2-badsign.crt @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN +AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN +owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz +NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM +tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P +hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya +HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD +VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw +FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJklg3T/ +////7BzsxM/vLyKccO6op0/gZzM4ghuLq2Y32kl0sM6kSNUUmduuq3u/+GmUZN2A 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a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server2.ku-ka.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server2.ku-ka.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90f7c4a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/server2.ku-ka.crt @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDijCCAnKgAwIBAgIBKjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTQwNDA5MDg0NDIzWhcNMjQwNDA2MDg0NDIzWjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMTCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN +AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN +owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz +NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM +tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P +hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya +HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaOBnzCBnDAJ 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+otherName.1=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4;SEQ:hw_module_name +DNS.2=example.net +DNS.3=*.example.org + +[multiple_san] +subjectAltName=@alt_names + +[hw_module_name] +hwtype = OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.17.3 +hwserial = OCT:123456 + +[v3_any_policy_ca] +basicConstraints = CA:true +certificatePolicies = 2.5.29.32.0 + +[v3_any_policy_qualifier_ca] +basicConstraints = CA:true +certificatePolicies = @policy_info + +[v3_multi_policy_ca] +basicConstraints = CA:true +certificatePolicies = 1.2.3.4,2.5.29.32.0 + +[v3_unsupported_policy_ca] +basicConstraints = CA:true +certificatePolicies = 1.2.3.4 + +[policy_info] +policyIdentifier = 2.5.29.32.0 +CPS.1 ="CPS uri string" + +[fan_cert] +extendedKeyUsage = 1.3.6.1.4.1.45605.1 + +[noext_ca] +basicConstraints = CA:true + +[test_ca] +database = /dev/null + +[crl_ext_idp] +issuingDistributionPoint=critical, @idpdata + +[crl_ext_idp_nc] +issuingDistributionPoint=@idpdata + +[idpdata] +fullname=URI:http://pki.example.com/ + +# these IPs are the ascii values for 'abcd' and 'abcd.example.com' +[tricky_ip_san] +subjectAltName=IP:97.98.99.100,IP:6162:6364:2e65:7861:6d70:6c65:2e63:6f6d diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.db b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.db new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c0e0128 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.db @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +R 210212144406Z 110212124407Z 01 unknown /C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Server 1 +R 210212144400Z 110212124407Z 03 unknown /C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.db b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.db new file mode 100644 index 00000000..763aa121 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.db @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +R 210212144406Z 290101124407Z 01 unknown /C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Server 1 +R 210212144400Z 290101124407Z 03 unknown /C=NL/O=PolarSSL/CN=PolarSSL Test CA diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e9ce7543 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.future-crl.opensslconf @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ + [ ca ] + default_ca = test-ca + + [ test-ca ] + certificate = test-ca.crt + private_key = test-ca.key + serial = test-ca.server1.serial + default_md = sha1 + default_startdate = 110212144406Z + default_enddate = 210212144406Z + new_certs_dir = ./ + database = ./test-ca.server1.future-crl.db + policy = policy_match + + [policy_match] + countryName = supplied + organizationName = supplied + commonName = supplied diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.opensslconf b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.opensslconf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..209b0fff --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.opensslconf @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ + [ ca ] + default_ca = test-ca + + [ test-ca ] + certificate = test-ca.crt + private_key = test-ca.key + serial = test-ca.server1.serial + default_md = sha1 + default_startdate = 110212144406Z + default_enddate = 210212144406Z + new_certs_dir = ./ + database = ./test-ca.server1.db + policy = policy_match + + [policy_match] + countryName = supplied + organizationName = supplied + commonName = supplied diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2-expired.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2-expired.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..22e4797f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2-expired.crt @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIB/TCCAYCgAwIBAgIBATAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw +DwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQTAe +Fw0wMzA5MjQxNTQ5NDhaFw0xMzA5MjQxNTQ5NDhaMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw +DwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQTB2 +MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IABMPaKzRBN1gvh1b+/Im6KUNLTuBuww5XUzM5 +WNRStJGVOQsj318XJGJI/BqVKc4sLYfCiFKAr9ZqqyHduNMcbli4yuiyaY7zQa0p +w7RfdadHb9UZKVVpmlM7ILRmFmAzHqNQME4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4E +FgQUnW0gJEkBPyvLeLUZvH4kydv7NnwwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUnW0gJEkBPyvLeLUZ +vH4kydv7NnwwDAYIKoZIzj0EAwIFAANpADBmAjEAvQ/49lXXrLYdOIGtTaYWjpZP +tRBXQiGPMzUvmKBk7gM7bF4iFPsdJikyXHmuwv3RAjEA8vtUX8fAAB3fbh5dEXRm +l7tz0Sw/RW6AHFtaIauGkhHqeKIaKIi6WSgHu6x97uyg +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7ac79e44 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIICBDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQAwPjELMAkGA1UE +BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0 +IEVDIENBMB4XDTE5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFoXDTI5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFowPjELMAkGA1UE +BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0 +IEVDIENBMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEw9orNEE3WC+HVv78ibopQ0tO +4G7DDldTMzlY1FK0kZU5CyPfXxckYkj8GpUpziwth8KIUoCv1mqrId240xxuWLjK +6LJpjvNBrSnDtF91p0dv1RkpVWmaUzsgtGYWYDMeo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/ +MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSdbSAkSQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSdbSAk +SQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAA2gAMGUCMFHKrjAPpHB0BN1a +LH8TwcJ3vh0AxeKZj30mRdOKBmg/jLS3rU3g8VQBHpn8sOTTBwIxANxPO5AerimZ +hCjMe0d4CTHf1gFZMF70+IqEP+o5VHsIp2Cqvflb0VGWFC5l9a4cQg== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2c8e217432a33259f5a5bf666daa4b77de32b0dc GIT binary patch literal 520 zcmXqLVq!69V(eJJ%*4pV#K~~b`B7bx^O+Y0JZv0VZ64=rS(uqv84TF}A43@fDUc8|k1$xMxHv~4B(=Ci!PQy8+0j5woY&CO zz{t?R(8R>Vz#vMT*9e(QvH4{N0&MJH_cAfEv1&K6Feou6F|ZuIrETJ99--eJ_U}*U zE=^}|zXy4T`ND&ZEhDZ3ZJ9XLl3V$Hytqn|#~-Pwn&)(M+YfaFHLSmuwOaA+j>|H6 z5j#%3*p%7#*>SDr;Vto{%iZ&@N@|8?&I-0x*peoeU@W&dz`zd}Qp};U!Yr%?%#4ix z4P-$)J{B<+k-51FDxQq?+NUeFO75vsIeGiHS&e}_NLrai!a%G6y8@JOXUFF(3k>|a@iRC6p(She?O^u@qwB6_J`*U2~m E0Kv4QxBvhE literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.key b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ccbba3c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.key @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MIGkAgEBBDCD2RUOoHHwVxAzozi4hsGmEV1ttAPhKXZF14dvI6tEIOpke4WxdueF +lap01tGkXuqgBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAATD2is0QTdYL4dW/vyJuilDS07gbsMOV1Mz +OVjUUrSRlTkLI99fFyRiSPwalSnOLC2HwohSgK/Waqsh3bjTHG5YuMrosmmO80Gt +KcO0X3WnR2/VGSlVaZpTOyC0ZhZgMx4= +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bf64141aaef8c4820c385bf55303706db2846d4d GIT binary patch literal 167 zcmV;Y09gMpfusTf0R%9E*%c0;aqw3VGov`ThQX#0U2U`j;VE`S*N1N-t3)8`WP63N zcISnas&v-Tq+aTv2L=Tzfdl{|p=1MM00hI@D>OkjSTBcG{``r$DML$6;BLbXS5q@N zSkzLqk(D_MBi~;aBw|SX8kH%|EG>t^h*E&B)@rLE-MG^nZdka==(1^!^FggC!?a&@ Vr$=wq87Wn1no~OX literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bb709901 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,307EAB469933D64E + +IxbrRmKcAzctJqPdTQLA4SWyBYYGYJVkYEna+F7Pa5t5Yg/gKADrFKcm6B72e7DG +ihExtZI648s0zdYw6qSJ74vrPSuWDe5qm93BqsfVH9svtCzWHW0pm1p0KTBCFfUq +UsuWTITwJImcnlAs1gaRZ3sAWm7cOUidL0fo2G0fYUFNcYoCSLffCFTEHBuPnagb +a77x/sY1Bvii8S9/XhDTb6pTMx06wzrm +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.ku-crl.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.ku-crl.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4fb40838 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca2.ku-crl.crt @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBzDCCAVOgAwIBAgIJAP6mZLzh0IPSMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYT +Ak5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBF +QyBDQTAeFw0xNDA0MDkxMTIzMzhaFw0yNDA0MDYxMTIzMzhaMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYT 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca_utf8.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2dadc776 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-ca_utf8.crt @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTkwMjExMTM0NTE0WhcNMjkwMjExMTM0NTE0WjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G +CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx +mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny +50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n +YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL +R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu +KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj +gZUwgZIwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MGMGA1UdIwRcMFqA 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00000000..9ce44c23 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-int-ca2.crt @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIC6TCCAdGgAwIBAgIBDzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER +MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN +MTMwOTI0MTYwODQyWhcNMjMwOTIyMTYwODQyWjBLMQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxKTAnBgNVBAMTIFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgSW50ZXJtZWRp +YXRlIEVDIENBMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAE8Oih3fX5SLeN1dmFncQl +WMw9+Y6sXblhlrXBxhXxjwdwpCHENn+foUVdrqYVYa7Suv3QVeO6nJ19H3QNixW8 +ik1P+hxsbaq8bta78vAyHmC4EmXQLg1w7oxb9Q82qX1Yo4GVMIGSMB0GA1UdDgQW +BBQPib1jQevLXhco/2gwPcGI0JxYOTBjBgNVHSMEXDBagBS0WuSls97SUva51aaV +D+s+vMf9/6E/pD0wOzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoTCFBvbGFyU1NMMRkw +FwYDVQQDExBQb2xhclNTTCBUZXN0IENBggEAMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZI +hvcNAQELBQADggEBAAjeaTUaCBiXT1CYLVr6UFSeRNZBrDPnj6PwqUQTvgB5I5n6 +yXqoE4RYDaEL0Lg24juFxI26itBuypto6vscgGq77cfrP/avSdxU+xeZ4bCWvh3M 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b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-int-ca3-badsign.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2087056e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-int-ca3-badsign.crt @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBtDCCATqgAwIBAgIBTTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjBLMQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxKTAnBgNVBAMTIFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgSW50ZXJtZWRp +YXRlIEVDIENBMB4XDTE1MDkwMTE0MDg0M1oXDTI1MDgyOTE0MDg0M1owSjELMAkG +A1UEBhMCVUsxETAPBgNVBAoTCG1iZWQgVExTMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9tYmVkIFRMUyBU +ZXN0IGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQSAzMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE +732fWHLNPMPsP1U1ibXvb55erlEVMlpXBGsj+KYwVqU1XCmW9Z9hhP7X/5js/DX9 +2J/utoHyjUtVpQOzdTrbsaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNo +ADBlAjAJRxbGRas3NBmk9MnGWXg7PT1xnRELHRWWIvfLdVQt06l1/xFg3ZuPdQdt +Qh7CK80CMQD7wa1o1a8qyDKBfLN636uKmKGga0E+vYXBeFCy9oARBangGCB0B2vt +pz590JvGWf0= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-int-ca3.crt b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-int-ca3.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7e724b24 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-int-ca3.crt @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBtDCCATqgAwIBAgIBTTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjBLMQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G +A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxKTAnBgNVBAMTIFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgSW50ZXJtZWRp +YXRlIEVDIENBMB4XDTE1MDkwMTE0MDg0M1oXDTI1MDgyOTE0MDg0M1owSjELMAkG +A1UEBhMCVUsxETAPBgNVBAoTCG1iZWQgVExTMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9tYmVkIFRMUyBU +ZXN0IGludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQSAzMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE +732fWHLNPMPsP1U1ibXvb55erlEVMlpXBGsj+KYwVqU1XCmW9Z9hhP7X/5js/DX9 +2J/utoHyjUtVpQOzdTrbsaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNo +ADBlAjAJRxbGRas3NBmk9MnGWXg7PT1xnRELHRWWIvfLdVQt06l1/xFg3ZuPdQdt +Qh7CK80CMQD7wa1o1a8qyDKBfLN636uKmKGga0E+vYXBeFCy9oARBangGCB0B2vt +pz590JvGWfM= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-int-ca3.key b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-int-ca3.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1bcc7116 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/data_files/test-int-ca3.key @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS----- +BggqhkjOPQMBBw== +-----END EC PARAMETERS----- +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MHcCAQEEIC9zTt8jgjBlbq+qCsGj6uclaKLYBqxYSmUiuBdM1KG9oAoGCCqGSM49 +AwEHoUQDQgAE732fWHLNPMPsP1U1ibXvb55erlEVMlpXBGsj+KYwVqU1XCmW9Z9h +hP7X/5js/DX92J/utoHyjUtVpQOzdTrbsQ== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/docker/bionic/Dockerfile b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/docker/bionic/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3132be9c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/docker/bionic/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +# Dockerfile +# +# Purpose +# ------- +# Defines a Docker container suitable to build and run all tests (all.sh), +# except for those that use a proprietary toolchain. + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +ARG MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL="" +ARG MY_REGISTRY= + +FROM ${MY_REGISTRY}ubuntu:bionic + + +ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND noninteractive + +RUN apt-get update \ + && apt-get -y install software-properties-common \ + && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists + +RUN add-apt-repository -y ppa:team-gcc-arm-embedded/ppa + +RUN apt-get update \ + && apt-get -y install \ + # mbedtls build/test dependencies + build-essential \ + clang \ + cmake \ + doxygen \ + gcc-arm-none-eabi \ + gcc-mingw-w64-i686 \ + gcc-multilib \ + g++-multilib \ + gdb \ + git \ + graphviz \ + lsof \ + python \ + python3-pip \ + python3 \ + pylint3 \ + valgrind \ + wget \ + # libnettle build dependencies + libgmp-dev \ + m4 \ + pkg-config \ + && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* + +# Build a static, legacy openssl from sources with sslv3 enabled +# Based on https://gist.github.com/bmaupin/8caca3a1e8c3c5686141 (build-openssl.sh) +# Note: openssl-1.0.2 and earlier has known build issues with parallel make. +RUN cd /tmp \ + && wget https://www.openssl.org/source/old/1.0.1/openssl-1.0.1j.tar.gz -qO- | tar xz \ + && cd openssl-1.0.1j \ + && ./config --openssldir=/usr/local/openssl-1.0.1j no-shared \ + && (make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} || make -j 1) \ + && make install_sw \ + && rm -rf /tmp/openssl* +ENV OPENSSL_LEGACY=/usr/local/openssl-1.0.1j/bin/openssl + +# Build OPENSSL as 1.0.2g +RUN cd /tmp \ + && wget https://www.openssl.org/source/old/1.0.2/openssl-1.0.2g.tar.gz -qO- | tar xz \ + && cd openssl-1.0.2g \ + && ./config --openssldir=/usr/local/openssl-1.0.2g no-shared \ + && (make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} || make -j 1) \ + && make install_sw \ + && rm -rf /tmp/openssl* +ENV OPENSSL=/usr/local/openssl-1.0.2g/bin/openssl + +# Build a new openssl binary for ARIA/CHACHA20 support +# Based on https://gist.github.com/bmaupin/8caca3a1e8c3c5686141 (build-openssl.sh) +RUN cd /tmp \ + && wget https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1a.tar.gz -qO- | tar xz \ + && cd openssl-1.1.1a \ + && ./config --prefix=/usr/local/openssl-1.1.1a -Wl,--enable-new-dtags,-rpath,'${LIBRPATH}' no-shared \ + && make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} \ + && make install_sw \ + && rm -rf /tmp/openssl* +ENV OPENSSL_NEXT=/usr/local/openssl-1.1.1a/bin/openssl + +# Build libnettle 2.7.1 (needed by legacy gnutls) +RUN cd /tmp \ + && wget https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/nettle/nettle-2.7.1.tar.gz -qO- | tar xz \ + && cd nettle-2.7.1 \ + && ./configure --disable-documentation \ + && make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} \ + && make install \ + && /sbin/ldconfig \ + && rm -rf /tmp/nettle* + +# Build legacy gnutls (3.3.8) +RUN cd /tmp \ + && wget https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.3/gnutls-3.3.8.tar.xz -qO- | tar xJ \ + && cd gnutls-3.3.8 \ + && ./configure --prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8 --exec_prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8 --disable-shared --disable-guile --disable-doc \ + && make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} \ + && make install \ + && rm -rf /tmp/gnutls* +ENV GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI=/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-cli +ENV GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV=/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-serv + +# Build libnettle 3.1 (needed by gnutls) +RUN cd /tmp \ + && wget https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/nettle/nettle-3.1.tar.gz -qO- | tar xz \ + && cd nettle-3.1 \ + && ./configure --disable-documentation \ + && make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} \ + && make install \ + && /sbin/ldconfig \ + && rm -rf /tmp/nettle* + +# Build gnutls (3.4.10) +RUN cd /tmp \ + && wget https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.4/gnutls-3.4.10.tar.xz -qO- | tar xJ \ + && cd gnutls-3.4.10 \ + && ./configure --prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.4.10 --exec_prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.4.10 \ + --with-included-libtasn1 --without-p11-kit \ + --disable-shared --disable-guile --disable-doc \ + && make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} \ + && make install \ + && rm -rf /tmp/gnutls* +ENV GNUTLS_CLI=/usr/local/gnutls-3.4.10/bin/gnutls-cli +ENV GNUTLS_SERV=/usr/local/gnutls-3.4.10/bin/gnutls-serv + +# Build libnettle 3.4 (needed by gnutls next) +RUN cd /tmp \ + && wget https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/nettle/nettle-3.4.1.tar.gz -qO- | tar xz \ + && cd nettle-3.4.1 \ + && ./configure --disable-documentation \ + && make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} \ + && make install \ + && /sbin/ldconfig \ + && rm -rf /tmp/nettle* + +# Build gnutls next (3.6.5) +RUN cd /tmp \ + && wget https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.6/gnutls-3.6.5.tar.xz -qO- | tar xJ \ + && cd gnutls-3.6.5 \ + && ./configure --prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5 --exec_prefix=/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5 \ + --with-included-libtasn1 --with-included-unistring --without-p11-kit \ + --disable-shared --disable-guile --disable-doc \ + && make ${MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL} \ + && make install \ + && rm -rf /tmp/gnutls* + +ENV GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI=/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-cli +ENV GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV=/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-serv diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/git-scripts/README.md b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/git-scripts/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29d7501b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/git-scripts/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +README for git hooks script +=========================== +git has a way to run scripts, which are invoked by specific git commands. +The git hooks are located in `/.git/hooks`, and as such are not under version control +for more information, see the [git documentation](https://git-scm.com/docs/githooks). + +The mbed TLS git hooks are located in `/tests/git-scripts` directory, and one must create a soft link from `/.git/hooks` to `/tesst/git-scripts`, in order to make the hook scripts successfully work. + +Example: + +Execute the following command to create a link on linux from the mbed TLS `.git/hooks` directory: +`ln -s ../../tests/git-scripts/pre-push.sh pre-push` + +**Note: Currently the mbed TLS git hooks work only on a GNU platform. If using a non-GNU platform, don't enable these hooks!** + +These scripts can also be used independently. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..fb28dad9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/git-scripts/pre-commit.sh @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# pre-commit.sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +# Purpose +# +# This script does quick sanity checks before commiting: +# - check that generated files are up-to-date. +# +# It is meant to be called as a git pre-commit hook, see README.md. +# +# From the git sample pre-commit hook: +# Called by "git commit" with no arguments. The hook should +# exit with non-zero status after issuing an appropriate message if +# it wants to stop the commit. + +set -eu + +tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/git-scripts/pre-push.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/git-scripts/pre-push.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..ce43467b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/git-scripts/pre-push.sh @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# pre-push.sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# Called by "git push" after it has checked the remote status, but before anything has been +# pushed. If this script exits with a non-zero status nothing will be pushed. +# This script can also be used independently, not using git. +# +# This hook is called with the following parameters: +# +# $1 -- Name of the remote to which the push is being done +# $2 -- URL to which the push is being done +# +# If pushing without using a named remote those arguments will be equal. +# +# Information about the commits which are being pushed is supplied as lines to +# the standard input in the form: +# +# +# + +REMOTE="$1" +URL="$2" + +echo "REMOTE is $REMOTE" +echo "URL is $URL" + +set -eu + +tests/scripts/all.sh -q -k 'check_*' diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/baremetal-override/time.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/baremetal-override/time.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40eed2d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/baremetal-override/time.h @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#error "time.h included in a configuration without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/spe/crypto_spe.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/spe/crypto_spe.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f80fd86b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/spe/crypto_spe.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + */ + +/** + * \file crypto_spe.h + * + * \brief When Mbed Crypto is built with the MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM option + * enabled, this header is included by all .c files in Mbed Crypto that + * use PSA Crypto function names. This avoids duplication of symbols + * between TF-M and Mbed Crypto. + * + * \note This file should be included before including any PSA Crypto headers + * from Mbed Crypto. + */ + +#ifndef CRYPTO_SPE_H +#define CRYPTO_SPE_H + +#define PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(x) mbedcrypto__ ## x + +#define psa_crypto_init \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_crypto_init) +#define psa_key_derivation_get_capacity \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_key_derivation_get_capacity) +#define psa_key_derivation_set_capacity \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_key_derivation_set_capacity) +#define psa_key_derivation_input_bytes \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_key_derivation_input_bytes) +#define psa_key_derivation_output_bytes \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_key_derivation_output_bytes) +#define psa_key_derivation_input_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_key_derivation_input_key) +#define psa_key_derivation_output_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_key_derivation_output_key) +#define psa_key_derivation_setup \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_key_derivation_setup) +#define psa_key_derivation_abort \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_key_derivation_abort) +#define psa_key_derivation_key_agreement \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_key_derivation_key_agreement) +#define psa_raw_key_agreement \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_raw_key_agreement) +#define psa_generate_random \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_generate_random) +#define psa_aead_encrypt \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_aead_encrypt) +#define psa_aead_decrypt \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_aead_decrypt) +#define psa_open_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_open_key) +#define psa_close_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_close_key) +#define psa_import_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_import_key) +#define psa_destroy_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_destroy_key) +#define psa_get_key_attributes \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_get_key_attributes) +#define psa_reset_key_attributes \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_reset_key_attributes) +#define psa_export_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_export_key) +#define psa_export_public_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_export_public_key) +#define psa_purge_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_purge_key) +#define psa_copy_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_copy_key) +#define psa_cipher_operation_init \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_cipher_operation_init) +#define psa_cipher_generate_iv \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_cipher_generate_iv) +#define psa_cipher_set_iv \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_cipher_set_iv) +#define psa_cipher_encrypt_setup \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_cipher_encrypt_setup) +#define psa_cipher_decrypt_setup \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_cipher_decrypt_setup) +#define psa_cipher_update \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_cipher_update) +#define psa_cipher_finish \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_cipher_finish) +#define psa_cipher_abort \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_cipher_abort) +#define psa_hash_operation_init \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_hash_operation_init) +#define psa_hash_setup \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_hash_setup) +#define psa_hash_update \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_hash_update) +#define psa_hash_finish \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_hash_finish) +#define psa_hash_verify \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_hash_verify) +#define psa_hash_abort \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_hash_abort) +#define psa_hash_clone \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_hash_clone) +#define psa_hash_compute \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_hash_compute) +#define psa_hash_compare \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_hash_compare) +#define psa_mac_operation_init \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_mac_operation_init) +#define psa_mac_sign_setup \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_mac_sign_setup) +#define psa_mac_verify_setup \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_mac_verify_setup) +#define psa_mac_update \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_mac_update) +#define psa_mac_sign_finish \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_mac_sign_finish) +#define psa_mac_verify_finish \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_mac_verify_finish) +#define psa_mac_abort \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_mac_abort) +#define psa_sign_hash \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_sign_hash) +#define psa_verify_hash \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_verify_hash) +#define psa_asymmetric_encrypt \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_asymmetric_encrypt) +#define psa_asymmetric_decrypt \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_asymmetric_decrypt) +#define psa_generate_key \ + PSA_FUNCTION_NAME(psa_generate_key) + +#endif /* CRYPTO_SPE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/asn1_helpers.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/asn1_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91ae2602 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/asn1_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/** Helper functions for tests that manipulate ASN.1 data. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef ASN1_HELPERS_H +#define ASN1_HELPERS_H + +#include "test/helpers.h" + +/** Skip past an INTEGER in an ASN.1 buffer. + * + * Mark the current test case as failed in any of the following conditions: + * - The buffer does not start with an ASN.1 INTEGER. + * - The integer's size or parity does not match the constraints expressed + * through \p min_bits, \p max_bits and \p must_be_odd. + * + * \param p Upon entry, `*p` points to the first byte of the + * buffer to parse. + * On successful return, `*p` points to the first byte + * after the parsed INTEGER. + * On failure, `*p` is unspecified. + * \param end The end of the ASN.1 buffer. + * \param min_bits Fail the test case if the integer does not have at + * least this many significant bits. + * \param max_bits Fail the test case if the integer has more than + * this many significant bits. + * \param must_be_odd Fail the test case if the integer is even. + * + * \return \c 0 if the test failed, otherwise 1. + */ +int mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + size_t min_bits, size_t max_bits, + int must_be_odd ); + +#endif /* ASN1_HELPERS_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/constant_flow.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/constant_flow.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af640116 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/constant_flow.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/** + * \file constant_flow.h + * + * \brief This file contains tools to ensure tested code has constant flow. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_H +#define TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/* + * This file defines the two macros + * + * #define TEST_CF_SECRET(ptr, size) + * #define TEST_CF_PUBLIC(ptr, size) + * + * that can be used in tests to mark a memory area as secret (no branch or + * memory access should depend on it) or public (default, only needs to be + * marked explicitly when it was derived from secret data). + * + * Arguments: + * - ptr: a pointer to the memory area to be marked + * - size: the size in bytes of the memory area + * + * Implementation: + * The basic idea is that of ctgrind : we can + * re-use tools that were designed for checking use of uninitialized memory. + * This file contains two implementations: one based on MemorySanitizer, the + * other on valgrind's memcheck. If none of them is enabled, dummy macros that + * do nothing are defined for convenience. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) +#include + +/* Use macros to avoid messing up with origin tracking */ +#define TEST_CF_SECRET __msan_allocated_memory +// void __msan_allocated_memory(const volatile void* data, size_t size); +#define TEST_CF_PUBLIC __msan_unpoison +// void __msan_unpoison(const volatile void *a, size_t size); + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) +#include + +#define TEST_CF_SECRET VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED +// VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(_qzz_addr, _qzz_len) +#define TEST_CF_PUBLIC VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED +// VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(_qzz_addr, _qzz_len) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN || + MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ + +#define TEST_CF_SECRET(ptr, size) +#define TEST_CF_PUBLIC(ptr, size) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN || + MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ + +#endif /* TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/aead.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/aead.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2207cb36 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/aead.h @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Test driver for AEAD driver entry points. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_AEAD_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_AEAD_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include + +typedef struct { + /* If not PSA_SUCCESS, return this error code instead of processing the + * function call. */ + psa_status_t forced_status; + /* Count the amount of times AEAD driver functions are called. */ + unsigned long hits; + /* Status returned by the last AEAD driver function call. */ + psa_status_t driver_status; +} mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_INIT { 0, 0, 0 } +static inline mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_init( void ) +{ + const mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_t v = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +extern mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_t mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_AEAD_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/cipher.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1aa616b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +/* + * Test driver for cipher functions + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_CIPHER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_CIPHER_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +typedef struct { + /* If non-null, on success, copy this to the output. */ + void *forced_output; + size_t forced_output_length; + /* If not PSA_SUCCESS, return this error code instead of processing the + * function call. */ + psa_status_t forced_status; + /* Count the amount of times one of the cipher driver functions is called. */ + unsigned long hits; +} mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_INIT { NULL, 0, PSA_SUCCESS, 0 } +static inline mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init( void ) +{ + const mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_t v = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +extern mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_t mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +/* + * opaque versions + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_update( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97be72d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Mbed TLS configuration for PSA test driver libraries. It includes: + * . the minimum set of modules needed by the PSA core. + * . the Mbed TLS configuration options that may need to be additionally + * enabled for the purpose of a specific test. + * . the PSA configuration file for the Mbed TLS library and its test drivers. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + +/* PSA core mandatory configuration options */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + +/* + * Configuration options that may need to be additionally enabled for the + * purpose of a specific set of tests. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +//#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +//#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af4686b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +/** + * This file is intended to be used to build PSA test driver libraries. It is + * intended to be appended by the test build system to the crypto_config.h file + * of the Mbed TLS library the test library will be linked to. It mirrors the + * PSA_ACCEL_* macros defining the cryptographic operations the test library + * supports. + */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD2) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD2 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD2 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD4) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD4 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD4 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_XTS 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#endif +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/hash.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/hash.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..865cd743 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Test driver for hash driver entry points. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_HASH_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_HASH_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include + +typedef struct { + /* If not PSA_SUCCESS, return this error code instead of processing the + * function call. */ + psa_status_t forced_status; + /* Count the amount of times hash driver entry points are called. */ + unsigned long hits; + /* Status returned by the last hash driver entry point call. */ + psa_status_t driver_status; +} mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_INIT { 0, 0, 0 } +static inline mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init( void ) +{ + const mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_t v = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +extern mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_t mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, size_t *hash_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *target_operation ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_HASH_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8dfbb37 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Test driver for generating and verifying keys. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_KEY_MANAGEMENT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_KEY_MANAGEMENT_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT 0 +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_ECDSA_KEY_SLOT 1 + +typedef struct { + /* If non-null, on success, copy this to the output. */ + void *forced_output; + size_t forced_output_length; + /* If not PSA_SUCCESS, return this error code instead of processing the + * function call. */ + psa_status_t forced_status; + /* Count the amount of times one of the key management driver functions + * is called. */ + unsigned long hits; + /* Location of the last key management driver called to import a key. */ + psa_key_location_t location; +} mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_t; + +/* The location is initialized to the invalid value 0x800000. Invalid in the + * sense that no PSA specification will assign a meaning to this location + * (stated first in version 1.0.1 of the specification) and that it is not + * used as a location of an opaque test drivers. */ +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_KEY_MANAGEMENT_INIT { NULL, 0, PSA_SUCCESS, 0, 0x800000 } +static inline mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_init( void ) +{ + const mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_t + v = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_KEY_MANAGEMENT_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +extern mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_init( void ); +void mbedtls_test_transparent_free( void ); +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_init( void ); +void mbedtls_test_opaque_free( void ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, size_t *key_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, size_t *key_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_KEY_MANAGEMENT_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/mac.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/mac.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7733dd34 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/mac.h @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/* + * Test driver for MAC driver entry points. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_MAC_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_MAC_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include + +typedef struct { + /* If not PSA_SUCCESS, return this error code instead of processing the + * function call. */ + psa_status_t forced_status; + /* Count the amount of times MAC driver functions are called. */ + unsigned long hits; + /* Status returned by the last MAC driver function call. */ + psa_status_t driver_status; +} mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_INIT { 0, 0, 0 } +static inline mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init( void ) +{ + const mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t v = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +extern mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_MAC_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5e64edc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/signature.h @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* + * Test driver for signature functions. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_SIGNATURE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_SIGNATURE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include + +typedef struct { + /* If non-null, on success, copy this to the output. */ + void *forced_output; + size_t forced_output_length; + /* If not PSA_SUCCESS, return this error code instead of processing the + * function call. */ + psa_status_t forced_status; + /* Count the amount of times one of the signature driver functions is called. */ + unsigned long hits; +} mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_SIGNATURE_INIT { NULL, 0, PSA_SUCCESS, 0 } +static inline mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init( void ) +{ + const mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_t + v = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_SIGNATURE_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +extern mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks; +extern mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_SIGNATURE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/size.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/size.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b2665bdd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/size.h @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* + * Test driver for context size functions + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_SIZE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_SIZE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include + +size_t mbedtls_test_size_function( + const psa_key_type_t key_type, + const size_t key_bits ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_SIZE_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b60932d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* + * Umbrella include for all of the test driver functionality + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_H + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION 0x7fffff + +#include "test/drivers/aead.h" +#include "test/drivers/cipher.h" +#include "test/drivers/hash.h" +#include "test/drivers/mac.h" +#include "test/drivers/key_management.h" +#include "test/drivers/signature.h" +#include "test/drivers/size.h" + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/fake_external_rng_for_test.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/fake_external_rng_for_test.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..faeef22e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/fake_external_rng_for_test.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Insecure but standalone implementation of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). + * Only for use in tests! + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef FAKE_EXTERNAL_RNG_FOR_TEST_H +#define FAKE_EXTERNAL_RNG_FOR_TEST_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** Enable the insecure implementation of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). + * + * The insecure implementation of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() is + * disabled by default. + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG is enabled and the test + * helpers are linked into a program, you must enable this before running any + * code that uses the PSA subsystem to generate random data (including internal + * random generation for purposes such as blinding when the random generation + * is routed through PSA). + * + * You can enable and disable it at any time, regardless of the state + * of the PSA subsystem. You may disable it temporarily to simulate a + * depleted entropy source. + */ +void mbedtls_test_enable_insecure_external_rng( void ); + +/** Disable the insecure implementation of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). + * + * See mbedtls_test_enable_insecure_external_rng(). + */ +void mbedtls_test_disable_insecure_external_rng( void ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#endif /* FAKE_EXTERNAL_RNG_FOR_TEST_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..540f1638 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,387 @@ +/** + * \file helpers.h + * + * \brief This file contains the prototypes of helper functions for the + * purpose of testing. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef TEST_HELPERS_H +#define TEST_HELPERS_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS = 0, + MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED, + MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED +} mbedtls_test_result_t; + +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_test_result_t result; + const char *test; + const char *filename; + int line_no; + unsigned long step; + char line1[76]; + char line2[76]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) + const char *mutex_usage_error; +#endif +} +mbedtls_test_info_t; +extern mbedtls_test_info_t mbedtls_test_info; + +int mbedtls_test_platform_setup( void ); +void mbedtls_test_platform_teardown( void ); + +/** + * \brief Record the current test case as a failure. + * + * This function can be called directly however it is usually + * called via macros such as TEST_ASSERT, TEST_EQUAL, + * PSA_ASSERT, etc... + * + * \note If the test case was already marked as failed, calling + * `mbedtls_test_fail( )` again will not overwrite any + * previous information about the failure. + * + * \param test Description of the failure or assertion that failed. This + * MUST be a string literal. + * \param line_no Line number where the failure originated. + * \param filename Filename where the failure originated. + */ +void mbedtls_test_fail( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename ); + +/** + * \brief Record the current test case as skipped. + * + * This function can be called directly however it is usually + * called via the TEST_ASSUME macro. + * + * \param test Description of the assumption that caused the test case to + * be skipped. This MUST be a string literal. + * \param line_no Line number where the test case was skipped. + * \param filename Filename where the test case was skipped. + */ +void mbedtls_test_skip( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename ); + +/** + * \brief Set the test step number for failure reports. + * + * Call this function to display "step NNN" in addition to the + * line number and file name if a test fails. Typically the "step + * number" is the index of a for loop but it can be whatever you + * want. + * + * \param step The step number to report. + */ +void mbedtls_test_set_step( unsigned long step ); + +/** + * \brief Reset mbedtls_test_info to a ready/starting state. + */ +void mbedtls_test_info_reset( void ); + +/** + * \brief Record the current test case as a failure if two integers + * have a different value. + * + * This function is usually called via the macro + * #TEST_EQUAL. + * + * \param test Description of the failure or assertion that failed. This + * MUST be a string literal. This normally has the form + * "EXPR1 == EXPR2" where EXPR1 has the value \p value1 + * and EXPR2 has the value \p value2. + * \param line_no Line number where the failure originated. + * \param filename Filename where the failure originated. + * \param value1 The first value to compare. + * \param value2 The second value to compare. + * + * \return \c 1 if the values are equal, otherwise \c 0. + */ +int mbedtls_test_equal( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename, + unsigned long long value1, unsigned long long value2 ); + +/** + * \brief Record the current test case as a failure based + * on comparing two unsigned integers. + * + * This function is usually called via the macro + * #TEST_LE_U. + * + * \param test Description of the failure or assertion that failed. This + * MUST be a string literal. This normally has the form + * "EXPR1 <= EXPR2" where EXPR1 has the value \p value1 + * and EXPR2 has the value \p value2. + * \param line_no Line number where the failure originated. + * \param filename Filename where the failure originated. + * \param value1 The first value to compare. + * \param value2 The second value to compare. + * + * \return \c 1 if \p value1 <= \p value2, otherwise \c 0. + */ +int mbedtls_test_le_u( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename, + unsigned long long value1, unsigned long long value2 ); + +/** + * \brief Record the current test case as a failure based + * on comparing two signed integers. + * + * This function is usually called via the macro + * #TEST_LE_S. + * + * \param test Description of the failure or assertion that failed. This + * MUST be a string literal. This normally has the form + * "EXPR1 <= EXPR2" where EXPR1 has the value \p value1 + * and EXPR2 has the value \p value2. + * \param line_no Line number where the failure originated. + * \param filename Filename where the failure originated. + * \param value1 The first value to compare. + * \param value2 The second value to compare. + * + * \return \c 1 if \p value1 <= \p value2, otherwise \c 0. + */ +int mbedtls_test_le_s( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename, + long long value1, long long value2 ); + +/** + * \brief This function decodes the hexadecimal representation of + * data. + * + * \note The output buffer can be the same as the input buffer. For + * any other overlapping of the input and output buffers, the + * behavior is undefined. + * + * \param obuf Output buffer. + * \param obufmax Size in number of bytes of \p obuf. + * \param ibuf Input buffer. + * \param len The number of unsigned char written in \p obuf. This must + * not be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c -1 if the output buffer is too small or the input string + * is not a valid hexadecimal representation. + */ +int mbedtls_test_unhexify( unsigned char *obuf, size_t obufmax, + const char *ibuf, size_t *len ); + +void mbedtls_test_hexify( unsigned char *obuf, + const unsigned char *ibuf, + int len ); + +/** + * Allocate and zeroize a buffer. + * + * If the size if zero, a pointer to a zeroized 1-byte buffer is returned. + * + * For convenience, dies if allocation fails. + */ +unsigned char *mbedtls_test_zero_alloc( size_t len ); + +/** + * Allocate and fill a buffer from hex data. + * + * The buffer is sized exactly as needed. This allows to detect buffer + * overruns (including overreads) when running the test suite under valgrind. + * + * If the size if zero, a pointer to a zeroized 1-byte buffer is returned. + * + * For convenience, dies if allocation fails. + */ +unsigned char *mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( const char *ibuf, size_t *olen ); + +int mbedtls_test_hexcmp( uint8_t * a, uint8_t * b, + uint32_t a_len, uint32_t b_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) + +typedef struct +{ + const char *failure_condition; + const char *file; + int line; +} +mbedtls_test_param_failed_location_record_t; + +/** + * \brief Get the location record of the last call to + * mbedtls_test_param_failed(). + * + * \note The call expectation is set up and active until the next call to + * mbedtls_test_param_failed_check_expected_call() or + * mbedtls_param_failed() that cancels it. + */ +void mbedtls_test_param_failed_get_location_record( + mbedtls_test_param_failed_location_record_t *location_record ); + +/** + * \brief State that a call to mbedtls_param_failed() is expected. + * + * \note The call expectation is set up and active until the next call to + * mbedtls_test_param_failed_check_expected_call() or + * mbedtls_param_failed that cancel it. + */ +void mbedtls_test_param_failed_expect_call( void ); + +/** + * \brief Check whether mbedtls_param_failed() has been called as expected. + * + * \note Check whether mbedtls_param_failed() has been called between the + * last call to mbedtls_test_param_failed_expect_call() and the call + * to this function. + * + * \return \c 0 Since the last call to mbedtls_param_failed_expect_call(), + * mbedtls_param_failed() has been called. + * \c -1 Otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_test_param_failed_check_expected_call( void ); + +/** + * \brief Get the address of the object of type jmp_buf holding the execution + * state information used by mbedtls_param_failed() to do a long jump. + * + * \note If a call to mbedtls_param_failed() is not expected in the sense + * that there is no call to mbedtls_test_param_failed_expect_call() + * preceding it, then mbedtls_param_failed() will try to restore the + * execution to the state stored in the jmp_buf object whose address + * is returned by the present function. + * + * \note This function is intended to provide the parameter of the + * setjmp() function to set-up where mbedtls_param_failed() should + * long-jump if it has to. It is foreseen to be used as: + * + * setjmp( mbedtls_test_param_failed_get_state_buf() ). + * + * \note The type of the returned value is not jmp_buf as jmp_buf is an + * an array type (C specification) and a function cannot return an + * array type. + * + * \note The type of the returned value is not jmp_buf* as then the return + * value couldn't be used by setjmp(), as its parameter's type is + * jmp_buf. + * + * \return Address of the object of type jmp_buf holding the execution state + * information used by mbedtls_param_failed() to do a long jump. + */ +void* mbedtls_test_param_failed_get_state_buf( void ); + +/** + * \brief Reset the execution state used by mbedtls_param_failed() to do a + * long jump. + * + * \note If a call to mbedtls_param_failed() is not expected in the sense + * that there is no call to mbedtls_test_param_failed_expect_call() + * preceding it, then mbedtls_param_failed() will try to restore the + * execution state that this function reset. + * + * \note It is recommended to reset the execution state when the state + * is not relevant anymore. That way an unexpected call to + * mbedtls_param_failed() will not trigger a long jump with + * undefined behavior but rather a long jump that will rather fault. + */ +void mbedtls_test_param_failed_reset_state( void ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +#include "test/fake_external_rng_for_test.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) +/** Permanently activate the mutex usage verification framework. See + * threading_helpers.c for information. */ +void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_init( void ); + +/** Call this function after executing a test case to check for mutex usage + * errors. */ +void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check( void ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +/** + * \brief Check that only a pure high-level error code is being combined with + * a pure low-level error code as otherwise the resultant error code + * would be corrupted. + * + * \note Both high-level and low-level error codes cannot be greater than + * zero however can be zero. If one error code is zero then the + * other error code is returned even if both codes are zero. + * + * \note If the check fails, fail the test currently being run. + */ +void mbedtls_test_err_add_check( int high, int low, + const char *file, int line); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** Read an MPI from a string. + * + * Like mbedtls_mpi_read_string(), but size the resulting bignum based + * on the number of digits in the string. In particular, construct a + * bignum with 0 limbs for an empty string, and a bignum with leading 0 + * limbs if the string has sufficiently many leading 0 digits. + * + * This is important so that the "0 (null)" and "0 (1 limb)" and + * "leading zeros" test cases do what they claim. + * + * \param[out] X The MPI object to populate. It must be initialized. + * \param radix The radix (2 to 16). + * \param[in] s The null-terminated string to read from. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code otherwise. + */ +/* Since the library has exactly the desired behavior, this is trivial. */ +int mbedtls_test_read_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#endif /* TEST_HELPERS_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/macros.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/macros.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2d68f7d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/macros.h @@ -0,0 +1,404 @@ +/** + * \file macros.h + * + * \brief This file contains generic macros for the purpose of testing. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef TEST_MACROS_H +#define TEST_MACROS_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#endif + +/** + * \brief This macro tests the expression passed to it as a test step or + * individual test in a test case. + * + * It allows a library function to return a value and return an error + * code that can be tested. + * + * When MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is enabled, calls to the parameter failure + * callback, MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), will be assumed to be a test + * failure. + * + * This macro is not suitable for negative parameter validation tests, + * as it assumes the test step will not create an error. + * + * Failing the test means: + * - Mark this test case as failed. + * - Print a message identifying the failure. + * - Jump to the \c exit label. + * + * This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression. + * It may jump to the \c exit label. + * + * \param TEST The test expression to be tested. + */ +#define TEST_ASSERT( TEST ) \ + do { \ + if( ! (TEST) ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_test_fail( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/** Evaluate two integer expressions and fail the test case if they have + * different values. + * + * The two expressions should have the same signedness, otherwise the + * comparison is not meaningful if the signed value is negative. + * + * \param expr1 An integral-typed expression to evaluate. + * \param expr2 Another integral-typed expression to evaluate. + */ +#define TEST_EQUAL( expr1, expr2 ) \ + do { \ + if( ! mbedtls_test_equal( #expr1 " == " #expr2, __LINE__, __FILE__, \ + expr1, expr2 ) ) \ + goto exit; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/** Evaluate two unsigned integer expressions and fail the test case + * if they are not in increasing order (left <= right). + * + * \param expr1 An integral-typed expression to evaluate. + * \param expr2 Another integral-typed expression to evaluate. + */ +#define TEST_LE_U( expr1, expr2 ) \ + do { \ + if( ! mbedtls_test_le_u( #expr1 " <= " #expr2, __LINE__, __FILE__, \ + expr1, expr2 ) ) \ + goto exit; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/** Evaluate two signed integer expressions and fail the test case + * if they are not in increasing order (left <= right). + * + * \param expr1 An integral-typed expression to evaluate. + * \param expr2 Another integral-typed expression to evaluate. + */ +#define TEST_LE_S( expr1, expr2 ) \ + do { \ + if( ! mbedtls_test_le_s( #expr1 " <= " #expr2, __LINE__, __FILE__, \ + expr1, expr2 ) ) \ + goto exit; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/** Allocate memory dynamically and fail the test case if this fails. + * The allocated memory will be filled with zeros. + * + * You must set \p pointer to \c NULL before calling this macro and + * put `mbedtls_free( pointer )` in the test's cleanup code. + * + * If \p length is zero, the resulting \p pointer will be \c NULL. + * This is usually what we want in tests since API functions are + * supposed to accept null pointers when a buffer size is zero. + * + * This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression. + * It may jump to the \c exit label. + * + * \param pointer An lvalue where the address of the allocated buffer + * will be stored. + * This expression may be evaluated multiple times. + * \param length Number of elements to allocate. + * This expression may be evaluated multiple times. + * + */ +#define ASSERT_ALLOC( pointer, length ) \ + do \ + { \ + TEST_ASSERT( ( pointer ) == NULL ); \ + if( ( length ) != 0 ) \ + { \ + ( pointer ) = mbedtls_calloc( sizeof( *( pointer ) ), \ + ( length ) ); \ + TEST_ASSERT( ( pointer ) != NULL ); \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +/** Allocate memory dynamically. If the allocation fails, skip the test case. + * + * This macro behaves like #ASSERT_ALLOC, except that if the allocation + * fails, it marks the test as skipped rather than failed. + */ +#define ASSERT_ALLOC_WEAK( pointer, length ) \ + do \ + { \ + TEST_ASSERT( ( pointer ) == NULL ); \ + if( ( length ) != 0 ) \ + { \ + ( pointer ) = mbedtls_calloc( sizeof( *( pointer ) ), \ + ( length ) ); \ + TEST_ASSUME( ( pointer ) != NULL ); \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +/** Compare two buffers and fail the test case if they differ. + * + * This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression. + * It may jump to the \c exit label. + * + * \param p1 Pointer to the start of the first buffer. + * \param size1 Size of the first buffer in bytes. + * This expression may be evaluated multiple times. + * \param p2 Pointer to the start of the second buffer. + * \param size2 Size of the second buffer in bytes. + * This expression may be evaluated multiple times. + */ +#define ASSERT_COMPARE( p1, size1, p2, size2 ) \ + do \ + { \ + TEST_ASSERT( ( size1 ) == ( size2 ) ); \ + if( ( size1 ) != 0 ) \ + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( ( p1 ), ( p2 ), ( size1 ) ) == 0 ); \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +/** + * \brief This macro tests the expression passed to it and skips the + * running test if it doesn't evaluate to 'true'. + * + * \param TEST The test expression to be tested. + */ +#define TEST_ASSUME( TEST ) \ + do { \ + if( ! (TEST) ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_test_skip( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT) +/** + * \brief This macro tests the statement passed to it as a test step or + * individual test in a test case. The macro assumes the test will fail + * and will generate an error. + * + * It allows a library function to return a value and tests the return + * code on return to confirm the given error code was returned. + * + * When MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is enabled, calls to the parameter failure + * callback, MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), are assumed to indicate the + * expected failure, and the test will pass. + * + * This macro is intended for negative parameter validation tests, + * where the failing function may return an error value or call + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to indicate the error. + * + * \param PARAM_ERROR_VALUE The expected error code. + * + * \param TEST The test expression to be tested. + */ +#define TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( PARAM_ERR_VALUE, TEST ) \ + do { \ + mbedtls_test_param_failed_expect_call( ); \ + if( ( ( TEST ) != ( PARAM_ERR_VALUE ) ) || \ + ( mbedtls_test_param_failed_check_expected_call( ) != 0 ) ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_test_fail( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + mbedtls_test_param_failed_check_expected_call( ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +/** + * \brief This macro tests the statement passed to it as a test step or + * individual test in a test case. The macro assumes the test will fail + * and will generate an error. + * + * It assumes the library function under test cannot return a value and + * assumes errors can only be indicated byt calls to + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). + * + * When MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is enabled, calls to the parameter failure + * callback, MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), are assumed to indicate the + * expected failure. If MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is not enabled, no test + * can be made. + * + * This macro is intended for negative parameter validation tests, + * where the failing function can only return an error by calling + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to indicate the error. + * + * \param TEST The test expression to be tested. + */ +#define TEST_INVALID_PARAM( TEST ) \ + do { \ + memcpy( jmp_tmp, mbedtls_test_param_failed_get_state_buf( ), \ + sizeof( jmp_tmp ) ); \ + if( setjmp( mbedtls_test_param_failed_get_state_buf( ) ) == 0 ) \ + { \ + TEST; \ + mbedtls_test_fail( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + mbedtls_test_param_failed_reset_state( ); \ + } while( 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS && !MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This macro tests the statement passed to it as a test step or + * individual test in a test case. The macro assumes the test will not fail. + * + * It assumes the library function under test cannot return a value and + * assumes errors can only be indicated by calls to + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). + * + * When MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is enabled, calls to the parameter failure + * callback, MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), are assumed to indicate the + * expected failure. If MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is not enabled, no test + * can be made. + * + * This macro is intended to test that functions returning void + * accept all of the parameter values they're supposed to accept - eg + * that they don't call MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() when a parameter + * that's allowed to be NULL happens to be NULL. + * + * Note: for functions that return something other that void, + * checking that they accept all the parameters they're supposed to + * accept is best done by using TEST_ASSERT() and checking the return + * value as well. + * + * Note: this macro is available even when #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is + * disabled, as it makes sense to check that the functions accept all + * legal values even if this option is disabled - only in that case, + * the test is more about whether the function segfaults than about + * whether it invokes MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). + * + * \param TEST The test expression to be tested. + */ +#define TEST_VALID_PARAM( TEST ) \ + TEST_ASSERT( ( TEST, 1 ) ); + +#define TEST_HELPER_ASSERT(a) if( !( a ) ) \ +{ \ + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Assertion Failed at %s:%d - %s\n", \ + __FILE__, __LINE__, #a ); \ + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); \ +} + +/** \def ARRAY_LENGTH + * Return the number of elements of a static or stack array. + * + * \param array A value of array (not pointer) type. + * + * \return The number of elements of the array. + */ +/* A correct implementation of ARRAY_LENGTH, but which silently gives + * a nonsensical result if called with a pointer rather than an array. */ +#define ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE( array ) \ + ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) ) + +#if defined(__GNUC__) +/* Test if arg and &(arg)[0] have the same type. This is true if arg is + * an array but not if it's a pointer. */ +#define IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER( arg ) \ + ( ! __builtin_types_compatible_p( __typeof__( arg ), \ + __typeof__( &( arg )[0] ) ) ) +/* A compile-time constant with the value 0. If `const_expr` is not a + * compile-time constant with a nonzero value, cause a compile-time error. */ +#define STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR( const_expr ) \ + ( 0 && sizeof( struct { unsigned int STATIC_ASSERT : 1 - 2 * ! ( const_expr ); } ) ) + +/* Return the scalar value `value` (possibly promoted). This is a compile-time + * constant if `value` is. `condition` must be a compile-time constant. + * If `condition` is false, arrange to cause a compile-time error. */ +#define STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN( condition, value ) \ + ( STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR( condition ) ? 0 : ( value ) ) + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) \ + ( STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN( IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER( array ), \ + ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE( array ) ) ) + +#else +/* If we aren't sure the compiler supports our non-standard tricks, + * fall back to the unsafe implementation. */ +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE( array ) +#endif + +/** Return the smaller of two values. + * + * \param x An integer-valued expression without side effects. + * \param y An integer-valued expression without side effects. + * + * \return The smaller of \p x and \p y. + */ +#define MIN( x, y ) ( ( x ) < ( y ) ? ( x ) : ( y ) ) + +/** Return the larger of two values. + * + * \param x An integer-valued expression without side effects. + * \param y An integer-valued expression without side effects. + * + * \return The larger of \p x and \p y. + */ +#define MAX( x, y ) ( ( x ) > ( y ) ? ( x ) : ( y ) ) + +/* + * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) + */ +#ifndef GET_UINT32_BE +#define GET_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ +{ \ + (n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] ); \ +} +#endif + +#ifndef PUT_UINT32_BE +#define PUT_UINT32_BE(n,b,i) \ +{ \ + (b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 24 ); \ + (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 16 ); \ + (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( (n) >> 8 ); \ + (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( (n) ); \ +} +#endif + +#endif /* TEST_MACROS_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f5622e2d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* + * Helper functions for tests that use the PSA Crypto API. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_HELPERS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_HELPERS_H + +#include "test/helpers.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "test/psa_helpers.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + +/* Internal function for #TEST_USES_KEY_ID. Return 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ +int mbedtls_test_uses_key_id( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id ); + +/** Destroy persistent keys recorded with #TEST_USES_KEY_ID. + */ +void mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_storage( void ); + +/** Purge the in-memory cache of persistent keys recorded with + * #TEST_USES_KEY_ID. + * + * Call this function before calling PSA_DONE() if it's ok for + * persistent keys to still exist at this point. + */ +void mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_cache( void ); + +/** \def TEST_USES_KEY_ID + * + * Call this macro in a test function before potentially creating a + * persistent key. Test functions that use this mechanism must call + * mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_storage() in their cleanup code. + * + * This macro records a persistent key identifier as potentially used in the + * current test case. Recorded key identifiers will be cleaned up at the end + * of the test case, even on failure. + * + * This macro has no effect on volatile keys. Therefore, it is safe to call + * this macro in a test function that creates either volatile or persistent + * keys depending on the test data. + * + * This macro currently has no effect on special identifiers + * used to store implementation-specific files. + * + * Calling this macro multiple times on the same key identifier in the same + * test case has no effect. + * + * This macro can fail the test case if there isn't enough memory to + * record the key id. + * + * \param key_id The PSA key identifier to record. + */ +#define TEST_USES_KEY_ID( key_id ) \ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_uses_key_id( key_id ) ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +#define TEST_USES_KEY_ID( key_id ) ( (void) ( key_id ) ) +#define mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_storage( ) ( (void) 0 ) +#define mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_cache( ) ( (void) 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +#define PSA_INIT( ) PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ) + +/** Check for things that have not been cleaned up properly in the + * PSA subsystem. + * + * \return NULL if nothing has leaked. + * \return A string literal explaining what has not been cleaned up + * if applicable. + */ +const char *mbedtls_test_helper_is_psa_leaking( void ); + +/** Check that no PSA Crypto key slots are in use. + * + * If any slots are in use, mark the current test as failed and jump to + * the exit label. This is equivalent to + * `TEST_ASSERT( ! mbedtls_test_helper_is_psa_leaking( ) )` + * but with a more informative message. + */ +#define ASSERT_PSA_PRISTINE( ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( test_fail_if_psa_leaking( __LINE__, __FILE__ ) ) \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +/** Shut down the PSA Crypto subsystem and destroy persistent keys. + * Expect a clean shutdown, with no slots in use. + * + * If some key slots are still in use, record the test case as failed, + * but continue executing. This macro is suitable (and primarily intended) + * for use in the cleanup section of test functions. + * + * \note Persistent keys must be recorded with #TEST_USES_KEY_ID before + * creating them. + */ +#define PSA_DONE( ) \ + do \ + { \ + test_fail_if_psa_leaking( __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_storage( ); \ + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +/** Shut down the PSA Crypto subsystem, allowing persistent keys to survive. + * Expect a clean shutdown, with no slots in use. + * + * If some key slots are still in use, record the test case as failed and + * jump to the `exit` label. + */ +#define PSA_SESSION_DONE( ) \ + do \ + { \ + mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_cache( ); \ + ASSERT_PSA_PRISTINE( ); \ + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + + + +#if defined(RECORD_PSA_STATUS_COVERAGE_LOG) +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_record_status( psa_status_t status, + const char *func, + const char *file, int line, + const char *expr ); + +/** Return value logging wrapper macro. + * + * Evaluate \p expr. Write a line recording its value to the log file + * #STATUS_LOG_FILE_NAME and return the value. The line is a colon-separated + * list of fields: + * ``` + * value of expr:string:__FILE__:__LINE__:expr + * ``` + * + * The test code does not call this macro explicitly because that would + * be very invasive. Instead, we instrument the source code by defining + * a bunch of wrapper macros like + * ``` + * #define psa_crypto_init() RECORD_STATUS("psa_crypto_init", psa_crypto_init()) + * ``` + * These macro definitions must be present in `instrument_record_status.h` + * when building the test suites. + * + * \param string A string, normally a function name. + * \param expr An expression to evaluate, normally a call of the function + * whose name is in \p string. This expression must return + * a value of type #psa_status_t. + * \return The value of \p expr. + */ +#define RECORD_STATUS( string, expr ) \ + mbedtls_test_record_status( ( expr ), string, __FILE__, __LINE__, #expr ) + +#include "instrument_record_status.h" + +#endif /* defined(RECORD_PSA_STATUS_COVERAGE_LOG) */ + +/** Return extended key usage policies. + * + * Do a key policy permission extension on key usage policies always involves + * permissions of other usage policies + * (like PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH involves PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSGAE). + */ +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( psa_key_usage_t usage_flags ); + +/** Skip a test case if the given key is a 192 bits AES key and the AES + * implementation is at least partially provided by an accelerator or + * alternative implementation. + * + * Call this macro in a test case when a cryptographic operation that may + * involve an AES operation returns a #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED error code. + * The macro call will skip and not fail the test case in case the operation + * involves a 192 bits AES key and the AES implementation is at least + * partially provided by an accelerator or alternative implementation. + * + * Hardware AES implementations not supporting 192 bits keys commonly exist. + * Consequently, PSA test cases aim at not failing when an AES operation with + * a 192 bits key performed by an alternative AES implementation returns + * with the #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED error code. The purpose of this macro + * is to facilitate this and make the test case code more readable. + * + * \param key_type Key type + * \param key_bits Key length in number of bits. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HAVE_ALT_AES 1 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HAVE_ALT_AES 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_bits ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( MBEDTLS_TEST_HAVE_ALT_AES ) && \ + ( ( key_type ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ) && \ + ( key_bits == 192 ) ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_test_skip( "AES-192 not supported", __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +/** Skip a test case if a GCM operation with a nonce length different from + * 12 bytes fails and was performed by an accelerator or alternative + * implementation. + * + * Call this macro in a test case when an AEAD cryptography operation that + * may involve the GCM mode returns with a #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED error + * code. The macro call will skip and not fail the test case in case the + * operation involves the GCM mode, a nonce with a length different from + * 12 bytes and the GCM mode implementation is an alternative one. + * + * Hardware GCM implementations not supporting nonce lengths different from + * 12 bytes commonly exist, as supporting a non-12-byte nonce requires + * additional computations involving the GHASH function. + * Consequently, PSA test cases aim at not failing when an AEAD operation in + * GCM mode with a nonce length different from 12 bytes is performed by an + * alternative GCM implementation and returns with a #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * error code. The purpose of this macro is to facilitate this check and make + * the test case code more readable. + * + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm. + * \param nonce_length The nonce length in number of bytes. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HAVE_ALT_GCM 1 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HAVE_ALT_GCM 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, \ + nonce_length ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( MBEDTLS_TEST_HAVE_ALT_GCM ) && \ + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( ( alg ) , 0 ) == \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ) ) && \ + ( ( nonce_length ) != 12 ) ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_test_skip( "GCM with non-12-byte IV is not supported", __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +/** \def USE_PSA_INIT + * + * Call this macro to initialize the PSA subsystem if #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + * is enabled and do nothing otherwise. If the initialization fails, mark + * the test case as failed and jump to the \p exit label. + */ +/** \def USE_PSA_DONE + * + * Call this macro at the end of a test case if you called #USE_PSA_INIT. + * This is like #PSA_DONE, except that it does nothing if + * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is disabled. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define USE_PSA_INIT( ) PSA_INIT( ) +#define USE_PSA_DONE( ) PSA_DONE( ) +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +/* Define empty macros so that we can use them in the preamble and teardown + * of every test function that uses PSA conditionally based on + * MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. */ +#define USE_PSA_INIT( ) ( (void) 0 ) +#define USE_PSA_DONE( ) ( (void) 0 ) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_HELPERS_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/psa_exercise_key.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/psa_exercise_key.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e67f515a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/psa_exercise_key.h @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +/** Code to exercise a PSA key object, i.e. validate that it seems well-formed + * and can do what it is supposed to do. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_EXERCISE_KEY_H +#define PSA_EXERCISE_KEY_H + +#include "test/helpers.h" +#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h" + +#include + +/** \def KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG + * + * A hash algorithm that is known to be supported. + * + * This is used in some smoke tests. + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_MD2 +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_MD4 +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_MD5 +/* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C omitted. This is necessary for the sake of + * exercise_signature_key() because Mbed TLS doesn't support RIPEMD160 + * in RSA PKCS#1v1.5 signatures. A RIPEMD160-only configuration would be + * implausible anyway. */ +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_SHA_1 +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_SHA_256 +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_SHA_384 +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_SHA_512 +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 +#else +#undef KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG +#endif + +/** \def KNOWN_MBEDTLS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG + * + * A hash algorithm that is known to be supported by Mbed TLS APIs. + * + * This is used in some smoke tests where the hash algorithm is used as + * part of another algorithm like a signature algorithm and the hashing is + * completed through an Mbed TLS hash API, not the PSA one. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +#define KNOWN_MBEDTLS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_MD2 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +#define KNOWN_MBEDTLS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_MD4 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define KNOWN_MBEDTLS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_MD5 +/* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C omitted. This is necessary for the sake of + * exercise_signature_key() because Mbed TLS doesn't support RIPEMD160 + * in RSA PKCS#1v1.5 signatures. A RIPEMD160-only configuration would be + * implausible anyway. */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define KNOWN_MBEDTLS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_SHA_1 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define KNOWN_MBEDTLS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_SHA_256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define KNOWN_MBEDTLS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG PSA_ALG_SHA_512 +#else +#undef KNOWN_MBEDLTS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG +#endif + +/** \def KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER + * + * A block cipher that is known to be supported. + * + * For simplicity's sake, stick to block ciphers with 16-byte blocks. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +#undef KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER +#endif + +/** \def KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_ALG + * + * A MAC mode that is known to be supported. + * + * It must either be HMAC with #KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG or + * a block cipher-based MAC with #KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER. + * + * This is used in some smoke tests. + */ +#if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_ALG ( PSA_ALG_HMAC( KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG ) ) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_KEY_TYPE PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +#elif defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER) && defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_ALG PSA_ALG_CMAC +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_KEY_TYPE KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER +#else +#undef KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_ALG +#undef KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_KEY_TYPE +#endif + +/** \def KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER_ALG + * + * A cipher algorithm and key type that are known to be supported. + * + * This is used in some smoke tests. + */ +#if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER_ALG PSA_ALG_CTR +#elif defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER_ALG PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING +#elif defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER_ALG PSA_ALG_CFB +#elif defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER_ALG PSA_ALG_OFB +#else +#undef KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER_ALG +#endif +#if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER_ALG) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_ALG KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER_ALG +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_KEY_TYPE KNOWN_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_CIPHER +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_RC4_C) +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_ALG PSA_ALG_RC4 +#define KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_KEY_TYPE PSA_KEY_TYPE_RC4 +#else +#undef KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_ALG +#undef KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_KEY_TYPE +#endif + +/** Convenience function to set up a key derivation. + * + * In case of failure, mark the current test case as failed. + * + * The inputs \p input1 and \p input2 are, in order: + * - HKDF: salt, info. + * - TKS 1.2 PRF, TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS: seed, label. + * + * \param operation The operation object to use. + * It must be in the initialized state. + * \param key The key to use. + * \param alg The algorithm to use. + * \param input1 The first input to pass. + * \param input1_length The length of \p input1 in bytes. + * \param input2 The first input to pass. + * \param input2_length The length of \p input2 in bytes. + * \param capacity The capacity to set. + * + * \return \c 1 on success, \c 0 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t* operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const unsigned char* input1, size_t input1_length, + const unsigned char* input2, size_t input2_length, + size_t capacity ); + +/** Perform a key agreement using the given key pair against its public key + * using psa_raw_key_agreement(). + * + * The result is discarded. The purpose of this function is to smoke-test a key. + * + * In case of failure, mark the current test case as failed. + * + * \param alg A key agreement algorithm compatible with \p key. + * \param key A key that allows key agreement with \p alg. + * + * \return \c 1 on success, \c 0 on failure. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_psa_raw_key_agreement_with_self( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +/** Perform a key agreement using the given key pair against its public key + * using psa_key_derivation_raw_key(). + * + * The result is discarded. The purpose of this function is to smoke-test a key. + * + * In case of failure, mark the current test case as failed. + * + * \param operation An operation that has been set up for a key + * agreement algorithm that is compatible with + * \p key. + * \param key A key pair object that is suitable for a key + * agreement with \p operation. + * + * \return \c 1 on success, \c 0 on failure. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_psa_key_agreement_with_self( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +/** Perform sanity checks on the given key representation. + * + * If any of the checks fail, mark the current test case as failed. + * + * The checks depend on the key type. + * - All types: check the export size against maximum-size macros. + * - DES: parity bits. + * - RSA: check the ASN.1 structure and the size and parity of the integers. + * - ECC private or public key: exact representation length. + * - Montgomery public key: first byte. + * + * \param type The key type. + * \param bits The key size in bits. + * \param exported A buffer containing the key representation. + * \param exported_length The length of \p exported in bytes. + * + * \return \c 1 if all checks passed, \c 0 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_test_psa_exported_key_sanity_check( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits, + const uint8_t *exported, size_t exported_length ); + +/** Do smoke tests on a key. + * + * Perform one of each operation indicated by \p alg (decrypt/encrypt, + * sign/verify, or derivation) that is permitted according to \p usage. + * \p usage and \p alg should correspond to the expected policy on the + * key. + * + * Export the key if permitted by \p usage, and check that the output + * looks sensible. If \p usage forbids export, check that + * \p psa_export_key correctly rejects the attempt. If the key is + * asymmetric, also check \p psa_export_public_key. + * + * If the key fails the tests, this function calls the test framework's + * `mbedtls_test_fail` function and returns false. Otherwise this function + * returns true. Therefore it should be used as follows: + * ``` + * if( ! exercise_key( ... ) ) goto exit; + * ``` + * + * \param key The key to exercise. It should be capable of performing + * \p alg. + * \param usage The usage flags to assume. + * \param alg The algorithm to exercise. + * + * \retval 0 The key failed the smoke tests. + * \retval 1 The key passed the smoke tests. + */ +int mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_test_psa_usage_to_exercise( psa_key_type_t type, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +#endif /* PSA_EXERCISE_KEY_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/psa_helpers.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/psa_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f438a71f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/psa_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Helper functions for tests that use any PSA API. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_HELPERS_H +#define PSA_HELPERS_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) +#include "spm/psa_defs.h" +#endif + +/** Evaluate an expression and fail the test case if it returns an error. + * + * \param expr The expression to evaluate. This is typically a call + * to a \c psa_xxx function that returns a value of type + * #psa_status_t. + */ +#define PSA_ASSERT( expr ) TEST_EQUAL( ( expr ), PSA_SUCCESS ) + +#endif /* PSA_HELPERS_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/random.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/random.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64282807 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/include/test/random.h @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/** + * \file random.h + * + * \brief This file contains the prototypes of helper functions to generate + * random numbers for the purpose of testing. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef TEST_RANDOM_H +#define TEST_RANDOM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned char *buf; /* Pointer to a buffer of length bytes. */ + size_t length; + /* If fallback_f_rng is NULL, fail after delivering length bytes. */ + int ( *fallback_f_rng )( void*, unsigned char *, size_t ); + void *fallback_p_rng; +} mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info; + +/** + * Info structure for the pseudo random function + * + * Key should be set at the start to a test-unique value. + * Do not forget endianness! + * State( v0, v1 ) should be set to zero. + */ +typedef struct +{ + uint32_t key[16]; + uint32_t v0, v1; +} mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info; + +/** + * This function just returns data from rand(). + * Although predictable and often similar on multiple + * runs, this does not result in identical random on + * each run. So do not use this if the results of a + * test depend on the random data that is generated. + * + * rng_state shall be NULL. + */ +int mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( void *rng_state, + unsigned char *output, + size_t len ); + +/** + * This function only returns zeros. + * + * \p rng_state shall be \c NULL. + */ +int mbedtls_test_rnd_zero_rand( void *rng_state, + unsigned char *output, + size_t len ); + +/** + * This function returns random data based on a buffer it receives. + * + * \p rng_state shall be a pointer to a #mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info structure. + * + * The number of bytes released from the buffer on each call to + * the random function is specified by \p len. + * + * After the buffer is empty, this function will call the fallback RNG in the + * #mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info structure if there is one, and + * will return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand( void *rng_state, + unsigned char *output, + size_t len ); + +/** + * This function returns random based on a pseudo random function. + * This means the results should be identical on all systems. + * Pseudo random is based on the XTEA encryption algorithm to + * generate pseudorandom. + * + * \p rng_state shall be a pointer to a #mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info structure. + */ +int mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand( void *rng_state, + unsigned char *output, + size_t len ); + +#endif /* TEST_RANDOM_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/make-in-docker.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/make-in-docker.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..77dc8ab4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/make-in-docker.sh @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +#!/bin/bash -eu + +# make-in-docker.sh +# +# Purpose +# ------- +# This runs make in a Docker container. +# +# See also: +# - scripts/docker_env.sh for general Docker prerequisites and other information. + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +source tests/scripts/docker_env.sh + +run_in_docker make $@ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/all-in-docker.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/all-in-docker.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..8c9ff476 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/all-in-docker.sh @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +#!/bin/bash -eu + +# all-in-docker.sh +# +# Purpose +# ------- +# This runs all.sh (except for armcc) in a Docker container. +# +# Notes for users +# --------------- +# See docker_env.sh for prerequisites and other information. +# +# See also all.sh for notes about invocation of that script. + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +source tests/scripts/docker_env.sh + +# Run tests that are possible with openly available compilers +run_in_docker tests/scripts/all.sh \ + --no-armcc \ + $@ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/all.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/all.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..4705fe88 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -0,0 +1,3221 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env bash + +# all.sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + + + +################################################################ +#### Documentation +################################################################ + +# Purpose +# ------- +# +# To run all tests possible or available on the platform. +# +# Notes for users +# --------------- +# +# Warning: the test is destructive. It includes various build modes and +# configurations, and can and will arbitrarily change the current CMake +# configuration. The following files must be committed into git: +# * include/mbedtls/config.h +# * Makefile, library/Makefile, programs/Makefile, tests/Makefile, +# programs/fuzz/Makefile +# After running this script, the CMake cache will be lost and CMake +# will no longer be initialised. +# +# The script assumes the presence of a number of tools: +# * Basic Unix tools (Windows users note: a Unix-style find must be before +# the Windows find in the PATH) +# * Perl +# * GNU Make +# * CMake +# * GCC and Clang (recent enough for using ASan with gcc and MemSan with clang, or valgrind) +# * G++ +# * arm-gcc and mingw-gcc +# * ArmCC 5 and ArmCC 6, unless invoked with --no-armcc +# * OpenSSL and GnuTLS command line tools, recent enough for the +# interoperability tests. If they don't support SSLv3 then a legacy +# version of these tools must be present as well (search for LEGACY +# below). +# See the invocation of check_tools below for details. +# +# This script must be invoked from the toplevel directory of a git +# working copy of Mbed TLS. +# +# The behavior on an error depends on whether --keep-going (alias -k) +# is in effect. +# * Without --keep-going: the script stops on the first error without +# cleaning up. This lets you work in the configuration of the failing +# component. +# * With --keep-going: the script runs all requested components and +# reports failures at the end. In particular the script always cleans +# up on exit. +# +# Note that the output is not saved. You may want to run +# script -c tests/scripts/all.sh +# or +# tests/scripts/all.sh >all.log 2>&1 +# +# Notes for maintainers +# --------------------- +# +# The bulk of the code is organized into functions that follow one of the +# following naming conventions: +# * pre_XXX: things to do before running the tests, in order. +# * component_XXX: independent components. They can be run in any order. +# * component_check_XXX: quick tests that aren't worth parallelizing. +# * component_build_XXX: build things but don't run them. +# * component_test_XXX: build and test. +# * support_XXX: if support_XXX exists and returns false then +# component_XXX is not run by default. +# * post_XXX: things to do after running the tests. +# * other: miscellaneous support functions. +# +# Each component must start by invoking `msg` with a short informative message. +# +# Warning: due to the way bash detects errors, the failure of a command +# inside 'if' or '!' is not detected. Use the 'not' function instead of '!'. +# +# Each component is executed in a separate shell process. The component +# fails if any command in it returns a non-zero status. +# +# The framework performs some cleanup tasks after each component. This +# means that components can assume that the working directory is in a +# cleaned-up state, and don't need to perform the cleanup themselves. +# * Run `make clean`. +# * Restore `include/mbedtks/config.h` from a backup made before running +# the component. +# * Check out `Makefile`, `library/Makefile`, `programs/Makefile`, +# `tests/Makefile` and `programs/fuzz/Makefile` from git. +# This cleans up after an in-tree use of CMake. +# +# The tests are roughly in order from fastest to slowest. This doesn't +# have to be exact, but in general you should add slower tests towards +# the end and fast checks near the beginning. + + + +################################################################ +#### Initialization and command line parsing +################################################################ + +# Abort on errors (even on the left-hand side of a pipe). +# Treat uninitialised variables as errors. +set -e -o pipefail -u + +pre_check_environment () { + if [ -d library -a -d include -a -d tests ]; then :; else + echo "Must be run from mbed TLS root" >&2 + exit 1 + fi +} + +pre_initialize_variables () { + CONFIG_H='include/mbedtls/config.h' + CRYPTO_CONFIG_H='include/psa/crypto_config.h' + + # Files that are clobbered by some jobs will be backed up. Use a different + # suffix from auxiliary scripts so that all.sh and auxiliary scripts can + # independently decide when to remove the backup file. + backup_suffix='.all.bak' + # Files clobbered by config.py + files_to_back_up="$CONFIG_H $CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" + # Files clobbered by in-tree cmake + files_to_back_up="$files_to_back_up Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile programs/fuzz/Makefile" + + append_outcome=0 + MEMORY=0 + FORCE=0 + QUIET=0 + KEEP_GOING=0 + + # Seed value used with the --release-test option. + # + # See also RELEASE_SEED in basic-build-test.sh. Debugging is easier if + # both values are kept in sync. If you change the value here because it + # breaks some tests, you'll definitely want to change it in + # basic-build-test.sh as well. + RELEASE_SEED=1 + + : ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE=} + : ${MBEDTLS_TEST_PLATFORM="$(uname -s | tr -c \\n0-9A-Za-z _)-$(uname -m | tr -c \\n0-9A-Za-z _)"} + export MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE + export MBEDTLS_TEST_PLATFORM + + # Default commands, can be overridden by the environment + : ${OPENSSL:="openssl"} + : ${OPENSSL_LEGACY:="$OPENSSL"} + : ${OPENSSL_NEXT:="$OPENSSL"} + : ${GNUTLS_CLI:="gnutls-cli"} + : ${GNUTLS_SERV:="gnutls-serv"} + : ${GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI:="$GNUTLS_CLI"} + : ${GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV:="$GNUTLS_SERV"} + : ${OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR:=./mbedtls_out_of_source_build} + : ${ARMC5_BIN_DIR:=/usr/bin} + : ${ARMC6_BIN_DIR:=/usr/bin} + : ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX:=arm-none-eabi-} + : ${ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX:=arm-linux-gnueabi-} + + # if MAKEFLAGS is not set add the -j option to speed up invocations of make + if [ -z "${MAKEFLAGS+set}" ]; then + export MAKEFLAGS="-j$(all_sh_nproc)" + fi + + # Include more verbose output for failing tests run by CMake or make + export CTEST_OUTPUT_ON_FAILURE=1 + + # CFLAGS and LDFLAGS for Asan builds that don't use CMake + ASAN_CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all' + + # Gather the list of available components. These are the functions + # defined in this script whose name starts with "component_". + # Parse the script with sed. This way we get the functions in the order + # they are defined. + ALL_COMPONENTS=$(sed -n 's/^ *component_\([0-9A-Z_a-z]*\) *().*/\1/p' <"$0") + + # Exclude components that are not supported on this platform. + SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS= + for component in $ALL_COMPONENTS; do + case $(type "support_$component" 2>&1) in + *' function'*) + if ! support_$component; then continue; fi;; + esac + SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS="$SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS $component" + done +} + +# Test whether the component $1 is included in the command line patterns. +is_component_included() +{ + # Temporarily disable wildcard expansion so that $COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS + # only does word splitting. + set -f + for pattern in $COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS; do + set +f + case ${1#component_} in $pattern) return 0;; esac + done + set +f + return 1 +} + +usage() +{ + cat < + Prefix for a cross-compiler for arm-none-eabi + (default: "${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}") + --arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-prefix= + Prefix for a cross-compiler for arm-linux-gnueabi + (default: "${ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX}") + --armcc Run ARM Compiler builds (on by default). + --restore First clean up the build tree, restoring backed up + files. Do not run any components unless they are + explicitly specified. + --error-test Error test mode: run a failing function in addition + to any specified component. May be repeated. + --except Exclude the COMPONENTs listed on the command line, + instead of running only those. + --no-append-outcome Write a new outcome file and analyze it (default). + --no-armcc Skip ARM Compiler builds. + --no-force Refuse to overwrite modified files (default). + --no-keep-going Stop at the first error (default). + --no-memory No additional memory tests (default). + --no-quiet Print full output from components. + --out-of-source-dir= Directory used for CMake out-of-source build tests. + --outcome-file= File where test outcomes are written (not done if + empty; default: \$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE). + --random-seed Use a random seed value for randomized tests (default). + -r|--release-test Run this script in release mode. This fixes the seed value to ${RELEASE_SEED}. + -s|--seed Integer seed value to use for this test run. + +Tool path options: + --armc5-bin-dir= ARM Compiler 5 bin directory. + --armc6-bin-dir= ARM Compiler 6 bin directory. + --gnutls-cli= GnuTLS client executable to use for most tests. + --gnutls-serv= GnuTLS server executable to use for most tests. + --gnutls-legacy-cli= GnuTLS client executable to use for legacy tests. + --gnutls-legacy-serv= GnuTLS server executable to use for legacy tests. + --openssl= OpenSSL executable to use for most tests. + --openssl-legacy= OpenSSL executable to use for legacy tests e.g. SSLv3. + --openssl-next= OpenSSL executable to use for recent things like ARIA +EOF +} + +# Cleanup before/after running a component. +# Remove built files as well as the cmake cache/config. +# Does not remove generated source files. +cleanup() +{ + command make clean + + # Remove CMake artefacts + find . -name .git -prune -o \ + -iname CMakeFiles -exec rm -rf {} \+ -o \ + \( -iname cmake_install.cmake -o \ + -iname CTestTestfile.cmake -o \ + -iname CMakeCache.txt \) -exec rm {} \+ + # Recover files overwritten by in-tree CMake builds + rm -f include/Makefile include/mbedtls/Makefile programs/*/Makefile + + # Remove any artifacts from the component_test_cmake_as_subdirectory test. + rm -rf programs/test/cmake_subproject/build + rm -f programs/test/cmake_subproject/Makefile + rm -f programs/test/cmake_subproject/cmake_subproject + + # Restore files that may have been clobbered by the job + for x in $files_to_back_up; do + cp -p "$x$backup_suffix" "$x" + done +} + +# Final cleanup when this script exits (except when exiting on a failure +# in non-keep-going mode). +final_cleanup () { + cleanup + + for x in $files_to_back_up; do + rm -f "$x$backup_suffix" + done +} + +# Executed on exit. May be redefined depending on command line options. +final_report () { + : +} + +fatal_signal () { + final_cleanup + final_report $1 + trap - $1 + kill -$1 $$ +} + +trap 'fatal_signal HUP' HUP +trap 'fatal_signal INT' INT +trap 'fatal_signal TERM' TERM + +# Number of processors on this machine. Used as the default setting +# for parallel make. +all_sh_nproc () +{ + { + nproc || # Linux + sysctl -n hw.ncpuonline || # NetBSD, OpenBSD + sysctl -n hw.ncpu || # FreeBSD + echo 1 + } 2>/dev/null +} + +msg() +{ + if [ -n "${current_component:-}" ]; then + current_section="${current_component#component_}: $1" + else + current_section="$1" + fi + + if [ $QUIET -eq 1 ]; then + return + fi + + echo "" + echo "******************************************************************" + echo "* $current_section " + printf "* "; date + echo "******************************************************************" +} + +armc6_build_test() +{ + FLAGS="$1" + + msg "build: ARM Compiler 6 ($FLAGS)" + ARM_TOOL_VARIANT="ult" CC="$ARMC6_CC" AR="$ARMC6_AR" CFLAGS="$FLAGS" \ + WARNING_CFLAGS='-xc -std=c99' make lib + + msg "size: ARM Compiler 6 ($FLAGS)" + "$ARMC6_FROMELF" -z library/*.o + + make clean +} + +err_msg() +{ + echo "$1" >&2 +} + +check_tools() +{ + for TOOL in "$@"; do + if ! `type "$TOOL" >/dev/null 2>&1`; then + err_msg "$TOOL not found!" + exit 1 + fi + done +} + +pre_parse_command_line () { + COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS= + all_except=0 + error_test=0 + restore_first=0 + no_armcc= + + # Note that legacy options are ignored instead of being omitted from this + # list of options, so invocations that worked with previous version of + # all.sh will still run and work properly. + while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do + case "$1" in + --append-outcome) append_outcome=1;; + --arm-none-eabi-gcc-prefix) shift; ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX="$1";; + --arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-prefix) shift; ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX="$1";; + --armcc) no_armcc=;; + --armc5-bin-dir) shift; ARMC5_BIN_DIR="$1";; + --armc6-bin-dir) shift; ARMC6_BIN_DIR="$1";; + --error-test) error_test=$((error_test + 1));; + --except) all_except=1;; + --force|-f) FORCE=1;; + --gnutls-cli) shift; GNUTLS_CLI="$1";; + --gnutls-legacy-cli) shift; GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI="$1";; + --gnutls-legacy-serv) shift; GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV="$1";; + --gnutls-serv) shift; GNUTLS_SERV="$1";; + --help|-h) usage; exit;; + --keep-going|-k) KEEP_GOING=1;; + --list-all-components) printf '%s\n' $ALL_COMPONENTS; exit;; + --list-components) printf '%s\n' $SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS; exit;; + --memory|-m) MEMORY=1;; + --no-append-outcome) append_outcome=0;; + --no-armcc) no_armcc=1;; + --no-force) FORCE=0;; + --no-keep-going) KEEP_GOING=0;; + --no-memory) MEMORY=0;; + --no-quiet) QUIET=0;; + --openssl) shift; OPENSSL="$1";; + --openssl-legacy) shift; OPENSSL_LEGACY="$1";; + --openssl-next) shift; OPENSSL_NEXT="$1";; + --outcome-file) shift; MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE="$1";; + --out-of-source-dir) shift; OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR="$1";; + --quiet|-q) QUIET=1;; + --random-seed) unset SEED;; + --release-test|-r) SEED=$RELEASE_SEED;; + --restore) restore_first=1;; + --seed|-s) shift; SEED="$1";; + -*) + echo >&2 "Unknown option: $1" + echo >&2 "Run $0 --help for usage." + exit 120 + ;; + *) COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS="$COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS $1";; + esac + shift + done + + # With no list of components, run everything. + if [ -z "$COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS" ] && [ $restore_first -eq 0 ]; then + all_except=1 + fi + + # --no-armcc is a legacy option. The modern way is --except '*_armcc*'. + # Ignore it if components are listed explicitly on the command line. + if [ -n "$no_armcc" ] && [ $all_except -eq 1 ]; then + COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS="$COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS *_armcc*" + fi + + # Error out if an explicitly requested component doesn't exist. + if [ $all_except -eq 0 ]; then + unsupported=0 + # Temporarily disable wildcard expansion so that $COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS + # only does word splitting. + set -f + for component in $COMMAND_LINE_COMPONENTS; do + set +f + # If the requested name includes a wildcard character, don't + # check it. Accept wildcard patterns that don't match anything. + case $component in + *[*?\[]*) continue;; + esac + case " $SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS " in + *" $component "*) :;; + *) + echo >&2 "Component $component was explicitly requested, but is not known or not supported." + unsupported=$((unsupported + 1));; + esac + done + set +f + if [ $unsupported -ne 0 ]; then + exit 2 + fi + fi + + # Build the list of components to run. + RUN_COMPONENTS= + for component in $SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS; do + if is_component_included "$component"; [ $? -eq $all_except ]; then + RUN_COMPONENTS="$RUN_COMPONENTS $component" + fi + done + + unset all_except + unset no_armcc +} + +pre_check_git () { + if [ $FORCE -eq 1 ]; then + rm -rf "$OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR" + git checkout-index -f -q $CONFIG_H + cleanup + else + + if [ -d "$OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR" ]; then + echo "Warning - there is an existing directory at '$OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR'" >&2 + echo "You can either delete this directory manually, or force the test by rerunning" + echo "the script as: $0 --force --out-of-source-dir $OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR" + exit 1 + fi + + if ! git diff --quiet include/mbedtls/config.h; then + err_msg "Warning - the configuration file 'include/mbedtls/config.h' has been edited. " + echo "You can either delete or preserve your work, or force the test by rerunning the" + echo "script as: $0 --force" + exit 1 + fi + fi +} + +pre_restore_files () { + # If the makefiles have been generated by a framework such as cmake, + # restore them from git. If the makefiles look like modifications from + # the ones checked into git, take care not to modify them. Whatever + # this function leaves behind is what the script will restore before + # each component. + case "$(head -n1 Makefile)" in + *[Gg]enerated*) + git update-index --no-skip-worktree Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile programs/fuzz/Makefile + git checkout -- Makefile library/Makefile programs/Makefile tests/Makefile programs/fuzz/Makefile + ;; + esac +} + +pre_back_up () { + for x in $files_to_back_up; do + cp -p "$x" "$x$backup_suffix" + done +} + +pre_setup_keep_going () { + failure_count=0 # Number of failed components + last_failure_status=0 # Last failure status in this component + + # See err_trap + previous_failure_status=0 + previous_failed_command= + previous_failure_funcall_depth=0 + unset report_failed_command + + start_red= + end_color= + if [ -t 1 ]; then + case "${TERM:-}" in + *color*|cygwin|linux|rxvt*|screen|[Eex]term*) + start_red=$(printf '\033[31m') + end_color=$(printf '\033[0m') + ;; + esac + fi + + # Keep a summary of failures in a file. We'll print it out at the end. + failure_summary_file=$PWD/all-sh-failures-$$.log + : >"$failure_summary_file" + + # Whether it makes sense to keep a component going after the specified + # command fails (test command) or not (configure or build). + # This function normally receives the failing simple command + # ($BASH_COMMAND) as an argument, but if $report_failed_command is set, + # this is passed instead. + # This doesn't have to be 100% accurate: all failures are recorded anyway. + # False positives result in running things that can't be expected to + # work. False negatives result in things not running after something else + # failed even though they might have given useful feedback. + can_keep_going_after_failure () { + case "$1" in + "msg "*) false;; + "cd "*) false;; + *make*[\ /]tests*) false;; # make tests, make CFLAGS=-I../tests, ... + *test*) true;; # make test, tests/stuff, env V=v tests/stuff, ... + *make*check*) true;; + "grep "*) true;; + "[ "*) true;; + "! "*) true;; + *) false;; + esac + } + + # This function runs if there is any error in a component. + # It must either exit with a nonzero status, or set + # last_failure_status to a nonzero value. + err_trap () { + # Save $? (status of the failing command). This must be the very + # first thing, before $? is overridden. + last_failure_status=$? + failed_command=${report_failed_command-$BASH_COMMAND} + + if [[ $last_failure_status -eq $previous_failure_status && + "$failed_command" == "$previous_failed_command" && + ${#FUNCNAME[@]} == $((previous_failure_funcall_depth - 1)) ]] + then + # The same command failed twice in a row, but this time one level + # less deep in the function call stack. This happens when the last + # command of a function returns a nonzero status, and the function + # returns that same status. Ignore the second failure. + previous_failure_funcall_depth=${#FUNCNAME[@]} + return + fi + previous_failure_status=$last_failure_status + previous_failed_command=$failed_command + previous_failure_funcall_depth=${#FUNCNAME[@]} + + text="$current_section: $failed_command -> $last_failure_status" + echo "${start_red}^^^^$text^^^^${end_color}" >&2 + echo "$text" >>"$failure_summary_file" + + # If the command is fatal (configure or build command), stop this + # component. Otherwise (test command) keep the component running + # (run more tests from the same build). + if ! can_keep_going_after_failure "$failed_command"; then + exit $last_failure_status + fi + } + + final_report () { + if [ $failure_count -gt 0 ]; then + echo + echo "!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!" + echo "${start_red}FAILED: $failure_count components${end_color}" + cat "$failure_summary_file" + echo "!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!" + elif [ -z "${1-}" ]; then + echo "SUCCESS :)" + fi + if [ -n "${1-}" ]; then + echo "Killed by SIG$1." + fi + rm -f "$failure_summary_file" + if [ $failure_count -gt 0 ]; then + exit 1 + fi + } +} + +# record_status() and if_build_succeeded() are kept temporarily for backward +# compatibility. Don't use them in new components. +record_status () { + "$@" +} +if_build_succeeded () { + "$@" +} + +# '! true' does not trigger the ERR trap. Arrange to trigger it, with +# a reasonably informative error message (not just "$@"). +not () { + if "$@"; then + report_failed_command="! $*" + false + unset report_failed_command + fi +} + +pre_prepare_outcome_file () { + case "$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE" in + [!/]*) MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE="$PWD/$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE";; + esac + if [ -n "$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE" ] && [ "$append_outcome" -eq 0 ]; then + rm -f "$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE" + fi +} + +pre_print_configuration () { + if [ $QUIET -eq 1 ]; then + return + fi + + msg "info: $0 configuration" + echo "MEMORY: $MEMORY" + echo "FORCE: $FORCE" + echo "MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE: ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE:-(none)}" + echo "SEED: ${SEED-"UNSET"}" + echo + echo "OPENSSL: $OPENSSL" + echo "OPENSSL_LEGACY: $OPENSSL_LEGACY" + echo "OPENSSL_NEXT: $OPENSSL_NEXT" + echo "GNUTLS_CLI: $GNUTLS_CLI" + echo "GNUTLS_SERV: $GNUTLS_SERV" + echo "GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI: $GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" + echo "GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV: $GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" + echo "ARMC5_BIN_DIR: $ARMC5_BIN_DIR" + echo "ARMC6_BIN_DIR: $ARMC6_BIN_DIR" +} + +# Make sure the tools we need are available. +pre_check_tools () { + # Build the list of variables to pass to output_env.sh. + set env + + case " $RUN_COMPONENTS " in + # Require OpenSSL and GnuTLS if running any tests (as opposed to + # only doing builds). Not all tests run OpenSSL and GnuTLS, but this + # is a good enough approximation in practice. + *" test_"*) + # To avoid setting OpenSSL and GnuTLS for each call to compat.sh + # and ssl-opt.sh, we just export the variables they require. + export OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL" + export GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_CLI" + export GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_SERV" + # Avoid passing --seed flag in every call to ssl-opt.sh + if [ -n "${SEED-}" ]; then + export SEED + fi + set "$@" OPENSSL="$OPENSSL" OPENSSL_LEGACY="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" + set "$@" GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_CLI" GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_SERV" + set "$@" GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" + set "$@" GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" + check_tools "$OPENSSL" "$OPENSSL_LEGACY" "$OPENSSL_NEXT" \ + "$GNUTLS_CLI" "$GNUTLS_SERV" \ + "$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" "$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" + ;; + esac + + case " $RUN_COMPONENTS " in + *_doxygen[_\ ]*) check_tools "doxygen" "dot";; + esac + + case " $RUN_COMPONENTS " in + *_arm_none_eabi_gcc[_\ ]*) check_tools "${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc";; + esac + + case " $RUN_COMPONENTS " in + *_mingw[_\ ]*) check_tools "i686-w64-mingw32-gcc";; + esac + + case " $RUN_COMPONENTS " in + *" test_zeroize "*) check_tools "gdb";; + esac + + case " $RUN_COMPONENTS " in + *_armcc*) + ARMC5_CC="$ARMC5_BIN_DIR/armcc" + ARMC5_AR="$ARMC5_BIN_DIR/armar" + ARMC5_FROMELF="$ARMC5_BIN_DIR/fromelf" + ARMC6_CC="$ARMC6_BIN_DIR/armclang" + ARMC6_AR="$ARMC6_BIN_DIR/armar" + ARMC6_FROMELF="$ARMC6_BIN_DIR/fromelf" + check_tools "$ARMC5_CC" "$ARMC5_AR" "$ARMC5_FROMELF" \ + "$ARMC6_CC" "$ARMC6_AR" "$ARMC6_FROMELF";; + esac + + # past this point, no call to check_tool, only printing output + if [ $QUIET -eq 1 ]; then + return + fi + + msg "info: output_env.sh" + case $RUN_COMPONENTS in + *_armcc*) + set "$@" ARMC5_CC="$ARMC5_CC" ARMC6_CC="$ARMC6_CC" RUN_ARMCC=1;; + *) set "$@" RUN_ARMCC=0;; + esac + "$@" scripts/output_env.sh +} + + + +################################################################ +#### Basic checks +################################################################ + +# +# Test Suites to be executed +# +# The test ordering tries to optimize for the following criteria: +# 1. Catch possible problems early, by running first tests that run quickly +# and/or are more likely to fail than others (eg I use Clang most of the +# time, so start with a GCC build). +# 2. Minimize total running time, by avoiding useless rebuilds +# +# Indicative running times are given for reference. + +component_check_recursion () { + msg "Check: recursion.pl" # < 1s + tests/scripts/recursion.pl library/*.c +} + +component_check_generated_files () { + msg "Check: freshness of generated source files" # < 1s + tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh +} + +component_check_doxy_blocks () { + msg "Check: doxygen markup outside doxygen blocks" # < 1s + tests/scripts/check-doxy-blocks.pl +} + +component_check_files () { + msg "Check: file sanity checks (permissions, encodings)" # < 1s + tests/scripts/check_files.py +} + +component_check_changelog () { + msg "Check: changelog entries" # < 1s + rm -f ChangeLog.new + scripts/assemble_changelog.py -o ChangeLog.new + if [ -e ChangeLog.new ]; then + # Show the diff for information. It isn't an error if the diff is + # non-empty. + diff -u ChangeLog ChangeLog.new || true + rm ChangeLog.new + fi +} + +component_check_names () { + msg "Check: declared and exported names (builds the library)" # < 3s + tests/scripts/check_names.py -v +} + +component_check_test_cases () { + msg "Check: test case descriptions" # < 1s + if [ $QUIET -eq 1 ]; then + opt='--quiet' + else + opt='' + fi + tests/scripts/check_test_cases.py $opt + unset opt +} + +component_check_doxygen_warnings () { + msg "Check: doxygen warnings (builds the documentation)" # ~ 3s + tests/scripts/doxygen.sh +} + + + +################################################################ +#### Build and test many configurations and targets +################################################################ + +component_test_default_out_of_box () { + msg "build: make, default config (out-of-box)" # ~1min + make + # Disable fancy stuff + unset MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE + + msg "test: main suites make, default config (out-of-box)" # ~10s + make test + + msg "selftest: make, default config (out-of-box)" # ~10s + programs/test/selftest +} + +component_test_default_cmake_gcc_asan () { + msg "build: cmake, gcc, ASan" # ~ 1 min 50s + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s + make test + + msg "test: selftest (ASan build)" # ~ 10s + programs/test/selftest + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 1 min + tests/ssl-opt.sh + + msg "test: compat.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + tests/compat.sh + + msg "test: context-info.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 15 sec + tests/context-info.sh +} + +component_test_full_cmake_gcc_asan () { + msg "build: full config, cmake, gcc, ASan" + scripts/config.py full + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: main suites (inc. selftests) (full config, ASan build)" + make test + + msg "test: selftest (ASan build)" # ~ 10s + programs/test/selftest + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (full config, ASan build)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh + + msg "test: compat.sh (full config, ASan build)" + tests/compat.sh + + msg "test: context-info.sh (full config, ASan build)" # ~ 15 sec + tests/context-info.sh +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_key_id_encodes_owner () { + msg "build: full config - USE_PSA_CRYPTO + PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER, cmake, gcc, ASan" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: full config - USE_PSA_CRYPTO + PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER, cmake, gcc, ASan" + make test +} + +# check_renamed_symbols HEADER LIB +# Check that if HEADER contains '#define MACRO ...' then MACRO is not a symbol +# name is LIB. +check_renamed_symbols () { + ! nm "$2" | sed 's/.* //' | + grep -x -F "$(sed -n 's/^ *# *define *\([A-Z_a-z][0-9A-Z_a-z]*\)..*/\1/p' "$1")" +} + +component_build_psa_crypto_spm () { + msg "build: full config - USE_PSA_CRYPTO + PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + PSA_CRYPTO_SPM, make, gcc" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + # We can only compile, not link, since our test and sample programs + # aren't equipped for the modified names used when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + # is active. + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -I../tests/include/spe' lib + + # Check that if a symbol is renamed by crypto_spe.h, the non-renamed + # version is not present. + echo "Checking for renamed symbols in the library" + check_renamed_symbols tests/include/spe/crypto_spe.h library/libmbedcrypto.a +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_client () { + msg "build: default config - PSA_CRYPTO_C + PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT, make" + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + make + + msg "test: default config - PSA_CRYPTO_C + PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT, make" + make test +} + +component_test_zlib_make() { + msg "build: zlib enabled, make" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT + make ZLIB=1 CFLAGS='-Werror -O2' + + msg "test: main suites (zlib, make)" + make test + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (zlib, make)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh +} +support_test_zlib_make () { + base=support_test_zlib_$$ + cat <<'EOF' > ${base}.c +#include "zlib.h" +int main(void) { return 0; } +EOF + gcc -o ${base}.exe ${base}.c -lz 2>/dev/null + ret=$? + rm -f ${base}.* + return $ret +} + +component_test_zlib_cmake() { + msg "build: zlib enabled, cmake" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT + cmake -D ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT=On -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release . + make + + msg "test: main suites (zlib, cmake)" + make test + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (zlib, cmake)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh +} +support_test_zlib_cmake () { + support_test_zlib_make "$@" +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_rsa_no_genprime() { + msg "build: default config minus MBEDTLS_GENPRIME" + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + make + + msg "test: default config minus MBEDTLS_GENPRIME" + make test +} + +component_test_ref_configs () { + msg "test/build: ref-configs (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min 20s + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl +} + +component_test_sslv3 () { + msg "build: Default + SSLv3 (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: SSLv3 - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s + make test + + msg "build: SSLv3 - compat.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + tests/compat.sh -m 'tls1 tls1_1 tls12 dtls1 dtls12' + env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" tests/compat.sh -m 'ssl3' + + msg "build: SSLv3 - ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + tests/ssl-opt.sh + + msg "build: SSLv3 - context-info.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 15 sec + tests/context-info.sh +} + +component_test_no_renegotiation () { + msg "build: Default + !MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: !MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s + make test + + msg "test: !MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION - ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + tests/ssl-opt.sh +} + +component_test_no_pem_no_fs () { + msg "build: Default + !MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + !MBEDTLS_FS_IO (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_FS_IO + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C # requires a filesystem + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C # requires PSA ITS + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: !MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C !MBEDTLS_FS_IO - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s + make test + + msg "test: !MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C !MBEDTLS_FS_IO - ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + tests/ssl-opt.sh +} + +component_test_rsa_no_crt () { + msg "build: Default + RSA_NO_CRT (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s + make test + + msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - RSA-related part of ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 5s + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f RSA + + msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - RSA-related part of compat.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 3 min + tests/compat.sh -t RSA + + msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - RSA-related part of context-info.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 15 sec + tests/context-info.sh +} + +component_test_no_ctr_drbg_classic () { + msg "build: Full minus CTR_DRBG, classic crypto in TLS" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, classic crypto - main suites" + make test + + # In this configuration, the TLS test programs use HMAC_DRBG. + # The SSL tests are slow, so run a small subset, just enough to get + # confidence that the SSL code copes with HMAC_DRBG. + msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, classic crypto - ssl-opt.sh (subset)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private.*delay=\|tickets enabled on server' + + msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, classic crypto - compat.sh (subset)" + tests/compat.sh -m tls12 -t 'ECDSA PSK' -V NO -p OpenSSL +} + +component_test_no_ctr_drbg_use_psa () { + msg "build: Full minus CTR_DRBG, PSA crypto in TLS" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - main suites" + make test + + # In this configuration, the TLS test programs use HMAC_DRBG. + # The SSL tests are slow, so run a small subset, just enough to get + # confidence that the SSL code copes with HMAC_DRBG. + msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - ssl-opt.sh (subset)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private.*delay=\|tickets enabled on server' + + msg "test: Full minus CTR_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - compat.sh (subset)" + tests/compat.sh -m tls12 -t 'ECDSA PSK' -V NO -p OpenSSL +} + +component_test_no_hmac_drbg_classic () { + msg "build: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, classic crypto in TLS" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, classic crypto - main suites" + make test + + # Normally our ECDSA implementation uses deterministic ECDSA. But since + # HMAC_DRBG is disabled in this configuration, randomized ECDSA is used + # instead. + # Test SSL with non-deterministic ECDSA. Only test features that + # might be affected by how ECDSA signature is performed. + msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, classic crypto - ssl-opt.sh (subset)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private: sign' + + # To save time, only test one protocol version, since this part of + # the protocol is identical in (D)TLS up to 1.2. + msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, classic crypto - compat.sh (ECDSA)" + tests/compat.sh -m tls12 -t 'ECDSA' +} + +component_test_no_hmac_drbg_use_psa () { + msg "build: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, PSA crypto in TLS" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - main suites" + make test + + # Normally our ECDSA implementation uses deterministic ECDSA. But since + # HMAC_DRBG is disabled in this configuration, randomized ECDSA is used + # instead. + # Test SSL with non-deterministic ECDSA. Only test features that + # might be affected by how ECDSA signature is performed. + msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - ssl-opt.sh (subset)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|SSL async private: sign' + + # To save time, only test one protocol version, since this part of + # the protocol is identical in (D)TLS up to 1.2. + msg "test: Full minus HMAC_DRBG, USE_PSA_CRYPTO - compat.sh (ECDSA)" + tests/compat.sh -m tls12 -t 'ECDSA' +} + +component_test_psa_external_rng_no_drbg_classic () { + msg "build: PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG minus *_DRBG, classic crypto in TLS" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + # When MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is disabled and there is no DRBG, + # the SSL test programs don't have an RNG and can't work. Explicitly + # make them use the PSA RNG with -DMBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG. + make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O2 -DMBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG minus *_DRBG, classic crypto - main suites" + make test + + msg "test: PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG minus *_DRBG, classic crypto - ssl-opt.sh (subset)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default' +} + +component_test_psa_external_rng_no_drbg_use_psa () { + msg "build: PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG minus *_DRBG, PSA crypto in TLS" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG minus *_DRBG, PSA crypto - main suites" + make test + + msg "test: PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG minus *_DRBG, PSA crypto - ssl-opt.sh (subset)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|opaque' +} + +component_test_psa_external_rng_use_psa_crypto () { + msg "build: full + PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + USE_PSA_CRYPTO minus CTR_DRBG" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: full + PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + USE_PSA_CRYPTO minus CTR_DRBG" + make test + + msg "test: full + PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + USE_PSA_CRYPTO minus CTR_DRBG" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|opaque' +} + +component_test_ecp_no_internal_rng () { + msg "build: Default plus ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG minus DRBG modules" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C # requires a DRBG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C # requires PSA Crypto + + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG, no DRBG module" + make test + + # no SSL tests as they all depend on having a DRBG +} + +component_test_ecp_restartable_no_internal_rng () { + msg "build: Default plus ECP_RESTARTABLE and ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG, no DRBG" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C # requires CTR_DRBG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C # requires PSA Crypto + + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: ECP_RESTARTABLE and ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG, no DRBG module" + make test + + # no SSL tests as they all depend on having a DRBG +} + +component_test_new_ecdh_context () { + msg "build: new ECDH context (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: new ECDH context - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s + make test + + msg "test: new ECDH context - ECDH-related part of ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 5s + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECDH + + msg "test: new ECDH context - compat.sh with some ECDH ciphersuites (ASan build)" # ~ 3 min + # Exclude some symmetric ciphers that are redundant here to gain time. + tests/compat.sh -f ECDH -V NO -e 'ARCFOUR\|ARIA\|CAMELLIA\|CHACHA\|DES\|RC4' +} + +component_test_everest () { + msg "build: Everest ECDH context (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED + CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: Everest ECDH context - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s + make test + + msg "test: Everest ECDH context - ECDH-related part of ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 5s + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECDH + + msg "test: Everest ECDH context - compat.sh with some ECDH ciphersuites (ASan build)" # ~ 3 min + # Exclude some symmetric ciphers that are redundant here to gain time. + tests/compat.sh -f ECDH -V NO -e 'ARCFOUR\|ARIA\|CAMELLIA\|CHACHA\|DES\|RC4' +} + +component_test_everest_curve25519_only () { + msg "build: Everest ECDH context, only Curve25519" # ~ 6 min + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + # Disable all curves + for c in $(sed -n 's/#define \(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_[0-9A-Z_a-z]*_ENABLED\).*/\1/p' <"$CONFIG_H"); do + scripts/config.py unset "$c" + done + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED + + make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: Everest ECDH context, only Curve25519" # ~ 50s + make test +} + +component_test_small_ssl_out_content_len () { + msg "build: small SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 4096 + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: small SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl-opt.sh MFL and large packet tests" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment\|Large packet" +} + +component_test_small_ssl_in_content_len () { + msg "build: small SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 4096 + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: small SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN - ssl-opt.sh MFL tests" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment" +} + +component_test_small_ssl_dtls_max_buffering () { + msg "build: small MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING #0" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 1000 + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: small MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING #0 - ssl-opt.sh specific reordering test" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order hs msg before reassembling next, free buffered msg" +} + +component_test_small_mbedtls_ssl_dtls_max_buffering () { + msg "build: small MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING #1" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 190 + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: small MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING #1 - ssl-opt.sh specific reordering test" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "DTLS reordering: Buffer encrypted Finished message, drop for fragmented NewSessionTicket" +} + +component_test_psa_collect_statuses () { + msg "build+test: psa_collect_statuses" # ~30s + scripts/config.py full + tests/scripts/psa_collect_statuses.py + # Check that psa_crypto_init() succeeded at least once + grep -q '^0:psa_crypto_init:' tests/statuses.log + rm -f tests/statuses.log +} + +component_test_full_cmake_clang () { + msg "build: cmake, full config, clang" # ~ 50s + scripts/config.py full + CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release -D ENABLE_TESTING=On . + make + + msg "test: main suites (full config, clang)" # ~ 5s + make test + + msg "test: psa_constant_names (full config, clang)" # ~ 1s + tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh default, ECJPAKE, SSL async (full config)" # ~ 1s + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|ECJPAKE\|SSL async private' + + msg "test: compat.sh RC4, DES, 3DES & NULL (full config)" # ~ 2 min + env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'NULL\|DES\|RC4\|ARCFOUR' + + msg "test: compat.sh ARIA + ChachaPoly" + env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_NEXT" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA' +} + +component_test_memsan_constant_flow () { + # This tests both (1) accesses to undefined memory, and (2) branches or + # memory access depending on secret values. To distinguish between those: + # - unset MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN - does the failure persist? + # - or alternatively, change the build type to MemSanDbg, which enables + # origin tracking and nicer stack traces (which are useful for debugging + # anyway), and check if the origin was TEST_CF_SECRET() or something else. + msg "build: cmake MSan (clang), full config with constant flow testing" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C # memsan doesn't grok asm + CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=MemSan . + make + + msg "test: main suites (Msan + constant flow)" + make test +} + +component_test_valgrind_constant_flow () { + # This tests both (1) everything that valgrind's memcheck usually checks + # (heap buffer overflows, use of uninitialized memory, use-after-free, + # etc.) and (2) branches or memory access depending on secret values, + # which will be reported as uninitialized memory. To distinguish between + # secret and actually uninitialized: + # - unset MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND - does the failure persist? + # - or alternatively, build with debug info and manually run the offending + # test suite with valgrind --track-origins=yes, then check if the origin + # was TEST_CF_SECRET() or something else. + msg "build: cmake release GCC, full config with constant flow testing" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release . + make + + # this only shows a summary of the results (how many of each type) + # details are left in Testing//DynamicAnalysis.xml + msg "test: main suites (valgrind + constant flow)" + make memcheck +} + +component_test_default_no_deprecated () { + # Test that removing the deprecated features from the default + # configuration leaves something consistent. + msg "build: make, default + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-O -Werror -Wall -Wextra' + + msg "test: make, default + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED" # ~ 5s + make test +} + +component_test_full_no_deprecated () { + msg "build: make, full_no_deprecated config" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full_no_deprecated + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-O -Werror -Wall -Wextra' + + msg "test: make, full_no_deprecated config" # ~ 5s + make test +} + +component_test_full_no_deprecated_deprecated_warning () { + # Test that there is nothing deprecated in "full_no_deprecated". + # A deprecated feature would trigger a warning (made fatal) from + # MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING. + msg "build: make, full_no_deprecated config, MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full_no_deprecated + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-O -Werror -Wall -Wextra' + + msg "test: make, full_no_deprecated config, MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING" # ~ 5s + make test +} + +component_test_full_deprecated_warning () { + # Test that when MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING is enabled, the build passes + # with only certain whitelisted types of warnings. + msg "build: make, full config + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING, expect warnings" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + # Expect warnings from '#warning' directives in check_config.h. + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-O -Werror -Wall -Wextra -Wno-error=cpp' lib programs + + msg "build: make tests, full config + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING, expect warnings" # ~ 30s + # Set MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED to enable tests for deprecated features. + # By default those are disabled when MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING is set. + # Expect warnings from '#warning' directives in check_config.h and + # from the use of deprecated functions in test suites. + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-O -Werror -Wall -Wextra -Wno-error=deprecated-declarations -Wno-error=cpp -DMBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED' tests + + msg "test: full config + MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED" # ~ 30s + make test +} + +# Check that the specified libraries exist and are empty. +are_empty_libraries () { + nm "$@" >/dev/null 2>/dev/null + ! nm "$@" 2>/dev/null | grep -v ':$' | grep . +} + +component_build_crypto_default () { + msg "build: make, crypto only" + scripts/config.py crypto + make CFLAGS='-O1 -Werror' + are_empty_libraries library/libmbedx509.* library/libmbedtls.* +} + +component_build_crypto_full () { + msg "build: make, crypto only, full config" + scripts/config.py crypto_full + make CFLAGS='-O1 -Werror' + are_empty_libraries library/libmbedx509.* library/libmbedtls.* +} + +component_build_crypto_baremetal () { + msg "build: make, crypto only, baremetal config" + scripts/config.py crypto_baremetal + make CFLAGS="-O1 -Werror -I$PWD/tests/include/baremetal-override/" + are_empty_libraries library/libmbedx509.* library/libmbedtls.* +} +support_build_crypto_baremetal () { + support_build_baremetal "$@" +} + +component_build_baremetal () { + msg "build: make, baremetal config" + scripts/config.py baremetal + make CFLAGS="-O1 -Werror -I$PWD/tests/include/baremetal-override/" +} +support_build_baremetal () { + # Older Glibc versions include time.h from other headers such as stdlib.h, + # which makes the no-time.h-in-baremetal check fail. Ubuntu 16.04 has this + # problem, Ubuntu 18.04 is ok. + ! grep -q -F time.h /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/sys/types.h +} + +component_test_depends_curves () { + msg "test/build: curves.pl (gcc)" # ~ 4 min + tests/scripts/curves.pl +} + +component_test_depends_curves_psa () { + msg "test/build: curves.pl with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined (gcc)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + tests/scripts/curves.pl +} + +component_test_depends_hashes () { + msg "test/build: depends-hashes.pl (gcc)" # ~ 2 min + tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl +} + +component_test_depends_hashes_psa () { + msg "test/build: depends-hashes.pl with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined (gcc)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl +} + +component_test_depends_pkalgs () { + msg "test/build: depends-pkalgs.pl (gcc)" # ~ 2 min + tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl +} + +component_test_depends_pkalgs_psa () { + msg "test/build: depends-pkalgs.pl with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined (gcc)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl +} + +component_build_key_exchanges () { + msg "test/build: key-exchanges (gcc)" # ~ 1 min + tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl +} + +component_test_make_cxx () { + msg "build: Unix make, full, gcc + g++" + scripts/config.py full + make TEST_CPP=1 lib programs + + msg "test: cpp_dummy_build" + programs/test/cpp_dummy_build +} + +component_test_no_use_psa_crypto_full_cmake_asan() { + # full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO: run the same set of tests as basic-build-test.sh + msg "build: cmake, full config minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, ASan" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE # not using PSA, so enable restartable ECC + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: main suites (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + make test + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh + + msg "test: compat.sh default (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + tests/compat.sh + + msg "test: compat.sh RC4, DES & NULL (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" tests/compat.sh -e '3DES\|DES-CBC3' -f 'NULL\|DES\|RC4\|ARCFOUR' + + msg "test: compat.sh ARIA + ChachaPoly (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_NEXT" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA' +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecdsa () { + msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated ECDSA" + + # Disable ALG_STREAM_CIPHER and ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING to avoid having + # partial support for cipher operations in the driver test library. + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING + # Disable obsolete hashes (alternatively we could enable support for them + # in the driver test library). + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + + # SHA384 needed for some ECDSA signature tests. + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h set MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + + loc_accel_list="ALG_ECDSA ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY" + loc_accel_flags=$( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DLIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' ) + make -C tests libtestdriver1.a CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + # Restore test driver base configuration + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h unset MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + + loc_accel_flags="$loc_accel_flags $( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' )" + make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O -Werror -I../tests/include -I../tests -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="-ltestdriver1 $ASAN_CFLAGS" + + not grep mbedtls_ecdsa_ library/ecdsa.o + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated ECDSA" + make test +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_rsa_signature () { + msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated RSA signature" + + # Disable ALG_STREAM_CIPHER and ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING to avoid having + # partial support for cipher operations in the driver test library. + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING + + # It seems it is not possible to remove only the support for RSA signature + # in the library. Thus we have to remove all RSA support (signature and + # encryption/decryption). AS there is no driver support for asymmetric + # encryption/decryption so far remove RSA encryption/decryption from the + # application algorithm list. + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + + # Make sure both the library and the test library support the SHA hash + # algorithms and only those ones (SHA256 is included by default). That way: + # - the test library can compute the RSA signatures even in the case of a + # composite RSA signature algorithm based on a SHA hash (no other hash + # used in the unit tests). + # - the dependency of RSA signature tests on PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_xyz is + # fulfilled as the hash SHA algorithm is supported by the library, and + # thus the tests are run, not skipped. + # - when testing a signature key with an algorithm wildcard built from + # PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH as algorithm to test with the key, the chosen hash + # algorithm based on the hashes supported by the library is also + # supported by the test library. + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160_C + + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h set MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h set MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + # We need PEM parsing in the test library as well to support the import + # of PEM encoded RSA keys. + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h set MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h set MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + + loc_accel_list="ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN ALG_RSA_PSS KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY" + loc_accel_flags=$( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DLIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' ) + make -C tests libtestdriver1.a CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + # Restore test driver base configuration + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h unset MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h unset MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h unset MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + scripts/config.py -f tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h unset MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + + + # Mbed TLS library build + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + + # Remove RSA support and its dependencies + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_RSA_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD2_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD4_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD5_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + + loc_accel_flags="$loc_accel_flags $( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' )" + make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -Werror -I../tests/include -I../tests -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="-ltestdriver1 $ASAN_CFLAGS" + + not grep mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign library/rsa.o + not grep mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext library/rsa.o + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated RSA signature" + make test +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hash () { + msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated hash" + + # Disable ALG_STREAM_CIPHER and ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING to avoid having + # partial support for cipher operations in the driver test library. + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING + + loc_accel_list="ALG_MD4 ALG_MD5 ALG_RIPEMD160 ALG_SHA_1 ALG_SHA_224 ALG_SHA_256 ALG_SHA_384 ALG_SHA_512" + loc_accel_flags=$( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DLIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' ) + make -C tests libtestdriver1.a CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD2_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD4_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD5_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + # Don't unset MBEDTLS_SHA256_C as it is needed by PSA crypto core. + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + # Unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3, MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 as they depend on MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + # Unset MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING as it depends on MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 in the default configuration. + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + loc_accel_flags="$loc_accel_flags $( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' )" + make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -Werror -I../tests/include -I../tests -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="-ltestdriver1 $ASAN_CFLAGS" + + not grep mbedtls_sha512_init library/sha512.o + not grep mbedtls_sha1_init library/sha1.o + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated hash" + make test +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_cipher () { + msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated cipher" + + # This test case focuses on cipher+AEAD. We don't yet support all + # combinations of configurations, so deactivate block-cipher-based MACs. + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC + + loc_accel_list="ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ALG_CTR ALG_CFB ALG_OFB ALG_XTS KEY_TYPE_DES" + loc_accel_flags=$( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DLIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' ) + make -C tests libtestdriver1.a CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + + # There is no intended accelerator support for ALG STREAM_CIPHER and + # ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING. Therefore, asking for them in the build implies the + # inclusion of the Mbed TLS cipher operations. As we want to test here with + # cipher operations solely supported by accelerators, disabled those + # PSA configuration options. + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING + + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_DES_C + + loc_accel_flags="$loc_accel_flags $( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' )" + make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -Werror -I../tests/include -I../tests -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="-ltestdriver1 $ASAN_CFLAGS" + + not grep mbedtls_des* library/des.o + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated hash" + make test +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_config_no_driver() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG minus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG minus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS" + make test +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_config_chachapoly_disabled() { + # full minus MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C without PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM and PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 + msg "build: full minus MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C without PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM and PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: full minus MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C without PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM and PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305" + make test +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator ECDSA code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_ecdsa() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA + # without MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + # PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA and PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA are already + # set in include/psa/crypto_config.h + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA without MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator ECDH code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_ecdh() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH + # without MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH without MBEDTLS_ECDH_C" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator ECC key pair code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_key_type_ecc_key_pair() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator ECC public key code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_key_type_ecc_public_key() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator HMAC code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_hmac() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator HKDF code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_hkdf() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF + # without MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF without MBEDTLS_HKDF_C" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + # Make sure to unset TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL since it requires HKDF_C and will not build properly without it. + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator MD2 code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_md2() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 without other hashes + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 - other hashes" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD2 -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator MD4 code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_md4() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 without other hashes + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 - other hashes" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD4 -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator MD5 code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_md5() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 without other hashes + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 - other hashes" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5 -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator RIPEMD160 code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_ripemd160() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 without other hashes + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 - other hashes" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160 -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator SHA1 code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha1() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 without other hashes + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 - other hashes" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1 -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator SHA224 code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha224() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 without other hashes + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 - other hashes" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224 -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator SHA256 code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha256() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 without other hashes + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 - other hashes" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator SHA384 code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha384() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 without other hashes + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 - other hashes" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384 -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator SHA512 code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha512() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 without other hashes + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 - other hashes" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512 -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator RSA code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_pkcs1v15_crypt() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator RSA code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_pkcs1v15_sign() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator RSA code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_oaep() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator RSA code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_pss() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator RSA code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_key_type_rsa_key_pair() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR and PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR + PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +# This should be renamed to test and updated once the accelerator RSA code is in place and ready to test. +component_build_psa_accel_key_type_rsa_public_key() { + # full plus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY and PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY + PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 + scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 + # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY -I../tests/include -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" +} + +component_test_check_params_functionality () { + msg "build+test: MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS functionality" + scripts/config.py full # includes CHECK_PARAMS + # Make MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED call mbedtls_param_failed(). + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -O1' all test +} + +component_test_check_params_without_platform () { + msg "build+test: MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS without MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C" + scripts/config.py full # includes CHECK_PARAMS + # Keep MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED as assert. + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -O1' all test +} + +component_test_check_params_silent () { + msg "build+test: MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS with alternative MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED()" + scripts/config.py full # includes CHECK_PARAMS + # Set MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED to nothing. + sed -i 's/.*\(#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond )\).*/\1/' "$CONFIG_H" + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -O1' all test +} + +component_test_no_platform () { + # Full configuration build, without platform support, file IO and net sockets. + # This should catch missing mbedtls_printf definitions, and by disabling file + # IO, it should catch missing '#include ' + msg "build: full config except platform/fsio/net, make, gcc, C99" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_NET_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_FS_IO + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + # Note, _DEFAULT_SOURCE needs to be defined for platforms using glibc version >2.19, + # to re-enable platform integration features otherwise disabled in C99 builds + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -std=c99 -pedantic -Os -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE' lib programs + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -Os' test +} + +component_build_no_std_function () { + # catch compile bugs in _uninit functions + msg "build: full config with NO_STD_FUNCTION, make, gcc" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Check . + make +} + +component_build_no_ssl_srv () { + msg "build: full config except ssl_srv.c, make, gcc" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -O1' +} + +component_build_no_ssl_cli () { + msg "build: full config except ssl_cli.c, make, gcc" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -O1' +} + +component_build_no_sockets () { + # Note, C99 compliance can also be tested with the sockets support disabled, + # as that requires a POSIX platform (which isn't the same as C99). + msg "build: full config except net_sockets.c, make, gcc -std=c99 -pedantic" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_NET_C # getaddrinfo() undeclared, etc. + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY # uses syscall() on GNU/Linux + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -O1 -std=c99 -pedantic' lib +} + +component_test_memory_buffer_allocator_backtrace () { + msg "build: default config with memory buffer allocator and backtrace enabled" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + CC=gcc cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release . + make + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE" + make test +} + +component_test_memory_buffer_allocator () { + msg "build: default config with memory buffer allocator" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + CC=gcc cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release . + make + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C" + make test + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C" + # MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC is slow. Skip tests that tend to time out. + tests/ssl-opt.sh -e '^DTLS proxy' +} + +component_test_no_max_fragment_length () { + # Run max fragment length tests with MFL disabled + msg "build: default config except MFL extension (ASan build)" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MFL-related tests" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment length" +} + +component_test_asan_remove_peer_certificate () { + msg "build: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE disabled (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE" + make test + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE" + tests/ssl-opt.sh + + msg "test: compat.sh, !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE" + tests/compat.sh + + msg "test: context-info.sh, !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE" + tests/context-info.sh +} + +component_test_no_max_fragment_length_small_ssl_out_content_len () { + msg "build: no MFL extension, small SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 4096 + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: MFL tests (disabled MFL extension case) & large packet tests" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Max fragment length\|Large buffer" + + msg "test: context-info.sh (disabled MFL extension case)" + tests/context-info.sh +} + +component_test_variable_ssl_in_out_buffer_len () { + msg "build: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH enabled (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH enabled" + make test + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH enabled" + tests/ssl-opt.sh + + msg "test: compat.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH enabled" + tests/compat.sh +} + +component_test_variable_ssl_in_out_buffer_len_CID () { + msg "build: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID" + make test + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled" + tests/ssl-opt.sh + + msg "test: compat.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled" + tests/compat.sh +} + +component_test_variable_ssl_in_out_buffer_len_record_splitting () { + msg "build: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING enabled (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING" + make test + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING enabled" + tests/ssl-opt.sh + + msg "test: compat.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING enabled" + tests/compat.sh +} + +component_test_ssl_alloc_buffer_and_mfl () { + msg "build: default config with memory buffer allocator and MFL extension" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + CC=gcc cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release . + make + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG and MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH" + make test + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG and MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "Handshake memory usage" +} + +component_test_when_no_ciphersuites_have_mac () { + msg "build: when no ciphersuites have MAC" + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + make + + msg "test: !MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC" + make test + + msg "test ssl-opt.sh: !MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|EtM' -e 'without EtM' +} + +component_test_null_entropy () { + msg "build: default config with MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan -D UNSAFE_BUILD=ON . + make + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" + make test +} + +component_test_no_date_time () { + msg "build: default config without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE" + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Check . + make + + msg "test: !MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE - main suites" + make test +} + +component_test_platform_calloc_macro () { + msg "build: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC/FREE}_MACRO enabled (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC/FREE}_MACRO enabled (ASan build)" + make test +} + +component_test_malloc_0_null () { + msg "build: malloc(0) returns NULL (ASan+UBSan build)" + scripts/config.py full + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE=\"$PWD/tests/configs/config-wrapper-malloc-0-null.h\"' $ASAN_CFLAGS -O" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: malloc(0) returns NULL (ASan+UBSan build)" + make test + + msg "selftest: malloc(0) returns NULL (ASan+UBSan build)" + # Just the calloc selftest. "make test" ran the others as part of the + # test suites. + programs/test/selftest calloc + + msg "test ssl-opt.sh: malloc(0) returns NULL (ASan+UBSan build)" + # Run a subset of the tests. The choice is a balance between coverage + # and time (including time indirectly wasted due to flaky tests). + # The current choice is to skip tests whose description includes + # "proxy", which is an approximation of skipping tests that use the + # UDP proxy, which tend to be slower and flakier. + tests/ssl-opt.sh -e 'proxy' +} + +component_test_aes_fewer_tables () { + msg "build: default config with AES_FEWER_TABLES enabled" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' + + msg "test: AES_FEWER_TABLES" + make test +} + +component_test_aes_rom_tables () { + msg "build: default config with AES_ROM_TABLES enabled" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' + + msg "test: AES_ROM_TABLES" + make test +} + +component_test_aes_fewer_tables_and_rom_tables () { + msg "build: default config with AES_ROM_TABLES and AES_FEWER_TABLES enabled" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' + + msg "test: AES_FEWER_TABLES + AES_ROM_TABLES" + make test +} + +component_test_ctr_drbg_aes_256_sha_256 () { + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: full + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 (ASan build)" + make test +} + +component_test_ctr_drbg_aes_128_sha_512 () { + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: full + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY (ASan build)" + make test +} + +component_test_ctr_drbg_aes_128_sha_256 () { + msg "build: full + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 (ASan build)" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: full + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 (ASan build)" + make test +} + +component_test_se_default () { + msg "build: default config + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + make CC=clang CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -Os" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: default config + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C" + make test +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_drivers () { + msg "build: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS w/ driver hooks" + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + loc_cflags="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST_ALL" + loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} '-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/user-config-for-test.h\"'" + loc_cflags="${loc_cflags} -I../tests/include -O2" + + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="${loc_cflags}" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: full + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS" + make test +} + +component_test_make_shared () { + msg "build/test: make shared" # ~ 40s + make SHARED=1 all check + ldd programs/util/strerror | grep libmbedcrypto + programs/test/dlopen_demo.sh +} + +component_test_cmake_shared () { + msg "build/test: cmake shared" # ~ 2min + cmake -DUSE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY=On . + make + ldd programs/util/strerror | grep libmbedcrypto + make test + programs/test/dlopen_demo.sh +} + +test_build_opt () { + info=$1 cc=$2; shift 2 + for opt in "$@"; do + msg "build/test: $cc $opt, $info" # ~ 30s + make CC="$cc" CFLAGS="$opt -std=c99 -pedantic -Wall -Wextra -Werror" + # We're confident enough in compilers to not run _all_ the tests, + # but at least run the unit tests. In particular, runs with + # optimizations use inline assembly whereas runs with -O0 + # skip inline assembly. + make test # ~30s + make clean + done +} + +component_test_clang_opt () { + scripts/config.py full + test_build_opt 'full config' clang -O0 -Os -O2 +} + +component_test_gcc_opt () { + scripts/config.py full + test_build_opt 'full config' gcc -O0 -Os -O2 +} + +component_build_mbedtls_config_file () { + msg "build: make with MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE" # ~40s + scripts/config.py -w full_config.h full + echo '#error "MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE is not working"' >"$CONFIG_H" + make CFLAGS="-I '$PWD' -DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE='\"full_config.h\"'" + # Make sure this feature is enabled. We'll disable it in the next phase. + programs/test/query_compile_time_config MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + make clean + + msg "build: make with MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE + MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE" + # In the user config, disable one feature (for simplicity, pick a feature + # that nothing else depends on). + echo '#undef MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C' >user_config.h + make CFLAGS="-I '$PWD' -DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE='\"full_config.h\"' -DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE='\"user_config.h\"'" + not programs/test/query_compile_time_config MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + + rm -f user_config.h full_config.h +} + +component_build_psa_config_file () { + msg "build: make with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE" # ~40s + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + cp "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" psa_test_config.h + echo '#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE is not working"' >"$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" + make CFLAGS="-I '$PWD' -DMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE='\"psa_test_config.h\"'" + # Make sure this feature is enabled. We'll disable it in the next phase. + programs/test/query_compile_time_config MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + make clean + + msg "build: make with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE" # ~40s + # In the user config, disable one feature, which will reflect on the + # mbedtls configuration so we can query it with query_compile_time_config. + echo '#undef PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC' >psa_user_config.h + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + make CFLAGS="-I '$PWD' -DMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE='\"psa_test_config.h\"' -DMBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE='\"psa_user_config.h\"'" + not programs/test/query_compile_time_config MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + + rm -f psa_test_config.h psa_user_config.h +} + +component_test_m32_o0 () { + # Build without optimization, so as to use portable C code (in a 32-bit + # build) and not the i386-specific inline assembly. + msg "build: i386, make, gcc -O0 (ASan build)" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -m32 -O0" LDFLAGS="-m32 $ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: i386, make, gcc -O0 (ASan build)" + make test +} +support_test_m32_o0 () { + case $(uname -m) in + *64*) true;; + *) false;; + esac +} + +component_test_m32_o2 () { + # Build with optimization, to use the i386 specific inline assembly + # and go faster for tests. + msg "build: i386, make, gcc -O2 (ASan build)" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -m32 -O2" LDFLAGS="-m32 $ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: i386, make, gcc -O2 (ASan build)" + make test + + msg "test ssl-opt.sh, i386, make, gcc-O2" + tests/ssl-opt.sh +} +support_test_m32_o2 () { + support_test_m32_o0 "$@" +} + +component_test_m32_everest () { + msg "build: i386, Everest ECDH context (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED + make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -m32 -O2" LDFLAGS="-m32 $ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: i386, Everest ECDH context - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s + make test + + msg "test: i386, Everest ECDH context - ECDH-related part of ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 5s + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECDH + + msg "test: i386, Everest ECDH context - compat.sh with some ECDH ciphersuites (ASan build)" # ~ 3 min + # Exclude some symmetric ciphers that are redundant here to gain time. + tests/compat.sh -f ECDH -V NO -e 'ARCFOUR\|ARIA\|CAMELLIA\|CHACHA\|DES\|RC4' +} +support_test_m32_everest () { + support_test_m32_o0 "$@" +} + +component_test_mx32 () { + msg "build: 64-bit ILP32, make, gcc" # ~ 30s + scripts/config.py full + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -mx32' LDFLAGS='-mx32' + + msg "test: 64-bit ILP32, make, gcc" + make test +} +support_test_mx32 () { + case $(uname -m) in + amd64|x86_64) true;; + *) false;; + esac +} + +component_test_min_mpi_window_size () { + msg "build: Default + MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE=1 (ASan build)" # ~ 10s + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 1 + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE=1 - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 10s + make test +} + +component_test_have_int32 () { + msg "build: gcc, force 32-bit bignum limbs" + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -DMBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32' + + msg "test: gcc, force 32-bit bignum limbs" + make test +} + +component_test_have_int64 () { + msg "build: gcc, force 64-bit bignum limbs" + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -DMBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64' + + msg "test: gcc, force 64-bit bignum limbs" + make test +} + +component_test_no_udbl_division () { + msg "build: MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION native" # ~ 10s + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + make CFLAGS='-Werror -O1' + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION native" # ~ 10s + make test +} + +component_test_no_64bit_multiplication () { + msg "build: MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION native" # ~ 10s + scripts/config.py full + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + make CFLAGS='-Werror -O1' + + msg "test: MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION native" # ~ 10s + make test +} + +component_test_no_strings () { + msg "build: no strings" # ~10s + scripts/config.py full + # Disable options that activate a large amount of string constants. + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + make CFLAGS='-Werror -Os' + + msg "test: no strings" # ~ 10s + make test +} + +component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc () { + msg "build: ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -O1, baremetal+debug" # ~ 10s + scripts/config.py baremetal + make CC="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc" AR="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ar" LD="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ld" CFLAGS='-std=c99 -Werror -Wall -Wextra -O1' lib + + msg "size: ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -O1, baremetal+debug" + ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}size library/*.o +} + +component_build_arm_linux_gnueabi_gcc_arm5vte () { + msg "build: ${ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -march=arm5vte, baremetal+debug" # ~ 10s + scripts/config.py baremetal + # Build for a target platform that's close to what Debian uses + # for its "armel" distribution (https://wiki.debian.org/ArmEabiPort). + # See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/2169 and comments. + # Build everything including programs, see for example + # https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/3449#issuecomment-675313720 + make CC="${ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc" AR="${ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX}ar" CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -march=armv5te -O1' LDFLAGS='-march=armv5te' + + msg "size: ${ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -march=armv5te -O1, baremetal+debug" + ${ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX}size library/*.o +} +support_build_arm_linux_gnueabi_gcc_arm5vte () { + type ${ARM_LINUX_GNUEABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc >/dev/null 2>&1 +} + +component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_arm5vte () { + msg "build: ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -march=arm5vte, baremetal+debug" # ~ 10s + scripts/config.py baremetal + # This is an imperfect substitute for + # component_build_arm_linux_gnueabi_gcc_arm5vte + # in case the gcc-arm-linux-gnueabi toolchain is not available + make CC="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc" AR="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ar" CFLAGS='-std=c99 -Werror -Wall -Wextra -march=armv5te -O1' LDFLAGS='-march=armv5te' SHELL='sh -x' lib + + msg "size: ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -march=armv5te -O1, baremetal+debug" + ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}size library/*.o +} + +component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_m0plus () { + msg "build: ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -mthumb -mcpu=cortex-m0plus, baremetal_size" # ~ 10s + scripts/config.py baremetal_size + make CC="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc" AR="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ar" LD="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ld" CFLAGS='-std=c99 -Werror -Wall -Wextra -mthumb -mcpu=cortex-m0plus -Os' lib + + msg "size: ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -mthumb -mcpu=cortex-m0plus -Os, baremetal_size" + ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}size library/*.o +} + +component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_udbl_division () { + msg "build: ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc -DMBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION, make" # ~ 10s + scripts/config.py baremetal + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + make CC="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc" AR="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ar" LD="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ld" CFLAGS='-std=c99 -Werror -Wall -Wextra' lib + echo "Checking that software 64-bit division is not required" + not grep __aeabi_uldiv library/*.o +} + +component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication () { + msg "build: ${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION, make" # ~ 10s + scripts/config.py baremetal + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + make CC="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}gcc" AR="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ar" LD="${ARM_NONE_EABI_GCC_PREFIX}ld" CFLAGS='-std=c99 -Werror -O1 -march=armv6-m -mthumb' lib + echo "Checking that software 64-bit multiplication is not required" + not grep __aeabi_lmul library/*.o +} + +component_build_armcc () { + msg "build: ARM Compiler 5" + scripts/config.py baremetal + make CC="$ARMC5_CC" AR="$ARMC5_AR" WARNING_CFLAGS='--strict --c99' lib + + msg "size: ARM Compiler 5" + "$ARMC5_FROMELF" -z library/*.o + + make clean + + # ARM Compiler 6 - Target ARMv7-A + armc6_build_test "--target=arm-arm-none-eabi -march=armv7-a" + + # ARM Compiler 6 - Target ARMv7-M + armc6_build_test "--target=arm-arm-none-eabi -march=armv7-m" + + # ARM Compiler 6 - Target ARMv8-A - AArch32 + armc6_build_test "--target=arm-arm-none-eabi -march=armv8.2-a" + + # ARM Compiler 6 - Target ARMv8-M + armc6_build_test "--target=arm-arm-none-eabi -march=armv8-m.main" + + # ARM Compiler 6 - Target ARMv8-A - AArch64 + armc6_build_test "--target=aarch64-arm-none-eabi -march=armv8.2-a" +} + +component_build_ssl_hw_record_accel() { + msg "build: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL enabled" + scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL + make CFLAGS='-Werror -O1' +} + +component_test_tls13_experimental () { + msg "build: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL enabled" + scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . + make + msg "test: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL enabled" + make test +} + +component_build_mingw () { + msg "build: Windows cross build - mingw64, make (Link Library)" # ~ 30s + make CC=i686-w64-mingw32-gcc AR=i686-w64-mingw32-ar LD=i686-w64-minggw32-ld CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' WINDOWS_BUILD=1 lib programs + + # note Make tests only builds the tests, but doesn't run them + make CC=i686-w64-mingw32-gcc AR=i686-w64-mingw32-ar LD=i686-w64-minggw32-ld CFLAGS='-Werror' WINDOWS_BUILD=1 tests + make WINDOWS_BUILD=1 clean + + msg "build: Windows cross build - mingw64, make (DLL)" # ~ 30s + make CC=i686-w64-mingw32-gcc AR=i686-w64-mingw32-ar LD=i686-w64-minggw32-ld CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' WINDOWS_BUILD=1 SHARED=1 lib programs + make CC=i686-w64-mingw32-gcc AR=i686-w64-mingw32-ar LD=i686-w64-minggw32-ld CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' WINDOWS_BUILD=1 SHARED=1 tests + make WINDOWS_BUILD=1 clean +} +support_build_mingw() { + case $(i686-w64-mingw32-gcc -dumpversion) in + [0-5]*) false;; + *) true;; + esac +} + +component_test_memsan () { + msg "build: MSan (clang)" # ~ 1 min 20s + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_AESNI_C # memsan doesn't grok asm + CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=MemSan . + make + + msg "test: main suites (MSan)" # ~ 10s + make test + + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (MSan)" # ~ 1 min + tests/ssl-opt.sh + + # Optional part(s) + + if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 0 ]; then + msg "test: compat.sh (MSan)" # ~ 6 min 20s + tests/compat.sh + fi +} + +component_test_valgrind () { + msg "build: Release (clang)" + CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release . + make + + msg "test: main suites valgrind (Release)" + make memcheck + + # Optional parts (slow; currently broken on OS X because programs don't + # seem to receive signals under valgrind on OS X). + if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 0 ]; then + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh --memcheck (Release)" + tests/ssl-opt.sh --memcheck + fi + + if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 1 ]; then + msg "test: compat.sh --memcheck (Release)" + tests/compat.sh --memcheck + fi + + if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 0 ]; then + msg "test: context-info.sh --memcheck (Release)" + tests/context-info.sh --memcheck + fi +} + +support_test_cmake_out_of_source () { + distrib_id="" + distrib_ver="" + distrib_ver_minor="" + distrib_ver_major="" + + # Attempt to parse lsb-release to find out distribution and version. If not + # found this should fail safe (test is supported). + if [[ -f /etc/lsb-release ]]; then + + while read -r lsb_line; do + case "$lsb_line" in + "DISTRIB_ID"*) distrib_id=${lsb_line/#DISTRIB_ID=};; + "DISTRIB_RELEASE"*) distrib_ver=${lsb_line/#DISTRIB_RELEASE=};; + esac + done < /etc/lsb-release + + distrib_ver_major="${distrib_ver%%.*}" + distrib_ver="${distrib_ver#*.}" + distrib_ver_minor="${distrib_ver%%.*}" + fi + + # Running the out of source CMake test on Ubuntu 16.04 using more than one + # processor (as the CI does) can create a race condition whereby the build + # fails to see a generated file, despite that file actually having been + # generated. This problem appears to go away with 18.04 or newer, so make + # the out of source tests unsupported on Ubuntu 16.04. + [ "$distrib_id" != "Ubuntu" ] || [ "$distrib_ver_major" -gt 16 ] +} + +component_test_cmake_out_of_source () { + msg "build: cmake 'out-of-source' build" + MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR="$PWD" + mkdir "$OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR" + cd "$OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR" + cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Check "$MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR" + make + + msg "test: cmake 'out-of-source' build" + make test + # Test an SSL option that requires an auxiliary script in test/scripts/. + # Also ensure that there are no error messages such as + # "No such file or directory", which would indicate that some required + # file is missing (ssl-opt.sh tolerates the absence of some files so + # may exit with status 0 but emit errors). + ./tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Fallback SCSV: beginning of list' >ssl-opt.out 2>ssl-opt.err + grep PASS ssl-opt.out + cat ssl-opt.err >&2 + # If ssl-opt.err is non-empty, record an error and keep going. + [ ! -s ssl-opt.err ] + rm ssl-opt.out ssl-opt.err + cd "$MBEDTLS_ROOT_DIR" + rm -rf "$OUT_OF_SOURCE_DIR" +} + +component_test_cmake_as_subdirectory () { + msg "build: cmake 'as-subdirectory' build" + cd programs/test/cmake_subproject + cmake . + make + ./cmake_subproject +} +support_test_cmake_as_subdirectory () { + support_test_cmake_out_of_source +} + +component_test_zeroize () { + # Test that the function mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is not optimized away by + # different combinations of compilers and optimization flags by using an + # auxiliary GDB script. Unfortunately, GDB does not return error values to the + # system in all cases that the script fails, so we must manually search the + # output to check whether the pass string is present and no failure strings + # were printed. + + # Don't try to disable ASLR. We don't care about ASLR here. We do care + # about a spurious message if Gdb tries and fails, so suppress that. + gdb_disable_aslr= + if [ -z "$(gdb -batch -nw -ex 'set disable-randomization off' 2>&1)" ]; then + gdb_disable_aslr='set disable-randomization off' + fi + + for optimization_flag in -O2 -O3 -Ofast -Os; do + for compiler in clang gcc; do + msg "test: $compiler $optimization_flag, mbedtls_platform_zeroize()" + make programs CC="$compiler" DEBUG=1 CFLAGS="$optimization_flag" + gdb -ex "$gdb_disable_aslr" -x tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb -nw -batch -nx 2>&1 | tee test_zeroize.log + grep "The buffer was correctly zeroized" test_zeroize.log + not grep -i "error" test_zeroize.log + rm -f test_zeroize.log + make clean + done + done +} + +component_test_psa_compliance () { + msg "build: make, default config + CMAC, libmbedcrypto.a only" + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + make -C library libmbedcrypto.a + + msg "unit test: test_psa_compliance.py" + ./tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py +} + +support_test_psa_compliance () { + # psa-compliance-tests only supports CMake >= 3.10.0 + ver="$(cmake --version)" + ver="${ver#cmake version }" + ver_major="${ver%%.*}" + + ver="${ver#*.}" + ver_minor="${ver%%.*}" + + [ "$ver_major" -eq 3 ] && [ "$ver_minor" -ge 10 ] +} + +component_check_python_files () { + msg "Lint: Python scripts" + tests/scripts/check-python-files.sh +} + +component_check_generate_test_code () { + msg "uint test: generate_test_code.py" + # unittest writes out mundane stuff like number or tests run on stderr. + # Our convention is to reserve stderr for actual errors, and write + # harmless info on stdout so it can be suppress with --quiet. + ./tests/scripts/test_generate_test_code.py 2>&1 +} + +################################################################ +#### Termination +################################################################ + +post_report () { + msg "Done, cleaning up" + final_cleanup + + final_report +} + + + +################################################################ +#### Run all the things +################################################################ + +# Function invoked by --error-test to test error reporting. +pseudo_component_error_test () { + msg "Testing error reporting $error_test_i" + if [ $KEEP_GOING -ne 0 ]; then + echo "Expect three failing commands." + fi + # If the component doesn't run in a subshell, changing error_test_i to an + # invalid integer will cause an error in the loop that runs this function. + error_test_i=this_should_not_be_used_since_the_component_runs_in_a_subshell + # Expected error: 'grep non_existent /dev/null -> 1' + grep non_existent /dev/null + # Expected error: '! grep -q . tests/scripts/all.sh -> 1' + not grep -q . "$0" + # Expected error: 'make unknown_target -> 2' + make unknown_target + false "this should not be executed" +} + +# Run one component and clean up afterwards. +run_component () { + current_component="$1" + export MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION="$current_component" + + # Unconditionally create a seedfile that's sufficiently long. + # Do this before each component, because a previous component may + # have messed it up or shortened it. + local dd_cmd + dd_cmd=(dd if=/dev/urandom of=./tests/seedfile bs=64 count=1) + case $OSTYPE in + linux*|freebsd*|openbsd*|darwin*) dd_cmd+=(status=none) + esac + "${dd_cmd[@]}" + + # Run the component in a subshell, with error trapping and output + # redirection set up based on the relevant options. + if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then + # We want to keep running if the subshell fails, so 'set -e' must + # be off when the subshell runs. + set +e + fi + ( + if [ $QUIET -eq 1 ]; then + # msg() will be silenced, so just print the component name here. + echo "${current_component#component_}" + exec >/dev/null + fi + if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then + # Keep "set -e" off, and run an ERR trap instead to record failures. + set -E + trap err_trap ERR + fi + # The next line is what runs the component + "$@" + if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then + trap - ERR + exit $last_failure_status + fi + ) + component_status=$? + if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then + set -e + if [ $component_status -ne 0 ]; then + failure_count=$((failure_count + 1)) + fi + fi + + # Restore the build tree to a clean state. + cleanup + unset current_component +} + +# Preliminary setup +pre_check_environment +pre_initialize_variables +pre_parse_command_line "$@" + +pre_check_git +pre_restore_files +pre_back_up + +build_status=0 +if [ $KEEP_GOING -eq 1 ]; then + pre_setup_keep_going +fi +pre_prepare_outcome_file +pre_print_configuration +pre_check_tools +cleanup + +# Run the requested tests. +for ((error_test_i=1; error_test_i <= error_test; error_test_i++)); do + run_component pseudo_component_error_test +done +unset error_test_i +for component in $RUN_COMPONENTS; do + run_component "component_$component" +done + +# We're done. +post_report diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..d06a0596 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 + +"""Analyze the test outcomes from a full CI run. + +This script can also run on outcomes from a partial run, but the results are +less likely to be useful. +""" + +import argparse +import sys +import traceback + +import check_test_cases + +class Results: + """Process analysis results.""" + + def __init__(self): + self.error_count = 0 + self.warning_count = 0 + + @staticmethod + def log(fmt, *args, **kwargs): + sys.stderr.write((fmt + '\n').format(*args, **kwargs)) + + def error(self, fmt, *args, **kwargs): + self.log('Error: ' + fmt, *args, **kwargs) + self.error_count += 1 + + def warning(self, fmt, *args, **kwargs): + self.log('Warning: ' + fmt, *args, **kwargs) + self.warning_count += 1 + +class TestCaseOutcomes: + """The outcomes of one test case across many configurations.""" + # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods + + def __init__(self): + # Collect a list of witnesses of the test case succeeding or failing. + # Currently we don't do anything with witnesses except count them. + # The format of a witness is determined by the read_outcome_file + # function; it's the platform and configuration joined by ';'. + self.successes = [] + self.failures = [] + + def hits(self): + """Return the number of times a test case has been run. + + This includes passes and failures, but not skips. + """ + return len(self.successes) + len(self.failures) + +def analyze_coverage(results, outcomes): + """Check that all available test cases are executed at least once.""" + available = check_test_cases.collect_available_test_cases() + for key in available: + hits = outcomes[key].hits() if key in outcomes else 0 + if hits == 0: + # Make this a warning, not an error, as long as we haven't + # fixed this branch to have full coverage of test cases. + results.warning('Test case not executed: {}', key) + +def analyze_outcomes(outcomes): + """Run all analyses on the given outcome collection.""" + results = Results() + analyze_coverage(results, outcomes) + return results + +def read_outcome_file(outcome_file): + """Parse an outcome file and return an outcome collection. + +An outcome collection is a dictionary mapping keys to TestCaseOutcomes objects. +The keys are the test suite name and the test case description, separated +by a semicolon. +""" + outcomes = {} + with open(outcome_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as input_file: + for line in input_file: + (platform, config, suite, case, result, _cause) = line.split(';') + key = ';'.join([suite, case]) + setup = ';'.join([platform, config]) + if key not in outcomes: + outcomes[key] = TestCaseOutcomes() + if result == 'PASS': + outcomes[key].successes.append(setup) + elif result == 'FAIL': + outcomes[key].failures.append(setup) + return outcomes + +def analyze_outcome_file(outcome_file): + """Analyze the given outcome file.""" + outcomes = read_outcome_file(outcome_file) + return analyze_outcomes(outcomes) + +def main(): + try: + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument('outcomes', metavar='OUTCOMES.CSV', + help='Outcome file to analyze') + options = parser.parse_args() + results = analyze_outcome_file(options.outcomes) + if results.error_count > 0: + sys.exit(1) + except Exception: # pylint: disable=broad-except + # Print the backtrace and exit explicitly with our chosen status. + traceback.print_exc() + sys.exit(120) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..56fd5b98 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# basic-build-tests.sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# Executes the basic test suites, captures the results, and generates a simple +# test report and code coverage report. +# +# The tests include: +# * Unit tests - executed using tests/scripts/run-test-suite.pl +# * Self-tests - executed using the test suites above +# * System tests - executed using tests/ssl-opt.sh +# * Interoperability tests - executed using tests/compat.sh +# +# The tests focus on functionality and do not consider performance. +# +# Note the tests self-adapt due to configurations in include/mbedtls/config.h +# which can lead to some tests being skipped, and can cause the number of +# available tests to fluctuate. +# +# This script has been written to be generic and should work on any shell. +# +# Usage: basic-build-tests.sh +# + +# Abort on errors (and uninitiliased variables) +set -eu + +if [ -d library -a -d include -a -d tests ]; then :; else + echo "Must be run from mbed TLS root" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +: ${OPENSSL:="openssl"} +: ${OPENSSL_LEGACY:="$OPENSSL"} +: ${GNUTLS_CLI:="gnutls-cli"} +: ${GNUTLS_SERV:="gnutls-serv"} +: ${GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI:="$GNUTLS_CLI"} +: ${GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV:="$GNUTLS_SERV"} + +# Used to make ssl-opt.sh deterministic. +# +# See also RELEASE_SEED in all.sh. Debugging is easier if both values are kept +# in sync. If you change the value here because it breaks some tests, you'll +# definitely want to change it in all.sh as well. +: ${SEED:=1} +export SEED + +# if MAKEFLAGS is not set add the -j option to speed up invocations of make +if [ -z "${MAKEFLAGS+set}" ]; then + export MAKEFLAGS="-j" +fi + +# To avoid setting OpenSSL and GnuTLS for each call to compat.sh and ssl-opt.sh +# we just export the variables they require +export OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL" +export GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_CLI" +export GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_SERV" + +CONFIG_H='include/mbedtls/config.h' +CONFIG_BAK="$CONFIG_H.bak" + +# Step 0 - print build environment info +OPENSSL="$OPENSSL" \ + OPENSSL_LEGACY="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" \ + GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_CLI" \ + GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_SERV" \ + GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" \ + GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" \ + scripts/output_env.sh +echo + +# Step 1 - Make and instrumented build for code coverage +export CFLAGS=' --coverage -g3 -O0 ' +export LDFLAGS=' --coverage' +make clean +cp "$CONFIG_H" "$CONFIG_BAK" +scripts/config.py full +make + + +# Step 2 - Execute the tests +TEST_OUTPUT=out_${PPID} +cd tests +if [ ! -f "seedfile" ]; then + dd if=/dev/urandom of="seedfile" bs=64 count=1 +fi +echo + +# Step 2a - Unit Tests (keep going even if some tests fail) +echo '################ Unit tests ################' +perl scripts/run-test-suites.pl -v 2 |tee unit-test-$TEST_OUTPUT +echo '^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Unit tests ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^' +echo + +# Step 2b - System Tests (keep going even if some tests fail) +echo +echo '################ ssl-opt.sh ################' +echo "ssl-opt.sh will use SEED=$SEED for udp_proxy" +sh ssl-opt.sh |tee sys-test-$TEST_OUTPUT +echo '^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ssl-opt.sh ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^' +echo + +# Step 2c - Compatibility tests (keep going even if some tests fail) +echo '################ compat.sh ################' +{ + echo '#### compat.sh: Default versions' + sh compat.sh -m 'tls1 tls1_1 tls12 dtls1 dtls12' + echo + + echo '#### compat.sh: legacy (SSLv3)' + OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" sh compat.sh -m 'ssl3' + echo + + echo '#### compat.sh: legacy (null, DES, RC4)' + OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_LEGACY" \ + GNUTLS_CLI="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_CLI" GNUTLS_SERV="$GNUTLS_LEGACY_SERV" \ + sh compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'NULL\|DES\|RC4\|ARCFOUR' + echo + + echo '#### compat.sh: next (ARIA, ChaCha)' + OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_NEXT" sh compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA' + echo +} | tee compat-test-$TEST_OUTPUT +echo '^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ compat.sh ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^' +echo + +# Step 3 - Process the coverage report +cd .. +{ + make lcov + echo SUCCESS +} | tee tests/cov-$TEST_OUTPUT + +if [ "$(tail -n1 tests/cov-$TEST_OUTPUT)" != "SUCCESS" ]; then + echo >&2 "Fatal: 'make lcov' failed" + exit 2 +fi + + +# Step 4 - Summarise the test report +echo +echo "=========================================================================" +echo "Test Report Summary" +echo + +# A failure of the left-hand side of a pipe is ignored (this is a limitation +# of sh). We'll use the presence of this file as a marker that the generation +# of the report succeeded. +rm -f "tests/basic-build-test-$$.ok" + +{ + + cd tests + + # Step 4a - Unit tests + echo "Unit tests - tests/scripts/run-test-suites.pl" + + PASSED_TESTS=$(tail -n6 unit-test-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/test cases passed :[\t]*\([0-9]*\)/\1/p'| tr -d ' ') + SKIPPED_TESTS=$(tail -n6 unit-test-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/skipped :[ \t]*\([0-9]*\)/\1/p'| tr -d ' ') + TOTAL_SUITES=$(tail -n6 unit-test-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/.* (\([0-9]*\) .*, [0-9]* tests run)/\1/p'| tr -d ' ') + FAILED_TESTS=$(tail -n6 unit-test-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/failed :[\t]*\([0-9]*\)/\1/p' |tr -d ' ') + + echo "No test suites : $TOTAL_SUITES" + echo "Passed : $PASSED_TESTS" + echo "Failed : $FAILED_TESTS" + echo "Skipped : $SKIPPED_TESTS" + echo "Total exec'd tests : $(($PASSED_TESTS + $FAILED_TESTS))" + echo "Total avail tests : $(($PASSED_TESTS + $FAILED_TESTS + $SKIPPED_TESTS))" + echo + + TOTAL_PASS=$PASSED_TESTS + TOTAL_FAIL=$FAILED_TESTS + TOTAL_SKIP=$SKIPPED_TESTS + TOTAL_AVAIL=$(($PASSED_TESTS + $FAILED_TESTS + $SKIPPED_TESTS)) + TOTAL_EXED=$(($PASSED_TESTS + $FAILED_TESTS)) + + # Step 4b - TLS Options tests + echo "TLS Options tests - tests/ssl-opt.sh" + + PASSED_TESTS=$(tail -n5 sys-test-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/.* (\([0-9]*\) \/ [0-9]* tests ([0-9]* skipped))$/\1/p') + SKIPPED_TESTS=$(tail -n5 sys-test-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/.* ([0-9]* \/ [0-9]* tests (\([0-9]*\) skipped))$/\1/p') + TOTAL_TESTS=$(tail -n5 sys-test-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/.* ([0-9]* \/ \([0-9]*\) tests ([0-9]* skipped))$/\1/p') + FAILED_TESTS=$(($TOTAL_TESTS - $PASSED_TESTS)) + + echo "Passed : $PASSED_TESTS" + echo "Failed : $FAILED_TESTS" + echo "Skipped : $SKIPPED_TESTS" + echo "Total exec'd tests : $TOTAL_TESTS" + echo "Total avail tests : $(($TOTAL_TESTS + $SKIPPED_TESTS))" + echo + + TOTAL_PASS=$(($TOTAL_PASS+$PASSED_TESTS)) + TOTAL_FAIL=$(($TOTAL_FAIL+$FAILED_TESTS)) + TOTAL_SKIP=$(($TOTAL_SKIP+$SKIPPED_TESTS)) + TOTAL_AVAIL=$(($TOTAL_AVAIL + $TOTAL_TESTS + $SKIPPED_TESTS)) + TOTAL_EXED=$(($TOTAL_EXED + $TOTAL_TESTS)) + + + # Step 4c - System Compatibility tests + echo "System/Compatibility tests - tests/compat.sh" + + PASSED_TESTS=$(cat compat-test-$TEST_OUTPUT | sed -n -e 's/.* (\([0-9]*\) \/ [0-9]* tests ([0-9]* skipped))$/\1/p' | awk 'BEGIN{ s = 0 } { s += $1 } END{ print s }') + SKIPPED_TESTS=$(cat compat-test-$TEST_OUTPUT | sed -n -e 's/.* ([0-9]* \/ [0-9]* tests (\([0-9]*\) skipped))$/\1/p' | awk 'BEGIN{ s = 0 } { s += $1 } END{ print s }') + EXED_TESTS=$(cat compat-test-$TEST_OUTPUT | sed -n -e 's/.* ([0-9]* \/ \([0-9]*\) tests ([0-9]* skipped))$/\1/p' | awk 'BEGIN{ s = 0 } { s += $1 } END{ print s }') + FAILED_TESTS=$(($EXED_TESTS - $PASSED_TESTS)) + + echo "Passed : $PASSED_TESTS" + echo "Failed : $FAILED_TESTS" + echo "Skipped : $SKIPPED_TESTS" + echo "Total exec'd tests : $EXED_TESTS" + echo "Total avail tests : $(($EXED_TESTS + $SKIPPED_TESTS))" + echo + + TOTAL_PASS=$(($TOTAL_PASS+$PASSED_TESTS)) + TOTAL_FAIL=$(($TOTAL_FAIL+$FAILED_TESTS)) + TOTAL_SKIP=$(($TOTAL_SKIP+$SKIPPED_TESTS)) + TOTAL_AVAIL=$(($TOTAL_AVAIL + $EXED_TESTS + $SKIPPED_TESTS)) + TOTAL_EXED=$(($TOTAL_EXED + $EXED_TESTS)) + + + # Step 4d - Grand totals + echo "-------------------------------------------------------------------------" + echo "Total tests" + + echo "Total Passed : $TOTAL_PASS" + echo "Total Failed : $TOTAL_FAIL" + echo "Total Skipped : $TOTAL_SKIP" + echo "Total exec'd tests : $TOTAL_EXED" + echo "Total avail tests : $TOTAL_AVAIL" + echo + + + # Step 4e - Coverage + echo "Coverage" + + LINES_TESTED=$(tail -n4 cov-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/ lines......: [0-9]*.[0-9]% (\([0-9]*\) of [0-9]* lines)/\1/p') + LINES_TOTAL=$(tail -n4 cov-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/ lines......: [0-9]*.[0-9]% ([0-9]* of \([0-9]*\) lines)/\1/p') + FUNCS_TESTED=$(tail -n4 cov-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/ functions..: [0-9]*.[0-9]% (\([0-9]*\) of [0-9]* functions)$/\1/p') + FUNCS_TOTAL=$(tail -n4 cov-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/ functions..: [0-9]*.[0-9]% ([0-9]* of \([0-9]*\) functions)$/\1/p') + BRANCHES_TESTED=$(tail -n4 cov-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/ branches...: [0-9]*.[0-9]% (\([0-9]*\) of [0-9]* branches)$/\1/p') + BRANCHES_TOTAL=$(tail -n4 cov-$TEST_OUTPUT|sed -n -e 's/ branches...: [0-9]*.[0-9]% ([0-9]* of \([0-9]*\) branches)$/\1/p') + + LINES_PERCENT=$((1000*$LINES_TESTED/$LINES_TOTAL)) + LINES_PERCENT="$(($LINES_PERCENT/10)).$(($LINES_PERCENT-($LINES_PERCENT/10)*10))" + + FUNCS_PERCENT=$((1000*$FUNCS_TESTED/$FUNCS_TOTAL)) + FUNCS_PERCENT="$(($FUNCS_PERCENT/10)).$(($FUNCS_PERCENT-($FUNCS_PERCENT/10)*10))" + + BRANCHES_PERCENT=$((1000*$BRANCHES_TESTED/$BRANCHES_TOTAL)) + BRANCHES_PERCENT="$(($BRANCHES_PERCENT/10)).$(($BRANCHES_PERCENT-($BRANCHES_PERCENT/10)*10))" + + rm unit-test-$TEST_OUTPUT + rm sys-test-$TEST_OUTPUT + rm compat-test-$TEST_OUTPUT + rm cov-$TEST_OUTPUT + + echo "Lines Tested : $LINES_TESTED of $LINES_TOTAL $LINES_PERCENT%" + echo "Functions Tested : $FUNCS_TESTED of $FUNCS_TOTAL $FUNCS_PERCENT%" + echo "Branches Tested : $BRANCHES_TESTED of $BRANCHES_TOTAL $BRANCHES_PERCENT%" + echo + + # Mark the report generation as having succeeded. This must be the + # last thing in the report generation. + touch "basic-build-test-$$.ok" +} | tee coverage-summary.txt + +make clean + +if [ -f "$CONFIG_BAK" ]; then + mv "$CONFIG_BAK" "$CONFIG_H" +fi + +# The file must exist, otherwise it means something went wrong while generating +# the coverage report. If something did go wrong, rm will complain so this +# script will exit with a failure status. +rm "tests/basic-build-test-$$.ok" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/basic-in-docker.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/basic-in-docker.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..50bcb05b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/basic-in-docker.sh @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +#!/bin/bash -eu + +# basic-in-docker.sh +# +# Purpose +# ------- +# This runs sanity checks and library tests in a Docker container. The tests +# are run for both clang and gcc. The testing includes a full test run +# in the default configuration, partial test runs in the reference +# configurations, and some dependency tests. +# +# Notes for users +# --------------- +# See docker_env.sh for prerequisites and other information. + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +source tests/scripts/docker_env.sh + +run_in_docker tests/scripts/all.sh 'check_*' + +for compiler in clang gcc; do + run_in_docker -e CC=${compiler} cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String="Check" . + run_in_docker -e CC=${compiler} make + run_in_docker -e CC=${compiler} make test + run_in_docker programs/test/selftest + run_in_docker -e OSSL_NO_DTLS=1 tests/compat.sh + run_in_docker tests/ssl-opt.sh -e '\(DTLS\|SCSV\).*openssl' + run_in_docker tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl + run_in_docker tests/scripts/curves.pl + run_in_docker tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl +done diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check-doxy-blocks.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check-doxy-blocks.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..3ed7069c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check-doxy-blocks.pl @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# Detect comment blocks that are likely meant to be doxygen blocks but aren't. +# +# More precisely, look for normal comment block containing '\'. +# Of course one could use doxygen warnings, eg with: +# sed -e '/EXTRACT/s/YES/NO/' doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile | doxygen - +# but that would warn about any undocumented item, while our goal is to find +# items that are documented, but not marked as such by mistake. +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use warnings; +use strict; +use File::Basename; + +# C/header files in the following directories will be checked +my @directories = qw(include/mbedtls library doxygen/input); + +# very naive pattern to find directives: +# everything with a backslach except '\0' and backslash at EOL +my $doxy_re = qr/\\(?!0|\n)/; + +# Return an error code to the environment if a potential error in the +# source code is found. +my $exit_code = 0; + +sub check_file { + my ($fname) = @_; + open my $fh, '<', $fname or die "Failed to open '$fname': $!\n"; + + # first line of the last normal comment block, + # or 0 if not in a normal comment block + my $block_start = 0; + while (my $line = <$fh>) { + $block_start = $. if $line =~ m/\/\*(?![*!])/; + $block_start = 0 if $line =~ m/\*\//; + if ($block_start and $line =~ m/$doxy_re/) { + print "$fname:$block_start: directive on line $.\n"; + $block_start = 0; # report only one directive per block + $exit_code = 1; + } + } + + close $fh; +} + +sub check_dir { + my ($dirname) = @_; + for my $file (<$dirname/*.[ch]>) { + check_file($file); + } +} + +# Check that the script is being run from the project's root directory. +for my $dir (@directories) { + if (! -d $dir) { + die "This script must be run from the mbed TLS root directory"; + } else { + check_dir($dir) + } +} + +exit $exit_code; + +__END__ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..75730ba2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env sh + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# Check if generated files are up-to-date. + +set -eu + +if [ $# -ne 0 ] && [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then + cat <&2 + exit 1 +fi + +UPDATE= +if [ $# -ne 0 ] && [ "$1" = "-u" ]; then + shift + UPDATE='y' +fi + +# check SCRIPT FILENAME[...] +# check SCRIPT DIRECTORY +# Run SCRIPT and check that it does not modify any of the specified files. +# In the first form, there can be any number of FILENAMEs, which must be +# regular files. +# In the second form, there must be a single DIRECTORY, standing for the +# list of files in the directory. Running SCRIPT must not modify any file +# in the directory and must not add or remove files either. +# If $UPDATE is empty, abort with an error status if a file is modified. +check() +{ + SCRIPT=$1 + shift + + directory= + if [ -d "$1" ]; then + directory="$1" + set -- "$1"/* + fi + + for FILE in "$@"; do + cp -p "$FILE" "$FILE.bak" + done + + "$SCRIPT" + + # Compare the script output to the old files and remove backups + for FILE in "$@"; do + if diff "$FILE" "$FILE.bak" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # Move the original file back so that $FILE's timestamp doesn't + # change (avoids spurious rebuilds with make). + mv "$FILE.bak" "$FILE" + else + echo "'$FILE' was either modified or deleted by '$SCRIPT'" + if [ -z "$UPDATE" ]; then + exit 1 + else + rm "$FILE.bak" + fi + fi + done + + if [ -n "$directory" ]; then + old_list="$*" + set -- "$directory"/* + new_list="$*" + # Check if there are any new files + if [ "$old_list" != "$new_list" ]; then + echo "Files were deleted or created by '$SCRIPT'" + echo "Before: $old_list" + echo "After: $new_list" + if [ -z "$UPDATE" ]; then + exit 1 + fi + fi + fi +} + +check scripts/generate_errors.pl library/error.c +check scripts/generate_query_config.pl programs/test/query_config.c +check scripts/generate_features.pl library/version_features.c +check scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl visualc/VS2010 +check scripts/generate_psa_constants.py programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c +check tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py $(tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py --list) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check-python-files.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check-python-files.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..dbf03653 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check-python-files.sh @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env sh + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +# Purpose: check Python files for potential programming errors or maintenance +# hurdles. Run pylint to detect some potential mistakes and enforce PEP8 +# coding standards. Run mypy to perform static type checking. + +# We'll keep going on errors and report the status at the end. +ret=0 + +if type python3 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + PYTHON=python3 +else + PYTHON=python +fi + +check_version () { + $PYTHON - "$2" <&2 "pylint reported errors" + ret=1 +} + +echo +echo 'Running mypy ...' +$PYTHON -m mypy scripts/*.py tests/scripts/*.py || + ret=1 + +exit $ret diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check_files.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check_files.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..a0f5e1f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check_files.py @@ -0,0 +1,410 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +""" +This script checks the current state of the source code for minor issues, +including incorrect file permissions, presence of tabs, non-Unix line endings, +trailing whitespace, and presence of UTF-8 BOM. +Note: requires python 3, must be run from Mbed TLS root. +""" + +import os +import argparse +import logging +import codecs +import re +import subprocess +import sys +try: + from typing import FrozenSet, Optional, Pattern # pylint: disable=unused-import +except ImportError: + pass + + +class FileIssueTracker: + """Base class for file-wide issue tracking. + + To implement a checker that processes a file as a whole, inherit from + this class and implement `check_file_for_issue` and define ``heading``. + + ``suffix_exemptions``: files whose name ends with a string in this set + will not be checked. + + ``path_exemptions``: files whose path (relative to the root of the source + tree) matches this regular expression will not be checked. This can be + ``None`` to match no path. Paths are normalized and converted to ``/`` + separators before matching. + + ``heading``: human-readable description of the issue + """ + + suffix_exemptions = frozenset() #type: FrozenSet[str] + path_exemptions = None #type: Optional[Pattern[str]] + # heading must be defined in derived classes. + # pylint: disable=no-member + + def __init__(self): + self.files_with_issues = {} + + @staticmethod + def normalize_path(filepath): + """Normalize ``filepath`` with / as the directory separator.""" + filepath = os.path.normpath(filepath) + # On Windows, we may have backslashes to separate directories. + # We need slashes to match exemption lists. + seps = os.path.sep + if os.path.altsep is not None: + seps += os.path.altsep + return '/'.join(filepath.split(seps)) + + def should_check_file(self, filepath): + """Whether the given file name should be checked. + + Files whose name ends with a string listed in ``self.suffix_exemptions`` + or whose path matches ``self.path_exemptions`` will not be checked. + """ + for files_exemption in self.suffix_exemptions: + if filepath.endswith(files_exemption): + return False + if self.path_exemptions and \ + re.match(self.path_exemptions, self.normalize_path(filepath)): + return False + return True + + def check_file_for_issue(self, filepath): + """Check the specified file for the issue that this class is for. + + Subclasses must implement this method. + """ + raise NotImplementedError + + def record_issue(self, filepath, line_number): + """Record that an issue was found at the specified location.""" + if filepath not in self.files_with_issues.keys(): + self.files_with_issues[filepath] = [] + self.files_with_issues[filepath].append(line_number) + + def output_file_issues(self, logger): + """Log all the locations where the issue was found.""" + if self.files_with_issues.values(): + logger.info(self.heading) + for filename, lines in sorted(self.files_with_issues.items()): + if lines: + logger.info("{}: {}".format( + filename, ", ".join(str(x) for x in lines) + )) + else: + logger.info(filename) + logger.info("") + +BINARY_FILE_PATH_RE_LIST = [ + r'docs/.*\.pdf\Z', + r'programs/fuzz/corpuses/[^.]+\Z', + r'tests/data_files/[^.]+\Z', + r'tests/data_files/.*\.(crt|csr|db|der|key|pubkey)\Z', + r'tests/data_files/.*\.req\.[^/]+\Z', + r'tests/data_files/.*malformed[^/]+\Z', + r'tests/data_files/format_pkcs12\.fmt\Z', +] +BINARY_FILE_PATH_RE = re.compile('|'.join(BINARY_FILE_PATH_RE_LIST)) + +class LineIssueTracker(FileIssueTracker): + """Base class for line-by-line issue tracking. + + To implement a checker that processes files line by line, inherit from + this class and implement `line_with_issue`. + """ + + # Exclude binary files. + path_exemptions = BINARY_FILE_PATH_RE + + def issue_with_line(self, line, filepath): + """Check the specified line for the issue that this class is for. + + Subclasses must implement this method. + """ + raise NotImplementedError + + def check_file_line(self, filepath, line, line_number): + if self.issue_with_line(line, filepath): + self.record_issue(filepath, line_number) + + def check_file_for_issue(self, filepath): + """Check the lines of the specified file. + + Subclasses must implement the ``issue_with_line`` method. + """ + with open(filepath, "rb") as f: + for i, line in enumerate(iter(f.readline, b"")): + self.check_file_line(filepath, line, i + 1) + + +def is_windows_file(filepath): + _root, ext = os.path.splitext(filepath) + return ext in ('.bat', '.dsp', '.dsw', '.sln', '.vcxproj') + + +class PermissionIssueTracker(FileIssueTracker): + """Track files with bad permissions. + + Files that are not executable scripts must not be executable.""" + + heading = "Incorrect permissions:" + + # .py files can be either full scripts or modules, so they may or may + # not be executable. + suffix_exemptions = frozenset({".py"}) + + def check_file_for_issue(self, filepath): + is_executable = os.access(filepath, os.X_OK) + should_be_executable = filepath.endswith((".sh", ".pl")) + if is_executable != should_be_executable: + self.files_with_issues[filepath] = None + + +class ShebangIssueTracker(FileIssueTracker): + """Track files with a bad, missing or extraneous shebang line. + + Executable scripts must start with a valid shebang (#!) line. + """ + + heading = "Invalid shebang line:" + + # Allow either /bin/sh, /bin/bash, or /usr/bin/env. + # Allow at most one argument (this is a Linux limitation). + # For sh and bash, the argument if present must be options. + # For env, the argument must be the base name of the interpreter. + _shebang_re = re.compile(rb'^#! ?(?:/bin/(bash|sh)(?: -[^\n ]*)?' + rb'|/usr/bin/env ([^\n /]+))$') + _extensions = { + b'bash': 'sh', + b'perl': 'pl', + b'python3': 'py', + b'sh': 'sh', + } + + def is_valid_shebang(self, first_line, filepath): + m = re.match(self._shebang_re, first_line) + if not m: + return False + interpreter = m.group(1) or m.group(2) + if interpreter not in self._extensions: + return False + if not filepath.endswith('.' + self._extensions[interpreter]): + return False + return True + + def check_file_for_issue(self, filepath): + is_executable = os.access(filepath, os.X_OK) + with open(filepath, "rb") as f: + first_line = f.readline() + if first_line.startswith(b'#!'): + if not is_executable: + # Shebang on a non-executable file + self.files_with_issues[filepath] = None + elif not self.is_valid_shebang(first_line, filepath): + self.files_with_issues[filepath] = [1] + elif is_executable: + # Executable without a shebang + self.files_with_issues[filepath] = None + + +class EndOfFileNewlineIssueTracker(FileIssueTracker): + """Track files that end with an incomplete line + (no newline character at the end of the last line).""" + + heading = "Missing newline at end of file:" + + path_exemptions = BINARY_FILE_PATH_RE + + def check_file_for_issue(self, filepath): + with open(filepath, "rb") as f: + try: + f.seek(-1, 2) + except OSError: + # This script only works on regular files. If we can't seek + # 1 before the end, it means that this position is before + # the beginning of the file, i.e. that the file is empty. + return + if f.read(1) != b"\n": + self.files_with_issues[filepath] = None + + +class Utf8BomIssueTracker(FileIssueTracker): + """Track files that start with a UTF-8 BOM. + Files should be ASCII or UTF-8. Valid UTF-8 does not start with a BOM.""" + + heading = "UTF-8 BOM present:" + + suffix_exemptions = frozenset([".vcxproj", ".sln"]) + path_exemptions = BINARY_FILE_PATH_RE + + def check_file_for_issue(self, filepath): + with open(filepath, "rb") as f: + if f.read().startswith(codecs.BOM_UTF8): + self.files_with_issues[filepath] = None + + +class UnixLineEndingIssueTracker(LineIssueTracker): + """Track files with non-Unix line endings (i.e. files with CR).""" + + heading = "Non-Unix line endings:" + + def should_check_file(self, filepath): + if not super().should_check_file(filepath): + return False + return not is_windows_file(filepath) + + def issue_with_line(self, line, _filepath): + return b"\r" in line + + +class WindowsLineEndingIssueTracker(LineIssueTracker): + """Track files with non-Windows line endings (i.e. CR or LF not in CRLF).""" + + heading = "Non-Windows line endings:" + + def should_check_file(self, filepath): + if not super().should_check_file(filepath): + return False + return is_windows_file(filepath) + + def issue_with_line(self, line, _filepath): + return not line.endswith(b"\r\n") or b"\r" in line[:-2] + + +class TrailingWhitespaceIssueTracker(LineIssueTracker): + """Track lines with trailing whitespace.""" + + heading = "Trailing whitespace:" + suffix_exemptions = frozenset([".dsp", ".md"]) + + def issue_with_line(self, line, _filepath): + return line.rstrip(b"\r\n") != line.rstrip() + + +class TabIssueTracker(LineIssueTracker): + """Track lines with tabs.""" + + heading = "Tabs present:" + suffix_exemptions = frozenset([ + ".pem", # some openssl dumps have tabs + ".sln", + "/Makefile", + "/Makefile.inc", + "/generate_visualc_files.pl", + ]) + + def issue_with_line(self, line, _filepath): + return b"\t" in line + + +class MergeArtifactIssueTracker(LineIssueTracker): + """Track lines with merge artifacts. + These are leftovers from a ``git merge`` that wasn't fully edited.""" + + heading = "Merge artifact:" + + def issue_with_line(self, line, _filepath): + # Detect leftover git conflict markers. + if line.startswith(b'<<<<<<< ') or line.startswith(b'>>>>>>> '): + return True + if line.startswith(b'||||||| '): # from merge.conflictStyle=diff3 + return True + if line.rstrip(b'\r\n') == b'=======' and \ + not _filepath.endswith('.md'): + return True + return False + + +class IntegrityChecker: + """Sanity-check files under the current directory.""" + + def __init__(self, log_file): + """Instantiate the sanity checker. + Check files under the current directory. + Write a report of issues to log_file.""" + self.check_repo_path() + self.logger = None + self.setup_logger(log_file) + self.issues_to_check = [ + PermissionIssueTracker(), + ShebangIssueTracker(), + EndOfFileNewlineIssueTracker(), + Utf8BomIssueTracker(), + UnixLineEndingIssueTracker(), + WindowsLineEndingIssueTracker(), + TrailingWhitespaceIssueTracker(), + TabIssueTracker(), + MergeArtifactIssueTracker(), + ] + + @staticmethod + def check_repo_path(): + if not all(os.path.isdir(d) for d in ["include", "library", "tests"]): + raise Exception("Must be run from Mbed TLS root") + + def setup_logger(self, log_file, level=logging.INFO): + self.logger = logging.getLogger() + self.logger.setLevel(level) + if log_file: + handler = logging.FileHandler(log_file) + self.logger.addHandler(handler) + else: + console = logging.StreamHandler() + self.logger.addHandler(console) + + @staticmethod + def collect_files(): + bytes_output = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'ls-files', '-z']) + bytes_filepaths = bytes_output.split(b'\0')[:-1] + ascii_filepaths = map(lambda fp: fp.decode('ascii'), bytes_filepaths) + # Prepend './' to files in the top-level directory so that + # something like `'/Makefile' in fp` matches in the top-level + # directory as well as in subdirectories. + return [fp if os.path.dirname(fp) else os.path.join(os.curdir, fp) + for fp in ascii_filepaths] + + def check_files(self): + for issue_to_check in self.issues_to_check: + for filepath in self.collect_files(): + if issue_to_check.should_check_file(filepath): + issue_to_check.check_file_for_issue(filepath) + + def output_issues(self): + integrity_return_code = 0 + for issue_to_check in self.issues_to_check: + if issue_to_check.files_with_issues: + integrity_return_code = 1 + issue_to_check.output_file_issues(self.logger) + return integrity_return_code + + +def run_main(): + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument( + "-l", "--log_file", type=str, help="path to optional output log", + ) + check_args = parser.parse_args() + integrity_check = IntegrityChecker(check_args.log_file) + integrity_check.check_files() + return_code = integrity_check.output_issues() + sys.exit(return_code) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + run_main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check_names.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check_names.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..875d0b0f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check_names.py @@ -0,0 +1,910 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +""" +This script confirms that the naming of all symbols and identifiers in Mbed TLS +are consistent with the house style and are also self-consistent. It only runs +on Linux and macOS since it depends on nm. + +It contains two major Python classes, CodeParser and NameChecker. They both have +a comprehensive "run-all" function (comprehensive_parse() and perform_checks()) +but the individual functions can also be used for specific needs. + +CodeParser makes heavy use of regular expressions to parse the code, and is +dependent on the current code formatting. Many Python C parser libraries require +preprocessed C code, which means no macro parsing. Compiler tools are also not +very helpful when we want the exact location in the original source (which +becomes impossible when e.g. comments are stripped). + +NameChecker performs the following checks: + +- All exported and available symbols in the library object files, are explicitly + declared in the header files. This uses the nm command. +- All macros, constants, and identifiers (function names, struct names, etc) + follow the required regex pattern. +- Typo checking: All words that begin with MBED exist as macros or constants. + +The script returns 0 on success, 1 on test failure, and 2 if there is a script +error. It must be run from Mbed TLS root. +""" + +import abc +import argparse +import fnmatch +import glob +import textwrap +import os +import sys +import traceback +import re +import enum +import shutil +import subprocess +import logging + +# Naming patterns to check against. These are defined outside the NameCheck +# class for ease of modification. +MACRO_PATTERN = r"^(MBEDTLS|PSA)_[0-9A-Z_]*[0-9A-Z]$" +CONSTANTS_PATTERN = MACRO_PATTERN +IDENTIFIER_PATTERN = r"^(mbedtls|psa)_[0-9a-z_]*[0-9a-z]$" + +class Match(): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods + """ + A class representing a match, together with its found position. + + Fields: + * filename: the file that the match was in. + * line: the full line containing the match. + * line_no: the line number. + * pos: a tuple of (start, end) positions on the line where the match is. + * name: the match itself. + """ + def __init__(self, filename, line, line_no, pos, name): + # pylint: disable=too-many-arguments + self.filename = filename + self.line = line + self.line_no = line_no + self.pos = pos + self.name = name + + def __str__(self): + """ + Return a formatted code listing representation of the erroneous line. + """ + gutter = format(self.line_no, "4d") + underline = self.pos[0] * " " + (self.pos[1] - self.pos[0]) * "^" + + return ( + " {0} |\n".format(" " * len(gutter)) + + " {0} | {1}".format(gutter, self.line) + + " {0} | {1}\n".format(" " * len(gutter), underline) + ) + +class Problem(abc.ABC): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods + """ + An abstract parent class representing a form of static analysis error. + It extends an Abstract Base Class, which means it is not instantiable, and + it also mandates certain abstract methods to be implemented in subclasses. + """ + # Class variable to control the quietness of all problems + quiet = False + def __init__(self): + self.textwrapper = textwrap.TextWrapper() + self.textwrapper.width = 80 + self.textwrapper.initial_indent = " > " + self.textwrapper.subsequent_indent = " " + + def __str__(self): + """ + Unified string representation method for all Problems. + """ + if self.__class__.quiet: + return self.quiet_output() + return self.verbose_output() + + @abc.abstractmethod + def quiet_output(self): + """ + The output when --quiet is enabled. + """ + pass + + @abc.abstractmethod + def verbose_output(self): + """ + The default output with explanation and code snippet if appropriate. + """ + pass + +class SymbolNotInHeader(Problem): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods + """ + A problem that occurs when an exported/available symbol in the object file + is not explicitly declared in header files. Created with + NameCheck.check_symbols_declared_in_header() + + Fields: + * symbol_name: the name of the symbol. + """ + def __init__(self, symbol_name): + self.symbol_name = symbol_name + Problem.__init__(self) + + def quiet_output(self): + return "{0}".format(self.symbol_name) + + def verbose_output(self): + return self.textwrapper.fill( + "'{0}' was found as an available symbol in the output of nm, " + "however it was not declared in any header files." + .format(self.symbol_name)) + +class PatternMismatch(Problem): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods + """ + A problem that occurs when something doesn't match the expected pattern. + Created with NameCheck.check_match_pattern() + + Fields: + * pattern: the expected regex pattern + * match: the Match object in question + """ + def __init__(self, pattern, match): + self.pattern = pattern + self.match = match + Problem.__init__(self) + + + def quiet_output(self): + return ( + "{0}:{1}:{2}" + .format(self.match.filename, self.match.line_no, self.match.name) + ) + + def verbose_output(self): + return self.textwrapper.fill( + "{0}:{1}: '{2}' does not match the required pattern '{3}'." + .format( + self.match.filename, + self.match.line_no, + self.match.name, + self.pattern + ) + ) + "\n" + str(self.match) + +class Typo(Problem): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods + """ + A problem that occurs when a word using MBED doesn't appear to be defined as + constants nor enum values. Created with NameCheck.check_for_typos() + + Fields: + * match: the Match object of the MBED name in question. + """ + def __init__(self, match): + self.match = match + Problem.__init__(self) + + def quiet_output(self): + return ( + "{0}:{1}:{2}" + .format(self.match.filename, self.match.line_no, self.match.name) + ) + + def verbose_output(self): + return self.textwrapper.fill( + "{0}:{1}: '{2}' looks like a typo. It was not found in any " + "macros or any enums. If this is not a typo, put " + "//no-check-names after it." + .format(self.match.filename, self.match.line_no, self.match.name) + ) + "\n" + str(self.match) + +class CodeParser(): + """ + Class for retrieving files and parsing the code. This can be used + independently of the checks that NameChecker performs, for example for + list_internal_identifiers.py. + """ + def __init__(self, log): + self.log = log + self.check_repo_path() + + # Memo for storing "glob expression": set(filepaths) + self.files = {} + + # Globally excluded filenames. + # Note that "*" can match directory separators in exclude lists. + self.excluded_files = ["*/bn_mul", "*/compat-1.3.h"] + + @staticmethod + def check_repo_path(): + """ + Check that the current working directory is the project root, and throw + an exception if not. + """ + if not all(os.path.isdir(d) for d in ["include", "library", "tests"]): + raise Exception("This script must be run from Mbed TLS root") + + def comprehensive_parse(self): + """ + Comprehensive ("default") function to call each parsing function and + retrieve various elements of the code, together with the source location. + + Returns a dict of parsed item key to the corresponding List of Matches. + """ + self.log.info("Parsing source code...") + self.log.debug( + "The following files are excluded from the search: {}" + .format(str(self.excluded_files)) + ) + + all_macros = self.parse_macros([ + "include/mbedtls/*.h", + "include/psa/*.h", + "library/*.h", + "tests/include/test/drivers/*.h", + "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h", + "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h" + ]) + enum_consts = self.parse_enum_consts([ + "include/mbedtls/*.h", + "library/*.h", + "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h", + "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h" + ]) + identifiers = self.parse_identifiers([ + "include/mbedtls/*.h", + "include/psa/*.h", + "library/*.h", + "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h", + "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h" + ]) + mbed_words = self.parse_mbed_words([ + "include/mbedtls/*.h", + "include/psa/*.h", + "library/*.h", + "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h", + "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h", + "library/*.c", + "3rdparty/everest/library/everest.c", + "3rdparty/everest/library/x25519.c" + ]) + symbols = self.parse_symbols() + + # Remove identifier macros like mbedtls_printf or mbedtls_calloc + identifiers_justname = [x.name for x in identifiers] + actual_macros = [] + for macro in all_macros: + if macro.name not in identifiers_justname: + actual_macros.append(macro) + + self.log.debug("Found:") + # Aligns the counts on the assumption that none exceeds 4 digits + self.log.debug(" {:4} Total Macros".format(len(all_macros))) + self.log.debug(" {:4} Non-identifier Macros".format(len(actual_macros))) + self.log.debug(" {:4} Enum Constants".format(len(enum_consts))) + self.log.debug(" {:4} Identifiers".format(len(identifiers))) + self.log.debug(" {:4} Exported Symbols".format(len(symbols))) + return { + "macros": actual_macros, + "enum_consts": enum_consts, + "identifiers": identifiers, + "symbols": symbols, + "mbed_words": mbed_words + } + + def is_file_excluded(self, path, exclude_wildcards): + """Whether the given file path is excluded.""" + # exclude_wildcards may be None. Also, consider the global exclusions. + exclude_wildcards = (exclude_wildcards or []) + self.excluded_files + for pattern in exclude_wildcards: + if fnmatch.fnmatch(path, pattern): + return True + return False + + def get_files(self, include_wildcards, exclude_wildcards): + """ + Get all files that match any of the UNIX-style wildcards. While the + check_names script is designed only for use on UNIX/macOS (due to nm), + this function alone would work fine on Windows even with forward slashes + in the wildcard. + + Args: + * include_wildcards: a List of shell-style wildcards to match filepaths. + * exclude_wildcards: a List of shell-style wildcards to exclude. + + Returns a List of relative filepaths. + """ + accumulator = set() + + for include_wildcard in include_wildcards: + accumulator = accumulator.union(glob.iglob(include_wildcard)) + + return list(path for path in accumulator + if not self.is_file_excluded(path, exclude_wildcards)) + + def parse_macros(self, include, exclude=None): + """ + Parse all macros defined by #define preprocessor directives. + + Args: + * include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through. + * exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files. + + Returns a List of Match objects for the found macros. + """ + macro_regex = re.compile(r"# *define +(?P\w+)") + exclusions = ( + "asm", "inline", "EMIT", "_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE", "MULADDC_" + ) + + files = self.get_files(include, exclude) + self.log.debug("Looking for macros in {} files".format(len(files))) + + macros = [] + for header_file in files: + with open(header_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as header: + for line_no, line in enumerate(header): + for macro in macro_regex.finditer(line): + if macro.group("macro").startswith(exclusions): + continue + + macros.append(Match( + header_file, + line, + line_no, + macro.span("macro"), + macro.group("macro"))) + + return macros + + def parse_mbed_words(self, include, exclude=None): + """ + Parse all words in the file that begin with MBED, in and out of macros, + comments, anything. + + Args: + * include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through. + * exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files. + + Returns a List of Match objects for words beginning with MBED. + """ + # Typos of TLS are common, hence the broader check below than MBEDTLS. + mbed_regex = re.compile(r"\bMBED.+?_[A-Z0-9_]*") + exclusions = re.compile(r"// *no-check-names|#error") + + files = self.get_files(include, exclude) + self.log.debug("Looking for MBED words in {} files".format(len(files))) + + mbed_words = [] + for filename in files: + with open(filename, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fp: + for line_no, line in enumerate(fp): + if exclusions.search(line): + continue + + for name in mbed_regex.finditer(line): + mbed_words.append(Match( + filename, + line, + line_no, + name.span(0), + name.group(0))) + + return mbed_words + + def parse_enum_consts(self, include, exclude=None): + """ + Parse all enum value constants that are declared. + + Args: + * include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through. + * exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files. + + Returns a List of Match objects for the findings. + """ + files = self.get_files(include, exclude) + self.log.debug("Looking for enum consts in {} files".format(len(files))) + + # Emulate a finite state machine to parse enum declarations. + # OUTSIDE_KEYWORD = outside the enum keyword + # IN_BRACES = inside enum opening braces + # IN_BETWEEN = between enum keyword and opening braces + states = enum.Enum("FSM", ["OUTSIDE_KEYWORD", "IN_BRACES", "IN_BETWEEN"]) + enum_consts = [] + for header_file in files: + state = states.OUTSIDE_KEYWORD + with open(header_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as header: + for line_no, line in enumerate(header): + # Match typedefs and brackets only when they are at the + # beginning of the line -- if they are indented, they might + # be sub-structures within structs, etc. + if (state == states.OUTSIDE_KEYWORD and + re.search(r"^(typedef +)?enum +{", line)): + state = states.IN_BRACES + elif (state == states.OUTSIDE_KEYWORD and + re.search(r"^(typedef +)?enum", line)): + state = states.IN_BETWEEN + elif (state == states.IN_BETWEEN and + re.search(r"^{", line)): + state = states.IN_BRACES + elif (state == states.IN_BRACES and + re.search(r"^}", line)): + state = states.OUTSIDE_KEYWORD + elif (state == states.IN_BRACES and + not re.search(r"^ *#", line)): + enum_const = re.search(r"^ *(?P\w+)", line) + if not enum_const: + continue + + enum_consts.append(Match( + header_file, + line, + line_no, + enum_const.span("enum_const"), + enum_const.group("enum_const"))) + + return enum_consts + + IGNORED_CHUNK_REGEX = re.compile('|'.join([ + r'/\*.*?\*/', # block comment entirely on one line + r'//.*', # line comment + r'(?P")(?:[^\\\"]|\\.)*"', # string literal + ])) + + def strip_comments_and_literals(self, line, in_block_comment): + """Strip comments and string literals from line. + + Continuation lines are not supported. + + If in_block_comment is true, assume that the line starts inside a + block comment. + + Return updated values of (line, in_block_comment) where: + * Comments in line have been replaced by a space (or nothing at the + start or end of the line). + * String contents have been removed. + * in_block_comment indicates whether the line ends inside a block + comment that continues on the next line. + """ + + # Terminate current multiline comment? + if in_block_comment: + m = re.search(r"\*/", line) + if m: + in_block_comment = False + line = line[m.end(0):] + else: + return '', True + + # Remove full comments and string literals. + # Do it all together to handle cases like "/*" correctly. + # Note that continuation lines are not supported. + line = re.sub(self.IGNORED_CHUNK_REGEX, + lambda s: '""' if s.group('string') else ' ', + line) + + # Start an unfinished comment? + # (If `/*` was part of a complete comment, it's already been removed.) + m = re.search(r"/\*", line) + if m: + in_block_comment = True + line = line[:m.start(0)] + + return line, in_block_comment + + IDENTIFIER_REGEX = re.compile('|'.join([ + # Match " something(a" or " *something(a". Functions. + # Assumptions: + # - function definition from return type to one of its arguments is + # all on one line + # - function definition line only contains alphanumeric, asterisk, + # underscore, and open bracket + r".* \**(\w+) *\( *\w", + # Match "(*something)(". + r".*\( *\* *(\w+) *\) *\(", + # Match names of named data structures. + r"(?:typedef +)?(?:struct|union|enum) +(\w+)(?: *{)?$", + # Match names of typedef instances, after closing bracket. + r"}? *(\w+)[;[].*", + ])) + # The regex below is indented for clarity. + EXCLUSION_LINES = re.compile("|".join([ + r"extern +\"C\"", + r"(typedef +)?(struct|union|enum)( *{)?$", + r"} *;?$", + r"$", + r"//", + r"#", + ])) + + def parse_identifiers_in_file(self, header_file, identifiers): + """ + Parse all lines of a header where a function/enum/struct/union/typedef + identifier is declared, based on some regex and heuristics. Highly + dependent on formatting style. + + Append found matches to the list ``identifiers``. + """ + + with open(header_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as header: + in_block_comment = False + # The previous line variable is used for concatenating lines + # when identifiers are formatted and spread across multiple + # lines. + previous_line = "" + + for line_no, line in enumerate(header): + line, in_block_comment = \ + self.strip_comments_and_literals(line, in_block_comment) + + if self.EXCLUSION_LINES.match(line): + previous_line = "" + continue + + # If the line contains only space-separated alphanumeric + # characters (or underscore, asterisk, or open parenthesis), + # and nothing else, high chance it's a declaration that + # continues on the next line + if re.search(r"^([\w\*\(]+\s+)+$", line): + previous_line += line + continue + + # If previous line seemed to start an unfinished declaration + # (as above), concat and treat them as one. + if previous_line: + line = previous_line.strip() + " " + line.strip() + "\n" + previous_line = "" + + # Skip parsing if line has a space in front = heuristic to + # skip function argument lines (highly subject to formatting + # changes) + if line[0] == " ": + continue + + identifier = self.IDENTIFIER_REGEX.search(line) + + if not identifier: + continue + + # Find the group that matched, and append it + for group in identifier.groups(): + if not group: + continue + + identifiers.append(Match( + header_file, + line, + line_no, + identifier.span(), + group)) + + def parse_identifiers(self, include, exclude=None): + """ + Parse all lines of a header where a function/enum/struct/union/typedef + identifier is declared, based on some regex and heuristics. Highly + dependent on formatting style. + + Args: + * include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through. + * exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files. + + Returns a List of Match objects with identifiers. + """ + + files = self.get_files(include, exclude) + self.log.debug("Looking for identifiers in {} files".format(len(files))) + + identifiers = [] + for header_file in files: + self.parse_identifiers_in_file(header_file, identifiers) + + return identifiers + + def parse_symbols(self): + """ + Compile the Mbed TLS libraries, and parse the TLS, Crypto, and x509 + object files using nm to retrieve the list of referenced symbols. + Exceptions thrown here are rethrown because they would be critical + errors that void several tests, and thus needs to halt the program. This + is explicitly done for clarity. + + Returns a List of unique symbols defined and used in the libraries. + """ + self.log.info("Compiling...") + symbols = [] + + # Back up the config and atomically compile with the full configratuion. + shutil.copy( + "include/mbedtls/config.h", + "include/mbedtls/config.h.bak" + ) + try: + # Use check=True in all subprocess calls so that failures are raised + # as exceptions and logged. + subprocess.run( + ["python3", "scripts/config.py", "full"], + universal_newlines=True, + check=True + ) + my_environment = os.environ.copy() + my_environment["CFLAGS"] = "-fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables" + # Run make clean separately to lib to prevent unwanted behavior when + # make is invoked with parallelism. + subprocess.run( + ["make", "clean"], + universal_newlines=True, + check=True + ) + subprocess.run( + ["make", "lib"], + env=my_environment, + universal_newlines=True, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, + check=True + ) + + # Perform object file analysis using nm + symbols = self.parse_symbols_from_nm([ + "library/libmbedcrypto.a", + "library/libmbedtls.a", + "library/libmbedx509.a" + ]) + + subprocess.run( + ["make", "clean"], + universal_newlines=True, + check=True + ) + except subprocess.CalledProcessError as error: + self.log.debug(error.output) + raise error + finally: + # Put back the original config regardless of there being errors. + # Works also for keyboard interrupts. + shutil.move( + "include/mbedtls/config.h.bak", + "include/mbedtls/config.h" + ) + + return symbols + + def parse_symbols_from_nm(self, object_files): + """ + Run nm to retrieve the list of referenced symbols in each object file. + Does not return the position data since it is of no use. + + Args: + * object_files: a List of compiled object filepaths to search through. + + Returns a List of unique symbols defined and used in any of the object + files. + """ + nm_undefined_regex = re.compile(r"^\S+: +U |^$|^\S+:$") + nm_valid_regex = re.compile(r"^\S+( [0-9A-Fa-f]+)* . _*(?P\w+)") + exclusions = ("FStar", "Hacl") + + symbols = [] + + # Gather all outputs of nm + nm_output = "" + for lib in object_files: + nm_output += subprocess.run( + ["nm", "-og", lib], + universal_newlines=True, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, + check=True + ).stdout + + for line in nm_output.splitlines(): + if not nm_undefined_regex.search(line): + symbol = nm_valid_regex.search(line) + if (symbol and not symbol.group("symbol").startswith(exclusions)): + symbols.append(symbol.group("symbol")) + else: + self.log.error(line) + + return symbols + +class NameChecker(): + """ + Representation of the core name checking operation performed by this script. + """ + def __init__(self, parse_result, log): + self.parse_result = parse_result + self.log = log + + def perform_checks(self, quiet=False): + """ + A comprehensive checker that performs each check in order, and outputs + a final verdict. + + Args: + * quiet: whether to hide detailed problem explanation. + """ + self.log.info("=============") + Problem.quiet = quiet + problems = 0 + problems += self.check_symbols_declared_in_header() + + pattern_checks = [ + ("macros", MACRO_PATTERN), + ("enum_consts", CONSTANTS_PATTERN), + ("identifiers", IDENTIFIER_PATTERN) + ] + for group, check_pattern in pattern_checks: + problems += self.check_match_pattern(group, check_pattern) + + problems += self.check_for_typos() + + self.log.info("=============") + if problems > 0: + self.log.info("FAIL: {0} problem(s) to fix".format(str(problems))) + if quiet: + self.log.info("Remove --quiet to see explanations.") + else: + self.log.info("Use --quiet for minimal output.") + return 1 + else: + self.log.info("PASS") + return 0 + + def check_symbols_declared_in_header(self): + """ + Perform a check that all detected symbols in the library object files + are properly declared in headers. + Assumes parse_names_in_source() was called before this. + + Returns the number of problems that need fixing. + """ + problems = [] + + for symbol in self.parse_result["symbols"]: + found_symbol_declared = False + for identifier_match in self.parse_result["identifiers"]: + if symbol == identifier_match.name: + found_symbol_declared = True + break + + if not found_symbol_declared: + problems.append(SymbolNotInHeader(symbol)) + + self.output_check_result("All symbols in header", problems) + return len(problems) + + def check_match_pattern(self, group_to_check, check_pattern): + """ + Perform a check that all items of a group conform to a regex pattern. + Assumes parse_names_in_source() was called before this. + + Args: + * group_to_check: string key to index into self.parse_result. + * check_pattern: the regex to check against. + + Returns the number of problems that need fixing. + """ + problems = [] + + for item_match in self.parse_result[group_to_check]: + if not re.search(check_pattern, item_match.name): + problems.append(PatternMismatch(check_pattern, item_match)) + # Double underscore should not be used for names + if re.search(r".*__.*", item_match.name): + problems.append( + PatternMismatch("no double underscore allowed", item_match)) + + self.output_check_result( + "Naming patterns of {}".format(group_to_check), + problems) + return len(problems) + + def check_for_typos(self): + """ + Perform a check that all words in the source code beginning with MBED are + either defined as macros, or as enum constants. + Assumes parse_names_in_source() was called before this. + + Returns the number of problems that need fixing. + """ + problems = [] + + # Set comprehension, equivalent to a list comprehension wrapped by set() + all_caps_names = { + match.name + for match + in self.parse_result["macros"] + self.parse_result["enum_consts"]} + typo_exclusion = re.compile(r"XXX|__|_$|^MBEDTLS_.*CONFIG_FILE$|" + r"MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER*") + + for name_match in self.parse_result["mbed_words"]: + found = name_match.name in all_caps_names + + # Since MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_XXX defines are defined by the + # PSA driver, they will not exist as macros. However, they + # should still be checked for typos using the equivalent + # BUILTINs that exist. + if "MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_" in name_match.name: + found = name_match.name.replace( + "MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_", + "MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_") in all_caps_names + + if not found and not typo_exclusion.search(name_match.name): + problems.append(Typo(name_match)) + + self.output_check_result("Likely typos", problems) + return len(problems) + + def output_check_result(self, name, problems): + """ + Write out the PASS/FAIL status of a performed check depending on whether + there were problems. + + Args: + * name: the name of the test + * problems: a List of encountered Problems + """ + if problems: + self.log.info("{}: FAIL\n".format(name)) + for problem in problems: + self.log.warning(str(problem)) + else: + self.log.info("{}: PASS".format(name)) + +def main(): + """ + Perform argument parsing, and create an instance of CodeParser and + NameChecker to begin the core operation. + """ + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( + formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter, + description=( + "This script confirms that the naming of all symbols and identifiers " + "in Mbed TLS are consistent with the house style and are also " + "self-consistent.\n\n" + "Expected to be run from the MbedTLS root directory.") + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-v", "--verbose", + action="store_true", + help="show parse results" + ) + parser.add_argument( + "-q", "--quiet", + action="store_true", + help="hide unnecessary text, explanations, and highlighs" + ) + + args = parser.parse_args() + + # Configure the global logger, which is then passed to the classes below + log = logging.getLogger() + log.setLevel(logging.DEBUG if args.verbose else logging.INFO) + log.addHandler(logging.StreamHandler()) + + try: + code_parser = CodeParser(log) + parse_result = code_parser.comprehensive_parse() + except Exception: # pylint: disable=broad-except + traceback.print_exc() + sys.exit(2) + + name_checker = NameChecker(parse_result, log) + return_code = name_checker.perform_checks(quiet=args.quiet) + + sys.exit(return_code) + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check_test_cases.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check_test_cases.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..c9f5e11d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/check_test_cases.py @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 + +"""Sanity checks for test data. + +This program contains a class for traversing test cases that can be used +independently of the checks. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import argparse +import glob +import os +import re +import sys + +class Results: + """Store file and line information about errors or warnings in test suites.""" + + def __init__(self, options): + self.errors = 0 + self.warnings = 0 + self.ignore_warnings = options.quiet + + def error(self, file_name, line_number, fmt, *args): + sys.stderr.write(('{}:{}:ERROR:' + fmt + '\n'). + format(file_name, line_number, *args)) + self.errors += 1 + + def warning(self, file_name, line_number, fmt, *args): + if not self.ignore_warnings: + sys.stderr.write(('{}:{}:Warning:' + fmt + '\n') + .format(file_name, line_number, *args)) + self.warnings += 1 + +class TestDescriptionExplorer: + """An iterator over test cases with descriptions. + +The test cases that have descriptions are: +* Individual unit tests (entries in a .data file) in test suites. +* Individual test cases in ssl-opt.sh. + +This is an abstract class. To use it, derive a class that implements +the process_test_case method, and call walk_all(). +""" + + def process_test_case(self, per_file_state, + file_name, line_number, description): + """Process a test case. + +per_file_state: an object created by new_per_file_state() at the beginning + of each file. +file_name: a relative path to the file containing the test case. +line_number: the line number in the given file. +description: the test case description as a byte string. +""" + raise NotImplementedError + + def new_per_file_state(self): + """Return a new per-file state object. + +The default per-file state object is None. Child classes that require per-file +state may override this method. +""" + #pylint: disable=no-self-use + return None + + def walk_test_suite(self, data_file_name): + """Iterate over the test cases in the given unit test data file.""" + in_paragraph = False + descriptions = self.new_per_file_state() # pylint: disable=assignment-from-none + with open(data_file_name, 'rb') as data_file: + for line_number, line in enumerate(data_file, 1): + line = line.rstrip(b'\r\n') + if not line: + in_paragraph = False + continue + if line.startswith(b'#'): + continue + if not in_paragraph: + # This is a test case description line. + self.process_test_case(descriptions, + data_file_name, line_number, line) + in_paragraph = True + + def walk_ssl_opt_sh(self, file_name): + """Iterate over the test cases in ssl-opt.sh or a file with a similar format.""" + descriptions = self.new_per_file_state() # pylint: disable=assignment-from-none + with open(file_name, 'rb') as file_contents: + for line_number, line in enumerate(file_contents, 1): + # Assume that all run_test calls have the same simple form + # with the test description entirely on the same line as the + # function name. + m = re.match(br'\s*run_test\s+"((?:[^\\"]|\\.)*)"', line) + if not m: + continue + description = m.group(1) + self.process_test_case(descriptions, + file_name, line_number, description) + + @staticmethod + def collect_test_directories(): + """Get the relative path for the TLS and Crypto test directories.""" + if os.path.isdir('tests'): + tests_dir = 'tests' + elif os.path.isdir('suites'): + tests_dir = '.' + elif os.path.isdir('../suites'): + tests_dir = '..' + directories = [tests_dir] + return directories + + def walk_all(self): + """Iterate over all named test cases.""" + test_directories = self.collect_test_directories() + for directory in test_directories: + for data_file_name in glob.glob(os.path.join(directory, 'suites', + '*.data')): + self.walk_test_suite(data_file_name) + ssl_opt_sh = os.path.join(directory, 'ssl-opt.sh') + if os.path.exists(ssl_opt_sh): + self.walk_ssl_opt_sh(ssl_opt_sh) + +class TestDescriptions(TestDescriptionExplorer): + """Collect the available test cases.""" + + def __init__(self): + super().__init__() + self.descriptions = set() + + def process_test_case(self, _per_file_state, + file_name, _line_number, description): + """Record an available test case.""" + base_name = re.sub(r'\.[^.]*$', '', re.sub(r'.*/', '', file_name)) + key = ';'.join([base_name, description.decode('utf-8')]) + self.descriptions.add(key) + +def collect_available_test_cases(): + """Collect the available test cases.""" + explorer = TestDescriptions() + explorer.walk_all() + return sorted(explorer.descriptions) + +class DescriptionChecker(TestDescriptionExplorer): + """Check all test case descriptions. + +* Check that each description is valid (length, allowed character set, etc.). +* Check that there is no duplicated description inside of one test suite. +""" + + def __init__(self, results): + self.results = results + + def new_per_file_state(self): + """Dictionary mapping descriptions to their line number.""" + return {} + + def process_test_case(self, per_file_state, + file_name, line_number, description): + """Check test case descriptions for errors.""" + results = self.results + seen = per_file_state + if description in seen: + results.error(file_name, line_number, + 'Duplicate description (also line {})', + seen[description]) + return + if re.search(br'[\t;]', description): + results.error(file_name, line_number, + 'Forbidden character \'{}\' in description', + re.search(br'[\t;]', description).group(0).decode('ascii')) + if re.search(br'[^ -~]', description): + results.error(file_name, line_number, + 'Non-ASCII character in description') + if len(description) > 66: + results.warning(file_name, line_number, + 'Test description too long ({} > 66)', + len(description)) + seen[description] = line_number + +def main(): + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument('--list-all', + action='store_true', + help='List all test cases, without doing checks') + parser.add_argument('--quiet', '-q', + action='store_true', + help='Hide warnings') + parser.add_argument('--verbose', '-v', + action='store_false', dest='quiet', + help='Show warnings (default: on; undoes --quiet)') + options = parser.parse_args() + if options.list_all: + descriptions = collect_available_test_cases() + sys.stdout.write('\n'.join(descriptions + [''])) + return + results = Results(options) + checker = DescriptionChecker(results) + checker.walk_all() + if (results.warnings or results.errors) and not options.quiet: + sys.stderr.write('{}: {} errors, {} warnings\n' + .format(sys.argv[0], results.errors, results.warnings)) + sys.exit(1 if results.errors else 0) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/curves.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/curves.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..08582dc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/curves.pl @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# curves.pl +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# The purpose of this test script is to validate that the library works +# when only a single curve is enabled. In particular, this validates that +# curve-specific code is guarded by the proper preprocessor conditionals, +# both in the library and in tests. +# +# Since this script only tests builds with a single curve, it can't detect +# bugs that are only triggered when multiple curves are present. We do +# also test in many configurations where all curves are enabled, as well +# as a few configurations in configs/*.h with a restricted subset of curves. +# +# Here are some known test gaps that could be addressed by testing all +# 2^n combinations of support for n curves, which is impractical: +# * There could be product bugs when curves A and B are enabled but not C. +# For example, a MAX_SIZE calculation that forgets B, where +# size(A) < size(B) < size(C). +# * For test cases that require three or more curves, validate that they're +# not missing dependencies. This is extremely rare. (For test cases that +# require curves A and B but are missing a dependency on B, this is +# detected in the A-only build.) +# Usage: tests/scripts/curves.pl +# +# This script should be executed from the root of the project directory. +# +# Only curves that are enabled in config.h will be tested. +# +# For best effect, run either with cmake disabled, or cmake enabled in a mode +# that includes -Werror. + +use warnings; +use strict; + +-d 'library' && -d 'include' && -d 'tests' or die "Must be run from root\n"; + +my $sed_cmd = 's/^#define \(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP.*_ENABLED\)/\1/p'; +my $config_h = 'include/mbedtls/config.h'; +my @curves = split( /\s+/, `sed -n -e '$sed_cmd' $config_h` ); + +# Determine which curves support ECDSA by checking the dependencies of +# ECDSA in check_config.h. +my %curve_supports_ecdsa = (); +{ + local $/ = ""; + local *CHECK_CONFIG; + open(CHECK_CONFIG, '<', 'include/mbedtls/check_config.h') + or die "open include/mbedtls/check_config.h: $!"; + while (my $stanza = ) { + if ($stanza =~ /\A#if defined\(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C\)/) { + for my $curve ($stanza =~ /(?<=\()MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_\w+_ENABLED(?=\))/g) { + $curve_supports_ecdsa{$curve} = 1; + } + last; + } + } + close(CHECK_CONFIG); +} + +system( "cp $config_h $config_h.bak" ) and die; +sub abort { + system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and warn "$config_h not restored\n"; + # use an exit code between 1 and 124 for git bisect (die returns 255) + warn $_[0]; + exit 1; +} + +# Disable all the curves. We'll then re-enable them one by one. +for my $curve (@curves) { + system( "scripts/config.pl unset $curve" ) + and abort "Failed to disable $curve\n"; +} +# Depends on a specific curve. Also, ignore error if it wasn't enabled. +system( "scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED" ); + +# Test with only $curve enabled, for each $curve. +for my $curve (@curves) { + system( "make clean" ) and die; + + print "\n******************************************\n"; + print "* Testing with only curve: $curve\n"; + print "******************************************\n"; + $ENV{MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION} = "$curve"; + + system( "scripts/config.pl set $curve" ) + and abort "Failed to enable $curve\n"; + + my $ecdsa = $curve_supports_ecdsa{$curve} ? "set" : "unset"; + for my $dep (qw(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) { + system( "scripts/config.pl $ecdsa $dep" ) + and abort "Failed to $ecdsa $dep\n"; + } + + system( "CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' make" ) + and abort "Failed to build: only $curve\n"; + system( "make test" ) + and abort "Failed test suite: only $curve\n"; + + system( "scripts/config.pl unset $curve" ) + and abort "Failed to disable $curve\n"; +} + +system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die "$config_h not restored\n"; +system( "make clean" ) and die; +exit 0; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..44d35430 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# depends-hashes.pl +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# To test the code dependencies on individual hashes in each test suite. This +# is a verification step to ensure we don't ship test suites that do not work +# for some build options. +# +# The process is: +# for each possible hash +# build the library and test suites with the hash disabled +# execute the test suites +# +# And any test suite with the wrong dependencies will fail. +# +# Usage: tests/scripts/depends-hashes.pl +# +# This script should be executed from the root of the project directory. +# +# For best effect, run either with cmake disabled, or cmake enabled in a mode +# that includes -Werror. + +use warnings; +use strict; + +-d 'library' && -d 'include' && -d 'tests' or die "Must be run from root\n"; + +my $config_h = 'include/mbedtls/config.h'; + +# as many SSL options depend on specific hashes, +# and SSL is not in the test suites anyways, +# disable it to avoid dependency issues +my $ssl_sed_cmd = 's/^#define \(MBEDTLS_SSL.*\)/\1/p'; +my @ssl = split( /\s+/, `sed -n -e '$ssl_sed_cmd' $config_h` ); + +# for md we want to catch MD5_C but not MD_C, hence the extra dot +my $mdx_sed_cmd = 's/^#define \(MBEDTLS_MD..*_C\)/\1/p'; +my $sha_sed_cmd = 's/^#define \(MBEDTLS_SHA.*_C\)/\1/p'; +my @hash_modules = split( /\s+/, + `sed -n -e '$mdx_sed_cmd' -e '$sha_sed_cmd' $config_h` ); + +# there are also negative options for truncated variants, disabled by default +my $sha_trunc_sed_cmd = 's/^\/\/#define \(MBEDTLS_SHA..._NO_.*\)/\1/p'; +my @hash_negatives = split( /\s+/, + `sed -n -e '$sha_trunc_sed_cmd' $config_h` ); + +# list hash options with corresponding actions +my @hashes = ((map { "unset $_" } @hash_modules), + (map { "set $_" } @hash_negatives)); + +system( "cp $config_h $config_h.bak" ) and die; +sub abort { + system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and warn "$config_h not restored\n"; + # use an exit code between 1 and 124 for git bisect (die returns 255) + warn $_[0]; + exit 1; +} + +for my $hash (@hashes) { + system( "cp $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die "$config_h not restored\n"; + system( "make clean" ) and die; + + print "\n******************************************\n"; + print "* Testing hash option: $hash\n"; + print "******************************************\n"; + $ENV{MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION} = "-$hash"; + + system( "scripts/config.py $hash" ) + and abort "Failed to $hash\n"; + + for my $opt (@ssl) { + system( "scripts/config.py unset $opt" ) + and abort "Failed to disable $opt\n"; + } + + system( "CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' make lib" ) + and abort "Failed to build lib: $hash\n"; + system( "cd tests && make" ) and abort "Failed to build tests: $hash\n"; + system( "make test" ) and abort "Failed test suite: $hash\n"; +} + +system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die "$config_h not restored\n"; +system( "make clean" ) and die; +exit 0; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..2ad4a7cc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# depends-pkalgs.pl +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# To test the code dependencies on individual PK algs (those that can be used +# from the PK layer, so currently signature and encryption but not key +# exchange) in each test suite. This is a verification step to ensure we don't +# ship test suites that do not work for some build options. +# +# The process is: +# for each possible PK alg +# build the library and test suites with that alg disabled +# execute the test suites +# +# And any test suite with the wrong dependencies will fail. +# +# Usage: tests/scripts/depends-pkalgs.pl +# +# This script should be executed from the root of the project directory. +# +# For best effect, run either with cmake disabled, or cmake enabled in a mode +# that includes -Werror. + +use warnings; +use strict; + +-d 'library' && -d 'include' && -d 'tests' or die "Must be run from root\n"; + +my $config_h = 'include/mbedtls/config.h'; + +# Some algorithms can't be disabled on their own as others depend on them, so +# we list those reverse-dependencies here to keep check_config.h happy. +my %algs = ( + 'MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C' => ['MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED'], + 'MBEDTLS_ECP_C' => ['MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C', + 'MBEDTLS_ECDH_C', + 'MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED'], + 'MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT' => [], + 'MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21' => ['MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT'], + 'MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15' => ['MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED'], + 'MBEDTLS_RSA_C' => ['MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED'], +); + +system( "cp $config_h $config_h.bak" ) and die; +sub abort { + system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and warn "$config_h not restored\n"; + # use an exit code between 1 and 124 for git bisect (die returns 255) + warn $_[0]; + exit 1; +} + +while( my ($alg, $extras) = each %algs ) { + system( "cp $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die "$config_h not restored\n"; + system( "make clean" ) and die; + + print "\n******************************************\n"; + print "* Testing without alg: $alg\n"; + print "******************************************\n"; + $ENV{MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION} = "-$alg"; + + system( "scripts/config.py unset $alg" ) + and abort "Failed to disable $alg\n"; + for my $opt (@$extras) { + system( "scripts/config.py unset $opt" ) + and abort "Failed to disable $opt\n"; + } + + system( "CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra' make lib" ) + and abort "Failed to build lib: $alg\n"; + system( "cd tests && make" ) and abort "Failed to build tests: $alg\n"; + system( "make test" ) and abort "Failed test suite: $alg\n"; +} + +system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die "$config_h not restored\n"; +system( "make clean" ) and die; +exit 0; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/docker_env.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/docker_env.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..be96c727 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/docker_env.sh @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +#!/bin/bash -eu + +# docker_env.sh +# +# Purpose +# ------- +# +# This is a helper script to enable running tests under a Docker container, +# thus making it easier to get set up as well as isolating test dependencies +# (which include legacy/insecure configurations of openssl and gnutls). +# +# Notes for users +# --------------- +# This script expects a Linux x86_64 system with a recent version of Docker +# installed and available for use, as well as http/https access. If a proxy +# server must be used, invoke this script with the usual environment variables +# (http_proxy and https_proxy) set appropriately. If an alternate Docker +# registry is needed, specify MBEDTLS_DOCKER_REGISTRY to point at the +# host name. +# +# +# Running this script directly will check for Docker availability and set up +# the Docker image. + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + + +# default values, can be overridden by the environment +: ${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST:=bionic} + + +DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG="armmbed/mbedtls-test:${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST}" + +# Make sure docker is available +if ! which docker > /dev/null; then + echo "Docker is required but doesn't seem to be installed. See https://www.docker.com/ to get started" + exit 1 +fi + +# Figure out if we need to 'sudo docker' +if groups | grep docker > /dev/null; then + DOCKER="docker" +else + echo "Using sudo to invoke docker since you're not a member of the docker group..." + DOCKER="sudo docker" +fi + +# Figure out the number of processors available +if [ "$(uname)" == "Darwin" ]; then + NUM_PROC="$(sysctl -n hw.logicalcpu)" +else + NUM_PROC="$(nproc)" +fi + +# Build the Docker image +echo "Getting docker image up to date (this may take a few minutes)..." +${DOCKER} image build \ + -t ${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \ + --cache-from=${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \ + --build-arg MAKEFLAGS_PARALLEL="-j ${NUM_PROC}" \ + --network host \ + ${http_proxy+--build-arg http_proxy=${http_proxy}} \ + ${https_proxy+--build-arg https_proxy=${https_proxy}} \ + ${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_REGISTRY+--build-arg MY_REGISTRY="${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_REGISTRY}/"} \ + tests/docker/${MBEDTLS_DOCKER_GUEST} + +run_in_docker() +{ + ENV_ARGS="" + while [ "$1" == "-e" ]; do + ENV_ARGS="${ENV_ARGS} $1 $2" + shift 2 + done + + ${DOCKER} container run -it --rm \ + --cap-add SYS_PTRACE \ + --user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \ + --volume $PWD:$PWD \ + --workdir $PWD \ + -e MAKEFLAGS \ + -e PYLINTHOME=/tmp/.pylintd \ + ${ENV_ARGS} \ + ${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG} \ + $@ +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/doxygen.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/doxygen.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..2c523ba7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/doxygen.sh @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Make sure the doxygen documentation builds without warnings +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +# Abort on errors (and uninitiliased variables) +set -eu + +if [ -d library -a -d include -a -d tests ]; then :; else + echo "Must be run from mbed TLS root" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if scripts/apidoc_full.sh > doc.out 2>doc.err; then :; else + cat doc.err + echo "FAIL" >&2 + exit 1; +fi + +cat doc.out doc.err | \ + grep -v "warning: ignoring unsupported tag" \ + > doc.filtered + +if egrep "(warning|error):" doc.filtered; then + echo "FAIL" >&2 + exit 1; +fi + +make apidoc_clean +rm -f doc.out doc.err doc.filtered diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_ctr_drbg.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_ctr_drbg.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..2345b9e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_ctr_drbg.pl @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl +# +# Based on NIST CTR_DRBG.rsp validation file +# Only uses AES-256-CTR cases that use a Derivation function +# and concats nonce and personalization for initialization. +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use strict; + +my $file = shift; + +open(TEST_DATA, "$file") or die "Opening test cases '$file': $!"; + +sub get_suite_val($) +{ + my $name = shift; + my $val = ""; + + my $line = ; + ($val) = ($line =~ /\[$name\s\=\s(\w+)\]/); + + return $val; +} + +sub get_val($) +{ + my $name = shift; + my $val = ""; + my $line; + + while($line = ) + { + next if($line !~ /=/); + last; + } + + ($val) = ($line =~ /^$name = (\w+)/); + + return $val; +} + +my $cnt = 1;; +while (my $line = ) +{ + next if ($line !~ /^\[AES-256 use df/); + + my $PredictionResistanceStr = get_suite_val("PredictionResistance"); + my $PredictionResistance = 0; + $PredictionResistance = 1 if ($PredictionResistanceStr eq 'True'); + my $EntropyInputLen = get_suite_val("EntropyInputLen"); + my $NonceLen = get_suite_val("NonceLen"); + my $PersonalizationStringLen = get_suite_val("PersonalizationStringLen"); + my $AdditionalInputLen = get_suite_val("AdditionalInputLen"); + + for ($cnt = 0; $cnt < 15; $cnt++) + { + my $Count = get_val("COUNT"); + my $EntropyInput = get_val("EntropyInput"); + my $Nonce = get_val("Nonce"); + my $PersonalizationString = get_val("PersonalizationString"); + my $AdditionalInput1 = get_val("AdditionalInput"); + my $EntropyInputPR1 = get_val("EntropyInputPR") if ($PredictionResistance == 1); + my $EntropyInputReseed = get_val("EntropyInputReseed") if ($PredictionResistance == 0); + my $AdditionalInputReseed = get_val("AdditionalInputReseed") if ($PredictionResistance == 0); + my $AdditionalInput2 = get_val("AdditionalInput"); + my $EntropyInputPR2 = get_val("EntropyInputPR") if ($PredictionResistance == 1); + my $ReturnedBits = get_val("ReturnedBits"); + + if ($PredictionResistance == 1) + { + print("CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,$PredictionResistanceStr,$EntropyInputLen,$NonceLen,$PersonalizationStringLen,$AdditionalInputLen) #$Count\n"); + print("ctr_drbg_validate_pr"); + print(":\"$Nonce$PersonalizationString\""); + print(":\"$EntropyInput$EntropyInputPR1$EntropyInputPR2\""); + print(":\"$AdditionalInput1\""); + print(":\"$AdditionalInput2\""); + print(":\"$ReturnedBits\""); + print("\n\n"); + } + else + { + print("CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,$PredictionResistanceStr,$EntropyInputLen,$NonceLen,$PersonalizationStringLen,$AdditionalInputLen) #$Count\n"); + print("ctr_drbg_validate_nopr"); + print(":\"$Nonce$PersonalizationString\""); + print(":\"$EntropyInput$EntropyInputReseed\""); + print(":\"$AdditionalInput1\""); + print(":\"$AdditionalInputReseed\""); + print(":\"$AdditionalInput2\""); + print(":\"$ReturnedBits\""); + print("\n\n"); + } + } +} +close(TEST_DATA); diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_gcm_decrypt.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_gcm_decrypt.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..354e351a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_gcm_decrypt.pl @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl +# +# Based on NIST gcmDecryptxxx.rsp validation files +# Only first 3 of every set used for compile time saving +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use strict; + +my $file = shift; + +open(TEST_DATA, "$file") or die "Opening test cases '$file': $!"; + +sub get_suite_val($) +{ + my $name = shift; + my $val = ""; + + while(my $line = ) + { + next if ($line !~ /^\[/); + ($val) = ($line =~ /\[$name\s\=\s(\w+)\]/); + last; + } + + return $val; +} + +sub get_val($) +{ + my $name = shift; + my $val = ""; + my $line; + + while($line = ) + { + next if($line !~ /=/); + last; + } + + ($val) = ($line =~ /^$name = (\w+)/); + + return $val; +} + +sub get_val_or_fail($) +{ + my $name = shift; + my $val = "FAIL"; + my $line; + + while($line = ) + { + next if($line !~ /=/ && $line !~ /FAIL/); + last; + } + + ($val) = ($line =~ /^$name = (\w+)/) if ($line =~ /=/); + + return $val; +} + +my $cnt = 1;; +while (my $line = ) +{ + my $key_len = get_suite_val("Keylen"); + next if ($key_len !~ /\d+/); + my $iv_len = get_suite_val("IVlen"); + my $pt_len = get_suite_val("PTlen"); + my $add_len = get_suite_val("AADlen"); + my $tag_len = get_suite_val("Taglen"); + + for ($cnt = 0; $cnt < 3; $cnt++) + { + my $Count = get_val("Count"); + my $key = get_val("Key"); + my $iv = get_val("IV"); + my $ct = get_val("CT"); + my $add = get_val("AAD"); + my $tag = get_val("Tag"); + my $pt = get_val_or_fail("PT"); + + print("GCM NIST Validation (AES-$key_len,$iv_len,$pt_len,$add_len,$tag_len) #$Count\n"); + print("gcm_decrypt_and_verify"); + print(":\"$key\""); + print(":\"$ct\""); + print(":\"$iv\""); + print(":\"$add\""); + print(":$tag_len"); + print(":\"$tag\""); + print(":\"$pt\""); + print(":0"); + print("\n\n"); + } +} + +print("GCM Selftest\n"); +print("gcm_selftest:\n\n"); + +close(TEST_DATA); diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_gcm_encrypt.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_gcm_encrypt.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..101456fe --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_gcm_encrypt.pl @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl +# +# Based on NIST gcmEncryptIntIVxxx.rsp validation files +# Only first 3 of every set used for compile time saving +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use strict; + +my $file = shift; + +open(TEST_DATA, "$file") or die "Opening test cases '$file': $!"; + +sub get_suite_val($) +{ + my $name = shift; + my $val = ""; + + while(my $line = ) + { + next if ($line !~ /^\[/); + ($val) = ($line =~ /\[$name\s\=\s(\w+)\]/); + last; + } + + return $val; +} + +sub get_val($) +{ + my $name = shift; + my $val = ""; + my $line; + + while($line = ) + { + next if($line !~ /=/); + last; + } + + ($val) = ($line =~ /^$name = (\w+)/); + + return $val; +} + +my $cnt = 1;; +while (my $line = ) +{ + my $key_len = get_suite_val("Keylen"); + next if ($key_len !~ /\d+/); + my $iv_len = get_suite_val("IVlen"); + my $pt_len = get_suite_val("PTlen"); + my $add_len = get_suite_val("AADlen"); + my $tag_len = get_suite_val("Taglen"); + + for ($cnt = 0; $cnt < 3; $cnt++) + { + my $Count = get_val("Count"); + my $key = get_val("Key"); + my $pt = get_val("PT"); + my $add = get_val("AAD"); + my $iv = get_val("IV"); + my $ct = get_val("CT"); + my $tag = get_val("Tag"); + + print("GCM NIST Validation (AES-$key_len,$iv_len,$pt_len,$add_len,$tag_len) #$Count\n"); + print("gcm_encrypt_and_tag"); + print(":\"$key\""); + print(":\"$pt\""); + print(":\"$iv\""); + print(":\"$add\""); + print(":\"$ct\""); + print(":$tag_len"); + print(":\"$tag\""); + print(":0"); + print("\n\n"); + } +} + +print("GCM Selftest\n"); +print("gcm_selftest:\n\n"); + +close(TEST_DATA); diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_pkcs1_v21_sign_verify.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_pkcs1_v21_sign_verify.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..609e5586 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/gen_pkcs1_v21_sign_verify.pl @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use strict; + +my $file = shift; + +open(TEST_DATA, "$file") or die "Opening test cases '$file': $!"; + +sub get_val($$) +{ + my $str = shift; + my $name = shift; + my $val = ""; + + while(my $line = ) + { + next if($line !~ /^# $str/); + last; + } + + while(my $line = ) + { + last if($line eq "\r\n"); + $val .= $line; + } + + $val =~ s/[ \r\n]//g; + + return $val; +} + +my $state = 0; +my $val_n = ""; +my $val_e = ""; +my $val_p = ""; +my $val_q = ""; +my $mod = 0; +my $cnt = 1; +while (my $line = ) +{ + next if ($line !~ /^# Example/); + + ( $mod ) = ($line =~ /A (\d+)/); + $val_n = get_val("RSA modulus n", "N"); + $val_e = get_val("RSA public exponent e", "E"); + $val_p = get_val("Prime p", "P"); + $val_q = get_val("Prime q", "Q"); + + for(my $i = 1; $i <= 6; $i++) + { + my $val_m = get_val("Message to be", "M"); + my $val_salt = get_val("Salt", "Salt"); + my $val_sig = get_val("Signature", "Sig"); + + print("RSASSA-PSS Signature Example ${cnt}_${i}\n"); + print("pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:$mod:16:\"$val_p\":16:\"$val_q\":16:\"$val_n\":16:\"$val_e\":SIG_RSA_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1"); + print(":\"$val_m\""); + print(":\"$val_salt\""); + print(":\"$val_sig\":0"); + print("\n\n"); + + print("RSASSA-PSS Signature Example ${cnt}_${i} (verify)\n"); + print("pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:$mod:16:\"$val_n\":16:\"$val_e\":SIG_RSA_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1"); + print(":\"$val_m\""); + print(":\"$val_salt\""); + print(":\"$val_sig\":0"); + print("\n\n"); + } + $cnt++; +} +close(TEST_DATA); diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/generate-afl-tests.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/generate-afl-tests.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..7c9f432a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/generate-afl-tests.sh @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# This script splits the data test files containing the test cases into +# individual files (one test case per file) suitable for use with afl +# (American Fuzzy Lop). http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/ +# +# Usage: generate-afl-tests.sh +# - should be the path to one of the test suite files +# such as 'test_suite_mpi.data' +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +# Abort on errors +set -e + +if [ -z $1 ] +then + echo " [!] No test file specified" >&2 + echo "Usage: $0 " >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +SRC_FILEPATH=$(dirname $1)/$(basename $1) +TESTSUITE=$(basename $1 .data) + +THIS_DIR=$(basename $PWD) + +if [ -d ../library -a -d ../include -a -d ../tests -a $THIS_DIR == "tests" ]; +then :; +else + echo " [!] Must be run from mbed TLS tests directory" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +DEST_TESTCASE_DIR=$TESTSUITE-afl-tests +DEST_OUTPUT_DIR=$TESTSUITE-afl-out + +echo " [+] Creating output directories" >&2 + +if [ -e $DEST_OUTPUT_DIR/* ]; +then : + echo " [!] Test output files already exist." >&2 + exit 1 +else + mkdir -p $DEST_OUTPUT_DIR +fi + +if [ -e $DEST_TESTCASE_DIR/* ]; +then : + echo " [!] Test output files already exist." >&2 +else + mkdir -p $DEST_TESTCASE_DIR +fi + +echo " [+] Creating test cases" >&2 +cd $DEST_TESTCASE_DIR + +split -p '^\s*$' ../$SRC_FILEPATH + +for f in *; +do + # Strip out any blank lines (no trim on OS X) + sed '/^\s*$/d' $f >testcase_$f + rm $f +done + +cd .. + +echo " [+] Test cases in $DEST_TESTCASE_DIR" >&2 + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..33c1fc3d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py @@ -0,0 +1,971 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Generate test data for PSA cryptographic mechanisms. + +With no arguments, generate all test data. With non-option arguments, +generate only the specified files. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import argparse +import enum +import os +import re +import sys +from typing import Callable, Dict, FrozenSet, Iterable, Iterator, List, Optional, TypeVar + +import scripts_path # pylint: disable=unused-import +from mbedtls_dev import crypto_knowledge +from mbedtls_dev import macro_collector +from mbedtls_dev import psa_storage +from mbedtls_dev import test_case + +T = TypeVar('T') #pylint: disable=invalid-name + + +def psa_want_symbol(name: str) -> str: + """Return the PSA_WANT_xxx symbol associated with a PSA crypto feature.""" + if name.startswith('PSA_'): + return name[:4] + 'WANT_' + name[4:] + else: + raise ValueError('Unable to determine the PSA_WANT_ symbol for ' + name) + +def finish_family_dependency(dep: str, bits: int) -> str: + """Finish dep if it's a family dependency symbol prefix. + + A family dependency symbol prefix is a PSA_WANT_ symbol that needs to be + qualified by the key size. If dep is such a symbol, finish it by adjusting + the prefix and appending the key size. Other symbols are left unchanged. + """ + return re.sub(r'_FAMILY_(.*)', r'_\1_' + str(bits), dep) + +def finish_family_dependencies(dependencies: List[str], bits: int) -> List[str]: + """Finish any family dependency symbol prefixes. + + Apply `finish_family_dependency` to each element of `dependencies`. + """ + return [finish_family_dependency(dep, bits) for dep in dependencies] + +SYMBOLS_WITHOUT_DEPENDENCY = frozenset([ + 'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG', # modifier, only in policies + 'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG', # modifier + 'PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH', # only in policies + 'PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC', # modifier, only in policies + 'PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT', # chaining + 'PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC', # modifier +]) +def automatic_dependencies(*expressions: str) -> List[str]: + """Infer dependencies of a test case by looking for PSA_xxx symbols. + + The arguments are strings which should be C expressions. Do not use + string literals or comments as this function is not smart enough to + skip them. + """ + used = set() + for expr in expressions: + used.update(re.findall(r'PSA_(?:ALG|ECC_FAMILY|KEY_TYPE)_\w+', expr)) + used.difference_update(SYMBOLS_WITHOUT_DEPENDENCY) + return sorted(psa_want_symbol(name) for name in used) + +# A temporary hack: at the time of writing, not all dependency symbols +# are implemented yet. Skip test cases for which the dependency symbols are +# not available. Once all dependency symbols are available, this hack must +# be removed so that a bug in the dependency symbols proprely leads to a test +# failure. +def read_implemented_dependencies(filename: str) -> FrozenSet[str]: + return frozenset(symbol + for line in open(filename) + for symbol in re.findall(r'\bPSA_WANT_\w+\b', line)) +_implemented_dependencies = None #type: Optional[FrozenSet[str]] #pylint: disable=invalid-name +def hack_dependencies_not_implemented(dependencies: List[str]) -> None: + global _implemented_dependencies #pylint: disable=global-statement,invalid-name + if _implemented_dependencies is None: + _implemented_dependencies = \ + read_implemented_dependencies('include/psa/crypto_config.h') + if not all((dep.lstrip('!') in _implemented_dependencies or 'PSA_WANT' not in dep) + for dep in dependencies): + dependencies.append('DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET') + + +class Information: + """Gather information about PSA constructors.""" + + def __init__(self) -> None: + self.constructors = self.read_psa_interface() + + @staticmethod + def remove_unwanted_macros( + constructors: macro_collector.PSAMacroEnumerator + ) -> None: + # Mbed TLS doesn't support finite-field DH yet and will not support + # finite-field DSA. Don't attempt to generate any related test case. + constructors.key_types.discard('PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR') + constructors.key_types.discard('PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY') + constructors.key_types.discard('PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR') + constructors.key_types.discard('PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY') + + def read_psa_interface(self) -> macro_collector.PSAMacroEnumerator: + """Return the list of known key types, algorithms, etc.""" + constructors = macro_collector.InputsForTest() + header_file_names = ['include/psa/crypto_values.h', + 'include/psa/crypto_extra.h'] + test_suites = ['tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data'] + for header_file_name in header_file_names: + constructors.parse_header(header_file_name) + for test_cases in test_suites: + constructors.parse_test_cases(test_cases) + self.remove_unwanted_macros(constructors) + constructors.gather_arguments() + return constructors + + +def test_case_for_key_type_not_supported( + verb: str, key_type: str, bits: int, + dependencies: List[str], + *args: str, + param_descr: str = '' +) -> test_case.TestCase: + """Return one test case exercising a key creation method + for an unsupported key type or size. + """ + hack_dependencies_not_implemented(dependencies) + tc = test_case.TestCase() + short_key_type = crypto_knowledge.short_expression(key_type) + adverb = 'not' if dependencies else 'never' + if param_descr: + adverb = param_descr + ' ' + adverb + tc.set_description('PSA {} {} {}-bit {} supported' + .format(verb, short_key_type, bits, adverb)) + tc.set_dependencies(dependencies) + tc.set_function(verb + '_not_supported') + tc.set_arguments([key_type] + list(args)) + return tc + +class NotSupported: + """Generate test cases for when something is not supported.""" + + def __init__(self, info: Information) -> None: + self.constructors = info.constructors + + ALWAYS_SUPPORTED = frozenset([ + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE', + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA', + ]) + def test_cases_for_key_type_not_supported( + self, + kt: crypto_knowledge.KeyType, + param: Optional[int] = None, + param_descr: str = '', + ) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]: + """Return test cases exercising key creation when the given type is unsupported. + + If param is present and not None, emit test cases conditioned on this + parameter not being supported. If it is absent or None, emit test cases + conditioned on the base type not being supported. + """ + if kt.name in self.ALWAYS_SUPPORTED: + # Don't generate test cases for key types that are always supported. + # They would be skipped in all configurations, which is noise. + return + import_dependencies = [('!' if param is None else '') + + psa_want_symbol(kt.name)] + if kt.params is not None: + import_dependencies += [('!' if param == i else '') + + psa_want_symbol(sym) + for i, sym in enumerate(kt.params)] + if kt.name.endswith('_PUBLIC_KEY'): + generate_dependencies = [] + else: + generate_dependencies = import_dependencies + for bits in kt.sizes_to_test(): + yield test_case_for_key_type_not_supported( + 'import', kt.expression, bits, + finish_family_dependencies(import_dependencies, bits), + test_case.hex_string(kt.key_material(bits)), + param_descr=param_descr, + ) + if not generate_dependencies and param is not None: + # If generation is impossible for this key type, rather than + # supported or not depending on implementation capabilities, + # only generate the test case once. + continue + # For public key we expect that key generation fails with + # INVALID_ARGUMENT. It is handled by KeyGenerate class. + if not kt.is_public(): + yield test_case_for_key_type_not_supported( + 'generate', kt.expression, bits, + finish_family_dependencies(generate_dependencies, bits), + str(bits), + param_descr=param_descr, + ) + # To be added: derive + + ECC_KEY_TYPES = ('PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR', + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY') + + def test_cases_for_not_supported(self) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]: + """Generate test cases that exercise the creation of keys of unsupported types.""" + for key_type in sorted(self.constructors.key_types): + if key_type in self.ECC_KEY_TYPES: + continue + kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(key_type) + yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_not_supported(kt) + for curve_family in sorted(self.constructors.ecc_curves): + for constr in self.ECC_KEY_TYPES: + kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(constr, [curve_family]) + yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_not_supported( + kt, param_descr='type') + yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_not_supported( + kt, 0, param_descr='curve') + +def test_case_for_key_generation( + key_type: str, bits: int, + dependencies: List[str], + *args: str, + result: str = '' +) -> test_case.TestCase: + """Return one test case exercising a key generation. + """ + hack_dependencies_not_implemented(dependencies) + tc = test_case.TestCase() + short_key_type = crypto_knowledge.short_expression(key_type) + tc.set_description('PSA {} {}-bit' + .format(short_key_type, bits)) + tc.set_dependencies(dependencies) + tc.set_function('generate_key') + tc.set_arguments([key_type] + list(args) + [result]) + + return tc + +class KeyGenerate: + """Generate positive and negative (invalid argument) test cases for key generation.""" + + def __init__(self, info: Information) -> None: + self.constructors = info.constructors + + ECC_KEY_TYPES = ('PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR', + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY') + + @staticmethod + def test_cases_for_key_type_key_generation( + kt: crypto_knowledge.KeyType + ) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]: + """Return test cases exercising key generation. + + All key types can be generated except for public keys. For public key + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT status is expected. + """ + result = 'PSA_SUCCESS' + + import_dependencies = [psa_want_symbol(kt.name)] + if kt.params is not None: + import_dependencies += [psa_want_symbol(sym) + for i, sym in enumerate(kt.params)] + if kt.name.endswith('_PUBLIC_KEY'): + # The library checks whether the key type is a public key generically, + # before it reaches a point where it needs support for the specific key + # type, so it returns INVALID_ARGUMENT for unsupported public key types. + generate_dependencies = [] + result = 'PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT' + else: + generate_dependencies = import_dependencies + if kt.name == 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR': + generate_dependencies.append("MBEDTLS_GENPRIME") + for bits in kt.sizes_to_test(): + yield test_case_for_key_generation( + kt.expression, bits, + finish_family_dependencies(generate_dependencies, bits), + str(bits), + result + ) + + def test_cases_for_key_generation(self) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]: + """Generate test cases that exercise the generation of keys.""" + for key_type in sorted(self.constructors.key_types): + if key_type in self.ECC_KEY_TYPES: + continue + kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(key_type) + yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_key_generation(kt) + for curve_family in sorted(self.constructors.ecc_curves): + for constr in self.ECC_KEY_TYPES: + kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(constr, [curve_family]) + yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_key_generation(kt) + +class OpFail: + """Generate test cases for operations that must fail.""" + #pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods + + class Reason(enum.Enum): + NOT_SUPPORTED = 0 + INVALID = 1 + INCOMPATIBLE = 2 + PUBLIC = 3 + + def __init__(self, info: Information) -> None: + self.constructors = info.constructors + key_type_expressions = self.constructors.generate_expressions( + sorted(self.constructors.key_types) + ) + self.key_types = [crypto_knowledge.KeyType(kt_expr) + for kt_expr in key_type_expressions] + + def make_test_case( + self, + alg: crypto_knowledge.Algorithm, + category: crypto_knowledge.AlgorithmCategory, + reason: 'Reason', + kt: Optional[crypto_knowledge.KeyType] = None, + not_deps: FrozenSet[str] = frozenset(), + ) -> test_case.TestCase: + """Construct a failure test case for a one-key or keyless operation.""" + #pylint: disable=too-many-arguments,too-many-locals + tc = test_case.TestCase() + pretty_alg = alg.short_expression() + if reason == self.Reason.NOT_SUPPORTED: + short_deps = [re.sub(r'PSA_WANT_ALG_', r'', dep) + for dep in not_deps] + pretty_reason = '!' + '&'.join(sorted(short_deps)) + else: + pretty_reason = reason.name.lower() + if kt: + key_type = kt.expression + pretty_type = kt.short_expression() + else: + key_type = '' + pretty_type = '' + tc.set_description('PSA {} {}: {}{}' + .format(category.name.lower(), + pretty_alg, + pretty_reason, + ' with ' + pretty_type if pretty_type else '')) + dependencies = automatic_dependencies(alg.base_expression, key_type) + for i, dep in enumerate(dependencies): + if dep in not_deps: + dependencies[i] = '!' + dep + tc.set_dependencies(dependencies) + tc.set_function(category.name.lower() + '_fail') + arguments = [] + if kt: + key_material = kt.key_material(kt.sizes_to_test()[0]) + arguments += [key_type, test_case.hex_string(key_material)] + arguments.append(alg.expression) + if category.is_asymmetric(): + arguments.append('1' if reason == self.Reason.PUBLIC else '0') + error = ('NOT_SUPPORTED' if reason == self.Reason.NOT_SUPPORTED else + 'INVALID_ARGUMENT') + arguments.append('PSA_ERROR_' + error) + tc.set_arguments(arguments) + return tc + + def no_key_test_cases( + self, + alg: crypto_knowledge.Algorithm, + category: crypto_knowledge.AlgorithmCategory, + ) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]: + """Generate failure test cases for keyless operations with the specified algorithm.""" + if alg.can_do(category): + # Compatible operation, unsupported algorithm + for dep in automatic_dependencies(alg.base_expression): + yield self.make_test_case(alg, category, + self.Reason.NOT_SUPPORTED, + not_deps=frozenset([dep])) + else: + # Incompatible operation, supported algorithm + yield self.make_test_case(alg, category, self.Reason.INVALID) + + def one_key_test_cases( + self, + alg: crypto_knowledge.Algorithm, + category: crypto_knowledge.AlgorithmCategory, + ) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]: + """Generate failure test cases for one-key operations with the specified algorithm.""" + for kt in self.key_types: + key_is_compatible = kt.can_do(alg) + if key_is_compatible and alg.can_do(category): + # Compatible key and operation, unsupported algorithm + for dep in automatic_dependencies(alg.base_expression): + yield self.make_test_case(alg, category, + self.Reason.NOT_SUPPORTED, + kt=kt, not_deps=frozenset([dep])) + # Public key for a private-key operation + if category.is_asymmetric() and kt.is_public(): + yield self.make_test_case(alg, category, + self.Reason.PUBLIC, + kt=kt) + elif key_is_compatible: + # Compatible key, incompatible operation, supported algorithm + yield self.make_test_case(alg, category, + self.Reason.INVALID, + kt=kt) + elif alg.can_do(category): + # Incompatible key, compatible operation, supported algorithm + yield self.make_test_case(alg, category, + self.Reason.INCOMPATIBLE, + kt=kt) + else: + # Incompatible key and operation. Don't test cases where + # multiple things are wrong, to keep the number of test + # cases reasonable. + pass + + def test_cases_for_algorithm( + self, + alg: crypto_knowledge.Algorithm, + ) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]: + """Generate operation failure test cases for the specified algorithm.""" + for category in crypto_knowledge.AlgorithmCategory: + if category == crypto_knowledge.AlgorithmCategory.PAKE: + # PAKE operations are not implemented yet + pass + elif category.requires_key(): + yield from self.one_key_test_cases(alg, category) + else: + yield from self.no_key_test_cases(alg, category) + + def all_test_cases(self) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]: + """Generate all test cases for operations that must fail.""" + algorithms = sorted(self.constructors.algorithms) + for expr in self.constructors.generate_expressions(algorithms): + alg = crypto_knowledge.Algorithm(expr) + yield from self.test_cases_for_algorithm(alg) + + +class StorageKey(psa_storage.Key): + """Representation of a key for storage format testing.""" + + IMPLICIT_USAGE_FLAGS = { + 'PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH': 'PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE', + 'PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH': 'PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE' + } #type: Dict[str, str] + """Mapping of usage flags to the flags that they imply.""" + + def __init__( + self, + usage: Iterable[str], + without_implicit_usage: Optional[bool] = False, + **kwargs + ) -> None: + """Prepare to generate a key. + + * `usage` : The usage flags used for the key. + * `without_implicit_usage`: Flag to defide to apply the usage extension + """ + usage_flags = set(usage) + if not without_implicit_usage: + for flag in sorted(usage_flags): + if flag in self.IMPLICIT_USAGE_FLAGS: + usage_flags.add(self.IMPLICIT_USAGE_FLAGS[flag]) + if usage_flags: + usage_expression = ' | '.join(sorted(usage_flags)) + else: + usage_expression = '0' + super().__init__(usage=usage_expression, **kwargs) + +class StorageTestData(StorageKey): + """Representation of test case data for storage format testing.""" + + def __init__( + self, + description: str, + expected_usage: Optional[List[str]] = None, + **kwargs + ) -> None: + """Prepare to generate test data + + * `description` : used for the the test case names + * `expected_usage`: the usage flags generated as the expected usage flags + in the test cases. CAn differ from the usage flags + stored in the keys because of the usage flags extension. + """ + super().__init__(**kwargs) + self.description = description #type: str + if expected_usage is None: + self.expected_usage = self.usage #type: psa_storage.Expr + elif expected_usage: + self.expected_usage = psa_storage.Expr(' | '.join(expected_usage)) + else: + self.expected_usage = psa_storage.Expr(0) + +class StorageFormat: + """Storage format stability test cases.""" + + def __init__(self, info: Information, version: int, forward: bool) -> None: + """Prepare to generate test cases for storage format stability. + + * `info`: information about the API. See the `Information` class. + * `version`: the storage format version to generate test cases for. + * `forward`: if true, generate forward compatibility test cases which + save a key and check that its representation is as intended. Otherwise + generate backward compatibility test cases which inject a key + representation and check that it can be read and used. + """ + self.constructors = info.constructors #type: macro_collector.PSAMacroEnumerator + self.version = version #type: int + self.forward = forward #type: bool + + RSA_OAEP_RE = re.compile(r'PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP\((.*)\)\Z') + BRAINPOOL_RE = re.compile(r'PSA_KEY_TYPE_\w+\(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_\w+\)\Z') + @classmethod + def exercise_key_with_algorithm( + cls, + key_type: psa_storage.Expr, bits: int, + alg: psa_storage.Expr + ) -> bool: + """Whether to the given key with the given algorithm. + + Normally only the type and algorithm matter for compatibility, and + this is handled in crypto_knowledge.KeyType.can_do(). This function + exists to detect exceptional cases. Exceptional cases detected here + are not tested in OpFail and should therefore have manually written + test cases. + """ + # Some test keys have the RAW_DATA type and attributes that don't + # necessarily make sense. We do this to validate numerical + # encodings of the attributes. + # Raw data keys have no useful exercise anyway so there is no + # loss of test coverage. + if key_type.string == 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA': + return False + # Mbed TLS only supports 128-bit keys for RC4. + if key_type.string == 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4' and bits != 128: + return False + # OAEP requires room for two hashes plus wrapping + m = cls.RSA_OAEP_RE.match(alg.string) + if m: + hash_alg = m.group(1) + hash_length = crypto_knowledge.Algorithm.hash_length(hash_alg) + key_length = (bits + 7) // 8 + # Leave enough room for at least one byte of plaintext + return key_length > 2 * hash_length + 2 + # There's nothing wrong with ECC keys on Brainpool curves, + # but operations with them are very slow. So we only exercise them + # with a single algorithm, not with all possible hashes. We do + # exercise other curves with all algorithms so test coverage is + # perfectly adequate like this. + m = cls.BRAINPOOL_RE.match(key_type.string) + if m and alg.string != 'PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY': + return False + return True + + def make_test_case(self, key: StorageTestData) -> test_case.TestCase: + """Construct a storage format test case for the given key. + + If ``forward`` is true, generate a forward compatibility test case: + create a key and validate that it has the expected representation. + Otherwise generate a backward compatibility test case: inject the + key representation into storage and validate that it can be read + correctly. + """ + verb = 'save' if self.forward else 'read' + tc = test_case.TestCase() + tc.set_description(verb + ' ' + key.description) + dependencies = automatic_dependencies( + key.lifetime.string, key.type.string, + key.alg.string, key.alg2.string, + ) + dependencies = finish_family_dependencies(dependencies, key.bits) + tc.set_dependencies(dependencies) + tc.set_function('key_storage_' + verb) + if self.forward: + extra_arguments = [] + else: + flags = [] + if self.exercise_key_with_algorithm(key.type, key.bits, key.alg): + flags.append('TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE') + if 'READ_ONLY' in key.lifetime.string: + flags.append('TEST_FLAG_READ_ONLY') + extra_arguments = [' | '.join(flags) if flags else '0'] + tc.set_arguments([key.lifetime.string, + key.type.string, str(key.bits), + key.expected_usage.string, + key.alg.string, key.alg2.string, + '"' + key.material.hex() + '"', + '"' + key.hex() + '"', + *extra_arguments]) + return tc + + def key_for_lifetime( + self, + lifetime: str, + ) -> StorageTestData: + """Construct a test key for the given lifetime.""" + short = lifetime + short = re.sub(r'PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION', + r'', short) + short = crypto_knowledge.short_expression(short) + description = 'lifetime: ' + short + key = StorageTestData(version=self.version, + id=1, lifetime=lifetime, + type='PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA', bits=8, + usage=['PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT'], alg=0, alg2=0, + material=b'L', + description=description) + return key + + def all_keys_for_lifetimes(self) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + """Generate test keys covering lifetimes.""" + lifetimes = sorted(self.constructors.lifetimes) + expressions = self.constructors.generate_expressions(lifetimes) + for lifetime in expressions: + # Don't attempt to create or load a volatile key in storage + if 'VOLATILE' in lifetime: + continue + # Don't attempt to create a read-only key in storage, + # but do attempt to load one. + if 'READ_ONLY' in lifetime and self.forward: + continue + yield self.key_for_lifetime(lifetime) + + def key_for_usage_flags( + self, + usage_flags: List[str], + short: Optional[str] = None, + test_implicit_usage: Optional[bool] = True + ) -> StorageTestData: + """Construct a test key for the given key usage.""" + extra_desc = ' without implication' if test_implicit_usage else '' + description = 'usage' + extra_desc + ': ' + key1 = StorageTestData(version=self.version, + id=1, lifetime=0x00000001, + type='PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA', bits=8, + expected_usage=usage_flags, + without_implicit_usage=not test_implicit_usage, + usage=usage_flags, alg=0, alg2=0, + material=b'K', + description=description) + if short is None: + usage_expr = key1.expected_usage.string + key1.description += crypto_knowledge.short_expression(usage_expr) + else: + key1.description += short + return key1 + + def generate_keys_for_usage_flags(self, **kwargs) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + """Generate test keys covering usage flags.""" + known_flags = sorted(self.constructors.key_usage_flags) + yield self.key_for_usage_flags(['0'], **kwargs) + for usage_flag in known_flags: + yield self.key_for_usage_flags([usage_flag], **kwargs) + for flag1, flag2 in zip(known_flags, + known_flags[1:] + [known_flags[0]]): + yield self.key_for_usage_flags([flag1, flag2], **kwargs) + + def generate_key_for_all_usage_flags(self) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + known_flags = sorted(self.constructors.key_usage_flags) + yield self.key_for_usage_flags(known_flags, short='all known') + + def all_keys_for_usage_flags(self) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + yield from self.generate_keys_for_usage_flags() + yield from self.generate_key_for_all_usage_flags() + + def key_for_type_and_alg( + self, + kt: crypto_knowledge.KeyType, + bits: int, + alg: Optional[crypto_knowledge.Algorithm] = None, + ) -> StorageTestData: + """Construct a test key of the given type. + + If alg is not None, this key allows it. + """ + usage_flags = ['PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT'] + alg1 = 0 #type: psa_storage.Exprable + alg2 = 0 + if alg is not None: + alg1 = alg.expression + usage_flags += alg.usage_flags(public=kt.is_public()) + key_material = kt.key_material(bits) + description = 'type: {} {}-bit'.format(kt.short_expression(1), bits) + if alg is not None: + description += ', ' + alg.short_expression(1) + key = StorageTestData(version=self.version, + id=1, lifetime=0x00000001, + type=kt.expression, bits=bits, + usage=usage_flags, alg=alg1, alg2=alg2, + material=key_material, + description=description) + return key + + def keys_for_type( + self, + key_type: str, + all_algorithms: List[crypto_knowledge.Algorithm], + ) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + """Generate test keys for the given key type.""" + kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(key_type) + for bits in kt.sizes_to_test(): + # Test a non-exercisable key, as well as exercisable keys for + # each compatible algorithm. + # To do: test reading a key from storage with an incompatible + # or unsupported algorithm. + yield self.key_for_type_and_alg(kt, bits) + compatible_algorithms = [alg for alg in all_algorithms + if kt.can_do(alg)] + for alg in compatible_algorithms: + yield self.key_for_type_and_alg(kt, bits, alg) + + def all_keys_for_types(self) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + """Generate test keys covering key types and their representations.""" + key_types = sorted(self.constructors.key_types) + all_algorithms = [crypto_knowledge.Algorithm(alg) + for alg in self.constructors.generate_expressions( + sorted(self.constructors.algorithms) + )] + for key_type in self.constructors.generate_expressions(key_types): + yield from self.keys_for_type(key_type, all_algorithms) + + def keys_for_algorithm(self, alg: str) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + """Generate test keys for the encoding of the specified algorithm.""" + # These test cases only validate the encoding of algorithms, not + # whether the key read from storage is suitable for an operation. + # `keys_for_types` generate read tests with an algorithm and a + # compatible key. + descr = crypto_knowledge.short_expression(alg, 1) + usage = ['PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT'] + key1 = StorageTestData(version=self.version, + id=1, lifetime=0x00000001, + type='PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA', bits=8, + usage=usage, alg=alg, alg2=0, + material=b'K', + description='alg: ' + descr) + yield key1 + key2 = StorageTestData(version=self.version, + id=1, lifetime=0x00000001, + type='PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA', bits=8, + usage=usage, alg=0, alg2=alg, + material=b'L', + description='alg2: ' + descr) + yield key2 + + def all_keys_for_algorithms(self) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + """Generate test keys covering algorithm encodings.""" + algorithms = sorted(self.constructors.algorithms) + for alg in self.constructors.generate_expressions(algorithms): + yield from self.keys_for_algorithm(alg) + + def generate_all_keys(self) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + """Generate all keys for the test cases.""" + yield from self.all_keys_for_lifetimes() + yield from self.all_keys_for_usage_flags() + yield from self.all_keys_for_types() + yield from self.all_keys_for_algorithms() + + def all_test_cases(self) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]: + """Generate all storage format test cases.""" + # First build a list of all keys, then construct all the corresponding + # test cases. This allows all required information to be obtained in + # one go, which is a significant performance gain as the information + # includes numerical values obtained by compiling a C program. + all_keys = list(self.generate_all_keys()) + for key in all_keys: + if key.location_value() != 0: + # Skip keys with a non-default location, because they + # require a driver and we currently have no mechanism to + # determine whether a driver is available. + continue + yield self.make_test_case(key) + +class StorageFormatForward(StorageFormat): + """Storage format stability test cases for forward compatibility.""" + + def __init__(self, info: Information, version: int) -> None: + super().__init__(info, version, True) + +class StorageFormatV0(StorageFormat): + """Storage format stability test cases for version 0 compatibility.""" + + def __init__(self, info: Information) -> None: + super().__init__(info, 0, False) + + def all_keys_for_usage_flags(self) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + """Generate test keys covering usage flags.""" + yield from super().all_keys_for_usage_flags() + yield from self.generate_keys_for_usage_flags(test_implicit_usage=False) + + def keys_for_implicit_usage( + self, + implyer_usage: str, + alg: str, + key_type: crypto_knowledge.KeyType + ) -> StorageTestData: + # pylint: disable=too-many-locals + """Generate test keys for the specified implicit usage flag, + algorithm and key type combination. + """ + bits = key_type.sizes_to_test()[0] + implicit_usage = StorageKey.IMPLICIT_USAGE_FLAGS[implyer_usage] + usage_flags = ['PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT'] + material_usage_flags = usage_flags + [implyer_usage] + expected_usage_flags = material_usage_flags + [implicit_usage] + alg2 = 0 + key_material = key_type.key_material(bits) + usage_expression = crypto_knowledge.short_expression(implyer_usage, 1) + alg_expression = crypto_knowledge.short_expression(alg, 1) + key_type_expression = key_type.short_expression(1) + description = 'implied by {}: {} {} {}-bit'.format( + usage_expression, alg_expression, key_type_expression, bits) + key = StorageTestData(version=self.version, + id=1, lifetime=0x00000001, + type=key_type.expression, bits=bits, + usage=material_usage_flags, + expected_usage=expected_usage_flags, + without_implicit_usage=True, + alg=alg, alg2=alg2, + material=key_material, + description=description) + return key + + def gather_key_types_for_sign_alg(self) -> Dict[str, List[str]]: + # pylint: disable=too-many-locals + """Match possible key types for sign algorithms.""" + # To create a valid combination both the algorithms and key types + # must be filtered. Pair them with keywords created from its names. + incompatible_alg_keyword = frozenset(['RAW', 'ANY', 'PURE']) + incompatible_key_type_keywords = frozenset(['MONTGOMERY']) + keyword_translation = { + 'ECDSA': 'ECC', + 'ED[0-9]*.*' : 'EDWARDS' + } + exclusive_keywords = { + 'EDWARDS': 'ECC' + } + key_types = set(self.constructors.generate_expressions(self.constructors.key_types)) + algorithms = set(self.constructors.generate_expressions(self.constructors.sign_algorithms)) + alg_with_keys = {} #type: Dict[str, List[str]] + translation_table = str.maketrans('(', '_', ')') + for alg in algorithms: + # Generate keywords from the name of the algorithm + alg_keywords = set(alg.partition('(')[0].split(sep='_')[2:]) + # Translate keywords for better matching with the key types + for keyword in alg_keywords.copy(): + for pattern, replace in keyword_translation.items(): + if re.match(pattern, keyword): + alg_keywords.remove(keyword) + alg_keywords.add(replace) + # Filter out incompatible algorithms + if not alg_keywords.isdisjoint(incompatible_alg_keyword): + continue + + for key_type in key_types: + # Generate keywords from the of the key type + key_type_keywords = set(key_type.translate(translation_table).split(sep='_')[3:]) + + # Remove ambiguous keywords + for keyword1, keyword2 in exclusive_keywords.items(): + if keyword1 in key_type_keywords: + key_type_keywords.remove(keyword2) + + if key_type_keywords.isdisjoint(incompatible_key_type_keywords) and\ + not key_type_keywords.isdisjoint(alg_keywords): + if alg in alg_with_keys: + alg_with_keys[alg].append(key_type) + else: + alg_with_keys[alg] = [key_type] + return alg_with_keys + + def all_keys_for_implicit_usage(self) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + """Generate test keys for usage flag extensions.""" + # Generate a key type and algorithm pair for each extendable usage + # flag to generate a valid key for exercising. The key is generated + # without usage extension to check the extension compatibility. + alg_with_keys = self.gather_key_types_for_sign_alg() + + for usage in sorted(StorageKey.IMPLICIT_USAGE_FLAGS, key=str): + for alg in sorted(alg_with_keys): + for key_type in sorted(alg_with_keys[alg]): + # The key types must be filtered to fit the specific usage flag. + kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(key_type) + if kt.is_public() and '_SIGN_' in usage: + # Can't sign with a public key + continue + yield self.keys_for_implicit_usage(usage, alg, kt) + + def generate_all_keys(self) -> Iterator[StorageTestData]: + yield from super().generate_all_keys() + yield from self.all_keys_for_implicit_usage() + +class TestGenerator: + """Generate test data.""" + + def __init__(self, options) -> None: + self.test_suite_directory = self.get_option(options, 'directory', + 'tests/suites') + self.info = Information() + + @staticmethod + def get_option(options, name: str, default: T) -> T: + value = getattr(options, name, None) + return default if value is None else value + + def filename_for(self, basename: str) -> str: + """The location of the data file with the specified base name.""" + return os.path.join(self.test_suite_directory, basename + '.data') + + def write_test_data_file(self, basename: str, + test_cases: Iterable[test_case.TestCase]) -> None: + """Write the test cases to a .data file. + + The output file is ``basename + '.data'`` in the test suite directory. + """ + filename = self.filename_for(basename) + test_case.write_data_file(filename, test_cases) + + # Note that targets whose names contain 'test_format' have their content + # validated by `abi_check.py`. + TARGETS = { + 'test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.generated': + lambda info: KeyGenerate(info).test_cases_for_key_generation(), + 'test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated': + lambda info: NotSupported(info).test_cases_for_not_supported(), + 'test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.generated': + lambda info: OpFail(info).all_test_cases(), + 'test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current': + lambda info: StorageFormatForward(info, 0).all_test_cases(), + 'test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.v0': + lambda info: StorageFormatV0(info).all_test_cases(), + } #type: Dict[str, Callable[[Information], Iterable[test_case.TestCase]]] + + def generate_target(self, name: str) -> None: + test_cases = self.TARGETS[name](self.info) + self.write_test_data_file(name, test_cases) + +def main(args): + """Command line entry point.""" + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument('--list', action='store_true', + help='List available targets and exit') + parser.add_argument('targets', nargs='*', metavar='TARGET', + help='Target file to generate (default: all; "-": none)') + options = parser.parse_args(args) + generator = TestGenerator(options) + if options.list: + for name in sorted(generator.TARGETS): + print(generator.filename_for(name)) + return + if options.targets: + # Allow "-" as a special case so you can run + # ``generate_psa_tests.py - $targets`` and it works uniformly whether + # ``$targets`` is empty or not. + options.targets = [os.path.basename(re.sub(r'\.data\Z', r'', target)) + for target in options.targets + if target != '-'] + else: + options.targets = sorted(generator.TARGETS) + for target in options.targets: + generator.generate_target(target) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main(sys.argv[1:]) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/generate_test_code.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/generate_test_code.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..f5750aac --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/generate_test_code.py @@ -0,0 +1,1145 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +# Test suites code generator. +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +""" +This script is a key part of Mbed TLS test suites framework. For +understanding the script it is important to understand the +framework. This doc string contains a summary of the framework +and explains the function of this script. + +Mbed TLS test suites: +===================== +Scope: +------ +The test suites focus on unit testing the crypto primitives and also +include x509 parser tests. Tests can be added to test any Mbed TLS +module. However, the framework is not capable of testing SSL +protocol, since that requires full stack execution and that is best +tested as part of the system test. + +Test case definition: +--------------------- +Tests are defined in a test_suite_[.].data +file. A test definition contains: + test name + optional build macro dependencies + test function + test parameters + +Test dependencies are build macros that can be specified to indicate +the build config in which the test is valid. For example if a test +depends on a feature that is only enabled by defining a macro. Then +that macro should be specified as a dependency of the test. + +Test function is the function that implements the test steps. This +function is specified for different tests that perform same steps +with different parameters. + +Test parameters are specified in string form separated by ':'. +Parameters can be of type string, binary data specified as hex +string and integer constants specified as integer, macro or +as an expression. Following is an example test definition: + + AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes + depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C + enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:8:-1 + +Test functions: +--------------- +Test functions are coded in C in test_suite_.function files. +Functions file is itself not compilable and contains special +format patterns to specify test suite dependencies, start and end +of functions and function dependencies. Check any existing functions +file for example. + +Execution: +---------- +Tests are executed in 3 steps: +- Generating test_suite_[.].c file + for each corresponding .data file. +- Building each source file into executables. +- Running each executable and printing report. + +Generating C test source requires more than just the test functions. +Following extras are required: +- Process main() +- Reading .data file and dispatching test cases. +- Platform specific test case execution +- Dependency checking +- Integer expression evaluation +- Test function dispatch + +Build dependencies and integer expressions (in the test parameters) +are specified as strings in the .data file. Their run time value is +not known at the generation stage. Hence, they need to be translated +into run time evaluations. This script generates the run time checks +for dependencies and integer expressions. + +Similarly, function names have to be translated into function calls. +This script also generates code for function dispatch. + +The extra code mentioned here is either generated by this script +or it comes from the input files: helpers file, platform file and +the template file. + +Helper file: +------------ +Helpers file contains common helper/utility functions and data. + +Platform file: +-------------- +Platform file contains platform specific setup code and test case +dispatch code. For example, host_test.function reads test data +file from host's file system and dispatches tests. + +Template file: +--------- +Template file for example main_test.function is a template C file in +which generated code and code from input files is substituted to +generate a compilable C file. It also contains skeleton functions for +dependency checks, expression evaluation and function dispatch. These +functions are populated with checks and return codes by this script. + +Template file contains "replacement" fields that are formatted +strings processed by Python string.Template.substitute() method. + +This script: +============ +Core function of this script is to fill the template file with +code that is generated or read from helpers and platform files. + +This script replaces following fields in the template and generates +the test source file: + +$test_common_helpers <-- All common code from helpers.function + is substituted here. +$functions_code <-- Test functions are substituted here + from the input test_suit_xyz.function + file. C preprocessor checks are generated + for the build dependencies specified + in the input file. This script also + generates wrappers for the test + functions with code to expand the + string parameters read from the data + file. +$expression_code <-- This script enumerates the + expressions in the .data file and + generates code to handle enumerated + expression Ids and return the values. +$dep_check_code <-- This script enumerates all + build dependencies and generate + code to handle enumerated build + dependency Id and return status: if + the dependency is defined or not. +$dispatch_code <-- This script enumerates the functions + specified in the input test data file + and generates the initializer for the + function table in the template + file. +$platform_code <-- Platform specific setup and test + dispatch code. + +""" + + +import io +import os +import re +import sys +import string +import argparse + + +BEGIN_HEADER_REGEX = r'/\*\s*BEGIN_HEADER\s*\*/' +END_HEADER_REGEX = r'/\*\s*END_HEADER\s*\*/' + +BEGIN_SUITE_HELPERS_REGEX = r'/\*\s*BEGIN_SUITE_HELPERS\s*\*/' +END_SUITE_HELPERS_REGEX = r'/\*\s*END_SUITE_HELPERS\s*\*/' + +BEGIN_DEP_REGEX = r'BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES' +END_DEP_REGEX = r'END_DEPENDENCIES' + +BEGIN_CASE_REGEX = r'/\*\s*BEGIN_CASE\s*(?P.*?)\s*\*/' +END_CASE_REGEX = r'/\*\s*END_CASE\s*\*/' + +DEPENDENCY_REGEX = r'depends_on:(?P.*)' +C_IDENTIFIER_REGEX = r'!?[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*' +CONDITION_OPERATOR_REGEX = r'[!=]=|[<>]=?' +# forbid 0ddd which might be accidentally octal or accidentally decimal +CONDITION_VALUE_REGEX = r'[-+]?(0x[0-9a-f]+|0|[1-9][0-9]*)' +CONDITION_REGEX = r'({})(?:\s*({})\s*({}))?$'.format(C_IDENTIFIER_REGEX, + CONDITION_OPERATOR_REGEX, + CONDITION_VALUE_REGEX) +TEST_FUNCTION_VALIDATION_REGEX = r'\s*void\s+(?P\w+)\s*\(' +INT_CHECK_REGEX = r'int\s+.*' +CHAR_CHECK_REGEX = r'char\s*\*\s*.*' +DATA_T_CHECK_REGEX = r'data_t\s*\*\s*.*' +FUNCTION_ARG_LIST_END_REGEX = r'.*\)' +EXIT_LABEL_REGEX = r'^exit:' + + +class GeneratorInputError(Exception): + """ + Exception to indicate error in the input files to this script. + This includes missing patterns, test function names and other + parsing errors. + """ + pass + + +class FileWrapper(io.FileIO): + """ + This class extends built-in io.FileIO class with attribute line_no, + that indicates line number for the line that is read. + """ + + def __init__(self, file_name): + """ + Instantiate the base class and initialize the line number to 0. + + :param file_name: File path to open. + """ + super(FileWrapper, self).__init__(file_name, 'r') + self._line_no = 0 + + def next(self): + """ + Python 2 iterator method. This method overrides base class's + next method and extends the next method to count the line + numbers as each line is read. + + It works for both Python 2 and Python 3 by checking iterator + method name in the base iterator object. + + :return: Line read from file. + """ + parent = super(FileWrapper, self) + if hasattr(parent, '__next__'): + line = parent.__next__() # Python 3 + else: + line = parent.next() # Python 2 # pylint: disable=no-member + if line is not None: + self._line_no += 1 + # Convert byte array to string with correct encoding and + # strip any whitespaces added in the decoding process. + return line.decode(sys.getdefaultencoding()).rstrip() + '\n' + return None + + # Python 3 iterator method + __next__ = next + + def get_line_no(self): + """ + Gives current line number. + """ + return self._line_no + + line_no = property(get_line_no) + + +def split_dep(dep): + """ + Split NOT character '!' from dependency. Used by gen_dependencies() + + :param dep: Dependency list + :return: string tuple. Ex: ('!', MACRO) for !MACRO and ('', MACRO) for + MACRO. + """ + return ('!', dep[1:]) if dep[0] == '!' else ('', dep) + + +def gen_dependencies(dependencies): + """ + Test suite data and functions specifies compile time dependencies. + This function generates C preprocessor code from the input + dependency list. Caller uses the generated preprocessor code to + wrap dependent code. + A dependency in the input list can have a leading '!' character + to negate a condition. '!' is separated from the dependency using + function split_dep() and proper preprocessor check is generated + accordingly. + + :param dependencies: List of dependencies. + :return: if defined and endif code with macro annotations for + readability. + """ + dep_start = ''.join(['#if %sdefined(%s)\n' % (x, y) for x, y in + map(split_dep, dependencies)]) + dep_end = ''.join(['#endif /* %s */\n' % + x for x in reversed(dependencies)]) + + return dep_start, dep_end + + +def gen_dependencies_one_line(dependencies): + """ + Similar to gen_dependencies() but generates dependency checks in one line. + Useful for generating code with #else block. + + :param dependencies: List of dependencies. + :return: Preprocessor check code + """ + defines = '#if ' if dependencies else '' + defines += ' && '.join(['%sdefined(%s)' % (x, y) for x, y in map( + split_dep, dependencies)]) + return defines + + +def gen_function_wrapper(name, local_vars, args_dispatch): + """ + Creates test function wrapper code. A wrapper has the code to + unpack parameters from parameters[] array. + + :param name: Test function name + :param local_vars: Local variables declaration code + :param args_dispatch: List of dispatch arguments. + Ex: ['(char *)params[0]', '*((int *)params[1])'] + :return: Test function wrapper. + """ + # Then create the wrapper + wrapper = ''' +void {name}_wrapper( void ** params ) +{{ +{unused_params}{locals} + {name}( {args} ); +}} +'''.format(name=name, + unused_params='' if args_dispatch else ' (void)params;\n', + args=', '.join(args_dispatch), + locals=local_vars) + return wrapper + + +def gen_dispatch(name, dependencies): + """ + Test suite code template main_test.function defines a C function + array to contain test case functions. This function generates an + initializer entry for a function in that array. The entry is + composed of a compile time check for the test function + dependencies. At compile time the test function is assigned when + dependencies are met, else NULL is assigned. + + :param name: Test function name + :param dependencies: List of dependencies + :return: Dispatch code. + """ + if dependencies: + preprocessor_check = gen_dependencies_one_line(dependencies) + dispatch_code = ''' +{preprocessor_check} + {name}_wrapper, +#else + NULL, +#endif +'''.format(preprocessor_check=preprocessor_check, name=name) + else: + dispatch_code = ''' + {name}_wrapper, +'''.format(name=name) + + return dispatch_code + + +def parse_until_pattern(funcs_f, end_regex): + """ + Matches pattern end_regex to the lines read from the file object. + Returns the lines read until end pattern is matched. + + :param funcs_f: file object for .function file + :param end_regex: Pattern to stop parsing + :return: Lines read before the end pattern + """ + headers = '#line %d "%s"\n' % (funcs_f.line_no + 1, funcs_f.name) + for line in funcs_f: + if re.search(end_regex, line): + break + headers += line + else: + raise GeneratorInputError("file: %s - end pattern [%s] not found!" % + (funcs_f.name, end_regex)) + + return headers + + +def validate_dependency(dependency): + """ + Validates a C macro and raises GeneratorInputError on invalid input. + :param dependency: Input macro dependency + :return: input dependency stripped of leading & trailing white spaces. + """ + dependency = dependency.strip() + if not re.match(CONDITION_REGEX, dependency, re.I): + raise GeneratorInputError('Invalid dependency %s' % dependency) + return dependency + + +def parse_dependencies(inp_str): + """ + Parses dependencies out of inp_str, validates them and returns a + list of macros. + + :param inp_str: Input string with macros delimited by ':'. + :return: list of dependencies + """ + dependencies = list(map(validate_dependency, inp_str.split(':'))) + return dependencies + + +def parse_suite_dependencies(funcs_f): + """ + Parses test suite dependencies specified at the top of a + .function file, that starts with pattern BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + and end with END_DEPENDENCIES. Dependencies are specified + after pattern 'depends_on:' and are delimited by ':'. + + :param funcs_f: file object for .function file + :return: List of test suite dependencies. + """ + dependencies = [] + for line in funcs_f: + match = re.search(DEPENDENCY_REGEX, line.strip()) + if match: + try: + dependencies = parse_dependencies(match.group('dependencies')) + except GeneratorInputError as error: + raise GeneratorInputError( + str(error) + " - %s:%d" % (funcs_f.name, funcs_f.line_no)) + if re.search(END_DEP_REGEX, line): + break + else: + raise GeneratorInputError("file: %s - end dependency pattern [%s]" + " not found!" % (funcs_f.name, + END_DEP_REGEX)) + + return dependencies + + +def parse_function_dependencies(line): + """ + Parses function dependencies, that are in the same line as + comment BEGIN_CASE. Dependencies are specified after pattern + 'depends_on:' and are delimited by ':'. + + :param line: Line from .function file that has dependencies. + :return: List of dependencies. + """ + dependencies = [] + match = re.search(BEGIN_CASE_REGEX, line) + dep_str = match.group('depends_on') + if dep_str: + match = re.search(DEPENDENCY_REGEX, dep_str) + if match: + dependencies += parse_dependencies(match.group('dependencies')) + + return dependencies + + +def parse_function_arguments(line): + """ + Parses test function signature for validation and generates + a dispatch wrapper function that translates input test vectors + read from the data file into test function arguments. + + :param line: Line from .function file that has a function + signature. + :return: argument list, local variables for + wrapper function and argument dispatch code. + """ + args = [] + local_vars = '' + args_dispatch = [] + arg_idx = 0 + # Remove characters before arguments + line = line[line.find('(') + 1:] + # Process arguments, ex: arg1, arg2 ) + # This script assumes that the argument list is terminated by ')' + # i.e. the test functions will not have a function pointer + # argument. + for arg in line[:line.find(')')].split(','): + arg = arg.strip() + if arg == '': + continue + if re.search(INT_CHECK_REGEX, arg.strip()): + args.append('int') + args_dispatch.append('*( (int *) params[%d] )' % arg_idx) + elif re.search(CHAR_CHECK_REGEX, arg.strip()): + args.append('char*') + args_dispatch.append('(char *) params[%d]' % arg_idx) + elif re.search(DATA_T_CHECK_REGEX, arg.strip()): + args.append('hex') + # create a structure + pointer_initializer = '(uint8_t *) params[%d]' % arg_idx + len_initializer = '*( (uint32_t *) params[%d] )' % (arg_idx+1) + local_vars += """ data_t data%d = {%s, %s}; +""" % (arg_idx, pointer_initializer, len_initializer) + + args_dispatch.append('&data%d' % arg_idx) + arg_idx += 1 + else: + raise ValueError("Test function arguments can only be 'int', " + "'char *' or 'data_t'\n%s" % line) + arg_idx += 1 + + return args, local_vars, args_dispatch + + +def generate_function_code(name, code, local_vars, args_dispatch, + dependencies): + """ + Generate function code with preprocessor checks and parameter dispatch + wrapper. + + :param name: Function name + :param code: Function code + :param local_vars: Local variables for function wrapper + :param args_dispatch: Argument dispatch code + :param dependencies: Preprocessor dependencies list + :return: Final function code + """ + # Add exit label if not present + if code.find('exit:') == -1: + split_code = code.rsplit('}', 1) + if len(split_code) == 2: + code = """exit: + ; +}""".join(split_code) + + code += gen_function_wrapper(name, local_vars, args_dispatch) + preprocessor_check_start, preprocessor_check_end = \ + gen_dependencies(dependencies) + return preprocessor_check_start + code + preprocessor_check_end + + +def parse_function_code(funcs_f, dependencies, suite_dependencies): + """ + Parses out a function from function file object and generates + function and dispatch code. + + :param funcs_f: file object of the functions file. + :param dependencies: List of dependencies + :param suite_dependencies: List of test suite dependencies + :return: Function name, arguments, function code and dispatch code. + """ + line_directive = '#line %d "%s"\n' % (funcs_f.line_no + 1, funcs_f.name) + code = '' + has_exit_label = False + for line in funcs_f: + # Check function signature. Function signature may be split + # across multiple lines. Here we try to find the start of + # arguments list, then remove '\n's and apply the regex to + # detect function start. + up_to_arg_list_start = code + line[:line.find('(') + 1] + match = re.match(TEST_FUNCTION_VALIDATION_REGEX, + up_to_arg_list_start.replace('\n', ' '), re.I) + if match: + # check if we have full signature i.e. split in more lines + name = match.group('func_name') + if not re.match(FUNCTION_ARG_LIST_END_REGEX, line): + for lin in funcs_f: + line += lin + if re.search(FUNCTION_ARG_LIST_END_REGEX, line): + break + args, local_vars, args_dispatch = parse_function_arguments( + line) + code += line + break + code += line + else: + raise GeneratorInputError("file: %s - Test functions not found!" % + funcs_f.name) + + # Prefix test function name with 'test_' + code = code.replace(name, 'test_' + name, 1) + name = 'test_' + name + + for line in funcs_f: + if re.search(END_CASE_REGEX, line): + break + if not has_exit_label: + has_exit_label = \ + re.search(EXIT_LABEL_REGEX, line.strip()) is not None + code += line + else: + raise GeneratorInputError("file: %s - end case pattern [%s] not " + "found!" % (funcs_f.name, END_CASE_REGEX)) + + code = line_directive + code + code = generate_function_code(name, code, local_vars, args_dispatch, + dependencies) + dispatch_code = gen_dispatch(name, suite_dependencies + dependencies) + return (name, args, code, dispatch_code) + + +def parse_functions(funcs_f): + """ + Parses a test_suite_xxx.function file and returns information + for generating a C source file for the test suite. + + :param funcs_f: file object of the functions file. + :return: List of test suite dependencies, test function dispatch + code, function code and a dict with function identifiers + and arguments info. + """ + suite_helpers = '' + suite_dependencies = [] + suite_functions = '' + func_info = {} + function_idx = 0 + dispatch_code = '' + for line in funcs_f: + if re.search(BEGIN_HEADER_REGEX, line): + suite_helpers += parse_until_pattern(funcs_f, END_HEADER_REGEX) + elif re.search(BEGIN_SUITE_HELPERS_REGEX, line): + suite_helpers += parse_until_pattern(funcs_f, + END_SUITE_HELPERS_REGEX) + elif re.search(BEGIN_DEP_REGEX, line): + suite_dependencies += parse_suite_dependencies(funcs_f) + elif re.search(BEGIN_CASE_REGEX, line): + try: + dependencies = parse_function_dependencies(line) + except GeneratorInputError as error: + raise GeneratorInputError( + "%s:%d: %s" % (funcs_f.name, funcs_f.line_no, + str(error))) + func_name, args, func_code, func_dispatch =\ + parse_function_code(funcs_f, dependencies, suite_dependencies) + suite_functions += func_code + # Generate dispatch code and enumeration info + if func_name in func_info: + raise GeneratorInputError( + "file: %s - function %s re-declared at line %d" % + (funcs_f.name, func_name, funcs_f.line_no)) + func_info[func_name] = (function_idx, args) + dispatch_code += '/* Function Id: %d */\n' % function_idx + dispatch_code += func_dispatch + function_idx += 1 + + func_code = (suite_helpers + + suite_functions).join(gen_dependencies(suite_dependencies)) + return suite_dependencies, dispatch_code, func_code, func_info + + +def escaped_split(inp_str, split_char): + """ + Split inp_str on character split_char but ignore if escaped. + Since, return value is used to write back to the intermediate + data file, any escape characters in the input are retained in the + output. + + :param inp_str: String to split + :param split_char: Split character + :return: List of splits + """ + if len(split_char) > 1: + raise ValueError('Expected split character. Found string!') + out = re.sub(r'(\\.)|' + split_char, + lambda m: m.group(1) or '\n', inp_str, + len(inp_str)).split('\n') + out = [x for x in out if x] + return out + + +def parse_test_data(data_f): + """ + Parses .data file for each test case name, test function name, + test dependencies and test arguments. This information is + correlated with the test functions file for generating an + intermediate data file replacing the strings for test function + names, dependencies and integer constant expressions with + identifiers. Mainly for optimising space for on-target + execution. + + :param data_f: file object of the data file. + :return: Generator that yields test name, function name, + dependency list and function argument list. + """ + __state_read_name = 0 + __state_read_args = 1 + state = __state_read_name + dependencies = [] + name = '' + for line in data_f: + line = line.strip() + # Skip comments + if line.startswith('#'): + continue + + # Blank line indicates end of test + if not line: + if state == __state_read_args: + raise GeneratorInputError("[%s:%d] Newline before arguments. " + "Test function and arguments " + "missing for %s" % + (data_f.name, data_f.line_no, name)) + continue + + if state == __state_read_name: + # Read test name + name = line + state = __state_read_args + elif state == __state_read_args: + # Check dependencies + match = re.search(DEPENDENCY_REGEX, line) + if match: + try: + dependencies = parse_dependencies( + match.group('dependencies')) + except GeneratorInputError as error: + raise GeneratorInputError( + str(error) + " - %s:%d" % + (data_f.name, data_f.line_no)) + else: + # Read test vectors + parts = escaped_split(line, ':') + test_function = parts[0] + args = parts[1:] + yield name, test_function, dependencies, args + dependencies = [] + state = __state_read_name + if state == __state_read_args: + raise GeneratorInputError("[%s:%d] Newline before arguments. " + "Test function and arguments missing for " + "%s" % (data_f.name, data_f.line_no, name)) + + +def gen_dep_check(dep_id, dep): + """ + Generate code for checking dependency with the associated + identifier. + + :param dep_id: Dependency identifier + :param dep: Dependency macro + :return: Dependency check code + """ + if dep_id < 0: + raise GeneratorInputError("Dependency Id should be a positive " + "integer.") + _not, dep = ('!', dep[1:]) if dep[0] == '!' else ('', dep) + if not dep: + raise GeneratorInputError("Dependency should not be an empty string.") + + dependency = re.match(CONDITION_REGEX, dep, re.I) + if not dependency: + raise GeneratorInputError('Invalid dependency %s' % dep) + + _defined = '' if dependency.group(2) else 'defined' + _cond = dependency.group(2) if dependency.group(2) else '' + _value = dependency.group(3) if dependency.group(3) else '' + + dep_check = ''' + case {id}: + {{ +#if {_not}{_defined}({macro}{_cond}{_value}) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + }} + break;'''.format(_not=_not, _defined=_defined, + macro=dependency.group(1), id=dep_id, + _cond=_cond, _value=_value) + return dep_check + + +def gen_expression_check(exp_id, exp): + """ + Generates code for evaluating an integer expression using + associated expression Id. + + :param exp_id: Expression Identifier + :param exp: Expression/Macro + :return: Expression check code + """ + if exp_id < 0: + raise GeneratorInputError("Expression Id should be a positive " + "integer.") + if not exp: + raise GeneratorInputError("Expression should not be an empty string.") + exp_code = ''' + case {exp_id}: + {{ + *out_value = {expression}; + }} + break;'''.format(exp_id=exp_id, expression=exp) + return exp_code + + +def write_dependencies(out_data_f, test_dependencies, unique_dependencies): + """ + Write dependencies to intermediate test data file, replacing + the string form with identifiers. Also, generates dependency + check code. + + :param out_data_f: Output intermediate data file + :param test_dependencies: Dependencies + :param unique_dependencies: Mutable list to track unique dependencies + that are global to this re-entrant function. + :return: returns dependency check code. + """ + dep_check_code = '' + if test_dependencies: + out_data_f.write('depends_on') + for dep in test_dependencies: + if dep not in unique_dependencies: + unique_dependencies.append(dep) + dep_id = unique_dependencies.index(dep) + dep_check_code += gen_dep_check(dep_id, dep) + else: + dep_id = unique_dependencies.index(dep) + out_data_f.write(':' + str(dep_id)) + out_data_f.write('\n') + return dep_check_code + + +def write_parameters(out_data_f, test_args, func_args, unique_expressions): + """ + Writes test parameters to the intermediate data file, replacing + the string form with identifiers. Also, generates expression + check code. + + :param out_data_f: Output intermediate data file + :param test_args: Test parameters + :param func_args: Function arguments + :param unique_expressions: Mutable list to track unique + expressions that are global to this re-entrant function. + :return: Returns expression check code. + """ + expression_code = '' + for i, _ in enumerate(test_args): + typ = func_args[i] + val = test_args[i] + + # check if val is a non literal int val (i.e. an expression) + if typ == 'int' and not re.match(r'(\d+|0x[0-9a-f]+)$', + val, re.I): + typ = 'exp' + if val not in unique_expressions: + unique_expressions.append(val) + # exp_id can be derived from len(). But for + # readability and consistency with case of existing + # let's use index(). + exp_id = unique_expressions.index(val) + expression_code += gen_expression_check(exp_id, val) + val = exp_id + else: + val = unique_expressions.index(val) + out_data_f.write(':' + typ + ':' + str(val)) + out_data_f.write('\n') + return expression_code + + +def gen_suite_dep_checks(suite_dependencies, dep_check_code, expression_code): + """ + Generates preprocessor checks for test suite dependencies. + + :param suite_dependencies: Test suite dependencies read from the + .function file. + :param dep_check_code: Dependency check code + :param expression_code: Expression check code + :return: Dependency and expression code guarded by test suite + dependencies. + """ + if suite_dependencies: + preprocessor_check = gen_dependencies_one_line(suite_dependencies) + dep_check_code = ''' +{preprocessor_check} +{code} +#endif +'''.format(preprocessor_check=preprocessor_check, code=dep_check_code) + expression_code = ''' +{preprocessor_check} +{code} +#endif +'''.format(preprocessor_check=preprocessor_check, code=expression_code) + return dep_check_code, expression_code + + +def gen_from_test_data(data_f, out_data_f, func_info, suite_dependencies): + """ + This function reads test case name, dependencies and test vectors + from the .data file. This information is correlated with the test + functions file for generating an intermediate data file replacing + the strings for test function names, dependencies and integer + constant expressions with identifiers. Mainly for optimising + space for on-target execution. + It also generates test case dependency check code and expression + evaluation code. + + :param data_f: Data file object + :param out_data_f: Output intermediate data file + :param func_info: Dict keyed by function and with function id + and arguments info + :param suite_dependencies: Test suite dependencies + :return: Returns dependency and expression check code + """ + unique_dependencies = [] + unique_expressions = [] + dep_check_code = '' + expression_code = '' + for test_name, function_name, test_dependencies, test_args in \ + parse_test_data(data_f): + out_data_f.write(test_name + '\n') + + # Write dependencies + dep_check_code += write_dependencies(out_data_f, test_dependencies, + unique_dependencies) + + # Write test function name + test_function_name = 'test_' + function_name + if test_function_name not in func_info: + raise GeneratorInputError("Function %s not found!" % + test_function_name) + func_id, func_args = func_info[test_function_name] + out_data_f.write(str(func_id)) + + # Write parameters + if len(test_args) != len(func_args): + raise GeneratorInputError("Invalid number of arguments in test " + "%s. See function %s signature." % + (test_name, function_name)) + expression_code += write_parameters(out_data_f, test_args, func_args, + unique_expressions) + + # Write a newline as test case separator + out_data_f.write('\n') + + dep_check_code, expression_code = gen_suite_dep_checks( + suite_dependencies, dep_check_code, expression_code) + return dep_check_code, expression_code + + +def add_input_info(funcs_file, data_file, template_file, + c_file, snippets): + """ + Add generator input info in snippets. + + :param funcs_file: Functions file object + :param data_file: Data file object + :param template_file: Template file object + :param c_file: Output C file object + :param snippets: Dictionary to contain code pieces to be + substituted in the template. + :return: + """ + snippets['test_file'] = c_file + snippets['test_main_file'] = template_file + snippets['test_case_file'] = funcs_file + snippets['test_case_data_file'] = data_file + + +def read_code_from_input_files(platform_file, helpers_file, + out_data_file, snippets): + """ + Read code from input files and create substitutions for replacement + strings in the template file. + + :param platform_file: Platform file object + :param helpers_file: Helper functions file object + :param out_data_file: Output intermediate data file object + :param snippets: Dictionary to contain code pieces to be + substituted in the template. + :return: + """ + # Read helpers + with open(helpers_file, 'r') as help_f, open(platform_file, 'r') as \ + platform_f: + snippets['test_common_helper_file'] = helpers_file + snippets['test_common_helpers'] = help_f.read() + snippets['test_platform_file'] = platform_file + snippets['platform_code'] = platform_f.read().replace( + 'DATA_FILE', out_data_file.replace('\\', '\\\\')) # escape '\' + + +def write_test_source_file(template_file, c_file, snippets): + """ + Write output source file with generated source code. + + :param template_file: Template file name + :param c_file: Output source file + :param snippets: Generated and code snippets + :return: + """ + with open(template_file, 'r') as template_f, open(c_file, 'w') as c_f: + for line_no, line in enumerate(template_f.readlines(), 1): + # Update line number. +1 as #line directive sets next line number + snippets['line_no'] = line_no + 1 + code = string.Template(line).substitute(**snippets) + c_f.write(code) + + +def parse_function_file(funcs_file, snippets): + """ + Parse function file and generate function dispatch code. + + :param funcs_file: Functions file name + :param snippets: Dictionary to contain code pieces to be + substituted in the template. + :return: + """ + with FileWrapper(funcs_file) as funcs_f: + suite_dependencies, dispatch_code, func_code, func_info = \ + parse_functions(funcs_f) + snippets['functions_code'] = func_code + snippets['dispatch_code'] = dispatch_code + return suite_dependencies, func_info + + +def generate_intermediate_data_file(data_file, out_data_file, + suite_dependencies, func_info, snippets): + """ + Generates intermediate data file from input data file and + information read from functions file. + + :param data_file: Data file name + :param out_data_file: Output/Intermediate data file + :param suite_dependencies: List of suite dependencies. + :param func_info: Function info parsed from functions file. + :param snippets: Dictionary to contain code pieces to be + substituted in the template. + :return: + """ + with FileWrapper(data_file) as data_f, \ + open(out_data_file, 'w') as out_data_f: + dep_check_code, expression_code = gen_from_test_data( + data_f, out_data_f, func_info, suite_dependencies) + snippets['dep_check_code'] = dep_check_code + snippets['expression_code'] = expression_code + + +def generate_code(**input_info): + """ + Generates C source code from test suite file, data file, common + helpers file and platform file. + + input_info expands to following parameters: + funcs_file: Functions file object + data_file: Data file object + template_file: Template file object + platform_file: Platform file object + helpers_file: Helper functions file object + suites_dir: Test suites dir + c_file: Output C file object + out_data_file: Output intermediate data file object + :return: + """ + funcs_file = input_info['funcs_file'] + data_file = input_info['data_file'] + template_file = input_info['template_file'] + platform_file = input_info['platform_file'] + helpers_file = input_info['helpers_file'] + suites_dir = input_info['suites_dir'] + c_file = input_info['c_file'] + out_data_file = input_info['out_data_file'] + for name, path in [('Functions file', funcs_file), + ('Data file', data_file), + ('Template file', template_file), + ('Platform file', platform_file), + ('Helpers code file', helpers_file), + ('Suites dir', suites_dir)]: + if not os.path.exists(path): + raise IOError("ERROR: %s [%s] not found!" % (name, path)) + + snippets = {'generator_script': os.path.basename(__file__)} + read_code_from_input_files(platform_file, helpers_file, + out_data_file, snippets) + add_input_info(funcs_file, data_file, template_file, + c_file, snippets) + suite_dependencies, func_info = parse_function_file(funcs_file, snippets) + generate_intermediate_data_file(data_file, out_data_file, + suite_dependencies, func_info, snippets) + write_test_source_file(template_file, c_file, snippets) + + +def main(): + """ + Command line parser. + + :return: + """ + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( + description='Dynamically generate test suite code.') + + parser.add_argument("-f", "--functions-file", + dest="funcs_file", + help="Functions file", + metavar="FUNCTIONS_FILE", + required=True) + + parser.add_argument("-d", "--data-file", + dest="data_file", + help="Data file", + metavar="DATA_FILE", + required=True) + + parser.add_argument("-t", "--template-file", + dest="template_file", + help="Template file", + metavar="TEMPLATE_FILE", + required=True) + + parser.add_argument("-s", "--suites-dir", + dest="suites_dir", + help="Suites dir", + metavar="SUITES_DIR", + required=True) + + parser.add_argument("--helpers-file", + dest="helpers_file", + help="Helpers file", + metavar="HELPERS_FILE", + required=True) + + parser.add_argument("-p", "--platform-file", + dest="platform_file", + help="Platform code file", + metavar="PLATFORM_FILE", + required=True) + + parser.add_argument("-o", "--out-dir", + dest="out_dir", + help="Dir where generated code and scripts are copied", + metavar="OUT_DIR", + required=True) + + args = parser.parse_args() + + data_file_name = os.path.basename(args.data_file) + data_name = os.path.splitext(data_file_name)[0] + + out_c_file = os.path.join(args.out_dir, data_name + '.c') + out_data_file = os.path.join(args.out_dir, data_name + '.datax') + + out_c_file_dir = os.path.dirname(out_c_file) + out_data_file_dir = os.path.dirname(out_data_file) + for directory in [out_c_file_dir, out_data_file_dir]: + if not os.path.exists(directory): + os.makedirs(directory) + + generate_code(funcs_file=args.funcs_file, data_file=args.data_file, + template_file=args.template_file, + platform_file=args.platform_file, + helpers_file=args.helpers_file, suites_dir=args.suites_dir, + c_file=out_c_file, out_data_file=out_data_file) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + try: + main() + except GeneratorInputError as err: + sys.exit("%s: input error: %s" % + (os.path.basename(sys.argv[0]), str(err))) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..20f3aa63 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# key-exchanges.pl +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# To test the code dependencies on individual key exchanges in the SSL module. +# is a verification step to ensure we don't ship SSL code that do not work +# for some build options. +# +# The process is: +# for each possible key exchange +# build the library with all but that key exchange disabled +# +# Usage: tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl +# +# This script should be executed from the root of the project directory. +# +# For best effect, run either with cmake disabled, or cmake enabled in a mode +# that includes -Werror. + +use warnings; +use strict; + +-d 'library' && -d 'include' && -d 'tests' or die "Must be run from root\n"; + +my $sed_cmd = 's/^#define \(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_.*_ENABLED\)/\1/p'; +my $config_h = 'include/mbedtls/config.h'; +my @kexes = split( /\s+/, `sed -n -e '$sed_cmd' $config_h` ); + +system( "cp $config_h $config_h.bak" ) and die; +sub abort { + system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and warn "$config_h not restored\n"; + # use an exit code between 1 and 124 for git bisect (die returns 255) + warn $_[0]; + exit 1; +} + +for my $kex (@kexes) { + system( "cp $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die "$config_h not restored\n"; + system( "make clean" ) and die; + + print "\n******************************************\n"; + print "* Testing with key exchange: $kex\n"; + print "******************************************\n"; + $ENV{MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION} = $kex; + + # full config with all key exchanges disabled except one + system( "scripts/config.py full" ) and abort "Failed config full\n"; + for my $k (@kexes) { + next if $k eq $kex; + system( "scripts/config.py unset $k" ) + and abort "Failed to disable $k\n"; + } + + system( "make lib CFLAGS='-Os -Werror'" ) and abort "Failed to build lib: $kex\n"; +} + +system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die "$config_h not restored\n"; +system( "make clean" ) and die; +exit 0; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..9b930802 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# +# Create a file named identifiers containing identifiers from internal header +# files, based on the --internal flag. +# Outputs the line count of the file to stdout. +# A very thin wrapper around list_internal_identifiers.py for backwards +# compatibility. +# Must be run from Mbed TLS root. +# +# Usage: list-identifiers.sh [ -i | --internal ] +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +set -eu + +if [ -d include/mbedtls ]; then :; else + echo "$0: Must be run from Mbed TLS root" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +INTERNAL="" + +until [ -z "${1-}" ] +do + case "$1" in + -i|--internal) + INTERNAL="1" + ;; + *) + # print error + echo "Unknown argument: '$1'" + exit 1 + ;; + esac + shift +done + +if [ $INTERNAL ] +then + tests/scripts/list_internal_identifiers.py + wc -l identifiers +else + cat <) +{ + if( /^[^\/#{}\s]/ && ! /\[.*]/ ) { + chomp( $cur_name = $_ ) unless $inside; + } elsif( /^{/ && $cur_name ) { + $inside = 1; + $cur_name =~ s/.* ([^ ]*)\(.*/$1/; + } elsif( /^}/ && $inside ) { + undef $inside; + undef $cur_name; + } elsif( $inside && /\b\Q$cur_name\E\([^)]/ ) { + push @funcs, $cur_name unless /$known_ok/; + } +} + +print "$_\n" for @funcs; +exit @funcs; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/run-test-suites.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/run-test-suites.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..15fa8bcf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/run-test-suites.pl @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# run-test-suites.pl +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +Execute all the test suites and print a summary of the results. + + run-test-suites.pl [[-v|--verbose] [VERBOSITY]] [--skip=SUITE[...]] + +Options: + + -v|--verbose Print detailed failure information. + -v 2|--verbose=2 Print detailed failure information and summary messages. + -v 3|--verbose=3 Print detailed information about every test case. + --skip=SUITE[,SUITE...] + Skip the specified SUITE(s). This option can be used + multiple times. + +=cut + +use warnings; +use strict; + +use utf8; +use open qw(:std utf8); + +use Getopt::Long qw(:config auto_help gnu_compat); +use Pod::Usage; + +my $verbose = 0; +my @skip_patterns = (); +GetOptions( + 'skip=s' => \@skip_patterns, + 'verbose|v:1' => \$verbose, + ) or die; + +# All test suites = executable files, excluding source files, debug +# and profiling information, etc. We can't just grep {! /\./} because +# some of our test cases' base names contain a dot. +my @suites = grep { -x $_ || /\.exe$/ } glob 'test_suite_*'; +@suites = grep { !/\.c$/ && !/\.data$/ && -f } @suites; +die "$0: no test suite found\n" unless @suites; + +# "foo" as a skip pattern skips "test_suite_foo" and "test_suite_foo.bar" +# but not "test_suite_foobar". +my $skip_re = + ( '\Atest_suite_(' . + join('|', map { + s/[ ,;]/|/g; # allow any of " ,;|" as separators + s/\./\./g; # "." in the input means ".", not "any character" + $_ + } @skip_patterns) . + ')(\z|\.)' ); + +# in case test suites are linked dynamically +$ENV{'LD_LIBRARY_PATH'} = '../library'; +$ENV{'DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH'} = '../library'; + +my $prefix = $^O eq "MSWin32" ? '' : './'; + +my ($failed_suites, $total_tests_run, $failed, $suite_cases_passed, + $suite_cases_failed, $suite_cases_skipped, $total_cases_passed, + $total_cases_failed, $total_cases_skipped ); +my $suites_skipped = 0; + +sub pad_print_center { + my( $width, $padchar, $string ) = @_; + my $padlen = ( $width - length( $string ) - 2 ) / 2; + print $padchar x( $padlen ), " $string ", $padchar x( $padlen ), "\n"; +} + +for my $suite (@suites) +{ + print "$suite ", "." x ( 72 - length($suite) - 2 - 4 ), " "; + if( $suite =~ /$skip_re/o ) { + print "SKIP\n"; + ++$suites_skipped; + next; + } + + my $command = "$prefix$suite"; + if( $verbose ) { + $command .= ' -v'; + } + my $result = `$command`; + + $suite_cases_passed = () = $result =~ /.. PASS/g; + $suite_cases_failed = () = $result =~ /.. FAILED/g; + $suite_cases_skipped = () = $result =~ /.. ----/g; + + if( $? == 0 ) { + print "PASS\n"; + if( $verbose > 2 ) { + pad_print_center( 72, '-', "Begin $suite" ); + print $result; + pad_print_center( 72, '-', "End $suite" ); + } + } else { + $failed_suites++; + print "FAIL\n"; + if( $verbose ) { + pad_print_center( 72, '-', "Begin $suite" ); + print $result; + pad_print_center( 72, '-', "End $suite" ); + } + } + + my ($passed, $tests, $skipped) = $result =~ /([0-9]*) \/ ([0-9]*) tests.*?([0-9]*) skipped/; + $total_tests_run += $tests - $skipped; + + if( $verbose > 1 ) { + print "(test cases passed:", $suite_cases_passed, + " failed:", $suite_cases_failed, + " skipped:", $suite_cases_skipped, + " of total:", ($suite_cases_passed + $suite_cases_failed + + $suite_cases_skipped), + ")\n" + } + + $total_cases_passed += $suite_cases_passed; + $total_cases_failed += $suite_cases_failed; + $total_cases_skipped += $suite_cases_skipped; +} + +print "-" x 72, "\n"; +print $failed_suites ? "FAILED" : "PASSED"; +printf( " (%d suites, %d tests run%s)\n", + scalar(@suites) - $suites_skipped, + $total_tests_run, + $suites_skipped ? ", $suites_skipped suites skipped" : "" ); + +if( $verbose > 1 ) { + print " test cases passed :", $total_cases_passed, "\n"; + print " failed :", $total_cases_failed, "\n"; + print " skipped :", $total_cases_skipped, "\n"; + print " of tests executed :", ( $total_cases_passed + $total_cases_failed ), + "\n"; + print " of available tests :", + ( $total_cases_passed + $total_cases_failed + $total_cases_skipped ), + "\n"; + if( $suites_skipped != 0 ) { + print "Note: $suites_skipped suites were skipped.\n"; + } +} + +exit( $failed_suites ? 1 : 0 ); + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/scripts_path.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/scripts_path.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..10bf6f85 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/scripts_path.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +"""Add our Python library directory to the module search path. + +Usage: + + import scripts_path # pylint: disable=unused-import +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import os +import sys + +sys.path.append(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), + os.path.pardir, os.path.pardir, + 'scripts')) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/set_psa_test_dependencies.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/set_psa_test_dependencies.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..61923d85 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/set_psa_test_dependencies.py @@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 + +"""Edit test cases to use PSA dependencies instead of classic dependencies. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import os +import re +import sys + +CLASSIC_DEPENDENCIES = frozenset([ + # This list is manually filtered from config.h. + + # Mbed TLS feature support. + # Only features that affect what can be done are listed here. + # Options that control optimizations or alternative implementations + # are omitted. + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC', + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB', + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR', + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB', + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS', + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER', + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7', + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS', + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN', + 'MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED', + #curve#'MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED', + 'MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC', + #'MBEDTLS_GENPRIME', #needed for RSA key generation + 'MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15', + 'MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21', + 'MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384', + + # Mbed TLS modules. + # Only modules that provide cryptographic mechanisms are listed here. + # Platform, data formatting, X.509 or TLS modules are omitted. + 'MBEDTLS_AES_C', + 'MBEDTLS_ARC4_C', + 'MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C', + #cipher#'MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C', + 'MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C', + 'MBEDTLS_ARIA_C', + 'MBEDTLS_CCM_C', + 'MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C', + 'MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C', + 'MBEDTLS_CMAC_C', + 'MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C', + 'MBEDTLS_DES_C', + 'MBEDTLS_DHM_C', + 'MBEDTLS_ECDH_C', + 'MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C', + 'MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C', + 'MBEDTLS_ECP_C', + 'MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C', + 'MBEDTLS_GCM_C', + 'MBEDTLS_HKDF_C', + 'MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C', + 'MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C', + 'MBEDTLS_MD2_C', + 'MBEDTLS_MD4_C', + 'MBEDTLS_MD5_C', + 'MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C', + 'MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C', + 'MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C', + 'MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C', + 'MBEDTLS_RSA_C', + 'MBEDTLS_SHA1_C', + 'MBEDTLS_SHA256_C', + 'MBEDTLS_SHA512_C', + 'MBEDTLS_XTEA_C', +]) + +def is_classic_dependency(dep): + """Whether dep is a classic dependency that PSA test cases should not use.""" + if dep.startswith('!'): + dep = dep[1:] + return dep in CLASSIC_DEPENDENCIES + +def is_systematic_dependency(dep): + """Whether dep is a PSA dependency which is determined systematically.""" + if dep.startswith('PSA_WANT_ECC_'): + return False + return dep.startswith('PSA_WANT_') + +WITHOUT_SYSTEMATIC_DEPENDENCIES = frozenset([ + 'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG', # only a modifier + 'PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH', # only meaningful in policies + 'PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT', # only a way to combine algorithms + 'PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC', # only a modifier + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE', # not a real key type + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE', # always supported, don't list it to reduce noise + 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA', # always supported, don't list it to reduce noise + 'PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC', #only a modifier + 'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG', #only a modifier +]) + +SPECIAL_SYSTEMATIC_DEPENDENCIES = { + 'PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY': frozenset(['PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA']), + 'PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW': frozenset(['PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN']), +} + +def dependencies_of_symbol(symbol): + """Return the dependencies for a symbol that designates a cryptographic mechanism.""" + if symbol in WITHOUT_SYSTEMATIC_DEPENDENCIES: + return frozenset() + if symbol in SPECIAL_SYSTEMATIC_DEPENDENCIES: + return SPECIAL_SYSTEMATIC_DEPENDENCIES[symbol] + if symbol.startswith('PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_') or \ + symbol.startswith('PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_'): + # Categories are used in test data when an unsupported but plausible + # mechanism number needed. They have no associated dependency. + return frozenset() + return {symbol.replace('_', '_WANT_', 1)} + +def systematic_dependencies(file_name, function_name, arguments): + """List the systematically determined dependency for a test case.""" + deps = set() + + # Run key policy negative tests even if the algorithm to attempt performing + # is not supported but in the case where the test is to check an + # incompatibility between a requested algorithm for a cryptographic + # operation and a key policy. In the latter, we want to filter out the + # cases # where PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED is returned instead of + # PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED. + if function_name.endswith('_key_policy') and \ + arguments[-1].startswith('PSA_ERROR_') and \ + arguments[-1] != ('PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED'): + arguments[-2] = '' + if function_name == 'copy_fail' and \ + arguments[-1].startswith('PSA_ERROR_'): + arguments[-2] = '' + arguments[-3] = '' + + # Storage format tests that only look at how the file is structured and + # don't care about the format of the key material don't depend on any + # cryptographic mechanisms. + if os.path.basename(file_name) == 'test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data' and \ + function_name in {'format_storage_data_check', + 'parse_storage_data_check'}: + return [] + + for arg in arguments: + for symbol in re.findall(r'PSA_(?:ALG|KEY_TYPE)_\w+', arg): + deps.update(dependencies_of_symbol(symbol)) + return sorted(deps) + +def updated_dependencies(file_name, function_name, arguments, dependencies): + """Rework the list of dependencies into PSA_WANT_xxx. + + Remove classic crypto dependencies such as MBEDTLS_RSA_C, + MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, etc. + + Add systematic PSA_WANT_xxx dependencies based on the called function and + its arguments, replacing existing PSA_WANT_xxx dependencies. + """ + automatic = systematic_dependencies(file_name, function_name, arguments) + manual = [dep for dep in dependencies + if not (is_systematic_dependency(dep) or + is_classic_dependency(dep))] + return automatic + manual + +def keep_manual_dependencies(file_name, function_name, arguments): + #pylint: disable=unused-argument + """Declare test functions with unusual dependencies here.""" + # If there are no arguments, we can't do any useful work. Assume that if + # there are dependencies, they are warranted. + if not arguments: + return True + # When PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED is expected, usually, at least one of the + # constants mentioned in the test should not be supported. It isn't + # possible to determine which one in a systematic way. So let the programmer + # decide. + if arguments[-1] == 'PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED': + return True + return False + +def process_data_stanza(stanza, file_name, test_case_number): + """Update PSA crypto dependencies in one Mbed TLS test case. + + stanza is the test case text (including the description, the dependencies, + the line with the function and arguments, and optionally comments). Return + a new stanza with an updated dependency line, preserving everything else + (description, comments, arguments, etc.). + """ + if not stanza.lstrip('\n'): + # Just blank lines + return stanza + # Expect 2 or 3 non-comment lines: description, optional dependencies, + # function-and-arguments. + content_matches = list(re.finditer(r'^[\t ]*([^\t #].*)$', stanza, re.M)) + if len(content_matches) < 2: + raise Exception('Not enough content lines in paragraph {} in {}' + .format(test_case_number, file_name)) + if len(content_matches) > 3: + raise Exception('Too many content lines in paragraph {} in {}' + .format(test_case_number, file_name)) + arguments = content_matches[-1].group(0).split(':') + function_name = arguments.pop(0) + if keep_manual_dependencies(file_name, function_name, arguments): + return stanza + if len(content_matches) == 2: + # Insert a line for the dependencies. If it turns out that there are + # no dependencies, we'll remove that empty line below. + dependencies_location = content_matches[-1].start() + text_before = stanza[:dependencies_location] + text_after = '\n' + stanza[dependencies_location:] + old_dependencies = [] + dependencies_leader = 'depends_on:' + else: + dependencies_match = content_matches[-2] + text_before = stanza[:dependencies_match.start()] + text_after = stanza[dependencies_match.end():] + old_dependencies = dependencies_match.group(0).split(':') + dependencies_leader = old_dependencies.pop(0) + ':' + if dependencies_leader != 'depends_on:': + raise Exception('Next-to-last line does not start with "depends_on:"' + ' in paragraph {} in {}' + .format(test_case_number, file_name)) + new_dependencies = updated_dependencies(file_name, function_name, arguments, + old_dependencies) + if new_dependencies: + stanza = (text_before + + dependencies_leader + ':'.join(new_dependencies) + + text_after) + else: + # The dependencies have become empty. Remove the depends_on: line. + assert text_after[0] == '\n' + stanza = text_before + text_after[1:] + return stanza + +def process_data_file(file_name, old_content): + """Update PSA crypto dependencies in an Mbed TLS test suite data file. + + Process old_content (the old content of the file) and return the new content. + """ + old_stanzas = old_content.split('\n\n') + new_stanzas = [process_data_stanza(stanza, file_name, n) + for n, stanza in enumerate(old_stanzas, start=1)] + return '\n\n'.join(new_stanzas) + +def update_file(file_name, old_content, new_content): + """Update the given file with the given new content. + + Replace the existing file. The previous version is renamed to *.bak. + Don't modify the file if the content was unchanged. + """ + if new_content == old_content: + return + backup = file_name + '.bak' + tmp = file_name + '.tmp' + with open(tmp, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as new_file: + new_file.write(new_content) + os.replace(file_name, backup) + os.replace(tmp, file_name) + +def process_file(file_name): + """Update PSA crypto dependencies in an Mbed TLS test suite data file. + + Replace the existing file. The previous version is renamed to *.bak. + Don't modify the file if the content was unchanged. + """ + old_content = open(file_name, encoding='utf-8').read() + if file_name.endswith('.data'): + new_content = process_data_file(file_name, old_content) + else: + raise Exception('File type not recognized: {}' + .format(file_name)) + update_file(file_name, old_content, new_content) + +def main(args): + for file_name in args: + process_file(file_name) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main(sys.argv[1:]) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/tcp_client.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/tcp_client.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..17f824e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/tcp_client.pl @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# A simple TCP client that sends some data and expects a response. +# Usage: tcp_client.pl HOSTNAME PORT DATA1 RESPONSE1 +# DATA: hex-encoded data to send to the server +# RESPONSE: regexp that must match the server's response +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +use warnings; +use strict; +use IO::Socket::INET; + +# Pack hex digits into a binary string, ignoring whitespace. +sub parse_hex { + my ($hex) = @_; + $hex =~ s/\s+//g; + return pack('H*', $hex); +} + +## Open a TCP connection to the specified host and port. +sub open_connection { + my ($host, $port) = @_; + my $socket = IO::Socket::INET->new(PeerAddr => $host, + PeerPort => $port, + Proto => 'tcp', + Timeout => 1); + die "Cannot connect to $host:$port: $!" unless $socket; + return $socket; +} + +## Close the TCP connection. +sub close_connection { + my ($connection) = @_; + $connection->shutdown(2); + # Ignore shutdown failures (at least for now) + return 1; +} + +## Write the given data, expressed as hexadecimal +sub write_data { + my ($connection, $hexdata) = @_; + my $data = parse_hex($hexdata); + my $total_sent = 0; + while ($total_sent < length($data)) { + my $sent = $connection->send($data, 0); + if (!defined $sent) { + die "Unable to send data: $!"; + } + $total_sent += $sent; + } + return 1; +} + +## Read a response and check it against an expected prefix +sub read_response { + my ($connection, $expected_hex) = @_; + my $expected_data = parse_hex($expected_hex); + my $start_offset = 0; + while ($start_offset < length($expected_data)) { + my $actual_data; + my $ok = $connection->recv($actual_data, length($expected_data)); + if (!defined $ok) { + die "Unable to receive data: $!"; + } + if (($actual_data ^ substr($expected_data, $start_offset)) =~ /[^\000]/) { + printf STDERR ("Received \\x%02x instead of \\x%02x at offset %d\n", + ord(substr($actual_data, $-[0], 1)), + ord(substr($expected_data, $start_offset + $-[0], 1)), + $start_offset + $-[0]); + return 0; + } + $start_offset += length($actual_data); + } + return 1; +} + +if (@ARGV != 4) { + print STDERR "Usage: $0 HOSTNAME PORT DATA1 RESPONSE1\n"; + exit(3); +} +my ($host, $port, $data1, $response1) = @ARGV; +my $connection = open_connection($host, $port); +write_data($connection, $data1); +if (!read_response($connection, $response1)) { + exit(1); +} +close_connection($connection); diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..78e01fce --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +# test-ref-configs.pl +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# For each reference configuration file in the configs directory, build the +# configuration, run the test suites and compat.sh +# +# Usage: tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl [config-name [...]] + +use warnings; +use strict; + +my %configs = ( + 'config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h' => { + 'compat' => '-m tls12 -f \'^TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-...-CCM-8\'', + 'test_again_with_use_psa' => 1 + }, + 'config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h' => { + 'compat' => '-m dtls12 -f \'^TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-...-CCM-8\'', + 'opt' => ' ', + 'opt_needs_debug' => 1, + 'test_again_with_use_psa' => 1 + }, + 'config-mini-tls1_1.h' => { + 'compat' => '-m tls1_1 -f \'^DES-CBC3-SHA$\|^TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA$\'', #', + ## Skip ssl-opt testing for now because ssl-opt.sh is missing a lot + ## of requires_xxx so it would try to run tests that don't apply. + # 'opt' => ' ', + # 'opt_needs_debug' => 1, + 'test_again_with_use_psa' => 1 + }, + 'config-no-entropy.h' => { + }, + 'config-suite-b.h' => { + 'compat' => "-m tls12 -f 'ECDHE-ECDSA.*AES.*GCM' -p mbedTLS", + 'test_again_with_use_psa' => 1, + 'opt' => ' ', + 'opt_needs_debug' => 1, + }, + 'config-symmetric-only.h' => { + 'test_again_with_use_psa' => 0, # Uses PSA by default, no need to test it twice + }, + 'config-thread.h' => { + 'opt' => '-f ECJPAKE.*nolog', + 'test_again_with_use_psa' => 1, + }, +); + +# If no config-name is provided, use all known configs. +# Otherwise, use the provided names only. +my @configs_to_test = sort keys %configs; +if ($#ARGV >= 0) { + foreach my $conf_name ( @ARGV ) { + if( ! exists $configs{$conf_name} ) { + die "Unknown configuration: $conf_name\n"; + } + } + @configs_to_test = @ARGV; +} + +-d 'library' && -d 'include' && -d 'tests' or die "Must be run from root\n"; + +my $config_h = 'include/mbedtls/config.h'; + +system( "cp $config_h $config_h.bak" ) and die; +sub abort { + system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and warn "$config_h not restored\n"; + # use an exit code between 1 and 124 for git bisect (die returns 255) + warn $_[0]; + exit 1; +} + +# Create a seedfile for configurations that enable MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED. +# For test purposes, this doesn't have to be cryptographically random. +if (!-e "tests/seedfile" || -s "tests/seedfile" < 64) { + local *SEEDFILE; + open SEEDFILE, ">tests/seedfile" or die; + print SEEDFILE "*" x 64 or die; + close SEEDFILE or die; +} + +sub perform_test { + my $conf_file = $_[0]; + my $data = $_[1]; + my $test_with_psa = $_[2]; + + my $conf_name = $conf_file; + if ( $test_with_psa ) + { + $conf_name .= "+PSA"; + } + + system( "cp $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and die; + system( "make clean" ) and die; + + print "\n******************************************\n"; + print "* Testing configuration: $conf_name\n"; + print "******************************************\n"; + + $ENV{MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION} = $conf_name; + + system( "cp configs/$conf_file $config_h" ) + and abort "Failed to activate $conf_file\n"; + + if ( $test_with_psa ) + { + system( "scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C" ); + system( "scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO" ); + } + + system( "CFLAGS='-Os -Werror -Wall -Wextra' make" ) and abort "Failed to build: $conf_name\n"; + system( "make test" ) and abort "Failed test suite: $conf_name\n"; + + my $compat = $data->{'compat'}; + if( $compat ) + { + print "\nrunning compat.sh $compat ($conf_name)\n"; + system( "tests/compat.sh $compat" ) + and abort "Failed compat.sh: $conf_name\n"; + } + else + { + print "\nskipping compat.sh ($conf_name)\n"; + } + + my $opt = $data->{'opt'}; + if( $opt ) + { + if( $data->{'opt_needs_debug'} ) + { + print "\nrebuilding with debug traces for ssl-opt ($conf_name)\n"; + $conf_name .= '+DEBUG'; + $ENV{MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION} = $conf_name; + system( "make clean" ); + system( "scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C" ); + system( "scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ERROR_C" ); + system( "CFLAGS='-Os -Werror -Wall -Wextra' make" ) and abort "Failed to build: $conf_name\n"; + } + + print "\nrunning ssl-opt.sh $opt ($conf_name)\n"; + system( "tests/ssl-opt.sh $opt" ) + and abort "Failed ssl-opt.sh: $conf_name\n"; + } + else + { + print "\nskipping ssl-opt.sh ($conf_name)\n"; + } +} + +foreach my $conf ( @configs_to_test ) { + my $test_with_psa = $configs{$conf}{'test_again_with_use_psa'}; + if ( $test_with_psa ) + { + perform_test( $conf, $configs{$conf}, $test_with_psa ); + } + perform_test( $conf, $configs{$conf}, 0 ); +} + +system( "mv $config_h.bak $config_h" ) and warn "$config_h not restored\n"; +system( "make clean" ); +exit 0; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_config_script.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_config_script.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..8ca41032 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_config_script.py @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 + +"""Test helper for the Mbed TLS configuration file tool + +Run config.py with various parameters and write the results to files. + +This is a harness to help regression testing, not a functional tester. +Sample usage: + + test_config_script.py -d old + ## Modify config.py and/or config.h ## + test_config_script.py -d new + diff -ru old new +""" + +## Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +## SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +## +## Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +## not use this file except in compliance with the License. +## You may obtain a copy of the License at +## +## http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +## +## Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +## distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +## WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +## See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +## limitations under the License. + +import argparse +import glob +import os +import re +import shutil +import subprocess + +OUTPUT_FILE_PREFIX = 'config-' + +def output_file_name(directory, stem, extension): + return os.path.join(directory, + '{}{}.{}'.format(OUTPUT_FILE_PREFIX, + stem, extension)) + +def cleanup_directory(directory): + """Remove old output files.""" + for extension in []: + pattern = output_file_name(directory, '*', extension) + filenames = glob.glob(pattern) + for filename in filenames: + os.remove(filename) + +def prepare_directory(directory): + """Create the output directory if it doesn't exist yet. + + If there are old output files, remove them. + """ + if os.path.exists(directory): + cleanup_directory(directory) + else: + os.makedirs(directory) + +def guess_presets_from_help(help_text): + """Figure out what presets the script supports. + + help_text should be the output from running the script with --help. + """ + # Try the output format from config.py + hits = re.findall(r'\{([-\w,]+)\}', help_text) + for hit in hits: + words = set(hit.split(',')) + if 'get' in words and 'set' in words and 'unset' in words: + words.remove('get') + words.remove('set') + words.remove('unset') + return words + # Try the output format from config.pl + hits = re.findall(r'\n +([-\w]+) +- ', help_text) + if hits: + return hits + raise Exception("Unable to figure out supported presets. Pass the '-p' option.") + +def list_presets(options): + """Return the list of presets to test. + + The list is taken from the command line if present, otherwise it is + extracted from running the config script with --help. + """ + if options.presets: + return re.split(r'[ ,]+', options.presets) + else: + help_text = subprocess.run([options.script, '--help'], + check=False, # config.pl --help returns 255 + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).stdout + return guess_presets_from_help(help_text.decode('ascii')) + +def run_one(options, args, stem_prefix='', input_file=None): + """Run the config script with the given arguments. + + Take the original content from input_file if specified, defaulting + to options.input_file if input_file is None. + + Write the following files, where xxx contains stem_prefix followed by + a filename-friendly encoding of args: + * config-xxx.h: modified file. + * config-xxx.out: standard output. + * config-xxx.err: standard output. + * config-xxx.status: exit code. + + Return ("xxx+", "path/to/config-xxx.h") which can be used as + stem_prefix and input_file to call this function again with new args. + """ + if input_file is None: + input_file = options.input_file + stem = stem_prefix + '-'.join(args) + data_filename = output_file_name(options.output_directory, stem, 'h') + stdout_filename = output_file_name(options.output_directory, stem, 'out') + stderr_filename = output_file_name(options.output_directory, stem, 'err') + status_filename = output_file_name(options.output_directory, stem, 'status') + shutil.copy(input_file, data_filename) + # Pass only the file basename, not the full path, to avoid getting the + # directory name in error messages, which would make comparisons + # between output directories more difficult. + cmd = [os.path.abspath(options.script), + '-f', os.path.basename(data_filename)] + with open(stdout_filename, 'wb') as out: + with open(stderr_filename, 'wb') as err: + status = subprocess.call(cmd + args, + cwd=options.output_directory, + stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, + stdout=out, stderr=err) + with open(status_filename, 'w') as status_file: + status_file.write('{}\n'.format(status)) + return stem + "+", data_filename + +### A list of symbols to test with. +### This script currently tests what happens when you change a symbol from +### having a value to not having a value or vice versa. This is not +### necessarily useful behavior, and we may not consider it a bug if +### config.py stops handling that case correctly. +TEST_SYMBOLS = [ + 'CUSTOM_SYMBOL', # does not exist + 'MBEDTLS_AES_C', # set, no value + 'MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE', # unset, has a value + 'MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION', # unset, in "System support" + 'MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT', # unset, in "Customisation configuration options" +] + +def run_all(options): + """Run all the command lines to test.""" + presets = list_presets(options) + for preset in presets: + run_one(options, [preset]) + for symbol in TEST_SYMBOLS: + run_one(options, ['get', symbol]) + (stem, filename) = run_one(options, ['set', symbol]) + run_one(options, ['get', symbol], stem_prefix=stem, input_file=filename) + run_one(options, ['--force', 'set', symbol]) + (stem, filename) = run_one(options, ['set', symbol, 'value']) + run_one(options, ['get', symbol], stem_prefix=stem, input_file=filename) + run_one(options, ['--force', 'set', symbol, 'value']) + run_one(options, ['unset', symbol]) + +def main(): + """Command line entry point.""" + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, + formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter) + parser.add_argument('-d', metavar='DIR', + dest='output_directory', required=True, + help="""Output directory.""") + parser.add_argument('-f', metavar='FILE', + dest='input_file', default='include/mbedtls/config.h', + help="""Config file (default: %(default)s).""") + parser.add_argument('-p', metavar='PRESET,...', + dest='presets', + help="""Presets to test (default: guessed from --help).""") + parser.add_argument('-s', metavar='FILE', + dest='script', default='scripts/config.py', + help="""Configuration script (default: %(default)s).""") + options = parser.parse_args() + prepare_directory(options.output_directory) + run_all(options) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_generate_test_code.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_generate_test_code.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..9bf66f1c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_generate_test_code.py @@ -0,0 +1,1699 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +# Unit test for generate_test_code.py +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +""" +Unit tests for generate_test_code.py +""" + +from io import StringIO +from unittest import TestCase, main as unittest_main +from unittest.mock import patch + +from generate_test_code import gen_dependencies, gen_dependencies_one_line +from generate_test_code import gen_function_wrapper, gen_dispatch +from generate_test_code import parse_until_pattern, GeneratorInputError +from generate_test_code import parse_suite_dependencies +from generate_test_code import parse_function_dependencies +from generate_test_code import parse_function_arguments, parse_function_code +from generate_test_code import parse_functions, END_HEADER_REGEX +from generate_test_code import END_SUITE_HELPERS_REGEX, escaped_split +from generate_test_code import parse_test_data, gen_dep_check +from generate_test_code import gen_expression_check, write_dependencies +from generate_test_code import write_parameters, gen_suite_dep_checks +from generate_test_code import gen_from_test_data + + +class GenDep(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for function gen_dep() + """ + + def test_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = ['DEP1', 'DEP2'] + dep_start, dep_end = gen_dependencies(dependencies) + preprocessor1, preprocessor2 = dep_start.splitlines() + endif1, endif2 = dep_end.splitlines() + self.assertEqual(preprocessor1, '#if defined(DEP1)', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(preprocessor2, '#if defined(DEP2)', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(endif1, '#endif /* DEP2 */', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(endif2, '#endif /* DEP1 */', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + def test_disabled_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = ['!DEP1', '!DEP2'] + dep_start, dep_end = gen_dependencies(dependencies) + preprocessor1, preprocessor2 = dep_start.splitlines() + endif1, endif2 = dep_end.splitlines() + self.assertEqual(preprocessor1, '#if !defined(DEP1)', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(preprocessor2, '#if !defined(DEP2)', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(endif1, '#endif /* !DEP2 */', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(endif2, '#endif /* !DEP1 */', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + def test_mixed_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = ['!DEP1', 'DEP2'] + dep_start, dep_end = gen_dependencies(dependencies) + preprocessor1, preprocessor2 = dep_start.splitlines() + endif1, endif2 = dep_end.splitlines() + self.assertEqual(preprocessor1, '#if !defined(DEP1)', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(preprocessor2, '#if defined(DEP2)', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(endif1, '#endif /* DEP2 */', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(endif2, '#endif /* !DEP1 */', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + def test_empty_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = [] + dep_start, dep_end = gen_dependencies(dependencies) + self.assertEqual(dep_start, '', 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(dep_end, '', 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + def test_large_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = [] + count = 10 + for i in range(count): + dependencies.append('DEP%d' % i) + dep_start, dep_end = gen_dependencies(dependencies) + self.assertEqual(len(dep_start.splitlines()), count, + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + self.assertEqual(len(dep_end.splitlines()), count, + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + +class GenDepOneLine(TestCase): + """ + Test Suite for testing gen_dependencies_one_line() + """ + + def test_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = ['DEP1', 'DEP2'] + dep_str = gen_dependencies_one_line(dependencies) + self.assertEqual(dep_str, '#if defined(DEP1) && defined(DEP2)', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + def test_disabled_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = ['!DEP1', '!DEP2'] + dep_str = gen_dependencies_one_line(dependencies) + self.assertEqual(dep_str, '#if !defined(DEP1) && !defined(DEP2)', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + def test_mixed_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = ['!DEP1', 'DEP2'] + dep_str = gen_dependencies_one_line(dependencies) + self.assertEqual(dep_str, '#if !defined(DEP1) && defined(DEP2)', + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + def test_empty_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = [] + dep_str = gen_dependencies_one_line(dependencies) + self.assertEqual(dep_str, '', 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + def test_large_dependencies_list(self): + """ + Test that gen_dep() correctly creates dependencies for given + dependency list. + :return: + """ + dependencies = [] + count = 10 + for i in range(count): + dependencies.append('DEP%d' % i) + dep_str = gen_dependencies_one_line(dependencies) + expected = '#if ' + ' && '.join(['defined(%s)' % + x for x in dependencies]) + self.assertEqual(dep_str, expected, + 'Preprocessor generated incorrectly') + + +class GenFunctionWrapper(TestCase): + """ + Test Suite for testing gen_function_wrapper() + """ + + def test_params_unpack(self): + """ + Test that params are properly unpacked in the function call. + + :return: + """ + code = gen_function_wrapper('test_a', '', ('a', 'b', 'c', 'd')) + expected = ''' +void test_a_wrapper( void ** params ) +{ + + test_a( a, b, c, d ); +} +''' + self.assertEqual(code, expected) + + def test_local(self): + """ + Test that params are properly unpacked in the function call. + + :return: + """ + code = gen_function_wrapper('test_a', + 'int x = 1;', ('x', 'b', 'c', 'd')) + expected = ''' +void test_a_wrapper( void ** params ) +{ +int x = 1; + test_a( x, b, c, d ); +} +''' + self.assertEqual(code, expected) + + def test_empty_params(self): + """ + Test that params are properly unpacked in the function call. + + :return: + """ + code = gen_function_wrapper('test_a', '', ()) + expected = ''' +void test_a_wrapper( void ** params ) +{ + (void)params; + + test_a( ); +} +''' + self.assertEqual(code, expected) + + +class GenDispatch(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for testing gen_dispatch() + """ + + def test_dispatch(self): + """ + Test that dispatch table entry is generated correctly. + :return: + """ + code = gen_dispatch('test_a', ['DEP1', 'DEP2']) + expected = ''' +#if defined(DEP1) && defined(DEP2) + test_a_wrapper, +#else + NULL, +#endif +''' + self.assertEqual(code, expected) + + def test_empty_dependencies(self): + """ + Test empty dependency list. + :return: + """ + code = gen_dispatch('test_a', []) + expected = ''' + test_a_wrapper, +''' + self.assertEqual(code, expected) + + +class StringIOWrapper(StringIO): + """ + file like class to mock file object in tests. + """ + def __init__(self, file_name, data, line_no=0): + """ + Init file handle. + + :param file_name: + :param data: + :param line_no: + """ + super(StringIOWrapper, self).__init__(data) + self.line_no = line_no + self.name = file_name + + def next(self): + """ + Iterator method. This method overrides base class's + next method and extends the next method to count the line + numbers as each line is read. + + :return: Line read from file. + """ + parent = super(StringIOWrapper, self) + line = parent.__next__() + return line + + def readline(self, _length=0): + """ + Wrap the base class readline. + + :param length: + :return: + """ + line = super(StringIOWrapper, self).readline() + if line is not None: + self.line_no += 1 + return line + + +class ParseUntilPattern(TestCase): + """ + Test Suite for testing parse_until_pattern(). + """ + + def test_suite_headers(self): + """ + Test that suite headers are parsed correctly. + + :return: + """ + data = '''#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 +/* END_HEADER */ +''' + expected = '''#line 1 "test_suite_ut.function" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data, line_no=0) + headers = parse_until_pattern(stream, END_HEADER_REGEX) + self.assertEqual(headers, expected) + + def test_line_no(self): + """ + Test that #line is set to correct line no. in source .function file. + + :return: + """ + data = '''#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 +/* END_HEADER */ +''' + offset_line_no = 5 + expected = '''#line %d "test_suite_ut.function" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 +''' % (offset_line_no + 1) + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data, + offset_line_no) + headers = parse_until_pattern(stream, END_HEADER_REGEX) + self.assertEqual(headers, expected) + + def test_no_end_header_comment(self): + """ + Test that InvalidFileFormat is raised when end header comment is + missing. + :return: + """ + data = '''#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 + +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, parse_until_pattern, stream, + END_HEADER_REGEX) + + +class ParseSuiteDependencies(TestCase): + """ + Test Suite for testing parse_suite_dependencies(). + """ + + def test_suite_dependencies(self): + """ + + :return: + """ + data = ''' + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ +''' + expected = ['MBEDTLS_ECP_C'] + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + dependencies = parse_suite_dependencies(stream) + self.assertEqual(dependencies, expected) + + def test_no_end_dep_comment(self): + """ + Test that InvalidFileFormat is raised when end dep comment is missing. + :return: + """ + data = ''' +* depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, parse_suite_dependencies, + stream) + + def test_dependencies_split(self): + """ + Test that InvalidFileFormat is raised when end dep comment is missing. + :return: + """ + data = ''' + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:A:B: C : D :F : G: !H + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ +''' + expected = ['MBEDTLS_ECP_C', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'F', 'G', '!H'] + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + dependencies = parse_suite_dependencies(stream) + self.assertEqual(dependencies, expected) + + +class ParseFuncDependencies(TestCase): + """ + Test Suite for testing parse_function_dependencies() + """ + + def test_function_dependencies(self): + """ + Test that parse_function_dependencies() correctly parses function + dependencies. + :return: + """ + line = '/* BEGIN_CASE ' \ + 'depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */' + expected = ['MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED', 'MBEDTLS_FS_IO'] + dependencies = parse_function_dependencies(line) + self.assertEqual(dependencies, expected) + + def test_no_dependencies(self): + """ + Test that parse_function_dependencies() correctly parses function + dependencies. + :return: + """ + line = '/* BEGIN_CASE */' + dependencies = parse_function_dependencies(line) + self.assertEqual(dependencies, []) + + def test_tolerance(self): + """ + Test that parse_function_dependencies() correctly parses function + dependencies. + :return: + """ + line = '/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO: A : !B:C : F*/' + dependencies = parse_function_dependencies(line) + self.assertEqual(dependencies, ['MBEDTLS_FS_IO', 'A', '!B', 'C', 'F']) + + +class ParseFuncSignature(TestCase): + """ + Test Suite for parse_function_arguments(). + """ + + def test_int_and_char_params(self): + """ + Test int and char parameters parsing + :return: + """ + line = 'void entropy_threshold( char * a, int b, int result )' + args, local, arg_dispatch = parse_function_arguments(line) + self.assertEqual(args, ['char*', 'int', 'int']) + self.assertEqual(local, '') + self.assertEqual(arg_dispatch, ['(char *) params[0]', + '*( (int *) params[1] )', + '*( (int *) params[2] )']) + + def test_hex_params(self): + """ + Test hex parameters parsing + :return: + """ + line = 'void entropy_threshold( char * a, data_t * h, int result )' + args, local, arg_dispatch = parse_function_arguments(line) + self.assertEqual(args, ['char*', 'hex', 'int']) + self.assertEqual(local, + ' data_t data1 = {(uint8_t *) params[1], ' + '*( (uint32_t *) params[2] )};\n') + self.assertEqual(arg_dispatch, ['(char *) params[0]', + '&data1', + '*( (int *) params[3] )']) + + def test_unsupported_arg(self): + """ + Test unsupported arguments (not among int, char * and data_t) + :return: + """ + line = 'void entropy_threshold( char * a, data_t * h, char result )' + self.assertRaises(ValueError, parse_function_arguments, line) + + def test_no_params(self): + """ + Test no parameters. + :return: + """ + line = 'void entropy_threshold()' + args, local, arg_dispatch = parse_function_arguments(line) + self.assertEqual(args, []) + self.assertEqual(local, '') + self.assertEqual(arg_dispatch, []) + + +class ParseFunctionCode(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for testing parse_function_code() + """ + + def test_no_function(self): + """ + Test no test function found. + :return: + """ + data = ''' +No +test +function +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + err_msg = 'file: test_suite_ut.function - Test functions not found!' + self.assertRaisesRegex(GeneratorInputError, err_msg, + parse_function_code, stream, [], []) + + def test_no_end_case_comment(self): + """ + Test missing end case. + :return: + """ + data = ''' +void test_func() +{ +} +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + err_msg = r'file: test_suite_ut.function - '\ + 'end case pattern .*? not found!' + self.assertRaisesRegex(GeneratorInputError, err_msg, + parse_function_code, stream, [], []) + + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_function_arguments") + def test_function_called(self, + parse_function_arguments_mock): + """ + Test parse_function_code() + :return: + """ + parse_function_arguments_mock.return_value = ([], '', []) + data = ''' +void test_func() +{ +} +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, parse_function_code, + stream, [], []) + self.assertTrue(parse_function_arguments_mock.called) + parse_function_arguments_mock.assert_called_with('void test_func()\n') + + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_dispatch") + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_dependencies") + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_function_wrapper") + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_function_arguments") + def test_return(self, parse_function_arguments_mock, + gen_function_wrapper_mock, + gen_dependencies_mock, + gen_dispatch_mock): + """ + Test generated code. + :return: + """ + parse_function_arguments_mock.return_value = ([], '', []) + gen_function_wrapper_mock.return_value = '' + gen_dependencies_mock.side_effect = gen_dependencies + gen_dispatch_mock.side_effect = gen_dispatch + data = ''' +void func() +{ + ba ba black sheep + have you any wool +} +/* END_CASE */ +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + name, arg, code, dispatch_code = parse_function_code(stream, [], []) + + self.assertTrue(parse_function_arguments_mock.called) + parse_function_arguments_mock.assert_called_with('void func()\n') + gen_function_wrapper_mock.assert_called_with('test_func', '', []) + self.assertEqual(name, 'test_func') + self.assertEqual(arg, []) + expected = '''#line 1 "test_suite_ut.function" + +void test_func() +{ + ba ba black sheep + have you any wool +exit: + ; +} +''' + self.assertEqual(code, expected) + self.assertEqual(dispatch_code, "\n test_func_wrapper,\n") + + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_dispatch") + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_dependencies") + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_function_wrapper") + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_function_arguments") + def test_with_exit_label(self, parse_function_arguments_mock, + gen_function_wrapper_mock, + gen_dependencies_mock, + gen_dispatch_mock): + """ + Test when exit label is present. + :return: + """ + parse_function_arguments_mock.return_value = ([], '', []) + gen_function_wrapper_mock.return_value = '' + gen_dependencies_mock.side_effect = gen_dependencies + gen_dispatch_mock.side_effect = gen_dispatch + data = ''' +void func() +{ + ba ba black sheep + have you any wool +exit: + yes sir yes sir + 3 bags full +} +/* END_CASE */ +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + _, _, code, _ = parse_function_code(stream, [], []) + + expected = '''#line 1 "test_suite_ut.function" + +void test_func() +{ + ba ba black sheep + have you any wool +exit: + yes sir yes sir + 3 bags full +} +''' + self.assertEqual(code, expected) + + def test_non_void_function(self): + """ + Test invalid signature (non void). + :return: + """ + data = 'int entropy_threshold( char * a, data_t * h, int result )' + err_msg = 'file: test_suite_ut.function - Test functions not found!' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + self.assertRaisesRegex(GeneratorInputError, err_msg, + parse_function_code, stream, [], []) + + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_dispatch") + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_dependencies") + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_function_wrapper") + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_function_arguments") + def test_functio_name_on_newline(self, parse_function_arguments_mock, + gen_function_wrapper_mock, + gen_dependencies_mock, + gen_dispatch_mock): + """ + Test when exit label is present. + :return: + """ + parse_function_arguments_mock.return_value = ([], '', []) + gen_function_wrapper_mock.return_value = '' + gen_dependencies_mock.side_effect = gen_dependencies + gen_dispatch_mock.side_effect = gen_dispatch + data = ''' +void + + +func() +{ + ba ba black sheep + have you any wool +exit: + yes sir yes sir + 3 bags full +} +/* END_CASE */ +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + _, _, code, _ = parse_function_code(stream, [], []) + + expected = '''#line 1 "test_suite_ut.function" + +void + + +test_func() +{ + ba ba black sheep + have you any wool +exit: + yes sir yes sir + 3 bags full +} +''' + self.assertEqual(code, expected) + + +class ParseFunction(TestCase): + """ + Test Suite for testing parse_functions() + """ + + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_until_pattern") + def test_begin_header(self, parse_until_pattern_mock): + """ + Test that begin header is checked and parse_until_pattern() is called. + :return: + """ + def stop(*_unused): + """Stop when parse_until_pattern is called.""" + raise Exception + parse_until_pattern_mock.side_effect = stop + data = '''/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 +/* END_HEADER */ +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + self.assertRaises(Exception, parse_functions, stream) + parse_until_pattern_mock.assert_called_with(stream, END_HEADER_REGEX) + self.assertEqual(stream.line_no, 1) + + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_until_pattern") + def test_begin_helper(self, parse_until_pattern_mock): + """ + Test that begin helper is checked and parse_until_pattern() is called. + :return: + """ + def stop(*_unused): + """Stop when parse_until_pattern is called.""" + raise Exception + parse_until_pattern_mock.side_effect = stop + data = '''/* BEGIN_SUITE_HELPERS */ +void print_hello_world() +{ + printf("Hello World!\n"); +} +/* END_SUITE_HELPERS */ +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + self.assertRaises(Exception, parse_functions, stream) + parse_until_pattern_mock.assert_called_with(stream, + END_SUITE_HELPERS_REGEX) + self.assertEqual(stream.line_no, 1) + + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_suite_dependencies") + def test_begin_dep(self, parse_suite_dependencies_mock): + """ + Test that begin dep is checked and parse_suite_dependencies() is + called. + :return: + """ + def stop(*_unused): + """Stop when parse_until_pattern is called.""" + raise Exception + parse_suite_dependencies_mock.side_effect = stop + data = '''/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + self.assertRaises(Exception, parse_functions, stream) + parse_suite_dependencies_mock.assert_called_with(stream) + self.assertEqual(stream.line_no, 1) + + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_function_dependencies") + def test_begin_function_dep(self, func_mock): + """ + Test that begin dep is checked and parse_function_dependencies() is + called. + :return: + """ + def stop(*_unused): + """Stop when parse_until_pattern is called.""" + raise Exception + func_mock.side_effect = stop + + dependencies_str = '/* BEGIN_CASE ' \ + 'depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */\n' + data = '''%svoid test_func() +{ +} +''' % dependencies_str + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + self.assertRaises(Exception, parse_functions, stream) + func_mock.assert_called_with(dependencies_str) + self.assertEqual(stream.line_no, 1) + + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_function_code") + @patch("generate_test_code.parse_function_dependencies") + def test_return(self, func_mock1, func_mock2): + """ + Test that begin case is checked and parse_function_code() is called. + :return: + """ + func_mock1.return_value = [] + in_func_code = '''void test_func() +{ +} +''' + func_dispatch = ''' + test_func_wrapper, +''' + func_mock2.return_value = 'test_func', [],\ + in_func_code, func_dispatch + dependencies_str = '/* BEGIN_CASE ' \ + 'depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */\n' + data = '''%svoid test_func() +{ +} +''' % dependencies_str + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + suite_dependencies, dispatch_code, func_code, func_info = \ + parse_functions(stream) + func_mock1.assert_called_with(dependencies_str) + func_mock2.assert_called_with(stream, [], []) + self.assertEqual(stream.line_no, 5) + self.assertEqual(suite_dependencies, []) + expected_dispatch_code = '''/* Function Id: 0 */ + + test_func_wrapper, +''' + self.assertEqual(dispatch_code, expected_dispatch_code) + self.assertEqual(func_code, in_func_code) + self.assertEqual(func_info, {'test_func': (0, [])}) + + def test_parsing(self): + """ + Test case parsing. + :return: + """ + data = '''/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void func1() +{ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void func2() +{ +} +/* END_CASE */ +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + suite_dependencies, dispatch_code, func_code, func_info = \ + parse_functions(stream) + self.assertEqual(stream.line_no, 23) + self.assertEqual(suite_dependencies, ['MBEDTLS_ECP_C']) + + expected_dispatch_code = '''/* Function Id: 0 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + test_func1_wrapper, +#else + NULL, +#endif +/* Function Id: 1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + test_func2_wrapper, +#else + NULL, +#endif +''' + self.assertEqual(dispatch_code, expected_dispatch_code) + expected_func_code = '''#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#line 2 "test_suite_ut.function" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#line 13 "test_suite_ut.function" +void test_func1() +{ +exit: + ; +} + +void test_func1_wrapper( void ** params ) +{ + (void)params; + + test_func1( ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#line 19 "test_suite_ut.function" +void test_func2() +{ +exit: + ; +} + +void test_func2_wrapper( void ** params ) +{ + (void)params; + + test_func2( ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +''' + self.assertEqual(func_code, expected_func_code) + self.assertEqual(func_info, {'test_func1': (0, []), + 'test_func2': (1, [])}) + + def test_same_function_name(self): + """ + Test name conflict. + :return: + """ + data = '''/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void func() +{ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void func() +{ +} +/* END_CASE */ +''' + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, parse_functions, stream) + + +class EscapedSplit(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for testing escaped_split(). + Note: Since escaped_split() output is used to write back to the + intermediate data file. Any escape characters in the input are + retained in the output. + """ + + def test_invalid_input(self): + """ + Test when input split character is not a character. + :return: + """ + self.assertRaises(ValueError, escaped_split, '', 'string') + + def test_empty_string(self): + """ + Test empty string input. + :return: + """ + splits = escaped_split('', ':') + self.assertEqual(splits, []) + + def test_no_escape(self): + """ + Test with no escape character. The behaviour should be same as + str.split() + :return: + """ + test_str = 'yahoo:google' + splits = escaped_split(test_str, ':') + self.assertEqual(splits, test_str.split(':')) + + def test_escaped_input(self): + """ + Test input that has escaped delimiter. + :return: + """ + test_str = r'yahoo\:google:facebook' + splits = escaped_split(test_str, ':') + self.assertEqual(splits, [r'yahoo\:google', 'facebook']) + + def test_escaped_escape(self): + """ + Test input that has escaped delimiter. + :return: + """ + test_str = r'yahoo\\:google:facebook' + splits = escaped_split(test_str, ':') + self.assertEqual(splits, [r'yahoo\\', 'google', 'facebook']) + + def test_all_at_once(self): + """ + Test input that has escaped delimiter. + :return: + """ + test_str = r'yahoo\\:google:facebook\:instagram\\:bbc\\:wikipedia' + splits = escaped_split(test_str, ':') + self.assertEqual(splits, [r'yahoo\\', r'google', + r'facebook\:instagram\\', + r'bbc\\', r'wikipedia']) + + +class ParseTestData(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for parse test data. + """ + + def test_parser(self): + """ + Test that tests are parsed correctly from data file. + :return: + """ + data = """ +Diffie-Hellman full exchange #1 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"5" + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange #2 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":10:"9345098304850938450983409622" + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange #3 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"9345098382739712938719287391879381271":10:"9345098792137312973297123912791271" + +Diffie-Hellman selftest +dhm_selftest: +""" + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + # List of (name, function_name, dependencies, args) + tests = list(parse_test_data(stream)) + test1, test2, test3, test4 = tests + self.assertEqual(test1[0], 'Diffie-Hellman full exchange #1') + self.assertEqual(test1[1], 'dhm_do_dhm') + self.assertEqual(test1[2], []) + self.assertEqual(test1[3], ['10', '"23"', '10', '"5"']) + + self.assertEqual(test2[0], 'Diffie-Hellman full exchange #2') + self.assertEqual(test2[1], 'dhm_do_dhm') + self.assertEqual(test2[2], []) + self.assertEqual(test2[3], ['10', '"93450983094850938450983409623"', + '10', '"9345098304850938450983409622"']) + + self.assertEqual(test3[0], 'Diffie-Hellman full exchange #3') + self.assertEqual(test3[1], 'dhm_do_dhm') + self.assertEqual(test3[2], []) + self.assertEqual(test3[3], ['10', + '"9345098382739712938719287391879381271"', + '10', + '"9345098792137312973297123912791271"']) + + self.assertEqual(test4[0], 'Diffie-Hellman selftest') + self.assertEqual(test4[1], 'dhm_selftest') + self.assertEqual(test4[2], []) + self.assertEqual(test4[3], []) + + def test_with_dependencies(self): + """ + Test that tests with dependencies are parsed. + :return: + """ + data = """ +Diffie-Hellman full exchange #1 +depends_on:YAHOO +dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"5" + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange #2 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":10:"9345098304850938450983409622" + +""" + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + # List of (name, function_name, dependencies, args) + tests = list(parse_test_data(stream)) + test1, test2 = tests + self.assertEqual(test1[0], 'Diffie-Hellman full exchange #1') + self.assertEqual(test1[1], 'dhm_do_dhm') + self.assertEqual(test1[2], ['YAHOO']) + self.assertEqual(test1[3], ['10', '"23"', '10', '"5"']) + + self.assertEqual(test2[0], 'Diffie-Hellman full exchange #2') + self.assertEqual(test2[1], 'dhm_do_dhm') + self.assertEqual(test2[2], []) + self.assertEqual(test2[3], ['10', '"93450983094850938450983409623"', + '10', '"9345098304850938450983409622"']) + + def test_no_args(self): + """ + Test GeneratorInputError is raised when test function name and + args line is missing. + :return: + """ + data = """ +Diffie-Hellman full exchange #1 +depends_on:YAHOO + + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange #2 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":10:"9345098304850938450983409622" + +""" + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + err = None + try: + for _, _, _, _ in parse_test_data(stream): + pass + except GeneratorInputError as err: + self.assertEqual(type(err), GeneratorInputError) + + def test_incomplete_data(self): + """ + Test GeneratorInputError is raised when test function name + and args line is missing. + :return: + """ + data = """ +Diffie-Hellman full exchange #1 +depends_on:YAHOO +""" + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.function', data) + err = None + try: + for _, _, _, _ in parse_test_data(stream): + pass + except GeneratorInputError as err: + self.assertEqual(type(err), GeneratorInputError) + + +class GenDepCheck(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for gen_dep_check(). It is assumed this function is + called with valid inputs. + """ + + def test_gen_dep_check(self): + """ + Test that dependency check code generated correctly. + :return: + """ + expected = """ + case 5: + { +#if defined(YAHOO) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break;""" + out = gen_dep_check(5, 'YAHOO') + self.assertEqual(out, expected) + + def test_not_defined_dependency(self): + """ + Test dependency with !. + :return: + """ + expected = """ + case 5: + { +#if !defined(YAHOO) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break;""" + out = gen_dep_check(5, '!YAHOO') + self.assertEqual(out, expected) + + def test_empty_dependency(self): + """ + Test invalid dependency input. + :return: + """ + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, gen_dep_check, 5, '!') + + def test_negative_dep_id(self): + """ + Test invalid dependency input. + :return: + """ + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, gen_dep_check, -1, 'YAHOO') + + +class GenExpCheck(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for gen_expression_check(). It is assumed this function + is called with valid inputs. + """ + + def test_gen_exp_check(self): + """ + Test that expression check code generated correctly. + :return: + """ + expected = """ + case 5: + { + *out_value = YAHOO; + } + break;""" + out = gen_expression_check(5, 'YAHOO') + self.assertEqual(out, expected) + + def test_invalid_expression(self): + """ + Test invalid expression input. + :return: + """ + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, gen_expression_check, 5, '') + + def test_negative_exp_id(self): + """ + Test invalid expression id. + :return: + """ + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, gen_expression_check, + -1, 'YAHOO') + + +class WriteDependencies(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for testing write_dependencies. + """ + + def test_no_test_dependencies(self): + """ + Test when test dependencies input is empty. + :return: + """ + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', '') + unique_dependencies = [] + dep_check_code = write_dependencies(stream, [], unique_dependencies) + self.assertEqual(dep_check_code, '') + self.assertEqual(len(unique_dependencies), 0) + self.assertEqual(stream.getvalue(), '') + + def test_unique_dep_ids(self): + """ + + :return: + """ + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', '') + unique_dependencies = [] + dep_check_code = write_dependencies(stream, ['DEP3', 'DEP2', 'DEP1'], + unique_dependencies) + expect_dep_check_code = ''' + case 0: + { +#if defined(DEP3) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break; + case 1: + { +#if defined(DEP2) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break; + case 2: + { +#if defined(DEP1) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break;''' + self.assertEqual(dep_check_code, expect_dep_check_code) + self.assertEqual(len(unique_dependencies), 3) + self.assertEqual(stream.getvalue(), 'depends_on:0:1:2\n') + + def test_dep_id_repeat(self): + """ + + :return: + """ + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', '') + unique_dependencies = [] + dep_check_code = '' + dep_check_code += write_dependencies(stream, ['DEP3', 'DEP2'], + unique_dependencies) + dep_check_code += write_dependencies(stream, ['DEP2', 'DEP1'], + unique_dependencies) + dep_check_code += write_dependencies(stream, ['DEP1', 'DEP3'], + unique_dependencies) + expect_dep_check_code = ''' + case 0: + { +#if defined(DEP3) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break; + case 1: + { +#if defined(DEP2) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break; + case 2: + { +#if defined(DEP1) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break;''' + self.assertEqual(dep_check_code, expect_dep_check_code) + self.assertEqual(len(unique_dependencies), 3) + self.assertEqual(stream.getvalue(), + 'depends_on:0:1\ndepends_on:1:2\ndepends_on:2:0\n') + + +class WriteParams(TestCase): + """ + Test Suite for testing write_parameters(). + """ + + def test_no_params(self): + """ + Test with empty test_args + :return: + """ + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', '') + unique_expressions = [] + expression_code = write_parameters(stream, [], [], unique_expressions) + self.assertEqual(len(unique_expressions), 0) + self.assertEqual(expression_code, '') + self.assertEqual(stream.getvalue(), '\n') + + def test_no_exp_param(self): + """ + Test when there is no macro or expression in the params. + :return: + """ + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', '') + unique_expressions = [] + expression_code = write_parameters(stream, ['"Yahoo"', '"abcdef00"', + '0'], + ['char*', 'hex', 'int'], + unique_expressions) + self.assertEqual(len(unique_expressions), 0) + self.assertEqual(expression_code, '') + self.assertEqual(stream.getvalue(), + ':char*:"Yahoo":hex:"abcdef00":int:0\n') + + def test_hex_format_int_param(self): + """ + Test int parameter in hex format. + :return: + """ + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', '') + unique_expressions = [] + expression_code = write_parameters(stream, + ['"Yahoo"', '"abcdef00"', '0xAA'], + ['char*', 'hex', 'int'], + unique_expressions) + self.assertEqual(len(unique_expressions), 0) + self.assertEqual(expression_code, '') + self.assertEqual(stream.getvalue(), + ':char*:"Yahoo":hex:"abcdef00":int:0xAA\n') + + def test_with_exp_param(self): + """ + Test when there is macro or expression in the params. + :return: + """ + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', '') + unique_expressions = [] + expression_code = write_parameters(stream, + ['"Yahoo"', '"abcdef00"', '0', + 'MACRO1', 'MACRO2', 'MACRO3'], + ['char*', 'hex', 'int', + 'int', 'int', 'int'], + unique_expressions) + self.assertEqual(len(unique_expressions), 3) + self.assertEqual(unique_expressions, ['MACRO1', 'MACRO2', 'MACRO3']) + expected_expression_code = ''' + case 0: + { + *out_value = MACRO1; + } + break; + case 1: + { + *out_value = MACRO2; + } + break; + case 2: + { + *out_value = MACRO3; + } + break;''' + self.assertEqual(expression_code, expected_expression_code) + self.assertEqual(stream.getvalue(), + ':char*:"Yahoo":hex:"abcdef00":int:0:exp:0:exp:1' + ':exp:2\n') + + def test_with_repeat_calls(self): + """ + Test when write_parameter() is called with same macro or expression. + :return: + """ + stream = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', '') + unique_expressions = [] + expression_code = '' + expression_code += write_parameters(stream, + ['"Yahoo"', 'MACRO1', 'MACRO2'], + ['char*', 'int', 'int'], + unique_expressions) + expression_code += write_parameters(stream, + ['"abcdef00"', 'MACRO2', 'MACRO3'], + ['hex', 'int', 'int'], + unique_expressions) + expression_code += write_parameters(stream, + ['0', 'MACRO3', 'MACRO1'], + ['int', 'int', 'int'], + unique_expressions) + self.assertEqual(len(unique_expressions), 3) + self.assertEqual(unique_expressions, ['MACRO1', 'MACRO2', 'MACRO3']) + expected_expression_code = ''' + case 0: + { + *out_value = MACRO1; + } + break; + case 1: + { + *out_value = MACRO2; + } + break; + case 2: + { + *out_value = MACRO3; + } + break;''' + self.assertEqual(expression_code, expected_expression_code) + expected_data_file = ''':char*:"Yahoo":exp:0:exp:1 +:hex:"abcdef00":exp:1:exp:2 +:int:0:exp:2:exp:0 +''' + self.assertEqual(stream.getvalue(), expected_data_file) + + +class GenTestSuiteDependenciesChecks(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for testing gen_suite_dep_checks() + """ + def test_empty_suite_dependencies(self): + """ + Test with empty suite_dependencies list. + + :return: + """ + dep_check_code, expression_code = \ + gen_suite_dep_checks([], 'DEP_CHECK_CODE', 'EXPRESSION_CODE') + self.assertEqual(dep_check_code, 'DEP_CHECK_CODE') + self.assertEqual(expression_code, 'EXPRESSION_CODE') + + def test_suite_dependencies(self): + """ + Test with suite_dependencies list. + + :return: + """ + dep_check_code, expression_code = \ + gen_suite_dep_checks(['SUITE_DEP'], 'DEP_CHECK_CODE', + 'EXPRESSION_CODE') + expected_dep_check_code = ''' +#if defined(SUITE_DEP) +DEP_CHECK_CODE +#endif +''' + expected_expression_code = ''' +#if defined(SUITE_DEP) +EXPRESSION_CODE +#endif +''' + self.assertEqual(dep_check_code, expected_dep_check_code) + self.assertEqual(expression_code, expected_expression_code) + + def test_no_dep_no_exp(self): + """ + Test when there are no dependency and expression code. + :return: + """ + dep_check_code, expression_code = gen_suite_dep_checks([], '', '') + self.assertEqual(dep_check_code, '') + self.assertEqual(expression_code, '') + + +class GenFromTestData(TestCase): + """ + Test suite for gen_from_test_data() + """ + + @staticmethod + @patch("generate_test_code.write_dependencies") + @patch("generate_test_code.write_parameters") + @patch("generate_test_code.gen_suite_dep_checks") + def test_intermediate_data_file(func_mock1, + write_parameters_mock, + write_dependencies_mock): + """ + Test that intermediate data file is written with expected data. + :return: + """ + data = ''' +My test +depends_on:DEP1 +func1:0 +''' + data_f = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', data) + out_data_f = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.datax', '') + func_info = {'test_func1': (1, ('int',))} + suite_dependencies = [] + write_parameters_mock.side_effect = write_parameters + write_dependencies_mock.side_effect = write_dependencies + func_mock1.side_effect = gen_suite_dep_checks + gen_from_test_data(data_f, out_data_f, func_info, suite_dependencies) + write_dependencies_mock.assert_called_with(out_data_f, + ['DEP1'], ['DEP1']) + write_parameters_mock.assert_called_with(out_data_f, ['0'], + ('int',), []) + expected_dep_check_code = ''' + case 0: + { +#if defined(DEP1) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break;''' + func_mock1.assert_called_with( + suite_dependencies, expected_dep_check_code, '') + + def test_function_not_found(self): + """ + Test that AssertError is raised when function info in not found. + :return: + """ + data = ''' +My test +depends_on:DEP1 +func1:0 +''' + data_f = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', data) + out_data_f = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.datax', '') + func_info = {'test_func2': (1, ('int',))} + suite_dependencies = [] + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, gen_from_test_data, + data_f, out_data_f, func_info, suite_dependencies) + + def test_different_func_args(self): + """ + Test that AssertError is raised when no. of parameters and + function args differ. + :return: + """ + data = ''' +My test +depends_on:DEP1 +func1:0 +''' + data_f = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', data) + out_data_f = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.datax', '') + func_info = {'test_func2': (1, ('int', 'hex'))} + suite_dependencies = [] + self.assertRaises(GeneratorInputError, gen_from_test_data, data_f, + out_data_f, func_info, suite_dependencies) + + def test_output(self): + """ + Test that intermediate data file is written with expected data. + :return: + """ + data = ''' +My test 1 +depends_on:DEP1 +func1:0:0xfa:MACRO1:MACRO2 + +My test 2 +depends_on:DEP1:DEP2 +func2:"yahoo":88:MACRO1 +''' + data_f = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.data', data) + out_data_f = StringIOWrapper('test_suite_ut.datax', '') + func_info = {'test_func1': (0, ('int', 'int', 'int', 'int')), + 'test_func2': (1, ('char*', 'int', 'int'))} + suite_dependencies = [] + dep_check_code, expression_code = \ + gen_from_test_data(data_f, out_data_f, func_info, + suite_dependencies) + expected_dep_check_code = ''' + case 0: + { +#if defined(DEP1) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break; + case 1: + { +#if defined(DEP2) + ret = DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED; +#else + ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + break;''' + expected_data = '''My test 1 +depends_on:0 +0:int:0:int:0xfa:exp:0:exp:1 + +My test 2 +depends_on:0:1 +1:char*:"yahoo":int:88:exp:0 + +''' + expected_expression_code = ''' + case 0: + { + *out_value = MACRO1; + } + break; + case 1: + { + *out_value = MACRO2; + } + break;''' + self.assertEqual(dep_check_code, expected_dep_check_code) + self.assertEqual(out_data_f.getvalue(), expected_data) + self.assertEqual(expression_code, expected_expression_code) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest_main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..777ffcb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Run the PSA Crypto API compliance test suite. +Clone the repo and check out the commit specified by PSA_ARCH_TEST_REPO and PSA_ARCH_TEST_REF, +then complie and run the test suite. The clone is stored at /psa-arch-tests. +Known defects in either the test suite or mbedtls - identified by their test number - are ignored, +while unexpected failures AND successes are reported as errors, +to help keep the list of known defects as up to date as possible. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import os +import re +import shutil +import subprocess +import sys + +# PSA Compliance tests we expect to fail due to known defects in Mbed TLS (or the test suite) +# The test numbers correspond to the numbers used by the console output of the test suite. +# Test number 2xx corresponds to the files in the folder +# psa-arch-tests/api-tests/dev_apis/crypto/test_c0xx +EXPECTED_FAILURES = { + # Multipart AEAD is not supported in Mbed TLS 2.x. + 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, + + # psa_hash_suspend() and psa_hash_resume() are not supported. + # - Tracked in issue #3274 + 262, 263 +} + +# We currently use a fork of ARM-software/psa-arch-tests, with a couple of downstream patches +# that allow it to build with Mbed TLS 2, and fixes a couple of issues in the compliance test suite. +# These fixes allow the tests numbered 216, 248 and 249 to complete successfully. +# +# Once all the fixes are upstreamed, this fork should be replaced with an upstream commit/tag. +# - Tracked in issue #5145 +# +# Web URL: https://github.com/bensze01/psa-arch-tests/tree/fixes-for-mbedtls-2 +PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REPO = 'https://github.com/bensze01/psa-arch-tests.git' +PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REF = 'fix-5735-2.28' + +#pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-statements +def main(): + mbedtls_dir = os.getcwd() + + if not os.path.exists('library/libmbedcrypto.a'): + subprocess.check_call(['make', '-C', 'library', 'libmbedcrypto.a']) + + psa_arch_tests_dir = 'psa-arch-tests' + os.makedirs(psa_arch_tests_dir, exist_ok=True) + try: + os.chdir(psa_arch_tests_dir) + + # Reuse existing local clone + subprocess.check_call(['git', 'init']) + subprocess.check_call(['git', 'fetch', PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REPO, PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REF]) + subprocess.check_call(['git', 'checkout', 'FETCH_HEAD']) + + build_dir = 'api-tests/build' + try: + shutil.rmtree(build_dir) + except FileNotFoundError: + pass + os.mkdir(build_dir) + os.chdir(build_dir) + + #pylint: disable=bad-continuation + subprocess.check_call([ + 'cmake', '..', + '-GUnix Makefiles', + '-DTARGET=tgt_dev_apis_stdc', + '-DTOOLCHAIN=HOST_GCC', + '-DSUITE=CRYPTO', + '-DMISSING_CRYPTO_1_0=1', + '-DPSA_CRYPTO_LIB_FILENAME={}/library/libmbedcrypto.a'.format(mbedtls_dir), + '-DPSA_INCLUDE_PATHS={}/include'.format(mbedtls_dir) + ]) + subprocess.check_call(['cmake', '--build', '.']) + + proc = subprocess.Popen(['./psa-arch-tests-crypto'], + bufsize=1, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, universal_newlines=True) + + test_re = re.compile( + '^TEST: (?P[0-9]*)|' + '^TEST RESULT: (?PFAILED|PASSED)' + ) + test = -1 + unexpected_successes = set(EXPECTED_FAILURES) + expected_failures = [] + unexpected_failures = [] + for line in proc.stdout: + print(line, end='') + match = test_re.match(line) + if match is not None: + groupdict = match.groupdict() + test_num = groupdict['test_num'] + if test_num is not None: + test = int(test_num) + elif groupdict['test_result'] == 'FAILED': + try: + unexpected_successes.remove(test) + expected_failures.append(test) + print('Expected failure, ignoring') + except KeyError: + unexpected_failures.append(test) + print('ERROR: Unexpected failure') + elif test in unexpected_successes: + print('ERROR: Unexpected success') + proc.wait() + + print() + print('***** test_psa_compliance.py report ******') + print() + print('Expected failures:', ', '.join(str(i) for i in expected_failures)) + print('Unexpected failures:', ', '.join(str(i) for i in unexpected_failures)) + print('Unexpected successes:', ', '.join(str(i) for i in sorted(unexpected_successes))) + print() + if unexpected_successes or unexpected_failures: + if unexpected_successes: + print('Unexpected successes encountered.') + print('Please remove the corresponding tests from ' + 'EXPECTED_FAILURES in tests/scripts/compliance_test.py') + print() + print('FAILED') + return 1 + else: + print('SUCCESS') + return 0 + finally: + os.chdir(mbedtls_dir) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py new file mode 100755 index 00000000..e43a0bae --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Test the program psa_constant_names. +Gather constant names from header files and test cases. Compile a C program +to print out their numerical values, feed these numerical values to +psa_constant_names, and check that the output is the original name. +Return 0 if all test cases pass, 1 if the output was not always as expected, +or 1 (with a Python backtrace) if there was an operational error. +""" + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +import argparse +from collections import namedtuple +import os +import re +import subprocess +import sys +from typing import Iterable, List, Optional, Tuple + +import scripts_path # pylint: disable=unused-import +from mbedtls_dev import c_build_helper +from mbedtls_dev.macro_collector import InputsForTest, PSAMacroEnumerator +from mbedtls_dev import typing_util + +def gather_inputs(headers: Iterable[str], + test_suites: Iterable[str], + inputs_class=InputsForTest) -> PSAMacroEnumerator: + """Read the list of inputs to test psa_constant_names with.""" + inputs = inputs_class() + for header in headers: + inputs.parse_header(header) + for test_cases in test_suites: + inputs.parse_test_cases(test_cases) + inputs.add_numerical_values() + inputs.gather_arguments() + return inputs + +def run_c(type_word: str, + expressions: Iterable[str], + include_path: Optional[str] = None, + keep_c: bool = False) -> List[str]: + """Generate and run a program to print out numerical values of C expressions.""" + if type_word == 'status': + cast_to = 'long' + printf_format = '%ld' + else: + cast_to = 'unsigned long' + printf_format = '0x%08lx' + return c_build_helper.get_c_expression_values( + cast_to, printf_format, + expressions, + caller='test_psa_constant_names.py for {} values'.format(type_word), + file_label=type_word, + header='#include ', + include_path=include_path, + keep_c=keep_c + ) + +NORMALIZE_STRIP_RE = re.compile(r'\s+') +def normalize(expr: str) -> str: + """Normalize the C expression so as not to care about trivial differences. + + Currently "trivial differences" means whitespace. + """ + return re.sub(NORMALIZE_STRIP_RE, '', expr) + +ALG_TRUNCATED_TO_SELF_RE = \ + re.compile(r'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG\(' + r'PSA_ALG_(?:CCM|CHACHA20_POLY1305|GCM)' + r', *16\)\Z') + +def is_simplifiable(expr: str) -> bool: + """Determine whether an expression is simplifiable. + + Simplifiable expressions can't be output in their input form, since + the output will be the simple form. Therefore they must be excluded + from testing. + """ + if ALG_TRUNCATED_TO_SELF_RE.match(expr): + return True + return False + +def collect_values(inputs: InputsForTest, + type_word: str, + include_path: Optional[str] = None, + keep_c: bool = False) -> Tuple[List[str], List[str]]: + """Generate expressions using known macro names and calculate their values. + + Return a list of pairs of (expr, value) where expr is an expression and + value is a string representation of its integer value. + """ + names = inputs.get_names(type_word) + expressions = sorted(expr + for expr in inputs.generate_expressions(names) + if not is_simplifiable(expr)) + values = run_c(type_word, expressions, + include_path=include_path, keep_c=keep_c) + return expressions, values + +class Tests: + """An object representing tests and their results.""" + + Error = namedtuple('Error', + ['type', 'expression', 'value', 'output']) + + def __init__(self, options) -> None: + self.options = options + self.count = 0 + self.errors = [] #type: List[Tests.Error] + + def run_one(self, inputs: InputsForTest, type_word: str) -> None: + """Test psa_constant_names for the specified type. + + Run the program on the names for this type. + Use the inputs to figure out what arguments to pass to macros that + take arguments. + """ + expressions, values = collect_values(inputs, type_word, + include_path=self.options.include, + keep_c=self.options.keep_c) + output_bytes = subprocess.check_output([self.options.program, + type_word] + values) + output = output_bytes.decode('ascii') + outputs = output.strip().split('\n') + self.count += len(expressions) + for expr, value, output in zip(expressions, values, outputs): + if self.options.show: + sys.stdout.write('{} {}\t{}\n'.format(type_word, value, output)) + if normalize(expr) != normalize(output): + self.errors.append(self.Error(type=type_word, + expression=expr, + value=value, + output=output)) + + def run_all(self, inputs: InputsForTest) -> None: + """Run psa_constant_names on all the gathered inputs.""" + for type_word in ['status', 'algorithm', 'ecc_curve', 'dh_group', + 'key_type', 'key_usage']: + self.run_one(inputs, type_word) + + def report(self, out: typing_util.Writable) -> None: + """Describe each case where the output is not as expected. + + Write the errors to ``out``. + Also write a total. + """ + for error in self.errors: + out.write('For {} "{}", got "{}" (value: {})\n' + .format(error.type, error.expression, + error.output, error.value)) + out.write('{} test cases'.format(self.count)) + if self.errors: + out.write(', {} FAIL\n'.format(len(self.errors))) + else: + out.write(' PASS\n') + +HEADERS = ['psa/crypto.h', 'psa/crypto_extra.h', 'psa/crypto_values.h'] +TEST_SUITES = ['tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data'] + +def main(): + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=globals()['__doc__']) + parser.add_argument('--include', '-I', + action='append', default=['include'], + help='Directory for header files') + parser.add_argument('--keep-c', + action='store_true', dest='keep_c', default=False, + help='Keep the intermediate C file') + parser.add_argument('--no-keep-c', + action='store_false', dest='keep_c', + help='Don\'t keep the intermediate C file (default)') + parser.add_argument('--program', + default='programs/psa/psa_constant_names', + help='Program to test') + parser.add_argument('--show', + action='store_true', + help='Show tested values on stdout') + parser.add_argument('--no-show', + action='store_false', dest='show', + help='Don\'t show tested values (default)') + options = parser.parse_args() + headers = [os.path.join(options.include[0], h) for h in HEADERS] + inputs = gather_inputs(headers, TEST_SUITES) + tests = Tests(options) + tests.run_all(inputs) + tests.report(sys.stdout) + if tests.errors: + sys.exit(1) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb new file mode 100644 index 00000000..66c63040 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/test_zeroize.gdb @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +# test_zeroize.gdb +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# Run a test using the debugger to check that the mbedtls_platform_zeroize() +# function in platform_util.h is not being optimized out by the compiler. To do +# so, the script loads the test program at programs/test/zeroize.c and sets a +# breakpoint at the last return statement in main(). When the breakpoint is +# hit, the debugger manually checks the contents to be zeroized and checks that +# it is actually cleared. +# +# The mbedtls_platform_zeroize() test is debugger driven because there does not +# seem to be a mechanism to reliably check whether the zeroize calls are being +# eliminated by compiler optimizations from within the compiled program. The +# problem is that a compiler would typically remove what it considers to be +# "unnecessary" assignments as part of redundant code elimination. To identify +# such code, the compilar will create some form dependency graph between +# reads and writes to variables (among other situations). It will then use this +# data structure to remove redundant code that does not have an impact on the +# program's observable behavior. In the case of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), an +# intelligent compiler could determine that this function clears a block of +# memory that is not accessed later in the program, so removing the call to +# mbedtls_platform_zeroize() does not have an observable behavior. However, +# inserting a test after a call to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to check whether +# the block of memory was correctly zeroed would force the compiler to not +# eliminate the mbedtls_platform_zeroize() call. If this does not occur, then +# the compiler potentially has a bug. +# +# Note: This test requires that the test program is compiled with -g3. + +set confirm off + +file ./programs/test/zeroize + +search GDB_BREAK_HERE +break $_ + +set args ./programs/test/zeroize.c +run + +set $i = 0 +set $len = sizeof(buf) +set $buf = buf + +while $i < $len + if $buf[$i++] != 0 + echo The buffer at was not zeroized\n + quit 1 + end +end + +echo The buffer was correctly zeroized\n + +continue + +if $_exitcode != 0 + echo The program did not terminate correctly\n + quit 1 +end + +quit 0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..249b3f80 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# travis-log-failure.sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# List the server and client logs on failed ssl-opt.sh and compat.sh tests. +# This script is used to make the logs show up in the Travis test results. +# +# Some of the logs can be very long: this means usually a couple of megabytes +# but it can be much more. For example, the client log of test 273 in ssl-opt.sh +# is more than 630 Megabytes long. + +if [ -d include/mbedtls ]; then :; else + echo "$0: must be run from root" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +FILES="o-srv-*.log o-cli-*.log c-srv-*.log c-cli-*.log o-pxy-*.log" +MAX_LOG_SIZE=1048576 + +for PATTERN in $FILES; do + for LOG in $( ls tests/$PATTERN 2>/dev/null ); do + echo + echo "****** BEGIN file: $LOG ******" + echo + tail -c $MAX_LOG_SIZE $LOG + echo "****** END file: $LOG ******" + echo + rm $LOG + done +done diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/asn1_helpers.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/asn1_helpers.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..79aa166c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/asn1_helpers.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/** \file asn1_helpers.c + * + * \brief Helper functions for tests that manipulate ASN.1 data. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + +#include + +int mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + size_t min_bits, size_t max_bits, + int must_be_odd ) +{ + size_t len; + size_t actual_bits; + unsigned char msb; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ), + 0 ); + + /* Check if the retrieved length doesn't extend the actual buffer's size. + * It is assumed here, that end >= p, which validates casting to size_t. */ + TEST_ASSERT( len <= (size_t)( end - *p) ); + + /* Tolerate a slight departure from DER encoding: + * - 0 may be represented by an empty string or a 1-byte string. + * - The sign bit may be used as a value bit. */ + if( ( len == 1 && ( *p )[0] == 0 ) || + ( len > 1 && ( *p )[0] == 0 && ( ( *p )[1] & 0x80 ) != 0 ) ) + { + ++( *p ); + --len; + } + if( min_bits == 0 && len == 0 ) + return( 1 ); + msb = ( *p )[0]; + TEST_ASSERT( msb != 0 ); + actual_bits = 8 * ( len - 1 ); + while( msb != 0 ) + { + msb >>= 1; + ++actual_bits; + } + TEST_ASSERT( actual_bits >= min_bits ); + TEST_ASSERT( actual_bits <= max_bits ); + if( must_be_odd ) + TEST_ASSERT( ( ( *p )[len-1] & 1 ) != 0 ); + *p += len; + return( 1 ); +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/hash.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/hash.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d59bee4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +/* + * Test driver for hash entry points. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include "test/drivers/hash.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_hash.h" +#endif + +mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_INIT; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, size_t *hash_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ); +#else + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( operation, alg ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( operation, alg ); +#else + (void) operation; + (void) alg; + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( source_operation, + target_operation ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( source_operation, target_operation ); +#else + (void) source_operation; + (void) target_operation; + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + operation, input, input_length ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_hash_update( operation, input, input_length ); +#else + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); +#else + (void) operation; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( operation ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( operation ); +#else + (void) operation; + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/platform_builtin_keys.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/platform_builtin_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..759fa783 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/platform_builtin_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/** \file platform_builtin_keys.c + * + * \brief Test driver implementation of the builtin key support + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include +#include + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_id_t builtin_key_id; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number; +} mbedtls_psa_builtin_key_description_t; + +static const mbedtls_psa_builtin_key_description_t builtin_keys[] = { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* For testing, assign the AES builtin key slot to the boundary values. + * ECDSA can be exercised on key ID MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + 1. */ + { MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN - 1, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ), + PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT }, + { MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ), + PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT }, + { MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + 1, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ), + PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_ECDSA_KEY_SLOT}, + { MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX - 1, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ), + PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT}, + { MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ), + PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT}, + { MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX + 1, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ), + PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT}, +#else + {0, 0, 0} +#endif +}; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + psa_key_lifetime_t *lifetime, + psa_drv_slot_number_t *slot_number ) +{ + psa_key_id_t app_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key_id ); + const mbedtls_psa_builtin_key_description_t *builtin_key; + + for( size_t i = 0; + i < ( sizeof( builtin_keys ) / sizeof( builtin_keys[0] ) ); i++ ) + { + builtin_key = &builtin_keys[i]; + if( builtin_key->builtin_key_id == app_key_id ) + { + *lifetime = builtin_key->lifetime; + *slot_number = builtin_key->slot_number; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_aead.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_aead.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..25396c92 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_aead.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* + * Test driver for AEAD entry points. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" + +#include "test/drivers/aead.h" + +mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_INIT; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_cipher.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30a8119a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,436 @@ +/* + * Test driver for cipher functions. + * Currently only supports multi-part operations using AES-CTR. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#include "test/drivers/cipher.h" + +#include "test/random.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#endif + +#include + +mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_t mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = + MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_INIT; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output != NULL ) + { + if( output_size < mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( output, + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output, + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length ); + *output_length = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length; + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + } + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, iv, iv_length, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, iv, iv_length, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output != NULL ) + { + if( output_size < mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( output, + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output, + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length ); + *output_length = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length; + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + } + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits++; + + /* Wiping the entire struct here, instead of member-by-member. This is + * useful for the test suite, since it gives a chance of catching memory + * corruption errors should the core not have allocated (enough) memory for + * our context struct. */ + memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) ); + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + operation, + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key, key_length, alg ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + operation, attributes, key, key_length, alg ) ); +#endif + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + operation, + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key, key_length, alg ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + operation, attributes, key, key_length, alg ) ); +#endif + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits++; + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( operation ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( operation ); +#endif + + /* Wiping the entire struct here, instead of member-by-member. This is + * useful for the test suite, since it gives a chance of catching memory + * corruption errors should the core not have allocated (enough) memory for + * our context struct. */ + memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) ); + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + operation, iv, iv_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( operation, iv, iv_length ) ); +#endif + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output != NULL ) + { + if( output_size < mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length ) + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + memcpy( output, + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output, + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length ); + *output_length = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length; + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + } + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output != NULL ) + { + if( output_size < mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length ) + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + memcpy( output, + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output, + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length ); + *output_length = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length; + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + } + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + operation, output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + operation, output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +/* + * opaque versions, to do + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) +{ + (void) attributes; + (void) key; + (void) key_length; + (void) alg; + (void) iv; + (void) iv_length; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) +{ + (void) attributes; + (void) key; + (void) key_length; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + (void) operation; + (void) attributes; + (void) key; + (void) key_length; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + (void) operation; + (void) attributes; + (void) key; + (void) key_length; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + (void) operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length) +{ + (void) operation; + (void) iv; + (void) iv_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_update( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + (void) operation; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89cb8b90 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c @@ -0,0 +1,459 @@ +/* + * Test driver for generating and verifying keys. + * Currently only supports generating and verifying ECC keys. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "test/drivers/key_management.h" +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#include "test/random.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#endif + +#include + +mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_KEY_MANAGEMENT_INIT; + +const uint8_t mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key[16] = + { 0x36, 0x77, 0x39, 0x7A, 0x24, 0x43, 0x26, 0x46, + 0x29, 0x4A, 0x40, 0x4E, 0x63, 0x52, 0x66, 0x55 }; +const uint8_t mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key[32] = + { 0xdc, 0x7d, 0x9d, 0x26, 0xd6, 0x7a, 0x4f, 0x63, + 0x2c, 0x34, 0xc2, 0xdc, 0x0b, 0x69, 0x86, 0x18, + 0x38, 0x82, 0xc2, 0x06, 0xdf, 0x04, 0xcd, 0xb7, + 0xd6, 0x9a, 0xab, 0xe2, 0x8b, 0xe4, 0xf8, 0x1a }; +const uint8_t mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_pubkey[65] = + { 0x04, + 0x85, 0xf6, 0x4d, 0x89, 0xf0, 0x0b, 0xe6, 0x6c, + 0x88, 0xdd, 0x93, 0x7e, 0xfd, 0x6d, 0x7c, 0x44, + 0x56, 0x48, 0xdc, 0xb7, 0x01, 0x15, 0x0b, 0x8a, + 0x95, 0x09, 0x29, 0x58, 0x50, 0xf4, 0x1c, 0x19, + 0x31, 0xe5, 0x71, 0xfb, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0x78, 0x31, + 0x7a, 0x20, 0xb3, 0x80, 0xe8, 0x66, 0x58, 0x4b, + 0xbc, 0x25, 0x16, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x70, 0x2d, 0x79, + 0x2f, 0x13, 0x1a, 0x92, 0x20, 0x95, 0xfd, 0x6c }; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_init( void ) +{ +psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) + status = libtestdriver1_psa_crypto_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + + (void)status; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +void mbedtls_test_transparent_free( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); +#endif + + return; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_init( void ) +{ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +void mbedtls_test_opaque_free( void ) +{ + return; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, size_t *key_length ) +{ + ++mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.hits; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_status ); + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output_length > + key_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + memcpy( key, mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output, + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output_length ); + *key_length = mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output_length; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) ) + && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key, key_size, key_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + attributes, key, key_size, key_length ) ); +#endif + } + else if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key, key_size, key_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + attributes, key, key_size, key_length ) ); +#endif + } + + (void)attributes; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, size_t *key_length ) +{ + (void) attributes; + (void) key; + (void) key_size; + (void) key_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = psa_get_key_type( attributes ); + + ++mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.hits; + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.location = PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_status ); + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + ( defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); +#endif + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + ( defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); +#endif + } + + (void)data; + (void)data_length; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)key_buffer_length; + (void)bits; + (void)type; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + /* Assume this is a builtin key based on the key material length. */ + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number = *( ( psa_drv_slot_number_t* ) key ); + + if( key_length != sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ) ) + { + /* Test driver does not support generic opaque key handling yet. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + switch( slot_number ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_ECDSA_KEY_SLOT: + /* This is the ECDSA slot. Verify the key's attributes before + * returning the private key. */ + if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) != + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + if( psa_get_key_algorithm( attributes ) != + PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + if( ( psa_get_key_usage_flags( attributes ) & + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + if( data_size < sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( data, mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key, + sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key ) ); + *data_length = sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_key ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT: + /* This is the AES slot. Verify the key's attributes before + * returning the key. */ + if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) != PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) != 128 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + if( psa_get_key_algorithm( attributes ) != PSA_ALG_CTR ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + if( ( psa_get_key_usage_flags( attributes ) & + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + if( data_size < sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( data, mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key, + sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key ) ); + *data_length = sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_aes_key ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + ++mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.hits; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_status ); + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output_length > + data_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + memcpy( data, mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output, + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output_length ); + *data_length = mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output_length; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type( attributes ); + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( key_type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + ( defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); +#endif + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( key_type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + ( defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); +#endif + } + + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)key_type; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + if( key_length != sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ) ) + { + /* Test driver does not support generic opaque key handling yet. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + /* Assume this is a builtin key based on the key material length. */ + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number = *( ( psa_drv_slot_number_t* ) key ); + switch( slot_number ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_ECDSA_KEY_SLOT: + /* This is the ECDSA slot. Verify the key's attributes before + * returning the public key. */ + if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) != + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + if( psa_get_key_algorithm( attributes ) != + PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + if( data_size < sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_pubkey ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( data, mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_pubkey, + sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_pubkey ) ); + *data_length = sizeof( mbedtls_test_driver_ecdsa_pubkey ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } +} + +/* The opaque test driver exposes two built-in keys when builtin key support is + * compiled in. + * The key in slot #PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT is an AES-128 + * key which allows CTR mode. + * The key in slot #PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_ECDSA_KEY_SLOT is a secp256r1 + * private key which allows ECDSA sign & verify. + * The key buffer format for these is the raw format of psa_drv_slot_number_t + * (i.e. for an actual driver this would mean 'builtin_key_size' = + * sizeof(psa_drv_slot_number_t)). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + switch( slot_number ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT: + psa_set_key_type( attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); + psa_set_key_bits( attributes, 128 ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( + attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( attributes, PSA_ALG_CTR ); + + if( key_buffer_size < sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + *( (psa_drv_slot_number_t*) key_buffer ) = + PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_AES_KEY_SLOT; + *key_buffer_length = sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_ECDSA_KEY_SLOT: + psa_set_key_type( + attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) ); + psa_set_key_bits( attributes, 256 ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( + attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( + attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) ); + + if( key_buffer_size < sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + *( (psa_drv_slot_number_t*) key_buffer ) = + PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_BUILTIN_ECDSA_KEY_SLOT; + *key_buffer_length = sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_mac.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_mac.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..06b6eb77 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,480 @@ +/* + * Test driver for MAC entry points. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" + +#include "test/drivers/mac.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_mac.h" +#endif + +mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_t mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = + MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_INIT; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); +#else + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + operation, + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ); +#else + (void) operation; + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + operation, + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *)attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + operation, attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ); +#else + (void) operation; + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + operation, input, input_length ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + operation, input, input_length ); +#else + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + operation, mac, mac_size, mac_length ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + operation, mac, mac_size, mac_length ); +#else + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + operation, mac, mac_length ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + operation, mac, mac_length ); +#else + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort( + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( operation ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( operation ); +#else + (void) operation; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { + (void) operation; + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { + (void) operation; + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort( + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits++; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status; + } + else + { + (void) operation; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.driver_status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_signature.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_signature.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3de43a8a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_signature.c @@ -0,0 +1,433 @@ +/* + * Test driver for signature functions. + * Currently supports signing and verifying precalculated hashes, using + * only deterministic ECDSA on curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#include "test/drivers/hash.h" +#include "test/drivers/signature.h" +#include "test/drivers/hash.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" + +#include "test/random.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#endif + +#include + +mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_SIGNATURE_INIT; +mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_t + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_SIGNATURE_INIT; + +psa_status_t sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + if( attributes->core.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + ( defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) ) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *) attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#endif + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + ( defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) ) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *) attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#endif + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + (void)attributes; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_size; + (void)signature_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + ( defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) ) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *) attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#endif + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + ( defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) ) + return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *) attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#endif + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + (void)attributes; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.hits; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status ); + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length > signature_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( signature, mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output, + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length ); + *signature_length = mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); +#else + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + return( sign_hash( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + (void) attributes; + (void) key; + (void) key_length; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_size; + (void) signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.hits; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); +#else + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + return( verify_hash( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + (void) attributes; + (void) key; + (void) key_length; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.hits; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status ); + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length > signature_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + memcpy( signature, mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output, + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length ); + *signature_length = mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + return( sign_hash( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + (void) attributes; + (void) key; + (void) key_length; + (void) alg; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_size; + (void) signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + ++mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.hits; + + if( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status ); + + return verify_hash( attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + (void) attributes; + (void) key; + (void) key_length; + (void) alg; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_size.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_size.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d8bcaee3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_size.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* + * Test driver for retrieving key context size. + * Only used by opaque drivers. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +#include "test/drivers/size.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +typedef struct { + unsigned int context; +} test_driver_key_context_t; + +/* + * This macro returns the base size for the key context. It is the size of the + * driver specific information stored in each key context. + */ +#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE sizeof( test_driver_key_context_t ) + +/* + * Number of bytes included in every key context for a key pair. + * + * This pair size is for an ECC 256-bit private/public key pair. + * Based on this value, the size of the private key can be derived by + * subtracting the public key size below from this one. + */ +#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_KEY_PAIR_SIZE 65 + +/* + * Number of bytes included in every key context for a public key. + * + * For ECC public keys, it needs 257 bits so 33 bytes. + */ +#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE 33 + +/* + * Every key context for a symmetric key includes this many times the key size. + */ +#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_SYMMETRIC_FACTOR 0 + +/* + * If this is true for a key pair, the key context includes space for the public key. + * If this is false, no additional space is added for the public key. + * + * For this instance, store the public key with the private one. + */ +#define TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_STORE_PUBLIC_KEY 1 + +size_t mbedtls_test_size_function( + const psa_key_type_t key_type, + const size_t key_bits ) +{ + size_t key_buffer_size = 0; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( key_type ) ) + { + int public_key_overhead = + ( ( TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_STORE_PUBLIC_KEY == 1 ) + ? PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits ) : 0 ); + key_buffer_size = TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE + + TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + + public_key_overhead; + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( key_type ) ) + { + key_buffer_size = TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE + + TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE; + } + else if ( !PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( key_type ) && + !PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY ( key_type ) ) + { + key_buffer_size = TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_BASE_SIZE + + ( TEST_DRIVER_KEY_CONTEXT_SYMMETRIC_FACTOR * + ( ( key_bits + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + } + + return( key_buffer_size ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/fake_external_rng_for_test.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/fake_external_rng_for_test.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9c2195bf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/fake_external_rng_for_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/** \file fake_external_rng_for_test.c + * + * \brief Helper functions to test PSA crypto functionality. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +#include +#include + +static int test_insecure_external_rng_enabled = 0; + +void mbedtls_test_enable_insecure_external_rng( void ) +{ + test_insecure_external_rng_enabled = 1; +} + +void mbedtls_test_disable_insecure_external_rng( void ) +{ + test_insecure_external_rng_enabled = 0; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + (void) context; + + if( !test_insecure_external_rng_enabled ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + + /* This implementation is for test purposes only! + * Use the libc non-cryptographic random generator. */ + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, output, output_size ); + *output_length = output_size; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/helpers.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/helpers.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..abc68523 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) +#include +#endif + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Static global variables */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t expected_call; + uint8_t expected_call_happened; + + jmp_buf state; + + mbedtls_test_param_failed_location_record_t location_record; +} +param_failed_ctx_t; +static param_failed_ctx_t param_failed_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +static mbedtls_platform_context platform_ctx; +#endif + +mbedtls_test_info_t mbedtls_test_info; + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Helper Functions */ + +int mbedtls_test_platform_setup( void ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + ret = mbedtls_platform_setup( &platform_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + return( ret ); +} + +void mbedtls_test_platform_teardown( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + mbedtls_platform_teardown( &platform_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +} + +static int ascii2uc(const char c, unsigned char *uc) +{ + if( ( c >= '0' ) && ( c <= '9' ) ) + *uc = c - '0'; + else if( ( c >= 'a' ) && ( c <= 'f' ) ) + *uc = c - 'a' + 10; + else if( ( c >= 'A' ) && ( c <= 'F' ) ) + *uc = c - 'A' + 10; + else + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_test_fail( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename ) +{ + if( mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED ) + { + /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't + * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ + return; + } + mbedtls_test_info.result = MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED; + mbedtls_test_info.test = test; + mbedtls_test_info.line_no = line_no; + mbedtls_test_info.filename = filename; +} + +void mbedtls_test_skip( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename ) +{ + mbedtls_test_info.result = MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED; + mbedtls_test_info.test = test; + mbedtls_test_info.line_no = line_no; + mbedtls_test_info.filename = filename; +} + +void mbedtls_test_set_step( unsigned long step ) +{ + mbedtls_test_info.step = step; +} + +void mbedtls_test_info_reset( void ) +{ + mbedtls_test_info.result = MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS; + mbedtls_test_info.step = (unsigned long)( -1 ); + mbedtls_test_info.test = 0; + mbedtls_test_info.line_no = 0; + mbedtls_test_info.filename = 0; + memset( mbedtls_test_info.line1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line1 ) ); + memset( mbedtls_test_info.line2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line2 ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_equal( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename, + unsigned long long value1, unsigned long long value2 ) +{ + if( value1 == value2 ) + return( 1 ); + if( mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED ) + { + /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't + * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ + return( 0 ); + } + mbedtls_test_fail( test, line_no, filename ); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf( mbedtls_test_info.line1, + sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line1 ), + "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", + value1, (long long) value1 ); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf( mbedtls_test_info.line2, + sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line2 ), + "rhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", + value2, (long long) value2 ); + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_le_u( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename, + unsigned long long value1, unsigned long long value2 ) +{ + if( value1 <= value2 ) + return( 1 ); + if( mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED ) + { + /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't + * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ + return( 0 ); + } + mbedtls_test_fail( test, line_no, filename ); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf( mbedtls_test_info.line1, + sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line1 ), + "lhs = 0x%016llx = %llu", + value1, value1 ); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf( mbedtls_test_info.line2, + sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line2 ), + "rhs = 0x%016llx = %llu", + value2, value2 ); + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_le_s( const char *test, int line_no, const char* filename, + long long value1, long long value2 ) +{ + if( value1 <= value2 ) + return( 1 ); + if( mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED ) + { + /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't + * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ + return( 0 ); + } + mbedtls_test_fail( test, line_no, filename ); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf( mbedtls_test_info.line1, + sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line1 ), + "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", + (unsigned long long) value1, value1 ); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf( mbedtls_test_info.line2, + sizeof( mbedtls_test_info.line2 ), + "rhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", + (unsigned long long) value2, value2 ); + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_unhexify( unsigned char *obuf, + size_t obufmax, + const char *ibuf, + size_t *len ) +{ + unsigned char uc, uc2; + + *len = strlen( ibuf ); + + /* Must be even number of bytes. */ + if ( ( *len ) & 1 ) + return( -1 ); + *len /= 2; + + if ( (*len) > obufmax ) + return( -1 ); + + while( *ibuf != 0 ) + { + if ( ascii2uc( *(ibuf++), &uc ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + if ( ascii2uc( *(ibuf++), &uc2 ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + *(obuf++) = ( uc << 4 ) | uc2; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_test_hexify( unsigned char *obuf, + const unsigned char *ibuf, + int len ) +{ + unsigned char l, h; + + while( len != 0 ) + { + h = *ibuf / 16; + l = *ibuf % 16; + + if( h < 10 ) + *obuf++ = '0' + h; + else + *obuf++ = 'a' + h - 10; + + if( l < 10 ) + *obuf++ = '0' + l; + else + *obuf++ = 'a' + l - 10; + + ++ibuf; + len--; + } +} + +unsigned char *mbedtls_test_zero_alloc( size_t len ) +{ + void *p; + size_t actual_len = ( len != 0 ) ? len : 1; + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, actual_len ); + TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( p != NULL ); + + memset( p, 0x00, actual_len ); + + return( p ); +} + +unsigned char *mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( const char *ibuf, size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *obuf; + size_t len; + + *olen = strlen( ibuf ) / 2; + + if( *olen == 0 ) + return( mbedtls_test_zero_alloc( *olen ) ); + + obuf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *olen ); + TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( obuf != NULL ); + TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_unhexify( obuf, *olen, ibuf, &len ) == 0 ); + + return( obuf ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_hexcmp( uint8_t * a, uint8_t * b, + uint32_t a_len, uint32_t b_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + uint32_t i = 0; + + if( a_len != b_len ) + return( -1 ); + + for( i = 0; i < a_len; i++ ) + { + if( a[i] != b[i] ) + { + ret = -1; + break; + } + } + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) +void mbedtls_test_param_failed_get_location_record( + mbedtls_test_param_failed_location_record_t *location_record ) +{ + *location_record = param_failed_ctx.location_record; +} + +void mbedtls_test_param_failed_expect_call( void ) +{ + param_failed_ctx.expected_call_happened = 0; + param_failed_ctx.expected_call = 1; +} + +int mbedtls_test_param_failed_check_expected_call( void ) +{ + param_failed_ctx.expected_call = 0; + + if( param_failed_ctx.expected_call_happened != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} + +void* mbedtls_test_param_failed_get_state_buf( void ) +{ + return ¶m_failed_ctx.state; +} + +void mbedtls_test_param_failed_reset_state( void ) +{ + memset( param_failed_ctx.state, 0, sizeof( param_failed_ctx.state ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_param_failed( const char *failure_condition, + const char *file, + int line ) +{ + /* Record the location of the failure */ + param_failed_ctx.location_record.failure_condition = failure_condition; + param_failed_ctx.location_record.file = file; + param_failed_ctx.location_record.line = line; + + /* If we are testing the callback function... */ + if( param_failed_ctx.expected_call != 0 ) + { + param_failed_ctx.expected_call = 0; + param_failed_ctx.expected_call_happened = 1; + } + else + { + /* ...else try a long jump. If the execution state has not been set-up + * or reset then the long jump buffer is all zero's and the call will + * with high probability fault, emphasizing there is something to look + * at. + */ + + longjmp( param_failed_ctx.state, 1 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void mbedtls_test_err_add_check( int high, int low, + const char *file, int line ) +{ + /* Error codes are always negative (a value of zero is a success) however + * their positive opposites can be easier to understand. The following + * examples given in comments have been made positive for ease of + * understanding. The structure of an error code is such: + * + * shhhhhhhhlllllll + * + * s = sign bit. + * h = high level error code (includes high level module ID (bits 12..14) + * and module-dependent error code (bits 7..11)). + * l = low level error code. + */ + if ( high > -0x1000 && high != 0 ) + /* high < 0001000000000000 + * No high level module ID bits are set. + */ + { + mbedtls_test_fail( "'high' is not a high-level error code", + line, file ); + } + else if ( high < -0x7F80 ) + /* high > 0111111110000000 + * Error code is greater than the largest allowed high level module ID. + */ + { + mbedtls_test_fail( "'high' error code is greater than 15 bits", + line, file ); + } + else if ( ( high & 0x7F ) != 0 ) + /* high & 0000000001111111 + * Error code contains low level error code bits. + */ + { + mbedtls_test_fail( "'high' contains a low-level error code", + line, file ); + } + else if ( low < -0x007F ) + /* low > 0000000001111111 + * Error code contains high or module level error code bits. + */ + { + mbedtls_test_fail( "'low' error code is greater than 7 bits", + line, file ); + } + else if ( low > 0 ) + { + mbedtls_test_fail( "'low' error code is greater than zero", + line, file ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +int mbedtls_test_read_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) +{ + /* mbedtls_mpi_read_string() currently retains leading zeros. + * It always allocates at least one limb for the value 0. */ + if( s[0] == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + else + return( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( X, radix, s ) ); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/psa_crypto_helpers.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/psa_crypto_helpers.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..299b6d12 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/psa_crypto_helpers.c @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_helpers.c + * + * \brief Helper functions to test PSA crypto functionality. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + +#include + +static mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_ids_used_in_test[9]; +static size_t num_key_ids_used; + +int mbedtls_test_uses_key_id( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + size_t i; + if( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key_id ) > + PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER ) + { + /* Don't touch key id values that designate non-key files. */ + return( 1 ); + } + for( i = 0; i < num_key_ids_used ; i++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key_id, key_ids_used_in_test[i] ) ) + return( 1 ); + } + if( num_key_ids_used == ARRAY_LENGTH( key_ids_used_in_test ) ) + return( 0 ); + key_ids_used_in_test[num_key_ids_used] = key_id; + ++num_key_ids_used; + return( 1 ); +} + +void mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_storage( void ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < num_key_ids_used; i++ ) + psa_destroy_persistent_key( key_ids_used_in_test[i] ); + num_key_ids_used = 0; +} + +void mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_cache( void ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < num_key_ids_used; i++ ) + psa_purge_key( key_ids_used_in_test[i] ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +const char *mbedtls_test_helper_is_psa_leaking( void ) +{ + mbedtls_psa_stats_t stats; + + mbedtls_psa_get_stats( &stats ); + + if( stats.volatile_slots != 0 ) + return( "A volatile slot has not been closed properly." ); + if( stats.persistent_slots != 0 ) + return( "A persistent slot has not been closed properly." ); + if( stats.external_slots != 0 ) + return( "An external slot has not been closed properly." ); + if( stats.half_filled_slots != 0 ) + return( "A half-filled slot has not been cleared properly." ); + if( stats.locked_slots != 0 ) + return( "Some slots are still marked as locked." ); + + return( NULL ); +} + +#if defined(RECORD_PSA_STATUS_COVERAGE_LOG) +/** Name of the file where return statuses are logged by #RECORD_STATUS. */ +#define STATUS_LOG_FILE_NAME "statuses.log" + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_record_status( psa_status_t status, + const char *func, + const char *file, int line, + const char *expr ) +{ + /* We open the log file on first use. + * We never close the log file, so the record_status feature is not + * compatible with resource leak detectors such as Asan. + */ + static FILE *log; + if( log == NULL ) + log = fopen( STATUS_LOG_FILE_NAME, "a" ); + fprintf( log, "%d:%s:%s:%d:%s\n", (int) status, func, file, line, expr ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(RECORD_PSA_STATUS_COVERAGE_LOG) */ + +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( psa_key_usage_t usage_flags ) +{ + psa_key_usage_t updated_usage = usage_flags; + + if( usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) + updated_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; + + if( usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) + updated_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + + return( updated_usage ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1650f18 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c @@ -0,0 +1,1000 @@ +/** Code to exercise a PSA key object, i.e. validate that it seems well-formed + * and can do what it is supposed to do. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +static int lifetime_is_dynamic_secure_element( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + return( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ) != + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ); +} +#endif + +static int check_key_attributes_sanity( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + int ok = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; + psa_key_type_t type; + size_t bits; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + lifetime = psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ); + id = psa_get_key_id( &attributes ); + type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + /* Persistence */ + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( + ( PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN <= + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ) && + ( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) <= + PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX ) ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( + ( PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN <= MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ) && + ( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) <= PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ) ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* randomly-generated 64-bit constant, should never appear in test data */ + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number = 0xec94d4a5058a1a21; + psa_status_t status = psa_get_key_slot_number( &attributes, &slot_number ); + if( lifetime_is_dynamic_secure_element( lifetime ) ) + { + /* Mbed Crypto currently always exposes the slot number to + * applications. This is not mandated by the PSA specification + * and may change in future versions. */ + TEST_EQUAL( status, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( slot_number != 0xec94d4a5058a1a21 ); + } + else + { + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +#endif + + /* Type and size */ + TEST_ASSERT( type != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( bits != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( bits <= PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ); + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED( type ) ) + TEST_ASSERT( bits % 8 == 0 ); + + /* MAX macros concerning specific key types */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + TEST_ASSERT( bits <= PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS ); + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) + TEST_ASSERT( bits <= PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( type ) <= PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE ); + + ok = 1; + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + return( ok ); +} + +static int exercise_mac_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + const unsigned char input[] = "foo"; + unsigned char mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t mac_length = sizeof( mac ); + + /* Convert wildcard algorithm to exercisable algorithm */ + if( alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + { + alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( alg ) ); + } + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, + input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation, + mac, sizeof( mac ), + &mac_length ) ); + } + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) + { + psa_status_t verify_status = + ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ? + PSA_SUCCESS : + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, + input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, mac, mac_length ), + verify_status ); + } + + return( 1 ); + +exit: + psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static int exercise_cipher_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + unsigned char iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t iv_length; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + const unsigned char plaintext[16] = "Hello, world..."; + unsigned char ciphertext[32] = "(wabblewebblewibblewobblewubble)"; + size_t ciphertext_length = sizeof( ciphertext ); + unsigned char decrypted[sizeof( ciphertext )]; + size_t part_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( key_type, alg ); + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + if( iv_length != 0 ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, + iv, sizeof( iv ), + &iv_length ) ); + } + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + plaintext, sizeof( plaintext ), + ciphertext, sizeof( ciphertext ), + &ciphertext_length ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + ciphertext + ciphertext_length, + sizeof( ciphertext ) - ciphertext_length, + &part_length ) ); + ciphertext_length += part_length; + } + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ) + { + psa_status_t status; + int maybe_invalid_padding = 0; + if( ! ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) ) + { + maybe_invalid_padding = ! PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER( alg ); + } + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + if( iv_length != 0 ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + iv, iv_length ) ); + } + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + decrypted, sizeof( decrypted ), + &part_length ) ); + status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + decrypted + part_length, + sizeof( decrypted ) - part_length, + &part_length ); + /* For a stream cipher, all inputs are valid. For a block cipher, + * if the input is some arbitrary data rather than an actual + ciphertext, a padding error is likely. */ + if( maybe_invalid_padding ) + TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_SUCCESS || + status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); + else + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + } + + return( 1 ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static int exercise_aead_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + unsigned char nonce[PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t nonce_length; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + unsigned char plaintext[16] = "Hello, world..."; + unsigned char ciphertext[48] = "(wabblewebblewibblewobblewubble)"; + size_t ciphertext_length = sizeof( ciphertext ); + size_t plaintext_length = sizeof( ciphertext ); + + /* Convert wildcard algorithm to exercisable algorithm */ + if( alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + { + alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + nonce_length = PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH( key_type, alg ); + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt( key, alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + NULL, 0, + plaintext, sizeof( plaintext ), + ciphertext, sizeof( ciphertext ), + &ciphertext_length ) ); + } + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ) + { + psa_status_t verify_status = + ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ? + PSA_SUCCESS : + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_decrypt( key, alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + NULL, 0, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, sizeof( plaintext ), + &plaintext_length ), + verify_status ); + } + + return( 1 ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static int can_sign_or_verify_message( psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + /* Sign-the-unspecified-hash algorithms can only be used with + * {sign,verify}_hash, not with {sign,verify}_message. */ + if( alg == PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY || alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW ) + return( 0 ); + return( usage & ( PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ) ); +} + +static int exercise_signature_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + if( usage & ( PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) ) + { + unsigned char payload[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE] = {1}; + size_t payload_length = 16; + unsigned char signature[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t signature_length = sizeof( signature ); + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ); + + /* If the policy allows signing with any hash, just pick one. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) && hash_alg == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + { + #if defined(KNOWN_MBEDTLS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG) + hash_alg = KNOWN_MBEDTLS_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG; + alg ^= PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ^ hash_alg; + #else + TEST_ASSERT( ! "No hash algorithm for hash-and-sign testing" ); + #endif + } + + /* Some algorithms require the payload to have the size of + * the hash encoded in the algorithm. Use this input size + * even for algorithms that allow other input sizes. */ + if( hash_alg != 0 ) + payload_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( key, alg, + payload, payload_length, + signature, sizeof( signature ), + &signature_length ) ); + } + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) + { + psa_status_t verify_status = + ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ? + PSA_SUCCESS : + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_verify_hash( key, alg, + payload, payload_length, + signature, signature_length ), + verify_status ); + } + } + + if( can_sign_or_verify_message( usage, alg ) ) + { + unsigned char message[256] = "Hello, world..."; + unsigned char signature[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t message_length = 16; + size_t signature_length = sizeof( signature ); + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_message( key, alg, + message, message_length, + signature, sizeof( signature ), + &signature_length ) ); + } + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ) + { + psa_status_t verify_status = + ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ? + PSA_SUCCESS : + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_verify_message( key, alg, + message, message_length, + signature, signature_length ), + verify_status ); + } + } + + return( 1 ); + +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +static int exercise_asymmetric_encryption_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + unsigned char plaintext[256] = "Hello, world..."; + unsigned char ciphertext[256] = "(wabblewebblewibblewobblewubble)"; + size_t ciphertext_length = sizeof( ciphertext ); + size_t plaintext_length = 16; + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_encrypt( key, alg, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + NULL, 0, + ciphertext, sizeof( ciphertext ), + &ciphertext_length ) ); + } + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ) + { + psa_status_t status = + psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key, alg, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + NULL, 0, + plaintext, sizeof( plaintext ), + &plaintext_length ); + TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_SUCCESS || + ( ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) == 0 && + ( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT || + status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ) ) ); + } + + return( 1 ); + +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t* operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const unsigned char* input1, size_t input1_length, + const unsigned char* input2, size_t input2_length, + size_t capacity ) +{ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( operation, alg ) ); + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( alg ) ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + input1, input1_length ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + input2, + input2_length ) ); + } + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + input1, input1_length ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, + input2, input2_length ) ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ! "Key derivation algorithm not supported" ); + } + + if( capacity != SIZE_MAX ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( operation, capacity ) ); + + return( 1 ); + +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + + +static int exercise_key_derivation_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + unsigned char input1[] = "Input 1"; + size_t input1_length = sizeof( input1 ); + unsigned char input2[] = "Input 2"; + size_t input2_length = sizeof( input2 ); + unsigned char output[1]; + size_t capacity = sizeof( output ); + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) + { + if( !mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( &operation, key, alg, + input1, input1_length, + input2, input2_length, + capacity ) ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + output, + capacity ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ) ); + } + + return( 1 ); + +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +/* We need two keys to exercise key agreement. Exercise the + * private key against its own public key. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_psa_key_agreement_with_self( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_type_t private_key_type; + psa_key_type_t public_key_type; + size_t key_bits; + uint8_t *public_key = NULL; + size_t public_key_length; + /* Return GENERIC_ERROR if something other than the final call to + * psa_key_derivation_key_agreement fails. This isn't fully satisfactory, + * but it's good enough: callers will report it as a failed test anyway. */ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + private_key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + public_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( private_key_type ); + public_key_length = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_key_type, key_bits ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( public_key, public_key_length ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( key, public_key, public_key_length, + &public_key_length ) ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key, + public_key, public_key_length ); +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + mbedtls_free( public_key ); + return( status ); +} + +/* We need two keys to exercise key agreement. Exercise the + * private key against its own public key. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_psa_raw_key_agreement_with_self( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_type_t private_key_type; + psa_key_type_t public_key_type; + size_t key_bits; + uint8_t *public_key = NULL; + size_t public_key_length; + uint8_t output[1024]; + size_t output_length; + /* Return GENERIC_ERROR if something other than the final call to + * psa_key_derivation_key_agreement fails. This isn't fully satisfactory, + * but it's good enough: callers will report it as a failed test anyway. */ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + private_key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + public_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( private_key_type ); + public_key_length = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_key_type, key_bits ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( public_key, public_key_length ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( key, + public_key, public_key_length, + &public_key_length ) ); + + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( alg, key, + public_key, public_key_length, + output, sizeof( output ), &output_length ); + if ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( output_length <= + PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE( private_key_type, + key_bits ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_length <= + PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + } + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + mbedtls_free( public_key ); + return( status ); +} + +static int exercise_raw_key_agreement_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + int ok = 0; + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) + { + /* We need two keys to exercise key agreement. Exercise the + * private key against its own public key. */ + PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_psa_raw_key_agreement_with_self( alg, key ) ); + } + ok = 1; + +exit: + return( ok ); +} + +static int exercise_key_agreement_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + unsigned char input[1]; + unsigned char output[1]; + int ok = 0; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ); + + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) + { + /* We need two keys to exercise key agreement. Exercise the + * private key against its own public key. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_psa_key_agreement_with_self( &operation, key ) ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, + input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + } + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + } + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + output, + sizeof( output ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ) ); + } + ok = 1; + +exit: + return( ok ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_psa_exported_key_sanity_check( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits, + const uint8_t *exported, size_t exported_length ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, bits ) ); + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED( type ) ) + TEST_EQUAL( exported_length, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) ); + else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + if( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t*) exported; + const uint8_t *end = exported + exported_length; + size_t len; + /* RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER, -- must be 0 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * } + */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( len, end - p ); + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 0, 0, 0 ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, bits, bits, 1 ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 2, bits, 1 ) ) + goto exit; + /* Require d to be at least half the size of n. */ + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, bits / 2, bits, 1 ) ) + goto exit; + /* Require p and q to be at most half the size of n, rounded up. */ + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, bits / 2, bits / 2 + 1, 1 ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, bits / 2, bits / 2 + 1, 1 ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 1, bits / 2 + 1, 0 ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 1, bits / 2 + 1, 0 ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 1, bits / 2 + 1, 0 ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( p - end, 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + /* Just the secret value */ + TEST_EQUAL( exported_length, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + if( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ) + { + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t*) exported; + const uint8_t *end = exported + exported_length; + size_t len; + /* RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ), + 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( len, end - p ); + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, bits, bits, 1 ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, 2, bits, 1 ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( p - end, 0 ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, bits ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, bits ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE ); + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* The representation of an ECC Montgomery public key is + * the raw compressed point */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ), exported_length ); + } + else + { + /* The representation of an ECC Weierstrass public key is: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - where m is the bit size associated with the curve. + */ + TEST_EQUAL( 1 + 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ), exported_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( exported[0], 4 ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + { + (void) exported; + TEST_ASSERT( ! "Sanity check not implemented for this key type" ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + if( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ) + { + /* Check the parity bits. */ + unsigned i; + for( i = 0; i < bits / 8; i++ ) + { + unsigned bit_count = 0; + unsigned m; + for( m = 1; m <= 0x100; m <<= 1 ) + { + if( exported[i] & m ) + ++bit_count; + } + TEST_ASSERT( bit_count % 2 != 0 ); + } + } +#endif + + return( 1 ); + +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +static int exercise_export_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t *exported = NULL; + size_t exported_size = 0; + size_t exported_length = 0; + int ok = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + + exported_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( exported, exported_size ); + + if( ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) == 0 && + ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ) ) ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( psa_export_key( key, exported, + exported_size, &exported_length ), + PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + ok = 1; + goto exit; + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( key, + exported, exported_size, + &exported_length ) ); + ok = mbedtls_test_psa_exported_key_sanity_check( + psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), + exported, exported_length ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + mbedtls_free( exported ); + return( ok ); +} + +static int exercise_export_public_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t public_type; + uint8_t *exported = NULL; + size_t exported_size = 0; + size_t exported_length = 0; + int ok = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ) ) ) + { + exported_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( exported, exported_size ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_export_public_key( key, exported, + exported_size, &exported_length ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + ok = 1; + goto exit; + } + + public_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( + psa_get_key_type( &attributes ) ); + exported_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_type, + psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( exported, exported_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( key, + exported, exported_size, + &exported_length ) ); + ok = mbedtls_test_psa_exported_key_sanity_check( + public_type, psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), + exported, exported_length ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + mbedtls_free( exported ); + return( ok ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + int ok = 0; + + if( ! check_key_attributes_sanity( key ) ) + return( 0 ); + + if( alg == 0 ) + ok = 1; /* If no algorithm, do nothing (used for raw data "keys"). */ + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ) + ok = exercise_mac_key( key, usage, alg ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + ok = exercise_cipher_key( key, usage, alg ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ) + ok = exercise_aead_key( key, usage, alg ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ) + ok = exercise_signature_key( key, usage, alg ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ) + ok = exercise_asymmetric_encryption_key( key, usage, alg ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ) + ok = exercise_key_derivation_key( key, usage, alg ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + ok = exercise_raw_key_agreement_key( key, usage, alg ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + ok = exercise_key_agreement_key( key, usage, alg ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( ! "No code to exercise this category of algorithm" ); + + ok = ok && exercise_export_key( key, usage ); + ok = ok && exercise_export_public_key( key ); + +exit: + return( ok ); +} + +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_test_psa_usage_to_exercise( psa_key_type_t type, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ); + } + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg) ) + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ); + + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + } + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ) + { + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + } + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + { + return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + } + else + { + return( 0 ); + } + +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/random.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/random.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f3f4016 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/random.c @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +/** + * \file random.c + * + * \brief This file contains the helper functions to generate random numbers + * for the purpose of testing. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * for arc4random_buf() from + */ +#if defined(__NetBSD__) +#define _NETBSD_SOURCE 1 +#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) +#define _BSD_SOURCE 1 +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +int mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( void *rng_state, + unsigned char *output, + size_t len ) +{ +#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) + size_t i; + + if( rng_state != NULL ) + rng_state = NULL; + + for( i = 0; i < len; ++i ) + output[i] = rand(); +#else + if( rng_state != NULL ) + rng_state = NULL; + + arc4random_buf( output, len ); +#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_rnd_zero_rand( void *rng_state, + unsigned char *output, + size_t len ) +{ + if( rng_state != NULL ) + rng_state = NULL; + + memset( output, 0, len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand( void *rng_state, + unsigned char *output, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info *info = (mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info *) rng_state; + size_t use_len; + + if( rng_state == NULL ) + return( mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, output, len ) ); + + use_len = len; + if( len > info->length ) + use_len = info->length; + + if( use_len ) + { + memcpy( output, info->buf, use_len ); + info->buf += use_len; + info->length -= use_len; + } + + if( len - use_len > 0 ) + { + if( info->fallback_f_rng != NULL ) + { + return( info->fallback_f_rng( info->fallback_p_rng, + output + use_len, + len - use_len ) ); + } + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand( void *rng_state, + unsigned char *output, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info *info = + (mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info *) rng_state; + uint32_t i, *k, sum, delta=0x9E3779B9; + unsigned char result[4], *out = output; + + if( rng_state == NULL ) + return( mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, output, len ) ); + + k = info->key; + + while( len > 0 ) + { + size_t use_len = ( len > 4 ) ? 4 : len; + sum = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ ) + { + info->v0 += ( ( ( info->v1 << 4 ) ^ ( info->v1 >> 5 ) ) + + info->v1 ) ^ ( sum + k[sum & 3] ); + sum += delta; + info->v1 += ( ( ( info->v0 << 4 ) ^ ( info->v0 >> 5 ) ) + + info->v0 ) ^ ( sum + k[( sum>>11 ) & 3] ); + } + + PUT_UINT32_BE( info->v0, result, 0 ); + memcpy( out, result, use_len ); + len -= use_len; + out += 4; + } + + return( 0 ); +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/threading_helpers.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/threading_helpers.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca91b793 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/src/threading_helpers.c @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +/** Mutex usage verification framework. */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) + +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +/** Mutex usage verification framework. + * + * The mutex usage verification code below aims to detect bad usage of + * Mbed TLS's mutex abstraction layer at runtime. Note that this is solely + * about the use of the mutex itself, not about checking whether the mutex + * correctly protects whatever it is supposed to protect. + * + * The normal usage of a mutex is: + * ``` + * digraph mutex_states { + * "UNINITIALIZED"; // the initial state + * "IDLE"; + * "FREED"; + * "LOCKED"; + * "UNINITIALIZED" -> "IDLE" [label="init"]; + * "FREED" -> "IDLE" [label="init"]; + * "IDLE" -> "LOCKED" [label="lock"]; + * "LOCKED" -> "IDLE" [label="unlock"]; + * "IDLE" -> "FREED" [label="free"]; + * } + * ``` + * + * All bad transitions that can be unambiguously detected are reported. + * An attempt to use an uninitialized mutex cannot be detected in general + * since the memory content may happen to denote a valid state. For the same + * reason, a double init cannot be detected. + * All-bits-zero is the state of a freed mutex, which is distinct from an + * initialized mutex, so attempting to use zero-initialized memory as a mutex + * without calling the init function is detected. + * + * The framework attempts to detect missing calls to init and free by counting + * calls to init and free. If there are more calls to init than free, this + * means that a mutex is not being freed somewhere, which is a memory leak + * on platforms where a mutex consumes resources other than the + * mbedtls_threading_mutex_t object itself. If there are more calls to free + * than init, this indicates a missing init, which is likely to be detected + * by an attempt to lock the mutex as well. A limitation of this framework is + * that it cannot detect scenarios where there is exactly the same number of + * calls to init and free but the calls don't match. A bug like this is + * unlikely to happen uniformly throughout the whole test suite though. + * + * If an error is detected, this framework will report what happened and the + * test case will be marked as failed. Unfortunately, the error report cannot + * indicate the exact location of the problematic call. To locate the error, + * use a debugger and set a breakpoint on mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(). + */ +enum value_of_mutex_is_valid_field +{ + /* Potential values for the is_valid field of mbedtls_threading_mutex_t. + * Note that MUTEX_FREED must be 0 and MUTEX_IDLE must be 1 for + * compatibility with threading_mutex_init_pthread() and + * threading_mutex_free_pthread(). MUTEX_LOCKED could be any nonzero + * value. */ + MUTEX_FREED = 0, //!< Set by threading_mutex_free_pthread + MUTEX_IDLE = 1, //!< Set by threading_mutex_init_pthread and by our unlock + MUTEX_LOCKED = 2, //!< Set by our lock +}; + +typedef struct +{ + void (*init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ); + void (*free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ); + int (*lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ); + int (*unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ); +} mutex_functions_t; +static mutex_functions_t mutex_functions; + +/** The total number of calls to mbedtls_mutex_init(), minus the total number + * of calls to mbedtls_mutex_free(). + * + * Reset to 0 after each test case. + */ +static int live_mutexes; + +static void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex, + const char *msg ) +{ + (void) mutex; + if( mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error == NULL ) + mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error = msg; + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "[mutex: %s] ", msg ); + /* Don't mark the test as failed yet. This way, if the test fails later + * for a functional reason, the test framework will report the message + * and location for this functional reason. If the test passes, + * mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check() will mark it as failed. */ +} + +static void mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_init( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + mutex_functions.init( mutex ); + if( mutex->is_valid ) + ++live_mutexes; +} + +static void mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_free( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + switch( mutex->is_valid ) + { + case MUTEX_FREED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mutex, "free without init or double free" ); + break; + case MUTEX_IDLE: + /* Do nothing. The underlying free function will reset is_valid + * to 0. */ + break; + case MUTEX_LOCKED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mutex, "free without unlock" ); + break; + default: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mutex, "corrupted state" ); + break; + } + if( mutex->is_valid ) + --live_mutexes; + mutex_functions.free( mutex ); +} + +static int mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_lock( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + int ret = mutex_functions.lock( mutex ); + switch( mutex->is_valid ) + { + case MUTEX_FREED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mutex, "lock without init" ); + break; + case MUTEX_IDLE: + if( ret == 0 ) + mutex->is_valid = 2; + break; + case MUTEX_LOCKED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mutex, "double lock" ); + break; + default: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mutex, "corrupted state" ); + break; + } + return( ret ); +} + +static int mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_unlock( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + int ret = mutex_functions.unlock( mutex ); + switch( mutex->is_valid ) + { + case MUTEX_FREED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mutex, "unlock without init" ); + break; + case MUTEX_IDLE: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mutex, "unlock without lock" ); + break; + case MUTEX_LOCKED: + if( ret == 0 ) + mutex->is_valid = MUTEX_IDLE; + break; + default: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error( mutex, "corrupted state" ); + break; + } + return( ret ); +} + +void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_init( void ) +{ + mutex_functions.init = mbedtls_mutex_init; + mutex_functions.free = mbedtls_mutex_free; + mutex_functions.lock = mbedtls_mutex_lock; + mutex_functions.unlock = mbedtls_mutex_unlock; + mbedtls_mutex_init = &mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_init; + mbedtls_mutex_free = &mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_free; + mbedtls_mutex_lock = &mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_lock; + mbedtls_mutex_unlock = &mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_unlock; +} + +void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check( void ) +{ + if( live_mutexes != 0 ) + { + /* A positive number (more init than free) means that a mutex resource + * is leaking (on platforms where a mutex consumes more than the + * mbedtls_threading_mutex_t object itself). The rare case of a + * negative number means a missing init somewhere. */ + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "[mutex: %d leaked] ", live_mutexes ); + live_mutexes = 0; + if( mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error == NULL ) + mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error = "missing free"; + } + if( mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error != NULL && + mbedtls_test_info.result != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED ) + { + /* Functionally, the test passed. But there was a mutex usage error, + * so mark the test as failed after all. */ + mbedtls_test_fail( "Mutex usage error", __LINE__, __FILE__ ); + } + mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error = NULL; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/ssl-opt-in-docker.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/ssl-opt-in-docker.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..401a69c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/ssl-opt-in-docker.sh @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +#!/bin/bash -eu + +# ssl-opt-in-docker.sh +# +# Purpose +# ------- +# This runs ssl-opt.sh in a Docker container. +# +# Notes for users +# --------------- +# If OPENSSL_CMD, GNUTLS_CLI, or GNUTLS_SERV are specified, the path must +# correspond to an executable inside the Docker container. The special +# values "next" and "legacy" are also allowed as shorthand for the +# installations inside the container. +# +# See also: +# - scripts/docker_env.sh for general Docker prerequisites and other information. +# - ssl-opt.sh for notes about invocation of that script. + +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. + +source tests/scripts/docker_env.sh + +case "${OPENSSL_CMD:-default}" in + "legacy") export OPENSSL_CMD="/usr/local/openssl-1.0.1j/bin/openssl";; + "next") export OPENSSL_CMD="/usr/local/openssl-1.1.1a/bin/openssl";; + *) ;; +esac + +case "${GNUTLS_CLI:-default}" in + "legacy") export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-cli";; + "next") export GNUTLS_CLI="/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-cli";; + *) ;; +esac + +case "${GNUTLS_SERV:-default}" in + "legacy") export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.3.8/bin/gnutls-serv";; + "next") export GNUTLS_SERV="/usr/local/gnutls-3.6.5/bin/gnutls-serv";; + *) ;; +esac + +run_in_docker \ + -e P_SRV \ + -e P_CLI \ + -e P_PXY \ + -e GNUTLS_CLI \ + -e GNUTLS_SERV \ + -e OPENSSL_CMD \ + tests/ssl-opt.sh \ + $@ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/ssl-opt.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..7199462c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -0,0 +1,10531 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# ssl-opt.sh +# +# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors +# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may +# not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +# +# Purpose +# +# Executes tests to prove various TLS/SSL options and extensions. +# +# The goal is not to cover every ciphersuite/version, but instead to cover +# specific options (max fragment length, truncated hmac, etc) or procedures +# (session resumption from cache or ticket, renego, etc). +# +# The tests assume a build with default options, with exceptions expressed +# with a dependency. The tests focus on functionality and do not consider +# performance. +# + +set -u + +# Limit the size of each log to 10 GiB, in case of failures with this script +# where it may output seemingly unlimited length error logs. +ulimit -f 20971520 + +ORIGINAL_PWD=$PWD +if ! cd "$(dirname "$0")"; then + exit 125 +fi + +# default values, can be overridden by the environment +: ${P_SRV:=../programs/ssl/ssl_server2} +: ${P_CLI:=../programs/ssl/ssl_client2} +: ${P_PXY:=../programs/test/udp_proxy} +: ${P_QUERY:=../programs/test/query_compile_time_config} +: ${OPENSSL_CMD:=openssl} # OPENSSL would conflict with the build system +: ${GNUTLS_CLI:=gnutls-cli} +: ${GNUTLS_SERV:=gnutls-serv} +: ${PERL:=perl} + +guess_config_name() { + if git diff --quiet ../include/mbedtls/config.h 2>/dev/null; then + echo "default" + else + echo "unknown" + fi +} +: ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE=} +: ${MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION:="$(guess_config_name)"} +: ${MBEDTLS_TEST_PLATFORM:="$(uname -s | tr -c \\n0-9A-Za-z _)-$(uname -m | tr -c \\n0-9A-Za-z _)"} + +O_SRV="$OPENSSL_CMD s_server -www -cert data_files/server5.crt -key data_files/server5.key" +O_CLI="echo 'GET / HTTP/1.0' | $OPENSSL_CMD s_client" +G_SRV="$GNUTLS_SERV --x509certfile data_files/server5.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server5.key" +G_CLI="echo 'GET / HTTP/1.0' | $GNUTLS_CLI --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt" +TCP_CLIENT="$PERL scripts/tcp_client.pl" + +# alternative versions of OpenSSL and GnuTLS (no default path) + +if [ -n "${OPENSSL_LEGACY:-}" ]; then + O_LEGACY_SRV="$OPENSSL_LEGACY s_server -www -cert data_files/server5.crt -key data_files/server5.key" + O_LEGACY_CLI="echo 'GET / HTTP/1.0' | $OPENSSL_LEGACY s_client" +else + O_LEGACY_SRV=false + O_LEGACY_CLI=false +fi + +if [ -n "${OPENSSL_NEXT:-}" ]; then + O_NEXT_SRV="$OPENSSL_NEXT s_server -www -cert data_files/server5.crt -key data_files/server5.key" + O_NEXT_CLI="echo 'GET / HTTP/1.0' | $OPENSSL_NEXT s_client" +else + O_NEXT_SRV=false + O_NEXT_CLI=false +fi + +if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV:-}" ]; then + G_NEXT_SRV="$GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV --x509certfile data_files/server5.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server5.key" +else + G_NEXT_SRV=false +fi + +if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI:-}" ]; then + G_NEXT_CLI="echo 'GET / HTTP/1.0' | $GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt" +else + G_NEXT_CLI=false +fi + +TESTS=0 +FAILS=0 +SKIPS=0 + +CONFIG_H='../include/mbedtls/config.h' + +MEMCHECK=0 +FILTER='.*' +EXCLUDE='^$' + +SHOW_TEST_NUMBER=0 +RUN_TEST_NUMBER='' + +PRESERVE_LOGS=0 + +# Pick a "unique" server port in the range 10000-19999, and a proxy +# port which is this plus 10000. Each port number may be independently +# overridden by a command line option. +SRV_PORT=$(($$ % 10000 + 10000)) +PXY_PORT=$((SRV_PORT + 10000)) + +print_usage() { + echo "Usage: $0 [options]" + printf " -h|--help\tPrint this help.\n" + printf " -m|--memcheck\tCheck memory leaks and errors.\n" + printf " -f|--filter\tOnly matching tests are executed (substring or BRE)\n" + printf " -e|--exclude\tMatching tests are excluded (substring or BRE)\n" + printf " -n|--number\tExecute only numbered test (comma-separated, e.g. '245,256')\n" + printf " -s|--show-numbers\tShow test numbers in front of test names\n" + printf " -p|--preserve-logs\tPreserve logs of successful tests as well\n" + printf " --outcome-file\tFile where test outcomes are written\n" + printf " \t(default: \$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE, none if empty)\n" + printf " --port \tTCP/UDP port (default: randomish 1xxxx)\n" + printf " --proxy-port\tTCP/UDP proxy port (default: randomish 2xxxx)\n" + printf " --seed \tInteger seed value to use for this test run\n" +} + +get_options() { + while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do + case "$1" in + -f|--filter) + shift; FILTER=$1 + ;; + -e|--exclude) + shift; EXCLUDE=$1 + ;; + -m|--memcheck) + MEMCHECK=1 + ;; + -n|--number) + shift; RUN_TEST_NUMBER=$1 + ;; + -s|--show-numbers) + SHOW_TEST_NUMBER=1 + ;; + -p|--preserve-logs) + PRESERVE_LOGS=1 + ;; + --port) + shift; SRV_PORT=$1 + ;; + --proxy-port) + shift; PXY_PORT=$1 + ;; + --seed) + shift; SEED="$1" + ;; + -h|--help) + print_usage + exit 0 + ;; + *) + echo "Unknown argument: '$1'" + print_usage + exit 1 + ;; + esac + shift + done +} + +# Make the outcome file path relative to the original directory, not +# to .../tests +case "$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE" in + [!/]*) + MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE="$ORIGINAL_PWD/$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE" + ;; +esac + +# Read boolean configuration options from config.h for easy and quick +# testing. Skip non-boolean options (with something other than spaces +# and a comment after "#define SYMBOL"). The variable contains a +# space-separated list of symbols. +CONFIGS_ENABLED=" $(echo `$P_QUERY -l` )" +# Skip next test; use this macro to skip tests which are legitimate +# in theory and expected to be re-introduced at some point, but +# aren't expected to succeed at the moment due to problems outside +# our control (such as bugs in other TLS implementations). +skip_next_test() { + SKIP_NEXT="YES" +} + +# skip next test if the flag is not enabled in config.h +requires_config_enabled() { + case $CONFIGS_ENABLED in + *" $1"[\ =]*) :;; + *) SKIP_NEXT="YES";; + esac +} + +# skip next test if the flag is enabled in config.h +requires_config_disabled() { + case $CONFIGS_ENABLED in + *" $1"[\ =]*) SKIP_NEXT="YES";; + esac +} + +get_config_value_or_default() { + # This function uses the query_config command line option to query the + # required Mbed TLS compile time configuration from the ssl_server2 + # program. The command will always return a success value if the + # configuration is defined and the value will be printed to stdout. + # + # Note that if the configuration is not defined or is defined to nothing, + # the output of this function will be an empty string. + ${P_SRV} "query_config=${1}" +} + +requires_config_value_at_least() { + VAL="$( get_config_value_or_default "$1" )" + if [ -z "$VAL" ]; then + # Should never happen + echo "Mbed TLS configuration $1 is not defined" + exit 1 + elif [ "$VAL" -lt "$2" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +requires_config_value_at_most() { + VAL=$( get_config_value_or_default "$1" ) + if [ -z "$VAL" ]; then + # Should never happen + echo "Mbed TLS configuration $1 is not defined" + exit 1 + elif [ "$VAL" -gt "$2" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +requires_config_value_equals() { + VAL=$( get_config_value_or_default "$1" ) + if [ -z "$VAL" ]; then + # Should never happen + echo "Mbed TLS configuration $1 is not defined" + exit 1 + elif [ "$VAL" -ne "$2" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# Require Mbed TLS to support the given protocol version. +# +# Inputs: +# * $1: protocol version in mbedtls syntax (argument to force_version=) +requires_protocol_version() { + # Support for DTLS is detected separately in detect_dtls(). + case "$1" in + ssl3) requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3;; + tls1) requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1;; + tls1_1|dtls1) requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1;; + tls12|dtls12) requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2;; + *) echo "Unknown required protocol version: $1"; exit 1;; + esac +} + +# Space-separated list of ciphersuites supported by this build of +# Mbed TLS. +P_CIPHERSUITES=" $($P_CLI --help 2>/dev/null | + grep TLS- | + tr -s ' \n' ' ')" +requires_ciphersuite_enabled() { + case $P_CIPHERSUITES in + *" $1 "*) :;; + *) SKIP_NEXT="YES";; + esac +} + +# detect_required_features CMD [RUN_TEST_OPTION...] +# If CMD (call to a TLS client or server program) requires certain features, +# arrange to only run the following test case if those features are enabled. +detect_required_features() { + case "$1" in + *\ force_version=*) + tmp="${1##*\ force_version=}" + tmp="${tmp%%[!-0-9A-Z_a-z]*}" + requires_protocol_version "$tmp";; + esac + + case "$1" in + *\ force_ciphersuite=*) + tmp="${1##*\ force_ciphersuite=}" + tmp="${tmp%%[!-0-9A-Z_a-z]*}" + case "$*" in + *"-s SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common"*) + # This test case expects a ciphersuite mismatch, so it + # doesn't actually require the ciphersuite to be enabled. + :;; + *) requires_ciphersuite_enabled "$tmp";; + esac;; + esac + + case " $1 " in + *[-_\ =]tickets=[^0]*) + requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C;; + esac + case " $1 " in + *[-_\ =]alpn=*) + requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN;; + esac + + case " $1 " in + *\ badmac_limit=*) + requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT;; + esac + + case " $1 " in + *\ fallback=1\ *|*\ -fallback_scsv\ *) + requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV;; + esac + + unset tmp +} + +requires_certificate_authentication () { + if [ "$PSK_ONLY" = "YES" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +adapt_cmd_for_psk () { + case "$2" in + *openssl*) s='-psk abc123 -nocert';; + *gnutls-*) s='--pskkey=abc123';; + *) s='psk=abc123';; + esac + eval $1='"$2 $s"' + unset s +} + +# maybe_adapt_for_psk [RUN_TEST_OPTION...] +# If running in a PSK-only build, maybe adapt the test to use a pre-shared key. +# +# If not running in a PSK-only build, do nothing. +# If the test looks like it doesn't use a pre-shared key but can run with a +# pre-shared key, pass a pre-shared key. If the test looks like it can't run +# with a pre-shared key, skip it. If the test looks like it's already using +# a pre-shared key, do nothing. +# +# This code does not consider builds with ECDHE-PSK or RSA-PSK. +# +# Inputs: +# * $CLI_CMD, $SRV_CMD, $PXY_CMD: client/server/proxy commands. +# * $PSK_ONLY: YES if running in a PSK-only build (no asymmetric key exchanges). +# * "$@": options passed to run_test. +# +# Outputs: +# * $CLI_CMD, $SRV_CMD: may be modified to add PSK-relevant arguments. +# * $SKIP_NEXT: set to YES if the test can't run with PSK. +maybe_adapt_for_psk() { + if [ "$PSK_ONLY" != "YES" ]; then + return + fi + if [ "$SKIP_NEXT" = "YES" ]; then + return + fi + case "$CLI_CMD $SRV_CMD" in + *[-_\ =]psk*|*[-_\ =]PSK*) + return;; + *force_ciphersuite*) + # The test case forces a non-PSK cipher suite. In some cases, a + # PSK cipher suite could be substituted, but we're not ready for + # that yet. + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + return;; + *\ auth_mode=*|*[-_\ =]crt[_=]*) + # The test case involves certificates. PSK won't do. + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + return;; + esac + adapt_cmd_for_psk CLI_CMD "$CLI_CMD" + adapt_cmd_for_psk SRV_CMD "$SRV_CMD" +} + +case " $CONFIGS_ENABLED " in + *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_[^P]*) PSK_ONLY="NO";; + *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_P[^S]*) PSK_ONLY="NO";; + *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PS[^K]*) PSK_ONLY="NO";; + *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK[^_]*) PSK_ONLY="NO";; + *\ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED\ *) PSK_ONLY="YES";; + *) PSK_ONLY="NO";; +esac + +# skip next test if OpenSSL doesn't support FALLBACK_SCSV +requires_openssl_with_fallback_scsv() { + if [ -z "${OPENSSL_HAS_FBSCSV:-}" ]; then + if $OPENSSL_CMD s_client -help 2>&1 | grep fallback_scsv >/dev/null + then + OPENSSL_HAS_FBSCSV="YES" + else + OPENSSL_HAS_FBSCSV="NO" + fi + fi + if [ "$OPENSSL_HAS_FBSCSV" = "NO" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# skip next test if either IN_CONTENT_LEN or MAX_CONTENT_LEN are below a value +requires_max_content_len() { + requires_config_value_at_least "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN" $1 + requires_config_value_at_least "MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN" $1 +} + +# skip next test if GnuTLS isn't available +requires_gnutls() { + if [ -z "${GNUTLS_AVAILABLE:-}" ]; then + if ( which "$GNUTLS_CLI" && which "$GNUTLS_SERV" ) >/dev/null 2>&1; then + GNUTLS_AVAILABLE="YES" + else + GNUTLS_AVAILABLE="NO" + fi + fi + if [ "$GNUTLS_AVAILABLE" = "NO" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# skip next test if GnuTLS-next isn't available +requires_gnutls_next() { + if [ -z "${GNUTLS_NEXT_AVAILABLE:-}" ]; then + if ( which "${GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI:-}" && which "${GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV:-}" ) >/dev/null 2>&1; then + GNUTLS_NEXT_AVAILABLE="YES" + else + GNUTLS_NEXT_AVAILABLE="NO" + fi + fi + if [ "$GNUTLS_NEXT_AVAILABLE" = "NO" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# skip next test if OpenSSL-legacy isn't available +requires_openssl_legacy() { + if [ -z "${OPENSSL_LEGACY_AVAILABLE:-}" ]; then + if which "${OPENSSL_LEGACY:-}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + OPENSSL_LEGACY_AVAILABLE="YES" + else + OPENSSL_LEGACY_AVAILABLE="NO" + fi + fi + if [ "$OPENSSL_LEGACY_AVAILABLE" = "NO" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +requires_openssl_next() { + if [ -z "${OPENSSL_NEXT_AVAILABLE:-}" ]; then + if which "${OPENSSL_NEXT:-}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + OPENSSL_NEXT_AVAILABLE="YES" + else + OPENSSL_NEXT_AVAILABLE="NO" + fi + fi + if [ "$OPENSSL_NEXT_AVAILABLE" = "NO" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# skip next test if IPv6 isn't available on this host +requires_ipv6() { + if [ -z "${HAS_IPV6:-}" ]; then + $P_SRV server_addr='::1' > $SRV_OUT 2>&1 & + SRV_PID=$! + sleep 1 + kill $SRV_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 + if grep "NET - Binding of the socket failed" $SRV_OUT >/dev/null; then + HAS_IPV6="NO" + else + HAS_IPV6="YES" + fi + rm -r $SRV_OUT + fi + + if [ "$HAS_IPV6" = "NO" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# skip next test if it's i686 or uname is not available +requires_not_i686() { + if [ -z "${IS_I686:-}" ]; then + IS_I686="YES" + if which "uname" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + if [ -z "$(uname -a | grep i686)" ]; then + IS_I686="NO" + fi + fi + fi + if [ "$IS_I686" = "YES" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# Calculate the input & output maximum content lengths set in the config +MAX_CONTENT_LEN=$( get_config_value_or_default "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN" ) +MAX_IN_LEN=$( get_config_value_or_default "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN" ) +MAX_OUT_LEN=$( get_config_value_or_default "MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN" ) + +# Calculate the maximum content length that fits both +if [ "$MAX_IN_LEN" -lt "$MAX_CONTENT_LEN" ]; then + MAX_CONTENT_LEN="$MAX_IN_LEN" +fi +if [ "$MAX_OUT_LEN" -lt "$MAX_CONTENT_LEN" ]; then + MAX_CONTENT_LEN="$MAX_OUT_LEN" +fi + +# skip the next test if the SSL output buffer is less than 16KB +requires_full_size_output_buffer() { + if [ "$MAX_OUT_LEN" -ne 16384 ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# skip the next test if valgrind is in use +not_with_valgrind() { + if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# skip the next test if valgrind is NOT in use +only_with_valgrind() { + if [ "$MEMCHECK" -eq 0 ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="YES" + fi +} + +# multiply the client timeout delay by the given factor for the next test +client_needs_more_time() { + CLI_DELAY_FACTOR=$1 +} + +# wait for the given seconds after the client finished in the next test +server_needs_more_time() { + SRV_DELAY_SECONDS=$1 +} + +# print_name +print_name() { + TESTS=$(( $TESTS + 1 )) + LINE="" + + if [ "$SHOW_TEST_NUMBER" -gt 0 ]; then + LINE="$TESTS " + fi + + LINE="$LINE$1" + printf "%s " "$LINE" + LEN=$(( 72 - `echo "$LINE" | wc -c` )) + for i in `seq 1 $LEN`; do printf '.'; done + printf ' ' + +} + +# record_outcome [] +# The test name must be in $NAME. +record_outcome() { + echo "$1" + if [ -n "$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE" ]; then + printf '%s;%s;%s;%s;%s;%s\n' \ + "$MBEDTLS_TEST_PLATFORM" "$MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION" \ + "ssl-opt" "$NAME" \ + "$1" "${2-}" \ + >>"$MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE" + fi +} + +# True if the presence of the given pattern in a log definitely indicates +# that the test has failed. False if the presence is inconclusive. +# +# Inputs: +# * $1: pattern found in the logs +# * $TIMES_LEFT: >0 if retrying is an option +# +# Outputs: +# * $outcome: set to a retry reason if the pattern is inconclusive, +# unchanged otherwise. +# * Return value: 1 if the pattern is inconclusive, +# 0 if the failure is definitive. +log_pattern_presence_is_conclusive() { + # If we've run out of attempts, then don't retry no matter what. + if [ $TIMES_LEFT -eq 0 ]; then + return 0 + fi + case $1 in + "resend") + # An undesired resend may have been caused by the OS dropping or + # delaying a packet at an inopportune time. + outcome="RETRY(resend)" + return 1;; + esac +} + +# fail +fail() { + record_outcome "FAIL" "$1" + echo " ! $1" + + mv $SRV_OUT o-srv-${TESTS}.log + mv $CLI_OUT o-cli-${TESTS}.log + if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then + mv $PXY_OUT o-pxy-${TESTS}.log + fi + echo " ! outputs saved to o-XXX-${TESTS}.log" + + if [ "${LOG_FAILURE_ON_STDOUT:-0}" != 0 ]; then + echo " ! server output:" + cat o-srv-${TESTS}.log + echo " ! ========================================================" + echo " ! client output:" + cat o-cli-${TESTS}.log + if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then + echo " ! ========================================================" + echo " ! proxy output:" + cat o-pxy-${TESTS}.log + fi + echo "" + fi + + FAILS=$(( $FAILS + 1 )) +} + +# is_polar +is_polar() { + case "$1" in + *ssl_client2*) true;; + *ssl_server2*) true;; + *) false;; + esac +} + +# openssl s_server doesn't have -www with DTLS +check_osrv_dtls() { + case "$SRV_CMD" in + *s_server*-dtls*) + NEEDS_INPUT=1 + SRV_CMD="$( echo $SRV_CMD | sed s/-www// )";; + *) NEEDS_INPUT=0;; + esac +} + +# provide input to commands that need it +provide_input() { + if [ $NEEDS_INPUT -eq 0 ]; then + return + fi + + while true; do + echo "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + sleep 1 + done +} + +# has_mem_err +has_mem_err() { + if ( grep -F 'All heap blocks were freed -- no leaks are possible' "$1" && + grep -F 'ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts' "$1" ) > /dev/null + then + return 1 # false: does not have errors + else + return 0 # true: has errors + fi +} + +# Wait for process $2 named $3 to be listening on port $1. Print error to $4. +if type lsof >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + wait_app_start() { + newline=' +' + START_TIME=$(date +%s) + if [ "$DTLS" -eq 1 ]; then + proto=UDP + else + proto=TCP + fi + # Make a tight loop, server normally takes less than 1s to start. + while true; do + SERVER_PIDS=$(lsof -a -n -b -i "$proto:$1" -t) + # When we use a proxy, it will be listening on the same port we + # are checking for as well as the server and lsof will list both. + case ${newline}${SERVER_PIDS}${newline} in + *${newline}${2}${newline}*) break;; + esac + if [ $(( $(date +%s) - $START_TIME )) -gt $DOG_DELAY ]; then + echo "$3 START TIMEOUT" + echo "$3 START TIMEOUT" >> $4 + break + fi + # Linux and *BSD support decimal arguments to sleep. On other + # OSes this may be a tight loop. + sleep 0.1 2>/dev/null || true + done + } +else + echo "Warning: lsof not available, wait_app_start = sleep" + wait_app_start() { + sleep "$START_DELAY" + } +fi + +# Wait for server process $2 to be listening on port $1. +wait_server_start() { + wait_app_start $1 $2 "SERVER" $SRV_OUT +} + +# Wait for proxy process $2 to be listening on port $1. +wait_proxy_start() { + wait_app_start $1 $2 "PROXY" $PXY_OUT +} + +# Given the client or server debug output, parse the unix timestamp that is +# included in the first 4 bytes of the random bytes and check that it's within +# acceptable bounds +check_server_hello_time() { + # Extract the time from the debug (lvl 3) output of the client + SERVER_HELLO_TIME="$(sed -n 's/.*server hello, current time: //p' < "$1")" + # Get the Unix timestamp for now + CUR_TIME=$(date +'%s') + THRESHOLD_IN_SECS=300 + + # Check if the ServerHello time was printed + if [ -z "$SERVER_HELLO_TIME" ]; then + return 1 + fi + + # Check the time in ServerHello is within acceptable bounds + if [ $SERVER_HELLO_TIME -lt $(( $CUR_TIME - $THRESHOLD_IN_SECS )) ]; then + # The time in ServerHello is at least 5 minutes before now + return 1 + elif [ $SERVER_HELLO_TIME -gt $(( $CUR_TIME + $THRESHOLD_IN_SECS )) ]; then + # The time in ServerHello is at least 5 minutes later than now + return 1 + else + return 0 + fi +} + +# Get handshake memory usage from server or client output and put it into the variable specified by the first argument +handshake_memory_get() { + OUTPUT_VARIABLE="$1" + OUTPUT_FILE="$2" + + # Get memory usage from a pattern like "Heap memory usage after handshake: 23112 bytes. Peak memory usage was 33112" + MEM_USAGE=$(sed -n 's/.*Heap memory usage after handshake: //p' < "$OUTPUT_FILE" | grep -o "[0-9]*" | head -1) + + # Check if memory usage was read + if [ -z "$MEM_USAGE" ]; then + echo "Error: Can not read the value of handshake memory usage" + return 1 + else + eval "$OUTPUT_VARIABLE=$MEM_USAGE" + return 0 + fi +} + +# Get handshake memory usage from server or client output and check if this value +# is not higher than the maximum given by the first argument +handshake_memory_check() { + MAX_MEMORY="$1" + OUTPUT_FILE="$2" + + # Get memory usage + if ! handshake_memory_get "MEMORY_USAGE" "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then + return 1 + fi + + # Check if memory usage is below max value + if [ "$MEMORY_USAGE" -gt "$MAX_MEMORY" ]; then + echo "\nFailed: Handshake memory usage was $MEMORY_USAGE bytes," \ + "but should be below $MAX_MEMORY bytes" + return 1 + else + return 0 + fi +} + +# wait for client to terminate and set CLI_EXIT +# must be called right after starting the client +wait_client_done() { + CLI_PID=$! + + CLI_DELAY=$(( $DOG_DELAY * $CLI_DELAY_FACTOR )) + CLI_DELAY_FACTOR=1 + + ( sleep $CLI_DELAY; echo "===CLIENT_TIMEOUT===" >> $CLI_OUT; kill $CLI_PID ) & + DOG_PID=$! + + wait $CLI_PID + CLI_EXIT=$? + + kill $DOG_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 + wait $DOG_PID + + echo "EXIT: $CLI_EXIT" >> $CLI_OUT + + sleep $SRV_DELAY_SECONDS + SRV_DELAY_SECONDS=0 +} + +# check if the given command uses dtls and sets global variable DTLS +detect_dtls() { + case "$1" in + *dtls=1*|*-dtls*|*-u*) DTLS=1;; + *) DTLS=0;; + esac +} + +# check if the given command uses gnutls and sets global variable CMD_IS_GNUTLS +is_gnutls() { + case "$1" in + *gnutls-cli*) + CMD_IS_GNUTLS=1 + ;; + *gnutls-serv*) + CMD_IS_GNUTLS=1 + ;; + *) + CMD_IS_GNUTLS=0 + ;; + esac +} + +# Determine what calc_verify trace is to be expected, if any. +# +# calc_verify is only called for two things: to calculate the +# extended master secret, and to process client authentication. +# +# Warning: the current implementation assumes that extended_ms is not +# disabled on the client or on the server. +# +# Inputs: +# * $1: the value of the server auth_mode parameter. +# 'required' if client authentication is expected, +# 'none' or absent if not. +# * $CONFIGS_ENABLED +# +# Outputs: +# * $maybe_calc_verify: set to a trace expected in the debug logs +set_maybe_calc_verify() { + maybe_calc_verify= + case $CONFIGS_ENABLED in + *\ MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET\ *) :;; + *) + case ${1-} in + ''|none) return;; + required) :;; + *) echo "Bad parameter 1 to set_maybe_calc_verify: $1"; exit 1;; + esac + esac + case $CONFIGS_ENABLED in + *\ MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO\ *) maybe_calc_verify="PSA calc verify";; + *) maybe_calc_verify="<= calc verify";; + esac +} + +# Compare file content +# Usage: find_in_both pattern file1 file2 +# extract from file1 the first line matching the pattern +# check in file2 that the same line can be found +find_in_both() { + srv_pattern=$(grep -m 1 "$1" "$2"); + if [ -z "$srv_pattern" ]; then + return 1; + fi + + if grep "$srv_pattern" $3 >/dev/null; then : + return 0; + else + return 1; + fi +} + +# Analyze the commands that will be used in a test. +# +# Analyze and possibly instrument $PXY_CMD, $CLI_CMD, $SRV_CMD to pass +# extra arguments or go through wrappers. +# +# Inputs: +# * $@: supplemental options to run_test() (after the mandatory arguments). +# * $CLI_CMD, $PXY_CMD, $SRV_CMD: the client, proxy and server commands. +# * $DTLS: 1 if DTLS, otherwise 0. +# +# Outputs: +# * $CLI_CMD, $PXY_CMD, $SRV_CMD: may be tweaked. +analyze_test_commands() { + # if the test uses DTLS but no custom proxy, add a simple proxy + # as it provides timing info that's useful to debug failures + if [ -z "$PXY_CMD" ] && [ "$DTLS" -eq 1 ]; then + PXY_CMD="$P_PXY" + case " $SRV_CMD " in + *' server_addr=::1 '*) + PXY_CMD="$PXY_CMD server_addr=::1 listen_addr=::1";; + esac + fi + + # update CMD_IS_GNUTLS variable + is_gnutls "$SRV_CMD" + + # if the server uses gnutls but doesn't set priority, explicitly + # set the default priority + if [ "$CMD_IS_GNUTLS" -eq 1 ]; then + case "$SRV_CMD" in + *--priority*) :;; + *) SRV_CMD="$SRV_CMD --priority=NORMAL";; + esac + fi + + # update CMD_IS_GNUTLS variable + is_gnutls "$CLI_CMD" + + # if the client uses gnutls but doesn't set priority, explicitly + # set the default priority + if [ "$CMD_IS_GNUTLS" -eq 1 ]; then + case "$CLI_CMD" in + *--priority*) :;; + *) CLI_CMD="$CLI_CMD --priority=NORMAL";; + esac + fi + + # fix client port + if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then + CLI_CMD=$( echo "$CLI_CMD" | sed s/+SRV_PORT/$PXY_PORT/g ) + else + CLI_CMD=$( echo "$CLI_CMD" | sed s/+SRV_PORT/$SRV_PORT/g ) + fi + + # prepend valgrind to our commands if active + if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + if is_polar "$SRV_CMD"; then + SRV_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $SRV_CMD" + fi + if is_polar "$CLI_CMD"; then + CLI_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $CLI_CMD" + fi + fi +} + +# Check for failure conditions after a test case. +# +# Inputs from run_test: +# * positional parameters: test options (see run_test documentation) +# * $CLI_EXIT: client return code +# * $CLI_EXPECT: expected client return code +# * $SRV_RET: server return code +# * $CLI_OUT, $SRV_OUT, $PXY_OUT: files containing client/server/proxy logs +# * $TIMES_LEFT: if nonzero, a RETRY outcome is allowed +# +# Outputs: +# * $outcome: one of PASS/RETRY*/FAIL +check_test_failure() { + outcome=FAIL + + if [ $TIMES_LEFT -gt 0 ] && + grep '===CLIENT_TIMEOUT===' $CLI_OUT >/dev/null + then + outcome="RETRY(client-timeout)" + return + fi + + # check if the client and server went at least to the handshake stage + # (useful to avoid tests with only negative assertions and non-zero + # expected client exit to incorrectly succeed in case of catastrophic + # failure) + if is_polar "$SRV_CMD"; then + if grep "Performing the SSL/TLS handshake" $SRV_OUT >/dev/null; then :; + else + fail "server or client failed to reach handshake stage" + return + fi + fi + if is_polar "$CLI_CMD"; then + if grep "Performing the SSL/TLS handshake" $CLI_OUT >/dev/null; then :; + else + fail "server or client failed to reach handshake stage" + return + fi + fi + + # Check server exit code (only for Mbed TLS: GnuTLS and OpenSSL don't + # exit with status 0 when interrupted by a signal, and we don't really + # care anyway), in case e.g. the server reports a memory leak. + if [ $SRV_RET != 0 ] && is_polar "$SRV_CMD"; then + fail "Server exited with status $SRV_RET" + return + fi + + # check client exit code + if [ \( "$CLI_EXPECT" = 0 -a "$CLI_EXIT" != 0 \) -o \ + \( "$CLI_EXPECT" != 0 -a "$CLI_EXIT" = 0 \) ] + then + fail "bad client exit code (expected $CLI_EXPECT, got $CLI_EXIT)" + return + fi + + # check other assertions + # lines beginning with == are added by valgrind, ignore them + # lines with 'Serious error when reading debug info', are valgrind issues as well + while [ $# -gt 0 ] + do + case $1 in + "-s") + if grep -v '^==' $SRV_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then :; else + fail "pattern '$2' MUST be present in the Server output" + return + fi + ;; + + "-c") + if grep -v '^==' $CLI_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then :; else + fail "pattern '$2' MUST be present in the Client output" + return + fi + ;; + + "-S") + if grep -v '^==' $SRV_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then + if log_pattern_presence_is_conclusive "$2"; then + fail "pattern '$2' MUST NOT be present in the Server output" + fi + return + fi + ;; + + "-C") + if grep -v '^==' $CLI_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep "$2" >/dev/null; then + if log_pattern_presence_is_conclusive "$2"; then + fail "pattern '$2' MUST NOT be present in the Client output" + fi + return + fi + ;; + + # The filtering in the following two options (-u and -U) do the following + # - ignore valgrind output + # - filter out everything but lines right after the pattern occurrences + # - keep one of each non-unique line + # - count how many lines remain + # A line with '--' will remain in the result from previous outputs, so the number of lines in the result will be 1 + # if there were no duplicates. + "-U") + if [ $(grep -v '^==' $SRV_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep -A1 "$2" | grep -v "$2" | sort | uniq -d | wc -l) -gt 1 ]; then + fail "lines following pattern '$2' must be unique in Server output" + return + fi + ;; + + "-u") + if [ $(grep -v '^==' $CLI_OUT | grep -v 'Serious error when reading debug info' | grep -A1 "$2" | grep -v "$2" | sort | uniq -d | wc -l) -gt 1 ]; then + fail "lines following pattern '$2' must be unique in Client output" + return + fi + ;; + "-F") + if ! $2 "$SRV_OUT"; then + fail "function call to '$2' failed on Server output" + return + fi + ;; + "-f") + if ! $2 "$CLI_OUT"; then + fail "function call to '$2' failed on Client output" + return + fi + ;; + "-g") + if ! eval "$2 '$SRV_OUT' '$CLI_OUT'"; then + fail "function call to '$2' failed on Server and Client output" + return + fi + ;; + + *) + echo "Unknown test: $1" >&2 + exit 1 + esac + shift 2 + done + + # check valgrind's results + if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + if is_polar "$SRV_CMD" && has_mem_err $SRV_OUT; then + fail "Server has memory errors" + return + fi + if is_polar "$CLI_CMD" && has_mem_err $CLI_OUT; then + fail "Client has memory errors" + return + fi + fi + + # if we're here, everything is ok + outcome=PASS +} + +# Run the current test case: start the server and if applicable the proxy, run +# the client, wait for all processes to finish or time out. +# +# Inputs: +# * $NAME: test case name +# * $CLI_CMD, $SRV_CMD, $PXY_CMD: commands to run +# * $CLI_OUT, $SRV_OUT, $PXY_OUT: files to contain client/server/proxy logs +# +# Outputs: +# * $CLI_EXIT: client return code +# * $SRV_RET: server return code +do_run_test_once() { + # run the commands + if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then + printf "# %s\n%s\n" "$NAME" "$PXY_CMD" > $PXY_OUT + $PXY_CMD >> $PXY_OUT 2>&1 & + PXY_PID=$! + wait_proxy_start "$PXY_PORT" "$PXY_PID" + fi + + check_osrv_dtls + printf '# %s\n%s\n' "$NAME" "$SRV_CMD" > $SRV_OUT + provide_input | $SRV_CMD >> $SRV_OUT 2>&1 & + SRV_PID=$! + wait_server_start "$SRV_PORT" "$SRV_PID" + + printf '# %s\n%s\n' "$NAME" "$CLI_CMD" > $CLI_OUT + # The client must be a subprocess of the script in order for killing it to + # work properly, that's why the ampersand is placed inside the eval command, + # not at the end of the line: the latter approach will spawn eval as a + # subprocess, and the $CLI_CMD as a grandchild. + eval "$CLI_CMD &" >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 + wait_client_done + + sleep 0.05 + + # terminate the server (and the proxy) + kill $SRV_PID + wait $SRV_PID + SRV_RET=$? + + if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then + kill $PXY_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 + wait $PXY_PID + fi +} + +# Usage: run_test name [-p proxy_cmd] srv_cmd cli_cmd cli_exit [option [...]] +# Options: -s pattern pattern that must be present in server output +# -c pattern pattern that must be present in client output +# -u pattern lines after pattern must be unique in client output +# -f call shell function on client output +# -S pattern pattern that must be absent in server output +# -C pattern pattern that must be absent in client output +# -U pattern lines after pattern must be unique in server output +# -F call shell function on server output +# -g call shell function on server and client output +run_test() { + NAME="$1" + shift 1 + + if is_excluded "$NAME"; then + SKIP_NEXT="NO" + # There was no request to run the test, so don't record its outcome. + return + fi + + print_name "$NAME" + + # Do we only run numbered tests? + if [ -n "$RUN_TEST_NUMBER" ]; then + case ",$RUN_TEST_NUMBER," in + *",$TESTS,"*) :;; + *) SKIP_NEXT="YES";; + esac + fi + + # does this test use a proxy? + if [ "X$1" = "X-p" ]; then + PXY_CMD="$2" + shift 2 + else + PXY_CMD="" + fi + + # get commands and client output + SRV_CMD="$1" + CLI_CMD="$2" + CLI_EXPECT="$3" + shift 3 + + # Check if test uses files + case "$SRV_CMD $CLI_CMD" in + *data_files/*) + requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_FS_IO;; + esac + + # Check if the test uses DTLS. + detect_dtls "$SRV_CMD" + if [ "$DTLS" -eq 1 ]; then + requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + fi + + # If the client or server requires certain features that can be detected + # from their command-line arguments, check that they're enabled. + detect_required_features "$SRV_CMD" "$@" + detect_required_features "$CLI_CMD" "$@" + + # If we're in a PSK-only build and the test can be adapted to PSK, do that. + maybe_adapt_for_psk "$@" + + # should we skip? + if [ "X$SKIP_NEXT" = "XYES" ]; then + SKIP_NEXT="NO" + record_outcome "SKIP" + SKIPS=$(( $SKIPS + 1 )) + return + fi + + analyze_test_commands "$@" + + # One regular run and two retries + TIMES_LEFT=3 + while [ $TIMES_LEFT -gt 0 ]; do + TIMES_LEFT=$(( $TIMES_LEFT - 1 )) + + do_run_test_once + + check_test_failure "$@" + case $outcome in + PASS) break;; + RETRY*) printf "$outcome ";; + FAIL) return;; + esac + done + + # If we get this far, the test case passed. + record_outcome "PASS" + if [ "$PRESERVE_LOGS" -gt 0 ]; then + mv $SRV_OUT o-srv-${TESTS}.log + mv $CLI_OUT o-cli-${TESTS}.log + if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then + mv $PXY_OUT o-pxy-${TESTS}.log + fi + fi + + rm -f $SRV_OUT $CLI_OUT $PXY_OUT +} + +run_test_psa() { + requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + set_maybe_calc_verify none + run_test "PSA-supported ciphersuite: $1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls12" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=$1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" \ + -c "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" \ + -c "$maybe_calc_verify" \ + -c "calc PSA finished" \ + -s "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" \ + -s "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" \ + -s "$maybe_calc_verify" \ + -s "calc PSA finished" \ + -C "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context"\ + -S "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context"\ + -s "Protocol is TLSv1.2" \ + -c "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation."\ + -c "Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" \ + -S "error" \ + -C "error" + unset maybe_calc_verify +} + +run_test_psa_force_curve() { + requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + set_maybe_calc_verify none + run_test "PSA - ECDH with $1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls12" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 curves=$1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" \ + -c "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" \ + -c "$maybe_calc_verify" \ + -c "calc PSA finished" \ + -s "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" \ + -s "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" \ + -s "$maybe_calc_verify" \ + -s "calc PSA finished" \ + -C "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context"\ + -S "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context"\ + -s "Protocol is TLSv1.2" \ + -c "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation."\ + -c "Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" \ + -S "error" \ + -C "error" + unset maybe_calc_verify +} + +# Test that the server's memory usage after a handshake is reduced when a client specifies +# a maximum fragment length. +# first argument ($1) is MFL for SSL client +# second argument ($2) is memory usage for SSL client with default MFL (16k) +run_test_memory_after_hanshake_with_mfl() +{ + # The test passes if the difference is around 2*(16k-MFL) + MEMORY_USAGE_LIMIT="$(( $2 - ( 2 * ( 16384 - $1 )) ))" + + # Leave some margin for robustness + MEMORY_USAGE_LIMIT="$(( ( MEMORY_USAGE_LIMIT * 110 ) / 100 ))" + + run_test "Handshake memory usage (MFL $1)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required force_version=tls12" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=tls12 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM max_frag_len=$1" \ + 0 \ + -F "handshake_memory_check $MEMORY_USAGE_LIMIT" +} + + +# Test that the server's memory usage after a handshake is reduced when a client specifies +# different values of Maximum Fragment Length: default (16k), 4k, 2k, 1k and 512 bytes +run_tests_memory_after_hanshake() +{ + # all tests in this sequence requires the same configuration (see requires_config_enabled()) + SKIP_THIS_TESTS="$SKIP_NEXT" + + # first test with default MFU is to get reference memory usage + MEMORY_USAGE_MFL_16K=0 + run_test "Handshake memory usage initial (MFL 16384 - default)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required force_version=tls12" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=tls12 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" \ + 0 \ + -F "handshake_memory_get MEMORY_USAGE_MFL_16K" + + SKIP_NEXT="$SKIP_THIS_TESTS" + run_test_memory_after_hanshake_with_mfl 4096 "$MEMORY_USAGE_MFL_16K" + + SKIP_NEXT="$SKIP_THIS_TESTS" + run_test_memory_after_hanshake_with_mfl 2048 "$MEMORY_USAGE_MFL_16K" + + SKIP_NEXT="$SKIP_THIS_TESTS" + run_test_memory_after_hanshake_with_mfl 1024 "$MEMORY_USAGE_MFL_16K" + + SKIP_NEXT="$SKIP_THIS_TESTS" + run_test_memory_after_hanshake_with_mfl 512 "$MEMORY_USAGE_MFL_16K" +} + +cleanup() { + rm -f $CLI_OUT $SRV_OUT $PXY_OUT $SESSION + rm -f context_srv.txt + rm -f context_cli.txt + test -n "${SRV_PID:-}" && kill $SRV_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 + test -n "${PXY_PID:-}" && kill $PXY_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 + test -n "${CLI_PID:-}" && kill $CLI_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 + test -n "${DOG_PID:-}" && kill $DOG_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 + exit 1 +} + +# +# MAIN +# + +get_options "$@" + +# Optimize filters: if $FILTER and $EXCLUDE can be expressed as shell +# patterns rather than regular expressions, use a case statement instead +# of calling grep. To keep the optimizer simple, it is incomplete and only +# detects simple cases: plain substring, everything, nothing. +# +# As an exception, the character '.' is treated as an ordinary character +# if it is the only special character in the string. This is because it's +# rare to need "any one character", but needing a literal '.' is common +# (e.g. '-f "DTLS 1.2"'). +need_grep= +case "$FILTER" in + '^$') simple_filter=;; + '.*') simple_filter='*';; + *[][$+*?\\^{\|}]*) # Regexp special characters (other than .), we need grep + need_grep=1;; + *) # No regexp or shell-pattern special character + simple_filter="*$FILTER*";; +esac +case "$EXCLUDE" in + '^$') simple_exclude=;; + '.*') simple_exclude='*';; + *[][$+*?\\^{\|}]*) # Regexp special characters (other than .), we need grep + need_grep=1;; + *) # No regexp or shell-pattern special character + simple_exclude="*$EXCLUDE*";; +esac +if [ -n "$need_grep" ]; then + is_excluded () { + ! echo "$1" | grep "$FILTER" | grep -q -v "$EXCLUDE" + } +else + is_excluded () { + case "$1" in + $simple_exclude) true;; + $simple_filter) false;; + *) true;; + esac + } +fi + +# sanity checks, avoid an avalanche of errors +P_SRV_BIN="${P_SRV%%[ ]*}" +P_CLI_BIN="${P_CLI%%[ ]*}" +P_PXY_BIN="${P_PXY%%[ ]*}" +if [ ! -x "$P_SRV_BIN" ]; then + echo "Command '$P_SRV_BIN' is not an executable file" + exit 1 +fi +if [ ! -x "$P_CLI_BIN" ]; then + echo "Command '$P_CLI_BIN' is not an executable file" + exit 1 +fi +if [ ! -x "$P_PXY_BIN" ]; then + echo "Command '$P_PXY_BIN' is not an executable file" + exit 1 +fi +if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + if which valgrind >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else + echo "Memcheck not possible. Valgrind not found" + exit 1 + fi +fi +if which $OPENSSL_CMD >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else + echo "Command '$OPENSSL_CMD' not found" + exit 1 +fi + +# used by watchdog +MAIN_PID="$$" + +# We use somewhat arbitrary delays for tests: +# - how long do we wait for the server to start (when lsof not available)? +# - how long do we allow for the client to finish? +# (not to check performance, just to avoid waiting indefinitely) +# Things are slower with valgrind, so give extra time here. +# +# Note: without lsof, there is a trade-off between the running time of this +# script and the risk of spurious errors because we didn't wait long enough. +# The watchdog delay on the other hand doesn't affect normal running time of +# the script, only the case where a client or server gets stuck. +if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then + START_DELAY=6 + DOG_DELAY=60 +else + START_DELAY=2 + DOG_DELAY=20 +fi + +# some particular tests need more time: +# - for the client, we multiply the usual watchdog limit by a factor +# - for the server, we sleep for a number of seconds after the client exits +# see client_need_more_time() and server_needs_more_time() +CLI_DELAY_FACTOR=1 +SRV_DELAY_SECONDS=0 + +# fix commands to use this port, force IPv4 while at it +# +SRV_PORT will be replaced by either $SRV_PORT or $PXY_PORT later +# Note: Using 'localhost' rather than 127.0.0.1 here is unwise, as on many +# machines that will resolve to ::1, and we don't want ipv6 here. +P_SRV="$P_SRV server_addr=127.0.0.1 server_port=$SRV_PORT" +P_CLI="$P_CLI server_addr=127.0.0.1 server_port=+SRV_PORT" +P_PXY="$P_PXY server_addr=127.0.0.1 server_port=$SRV_PORT listen_addr=127.0.0.1 listen_port=$PXY_PORT ${SEED:+"seed=$SEED"}" +O_SRV="$O_SRV -accept $SRV_PORT" +O_CLI="$O_CLI -connect 127.0.0.1:+SRV_PORT" +G_SRV="$G_SRV -p $SRV_PORT" +G_CLI="$G_CLI -p +SRV_PORT" + +if [ -n "${OPENSSL_LEGACY:-}" ]; then + O_LEGACY_SRV="$O_LEGACY_SRV -accept $SRV_PORT -dhparam data_files/dhparams.pem" + O_LEGACY_CLI="$O_LEGACY_CLI -connect 127.0.0.1:+SRV_PORT" +fi + +if [ -n "${OPENSSL_NEXT:-}" ]; then + O_NEXT_SRV="$O_NEXT_SRV -accept $SRV_PORT" + O_NEXT_CLI="$O_NEXT_CLI -connect 127.0.0.1:+SRV_PORT" +fi + +if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_SERV:-}" ]; then + G_NEXT_SRV="$G_NEXT_SRV -p $SRV_PORT" +fi + +if [ -n "${GNUTLS_NEXT_CLI:-}" ]; then + G_NEXT_CLI="$G_NEXT_CLI -p +SRV_PORT" +fi + +# Allow SHA-1, because many of our test certificates use it +P_SRV="$P_SRV allow_sha1=1" +P_CLI="$P_CLI allow_sha1=1" + +# Also pick a unique name for intermediate files +SRV_OUT="srv_out.$$" +CLI_OUT="cli_out.$$" +PXY_OUT="pxy_out.$$" +SESSION="session.$$" + +SKIP_NEXT="NO" + +trap cleanup INT TERM HUP + +# Basic test + +# Checks that: +# - things work with all ciphersuites active (used with config-full in all.sh) +# - the expected parameters are selected +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +requires_ciphersuite_enabled TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA512_C # "signature_algorithm ext: 6" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +run_test "Default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -s "Protocol is TLSv1.2" \ + -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" \ + -s "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: 6" \ + -s "ECDHE curve: secp521r1" \ + -S "error" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +requires_ciphersuite_enabled TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 +run_test "Default, DTLS" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Protocol is DTLSv1.2" \ + -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" + +run_test "TLS client auth: required" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +run_test "TLS: password protected client key" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key.enc key_pwd=PolarSSLTest" \ + 0 + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +run_test "TLS: password protected server key" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key.enc key_pwd=PolarSSLTest" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +run_test "TLS: password protected server key, two certificates" \ + "$P_SRV \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key.enc key_pwd=PolarSSLTest crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server2.key.enc key_pwd2=PolarSSLTest crt_file2=data_files/server2.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +run_test "Default (compression enabled)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "Allocating compression buffer" \ + -c "Allocating compression buffer" \ + -s "Record expansion is unknown (compression)" \ + -c "Record expansion is unknown (compression)" \ + -S "error" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "CA callback on client" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 " \ + 0 \ + -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -S "error" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +run_test "CA callback on server" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 0 \ + -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \ + -S "error" \ + -C "error" + +# Test using an opaque private key for client authentication +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +run_test "Opaque key for client authentication" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 0 \ + -c "key type: Opaque" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \ + -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \ + -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \ + -S "error" \ + -C "error" + +# Test using an opaque private key for server authentication +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +run_test "Opaque key for server authentication" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 0 \ + -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \ + -s "key types: Opaque - invalid PK" \ + -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \ + -S "error" \ + -C "error" + +# Test using an opaque private key for client/server authentication +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +run_test "Opaque key for client/server authentication" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 0 \ + -c "key type: Opaque" \ + -c "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \ + -s "key types: Opaque - invalid PK" \ + -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \ + -s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA" \ + -S "error" \ + -C "error" + +# Opaque keys not supported for static ECDH +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +run_test "Opaque key: server: ECDH-ECDSA not supported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_opaque=1 + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + 1 \ + -s "server key not ECDH capable" \ + -s "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert() returned" \ + -s "error" \ + -c "error" + +# Opaque keys not supported for static ECDH +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +run_test "Opaque key: server: ECDH-RSA not supported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_opaque=1 + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + 1 \ + -s "server key not ECDH capable" \ + -s "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert() returned" \ + -s "error" \ + -c "error" + +# Opaque PSKs not supported for mixed PSK + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "Opaque psk: client: ECDHE-PSK not supported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 \ + force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -c "opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK" \ + -s "error" \ + -c "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "Opaque psk: client: DHE-PSK not supported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 \ + force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -c "opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK" \ + -s "error" \ + -c "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "Opaque psk: client: RSA-PSK not supported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 \ + force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -c "opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK" \ + -s "error" \ + -c "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "Opaque psk: server: ECDHE-PSK not supported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 \ + force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + 1 \ + -s "opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK" \ + -s "error" \ + -c "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "Opaque psk: server: DHE-PSK not supported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 \ + force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + 1 \ + -s "opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK" \ + -s "error" \ + -c "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "Opaque psk: server: RSA-PSK not supported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 \ + force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + 1 \ + -s "opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK" \ + -s "error" \ + -c "error" + +# Test ciphersuites which we expect to be fully supported by PSA Crypto +# and check that we don't fall back to Mbed TLS' internal crypto primitives. +run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 +run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM +run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 +run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 +run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA +run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 +run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "secp521r1" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "brainpoolP512r1" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "secp384r1" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "brainpoolP384r1" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "secp256r1" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "secp256k1" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "brainpoolP256r1" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "secp224r1" +## SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API +## (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541), +## so it is disabled in PSA even when it's enabled in Mbed TLS. +## The proper dependency would be on PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 but +## dependencies on PSA symbols in ssl-opt.sh are not implemented yet. +#requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#run_test_psa_force_curve "secp224k1" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "secp192r1" +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +run_test_psa_force_curve "secp192k1" + +# Test current time in ServerHello +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME +run_test "ServerHello contains gmt_unix_time" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -f "check_server_hello_time" \ + -F "check_server_hello_time" + +# Test for uniqueness of IVs in AEAD ciphersuites +run_test "Unique IV in GCM" \ + "$P_SRV exchanges=20 debug_level=4" \ + "$P_CLI exchanges=20 debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" \ + 0 \ + -u "IV used" \ + -U "IV used" + +# Tests for certificate verification callback +run_test "Configuration-specific CRT verification callback" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI context_crt_cb=0 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -S "error" \ + -c "Verify requested for " \ + -c "Use configuration-specific verification callback" \ + -C "Use context-specific verification callback" \ + -C "error" + +run_test "Context-specific CRT verification callback" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI context_crt_cb=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -S "error" \ + -c "Verify requested for " \ + -c "Use context-specific verification callback" \ + -C "Use configuration-specific verification callback" \ + -C "error" + +# Tests for rc4 option + +# Manual dependencies on the ciphersuite support are necessary +# because the automatic requirements from force_ciphersuite=... detection +# make an exception for these test cases since they expect a handshake +# failure. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +run_test "RC4: server disabled, client enabled" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -s "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +run_test "RC4: server half, client enabled" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -s "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +run_test "RC4: server enabled, client disabled" \ + "$P_SRV force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 1 \ + -s "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common" + +# Run even if the ciphersuite is disabled by default, but only if the +# requisite cryptographic mechanisms are present. +# Having "force_ciphersuite=..." in the client or server arguments would +# prevent that due to the automatic detection, so hide behind some +# shell expansion to fool the automatic detection. +with_rc4_ciphersuite() { + exec "$@" force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA +} +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +run_test "RC4: both enabled" \ + "with_rc4_ciphersuite $P_SRV" \ + "with_rc4_ciphersuite $P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common" + +# Test empty CA list in CertificateRequest in TLS 1.1 and earlier + +requires_gnutls +run_test "CertificateRequest with empty CA list, TLS 1.1 (GnuTLS server)" \ + "$G_SRV"\ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 + +requires_gnutls +run_test "CertificateRequest with empty CA list, TLS 1.0 (GnuTLS server)" \ + "$G_SRV"\ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1" \ + 0 + +# Tests for SHA-1 support + +run_test "SHA-1 forbidden by default in server certificate" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server2.key crt_file=data_files/server2.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=2 allow_sha1=0" \ + 1 \ + -c "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash" + +run_test "SHA-1 explicitly allowed in server certificate" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server2.key crt_file=data_files/server2.crt" \ + "$P_CLI allow_sha1=1" \ + 0 + +run_test "SHA-256 allowed by default in server certificate" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server2.key crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt" \ + "$P_CLI allow_sha1=0" \ + 0 + +run_test "SHA-1 forbidden by default in client certificate" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required allow_sha1=0" \ + "$P_CLI key_file=data_files/cli-rsa.key crt_file=data_files/cli-rsa-sha1.crt" \ + 1 \ + -s "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash" + +run_test "SHA-1 explicitly allowed in client certificate" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required allow_sha1=1" \ + "$P_CLI key_file=data_files/cli-rsa.key crt_file=data_files/cli-rsa-sha1.crt" \ + 0 + +run_test "SHA-256 allowed by default in client certificate" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required allow_sha1=0" \ + "$P_CLI key_file=data_files/cli-rsa.key crt_file=data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt" \ + 0 + +# Tests for datagram packing +run_test "DTLS: multiple records in same datagram, client and server" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=1 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "next record in same datagram" \ + -s "next record in same datagram" + +run_test "DTLS: multiple records in same datagram, client only" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -s "next record in same datagram" \ + -C "next record in same datagram" + +run_test "DTLS: multiple records in same datagram, server only" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=1 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -S "next record in same datagram" \ + -c "next record in same datagram" + +run_test "DTLS: multiple records in same datagram, neither client nor server" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -S "next record in same datagram" \ + -C "next record in same datagram" + +# Tests for Truncated HMAC extension + +run_test "Truncated HMAC: client default, server default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=4" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC: client disabled, server default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=4" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC: client enabled, server default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=4" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC: client enabled, server disabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=0" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC: client disabled, server enabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC: client enabled, server enabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +run_test "Truncated HMAC, DTLS: client default, server default" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=4" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC, DTLS: client disabled, server default" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=4" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC, DTLS: client enabled, server default" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=4" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC, DTLS: client enabled, server disabled" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC, DTLS: client disabled, server enabled" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Truncated HMAC, DTLS: client enabled, server enabled" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \ + -s "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)" + +# Tests for Context serialization + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, client serializes, CCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -S "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, client serializes, ChaChaPoly" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -S "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, client serializes, GCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -S "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Context serialization, client serializes, with CID" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -S "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, server serializes, CCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -C "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, server serializes, ChaChaPoly" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -C "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, server serializes, GCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -C "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Context serialization, server serializes, with CID" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -C "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, both serialize, CCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, both serialize, ChaChaPoly" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, both serialize, GCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Context serialization, both serialize, with CID" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, client serializes, CCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -S "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, client serializes, ChaChaPoly" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -S "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, client serializes, GCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -S "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, client serializes, with CID" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -S "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, server serializes, CCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -C "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, server serializes, ChaChaPoly" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -C "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, server serializes, GCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -C "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, server serializes, with CID" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -C "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, both serialize, CCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, both serialize, ChaChaPoly" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, both serialize, GCM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Context serialization, re-init, both serialize, with CID" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "Deserializing connection..." \ + -s "Deserializing connection..." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION +run_test "Saving the serialized context to a file" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 context_file=context_srv.txt" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 serialize=1 context_file=context_cli.txt" \ + 0 \ + -s "Save serialized context to a file... ok" \ + -c "Save serialized context to a file... ok" +rm -f context_srv.txt +rm -f context_cli.txt + +# Tests for DTLS Connection ID extension + +# So far, the CID API isn't implemented, so we can't +# grep for output witnessing its use. This needs to be +# changed once the CID extension is implemented. + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli enabled, Srv disabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=deadbeef" \ + 0 \ + -s "Disable use of CID extension." \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled" \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -C "found CID extension" \ + -S "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -C "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID was rejected by the server" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli disabled, Srv enabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=deadbeef" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Disable use of CID extension." \ + -C "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -S "found CID extension" \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -S "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -C "found CID extension" \ + -S "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -C "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID was not offered by client" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli+Srv CID nonempty" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID, 3D: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli+Srv CID nonempty" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 bad_cid=1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 dgram_packing=0 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 dgram_packing=0 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "ignoring unexpected CID" \ + -s "ignoring unexpected CID" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID, MTU: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli+Srv CID nonempty" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=800" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID, 3D+MTU: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli+Srv CID nonempty" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=800 drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 bad_cid=1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "ignoring unexpected CID" \ + -s "ignoring unexpected CID" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli CID empty" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=deadbeef" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 4 Bytes): de ad be ef" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 0 Bytes):" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Srv CID empty" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=deadbeef" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 4 Bytes): de ad be ef" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 0 Bytes):" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli+Srv CID empty" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -S "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli+Srv CID nonempty, AES-128-CCM-8" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli CID empty, AES-128-CCM-8" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=deadbeef" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 4 Bytes): de ad be ef" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 0 Bytes):" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Srv CID empty, AES-128-CCM-8" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=deadbeef force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 4 Bytes): de ad be ef" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 0 Bytes):" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli+Srv CID empty, AES-128-CCM-8" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -S "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli+Srv CID nonempty, AES-128-CBC" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli CID empty, AES-128-CBC" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=deadbeef" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 4 Bytes): de ad be ef" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 0 Bytes):" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Srv CID empty, AES-128-CBC" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=deadbeef force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 4 Bytes): de ad be ef" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 0 Bytes):" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli+Srv CID empty, AES-128-CBC" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -S "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, renegotiate without change of CID" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, renegotiate with different CID" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead cid_val_renego=beef renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef cid_val_renego=dead renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID, no packing: Cli+Srv enabled, renegotiate with different CID" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 dgram_packing=0 cid_val=dead cid_val_renego=beef renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 dgram_packing=0 cid_val=beef cid_val_renego=dead renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID, 3D+MTU: Cli+Srv enabled, renegotiate with different CID" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=800 drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 bad_cid=1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead cid_val_renego=beef renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef cid_val_renego=dead renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "ignoring unexpected CID" \ + -s "ignoring unexpected CID" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, renegotiate without CID" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID, no packing: Cli+Srv enabled, renegotiate without CID" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 cid=1 cid_val=dead cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 cid=1 cid_val=beef cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID, 3D+MTU: Cli+Srv enabled, renegotiate without CID" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 bad_cid=1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "ignoring unexpected CID" \ + -s "ignoring unexpected CID" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, CID on renegotiation" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=0 cid_renego=1 cid_val_renego=dead renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=0 cid_renego=1 cid_val_renego=beef renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID, no packing: Cli+Srv enabled, CID on renegotiation" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 cid=0 cid_renego=1 cid_val_renego=dead renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 cid=0 cid_renego=1 cid_val_renego=beef renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID, 3D+MTU: Cli+Srv enabled, CID on renegotiation" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=800 drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 bad_cid=1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 dgram_packing=1 cid=0 cid_renego=1 cid_val_renego=dead renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 mtu=800 dtls=1 dgram_packing=1 cid=0 cid_renego=1 cid_val_renego=beef renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "ignoring unexpected CID" \ + -s "ignoring unexpected CID" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli disables on renegotiation" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID was not offered by client" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID, 3D: Cli+Srv enabled, Cli disables on renegotiation" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 bad_cid=1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -s "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID was not offered by client" \ + -c "ignoring unexpected CID" \ + -s "ignoring unexpected CID" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, Srv disables on renegotiation" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID was rejected by the server" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Connection ID, 3D: Cli+Srv enabled, Srv disables on renegotiation" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 bad_cid=1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead cid_renego=0 renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -C "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -S "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(after renegotiation) Use of Connection ID was rejected by the server" \ + -c "ignoring unexpected CID" \ + -s "ignoring unexpected CID" + +# This and the test below it require MAX_CONTENT_LEN to be at least MFL+1, because the +# tests check that the buffer contents are reallocated when the message is +# larger than the buffer. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 513 +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, variable buffer lengths, MFL=512" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite="TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" max_frag_len=512 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -s "Reallocating in_buf" \ + -s "Reallocating out_buf" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 1025 +run_test "Connection ID: Cli+Srv enabled, variable buffer lengths, MFL=1024" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=dead debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite="TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" max_frag_len=1024 dtls=1 cid=1 cid_val=beef" \ + 0 \ + -c "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "(initial handshake) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -s "Reallocating in_buf" \ + -s "Reallocating out_buf" + +# Tests for Encrypt-then-MAC extension + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC: default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -s "found encrypt then mac extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" \ + -c "found encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -c "using encrypt then mac" \ + -s "using encrypt then mac" + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC: client enabled, server disabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 etm=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 etm=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -s "found encrypt then mac extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" \ + -C "found encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -C "using encrypt then mac" \ + -S "using encrypt then mac" + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC: client enabled, aead cipher" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 etm=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 etm=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -s "found encrypt then mac extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" \ + -C "found encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -C "using encrypt then mac" \ + -S "using encrypt then mac" + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC: client enabled, stream cipher" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 etm=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 etm=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -s "found encrypt then mac extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" \ + -C "found encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -C "using encrypt then mac" \ + -S "using encrypt then mac" + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC: client disabled, server enabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 etm=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -S "found encrypt then mac extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" \ + -C "found encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -C "using encrypt then mac" \ + -S "using encrypt then mac" + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC: client SSLv3, server enabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 min_version=ssl3 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=ssl3" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -S "found encrypt then mac extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" \ + -C "found encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -C "using encrypt then mac" \ + -S "using encrypt then mac" + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC: client enabled, server SSLv3" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=ssl3 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=ssl3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -S "found encrypt then mac extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" \ + -C "found encrypt_then_mac extension" \ + -C "using encrypt then mac" \ + -S "using encrypt then mac" + +# Tests for Extended Master Secret extension + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +run_test "Extended Master Secret: default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" \ + -s "found extended master secret extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding extended master secret extension" \ + -c "found extended_master_secret extension" \ + -c "session hash for extended master secret" \ + -s "session hash for extended master secret" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +run_test "Extended Master Secret: client enabled, server disabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 extended_ms=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 extended_ms=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" \ + -s "found extended master secret extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding extended master secret extension" \ + -C "found extended_master_secret extension" \ + -C "session hash for extended master secret" \ + -S "session hash for extended master secret" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +run_test "Extended Master Secret: client disabled, server enabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 extended_ms=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 extended_ms=0" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" \ + -S "found extended master secret extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding extended master secret extension" \ + -C "found extended_master_secret extension" \ + -C "session hash for extended master secret" \ + -S "session hash for extended master secret" + +run_test "Extended Master Secret: client SSLv3, server enabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 min_version=ssl3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=ssl3" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" \ + -S "found extended master secret extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding extended master secret extension" \ + -C "found extended_master_secret extension" \ + -C "session hash for extended master secret" \ + -S "session hash for extended master secret" + +run_test "Extended Master Secret: client enabled, server SSLv3" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=ssl3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=ssl3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" \ + -S "found extended master secret extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding extended master secret extension" \ + -C "found extended_master_secret extension" \ + -C "session hash for extended master secret" \ + -S "session hash for extended master secret" + +# Tests for FALLBACK_SCSV + +run_test "Fallback SCSV: default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -C "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -S "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -S "inapropriate fallback" \ + -C "is a fatal alert message (msg 86)" + +run_test "Fallback SCSV: explicitly disabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=tls1_1 fallback=0" \ + 0 \ + -C "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -S "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -S "inapropriate fallback" \ + -C "is a fatal alert message (msg 86)" + +run_test "Fallback SCSV: enabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=tls1_1 fallback=1" \ + 1 \ + -c "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -s "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -s "inapropriate fallback" \ + -c "is a fatal alert message (msg 86)" + +run_test "Fallback SCSV: enabled, max version" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 fallback=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -s "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -S "inapropriate fallback" \ + -C "is a fatal alert message (msg 86)" + +requires_openssl_with_fallback_scsv +run_test "Fallback SCSV: default, openssl server" \ + "$O_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=tls1_1 fallback=0" \ + 0 \ + -C "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -C "is a fatal alert message (msg 86)" + +requires_openssl_with_fallback_scsv +run_test "Fallback SCSV: enabled, openssl server" \ + "$O_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=tls1_1 fallback=1" \ + 1 \ + -c "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -c "is a fatal alert message (msg 86)" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +requires_openssl_with_fallback_scsv +run_test "Fallback SCSV: disabled, openssl client" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$O_CLI -tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -S "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -S "inapropriate fallback" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +requires_openssl_with_fallback_scsv +run_test "Fallback SCSV: enabled, openssl client" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$O_CLI -tls1_1 -fallback_scsv" \ + 1 \ + -s "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -s "inapropriate fallback" + +requires_openssl_with_fallback_scsv +run_test "Fallback SCSV: enabled, max version, openssl client" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$O_CLI -fallback_scsv" \ + 0 \ + -s "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -S "inapropriate fallback" + +# Test sending and receiving empty application data records + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC: empty application data record" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=none debug_level=4 etm=1" \ + "$P_CLI auth_mode=none etm=1 request_size=0 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -S "0000: 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f" \ + -s "dumping 'input payload after decrypt' (0 bytes)" \ + -c "0 bytes written in 1 fragments" + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC: disabled, empty application data record" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=none debug_level=4 etm=0" \ + "$P_CLI auth_mode=none etm=0 request_size=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'input payload after decrypt' (0 bytes)" \ + -c "0 bytes written in 1 fragments" + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC, DTLS: empty application data record" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=none debug_level=4 etm=1 dtls=1" \ + "$P_CLI auth_mode=none etm=1 request_size=0 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "0000: 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f 0f" \ + -s "dumping 'input payload after decrypt' (0 bytes)" \ + -c "0 bytes written in 1 fragments" + +run_test "Encrypt then MAC, DTLS: disabled, empty application data record" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=none debug_level=4 etm=0 dtls=1" \ + "$P_CLI auth_mode=none etm=0 request_size=0 dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'input payload after decrypt' (0 bytes)" \ + -c "0 bytes written in 1 fragments" + +## ClientHello generated with +## "openssl s_client -CAfile tests/data_files/test-ca.crt -tls1_1 -connect localhost:4433 -cipher ..." +## then manually twiddling the ciphersuite list. +## The ClientHello content is spelled out below as a hex string as +## "prefix ciphersuite1 ciphersuite2 ciphersuite3 ciphersuite4 suffix". +## The expected response is an inappropriate_fallback alert. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +run_test "Fallback SCSV: beginning of list" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$TCP_CLIENT localhost $SRV_PORT '160301003e0100003a03022aafb94308dc22ca1086c65acc00e414384d76b61ecab37df1633b1ae1034dbe000008 5600 0031 0032 0033 0100000900230000000f000101' '15030200020256'" \ + 0 \ + -s "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -s "inapropriate fallback" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +run_test "Fallback SCSV: end of list" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$TCP_CLIENT localhost $SRV_PORT '160301003e0100003a03022aafb94308dc22ca1086c65acc00e414384d76b61ecab37df1633b1ae1034dbe000008 0031 0032 0033 5600 0100000900230000000f000101' '15030200020256'" \ + 0 \ + -s "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -s "inapropriate fallback" + +## Here the expected response is a valid ServerHello prefix, up to the random. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +run_test "Fallback SCSV: not in list" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=2" \ + "$TCP_CLIENT localhost $SRV_PORT '160301003e0100003a03022aafb94308dc22ca1086c65acc00e414384d76b61ecab37df1633b1ae1034dbe000008 0056 0031 0032 0033 0100000900230000000f000101' '16030200300200002c0302'" \ + 0 \ + -S "received FALLBACK_SCSV" \ + -S "inapropriate fallback" + +# Tests for CBC 1/n-1 record splitting + +run_test "CBC Record splitting: TLS 1.2, no splitting" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + request_size=123 force_version=tls12" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 123 bytes read" \ + -S "Read from client: 1 bytes read" \ + -S "122 bytes read" + +run_test "CBC Record splitting: TLS 1.1, no splitting" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + request_size=123 force_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 123 bytes read" \ + -S "Read from client: 1 bytes read" \ + -S "122 bytes read" + +run_test "CBC Record splitting: TLS 1.0, splitting" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + request_size=123 force_version=tls1" \ + 0 \ + -S "Read from client: 123 bytes read" \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" \ + -s "122 bytes read" + +run_test "CBC Record splitting: SSLv3, splitting" \ + "$P_SRV min_version=ssl3" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + request_size=123 force_version=ssl3" \ + 0 \ + -S "Read from client: 123 bytes read" \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" \ + -s "122 bytes read" + +run_test "CBC Record splitting: TLS 1.0 RC4, no splitting" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + request_size=123 force_version=tls1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 123 bytes read" \ + -S "Read from client: 1 bytes read" \ + -S "122 bytes read" + +run_test "CBC Record splitting: TLS 1.0, splitting disabled" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + request_size=123 force_version=tls1 recsplit=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 123 bytes read" \ + -S "Read from client: 1 bytes read" \ + -S "122 bytes read" + +run_test "CBC Record splitting: TLS 1.0, splitting, nbio" \ + "$P_SRV nbio=2" \ + "$P_CLI nbio=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + request_size=123 force_version=tls1" \ + 0 \ + -S "Read from client: 123 bytes read" \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" \ + -s "122 bytes read" + +# Tests for Session Tickets + +run_test "Session resume using tickets: basic" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -s "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using tickets: cache disabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=1 cache_max=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -s "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using tickets: timeout" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=1 cache_max=0 ticket_timeout=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=1 reconnect=1 reco_delay=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -S "a session has been resumed" \ + -C "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using tickets: session copy" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=1 cache_max=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=1 reconnect=1 reco_mode=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -s "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using tickets: openssl server" \ + "$O_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using tickets: openssl client" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=1" \ + "( $O_CLI -sess_out $SESSION; \ + $O_CLI -sess_in $SESSION; \ + rm -f $SESSION )" \ + 0 \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -s "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" + +# Tests for Session Tickets with DTLS + +run_test "Session resume using tickets, DTLS: basic" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 tickets=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -s "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using tickets, DTLS: cache disabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 tickets=1 cache_max=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -s "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using tickets, DTLS: timeout" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 tickets=1 cache_max=0 ticket_timeout=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1 reco_delay=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -S "a session has been resumed" \ + -C "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using tickets, DTLS: session copy" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 tickets=1 cache_max=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1 reco_mode=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -s "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using tickets, DTLS: openssl server" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -c "found session_ticket extension" \ + -c "parse new session ticket" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +# For reasons that aren't fully understood, this test randomly fails with high +# probability with OpenSSL 1.0.2g on the CI, see #5012. +requires_openssl_next +run_test "Session resume using tickets, DTLS: openssl client" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=1" \ + "( $O_NEXT_CLI -dtls1 -sess_out $SESSION; \ + $O_NEXT_CLI -dtls1 -sess_in $SESSION; \ + rm -f $SESSION )" \ + 0 \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -s "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -s "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" + +# Tests for Session Resume based on session-ID and cache + +run_test "Session resume using cache: tickets enabled on client" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -C "found session_ticket extension" \ + -C "parse new session ticket" \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using cache: tickets enabled on server" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -S "found session ticket extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -C "found session_ticket extension" \ + -C "parse new session ticket" \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +run_test "Session resume using cache: cache_max=0" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0 cache_max=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -S "a session has been resumed" \ + -C "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache: cache_max=1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0 cache_max=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache: timeout > delay" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 reco_delay=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache: timeout < delay" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0 cache_timeout=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 reco_delay=2" \ + 0 \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -S "a session has been resumed" \ + -C "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache: no timeout" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0 cache_timeout=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 reco_delay=2" \ + 0 \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache: session copy" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 reco_mode=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache: openssl client" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 tickets=0" \ + "( $O_CLI -sess_out $SESSION; \ + $O_CLI -sess_in $SESSION; \ + rm -f $SESSION )" \ + 0 \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache: openssl server" \ + "$O_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "found session_ticket extension" \ + -C "parse new session ticket" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +# Tests for Session resume and extensions + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +run_test "Session resume and connection ID" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 cid=1 cid_val=dead dtls=1 tickets=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 cid=1 cid_val=beef dtls=1 tickets=0 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -s "Enable use of CID extension." \ + -c "client hello, adding CID extension" \ + -s "found CID extension" \ + -s "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "server hello, adding CID extension" \ + -c "found CID extension" \ + -c "Use of CID extension negotiated" \ + -s "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" \ + -c "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): de ad" \ + -s "Peer CID (length 2 Bytes): be ef" \ + -s "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" \ + -c "Use of Connection ID has been negotiated" + +# Tests for Session Resume based on session-ID and cache, DTLS + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: tickets enabled on client" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=1 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -C "found session_ticket extension" \ + -C "parse new session ticket" \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: tickets enabled on server" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -S "found session ticket extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -C "found session_ticket extension" \ + -C "parse new session ticket" \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: cache_max=0" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 cache_max=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -S "a session has been resumed" \ + -C "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: cache_max=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 cache_max=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: timeout > delay" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1 reco_delay=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: timeout < delay" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 cache_timeout=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1 reco_delay=2" \ + 0 \ + -S "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -S "a session has been resumed" \ + -C "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: no timeout" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 cache_timeout=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1 reco_delay=2" \ + 0 \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: session copy" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1 reco_mode=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +# For reasons that aren't fully understood, this test randomly fails with high +# probability with OpenSSL 1.0.2g on the CI, see #5012. +requires_openssl_next +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: openssl client" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0" \ + "( $O_NEXT_CLI -dtls1 -sess_out $SESSION; \ + $O_NEXT_CLI -dtls1 -sess_in $SESSION; \ + rm -f $SESSION )" \ + 0 \ + -s "found session ticket extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding session ticket extension" \ + -s "session successfully restored from cache" \ + -S "session successfully restored from ticket" \ + -s "a session has been resumed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "Session resume using cache, DTLS: openssl server" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=3 tickets=0 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "found session_ticket extension" \ + -C "parse new session ticket" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" + +# Tests for Max Fragment Length extension + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: enabled, default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -C "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -S "found max fragment length extension" \ + -S "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -C "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: enabled, default, larger message" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 request_size=$(( $MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 1))" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -C "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -S "found max fragment length extension" \ + -S "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -C "found max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "$(( $MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 1)) bytes written in 2 fragments" \ + -s "$MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" \ + -s "1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length, DTLS: enabled, default, larger message" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 request_size=$(( $MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 1))" \ + 1 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -C "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -S "found max fragment length extension" \ + -S "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -C "found max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "fragment larger than.*maximum " + +# Run some tests with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH disabled +# (session fragment length will be 16384 regardless of mbedtls +# content length configuration.) + +requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: disabled, larger message" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 request_size=$(( $MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 1))" \ + 0 \ + -C "Maximum input fragment length is 16384" \ + -C "Maximum output fragment length is 16384" \ + -S "Maximum input fragment length is 16384" \ + -S "Maximum output fragment length is 16384" \ + -c "$(( $MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 1)) bytes written in 2 fragments" \ + -s "$MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" \ + -s "1 bytes read" + +requires_config_disabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length, DTLS: disabled, larger message" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 request_size=$(( $MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 1))" \ + 1 \ + -C "Maximum input fragment length is 16384" \ + -C "Maximum output fragment length is 16384" \ + -S "Maximum input fragment length is 16384" \ + -S "Maximum output fragment length is 16384" \ + -c "fragment larger than.*maximum " + +requires_max_content_len 4096 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: used by client" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=4096" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 4096" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 4096" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 4096" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 4096" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 1024 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 512, server 1024" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=1024" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=512" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 512" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 512" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 2048 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 512, server 2048" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=2048" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=512" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 512" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 512" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 4096 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 512, server 4096" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=4096" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=512" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 512" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 512" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 1024 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 1024, server 512" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=512" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=1024" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 1024" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 1024" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 1024" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 2048 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 1024, server 2048" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=2048" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=1024" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 1024" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 1024" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 1024" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 1024" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 4096 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 1024, server 4096" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=4096" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=1024" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 1024" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 1024" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 1024" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 1024" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 2048 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 2048, server 512" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=512" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=2048" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 2048 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 2048, server 1024" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=1024" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=2048" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 1024" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 4096 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 2048, server 4096" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=4096" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=2048" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 4096 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 4096, server 512" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=512" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=4096" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 4096" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 4096" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 4096" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 4096 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 4096, server 1024" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=1024" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=4096" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 4096" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 4096" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 4096" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 1024" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 4096 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client 4096, server 2048" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=2048" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=4096" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 4096" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 4096" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 4096" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 4096 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: used by server" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 max_frag_len=4096" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is $MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 4096" \ + -C "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -S "found max fragment length extension" \ + -S "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -C "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 4096 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_gnutls +run_test "Max fragment length: gnutls server" \ + "$G_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=4096" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 4096" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 4096" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" + +requires_max_content_len 2048 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client, message just fits" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=2048 request_size=2048" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "2048 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -s "2048 bytes read" + +requires_max_content_len 2048 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: client, larger message" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 max_frag_len=2048 request_size=2345" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "2345 bytes written in 2 fragments" \ + -s "2048 bytes read" \ + -s "297 bytes read" + +requires_max_content_len 2048 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +run_test "Max fragment length: DTLS client, larger message" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 max_frag_len=2048 request_size=2345" \ + 1 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "fragment larger than.*maximum" + +# Tests for renegotiation + +# Renegotiation SCSV always added, regardless of SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: none, for reference" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -S "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -C "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "write hello request" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: client-initiated" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "write hello request" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: server-initiated" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 auth_mode=optional renegotiate=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" + +# Checks that no Signature Algorithm with SHA-1 gets negotiated. Negotiating SHA-1 would mean that +# the server did not parse the Signature Algorithm extension. This test is valid only if an MD +# algorithm stronger than SHA-1 is enabled in config.h +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: Signature Algorithms parsing, client-initiated" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "write hello request" \ + -S "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: 2" # Is SHA-1 negotiated? + +# Checks that no Signature Algorithm with SHA-1 gets negotiated. Negotiating SHA-1 would mean that +# the server did not parse the Signature Algorithm extension. This test is valid only if an MD +# algorithm stronger than SHA-1 is enabled in config.h +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: Signature Algorithms parsing, server-initiated" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 auth_mode=optional renegotiate=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" \ + -S "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: 2" # Is SHA-1 negotiated? + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: double" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 auth_mode=optional renegotiate=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "Renegotiation with max fragment length: client 2048, server 512" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 auth_mode=optional renegotiate=1 max_frag_len=512" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 max_frag_len=2048 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -c "Maximum output fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum input fragment length is 2048" \ + -s "Maximum output fragment length is 512" \ + -c "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" \ + -s "found max fragment length extension" \ + -s "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "found max_fragment_length extension" \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: client-initiated, server-rejected" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=0 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 1 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -S "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "write hello request" \ + -c "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" \ + -c "failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: server-initiated, client-rejected, default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=0" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -S "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -C "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" \ + -S "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" \ + -S "failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: server-initiated, client-rejected, not enforced" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + renego_delay=-1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=0" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -S "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -C "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" \ + -S "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" \ + -S "failed" + +# delay 2 for 1 alert record + 1 application data record +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: server-initiated, client-rejected, delay 2" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + renego_delay=2 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=0" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -S "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -C "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" \ + -S "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" \ + -S "failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: server-initiated, client-rejected, delay 0" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + renego_delay=0 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=0" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -S "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -C "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" \ + -s "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: server-initiated, client-accepted, delay 0" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + renego_delay=0 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" \ + -S "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" \ + -S "failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: periodic, just below period" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=9 renegotiation=1 renego_period=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -S "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -S "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" \ + -C "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "write hello request" \ + -S "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" \ + -S "failed" + +# one extra exchange to be able to complete renego +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: periodic, just above period" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=9 renegotiation=1 renego_period=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=4 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" \ + -S "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" \ + -S "failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: periodic, two times period" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=9 renegotiation=1 renego_period=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=7 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" \ + -S "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" \ + -S "failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: periodic, above period, disabled" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=9 renegotiation=0 renego_period=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=4 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -S "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -S "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" \ + -C "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "write hello request" \ + -S "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" \ + -S "failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: nbio, client-initiated" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 nbio=2 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 nbio=2 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "write hello request" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: nbio, server-initiated" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 nbio=2 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 nbio=2 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: openssl server, client-initiated" \ + "$O_SRV -www" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -C "ssl_hanshake() returned" \ + -C "error" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" + +requires_gnutls +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: gnutls server strict, client-initiated" \ + "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -C "ssl_hanshake() returned" \ + -C "error" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" + +requires_gnutls +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: gnutls server unsafe, client-initiated default" \ + "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 1 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -C "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -c "mbedtls_ssl_handshake() returned" \ + -c "error" \ + -C "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" + +requires_gnutls +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: gnutls server unsafe, client-inititated no legacy" \ + "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + allow_legacy=0" \ + 1 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -C "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -c "mbedtls_ssl_handshake() returned" \ + -c "error" \ + -C "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" + +requires_gnutls +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: gnutls server unsafe, client-inititated legacy" \ + "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + allow_legacy=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -C "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -C "ssl_hanshake() returned" \ + -C "error" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: DTLS, client-initiated" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -S "write hello request" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: DTLS, server-initiated" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 \ + read_timeout=1000 max_resend=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: DTLS, renego_period overflow" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 exchanges=4 renegotiation=1 renego_period=18446462598732840962 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 exchanges=4 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO" \ + -s "found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" \ + -s "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "write hello request" + +requires_gnutls +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "Renegotiation: DTLS, gnutls server, client-initiated" \ + "$G_SRV -u --mtu 4096" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "error" \ + -s "Extra-header:" + +# Test for the "secure renegotiation" extension only (no actual renegotiation) + +requires_gnutls +run_test "Renego ext: gnutls server strict, client default" \ + "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -C "error" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" + +requires_gnutls +run_test "Renego ext: gnutls server unsafe, client default" \ + "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -C "found renegotiation extension" \ + -C "error" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" + +requires_gnutls +run_test "Renego ext: gnutls server unsafe, client break legacy" \ + "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 allow_legacy=-1" \ + 1 \ + -C "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "error" \ + -C "HTTP/1.0 200 [Oo][Kk]" + +requires_gnutls +run_test "Renego ext: gnutls client strict, server default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI --priority=NORMAL:%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION localhost" \ + 0 \ + -s "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO\|found renegotiation extension" \ + -s "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" + +requires_gnutls +run_test "Renego ext: gnutls client unsafe, server default" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI --priority=NORMAL:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION localhost" \ + 0 \ + -S "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO\|found renegotiation extension" \ + -S "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" + +requires_gnutls +run_test "Renego ext: gnutls client unsafe, server break legacy" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 allow_legacy=-1" \ + "$G_CLI --priority=NORMAL:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION localhost" \ + 1 \ + -S "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO\|found renegotiation extension" \ + -S "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" + +# Tests for silently dropping trailing extra bytes in .der certificates + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DER format: no trailing bytes" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-der0.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$G_CLI localhost" \ + 0 \ + -c "Handshake was completed" \ + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DER format: with a trailing zero byte" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-der1a.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$G_CLI localhost" \ + 0 \ + -c "Handshake was completed" \ + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DER format: with a trailing random byte" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-der1b.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$G_CLI localhost" \ + 0 \ + -c "Handshake was completed" \ + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DER format: with 2 trailing random bytes" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-der2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$G_CLI localhost" \ + 0 \ + -c "Handshake was completed" \ + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DER format: with 4 trailing random bytes" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-der4.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$G_CLI localhost" \ + 0 \ + -c "Handshake was completed" \ + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DER format: with 8 trailing random bytes" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-der8.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$G_CLI localhost" \ + 0 \ + -c "Handshake was completed" \ + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DER format: with 9 trailing random bytes" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-der9.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$G_CLI localhost" \ + 0 \ + -c "Handshake was completed" \ + +# Tests for auth_mode, there are duplicated tests using ca callback for authentication +# When updating these tests, modify the matching authentication tests accordingly + +run_test "Authentication: server badcert, client required" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=required" \ + 1 \ + -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +run_test "Authentication: server badcert, client optional" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + 0 \ + -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +run_test "Authentication: server goodcert, client optional, no trusted CA" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional ca_file=none ca_path=none" \ + 0 \ + -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -c "! Certificate verification flags"\ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \ + -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" + +run_test "Authentication: server goodcert, client required, no trusted CA" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=required ca_file=none ca_path=none" \ + 1 \ + -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -c "! Certificate verification flags"\ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" + +# The purpose of the next two tests is to test the client's behaviour when receiving a server +# certificate with an unsupported elliptic curve. This should usually not happen because +# the client informs the server about the supported curves - it does, though, in the +# corner case of a static ECDH suite, because the server doesn't check the curve on that +# occasion (to be fixed). If that bug's fixed, the test needs to be altered to use a +# different means to have the server ignoring the client's supported curve list. + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_C +run_test "Authentication: server ECDH p256v1, client required, p256v1 unsupported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.ku-ka.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=required curves=secp521r1" \ + 1 \ + -c "bad certificate (EC key curve)"\ + -c "! Certificate verification flags"\ + -C "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" # Expect failure at earlier verification stage + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_C +run_test "Authentication: server ECDH p256v1, client optional, p256v1 unsupported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.ku-ka.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional curves=secp521r1" \ + 1 \ + -c "bad certificate (EC key curve)"\ + -c "! Certificate verification flags"\ + -c "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" # Expect failure only at ECDH params check + +run_test "Authentication: server badcert, client none" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=none" \ + 0 \ + -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +run_test "Authentication: client SHA256, server required" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server6.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" \ + 0 \ + -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4," \ + -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5," + +run_test "Authentication: client SHA384, server required" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server6.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4," \ + -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5," + +run_test "Authentication: client has no cert, server required (SSLv3)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 min_version=ssl3 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_version=ssl3 crt_file=none \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 1 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -c "got no certificate to send" \ + -S "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "client has no certificate" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" + +run_test "Authentication: client has no cert, server required (TLS)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=none \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 1 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -c "= write certificate$" \ + -C "skip write certificate$" \ + -S "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "client has no certificate" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" + +run_test "Authentication: client badcert, server required" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 1 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "send alert level=2 message=48" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed" +# We don't check that the client receives the alert because it might +# detect that its write end of the connection is closed and abort +# before reading the alert message. + +run_test "Authentication: client cert self-signed and trusted, server required" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required ca_file=data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -S "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed" \ + -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +run_test "Authentication: client cert not trusted, server required" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 1 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +run_test "Authentication: client badcert, server optional" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -S "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +run_test "Authentication: client badcert, server none" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 0 \ + -s "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got no certificate request" \ + -c "skip write certificate" \ + -c "skip write certificate verify" \ + -s "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -S "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -S "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +run_test "Authentication: client no cert, server optional" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=none key_file=none" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate$" \ + -C "got no certificate to send" \ + -S "SSLv3 client has no certificate" \ + -c "skip write certificate verify" \ + -s "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "! Certificate was missing" \ + -S "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +run_test "Authentication: openssl client no cert, server optional" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$O_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -s "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "! Certificate was missing" \ + -S "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +run_test "Authentication: client no cert, openssl server optional" \ + "$O_SRV -verify 10" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=none key_file=none" \ + 0 \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate$" \ + -c "skip write certificate verify" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" + +run_test "Authentication: client no cert, openssl server required" \ + "$O_SRV -Verify 10" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=none key_file=none" \ + 1 \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate$" \ + -c "skip write certificate verify" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" + +run_test "Authentication: client no cert, ssl3" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional force_version=ssl3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=none key_file=none min_version=ssl3" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate$" \ + -c "skip write certificate verify" \ + -c "got no certificate to send" \ + -s "SSLv3 client has no certificate" \ + -s "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "! Certificate was missing" \ + -S "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +# This script assumes that MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA has its default +# value, defined here as MAX_IM_CA. Some test cases will be skipped if the +# library is configured with a different value. + +MAX_IM_CA='8' + +# The tests for the max_int tests can pass with any number higher than MAX_IM_CA +# because only a chain of MAX_IM_CA length is tested. Equally, the max_int+1 +# tests can pass with any number less than MAX_IM_CA. However, stricter preconditions +# are in place so that the semantics are consistent with the test description. +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +run_test "Authentication: server max_int chain, client default" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/09.key" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=CA09 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \ + 0 \ + -C "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +run_test "Authentication: server max_int+1 chain, client default" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=CA10 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \ + 1 \ + -c "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +run_test "Authentication: server max_int+1 chain, client optional" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=CA10 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt \ + auth_mode=optional" \ + 1 \ + -c "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +run_test "Authentication: server max_int+1 chain, client none" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=CA10 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt \ + auth_mode=none" \ + 0 \ + -C "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +run_test "Authentication: client max_int+1 chain, server default" \ + "$P_SRV ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + 0 \ + -S "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +run_test "Authentication: client max_int+1 chain, server optional" \ + "$P_SRV ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + 1 \ + -s "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +run_test "Authentication: client max_int+1 chain, server required" \ + "$P_SRV ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + 1 \ + -s "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +run_test "Authentication: client max_int chain, server required" \ + "$P_SRV ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/09.key" \ + 0 \ + -S "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +# Tests for CA list in CertificateRequest messages + +run_test "Authentication: send CA list in CertificateRequest (default)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server6.key" \ + 0 \ + -s "requested DN" + +run_test "Authentication: do not send CA list in CertificateRequest" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required cert_req_ca_list=0" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server6.key" \ + 0 \ + -S "requested DN" + +run_test "Authentication: send CA list in CertificateRequest, client self signed" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required cert_req_ca_list=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 1 \ + -S "requested DN" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +# Tests for auth_mode, using CA callback, these are duplicated from the authentication tests +# When updating these tests, modify the matching authentication tests accordingly + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: server badcert, client required" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \ + 1 \ + -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: server badcert, client optional" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + 0 \ + -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +# The purpose of the next two tests is to test the client's behaviour when receiving a server +# certificate with an unsupported elliptic curve. This should usually not happen because +# the client informs the server about the supported curves - it does, though, in the +# corner case of a static ECDH suite, because the server doesn't check the curve on that +# occasion (to be fixed). If that bug's fixed, the test needs to be altered to use a +# different means to have the server ignoring the client's supported curve list. + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: server ECDH p256v1, client required, p256v1 unsupported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.ku-ka.crt" \ + "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required curves=secp521r1" \ + 1 \ + -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -c "bad certificate (EC key curve)" \ + -c "! Certificate verification flags" \ + -C "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" # Expect failure at earlier verification stage + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: server ECDH p256v1, client optional, p256v1 unsupported" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.ku-ka.crt" \ + "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional curves=secp521r1" \ + 1 \ + -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -c "bad certificate (EC key curve)"\ + -c "! Certificate verification flags"\ + -c "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" # Expect failure only at ECDH params check + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA256, server required" \ + "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server6.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" \ + 0 \ + -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4," \ + -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5," + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA384, server required" \ + "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server6.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4," \ + -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5," + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: client badcert, server required" \ + "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 1 \ + -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "send alert level=2 message=48" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed" +# We don't check that the client receives the alert because it might +# detect that its write end of the connection is closed and abort +# before reading the alert message. + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: client cert not trusted, server required" \ + "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 1 \ + -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: client badcert, server optional" \ + "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + 0 \ + -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -S "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -S "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: server max_int chain, client default" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/09.key" \ + "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 server_name=CA09 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \ + 0 \ + -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -C "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: server max_int+1 chain, client default" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \ + 1 \ + -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -c "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: server max_int+1 chain, client optional" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt \ + debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \ + 1 \ + -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -c "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int+1 chain, server optional" \ + "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + 1 \ + -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -s "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int+1 chain, server required" \ + "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/10.key" \ + 1 \ + -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -s "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA +requires_full_size_output_buffer +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +run_test "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int chain, server required" \ + "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI crt_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \ + key_file=data_files/dir-maxpath/09.key" \ + 0 \ + -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \ + -S "X509 - A fatal error occurred" + +# Tests for certificate selection based on SHA version + +run_test "Certificate hash: client TLS 1.2 -> SHA-2" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file2=data_files/server5-sha1.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12" \ + 0 \ + -c "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA256" \ + -C "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA1" + +run_test "Certificate hash: client TLS 1.1 -> SHA-1" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file2=data_files/server5-sha1.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -C "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA256" \ + -c "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA1" + +run_test "Certificate hash: client TLS 1.0 -> SHA-1" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file2=data_files/server5-sha1.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1" \ + 0 \ + -C "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA256" \ + -c "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA1" + +run_test "Certificate hash: client TLS 1.1, no SHA-1 -> SHA-2 (order 1)" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file2=data_files/server6.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server6.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -c "serial number.*09" \ + -c "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA256" \ + -C "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA1" + +run_test "Certificate hash: client TLS 1.1, no SHA-1 -> SHA-2 (order 2)" \ + "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server6.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server6.key \ + crt_file2=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -c "serial number.*0A" \ + -c "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA256" \ + -C "signed using.*ECDSA with SHA1" + +# tests for SNI + +run_test "SNI: no SNI callback" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=localhost" \ + 0 \ + -S "parse ServerName extension" \ + -c "issuer name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \ + -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost" + +run_test "SNI: matching cert 1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=localhost" \ + 0 \ + -s "parse ServerName extension" \ + -c "issuer name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA" \ + -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost" + +run_test "SNI: matching cert 2" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=polarssl.example" \ + 0 \ + -s "parse ServerName extension" \ + -c "issuer name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA" \ + -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=polarssl.example" + +run_test "SNI: no matching cert" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=nonesuch.example" \ + 1 \ + -s "parse ServerName extension" \ + -s "ssl_sni_wrapper() returned" \ + -s "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" + +run_test "SNI: client auth no override: optional" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" + +run_test "SNI: client auth override: none -> optional" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=none \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" + +run_test "SNI: client auth override: optional -> none" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,none" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost" \ + 0 \ + -s "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got no certificate request" \ + -c "skip write certificate" \ + -c "skip write certificate verify" \ + -s "skip parse certificate verify" + +run_test "SNI: CA no override" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + ca_file=data_files/test-ca.crt \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost \ + crt_file=data_files/server6.crt key_file=data_files/server6.key" \ + 1 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -S "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" + +run_test "SNI: CA override" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + ca_file=data_files/test-ca.crt \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,data_files/test-ca2.crt,-,required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost \ + crt_file=data_files/server6.crt key_file=data_files/server6.key" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -S "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -S "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" + +run_test "SNI: CA override with CRL" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + ca_file=data_files/test-ca.crt \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,data_files/test-ca2.crt,data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem,required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost \ + crt_file=data_files/server6.crt key_file=data_files/server6.key" \ + 1 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -s "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" + +# Tests for SNI and DTLS + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, no SNI callback" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=localhost dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "parse ServerName extension" \ + -c "issuer name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA" \ + -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost" + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, matching cert 1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=localhost dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "parse ServerName extension" \ + -c "issuer name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA" \ + -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost" + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, matching cert 2" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=polarssl.example dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "parse ServerName extension" \ + -c "issuer name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA" \ + -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=polarssl.example" + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, no matching cert" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=nonesuch.example dtls=1" \ + 1 \ + -s "parse ServerName extension" \ + -s "ssl_sni_wrapper() returned" \ + -s "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, client auth no override: optional" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, client auth override: none -> optional" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=none dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,optional" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, client auth override: optional -> none" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,none" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got no certificate request" \ + -c "skip write certificate" \ + -c "skip write certificate verify" \ + -s "skip parse certificate verify" + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, CA no override" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + ca_file=data_files/test-ca.crt \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server6.crt key_file=data_files/server6.key" \ + 1 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -S "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, CA override" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + ca_file=data_files/test-ca.crt \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,data_files/test-ca2.crt,-,required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server6.crt key_file=data_files/server6.key" \ + 0 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -S "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -S "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" + +run_test "SNI: DTLS, CA override with CRL" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key dtls=1 \ + ca_file=data_files/test-ca.crt \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,data_files/test-ca2.crt,data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem,required" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 server_name=localhost dtls=1 \ + crt_file=data_files/server6.crt key_file=data_files/server6.key" \ + 1 \ + -S "skip write certificate request" \ + -C "skip parse certificate request" \ + -c "got a certificate request" \ + -C "skip write certificate" \ + -C "skip write certificate verify" \ + -S "skip parse certificate verify" \ + -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \ + -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -s "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" + +# Tests for non-blocking I/O: exercise a variety of handshake flows + +run_test "Non-blocking I/O: basic handshake" \ + "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Non-blocking I/O: client auth" \ + "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=0 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Non-blocking I/O: ticket" \ + "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Non-blocking I/O: ticket + client auth" \ + "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Non-blocking I/O: ticket + client auth + resume" \ + "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Non-blocking I/O: ticket + resume" \ + "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Non-blocking I/O: session-id resume" \ + "$P_SRV nbio=2 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI nbio=2 tickets=0 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +# Tests for event-driven I/O: exercise a variety of handshake flows + +run_test "Event-driven I/O: basic handshake" \ + "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O: client auth" \ + "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O: ticket" \ + "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O: ticket + client auth" \ + "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O: ticket + client auth + resume" \ + "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O: ticket + resume" \ + "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O: session-id resume" \ + "$P_SRV event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI event=1 tickets=0 reconnect=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O, DTLS: basic handshake" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 event=1 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O, DTLS: client auth" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 event=1 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O, DTLS: ticket" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 event=1 tickets=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O, DTLS: ticket + client auth" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 event=1 tickets=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O, DTLS: ticket + client auth + resume" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 event=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O, DTLS: ticket + resume" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 event=1 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 event=1 tickets=1 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +run_test "Event-driven I/O, DTLS: session-id resume" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 event=1 tickets=0 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +# This test demonstrates the need for the mbedtls_ssl_check_pending function. +# During session resumption, the client will send its ApplicationData record +# within the same datagram as the Finished messages. In this situation, the +# server MUST NOT idle on the underlying transport after handshake completion, +# because the ApplicationData request has already been queued internally. +run_test "Event-driven I/O, DTLS: session-id resume, UDP packing" \ + -p "$P_PXY pack=50" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 event=1 tickets=0 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 event=1 tickets=0 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: .* bytes read" + +# Tests for version negotiation + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +run_test "Version check: all -> 1.2" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Protocol is TLSv1.2" \ + -c "Protocol is TLSv1.2" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +run_test "Version check: cli max 1.1 -> 1.1" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI max_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Protocol is TLSv1.1" \ + -c "Protocol is TLSv1.1" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +run_test "Version check: srv max 1.1 -> 1.1" \ + "$P_SRV max_version=tls1_1" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Protocol is TLSv1.1" \ + -c "Protocol is TLSv1.1" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +run_test "Version check: cli+srv max 1.1 -> 1.1" \ + "$P_SRV max_version=tls1_1" \ + "$P_CLI max_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Protocol is TLSv1.1" \ + -c "Protocol is TLSv1.1" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +run_test "Version check: cli max 1.1, srv min 1.1 -> 1.1" \ + "$P_SRV min_version=tls1_1" \ + "$P_CLI max_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Protocol is TLSv1.1" \ + -c "Protocol is TLSv1.1" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +run_test "Version check: cli min 1.1, srv max 1.1 -> 1.1" \ + "$P_SRV max_version=tls1_1" \ + "$P_CLI min_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -S "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Protocol is TLSv1.1" \ + -c "Protocol is TLSv1.1" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +run_test "Version check: cli min 1.2, srv max 1.1 -> fail" \ + "$P_SRV max_version=tls1_1" \ + "$P_CLI min_version=tls12" \ + 1 \ + -s "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +run_test "Version check: srv min 1.2, cli max 1.1 -> fail" \ + "$P_SRV min_version=tls12" \ + "$P_CLI max_version=tls1_1" \ + 1 \ + -s "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" + +# Tests for ALPN extension + +run_test "ALPN: none" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -S "found alpn extension" \ + -C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \ + -S "server hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -C "found alpn extension " \ + -C "Application Layer Protocol is" \ + -S "Application Layer Protocol is" + +run_test "ALPN: client only" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -s "found alpn extension" \ + -C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \ + -S "server hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -C "found alpn extension " \ + -c "Application Layer Protocol is (none)" \ + -S "Application Layer Protocol is" + +run_test "ALPN: server only" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -S "found alpn extension" \ + -C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \ + -S "server hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -C "found alpn extension " \ + -C "Application Layer Protocol is" \ + -s "Application Layer Protocol is (none)" + +run_test "ALPN: both, common cli1-srv1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -s "found alpn extension" \ + -C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \ + -s "server hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -c "found alpn extension" \ + -c "Application Layer Protocol is abc" \ + -s "Application Layer Protocol is abc" + +run_test "ALPN: both, common cli2-srv1" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=1234,abc" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -s "found alpn extension" \ + -C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \ + -s "server hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -c "found alpn extension" \ + -c "Application Layer Protocol is abc" \ + -s "Application Layer Protocol is abc" + +run_test "ALPN: both, common cli1-srv2" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,1234" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=1234,abcde" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -s "found alpn extension" \ + -C "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \ + -s "server hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -c "found alpn extension" \ + -c "Application Layer Protocol is 1234" \ + -s "Application Layer Protocol is 1234" + +run_test "ALPN: both, no common" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 alpn=abc,123" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 alpn=1234,abcde" \ + 1 \ + -c "client hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -s "found alpn extension" \ + -c "got an alert message, type: \\[2:120]" \ + -S "server hello, adding alpn extension" \ + -C "found alpn extension" \ + -C "Application Layer Protocol is 1234" \ + -S "Application Layer Protocol is 1234" + + +# Tests for keyUsage in leaf certificates, part 1: +# server-side certificate/suite selection + +run_test "keyUsage srv: RSA, digitalSignature -> (EC)DHE-RSA" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server2.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server2.ku-ds.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-[EC]*DHE-RSA-WITH-" + + +run_test "keyUsage srv: RSA, keyEncipherment -> RSA" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server2.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server2.ku-ke.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-WITH-" + +run_test "keyUsage srv: RSA, keyAgreement -> fail" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server2.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server2.ku-ka.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 1 \ + -C "Ciphersuite is " + +run_test "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, digitalSignature -> ECDHE-ECDSA" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.ku-ds.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-" + + +run_test "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, keyAgreement -> ECDH-" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.ku-ka.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDH-" + +run_test "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, keyEncipherment -> fail" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.ku-ke.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 1 \ + -C "Ciphersuite is " + +# Tests for keyUsage in leaf certificates, part 2: +# client-side checking of server cert + +run_test "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ds_ke.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -C "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +run_test "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: OK" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ds_ke.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -C "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +run_test "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ke.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -C "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +run_test "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ke.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +run_test "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail, soft" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ke.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \ + -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" + +run_test "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, DHE-RSA: OK" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ds.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -C "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +run_test "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ds.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +run_test "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail, soft" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ds.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \ + -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" + +# Tests for keyUsage in leaf certificates, part 3: +# server-side checking of client cert + +run_test "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ds.crt" \ + 0 \ + -S "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +run_test "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (soft)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ke.crt" \ + 0 \ + -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +run_test "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (hard)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server2.key \ + -cert data_files/server2.ku-ke.crt" \ + 1 \ + -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +run_test "keyUsage cli-auth: ECDSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.ku-ds.crt" \ + 0 \ + -S "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +run_test "keyUsage cli-auth: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (soft)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.ku-ka.crt" \ + 0 \ + -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +# Tests for extendedKeyUsage, part 1: server-side certificate/suite selection + +run_test "extKeyUsage srv: serverAuth -> OK" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.eku-srv.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 + +run_test "extKeyUsage srv: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.eku-srv.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 + +run_test "extKeyUsage srv: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.eku-cs_any.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 + +run_test "extKeyUsage srv: codeSign -> fail" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.eku-cli.crt" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 1 + +# Tests for extendedKeyUsage, part 2: client-side checking of server cert + +run_test "extKeyUsage cli: serverAuth -> OK" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.eku-srv.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +run_test "extKeyUsage cli: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.eku-srv_cli.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +run_test "extKeyUsage cli: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.eku-cs_any.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +run_test "extKeyUsage cli: codeSign -> fail" \ + "$O_SRV -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.eku-cs.crt" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \ + 1 \ + -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \ + -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-" + +# Tests for extendedKeyUsage, part 3: server-side checking of client cert + +run_test "extKeyUsage cli-auth: clientAuth -> OK" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.eku-cli.crt" \ + 0 \ + -S "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +run_test "extKeyUsage cli-auth: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.eku-srv_cli.crt" \ + 0 \ + -S "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +run_test "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.eku-cs_any.crt" \ + 0 \ + -S "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +run_test "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign -> fail (soft)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.eku-cs.crt" \ + 0 \ + -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +run_test "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$O_CLI -key data_files/server5.key \ + -cert data_files/server5.eku-cs.crt" \ + 1 \ + -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \ + -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" + +# Tests for DHM parameters loading + +run_test "DHM parameters: reference" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "value of 'DHM: P ' (2048 bits)" \ + -c "value of 'DHM: G ' (2 bits)" + +run_test "DHM parameters: other parameters" \ + "$P_SRV dhm_file=data_files/dhparams.pem" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "value of 'DHM: P ' (1024 bits)" \ + -c "value of 'DHM: G ' (2 bits)" + +# Tests for DHM client-side size checking + +run_test "DHM size: server default, client default, OK" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "DHM prime too short:" + +run_test "DHM size: server default, client 2048, OK" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1 dhmlen=2048" \ + 0 \ + -C "DHM prime too short:" + +run_test "DHM size: server 1024, client default, OK" \ + "$P_SRV dhm_file=data_files/dhparams.pem" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "DHM prime too short:" + +run_test "DHM size: server 999, client 999, OK" \ + "$P_SRV dhm_file=data_files/dh.999.pem" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1 dhmlen=999" \ + 0 \ + -C "DHM prime too short:" + +run_test "DHM size: server 1000, client 1000, OK" \ + "$P_SRV dhm_file=data_files/dh.1000.pem" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1 dhmlen=1000" \ + 0 \ + -C "DHM prime too short:" + +run_test "DHM size: server 1000, client default, rejected" \ + "$P_SRV dhm_file=data_files/dh.1000.pem" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1" \ + 1 \ + -c "DHM prime too short:" + +run_test "DHM size: server 1000, client 1001, rejected" \ + "$P_SRV dhm_file=data_files/dh.1000.pem" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1 dhmlen=1001" \ + 1 \ + -c "DHM prime too short:" + +run_test "DHM size: server 999, client 1000, rejected" \ + "$P_SRV dhm_file=data_files/dh.999.pem" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1 dhmlen=1000" \ + 1 \ + -c "DHM prime too short:" + +run_test "DHM size: server 998, client 999, rejected" \ + "$P_SRV dhm_file=data_files/dh.998.pem" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1 dhmlen=999" \ + 1 \ + -c "DHM prime too short:" + +run_test "DHM size: server default, client 2049, rejected" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + debug_level=1 dhmlen=2049" \ + 1 \ + -c "DHM prime too short:" + +# Tests for PSK callback + +run_test "PSK callback: psk, no callback" \ + "$P_SRV psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123" \ + 0 \ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: opaque psk on client, no callback" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 psk_opaque=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -S "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: opaque psk on client, no callback, SHA-384" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 psk_opaque=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -S "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: opaque psk on client, no callback, EMS" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=1 debug_level=3 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=1 debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 psk_opaque=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -S "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -c "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -s "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: opaque psk on client, no callback, SHA-384, EMS" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=1 debug_level=3 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=1 debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 psk_opaque=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -S "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -c "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -s "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, static opaque on server, no callback" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123" \ + 0 \ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, static opaque on server, no callback, SHA-384" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123" \ + 0 \ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, static opaque on server, no callback, EMS" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA extended_ms=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 extended_ms=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -s "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, static opaque on server, no callback, EMS, SHA384" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 extended_ms=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 extended_ms=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -s "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, no static PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=def psk=beef" \ + 0 \ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, no static PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback, SHA-384" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + psk_identity=def psk=beef" \ + 0 \ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, no static PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback, EMS" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA extended_ms=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=abc psk=dead extended_ms=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -s "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, no static PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback, EMS, SHA384" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 extended_ms=1" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \ + psk_identity=abc psk=dead extended_ms=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -s "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, mismatching static raw PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=def psk=beef" \ + 0 \ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, mismatching static opaque PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_opaque=1 psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=def psk=beef" \ + 0 \ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, mismatching static opaque PSK on server, raw PSK from callback" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_opaque=1 psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=def psk=beef" \ + 0 \ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, id-matching but wrong raw PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_opaque=1 psk_identity=def psk=abc123 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=def psk=beef" \ + 0 \ + -C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\ + -C "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "session hash for extended master secret"\ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO +run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, matching opaque PSK on server, wrong opaque PSK from callback" \ + "$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_opaque=1 psk_identity=def psk=beef debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,abc123 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls12 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=def psk=beef" \ + 1 \ + -s "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "PSK callback: no psk, no callback" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123" \ + 1 \ + -s "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "PSK callback: callback overrides other settings" \ + "$P_SRV psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=foo psk=abc123" \ + 1 \ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -s "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "PSK callback: first id matches" \ + "$P_SRV psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=abc psk=dead" \ + 0 \ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "PSK callback: second id matches" \ + "$P_SRV psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=def psk=beef" \ + 0 \ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "PSK callback: no match" \ + "$P_SRV psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=ghi psk=beef" \ + 1 \ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -s "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "PSK callback: wrong key" \ + "$P_SRV psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \ + psk_identity=abc psk=beef" \ + 1 \ + -S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \ + -s "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +# Tests for EC J-PAKE + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +run_test "ECJPAKE: client not configured" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -C "add ciphersuite: 0xc0ff" \ + -C "adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" \ + -S "found ecjpake kkpp extension" \ + -S "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" \ + -S "ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake not configured" \ + -S "server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension" \ + -C "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" \ + -S "None of the common ciphersuites is usable" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +run_test "ECJPAKE: server not configured" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 ecjpake_pw=bla \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 1 \ + -c "add ciphersuite: 0xc0ff" \ + -c "adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" \ + -s "found ecjpake kkpp extension" \ + -s "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" \ + -s "ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake not configured" \ + -S "server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension" \ + -C "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" \ + -s "None of the common ciphersuites is usable" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +run_test "ECJPAKE: working, TLS" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 ecjpake_pw=bla" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 ecjpake_pw=bla \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "add ciphersuite: 0xc0ff" \ + -c "adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" \ + -C "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" \ + -s "found ecjpake kkpp extension" \ + -S "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" \ + -S "ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake not configured" \ + -s "server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension" \ + -c "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" \ + -S "None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +server_needs_more_time 1 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +run_test "ECJPAKE: password mismatch, TLS" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 ecjpake_pw=bla" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 ecjpake_pw=bad \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 1 \ + -C "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" \ + -s "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +run_test "ECJPAKE: working, DTLS" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 ecjpake_pw=bla" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 ecjpake_pw=bla \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +run_test "ECJPAKE: working, DTLS, no cookie" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 ecjpake_pw=bla cookies=0" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 ecjpake_pw=bla \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -C "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" \ + -S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +server_needs_more_time 1 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +run_test "ECJPAKE: password mismatch, DTLS" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 dtls=1 ecjpake_pw=bla" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 ecjpake_pw=bad \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 1 \ + -c "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" \ + -s "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" + +# for tests with configs/config-thread.h +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +run_test "ECJPAKE: working, DTLS, nolog" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 ecjpake_pw=bla" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 ecjpake_pw=bla \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 + +# Tests for ciphersuites per version + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +run_test "Per-version suites: SSL3" \ + "$P_SRV min_version=ssl3 version_suites=TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=ssl3" \ + 0 \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +run_test "Per-version suites: TLS 1.0" \ + "$P_SRV version_suites=TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 arc4=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +run_test "Per-version suites: TLS 1.1" \ + "$P_SRV version_suites=TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +run_test "Per-version suites: TLS 1.2" \ + "$P_SRV version_suites=TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12" \ + 0 \ + -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" + +# Test for ClientHello without extensions + +requires_gnutls +run_test "ClientHello without extensions" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI --priority=NORMAL:%NO_EXTENSIONS:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION localhost" \ + 0 \ + -s "dumping 'client hello extensions' (0 bytes)" + +# Tests for mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail() + +# The server first reads buffer_size-1 bytes, then reads the remainder. +run_test "mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail: no extra data" \ + "$P_SRV buffer_size=100" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=100" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 100 bytes read$" + +run_test "mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail: extra data (+1)" \ + "$P_SRV buffer_size=100" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=101" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 101 bytes read (100 + 1)" + +requires_max_content_len 200 +run_test "mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail: extra data (*2)" \ + "$P_SRV buffer_size=100" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=200" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 200 bytes read (100 + 100)" + +run_test "mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail: extra data (max)" \ + "$P_SRV buffer_size=100" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=$MAX_CONTENT_LEN" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read (100 + $((MAX_CONTENT_LEN - 100)))" + +# Tests for small client packets + +run_test "Small client packet SSLv3 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV min_version=ssl3" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=ssl3 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet SSLv3 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV min_version=ssl3 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=ssl3 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1 etm=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher larger MAC" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 AEAD" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small client packet TLS 1.2 AEAD shorter tag" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=1 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +# Tests for small client packets in DTLS + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +run_test "Small client packet DTLS 1.0" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 force_version=dtls1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 request_size=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +run_test "Small client packet DTLS 1.0, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 force_version=dtls1 etm=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 request_size=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet DTLS 1.0, truncated hmac" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 force_version=dtls1 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 request_size=1 trunc_hmac=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet DTLS 1.0, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 force_version=dtls1 trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 request_size=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1"\ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +run_test "Small client packet DTLS 1.2" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 force_version=dtls12" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 request_size=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +run_test "Small client packet DTLS 1.2, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 force_version=dtls12 etm=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 request_size=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet DTLS 1.2, truncated hmac" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 force_version=dtls12 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 request_size=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small client packet DTLS 1.2, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 force_version=dtls12 trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 request_size=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1"\ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: 1 bytes read" + +# Tests for small server packets + +run_test "Small server packet SSLv3 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 min_version=ssl3" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=ssl3 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet SSLv3 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 min_version=ssl3 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=ssl3 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 etm=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher larger MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 AEAD" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +run_test "Small server packet TLS 1.2 AEAD shorter tag" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +# Tests for small server packets in DTLS + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +run_test "Small server packet DTLS 1.0" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 response_size=1 force_version=dtls1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +run_test "Small server packet DTLS 1.0, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 response_size=1 force_version=dtls1 etm=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet DTLS 1.0, truncated hmac" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 response_size=1 force_version=dtls1 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 trunc_hmac=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet DTLS 1.0, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 response_size=1 force_version=dtls1 trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1"\ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +run_test "Small server packet DTLS 1.2" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 response_size=1 force_version=dtls12" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +run_test "Small server packet DTLS 1.2, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 response_size=1 force_version=dtls12 etm=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet DTLS 1.2, truncated hmac" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 response_size=1 force_version=dtls12 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Small server packet DTLS 1.2, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 response_size=1 force_version=dtls12 trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1"\ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read" + +# A test for extensions in SSLv3 +requires_max_content_len 4096 +run_test "SSLv3 with extensions, server side" \ + "$P_SRV min_version=ssl3 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=ssl3 tickets=1 max_frag_len=4096 alpn=abc,1234" \ + 0 \ + -S "dumping 'client hello extensions'" \ + -S "server hello, total extension length:" + +# Test for large client packets + +# How many fragments do we expect to write $1 bytes? +fragments_for_write() { + echo "$(( ( $1 + $MAX_OUT_LEN - 1 ) / $MAX_OUT_LEN ))" +} + +run_test "Large client packet SSLv3 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV min_version=ssl3" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=ssl3 recsplit=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet SSLv3 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV min_version=ssl3 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=ssl3 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1 recsplit=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1 etm=0 recsplit=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1 recsplit=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1 etm=0 recsplit=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1_1 etm=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 etm=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher larger MAC" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 AEAD" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +run_test "Large client packet TLS 1.2 AEAD shorter tag" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI request_size=16384 force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "16384 bytes written in $(fragments_for_write 16384) fragments" \ + -s "Read from client: $MAX_CONTENT_LEN bytes read" + +# Test for large server packets +# The tests below fail when the server's OUT_CONTENT_LEN is less than 16384. +run_test "Large server packet SSLv3 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 min_version=ssl3 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=ssl3 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +# Checking next 4 tests logs for 1n-1 split against BEAST too +run_test "Large server packet SSLv3 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 min_version=ssl3" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=ssl3 recsplit=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read"\ + -c "16383 bytes read"\ + -C "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 recsplit=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read"\ + -c "16383 bytes read"\ + -C "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 etm=0 recsplit=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read"\ + -c "16383 bytes read"\ + -C "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.0 BlockCipher truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 recsplit=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 1 bytes read"\ + -c "16383 bytes read"\ + -C "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.0 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 etm=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.1 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.1 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 etm=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher larger MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \ + trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 BlockCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, without EtM" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA \ + trunc_hmac=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 StreamCipher, without EtM, truncated MAC" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384 arc4=1 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA trunc_hmac=1 etm=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "16384 bytes written in 1 fragments" \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 AEAD" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +run_test "Large server packet TLS 1.2 AEAD shorter tag" \ + "$P_SRV response_size=16384" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "Read from server: 16384 bytes read" + +# Tests for restartable ECC + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: TLS, default" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + debug_level=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: TLS, max_ops=0" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + debug_level=1 ec_max_ops=0" \ + 0 \ + -C "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: TLS, max_ops=65535" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + debug_level=1 ec_max_ops=65535" \ + 0 \ + -C "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: TLS, max_ops=1000" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + debug_level=1 ec_max_ops=1000" \ + 0 \ + -c "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: TLS, max_ops=1000, badsign" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + debug_level=1 ec_max_ops=1000" \ + 1 \ + -c "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" \ + -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -c "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: TLS, max_ops=1000, auth_mode=optional badsign" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + debug_level=1 ec_max_ops=1000 auth_mode=optional" \ + 0 \ + -c "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" \ + -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: TLS, max_ops=1000, auth_mode=none badsign" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server5-badsign.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + debug_level=1 ec_max_ops=1000 auth_mode=none" \ + 0 \ + -C "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" \ + -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \ + -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: DTLS, max_ops=1000" \ + "$P_SRV auth_mode=required dtls=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + dtls=1 debug_level=1 ec_max_ops=1000" \ + 0 \ + -c "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: TLS, max_ops=1000 no client auth" \ + "$P_SRV" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + debug_level=1 ec_max_ops=1000" \ + 0 \ + -c "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -c "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE +run_test "EC restart: TLS, max_ops=1000, ECDHE-PSK" \ + "$P_SRV psk=abc123" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + psk=abc123 debug_level=1 ec_max_ops=1000" \ + 0 \ + -C "x509_verify_cert.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_verify.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public.*4b00" \ + -C "mbedtls_pk_sign.*4b00" + +# Tests of asynchronous private key support in SSL + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign, delay=0" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=0 async_private_delay2=0" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): sign done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign, delay=1" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): call 0 more times." \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): sign done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign, delay=2" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=2 async_private_delay2=2" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -U "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): call 1 more times." \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): call 0 more times." \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): sign done, status=0" + +# Test that the async callback correctly signs the 36-byte hash of TLS 1.0/1.1 +# with RSA PKCS#1v1.5 as used in TLS 1.0/1.1. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign, RSA, TLS 1.1" \ + "$P_SRV key_file=data_files/server2.key crt_file=data_files/server2.crt \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=0 async_private_delay2=0" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): sign done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign, SNI" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=0 async_private_delay2=0 \ + crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key \ + sni=localhost,data_files/server2.crt,data_files/server2.key,-,-,-,polarssl.example,data_files/server1-nospace.crt,data_files/server1.key,-,-,-" \ + "$P_CLI server_name=polarssl.example" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): sign done, status=0" \ + -s "parse ServerName extension" \ + -c "issuer name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA" \ + -c "subject name *: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=polarssl.example" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: decrypt, delay=0" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=0 async_private_delay2=0" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async decrypt callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): decrypt done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: decrypt, delay=1" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async decrypt callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): call 0 more times." \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): decrypt done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: decrypt RSA-PSK, delay=0" \ + "$P_SRV psk=abc123 \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=0 async_private_delay2=0" \ + "$P_CLI psk=abc123 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async decrypt callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): decrypt done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: decrypt RSA-PSK, delay=1" \ + "$P_SRV psk=abc123 \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1" \ + "$P_CLI psk=abc123 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async decrypt callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): call 0 more times." \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): decrypt done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign callback not present" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1" \ + "$P_CLI; [ \$? -eq 1 ] && + $P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -S "Async sign callback" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): decrypt done, status=0" \ + -s "Successful connection" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: decrypt callback not present" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=1 \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA; + [ \$? -eq 1 ] && $P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -S "Async decrypt callback" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "got no RSA private key" \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): sign done, status=0" \ + -s "Successful connection" + +# key1: ECDSA, key2: RSA; use key1 from slot 0 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: slot 0 used with key1" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server2.key crt_file2=data_files/server2.crt" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot 0," \ + -s "Async resume (slot 0): call 0 more times." \ + -s "Async resume (slot 0): sign done, status=0" + +# key1: ECDSA, key2: RSA; use key2 from slot 0 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: slot 0 used with key2" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay2=1 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server2.key crt_file2=data_files/server2.crt" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot 0," \ + -s "Async resume (slot 0): call 0 more times." \ + -s "Async resume (slot 0): sign done, status=0" + +# key1: ECDSA, key2: RSA; use key2 from slot 1 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: slot 1 used with key2" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server2.key crt_file2=data_files/server2.crt" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot 1," \ + -s "Async resume (slot 1): call 0 more times." \ + -s "Async resume (slot 1): sign done, status=0" + +# key1: ECDSA, key2: RSA; use key2 directly +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: fall back to transparent key" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server2.key crt_file2=data_files/server2.crt " \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: no key matches this certificate." + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign, error in start" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + async_private_error=1" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 1 \ + -s "Async sign callback: injected error" \ + -S "Async resume" \ + -S "Async cancel" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign, cancel after start" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + async_private_error=2" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 1 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -S "Async resume" \ + -s "Async cancel" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign, error in resume" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + async_private_error=3" \ + "$P_CLI" \ + 1 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume callback: sign done but injected error" \ + -S "Async cancel" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: decrypt, error in start" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + async_private_error=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -s "Async decrypt callback: injected error" \ + -S "Async resume" \ + -S "Async cancel" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: decrypt, cancel after start" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + async_private_error=2" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -s "Async decrypt callback: using key slot " \ + -S "Async resume" \ + -s "Async cancel" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: decrypt, error in resume" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + async_private_error=3" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 1 \ + -s "Async decrypt callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume callback: decrypt done but injected error" \ + -S "Async cancel" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: cancel after start then operate correctly" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + async_private_error=-2" \ + "$P_CLI; [ \$? -eq 1 ] && $P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async cancel" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Async resume" \ + -s "Successful connection" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: error in resume then operate correctly" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + async_private_error=-3" \ + "$P_CLI; [ \$? -eq 1 ] && $P_CLI" \ + 0 \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Async resume" \ + -s "Successful connection" + +# key1: ECDSA, key2: RSA; use key1 through async, then key2 directly +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: cancel after start then fall back to transparent key" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_error=-2 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server2.key crt_file2=data_files/server2.crt" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256; + [ \$? -eq 1 ] && + $P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot 0" \ + -S "Async resume" \ + -s "Async cancel" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Async sign callback: no key matches this certificate." \ + -s "Successful connection" + +# key1: ECDSA, key2: RSA; use key1 through async, then key2 directly +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +run_test "SSL async private: sign, error in resume then fall back to transparent key" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_error=-3 \ + key_file=data_files/server5.key crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \ + key_file2=data_files/server2.key crt_file2=data_files/server2.crt" \ + "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256; + [ \$? -eq 1 ] && + $P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async resume" \ + -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -s "Async sign callback: no key matches this certificate." \ + -s "Successful connection" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "SSL async private: renegotiation: client-initiated, sign" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): sign done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "SSL async private: renegotiation: server-initiated, sign" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=s async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + "$P_CLI exchanges=2 renegotiation=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async sign callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): sign done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "SSL async private: renegotiation: client-initiated, decrypt" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1" \ + "$P_CLI exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async decrypt callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): decrypt done, status=0" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "SSL async private: renegotiation: server-initiated, decrypt" \ + "$P_SRV \ + async_operations=d async_private_delay1=1 async_private_delay2=1 \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + "$P_CLI exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Async decrypt callback: using key slot " \ + -s "Async resume (slot [0-9]): decrypt done, status=0" + +# Tests for ECC extensions (rfc 4492) + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +run_test "Force a non ECC ciphersuite in the client side" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -C "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" \ + -C "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" \ + -S "found supported elliptic curves extension" \ + -S "found supported point formats extension" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +run_test "Force a non ECC ciphersuite in the server side" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -C "found supported_point_formats extension" \ + -S "server hello, supported_point_formats extension" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +run_test "Force an ECC ciphersuite in the client side" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" \ + -c "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" \ + -s "found supported elliptic curves extension" \ + -s "found supported point formats extension" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +run_test "Force an ECC ciphersuite in the server side" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "found supported_point_formats extension" \ + -s "server hello, supported_point_formats extension" + +# Tests for DTLS HelloVerifyRequest + +run_test "DTLS cookie: enabled" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -s "cookie verification failed" \ + -s "cookie verification passed" \ + -S "cookie verification skipped" \ + -c "received hello verify request" \ + -s "hello verification requested" \ + -S "SSL - The requested feature is not available" + +run_test "DTLS cookie: disabled" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 cookies=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -S "cookie verification failed" \ + -S "cookie verification passed" \ + -s "cookie verification skipped" \ + -C "received hello verify request" \ + -S "hello verification requested" \ + -S "SSL - The requested feature is not available" + +run_test "DTLS cookie: default (failing)" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 cookies=-1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=100-400" \ + 1 \ + -s "cookie verification failed" \ + -S "cookie verification passed" \ + -S "cookie verification skipped" \ + -C "received hello verify request" \ + -S "hello verification requested" \ + -s "SSL - The requested feature is not available" + +requires_ipv6 +run_test "DTLS cookie: enabled, IPv6" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 server_addr=::1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 server_addr=::1" \ + 0 \ + -s "cookie verification failed" \ + -s "cookie verification passed" \ + -S "cookie verification skipped" \ + -c "received hello verify request" \ + -s "hello verification requested" \ + -S "SSL - The requested feature is not available" + +run_test "DTLS cookie: enabled, nbio" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 nbio=2 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 nbio=2 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -s "cookie verification failed" \ + -s "cookie verification passed" \ + -S "cookie verification skipped" \ + -c "received hello verify request" \ + -s "hello verification requested" \ + -S "SSL - The requested feature is not available" + +# Tests for client reconnecting from the same port with DTLS + +not_with_valgrind # spurious resend +run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reference" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=20000 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \ + 0 \ + -C "resend" \ + -S "The operation timed out" \ + -S "Client initiated reconnection from same port" + +not_with_valgrind # spurious resend +run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reconnect" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=20000 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000 reconnect_hard=1" \ + 0 \ + -C "resend" \ + -S "The operation timed out" \ + -s "Client initiated reconnection from same port" + +not_with_valgrind # server/client too slow to respond in time (next test has higher timeouts) +run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reconnect, nbio, no valgrind" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=1000 nbio=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=500-1000 reconnect_hard=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "The operation timed out" \ + -s "Client initiated reconnection from same port" + +only_with_valgrind # Only with valgrind, do previous test but with higher read_timeout and hs_timeout +run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reconnect, nbio, valgrind" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=2000 nbio=2 hs_timeout=1500-6000" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=1500-3000 reconnect_hard=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "The operation timed out" \ + -s "Client initiated reconnection from same port" + +run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: no cookies" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=1000 cookies=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=500-8000 reconnect_hard=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "The operation timed out" \ + -S "Client initiated reconnection from same port" + +run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: attacker-injected" \ + -p "$P_PXY inject_clihlo=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2" \ + 0 \ + -s "possible client reconnect from the same port" \ + -S "Client initiated reconnection from same port" + +# Tests for various cases of client authentication with DTLS +# (focused on handshake flows and message parsing) + +run_test "DTLS client auth: required" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" + +run_test "DTLS client auth: optional, client has no cert" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 auth_mode=optional" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 crt_file=none key_file=none" \ + 0 \ + -s "! Certificate was missing" + +run_test "DTLS client auth: none, client has no cert" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 crt_file=none key_file=none debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "skip write certificate$" \ + -s "! Certificate verification was skipped" + +run_test "DTLS wrong PSK: badmac alert" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 psk=abc123 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 psk=abc124" \ + 1 \ + -s "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" \ + -c "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" + +# Tests for receiving fragmented handshake messages with DTLS + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS reassembly: no fragmentation (gnutls server)" \ + "$G_SRV -u --mtu 2048 -a" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -C "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS reassembly: some fragmentation (gnutls server)" \ + "$G_SRV -u --mtu 512" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS reassembly: more fragmentation (gnutls server)" \ + "$G_SRV -u --mtu 128" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS reassembly: more fragmentation, nbio (gnutls server)" \ + "$G_SRV -u --mtu 128" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 nbio=2 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_gnutls +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "DTLS reassembly: fragmentation, renego (gnutls server)" \ + "$G_SRV -u --mtu 256" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "error" \ + -s "Extra-header:" + +requires_gnutls +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "DTLS reassembly: fragmentation, nbio, renego (gnutls server)" \ + "$G_SRV -u --mtu 256" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 nbio=2 dtls=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + 0 \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ + -c "found renegotiation extension" \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -C "mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \ + -C "error" \ + -s "Extra-header:" + +run_test "DTLS reassembly: no fragmentation (openssl server)" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -mtu 2048" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -C "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +run_test "DTLS reassembly: some fragmentation (openssl server)" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -mtu 768" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +run_test "DTLS reassembly: more fragmentation (openssl server)" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -mtu 256" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +run_test "DTLS reassembly: fragmentation, nbio (openssl server)" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -mtu 256" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 nbio=2 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# Tests for sending fragmented handshake messages with DTLS +# +# Use client auth when we need the client to send large messages, +# and use large cert chains on both sides too (the long chains we have all use +# both RSA and ECDSA, but ideally we should have long chains with either). +# Sizes reached (UDP payload): +# - 2037B for server certificate +# - 1542B for client certificate +# - 1013B for newsessionticket +# - all others below 512B +# All those tests assume MAX_CONTENT_LEN is at least 2048 + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 4096 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: none (for reference)" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=4096" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=4096" \ + 0 \ + -S "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: server only (max_frag_len)" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=1024" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=2048" \ + 0 \ + -S "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# With the MFL extension, the server has no way of forcing +# the client to not exceed a certain MTU; hence, the following +# test can't be replicated with an MTU proxy such as the one +# `client-initiated, server only (max_frag_len)` below. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 4096 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: server only (more) (max_frag_len)" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=512" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=4096" \ + 0 \ + -S "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: client-initiated, server only (max_frag_len)" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=none \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=2048" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=1024" \ + 0 \ + -S "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# While not required by the standard defining the MFL extension +# (according to which it only applies to records, not to datagrams), +# Mbed TLS will never send datagrams larger than MFL + { Max record expansion }, +# as otherwise there wouldn't be any means to communicate MTU restrictions +# to the peer. +# The next test checks that no datagrams significantly larger than the +# negotiated MFL are sent. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: client-initiated, server only (max_frag_len), proxy MTU" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=1110" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=none \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=2048" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=1024" \ + 0 \ + -S "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: client-initiated, both (max_frag_len)" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=2048" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=1024" \ + 0 \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# While not required by the standard defining the MFL extension +# (according to which it only applies to records, not to datagrams), +# Mbed TLS will never send datagrams larger than MFL + { Max record expansion }, +# as otherwise there wouldn't be any means to communicate MTU restrictions +# to the peer. +# The next test checks that no datagrams significantly larger than the +# negotiated MFL are sent. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: client-initiated, both (max_frag_len), proxy MTU" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=1110" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=2048" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + max_frag_len=1024" \ + 0 \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 4096 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: none (for reference) (MTU)" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + mtu=4096" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + mtu=4096" \ + 0 \ + -S "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 4096 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: client (MTU)" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=3500-60000 \ + mtu=4096" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=3500-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + 0 \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: server (MTU)" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + mtu=512" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + mtu=2048" \ + 0 \ + -S "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: both (MTU=1024)" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=1024" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + 0 \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# Forcing ciphersuite for this test to fit the MTU of 512 with full config. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: both (MTU=512)" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=512" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + mtu=512" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000 \ + mtu=512" \ + 0 \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# Test for automatic MTU reduction on repeated resend. +# Forcing ciphersuite for this test to fit the MTU of 508 with full config. +# The ratio of max/min timeout should ideally equal 4 to accept two +# retransmissions, but in some cases (like both the server and client using +# fragmentation and auto-reduction) an extra retransmission might occur, +# hence the ratio of 8. +not_with_valgrind +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU: auto-reduction (not valgrind)" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=508" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=400-3200" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=400-3200" \ + 0 \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# Forcing ciphersuite for this test to fit the MTU of 508 with full config. +only_with_valgrind +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU: auto-reduction (with valgrind)" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=508" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=250-10000" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=250-10000" \ + 0 \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# the proxy shouldn't drop or mess up anything, so we shouldn't need to resend +# OTOH the client might resend if the server is to slow to reset after sending +# a HelloVerifyRequest, so only check for no retransmission server-side +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, simple handshake (MTU=1024)" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=1024" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# Forcing ciphersuite for this test to fit the MTU of 512 with full config. +# the proxy shouldn't drop or mess up anything, so we shouldn't need to resend +# OTOH the client might resend if the server is to slow to reset after sending +# a HelloVerifyRequest, so only check for no retransmission server-side +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, simple handshake (MTU=512)" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=512" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=512" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=512" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, simple handshake, nbio (MTU=1024)" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=1024" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024 nbio=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024 nbio=2" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# Forcing ciphersuite for this test to fit the MTU of 512 with full config. +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, simple handshake, nbio (MTU=512)" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=512" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=512 nbio=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=512 nbio=2" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# Forcing ciphersuite for this test to fit the MTU of 1450 with full config. +# This ensures things still work after session_reset(). +# It also exercises the "resumed handshake" flow. +# Since we don't support reading fragmented ClientHello yet, +# up the MTU to 1450 (larger than ClientHello with session ticket, +# but still smaller than client's Certificate to ensure fragmentation). +# An autoreduction on the client-side might happen if the server is +# slow to reset, therefore omitting '-C "autoreduction"' below. +# reco_delay avoids races where the client reconnects before the server has +# resumed listening, which would result in a spurious autoreduction. +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, resumed handshake" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=1450" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1450" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + mtu=1450 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1 reco_delay=1" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# An autoreduction on the client-side might happen if the server is +# slow to reset, therefore omitting '-C "autoreduction"' below. +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, ChachaPoly renego" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=512" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=512" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=512" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# An autoreduction on the client-side might happen if the server is +# slow to reset, therefore omitting '-C "autoreduction"' below. +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, AES-GCM renego" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=512" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=512" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=512" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# An autoreduction on the client-side might happen if the server is +# slow to reset, therefore omitting '-C "autoreduction"' below. +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CCM_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, AES-CCM renego" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=1024" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# An autoreduction on the client-side might happen if the server is +# slow to reset, therefore omitting '-C "autoreduction"' below. +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, AES-CBC EtM renego" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=1024" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# An autoreduction on the client-side might happen if the server is +# slow to reset, therefore omitting '-C "autoreduction"' below. +not_with_valgrind # spurious autoreduction due to timeout +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU, AES-CBC non-EtM renego" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=1024" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 etm=0 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + exchanges=2 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ + hs_timeout=10000-60000 \ + mtu=1024" \ + 0 \ + -S "autoreduction" \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# Forcing ciphersuite for this test to fit the MTU of 512 with full config. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C +client_needs_more_time 2 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU + 3d" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=512 drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$P_SRV dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=250-10000 mtu=512" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=250-10000 mtu=512" \ + 0 \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# Forcing ciphersuite for this test to fit the MTU of 512 with full config. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_GCM_C +client_needs_more_time 2 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: proxy MTU + 3d, nbio" \ + -p "$P_PXY mtu=512 drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 auth_mode=required \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=250-10000 mtu=512 nbio=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \ + hs_timeout=250-10000 mtu=512 nbio=2" \ + 0 \ + -s "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# interop tests for DTLS fragmentating with reliable connection +# +# here and below we just want to test that the we fragment in a way that +# pleases other implementations, so we don't need the peer to fragment +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_gnutls +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: gnutls server, DTLS 1.2" \ + "$G_SRV -u" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + mtu=512 force_version=dtls12" \ + 0 \ + -c "fragmenting handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_gnutls +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: gnutls server, DTLS 1.0" \ + "$G_SRV -u" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \ + 0 \ + -c "fragmenting handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +# We use --insecure for the GnuTLS client because it expects +# the hostname / IP it connects to to be the name used in the +# certificate obtained from the server. Here, however, it +# connects to 127.0.0.1 while our test certificates use 'localhost' +# as the server name in the certificate. This will make the +# certificate validation fail, but passing --insecure makes +# GnuTLS continue the connection nonetheless. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_gnutls +requires_not_i686 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: gnutls client, DTLS 1.2" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + mtu=512 force_version=dtls12" \ + "$G_CLI -u --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "fragmenting handshake message" + +# See previous test for the reason to use --insecure +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_gnutls +requires_not_i686 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: gnutls client, DTLS 1.0" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \ + "$G_CLI -u --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "fragmenting handshake message" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: openssl server, DTLS 1.2" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1_2 -verify 10" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + mtu=512 force_version=dtls12" \ + 0 \ + -c "fragmenting handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: openssl server, DTLS 1.0" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -verify 10" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \ + 0 \ + -c "fragmenting handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: openssl client, DTLS 1.2" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + mtu=512 force_version=dtls12" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1_2" \ + 0 \ + -s "fragmenting handshake message" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: openssl client, DTLS 1.0" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1" \ + 0 \ + -s "fragmenting handshake message" + +# interop tests for DTLS fragmentating with unreliable connection +# +# again we just want to test that the we fragment in a way that +# pleases other implementations, so we don't need the peer to fragment +requires_gnutls_next +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, gnutls server, DTLS 1.2" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV -u" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls12" \ + 0 \ + -c "fragmenting handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_gnutls_next +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, gnutls server, DTLS 1.0" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV -u" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \ + 0 \ + -c "fragmenting handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +requires_gnutls_next +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, gnutls client, DTLS 1.2" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls12" \ + "$G_NEXT_CLI -u --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "fragmenting handshake message" + +requires_gnutls_next +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, gnutls client, DTLS 1.0" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \ + "$G_NEXT_CLI -u --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "fragmenting handshake message" + +## Interop test with OpenSSL might trigger a bug in recent versions (including +## all versions installed on the CI machines), reported here: +## Bug report: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6902 +## They should be re-enabled once a fixed version of OpenSSL is available +## (this should happen in some 1.1.1_ release according to the ticket). +skip_next_test +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, openssl server, DTLS 1.2" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1_2 -verify 10" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls12" \ + 0 \ + -c "fragmenting handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +skip_next_test +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, openssl server, DTLS 1.0" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -verify 10" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server8.key \ + hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \ + 0 \ + -c "fragmenting handshake message" \ + -C "error" + +skip_next_test +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, openssl client, DTLS 1.2" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls12" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1_2" \ + 0 \ + -s "fragmenting handshake message" + +# -nbio is added to prevent s_client from blocking in case of duplicated +# messages at the end of the handshake +skip_next_test +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_RSA_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_max_content_len 2048 +run_test "DTLS fragmenting: 3d, openssl client, DTLS 1.0" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=8 delay=8 duplicate=8" \ + "$P_SRV dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + crt_file=data_files/server7_int-ca.crt \ + key_file=data_files/server7.key \ + hs_timeout=250-60000 mtu=512 force_version=dtls1" \ + "$O_CLI -nbio -dtls1" \ + 0 \ + -s "fragmenting handshake message" + +# Tests for DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP all profiles supported" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -C "error" + + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports all profiles. Client supports one profile." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=5 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" \ + -s "selected srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports one profile. Client supports all profiles." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=6 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one matching profile." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -s "selected srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one different profile." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=6 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -S "selected srtp profile" \ + -S "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -S "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found srtp profile" \ + -C "selected srtp profile" \ + -C "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server doesn't support use_srtp extension." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -S "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found srtp profile" \ + -C "selected srtp profile" \ + -C "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP all profiles supported. mki used" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 support_mki=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 mki=542310ab34290481 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "dumping 'using mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "dumping 'sending mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -c "dumping 'received mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *DTLS-SRTP mki value: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP all profiles supported. server doesn't support mki." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 mki=542310ab34290481 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -s "DTLS-SRTP no mki value negotiated"\ + -S "dumping 'using mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "DTLS-SRTP no mki value negotiated"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -c "dumping 'sending mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -C "dumping 'received mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP all profiles supported. openssl client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -c "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports all profiles. Client supports all profiles, in different order. openssl client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32:SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -c "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports all profiles. Client supports one profile. openssl client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -c "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports one profile. Client supports all profiles. openssl client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -c "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one matching profile. openssl client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -g "find_in_both '^ *Keying material: [0-9A-F]*$'"\ + -c "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one different profile. openssl client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -S "selected srtp profile" \ + -S "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -S "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server doesn't support use_srtp extension. openssl client" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$O_CLI -dtls1 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -S "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP all profiles supported. openssl server" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -verify 0 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile" \ + -c "selected srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports all profiles. Client supports all profiles, in different order. openssl server." \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -verify 0 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32:SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports all profiles. Client supports one profile. openssl server." \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -verify 0 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports one profile. Client supports all profiles. openssl server." \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -verify 0 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one matching profile. openssl server." \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -verify 0 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one different profile. openssl server." \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -verify 0 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=6 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found srtp profile" \ + -C "selected srtp profile" \ + -C "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server doesn't support use_srtp extension. openssl server" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found srtp profile" \ + -C "selected srtp profile" \ + -C "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +run_test "DTLS-SRTP all profiles supported. server doesn't support mki. openssl server." \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -verify 0 -use_srtp SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 -keymatexport 'EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp' -keymatexportlen 60" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 mki=542310ab34290481 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "DTLS-SRTP no mki value negotiated"\ + -c "dumping 'sending mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -C "dumping 'received mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP all profiles supported. gnutls client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32 --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "SRTP profile: SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports all profiles. Client supports all profiles, in different order. gnutls client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "SRTP profile: SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports all profiles. Client supports one profile. gnutls client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -s "selected srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "SRTP profile: SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports one profile. Client supports all profiles. gnutls client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=6 debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32 --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "SRTP profile: SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one matching profile. gnutls client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -s "selected srtp profile" \ + -s "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -s "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "SRTP profile: SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one different profile. gnutls client." \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -s "found srtp profile" \ + -S "selected srtp profile" \ + -S "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -S "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "SRTP profile:" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server doesn't support use_srtp extension. gnutls client" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$G_CLI -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32 --insecure 127.0.0.1" \ + 0 \ + -s "found use_srtp extension" \ + -S "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -S "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "SRTP profile:" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP all profiles supported. gnutls server" \ + "$G_SRV -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile" \ + -c "selected srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports all profiles. Client supports all profiles, in different order. gnutls server." \ + "$G_SRV -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile" \ + -c "selected srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports all profiles. Client supports one profile. gnutls server." \ + "$G_SRV -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server supports one profile. Client supports all profiles. gnutls server." \ + "$G_SRV -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one matching profile. gnutls server." \ + "$G_SRV -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=2 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile: MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server and Client support only one different profile. gnutls server." \ + "$G_SRV -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 srtp_force_profile=6 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found srtp profile" \ + -C "selected srtp profile" \ + -C "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP server doesn't support use_srtp extension. gnutls server" \ + "$G_SRV -u" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found use_srtp extension" \ + -C "found srtp profile" \ + -C "selected srtp profile" \ + -C "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -C "error" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +requires_gnutls +run_test "DTLS-SRTP all profiles supported. mki used. gnutls server." \ + "$G_SRV -u --srtp-profiles=SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 use_srtp=1 mki=542310ab34290481 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -c "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found use_srtp extension" \ + -c "found srtp profile" \ + -c "selected srtp profile" \ + -c "DTLS-SRTP key material is"\ + -c "DTLS-SRTP mki value:"\ + -c "dumping 'sending mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -c "dumping 'received mki' (8 bytes)" \ + -C "error" + +# Tests for specific things with "unreliable" UDP connection + +not_with_valgrind # spurious resend due to timeout +run_test "DTLS proxy: reference" \ + -p "$P_PXY" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \ + 0 \ + -C "replayed record" \ + -S "replayed record" \ + -C "Buffer record from epoch" \ + -S "Buffer record from epoch" \ + -C "ssl_buffer_message" \ + -S "ssl_buffer_message" \ + -C "discarding invalid record" \ + -S "discarding invalid record" \ + -S "resend" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +not_with_valgrind # spurious resend due to timeout +run_test "DTLS proxy: duplicate every packet" \ + -p "$P_PXY duplicate=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \ + 0 \ + -c "replayed record" \ + -s "replayed record" \ + -c "record from another epoch" \ + -s "record from another epoch" \ + -S "resend" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +run_test "DTLS proxy: duplicate every packet, server anti-replay off" \ + -p "$P_PXY duplicate=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2 anti_replay=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "replayed record" \ + -S "replayed record" \ + -c "record from another epoch" \ + -s "record from another epoch" \ + -c "resend" \ + -s "resend" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +run_test "DTLS proxy: multiple records in same datagram" \ + -p "$P_PXY pack=50" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "next record in same datagram" \ + -s "next record in same datagram" + +run_test "DTLS proxy: multiple records in same datagram, duplicate every packet" \ + -p "$P_PXY pack=50 duplicate=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=2" \ + 0 \ + -c "next record in same datagram" \ + -s "next record in same datagram" + +run_test "DTLS proxy: inject invalid AD record, default badmac_limit" \ + -p "$P_PXY bad_ad=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=1 read_timeout=100" \ + 0 \ + -c "discarding invalid record (mac)" \ + -s "discarding invalid record (mac)" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" \ + -S "too many records with bad MAC" \ + -S "Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "DTLS proxy: inject invalid AD record, badmac_limit 1" \ + -p "$P_PXY bad_ad=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=1 badmac_limit=1" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=1 read_timeout=100" \ + 1 \ + -C "discarding invalid record (mac)" \ + -S "discarding invalid record (mac)" \ + -S "Extra-header:" \ + -C "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" \ + -s "too many records with bad MAC" \ + -s "Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "DTLS proxy: inject invalid AD record, badmac_limit 2" \ + -p "$P_PXY bad_ad=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=1 badmac_limit=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=1 read_timeout=100" \ + 0 \ + -c "discarding invalid record (mac)" \ + -s "discarding invalid record (mac)" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" \ + -S "too many records with bad MAC" \ + -S "Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "DTLS proxy: inject invalid AD record, badmac_limit 2, exchanges 2"\ + -p "$P_PXY bad_ad=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=1 badmac_limit=2 exchanges=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 debug_level=1 read_timeout=100 exchanges=2" \ + 1 \ + -c "discarding invalid record (mac)" \ + -s "discarding invalid record (mac)" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" \ + -s "too many records with bad MAC" \ + -s "Verification of the message MAC failed" + +run_test "DTLS proxy: delay ChangeCipherSpec" \ + -p "$P_PXY delay_ccs=1" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=1 dgram_packing=0" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=1 dgram_packing=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "record from another epoch" \ + -s "record from another epoch" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +# Tests for reordering support with DTLS + +requires_certificate_authentication +run_test "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order handshake message on client" \ + -p "$P_PXY delay_srv=ServerHello" \ + "$P_SRV dgram_packing=0 cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -c "Buffering HS message" \ + -c "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -S "Buffering HS message" \ + -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -C "Remember CCS message" \ + -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -S "Remember CCS message" + +requires_certificate_authentication +run_test "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order handshake message fragment on client" \ + -p "$P_PXY delay_srv=ServerHello" \ + "$P_SRV mtu=512 dgram_packing=0 cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -c "Buffering HS message" \ + -c "found fragmented DTLS handshake message"\ + -c "Next handshake message 1 not or only partially bufffered" \ + -c "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -S "Buffering HS message" \ + -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -C "Remember CCS message" \ + -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -S "Remember CCS message" + +# The client buffers the ServerKeyExchange before receiving the fragmented +# Certificate message; at the time of writing, together these are aroudn 1200b +# in size, so that the bound below ensures that the certificate can be reassembled +# while keeping the ServerKeyExchange. +requires_certificate_authentication +requires_config_value_at_least "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING" 1300 +run_test "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order hs msg before reassembling next" \ + -p "$P_PXY delay_srv=Certificate delay_srv=Certificate" \ + "$P_SRV mtu=512 dgram_packing=0 cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -c "Buffering HS message" \ + -c "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -C "attempt to make space by freeing buffered messages" \ + -S "Buffering HS message" \ + -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -C "Remember CCS message" \ + -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -S "Remember CCS message" + +# The size constraints ensure that the delayed certificate message can't +# be reassembled while keeping the ServerKeyExchange message, but it can +# when dropping it first. +requires_certificate_authentication +requires_config_value_at_least "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING" 900 +requires_config_value_at_most "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING" 1299 +run_test "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order hs msg before reassembling next, free buffered msg" \ + -p "$P_PXY delay_srv=Certificate delay_srv=Certificate" \ + "$P_SRV mtu=512 dgram_packing=0 cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -c "Buffering HS message" \ + -c "attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages" \ + -c "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" \ + -S "Buffering HS message" \ + -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -C "Remember CCS message" \ + -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -S "Remember CCS message" + +requires_certificate_authentication +run_test "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order handshake message on server" \ + -p "$P_PXY delay_cli=Certificate" \ + "$P_SRV dgram_packing=0 auth_mode=required cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -C "Buffering HS message" \ + -C "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -s "Buffering HS message" \ + -s "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" \ + -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -C "Remember CCS message" \ + -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -S "Remember CCS message" + +requires_certificate_authentication +run_test "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order CCS message on client"\ + -p "$P_PXY delay_srv=NewSessionTicket" \ + "$P_SRV dgram_packing=0 cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -C "Buffering HS message" \ + -C "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -S "Buffering HS message" \ + -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" \ + -c "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -c "Remember CCS message" \ + -S "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -S "Remember CCS message" + +requires_certificate_authentication +run_test "DTLS reordering: Buffer out-of-order CCS message on server"\ + -p "$P_PXY delay_cli=ClientKeyExchange" \ + "$P_SRV dgram_packing=0 cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -C "Buffering HS message" \ + -C "Next handshake message has been buffered - load"\ + -S "Buffering HS message" \ + -S "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" \ + -C "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -C "Remember CCS message" \ + -s "Injecting buffered CCS message" \ + -s "Remember CCS message" + +run_test "DTLS reordering: Buffer encrypted Finished message" \ + -p "$P_PXY delay_ccs=1" \ + "$P_SRV dgram_packing=0 cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 \ + hs_timeout=2500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -s "Buffer record from epoch 1" \ + -s "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" \ + -c "Buffer record from epoch 1" \ + -c "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" + +# In this test, both the fragmented NewSessionTicket and the ChangeCipherSpec +# from the server are delayed, so that the encrypted Finished message +# is received and buffered. When the fragmented NewSessionTicket comes +# in afterwards, the encrypted Finished message must be freed in order +# to make space for the NewSessionTicket to be reassembled. +# This works only in very particular circumstances: +# - MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING must be large enough to allow buffering +# of the NewSessionTicket, but small enough to also allow buffering of +# the encrypted Finished message. +# - The MTU setting on the server must be so small that the NewSessionTicket +# needs to be fragmented. +# - All messages sent by the server must be small enough to be either sent +# without fragmentation or be reassembled within the bounds of +# MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING. Achieve this by testing with a PSK-based +# handshake, omitting CRTs. +requires_config_value_at_least "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING" 190 +requires_config_value_at_most "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING" 230 +run_test "DTLS reordering: Buffer encrypted Finished message, drop for fragmented NewSessionTicket" \ + -p "$P_PXY delay_srv=NewSessionTicket delay_srv=NewSessionTicket delay_ccs=1" \ + "$P_SRV mtu=140 response_size=90 dgram_packing=0 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo cookies=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 debug_level=2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \ + 0 \ + -s "Buffer record from epoch 1" \ + -s "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" \ + -c "Buffer record from epoch 1" \ + -C "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" \ + -c "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" + +# Tests for "randomly unreliable connection": try a variety of flows and peers + +client_needs_more_time 2 +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d (drop, delay, duplicate), \"short\" PSK handshake" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none \ + psk=abc123" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 psk=abc123 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 2 +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, \"short\" RSA handshake" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 2 +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, \"short\" (no ticket, no cli_auth) FS handshake" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 2 +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, FS, client auth" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 2 +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, FS, ticket" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=1 auth_mode=none" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 2 +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, max handshake (FS, ticket + client auth)" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=1 auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 2 +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, max handshake, nbio" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 nbio=2 tickets=1 \ + auth_mode=required" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 nbio=2 tickets=1" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, min handshake, resumption" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none \ + psk=abc123 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 psk=abc123 \ + debug_level=3 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1 read_timeout=1000 max_resend=10 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, min handshake, resumption, nbio" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none \ + psk=abc123 debug_level=3 nbio=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 psk=abc123 \ + debug_level=3 reconnect=1 skip_close_notify=1 read_timeout=1000 max_resend=10 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 nbio=2" \ + 0 \ + -s "a session has been resumed" \ + -c "a session has been resumed" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, min handshake, client-initiated renego" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none \ + psk=abc123 renegotiation=1 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 psk=abc123 \ + renegotiate=1 debug_level=2 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, min handshake, client-initiated renego, nbio" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none \ + psk=abc123 renegotiation=1 debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 psk=abc123 \ + renegotiate=1 debug_level=2 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, min handshake, server-initiated renego" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none \ + psk=abc123 renegotiate=1 renegotiation=1 exchanges=4 \ + debug_level=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 psk=abc123 \ + renegotiation=1 exchanges=4 debug_level=2 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +client_needs_more_time 4 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, min handshake, server-initiated renego, nbio" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$P_SRV dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 auth_mode=none \ + psk=abc123 renegotiate=1 renegotiation=1 exchanges=4 \ + debug_level=2 nbio=2" \ + "$P_CLI dtls=1 dgram_packing=0 hs_timeout=500-10000 tickets=0 psk=abc123 \ + renegotiation=1 exchanges=4 debug_level=2 nbio=2 \ + force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \ + 0 \ + -c "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "=> renegotiate" \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +## Interop tests with OpenSSL might trigger a bug in recent versions (including +## all versions installed on the CI machines), reported here: +## Bug report: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6902 +## They should be re-enabled once a fixed version of OpenSSL is available +## (this should happen in some 1.1.1_ release according to the ticket). +skip_next_test +client_needs_more_time 6 +not_with_valgrind # risk of non-mbedtls peer timing out +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, openssl server" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 protect_hvr=1" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -mtu 2048" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 hs_timeout=500-60000 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +skip_next_test # see above +client_needs_more_time 8 +not_with_valgrind # risk of non-mbedtls peer timing out +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, openssl server, fragmentation" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 protect_hvr=1" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -mtu 768" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 hs_timeout=500-60000 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +skip_next_test # see above +client_needs_more_time 8 +not_with_valgrind # risk of non-mbedtls peer timing out +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, openssl server, fragmentation, nbio" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5 protect_hvr=1" \ + "$O_SRV -dtls1 -mtu 768" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 hs_timeout=500-60000 nbio=2 tickets=0" \ + 0 \ + -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" + +requires_gnutls +client_needs_more_time 6 +not_with_valgrind # risk of non-mbedtls peer timing out +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, gnutls server" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$G_SRV -u --mtu 2048 -a" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 hs_timeout=500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "Extra-header:" + +requires_gnutls_next +client_needs_more_time 8 +not_with_valgrind # risk of non-mbedtls peer timing out +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, gnutls server, fragmentation" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV -u --mtu 512" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 hs_timeout=500-60000" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "Extra-header:" + +requires_gnutls_next +client_needs_more_time 8 +not_with_valgrind # risk of non-mbedtls peer timing out +run_test "DTLS proxy: 3d, gnutls server, fragmentation, nbio" \ + -p "$P_PXY drop=5 delay=5 duplicate=5" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV -u --mtu 512" \ + "$P_CLI dgram_packing=0 dtls=1 hs_timeout=500-60000 nbio=2" \ + 0 \ + -s "Extra-header:" \ + -c "Extra-header:" + +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS +run_test "export keys functionality" \ + "$P_SRV eap_tls=1 debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI eap_tls=1 debug_level=3" \ + 0 \ + -s "exported maclen is " \ + -s "exported keylen is " \ + -s "exported ivlen is " \ + -c "exported maclen is " \ + -c "exported keylen is " \ + -c "exported ivlen is " \ + -c "EAP-TLS key material is:"\ + -s "EAP-TLS key material is:"\ + -c "EAP-TLS IV is:" \ + -s "EAP-TLS IV is:" + +# Test heap memory usage after handshake +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +requires_max_content_len 16384 +run_tests_memory_after_hanshake + +# Final report + +echo "------------------------------------------------------------------------" + +if [ $FAILS = 0 ]; then + printf "PASSED" +else + printf "FAILED" +fi +PASSES=$(( $TESTS - $FAILS )) +echo " ($PASSES / $TESTS tests ($SKIPS skipped))" + +exit $FAILS diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/helpers.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/helpers.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91ad925f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/helpers.function @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +#line 2 "suites/helpers.function" +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Headers */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#define mbedtls_time time +#define mbedtls_time_t time_t +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include +#endif + +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#include +typedef UINT8 uint8_t; +typedef INT32 int32_t; +typedef UINT32 uint32_t; +#define strncasecmp _strnicmp +#define strcasecmp _stricmp +#else +#include +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) +#include +#include +#endif + +/* Type for Hex parameters */ +typedef struct data_tag +{ + uint8_t * x; + uint32_t len; +} data_t; + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Status and error constants */ + +#define DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED 0 /* Dependency supported by build */ +#define KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_FOUND 0 /* Integer expression found */ +#define DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS 0 /* Test dispatch successful */ + +#define KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_NOT_FOUND -1 /* Integer expression not found */ +#define DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED -2 /* Dependency not supported */ +#define DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND -3 /* Test function not found */ +#define DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA -4 /* Invalid test parameter type. + Only int, string, binary data + and integer expressions are + allowed */ +#define DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE -5 /* Test suite not supported by the + build */ + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Global variables */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) +jmp_buf jmp_tmp; +#endif + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Helper flags for complex dependencies */ + +/* Indicates whether we expect mbedtls_entropy_init + * to initialize some strong entropy source. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) || \ + defined(ENTROPY_NV_SEED) ) ) +#define ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG +#endif + + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Helper Functions */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +/** Check that no PSA Crypto key slots are in use. + * + * If any slots are in use, mark the current test as failed. + * + * \return 0 if the key store is empty, 1 otherwise. + */ +int test_fail_if_psa_leaking( int line_no, const char *filename ) +{ + const char *msg = mbedtls_test_helper_is_psa_leaking( ); + if( msg == NULL ) + return 0; + else + { + mbedtls_test_fail( msg, line_no, filename ); + return 1; + } +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) */ + +#if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) +static int redirect_output( FILE* out_stream, const char* path ) +{ + int out_fd, dup_fd; + FILE* path_stream; + + out_fd = fileno( out_stream ); + dup_fd = dup( out_fd ); + + if( dup_fd == -1 ) + { + return( -1 ); + } + + path_stream = fopen( path, "w" ); + if( path_stream == NULL ) + { + close( dup_fd ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fflush( out_stream ); + if( dup2( fileno( path_stream ), out_fd ) == -1 ) + { + close( dup_fd ); + fclose( path_stream ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( path_stream ); + return( dup_fd ); +} + +static int restore_output( FILE* out_stream, int dup_fd ) +{ + int out_fd = fileno( out_stream ); + + fflush( out_stream ); + if( dup2( dup_fd, out_fd ) == -1 ) + { + close( out_fd ); + close( dup_fd ); + return( -1 ); + } + + close( dup_fd ); + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* __unix__ || __APPLE__ __MACH__ */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/host_test.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/host_test.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b9ea3d6d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/host_test.function @@ -0,0 +1,829 @@ +#line 2 "suites/host_test.function" + +/** + * \brief Verifies that string is in string parameter format i.e. "" + * It also strips enclosing '"' from the input string. + * + * \param str String parameter. + * + * \return 0 if success else 1 + */ +int verify_string( char **str ) +{ + if( ( *str )[0] != '"' || + ( *str )[strlen( *str ) - 1] != '"' ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "Expected string (with \"\") for parameter and got: %s\n", *str ); + return( -1 ); + } + + ( *str )++; + ( *str )[strlen( *str ) - 1] = '\0'; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Verifies that string is an integer. Also gives the converted + * integer value. + * + * \param str Input string. + * \param value Pointer to int for output value. + * + * \return 0 if success else 1 + */ +int verify_int( char *str, int32_t *value ) +{ + size_t i; + int minus = 0; + int digits = 1; + int hex = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < strlen( str ); i++ ) + { + if( i == 0 && str[i] == '-' ) + { + minus = 1; + continue; + } + + if( ( ( minus && i == 2 ) || ( !minus && i == 1 ) ) && + str[i - 1] == '0' && ( str[i] == 'x' || str[i] == 'X' ) ) + { + hex = 1; + continue; + } + + if( ! ( ( str[i] >= '0' && str[i] <= '9' ) || + ( hex && ( ( str[i] >= 'a' && str[i] <= 'f' ) || + ( str[i] >= 'A' && str[i] <= 'F' ) ) ) ) ) + { + digits = 0; + break; + } + } + + if( digits ) + { + if( hex ) + *value = strtol( str, NULL, 16 ); + else + *value = strtol( str, NULL, 10 ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "Expected integer for parameter and got: %s\n", str ); + return( KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_NOT_FOUND ); +} + + +/** + * \brief Usage string. + * + */ +#define USAGE \ + "Usage: %s [OPTIONS] files...\n\n" \ + " Command line arguments:\n" \ + " files... One or more test data files. If no file is\n" \ + " specified the following default test case\n" \ + " file is used:\n" \ + " %s\n\n" \ + " Options:\n" \ + " -v | --verbose Display full information about each test\n" \ + " -h | --help Display this information\n\n", \ + argv[0], \ + "TESTCASE_FILENAME" + + +/** + * \brief Read a line from the passed file pointer. + * + * \param f FILE pointer + * \param buf Pointer to memory to hold read line. + * \param len Length of the buf. + * + * \return 0 if success else -1 + */ +int get_line( FILE *f, char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + char *ret; + int i = 0, str_len = 0, has_string = 0; + + /* Read until we get a valid line */ + do + { + ret = fgets( buf, len, f ); + if( ret == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + str_len = strlen( buf ); + + /* Skip empty line and comment */ + if ( str_len == 0 || buf[0] == '#' ) + continue; + has_string = 0; + for ( i = 0; i < str_len; i++ ) + { + char c = buf[i]; + if ( c != ' ' && c != '\t' && c != '\n' && + c != '\v' && c != '\f' && c != '\r' ) + { + has_string = 1; + break; + } + } + } while( !has_string ); + + /* Strip new line and carriage return */ + ret = buf + strlen( buf ); + if( ret-- > buf && *ret == '\n' ) + *ret = '\0'; + if( ret-- > buf && *ret == '\r' ) + *ret = '\0'; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Splits string delimited by ':'. Ignores '\:'. + * + * \param buf Input string + * \param len Input string length + * \param params Out params found + * \param params_len Out params array len + * + * \return Count of strings found. + */ +static int parse_arguments( char *buf, size_t len, char **params, + size_t params_len ) +{ + size_t cnt = 0, i; + char *cur = buf; + char *p = buf, *q; + + params[cnt++] = cur; + + while( *p != '\0' && p < ( buf + len ) ) + { + if( *p == '\\' ) + { + p++; + p++; + continue; + } + if( *p == ':' ) + { + if( p + 1 < buf + len ) + { + cur = p + 1; + TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( cnt < params_len ); + params[cnt++] = cur; + } + *p = '\0'; + } + + p++; + } + + /* Replace newlines, question marks and colons in strings */ + for( i = 0; i < cnt; i++ ) + { + p = params[i]; + q = params[i]; + + while( *p != '\0' ) + { + if( *p == '\\' && *( p + 1 ) == 'n' ) + { + p += 2; + *( q++ ) = '\n'; + } + else if( *p == '\\' && *( p + 1 ) == ':' ) + { + p += 2; + *( q++ ) = ':'; + } + else if( *p == '\\' && *( p + 1 ) == '?' ) + { + p += 2; + *( q++ ) = '?'; + } + else + *( q++ ) = *( p++ ); + } + *q = '\0'; + } + + return( cnt ); +} + +/** + * \brief Converts parameters into test function consumable parameters. + * Example: Input: {"int", "0", "char*", "Hello", + * "hex", "abef", "exp", "1"} + * Output: { + * 0, // Verified int + * "Hello", // Verified string + * 2, { 0xab, 0xef },// Converted len,hex pair + * 9600 // Evaluated expression + * } + * + * + * \param cnt Parameter array count. + * \param params Out array of found parameters. + * \param int_params_store Memory for storing processed integer parameters. + * + * \return 0 for success else 1 + */ +static int convert_params( size_t cnt , char ** params , int32_t * int_params_store ) +{ + char ** cur = params; + char ** out = params; + int ret = DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS; + + while ( cur < params + cnt ) + { + char * type = *cur++; + char * val = *cur++; + + if ( strcmp( type, "char*" ) == 0 ) + { + if ( verify_string( &val ) == 0 ) + { + *out++ = val; + } + else + { + ret = ( DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA ); + break; + } + } + else if ( strcmp( type, "int" ) == 0 ) + { + if ( verify_int( val, int_params_store ) == 0 ) + { + *out++ = (char *) int_params_store++; + } + else + { + ret = ( DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA ); + break; + } + } + else if ( strcmp( type, "hex" ) == 0 ) + { + if ( verify_string( &val ) == 0 ) + { + size_t len; + + TEST_HELPER_ASSERT( + mbedtls_test_unhexify( (unsigned char *) val, strlen( val ), + val, &len ) == 0 ); + + *int_params_store = len; + *out++ = val; + *out++ = (char *)(int_params_store++); + } + else + { + ret = ( DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA ); + break; + } + } + else if ( strcmp( type, "exp" ) == 0 ) + { + int exp_id = strtol( val, NULL, 10 ); + if ( get_expression ( exp_id, int_params_store ) == 0 ) + { + *out++ = (char *)int_params_store++; + } + else + { + ret = ( DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA ); + break; + } + } + else + { + ret = ( DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA ); + break; + } + } + return( ret ); +} + +/** + * \brief Tests snprintf implementation with test input. + * + * \note + * At high optimization levels (e.g. gcc -O3), this function may be + * inlined in run_test_snprintf. This can trigger a spurious warning about + * potential misuse of snprintf from gcc -Wformat-truncation (observed with + * gcc 7.2). This warning makes tests in run_test_snprintf redundant on gcc + * only. They are still valid for other compilers. Avoid this warning by + * forbidding inlining of this function by gcc. + * + * \param n Buffer test length. + * \param ref_buf Expected buffer. + * \param ref_ret Expected snprintf return value. + * + * \return 0 for success else 1 + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((__noinline__)) +#endif +static int test_snprintf( size_t n, const char *ref_buf, int ref_ret ) +{ + int ret; + char buf[10] = "xxxxxxxxx"; + const char ref[10] = "xxxxxxxxx"; + + if( n >= sizeof( buf ) ) + return( -1 ); + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( buf, n, "%s", "123" ); + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n ) + ret = -1; + + if( strncmp( ref_buf, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) != 0 || + ref_ret != ret || + memcmp( buf + n, ref + n, sizeof( buf ) - n ) != 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Tests snprintf implementation. + * + * \return 0 for success else 1 + */ +static int run_test_snprintf( void ) +{ + return( test_snprintf( 0, "xxxxxxxxx", -1 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 1, "", -1 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 2, "1", -1 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 3, "12", -1 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 4, "123", 3 ) != 0 || + test_snprintf( 5, "123", 3 ) != 0 ); +} + +/** \brief Write the description of the test case to the outcome CSV file. + * + * \param outcome_file The file to write to. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * \param argv0 The test suite name. + * \param test_case The test case description. + */ +static void write_outcome_entry( FILE *outcome_file, + const char *argv0, + const char *test_case ) +{ + /* The non-varying fields are initialized on first use. */ + static const char *platform = NULL; + static const char *configuration = NULL; + static const char *test_suite = NULL; + + if( outcome_file == NULL ) + return; + + if( platform == NULL ) + { + platform = getenv( "MBEDTLS_TEST_PLATFORM" ); + if( platform == NULL ) + platform = "unknown"; + } + if( configuration == NULL ) + { + configuration = getenv( "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONFIGURATION" ); + if( configuration == NULL ) + configuration = "unknown"; + } + if( test_suite == NULL ) + { + test_suite = strrchr( argv0, '/' ); + if( test_suite != NULL ) + test_suite += 1; // skip the '/' + else + test_suite = argv0; + } + + /* Write the beginning of the outcome line. + * Ignore errors: writing the outcome file is on a best-effort basis. */ + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "%s;%s;%s;%s;", + platform, configuration, test_suite, test_case ); +} + +/** \brief Write the result of the test case to the outcome CSV file. + * + * \param outcome_file The file to write to. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * \param unmet_dep_count The number of unmet dependencies. + * \param unmet_dependencies The array of unmet dependencies. + * \param missing_unmet_dependencies Non-zero if there was a problem tracking + * all unmet dependencies, 0 otherwise. + * \param ret The test dispatch status (DISPATCH_xxx). + * \param info A pointer to the test info structure. + */ +static void write_outcome_result( FILE *outcome_file, + size_t unmet_dep_count, + int unmet_dependencies[], + int missing_unmet_dependencies, + int ret, + const mbedtls_test_info_t *info ) +{ + if( outcome_file == NULL ) + return; + + /* Write the end of the outcome line. + * Ignore errors: writing the outcome file is on a best-effort basis. */ + switch( ret ) + { + case DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS: + if( unmet_dep_count > 0 ) + { + size_t i; + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "SKIP" ); + for( i = 0; i < unmet_dep_count; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "%c%d", + i == 0 ? ';' : ':', + unmet_dependencies[i] ); + } + if( missing_unmet_dependencies ) + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, ":..." ); + break; + } + switch( info->result ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS: + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "PASS;" ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED: + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "SKIP;Runtime skip" ); + break; + default: + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "FAIL;%s:%d:%s", + info->filename, info->line_no, + info->test ); + break; + } + break; + case DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND: + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "FAIL;Test function not found" ); + break; + case DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA: + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "FAIL;Invalid test data" ); + break; + case DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE: + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "SKIP;Unsupported suite" ); + break; + default: + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "FAIL;Unknown cause" ); + break; + } + mbedtls_fprintf( outcome_file, "\n" ); + fflush( outcome_file ); +} + +/** + * \brief Desktop implementation of execute_tests(). + * Parses command line and executes tests from + * supplied or default data file. + * + * \param argc Command line argument count. + * \param argv Argument array. + * + * \return Program exit status. + */ +int execute_tests( int argc , const char ** argv ) +{ + /* Local Configurations and options */ + const char *default_filename = "DATA_FILE"; + const char *test_filename = NULL; + const char **test_files = NULL; + size_t testfile_count = 0; + int option_verbose = 0; + size_t function_id = 0; + + /* Other Local variables */ + int arg_index = 1; + const char *next_arg; + size_t testfile_index, i, cnt; + int ret; + unsigned total_errors = 0, total_tests = 0, total_skipped = 0; + FILE *file; + char buf[5000]; + char *params[50]; + /* Store for processed integer params. */ + int32_t int_params[50]; + void *pointer; +#if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) + int stdout_fd = -1; +#endif /* __unix__ || __APPLE__ __MACH__ */ + const char *outcome_file_name = getenv( "MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE" ); + FILE *outcome_file = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \ + !defined(TEST_SUITE_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC) + unsigned char alloc_buf[1000000]; + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof( alloc_buf ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_init( ); +#endif + + /* + * The C standard doesn't guarantee that all-bits-0 is the representation + * of a NULL pointer. We do however use that in our code for initializing + * structures, which should work on every modern platform. Let's be sure. + */ + memset( &pointer, 0, sizeof( void * ) ); + if( pointer != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "all-bits-zero is not a NULL pointer\n" ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * Make sure we have a snprintf that correctly zero-terminates + */ + if( run_test_snprintf() != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "the snprintf implementation is broken\n" ); + return( 1 ); + } + + if( outcome_file_name != NULL && *outcome_file_name != '\0' ) + { + outcome_file = fopen( outcome_file_name, "a" ); + if( outcome_file == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Unable to open outcome file. Continuing anyway.\n" ); + } + } + + while( arg_index < argc ) + { + next_arg = argv[arg_index]; + + if( strcmp( next_arg, "--verbose" ) == 0 || + strcmp( next_arg, "-v" ) == 0 ) + { + option_verbose = 1; + } + else if( strcmp(next_arg, "--help" ) == 0 || + strcmp(next_arg, "-h" ) == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, USAGE ); + mbedtls_exit( EXIT_SUCCESS ); + } + else + { + /* Not an option, therefore treat all further arguments as the file + * list. + */ + test_files = &argv[ arg_index ]; + testfile_count = argc - arg_index; + } + + arg_index++; + } + + /* If no files were specified, assume a default */ + if ( test_files == NULL || testfile_count == 0 ) + { + test_files = &default_filename; + testfile_count = 1; + } + + /* Initialize the struct that holds information about the last test */ + mbedtls_test_info_reset( ); + + /* Now begin to execute the tests in the testfiles */ + for ( testfile_index = 0; + testfile_index < testfile_count; + testfile_index++ ) + { + size_t unmet_dep_count = 0; + int unmet_dependencies[20]; + int missing_unmet_dependencies = 0; + + test_filename = test_files[ testfile_index ]; + + file = fopen( test_filename, "r" ); + if( file == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Failed to open test file: %s\n", + test_filename ); + if( outcome_file != NULL ) + fclose( outcome_file ); + return( 1 ); + } + + while( !feof( file ) ) + { + if( unmet_dep_count > 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "FATAL: Dep count larger than zero at start of loop\n" ); + mbedtls_exit( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE ); + } + unmet_dep_count = 0; + missing_unmet_dependencies = 0; + + if( ( ret = get_line( file, buf, sizeof(buf) ) ) != 0 ) + break; + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "%s%.66s", + mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED ? + "\n" : "", buf ); + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, " " ); + for( i = strlen( buf ) + 1; i < 67; i++ ) + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "." ); + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, " " ); + fflush( stdout ); + write_outcome_entry( outcome_file, argv[0], buf ); + + total_tests++; + + if( ( ret = get_line( file, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + break; + cnt = parse_arguments( buf, strlen( buf ), params, + sizeof( params ) / sizeof( params[0] ) ); + + if( strcmp( params[0], "depends_on" ) == 0 ) + { + for( i = 1; i < cnt; i++ ) + { + int dep_id = strtol( params[i], NULL, 10 ); + if( dep_check( dep_id ) != DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED ) + { + if( unmet_dep_count < + ARRAY_LENGTH( unmet_dependencies ) ) + { + unmet_dependencies[unmet_dep_count] = dep_id; + unmet_dep_count++; + } + else + { + missing_unmet_dependencies = 1; + } + } + } + + if( ( ret = get_line( file, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + break; + cnt = parse_arguments( buf, strlen( buf ), params, + sizeof( params ) / sizeof( params[0] ) ); + } + + // If there are no unmet dependencies execute the test + if( unmet_dep_count == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_test_info_reset( ); + +#if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) + /* Suppress all output from the library unless we're verbose + * mode + */ + if( !option_verbose ) + { + stdout_fd = redirect_output( stdout, "/dev/null" ); + if( stdout_fd == -1 ) + { + /* Redirection has failed with no stdout so exit */ + exit( 1 ); + } + } +#endif /* __unix__ || __APPLE__ __MACH__ */ + + function_id = strtoul( params[0], NULL, 10 ); + if ( (ret = check_test( function_id )) == DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = convert_params( cnt - 1, params + 1, int_params ); + if ( DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS == ret ) + { + ret = dispatch_test( function_id, (void **)( params + 1 ) ); + } + } + +#if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) + if( !option_verbose && restore_output( stdout, stdout_fd ) ) + { + /* Redirection has failed with no stdout so exit */ + exit( 1 ); + } +#endif /* __unix__ || __APPLE__ __MACH__ */ + + } + + write_outcome_result( outcome_file, + unmet_dep_count, unmet_dependencies, + missing_unmet_dependencies, + ret, &mbedtls_test_info ); + if( unmet_dep_count > 0 || ret == DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE ) + { + total_skipped++; + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "----" ); + + if( 1 == option_verbose && ret == DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "\n Test Suite not enabled" ); + } + + if( 1 == option_verbose && unmet_dep_count > 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "\n Unmet dependencies: " ); + for( i = 0; i < unmet_dep_count; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "%d ", + unmet_dependencies[i] ); + } + if( missing_unmet_dependencies ) + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "..." ); + } + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "\n" ); + fflush( stdout ); + + unmet_dep_count = 0; + missing_unmet_dependencies = 0; + } + else if( ret == DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS ) + { + if( mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "PASS\n" ); + } + else if( mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "----\n" ); + total_skipped++; + } + else + { + total_errors++; + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "FAILED\n" ); + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, " %s\n at ", + mbedtls_test_info.test ); + if( mbedtls_test_info.step != (unsigned long)( -1 ) ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "step %lu, ", + mbedtls_test_info.step ); + } + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "line %d, %s", + mbedtls_test_info.line_no, + mbedtls_test_info.filename ); + if( mbedtls_test_info.line1[0] != 0 ) + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "\n %s", + mbedtls_test_info.line1 ); + if( mbedtls_test_info.line2[0] != 0 ) + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "\n %s", + mbedtls_test_info.line2 ); + } + fflush( stdout ); + } + else if( ret == DISPATCH_INVALID_TEST_DATA ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FAILED: FATAL PARSE ERROR\n" ); + fclose( file ); + mbedtls_exit( 2 ); + } + else if( ret == DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FAILED: FATAL TEST FUNCTION NOT FOUND\n" ); + fclose( file ); + mbedtls_exit( 2 ); + } + else + total_errors++; + } + fclose( file ); + } + + if( outcome_file != NULL ) + fclose( outcome_file ); + + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n"); + if( total_errors == 0 ) + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "PASSED" ); + else + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, "FAILED" ); + + mbedtls_fprintf( stdout, " (%u / %u tests (%u skipped))\n", + total_tests - total_errors, total_tests, total_skipped ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \ + !defined(TEST_SUITE_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(); +#endif + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); +#endif + + return( total_errors != 0 ); +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/main_test.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/main_test.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac00f45e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/main_test.function @@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ +#line 2 "suites/main_test.function" +/* + * *** THIS FILE HAS BEEN MACHINE GENERATED *** + * + * This file has been machine generated using the script: + * $generator_script + * + * Test file : $test_file + * + * The following files were used to create this file. + * + * Main code file : $test_main_file + * Platform code file : $test_platform_file + * Helper file : $test_common_helper_file + * Test suite file : $test_case_file + * Test suite data : $test_case_data_file + * + */ + +#if defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L // for fileno() from +#endif +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#endif + +/* Test code may use deprecated identifiers only if the preprocessor symbol + * MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED is defined. When building tests, set + * MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED explicitly if MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING is + * enabled but the corresponding warnings are not treated as errors. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Common helper code */ + +$test_common_helpers + +#line $line_no "suites/main_test.function" + + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Test Suite Code */ + + +#define TEST_SUITE_ACTIVE + +$functions_code + +#line $line_no "suites/main_test.function" + + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Test dispatch code */ + + +/** + * \brief Evaluates an expression/macro into its literal integer value. + * For optimizing space for embedded targets each expression/macro + * is identified by a unique identifier instead of string literals. + * Identifiers and evaluation code is generated by script: + * $generator_script + * + * \param exp_id Expression identifier. + * \param out_value Pointer to int to hold the integer. + * + * \return 0 if exp_id is found. 1 otherwise. + */ +int get_expression( int32_t exp_id, int32_t * out_value ) +{ + int ret = KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_FOUND; + + (void) exp_id; + (void) out_value; + + switch( exp_id ) + { +$expression_code +#line $line_no "suites/main_test.function" + default: + { + ret = KEY_VALUE_MAPPING_NOT_FOUND; + } + break; + } + return( ret ); +} + + +/** + * \brief Checks if the dependency i.e. the compile flag is set. + * For optimizing space for embedded targets each dependency + * is identified by a unique identifier instead of string literals. + * Identifiers and check code is generated by script: + * $generator_script + * + * \param dep_id Dependency identifier. + * + * \return DEPENDENCY_SUPPORTED if set else DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED + */ +int dep_check( int dep_id ) +{ + int ret = DEPENDENCY_NOT_SUPPORTED; + + (void) dep_id; + + switch( dep_id ) + { +$dep_check_code +#line $line_no "suites/main_test.function" + default: + break; + } + return( ret ); +} + + +/** + * \brief Function pointer type for test function wrappers. + * + * A test function wrapper decodes the parameters and passes them to the + * underlying test function. Both the wrapper and the underlying function + * return void. Test wrappers assume that they are passed a suitable + * parameter array and do not perform any error detection. + * + * \param param_array The array of parameters. Each element is a `void *` + * which the wrapper casts to the correct type and + * dereferences. Each wrapper function hard-codes the + * number and types of the parameters. + */ +typedef void (*TestWrapper_t)( void **param_array ); + + +/** + * \brief Table of test function wrappers. Used by dispatch_test(). + * This table is populated by script: + * $generator_script + * + */ +TestWrapper_t test_funcs[] = +{ +$dispatch_code +#line $line_no "suites/main_test.function" +}; + +/** + * \brief Execute the test function. + * + * This is a wrapper function around the test function execution + * to allow the setjmp() call used to catch any calls to the + * parameter failure callback, to be used. Calls to setjmp() + * can invalidate the state of any local auto variables. + * + * \param fp Function pointer to the test function. + * \param params Parameters to pass to the #TestWrapper_t wrapper function. + * + */ +void execute_function_ptr(TestWrapper_t fp, void **params) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + mbedtls_test_enable_insecure_external_rng( ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) + mbedtls_test_param_failed_location_record_t location_record; + + if ( setjmp( mbedtls_test_param_failed_get_state_buf( ) ) == 0 ) + { + fp( params ); + } + else + { + /* Unexpected parameter validation error */ + mbedtls_test_param_failed_get_location_record( &location_record ); + mbedtls_test_fail( location_record.failure_condition, + location_record.line, + location_record.file ); + } + + mbedtls_test_param_failed_reset_state( ); +#else + fp( params ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE */ +} + +/** + * \brief Dispatches test functions based on function index. + * + * \param func_idx Test function index. + * \param params The array of parameters to pass to the test function. + * It will be decoded by the #TestWrapper_t wrapper function. + * + * \return DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS if found + * DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND if not found + * DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE if not compile time enabled. + */ +int dispatch_test( size_t func_idx, void ** params ) +{ + int ret = DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS; + TestWrapper_t fp = NULL; + + if ( func_idx < (int)( sizeof( test_funcs ) / sizeof( TestWrapper_t ) ) ) + { + fp = test_funcs[func_idx]; + if ( fp ) + execute_function_ptr(fp, params); + else + ret = DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE; + } + else + { + ret = DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND; + } + + return( ret ); +} + + +/** + * \brief Checks if test function is supported in this build-time + * configuration. + * + * \param func_idx Test function index. + * + * \return DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS if found + * DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND if not found + * DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE if not compile time enabled. + */ +int check_test( size_t func_idx ) +{ + int ret = DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS; + TestWrapper_t fp = NULL; + + if ( func_idx < (int)( sizeof(test_funcs)/sizeof( TestWrapper_t ) ) ) + { + fp = test_funcs[func_idx]; + if ( fp == NULL ) + ret = DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE; + } + else + { + ret = DISPATCH_TEST_FN_NOT_FOUND; + } + + return( ret ); +} + + +$platform_code + +#line $line_no "suites/main_test.function" + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Main Test code */ + + +/** + * \brief Program main. Invokes platform specific execute_tests(). + * + * \param argc Command line arguments count. + * \param argv Array of command line arguments. + * + * \return Exit code. + */ +int main( int argc, const char *argv[] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined (MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + mbedtls_test_hook_error_add = &mbedtls_test_err_add_check; +#endif + + int ret = mbedtls_test_platform_setup(); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "FATAL: Failed to initialize platform - error %d\n", + ret ); + return( -1 ); + } + + ret = execute_tests( argc, argv ); + mbedtls_test_platform_teardown(); + return( ret ); +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.cbc.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.cbc.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..95a9eee4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.cbc.data @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"fffffffffffff8000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8b527a6aebdaec9eaef8eda2cb7783e5":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"fffffffffffffc000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"43fdaf53ebbc9880c228617d6a9b548b":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"fffffffffffffe000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"53786104b9744b98f052c46f1c850d0b":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"e37b1c6aa2846f6fdb413f238b089f23":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"43c9f7e62f5d288bb27aa40ef8fe1ea8":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"6c002b682483e0cabcc731c253be5674":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3580d19cff44f1014a7c966a69059de5":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"143ae8ed6555aba96110ab58893a8ae1":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"806da864dd29d48deafbe764f8202aef":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6a118a874519e64e9963798a503f1d35":"dc43be40be0e53712f7e2bf5ca707209":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"cb9fceec81286ca3e989bd979b0cb284":"92beedab1895a94faa69b632e5cc47ce":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"b26aeb1874e47ca8358ff22378f09144":"459264f4798f6a78bacb89c15ed3d601":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffffffffc000000000":"90684a2ac55fe1ec2b8ebd5622520b73":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffffffffe000000000":"7472f9a7988607ca79707795991035e6":0 + +AES-128-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffff000000000":"56aff089878bf3352f8df172a3ae47d8":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"ffffffffe00000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"23f710842b9bb9c32f26648c786807ca":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"fffffffff00000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"44a98bf11e163f632c47ec6a49683a89":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"fffffffff80000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0f18aff94274696d9b61848bd50ac5e5":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"e234cdca2606b81f29408d5f6da21206":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fff60a4740086b3b9c56195b98d91a7b":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"13237c49074a3da078dc1d828bb78c6f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8146a08e2357f0caa30ca8c94d1a0544":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"3071a2a48fe6cbd04f1a129098e308f8":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4b98e06d356deb07ebb824e5713f7be3":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a9a1631bf4996954ebc093957b234589":"9798c4640bad75c7c3227db910174e72":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ff4f8391a6a40ca5b25d23bedd44a597":"96ab5c2ff612d9dfaae8c31f30c42168":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f9b0fda0c4a898f5b9e6f661c4ce4d07":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8ade895913685c67c5269f8aae42983e":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff8":0 + +AES-128-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"39bde67d5c8ed8a8b1c37eb8fa9f5ac0":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc":0 + +AES-192-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe00":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ddb505e6cc1384cbaec1df90b80beb20":0 + +AES-192-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5674a3bed27bf4bd3622f9f5fe208306":0 + +AES-192-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff80":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"b687f26a89cfbfbb8e5eeac54055315e":0 + +AES-192-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"25a39dbfd8034f71a81f9ceb55026e4037f8f6aa30ab44ce":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3608c344868e94555d23a120f8a5502d":0 + +AES-192-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"e08c15411774ec4a908b64eadc6ac4199c7cd453f3aaef53":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"77da2021935b840b7f5dcc39132da9e5":0 + +AES-192-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #6 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+aes_encrypt_cbc:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffc00000000000000000000000000000":"030d7e5b64f380a7e4ea5387b5cd7f49":0 + +AES-192-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffe00000000000000000000000000000":"0dc9a2610037009b698f11bb7e86c83e":0 + +AES-192-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fff00000000000000000000000000000":"0046612c766d1840c226364f1fa7ed72":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"902d88d13eae52089abd6143cfe394e9":"ffffffffe00000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d49bceb3b823fedd602c305345734bd2":"fffffffff00000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"707b1dbb0ffa40ef7d95def421233fae":"fffffffff80000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"fffffffffffffffffffc0000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8dfd999be5d0cfa35732c0ddc88ff5a5":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"fffffffffffffffffffe0000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"02647c76a300c3173b841487eb2bae9f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"ffffffffffffffffffff0000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"172df8b02f04b53adab028b4e01acd87":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"b3ad5cea1dddc214ca969ac35f37dae1a9a9d1528f89bb35":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3cf5e1d21a17956d1dffad6a7c41c659":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"45899367c3132849763073c435a9288a766c8b9ec2308516":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"69fd12e8505f8ded2fdcb197a121b362":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"ec250e04c3903f602647b85a401a1ae7ca2f02f67fa4253e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8aa584e2cc4d17417a97cb9a28ba29c8":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"c9b8135ff1b5adc413dfd053b21bd96d":"9c2d8842e5f48f57648205d39a239af1":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4a3650c3371ce2eb35e389a171427440":"bff52510095f518ecca60af4205444bb":0 + +AES-192-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4f354592ff7c8847d2d0870ca9481b7c":"51719783d3185a535bd75adc65071ce1":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"e35a6dcb19b201a01ebcfa8aa22b5759":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"c000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"b29169cdcf2d83e838125a12ee6aa400":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"e000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d8f3a72fc3cdf74dfaf6c3e6b97b2fa6":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"dc0eba1f2232a7879ded34ed8428eeb8769b056bbaf8ad77cb65c3541430b4cf":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fc6aec906323480005c58e7e1ab004ad":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"f8be9ba615c5a952cabbca24f68f8593039624d524c816acda2c9183bd917cb9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a3944b95ca0b52043584ef02151926a8":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"797f8b3d176dac5b7e34a2d539c4ef367a16f8635f6264737591c5c07bf57a3e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a74289fe73a4c123ca189ea1e1b49ad5":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8a560769d605868ad80d819bdba03771":"38f2c7ae10612415d27ca190d27da8b4":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"91fbef2d15a97816060bee1feaa49afe":"1bc704f1bce135ceb810341b216d7abe":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffff800000000000000000":"0d9ac756eb297695eed4d382eb126d26":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffc00000000000000000":"56ede9dda3f6f141bff1757fa689c3e1":0 + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_encrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffe00000000000000000":"768f520efe0f23e61d3ec8ad9ce91774":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"49af6b372135acef10132e548f217b17":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8bcd40f94ebb63b9f7909676e667f1e7":"ff800000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fe1cffb83f45dcfb38b29be438dbd3ab":"ffc00000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc00":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"cca7c3086f5f9511b31233da7cab9160":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe00":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5b40ff4ec9be536ba23035fa4f06064c":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"60eb5af8416b257149372194e8b88749":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"90143ae20cd78c5d8ebdd6cb9dc1762427a96c78c639bccc41a61424564eafe1":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"798c7c005dee432b2c8ea5dfa381ecc3":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"b7a5794d52737475d53d5a377200849be0260a67a2b22ced8bbef12882270d07":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"637c31dc2591a07636f646b72daabbe7":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"fca02f3d5011cfc5c1e23165d413a049d4526a991827424d896fe3435e0bf68e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"179a49c712154bbffbe6e7a84a18e220":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a9ff75bd7cf6613d3731c77c3b6d0c04":"0b24af36193ce4665f2825d7b4749c98":0 + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_decrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.cfb.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.cfb.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f4953f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.cfb.data @@ -0,0 +1,467 @@ +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"f0000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"970014d634e2b7650777e8e84d03ccd8" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"f8000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f17e79aed0db7e279e955b5f493875a7" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"fc000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"9ed5a75136a940d0963da379db4af26a" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"64cf9c7abc50b888af65f49d521944b2":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f7efc89d5dba578104016ce5ad659c05" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"47d6742eefcc0465dc96355e851b64d9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0306194f666d183624aa230a8b264ae7" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"3eb39790678c56bee34bbcdeccf6cdb5":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"858075d536d79ccee571f7d7204b1f67" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6a118a874519e64e9963798a503f1d35":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dc43be40be0e53712f7e2bf5ca707209" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"cb9fceec81286ca3e989bd979b0cb284":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"92beedab1895a94faa69b632e5cc47ce" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"b26aeb1874e47ca8358ff22378f09144":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"459264f4798f6a78bacb89c15ed3d601" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f9b0fda0c4a898f5b9e6f661c4ce4d07" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff8":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8ade895913685c67c5269f8aae42983e" + +AES-128-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"39bde67d5c8ed8a8b1c37eb8fa9f5ac0" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"fffffffe000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"1114bc2028009b923f0b01915ce5e7c4":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"ffffffff000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"9c28524a16a1e1c1452971caa8d13476":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"ffffffff800000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ed62e16363638360fdd6ad62112794f0":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"3071a2a48fe6cbd04f1a129098e308f8":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4b98e06d356deb07ebb824e5713f7be3":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"90f42ec0f68385f2ffc5dfc03a654dce":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"7a20a53d460fc9ce0423a7a0764c6cf2":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"febd9a24d8b65c1c787d50a4ed3619a9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f4a70d8af877f9b02b4c40df57d45b17":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"9798c4640bad75c7c3227db910174e72":"a9a1631bf4996954ebc093957b234589":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"96ab5c2ff612d9dfaae8c31f30c42168":"ff4f8391a6a40ca5b25d23bedd44a597":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffff0000000000000000":"f807c3e7985fe0f5a50e2cdb25c5109e":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffff8000000000000000":"41f992a856fb278b389a62f5d274d7e9":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffc000000000000000":"10d3ed7a6fe15ab4d91acbc7d0767ab1":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"fffffffffffffffffffc0000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8dfd999be5d0cfa35732c0ddc88ff5a5" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"fffffffffffffffffffe0000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"02647c76a300c3173b841487eb2bae9f" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"ffffffffffffffffffff0000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"172df8b02f04b53adab028b4e01acd87" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"d184c36cf0dddfec39e654195006022237871a47c33d3198":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"2e19fb60a3e1de0166f483c97824a978" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"4c6994ffa9dcdc805b60c2c0095334c42d95a8fc0ca5b080":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"7656709538dd5fec41e0ce6a0f8e207d" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"c88f5b00a4ef9a6840e2acaf33f00a3bdc4e25895303fa72":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a67cf333b314d411d3c0ae6e1cfcd8f5" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"9c2d8842e5f48f57648205d39a239af1":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"c9b8135ff1b5adc413dfd053b21bd96d" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"bff52510095f518ecca60af4205444bb":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4a3650c3371ce2eb35e389a171427440" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"51719783d3185a535bd75adc65071ce1":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4f354592ff7c8847d2d0870ca9481b7c" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffe00000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f34e4a6324ea4a5c39a661c8fe5ada8f" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffff00000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0882a16f44088d42447a29ac090ec17e" + +AES-192-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffff80000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3a3c15bfc11a9537c130687004e136ee" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe00000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"60136703374f64e860b48ce31f930716":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8d63a269b14d506ccc401ab8a9f1b591":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff80000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d317f81dc6aa454aee4bd4a5a5cff4bd":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"98c6b8e01e379fbd14e61af6af891596583565f2a27d59e9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"19c80ec4a6deb7e5ed1033dda933498f":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"b3ad5cea1dddc214ca969ac35f37dae1a9a9d1528f89bb35":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3cf5e1d21a17956d1dffad6a7c41c659":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"45899367c3132849763073c435a9288a766c8b9ec2308516":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"69fd12e8505f8ded2fdcb197a121b362":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"9c2d8842e5f48f57648205d39a239af1":"c9b8135ff1b5adc413dfd053b21bd96d":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"bff52510095f518ecca60af4205444bb":"4a3650c3371ce2eb35e389a171427440":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffffff000000000000":"54d632d03aba0bd0f91877ebdd4d09cb":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffffff800000000000":"d3427be7e4d27cd54f5fe37b03cf0897":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-192-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000":"b2099795e88cc158fd75ea133d7e7fbe":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"ffffffe000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"bbd1097a62433f79449fa97d4ee80dbf" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"fffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"07058e408f5b99b0e0f061a1761b5b3b" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"fffffff800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5fd1f13fa0f31e37fabde328f894eac2" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"13428b5e4c005e0636dd338405d173ab135dec2a25c22c5df0722d69dcc43887":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"649a71545378c783e368c9ade7114f6c" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"07eb03a08d291d1b07408bf3512ab40c91097ac77461aad4bb859647f74f00ee":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"47cb030da2ab051dfc6c4bf6910d12bb" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"90143ae20cd78c5d8ebdd6cb9dc1762427a96c78c639bccc41a61424564eafe1":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"798c7c005dee432b2c8ea5dfa381ecc3" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0b24af36193ce4665f2825d7b4749c98":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a9ff75bd7cf6613d3731c77c3b6d0c04" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"8a560769d605868ad80d819bdba03771":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"38f2c7ae10612415d27ca190d27da8b4" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffffffffffe0000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"2be1fae5048a25582a679ca10905eb80" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffff0000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"da86f292c6f41ea34fb2068df75ecc29" + +AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_encrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffff8000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"220df19f85d69b1b562fa69a3c5beca5" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"ffffffffff800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"be66cfea2fecd6bf0ec7b4352c99bcaa":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"ffffffffffc00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"df31144f87a2ef523facdcf21a427804":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"ffffffffffe00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"b5bb0f5629fb6aae5e1839a3c3625d63":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"1d85a181b54cde51f0e098095b2962fdc93b51fe9b88602b3f54130bf76a5bd9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"531c2c38344578b84d50b3c917bbb6e1":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"dc0eba1f2232a7879ded34ed8428eeb8769b056bbaf8ad77cb65c3541430b4cf":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fc6aec906323480005c58e7e1ab004ad":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"f8be9ba615c5a952cabbca24f68f8593039624d524c816acda2c9183bd917cb9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a3944b95ca0b52043584ef02151926a8":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"8a560769d605868ad80d819bdba03771":"38f2c7ae10612415d27ca190d27da8b4":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"91fbef2d15a97816060bee1feaa49afe":"1bc704f1bce135ceb810341b216d7abe":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"e0000000000000000000000000000000":"9b80eefb7ebe2d2b16247aa0efc72f5d":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"f0000000000000000000000000000000":"7f2c5ece07a98d8bee13c51177395ff7":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +aes_decrypt_cfb128:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"f8000000000000000000000000000000":"7818d800dcf6f4be1e0e94f403d1e4c2":"00000000000000000000000000000000" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #0 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"c57d699d89df7cfbef71c080a6b10ac3":"fcb2bc4c006b87483978796a2ae2c42e":"61":"24" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #1 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"0d8f3dc3edee60db658bb97faf46fba3":"e481fdc42e606b96a383c0a1a5520ebb":"aacd":"5066" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #2 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"c8fe9bf77b930f46d2078b8c0e657cd4":"f475c64991b20eaee183a22629e21e22":"c90635":"d27691" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #3 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"280cf81af5cc7e7363579c1da03390e6":"5d6cf4722d0e21f1d9ced53a0e36c342":"b2a22ced":"73f3aebf" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #4 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"5d5e7f20e0a66d3e09e0e5a9912f8a46":"052d7ea0ad1f2956a23b27afe1d87b6b":"b84a90fc6d":"1a9a61c307" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #5 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"ec89fb348787cf902ca973c47081438d":"528fe95c711bd13f37bc52cc9e96d45c":"14253472e99d":"cfc247e33a3b" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #6 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"6607987c354809cba818639dcd185147":"552c101a0b7c0ca143af258453937fa3":"9b1a5a1369166e":"b7ab2a4cc71904" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #7 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"c028e6bf2b749ffa86759f2f84e93cb0":"288c752d9faccf367e5d0cca1fa6ec3b":"324015878cdc82bf":"873250152fc6a5bb" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #8 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"d01da95d2c2a61da06ea78cfba59cc30":"f9a393ad90814faf262e3a5b1d97592e":"57c1a30e48166d9640":"e9a8c3b776edd39e3d" + +AES-128-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #9 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"3a6f9159263fa6cef2a075caface5817":"0fc23662b7dbf73827f0c7de321ca36e":"87efeb8d559ed3367728":"8e9c50425614d540ce11" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #0 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"03edfe082550bd5ac8ddf64f42a0547f":"52acd8dab62c981da08e51939cc08dab":"21":"09" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #1 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"38cf776750162edc63c3b5dbe311ab9f":"98fbbd288872c40f1926b16ecaec1561":"4878":"eb24" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #2 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"c9053c87c3e56bc5e52bd31f6545f991":"b8f9640d0923da13fe6eb87b01f0cfa0":"aeb6d2":"910949" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #3 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"e96771f5f20a89ee871261d2d18e1e46":"6e86403e33396655907ae06ef192262f":"83cab2f3":"3b7f1f1c" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #4 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"92ad13ecb60bde1bb3b34ce07867672b":"f95a4060b8f80e3f839d4c3ca33dad94":"49f73e652b":"17b9b9e16d" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #5 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"eb57b8dd076e7bbb33d4bfc4d7ecb27e":"51135997a067dcd2e016c57134c5fa52":"b0eacbf2ca46":"ca989fa4e818" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #6 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"70abc48bb1be490183f0fe3df56195ff":"e251f179174b71ee1e488ab3dd200483":"08fbef9b2a369a":"5405da1186b7e0" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #7 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"1273b8e0eee1a1ca827059b4d0a3a55d":"622cab49092d026f554dd98a6441dc26":"b3cb9d8892423aeb":"d497df73afb9787c" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #8 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"49437e06b6faa5f20fd98bf71f8ff554":"63c818e0d3cb5b7054ef3e1e87df0e12":"01992a986279c3685e":"f203bcd402b65919da" + +AES-128-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #9 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"6399c1dc068ba3509845628fa9ed1a96":"1157c2766c86b754df485be9dd5851df":"c9c284e9abbfe6fb11fe":"feff4e2e2458addf2a54" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #0 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"32a1b0e3da368db563d7316b9779d3327e53d9a6d287ed97":"3dd0e7e21f09d5842f3a699da9b57346":"54":"6d" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #1 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"a6381dcc18dd85d7729c1dce90743bbe1df580d857f5b9c4":"c0ac501fad7f4a1465daf32e18fc1a4f":"a456":"8fb6" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #2 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"d08dbee4732c7ffc544c1695b201d30e795037325ef0aa18":"a1e39aeeb972a8d70aa0fc7d6fac6eac":"fd115d":"c4c016" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #3 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"277185a4a440869920f523c4d578fc5bedd33aee8d2ebaf7":"67be00572f82aabc13d6e5a2e51d1f08":"88e07061":"8bb630ba" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #4 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"83f70fdce47306fcbb8c21b6a8b3209f7ec185fef4deebd4":"ff73b310cf7e62ce6f501092fa6cc888":"36664e222d":"20855555d1" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #5 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"c5be271a29f4a29e085e8e98196601dcb88ccc03e559a304":"9f51fa2eb8a084718f7240e47d135dce":"b57f12342a62":"73ff9bf3ec4b" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #6 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"9c55322e6d495be01076d4b80371ad1479ae5636ff9861f5":"2b79cfc1ff37254dedf5924a6b61e3e0":"6dcede43c2ee65":"7c897658282220" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #7 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"6e78ccece7d1b2a3c08cf0de738bee33cbbbf78d9bf4922c":"4bbe15b1e94a7b97250a2136d8804e46":"ceda42527871f802":"d92ff89045b1917f" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #8 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"13c98665746f7825b37b404916240adbd1e4364be1d05c63":"0e479fbd5f3961f38b8a26be1f2d65c5":"1b0a63d73464ab3c8a":"5485847e5d3c2e2cc4" + +AES-192-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #9 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"537e7bf661fd4024a024613f15b13690f7d0c847c1e18965":"3a81f9d9d3c155b0caad5d73349476fc":"d3d8b9b984adc24237ee":"3879fea72ac99929e53a" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #0 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"7dbdc15ad4034ed828dc862799b7adc9abd68eaf9d526d5d":"4359683af5a3a85c248fb7f5506f317b":"25":"2d" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #1 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"3a2cdf9c9608c1dd6233d03dd855293b0885915114b25279":"e7a28ee34acc52128ddae658ec6398a2":"0678":"7b04" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #2 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"c984b99a6cc5bc88003143cbe4b755e6e30ba94114f7ad1e":"41e3b8fd138f8c358dfeef420302f634":"037cf6":"658d0a" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #3 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"39747da225bdc0c53c3463fd686dbe19d14157535171f91d":"77d3a5ad8bbdb169f8d29e5f21798651":"0fb0cee2":"2d191f2f" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #4 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"4cd13179dfa16d01c6a8633dfc8783e723e72114c9b0d50a":"6657c46c99d642474c330d8016b71dbe":"09d914cf0b":"105a64c872" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #5 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"5dcc9b8d8a456e9917cd8d54d7f7100b34964b4ed2d398a0":"4fa295a8987f1b010ce4e011fbf94156":"288c752d9fac":"98f332d37b78" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #6 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"c8baf0204ef80b8e0125efe43a0bccdfd0f356b62e6c75fe":"e9144bf2cbc5720a1b4cb6f37d11edff":"c9981a34b7aa89":"56bb4c3cae53b3" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #7 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"64e40763f38a63ae378c32052b0ae3aa538bb868a04ac985":"aacf65089e4b285438451ffdcd0f6389":"d8fcf83a88510a0d":"b567411bc61b0a76" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #8 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"7bfdca9605f17253f203efffc92da96fde023007d22cdad0":"45c09e44036070f8a7737a5176b8cf26":"9c195b1944c4af5bfb":"89358df65c3ef14d26" + +AES-192-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #9 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"baf08b76317a65c5f07ae6f57eb0e65488659324d29709e3":"0a02846b62abb693ef31d754842eed29":"729c0b6deb75fa6eb5e8":"9895932402393dc33a60" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #0 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"34e8091cee09f1bd3ebf1e8f05f51bfbd4899ef2ae006a3a0f7875052cdd46c8":"43eb4dcc4b04a80216a20e4a09a7abb5":"f9":"28" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #1 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"e04e43173113109e1343393842fe6caef3f8a2e506d7f55f83dcb10444c6ad23":"a38b88a293b077fb5546636aad90d663":"2914":"69a6" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #2 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"064874092f7a13cc4462247ad423d0e96edf42e8b67a5a23b7a0a6477b098e66":"338c552ff1eca14408e05d8cf9f3b31b":"b974fa":"1cff95" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #3 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"56794adb0ef04aeddeabd650de736531d408837954b919002c33edfdff976cc2":"71b5526facea4236d33f1f4107e4b04f":"db774912":"f04d9d4f" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #4 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"dddd7f234e7d0e6ec64560b96430986a856f2ee9805443a7946e31601ef6679d":"e20f39db0025eb24491bd06012887108":"ad1d5311ea":"19cc97a662" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #5 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"ec73a760272c83f91771b3ab7b188715c6d6afb9c554feae83856e966a3863d0":"ae7bfa38fd25778fcf66ce8157f6e42e":"02fe724fbc5d":"b0eca63405f4" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #6 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"a66874ca0b70fb98b37c033ec96413f339adae02acade015b9f016b459db3309":"6ed480d9e4ed031cf66bb1e07f8d5514":"b4777e6bcd9a05":"8c017397ad5bab" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #7 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"a3dbbb775ada92b0b8ed1632444e21c1c86ff3eba8f628307306e766b8c15b5c":"4ec56a8e541f5cfe7b8ab947bfa4fd08":"1d70a5a82badf5ea":"1e22bebebeacd81d" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #8 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"64135e67c0ca1acef3360d930afcd726c5b04861a69c1b6a48bde1daf20f3b1f":"5377a154d5f948189f9aa57b466c16b2":"a36ca5ea382a322eef":"3105016567d3174aed" + +AES-256-CFB8 Encrypt NIST MMT #9 +aes_encrypt_cfb8:"ebbb4566b5e182e0f072466b0b311df38f9175bc0213a5530bce2ec4d74f400d":"0956a48e01002c9e16376d6e308dbad1":"b0fe25ac8d3d28a2f471":"638c6823e7256fb5626e" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #0 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"1687831580cb764321a9d674dbd0a9640f668b0f58ef01b87a710b3095d5f855":"6cd5bec6d6e1fd23afc543b8f80d3f89":"6f":"98" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #1 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"b6b504e8b7065373ea31cd549e52eda7cb96fd1db14eddacbc420085ab48b747":"870ecd45b1241803ddaf8bad15a025d7":"17d4":"3572" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #2 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"6ad3105e15fb5b742bf4fe1eb8e98c6c1ffea653107c84f6b42ed1232a0bbc21":"17534c89c4eae5dea6ea353dde7b1623":"a9841e":"f9411a" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #3 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"758f3fa8b2b289f19fd59e7316be40b904eff7f565caac4570f972360e0da787":"b21335ae980898fa92c4b3069e532973":"84b35e25":"47887872" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #4 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"802e854eb799500975d960a67885820d195e02ab23d51f15e5cdbcee86a1580c":"94478c4e44e2fa8d2e6bc43d384597e6":"d1e96bf1e8":"ed414b5689" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #5 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"3a0c03ca9d1e5d49bb37f9041f88d159c3f1d5ce26c798f59ed54a93f0a0e600":"9aae38ba832e4b093b50444074517d20":"74410ccd12da":"8207eee2a7ab" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #6 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"ee05462128fea75e919f6f436cb198f222847d698a283f5767df682d33d3ce77":"d2ad55e41887075184635112a22fc093":"ff039e89877b44":"aff3aa4c24e353" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #7 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"08abbdcc3eb9c1717db1faa38dcd0893afd5e16e2596747af58f8d61ebedf9cd":"b925c8dc9a9b55a4372ea6d37d21c1eb":"e176ba99ea602fd9":"b7370050288bf600" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #8 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"56d404a893fb3b3f594aab18939230b096646a37a781629fbd9270f3891a5cea":"e5906b36f2d97e6f2db19b6c7a3ce319":"c55a9a917a809a784b":"e44995bbb0fff40fee" + +AES-256-CFB8 Decrypt NIST MMT #9 +aes_decrypt_cfb8:"ec13062551e4d7291e320f565b749eea1809b663b26f2c4d53b52058b833e0ad":"fbfa5a528e20863012790c2abafb5a0c":"2bfc3f0209307140101a":"547bfd642cf6e12ed942" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ecb.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ecb.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6349034a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ecb.data @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"9798c4640bad75c7c3227db910174e72":"a9a1631bf4996954ebc093957b234589":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"96ab5c2ff612d9dfaae8c31f30c42168":"ff4f8391a6a40ca5b25d23bedd44a597":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"e0000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"72a1da770f5d7ac4c9ef94d822affd97":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"f0000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"970014d634e2b7650777e8e84d03ccd8":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"f8000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f17e79aed0db7e279e955b5f493875a7":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffff0000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"7b90785125505fad59b13c186dd66ce3":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffff8000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8b527a6aebdaec9eaef8eda2cb7783e5":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffc000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"43fdaf53ebbc9880c228617d6a9b548b":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"70c46bb30692be657f7eaa93ebad9897":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"323994cfb9da285a5d9642e1759b224a":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffff000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"1dbf57877b7b17385c85d0b54851e371":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #13 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffc00000000000000000":"3a4d354f02bb5a5e47d39666867f246a":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #14 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffe00000000000000000":"d451b8d6e1e1a0ebb155fbbf6e7b7dc3":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #15 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffff00000000000000000":"6898d4f42fa7ba6a10ac05e87b9f2080":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #16 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffffffffffe0000000":"082eb8be35f442fb52668e16a591d1d6":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #17 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffff0000000":"e656f9ecf5fe27ec3e4a73d00c282fb3":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #18 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffff8000000":"2ca8209d63274cd9a29bb74bcd77683a":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"db4f1aa530967d6732ce4715eb0ee24b":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a81738252621dd180a34f3455b4baa2f":"ff800000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"77e2b508db7fd89234caf7939ee5621a":"ffc00000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dc43be40be0e53712f7e2bf5ca707209":"6a118a874519e64e9963798a503f1d35":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"92beedab1895a94faa69b632e5cc47ce":"cb9fceec81286ca3e989bd979b0cb284":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"459264f4798f6a78bacb89c15ed3d601":"b26aeb1874e47ca8358ff22378f09144":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"b69418a85332240dc82492353956ae0c":"a303d940ded8f0baff6f75414cac5243":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"71b5c08a1993e1362e4d0ce9b22b78d5":"c2dabd117f8a3ecabfbb11d12194d9d0":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"e234cdca2606b81f29408d5f6da21206":"fff60a4740086b3b9c56195b98d91a7b":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffff0000000000000000":"84be19e053635f09f2665e7bae85b42d":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffff8000000000000000":"32cd652842926aea4aa6137bb2be2b5e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffff80000000000":"156f07767a85a4312321f63968338a01":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffc0000000000":"15eec9ebf42b9ca76897d2cd6c5a12e2":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffe0000000000":"db0d3a6fdcc13f915e2b302ceeb70fd8":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"51719783d3185a535bd75adc65071ce1":"4f354592ff7c8847d2d0870ca9481b7c":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"26aa49dcfe7629a8901a69a9914e6dfd":"d5e08bf9a182e857cf40b3a36ee248cc":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"941a4773058224e1ef66d10e0a6ee782":"067cd9d3749207791841562507fa9626":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"d2926527e0aa9f37b45e2ec2ade5853ef807576104c7ace3":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dd619e1cf204446112e0af2b9afa8f8c":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"982215f4e173dfa0fcffe5d3da41c4812c7bcc8ed3540f93":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d4f0aae13c8fe9339fbf9e69ed0ad74d":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"98c6b8e01e379fbd14e61af6af891596583565f2a27d59e9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"19c80ec4a6deb7e5ed1033dda933498f":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffff800000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8dd274bd0f1b58ae345d9e7233f9b8f3":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"9d6bdc8f4ce5feb0f3bed2e4b9a9bb0b":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffe00000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fd5548bcf3f42565f7efa94562528d46":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff000000000000000":"bb2852c891c5947d2ed44032c421b85f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff800000000000000":"1b9f5fbd5e8a4264c0a85b80409afa5e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000000":"30dab809f85a917fe924733f424ac589":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"61257134a518a0d57d9d244d45f6498cbc32f2bafc522d79":"cfe4d74002696ccf7d87b14a2f9cafc9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"b0ab0a6a818baef2d11fa33eac947284fb7d748cfb75e570":"d2eafd86f63b109b91f5dbb3a3fb7e13":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"ee053aa011c8b428cdcc3636313c54d6a03cac01c71579d6":"9b9fdd1c5975655f539998b306a324af":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"c9b8135ff1b5adc413dfd053b21bd96d":"9c2d8842e5f48f57648205d39a239af1":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"4a3650c3371ce2eb35e389a171427440":"bff52510095f518ecca60af4205444bb":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"b2099795e88cc158fd75ea133d7e7fbe":"ffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"a6cae46fb6fadfe7a2c302a34242817b":"ffffffffffffffffffffe00000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"026a7024d6a902e0b3ffccbaa910cc3f":"fffffffffffffffffffff00000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"c1cc358b449909a19436cfbb3f852ef8bcb5ed12ac7058325f56e6099aab1a1c":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"352065272169abf9856843927d0674fd":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"984ca75f4ee8d706f46c2d98c0bf4a45f5b00d791c2dfeb191b5ed8e420fd627":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4307456a9e67813b452e15fa8fffe398":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"b43d08a447ac8609baadae4ff12918b9f68fc1653f1269222f123981ded7a92f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4663446607354989477a5c6f0f007ef4":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0b24af36193ce4665f2825d7b4749c98":"a9ff75bd7cf6613d3731c77c3b6d0c04":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"8a560769d605868ad80d819bdba03771":"38f2c7ae10612415d27ca190d27da8b4":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffff80000000000000000000000000":"36aff0ef7bf3280772cf4cac80a0d2b2":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffc0000000000000000000000000":"1f8eedea0f62a1406d58cfc3ecea72cf":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffe0000000000000000000000000":"abf4154a3375a1d3e6b1d454438f95a6":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff8000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"45d089c36d5c5a4efc689e3b0de10dd5":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"b4da5df4becb5462e03a0ed00d295629":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_encrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dcf4e129136c1a4b7a0f38935cc34b2b":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000000000000000":"edf61ae362e882ddc0167474a7a77f3a":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff80000000000000000":"6168b00ba7859e0970ecfd757efecf7c":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc0000000000000000":"d1415447866230d28bb1ea18a4cdfd02":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"f8be9ba615c5a952cabbca24f68f8593039624d524c816acda2c9183bd917cb9":"a3944b95ca0b52043584ef02151926a8":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"797f8b3d176dac5b7e34a2d539c4ef367a16f8635f6264737591c5c07bf57a3e":"a74289fe73a4c123ca189ea1e1b49ad5":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"6838d40caf927749c13f0329d331f448e202c73ef52c5f73a37ca635d4c47707":"b91d4ea4488644b56cf0812fa7fcf5fc":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"38f2c7ae10612415d27ca190d27da8b4":"8a560769d605868ad80d819bdba03771":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"1bc704f1bce135ceb810341b216d7abe":"91fbef2d15a97816060bee1feaa49afe":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0a6bdc6d4c1e6280301fd8e97ddbe601":"c0000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +aes_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"9b80eefb7ebe2d2b16247aa0efc72f5d":"e0000000000000000000000000000000":0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5a64099f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function @@ -0,0 +1,622 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aes_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst, int setkey_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == setkey_result ); + if( setkey_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aes_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst, int setkey_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == setkey_result ); + if( setkey_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void aes_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, + int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void aes_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, + int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +void aes_encrypt_xts( char *hex_key_string, char *hex_data_unit_string, + char *hex_src_string, char *hex_dst_string ) +{ + enum { AES_BLOCK_SIZE = 16 }; + unsigned char *data_unit = NULL; + unsigned char *key = NULL; + unsigned char *src = NULL; + unsigned char *dst = NULL; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx; + size_t key_len, src_len, dst_len, data_unit_len; + + mbedtls_aes_xts_init( &ctx ); + + data_unit = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_data_unit_string, + &data_unit_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( data_unit_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + key = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_key_string, &key_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( key_len % 2 == 0 ); + + src = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_src_string, &src_len ); + dst = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_dst_string, &dst_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( src_len == dst_len ); + + output = mbedtls_test_zero_alloc( dst_len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, key_len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, src_len, + data_unit, src, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, dst, dst_len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_xts_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_free( data_unit ); + mbedtls_free( key ); + mbedtls_free( src ); + mbedtls_free( dst ); + mbedtls_free( output ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +void aes_decrypt_xts( char *hex_key_string, char *hex_data_unit_string, + char *hex_dst_string, char *hex_src_string ) +{ + enum { AES_BLOCK_SIZE = 16 }; + unsigned char *data_unit = NULL; + unsigned char *key = NULL; + unsigned char *src = NULL; + unsigned char *dst = NULL; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx; + size_t key_len, src_len, dst_len, data_unit_len; + + mbedtls_aes_xts_init( &ctx ); + + data_unit = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_data_unit_string, + &data_unit_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( data_unit_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + key = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_key_string, &key_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( key_len % 2 == 0 ); + + src = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_src_string, &src_len ); + dst = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_dst_string, &dst_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( src_len == dst_len ); + + output = mbedtls_test_zero_alloc( dst_len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, key_len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, src_len, + data_unit, src, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, dst, dst_len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_xts_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_free( data_unit ); + mbedtls_free( key ); + mbedtls_free( src ); + mbedtls_free( dst ); + mbedtls_free( output ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +void aes_crypt_xts_size( int size, int retval ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx; + const unsigned char src[16] = { 0 }; + unsigned char output[16]; + unsigned char data_unit[16]; + size_t length = size; + + mbedtls_aes_xts_init( &ctx ); + memset( data_unit, 0x00, sizeof( data_unit ) ); + + + /* Valid pointers are passed for builds with MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS, as + * otherwise we wouldn't get to the size check we're interested in. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, length, data_unit, src, output ) == retval ); +exit: + mbedtls_aes_xts_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +void aes_crypt_xts_keysize( int size, int retval ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx; + const unsigned char key[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06 }; + size_t key_len = size; + + mbedtls_aes_xts_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, key_len * 8 ) == retval ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, key_len * 8 ) == retval ); +exit: + mbedtls_aes_xts_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void aes_encrypt_cfb128( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void aes_decrypt_cfb128( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void aes_encrypt_cfb8( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void aes_decrypt_cfb8( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ +void aes_encrypt_ofb( int fragment_size, data_t *key_str, + data_t *iv_str, data_t *src_str, + data_t *expected_output ) +{ + unsigned char output[32]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + int in_buffer_len; + unsigned char* src_str_next; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t)fragment_size < sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, + key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + in_buffer_len = src_str->len; + src_str_next = src_str->x; + + while( in_buffer_len > 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &ctx, fragment_size, &iv_offset, + iv_str->x, src_str_next, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, expected_output->x, fragment_size ) == 0 ); + + in_buffer_len -= fragment_size; + expected_output->x += fragment_size; + src_str_next += fragment_size; + + if( in_buffer_len < fragment_size ) + fragment_size = in_buffer_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void aes_check_params( ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + mbedtls_aes_xts_context xts_ctx; +#endif + const unsigned char key[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06 }; + const unsigned char in[16] = { 0 }; + unsigned char out[16]; + size_t size; + const int valid_mode = MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT; + const int invalid_mode = 42; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_aes_init( NULL ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_aes_xts_init( NULL ) ); +#endif + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( NULL, key, 128 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, NULL, 128 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( NULL, key, 128 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &aes_ctx, NULL, 128 ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( NULL, key, 128 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( &xts_ctx, NULL, 128 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( NULL, key, 128 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( &xts_ctx, NULL, 128 ) ); +#endif + + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( NULL, + valid_mode, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, + invalid_mode, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, NULL, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, in, NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( NULL, + valid_mode, 16, + out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes_ctx, + invalid_mode, 16, + out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + NULL, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + out, NULL, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + out, in, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( NULL, + valid_mode, 16, + in, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &xts_ctx, + invalid_mode, 16, + in, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &xts_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + NULL, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &xts_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + in, NULL, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &xts_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + in, in, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( NULL, + valid_mode, 16, + &size, out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &aes_ctx, + invalid_mode, 16, + &size, out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + NULL, out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + &size, NULL, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + &size, out, NULL, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + &size, out, in, NULL ) ); + + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( NULL, + valid_mode, 16, + out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &aes_ctx, + invalid_mode, 16, + out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + NULL, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + out, NULL, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( &aes_ctx, + valid_mode, 16, + out, in, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( NULL, 16, + &size, out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &aes_ctx, 16, + NULL, out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &aes_ctx, 16, + &size, NULL, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &aes_ctx, 16, + &size, out, NULL, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &aes_ctx, 16, + &size, out, in, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( NULL, 16, &size, out, + out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( &aes_ctx, 16, NULL, out, + out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( &aes_ctx, 16, &size, NULL, + out, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( &aes_ctx, 16, &size, out, + NULL, in, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( &aes_ctx, 16, &size, out, + out, NULL, out ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( &aes_ctx, 16, &size, out, + out, in, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aes_misc_params( ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; + const unsigned char in[16] = { 0 }; + unsigned char out[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + mbedtls_aes_xts_context xts_ctx; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + size_t size; +#endif + + /* These calls accept NULL */ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_aes_free( NULL ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_aes_xts_free( NULL ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + 15, + out, in, out ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + 17, + out, in, out ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &xts_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + 15, + in, in, out ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &xts_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + (1 << 24) + 1, + in, in, out ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + size = 16; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, 16, + &size, out, in, out ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + size = 16; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &aes_ctx, 16, &size, out, in, out ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void aes_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ofb.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ofb.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b9d80e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ofb.data @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +# NIST Special Publication 800-38A +# Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation +# Test Vectors - Appendix F, Section F.4 +OFB-AES128.Encrypt - Single block +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +aes_encrypt_ofb:16:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":"3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a" + +OFB-AES128.Encrypt - Partial blocks - 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +aes_encrypt_ofb:5:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a7789508d16918f03f53c52dac54ed8259740051e9c5fecf64344f7a82260edcc304c6528f659c77866a510d9c1d6ae5e" + +OFB-AES128.Encrypt - Test NIST SP800-38A - F.4.1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +aes_encrypt_ofb:16:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a7789508d16918f03f53c52dac54ed8259740051e9c5fecf64344f7a82260edcc304c6528f659c77866a510d9c1d6ae5e" + +OFB-AES128.Decrypt - Test NIST SP800-38A - F.4.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +aes_encrypt_ofb:16:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"3b3fd92eb72dad20333449f8e83cfb4a7789508d16918f03f53c52dac54ed8259740051e9c5fecf64344f7a82260edcc304c6528f659c77866a510d9c1d6ae5e":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710" + +OFB-AES192.Encrypt - Test NIST SP800-38A - F.4.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +aes_encrypt_ofb:16:"8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"cdc80d6fddf18cab34c25909c99a4174fcc28b8d4c63837c09e81700c11004018d9a9aeac0f6596f559c6d4daf59a5f26d9f200857ca6c3e9cac524bd9acc92a" + +OFB-AES192.Decrypt - Test NIST SP800-38A - F.4.4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +aes_encrypt_ofb:16:"8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"cdc80d6fddf18cab34c25909c99a4174fcc28b8d4c63837c09e81700c11004018d9a9aeac0f6596f559c6d4daf59a5f26d9f200857ca6c3e9cac524bd9acc92a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710" + +OFB-AES256.Encrypt - Test NIST SP800-38A - F.4.5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +aes_encrypt_ofb:16:"603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"dc7e84bfda79164b7ecd8486985d38604febdc6740d20b3ac88f6ad82a4fb08d71ab47a086e86eedf39d1c5bba97c4080126141d67f37be8538f5a8be740e484" + +OFB-AES256.Decrypt - Test NIST SP800-38A - F.4.6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +aes_encrypt_ofb:16:"603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"dc7e84bfda79164b7ecd8486985d38604febdc6740d20b3ac88f6ad82a4fb08d71ab47a086e86eedf39d1c5bba97c4080126141d67f37be8538f5a8be740e484":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710" + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.rest.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.rest.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a76b43e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.rest.data @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +AES-ECB Encrypt (Invalid keylength) +aes_encrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + +AES-ECB Decrypt (Invalid keylength) +aes_decrypt_ecb:"000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + +AES-256-CBC Encrypt (Invalid input length) +aes_encrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffe000000000000000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +AES-256-CBC Decrypt (Invalid input length) +aes_decrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c74":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +AES - Optional Parameter Validation (MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) +aes_check_params: + +AES - Mandatory Parameter Validation and Valid Parameters +aes_misc_params: + +AES Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +aes_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.xts.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.xts.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..647819e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.xts.data @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +# +# Tests for expected errors (negative tests) +# +AES-128-XTS Encrypt Fail Sector Too Small (by 16 bytes) +aes_crypt_xts_size:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt Fail Sector Too Small (by 1 byte) +aes_crypt_xts_size:15:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt Fail Sector Too Large (by 1 byte) +aes_crypt_xts_size:16777217:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt Fail Sector Too Large (by 1 block) +aes_crypt_xts_size:16777232:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +AES-0-XTS Setkey Fail Invalid Key Length +aes_crypt_xts_keysize:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + +AES-4-XTS Setkey Fail Invalid Key Length +aes_crypt_xts_keysize:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + +AES-64-XTS Setkey Fail Invalid Key Length +aes_crypt_xts_keysize:16:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + +AES-192-XTS Setkey Fail Invalid Key Length +aes_crypt_xts_keysize:48:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + +AES-384-XTS Setkey Fail Invalid Key Length +aes_crypt_xts_keysize:96:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + +# +# IEEE P1619/D16 Annex B Test Vectors +# http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf +# +# 128-bit keys with 32 byte sector +# +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 1 +aes_encrypt_xts:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"917cf69ebd68b2ec9b9fe9a3eadda692cd43d2f59598ed858c02c2652fbf922e" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 2 +aes_encrypt_xts:"1111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222":"33333333330000000000000000000000":"4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444":"c454185e6a16936e39334038acef838bfb186fff7480adc4289382ecd6d394f0" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 3 +aes_encrypt_xts:"fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f022222222222222222222222222222222":"33333333330000000000000000000000":"4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444":"af85336b597afc1a900b2eb21ec949d292df4c047e0b21532186a5971a227a89" + +# +# 128-bit keys with 512 byte sector +# +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 4 +aes_encrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 5 +aes_encrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"01000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 6 +aes_encrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"02000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 7 +aes_encrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"fd000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 8 +aes_encrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"fe000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 9 +aes_encrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +# +# 256-bit keys with 512 byte sector +# +AES-256-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 10 +aes_encrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-256-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 11 +aes_encrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ffff0000000000000000000000000000":"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":"77a31251618a15e6b92d1d66dffe7b50b50bad552305ba0217a610688eff7e11e1d0225438e093242d6db274fde801d4cae06f2092c728b2478559df58e837c2469ee4a4fa794e4bbc7f39bc026e3cb72c33b0888f25b4acf56a2a9804f1ce6d3d6e1dc6ca181d4b546179d55544aa7760c40d06741539c7e3cd9d2f6650b2013fd0eeb8c2b8e3d8d240ccae2d4c98320a7442e1c8d75a42d6e6cfa4c2eca1798d158c7aecdf82490f24bb9b38e108bcda12c3faf9a21141c3613b58367f922aaa26cd22f23d708dae699ad7cb40a8ad0b6e2784973dcb605684c08b8d6998c69aac049921871ebb65301a4619ca80ecb485a31d744223ce8ddc2394828d6a80470c092f5ba413c3378fa6054255c6f9df4495862bbb3287681f931b687c888abf844dfc8fc28331e579928cd12bd2390ae123cf03818d14dedde5c0c24c8ab018bfca75ca096f2d531f3d1619e785f1ada437cab92e980558b3dce1474afb75bfedbf8ff54cb2618e0244c9ac0d3c66fb51598cd2db11f9be39791abe447c63094f7c453b7ff87cb5bb36b7c79efb0872d17058b83b15ab0866ad8a58656c5a7e20dbdf308b2461d97c0ec0024a2715055249cf3b478ddd4740de654f75ca686e0d7345c69ed50cdc2a8b332b1f8824108ac937eb050585608ee734097fc09054fbff89eeaeea791f4a7ab1f9868294a4f9e27b42af8100cb9d59cef9645803" + +AES-256-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 12 +aes_encrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ffffff00000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-256-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 13 +aes_encrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ffffffff000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-256-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 14 +aes_encrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ffffffffff0000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +# +# 128-bit keys with sector size not evenly divisible by 16 bytes +# +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 15 +aes_encrypt_xts:"fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0":"9a785634120000000000000000000000":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10":"6c1625db4671522d3d7599601de7ca09ed" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 16 +aes_encrypt_xts:"fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0":"9a785634120000000000000000000000":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011":"d069444b7a7e0cab09e24447d24deb1fedbf" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 17 +aes_encrypt_xts:"fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0":"9a785634120000000000000000000000":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112":"e5df1351c0544ba1350b3363cd8ef4beedbf9d" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 18 +aes_encrypt_xts:"fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0":"9a785634120000000000000000000000":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213":"9d84c813f719aa2c7be3f66171c7c5c2edbf9dac" + +AES-128-XTS Encrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 19 +aes_encrypt_xts:"e0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeefc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf":"21436587a90000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 1 +aes_decrypt_xts:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"917cf69ebd68b2ec9b9fe9a3eadda692cd43d2f59598ed858c02c2652fbf922e" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 2 +aes_decrypt_xts:"1111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222":"33333333330000000000000000000000":"4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444":"c454185e6a16936e39334038acef838bfb186fff7480adc4289382ecd6d394f0" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 3 +aes_decrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 4 +aes_decrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 5 +aes_decrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"01000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 6 +aes_decrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"02000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 7 +aes_decrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"fd000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 8 +aes_decrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"fe000000000000000000000000000000":"d55f684f81f4426e9fde92a5ff02df2ac896af63962888a97910c1379e20b0a3b1db613fb7fe2e07004329ea5c22bfd33e3dbe4cf58cc608c2c26c19a2e2fe22f98732c2b5cb844cc6c0702d91e1d50fc4382a7eba5635cd602432a2306ac4ce82f8d70c8d9bc15f918fe71e74c622d5cf71178bf6e0b9cc9f2b41dd8dbe441c41cd0c73a6dc47a348f6702f9d0e9b1b1431e948e299b9ec2272ab2c5f0c7be86affa5dec87a0bee81d3d50007edaa2bcfccb35605155ff36ed8edd4a40dcd4b243acd11b2b987bdbfaf91a7cac27e9c5aea525ee53de7b2d3332c8644402b823e94a7db26276d2d23aa07180f76b4fd29b9c0823099c9d62c519880aee7e9697617c1497d47bf3e571950311421b6b734d38b0db91eb85331b91ea9f61530f54512a5a52a4bad589eb69781d537f23297bb459bdad2948a29e1550bf4787e0be95bb173cf5fab17dab7a13a052a63453d97ccec1a321954886b7a1299faaeecae35c6eaaca753b041b5e5f093bf83397fd21dd6b3012066fcc058cc32c3b09d7562dee29509b5839392c9ff05f51f3166aaac4ac5f238038a3045e6f72e48ef0fe8bc675e82c318a268e43970271bf119b81bf6a982746554f84e72b9f00280a320a08142923c23c883423ff949827f29bbacdc1ccdb04938ce6098c95ba6b32528f4ef78eed778b2e122ddfd1cbdd11d1c0a6783e011fc536d63d053260637":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 9 +aes_decrypt_xts:"2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-256-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 10 +aes_decrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-256-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 11 +aes_decrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ffff0000000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-256-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 12 +aes_decrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ffffff00000000000000000000000000":"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":"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" + +AES-256-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 13 +aes_decrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ffffffff000000000000000000000000":"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":"bf53d2dade78e822a4d949a9bc6766b01b06a8ef70d26748c6a7fc36d80ae4c5520f7c4ab0ac8544424fa405162fef5a6b7f229498063618d39f0003cb5fb8d1c86b643497da1ff945c8d3bedeca4f479702a7a735f043ddb1d6aaade3c4a0ac7ca7f3fa5279bef56f82cd7a2f38672e824814e10700300a055e1630b8f1cb0e919f5e942010a416e2bf48cb46993d3cb6a51c19bacf864785a00bc2ecff15d350875b246ed53e68be6f55bd7e05cfc2b2ed6432198a6444b6d8c247fab941f569768b5c429366f1d3f00f0345b96123d56204c01c63b22ce78baf116e525ed90fdea39fa469494d3866c31e05f295ff21fea8d4e6e13d67e47ce722e9698a1c1048d68ebcde76b86fcf976eab8aa9790268b7068e017a8b9b749409514f1053027fd16c3786ea1bac5f15cb79711ee2abe82f5cf8b13ae73030ef5b9e4457e75d1304f988d62dd6fc4b94ed38ba831da4b7634971b6cd8ec325d9c61c00f1df73627ed3745a5e8489f3a95c69639c32cd6e1d537a85f75cc844726e8a72fc0077ad22000f1d5078f6b866318c668f1ad03d5a5fced5219f2eabbd0aa5c0f460d183f04404a0d6f469558e81fab24a167905ab4c7878502ad3e38fdbe62a41556cec37325759533ce8f25f367c87bb5578d667ae93f9e2fd99bcbc5f2fbba88cf6516139420fcff3b7361d86322c4bd84c82f335abb152c4a93411373aaa8220" + +AES-256-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 14 +aes_decrypt_xts:"27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592":"ffffffffff0000000000000000000000":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"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" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 15 +aes_decrypt_xts:"fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0":"9a785634120000000000000000000000":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10":"6c1625db4671522d3d7599601de7ca09ed" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 16 +aes_decrypt_xts:"fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0":"9a785634120000000000000000000000":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011":"d069444b7a7e0cab09e24447d24deb1fedbf" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 17 +aes_decrypt_xts:"fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0":"9a785634120000000000000000000000":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112":"e5df1351c0544ba1350b3363cd8ef4beedbf9d" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 18 +aes_decrypt_xts:"fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0":"9a785634120000000000000000000000":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213":"9d84c813f719aa2c7be3f66171c7c5c2edbf9dac" + +AES-128-XTS Decrypt IEEE P1619/D16 Vector 19 +aes_decrypt_xts:"e0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeefc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf":"21436587a90000000000000000000000":"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":"38b45812ef43a05bd957e545907e223b954ab4aaf088303ad910eadf14b42be68b2461149d8c8ba85f992be970bc621f1b06573f63e867bf5875acafa04e42ccbd7bd3c2a0fb1fff791ec5ec36c66ae4ac1e806d81fbf709dbe29e471fad38549c8e66f5345d7c1eb94f405d1ec785cc6f6a68f6254dd8339f9d84057e01a17741990482999516b5611a38f41bb6478e6f173f320805dd71b1932fc333cb9ee39936beea9ad96fa10fb4112b901734ddad40bc1878995f8e11aee7d141a2f5d48b7a4e1e7f0b2c04830e69a4fd1378411c2f287edf48c6c4e5c247a19680f7fe41cefbd49b582106e3616cbbe4dfb2344b2ae9519391f3e0fb4922254b1d6d2d19c6d4d537b3a26f3bcc51588b32f3eca0829b6a5ac72578fb814fb43cf80d64a233e3f997a3f02683342f2b33d25b492536b93becb2f5e1a8b82f5b883342729e8ae09d16938841a21a97fb543eea3bbff59f13c1a18449e398701c1ad51648346cbc04c27bb2da3b93a1372ccae548fb53bee476f9e9c91773b1bb19828394d55d3e1a20ed69113a860b6829ffa847224604435070221b257e8dff783615d2cae4803a93aa4334ab482a0afac9c0aeda70b45a481df5dec5df8cc0f423c77a5fd46cd312021d4b438862419a791be03bb4d97c0e59578542531ba466a83baf92cefc151b5cc1611a167893819b63fb8a6b18e86de60290fa72b797b0ce59f3" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf32c85d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.data @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +Test vector ARC4 [Cryptlib] +mbedtls_arc4_crypt:"0000000000000000":"0123456789abcdef":"7494c2e7104b0879" + +Test vector ARC4 [COMMERCE] +mbedtls_arc4_crypt:"dcee4cf92c":"618a63d2fb":"f13829c9de" + +Test vector ARC4 [SSH ARCFOUR] +mbedtls_arc4_crypt:"527569736c696e6e756e206c61756c75206b6f727669737373616e692c2074e4686be470e46964656e2070e4e46c6ce42074e47973696b75752e204b6573e479f66e206f6e206f6e6e69206f6d616e616e692c206b61736b6973617675756e206c61616b736f7420766572686f75752e20456e206d6120696c6f697473652c20737572652068756f6b61612c206d75747461206d657473e46e2074756d6d757573206d756c6c652074756f6b61612e205075756e746f2070696c76656e2c206d692068756b6b75752c207369696e746f20766172616e207475756c6973656e2c206d69206e756b6b75752e2054756f6b7375742076616e616d6f6e206a61207661726a6f74207665656e2c206e69697374e420737964e46d656e69206c61756c756e207465656e2e202d2045696e6f204c65696e6f":"29041972fb42ba5fc7127712f13829c9":"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" + +Test Vector ARC4 [RFC6229 40-bit] +mbedtls_arc4_crypt:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0102030405":"b2396305f03dc027ccc3524a0a1118a86982944f18fc82d589c403a47a0d0919" + +Test Vector ARC4 [RFC6229 56-bit] +mbedtls_arc4_crypt:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"01020304050607":"293f02d47f37c9b633f2af5285feb46be620f1390d19bd84e2e0fd752031afc1" + +Test Vector ARC4 [RFC6229 64-bit] +mbedtls_arc4_crypt:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0102030405060708":"97ab8a1bf0afb96132f2f67258da15a88263efdb45c4a18684ef87e6b19e5b09" + +Test Vector ARC4 [RFC6229 128-bit] +mbedtls_arc4_crypt:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10":"9ac7cc9a609d1ef7b2932899cde41b975248c4959014126a6e8a84f11d1a9e1c" + +TMP +mbedtls_arc4_crypt:"1400002433c96cfa5c53a65184fcba83d9793f42522f94e49bf25edcb7a23c9eaae5ca84f6ee6da8":"5e58b1ad80":"e9a3d07ea1a3eac9fd73dcb14c409f2d434a72b6aa077e0924bcffc236f55d2d372b289707571531" + +ARC4 Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +arc4_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1e23866 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_arc4.function @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_arc4_crypt( data_t * src_str, data_t * key_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char dst_str[1000]; + mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; + + memset(dst_str, 0x00, 1000); + mbedtls_arc4_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_arc4_setup(&ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_arc4_crypt(&ctx, src_str->len, + src_str->x, dst_str ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( dst_str, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_arc4_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void arc4_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_arc4_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8848978e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.data @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +ARIA - Valid parameters +aria_valid_param: + +ARIA - Invalid parameters +aria_invalid_param: + +ARIA-128-ECB Encrypt - RFC 5794 +aria_encrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":"d718fbd6ab644c739da95f3be6451778":0 + +ARIA-128-ECB Decrypt - RFC 5794 +aria_decrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"d718fbd6ab644c739da95f3be6451778":"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":0 + +ARIA-192-ECB Encrypt - RFC 5794 +aria_encrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617":"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":"26449c1805dbe7aa25a468ce263a9e79":0 + +ARIA-192-ECB Decrypt - RFC 5794 +aria_decrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617":"26449c1805dbe7aa25a468ce263a9e79":"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":0 + +ARIA-256-ECB Encrypt - RFC 5794 +aria_encrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f":"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":"f92bd7c79fb72e2f2b8f80c1972d24fc":0 + +ARIA-256-ECB Decrypt - RFC 5794 +aria_decrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f":"f92bd7c79fb72e2f2b8f80c1972d24fc":"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":0 + +ARIA-128-ECB Encrypt - Official Test Vectors 1.0 +aria_encrypt_ecb:"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":"11111111aaaaaaaa11111111bbbbbbbb11111111cccccccc11111111dddddddd22222222aaaaaaaa22222222bbbbbbbb22222222cccccccc22222222dddddddd33333333aaaaaaaa33333333bbbbbbbb33333333cccccccc33333333dddddddd44444444aaaaaaaa44444444bbbbbbbb44444444cccccccc44444444dddddddd55555555aaaaaaaa55555555bbbbbbbb55555555cccccccc55555555dddddddd":"c6ecd08e22c30abdb215cf74e2075e6e29ccaac63448708d331b2f816c51b17d9e133d1528dbf0af5787c7f3a3f5c2bf6b6f345907a3055612ce072ff54de7d788424da6e8ccfe8172b391be499354165665ba7864917000a6eeb2ecb4a698edfc7887e7f556377614ab0a282293e6d884dbb84206cdb16ed1754e77a1f243fd086953f752cc1e46c7c794ae85537dcaec8dd721f55c93b6edfe2adea43873e8":0 + +ARIA-128-ECB Decrypt - Official Test Vectors 1.0 +aria_decrypt_ecb:"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":"c6ecd08e22c30abdb215cf74e2075e6e29ccaac63448708d331b2f816c51b17d9e133d1528dbf0af5787c7f3a3f5c2bf6b6f345907a3055612ce072ff54de7d788424da6e8ccfe8172b391be499354165665ba7864917000a6eeb2ecb4a698edfc7887e7f556377614ab0a282293e6d884dbb84206cdb16ed1754e77a1f243fd086953f752cc1e46c7c794ae85537dcaec8dd721f55c93b6edfe2adea43873e8":"11111111aaaaaaaa11111111bbbbbbbb11111111cccccccc11111111dddddddd22222222aaaaaaaa22222222bbbbbbbb22222222cccccccc22222222dddddddd33333333aaaaaaaa33333333bbbbbbbb33333333cccccccc33333333dddddddd44444444aaaaaaaa44444444bbbbbbbb44444444cccccccc44444444dddddddd55555555aaaaaaaa55555555bbbbbbbb55555555cccccccc55555555dddddddd":0 + +ARIA-192-ECB Encrypt - Official Test Vectors 1.0 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+aria_decrypt_cfb128:"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0011223344556677":"0f1e2d3c4b5a69788796a5b4c3d2e1f0":"4171f7192bf4495494d2736129640f5c4d87a9a213664c9448477c6ecc2013598d9766952dd8c3868f17e36ef66fd84bfa45d1593d2d6ee3ea2115047d710d4fb66187caa3a315b3c8ea2d313962edcfe5a3e2028d5ba9a09fd5c65c19d3440e477f0cab0628ec6902c73ee02f1afee9f80115be7b9df82d1e28228e28581a20560e195cbb9e2b327bf56fd2d0ae5502e42c13e9b4015d4da42dc859252e7da4":"11111111aaaaaaaa11111111bbbbbbbb11111111cccccccc11111111dddddddd22222222aaaaaaaa22222222bbbbbbbb22222222cccccccc22222222dddddddd33333333aaaaaaaa33333333bbbbbbbb33333333cccccccc33333333dddddddd44444444aaaaaaaa44444444bbbbbbbb44444444cccccccc44444444dddddddd55555555aaaaaaaa55555555bbbbbbbb55555555cccccccc55555555dddddddd":0 + +ARIA-256-CFB128 Encrypt - Official Test Vectors 1.0 +aria_encrypt_cfb128:"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":"0f1e2d3c4b5a69788796a5b4c3d2e1f0":"11111111aaaaaaaa11111111bbbbbbbb11111111cccccccc11111111dddddddd22222222aaaaaaaa22222222bbbbbbbb22222222cccccccc22222222dddddddd33333333aaaaaaaa33333333bbbbbbbb33333333cccccccc33333333dddddddd44444444aaaaaaaa44444444bbbbbbbb44444444cccccccc44444444dddddddd55555555aaaaaaaa55555555bbbbbbbb55555555cccccccc55555555dddddddd":"26834705b0f2c0e2588d4a7f09009635f28bb93d8c31f870ec1e0bdb082b66fa402dd9c202be300c4517d196b14d4ce11dce97f7aaba54341b0d872cc9b63753a3e8556a14be6f7b3e27e3cfc39caf80f2a355aa50dc83c09c7b11828694f8e4aa726c528976b53f2c877f4991a3a8d28adb63bd751846ffb2350265e179d4990753ae8485ff9b4133ddad5875b84a90cbcfa62a045d726df71b6bda0eeca0be":0 + +ARIA-256-CFB128 Decrypt - Official Test Vectors 1.0 +aria_decrypt_cfb128:"00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":"0f1e2d3c4b5a69788796a5b4c3d2e1f0":"26834705b0f2c0e2588d4a7f09009635f28bb93d8c31f870ec1e0bdb082b66fa402dd9c202be300c4517d196b14d4ce11dce97f7aaba54341b0d872cc9b63753a3e8556a14be6f7b3e27e3cfc39caf80f2a355aa50dc83c09c7b11828694f8e4aa726c528976b53f2c877f4991a3a8d28adb63bd751846ffb2350265e179d4990753ae8485ff9b4133ddad5875b84a90cbcfa62a045d726df71b6bda0eeca0be":"11111111aaaaaaaa11111111bbbbbbbb11111111cccccccc11111111dddddddd22222222aaaaaaaa22222222bbbbbbbb22222222cccccccc22222222dddddddd33333333aaaaaaaa33333333bbbbbbbb33333333cccccccc33333333dddddddd44444444aaaaaaaa44444444bbbbbbbb44444444cccccccc44444444dddddddd55555555aaaaaaaa55555555bbbbbbbb55555555cccccccc55555555dddddddd":0 + +ARIA Selftest +aria_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..11af9a32 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function @@ -0,0 +1,429 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" + +/* Maximum size of data used by test vectors + * WARNING: to be adapted if and when adding larger test cases */ +#define ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE 160 + +/* Maximum sizes of hexified things */ +#define ARIA_MAX_KEY_STR ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_KEYSIZE + 1 ) +#define ARIA_BLOCK_STR ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE + 1 ) +#define ARIA_MAX_DATA_STR ( 2 * ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE + 1 ) +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aria_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_aria_free( NULL ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void aria_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + unsigned char key[128 / 8] = { 0 }; + unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = { 0 }; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = { 0 }; + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = { 0 }; + size_t iv_off = 0; + + ((void) iv_off); + ((void) iv); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_aria_init( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( NULL, key, + sizeof( key ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, NULL, + sizeof( key ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( NULL, key, + sizeof( key ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( &ctx, NULL, + sizeof( key ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( NULL, input, output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, NULL, output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, input, NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( NULL, + MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + sizeof( input ), + iv, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + 42 /* invalid mode */, + sizeof( input ), + iv, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + sizeof( input ), + NULL, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + sizeof( input ), + iv, + NULL, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + sizeof( input ), + iv, + input, + NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( NULL, + MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + iv, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + 42, /* invalid mode */ + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + iv, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + sizeof( input ), + NULL, + iv, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + NULL, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + iv, + NULL, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + iv, + input, + NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( NULL, + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + iv, + iv, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( input ), + NULL, + iv, + iv, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + NULL, + iv, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + iv, + NULL, + input, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + iv, + iv, + NULL, + output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( input ), + &iv_off, + iv, + iv, + input, + NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +exit: + return; + +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aria_encrypt_ecb( data_t *key_str, data_t *src_str, + data_t *expected_output, int setkey_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + size_t i; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) + == setkey_result ); + if( setkey_result == 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < src_str->len; i += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x + i, + output + i ) == 0 ); + } + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aria_decrypt_ecb( data_t *key_str, data_t *src_str, + data_t *expected_output, int setkey_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + size_t i; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) + == setkey_result ); + if( setkey_result == 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < src_str->len; i += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x + i, + output + i ) == 0 ); + } + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void aria_encrypt_cbc( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str, + data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output, + int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, + output ) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void aria_decrypt_cbc( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str, + data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output, + int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, + src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, + output ) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void aria_encrypt_cfb128( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str, + data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, + src_str->len, &iv_offset, + iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) + == result ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void aria_decrypt_cfb128( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str, + data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, + src_str->len, &iv_offset, + iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) + == result ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +void aria_encrypt_ctr( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str, + data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE]; + unsigned char blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, src_str->len, &iv_offset, + iv_str->x, blk, src_str->x, output ) + == result ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +void aria_decrypt_ctr( data_t *key_str, data_t *iv_str, + data_t *src_str, data_t *expected_output, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[ARIA_MAX_DATASIZE]; + unsigned char blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, src_str->len, &iv_offset, + iv_str->x, blk, src_str->x, output ) + == result ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output->len, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void aria_selftest() +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aria_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1parse.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1parse.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..36ab1e48 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1parse.data @@ -0,0 +1,632 @@ +Empty length +parse_prefixes:"04":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:UNPREDICTABLE_RESULT + +Incomplete length +parse_prefixes:"0481":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:UNPREDICTABLE_RESULT + +Prefixes of OCTET STRING, length=0 +parse_prefixes:"0400":0:0 + +Prefixes of OCTET STRING, length=0 (0 length bytes) +parse_prefixes:"0480":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +Prefixes of OCTET STRING, length=1 +parse_prefixes:"040141":0:0 + +Prefixes of OCTET STRING, length=2 +parse_prefixes:"04024142":0:0 + +Prefixes of BOOLEAN, length=0 +parse_prefixes:"0100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +Prefixes of BOOLEAN, length=1 +parse_prefixes:"010100":0:0 + +Prefixes of BOOLEAN, length=2 +parse_prefixes:"01020000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +Prefixes of INTEGER, length=1 +parse_prefixes:"020141":0:0 + +Prefixes of INTEGER, length=2 +parse_prefixes:"02024142":0:0 + +Prefixes of INTEGER, length=5 +parse_prefixes:"02054142434445":0:0 + +Prefixes of empty BIT STRING +parse_prefixes:"0300":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:UNPREDICTABLE_RESULT + +Prefixes of BIT STRING, unused_bits=0, payload_length=0 +parse_prefixes:"030100":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +Prefixes of BIT STRING, unused_bits=0, payload_length=1 +parse_prefixes:"0302002a":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +Prefixes of BIT STRING, unused_bits=1, payload_length=1 +parse_prefixes:"0302012a":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +Prefixes of empty SEQUENCE +parse_prefixes:"3000":0:0 + +Prefixes of SEQUENCE of BOOLEAN, INTEGER, INTEGER +parse_prefixes:"300b01010102012a0203123456":0:0 + +Prefixes of SEQUENCE of (SEQUENCE of INTEGER, INTEGER), INTEGER +parse_prefixes:"300b3006020141020142020161":0:0 + +length=0 (short form) +get_len:"00":0 + +length=0 (1 length byte) +get_len:"8100":0 + +length=0 (2 length bytes) +get_len:"820000":0 + +length=1 (short form) +get_len:"01":1 + +length=1 (1 length byte) +get_len:"8101":1 + +length=1 (2 length bytes) +get_len:"820001":1 + +length=1 (3 length bytes) +get_len:"83000001":1 + +length=1 (4 length bytes) +get_len:"8400000001":1 + +length=2 (short form) +get_len:"02":2 + +length=2 (1 length byte) +get_len:"8102":2 + +length=2 (2 length bytes) +get_len:"820002":2 + +length=2 (3 length bytes) +get_len:"83000002":2 + +length=2 (4 length bytes) +get_len:"8400000002":2 + +length=127 (short form) +get_len:"7f":127 + +length=128 (1 length byte) +get_len:"8180":128 + +length=128 (2 length bytes) +get_len:"820080":128 + +length=255 (1 length byte) +get_len:"81ff":255 + +length=255 (2 length bytes) +get_len:"8200ff":255 + +length=256 (2 length bytes) +get_len:"820100":256 + +length=256 (3 length bytes) +get_len:"83000100":256 + +length=258 (2 length bytes) +get_len:"820102":258 + +length=258 (3 length bytes) +get_len:"83000102":258 + +length=65535 (2 length bytes) +get_len:"82ffff":65535 + +length=65535 (3 length bytes) +get_len:"8300ffff":65535 + +length=65535 (4 length bytes) +get_len:"840000ffff":65535 + +length=65536 (3 length bytes) +get_len:"83010000":65536 + +length=65536 (4 length bytes) +get_len:"8400010000":65536 + +length=16777215 (3 length bytes) +get_len:"83ffffff":16777215 + +length=16777215 (4 length bytes) +get_len:"8400ffffff":16777215 + +length=16777216 (4 length bytes) +get_len:"8401000000":16777216 + +length=16909060 (4 length bytes) +get_len:"8401020304":16909060 + +BOOLEAN FALSE +get_boolean:"010100":0:0 + +BOOLEAN TRUE (1) +get_boolean:"010101":1:0 + +BOOLEAN TRUE (2) +get_boolean:"010101":1:0 + +BOOLEAN TRUE (128) +get_boolean:"010180":1:0 + +BOOLEAN TRUE (255) +get_boolean:"0101ff":1:0 + +Not BOOLEAN +get_boolean:"020101":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +Empty INTEGER +empty_integer:"0200" + +INTEGER 0 +get_integer:"020100":"0":0 + +INTEGER 0, extra leading 0 +get_integer:"02020000":"0":0 + +INTEGER 1 +get_integer:"020101":"1":0: + +INTEGER 1, extra leading 0 +get_integer:"02020001":"1":0: + +INTEGER 0x7f +get_integer:"02017f":"7f":0 + +INTEGER 0x80 +get_integer:"02020080":"80":0 + +INTEGER 0x80, extra leading 0 +get_integer:"0203000080":"80":0 + +INTEGER 0xff +get_integer:"020200ff":"ff":0 + +INTEGER 0x7fff +get_integer:"02027fff":"7fff":0 + +INTEGER 0x12345678 +get_integer:"020412345678":"12345678":0 + +INTEGER 0x12345678, extra leading 0 +get_integer:"02050012345678":"12345678":0 + +INTEGER 0x7fffffff +get_integer:"02047fffffff":"7fffffff":0 + +INTEGER 0x7fffffff, extra leading 0 +get_integer:"0205007fffffff":"7fffffff":0 + +INTEGER 0x80000000 +get_integer:"02050080000000":"80000000":0 + +INTEGER 0xffffffff +get_integer:"020500ffffffff":"ffffffff":0 + +INTEGER 0x100000000 +get_integer:"02050100000000":"0100000000":0 + +INTEGER 0x123456789abcdef0 +get_integer:"0208123456789abcdef0":"123456789abcdef0":0 + +INTEGER 0xfedcab9876543210 +get_integer:"020900fedcab9876543210":"fedcab9876543210":0 + +INTEGER 0x1fedcab9876543210 +get_integer:"020901fedcab9876543210":"1fedcab9876543210":0 + +INTEGER with 127 value octets +get_integer:"027f0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcd":"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcd":0 + +INTEGER with 127 value octets (long length encoding) +get_integer:"02817f0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcd":"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcd":0 + +INTEGER with 128 value octets +get_integer:"0281800123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":0 + +INTEGER with 128 value octets (leading 0 in length) +get_integer:"028200800123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":0 + +INTEGER -1 +get_integer:"0201ff":"-1":0 + +INTEGER -1, extra leading ff +get_integer:"0202ffff":"-1":0 + +INTEGER -0x7f +get_integer:"020181":"-7f":0 + +INTEGER -0x80 +get_integer:"020180":"-80":0 + +INTEGER -0x81 +get_integer:"0202ff7f":"-81":0 + +INTEGER -0xff +get_integer:"0202ff01":"-ff":0 + +INTEGER -0x100 +get_integer:"0202ff00":"-100":0 + +INTEGER -0x7fffffff +get_integer:"020480000001":"-7fffffff":0 + +INTEGER -0x80000000 +get_integer:"020480000000":"-80000000":0 + +INTEGER -0x80000001 +get_integer:"0205ff7fffffff":"-80000001":0 + +INTEGER -0xffffffff +get_integer:"0205ff00000001":"-ffffffff":0 + +INTEGER -0x100000000 +get_integer:"0205ff00000000":"-100000000":0 + +INTEGER -0x123456789abcdef0 +get_integer:"0208edcba98765432110":"-123456789abcdef0":0 + +INTEGER -0xfedcba9876543210 +get_integer:"0209ff0123456789abcdf0":"-fedcba9876543210":0 + +INTEGER -0x1fedcab9876543210 +get_integer:"0209fe0123546789abcdf0":"-1fedcab9876543210":0 + +Not INTEGER +get_integer:"010101":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +INTEGER too large for mpi +get_mpi_too_large: + +ENUMERATED 0 +get_enum:"0A0100":"0":0 + +ENUMERATED 0, extra leading 0 +get_enum:"0A020000":"0":0 + +ENUMERATED 1 +get_enum:"0A0101":"1":0 + +ENUMERATED 1, extra leading 0 +get_enum:"0A020001":"1":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x7f +get_enum:"0A017f":"7f":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x80 +get_enum:"0A020080":"80":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x80, extra leading 0 +get_enum:"0A03000080":"80":0 + +ENUMERATED 0xff +get_enum:"0A0200ff":"ff":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x7fff +get_enum:"0A027fff":"7fff":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x12345678 +get_enum:"0A0412345678":"12345678":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x12345678, extra leading 0 +get_enum:"0A050012345678":"12345678":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x7fffffff +get_enum:"0A047fffffff":"7fffffff":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x7fffffff, extra leading 0 +get_enum:"0A05007fffffff":"7fffffff":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x80000000 +get_enum:"0A050080000000":"80000000":0 + +ENUMERATED 0xffffffff +get_enum:"0A0500ffffffff":"ffffffff":0 + +ENUMERATED 0x100000000 +get_enum:"0A050100000000":"0100000000":0 + +ENUMERATED -1 +get_enum:"0A01ff":"-1":0 + +ENUMERATED -1, extra leading ff +get_enum:"0A02ffff":"-1":0 + +ENUMERATED -0x7f +get_enum:"0A0181":"-7f":0 + +ENUMERATED -0x80 +get_enum:"0A0180":"-80":0 + +ENUMERATED -0x81 +get_enum:"0A02ff7f":"-81":0 + +ENUMERATED -0xff +get_enum:"0A02ff01":"-ff":0 + +ENUMERATED -0x100 +get_enum:"0A02ff00":"-100":0 + +ENUMERATED -0x7fffffff +get_enum:"0A0480000001":"-7fffffff":0 + +ENUMERATED -0x80000000 +get_enum:"0A0480000000":"-80000000":0 + +ENUMERATED -0x80000001 +get_enum:"0A05ff7fffffff":"-80000001":0 + +ENUMERATED -0xffffffff +get_enum:"0A05ff00000001":"-ffffffff":0 + +ENUMERATED -0x100000000 +get_enum:"0A05ff00000000":"-100000000":0 + +BIT STRING: empty +get_bitstring:"0300":0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +BIT STRING: octets=0, unused_bits=0 +get_bitstring:"030100":0:0:0:0 + +BIT STRING: octets=0, unused_bits=7 +get_bitstring:"030107":0:7:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +BIT STRING: octets=0, unused_bits=8 +get_bitstring:"030108":0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +BIT STRING: octets=1, unused_bits=0 +get_bitstring:"03020041":1:0:0:0 + +BIT STRING: octets=1, unused_bits=7 +get_bitstring:"03020741":1:7:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +BIT STRING: octets=1, unused_bits=8 +get_bitstring:"03020841":1:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +BIT STRING: octets=2, unused_bits=0 +get_bitstring:"0303004142":2:0:0:0 + +BIT STRING: octets=2, unused_bits=7 +get_bitstring:"0303074142":2:7:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +BIT STRING: octets=2, unused_bits=8 +get_bitstring:"0303084142":2:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +BIT STRING with trailing garbage, unused_bits=0 +get_bitstring:"030200417e":1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH:0 + +BIT STRING with trailing garbage, unused_bits=7 +get_bitstring:"030207417e":1:7:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +BIT STRING with trailing garbage, unused_bits=8 +get_bitstring:"030208417e":1:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +Not BIT STRING +get_bitstring:"04020100":0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +SEQUENCE OF 0 OCTET STRING +get_sequence_of:"3000":0x04:"":0 + +SEQUENCE OF 0 OCTET STRING plus trailing garbage +get_sequence_of:"30007e":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +SEQUENCE of 1 OCTET STRING truncated after tag +get_sequence_of:"300104":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 1 OCTET STRING truncated in length #1 +get_sequence_of:"30020481":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 1 OCTET STRING truncated in length #2 +get_sequence_of:"3003048201":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 1 OCTET STRING truncated in content #1 +get_sequence_of:"30020401":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 1 OCTET STRING truncated in content #2 +get_sequence_of:"3003040241":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 1 OCTET STRING truncated in content #3 +get_sequence_of:"300404034142":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 1 OCTET STRING (0) +get_sequence_of:"30020400":0x04:"4,0":0 + +SEQUENCE of 1 OCTET STRING (1) +get_sequence_of:"3003040141":0x04:"4,1":0 + +SEQUENCE of 1 OCTET STRING (126) +get_sequence_of:"308180047e414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141":0x04:"5,126":0 + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs, second truncated after tag +get_sequence_of:"30050402414104":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs, second truncated in length #1 +get_sequence_of:"3006040241410481":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs, second truncated in length #2 +get_sequence_of:"300704024141048201":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs, second truncated in content #1 +get_sequence_of:"3006040241410401":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs, second truncated in content #2 +get_sequence_of:"300704024141040241":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs, second truncated in content #3 +get_sequence_of:"30080402414104034142":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs (2, 0) +get_sequence_of:"3006040241410400":0x04:"4,2,8,0":0 + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs (2, 1) +get_sequence_of:"300704024141040142":0x04:"4,2,8,1":0 + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs (0, 2) +get_sequence_of:"3006040004024141":0x04:"4,0,6,2":0 + +SEQUENCE of 2 OCTET STRINGs (1, 2) +get_sequence_of:"300704014104024242":0x04:"4,1,7,2":0 + +Not a SEQUENCE (not CONSTRUCTED) +get_sequence_of:"1000":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +Not a SEQUENCE (not SEQUENCE) +get_sequence_of:"3100":0x04:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +Traverse empty SEQUENCE +traverse_sequence_of:"3000":0:0:0:0:"":0 + +Traverse empty SEQUENCE plus trailing garbage +traverse_sequence_of:"30007e":0:0:0:0:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER: 1 INTEGER +traverse_sequence_of:"30050203123456":0xff:0x02:0:0:"4,0x02,3":0 + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER: 2 INTEGERs +traverse_sequence_of:"30080203123456020178":0xff:0x02:0:0:"4,0x02,3,9,0x02,1":0 + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER: INTEGER, NULL +traverse_sequence_of:"300702031234560500":0xff:0x02:0:0:"4,0x02,3":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER: NULL, INTEGER +traverse_sequence_of:"300705000203123456":0xff:0x02:0:0:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +Traverse SEQUENCE of ANY: NULL, INTEGER +traverse_sequence_of:"300705000203123456":0:0:0:0:"4,0x05,0,6,0x02,3":0 + +Traverse SEQUENCE of ANY, skip non-INTEGER: INTEGER, NULL +traverse_sequence_of:"300702031234560500":0:0:0xff:0x02:"4,0x02,3":0 + +Traverse SEQUENCE of ANY, skip non-INTEGER: NULL, INTEGER +traverse_sequence_of:"300705000203123456":0:0:0xff:0x02:"6,0x02,3":0 + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER, skip everything +traverse_sequence_of:"30080203123456020178":0xff:0x02:0:1:"":0 + +Traverse SEQUENCE of {NULL, OCTET STRING}, skip NULL: OS, NULL +traverse_sequence_of:"300704031234560500":0xfe:0x04:0xff:0x04:"4,0x04,3":0 + +Traverse SEQUENCE of {NULL, OCTET STRING}, skip NULL: NULL, OS +traverse_sequence_of:"300705000403123456":0xfe:0x04:0xff:0x04:"6,0x04,3":0 + +Traverse SEQUENCE of {NULL, OCTET STRING}, skip everything +traverse_sequence_of:"300705000403123456":0xfe:0x04:0:1:"":0 + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER, stop at 0: NULL +traverse_sequence_of:"30020500":0xff:0x02:0:0:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER, stop at 0: INTEGER +traverse_sequence_of:"30050203123456":0xff:0x02:0:0:"":RET_TRAVERSE_STOP + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER, stop at 0: INTEGER, NULL +traverse_sequence_of:"300702031234560500":0xff:0x02:0:0:"":RET_TRAVERSE_STOP + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER, stop at 1: INTEGER, NULL +traverse_sequence_of:"300702031234560500":0xff:0x02:0:0:"4,0x02,3":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +Traverse SEQUENCE of INTEGER, stop at 1: INTEGER, INTEGER +traverse_sequence_of:"30080203123456020178":0xff:0x02:0:0:"4,0x02,3":RET_TRAVERSE_STOP + +AlgorithmIdentifier, no params +get_alg:"300506034f4944":4:3:0:0:0:7:0 + +AlgorithmIdentifier, no params, trailing garbage +get_alg:"300506034f49447e":4:3:0:0:0:7:0 + +AlgorithmIdentifier, null params +get_alg:"300706034f49440500":4:3:0x05:9:0:9:0 + +AlgorithmIdentifier, null params, trailing garbage +get_alg:"300706034f494405007e":4:3:0x05:9:0:9:0 + +AlgorithmIdentifier, OCTET STRING params +get_alg:"300c06034f494404056162636465":4:3:0x04:9:5:14:0 + +AlgorithmIdentifier, truncated before OID +get_alg:"3000":4:3:0:0:0:2:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +AlgorithmIdentifier, truncated in OID after tag +get_alg:"300106":0:0:0:0:0:3:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +AlgorithmIdentifier, truncated in OID after length +get_alg:"30020603":4:3:0:0:0:4:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +AlgorithmIdentifier, truncated inside OID content +get_alg:"300406034f49":4:3:0:0:0:6:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +AlgorithmIdentifier, truncated in params after tag +get_alg:"300606034f494404":4:3:0x04:0:0:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +AlgorithmIdentifier, truncated in params after length +get_alg:"300706034f49440405":4:3:0x04:9:0:9:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +AlgorithmIdentifier, truncated inside params content +get_alg:"300806034f4944040561":4:3:0x04:9:5:10:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +Not an AlgorithmIdentifier (not a SEQUENCE) +get_alg:"310506034f4944":0:0:0:0:0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +Not an AlgorithmIdentifier (empty SEQUENCE) +get_alg:"3000":0:0:0:0:0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +Not an AlgorithmIdentifier (not an OID) +get_alg:"3006050006034f4944":0:0:0:0:0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +Not an AlgorithmIdentifier (too many elements) +get_alg:"300f06034f494406034f494406034f4944":0:0:0:0:0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +Find named data: not found +find_named_data:"414141":"424242":"434343":"444444":"7f7f7f":0:4 + +Find named data: empty haystack +find_named_data:"414141":"424242":"434343":"444444":"7f7f7f":4:4 + +Find named data: first +find_named_data:"414141":"424242":"434343":"444444":"414141":0:0 + +Find named data: last +find_named_data:"414141":"424242":"434343":"444444":"444444":0:3 + +Find named data: skip suffix +find_named_data:"41414141":"414141":"434343":"444444":"414141":0:1 + +Find named data: skip prefix +find_named_data:"4141":"414141":"434343":"444444":"414141":0:1 + +Find named data: first match +find_named_data:"414141":"414141":"434343":"444444":"414141":0:0 + +Free named data: null pointer +free_named_data_null: + +Free named data: all null +free_named_data:0:0:0 + +Free named data: with oid +free_named_data:1:0:0 + +Free named data: with val +free_named_data:0:1:0 + +Free named data: with next +free_named_data:0:0:1 + +Free named data list (empty) +free_named_data_list:0 + +Free named data list (1) +free_named_data_list:1 + +Free named data list (2) +free_named_data_list:2 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1parse.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1parse.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..414278f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1parse.function @@ -0,0 +1,795 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#endif + +/* Used internally to report an error that indicates a bug in a parsing function. */ +#define ERR_PARSE_INCONSISTENCY INT_MAX + +/* Use this magic value in some tests to indicate that the expected result + * should not be checked. */ +#define UNPREDICTABLE_RESULT 0x5552 + +static int nested_parse( unsigned char **const p, + const unsigned char *const end ) +{ + int ret; + size_t len = 0; + size_t len2 = 0; + unsigned char *const start = *p; + unsigned char *content_start; + unsigned char tag; + + /* First get the length, skipping over the tag. */ + content_start = start + 1; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( &content_start, end, &len ); + TEST_ASSERT( content_start <= end ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Since we have a valid element start (tag and length), retrieve and + * check the tag. */ + tag = start[0]; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len2, tag ^ 1 ), + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + *p = start; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len2, tag ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( len, len2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( *p == content_start ); + *p = content_start; + + switch( tag & 0x1f ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN: + { + int val = -257; + *p = start; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end, &val ); + if( ret == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( val == 0 || val == 1 ); + break; + } + + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER: + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + mbedtls_mpi mpi; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mpi ); + *p = start; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( p, end, &mpi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mpi ); +#else + *p = start + 1; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len ); + *p += len; +#endif + /* If we're sure that the number fits in an int, also + * call mbedtls_asn1_get_int(). */ + if( ret == 0 && len < sizeof( int ) ) + { + int val = -257; + unsigned char *q = start; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &q, end, &val ); + TEST_ASSERT( *p == q ); + } + break; + } + + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING: + { + mbedtls_asn1_bitstring bs; + *p = start; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ); + break; + } + + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE: + { + while( *p <= end && *p < content_start + len && ret == 0 ) + ret = nested_parse( p, content_start + len ); + break; + } + + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING: + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING: + default: + /* No further testing implemented for this tag. */ + *p += len; + return( 0 ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( *p <= end ); + return( ret ); + +exit: + return( ERR_PARSE_INCONSISTENCY ); +} + +int get_len_step( const data_t *input, size_t buffer_size, + size_t actual_length ) +{ + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + unsigned char *p = NULL; + unsigned char *end; + size_t parsed_length; + int ret; + + mbedtls_test_set_step( buffer_size ); + /* Allocate a new buffer of exactly the length to parse each time. + * This gives memory sanitizers a chance to catch buffer overreads. */ + if( buffer_size == 0 ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( buf, 1 ); + end = buf + 1; + p = end; + } + else + { + ASSERT_ALLOC_WEAK( buf, buffer_size ); + if( buffer_size > input->len ) + { + memcpy( buf, input->x, input->len ); + memset( buf + input->len, 'A', buffer_size - input->len ); + } + else + { + memcpy( buf, input->x, buffer_size ); + } + p = buf; + end = buf + buffer_size; + } + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( &p, end, &parsed_length ); + + if( buffer_size >= input->len + actual_length ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( ret, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( p == buf + input->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( parsed_length, actual_length ); + } + else + { + TEST_EQUAL( ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + } + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( 1 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( 0 ); +} + +typedef struct +{ + const unsigned char *input_start; + const char *description; +} traverse_state_t; + +/* Value returned by traverse_callback if description runs out. */ +#define RET_TRAVERSE_STOP 1 +/* Value returned by traverse_callback if description has an invalid format + * (see traverse_sequence_of). */ +#define RET_TRAVERSE_ERROR 2 + + +static int traverse_callback( void *ctx, int tag, + unsigned char *content, size_t len ) +{ + traverse_state_t *state = ctx; + size_t offset; + const char *rest = state->description; + unsigned long n; + + TEST_ASSERT( content > state->input_start ); + offset = content - state->input_start; + mbedtls_test_set_step( offset ); + + if( *rest == 0 ) + return( RET_TRAVERSE_STOP ); + n = strtoul( rest, (char **) &rest, 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( n, offset ); + TEST_EQUAL( *rest, ',' ); + ++rest; + n = strtoul( rest, (char **) &rest, 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( n, (unsigned) tag ); + TEST_EQUAL( *rest, ',' ); + ++rest; + n = strtoul( rest, (char **) &rest, 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( n, len ); + if( *rest == ',' ) + ++rest; + + state->description = rest; + return( 0 ); + +exit: + return( RET_TRAVERSE_ERROR ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void parse_prefixes( const data_t *input, + int full_result, + int overfull_result ) +{ + /* full_result: expected result from parsing the given string. */ + /* overfull_result: expected_result from parsing the given string plus + * some trailing garbage. This may be UNPREDICTABLE_RESULT to accept + * any result: use this for invalid inputs that may or may not become + * valid depending on what the trailing garbage is. */ + + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + unsigned char *p = NULL; + size_t buffer_size; + int ret; + + /* Test every prefix of the input, except the empty string. + * The first byte of the string is the tag. Without a tag byte, + * we wouldn't know what to parse the input as. + * Also test the input followed by an extra byte. + */ + for( buffer_size = 1; buffer_size <= input->len + 1; buffer_size++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( buffer_size ); + /* Allocate a new buffer of exactly the length to parse each time. + * This gives memory sanitizers a chance to catch buffer overreads. */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( buf, buffer_size ); + memcpy( buf, input->x, buffer_size ); + p = buf; + ret = nested_parse( &p, buf + buffer_size ); + + if( ret == ERR_PARSE_INCONSISTENCY ) + goto exit; + if( buffer_size < input->len ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + } + else if( buffer_size == input->len ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( ret, full_result ); + } + else /* ( buffer_size > input->len ) */ + { + if( overfull_result != UNPREDICTABLE_RESULT ) + TEST_EQUAL( ret, overfull_result ); + } + if( ret == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( p == buf + input->len ); + + mbedtls_free( buf ); + buf = NULL; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void get_len( const data_t *input, int actual_length_arg ) +{ + size_t actual_length = actual_length_arg; + size_t buffer_size; + + /* Test prefixes of a buffer containing the given length string + * followed by `actual_length` bytes of payload. To save a bit of + * time, we skip some "boring" prefixes: we don't test prefixes where + * the payload is truncated more than one byte away from either end, + * and we only test the empty string on a 1-byte input. + */ + for( buffer_size = 1; buffer_size <= input->len + 1; buffer_size++ ) + { + if( ! get_len_step( input, buffer_size, actual_length ) ) + goto exit; + } + if( ! get_len_step( input, input->len + actual_length - 1, actual_length ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! get_len_step( input, input->len + actual_length, actual_length ) ) + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void get_boolean( const data_t *input, + int expected_value, int expected_result ) +{ + unsigned char *p = input->x; + int val; + int ret; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( &p, input->x + input->len, &val ); + TEST_EQUAL( ret, expected_result ); + if( expected_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( val, expected_value ); + TEST_ASSERT( p == input->x + input->len ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void empty_integer( const data_t *input ) +{ + unsigned char *p; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + mbedtls_mpi actual_mpi; +#endif + int val; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_init( & actual_mpi ); +#endif + + /* An INTEGER with no content is not valid. */ + p = input->x; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, input->x + input->len, &val ), + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + /* INTEGERs are sometimes abused as bitstrings, so the library accepts + * an INTEGER with empty content and gives it the value 0. */ + p = input->x; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, input->x + input->len, &actual_mpi ), + 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &actual_mpi, 0 ), 0 ); +#endif + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &actual_mpi ); +#endif + /*empty cleanup in some configurations*/ ; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void get_integer( const data_t *input, + const char *expected_hex, int expected_result ) +{ + unsigned char *p; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + mbedtls_mpi expected_mpi; + mbedtls_mpi actual_mpi; + mbedtls_mpi complement; + int expected_result_for_mpi = expected_result; +#endif + long expected_value; + int expected_result_for_int = expected_result; + int val; + int ret; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_init( &expected_mpi ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual_mpi ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &complement ); +#endif + + errno = 0; + expected_value = strtol( expected_hex, NULL, 16 ); + if( expected_result == 0 && + ( errno == ERANGE +#if LONG_MAX > INT_MAX + || expected_value > INT_MAX || expected_value < INT_MIN +#endif + ) ) + { + /* The library returns the dubious error code INVALID_LENGTH + * for integers that are out of range. */ + expected_result_for_int = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + if( expected_result == 0 && expected_value < 0 ) + { + /* The library does not support negative INTEGERs and + * returns the dubious error code INVALID_LENGTH. + * Test that we preserve the historical behavior. If we + * decide to change the behavior, we'll also change this test. */ + expected_result_for_int = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + + p = input->x; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, input->x + input->len, &val ); + TEST_EQUAL( ret, expected_result_for_int ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( val, expected_value ); + TEST_ASSERT( p == input->x + input->len ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + ret = mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &expected_mpi, 16, expected_hex ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + { + /* The data overflows the maximum MPI size. */ + expected_result_for_mpi = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + p = input->x; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, input->x + input->len, &actual_mpi ); + TEST_EQUAL( ret, expected_result_for_mpi ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + if( expected_value >= 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &actual_mpi, + &expected_mpi ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + /* The library ignores the sign bit in ASN.1 INTEGERs + * (which makes sense insofar as INTEGERs are sometimes + * abused as bit strings), so the result of parsing them + * is a positive integer such that expected_mpi + + * actual_mpi = 2^n where n is the length of the content + * of the INTEGER. (Leading ff octets don't matter for the + * expected value, but they matter for the actual value.) + * Test that we don't change from this behavior. If we + * decide to fix the library to change the behavior on + * negative INTEGERs, we'll fix this test code. */ + unsigned char *q = input->x + 1; + size_t len; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_asn1_get_len( &q, input->x + input->len, + &len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &complement, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &complement, len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &complement, &complement, + &expected_mpi ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &complement, + &actual_mpi ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( p == input->x + input->len ); + } +#endif + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &expected_mpi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &actual_mpi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &complement ); +#endif + /*empty cleanup in some configurations*/ ; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void get_enum( const data_t *input, + const char *expected_hex, int expected_result ) +{ + unsigned char *p; + long expected_value; + int expected_result_for_enum = expected_result; + int val; + int ret; + + errno = 0; + expected_value = strtol( expected_hex, NULL, 16 ); + if( expected_result == 0 && + ( errno == ERANGE +#if LONG_MAX > INT_MAX + || expected_value > INT_MAX || expected_value < INT_MIN +#endif + ) ) + { + /* The library returns the dubious error code INVALID_LENGTH + * for integers that are out of range. */ + expected_result_for_enum = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + if( expected_result == 0 && expected_value < 0 ) + { + /* The library does not support negative INTEGERs and + * returns the dubious error code INVALID_LENGTH. + * Test that we preserve the historical behavior. If we + * decide to change the behavior, we'll also change this test. */ + expected_result_for_enum = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + + p = input->x; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( &p, input->x + input->len, &val ); + TEST_EQUAL( ret, expected_result_for_enum ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( val, expected_value ); + TEST_ASSERT( p == input->x + input->len ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +void get_mpi_too_large( ) +{ + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + unsigned char *p; + mbedtls_mpi actual_mpi; + size_t too_many_octets = + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1; + size_t size = too_many_octets + 6; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual_mpi ); + + ASSERT_ALLOC( buf, size ); + buf[0] = 0x02; /* tag: INTEGER */ + buf[1] = 0x84; /* 4-octet length */ + buf[2] = ( too_many_octets >> 24 ) & 0xff; + buf[3] = ( too_many_octets >> 16 ) & 0xff; + buf[4] = ( too_many_octets >> 8 ) & 0xff; + buf[5] = too_many_octets & 0xff; + buf[6] = 0x01; /* most significant octet */ + + p = buf; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, buf + size, &actual_mpi ), + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &actual_mpi ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void get_bitstring( const data_t *input, + int expected_length, int expected_unused_bits, + int expected_result, int expected_result_null ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_bitstring bs = { 0xdead, 0x21, NULL }; + unsigned char *p = input->x; + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( &p, input->x + input->len, &bs ), + expected_result ); + if( expected_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( bs.len, (size_t) expected_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( bs.unused_bits, expected_unused_bits ); + TEST_ASSERT( bs.p != NULL ); + TEST_EQUAL( bs.p - input->x + bs.len, input->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( p == input->x + input->len ); + } + + p = input->x; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( &p, input->x + input->len, + &bs.len ), + expected_result_null ); + if( expected_result_null == 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( bs.len, (size_t) expected_length ); + if( expected_result == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( p == input->x + input->len - bs.len ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void get_sequence_of( const data_t *input, int tag, + const char *description, + int expected_result ) +{ + /* The description string is a comma-separated list of integers. + * For each element in the SEQUENCE in input, description contains + * two integers: the offset of the element (offset from the start + * of input to the tag of the element) and the length of the + * element's contents. + * "offset1,length1,..." */ + + mbedtls_asn1_sequence head = { { 0, 0, NULL }, NULL }; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur; + unsigned char *p = input->x; + const char *rest = description; + unsigned long n; + unsigned int step = 0; + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( &p, input->x + input->len, + &head, tag ), + expected_result ); + if( expected_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( p == input->x + input->len ); + + if( ! *rest ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( head.buf.tag, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( head.buf.p == NULL ); + TEST_EQUAL( head.buf.len, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( head.next == NULL ); + } + else + { + cur = &head; + while( *rest ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( step ); + TEST_ASSERT( cur != NULL ); + TEST_EQUAL( cur->buf.tag, tag ); + n = strtoul( rest, (char **) &rest, 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( n, (size_t)( cur->buf.p - input->x ) ); + ++rest; + n = strtoul( rest, (char **) &rest, 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( n, cur->buf.len ); + if( *rest ) + ++rest; + cur = cur->next; + ++step; + } + TEST_ASSERT( cur == NULL ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free( head.next ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void traverse_sequence_of( const data_t *input, + int tag_must_mask, int tag_must_val, + int tag_may_mask, int tag_may_val, + const char *description, + int expected_result ) +{ + /* The description string is a comma-separated list of integers. + * For each element in the SEQUENCE in input, description contains + * three integers: the offset of the element's content (offset from + * the start of input to the content of the element), the element's tag, + * and the length of the element's contents. + * "offset1,tag1,length1,..." */ + + unsigned char *p = input->x; + traverse_state_t traverse_state = {input->x, description}; + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( &p, input->x + input->len, + (uint8_t) tag_must_mask, (uint8_t) tag_must_val, + (uint8_t) tag_may_mask, (uint8_t) tag_may_val, + traverse_callback, &traverse_state ); + if( ret == RET_TRAVERSE_ERROR ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( ret, expected_result ); + TEST_EQUAL( *traverse_state.description, 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void get_alg( const data_t *input, + int oid_offset, int oid_length, + int params_tag, int params_offset, int params_length, + int total_length, + int expected_result ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_buf oid = { -1, 0, NULL }; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params = { -1, 0, NULL }; + unsigned char *p = input->x; + int ret; + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, input->x + input->len, + &oid, ¶ms ), + expected_result ); + if( expected_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( oid.tag, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ); + TEST_EQUAL( oid.p - input->x, oid_offset ); + TEST_EQUAL( oid.len, (size_t) oid_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( params.tag, params_tag ); + if( params_offset != 0 ) + TEST_EQUAL( params.p - input->x, params_offset ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( params.p == NULL ); + TEST_EQUAL( params.len, (size_t) params_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( p - input->x, total_length ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( &p, input->x + input->len, &oid ); + if( expected_result == 0 && params_offset == 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( oid.tag, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ); + TEST_EQUAL( oid.p - input->x, oid_offset ); + TEST_EQUAL( oid.len, (size_t) oid_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( p - input->x, total_length ); + } + else + TEST_ASSERT( ret != 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void find_named_data( data_t *oid0, data_t *oid1, data_t *oid2, data_t *oid3, + data_t *needle, int from, int position ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data nd[] ={ + { {0x06, oid0->len, oid0->x}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }, + { {0x06, oid1->len, oid1->x}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }, + { {0x06, oid2->len, oid2->x}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }, + { {0x06, oid3->len, oid3->x}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }, + }; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *pointers[ARRAY_LENGTH( nd ) + 1]; + size_t i; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *found; + + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( nd ); i++ ) + pointers[i] = &nd[i]; + pointers[ARRAY_LENGTH( nd )] = NULL; + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( nd ); i++ ) + nd[i].next = pointers[i+1]; + + found = mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( pointers[from], + (const char *) needle->x, + needle->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( found == pointers[position] ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void free_named_data_null( ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( NULL ); + goto exit; /* Silence unused label warning */ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void free_named_data( int with_oid, int with_val, int with_next ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data next = + { {0x06, 0, NULL}, {0, 0xcafe, NULL}, NULL, 0 }; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data head = + { {0x06, 0, NULL}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }; + + if( with_oid ) + ASSERT_ALLOC( head.oid.p, 1 ); + if( with_val ) + ASSERT_ALLOC( head.val.p, 1 ); + if( with_next ) + head.next = &next; + + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( &head ); + TEST_ASSERT( head.oid.p == NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( head.val.p == NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( head.next == NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( next.val.len == 0xcafe ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( head.oid.p ); + mbedtls_free( head.val.p ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void free_named_data_list( int length ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *head = NULL; + int i; + + for( i = 0; i < length; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *new = NULL; + ASSERT_ALLOC( new, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_named_data ) ); + new->next = head; + head = new; + } + + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &head ); + TEST_ASSERT( head == NULL ); + /* Most of the point of the test is that it doesn't leak memory. + * So this test is only really useful under a memory leak detection + * framework. */ +exit: + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &head ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..725cbc22 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.data @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ +ASN.1 Write NULL +mbedtls_asn1_write_null:"0500" + +ASN.1 Write BOOLEAN FALSE +mbedtls_asn1_write_bool:0:"010100" + +ASN.1 Write BOOLEAN TRUE +mbedtls_asn1_write_bool:1:"0101ff" + +ASN.1 Write int 0 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0:"020100" + +ASN.1 Write int 1 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:1:"020101" + +ASN.1 Write int 127 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x7f:"02017f" + +ASN.1 Write int 128 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x80:"02020080" + +ASN.1 Write int 255 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0xff:"020200ff" + +ASN.1 Write int 256 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x100:"02020100" + +ASN.1 Write int 32767 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x7fff:"02027fff" + +ASN.1 Write int 32768 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x8000:"0203008000" + +ASN.1 Write int 65535 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0xffff:"020300ffff" + +ASN.1 Write int 65536 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x10000:"0203010000" + +ASN.1 Write int 8388607 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x7fffff:"02037fffff" + +ASN.1 Write int 8388608 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x800000:"020400800000" + +ASN.1 Write int 0x12345678 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x12345678:"020412345678" + +ASN.1 Write int 2147483647 +mbedtls_asn1_write_int:0x7fffffff:"02047fffffff" + +ASN.1 Write enum 0 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0:"0A0100" + +ASN.1 Write enum 1 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:1:"0A0101" + +ASN.1 Write enum 127 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x7f:"0A017f" + +ASN.1 Write enum 128 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x80:"0A020080" + +ASN.1 Write enum 255 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0xff:"0A0200ff" + +ASN.1 Write enum 256 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x100:"0A020100" + +ASN.1 Write enum 32767 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x7fff:"0A027fff" + +ASN.1 Write enum 32768 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x8000:"0A03008000" + +ASN.1 Write enum 65535 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0xffff:"0A0300ffff" + +ASN.1 Write enum 65536 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x10000:"0A03010000" + +ASN.1 Write enum 8388607 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x7fffff:"0A037fffff" + +ASN.1 Write enum 8388608 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x800000:"0A0400800000" + +ASN.1 Write enum 0x12345678 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x12345678:"0A0412345678" + +ASN.1 Write enum 2147483647 +mbedtls_asn1_write_enum:0x7fffffff:"0A047fffffff" + +ASN.1 Write mpi 0 (null) +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"":"020100" + +ASN.1 Write mpi 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"00":"020100" + +ASN.1 Write mpi 1 +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"01":"020101" + +ASN.1 Write mpi 0x7f +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"7f":"02017f" + +ASN.1 Write mpi 0x7f with leading 0 limb +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"00000000000000007f":"02017f" + +ASN.1 Write mpi 0x80 +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"80":"02020080" + +ASN.1 Write mpi 0x80 with leading 0 limb +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"000000000000000080":"02020080" + +ASN.1 Write mpi 0xff +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"ff":"020200ff" + +ASN.1 Write mpi 0x100 +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"0100":"02020100" + +ASN.1 Write mpi, 127*8-1 bits +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"7f7b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8":"027f7f7b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8" + +ASN.1 Write mpi, 127*8 bits +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"e77b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8":"02818000e77b16e05c1537de7c41cef1a0985d6a3ced98aec28e091874cbad6b5e40a5c956258f18861c28bed8ba808259339ee34b2e509c4080149474d5d5b86093f90c475a6443fc87e1a293d4151be625d652f1c32a00a018bba10c8a2ae5b2b0ee4be64e053dce9d07ec7919526c9dfcf2ec9fc3db485caa8e5a68a2cd0a427de8" + +ASN.1 Write mpi, 127*8+1 bits +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"018446d68934cc1af23c4cd909884d4bd737a1890e12f5ef8bf3d807d72feffa63c0bf2633345f8b8418d144617c871a7a0277ac0150eed4b3db7f9dff21114cd0d7f282400f03c931cb00c367550e374a1ed3762a1801ca714cfc8d5aac69707ca81e0661400ed0014d97cba48f94d835dd681fc3053c51958afbf7583cf49c":"028180018446d68934cc1af23c4cd909884d4bd737a1890e12f5ef8bf3d807d72feffa63c0bf2633345f8b8418d144617c871a7a0277ac0150eed4b3db7f9dff21114cd0d7f282400f03c931cb00c367550e374a1ed3762a1801ca714cfc8d5aac69707ca81e0661400ed0014d97cba48f94d835dd681fc3053c51958afbf7583cf49c" + +ASN.1 Write mpi, 255*8-1 bits +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"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":"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" + +ASN.1 Write mpi, 255*8 bits +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"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":"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" + +ASN.1 Write mpi, 256*8-1 bits +mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi:"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":"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" + +ASN.1 Write OCTET STRING: length=0 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:"":"0400" + +ASN.1 Write OCTET STRING: length=1 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:"41":"040141" + +ASN.1 Write OCTET STRING: length=2 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:"4142":"04024142" + +ASN.1 Write OCTET STRING: length=127 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:"99a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38":"047f99a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38" + +ASN.1 Write OCTET STRING: length=128 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:"0199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38":"0481800199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38" + +ASN.1 Write OCTET STRING: length=255 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:"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":"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" + +ASN.1 Write OCTET STRING: length=256 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:"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":"048201005a633ed2cb0a2915dc4438a4c063017eb336cd9571d2a0585522c5073ca22a30ca7b8c9bd167d89ba1827bc6fb5d6ef6dcc52ee6eecc47e84ee0dd18fa3ebbdb6edfc679f037160d48d46a0d7e571335b24a28c8fd29b7f4a93d013b74e522bc1f5f605096bb99d438814b77b54d6dde608417b0a0ce9a8cb507fbeb95e9926b4bb6eec725599493d4b156ef3a5fd701426456029111c20f1d03c5d8999d2c042277ef91c5114a6c06218c1ba28d41ef08e4870d0cef260cba9de16d7d11ed5889b88fb93073746ebb158a4246cdb8a4ce403a5d1d598a0d11548f22070f833c1344d15e7a1445c133d19b8295b7c071bf2227178938031249d22d21c6f8e53d" + +ASN.1 Write UTF8 STRING: length=0 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING:"":"0c00" + +ASN.1 Write UTF8 STRING: length=1 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING:"41":"0c0141" + +ASN.1 Write UTF8 STRING: length=128 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING:"0199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38":"0c81800199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38" + +ASN.1 Write PRINTABLE STRING: length=0 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING:"":"1300" + +ASN.1 Write PRINTABLE STRING: length=1 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING:"41":"130141" + +ASN.1 Write PRINTABLE STRING: length=128 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING:"0199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38":"1381800199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38" + +ASN.1 Write IA5 STRING: length=0 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING:"":"1600" + +ASN.1 Write IA5 STRING: length=1 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING:"41":"160141" + +ASN.1 Write IA5 STRING: length=128 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING:"0199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38":"1681800199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38" + +ASN.1 Write tagged string: length=0 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC:"":"9600" + +ASN.1 Write tagged string: length=1 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC:"41":"960141" + +ASN.1 Write tagged string: length=128 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC:"0199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38":"9681800199a66790856f7199641f55cadabb660aaed6aa0d9ef8cef4417118c6e8c6e15becbaa21c63faf48726e92357a38b3079a0b9d60be7457ec6552f900dd032577167c91e829927343c3a769b362db4de0ad2ffb8f13cc2eeca9e52dc557118baa88b857477595622bc301a1ae2150030d652c4a482cf88d0ded85d6731ff2d38" + +ASN.1 Write OID: length=0 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID:"":"0600" + +ASN.1 Write OID: length=1 +mbedtls_asn1_write_string:MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID:"41":"060141" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, null parameters +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0:"300706034f49440500" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, parameters (8 bytes) +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":8:"300d06034f4944" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, total length=0x7f +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0x7a:"307f06034f4944" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, total length=0x80 +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0x7b:"30818006034f4944" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, total length=0xff +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0xfa:"3081ff06034f4944" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, total length=0x100 +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0xfb:"3082010006034f4944" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, total length=0xffff +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0xfffa:"3082ffff06034f4944" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, total length=0x10000 +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0xfffb:"308301000006034f4944" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, total length=0xffffff +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0xfffffa:"3083ffffff06034f4944" + +ASN.1 Write AlgorithmIdentifier, total length=0x1000000 +mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier:"4f4944":0xfffffb:"30840100000006034f4944" + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #0 (Len = 0, short form) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:0:"00":1:1 + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #1 (Len = 127, short form) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:127:"7F":1:1 + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #2 (Len = 127, buffer too small) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:127:"7F":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #3 (Len = 128, long form) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:128:"8180":2:2 + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #4 (Len = 255, long form) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:255:"81FF":2:2 + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #5 (Len = 255, buffer too small) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:255:"81FF":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #6 (Len = 258, byte order) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:258:"820102":3:3 + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #7 (Len = 65535, long form) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:65535:"82FFFF":3:3 + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #8 (Len = 65535, buffer too small) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:65535:"82FFFF":2:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #9 (Len = 66051, byte order) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:66051:"83010203":4:4 + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #10 (Len = 16777215, long form) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:16777215:"83FFFFFF":4:4 + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #11 (Len = 16777215, buffer too small) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:16777215:"83FFFFFF":3:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #12 (Len = 16909060, byte order) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:16909060:"8401020304":5:5 + +ASN.1 Write / Read Length #12 (Len = 16909060, buffer too small) +mbedtls_asn1_write_len:16909060:"8401020304":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Unused bits #0 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FF":8:"030200FF":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Unused bits #1 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FE":8:"030201FE":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Unused bits #2 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FC":7:"030202FC":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Unused bits #3 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"F8":8:"030203F8":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Unused bits #4 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"F0":6:"030204F0":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Unused bits #5 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"E0":6:"030205E0":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Unused bits #6 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"C0":8:"030206C0":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Unused bits #7 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"80":8:"03020780":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Empty bitstring +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"00":7:"030100":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Empty bitstring (bits = 16) +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"0000":16:"030100":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / Empty bitstring (bits = 24) +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FFFFFF":0:"030100":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / 15 trailing bits all unset +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"F88000":24:"030307F880":1 + +ASN.1 Write Named Bitstring / 15 trailing bits all set +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"F8FFFF":9:"030307F880":1 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / Unused bits #0 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FF":8:"030200FF":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / Unused bits #1 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FF":7:"030201FE":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / Unused bits #2 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FF":6:"030202FC":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / Unused bits #3 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FF":5:"030203F8":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / Unused bits #4 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FF":4:"030204F0":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / Unused bits #5 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FF":3:"030205E0":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / Unused bits #6 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FF":2:"030206C0":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / Unused bits #7 +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"FF":1:"03020780":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / 1 trailing bit (bits 15) +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"0003":15:"0303010002":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / 0 bits +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"":0:"030100":0 + +ASN.1 Write Bitstring / long string all bits unset except trailing bits +test_asn1_write_bitstrings:"000000000007":45:"030703000000000000":0 + +Store named data: not found +store_named_data_find:"414141":"424242":"434343":"444444":"7f7f7f":0:-1 + +Store named data: empty haystack +store_named_data_find:"414141":"424242":"434343":"444444":"7f7f7f":4:-1 + +Store named data: first +store_named_data_find:"414141":"424242":"434343":"444444":"414141":0:0 + +Store named data: last +store_named_data_find:"414141":"424242":"434343":"444444":"444444":0:3 + +Store named data: skip suffix +store_named_data_find:"41414141":"414141":"434343":"444444":"414141":0:1 + +Store named data: skip prefix +store_named_data_find:"4141":"414141":"434343":"444444":"414141":0:1 + +Store named data: first match +store_named_data_find:"414141":"414141":"434343":"444444":"414141":0:0 + +Store named data: found, null to zero +store_named_data_val_found:0:0 + +Store named data: found, null to data +store_named_data_val_found:0:9 + +Store named data: found, data to zero +store_named_data_val_found:9:0 + +Store named data: found, smaller data +store_named_data_val_found:9:2 + +Store named data: found, same-size data +store_named_data_val_found:9:9 + +Store named data: found, larger data +store_named_data_val_found:4:9 + +Store named data: new, val_len=0 +store_named_data_val_new:0:1 + +Stored named data: new, val_len=0, val=NULL +store_named_data_val_new:0:0 + +Store named data: new, val_len=4 +store_named_data_val_new:4:1 + +Store named data: new, val_len=4, val=NULL +store_named_data_val_new:4:0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5aa4cbe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_asn1write.function @@ -0,0 +1,615 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" + +#define GUARD_LEN 4 +#define GUARD_VAL 0x2a + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned char *output; + unsigned char *start; + unsigned char *end; + unsigned char *p; + size_t size; +} generic_write_data_t; + +int generic_write_start_step( generic_write_data_t *data ) +{ + mbedtls_test_set_step( data->size ); + mbedtls_free( data->output ); + data->output = NULL; + ASSERT_ALLOC( data->output, data->size == 0 ? 1 : data->size ); + data->end = data->output + data->size; + data->p = data->end; + data->start = data->end - data->size; + return( 1 ); +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +int generic_write_finish_step( generic_write_data_t *data, + const data_t *expected, int ret ) +{ + int ok = 0; + + if( data->size < expected->len ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + } + else + { + TEST_EQUAL( ret, data->end - data->p ); + TEST_ASSERT( data->p >= data->start ); + TEST_ASSERT( data->p <= data->end ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( data->p, (size_t)( data->end - data->p ), + expected->x, expected->len ); + } + ok = 1; + +exit: + return( ok ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_asn1_write_null( data_t *expected ) +{ + generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; + int ret; + + for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ ) + { + if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_null( &data.p, data.start ); + if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) ) + goto exit; + /* There's no parsing function for NULL. */ + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data.output ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( int val, data_t *expected ) +{ + generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; + int ret; + + for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ ) + { + if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( &data.p, data.start, val ); + if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) ) + goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + if( ret >= 0 ) + { + int read = 0xdeadbeef; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( &data.p, data.end, &read ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( val, read ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data.output ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_asn1_write_int( int val, data_t *expected ) +{ + generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; + int ret; + + for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ ) + { + if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &data.p, data.start, val ); + if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) ) + goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + if( ret >= 0 ) + { + int read = 0xdeadbeef; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &data.p, data.end, &read ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( val, read ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data.output ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( int val, data_t *expected ) +{ + generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; + int ret; + + for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ ) + { + if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( &data.p, data.start, val ); + if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) ) + goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + if( ret >= 0 ) + { + int read = 0xdeadbeef; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( &data.p, data.end, &read ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( val, read ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data.output ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +void mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( data_t *val, data_t *expected ) +{ + generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; + mbedtls_mpi mpi, read; + int ret; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mpi ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &read ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &mpi, val->x, val->len ) == 0 ); + + for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ ) + { + if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &data.p, data.start, &mpi ); + if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) ) + goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + if( ret >= 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &data.p, data.end, &read ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &mpi, &read ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + /* Skip some intermediate lengths, they're boring. */ + if( expected->len > 10 && data.size == 8 ) + data.size = expected->len - 2; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mpi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &read ); + mbedtls_free( data.output ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_asn1_write_string( int tag, data_t *content, data_t *expected ) +{ + generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; + int ret; + + for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ ) + { + if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) ) + goto exit; + switch( tag ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( + &data.p, data.start, content->x, content->len ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID: + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( + &data.p, data.start, + (const char *) content->x, content->len ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING: + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( + &data.p, data.start, + (const char *) content->x, content->len ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING: + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( + &data.p, data.start, + (const char *) content->x, content->len ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING: + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( + &data.p, data.start, + (const char *) content->x, content->len ); + break; + default: + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( + &data.p, data.start, tag, + (const char *) content->x, content->len ); + } + if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) ) + goto exit; + /* There's no parsing function for octet or character strings. */ + /* Skip some intermediate lengths, they're boring. */ + if( expected->len > 10 && data.size == 8 ) + data.size = expected->len - 2; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data.output ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( data_t *oid, + int par_len, + data_t *expected ) +{ + generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; + int ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + unsigned char *buf_complete = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + + for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ ) + { + if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( + &data.p, data.start, + (const char *) oid->x, oid->len, par_len ); + /* If params_len != 0, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier() + * assumes that the parameters are already present in the buffer + * and returns a length that accounts for this, but our test + * data omits the parameters. */ + if( ret >= 0 ) + ret -= par_len; + if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + /* Only do a parse-back test if the parameters aren't too large for + * a small-heap environment. The boundary is somewhat arbitrary. */ + if( ret >= 0 && par_len <= 1234 ) + { + mbedtls_asn1_buf alg = {0, 0, NULL}; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params = {0, 0, NULL}; + /* The writing function doesn't write the parameters unless + * they're null: it only takes their length as input. But the + * parsing function requires the parameters to be present. + * Thus make up parameters. */ + size_t data_len = data.end - data.p; + size_t len_complete = data_len + par_len; + unsigned char expected_params_tag; + size_t expected_params_len; + ASSERT_ALLOC( buf_complete, len_complete ); + unsigned char *end_complete = buf_complete + len_complete; + memcpy( buf_complete, data.p, data_len ); + if( par_len == 0 ) + { + /* mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier() wrote a NULL */ + expected_params_tag = 0x05; + expected_params_len = 0; + } + else if( par_len >= 2 && par_len < 2 + 128 ) + { + /* Write an OCTET STRING with a short length encoding */ + expected_params_tag = buf_complete[data_len] = 0x04; + expected_params_len = par_len - 2; + buf_complete[data_len + 1] = (unsigned char) expected_params_len; + } + else if( par_len >= 4 + 128 && par_len < 3 + 256 * 256 ) + { + /* Write an OCTET STRING with a two-byte length encoding */ + expected_params_tag = buf_complete[data_len] = 0x04; + expected_params_len = par_len - 4; + buf_complete[data_len + 1] = 0x82; + buf_complete[data_len + 2] = (unsigned char) ( expected_params_len >> 8 ); + buf_complete[data_len + 3] = (unsigned char) ( expected_params_len ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ! "Bad test data: invalid length of ASN.1 element" ); + } + unsigned char *p = buf_complete; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end_complete, + &alg, ¶ms ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( alg.tag, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( alg.p, alg.len, oid->x, oid->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( params.tag, expected_params_tag ); + TEST_EQUAL( params.len, expected_params_len ); + mbedtls_free( buf_complete ); + buf_complete = NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data.output ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_free( buf_complete ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_asn1_write_len( int len, data_t * asn1, int buf_len, + int result ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char buf[150]; + unsigned char *p; + size_t i; + size_t read_len; + + memset( buf, GUARD_VAL, sizeof( buf ) ); + + p = buf + GUARD_LEN + buf_len; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, buf + GUARD_LEN, (size_t) len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result ); + + /* Check for buffer overwrite on both sides */ + for( i = 0; i < GUARD_LEN; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( buf[i] == GUARD_VAL ); + TEST_ASSERT( buf[GUARD_LEN + buf_len + i] == GUARD_VAL ); + } + + if( result >= 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( p + asn1->len == buf + GUARD_LEN + buf_len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( p, asn1->x, asn1->len ) == 0 ); + + /* Read back with mbedtls_asn1_get_len() to check */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( &p, buf + GUARD_LEN + buf_len, &read_len ); + + if( len == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + else + { + /* Return will be MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA because the rest of + * the buffer is missing + */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( read_len == (size_t) len ); + TEST_ASSERT( p == buf + GUARD_LEN + buf_len ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void test_asn1_write_bitstrings( data_t *bitstring, int bits, + data_t *expected, int is_named ) +{ + generic_write_data_t data = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; + int ret; + int ( *func )( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ) = + ( is_named ? mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring : + mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + unsigned char *masked_bitstring = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + + /* The API expects `bitstring->x` to contain `bits` bits. */ + size_t byte_length = ( bits + 7 ) / 8; + TEST_ASSERT( bitstring->len >= byte_length ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + ASSERT_ALLOC( masked_bitstring, byte_length ); + if( byte_length != 0 ) + { + memcpy( masked_bitstring, bitstring->x, byte_length ); + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + masked_bitstring[byte_length - 1] &= ~( 0xff >> ( bits % 8 ) ); + } + size_t value_bits = bits; + if( is_named ) + { + /* In a named bit string, all trailing 0 bits are removed. */ + while( byte_length > 0 && masked_bitstring[byte_length - 1] == 0 ) + --byte_length; + value_bits = 8 * byte_length; + if( byte_length > 0 ) + { + unsigned char last_byte = masked_bitstring[byte_length - 1]; + for( unsigned b = 1; b < 0xff && ( last_byte & b ) == 0; b <<= 1 ) + --value_bits; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + + for( data.size = 0; data.size <= expected->len + 1; data.size++ ) + { + if( ! generic_write_start_step( &data ) ) + goto exit; + ret = ( *func )( &data.p, data.start, bitstring->x, bits ); + if( ! generic_write_finish_step( &data, expected, ret ) ) + goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + if( ret >= 0 ) + { + mbedtls_asn1_bitstring read = {0, 0, NULL}; + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( &data.p, data.end, + &read ), 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( read.p, read.len, + masked_bitstring, byte_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( read.unused_bits, 8 * byte_length - value_bits ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data.output ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_free( masked_bitstring ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void store_named_data_find( data_t *oid0, data_t *oid1, + data_t *oid2, data_t *oid3, + data_t *needle, int from, int position ) +{ + data_t *oid[4] = {oid0, oid1, oid2, oid3}; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data nd[] ={ + { {0x06, 0, NULL}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }, + { {0x06, 0, NULL}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }, + { {0x06, 0, NULL}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }, + { {0x06, 0, NULL}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }, + }; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *pointers[ARRAY_LENGTH( nd ) + 1]; + size_t i; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *head = NULL; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *found = NULL; + + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( nd ); i++ ) + pointers[i] = &nd[i]; + pointers[ARRAY_LENGTH( nd )] = NULL; + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( nd ); i++ ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( nd[i].oid.p, oid[i]->len ); + memcpy( nd[i].oid.p, oid[i]->x, oid[i]->len ); + nd[i].oid.len = oid[i]->len; + nd[i].next = pointers[i+1]; + } + + head = pointers[from]; + found = mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( &head, + (const char *) needle->x, + needle->len, + NULL, 0 ); + + /* In any case, the existing list structure must be unchanged. */ + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( nd ); i++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( nd[i].next == pointers[i+1] ); + + if( position >= 0 ) + { + /* position should have been found and modified. */ + TEST_ASSERT( head == pointers[from] ); + TEST_ASSERT( found == pointers[position] ); + } + else + { + /* A new entry should have been created. */ + TEST_ASSERT( found == head ); + TEST_ASSERT( head->next == pointers[from] ); + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( nd ); i++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( found != &nd[i] ); + } + +exit: + if( found != NULL && found == head && found != pointers[from] ) + { + mbedtls_free( found->oid.p ); + mbedtls_free( found ); + } + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( nd ); i++ ) + mbedtls_free( nd[i].oid.p ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void store_named_data_val_found( int old_len, int new_len ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data nd = + { {0x06, 3, (unsigned char *) "OID"}, {0, 0, NULL}, NULL, 0 }; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *head = &nd; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *found = NULL; + unsigned char *old_val = NULL; + unsigned char *new_val = (unsigned char *) "new value"; + + if( old_len != 0 ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( nd.val.p, (size_t) old_len ); + old_val = nd.val.p; + nd.val.len = old_len; + memset( old_val, 'x', old_len ); + } + if( new_len <= 0 ) + { + new_len = - new_len; + new_val = NULL; + } + + found = mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( &head, "OID", 3, + new_val, new_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( head == &nd ); + TEST_ASSERT( found == head ); + + if( new_val != NULL) + ASSERT_COMPARE( found->val.p, found->val.len, + new_val, (size_t) new_len ); + if( new_len == 0) + TEST_ASSERT( found->val.p == NULL ); + else if( new_len == old_len ) + TEST_ASSERT( found->val.p == old_val ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( found->val.p != old_val ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( nd.val.p ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void store_named_data_val_new( int new_len, int set_new_val ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *head = NULL; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *found = NULL; + const unsigned char *oid = (unsigned char *) "OID"; + size_t oid_len = strlen( (const char *) oid ); + const unsigned char *new_val = (unsigned char *) "new value"; + + if( set_new_val == 0 ) + new_val = NULL; + + found = mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( &head, + (const char *) oid, oid_len, + new_val, (size_t) new_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( found != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( found == head ); + TEST_ASSERT( found->oid.p != oid ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( found->oid.p, found->oid.len, oid, oid_len ); + if( new_len == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( found->val.p == NULL ); + else if( new_val == NULL ) + TEST_ASSERT( found->val.p != NULL ); + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( found->val.p != new_val ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( found->val.p, found->val.len, + new_val, (size_t) new_len ); + } + +exit: + if( found != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( found->oid.p ); + mbedtls_free( found->val.p ); + } + mbedtls_free( found ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..55566680 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +mask_of_range empty (1..0) +mask_of_range:1:0 + +mask_of_range empty (255..0) +mask_of_range:255:0 + +mask_of_range empty (42..7) +mask_of_range:42:7 + +mask_of_range 0..0 +mask_of_range:0:0 + +mask_of_range 42..42 +mask_of_range:42:42 + +mask_of_range 255..255 +mask_of_range:255:255 + +mask_of_range 0..255 +mask_of_range:0:255 + +mask_of_range 'A'..'Z' +mask_of_range:65:90 + +enc_char (all digits) +enc_chars: + +dec_value (all characters) +dec_chars: + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #1 buffer just right +mbedtls_base64_encode:"":"":0:0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #2 buffer just right +mbedtls_base64_encode:"f":"Zg==":5:0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #2 buffer too small +mbedtls_base64_encode:"f":"Zg==":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #3 buffer just right +mbedtls_base64_encode:"fo":"Zm8=":5:0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #3 buffer too small +mbedtls_base64_encode:"fo":"Zm8=":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #4 buffer just right +mbedtls_base64_encode:"foo":"Zm9v":5:0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #4 buffer too small +mbedtls_base64_encode:"foo":"Zm9v":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #5 buffer just right +mbedtls_base64_encode:"foob":"Zm9vYg==":9:0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #5 buffer too small +mbedtls_base64_encode:"foob":"Zm9vYg==":8:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #6 buffer just right +mbedtls_base64_encode:"fooba":"Zm9vYmE=":9:0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #6 buffer too small +mbedtls_base64_encode:"fooba":"Zm9vYmE=":8:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #7 buffer just right +mbedtls_base64_encode:"foobar":"Zm9vYmFy":9:0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #7 buffer too small +mbedtls_base64_encode:"foobar":"Zm9vYmFy":8:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Test case mbedtls_base64_decode #1 +mbedtls_base64_decode:"":"":0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_decode #2 +mbedtls_base64_decode:"Zg==":"f":0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_decode #3 +mbedtls_base64_decode:"Zm8=":"fo":0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_decode #4 +mbedtls_base64_decode:"Zm9v":"foo":0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_decode #5 +mbedtls_base64_decode:"Zm9vYg==":"foob":0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_decode #6 +mbedtls_base64_decode:"Zm9vYmE=":"fooba":0 + +Test case mbedtls_base64_decode #7 +mbedtls_base64_decode:"Zm9vYmFy":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode (Illegal character) +mbedtls_base64_decode:"zm#=":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode (Too much equal signs) +mbedtls_base64_decode:"zm===":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode (Invalid char after equal signs) +mbedtls_base64_decode:"zm=masd":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode (Space inside string) +mbedtls_base64_decode:"zm masd":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy" (no newline nor '\0' at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d4679":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy\n" (LF at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d46790a":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy\r\n" (CRLF at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d46790d0a":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy\r" (CR at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d46790d":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy " (SP at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d467920":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy \n" (SP+LF at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d4679200a":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy \r\n" (SP+CRLF at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d4679200d0a":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy \r" (SP+CR at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d4679200d":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy " (2SP at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d46792020":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy \n" (2SP+LF at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d467920200a":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy \r\n" (2SP+CRLF at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d467920200d0a":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmFy \r" (2SP+CR at end) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d467920200d":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF\ny" (LF inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d460a79":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF\ry" (CRLF inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d460d0a79":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF\ry" (CR inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d460d79":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF y" (SP inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d462079":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF \ny" (SP+LF inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d46200a79":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF \ry" (SP+CRLF inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d46200d0a79":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF \ry" (SP+CR inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d46200d79":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF y" (2SP inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d46202079":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF \ny" (2SP+LF inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d4620200a79":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF \ry" (2SP+CRLF inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d4620200d0a79":"foobar":0 + +Base64 decode "Zm9vYmF \ry" (2SP+CR inside) +base64_decode_hex_src:"5a6d3976596d4620200d79":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +Base64 encode hex #1 +base64_encode_hex:"010203040506070809":"AQIDBAUGBwgJ":13:0 + +Base64 encode hex #2 (buffer too small) +base64_encode_hex:"010203040506070809":"AQIDBAUGBwgJ":12:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Base64 encode hex #3 +base64_encode_hex:"0102030405060708":"AQIDBAUGBwg=":13:0 + +Base64 encode hex #4 +base64_encode_hex:"01020304050607":"AQIDBAUGBw==":13:0 + +# Rotate the bytes around so that they end up at each offset modulo 3 in +# successive test cases. +Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #0 +base64_encode_hex:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8gISIjJCUmJygpKissLS4vMDEyMzQ1Njc4OTo7PD0+P0BBQkNERUZHSElKS0xNTk9QUVJTVFVWV1hZWltcXV5fYGFiY2RlZmdoaWprbG1ub3BxcnN0dXZ3eHl6e3x9fn+AgYKDhIWGh4iJiouMjY6PkJGSk5SVlpeYmZqbnJ2en6ChoqOkpaanqKmqq6ytrq+wsbKztLW2t7i5uru8vb6/wMHCw8TFxsfIycrLzM3Oz9DR0tPU1dbX2Nna29zd3t/g4eLj5OXm5+jp6uvs7e7v8PHy8/T19vf4+fr7/P3+/w==":345:0 + +Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #1 +base64_encode_hex:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff00":"AQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4PEBESExQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMkJSYnKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzNDU2Nzg5Ojs8PT4/QEFCQ0RFRkdISUpLTE1OT1BRUlNUVVZXWFlaW1xdXl9gYWJjZGVmZ2hpamtsbW5vcHFyc3R1dnd4eXp7fH1+f4CBgoOEhYaHiImKi4yNjo+QkZKTlJWWl5iZmpucnZ6foKGio6SlpqeoqaqrrK2ur7CxsrO0tba3uLm6u7y9vr/AwcLDxMXGx8jJysvMzc7P0NHS09TV1tfY2drb3N3e3+Dh4uPk5ebn6Onq6+zt7u/w8fLz9PX29/j5+vv8/f7/AA==":345:0 + +Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #2 +base64_encode_hex:"02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff0001":"AgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8QERITFBUWFxgZGhscHR4fICEiIyQlJicoKSorLC0uLzAxMjM0NTY3ODk6Ozw9Pj9AQUJDREVGR0hJSktMTU5PUFFSU1RVVldYWVpbXF1eX2BhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3h5ent8fX5/gIGCg4SFhoeIiYqLjI2Oj5CRkpOUlZaXmJmam5ydnp+goaKjpKWmp6ipqqusra6vsLGys7S1tre4ubq7vL2+v8DBwsPExcbHyMnKy8zNzs/Q0dLT1NXW19jZ2tvc3d7f4OHi4+Tl5ufo6err7O3u7/Dx8vP09fb3+Pn6+/z9/v8AAQ==":345:0 + +Base64 encode all valid output characters at all offsets +base64_encode_hex:"00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7effe00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7efd0":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/Q":261:0 + +Base64 decode hex #1 +base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBwgJ":"010203040506070809":9:0 + +Base64 decode hex #2 (buffer too small) +base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBwgJ":"010203040506070809":8:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Base64 decode hex #3 +base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBwg=":"0102030405060708":8:0 + +Base64 decode hex #4 +base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBw==":"01020304050607":7:0 + +Base64 decode hex #5 (buffer too small) +base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBw==":"01020304050607":6:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Base64 decode all valid input characters at all offsets +base64_decode_hex:"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/Q":"00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7effe00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7efd0":195:0 + +Base64 Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +base64_selftest: + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7baa3d50 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "constant_time_invasive.h" +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +static const char base64_digits[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +void mask_of_range( int low_arg, int high_arg ) +{ + unsigned char low = low_arg, high = high_arg; + unsigned c; + for( c = 0; c <= 0xff; c++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( c ); + TEST_CF_SECRET( &c, sizeof( c ) ); + unsigned char m = mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( low, high, c ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &c, sizeof( c ) ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &m, sizeof( m ) ); + if( low <= c && c <= high ) + TEST_EQUAL( m, 0xff ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( m, 0 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +void enc_chars( ) +{ + for( unsigned value = 0; value < 64; value++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( value ); + TEST_CF_SECRET( &value, sizeof( value ) ); + unsigned char digit = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( value ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &value, sizeof( value ) ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &digit, sizeof( digit ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( digit, base64_digits[value] ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +void dec_chars( ) +{ + char *p; + signed char expected; + + for( unsigned c = 0; c <= 0xff; c++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( c ); + /* base64_digits is 0-terminated. sizeof()-1 excludes the trailing 0. */ + p = memchr( base64_digits, c, sizeof( base64_digits ) - 1 ); + if( p == NULL ) + expected = -1; + else + expected = p - base64_digits; + TEST_CF_SECRET( &c, sizeof( c ) ); + signed char actual = mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( c ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &c, sizeof( c ) ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &actual, sizeof( actual ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual, expected ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_base64_encode( char * src_string, char * dst_string, + int dst_buf_size, int result ) +{ + unsigned char src_str[1000]; + unsigned char dst_str[1000]; + size_t len, src_len; + + memset(src_str, 0x00, 1000); + memset(dst_str, 0x00, 1000); + + strncpy( (char *) src_str, src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 ); + src_len = strlen( (char *) src_str ); + + TEST_CF_SECRET( src_str, sizeof( src_str ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( dst_str, dst_buf_size, &len, src_str, src_len) == result ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( src_str, sizeof( src_str ) ); + + /* dest_str will have had tainted data copied to it, prevent the TEST_ASSERT below from triggering + CF failures by unmarking it. */ + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst_str, len ); + + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) dst_str, dst_string ) == 0 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_base64_decode( char * src_string, char * dst_string, int result ) +{ + unsigned char src_str[1000]; + unsigned char dst_str[1000]; + size_t len; + int res; + + memset(src_str, 0x00, 1000); + memset(dst_str, 0x00, 1000); + + strncpy( (char *) src_str, src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 ); + res = mbedtls_base64_decode( dst_str, sizeof( dst_str ), &len, src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) dst_str, dst_string ) == 0 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void base64_encode_hex( data_t * src, char * dst, int dst_buf_size, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char *res = NULL; + size_t len; + + res = mbedtls_test_zero_alloc( dst_buf_size ); + + TEST_CF_SECRET( src->x, src->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( res, dst_buf_size, &len, src->x, src->len ) == result ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( src->x, src->len ); + + /* res will have had tainted data copied to it, prevent the TEST_ASSERT below from triggering + CF failures by unmarking it. */ + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( res, len ); + + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( len == strlen( dst ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( dst, res, len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( res ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void base64_decode_hex( char * src, data_t * dst, int dst_buf_size, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char *res = NULL; + size_t len; + + res = mbedtls_test_zero_alloc( dst_buf_size ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_decode( res, dst_buf_size, &len, (unsigned char *) src, + strlen( src ) ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( len == dst->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( dst->x, res, len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( res ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void base64_decode_hex_src( data_t * src, char * dst_ref, int result ) +{ + unsigned char dst[1000] = { 0 }; + size_t len; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_decode( dst, sizeof( dst ), &len, src->x, src->len ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( len == strlen( dst_ref ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( dst, dst_ref, len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + ;; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void base64_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c9639f6e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.data @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +BLOWFISH - Valid parameters +blowfish_valid_param: + +BLOWFISH - Invalid parameters +blowfish_invalid_param: + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #1 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"0000000000000000":"4ef997456198dd78":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #2 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffff":"ffffffffffffffff":"51866fd5b85ecb8a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #3 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"3000000000000000":"1000000000000001":"7d856f9a613063f2":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #4 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"1111111111111111":"1111111111111111":"2466dd878b963c9d":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #5 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"0123456789abcdef":"1111111111111111":"61f9c3802281b096":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #6 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"1111111111111111":"0123456789abcdef":"7d0cc630afda1ec7":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #7 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"0000000000000000":"4ef997456198dd78":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #8 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"fedcba9876543210":"0123456789abcdef":"0aceab0fc6a0a28d":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #9 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"7ca110454a1a6e57":"01a1d6d039776742":"59c68245eb05282b":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #10 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"0131d9619dc1376e":"5cd54ca83def57da":"b1b8cc0b250f09a0":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #11 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"07a1133e4a0b2686":"0248d43806f67172":"1730e5778bea1da4":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #12 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"3849674c2602319e":"51454b582ddf440a":"a25e7856cf2651eb":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #13 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"04b915ba43feb5b6":"42fd443059577fa2":"353882b109ce8f1a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #14 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"0113b970fd34f2ce":"059b5e0851cf143a":"48f4d0884c379918":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #15 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"0170f175468fb5e6":"0756d8e0774761d2":"432193b78951fc98":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #16 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"43297fad38e373fe":"762514b829bf486a":"13f04154d69d1ae5":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #17 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"07a7137045da2a16":"3bdd119049372802":"2eedda93ffd39c79":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #18 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"04689104c2fd3b2f":"26955f6835af609a":"d887e0393c2da6e3":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #19 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"37d06bb516cb7546":"164d5e404f275232":"5f99d04f5b163969":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #20 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"1f08260d1ac2465e":"6b056e18759f5cca":"4a057a3b24d3977b":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #21 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"584023641aba6176":"004bd6ef09176062":"452031c1e4fada8e":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #22 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"025816164629b007":"480d39006ee762f2":"7555ae39f59b87bd":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #23 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"49793ebc79b3258f":"437540c8698f3cfa":"53c55f9cb49fc019":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #24 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"4fb05e1515ab73a7":"072d43a077075292":"7a8e7bfa937e89a3":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #25 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"49e95d6d4ca229bf":"02fe55778117f12a":"cf9c5d7a4986adb5":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #26 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"018310dc409b26d6":"1d9d5c5018f728c2":"d1abb290658bc778":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #27 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"1c587f1c13924fef":"305532286d6f295a":"55cb3774d13ef201":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #28 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"0101010101010101":"0123456789abcdef":"fa34ec4847b268b2":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #29 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"1f1f1f1f0e0e0e0e":"0123456789abcdef":"a790795108ea3cae":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #30 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"e0fee0fef1fef1fe":"0123456789abcdef":"c39e072d9fac631d":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #31 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffff":"014933e0cdaff6e4":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #32 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffff":"0000000000000000":"f21e9a77b71c49bc":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #33 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"0123456789abcdef":"0000000000000000":"245946885754369a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Encrypt SSLeay reference #34 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"fedcba9876543210":"ffffffffffffffff":"6b5c5a9c5d9e0a5a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #1 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"4ef997456198dd78":"0000000000000000":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #2 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffff":"51866fd5b85ecb8a":"ffffffffffffffff":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #3 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"3000000000000000":"7d856f9a613063f2":"1000000000000001":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #4 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"1111111111111111":"2466dd878b963c9d":"1111111111111111":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #5 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"0123456789abcdef":"61f9c3802281b096":"1111111111111111":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #6 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"1111111111111111":"7d0cc630afda1ec7":"0123456789abcdef":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #7 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"4ef997456198dd78":"0000000000000000":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #8 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"fedcba9876543210":"0aceab0fc6a0a28d":"0123456789abcdef":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #9 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"7ca110454a1a6e57":"59c68245eb05282b":"01a1d6d039776742":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #10 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"0131d9619dc1376e":"b1b8cc0b250f09a0":"5cd54ca83def57da":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #11 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"07a1133e4a0b2686":"1730e5778bea1da4":"0248d43806f67172":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #12 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"3849674c2602319e":"a25e7856cf2651eb":"51454b582ddf440a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #13 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"04b915ba43feb5b6":"353882b109ce8f1a":"42fd443059577fa2":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #14 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"0113b970fd34f2ce":"48f4d0884c379918":"059b5e0851cf143a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #15 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"0170f175468fb5e6":"432193b78951fc98":"0756d8e0774761d2":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #16 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"43297fad38e373fe":"13f04154d69d1ae5":"762514b829bf486a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #17 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"07a7137045da2a16":"2eedda93ffd39c79":"3bdd119049372802":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #18 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"04689104c2fd3b2f":"d887e0393c2da6e3":"26955f6835af609a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #19 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"37d06bb516cb7546":"5f99d04f5b163969":"164d5e404f275232":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #20 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"1f08260d1ac2465e":"4a057a3b24d3977b":"6b056e18759f5cca":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #21 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"584023641aba6176":"452031c1e4fada8e":"004bd6ef09176062":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #22 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"025816164629b007":"7555ae39f59b87bd":"480d39006ee762f2":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #23 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"49793ebc79b3258f":"53c55f9cb49fc019":"437540c8698f3cfa":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #24 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"4fb05e1515ab73a7":"7a8e7bfa937e89a3":"072d43a077075292":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #25 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"49e95d6d4ca229bf":"cf9c5d7a4986adb5":"02fe55778117f12a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #26 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"018310dc409b26d6":"d1abb290658bc778":"1d9d5c5018f728c2":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #27 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"1c587f1c13924fef":"55cb3774d13ef201":"305532286d6f295a":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #28 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"0101010101010101":"fa34ec4847b268b2":"0123456789abcdef":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #29 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"1f1f1f1f0e0e0e0e":"a790795108ea3cae":"0123456789abcdef":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #30 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"e0fee0fef1fef1fe":"c39e072d9fac631d":"0123456789abcdef":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #31 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"014933e0cdaff6e4":"ffffffffffffffff":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #32 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"ffffffffffffffff":"f21e9a77b71c49bc":"0000000000000000":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #33 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"0123456789abcdef":"245946885754369a":"0000000000000000":0 + +BLOWFISH-ECB Decrypt SSLeay reference #34 +blowfish_decrypt_ecb:"fedcba9876543210":"6b5c5a9c5d9e0a5a":"ffffffffffffffff":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #1 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0":"fedcba9876543210":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #2 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1":"fedcba9876543210":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #3 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2":"fedcba9876543210":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #4 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3":"fedcba9876543210":"be1e639408640f05":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #5 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4":"fedcba9876543210":"b39e44481bdb1e6e":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #6 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5":"fedcba9876543210":"9457aa83b1928c0d":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #7 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a596":"fedcba9876543210":"8bb77032f960629d":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #8 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a59687":"fedcba9876543210":"e87a244e2cc85e82":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #9 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778":"fedcba9876543210":"15750e7a4f4ec577":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #10 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a596877869":"fedcba9876543210":"122ba70b3ab64ae0":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #11 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a":"fedcba9876543210":"3a833c9affc537f6":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #12 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b":"fedcba9876543210":"9409da87a90f6bf2":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #13 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c":"fedcba9876543210":"884f80625060b8b4":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #14 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d":"fedcba9876543210":"1f85031c19e11968":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #15 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e":"fedcba9876543210":"79d9373a714ca34f":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #16 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f":"fedcba9876543210":"93142887ee3be15c":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #17 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f00":"fedcba9876543210":"03429e838ce2d14b":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #18 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f0011":"fedcba9876543210":"a4299e27469ff67b":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #19 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f001122":"fedcba9876543210":"afd5aed1c1bc96a8":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #20 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f00112233":"fedcba9876543210":"10851c0e3858da9f":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #21 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f0011223344":"fedcba9876543210":"e6f51ed79b9db21f":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #22 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f001122334455":"fedcba9876543210":"64a6e14afd36b46f":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #23 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f00112233445566":"fedcba9876543210":"80c7d7d45a5479ad":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey SSLeay reference #24 +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f0011223344556677":"fedcba9876543210":"05044b62fa52d080":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey 440 bits +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"fedcba9876543210":"9a2ab8f1b00c73d2":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey 448 bits +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fff":"fedcba9876543210":"2fb3ab7f0ee91b69":0 + +BLOWFISH-SETKEY Setkey 456 bits +blowfish_encrypt_ecb:"f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0fffff":"fedcba9876543210":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +BLOWFISH-CBC Encrypt [#1] +blowfish_encrypt_cbc:"0123456789ABCDEFF0E1D2C3B4A59687":"FEDCBA9876543210":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000":"6b77b4d63006dee605b156e27403979358deb9e7154616d959f1652bd5ff92cc":0 + +BLOWFISH-CBC Decrypt [#1] +blowfish_decrypt_cbc:"0123456789ABCDEFF0E1D2C3B4A59687":"FEDCBA9876543210":"6B77B4D63006DEE605B156E27403979358DEB9E7154616D959F1652BD5FF92CC":"37363534333231204e6f77206973207468652074696d6520666f722000000000":0 + +BLOWFISH-CBC Encrypt [#2] +blowfish_encrypt_cbc:"0123456789ABCDEFF0E1D2C3B4A59687":"FEDCBA9876543210":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F7220000000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +BLOWFISH-CBC Decrypt [#2] +blowfish_decrypt_cbc:"0123456789ABCDEFF0E1D2C3B4A59687":"FEDCBA9876543210":"6B77B4D63006DEE605B156E27403979358DEB9E7154616D959F1652BD5FF92CC00":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +BLOWFISH-CFB Encrypt +blowfish_encrypt_cfb64:"0123456789ABCDEFF0E1D2C3B4A59687":"FEDCBA9876543210":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000":"e73214a2822139caf26ecf6d2eb9e76e3da3de04d1517200519d57a6c3" + +BLOWFISH-CFB Decrypt +blowfish_decrypt_cfb64:"0123456789ABCDEFF0E1D2C3B4A59687":"FEDCBA9876543210":"E73214A2822139CAF26ECF6D2EB9E76E3DA3DE04D1517200519D57A6C3":"37363534333231204e6f77206973207468652074696d6520666f722000" + +BLOWFISH-CTR Encrypt +blowfish_encrypt_ctr:"0123456789ABCDEFF0E1D2C3B4A59687":"FEDCBA9876543210":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000":"e73214a2822139ca60254740dd8c5b8acf5e9569c4affeb944b8fc020e" + +BLOWFISH-CTR Decrypt +blowfish_encrypt_ctr:"0123456789ABCDEFF0E1D2C3B4A59687":"FEDCBA9876543210":"e73214a2822139ca60254740dd8c5b8acf5e9569c4affeb944b8fc020e":"37363534333231204e6f77206973207468652074696d6520666f722000" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f89353ce --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_blowfish.function @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void blowfish_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_blowfish_free( NULL ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void blowfish_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[16] = { 0 }; + size_t const valid_keylength = sizeof( buf ) * 8; + size_t valid_mode = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT; + size_t invalid_mode = 42; + size_t off; + ((void) off); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_blowfish_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_blowfish_free( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( NULL, + buf, + valid_keylength ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, + NULL, + valid_keylength ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( NULL, + valid_mode, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( &ctx, + invalid_mode, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( &ctx, + valid_mode, + NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( &ctx, + valid_mode, + buf, NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + buf, buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + invalid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + buf, buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + NULL, buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + buf, NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + buf, buf, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( &ctx, + invalid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + NULL, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, NULL, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, buf, + NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, buf, + buf, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( NULL, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + buf, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + NULL, + buf, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + NULL, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + buf, NULL, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + buf, buf, + NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + buf, buf, + buf, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void blowfish_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst, int setkey_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_blowfish_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == setkey_result ); + if( setkey_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void blowfish_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst, int setkey_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_blowfish_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == setkey_result ); + if( setkey_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void blowfish_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, + int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_blowfish_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, src_str->len , iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void blowfish_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, + int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_blowfish_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT, src_str->len , iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len, + dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void blowfish_encrypt_cfb64( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_blowfish_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len, + dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void blowfish_decrypt_cfb64( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_blowfish_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( &ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT, src_str->len, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len, + dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +void blowfish_encrypt_ctr( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char stream_str[100]; + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_blowfish_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset(stream_str, 0x00, 100); + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_blowfish_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( &ctx, src_str->len, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, stream_str, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len, + dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_blowfish_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d11b8cb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.data @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +Camellia - Valid parameters +camellia_valid_param: + +Camellia - Invalid parameters +camellia_invalid_param: + +Camellia-128-ECB Encrypt RFC3713 #1 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210":"0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210":"67673138549669730857065648eabe43":0 + +Camellia-192-ECB Encrypt RFC3713 #1 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100011223344556677":"0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210":"b4993401b3e996f84ee5cee7d79b09b9":0 + +Camellia-256-ECB Encrypt RFC3713 #1 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":"0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210":"9acc237dff16d76c20ef7c919e3a7509":0 + +Camellia-128-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #1 [#1] +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF":"77CF412067AF8270613529149919546F":0 + +Camellia-192-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #1 [#1] +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617":"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF":"B22F3C36B72D31329EEE8ADDC2906C68":0 + +Camellia-256-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #1 [#1] +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF":"2EDF1F3418D53B88841FC8985FB1ECF2":0 + +Camellia-128-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #1 [#2] +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"432FC5DCD628115B7C388D770B270C96":0 + +Camellia-128-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #2 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"0BE1F14023782A22E8384C5ABB7FAB2B":0 + +Camellia-128-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #3 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"A0A1ABCD1893AB6FE0FE5B65DF5F8636":0 + +Camellia-128-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #4 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"E61925E0D5DFAA9BB29F815B3076E51A":0 + +Camellia-192-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #1 [#2] +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"CCCC6C4E138B45848514D48D0D3439D3":0 + +Camellia-192-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #2 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"5713C62C14B2EC0F8393B6AFD6F5785A":0 + +Camellia-192-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #3 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"B40ED2B60EB54D09D030CF511FEEF366":0 + +Camellia-192-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #4 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"909DBD95799096748CB27357E73E1D26":0 + +Camellia-256-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #1 [#2] +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"BEFD219B112FA00098919CD101C9CCFA":0 + +Camellia-256-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #2 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"C91D3A8F1AEA08A9386CF4B66C0169EA":0 + +Camellia-256-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #3 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"A623D711DC5F25A51BB8A80D56397D28":0 + +Camellia-256-ECB Encrypt Perl EVP #4 +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"7960109FB6DC42947FCFE59EA3C5EB6B":0 + +Camellia-128-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #1 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"1607CF494B36BBF00DAEB0B503C831AB":0 + +Camellia-128-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #2 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"1607CF494B36BBF00DAEB0B503C831AB":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"A2F2CF671629EF7840C5A5DFB5074887":0 + +Camellia-128-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #3 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"A2F2CF671629EF7840C5A5DFB5074887":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"0F06165008CF8B8B5A63586362543E54":0 + +Camellia-128-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #4 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"36A84CDAFD5F9A85ADA0F0A993D6D577":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"74C64268CDB8B8FAF5B34E8AF3732980":0 + +Camellia-192-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #1 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"2A4830AB5AC4A1A2405955FD2195CF93":0 + +Camellia-192-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #2 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"2A4830AB5AC4A1A2405955FD2195CF93":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"5D5A869BD14CE54264F892A6DD2EC3D5":0 + +Camellia-192-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #3 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"5D5A869BD14CE54264F892A6DD2EC3D5":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"37D359C3349836D884E310ADDF68C449":0 + +Camellia-192-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #4 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"37D359C3349836D884E310ADDF68C449":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"01FAAA930B4AB9916E9668E1428C6B08":0 + +Camellia-256-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #1 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"E6CFA35FC02B134A4D2C0B6737AC3EDA":0 + +Camellia-256-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #2 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"E6CFA35FC02B134A4D2C0B6737AC3EDA":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"36CBEB73BD504B4070B1B7DE2B21EB50":0 + +Camellia-256-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #3 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"36CBEB73BD504B4070B1B7DE2B21EB50":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"E31A6055297D96CA3330CDF1B1860A83":0 + +Camellia-256-CBC Encrypt Perl EVP #4 +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"E31A6055297D96CA3330CDF1B1860A83":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"5D563F6D1CCCF236051C0C5C1C58F28F":0 + +Camellia-128-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719" + +Camellia-128-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B" + +Camellia-128-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96" + +Camellia-128-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"742A25F0542340C7BAEF24CA8482BB09" + +Camellia-128-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719" + +Camellia-128-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B" + +Camellia-128-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96" + +Camellia-128-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"742A25F0542340C7BAEF24CA8482BB09" + +Camellia-192-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E" + +Camellia-192-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98" + +Camellia-192-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01" + +Camellia-192-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"D5B5378A3ABED55803F25565D8907B84" + +Camellia-192-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E" + +Camellia-192-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98" + +Camellia-192-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01" + +Camellia-192-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"D5B5378A3ABED55803F25565D8907B84" + +Camellia-256-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93" + +Camellia-256-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B" + +Camellia-256-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4" + +Camellia-256-CFB128 Encrypt Perl EVP #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_encrypt_cfb128:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"5953ADCE14DB8C7F39F1BD39F359BFFA" + +Camellia-256-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A":"CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93" + +Camellia-256-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93":"AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51":"89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B" + +Camellia-256-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B":"30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF":"555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4" + +Camellia-256-CFB128 Decrypt Perl EVP #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +camellia_decrypt_cfb128:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4":"F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"5953ADCE14DB8C7F39F1BD39F359BFFA" + +Camellia-ECB Encrypt (Invalid key length) +camellia_encrypt_ecb:"0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432":"0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210":"67673138549669730857065648eabe43":MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Camellia-ECB Decrypt (Invalid key length) +camellia_decrypt_ecb:"0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432":"0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210":"67673138549669730857065648eabe43":MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Camellia-256-CBC Encrypt (Invalid input length) +camellia_encrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffe000000000000000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +Camellia-256-CBC Decrypt (Invalid input length) +camellia_decrypt_cbc:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c74":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +Camellia Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +camellia_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..312495c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_camellia.function @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void camellia_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_camellia_free( NULL ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void camellia_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[16] = { 0 }; + const size_t valid_keybits = 128; + const int invalid_mode = 42; + const int valid_mode = MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT; + size_t off; + ((void) off); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_camellia_init( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( NULL, + buf, + valid_keybits ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, + NULL, + valid_keybits ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( NULL, + buf, + valid_keybits ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( &ctx, + NULL, + valid_keybits ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( NULL, + valid_mode, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( &ctx, + invalid_mode, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( &ctx, + valid_mode, + NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( &ctx, + valid_mode, + buf, NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + buf, buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + invalid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + buf, buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + NULL, buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + buf, NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + buf, buf, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + invalid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + NULL, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, NULL, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, buf, + NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, buf, + buf, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( NULL, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + buf, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + NULL, + buf, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + NULL, buf, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + buf, NULL, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + buf, buf, + NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( &ctx, + sizeof( buf ), + &off, + buf, buf, + buf, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void camellia_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst, int setkey_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == setkey_result ); + if( setkey_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void camellia_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst, int setkey_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == setkey_result ); + if( setkey_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void camellia_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len, + dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void camellia_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, + int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len, + dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void camellia_encrypt_cfb128( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +void camellia_decrypt_cfb128( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + size_t iv_offset = 0; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx ); + + + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT, 16, &iv_offset, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 16, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void camellia_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_camellia_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4f83468a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data @@ -0,0 +1,1525 @@ +CCM self test +mbedtls_ccm_self_test: + +CCM - Invalid parameters +ccm_invalid_param: + +CCM - Valid parameters +ccm_valid_param: + +CCM init #1 AES-128: OK +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:128:0 + +CCM init #2 CAMELLIA-256: OK +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:256:0 + +CCM init #3 AES-224: bad key size +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:224:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM init #4 BLOWFISH-128: bad block size +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +mbedtls_ccm_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH:128:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM lengths #1 all OK +ccm_lengths:5:10:5:8:0 + +CCM lengths #2 nonce too short +ccm_lengths:5:6:5:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM lengths #3 nonce too long +ccm_lengths:5:14:5:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM lengths #4 tag too short +ccm_lengths:5:10:5:2:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM lengths #5 tag too long +ccm_lengths:5:10:5:18:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM lengths #6 tag length not even +ccm_lengths:5:10:5:7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM lengths #7 AD too long (2^16 - 2^8) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT +ccm_lengths:5:10:65280:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM lengths #8 msg too long for this IV length (2^16, q = 2) +ccm_lengths:65536:13:5:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM lengths #9 tag length 0 +ccm_lengths:5:10:5:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT + +CCM lengths #10 Large AD +ccm_lengths:5:10:32768:8:0 + +CCM* fixed tag lengths #1 all OK +ccm_star_lengths:5:10:5:8:0 + +CCM* fixed tag lengths #2 all OK - tag length 0 +ccm_star_lengths:5:10:5:0:0 + +CCM* encrypt and tag #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"":"ACDE480000000001":"00000005":2:"08D0842143010000000048DEAC020500000055CF000051525354":"223BC1EC841AB553":0 + +CCM* encrypt and tag #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"61626364":"ACDE480000000001":"00000005":4:"69DC842143020000000048DEAC010000000048DEAC0405000000":"D43E022B":0 + +CCM* encrypt and tag #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"CE":"ACDE480000000001":"00000005":6:"2BDC842143020000000048DEACFFFF010000000048DEAC060500000001":"D84FDE529061F9C6F1":0 + +CCM* auth decrypt tag #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"223BC1EC841AB553":"ACDE480000000001":"00000005":2:"08D0842143010000000048DEAC020500000055CF000051525354":"":0 + +CCM* auth decrypt tag #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"D43E022B":"ACDE480000000001":"00000005":4:"69DC842143020000000048DEAC010000000048DEAC0405000000":"61626364":0 + +CCM* auth decrypt tag #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"D84FDE529061F9C6F1":"ACDE480000000001":"00000005":6:"2BDC842143020000000048DEACFFFF010000000048DEAC060500000001":"CE":0 + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"588C979A61C663D2F066D0C2C0F989806D5F6B61DAC38417E8D12CFDF926E0" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"00000004030201A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"72C91A36E135F8CF291CA894085C87E3CC15C439C9E43A3BA091D56E10400916" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":"00000005040302A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"51B1E5F44A197D1DA46B0F8E2D282AE871E838BB64DA8596574ADAA76FBD9FB0C5" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"00000006050403A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"A28C6865939A9A79FAAA5C4C2A9D4A91CDAC8C96C861B9C9E61EF1" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"00000007060504A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"DCF1FB7B5D9E23FB9D4E131253658AD86EBDCA3E51E83F077D9C2D93" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":"00000008070605A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"6FC1B011F006568B5171A42D953D469B2570A4BD87405A0443AC91CB94" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"00000009080706A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"0135D1B2C95F41D5D1D4FEC185D166B8094E999DFED96C048C56602C97ACBB7490" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"0000000A090807A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"7B75399AC0831DD2F0BBD75879A2FD8F6CAE6B6CD9B7DB24C17B4433F434963F34B4" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":"0000000B0A0908A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"82531A60CC24945A4B8279181AB5C84DF21CE7F9B73F42E197EA9C07E56B5EB17E5F4E" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"0000000C0B0A09A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"07342594157785152B074098330ABB141B947B566AA9406B4D999988DD" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"0000000D0C0B0AA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"676BB20380B0E301E8AB79590A396DA78B834934F53AA2E9107A8B6C022C" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":"0000000E0D0C0BA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"C0FFA0D6F05BDB67F24D43A4338D2AA4BED7B20E43CD1AA31662E7AD65D6DB" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"08E8CF97D820EA258460E96AD9CF5289054D895CEAC47C":"00412B4EA9CDBE3C9696766CFA":"0BE1A88BACE018B1":"4CB97F86A2A4689A877947AB8091EF5386A6FFBDD080F8E78CF7CB0CDDD7B3" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"9020EA6F91BDD85AFA0039BA4BAFF9BFB79C7028949CD0EC":"0033568EF7B2633C9696766CFA":"63018F76DC8A1BCB":"4CCB1E7CA981BEFAA0726C55D378061298C85C92814ABC33C52EE81D7D77C08A" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"B916E0EACC1C00D7DCEC68EC0B3BBB1A02DE8A2D1AA346132E":"00103FE41336713C9696766CFA":"AA6CFA36CAE86B40":"B1D23A2220DDC0AC900D9AA03C61FCF4A559A4417767089708A776796EDB723506" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #16 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"12DAAC5630EFA5396F770CE1A66B21F7B2101C":"00764C63B8058E3C9696766CFA":"D0D0735C531E1BECF049C244":"14D253C3967B70609B7CBB7C499160283245269A6F49975BCADEAF" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #17 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"E88B6A46C78D63E52EB8C546EFB5DE6F75E9CC0D":"00F8B678094E3B3C9696766CFA":"77B60F011C03E1525899BCAE":"5545FF1A085EE2EFBF52B2E04BEE1E2336C73E3F762C0C7744FE7E3C" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #18 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"6435ACBAFB11A82E2F071D7CA4A5EBD93A803BA87F":"00D560912D3F703C9696766CFA":"CD9044D2B71FDB8120EA60C0":"009769ECABDF48625594C59251E6035722675E04C847099E5AE0704551" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #19 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"8A19B950BCF71A018E5E6701C91787659809D67DBEDD18":"0042FFF8F1951C3C9696766CFA":"D85BC7E69F944FB8":"BC218DAA947427B6DB386A99AC1AEF23ADE0B52939CB6A637CF9BEC2408897C6BA" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"1761433C37C5A35FC1F39F406302EB907C6163BE38C98437":"00920F40E56CDC3C9696766CFA":"74A0EBC9069F5B37":"5810E6FD25874022E80361A478E3E9CF484AB04F447EFFF6F0A477CC2FC9BF548944" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"A434A8E58500C6E41530538862D686EA9E81301B5AE4226BFA":"0027CA0C7120BC3C9696766CFA":"44A3AA3AAE6475CA":"F2BEED7BC5098E83FEB5B31608F8E29C38819A89C8E776F1544D4151A4ED3A8B87B9CE" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #22 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"B96B49E21D621741632875DB7F6C9243D2D7C2":"005B8CCBCD9AF83C9696766CFA":"EC46BB63B02520C33C49FD70":"31D750A09DA3ED7FDDD49A2032AABF17EC8EBF7D22C8088C666BE5C197" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #23 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"E2FCFBB880442C731BF95167C8FFD7895E337076":"003EBE94044B9A3C9696766CFA":"47A65AC78B3D594227E85E71":"E882F1DBD38CE3EDA7C23F04DD65071EB41342ACDF7E00DCCEC7AE52987D" + +CCM encrypt and tag RFC 3610 #24 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":"ABF21C0B02FEB88F856DF4A37381BCE3CC128517D4":"008D493B30AE8B3C9696766CFA":"6E37A6EF546D955D34AB6059":"F32905B88A641B04B9C9FFB58CC390900F3DA12AB16DCE9E82EFA16DA62059" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-128 #1 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"43b1a6bc8d0d22d6d1ca95c18593cca5":"a2b381c7d1545c408fe29817a21dc435a154c87256346b05":"9882578e750b9682c6ca7f8f86":"2084f3861c9ad0ccee7c63a7e05aece5db8b34bd8724cc06b4ca99a7f9c4914f":"cc69ed76985e0ed4c8365a72775e5a19bfccc71aeb116c85a8c74677" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-128 #2 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=6) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"44e89189b815b4649c4e9b38c4275a5a":"8db6ae1eb959963931d1c5224f29ef50019d2b0db7f5f76f":"374c83e94384061ac01963f88d":"cd149d17dba7ec50000b8c5390d114697fafb61025301f4e3eaa9f4535718a08":"df952dce0f843374d33da94c969eff07b7bc2418ca9ee01e32bc2ffa8600" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-128 #3 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=8) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"368f35a1f80eaaacd6bb136609389727":"1cccd55825316a94c5979e049310d1d717cdfb7624289dac":"842a8445847502ea77363a16b6":"34396dfcfa6f742aea7040976bd596497a7a6fa4fb85ee8e4ca394d02095b7bf":"1a58094f0e8c6035a5584bfa8d1009c5f78fd2ca487ff222f6d1d897d6051618" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-128 #4 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=10) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"996a09a652fa6c82eae8be7886d7e75e":"84cdd7380f47524b86168ed95386faa402831f22045183d0":"a8b3eb68f205a46d8f632c3367":"c71620d0477c8137b77ec5c72ced4df3a1e987fd9af6b5b10853f0526d876cd5":"a7fbf9dd1b099ed3acf6bcbd0b6f7cae57bee99f9d084f826d86e69c07f053d1a607" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-128 #5 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=12) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3ee186594f110fb788a8bf8aa8be5d4a":"d71864877f2578db092daba2d6a1f9f4698a9c356c7830a1":"44f705d52acf27b7f17196aa9b":"2c16724296ff85e079627be3053ea95adf35722c21886baba343bd6c79b5cb57":"b4dd74e7a0cc51aea45dfb401a41d5822c96901a83247ea0d6965f5aa6e31302a9cc2b36" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-128 #6 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=14) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7b2d52a5186d912cf6b83ace7740ceda":"ea384b081f60bb450808e0c20dc2914ae14a320612c3e1e8":"f47be3a2b019d1beededf5b80c":"76cf3522aff97a44b4edd0eef3b81e3ab3cd1ccc93a767a133afd508315f05ed":"79070f33114a980dfd48215051e224dfd01471ac293242afddb36e37da1ee8a88a77d7f12cc6" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-128 #7 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4189351b5caea375a0299e81c621bf43":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-192 #1 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"11fd45743d946e6d37341fec49947e8c70482494a8f07fcc":"ee7e6075ba52846de5d6254959a18affc4faf59c8ef63489":"c6aeebcb146cfafaae66f78aab":"7dc8c52144a7cb65b3e5a846e8fd7eae37bf6996c299b56e49144ebf43a1770f":"137d9da59baf5cbfd46620c5f298fc766de10ac68e774edf1f2c5bad" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-192 #2 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=6) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"146a163bbf10746e7c1201546ba46de769be23f9d7cc2c80":"473b6600559aefb67f7976f0a5cc744fb456efd86f615648":"f5827e51707d8d64bb522985bb":"599b12ebd3347a5ad098772c44c49eed954ec27c3ba6206d899ddaabca23a762":"26d2be30e171439d54a0fec291c6024d1de09d61b44f53258ba1360406f9" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-192 #3 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=8) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"bdf277af2226f03ec1a0ba7a8532ade6aea9b3d519fe2d38":"0ff89eff92a530b66684cd75a39481e7e069a7d05e89b692":"cc3c596be884e7caed503315c0":"4d6546167b3ed55f01c62bd384e02e1039c0d67ef7abe33291fecb136272f73b":"6ef66a52c866bd5df20ec5096de92167ad83cab0e095ad0c778a299f1224f10c" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-192 #4 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=10) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"62f8eba1c2c5f66215493a6fa6ae007aae5be92f7880336a":"f5522e3405d9b77cbf3257db2b9675e618e8744a0ee03f0f":"15769753f503aa324f4b0e8ee0":"1bc05440ee3e34d0f25e90ca1ecbb555d0fb92b311621d171be6f2b719923d23":"b9103942dbbb93e15086751c9bb0a3d33112b55f95b7d4f32ff0bb90a8879812683f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-192 #5 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=12) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5a5667197f46b8027980d0a3166c0a419713d4df0629a860":"d0e4024d6e33daafc011fe463545ed20f172872f6f33cefa":"6236b01079d180fce156fbaab4":"29bdf65b29394d363d5243d4249bad087520f8d733a763daa1356be458d487e5":"479f3d408bfa00d1cd1c8bf11a167ce7ae4bcdb011f04e38733013b8ebe5e92b1917640c" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-192 #6 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=14) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d2d4482ea8e98c1cf309671895a16610152ce283434bca38":"78168e5cc3cddf4b90d5bc11613465030903e0196f1fe443":"6ee177d48f59bd37045ec03731":"9ef2d0d556d05cf9d1ee9dab9b322a389c75cd4e9dee2c0d08eea961efce8690":"e2324a6d5643dfc8aea8c08cbbc245494a3dcbcb800c797c3abcdb0563978785bf7fd71c6c1f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-192 #7 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7177fd129674c6c91c1c89f4408139afe187026b8114893":"2cea0f7304860a4f40a28c8b890db60f3891b9982478495e":"31bb28f0e1e63c36ca3959dd18":"2529a834668187213f5342a1f3deea0dc2765478c7d71c9c21b9eb1351a5f6cb":"5bb7aa6ab9c02a5712d62343fbe61f774e598d6b87545612380ea23dcffc9574f672bca92e306411" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-256 #1 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9074b1ae4ca3342fe5bf6f14bcf2f27904f0b15179d95a654f61e699692e6f71":"239029f150bccbd67edbb67f8ae456b4ea066a4beee065f9":"2e1e0132468500d4bd47862563":"3c5f5404370abdcb1edde99de60d0682c600b034e063b7d3237723da70ab7552":"9c8d5dd227fd9f81237601830afee4f0115636c8e5d5fd743cb9afed" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-256 #2 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=6) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8596a69890b0e47d43aeeca54b52029331da06fae63aa3249faaca94e2605feb":"f0b065da6ecb9ddcab855152d3b4155037adfa758ba96070":"20442e1c3f3c88919c39978b78":"4e0d3aa502bd03fe1761b167c4e0df1d228301d3ebaa4a0281becd813266e255":"d6a0f377f7c1b14dcdba729cae5271b027e71cc7850173ec265867a29eb3" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-256 #3 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=8) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"bae73483de27b581a7c13f178a6d7bda168c1b4a1cb9180512a13e3ab914eb61":"28ef408d57930086011b167ac04b866e5b58fe6690a0b9c3":"daf54faef6e4fc7867624b76f2":"7022eaa52c9da821da72d2edd98f6b91dfe474999b75b34699aeb38465f70c1c":"356367c6cee4453658418d9517f7c6faddcd7c65aef460138cf050f48c505151" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-256 #4 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=10) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d5b321b0ac2fedce0933d57d12195c7b9941f4caa95529125ed21c41fac43374":"6aa6ea668df60b0db85592d0a819c9df9e1099916272aafb":"b35fb2262edfa14938a0fba03e":"ba762bbda601d711e2dfc9dbe3003d39df1043ca845612b8e9dc9ff5c5d06ec4":"97027de5effd82c58f8dbfb909d7696fbe2d54916262912001a4d765bc1c95c90a95" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-256 #5 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=12) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7f4af6765cad1d511db07e33aaafd57646ec279db629048aa6770af24849aa0d":"7ebef26bf4ecf6f0ebb2eb860edbf900f27b75b4a6340fdb":"dde2a362ce81b2b6913abc3095":"404f5df97ece7431987bc098cce994fc3c063b519ffa47b0365226a0015ef695":"353022db9c568bd7183a13c40b1ba30fcc768c54264aa2cd2927a053c9244d3217a7ad05" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-256 #6 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=14) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5c8b59d3e7986c277d5ad51e4a2233251076809ebf59463f47cd10b4aa951f8c":"138ee53b1914d3322c2dd0a4e02faab2236555131d5eea08":"21ff892b743d661189e205c7f3":"f1e0af185180d2eb63e50e37ba692647cac2c6a149d70c81dbd34685ed78feaa":"5b2f3026f30fdd50accc40ddd093b7997f23d7c6d3c8bc425f82c828413643b8794494cb5236" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VTT AES-256 #7 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"60823b64e0b2da3a7eb772bd5941c534e6ff94ea96b564e2b38f82c78bb54522":"a8be794613835c4366e75817d228438f011a2ec8a86f9797":"48526f1bffc97dd65e42906983":"fab62b3e5deda7a9c1128663cc81c44b74ab1bfe70bc1c9dec7c7fd08173b80a":"cc3efe04d84a4ec5cb6a6c28dc2c2d386a359d9550dbdec963ddd56464aed6d0613159d1aa181dcb" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #1 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2ebf60f0969013a54a3dedb19d20f6c8":"":"1de8c5e21f9db33123ff870add":"e1de6c6119d7db471136285d10b47a450221b16978569190ef6a22b055295603":"0ead29ef205fbb86d11abe5ed704b880" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #2 (P=1, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6ae7a8e907b8720f4b0d5507c1d0dc41":"0e":"7f18ad442e536a0159e7aa8c0f":"9c9b0f11e020c6512a63dfa1a5ec8df8bd8e2ad83cf87b80b38635621c5dc0d7":"4c201784bdab19e255787fecd02000c49d" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #3 (P=2, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3d746ae6cac5cefd01f021c0bbf4bc3c":"4360":"597b3614ff9cd567afd1aad4e5":"90446190e1ff5e48e8a09d692b217de3ad0ab4a670e7f1b437f9c07a902cad60":"e38fdb77c1f8bbac2903a2ec7bc0f9c5654d" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #4 (P=3, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3e4fa1c6f8b00f1296956735ee86e310":"3a6734":"c6a170936568651020edfe15df":"00d57896da2435a4271afb9c98f61a650e63a4955357c47d073c5165dd4ea318":"384be657bfc5f385b179be7333eb3f57df546b" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #5 (P=4, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7ccbb8557f6e08f436d0957d4bbe7fdf":"4cabeb02":"bb8e2ef2ed9484f9021cda7073":"fba1d18a74a3bb38671ab2842ffaa434cd572a0b45320e4145930b3008d8d350":"32501f4235c4dd96e83d5ab4c3c31c523453c317" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #6 (P=5, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3725c7905bfaca415908c617b78f8dee":"f5499a7082":"c98ec4473e051a4d4ac56fd082":"11bc87f1c2d2076ba47c5cb530dd6c2a224f7a0f7f554e23d7d29077c7787680":"e378b776242066751af249d521c6eaebdff40b2642" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #7 (P=6, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"80bead98a05d1bb173cd4fca463b8fa3":"e479990bf082":"8a14a6d255aa4032ebff37a3d7":"bb4e706e73d21df66f64173859d47e247527cd9832e20dccff8548ed5f554108":"89c9246238878427f36b1f6c633e4542f32b50ca8edb" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #8 (P=7, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dc8ec91184ba18eae31ac2d3b252673f":"2a5775986551c8":"0da4c988f521f5648259f2bec2":"6d5573c9279897d7d1602d8a95c04bb5ca3fad2dbe89a024b3651eb227e73bb5":"4f259f2a718faea852a7c4358dfa9f5467357638acac90" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #9 (P=8, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19f97ef5318b8005fc7133fa31dd1236":"6d972a673fbe1ca1":"01ce9814c6329dbee1d02b1321":"85853f120981f33cf1d50fde6b8bc865fe988a9f12579acdb336f9f992b08b89":"2f12a7e7acecae5d2563309efc19368cdee8266538ca89d3" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #10 (P=9, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c17944bfaeeb808eed66ae7242ab545f":"7caae2640e734539d3":"910b3db64df3728ca98219e01b":"edf64f98b3ab593cbcf68ab37a8c9472e49cb849d4a744deae925a5a43faf262":"0dae8b3ccf0b439f6ff8ee4a233dfb7753f6bfe321b3e26959" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #11 (P=10, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0fb9df6f638847f5de371f003dd938f4":"e10cc36bc1c5d3c646ab":"c9ddf61c052f3502ad6b229819":"4f9938d5bc3dcbe47f6b256d5e99723d0891e50c6175aba41b011e4686113c49":"7f797367de50be6dc04e4cf0d8c24189affd35060cb7ca3dd136" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #12 (P=11, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"006ff7d3153caf906ec7929f5aef9276":"31be1b241cae79c54c2446":"57db1541a185bd9cdc34d62025":"7d9681cac38e778fba11f4464f69ed9ebfea31b7ffcaf2925b3381c65d975974":"9dd8a4244fbdb30b624578a625c43233476bbb959acd9edebe2883" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #13 (P=12, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"026331e98aba9e8c23a9e8a91d0b0c97":"a82200ef3a08c390dec5cbf9":"bccfe69bba168b81cbdf7d018a":"26e011143a686a7224ddb8c5b1e5d31713fa22c386785e2c34f498ae56d07ed5":"adf4fc6f9be113066c09248fcb56a9c1a1c3bb16fbb9fbaedacdb12b" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d32088d50df9aba14d9022c870a0cb85":"4b10788c1a03bca656f04f1f98":"e16c69861efc206e85aab1255e":"0eff7d7bcceb873c3203a8df74f4e91b04bd607ec11202f96cfeb99f5bcdb7aa":"89f15b1cb665a8851da03b874ca6f73242f2f227350c0277e4e72cdaa6" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #15 (P=14, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7301c907b9d2aaac355c5416ff25c59b":"484300aa3a506afcd313b49ead8d":"7304b65b6dab466273862c88b9":"2c5d114eff62c527cc2e03c33c595a80fe609bfc0fe13ce3380efe05d85cceac":"928ca58b0d373dc50c52afac787ce8eeb5d5b493661259a9d91ea31a5f7e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #16 (P=15, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"38be46d271bf868c198052391f8a2147":"61bd1385be92097e866550a55278f0":"6758f67db9bfea5f0e0972e08b":"c6de3be97f11d0e2ab85c9353b783f25b37366a78a2012cecf5b7a87138b3c86":"7c9fa8d99b38f825315ece6a2613f55e902f296dcce870263ae50cda4fadae" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #17 (P=16, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"70010ed90e6186ecad41f0d3c7c42ff8":"be322f58efa7f8c68a635e0b9cce77f2":"a5f4f4986e98472965f5abcc4b":"3fec0e5cc24d67139437cbc8112414fc8daccd1a94b49a4c76e2d39303547317":"8e4425ae573974f0f0693a188b525812eef08e3fb15f4227e0d989a4d587a8cf" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #18 (P=17, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"79eae5baddc5887bdf3031fd1d65085b":"001343e6191f5f1738e7d19d4eec2b9592":"9da59614535d1fad35f2ece00f":"46603500af9e4e7a2f9545411a58b21a6efd21f2b5f315d02d964c09270145b3":"2162e27bfbf1d00f2404754a254665fd9270f0edb415993588b2535e2e0e4fd086" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #19 (P=18, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c14eda0f958465246fe6ab541e5dfd75":"617868ae91f705c6b583b5fd7e1e4086a1bb":"32b63ca7e269223f80a56baaaa":"733f8e7670de3446016916510dfe722ce671570121d91331a64feb3d03f210e6":"b2dc1e548b3d3f225a34082f4391980a0788b4cc36852fd64a423fb8e872252b248e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #20 (P=19, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c5e7147f56ba4530b8799ababeb82772":"2f3bf0b566440912a1e47a0c07f1cfd39cb440":"bdd38e173fb20b981659c597d6":"3a069a2bfda44abbb0a82a97e5e9047258c803da2c66190d77149e0f010b3af9":"bd6265dcba9e14c59e515e395dc60bd053345fa6d7568c738e3a7fdf142d8f2d1562c0" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #21 (P=20, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c12":"4802422c9b3b4459ba26e7863ad87b0c172cfe4b":"5de41a86ce3f3fb1b685b3ca4d":"e98a77f2a941b36232589486b05f4278275588665a06d98aec98915cc5607e06":"daea2234ea433533bf0716abe1aa3844b6d3c51e9d5ca3d8ec5065630d2de0717cdeb7d5" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #22 (P=21, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8883002bf13b3a94b2467225970df938":"d516bbff452e7706c91c7ace3e9baa76d65ff7050f":"818a702d5c8ee973b34e9acda1":"545aeac737c0ca2a3d5e1fd966840c3a0d71e0301abbe99c7af18d24cc7e9633":"b85242fdc06344f2bd9a97b408902ebcd22aece3d42f2da4dd4d817c9fa2d44bc02163a0a9" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #23 (P=22, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5cea00ee44cfb9cfbb598d3812e380ef":"33bfd0713f30fcac8f7f95920ac6d9b803ddd5480dd8":"948788a9c8188cb988430a7ebd":"50422c5e6a0fb8231b3bb6e2f89607019be6ad92a4dae8e0fe3f9e486476004b":"b168747dea3ae0fbede4402af9a3dc3185d6d162f859d828101682de32923788c70262b84814" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #24 (P=23, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cb83f77751e72711401cbbf4f61aa0ed":"eede01b08f9a303cdf14c99d7a45732972c6eff2a1db06":"c0b461b2e15b8b116ef9281704":"2bd112231f903fa0dff085db48a2e2a96ec0199249b005d5ab4c2eab753f9ad0":"feb114b7bd3b43497b62454a675a632c3546d2802462c6af57647efda119c59862cd5dd3904efc" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-128 #25 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"43c1142877d9f450e12d7b6db47a85ba":"b506a6ba900c1147c806775324b36eb376aa01d4c3eef6f5":"76becd9d27ca8a026215f32712":"6a59aacadd416e465264c15e1a1e9bfa084687492710f9bda832e2571e468224":"14b14fe5b317411392861638ec383ae40ba95fefe34255dc2ec067887114bc370281de6f00836ce4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #1 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"086e2967cde99e90faaea8a94e168bf0e066c503a849a9f3":"":"929542cd690f1babcf1696cb03":"58f70bab24e0a6137e5cd3eb18656f2b5ccddc3f538a0000c65190e4a3668e71":"3bf9d93af6ffac9ac84cd3202d4e0cc8" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #2 (P=1, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"992d38768b11a236945bd4b327c3728fac24c091238b6553":"1c":"b248a90b84b0122a5ad8e12760":"27cabc40da0e1eda0ea5f8abbb7c179e30776250a7b30d711b0e106c5ee9d84a":"1a96f58c3f38c44d1a345f3e2da6679f20" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #3 (P=2, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5012db40ff6ae23c1e1ce43768c5936c4400b0e79ae77f30":"0c6c":"b67e500b35d60ad7264240027c":"40affd355416200191ba64edec8d7d27ead235a7b2e01a12662273deb36379b8":"c996ef3d6ef9f981557506ecc8797bbaaaa7" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #4 (P=3, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fa15cc7f0de294d7341b1fd79326c8be78e67822343c1992":"bcb898":"e5257aed2bda0495aa44591db4":"31a0338c3839931fa1dd5131cb796c4c6cfde9fb336d8a80ac35dec463be7a94":"68f08298d9a2147776dca9c1a42382bce323b2" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #5 (P=4, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b5330a8447d74a7987fb718cfae246b5c7e057991064eeaf":"b46b343e":"2ef29d62b40d8643848797cde8":"1225b036e6044df52314016760e92750de0936120395de750a2c54a7fa0cea82":"c2c39d6f9344e2de064f269d065a2a6108605916" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #6 (P=5, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"30419145ae966591b408c29e5fd14d9112542909be5363f7":"8ceaeb89fd":"27e6b2a482bbc6f13702005708":"e04e81e860daf9696098c723085d8023c240ebe7a643131e35359ab04bd650fe":"ec9d5ed36243ddf77b33d8cf2963ba76fd4e19f3c5" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #7 (P=6, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"748ad503388a34041a7bdae6361d57894357c333bacf02ca":"24d6880aed7e":"518b79d194579b19f2d8845b70":"691dd98f61fd213b0840ec5a6f06ef9a1420be0d59bde5e43546347a2a865a94":"270120f9634ec15536e21d961c675070ec4cff9037bc" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #8 (P=7, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b930cca30a3fd230c237c8f3cc6792d0c4084dff5c18d775":"2a755e362373ef":"7574802fd82fe96c05431acd40":"1cf83928b6a9e525fe578c5c0f40c322be71b3092239bff954dd6883738d6d71":"f06238b0450fd1f4b6cab1383adb420c4724aa7bdfefb7" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #9 (P=8, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"314c136999e41d137bd7ba17201a9fa406025868334e39b3":"4d54d8b06b204445":"65f7a0f4c0f5bba9d26f7e0ddb":"5c7ce4819b30b975ae6ce58dcc1bfa29a8b6dda8f4b76c7e23516487745e829c":"2baf90c490b11f9607482362ab3f157c42d0e9c6c5cffcf0" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #10 (P=9, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a19f6be062ec0aaf33046bd52734f3336c85d8368bef86ab":"13511ae5ff6c6860a1":"7f2d07f8169c5672b4df7f6cac":"d68d5f763db6111c5d6324d694cb0236beab877daae8115ecb75d60530777b58":"b3859b757802ebd048467fd8e139eb9ee8fcdca45ed87dc1c8" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #11 (P=10, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"de1c8263345081d2dfa9afdf37675971135e178df554a4d8":"f777aba1fa70f94e6de9":"a301bb82f91a582db01355c388":"9ad52c041390d0d4aaf65a4667c3239c95e7eae6178acc23fb4e70a852d483c6":"9d8bff6d2dcde77104ac6aba025abc01416a7ca9f096ab2529cb" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #12 (P=11, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"248d36bd15f58e47fcf1c948272355821f8492e6e69f3661":"33709d9c7906e2f82dd9e2":"9e8d492c304cf6ad59102bca0e":"9ec08c7ed6b70823d819e9ab019e9929249f966fdb2069311a0ddc680ac468f5":"9114d36b79b1918b2720f40cddce66df9b4802f737bea4bd8f5378" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #13 (P=12, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"77a67fb504b961028633321111aac2c30eb6d71a8cf72056":"10554c062d269ff6dcd98493":"acadc0330194906f8c75ac287f":"8c18486d52571f70f2ba6a747aaa3d4b3ebc2e481ee1b70907dddb94bdfa0ca6":"7f8b0cad79b545e5addf0b04ff4b0f2b2a5067283210aba8630d0306" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0d423519e4110c06063061323f8c7c95387776b6ee4e4b6e":"4021ff104ff1dbd91e46db249f":"39abe53826d9b8e300fe747533":"cdd9bf1b4f865e922c678ec4947ea0cb02e78bd5c1538f33aeb818ad3f47e519":"7953d3cd66d093785d123f65ba37f16761dd6aedbfc789ad96edf1490d" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #15 (P=14, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a60cf7ceb62bf3118532bc61daa25ce946991047f951b536":"d64f9426febce6a84c954dd5ded5":"7499494faa44a7576f9ed5580d":"baa482c64eefd09118549a8968f44cfea7a436913a428e30aa4ab44802a4ba35":"f7580f17266d68237747bf57c7ed8242ac1a1979c5a9e7bc67d7698c7efa" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #16 (P=15, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"82d4bc9aac298b09112073277205e1bf42176d1e6339b76c":"25a53fd3e476dc0860eeeea25fcb0c":"70325ef19e581b743095cd5eb1":"6d14bb2635c5d0ae83687f1824279cf141173527e1b32d1baf8a27f7fe34a542":"4a1cfd0023557a184b929965b0a445cb3993ca35acf354cb2b4254ff672e7f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #17 (P=16, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6873f1c6c30975aff6f08470264321130a6e5984ade324e9":"5051a0b0b6766cd6ea29a672769d40fe":"7c4d2f7cec04361f187f0726d5":"77743b5d83a00d2c8d5f7e10781531b496e09f3bc9295d7ae9799e64668ef8c5":"0ce5ac8d6b256fb7580bf6acc76426af40bce58fd4cd6548df90a0337c842004" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #18 (P=17, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3cf8da27d5be1af024158985f725fd7a6242cbe0041f2c17":"f6dd2c64bf597e63263ccae1c54e0805fe":"07f77f114d7264a122a7e9db4f":"30457e99616f0247f1339b101974ea231904d0ef7bd0d5ee9b57c6c16761a282":"ce3031c3a70600e9340b2ddfe56aa72cffdc5e53e68c51ee55b276eb3f85d2cf63" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #19 (P=18, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b46a3a24c66eb846ca6413c001153dc6998970c12e7acd5a":"56d18d3e2e496440d0a5c9e1bcb464faf5bc":"b79c33c96a0a90030694163e2a":"ea9405d6a46cac9783a7b48ac2e25cc9a3a519c4658b2a8770a37240d41587fb":"01baba2e0d5b49d600d03a7ed84ee878926c0ca478f40a6fbde01f584d938a1c91bf" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #20 (P=19, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7b71045ccef735bd0c5bea3cf3b7e16e58d9c62061a204e0":"890d05420d57e3b3d8dbef117fe60c3fa6a095":"2b9ecfd179242c295fe6c6fa55":"b89166f97deb9cc7fdeb63639eeafb145895b307749ec1a293b27115f3aa8232":"f842ff6662684de8785af275fa2d82d587de0687ebe35e883cbd53b82f2a4624c03894" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #21 (P=20, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dc7c67715f2709e150cceff020aaacf88a1e7568191acbcf":"f383bd3e6270876b74abbb5d35e7d4f11d83412c":"da56ea046990c70fa216e5e6c4":"f799818d91be7bab555a2e39f1f45810a94d07179f94fe1151d95ab963c47611":"377b5df263c5c74f63603692cbb61ea37b6d686c743f71e15490ca41d245768988719ede" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #22 (P=21, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f41e369a1599627e76983e9a4fc2e963dab4960b09ebe390":"81ad3f386bedcbf656ff535c63580d1f87e3c72326":"68ef8285b90f28bcd3cb1bacea":"dbe3e82e49624d968f5463ceb8af189fb3ad8b3b4122142b110d848a286dae71":"9f6028153e06d14d30b862a99a35413413c04a49dc6f68a03a11cf00d58f062a7b36465d13" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #23 (P=22, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3289e59e3a7b29bf4a309afc253030bba4b9bdd64f0722f9":"53911a67b65738f87fc7c20d6db8044bde1af95838d1":"30259ce106e9bd7a8bacbaf212":"2870bd9a26c510e9a256920899bbc77a4eb9b53f927045a943d5ed6b13638cf3":"70cf37d4b6f7e707376b1574ce17c040b5143da47abb2fe9afafc2fccd98ccf63b0fdec30eac" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #24 (P=23, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"40f1aff2e44d05f12126097a0f07ac0359ba1a609356a4e6":"8d98c580fb366f330dbfda20f91d99a0878b47efd14c6d":"0df3fc6396f851785fca9aa5ff":"e9699b20b0574fce8b5cbc4ef792eb96e2c1cce36b1b1f06ea2a95fe300633cc":"579cdf9da62a2df471e03450516adb4ce99ae0f70b1776a39c3b429a1f922fac0b59e29a122e43" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-192 #25 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"91f9d636a071c3aad1743137e0644a73de9e47bd76acd919":"4eaf9384cad976f65f98042d561d760b5a787330dc658f6c":"1bf491ac320d660eb2dd45c6c3":"3bdfd7f18d2b6d0804d779f0679aaa2d7d32978c2df8015ae4b758d337be81dd":"635530cab14e3d0a135bb6eebb5829412676e6dd4995f99cb7e17f235bd660e7e17b2c65320e9fd4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #1 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c6c14c655e52c8a4c7e8d54e974d698e1f21ee3ba717a0adfa6136d02668c476":"":"291e91b19de518cd7806de44f6":"b4f8326944a45d95f91887c2a6ac36b60eea5edef84c1c358146a666b6878335":"ca482c674b599046cc7d7ee0d00eec1e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #2 (P=1, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cc49d4a397887cb57bc92c8a8c26a7aac205c653ef4011c1f48390ad35f5df14":"1a":"6df8c5c28d1728975a0b766cd7":"080f82469505118842e5fa70df5323de175a37609904ee5e76288f94ca84b3c5":"a5f24e87a11a95374d4c190945bf08ef2f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #3 (P=2, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"36b0175379e7ae19c277fe656a2252a82796309be0f0d4e1c07fdde88aca4510":"be80":"021bd8b551947be4c18cf1a455":"b5c6e8313b9c68e6bb84bffd65fa4108d243f580eab99bb80563ed1050c8266b":"ecacc3152e43d9efea26e16c1d1793e2a8c4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #4 (P=3, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ddb739acda6c56ec9aefc4f4cbc258587f443da4e76ddfa85dbe0813a8784944":"db457c":"0bddf342121b82f906368b0d7b":"887486fff7922768186363ef17eb78e5cf2fab8f47a4eb327de8b16d63b02acb":"54473c3f65d6be431e79700378049ac06f2599" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #5 (P=4, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"62b82637e567ad27c3066d533ed76e314522ac5c53851a8c958ce6c64b82ffd0":"87294078":"5bc2896d8b81999546f88232ab":"fffb40b0d18cb23018aac109bf62d849adca42629d8a9ad1299b83fe274f9a63":"2bc22735ab21dfdcfe95bd83592fb6b4168d9a23" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #6 (P=5, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"bc29a16e19cfbe32bf4948e8e4484159bc819b7eec504e4441a1a98ca210e576":"3e8c6d1b12":"4f18bcc8ee0bbb80de30a9e086":"574931ae4b24bdf7e9217eca6ce2a07287999e529f6e106e3721c42dacf00f5d":"45f3795fcf9c66e1a43103d9a18f5fba5fab83f994" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #7 (P=6, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5f4b4f97b6aa48adb3336c451aac377fde4adf47897fd9ccdf139f33be76b18c":"1b62ad19dcac":"7a76eac44486afdb112fc4aab9":"a66c980f6621e03ff93b55d5a148615c4ad36d6cbdd0b22b173b4b1479fb8ff7":"4ad1fcf57c12b14e0e659a6305b4aeffae82f8a66c94" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #8 (P=7, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f7aaeff3a1dc0cc5ecf220c67ad9f6dda060b4f1be3cc609cb4f18b2342a88a2":"d48daa2919348d":"d0d6871b9adc8623ac63faf00f":"e97175c23c5b47da8ce67811c6d60a7499b3b7e1347ad860519285b67201fe38":"eb32ab153a8e092fa325bafc176a07c31e6cc0a852d288" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #9 (P=8, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"493e14623cd250058a7fc66a3fee0c24b6e363b966c2314aff53b276b6c2ea7b":"e5653e512d8b0b70":"fe2d8ae8da94a6df563f89ce00":"579a637e37a0974cd2fc3b735d9ed088e8e488ffe210f043e0f9d2079a015ad6":"75d31f8d47bee5c4e2ba537355ae8ab25cc9ed3511ff5053" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #10 (P=9, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b23255372455c69244a0210e6a9e13b155a5ec9d6d0900e54a8f4d9f7a255e3a":"615d724ae94a5daf8d":"274846196d78f0af2df5860231":"69adcae8a1e9a3f2fe9e62591f7b4c5b19d3b50e769521f67e7ea8d7b58d9fc8":"f019ae51063239287d896e7127f17d13f98013b420219eb877" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #11 (P=10, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dbf06366f766e2811ecd5d4384d6d08336adc37e0824d620cf0d9e7fd1e7afa9":"2e3cf0af8c96c7b22719":"b3503ed4e277ed9769b20c10c0":"9ae5a04baa9d02c8854e609899c6240851cbc83f81f752bc04c71affa4eed385":"e317df43ab46eb31be7e76f2730d771d56099a0c8d2703d7a24e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #12 (P=11, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4dd555bd3a5253a90b68b5d4d46bd050340ee07ddad3a72048c657b5d76bb207":"8015c0f07a7acd4b1cbdd2":"bdb1b82ba864893c2ee8f7426c":"9bcc5848e928ba0068f7a867e79e83a6f93593354a8bfcfc306aeeb9821c1da1":"8e9f80c726980b3d42e43a6512a0481255b729a10f9edb5f07c60c" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #13 (P=12, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d3ad8cda9a0d91a205c4c05665728bb255d50a83403c9ab9243fcbbe95ae7906":"a203aeb635e195bc33fd42fa":"0b5f69697eb1af24e8e6fcb605":"ea26ea68facdac3c75ba0cdf7b1ad703c9474af83b3fbfc58e548d776b2529b9":"62666297a809c982b50722bd56bc555899345e0404b2938edf33168e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #14 (P=13, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e300fc7a5b96806382c35af5b2c2e8e26382751b59010d4b1cfc90a4a9cb06df":"8714eb9ecf8bdb13e919de40f9":"55b59eb434dd1ba3723ee0dc72":"9b1d85384cb6f47c0b13514a303d4e1d95af4c6442691f314a401135f07829ec":"ba6063824d314aa3cbab14b8c54c6520dac0f073856d9b9010b7857736" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #15 (P=14, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3ae5be5904bae62609ac525e2d1cad90133447573d7b608975a6a2b16cb2efc0":"959403e0771c21a416bd03f38983":"61bf06b9fa5a450d094f3ddcb5":"0245484bcd987787fe97fda6c8ffb6e7058d7b8f7064f27514afaac4048767fd":"37a346bc4909965c5497838251826385a52c68914e9d1f63fd297ee6e7ed" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #16 (P=15, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fab62b3e5deda7a9c1128663cc81c44b74ab1bfe70bc1c9dec7c7fd08173b80a":"54be71705e453177b53c92bbf2ab13":"a5c1b146c82c34b2e6ebeceb58":"5e60b02b26e2d5f752eb55ea5f50bb354a6f01b800cea5c815ff0030b8c7d475":"788db949697b8cd9abbc74ed9aa40cd6852dc829469368491149d6bb140071" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #17 (P=16, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ee8ce187169779d13e443d6428e38b38b55dfb90f0228a8a4e62f8f535806e62":"d15f98f2c6d670f55c78a06648332bc9":"121642c4218b391c98e6269c8a":"718d13e47522ac4cdf3f828063980b6d452fcdcd6e1a1904bf87f548a5fd5a05":"cc17bf8794c843457d899391898ed22a6f9d28fcb64234e1cd793c4144f1da50" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #18 (P=17, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7da6ef35ad594a09cb74daf27e50a6b30d6b4160cf0de41ee32bbf2a208b911d":"b0053d1f490809794250d856062d0aaa92":"98a32d7fe606583e2906420297":"217d130408a738e6a833931e69f8696960c817407301560bbe5fbd92361488b4":"a6341ee3d60eb34a8a8bc2806d50dd57a3f628ee49a8c2005c7d07d354bf80994d" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #19 (P=18, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0786706f680c27b792d054faa63f499a8e6b5ddb90502946235bf74c022d772c":"6a26677836d65bd0d35a027d278b2534e7df":"f61ef1c8c10a863efeb4a1de86":"67874c808600a27fcab34d6f69cc5c730831ad4589075dd82479823cb9b41dc3":"d1c1f3c60603359c7d6a707f05ecb2296f8e52f2210b7a798ad5c778ee7cfd7fe6e0" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #20 (P=19, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"bac55f9847d93325bf5071c220c0a3dfeb38f214292d47b4acb7b0a597fe056f":"c1a994dc198f5676ea85801cd27cc8f47267ec":"05b50c458adbba16c55fcc454d":"89ad6ae1e550975eaa916a62615e6b6a66366a17a7e06380a95ea5cdcc1d3302":"7c9b138177590edaafec4728c4663e77458ffbe3243faec177de4a2e4a293952073e43" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #21 (P=20, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8beedeb85d42c2a7fa6f7237b05acb197dd8e1672471ac878064fe5319eab876":"7b125c3b9612a8b554913d0384f4795c90cd387c":"8479bdfad28ebe781e9c01a3f6":"7aebdfd955d6e8a19a701d387447a4bdd59a9382156ab0c0dcd37b89419d6eff":"6cc611d816b18c6847b348e46a4119465104254a04e2dfeeeac9c3255f6227704848d5b2" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #22 (P=21, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c3a0c126cad581012151c25cf85a44472c23f83b6095b6004f4f32cd60ec2db2":"73b09d18554471309141aa33b687f9248b50fe3154":"94ab51ce75db8b046d6ab92830":"2a243246bfe5b5ab05f51bf5f401af52d5bbaa2549cf57a18e197597fe15dd8c":"b7e8264ca70fd2a4fb76f20a8ad5da3c37f5893fb12abeeaef1187f815ca481ed8ddd3dd37" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #23 (P=22, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9cdebaeee8690b68751070691f49593668a6de12d3a948b38ddbd3f75218b2d4":"3cbb08f133270e4454bcaaa0f20f6d63c38b6572e766":"af1a97d43151f5ea9c48ad36a3":"f5353fb6bfc8f09d556158132d6cbb97d9045eacdc71f782bcef62d258b1950a":"3966930a2ae8fdd8f40e7007f3fde0bd6eb48a46e6d26eef83da9f6384b1a2bda10790dadb3f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #24 (P=23, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d34264a12c35cdd67ac105e2826b071e46f8131d1e325f8e0ae80a6447375135":"79ac1a6a9eca5e07ce635bfd666ef72b16f3f2e140d56c":"3891e308b9f44c5b5a8b59004a":"0cda000ed754456a844c9ed61843deea9dadf5e723ea1448057712996d660f8c":"1abcc9b1649deaa0bfa7dcd23508282d9c50ca7fee72486950608d7bcb39dcf03a2cab01587f61" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VPT AES-256 #25 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4ad98dbef0fb2a188b6c49a859c920967214b998435a00b93d931b5acecaf976":"9cea3b061e5c402d48497ea4948d75b8af7746d4e570c848":"00d772b07788536b688ff2b84a":"5f8b1400920891e8057639618183c9c847821c1aae79f2a90d75f114db21e975":"f28ec535c2d834963c85814ec4173c0b8983dff8dc4a2d4e0f73bfb28ad42aa8f75f549a93594dd4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-128 #1 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c0425ed20cd28fda67a2bcc0ab342a49":"4f065a23eeca6b18d118e1de4d7e5ca1a7c0e556d786d407":"37667f334dce90":"0b3e8d9785c74c8f41ea257d4d87495ffbbb335542b12e0d62bb177ec7a164d9":"768fccdf4898bca099e33c3d40565497dec22dd6e33dcf4384d71be8565c21a455db45816da8158c" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-128 #2 (P=24, N=8, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0b6256bd328a4cda2510d527c0f73ed4":"78a292662b8e05abc2d44fbefd0840795e7493028015d9f2":"21fd9011d6d9484a":"66ff35c4f86ad7755b149e14e299034763023e7384f4af8c35277d2c7e1a7de2":"5a0be834c57b59d47a4590d8d19a1206d3c06e937a9b57f74034d9fdb43c3f48932aa72177b23bf6" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-128 #3 (P=24, N=9, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"afdccc84f257cb768b7ad735edbd1990":"56d0942490e546798f30d3c60ad4e3e110fc04f5b1c1fa83":"b7776aa998f4d1189b":"9f9ac464de508b98e789243fdb32db458538f8a291ed93ddf8aeaacfbfc371aa":"96f124c74fd737819008ddef440320f4a3733d0062c83c893e259aecf12ba08f2a2e966a3341d6d4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-128 #4 (P=24, N=10, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6ccb68d3838d4ddf660b9cd904cad40f":"5ea35c082e2b190e9d98e6b2daad8672f587b4f2968072fc":"c4fb7519a19f13d9d1fc":"092e64fef08b5655a86cdb8de63ffaa7772e8730844e9016141af8bad2216246":"cda5fe3d15d00150b99120c7f206b88a4c2c4a39ca9143425603ab284a73a38cc916f8b653c92ab4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-128 #5 (P=24, N=11, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e6ab9e70a4fb51b01c2e262233e64c0d":"ba15916733550d7aa82b2f6b117cd3f54c83ddc16cd0288a":"74e689eb5af9441dd690a6":"42f6518ee0fbe42f28e13b4bb2eb60517b37c9744394d9143393a879c3e107c7":"dcc151443288f35d39ed8fae6f0ce1d1eb656f4f7fd65c0b16f322ce85d7c54e71ac560fd4da9651" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-128 #6 (P=24, N=12, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"005e8f4d8e0cbf4e1ceeb5d87a275848":"b6f345204526439daf84998f380dcfb4b4167c959c04ff65":"0ec3ac452b547b9062aac8fa":"2f1821aa57e5278ffd33c17d46615b77363149dbc98470413f6543a6b749f2ca":"9575e16f35da3c88a19c26a7b762044f4d7bbbafeff05d754829e2a7752fa3a14890972884b511d8" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-128 #7 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ac87fef3b76e725d66d905625a387e82":"959403e0771c21a416bd03f3898390e90d0a0899f69f9552":"61bf06b9fa5a450d094f3ddcb5":"0245484bcd987787fe97fda6c8ffb6e7058d7b8f7064f27514afaac4048767fd":"cabf8aa613d5357aa3e70173d43f1f202b628a61d18e8b572eb66bb8213a515aa61e5f0945cd57f4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-192 #1 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ceb009aea4454451feadf0e6b36f45555dd04723baa448e8":"c8d275f919e17d7fe69c2a1f58939dfe4d403791b5df1310":"764043c49460b7":"6e80dd7f1badf3a1c9ab25c75f10bde78c23fa0eb8f9aaa53adefbf4cbf78fe4":"8a0f3d8229e48e7487fd95a28ad392c80b3681d4fbc7bbfd2dd6ef1c45d4ccb723dc074414db506d" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-192 #2 (P=24, N=8, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1dd56442fa09a42890b1b4274b950770ea8beea2e048193d":"bd92d6744cde446fc8621625658fc4bc00dcb97f06195ad7":"ad749d596d88a4b4":"c67219909828adef64422286008e1e306867a1c0b3da95444507a68b45c953e4":"076cffd0ca978fe2bad411ced45a090abafb22a99896f6a75a1969276aa2b0cdb37ccaf2845dbf6e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-192 #3 (P=24, N=9, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8cc622645065c72d0d2aca75802cf1bbbd81096721627c08":"597b3614ff9cd567afd1aad4e5f52cc3fa4ca32b9b213c55":"cd84acbe9abb6a990a":"447b6f36acdad2d1cfd6e9a92f4055ad90142e61f4a19927caea9dbe634d3208":"2d7fb83e6621eed9073e0386d032c6941bef37b2cf36a4c6c5e36222d17c6fb0631c3f560a3ce4a4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-192 #4 (P=24, N=10, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ab72eef2aba30205c986e2052d6e2c67881d24ae5fceaa8f":"2a794b84fc9e4a7e6d70a82b5141fd132177a86b4e8fc13a":"d7a46e726ed43f1580eb":"baa86f14271b2be7dbb37ddc7c95ce4857e57aa94624d594d7bd6ceeaada8d5f":"2d7f76464417613bb61d3657481346b74fc9d6abc6a3babd39365dce86859cd82395d11bfc8cf188" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-192 #5 (P=24, N=11, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"af84c6f302c59aeee6d5728ed5da2e3c64a5a781c52c4d1b":"6db41aeb5f7c24df8929dbc30483b3c7934b3bd1cdce5bb9":"df990c42a268950677c433":"a6ab5d78427f297a4b7e21f1091ff3a5b20caa3fe1cbcb09459d9df596a6c8e1":"8c9328258bf71970d33e23a3ff81cc1c9cbe196a1294264bfd6a7255e4801963bb30a63de3fc5b82" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-192 #6 (P=24, N=12, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d49b255aed8be1c02eb6d8ae2bac6dcd7901f1f61df3bbf5":"062eafb0cd09d26e65108c0f56fcc7a305f31c34e0f3a24c":"1af29e721c98e81fb6286370":"64f8a0eee5487a4958a489ed35f1327e2096542c1bdb2134fb942ca91804c274":"721344e2fd05d2ee50713531052d75e4071103ab0436f65f0af2a663da51bac626c9f4128ba5ec0b" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-192 #7 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"36ad1e3fb630d1b1fbccfd685f44edd8984427b78deae7a9":"8b9db1c8f9b4892a5654c85467bcffa2e15e28392c938952":"3af625df8be9d7685a842f260e":"308443033ecd4a814475672b814b7c6d813d0ec2a0caeecbcaba18a2840cdb6c":"6bc6890fee299c712fb8d9df9c141f24ee1572b8f15112c2f8c99ccf2d82788cf613a61d60dae458" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-256 #1 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"553521a765ab0c3fd203654e9916330e189bdf951feee9b44b10da208fee7acf":"644eb34b9a126e437b5e015eea141ca1a88020f2d5d6cc2c":"aaa23f101647d8":"a355d4c611812e5f9258d7188b3df8851477094ffc2af2cf0c8670db903fbbe0":"27ed90668174ebf8241a3c74b35e1246b6617e4123578f153bdb67062a13ef4e986f5bb3d0bb4307" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-256 #2 (P=24, N=8, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"472bf7946bce1d3c6f168f4475e5bb3a67d5df2fa01e64bce8bb6e43a6c8b177":"59eb45bbbeb054b0b97334d53580ce03f699ac2a7e490143":"790134a8db83f2da":"a7a86a4407b7ecebc89434baa65ef173e88bd2dad9899b717ca578867c2d916f":"db4961070f528ccd1a5a0681ee4d0ce3515fb890bccedc2dbc00b1d8b2bc393a8d09e87af7811f55" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-256 #3 (P=24, N=9, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"58ae7965a508e8dd2eda69b5d888a28a1cb3783bad55d59d5b0da87137b72e93":"e61bad17640ecff926d0b0238271ee4c9f8e801dd7243e9e":"caa3d928d2bf2b7f2c":"304678b3ffd3200e33a8912bcb556b3cfec53ca17f70ecba00d359f9f51d3e3b":"7bb1137c14cb4d324a4a8f1115c619ebf74927f0bed60a8d5a9140ff50dc4da375c7d2de80de097f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-256 #4 (P=24, N=10, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"aecc5e18088bf9fd7b17f089bdd5607b69903b04b726361f8a81e221b1c91891":"d4291c99901345afe29f58912a414a7498f37b44362bdf3c":"c527d309ab29ee91c5fc":"8f9a73e7bc1c11e2919020ba3a404cbddf861e9e78477218e3be2cd4337b278d":"392784a9e0b14bcd37639ec5409d6ead3e75f855e5a92c33ffc040ef3977e0035ce6ea6d157c18d3" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-256 #5 (P=24, N=11, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"97bc7482a87ba005475dfa3448f59d4b3f9c4c969d08b39b1b21ef965c0f5125":"b99bf4dc781795fc4d3a8467b06e1665d4e543657f23129f":"0bcf78103ec52d6df28887":"049c10f0cb37ae08eae2d0766563b7c5a8454f841c2061a4f71a0a2158ae6ce5":"0d3891fa0caac1f7ebe41b480920ffd34d4155064c24f3b17a483163dd8f228d1f20cd4f86cf38fd" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-256 #6 (P=24, N=12, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d6ff67379a2ead2ca87aa4f29536258f9fb9fc2e91b0ed18e7b9f5df332dd1dc":"98626ffc6c44f13c964e7fcb7d16e988990d6d063d012d33":"2f1d0717a822e20c7cd28f0a":"d50741d34c8564d92f396b97be782923ff3c855ea9757bde419f632c83997630":"50e22db70ac2bab6d6af7059c90d00fbf0fb52eee5eb650e08aca7dec636170f481dcb9fefb85c05" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VNT AES-256 #7 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4a75ff2f66dae2935403cce27e829ad8be98185c73f8bc61d3ce950a83007e11":"205f2a664a8512e18321a91c13ec13b9e6b633228c57cc1e":"46eb390b175e75da6193d7edb6":"282f05f734f249c0535ee396282218b7c4913c39b59ad2a03ffaf5b0e9b0f780":"58f1584f761983bef4d0060746b5d5ee610ecfda31101a7f5460e9b7856d60a5ad9803c0762f8176" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #1 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d24a3d3dde8c84830280cb87abad0bb3":"7c86135ed9c2a515aaae0e9a208133897269220f30870006":"f1100035bb24a8d26004e0e24b":"":"1faeb0ee2ca2cd52f0aa3966578344f24e69b742c4ab37ab1123301219c70599b7c373ad4b3ad67b" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #2 (P=24, N=13, A=1, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"08b0da255d2083808a1b4d367090bacc":"1b156d7e2bf7c9a25ad91cff7b0b02161cb78ff9162286b0":"777828b13679a9e2ca89568233":"dd":"e8b80af4960d5417c15726406e345c5c46831192b03432eed16b6282283e16602331bcca9d51ce76" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #3 (P=24, N=13, A=2, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1538cc03b60880bf3e7d388e29f27739":"e7b819a853ffe79baaa72097ff0d04f02640ae62bcfd3da5":"9e734de325026b5d7128193973":"c93c":"1d8f42f9730424fa27240bd6277f4882604f440324b11b003ca01d874439b4e1f79a26d8c6dc433a" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #4 (P=24, N=13, A=3, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f149e41d848f59276cfddd743bafa9a9":"9759e6f21f5a588010f57e6d6eae178d8b20ab59cda66f42":"14b756d66fc51134e203d1c6f9":"f5827e":"f634bf00f1f9f1f93f41049d7f3797b05e805f0b14850f4e78e2a23411147a6187da6818506232ee" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #5 (P=24, N=13, A=4, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9a57a22c7f26feff8ca6cceff214e4c2":"035c516776c706a7dd5f181fa6aa891b04dd423042ea0667":"88f30fd2b04fb8ddbce8fc26e6":"a95bdff6":"b92f7ec2ebecebdbd2977b3874e61bf496a382153b2529fc9b6443a35f329b2068916fb6ab8227eb" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #6 (P=24, N=13, A=5, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"54caf96ef6d448734700aadab50faf7a":"c69f7c5a50f3e72123371bbfd6bdf532b99ef78500508dfe":"a3803e752ae849c910d8da36af":"5f476348dd":"20c43ad83610880249f1632dd418ec9a5ed333b50e996d1a4e5a32fbe7961b832b722bc07a18595b" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #7 (P=24, N=13, A=6, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cc0c084d7de011e2f031616a302e7a31":"15b369889699b6de1fa3ee73e5fe19814e46f129074c965b":"f0b4522847f6f8336fe534a4e7":"da853a27aee2":"f39755d160a64611368a8eccf6fcbc45ef7f1f56240eb19a2e3ca4ec3c776ab58843f617d605fd72" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #8 (P=24, N=13, A=7, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d7572ed0e37261efa02f8c83e695efdc":"1edef80c57d17f969f8bde10ab38a1a8811a124de72c526e":"f4f96d7b4384a3930b3d830f82":"922340ec94861f":"de14558cc686e1836f1f121ea1b941a9ebd4f0fb916dc870fd541b988a801cb5751c7faaf5b0c164" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #9 (P=24, N=13, A=8, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"98a42d7a0c5917deaf3b4de3f0cbe0a1":"9aa9c8358117564371366beeec923051ef433252197aaad5":"03d33ab0c2df7bfce88b5ee4c4":"2d5438b728b950d9":"9ff942baa60f440c17a78e9581216b9a947a67f04d54911feecfff971fdfaa856310b014aa59c978" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #10 (P=24, N=13, A=9, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2a68e3fe746f593c1b97cb637079c3e5":"13b4a874888db0e5d8fd814b5e7e04f7fdfbc1601ccc02bc":"cd62d0f27b7f4864dc7c343acd":"abe4f1d3812bfe3ccf":"032835a3dbf688d09cf2a32a92b101959d33ff47500f92f4fd49840440f866d1a22b0854996111d8" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #11 (P=24, N=13, A=10, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"46b067cf9b1a28cf187002e90b14e130":"cc0915194218d4536e467433cd6d79ff1d9eb9ff160ab684":"bad8c03292bf01cfd8d34f860c":"8d65880eddb9fd96d276":"bd56edc015692c6ab9bec493a9893863598414a3d11a6a0f27ecdcb257d0d30491e5bf1aa8f90958" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #12 (P=24, N=13, A=11, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e94dac9c90984790a7c0c867536615ff":"4d64461c55eb16bf7b9120f22be349598f2f394da8460dc6":"c19f06f91e645d4199365f18c0":"537038b5357e358a930bd6":"e9fc5004c2359724e1e4411ae6f834ef6bea046d549753c88790c1648f461a31c84e62ea8592a074" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #13 (P=24, N=13, A=12, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f6bb5d59b0fa9de0828b115303bf94aa":"011fc50329bfd63a85ebd4f7693363602f1a4147371270b7":"05358f33e1fc6a53ab5a5c98ce":"040b25771239cc2a39446e3c":"4432d7eb42980734d34f19c50cf8abf71ac1b19ed75a727854e5d050a405f755047d09cb0f49546a" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d1da2e961e78063af8de41865b226873":"8e5fa1a6662a8378cda15697e926841594f2f394fa5a34ab":"03739f5474857006340cce554d":"e3afd091d2b588465872a6300f":"ca0d95e3ff186ad6b88d45fc4079e6b7b4a615e7e8dd5f4742d522cc9dc19c47a4fa0b1528069cf8" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #15 (P=24, N=13, A=14, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1eee667267ef10b03624cf9c341e3f75":"798e31cce0a83702a95171fb1162a17b9ce00ec3592ce262":"0630a3eae27e505c61c56e6560":"d24651ef0561282d3e20e834960c":"f3c3e52f1a1ff528a8d3783ee4e75f114e3e6416334815d2d9236d5c5c9319092078411b72c51ba8" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #16 (P=24, N=13, A=15, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dbbd26f5d9e970e4e384b2273961be5a":"553714e17a208a2eceb847a4a2d95088388b1ac8d8ca43e0":"0b1eabe504ef4822542e397fec":"477937301c83ba02d50760b603e0ea":"1c80213268bad5402c4dc9b5d836ab7499810d0d8a974716df9a0e986ab2890736423bb3772cec3e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #17 (P=24, N=13, A=16, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"10a7720f2e18f739c26924925af6b670":"e59782a9aea45f467b90e51a0fdf166baba05663def2d8b6":"8c4e7813ab9bce9dafee01c628":"a209941fab710fda38d11c68b13d930f":"e357b1ccdaca6f3506dc45279c2e4c59f5307a5fd6a99cd72341ea8c0785569973f90ee9ee645acc" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #18 (P=24, N=13, A=17, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6bffab1f4f4c1ff66b4a669b515b2f8d":"d91b12e8655dd92b1332fc1d71c391c96a17111562d90ba3":"ddb34d5e0140fb96d690e1a2b7":"5cbba9ea778e01af00afb2a934f28c7211":"d302e5b2d5d90433186b804cd7717e2db2f22cdc34fb2942ab30780a2c4f12af8f35350d65284c59" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #19 (P=24, N=13, A=18, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ae6136df9ab43631ef143515dacedbe7":"6a493c5ef3769ccc4101dbb2eb36e1e5bbc577a057ce0731":"c5c445792208a50c8e93d64aa3":"e04006b68c83a5dd4ceac3cde238e48895ae":"c7584c0203c2535c5702c6ae93b7cbfb066f4a055c627a180d6d676d11fce907b5c93fa1ed7bff2b" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #20 (P=24, N=13, A=19, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f1908328edf2996ebfc9655472ca5ad0":"eede01b08f9a303cdf14c99d7a45732972c6eff2a1db06eb":"4c693364546930b6c5250e2699":"4a3634e5028df97fbe00eb016e8ea4f1918faa":"90c850790b0b380f5aeb2488fdf43c9d5ef1759861e86f6e52570e769629dcc2e568737ba53a1195" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #21 (P=24, N=13, A=20, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"61cb8eb792e95d099a1455fb789d8d16":"6ad541695a37c32d73ff6d5f870abd5b0f362a8968c4fce0":"1f37b3e59137f2a60dc09d16ac":"09db3efac9473f713da630ae92c2c8604c61c51e":"e65fcc975865c1499b088b58ba163283085d8ca68dc3b235d89756e5d78753ef22c012ae34b39a20" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #22 (P=24, N=13, A=21, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"be1ed49e2cb0caf6b6a0940c58453b93":"a9eec383f63892521e4616fcbadc5485942ffaf4669c43a7":"b78ad129457681fa7346435b97":"161d92c7df1ebb0924719e066e08b95eb4914a5eda":"949be340720c4fdc4adc05cb777dd81a2549628d33fba07e62d2b338a7b34ebd9d85c244c952d681" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #23 (P=24, N=13, A=22, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"34ab6fd7f54a2e0276fcb7cf1e203aba":"8d164f598ea141082b1069776fccd87baf6a2563cbdbc9d1":"6091afb62c1a8eed4da5624dd7":"1ab5cc3d7b01dc74e6cf838bb565fea3187d33d552a2":"0d30ab07153b5153637969e6bd3539448c541e42b3d432fd7ef14622a9b621d1721b944c60f7fd67" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #24 (P=24, N=13, A=23, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ea96f90fbae12a857f5c97e0cba57943":"49db80f22bc267a70e5636dfbc8a21c83d9691fe4b9c3051":"21cc46d9ced1539b0ad946e600":"105258d2f25f62675aee975cfdb668aff833f05b61eb2a":"d2fcc8b7809b5fc07e44083e437d8180157f1782a9ce9f65c7fa9ee2e7cdc1b755258f2212a8a8f4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #25 (P=24, N=13, A=24, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"35b403a15212097085d6e2b77ec3d4f2":"7dd7396db6613eb80909a3b8c0029b624912aabedda0659b":"daa423bf9256c3fcc347a293aa":"d3c0ed74e5f25e4c1e479e1a51182bb018698ec267269149":"5b00cf8a66baa7fe22502ed6f4861af71fa64b550d643f95eee82c19ecba34280604b58d92dacd3f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #26 (P=24, N=13, A=25, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7a459aadb48f1a528edae71fcf698b84":"0b3d947de8632dc8ff752f619ba7c84716fac7a23e101641":"fa4616b715ea898772b0e89dd4":"0c0b4a45df5c3919c1e1669c5af5d398d9545e44307d95c481":"7db9f3f7dc26fc2adf58d4525d26d5601e977de5a7c33911a1138cff7b624f9908b5b4d7e90a824a" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #27 (P=24, N=13, A=26, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ca748225057f735f712ecc64791367f0":"e92cd0cb97afe4fb00c4f12e9b9abe1d08db98f49a27f461":"1341a6998eb1f50d4b710a13ac":"5fb96b045f494808c02014f06074bd45b8a8ad12b4cb448ec162":"82b666694232e86e82295beae66ae67d56aceb5d6b1484ceb4a6843ec16078038c10afedc41f5362" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #28 (P=24, N=13, A=27, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fdf2b2c7fcb3789b4e90abe607dca2af":"d7aa4efa5d75195a400018bd38f7d8cd53fdffe88df1837f":"a69ddc66e63a3415f21009d53a":"c76846da496ed87b9c0f65c6266c9a822224acde9775efb186a4a5":"150d9a8b78d9c04239d66207a1f95021bbb1b7c70d7c354825d05e5a2e76a90f6fe489fd74cab2a3" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #29 (P=24, N=13, A=28, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7d870d7e52d3053c65eefad47764cfeb":"109317556c21c969eda65a94176d7a11462c9ae18a865b6d":"37d888f4aa452d7bf217f5a529":"9610949f6d23d5b1f3989b2f4e524fab4f297a5bec8ddad4f16cb616":"4e6b967b1571c6d7b9e118b112b7ac949a4a175650316a242dd579cb0d201d22c86bbc7fbe47bd0d" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #30 (P=24, N=13, A=29, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8fcac40527c0e7ca8eaff265ca12c053":"78d1e96af8cebdcc7e7e2a4ddcfa34f6cf9a24fb85672ad7":"ae9f012fd9af60a400e20b1690":"9ce65598cd1f86afc9aaaf172809570cc306333c25523f863c6d0e0154":"9adb9a95a9379ad795d8d3ffd4e37a045160d6d727f974a6cb3b5151f327e65447e52c7525562c91" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #31 (P=24, N=13, A=30, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ddf9f150cc3f1c15e8e773663c5b061c":"79d8841ab83279724ce35e1a8abd4e158168dcf388ab4c3d":"98c5036b7d54da9a1177105600":"20c5ab290e6d97f53c74121951f39ba865b3acc465fa3f0fb8a591622277":"d00d29396ffa9e691290d746527777bf96a851f306d4da0b1816df1e0e82bb7bc8105930ad6a2232" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #32 (P=24, N=13, A=31, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b1dc81d116d94f5eced526b37c004b95":"54390715b6e7c7bd51a234db059a51ba030cf22ee00b7277":"97c8f69fb91b17299461fd8d63":"f8b08aa83bed09ca342249b2cf9e2b45a89dcfb8711a120395e455921af481":"cb629994c3418a662a8cde1b5f4d99aa7df66e24c53dc6df11297930fd44c63675b7cca70671ef4d" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-128 #33 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5a33980e71e7d67fd6cf171454dc96e5":"a34dfa24847c365291ce1b54bcf8d9a75d861e5133cc3a74":"33ae68ebb8010c6b3da6b9cb29":"eca622a37570df619e10ebb18bebadb2f2b49c4d2b2ff715873bb672e30fc0ff":"7a60fa7ee8859e283cce378fb6b95522ab8b70efcdb0265f7c4b4fa597666b86dd1353e400f28864" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #1 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"39f08a2af1d8da6212550639b91fb2573e39a8eb5d801de8":"15b369889699b6de1fa3ee73e5":"":"6342b8700edec97a960eb16e7cb1eb4412fb4e263ddd2206b090155d34a76c8324e5550c3ef426ed" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #2 (P=24, N=13, A=1, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9748798c0f3cc766795c8ce0e4c979c1930dfe7faefea84a":"100fa71462277d76ca81f2cfdb3d39d3894b0ca28074a0f0":"cdf4ba655acfe8e2134fa0542f":"67":"36e2415b4f888a6072f260d7e786d803be16f8b9cbee112d7ff74e3b05b7d7c13284573bd3e7e481" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #3 (P=24, N=13, A=2, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"393dcac5a28d77297946d7ab471ae03bd303ba3499e2ce26":"262f4ac988812500cb437f52f0c182148e85a0bec67a2736":"fe7329f343f6e726a90b11ae37":"1c8b":"e6d43f822ad168aa9c2e29c07f4592d7bbeb0203f418f3020ecdbc200be353112faf20e2be711908" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #4 (P=24, N=13, A=3, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a74abc4347e4be0acb0a73bb8f7d25c35bae13b77f80233a":"6372824bf416cd072a7ad0ae5f9f596c6127520c1b688ab4":"6a850e94940da8781159ba97ef":"a4490e":"b14a07bdc119d87611342c4c6935c5786ff1f9ae2eb49e6191c88a3cb4fbafcb8a4a157d587d7e39" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #5 (P=24, N=13, A=4, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"df052e95aea3769a433ce4e4e800b8418649bbe8c6297eb0":"e8c1a89228d8212f75c136bab7923a89f9fea18e781cb836":"ba356d392c3f700f4f2706a4ca":"8ffc0e3d":"66b5d782323925e1bd0a8413a9a5a881356453d5df2cbeb199b2e1e803550dcdde55fd66ecb45edd" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #6 (P=24, N=13, A=5, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"16d345606a315ad2406abbcb43cd8cabe948107ba6d17a72":"d3bef460223c81e4579c9d1d463ac5e0881685de1420a411":"d4ef3e9e04f1b7f20ffc5a022e":"a468f08d07":"abb85db49a9b1c8724ecbc734cc8373bd20083cfa4007b1cfe4d3a3bb25f89f692884be230c6035c" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #7 (P=24, N=13, A=6, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1c476cfd7dd300d961fd3f24a6fe0e80742b00851676ca63":"6f3938932b5c1280311e892280d8a822a828a0be7fdb1bcd":"e300fc7a5b96806382c35af5b2":"28130f938c45":"df48662fe134e75a85abc2cece2c3b6236c88a70fa792e9beadc9601adf9fbdf4e3e94b395b0a332" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #8 (P=24, N=13, A=7, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"79d1e38a70df1cf239be168833dcd0570bc8f37b3aa26c37":"83c24f3a77b83b4ef45277ba90225f3ba1722312f52b1a07":"8229d6d7e9e21fdc789bff5dcf":"076887d2abe900":"19d880f1d959a68f162de243d4a45747ace704613359b27218d1531a066de60a95d2924a6910e990" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #9 (P=24, N=13, A=8, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"72e6cebdaf88205c4e74428664bc0d7eb4687a272217b7ca":"54bc7e3c227df4e83252a5848fea12dfdb2d14b9e67c1629":"3820db475c7cb04a0f74d8e449":"f427c47e10c45bb3":"91e7baff2b42af63e26c87ce6991af22422c1f82906858b1721961de5c768f4d19bd3034f44f08d2" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #10 (P=24, N=13, A=9, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"39c03a0c8634047b1635348f284d3dc1e752ab40548eb337":"0662e63c88e963d3e0cf2c4653515ae4474a2c78ab0394c0":"9e2ea8eb7f56087ee506925648":"28d157f09a71da80dd":"01dcd4dd3b8c1369518136ce45e8bb9df565b0ad231a887b02ada34addf0aa2f4744ed2e07995491" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #11 (P=24, N=13, A=10, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e2a92ffbb0b5eb68cb82687f12449fae5167d375131b0b10":"048c9ba4597c3bb595bfd5048e5e9a1296f30e5c0118b177":"441ad5e1382e083a95224f395d":"2352648299b0413cb2ce":"25247a258e4ac0a988d8def60cc174a9d4578cd5346fb5150c96e8ab8774baa421f39c64a386c418" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #12 (P=24, N=13, A=11, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ef1ad3eb0bde7d4728389da2255d1f8a66ecb72e6f2f1ac4":"9f580cc6c62a05ce125c6bec109a48ca527ee26a64b14b68":"8e7d8a44244daa7df2b340993e":"521583c25eb4a3b2e46120":"ff0ff95bcb0bccd5e4aadd77ac6770f5013654eb3c6386fded2c87135861b43a99f258b6938f66e3" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #13 (P=24, N=13, A=12, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"44cba20b7204ed85327c9c71c6fea00b47ce7bdde9dea490":"6333bde218b784ccd8370492f7c8c722f8ef143af66d71d7":"f3329154d8908f4e4a5b079992":"f1e0af185180d2eb63e50e37":"b9401a4927b34dc15e9193db00212f85f0c319781ec90e3b4484d93cb422cb564acc63d3d18e169c" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181":"fd80e88f07dad09eed5569a4f9bb65c42ef426dda40450119503d811701642143013f28ce384d912" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #15 (P=24, N=13, A=14, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"13f179aa2a23bc90a85660306394940e9bb226ce3885ec01":"d3b36c6289ad6ae7c5d885fe83d62a76270689ce05fa3b48":"aaa52c63ca1f74a203d08c2078":"5cc924222692979a8e28ab1e0018":"bc4fcef401c2e1d1c335734ff23ea52c3474d2e6f31648a7f58649400ac9e825b038d67f0c2a6f1c" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #16 (P=24, N=13, A=15, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c1dfc48273d406a3a7b9176f80b2dc4e9a7f68134bab66d2":"67d9728a88f1fac3af43ed6d634ba902896bd226858697d9":"1ac53ba965cdaeeef7326a37e4":"39ba54a410a58a5d11615a2163cc3b":"360f0fc714994e3b59448b50cdd61d511b4f09e0e5fb5ac826a51fe5b9b598a17eb3da10f936813b" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #17 (P=24, N=13, A=16, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d8a662ab8449bd037da0346a24565683a3bbbbd1800e3c1c":"61fdd10938557080191d13dd6c3002dd445d9af988029199":"166fb8d0e110124c09013e0568":"1c1c082eeb5b8548283d50cc2ace1c35":"23c05927502a4ee6e61e4e10552d49b020643eab476eeacc867601fe79a122a7817819655183283e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #18 (P=24, N=13, A=17, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"116f4855121d6aa53e8b8b43a2e23d468c8568c744f49de5":"1bd3b5db392402790be16e8d0a715453928f17f3384c13a7":"924322a3ef0c64412f460a91b2":"03c2d22a3bb08bbb96b2811ce4b1110a83":"ad736402626df0f9393fe4491eb812725ad39d6facf20b5b2f9340b0d48a17ae1cc71d7515e61ee9" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #19 (P=24, N=13, A=18, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e67f3ba11282d61fe36e38cab7b559c2fd9cbe8bf7eb5863":"d7a954dae563b93385c02c82e0143b6c17ce3067d8b54120":"a727ed373886dd872859b92ccd":"68d199e8fced02b7aeba31aa94068a25d27a":"c6cfaa1f54d041089bd81f89197e57a53b2880cefc3f9d877e30b2bcc3f1ea9ec2b8f28bf0af4ecf" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #20 (P=24, N=13, A=19, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e0a29a2c7840cf9b41de49780b9ee92d646a4bfc5b9da74a":"344dc8b6bd66a1fbbe330a95af5dd2a8783dc264d6a9267d":"fc9fd876b1edded09f70b18824":"36e15baafa0002efbb4bb26503b7e3b79f6c68":"43b3b96aa5a54378f3bb573ffda3e154aa7f425fc3008175b60a77b9d38740356b544b1c0f259086" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #21 (P=24, N=13, A=20, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26d0a3a8509d97f81379d21981fe1a02c579121ab7356ca0":"37ab2a0b7b69942278e21032fc83eba6cdc34f5285a8b711":"8015c0f07a7acd4b1cbdd21b54":"093ed26ada5628cfb8cfc1391526b3bcc4af97d9":"a3a60b422eb070b499cf6da0a404b13a05cedda549c6b93e6ca0e07e04674f21a46df2659a5905fb" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #22 (P=24, N=13, A=21, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"aac60835c309d837aacc635931af95702a4784c214283ebb":"e8610756528f75607b83926597ef515f4b32a8386437e6d4":"0e20602d4dc38baa1ebf94ded5":"796e55fbe7bed46d025599c258964a99574c523f6a":"e0a3d5f43e688ce104f4ae1a4fcd85500aa6b8fdbcd1b8d3003c0c3b7369e79339433e1754c0937f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #23 (P=24, N=13, A=22, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"671544bf2988056f7f9ccd526861391a27233793a23f811f":"576b069ae2713f53d2924c1fd68f786cb2eec68892f9e1be":"0a259148a1d081e0df381ecd0c":"61dafc237cb52f83ab773ba8a885462b6f77d4924611":"ce06b3d09b02921f290544032a081a7766612940048867281bb089af0245792c16e6320cf5ffa19e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #24 (P=24, N=13, A=23, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90e2c63b6e5394b1aeec03f95a9d13a01a7d4e9d58610786":"44dd098b1f869d670a8a841900c4bef023a1946a0c278354":"dada5465eb9b7229807a39e557":"f5629ca0eea589f6cf963d875a7d2efb656983f2dd2231":"6b38ca85450e05e7b9362ed7e6e291a130ff233b5a561cdef7ec84dd992fdf98514f845dac8f656e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #25 (P=24, N=13, A=24, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"13cdaaa4f5721c6d7e709cc048063cfb8b9d92e6425903e6":"d7c837971b973f5f651102bf8d032e7dcd10e306739a0d6c":"f97b532259babac5322e9d9a79":"ad6622279832502839a82348486d42e9b38626e8f06317c4":"4709600418f2839841e6d126359f6982bdb53acc7ff209635623d15b24184481eadc63bb8c878fc4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #26 (P=24, N=13, A=25, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90851933d4d3257137984cdb9cba2ca737322dac4dbd64bc":"ba1785a149cb8b69a4e011c11a3ff06f6d7218f525ac81b5":"be02df3a840322df8d448c600c":"69a9dd9ac8be489c3a3f7f070bdaca10699171f66ab3da9351":"89ab2efefa8406336d9e2245199fbc9454f0ef650b9ed0f446c7246bd3130803bf8d703ef5bdf15c" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #27 (P=24, N=13, A=26, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5c5d02c93faa74a848e5046fc52f236049e28cd8096dcac6":"b4da43ebfe9396b68f4689fba8837c68d0064841c6ddd4a7":"54cbf2889437673b8875a0f567":"09fc21ac4a1f43de29621cacf3ad84e055c6b220721af7ce33bb":"d40725397229021a18f3481e3a85f70445557bb2a85e4ae8101a34c777e918e16186fda05a386572" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #28 (P=24, N=13, A=27, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0234dae5bd7ae66c67ff0c1a3f1a191a0d7bceb451bc2b7d":"0f960a89a7e806f8709047cb7a2e7c4211ad724692c88a05":"16d345606a315ad2406abbcb43":"c37fdf7449fd7e943595d75e977089c623be0a3926e63fdbbfdf4a":"3907880d25f910eab12dd14e704d1b33ea7c453634d54da2a461f44dac1112ae3f9c65671a931d3e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #29 (P=24, N=13, A=28, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6351a67fd6daabd2fd49ee944dd41dd37301f958dd17fcc3":"0c0663dd69ccbffbbd0c8c2e9473d0354451ae7a20fa3695":"b8d517b033754058128d13d11a":"511c6924fa96db716f6b053b7a48aebdc1504145a56cd02d6be2590d":"19f2745df5007619c79c84d174e4521b942776478a0601d982c560fede4741e2fd3b54b3a48f3e38" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #30 (P=24, N=13, A=29, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9a5a9560baed3b8e0e90b92655d4e5f33889e5d7253d9f6c":"5bbe9c1fb2563e3e82999fe097b28da4dc6ff2e020f3b4f3":"c0049382cdd8646756d4e6bff5":"c95a86d52088a8b0107cc5b437a8938b2c9e74e46e2e03bb9bceecdbe3":"6d5401db42b5c48b79203b6ad82806d7460ac4c82ad0809b811020480e834f6fe55900a162a4e61a" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #31 (P=24, N=13, A=30, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3e61094c80df0053e86d43fccf4e1d3ee2cdb862d3237b0a":"1fada8f4c7daea0d1c370184c169485b80a278708ed41451":"63f00b2488809fdc49ca5f05d5":"a08763ca936abdeece06467bef8c3c47c3a473636a039d4db540c867d3e3":"680dd22f16a1290bde42c9792dfa997aed24d5bd2265b6e095aa6b99d3f894d3790c2aa2dae1ba2c" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #32 (P=24, N=13, A=31, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b5664dd6ed435df006052f6ded74bb7ce9482ca9229886f7":"0b6de49b530703affc94010c2b793ddc6de0c44d48037ff2":"7a1649896f3e030c18f0205599":"c5f1a26351e53e6509c8bbbed03c42c23ad81c65fccec7ffa1cb494c7f1fc4":"56b02fea595cc24e798691ae905be3d466ca68ca744005dba260b5ea3b047020b73b5bafa17e5084" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-192 #33 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"50925853a84a33ff392154e4e737efc18dcfc98f4d5235a9":"718f061e8b972a3adcf465d66c5b28e8661f080127f6722f":"809343e986f6ff47f54d4cac22":"d70aef3532bdc5293a3ebb11589ac1f801c9f93ea0d656e1d04068facf9f768b":"bad3b0e6772e9c4c9c631c095e259d99692292932efb72b8966e91a19617bb748f3495aa433585bb" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #1 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886df3ba3e6da3a1389":"30d56ff2a25b83fee791110fcaea48e41db7c7f098a81000":"72a60f345a1978fb40f28a2fa4":"":"55f068c0bbba8b598013dd1841fd740fda2902322148ab5e935753e601b79db4ae730b6ae3500731" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #2 (P=24, N=13, A=1, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a4490ed6ab51dbfccd6f3702a857575dad44da3a27eaf31178abc97da60d1e4b":"1b5cc6b1651dec4bbbf5130343852e971c7ff1774100d9be":"26ceaf6e3b28190a17c4f0c378":"9e":"789bce069a725a96c484e64a9e54dcb7a7c268c85df47815a462ff2dd8ba44a381e1f6edab12b5a9" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #3 (P=24, N=13, A=2, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"df594db94ef8eca56a417afe946085eaed444c7cc648d07d58132e6cb5bc2bc3":"f4d7978fad36223623ccb5bb18a7373cba8a6e3b1c921259":"c1ad812bf2bbb2cdaee4636ee7":"c0c3":"bea778540a90033b2c0d087e3cc447711ea25f7eea96855506ec97f23bd6ea97834f92f7263c3195" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #4 (P=24, N=13, A=3, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d98193ab2a465e3fcd85651aaeca18b8e91489b73b7c7e93b518c4b5b81fc6ac":"edba7d6312144e90ec9eaace7576045a46e553dcb8ee5a98":"2247dc7e2674e9e0a63fe70613":"4dc2f4":"44b9ea727c847336fd739ad11f4b906b292edb810462f06ef59626ad5cdac2e4d4cb07b538a1fd8f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #5 (P=24, N=13, A=4, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"45c8afd7373cb0f6b092af3a633d9fd97c4ca378e19d75f9b74d089429726c29":"0b92adbb251dc29a67f0bb97f8e7160862b6c4e843d07fd9":"fdb1fa230ae0b172ff98fc7496":"270981af":"274e2faea3271ea6fa0494c1951f115b5491a893056c3ee4c76fc350e585277e373e9119bf9595cb" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #6 (P=24, N=13, A=5, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a2e6bf39efd1ceddc92b4333ed92d65efeea6c031ca345adb93a7770a8039bcd":"d822f84b023f12ea9e3ce16b904278e4aaab5e11c2c23f3f":"693cbb46bc8366086ec7cd7776":"3ba11282d6":"9f91fd2f6472e33b02b1eabb9d6655729d44c44dad6b3883fe0667bcc5806b225224b04ade8b21c1" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #7 (P=24, N=13, A=6, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c5a850167a5bfdf56636ce9e56e2952855504e35cc4f5d24ee5e168853be82d8":"e758796d7db73bccb1697c42df691ac57974b40ca9186a43":"c45b165477e8bfa9ca3a1cd3ca":"4759557e9bab":"93ad58bd5f4f77ac4f92b0ae16c62489e4074c7f152e2ed8a88179e0d32f4928eff13b4ce2873338" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #8 (P=24, N=13, A=7, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ae8f93c3efe38e2af07e256961dd33028faa0716e5320a7ab319a10d2f4c5548":"bc9ca92a9c9919e39095d3e53fb148694620ae61227e0069":"6333bde218b784ccd8370492f7":"0b1fabdf2a4107":"45811b0c8f754bf03950e520cd4afc81c2e3eb8a11f4fd386d5a6e4b1fbee15d35939c721004502e" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #9 (P=24, N=13, A=8, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"548c2d1eb7d91e003633d4d9ff199e4a8447180edd89ac7867d25a1db288b5ce":"49fd5cbe4aff89dc3b8718f9ce545d612cbbebb289ecbf42":"23b205bd6ff8ed0bab0c98999c":"a6601111cd92c943":"3cfc6211e359ae322802fc9566f377b0dfe17d1dfe0878ebf2a9047e37cc0be1fab0006af8db8dc4" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #10 (P=24, N=13, A=9, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"aab793e377a12484dbdd74c9b3a85c74c286e1cc498663fbd7c718b5633bb91a":"7c0889854658d3408c5d8043aad2f4ae4a89449a36f8a3b8":"10022cddb323e88b3c08f95a0f":"82b8c736037ce2f2e8":"1044250f58857c69f72b5d3454d43949e5c02b3822970b280de1a3f7fc5d06cc30f06075f5504ed7" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #11 (P=24, N=13, A=10, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"06ac39896073a44283611a66ccab067e2dd2faa8da82ff9a45bb29e54d2e6e77":"3216dce3b8b1ce0e79e40fffcac728ab191aaaf319d971d3":"6c7942c9819cf69b817bfcdb0a":"215e2a6c24325340fdec":"c5b3b50ed8a7b7b96b02ba9464b6a2ff80e90548605699a63d70e6dffb31a376a1eb7f94526dca48" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #12 (P=24, N=13, A=11, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"50412c6444bcf9829506ab019e98234af1541061557412740bc120b456052763":"6cdbd63f6d591f59776f828533b28e2453a214d1d0dd8a39":"85684f94c3702c5d870310166d":"f706a3e09df95d3e21d2e0":"8c8b4ae854a5d5c265b25e3b54bded9444cc454b3e0e6a24d6c05eaf406a5ebd578e19edd5227380" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #13 (P=24, N=13, A=12, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8a56588fe5e125237b6cdc30f940b8d88b2863ec501a0cb00b1abade1b5ce0ed":"c825952293e434ea866db558aaf486ef09a92bf366988f71":"d80210b9f9776ea36dc0e0a787":"e4296d1c8cf4ffc4b2635135":"b8b3b15fdf6a4a0b5abc313afc769e4e8413bd887552583ede3ed995d1b70561c8e28a7b1a7e3dc8" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a4cc7e1c90f8684e6a5f95e6898ab4e3c194cb46e196d8228062b9f3fa744930":"10d4cff95ef490923c9e0906880729d4d05412e7675cce76":"cdc2712e51c7f333d6bad78eee":"569c56b27268d3db54e728aac0":"be3ce3e9dc72499839a98ae52abb17415e8547687e8a3c7b8aaaac20d4c9276f2851cbba2b04d185" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #15 (P=24, N=13, A=14, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"347e12eec56e95aafcc7d25bf10fc756b4e42bc2e43da7f97df24331f27f1f5c":"ca88dddfc876a12f45f19562bc9ca250f43267ab251a7f34":"b8d517b033754058128d13d11a":"511c6924fa96db716f6b053b7a48":"eeedcfa8f5b5b48c1d7e277526eecb7294213b9f5785167ae949b93003dfe63c95c1d49edfb4de3f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #16 (P=24, N=13, A=15, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"520902aa27c16dee112812b2e685aa203aeb8b8633bd1bfc99728a482d96c1fe":"533fee7d2c7740db55770e48cb1b541d990ea3f8f08ed1a6":"ddf50502f414c1bf24888f1328":"22b4f8f1aac02a9b2ef785d0ff6f93":"fc867b319e0e4ab45ec518a1b5dcec4f29982173f3abfd4d8a8f8d14d2bdac84c3737cfbd75b7c0b" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #17 (P=24, N=13, A=16, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"57da1c2704219ed59abfdf04743a9a93c87a63d471818de0f1564b2db6421562":"ddc3c1aa73fb6de92bb4db138e26f3c2e0543ab4f5924871":"4b60a47b7e90f622fa0bf803e1":"0ae8c012ff39753510df3ee80707e4e2":"daa8256d4753fdf9cfef876295badaba89b45cc497f54d220ec2c6fb687753bca4580adc6aa2f296" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #18 (P=24, N=13, A=17, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9267ebc99ccf648b146cba3c251187e24a9947d806ceb0ced6894211641a1e0d":"967daf12f16f166b7b5038f83a1cf0b980f5abf4c7746f2a":"9b7298950280e8762ecdc9bbe4":"5824689453bc406bf891b85e4576e38fe8":"7cfe2a7a54306eb8d8a63d3d1ae86794f9a2c22198b2cb4f10ca926f1a430c08c12e23db3d913e93" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #19 (P=24, N=13, A=18, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7a855e1690ee638de01db43b37401dcd569c1ae03dc73dd0a917d0cadb5abc29":"33ae68ebb8010c6b3da6b9cb29fe9f8bd09b59ec39f4ce4b":"8f160a873a1166c8b32bccbba7":"72674aca7eba2fc0eeafbd143c2c4d8aa6c8":"b22afdf4f12c43ec23e01ac1215a3f5286059211207e957057e9a9203da74387a9468f8af5e27547" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #20 (P=24, N=13, A=19, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0ebdc6ddb4c502725dd6ee8da95d56a0d1044b4694d6ba8475a4434f23a8474f":"c7360282c85484a5a33ab1c68dd70873ab4e74ffd4a62cd5":"fb717a8c82114477253acc14f6":"41e9d65632f74f449a6842d5e6c4a86ef83791":"2e961b3a2fa1609a4e6fd04bff6ac5e306ae2638706f997b42be2e2ba05c54b619850db5c9d684fe" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #21 (P=24, N=13, A=20, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2ff64bbec197a63315c2f328dcb4837d0cdc21a5d6f89ff1d97cb51195330cd8":"4a17522da707b4b2587a0ae367a2cd2831bb593a18ef442a":"a235f8ee3de9896b71910ac02c":"2b411bea57b51d10a4d2fb17ef0f204aa53cf112":"1bf122798bd8ee8e73391d589bd046a294d1615794e69cb9e6f3ba30143acbc3a1c1c6ec74333107" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #22 (P=24, N=13, A=21, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"24e9f08a9a007f9976919e10dc432002e2e078a339677f00105c72ed35633a3f":"d3416a81b4246eb0bf8119a72a886bbc0ac9449c69f71d2f":"15977424eeec0ec7f647e6c798":"2d838eb51a4bc69a001a18adf2084a680f02a3c5fc":"e001a8fae390dc5d672cdd18f86a1f728158ec83a002050def9af5679edbcbb7db20ab6af30698db" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #23 (P=24, N=13, A=22, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0ec1b22b8df05dc92135d2dfbefed8ea81458f5ea1b801e8a218faf6cbdf1a79":"2f59d94d4ab8eeb84c2a6fefb7fb0a3ac059c1e1a65ae34a":"97ebcb8575bb58260208d5c227":"a2f6337f86dd00d1a58448851e95d8c9bace4a5c8710":"7ca0b1dbe34b0391e524b868b0af08b3e096917664d6aa2cabc1f9d0132394149c9062b74b82f04b" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #24 (P=24, N=13, A=23, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0875020959ed969cfb38636d1d5aabce9658b00171a7614ea9e5395331c7659c":"065ef9eeafbe077c1c7049f43eb0d8999708e8609f214d5c":"451101250ec6f26652249d59dc":"7cc9c51b69f98a06391ab32742fb6365e15106c811fe8a":"990065322a438e136860f7b019807e9feff52a642bf3d44a9163fa7a867f04cab6f52dc250070f31" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #25 (P=24, N=13, A=24, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ef4c1d2314e671f666cc6667660f1438a293208c7cc29b412d81277f0a635c91":"c99c3e79125b6fd95e737326a842424eb6c6ecea4c0475c4":"50b23b052922366c25dd40e348":"cd0522ebe1fed82465277d1c10ae9316a98b4469be63b180":"76df4be4ec8373864399acda11294b220b9f7c3a7d2b3660b25764e40ac6a171e7e6bab4fdee4288" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #26 (P=24, N=13, A=25, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8544808e8fbf8c3a5e1d4ca751d4b603af9fe119eabc6923205815e0e748b7e7":"617d54fc6a23601c79e3984f93bfc2d151fde420863206b3":"b44a58724596b4d8dea827c1a0":"f5b2c88f5232c37273b1e66aa31cfa7201e33c21d60054d025":"57b3414db48982c6567265e1e0173bf38fdfaffe4461fbebc1411af83237c0f9eb0bfe8ed914da66" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #27 (P=24, N=13, A=26, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e19eaddd9f1574447e7e6525f7fd67e3b42807e44fbb60e75d8c3e98abc18361":"b3b0de10b7c0996662f1b064e04e528b7d85ca1166985d33":"a8c459ce0223358826fb1ec0f0":"ef88f4393d6c1e7b7be55a12144209ee051bb779e440432721ef":"d63e6082c95c6c5ff2bc0771321a4f883ef61cff7b99e0ea8a20a1abe7c842ebc08c8c81a2743c81" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #28 (P=24, N=13, A=27, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9498f02e50487cfbda1ce6459e241233bd4c4cb10281dcb51915dbc7fb6545c0":"0d16cc69caa9f19b88b05e151b3d26accd018ca4a5786a80":"e3bd4bc3a60cddd26c20aa8636":"70cfcb828d483216b46c3cd22e2f9ee879e9e3059b566179b6e16c":"f1c4bedb8d6f91676881daa37656a7e6402f472735b04a0f1f8332f4236437737438e7aa1b5100c7" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #29 (P=24, N=13, A=28, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3ac7d5bc4698c021e49a685cd71057e09821633957d1d59c3c30cbc3f2d1dbf8":"89198d3acc39b950f0d411119c478c60b2422ffe7e26e00b":"54c8ff5459702aac058bb3be04":"ecbd7091732e49c0f4bda2e63235ea43bbf8c8730f955f9c049dd1ec":"7717b8e4447afcea1eeebf3e39ffdab2f52828e7931ef27e475acd27900478f09fec1f479ab3a7c8" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #30 (P=24, N=13, A=29, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"948882c3667caa81c9b900996e3d591e6fcb3d08333eeb29911e9c6338710c17":"8b9130b0c3c15366831bbb19f377e3209a8dbf7619cd09bd":"43b0aca2f0a9030f90559fa6d3":"a516ca8405e5c8854e667921b5c5e1968bdd052915b55ac9984b7eefb3":"4646b2acdeb11174171da23999cd54e297daa32bbc13d30512e57c576b315f48c11877178389aaa0" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #31 (P=24, N=13, A=30, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3bf52cc5ee86b9a0190f390a5c0366a560b557000dbe5115fd9ee11630a62769":"094b538110495e938b08cf748a6bcf3e0c80ff9c66570237":"f9fbd02f28ecc929d369182752":"ebf0b3e3199a5c3773c761c725c7600add5f9d8321c9f8e5e5fd1c7a5d2f":"4d8b53016fc8bc9677184c0fa15bbd3d671b9366d82ecb67f8562eadcdcbcdbad1299bea1523f5d2" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #32 (P=24, N=13, A=31, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e45bb1730d0d539aab3805350ac986540de9f0f6c239ee70395c291397b70309":"bc8b3bc48c7a88c9fafde258b6ccaa9d4f0d018703d63871":"d5c7824af715bb7822b6b340fe":"860f4a09ad8b3d345c2aa18ffb803f0bc3b734a4d047a1437701a5e3d95288":"95f083ad6bbaee6ab540fe023858f8baf25e333fd3e89c00e678a392d228b210dc5c991905dacf3f" + +CCM encrypt and tag NIST VADT AES-256 #33 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2e6e34070caf1b8820ed39edfa83459abe1c15a1827f1c39f7ac316c4c27910f":"771a7baa9cf83aa253349f6475d5e74dba4525307b022ba7":"c49ccef869bb86d21932cb443b":"d37e35d7cdccd9824a1ae4c787819735e4af798a3beb49d4705336d6496853ad":"eebac2475004970071dfa2cfb855c4e78b1add8dcbccfc0bd6b14027324b657a56263df148665393" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #1 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"02209f55":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #2 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"9a04c241":"3796cf51b87266":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #3 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"75d582db43ce9b13ab4b6f7f14341330":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #4 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"3a65e03af37b81d05acc7ec1bc39deb0":"3796cf51b87266":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #5 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"90156f3f":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #6 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"88909016":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #7 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"fb04dc5a44c6bb000f2440f5154364b4":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #8 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5447075bf42a59b91f08064738b015ab":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #9 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"a90e8ea44085ced791b2fdb7fd44b5cf0bd7d27718029bb703e1fa6b":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":4:0:"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #10 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"50aafe0578c115c4a8e126ff7b3ccb64dce8ccaa8ceda69f23e5d81c":"31f8fa25827d48":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #11 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"24ab9eeb0e5508cae80074f1070ee188a637171860881f1f2d9a3fbc210595b7b8b1b41523111a8e":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":16:0:"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #12 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"7ebfda6fa5da1dbffd82dc29b875798fbcef8ba0084fbd2463af747cc88a001fa94e060290f209c4":"31f8fa25827d48":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #13 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"4a550134f94455979ec4bf89ad2bd80d25a77ae94e456134a3e138b9":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":4:0:"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"118ec53dd1bfbe52d5b9fe5dfebecf2ee674ec983eada654091a5ae9":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #15 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb6a9a970b9beb2ac1bd4fd62168f8378a":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":16:0:"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #16 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"0c56a503aa2c12e87450d45a7b714db980fd348f327c0065a65666144994bad0c8195bcb4ade1337":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #17 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"782e4318":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #18 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"a04f270a":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #19 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"41b476013f45e4a781f253a6f3b1e530":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #20 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"f9f018fcd125822616083fffebc4c8e6":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #21 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"9f69f24f":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #22 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"e17afaa4":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"1859ac36a40a6b28b34266253627797a":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #24 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"edf8b46eb69ac0044116019dec183072":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #25 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"6be31860ca271ef448de8f8d8b39346daf4b81d7e92d65b338f125fa":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":4:0:"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #26 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"4cc57a9927a6bc401441870d3193bf89ebd163f5c01501c728a66b69":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #27 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"b351ab96b2e45515254558d5212673ee6c776d42dbca3b512cf3a20b7fd7c49e6e79bef475c2906f":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":16:0:"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #28 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"df1a5285caa41b4bb47f6e5ceceba4e82721828d68427a3081d18ca149d6766bfaccec88f194eb5b":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #29 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"934f893824e880f743d196b22d1f340a52608155087bd28ac25e5329":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":4:0:"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #30 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"f43ba9d834ad85dfab3f1c0c27c3441fe4e411a38a261a6559b3b3ee":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #31 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"50038b5fdd364ee747b70d00bd36840ece4ea19998123375c0a458bfcafa3b2609afe0f825cbf503":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":16:0:"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-128 #32 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"78ed8ff6b5a1255d0fbd0a719a9c27b059ff5f83d0c4962c390042ba8bb5f6798dab01c5afad7306":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #1 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"9d4b7f3b":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #2 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"80745de9":"3796cf51b87266":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #3 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"17223038fa99d53681ca1beabe78d1b4":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #4 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"d0e1eeef4d2a264536bb1c2c1bde7c35":"3796cf51b87266":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #5 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"fe69ed84":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #6 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"db7ffc82":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #7 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"0c66a8e547ed4f8c2c9a9a1eb5d455b9":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #8 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"38757b3a61a4dc97ca3ab88bf1240695":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #9 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138cddc93a54":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":4:0:"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #10 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"32b649ab56162e55d4148a1292d6a225a988eb1308298273b6889036":"31f8fa25827d48":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #11 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"cba4b4aeb85f0492fd8d905c4a6d8233139833373ef188a8c5a5ebecf7ac8607fe412189e83d9d20":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":16:0:"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #12 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"ca62713728b5c9d652504b0ae8fd4fee5d297ee6a8d19cb6e699f15f14d34dcaf9ba8ed4b877c97d":"31f8fa25827d48":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #13 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"042653c674ef2a90f7fb11d30848e530ae59478f1051633a34fad277":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":4:0:"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"1902d9769a7ba3d3268e1257395c8c2e5f98eef295dcbfa5a35df775":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #15 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"a5b7d8cca2069908d1ed88e6a9fe2c9bede3131dad54671ea7ade30a07d185692ab0ebdf4c78cf7a":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":16:0:"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #16 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"9a98617fb97a0dfe466be692272dcdaec1c5443a3b51312ef042c86363cc05afb98c66e16be8a445":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #17 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"1d089a5f":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #18 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"2f46022a":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #19 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5280a2137fee3deefcfe9b63a1199fb3":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #20 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"d40a7318c5f2d82f838c0beeefe0d598":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #21 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5e0eaebd":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #22 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"71b7fc33":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"d07ccf9fdc3d33aa94cda3d230da707c":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #24 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"65fe32b649dc328c9f531584897e85b3":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #25 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"9f6ca4af9b159148c889a6584d1183ea26e2614874b0504575dea8d1":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":4:0:"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #26 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"84d8212e9cfc2121252baa3b065b1edcf50497b9594db1ebd7965825":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #27 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"6aab64c4787599d8f213446beadb16e08dba60e97f56dbd14d1d980d6fe0fb44b421992662b97975":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":16:0:"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #28 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"4980b2ee49b1aaf393175f5ab9bae95ec7904557dfa206603c51d36c826f01384100886198a7f6a3":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #29 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"16e543d0e20615ff0df15acd9927ddfe40668a54bb854cccc25e9fce":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":4:0:"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #30 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"df35b109caf690656ae278bbd8f8bba687a2ce11b105dae98ecedb3e":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #31 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"c5b0b2ef17498c5570eb335df4588032958ba3d69bf6f3178464a6f7fa2b76744e8e8d95691cecb8":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":16:0:"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-192 #32 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"d1f0518929f4ae2f0543de2a7dfe4bb0110bb3057e524a1c06bd6dc2e6bcc3436cffb969ae900388":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #1 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"469c90bb":"a544218dadd3c1":"":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #2 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"46a908ed":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #3 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"8207eb14d33855a52acceed17dbcbf6e":"a544218dadd3c1":"":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #4 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"60f8e127cb4d30db6df0622158cd931d":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #5 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"8a19a133":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #6 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"2e317f1b":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #7 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"97e1a8dd4259ccd2e431e057b0397fcf":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #8 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"5a9596c511ea6a8671adefc4f2157d8b":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #9 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"64a1341679972dc5869fcf69b19d5c5ea50aa0b5e985f5b722aa8d59":"a544218dadd3c1":"":4:0:"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #10 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"c5b7f802bffc498c1626e3774f1d9f94045dfd8e1a10a20277d00a75":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #11 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"bc51c3925a960e7732533e4ef3a4f69ee6826de952bcb0fd374f3bb6db8377ebfc79674858c4f305":"a544218dadd3c1":"":16:0:"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #12 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"afa1fa8e8a70e26b02161150556d604101fdf423f332c3363275f2a4907d51b734fe7238cebbd48f":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #13 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"63e00d30e4b08fd2a1cc8d70fab327b2368e77a93be4f4123d14fb3f":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":4:0:"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"bb5425b3869b76856ec58e39886fb6f6f2ac13fe44cb132d8d0c0099":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #15 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"f0050ad16392021a3f40207bed3521fb1e9f808f49830c423a578d179902f912f9ea1afbce1120b3":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":16:0:"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #16 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"c408190d0fbf5034f83b24a8ed9657331a7ce141de4fae769084607b83bd06e6442eac8dacf583cc":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #17 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"92d00fbe":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #18 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"9143e5c4":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #19 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"93af11a08379eb37a16aa2837f09d69d":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #20 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"d19b0c14ec686a7961ca7c386d125a65":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #21 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"866d4227":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":4:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #22 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"94cb1127":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":16:0:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #24 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"677a040d46ee3f2b7838273bdad14f16":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #25 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"c2fe12658139f5d0dd22cadf2e901695b579302a72fc56083ebc7720":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":4:0:"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #26 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"94748ba81229e53c38583a8564b23ebbafc6f6efdf4c2a81c44db2c9":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #27 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"3341168eb8c48468c414347fb08f71d2086f7c2d1bd581ce1ac68bd42f5ec7fa7e068cc0ecd79c2a":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":16:0:"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #28 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"d543acda712b898cbb27b8f598b2e4438ce587a836e2785147c3338a2400809e739b63ba8227d2f9":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #29 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"c0ea400b599561e7905b99262b4565d5c3dc49fad84d7c69ef891339":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":4:0:"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #30 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"60871e03ea0eb968536c99f926ea24ef43d41272ad9fb7f63d488623":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #31 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"8d34cdca37ce77be68f65baf3382e31efa693e63f914a781367f30f2eaad8c063ca50795acd90203":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":16:0:"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3" + +CCM auth decrypt tag NIST DVPT AES-256 #32 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"516c0095cc3d85fd55e48da17c592e0c7014b9daafb82bdc4b41096dfdbe9cc1ab610f8f3e038d16":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED:"" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"BA737185E719310492F38A5F1251DA55FAFBC949848A0DFCAECE746B3DB9AD" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"00000004030201A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"5D2564BF8EAFE1D99526EC016D1BF0424CFBD2CD62848F3360B2295DF24283E8" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":"00000005040302A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"81F663D6C7787817F9203608B982AD15DC2BBD87D756F79204F551D6682F23AA46" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"00000006050403A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"CAEF1E827211B08F7BD90F08C77288C070A4A08B3A933A63E497A0" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"00000007060504A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"2AD3BAD94FC52E92BE438E827C1023B96A8A77258FA17BA7F331DB09" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":"00000008070605A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"FEA5480BA53FA8D3C34422AACE4DE67FFA3BB73BABAB36A1EE4FE0FE28" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"00000009080706A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"54532026E54C119A8D36D9EC6E1ED97416C8708C4B5C2CACAFA3BCCF7A4EBF9573" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"0000000A090807A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"8AD19B001A87D148F4D92BEF34525CCCE3A63C6512A6F5757388E4913EF14701F441" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":"0000000B0A0908A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"5DB08D62407E6E31D60F9CA2C60474219AC0BE50C0D4A5778794D6E230CD25C9FEBF87" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":"0000000C0B0A09A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"DB118CCEC1B8761C877CD8963A67D6F3BBBC5CD09299EB11F312F23237" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"0000000D0C0B0AA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"7CC83D8DC49103525B483DC5CA7EA9AB812B7056079DAFFADA16CCCF2C4E" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":"0000000E0D0C0BA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"2CD35B8820D23E7AA351B0E92FC79367238B2CC748CBB94C2947793D64AF75" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"C6B5F3E6CA2311AEF7472B203E735EA561ADB17D56C5A3":"00A970110E1927B160B6A31C1C":"6B7F464507FAE496":"A435D727348DDD22907F7EB8F5FDBB4D939DA6524DB4F64558C02D25B127EE" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"01F6CE6764C574483BB02E6BBF1E0ABD26A22572B4D80EE7":"0083CD8CE0CB42B160B6A31C1C":"986605B43DF15DE7":"8AE052508FBECA932E346F05E0DC0DFBCF939EAFFA3E587C867D6E1C48703806" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"CDF1D8406FC2E9014953897005FBFB8BA57276F92404608E08":"005F54950B18F2B160B6A31C1C":"48F2E7E1A7671A51":"08B67EE21C8BF26E473E408599E9C0836D6AF0BB18DF55466CA80878A790476DE5" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #16 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"B005DCFA0B59181426A961685A993D8C43185B":"00EC600863319AB160B6A31C1C":"DE97DF3B8CBD6D8E5030DA4C":"63B78B4967B19EDBB733CD1114F64EB226089368C354828D950CC5" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #17 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"2E20211298105F129D5ED95B93F72D30B2FACCD7":"0060CFF1A31EA1B160B6A31C1C":"A5EE93E457DF05466E782DCF":"0BC6BBE2A8B909F4629EE6DC148DA44410E18AF43147383276F66A9F" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #18 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"2645941E75632D3491AF0FC0C9876C3BE4AA7468C9":"000F85CD995C97B160B6A31C1C":"24AA1BF9A5CD876182A25074":"222AD632FA31D6AF970C345F7E77CA3BD0DC25B340A1A3D31F8D4B44B7" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #19 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"070135A6437C9DB120CD61D8F6C39C3EA125FD95A0D23D":"00C29B2CAAC4CDB160B6A31C1C":"691946B9CA07BE87":"05B8E1B9C49CFD56CF130AA6251DC2ECC06CCC508FE697A0066D57C84BEC182768" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"C8C0880E6C636E20093DD6594217D2E18877DB264E71A5CC":"002C6B7595EE62B160B6A31C1C":"D0C54ECB84627DC4":"54CEB968DEE23611575EC003DFAA1CD48849BDF5AE2EDB6B7FA775B150ED4383C5A9" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"F75DAA0710C4E64297794DC2B7D2A20757B1AA4E448002FFAB":"00C53CD4C2AA24B160B6A31C1C":"E285E0E4808CDA3D":"B1404546BF667210CA28E309B39BD6CA7E9FC8285FE698D43CD20A02E0BDCAED2010D3" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #22 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"C238822FAC5F98FF929405B0AD127A4E41854E":"00BEE9267FBADCB160B6A31C1C":"6CAEF9941141570D7C813405":"94C8959C11569A297831A721005857AB61B87A2DEA0936B6EB5F625F5D" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #23 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"4DBF3E774AD245E5D5891F9D1C32A0AE022C85D7":"00DFA8B1245007B160B6A31C1C":"36A52CF16B19A2037AB7011E":"5869E3AAD2447C74E0FC05F9A4EA74577F4DE8CA8924764296AD04119CE7" + +CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #24 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"9DC9EDAE2FF5DF8636E8C6DE0EED55F7867E33337D":"003B8FD8D3A937B160B6A31C1C":"A4D499F78419728C19178B0C":"4B198156393B0F7796086AAFB454F8C3F034CCA966945F1FCEA7E11BEE6A2F" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5a3726e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function @@ -0,0 +1,506 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST:MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +void mbedtls_ccm_self_test( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ccm_setkey( int cipher_id, int key_size, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + unsigned char key[32]; + int ret; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + memset( key, 0x2A, sizeof( key ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( (unsigned) key_size <= 8 * sizeof( key ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key, key_size ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +void ccm_lengths( int msg_len, int iv_len, int add_len, int tag_len, int res ) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + unsigned char key[16]; + unsigned char msg[10]; + unsigned char iv[14]; + unsigned char *add = NULL; + unsigned char out[10]; + unsigned char tag[18]; + int decrypt_ret; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + ASSERT_ALLOC_WEAK( add, add_len ); + memset( key, 0, sizeof( key ) ); + memset( msg, 0, sizeof( msg ) ); + memset( iv, 0, sizeof( iv ) ); + memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) ); + memset( tag, 0, sizeof( tag ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, 8 * sizeof( key ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg_len, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + msg, out, tag, tag_len ) == res ); + + decrypt_ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg_len, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + msg, out, tag, tag_len ); + + if( res == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( decrypt_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( decrypt_ret == res ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( add ); + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +void ccm_star_lengths( int msg_len, int iv_len, int add_len, int tag_len, + int res ) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + unsigned char key[16]; + unsigned char msg[10]; + unsigned char iv[14]; + unsigned char add[10]; + unsigned char out[10]; + unsigned char tag[18]; + int decrypt_ret; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + memset( key, 0, sizeof( key ) ); + memset( msg, 0, sizeof( msg ) ); + memset( iv, 0, sizeof( iv ) ); + memset( add, 0, sizeof( add ) ); + memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) ); + memset( tag, 0, sizeof( tag ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, 8 * sizeof( key ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg_len, iv, iv_len, + add, add_len, msg, out, tag, tag_len ) == res ); + + decrypt_ret = mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg_len, iv, iv_len, add, + add_len, msg, out, tag, tag_len ); + + if( res == 0 && tag_len != 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( decrypt_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( decrypt_ret == res ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( int cipher_id, data_t * key, + data_t * msg, data_t * iv, + data_t * add, data_t * result ) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + size_t tag_len; + uint8_t * msg_n_tag = (uint8_t *)malloc( result->len + 2 ); + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + memset( msg_n_tag, 0, result->len + 2 ); + memcpy( msg_n_tag, msg->x, msg->len ); + + tag_len = result->len - msg->len; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + + /* Test with input == output */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len, + msg_n_tag, msg_n_tag, msg_n_tag + msg->len, tag_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg_n_tag, result->x, result->len ) == 0 ); + + /* Check we didn't write past the end */ + TEST_ASSERT( msg_n_tag[result->len] == 0 && msg_n_tag[result->len + 1] == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); + free( msg_n_tag ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( int cipher_id, data_t * key, + data_t * msg, data_t * iv, + data_t * add, int tag_len, int result, + data_t * expected_msg ) +{ + unsigned char tag[16]; + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + memset( tag, 0x00, sizeof( tag ) ); + + msg->len -= tag_len; + memcpy( tag, msg->x + msg->len, tag_len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + + /* Test with input == output */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len, + msg->x, msg->x, msg->x + msg->len, tag_len ) == result ); + + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x, expected_msg->x, expected_msg->len ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < msg->len; i++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( msg->x[i] == 0 ); + } + + /* Check we didn't write past the end (where the original tag is) */ + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x + msg->len, tag, tag_len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( int cipher_id, + data_t *key, data_t *msg, + data_t *source_address, data_t *frame_counter, + int sec_level, data_t *add, + data_t *expected_result, int output_ret ) +{ + unsigned char iv[13]; + unsigned char result[50]; + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + size_t iv_len, tag_len; + int ret; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + memset( result, 0x00, sizeof( result ) ); + + if( sec_level % 4 == 0) + tag_len = 0; + else + tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1); + + TEST_ASSERT( source_address->len == 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( frame_counter->len == 4 ); + memcpy( iv, source_address->x, source_address->len ); + memcpy( iv + source_address->len, frame_counter->x, frame_counter->len ); + iv[source_address->len + frame_counter->len] = sec_level; + iv_len = sizeof( iv ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, + key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv, iv_len, + add->x, add->len, msg->x, + result, result + msg->len, tag_len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == output_ret ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( result, + expected_result->x, expected_result->len ) == 0 ); + + /* Check we didn't write past the end */ + TEST_ASSERT( result[expected_result->len] == 0 && + result[expected_result->len + 1] == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( int cipher_id, + data_t *key, data_t *msg, + data_t *source_address, data_t *frame_counter, + int sec_level, data_t *add, + data_t *expected_result, int output_ret ) +{ + unsigned char iv[13]; + unsigned char result[50]; + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + size_t iv_len, tag_len; + int ret; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + memset( iv, 0x00, sizeof( iv ) ); + memset( result, '+', sizeof( result ) ); + + if( sec_level % 4 == 0) + tag_len = 0; + else + tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1); + + TEST_ASSERT( source_address->len == 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( frame_counter->len == 4 ); + memcpy( iv, source_address->x, source_address->len ); + memcpy( iv + source_address->len, frame_counter->x, frame_counter->len ); + iv[source_address->len + frame_counter->len] = sec_level; + iv_len = sizeof( iv ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg->len - tag_len, iv, iv_len, + add->x, add->len, msg->x, result, + msg->x + msg->len - tag_len, tag_len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == output_ret ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( result, expected_result->x, + expected_result->len ) == 0 ); + + /* Check we didn't write past the end (where the original tag is) */ + TEST_ASSERT( ( msg->len + 2 ) <= sizeof( result ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( result[msg->len], '+' ); + TEST_EQUAL( result[msg->len + 1], '+' ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void ccm_invalid_param( ) +{ + struct mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + unsigned char valid_buffer[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06 }; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t valid_cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + int valid_len = sizeof(valid_buffer); + int valid_bitlen = valid_len * 8; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + /* mbedtls_ccm_init() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ccm_init( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_ccm_setkey() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_setkey( NULL, valid_cipher, valid_buffer, valid_bitlen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, valid_cipher, NULL, valid_bitlen ) ); + + /* mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + NULL, valid_len ) ); + + /* mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + NULL, valid_len ) ); + + /* mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + NULL, valid_len ) ); + + /* mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_buffer, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + NULL, valid_len ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ccm_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ccm_free( NULL ) ); +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f9033ee --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.data @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +ChaCha20 RFC 7539 Example and Test Vector (Encrypt) +chacha20_crypt:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f":"000000000000004a00000000":1:"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":"6e2e359a2568f98041ba0728dd0d6981e97e7aec1d4360c20a27afccfd9fae0bf91b65c5524733ab8f593dabcd62b3571639d624e65152ab8f530c359f0861d807ca0dbf500d6a6156a38e088a22b65e52bc514d16ccf806818ce91ab77937365af90bbf74a35be6b40b8eedf2785e42874d" + +ChaCha20 RFC 7539 Example and Test Vector (Decrypt) +chacha20_crypt:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f":"000000000000004a00000000":1:"6e2e359a2568f98041ba0728dd0d6981e97e7aec1d4360c20a27afccfd9fae0bf91b65c5524733ab8f593dabcd62b3571639d624e65152ab8f530c359f0861d807ca0dbf500d6a6156a38e088a22b65e52bc514d16ccf806818ce91ab77937365af90bbf74a35be6b40b8eedf2785e42874d":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e" + +ChaCha20 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 (Encrypt) +chacha20_crypt:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":0:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"76b8e0ada0f13d90405d6ae55386bd28bdd219b8a08ded1aa836efcc8b770dc7da41597c5157488d7724e03fb8d84a376a43b8f41518a11cc387b669b2ee6586" + +ChaCha20 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 (Decrypt) +chacha20_crypt:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":0:"76b8e0ada0f13d90405d6ae55386bd28bdd219b8a08ded1aa836efcc8b770dc7da41597c5157488d7724e03fb8d84a376a43b8f41518a11cc387b669b2ee6586":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +ChaCha20 RFC 7539 Test Vector #2 (Encrypt) +chacha20_crypt:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001":"000000000000000000000002":1:"416e79207375626d697373696f6e20746f20746865204945544620696e74656e6465642062792074686520436f6e7472696275746f7220666f72207075626c69636174696f6e20617320616c6c206f722070617274206f6620616e204945544620496e7465726e65742d4472616674206f722052464320616e6420616e792073746174656d656e74206d6164652077697468696e2074686520636f6e74657874206f6620616e204945544620616374697669747920697320636f6e7369646572656420616e20224945544620436f6e747269627574696f6e222e20537563682073746174656d656e747320696e636c756465206f72616c2073746174656d656e747320696e20494554462073657373696f6e732c2061732077656c6c206173207772697474656e20616e6420656c656374726f6e696320636f6d6d756e69636174696f6e73206d61646520617420616e792074696d65206f7220706c6163652c207768696368206172652061646472657373656420746f":"a3fbf07df3fa2fde4f376ca23e82737041605d9f4f4f57bd8cff2c1d4b7955ec2a97948bd3722915c8f3d337f7d370050e9e96d647b7c39f56e031ca5eb6250d4042e02785ececfa4b4bb5e8ead0440e20b6e8db09d881a7c6132f420e52795042bdfa7773d8a9051447b3291ce1411c680465552aa6c405b7764d5e87bea85ad00f8449ed8f72d0d662ab052691ca66424bc86d2df80ea41f43abf937d3259dc4b2d0dfb48a6c9139ddd7f76966e928e635553ba76c5c879d7b35d49eb2e62b0871cdac638939e25e8a1e0ef9d5280fa8ca328b351c3c765989cbcf3daa8b6ccc3aaf9f3979c92b3720fc88dc95ed84a1be059c6499b9fda236e7e818b04b0bc39c1e876b193bfe5569753f88128cc08aaa9b63d1a16f80ef2554d7189c411f5869ca52c5b83fa36ff216b9c1d30062bebcfd2dc5bce0911934fda79a86f6e698ced759c3ff9b6477338f3da4f9cd8514ea9982ccafb341b2384dd902f3d1ab7ac61dd29c6f21ba5b862f3730e37cfdc4fd806c22f221" + +ChaCha20 RFC 7539 Test Vector #2 (Decrypt) +chacha20_crypt:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001":"000000000000000000000002":1:"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":"416e79207375626d697373696f6e20746f20746865204945544620696e74656e6465642062792074686520436f6e7472696275746f7220666f72207075626c69636174696f6e20617320616c6c206f722070617274206f6620616e204945544620496e7465726e65742d4472616674206f722052464320616e6420616e792073746174656d656e74206d6164652077697468696e2074686520636f6e74657874206f6620616e204945544620616374697669747920697320636f6e7369646572656420616e20224945544620436f6e747269627574696f6e222e20537563682073746174656d656e747320696e636c756465206f72616c2073746174656d656e747320696e20494554462073657373696f6e732c2061732077656c6c206173207772697474656e20616e6420656c656374726f6e696320636f6d6d756e69636174696f6e73206d61646520617420616e792074696d65206f7220706c6163652c207768696368206172652061646472657373656420746f" + +ChaCha20 RFC 7539 Test Vector #3 (Encrypt) +chacha20_crypt:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000000000000000002":42:"2754776173206272696c6c69672c20616e642074686520736c6974687920746f7665730a446964206779726520616e642067696d626c6520696e2074686520776162653a0a416c6c206d696d737920776572652074686520626f726f676f7665732c0a416e6420746865206d6f6d65207261746873206f757467726162652e":"62e6347f95ed87a45ffae7426f27a1df5fb69110044c0d73118effa95b01e5cf166d3df2d721caf9b21e5fb14c616871fd84c54f9d65b283196c7fe4f60553ebf39c6402c42234e32a356b3e764312a61a5532055716ead6962568f87d3f3f7704c6a8d1bcd1bf4d50d6154b6da731b187b58dfd728afa36757a797ac188d1" + +ChaCha20 RFC 7539 Test Vector #3 (Decrypt) +chacha20_crypt:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000000000000000002":42:"62e6347f95ed87a45ffae7426f27a1df5fb69110044c0d73118effa95b01e5cf166d3df2d721caf9b21e5fb14c616871fd84c54f9d65b283196c7fe4f60553ebf39c6402c42234e32a356b3e764312a61a5532055716ead6962568f87d3f3f7704c6a8d1bcd1bf4d50d6154b6da731b187b58dfd728afa36757a797ac188d1":"2754776173206272696c6c69672c20616e642074686520736c6974687920746f7665730a446964206779726520616e642067696d626c6520696e2074686520776162653a0a416c6c206d696d737920776572652074686520626f726f676f7665732c0a416e6420746865206d6f6d65207261746873206f757467726162652e" + +ChaCha20 Paremeter Validation +chacha20_bad_params: + +ChaCha20 Selftest +chacha20_self_test: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..67c8de2e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chacha20.function @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void chacha20_crypt( data_t *key_str, + data_t *nonce_str, + int counter, + data_t *src_str, + data_t *expected_output_str ) +{ + unsigned char output[375]; + mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx; + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( src_str->len == expected_output_str->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( key_str->len == 32U ); + TEST_ASSERT( nonce_str->len == 12U ); + + /* + * Test the integrated API + */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( key_str->x, nonce_str->x, counter, src_str->len, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output_str->len, + expected_output_str->x, expected_output_str->len ); + + /* + * Test the streaming API + */ + mbedtls_chacha20_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_starts( &ctx, nonce_str->x, counter ) == 0 ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx, src_str->len, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output_str->len, + expected_output_str->x, expected_output_str->len ); + + /* + * Test the streaming API again, piecewise + */ + + /* Don't free/init the context nor set the key again, + * in order to test that starts() does the right thing. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_starts( &ctx, nonce_str->x, counter ) == 0 ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx, 1, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx, src_str->len - 1, + src_str->x + 1, output + 1 ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, expected_output_str->len, + expected_output_str->x, expected_output_str->len ); + + mbedtls_chacha20_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void chacha20_bad_params() +{ + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char nonce[12]; + unsigned char src[1]; + unsigned char dst[1]; + uint32_t counter = 0; + size_t len = sizeof( src ); + mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_chacha20_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_chacha20_free( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( NULL, key ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_starts( NULL, nonce, counter ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_starts( &ctx, NULL, counter ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_update( NULL, 0, src, dst ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx, len, NULL, dst ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx, len, src, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( NULL, nonce, counter, 0, src, dst ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( key, NULL, counter, 0, src, dst ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( key, nonce, counter, len, NULL, dst ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( key, nonce, counter, len, src, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; + +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void chacha20_self_test() +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chacha20_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chachapoly.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chachapoly.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34cb5683 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chachapoly.data @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +ChaCha20-Poly1305 RFC 7539 Example and Test Vector (Encrypt) +mbedtls_chachapoly_enc:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b6116":"1ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691" + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 RFC 7539 Example and Test Vector (Decrypt) +mbedtls_chachapoly_dec:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b6116":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":"1ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691":0 + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 RFC 7539 Example and Test Vector (Decrypt, not authentic) +mbedtls_chachapoly_dec:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b6116":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":"1ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600690":MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 (Encrypt) +mbedtls_chachapoly_enc:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"f33388860000000000004e91":"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":"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":"eead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38" + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 (Decrypt) +mbedtls_chachapoly_dec:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"f33388860000000000004e91":"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":"496e7465726e65742d4472616674732061726520647261667420646f63756d656e74732076616c696420666f722061206d6178696d756d206f6620736978206d6f6e74687320616e64206d617920626520757064617465642c207265706c616365642c206f72206f62736f6c65746564206279206f7468657220646f63756d656e747320617420616e792074696d652e20497420697320696e617070726f70726961746520746f2075736520496e7465726e65742d447261667473206173207265666572656e6365206d6174657269616c206f7220746f2063697465207468656d206f74686572207468616e206173202fe2809c776f726b20696e2070726f67726573732e2fe2809d":"eead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38":0 + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 (Decrypt, not authentic) +mbedtls_chachapoly_dec:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"f33388860000000000004e91":"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":"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":"fead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38":MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 State Flow +chachapoly_state: + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 Parameter Validation +chachapoly_bad_params: + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +chachapoly_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chachapoly.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chachapoly.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96128e4e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_chachapoly.function @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_chachapoly_enc( data_t *key_str, data_t *nonce_str, data_t *aad_str, data_t *input_str, data_t *output_str, data_t *mac_str ) +{ + unsigned char output[265]; + unsigned char mac[16]; /* size set by the standard */ + mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx; + + TEST_ASSERT( key_str->len == 32 ); + TEST_ASSERT( nonce_str->len == 12 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mac_str->len == 16 ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, + input_str->len, nonce_str->x, + aad_str->x, aad_str->len, + input_str->x, output, mac ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output_str->x, output, output_str->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( mac_str->x, mac, 16U ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_chachapoly_dec( data_t *key_str, data_t *nonce_str, data_t *aad_str, data_t *input_str, data_t *output_str, data_t *mac_str, int ret_exp ) +{ + unsigned char output[265]; + int ret; + mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx; + + TEST_ASSERT( key_str->len == 32 ); + TEST_ASSERT( nonce_str->len == 12 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mac_str->len == 16 ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( &ctx, + input_str->len, nonce_str->x, + aad_str->x, aad_str->len, + mac_str->x, input_str->x, output ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == ret_exp ); + if( ret_exp == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output_str->x, output, output_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void chachapoly_bad_params() +{ + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char nonce[12]; + unsigned char aad[1]; + unsigned char input[1]; + unsigned char output[1]; + unsigned char mac[16]; + size_t input_len = sizeof( input ); + size_t aad_len = sizeof( aad ); + mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx; + + memset( key, 0x00, sizeof( key ) ); + memset( nonce, 0x00, sizeof( nonce ) ); + memset( aad, 0x00, sizeof( aad ) ); + memset( input, 0x00, sizeof( input ) ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( mac, 0x00, sizeof( mac ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_chachapoly_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_chachapoly_free( NULL ) ); + + /* setkey */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( NULL, key ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + /* encrypt_and_tag */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( NULL, + 0, nonce, + aad, 0, + input, output, mac ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, + 0, NULL, + aad, 0, + input, output, mac ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, + 0, nonce, + NULL, aad_len, + input, output, mac ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, + input_len, nonce, + aad, 0, + NULL, output, mac ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, + input_len, nonce, + aad, 0, + input, NULL, mac ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, + 0, nonce, + aad, 0, + input, output, NULL ) ); + + /* auth_decrypt */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( NULL, + 0, nonce, + aad, 0, + mac, input, output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( &ctx, + 0, NULL, + aad, 0, + mac, input, output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( &ctx, + 0, nonce, + NULL, aad_len, + mac, input, output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( &ctx, + 0, nonce, + aad, 0, + NULL, input, output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( &ctx, + input_len, nonce, + aad, 0, + mac, NULL, output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( &ctx, + input_len, nonce, + aad, 0, + mac, input, NULL ) ); + + /* starts */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( NULL, nonce, + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( &ctx, NULL, + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT ) ); + + /* update_aad */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( NULL, aad, + aad_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( &ctx, NULL, + aad_len ) ); + + /* update */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_update( NULL, input_len, + input, output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_update( &ctx, input_len, + NULL, output ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_update( &ctx, input_len, + input, NULL ) ); + + /* finish */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( NULL, mac ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( &ctx, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void chachapoly_state() +{ + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char nonce[12]; + unsigned char aad[1]; + unsigned char input[1]; + unsigned char output[1]; + unsigned char mac[16]; + size_t input_len = sizeof( input ); + size_t aad_len = sizeof( aad ); + mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx; + + memset( key, 0x00, sizeof( key ) ); + memset( nonce, 0x00, sizeof( nonce ) ); + memset( aad, 0x00, sizeof( aad ) ); + memset( input, 0x00, sizeof( input ) ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( mac, 0x00, sizeof( mac ) ); + + /* Initial state: finish, update, update_aad forbidden */ + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( &ctx, mac ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update( &ctx, input_len, input, output ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( &ctx, aad, aad_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Still initial state: finish, update, update_aad forbidden */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &ctx, key ) + == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( &ctx, mac ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update( &ctx, input_len, input, output ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( &ctx, aad, aad_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Starts -> finish OK */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( &ctx, nonce, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( &ctx, mac ) + == 0 ); + + /* After finish: update, update_aad forbidden */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update( &ctx, input_len, input, output ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( &ctx, aad, aad_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Starts -> update* OK */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( &ctx, nonce, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update( &ctx, input_len, input, output ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update( &ctx, input_len, input, output ) + == 0 ); + + /* After update: update_aad forbidden */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( &ctx, aad, aad_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Starts -> update_aad* -> finish OK */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( &ctx, nonce, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( &ctx, aad, aad_len ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( &ctx, aad, aad_len ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( &ctx, mac ) + == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void chachapoly_selftest() +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8fbca29 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data @@ -0,0 +1,1899 @@ +AES-128 CBC - Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:0:0 + +AES-128 XTS - Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH:0 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:0:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:1:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:2:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:7:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:8:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:9:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:15:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:16:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:17:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:31:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:32:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:33:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:47:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:48:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:49:-1 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:"AES-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 1 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 2 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:2:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 7 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 8 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 9 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:9:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 15 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:15:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 17 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:17:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 31 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:31:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 33 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:33:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 47 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:47:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Try encrypting 49 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:49:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:1:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:0:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:0:0:0 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:15:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:16:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:0:16 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:17:6:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:0:16:0 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:16:16:0:32 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:0:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:0:0:0:0 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with no padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:16:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:16:0:16:0 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with no padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:0:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with no padding 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:1:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with no padding 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:15:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts with no padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:128:16:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:16:16:16:16 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:0:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:1:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:2:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:7:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:8:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:9:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:15:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:16:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:17:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:31:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:32:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:33:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:47:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:48:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:"AES-128-CFB128":128:49:-1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +AES-128 CFB - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:0:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:1:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:2:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:7:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:8:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:9:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:15:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:16:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:17:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:31:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:32:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:33:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:47:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:48:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:"AES-128-OFB":128:49:-1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +AES-128 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:0:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:1:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:2:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:7:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:8:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:9:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:15:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:16:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:17:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:31:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:32:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:33:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:47:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:48:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:"AES-192-OFB":192:49:-1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +AES-192 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:192:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:0:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:1:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:2:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:7:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:8:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:9:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:15:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:16:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:17:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:31:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:32:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:33:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:47:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:48:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:"AES-256-OFB":256:49:-1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +AES-256 OFB - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:256:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +AES-128 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:"AES-128-XTS":256:16:-1 + +AES-128 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:"AES-128-XTS":256:17:-1 + +AES-128 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:"AES-128-XTS":256:31:-1 + +AES-128 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:"AES-128-XTS":256:32:-1 + +AES-128 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:"AES-128-XTS":256:33:-1 + +AES-128 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:"AES-128-XTS":256:47:-1 + +AES-128 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:"AES-128-XTS":256:48:-1 + +AES-128 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS:"AES-128-XTS":256:49:-1 + +AES-256 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS:"AES-256-XTS":512:16:-1 + +AES-256 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS:"AES-256-XTS":512:17:-1 + +AES-256 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS:"AES-256-XTS":512:31:-1 + +AES-256 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS:"AES-256-XTS":512:32:-1 + +AES-256 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS:"AES-256-XTS":512:33:-1 + +AES-256 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS:"AES-256-XTS":512:47:-1 + +AES-256 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS:"AES-256-XTS":512:48:-1 + +AES-256 XTS - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS:"AES-256-XTS":512:49:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:0:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:1:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:2:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:7:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:8:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:9:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:15:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:16:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:17:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:31:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:32:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:33:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:47:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:48:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:"AES-128-CTR":128:49:-1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +AES-128 CTR - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:0:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:1:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:2:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:7:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:8:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:9:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:15:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:16:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:17:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:31:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:32:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:33:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:47:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:48:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:"AES-192-CBC":192:49:-1 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES-192 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:192:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32 + +AES-256 CBC - Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:0:0 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:0:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:1:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:2:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:7:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:8:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:9:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:15:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:16:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:17:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:31:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:32:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:33:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:47:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:48:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:"AES-256-CBC":256:49:-1 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 23 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES-256 CBC - Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts with PKCS7 padding 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:256:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32 + +AES Decrypt test vector #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"ffffffffe00000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"23f710842b9bb9c32f26648c786807ca":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +AES Decrypt test vector #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:"ffffffffe00000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"23f710842b9bb9c32f26648c786807ca":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":0:0 + +AES Decrypt test vector #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"707b1dbb0ffa40ef7d95def421233fae":"fffffffff80000000000000000000000":"":"":0:0 + +AES Decrypt test vector #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"49af6b372135acef10132e548f217b17":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":0:0 + +AES Decrypt test vector #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:-1:"fffffffe000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"1114bc2028009b923f0b01915ce5e7c4":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":0:0: + +AES Decrypt test vector #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128:-1:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe00000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"60136703374f64e860b48ce31f930716":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":0:0 + +AES Decrypt test vector #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128:-1:"ffffffffff800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"be66cfea2fecd6bf0ec7b4352c99bcaa":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":0:0 + +AES Decrypt test vector #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB:-1:"2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A7789508d16918f03f53c52dac54ed8259740051e9c5fecf64344f7a82260edcc304c6528f659c77866a510d9c1d6ae5e":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172AAE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E5130C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EFF69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"":"":0:0: + +AES Decrypt test vector #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB:-1:"8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174fcc28b8d4c63837c09e81700c11004018d9a9aeac0f6596f559c6d4daf59a5f26d9f200857ca6c3e9cac524bd9acc92a":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172AAE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E5130C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EFF69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"":"":0:0: + +AES Decrypt test vector #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB:-1:"603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D38604febdc6740d20b3ac88f6ad82a4fb08d71ab47a086e86eedf39d1c5bba97c4080126141d67f37be8538f5a8be740e484":"6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172AAE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E5130C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EFF69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710":"":"":0:0: + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"9798c4640bad75c7c3227db910174e72":"a9a1631bf4996954ebc093957b234589":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"96ab5c2ff612d9dfaae8c31f30c42168":"ff4f8391a6a40ca5b25d23bedd44a597":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"e0000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"72a1da770f5d7ac4c9ef94d822affd97":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"f0000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"970014d634e2b7650777e8e84d03ccd8":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"f8000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f17e79aed0db7e279e955b5f493875a7":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffff0000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"7b90785125505fad59b13c186dd66ce3":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffff8000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8b527a6aebdaec9eaef8eda2cb7783e5":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffffc000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"43fdaf53ebbc9880c228617d6a9b548b":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"70c46bb30692be657f7eaa93ebad9897":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"323994cfb9da285a5d9642e1759b224a":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffff000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"1dbf57877b7b17385c85d0b54851e371":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffc00000000000000000":"3a4d354f02bb5a5e47d39666867f246a":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffe00000000000000000":"d451b8d6e1e1a0ebb155fbbf6e7b7dc3":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffff00000000000000000":"6898d4f42fa7ba6a10ac05e87b9f2080":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #16 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffffffffffe0000000":"082eb8be35f442fb52668e16a591d1d6":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #17 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffff0000000":"e656f9ecf5fe27ec3e4a73d00c282fb3":0 + +AES-128-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #18 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffff8000000":"2ca8209d63274cd9a29bb74bcd77683a":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"db4f1aa530967d6732ce4715eb0ee24b":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a81738252621dd180a34f3455b4baa2f":"ff800000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"77e2b508db7fd89234caf7939ee5621a":"ffc00000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dc43be40be0e53712f7e2bf5ca707209":"6a118a874519e64e9963798a503f1d35":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"92beedab1895a94faa69b632e5cc47ce":"cb9fceec81286ca3e989bd979b0cb284":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"459264f4798f6a78bacb89c15ed3d601":"b26aeb1874e47ca8358ff22378f09144":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"b69418a85332240dc82492353956ae0c":"a303d940ded8f0baff6f75414cac5243":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"71b5c08a1993e1362e4d0ce9b22b78d5":"c2dabd117f8a3ecabfbb11d12194d9d0":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"e234cdca2606b81f29408d5f6da21206":"fff60a4740086b3b9c56195b98d91a7b":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffffffffffffff0000000000000000":"84be19e053635f09f2665e7bae85b42d":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffffffffffffff8000000000000000":"32cd652842926aea4aa6137bb2be2b5e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffff80000000000":"156f07767a85a4312321f63968338a01":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffc0000000000":"15eec9ebf42b9ca76897d2cd6c5a12e2":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffe0000000000":"db0d3a6fdcc13f915e2b302ceeb70fd8":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"51719783d3185a535bd75adc65071ce1":"4f354592ff7c8847d2d0870ca9481b7c":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"26aa49dcfe7629a8901a69a9914e6dfd":"d5e08bf9a182e857cf40b3a36ee248cc":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"941a4773058224e1ef66d10e0a6ee782":"067cd9d3749207791841562507fa9626":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"d2926527e0aa9f37b45e2ec2ade5853ef807576104c7ace3":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dd619e1cf204446112e0af2b9afa8f8c":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"982215f4e173dfa0fcffe5d3da41c4812c7bcc8ed3540f93":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d4f0aae13c8fe9339fbf9e69ed0ad74d":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"98c6b8e01e379fbd14e61af6af891596583565f2a27d59e9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"19c80ec4a6deb7e5ed1033dda933498f":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffff800000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8dd274bd0f1b58ae345d9e7233f9b8f3":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"9d6bdc8f4ce5feb0f3bed2e4b9a9bb0b":0 + +AES-192-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffe00000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fd5548bcf3f42565f7efa94562528d46":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff000000000000000":"bb2852c891c5947d2ed44032c421b85f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff800000000000000":"1b9f5fbd5e8a4264c0a85b80409afa5e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000000":"30dab809f85a917fe924733f424ac589":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"61257134a518a0d57d9d244d45f6498cbc32f2bafc522d79":"cfe4d74002696ccf7d87b14a2f9cafc9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"b0ab0a6a818baef2d11fa33eac947284fb7d748cfb75e570":"d2eafd86f63b109b91f5dbb3a3fb7e13":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ee053aa011c8b428cdcc3636313c54d6a03cac01c71579d6":"9b9fdd1c5975655f539998b306a324af":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"c9b8135ff1b5adc413dfd053b21bd96d":"9c2d8842e5f48f57648205d39a239af1":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"4a3650c3371ce2eb35e389a171427440":"bff52510095f518ecca60af4205444bb":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"b2099795e88cc158fd75ea133d7e7fbe":"ffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"a6cae46fb6fadfe7a2c302a34242817b":"ffffffffffffffffffffe00000000000":0 + +AES-192-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"026a7024d6a902e0b3ffccbaa910cc3f":"fffffffffffffffffffff00000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c1cc358b449909a19436cfbb3f852ef8bcb5ed12ac7058325f56e6099aab1a1c":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"352065272169abf9856843927d0674fd":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"984ca75f4ee8d706f46c2d98c0bf4a45f5b00d791c2dfeb191b5ed8e420fd627":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4307456a9e67813b452e15fa8fffe398":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"b43d08a447ac8609baadae4ff12918b9f68fc1653f1269222f123981ded7a92f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4663446607354989477a5c6f0f007ef4":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0b24af36193ce4665f2825d7b4749c98":"a9ff75bd7cf6613d3731c77c3b6d0c04":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"8a560769d605868ad80d819bdba03771":"38f2c7ae10612415d27ca190d27da8b4":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffff80000000000000000000000000":"36aff0ef7bf3280772cf4cac80a0d2b2":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffc0000000000000000000000000":"1f8eedea0f62a1406d58cfc3ecea72cf":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffe0000000000000000000000000":"abf4154a3375a1d3e6b1d454438f95a6":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff8000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"45d089c36d5c5a4efc689e3b0de10dd5":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"b4da5df4becb5462e03a0ed00d295629":0 + +AES-256-ECB Encrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dcf4e129136c1a4b7a0f38935cc34b2b":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000000000000000":"edf61ae362e882ddc0167474a7a77f3a":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff80000000000000000":"6168b00ba7859e0970ecfd757efecf7c":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc0000000000000000":"d1415447866230d28bb1ea18a4cdfd02":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"f8be9ba615c5a952cabbca24f68f8593039624d524c816acda2c9183bd917cb9":"a3944b95ca0b52043584ef02151926a8":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"797f8b3d176dac5b7e34a2d539c4ef367a16f8635f6264737591c5c07bf57a3e":"a74289fe73a4c123ca189ea1e1b49ad5":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"6838d40caf927749c13f0329d331f448e202c73ef52c5f73a37ca635d4c47707":"b91d4ea4488644b56cf0812fa7fcf5fc":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"38f2c7ae10612415d27ca190d27da8b4":"8a560769d605868ad80d819bdba03771":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"1bc704f1bce135ceb810341b216d7abe":"91fbef2d15a97816060bee1feaa49afe":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0a6bdc6d4c1e6280301fd8e97ddbe601":"c0000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"9b80eefb7ebe2d2b16247aa0efc72f5d":"e0000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0:0 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"f0000000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"970014d634e2b7650777e8e84d03ccd8":0:0 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ffffffffffffffc00000000000000000":"3a4d354f02bb5a5e47d39666867f246a":0:0 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"db4f1aa530967d6732ce4715eb0ee24b":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"b69418a85332240dc82492353956ae0c":"":"a303d940ded8f0baff6f75414cac5243":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffffffffffffff8000000000000000":"":"32cd652842926aea4aa6137bb2be2b5e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"fffffffffffffffffffff80000000000":"156f07767a85a4312321f63968338a01":0:0 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"51719783d3185a535bd75adc65071ce1":"4f354592ff7c8847d2d0870ca9481b7c":0:0 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"d2926527e0aa9f37b45e2ec2ade5853ef807576104c7ace3":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dd619e1cf204446112e0af2b9afa8f8c":0:0 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffff800000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8dd274bd0f1b58ae345d9e7233f9b8f3":0:0 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff000000000000000":"":"bb2852c891c5947d2ed44032c421b85f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"61257134a518a0d57d9d244d45f6498cbc32f2bafc522d79":"":"cfe4d74002696ccf7d87b14a2f9cafc9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0:0 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"b2099795e88cc158fd75ea133d7e7fbe":"ffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000":0:0 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c1cc358b449909a19436cfbb3f852ef8bcb5ed12ac7058325f56e6099aab1a1c":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"352065272169abf9856843927d0674fd":0:0 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"0b24af36193ce4665f2825d7b4749c98":"a9ff75bd7cf6613d3731c77c3b6d0c04":0:0 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ffffff80000000000000000000000000":"36aff0ef7bf3280772cf4cac80a0d2b2":0:0 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff8000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"45d089c36d5c5a4efc689e3b0de10dd5":0:0 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000000000000000":"":"edf61ae362e882ddc0167474a7a77f3a":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"f8be9ba615c5a952cabbca24f68f8593039624d524c816acda2c9183bd917cb9":"":"a3944b95ca0b52043584ef02151926a8":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":0:0 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":0:0 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"323994cfb9da285a5d9642e1759b224a":0:0 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":0:0 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0:0 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffc000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"df556a33438db87bc41b1752c55e5e49":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":0:0 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":0:0 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"833f71258d53036b02952c76c744f5a1":0:0 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":0:0 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":0:0 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"7ababc4b3f516c9aafb35f4140b548f9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0:0 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":0:0 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ec52a212f80a09df6317021bc2a9819e":0:0 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":0:0 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":0:0 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d1ccb9b1337002cbac42c520b5d67722":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":0:0 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":0:1 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"323994cfb9da285a5d9642e1759b224a":0:1 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":0:1 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0:1 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffc000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"df556a33438db87bc41b1752c55e5e49":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":0:1 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":0:1 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"833f71258d53036b02952c76c744f5a1":0:1 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":0:1 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":0:1 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"7ababc4b3f516c9aafb35f4140b548f9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0:1 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":0:1 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ec52a212f80a09df6317021bc2a9819e":0:1 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":0:1 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":0:1 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d1ccb9b1337002cbac42c520b5d67722":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":0:1 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":0:1 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"323994cfb9da285a5d9642e1759b224a":0:1 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":0:1 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0:1 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffc000000000000000000000000000":"":"df556a33438db87bc41b1752c55e5e49":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":0:1 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":0:1 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"833f71258d53036b02952c76c744f5a1":0:1 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":0:1 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":0:1 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"7ababc4b3f516c9aafb35f4140b548f9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0:1 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":0:1 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ec52a212f80a09df6317021bc2a9819e":0:1 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":0:1 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":0:1 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"d1ccb9b1337002cbac42c520b5d67722":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1 + +AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C +test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":0:1 + +Cipher Corner Case behaviours +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +cipher_special_behaviours: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.arc4.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.arc4.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a473739 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.arc4.data @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +ARC4 Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:0:0 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:0:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:1:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:2:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:7:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:8:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:9:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:15:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:16:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:17:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:31:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:32:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:33:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:47:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:48:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:"ARC4-128":128:49:-1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +ARC4 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c50a21f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aria.data @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Aria CBC Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:0:0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.blowfish.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.blowfish.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a05a4e7b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.blowfish.data @@ -0,0 +1,607 @@ +BLOWFISH CBC Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:0:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:0:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:1:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:2:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:7:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:8:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:9:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:15:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:16:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:17:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:31:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:32:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:33:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:47:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:48:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:49:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with one and zeros padding [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with one and zeros padding [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros and len padding [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros and len padding [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros padding [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros padding [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 1 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 2 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:2:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 7 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 9 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:9:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 15 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:15:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 17 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:17:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 31 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:31:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 33 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:33:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 47 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:47:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Try encrypting 49 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:49:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:16:0:-1:16:0:8:8 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:15:1:-1:8:8:8:8 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:15:7:-1:8:8:8:8 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:16:6:-1:16:0:8:8 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:128:16:16:-1:16:16:8:24 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:0:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:1:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:2:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:7:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:8:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:9:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:15:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:16:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:17:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:31:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:32:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:33:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:47:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:48:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":128:49:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#6] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:0:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:1:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:2:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:7:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:8:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:9:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:15:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:16:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:17:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:31:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:32:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#6] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:33:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:47:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:48:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":128:49:-1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#7] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#8] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#9] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +BLOWFISH Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +BLOWFISH CBC Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes, 192-bits key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:"BLOWFISH-CBC":192:7:-1 + +BLOWFISH CTR Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes, 192-bits key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:"BLOWFISH-CTR":192:7:-1 + +BLOWFISH CFB64 Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes, 192-bits key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:"BLOWFISH-CFB64":192:7:-1 + +BLOWFISH ECB Encrypt test vector (SSLeay) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0000000000000000":"4ef997456198dd78":0 + +BLOWFISH ECB Encrypt test vector (SSLeay) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"ffffffffffffffff":"51866fd5b85ecb8a":0 + +BLOWFISH ECB Encrypt test vector (SSLeay) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210":"0123456789abcdef":"0aceab0fc6a0a28d":0 + +BLOWFISH ECB Encrypt test vector (SSLeay) #3, 64-bit key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fedcba9876543210":"0123456789abcdef":"0aceab0fc6a0a28d":0 + +BLOWFISH ECB Encrypt test vector (SSLeay) #3, 192-bit key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210":"0123456789abcdef":"0aceab0fc6a0a28d":0 + +BLOWFISH ECB Decrypt test vector (SSLeay) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4ef997456198dd78":"0000000000000000":0 + +BLOWFISH ECB Decrypt test vector (SSLeay) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"51866fd5b85ecb8a":"ffffffffffffffff":0 + +BLOWFISH ECB Decrypt test vector (SSLeay) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"3849674c2602319e3849674c2602319e":"a25e7856cf2651eb":"51454b582ddf440a":0 + +BLOWFISH ECB Decrypt test vector (SSLeay) #3, 64-bit key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"3849674c2602319e":"a25e7856cf2651eb":"51454b582ddf440a":0 + +BLOWFISH ECB Decrypt test vector (SSLeay) #3, 192-bit key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"3849674c2602319e3849674c2602319e3849674c2602319e":"a25e7856cf2651eb":"51454b582ddf440a":0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3e7bffa4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.camellia.data @@ -0,0 +1,767 @@ +CAMELLIA-128 CBC - Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:0:0 + +CAMELLIA-256 CBC - Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:0:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:1:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:2:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:7:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:8:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:9:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:15:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:16:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:17:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:31:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:32:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:33:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:47:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:48:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:49:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with one and zeros padding [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with one and zeros padding [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros and len padding [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros and len padding [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros padding [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros padding [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:"CAMELLIA-128-CBC":128:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 1 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 2 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:2:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 7 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 8 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 9 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:9:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 15 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:15:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 17 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:17:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 31 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:31:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 33 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:33:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 47 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:47:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Try encrypting 49 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:128:49:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:128:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:0:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:1:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:2:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:7:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:8:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:9:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:15:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:16:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:17:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:31:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:32:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:33:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:47:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:48:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:"CAMELLIA-128-CFB128":128:49:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#6] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:0:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:1:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:2:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:7:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:8:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:9:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:15:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:16:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:17:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:31:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:32:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#6] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:33:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:47:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:48:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:"CAMELLIA-128-CTR":128:49:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#7] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#8] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#9] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:0:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:1:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:2:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:7:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:8:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:9:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:15:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:16:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:17:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:31:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#7] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:32:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#8] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:33:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:47:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:48:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:"CAMELLIA-192-CBC":192:49:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#10] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#11] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#12] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:192:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:0:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:1:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:2:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:7:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:8:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:9:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:15:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:16:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:17:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:31:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#9] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:32:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#10] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:33:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:47:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:48:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:"CAMELLIA-256-CBC":256:49:-1 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:0:-1:16:0:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:15:1:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#13] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:15:7:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#14] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:6:-1:16:0:0:16 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#15] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0 + +CAMELLIA Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:256:16:16:-1:16:16:0:32 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.ccm.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.ccm.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..79725008 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.ccm.data @@ -0,0 +1,863 @@ +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #1 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"02209f55":"":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #2 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"9a04c241":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #3 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"75d582db43ce9b13ab4b6f7f14341330":"":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #4 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"3a65e03af37b81d05acc7ec1bc39deb0":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #5 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"90156f3f":"":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #6 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"88909016":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #7 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fb04dc5a44c6bb000f2440f5154364b4":"":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #8 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"5447075bf42a59b91f08064738b015ab":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #9 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"a90e8ea44085ced791b2fdb7fd44b5cf0bd7d27718029bb7":"03e1fa6b":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #10 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"50aafe0578c115c4a8e126ff7b3ccb64dce8ccaa8ceda69f":"23e5d81c":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #11 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"24ab9eeb0e5508cae80074f1070ee188a637171860881f1f":"2d9a3fbc210595b7b8b1b41523111a8e":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #12 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"7ebfda6fa5da1dbffd82dc29b875798fbcef8ba0084fbd24":"63af747cc88a001fa94e060290f209c4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #13 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4a550134f94455979ec4bf89ad2bd80d25a77ae94e456134":"a3e138b9":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #14 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"118ec53dd1bfbe52d5b9fe5dfebecf2ee674ec983eada654":"091a5ae9":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #15 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb":"6a9a970b9beb2ac1bd4fd62168f8378a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #16 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"0c56a503aa2c12e87450d45a7b714db980fd348f327c0065":"a65666144994bad0c8195bcb4ade1337":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #17 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"782e4318":"":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #18 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"a04f270a":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #19 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"41b476013f45e4a781f253a6f3b1e530":"":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #20 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"f9f018fcd125822616083fffebc4c8e6":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #21 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"9f69f24f":"":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #22 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"e17afaa4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"1859ac36a40a6b28b34266253627797a":"":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #24 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"edf8b46eb69ac0044116019dec183072":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #25 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6be31860ca271ef448de8f8d8b39346daf4b81d7e92d65b3":"38f125fa":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #26 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4cc57a9927a6bc401441870d3193bf89ebd163f5c01501c7":"28a66b69":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #27 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"b351ab96b2e45515254558d5212673ee6c776d42dbca3b51":"2cf3a20b7fd7c49e6e79bef475c2906f":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #28 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"df1a5285caa41b4bb47f6e5ceceba4e82721828d68427a30":"81d18ca149d6766bfaccec88f194eb5b":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #29 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"934f893824e880f743d196b22d1f340a52608155087bd28a":"c25e5329":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #30 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"f43ba9d834ad85dfab3f1c0c27c3441fe4e411a38a261a65":"59b3b3ee":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #31 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"50038b5fdd364ee747b70d00bd36840ece4ea19998123375":"c0a458bfcafa3b2609afe0f825cbf503":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #32 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"78ed8ff6b5a1255d0fbd0a719a9c27b059ff5f83d0c4962c":"390042ba8bb5f6798dab01c5afad7306":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #1 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"9d4b7f3b":"":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #2 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"80745de9":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #3 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"17223038fa99d53681ca1beabe78d1b4":"":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #4 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"d0e1eeef4d2a264536bb1c2c1bde7c35":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #5 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fe69ed84":"":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #6 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"db7ffc82":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #7 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"0c66a8e547ed4f8c2c9a9a1eb5d455b9":"":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #8 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"38757b3a61a4dc97ca3ab88bf1240695":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #9 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"ddc93a54":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #10 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"32b649ab56162e55d4148a1292d6a225a988eb1308298273":"b6889036":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #11 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"cba4b4aeb85f0492fd8d905c4a6d8233139833373ef188a8":"c5a5ebecf7ac8607fe412189e83d9d20":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #12 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"ca62713728b5c9d652504b0ae8fd4fee5d297ee6a8d19cb6":"e699f15f14d34dcaf9ba8ed4b877c97d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #13 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"042653c674ef2a90f7fb11d30848e530ae59478f1051633a":"34fad277":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #14 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"1902d9769a7ba3d3268e1257395c8c2e5f98eef295dcbfa5":"a35df775":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #15 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"a5b7d8cca2069908d1ed88e6a9fe2c9bede3131dad54671e":"a7ade30a07d185692ab0ebdf4c78cf7a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #16 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"9a98617fb97a0dfe466be692272dcdaec1c5443a3b51312e":"f042c86363cc05afb98c66e16be8a445":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #17 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"1d089a5f":"":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #18 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"2f46022a":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #19 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"5280a2137fee3deefcfe9b63a1199fb3":"":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #20 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"d40a7318c5f2d82f838c0beeefe0d598":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #21 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"5e0eaebd":"":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #22 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"71b7fc33":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"d07ccf9fdc3d33aa94cda3d230da707c":"":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #24 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"65fe32b649dc328c9f531584897e85b3":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #25 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"9f6ca4af9b159148c889a6584d1183ea26e2614874b05045":"75dea8d1":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #26 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"84d8212e9cfc2121252baa3b065b1edcf50497b9594db1eb":"d7965825":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #27 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6aab64c4787599d8f213446beadb16e08dba60e97f56dbd1":"4d1d980d6fe0fb44b421992662b97975":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #28 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4980b2ee49b1aaf393175f5ab9bae95ec7904557dfa20660":"3c51d36c826f01384100886198a7f6a3":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #29 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"16e543d0e20615ff0df15acd9927ddfe40668a54bb854ccc":"c25e9fce":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #30 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"df35b109caf690656ae278bbd8f8bba687a2ce11b105dae9":"8ecedb3e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #31 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"c5b0b2ef17498c5570eb335df4588032958ba3d69bf6f317":"8464a6f7fa2b76744e8e8d95691cecb8":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":0 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #32 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"d1f0518929f4ae2f0543de2a7dfe4bb0110bb3057e524a1c":"06bd6dc2e6bcc3436cffb969ae900388":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #1 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"469c90bb":"":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #2 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"46a908ed":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #3 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"8207eb14d33855a52acceed17dbcbf6e":"":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #4 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"60f8e127cb4d30db6df0622158cd931d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #5 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"8a19a133":"":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #6 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"2e317f1b":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #7 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"97e1a8dd4259ccd2e431e057b0397fcf":"":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #8 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"5a9596c511ea6a8671adefc4f2157d8b":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #9 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"64a1341679972dc5869fcf69b19d5c5ea50aa0b5e985f5b7":"22aa8d59":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #10 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"c5b7f802bffc498c1626e3774f1d9f94045dfd8e1a10a202":"77d00a75":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #11 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"bc51c3925a960e7732533e4ef3a4f69ee6826de952bcb0fd":"374f3bb6db8377ebfc79674858c4f305":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #12 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"afa1fa8e8a70e26b02161150556d604101fdf423f332c336":"3275f2a4907d51b734fe7238cebbd48f":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #13 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"63e00d30e4b08fd2a1cc8d70fab327b2368e77a93be4f412":"3d14fb3f":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #14 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"bb5425b3869b76856ec58e39886fb6f6f2ac13fe44cb132d":"8d0c0099":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #15 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"f0050ad16392021a3f40207bed3521fb1e9f808f49830c42":"3a578d179902f912f9ea1afbce1120b3":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #16 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"c408190d0fbf5034f83b24a8ed9657331a7ce141de4fae76":"9084607b83bd06e6442eac8dacf583cc":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #17 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"92d00fbe":"":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #18 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"9143e5c4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #19 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"93af11a08379eb37a16aa2837f09d69d":"":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #20 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"d19b0c14ec686a7961ca7c386d125a65":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #21 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"866d4227":"":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #22 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"94cb1127":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5":"":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #24 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"677a040d46ee3f2b7838273bdad14f16":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #25 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"c2fe12658139f5d0dd22cadf2e901695b579302a72fc5608":"3ebc7720":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #26 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"94748ba81229e53c38583a8564b23ebbafc6f6efdf4c2a81":"c44db2c9":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #27 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"3341168eb8c48468c414347fb08f71d2086f7c2d1bd581ce":"1ac68bd42f5ec7fa7e068cc0ecd79c2a":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #28 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"d543acda712b898cbb27b8f598b2e4438ce587a836e27851":"47c3338a2400809e739b63ba8227d2f9":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #29 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"c0ea400b599561e7905b99262b4565d5c3dc49fad84d7c69":"ef891339":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #30 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"60871e03ea0eb968536c99f926ea24ef43d41272ad9fb7f6":"3d488623":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #31 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"8d34cdca37ce77be68f65baf3382e31efa693e63f914a781":"367f30f2eaad8c063ca50795acd90203":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3":0 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #32 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"516c0095cc3d85fd55e48da17c592e0c7014b9daafb82bdc":"4b41096dfdbe9cc1ab610f8f3e038d16":"FAIL":"":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"BA737185E719310492F38A5F1251DA55FAFBC949848A0D":"FCAECE746B3DB9AD":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000004030201A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"5D2564BF8EAFE1D99526EC016D1BF0424CFBD2CD62848F33":"60B2295DF24283E8":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000005040302A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"81F663D6C7787817F9203608B982AD15DC2BBD87D756F79204":"F551D6682F23AA46":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000006050403A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"CAEF1E827211B08F7BD90F08C77288C070A4A0":"8B3A933A63E497A0":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000007060504A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"2AD3BAD94FC52E92BE438E827C1023B96A8A7725":"8FA17BA7F331DB09":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000008070605A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"FEA5480BA53FA8D3C34422AACE4DE67FFA3BB73BAB":"AB36A1EE4FE0FE28":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000009080706A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"54532026E54C119A8D36D9EC6E1ED97416C8708C4B5C2C":"ACAFA3BCCF7A4EBF9573":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000A090807A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"8AD19B001A87D148F4D92BEF34525CCCE3A63C6512A6F575":"7388E4913EF14701F441":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000B0A0908A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"5DB08D62407E6E31D60F9CA2C60474219AC0BE50C0D4A57787":"94D6E230CD25C9FEBF87":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000C0B0A09A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"DB118CCEC1B8761C877CD8963A67D6F3BBBC5C":"D09299EB11F312F23237":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000D0C0B0AA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"7CC83D8DC49103525B483DC5CA7EA9AB812B7056":"079DAFFADA16CCCF2C4E":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000E0D0C0BA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"2CD35B8820D23E7AA351B0E92FC79367238B2CC748":"CBB94C2947793D64AF75":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00A970110E1927B160B6A31C1C":"6B7F464507FAE496":"A435D727348DDD22907F7EB8F5FDBB4D939DA6524DB4F6":"4558C02D25B127EE":"":"C6B5F3E6CA2311AEF7472B203E735EA561ADB17D56C5A3":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"0083CD8CE0CB42B160B6A31C1C":"986605B43DF15DE7":"8AE052508FBECA932E346F05E0DC0DFBCF939EAFFA3E587C":"867D6E1C48703806":"":"01F6CE6764C574483BB02E6BBF1E0ABD26A22572B4D80EE7":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"005F54950B18F2B160B6A31C1C":"48F2E7E1A7671A51":"08B67EE21C8BF26E473E408599E9C0836D6AF0BB18DF55466C":"A80878A790476DE5":"":"CDF1D8406FC2E9014953897005FBFB8BA57276F92404608E08":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #16 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00EC600863319AB160B6A31C1C":"DE97DF3B8CBD6D8E5030DA4C":"63B78B4967B19EDBB733CD1114F64EB2260893":"68C354828D950CC5":"":"B005DCFA0B59181426A961685A993D8C43185B":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #17 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"0060CFF1A31EA1B160B6A31C1C":"A5EE93E457DF05466E782DCF":"0BC6BBE2A8B909F4629EE6DC148DA44410E18AF4":"3147383276F66A9F":"":"2E20211298105F129D5ED95B93F72D30B2FACCD7":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #18 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"000F85CD995C97B160B6A31C1C":"24AA1BF9A5CD876182A25074":"222AD632FA31D6AF970C345F7E77CA3BD0DC25B340":"A1A3D31F8D4B44B7":"":"2645941E75632D3491AF0FC0C9876C3BE4AA7468C9":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #19 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00C29B2CAAC4CDB160B6A31C1C":"691946B9CA07BE87":"05B8E1B9C49CFD56CF130AA6251DC2ECC06CCC508FE697":"A0066D57C84BEC182768":"":"070135A6437C9DB120CD61D8F6C39C3EA125FD95A0D23D":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"002C6B7595EE62B160B6A31C1C":"D0C54ECB84627DC4":"54CEB968DEE23611575EC003DFAA1CD48849BDF5AE2EDB6B":"7FA775B150ED4383C5A9":"":"C8C0880E6C636E20093DD6594217D2E18877DB264E71A5CC":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00C53CD4C2AA24B160B6A31C1C":"E285E0E4808CDA3D":"B1404546BF667210CA28E309B39BD6CA7E9FC8285FE698D43C":"D20A02E0BDCAED2010D3":"":"F75DAA0710C4E64297794DC2B7D2A20757B1AA4E448002FFAB":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #22 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00BEE9267FBADCB160B6A31C1C":"6CAEF9941141570D7C813405":"94C8959C11569A297831A721005857AB61B87A":"2DEA0936B6EB5F625F5D":"":"C238822FAC5F98FF929405B0AD127A4E41854E":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #23 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00DFA8B1245007B160B6A31C1C":"36A52CF16B19A2037AB7011E":"5869E3AAD2447C74E0FC05F9A4EA74577F4DE8CA":"8924764296AD04119CE7":"":"4DBF3E774AD245E5D5891F9D1C32A0AE022C85D7":0 + +Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #24 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"003B8FD8D3A937B160B6A31C1C":"A4D499F78419728C19178B0C":"4B198156393B0F7796086AAFB454F8C3F034CCA966":"945F1FCEA7E11BEE6A2F":"":"9DC9EDAE2FF5DF8636E8C6DE0EED55F7867E33337D":0 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #1 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"02209f55":"":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #2 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"9a04c241":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #3 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"75d582db43ce9b13ab4b6f7f14341330":"":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #4 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"3a65e03af37b81d05acc7ec1bc39deb0":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #5 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"90156f3f":"":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #6 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"88909016":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #7 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fb04dc5a44c6bb000f2440f5154364b4":"":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #8 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"5447075bf42a59b91f08064738b015ab":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #9 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"a90e8ea44085ced791b2fdb7fd44b5cf0bd7d27718029bb7":"03e1fa6b":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #10 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"50aafe0578c115c4a8e126ff7b3ccb64dce8ccaa8ceda69f":"23e5d81c":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #11 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"24ab9eeb0e5508cae80074f1070ee188a637171860881f1f":"2d9a3fbc210595b7b8b1b41523111a8e":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #12 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"7ebfda6fa5da1dbffd82dc29b875798fbcef8ba0084fbd24":"63af747cc88a001fa94e060290f209c4":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #13 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4a550134f94455979ec4bf89ad2bd80d25a77ae94e456134":"a3e138b9":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #14 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"118ec53dd1bfbe52d5b9fe5dfebecf2ee674ec983eada654":"091a5ae9":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #15 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb":"6a9a970b9beb2ac1bd4fd62168f8378a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #16 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"0c56a503aa2c12e87450d45a7b714db980fd348f327c0065":"a65666144994bad0c8195bcb4ade1337":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #17 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"782e4318":"":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #18 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"a04f270a":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #19 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"41b476013f45e4a781f253a6f3b1e530":"":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #20 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"f9f018fcd125822616083fffebc4c8e6":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #21 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"9f69f24f":"":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #22 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"e17afaa4":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #23 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"1859ac36a40a6b28b34266253627797a":"":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #24 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"edf8b46eb69ac0044116019dec183072":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #25 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6be31860ca271ef448de8f8d8b39346daf4b81d7e92d65b3":"38f125fa":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #26 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4cc57a9927a6bc401441870d3193bf89ebd163f5c01501c7":"28a66b69":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #27 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"b351ab96b2e45515254558d5212673ee6c776d42dbca3b51":"2cf3a20b7fd7c49e6e79bef475c2906f":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #28 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"df1a5285caa41b4bb47f6e5ceceba4e82721828d68427a30":"81d18ca149d6766bfaccec88f194eb5b":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #29 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"934f893824e880f743d196b22d1f340a52608155087bd28a":"c25e5329":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #30 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"f43ba9d834ad85dfab3f1c0c27c3441fe4e411a38a261a65":"59b3b3ee":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #31 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"50038b5fdd364ee747b70d00bd36840ece4ea19998123375":"c0a458bfcafa3b2609afe0f825cbf503":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":1 + +AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #32 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"78ed8ff6b5a1255d0fbd0a719a9c27b059ff5f83d0c4962c":"390042ba8bb5f6798dab01c5afad7306":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #1 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"9d4b7f3b":"":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #2 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"80745de9":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #3 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"17223038fa99d53681ca1beabe78d1b4":"":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #4 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"d0e1eeef4d2a264536bb1c2c1bde7c35":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #5 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fe69ed84":"":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #6 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"db7ffc82":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #7 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"0c66a8e547ed4f8c2c9a9a1eb5d455b9":"":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #8 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"38757b3a61a4dc97ca3ab88bf1240695":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #9 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"ddc93a54":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #10 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"32b649ab56162e55d4148a1292d6a225a988eb1308298273":"b6889036":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #11 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"cba4b4aeb85f0492fd8d905c4a6d8233139833373ef188a8":"c5a5ebecf7ac8607fe412189e83d9d20":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #12 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"ca62713728b5c9d652504b0ae8fd4fee5d297ee6a8d19cb6":"e699f15f14d34dcaf9ba8ed4b877c97d":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #13 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"042653c674ef2a90f7fb11d30848e530ae59478f1051633a":"34fad277":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #14 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"1902d9769a7ba3d3268e1257395c8c2e5f98eef295dcbfa5":"a35df775":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #15 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"a5b7d8cca2069908d1ed88e6a9fe2c9bede3131dad54671e":"a7ade30a07d185692ab0ebdf4c78cf7a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #16 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"9a98617fb97a0dfe466be692272dcdaec1c5443a3b51312e":"f042c86363cc05afb98c66e16be8a445":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #17 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"1d089a5f":"":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #18 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"2f46022a":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #19 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"5280a2137fee3deefcfe9b63a1199fb3":"":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #20 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"d40a7318c5f2d82f838c0beeefe0d598":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #21 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"5e0eaebd":"":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #22 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"71b7fc33":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #23 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"d07ccf9fdc3d33aa94cda3d230da707c":"":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #24 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"65fe32b649dc328c9f531584897e85b3":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #25 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"9f6ca4af9b159148c889a6584d1183ea26e2614874b05045":"75dea8d1":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #26 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"84d8212e9cfc2121252baa3b065b1edcf50497b9594db1eb":"d7965825":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #27 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6aab64c4787599d8f213446beadb16e08dba60e97f56dbd1":"4d1d980d6fe0fb44b421992662b97975":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #28 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4980b2ee49b1aaf393175f5ab9bae95ec7904557dfa20660":"3c51d36c826f01384100886198a7f6a3":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #29 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"16e543d0e20615ff0df15acd9927ddfe40668a54bb854ccc":"c25e9fce":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #30 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"df35b109caf690656ae278bbd8f8bba687a2ce11b105dae9":"8ecedb3e":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #31 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"c5b0b2ef17498c5570eb335df4588032958ba3d69bf6f317":"8464a6f7fa2b76744e8e8d95691cecb8":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":1 + +AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #32 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"d1f0518929f4ae2f0543de2a7dfe4bb0110bb3057e524a1c":"06bd6dc2e6bcc3436cffb969ae900388":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #1 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"469c90bb":"":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #2 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"46a908ed":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #3 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"8207eb14d33855a52acceed17dbcbf6e":"":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #4 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"60f8e127cb4d30db6df0622158cd931d":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #5 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"8a19a133":"":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #6 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"2e317f1b":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #7 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"97e1a8dd4259ccd2e431e057b0397fcf":"":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #8 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"5a9596c511ea6a8671adefc4f2157d8b":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #9 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"64a1341679972dc5869fcf69b19d5c5ea50aa0b5e985f5b7":"22aa8d59":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #10 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"c5b7f802bffc498c1626e3774f1d9f94045dfd8e1a10a202":"77d00a75":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #11 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"bc51c3925a960e7732533e4ef3a4f69ee6826de952bcb0fd":"374f3bb6db8377ebfc79674858c4f305":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #12 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"afa1fa8e8a70e26b02161150556d604101fdf423f332c336":"3275f2a4907d51b734fe7238cebbd48f":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #13 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"63e00d30e4b08fd2a1cc8d70fab327b2368e77a93be4f412":"3d14fb3f":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #14 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"bb5425b3869b76856ec58e39886fb6f6f2ac13fe44cb132d":"8d0c0099":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #15 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"f0050ad16392021a3f40207bed3521fb1e9f808f49830c42":"3a578d179902f912f9ea1afbce1120b3":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #16 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"c408190d0fbf5034f83b24a8ed9657331a7ce141de4fae76":"9084607b83bd06e6442eac8dacf583cc":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #17 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"92d00fbe":"":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #18 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"9143e5c4":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #19 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"93af11a08379eb37a16aa2837f09d69d":"":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #20 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"d19b0c14ec686a7961ca7c386d125a65":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #21 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"866d4227":"":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #22 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"94cb1127":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #23 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5":"":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #24 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"677a040d46ee3f2b7838273bdad14f16":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #25 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"c2fe12658139f5d0dd22cadf2e901695b579302a72fc5608":"3ebc7720":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #26 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"94748ba81229e53c38583a8564b23ebbafc6f6efdf4c2a81":"c44db2c9":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #27 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"3341168eb8c48468c414347fb08f71d2086f7c2d1bd581ce":"1ac68bd42f5ec7fa7e068cc0ecd79c2a":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #28 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"d543acda712b898cbb27b8f598b2e4438ce587a836e27851":"47c3338a2400809e739b63ba8227d2f9":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #29 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"c0ea400b599561e7905b99262b4565d5c3dc49fad84d7c69":"ef891339":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #30 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"60871e03ea0eb968536c99f926ea24ef43d41272ad9fb7f6":"3d488623":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #31 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"8d34cdca37ce77be68f65baf3382e31efa693e63f914a781":"367f30f2eaad8c063ca50795acd90203":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3":1 + +AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #32 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"516c0095cc3d85fd55e48da17c592e0c7014b9daafb82bdc":"4b41096dfdbe9cc1ab610f8f3e038d16":"FAIL":"":1 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.chacha20.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.chacha20.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..11bbfa23 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.chacha20.data @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:0:0 + +Chacha20 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:-1:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":"76b8e0ada0f13d90405d6ae55386bd28bdd219b8a08ded1aa836efcc8b770dc7da41597c5157488d7724e03fb8d84a376a43b8f41518a11cc387b669b2ee6586":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":0:0 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:0:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:1:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:2:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:7:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:8:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:9:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:15:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:16:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:17:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:31:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:32:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:33:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:47:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:48:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":256:49:-1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:7:15:-1:7:15:7:15 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:6:16:-1:6:16:6:16 + +ChaCha20 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:256:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +ChaCha20 IV Length 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ChaCha20 IV Length 11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":11:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ChaCha20 IV Length 12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":12:0 + +ChaCha20 IV Length 13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":13:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ChaCha20 IV Length 16 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20:"CHACHA20":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.chachapoly.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.chachapoly.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..df789179 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.chachapoly.data @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:0 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:0:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:1:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:2:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:7:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:8:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:9:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:15:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:16:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:17:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:31:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:32:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:33:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:47:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:48:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":256:49:-1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:7:15:-1:7:15:7:15 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:6:16:-1:6:16:6:16 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"f33388860000000000004e91":"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":"eead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38":"":"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":0 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 Unauthentic (1st bit flipped) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"f33388860000000000004e91":"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":"6ead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38":"FAIL":"":0 + +Chacha20+Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 (streaming) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:-1:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"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":"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":"f33388860000000000004e91":"eead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38":0:0 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 IV Length 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 IV Length 11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":11:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 IV Length 12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":12:0 + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 IV Length 13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":13:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ChaCha20+Poly1305 IV Length 16 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +iv_len_validity:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"CHACHA20-POLY1305":16:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.des.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.des.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9410262e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.des.data @@ -0,0 +1,603 @@ +DES CBC Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:0:0 + +DES EDE CBC Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:0:0 + +DES EDE3 CBC Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:0:0 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:0:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:1:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:2:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:7:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:8:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:9:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:15:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:16:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:17:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:31:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:32:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:33:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:47:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:48:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:49:-1 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with one and zeros padding [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with one and zeros padding [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with one and zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros and len padding [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros and len padding [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with zeros and len padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:1:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:2:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:7:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:9:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:15:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:17:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:31:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros padding [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with zeros padding [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:33:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:47:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes with zeros padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:49:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:0:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:8:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:16:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:32:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:"DES-CBC":64:48:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE + +DES Try encrypting 1 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Try encrypting 2 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:2:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Try encrypting 7 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Try encrypting 9 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:9:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Try encrypting 15 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:15:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Try encrypting 17 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:17:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Try encrypting 31 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:31:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Try encrypting 33 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:33:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Try encrypting 47 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:47:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Try encrypting 49 bytes with no padding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_fail:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:64:49:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:16:0:-1:16:0:8:8 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:15:1:-1:8:8:8:8 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:15:7:-1:8:8:8:8 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:16:6:-1:16:0:8:8 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:64:16:16:-1:16:16:8:24 + +DES Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:0:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:1:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:2:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:7:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:8:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:9:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:15:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:16:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:17:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:31:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:32:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:33:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:47:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:48:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:"DES-EDE-CBC":128:49:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:16:0:-1:16:0:8:8 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:15:1:-1:8:8:8:8 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:15:7:-1:8:8:8:8 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:16:6:-1:16:0:8:8 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC:128:16:16:-1:16:16:8:24 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:0:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:1:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:2:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:7:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:8:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:9:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:15:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:16:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:17:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:31:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:32:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:33:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:47:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:48:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:"DES-EDE3-CBC":192:49:-1 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:1:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:0:1:-1:0:0:0:0 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:16:0:-1:16:0:8:8 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:1:15:-1:0:16:0:16 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:15:1:-1:8:8:8:8 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#4] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:15:7:-1:8:8:8:8 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#5] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:16:6:-1:16:0:8:8 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#6] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:17:6:-1:16:0:16:0 + +DES3 Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:192:16:16:-1:16:16:8:24 + +DES ECB Encrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000":"0000000000000000":"8CA64DE9C1B123A7":0 + +DES ECB Encrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"7359B2163E4EDC58":0 + +DES ECB Encrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"FEDCBA9876543210":"0123456789ABCDEF":"ED39D950FA74BCC4":0 + +DES ECB Decrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000":"8CA64DE9C1B123A7":"0000000000000000":0 + +DES ECB Decrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"7359B2163E4EDC58":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":0 + +DES ECB Decrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"43297FAD38E373FE":"EA676B2CB7DB2B7A":"762514B829BF486A":0 + +DES3-EDE ECB Encrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"0000000000000000":"9295B59BB384736E":0 + +DES3-EDE ECB Encrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF3000000000000000":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"199E9D6DF39AA816":0 + +DES3-EDE ECB Decrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"9295B59BB384736E":"0000000000000000":0 + +DES3-EDE ECB Decrypt test vector (OpenSSL) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF3000000000000000":"199E9D6DF39AA816":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93bff1e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function @@ -0,0 +1,1637 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT) +/* Helper for resetting key/direction + * + * The documentation doesn't explicitly say whether calling + * mbedtls_cipher_setkey() twice is allowed or not. This currently works with + * the default software implementation, but only by accident. It isn't + * guaranteed to work with new ciphers or with alternative implementations of + * individual ciphers, and it doesn't work with the PSA wrappers. So don't do + * it, and instead start with a fresh context. + */ +static int cipher_reset_key( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int cipher_id, + int use_psa, size_t tag_len, const data_t *key, int direction ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( ctx ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + (void) use_psa; + (void) tag_len; +#else + if( use_psa == 1 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ), + tag_len ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( ctx, key->x, 8 * key->len, + direction ) ); + return( 1 ); + +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check if a buffer is all-0 bytes: + * return 1 if it is, + * 0 if it isn't. + */ +int buffer_is_all_zero( const uint8_t *buf, size_t size ) +{ + for( size_t i = 0; i < size; i++ ) + if( buf[i] != 0 ) + return 0; + return 1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT */ + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_cipher_list( ) +{ + const int *cipher_type; + + for( cipher_type = mbedtls_cipher_list(); *cipher_type != 0; cipher_type++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( *cipher_type ) != NULL ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_invalid_param_unconditional( ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t valid_ctx; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t invalid_ctx; + mbedtls_operation_t valid_operation = MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT; + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t valid_mode = MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS; + unsigned char valid_buffer[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 }; + int valid_size = sizeof(valid_buffer); + int valid_bitlen = valid_size * 8; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *valid_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( + *( mbedtls_cipher_list() ) ); + size_t size_t_var; + + (void)valid_mode; /* In some configurations this is unused */ + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &valid_ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &invalid_ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &valid_ctx, valid_info ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_setup() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &valid_ctx, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &invalid_ctx ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &invalid_ctx ) == + MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( &invalid_ctx ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_type() */ + TEST_ASSERT( + mbedtls_cipher_get_type( &invalid_ctx ) == + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_name() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_get_name( &invalid_ctx ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( &invalid_ctx ) == + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_operation() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( &invalid_ctx ) == + MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_setkey() */ + TEST_ASSERT( + mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &invalid_ctx, + valid_buffer, + valid_bitlen, + valid_operation ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() */ + TEST_ASSERT( + mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &invalid_ctx, + valid_buffer, + valid_size ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_reset() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_reset( &invalid_ctx ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + /* mbedtls_cipher_update_ad() */ + TEST_ASSERT( + mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &invalid_ctx, + valid_buffer, + valid_size ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + /* mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &invalid_ctx, valid_mode ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif + + /* mbedtls_cipher_update() */ + TEST_ASSERT( + mbedtls_cipher_update( &invalid_ctx, + valid_buffer, + valid_size, + valid_buffer, + &size_t_var ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_finish() */ + TEST_ASSERT( + mbedtls_cipher_finish( &invalid_ctx, + valid_buffer, + &size_t_var ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + /* mbedtls_cipher_write_tag() */ + TEST_ASSERT( + mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( &invalid_ctx, + valid_buffer, + valid_size ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() */ + TEST_ASSERT( + mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( &invalid_ctx, + valid_buffer, + valid_size ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) */ + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &invalid_ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &valid_ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void cipher_invalid_param_conditional( ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t valid_ctx; + + mbedtls_operation_t valid_operation = MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT; + mbedtls_operation_t invalid_operation = 100; + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t valid_mode = MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS; + unsigned char valid_buffer[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 }; + int valid_size = sizeof(valid_buffer); + int valid_bitlen = valid_size * 8; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *valid_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( + *( mbedtls_cipher_list() ) ); + + size_t size_t_var; + + (void)valid_mode; /* In some configurations this is unused */ + + /* mbedtls_cipher_init() */ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_cipher_init( &valid_ctx ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_cipher_init( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_setup() */ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &valid_ctx, valid_info ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_setup( NULL, valid_info ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( 0, mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE, + mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( 0, mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_type() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, + mbedtls_cipher_get_type( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_name() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( 0, mbedtls_cipher_get_name( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE, + mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_get_operation() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE, + mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_setkey() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_setkey( NULL, + valid_buffer, + valid_bitlen, + valid_operation ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &valid_ctx, + NULL, + valid_bitlen, + valid_operation ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, + valid_bitlen, + invalid_operation ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( NULL, + valid_buffer, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &valid_ctx, + NULL, + valid_size ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_reset() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_reset( NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + /* mbedtls_cipher_update_ad() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( NULL, + valid_buffer, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &valid_ctx, + NULL, + valid_size ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + /* mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( NULL, valid_mode ) ); +#endif + + /* mbedtls_cipher_update() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_update( NULL, + valid_buffer, + valid_size, + valid_buffer, + &size_t_var ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_update( &valid_ctx, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, + &size_t_var ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_update( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, + &size_t_var ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_update( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, + NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_finish() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_finish( NULL, + valid_buffer, + &size_t_var ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_finish( &valid_ctx, + NULL, + &size_t_var ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_finish( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, + NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + /* mbedtls_cipher_write_tag() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( NULL, + valid_buffer, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( &valid_ctx, + NULL, + valid_size ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( NULL, + valid_buffer, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( &valid_ctx, + NULL, + valid_size ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) */ + + /* mbedtls_cipher_crypt() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_crypt( NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &valid_ctx, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, &size_t_var ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + NULL, valid_size ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, &size_t_var, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, &size_t_var, + NULL, valid_size ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + /* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, NULL, + valid_size ) ); + + /* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( NULL, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + NULL, valid_size, &size_t_var, + valid_size ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &valid_ctx, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, + valid_buffer, valid_size, NULL, + valid_size ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + + /* mbedtls_cipher_free() */ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_cipher_free( NULL ) ); +exit: + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_cipher_free( &valid_ctx ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +void cipher_special_behaviours( ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + unsigned char input[32]; + unsigned char output[32]; +#if defined (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char iv[32]; +#endif + size_t olen = 0; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + memset( input, 0, sizeof( input ) ); + memset( output, 0, sizeof( output ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + memset( iv, 0, sizeof( iv ) ); + + /* Check and get info structures */ + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != cipher_info ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) ); + + /* IV too big */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx, iv, MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 1 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + /* IV too small */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx, iv, 0 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != cipher_info ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) ); + + /* Update ECB with partial block */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx, input, 1, output, &olen ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void enc_dec_buf( int cipher_id, char * cipher_string, int key_len, + int length_val, int pad_mode ) +{ + size_t length = length_val, outlen, total_len, i, block_size, iv_len; + unsigned char key[64]; + unsigned char iv[16]; + unsigned char ad[13]; + unsigned char tag[16]; + unsigned char inbuf[64]; + unsigned char encbuf[64]; + unsigned char decbuf[64]; + + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx_dec; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx_enc; + + /* + * Prepare contexts + */ + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx_dec ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx_enc ); + + memset( key, 0x2a, sizeof( key ) ); + + /* Check and get info structures */ + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != cipher_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( cipher_string ) == cipher_info ); + + /* Initialise enc and dec contexts */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx_dec, cipher_info ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx_enc, cipher_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx_dec, key, key_len, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx_enc, key, key_len, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + if( -1 != pad_mode ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &ctx_dec, pad_mode ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &ctx_enc, pad_mode ) ); + } +#else + (void) pad_mode; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + + /* + * Do a few encode/decode cycles + */ + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + memset( iv , 0x00 + i, sizeof( iv ) ); + memset( ad, 0x10 + i, sizeof( ad ) ); + memset( inbuf, 0x20 + i, sizeof( inbuf ) ); + + memset( encbuf, 0, sizeof( encbuf ) ); + memset( decbuf, 0, sizeof( decbuf ) ); + memset( tag, 0, sizeof( tag ) ); + + if( cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 || + cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + iv_len = 12; + else + iv_len = sizeof(iv); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_dec, iv, iv_len ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_enc, iv, iv_len ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_dec ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_enc ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_dec, ad, sizeof( ad ) - i ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_enc, ad, sizeof( ad ) - i ) ); +#endif + + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &ctx_enc ); + TEST_ASSERT( block_size != 0 ); + + /* encode length number of bytes from inbuf */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx_enc, inbuf, length, encbuf, &outlen ) ); + total_len = outlen; + + TEST_ASSERT( total_len == length || + ( total_len % block_size == 0 && + total_len < length && + total_len + block_size > length ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_finish( &ctx_enc, encbuf + outlen, &outlen ) ); + total_len += outlen; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( &ctx_enc, tag, sizeof( tag ) ) ); +#endif + + TEST_ASSERT( total_len == length || + ( total_len % block_size == 0 && + total_len > length && + total_len <= length + block_size ) ); + + /* decode the previously encoded string */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx_dec, encbuf, total_len, decbuf, &outlen ) ); + total_len = outlen; + + TEST_ASSERT( total_len == length || + ( total_len % block_size == 0 && + total_len < length && + total_len + block_size >= length ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_finish( &ctx_dec, decbuf + outlen, &outlen ) ); + total_len += outlen; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( &ctx_dec, tag, sizeof( tag ) ) ); +#endif + + /* check result */ + TEST_ASSERT( total_len == length ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == memcmp(inbuf, decbuf, length) ); + } + + /* + * Done + */ +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx_dec ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx_enc ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void enc_fail( int cipher_id, int pad_mode, int key_len, int length_val, + int ret ) +{ + size_t length = length_val; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char iv[16]; + + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + + unsigned char inbuf[64]; + unsigned char encbuf[64]; + + size_t outlen = 0; + + memset( key, 0, 32 ); + memset( iv , 0, 16 ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + memset( inbuf, 5, 64 ); + memset( encbuf, 0, 64 ); + + /* Check and get info structures */ + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != cipher_info ); + + /* Initialise context */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key, key_len, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &ctx, pad_mode ) ); +#else + (void) pad_mode; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx, iv, 16 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); +#endif + + /* encode length number of bytes from inbuf */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx, inbuf, length, encbuf, &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == mbedtls_cipher_finish( &ctx, encbuf + outlen, &outlen ) ); + + /* done */ +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void dec_empty_buf( int cipher, + int expected_update_ret, + int expected_finish_ret ) +{ + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char iv[16]; + size_t iv_len = sizeof(iv); + + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx_dec; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + unsigned char encbuf[64]; + unsigned char decbuf[64]; + + size_t outlen = 0; + + memset( key, 0, 32 ); + memset( iv , 0, 16 ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx_dec ); + + memset( encbuf, 0, 64 ); + memset( decbuf, 0, 64 ); + + /* Initialise context */ + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != cipher_info); + + if( cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 || + cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + iv_len = 12; + + TEST_ASSERT( sizeof(key) * 8 >= cipher_info->key_bitlen ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx_dec, cipher_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx_dec, + key, cipher_info->key_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_dec, iv, iv_len ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_dec ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_dec, NULL, 0 ) ); +#endif + + /* decode 0-byte string */ + TEST_ASSERT( expected_update_ret == + mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx_dec, encbuf, 0, decbuf, &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == outlen ); + + if ( expected_finish_ret == 0 && + ( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ) ) + { + /* Non-CBC and non-ECB ciphers are OK with decrypting empty buffers and + * return success, not MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED, when + * decrypting an empty buffer. + * On the other hand, CBC and ECB ciphers need a full block of input. + */ + expected_finish_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( expected_finish_ret == mbedtls_cipher_finish( + &ctx_dec, decbuf + outlen, &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == outlen ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx_dec ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void enc_dec_buf_multipart( int cipher_id, int key_len, int first_length_val, + int second_length_val, int pad_mode, + int first_encrypt_output_len, int second_encrypt_output_len, + int first_decrypt_output_len, int second_decrypt_output_len ) +{ + size_t first_length = first_length_val; + size_t second_length = second_length_val; + size_t length = first_length + second_length; + size_t block_size, iv_len; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char iv[16]; + + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx_dec; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx_enc; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + unsigned char inbuf[64]; + unsigned char encbuf[64]; + unsigned char decbuf[64]; + + size_t outlen = 0; + size_t totaloutlen = 0; + + memset( key, 0, 32 ); + memset( iv , 0, 16 ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx_dec ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx_enc ); + + memset( inbuf, 5, 64 ); + memset( encbuf, 0, 64 ); + memset( decbuf, 0, 64 ); + + /* Initialise enc and dec contexts */ + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != cipher_info); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx_dec, cipher_info ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx_enc, cipher_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx_dec, key, key_len, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx_enc, key, key_len, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + if( -1 != pad_mode ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &ctx_dec, pad_mode ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &ctx_enc, pad_mode ) ); + } +#else + (void) pad_mode; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + + if( cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 || + cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + iv_len = 12; + else + iv_len = sizeof(iv); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_dec, iv, iv_len ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_enc, iv, iv_len ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_dec ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_enc ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_dec, NULL, 0 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_enc, NULL, 0 ) ); +#endif + + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &ctx_enc ); + TEST_ASSERT( block_size != 0 ); + + /* encode length number of bytes from inbuf */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx_enc, inbuf, first_length, encbuf, &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t)first_encrypt_output_len == outlen ); + totaloutlen = outlen; + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx_enc, inbuf + first_length, second_length, encbuf + totaloutlen, &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t)second_encrypt_output_len == outlen ); + totaloutlen += outlen; + TEST_ASSERT( totaloutlen == length || + ( totaloutlen % block_size == 0 && + totaloutlen < length && + totaloutlen + block_size > length ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_finish( &ctx_enc, encbuf + totaloutlen, &outlen ) ); + totaloutlen += outlen; + TEST_ASSERT( totaloutlen == length || + ( totaloutlen % block_size == 0 && + totaloutlen > length && + totaloutlen <= length + block_size ) ); + + /* decode the previously encoded string */ + second_length = totaloutlen - first_length; + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx_dec, encbuf, first_length, decbuf, &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t)first_decrypt_output_len == outlen ); + totaloutlen = outlen; + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx_dec, encbuf + first_length, second_length, decbuf + totaloutlen, &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t)second_decrypt_output_len == outlen ); + totaloutlen += outlen; + + TEST_ASSERT( totaloutlen == length || + ( totaloutlen % block_size == 0 && + totaloutlen < length && + totaloutlen + block_size >= length ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_finish( &ctx_dec, decbuf + totaloutlen, &outlen ) ); + totaloutlen += outlen; + + TEST_ASSERT( totaloutlen == length ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == memcmp(inbuf, decbuf, length) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx_dec ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx_enc ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void decrypt_test_vec( int cipher_id, int pad_mode, data_t * key, + data_t * iv, data_t * cipher, + data_t * clear, data_t * ad, data_t * tag, + int finish_result, int tag_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[265]; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + size_t outlen, total_len; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + ((void) ad); + ((void) tag); +#endif + + /* Prepare context */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key->x, 8 * key->len, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + if( pad_mode != -1 ) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &ctx, pad_mode ) ); +#else + (void) pad_mode; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx, ad->x, ad->len ) ); +#endif + + /* decode buffer and check tag->x */ + total_len = 0; + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx, cipher->x, cipher->len, output, &outlen ) ); + total_len += outlen; + TEST_ASSERT( finish_result == mbedtls_cipher_finish( &ctx, output + outlen, + &outlen ) ); + total_len += outlen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + TEST_ASSERT( tag_result == mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( &ctx, tag->x, tag->len ) ); +#endif + + /* check plaintext only if everything went fine */ + if( 0 == finish_result && 0 == tag_result ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( total_len == clear->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( output, clear->x, clear->len ) ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AUTH_CRYPT */ +void auth_crypt_tv( int cipher_id, data_t * key, data_t * iv, + data_t * ad, data_t * cipher, data_t * tag, + char * result, data_t * clear, int use_psa ) +{ + /* + * Take an AEAD ciphertext + tag and perform a pair + * of AEAD decryption and AEAD encryption. Check that + * this results in the expected plaintext, and that + * decryption and encryption are inverse to one another. + * + * Do that twice: + * - once with legacy functions auth_decrypt/auth_encrypt + * - once with new functions auth_decrypt_ext/auth_encrypt_ext + * This allows testing both without duplicating test cases. + */ + + int ret; + int using_nist_kw, using_nist_kw_padding; + + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + size_t outlen; + + unsigned char *cipher_plus_tag = NULL; + size_t cipher_plus_tag_len; + unsigned char *decrypt_buf = NULL; + size_t decrypt_buf_len = 0; + unsigned char *encrypt_buf = NULL; + size_t encrypt_buf_len = 0; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + unsigned char *tmp_tag = NULL; + unsigned char *tmp_cipher = NULL; + unsigned char *tag_buf = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + /* Null pointers are documented as valid for inputs of length 0. + * The test framework passes non-null pointers, so set them to NULL. + * key, cipher and tag can't be empty. */ + if( iv->len == 0 ) + iv->x = NULL; + if( ad->len == 0 ) + ad->x = NULL; + if( clear->len == 0 ) + clear->x = NULL; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + /* Initialize PSA Crypto */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( use_psa == 1 ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); +#else + (void) use_psa; +#endif + + /* + * Are we using NIST_KW? with padding? + */ + using_nist_kw_padding = cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP || + cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP || + cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP; + using_nist_kw = cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW || + cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW || + cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW || + using_nist_kw_padding; + + /**************************************************************** + * * + * Part 1: non-deprecated API * + * * + ****************************************************************/ + + /* + * Prepare context for decryption + */ + if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) + goto exit; + + /* + * prepare buffer for decryption + * (we need the tag appended to the ciphertext) + */ + cipher_plus_tag_len = cipher->len + tag->len; + ASSERT_ALLOC( cipher_plus_tag, cipher_plus_tag_len ); + memcpy( cipher_plus_tag, cipher->x, cipher->len ); + memcpy( cipher_plus_tag + cipher->len, tag->x, tag->len ); + + /* + * Compute length of output buffer according to the documentation + */ + if( using_nist_kw ) + decrypt_buf_len = cipher_plus_tag_len - 8; + else + decrypt_buf_len = cipher_plus_tag_len - tag->len; + + + /* + * Try decrypting to a buffer that's 1B too small + */ + if( decrypt_buf_len != 0 ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len - 1 ); + + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, + ad->x, ad->len, cipher_plus_tag, cipher_plus_tag_len, + decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len - 1, &outlen, tag->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf ); + decrypt_buf = NULL; + } + + /* + * Authenticate and decrypt, and check result + */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len ); + + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, + ad->x, ad->len, cipher_plus_tag, cipher_plus_tag_len, + decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len, &outlen, tag->len ); + + if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ); + TEST_ASSERT( buffer_is_all_zero( decrypt_buf, decrypt_buf_len ) ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( decrypt_buf, outlen, clear->x, clear->len ); + } + + /* Free this, but keep cipher_plus_tag for deprecated function with PSA */ + mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf ); + decrypt_buf = NULL; + + /* + * Encrypt back if test data was authentic + */ + if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) != 0 ) + { + /* prepare context for encryption */ + if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Compute size of output buffer according to documentation + */ + if( using_nist_kw ) + { + encrypt_buf_len = clear->len + 8; + if( using_nist_kw_padding && encrypt_buf_len % 8 != 0 ) + encrypt_buf_len += 8 - encrypt_buf_len % 8; + } + else + { + encrypt_buf_len = clear->len + tag->len; + } + + /* + * Try encrypting with an output buffer that's 1B too small + */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( encrypt_buf, encrypt_buf_len - 1 ); + + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, + ad->x, ad->len, clear->x, clear->len, + encrypt_buf, encrypt_buf_len - 1, &outlen, tag->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret != 0 ); + + mbedtls_free( encrypt_buf ); + encrypt_buf = NULL; + + /* + * Encrypt and check the result + */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( encrypt_buf, encrypt_buf_len ); + + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, + ad->x, ad->len, clear->x, clear->len, + encrypt_buf, encrypt_buf_len, &outlen, tag->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( outlen == cipher->len + tag->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( encrypt_buf, cipher->x, cipher->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( encrypt_buf + cipher->len, + tag->x, tag->len ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_free( encrypt_buf ); + encrypt_buf = NULL; + } + + /**************************************************************** + * * + * Part 2: deprecated API * + * * + ****************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + + /* + * Prepare context for decryption + */ + if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Prepare pointers for decryption + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( use_psa == 1 ) + { + /* PSA requires that the tag immediately follows the ciphertext. + * Fortunately, we already have that from testing the new API. */ + tmp_cipher = cipher_plus_tag; + tmp_tag = tmp_cipher + cipher->len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + tmp_cipher = cipher->x; + tmp_tag = tag->x; + } + + /* + * Authenticate and decrypt, and check result + */ + + ASSERT_ALLOC( decrypt_buf, cipher->len ); + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len, + tmp_cipher, cipher->len, decrypt_buf, &outlen, + tmp_tag, tag->len ); + + if( using_nist_kw ) + { + /* NIST_KW with legacy API */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + else if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) == 0 ) + { + /* unauthentic message */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ); + TEST_ASSERT( buffer_is_all_zero( decrypt_buf, cipher->len ) ); + } + else + { + /* authentic message: is the plaintext correct? */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( decrypt_buf, outlen, clear->x, clear->len ); + } + + mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf ); + decrypt_buf = NULL; + mbedtls_free( cipher_plus_tag ); + cipher_plus_tag = NULL; + + /* + * Encrypt back if test data was authentic + */ + if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) != 0 ) + { + /* prepare context for encryption */ + if( ! cipher_reset_key( &ctx, cipher_id, use_psa, tag->len, key, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) + goto exit; + + /* prepare buffers for encryption */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( use_psa ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( cipher_plus_tag, cipher->len + tag->len ); + tmp_cipher = cipher_plus_tag; + tmp_tag = cipher_plus_tag + cipher->len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( encrypt_buf, cipher->len ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, tag->len ); + tmp_cipher = encrypt_buf; + tmp_tag = tag_buf; + } + + /* + * Encrypt and check the result + */ + outlen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len, + clear->x, clear->len, tmp_cipher, &outlen, + tmp_tag, tag->len ); + + if( using_nist_kw ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( outlen == cipher->len ); + if( cipher->len != 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( tmp_cipher, cipher->x, cipher->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( tmp_tag, tag->x, tag->len ) == 0 ); + } + } + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +exit: + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_free( decrypt_buf ); + mbedtls_free( encrypt_buf ); + mbedtls_free( cipher_plus_tag ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + mbedtls_free( tag_buf ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( use_psa == 1 ) + PSA_DONE( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void test_vec_ecb( int cipher_id, int operation, data_t * key, + data_t * input, data_t * result, int finish_result + ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + unsigned char output[32]; + size_t outlen; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + /* Prepare context */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key->x, 8 * key->len, operation ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx, input->x, + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &ctx ), + output, &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( outlen == mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &ctx ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( finish_result == mbedtls_cipher_finish( &ctx, output + outlen, + &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == outlen ); + + /* check plaintext only if everything went fine */ + if( 0 == finish_result ) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( output, result->x, + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &ctx ) ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ +void test_vec_crypt( int cipher_id, int operation, data_t *key, + data_t *iv, data_t *input, data_t *result, + int finish_result, int use_psa ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + unsigned char output[32]; + size_t outlen; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + /* Prepare context */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + (void) use_psa; +#else + if( use_psa == 1 ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ), 0 ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key->x, 8 * key->len, operation ) ); + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ctx.cipher_info->mode ) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( finish_result == mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ctx, iv->len ? iv->x : NULL, + iv->len, input->x, input->len, + output, &outlen ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( result->len == outlen ); + /* check plaintext only if everything went fine */ + if( 0 == finish_result ) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( output, result->x, outlen ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + PSA_DONE( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ +void set_padding( int cipher_id, int pad_mode, int ret ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != cipher_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &ctx, pad_mode ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void check_padding( int pad_mode, data_t * input, int ret, int dlen_check + ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_info_t cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + size_t dlen; + + /* build a fake context just for getting access to get_padding */ + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + cipher_info.mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + ctx.cipher_info = &cipher_info; + + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &ctx, pad_mode ) ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == ctx.get_padding( input->x, input->len, &dlen ) ); + if( 0 == ret ) + TEST_ASSERT( dlen == (size_t) dlen_check ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void iv_len_validity( int cipher_id, char * cipher_string, + int iv_len_val, int ret ) +{ + size_t iv_len = iv_len_val; + unsigned char iv[16]; + + /* Initialise iv buffer */ + memset( iv, 0, sizeof( iv ) ); + + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx_dec; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx_enc; + + /* + * Prepare contexts + */ + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx_dec ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx_enc ); + + /* Check and get info structures */ + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != cipher_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( cipher_string ) == cipher_info ); + + /* Initialise enc and dec contexts */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx_dec, cipher_info ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx_enc, cipher_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_dec, iv, iv_len ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx_enc, iv, iv_len ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx_dec ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx_enc ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.gcm.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.gcm.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..563847f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.gcm.data @@ -0,0 +1,4747 @@ +CAMELLIA GCM Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:0:0 + +AES GCM Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:0:0 + +Aria GCM Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM:0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:0:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:1:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:2:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:7:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:8:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:9:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:15:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:16:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:17:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:31:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:32:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:33:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:47:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:48:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:"AES-128-GCM":128:49:-1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:128:0:22:-1:0:22:0:22 + +AES 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:-1:"d785dafea3e966731ef6fc6202262584":"d91a46205ee94058b3b8403997592dd2":"":"":"":"3b92a17c1b9c3578a68cffea5a5b6245":0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:-1:"9ab5c8ca905b5fe50461f4a68941144b":"96dd3927a96e16123f2e9d6b367d303f":"":"":"":"6e0c53ef":0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #3 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:-1:"b5fc7af605721a9cfe61c1ee6a4b3e22":"6b757d4055823d1035d01077666037d6":"":"":"":"e8c09ddd":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #4 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:-1:"03c0b4a6e508a8490db0d086a82c9db7":"ac52f6c1a05030321fa39f87e89fdb5e":"":"":"33316ca79d10a79f4fd038593e8eef09625089dc4e0ffe4bc1f2871554fa6666ab3e7fe7885edef694b410456f3ec0e513bb25f1b48d95e4820c5972c1aabb25c84c08566002dadc36df334c1ce86847964a122016d389ac873bca8c335a7a99bcef91e1b985ae5d488a2d7f78b4bf14e0c2dc715e814f4e24276057cf668172":"756292d8b4653887edef51679b161812":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #5 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:-1:"2bc73fba942ff105823b5dccf6befb1c":"902c3e3b69b1ef8395d7281ff74cce38":"":"":"4adec0b4ac00325a860044d9f9519daa4f7c163229a75819b0fd7d8e23319f030e61dfa8eadabff42ea27bc36bdb6cad249e801ca631b656836448b7172c11126bad2781e6a1aa4f62c4eda53409408b008c057e0b81215cc13ddabbb8f1915f4bbab854f8b00763a530ad5055d265778cd3080d0bd35b76a329bdd5b5a2d268":"ebdd7c8e87fe733138a433543542d1":0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #6 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:-1:"0dd358bc3f992f26e81e3a2f3aa2d517":"d8c750bb443ee1a169dfe97cfe4d855b":"87cc4fd75788c9d5cc83bae5d764dd249d178ab23224049795d4288b5ed9ea3f317068a39a7574b300c8544226e87b08e008fbe241d094545c211d56ac44437d41491a438272738968c8d371aa7787b5f606c8549a9d868d8a71380e9657d3c0337979feb01de5991fc1470dfc59eb02511efbbff3fcb479a862ba3844a25aaa":"77949b29f085bb3abb71a5386003811233056d3296eb093370f7777dadd306d93d59dcb9754d3857cf2758091ba661f845ef0582f6ae0e134328106f0d5d16b541cd74fdc756dc7b53f4f8a194daeea9369ebb1630c01ccb307b848e9527da20a39898d748fd59206f0b79d0ed946a8958033a45bd9ae673518b32606748eb65":"":"a81d13973baa22a751833d7d3f94b3b1":0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #7 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:-1:"9a433c612d7e1bdff881e4d63ba8b141":"8b670cf31f470f79a6c0b79e73863ca1":"ce10758332f423228b5e4ae31efda7677586934a1d8f05d9b7a0dc4e2010ec3eaacb71a527a5fff8e787d75ebd24ad163394c891b33477ed9e2a2d853c364cb1c5d0bc317fcaf4010817dbe5f1fd1037c701b291b3a66b164bc818bf5c00a4c210a1671faa574d74c7f3543f6c09aaf117e12e2eb3dae55edb1cc5b4086b617d":"":"":"8526fd25daf890e79946a205b698f287":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:-1:"69eedf3777e594c30e94e9c5e2bce467":"a3330638a809ba358d6c098e4342b81e":"5114e9983c96fecec3f7304ca42f52aa16cb7c6aadfb62ad537c93a3188835ca0703dad34c73cf96435b668b68a7a1d056931959316e8d3ab956bf64c4e07479c7767f9d488b0c0c351333ccf400b7e0be19a0fd173e3f2a1ae313f27e516952260fd2da9ab9daca478ebb93cd07d0b7503b32364d8e308d904d966c58f226bb":"208e6321238bf5c6e2ef55a4b8f531cbbfb0d77374fe32df6dd663486cf79beeed39bb6910c3c78dd0cc30707a0a12b226b2d06024db25dcd8a4e620f009cafa5242121e864c7f3f4360aaf1e9d4e548d99615156f156008418c1c41ff2bbc007cecf8f209c73203e6df89b32871de637b3d6af2e277d146ae03f3404d387b77":"df4e3f2b47cf0e8590228fcf9913fb8a5eb9751bba318fd2d57be68c7e788e04fabf303699b99f26313d1c4956105cd2817aad21b91c28f3b9251e9c0b354490fa5abfcea0065aa3cc9b96772eb8af06a1a9054bf12d3ae698dfb01a13f989f8b8a4bb61686cf3adf58f05873a24d403a62a092290c2481e4159588fea6b9a09":"5de3068e1e20eed469265000077b1db9":0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:-1:"45cc35311eedf0ba093bf901931a7036":"fed5084de3c348f5a0adf4c2fd4e848a":"5dc8d7525eaad035c19714ae1b1e538cb66a4089027245351e0ad9297410fb3a0c1155407c10a8bb95a9ca624a9c9925dac003ee78926c6e90ff4ccdba10e8a78bda1c4478162a0e302de5ff05fb0f94c89c3c7429fb94828bdcd97d21333c2ee72963ee6f056ce272b8bab007e653a42b01d1d2041ba627f169c8c0d32e6dae":"":"6e210914e4aed188d576f5ad7fc7e4cf7dd8d82f34ea3bcbdb7267cfd9045f806978dbff3460c4e8ff8c4edb6ad2edba405a8d915729d89aab2116b36a70b54f5920a97f5a571977e0329eda6c696749be940eabfc6d8b0bbd6fbdb87657b3a7695da9f5d3a7384257f20e0becd8512d3705cc246ee6ca1e610921cf92603d79":"266a895fc21da5176b44b446d7d1921d":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:0:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:1:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:2:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:7:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:8:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:9:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:15:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:16:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:17:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:31:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:32:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:33:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:47:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:48:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:"AES-192-GCM":192:49:-1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:192:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:192:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:192:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:192:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:192:0:22:-1:0:22:0:22 + +AES 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:192:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +AES 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:-1:"806766a4d2b6507cc4113bc0e46eebe120eacd948c24dc7f":"4f801c772395c4519ec830980c8ca5a4":"":"":"":"8fa16452b132bebc6aa521e92cb3b0ea":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:-1:"be2f0f4ae4ab851b258ec5602628df261b6a69e309ff9043":"646a91d83ae72b9b9e9fce64135cbf73":"":"":"":"169e717e2bae42e3eb61d0a1a29b":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:-1:"1eb53aa548b41bfdc85c657ebdebdae0c7e525a6432bc012":"37ffc64d4b2d9c82dd17d1ad3076d82b":"":"":"":"34b8e037084b3f2d":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:-1:"c6a98102af3d875bcdebe594661d3a6b376970c02b11d019":"bea8cd85a28a2c05bf7406b8eef1efcc":"":"":"f2f80e2c042092cc7240b598ab30fad055bce85408aa0f8cefaf8a7204f0e2acb87c78f46a5867b1f1c19461cbf5ed5d2ca21c96a63fb1f42f10f394952e63520795c56df77d6a04cb5ad006ee865a47dc2349a814a630b3d4c4e0fd149f51e8fa846656ea569fd29a1ebafc061446eb80ec182f833f1f6d9083545abf52fa4c":"04b80f25ae9d07f5fd8220263ac3f2f7":0:0 + +AES 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:-1:"a249135c9f2f5a8b1af66442a4d4e101771a918ef8acee05":"80b6e48fe4a3b08d40c1636b25dfd2c4":"c62b39b937edbdc9b644321d5d284e62eaa4154010c7a3208c1ef4706fba90223da04b2f686a28b975eff17386598ba77e212855692f384782c1f3c00be011e466e145f6f8b65c458e41409e01a019b290773992e19334ffaca544e28fc9044a5e86bcd2fa5ad2e76f2be3f014d8c387456a8fcfded3ae4d1194d0e3e53a2031":"b865f8dd64a6f51a500bcfc8cadbc9e9f5d54d2d27d815ecfe3d5731e1b230c587b46958c6187e41b52ff187a14d26aa41c5f9909a3b77859429232e5bd6c6dc22cf5590402476d033a32682e8ab8dc7ed0b089c5ab20ab9a8c5d6a3be9ea7aa56c9d3ab08de4a4a019abb447db448062f16a533d416951a8ff6f13ed5608f77":"":"951c1c89b6d95661630d739dd9120a73":0:0 + +AES 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:-1:"23c201968def551817f20e49b09dbb5aae0033305bef68a0":"bd2952d215aed5e915d863e7f7696b3e":"77bc8af42d1b64ee39012df5fc33c554af32bfef6d9182804dcfe370dfc4b9d059bdbc55f6ba4eacb8e3a491d96a65360d790864ba60acf1a605f6b28a6591513ea3cfd768ff47aee242a8e9bdfac399b452231bfd59d81c9b91f8dc589ad751d8f9fdad01dd00631f0cb51cb0248332f24194b577e5571ceb5c037a6d0bcfe8":"17d93c921009c6b0b3ecf243d08b701422983f2dcaec9c8d7604a2d5565ed96ce5cddcb183cd5882f8d61d3202c9015d207fed16a4c1195ba712428c727601135315fc504e80c253c3a2e4a5593fc6c4a206edce1fd7104e8a888385bbb396d3cdf1eb2b2aa4d0c9e45451e99550d9cfa05aafe6e7b5319c73c33fd6f98db3c5":"23f35fac583897519b94998084ad6d77666e13595109e874625bc6ccc6d0c7816a62d64b02e670fa664e3bb52c276b1bafbeb44e5f9cc3ae028daf1d787344482f31fce5d2800020732b381a8b11c6837f428204b7ed2f4c4810067f2d4da99987b66e6525fc6b9217a8f6933f1681b7cfa857e102f616a7c84adc2f676e3a8f":"bb9ba3a9ac7d63e67bd78d71dc3133b3":0:0 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:0:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:1:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:2:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:7:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:8:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:9:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:15:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:16:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:17:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:31:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:32:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:33:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:47:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:48:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"AES-256-GCM":256:49:-1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:256:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:256:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:256:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:256:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:256:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:256:0:22:-1:0:22:0:22 + +AES 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:256:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:-1:"2c186654406b2b92c9639a7189d4ab5ab0b9bb87c43005027f3fa832fd3507b1":"3a0324d63a70400490c92e7604a3ba97":"":"":"":"4c61cd2e28a13d78a4e87ea7374dd01a":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:-1:"c8ae011795c9a60ad7660a31fe354fa6f7e9c2724d7a126436291680cd95c007":"1bd9ea6186450f9cd253ccfed2812b1c":"":"":"":"35214bbc510430e3":0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:-1:"449d39f863e4909984b37f2e5c09ea4d4b3e9fac67bd57c299e4e1d1f084aaa3":"d8e9118f331bb5a359f0aa8882861b72":"":"":"4ddcae0bc24d622e12bdeaac73e8d1ab7957af051d27dfaafce53aeed4cdd3f989ea25989a2f41cfb3c38dbd841c5560b0b5ab1861b1fbcd236865d13da55b50219462e021f8a21848a64a85326031fcec8fe47a6ef4a435dd2b2fff637644ffcf3914ef2dfa5dd556421bfd297be150b31db039f0f2cc422b282e659e70cceb":"c595b9d99414891228c9fa5edb5fcce3":0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #3 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:-1:"1a1bb9122e762ecd7ff861a1d65e52607d98e7ae5bd1c3a944e443710f3b0599":"32f99ea4cbf52c2701c2252e5e6c863d":"":"":"91b7a70c3a06c1f7f2ea584acb5dd76177ba07323c94f2e8f7cbe93fc0bb7c389c3c88e16aa53174f0fc373bc778a6ccf91bf61b6e92c2969d3441eb17a0a835d30dcf882472a6d3cb036533b04d79f05ebfaadf221ae1c14af3f02fa41867acfdfa35f81e8a9d11d42b9a63288c759063c0c3040c3e6ee69cf7c75f9c33fea1":"a8e29e08623a3efdbbe8b111de30a4":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #4 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:-1:"f10965a66255f0c3515af497ccbb257a09f22ec2d57c5edae322a3e6d2d188ef":"c571ce0e911de5d883dc4a0787483235":"91598690edf2de8b27f9bc7461a84e80811cee544f0542923898328cf157590251f0342cb81d359b5dccc5391a12320d1444c26f24178977dd6705c2b365dc1ece0152c42e2f0ee3162cf886ef5529f4f16a77f3bdd2aeccd405b59addf098521d0d38cc25f1991e11be7ecf24caedb48a2a286d2e560a38fa9001c5a228c4d1":"2867996e389e09ec0da94d42e77b1e436b50065b09ca4adf1cd03240444ee699dbb7b3fc081a1869ca607d77d5ff9754fc3c997ff0a4ee17543a2ba77886b88a7128bcc51d3450df58ff3a26671b02c1d213df6adb6f7e853080eb46b504517cbaea162710a9bbc2da8b552eb6b0e0cb98e44fcab0a157312be67974678d143e":"":"6d9d3a5dbc8dce385f092fff14bfffda":0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #5 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:-1:"4103b1ddff87a508a219c808a04ad4750668688f4c2ee75b92d28d70b98a2c94":"5cea906737518c2cb901016e30206276":"a00a196193ff07006b7df524824bd0971d63f447a3a7bb1b75c1e2d11789482c115cff677b54948d36dc4de34200bce97be0101d88cee39b177857dd5da3cb0d2f9d6e1150f72a3bd655e0bace1d25a657ba9a7f8dff082b4460432075afb20173da22b49beeb6a030d72ba07869ff4389fc1c28d87018d7c1a9829c21932197":"":"":"3a3a771dd5f31c977e154ef5c73a":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #6 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:-1:"df867d1dd8a287821a54479cab6f88636d2aca30e1bf01a5dffc735e17590356":"35019826c51dd1ef07ff915d9ac4ea96":"6517272cac85d7f38902bcb4b96a0c59c4bdc46bfefa6ebacd7f2fb1629b87ca91de2ffefc42ce3cfd34dcbf01b3f7cadcea3f99e6addf35d36c51f2ceb1f85c1f56a04ec9c9fff60cd7fc238674992183ea3de72ef778561b906202b7b83fe6562a0bca9c1e0a18638e8685b998b4192f5120435809ad6e93a0422d00725262":"723be39bc13adbc48c861b07753f64fac1ae28fc8933acba888b6538721df0a8b91c040a26522fe0dbb7335d8f63d209e89f7cde23afa9ca3c584b336d63a91e07fdd8808b14c3214c96a202e665bbaaa34248ff30348f3d79c9f16e66ad6c5903305acd887a89b6244eb7c2d96e18b13a686de935bf3821444ee20f48678be5":"0375ed93f287eefe414ab2968844bd10148860c528dbf571a77aa74f98cc669a7fc317adc9f7cf2d80dda29b19db635b30a044399f3665b6176ed669146d28f5ada03b3d32d53fe46575a8afcd37f20386d9e36f7e090b4fefadfab7f008e02f1b5022c0eeb81d03443a276eae48c038ed173631687d2450b913b02c97243edb":"e49beb083a9b008ae97a17e3825692f0":0:0 + +AES 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #7 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:-1:"886c77b80f5f3a21c01932685a540b23629f6d41d5574fc527227ed0bdf2e21b":"5ec506edb1890a5a63b464490450d419":"53a17d7b69f607f08676d6f6dd4e8db08e01333a8355d8c87616e84cdf10ef5b041fc6ddc3f6a245c0f534c2b167064af82f45e4702a5e8dede59579fdecf6713353392433950c9b97c38d9ee515ac97d0970ccf03981954540088567a30941bb2cca08cbed680500f8342faa7aebbc6c143e2ea57ba6b4ac1fd975dcc5d0871":"79ee27adfa9698a97d217c5010ec807806feda37db811e398c3b82abf698aece08561fffc6c601d2691738e279eeb57e5804e1405a9913830e3ba0d7b979213ef40d733a19497d4bb1b8b2c609a8f904e29771fa230c39a48ebb8c3376f07c8013fff6e34f10fe53988a6ec87a9296c0a7cfba769adefe599ec6671012965973":"05b8d820c9f439d7aeae5c7da0ee25fb0dad47cc3e6f3a47e8b984e856201546975f8214531fc3c2e504d2ac10fa49cb948596b9a8fab01b95c49d6f04d1589f93b77b899e803dd20e1f00a51c0b5953e85be639109b14b100e35ca26d84ea629964b0db8260dfa5a150a66261bf37e79de2ec49e9f1b082a7c58ecd3d39b6c9":"ffdf56e1c1a7252b88422787536484":0:0 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:0:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:1:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:2:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:7:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:8:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:9:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:15:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:16:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:17:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:31:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:32:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:33:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:47:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:48:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:"CAMELLIA-128-GCM":128:49:-1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:128:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:128:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:128:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:128:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:128:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:128:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:128:0:22:-1:0:22:0:22 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:128:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:-1:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":"":"":"":"f5574acc3148dfcb9015200631024df8":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:-1:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":"defe3e0b5c54c94b4f2a0f5a46f6210d":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"f672b94d192266c7c8c8dbb427cc989a":0:0 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:-1:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf889":"d0d94a13b632f337a0cc9955b94fa020c815f903aab12f1efaf2fe9d90f729a6cccbfa986ef2ff2c33de418d9a2529091cf18fe652c1cfde13f8260614bab815":"":"":"86e318012dd8329dc9dae6a170f61b24":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:-1:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"d0d94a13b632f337a0cc9955b94fa020c815f903aab12f1efaf2fe9d90f729a6cccbfa986ef2ff2c33de418d9a2529091cf18fe652c1cfde13f82606":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":"9f458869431576ea6a095456ec6b8101":0:0 + +CAMELLIA 128 GCM Decrypt test vector #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:-1:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"cafebabefacedbad":"28fd7434d5cd424a5353818fc21a982460d20cf632eb1e6c4fbfca17d5abcf6a52111086162fe9570e7774c7a912aca3dfa10067ddaad40688645bdd":"":"feedfadedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":"e86f8f2e730c49d536f00fb5225d28b1":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:0:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:1:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:2:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:7:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:8:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:9:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:15:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:16:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:17:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:31:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:32:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:33:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:47:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:48:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:"CAMELLIA-192-GCM":192:49:-1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:192:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:192:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:192:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:192:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:192:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:192:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:192:0:22:-1:0:22:0:22 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:192:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:-1:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":"":"":"":"ba9ae89fddce4b51131e17c4d65ce587":0:0 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:-1:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":"8f9c0aa2549714c88bb2665e8af86d42":"":"":"783cff5c5aca7197320658a74279ab37":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:-1:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"0f009e88410d84ad93c90d55efbe20ffa855492f4dfd0fb485c4f02f536feffbb4d967729e5c67f1de0750255cc500716ba483eb3b0a2bf607af28f6a60bb2e9":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255":"":"8d645a0b0e48d3c3b60a014157cb49b4":0:0 + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:-1:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"0f009e88410d84ad93c90d55efbe20ffa855492f4dfd0fb485c4f02f536feffbb4d967729e5c67f1de0750255cc500716ba483eb3b0a2bf607af28f6":"":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":"11b15bb5ab6fac0c422014e91eacbf2b":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +CAMELLIA 192 GCM Decrypt test vector #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +decrypt_test_vec:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:-1:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c":"cafebabefacedbad":"678b3dcb270faa206dc5f6fbb5014996e86d6f3e35cdcdfeb03b37b9b06ff4ff2682248823bd3c84124dc76af7bde3dd440c228b5efbc795dd80dfb6":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":"f876143d933214a5035ff0bb96ff650b":0:0 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:0:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 byte +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:1:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:2:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:7:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:8:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:9:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:15:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:16:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 17 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:17:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:31:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:32:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:33:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:47:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:48:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:"CAMELLIA-256-GCM":256:49:-1 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes in multiple parts +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:256:0:0:-1:0:0:0:0 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:256:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +CAMELLIA 256 GCM Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C 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Validation PSA (AES-128,128,1024,1024,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:"ca9fa36ca2159dff9723f6cfdb13280446eb6bc3688043c7e2e2504184791596":"d13ca73365e57114fc698ee60ba0ad84":"2aa510b7f1620bfce90080e0e25f5468dbc5314b50914e793b5278369c51ac017eace9fd15127fca5a726ad9e67bdee5af298988d9a57ec4bbc43d4eb849535eb10521ac7cd7ed647479a42876af2ebc9e2108b539febdaa9127c49bda1bda800f6034050b8576e944311dfbca59d64d259571b6d2ed5b2fc07127239b03f4b7":"ac04c4293554cd832aa400c811cb202d815d6178aa1343b4628592b7f3ae45dc5f12ea47be4b43e1865f40b06ab67b3a9fb3644248a9b3efe131a8addb7447978bb51ccf749e75574fea60e8781677200af023b2f8c415f4e6d8c575a9e374916d9ec3a612b16e37beb589444b588e0b770d9f8e818ad83f83aa4ecf386d17a7":"2111d55d96a4d84d":"FAIL":"":1 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation PSA (AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+1,5 @@ +CIPHER - Conditional invalid parameter checks +cipher_invalid_param_conditional: + +CIPHER - Unconditional invalid parameter checks +cipher_invalid_param_unconditional: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.nist_kw.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.nist_kw.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..24204aa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.nist_kw.data @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ +KW AES-128 wrap - Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +KWP AES-128 wrap - Decrypt empty buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +dec_empty_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +KW AES-128 wrap rfc 3394 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C 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+auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":"883500DB91747BAD8C5E122ED2338F3BCB6B43064F5DA9D1303E165815EC8CC4C5BFD31AEAE1B6A3":"":"":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718":0 + +KWP AES-128 26 byte input +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":"24099AAAD4F19BF614ECC35DA9E3646F73AAFAA9C46975D4B56D72A332AF7EC4850B8294D94B7E1A":"":"":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F10111213141516171819":0 + +KWP AES-128 27 byte input +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":"C24F8CCE3425AC9638145A0DAC28B59368583FF3A7AAD85FBE1AEAAB5D23C0B128A1F9BC575B785A":"":"":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A":0 + +KWP AES-128 28 byte input +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"":"EFD0BC7612331A98F2D68F86E606717197BF57E35114234C675D40E9462ACF00DE7860C0F38677F7":"":"":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B":0 + +KW AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 16 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW:"7575da3a93607cc2bfd8cec7aadfd9a6":"":"":"031f6bd7e61e643df68594816f64caa3f56fabea2548f5fb":"":"":"42136d3c384a3eeac95a066fd28fed3f":0 + +KW AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 16 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW:"7575da3a93607cc2bfd8cec7aadfd9a7":"":"":"031f6bd7e61e643df68594816f64cbb3f56fabea2548f5fb":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KW AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 32 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW:"e5d058e7f1c22c016c4e1cc9b26b9f8f":"":"":"60b9f8ac797c56e01e9b5f84d65816a980777869f67991a0e6dc19b8cd75c9b54db4a38456bbd6f3":"":"":"7f604e9b8d39d3c91e193fe6f196c1e3da6211a7c9a33b8873b64b138d1803e4":0 + +KW AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 24 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW:"67ae4270bcdd31e8326b7e7f94c80276":"":"":"96cec0e3272a21faa550a857957aa38ce3c1cf06f0dd9f5b5c5c422cef6c69a1":"":"":"57e748b62fbc37ba25e904ee973d01b136cf7c1d0c8c5c87":0 + +KW AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 16 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW:"a6a3f6d509811859238fc569b5664605f7a73c475a691a8f":"":"":"57d7a4b4e85ffdcb7788b9b666cb63303dd2c5d0f11b1bbb":"":"":"8484e414b091f8a9f72cfd13087ddec1":0 + +KW AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 32 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW:"3686e50dd602f84024570f545bbf618362bef80d45472436":"":"":"c7d5a1a5dfeb7327acbb94767d74cc2afc622ffd01f854d7d3e2b6f75ca7e8f441a0c0bad3d26ee2":"":"":"d780d69b45483b682d311ccaaadcfa3a1cecf1f05dbe2ebc71e6d3fa979f3de8":0 + +KW AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 24 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW:"0a833412e7aa1384ff26866dc9c551bf60413c17e847d317":"":"":"3a7efd629305bf1d61360ed6ff8ec7d059e8af3e5104c29729adb55d1bb94f7e":"":"":"f734760cc0fa3bbfb271277d4f29a48ddecda733d610fa42":0 + +KW AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 16 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW:"f59782f1dceb0544a8da06b34969b9212b55ce6dcbdd0975a33f4b3f88b538da":"":"":"2e63946ea3c090902fa1558375fdb2907742ac74e39403fc":"":"":"73d33060b5f9f2eb5785c0703ddfa704":0 + +KW AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 32 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW:"8b54e6bc3d20e823d96343dc776c0db10c51708ceecc9a38a14beb4ca5b8b221":"":"":"b13eeb7619fab818f1519266516ceb82abc0e699a7153cf26edcb8aeb879f4c011da906841fc5956":"":"":"d6192635c620dee3054e0963396b260af5c6f02695a5205f159541b4bc584bac":0 + +KW AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 24 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW:"112ad41b4856c7254a9848d30fdd78335b039a48a8962c4d1cb78eabd5dad788":"":"":"ba8a259a471b787dd5d540ec25d43d87200fdadc6d1f05d916584fa9f6cbf512":"":"":"1b20bf1990b065d798e1b32264ad50a8747492ba09a04dd1":0 + +KWP AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:"6decf10a1caf8e3b80c7a4be8c9c84e8":"":"":"01a7d657fc4a5b216f261cca4d052c2b":"":"":"49":0 + +KWP AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:"a8e06da625a65b25cf5030826830b661":"":"":"b6f967616dd8d772e9fea295a456dba7":"":"":"43acff293120dd5d":0 + +KWP AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:"7865e20f3c21659ab4690b629cdf3cc4":"":"":"41eca956d4aa047eb5cf4efe659661e74db6f8c564e23500":"":"":"bd6843d420378dc896":0 + +KWP AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 31 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:"be96dc195ec034d616486ed70e97fe83":"":"":"974769b3a7b4d5d32985f87fddf9990631e5610fbfb278387b58b1f48e05c77d2fb7575c5169eb0e":"":"":"85b5437b6335ebba7635903a4493d12a77d9357a9e0dbc013456d85f1d3201":0 + +KWP AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP:"9ca11078baebc1597a68ce2fe3fc79a201626575252b8860":"":"":"866bc0ae30e290bb20a0dab31a6e7165":"":"":"76":0 + +KWP AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP:"c5029804d28341ca267c9e73afc5f963b14bb604708b43f2":"":"":"15b98046b2a3a49b9c0831c476fc34fb":"":"":"e6eb18a3e969ab5c":0 + +KWP AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP:"9464f1af6aabad076661328bcfd15777da16a288a2660009":"":"":"d9b257b400d808a0b0386af3be9154fc7f2fb2d7edc06201":"":"":"431527c3a644c106bb":0 + +KWP AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 31 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP:"a354ccd6dd97cf40bed840f8137e0cf2e91c00e592104765":"":"":"f018e7c8d6dcdbd20606502b2667439d9049a9a2d5c960af8e9251466d6ff8923fb82432b299f1a4":"":"":"22ccc034c5345550f5bc0114f2951f0fe439ec3ecd8ac1fea8889dd12bfb8e":0 + +KWP AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP:"95da2700ca6fd9a52554ee2a8df1386f5b94a1a60ed8a4aef60a8d61ab5f225a":"":"":"06ba7ae6f3248cfdcf267507fa001bc4":"":"":"d1":0 + +KWP AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP:"3517f0efa7f0c4d74f91af83ece5e7503bcc5ab82907a6e4b7ed34d87b69ab1d":"":"":"0b06a9b635d50cda9d4210cb3a71f990":"":"":"897e0456b289ad31":0 + +KWP AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP:"70da43aac823c6dd37d1109f5b18feb4503c973288989745e2cc1cc21d9570c6":"":"":"d67b5b2ad15c645450e23b5e7b6d682f8ae20e716d470db7":"":"":"edf17d966ed896aee3":0 + +KWP AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 COUNT 0 PLEN 31 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP:"e9bb7f44c7baafbf392ab912589a2f8db53268106eafb74689bb1833136e6113":"":"":"15b9f06fbc765e5e3d55d6b824616f21921d2a6918ee7bf1406b524274e170b4a78333ca5ee92af5":"":"":"ffe952604834bff899e63658f34246815c91597eb40a21729e0a8a959b61f2":0 +KW AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 1 CLEN 48 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW:"5d4899ee66beff1bda1fc717a1ad4c50":"":"":"bb7fd0bce778bd775e4e88d904d26a7134364c53a6c493a0":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KW AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 1 CLEN 80 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW:"84bc6ce7ee4fd9db512536669d0686da":"":"":"c383db930ffd02c0073ac2cc79ec289e6866bdcc6a135a3b776aa42f14ee04f9cca06ed6c0b22901":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KW AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 3 CLEN 64 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW:"266b009e911bb55f9aa0661539a6fdd5":"":"":"db9c94e7236ec56982d7ddeb9427c24580bc1fb96db98ab19340e03670045b7a":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KW AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 3 CLEN 48 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW:"9200a0f688d86c0b6bfd9abeff66341684a373fe3f9a3057":"":"":"5c685c8596e374710fe327bafc45cd09190215fdcc03d010":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KW AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 1 CLEN 80 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW:"95c9e644559919cace6f93f545dbfe48b130808ed66d0964":"":"":"7b8d1307e992221f6ffdcc7909d972d5f02e92187139cfd77f79345cb998bbdbabedb3ac00a6cdc4":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KW AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 2 CLEN 64 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW:"e218e9643d5db01b412fcaefafe5eb237d03acfad0a3abaa":"":"":"5eee8fbf6a8ab6ba371f4581982ec61839bf28c0eb913d1f417a284dccd72580":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KW AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 4 CLEN 48 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW:"08c936b25b567a0aa679c29f201bf8b190327df0c2563e39cee061f149f4d91b":"":"":"e227eb8ae9d239ccd8928adec39c28810ca9b3dc1f366444":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KW AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 3 CLEN 80 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW:"605b22935f1eee56ba884bc7a869febc159ac306b66fb9767a7cc6ab7068dffa":"":"":"6607f5a64c8f9fd96dc6f9f735b06a193762cdbacfc367e410926c1bfe6dd715490adbad5b9697a6":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KW AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 3 CLEN 64 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW:"81c93da5baa5157bf700fd38d7d67662670778b690cfbca9fe11e06268b35605":"":"":"875e1ca385586f83d1e23e44ca201006df04e1854e41b933fd607a7383ae1a39":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KWP AES-128 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 1 CLEN 32 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP:"30be7ff51227f0eef786cb7be2482510":"":"":"7f61a0a8b2fe7803f2947d233ec3a255":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KWP AES-192 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 3 CLEN 32 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP:"21fb6600c1d34a74adee67612672593a86cf235421735350":"":"":"56b45c49c3e379b18d9c38b6423db133":"":"FAIL":"":0 + +KWP AES-256 wrap CAVS 17.4 FAIL COUNT 4 CLEN 32 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP:"c32cb3e1e41a4b9f4de79989957866f5dd48dba38c22a6ebb80e14c84bdd9534":"":"":"c29b05c2619a58ecc1d239e7a34273cd":"":"FAIL":"":0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.null.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.null.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a063ab1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.null.data @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 0 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:0:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:1:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 2 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:2:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 7 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:7:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 8 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:8:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 9 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:9:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 15 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:15:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:16:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 31 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:31:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:32:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 33 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:33:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 47 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:47:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 48 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:48:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 49 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:"NULL":0:49:-1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:1:0:-1:1:0:1:0 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 1 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:0:1:-1:0:1:0:1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:16:0:-1:16:0:16:0 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:0:16:-1:0:16:0:16 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:1:15:-1:1:15:1:15 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 16 bytes in multiple parts 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:15:1:-1:15:1:15:1 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:15:7:-1:15:7:15:7 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:16:6:-1:16:6:16:6 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 22 bytes in multiple parts 1 [#3] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:17:6:-1:17:6:17:6 + +NULL Encrypt and decrypt 32 bytes in multiple parts 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:0:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.padding.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.padding.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dc4c9d70 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.padding.data @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +Cipher list +mbedtls_cipher_list: + +Set padding with AES-CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0 + +Set padding with AES-CFB +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Set padding with AES-CTR +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Set padding with CAMELLIA-CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0 + +Set padding with CAMELLIA-CFB +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Set padding with CAMELLIA-CTR +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Set padding with DES-CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0 + +Set padding with BLOWFISH-CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:0 + +Set padding with BLOWFISH-CFB +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Set padding with BLOWFISH-CTR +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Set padding with NULL +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Set non-existent padding with AES-CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:-1:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +Set non-existent padding with CAMELLIA-CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:-1:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +Set non-existent padding with DES-CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC:-1:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +Set non-existent padding with BLOWFISH-CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +set_padding:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:-1:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +Check PKCS padding #1 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD0004040404":0:4 + +Check PKCS padding #2 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD0001":0:4 + +Check PKCS padding #3 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD000101":0:5 + +Check PKCS padding #4 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"030303":0:0 + +Check PKCS padding #5 (null padding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD0000":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #6 (too few padding bytes) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD0002":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00030203":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00030103":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #3) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00030703":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00030b03":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #5) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00031303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #6) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00032303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #7) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00034203":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #8) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00038303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #9) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00020303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #10) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00010303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #11) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00070303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #12) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD000b0303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #13) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00130303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #14) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00230303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #15) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00420303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #7 (non-uniform padding bytes #16) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"DABBAD00830303":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check PKCS padding #8 (overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:"040404":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check one and zeros padding #1 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS:"DABBAD0080":0:4 + +Check one and zeros padding #2 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS:"DABBAD008000":0:4 + +Check one and zeros padding #3 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS:"DABBAD00800000":0:4 + +Check one and zeros padding #4 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS:"DABBAD00808000":0:5 + +Check one and zeros padding #5 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS:"800000":0:0 + +Check one and zeros padding #6 (missing one) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS:"DABBAD0000":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:4 + +Check one and zeros padding #7 (overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS:"0000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:4 + +Check one and zeros padding #8 (last byte 0x80 | x) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS:"0000000082":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:4 + +Check zeros and len padding #1 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN:"DABBAD0001":0:4 + +Check zeros and len padding #2 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN:"DABBAD000002":0:4 + +Check zeros and len padding #3 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN:"DABBAD000003":0:3 + +Check zeros and len padding #4 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN:"000003":0:0 + +Check zeros and len padding #5 (overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN:"000004":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check zeros and len padding #6 (not enough zeros) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN:"DABBAD000004":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +Check zeros padding #1 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS:"DABBAD00":0:3 + +Check zeros padding #2 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS:"DABBAD0000":0:3 + +Check zeros padding #3 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS:"DABBAD":0:3 + +Check zeros padding #4 (correct) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS:"000000":0:0 + +Check no padding #1 (correct by definition) +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:"DABBAD00":0:4 + +Check no padding #2 (correct by definition) +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:"DABBAD0001":0:5 + +Check no padding #3 (correct by definition) +check_padding:MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:"":0:0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70b7609e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.data @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +CMAC self test +mbedtls_cmac_self_test: + +CMAC null arguments +mbedtls_cmac_null_args: + +CMAC init #1 AES-128: OK +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:128:0 + +CMAC init #2 AES-192: OK +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:192:0 + +CMAC init #3 AES-256: OK +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:256:0 + +CMAC init #4 3DES : OK +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB:192:0 + +CMAC init #5 AES-224: bad key size +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:224:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +CMAC init #6 AES-0: bad key size +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +CMAC init #7 Camellia: wrong cipher +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_cmac_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:128:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +CMAC Single Blocks #1 - Empty block, no updates +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_blocks:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":128:16:"":-1:"":-1:"":-1:"":-1:"bb1d6929e95937287fa37d129b756746" + +CMAC Single Blocks #2 - Single 16 byte block +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_blocks:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":128:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:"":-1:"":-1:"":-1:"070a16b46b4d4144f79bdd9dd04a287c" + +CMAC Single Blocks #3 - Single 64 byte block +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_blocks:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":128:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":64:"":-1:"":-1:"":-1:"51f0bebf7e3b9d92fc49741779363cfe" + +CMAC Multiple Blocks #1 - Multiple 8 byte blocks +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_blocks:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":128:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96":8:"e93d7e117393172a":8:"":-1:"":-1:"070a16b46b4d4144f79bdd9dd04a287c" + +CMAC Multiple Blocks #2 - Multiple 16 byte blocks +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_blocks:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":128:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:"ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51":16:"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef":16:"f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":16:"51f0bebf7e3b9d92fc49741779363cfe" + +CMAC Multiple Blocks #3 - Multiple variable sized blocks +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_blocks:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":128:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96":8:"e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c":16:"9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef":24:"f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":16:"51f0bebf7e3b9d92fc49741779363cfe" + +CMAC Multiple Blocks #4 - Multiple 8 byte blocks with gaps +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_blocks:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":128:16:"":0:"6bc1bee22e409f96":8:"":0:"e93d7e117393172a":8:"070a16b46b4d4144f79bdd9dd04a287c" + +CMAC Multiple Operations, same key #1 - Empty, empty +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_operations_same_key:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:"8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b":192:16:"":-1:"":-1:"":-1:"d17ddf46adaacde531cac483de7a9367":"":-1:"":-1:"":-1:"d17ddf46adaacde531cac483de7a9367" + +CMAC Multiple Operations, same key #2 - Empty, 64 byte block +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_operations_same_key:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:"8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b":192:16:"":-1:"":-1:"":-1:"d17ddf46adaacde531cac483de7a9367":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":64:"":-1:"":-1:"a1d5df0eed790f794d77589659f39a11" + +CMAC Multiple Operations, same key #3 - variable byte blocks +mbedtls_cmac_multiple_operations_same_key:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:"8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b":192:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51":32:"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":32:"":-1:"a1d5df0eed790f794d77589659f39a11":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51":32:"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":32:"":-1:"a1d5df0eed790f794d77589659f39a11" + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cabf1070 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_cmac.function @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void mbedtls_cmac_self_test( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cmac_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_cmac_null_args( ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + unsigned char test_key[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char test_data[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char test_output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + /* Test NULL cipher info */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, test_data, 16 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( NULL, test_key, 128 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &ctx, NULL, 128 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( NULL, test_data, 16 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, NULL, 16 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( NULL, test_output ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &ctx, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset( NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac( NULL, + test_key, 128, + test_data, 16, + test_output ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, + NULL, 128, + test_data, 16, + test_output ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, + test_key, 128, + NULL, 16, + test_output ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, + test_key, 128, + test_data, 16, + NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( NULL, 16, + test_data, 16, + test_output ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( test_key, 16, + NULL, 16, + test_output ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( test_key, 16, + test_data, 16, + NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_cmac_setkey( int cipher_type, int key_size, int result ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char buf[16]; + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + memset( key, 0x2A, sizeof( key ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( (unsigned) key_size <= 8 * sizeof( key ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ( cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ) ) + != NULL ); + + memset( buf, 0x2A, sizeof( buf ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ( result == mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, key, key_size, + buf, 16, tmp ) ) != 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_cmac_multiple_blocks( int cipher_type, data_t * key, + int keybits, int block_size, + data_t * block1, int block1_len, + data_t * block2, int block2_len, + data_t * block3, int block3_len, + data_t * block4, int block4_len, + data_t * expected_result ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + /* Convert the test parameters to binary data */ + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + /* Validate the test inputs */ + TEST_ASSERT( block1_len <= 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( block2_len <= 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( block3_len <= 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( block4_len <= 100 ); + + /* Set up */ + TEST_ASSERT( ( cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ) ) + != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &ctx, + (const unsigned char*)key->x, + keybits ) == 0 ); + + /* Multiple partial and complete blocks. A negative length means skip the + * update operation */ + if( block1_len >= 0) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block1->x, + block1_len ) == 0); + + if( block2_len >= 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block2->x, + block2_len ) == 0); + + if( block3_len >= 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block3->x, + block3_len ) == 0); + + if( block4_len >= 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block4->x, + block4_len ) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &ctx, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, expected_result->x, block_size ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_cmac_multiple_operations_same_key( int cipher_type, + data_t * key, int keybits, + int block_size, + data_t * block_a1, + int block_a1_len, + data_t * block_a2, + int block_a2_len, + data_t * block_a3, + int block_a3_len, + data_t * expected_result_a, + data_t * block_b1, + int block_b1_len, + data_t * block_b2, + int block_b2_len, + data_t * block_b3, + int block_b3_len, + data_t * expected_result_b + ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + /* Convert the test parameters to binary data */ + + + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + /* Validate the test inputs */ + TEST_ASSERT( block_a1_len <= 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( block_a2_len <= 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( block_a3_len <= 100 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( block_b1_len <= 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( block_b2_len <= 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( block_b3_len <= 100 ); + + /* Set up */ + TEST_ASSERT( ( cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ) ) + != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &ctx, + (const unsigned char*)key->x, + keybits ) == 0 ); + + /* Sequence A */ + + /* Multiple partial and complete blocks. A negative length means skip the + * update operation */ + if( block_a1_len >= 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block_a1->x, + block_a1_len ) == 0); + + if( block_a2_len >= 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block_a2->x, + block_a2_len ) == 0); + + if( block_a3_len >= 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block_a3->x, + block_a3_len ) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &ctx, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, expected_result_a->x, block_size ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + /* Sequence B */ + + /* Multiple partial and complete blocks. A negative length means skip the + * update operation */ + if( block_b1_len >= 0) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block_b1->x, + block_b1_len ) == 0); + + if( block_b2_len >= 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block_b2->x, + block_b2_len ) == 0); + + if( block_b3_len >= 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, + (unsigned char*)block_b3->x, + block_b3_len ) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &ctx, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, expected_result_b->x, block_size ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..09195f04 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.data @@ -0,0 +1,1100 @@ +CTR_DRBG_withDF.pdf: AES-256, PR=no, perso=no, add=no +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f":"":"":"8da6cc59e703ced07d58d96e5b6d7836c32599735b734f88c1a73b53c7a6d82e" + +CTR_DRBG_withDF.pdf: AES-256, PR=no, perso=no, add=yes +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f":"a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf":"81daaf9800c34ff0a104e51d87e36f5b17eb14b9abc5064cadda976ec4f77d34" + +CTR_DRBG_withDF.pdf: AES-256, PR=no, perso=yes, add=no +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f":"":"":"bb2a0f5f0ca6d30634ba6068eb94aae8701437db7223a1b5afe8771547da3cee" + +CTR_DRBG_withDF.pdf: AES-256, PR=no, perso=yes, add=yes +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f":"a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf":"98a28e3b1ba363c9daf0f6887a1cf52b833d3354d77a7c10837dd63dd2e645f8" + +CTR_DRBG_withDF.pdf: AES-256, PR=yes, perso=no, add=no +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeef":"":"":"259dc78ccfaec4210c30af815e4f75a5662b7da4b41013bdc00302dfb6076492" + +CTR_DRBG_withDF.pdf: AES-256, PR=yes, perso=no, add=yes +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeef":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f":"a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf":"386debbbf091bbf0502957b0329938fb836b82e594a2f5fdd5eb28d4e35528f4" + +CTR_DRBG_withDF.pdf: AES-256, PR=yes, perso=yes, add=no +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeef":"":"":"601f95384f0d85946301d1eace8f645a825ce38f1e2565b0c0c439448e9ca8ac" + +CTR_DRBG_withDF.pdf: AES-256, PR=yes, perso=yes, add=yes +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeef":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f":"a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf":"738e99c95af59519aad37ff3d5180986adebab6e95836725097e50a8d1d0bd28" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"d254fcff021e69d229c9cfad85fa486c":"c18081a65d44021619b3f180b1c920026a546f0c7081498b6ea662526d51b1cb583bfad5375ffbc9ff46d219c7223e95459d82e1e7229f633169d26b57474fa337c9981c0bfb91314d55b9e91c5a5ee49392cfc52312d5562c4a6effdc10d068":"":"":"34011656b429008f3563ecb5f2590723" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #1 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"7be87545266dadd1d73546c0927afc8d":"a7f38c750bd6ff41c4e79f5b7dd3024d58ca3f1f4c096486c4a73c4f74a2410c4c9c5143eb8c09df842ba4427f385bbf65c350b0bf2c87242c7a23c8c2e0e419e44e500c250f6bc0dc25ec0ce929c4ad5ffb7a87950c618f8cee1af4831b4b8e":"":"":"d5b1da77f36ce58510b75dfde71dbd5d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #2 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"3771416b162f4d9c5f48a05b7aa73938":"d20a0e5cdb714f01b48e00bae51909f345af05de13217e5d55fc6c2d705aea550420d9a458594d825b71e16b36130020cf5948fe813462061c1a222d1ff0e1e4b3d21ae8eee31d3260330d668d24ef3c8941b8720e8591b7deec4bd35a3a1f1a":"":"":"3cbd7d53ac1772c959311419adad836e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #3 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"f2bad8f7dab3f5886faa1cf6e1f52c87":"4df54a483b4510ed76049faae14b962fbb16459d1f6b4f4dbeca85deded6018361223c893f9442719c51eb5695e1304a1c2be8c05d0846b6510a9525a28831a8efcbd82aa50540d7e7864e2b8a42d44380cdc6e02eebb48d0b5a840b7cdd6e04":"":"":"0062d822bc549bea292c37846340789b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #4 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"1c5760aa0fd4ce308735b28682b67246":"89defd4445061c080e4762afac194b9f79c4bb1ed88c961af41d9d37bd388a1d45c82ca46f404348a2ae5e22ce00aa35ebc7c5051d8800890d44d25284489efcbd1f5e2b16e403f6921f71bbdfcf7b9aeddef65bc92fbd1cb9e4ea389aee5179":"":"":"3baf81155548afca67d57c503d00a5b4" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #5 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"b72b9451a5e866e226978623d36b3491":"2713d74affed98e3433559e17d240288bb1a1790904cd7754cad97007e205a157b8ddca704a3624413f2ec8361ccd85442fb0b7cc60a247f0fd102cef44677321514ea4186d0203ab7387925d0222800ce2078c4588bc50cdfccbc04fbecd593":"":"":"047a50890c282e26bfede4c0904f5369" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #6 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"91b955a3e7eccd7f07290cba4464baff":"b160465448894c7d5ee1963bb3e1a2f3f75fcd167ffa332c41c4c91c1830b7c07413bd580302958aa6fa81588ad2b3173698a4afafda468acb368dbbd524207196b9a3be37ac21ba7a072b4c8223492ee18b48551524d5c3449c5c8d3517212e":"":"":"af2c062fedb98ee599ae1f47fc202071" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #7 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"d08114670c4f6016a4cf9d2da3e3a674":"38dfbfb52c185acf74de00b5a50f0cd9688286747ab340cfe9ad30d38b390fd2443bfd7ea93941d8262ae0f66b0eab4ff64ba59a2ff940c3c26fda103e0d798dbcaa1318e842143975673af8408b5af48dfbaa56ca4f9ddc87100028b4a95549":"":"":"55030fef65c679ecaffb0dc070bfd4d2" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #8 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"e2af9abe8770e33798a5f05b22057d24":"88fb2a8020e604ea64a620f4704078857062cc97e24604c30de4c70cbf5e5bea0f0db79d16f4db636a2d6cd992c5890389a40cfe93967eac609e5b9f66788944285758547c7136ef2ee3b38724ed340d61763d0d5991ece4924bb72483b96945":"":"":"a44f0cfa383916811fffb2e0cfc9bfc3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #9 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"ae30f1642753c5cb6e118d7ff5d59f1d":"340def3420b608420d81b4ea8252a3d86d3e1dd7597e6063ed923a73a7b8e981e6079f7f0c42deb9f4ef11d2f3581abadf44b06d882afdc47896777ce8dafd85ec040f7873d0e25c4be709c614a28b708e547266ac8f07f5fdb450d63bc0c999":"":"":"c7e7670145573581842bd1f3e0c6e90b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #10 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"711ecfe467d6f83bcc82e566729669af":"21d6c822706d1af09e4d233c0ebac7f4ec60c7be2500dd41a85a19b2dc5c7da27f8a82164bd2a644218cb5ac283c547da1064784413eed5ecf32fadd00357abaae81225ac8d0391ead533362cff56798825445d639b0b45e0312aa7047c00b4d":"":"":"d3a0d2c457f5e9d1328a9e1d22b6eaf6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #11 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"f9b22152bc0eff1ebf0bfafeea40aecf":"4ee32f0aeadb3936e17f1aa3b18c10f773def5f83500c2ba96f84408a2521c1258f6be9aa5cee528746629aa2b8118ac41dd98ef1b3de31d26b8c2ad3442081203f5ef21df409df3381fbf2e064fbaec64d731dc93b3218e34bb3b03bfd88373":"":"":"86009b14c4906a409abe6ca9b0718cbe" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #12 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"5174e76e904ff1471367ccace9c66ed9":"fa81535670275e8ab74121377cf88a4742dd0d7a99cf06eb9c2b4fe2b03423dbe441201144c22a9fc0ca49f5ef614987a2271cc1089d10ee01b25163c090a1f263797e4f130920cdc3b890a078e8abbb070ded2e8fd717f4389f06ff2c10d180":"":"":"18d6fcd35457d2678175df36df5e215d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #13 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"73c372f60519e8eca371eaa13fb54f88":"930c290a797b85d58b52d0d92356436977b2f636f07d5a80c987fb7eea6b750cceb9eb87860547ab4029865a6810fc5c3663c4e369f290994461d2e9c7160a8b5985853bd9088b3e969f988fe6923b3994040eeee09ad353b969d58938237cfe":"":"":"f62c7cfbe74555744790bcc7930e03c3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #14 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"75ba8ddeef24f9f5b00b426a362c4f02":"7065d128ddb2fc6ea31f4110b6c0934ed112c51d74a4a0741a0843d8befac22902a01353322674c3d58935144a0f8f171a99dbeab71272ff7518c46cc7ebb573adbf95bff8ec68eeba5e8ec1221655aed8420086bda89c7de34f217dce73ccab":"":"":"700761857ea2763e8739b8f6f6481d1c" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"14051b57277bc3d3bbae51bdecfb9f5d":"82c80d922c47bbec0f664dd623e22a11a3b84d308351e45e30ee286e89547d22c43e17b3ca0fa08f77eef1001ba696932e9ee890e7aac4661c138e5b5ce36773d3120c35f8c94e0a78ffbf407a63ca435392e17c07461522fdc1f63f037aacff":"b70e7c1c4b8e0f1770e05b29a93f9d7a6540f23ab84136b05b161d85e5f19251":"5a737c128bd69f927f8f3ad68f93f6356d5f4ec0e36b6b50ced43dcd5c44dbc2":"a4e6c754194a09614994b36ecce33b55" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #1 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"4526b268128ea35f8558b4e1d08388f2":"952f3f179cbbda27ebd30f4fc31bf96baccb2adbaa9c090bc0f37044a44e85b3bc668cd3533faaf56b5da9242844d65733f7ac1f55c38b175749b88e18d19672b7bdab54e0ababdd4519fb07e0c25578f64ad40d0beb0a26275d5e2f4906aa70":"6b167c7cebea2e585ab974b60c4d305a113102ca8c3dc87651665728c4c675ad":"a038f1ca1f420eae449791f13be4901bfb91e41e052e02635b1f1817bd8969b1":"745ec376282e20fd1f9151f7040ed94a" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #2 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"c1aafa90f394e0ba9a528032dc6780d3":"75fd042bfd994de2c92e5aa505945ec93bd7cf366d86a356723fca3c9479ee17fb59c6ca8ba89784d43f06cdad113e5081e02427ee0714439d88dc1a6257fc91d99c1a15e92527847ab10883cc8f471cad8cf0882f5b6d33a846a00dee154012":"c704164ce80a400cb2f54d1b2d7efa20f32b699fa881bfc7b56cfd7c4bee1ea6":"f3baff4b6f42c8e75b70c2a72a027b14a99ae49a5a47c7af0f538843c94e1a69":"7af9113cd607cdb4c6534f401fe4e96c" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #3 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"e6e726b72e7b264a36ec0cd60d4578b5":"0c3c6dd706076d6484478347559b495d7ee898c39cde06027bc99f7bf69ce1140ca04602265e1308af6dd6446a1cf151749b22a99e8a05d30cc3ccd00e663bc1bc37e08ee62834fcc52a4bc8c1d6442544187484f81dc729417d5bedfcab5a54":"d84b978483c0bd8f8c231d92ea88ac21e6e667215804b15725a7ed32f7fc5dd7":"9a8971f6c559f7f197c73a94a92f957d1919ad305f4167c56fe729d50e5754a5":"e16ee5bceca30f1fbcadb5de2d7cfc42" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #4 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"0272d86db283244eb7ee0ed8c8054b89":"a08ce39f2f671e1f934821a8db9070f39a734a7a20e70307fccca17db15bb4e8a421600df11d1a6e7806a14826739322c8043649ea707180f1d00dea752c2c36398030519465864c4d38163f5b0dd5be07dbc0ae29693ad4a67ca69f28414634":"aa97055cf46ba26465dfb3ef1cf93191625c352768b2d8e34459499a27502e50":"dddd0007eb29fdf942220e920ca0637db4b91cbf898efd2696576ff6bfacb9d1":"9db0057e39ca6e0f16e79b4f8a0ed5c7" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #5 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"4ad8f72a0d0e28a758722b20e3017d7e":"89af36a1c53f730c1b818b26aa510627b17e6f9da51c8e53930de883b7cc7a3e8c3c463c910646ac3ff08f05bca8e340daf9a322d133ae453fdf7e6860a27ff4495c89875431ba9de3e4f3247cda8c62acc86f7066448f639d8ba8b5249337f8":"9d060b7ed63bdb59263c75ebe6a54bf3a4ac9c9926ca8fb49caa905a2651eead":"016099232dc44bb7cdb492f4955ab1aabc5dc0b5731447cea2eb1d92e41482d1":"4b658e95adae4bf0c418fded4431c27f" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #6 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"aa19b944c2e1b9d27933bc87322bdf14":"dc8c60dd42c85fed86cb32af035bbde5737526eb07991397c853256f2f0cb311bce70e1c5e32fc3510402d7d7e3de36fa5e584234daf391bc53cc651e001ab7fcf760679b3c82057f9d09bfdcab8e158d4daa63b20c0e1102f7a06bf5a2788dd":"6b98fec5f7de8098ff9df80f62473c73831edace832a767abf5965ea8bf789ba":"cc998bd5752f9c96ec35d9658cc8b3833dd6ab80c7accd6777c06c2cf7c01e59":"fc58833e0e27f7705e4937dd2aadb238" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #7 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"10c8c17a25041e2ef0d3cc80671e4cfe":"513fb96b6164ece801e52855aad28cb80131e7872d8432d27a974fb62d8d0100bb7ebcb8f5c066e230377a8847d6798c3d8090469b9719a80ac956ac33186b00eb8ca64c5530421f93932bc7c98ee92651e85dab562483bdb189676802726647":"240f36a0a598fe2116ffa682824f25acc35132f137f5221bc0ff05b501f5fd97":"22a5eb5aa00309a762ab60a8c2647eebe1083f8905104b5d375ed1661b4c8478":"145a16109ec39b0615a9916d07f0854e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #8 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"cea0c3c12be683c0f27693650a6a3d7d":"df8bc70e45fe14abb02c1b9a9754c37497fc2f67709edd854196fc4d074b12797ce7cb292f14cb1d6904abf32bf229299db5ccf5a791a3b8cd3e40a64f38f6b57df759a863e09d7676d2f3ff2762cdab221151000dba32a67f38cab93d5b7a55":"bf2ac545d94e318066ff88f39791a8385e1a8539e99ac4fa5a6b97a4caead9d4":"846efef8672d256c63aa05a61de86a1bbc6950de8bfb9808d1c1066aef7f7d70":"8d8f0389d41adcac8ca7b61fc02409c3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #9 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"1b782af2545352631983dc89945ffc37":"51930fb7095edef3fc20aca2a24127f03d3c4b983329e013ad8a35016f581dd7b2d11bafbf971c1fdefd95a0024195e6e90a60ec39b1a8dbe0cb0c3aabf9cf56b662efc722b2dffa6c3be651f199cbc3da2315b4d55aeafd1492283889e1c34f":"1b6295986f6fb55dc4c4c19a3dba41066fdc0297d50fb14e9501ba4378d662ed":"6e66ff63fc457014550b85210a18f00beab765f9e12aa16818f29d1449620d28":"78dfcb662736a831efaa592153a9aff9" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #10 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"6580f6df5c8de7c4a105c11ed44435c2":"d37403db6f84a7ba162e1cc351fe2e44d674ae8606280c9dac3e3975f30cbe1c9925e502a9804b91aada5cc97b259b90ccb5b8103394d9a28f0709fc9b5ffe9d73ad3672e02064ea68cebe3face5d823ee605c46c173db591135f564558dab4c":"97486a5e6ce6c6cf9d3f9a313d346cbc34b2bd54db80c5f8d74d6f6939f89519":"8377fcb52556f9974f1aa325d6e141d7b81355bd160abbc86e0007571b3c1904":"77031d3474303470dca9336b1692c504" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #11 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"f5303f148d6d6faca90aa88b07ab2ba9":"a0de51b8efa44b8245dba31d78f7840b2b7abced4e265b4cd9628eabc6ebbccb0f118dd8cc958b36dc959e22c4a03dafa212eeedec7d25ee6c5961187bee83b1ed3a75c7bdd9d0713b16cc67e68231f4cb274c8f3dfcc7e5d288c426a0d43b8f":"8d1fddc11dbad007e9b14679a5599e5e8a836197f14d010f3329d164c02d46d6":"9ceb6570568455d42a7397f8ca8b8af7a961a33a73770544cca563c04bc919ca":"9882f0bd1f6129a78b51d108e752b2d9" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #12 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"5a799c58985aa2898cc8fe8e5bc4a9f8":"dbdbef9d217e9051025c321b628c1cc823d508ffdd13fc4edbe8677658a57ef5b64395a6b7d62c0e93dc0956ee0217ec48ae054f1d4680023cc1b2af666efa9e1458cf6b0dae72eef2392e93687bd1fb5f366bb2cdd12937ad09724e39db4189":"8c179b35739e75719e74f7c3e038bc06eb3e212d6ade85275cfebf12b2dce2a2":"af617f2e228adde3edaf52a7e5979476dbb9cd2956a1737d93a16563bbbb4888":"49a04f3b4ef052747c7f4e77c91603e8" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #13 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"8f5b51983a8156a529f559ac3afebbf0":"bf22b182d39622e941017285adbdfe446c3d1a72601d0e5a15674f3b1b260170b1b2ab6b588a0267d86776a5d4ce80e132d7135a581af75ea6de65153680e28ce35ce78d0917b4932000d62260149e5a3ae72bc250548390b664f53c697dac45":"4cbb5b2d6e666d5dd3dd99b951ea435cae5a75d2e1eb41a48c775829b860e98b":"a4b4171c2592516404434932ad0a8ee67bd776a03479b507c406405b3d8962bc":"cab49631733f06e3fb3e0898e5ad22e7" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,256) #14 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"9f305a77cbaec1ab408cfc0eb89c6cbb":"1e50fada1e76a0d243e6f64c36a173ddc1f47a1dab834f5cd492568792958d5be22cce3110c8e8958b47f07b5c63f86b254942361d4d553e47d36103f47cd7f0bbee27d2e238b1d85671afe8284ee1fd2a431a5f69b2df73e95341c3a2e4fe4b":"c254f3b40e773eb09053b226820f68cafa3458ad403ad36f715245a854752a93":"699e177b7be3353c45ce7b7a0d573b00087d700a9f2c1cd2e370e05d4ddadc86":"bb6b02b25a496f29245315f58a16febc" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"e09f65dcffc0d3a4d84bacc41617a4e46ce5184eca011049ab657566f728e4aa28315ffac166ebe50e1269b01c95b3a2":"545a783ae97d827ed0b81d9752ad0f7e965f511b1f5dae0f872e9ec37cfe63af86c1d15e153887989b605773b16ad5505e65f617cfa8ef46547c4c3f9d0c4fd0b6e1cff5ca0f1929266fe43ba8f45ad664cfe5e90903a9cb722b42ae8989c148":"":"":"1e77d7cc18775fef9a3d3e00903da01b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #1 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"056cd44c8847d89da05fbef95e9660d589046b0c02f9b42c17fd8b069f831c73cd896005ec080113589b6f07be6e42ea":"dde6c0850fe642602eb222ca7371213c598cef8c3e71e0593ea8edb54e1bed130b9b0aebe0893093b950c52f56eb9b338aa4bd01dae030515726ece1bf751660b4a3602da6400e4b94edebba646b5c3d4e64ceea1c4f14b7a19f0142783247df":"":"":"a790ab939e63555d02ea1e9696051725" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #2 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"73c72c7dfe138ef4b9817d41b9722b3940762b59bda26b3f6bb8b30583e01d088a29726b71d36ffeebdb387010cb1bb6":"6fe09520e26f5abece0fceadc54913c650a9f55725af45a9a5f373d09b9970b8706b9041d0189a204f6a4eb527dfa86584a3bee3265b809c3932ae5e7228194a3cf7592fc9301c833b45a53be32b9caec9f0f91ba86519f12b0b235f68419c1e":"":"":"798d997f46ff7cc4206994085340325e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #3 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"cdba7c7033c34852b7bc1a6b33edab36f41d563bd0395d1001c02ffc0c42ec8595ed2b5ddabc923372e3b6bb457833fa":"532960c23c8c8b2146576dde52fadc985134914abf42ca1c5f47206937fda41289ae5d9f935dc4ce45f77cad230a4f345599e3bae4071188324483a0b93593c96d8b6ac6c0d8b52f8795c44171f0d8cd0b1e85dc75ce8abe65d5f25460166ba0":"":"":"9d48160aca60f1a82baaa8a7d804a3d8" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #4 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"02cef01aca992f60aa12db4b2c441689e4972a6f9deaf3663082afed642c1502b67b42d490af1c52c7e6eaf459882eca":"9216c9a833f81953792260a688eb7c3dfc85565ae6a6033203741a763db056247808e0ecd5ba1fc4549c3a757eba535adc786e810ddaae9a2714d31f5154f2c3ee81108669f1239f4f4efd6e18aabfa2d88f0ac25f4740108f6cfebffeb2d857":"":"":"d6378bcf43be1ad42da83780c1dab314" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #5 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"d7d80084e9d1fbb9315c3bce1510dbf22cf11fa54177d913a3b04b64cb30957395bd6f3d7e3d866d1be41b29db9ed81d":"80d4741e4e646748bb65e1289f1f9b3c21bffec4d0a666b301f199d76b4a83464583057079b069946b03d6ac81ebf9e6fa8d4081120f18bf58286a0c4de7576f36f3c7c353126f481a065ac28bdf28e13cd0c1e7911db6343c47d613f1750dc6":"":"":"9165a92ed92248b2d237d9f46d39bde8" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #6 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"df5a68d3bede467fd69716f5f8fbac297594b8573921afb864ba76aaa6dd89e83b89e359a5a0dd1aac9b4acb9573d218":"52df6336f93781115c2a77bd8f99cb717871fe14707947a21f6093dd9205bc378acf61329f8831369b4b1af0a9edfb25d74f5863f26859ad9c920767b113c47ed2690053bf9a2f7c7a67a8d680e08865720b9e9f7b6ae697e3c93e66f24b6ddc":"":"":"c542cf248a163bbceee7b9f1453bd90b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #7 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"2945527372ff71edfa5776f55f7e4a247544aa6de974e81b2eba5552843ab6dfa248695f4f3225a43d4bf3672c3a6b2e":"aa560af2132cbd0624a69c7a7e733cd59a4f2d4e61d2b830087bd88f30fa792c7e4d3168fa86a10f7619d5b9dcf4f7bb08b350ba6a6bfc0fdfb7ee7aca07260c9a11abe49963c36efaefa94d2978ed09472bf93cc873d0f24c000762bb1402cd":"":"":"33af0134eeca279dce5e69c2cda3f3f4" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #8 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"b30cb767125674f6099a5cf7cb2e4f5b6c1cd1e32ffc1e393b1c5698b52b37f971f12521a7c1ffaaf3233d5391bc4c86":"2d42b00248d95d9378a2aece40d636bc1ab22edaaa64daa34335195a9efa4c1b58f13ac184ca2be52e15c3a977abde2aa505243fc106c4ea6f0671fe0f209b106ea8965645af73d8ebb8a80251db2967149c701cfe1d157cc189b03bf1bff1ac":"":"":"1e10eff9ceebc7e5f66e5213cb07fca4" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #9 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"c962a2da4524f08adcdd5ceddc04e669ad6154aee06164645e80c832506b98f9919451c7ec1d3a6a9704f83def8f6e2d":"a1ff68a85e437475b1b518821dbaac1730071a4ddd3255361778194fb0cfe3293e38df81527d8b8da15d03acb26467b6b53d7952441b79f95b633f4a979d998fd0417b9193023288b657d30c0cb2dada264addf9d13f1f8ed10b74e2dd2b56b3":"":"":"58990069b72b7557c234d5caf4334853" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #10 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"a3cc1fe561d03a055e8eedaa0e713be490c4bd4c6839a5b98c2ac0139bf215bdc46783d2a3e6b9d15d9b7a8bfe15104b":"207267911c12125cb3012230e4fafd257777ccbfb91653f77e4c1287574f9b79d81af7fb304790349dd457983cc99b48d5f4677ccd979fcc6e545cbf5b5c8b98102c9a89ae354349dbdee31a362d47c7cdae128034c0f4c3e71e298fe1af33c6":"":"":"ffd1d259acd79111a6fb508181272831" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #11 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"ecf186071b81e0ed384d4ebfb5bf261b4054e2e6072b51d21dfb6817adc51ff1c8956ff3612767538cdc8d73fade78b3":"3b9aec9f8bf8495004c5e4e731e5c347988e787caf003f001e68584e3510a6abdedffa15895702c2d57c304300f4f0af80a89bcc36b3cea2f08a0740236b80cfd2ea6e5cfe4144bc4ae09270fb6bc58c313dbaaedc16d643fc0565171f963222":"":"":"a2d917f5ec39a090b55d51713006e49d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #12 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"3fcedba86089709aa638d00713150df781d4a93e85f155338e90ff537bcbf017f37a2d62259f5d8cc40ddfb041592539":"6b1e9d45c2ec598de7527b6414a339f26192fc4e3f5eff4b3a3e2a80ee0f2e9743031804d1be12b3c7ff6fbc222db1d97226890addeef0e1579a860e2279292c2f769416b7068f582f6ffc192ae4c4f1eeb41d5f77f0a612b059c47aef8e3d8e":"":"":"aa414799c51957de97c0070fb00eb919" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #13 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"f4c45fb8f58b7ebf73a0cd81c6a26686977558d4b8bf1cedfc6bd3754de6aaed5008fd72208437c54d8feb9a16ce3224":"6d170cf472ea07da6146a7087ed15d3f5b6ad72b8c99e46bae3b89e49a6e63467199ee16096516c2362dbd181bf5343a29fd0932d72eeb019fc3bfea3a3b01ffc2b985e341cfb6479d9dc71e2197b5cffc402587182e5fe93b5a8cf75eac2e42":"":"":"f557f627688fe63c119cf0f25274aa74" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,0) #14 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"7120742a7807b66c5a9b50995d5494a5b9451bb795393c0d8a30ae665879269408f8297d49ab87410a7f16a65a54b1cb":"c08a6f9797ea668cd14ba6338cb5d23c0921e637e66a96259f78e33e45aafd035edb44394cb459453b9b48beac1e32d3b6f281473cda42fb6fd6c6b9858e7a4143d81bfc2faf4ef4b632c473be50a87b982815be589a91ca750dc875a0808b89":"":"":"521973eac38e81de4e41ccc35db6193d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"add2bbbab76589c3216c55332b36ffa46ecae72072d3845a32d34b2472c4632b9d12240c23268e8316370bd1064f686d":"6168fc1af0b5956b85099b743f1378493b85ec93133ba94f96ab2ce4c88fdd6a0b23afdff162d7d34397f87704a84220bdf60fc1172f9f54bb561786680ebaa9bf6c592a0d440fae9a5e0373d8a6e1cf25613824869e53e8a4df56f406079c0f":"7e084abbe3217cc923d2f8b07398ba847423ab068ae222d37bce9bd24a76b8de":"946bc99fab8dc5ec71881d008c8968e4c8077736176d7978c7064e99042829c3":"224ab4b8b6ee7db19ec9f9a0d9e29700" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #1 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"8964ebde61f0c4e23f8e91244ae9682ed0b17e424edd4c025b461a2d209a538583f29465df3f89cf04f703b771ff5c90":"4db8e8a27fe7a0378e37d4cc01b6a465d34be91f48c52fdc1023ef2ea1241082f522805bc8777fda6c10e3d441b58f648edcd7d4df3df8c8a398d7b005c4fd6f41c9b033bd38fc5f577069251529b58273f6a9175feb3978798fdeb78a043232":"5eb3fb44784f181852d80fcf7c2e3b8414ae797f7b9b013b59cf86b9d3a19006":"3eec358f7f9e789e4ad5a78dd73987addbf3ae5b06d826cec2d54425289dc9af":"9a66c015d2550e3f78c44b901075fabb" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #2 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"98784aa794df5400890e6803f06d886aeb0833b1fea28a5f7952397aa21092ceafdb9194079f3609bc68233147c778e7":"7338521e8e127e70da259b37f5f5cdf83079bdb4024234b8ceecfba8d8c3f1c8510ff91f3bd08f2c54f11b534048a320a15ba0fccec8da34d4ef7f49ade4847814c859831907992d0adab27046324d4d9a853eb986b8de25b34ea74eb3d11048":"b14c5314aac11cb43f45730e474b84fbf5d1480d94d0699b80e3570f6636aa72":"d6208912348236feee1d258092283dd9db75899769dd109cc2f0f26d88dcc6bf":"5ec75fdd1ed3a742328e11344784b681" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #3 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"fe9b7df306c4ccd02afd6142c6650418325617945147de436a55e78aa45866116d6678e013a0e2c5a13e0d01fbd84039":"c4da56f4239fde0bc49b1d852cb36c80205f9e99e5995a80be04bbbba15f25b8d054c397a34cff1326a71f0acc4f7942795cabc3fa46339dc54b4bf7f11c095af8503004d97c485acec8815d1404674592c896ecfabefcbf222f4fe5a3ced0af":"086d09a6ee20c69bf5c054ebc6250f06097c8da1a932fb3d4b1fb5f40af6268a":"44e64b14c49ebb75c536329bb41ab198848849ca121c960db99f7b26330b1f6d":"7aa3a7e159d194399fc8ef9eb531a704" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #4 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"c0d47ee2328185df2c299d270e11fee26df753a5b4f899fdc0dff79eb50748232f9f79cf3f5e9bd4a26a48e743843b02":"a6b5dd5f1bad95331caae5852be50a26267af655c98feb8b66c45a8ae2ddfca270ab0d8023e43e6e22a7b5904d63482f045e85556b9c105cde0f3eb7b1fff1026086c80b195196803b5f664362b659578894d6551fb7c4566eec02202fdc298f":"3b575d028046e7f6005dfcdfcdcf03ff77a9cacd2516bcdff7f3601a9a951317":"f13b58daed46f5bf3c62b518ab5c508dd2bc3e33d132939049421ff29c31c4f0":"8469dfa89453d1481abedd6cc62e4e44" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #5 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"a0db812a939fbf3942b00be018cff4578b9fb62629c766a50f3518fe634100b1cbc4244ae843fe32125c53b653705457":"7e3dca20a7a977b6616a684e309015cf6a37edd0d85819fe91d074c915b0c9540a8aa486f58685b064851d6164150b1c1b0e2e545c6358d28b2f5263b2fd12c503d271ab6de76d4fa4c604cae469335840328008d8ce5545586b9ea6b21da4f9":"554b297bc32866a52884fabfc6d837690de30467b8f9158b258869e6f4ed0831":"4f688cba5908e0699b33b508847f7dac32f233e6f02cf093efdacae74259f3b6":"9696dd6ed5875cdef4a918a6686455a8" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #6 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"ff6cd20443a32c9e938f2a617bbb969ba54040b12723b0d452a669b584ba16ffaacbe38af62b5a62e0c67d165d022344":"efcf7536f32932526fe82b3a2333508404727878723fc09cbd902581d82463cf6acf1ddf4217ea6404469193e8db0e7e8c864ae655b49c6a095f80f1ab16985453f0fb729c119d8a3b820034626a93b1f70eb99b6cd8c990dda34a1c6a4b6eea":"8d412208091b987ee0781ff679c50dbab9ef389156f570f27aaf3e699bdade48":"501381ce5e7718c92ee73e9c247965dd5f0bbde013c4b5e625e9af8907e40566":"4f323934adb8a2096f17d5c4d7444078" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #7 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"bd14779153ed9696d3e5143c50b2050b6acd3ea2f8b670ef0e5f4bedf01705727bf9e64ae859214abe6ef497163f0236":"bfb0931b05a3fe232614e1b1c3060b3b07fb75d23ac10190a47a7245a6ecad5f3834e6727b75acc37e9d512d01a4a9cef6cb17eb97e4d1d7c1df572296972f0437a89c19894f721cbe085cf3b89767291a82b999bf3925357d860f181a3681ce":"0b5dc1cdfc40cfdc225798da773411dc9a8779316ceb18d1e8f13809466c6366":"843eb7297570e536b5760c3158adb27c0c426c77d798c08314f53b59aa72d08b":"1e703f3122455a40536c39f9ea3ceaa6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #8 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"64b155fd4b8634663a7e8a602e2b9fe2477be74692643ccfd0b316a025ea6f1fc0dfd0833248cb011082be36cba3c5d1":"a5b15cb1e039d7bbe2db80a32d4f402c7d3c59a45b05255401d1122770dbdb9894841964d5cadc9ae9af007d63e870d0510078885ca402bd222f16d2d27892e23292b65cf370b15d5e5a739ddd13e3e27f7c2e2b945f8e21897c3bbf05d8b043":"aea2fe995be77dfdca6ebaa1c05ba4c84d0e6b9a87905c398a3dfe08aeb26d38":"f4e9e7eb0eea4e2d419de6ad2909d36ec06c79097884bf98981e86dedae366ba":"4a28955dc97936b1c0aed0751a1afed5" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #9 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"e6c08e8b8d8e418477087911610096f7e0422083a376a77198e9c60fb2dc8c14aff33d7835878b65322f1561738b1ebb":"d4e0347c2158b882eb1e165f7f2aa1324d6606fe259ca730b2a3367435cb93b89108e49bd97355215063f63e78e8926b264c8a97571fd4d55882364915b7bd544254c25c2b67cdd979737c7811bcdeef5b052d8fe05a89b3291ef669d5579a61":"6607541177bc0c5f278c11cb2dcb187fc9f2c9a9e8eefa657ba92dee12d84b07":"7a439c8593b927867cfa853949e592baea0eeb394b0e2fe9ab0876243b7e11e2":"420888122f2e0334757c4af87bbc28a4" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #10 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"4413ff775c9b7d9a3003e0b727e34554e0f615471d52aeb4a059777b372d60332a1a4bcaf906e598581bc5a369b2c933":"a21cf567362fed0edddfd0b1c2d85ff6d2db5484fca8bf90a82da2ab76efcac9286e417628496f37effda150ef4912125aac68aac72e6f900a70192d4ef0b4cc4e9419c93ffb245965ae30c5f8abe20f732d76080bde5a1c6b3f075eb35622d1":"b924d145fc3ecd76f000f12638ef0a49a5d4cf887aa93fc9e5c536febc454f2d":"73dbb40b257e6598744f9107c8e7ff51a080407fc9e80d39d9a4db94f167c116":"84457ea753771ad7c97ce9c03ab08f43" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #11 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"5e409d56afb6940f9ffa45e0f92ef4972acedd3557b8e0f5418e302f2720ae5289294176045ad3096ea68db634cf5597":"c5a63c886af7ed7496473a6ae2f27f056c7e61c9aca8c5d095af11b2efe1a6b43344f92b37c7b6977ddbef1273e9511d9305fcbe7f32bc6a62f28d34841350362d2717dd00467224a35985b9fecc2739acd198743849dbfa97f458e2e7d6b1dc":"7fda133a23e929b17548a05013ff9c7085c5af9c979057b8f961ba7514509ff3":"bd061292b6bc3d3e71ed01af091f0169f70f23862efccd9e76345ff607dff3ec":"75b35dab3ad5e35c10ee39529a7f840f" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #12 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"ed2a52169791d7c7d332cf258ea4847c359335f9a6839ee767a8f76800ba28e94858cc9b7f526e62a93603fa2b1caa6b":"0a6155ff422ff6ae9814f81bf353bd3454d0c9892f9f3d730dcd8c87626f813cbe1dff1922fe73e4a319be53f4ec05e965c27f239b1e51869069a7e7cdd916fc1fd6f640bfe4b761a8040f8db37fb5ee7508e7d226c7695fb2a8bd791fe49ef2":"14073a1b4f07f3b594fa43d0c8781b8089dd2d9b8ad266e0321aaa6b71a0d058":"4247fc6886e8657b84369cf14469b42aa371d57d27093ee724f87bf20fa9e4e6":"f2aea2bc23e7c70f4ee2f7b60c59d24d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #13 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"f0d3a46501da7ab23d8688725f53f4289ce3bfa627646fe301533ec585f866caafb8131e95460566270f68cd25e1f153":"223d49f99a56cfcf2eb8cca39a8a82ee306c6272d521257f3d7d2a87699111e442fc55a399994d57373141f2207d43a8bbc1e086d67343b7dc2a891853c860fe43fb6be32cf035aca582bf5590cb5001b09b4976ea617fa7bd56da81fdef2df9":"7d12673cad5ad5003400fb94547e2b987e934acf6b930c0e7aec72634bfb8388":"e8583b9983b3ac589a6bb7a8405edfc05d7aa5874a8643f9ac30a3d8945a9f96":"ce72c0ea0e76be6bc82331c9bddd7ffb" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,256,256) #14 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"1e4644df1d01f9a0f31d1d0c67bc9fb9a1ee2223fbfb25520d3881cde2b183b73fe1a8cc5f17796cf22aaaed57607420":"cdac62b5e4ccee8609b1f4b7a8733e69068c71219b6292ecb318b9d3479516807af280cfa20e455d5e96eb6794a3b963957f3c099fd1e1199706d36a06011836af890f3b7b15cda6346a06fdd0f194de40bfbec12b021b02eeabaa34d35b30a3":"8169251ea55cce534c6efd0e8a2956d32ed73be71d12477cea8e0f1ab8251b50":"865d14cb37dd160a3f02f56ac32738f9e350da9e789a1f280ee7b7961ec918a7":"ff11ba8349daa9b9c87cf6ab4c2adfd7" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #0 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"1b54b8ff0642bff521f15c1c0b665f3f":"5a194d5e2b31581454def675fb7958fec7db873e5689fc9d03217c68d8033820f9e65e04d856f3a9c44a4cbdc1d00846f5983d771c1b137e4e0f9d8ef409f92e":"":"":"":"a054303d8a7ea9889d903e077c6f218f" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #1 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"90bc3b555b9d6b6aeb1774a583f98cad":"93b7055d7888ae234bfb431e379069d00ae810fbd48f2e06c204beae3b0bfaf091d1d0e853525ead0e7f79abb0f0bf68064576339c3585cfd6d9b55d4f39278d":"":"":"":"aaf27fc2bf64b0320dd3564bb9b03377" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #2 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"4a2a7dcbde58b8b3c3f4697beb67bba2":"58364ceefad37581c518b7d42ac4f9aae22befd84cbc986c08d1fb20d3bd2400a899bafd470278fad8f0a50f8490af29f938471b4075654fda577dad20fa01ca":"":"":"":"20c5117a8aca72ee5ab91468daf44f29" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #3 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"911faab1347ae2b3093a607c8bc77bfe":"2f044b8651e1c9d99317084cc6c4fa1f502dd62466a57d4b88bc0d703cabc562708201ac19cdb5cf918fae29c009fb1a2cf42fd714cc9a53ca5acb715482456a":"":"":"":"aae0c0ac97f53d222b83578a2b3dd05d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #4 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"f959f1bc100ae30088017fae51289d8e":"77d0f0efbc7ca794a51dff96e85b8e7dfd4875fbfb6e5593ae17908bfbddc313e051cb7d659c838180d834fdd987ae3c7f605aaa1b3a936575384b002a35dd98":"":"":"":"5d80bc3fffa42b89ccb390e8447e33e5" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #5 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"45a8bb33062783eede09b05a35bd44dd":"6bb14dc34f669759f8fa5453c4899eb5ac4e33a69e35e89b19a46dbd0888429d1367f7f3191e911b3b355b6e3b2426e242ef4140ddcc9676371101209662f253":"":"":"":"0dfa9955a13a9c57a3546a04108b8e9e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #6 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"0ada129f9948073d628c11274cec3f69":"b3d01bcb1ec747fdb7feb5a7de92807afa4338aba1c81ce1eb50955e125af46b19aed891366ec0f70b079037a5aeb33f07f4c894fdcda3ff41e2867ace1aa05c":"":"":"":"f34710c9ebf9d5aaa5f797fd85a1c413" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #7 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"052a5ad4cd38de90e5d3c2fc430fa51e":"98482e58e44b8e4a6b09fa02c05fcc491da03a479a7fad13a83b6080d30b3b255e01a43568a9d6dd5cecf99b0ce9fd594d69eff8fa88159b2da24c33ba81a14d":"":"":"":"3f55144eec263aed50f9c9a641538e55" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #8 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"004cd2f28f083d1cee68975d5cbbbe4f":"6238d448015e86aa16af62cdc287f1c17b78a79809fa00b8c655e06715cd2b935bf4df966e3ec1f14b28cc1d080f882a7215e258430c91a4a0a2aa98d7cd8053":"":"":"":"b137119dbbd9d752a8dfceec05b884b6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #9 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"f985b3ea2d8b15db26a71895a2ff57cd":"50d3c4ecb1d6e95aebb87e9e8a5c869c11fb945dfad2e45ee90fb61931fcedd47d6005aa5df24bb9efc11bbb96bb21065d44e2532a1e17493f974a4bf8f8b580":"":"":"":"eb419628fbc441ae6a03e26aeecb34a6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #10 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"100f196991b6e96f8b96a3456f6e2baf":"d27cbeac39a6c899938197f0e61dc90be3a3a20fa5c5e1f7a76adde00598e59555c1e9fd102d4b52e1ae9fb004be8944bad85c58e341d1bee014057da98eb3bc":"":"":"":"e3e09d0ed827e4f24a20553fd1087c9d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #11 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"88f55d9ba8fef7828483298321133fec":"16f9f5354d624c5ab1f82c750e05f51f2a2eeca7e5b774fd96148ddba3b38d34ba7f1472567c52087252480d305ad1c69e4aac8472a154ae03511d0e8aac905a":"":"":"":"07cd821012ef03f16d8510c23b86baf3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #12 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"126479abd70b25acd891e1c4c92044f9":"70afbc83bf9ff09535d6f0ddc51278ad7909f11e6f198b59132c9e269deb41ba901c62346283e293b8714fd3241ae870f974ff33c35f9aff05144be039d24e50":"":"":"":"0f90df350741d88552a5b03b6488e9fb" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #13 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a45f2fca553089fe04e7832059dc7976":"5e5a9e1e3cb80738c238464ede1b6b6a321261a3b006a98a79265ad1f635573bba48dccf17b12f6868478252f556b77c3ec57a3bf6bb6599429453db2d050352":"":"":"":"6eb85ae2406c43814b687f74f4e942bc" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #14 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"52dbb43241002415966eaec2615aba27":"31cfe60e5ed12ff37d7f2270963def598726320c02b910b5c6c795e2209b4b4a95866c64cb097af1d6404d1e6182edf9600e1855345375b201801d6f4c4e4b32":"":"":"":"2a270f5ef815665ddd07527c48719ab1" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #0 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"176200bb44808b5400b24e1b5f56cf73":"f84d395b1734eac4600dbc36f6b1e1599bc7f2608dc8ecb3a55369d7b1b122a09f5ac9c16d9a2be37d2ff70a9bba732fc3785b23ff4ade3c8404da3f09f95a8f":"aef28c9169e9af74c73432d4aa6f5dff9ea4a53433de2ecb9bf380a8868c86e1":"0626ae19763c5313b627a8d65cf1cfba46dfd6773242738b9b81fde8d566ade1":"63c160ed6a6c1fffd0586f52fa488a9055533930b36d4fa5ea3467cda9ffe198":"e8f91633725d786081625fb99336a993" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #1 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"19c3d16197ac93bf58c4110c9e864804":"50755cc0178c68ae70befd7744f6f1e3f6a59b3bbe484a744436079c7fae8d83c4965516fb952c63e1d0561d92cccc56037465815c9e549c9adce4a064877128":"5cb82d2c297404f3db1909480c597dd081d94ca282ba9370786a50f3cbab6a9b":"96d130faf1a971920c2bf57bcd6c02d5a4af7d3c840706081e4a50e55f38bf96":"1b0d04f179690a30d501e8f6f82201dbab6d972ece2a0edfb5ca66a8c9bcf47d":"4628b26492e5cb3b21956d4160f0b911" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #2 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"4b1edd0f53bf4e012def80efd740140b":"e50c31ebbb735c4a53fc0535647ae1fff7a5ac4fa4068ba90f1fa03ca4ddedecd5b1898d5e38185054b0de7e348034b57067a82a478b0057e0c46de4a7280cd9":"e7154ec1f7ac369d0bd41238f603b5315314d1dc82f71191de9e74364226eb09":"9444238bd27c45128a25d55e0734d3adafecccb2c24abdaa50ac2ca479c3830b":"ab2488c8b7e819d8ce5ec1ffb77efc770453970d6b852b496426d5db05c03947":"a488a87c04eb1c7586b8141ed45e7761" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #3 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"1f89c914649ae8a234c0e9230f3460f9":"5e029c173dc28ab19851a8db008efbcf862f4187fca84e4e6f5ba686e3005dba5b95c5a0bcf78fb35ada347af58ec0aca09ed4799cd8a734739f3c425273e441":"b51f5fd5888552af0e9b667c2750c79106ce37c00c850afbe3776746d8c3bce1":"9b132a2cbffb8407aa06954ae6ebee265f986666757b5453601207e0cbb4871b":"f1c435e2ebf083a222218ee4602263872a2d3e097b536a8cc32a5a2220b8065f":"a065cc203881254ca81bd9595515e705" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #4 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"0ef2be2d00a16051404fc2a0faa74fdc":"b66c882ae02c5215ed3bcd9e9a40934b09bf48a15fe7558c9d9ceb0ebec63625ea18f7c3ab341d9f7edd8e1d8816edecb34dbd71ae02771327b5ebc74613dadd":"1ebe9893957a5c4a707793906d31bb201e88d88a22abd6baa6461fc61def7ffb":"f81e26744834413cb95af8d438d0050c7c968f929a33e35ee5c6715a0a520950":"687a848b2b6c715a0e613b3f3bb16cf2f056543eb9dd6b8aee8de8aa6fd8a1e6":"a6c4a7e99d08cc847ac0b8c8bcf22ec0" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #5 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"eb2439d156c4f51fb1943c26f27de8af":"ad153fd266d9f73b21f4e5e88d3d13ba8325abdec427d5d8f671cfccdbd3510e9774d59a14d9b5472b217b7bcf355436a51965d2dff7c4ac586ab812f20d326e":"e24bd6b69a40fa0a02cefbbaa282f8f63a80e154be338d1b913418d4ff7a810d":"fd40baf11d7cdd77641a2b46916cb0c12980e02612ef59fb6fe7dabbbe7a85c0":"a40019e3b85d7d5775e793dd4c09b2bdc8253694b1dcb73e63a18b066a7f7d0c":"7cd8d2710147a0b7f053bb271edf07b5" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #6 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"b23796d88ee5ae75ff2ba4fbbd5e2de8":"b249d2d9b269b58c5355710aaae98be12d8fb2e79046b4e6deeec28adad7e789999847e20de11f7c3277216374f117e3e006bdf99bb8631aa4c4c542cd482840":"79f0214b6b0c5ffb21b1d521498b71d22c67be4607c16300ab8dde3b52498097":"582be1e080264b3e68ec184347a5b6db1e8be1811578206e14ad84029fe39f71":"f5e9c3356810793f461f889d8c5003b1c0b20a284cb348301ce7b2dd7a1c7dd7":"1aa8cf54994be6b329e9eb897007abf0" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #7 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"081db0b1620a56afd87c2fd2bebb1db3":"3f1e90d88870a0bd03364036b655495e3e7d51bf67fb64ba0cbf003430af5585f5936b84ab3b8a55c02b8b6c54bea09cf2d77691858c5818991383add5f0c644":"5b98bc83ae8bed5c49cb71689dc39fee38d5d08bdfa2a01cee9d61e9f3d1e115":"aad3e58fdd98aa60fc2cae0df3fc734fff01a07f29f69c5ffeb96d299200d0d8":"bad9039ebb7c3a44061353542a2b1c1a89b3e9b493e9f59e438bfc80de3d1836":"8d01e3dc48b28f016fc34655c54be81f" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #8 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a8427443d9c34abcdcca061a2bbcff52":"b0e9b2192adc8912653d90a634d5d40c53ca4383290a8764bdf92667f859d833c3e72ad0ff41e07fe257b1ead11649be655c58a5df233114e7eda2558b7214d7":"c6cad9fb17ada437d195d1f8b6a7fa463e20050e94024170d2ffc34b80a50108":"be461a9c1a72ebaf28ee732219e3ca54cbee36921daaa946917a7c63279a6b0e":"b6d110d6b746d7ccf7a48a4337ba341d52508d0336d017ae20377977163c1a20":"16ccd63dbf7b24b6b427126b863f7c86" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #9 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"86bd02976e6c50656372b8c212cf0a7a":"89900b0febf6b4e19ab8fc5babb4122a8aad86d658d0c2f98988c99fbd8530ff4ad365bd5fddaa15f96537bd72deb5384405b610e6ebae83e848307051fd6c82":"41bf3794ee54647a48a2588fdfdea686f1af6792e957d42f181f2631b207ac0c":"c4478afbea4eecb225448f069b02a74c2a222698c68e37eb144aff9e457f9610":"41a99e0d3f5b767f9bedcb2f878a5d99d42856bed29042d568b04e347624bf7f":"863337529aac9ab1e9f7f8187ea7aa7d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #10 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"e809ef8d4c3d82575833d51ac69481b2":"3e831b7715ce202c95ec85337e2c0061d972169955bd96fbe1f758508c0336b3226260ea5e66f943b538eb115ffe4d5e534cbe58262a610528641629bc12fc75":"4d40c6a961168445c1691fea02ebd693cb4b3f74b03d45a350c65f0aaccb118b":"b07dc50e6ca7544ed6fdebd8f00ed5fa9b1f2213b477de8568eb92dddaabfe3f":"cbac982aa9f1830d0dc7373d9907670f561642adb1888f66b4150d3487bf0b8d":"2814be767d79778ebb82a096976f30db" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #11 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"ad71caa50420d213b25f5558e0dc1170":"6a3fd23e7dc934e6de6eb4cc846c0dc3cf35ea4be3f561c34666aed1bbd6331004afba5a5b83fff1e7b8a957fbee7cd9f8142326c796ca129ec9fbacf295b882":"3042dd041b89aaa61f185fdda706c77667515c037f2a88c6d47f23ddadc828ae":"9b1e3f72aaab66b202f17c5cc075cfba7242817b2b38c19fe8924ca325b826ea":"8660b503329aaea56acdb73ca83763299bac0f30264702cb9d52cbaf3d71d69d":"c204a3174784d82b664e9a1c0a13ffa6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #12 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"5fd6606b08e7e625af788814bef7f263":"baf8750e07194fc7172c736e0fdea0a632810d45602dff17ce37adf106d652f87e31b6bd24d21481c86444d8109586118672a6f93731b7438a3f0f39648b83a3":"3c37193d40e79ce8d569d8aa7ef80aabaa294f1b6d5a8341805f5ac67a6abf42":"c7033b3b68be178d120379e7366980d076c73280e629dd6e82f5af1af258931b":"452218a426a58463940785a67cb34799a1787f39d376c9e56e4a3f2215785dad":"561e16a8b297e458c4ec39ba43f0b67e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #13 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"08def734914ecf74b9eccb5dfaa045b8":"6697f889fcf6dae16881dc1e540e5c07f9461d409acee31842b04f93c00efbba670dfbf6040c1c2e29ad89064eae283fd6d431832f356e492bc5b2049f229892":"a6ac87af21efd3508990aac51d36243d46237b3755a0e68680adb59e19e8ae23":"0052152872b21615775431eb51889a264fed6ca44fa0436b72a419b91f92604c":"ebadf71565d9a8cc2621403c36e6411e7bed67193a843b90ccf2f7aa9f229ca2":"c83fa5df210b63f4bf4a0aca63650aab" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #14 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"6437862e93060def199029ff2182f1e5":"719d1afcb6dc8ca26cba6a7c10f59cf82345b2a0c631a7879812d6f2d2663b49f9e92daecb81ff7c0790205d66694526477d6de54a269f542cb5e77fe4bc8db3":"5c961db0ac2ea8caf62c9acc44465dcfb4d721fcb2cd3e1c76cdcb61bfaa7e75":"24eabd392d37493e306705d0b287be11a4d72dd4b9577ac4098ef0dae69b0000":"9e4f05c1b85613e97958bc3863e521331b2bd78fdf2585f84607bf2238e82415":"21aaae76dc97c9bf7cf858054839653e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #0 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"cd7a1981c1b7079c1c38f5aeee86db22207cb9faed8c576b1724ca7817aa6abfb26c42a019eb4c2f4064f0587ea2b952":"7f88c3805ae0857c5cbb085a5d6259d26fb3a88dfe7084172ec959066f26296a800953ce19a24785b6acef451c4ce4c2dfb565cbe057f21b054a28633afbdd97":"":"":"":"76c1cdb0b95af271b52ac3b0c9289146" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #1 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"0ccdac2fd65a86bf8f8e9ddcabffb9d29a935139f627c165a815b23137eeee94cbb21be86ac5117379177d37728db6fd":"6f61703f92d3192cd982b2e52a8683e0d62918d51b12e084deae06c4a8e08ecfb3d2d30a980a70b083710bc45d9d407966b52829cf3813cc970b859aa4c871fe":"":"":"":"e6c73e159d73c2ba8950cd77acb39c10" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #2 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"fbbcc4abfd671296de3e0dcf409a139e35deae126c1941bf1afcc8d3da3a2d65f54a6d317bb6d683a3a77f6266b007ff":"c662ed723e7041877542fdcf629533d4a74393eb4dae4f3ec06d2d1c0d37ed7f519609a8485cb8deb578ae4cbb45c98ef7f2f2e677363e89fb3744286db6bfc1":"":"":"":"9d934d34417c6d0858f4a3faacbe759e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #3 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"1b824790b6b22b246bcc1bcfbbb61a76045476672f917b72e79cca358e650eb29ed49fb0a5739e097f5f5336d46fc619":"c57a5686486ebacc2422236b19110c754795a869a8157901cf71303de1adc6af16a952190a395d6c20e155e690f41922f6f721dc8e93da81afb844f68714cba7":"":"":"":"13e7bf23d88f3bb5a5106a8227c8c456" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #4 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"2ea7861e374232cb8ceecbbd9a18fc1f63c31f833fe394f1e19c8ef61092a56f28342fa5b591f7b951583d50c12ef081":"6a0873634094be7028b885c345cd5016295eec5e524f069de6510ae8ac843dba2cc05c10baa8aad75eac8e8d1a8570f4d2a3cf718914a199deb3edf8c993a822":"":"":"":"c008f46a242ae0babad17268c9e0839a" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #5 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"39caa986b82b5303d98e07b211ddc5ce89a67506095cad1aeed63b8bfe0d9c3d3c906f0c05cfb6b26bab4af7d03c9e1a":"f2059f7fb797e8e22de14dac783c56942a33d092c1ab68a762528ae8d74b7ad0690694ede462edbd6527550677b6d080d80cdabe51c963d5d6830a4ae04c993f":"":"":"":"202d3b2870be8f29b518f2e3e52f1564" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #6 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a4e25102c1b04bafd66bfe1ce4a4b340797f776f54a2b3afe351eede44e75c28e3525155f837e7974269d398048c83c3":"0a03b7d026fab3773e9724dacb436197954b770eca3060535f2f8152aa136942915304dede1de0f5e89bd91d8e92531b5e39373013628fea4ee7622b9255d179":"":"":"":"be21cab637218ddffa3510c86271db7f" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #7 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"6de33a116425ebfe01f0a0124ad3fad382ca28473f5fc53885639788f9b1a470ab523b649bad87e76dee768f6abacb55":"d88312da6acbe792d087012c0bf3c83f363fa6b7a9dd45c3501009fb47b4cfcfeb7b31386155fe3b967f46e2898a00ecf51ec38b6e420852bef0a16081d778cc":"":"":"":"2c285bfd758f0156e782bb4467f6832c" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #8 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"b8ab42fd3f6306426602cae0c48eb02ffa7053940389900c17846e1d9726251762095383f2ec3406b3381d94a6d53dd8":"6a7873ccb7afb140e923acbec8256fa78232f40c0c8ba3dcbcf7074d26d6d18a7e78fffda328f097706b6d358048ee6a4728c92a6f62b3f2730a753b7bf5ec1f":"":"":"":"13504a2b09474f90d2e9ef40d1f2d0d5" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #9 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"042b524444b9903c1ecb80af21eef0e884115561a15a1ab2f9f3a322edcbf14174f54d315196a632940c2c6f56612c09":"31ba5f801aeaac790f2480fbd2373a76ba1685ebebc5ae7cd4844733ec3cfb112634b3899104dcc16050e1206f8b3fb787d43d54de2c804fd3d8eb98e512bb00":"":"":"":"0a0484c14e7868178e68d6d5c5f57c5c" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #10 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"632758f92efaca39615862177c267906ab0424230d481ee0a5aa1a5f66697d3918d4aab3f310b72a7f2d71c0a96b9247":"46dc837620872a5ffa642399213b4eebfb28ca069c5eaaf2a636f5bd647de365c11402b10ecd7780c56d464f56b653e17af8550b90a54adb38173a0b2f9e2ea7":"":"":"":"90432ce3f7b580961abecde259aa5af6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #11 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"7b389118af3d0f8336b41cf58c2d810f0e5f9940703fd56a46c10a315fb09aafd7670c9e96ffa61e0cb750cb2aa6a7fe":"76e92e9f00fc7d0c525c48739a8b3601c51f8f5996117a7e07497afee36829636e714dbcb84c8f8d57e0850a361a5bdfc21084a1c30fb7797ce6280e057309b7":"":"":"":"7243964051082c0617e200fcbbe7ff45" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #12 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"e50d38434e9dfe3601e7ea1765d9fe777d467d9918974b5599ec19f42d7054b70ff6db63a3403d2fd09333eda17a5e76":"c9aa4739011c60f8e99db0580b3cad4269874d1dda1c81ffa872f01669e8f75215aaad1ccc301c12f90cd240bf99ad42bb06965afb0aa2bd3fcb681c710aa375":"":"":"":"28499495c94c6ceec1bd494e364ad97c" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #13 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"3253cb074d610db602b0a0d2836df1f20c3ee162d80b90b31660bb86ef3f0789fa857af4f45a5897bdd73c2295f879b6":"b06960a92d32a9e9658d9800de87a3800f3595e173fdc46bef22966264953672e2d7c638cc7b1cada747026726baf6cea4c64ba956be8bb1d1801158bee5e5d4":"":"":"":"b6608d6e5fcb4591a718f9149b79f8f1" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #14 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"83e4733566f90c8d69e6bcbe9fb52521ff3e26f806d9b7b86e9344cca0305dbf106de855240f1d35492cc6d651b8b6ae":"0e0105b12af35ac87cb23cf9ca8fb6a44307c3dcdc5bc890eb5253f4034c1533392a1760c98ba30d7751af93dd865d4bd66fbbeb215d7ff239b700527247775d":"":"":"":"68d64d1522c09a859b9b85b528d0d912" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #0 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a94da55afdc50ce51c9a3b8a4c4484408b52a24a93c34ea71e1ca705eb829ba65de4d4e07fa3d86b37845ff1c7d5f6d2":"a53e371017439193591e475087aaddd5c1c386cdca0ddb68e002d80fdc401a47dd40e5987b2716731568d276bf0c6715757903d3dede914642ddd467c879c81e":"20f422edf85ca16a01cfbe5f8d6c947fae12a857db2aa9bfc7b36581808d0d46":"7fd81fbd2ab51c115d834e99f65ca54020ed388ed59ee07593fe125e5d73fb75":"cd2cff14693e4c9efdfe260de986004930bab1c65057772a62392c3b74ebc90d":"4f78beb94d978ce9d097feadfafd355e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #1 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"e8649d4f86b3de85fe39ff04d7afe6e4dd00770931330b27e975a7b1e7b5206ee2f247d50401a372c3a27197fec5da46":"78d7d65c457218a63e2eb1eba287f121c5466728ac4f963aeaabf593b9d72b6376daea6436e55415ad097dee10c40a1ff61fca1c30b8ab51ed11ff090d19ef9a":"cc57adc98b2540664403ad6fd50c9042f0bf0e0b54ed33584ee189e072d0fb8f":"ab2f99e2d983aa8dd05336a090584f4f84d485a4763e00ced42ddda72483cd84":"0ecd7680e2e9f0250a43e28f2f8936d7ef16f45d79c0fa3f69e4fafce4aeb362":"08e38625611bb0fb844f43439550bd7a" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #2 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"6c79e1556889b3c074fc083a120d73784b888c5acb877899f17ce52e424b84178d144441aa9f328c730a951b02b048df":"c78ff6b9fc91cbce246c9fcc2366d5f7dd6d99fb1325d8997f36819232d5fcd12ccafdcbefd01409d90acd0e0ffb7427c820b2d729fe7e845e6a6168fc1af0b5":"60cba10826de22c5e85d06357de63d6b2ff0719694dafca6ab33283f3a4aacdd":"8943c22fb68b30811790a99b9cbb056e1a2c329185a199c76ba5aeceb2fcd769":"70671a50e8387bf232989d904c19215c7535ad2d0c5dec30a744c8d2706be6ec":"f6b94b671cae8dfa8387719bfd75ee84" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #3 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"f5ab77b2a8e370548b88febfd79772144cd5fc8d78062582addd4ff1e5c10094b390e66b3c4efb087510de1b9d25703f":"21a21c9314b37d4ade4a50a5d85995e0be07e358ed9bca19daa867a8d47847105dca7a424f32f715adb8fea5d3a41cfe388872a42ab18aa5cbcd7bde4adc3f8b":"023d582569a7ff1405e44cf09ceebb9d3254eef72286e4b87e6577a8ab091a06":"39597519872d49fbd186704241ba1dc10b1f84f9296fb61d597dbd655a18f997":"3091c9fe96109b41da63aa5fa00d716b5fa20e96d4f3e0f9c97666a706fa56f1":"1fb57058b3ba8751df5a99f018798983" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #4 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"f0b79e292d0e393e78b6d6117e06d2e725823fe35bde1146502967a78d99d6bca564f0e2f324272f968be5baab4aeb29":"192054dddac02157a35eb7f75ae8ebdb43d6b969e33942fb16ff06cd6d8a602506c41e4e743b8230e8239b71b31b2d5e3614e3a65d79e91d5b9fc9d2a66f8553":"b12241e90d80f129004287c5b9911a70f7159794e6f9c1023b3b68da9237e8b7":"59e9c3c0f90e91f22c35a3be0c65f16157c569c7e3c78a545d9840f648c60069":"089a59af69f47ddb4191bd27720bb4c29216f738c48c0e14d2b8afd68de63c17":"15287156e544617529e7eede4aa9c70e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #5 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"e3f33843aecb35d01001ff92ab9a0f1a5431ba9de3e4f3247cda8c62acc86f7066448f639d8ba8b5249337f8c353bbbd":"ef081af1f62400a3d193969d689a40234998afb646d99a7c4b9cbbf47e650cda93a90e754a16fffa25fc2a2edab09720b4520c47309ec4f6d9f76f0162af6cae":"e7cc55b72862544a8661b5034e15587b1e5a45eb5dc744f5fa1db9b267f1c3ff":"882d30c888eb8e344b1d17057074606fe232ceb42eb71055264ede7bb638f2a2":"9ce65e95c1e735fe950e52c324e7551403d0ef70ad865bd31fef1e22b129fdd6":"205e3a53367c4a5183be74bb875fa717" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #6 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"f30a18d597d8591a22dee908de95c5af74884b025f39b4f6707d28447d9d0a3114a57bc2d9eed8e621ec75e8ce389a16":"fae3d554d12a14e29de1b622922f27559559ca1518c9f800375a37a212e8b9a653cc3700223e9404d5bf781d15fccf638050a1394592caba001cfc65d61ef90b":"54240edd89016ed27e3bb3977a206836f5ef1fba0f000af95337d79caca9cf71":"250611e51852d933ff1a177b509c05e3228cb9f46dfb7b26848a68aad2ce4779":"f8b602d89fa1a0bfb31d0bd49246b458200a1adb28b64a68f7c197f335d69706":"7b63bfb325bafe7d9ef342cd14ea40a4" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #7 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"c8dbc3d39beb612811c52e2b46ef76d2b7bd5d3a90ceddf9fb864fe6f44e36687d88158d61014e192f9a3cd474338e13":"8e60115b4af9c8e5606223792539e9ba87e9ef46cd16fcc09046db1ef8d3c036241cae5d61141711818e9e861dbd833632069ebf5af1bd6d4e513f059ab1efd3":"9b56eba0838457f736fc5efa2cfbe698908340f07d4680e279d21dd530fdc8c8":"62c47ece469a7a409e4b2b76d1c793aaf11654e177cc8bf63faff3e6c5a5395c":"4251597013d0c949c53bbd945477b78aa91baa95f1ff757c3a039ccc4e1f4789":"af2f37160940f0cc27d144a043ddf79b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #8 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a37f9ed6c4e8f74ff16046b0678ef7bd24fcdca247b771ea1ce1fd48e3f5d2067e38aaf64ec59f1f49d96fa85e60ef03":"95da91f4185b254322ef0fc852473a9b9e4c274b242ded8a4eae6f1e2badde0664cf57f2128aa3dc83e436f7e80928a01d93bf25011eedf0190d0bf3619cd555":"b4a22f5598f79d34f0b9600763c081b0200ba489da7028ad0283828545c6d594":"fa3edc0962b20a9d9e1d0afcad907c8097c21d7a65c0e47c63d65cea94bf43bd":"49ba791a227e9e391e04225ad67f43f64754daac0b0bb4c6db77320943231ec3":"32f313ded225289793c14a71d1d32c9f" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #9 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"87f85b9c19eba1d953b6613cf555c21bc74428d9a8fee15e6cd717e240506f3e80860423973a66c61820d4ce1c6bb77d":"f22dd3517350176e35e1b7ecc8c00bea4747f0ac17bda1b1ddf8cdf7be53ff8c326268366e89cf3b023a9646177a0dcca902f0c98bf3840c9cbdf5c0494bee3c":"611caa00f93d4456fd2abb90de4dbcd934afbf1a56c2c4633b704c998f649960":"cba68367dc2fc92250e23e2b1a547fb3231b2beaab5e5a2ee39c5c74c9bab5f5":"f4895c9653b44a96152b893b7c94db80057fb67824d61c5c4186b9d8f16d3d98":"a05de6531a1aa1b2ba3faea8ad6ac209" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #10 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"9670deb707caabc888a3b0df7270942934732e02be728a4bedb5fc9ca4d675b2f3b47c7132c364ce6292cef7c19b60c7":"bba34e6f4ee27e5d4e885e59f8bbb0dc7353a8912e66637d7515a66e5398d9a8cbd328fed32f71bdd34c73cdf97e0d211be6dabfb0144e1011fd136cf01ea4e4":"9f55da36babd6ea42082f5f5d4330f023440bb864f8ad5498a29cf89757eaeab":"8013a309058c91c80f4d966f98bce1d4291003ad547e915777a3fce8ae2eaf77":"c83106272d44e832e94c7096c9c11f6342e12ec06d5db336424af73d12451406":"bc8d4d00609662c1163dca930901821d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #11 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"6d984c8ab923a7e118447fd53ad287b8f01d1e6112cff12bfb338ecd3ed16bafdd634677c600bdd68f852a946f45c3d9":"ed0e524ed2990ef348dbb15b3f964b12ad3109978d6952ae193b21e94510a47406926620798e71a0ffcbdd2e54ec45509d784a8bfc9d59cb733f9f11fc474b5e":"0a3a32260d04dd7a82fb0873ecae7db5e5a4b6a51b09f4bf8a989e1afacbda3b":"3cbcabb83aab5a3e54836bbf12d3a7862a18e2dffeeb8bdd5770936d61fd839a":"f63b30a3efc0273eba03bf3cf90b1e4ac20b00e53a317dbf77b0fe70960e7c60":"ab9af144e8fad6a978a636ad84e0469e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #12 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"2c59520d6f8ce946dcc5222f4fc80ba83f38df9dce2861412eebb1614245331626e7fb93eedbad33a12e94c276deff0a":"2882d4a30b22659b87ad2d71db1d7cf093ffca80079a4ef21660de9223940969afec70b0384a54b1de9bcca6b43fb182e58d8dfcad82b0df99a8929201476ae9":"d3c17a2d9c5da051b2d1825120814eaee07dfca65ab4df01195c8b1fcea0ed41":"dcc39555b87f31973ae085f83eaf497441d22ab6d87b69e47296b0ab51733687":"9a8a1b4ccf8230e3d3a1be79e60ae06c393fe6b1ca245281825317468ca114c7":"fba523a09c587ecad4e7e7fd81e5ca39" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #13 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"1c1207f50b645aaed5c16fe36f6aae83af4924e6b98a7e2a2533a584c1bac123f8b6f0e05109e0132950ae97b389001a":"8ae9a5903da32a38b7c6fed92dd0c6a035ca5104a3528d71a3eacc2f1681379724991a0053e8dac65e35f3deee0435e99f86364577c8ebdba321872973dc9790":"568bfee681d7f9be23a175a3cbf441b513829a9cbdf0706c145fdcd7803ce099":"e32cb5fec72c068894aaeabfc1b8d5e0de0b5acdf287a82e130a46e846770dc2":"d4418c333687a1c15cac7d4021f7d8823a114bb98f92c8a6dccc59ff8ad51c1f":"194e3018377cef71610794006b95def5" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #14 [#1] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"28254014c5d6ebf9bd9e5f3946fc98e55fe351deee8fc70333e4f20f1f7719a522b3ea9a4424afe68208d1cc6c128c47":"98a0db985544c33990aee0f69655dba7198e6720ce56ff9d4662e26f0c6b4ee7ab599932c05295f6c5a4011085c5b2c861a5a8ae4f572ce614ff2dafc0fddb34":"64215cbe384f1f4cf548078ffd51f91eee9a8bae5aacdd19ca16bcaaf354f8ad":"2e21df638dabe24aebf62d97e25f701f781d12d0064f2f5a4a44d320c90b7260":"7f936274f74a466cbf69dbfe46db79f3c349377df683cb461f2da3b842ad438e":"25c469cc8407b82f42e34f11db3d8462" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #0 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"e26c8a13dae5c2da81023f27ab10b878":"fea104f90c5881df7ad1c863307bad22c98770ecd0d717513a2807682582e3e18e81d7935c8a7bacddd5176e7ca4911b9f8f5b1d9c349152fa215393eb006384":"":"":"":"fd87337c305a0a8ef8eef797601732c2" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #1 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"8d7dda20a9807804bfc37bd7472d3b0c":"1d723cbc2ff2c115160e7240340adbf31c717696d0fdfecf3ec21150fca00cde477d37e2abbe32f399a505b74d82e502fbff94cecac87e87127d1397d3d76532":"":"":"":"7221761b913b1f50125abca6c3b2f229" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #2 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"c02e3b6fd4fea7ec517a232f48aaa8cb":"0820fc21cecba6b2fe053a269a34e6a7637dedaf55ef46d266f672ca7cfd9cc21cd807e2b7f6a1c640b4f059952ae6da7282c5c32959fed39f734a5e88a408d2":"":"":"":"667d4dbefe938d6a662440a17965a334" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #3 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"9aee0326f9b16f88a4114e8d49b8e282":"ef0aae3f9c425253205215e5bf0ad70f141ad8cc72a332247cfe989601ca4fc52ba48b82db4d00fe1f279979b5aed1ae2ec2b02d2c921ee2d9cb89e3a900b97d":"":"":"":"651ad783fe3def80a8456552e405b98d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #4 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"1e7a4961d1cd2fd30f571b92a763c2c5":"a9262ed5b54880cc8ecd4119cce9afe3de8875d403f7ca6b8ed8c88559470b29e644fddd83e127c5f938bc8a425db169c33c5c2d0b0c5133c8f87bbc0b0a7d79":"":"":"":"1124c509ca52693977cf461b0f0a0da9" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #5 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"ae0b0d2e84f48c632f031356cdea60ac":"554cf6fad1c376ad6148cd40b53105c16e2f5dd5fa564865b26faa8c318150bfb2294e711735df5eb86ff4b4e778531793bad42403d93a80d05c5421229a53da":"":"":"":"1212e5d3070b1cdf52c0217866481c58" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #6 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"16b8c7495d43cd2ff5f65ad2ab48ecef":"7cffe2bef0d42374f7263a386b67fba991e59cefd73590cbcde3a4dc635a5a328f1a8e5edd3ada75854f251ee9f2de6cd247f64c6ca4f6c983805aa0fe9d3106":"":"":"":"d3869a9c5004b8a6ae8d8f0f461b602b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #7 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a2d5eff6f73f98e5b04c01967dffa69b":"59759bb91b3c4feb18c0f086269ec52e097b67698f4dfe91ebe8bef851caa35cadb3fd22d1309f13510e1252856c71394a8e210fdbf3c7aae7998865f98e8744":"":"":"":"a1f99bd9522342e963af2ec8eed25c08" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #8 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"ea1f47fe5e281136706419ea9b652967":"0ec7c617f85bec74044111020c977be32ab8050b326ebc03715bbbffa5a34622f2264d4b5141b7883281c21ea91981155a64fb7b902e674e9a41a8a86c32052b":"":"":"":"daf75b8288fc66802b23af5fd04a9434" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #9 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"6f072c681a82c00dcd0d9dd5b7ffa2af":"cd7ce90f0141e80f6bd6ff3d981d8a0a877d0ddae7c98f9091763b5946fc38b64c1ef698485007d53251ad278daf5d4ae94a725d617fc9a45a919a9e785a9849":"":"":"":"39c0144f28c5a490eff6221b62384602" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #10 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"9d730655366e2aa89ee09332bd0a5053":"854766e842eb165a31551f96008354bca1628a9520d29c3cc4f6a41068bf76d8054b75b7d69f5865266c310b5e9f0290af37c5d94535cb5dc9c854ea1cb36eb7":"":"":"":"baa2a3ed6fdc049d0f158693db8c70ef" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #11 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"3363881611bfd5d16814360e83d8544f":"6abfab14cbf222d553d0e930a38941f6f271b48943ea6f69e796e30135bc9eb30204b77ab416ac066da0a649c8558e5a0eac62f54f2f6e66c207cab461c71510":"":"":"":"5be410ce54288e881acd3e566964df78" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #12 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"14e589065423528ff84a1f89507ab519":"0d2e446cad387a962ff2217c7cf4826dcabb997ab7f74f64aa18fbcb69151993f263925ae71f9dfdff122bb61802480f2803930efce01a3f37c97101893c140f":"":"":"":"fc2d3df6c9aae68fb01d8382fcd82104" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #13 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"974c5ae90347d839475f0f994f2bf01d":"aa04d9fc56349fdd31d868e9efc2938f9104c0291e55ac0aa0c24ec4609731b8e0ac04b42180bde1af6ad1b26faff8a6de60a8a4a828cd6f8758c54b6037a0ee":"":"":"":"3caec482015003643d5a319a2af48fb4" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #14 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"b3a110587a16c1eafe51128a66816ecf":"203bba645fb5ccee3383cf402e04c713b7a6b6cca8b154e827520daac4ea3a0247bbdc3b2cd853e170587d22c70fb96c320ea71cb80c04826316c7317c797b8a":"":"":"":"9af4f67a30a4346e0cfcf51c45fd2589" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #0 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"55546068cd524c51496c5fc9622b64c6":"951e712d057028158831ca8c74d4ae303c6e4641c344a1c80292260bdd9d8e2f5b97606370e95903e3124659de3e3f6e021cd9ccc86aa4a619c0e94b2a9aa3cc":"2d6de8661c7a30a0ca6a20c13c4c04421ba200fbef4f6eb499c17aee1561faf1":"41797b2eeaccb8a002538d3480cb0b76060ee5ba9d7e4a2bb2b201154f61c975":"b744980bb0377e176b07f48e7994fffd7b0d8a539e1f02a5535d2f4051f054f3":"65b9f7382ed578af03efa2008dbdd56f" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #1 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a0c92565640a3315cac8da6d0458fb07":"6e9b31755c1f45df7d685f86044ab3bc25433a3ff08ab5de7154e06b0867f4e3531ed2e2a15ab63c611fc2894240fdac1d3292d1b36da87caa2080d1c41bcf24":"c6c74690bdee26288d2f87a06435d664431206b23b24f426e847fb892d40d5d5":"4e7dc1adbc8bc16ba7b584c18a0d7e4383c470bff2f320af54ad5ade5f43265b":"c6fb8ee194a339726f5051b91925c6a214079a661ec78358e98fc4f41e8c4724":"c3f849ee7d87291301e11b467fa2162f" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #2 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"63e143bd6a87065a00eea930593f9b29":"62c2c790cb56518ed2d8d65952bbd4ab85a56463495c940b94f403a93338bdc96129feea9335b1a3e0ada7cf4c207f4732013bc6a52db41407bf5d6fe9183b3c":"7b4e9ff0c8f8c90f8b324c7189226d3adccd79df2d0c22b52fb31dbb5dfefba6":"49e1aecf2b96a366325dc1892c016a5535dd2480360a382e9cc78bf75b2bba37":"f4ce1d27e759f3ba4a56aaab713642b4c56810c9995fbfc04ce285429f95a8f4":"513111abaae3069e599b56f7e5fb91d1" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #3 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"98dc16e95f97b5b9d8287875774d9d19":"2fab4a629e4b21f27488a0c9ed36fc8e75bee0c386346c6ec59a6f045975e29818440a6638eb3b9e952e19df82d6dc7b8b9c18530aef763d0709b3b55433ddc6":"2e9d2f52a55df05fb8b9549947f8690c9ce410268d1d3aa7d69e63cbb28e4eb8":"57ecdad71d709dcdb1eba6cf36e0ecf04aaccd7527ca44c6f96768968027274f":"7b2da3d1ae252a71bccbb318e0eec95493a236f0dec97f2600de9f0743030529":"841882e4d9346bea32b1216eebc06aac" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #4 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"5dbac5c313527d4d0e5ca9b6f5596ed7":"c00b28c78da4f9ce159741437fe7f90e4e23ecd01cd292f197202decbbc823d9ce46b8191c11e8f8d007d38e2ecd93b8bd9bbad5812aaf547ddf4c7a6738b777":"460c54f4c3fe49d9b25b069ff6664517ed3b234890175a59cde5c3bc230c0a9e":"bf5187f1f55ae6711c2bc1884324490bf2d29d29e95cad7a1c295045eed5a310":"28fd8277dcb807741d4d5cb255a8d9a32ef56a880ccf2b3dcca54645bd6f1013":"b488f5c13bb017b0d9de2092d577c76e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #5 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"254d5f5044415c694a89249b0b6e1a2c":"4c1cc9ebe7a03cde31860637d8222faeefa9cbf789fab62e99a98d83084fef29eafcf7177d62d55435a1acb77e7a61ad86c47d1950b8683e167fe3ece3f8c9e8":"71af584657160f0f0b81740ef93017a37c174bee5a02c8967f087fdbfd33bfde":"96e8522f6ed8e8a9772ffb19e9416a1c6293ad6d1ecd317972e2f6258d7d68dd":"3aaa5e4d6af79055742150e630c5e3a46288e216d6607793c021d6705349f96a":"66629af4a0e90550b9bd3811243d6b86" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #6 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"b46fceed0fcc29665815cc9459971913":"ff62d52aed55d8e966044f7f7c5013b4915197c73668e01b4487c3243bbf5f9248a4fdd6ef0f63b87fc8d1c5d514ff243319b2fbdfa474d5f83b935399655e15":"994d6b5393fbf0351f0bcfb48e1e763b377b732c73bf8e28dec720a2cadcb8a5":"118bb8c7a43b9c30afaf9ce4db3e6a60a3f9d01c30b9ab3572662955808b41e4":"bb47e443090afc32ee34873bd106bf867650adf5b5d90a2e7d0e58ed0ae83e8a":"1865fee6024db510690725f16b938487" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #7 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"e1a5dd32fc7cefb281d5d6ce3200f4ca":"bf1ba4166007b53fcaee41f9c54771c8a0b309a52ea7894a005783c1e3e43e2eb9871d7909a1c3567953aabdf75e38c8f5578c51a692d883755102a0c82c7c12":"32e9922bd780303828091a140274d04f879cd821f352bd18bcaa49ffef840010":"01830ddd2f0e323c90830beddedf1480e6c23b0d99c2201871f18cc308ab3139":"f36d792dbde7609b8bf4724d7d71362840b309c5f2961e2537c8b5979a569ae8":"7080e8379a43c2e28e07d0c7ed9705a8" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #8 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"d1b7be857a422b425ae62c61e90a192a":"6ac34c4ce22b644632283ab13e294df2093e939d32411340b046c26fcc449d0fd6d14132c7205df303dbb663190e6e86ad12e14e145b6603308241f38d94eb5d":"aacfe8553d5ffef6abc3fd8f94d796cae2079ff04f7ab1b41982003f02427c7a":"01d2d1bc29d6a6b52bb29bd6652be772096ca23c838c40730d5b4a4f8f735daa":"27af728ee07d3f5902f4e56453b6a9feb308ef14795eb5630b2651debdd36d5b":"b03fbcd03fa1cc69db0a4e3492a52bad" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #9 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a2c49aa6f3f92e36266bf267af5877ed":"5684c3eb99314127078484959314d52b3bc50cb3615c0eef6b48850d98aee04c528b0693be13ed1bb4040e8e96cb13c316143f0815cd68d1bb7931a3d9b88a3d":"566522085426b76bdef152adefd73ef0f76eee4614bc5a4391629ec49e0acffb":"30ef9585148dd2270c41540a4235328de8952f28cf5472df463e88e837419e99":"adc46e0afcf69302f62c84c5c4bfcbb7132f8db118d1a84dc2b910753fe86a2d":"4edc4383977ee91aaa2f5b9ac4257570" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #10 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"43852c53041a3a4f710435dbd3e4382b":"ab7bca5595084bccdba80ade7ac3df2a0ce198fa49d29414c0249ec3d1c50d271ca74ba5c3521576a89a1964e6deded2d5ba7ff28a364a8f9235981bec1bedfa":"c5612a9540b64fc134074cb36f4c9ea62fff993938709b5d354a917e5265adee":"eee2258aba665aa6d3f5b8c2207f135276f597adb2a0fbfb16a20460e8cc3c68":"a6d6d126bed13dbcf2b327aa884b7260a9c388cb03751dbe9feb28a3fe351d62":"e04c3de51a1ffe8cda89e881c396584b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #11 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"52628551ce90c338ed94b655d4f05811":"b3a4a3c4d3d53ffa41b85ce3b8f292b1cc8e5af7488286d4c581005f8c02c5545c09bb08d8470b8cffdf62731b1d4b75c036af7dc4f2f1fc7e9a496f3d235f2d":"f5f9d5b51075b12aa300afdc7b8ea3944fc8cf4d1e95625cc4e42fdfdcbeb169":"60bccbc7345f23733fe8f8eb9760975057238705d9cee33b3269f9bfedd72202":"c0fa3afd6e9decfbffa7ea6678d2481c5f55ec0a35172ff93214b997400e97c3":"5a113906e1ef76b7b75fefbf20d78ef8" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #12 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"0e4873c4cbcde280abc6711a66dbb81a":"1ab7c7d8fe8f505e1dd7ddb8e7cda962572f7004b2a14c7a7c5bcf24bd16616e2c42c50ae5db9981ccd7d0c79062ac572d3893486bd0ae1f99cbc1d28a9e4c1e":"e4b89e28663e853f8b380c8a4491b54121fe6927340a74342362c37d8d615b66":"619775878879eff9ee2189790ff6f187baed4ed1b156029b80e7a070a1072a09":"ba3d673e5e41bd1abbc7191cc4b9a945201b8fef0016e4774047ee2abf499e74":"4758fd021c34a5cf6bea760ad09438a0" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #13 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"0684e8ef93c3363ba535c4e573af1c24":"748a5f5fde271c563a8f8d15520d6818f7ed0efb9b434adf2ff9471b391dd225b37868179ffa9a6e58df3b1b765b8945685a2f966d29648dd86a42078339650b":"e90c82153d2280f1ddb55bd65e7752bf6717fbe08c49414f6c129bf608578db7":"c17e97c93cfabe0b925ca5d22615a06430a201b7595ad0d9967cc89a4777947d":"3d554c430c8928dcdb1f6d5e5a4306b309856a9b78c5f431c55d7ebd519443bb":"d3da71af70e196483c951d95eb3f0135" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #14 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"89b885ddb12abc4f7422334f27c00439":"e2366eec626bfd9cb932bcaa0569de6a7a37cf1dfde1f25d00d1a0c89fe25fea592cbd2af7c8202521fa48e15f7cc7e97e431b222b516a3ad2bb7b55b7fcf7f4":"c77ee92bd17939efe9bee48af66589aee1d9fe4cd6c8ae26b74b3799e35342a6":"23e80d36ca72ecc38551e7e0a4f9502bed0e160f382d802f48fb2714ec6e3315":"6b83f7458dc813ce0b963b231c424e8bced599d002c0ef91a9c20dcc3f172ea5":"81d13a6b79f05137e233e3c3a1091360" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #0 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"ff568be02a46343113f06949a16cc7d9da315aef82f5681f0459650e5e180e65d1d77b00e5ce3e3f9eb6c18efff4db36":"77de4e5db3b308c38c814228583dfd1eb415771f4ae30f9cc2d35b48075286a4e8c2c6f441d1aac496d0d4be395d078519e31cb77d06d6f7fd4c033bc40fd659":"":"":"":"448ac707ba934c909335425de62944d6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #1 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"6f092b85eb9f96427642f69467911172cba6df86e0db08d04e824cde6fb91d9b9af2cea53f42d53c45ee3e69a2327172":"667d3ed9f41a154ea33b55182b8bee4d7d46eff8e890c7036cf7c2665d44c28f9e3a8cff166dabfaf262933d337e729e0b6a60a51d00ba18f877bdc9d0cc659e":"":"":"":"16a200f683ab862947e061cddaac5597" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #2 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"26e635a6a2b6402b968c1eea13c6a980a0ee9b8497abc14fccdc5bf8439008861f74de2c200505185bf5907d3adc9de2":"80e56f9893beb9f22b2b03caa8f1861d5b31b37f636f2ccbc7e4040ad3073aa20f2f3c6bfefc041df8e57e7100794c42732b6d4b63d8bb51329ca99671d53c7c":"":"":"":"807586c977febcf2ad28fcd45e1a1deb" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #3 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"b239c485d319ce964d69bd3dbc5b7ab9cc72ac9134a25e641bcd3c8b6f89e7e08ef2d0a45cf67667a4e2e634b32d73ff":"c963e17ef46b7b2c68756019704ec7435ec093c423600b3f2f99dd8989f8539a11b1b0598e93e84d50b65e816e794421ab546b202e4b224a8494538dda85da82":"":"":"":"2a3218b4d59f99bd3825631a6eefb09c" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #4 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"0239545a23735b803ae7cb7766194917d6cce164f7ec4f65c6ccd5ec1db5297722d4b7466589da4d39f4585856bc1d7e":"71a440b70a2b5ce41b85de27d987fa2a0628d7990dd7cd1460fddc5410ce6e9bb0ae4f90231f45bc71188fd94e4170389a8bbe4a7e781c95c9a97ad78ba7d07b":"":"":"":"9dafaa8b727c4829dda10a831e67419d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #5 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"237e8916eadd65e3422fe59ab257b7e6957fe24f760b499fbd052241879e8294b01d2169ec2b98f52660d9f5170dee22":"d8908cfc1ea8518c1442e46731f30fdad85399894db262b8f4fdc0dbcbf11b60b60b25d3108f4b169fcbef621a14c635525fa3af8ccef6b91f808479509967f4":"":"":"":"593c39c56bb9e476550299ee8d85d2fc" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #6 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"28b6639b415c79012c749dc2a0d18433ec36eda55815f0841241453fa11b9d572b7c29208e01dbb0be91e1075f305d7f":"6767c3eb6ba1b19412c32bfe44e4d0317beba10f3abea328cda7b7c14109b72046c8691c1c7b28487037d381f77a3bbc8464a51b87de68bdc50ec9c658f915ab":"":"":"":"e390806219fa727e74a90011b4835ed6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #7 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"ce735a8549fc3f9dfc7b96bf0d48936a711439ac7271d715a278718aca9e2fe3c801030bc74b048ac1e40852345e87cc":"510b0dc06e84ceb901c7195c2f00ad7a04bdd75e0ab52b3d2cd47ddfcd89248dd58e3f1aa8c1ffe306f493905f65369eaed2a5b337dff8ac81c4c1e8903a6ad5":"":"":"":"ba871ba5843083b553a57cf8defa39d7" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #8 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"841ea92fa42c06769c5c52fe152d07837b8ff0048392caa5dd045054353d363b25439eb5885e96771dded4005f2baf42":"97511ae52590a0b64b75c37e10b89671880d2d6e8f90780ac27263dbc0e32d0824be5e80a88cf8fc3d4c607eb873c0322d09b9ca3498c4015c53ca6fee890093":"":"":"":"a8fb31362bd997adf4d9116e23dbaf10" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #9 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"55cd76fa5f004b97bb8e14170f79f52715d18c60f142b06d16e8e06c274798190a79c8b325163989d86323c03dbe0d68":"bafc0ba64669c9a36514bde6169034101f29e2a0a4b9a55c0aae7dff0c5aca2371b523e26dc44bf75493bdaa023d1555294178288b70f1ae72150d9f7265b4e6":"":"":"":"fa16dbdaf01b3c202426adabf61fa64a" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #10 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"ff3f3098fa3d2b23b38ed982e7afb61d46b4848c878b9280f8e5ed6bd81176e76f0a2a85071a411829cf84421c22f23e":"92194e2c700fa724489683d0b6ddcf72c89b9c3f3ff584e802ae426be4908b1ade093bcf9baf7738b988dc0fde1739498a97c9610da853a7c83981c6a7b68096":"":"":"":"f85490426dc243ba09f9719bff73545a" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #11 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"7242c1020a63770cccf6f8100970990232a9d11d61c9b0d38fe5e7a568a86252a66481212e5d53c868561298dd5bdeec":"7c3806a32ccf3252ac27a92a07209cd7000b160faa70b9024420b903587d1d77f002d3abe28b563d32ccc502b88f83bc5996f3dbbf0f57835839eadd94563b9d":"":"":"":"2232181f08c1569efaad1a82bcb5f3ba" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #12 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a2e445290fed8187df6d2a57e68385bb62d700cb8f140410766b53e69e6a0f2939bbfa7ce091525c9051f064e383a2e1":"fdae5f1ea253108fcb255d215a3ce1dc1d101acf89de4423b75a74619e95f3feaa35b5e0bec430b0ad9567df818989c36c77742129af335c90ceb6dd79c7d2c4":"":"":"":"3841e2d795b17cb9a2081d6016a1a71d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #13 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"bc885454e385d911336dda9b7a609a6a7079a4a5a860fcd704161c34658bd98685bb03418b7f24f2ed9475eb8ceb232e":"77bef884a91126564b3214029ac6842d86e4c1fa283e33d6828d428377416f66947e39a4a6708e10bfdae8337a6f302420a6649fc109d0f094c18c1e9361375a":"":"":"":"ea20780ed280d8109f811a6a398c3e76" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #14 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"c1825cf00cdc2da93adb3e7a33c1f3a76c49166887883744ea2683ddca23f31900f25c434364c992a6d913f753a9c42a":"56940a6fc4823c9e42e8ffed63fc3cf46d0a2b305c236a511b0b5ec7005ecd8989bf2006ebe52ed55845f7cc25d3d0086cece95f0bff6fa7e17ddf474704abfe":"":"":"":"b037c7f0f85f4d7eaeeb17f4c8643a74" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #0 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"19b83c0deea6463a3912d21ffc8d8041a5b30640352abc9652770cfca99dc53c9c09942ddd67b91f4da50a8615462ce4":"5d85c56d0d20ee39958a90f301d2f8bb136fa34d09b41a0c9375114a0df9c1dcdb2a62c4be398d9eaf2440949b806f0e5a977da608eeb652a41711d1e9b72655":"9c1db928b95c84cb674060a6d2f6b7a6a5d43e9ee967e9f821bf309ca5f8821f":"a3111cb57365c617df0b0bb3a1aada49ca789bc75903eeb21e42a7d3d0dd0825":"ce7f557c70676987d13aca60bc4585147efeed97be139871a1b29caa1e180af9":"4a49430277d64446e2fa75763eb79ec6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #1 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"239f21be6cda23e8660c8a5e04c79f6dad6f363ac6dcffd9228699ae43fbce5ac3c51645500cb3eae68f0b604dc4472c":"2975a099f7e6530e5576534c25171f39131d6bffb99259f7f2bbf7d77de9fb1e829052b54a9631a733113021692eba1097438347c6de82307a0c2bb308edf065":"d451a54584e6d1d634217379e7e60e67303e19dd4ba63b097899c7349a5a7433":"a33dc24c6a656eb26275415581d568b7c2424a9c5fb9e2944ca35ecbf641f713":"8dfccc62379af46844df136122b72a878d9d61b40ccaa029b09e6b9f0b4d0192":"005e91760d89ecb64b5fc3b0e222fca3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #2 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"e326abbe1db3ead3738d2ca4d9f1d62080cd23ff3396f43a0af992bed2420cec6661dfaac83c3c4d83347ac840f7dc14":"37c94d11ed0e93b8199d43d6eb242165dddd12fe39c0bea4cdef6bcfeb5d17bb866f080a9daef128f685fb3bc59c945927fb0aa3e17068515c3c92fbdf04a228":"1ff41405dbb3b12b8ddc973069edc2d2801af0e0dc9bde2cdd35c5b2d4091509":"138b6d2eabef4b32174afb0156ad1df570cf6e5f6ebde5d19cc30daffd9ca4f2":"f27cf7422808c54c58fcdde1cece92f5342c7a10ac43ab3b2e53362b2272e3ad":"506d6fae6fff9f222e65ac86df61a832" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #3 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"cb0229d2bb72d910b0169e8f93318905aef8dd93ed91a2f8388545db32db3f2489e7988b50de64c49a9f7feb5abe8630":"514ec8c02439290853434e75e3d0bd159eacd5ac13b8f202cfd5c36cdc0fe99b53a1b7a1619e94eb661ac825a48ea5ef8bb9120dd6efc351e39eb7cc5223f637":"a6ed69c9216c551793107f1bdaa04944f6d76fe4474f64bb08b0ebc10a18f337":"e0bc1cc56fdfeef686e0c7ec359e2e8bd48d76c8643c40d12325328170bbf702":"87c5b23aa3c100ff9e368fc47534ff8fa2f9e2bfd3599519ee6f60164485cf6d":"bd419968f636e374268ccdd62403f79c" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #4 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"bdd156ef3c4e09b77fe8781c446eac55b562e4ee1b7d15515a966882d4c7fadb0fc7b37554ba03908838db40499ded5b":"9facd9f4587819acb358e4936d9f44b67ddf82616e79a44ffd6a2510f652f6b9cebc1424b5c642362b19f63c615f49686df66a8f80ddffb56ce0c0d8540150fb":"35ea316fe302786f626e3831530622b62eb33a3608d4af3384ecfcbd198f3f05":"8d4fae22290b6ef8618ded1c3412e85fab7b8d17fb9cbd09dbc87f97279cc72d":"2f54928372e4ce447201427a3ae05769ae1c54b2e83bdc86d380a90b07f2890c":"8045e8da88b1bc126785c8a771db5354" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #5 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"154876298a1b63334624b367da984eb31d7260abe79ced41de35ba68a716233a5df0937b90f89dde7fd55a9693c9031f":"36895f574e9e9d08e6c885d305eb4764c1e5689d1f99c2462b3ebdf659e8ce43818dfc886ec797843bfee361b554cd5f969b0c7b0381b53f4afc1bcadbf7eb1c":"c3a46105c50a167a5b0391053f3814a06c90cea2c1fa9329d97fdbc62887ff6d":"54c7d66c65dbddb4665981bff0f503de37d724362aeb67abce6a870fd6a7398a":"58204ca953cbd46dd6c8870b358cba77c436870db49bcd3e2f92697bb580b460":"cd903c0f11ea701214f91715cfec11a3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #6 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"94e273fde1e699f84aeef343eb0277c50d169bb5496575301021a2be50df6a555d1422ea88e0e4d905158e93fd8d0089":"1cd97b6e6e7f19401e409aea7b3ec33a8faefd71402b8f34a73c1cb1af215e0e87debe68bce590d41c1f90c6ad9db3d30b3901862e076d765ffdf58776e5fb7e":"6ee75e9f9aee6ac93e20f742f20427e5eb9b4ad2ed06fbba8c7b7870a96941ac":"0ba60399893ede284372bc4e0a37702a23b16aa8e5fe70ea95429af87ff291aa":"94bd2b51c32d29cd14e2123221e45ec0cf1f38766fb6bb0716856d0138f6fa39":"831793686abd406f7b385cd59e497b18" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #7 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"5a699113ebf98bff9cb780ce29747a61ba2d7581a5716065d018c89348d7c2ed3f5bba32442cd192c1e37b77b98f5791":"de6d2a3b6ad9af07058d3b1d1976cf61d49566b965eb4e9b74a4cad8e286e7a40b254b860e2e209a8cb4cff3a8e615b84f5ae7505957a758e266a4c3e915d251":"ed18c16a61ba5ecc0755f94c286390a6d46e6e26439dadd36c83ebdee42b4b4c":"7c4550d058b85580be2053fd9d933c87041c5c3f62a5b6b303259dafc90d9041":"ebebfcb9b4b3595e516939ca0688422bbdfc4b9f67b0d6619757cb315b7d7908":"1a5a496aa2268483444b3740c9cc4104" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #8 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"42450f2689b87a3dd940f3b9e3b32d4654c725a24ddd2c22f006694321dacf1980b50f7ac0401626453ec836039bfdc9":"4765399ccbbf3d33433bb992ee29e4381f28d800b05431f1c5b3e949c5db72c582bfe8ba08db1575b866816cabbe5e1d31d8a870ceed49fb75676c97020d1f22":"6ee5a7613c25ecec263a2fd2288948b2df9a05d50040c4031b0653878fdb067f":"68a1038481be7412d6a7c8474d4b2a2535c9b55ea301ee800d5a846127d345cb":"7a1915cf78e6da2dc7840cba40390d668d07571608b77857d2224c4531c17bb8":"80a6c622e64495f9a391f5a8a9c76818" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #9 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"873869e194201b822b140bdd7797dd1ed408f2190b759c068b7019e6707f60751e101d3465c4ec57dbf9d1ea7597fa44":"d2f92706ca3fb9ced8183c74704440d7eedee1542c2e812f65afc83f4b62dadf1c51fa68f8d5f457a893211c8afc82c93e6a1e15822eff0d4ada6efd25d271a0":"8d0393d2a1ae8930ea88773adfa47b49060f0bf2d3def2acc57786bfbd1e2d6f":"5bcf5ff4fbd9eaabf8bf82ec7c59b043fd64b0025ad1ab2b384e399b9e13147a":"6e2d05e286c90502a3abf2ee72ab7ffb520ce5facfb27e095787a09a412abec3":"e1ceda71b8feb4b0d14d35bbb57a79a2" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #10 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"1fecb5fe87c2a208b4f193e9c3ff810954c554150d544baea1685fb4774320315d5cb651be493ef120ef6966e3e7518c":"34bc292809674352ffb60786dca59ec799188aa401b366a48cdeddf37c12ee4c666f8fb3a0d53df4cd7191166d50ff01d992f94cd92da7a385ffe5795b197ced":"38249fed34a907768eac49267c2c613a65154eec5b73b541d7d7b314b5080061":"115be9cb914b50480fffe078d8170870b56129a0a74271dee063f8b2049e1be3":"69fa6faf7223f5bb1b55f35a544f78181579b1745990053357916fe507e51db6":"60cc92d3ba3ff0715f5627182334ed1b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #11 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"4d283eb5ecd85a1613c975e24832770643613c9a5aee0d8649bc0d68c89cf1ea6ec3a1a22eefd9e212d602c338d64c6e":"4aa6917a5c9f370590d70536fdd89c916fec5e5bcbade8c6a6cfcf5b232c98a6b3e6b79a2dfb0778fbc3f1da7b06044d7b0fa2c04ffc3b71324aca1ee19f936b":"05a7092a684ba7a7fbd33533f9be58a4140a3855d4c5f44a31d665a0720c1739":"557ef1bedc890d1543de6cfeb25642782683d77a46bc8aa0836b07157599c7c3":"e87e45073ff8e36c38b128cd2275a160e431787b5e81f6c2fd7a37909eb72ea5":"31ecfb1bcf3253ba5f71b185a66c7cff" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #12 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a6f488104a6c03e354d5d1805c62dcd3016322d218747fa83f9199e20f6ab1cfbc2b889536bda1187f59b7294d557ff2":"22f8ad57a2dfa8010e2865ad6263823652917b84dfea61f639efdb0fdbb35c6341ca7721095d69686212dffe78410c0d0db94f04756d52e7d76165d5a1d516d9":"fb9951d563f7aa88db545874b1a3049c5f79774d486e7a28aed1ed75f59224a5":"b1ea7c6b53e79e4e947e63086dee32dcc17bc4f27fba6142f8215ec081cdd5c9":"0d12cc0a39bfbf87194e4070f6b54caaabbe48fa192b96cfed2a794d95fa299d":"62a1c5678e6e8fc738d375e2ca48751f" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #13 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"9d67e017e0abdd7c079bc0354f33dab696ad64146802f06d6cefd9cdefbf55b197f5899e5efaa269cc0432c87648ce18":"d8be0ec1119ff959c32c9cf29914e3f7bf2b01bdbf806c2d9ba119ae2a2cfb565871762b02ee7bf68f1d280532fd7ae7368517f6f751739b228d23df2f207f35":"74a5e24477e8759bedfbaa196f398777108392efb8c64c65c0c9ecd6cd3b5f04":"70cbc6cfe1d6ab4bc30d66fa162d5d4b3029e4b1b9d759f3eae17fb508e91a46":"d3c538e042f0eb796b4af9b4e65cd850425c72e2c896fcea741c17172faf27d9":"559a5e04b75cec250aac2433176a725e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #14 [#2] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"10914608a6d373a26c53ab83014283b678d73dfea65b4a3540af17f2fafa3b3cf698925b423edb9f946b906f43110795":"9ded87d289412dfda8935e5b08ec66b68abd1bae1fc5363e4341f58db954f1f9bc4b681c0d930ba080f85f8fd04c173cb2b77723ce67692efa7ade48b82b6926":"225159b4c679094f277516b2335b1e8b7d0a7ea33fd56822906d481fe412586d":"4967cd401cd466aba0be5f55615ca0d9fb8adbde5cb4e6ae3a0159fcd6c36bf0":"fec14f325b8b458ddf3e7f2e10938f4c2d04c8d9885bb5b9277bdc229c70b354":"1cd5c0bdeb87c79235bead416c565d32" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #0 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"b023f6a6f73d4749b36eb54867994432":"2462ad760ddbca4e013688bf61381f190c7b2de57cbeeec81d6ab7b6f067b75adc3545887f8d2aa5d9b9dfcbfa425d610faa9c247eb5d71145f302918e908ae5":"":"":"":"c0620c68515a4618e572db6e4c14473d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #1 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"7e0fcd953c1c8bb8d03d7a0e918fb59d":"56b2e11d5c2d87d2c9c90c285e0041beb4594a6efdd577580095612e50cf47c0b76208337e1e18453082d725629667d86226ab22944bbfb40c38b7986e489adb":"":"":"":"7194eee0d333fa5282dc44db964ecf5b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #2 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"0130217d4a3945402ed99d7b8504fe4b":"28e592fd9db72b40ae4888078aedde260f6de4f0472a7601258e694d7bb6af6810ff4eabdffb332932765fa1d66650fb78cc2be484c0ba803eb9a2502020e865":"":"":"":"4652f0545385fdbe02d05aec21668608" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #3 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"07854447e33521d2d997d90c0887f42d":"c561ab6acfbfb98879982ac7add92b80471e0154b77ccc9fd98e7c2013c411e8075948e97ab4db7505797a99d456e54e6585042efeff7e3970e399ea0d27537c":"":"":"":"1a14a810c11b4f0af23c6467c47bbde0" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #4 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"68a8ec01581d6066391f3e5977465026":"747c7e9aace6d4f840c7b5261e0af796c516477421d52850a7072a0ab2c768fcc80c9ba8d18b228e77a7f6131c788a76515fe31aef4ed67376568231a4700fac":"":"":"":"a5723c43743442fae3637bb553891aeb" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #5 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"1459038c60b70bae7af0da6cfab707a2":"9f7d839310846bd452827a185539c0eb0f106acc7bc4de80d3521a970b23483d57826b1484d329a2d1c2ecfeaf8eeffbaa6e1a305e3f1e47b96ad48a711ad1aa":"":"":"":"5fcd6bf108fe68b85f61f85c0556f5c0" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #6 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a3357db173df98da4dd02ee24ce5c303":"f1ce08587ac0338b4d0b8e075b42b6501e77758b30087de028a8622fb7abd7f65e3b4f802d1a472dedb9c1a6dc9263c65918d8b7fafd0ae7e9c39e2e8684af3f":"":"":"":"8a5fa11d8e78fbf1ca4e4ca3e1ae82b8" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #7 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"212f4c80c7e9287c8d25e3b965f91a3c":"bf1d715b3f56c433827c9cb429bee5ca61c80a8d9b2fd4498e1c86ce703637f8f7f34056ab0039e0baa63320df0ec61de60354f2ece06356d9be3c6d1cdcc4cf":"":"":"":"04ac2f969e828f375b03ee16317e8572" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #8 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"46e85752e0af82fc63932950120e4b5d":"ae4316424fa765179404188eb8839ce84ad8db92cb12f39089a93a2dbdc371e2fdbef1ad080eb354eecdda3a10ea66ef647aa095afa1786c01bd1c9f70d8da4f":"":"":"":"de576284d8ad36b31bd4f8f3da633e36" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #9 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"ec2459b1dd7f50df63e14e40aa4a4e66":"b964a24bf98264327c0b9e2e1c99ed1b35f534be801c996f318bc2074ed2500ba8488c4feb442b507c3220523c0041c9543133379365e65e092850a5e3f96cc9":"":"":"":"4d466e2f388aae40d1b31ce1f8ddc5e8" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #10 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"acf480d54f4c66d611519b72f2c0dca6":"d5b3277cf8badf6be86af27dd36f23ffc580847c5fcb56c4d8a42339336f185c38ffb86f4d8aa7646c1aaed6c2b0c7ae7e4d435f481d62bb01e632f6bbb2abf9":"":"":"":"746aaa5423ef77ea6b1eda47410262dd" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #11 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"edb80fddc595b234e3c5c03b2be3d721":"94aad8c772201435543efd9013c9f5f022038db6864e9ed4141ea75beb236844da6e6a17109262bc80f528427b37d9da6df03c7dd25be233774384a7f53197ea":"":"":"":"511927f10f800445b705ea3cfe6ec823" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #12 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"c7790c9888b0e731ca6ccd60c32bb98a":"967050c11050a6d99a5da428d1f0fc8068b29ba4c66965addbfd31b745cb07d2439d268ab32a5fa2b1934bf277ff586506a941768468905ed980537d8baa1d07":"":"":"":"978493f0cece6f94d21863a519e06dbe" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #13 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"58c75625771df61c48a82590eeed3378":"be3120e8515a98701b4b2fb0667de2bad3f32bcbf10fb9b820956f9aa7ffa1bbbafb70002a9c7fdd1cf7e76a735261798dc60a1163919d58e39ef0c38b54b27b":"":"":"":"90f5c486e7efe932258610e744506487" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #14 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"d3f64c11aa21bb2d12278847547fb11b":"855c0e3a7567730b11e197c136e5c22b1dc7271d4dbe04bcdfd2fc0ef806b3c05b4264ee6c60d526506622ebf6130738dba4bf35c13ce33db19487312ee691fe":"":"":"":"33ed7089ebae738c6a7e6e2390d573e4" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #0 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"132ad1c40afb066620f004f08409c59e":"2e5beadd89b663b3903d3a63c3ab5605bfb1a0045a42430e0220243c51a69f7ff7678c2f8edb7bb4a29b646f3edfaca2463f9defd342da87d22b1b8fdb012fd5":"150deb841d1a4d90e66e85b036d9f5a7efca726b907ae3e8f05e1d1338cdfd32":"fb199beeeaf3939be2a5f9e6ba22f97cdd2c7576e81eccc686facbdf8bb4f2aa":"4293341721f57e4548ce8c003531d38622446c8825904e1b868dcddc626c5164":"66d8f3bfb78186b57136ec2c1602e1ef" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #1 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"1c1502ca97c109399a72a77c8d6cc22b":"1d33b1b257a3ae1210fa2099307916a73dd92270769697ea2d7901f56865e3cae1be94b5024d0da3880bce06f0b31231c5a889f8ba3d92a20844b61009db672d":"23eede46eff4a04b08dcc2133e4537b332351f8469630f11b0c8853fb762a4bc":"6fd9f9da108e68aea9d1cecd81c49bcd0e7bedb348890f2248cb31c4277369f7":"76bcc11bd952123f78dd2ba60dd932d49203e418bb832d60b45c083e1e129834":"a1eee46001616f2bf87729895da0d0d1" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #2 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"c79c0a1db75e83af258cdf9ead81264d":"5e8cc0fdadc170ed0f5e12f79a6b9e585f9d7c2926c163686a6a724495d88fabcec940d752545cae63f1792dcb966a7325f61997ba8883559ad6f6f8fc09898a":"a2cf6c1c9e4489f504e17f385f08aa82775aa2b0a84abd0b7ee3c6b393d7fd50":"c7529b874e07d4b876196786d510cc038c9e1ab93c461df2474eba484ae6876f":"63c6e7f3548529386c9f47c5aece52ce8454da5db9a807a1b960f7730a61582b":"43b7931e0b3b3769ef8972d0026896a3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #3 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"b44d1dd914e88840bc65a94ee199b3ac":"c3dae1863d323cc78f43ccb3f632fde29130e6b23b843ff5a8d79fddc3c1f92b55cd3dcaf7848d40d189c0de7790bebb889e01be05980dcdf30d2b3333426c50":"41e2fce9b48642a1b9bd1695314adcdd38e1a8afe4891e633c5088c6753438a2":"1eb3f8bbacb0c6b901718bfd7eba29f6f87e1fe056ad442d6d38c1351a684e1f":"85570db773f3f5202967376f91a0a9c09c89cd4eddd58cdc6210335fd5e7acef":"bd53036538d9ed904a49966b5428a2a8" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #4 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"5ef97f7af7df5cc6fa94f8428ec7be5c":"be67434ac4d77f0f50ec5bacc8112d1480bd9f20d6b4ea768d9b51bb69c1dffcd8c30e4412127644aaa6fc453e59fb633f6a5a8c2f69e40d1863e35d4d4c0227":"a64195b1e56cf97fd81e99fa1833d191faf62f534c874def4b8bed0ae7195ac7":"353cd3a8d9cd92bce82cd8d1cc198baa9276db478b0cfe50249e30c3042ee9db":"393ab4726f088fdfeb4df752e1b2aec678e41fa60781bc5e914296227d6b3dfc":"24bdc2cad5dccd2309425f11a24c8c39" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #5 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"567130da4e7ecc4db0f035d7ecb11878":"cc070df6aa3623f74afd85b59d1bef2b1fcd9c8093362512ff109ebfe992ed75bd58b5ae1561d702b69065eb3cc0bd328ab698d4c6ca274e96d673309b5df5df":"42033054cefa1f20b3443f8ab7d9635ae8f047b833c8529245ba8b4aa07edba3":"72972fb947bff60df291888ddbfd91e698e0c1c26a346b95fc7c5dac596d0073":"af29b6a13602ba9c6b11f8dbdeb6cb52e211f9cd2fc96e63b61e3c1ec631d2ea":"b0849f8317e043271a3fc5f2eaaaaba2" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #6 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"2c20ae36f1e74542ed8b0a177b8050aa":"c4bf7a39caf26dc3f61311f54ab3095493c626a988f5abee2826c67a4f4b4d6a02329c99a6bcb5e387fa160741c871acc2929c1cc07f2f0a7ce1619eb7da1ec4":"97c148dd10c3dd72b1eaaafbe37a9310ed15b23872e9f2b62d1feb91ea81ffe3":"23df0c30c68bf2eeb55d273a596f1f54ed916271595b906e4f7793b7a52f2573":"22f120fa09215105116919aaf8eebcb69eccd5da42feb737018a05268bf08e46":"b7c73b9ceea2e6ca0be6a3773cdd6886" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #7 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"2076f9e116a2648e1e664b815b1b3674":"979b5aeafe555aeba152ed66e32e30e110df20ee1f227932a72acfb8218aec767941efaefa091c0128dad9b93b06b28fc76e01f275e8ce1c02f0eb567c914f89":"d12fb10b9fa6d2fd0f39cf76294cd44dcbfa80dca7c2f8537c75453d985ef551":"4228a99faf35547a58c1a4d842301dca374f1f13c6fd067b7c1b815863b73158":"a3a7d5f1e2dcf95a90715ec5fd32e7f88c38b0a452b6ccd1f107458db4f74fd6":"8a63a5002a3636b241f0bec14fd9c2ac" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #8 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a71015cf06ddd0a6cd72fa014cf0aee6":"c810cb9db0f169dbc30fda85ccb6d4c40db68d429eeb3653070db7641fbbaba60ef0ff970eaf40887b7e154e2ecd5331de7004689ec604e69927da630a8dd7a7":"5f99f45d8770041703e5a14521c501904fd05ff3340835ac0c41b86442e4939c":"eb7efa6e46ab926ea04c87eb9ce454f5b10717bd9d85305f27d71bea1bc991b3":"cbc80c6171d098fc81023486d327efe2415a0f32e5fa6f6793ce1d0e98783258":"a353f6b350404f3f7b4fb724f84a948a" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #9 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"395931837614c322d8488ec6a2c4c919":"831fc8d63592b6ce358c08aeac39d67c3e48b4c2617735b6fe5e9fa44d7aee9d60f2fcf549db239d5bed9c608c94e8f8c23b32901442ac53442127377bdcf205":"eb261c737c0a17c8cb1ae055c143f701b74c96c852e4a76ca3ea045e7efdf5ee":"153276007b3843a897efbf022bd1bcabcf655c7eb8acef9baac710b339ecfd99":"a8a5cb17a2945e5b41ff370cc88ac498389b89b6cd82bb3bbde81c212f7c17d4":"537fc2b73183d2c0c106886937a6609c" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #10 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"9a1983859dd6c4cb602970d705952b2b":"68c5cf31f7959ffaa83af9dd55a75ec001befbf835e42a789ac42d39d96128eb6d9b3f07ced15e57e39760390c065fb4425c19ef7184635c18e5ed28256937e1":"e06497a181a5362980579c91d263f630ad4794519a64261ede8b36cf0ac5e713":"714e4fc52aea763e23a1f5b18949ab8fd949f1768560559bccb49d78d51dfab5":"6b6b7f65fd472ad428df2bbb86b85067d0a6f89d9233eea92f5189a9163d0419":"e32af8a81c59dc44540ed8845b447fdb" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #11 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"230576e9518fb9a6a8391a84919b0d97":"6193f0e7b33ce19fde922aec9c93f1271ebcdd296d9c8c77029b59afa2064e3159088e07e91c14a4a3dc23b6005dd8ef1425d7d2ae8282a5b30b7498b6754234":"ffaca30a256d18836a0d49bbaad599a28fc7821d71aa91b97158a492d84a6280":"a3da13852d0717afed7c58c52530d2ae047b645a5e7aa8cfabc11478444151ac":"e15fdaeea31c95555fc509d2a266abf78d86ca11aa2f87ce1041142eb9f82bae":"7906f8da1e140345c191dbc2de5ead1b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #12 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"e08a3a33adb4399a9be72fead224155f":"cfbe8b1464b00bb9e0d18b04d2040ed9bd822741188812b98a440fbc66ff018ddf6c0ea20c62d01b8237bc7c3da9e3f9fb874fca79a360b4f0f967d8d02083ba":"56f975849197e2eae5a2e6fb445a93c1fadf57280ac27e27c7cbea2cb00c10cc":"0a6d9e2d6e181addab0ea1ee89c65ce557e10fb8e8d43a24cdd27033d3fff507":"823e9400a9f563cc1fa5daf10f4ff1ab8affa18d8371f9cd0e067fcddce8caed":"5ded298f98cffb2e7f5ea97bd50c7e3e" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #13 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"11c13b917d9f94fd7a008566d8598e89":"f53343a5a455132df3d1b03db39e44d933855b375d7422ad0d07dfdfb352af28946eb29980793456ec8634bf113e75783246bbd05aa8a7cb5886d372fa012f58":"ff1d8d33083023ffbe28f153bddfa9d9f3c221da16f8f20967d2508fa7752b55":"66a98c7d778d798617e1d31d4bdfabf8d381d38b82125838ddf43fb7f5b27dc6":"407c72d7c890c00b249be00a53ae722e5d8033c84b1e1a6a69d4b278ba5db9eb":"67ab88156f20d03b3a1bc363daefc0c6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,256) #14 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"7b95343a4ac0f8c8b2645c33757a3146":"3d7e2987860cbcba14a12594e1a394ee754c9a7a65cecc990bc79b5e86e672e12f8c144d843e1abca46b4759a11b3d29f4e219077a8696efadee618f254cb80a":"16297534a79c4ae7493178226b29e42a6f1e0066aeaee8b5af65bcefa2ee3ebb":"b429ee986f16fb35fe2c47c03c0918870b4560f4ec4678f9df471cbd7ca6a887":"2b14d612eb00c7fba0d8e23bf91df91daef6f8e279e0050d5497ddf0f3466c76":"8f72c17405163090fe0bd795b65811c6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #0 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"327290da2e9a19c840de8d33e425efaa5aa7a7afa4e5a812065965478d640f78520cf3c670b098943fec1914d4c8c411":"80bdf18288cb8adb6e3dacb09c553af2e7317c194d37f433eec27e324a0bad752899bda91fd41e5a08acdfd76007aecabc19c95a8bcede310f7320ce97aaad0e":"":"":"":"c26222662ed3a649a1745dee5df4eef0" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #1 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"be14f473472db07a43b7f9a517735d7f7ede2aa70dbdb729bc4f578a0dce9d7fe9fd97939cd1ef731262417b5213bd7f":"ac71ff53140c1383eb379e5311e37637af933db494e5e689d065661e9095b8302e4174c392f324fac43695d9381e3cf4626a5347938ed9e21502cbd789cca363":"":"":"":"4bab95f9f05fc36a337b6f2582c2ce98" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #2 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"88c31e24f4f859b668946ce73f8600621a70731440762b3c267ceab52a9d77a23d6f70ddba0e46a786697a906ccb18a3":"bf9bf25a949d447274a8c72f1ae51399521f8aca39b1b37bb7b4d5cf3c67d55ef8dbacfb71aa9c5949416e2868b968883e517215bc20292894f8406ab39c1ea1":"":"":"":"841aaa0b171d1526ef365b9201adbff3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #3 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"8545a0de5ea028c8e5976d5b58fa50079b20ba716f0856cc1af7b98537c895f0266b956542d2b8ca661aef5da1f7f8c5":"686f4f9ee74c3402845fbad9353d7dfeff727584d892eb64bd84b764110cbe4ac8581e7e23acb95caf12979983e8947c570264aec292f1c7b756f7184007dcba":"":"":"":"f6d6ae6449b2984df8bcb69584fb16f3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #4 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"d6cd4b4fb9105374605deac7bb49ad792eb225daa560f2a86f66269bf9afc2ea01b6ee6f0eb4926d2f09329df6e90d79":"5d1b8fa0ca2ee127d1bd41423c17b9a8c736715cc2906818e9216dfd81b7637b66c89b772b55ae707c6effa2d9ce7425df26f966646ab613d5599143cf51e5e8":"":"":"":"c36ab451116d733eb4377de3511db5ce" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #5 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"e73ebae0d0834fdff1829ac3d9722fe9f1bc65b5f652fae5f7615af116440e3d5709b5cddd6065d568c246820de46b09":"2026cf7c1b1fe9645ab8759958ac04fb1d8938b9913c3b7f22da81e398b2c00b1921e1d4edb5d21c4531515cb0f9644fe8068685b9fca813176e6780796e8ded":"":"":"":"98d1dce30593de8a8d5b4d956f6c684b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #6 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a53c1813c06b609eff9ddc77204b085ca985f22170b8ecfcbbf45ea11c45c24fcf25bc33150f9f97ce48244d5beb685c":"1d0dd1a87d59c69f28e118e1083d65f1ee0df31f6308a92dcc47503ec4d20a018d9821c6a7d64385724f0e941231426e028efe6d75e53ff8edf095ef1baf2656":"":"":"":"035cec3a24ba7c44e5c19436c2689a75" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #7 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"16d5b8290693a5c40c5a526dd6d653ac54cabb5608d77bb2cb7d6270b96c2fe2de076716ae8cf0a5c781edbde861dc70":"aa82a5ea33439d0c16a1cc13cbae53b169f4d369bcbdae81a9a38129c65ae0ea4f720576c012f8d7eb1c0202003c39d28453a22e502b4949cf5ba23a727721bf":"":"":"":"de4ed9d163d11e9b52470d078df4c869" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #8 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"68bfabdbb821cb978527ff18ce37c96c79ad751756551f36b6991981285a68854ec7f72f548c3395ad3ee40410064d4b":"3da9e9518eb1f1b6268e4597f158844ff672ddb414f7ec23fa66d6c86b90a732a7b3016a3387ec3dbed34eb479413d017932ebf9f2a2fea0b35d2bf4e06718f9":"":"":"":"ec4e3e2b6b8763deb17b8611d1fe7953" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #9 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"171a74ab694a7d7c2baa3ccf103ad94f11094e07a955ae9ac3bad370f1448753e99b63cc23d1878ab66f94136ec2ecac":"72ebeda7342770d03bc0e531754f946ca5cca684c41f9d089fe9147fad93b6154919c5cb2e6d162fbfde7b9ff0aa590a17993ca6c80bd59eee4134fc2ce944d8":"":"":"":"582ab4f105c3e1fed9593f58fc335fc3" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #10 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"caed30015b34064762591eba9a59f440566a6621832f650572362229e8a38cd0f5d6d322afd8444132056690d6fa5540":"8e27f0dbeae4613bcf0011105f824ed2ecb150a83a0994f8f6607833755216e016fb175e51d42370afe27b11c18477886b530c95bc31bd1c0f8fe00f61fc15a0":"":"":"":"d42787e97147d457f1590c742443ad92" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #11 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"c58d62f8145622cd86cfbda66bc26d2ce4c5610cd9cd1c326b99b60355a6fe751783c07f2cc21ba68f1f20ca70f0ad31":"38a8b685e6bbab67824f4cc72995043ea2854f067f2afaec762c9e78ff9d585a25bc63c8d0d075d06d43f3f694733982d26cbe0648b2d0cf8053918b912c303a":"":"":"":"84001709f15a2fd167c161b5d376d86d" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #12 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"dc9719050d5257152d8a7d60d3ef1fc5b8cb1700bafc7de863c019f244779c464b6214f21a2f6d0aa3ca282007615ce5":"f188a1ba21b1791ebf8a08d8ba555e49423d9178a561bcc1672539c3a7ba1d856eae9922c4d96c181ed045d6f1d15e855690cdae451edac60f1ca2021f1fec57":"":"":"":"7540fed313c96261cac255bf83b5ae99" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #13 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"ff057781af4a4a1eefeb26ab38f82a2efb6f065de290ebf225bd693dfb1f97455b49143bdb430324c9d945c48824f6cc":"0ddd0f4a43a7b54d9abb0928a2242c378db7a95a0b206baa642afe5cd55108f412f1d727fd591bca2c76355aa62aa8638cfa1916739bc66e02b9459ccd0881ba":"":"":"":"8b6e74a94fcac0d2f212d3594213fbb6" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,0) #14 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"ef027327e47fc5875c01cb17d798fdc2b27a5c78000727842f8a516f4e8dd34afc167ae145b1e763bebdca51e2f461a7":"128566fe6c5b5595742190519445c25db85ee0ce29371f4cab213400d479d2bfe27655155be0fa237173abb214f0226a2f1770802dd69485adb25e6d837485e1":"":"":"":"76cd1553b2b73d4ef6043a09fb90d679" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #0 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"8e1a59210f876d017109cb90c7d5dd669b375d971266b7320ba8db9bd79b373bcc895974460e08eadd07a00ce7bdade9":"23677c04a2d6ab446b7b3c582a8071654d27859441b10799f08b788378b926ca4306e7cb5c0f9f104c607fbf0c379be49426e53bf5637225b551f0cc694d6593":"19e914ffbc6d872be010d66b17874010ec8b036a3d60d7f7dda5accc6962a542":"bd7a0c09e780e0ad783fd708355b8df77b4454c3d606fb8de053bffa5ecf9021":"d284dc2caf6d214f8909efc9a75297bccfc04353c2788a96f8b752749c7fec0c":"129d256e7db6269e5a0a160d2278f305" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #1 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"00674e633670c9971be7af789d37d5a4ef567b3ca4766722cd8f67e09d21cbbfa08d43ea1aa259999c6a307ae6347d62":"ec47b029643f85ea19388b6e9de6ab22705b060ae10cee71262027d0bdff5efd7393af619bc6658612fabc78439a0bd5a01255563a96013fa130dd06fd0f5442":"5b92bce3f87645126daa4704fd7df98b880aa07743a57399b985ad1a00b1f2fc":"8199de1338c688234c77262ef35423f4695b277726c76d8b5f426399c14d83b5":"eb95f5a4d8400cec2d4e0f548b6e92636b5e284fb6b61766a1f35bb9cdc5df0a":"9fbe95817578eb272aa9da2f509c2a06" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #2 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"2553423c3cb0fae8ca54af56f496e9935d5af4738898f77f789a9bee867dfbc6010c4e5bc68da2b922cdd84eea68e1da":"a9bebd13711c0c22c94b3252654854515a9dc015fe69e688fbac9676b3d77ab67e19b020cd2427ac789ca17f656e499be3ba3ab2075ff95247c6355157eebc79":"e74e45fa28697a06dab08545fde0cc26e7eca31c40aa68ee41c4de402fdcc961":"5aa8abf7062079929d6a131cd3844a5fb6514c07061e25cad67677d867297685":"84819109b2e09b46ba3f5464c34b28ce25a186f0e0fd83fe5fa0ab026c01292a":"3846f3406e49040c48b5cfc9cbc75d1a" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #3 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"856f1371454bb9aa06be897dcda9b295817c6eeb865a9acb3a89d145bfe29ce5e1b3b12b714571afdfaca7951cd47e33":"a691b8bf6a407c93a36d18aeced4c75f76d8397d4ecbcd4e8f820cb393186897f05c1ef668b027fc78ba6da9bd554cc31a467d47b5e534b5340c7799383ec05c":"2c81d1e94b33164a177d0183d182fe7d23ef4f88444246464e58bdd0de38d82c":"1b5dae81c96771bea091521c0973c5af76a03e3624160e2511e57ff43a1d32a9":"bf5878e2bd139f8f058f3d834acd771514da6d4c5b9ef84466e5a4e0e4b2eaaf":"6a5ea73aad476ce201e173d4d5a7ffcc" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #4 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"0436075cf8cf62ce623c2301ebd45203c98282611cfa5a12dd7c04525ffa7eb343a607af2f57feb7ce3af97e0abc2285":"1ab9ada5eeebc3fc8e53f358b643476fcfd4dd9f092f21d2bc1c4bb1ffd01a0c5b207aaa09ff76a9cab0aa6ce62b6a65b2650ab448b8bb2e8696a7aa4b6f4e8d":"62f07d1f49e40f7f472985947ac4d8ef2d58216d918f7942b9c70f43daff8972":"37ae758141fbc890ee7e1d0854426b2984fb1c094677e6a61546e9315bab0898":"353d1dd0c8d8656bc418a6a3ace138ecd62819d4e21b8bd87694ea683ec0cc37":"bfee6bb4afc228da981bfe7f0d17578b" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #5 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"d004a0893bf326d50ee52e04cb3e64409f204f4e9af780d5dd092d04162d088385b1f243000914c62cba3dadf9827c81":"c36004075f5fd078137ea08de6cb15f71aeb9eca21c891cfdf7a8c0d21790c94ffa93be5fa06beb5e82d9fbf173ef9b29c18511fee2455dbbe61d6b01baf024a":"7d313ada131650c7a506d2c194444ed202d568544caa75bbc60e57a0b74c9a10":"791d60238677ff53150cf7074061eac68335c0a7cec7de43ea63a5df0f312cd8":"6754366be264deb9e94f39e92ac2894bd93c1d7e1198d39e6eddccb0ea486f4d":"1c29795f03e3c771603293473e347ab4" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #6 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"9a8c79b48ada409183f7260aa1415c9ee4e0b662e0fb81b5c56f85d76ed75efac5751dd4de7e7f8b53a36ee0dce2bc9e":"c4d68b76dc0e785823be2da9d339dc900132f12721e8a63ebe92e36d740c5a5e5564c367bff4a52bc70b1c60c86f0bcb7c1d99c414956a259963207184f01246":"04c7060f36569a5d9578c718627fc2695e8d783c0c8aefca2744da6664e67c8c":"1d4b7d587421dea4f7f3e77fcf997607ecfeb6e665a9a184138eb5736b16f516":"8cb8daf9cda230d8d39b829b968aaa5f5d3e3106d8b693227ab1b6201b78a7b8":"faa146098526546927a43fa4a5073e46" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #7 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"a0736a5a8b0a394625d8985b05e3a9f277c7ba03b253c0e783359a8c4c086121cb46ea469c7756d5f099f5ee8ed16243":"ea7a046fa1760866bcb37fecf9ade7bcea4444662ea782d6f2820b22a96bab97b4c5adcb0a50ced885121b6b85a5074444b1555d9655f4f6ded31fe15281b30e":"47f3655dd05c42454fad68e330aabca49f27c76ba05ef07b6d77fba41153c0ab":"a5d07da3e399cc51d136096599fcbd9779e839b1fd86f21d7d1e23acd91f9fa7":"150b028b64a988fc1ffdfc9e66b4c8dfe4fcd8538ee976c89923638ebad33802":"6ffdc685169b174ad0dd84cdeed050a7" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #8 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"d445a3d9332c8577715c1e93f119521bd31a464db08cdbd73d50080d62d5a48fba4cef2dd097ec749973037e33e8d6fa":"da5f9b2db13d0555846c00da96115036bb75ace66d56fc582d6cd0171e3e23335c5c2b8691e58af8899ed0204316479f849ca6f47309cae571ccb42d3d35c166":"79346394f795f05c5a5199423649b8b5345355ef11eb4239db1c767c68afa70a":"c22810de9987b228c19680eb044da22a08032148a6015f358849d6d608a214b9":"7747d68ca8bcb43931f1edce4f8c9727dd56c1d1d2600ad1fb767eb4fbc7b2d6":"f5c40babbec97cb60ba65200e82d7a68" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #9 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"2728be06796e2a77c60a401752cd36e4a051724aa3276a146b4b351017eee79c8257398c612fc1129c0e74ecef455cd3":"d663d2cfcddf40ff61377c3811266d927a5dfc7b73cf549e673e5a15f4056ad1f9733c8ed875ff77928284dc1cdb33accc47971d3626615a45b9a16d9baf426e":"62349efbac4a4747d0e92727c67a6bc7f8404cf746002e7d3eeffb9a9be0bbdc":"381c0cffbdfa61a6af3f11ccd0e543208b584c3f520130e33617564ec7a48cf7":"6974043362f834fd793de07ceebd051599163d50489441005afc9db09a9ab44f":"df7894746c599e02d985b195ca3b4863" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #10 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"2b65b56de410ee82e55bd2bf80e6cee356a37c3a3aa7042df45fa750a74e097b071fc18d6eed96523dd4fbb677b8c729":"bf03a6b3e8e23ff53369b971217dc3d3f4c1211329c94847347b3aa77dc7a3e0670381573527844a1ade786f18631944558defffb9a00900ca55f97ec726126b":"59255e5cd2221316c945bd614471df76d5b2f394b8829de82e5c30bc178565e2":"5739bc14f0f2ef9d3393928aee67b0908adaf587650928916d8ae78b0077a3b3":"6b236cf0ee0dba0c92b26c60235d3868715a80c0efbc0c898b6f0b1ace8146e9":"8374b571d7f2d94ce2bdadeb9d815397" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #11 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"8756ee2c5e381c7c1dc530748b76a6274ef6583090e555d85210e2356feb2974a8f15119a04e9b481cd3bc557a197b8e":"19705743eaaaa0e8890a0faa2e0df37c820d556c7a45f04d76276f9f9ce2e7c133258ae6d1ba9cdf7745d01745763d18dcd1af2c9e9b0bed2806e60f0f9b636c":"2b4a92b682e9a557466af97b735e2ffdbac3bfc31fd5be2cd212cfbd4b8d690a":"e86504f10317bbeab346f3b9e4b310cbe9fbd81a42054f358eacd08cccab6eff":"19ffad856a6675268cc464ca6fdb8afd0912143e552668528d1484c9a54592cf":"f347fd58aff2999530e258be77591701" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #12 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"f58be57e5035d5c455b17a41ccf7542ffd77f5c009e0a737118ed6c4188f78fcbdbe946bf82e1fa50fd81691de82dcf3":"f9939592ab2b31d92ac72673da013a588ea17bbf02cfd6e79d79f8296601633d04ceb005110f266e6100040ef33194858def8b535314c73caa0e48fc4d2f6e2d":"bb1cb21a316d4b88093cbfc7917d614dca97090cdc8bb340d864547cb3e1fef6":"7e42d5439d81680c8edf5c571d548699730cfada33b650a4d510172a42b298bb":"e9e3cf180f72ba2c1a45d0a94b822943612143e0b642398796b0428ae1af6cf5":"d0c83a4bf3517648b441d411ddcb808c" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #13 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"898064243e44ff67151736ce8bb6f1c759cab4aaca9b87543a1ac984ef955cd5db76c1aa56aff83f1f6799f18fe531cc":"b8d6be3036eeb5657fb10766354d4be897bd27973b3530270ccc02a08169a2e437b30a3635eb6ccb310f319257f58d8aa030c8aab616418e0914a46131306a0c":"37572428df5826e6ae5ce95db4ef63f41e908f685204a7b64edb9f473c41e45c":"28beda0e0e346b447d32208c6b4c42dcd567acfe1e483fb4a95ea82cb8ce55a5":"7a0fffa541d723e16340eeb960b1b9c9aae912477e0ebfac03f8f1a3a8bdc531":"611c9f6fc5193dbe3db96cbcd276168a" + +CTR_DRBG NIST Validation (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,256,256) #14 [#3] +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between:"50de72903b9d99764123ffaa0c721e14ad1ab5c46a34c040f25324ba1d937b8ef10467161fcf2978c2a680ac5570c6d2":"5c9954fd0143e62c3bf2d5734052e3c9370f7b9d75c70f58fe33b12e3997ee2c8db84f8467affd7cfd9a9e7ec60da6f31bf9bf32aedf644e4934bd1fc916bc8d":"d5dc4c9fc7171fcbfdaead558a565ffd55d245a58b22ad1666ee05131e33f49e":"ea3114e92e6a19f53b207a0a54cd363a6d053fed0a827f92556f0a8580f7a342":"53686f069b455af4692888d11fac15cf7b4bd38e198de4e62b7098f875198a75":"9fb0df053e0345e5640aa97fedef50a6" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 no df,no reseed,256,128,0,0) block 1 #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"496f25b0f1301b4f501be30380a137eb":"36401940fa8b1fba91a1661f211d78a0b9389a74e5bccfece8d766af1a6d3b14":"":"":"5862eb38bd558dd978a696e6df164782ddd887e7e9a6c9f3f1fbafb78941b535a64912dfd224c6dc7454e5250b3d97165e16260c2faf1cc7735cb75fb4f07e1d" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 no df,no reseed,256,128,0,256) block 1 #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"41c71a24d17d974190982bb7515ce7f5":"8148d65d86513ce7d38923ec2f26b9e7c677dcc8997e325b7372619e753ed944":"55b446046c2d14bdd0cdba4b71873fd4762650695a11507949462da8d964ab6a":"91468f1a097d99ee339462ca916cb4a10f63d53850a4f17f598eac490299b02e":"54603d1a506132bbfa05b153a04f22a1d516cc46323cef15111af221f030f38d6841d4670518b4914a4631af682e7421dffaac986a38e94d92bfa758e2eb101f" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 no df,no reseed,256,128,0,0) block 2 #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"bac0fdc0c417aa269bbdea77e928f9f8":"8b0bcb3f932170416739ea42e7dcdc6fa960645bc018820134f714b3c6912b56":"":"":"d9c4fd81f6621a8cf06d612e9a84b80fa13d098dceaf2c083dc81cd80caedd105c7f2789963a167d72f76e81178001fd93de4623c260fe9eebced89f7b4b047a" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 no df,no reseed,256,128,0,256) block 2 #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"69ff3310141dbf3ece409ade58745113":"d67439abf1e162e5b25941605a8aeba7d686dec133257f6c220e1c595e954a07":"03e795be8379c481cb32534011ca6bf524dc754978ee5ebee475129ad39eca98":"5685c7330f33004515f8c0ab27f2a1cbe0c8a4a6806d6c8486e0217b43e859f2":"a6d22a4370251c51978fedc7e7753c78179ed1943d2ff1b5a374860106041a304b124d47cfa304c909f7d417843846d52dcc7ebcf5c93afef885c893b40c81ed" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 no df,no reseed,256,128,0,0) block 3 #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"aaa46610681167ff8d4d2c51e77911d4":"58a5f79da44b9f23a98a39352972ad16031fe13637bd18d6cb6c9f5269d8e240":"":"":"c1714f89459ce746b151509e5066d4811a06ad06c1e9b13b50c0fc7cdd77ceedc233908ebe1ea8140ec2dc262a43201be667008e081e5476b19b27214111d325" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 no df,no reseed,256,128,0,256) block 3 #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"6ca848651d420fb02f9b66f06b377e59":"001ec3b192ddc765553e15742dffeb21cc7d97a4bcf866e3664d8a5ecb4c2463":"99f139ab5ee4f7eed6148e82d79ad5f2b9fa638d574e5db79b650c0e682ca466":"6e7bf0ae28a797ccbb47101f26bfe5a0b1e450c57aedf731272411fa7b6c4ed4":"865b6dd4363c5940d6228cc90ba8f1a21efbaa99b0c7b37361f7fed7e969a97b68d550dd6ad4bbfaf6626779bfb43c66845c2923df9f55307c8bc9f0a3872fa7" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 no df,no reseed,256,128,0,0) block 4 #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"1c6a80d82012c39c9f14a808643f08e7":"4ee68b3352b874e1cc29375028851dee9d5dfd88a40664c79e2b724fb11b2808":"":"":"7c58d2a5522a88341fb55facefdb6e24840cae283948d53148a384e13b5407d7712c33434bd3d19448b43270c54860bf3495579057c70bff3084dddff08a091d" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 no df,no reseed,256,128,0,256) block 4 #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"70bdedbc6825c4fe0a9f7e45290ddd51":"481e505bf7a36f9d96690d49154d98d6a247c14a703dbfed7cf1b7a71bee737f":"5b07610c2c946eda2975a26ddadf7d73e3d287e923d9b1a2d2070776a446d8e6":"2792a988ebb2e768eee0d5c263bcd76a675d6f339e5f1ab2ca595e6b3b4d024a":"303448a355fc0a69a130b6ab194997b220970bf680914913da904e92109dee3d9f23871130c407045cf463ce783a5dfafd603a8384790573af385d479acd7206" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,no reseed,128,64,0,0) block 1 #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"aad471ef3ef1d203":"890eb067acf7382eff80b0c73bc872c6":"":"":"a5514ed7095f64f3d0d3a5760394ab42062f373a25072a6ea6bcfd8489e94af6cf18659fea22ed1ca0a9e33f718b115ee536b12809c31b72b08ddd8be1910fa3" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,no reseed,128,64,0,128) block 1 #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"026c768fd577b92a":"b408cefb5bc7157d3f26cb95a8b1d7ac":"5737ef81dee365b6dadb3feebf5d1084":"3368a516b3431a3daaa60dc8743c8297":"4e909ebb24147a0004063a5e47ee044fead610d62324bd0f963f756fb91361e8b87e3a76a398143fe88130fe1b547b661a6480c711b739f18a9df3ae51d41bc9" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,no reseed,128,64,0,0) block 2 #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"259195269ec11af6":"2d2ab564202918c4ef5b102dda385a18":"":"":"2c5cd79ed87622a91b8654c8903d852242cd49cb5df2d4b4150584301c59f01fd95a702ac157c84cc15f42c8211335672d8ce1291ef9b1def78149a04fa2697c" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,no reseed,128,64,0,128) block 2 #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"b25716931b6e3cc1":"adf5711f93d8c8997349429ccaedae0a":"abf8cd66dd39758b01d7dbb99ab17dc3":"4be0f6b2755377c6e881fbb261b56beb":"d420604dee6467492db5957c86207a708fd242ed67942aed299425335c83b41437418582f41bc7fc0ef0d6927f34d83acd67c70133644fd711dd5a65731f9f02" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,no reseed,128,64,0,0) block 3 #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"38aa5590f6bfaa4b":"2e1724db482232a3e61f92c1c266faf8":"":"":"4438b48a45fb0141e31f0a9624dfe6fcc2f9edc075c0a52bc5fc46d85a966c853feee6af913234b3f9a679f667898dc15a24aaed89f035bfa5da516e435bbad1" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,no reseed,128,64,0,128) block 3 #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"111d8612a0f04e2a":"9bfaefb698b1b5fcc62db2c16498c33a":"aedbe02847b1b08b6a673bdf25b0224c":"9901ead62ce56573b0f71cd020fe3469":"dff8bf2aec531f8532607e738bd79f91d6085cb19568b7b0240ce6a6b371a282bafcdba02137df990535d9ebf0ba77117751626b2678aca7be4decfd6b9d4b38" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,no reseed,128,64,0,0) block 4 #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"e78c5571c5f926f9":"6bdf5332bdce4655d45c2cfea897b000":"":"":"e0715688765a3285e7b7db555f277924e7171f7541bf26122b13dbaaa39f9e2b0345c659583ff8c9cfd888f1abd2f3b36a7c9d47c687b01c819a9f9888542e0f" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,no reseed,128,64,0,128) block 4 #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed:"7ee2614ead3c128e":"8b80936e69c67edb771c28f9b9452124":"fc35cba97a1e211bc420e8af53f8e13c":"fba438aaa75a3cd4cd0cce399bfec74a":"6721cc1ada5ebc1713f74c759000765652eeb5f3f9c24fb9341b36a369cec1d27ea80d6b73b56047af07138c5a43c99a87753115c471b8587ea65fa2065e3ce0" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 use df,False,256,128,0,0) #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_first:"0bf814b411f65ec4866be1abb59d3c32":"2d4c9f46b981c6a0b2b5d8c69391e569ff13851437ebc0fc00d616340252fed593500fae4fa32b86033b7a7bac9d37e710dcc67ca266bc8607d665937766d207":"":"":"":"322dd28670e75c0ea638f3cb68d6a9d6e50ddfd052b772a7b1d78263a7b8978b6740c2b65a9550c3a76325866fa97e16d74006bc96f26249b9f0a90d076f08e5" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,False,128,64,0,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_first:"5209e5b4ed82a234":"0f65da13dca407999d4773c2b4a11d851dea0a12c52bf64339dd291c80d8ca89":"":"":"":"2859cc468a76b08661ffd23b28547ffd0997ad526a0f51261b99ed3a37bd407bf418dbe6c6c3e26ed0ddefcb7474d899bd99f3655427519fc5b4057bcaf306d4" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-256 use df,True,256,128,0,0) #0 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"a2d015f22d854e29de278d910c573de5":"16a1f035388cd8d956026e3b0117cb524dd3eb563f9a7720bb7dcb0fc6fbe743cf140bcd4d7130e7e3ea14046c56442b57c43b34ad219553e7105c18f6e561afe27c9f0be60d82d6cc474efb7fc737b16a6895d9a3a45b971d19b743c1a4ac8f":"":"":"b4e8395bcb7503410a94633f70e9904a5b30e62c35bc6dd2a03496c4a49932e184fbffdbcf1de1c72c50d36dc2ae8f04f40f96aae159c3fb816ca16df99b6c3e" + +CTR_DRBG CAVS 14.3 (AES-128 use df,True,128,64,0,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_validate_pr:"d4f1f4ae08bcb3e1":"5d4041942bcf68864a4997d8171f1f9fef55a769b7eaf03fe082029bb32a2b9d8239e865c0a42e14b964b9c09de85a20":"":"":"4155320287eedcf7d484c2c2a1e2eb64b9c9ce77c87202a1ae1616c7a5cfd1c687c7a0bfcc85bda48fdd4629fd330c22d0a76076f88fc7cd04037ee06b7af602" + +CTR_DRBG entropy usage (default entropy_nonce_len) +ctr_drbg_entropy_usage:-1 + +CTR_DRBG entropy usage (entropy_nonce_len=0) +ctr_drbg_entropy_usage:0 + +CTR_DRBG entropy usage (entropy_nonce_len=7) +ctr_drbg_entropy_usage:7 + +CTR_DRBG entropy strength: 128 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_entropy_strength:128 + +CTR_DRBG entropy strength: 256 bits +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +ctr_drbg_entropy_strength:256 + +CTR_DRBG write/update seed file [#1] +ctr_drbg_seed_file:"data_files/ctr_drbg_seed":0 + +CTR_DRBG write/update seed file [#2] +ctr_drbg_seed_file:"no_such_dir/file":MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR + +CTR_DRBG Special Behaviours +ctr_drbg_special_behaviours: + +CTR_DRBG self test +ctr_drbg_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c3ffe3b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "string.h" + +/* Modes for ctr_drbg_validate */ +enum reseed_mode +{ + RESEED_NEVER, /* never reseed */ + RESEED_FIRST, /* instantiate, reseed, generate, generate */ + RESEED_SECOND, /* instantiate, generate, reseed, generate */ + RESEED_ALWAYS /* prediction resistance, no explicit reseed */ +}; + +static size_t test_offset_idx = 0; +static size_t test_max_idx = 0; +static int mbedtls_test_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) data; + if( test_offset_idx + len > test_max_idx ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + memcpy( buf, p + test_offset_idx, len ); + test_offset_idx += len; + return( 0 ); +} + +static void ctr_drbg_validate_internal( int reseed_mode, data_t * nonce, + int entropy_len_arg, data_t * entropy, + data_t * reseed, + data_t * add1, data_t * add2, + data_t * result ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[64]; + + size_t entropy_chunk_len = (size_t) entropy_len_arg; + + TEST_ASSERT( entropy_chunk_len <= sizeof( buf ) ); + + test_offset_idx = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + test_max_idx = entropy->len; + + /* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy[:entropy->len], nonce, perso, ) + * where nonce||perso = nonce[nonce->len] */ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, entropy_chunk_len ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( + &ctx, + mbedtls_test_entropy_func, entropy->x, + nonce->x, nonce->len ) == 0 ); + if( reseed_mode == RESEED_ALWAYS ) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( + &ctx, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); + + if( reseed_mode == RESEED_FIRST ) + { + /* CTR_DRBG_Reseed(entropy[idx:idx+entropy->len], + * reseed[:reseed->len]) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( + &ctx, + reseed->x, reseed->len ) == 0 ); + } + + /* CTR_DRBG_Generate(result->len * 8 bits, add1[:add1->len]) -> buf */ + /* Then reseed if prediction resistance is enabled. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( + &ctx, + buf, result->len, + add1->x, add1->len ) == 0 ); + + + if( reseed_mode == RESEED_SECOND ) + { + /* CTR_DRBG_Reseed(entropy[idx:idx+entropy->len], + * reseed[:reseed->len]) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( + &ctx, + reseed->x, reseed->len ) == 0 ); + } + + /* CTR_DRBG_Generate(result->len * 8 bits, add2->x[:add2->len]) -> buf */ + /* Then reseed if prediction resistance is enabled. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( + &ctx, + buf, result->len, + add2->x, add2->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, result->x, result->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ctr_drbg_special_behaviours( ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; + unsigned char output[512]; + unsigned char additional[512]; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + memset( output, 0, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( additional, 0, sizeof( additional ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, + output, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1, + additional, 16 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, + output, 16, + additional, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + 1 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, additional, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + 1 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, ~0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, additional, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); +exit: + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ctr_drbg_validate_no_reseed( data_t * add_init, data_t * entropy, + data_t * add1, data_t * add2, + data_t * result_string ) +{ + data_t empty = { 0, 0 }; + ctr_drbg_validate_internal( RESEED_NEVER, add_init, + entropy->len, entropy, + &empty, add1, add2, + result_string ); + goto exit; // goto is needed to avoid warning ( no test assertions in func) +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ctr_drbg_validate_pr( data_t * add_init, data_t * entropy, + data_t * add1, data_t * add2, + data_t * result_string ) +{ + data_t empty = { 0, 0 }; + ctr_drbg_validate_internal( RESEED_ALWAYS, add_init, + entropy->len / 3, entropy, + &empty, add1, add2, + result_string ); + goto exit; // goto is needed to avoid warning ( no test assertions in func) +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_between( data_t * add_init, data_t * entropy, + data_t * add1, data_t * add_reseed, + data_t * add2, data_t * result_string ) +{ + ctr_drbg_validate_internal( RESEED_SECOND, add_init, + entropy->len / 2, entropy, + add_reseed, add1, add2, + result_string ); + goto exit; // goto is needed to avoid warning ( no test assertions in func) +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ctr_drbg_validate_reseed_first( data_t * add_init, data_t * entropy, + data_t * add1, data_t * add_reseed, + data_t * add2, data_t * result_string ) +{ + ctr_drbg_validate_internal( RESEED_FIRST, add_init, + entropy->len / 2, entropy, + add_reseed, add1, add2, + result_string ); + goto exit; // goto is needed to avoid warning ( no test assertions in func) +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ctr_drbg_entropy_strength( int expected_bit_strength ) +{ + unsigned char entropy[/*initial entropy*/ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + + /*nonce*/ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN + + /*reseed*/ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN]; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; + size_t last_idx; + size_t byte_strength = expected_bit_strength / 8; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + test_offset_idx = 0; + test_max_idx = sizeof( entropy ); + memset( entropy, 0, sizeof( entropy ) ); + + /* The initial seeding must grab at least byte_strength bytes of entropy + * for the entropy input and byte_strength/2 bytes for a nonce. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, + mbedtls_test_entropy_func, entropy, + NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( test_offset_idx >= ( byte_strength * 3 + 1 ) / 2 ); + last_idx = test_offset_idx; + + /* A reseed must grab at least byte_strength bytes of entropy. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( test_offset_idx - last_idx >= byte_strength ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ctr_drbg_entropy_usage( int entropy_nonce_len ) +{ + unsigned char out[16]; + unsigned char add[16]; + unsigned char entropy[1024]; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; + size_t i, reps = 10; + size_t expected_idx = 0; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + test_offset_idx = 0; + test_max_idx = sizeof( entropy ); + memset( entropy, 0, sizeof( entropy ) ); + memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) ); + memset( add, 0, sizeof( add ) ); + + if( entropy_nonce_len >= 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, entropy_nonce_len ) == 0 ); + + /* Set reseed interval before seed */ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( &ctx, 2 * reps ); + + /* Init must use entropy */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, mbedtls_test_entropy_func, entropy, NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + expected_idx += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; + if( entropy_nonce_len >= 0 ) + expected_idx += entropy_nonce_len; + else + expected_idx += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN; + TEST_EQUAL( test_offset_idx, expected_idx ); + + /* By default, PR is off, and reseed interval was set to + * 2 * reps so the next few calls should not use entropy */ + for( i = 0; i < reps; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) - 4 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) - 4, + add, sizeof( add ) ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_EQUAL( test_offset_idx, expected_idx ); + + /* While at it, make sure we didn't write past the requested length */ + TEST_ASSERT( out[sizeof( out ) - 4] == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( out[sizeof( out ) - 3] == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( out[sizeof( out ) - 2] == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( out[sizeof( out ) - 1] == 0 ); + + /* There have been 2 * reps calls to random. The next call should reseed */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + expected_idx += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; + TEST_EQUAL( test_offset_idx, expected_idx ); + + /* Set reseed interval after seed */ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( &ctx, 4 * reps + 1 ); + + /* The next few calls should not reseed */ + for( i = 0; i < (2 * reps); i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) , + add, sizeof( add ) ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_EQUAL( test_offset_idx, expected_idx ); + + /* Call update with too much data (sizeof entropy > MAX(_SEED)_INPUT). + * Make sure it's detected as an error and doesn't cause memory + * corruption. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( + &ctx, entropy, sizeof( entropy ) ) != 0 ); + + /* Now enable PR, so the next few calls should all reseed */ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + expected_idx += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; + TEST_EQUAL( test_offset_idx, expected_idx ); + + /* Finally, check setting entropy_len */ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, 42 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + expected_idx += 42; + TEST_EQUAL( test_offset_idx, expected_idx ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, 13 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + expected_idx += 13; + TEST_EQUAL( test_offset_idx, expected_idx ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void ctr_drbg_seed_file( char * path, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL, NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( &ctx, path ) == ret ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( &ctx, path ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void ctr_drbg_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d574424 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.data @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +Debug print msg (threshold 1, level 0) +debug_print_msg_threshold:1:0:"MyFile":999:"MyFile(0999)\: Text message, 2 == 2\n" + +Debug print msg (threshold 1, level 1) +debug_print_msg_threshold:1:1:"MyFile":999:"MyFile(0999)\: Text message, 2 == 2\n" + +Debug print msg (threshold 1, level 2) +debug_print_msg_threshold:1:2:"MyFile":999:"" + +Debug print msg (threshold 0, level 1) +debug_print_msg_threshold:0:1:"MyFile":999:"" + +Debug print msg (threshold 0, level 5) +debug_print_msg_threshold:0:5:"MyFile":999:"" + +Debug print return value #1 +mbedtls_debug_print_ret:"MyFile":999:"Test return value":0:"MyFile(0999)\: Test return value() returned 0 (-0x0000)\n" + +Debug print return value #2 +mbedtls_debug_print_ret:"MyFile":999:"Test return value":-0x1000:"MyFile(0999)\: Test return value() returned -4096 (-0x1000)\n" + +Debug print return value #3 +mbedtls_debug_print_ret:"MyFile":999:"Test return value":-0xFFFF:"MyFile(0999)\: Test return value() returned -65535 (-0xffff)\n" + +Debug print buffer #1 +mbedtls_debug_print_buf:"MyFile":999:"Test return value":"":"MyFile(0999)\: dumping 'Test return value' (0 bytes)\n" + +Debug print buffer #2 +mbedtls_debug_print_buf:"MyFile":999:"Test return value":"00":"MyFile(0999)\: dumping 'Test return value' (1 bytes)\nMyFile(0999)\: 0000\: 00 .\n" + +Debug print buffer #3 +mbedtls_debug_print_buf:"MyFile":999:"Test return value":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"MyFile(0999)\: dumping 'Test return value' (16 bytes)\nMyFile(0999)\: 0000\: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f ................\n" + +Debug print buffer #4 +mbedtls_debug_print_buf:"MyFile":999:"Test return value":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F00":"MyFile(0999)\: dumping 'Test return value' (17 bytes)\nMyFile(0999)\: 0000\: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f ................\nMyFile(0999)\: 0010\: 00 .\n" + +Debug print buffer #5 +mbedtls_debug_print_buf:"MyFile":999:"Test return value":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F30":"MyFile(0999)\: dumping 'Test return value' (49 bytes)\nMyFile(0999)\: 0000\: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f ................\nMyFile(0999)\: 0010\: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f ................\nMyFile(0999)\: 0020\: 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f !"#$%&'()*+,-./\nMyFile(0999)\: 0030\: 30 0\n" + +Debug print mbedtls_mpi: 0 (empty representation) +mbedtls_debug_print_mpi:16:"":"MyFile":999:"VALUE":"MyFile(0999)\: value of 'VALUE' (0 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: 00\n" + +Debug print mbedtls_mpi: 0 (non-empty representation) +mbedtls_debug_print_mpi:16:"00000000000000":"MyFile":999:"VALUE":"MyFile(0999)\: value of 'VALUE' (0 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: 00\n" + +Debug print mbedtls_mpi #2: 3 bits +mbedtls_debug_print_mpi:16:"00000000000007":"MyFile":999:"VALUE":"MyFile(0999)\: value of 'VALUE' (3 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: 07\n" + +Debug print mbedtls_mpi: 49 bits +mbedtls_debug_print_mpi:16:"01020304050607":"MyFile":999:"VALUE":"MyFile(0999)\: value of 'VALUE' (49 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07\n" + +Debug print mbedtls_mpi: 759 bits +mbedtls_debug_print_mpi:16:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000041379d00fed1491fe15df284dfde4a142f68aa8d412023195cee66883e6290ffe703f4ea5963bf212713cee46b107c09182b5edcd955adac418bf4918e2889af48e1099d513830cec85c26ac1e158b52620e33ba8692f893efbb2f958b4424":"MyFile":999:"VALUE":"MyFile(0999)\: value of 'VALUE' (759 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: 41 37 9d 00 fe d1 49 1f e1 5d f2 84 df de 4a 14\nMyFile(0999)\: 2f 68 aa 8d 41 20 23 19 5c ee 66 88 3e 62 90 ff\nMyFile(0999)\: e7 03 f4 ea 59 63 bf 21 27 13 ce e4 6b 10 7c 09\nMyFile(0999)\: 18 2b 5e dc d9 55 ad ac 41 8b f4 91 8e 28 89 af\nMyFile(0999)\: 48 e1 09 9d 51 38 30 ce c8 5c 26 ac 1e 15 8b 52\nMyFile(0999)\: 62 0e 33 ba 86 92 f8 93 ef bb 2f 95 8b 44 24\n" + +Debug print mbedtls_mpi: 764 bits #1 +mbedtls_debug_print_mpi:16:"0941379d00fed1491fe15df284dfde4a142f68aa8d412023195cee66883e6290ffe703f4ea5963bf212713cee46b107c09182b5edcd955adac418bf4918e2889af48e1099d513830cec85c26ac1e158b52620e33ba8692f893efbb2f958b4424":"MyFile":999:"VALUE":"MyFile(0999)\: value of 'VALUE' (764 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: 09 41 37 9d 00 fe d1 49 1f e1 5d f2 84 df de 4a\nMyFile(0999)\: 14 2f 68 aa 8d 41 20 23 19 5c ee 66 88 3e 62 90\nMyFile(0999)\: ff e7 03 f4 ea 59 63 bf 21 27 13 ce e4 6b 10 7c\nMyFile(0999)\: 09 18 2b 5e dc d9 55 ad ac 41 8b f4 91 8e 28 89\nMyFile(0999)\: af 48 e1 09 9d 51 38 30 ce c8 5c 26 ac 1e 15 8b\nMyFile(0999)\: 52 62 0e 33 ba 86 92 f8 93 ef bb 2f 95 8b 44 24\n" + +Debug print mbedtls_mpi: 764 bits #2 +mbedtls_debug_print_mpi:16:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000941379d00fed1491fe15df284dfde4a142f68aa8d412023195cee66883e6290ffe703f4ea5963bf212713cee46b107c09182b5edcd955adac418bf4918e2889af48e1099d513830cec85c26ac1e158b52620e33ba8692f893efbb2f958b4424":"MyFile":999:"VALUE":"MyFile(0999)\: value of 'VALUE' (764 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: 09 41 37 9d 00 fe d1 49 1f e1 5d f2 84 df de 4a\nMyFile(0999)\: 14 2f 68 aa 8d 41 20 23 19 5c ee 66 88 3e 62 90\nMyFile(0999)\: ff e7 03 f4 ea 59 63 bf 21 27 13 ce e4 6b 10 7c\nMyFile(0999)\: 09 18 2b 5e dc d9 55 ad ac 41 8b f4 91 8e 28 89\nMyFile(0999)\: af 48 e1 09 9d 51 38 30 ce c8 5c 26 ac 1e 15 8b\nMyFile(0999)\: 52 62 0e 33 ba 86 92 f8 93 ef bb 2f 95 8b 44 24\n" + +Debug print certificate #1 (RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_debug_print_crt:"data_files/server1.crt":"MyFile":999:"PREFIX_":"MyFile(0999)\: PREFIX_ #1\:\nMyFile(0999)\: cert. version \: 3\nMyFile(0999)\: serial number \: 01\nMyFile(0999)\: issuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nMyFile(0999)\: subject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nMyFile(0999)\: issued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nMyFile(0999)\: expires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nMyFile(0999)\: signed using \: RSA with SHA1\nMyFile(0999)\: RSA key size \: 2048 bits\nMyFile(0999)\: basic constraints \: CA=false\nMyFile(0999)\: value of 'crt->rsa.N' (2048 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: a9 02 1f 3d 40 6a d5 55 53 8b fd 36 ee 82 65 2e\nMyFile(0999)\: 15 61 5e 89 bf b8 e8 45 90 db ee 88 16 52 d3 f1\nMyFile(0999)\: 43 50 47 96 12 59 64 87 6b fd 2b e0 46 f9 73 be\nMyFile(0999)\: dd cf 92 e1 91 5b ed 66 a0 6f 89 29 79 45 80 d0\nMyFile(0999)\: 83 6a d5 41 43 77 5f 39 7c 09 04 47 82 b0 57 39\nMyFile(0999)\: 70 ed a3 ec 15 19 1e a8 33 08 47 c1 05 42 a9 fd\nMyFile(0999)\: 4c c3 b4 df dd 06 1f 4d 10 51 40 67 73 13 0f 40\nMyFile(0999)\: f8 6d 81 25 5f 0a b1 53 c6 30 7e 15 39 ac f9 5a\nMyFile(0999)\: ee 7f 92 9e a6 05 5b e7 13 97 85 b5 23 92 d9 d4\nMyFile(0999)\: 24 06 d5 09 25 89 75 07 dd a6 1a 8f 3f 09 19 be\nMyFile(0999)\: ad 65 2c 64 eb 95 9b dc fe 41 5e 17 a6 da 6c 5b\nMyFile(0999)\: 69 cc 02 ba 14 2c 16 24 9c 4a dc cd d0 f7 52 67\nMyFile(0999)\: 73 f1 2d a0 23 fd 7e f4 31 ca 2d 70 ca 89 0b 04\nMyFile(0999)\: db 2e a6 4f 70 6e 9e ce bd 58 89 e2 53 59 9e 6e\nMyFile(0999)\: 5a 92 65 e2 88 3f 0c 94 19 a3 dd e5 e8 9d 95 13\nMyFile(0999)\: ed 29 db ab 70 12 dc 5a ca 6b 17 ab 52 82 54 b1\nMyFile(0999)\: value of 'crt->rsa.E' (17 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: 01 00 01\n" + +Debug print certificate #2 (EC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_debug_print_crt:"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"MyFile":999:"PREFIX_":"MyFile(0999)\: PREFIX_ #1\:\nMyFile(0999)\: cert. version \: 3\nMyFile(0999)\: serial number \: C1\:43\:E2\:7E\:62\:43\:CC\:E8\nMyFile(0999)\: issuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nMyFile(0999)\: subject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nMyFile(0999)\: issued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:00\nMyFile(0999)\: expires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:00\nMyFile(0999)\: signed using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nMyFile(0999)\: EC key size \: 384 bits\nMyFile(0999)\: basic constraints \: CA=true\nMyFile(0999)\: value of 'crt->eckey.Q(X)' (384 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: c3 da 2b 34 41 37 58 2f 87 56 fe fc 89 ba 29 43\nMyFile(0999)\: 4b 4e e0 6e c3 0e 57 53 33 39 58 d4 52 b4 91 95\nMyFile(0999)\: 39 0b 23 df 5f 17 24 62 48 fc 1a 95 29 ce 2c 2d\nMyFile(0999)\: value of 'crt->eckey.Q(Y)' (384 bits) is\:\nMyFile(0999)\: 87 c2 88 52 80 af d6 6a ab 21 dd b8 d3 1c 6e 58\nMyFile(0999)\: b8 ca e8 b2 69 8e f3 41 ad 29 c3 b4 5f 75 a7 47\nMyFile(0999)\: 6f d5 19 29 55 69 9a 53 3b 20 b4 66 16 60 33 1e\n" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fe5549a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "string.h" + +struct buffer_data +{ + char buf[2000]; + char *ptr; +}; + +void string_debug(void *data, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *str) +{ + struct buffer_data *buffer = (struct buffer_data *) data; + char *p = buffer->ptr; + ((void) level); + + memcpy( p, file, strlen( file ) ); + p += strlen( file ); + + *p++ = '('; + *p++ = '0' + ( line / 1000 ) % 10; + *p++ = '0' + ( line / 100 ) % 10; + *p++ = '0' + ( line / 10 ) % 10; + *p++ = '0' + ( line / 1 ) % 10; + *p++ = ')'; + *p++ = ':'; + *p++ = ' '; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Skip "thread ID" (up to the first space) as it is not predictable */ + while( *str++ != ' ' ); +#endif + + memcpy( p, str, strlen( str ) ); + p += strlen( str ); + + /* Detect if debug messages output partial lines and mark them */ + if( p[-1] != '\n' ) + *p++ = '*'; + + buffer->ptr = p; +} +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void debug_print_msg_threshold( int threshold, int level, char * file, + int line, char * result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + struct buffer_data buffer; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + memset( buffer.buf, 0, 2000 ); + buffer.ptr = buffer.buf; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( threshold ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, string_debug, &buffer); + + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( &ssl, level, file, line, + "Text message, 2 == %d", 2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buffer.buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret( char * file, int line, char * text, int value, + char * result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + struct buffer_data buffer; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + memset( buffer.buf, 0, 2000 ); + buffer.ptr = buffer.buf; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, string_debug, &buffer); + + mbedtls_debug_print_ret( &ssl, 0, file, line, text, value); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buffer.buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf( char * file, int line, char * text, + data_t * data, char * result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + struct buffer_data buffer; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + memset( buffer.buf, 0, 2000 ); + buffer.ptr = buffer.buf; + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, string_debug, &buffer); + + mbedtls_debug_print_buf( &ssl, 0, file, line, text, data->x, data->len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buffer.buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt( char * crt_file, char * file, int line, + char * prefix, char * result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + struct buffer_data buffer; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( buffer.buf, 0, 2000 ); + buffer.ptr = buffer.buf; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, string_debug, &buffer); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_debug_print_crt( &ssl, 0, file, line, prefix, &crt); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buffer.buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( int radix, char * value, char * file, int line, + char * prefix, char * result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + struct buffer_data buffer; + mbedtls_mpi val; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &val ); + memset( buffer.buf, 0, 2000 ); + buffer.ptr = buffer.buf; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &val, radix, value ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, string_debug, &buffer); + + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( &ssl, 0, file, line, prefix, &val); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buffer.buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &val ); + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_des.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_des.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3eeb6954 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_des.data @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +DES check weak key #1 +des_check_weak:"0101010101010101":1 + +DES check weak key #2 +des_check_weak:"FEE0FEE0FEF1FEF1":1 + +DES check weak key #3 +des_check_weak:"0101010101010100":0 + +DES check weak key #4 +des_check_weak:"EEE0FEE0FEF1FEF1":0 + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #1 +des_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"0000000000000000":"8CA64DE9C1B123A7" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #2 +des_encrypt_ecb:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"7359B2163E4EDC58" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #3 +des_encrypt_ecb:"3000000000000000":"1000000000000001":"958E6E627A05557B" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #4 +des_encrypt_ecb:"1111111111111111":"1111111111111111":"F40379AB9E0EC533" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #5 +des_encrypt_ecb:"0123456789ABCDEF":"1111111111111111":"17668DFC7292532D" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #6 +des_encrypt_ecb:"1111111111111111":"0123456789ABCDEF":"8A5AE1F81AB8F2DD" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #7 +des_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"0000000000000000":"8CA64DE9C1B123A7" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #8 +des_encrypt_ecb:"FEDCBA9876543210":"0123456789ABCDEF":"ED39D950FA74BCC4" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #9 +des_encrypt_ecb:"7CA110454A1A6E57":"01A1D6D039776742":"690F5B0D9A26939B" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #10 +des_encrypt_ecb:"0131D9619DC1376E":"5CD54CA83DEF57DA":"7A389D10354BD271" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #11 +des_encrypt_ecb:"07A1133E4A0B2686":"0248D43806F67172":"868EBB51CAB4599A" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #12 +des_encrypt_ecb:"3849674C2602319E":"51454B582DDF440A":"7178876E01F19B2A" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #13 +des_encrypt_ecb:"04B915BA43FEB5B6":"42FD443059577FA2":"AF37FB421F8C4095" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #14 +des_encrypt_ecb:"0113B970FD34F2CE":"059B5E0851CF143A":"86A560F10EC6D85B" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #15 +des_encrypt_ecb:"0170F175468FB5E6":"0756D8E0774761D2":"0CD3DA020021DC09" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #16 +des_encrypt_ecb:"43297FAD38E373FE":"762514B829BF486A":"EA676B2CB7DB2B7A" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #17 +des_encrypt_ecb:"07A7137045DA2A16":"3BDD119049372802":"DFD64A815CAF1A0F" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #18 +des_encrypt_ecb:"04689104C2FD3B2F":"26955F6835AF609A":"5C513C9C4886C088" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #19 +des_encrypt_ecb:"37D06BB516CB7546":"164D5E404F275232":"0A2AEEAE3FF4AB77" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #20 +des_encrypt_ecb:"1F08260D1AC2465E":"6B056E18759F5CCA":"EF1BF03E5DFA575A" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #21 +des_encrypt_ecb:"584023641ABA6176":"004BD6EF09176062":"88BF0DB6D70DEE56" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #22 +des_encrypt_ecb:"025816164629B007":"480D39006EE762F2":"A1F9915541020B56" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #23 +des_encrypt_ecb:"49793EBC79B3258F":"437540C8698F3CFA":"6FBF1CAFCFFD0556" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #24 +des_encrypt_ecb:"4FB05E1515AB73A7":"072D43A077075292":"2F22E49BAB7CA1AC" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #25 +des_encrypt_ecb:"49E95D6D4CA229BF":"02FE55778117F12A":"5A6B612CC26CCE4A" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #26 +des_encrypt_ecb:"018310DC409B26D6":"1D9D5C5018F728C2":"5F4C038ED12B2E41" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #27 +des_encrypt_ecb:"1C587F1C13924FEF":"305532286D6F295A":"63FAC0D034D9F793" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #28 +des_encrypt_ecb:"0101010101010101":"0123456789ABCDEF":"617B3A0CE8F07100" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #29 +des_encrypt_ecb:"1F1F1F1F0E0E0E0E":"0123456789ABCDEF":"DB958605F8C8C606" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #30 +des_encrypt_ecb:"E0FEE0FEF1FEF1FE":"0123456789ABCDEF":"EDBFD1C66C29CCC7" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #31 +des_encrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"355550B2150E2451" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #32 +des_encrypt_ecb:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"0000000000000000":"CAAAAF4DEAF1DBAE" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #33 +des_encrypt_ecb:"0123456789ABCDEF":"0000000000000000":"D5D44FF720683D0D" + +DES Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #34 +des_encrypt_ecb:"FEDCBA9876543210":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"2A2BB008DF97C2F2" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #1 +des_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"8CA64DE9C1B123A7":"0000000000000000" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #2 +des_decrypt_ecb:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"7359B2163E4EDC58":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #3 +des_decrypt_ecb:"3000000000000000":"958E6E627A05557B":"1000000000000001" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #4 +des_decrypt_ecb:"1111111111111111":"F40379AB9E0EC533":"1111111111111111" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #5 +des_decrypt_ecb:"0123456789ABCDEF":"17668DFC7292532D":"1111111111111111" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #6 +des_decrypt_ecb:"1111111111111111":"8A5AE1F81AB8F2DD":"0123456789ABCDEF" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #7 +des_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"8CA64DE9C1B123A7":"0000000000000000" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #8 +des_decrypt_ecb:"FEDCBA9876543210":"ED39D950FA74BCC4":"0123456789ABCDEF" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #9 +des_decrypt_ecb:"7CA110454A1A6E57":"690F5B0D9A26939B":"01A1D6D039776742" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #10 +des_decrypt_ecb:"0131D9619DC1376E":"7A389D10354BD271":"5CD54CA83DEF57DA" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #11 +des_decrypt_ecb:"07A1133E4A0B2686":"868EBB51CAB4599A":"0248D43806F67172" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #12 +des_decrypt_ecb:"3849674C2602319E":"7178876E01F19B2A":"51454B582DDF440A" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #13 +des_decrypt_ecb:"04B915BA43FEB5B6":"AF37FB421F8C4095":"42FD443059577FA2" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #14 +des_decrypt_ecb:"0113B970FD34F2CE":"86A560F10EC6D85B":"059B5E0851CF143A" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #15 +des_decrypt_ecb:"0170F175468FB5E6":"0CD3DA020021DC09":"0756D8E0774761D2" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #16 +des_decrypt_ecb:"43297FAD38E373FE":"EA676B2CB7DB2B7A":"762514B829BF486A" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #17 +des_decrypt_ecb:"07A7137045DA2A16":"DFD64A815CAF1A0F":"3BDD119049372802" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #18 +des_decrypt_ecb:"04689104C2FD3B2F":"5C513C9C4886C088":"26955F6835AF609A" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #19 +des_decrypt_ecb:"37D06BB516CB7546":"0A2AEEAE3FF4AB77":"164D5E404F275232" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #20 +des_decrypt_ecb:"1F08260D1AC2465E":"EF1BF03E5DFA575A":"6B056E18759F5CCA" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #21 +des_decrypt_ecb:"584023641ABA6176":"88BF0DB6D70DEE56":"004BD6EF09176062" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #22 +des_decrypt_ecb:"025816164629B007":"A1F9915541020B56":"480D39006EE762F2" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #23 +des_decrypt_ecb:"49793EBC79B3258F":"6FBF1CAFCFFD0556":"437540C8698F3CFA" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #24 +des_decrypt_ecb:"4FB05E1515AB73A7":"2F22E49BAB7CA1AC":"072D43A077075292" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #25 +des_decrypt_ecb:"49E95D6D4CA229BF":"5A6B612CC26CCE4A":"02FE55778117F12A" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #26 +des_decrypt_ecb:"018310DC409B26D6":"5F4C038ED12B2E41":"1D9D5C5018F728C2" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #27 +des_decrypt_ecb:"1C587F1C13924FEF":"63FAC0D034D9F793":"305532286D6F295A" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #28 +des_decrypt_ecb:"0101010101010101":"617B3A0CE8F07100":"0123456789ABCDEF" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #29 +des_decrypt_ecb:"1F1F1F1F0E0E0E0E":"DB958605F8C8C606":"0123456789ABCDEF" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #30 +des_decrypt_ecb:"E0FEE0FEF1FEF1FE":"EDBFD1C66C29CCC7":"0123456789ABCDEF" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #31 +des_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000":"355550B2150E2451":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #32 +des_decrypt_ecb:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"CAAAAF4DEAF1DBAE":"0000000000000000" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #33 +des_decrypt_ecb:"0123456789ABCDEF":"D5D44FF720683D0D":"0000000000000000" + +DES Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #34 +des_decrypt_ecb:"FEDCBA9876543210":"2A2BB008DF97C2F2":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" + +DES-CBC Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #1 +des_encrypt_cbc:"0123456789abcdef":"fedcba9876543210":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520":"ccd173ffab2039f4acd8aefddfd8a1eb468e91157888ba68":0 + +DES-CBC Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #1 +des_decrypt_cbc:"0123456789abcdef":"fedcba9876543210":"ccd173ffab2039f4acd8aefddfd8a1eb468e91157888ba68":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520":0 + +3DES-ECB 2Key Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #1 +des3_encrypt_ecb:2:"0000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"0000000000000000":"9295B59BB384736E" + +3DES-ECB 2Key Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #2 +des3_encrypt_ecb:2:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF3000000000000000":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"199E9D6DF39AA816" + +3DES-ECB 2Key Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #1 +des3_decrypt_ecb:2:"0000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"9295B59BB384736E":"0000000000000000" + +3DES-ECB 2Key Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #2 +des3_decrypt_ecb:2:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF3000000000000000":"199E9D6DF39AA816":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" + +3DES-CBC 3Key Encrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #1 +des3_encrypt_cbc:3:"0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210":"fedcba9876543210":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520":"3FE301C962AC01D02213763C1CBD4CDC799657C064ECF5D4":0 + +3DES-CBC 3Key Decrypt OpenSSL Test Vector #1 +des3_decrypt_cbc:3:"0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210":"fedcba9876543210":"3FE301C962AC01D02213763C1CBD4CDC799657C064ECF5D4":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520":0 + +DES-CBC Encrypt (Invalid input length) +des_encrypt_cbc:"0123456789abcdef":"fedcba9876543210":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D65":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +3DES-CBC 3Key Encrypt (Invalid input length) +des3_encrypt_cbc:3:"0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210":"fedcba9876543210":"37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D65":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +Run through parity bit tests +des_key_parity_run: + +DES Selftest +des_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7256fb53 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_des.function @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void des_check_weak( data_t * key, int ret ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_key_check_weak( key->x ) == ret ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void des_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_des_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_des_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void des_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_des_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_des_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void des_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_des_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_des_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len, + dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void des_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst, + int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_des_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_des_init( &ctx ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result ); + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len, + dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void des3_encrypt_ecb( int key_count, data_t * key_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_des3_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_des3_init( &ctx ); + + + if( key_count == 2 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + else if( key_count == 3 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des3_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void des3_decrypt_ecb( int key_count, data_t * key_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_des3_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_des3_init( &ctx ); + + + if( key_count == 2 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + else if( key_count == 3 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( &ctx, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des3_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void des3_encrypt_cbc( int key_count, data_t * key_str, + data_t * iv_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst, int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_des3_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_des3_init( &ctx ); + + + if( key_count == 2 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + else if( key_count == 3 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result ); + + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_des3_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void des3_decrypt_cbc( int key_count, data_t * key_str, + data_t * iv_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst, int cbc_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_des3_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + mbedtls_des3_init( &ctx ); + + + if( key_count == 2 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + else if( key_count == 3 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx, key_str->x ) == 0 ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, src_str->x, output ) == cbc_result ); + + if( cbc_result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, src_str->len, + dst->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_des3_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void des_key_parity_run( ) +{ + int i, j, cnt; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]; + unsigned int parity; + + memset( key, 0, MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE ); + cnt = 0; + + // Iterate through all possible byte values + // + for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 8; j++ ) + key[j] = cnt++; + + // Set the key parity according to the table + // + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( key ); + + // Check the parity with a function + // + for( j = 0; j < 8; j++ ) + { + parity = key[j] ^ ( key[j] >> 4 ); + parity = parity ^ + ( parity >> 1 ) ^ + ( parity >> 2 ) ^ + ( parity >> 3 ); + parity &= 1; + + if( parity != 1 ) + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + } + + // Check the parity with the table + // + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity( key ) == 0 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void des_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_des_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4e13e485 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: tiny x_size +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman parameter validation +dhm_invalid_params: + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit, x_size=3 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":3:10:"5":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit, x_size=2 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":2:10:"5":0 + +## Repeat this test case and a few similar ones several times. The RNG state +## changes, so we get to exercise the code with a few different values. +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #1 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #2 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #3 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #4 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #5 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0 + +## This is x_size = P_size + 1. Arguably x_size > P_size makes no sense, +## but it's the current undocumented behavior to treat it the same as when +## x_size = P_size. If this behavior changes in the future, change the expected +## return status from 0 to MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA. +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=14 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":14:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #1 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #2 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #3 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #4 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #5 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=12 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":12:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=11 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":11:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #1 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #2 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #3 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #4 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #5 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0 + +Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 286-bit +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623982317398171298719873918739182739712938719287391879381271":36:10:"9345098309485093845098340962223981329819812792137312973297123912791271":0 + +Diffie-Hellman small modulus +dhm_do_dhm:10:"3":1:10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED+MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman zero modulus +dhm_do_dhm:10:"0":1:10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman with G=0 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman with G=1 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman with G=-1 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"-1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman with G=P-1 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"93450983094850938450983409622":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman with G=P-2 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"93450983094850938450983409621":0 + +Diffie-Hellman with G=P +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman with G=P+1 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"93450983094850938450983409624":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman with G=P+2 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"93450983094850938450983409625":0 + +Diffie-Hellman: x_size < 0 +dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":-1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman MPI_MAX_SIZE modulus +dhm_make_public:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:"5":0 + +Diffie-Hellman MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1 modulus +dhm_make_public:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED+MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Diffie-Hellman load parameters from file [#1] +dhm_file:"data_files/dhparams.pem":"9e35f430443a09904f3a39a979797d070df53378e79c2438bef4e761f3c714553328589b041c809be1d6c6b5f1fc9f47d3a25443188253a992a56818b37ba9de5a40d362e56eff0be5417474c125c199272c8fe41dea733df6f662c92ae76556e755d10c64e6a50968f67fc6ea73d0dca8569be2ba204e23580d8bca2f4975b3":"02":128 + +Diffie-Hellman load parameters from file [#2] +dhm_file:"data_files/dh.optlen.pem":"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":"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":256 + +Diffie-Hellman selftest +dhm_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96ff2ac7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function @@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" + +/* Sanity checks on a Diffie-Hellman parameter: check the length-value + * syntax and check that the value is the expected one (taken from the + * DHM context by the caller). */ +static int check_dhm_param_output( const mbedtls_mpi *expected, + const unsigned char *buffer, + size_t size, + size_t *offset ) +{ + size_t n; + mbedtls_mpi actual; + int ok = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual ); + + ++mbedtls_test_info.step; + + TEST_ASSERT( size >= *offset + 2 ); + n = ( buffer[*offset] << 8 ) | buffer[*offset + 1]; + *offset += 2; + /* The DHM param output from Mbed TLS has leading zeros stripped, as + * permitted but not required by RFC 5246 \S4.4. */ + TEST_EQUAL( n, mbedtls_mpi_size( expected ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( size >= *offset + n ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &actual, buffer + *offset, n ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( expected, &actual ) ); + *offset += n; + + ok = 1; +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &actual ); + return( ok ); +} + +/* Sanity checks on Diffie-Hellman parameters: syntax, range, and comparison + * against the context. */ +static int check_dhm_params( const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + size_t x_size, + const unsigned char *ske, size_t ske_len ) +{ + size_t offset = 0; + + /* Check that ctx->X and ctx->GX are within range. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->X, 1 ) > 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) < 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->X ) <= x_size ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->GX, 1 ) > 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) < 0 ); + + /* Check ske: it must contain P, G and G^X, each prefixed with a + * 2-byte size. */ + if( !check_dhm_param_output( &ctx->P, ske, ske_len, &offset ) ) + goto exit; + if( !check_dhm_param_output( &ctx->G, ske, ske_len, &offset ) ) + goto exit; + if( !check_dhm_param_output( &ctx->GX, ske, ske_len, &offset ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( offset, ske_len ); + + return( 1 ); +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_DHM_C:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void dhm_invalid_params( ) +{ + mbedtls_dhm_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[42] = { 0 }; + unsigned char *buf_null = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi X; + size_t const buflen = sizeof( buf ); + size_t len; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_dhm_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_dhm_free( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_read_params( NULL, + (unsigned char**) &buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ctx, &buf_null, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ctx, NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ctx, + (unsigned char**) &buf, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_make_params( NULL, buflen, + buf, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx, buflen, + NULL, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx, buflen, + buf, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx, buflen, + buf, &len, + NULL, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_set_group( NULL, &X, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_set_group( &ctx, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_set_group( &ctx, &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_read_public( NULL, buf, buflen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ctx, NULL, buflen ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_make_public( NULL, buflen, + buf, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ctx, buflen, + NULL, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ctx, buflen, + buf, buflen, + NULL, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( NULL, buf, buflen, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx, NULL, buflen, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx, buf, buflen, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( NULL, buf, buflen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( &ctx, NULL, buflen ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( NULL, "" ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( &ctx, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void dhm_do_dhm( int radix_P, char *input_P, int x_size, + int radix_G, char *input_G, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_dhm_context ctx_srv; + mbedtls_dhm_context ctx_cli; + unsigned char ske[1000]; + unsigned char *p = ske; + unsigned char pub_cli[1000]; + unsigned char sec_srv[1000]; + unsigned char sec_cli[1000]; + size_t ske_len = 0; + size_t pub_cli_len = 0; + size_t sec_srv_len; + size_t sec_cli_len; + int i; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_dhm_init( &ctx_srv ); + mbedtls_dhm_init( &ctx_cli ); + memset( ske, 0x00, 1000 ); + memset( pub_cli, 0x00, 1000 ); + memset( sec_srv, 0x00, 1000 ); + memset( sec_cli, 0x00, 1000 ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + /* + * Set params + */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx_srv.P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx_srv.G, radix_G, input_G ) == 0 ); + pub_cli_len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx_srv.P ); + + /* + * First key exchange + */ + mbedtls_test_set_step( 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, &ske_len, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == result ); + if ( result != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( !check_dhm_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, ske_len ) ) + goto exit; + + ske[ske_len++] = 0; + ske[ske_len++] = 0; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ctx_cli, &p, ske + ske_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ctx_cli, x_size, pub_cli, pub_cli_len, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ctx_srv, pub_cli, pub_cli_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_srv, sec_srv, sizeof( sec_srv ), + &sec_srv_len, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_cli, sec_cli, sizeof( sec_cli ), &sec_cli_len, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len == sec_cli_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( sec_srv, sec_cli, sec_srv_len ) == 0 ); + + /* Re-do calc_secret on server a few times to test update of blinding values */ + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( 20 + i ); + sec_srv_len = 1000; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_srv, sec_srv, + sizeof( sec_srv ), &sec_srv_len, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len == sec_cli_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( sec_srv, sec_cli, sec_srv_len ) == 0 ); + } + + /* + * Second key exchange to test change of blinding values on server + */ + p = ske; + + mbedtls_test_set_step( 30 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, &ske_len, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + if( !check_dhm_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, ske_len ) ) + goto exit; + ske[ske_len++] = 0; + ske[ske_len++] = 0; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ctx_cli, &p, ske + ske_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ctx_cli, x_size, pub_cli, pub_cli_len, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ctx_srv, pub_cli, pub_cli_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_srv, sec_srv, sizeof( sec_srv ), + &sec_srv_len, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_cli, sec_cli, sizeof( sec_cli ), &sec_cli_len, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len == sec_cli_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( sec_srv, sec_cli, sec_srv_len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_dhm_free( &ctx_srv ); + mbedtls_dhm_free( &ctx_cli ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void dhm_make_public( int P_bytes, int radix_G, char *input_G, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi P, G; + mbedtls_dhm_context ctx; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); + mbedtls_dhm_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &P, ( P_bytes * 8 ) - 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &P, 0, 1 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &G, radix_G, input_G ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_set_group( &ctx, &P, &G ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ctx, (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &P ), + output, sizeof(output), + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + NULL ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); + mbedtls_dhm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void dhm_file( char * filename, char * p, char * g, int len ) +{ + mbedtls_dhm_context ctx; + mbedtls_mpi P, G; + + mbedtls_dhm_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, 16, p ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &G, 16, g ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( &ctx, filename ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ctx.len == (size_t) len ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx.P, &P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx.G, &G ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); + mbedtls_dhm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void dhm_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fb4a232f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.data @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +ECDH - Valid parameters +ecdh_valid_param: + +ECDH - Invalid parameters +ecdh_invalid_param: + +ECDH primitive random #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecdh_primitive_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECDH primitive random #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecdh_primitive_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 + +ECDH primitive random #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_primitive_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 + +ECDH primitive random #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecdh_primitive_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 + +ECDH primitive random #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdh_primitive_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 + +ECDH primitive rfc 5903 p256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_primitive_testvec:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"DAD0B65394221CF9B051E1FECA5787D098DFE637FC90B9EF945D0C3772581180":"5271A0461CDB8252D61F1C456FA3E59AB1F45B33ACCF5F58389E0577B8990BB3":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D12DFB5289C8D4F81208B70270398C342296970A0BCCB74C736FC7554494BF63":"56FBF3CA366CC23E8157854C13C58D6AAC23F046ADA30F8353E74F33039872AB":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE" + +ECDH primitive rfc 5903 p384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecdh_primitive_testvec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primitive rfc 5903 p521 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdh_primitive_testvec:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"0037ADE9319A89F4DABDB3EF411AACCCA5123C61ACAB57B5393DCE47608172A095AA85A30FE1C2952C6771D937BA9777F5957B2639BAB072462F68C27A57382D4A52":"0015417E84DBF28C0AD3C278713349DC7DF153C897A1891BD98BAB4357C9ECBEE1E3BF42E00B8E380AEAE57C2D107564941885942AF5A7F4601723C4195D176CED3E":"017CAE20B6641D2EEB695786D8C946146239D099E18E1D5A514C739D7CB4A10AD8A788015AC405D7799DC75E7B7D5B6CF2261A6A7F1507438BF01BEB6CA3926F9582":"0145BA99A847AF43793FDD0E872E7CDFA16BE30FDC780F97BCCC3F078380201E9C677D600B343757A3BDBF2A3163E4C2F869CCA7458AA4A4EFFC311F5CB151685EB9":"00D0B3975AC4B799F5BEA16D5E13E9AF971D5E9B984C9F39728B5E5739735A219B97C356436ADC6E95BB0352F6BE64A6C2912D4EF2D0433CED2B6171640012D9460F":"015C68226383956E3BD066E797B623C27CE0EAC2F551A10C2C724D9852077B87220B6536C5C408A1D2AEBB8E86D678AE49CB57091F4732296579AB44FCD17F0FC56A":"01144C7D79AE6956BC8EDB8E7C787C4521CB086FA64407F97894E5E6B2D79B04D1427E73CA4BAA240A34786859810C06B3C715A3A8CC3151F2BEE417996D19F3DDEA" + +ECDH exchange #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECDH exchange #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 + +ECDH restartable rfc 5903 p256 restart enabled max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE":1:0:0:0 + +ECDH restartable rfc 5903 p256 restart enabled max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE":1:1:1:10000 + +ECDH restartable rfc 5903 p256 restart enabled max_ops=10000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE":1:10000:0:0 + +ECDH restartable rfc 5903 p256 restart enabled max_ops=250 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE":1:250:2:32 + +ECDH restartable rfc 5903 p256 restart disabled max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE":0:0:0:0 + +ECDH restartable rfc 5903 p256 restart disabled max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE":0:1:0:0 + +ECDH restartable rfc 5903 p256 restart disabled max_ops=10000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE":0:10000:0:0 + +ECDH restartable rfc 5903 p256 restart disabled max_ops=250 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE":0:250:0:0 + +ECDH exchange legacy context +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange_legacy:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECDH calc_secret: ours first, SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange_calc_secret:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"c6ef9c5d78ae012a011164acb397ce2088685d8f06bf9be0b283ab46476bee53":"04dad0b65394221cf9b051e1feca5787d098dfe637fc90b9ef945d0c37725811805271a0461cdb8252d61f1c456fa3e59ab1f45b33accf5f58389e0577b8990bb3":0:"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de" + +ECDH calc_secret: theirs first, SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange_calc_secret:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"c6ef9c5d78ae012a011164acb397ce2088685d8f06bf9be0b283ab46476bee53":"04dad0b65394221cf9b051e1feca5787d098dfe637fc90b9ef945d0c37725811805271a0461cdb8252d61f1c456fa3e59ab1f45b33accf5f58389e0577b8990bb3":1:"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de" + +ecdh calc_secret: ours first (Alice), curve25519 (rfc 7748) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange_calc_secret:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":"de9edb7d7b7dc1b4d35b61c2ece435373f8343c85b78674dadfc7e146f882b4f":0:"4a5d9d5ba4ce2de1728e3bf480350f25e07e21c947d19e3376f09b3c1e161742" + +ecdh calc_secret: theirs first (Alice), curve25519 (rfc 7748) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange_calc_secret:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":"de9edb7d7b7dc1b4d35b61c2ece435373f8343c85b78674dadfc7e146f882b4f":1:"4a5d9d5ba4ce2de1728e3bf480350f25e07e21c947d19e3376f09b3c1e161742" + +ecdh calc_secret: ours first (Bob), curve25519 (rfc 7748) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange_calc_secret:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"5dab087e624a8a4b79e17f8b83800ee66f3bb1292618b6fd1c2f8b27ff88e0eb":"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":0:"4a5d9d5ba4ce2de1728e3bf480350f25e07e21c947d19e3376f09b3c1e161742" + +ECDH get_params with mismatched groups: our BP256R1, their SECP256R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange_get_params_fail:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:"1234567812345678123456781234567812345678123456781234567812345678":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04dad0b65394221cf9b051e1feca5787d098dfe637fc90b9ef945d0c37725811805271a0461cdb8252d61f1c456fa3e59ab1f45b33accf5f58389e0577b8990bb3":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECDH get_params with mismatched groups: their SECP256R1, our BP256R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +ecdh_exchange_get_params_fail:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:"1234567812345678123456781234567812345678123456781234567812345678":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04dad0b65394221cf9b051e1feca5787d098dfe637fc90b9ef945d0c37725811805271a0461cdb8252d61f1c456fa3e59ab1f45b33accf5f58389e0577b8990bb3":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..acc59c54 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function @@ -0,0 +1,619 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" + +static int load_public_key( int grp_id, data_t *point, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp ) +{ + int ok = 0; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp->grp, grp_id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp->grp, + &ecp->Q, + point->x, + point->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &ecp->grp, + &ecp->Q ) == 0 ); + ok = 1; +exit: + return( ok ); +} + +static int load_private_key( int grp_id, data_t *private_key, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info *rnd_info ) +{ + int ok = 0; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_read_key( grp_id, ecp, + private_key->x, + private_key->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &ecp->grp, &ecp->d ) == 0 ); + /* Calculate the public key from the private key. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, + &ecp->grp.G, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + rnd_info ) == 0 ); + ok = 1; +exit: + return( ok ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdh_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecdh_free( NULL ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void ecdh_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ctx; + mbedtls_mpi m; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair kp; + size_t olen; + unsigned char buf[42] = { 0 }; + const unsigned char *buf_null = NULL; + size_t const buflen = sizeof( buf ); + int invalid_side = 42; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id valid_grp = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecdh_init( NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( NULL, &m, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &grp, NULL, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &grp, &m, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &grp, &m, &P, + NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( NULL, &m, &P, &m, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, NULL, &P, &m, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &m, NULL, &m, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &m, &P, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_setup( NULL, valid_grp ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( NULL, &olen, buf, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &ctx, NULL, buf, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &ctx, &olen, NULL, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &ctx, &olen, buf, buflen, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( NULL, + (const unsigned char**) &buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ctx, &buf_null, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ctx, NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ctx, + (const unsigned char**) &buf, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( NULL, &kp, + MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ctx, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ctx, &kp, + invalid_side ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( NULL, &olen, buf, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ctx, NULL, buf, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ctx, &olen, NULL, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ctx, &olen, buf, buflen, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( NULL, buf, buflen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ctx, NULL, buflen ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( NULL, &olen, buf, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ctx, NULL, buf, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ctx, &olen, NULL, buflen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdh_primitive_random( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point qA, qB; + mbedtls_mpi dA, dB, zA, zB; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &qA ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &qB ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &dB ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &zA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &zB ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &grp, &dA, &qA, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &grp, &dB, &qB, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zA, &qB, &dA, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zB, &qA, &dB, + NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &zA, &zB ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &qA ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &qB ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &dB ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &zA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &zB ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdh_primitive_testvec( int id, data_t * rnd_buf_A, char * xA_str, + char * yA_str, data_t * rnd_buf_B, + char * xB_str, char * yB_str, char * z_str ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point qA, qB; + mbedtls_mpi dA, dB, zA, zB, check; + mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info rnd_info_A, rnd_info_B; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &qA ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &qB ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &dB ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &zA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &zB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &check ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + rnd_info_A.buf = rnd_buf_A->x; + rnd_info_A.length = rnd_buf_A->len; + rnd_info_A.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand; + rnd_info_A.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + + /* Fix rnd_buf_A->x by shifting it left if necessary */ + if( grp.nbits % 8 != 0 ) + { + unsigned char shift = 8 - ( grp.nbits % 8 ); + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < rnd_info_A.length - 1; i++ ) + rnd_buf_A->x[i] = rnd_buf_A->x[i] << shift + | rnd_buf_A->x[i+1] >> ( 8 - shift ); + + rnd_buf_A->x[rnd_info_A.length-1] <<= shift; + } + + rnd_info_B.buf = rnd_buf_B->x; + rnd_info_B.length = rnd_buf_B->len; + rnd_info_B.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand; + rnd_info_B.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + + /* Fix rnd_buf_B->x by shifting it left if necessary */ + if( grp.nbits % 8 != 0 ) + { + unsigned char shift = 8 - ( grp.nbits % 8 ); + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < rnd_info_B.length - 1; i++ ) + rnd_buf_B->x[i] = rnd_buf_B->x[i] << shift + | rnd_buf_B->x[i+1] >> ( 8 - shift ); + + rnd_buf_B->x[rnd_info_B.length-1] <<= shift; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &grp, &dA, &qA, + mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, + &rnd_info_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &qA ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &check, 16, xA_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &qA.X, &check ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &check, 16, yA_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &qA.Y, &check ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &grp, &dB, &qB, + mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, + &rnd_info_B ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &qB ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &check, 16, xB_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &qB.X, &check ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &check, 16, yB_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &qB.Y, &check ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &check, 16, z_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zA, &qB, &dA, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &zA, &check ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zB, &qA, &dB, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &zB, &check ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &qA ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &qB ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &dB ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &zA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &zB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &check ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdh_exchange( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdh_context srv, cli; + unsigned char buf[1000]; + const unsigned char *vbuf; + size_t len; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + unsigned char res_buf[1000]; + size_t res_len; + + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &srv ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &cli ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &srv, id ) == 0 ); + + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); vbuf = buf; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &srv, &len, buf, 1000, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &cli, &vbuf, buf + len ) == 0 ); + + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &cli, &len, buf, 1000, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &srv, &len, buf, 1000, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &cli, &res_len, res_buf, 1000, + NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( len == res_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, res_buf, len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &srv ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &cli ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +void ecdh_restart( int id, data_t *dA, data_t *dB, data_t *z, + int enable, int max_ops, int min_restart, int max_restart ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_ecdh_context srv, cli; + unsigned char buf[1000]; + const unsigned char *vbuf; + size_t len; + mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info rnd_info_A, rnd_info_B; + int cnt_restart; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &srv ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &cli ); + + rnd_info_A.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand; + rnd_info_A.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + rnd_info_A.buf = dA->x; + rnd_info_A.length = dA->len; + + rnd_info_B.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand; + rnd_info_B.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + rnd_info_B.buf = dB->x; + rnd_info_B.length = dB->len; + + /* The ECDH context is not guaranteed to have an mbedtls_ecp_group structure + * in every configuration, therefore we load it separately. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + /* Otherwise we would have to fix the random buffer, + * as in ecdh_primitive_testvec. */ + TEST_ASSERT( grp.nbits % 8 == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &srv, id ) == 0 ); + + /* set up restart parameters */ + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( max_ops ); + + if( enable ) + { + mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &srv ); + mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &cli ); + } + + /* server writes its parameters */ + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); + len = 0; + + cnt_restart = 0; + do { + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &srv, &len, buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, + &rnd_info_A ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart >= min_restart ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart <= max_restart ); + + /* client read server params */ + vbuf = buf; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &cli, &vbuf, buf + len ) == 0 ); + + /* client writes its key share */ + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); + len = 0; + + cnt_restart = 0; + do { + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &cli, &len, buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, + &rnd_info_B ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart >= min_restart ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart <= max_restart ); + + /* server reads client key share */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + /* server computes shared secret */ + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + len = 0; + + cnt_restart = 0; + do { + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &srv, &len, buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, NULL ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart >= min_restart ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart <= max_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == z->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, z->x, len ) == 0 ); + + /* client computes shared secret */ + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + len = 0; + + cnt_restart = 0; + do { + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &cli, &len, buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, NULL ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart >= min_restart ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart <= max_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == z->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, z->x, len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &srv ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &cli ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ +void ecdh_exchange_legacy( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdh_context srv, cli; + unsigned char buf[1000]; + const unsigned char *vbuf; + size_t len; + + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &srv ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &cli ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &srv.grp, id ) == 0 ); + + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); vbuf = buf; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &srv, &len, buf, 1000, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &cli, &vbuf, buf + len ) == 0 ); + + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &cli, &len, buf, 1000, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &srv, &len, buf, 1000, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &cli, &len, buf, 1000, NULL, + NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &srv.z, &cli.z ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &srv ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &cli ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdh_exchange_calc_secret( int grp_id, + data_t *our_private_key, + data_t *their_point, + int ours_first, + data_t *expected ) +{ + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair our_key; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair their_key; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; + unsigned char shared_secret[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t shared_secret_length = 0; + + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &our_key ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &their_key ); + + if( ! load_private_key( grp_id, our_private_key, &our_key, &rnd_info ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! load_public_key( grp_id, their_point, &their_key ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Import the keys to the ECDH calculation. */ + if( ours_first ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( + &ecdh, &our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( + &ecdh, &their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( + &ecdh, &their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( + &ecdh, &our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) == 0 ); + } + + /* Perform the ECDH calculation. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( + &ecdh, + &shared_secret_length, + shared_secret, sizeof( shared_secret ), + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( shared_secret_length == expected->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( expected->x, shared_secret, + shared_secret_length ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &our_key ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &their_key ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdh_exchange_get_params_fail( int our_grp_id, + data_t *our_private_key, + int their_grp_id, + data_t *their_point, + int ours_first, + int expected_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair our_key; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair their_key; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; + + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &our_key ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &their_key ); + + if( ! load_private_key( our_grp_id, our_private_key, &our_key, &rnd_info ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! load_public_key( their_grp_id, their_point, &their_key ) ) + goto exit; + + if( ours_first ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( + &ecdh, &our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( + &ecdh, &their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) == + expected_ret ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( + &ecdh, &their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( + &ecdh, &our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) == + expected_ret ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &our_key ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &their_key ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..755a43cd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data @@ -0,0 +1,366 @@ +ECDSA Parameter validation +ecdsa_invalid_param: + +ECDSA primitive hash zero #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECDSA primitive hash zero #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 + +ECDSA primitive hash zero #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 + +ECDSA primitive hash zero #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 + +ECDSA primitive hash zero #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 + +ECDSA primitive random #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECDSA primitive random #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 + +ECDSA primitive random #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 + +ECDSA primitive random #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 + +ECDSA primitive random #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 + +ECDSA primitive rfc 4754 p256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"DC51D3866A15BACDE33D96F992FCA99DA7E6EF0934E7097559C27F1614C88A7F":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085E0822CB04235E970":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945CDDFE7D509BBFD7D":"9E56F509196784D963D1C0A401510EE7ADA3DCC5DEE04B154BF61AF1D5A6DECE":"BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A396177A9CB410FF61F20015AD":"CB28E0999B9C7715FD0A80D8E47A77079716CBBF917DD72E97566EA1C066957C":"86FA3BB4E26CAD5BF90B7F81899256CE7594BB1EA0C89212748BFF3B3D5B0315":0 + +ECDSA primitive rfc 4754 p384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"0BEB646634BA87735D77AE4809A0EBEA865535DE4C1E1DCB692E84708E81A5AF62E528C38B2A81B35309668D73524D9F":"96281BF8DD5E0525CA049C048D345D3082968D10FEDF5C5ACA0C64E6465A97EA5CE10C9DFEC21797415710721F437922":"447688BA94708EB6E2E4D59F6AB6D7EDFF9301D249FE49C33096655F5D502FAD3D383B91C5E7EDAA2B714CC99D5743CA":"B4B74E44D71A13D568003D7489908D564C7761E229C58CBFA18950096EB7463B854D7FA992F934D927376285E63414FA":"CB00753F45A35E8BB5A03D699AC65007272C32AB0EDED1631A8B605A43FF5BED8086072BA1E7CC2358BAECA134C825A7":"FB017B914E29149432D8BAC29A514640B46F53DDAB2C69948084E2930F1C8F7E08E07C9C63F2D21A07DCB56A6AF56EB3":"B263A1305E057F984D38726A1B46874109F417BCA112674C528262A40A629AF1CBB9F516CE0FA7D2FF630863A00E8B9F":0 + +ECDSA primitive rfc 4754 p521 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors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write-read hash zero #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECDSA write-read hash zero #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 + +ECDSA write-read hash zero #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 + +ECDSA write-read hash zero #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 + +ECDSA write-read hash zero #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_zero:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 + +ECDSA write-read random #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECDSA write-read random #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 + +ECDSA write-read random #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 + +ECDSA write-read random #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 + +ECDSA write-read random #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_write_read_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"sample":"98C6BD12B23EAF5E2A2045132086BE3EB8EBD62ABF6698FF":"57A22B07DEA9530F8DE9471B1DC6624472E8E2844BC25B64" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha224 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"sample":"A1F00DAD97AEEC91C95585F36200C65F3C01812AA60378F5":"E07EC1304C7C6C9DEBBE980B9692668F81D4DE7922A0F97A" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha256 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"sample":"4B0B8CE98A92866A2820E20AA6B75B56382E0F9BFD5ECB55":"CCDB006926EA9565CBADC840829D8C384E06DE1F1E381B85" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha384 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"sample":"DA63BF0B9ABCF948FBB1E9167F136145F7A20426DCC287D5":"C3AA2C960972BD7A2003A57E1C4C77F0578F8AE95E31EC5E" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha512 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"sample":"4D60C5AB1996BD848343B31C00850205E2EA6922DAC2E4B8":"3F6E837448F027A1BF4B34E796E32A811CBB4050908D8F67" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"test":"0F2141A0EBBC44D2E1AF90A50EBCFCE5E197B3B7D4DE036D":"EB18BC9E1F3D7387500CB99CF5F7C157070A8961E38700B7" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha224 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"test":"6945A1C1D1B2206B8145548F633BB61CEF04891BAF26ED34":"B7FB7FDFC339C0B9BD61A9F5A8EAF9BE58FC5CBA2CB15293" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha256 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3A718BD8B4926C3B52EE6BBE67EF79B18CB6EB62B1AD97AE":"5662E6848A4A19B1F1AE2F72ACD4B8BBE50F1EAC65D9124F" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha384 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"test":"B234B60B4DB75A733E19280A7A6034BD6B1EE88AF5332367":"7994090B2D59BB782BE57E74A44C9A1C700413F8ABEFE77A" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p192 sha512 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"test":"FE4F4AE86A58B6507946715934FE2D8FF9D95B6B098FE739":"74CF5605C98FBA0E1EF34D4B5A1577A7DCF59457CAE52290" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"sample":"22226F9D40A96E19C4A301CE5B74B115303C0F3A4FD30FC257FB57AC":"66D1CDD83E3AF75605DD6E2FEFF196D30AA7ED7A2EDF7AF475403D69" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha224 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"sample":"1CDFE6662DDE1E4A1EC4CDEDF6A1F5A2FB7FBD9145C12113E6ABFD3E":"A6694FD7718A21053F225D3F46197CA699D45006C06F871808F43EBC" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha256 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"sample":"61AA3DA010E8E8406C656BC477A7A7189895E7E840CDFE8FF42307BA":"BC814050DAB5D23770879494F9E0A680DC1AF7161991BDE692B10101" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha384 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"sample":"0B115E5E36F0F9EC81F1325A5952878D745E19D7BB3EABFABA77E953":"830F34CCDFE826CCFDC81EB4129772E20E122348A2BBD889A1B1AF1D" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha512 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"sample":"074BD1D979D5F32BF958DDC61E4FB4872ADCAFEB2256497CDAC30397":"A4CECA196C3D5A1FF31027B33185DC8EE43F288B21AB342E5D8EB084" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"test":"DEAA646EC2AF2EA8AD53ED66B2E2DDAA49A12EFD8356561451F3E21C":"95987796F6CF2062AB8135271DE56AE55366C045F6D9593F53787BD2" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha224 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"test":"C441CE8E261DED634E4CF84910E4C5D1D22C5CF3B732BB204DBEF019":"902F42847A63BDC5F6046ADA114953120F99442D76510150F372A3F4" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha256 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"AD04DDE87B84747A243A631EA47A1BA6D1FAA059149AD2440DE6FBA6":"178D49B1AE90E3D8B629BE3DB5683915F4E8C99FDF6E666CF37ADCFD" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha384 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"test":"389B92682E399B26518A95506B52C03BC9379A9DADF3391A21FB0EA4":"414A718ED3249FF6DBC5B50C27F71F01F070944DA22AB1F78F559AAB" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p224 sha512 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"test":"049F050477C5ADD858CAC56208394B5A55BAEBBE887FDF765047C17C":"077EB13E7005929CEFA3CD0403C7CDCC077ADF4E44F3C41B2F60ECFF" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p256 sha1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"sample":"61340C88C3AAEBEB4F6D667F672CA9759A6CCAA9FA8811313039EE4A35471D32":"6D7F147DAC089441BB2E2FE8F7A3FA264B9C475098FDCF6E00D7C996E1B8B7EB" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p256 sha224 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"sample":"53B2FFF5D1752B2C689DF257C04C40A587FABABB3F6FC2702F1343AF7CA9AA3F":"B9AFB64FDC03DC1A131C7D2386D11E349F070AA432A4ACC918BEA988BF75C74C" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p256 sha256 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"sample":"EFD48B2AACB6A8FD1140DD9CD45E81D69D2C877B56AAF991C34D0EA84EAF3716":"F7CB1C942D657C41D436C7A1B6E29F65F3E900DBB9AFF4064DC4AB2F843ACDA8" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p256 sha384 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 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+ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"test":"461D93F31B6540894788FD206C07CFA0CC35F46FA3C91816FFF1040AD1581A04":"39AF9F15DE0DB8D97E72719C74820D304CE5226E32DEDAE67519E840D1194E55" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p384 sha1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"6B9D3DAD2E1B8C1C05B19875B6659F4DE23C3B667BF297BA9AA47740787137D896D5724E4C70A825F872C9EA60D2EDF5":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"sample":"EC748D839243D6FBEF4FC5C4859A7DFFD7F3ABDDF72014540C16D73309834FA37B9BA002899F6FDA3A4A9386790D4EB2":"A3BCFA947BEEF4732BF247AC17F71676CB31A847B9FF0CBC9C9ED4C1A5B3FACF26F49CA031D4857570CCB5CA4424A443" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p384 sha224 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C 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+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"6B9D3DAD2E1B8C1C05B19875B6659F4DE23C3B667BF297BA9AA47740787137D896D5724E4C70A825F872C9EA60D2EDF5":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"6D6DEFAC9AB64DABAFE36C6BF510352A4CC27001263638E5B16D9BB51D451559F918EEDAF2293BE5B475CC8F0188636B":"2D46F3BECBCC523D5F1A1256BF0C9B024D879BA9E838144C8BA6BAEB4B53B47D51AB373F9845C0514EEFB14024787265" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p384 sha384 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"6B9D3DAD2E1B8C1C05B19875B6659F4DE23C3B667BF297BA9AA47740787137D896D5724E4C70A825F872C9EA60D2EDF5":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"test":"8203B63D3C853E8D77227FB377BCF7B7B772E97892A80F36AB775D509D7A5FEB0542A7F0812998DA8F1DD3CA3CF023DB":"DDD0760448D42D8A43AF45AF836FCE4DE8BE06B485E9B61B827C2F13173923E06A739F040649A667BF3B828246BAA5A5" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p384 sha512 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"6B9D3DAD2E1B8C1C05B19875B6659F4DE23C3B667BF297BA9AA47740787137D896D5724E4C70A825F872C9EA60D2EDF5":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"test":"A0D5D090C9980FAF3C2CE57B7AE951D31977DD11C775D314AF55F76C676447D06FB6495CD21B4B6E340FC236584FB277":"976984E59B4C77B0E8E4460DCA3D9F20E07B9BB1F63BEEFAF576F6B2E8B224634A2092CD3792E0159AD9CEE37659C736" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p521 sha1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C 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+ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"0FAD06DAA62BA3B25D2FB40133DA757205DE67F5BB0018FEE8C86E1B68C7E75CAA896EB32F1F47C70855836A6D16FCC1466F6D8FBEC67DB89EC0C08B0E996B83538":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"sample":"1776331CFCDF927D666E032E00CF776187BC9FDD8E69D0DABB4109FFE1B5E2A30715F4CC923A4A5E94D2503E9ACFED92857B7F31D7152E0F8C00C15FF3D87E2ED2E":"050CB5265417FE2320BBB5A122B8E1A32BD699089851128E360E620A30C7E17BA41A666AF126CE100E5799B153B60528D5300D08489CA9178FB610A2006C254B41F" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p521 sha256 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"0FAD06DAA62BA3B25D2FB40133DA757205DE67F5BB0018FEE8C86E1B68C7E75CAA896EB32F1F47C70855836A6D16FCC1466F6D8FBEC67DB89EC0C08B0E996B83538":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"sample":"1511BB4D675114FE266FC4372B87682BAECC01D3CC62CF2303C92B3526012659D16876E25C7C1E57648F23B73564D67F61C6F14D527D54972810421E7D87589E1A7":"04A171143A83163D6DF460AAF61522695F207A58B95C0644D87E52AA1A347916E4F7A72930B1BC06DBE22CE3F58264AFD23704CBB63B29B931F7DE6C9D949A7ECFC" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p521 sha384 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"0FAD06DAA62BA3B25D2FB40133DA757205DE67F5BB0018FEE8C86E1B68C7E75CAA896EB32F1F47C70855836A6D16FCC1466F6D8FBEC67DB89EC0C08B0E996B83538":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"sample":"1EA842A0E17D2DE4F92C15315C63DDF72685C18195C2BB95E572B9C5136CA4B4B576AD712A52BE9730627D16054BA40CC0B8D3FF035B12AE75168397F5D50C67451":"1F21A3CEE066E1961025FB048BD5FE2B7924D0CD797BABE0A83B66F1E35EEAF5FDE143FA85DC394A7DEE766523393784484BDF3E00114A1C857CDE1AA203DB65D61" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p521 sha512 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C 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+ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"0FAD06DAA62BA3B25D2FB40133DA757205DE67F5BB0018FEE8C86E1B68C7E75CAA896EB32F1F47C70855836A6D16FCC1466F6D8FBEC67DB89EC0C08B0E996B83538":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"00E871C4A14F993C6C7369501900C4BC1E9C7B0B4BA44E04868B30B41D8071042EB28C4C250411D0CE08CD197E4188EA4876F279F90B3D8D74A3C76E6F1E4656AA8":"0CD52DBAA33B063C3A6CD8058A1FB0A46A4754B034FCC644766CA14DA8CA5CA9FDE00E88C1AD60CCBA759025299079D7A427EC3CC5B619BFBC828E7769BCD694E86" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p521 sha384 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"0FAD06DAA62BA3B25D2FB40133DA757205DE67F5BB0018FEE8C86E1B68C7E75CAA896EB32F1F47C70855836A6D16FCC1466F6D8FBEC67DB89EC0C08B0E996B83538":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"test":"14BEE21A18B6D8B3C93FAB08D43E739707953244FDBE924FA926D76669E7AC8C89DF62ED8975C2D8397A65A49DCC09F6B0AC62272741924D479354D74FF6075578C":"133330865C067A0EAF72362A65E2D7BC4E461E8C8995C3B6226A21BD1AA78F0ED94FE536A0DCA35534F0CD1510C41525D163FE9D74D134881E35141ED5E8E95B979" + +ECDSA deterministic test vector rfc 6979 p521 sha512 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +ecdsa_det_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"0FAD06DAA62BA3B25D2FB40133DA757205DE67F5BB0018FEE8C86E1B68C7E75CAA896EB32F1F47C70855836A6D16FCC1466F6D8FBEC67DB89EC0C08B0E996B83538":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"test":"13E99020ABF5CEE7525D16B69B229652AB6BDF2AFFCAEF38773B4B7D08725F10CDB93482FDCC54EDCEE91ECA4166B2A7C6265EF0CE2BD7051B7CEF945BABD47EE6D":"1FBD0013C674AA79CB39849527916CE301C66EA7CE8B80682786AD60F98F7E78A19CA69EFF5C57400E3B3A0AD66CE0978214D13BAF4E9AC60752F7B155E2DE4DCE3" + +ECDSA restartable read-verify: max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_read_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04e8f573412a810c5f81ecd2d251bb94387e72f28af70dced90ebe75725c97a6428231069c2b1ef78509a22c59044319f6ed3cb750dfe64c2a282b35967a458ad6":"dee9d4d8b0e40a034602d6e638197998060f6e9f353ae1d10c94cd56476d3c92":"304502210098a5a1392abe29e4b0a4da3fefe9af0f8c32e5b839ab52ba6a05da9c3b7edd0f0220596f0e195ae1e58c1e53e9e7f0f030b274348a8c11232101778d89c4943f5ad2":0:0:0 + +ECDSA restartable read-verify: max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_read_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04e8f573412a810c5f81ecd2d251bb94387e72f28af70dced90ebe75725c97a6428231069c2b1ef78509a22c59044319f6ed3cb750dfe64c2a282b35967a458ad6":"dee9d4d8b0e40a034602d6e638197998060f6e9f353ae1d10c94cd56476d3c92":"304502210098a5a1392abe29e4b0a4da3fefe9af0f8c32e5b839ab52ba6a05da9c3b7edd0f0220596f0e195ae1e58c1e53e9e7f0f030b274348a8c11232101778d89c4943f5ad2":1:42:10000 + +ECDSA restartable read-verify: max_ops=10000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_read_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04e8f573412a810c5f81ecd2d251bb94387e72f28af70dced90ebe75725c97a6428231069c2b1ef78509a22c59044319f6ed3cb750dfe64c2a282b35967a458ad6":"dee9d4d8b0e40a034602d6e638197998060f6e9f353ae1d10c94cd56476d3c92":"304502210098a5a1392abe29e4b0a4da3fefe9af0f8c32e5b839ab52ba6a05da9c3b7edd0f0220596f0e195ae1e58c1e53e9e7f0f030b274348a8c11232101778d89c4943f5ad2":10000:0:0 + +ECDSA restartable read-verify: max_ops=250 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_read_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04e8f573412a810c5f81ecd2d251bb94387e72f28af70dced90ebe75725c97a6428231069c2b1ef78509a22c59044319f6ed3cb750dfe64c2a282b35967a458ad6":"dee9d4d8b0e40a034602d6e638197998060f6e9f353ae1d10c94cd56476d3c92":"304502210098a5a1392abe29e4b0a4da3fefe9af0f8c32e5b839ab52ba6a05da9c3b7edd0f0220596f0e195ae1e58c1e53e9e7f0f030b274348a8c11232101778d89c4943f5ad2":250:4:64 + +ECDSA restartable sign-write: secp256r1 max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_write_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":0:0:0 + +ECDSA restartable sign-write: secp256r1 restart max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_write_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":1:1:10000 + +ECDSA restartable sign-write: secp256r1 restart max_ops=10000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_write_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":10000:0:0 + +ECDSA restartable sign-write: secp256r1 restart max_ops=250 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ecdsa_write_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":250:2:32 + +ECDSA zero private parameter p192 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"0":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945":"9E56F509196784D963D1C0A401510EE7ADA3DCC5DEE04B15":"BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A396177A9C":"98C6BD12B23EAF5E2A2045132086BE3EB8EBD62ABF6698FF":"57A22B07DEA9530F8DE9471B1DC6624472E8E2844BC25B64":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECDSA private parameter greater than n p192 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD41":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945":"9E56F509196784D963D1C0A401510EE7ADA3DCC5DEE04B15":"BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A396177A9CB410FF61":"98C6BD12B23EAF5E2A2045132086BE3EB8EBD62ABF6698FF":"57A22B07DEA9530F8DE9471B1DC6624472E8E2844BC25B64":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECDSA zero private parameter p224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"0":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085E0822CB04235E970":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945CDDFE7D5":"9E56F509196784D963D1C0A401510EE7ADA3DCC5DEE04B154BF61AF1":"BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A396177A9CB410FF61":"22226F9D40A96E19C4A301CE5B74B115303C0F3A4FD30FC257FB57AC":"66D1CDD83E3AF75605DD6E2FEFF196D30AA7ED7A2EDF7AF475403D69":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECDSA private parameter greater than n p224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"F220266E1105BFE3083E03EC7A3A654651F45E37167E88600BF257C11":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085E0822CB04235E970":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945CDDFE7D5":"9E56F509196784D963D1C0A401510EE7ADA3DCC5DEE04B154BF61AF1":"BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A396177A9CB410FF61F20015AD":"22226F9D40A96E19C4A301CE5B74B115303C0F3A4FD30FC257FB57AC":"66D1CDD83E3AF75605DD6E2FEFF196D30AA7ED7A2EDF7AF475403D69":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECDSA zero private parameter p256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085E0822CB04235E970":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945CDDFE7D509BBFD7D":"9E56F509196784D963D1C0A401510EE7ADA3DCC5DEE04B154BF61AF1D5A6DECE":"BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A396177A9CB410FF61F20015AD":"CB28E0999B9C7715FD0A80D8E47A77079716CBBF917DD72E97566EA1C066957C":"86FA3BB4E26CAD5BF90B7F81899256CE7594BB1EA0C89212748BFF3B3D5B0315":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECDSA private parameter greater than n p256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"DC51D3866A15BACDE33D96F992FCA99DA7E6EF0934E7097559C27F1614C88A7F1":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085E0822CB04235E970":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945CDDFE7D509BBFD7D":"9E56F509196784D963D1C0A401510EE7ADA3DCC5DEE04B154BF61AF1D5A6DECE":"BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A396177A9CB410FF61F20015AD":"CB28E0999B9C7715FD0A80D8E47A77079716CBBF917DD72E97566EA1C066957C":"86FA3BB4E26CAD5BF90B7F81899256CE7594BB1EA0C89212748BFF3B3D5B0315":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECDSA zero private parameter p384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"0":"96281BF8DD5E0525CA049C048D345D3082968D10FEDF5C5ACA0C64E6465A97EA5CE10C9DFEC21797415710721F437922":"447688BA94708EB6E2E4D59F6AB6D7EDFF9301D249FE49C33096655F5D502FAD3D383B91C5E7EDAA2B714CC99D5743CA":"B4B74E44D71A13D568003D7489908D564C7761E229C58CBFA18950096EB7463B854D7FA992F934D927376285E63414FA":"CB00753F45A35E8BB5A03D699AC65007272C32AB0EDED1631A8B605A43FF5BED8086072BA1E7CC2358BAECA134C825A7":"FB017B914E29149432D8BAC29A514640B46F53DDAB2C69948084E2930F1C8F7E08E07C9C63F2D21A07DCB56A6AF56EB3":"B263A1305E057F984D38726A1B46874109F417BCA112674C528262A40A629AF1CBB9F516CE0FA7D2FF630863A00E8B9F":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECDSA private parameter greater than n p384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"10BEB646634BA87735D77AE4809A0EBEA865535DE4C1E1DCB692E84708E81A5AF62E528C38B2A81B35309668D73524D9F":"96281BF8DD5E0525CA049C048D345D3082968D10FEDF5C5ACA0C64E6465A97EA5CE10C9DFEC21797415710721F437922":"447688BA94708EB6E2E4D59F6AB6D7EDFF9301D249FE49C33096655F5D502FAD3D383B91C5E7EDAA2B714CC99D5743CA":"B4B74E44D71A13D568003D7489908D564C7761E229C58CBFA18950096EB7463B854D7FA992F934D927376285E63414FA":"CB00753F45A35E8BB5A03D699AC65007272C32AB0EDED1631A8B605A43FF5BED8086072BA1E7CC2358BAECA134C825A7":"FB017B914E29149432D8BAC29A514640B46F53DDAB2C69948084E2930F1C8F7E08E07C9C63F2D21A07DCB56A6AF56EB3":"B263A1305E057F984D38726A1B46874109F417BCA112674C528262A40A629AF1CBB9F516CE0FA7D2FF630863A00E8B9F":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECDSA zero private parameter p521 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors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private parameter greater than n p521 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecdsa_prim_test_vectors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diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b45aaba --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function @@ -0,0 +1,677 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void ecdsa_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id valid_group = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + mbedtls_md_type_t valid_md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + mbedtls_mpi m; + size_t slen; + unsigned char buf[42] = { 0 }; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecdsa_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecdsa_free( NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( NULL, &m, &m, &m, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &grp, NULL, &m, &m, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &grp, &m, NULL, &m, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &grp, &m, &m, NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &grp, &m, &m, &m, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &grp, &m, &m, &m, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( NULL, &m, &m, &m, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + valid_md, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, NULL, &m, &m, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + valid_md, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &m, NULL, &m, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + valid_md, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &m, &m, NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + valid_md, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &m, &m, &m, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + valid_md, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + &P, &m, &m ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + &P, &m, &m ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, &m, &m ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + &P, NULL, &m ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + &P, &m, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( NULL, valid_md, buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, &slen, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( &ctx, valid_md, NULL, sizeof( buf ), + buf, &slen, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( &ctx, valid_md, buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, &slen, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( &ctx, valid_md, buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, NULL, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( NULL, valid_md, buf, + sizeof( buf ), buf, &slen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( &ctx, valid_md, NULL, + sizeof( buf ), buf, &slen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( &ctx, valid_md, buf, + sizeof( buf ), NULL, &slen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( &ctx, valid_md, buf, + sizeof( buf ), buf, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( &ctx, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( &ctx, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( NULL, valid_group, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( &ctx, valid_group, + NULL, NULL ) ); + + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( NULL, &key ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ctx, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdsa_prim_zero( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_mpi d, r, s; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &grp, &d, &Q, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &grp, &r, &s, &d, buf, sizeof( buf ), + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, buf, sizeof( buf ), &Q, &r, &s ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdsa_prim_random( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_mpi d, r, s; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + /* prepare material for signature */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand( &rnd_info, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &grp, &d, &Q, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &grp, &r, &s, &d, buf, sizeof( buf ), + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, buf, sizeof( buf ), &Q, &r, &s ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdsa_prim_test_vectors( int id, char * d_str, char * xQ_str, + char * yQ_str, data_t * rnd_buf, + data_t * hash, char * r_str, char * s_str, + int result ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_mpi d, r, s, r_check, s_check, zero; + mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r_check ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_check ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &zero ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( &Q, 16, xQ_str, yQ_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &d, 16, d_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &r_check, 16, r_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &s_check, 16, s_str ) == 0 ); + rnd_info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand; + rnd_info.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + rnd_info.buf = rnd_buf->x; + rnd_info.length = rnd_buf->len; + + /* Fix rnd_buf->x by shifting it left if necessary */ + if( grp.nbits % 8 != 0 ) + { + unsigned char shift = 8 - ( grp.nbits % 8 ); + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < rnd_info.length - 1; i++ ) + rnd_buf->x[i] = rnd_buf->x[i] << shift | rnd_buf->x[i+1] >> ( 8 - shift ); + + rnd_buf->x[rnd_info.length-1] <<= shift; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &grp, &r, &s, &d, hash->x, hash->len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, &rnd_info ) == result ); + + if ( result == 0) + { + /* Check we generated the expected values */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ), 0 ); + + /* Valid signature */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, + &Q, &r_check, &s_check ), 0 ); + + /* Invalid signature: wrong public key (G instead of Q) */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, + &grp.G, &r_check, &s_check ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + /* Invalid signatures: r or s or both one off */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &r, &r_check, 1 ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &s, &s_check, 1 ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r, &s_check ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r_check, &s ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r, &s ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + /* Invalid signatures: r, s or both (CVE-2022-21449) are zero */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &zero, 0 ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &zero, &s_check ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r_check, &zero ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &zero, &zero ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + /* Invalid signatures: r, s or both are == N */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &grp.N, &s_check ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r_check, &grp.N ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &grp.N, &grp.N ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + /* Invalid signatures: r, s or both are negative */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &r, &r_check, &grp.N ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &s, &s_check, &grp.N ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r, &s_check ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r_check, &s ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r, &s ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + /* Invalid signatures: r or s or both are > N */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &r, &r_check, &grp.N ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &s, &s_check, &grp.N ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r, &s_check ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r_check, &s ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &grp, hash->x, hash->len, &Q, + &r, &s ), MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r_check ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_check ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &zero ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ +void ecdsa_det_test_vectors( int id, char * d_str, int md_alg, char * msg, + char * r_str, char * s_str ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_mpi d, r, s, r_check, s_check; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t hlen; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r_check ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_check ); + memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &d, 16, d_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &r_check, 16, r_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &s_check, 16, s_str ) == 0 ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( md_info, (const unsigned char *) msg, + strlen( msg ), hash ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &grp, &r, &s, &d, hash, hlen, + md_alg, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) + == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &r, &r_check ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &s, &s_check ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r_check ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_check ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void ecdsa_write_read_zero( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char sig[200]; + size_t sig_len, i; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ctx ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) ); + memset( sig, 0x2a, sizeof( sig ) ); + + /* generate signing key */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( &ctx, id, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + + /* generate and write signature, then read and verify it */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( &ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, &sig_len, &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len ) == 0 ); + + /* check we didn't write past the announced length */ + for( i = sig_len; i < sizeof( sig ); i++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( sig[i] == 0x2a ); + + /* try verification with invalid length */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len - 1 ) != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len + 1 ) != 0 ); + + /* try invalid sequence tag */ + sig[0]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len ) != 0 ); + sig[0]--; + + /* try modifying r */ + sig[10]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + sig[10]--; + + /* try modifying s */ + sig[sig_len - 1]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + sig[sig_len - 1]--; + +exit: + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void ecdsa_write_read_random( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char sig[200]; + size_t sig_len, i; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ctx ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) ); + memset( sig, 0x2a, sizeof( sig ) ); + + /* prepare material for signature */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand( &rnd_info, + hash, sizeof( hash ) ) == 0 ); + + /* generate signing key */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( &ctx, id, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + + /* generate and write signature, then read and verify it */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( &ctx, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, &sig_len, &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len ) == 0 ); + + /* check we didn't write past the announced length */ + for( i = sig_len; i < sizeof( sig ); i++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( sig[i] == 0x2a ); + + /* try verification with invalid length */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len - 1 ) != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len + 1 ) != 0 ); + + /* try invalid sequence tag */ + sig[0]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len ) != 0 ); + sig[0]--; + + /* try modifying r */ + sig[10]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + sig[10]--; + + /* try modifying s */ + sig[sig_len - 1]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( &ctx, hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, sig_len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + sig[sig_len - 1]--; + +exit: + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +void ecdsa_read_restart( int id, data_t *pk, data_t *hash, data_t *sig, + int max_ops, int min_restart, int max_restart ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx rs_ctx; + int ret, cnt_restart; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( &rs_ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx.grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ctx.grp, &ctx.Q, + pk->x, pk->len ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( max_ops ); + + cnt_restart = 0; + do { + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( &ctx, + hash->x, hash->len, sig->x, sig->len, &rs_ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart >= min_restart ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart <= max_restart ); + + /* try modifying r */ + + TEST_ASSERT( sig->len > 10 ); + sig->x[10]++; + do { + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( &ctx, + hash->x, hash->len, sig->x, sig->len, &rs_ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + sig->x[10]--; + + /* try modifying s */ + sig->x[sig->len - 1]++; + do { + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( &ctx, + hash->x, hash->len, sig->x, sig->len, &rs_ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED ); + sig->x[sig->len - 1]--; + + /* Do we leak memory when aborting an operation? + * This test only makes sense when we actually restart */ + if( min_restart > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( &ctx, + hash->x, hash->len, sig->x, sig->len, &rs_ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( &rs_ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ +void ecdsa_write_restart( int id, char *d_str, int md_alg, + char *msg, data_t *sig_check, + int max_ops, int min_restart, int max_restart ) +{ + int ret, cnt_restart; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx rs_ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN]; + size_t hlen, slen; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( &rs_ctx ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ctx ); + memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) ); + memset( sig, 0, sizeof( sig ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx.grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx.d, 16, d_str ) == 0 ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( md_info, + (const unsigned char *) msg, strlen( msg ), + hash ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( max_ops ); + + slen = sizeof( sig ); + cnt_restart = 0; + do { + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( &ctx, + md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, &slen, NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( slen == sig_check->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( sig, sig_check->x, slen ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart >= min_restart ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart <= max_restart ); + + /* Do we leak memory when aborting an operation? + * This test only makes sense when we actually restart */ + if( min_restart > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( &ctx, + md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, &slen, NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( &rs_ctx ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..73808c94 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.data @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +ECJPAKE parameter validation +ecjpake_invalid_param: + +ECJPAKE selftest +ecjpake_selftest: + +ECJPAKE fail read corrupt MD +read_bad_md:"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" + +ECJPAKE round one: client, valid +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":0 + +ECJPAKE round one: server, valid +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER:"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":0 + +ECJPAKE round one: role mismatch +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED + +ECJPAKE round one: trailing byte +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: no data +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: length of first point too small +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: length of first point too big +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"01":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: no point data +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"0104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: first point is zero +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"0100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: unknown first point format +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41057ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: nothing after first point +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: length of second point too small +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: length of second point too big +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b01":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: no second point data +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b0104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: unknown second point format +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b410509f85b3d20ebd7885ce464c08d056d6428fe4dd9287aa365f131f4360ff386d846898bc4b41583c2a5197f65d78742746c12a5ec0a4ffe2f270a750a1d8fb516":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: nothing after second point +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b410409f85b3d20ebd7885ce464c08d056d6428fe4dd9287aa365f131f4360ff386d846898bc4b41583c2a5197f65d78742746c12a5ec0a4ffe2f270a750a1d8fb516":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: zero-length r +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b410409f85b3d20ebd7885ce464c08d056d6428fe4dd9287aa365f131f4360ff386d846898bc4b41583c2a5197f65d78742746c12a5ec0a4ffe2f270a750a1d8fb51600":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: no data for r +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b410409f85b3d20ebd7885ce464c08d056d6428fe4dd9287aa365f131f4360ff386d846898bc4b41583c2a5197f65d78742746c12a5ec0a4ffe2f270a750a1d8fb51601":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: corrupted r +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b410409f85b3d20ebd7885ce464c08d056d6428fe4dd9287aa365f131f4360ff386d846898bc4b41583c2a5197f65d78742746c12a5ec0a4ffe2f270a750a1d8fb51620934d74eb43e54df424fd96306c0117bf131afabf90a9d33d1198d90519373515":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP1: X not on the curve +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"41047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2a410409f85b3d20ebd7885ce464c08d056d6428fe4dd9287aa365f131f4360ff386d846898bc4b41583c2a5197f65d78742746c12a5ec0a4ffe2f270a750a1d8fb51620934d74eb43e54df424fd96306c0117bf131afabf90a9d33d1198d90519373514":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: no data +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb12":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: length of first point too small +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb1200":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: length of first point too big +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb1201":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: no point data +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb120104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: first point is zero +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb120100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: unknown first point format +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb1241057ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: nothing after first point +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb1241047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: length of second point too small +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb1241047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: length of second point too big +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb1241047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b01":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: no second point data +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"4104190a07700ffa4be6ae1d79ee0f06aeb544cd5addaabedf70f8623321332c54f355f0fbfec783ed359e5d0bf7377a0fc4ea7ace473c9c112b41ccd41ac56a56124104360a1cea33fce641156458e0a4eac219e96831e6aebc88b3f3752f93a0281d1bf1fb106051db9694a8d6e862a5ef1324a3d9e27894f1ee4f7c59199965a8dd4a2091847d2d22df3ee55faa2a3fb33fd2d1e055a07a7c61ecfb8d80ec00c2c9eb1241047ea6e3a4487037a9e0dbd79262b2cc273e779930fc18409ac5361c5fe669d702e147790aeb4ce7fd6575ab0f6c7fd1c335939aa863ba37ec91b7e32bb013bb2b0104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: unknown second point format +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: nothing after second point +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: zero-length r +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: no data for r +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: corrupted r +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED + +ECJPAKE round one: KKP2: X not on the curve +read_round_one:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT:"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECJPAKE round two client: valid +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a641045516ea3e54a0d5d8b2ce786b38d383370029a5dbe4459c9dd601b408a24ae6465c8ac905b9eb03b5d3691c139ef83f1cd4200f6c9cd4ec392218a59ed243d3c820ff724a9a70b88cb86f20b434c6865aa1cd7906dd7c9bce3525f508276f26836c":0 + +ECJPAKE round two client: trailing byte +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a641045516ea3e54a0d5d8b2ce786b38d383370029a5dbe4459c9dd601b408a24ae6465c8ac905b9eb03b5d3691c139ef83f1cd4200f6c9cd4ec392218a59ed243d3c820ff724a9a70b88cb86f20b434c6865aa1cd7906dd7c9bce3525f508276f26836c00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: no data +read_round_two_cli:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: ECParams too short +read_round_two_cli:"0300":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: ECParams not named curve +read_round_two_cli:"010017":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: ECParams wrong curve +read_round_two_cli:"030016":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECJPAKE round two client: no data after ECParams +read_round_two_cli:"030017":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: length of first point too small +read_round_two_cli:"03001700":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: length of first point too big +read_round_two_cli:"03001701":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: no first point data +read_round_two_cli:"0300170104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: first point is zero +read_round_two_cli:"0300170100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECJPAKE round two client: unknown first point format +read_round_two_cli:"03001741050fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a6":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECJPAKE round two client: nothing after first point +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a6":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: length of second point too small +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a600":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: length of second point too big +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a601":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: no second point data +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a60104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: unknown second point format +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a641055516ea3e54a0d5d8b2ce786b38d383370029a5dbe4459c9dd601b408a24ae6465c8ac905b9eb03b5d3691c139ef83f1cd4200f6c9cd4ec392218a59ed243d3c8":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECJPAKE round two client: nothing after second point +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a641045516ea3e54a0d5d8b2ce786b38d383370029a5dbe4459c9dd601b408a24ae6465c8ac905b9eb03b5d3691c139ef83f1cd4200f6c9cd4ec392218a59ed243d3c8":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: zero-length r +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a641045516ea3e54a0d5d8b2ce786b38d383370029a5dbe4459c9dd601b408a24ae6465c8ac905b9eb03b5d3691c139ef83f1cd4200f6c9cd4ec392218a59ed243d3c800":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: no data for r +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a641045516ea3e54a0d5d8b2ce786b38d383370029a5dbe4459c9dd601b408a24ae6465c8ac905b9eb03b5d3691c139ef83f1cd4200f6c9cd4ec392218a59ed243d3c801":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two client: corrupted r +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a641045516ea3e54a0d5d8b2ce786b38d383370029a5dbe4459c9dd601b408a24ae6465c8ac905b9eb03b5d3691c139ef83f1cd4200f6c9cd4ec392218a59ed243d3c820ff724a9a70b88cb86f20b434c6865aa1cd7906dd7c9bce3525f508276f26836d":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED + +ECJPAKE round two client: X not on the curve +read_round_two_cli:"03001741040fb22b1d5d1123e0ef9feb9d8a2e590a1f4d7ced2c2b06586e8f2a16d4eb2fda4328a20b07d8fd667654ca18c54e32a333a0845451e926ee8804fd7af0aaa7a741045516ea3e54a0d5d8b2ce786b38d383370029a5dbe4459c9dd601b408a24ae6465c8ac905b9eb03b5d3691c139ef83f1cd4200f6c9cd4ec392218a59ed243d3c820ff724a9a70b88cb86f20b434c6865aa1cd7906dd7c9bce3525f508276f26836c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECJPAKE round two server: valid +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee4104077e8c31e20e6bedb760c13593e69f15be85c27d68cd09ccb8c4183608917c5c3d409fac39fefee82f7292d36f0d23e055913f45a52b85dd8a2052e9e129bb4d200f011f19483535a6e89a580c9b0003baf21462ece91a82cc38dbdcae60d9c54c":0 + +ECJPAKE round two server: trailing byte +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee4104077e8c31e20e6bedb760c13593e69f15be85c27d68cd09ccb8c4183608917c5c3d409fac39fefee82f7292d36f0d23e055913f45a52b85dd8a2052e9e129bb4d200f011f19483535a6e89a580c9b0003baf21462ece91a82cc38dbdcae60d9c54c00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: no data +read_round_two_srv:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: length of first point too small +read_round_two_srv:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: length of first point too big +read_round_two_srv:"01":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: no first point data +read_round_two_srv:"0104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: first point is zero +read_round_two_srv:"0100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECJPAKE round two server: unknown first point format +read_round_two_srv:"410569d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECJPAKE round two server: nothing after first point +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: length of second point too small +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: length of second point too big +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee01":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: no second point data +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee0104":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: unknown second point format +read_round_two_srv:"410569d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee4104077e8c31e20e6bedb760c13593e69f15be85c27d68cd09ccb8c4183608917c5c3d409fac39fefee82f7292d36f0d23e055913f45a52b85dd8a2052e9e129bb4d":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECJPAKE round two server: nothing after second point +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee4104077e8c31e20e6bedb760c13593e69f15be85c27d68cd09ccb8c4183608917c5c3d409fac39fefee82f7292d36f0d23e055913f45a52b85dd8a2052e9e129bb4d":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: zero-length r +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee4104077e8c31e20e6bedb760c13593e69f15be85c27d68cd09ccb8c4183608917c5c3d409fac39fefee82f7292d36f0d23e055913f45a52b85dd8a2052e9e129bb4d00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: no data for r +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee4104077e8c31e20e6bedb760c13593e69f15be85c27d68cd09ccb8c4183608917c5c3d409fac39fefee82f7292d36f0d23e055913f45a52b85dd8a2052e9e129bb4d20":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECJPAKE round two server: corrupted r +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ee4104077e8c31e20e6bedb760c13593e69f15be85c27d68cd09ccb8c4183608917c5c3d409fac39fefee82f7292d36f0d23e055913f45a52b85dd8a2052e9e129bb4d200f011f19483535a6e89a580c9b0003baf21462ece91a82cc38dbdcae60d9c54d":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED + +ECJPAKE round two server: X not on curve +read_round_two_srv:"410469d54ee85e90ce3f1246742de507e939e81d1dc1c5cb988b58c310c9fdd9524d93720b45541c83ee8841191da7ced86e3312d43623c1d63e74989aba4affd1ef4104077e8c31e20e6bedb760c13593e69f15be85c27d68cd09ccb8c4183608917c5c3d409fac39fefee82f7292d36f0d23e055913f45a52b85dd8a2052e9e129bb4d200f011f19483535a6e89a580c9b0003baf21462ece91a82cc38dbdcae60d9c54c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ab672a8d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecjpake.function @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x1[] = { + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, + 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, + 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x21 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x2[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x3[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x4[] = { + 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, + 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8, + 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe1 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_X1[] = { + 0x04, 0xac, 0xcf, 0x01, 0x06, 0xef, 0x85, 0x8f, 0xa2, 0xd9, 0x19, 0x33, + 0x13, 0x46, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x8b, 0xba, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0x44, 0xe5, + 0xc7, 0x89, 0x28, 0x79, 0x14, 0x61, 0x87, 0xdd, 0x26, 0x66, 0xad, 0xa7, + 0x81, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x11, 0x13, 0x72, 0x25, 0x1a, 0x89, 0x10, 0x62, 0x1f, + 0x63, 0x4d, 0xf1, 0x28, 0xac, 0x48, 0xe3, 0x81, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0xf9, 0x06, + 0x07, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x94, 0xa4 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_X2[] = { + 0x04, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, 0xd7, + 0x92, 0x62, 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x40, + 0x9a, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, 0x79, + 0x0a, 0xeb, 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, 0xd1, + 0xc3, 0x35, 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, 0xe3, + 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_X3[] = { + 0x04, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, 0xd7, + 0x92, 0x62, 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x40, + 0x9a, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, 0x79, + 0x0a, 0xeb, 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, 0xd1, + 0xc3, 0x35, 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, 0xe3, + 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_X4[] = { + 0x04, 0x19, 0x0a, 0x07, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xfa, 0x4b, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x79, + 0xee, 0x0f, 0x06, 0xae, 0xb5, 0x44, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xdd, 0xaa, 0xbe, 0xdf, + 0x70, 0xf8, 0x62, 0x33, 0x21, 0x33, 0x2c, 0x54, 0xf3, 0x55, 0xf0, 0xfb, + 0xfe, 0xc7, 0x83, 0xed, 0x35, 0x9e, 0x5d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x37, 0x7a, 0x0f, + 0xc4, 0xea, 0x7a, 0xce, 0x47, 0x3c, 0x9c, 0x11, 0x2b, 0x41, 0xcc, 0xd4, + 0x1a, 0xc5, 0x6a, 0x56, 0x12 +}; + +/* Load my private and public keys, and peer's public keys */ +static int ecjpake_test_load( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len_xm1, + const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len_xm2, + const unsigned char *Xm1, size_t len_Xm1, + const unsigned char *Xm2, size_t len_Xm2, + const unsigned char *Xp1, size_t len_Xp1, + const unsigned char *Xp2, size_t len_Xp2 ) +{ + int ret; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm1, xm1, len_xm1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm2, xm2, len_xm2 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ctx->grp, + &ctx->Xm1, Xm1, len_Xm1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ctx->grp, + &ctx->Xm2, Xm2, len_Xm2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ctx->grp, + &ctx->Xp1, Xp1, len_Xp1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ctx->grp, + &ctx->Xp2, Xp2, len_Xp2 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#define ADD_SIZE( x ) x, sizeof( x ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void ecjpake_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[42] = { 0 }; + size_t olen; + size_t const len = sizeof( buf ); + mbedtls_ecjpake_role valid_role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + mbedtls_ecjpake_role invalid_role = (mbedtls_ecjpake_role) 42; + mbedtls_md_type_t valid_md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id valid_group = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecjpake_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecjpake_free( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( NULL, + valid_role, + valid_md, + valid_group, + buf, len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &ctx, + invalid_role, + valid_md, + valid_group, + buf, len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &ctx, + valid_role, + valid_md, + valid_group, + NULL, len ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_check( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( NULL, buf, len, &olen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ctx, NULL, len, &olen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ctx, buf, len, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ctx, buf, len, &olen, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( NULL, buf, len, &olen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ctx, NULL, len, &olen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ctx, buf, len, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ctx, buf, len, &olen, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( NULL, + buf, len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ctx, + NULL, len ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( NULL, + buf, len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ctx, + NULL, len ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( NULL, buf, len, &olen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ctx, NULL, len, &olen, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ctx, buf, len, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ctx, buf, len, &olen, NULL, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void ecjpake_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void read_bad_md( data_t *msg ) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_context corrupt_ctx; + const unsigned char * pw = NULL; + const size_t pw_len = 0; + int any_role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &corrupt_ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &corrupt_ctx, any_role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, pw, pw_len ) == 0 ); + corrupt_ctx.md_info = NULL; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &corrupt_ctx, msg->x, + msg->len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &corrupt_ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void read_round_one( int role, data_t * msg, int ref_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ctx; + const unsigned char * pw = NULL; + const size_t pw_len = 0; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &ctx, role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, pw, pw_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len ) == ref_ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void read_round_two_cli( data_t * msg, int ref_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ctx; + const unsigned char * pw = NULL; + const size_t pw_len = 0; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, pw, pw_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ecjpake_test_load( &ctx, + ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_x1 ), ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_x2 ), + ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_X1 ), ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_X2 ), + ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_X3 ), ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_X4 ) ) + == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len ) == ref_ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void read_round_two_srv( data_t * msg, int ref_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ctx; + const unsigned char * pw = NULL; + const size_t pw_len = 0; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, pw, pw_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ecjpake_test_load( &ctx, + ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_x3 ), ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_x4 ), + ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_X3 ), ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_X4 ), + ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_X1 ), ADD_SIZE( ecjpake_test_X2 ) ) + == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len ) == ref_ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dd466037 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data @@ -0,0 +1,850 @@ +ECP valid params +ecp_valid_param: + +ECP invalid params +ecp_invalid_param: + +ECP curve info #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:28:512:"brainpoolP512r1" + +ECP curve info #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:27:384:"brainpoolP384r1" + +ECP curve info #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:26:256:"brainpoolP256r1" + +ECP curve info #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:25:521:"secp521r1" + +ECP curve info #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:24:384:"secp384r1" + +ECP curve info #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:23:256:"secp256r1" + +ECP curve info #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:21:224:"secp224r1" + +ECP curve info #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_curve_info:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:19:192:"secp192r1" + +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 #1 (biggest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"0":"1":0 + +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 #2 (too big) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 #3 (DoS big) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 y ignored +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"2":"-1":"1":0 + +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 z is not 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"2":"0":"2":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 x negative +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"-2":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"0":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"1":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #3 (let's call this u) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"b8495f16056286fdb1329ceb8d09da6ac49ff1fae35616aeb8413b7c7aebe0":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #4 (let's call this v) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"57119fd0dd4e22d8868e1c58c45c44045bef839c55b1d0b1248c50a3bc959c5f":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #5 p-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffec":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #6 p +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffed":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #7 p+1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffee":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #8 p+u +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"80b8495f16056286fdb1329ceb8d09da6ac49ff1fae35616aeb8413b7c7aebcd":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #9 p+v +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"d7119fd0dd4e22d8868e1c58c45c44045bef839c55b1d0b1248c50a3bc959c4c":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #10 2p-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffd9":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #11 2p +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffda":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +# see https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate +ECP check pubkey Curve25519 low-order point #12 2p+1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffdb":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 #1 (biggest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"0":"1":0 + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 #2 (too big) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"01FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 #3 (DoS big) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 y ignored +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"2":"-1":"1":0 + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 z is not 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"2":"0":"2":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 x negative +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"-2":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 low-order point #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"0":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 low-order point #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"1":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 low-order point #3 p-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 low-order point #4 p +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Curve448 low-order point #5 p+1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Koblitz #1 (point not on curve) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:"E2000000000000BB3A13D43B323337383935321F0603551D":"100101FF040830060101FF02010A30220603551D0E041B04636FC0C0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check pubkey Koblitz #2 (coordinate not affine) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +ecp_check_pub:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:"E2000000000000BB3A13D43B323337383935321F0603551D":"100101FF040830060101FF02010A30220603551D0E041B04636FC0C0":"101":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP write binary #1 (zero, uncompressed, buffer just fits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"01":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED:"00":1:0 + +ECP write binary #2 (zero, buffer too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"01":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED:"00":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +ECP write binary #3 (non-zero, uncompressed, buffer just fits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"48d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":"6ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"01":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED:"0448d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc99336ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":49:0 + +ECP write binary #4 (non-zero, uncompressed, buffer too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"48d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":"6ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"01":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED:"0448d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc99336ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":48:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +ECP write binary #5 (zero, compressed, buffer just fits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"01":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED:"00":1:0 + +ECP write binary #6 (zero, buffer too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"01":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED:"00":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +ECP write binary #7 (even, compressed, buffer just fits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"48d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":"6ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"01":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED:"0248d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":25:0 + +ECP write binary #8 (even, compressed, buffer too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"48d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":"6ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"01":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED:"0248d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":24:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +ECP write binary #9 (odd, compressed, buffer just fits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"48d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":"93112b28345b7d1d7799611e49bea9d8290cb2d7afe1f9f3":"01":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED:"0348d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":25:0 + +ECP write binary #10 (Montgomery, buffer just fits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED:"ffeeddccbbaa00998877665544332211ffeeddccbbaa00998877665544332211":32:0 + +ECP write binary #11 (Montgomery, buffer too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_write_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED:"ffeeddccbbaa00998877665544332211ffeeddccbbaa00998877665544332211":31:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +ECP read binary #1 (zero, invalid ilen) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"0000":"01":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP read binary #2 (zero, invalid first byte) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"01":"01":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECP read binary #3 (zero, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"00":"01":"01":"00":0 + +ECP read binary #4 (non-zero, invalid ilen) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"04001122":"01":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP read binary #5 (non-zero, invalid first byte) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"0548d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc99336ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"48d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":"6ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"01":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECP read binary #6 (non-zero, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"0448d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc99336ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"48d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":"6ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"01":0 + +ECP read binary #7 (Curve25519, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":"6a4e9baa8ea9a4ebf41a38260d3abf0d5af73eb4dc7d8b7454a7308909f02085":"0":"1":0 + +ECP read binary #8 (Curve25519, masked first bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4efa":"7a4e9baa8ea9a4ebf41a38260d3abf0d5af73eb4dc7d8b7454a7308909f02085":"0":"1":0 + +ECP read binary #9 (Curve25519, too short) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"20f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":"6a4e9baa8ea9a4ebf41a38260d3abf0d5af73eb4dc7d8b7454a7308909f020":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP read binary #10 (Curve25519, non-canonical) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f":"7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"0":"1":0 + +ECP read binary #11 (Curve25519, masked non-canonical) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"0":"1":0 + +ECP read binary #12 (Curve25519, too long) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_read_binary:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a00":"6a4e9baa8ea9a4ebf41a38260d3abf0d5af73eb4dc7d8b7454a7308909f02085":"0":"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP tls read point #1 (zero, invalid length byte) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"0200":"01":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP tls read point #2 (zero, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"0100":"01":"01":"00":0 + +ECP tls read point #3 (non-zero, invalid length byte) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"300448d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc99336ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"48d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":"6ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"01":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP tls read point #4 (non-zero, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"310448d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc99336ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"48d8082a3a1e3112bc03a8ef2f6d40d0a77a6f8e00cc9933":"6ceed4d7cba482e288669ee1b6415626d6f34d28501e060c":"01":0 + +ECP tls write-read point #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_tls_write_read_point:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECP tls write-read point #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecp_tls_write_read_point:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 + +ECP tls read group #1 (record too short) +mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group:"0313":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA:0:0 + +ECP tls read group #2 (bad curve_type) +mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group:"010013":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA:0:0 + +ECP tls read group #3 (unknown curve) +mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group:"030010":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:0:0 + +ECP tls read group #4 (OK, buffer just fits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group:"030017":0:256:3 + +ECP tls read group #5 (OK, buffer continues) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group:"0300180000":0:384:3 + +ECP tls write-read group #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_tls_write_read_group:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECP tls write-read group #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecp_tls_write_read_group:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 + +ECP check privkey #1 (short weierstrass, too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check privkey #2 (short weierstrass, smallest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"01":0 + +ECP check privkey #3 (short weierstrass, biggest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22830":0 + +ECP check privkey #4 (short weierstrass, too big) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check privkey #5 (montgomery, too big) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"C000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check privkey #6 (montgomery, not big enough) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check privkey #7 (montgomery, msb OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +ECP check privkey #8 (montgomery, bit 0 set) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check privkey #9 (montgomery, bit 1 set) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check privkey #10 (montgomery, bit 2 set) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP check privkey #11 (montgomery, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8":0 + +ECP check public-private #1 (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":0 + +ECP check public-private #2 (group none) +mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE:"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE:"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP check public-private #3 (group mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP check public-private #4 (Qx mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596293":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP check public-private #5 (Qy mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edfe":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP check public-private #6 (wrong Qx) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596293":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596293":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP check public-private #7 (wrong Qy) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edfe":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edfe":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +ECP gen keypair [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECP gen keypair [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 + +ECP gen keypair wrapper +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_gen_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, random in range +genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"9e020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e20222426282a2c2e30323436383a3df0":"4f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1ef8" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, clear higher bit +genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"ff0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1ef8":"7f808101820283038404850586068707880889098a0a8b0b8c0c8d0d8e0e8f78" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, clear low bits +genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"9e020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e20222426282a2c2e30323436383a3dff":"4f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1ef8" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, random = all-bits-zero +genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, random = all-bits-one +genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff8" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, not enough entropy +genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"4f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e":"" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, random in range +genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"cf0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc":"cf0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, set high bit +genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc":"8f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, clear low bits +genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"cf0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536ff":"cf0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, random = all-bits-zero +genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, random = all-bits-one +genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc" + +ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, not enough entropy +genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"4f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536":"" + +ECP read key #1 (short weierstrass, too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:0 + +ECP read key #2 (short weierstrass, smallest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"01":0:1 + +ECP read key #3 (short weierstrass, biggest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22830":0:1 + +ECP read key #4 (short weierstrass, too big) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:0 + +ECP read key #5 (Curve25519, most significant bit set) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000C0":0:0 + +ECP read key #6 (Curve25519, second most significant bit unset) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"F0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF3F":0:0 + +ECP read key #7 (Curve25519, msb OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040":0:1 + +ECP read key #8 (Curve25519, bit 0 set) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040":0:0 + +ECP read key #9 (Curve25519, bit 1 set) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040":0:0 + +ECP read key #10 (Curve25519, bit 2 set) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"0400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040":0:0 + +ECP read key #11 (Curve25519, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"F8FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7F":0:1 + +ECP read key #12 (Curve25519, too long) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000C":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:0 + +ECP read key #13 (Curve25519, not long enough) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"F0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF3F":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:0 + +ECP read key #14 (Curve448, not supported) +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"FCFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:0 + +ECP read key #15 (Curve25519, not supported) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"F8FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7F":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:0 + +ECP read key #15 (invalid curve) +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:INT_MAX:"F8FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7F":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:0 + +ECP read key #16 (Curve25519 RFC, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":0:1 + +ECP mod p192 small (more than 192 bits, less limbs than 2 * 192 bits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"0100000000000103010000000000010201000000000001010100000000000100" + +ECP mod p192 readable +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"010000000000010501000000000001040100000000000103010000000000010201000000000001010100000000000100" + +ECP mod p192 readable with carry +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"FF00000000010500FF00000000010400FF00000000010300FF00000000010200FF00000000010100FF00000000010000" + +ECP mod p192 random +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"36CF96B45D706A0954D89E52CE5F38517A2270E0175849B6F3740151D238CCABEF921437E475881D83BB69E4AA258EBD" + +ECP mod p192 (from a past failure case) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"1AC2D6F96A2A425E9DD1776DD8368D4BBC86BF4964E79FEA713583BF948BBEFF0939F96FB19EC48C585BDA6A2D35C750" + +ECP mod p224 readable without carry +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"0000000D0000000C0000000B0000000A0000000900000008000000070000FF060000FF050000FF040000FF03000FF0020000FF010000FF00" + +ECP mod p224 readable with negative carry +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"0000000D0000000C0000000B0000000A00000009000000080000000700000006000000050000000400000003000000020000000100000000" + +ECP mod p224 readable with positive carry +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"0000000D0000000C0000000BFFFFFF0AFFFFFF09FFFFFF08FFFFFF070000FF060000FF050000FF040000FF03000FF0020000FF010000FF00" + +ECP mod p224 readable with final negative carry +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"FF00000D0000000C0000000B0000000A00000009000000080000000700000006000000050000000400000003000000020000000100000000" + +ECP mod p521 very small +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"01" + +ECP mod p521 small (522 bits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +ECP mod p521 readable +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"03FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +ECP mod p521 readable with carry +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecp_fast_mod:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"03FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001" + +ECP test vectors secp192r1 rfc 5114 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"323FA3169D8E9C6593F59476BC142000AB5BE0E249C43426":"CD46489ECFD6C105E7B3D32566E2B122E249ABAADD870612":"68887B4877DF51DD4DC3D6FD11F0A26F8FD3844317916E9A":"631F95BB4A67632C9C476EEE9AB695AB240A0499307FCF62":"519A121680E0045466BA21DF2EEE47F5973B500577EF13D5":"FF613AB4D64CEE3A20875BDB10F953F6B30CA072C60AA57F":"AD420182633F8526BFE954ACDA376F05E5FF4F837F54FEBE":"4371545ED772A59741D0EDA32C671112B7FDDD51461FCF32" + +ECP test vectors secp224r1 rfc 5114 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"B558EB6C288DA707BBB4F8FBAE2AB9E9CB62E3BC5C7573E22E26D37F":"49DFEF309F81488C304CFF5AB3EE5A2154367DC7833150E0A51F3EEB":"4F2B5EE45762C4F654C1A0C67F54CF88B016B51BCE3D7C228D57ADB4":"AC3B1ADD3D9770E6F6A708EE9F3B8E0AB3B480E9F27F85C88B5E6D18":"6B3AC96A8D0CDE6A5599BE8032EDF10C162D0A8AD219506DCD42A207":"D491BE99C213A7D1CA3706DEBFE305F361AFCBB33E2609C8B1618AD5":"52272F50F46F4EDC9151569092F46DF2D96ECC3B6DC1714A4EA949FA":"5F30C6AA36DDC403C0ACB712BB88F1763C3046F6D919BD9C524322BF" + +ECP test vectors secp256r1 rfc 5114 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"814264145F2F56F2E96A8E337A1284993FAF432A5ABCE59E867B7291D507A3AF":"2AF502F3BE8952F2C9B5A8D4160D09E97165BE50BC42AE4A5E8D3B4BA83AEB15":"EB0FAF4CA986C4D38681A0F9872D79D56795BD4BFF6E6DE3C0F5015ECE5EFD85":"2CE1788EC197E096DB95A200CC0AB26A19CE6BCCAD562B8EEE1B593761CF7F41":"B120DE4AA36492795346E8DE6C2C8646AE06AAEA279FA775B3AB0715F6CE51B0":"9F1B7EECE20D7B5ED8EC685FA3F071D83727027092A8411385C34DDE5708B2B6":"DD0F5396219D1EA393310412D19A08F1F5811E9DC8EC8EEA7F80D21C820C2788":"0357DCCD4C804D0D8D33AA42B848834AA5605F9AB0D37239A115BBB647936F50" + +ECP test vectors secp384r1 rfc 5114 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect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test vectors secp521r1 rfc 5114 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect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test vectors brainpoolP256r1 rfc 7027 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:"81DB1EE100150FF2EA338D708271BE38300CB54241D79950F77B063039804F1D":"44106E913F92BC02A1705D9953A8414DB95E1AAA49E81D9E85F929A8E3100BE5":"8AB4846F11CACCB73CE49CBDD120F5A900A69FD32C272223F789EF10EB089BDC":"55E40BC41E37E3E2AD25C3C6654511FFA8474A91A0032087593852D3E7D76BD3":"8D2D688C6CF93E1160AD04CC4429117DC2C41825E1E9FCA0ADDD34E6F1B39F7B":"990C57520812BE512641E47034832106BC7D3E8DD0E4C7F1136D7006547CEC6A":"89AFC39D41D3B327814B80940B042590F96556EC91E6AE7939BCE31F3A18BF2B":"49C27868F4ECA2179BFD7D59B1E3BF34C1DBDE61AE12931648F43E59632504DE" + +ECP test vectors brainpoolP384r1 rfc 7027 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect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test vectors brainpoolP512r1 rfc 7027 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect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test vectors Curve25519 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_test_vec_x:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"5AC99F33632E5A768DE7E81BF854C27C46E3FBF2ABBACD29EC4AFF517369C660":"057E23EA9F1CBE8A27168F6E696A791DE61DD3AF7ACD4EEACC6E7BA514FDA863":"47DC3D214174820E1154B49BC6CDB2ABD45EE95817055D255AA35831B70D3260":"6EB89DA91989AE37C7EAC7618D9E5C4951DBA1D73C285AE1CD26A855020EEF04":"61450CD98E36016B58776A897A9F0AEF738B99F09468B8D6B8511184D53494AB" + +ECP point multiplication Curve25519 (normalized) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_test_mul:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"5AC99F33632E5A768DE7E81BF854C27C46E3FBF2ABBACD29EC4AFF517369C660":"09":"00":"01":"057E23EA9F1CBE8A27168F6E696A791DE61DD3AF7ACD4EEACC6E7BA514FDA863":"00":"01":0 + +ECP point multiplication Curve25519 (not normalized) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_test_mul:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"5AC99F33632E5A768DE7E81BF854C27C46E3FBF2ABBACD29EC4AFF517369C660":"1B":"00":"03":"057E23EA9F1CBE8A27168F6E696A791DE61DD3AF7ACD4EEACC6E7BA514FDA863":"00":"01":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP point multiplication Curve25519 (element of order 2: origin) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_test_mul:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"5AC99F33632E5A768DE7E81BF854C27C46E3FBF2ABBACD29EC4AFF517369C660":"00":"00":"01":"00":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP point multiplication Curve25519 (element of order 4: 1) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_test_mul:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"5AC99F33632E5A768DE7E81BF854C27C46E3FBF2ABBACD29EC4AFF517369C660":"01":"00":"01":"00":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP point multiplication Curve25519 (element of order 8) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_test_mul:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"5AC99F33632E5A768DE7E81BF854C27C46E3FBF2ABBACD29EC4AFF517369C660":"B8495F16056286FDB1329CEB8D09DA6AC49FF1FAE35616AEB8413B7C7AEBE0":"00":"01":"00":"01":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY + +ECP point multiplication rng fail secp256r1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_mul_rng:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"814264145F2F56F2E96A8E337A1284993FAF432A5ABCE59E867B7291D507A3AF" + +ECP point multiplication rng fail Curve25519 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_test_mul_rng:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"5AC99F33632E5A768DE7E81BF854C27C46E3FBF2ABBACD29EC4AFF517369C660" + +ECP point muladd secp256r1 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_muladd:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"01":"04e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e0e1ff20e1ffe120e1e1e173287170a761308491683e345cacaebb500c96e1a7bbd37772968b2c951f0579":"01":"04e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1ffffffff20e120e1e1e1e13a4e135157317b79d4ecf329fed4f9eb00dc67dbddae33faca8b6d8a0255b5ce":"04fab65e09aa5dd948320f86246be1d3fc571e7f799d9005170ed5cc868b67598431a668f96aa9fd0b0eb15f0edf4c7fe1be2885eadcb57e3db4fdd093585d3fa6" + +ECP point muladd secp256r1 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_muladd:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"01":"04e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1ffffffff20e120e1e1e1e13a4e135157317b79d4ecf329fed4f9eb00dc67dbddae33faca8b6d8a0255b5ce":"01":"04e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e0e1ff20e1ffe120e1e1e173287170a761308491683e345cacaebb500c96e1a7bbd37772968b2c951f0579":"04fab65e09aa5dd948320f86246be1d3fc571e7f799d9005170ed5cc868b67598431a668f96aa9fd0b0eb15f0edf4c7fe1be2885eadcb57e3db4fdd093585d3fa6" + +ECP test vectors Curve448 (RFC 7748 6.2, after decodeUCoordinate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_test_vec_x:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"eb7298a5c0d8c29a1dab27f1a6826300917389449741a974f5bac9d98dc298d46555bce8bae89eeed400584bb046cf75579f51d125498f98":"a01fc432e5807f17530d1288da125b0cd453d941726436c8bbd9c5222c3da7fa639ce03db8d23b274a0721a1aed5227de6e3b731ccf7089b":"ad997351b6106f36b0d1091b929c4c37213e0d2b97e85ebb20c127691d0dad8f1d8175b0723745e639a3cb7044290b99e0e2a0c27a6a301c":"0936f37bc6c1bd07ae3dec7ab5dc06a73ca13242fb343efc72b9d82730b445f3d4b0bd077162a46dcfec6f9b590bfcbcf520cdb029a8b73e":"9d874a5137509a449ad5853040241c5236395435c36424fd560b0cb62b281d285275a740ce32a22dd1740f4aa9161cec95ccc61a18f4ff07" + +ECP test vectors secp192k1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:"D1E13A359F6E0F0698791938E6D60246030AE4B0D8D4E9DE":"281BCA982F187ED30AD5E088461EBE0A5FADBB682546DF79":"3F68A8E9441FB93A4DD48CB70B504FCC9AA01902EF5BE0F3":"BE97C5D2A1A94D081E3FACE53E65A27108B7467BDF58DE43":"5EB35E922CD693F7947124F5920022C4891C04F6A8B8DCB2":"60ECF73D0FC43E0C42E8E155FFE39F9F0B531F87B34B6C3C":"372F5C5D0E18313C82AEF940EC3AFEE26087A46F1EBAE923":"D5A9F9182EC09CEAEA5F57EA10225EC77FA44174511985FD" + +ECP test vectors secp224k1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:"8EAD9B2819A3C2746B3EDC1E0D30F23271CDAC048C0615C961B1A9D3":"DEE0A75EF26CF8F501DB80807A3A0908E5CF01852709C1D35B31428B":"276D2B817918F7CD1DA5CCA081EC4B62CD255E0ACDC9F85FA8C52CAC":"AB7E70AEDA68A174ECC1F3800561B2D4FABE97C5D2A1A94D081E3FAC":"D2E94B00FD30201C40EDF73B137427916687AEA1935B277A5960DD1C":"DE728A614B17D91EB3CB2C17DA195562B6281585986332B3E12DA0ED":"B66B673D29038A3487A2D9C10CDCE67646F7C39C984EBE9E8795AD3C":"928C6147AF5EE4B54FA6ECF77B70CA3FEE5F4182DB057878F129DF": + +ECP test vectors secp256k1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:"923C6D4756CD940CD1E13A359F6E0F0698791938E6D60246030AE4B0D8D4E9DE":"20A865B295E93C5B090F324B84D7AC7526AA1CFE86DD80E792CECCD16B657D55":"38AC87141A4854A8DFD87333E107B61692323721FE2EAD6E52206FE471A4771B":"4F5036A8ED5809AB7E70AEDA68A174ECC1F3800561B2D4FABE97C5D2A1A94D08":"029F5D2CC5A2C7E538FBA321439B4EC8DD79B7FEB9C0A8A5114EEA39856E22E8":"165171AFC3411A427F24FDDE1192A551C90983EB421BC982AB4CF4E21F18F04B":"E4B5B537D3ACEA7624F2E9C185BFFD80BC7035E515F33E0D4CFAE747FD20038E":"2BC685B7DCDBC694F5E036C4EAE9BFB489D7BF8940C4681F734B71D68501514C" + +ECP selftest +ecp_selftest: + +ECP restartable mul secp256r1 max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"814264145F2F56F2E96A8E337A1284993FAF432A5ABCE59E867B7291D507A3AF":"2AF502F3BE8952F2C9B5A8D4160D09E97165BE50BC42AE4A5E8D3B4BA83AEB15":"EB0FAF4CA986C4D38681A0F9872D79D56795BD4BFF6E6DE3C0F5015ECE5EFD85":"2CE1788EC197E096DB95A200CC0AB26A19CE6BCCAD562B8EEE1B593761CF7F41":"DD0F5396219D1EA393310412D19A08F1F5811E9DC8EC8EEA7F80D21C820C2788":"0357DCCD4C804D0D8D33AA42B848834AA5605F9AB0D37239A115BBB647936F50":0:0:0 + +ECP restartable mul secp256r1 max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"814264145F2F56F2E96A8E337A1284993FAF432A5ABCE59E867B7291D507A3AF":"2AF502F3BE8952F2C9B5A8D4160D09E97165BE50BC42AE4A5E8D3B4BA83AEB15":"EB0FAF4CA986C4D38681A0F9872D79D56795BD4BFF6E6DE3C0F5015ECE5EFD85":"2CE1788EC197E096DB95A200CC0AB26A19CE6BCCAD562B8EEE1B593761CF7F41":"DD0F5396219D1EA393310412D19A08F1F5811E9DC8EC8EEA7F80D21C820C2788":"0357DCCD4C804D0D8D33AA42B848834AA5605F9AB0D37239A115BBB647936F50":1:1:5000 + +ECP restartable mul secp256r1 max_ops=10000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"814264145F2F56F2E96A8E337A1284993FAF432A5ABCE59E867B7291D507A3AF":"2AF502F3BE8952F2C9B5A8D4160D09E97165BE50BC42AE4A5E8D3B4BA83AEB15":"EB0FAF4CA986C4D38681A0F9872D79D56795BD4BFF6E6DE3C0F5015ECE5EFD85":"2CE1788EC197E096DB95A200CC0AB26A19CE6BCCAD562B8EEE1B593761CF7F41":"DD0F5396219D1EA393310412D19A08F1F5811E9DC8EC8EEA7F80D21C820C2788":"0357DCCD4C804D0D8D33AA42B848834AA5605F9AB0D37239A115BBB647936F50":10000:0:0 + +ECP restartable mul secp256r1 max_ops=250 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_test_vect_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"814264145F2F56F2E96A8E337A1284993FAF432A5ABCE59E867B7291D507A3AF":"2AF502F3BE8952F2C9B5A8D4160D09E97165BE50BC42AE4A5E8D3B4BA83AEB15":"EB0FAF4CA986C4D38681A0F9872D79D56795BD4BFF6E6DE3C0F5015ECE5EFD85":"2CE1788EC197E096DB95A200CC0AB26A19CE6BCCAD562B8EEE1B593761CF7F41":"DD0F5396219D1EA393310412D19A08F1F5811E9DC8EC8EEA7F80D21C820C2788":"0357DCCD4C804D0D8D33AA42B848834AA5605F9AB0D37239A115BBB647936F50":250:2:32 + +ECP restartable muladd secp256r1 max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_muladd_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"CB28E0999B9C7715FD0A80D8E47A77079716CBBF917DD72E97566EA1C066957C":"2B57C0235FB7489768D058FF4911C20FDBE71E3699D91339AFBB903EE17255DC":"C3875E57C85038A0D60370A87505200DC8317C8C534948BEA6559C7C18E6D4CE":"3B4E49C4FDBFC006FF993C81A50EAE221149076D6EC09DDD9FB3B787F85B6483":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085E0822CB04235E970":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945CDDFE7D509BBFD7D":0:0:0 + +ECP restartable muladd secp256r1 max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_muladd_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"CB28E0999B9C7715FD0A80D8E47A77079716CBBF917DD72E97566EA1C066957C":"2B57C0235FB7489768D058FF4911C20FDBE71E3699D91339AFBB903EE17255DC":"C3875E57C85038A0D60370A87505200DC8317C8C534948BEA6559C7C18E6D4CE":"3B4E49C4FDBFC006FF993C81A50EAE221149076D6EC09DDD9FB3B787F85B6483":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085E0822CB04235E970":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945CDDFE7D509BBFD7D":1:1:10000 + +ECP restartable muladd secp256r1 max_ops=10000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_muladd_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"CB28E0999B9C7715FD0A80D8E47A77079716CBBF917DD72E97566EA1C066957C":"2B57C0235FB7489768D058FF4911C20FDBE71E3699D91339AFBB903EE17255DC":"C3875E57C85038A0D60370A87505200DC8317C8C534948BEA6559C7C18E6D4CE":"3B4E49C4FDBFC006FF993C81A50EAE221149076D6EC09DDD9FB3B787F85B6483":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085E0822CB04235E970":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945CDDFE7D509BBFD7D":10000:0:0 + +ECP restartable muladd secp256r1 max_ops=250 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_muladd_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"CB28E0999B9C7715FD0A80D8E47A77079716CBBF917DD72E97566EA1C066957C":"2B57C0235FB7489768D058FF4911C20FDBE71E3699D91339AFBB903EE17255DC":"C3875E57C85038A0D60370A87505200DC8317C8C534948BEA6559C7C18E6D4CE":"3B4E49C4FDBFC006FF993C81A50EAE221149076D6EC09DDD9FB3B787F85B6483":"2442A5CC0ECD015FA3CA31DC8E2BBC70BF42D60CBCA20085E0822CB04235E970":"6FC98BD7E50211A4A27102FA3549DF79EBCB4BF246B80945CDDFE7D509BBFD7D":250:4:64 + +ECP fix_negative: 0, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"00":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 1, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"01":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^32-1, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"ffffffff":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^32, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"0100000000":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^64-1, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffff":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^64, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"010000000000000000":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128-1, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"0100000000000000000000000000000000":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128+1, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"0100000000000000000000000000000001":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^224-1, -1, 224 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":-1:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 0, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"00":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 1, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"01":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^32-1, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"ffffffff":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^32, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"0100000000":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^64-1, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffff":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^64, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"010000000000000000":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128-1, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"0100000000000000000000000000000000":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128+1, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"0100000000000000000000000000000001":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^224-1, -2, 224 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":-2:224 + +ECP fix_negative: 0, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"00":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 1, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"01":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^32-1, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"ffffffff":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^32, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"0100000000":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^64-1, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffff":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^64, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"010000000000000000":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128-1, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"0100000000000000000000000000000000":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128+1, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"0100000000000000000000000000000001":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^256-1, -1, 256 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":-1:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 0, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"00":-2:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 1, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"01":-2:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^32-1, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"ffffffff":-2:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^32, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"0100000000":-2:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^64-1, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffff":-2:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^64, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"010000000000000000":-2:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128-1, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":-2:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"0100000000000000000000000000000000":-2:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^128+1, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"0100000000000000000000000000000001":-2:256 + +ECP fix_negative: 2^256-1, -2, 256 +fix_negative:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":-2:256 + +# The first call to fix_negative in the test case of issue #4296. +ECP fix_negative: #4296.1 +fix_negative:"8A4DD4C8B42C5EAED15FE4F4579F4CE513EC90A94010BF000000000000000000":-1:256 + +ECP check order for SECP192R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831" + +ECP check order for SECP224R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D" + +ECP check order for SECP256R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551" + +ECP check order for SECP384R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC7634D81F4372DDF581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973" + +ECP check order for SECP521R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:"01FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386409" + +ECP check order for BP256R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:"A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7" + +ECP check order for BP384R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:"8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B31F166E6CAC0425A7CF3AB6AF6B7FC3103B883202E9046565" + +ECP check order for BP512R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:"AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA70330870553E5C414CA92619418661197FAC10471DB1D381085DDADDB58796829CA90069" + +ECP check order for CURVE25519 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"1000000000000000000000000000000014def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed" + +ECP check order for SECP192K1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:"fffffffffffffffffffffffe26f2fc170f69466a74defd8d" + +ECP check order for SECP224K1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:"10000000000000000000000000001dce8d2ec6184caf0a971769fb1f7" + +ECP check order for SECP256K1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141" + +ECP check order for CURVE448 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"3fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7cca23e9c44edb49aed63690216cc2728dc58f552378c292ab5844f3" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..023f5fe6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -0,0 +1,1323 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) ) +#define HAVE_FIX_NEGATIVE +#endif + +#define ECP_PF_UNKNOWN -1 + +#define ECP_PT_RESET( x ) \ + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( x ); \ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( x ); + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecp_group_free( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecp_point_free( NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void ecp_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair kp; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + mbedtls_mpi m; + const char *x = "deadbeef"; + int valid_fmt = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + int invalid_fmt = 42; + size_t olen; + unsigned char buf[42] = { 0 }; + const unsigned char *null_buf = NULL; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id valid_group = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx restart_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecp_point_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecp_group_init( NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( NULL, &restart_ctx, 42 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_copy( NULL, &P ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_copy( &P, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( NULL, &grp ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &grp, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( NULL, + &m, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( &grp, + NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( &grp, + &m, + NULL, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( NULL, &P ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( &P, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( NULL, 2, + x, x ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( &P, 2, + NULL, x ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( &P, 2, + x, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( NULL, &P, + valid_fmt, + &olen, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &grp, NULL, + valid_fmt, + &olen, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &grp, &P, + invalid_fmt, + &olen, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &grp, &P, + valid_fmt, + NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &grp, &P, + valid_fmt, + &olen, + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( NULL, &P, buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &grp, NULL, buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &grp, &P, NULL, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( NULL, &P, + (const unsigned char **) &buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &grp, NULL, + (const unsigned char **) &buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &grp, &P, &null_buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &grp, &P, NULL, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( NULL, &P, + valid_fmt, + &olen, + buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &grp, NULL, + valid_fmt, + &olen, + buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &grp, &P, + invalid_fmt, + &olen, + buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &grp, &P, + valid_fmt, + NULL, + buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &grp, &P, + valid_fmt, + &olen, + NULL, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_group_load( NULL, valid_group ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( NULL, + (const unsigned char **) &buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( &grp, NULL, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( &grp, &null_buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( NULL, + (const unsigned char **) &buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( &valid_group, NULL, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( &valid_group, + &null_buf, + sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( NULL, &olen, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &grp, NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &grp, &olen, + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_mul( NULL, &P, &m, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, NULL, &m, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, NULL, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( NULL, &P, &m, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL , NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, NULL, &m, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL , NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &P, NULL, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL , NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &P, &m, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL , NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd( NULL, &P, &m, &P, + &m, &P ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd( &grp, NULL, &m, &P, + &m, &P ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd( &grp, &P, NULL, &P, + &m, &P ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd( &grp, &P, &m, NULL, + &m, &P ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd( &grp, &P, &m, &P, + NULL, &P ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd( &grp, &P, &m, &P, + &m, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( NULL, &P, &m, &P, + &m, &P, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( &grp, NULL, &m, &P, + &m, &P, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( &grp, &P, NULL, &P, + &m, &P, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( &grp, &P, &m, NULL, + &m, &P, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( &grp, &P, &m, &P, + NULL, &P, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( &grp, &P, &m, &P, + &m, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( NULL, &P ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( NULL, &kp ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( &kp, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( NULL, &m ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &grp, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( NULL, &P, &m, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( &grp, NULL, &m, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( &grp, &P, NULL, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( &grp, &P, &m, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( &grp, &P, &m, &P, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( NULL, + &m, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &grp, + NULL, &P, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &grp, + &m, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &grp, + &m, &P, + NULL, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( valid_group, NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( valid_group, &kp, + NULL, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ecp_curve_info( int id, int tls_id, int size, char * name ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *by_id, *by_tls, *by_name; + + by_id = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( id ); + by_tls = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ); + by_name = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( name ); + TEST_ASSERT( by_id != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( by_tls != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( by_name != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( by_id == by_tls ); + TEST_ASSERT( by_id == by_name ); + + TEST_ASSERT( by_id->bit_size == size ); + TEST_ASSERT( size <= MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS ); + TEST_ASSERT( size <= MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES * 8 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_check_pub( int grp_id, char * x_hex, char * y_hex, char * z_hex, + int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, grp_id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P.X, 16, x_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P.Y, 16, y_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P.Z, 16, z_hex ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &P ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +void ecp_test_vect_restart( int id, + char *dA_str, char *xA_str, char *yA_str, + char *dB_str, char *xZ_str, char *yZ_str, + int max_ops, int min_restarts, int max_restarts ) +{ + /* + * Test for early restart. Based on test vectors like ecp_test_vect(), + * but for the sake of simplicity only does half of each side. It's + * important to test both base point and random point, though, as memory + * management is different in each case. + * + * Don't try using too precise bounds for restarts as the exact number + * will depend on settings such as MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE, as well as implementation details that may + * change in the future. A factor 2 is a minimum safety margin. + * + * For reference, with mbed TLS 2.4 and default settings, for P-256: + * - Random point mult: ~3250M + * - Cold base point mult: ~3300M + * - Hot base point mult: ~1100M + * With MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE set to 2 (minimum): + * - Random point mult: ~3850M + */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx ctx; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; + mbedtls_mpi dA, xA, yA, dB, xZ, yZ; + int cnt_restarts; + int ret; + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &xA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &yA ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &dB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &xZ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &yZ ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &dA, 16, dA_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &xA, 16, xA_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &yA, 16, yA_str ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &dB, 16, dB_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &xZ, 16, xZ_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &yZ, 16, yZ_str ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( (unsigned) max_ops ); + + /* Base point case */ + cnt_restarts = 0; + do { + ECP_PT_RESET( &R ); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &R, &dA, &grp.G, NULL, NULL, &ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restarts ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xA ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yA ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restarts >= min_restarts ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restarts <= max_restarts ); + + /* Non-base point case */ + mbedtls_ecp_copy( &P, &R ); + cnt_restarts = 0; + do { + ECP_PT_RESET( &R ); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &R, &dB, &P, NULL, NULL, &ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restarts ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xZ ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yZ ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restarts >= min_restarts ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restarts <= max_restarts ); + + /* Do we leak memory when aborting an operation? + * This test only makes sense when we actually restart */ + if( min_restarts > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &R, &dB, &P, NULL, NULL, &ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &xA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &yA ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &xZ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &yZ ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +void ecp_muladd_restart( int id, char *xR_str, char *yR_str, + char *u1_str, char *u2_str, + char *xQ_str, char *yQ_str, + int max_ops, int min_restarts, int max_restarts ) +{ + /* + * Compute R = u1 * G + u2 * Q + * (test vectors mostly taken from ECDSA intermediate results) + * + * See comments at the top of ecp_test_vect_restart() + */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx ctx; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point R, Q; + mbedtls_mpi u1, u2, xR, yR; + int cnt_restarts; + int ret; + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &xR ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &yR ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &u1, 16, u1_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &u2, 16, u2_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &xR, 16, xR_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &yR, 16, yR_str ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q.X, 16, xQ_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q.Y, 16, yQ_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Q.Z, 1 ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( (unsigned) max_ops ); + + cnt_restarts = 0; + do { + ECP_PT_RESET( &R ); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( &grp, &R, + &u1, &grp.G, &u2, &Q, &ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restarts ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xR ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yR ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restarts >= min_restarts ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restarts <= max_restarts ); + + /* Do we leak memory when aborting an operation? + * This test only makes sense when we actually restart */ + if( min_restarts > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( &grp, &R, + &u1, &grp.G, &u2, &Q, &ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &xR ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &yR ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_test_vect( int id, char * dA_str, char * xA_str, char * yA_str, + char * dB_str, char * xB_str, char * yB_str, + char * xZ_str, char * yZ_str ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi dA, xA, yA, dB, xB, yB, xZ, yZ; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &xA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &yA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &dB ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &xB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &yB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &xZ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &yZ ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &grp.G ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &dA, 16, dA_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &xA, 16, xA_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &yA, 16, yA_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &dB, 16, dB_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &xB, 16, xB_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &yB, 16, yB_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &xZ, 16, xZ_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &yZ, 16, yZ_str ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &grp.G, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xA ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yA ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &R, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xZ ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yZ ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xB ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yB ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &R, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xZ ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yZ ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &xA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &yA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &dB ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &xB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &yB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &xZ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &yZ ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_test_vec_x( int id, char * dA_hex, char * xA_hex, char * dB_hex, + char * xB_hex, char * xS_hex ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi dA, xA, dB, xB, xS; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &xA ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &dB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &xB ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &xS ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &grp.G ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &dA, 16, dA_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &dB, 16, dB_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &xA, 16, xA_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &xB, 16, xB_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &xS, 16, xS_hex ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &grp.G, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xA ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &R, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xS ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xB ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &R, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xS ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &xA ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &xB ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &xS ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_test_mul( int id, data_t * n_hex, + data_t * Px_hex, data_t * Py_hex, data_t * Pz_hex, + data_t * nPx_hex, data_t * nPy_hex, data_t * nPz_hex, + int expected_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point P, nP, R; + mbedtls_mpi n; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &nP ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &n ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &grp.G ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &n, n_hex->x, n_hex->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &P.X, Px_hex->x, Px_hex->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &P.Y, Py_hex->x, Py_hex->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &P.Z, Pz_hex->x, Pz_hex->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &nP.X, nPx_hex->x, nPx_hex->len ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &nP.Y, nPy_hex->x, nPy_hex->len ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &nP.Z, nPz_hex->x, nPz_hex->len ) + == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &n, &P, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) + == expected_ret ); + + if( expected_ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &nP.X, &R.X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &nP.Y, &R.Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &nP.Z, &R.Z ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &nP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &n ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_test_mul_rng( int id, data_t * d_hex) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_mpi d; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &grp.G ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &d, d_hex->x, d_hex->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &Q, &d, &grp.G, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_zero_rand, NULL ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +void ecp_muladd( int id, + data_t *u1_bin, data_t *P1_bin, + data_t *u2_bin, data_t *P2_bin, + data_t *expected_result ) +{ + /* Compute R = u1 * P1 + u2 * P2 */ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point P1, P2, R; + mbedtls_mpi u1, u2; + uint8_t actual_result[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; + size_t len; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &u1, u1_bin->x, u1_bin->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &u2, u2_bin->x, u2_bin->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &grp, &P1, + P1_bin->x, P1_bin->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &grp, &P2, + P2_bin->x, P2_bin->len ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ecp_muladd( &grp, &R, &u1, &P1, &u2, &P2 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( + &grp, &R, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, actual_result, sizeof( actual_result ) ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( len <= MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_result->x, expected_result->len, + actual_result, len ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_fast_mod( int id, char * N_str ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_mpi N, R; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, 16, N_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( grp.modp != NULL ); + + /* + * Store correct result before we touch N + */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R, &N, &grp.P ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( grp.modp( &N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &N ) <= grp.pbits + 3 ); + + /* + * Use mod rather than addition/subtraction in case previous test fails + */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &N, &N, &grp.P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &N, &R ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_write_binary( int id, char * x, char * y, char * z, int format, + data_t * out, int blen, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + unsigned char buf[256]; + size_t olen; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P.X, 16, x ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P.Y, 16, y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P.Z, 16, z ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &grp, &P, format, + &olen, buf, blen ) == ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( olen <= MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( buf, out->x, olen, out->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_read_binary( int id, data_t * buf, char * x, char * y, char * z, + int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z; + + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, 16, x ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, 16, y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Z, 16, z ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &grp, &P, buf->x, buf->len ) == ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P.X, &X ) == 0 ); + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Y, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( P.Y.p == NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Z, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P.Z, 1 ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P.Y, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P.Z, &Z ) == 0 ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( int id, data_t * buf, char * x, char * y, + char * z, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z; + const unsigned char *vbuf = buf->x; + + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, 16, x ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, 16, y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Z, 16, z ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &grp, &P, &vbuf, buf->len ) == ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P.X, &X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P.Y, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P.Z, &Z ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( (uint32_t)( vbuf - buf->x ) == buf->len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_tls_write_read_point( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point pt; + unsigned char buf[256]; + const unsigned char *vbuf; + size_t olen; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &pt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); vbuf = buf; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &grp, &grp.G, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED, &olen, buf, 256 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &grp, &pt, &vbuf, olen ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + TEST_ASSERT( vbuf == buf + olen ); + + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); vbuf = buf; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &grp, &grp.G, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, buf, 256 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &grp, &pt, &vbuf, olen ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp.G.X, &pt.X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp.G.Y, &pt.Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp.G.Z, &pt.Z ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( vbuf == buf + olen ); + + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); vbuf = buf; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( &pt ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &grp, &pt, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED, &olen, buf, 256 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &grp, &pt, &vbuf, olen ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &pt ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( vbuf == buf + olen ); + + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); vbuf = buf; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( &pt ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &grp, &pt, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, buf, 256 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &grp, &pt, &vbuf, olen ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &pt ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( vbuf == buf + olen ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &pt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( data_t * buf, int result, int bits, + int record_len ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + const unsigned char *vbuf = buf->x; + int ret; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( &grp, &vbuf, buf->len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result ); + if( ret == 0) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp.P ) == (size_t) bits ); + TEST_ASSERT( vbuf - buf->x == record_len); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_tls_write_read_group( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp1, grp2; + unsigned char buf[10]; + const unsigned char *vbuf = buf; + size_t len; + int ret; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp2 ); + memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp1, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &grp1, &len, buf, 10 ) == 0 ); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( &grp2, &vbuf, len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp1.N, &grp2.N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( grp1.id == grp2.id ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp2 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( int id, char * key_hex, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_mpi d; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &d ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &d, 16, key_hex ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &grp, &d ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( int id_pub, char * Qx_pub, char * Qy_pub, + int id, char * d, char * Qx, char * Qy, + int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair pub, prv; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &pub ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &prv ); + + if( id_pub != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &pub.grp, id_pub ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( &pub.Q, 16, Qx_pub, Qy_pub ) == 0 ); + + if( id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &prv.grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( &prv.Q, 16, Qx, Qy ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &prv.d, 16, d ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( &pub, &prv ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &pub ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &prv ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_mpi d; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &d ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &grp, &d, &Q, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &grp, &d ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( int id ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &key ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( id, &key, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &key.grp, &key.Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &key.grp, &key.d ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &key ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_ecp_read_key( int grp_id, data_t* in_key, int expected, int canonical ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key2; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &key ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &key2 ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key( grp_id, &key, in_key->x, in_key->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == expected ); + + if( expected == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &key.grp, &key.d ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + if( canonical ) + { + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key( &key, buf, in_key->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( in_key->x, in_key->len, + buf, in_key->len ); + } + else + { + unsigned char export1[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char export2[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key( &key, export1, in_key->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key( grp_id, &key2, export1, in_key->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == expected ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key( &key2, export2, in_key->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( export1, in_key->len, + export2, in_key->len ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &key ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &key2 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:HAVE_FIX_NEGATIVE */ +void fix_negative( data_t *N_bin, int c, int bits ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi C, M, N; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); + + /* C = - c * 2^bits (positive since c is negative) */ + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_lset( &C, -c ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &C, bits ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &N, N_bin->x, N_bin->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_grow( &N, C.n ) ); + + /* M = N - C = - ( C - N ) (expected result of fix_negative) */ + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &M, &N, &C ) ); + + mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( &N, c, bits ); + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &N, &M ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS:MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ +void genkey_mx_known_answer( int bits, data_t *seed, data_t *expected ) +{ + mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info rnd_info; + mbedtls_mpi d; + int ret; + uint8_t *actual = NULL; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &d ); + rnd_info.buf = seed->x; + rnd_info.length = seed->len; + rnd_info.fallback_f_rng = NULL; + rnd_info.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( actual, expected->len ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( bits, &d, + mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, &rnd_info ); + + if( expected->len == 0 ) + { + /* Expecting an error (happens if there isn't enough randomness) */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret != 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_EQUAL( ret, 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( (size_t) bits + 1, mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &d ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &d, actual, expected->len ) ); + /* Test the exact result. This assumes that the output of the + * RNG is used in a specific way, which is overly constraining. + * The advantage is that it's easier to test the expected properties + * of the generated key: + * - The most significant bit must be at a specific positions + * (can be enforced by checking the bit-length). + * - The least significant bits must have specific values + * (can be enforced by checking these bits). + * - Other bits must be random (by testing with different RNG outputs, + * we validate that those bits are indeed influenced by the RNG). */ + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected->x, expected->len, + actual, expected->len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( actual ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void ecp_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_check_order( int id, char * expected_order_hex ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_mpi expected_n; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &expected_n ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &expected_n, 16, expected_order_hex ) == 0); + + // check sign bits are well-formed (i.e. 1 or -1) - see #5810 + TEST_ASSERT( grp.N.s == -1 || grp.N.s == 1); + TEST_ASSERT( expected_n.s == -1 || expected_n.s == 1); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp.N, &expected_n ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &expected_n ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..95bfe66e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.data @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +Entropy init-free-free +entropy_init_free:0 + +Entropy init-free-init-free +entropy_init_free:1 + +Create NV seed_file +nv_seed_file_create: + +Entropy write/update seed file: good +entropy_seed_file:"data_files/entropy_seed":0 + +Entropy write/update seed file: nonexistent +entropy_seed_file:"no_such_dir/file":MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR + +Entropy write/update seed file: base NV seed file +entropy_write_base_seed_file:0 + +Entropy no sources +entropy_no_sources: + +Entropy too many sources +entropy_too_many_sources: + +Entropy output length: 0 +entropy_func_len:0:0 + +Entropy output length: 1 +entropy_func_len:1:0 + +Entropy output length: 2 +entropy_func_len:2:0 + +Entropy output length: 31 +entropy_func_len:31:0 + +Entropy output length: 65 > BLOCK_SIZE +entropy_func_len:65:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Entropy failing source +entropy_source_fail:"data_files/entropy_seed" + +Entropy threshold: 16=2*8 +entropy_threshold:16:2:8 + +Entropy threshold: 32=1*32 +entropy_threshold:32:1:32 + +Entropy threshold: 0* never reaches the threshold +entropy_threshold:16:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Entropy threshold: 1024 never reached +entropy_threshold:1024:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Entropy calls: no strong +entropy_calls:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK:1:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE + +Entropy calls: 1 strong, 1*BLOCK_SIZE +entropy_calls:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK:1:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:1 + +Entropy calls: 1 strong, 2*(BLOCK_SIZE/2) +entropy_calls:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK:1:(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE+1)/2:2 + +Entropy calls: 1 strong, BLOCK_SIZE*1 +entropy_calls:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK:1:1:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + +Entropy calls: 1 strong, 2*BLOCK_SIZE to reach threshold +entropy_calls:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE+1:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:2 + +Entropy calls: 2 strong, BLOCK_SIZE/2 each +entropy_calls:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK:(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE+1)/2:(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE+1)/2:2 + +Check NV seed standard IO +entropy_nv_seed_std_io: + +Check NV seed manually #1 +entropy_nv_seed:"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF" + +Check NV seed manually #2 +entropy_nv_seed:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +Check NV seed manually #3 +entropy_nv_seed:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" + +Entropy self test +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY +entropy_selftest:0 + +Entropy self test (MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY +entropy_selftest:1 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e5e88bb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.function @@ -0,0 +1,530 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "string.h" + +typedef enum +{ + DUMMY_CONSTANT_LENGTH, /* Output context->length bytes */ + DUMMY_REQUESTED_LENGTH, /* Output whatever length was requested */ + DUMMY_FAIL, /* Return an error code */ +} entropy_dummy_instruction; + +typedef struct +{ + entropy_dummy_instruction instruction; + size_t length; /* Length to return for DUMMY_CONSTANT_LENGTH */ + size_t calls; /* Incremented at each call */ +} entropy_dummy_context; + +/* + * Dummy entropy source + * + * If data is NULL, write exactly the requested length. + * Otherwise, write the length indicated by data or error if negative + */ +static int entropy_dummy_source( void *arg, unsigned char *output, + size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + entropy_dummy_context *context = arg; + ++context->calls; + + switch( context->instruction ) + { + case DUMMY_CONSTANT_LENGTH: + *olen = context->length; + break; + case DUMMY_REQUESTED_LENGTH: + *olen = len; + break; + case DUMMY_FAIL: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + memset( output, 0x2a, *olen ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Ability to clear entropy sources to allow testing with just predefined + * entropy sources. This function or tests depending on it might break if there + * are internal changes to how entropy sources are registered. + * + * To be called immediately after mbedtls_entropy_init(). + * + * Just resetting the counter. New sources will overwrite existing ones. + * This might break memory checks in the future if sources need 'free-ing' then + * as well. + */ +static void entropy_clear_sources( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->source_count = 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +/* + * NV seed read/write functions that use a buffer instead of a file + */ +static unsigned char buffer_seed[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + +int buffer_nv_seed_read( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + if( buf_len != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + return( -1 ); + + memcpy( buf, buffer_seed, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + return( 0 ); +} + +int buffer_nv_seed_write( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + if( buf_len != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + return( -1 ); + + memcpy( buffer_seed, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * NV seed read/write helpers that fill the base seedfile + */ +static int write_nv_seed( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + FILE *f; + + if( buf_len != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( f = fopen( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE, "w" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, f ) != + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + return( -1 ); + + fclose( f ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int read_nv_seed( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + FILE *f; + + if( buf_len != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( f = fopen( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( fread( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, f ) != + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + return( -1 ); + + fclose( f ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void entropy_init_free( int reinit ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + + /* Double free is not explicitly documented to work, but it is convenient + * to call mbedtls_entropy_free() unconditionally on an error path without + * checking whether it has already been called in the success path. */ + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); + + if( reinit ) + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); + + /* This test case always succeeds, functionally speaking. A plausible + * bug might trigger an invalid pointer dereference or a memory leak. */ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void entropy_seed_file( char * path, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( &ctx, path ) == ret ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( &ctx, path ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void entropy_write_base_seed_file( int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( &ctx, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE ) == ret ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( &ctx, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void entropy_no_sources( ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + entropy_clear_sources( &ctx ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_entropy_func( &ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ), + MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED ); + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void entropy_too_many_sources( ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + size_t i; + entropy_dummy_context dummy = {DUMMY_REQUESTED_LENGTH, 0, 0}; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * It's hard to tell precisely when the error will occur, + * since we don't know how many sources were automatically added. + */ + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES; i++ ) + (void) mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, entropy_dummy_source, &dummy, + 16, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, entropy_dummy_source, &dummy, + 16, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES ); + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG */ +void entropy_func_len( int len, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + 10] = { 0 }; + unsigned char acc[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + 10] = { 0 }; + size_t i, j; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * See comments in mbedtls_entropy_self_test() + */ + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_func( &ctx, buf, len ) == ret ); + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( buf ); j++ ) + acc[j] |= buf[j]; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + for( j = 0; j < (size_t) len; j++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( acc[j] != 0 ); + + for( j = len; j < sizeof( buf ); j++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( acc[j] == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void entropy_source_fail( char * path ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[16]; + entropy_dummy_context dummy = {DUMMY_FAIL, 0, 0}; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, entropy_dummy_source, + &dummy, 16, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ) + == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_func( &ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_gather( &ctx ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( &ctx, path ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( &ctx, path ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); +#else + ((void) path); +#endif + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void entropy_threshold( int threshold, int chunk_size, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + entropy_dummy_context strong = + {DUMMY_CONSTANT_LENGTH, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, 0}; + entropy_dummy_context weak = {DUMMY_CONSTANT_LENGTH, chunk_size, 0}; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; + int ret; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + entropy_clear_sources( &ctx ); + + /* Set strong source that reaches its threshold immediately and + * a weak source whose threshold is a test parameter. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, entropy_dummy_source, + &strong, 1, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, entropy_dummy_source, + &weak, threshold, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( &ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( result >= 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + /* If the NV seed functionality is enabled, there are two entropy + * updates: before and after updating the NV seed. */ + result *= 2; +#endif + TEST_ASSERT( weak.calls == (size_t) result ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void entropy_calls( int strength1, int strength2, + int threshold, int chunk_size, + int result ) +{ + /* + * if result >= 0: result = expected number of calls to source 1 + * if result < 0: result = expected return code from mbedtls_entropy_func() + */ + + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + entropy_dummy_context dummy1 = {DUMMY_CONSTANT_LENGTH, chunk_size, 0}; + entropy_dummy_context dummy2 = {DUMMY_CONSTANT_LENGTH, chunk_size, 0}; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; + int ret; + + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + entropy_clear_sources( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, entropy_dummy_source, + &dummy1, threshold, + strength1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, entropy_dummy_source, + &dummy2, threshold, + strength2 ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( &ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( result >= 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + /* If the NV seed functionality is enabled, there are two entropy + * updates: before and after updating the NV seed. */ + result *= 2; +#endif + TEST_ASSERT( dummy1.calls == (size_t) result ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void nv_seed_file_create( ) +{ + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + TEST_ASSERT( write_nv_seed( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +void entropy_nv_seed_std_io( ) +{ + unsigned char io_seed[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char check_seed[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + memset( io_seed, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + memset( check_seed, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read, + mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write ); + + /* Check if platform NV read and write manipulate the same data */ + TEST_ASSERT( write_nv_seed( io_seed, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nv_seed_read( check_seed, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( io_seed, check_seed, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); + + memset( check_seed, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + /* Check if platform NV write and raw read manipulate the same data */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nv_seed_write( io_seed, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + TEST_ASSERT( read_nv_seed( check_seed, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( io_seed, check_seed, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +void entropy_nv_seed( data_t * read_seed ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); +#else +#error "Unsupported entropy accumulator" +#endif + mbedtls_md_context_t accumulator; + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + int (*original_mbedtls_nv_seed_read)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) = + mbedtls_nv_seed_read; + int (*original_mbedtls_nv_seed_write)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) = + mbedtls_nv_seed_write; + + unsigned char header[2]; + unsigned char entropy[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char empty[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char check_seed[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char check_entropy[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + memset( entropy, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + memset( empty, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + memset( check_seed, 2, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + memset( check_entropy, 3, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + // Make sure we read/write NV seed from our buffers + mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( buffer_nv_seed_read, buffer_nv_seed_write ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &accumulator ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + entropy_clear_sources( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ) == 0 ); + + // Set the initial NV seed to read + TEST_ASSERT( read_seed->len >= MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + memcpy( buffer_seed, read_seed->x, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + // Do an entropy run + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_func( &ctx, entropy, sizeof( entropy ) ) == 0 ); + // Determine what should have happened with manual entropy internal logic + + // Init accumulator + header[1] = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_setup( &accumulator, md_info, 0 ) == 0 ); + + // First run for updating write_seed + header[0] = 0; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_starts( &accumulator ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_update( &accumulator, header, 2 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_update( &accumulator, + read_seed->x, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_finish( &accumulator, buf ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_starts( &accumulator ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_update( &accumulator, + buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + check_seed ) == 0 ); + + // Second run for actual entropy (triggers mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed) + header[0] = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_update( &accumulator, header, 2 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_update( &accumulator, + empty, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); + + header[0] = 0; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_update( &accumulator, header, 2 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_update( &accumulator, + check_seed, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_finish( &accumulator, buf ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + check_entropy ) == 0 ); + + // Check result of both NV file and entropy received with the manual calculations + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( check_seed, buffer_seed, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( check_entropy, entropy, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &accumulator ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_nv_seed_read = original_mbedtls_nv_seed_read; + mbedtls_nv_seed_write = original_mbedtls_nv_seed_write; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void entropy_selftest( int result ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_entropy_self_test( 1 ) == result ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_error.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_error.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dec5639e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_error.data @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +Single low error +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +error_strerror:-0x0020:"AES - Invalid key length" + +Single high error +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +error_strerror:-0x4080:"RSA - Bad input parameters to function" + +Low and high error +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +error_strerror:-0x40A0:"RSA - Bad input parameters to function \: AES - Invalid key length" + +Non existing high error +error_strerror:-0x8880:"UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (8880)" + +Non existing low error +error_strerror:-0x007F:"UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (007F)" + +Non existing low and high error +error_strerror:-0x88FF:"UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (8880) \: UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (007F)" + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_error.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_error.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..68831ce5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_error.function @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void error_strerror( int code, char * result_str ) +{ + char buf[500]; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + mbedtls_strerror( code, buf, 500 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buf, result_str ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_de.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_de.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c865b0cb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_de.data @@ -0,0 +1,679 @@ +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d785dafea3e966731ef6fc6202262584":"":"d91a46205ee94058b3b8403997592dd2":"":128:"3b92a17c1b9c3578a68cffea5a5b6245":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"aec963833b9098de1ababc853ab74d96":"":"4e0ffd93beffd732c6f7d6ad606a2d24":"":128:"e9fcedc176dfe587dc61b2011010cdf1":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c4fb9e3393681da9cec5ec96f87c5c31":"":"845e910bc055d895879f62101d08b4c7":"":128:"99fb783c497416e4b6e2a5de7c782057":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2a930f2e09beceacd9919cb76f2ac8d3":"":"340d9af44f6370eff534c653033a785a":"":120:"0c1e5e9c8fe5edfd11f114f3503d63":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fe71177e02073b1c407b5724e2263a5e":"":"83c23d20d2a9d4b8f92da96587c96b18":"":120:"43b2ca795420f35f6cb39f5dfa47a2":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b02392fd7f228888c281e59d1eaa15fb":"":"2726344ba8912c737e195424e1e6679e":"":120:"a10b601ca8053536a2af2cc255d2b6":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"21895cbafc16b7b8bf5867e88e0853d4":"":"f987ce1005d9bbd31d2452fb80957753":"":112:"952a7e265830d58a6778d68b9450":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9bb9742bf47f68caf64963d7c10a97b0":"":"34a85669de64e1cd44731905fddbcbc5":"":112:"e9b6be928aa77b2de28b480ae74c":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4e9708e4b37e2e1b5feaf4f5ab54e2a6":"":"1c53a9fdd23919b036d99560619a9939":"":112:"6611b50d6fbca83047f9f5fe1768":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"82fede79db25f00be96eb050a22cea87":"":"e9c50b517ab26c89b83c1f0cac50162c":"":104:"d0c0ce9db60b77b0e31d05e048":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1d98566fca5201abb12914311a8bd532":"":"590aef4b46a9023405d075edab7e6849":"":104:"a1cfd1a27b341f49eda2ca8305":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3038771820c2e1319f02a74b8a7a0c08":"":"e556d9f07fb69d7e9a644261c80fac92":"":104:"4d2f005d662b6a8787f231c5e1":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0fb7eef50de598d7d8b508d019a30d5a":"":"a2a2617040116c2c7e4236d2d8278213":"":96:"68413c58df7bb5f067197ca0":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8cc58b609204215c8ab4908286e56e5c":"":"fb83ea637279332677b5f68081173e99":"":96:"a2a9160d82739a55d8cd419f":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"81a5fd184742a478432963f6477e8f92":"":"da297cbb53b11d7c379e0566299b4d5a":"":96:"200bee49466fdda2f21f0062":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f604ac66d626959e595cbb7b4128e096":"":"269d2a49d533c6bb38008711f38e0b39":"":64:"468200fa4683e8be":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2e308ba7903e925f768c1d00ff3eb623":"":"335acd2aa48a47a37cfe21e491f1b141":"":64:"4872bfd5e2ff55f6":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1304e2a5a3520454a5109df61a67da7a":"":"dbe8b452acf4fa1444c3668e9ee72d26":"":64:"83a0d3440200ca95":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ecf1ec2c9a8f2e9cc799f9b9fddb3232":"":"ddf0b695aef5df2b594fcaae72b7e41c":"":32:"2819aedf":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9ab5c8ca905b5fe50461f4a68941144b":"":"96dd3927a96e16123f2e9d6b367d303f":"":32:"6e0c53ef":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b5fc7af605721a9cfe61c1ee6a4b3e22":"":"6b757d4055823d1035d01077666037d6":"":32:"e8c09ddd":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"03c0b4a6e508a8490db0d086a82c9db7":"":"ac52f6c1a05030321fa39f87e89fdb5e":"33316ca79d10a79f4fd038593e8eef09625089dc4e0ffe4bc1f2871554fa6666ab3e7fe7885edef694b410456f3ec0e513bb25f1b48d95e4820c5972c1aabb25c84c08566002dadc36df334c1ce86847964a122016d389ac873bca8c335a7a99bcef91e1b985ae5d488a2d7f78b4bf14e0c2dc715e814f4e24276057cf668172":128:"756292d8b4653887edef51679b161812":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b228d3d15219ea9ad5651fce02c8374d":"":"5c7eafaead029c3fe3cf3835fe758d0e":"8c35dd805c08686b9b4d460f81b4dcb8c46c6d57842dc3e72ba90952e2bebf17fe7184445b02f801800a944486d662a127d01d3b7f42679052cdc73ce533129af8d13957415c5495142157d6ce8a68aa977e56f562fed98e468e42522767656ce50369471060381bb752dd5e77c79677a4cadffa39e518e30a789e793b07ea21":128:"a4dde1ab93c84937c3bbc3ad5237818d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"776afcbabedd5577fe660a60f920b536":"":"5bbb7f1b14084e520408dd87b97705e9":"44631fc9d4a07416b0dfb4e2b42071e3e2be45502c9ddf72b3e61810eeda31a7d685ebb2ee43a2c06af374569f439ee1668c550067de2dece9ec46ee72b260858d6033f814e85275c5ae669b60803a8c516de32804fa34d3a213ccfaf6689046e25eeb30b9e1608e689f4d31cc664b83a468a51165f5625f12f098a6bf7ddab2":128:"a5347d41d93b587240651bcd5230264f":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"20abeafa25fc4ea7d0592cb3e9b4d5fe":"":"3aba79a58c5aa664856b41d552c7a8d3":"98cfecaae9eb9a7c3b17e6bc5f80d8a4bf7a9f4fa5e01b74cae15ee6af14633205aafe3b28fb7b7918e12322ea27352056a603746d728a61361134a561619400ff2bf679045bac2e0fbc2c1d41f8faba4b27c7827bceda4e9bf505df4185515dd3a5e26f7639c8ad5a38bc5906a44be062f02cc53862678ae36fa3de3c02c982":120:"2a67ad1471a520fe09a304f0975f31":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2bc73fba942ff105823b5dccf6befb1c":"":"902c3e3b69b1ef8395d7281ff74cce38":"4adec0b4ac00325a860044d9f9519daa4f7c163229a75819b0fd7d8e23319f030e61dfa8eadabff42ea27bc36bdb6cad249e801ca631b656836448b7172c11126bad2781e6a1aa4f62c4eda53409408b008c057e0b81215cc13ddabbb8f1915f4bbab854f8b00763a530ad5055d265778cd3080d0bd35b76a329bdd5b5a2d268":120:"ebdd7c8e87fe733138a433543542d1":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"356a4c245868243d61756cabe86da887":"":"b442f2ec6d45a17144c258fd59fe5b3b":"12cccc3c60474b0a1579c5006c2134850724fa6c9da3a7022d4f65fd238b052bdf34ea34aa7dbadad64996065acee588ab6bd29726d07ed24ffae2d33aadf3e66ebb87f57e689fd85128be1c9e3d8362fad1f8096ee391f75b576fb213d394cef6f091fc5488d9aa152be69475b9167abd6dd4fd93bbbc7b8ca316c952eb19c6":120:"ed26080dcb670590613d97d7c47cf4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dfa7e93aff73600fc552324253066e2c":"":"c20001e93f1cd05253c277a9445d61e4":"a64d1e20058a1f7e698622a02f7ff8dc11886717ede17bbdc3c4645a66a71d8b04346fb389a251ffb0a7f445a25faf642bb7e4697d2cacf925e78c4be98457996afb25b0516b50f179441d1923312364947f8f1e0f5715b43bd537727bf943d7b4679b0b0b28b94e56e7bbf554d9cf79fcee4387f32bb6f91efdd23620035be6":112:"6ba5e4dace9a54b50b901d9b73ad":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2ecea80b48d2ecd194a7699aa7d8ccfc":"":"8b4db08bafc23b65ae50a2d20661d270":"efc2ca1a3b41b90f8ddf74291d68f072a6e025d0c91c3ce2b133525943c73ebadc71f150be20afeb097442fa51be31a641df65d90ebd81dcbaf32711ed31f5e0271421377ffe14ddafea3ca60a600588d484856a98de73f56a766ae60bae384a4ae01a1a06821cf0c7a6b4ee4c8f413748457b3777283d3310218fb55c107293":112:"246a9d37553088b6411ebb62aa16":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d38fee3fd3d6d08224c3c83529a25d08":"":"a942ccb11cf9468186fabfc18c899801":"1c92a4ce0a1dae27e720d6f9b1e460276538de437f3812ab1177cf0273b05908f296f33ba0f4c790abe2ce958b1d92b930a0d81243e6ad09ef86ee8e3270243095096537cb1054fcfcf537d828b65af9b6cf7c50f5b8470f7908f314d0859107eed772ee1732c78e8a2e35b2493f3e8c1e601b08aeab8d9729e0294dca168c62":112:"803a08700ec86fdeb88f7a388921":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1899b0cbae41d705c6eed3226afb5bc0":"":"82d0910aa53e300a487d880d018d0dea":"6bf5583cc1007d74f3529db63b8d4e085400ccf3725eab8e19cb145f3910c61465a21486740a26f74691866a9f632af9fae81f5f0bffedf0c28a6ce0fd520bb4db04a3cd1a7d29d8801e05e4b9c9374fd89bcb539489c2f7f1f801c253a1cc737408669bcd133b62da357f7399a52179125aa59fae6707d340846886d730a835":104:"c5d58870fee9ce157f5ec1fa8f":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8b95323d86d02754f4c2874b42ec6eb0":"":"4f76084acbdef9999c71dcc794238d7c":"ebc75788377c0b264818a6f97c19cf92c29f1c7cdeb6b5f0a92d238fa4614bc35d0cfe4ec9d045cd628ff6262c460679ac15b0c6366d9289bbd217e5012279e0af0fb2cfcbdf51fe16935968cbb727f725fe5bcd4428905849746c8493600ce8b2cfc1b61b04c8b752b915fed611d6b54ef73ec4e3950d6db1807b1ce7ed1dcc":104:"c4724ff1d2c57295eb733e9cad":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"30da555559eb11cf7e0eff9d99e9607d":"":"7799275bf12335f281ec94a870f90a0b":"e735d556e15aec78d9736016c8c99db753ed14d4e4adaaa1dd7eaad702ea5dc337433f8c2b45afdf2f385fdf6c55574425571e079ca759b6235f877ed11618ff212bafd865a22b80b76b3b5cf1acfd24d92fd41607bbb7382f26cd703757088d497b16b32de80e1256c734a9b83356b6fced207177de75458481eaef59a431d7":104:"3c82272130e17c4a0a007a908e":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ed2ac74af896c5190c271cfa6af02fd2":"":"e0226e2d8da47badad1fb78b9a797f27":"8f11353ae476ff923013e6e736ffc9d23101a1c471ccc07ad372a8430d6559c376075efce2e318cdf4c9443dbf132e7e6da5524045028c97e904633b44c4d189a4b64237ac7692dd03c0e751ce9f04d0fdbd8a96074cd7dfa2fd441a52328b4ac3974b4902db45663f7b6f24947dba618f8b9769e927faf84c9f49ad8239b9fb":96:"db8af7a0d548fc54d9457c73":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0225b73fe5fbbe52f838d873173959d8":"":"02a048764f48d9aed1147ee922395bbf":"9b46a57b06e156c877e94c089814493ead879397dab3dfcab2db349ef387efcd0cc339a7e79131a2c580188fc7429044a465b8329d74cd8f47272a4ed32582b1c5c7e3d32341ae902ea4923dc33df8062bc24bb51a11d2ecc82f464f615041387f9c82bd2135d4e240fe56fa8a68e6a9a417e6702430a434b14d70cf02db3181":96:"e2c2ce4022c49a95c9ac9026":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"89ca3771a0ef3287568b4ac036120198":"":"7e83d2ffa8af8c554cfd71a0db56ef5b":"1bd7a9d6262882bd12c62bd50942965b3cdcadf5e0fab2dc4d0daf0ee4b16e92c6e2464c0caa423cdce88e4d843490609716ec5e44c41672c656ac0e444d3622557ea8420c94deae3ad190ddaf859f6f8c23e4e2e32a46d28df23de4f99bd6c34f69e06eddfdfa5f263dbe8baf9d4296b2c543e4c4847271e7590374edf46234":96:"06b2bf62591dc7ec1b814705":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a41a297bd96e224942998fe2192934a1":"":"6827f2c5a0b7ecd6bbc696abb0adf556":"f32041abd8543415cbac423d945dda5378a16a7e94d9ab5dbd2d32eb1c5048cc7c8e4df3ca84ec725f18c34cfdeaa7595392aabfd66d9e2f37c1165369cd806cd9d2110def6f5fad4345e5a6e2326c9300199438fcc078cd9fcf4d76872cac77fc9a0a8ac7e4d63995078a9addecf798460ff5910861b76c71bccfb6b629d722":64:"49a4917eef61f78e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a9372c058f42e0a1d019bdb528313919":"":"8d03f423230c8f00a5b6b712d426a2af":"cfef4e70fcc1821eeccf7c7b5eb3c0c3b5f72dc762426e0bd26242f8aa68c5b716ab97eded5e5720caccc1965da603d556d8214d5828f2cf276d95bf552d47313876796221f62ccb818a6d801088755d58cfb751bfed0d5a19718d4e0f94b850e0279b3a69295d1837cba958a6cc56e7594080b9e5b954a199fdc9e54ddc8583":64:"b82cd11cd3575c8d":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6302b7338f8fa84195ad9abbacd89b4e":"":"e1bed5c53547cbc85f3411fbb43bb08b":"bcd329c076e8da2797d50dcdcf271cecf3ce12f3c136ed746edc722f907be6133276ee099038fdc5d73eec812739c7489d4bcc275f95451b44890416e3ffe5a1b6fa3986b84eee3adad774c6feaecb1f785053eeda2cfc18953b8547866d98918dbe0a6abc168ac7d77467a367f11c284924d9d186ef64ef0fd54eacd75156d2":64:"5222d092e9e8bd6c":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"78b5c28d62e4b2097873a1180bd5a3a5":"":"c93902c2819ee494f0fc4b259ee65dd8":"e6b1192674a02083a6cf36d4ba93ba40a5331fadf63fd1eb2efa2ee9c0d8818472aaaf2b4705746011753f30f447c8f58dd34d29606daf57eadc172529837058cb78a378b19da8d63c321f550dfa256b5fd9f30e93d8f377443bfcd125f86a079a1765d2010be73d060f24eebae8d05e644688b2149bc39e18bd527bc066f2ba":32:"eae48137":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3d84130578070e036c9e3df5b5509473":"":"3b9b4950523a19c6866fd2b0cde541fd":"a764931e1b21a140c54a8619aacdb4358834987fb6e263cec525f888f9e9764c165aaa7db74f2c42273f912daeae6d72b232a872ac2c652d7cd3af3a5753f58331c11b6c866475697876dbc4c6ca0e52a00ba015ee3c3b7fb444c6e50a4b4b9bbe135fc0632d32a3f79f333d8f487771ed12522e664b9cf90e66da267f47a74d":32:"79987692":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"08428605ab4742a3e8a55354d4764620":"":"128f5f4a817e4af04113847a223adeb0":"464b484ed79d93a48e0f804e04df69d7ca10ad04ba7188d69e6549ab50503baaec67e0acba5537d1163c868fd3e350e9d0ae9123046bc76815c201a947aa4a7e4ed239ce889d4ff9c8d043877de06df5fc27cf67442b729b02e9c30287c0821ef9fa15d4cccbc53a95fa9ec3ed432ca960ebbf5a169ccada95a5bf4c7c968830":32:"3eb3e3a2":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0dd358bc3f992f26e81e3a2f3aa2d517":"87cc4fd75788c9d5cc83bae5d764dd249d178ab23224049795d4288b5ed9ea3f317068a39a7574b300c8544226e87b08e008fbe241d094545c211d56ac44437d41491a438272738968c8d371aa7787b5f606c8549a9d868d8a71380e9657d3c0337979feb01de5991fc1470dfc59eb02511efbbff3fcb479a862ba3844a25aaa":"d8c750bb443ee1a169dfe97cfe4d855b":"":128:"a81d13973baa22a751833d7d3f94b3b1":"":"77949b29f085bb3abb71a5386003811233056d3296eb093370f7777dadd306d93d59dcb9754d3857cf2758091ba661f845ef0582f6ae0e134328106f0d5d16b541cd74fdc756dc7b53f4f8a194daeea9369ebb1630c01ccb307b848e9527da20a39898d748fd59206f0b79d0ed946a8958033a45bd9ae673518b32606748eb65":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"43b5f18227e5c74288dbeff03801acd6":"f58d630f10cfca61d4644d4f6505bab629e8e8faf1673e64417f9b79e622966a7011cfb3ff74db5cebf09ad3f41643d4437d213204a6c8397e7d59b8a5b1970aed2b6bb5ea1933c72c351f6ba96c0b0b98188f6e373f5db6c5ebece911ec7a1848abd3ae335515c774e0027dab7d1c07d047d3b8825ff94222dbaf6f9ab597ee":"08ee12246cf7edb81da3d610f3ebd167":"":128:"82d83b2f7da218d1d1441a5b37bcb065":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9a433c612d7e1bdff881e4d63ba8b141":"ce10758332f423228b5e4ae31efda7677586934a1d8f05d9b7a0dc4e2010ec3eaacb71a527a5fff8e787d75ebd24ad163394c891b33477ed9e2a2d853c364cb1c5d0bc317fcaf4010817dbe5f1fd1037c701b291b3a66b164bc818bf5c00a4c210a1671faa574d74c7f3543f6c09aaf117e12e2eb3dae55edb1cc5b4086b617d":"8b670cf31f470f79a6c0b79e73863ca1":"":128:"8526fd25daf890e79946a205b698f287":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8e9d75c781d63b29f1816859f7a0e0a0":"a9f1883f58e4ef78377992101ab86da0dafcefa827904dd94dff6f6704b1e45517165a34c5555a55b04c6992fb6d0840a71bd262fe59815e5c7b80fe803b47d5ba44982a3f72cb42f591d8b62df38c9f56a5868af8f68242e3a15f97be8ef2399dbace1273f509623b6f9e4d27a97436aebf2d044e75f1c62694db77ceac05de":"748a3b486b62a164cedcf1bab9325add":"":120:"131e0e4ce46d768674a7bcacdcef9c":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"45cc35311eedf0ba093bf901931a7036":"5dc8d7525eaad035c19714ae1b1e538cb66a4089027245351e0ad9297410fb3a0c1155407c10a8bb95a9ca624a9c9925dac003ee78926c6e90ff4ccdba10e8a78bda1c4478162a0e302de5ff05fb0f94c89c3c7429fb94828bdcd97d21333c2ee72963ee6f056ce272b8bab007e653a42b01d1d2041ba627f169c8c0d32e6dae":"fed5084de3c348f5a0adf4c2fd4e848a":"6e210914e4aed188d576f5ad7fc7e4cf7dd8d82f34ea3bcbdb7267cfd9045f806978dbff3460c4e8ff8c4edb6ad2edba405a8d915729d89aab2116b36a70b54f5920a97f5a571977e0329eda6c696749be940eabfc6d8b0bbd6fbdb87657b3a7695da9f5d3a7384257f20e0becd8512d3705cc246ee6ca1e610921cf92603d79":128:"266a895fc21da5176b44b446d7d1921d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9edb5231ca4a136b4df4ae22b8588f9f":"493df801c57f8bb591955712d92d3fc34518f0599fec8533b2b4473364e1df4f560c12444cf50eeb584676b7e955c742189de6b50b8e012dfa6642f3679fb02bc6d8e08d1db88c8ae955a7946263e06494e17f8df246b672942661e5563302252208f2e00a0d77068a020e26082c291a75a06f63c41e2830292a418b2b5fd9dd":"c342e9bdabe7be922b2695f5894e032c":"a45c7f8032ac5144deef8d5380f033aea2786b0592720a867f4831eaccc6b85d3fd568aedc6e472e017455b0b5b30cf7a08ea43ca587f35e1646ecd9b4dc774d11e350c82c65692be1e9541cbd72a283bdcf93dc7115545f373747b4f8d5915ed0c42fbeefd3e9bd86003d65efc2361fde5b874ddabcf8265e6b884615102eff":128:"5ed3ea75c8172fa0e8755fef7b4c90f1":"":"56696e501fac1e8d5b83ef911ed11337d5d51ff5342a82993dd5340bb9632e6606eef68ec5fe8cec6b34ebbc596c279e6cbc9221c4cde933f6d93ae014e3c4ca49593f35eaa638606d059519bac3a3373519e6184e7227d2aa62170c36479fe239cb698bfca863925a4c9fb1338685a55a6dfd3bd9c52d8ae12be8551fce6e1a":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,120) #0 [#1] 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(AES-128,128,1024,1024,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"036198cd3a3ab9319684d0f811cf2992":"6b95b9e82a695fb7b466ce3adb536f525d8314f95eada39efb49baf121093ce7d5439f0d8223e03530b85accd388a70650ca9f7e63eb32afecb7b1916ed9b762128cc641caf3e08e027c3d88481d653b6b15172e977dfb9b3f88465911aee162501cbf8501ce2b66ee151bbfdc23225f638f18750c239d62471663e5ee2a5856":"47dffc6b3b80ffef4b943bde87b9cf3c":"ec4de476cd337f564a3facb544d0ff31cd89af4c3d9a28543e45156189f8eff8f804494dda83a1fb2c30ce858884a01ec63db59268452b1eea0f0d48280bb7340eaacc84509469dd94d303774d053d7ab4fb5f6c26581efeb19165f8cb09d58ec314d09ab8356731e87fd081f661e7b2d1a7c3aa4af5448a12b742e7b210b0b0":120:"6cf68a374bea08a977ec8a04b92e8b":"":"5c2f7c408167be3d266ff634e1993fe291aef7efae245fa0b6b5bde886a810c866ae6a078286684d1b66116e636e285f03646e09f3c4ed7b184e7c171ba84f3bfd9500c6f35964a404892b4cdcdd3f697fc5b01934a86019810987a9fea7efca016049873f1072f62df3c17f57ea1d88ccd8757f7e3c5d96e8a18d5366a39ea9":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"38cf029a4b20607030586cd2d82146e6":"f4c9f4476561c9ebdac71b282ae6e2f9f03547da98e66d4d857720db2fcc9ed1f363858db34c9dcaca0109d7c81db24150493115f2bb6985efa8686e3d2ab719d33b230aa4c5c70696bf42f225fb3c6704711c054a882d89b320884a78cb59cd2100496edf4010487597fb9135d8ca79693a43843e9626fd6c64a8722b3a27dc":"6330084319e2bf32cd5240f4826944bc":"80746cfb0127c592f8164d751b0e14a5b379056a884cece7ee4e9b80538d7ff6be56a3b19c135786722aaf315123b47672b0251e87ea45f0fd3601cf93f9efa6cbd9ad537f54d57f1e187f821faac24096ecec19d137c9f4cf145c278af4cd8de01c7758784fda06f1cc62d92ae1977786f3d0645714ab4ab6f48c8794b12f73":104:"7b021de5cda915ba58f90ceef4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cf4d81fc5997c744a572bed71f4ae609":"f3d65d70326e641fbe7fd945fe9cf66c74f17d0d1020ae8ac488f39b7285c99d8632bc2201960f3d77daccfecc04428abe0853aa8d82b90a93127c72b2d2af53f7f1bd0afb99d50f0b3b24e934ec98eddb278b2c65866442cebf10208c7ce1b7ecf764858480b2a269b106fa6d2428d5ad17612e53e62ccc7ad1184663aeb9a7":"bc4e20c56931c967ce8e3b8f5f1c392f":"b6b8294abf7da5703f864721f7904d3821f5568bf4b269e44edef4f1c95ddc172d83a06c0ad9f7f1fd2e292c17a876392bc5bb705d370b2f16ff721bef7648f423346fd3a4d762676e6fcf2d690553a47224af29afed0f452d263be90eb8150a13d720f1db6f1abc1c2ec18cfbf93b8ed3c5aa7cfc1dcb514d69f90409687a4d":104:"0a86142a0af81c8df64ba689f4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c3ce86a212a30e724b4c624057db4e79":"3582ef7a9565c9a8e4496750ee5ca3e3a80df6238f7b7608e3394ec56d1360777921da039ede34abcedd01081babd496ba4de74a7de501181d6bb2022a6cc7f79d89a4c6a97676fb0f2b42f70e2d0bc1eaac364c3646df4f611c1d6b09737451b81b5a4da73c05fb58391c74e44498b80b26f1c29562d23c39b5d3f086b280cb":"9e03f0dd4cb2b3d830a6925e4400ed89":"92c48a39d93ea3308f55f6650d33fdf17a902076d582a94a82ac99496de9f62312292b844bbca5a683ef0f0710bbc1c7f89cbcca8f9c0299f154590d32059bd99fca5d78c450ede0d11d55075947caf2151218ce7a06c1e81985a7781a3444054170b457fd7ba816026310112abb47c8eddfd3ab7f679a0f60efc6c6dd3b759e":96:"3230fe94b6ccd63e605f87d0":"":"052347a4273cddba65b2a0b961477f07edee440a9117ab204359d2dd45ad2a6dad3b60ead891e7da6d79f3017ac90f95725a0089f04d25ce537bf53b7ea8e1ea58692d34c221db141e2a9fd7211adcee03ef8b5bf3c5d36311d20bb3d81f70f7e7272d0e2b6d12293b1a2c31b70f140a8f08d98c6231a3c429c3d0a10b2e1c1c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a0155360b84420b5bf4fb410ea02f31e":"ecdb51522fc440f7471ea6a31f7c1ef1ec2153e5bcf6303297dbf8ddb3830b45ed9866157375ce4bdeb5e32fcbc6607984fccd7e6552628736608ab13072856d432ceccd3e90d1bb52ca9ada9cee90eb89ac10e887a1978fd0fb3d7bb20caaf35539e150be8044b725b8427c4c4a910f79980865d36344a8784bcc3d58460acb":"46f0386be7363887e7e357376305eab5":"611bc290f91798ad84f0a5ecb5a7cb8fa35e9ab6a5a51c9869a68a076e96f92c9c117595f92cbac5d33343fa2accd2541473907cbc54792c5e215ae857424c921b04ca4b81376bbedbfcc0e565c118f2aced08f247698eed5e2d202c48245161cabeac9fa195219f9799fa253e339561e13012167f1d02b4012b7791b7c863ba":96:"ac5addcc10cae6c1345520f1":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"694f621f594d96b16c32254ff06f3f9c":"e61476b8b7f101ca6005f25af2b9bee795d62720bbbf59357057ca7cd473e00f0d465255fce8d6164657603323549fb4e3d33fa51054b1a70cc7e492916dea85453e9107fe781bfeb4a622c5b2306a8dddef99386dc50745003aa7220cd7f32fb0a060fa7682576769a48f9169c7d11fe0a8a61b95f5d6dfcf216f7d0c652a84":"542db4e107485a3cd24c7ad337a4f1b5":"27b7bfa5eb34ba376e515e58ab8b6556c396820d0074a1fe3b984945dcf5251ca450456ccb4bb66ec739b03fdc5f72d24553e843255adc012d1f1c95aa3cdac5d12926465354217203052cbd4869a8b5be2e01d0fe66b5a6a8da0a2ce351557e2991ce77baa812b9c67b8e1c5a1fc348710e1a73a0fd49acfd538b7db6bef8b3":96:"0bdef4d771a1740381e7db97":"":"8b27a338fd2153d304f04655e09bd9bdf4468890ecce1e3b51de2c9a25a8d9336a9acd753ce270b1fe8d50196feac68145e0fd59c9cb3aa7c1e8af03494bc4279c6e287c849f3c775ada584ae173100946ae6921ef7c96bbc6f216093548702cf1867bb1bf1f4c9e90a34230a2b2aeb584622dd615023a43a406e64428bd9170":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"78826a5215a1d5e1b39cad5a06861f8f":"0fe2c798d7015d3e2f8725648d95729c45d357dc0c89fc63b9df5a68d3e65419540f663e9190793a29c58c495d5c6a731782acf119e2df8a96fb180ad772c301d098dbc5e3560ac45b6631a01cef7eed6db51f223775d601d2e11b9baa55e2f0651344777e5a03f6738a2013626a891b5f134f07b16598b8cbe3aeaefa1c2a26":"feb9d740fd1e221e328b5ef5ed19eff5":"ca9411b368d8295210d7a04da05a351d287f2f67d978ef1bb936de9f8065473f6fa11495da2eab13a1002231c86411d5409bbc718e2042ee99e013b1df1ef786e9fc1f2d43293c854128184efb9317c4ef82a002eac8b28fcd91d8a714a3aa25fc3c0ae4af9f4bcf5ad19a30cd8ec4b1785df70aa92074da419abe433dd4c435":64:"a724bbb295a02883":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d450f5253251121606e56687952bf2f1":"479b4f421bd8ac7f615c4a507da187cb5d4b1f1e2c6113d1f9678c1ba92dc5e17c5b525d7f3208733223eb82af0820b8476e9b08ca714ce044417b24d2238720cb8ffdc69db558cbaff52e3651b400e16c9d5ac8ed8949a19c35516f80394a04bd1cfdced7b204f779d792086e00b2ebca2f55a1140e85f5ee9ac7cfc5a31747":"fe7ff90b020fc77d7fcd90bc583850ac":"a3bca9ff25a60006eb18f993dcdc99681e414e27605264dfd25652195d7fe1489550afd07fc7346b88d93b59eb6642913646e93bf50ee1db5dd30106cf181124d8ad01c72ed99038c9798620abdf5c78c419b08c97f982b34d9e9105d9aa4538afcd37f62e2412f14f7a248fcd60abaf2b66cd4554767f99030f1a495d56a5ae":64:"6446398aff73ed23":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90a59f6b0abf932311f0b65623c17740":"be5a948a771a8df12adaf74d702f064a75f6483c03203365fbde7d184844fe6dee0b84cf344be05b1d163817ba1516fcb87b9167ed81f884ada73b0058e2b38cba515bbbe462f4c21f8de1d41bca2cf4340aa659f9f07886c2bb620d9c3295318c07fa3c17fe8242409359c08bcb337e5cf268880839b6a20f4ee4b3f04e7024":"20778bea82a6717038e7064f48a31981":"4022d04f1454a72d2efe57533bd32757595220b20f3a37d166cec0412fb1eb2588f939ecd906c805f4827338669888e9f730905001eb1b136b95e306edf70d9ba1e5cd0aa13a25a1f28ab55cff36f9cd7036c735e3b285d26002ad2ed1074b566e252ea3ec8a9ce10882375dc3f1d9676e301dcb179eaae991120b796cc35648":64:"dc77c1d7e0902d48":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6be4ef629f0b38194c74f7b66418922d":"b67ea20a320f4ec0e4185c62a4ad79a3c97a8189a5e4d1deff9d3edff0f9a9323532853c1a2a2c1e62e4d1afebfcdf1d8461921ea601750380e63b912d8b7389198f976851d88a19f1aa32c97143668ad00838d98da1c4f2be0e6e2dc964d170d7f7ad2e2997982e5ca110e744b6e10c24ca18eadff6b129b1f290c8a7e0a593":"fb77a4b9b246271abfc656433f87628c":"e5d5227725a19a3050fbf2a97a6e854bc1218b94a4a3403b721ace3447daff68fff5553a26edd41219e68fb61fb9e964d0a3c29796251ae4eb942187cdc55d13a09dfb487e93d9e2072d7271456a77c6ccb81154443eea176314d6e3a08619b52cd880f1c28ae5214ac0090a3855dbd74f87389fe8afebd464330fb683dff81a":32:"3d8fc6fb":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c50e37244931e8debc12b3d561c83ba2":"b9abf0796f2d2f774735546cf809030f65ed0c7f6bd469ef2fe0ef32aa0225b57fbce07c36017bbc1806a81ff1a429278160a07643f864485b4e0e35d57553dc1a131e32aa10f1f91d663b10f0a418f472ed7b4bca54fd7ffdbb22c4d7764d94a7ffd04730614459431eb64335b9b65363de292c04275d40a7b968c0f5c486e9":"6c0b1fd7ab424a6883c36457d1b5521f":"516dc25f6452ae169ce293c5cee440de47353ca5ba770dca0f04175950e87a2d4c3f84fbc6eeacaac436853492929680066f959e74de4b736ab924d8367b90aaa6e9492561ad4b5aa78b6737d562e960edc3b983e2e01a186e9f22896f48d8dfcfb6a42cfe2c6006c687a27772820a1e8875bdf09e8104248ce4db883376bc04":32:"7d4393f0":"":"962509e494f10269b70ebad02b0cd799d1d41191a734863ef502aff3d3ba48dc2acf9da9a3fc3f40be4d210dc5e128bc00499aec57aa0a4669863165428687b88d46fad41e36af8ea6605586eaa5c0736d0d53b9d523e0cb5a0b285048e060a73cbf4b587d2cd787debdb2b4c8cda731a61a15b19fe8b561fbdd3a7373853ae1":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8531ddb03977383405baf2ee9ca7d64b":"d90c9e26509bdba9b1dea8d2b94f2b1881d22c2bd756ad23cd61944710a1c1f2807170ed47a6870ae654e44757fcb3822ef28b37946cafc07284f8a0c22ae3552954f0d87b8d8c825bd546935b494cacb4262d9e2a88f254f200ad31367d8b3715afbabea5f34214ffedb14d7c84806022aba2dc8f88a314ffbb24017d1a9b9f":"baf623867d6a25fd85d1f08e599c0566":"18f92cdd37dcd7f99b06838f3f68748aba367baabaebd0da9ee787d70e752fa07dea553a43b643b8d8f460175c0746675205e20a7a98acfcac864d7c4cf5ab4c41c031738c76882acda003c5af47b1c4df8894a827a317935d970d4afaee17715c9cfd1883e8c345f19d1f89e229b8edba6b4f53b86d8da1c0f159afb83b6b33":32:"2fc9de46":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"862dd5b362cfa556ca37e73cff7f4a0e":"":"81530a243655a60d22d9ab40d2520447":"":128:"3b9b2af54e610ed0b3dda96961dd8783":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3452b7bc100c334292e08343f139b9d0":"":"8f92739a30fe4ba24079f5d42753d6ac":"":128:"0eeca69f8b95e1a902cc3ab1aaa8e2af":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"31a0cbaf21b943f8badc939e94eac7eb":"":"d5bb2c4eaec47088230972ae34fcda9c":"":128:"580e728512c8e44fbb3fe2c498e05323":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9e8fca537746e7cbff97f1dcd40a3392":"":"43e9f2bf186b2af8cc022e7c7412d641":"":120:"4465a3f9d9751789bcef5c7c58cbc5":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"35b5854ca83792ad691dbda1a66790fb":"":"cff61cf9b32ea30cf7e3692aa6e74bed":"":120:"726793199df533dd9055b0ac7c939d":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"07259267c1c6a015437a5d8cfa92f9e6":"":"18b9cf2ad7ace6ec1c8366b72878cf20":"":120:"4340f6263f0ba2d82c2eb79cb0cc7e":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fa1df8955aa3ef191900b06e7c1b7d46":"":"6928c138c98a4350c318fbdccd3f44ba":"":112:"7c89d9e77515d271b6ed54c9c4e3":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c04200ce41ce77d772babb206315ec7d":"":"a885d58f0f38f9ff26d906fa1bfb12f4":"":112:"9ee0d025421f2bf18caf563953fb":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"650df049461be341c3099bd1613dcead":"":"8a4ff6327b49d297248ce2d5bd38afa8":"":112:"13f067ef0d7b448d56e70d282fed":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ee61b5bf5060fcc637dc833926898508":"":"b2dcf21f9ffa4a883044d29f087f9b85":"":104:"9ab1d66666d4dea3cbb5982238":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"01cc56ca7e64db7fbef66236a5c49493":"":"8ea5b63004189792cc040ef18b37e550":"":104:"d685aeb54aa129a21bed17766e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"134dd72ac8e28ab46720c2f42284a303":"":"c6368e4c0ba0ec90fa7488af9997a4c7":"":104:"4ad9cdf19ff7d7fd7e273efced":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"180c04b2bde6901edcda66085f73ecd9":"":"9193b206beade4cb036f01a9db187cb8":"":96:"530f5e9ed0879ccef3a7b360":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"aaac85742a55ffa07e98106d6d6b1004":"":"630cd8ab849253c4da95ac80324ecc28":"":96:"37911820c810e3700c3a9321":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ab663c4f8f2fdc7d5eabf6ef26169b4e":"":"86e6100669929e329a1d258cd3552dc9":"":96:"958d6141f7fb2b2dc7d851a6":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0dd756d49fd25380c4026ea03cafc2da":"":"6a6f7e39b0d730ea1670e13d16c12c28":"":64:"872ef05a28da5ea1":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"bd8a834b288bdc7578b6c6ab36f5d068":"":"aa77de0af5fa4dd1ed2ada5cb94813a0":"":64:"c5c094e83755f2b6":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"020d280dbd06939bbb5e6edc6f6d39c6":"":"09aea6f0e57598452719d6f63b6fe5a0":"":64:"05d6c56ba601e85b":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e47f41a27a2722df293c1431badc0f90":"":"227c036fca03171a890806b9fa0c250d":"":32:"86c22189":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9d3e112114b94e26e93d3855d4be26bd":"":"99b98525160c4bb2029da5553ff82b59":"":32:"33bee715":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5b4b7688588125349fbb66004a30d5d4":"":"b4ae363edb529d8b927c051cf21a2d9d":"":32:"6a920617":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c4b6c5b8e21c32f36b0ae4ef3b75d5cd":"":"3d1036bf0000e6f1b77a799f2ef32dec":"1cf2b6cbe86a87b4b5bb3cc50024aeb27c48143658d47b41f2f20b87ed67bd6fc3b85a3a803f66d3576608f5d6ce6cad11e02fe12de5390722dccb8242e1dd140051bef51aa9716c860d45d45bca6effbb1a4797e6e7406a04db5d823766c0f011ebc28e9a8cd4446ec8a75ea8bdc1b2fdbb5cc364fa9877886e30404593df34":128:"a49725014c214ef7cc2d28b9b2b53da7":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"63c3f81500746eaf383fe3975d84f849":"":"0799d4152fd73c1604b4610cf7171fe1":"cb8248e5f904cc9ccccf6f273fe621eee1b4d7ed98480f9e806a48b84e2d6a733772ecf8fb7fe91805715cddab2b462b89f6e6c7cf873f65031f13c357d5f57b00b7c391c39e78ad1ed94be236ca0ae316bce11bc33c5d701fdfc58abbe918b9c42f7b3d6e89d46f9784b388a6e6daf47730b9fa665d755a17e89932fa669c44":128:"c53d01e53ee4a6ea106ea4a66538265e":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b0c88b191ce6e8e4a3941f7960b7eae5":"":"e2a899961c332c815685c553351fa519":"308bf10570af48d632911f3641dea60d78046211c01a63bb8e4e5cbddfff8841d2f2b11e18ccb2170805ef4cacf7804d64e0feef40731a1704907f33b77788c18ccf35b224ec3046a67664ac9a3481d2385b6ddeec6da4f32423f94ea9663a5c51cc388cef33744a8159b4fb654dfdb5092718bf926c824be31197f07f276b5f":128:"92604d37407aff33f8b677326cbb94fc":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c818dfa0885a09f65ef78712f5ce6609":"":"ca279284723530fdd68ae880e0ce775c":"2a562abdbb483ca5f355f9cc1c5e607bdd624a078a76b717ce0f8f35d0d4c54b629f372f15d20c848d01420c6af5a7040d42063704a17b46259dcc53723caf2d4bf556143ff9117c752fa4f22c9c155c99b7bf5949d089cdafd562165b9cbf53ff51cec21f49128c8a599718bbcdb4a5d705d20509c44c8945e2a133164b9942":120:"20e9a3a98d71d460743e1efaab13c6":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2354c6b6afaa883e7ce91faca4981f8b":"":"604f2730c756c8c39a0527093bc2feb5":"959b4b0b9ce2e9120b327d2d090117553999ee10bdd384a546fc6de0957ef4b447daf07b3d07ef7dbc811f36b0fc09a175d26e4d1263cb5e21eda5ecab85d763807bb20b3cb6ac3f31d548dff00aae058d434ebcf6f7e3a37f11324134f453dd0ea7f51094863486426ff1706129a5a93c53d8c5ccb56cafa5881981fe233cb0":120:"3588c9aa769897dfa328549fbbd10a":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b0af48e6aebbb6ff5b7c92bd140b085f":"":"d210d6502a5221ac1274a9c7f5a81725":"d725311ca10eb4b4aa24e6dd19c5e72dc34fc1ff53feb25d924a9b7d8d72205790ca4b1275bd93ad60c27a5587a45659bca07c111e9748fb683a03465153ffd735b7d134b479674ab8596f0596496fe2090f623fd1e4dd730c5283d8b172db8a25df42d9b34f388ed32676a56b8ba03347e47379702654508ccd0a21ff03516e":120:"e6222f068a1e18f09ba6c771eabd86":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a05fe482fe164b2eca7f6c3e377b39d8":"":"145327bcc10335fccb93afbf4b17e6e7":"ea6f2e93b5e1bf127d40440b8d6397405246b1b48eebe16964f18928f6b4b8ee2c36322d7126905c1a5b816996e340404b586edc2d77afac11a6c1266511f9eff1a320b035442d4078f8e42ca63cf26d12a971a7adf4645d1bd9a8e4d0a20722f7c2d529beaecc4033f7738075e1cdc6d8a929da5582540678935b82e7b7ba68":112:"3900bde9fa9ae2cbeee54d04f224":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dacbadf819eb16a63f6f091d13ed04d4":"":"b9ebce724b0dcb0989ac2d8e7ff8aaec":"7dc6e2189d8a96f3507e352e05e8fd1b4bab988c2f1c706115887119f63b78084f015d85f6b460901a02880103e4d36e8f6527dfd74e4a3acd3f578c0cc726b528875f701ff8b66e5c11b4689c346a098e123bebfa253362cb86829be73c2b85a6881fa976aa730fabb76775027feec7fd920a6c8965a4a509ea812d7c413a95":112:"8988fca83c8cfb1f8feefac46f04":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"969244c7444f3f3bf193b28f8e8e96dc":"":"49b2845a1a1c87fa66eb8f78c05ac029":"1414a07e86d8b61d1eff43e1ff4ab42c1c95e159058b74c731e3007d21a5eb78bc17b7e920363a3974aeb8608813dc9a4655199b6703ed337450702d8ab16a89776831b2c7c811fec3acc23598a0aa01680a7bf42a4e258145beb08c9f0eacf2bb5f56d26bea3ad11e1a956a630b80f3d22bf35592b4704f7c464b08b06dd7f8":112:"a291c7527385f037f62e60fd8a96":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"525abe490c8434802b69439c590a5290":"":"141f79f0501316e66451c41c7af0f0cd":"be440db66d3f81be467605a7b2805ec1df5e71e1b1b04bd7a4d05e912f5aa1912ba08de72df18613b32b7edf78963c48c80c25178b3b19262b85bb829f5377e0b368b500d6d3b442f54172d4ca4500eb5b4d478b602e5dc11d090539455087ce1e5b9ea74355fc06e9b60cbf25a9804d3f8c623fff130abc48bc2d8d116b8366":104:"038c7e95f790e6ca5ce73f9551":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"51644e025659de983f5c8156516b812e":"":"614837c743d0974e9cca497f13038c02":"60c5d062ade2c5c2dec68b734dd3e58ec474a586d1c4797fdfa2337800510134cb27a10d501927632af3c1febc275010c0d2e5abee630cd2bc792963fa82a42286ab047b934a261927311b40f5f953bfd661427921147cac7613d95ee86e16326ef67c1ed097e8fb87a78753d785de34e03a182232786079cb6be00182e41c9e":104:"77e3deba2c7f9386f85bc4a801":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"08566ca7310302dfb84d76ea0525ba20":"":"5f20ec9c35c08aa7f1c0e8a20fdbd2b3":"5d84e32768b8d1e7e3c426b3118d48e35491bf1bb454b359c8429220216efd8826be94fe1919409a128ccd8125a594f1691c9421fc3dbbb3f757bf2355bb0d074ceec165eb70e26eb53fa2cb5d84dfae06babb557805ef7b8c61c1bc76137571bcc5e84bf5987dc49013831d78bd497ccc49cde7dca2cb75e7ab967da8c6ce81":104:"873f037fc05252a44dc76f8155":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dfb54db96383fa911bf5b4fa1218ef9a":"":"7e849e24983f63f1194b396bbd2d55e0":"d3fb689c5818810dd104693f3306a10b27178444af26798a194f7c2ab31ff3a172904b951942b1a26c8ae5b5b1ee2d86dc78bb72a335fde350766d7d9aef6f549871dd46b04b2cc319fcdd47be437d431ad18cab82d51ca9fa57f4108a8de622a92f87d28c0349fab27757fd773413f559a8c00d30e258c1f6cd96f9759bd957":96:"dada7fc7fed58db462854ef6":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"389cf888474e9403e5f4d0e22ffec439":"":"ef57794cf6fac9f9cea3e8499b53b1d6":"7ea7f7f4763ad208eb6199285b6b2819756c4e3caf2d0ac6f5076ae6785fecdcc4b138a51860ff8b87aaac3a18c2df778a4818308d458dba28f5017513e1454f60be20dae68736ea6d48b1f9deadb517df63140acbd329fbfbc9b82f3ca1862c9e998f0faff1d3ae60b005bf66829f5cf0c5fa03efbdd92d39351e3954be0257":96:"92726d90ad26130e65f2beb4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e55abb2ca36c822bf2a030ac703cb8b4":"":"d86f7177e8ec90f9e9edf10175d5012d":"777a9d93091de56324c10712243f5541722e0b27e1f303fef6faa387a8666161ab354dbea6c43c82a24e8623bfec39aab13164add6be0dfd55d23204c0975b4ba6fbda51363befde482a9ccc1eb9f151e6ad59c77a1e24dd268389e4686f198a936dd603044a3fb653d63cff80597f5a2913c8a2ec1b7d9dce5728dd56c78c2c":96:"65025250343ed8c09b3fceed":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"586114f3b1dc087e1b2739b28c592dfe":"":"ae5a38ddd455505284434a4bcfe81ef2":"531ff8c285e532d961f49bd210a5523cd9b19a697a3a3fb26db940a496f253862405b1e825daeda7eb0445c98022b8342c8f8ea20301618483f8ab04b6ebccd7e7fc57878fb544a5bf78fa896f50ac30126ff8afca8a86388666b64c643d16812729bfd7e5c03ba52f7e6ea4c6a685404f7bcbd956964417fa0ea9a6d7290c41":64:"467a815610faeb82":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cbfe806bddb7f06b3826b097550c68f5":"":"04c1b6c9fd2ab76fc2adfe15d3421bbb":"cfa86d02599652cb4ffff027b9c6ef2336dc9fe946f64fa5ce83f624e144563d4738381bc5371c3cb55cf41ceda07e62cb635ff37246bfa428785229c6e869d5df69d7949a8577889a29e3d05b788ddd43608d9c14e3f1b51ce2085b9a976fe843e3396a74922babe6797d5f01c37ead623b5b582505bcd29edf8a6ea36b0fc7":64:"0697ac372a9acafd":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"96ce3a095a91effdd91d616f1f02ddcd":"":"579d6633ec6687afa24ef874899b58e0":"3ff3c0038148ed391b6a10aad623a82fe9209c5ba74482f11506d597b5fc7af977235d8ee9e28cf2160346ddd0e33a5bd1fb67b87dad7167fdd4b2b4000d8460ef7b3e1b59b9d61d06cfbe7945379ed6b650de86f396a38cc70d47b8a349f067d00144c903c276b323be6a929a7d7dd8ae7d254d640cdc1176f98e01a1d8c82f":64:"55a0f61032e048f3":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"24ece168c2971cf2b404ea206dc9e29d":"":"e9db62a42491664a6c46cbb0b2bafc92":"3579f6c0cb3d2a5d0c4548855c7c052d36b6a8dfc60f4ca1b4bbe28ed87306119e71982dd84c4205ceba918d675472753df1b5192d3693dbf6a061c6056e312135ffc5ff426895a7e30f7f675d2cb21de06eea5e3761b94deef7537b985d324864c9ff6ab6e230a1006720f98c958912b604a6d03e3979887c07be3ceaafc78f":32:"d2b15a23":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d3c3cf993f6740a019e61ce13c29955c":"":"af900ac348082ff32d2e0ab886079516":"2ddd0e8c99661f0757f04aa79a1ffa24ad48fbe5da68b9e71f7a0cf1b4f2ca9b757695900b7549d48847ae49950dc9b270b1569d29dcbef412216737bd83509c17ae41c34ccda318939cb37a0a380762993a7568c0b07794e78746173dd5c0d921cd50de4b548c1589e142c3dadbad42161aaeda2310f3c6d5c722d9ac69e96d":32:"f2d3a6ff":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5f1e5bd45ee8bb207ebbd730510ff218":"":"8846424a194f5de858556e6be5b65d7f":"e968947fc0e49136e730b97f6b16e393d5e4fdf3e4803a23af79211ef59f29167c60ead72fd489da32d2ffa43b2bca2074f9d1b4f5396ca65004b0806cb7c6dfa751fb6afbee3e443f3c9b0e3df6722e0d1320441400c5ca508afb657c2b7f1669b0de21761dccab9a40fc513768bd1f552692626ce35078a2e0e12f5d930647":32:"0d6c15da":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3997050377cfbb802cc438d973661688":"b02f0dd373e42c65e8e1db2dd76a432e0b2bf6e630c8aaf0d48af51b3709b175de9a19b3245ae75818274c771c06fae225c4f8b002236712336e805ab006449eb29cc5e29abd82b06c32d4c36ee99acb9a6d7d9eae6ec6ec263c002a22c4a898c74f6abd6d92112367ca7ffe82787c5b39e7012ba22825d3612af3d41e8008a8":"c95c84c263bdfd5f1de66e7e616cf3fb":"":128:"b35b3cf6ed59ccb69dbc9b47a3f284ae":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c58583f6479d9bc9f1bffddefee66e59":"564a9f700cbc1f895e4f4fa6426f73b4956896a15e6127e7560d74e3fd0b980d2ee45b7a6a3884fa613d91d13921e3f90967d7132bdafcd146dd8ff7147ed1964c2bdb3e12f4133d3dbbc3bf030ff37b1d2147c493ce885068d9ba5bebae24903aaac004aa0ab73fe789e4150e75ddc2bde2700db02e6398d53e88ac652964ac":"cee448b48d3506ff3ecc227a87987846":"":128:"361fc2896d7ee986ecef7cbe665bc60c":"":"9cce7db3fc087d8cb384f6b1a81f03b3fafa2e3281e9f0fcf08a8283929f32439bb0d302516f0ab65b79181fc223a42345bad6e46ff8bcb55add90207f74481227f71a6230a3e13739ef2d015f5003638234b01e58537b7cfab5a8edac19721f41d46948987d1bb1b1d9485a672647bb3b5cb246a1d753a0d107bff036ac7d95":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0bc2bde877e881aea512068105694968":"1a6369a45e8ef2846c42d54f92d0d140a94f9633432782dcbf094f1444a1d006acd07ef6076cd0faee226f9ff14adc1fb23e3c63ed818c9a743efbe16624981663e5a64f03f411dcd326e0c259bcadca3b3dd7660ed985c1b77f13a3b232a5934f8b54e46f8368c6e6eb75f933196fa973e7413e4b1442b9dee5e265b44255ed":"05f0c34ab2e8e8026b0a23719344b71f":"":128:"46bab9fc2dbe87b8f6ca0ed4d73e5368":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e14f45ba5d1eb52e0412240da5d7b5f9":"9a85fda19ce923f093a0c25b0c52f5d9534828af7c7687d22307004ae2d10c4592242c0f2704070307ab55b137780d1e2013a19396ab43ff6a295b63fdcf323456d149758f9a2bb37f1418d62ea6368b24d5067b9c63d2968e06d6586c7e3275faffa005f7c7bfef51303e4c2b2ed4564acd17d50efac9f5e3e7f16ce589c39b":"d7f8ef12f66f8b7c60aea02ef6ff688f":"":120:"beede05e4928c808bc660f3de95634":"":"4ad5b9ace0c0c7c07df2900faf37a902899471e7aa4a0a1ad5387f8f56d73f78f619be79a4e253f95b15d52895a05bae9ecffa916d35efacd8baf1c704d2aa4a38c234efc4dcfb191ec0fa0b522328fa5b5dff55e8c443fee660ebe3d8ad85de157a889aefc823720030a4cd6ba94a6309dd61806f0abb27772432018bc61701":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9a64579f3601b0022d357b601cd876ab":"88be1f4bc8c81b8a9d7abc073cb2751e209ab6b912c15dc094002f95a57a660b9f08b1b34f5947223205b579e704d70a9ecb54520ce3491e52965be643f729516f5cb018beeedc68a7d66c0d40a3f392ec7729c566ce1e9f964c4c0bd61b291ccb96e3d1fac18a401a302f3775697c71edb8ff5a8275a815eba9dd3b912e3759":"515efc6d036f95db7df56b1bbec0aff2":"":120:"13ea92ba35fced366d1e47c97ca5c9":"":"7fc8565760c168d640f24896c69758355b17310dbc359f38b73fc7b57fe3f4b6ecad3f298be931c96a639df3c5744f7e932b32d222f5534efb8eb5d5b98d218dce3efef5c8c7ce65738bf63412d0a8ed209071218a6fa2f7be79b38d0b2f5b571ec73f1a91721bd409b1722b313683e97d53df19ded95fd471124fa5f294a4bb":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,0,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-128,128,1024,1024,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6cc13cbd62428bb8658dd3954fe9181f":"2c9ec982d1cfb644ddbc53c0759b10493206d5186affc6882fbb2ba3aa430f9bae1209db2d78dcc125f3c909a54dd84fdff96c71e678216a58390ef4308bdd90f94f7109c4edefa76a74fda64b201b7a435bbabc27298f3eaa4c2d1393bd584f811fff52638f6ad2f6d86a8c3c9c030d9d4264c8c079592a36178d25991cff09":"86740da7ce4efbed70af55e1d6c10fdf":"be561ac15e3cfda624b422af97c26719c140bb50e4a993d636efe9c7f1963fb9047a0762169b571a698ff310bc417e34d4039b7562a95af710ccc1b197964a376c986fd2ed8ac4b0c7b4e843c37a41366f2f483c821a1823f317416c7e4f32eed9b9dc2ae1a2f3ed32c4b3187358a2329aa42191b7c2fe87b6e27ff20303cb29":128:"76b990a1e010e5f088f6ae90bec40b32":"":"0b9a5f5d2e6852b75b9cf26c1b310b2200e56dafcf3c941478862cdf9737ac8e2cb9b38d41bd4a1872ea1b4cfd51a1a0b9b743aca439eefa10de8459a0a7a221c5429b3dee393f17031ca6c399df8e05657c3db55be9c9dd29e690042a4ed8db732efce7c58d6b20a2a0f7c79e42e5ada43b87ab00f481c20cac1b35514dcdc9":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"286d3f5080cfe88538571188fbeb2dd5":"55135928997711360622eda1820c815aa22115204b1e9bb567e231ac6ea2594b4d652627b6816bdc6c40a4411fd6b12fab9a1f169d81c476dbf77151bff13f98ca0d1dc0a68ea681652be089fadbc66c604284eebfc8ce4cf10f4ca6bda0e0f6634023db6e3f0f1de626c3249a28a642ecc9ec5ff401e941fa8a3c691566c0ae":"da6140bd4dc6456ddab19069e86efb35":"5d350a04562a605e9082ebd8faec6c27e561425849e7f0f05f5049859c2c1bd2c4682ebf9773fab6177d2601fd5a086cefc3adef5a2f8f6b5dc9e649e98dd0a3d1a2524419f01305bd0fcfff52d84a20d1b14dea2138dcc54eea2bf263c6fe27c3e7255f1f359d0d00fb1b350d7a04965af30027632520197e85eb41de6bb286":120:"d90d34094d740214dd3de685010ce3":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-128,128,1024,1024,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90dbda7397d8fc46215a1218a6ffd0d8":"4f82a1eca6c9184240f50f7e0cfec07ec772cad5276d93043c462d8364addd9a652eed385ccc6b0faa6ca679ab3a4c3d0be6a759425fd38316ee6a1b1b0c52c1bb3b57a9bd7c8a3be95c82f37800c2e3b42dde031851937398811f8f8dc2a15bfd2d6be99a572d56f536e62bc5b041d3944da666081cd755ec347f464214bf33":"7be477d14df5dc15877ae537b62e1a56":"7358ddf1310a58871a2f76705f1cf64223c015c4d1574104d2e38783bb866205042f05c86e76c47a2516ce284911f1d2cbee079982dd77167e328b8324eec47c9244cc5668cf908c679bb586d4dd32c6c99ed99a6b571cf18b00689463e7a88cea6ea32d288301a10a9139ed6092ffe298e25b8cfb6b4be8217f16076dcd0a90":112:"776d871944159c51b2f5ec1980a6":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-128,128,1024,1024,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"59fe44c6e28d025b2ad05e6e867051ab":"20e66bae1215de9a87a0b878d39015d17e0d4542a1aaba2000cefbd5f892c26a410f55f0d7dc2f6b66690f2997032985e5516e068bfc6ec8a3669f566e280b0cefded519023b735ee3bcbfc5b6ce8203b727933a750f9bd515ec448c1f3a030aa0f40e607727a3239ebbe655d46b38a3d867e481ccf0fadbf0d59b665d2ed6b5":"eb0c30320029433f66d29b3fd5c6563b":"49b7418b87374b462d25309b1c06e3132a3c8f4a4fcf29fed58e0902509426be712639db21c076df7b83dcfcc2c2c8fcc88576f4622a4366eb42f84ebf760e3eb22b14f8b5ff83f06a6f04a924eaab05b912e126e80da22461abf7f1925fd72ebdf2aea335a044726e7c2ebbb2b8aeebab4f7de5e186b50f275b700794d895d8":96:"296c4cdaeb94beb2847dc53d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c314264cee0e6db30ebe9b2f6d4991b2":"d436ff9abfb044a332c4e009b591719a67b12a5366da0a66edf19605c34daa37588e15dd3da0d1a097215e469439de79cca74e04cd4904e5b4a6cb4e0ea54e6ba4e624ed6bd48be32d1ef68ffea1639a14e91a5914c2346ea526df95cbd4ad1b8ee842da210b35b6315c3075ecc267d51643c4b39202d0ad793cbb0045ebdc19":"4cd4431bb6dea8eb18ae74e4c35a6698":"0eeafbfd04f9a0ea18e5bdc688c7df27183f346187e9574b61222006f2b3e12e8d9d9bf1f0f15949ee1a7ee8e5c80ee903b8ba2860e15ccb999929f280200b159c2adca481748d0632a7b40601c45055f8cb5126148e6cbab2c76f543537ab54eb276188343cea3c4ab0d7b65b8754e55cfe3f6a5c41b6ea3c08b81fcecc968a":96:"fda18d2f795d900f057fe872":"":"cb9e0fb0ac13ca730b79e34745584b362d0716c344e4de90d8352b21117471ba12c97f193150b33774baee5e4a0f11b10428eaf0106c958e16aa46c5f6f3d99eed93d1b9ba3957bed05a8b9cc8c5511cf813a66dc7d773cb735b0523d8d6b0b80639b031ddc375f714c6dd50055320cd7ed44a471c8d5645c938a9005d0b5050":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26072018bd0bda524b5beb66a622c63e":"91c524b359dae3bc49117eebfa610672af1e7754054607317d4c417e7b1a68453f72d355468f825aeb7fde044b20049aed196ec6646cce1eeeccf06cb394286272b573220cdb846613ebc4683442dccc7a19ec86ef1ec971c115726584ae1f4008f94e47d1290d8b6b7a932cfe07165fd2b94e8f96d15f73bf72939c73f4bd11":"c783d6d3b8392160e3b68038b43cf1f4":"8ae7c809a9dc40a6732a7384e3c64abb359c1b09dcb752e5a6b584873e3890230c6fc572b9ad24d849766f849c73f060fc48f664c1af9e6707e223691b77e170966ed164e0cc25ede3fbc3541c480f75b71e7be88fe730d8b361ea2733c6f37e6a59621de6004e020894b51dfb525973d641efe8d5fd9077a0bbc9dc7933a5de":64:"edffe55c60235556":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"201751d3da98bd39ff4e5990a56cfea7":"2965af0bde3565a00e61cebbfe0b51b5b5ee98dbbfff7b1b5bf61da5ba537e6f4cf5fa07d2b20e518232c4961e6bc3ae247b797429da5d7eee2fc675b07066ac2e670261c6e9a91d920c7076101d86d5ef422b58e74bdc1e0b1d58298d3ee0f510ee3a3f63a3bbc24a55be556e465c20525dd100e33815c2a128ac89574884c1":"6172468634bf4e5dda96f67d433062d7":"ae2d770f40706e1eaa36e087b0093ec11ed58afbde4695794745e7523be0a1e4e54daade393f68ba770956d1cfb267b083431851d713249ffe4b61227f1784769ce8c9127f54271526d54181513aca69dc013b2dfb4a5277f4798b1ff674bca79b3dec4a7a27fcf2905ae0ce03f727c315662cd906e57aa557d1023cce2acd84":64:"66c247e5ad4e1d6a":"":"efd064d4b4ef4c37b48ddf2fa6f5facc5e9cc4c3255b23a1e3765fabb5a339fa0eda754a5381b72989fc1323ff9a6bbaecd904eb4835e5a511b922927574673061ed8de23299ea1456054e7ebb62869878c34fb95e48c8385b5ebceecb962654cf1586b3f54e7887ce31850363e9a22be9e6fbc22e694db81aa055490495dbf2":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3bc0dcb5261a641a08e6cb00d23e4deb":"d533ad89a1a578db330c01b4e04d08238b020e36aebe87cf2b0bf0b01f1ce4197be8b0596e475a95946918152e8b334ba89f60486c31f0bd8773ca4ff1319fe92197088b131e728d64405441c4fb5466641f0b8682e6cb371f8a8936140b16677f6def8b3dd9cbf47a73f553f1dca4320ad76f387e92f910f9434543f0df0626":"16fa19f69fceed9e97173207158755a5":"92ddd3b98f08fc8538f6106f6434a1efa0a7441cc7f6fd0841103c2e4dd181ea0c9a4811b3cb1bad1986a44d8addabc02dd6980daf7d60405b38dadc836bb1d0620ceab84e0134aca7c30f9f9490436b27acfd7052f9d7f0379b8e7116571017add46b9976f4b41431d47bae6f5f34dc42410793bc26c84bfe84fb53ae138c85":64:"f5289e1204ace3b2":"":"be0c30deeffbe51706247928132002b24d29272eee6b9d618483868e67280236632fa1ae06f3ef793f67bd01b1b01f70a827367c1cd28f778910457c7cbd977dfefff1f84a522247e19b2fd01fa22ce67cef9503d45c80a5084741f04108f2462b7cdd06a8f1f044fea2b05e920bcc061fbc6910175d732f45102a63c76ae48c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"239c15492d6deec979e79236baca4635":"d64886ce5f5b4adb7fe8f95904bc1461749c931655b02819ffdd0ae31bad4175125aa68962f8e36ec834a7d53a191a74c937e81ec93ad9ce0d3b286d3c11ff1733c0b7780130768c120b1833933561cf07399ca49b912370ae34f0e49b9c8cb9920eddc6816ab2ae261c6d7f70058a9b83a494026f249e58c4c613eefafe6974":"916b8b5417578fa83d2e9e9b8e2e7f6b":"b39eb732bc296c555cc9f00cf4caaf37d012329f344a6b74a873baf0d8dde9631f5e57b45b957d6aec0f7978e573dd78b43d459b77756037cd64d10d49966eb3a2a08d0f4d5e4f5dcb8713f4e4756acdf9925c5fc6120c477f6dffc59b0b47a3d5efd32b8c9052b321bb9b5129e5c6a095d8de563601b34608456f58d7221f2d":32:"fc08cbbe":"":"95c169721ea007c3f292e4ec7562a426d9baa7d374fd82e1e48d1eaca93d891d5ffa9acf5e3bd82e713ac627141e26a8b654920baffab948401cc3c390d6eea9d7b78c4fcb080b0aa9222e4d51bf201ccfd9328995831435e065d92ad37ee41c7c4366cc1efe15c07fc0470608866aeea96997772ecf926934c5d02efe05f250":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"db68a96e216b0dd9945f14b878487e03":"5634196a32d4cbfa7a2f874a1e0f86287d2942090e0cc6a82bd5caf40136a27ddf524a17713ce4af04ca6cb640a7205cce4ac9cb2d0ab380d533e1e968089ea5740c0fcbfa51f2424008e0b89dc7b3396b224cfaed53b3ac0604879983d3e6e6d36053de4866f52976890f72b8f4b9505e4ebdd04c0497048c3ce19336133ea4":"8a1a72e7bb740ec37ea4619c3007f8ae":"1b4f37190a59a4fff41d348798d1829031204fd7ac2a1be7b5ea385567e95e2ace25bf9e324488dd3ab8ce7f29d4c9a4f4b1a8a97f774871ee825e2c17700128d3c55908d3b684a1f550fdb8b38149ff759c21debdd54e49d64d3e8aac803dfd81600464ed484749bb993f89d4224b3d7d55c756b454466ff9fd609019ed5e83":32:"9251d3e3":"":"0c6bb3ee5de5cbb4b39d85d509bcacb3dda63fa50897936531339882962e8dc54c285c8944768d12096d4a3c2b42ffa92603cee2da9b435ec52908fca6d38ed74f898fe0ffa761f96038ff7dfeccc65bb841c3457b8de1e97d9bee82e2911602ee2dc555b33a227424dea86d610d37c447776295b412b412903ad2cede5170b6":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"659b9e729d12f68b73fdc2f7260ab114":"fd0732a38224c3f16f58de3a7f333da2ecdb6eec92b469544a891966dd4f8fb64a711a793f1ef6a90e49765eacaccdd8cc438c2b57c51902d27a82ee4f24925a864a9513a74e734ddbf77204a99a3c0060fcfbaccae48fe509bc95c3d6e1b1592889c489801265715e6e4355a45357ce467c1caa2f1c3071bd3a9168a7d223e3":"459df18e2dfbd66d6ad04978432a6d97":"ee0b0b52a729c45b899cc924f46eb1908e55aaaeeaa0c4cdaacf57948a7993a6debd7b6cd7aa426dc3b3b6f56522ba3d5700a820b1697b8170bad9ca7caf1050f13d54fb1ddeb111086cb650e1c5f4a14b6a927205a83bf49f357576fd0f884a83b068154352076a6e36a5369436d2c8351f3e6bfec65b4816e3eb3f144ed7f9":32:"8e5a6a79":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM Bad IV (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_bad_parameters:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT:"d0194b6ee68f0ed8adc4b22ed15dbf14":"":"":"":32:MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT + +AES-GCM Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_en.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_en.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b1dae753 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes128_en.data @@ -0,0 +1,679 @@ +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1014f74310d1718d1cc8f65f033aaf83":"":"6bb54c9fd83c12f5ba76cc83f7650d2c":"":"":128:"0b6b57db309eff920c8133b8691e0cac":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d874a25f2269e352ccdd83cc2d4e45b7":"":"9717abb9ed114f2760a067279c3821e3":"":"":128:"0e09e53e5fe8d818c5397c51173eda97":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7dab77e23b901c926454f29677eb62d4":"":"8aaec11c4a0f053d7f40badd31a63e27":"":"":128:"cec2e3230d8b762acee527e184e4c0db":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2397f163a0cb50b0e8c85f909b96adc1":"":"97a631f5f6fc928ffce32ee2c92f5e50":"":"":120:"3b74cca7bcdc07c8f8d4818de714f2":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7adc0d3aacef42397bbca79dd65dbdf":"":"c6d3114c1429e37314683081d484c87c":"":"":120:"d88141d27fe1748919845cfa5934bc":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"10171805d7f7a6d87b64bda57474d7fc":"":"fad65b50c1007c4b0c83c7a6720cacb8":"":"":120:"c3d3f240d3f3da317eae42a238bcc1":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8aaa0c85d214c6c9e9e260e62f695827":"":"84e25c916f38dd6fdb732c0d6d8f86bb":"":"":112:"a774815a2a8432ca891ef4003125":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"def8b6a58b8e582e57700bab4f2a4109":"":"3615439e9fb777439eb814256c894fb2":"":"":112:"537be9c88d3a46845e6cf5f91e11":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5894231d743f79638687c070b60beee1":"":"e34cd13b897d1c9b8011a0e63950c099":"":"":112:"d582c4bc083a8cf1af4d5c2c9b11":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6b25f9cbdc3bcd27fd245a1c411594bc":"":"a6526f8c803b69dd5f59feca1cff78e2":"":"":104:"c7e19e08a09a9c1fa698202890":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b3235422897b6459798a97ddd709db3d":"":"96679e9362f919217d5e64068969d958":"":"":104:"44ed41bda0eb0958d407b7b787":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f65bc795434efba3c5399ed3c99ff045":"":"2e727c19a89cba6f9c04d990245fceed":"":"":104:"64830ed7f772e898800fc9ae2a":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c6c66d50f2f76c4e911b3b17fcdcba1d":"":"77b42158a4ef5dc33039d33631bb0161":"":"":96:"1bce3ba33f73e750ab284d78":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"13558db9b7441c585d381ffc16b32517":"":"addf5dbe0975c5ad321e14dd4bdc2ad2":"":"":96:"f413c3bf125ce5317cd1c6bd":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"74638628b1361c2954ce0ac5456a1155":"":"c5861507c879e6864d7cb1f77cc55cc6":"":"":96:"8a514fdc7835711e4f458199":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7815d22c5c081df9ac2114aaa2c0cbf9":"":"822f83cd9f249dfc204b5957f0b0deab":"":"":64:"aa1f69f5d3bb79e5":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1a847a47823cb9c298e4107c6aaff95c":"":"39348f80c6bc489f9315be7a6fcbb96f":"":"":64:"c3b3f31e56cf4895":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"16e67ea248ea6db08af1d810cb10574e":"":"50386e2075eb15ca3f3e6db6bff01969":"":"":64:"3d4f3b8526a376ae":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26a8301636ba93e7f56309143f184241":"":"c7e32b1d312971bdc344aefaf45461bc":"":"":32:"25f1b41c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"130a07c467067148da2790f90d73ff32":"":"800b81c9d2ff3a8e15690ffb4117e211":"":"":32:"abcc8d71":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ccfaae59c3196b8c403716424ea601f5":"":"f9b059de0efa4e3f364763d63d098410":"":"":32:"8933444f":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b5beefbdd23360f2dd1e6e3c1ddbfebf":"":"81a8494f85be635d71e5663789162494":"f9ebf242b616a42e2057ede3b56b4c27349fed148817a710654de75d1cfc5f6304709b46ef1e2ccb42f877c50f484f8a8c6b0a25cff61d9537c3fd0c69bbc6ef21cbec8986cbc9b6e87963b8d9db91b7134afe69d3d9dec3a76b6c645f9c5528968f27396cc9e989d589369c90bbfefb249e3fa416451bc3d6592cc5feefbd76":"":128:"159a642185e0756d46f1db57af975fa3":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c465aa8fe5d534c912e654f5aaed5857":"":"5c155f7194b0d0a17b9a0c234d609443":"a3f8d705b233b574399f72350b256cb4893e130688913ce3def8e44687688c0352ff987aea35dc53bc95cdb9cdcc6e6eb280265d9a1af38d526392ab63c9b043c1b1b43e18321e84eb7e08884f2463c32b55eb5859fb10918595a724a61cfdf935e4f96d0721612720d46a946487b525779f6ce0abf04fc5608351119b7427d2":"":128:"9595a6d879cd7a949fa08e95d2b76c69":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#1] 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(AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"73cd0a1e2b6e12fbaa7cbace77d5119c":"":"d897681764bcc3b62c26b4aaf407cefa":"8c773e14a906c7deae362d1bf3d7e54c6be4c74c691b7f2d248693b2619219fba6eb5bc45f77af1cf7c05d3dd463158f884fe82290d145135889fd851b86ee282aa20bbdf6af78c7f9db6128b8b99e7f9b270fd222efa18f7aca6932a1024efb72113e812b3f9d2d4ccc7c85f5898ddacccbf1b441cd74097740dd922b57bade":"":112:"d8811a8990191f1e5bd15be84995":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c1dfddafe076d0ceebb0f37bb25bc0b1":"":"29c56db10cea802c19fb6230227ab2bf":"287b73cdc62ce058cdceff8e9af7afc321716f69da9eef60c2de93630ba7d0ed0a9d303cd15521a2647159b8478593f3dd3f5b7c52081e5154e55ccbff371d7e5dfc2d05e14d666a01ec2cc6028aacadfd78dfc73bf639fc4dfa0a0c46415902bbda2443620fa5e0ce4fccf1b8591e3a548f95755102a8438300753ea5f61b9f":"":112:"309fedad1f3b81e51d69e4162e6f":0 + +AES-GCM NIST 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Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7b2a230c8978d4e38fa5096ddc19d6f5":"":"cd25e744a78af858e825e1fd070324ee":"628baac336862573cee158cd3935c34df3055dadc9c1695e9ea18724f6457f0d1833aab30b85a99e0793e56000de5d6d5cb2327a4cc8bec40cd198459e7b93617713e63bbd15381a066bc44a69c9ad3dfb1984f8b33a9429eda3068d3ac5fbbaaee2b952a486e58d674ffca641d9ec1d102600af11641fd5fff725204e6c34a8":"":104:"68d49d495ff092ca8e5a2c16cb":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"73aa576e1dfad2c993afcc088bd8d62b":"":"712e665a0a83e8ecad97e92afeb35706":"314e5fee776e9d5d2a1fb64ceb78e2c9a560a34724e30da860b5588fe63d50838cb480ff8ac61d7958b470b1bfd4c84799af6cb74c4a331b198204a251e731f7d785b966da595b745d01769623492c18b9dd8bd3c75249effd2032658c715906a71dbbed847027ea75d647f9803296a41906e0915250854597a163035a8d3f45":"":104:"a41f5c9c7de2694c75856460d4":0 + +AES-GCM NIST 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NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4d901e59a491c86bf538f7b38247bb21":"4c370a9f316d25702195409d8e73bbfa40aa15c2b0ea55db9257a9ae4e8dccad14589718741a78e5a74c26a801857e388c9f141ef7df08bc01384b2b2338c38abce51d547056f4bbaf7484f9edc96df122e71f132b7bcb6484228c3ae2f741a2c8b9b208b6f49b07081334b93c501938808cdbd2e40cf95ae4f27a29e1121480":"39e2788c9697e82cae0e222a9e413d8f":"48d7d20e424df3c3efced29e860771647ae01312a96e68d33f982c540e74160a7fbdb623d4b19abb1871d74c6dadc56038954b154389b752bebc40cf4ee1505ec8d844e1a04dcae430befdb081cc84252e0840f5f5146ffe5b9594f856afc2edb33b3c6f9041c9631c5e3d812959c5504938635f72c6fe29a25bbf66a4ecd211":"262718671dd0e2c9a40b9d7297c7f6a26cd5fe4f301999a32059812719896d3a2f5350f6ec20d999fc80b8d7af5a421545b325de9180f14505f0c72250658a5014768fed63ab553de0fb01ab1368356043f6d1a6c9950c80e3d9d4637bbeea44c9d58a4148bb10974d507c62b67cc4e37eaebd7eb8e67077856cc5d1702f8e2d":64:"bd814b4584941681":0 + 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+AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"195ddad2b0da195ea54a9dad0f86c161":"":"265ab1995fac4fca7c2b26c84e4a2dbc":"":"":128:"930f719034b76c232619ef2792fe6e65":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"12be48e90c849063637b1c2ab0f2b467":"":"0020c3dff2f6f3acaaae982ce38f63c3":"":"":128:"c8891f32b8015024ca42536d633b1863":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8e792fc91675d5efd4d80d5a06378d24":"":"15ad63b969f8e313eac3c717ff9a994d":"":"":128:"de9a04b030954b0141dd78ffc67323d6":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a668cfd45b6ef8b766a4bb187d0824d1":"":"a111e94a6426ad9b4362132052eadf4a":"":"":120:"3a3331e6a41cada2cca8e856135549":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f36e07f2689832b914e0b817010c528c":"":"654104f9d16348231e6ba6fd30c1f02c":"":"":120:"be897583bae073f42138d64e622c35":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"25d839a709d98ef9c0c9e78ece961eba":"":"b64537609040790ff648d51406710b9a":"":"":120:"4d5854c69cc973be8de41d5584407c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"957dd619f9f19445c374ceda9e9ac082":"":"34887be03b4d4ca8ea2261b600ab0b0e":"":"":112:"60e2d50adff707d8b279bdedb277":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a5c9a2dcaf576e67828e806082d8e780":"":"f93732aac9448c4a427e634089d7edcc":"":"":112:"f67ed1c98bd2c5f3a738e75f15ac":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0a30a816e8d4d85d40c8e4d7c93b777e":"":"bf1f332aa19682d05cf95f2b03d26af9":"":"":112:"acfb2f7884bc496f3089e50dbf42":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b45a16bba5fba362704149dc56ba8a13":"":"64cca850412091bf4e120ccd612df353":"":"":104:"7b1adc23af9be185e5ae0b0f0e":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0cbcbc1c72aa90e3ea7e2fe328d79723":"":"2fc5fd964b45082546636ae1e208a937":"":"":104:"fe091a768c731e54e2237bfdc4":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"94297a1ad3f0c333cd9b087b1efd43c0":"":"52ec9dc82131d7b1c69c01fed6aada10":"":"":104:"5c927dda855b76ab8fc077203b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1e8cf32008bdf867f0ff76e7d7ec21bd":"":"3854b7412de72fefcc4b0c2155f6910e":"":"":96:"cc8e7eccc056b06cffc307e0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2ce1a9bd93fdde2adfd8c2c16a395b95":"":"64072313ed36eef8209f079fa622d7f0":"":"":96:"cd9e8ffc1423270015bf8e8b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b15354ad3d874fe472719ebccd45f123":"":"1b2013153290edef60a6a438bd7517de":"":"":96:"f65a841ed510becf52b1eae7":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"14ef129784776647eb3fb8897915ab9e":"":"f7bbe9f699156549935f2b92c1dda163":"":"":64:"dd10fa64fd51231d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5d4470053c46a577bba7000075e9bf2c":"":"854b768fdd7492c21618ca716bc8790d":"":"":64:"1f3c73722006023a":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ea87d675a0d406c57f78a2531bfc0c9a":"":"0907503fcb06ee384526f7206180a080":"":"":64:"65d5466392b63bf6":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d3e8e27568e6e17ff807cc207e5d4eea":"":"18e51cdfb4a3a5ebc7b0d7b17727aa95":"":"":32:"a7e3f637":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"596a602164b1a0bb50ef91bce3a98796":"":"2025e72bd6a511980a8ddce34565d16a":"":"":32:"f84f92de":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d0194b6ee68f0ed8adc4b22ed15dbf14":"":"32ea8970a8cb70d6ffb3972a146c6984":"":"":32:"eef4b97a":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"869ce65e5e5e12c620076365f149784f":"":"317bf07e83c2e9717880b7d080957fe1":"ee185d738260de67f1792a7d548ea73267fbbb6543bc081fac43e00e6cca92d7d646f27054894664ffdcbe635e34cfa800912b59fdaa624b36c44c9ff4f193d3be2f97a7820a6d4ceabe967091ef672098baf82dd3b671cac4fd4f4b14e4ee388fbdaafb4dab2385df4fca23a78d31f11bca15eedd7cac778484258778106a07":"":128:"add6c89153c4c0eead03df44487742a0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0a05baee927bf23dd2f4b57b90fb6434":"":"8147e99dc9e462efea9c1d7f30bdf45c":"6424ca7fbf24c6c3b0b5eb9d769b26a9792c96a8585dc596208ae6cfc0b265bd8d26af31027f278bb92a9e3b365beae8d964ec7a4096513f84fa73f8739fa7e11d54d678bed19546d2b71b3d0166b25b47ad7cfa69d74057d889258a796a65f2bf8d3bb151f4e721d398e74594a186e6182c16fe4c8813dfec67215b3c4a94c0":"":128:"05fac5520a99ad7fb407c48995a2c331":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e28c435211743a7872e4a0bd7602336a":"":"2ddbee94fcbfacea080ded468f67180c":"63190ef542656cc2b69a9b0daf8dbd2d38cd75f17b92d6d891c17b0337ad4fe4539d9154722fa430782a1d79620e974661918166e39c453c5a98759a13d2766138c7750e6cbdc7b6d7cbe44f3f4de7bb562d9bce6e6e2e815444842b89ba8b73454218c483e574ca886a84e8c9aa6f56dd1541a7e35a4a5b8f6a05ad5bb013e9":"":128:"2ce6d74cda466354a736636bf18acfc0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2b2bec16c7d326a35a8e4c0b8c2e3674":"":"4573eb54491ed91bfa2185b762115bc8":"7a4a6b3114dabc50b201472c5cb13a79430f78eedb2ba8492c01ce10a74d08565b9bf9874bb8fb72f694a23babdd08684cb68d7e09e65813728aaa5c41f9c2b10d921f8271e200e0c519c7c46f572bc9fe3f27e13d1e6d7bda4bd66c1c4b0fec8c68a1b0ed7b0659009dc894ad55e0712ddd0837315734f2bc3b757241af35ba":"":120:"5f5d4695795b8580b0bc414a81b002":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"886fb12554b075dd9663efd076acbe56":"":"7e7a73542868fc27a01865c3aa635ad5":"cb25c2f029c7a877a0aa565c7f7347b317ad534821edeeea838996dfc42b13787e5bb237525ac926ca8a6c5078210f4a27863e8114c728d09653fa93ae990e99f0c856bc8097c2cd33cdca1a407897e2f495d2e75356aabd891702f25ff20e6b6c8a785d74b78a734e311fd236f9e970202674004ee4151879d59340b20aa23b":"":120:"8255116ee1e3cf936633017c4dec3a":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"920fdf4b39c63947d57a07eabbf3f2f5":"":"77431ebaad53e42ca7eead0d45e5bd18":"11f82f9ef7c2161ba73cf7da82c5397da5e8278da180a976f43222402e983b057171f793641a8343d6366d6cc9260dfe8becb8396b5bcfa0f46908bd809bdab61126cbb8d63f601965fb9e4b3afd66c594dfd394d4cf06f79f361771a85dcead6f45dc7df10fa434736eb109a76fe6cda32c5773d4db6449494f2a3f6c884bfe":"":120:"1291cbea1a9f8b166c7306ff9eb281":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"114060534f526895f30dfb4007356ea7":"":"5ed7fb59618ec3d081e60d8259a3f184":"a56566a98d9d4fdcebc932adc405e0b8190d537f931983168283d0431e7589333d42f2a3d6e41f268e7b566cf48694cdcfe01fbb9198804ad39e7d387039575c5de787610a23ec265505a448c3a64ddac1b0d8c567eefe5c3c2dc1bb15af45b4bd8fc2e1506ddeb2e39e04f72fd24a64cbbbc929800e0687b53eb89b3049f271":"":112:"62f770b3985388ac37e14e8d4696":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"697ca4e9de580b525d7149e8b69e8093":"":"e844153734eaebd86983aa3bf50068df":"cedcd5ffeb7988837c38a0be4234ab1b03f14367a1a3854b6dc9f33eb9a87c411326e5cb7d12dc730cb6f363da2ba68affdfb651fe497942e0dd59668f56c23dae80b7bbf905d36b501ff037fcdffa472efa4bcc1c975b67e5d7f348db73e0ce648b44ecc5b5bbbdf3101bf32ea99e3c8e8991c94fa609c93d4b375a4389023b":"":112:"95becb04cd39c868c9dbd1d4e59b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2fa92cc97ef469efeb2c25838193435a":"":"07e6492f2377c04a85045d24940fbe8f":"0f021fb787c6de2be054bdb2741aef82ce35d951de2986c86c3dac77ee0804dfbd010d33a5dcc109769d4b8ff1471eb98fe917c7b0b374e80539f2f4432f92aa55d8398a71510c2acf85c54975fb09ff5638b936283efa3c1d3b054865f97685d6bfa0dfcffde3a20525b5324573b69dde230ea87c685e4f6b5c3c4c55828a86":"":112:"397b2b0dad7f1926bfc25a3ba0ca":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a61f8a5777ec3da0c3e257d421286696":"":"14894cc4ff71e249f0053bbc1680331f":"9df46dde257054160854248e70625183bf957ecec36fa4f5a79a1650e04b500f7f2fab4bb873f0e813f0d6b17610bde0de95427a8e2d1293dcdde053f5b1a5a81af25d553289e89e77e4ad7d0a1190151724730149050bd021ec61a08ce2271390161c752df8b5f61c33ee39366de4c1db41d085ab9dd88e170e8c41c571e2cf":"":104:"e062ab7984221ed226be353731":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"aa2d04f4f5258c6363b1210c91aff7d1":"":"6b24c03273dcfd508cead2df0c65ef2d":"81a1b326f8f22bfecdf1f386bf8fe678a427e3886801b823a37860b9a832356724b1d352d6250cf8e8f89d0bf2314fd11464c3b4871478f0bc290ee1096c8f6cb5484176d70762289b44309d6a88e4750185abf30901bcf8d952da9abaaf9807c0c0ee8be2b247dbbfd182b83f9bfa67ca3bf448c3f5a3de3c31b058c3f944a9":"":104:"80dee09fed5183d6405beeb268":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cf221e6cade9f6cf509afa6979cc1fb9":"":"d35433be41a259dfaf58aac1d82af462":"b31c477490e5624c4aac8e590725bfa8b3efca618e2369e9b980d6a463a014d55aa8317a9e70ce6de7c574cd15242cf4eb3eb078cd2f49fd82d1a56c6c4241342e62a2e9d94f0aaa024055cb441d650f0a6ecabfe9ef563d6bd87d4cb1bed348aee42487c13b73e52fb70f0ca6ed81924fd519806e04babfd08df1a00191caa1":"":104:"f1776b1ee7a3c49f99f34f582d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c98eb634c7caf52d3f3d9f344e141988":"":"a0e58176826910a69c2d68ae1c6a05c0":"6e559278bc469cc670c4d9105c3c2f8fa308e11b4a60f75664a9bfaff4f0176175ddd3c6c17ff91a208dbbc7c49efff099fa873f60849ffaa3a3003419cadaa06b92a678b80bf6c952bbbe596dd0a2eed35507c55c48a9e6131bcbda0621cff87e02be5d082944f2c8e27211527717272839601b0e26cb5aa2301afd05ae1b35":"":96:"3d8617b2db536ba7d367013c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c5018f4a8e2a850979b006d0498dd0fe":"":"75e4bebdd170159cff59f895ebdeb118":"25ed2831fef205690381c73e925ef7ba20d5f2e3a4b5d7beabd749fafa08a6941acb1385aed977ea824322d378649f646a812e6c87ded6ae437c68ffdd4fae937a8498ae825d7523746730af84d56380be8f575c60e7f836a862343916e98cc2aa5a27cd63cd92df63b8bb47c81fa6a53740a125bb9cbb247c916363e60f5f65":"":96:"0aa5aced93e0237bea9a0015":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,0,1024,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cefd40aeac28fbea6e3343a125fe1c9a":"":"324b9722166edc3831bd19c1db5bfbf2":"72b7a4289bf7f5a752665839adde8f79644424839db059ce40de326414c09691d5c7071e43722104a94e430e263bc974b98f167c50b97490bcd4286b502f607ddcec5387695463154bd9598ce8ffb6104d1f7010bc196ea2dcbfbf452d6257b1da00271fe1e6fb56c43656d5570b965e0369502443536cc46d4c05b1e863ed8f":"":96:"0c6b28de22e02fe6a4595d5f":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation 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+AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5e45d57981f65a6b170efa758cf4553d":"bc8d4c418442743f2fdbaf95b8f87b7c15a3176085e34addf4cf0fb3c2df15587526691b07e6407ba16999b72382635a2aebb62d05c1547a7d074c857a23107c7577864e7f7bcdb5b6d1fb50136391f89c42d3f02754b0e4ed0fcb0c03576b986af5c12cf9bf5e0c585d6aaf49d0c6fb2ec30eae97b2b850a35474bfb9a2c069":"b43403b627fe9e0135192d1a048c6faa":"7a27ea26c7607e4e7e627f3161bdf15f21f3d62dc33df14951971712f960d3b2082d75395c5008e5ea00d282d350f86dac8c61f5c0f90e7797a5b61ee96f7e332ec5de51cb1377e47c641f326d1e58817c8c95feb5b2923758e33b279191d0a9ffd09b7619b0318a70775e36abf5f7ab59422ff68914e7b478c448a7b141c4bf":"90d8a6218da063c38e0f06d548a3d5685fd3e0fbaf609c77bdd573bb9c63f30590eaf8b181a2feb81c8b3f5f34a94dc94b905036a6c69b97263302b8674d9e09325065588e97c0b5b33116981f1f362a7c5bb1e996c126c31fbd63791772f4d594632f408fdf011b3f2cc750b060452c181e8e09697c8662c00c8d4f29d875a7":32:"611abef7":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"00d4bf20509a61bc76430ffa5f013589":"036a191a388cf3c57c9e6f0e2f5c8bc3d5c25ee8e2fedfadb7b7433155c7e79304f0905ab2a17e1f04f2f2dacd4a41521d6ce213961df9dc9101d41df4e44246488fbedb75a01256fbc7784769eb8f99d44d5eabf93cf667ebae2437ccedc79efa58c075183d46a5c20bf4c81e0f9754ad35af65f7c8aafe7daa3460c6892b1a":"25b1026a009470a5ca8caeeb67200792":"fd75acfd5aa25fb8bccb53672e5d6a8080081506cf03df2bab0746a353510996e0237d6354ee0210a41f20f88ec6569f2b200b28c6a31464a0533a6bc45afef3ae381425a3606de2866dba694124d96da9d0a2b061b787524ee6e5d3b1ef5c4bcf168810aa177660b7e1379ac8a480ce43d73dfcc696873cea2df419f372651e":"cab80615b666c47fcabf0d9805842ab2805150abad4de0ae8b12306bed504d4a7f91f52379df65cb9587577e59dafcd4203d2ed2743d35472285e9522db0ce3dd027a01c79ac64caee29ef3752a077254b0dca269f6f206f6cc575e8fedb0ba525dcf6252fa6f7b688556933f1dee84b2ad36a266695ce8672229cedd82f20a1":32:"3287478c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-128,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fe481476fce76efcfc78ed144b0756f1":"246e1f2babab8da98b17cc928bd49504d7d87ea2cc174f9ffb7dbafe5969ff824a0bcb52f35441d22f3edcd10fab0ec04c0bde5abd3624ca25cbb4541b5d62a3deb52c00b75d68aaf0504d51f95b8dcbebdd8433f4966c584ac7f8c19407ca927a79fa4ead2688c4a7baafb4c31ef83c05e8848ec2b4f657aab84c109c91c277":"1a2c18c6bf13b3b2785610c71ccd98ca":"b0ab3cb5256575774b8242b89badfbe0dfdfd04f5dd75a8e5f218b28d3f6bc085a013defa5f5b15dfb46132db58ed7a9ddb812d28ee2f962796ad988561a381c02d1cf37dca5fd33e081d61cc7b3ab0b477947524a4ca4cb48c36f48b302c440be6f5777518a60585a8a16cea510dbfc5580b0daac49a2b1242ff55e91a8eae8":"5587620bbb77f70afdf3cdb7ae390edd0473286d86d3f862ad70902d90ff1d315947c959f016257a8fe1f52cc22a54f21de8cb60b74808ac7b22ea7a15945371e18b77c9571aad631aa080c60c1e472019fa85625fc80ed32a51d05e397a8987c8fece197a566689d24d05361b6f3a75616c89db6123bf5902960b21a18bc03a":32:"bd4265a8":0 + +AES-GCM Bad IV (AES-128,128,0,0,32) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_bad_parameters:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT:"d0194b6ee68f0ed8adc4b22ed15dbf14":"":"":"":32:MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT + +AES-GCM Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes192_de.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes192_de.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96d8059e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes192_de.data @@ -0,0 +1,679 @@ +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"806766a4d2b6507cc4113bc0e46eebe120eacd948c24dc7f":"":"4f801c772395c4519ec830980c8ca5a4":"":128:"8fa16452b132bebc6aa521e92cb3b0ea":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0c2abdcd2e4ae4137509761a38e6ca436b99c21b141f28f5":"":"335ca01a07081fea4e605eb5f23a778e":"":128:"d7f475dfcb92a75bc8521c12bb2e8b86":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"eef490a0c2ecb32472e1654184340cc7433c34da981c062d":"":"d9172c3344d37ff93d2dcb2170ea5d01":"":128:"017fef05260a496654896d4703db3888":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fe0c3490f1f0dba23cf5c64e6e1740d06f85e0afec6772f3":"":"f47e915163fa3df7f6c15b9d69f53907":"":120:"14e1a057a2e7ffbd2208e9c25dbba1":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4356b3b1f308df3573509945afe5268984f9d953f01096de":"":"a35b397b34a14a8e24d05a37be4d1822":"":120:"e045ecba220d22c80826b77a21b013":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e2898937cc575c8bb7444413884deafe8eaf326be8849e42":"":"169a449ccb3eb29805b15304d603b132":"":120:"3a807251f3d6242849a69972b14f6d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"75683c7df0442e10b5368fcd6bb481f0bff8d95aae90487e":"":"538641f7d1cc5c68715971cee607da73":"":112:"07d68fffe417adc3397706d73b95":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0724ee1f317997ce77bb659446fcb5a557490f40597341c7":"":"0d8eb78032d83c676820b2ef5ccc2cc8":"":112:"7da181563b26c7aefeb29e71cc69":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"be2f0f4ae4ab851b258ec5602628df261b6a69e309ff9043":"":"646a91d83ae72b9b9e9fce64135cbf73":"":112:"169e717e2bae42e3eb61d0a1a29b":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"583c328daecd18c2ac5c83a0c263de194a4c73aa4700fe76":"":"55e10d5e9b438b02505d30f211b16fea":"":104:"95c0a4ea9e80f91a4acce500f7":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b40857e7e6f26050f1e9a6cbe05e15a0ba07c2055634ad47":"":"e25ef162a4295d7d24de75a673172346":"":104:"89ea4d1f34edb716b322ea7f6f":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"627008956e31fea497fb120b438a2a043c23b1b38dc6bc10":"":"08ea464baac54469b0498419d83820e6":"":104:"ab064a8d380fe2cda38e61f9e1":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8c386d67d7c2bfd46b8571d8685b35741e87a3ed4a46c9db":"":"766996fb67ace9e6a22d7f802455d4ef":"":96:"9a641be173dc3557ea015372":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"711bc5aa6b94fa3287fad0167ac1a9ef5e8e01c16a79e95a":"":"75cdb8b83017f3dc5ac8733016ab47c7":"":96:"81e3a5580234d8e0b2204bc3":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c74620828402e0bdf3f7a5353668505dc1550a31debce59a":"":"cfbefe265583ab3a2285e8080141ba48":"":96:"355a43bcebbe7f72b6cd27ea":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1eb53aa548b41bfdc85c657ebdebdae0c7e525a6432bc012":"":"37ffc64d4b2d9c82dd17d1ad3076d82b":"":64:"34b8e037084b3f2d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"50d077575f6db91024a8e564db83324539e9b7add7bb98e4":"":"118d0283294d4084127cce4b0cd5b5fa":"":64:"507a361d8ac59882":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d9ddca0807305025d61919ed7893d7d5c5a3c9f012f4842f":"":"b78d518b6c41a9e031a00b10fb178327":"":64:"f401d546c8b739ff":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6ed8d8afde4dc3872cbc274d7c47b719205518496dd7951d":"":"14eb280288740d464e3b8f296c642daa":"":32:"39e64d7a":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"80aace5ab74f261bc09ac6f66898f69e7f348f805d52404d":"":"f54bf4aac8fb631c8b6ff5e96465fae6":"":32:"1ec1c1a1":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"23b76efd0dbc8d501885ab7d43a7dacde91edd9cde1e1048":"":"75532d15e582e6c477b411e727d4171e":"":32:"76a0e017":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"94c50453dd3ef7f7ea763ae13fa34debb9c1198abbf32326":"":"1afe962bc46e36099165552ddb329ac6":"b2920dd9b0325a87e8edda8db560bfe287e44df79cf61edba3b2c95e34629638ecb86584f05a303603065e63323523f6ccc5b605679d1722cde5561f89d268d5f8db8e6bdffda4839c4a04982e8314da78e89f8f8ad9c0fee86332906bf78d2f20afcaabdc282008c6d09df2bfe9be2c9027bb49268b8be8936be39fa8b1ae03":128:"51e1f19a7dea5cfe9b9ca9d09096c3e7":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c6a98102af3d875bcdebe594661d3a6b376970c02b11d019":"":"bea8cd85a28a2c05bf7406b8eef1efcc":"f2f80e2c042092cc7240b598ab30fad055bce85408aa0f8cefaf8a7204f0e2acb87c78f46a5867b1f1c19461cbf5ed5d2ca21c96a63fb1f42f10f394952e63520795c56df77d6a04cb5ad006ee865a47dc2349a814a630b3d4c4e0fd149f51e8fa846656ea569fd29a1ebafc061446eb80ec182f833f1f6d9083545abf52fa4c":128:"04b80f25ae9d07f5fd8220263ac3f2f7":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ec3cc45a22fdc7cc79ed658d9e9dbc138dcc7d6e795cba1a":"":"b10d9c70205e142704f9d1f74caee0f6":"714994017c169c574aaff2f8bad15f8fa6a385117f5405f74846eca873ca4a8f4876adf704f2fcaff2dfa75c17afefd08a4707292debc6d9fafda6244ca509bc52b0c6b70f09b14c0d7c667583c091d4064e241ba1f82dd43dc3ea4b8922be65faf5583f6b21ff5b22d3632eb4a426675648250e4b3e37c688d6129b954ef6a8":128:"d22407fd3ae1921d1b380461d2e60210":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5a32ebc7a2338038ced36d2b85cbc6c45cca9845a7c5aa99":"":"9afe0882e418c9af205eeb90e131d212":"61ff8a8bc22803f17e8e9f01aff865bc7d3083ff413ce392a989e46ebed5114894de906f7d36439024d8f2e69cc815ac043fff2f75169f6c9aa9761ff32d10a1353213ac756cb84bd3613f8261ef390e1d00c3a8fb82764b0cda4e0049219e87d2e92c38f78ffac242391f838a248f608bb2b56b31bbb453d1098e99d079ea1b":120:"fcbb932ddb0128df78a71971c52838":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9bf22885e7f13bcc63bb0a2ca90c20e5c86001f05edf85d8":"":"99dec21f4781284722b5074ea567c171":"9f4176dacf26e27aa0e669cd4d44bca41f83468c70b54c745a601408a214bf876941ae2ae4d26929113f5de2e7d15a7bb656541292137bf2129fdc31f06f070e3cfaf0a7b30d93d8d3c76a981d75cd0ffa0bcacb34597d5be1a055c35eefeddc07ee098603e48ad88eb7a2ec19c1aefc5c7be9a237797397aa27590d5261f67a":120:"18fd1feec5e3bbf0985312dd6100d1":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cfd75a9d3788d965895553ab5fb7a8ff0aa383b7594850a6":"":"a6df69e5f77f4d99d5318c45c87451b2":"041aeb2fa0f7df027cd7709a992e041179d499f5dbccd389035bf7e514a38b5f8368379d2d7b5015d4fa6fadfd7c75abd2d855f5ea4220315fad2c2d435d910253bf76f252a21c57fe74f7247dac32f4276d793d30d48dd61d0e14a4b7f07a56c94d3799d04324dfb2b27a22a5077e280422d4f014f253d138e74c9ac3428a7b":120:"fd78b9956e4e4522605db410f97e84":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b0b21ae138485591c6bef7b3d5a0aa0e9762c30a50e4bba2":"":"56dc980e1cba1bc2e3b4a0733d7897ca":"a38458e5cc71f22f6f5880dc018c5777c0e6c8a1301e7d0300c02c976423c2b65f522db4a90401035346d855c892cbf27092c81b969e99cb2b6198e450a95c547bb0145652c9720aaf72a975e4cb5124b483a42f84b5cd022367802c5f167a7dfc885c1f983bb4525a88c8257df3067b6d36d2dbf6323df80c3eaeffc2d176a5":112:"b11f5c0e8cb6fea1a170c9342437":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8775665aba345b1c3e626128b5afa3d0da8f4d36b8cf1ca6":"":"cd17f761670e1f104f8ea4fb0cec7166":"2ee08a51ceaca1dbbb3ee09b72f57427fd34bd95da5b4c0933cbb0fc2f7270cffd3476aa05deeb892a7e6a8a3407e61f8631d1a00e47d46efb918393ee5099df7d65c12ab8c9640bfcb3a6cce00c3243d0b3f316f0822cfeae05ee67b419393cc81846b60c42aeb5c53f0ede1280dc36aa8ef59addd10668dd61557ce760c544":112:"6cdf60e62c91a6a944fa80da1854":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cc9922299b47725952f06272168b728218d2443028d81597":"":"9b2f1a40717afcdbb6a95d6e335c9e4d":"bcfca8420bc7b9df0290d8c1bcf4e3e66d3a4be1c947af82dd541336e44e2c4fa7c6b456980b174948de30b694232b03f8eb990f849b5f57762886b449671e4f0b5e7a173f12910393bdf5c162163584c774ad3bba39794767a4cc45f4a582d307503960454631cdf551e528a863f2e014b1fca4955a78bd545dec831e4d71c7":112:"dd515e5a8b41ecc441443a749b31":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5a27d718f21c5cbdc52a745b931bc77bd1afa8b1231f8815":"":"59661051912fba45023aef4e6f9380a5":"2b7ce5cea81300ed23501493310f1316581ef8a50e37eaadd4bb5f527add6deb09e7dcc67652e44ac889b48726d8c0ae80e2b3a89dd34232eb1da32f7f4fcd5bf8e920d286db8604f23ab06eab3e6f99beb55fe3725107e9d67a491cdada1580717bbf64c28799c9ab67922da9194747f32fd84197070a86838d1c9ebae379b7":104:"f33e8f42b58f45a0456f83a13e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b83e933cf54ac58f8c7e5ed18e4ed2213059158ed9cb2c30":"":"8710af55dd79da45a4b24f6e972bc60a":"b7a428bc68696cee06f2f8b43f63b47914e29f04a4a40c0eec6193a9a24bbe012d68bea5573382dd579beeb0565b0e0334cce6724997138b198fce8325f07069d6890ac4c052e127aa6e70a6248e6536d1d3c6ac60d8cd14d9a45200f6540305f882df5fca2cac48278f94fe502b5abe2992fa2719b0ce98b7ef1b5582e0151c":104:"380128ad7f35be87a17c9590fa":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d2f85f92092385f15da43a086cff64c7448b4ee5a83ed72e":"":"9026dfd09e4553cd51c4c13ce70830de":"3c8de64c14df73c1b470a9d8aa693af96e487d548d03a92ce59c0baec8576129945c722586a66f03deb5029cbda029fb22d355952c3dadfdede20b63f4221f27c8e5d710e2b335c2d9a9b7ca899597a03c41ee6508e40a6d74814441ac3acb64a20f48a61e8a18f4bbcbd3e7e59bb3cd2be405afd6ac80d47ce6496c4b9b294c":104:"e9e5beea7d39c9250347a2a33d":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"de7df44ce007c99f7baad6a6955195f14e60999ed9818707":"":"4d209e414965fe99636c1c6493bba3a3":"da3bc6bdd414a1e07e00981cf9199371192a1fb2eaae20f7091e5fe5368e26d61b981f7f1d29f1a9085ad2789d101155a980de98d961c093941502268adb70537ad9783e6c7d5157c939f59b8ad474c3d7fc1fcc91165cdf8dd9d6ec70d6400086d564b68ebead0d03ebd3aa66ded555692b8de0baf43bc0ddef42e3a9eb34ab":96:"24483a57c20826a709b7d10a":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1dfa5ff20046c775b5e768c2bd9775066ae766345b7befc3":"":"2d49409b869b8b9fc5b67767979ca8cd":"e35d34478b228bc903ea2423697e603cc077967d7cfb062e95bc11d89fbe0a1f1d4569f89b2a7047300c1f5131d91564ec9bce014d18ba605a1c1e4e15e3e5c18413b8b59cbb25ab8f088885225de1235c16c7d9a8d06a23cb0b38fd1d5c6c19617fe08fd6bf01c965ed593149a1c6295435e98463e4f03a511d1a7e82c11f01":96:"23012503febbf26dc2d872dc":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2df3ee3a6484c48fdd0d37bab443228c7d873c984529dfb4":"":"dc6aeb41415c115d66443fbd7acdfc8f":"eafc6007fafb461d3b151bdff459e56dd09b7b48b93ea730c85e5424f762b4a9080de44497a7c56dd7855628ffc61c7b4faeb7d6f413d464fe5ec6401f3028427ae3e62db3ff39cd0f5333a664d3505ff42caa8899b96a92ec01934d4b59556feb9055e8dfb81f55e60135345bfce3e4199bfcdb3ce42523e7d24be2a04cdb67":96:"e8e80bf6e5c4a55e7964f455":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ce0787f65e6c24a1c444c35dcd38195197530aa20f1f6f3b":"":"55300431b1eaac0375681d7821e1eb7a":"84a699a34a1e597061ef95e8ec3c21b592e9236ddb98c68d7e05f1e709937b48ec34a4b88d99708d133a2cc33f5cf6819d5e7b82888e49faa5d54147d36c9e486630aa68fef88d55537119db1d57df0402f56e219f7ece7b4bb5f996dbe1c664a75174c880a00b0f2a56e35d17b69c550921961505afabf4bfd66cf04dc596d1":64:"74264163131d16ac":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3a15541b5857a668dc9899b2e198d2416e83bac13282ca46":"":"89bf8ab0cea6f59616eeb9b314d7c333":"4d2843f34f9ea13a1ac521479457005178bcf8b2ebeaeb09097ea4471da9f6cc60a532bcda1c18cab822af541de3b87de606999e994ace3951f58a02de0d6620c9ae04549326da449a3e90364a17b90b6b17debc0f454bb0e7e98aef56a1caccf8c91614d1616db30fc8223dbcd8e77bf55d8253efe034fd66f7191e0303c52f":64:"8f4877806daff10e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b61cdfd19c136ee2acbe09b7993a4683a713427518f8e559":"":"4066118061c904ed1e866d4f31d11234":"153c075ecdd184fd8a0fca25cae8f720201361ef84f3c638b148ca32c51d091a0e394236d0b51c1d2ee601914120c56dfea1289af470dbc9ef462ec5f974e455e6a83e215a2c8e27c0c5b5b45b662b7f58635a29866e8f76ab41ee628c12a24ab4d5f7954665c3e4a3a346739f20393fc5700ec79d2e3c2722c3fb3c77305337":64:"4eff7227b42f9a7d":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ce175a7df7e429fcc233540e6b8524323e91f40f592ba144":"":"c34484b4857b93e309df8e1a0e1ec9a3":"ce8d8775f047b543a6cc0d9ef9bc0db5ac5d610dc3ff6e12e0ad7cd3a399ebb762331e3c1101a189b3433a7ff4cd880a0639d2581b71e398dd982f55a11bf0f4e6ee95bacd897e8ec34649e1c256ee6ccecb33e36c76927cc5124bc2962713ad44cbd435ae3c1143796d3037fa1d659e5dad7ebf3c8cbdb5b619113d7ce8c483":32:"ff355f10":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5f659ed236ba60494e9bf1ee2cb40edcf3f25a2bac2e5bc5":"":"ad49f12f202320255406c2f40e55b034":"6da62892f436dfe9790e72d26f4858ca156d1d655c9cc4336fcf282b0f3f0b201e47f799c3019109af89ef5fd48a4811980930e82cd95f86b1995d977c847bbb06ecdcc98b1aae100b23c9c2f0dcf317a1fb36f14e90e396e6c0c594bcc0dc5f3ebf86ce7ecd4b06d1c43202734d53f55751a6e6bbda982104102af240def4eb":32:"cb4d8c1d":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a73f318b1e298ba4ac0ab2aed74f73543b1017cccbd1b240":"":"abe33b7e8d88bd30deb96d1e90c4e951":"6de616b000047b14b6759015183dd753c61499c0e665d06a89e4fb0cd0dd3064ff8651582e901ef5d0cdf3344c29c70c3aabc2aaf83cb3f284c6fe4104906d389b027e7d9ca60d010f06ef8cd9e55db2483d06552ddbe3fc43b24c55085cd998eae3edec36673445bf626e933c15b6af08ea21cbace4720b0b68fe1a374877d5":32:"4a28ec97":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"73d5be74615bc5b627eedfb95746fb5f17cbf25b500a597f":"fc40993eb8559e6b127315c03103ce31b70fc0e07a766d9eecf2e4e8d973faa4afd3053c9ebef0282c9e3d2289d21b6c339748273fa1edf6d6ef5c8f1e1e9301b250297092d9ac4f4843125ea7299d5370f7f49c258eac2a58cc9df14c162604ba0801728994dc82cb625981130c3ca8cdb3391658d4e034691e62ece0a6e407":"eb16ed8de81efde2915a901f557fba95":"":128:"804056dca9f102c4a13a930c81d77eca":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a249135c9f2f5a8b1af66442a4d4e101771a918ef8acee05":"c62b39b937edbdc9b644321d5d284e62eaa4154010c7a3208c1ef4706fba90223da04b2f686a28b975eff17386598ba77e212855692f384782c1f3c00be011e466e145f6f8b65c458e41409e01a019b290773992e19334ffaca544e28fc9044a5e86bcd2fa5ad2e76f2be3f014d8c387456a8fcfded3ae4d1194d0e3e53a2031":"80b6e48fe4a3b08d40c1636b25dfd2c4":"":128:"951c1c89b6d95661630d739dd9120a73":"":"b865f8dd64a6f51a500bcfc8cadbc9e9f5d54d2d27d815ecfe3d5731e1b230c587b46958c6187e41b52ff187a14d26aa41c5f9909a3b77859429232e5bd6c6dc22cf5590402476d033a32682e8ab8dc7ed0b089c5ab20ab9a8c5d6a3be9ea7aa56c9d3ab08de4a4a019abb447db448062f16a533d416951a8ff6f13ed5608f77":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fa832a4b37dcb3c0879a771bb8ae734f0d88b9be497797a8":"0f1105f9ec24121232b60b6ef3c3e8ca9eec1a3d7625004b857d1d77f292b6ec065d92f5bb97e0dc2fdfdf823a5db275109a9472690caea04730e4bd732c33548718e9f7658bbf3e30b8d07790cd540c5754486ed8e4d6920cefaeb1c182c4d67ebed0d205ba0bd9441a599d55e45094b380f3478bcfca9646a0d7aa18d08e52":"70835abab9f945c84ef4e97cdcf2a694":"":128:"a459be0b349f6e8392c2a86edd8a9da5":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dda216287910d1f5c0a312f63c243612388bc510cb76c5ba":"d6617d583344d4fe472099d2a688297857215a3e31b47d1bf355ccfe9cf2398a3eba362c670c88f8c7162903275dfd4761d095900bd97eba72200d4045d72bd239bda156829c36b38b1ff5e4230125e5695f623e129829721e889da235bb7d4b9da07cce8c3ceb96964fd2f9dd1ff0997e1a3e253a688ceb1bfec76a7c567266":"7f770140df5b8678bc9c4b962b8c9034":"":120:"9823e3242b3f890c6a456f1837e039":"":"b4910277224025f58a5d0f37385b03fcd488dfef7580eb5c270c10bd7a6f6d9c7ddc2d1368d68d4e04f90e3df029ed028432a09f710be1610b2a75bd05f31bae83920573929573affd0eb03c63e0cec7a027deab792f43ee6307fd3c5078d43d5b1407ac023824d41c9437d66eeec172488f28d700aa4b54931aad7cd458456f":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c5afa1e61d4594b1c2fa637f64f18dd557e4df3255b47f24":"5c772cdf19571cd51d71fc166d33a0b892fbca4eae36ab0ac94e6164d51acb2d4e60d4f3a19c3757a93960e7fd90b9a6cdf98bdf259b370ed6c7ef8cb96dba7e3a875e6e7fe6abc76aabad30c8743b3e47c8de5d604c748eeb16806c2e75180a96af7741904eca61769d39e943eb4c4c25f2afd68e9472043de2bb03e9edae20":"151fd3ba32f5bde72adce6291bcf63ea":"":120:"f0626cc07f2ed1a7570386a4110fc1":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"febd4ff0fedd9f16bccb62380d59cd41b8eff1834347d8fa":"dc971c8f65ece2ea4130afd4db38fc657c085ea19c76fef50f5bd0f8dd364cc22471c2fa36be8cde78529f58a78888e9de10961760a01af005e42fc5b03e6f64962e6b18eaedea979d33d1b06e2038b1aad8993e5b20cae6cc93f3f7cf2ad658fbba633d74f21a2003dded5f5dda3b46ed7424845c11bab439fbb987f0be09f8":"743699d3759781e82a3d21c7cd7991c8":"":120:"1da347f9b6341049e63140395ad445":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d280d079110c1c826cc77f490d807dd8d508eb579a160c49":"a286d19610a990d64f3accd329fc005d468465a98cfa2f3606c6d0fbeb9732879bad3ca8094322a334a43155baed02d8e13a2fbf259d80066c6f418a1a74b23e0f6238f505b2b3dc906ffcb4910ce6c878b595bb4e5f8f3e2ede912b38dbafdf4659a93b056a1a67cb0ec1dbf00d93223f3b20b3f64a157105c5445b61628abf":"85b241d516b94759c9ef975f557bccea":"":112:"bbf289df539f78c3a912b141da3a":"":"b9286ab91645c20de040a805020fed53c612d493a8ce9c71649ae16bd50eab6fb7f3a9180e1651d5413aa542608d7ecbf9fc7378c0bef4d439bc35434b6cf803976b8783aecc83a91e95cea72c2a26a883b710252e0c2a6baa115739a0692c85f6d34ff06234fbdc79b8c4a8ea0a7056fb48c18f73aaf5084868abb0dfaa287d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5e80f87fa2156c62df7be2ad16c4890de5ee5868a684fcf9":"c829073efd5c5150d2b7e2cdaeff979830d1aa983c747724ade6472c647a6e8e5033046e0359ea62fc26b4c95bccb3ac416fdf54e95815c35bf86d3fdd7856abbb618fe8fcd35a9295114926a0c9df92317d44ba1885a0c67c10b9ba24b8b2f3a464308c5578932247bf9c79d939aa3576376d2d6b4f14a378ab775531fe8abf":"9769f71c76b5b6c60462a845d2c123ad":"":112:"394b6c631a69be3ed8c90770f3d4":"":"f886bd92ca9d73a52e626b0c63a3daa138faaacf7809086d04f5c0c899362aa22e25d8659653b59c3103668461d9785bb425c6c1026ad9c924271cec9f27a9b341f708ca86f1d82a77aae88b25da9061b78b97276f3216720352629bd1a27ebf890da6f42d8c63d68342a93c382442d49dd4b62219504785cee89dffdc36f868":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d8a7b99e53f5e5b197364d4516cace4b928de50e571315e3":"d0db0ac5e14bf03729125f3137d4854b4d8ce2d264f8646da17402bdad7034c0d84d7a80f107eb202aeadbfdf063904ae9793c6ae91ee8bcc0fc0674d8111f6aea6607633f92e4be3cfbb64418101db8b0a9225c83e60ffcf7a7f71f77149a13f8c5227cd92855241e11ee363062a893a76ac282fb47b523b306cd8235cd81c2":"4b12c6701534098e23e1b4659f684d6f":"":112:"729b31c65d8699c93d741caac8e3":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c874b427b7181b0c90b887147c36f242827149324fd5c945":"bdd90190d587a564af022f06c8bd1a68735b6f18f04113fdcec24c6027aaf0271b183336fb713d247a173d9e095dae6e9badb0ab069712302875406f14320151fd43b90a3d6f35cc856636b1a6f98afc797cb5259567e2e9b7ce62d7b3370b5ee852722faf740edf815b3af460cdd7de90ca6ab6cd173844216c064b16ea3696":"4b8dda046a5b7c46abeeca2f2f9bcaf8":"":104:"fe1e427bcb15ce026413a0da87":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"56543cd6e2ebb1e3dc136a826bfc37eddb12f7a26430a1b4":"d541dd3acec2da042e6ea26fb90ff9a3861191926423b6dc99c5110b3bf150b362017159d0b85ffea397106a0d8299ec22791cb06103cd44036eed0d6d9f953724fb003068b3c3d97da129c28d97f09e6300cbea06ba66f410ca61c3311ce334c55f077c37acb3b7129c481748f79c958bc3bbeb2d3ff445ad361ed4bbc79f0a":"927ce8a596ed28c85d9cb8e688a829e6":"":104:"3a98f471112a8a646460e8efd0":"":"a602d61e7a35cbe0e463119bb66fd4bb6c75d1fe0b211b9d6a0a6e9e84b0794282318f0d33ec053f2cfba1623e865681affeaf29f3da3113995e87d51a5ab4872bb05b5be8ef2b14dfc3df5a48cbc9b10853a708ee4886a7390e8e4d286740a0dd41c025c8d72eda3f73f3cec5c33d5e50b643afd7691213cccccc2c41b9bd7a":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"caaf81cd380f3af7885ef0d6196a1688c9372c5850dc5b0b":"6f269929b92c6281e00672eaec183f187b2ddecc11c9045319521d245b595ab154dd50f045a660c4d53ae07d1b7a7fd6b21da10976eb5ffcddda08c1e9075a3b4d785faa003b4dd243f379e0654740b466704d9173bc43292ae0e279a903a955ce33b299bf2842b3461f7c9a2bd311f3e87254b5413d372ec543d6efa237b95a":"508c55f1726896f5b9f0a7024fe2fad0":"":104:"3b8026268caf599ee677ecfd70":"":"c4a96fb08d7c2eebd17046172b98569bc2441929fc0d6876aa1f389b80c05e2ede74dc6f8c3896a2ccf518e1b375ee75e4967f7cca21fa81ee176f8fb8753381ce03b2df873897131adc62a0cbebf718c8e0bb8eeed3104535f17a9c706d178d95a1b232e9dac31f2d1bdb3a1b098f3056f0e3d18be36bd746675779c0f80a10":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"81ff729efa4a9aa2eccc37c5f846235b53d3b93c79c709c8":"3992ad29eeb97d17bd5c0f04d8589903ee23ccb2b1adc2992a48a2eb62c2644c0df53b4afe4ace60dc5ec249c0c083473ebac3323539a575c14fa74c8381d1ac90cb501240f96d1779b287f7d8ba8775281d453aae37c803185f2711d21f5c00eb45cad37587ed196d1633f1eb0b33abef337447d03ec09c0e3f7fd32e8c69f0":"1bd17f04d1dc2e447b41665952ad9031":"":96:"01b0a815dc6da3e32851e1fb":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"068500e8d4f8d4af9035cdaa8e005a648352e8f28bdafc8a":"98e32428d9d21c4b60e690a2ce1cf70bee90df31302d1819b7d27fd577dd990f7ffe6ba5ef117caac718cc1880b4ca98f72db281c9609e189307302dc2866f20be3a545a565521368a6881e2642cba63b3cf4c8b5e5a8eabeb3e8b004618b8f77667c111e5402c5d7c66afd297c575ce5092e898d5831031d225cee668c186a1":"5ea9198b860679759357befdbb106b62":"":96:"d58752f66b2cb9bb2bc388eb":"":"2ef3a17fcdb154f60d5e80263b7301a8526d2de451ea49adb441aa2541986b868dab24027178f48759dbe874ae7aa7b27fb19461c6678a0ba84bbcd8567ba2412a55179e15e7c1a1392730ac392b59c51d48f8366d45b933880095800e1f36ff1ac00753f6363b0e854f494552f1f2efe028d969e6b1a8080149dd853aa6751e":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7474d9b07739001b25baf6867254994e06e54c578508232f":"1cbab2b6e4274caa80987072914f667b887198f7aaf4574608b91b5274f5afc3eb05a457554ff5d346d460f92c068bc626fd301d0bb15cb3726504b3d88ecd46a15077728ddc2b698a2e8c5ea5885fc534ac227b8f103d193f1977badf4f853a0931398da01f8019a9b1ff271b3a783ff0fae6f54db425af6e3a345ba7512cbf":"3ade6c92fe2dc575c136e3fbbba5c484":"":64:"67c25240b8e39b63":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d50d4c7d442d8a92d0489a96e897d50dda6fbe47ca7713ee":"b36b4caf1d47b0d10652824bd57b603ec1c16f4720ce7d43edde8af1b9737f61b68b882566e04da50136f27d9af4c4c57fff4c8465c8a85f0aeadc17e02709cc9ba818d9a272709e5fb65dd5612a5c5d700da399b3668a00041a51c23de616ea3f72093d85ecbfd9dd0b5d02b541fb605dcffe81e9f45a5c0c191cc0b92ac56d":"41b37c04ab8a80f5a8d9d82a3a444772":"":64:"4ee54d280829e6ef":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"38f3ec3ec775dac76ae484d5b6ca61c695c7beafba4606ca":"49726b8cefc842a02f2d7bef099871f38257cc8ea096c9ac50baced6d940acb4e8baf932bec379a973a2c3a3bc49f60f7e9eef45eafdd15bda1dd1557f068e81226af503934eb96564d14c03f0f351974c8a54fb104fb07417fe79272e4b0c0072b9f89b770326562e4e1b14cad784a2cd1b4ae1dc43623ec451a1cae55f6f84":"9af53cf6891a749ab286f5c34238088a":"":64:"6f6f344dd43b0d20":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"307d31a594e54f673bea2f977835670aca4f3d45c9c376cc":"d7385a7bd0cb76e1e242fa547c474370bcc7cc7cf3e3fa37b00fe08a56383ca31d023d8c493f6d42e482b0f32e4f244dd100ea08eee6535e5bb8d27f76dbb7eead6ba8e031ccd0eaeb649edee92aeaf0f027d59efd4e39b1f34b15ceb8b592ee0f171b1773b308c0e747790b0e6ace90fc661caa5f942bdc197067f28fbe87d1":"0bdaa353c4904d32432926f27534c73c":"aa39f04559ccc2cae3d563dda831fb238b2582cb2c2bb28cff20cc20200724c8771b9805ef7464b8fc06c7b8060c6920fd2779fbc807c2292c8c1f88f8088755609a1732ff8c0b06606452b970c79997b985889404fd907c4668a0bcc11ba617175f4525523494a244da60b238468c863055f04db20ea489adf545d56c0a71d8":128:"2ddda790aae2ca427f5fb032c29673e6":"":"0b92262759897f4bd5624a891187eba6040d79322a2a5a60fb75c6c6a5badd117abe40c6d963931bbc72dca1a1bf1f5388030fe323b3b24bd408334b95908177fb59af57c5cc6b31825bc7097eec7fec19f9cdb41c0264fd22f71893bcf881c1510feb8057e64880f1ea2df8dc60bb300fd06b0a582f7be534e522caadc4a2c7":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7b882a2df81fdb9275fb05d120f32417e8ffedd07457e938":"0aae7213da279b34d6dcf2a691b2d0333112ea22de0c3c68d47cf9f9f4ed8ad4e03d4a60ec18c3a04ac9c2abb73e1023051029b5e8705bb69c4c50afc84deb0379db5077be1f663652f8bd8958271af2c1ac4a87e08cb526bab8a030652f2a29af8055d0f31e35475caee27f84c156ef8642e5bfef89192f5bde3c54279ffe06":"5c064d3418b89388fb21c61d8c74d2c5":"5bfa7113d34e00f34713cf07c386d055e889bb42d7f6c8631ffce5668e98cb19bed8820b90ecb2b35df7134f975700347e5514287cfef7ffa2b0ff48b1de0769b03dca6610995d67cb80052cb2e5914eb4ed43ef5861f4b9364314fde6ad2b82fbba7fd849dfa6e46ecc12edc8cabfff28d9bd23c2bcc8ab3661c9ba4d5fee06":120:"0943abb85adee47741540900cc833f":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"30db73d46b518669c45b81bc67b93bed3d0864f7e9e8e789":"750bc1d2f91d786bb1e621192a376f552538ba8c07d50d9e10b9345f31b3e5f9d8ad7c719c03d8548a3b184b741cd06c49d7fb6fe80258d60c01c2987c337c823211cee7c1cf82077266889bc7767475e0eeabb2ef6b5a1de2089aaef77565d40a1c2c470a880c911e77a186eacca173b25970574f05c0bdcd5428b39b52af7f":"5069e2d2f82b36de8c2eb171f301135d":"ef781dce556b84188adee2b6e1d64dac2751dd8592abc6c72af7b998dfae40cbe692a4cae0b4aa2c95910e270600550fca1e83640c64efb1eb0e0a90a6fc475ae1db863a64ce9cc272f00abac8a63d48dd9f1c0a5f4586224befed05be4afae5bd92249833d565cc6b65fd8955cb8a7d7bd9f4b6a229e3881212871a52c15d1c":112:"a5100c5e9a16aedf0e1bd8604335":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"209f0478f1a62cb54c551181cbd4d24b796e95f3a06b6cb9":"66db7cc97b4a8266c0a2228e8028e38d8986e79fcbcc3caff3050fdd2de87b7ff7a6895b988b0bdb7fcc4d6e2d538dcfaad43ce2f98b6d32500f5a6e6183d84cb19157a699cdde1266d6d75a251ee1a2eb97bfe6405d50be2b17a58ba6eafaee0a023a28d568fd1c914f06041a49c79b9df9efe63d56883cbbbeaba809273d2e":"7be1768f6ffb31599eb6def7d1daa41c":"9cb49357536ebe087e1475a5387907a9e51ad1550697f13c6cc04384ec8a67dea13376bdd5e26b815c84a78f921b506b9e2086de50f849185f05ba7c3041e49e42c0673df856da109a78b8e0ce918c25836f7e781e6b16168e4e5976d27ebc83f20b7bf4beadecb9b4f17a7a0d3a3db27fc65288a754b5031a2f5a1394801e6e":112:"4d2ac05bfd4b59b15a6f70ea7cd0":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1bfa30b315e7b908263330140fa2d66ed57104784a43cc70":"8eeee9865e23fa51dbbf197fa41776b7edbdb9381a22c935299cd959a46190788ae82f4e645b0362df89bfc00241964784bc7ef70f6f97e81687d52e552a33af20ae34a3005e0a7b85d094368d707c3c4cd3ef31c0daf3ccaa1676609ed199327f4139d0c120977e6babceed28896d2cb3129630f3ee135572dc39433057e26a":"b7081a3010b524218390ba6dd460a1ec":"8c1f42b5931d69ae351fcde7d2b4136d4898a4fa8ba62d55cef721dadf19beaabf9d1900bdf2e58ee568b808684eecbf7aa3c890f65c54b967b94484be082193b2d8393007389abaa9debbb49d727a2ac16b4dab2c8f276840e9c65a47974d9b04f2e63adf38b6aad763f0d7cdb2c3d58691adde6e51e0a85093a4c4944f5bf2":112:"4da85b8ec861dd8be54787bb83f1":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fc47156a693e59a1dea0618c41441fe669fc65dcfb7d0726":"3e4f0a586bad532a08c8863ebba01fd25014baa907e6032ee43d4a7dfc7c3171916dcdf9faee0531f27527872ae4e127b6b9aaee93f5e74d0ab23f3874aa0e291564bc97f17085dd7d5eb9a85d9f44574e5952929eda08863b64c85dd395c91b01fe5bef66e3fa8f9ee5bf62c25d80dc84fbe002ecfd218430b26f3549f734a1":"ea1935ed014883cc427983d7962d9992":"0d85b8513becfe8c91d0f6ffb65ec31f2cf406c51c0da88893c43d1327fd8ad1f4bab2d7b5e27438d643397034a72f8666bf641b6781bc90f764db387eae6720b5723d510194570ccd773e1b3bebfc333cc099d078583e8dac60d174d332925a24a45110c8d2abe8924ea677ac74db66ea789e2838efc96c78bceaa6236c0a67":104:"8781b045a509c4239b9f44624e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b5fcd780a03ba80341081ef96b440c0e4348afde4d60c1d5":"6316f3beb32f6f3bf8f2ff6a2c160b432bafd3036d3eefa1e4ec204f24892e37dc4d75c7ce9a24b5c49fb4df901f35ef9d5955f7dc289c56cb74753f4d6b2982267d5269d12237e21202a65061849c65e90e6702dda03a35ace3a3a098d16b4bfbb85b7232404baee37776a9b51af6b3059a5f170f4ebe4ecf11061ca3c1f1f3":"ad20cce056e74ec5d0a76d6280998f15":"28f8fcf23b9c1ba40c19ffc1092632e35f234c1e8b82bcd5309d37bf849a2ce401413d1f242cf255ed597f9a93a1d6e50676997f95aa612e580d88234a86ddc404292746f0b2f5cf15abebcea6659f998ec6a1cb5a9914fee5aa1aa5d04b3c20914e45095e4141ce9c173653dd91c3ebe4ed4a9a28f3915d7b2edba34c2a58d8":104:"2ad4520ddc3b907414d934cc1d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4382507dddccf1385fc831da8924147563416d0656e168ec":"e5c5430b960aa35dc8540215c2772d66811270859e33dd4477904759e7e5eb2986a52a4ccc9f592e614147b5ea2ead6636a15c6426336b2995d9a31ab36d76578c3540bc6693842a4bc0491c7963ee9cda2317951cf93244bd30bcdfec69a4767004636fe7d1be7300c35e80627bab9236a075a803e9e1080b9159060c643a78":"a37687c9cd4bdc1ead4e6b8f78bee7f5":"fa9ae30509cbb6fe104c21480ae7b8ec9f12f1afb17320d77b77cdf32ce8c5a3f7f927e501118c7ccd6975b79225059cef530a4fcb0a9719f5e2d3bebe7bb6ec0855e495a31e5075eb50aa6c1227e48b03e3fdf780084ac4912eb3a5674cca9dd6ac037366b230ae631a8580d2d117942dee5d5ddbbb2233afeca53289cc4f68":104:"4221818d4be45306e205813789":"":"b5b36719bc4d13a5fbf37188ea814cdf3c97a430784330540325c899570e15482300bc82c5b8163074e0544c5132e3ce93bba68bd7a8d2db81d1431b424b697c1158c4d70625666d5ff99145ca34856815c905b5a0fd95806df56b9cd5b384bda3e394b409048eb1037144cc071539c02397e931da28a43cc354d584643afd4f":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7a66db3450dac9a1e63d2639f34c5c6a3fbfb3c8e8230199":"6463a7eb2496379bc8a5635541525926a6f9fa718e338221952118ae4cf03a85f2074b4ebaf108b9c725809be1e6309c3a444b66f12286f6ea9d80c3413706b234b26372e8f00783819314a994c9e3ecf6abdd255cbfe01b3865e1390a35dcd2853a3d99ed992e82ec67ba245f088cb090adade74bdbc8a1bad0f06cbea766a6":"21f8341529b210ade7f2c6055e13007a":"1699bc8c198ab03e22d9bc4f3682aad335c6e35f3f616bb69769a9d5a202511797e770ae0d8d8528ef7b2bb25b4294d47427b43f0580fa71d93fdef667f4f4196f84e41c0b1978796d0de74a94420fb8571bff39137fa231c572b31be9ae72338288bef5f8c992121dc918538551f346e279a9047df14ec9fc0fd399cd3bd8d8":96:"4af02b81b26104d1d31e295a":"":"53fe6a34d280f2c96d1ae2b2e8baf6abd67cedf7d214312f75dd4a1bec28a641dda3e71aa398726b2b0b1f515e1f4259ee97acaf17f122db9ec7814c2de6a88d36c3ac106396ad03d337c2cd2d2b9b4b7170e23a5848ca7ea129838f967dfdfe83b45ff2a9be699bfb2346115465d59f074f09e24d8fcbd9ece0018c92776c43":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1f5c818f24d201f9fb23fcca211b0545eee5c5c9b440810d":"9a7566817a06f792e96a6a2ba8e0a01f8837e2de06796e68b0782cc54ed0b04fc5e24a1ad37d5ffb035548b882d88150e89915b89f57cde2bf3c43ab9dae356927daef6bd61cc9edd5e1b7a4abea2f71313677f1b2fdf3d8d4a7e9814ea820fbc3e5c83947db961839a985a57ced7f5e4a1efffcfd17a2c806d4cdc1e79162da":"3a163067bdd90fce0406d1c198a88771":"a5e94e233d04fe0c4b6c4684b386902fe05096702237dfbe76f73befa69b6f30394cf9fe3358997942df65842748fb4f075a3dc06e147bd8d67fc4371113a4d75c70219257c650a6f38a136659e20a1cf3a119397835c304e0fb2a33aa3c3019175c86463043d5edc6992874f61e81cd0d26af8b62cf8c8626901d4f16d84236":96:"b124eea927e2a62a875494a1":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9a301f7edf83da63bcf37216a3a33d7613331c3210281dd7":"e09cc8543db7804870004706a26e94b457c125bd648b581a196f962f2ae8fa55d9bc66530ba5020e22d282080b4720dc9a2096a11c0fcc3d9a67cd1cf95cd7cd2417ba308c761e64be24347a14c9423447094a5c72a0043c288b35e753ba0aa748f208381249fb1c8d195a472192404b6c8172663ee4b4d4ecfa426e1fb003f2":"d73a546b0fa307633ac89506fa86138b":"f57fe548cf4a551a216ffb24a1dcf1b79c95f9abf06443fd58af042d287c2165db373c82a94172db517840f22e45e966e3ead91ce1ddad132bcb844e406e84b76a0b5b0ee23064b66a229f32a2d3b9c71103f020c4ba57fc0f0608b7114914cf2ada0c5a9bc4afbfa9ce5da320f34beb2211d569a142f53bfd262f6d149c4350":96:"f536a3b8c333b1aa520d6440":"":"124a327a8c22b7652886dac2c84b8997ca8a6f61c9ba9c094b5aea41eaa050a6df6cbf280259e5466071bcfa53b4ebc76c3cc4afc8c0385189a5382933aa57c89aab78dca84331e0fe8f0aab3a7857d3e13f08dcd90ec5f0684f82088ef8eb7fd67e75de43b67afc3a0beb458f5ebd61b2c779e6c539d795c667bb7dcc2b762e":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fd40e8226fd13cb95ba50b7cdf0f07f7ab7037cf8705ca50":"75aa7df5c3c443d48ee998064b6fd112c20d2d90c98e00d025ef08d1ad3595385be99de47fa627549b827c48bc79eb1dcaf2f1be95a45f7e55755b952aee5ae0748e68bee1b014a628f3f7dc88e0ebac1d1d00e268355f5101838ce125c57003aebc02a1c9d6ae2cd6e2592f52c0be38cef21a680ae35c909cab99dce9837aef":"3406e70cbe16b047fedaa537eb892279":"390b18d22d5ecc0b5a524ae9afac6fd948ac72d1360775a88b385aa862cce8a27f3e4b420e539bec6e8958f8c1b5416c313fa0a16f921149a2bfeae29ad2348949b29a73970e5be925ec0c35218b82a020cf21bb68c6931f86b29e01b85500a73f3ee7eb78da60078f42550da83b2e301d151d69b273a050f89e57dfc4787cbf":64:"69e06c72ead69501":"":"6e8d661cd320b1b39f8494836fcf738b0ab82873d3903c9ee34d74f618aea36099926b54c1589225ec9a9d48ca53657f10d9289c31f199c37c48fb9cbe1cda1e790aaeedf73871f66a3761625cca3c4f642bc4f254868f6b903e80ceeeb015569ace23376567d3712ad16d1289dc504f15d9b2751b23e7722b9e6d8e0827859f":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a85ab87563b809b01725764d64ba4cc6a143e2e0362f0c52":"ef43629721b50bd3656b7ae31b6e4b4ba1cf2c72ed0460ee7d9fb416631ddc597e5f9aebbcf4442b95cc46e28476a464dd87caf9c1c1d6c99d3e3e059dc23f8d2fe155ff5e59c50d640bc052c62adee3aa1295b38732e3458f379e98a8dbdfed04c22a5761792e87fa67ecbcbf3b90eb1bcd1d3f49e60132452f28afece83e90":"9f991ff16a3e3eb164a4f819c9f1821a":"df289511f78d8fa2505afc4c71ab1d7c31a8d15d1e5fcbb29d70f0e56f89c4d7b30f1b3b4745b5d2cc7af34fb4c95461372bf516ec192b400dc8fdb0ca9fe1f30f5320d0fadf20155cfcddcf09233c6f591c1c89917e38a003f56b94a1e2429d1f2b6297db790d7dce84d9fa13d2d86a0e4d100e154050b07178bee4cdf18126":64:"dc4c97fe8cc53350":"":"ff0e531c7344f0425d62d5fbedf4bc8d3d5cc80647e67b852c1a58ad1516d376d954cb8dda739f6a4df3cf1507e59696610bcb6b34340d6313028e00d7197845d392e73331aaf168b474a67364d8f9dab740509fabf92af75045f0afabc1b5829264d138820952bbc484d1100d058a4de32b4ece82746b2b4a85fb2993d4add8":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3ed5dadefa0f6d14fedd1a3cdbab109f6660896a952ac5ab":"aef617f69724e020309ec39d9587520efda68a8e303686c3a41ef700cba05b7c6e43e95aadb1a566f61650c87845835e789eb2366941e3bfef6d9846af0e0dbc43249117ad6f299bbc40669ac383cdf79289ada6ccd8ccfe329a0dc6a38eea1a99550457102d10f641cda50c21f533b1f981663f74a0a7c657c04d9fc6696ff4":"553a14f1e1619f9d7bd07cd823961f25":"eb8ea81d3e328a1113942cd5efd0f2b5e7f088791c8fc05690a34584101c4d493628ee7d0099a2865ac194b9124c3fb924de0c4428d0a1c26ea3ad9a0bc89187a16673e3b6f7e370dfb2dc26e8a56a9cf91f9c2088c020a766efe0d0c91689743a603f2cd1e300a6a84828b3b515a4b9a06e6bb20457bf124cd6ce4ac8b83d51":32:"dc413c4c":"":"bc1f34991a48aabb0fea513f790f0d223e9feac4c99fa1e8427f01ab8b4b2827cfaf239342de36051a846af0306a3f82e7aed98dd0416fb078bc7f3b617b00ceb2cea4ddafc22dd022efa8303e9804510e0e888065d8427345156d823f796f74130c06db9f9934435552b4fefd051953e20ecba3a4514ac121d7d2097d597439":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6d97e8bff3923a778504fb917dbc1428a1328587047697d9":"dc1a81efd51e967767f5bdd7e2e425732c1d28451f2bf5bdf3f5a6492279330594d360dd8a193e5dbde1be49bf143a35c38bcd059f762ada65c5119e097f0976891347f4d829b087bd72daa3494b344cbd3370c4459ca243bd57aeda4cb86cdd0bf274f07830cdbf5e5be4eb9b742ddffef8aa35626d2b9ea0a29d3c3d058b28":"0c28dc4cd53725091c2fb68a476c2e40":"f3932f5e82d75a1e3eba1591c17769e1a45819ccf057c31e76fa810b93678766d25905e859775c244e96bcafbc75c4a2d95e7d02868ccb2f65e49276f0b645ac8cf6e3758402304a3c25ce2de0a49f401b1acadaff8b57589b45cc79130ddc8387f41cc383e33ef38eec019152051c756198d6f782ccf56297b9fe944269a65a":32:"e6d6df7a":"":"39327836e9d8cfb59397adcf045a85644c52c3563290795811f26350c8bce8f55ca779cbcd15479efd8144b8a39ef611153955c70bf3a7da9d4d944c2407a0d735784fcb68de1083eebf6940ebc9cf92f9f139c01404b503ff64e61126a94e881351473507884357040fd32714b872c254349071069644e2bd642905521b944e":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2c78e29971e90a01bb65973f81260b9344fa835751f5f142":"":"f1a23ce6e2bc9088a62c887abecd30ae":"":128:"d4d5c22f993c8c610145fcbe4e021687":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8c582d5b6a40ef0e4048ec20f0263572d7cc82704e380851":"":"ef221a1c66fda17906190b7c99ab60b8":"":128:"6327dcb46ffb3d0fd8fbf3d2848a8f01":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3a58abadd29e946e23ca9eb09af059913d5394971bda6a4f":"":"7c29b3196d44df78fa514a1967fcd3a6":"":128:"fc123944bbea6c5075a5f987aed9cf99":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"04bdde4c35c385783715d8a883640851b860ce0e8436ec19":"":"783f9a3c36b6d0c9fd57c15105316535":"":120:"23e21a803cac5237777014686564f2":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4ba5fba0c22fbe10c2d1690c5d99938522de9c5186721bac":"":"2acc2073089a34d4651eee39a262e8ae":"":120:"7ac742c859a02a543b50464c66dcf5":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f12890b0a8819faa5a8e0e487f7f064af42fa6d5519d009f":"":"c937615675738f4b3227c799833d1e61":"":120:"88300bd65b12dcb341f1f6d8a15584":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"51878f3630298a81297f4a21514fea637faa3815d4f26fae":"":"1f939226feab012dabfc2193637d15b1":"":112:"eed5fcb7607c038b354746d91c5b":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ae596e74840a600556a06f97b13b89e38f67c152f1a1b930":"":"e2076e1050070d468659885ea77e88d0":"":112:"b4586bdbd4b6b899648f2333eee0":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fd33b7a0efae34339ca987b5eb8075385fd1276e63cc8530":"":"2d07bb8616fc0bbb71755a1bd256e7fb":"":112:"6b60d645220cfde42d88296ac193":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5685b12a6617d554c36b62af5b8ff2239cb3ffb1d2c40e14":"":"6c31194df99d08881fa5b1dd33b45a92":"":104:"69431593c376c9f8052bf10747":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"036ae037410dae9f0741608516d03b855c9c1851df8c54a4":"":"73599275f8237f14c4a52b283c07275d":"":104:"6f7249d25c9f273434c4720275":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ac144f39ebd6124bad85c9c7fb4f75bff389ece2e8085d83":"":"d0871bfc3693245be478e6a257c79efb":"":104:"5a99d59631d0e12f58b7b95ccd":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a8a541ff11a1b8548e832d9e015edeccc94b87dadc156065":"":"c72bb300b624c27cded863eba56e7587":"":96:"ea2528e7439be2ed0a0d6b2a":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"30dd8f400335e9c688e13cc0b1007bd21736a6d395d152e2":"":"28899601fa95f532b030f11bbeb87011":"":96:"35625638589bb7f6ccdb0222":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cb8f672b04d706d7d4125d6830fff5d2ec069569bea050ce":"":"375d4134e8649367f4db9bdb07aa8594":"":96:"70610bf329683e15ecf8c79f":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"bf71e5b1cd6eb363ecd89a4958675a1166c10749e1ff1f44":"":"9f502fb5ac90ff5f5616dd1fa837387d":"":64:"a4b5138122e1209d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5b9d1dfb2303b66848e363793bdca0e5ada8599cb2c09e24":"":"2ee96384dd29f8a4c4a6102549a026ab":"":64:"3b33a10189338c3b":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a35ae271f70ebacb28173b37b921f5abcad1712a1cf5d5db":"":"8d97f354564d8185b57f7727626850a0":"":64:"813d2f98a760130c":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9bdd0cb826d5d28c2ab9777d5a0c1558e7c8227c53ed4c4f":"":"daf13501a47ee73c0197d8b774eec399":"":32:"a6d108c0":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"81b4d5ee4e1cbee1d8966fb3946409e6e64319a4b83231f5":"":"bc2f9320d6b62eea29ebc9cf7fc9f04a":"":32:"a47cdadd":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5813627d26d568dfe5a0f8184cf561fe455eb98b98841fe0":"":"817199254a912880405c9729d75ed391":"":32:"d81d9b41":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"94f160e2325da2330fbe4e15910d33c2014f01ace58e5b24":"":"80a1b99750980bf2be84a17032fc2721":"066fdd980cf043a732403ee5f65c82ca81e3fc858ad3cfa343014a8426fd3806770f127e2041efb42e31506ce83390ac5d76de2fe1806df24ce6e4bb894972a107ef99e51e4acfb0e325ab053f9824514b5941ab1ec598fbb57a5d18ed34d72992a19215d914e34ad1a22326e493d1ff2da7bc271c96ad3ab66d0c32bd711293":128:"dd153cfd7aa946280660c445f586fa28":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4785846f7c0524e78f3eb137fd433e1808af64549af69183":"":"5334476a5fa3fa50dcc4b12f8ac00b51":"e70f82d1e3361ac5a5c9a087e47984d5533ba296f9b7e4a192a4ab28a833cdbbd5cece3415cf6fbb2f8055560b5c31c98d83d139954e1c03a464739f1eb5ad982c4371cf20b8984bbd97d5f40b336f5e96df3d272b95f7547be15c3bc05b3caac7d08c5eb5de8bdd246e74f6caa6bff76ea0417730ce72b911867f88fdcf73a0":128:"c59231ddaae98e0e8db6b3fe8f4d3427":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"49b085fe1a8e1ae769ed09fc585d29eb24d589689992e6c5":"":"899878b0684fb865d30190821817b88c":"f789eafe3d02826b619ca4fbca7bb1919e5c6f7c33824a2f7f815dc50e329979705f7ef61e9adf7899d34f1b8840384ff62ef6d29eea38c45d12be9249aca69a02222cd744d81958c6816304ff0d81d6714a2023b3dd9d940db5c50afd89c52774d28d6afde2b6c68425b6acbe34682531a2e57e2b9a7729b3e8d96a729b15cc":128:"2c84bf7a8947ab93b10ae408243b4993":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"75847588760ecb6ca548747b743914c89fea367a5ccb81b6":"":"7d8a9fd254e2061c01e39eb574951924":"b03c57dfd49152401a225357f1d6e533f3a423e5cfce07b8ae7ca9daf68645e5bd67b3ca2421eac447530b27c6dc6bd9c7f1b22441b8cc8c4ac26cec2c9c0d665a35b66d779a3772d714f802d6b6272984808d0740344b6abdb63e626ef4e1ab0469da521c7908b2c95a0fd07437c0e9d4d2451ae189ad61ff19f4efb405127c":120:"e8aac14b53cdbc2028d330fc8d92a7":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e3a18a96d2e45d2f60780dc39cee7160e28cb810bf09858c":"":"26a4d659665ded39b7a1583de756d0ad":"83f8d9c58169b4c68032321197077ff5c8ee4ebb732b040748e1b55dcf53375ae86fb9646a672b5c5bc805a92c475cbb6d0ed689a58abdf2230250a7d3fbd8cfab07835fa85e738a7f74bc3e93616d844b1ec61b79f23dfea62e1815f295d43f61d7b5956103b31ca88afb0b3d37eb42cf77232dbf2258065232971c397dcbcb":120:"dc034564d4be7de243ff059b5f9160":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7be3909170ea7a2ff76f9f28241d8cc48ddeafa8517c6f8c":"":"8dee7e29350c60c5bcfec89da6617d2e":"f6e9e7a7f9716760eb43060d5c80236a0f118b0f750ebd5df01fd2dba95c556ecd2e54a3f337767321abf569c8137a8e48c5b44037ba62951e9f9f709e6e4540a36d769f3945d01a20a2ed1891c415a16d95cab7ddf9bcebf18842c830067509a2a5d49a9684324c433d53824d2f8fd326b149af17f40e5bf5e49185738fba60":120:"942b52277e9dc0a30d737d00f5e597":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1fe413bafc4753e1511b580c830449bee56e0e5b9acb852c":"":"e30829f64f3eda13bfb2ac572aceb3de":"6c772d08b4d7507e35804572fa697c646c77301954cc5c160941e49e230697ed8c23338b9f30c3ead69b1c1a2329ff025dcd3c0d0a9cc83fee4979448aa71ddb9d569bedc8c497a2a4ac3b60d087d7872f0a110bf90493ae7da03b0953734223156cd2d6c562e4a978a6dd5cdb229dd58dd4d0f50ac015f2f5e89dac4aa29a19":112:"87737873b82586bb29b406946cae":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b4bc4378d423931f9b320bb57df584c641406c1daa7448ad":"":"eca70e10c0358838a3f4a45c4b016ccd":"68d1c045c1604e3c3dd4f7c7543240aca8dbc5266dc18c5a8071e8b09e3700b7cf819044b2722d8db92021f42a0afb295d7b16ecf4e4704a50a527a2e72d7f53617c358e3b7be3d7fecda612ce6842fcfaa68f2d1b8a59d8b8391779f2fab99f820862c94029f444abe62367c5de0a4becc359660e4a5366f7d482bdc362b866":112:"06f95ca69c222a8985887925b15e":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1cd4414ffd24e830e2dc49727efa592e430a6a75391cf111":"":"a08e32ad7d63f975de314ad2c0fa13fc":"20a271f1f4c6bea8f1584ab39a7179ec448650e2ff67a7338d1bc9fab7f73b2ce5222cd07ded947d135d9d0670dc368f0a4b50ece85cbf641877f9fe0ac6a7e6afb32fdb1b3cd35360bb80cfffc34cfb94dbcbee9ca5be98a0ca846394a135860fba57c6f0125dcb9fb8b61be681ada31a997638ee172525c03dd13171534a91":112:"c68842cafc50070799f7c8acd62a":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9e0ef9ed5e6f00a721a9893e1f0d9079c5aa667a4cdd2a52":"":"5f015fd556e87ff0d0df586fb452306d":"b82986135e49e03f6f8f3ce4048ded2e63ee0c31ddc84929e022ee8561159179b3bb4403ebdafdf6beae51ac5bf4abed4dbc251433417ece3228b260eca5134e5390cba49a0b6fcbbbabb085378374e4e671d9ba265298e9864bfce256884247c36f9bddceb79b6a3e700cb3dd40088ba7bb6ab6aa11b6be261a7e5348f4a7d1":104:"ec9a79a88a164e1a6253d8312e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9bc8f15d98e089d60d4db00808700053f78b33c31652c3e4":"":"5cc0ff9bb7d5b9b2aa06f6ecf669d5bb":"24ac95a6ed2f78853f9ab20f53de47e7f662f72aea454141e2131aace7ed2daeb395bbccdbf004e23ce04ad85909f30151b6526c1ce7934726f99997bbab27055b379e5e43b80ad546e2d1655d1adad4cbe51282643bb4df086deb1b48c1bd3ac3b53c4a406be2687174028ecf7e7976e5c7a11c9a3827813ade32baef9f15ec":104:"9779b7c3ece6c23d5813e243ec":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"19afc43a4481f796d77561f80b5b2e1514c96c5d1d86e64c":"":"d4c06595fefd4a81bbbd4b40c2e1989d":"98fcca51352998d0126b5539e3fb9a238ac31c05954fc206d381909aee70983b6ab99d3f3efe8530a1c3cfe3b62756321b1d0771a5940055eba1e71fa64f29291aa5e5b0af0fcc8e6f5a02688d9e93417225eded791a35217822ffb346d3fa2809b65abe729448316be30cf661137d3c0e49846cb0df598d90eda545afb64a5e":104:"ca82448429106009094c21d70b":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b4fc31dcfef6203fdb296cc928c13b7df56bfe6f32583057":"":"6308a78dc8f3c90442dc52196649c38e":"2567d80c253b080c0158102558551445d8ce4d5ddee2014a2be5cbad62e1717a0fd4d2059447c3151192951eb11a4a7b19a952f6ba261c87f10f4c9032028de3cc5a2a573a4e993a690fc8954daa3ec92743e7343e75b646c4fa9cbc3fceb4f5d59bb439c23754c4d9666fbc16c90c0cac91679b6ad1bfe5dcf6bd1a8a67c6b5":96:"9d1603799e2485a03e7b05a0":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1c2d9412486c381440213e1588b6bb58b0da53300b9d3089":"":"727ed8846daab874d5a9918b47d016f4":"656430f0c1423018b5e2efbb1e32a5385c1a9a1779c4dbd585dea91edc39ea8752ebfc2d8064251a8a5ae71e1845f24a7e42c6371c2ecb31e2229d5f4923bffc21d4804575a84836f3cf90ec6047bb360b558a41a975ece111b5284dfa2441705a6df54fc66ca6cc1af9163ecc46902fac337d5f67f563fde8e8e7e64b8588b7":96:"05ee6ce13711535864674a5b":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"abf7a97569427225a4bd5143c716a22e62f84c145bb51511":"":"e255088cdfe8ae5c9fea86d74d2f1b7d":"b850993300f54d078f83ceb9aef7345bbf758f92365b6625c210f61dad4f2a2319f51d883a383a706392d3dfca1706eba585a6fac8bd4294c0bb2cb3f6b454d5c97819e8e5c926754840261b07ec4ef1f87cf281d75c187839689944230306e1903047915e086043990745864819ad713d34a244aa4e9d755fdb137105d7eed8":96:"0c9c17388d0610f99d0a093f":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"45a6df655e88bc880acff41520aafd0cc8aa8aeb8952fd06":"":"1125e1de94970c9e7be70e58e7626ef4":"fe9838a445b8edef19b3e9f33c8c0c265b3a12c97b8ec57ceb94f65ae5227177de38f1e338dccb2b24e5bd0f0eb8127f83eba0f1ddfa55198789df0cdd1d977fcb985ad9c7d51b96e749d2cf3cc7a1ec4dfcbc641a1a022d55def328e081af890a7e699f2dbafdf506389e045aa1219239d5868ba675a3925602b6fb6f6e6d37":64:"1c3bd1e0d4918e36":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"279f4f2ab4b70778fdb9ca7800cd20e323601d7aa2c75366":"":"0f7b402560735cf03d5da58de5b6c685":"7dd9a8c848bbcf5127161c8a419a436a0dad559f7c1613cdf41594e177016acb1ccf44be852185c42e7120902a42efe83855995ab52cf5c190d499fcfd698c671fd72949dc3ea7ddb874e586a3aa455a021cec7b5f8608462ca66f926aba76e60a5846d4eb204155cd3c1328da51ba35c3007b8bb394f34e3a8b81ddd2ea1115":64:"dab612351f75e2cb":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6716ab937755684af7403e6fba5452c1b11568a9047bb50f":"":"2fd5a446dd564619ef75b6e00905ffe0":"20d261d3192996c21da69e979c26f5f937e6ea4cb7b05c6ef556ce4d86ca0fe85ec2425d274c43b5212fe9d27bb48b04e887461a9f45f524059b87eaea2e287a8d4537f338b0212012a9d4b6610e8c97dd554e0b3c3133e05c14d0ddab3524c93fd527e223b1996b4cff0a4a7438f1d54890bf573cd803941b69e5fc6212c5d2":64:"f1d743b7e1b73af5":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7dc94b5bbd6315ad8d2b67f0c683d10cf456f822a3ebb024":"":"6f3eedeb57dcf12bfb3cd80849893c90":"ee1ff367f4b23c156e3dccff84ae4bf2b8ecec1fb5ffd25ccaa93b6c6834389bd79655bd4bac75238eb0f65d3603ecc57c8774798309e85b6677e78ed2077b712cf28795d0dc8fee994f97373a82338ef67c62378136a79a990ecbcd6367445e805efa98f9168826e57cb8dd7e7b1d5c89ad98358646fa56dd2a71c40e0275a1":32:"4dc74971":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3bbe223e253bf272599e28af6861013ecd0c88710947ed41":"":"4fbf09ffaffb600f0de38fb12315cab5":"5388146f6479f7b3b280f45655a95b847ee27c734fb2fd91f6c009b1ab1810c772c7435d3221069f9490d251b76e740147906ac1db1c209c175b21aa10881c44fb307d4d2900aa3b1d56fb0edb9f2a58505653a17fee350e12755b9656bc65c78c1593d5cb7178e29f82209caf53e60fddf725f6957cc9718bf410c4a0229ed4":32:"fb845ab7":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"461877813acfe6e9979eab729b52e3d192b3236758bb6563":"":"6985cf77b75a47a3978dd6412d59200b":"385551854a89ab37063ba0ed911501b3d632153c5c2992e154c0a334bc36620476f11495437b842409e0954f7352cbf288d158bdbbaf72621ea2ce75b708bc276f796c5aa7fd0071e522c5f175a9e7787deef79f6362101aa3607b4588f2e1df7127f617c6073593a1c792b959e201e4a7a43ea8b1c3af026376439ef629266c":32:"c840d994":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"09770f9114120a2c1c3cc416fe0eb8699e07141158a5bdff":"875e2e5b5c02e0a33e71b678aa29c15ce18ec259cf4b41874893ed3112daa56ff2a7475681b8b3d9028ef184d30658e881c908f3588f69899962074db4ddfc0597f8debb66c8388a1bccf0ffe2cf9f078dc1c93f8191f920754442ad4a325985c62de1a57a25de4e9ed5c2fd0f2c8af33f3b140bac12bf60fdb33e0ec557955b":"cff291d2364fc06a3a89e867b0e67e56":"":128:"81f1eb568d0af29680518df7378ba3e8":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4fbf1c785c087ad06b43d4163cf9b9396deffd3712856379":"96a690e5319c94d94923988025307e543f16fd970aec24524cf9808dc62b093359287251503f4231bf52cd1a16a80bfa82d8f585d96855dc1932f4919a92da2618d6448fc18a234f9acb386ab4ab4a9e38ea341e7c54faceff38c162d74e7fabbca13aadb71e9c8ae6072e7bef4073cf08aa7faaa6d639f98d15bad4ed183ced":"1c8f41424acaf009996ceaa815b24ad4":"":128:"9f3c0349c5a4a740a82d6d63bf00fb17":"":"6100b091e52366fb422251d9b68974b6c666a62a8bb77a1ffd7c7d1ae586a6ee763b84dc11aace02a25af91d194b70b3265ec46872fded54275b7ddb26ee1f20c857328f46a694fb1dce68bcaecbd587ece5b505d658d57d50333e30b639eea1f6537b37c175f62497c6c84e3cfddae214285d2d68d90dd5cd8ce2273d25c8ca":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3e0ce4fb4fe4bb2fdf97b23084ff5671b9b899624184acef":"df89974b1534f0ba262bbea5efe39d8b72820cc8a720cc99520fedbf667515c3f6d8c3e25c72c48c1cff042171df58421741aacb2a49f23167257be7d7004d56b14901b2075eaca85946e9fbf1bbf4ae98227efc62bf255a25dd0402d37c67ba553531c699dd89ff797e7a5b5b9a9aa51e73ca2dacfda0f814152aa8ed8c79f9":"a950ab0dd84115e3829ab0ad3bbb1193":"":128:"25cfde73e7a29115828dfe1617f8b53e":"":"847b54e176ccc83081cb966efc4b4a3bf7809ce0b4885009f620f61fafcaa78feee91a835ae6c1a942571811108b1e81b4c4ddac46aaff599c14988c9a1fb9f387ab7f1357b581568b7b34e167ac2c8c2b2b8a4df3fd7ad8947a363c1c0cb782ec54b1901e928821cf319669dd77eb37b15c67f13ad787ff74312812731ca3e6":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6be3c66b20e5e66ababbfba1b38e5a716eafce23a1767b69":"de1cd978354a499415176f260021abe0a8c5bc34d166f53d20e02e413e1377ce4ef5d7f58337c62251a3b4ddea0dea23c40e5de037fd5dd8a558eb53bffa4e8ce94899afa8284afab503c1a485999a154d23777f9d8a031b7ad5c6d23d6abbe3b775c77876ad50f6bed14ac0b2b88fb19c438e4b7eb03f7d4d3fcca90dd01260":"3a2acf69bba19f5d1d1947af2cfda781":"":120:"f826d212f7c1212fb8a8bf23996826":"":"fd1f7b56e5664cf4c91e58f7c50f6c5e98e42ca2e4adcc00348cee6f662b382ad4022da54a47d8faeb9b76a24dfc4f493c27fc0bc421a4648fad7b14b0df95d8752013feb033b1fd971daa2c9a5df898bece6a3b8fa078dd130071df20a68cd0f394be25dcbb3e85bdfa0df4797fa6f01f5f0da7a6e86320207ddb5b3be53ae0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d16abb9f5b38d7f5abba9dc36995ce6ce928ed822a07b7c4":"e72f29b1fc1dbfc2d93a0f3b79ea4b9806ce9b2c4d490ac5c0c3c793df9dc7df5471e834b84d18afa5a7516f9a6a813a9b65ae2f083a854730547e28a1f60fe97d8dba1d2d433e11847b9bffd8873ec634e64365530c905dd6f274e45c9795ac127a6f356f63cc6c116c5dd8c628e7e17e1fadc58f8452bf21f53c4133198118":"3cd95429c6de1d327b9eb3c45424a87c":"":120:"13521236f190f78e75c0897c5fb237":"":"cd8bb97c28df092b6783ef653fd26f2bdc27c442bab0a4c7bee2789f389dcd1b280c0231672721bfbbc939a0449557678ec61ba0afb2e5817e6f7d94387f84ecafbfa1216d65e7f5025f47b0d2905cff7c99adf8306a3d9850c5908be05f87cb1d36a4837dba428aac97d7fbc18e3778f8d81a319259504c87fc94bd0766ed93":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0bc344b1a4078807e5f53a6e7e1e36fa83108473ae2fb4c2":"8bd73f94c71e3765bc7d17fdc90a9ba6aff9648b46300e4048985fbbd7c60c39c3766f7c524780bfc2296dc11e1132134921760a373104edc376eab6e91e9a60a5c4a5972935df12eadae074722bdc0147c3caf6a62fd449ef37d76b65f6d210283c94ac524cf13186e444d80a70b01e4373cc0462546f1caee6b49e738a742c":"bd505fcba464e6e2c58fdf29f5695fb9":"":120:"8510fff71bb879f56ea2fe43f6ff50":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c8097398fc21f93eea6a95aa93a3231096817b65520bc549":"80b0abbaebbd537a0810ed75cd172d29d50f5982e4d01f8664ddb2dfda8f57fa0ed87e64a779a1d7f5e568b6acfdc739572a7176752307b430fb1fa1c3c2c346477cebe7d01b16745ca6c8929a7f446c03ad9a9e8a5a935de78ca6c701e8c1c5e6d2550c42949cf5342fb5ef4c6ab9bb02ace8388b16edf72a1237e5d1d0e820":"776248381941e16908f52d19207881f5":"":112:"7fc4388b2f8eab0f0c2d6a08527e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"76d4bb5694faaf344db83bc6d6c47d56bb6ab52700826f2d":"9e31fda6a171f0d4a5f2af2c4f827b1312d9dda5d78fa329b8f1b6373b9b29be358601e5bb0d0c615aef4b9e441c811219f1f2ff2d0ab23e0cd829a88b5b615ee72e5e3ea604fa26cc6438ec4c30e90f7348e9116adf8e8efb7498320d2da16679fa546b1aa9afc7720b074c4e48e06862d41428c9e71a4772c2e195a6f36978":"603977845d82faccb401817ecce6e2fe":"":112:"c955a3bc316841be07e406d289c8":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a3e5020695587984074d78d9c98b8e1a5719e5f88372740e":"c0bfe3b2dc4dad17ec5a7662d86847fb67e582cc0baf469bc9baa7a075d48a8b97521a1072c2798bfbdae5ca3752eda1cb96fe5cf24af989eb77a2948aae3d8b70d83d93f84c49347f788480f34051621c358c03cf8159a70fc72cb8bc02876234ffe76b181da8b22b8796c87b0904da1af46de519c20d8d1b1dc7cc24e39ba5":"4cd56de54e5140a587be7dfd02d3a39e":"":112:"1a29527a41330259f918d99d7509":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"afe986ead799727063958e2ce13ca846f76c51605439f839":"7c1b354a5bb214bd95147e32d81e658705089c38035d0ea423eb1a5c82f97443c6903d2cf1ba7a007eec7c8ff98b8f82b073d9636a79bd47c7f2f639a8eb4e92076f9ed615766f43ac3a4f1687301ed7d507766605e0e332880ae740ab72e861a2cb6dce1df1ff8be1873d25845ee7c665e712c5bbe029a1788634bce122836c":"f85a95ed10b69623162ab68d1098de94":"":104:"3cf1cdb4a4fdc48da78a8b4e81":"":"a7f252ad7983e7083260598051bffd83f40f4d4a8b580cc2388d720a0979dde71549ddcb86b0a62c4964fca591d0982f3a203f2f8884ff4991f17e20f759ea7125ba2bb4d993722f23938994eb2709c850f33ed9889e5a3966f9d7b76add46aedf230e8f417425f9db79ccd46b5660361de7c5d87f71a9d82c491c0c3daaf56c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2cfaa215841826a977ae6adfdd993346210c49dd04d5d493":"e8eb3b6edd0ca4201b49a6a83036445aba1a1db040f3e74511363bce769760a9914e05a067f555ca15a57c6e02e66fbe4e04dd8c8db8d6d14ebc01cc7d84a20ff0aacb69bb3679d6b7d9d2e07deda7c2d4fe4c584fe1166e78d21dc56b9cdad93709c03b9145b887f87b4f605f24f989d5e0534fc71a58e8a8619ee99f69e5f5":"537a4ee307af3072e745570aaaadce34":"":104:"df01cffbd3978850e07328e6b8":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"128ddc83d2170c403a517615056dceec0d19d6fd7632e738":"cfe9f7797ee37bfc4f564419bf2268c964479efa7435970874154432930f3b2736438da4dc9c76200009651340e23044bc9d200a32acfd4df2e1b98b0bae3e9ff9d6e8181d926d2d03f89768edc35b963d341931ac57d2739b270ce254f042b64ceac4b75223b233602c9a4bdc925967b051440c28805d816abe76fc9d593f5a":"5124b410c43d875eca6ce298c45994a7":"":104:"56ad9c1653f11a41fd649cccd8":"":"cf91f087fd7faf362caacf4a68cff51ec57b3075563e4ad0955df20b366e92bd75c3762cf4a6f0eb859872667a5c55aa5d94f5ac9479b1b9c9345b50f82379d551506a2ab02b0441b14b28b78a12b38500d703a8c19888fe612d4710eec7cd18c16d6a4b55d3c69760e2bed99efc8b551dbe2ac9b9b64715f87180b8e14d1795":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"98581c28983c4da321ce0c419cc0d476d539e77da513c894":"bdef5b65b5111b29e781a6b71a0160179c52b5bccb1ac5c0377b26cf3f61432f3ccd67633a836357c24b5099db0510a7f8110f59e8227cacd11f17ea1798b5d4d68902ca6c6eccd319fef14545edd135078b38d43b61c9af269fc72f7a209ba7897e4c6dbd21bb71d7e93d2d2426ffa1557cae28e74059d3baf06ba419a47b39":"ff10234524433b871202c2cca6acb194":"":96:"984943355a7aef15c4fb8033":"":"808e28bfd441cb8890416a757d252c986daa8d607ac9cadd2f4fd29eddbcf3b859ba298e14a4ccefe2c2752b123f87b98d6708fde48faca4bc7dd818a7ea76cfa4357932e59cb6be0e9283bdfb49454b86b9fd04aa8cdef503c65d13fcff42e9cd8f142f8c06cf7daa6d8ef8b9c9d69c39e8afd980048fecf731fd674b2a814b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"167b8b6df8014c8f3de912b77f5a0c113580aa42d785298f":"4f787de12ba907a589edf74c8e7a6cdaaabebddd465a86e170e1efc289240298b516fddc43c7fd9bb1c51720a4455db4dd630b59aebaa82bd578eb3cb19f8b23ee6897c1fefaef820430efa6eb7d6ff04de4d8b079605fb520b0d33e96c28f0cd71983c4ce76c0ea62fd7209d21ec7b416881d545824a73d1f9f8d3323fdb90c":"49da91e926091a448d57d521cc90f3c0":"":96:"99198f55f9fa763651bba58e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"71f5f8505fba62f08fa0557dd5407fc83a852c6007ccecc8":"3e19ec02365e450e946123a3362f9859352eb52902a6bcb8a782285dfac9d2b282f56302b60d6e9f53fddd16bbf04976cf4eb84ef3b6583e9dc2f805276a7b7340dec7abde4916fb94b0ed9c9af6d4917b27e44d25f3952d0444cd32a4a574e165a23fa8c93229ceb48345171a4f20d610b5be7d9e40dcf7209128f029fed6bf":"b5efb9feae3de41b5ce9aa75583b8d21":"":96:"9604d031fa43dcd0853e641c":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4cdb38f8185a4186fc983e58a776a6454b92ecf0bffefe98":"1ca72c50a093076e9a9dfa09888b9c89eb36a942072fc536a81713f05a2669b39fdb2871b82ca47dcaf18393ca81dcb499aafcc4ed57ea79f8d4f9bd63540610215b2c65481b294638cec41264a7fdca4230df5fe1e7e3d8d26dcd0c435fec8e9bf778f9e6f13482157a9722761601e08425f6160d3bb626ae39ee1117b0353c":"aef257dd44d14d0bc75f9311ef24e85a":"":64:"d951becb0d55f9fb":"":"2eaa7e922dbd8963e2078aae216636276f3f7cb5d7f35fa759e91bddb6e247a93c388241ba1d0d37040c0b9e447c67d35b4991c1acce97914f3bc22ee50171bc5922299983ee70af79303265bc1ae1e7334202460618b4a8891d1a7eaaac5cac1e4dce024ce662d14849993f89e771fb873644b552120fd346250df39aaaa403":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ee8d3aced3aa3cb2166aa66c4a252c12dc0978830d0bc75b":"ee69b2421d43a9f383d99f9802ba4d6cf1c537b42041c86cce681049bb475e5098d4181f1902b0a49c202bf34ef70ea7b787fa685ab8f824fcc27282146d8158925bfef47ccba89aa81c0565eacb087b46b8706c9f886b7edf863701003051d6fb57e45e61d33412591ec818d016eec7dee4254636615a43dacb4f1e6ec35702":"c15c9c0b0b70c7321df044bfde2b15fb":"":64:"c5c9851a6bf686d0":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4a8538d609444e3197ab740cd33b66db1cf53600096b94e0":"8c2b8fb775d1b21c41a3dcf48ad6d68ab05be3879f9b94b305a6ce4d799e3a992c1c3a65a3e4eab563edb57424927c90c76e49386e29dd5e7de2800fcc0eefbc8b4f977f71be3754c006ee93dc09b1cfa59c424b6b3987aeb56feefc21004c63e8284b6845e395bc8843cca0917267fb4a8f2db1f7daafe7a9da95083a44de70":"0bd64d222532dae8ab63dc299355bf2a":"":64:"3477cad1fd4098b2":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"447f0f065771b6129952e52206a64fe0844658ed685e39cd":"fea5d227869e527882c63a68a6623f4a699df82b3dc715c7260a5554336df8376744c05ae89ec27d40da02d9f1c5e9e29405579fd4132143cb21cdbe3edfaaab62128ecc28018725c8dd309d2376223d2e2edfea9765699b2630ff5d9fe9bec416c0ca6418b938d195d31a08e4034c49d79e3a249edd65f985230b33c444dd02":"37e3a300542d9caf3975c6429cb8a2e8":"":32:"06bfca29":"":"e1bdd1c212b159b87e41a5f64dcba6b27aa0f5c8871fabfb588df0e06bd7730ec1beb0e3388f96c992a573ff69b34870f83c53fb65b420c1c6f92e2aa6f03917e8203d77c7f5ee08baf9fab12f9d38fc0ffb83807ba781c3dd7b62edca2121f68ef230b42b8adbd4cea072209d02713789ed559b83739a54cfde69e68bdc4128":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f465e95f6fc19fe6968b98319b547104d0c01c17105f8fc0":"2426f108368a00d2a49670a3b64b4f0569c6da9660163e7b209ec3f8d058ee11f7818a8c5030c5f4ce6e1e5a93faa3e5ae3d0bd5d712fbc891cfeb20845707edcf5e29719a5246a3b024fb12d37bd1b81df3812fd50b1dfb3e948ce546dd165cc77f903c07fe32bc7da7fbc25036679017317ce94cd8a00c1bce7379774f1714":"6cba4efc8d4840aa044a92d03d6b4d69":"":32:"92750ac9":"":"2e59b104c1a6f6d651000396adbfa009bf4cf8cbf714da8e4d3b4a62bd7f522d614decf090c7552a4b9e8d7ee457ba642d5100c0c81c14cbba8c8ff49b12827f6ebd41504ccb6dfc97cdf8532d1f7f7e603c609efa72d2ae0dce036ec4ab36849a0c06f8737d9710075a1daaed3867ca0a7e22111c0e7afae91f553b6fd66c6e":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,0,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f08e3e9f7b3a20ccdc4d98b56f2b567399a28a6b3908deab":"a986e816f1eafb532c716a555cca1839a1b0523410134ea0426ab309520b339fc1fdeb40478ae76823cee4e03b8d3450e6be92d5ff17b2f78400f0176e6d6a3930bd076a7a3c87c3397dcc0520c6b7b4ff9059ea21e71c91912a74aac2ca70eec422b507cc5c60860bb8baca01eec2a3003970ba84011efe576804b2820e306c":"4f4636d1b283bfa72c82809eb4f12519":"":32:"16c80a62":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a2d069b826455d5e79e65db4f1d2b6a29ae9f401bc623917":"acd6225dc5b9109d56ea565ab38dd4db432a7ec08f0db04f1c6b691c96d2eaaa6be62da7cc7fd75f931716c7f39705ea7cf828f1a5a325955e9b2c77e7fb2d562be6a89b3351b1b3d1355b43b73ed425049430314c16bf0836ed580e9390a3b8e2a652fddbfa939ca4c3c99765b09db7f30bf2ef88e1aa030e68958722cb0da3":"6d40a0c7813bc0410ff73f19bb5d89c9":"9960376b1898618d98c327c1761959d045488cc6198238bbe72662f276d47b41e8aebc06dbce63da5adcb302a61ade140c72b9cf9f6dfad6ecedd7401c9509fae349d3c7debe35117776227ba167f2b75921d7321d79f4ebca13d20af1638a1567043365f179f4162795fe4fd80b5d832e4ca70e7bf9830bc272b82182f70d2e":128:"010195091d4e1684029e58439039d91e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e462957f2c500bf2d6bfa9af97938fdd8930e360ea4175e7":"82a7a6dd82a5ea3d9a8e9541d854978487eda298b483df02b45c76b8b38bac98ffd969dd160a2765595b19d4ea3e64351ce95764a903f595dd673d13facf5a5594e01be1d60a0c6d28b866a1f93a63a74fecb6d73ac6fb26b20c008b93db53e9dc1d3e3902359fd47734fe22a5c6958f97e9001cc4e8b6484d9542dbbdfcfcdc":"b380584a3f4e0e59add4753c282f2cf7":"682b0af6592eef173e559407e7f56574c069251b92092570cbb7f5a2f05e88bed0af48dcda45b2930b1ee7d5da78dc43ec3598a38593df7c548058eda3c9275c1304489aff95f33a6cd79e724e8d12ca0ae92b20273eb3736efcd50dc49e803ad631dcbf64376a45a687eb4e417aef08a3f5f8230d3f0b266ea732c21ed2eed7":120:"28a43253d8b37795433140641e9ffd":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fc46976d38a581a7042a94ea4b5bfe3587ddc65d1162d71e":"4b9e858fc8f01903e426112192d4ae4686b1ae4d683b75afb2b8c63590275943d0d6d6a23b6d35796a2f101203acba107474ca6f4ff6dd87d6b77785ad1d160ef2755d84092dc70c86db5e639b689943b15efa646aff44b3f51f5d3f4cf6c8f7fc5adfe7bf2d72f75b93b8ee94ef3fa69ea0fc0bb77b3983901fdcd30bcd36f5":"b5e92563dd0339df00b7ffa2239d21bc":"7b6f6e104acbcd7188161477d8e425ff99add22df4d22de7f28d0a0075ca4ef848f68d07ed22d3165c08e40890ce04d1bd05b1a6ccb2fec8193d5f7dffc93d97a0c036b3748f708b011b68247a0249b9e1a60b652164e5c2fd7210377de804ac010c8aa08a11f40af97e8370a59f936cd14c22ea7a236d904145adc04a241fc0":120:"d4356cb417953b01f7b1110c8aa3eb":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c3471259512d1f03ce44c1ddac186e9a56c1434a6ac567c6":"dd5b98b3b3cf03fb92be579068a885afd984630692eb5f155fa6b49f2b1690b803d34b90e8de3cc39c2e61650ffffb51e7ef36d35ad17dc4d91f336363b0734996b162b509c9954cab3dd959bde7e437e9100d84c44104c61e29dbe12492a0272ce6eea2906d390de7808d337e8c650b3301af04a9ed52ab9ea208f3c7439d6c":"50164c63d466148ab371376d5c2b6b72":"11d1f523888bea1fbc680d34bc9b66957d651efa59e788db3d3f6f50e72184b9d14e9ff9bc05fb687520cf423d681812e007025eedf0e78e7e8191e6b62404e8eb400cf837d762a31aa248553367263d6de091fcf7abedc3e69fc118b7efb0594c89b96c387b7c28ed9a7b75db60b6b5133949b891ff81eca5790a265f12a58c":112:"6c5f38232e8a43871ab72a3419ad":"":"50438ee712720abf2089331e4c058b30c30c3d17834c507c0010ac3f974a256d01b14a45e9ce5193c5cede41330cf31e1a07a1f5e3ceca515cc971bfda0fbe0b823450efc30563e8ed941b0350f146ec75cd31a2c7e1e469c2dd860c0fd5b286219018d4fbacda164a40d2980aa3a27aa95f8b8e2cd8e2f5f20d79a22c3ff028":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ec326a1e0fe6a99421398df4fc7d8fea67b67e5f5fcd50ad":"6d5016c434a0f4b4a5d9e0b6b8e2d848a94f132f055d2d847e54601a4c9cfc5966a654d696f8a3529a48a90b491ea0d31c08eae8ef364f71f8ec7ae7f7e39bb9c331137b2578362ff165628099944ba8deb0d99ac660d5ed2215b9a7626ff1fa6173cd8dd676c988d16c9cf750a0d793f584c3c8f5fd5d167bc278f4d77a629c":"c94aa4baa840a044dbd5942787a0c951":"f8401c578f20d9c250ea86eb945184e007a0190462c7abddf238ce1ceddcc230756aa222386d8ba66ebbba13de008ced140896ac55bc47c231cc81370ca9feadc225e017d59890e6291cc4cca27db3078c0cd6cbb51afb62210226a76837c5454728cb5ce3afe7352e7fe75421f94986e6b7b26321bbca15c75ac7c13dc15f50":112:"3269922affb9d767f5abe041cc8e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7ef81652f604e88a72416924c53979dc73cadd3575eda1c":"9ecd19a8eba9fba843486e1bbfb8d9053c5e04b24e30174d4aa89d8307439d653f8630edddafd51719c744bcb4bce3e444847567bd2cdde2995870d0634cc0ba2bde4b6bc2bc583062fb83874a1c25b50aeb945bd109a151772c077438c4d1caaeb5b0c56390ac23c6d117f3a00fd616306fc2ffc4c1e76f934b30fbbc52eec2":"0cc9ae54c9a85f3e9325c5f3658ab3b2":"d0195b744351aa25a57a99df9573dfa3cebe9850139149b64f7e4af37756a430dda8af98e4ed480e913aa82821c01c1f75b187e105a8f39621757d522c083a8d81d7d8bfe6cf15c439d0692b6affd655a11bcd2457046fae996a1075c66029867b88cd23c503ae04037dd41f27bafd5000d1f516002f9fcc0f2500e8c1b27de0":104:"22c2efeddfd5d9cb528861c4eb":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"605271a41e263c92dc14fe9df5203e79d58cc2d1289dc361":"2bda3448a283ecba31e0299c0a9e44628cb2b41fa7b1a41107e107cabc381083bdbe048f2804568fdd5fe016f4d607f694042a459ba03a2deda4cccc8cbe4612d8ed0d4575e48bc9f59843369dbe2af6d048e65ff4250e1eef61d7b1b378fe2f3305b133ddc7e37d95ca6de89a971730fc80da943a767ff137707a8d8a24329c":"7f128092a777fc503adc7f6b85eb2006":"aef9f984fb645e08d5f0aa07a31c114d2f8e9eca047e4a8d5471378cfc2ced1159dc093d174788e58447a854be58942ed9a3fd45f3f4a1af7351e087369a267797c525f134e79709097e733b9003b9be0c569fc70ee3462b815b6410e19954ce2efac121300c06fd9e00542a9c6a5a682fe1010c145acbbb8b82333bdb5ddfd9":104:"673afea592b2ce16bd058469f1":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fa076f36cb678e2275561e9553ebdf397360e5a5e44791c4":"513305e86c0cb046c5d3720b25a406392766bd1fb7de2758de370ff2e68281e211922890c61f3659460f22c45a57895b424441262a3ba0606df4e2701f38281fd3436a4d0e0f8efecd231808a9ea063dfb725015a91f27cadfe7909a0ee109eac391ac807afed1767ae0515b9c1b51ae9a48b38fe7fec7fe0ddee562c945e5ae":"1ecd53d94fe287047ff184e8b9b71a26":"5ff25f7bac5f76f533f9edffdfd2b2991d7fc4cd5a0452a1031da6094cd498297fb2a05ae8db71cb3451e4ac33a01172619035a9621d2d54f812ef5343e14b9dedc93838e4cf30e223d215b4d2476ea961a17ac7295069f25b2a12d6e2efe76d91f45632c6d4e61ff19a95d5ae36af960d95050ce98b5791df0b7e322411c884":104:"079e8db9c3e6eddb0335b1cf64":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ce9dafa0e7e53a8766fc0bc38fba807d04e14e5ed61bc234":"b585b8bf634757dac015f2f69f2ae674372a664f2115ad2d03bd3e0c335306b02d0947d3cda5991f5c0c25f12ead2c3cc2d65d575fd67091c70bc93ddb4b1e21f7b0fc6e6ae652dea93a6564ff13489f927942e64dd94bf8f821c7ffdef16df58bd8306a957821ac256da6f19c9d96e48eee87f88acb83bae05d693b70b9337b":"fd0751af49814ee98b2b0cdf730adaa6":"1cba488a0fc8a012f9a336cc7b01cbcc504178eeb08237dbedbc6c7ac68fdf3a6742751a207e43d43068abf6ef4e12a5e3c17e5a2f9398fc04ced67377cbb858fd6020fad675a880adb249e4aba94b96efa515d1cdf5c0c3071a27a3245968867ea94b2bfc2028a67be34c84c3f475944497aa8ca1ab009f8e4b11c8308c1996":96:"e5dc92f4ad4000e9b62fb637":"":"95f4324b0656bef19eca5570548fc6a7a9923f4e2a7e42066891bc132fd73bc1c9089755d996756de0072824e69c43f2db8ba2bf6f90d3c4eafc0721ceaccce1af896f9fb15fb19c4746979b6d945f593fad61d550f81d12b5945ed728c02931d7f8d917285c22a3af748d75a6bf163fddd84b941d8564c1a63192c816ad6d6d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8a328554fed68dc4838fbc89fd162c99ec105b36651abbc9":"75986f56972c045c850ed68aeb229f203b228fdfc36cad6b16d9bd12037c48700d20d8062a983ffeca76b8d36a67ef51bc8853706e83a34e4e23ff4f4a4eb943f19dbe85e454043d7906be6587a85079f9ccd27962d2905117d2dbeaf725d6ffe87bef52b2138da153ef29b18065b3342b3f9d07837d57b8bc5f2597de06c54f":"e4f7c69a1d026eeebfc45e77bd7b3538":"e349dcedb0bfcc771c820f0d510b80cef32ae3326484e25aa183015941e7844bc46f617d5e61fd64fa71759e90fcb72ae220bcd507f0fb389b689dd3fa29b3b937eded85f26ada9e0f3f5109f82fef47c7eba7313049750ad17969e7550c0d4093ed18ee27843d082bcee8bf3fc7833d569b7723998595a5a1d871089fd238da":96:"8e8320912fff628f47e92430":"":"a1ed65cfc7e1aeccd0531bce1dc749c7aa84451ec0f29856f12f22c4105888c7d62e2e2fc8ad7a62748610b16e57490f061ad063c88800037d7244ee59e109d445205280473390336d7b6089f3a78218447b1b2398c4d0b3aac8b57a35891ad60dc1b69ad75e2e86248ceac7bb4cf3caade4a896e5ee8c76893ef990f6f65266":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6e7f6feb4022312de5c804ed1d7a37580d74499107f8cc8b":"4f5bbdf575ab8f778549f749f2265e17dc7225713e73ee6d7be163ff7071557dcc2240b0705c079008605f81396414ac64f06b1b637876e04c3fca8d0fa576cef4dd3dc553fd6808eaf120f837f9bb1d9dbbd5cf67ed497167fc7db89d3a84151b81aeab0e921057f121583df5ed7f976b206ece17a913f23485385f64c462a8":"6ce13485ffbc80567b02dd542344d7ef":"c6804a2bd8c34de14fe485c8b7caa2564adaf9fcbb754bd2cc1d88ba9183f13d110c762a3c5d2afc0fbc80aedcb91e45efe43d9320075420ee85ab22505f20e77fa4624b0387346c1bd944e9cd54055b5135c7fc92e85390ecf45a7091136b47e3d68d9076594cfad36c36047538e652178c375a2fe59a246a79784577860189":96:"974bd0c4a8cac1563a0e0ce0":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"46d6e982feff0e7d04a84384c56739b69626dde500e4b7fb":"a5160fb2d397b55a7eba02df33a042404188f02f4492d46f4edc03fc67723d64f5f7fed3a60728438703c60454a30f473ac918ffc8f98be5c5e9779ee984415e415ce3c71f9acc3f808d215be58535d3144cebe7982b9b527edbe41446161094d6fc74dec2e0a1c644bbc2cf5779a22bd4117a7edb11d13e35e95feeb418d3f0":"71a6d1e022a6bdff6460c674fb0cf048":"67a8455c7d3fbfdba3c5ec5f40e0be935fbb9417e805771832ffad06ba38a61b8377997af1f586dc0fa1e3da0b39facd520db1f0ec2bdf1904a3a897f0b507c901fab30a85de51effa9f7d4703ceeb2ca72abe0bd146ba0bd3ffdee11628310db7d65ea1343b018084ea2414995f86fefb45ba91a9dc2236d92078b4305671b5":64:"84f1efd34ff84e83":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"991dcaa2e8fdad2b4e6e462a3c06c96067ef5e9fb133496a":"9cd0c27f0c2011c1ab947400d28516c7f46d22a409a18fd35c1babf693b8030dfd7822d9ba03bb8fd56a00f9c7149c056640dde690889d2f23978eeeb28ccc26e2fc251220a3682c963f5580c654c1a6736cccb1b8ed104ec7390021d244bd9f92abde89e39a4b83eff8211c8a6259bd6ac2af1da7dfb8cf1355238056c60381":"978913d2c822ba7cc758041d5ee46759":"5a94dc81af011a8af263318b60215b9752292b194b89f6fc013b0fe8e29133de631d981862f2c131ee34905bd93caffc3b8f91aeb0264b27a509e5c6a41ae781209f8c5895d0d35b3c5e1ae34a1a92a2b979e0e62132051394940ea4d9bfffb8d89ba1e8331b15bdf05c41db83a57745a4a651a757cc8648acdcf850a2f25367":64:"15d456da7645abf2":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f29cff00781f5916930f125489c87d21f6593324d1506f65":"a3e8595747b7147d471ac4fe38014bf4a409931e3f419ff88ae249ba7a7f51bd0ede371bf153bab4b28020b7a82a8ca30b75f1e3bcfee3c13db813cbc85138ef05874dedb14a6e5b6d06d7589a83bd5e052dc64433a8e24c1188b9470ddb2536d13b4b7bff0c5afcfaa9aa0157c3aae3b1774df2df14f965d6dee4332edba67e":"50db7ee25a9f815c784236f908bfd7f2":"ec1482e18692bcd6894a364c4a6abb9c3b9818bb17e5e1fc9ec0b41702c423f3a60907e94c888fad8e78f51e1f724b39969ba7b11d31b503504b304d5c4b4cbd42634f4ec5080a9fe51c82e121ae191270dd2c307af84c82d892d982413a50ccce33698054f761a3fa93da9a1fca321296b378a50d458ba78e57a70da4676150":64:"a1e19ef2f0d4b9f1":"":"eea18261a4de31d8619e77005ebbb3998c5dcfac2bc120ae465e29d6b4c46de7e6c044c8b148ffe4eda7629c243df8af4e7ceb512d5751a3ee58defb0690b6f26b51086dedfde38748f6f0bbe6b495f4304373188e5d2dc93461bd51bf720149a7d3aa543623b122b9af0123b2cdc9020136b041a49498ec4aa696c2d3c46d06":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2087e14092dad6df8996715cb1cfca90094f030328080ffd":"6d039513061980fb195bdf2f7c7079ca4b7e0fdd50d948cbfab5ba10b99e3aea27f08abd000c428851de82cacb0d64c146cd9567e9d55b89819876d6a635bd68bcaf47ffa41e02d9ee97f5a2363bfe6131ae7a21ea5130ae953a64d57d6cbfd45260c5f1946388d445ce97d23ab7ba31a5069a4896bc940a71de32bde02bc18d":"d30504afb6f8b6ac444b4a76115d79d1":"d95845d268c8d8f9135d310c39e30f55f83ef7ffee69e6ba1f80d08e92ed473b5ac12cc8f7a872bfc8b325e6b8e374609c90beaf52d975f71caeef5ee4c13de08dce80d358ee1cd091faea209a24e3392adcfe01aeb2b2e1738bc75d4a9b7cd31df7f878141cf278d150f6faa83fb3a2fd1225542a39c900606c602f15c06a4f":32:"5412f25c":"":"1e81a4c10a3440d0002ddc1bfa42ebb08e504fcc8f0497915c51b6f5f75fee3f0cd3e9c5a81ff6528e0fecd68a36192114f17fa1a4cfe21918dac46e3ba1383c2678c7a6889a980024ee2a21bcf737f7723b5735e1ebe78996f7c7eace2802ebb8284216867d73b53a370a57d5b587d070a96db34b5b4f5afe7f39830498c112":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3fc76d627c775de2f789279dc7b67979a9f1cc23c8dcabc9":"92a60d38fc687b92d44635aafee416a142d11a025680e5aa42e9ba5aa010462991ad3dd7328ca4a693673410f9bba37f05a551b949ab0d43fc61ef3b8996dd3fc1b325e66eec6cc61ea667500f82a83e699756a139d14be6ca9747ed38cd9b1d9da032ece311331bdcd698666ddc970b8be2b746ec55fe60e65d7ae47c6f853c":"8f6fd53eb97e12dcd4d40f2843e25365":"e56995df73e52606a11de9df6c7bfb0ef93b86bf6766e319aea59372060294b0e1b13c6288c2310a4bef725a2dddb174f3e1228649861757903c4497a0eec9c141454fc75f101439a2150e368857c4f0f6e5161c42c77f632bf1c229a52595cbf16e9018de9a8f6a1e6b8b18bd244f93f001eb2eb315405d223c0d27ece9d4d9":32:"613ba486":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b10979797fb8f418a126120d45106e1779b4538751a19bf6":"e3dc64e3c02731fe6e6ec0e899183018da347bf8bd476aa7746d7a7729d83a95f64bb732ba987468d0cede154e28169f7bafa36559200795037ee38279e0e4ca40f9cfa85aa0c8035df9649345c8fdffd1c31528b485dfe443c1923180cc8fae5196d16f822be4ad07e3f1234e1d218e7c8fb37a0e4480dc6717c9c09ff5c45f":"ca362e615024a1fe11286668646cc1de":"237d95d86a5ad46035870f576a1757eded636c7234d5ed0f8039f6f59f1333cc31cb893170d1baa98bd4e79576de920120ead0fdecfb343edbc2fcc556540a91607388a05d43bdb8b55f1327552feed3b620614dfcccb2b342083896cbc81dc9670b761add998913ca813163708a45974e6d7b56dfd0511a72eb879f239d6a6d":32:"28d730ea":"":"dafde27aa8b3076bfa16ab1d89207d339c4997f8a756cc3eb62c0b023976de808ab640ba4467f2b2ea83d238861229c73387594cd43770386512ea595a70888b4c38863472279e06b923e7cf32438199b3e054ac4bc21baa8df39ddaa207ebb17fa4cad6e83ea58c3a92ec74e6e01b0a8979af145dd31d5df29750bb91b42d45":0 + +AES-GCM Bad IV (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_bad_parameters:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT:"b10979797fb8f418a126120d45106e1779b4538751a19bf6":"":"":"":32:MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT + +AES-GCM Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes192_en.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes192_en.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9cc267ec --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes192_en.data @@ -0,0 +1,679 @@ +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f8022b8988383d5cfd7d9e0e208146e7868d3d714fe85744":"":"5fccd8cb551cfc9c20998da4cb981d49":"":"":128:"1b5c6c9a28f5edfa4cf99176b0f14077":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a7d4456b8e16b82283b677bd8c4b1f56dc7f153b5cfa746f":"":"081de4a3f71f5d6fdf7801ff6c667f7d":"":"":128:"90c2729c5ba04f8f5c73726c910640aa":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5779b60b536b096c9348cd8dafb3451280791e319b7198c2":"":"62f8e195bc79957ca8ce99a88ded1a02":"":"":128:"699d71bb63c668b533c357662f861513":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"966cfb078f695c8ad84ede2fb96fb89488fa271dd3b50346":"":"4a7b709d45745d94c5433b01fc9d57fb":"":"":120:"4a9bd213420629a5f6e471650060e0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cc69ed684af2c2bd2b3e2d2f9faf98acf8071a686c31e8e3":"":"0bd4197e5ab294ab7ab1e6ec75db2ac0":"":"":120:"6632b618b4cab963dd671fd53d2075":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"99deafc5ec6155043b53a86d466c2b652d59b7274bb844ef":"":"09d18e85e5ed38f51e04a724faf33a0e":"":"":120:"90bfade2f07f38b2192e24689b61cb":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5c0c706a1fd48005e0fd0ed91b4d9f0028c500dccb28ca73":"":"595716e15498454577d3581e94f5c77e":"":"":112:"8b10eacb1f127f4c58cbb8c3516c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ae8e125507ea16d5282fe8bac42d3cb4908b717f345e6a38":"":"0a7f64edb8cd8052fcd5b92e20c0bc2d":"":"":112:"467a2c0ba1d24c414f758200b8a4":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"02176a5a5d8cb8f5ccee3f66a22181765ce730751c135198":"":"c19ed1f52f5ebbcf89ab1907b9ebc7f7":"":"":112:"6525beb5856d6f29105777e31457":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4434d6bce3a33551733d7afe8cd477a79be8eeac19bc0a05":"":"b0eafdf326886eaacb750dcf2c104abe":"":"":104:"ab9f7923a3b9228cb9ecd7f907":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"39994c2520a6196cc3f3e8c6e4833286ce37399e0379563b":"":"dbf9c40266d95191d70739e932cd8572":"":"":104:"b29acaf5addd6b379315535375":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1f27d054114a264b37ee1821a077773750cc79d28594f506":"":"6739d43092620f44b57e65035ce14565":"":"":104:"25e0434a3660704eee4bb82962":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0e97d15f4992a6354e43944fd346da65ac1f0f1229189442":"":"32a64e826b500d7e85f4c42a784f7c19":"":"":96:"da8f3e0a6f156ec260aa34fd":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"27504fc47a9e9a85eaded3782cb5b088359ea1c0abbf2730":"":"c55c8dc3d6d2970c81659f2f87bf849d":"":"":96:"113e637538de291e2463abcf":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d5fc67f73de736768e5c64c37459c5eec3d27f7e337c346c":"":"2691432d3935d4ea8cb8f7c17bef3558":"":"":96:"c0af76d6f62430106ca54928":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f28292ee2c54119511a67db0d2317433abaeccabfdd5d1f1":"":"cf9331a1bb3851b2fc3aeed2d1a33eb8":"":"":64:"8e14b869a95eb12e":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2042f9244079736291ba7fe1f030cba99672a97ce361dc14":"":"aadfa619bafb21b5c738b65d632bb8b2":"":"":64:"ad6f52f25aea1c55":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d9b4eb00ac03fabb5304ac38414f7782cb0186436a4b9036":"":"809939260117b759d8dac1a69c27c12a":"":"":64:"1f7d0b3104aae50b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b5128f4cf91d53b3a50e9b76b0b27da33cbd4b9349d89413":"":"644909f5fbcd61d850e43fbef1fb454f":"":"":32:"2ddbf709":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3ac7ab2ade7a8e397d66be6dc7671f19cd39ad65490f1712":"":"d152359d765f41dd9cabf5c8f37cfd8a":"":"":32:"a6e4e30d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9c2de7e3c74b7e318413a32892d4fd070de9882158bbc82":"":"63410c83fa363a63fa78303b9994b6c6":"":"":32:"49c514ac":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"66ebdc2332276784a69b6bb137161210bac9f1d6a36d6a4c":"":"647f41b60c6a579086ba8854d043495c":"da26eebd04c27bbe7fa7b54b87d3b7227f056dd9c085fabfcb59ec665a257c6de68fd2c1c51aad5e6188e02a56f70aac49ba489802247ca327de57ea3cfa87e72cae7dd82b50341a2133b03cd0027216fcd94cf43ec8a48e1c04145b597924b37f7977db3ff23b8edc913357037d0fe02afe2bba6b91e27554edbfb77f51cc41":"":128:"420b320c2d616a0b11a7605a84f88e26":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"26b04d8427582b04318fefebac2a2298ec3ce61146f39a35":"":"99f3449c8538414e7ab595b92a7e6e10":"edfc2aa8ed91cfc0e117fc9e2d1bfe843c7cf365a2b6cabd4259686cd7aede9c7453623967a30ffbd52b30fc205208bb346ffc70584478f5f39a79d4971ed71cc3dd0200a89aef6aecda0a1f3a4bf2929b7b9e141be0ddd3671f727e5e793ef085f52ecb77a266b9a02a2c700b63d8c43da0b569510285e98b530abcdbf7739d":"":128:"091cfc38b248460eafb181ab58634a39":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"82c8197e6641d0832639e2b1d7691fbac79618b2f5db45bf":"":"69e1a3e5eed54bedc941646e3ad25a6c":"d0fcb4f4d764efc0fb52c8108e61b67a1386f1a13c1761941cc9a28c6ad15e78474cd2a65ae9475d70d9c845f14bf4d2bd2bc46c29e507a347391829e0f24495b026f681c387b3e6aec8acfa5ecaf4c3cfe796c22469478ee6744cf04a22e6aec82489f53109551f58cc6602933d1780b8b45b933f76a94ef652a8ce8bac2cc6":"":128:"8e74343ae8cf1cdda4969c1a94aab5cc":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1a349ba960b2c8f49b7e5314911ba8de358f2e74ceddf126":"":"f5998a62ec507c5fe5b280f9c57ac626":"78445eceecf2e6d2ecf2589fd24e854bed3aecc63aef934aec9aea93dca95d58629002a4ba91e9bf6d12e13f0a844977b3c2700645281db5de381adbccd34a84346a99f34889bd46c75b1956e21aa9f87684af55d7fd0de6da07e856d9b791c0a45e9e37881092f6040a9ae9d87757142d3c9c7fc6f25db0e5b5d377865ec4da":"":120:"4d7eab0a3719fa53e552b9e5a85bdd":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"019af03d23342f7916e329b6843161e566aa859402cb07ff":"":"c5fd96765fcf6d51e23ac6d206744af0":"f9808af3403051a52b6652df03b6b37d90a471bc242c436cab6ba699139eaad16847665093798731b9969709287199233c5e77351c5e42b15453b4171237a6d16aee63773c8c0d736b3a8bf38ccf922e561c456682fbc2c7161da3b89526d9de222351bbd04ecd4e8680f26d70fe57d577ea287b199be1bbb8b76328ddee3d33":"":120:"fd36fafe4f5571fafb6ece59b77381":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fab39ad2946b2a343d76b1ccc1939cce7ae3cd7b6ea187bc":"":"247bc71446489dd3495c4dee8a071c76":"cb2c06fa5aa54ad079741afc56dbed79061a02045b6c099d0ae2d7883b78c5fe09636cc8a5dbba0c0c76ebfdb81217526afbbe04fa4b2b78f3357025930b0f9488369bf3aa088a2107bfb6c4ba714f1c26d0380d647ada5852d2c539300a4779295412b202c3cb977a7b94c24c4dd2a891a2035f388257b84e5b31bdc895f062":"":120:"65e1aad214f49881a067d8b372ab6d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"57b52697f72ae2df6354410a69dc3c5f28b31e6617bd78c1":"":"0d96720526491d196eca66457e3c9e71":"cbdfdb3cc73aed4297ff9aba76dd8ca4d8efe11b0f521fd7170f07461c7885252874b2ff8fd05a3943ecdc824ffcef0396980ebbddc0a53c6c99086c14fc806d90d35347d45e556e9a55ecc3a9fd74c8e5dbd19ed8b452eaeb673818ddc0695f56ddf3b139a3df378fcfe5b6ccfa358f5a5bcd1550f1d9d5f325f15f9dcd007f":"":112:"f0c49960e60fb63edbb50bfebd98":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7bf69ed06271107e11fdf016edc4aafb0e2d2ac05bdbc46f":"":"50e65aa338cfe856c80cbe1331b46abd":"a7cab4e1e56f4b9fccca08d3791560e4b6c7ceb40a10adec0536861c5c46fc3fd06c0a8eb32c9f18c40463b0f06cd0053e615dfd7caeb2b353b08ad6da1f8a23ebddf16524d2eaed70d4d7e565412dcc9598df7e107beb464b103cd8de9301cafe8b0420f0c156025d72b73d6e015ed2312535d35899aed73aa54374674d7f02":"":112:"d7fb9d78fede77981948eb013ea1":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"caa781bbed41d7a1c56d47673f74d4310a3bf8b1275031d6":"":"7795dc04261d9433367f51c3b87bf18d":"f44d77bd541e02a737c693ff3ea0adc091fff1966a593524e68954a2d7d66a48199366a5a600331cf392965b5ebedbf949203975fa9db53b72586615975e8a7b84e0633c6cf69caf482dd72b26b0a5687ec71667e7f6e5abea89c3d69d2dc42a242ef959e4039ba5b2d22a3e48424a431a77e816604769d13b7f892e2b33fcd2":"":112:"386930ced9a46097c0d1f6e65c62":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1b268de4ff644cfa4361f8014656d5d4decbcf9cede8605c":"":"4009bb00afad026cbad117c6047f4ed8":"140c5a93293598fab85b3948b53e0ba15438a0b948e91041a13104f0ad263c8a10613e20e87ef261999a54d469ba6f1abe56ec3979623df8520a0476801987c15410ec24f5a9be72acfca71e8c5904e2ea5f8b22b8cf404b9fd533aa37e33b3d4cf91599cbb3b85ecda4aebaa27ac0365df8312c399ba1767c47fe0923f2c53e":"":104:"af36bcee7561cd7d0861085d55":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c2843bd689ccbba60ce961b7dd50619a59234dad97567e39":"":"55a68cbaa5755d8c67bf26f03c5863c6":"d7980ab86ceb9b66ab265b68e078deddf7ba084b8967c3227839e8f31cdcfbbffa004953f3582ea9274dcf46e3ad7e7744a576dec37e0cb36fced2b2c2fcf4328f506302f5741e696ce25c49492e33c6a0c8aed5af03cdc1a266352623c6a52a555ce906f684bfd597b5e37f60b5175a981088b9d8b8b5493e4fc1bfeca64f95":"":104:"66cccb7d28d3fa70bce2900a84":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f451c5edf9849a390486dfecad437cb809c33d31f6898ba0":"":"9e2dd52c04651ceea88caf4adfb2e8ee":"87b804d4a81dc203d67a92b4fdeab959c2056dcedb28d29f216f9172817bcfb3d2256bc1c8aac23feb22b71f1fd02ea28cdf91785931750ba4865d672345b5001b1aade4f6acc7edb03758d2540e6472aff50ab3ea61a0b9ff37ff7a87b91013b14867c3e43cb097a923e6d8ddb1f52e4bd940b60d500a4e35bfa91935065f26":"":104:"e192a49f5f2b22fa39dcfa54c8":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"82fc47638cfb361ecf7924c03925d6006cb99459ef5691e8":"d14a550d419b8e03762429a7abda3b17ad7a1305e5fc639e71538285cd70d78fa30e0c048e2c32d2a7fd7f82c874d63ae922db5a77111b46caefbfe4feef4df19786e5fec6a4df84f76df412b1f06bea149f1996b41b117d00d422bba5566d3af5289ca9377f325ca1e72f7d6a32df6607bde194cf4ac52c28e8aa1e8f1c9a67":"2a8e1cadd2f264f2ad7be9e7bdfa24a2":"8088358d7c3ca8951d7e8cd6cae15844edabccc8d0fcf8f169a48cf434d4814f1d7d9ae410e5581d414f952f52b852eb10fcf0f2a67bea826ea2e28331f0597152e624e148462d5952f10fa363666d57ebfe036695e1e68f79161b991e20c8ae6095232e63fde073c79603135849c62f8d98a1d80608fc081171114db41883f6":"e54cc95e845f4d1b28885e9b90d1d9d3cc51fd9d8fec9bce57de8781a28b4e5b7ab446074e84471d7a9a23748b689c354e402be77f9890a9c52a2eb9022a6a415e01285db1c6eb66d5e15f4216a4f3f45782677b6ccbf20ac7b35bd153f52a599712d09712ef1454ccf72ee48cca967f4917f1aeaeaa6eaaf8493ec7ff2dc1d4":64:"093343e49b70c938":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d3180703e1ec93b20d1ac4d64e85d5461d75f783bcd2f4fa":"b7b350db6fc0796e9fd0cb239f561bf7e27b2aa26b8e3e76d8b737caa1c1c5ad624a32f5709e4b751f8c21172d4d0f4ba38ca4d1d0e2570c084cabdd0e8880b35140c84f775c3c301a9b260825e1fd75f9835777d6c0e23d359af1a5f7caef934b91bee521531582b639be2cca87c2991f5525f4a2f64c30a1453013d73c16cf":"916d72d515d3247ba48828d4113bda3b":"1002513035cb1d7e8b2710ff8c93cec55e2e2c2b56000d4c1182b5286736acd2d6f2fc9b82f71156dba6f77463805627e4bc38c96e091ecd945df7e996e7fc3bbfdae3d85ef1337fbce960fd1d60d06962a1669e9e8d20be151f6323cb38ef68ab5e838f02a0f379567f518f15d81b192cb25a42356807c1b9c02bef8309ff44":"d590f2afcd64c574ece12c675f509efdffc01e1404cbafbc923c4b44390eff66dd839e6d800df67bc06f49f76911df3cec36a3a1521762d6d4a8ee602ebefde0178863443f918668fcde8a531f3b5ee0e4c379ecf3e75e7c59f753e41f4e39811bd3e7dd3d6bbaa1e81fdbf8bd976384a6c4505f7e4270321c7329bba7f15506":32:"22e50ed0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"02bc0a8ab5468123009b2c69aaffd0a20a1fb082b55a7ecb":"8bf32af1632a7903f00e801ee6e5c690147c021be6886cf2462b2172786ab296e0feb96648e4a602ae6dc45e2aa60e6610356cde26b1dde3aa114c5449216a467fcde18332a6d482d24a1ee952379340d036a48b63efa092db4c30a95f402d57b9c837183e900b47805f170cfe9e69baea2b939799e983f7470bb1297f937bbf":"bcfc15308e891f32506a50c4ed41bff6":"01bff5e606a536e951213b23672db9074fa8bbf947e815d32cbfe30adc1e736517f86139840a4aa0a671b4e9bbd6a59d292db34cc87742c0dfd2d658ef157734c5fdebb3e5772d4990ad1b2675c23ddf1472e892dafe7bf140d614c50cf937923491662299ab957606f4ca5eed2facdc5c657784bac871fab04d6cd3ccb18332":"b8dff03141832970c925e7ff0038394a0df7f35add3046cc56f73e3eff59e18932aac697456107b6da7da3249049c3be5c098dd730cd4bf68cdf798c3a932b2c51f18d29e4386cbf1b7998a81b603372337784307b0beb59235eba4d3e4810899f6d71a994ba9742aea1875878ccef1bf674ee655a0720bd37e44b33cafe5742":32:"bd0be868":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7c07d5ccaadb9e3ba5b5ddf380a7a2a175522b98e31e1d34":"04d3e6bcd5ebf696fe84a702ffd5f76dcbe9679c909b36d41ce6362f229304aeb19896c6376cb3c25081f709af57d36f39f421ecdb70bed9f829558bec6e78823275fc11f9a2d5f773d27136d903ff08e5926338dfdcbc182825794e5f739efc1f0ecda8e53751edbe0d08963471fb5099f2ff31f76b479677bd6d186a409525":"e4db5c6403a03daa703516763052bce0":"b747d97f263d0ff6119df1b5332640d2e4568813adc12ed76175fdfffafd087456748abb267195688d2db41caef301117979dfd2db9714b352398594005bebb449ea20415fcfb2671253f69bf6467ce7f5bce350a834c4586eb03e766c1930e7e6ccf01283ea31b8c73d7967cde0f2a53cc46b1b50c48649044d6f753f1d54b5":"f5faf7bdd99c62ec87f93da2ca3ce31e694df0a0fd04d61914f9a7a4235de20e0a406e297ba1099fff8c14e8fd37a9d6cbe2c5c572c988cb1ff87ffe7825e1947ea3da73b8b3633721fb4e08deb3f8fcae2407d73bd4c07f32b4f9ad0b1364003b11f84037a28239e96c3996874ba8e4ec7270bf0441d648f52f3730d30e3536":32:"e0820c4d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dd01d48789ef7f07f80a7385e4d1b1734903bc6ec768c9f2":"":"944ed7743be9ce370cba7b7c9b7dece2":"":"":128:"dfa0ab389c3a780f598af80200c84da8":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0383849ed0db3e52743aa82fe8cd9173b457755be8bbd46c":"":"c6b8518346ec52c001697b7bd38dc795":"":"":128:"48a1992549b627c8621e8fbaadacb16c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"936388053ee0116b3f783ae34f000d5fe2c5d712842d46f9":"":"c5426b20c014e472c7b85be2ed0f64c8":"":"":128:"4cf0f6a45f3544e3d391375c8fe176b1":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"40dfcb3151a8dab1cb79a6a1e6a24fb55024d0e256bd4b07":"":"b8495cc54653e7ad74206153ea64c3cb":"":"":120:"1d3786412e0ceb383de3898ef2cffe":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"83ca41d8b33c6134a14d8b30b0c36d5b799574dd925f3b8b":"":"fb9aca5b4932035c65b571d170fdf524":"":"":120:"9787f7d68d2648963cb49fd7459121":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"886e646688d573c2dcc8ca229a11b394b3400408dd801503":"":"c0744685722cb87717c76fd09a721dac":"":"":120:"794fe4df0084c21ffeaf959e5b0382":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0b845dc2c4e9e5a94bd3e8969300b16b45d3ad5eadb2e80a":"":"0900b3fa3cc9833d702655d285f904ed":"":"":112:"dc670518e150d326921bd5f43e80":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ac9fac2e32ab44a0774949d53a62c1cda04b132a3b07a211":"":"8cf6a81bfa21633ad95ffc690c737511":"":"":112:"4cd7a6e4f3ec3d41d086e6abf14c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9f9721ef784980d03140490f760313cc8a56424affb01672":"":"c104bd8482e3fe7359c85e0e94fd4070":"":"":112:"3f682fc71989804ba74bdad04a97":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f7c935f56970678ab89f6d97315a33efae76148263e95f1e":"":"1a91965c5458f4a1fde309cd42a3f277":"":"":104:"ce266c6f0447623a3ef1f6f57c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"30ecea6cac70a9de4f4f7f441d6b9b5608cca39d07c0ded5":"":"361e5cd21c670de39b5f0b2b89437f99":"":"":104:"48a9621522a98bc6c0acf03429":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4fb80c4fd026c3f68ab8fcb8e28e144fdb3ba00d70295ebf":"":"ee552fb94a527d18d285d6c195ca7b2f":"":"":104:"5ec97630ce593e9d560136774c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c0261023ee9f682789ce9ae970fb7601f07551259ef91945":"":"bffe4af76db75bc4a3d42b57c73c51b6":"":"":96:"bf827b4526da77ab2e21908c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4fb4ab2071bff4ec239ac05c04800806df2c256a4845b13a":"":"3ee0e2e72eea437e46a873bd659b1c4a":"":"":96:"572d3ec2650ad57eec84fe00":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"193d5ebeb466d3fe68754bba413c65112ae29c5ca5e450c4":"":"04e9d31b3b1205cae37c435d5a5579df":"":"":96:"71004356f266688374437aef":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9a455ea1d9a78425a41d43e293e88de40dd6ad9ab2a63ef0":"":"c108c56a1b3261042adc89046ad1ecf8":"":"":64:"213d77ed0534cc20":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d6fff8797db2f1884b7d71e3ef3e5983234a837dbd0c2cd6":"":"6be4417d7c00fe9c731e0932a7037a71":"":"":64:"68b6c28786a017e7":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"86e6c451ea0ecaec9e365bc4831e7a6c092b65ee9bcf1b86":"":"6258168da407ce43cc18d6931497c1f3":"":"":64:"cbf20172e75a6316":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9295cc6458d907da5e7c356a7de51eb8e8d3031f72a05fb7":"":"c7eaad3389fc24a4ef96a711ffbfff9e":"":"":32:"12508e37":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"308b6ee958f81a7fbf3bc386e167459206df9c1cb999d904":"":"2c61b991ce478d9aac818d7aa75ada36":"":"":32:"32ead170":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"873d033773218387690c2871448578d8440ef36553583928":"":"02072ec745c856c6e86873a0523d603a":"":"":32:"e6a5726b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cfd9c1375dfd19e64b5e4b75022fabaa049627d5238cba3a":"":"0a745c6910b23c78b1b44c02f1ce11b2":"0cc6724b9f3675619fbc70117bfcfb5871e903b0f01382e404793c1dfaff5a5b4131a7fc3041014941dc2c53871bee3ff18c08e9abbb13a8ea220cb89cf65bea1581eb8ac43d148203532dad8854616210ed7f1f9467e6b22071ccc8bb7e3bd89a0ed02a7058401aa4f2b5d0ce050092b650591282e66ee789bbf032dc105503":"":128:"8ec41e9c76e96c031c18621b00c33a13":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6c9f16c5dff4bd8d1855995dcad1c4253759b6e2a833995b":"":"3f25e3210d6d9caa8725eb55c6813cef":"7c6a66d930c95ce1028310cfa3670b77ffeb5e9b627a667859665c1dee8e69930c287fb1f1a3706ed1a0d35eb6d1becb236352a226a5b686bc27e1e1dce4ac6d5974d88b9812b39ba289b2490821319b5fd677da23fab3adbae4fb3630e2571ac887ed951a49051b0cc551e7ebe924c0cbb1c516f71db60e24773430dc34f47b":"":128:"5e000478b55ecb080c1b685f24f255a9":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a8e393e00714cd94de0347351b924ebd555003f3a297493f":"":"9c7eaf730fa8074acd372fdc53b726c0":"ce4cb46e67d85c5e68afe61ddecb1a36da4de42774d45250d0d52b328834385ce1ceba96f703daab81d7a981cd80c469855e14d834df41e4c0c98873f3dbb777fc0562f284c466b701a530f27fc4e6838cecbd162db34b8e8a23131d60d1f9dac6c14d32a2141173f59f057f38af51a89a9c783afd3410de3f2bbd07b90a4eb2":"":128:"66bb46adf7b981f7c7e39cfffc53390f":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"bd356a8acd12b06de9f63825e93664cab1beae7f4112cc70":"":"72eaf459b8af0f787e91d117931e3cdd":"9295b227be3e1faf4e969be6c7f20d507431cf5da9e2a577c9b31538058472683bd52f0ad3f2fa9f68159c1df88e7dde40d6612f8abb0f11a0078419b34b558d9144ea6596a09e5d5548b275620e5a3096dceb2768d2f77a0b79e0b963387d3016ecc2f155d9182e3209d97c76329b830bb62df195cb2be11223565f496e751a":"":120:"2ff4aecc90e2de9a7d3d15eb314cc8":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"80ecc9587bc2cec1ba87ab431c7ed03926169c01eba19729":"":"5a65f279f453572e169db33807d9b52d":"29520d9020efa1ecf514e39a286f398c7225b945608d4b57ec873ae8bfbdd40e4cbd75b9b535c9f171cd7913ed4b21e09d6bb030eaa27ca58b08131817113c852b6cbdf550d94dddfde8595e689470cf92f9c20960b936ac0692171158e54041155482f29e4acae41565d87f5641d1aac96b8cb763b7f1267ccdbce234d067d4":"":120:"83dec0fb36463b86270656681455a0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"94345293fb7733fea9c8b94be2f4fc26f8c3655f583e2b0e":"":"8bad4f3f289b9f4063ba39622ba2b7ee":"7e2b6520d7a554e612d01f462606c0e6d0181bafece1daf54f4316d707483a5dcd4275a08caecc1c20f3e32872fe3e57fa62d598949f5e49ef0efd53e918617e0a140338c007025493f2e0f8dbe5fca4a57d1db6333551bbca79243a73ae8a68dafb3089998359159df916ee6ba4f928a6a173390f15f2ee6045d578dd757bb1":"":120:"da305181a12517420c6f0d71fd3ee1":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a3915523031c3caa58ce02c2b1e6ee2eb42cdaf31332432c":"":"d5416986beb3131afd6b7967836d243b":"ba4e883147c8f07afc08735e6e439798bec60e00ed3f5982f66d6b82a9af7580934112a9858f83abbd71193190298f0683453d3f8388c475fbbc8f9b6a3d2c77046b73986a54cc4559c57cbb86330267e04bcf5fd583c6d2968a7971da64c99d98623676154b0ee413ba531ebf12fce5e06b4ee0617e43bdaeb408b54d1b4445":"":112:"f273fe664e5190a506da28ea8307":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"799d3ff266644128f330ceb8c028297991b2a5593e4afa3b":"":"9d27061dd9d50817b3086f453f1f401a":"d3b5c420ac597daaac7503cd17f580e94ad779fae0d4199ada2c7da7c4a611228752375647a03241f29f810d3a6a74a140ef9651e4a6099259f7d41ec4e51a02917e8cc35edf7f60ffc473805f56f0ad51fcc767670157c050c3214d36f831a54bfeb7ab2039cb10f7919b89b0f623a572aaed313983b105fdff495d979b8a84":"":112:"e690c9afdecea2494b6cf5a576bd":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,112) 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Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7f5ea90f99fc76594f0f06448321bd4bb5e494a5e351e41b":"":"002a5da3c543ca56dd7e5b013b094f70":"b8150b50e36de85158a96d2096678f31f179c8765ae6ba5723ca655e890528eae96d438f9d9365575dadea3cebb4d7df3a9d5323f93696c40781a6661dd4849531e672f5cee7cdfc529416c9c3faa889d0f66ee4049c949c3c8459680f490bbb0a25e50af54de57d9e3241e0dff72604af55827b9c4d61b7d1a89f551cea2956":"":104:"db9fd90a0be35a29f805989410":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-192,128,0,1024,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f0072110572321ad9804efb5bcbc2ae7b271b1cbb0f4897b":"":"604ed8056666b17fd27b111afd419375":"97f68c00513b2247bc88a331a3ffa1208038736d6761b3b080884a8dd46e0596f2c00c1a93bceeeee814210e57d7f1cbdb4e0c2ea6a0834baf716945af9aa98e2826ae0eb5717b241ede2b9e873f94c1db9eb5e1b25f75827c25849a2c7b92098b54845ed81f52871a2b0d12d317846cec34defaaafc3bd3cc53a6ab812bd250":"":64:"64881eaf78aeaa7d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e91e8c2d6928bbaf870e141ee34d3a56d00dacc8c7e50514":"":"6f3d661a3e321844d1fc12d5ec2becf6":"fc8e5b45ad1647f9dbdbb6b437abecf0a8ac66065d0e250aa2ae75525455ee13adce8c59d643b96de9002d780db64f1eb9d823c6b9a4238171db26bf5d05153d1e3c839b93495084363b845fed75671ace0c009800454596674217b19832751252f051f3995776a89209c1636b4f4b28a364bccdedb78ad36876745c1a438406":"":64:"1f4f495adfed6c1e":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"138ff9c8c556ffe7637f7602cae428d7e20dff882d44ddc3":"":"38d7005fadee55b5a0434d924d971491":"3facceb047e486998c945839ee5eddd67054bbb28308365b2909dabaed29fd5b7b34644043fa443165e07b20214710cd652fecd816d9273c700d6828d216db8f3ceaa9eed0e251585f4ee5ba4beb3c0582b8128a3ecc01f4b29cab099ba2a8931e56120802fdf6004a6c02e6dd00257a83adc95b3acb270e8000fd2126b8eb83":"":64:"fa8aed1987868388":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1187a34ccb75fc06dafeca0235186c64ba929adac6cf6e49":"":"9dd515d3481f21efbe43198f623b34f7":"8a1b00ea5d1f4e451cea71b3d2fc9bb03b9790a8ae8ae262b3e97ebf34911f9d865c8810b9fe779fff701c72f3639654e60898d1f57eb93381749f0e2cecb4ee342f5f34473215d5c46818338ff688637217fdfa8b7ee552db01973fdb6084c3c20b530863eeb1ce798046890994f5625df2a56042d62742097cc10d512a543a":"":32:"83f45529":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4c1052610d05fb77543b6b517eb64b487ed902f9969a420f":"":"90f4c93301371158271a8f46df1c86c9":"83d009a1238f8aa40e36cbddf08a5f3d96403a03f7d079359cd6d3d0c719bf79c908654882919dbc6c27db34007b6732cb344a0f4babd26b1209ce6b134a8d2318f9a38af034b265562097b63794d7efee306e97c6ac0a991b3764ecd936c87000fa58e6689e302f12c2851b1ffc950dad7a553c8c67e01a2270e1e5e9caf30a":"":32:"30b3fd85":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,0,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3dc62e54957bdd1968be71b7d205fedaa291349d69f2854f":"":"b8bce0f9263688ca41c4cefb26e79453":"22b6d92d8908bbdbcd0ff35299eddaf0cfb039befa2d2d83c896f373b92091d145f1771c58d60f94d3548d0cbbeabeb796d7632b5da3c66ef75cb41a35e7d1b032ccfbddbb9423e0ee054bd56b6288bdf1b616492c85393e4134ff9c066b23f3f626eac63a5fe191ce61810379c698de62922d3bdbe30697a3e3e78190756c3d":"":32:"67887aeb":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation 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(AES-192,128,1024,1024,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"61159242d48c2ca0c30377ec2ad701135adb62d113c9f9ba":"8ae40603f6cdae4b63ac7b18b4bcbb83c65867c2ae270102efb6f00aa8af5d0400dc95085910a50a16cbcf71f06c3f3eab71345d59c6054aaac02971111c7146add8c072158e0b374d481bb540036a136ccb91523f96f24ea237940ab011ad38f2a3095c0785df91604be1fe7734cc4119b27aa784875d0a251c678900334a0b":"4fda7236bd6ebe0b316feeea31cb5ebc":"ed28e9954634ec2c9e2df493062abf3ea3e199299053a15ce8d6fe051d1076287e4e7c0b2bab0a599b763a29d0aab680626f280c4f5ad94b7792d9af532681f6e4eb2672781f2342304daff902d03b396853eaf585af4d3bf5078d064e9eea6e94e667722f15c004f4cf52253a5c65b75319b07ba539558d8a2b552390a21577":"dba251e35422f60f902f594bb58dce37131e8ae06b5f40ad23c4a70a5e25fe24c76982c9bc11a7f4e3cc62d8c1326170432633eba1634972a9bcd093b08e1c63ece07c4be79cadc888b0408e40c09636e1cf1e5e9a6f2ea44eea5409a2ffe9c3ac9a18ad7aa9041f08eb109c01ed90732a8afe0694319ef98a0269685b4d16b1":96:"b0feebfc8324fd1e9e40f7f0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5b4c37150f8bf0e14e0bfd37ac14e606dd273577007f24b4":"48c6486b2691b86f5f107e8fe0122a821248206d2dd3ce898a2bb3772202ffe97292852bc61513529ad95faf6383b5f6c5a7c16c4cbe33cb02e5e50f32db95ee2962aae1c9c0f5470b3baa216cc19be5ab86b53316beef14397effb8afba5b5159074e26bf5dd3b700f4ea5abd43e93ca18494e1779b8c48fcd51f46664dd262":"664f553a14dcd4dcba42f06e10b186aa":"4386e28ebd16d8276c6e84e1d7a3d9f1283e12cb177478ab46acb256b71df5a2da868134ed72ef43f73e8226df1f34e350b7f936bd43caff84a317b1e5b2e9a2b92ccab1e3e817f93222dd1e2cf870d45a8458e57948a649360c6e2439bbcc682383b50bcd3d8b000592c3ca599e598a03b9953af485f1ecc22501dcacb7110e":"05fdbb5ad403d64011e15d27cd6f5a2247e018e479e58ad3fee1e0e8ddd9e114c0e82f2c947ff9af525ce752f4aea959463899542b85c9b413d065ea175103c3b3c35f56eea52af2c54ec08a1d5b7cd5ee4f59de8be86512b770e42ab176b6b70ccbcd264d6d5cfdd2e52e618dc24251ac339ea38cdc446c778d2db3c7c3e93d":96:"77f32401db21adb775e7f1d0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"531a380b109098eafd997bd25bfde4868d2a1ca781795e9a":"466237db78d4c770a658b9693420a2e087c978fcc434c9ac82f3e2447b2fa08be32d2ce6da25846555ffe5764234b07b35dd1d1bcb710e8a49f918f2c873681f32765b092a836e9418faba61dc59a254c923159be16f585e526616fedd3acfe2748ce19ee03868ea9836bee2c6acb1b821e231eb2d30d300387c93390d51e3a5":"ad079d0b958f09732aaa2158f6215573":"09e002c2c48beaf1122411e8624522a9e90cc3f2a040c52ffcb91136519277c39fd6a79292b8835e0fbcaef2279218106aaf75036590f8a46f6b6912053a3b391849f7e204f096288d6141d5f80c7f91dd2f2b6ebc1ced6af8216e0a594814b56bd592df800299b29e26ed7461ba3f6f3cf151b9c10ad634a01d9c5e578aa372":"d1f49f94e6fbef7e21abad23e16c06fcdfa75a8c342be67baea8e0e57dbcd2971276e993faa124ac81e6be18f68af303518efd926513cee9dbcc5ef6cf5e9c068a1210e53fdd56776148d51597e359dbaa0570b4fe15476ccc9aa79f7c765755b6f694af4269b9e18fc62a0d47708bca67dcf080e200718c22bac256f641e7a2":64:"01ec395c99a17db6":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fbd7a92120ff973ec69b6a8189c6ea827ca20743a8781518":"1583c1578a8c8d272a970f05d875f199e497c55f03f10f7bc934fee21c30379dad3c580b3f99304a5747b61fd43428506439ede2c57f5229e13da9cb7cd6174cccbb397e98fb90455ccf3ea3b1304f432a070a2eb5205ed863326b3b86d4eb7f54ee2ffcd50ed6ef01b3ee216c53f4f2659a88fb6343396b2ded0b389c6266c5":"57658c71b2c45f6ae2d1b6775a9731cf":"45ca8a168ecca7a42847b779ef152766b902192db621d2770b56c7d592207afaf52d19a6059feb76e96b90628995bd6517af3f114e97af8d602a493b77405e93095fee6761877dc292fab696a4303102dece60951cca20cacb171abdcfd0ef6da6c90b44edba63b9b6087d876b3fff24dea909899ebd0d0371c424f51a9a84b8":"58a290cf0e774293d1b55f5ef8a305f68605c0c81668b8a1ba95fceeaa65229404e18fa54dd811a6af085c98b8854d0f956adc2aaad742cafa9ed53d7cb445451ee7a4dc1e8399ec7e5b4d004ecd22496565bf444b2e3d82ddf6a6d5e6256c5095a699d7ff3f8cf2addec73e21013ee6f3dfc0a3abf316ea5ee1d6943bc394e1":64:"af737ec3512da2b4":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"54bfc8379e0a8180b931c5188c95ab3ed3461d6e9004d182":"93327664eb576bbb64e4ff061874346b4e80a779cdeb1fbe630bf5e4307d4f2c5d5ecc94aa8bdea755c1af165fc8925bfcdf128c1ee6571e9f8344b22dfc90ed893316031661a9438b305396f3a80452c9b11924163b7fc4422b00dc58ee0e674710239975a2cf3253bf2601cd155e09547a5f3be1adda84a4b29631a8e13161":"9d15df8de4150f44d342f2031de3611c":"63331936d2972abd44c1c9f62e42bfa932dff8cc75d9f555f5a7847d08558e76f5393e08909760edbef8d2922a7ca8e1c0c505ca627c02af73253791bb35ff080b4db7dddf4c8b304999ff645227cd79f13ac87f9c963b93a79a0e946e5781cdbf1b4b1967a75314f19c7219e3b69dc2c24ba09fbbdf7184278f82818bdd0958":"18ff87dccbc24c396190c7b37c4a77f86e609db7fb2b326802714d0f196b00b84af887f1b3bd30ee0b0b192d0801ac4e59ac40e5c652b3da32aa024da3acf648da0253674c391d260c0674853c7821861059772c9a7f2775a7ef77d1d31a6ec1c51c5f3089bb516f8cf52d5a15724281086abd92a74d255b7cc84b5051be4e5b":64:"bf0f7f8084e79da5":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"21b775ef8c40a5387d6c8eda4e90d0a00c795681a2887dfc":"6346f84301d6d83e1c5bad44fa7e0821f35723713ee8d4a9e2bf15abf953425b09bd77b2360f4e62e82bf9e14e2b56be51d032aa8a96e894f19f3e84630f9eae831b329f7638b09de7210cd29778059ef1d0bc039c1e10405f3ae5e4ca33216adcfc21869d9f825344d62b50bab03f7aa7b92fdb94951a68acd01f1dee75e428":"9763e6187d4b96b1801d1f6efe7e80a5":"3bd523c16a0022b780ae8318a28f001502120bb26e2f65f4fe94019686f9d1df330e70cef1b2ba4b6ce1f7ef37750f47e602843cbc5f13ff2ceadc5091eb3601604b70bd4acad3d61950b9dd2cbfd83a391223c8e09fddd4020c0f8a8a7057139fd92f3bbe034f03cc48afdde064c8b13ea942ec0d621db959ec9d5fa95afe45":"f25408848bc27ab087b3ea053762837a534c3702dd8be01d79f075f61d76ac1d6557d392e1fab475cc7d13a5f6be6f0718bad71c3c85b5996bd3c0159e264930988e3ed506bcc94fabecfb58caaf56e2e4315bb50817cba765636d1faa91147b3880815eeb90d0934180e49132833abfa6279247d9dd4048dff851e9a551ee1c":32:"d1fb9aed":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8a7d8197d9ceebd8e3f6b3bfb74877ccf649ac91d7057af5":"37b01df357561f5aa43b5b4b0081148213f7b74babc80f4b3c6dd78ad17687f11443cd4a57f8d7a74ca3080e2a229f78d8e6db276c1142d5f4ee764eaf09cfd70c596d7a2cad5360c2de20d5e17ec6e06a9b049bb10f8742a30a94270cc6d7709b2f09f3cb8347e41117b7ddb99e4a939f3094c016330a8f170ccccb9d3651fb":"db5144951a9f1721397b7321713a723e":"ad72fa5a05adc40fb38245da019cbf50958ccfe26abf67dfdd49f4c4af6bda8bfc99d557913b2634c5c65d33ca909360adf598b703db1dbcc29481b17ca42fce3315ea1454693b5843e751fafd78158fc040c1cbe607063ba9c0ac02ae4b88989e3cc63adda8427032c70560349e1a8ec847906a9a7b0422a694a1f9eb2b3b72":"6985ec525cfe869e1709751eb6f1ff0aabcb39ae3aa708adc452ce1a8cad8ab4f1739f660b2841566f1f5c9e15e846de7f86ca1dc085188fcaa4a3f839ab2a5f0cfd36e36965ae519fe14f98899ccb07a3ca15ec705e3160df6dbc37ab89c882012eefe51e4da8d6d6b84b3144ca87a90864ff5390abfb92992e44c46807b3c8":32:"c51604f5":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-192,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"713358e746dd84ab27b8adb3b17ea59cd75fa6cb0c13d1a8":"35b8b655efdf2d09f5ed0233c9eeb0b6f85e513834848cd594dba3c6e64f78e7af4a7a6d53bba7b43764334d6373360ae3b73b1e765978dffa7dbd805fda7825b8e317e8d3f1314aa97f877be815439c5da845028d1686283735aefac79cdb9e02ec3590091cb507089b9174cd9a6111f446feead91f19b80fd222fc6299fd1c":"26ed909f5851961dd57fa950b437e17c":"c9469ad408764cb7d417f800d3d84f03080cee9bbd53f652763accde5fba13a53a12d990094d587345da2cdc99357b9afd63945ca07b760a2c2d4948dbadb1312670ccde87655a6a68edb5982d2fcf733bb4101d38cdb1a4942a5d410f4c45f5ddf00889bc1fe5ec69b40ae8aaee60ee97bea096eeef0ea71736efdb0d8a5ec9":"cc3f9983e1d673ec2c86ae4c1e1b04e30f9f395f67c36838e15ce825b05d37e9cd40041470224da345aa2da5dfb3e0c561dd05ba7984a1332541d58e8f9160e7e8457e717bab203de3161a72b7aedfa53616b16ca77fd28d566fbf7431be559caa1a129b2f29b9c5bbf3eaba594d6650c62907eb28e176f27c3be7a3aa24cef6":32:"5be7611b":0 + +AES-GCM Bad IV (AES-192,128,0,0,32) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_bad_parameters:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT:"b10979797fb8f418a126120d45106e1779b4538751a19bf6":"":"":"":32:MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT + +AES-GCM Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes256_de.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes256_de.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..95209f03 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes256_de.data @@ -0,0 +1,679 @@ +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2c186654406b2b92c9639a7189d4ab5ab0b9bb87c43005027f3fa832fd3507b1":"":"3a0324d63a70400490c92e7604a3ba97":"":128:"4c61cd2e28a13d78a4e87ea7374dd01a":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"747d01d82d7382b4263e7cbf25bd198a8a92faabf8d7367584c7e2fa506e9c5f":"":"7156358b203a44ef173706fdc81900f8":"":128:"9687fb231c4742a74d6bf78c62b8ac53":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1cbe30216136b7eaf223e6a7b46c06625176d9a08182fa806a63d8b143aa768b":"":"4fe6ace582c4e26ce71ee7f756fb7a88":"":128:"d5bdf8ec2896acafb7022708d74646c7":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f31194c83bb8da979a1eabb3337ceb3d38a663790da74380d8f94142ab8b8797":"":"404efd26b665c97ea75437892cf676b6":"":120:"e491075851eec28c723159cc1b2c76":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"daeed52ae4bf5cbe1ad58ae4ccb3da81fb9c0b6f7619ca21979313ad9d3e83c1":"":"4037eadb11249884b6b38b5525ba2df4":"":120:"360c6ef41cbd9cd4a4e649712d2930":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3ad81c34389406a965c60edb3214663ac4a6bd5cfd154ae8d9dc86dae93def64":"":"cebbce06a88852d3bb2978dbe2b5995a":"":120:"bd7ca9f6bd1099cde87c0f0d7cc887":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4c152ba30aefa5b2a08b0b4d9bf3f16fc208bb0bc4c4eca9411dc262d9276bad":"":"008d040fbd7342464209f330cf56722c":"":112:"c87107585751e666bedae2b1b7e8":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9aed4ae6b1d857fdcbe5aec6db38440613dcc49f24aa31fba1f300b2585723f1":"":"947c5f0432723f2d7b560eca90842df1":"":112:"7d331fedcea0fd1e9e6a84385467":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cc80bc031676eff5f34dd076388a5130e985f9e06df4b4bf8490ff9ff20aae73":"":"51f639467083377795111d44f7d16592":"":112:"02d31f29e15f60ae3bee1ad7ea65":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"db7a40213b5b4b07e9900dc28f599403b0579cbce13fcd44dff090062f952686":"":"aea6f8690f865bca9f77a5ff843d2365":"":104:"7f2280776d6cd6802b3c85083c":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"299b874eaa8b7baf769f81f4988a41e2708ae928e69a5ba7b893e8e6b2db5c3b":"":"2aa04d85d2c0dc6f5294cb71c0d89ac1":"":104:"ea01723a22838ed65ceb80b1cf":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a6c7b4c8175db4cf23d0593ed8ea949043880fc02e2725f0ab90ae638f9dcfce":"":"ae07f8c7ac82c4f4c086e04a20db12bc":"":104:"1132e4fff06db51ff135ed9ced":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b98e1bf76828b65a81005449971fdc8b11be546d31de6616cd73c5813050c326":"":"929b006eb30d69b49a7f52392d7d3f11":"":96:"33940d330f7c019a57b74f2d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"09ccef64ae761a70fe16772cba462b058a69477c91595de26a5f1bd637c3816f":"":"e34b19381f05693f7606ce043626664d":"":96:"2adc2c45947bfa7faa5c464a":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"654cf46598e5ad3e243472a459bcd80f1e026a65429352dbd56e73fcc5895d1c":"":"a56f27709e670b85e5917d5c1d5b0cc2":"":96:"177b9a5e6d9731419dd33c5c":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"84bca1b2768b9202bf194f2d5e5a0a5f51fd8bb725f2bab8a3fccbdb64a4ea70":"":"c45b2708c5bdf65ec6cc66b6dfb3623b":"":64:"fe82300adffd8c17":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c8ae011795c9a60ad7660a31fe354fa6f7e9c2724d7a126436291680cd95c007":"":"1bd9ea6186450f9cd253ccfed2812b1c":"":64:"35214bbc510430e3":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"df2f0a8a3849f497d12bda44e12ce30a6957f3febcd5ec9bc134171326ca66d3":"":"728cb9608b67a489a382aa677b1f4f5b":"":64:"e2ef5d9cc5791c01":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"78e8a8ad1ecd17446cf9cd9c56facfd4e10faf5762da0fd0da177f6a9b9c3a71":"":"f169ce6f3ccc58f6434ae2b8ad1a63a1":"":32:"0fe57572":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"02ca6d8a862e25db9d68e4404abc107e700135df4157cfb135ce98eaa33151c9":"":"7b722fdd43cff20832812f9baf2d6791":"":32:"72dea6cc":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9a2b709dbcc3a4fb15b3ad541fb008c381b7e985b57df52f07ca7cd26ab1ecc4":"":"729baa4c0ef75ed8aae746376b39fe3c":"":32:"2a0d607c":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"449d39f863e4909984b37f2e5c09ea4d4b3e9fac67bd57c299e4e1d1f084aaa3":"":"d8e9118f331bb5a359f0aa8882861b72":"4ddcae0bc24d622e12bdeaac73e8d1ab7957af051d27dfaafce53aeed4cdd3f989ea25989a2f41cfb3c38dbd841c5560b0b5ab1861b1fbcd236865d13da55b50219462e021f8a21848a64a85326031fcec8fe47a6ef4a435dd2b2fff637644ffcf3914ef2dfa5dd556421bfd297be150b31db039f0f2cc422b282e659e70cceb":128:"c595b9d99414891228c9fa5edb5fcce3":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3e70e66813fc48f984dcda4d1c9c24f1d5d1b71ecfc8bb9581782e7cca5a5cc6":"":"d804f1051e72c9b7117002b862eb45ff":"0b1ab2b7a87cebac668c7a532fa8fa56a22cabf0c41fc1e6744ffe07c857c6865d623f508351f98f3f0c577d1eb94300a30a445472218c8ac626b0bee7d4c122d33f8130436a89add341e8ef7e00694afb4ad80d314d87ad3f921c7105eed05431b8151df7cff2c8e3790efd4acd3f60332dc7f34fdd90beef70f9093361d65b":128:"c09c2e3fdfefa222f7345ae4efb978fc":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8e534041090b45b80f287dc5fa20ebda017ad81b0530e680f62c6280fd8881af":"":"ead675b019ef5c6bbf4985f2a382d6c1":"b1db220052c4bebcef27eed6db0dc91be481179d71160c5a2ddb2fe497a05484840b04cce48980057d770fbbd0d5f3d5c633b55470617ad2cab5767188283310337825c4b0eafe13b5b11293dec230dad43b220885105767938c7ec4600fe063f98aa14bc6afb886fc874c10546749da295f571e696305bd9165486e29f43f52":128:"9aa0cdad5686ca515cd58aed94938ef4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2de18874470c09db683cf45cd752bdfa8bf33e7967220b1a69f41f2a02da1d80":"":"af30eb2d0a0c2a50ea413f3285aa88d4":"22889b868d8ccc9f488406813caed199b23091ddd796c8632f564e7cf5a39dfb725266a931fec958659b6fc5b6b9343b8217edb0acb010afc9416601155262b57bd398d62f555953f0e15958e19ae004fbc9cb25e0269a9eaa38a4635a27bfa719fb249fa49337796bcf5f416bba87fbf3b19f0d8c11290c25ca50bbdc822f01":120:"646bbc9b14681af65b0d1c4c9f1d0d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1a1bb9122e762ecd7ff861a1d65e52607d98e7ae5bd1c3a944e443710f3b0599":"":"32f99ea4cbf52c2701c2252e5e6c863d":"91b7a70c3a06c1f7f2ea584acb5dd76177ba07323c94f2e8f7cbe93fc0bb7c389c3c88e16aa53174f0fc373bc778a6ccf91bf61b6e92c2969d3441eb17a0a835d30dcf882472a6d3cb036533b04d79f05ebfaadf221ae1c14af3f02fa41867acfdfa35f81e8a9d11d42b9a63288c759063c0c3040c3e6ee69cf7c75f9c33fea1":120:"a8e29e08623a3efdbbe8b111de30a4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3bfad1e8f9850577f9ba3f290e9a5e91b494c2d99534220362e171a7543177ac":"":"8410886b70c57d7ded8596443bd1b157":"ca801c83596795515ea931edba00e06e332bf84246b7036e10b317e2d09a51b2981fcb664ee3bf4180bb0b12ed1cda221abc6790b27c26914f5ef9cea9536e2453cd5b247cb054e295c2687b725a97cbc484b8eb86c6ceee03bd07a54a9301a3ac0ddb23aecb825a238252e7575329058b40e75575a7f16439edf5be163ce5f5":120:"e3645db0c600dba52044efcecfc331":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"65debdf2f2191a6cd8de8ad4d5d4d0d8f731f67744e2545df6b2a7cba89c1ee0":"":"fdab2ee547dd8b6f5a4ea2dd19697b3e":"d2b0a0438ee0f145aec9a7ca452b788ecb473152b78fb75f6ace721afc7b0ae1942049b790f3a5b6221a8760295659756d35347cc04029be03459f3e23a71209b4e0bbe13a253a888c83db23376d3a6d9a539f7c9fa4a12dc64297e7c93dfa0ab53ef76b6e1d95bf6f3d5e6ee8f08662fc03ec9d40eff0a43f23ac313671bfd9":112:"c25fc157c3f2474885e2eea48aea":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"496ae810380460d40cd2fdae8c0739f16b87205cc7f57db0a71a473eb361d570":"":"77233de96f5e1744337778212b411bd5":"85f5b54b4c4af5c808120bd28d98e44e96f4126623e57684957e9fc4fd1a2d0583940b8fc8314a249325476e8d05247831b04709580ae714e8187cd38f9559419e14c9fc4f8c454ec191b8ef2a3610988fe3339d0dc6b72f5978f9eff9d596dfabf27056e3a908c6497267461386e860f6b9d65526294bcb92908b5661b06b5a":112:"4ed91af6340e70b0c2b94ab6f82e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"aca188183b46139cc7cffc82a6aaaeb2fd73cecad14e75c663bd62daf1ec711d":"":"7bbf7fb55eb70cce94cc6a2b67de55ba":"015cfba90f069545fed60f31992ff3d3c3592eb91e7a53df5978ded64291954cb99a57de82d5398ce782b68d14ac04a8b425395bd076ead59eb445721bdb2f45e19fa089117800cbbac7b8313fb165ccb1122acb654e1242dc7fe6885ea1cbb7281b1270cfa1549cdfe9b47caf47b4ac3807e562e48c066566f5e606b5023b47":112:"3bcb5c2a4261d75bfa106fb25ee1":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8cd6815f6ec15f03b7a53f159e877a5981e0ab7f6e6c261ddde4b47cbb2f2366":"":"c431c07d9adf5f61204a017259cddd75":"4e1a835402bde4f5227e64b46a1f8d0f23a9434e189377fcdf1b9621ba1987eb86a7f3b97ed0babfd674e74c5604a03dd016d71000a72bbbd00a7f7fe56ad0fcb36a3e24dd0fdb63bd66d4db415f35012416ed599796ca3f678df7eb5a1b17f75abb348ddd3b366369a7b362c9488aedab836b61f9a158f0b129c8ca0a53a81e":104:"0e463806ff34e206f703dd96b3":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8f0a72abcda104aa7fae501f9a3b686d00d3f6fe984731db8a2865bfec587073":"":"ab8acd063775d1b1314f14e90fddd1be":"02c6d426e7f20b725d8cde0a6382e49b029b52126889013ef45251f27b2fadb95ca4a9a3b16ad06999eeca4a473e813045db4942e9b9ff2e5a5e429d9bac298372344d1b781d5facabf6d779643f31ada6124eb50aad599044b54279ec9b25714ac8a3b9ad2487cec7f4b1ee245d7be3d496d6af1d4cbee1c8201312541f3064":104:"3f0ccc134091e0c0425887b1b9":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"417135cad74280e6f8597dc791431c95cb8fa63bbf7197e3ab37c4b1d6d9438a":"":"0fe22d9ba1d0e32656e3a9f07a517a27":"a0b2712e81d329d5b076a4be2ad6823cee6dbd17d9a592d065bdebb92b1ff37a56bf2f5e5341f39c574246ccda19e5f35fede49c9ba958f3920cc5440fb404fab7846884ca0c2a3af5b51f4fe97a1395571319cc5b40f8aac986d77de280db82343983982638326ef003e0c013af19c34672975dc99ccc0853a1acf7c617d965":104:"888b836c9111073924a9b43069":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"304824914e32ea0efd61be6972586093349bd2cc2cf0cff44be943682b2dbff5":"":"b6d927a71929029f6766be42746f7cb1":"7281c81c7514f4b17cb125c4649006ef8959a400a1e4d609d277e363e433725fa32346a10bcbd826b6afc8222158920d0a2db1e6fc915e81231c34c3941ecf3c6f94ffe2136190cae3dc39a4277acbc247f36291b5614a8433b1a0780434a6c50521b72ec25145bbd3b192647155d5dd9df9e66762d39592602ea99bf9bfff49":96:"b6044c4d7f59491f68b2c61e":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8a10e9abe9389738e12a4bb6f553ae81e8bd320e0dfbc05fbae2128c1fde7a23":"":"6da44354e198e3beb54792718becbcc1":"199d754630135b669bf2ec581d3027a569412ab39a78dd9d482e87b778ec65c6473656260c27827e00e566f1e3728fd7bc1853a39d00e43752c6f62c6f9b542a302eea4fd314473674f6926a878ec1e4b475d889126ce6317115aea7660b86ab7f7595695787f6954903f72361c917523615a86d6ce724bd4a20c9257984c0c6":96:"5c5683e587baf2bd32de3df5":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d164ffde5dd684becaf73e9667e3e6acb316682c41aea247899e104a54dd7a7f":"":"1d388e19e9d7a9750e2fc1187d4b075a":"f166a5b6f91261cda56f1a537f42ffb8aed10af5e0248f8910034b92dbc58d25953f1497f571d31fbf5ec30d92234b440161703851f0e43530418147ce6270fbcb5db33ab819ba8973051908704b6bea8aaca0718947e6aa82498a6e26a813981783ed9bf9d02eb1ea60927530c4700ff21f00179002b27903dd4103bbc5c645":96:"52e10495105799ead991547b":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2854188c28b15af4b8e528ab25c0950fc1384976f242716c91bddeec06f2fdea":"":"075af9c31f5252b8920092cbd999e7a0":"e9452f71093843a025bb5f655eb6a4e8316ab5946484b11818f22b62f4df75d5891fa3397537093a261dc9a7648b7477ea1f5fc761716e302763364bcab7992595edd0fc1c7f7ac719c879e6616e2007948eb8530065a6cccf73d0fe4a0598819b471b0856e6d90ea0fc0e5d36a30ee925b6b8e5dbf40e77f01efe782c0bb4f7":64:"6ff8fd87e5a31eb6":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2bfc445ac0365ae6c3c3815fd18bbd0c60ea224f6620d9b6ac442a500221f104":"":"43c5f3367a9955aaee1a0c4d4a330059":"db0bae8ce7c66a8ba2fedec22f236212e9a7ad72b371de285c7dc6d2f6c22df0ce4920e0f03f91eb1653c4490050b9f18a2a047115796f0adc41707d1ffcbf148aed5c82013f557e6c28f49434fc4eb20112f43566f212c48cec9894ac40772fcd9b611ee9444df7b73e35b8a38428ccb064c9c50491d2535e0b539f424db83e":64:"49aaa806cb2eeadd":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7b828f99aaf751bf22d993ed682e488595617a607ed74aaacbb6b60457453080":"":"d48dac1d8d77e245420feb2598812418":"f50f785f4e7c848a55a616ecf4b6b1e1ca85e16de7100c7e4273d411bd95c1380ee157ba501ba9616980195f34e39f43e335f33253342feb8ed64443483c721b85241a0320b3cac83104de2db47188c61a373fba592ea16feeefdee1f2bb43927396f58151418672ebb74afff5c029503a0d0be81430e81ed443e08b74c03183":64:"a5b71ecf845b25d0":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7b6da11d69fca3e4c907628d3eb63d95c7e502fc901372fd097e064e70831432":"":"6fe2148f250ea178d4c8ca8423ead87d":"a8097bb74ded776f578eb7588f5ef8915db9bfa7262af700c8e76ee114e07557b6786dd5a60a66b2703e7c9de5d6b42aca92568aec5d1ecc298dbd0edb150b8cc13c9a78698f7674caa94da6cacd1f3ef4ca4238c59830ea725ab3a6284e28966c8c32d9bccfb0cfd6583a5ca309debe86549a6f317d15c5f928cbc7f473310c":32:"e9cdbc52":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c5ae9328be49e761064080fc213e53e373fd86359a09d0355e2d438d9b8e68f1":"":"a7e3f8660ff925d5c88c5aceffbd7026":"2ddddba7a56cc808aec4602f09ae9bd78887827bf0315d8dbe16821606ef9d117746dd138bf1f23565d1ab8f4cee36d53fe3730632c5df9f12109b16edbeae285bb49dfdd155f5dc97b319a85362d53cc86817b7c1c31e5e87c9f37422f133d00dd0776bd92ab05ce6860573cd911645cfe3fbe515e85f744899a447fe443653":32:"e35dbac8":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e4f8ca13ba86c658cc7f42d4f029422209efbd101bc10a1df81a42cfb3a0f79f":"":"1a362fa0e4054ba11e4b06d59c8bc9cf":"e7ad5c75aa13659f8ce4b1650c46382645ec67418199b84ea445b8ceef619ef3fbde59ed3d313c459e36fcf87d26ef2b453409b32f1086934c3072c1ef0aac83762d28b1193b9afff2c083ce4300b768b0ae23ff9d3dcf65bc1693f1350da65180620aab205aceacfc683c8be53a332e2d0337a7518d2a5204f9c8d7325a4799":32:"e7a37f15":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"00050a21ca1e72cd0924be31b943c60854be6744577de3dd9d1f4fada4a19ea6":"693ffd3d92294857a99c702a0799eeca28ab066dd90917b9ea5ef8f6547f1d90b106cbec8ef2c22af9f8efa6c652f2f97c2baf33af14fe9def230d49524bd65909c3df1490f637f99e788dcc042b40e00bd524c91e2427ef991bf77e7b2f770cda6e90076c5dac4cac7ee3958b53ff8ce846c3a96281f53c2c52f5f3e523536f":"2fc1afc1395d8409919248709f468496":"":128:"e39b6a7fd5ac67a2a1cc24d5eb9d9c74":"":"cfcd6b9ff7641829cbadeaa2e56f1f150a099eccf3e378fa4da59794dcc4490aa4f9c5db0ab245bec36a7d4557a572008e42f03bc1baff3c946f23f54a4dc9828f106cf4264e4ab40165839d1085e7795b1ae0950f0ee4a08e46ada501b6b51dee0e518129c9426e5bd44c66674a9f99cfe676f002cfd344c5bbd22d3d91e600":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e6e1ada628ca76eb9832cc6b5efc5c9d2686bb587366a6de2d734233fa95279e":"a0ac738e0fb35246b84a6fbe319f827039515df25d0c0fc6de7c048253ae63d3c561e44a12672ffeae1cb925610b482aa422bbee0e1784fc69baac3a97d69f51e6d2a17957b44b318624ea7ec680a559f4d3f2761d09bee66efb3a312ae6b3ecb673e756b2a0f654671e82500e7ace91f2be2a74bc3bc1ec1a4b6877a53c27c8":"5a100b451e3a63a3e6d4b8a9e59c6bce":"":120:"88df9a1ea54e5bd2ef24da6880b79d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cd8c2f0c330d5db316dae7a16b57d681ca058864f7bd60f3d0de174442283f77":"e2a5ad295d35031535bf13c2993bd0b292e8a9465b9dab738e59ba03670248a1ecc92b38a55bae34729162271cc1572c35fcccb27417b48dfcbff852a7a8845cc829a4461061b558ac8b5930a5c6491ffba04a9d0dff220b3cd5e4fc2e0f3db3b2ddd90328f2cad819573a7856299620b02f5ee0267f3b56981afbf1b7d9e3e1":"387ee8c1e7f047e94d06d0322eec02fc":"":112:"62356850d12b54e39872357cfa03":"":"17b7f6bdfc1993c56dd9bd674cc276a55a46fdd9fd5fe435b9e4b7ebc7052a9dc76a99e4e43aba7d486603189c90d10a21ad3722c86bf5bc856a0f930ff5bca65be708b76bb8a29105da67f31eebcec81f28aaf526d2f8f0feac393a24959dcd612e2b93b4463f61957d2b3046bcdf855e346601e4c7760c0ca618ee7bf55381":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7e19e400872eed721d560202cd757d3eb99729496b6e3a6d38dd8afe1066045a":"3fb9abc7aba654dfb174e8899c17db222ffbb387b7260fc6f015b54f1cd74284c516e21aae3b72338e5e8dc643cfafca0678f5bda3a7539f1612dddb04366031b5a3eda55f3232c1b176cc9be7cc07e0ebca674a272224929c401a2530efc6d4eed0087b544b12d172a01bc8340d9c2a2ebcb5af8b07d96073a879fda140c196":"d2b277f78e98f1fa16f977ce72ee22a7":"":104:"4c81c044101f458fdfac9ca3b9":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d0653934a16fd36c27d54488a1829302b931bed6e26ca26047242b85b50bfb61":"c02347e1add9178d830d8baaad9aeee37e958bedf2cc846e2561fe8c83481d0a8a85911e7f1f6e444b28f30bd96c13c390e80f616feb6844ee6fa486543a2e3f38c138f45b4405e3fb331b64648219aaf1d574be948ccfca6afc18d12488db19c35b05601e47c0af5d49a93a5dd4420f38585c1eb033e173376fa390d3f948df":"94886a1845aebba5ed6b86f580be47f9":"":104:"4be34ff42085ef4443c8b6042d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d0f0ccb88c7cec9496f26a59ddc67dc59ebe49ae3dd89ef3be008598727e214c":"7845e155f4f28021291e7c814a1ace8f42b239990831aa82758fc1e376cace0b6f668f7f2f224dede1ef5b1df7ae74b2c01483701044acbbb72a9216eec6b7ef0190f114b3c73c6985c4653f11601c774d10b7f9df1f1e1f3ff4fafa20d6525edb37d9e5acfafe6d3468ee068d407fdb56dc718c98425926831253978d727854":"e5ca84b907ac761a5e68a9080da0a88a":"":104:"c8f78e4139dd3eaf2baef8aafb":"":"0cc3ede50b0d3fb9ada11300a3239a383c98f968ad65266d57a195bb18d3e568fe6cabba258da4bee9e923c7c838e06dc887a6c49cc1453ea6a227c6a83e651a8742e0316cad5efc93739393e3603446b5c920a206db1434adbb8ebde4d1a7a8699c7f6c61b2d57c9709b564338423b4f526d6c157647a6c45da9dd521061f05":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2aae1aa047a20ed2d6d8336d923864cee9404f924031ae327fbfe2d293e1d93c":"8e5b6b9e4e7d01de9a919dd33c0c1eb94dcfebf28847c754c62c1c00642d9e96f15b5d28ad103ff6969be750aadfd02fc146935562c83ec459a932a2fd5fda32eb851e6cff33335abd5c2434ae4f5524d6bc74a38094ced360f4606a1a17096ff06604952c8ca94a9a6dc4a251e13b0e0c54bd8a6dff5f397a1eb1cf186fa518":"3da9af3567d70553ca3a9636f0b26470":"":96:"e1026b3d15d261b2fb47632e":"":"58c52ea9f3b162511160eed1a68b6f52b3c4f5834af728de97a3d9e4ba337b29aad12636003cf5be9ffbeae0f383f7cf32f645a8f6fc5cdc1cde91c625c69a92bc434ed671e52a0044a48f3fce55cae49a7d065c2a72603a7efe58b5a7b18ac500d1a51420e820357e7a439b1c02198ebe3d4e62d5573a3aa5f40900a21e3b41":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,0,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f94170790fadab3240df568197f9d6f6855afaed8d07eceeaa2380121872529f":"ed231b78db082f652bc6310c396993b52de804a82464fa3fac602a1286535f59c67fc2b1b420c7321eb42b971edde24cd4cb9e75c843f2ac6fb8ecdad612d2e5049cf39327aa7a8d43ec821161c385f3fdc92284a764a5d1cbae886f07f93017f83a105bb7c3cc4fc51e2781516a2471b65c940ddae6b550ad37b35f53d7cc64":"2f9c0647a4af7f61ced45f28d45c43f1":"":64:"ab74877a0b223e1c":"":"1cb5ed0c10cee98ff8ecfa5a1b6592391bbd9f9b1dc1ff351e0af23920d546b5e27d62b94daabd32f7f96a2632dc9fd7c19bf55f3b9b7cd492e76f4d6b0f5b437c155c14a75e65bfc4120bef186da05e06a2fd3696f210292ee422ddbce6e63d99ee766b68363139438733c5e567177f72e52ef2df6a7dd33fc0376d12ec3005":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,0,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"29264a90f114a800c0fc3247b3bda00981a12a8f85cf3a19ea4c7ffdd005f4bb":"587c8e53ab5ae8c31e16160b4a41d88798e27f4ad61c573c023c62d4dbb3952eef5026ad7b453fa9e0694347ab8fe50a6cf20da566202b81e325cee9c07ab2d4d53ed45b3ec2d2135936515f8a24f2a8116807dce9df3c44edf64c32647145152ff241d9e018e4101e400af070192dc3b498b5a213d265b4cfc8c8d4d7deccb5":"cf296aa43cb7b328e09c8975e067404e":"":32:"56015c1e":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5e9eae594cb54c8089330e4404ff79abb1c0841b0be5347a14633ad1e1ff44fa":"32abc1eb6077555a85a0a6fd1c78cccca6c8b375842e2eb8eee45ee6c38dc0837443d16c647252e8124639dd01c808ac5e857a25d927c2a75e2fa8955cad5beb5c206fc050cd933fc4621f5718936f01f39dd700ae1aee7537cc595df8789c5d1a6e1e87b1c7a60e3ce5d57c80dd65dee3801798e1481b1963bcc78cc69f8c50":"0917b486da754f48bb43ecc8766a7ce3":"2aa1ef2f91aeba5da10b48a882dbd4574df4e9157a18abf8cecd03e4176712ba171b6ecb0e745841ff84e35063e47b08101afc44cfd9cededb913a82f00b9d4bac922f23a22f200642270399896405d00fa5271718eefb4cd5fe7e5f32097766ebff36ff1898a1c8a1a01cc18e6121e470805c37ff298fc65ef2fb1b336d09fd":112:"92282b022e393924ab9c65b258c2":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ceaf204ff504ea8e7fade1a2097f2b527a44766860447322fa5ad346cd810217":"1c8e4cf6018211518494d46c2e0607fa42e236abc28d58f8175c530f84b1f030572f5f6a74cb5517e1fb999a637d352afcbeadea9121e695675859b66b499a3a351ecba5226e58ebbb59fe12e359e4c89cd51c8703d4643c49921ae495801c73627df404b91e828e1d0e03ae09a39defb5aa5f2c8106953772ba0713d3261329":"cfdb8183251f4b61c64e73243594fdc6":"a60f3969fd1b14793dd1425aa0b1f742a4861e0b50eaffd1525cd209ba6d1252176763bb5bee59aaa55f92341cdc0705899aba44cf0ec05cbf80274ebef65cd9507fd4224b25cac19610968d6a37e2daf9ddf046ef158ef512401f8fd0e4f95662eebdee09dd4a7894cc8c409be086d41280bd78d6bc04c35a4e8cd3a2e83be3":96:"9e45029f4f13a4767ee05cec":"":"5cdc66b587ed5eebb04f42b83a6ab7017093514881c598cce332d74fa3fab927493ac15bff26835296e080b5b45ef907c0529fc2f4ed2fc09db179ef598e5d193ea60c301d3f8d823404814e3e74de0e1d2417c963e9246c353201c7a42659d447376e7d05c579dd4c3ae51c2436407b8eff16ec31f592f04b8013efcfd0f367":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"15652abe38cd09777bba21d0db04637f5737d3cb3922181b9f2d07bfdafd327a":"1d6c153dec3b4738a09c9fbdfe31a093eb7ea79b8fa49f83e5e1f46893590f074fb171fb66e30ef887767014e3a10a3aa05da2bd50dd7b7936e1d7f6f31af9030e31e76bdf147f4396464db0f6a72511c4885c6c2305d339906e3c761a3249d7ebea3bf463e8b79c3706e684575550e964b8047979f7aed6ea05056c4b5840b1":"3a5e0d223ae981efb405566264e3e776":"cd755437cb61b539908e0cfaaa36c0123f8f17d1e6539783cb61d4b56cac3bc1e971c1ea558b12669b025cb6b9ad55991c6e2f8ee8b0b7901790193e226a0fbbfff7ff0bee6a554660b9f32e061b6c04bf048484ff9ebd492f7e50e744edd72d02c8fd32f87f9421bf18a5a20ebb4d9dbe39a13c34b7296232470e8be587ba09":96:"01a573d8e99c884563310954":"":"162430c23f7adcf98575a2d9249b4b5cec42efae33776360ebfa6a19c8eee4bd6b07cbd274deadc3292b7cdbb7803e99d9f67ccc5077f3ad5808f339a05b3213dbfd11377673d4f9b486a67a72a9ac8ea9ba699861dce0de7e2fd83d3ba2a2ec7fabf18b95a2bbe2184ff7bddd63111b560b3afe7f2c76807614ba36c1b011fb":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a43f6d07042a15cd49f6f52a2a3a67c6c2ff420d95bb94b9fe03b287c3abcaf8":"b67e58c8b608724fd20aa097ee483bc4c804490cc79de635170944af75c87ae0ad8261365c1dc80d852553bcba18da9fbc3fbe61d27550a03003ef0c60202054626655509a9e1ab54677e537a4e761df011d6c6dd041c795446b384161ae9eab441afd24d19b58eb4fe5116cd7b11b751ebbd0a2adba7afc380d9d775177099a":"3b6fad21f0034bba8b1f7a344edf7a3c":"2e01c0523c8293fc51388281dccdb8d0a2d215d729289deb327b8142d716c2bb849e9476545b82f3882ba7961b70c5da2a925ba18b6b121e9215d52ac479c9129c9cd28f81584ff84509d5f9dcb7eaae66911b303cc388efa5020ac26a9cd9ea953f61992a306eb4b35bcd8447eea63cef37bb0c95c1e37811115cf26c53e8c5":96:"43470bc3d7c573cb3a5230f5":"":"e1720d451fa7ab9db4988567187244b15b6fe795dd4fef579fb72e41b21aaa436d2e5d8735a4abd232a3fb9188c75c247f6034cdebb07fd7f260f8e54efefa4f2981cafa510dd5c482a27753a7c015b3cae1c18c7c99a6d6daa4781b80f18bbe6620bfc1518a32531017a1a52aadb96a7794887c11ad6bdd68187ba14f72a4b5":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1f0f0191e18db07c0501dbab4ed952c5603a4cd249d2d8d17e62e10b96ae713f":"aad40e7866c26e486b6f6e8eb14a130d5f88891bf0d09aa8fe32f447ab8dea7bee5d3eda4499c0103a010483f2b64fdf1155499d31decf528c77dd7627884f9995c213cf7402143dbb7561d69c86886734260ac94ffac7eb33598d25714228ef43f744ec1af2a87e789f1e5d6fff0fbd5082dcc49328f194e8f8a14a5bfc962d":"ab8be16b4db809c81be4684b726c05ab":"a5a6e828352a44bd438ad58de80011be0408d410f6e762e3145f8b264a70c593476b41bb87875746c97de7d5fab120bd2f716b37c343608ee48d197a46c7546fafcdbe3e7688b7e9d2f5b6319c91d3881d804546b5f3dbe480996968dd046f406c11f0dc671be0421cbc8b4ea6811dd504281518bb96148dddf9f0dc4e2e2436":64:"d8bd7d8773893519":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a6cf7d83137f57f2310ee6bf31e8883952bb07ccdc12f516233ed533ea967e5d":"83ab20698fd7573fd121976a72b45a7f03aad84702fc8ac73d6926eabd8a546895aeffe4ba81d117507e2cd37d58eeff71cc3afa8a4449be85f228ea52f6dc6395bb43c1c9f795343720841682d9b2f00602eafa4d4cbe297bfc62467e526b9d823cc8eeecd9e5f8dbc2f65610663c6f37b3d896651b254bd60215629ade3b2a":"f17e37e73a28c682366bfe619cc673bb":"0f4dd201b18e20230b6233e0d7add6f96537dd4e82d3d0704c047fab41af5faf6bd52bd14fa9a072f81d92a2ce04352f0b66f088c67102d2d127a9850b09ff6087f194a6e8ccaba24091feb303eebb65f1203b2d22af44e7be4de71f03e6f6cbadf28e15af58f58eb62e5bddfae06df773cc3f0942520de20078dda752e3270f":64:"74110471ccd75912":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b0c85ac6b3887639838ddca94c5c69f38115aa00122322c8114642d12ea1b8fe":"0210fce418e7e2199cb8f899c81b9be74a630d00269755f882fc4db27632e99685cc12c426a7503473646df1288d0ede28408be9add5713628700f8e2b2e27d7522520ed00ac47239084651eb99e7d03e1520aae137b768f3144232c16b72158fd5da4a26a2525b9b27791bf06d1eb2e671c54daf64fddc1420bc2a30a324ba5":"14f68e533ecf02bceb9a504d452e78c7":"796a46236fd0ff6572b1d6257c874038f870aa71cbb06b39046d0fb6489d6ae8622b5154292ae5c4e1d5ff706daedb2e812533ae3a635d339a7fbe53780e3e8204924a5deb4b6856618f4c7465d125a3edffe1ab8f88b31d49537791c0f3171f08dbb5ed1d9ed863dafbae4ecb46824a4922862fe0954ee2caa09ab0e77ed8fc":64:"6fb0b5c83b5212bf":"":"5e6c362f7587936bcb306673713a6f1fb080783a20e9bbb906456973e529cfa0298206184509c30e1d3793eaaa5d564edd4488f04311821eb652e0a1f4adaf6971505ca014788c8ce085ceb3523d70284ed2bb0aebeba7af83d484df69c87f55a93b3d87baa43bd301c4e55eb8c45dcf3e4612535ea1bd5fdb4c3b9056d0cae9":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e61b1a6b40e2ab1245ff65dcfb9948318ac4fe55e9ed600cec301dae32ae0e93":"8d67fa9fcf078e421cb63abeb25dba739ab0e09a091dd06b0c616e1e888f350edb2d73a42f57f115266ea20c7f8fc143ac746649612df06a5e29b4a15934dc049be1ab49d018ab86c4f37d8c3d9c714f038029e74d8ee3dbe61d81adc63712ea413b37f7604da12107aa1695d9b0981e5a92cdfaa5fbda0e31b22c6fd6f3b499":"c356244b3034d288e4d4fe901b8e27c1":"bdcfeb09d5b97bab05a7acd9849e7de2c5beb7a4dc573c7e1c1d0c0409245a6584023114fdcc6413c800ca16847bde750b27c4d590248e2ce457c19b0f614f6aff4d78d4a19b3251531e5e852fbb05d09412cc1ff8988d1955ca6f5fe2d820f20a7642e3ae69e8122b06ba0918e806400b9b615e1abe6fdd4f56a7d02d649083":32:"86acc02f":"":"7c73182eca97d9617abb478a6ce62e3491a7e9951981c89c3071b161a4c80440614c3f24d0155073e28dcccee96bc8303dab4901ef77318df522d16d9da47770ef022395d6104cd623d93d67090a27507fc8ca04157e7939e639c62cd0e7d8a472314833c0eaa9ba2fd54a25b02854e3bff25cccd638885c082374ae520ed392":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4f5a02e9843d28c8c226ed70d44b8fced8fb757ab6ece4d4f06e3c3cec79e44f":"3ec13950d329f24074714c583bdc35686b811f775b76b0a8fcfa66fc56426c9d022f8ab0af38f8d2f71a068548330cdbe891670181ed7491bf40c739ef4dd93689fd35929b225089d2b151f83d9b3cd767300611144586767354c0491112c205409f3168092d27f9b9f433afb79820a2811984d48e70c1fb2a13bbb3ddbc53fb":"099e5d9aae89fb6391a18adf844a758e":"ad93e8662c3196e48cfdb5aa3bc923cd204151aa980cbec78f0d592b701f779c1c49f9e8686d7e2385a4146b21a643a59c18c8b82214f42560bcd686fad7c7c8e8c1944ce6b20ec9537dd14b6cf2592740ca112f4cd582250d69f240d3e957040e1f7e19c60b3c8f2bd00cb666604c38946eb9b2f17336d281b4794f71e538a2":32:"30298885":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1cdb218e0bd0e02156e5b48182990f778889793ef6018a8928e61164ac047c8e":"4d039618a0eb640329f90fe97de18bc928fc3fc7a0db42c97774bec2e882e872fc1097c8319f7837a16516bf387b1bae321c565e8fc1cb8480f051158e4685f0adba310d2c6253bc1300403cbd3f7ddcb2796a69f8bf9e73d47aada9a02673c1a3d5ecdac838abf22b385906236529a1b7dd5b8af2611a04cf4f83b15ba41cfc":"d2ffbb176f86bee958e08e5c7c6357c7":"bc580c4223f34e4f867d97febf9b03629d1c00c73df94436852cafd1408c945c5474c554cb0faf2bae35d3160c823d339a64ebd607cf765fa91f416fc6db042bc2bd7445c129b4a0e04b6f92a7b7b669eb70be9f9b2569e774db7cb7ae83943e3a12d29221356e08e5bf1b09e65f193d00d9fe89f82b84b3b8b062e649163dc8":32:"1997daa9":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dc1a145c18bdbca760f35eea0d4a5992de04a0615964ec8b419c8288ab1470f0":"":"7f8368254955e1b6d55b5c64458f3e66":"":128:"8ddaa2c3ed09d53731834fa932d9d3af":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7b4766d3a6615ee58b390daa228ae7a541c46ce80a1efe227cc43cb777df3232":"":"274367f31ec16601fe87a8e35b7a22dd":"":128:"5f3a757b596e06e9b246ed9bac9397f9":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d19b04055bf6e7ff82e89daef66c9d8319ab25f9197e559444c5729b92c4f338":"":"796efaff4f172bef78453d36a237cd36":"":128:"3b445f38bf4db94f1a9ec771173a29e8":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7ca68e300534a90a7a87ca9906e4ac614a6aa51f769b6e6129753a4f83d10317":"":"45e6b23f8b3feefd4b0ea06880b2c324":"":120:"6c0a1c9c2cf5a40407bfa1d5958612":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a2b7cd693239bbc93599d3d12c9876e7303b227b8ae718e2c62e689e1fd62903":"":"548c9c8fcc16416a9d2b35c29f0dacb3":"":120:"3aa21f221266e7773eeba4440d1d01":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"156b854beb0c276a5e724f5da72f0d1ca4ae7cbd5f93a2257d95c2e5bfd78ad4":"":"a5129e2530f47bcad42fc5774ee09fe7":"":120:"6bb09ed183527c5d5ed46f568af35f":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d824330c60141264e1f709d63227a9a731bcc42b4adec1d8f0161b10b4fdb2ab":"":"c5afaa45312c64ab3c3cf9d6c4e0cc47":"":112:"55952a01eee29d8a1734bbdf3f8f":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b5517589948d8aea778df6fd66c17a170d327f69e504f0a4bd504c4286a9f578":"":"6404b111c6289eefa0d88ed6117bb730":"":112:"637f82e592831531a8e877adfc2c":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f6137b2bcbd327fbcc7f313efa10f6ffaed30e4782e222e1225c87103fcae905":"":"3b87b08337a82272b192bd067e3245ec":"":112:"1f2dda372f20ffddd9dd4810e05f":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b5e70d1b78e931abf44bba3f937dbc344858516a8a8afe605818dc67d0c3e4c4":"":"58e70095c6f3a0cda2cdc7775e2f383d":"":104:"1763573f7dab8b46bc177e6147":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"90de0c047d1dd01d521f2dedec7eb81bc0ace7a5a693a7869eaafbb6e725ad7b":"":"d565c9cdfb5d0a25c4083b51729626bd":"":104:"78738d3e9f5e00b49635ac9a2d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c43e8dbeafb079692483a9fcbab964b76fccca6ca99e1388a1aa9bf78dfd2f02":"":"f2bd4fe0d30c0e8d429cac90c8a7b1c8":"":104:"ea7b52490943380ccc902ca5ae":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"13540919fdb95559e37b535a427efeee334309e34c4608459e204d931b8087e7":"":"c993c1802df0f075ce92963eb9bff9bd":"":96:"edfab013213591beb53e6419":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2a7b2e07c148ff0f627ae28c241a395876bbed0c20f3fd637330e986db025714":"":"8f7e1621c2227839da4ea60548290ffa":"":96:"f9da62f59c080160ec30b43d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b3e7837a75b38ae6d4299a1ae4af3c2460dfca558708de0874d6b1a5689b8360":"":"05d363b2452beff4b47afb052ac3c973":"":96:"6b4a16d1ea1c21b22bdcb235":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9df3ccd95f7570f6ecf5e5329dcb79bcd46cbcf083fe03aa8f5bd0f645c6a607":"":"774f4e70a7577b5101c0c3d019655d3e":"":64:"98ff89a8e28c03fd":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1c7123e2e8d3774c8f1bdbb2272f19129e04f29b4351ae19c3b9d24e6ea1fe87":"":"99f25cebd6cfa7f41390b42df6a65f48":"":64:"8e14a0a4853a156a":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"490090323e9257517e2453469caa3414045cacb4d05d5cebc6b9c06fa6d19291":"":"c1beff1ff6cdd62339aa21149c4da1e6":"":64:"f998d7c08d609b3a":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"360e48dd38d9e7f5bf29a2994ab5b3c9c70247102d94049ae791850807a4c845":"":"88126c350dfc079c569210ee44a0e31a":"":32:"f2ebe5e4":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1562b32e4dd843edaf4474b62cadd8f46d50461f5b22c9f1a8eae7367d35d71b":"":"af29fdb96f726c76f76c473c873b9e08":"":32:"13fd6dfd":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d5160d0c98ffcb1c26aad755f67589000e2bb25fa940e6b1d81d780f421353d9":"":"1552604763453b48a57cea1aed8113f4":"":32:"660c5175":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c3a3ea3a097c0c2b3a4cb78462d87fd5a8f348687c4150e9d3354b388ab13d17":"":"f77945979241fb3a454d8e3da193e169":"a69bac31241a2c07d3f7e331b77f662b1e67ccb81c07f52578b01f5785de9437f02eb7627ca7b9af09c1cb428fe93d6deb31f4d6dd2f0729f87480bdeb92d985de1aaad4bcebc6fbad83bede9a5dd1ca6a15bf5d8a96d4edb5bee1f7d195e9b2e5fb2221a596d69f257c18a143eda870e22d3f2ed20c9b3b0d8c8a229c462fff":128:"6b4b1a84f49befe3897d59ce85598a9f":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e1626327d987342cba5c8c63b75b4ed65463a2b9c831f4f9f80325fa867d1d73":"":"4e25800deab7ecec2a2311f8fb44eb7d":"ebaffd558f24dae03117c69ac4b2b4aaeaffe7e0e7599eaba678bfce23a9914dc9f80b69f4a1c837a5544cba08064a8f924064cba4d783623600d8b61837a08b4e0d4eb9218c29bc3edb8dd0e78c1534ab52331f949b09b25fbf73bece7054179817bc15b4e869c5df1af569c2b19cb6d060855be9a15f2cf497c168c4e683f2":128:"8faa0ffb91311a1a2827b86fec01788d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"938da64b837275b0c80c442bdf2301aa75e387fe65a775d10a8ec840f62ff429":"":"dec6adeb60216cbb8a6c3afba49fa201":"4ac144bd95f405649444f01ab67ef3e4c0a54fdbd933b6ba00518c79db45c22c90030c45aadcfdb53ec8199be0cbb22dbb9ab938a871f4b3b0c98ed32590a051abb946c42726b3e9701f183b2092985e3457943a6350fbcaece2e6b111b179ea3fd10ac080a577a1481785111d5f294bc28519c470ff94392a51a2c40a42d8b5":128:"2211ca91a809adb8cf55f001745c0563":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e2436484ea1f454d6451ad8dbd1574b208d7a3ab4fa34869299b85c24348b43d":"":"97040d2ec094fe1c64fa35b35b7451a7":"bc198677513ce0e66697dfe52b22315fa5d8f92042f34cc9f373a01f94607df1a599132f60af010ed9b5e52162dd7b162912b68b11700e08f5fdafd84d10f760fc05ec97c05b83e55155194f399594015b90a19c04fb992e228940fe1b54ba59c4bb8318b33cc0df1cb1d71c389473dfb3eefabfe269ca95db59a7bc0201c253":120:"2e080ba16011e22a779da1922345c2":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7fb3fc72eb8a3aa5b102f90039f852cc3fd64f46915f5e49f1d9e02fe9cc13b1":"":"f6120fea313362524917c53d90bafb4f":"60c2be7fbd15faf895fd19a9ce775fe2b183b45cffafe4fcbf50d421bea97347e41a9418cfa129b2dda63b889a70063010215dbe38c37feae18bc31b34f31b726f22177f2b4b9d648dd4aa80edfd12dafaee10baa83224354432d1cb62ccabe38bb8448d162cd0d30e988d2e1a2458ffdafaacbdff928756390f66dc60d7ea45":120:"83de3f521fcfdaff902386f359e683":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"697c96d80d0a3fa9af35b86f31fb71a17aed30ce841c79896bbc8863b3b3ee04":"":"3a5163ec7e007061838d755ac219855e":"de50c12da63232768d5eb9920d49683b5b7114cb77448fa10b9d63552ec5d9c2eac94b375d11f944959f903bb20c696639b6e7f108ec1e873870098c631ddacb2c25268cfc26d2a4cacfb7dda7383374c5456bcf4daa887a887f4293f8caa14419472a8bf7ffd214dfb2743091238b6d1142b116c2b9f4360c6fe0015cd7de81":120:"cd4542b26094a1c8e058648874f06f":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"66c1d9ce3feb0e966c33e3fd542ec11cc32f18c2514b953103d32abcdc72633a":"":"46fdb88fdde9b7d74e893802a0303256":"55d2f263d2e3cf0b390fce1dd1ebd5f666086f26e1ce2f08002bedbb810ada3922c6bfcf6a6adaa556e9e326c9766f02b3eb6e278da2fa3baa7dbdb6373be3c6ecfbe646b1a39e27c5a449db9b559e7ea3496366b8cdbca00ee7a3dea7fdfbea1665bbf58bd69bb961c33a0fd7d37b580b6a82804f394f9d5d4366772cee3115":112:"96ca402b16b0f2cd0cdff77935d3":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d7c949420dc9497232cd5810f316d11f9e85d36c430b5943ba79836d88c1eb92":"":"7ef9788ff09cbeedd9569d49083a4097":"ca1de5cc3fcde2638eb72210e551e9c0e0a3f5570d5be83a9a4406b545d854bf17e75b9cd0f4c45722fbd71319a317b72a8798485e9316a1c8102432b83bc95af42f6d50700ba68f6f2e19b6af609b73ad643dfa43da94be32cc09b024e087c120e4d2c20f96f8e9ddfe7eae186a540a22131cedfe556d1ebd9306684e345fd1":112:"8233588fca3ad1698d07b25fa3c4":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6fe7c70815aa12326cdcbb2d2d3e088bbaaef98b730f87fe8510b33d30e12afe":"":"e0253bd1f19e99a7f8848206fb8ac4a4":"397897eca4856f90d14c3cdfe1ad3cba47e23174ae2dab7d2a6320898584e03bffa3ffd526f416d7b3c579b0f3628744e36eebb5df519240c81d8bbbf5c5966519c5da083ab30a7aa42deae6180e517cdd764b7f77d19cc1a84141817758887a8d7265e7e62279b9d33cd2f1ba10fd54c6c96d4b8a5dbe2318fef629c8e2af0f":112:"477b0a884d788d1905646bd66084":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"cbeefb3817cb02d617f385cf2371d52c8bcbc29e5e7a55cd2da131ca184c6e89":"":"f74156d6400ae46b612531848bffe18f":"1abe2ab05ceccf2391273126fe4a4426b94d2c3b97a7f1cd2ee6bb952bf4a546e972b5a1701d5ddb0e5bb7a248fcb47107a9fc77e4b9806b68a11850119aa239fa8be1370e3a2e1a8b168f7323afdfc4b8917d92570167848a56132d68876abc386c258a9233dc8a9eb73443b052e842c3d63e8b5369acdd038404e4e9a4b038":104:"0cb67cec1820339fa0552702dd":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"e6f5f65ce2fc8ec3f602f5df90eb7d506dd771337913680ac16bdcd15c56583d":"":"9212a548c597677d1747e98ce6fb18a4":"55ca486c0183d0134925880d2e21dde0af51c4c77c6038a5a9c0497884e0aa4715bdb5b4bb864acc708ac00b511a24fa08496df6a0ca83259110e97a011b876e748a1d0eae2951ce7c22661a3e2ecf50633c50e3d26fa33c2319c139b288825b7aa5efbd133a5ce7483feecb11167099565e3131d5f0cb360f2174f46cb6b37c":104:"08d7cc52d1637db2a43c399310":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0e9a0391435acb57eae2e6217e0941c79a3ff938ec6a19b8a7db2ea972e49f54":"":"27cd1d7af7e491e30c8110cc01392529":"79140d32bb32dace0779e2d37a0f744d6d973e99a279962b43a6c0af63772e8a0a21d5d9dd3c33d4b218cb2f6f24dd8d93bb4e1e6a788cb93135321ecfed455e747fa919b85b63b9e98b4980a8ccb3b19d50d735742cb5853720c2ad37fa5b0e655149583585830f8d799c0d2e67c0dc24fc9273d9730f3bb367c487a5f89a25":104:"fbb477dd4b9898a9abc5a45c63":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"55a12eeca637654252e3e40b371667e3f308b00f2fd2af696223e4cd89e3fd4e":"":"8a3793b6441258360f7f4801b03d0b26":"f5810dc5f25e49bd6d94bc63c2494aa7a579a4056a25f1dd9b2734d0b8731ee52523edd54ff475651d45c213e1bf254327fb0e2c41a7d85345b02bcc9d27b08915d332e1659671991a4bb74055967bebbba6ecceb182f57977130623d5a7b2175fa5a84b334868661c1f450b95562928b4791759796a177d59ed18bbf141e2ad":96:"99230019630647aedebbb24b":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3d353f870a9c088de5674efd97646b9c5420b2bcdfcffefcadd81682847e5331":"":"f267fa982af5c85359b6447f9b7715ea":"7cf55630867af5dff747c8dd25bcc531d94a7730a20b6c03d46059ea93fcaa00d07ee17dad0e0dff814b02dfef0cbe00b37fd2f5f95ead7c72be60016f2934d7683fc1e47185c7211c49cb03e209b088edb14e533dbcb792ab7033728904f7ff12381a236dba97894ec1fafcf853ab15fff343f9265d0283acef10168ffd1271":96:"9553b583d4f9a1a8946fe053":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d227c9ff5d17a984983056fb96f3991932ae8132377529c29238cf7db94a359d":"":"b8f6536f376a7efe0e684acf350bae70":"1cc25da31f90de7fa47ebce92754d3faa99f88d4e25ccab45645c1acdf850d55d7f02f61a0bfdc3125f29259d7da8abef532fe0966c63d3486753c8a2cb63a39349a0641b2f2b9526a03b97d58ca60fbb054c6c164ff2836688b0cad54df2b165bc082eeae660e768dde5130e30f8edc863446661c74da69b9e56de8ae388da0":96:"44b95a37fab232c2efb11231":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b2a57ef85ffcf0548c3d087012b336c46f6574cf1d97ca087bfad042ee83eec2":"":"3d580402d2a8dc4d7466e5dcb456be7a":"c2b9e95c16e55028794a63ef82d11fb83a2a75dc34a81f238e472c33264534bdd54cd07d02a0ecf9019ad1a6d6c779f339dd479e37940486950f183bade24fca2f24f06d4037b3555b09fc80279ea311769473eb0630b694a29823324cdf780d7d1a50d89f7a23b05f7a8c3ad04b7949aa9e6a55978ba48d8078b5a2fd3c1bbb":64:"072d4118e70cd5ab":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"63889ed5bf2c27d518a696b71c0f85592e3337aae95b5bf07289e4c5dfdc088d":"":"1ad534280a0fac7dce31f2ae4fb73f5a":"be1b9dabea33bb9443e27f674b27931c0fba699a33dc86fab29e50b76a9441030444b465317bbf2949faf908bc1b501d11a5ea2042e4b460a85f3be5836729e523d99b56ef39231d5c6d8ae2c2ab36ef44e2aa02a1f2c559c6e333216c7f9ed5f9b880a88e920219204c99a3ae8f90afd1396563bc59a691a93e0070b0b5fd90":64:"1bcea0ac2c1a0c73":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"94e3e2c17cfb6f52d4fdba3ba6d18bba891b6662e85df14d7e61f04adb69e0e5":"":"8a80efb3bfe220526997543409fddb4d":"05da1b0f7ac6eef488d3f087ecae7f35abe3ef36d339709dc3fcb5b471979268ee894c3b6c7f984300d70bc5ea5fba923bfb41d88652bdaecc710964c51f3e2ae2c280b7d6c8e3b9a8a8991d19d92d46c8a158123187f19397ad1ad9080b4ffd04b82b5d68d89dacd3e76439013728c1395263e722b28e45dabf1ef46b8e70b5":64:"faa5c13d899f17ea":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fe5e479ad0d79dbf717a1f51f5250d467819e444b79cb3def1e0033c80ddadd8":"":"47ce838083fd070d8544c0ad5337cdc6":"98476bf05a18c4ff1b6024dd779c1ac06d838705a0a83fe42bee5fc6ebf3b2a1a5049b67f4aabc8239cd6ff56504bcbad1e2498c159bbec2a6635933945f6ea49e5bc763dcf94f4b3643d3888f16105abb0965e24f51cb4949406124145e9ae31cc76535b4178492f38b311099df2751f674363ae7a58f6f93019653b7e6a6f0":32:"a3958500":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"27d4dedb71a8f68ca5ce2b9e56da772bf5a09b7981d41cd29f485bd2d1adb8d4":"":"7e6f0343c54539717a97b6c8b9f7dec4":"d386db78043f719b7e137cbf79a7f53dda2fe3baccbebb57d499f6eb168e5151f10081d76b72ae0f30165efbdda469e826f9246e59dbcad5c0b27691c00d6c192c24073e99c19cf8c142087c0b83c4ce2fc7ba1e696394e5620ab2d117d5dcd2ac2298997407fd5de07d008de8f9941a4a5f8074736a59404118afac0700be6c":32:"50fd1798":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"5a7aa836a469d28542d0d24d3232fad266da8fc889c6b6038b726d3da25f7b20":"":"9faf7cd805803e143ec8f3f13475efd2":"1006c707f608728b2bf64734062b12a5625062bcdcb80a3ce2058352a2922d5e6fbe19681b4f0d79ad3c837f81e72f2fbf8df669894e802a39072b26c286f4b05188c708f7c6edd5f5bb90b87ffa95b86d84d6c1c4591b11d22c772a8ad7f2fe6bd8b46be0e93672df2e8bff8ba80629e1846cfd4603e75f2d98874665c1a089":32:"07764143":"":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a9444fd176acbe061d0221fde3ddfcc4ff74e995d981a831297c4cbda51c22a1":"c146ff5a988496cad7eced7a2ea471e0117d5d6bd2562c23ce9db4bf36d83ba3fc22e90486ec288a627d208e0b2fd3b65f8301cf7fc41d97959981a95cd1cf37effc46db99b94b21c941c3613c26a10b1a6b7793f467d58ff5134612230f1c49d7e1fcf664fe52fc6eca46273982f6fe729b009d90eb8d8e4a0b0dbe907b76da":"5714732145470da1c42452e10cd274b5":"":128:"db85b830a03357f408587410ebafd10d":"":"a3cad9a57fa28e6f6aaa37150a803bf8b77e765f0702e492c4e5ebb31ae6b12d791149153e469a92bb625784a699fd7ca517500ee3f2851840ba67063b28b481e24ba441314e8b7128f5aaccaf4c4e2c92258eb27310bf031422b7fc2f220f621d4c64837c9377222aced2411628018a409a744902c9e95c14b77d5bb7f5846b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,0,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b56f0c980acf7875cf7f27d53ad4a276adc126d0b93a5774ac4277eecad4309e":"2c94299e36b7c4a825ecbc5a7809061e0a6761764a5a655ffdb0c20e5c3fcb10f4e93c68aa0a38c2acc5d06f2b7c4ff4fcf814b551bfefa248dbe06a09a0f153213538a31fa7cf7d646b5b53908d8978f514c9c4d6d66f2b3738024b5f9c3fd86b6da0c818203183f4205f186ea44a54edb911b1a17c424c95852c8d271b2e93":"b004c049decfb43d6f3ec13c56f839ef":"b2045b97fbb52a5fc6ff03d74e59dd696f3f442c0b555add8e6d111f835df420f45e970c4b32a84f0c45ba3710b5cd574001862b073efa5c9c4bd50127b2ce72d2c736c5e2723956da5a0acb82041a609386d07b50551c1d1fa4678886bac54b0bd080cc5ef607dca2a0d6a1e71f0e3833678bf8560bc059dae370ec94d43af6":128:"fce7234f7f76b5d502fd2b96fc9b1ce7":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"34c3019810d72b5e584f0758f2f5888a42729a33610aafa9824badade4136bbd":"22deef66cbb7db240c399b6c83407f090d6999ba25e560b2087fed0467904bb5c40cbaa05b8bf0ff5a77c53fa229478d8e0736414daf9c420417c391c9a523fd85954533f1304d81359bdcc2c4ac90d9f5f8a67a517d7f05ba0409b718159baf11cd9154e815d5745179beb59954a45a8676a375d5af7fae4d0da05c4ea91a13":"f315ea36c17fc57dab3a2737d687cd4f":"f33c5a3a9e546ad5b35e4febf2ae557ca767b55d93bb3c1cf62d862d112dbd26f8fe2a3f54d347c1bc30029e55118bab2662b99b984b8b8e2d76831f94e48587de2709e32f16c26695f07e654b703eba6428f30070e23ed40b61d04dd1430e33c629117d945d9c0e4d36c79a8b8ab555d85083a898e7e7fbeb64a45cc3511d99":120:"0bae9403888efb4d8ec97df604cd5d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6ad06c88dd4f3becf35eed95bb859be2406a1803a66e4332a74c5f75c09b9a01":"2219c11672884b93d0290b6a7140feafe416461f1cdaf0b3aa64693d7db2eb10feae46aac7af549fa1b0abc78c11f8df7ee803ef70310fc3e67769f8b4bc64f81143a6ebf8bee9d386a8ede5d2cc0ed17985a3b7bb95191ef55e684690ccdc5ca504bc6eb28442b353861a034a43532c025f666e80be967a6b05b9dd3a91ff58":"07d8b4a6e77aef9018828b61e0fdf2a4":"cca1fd0278045dda80b847f0975b6cbf31e1910d2c99b4eb78c360d89133a1c52e66c5c3801824afc1f079d2b2b1c827199e83f680e59b9a7de9b15fa7b6848b5bf4e16a12ac1af4cf2b4d7bb45673c5e1241e9996440860a9204fc27cae46a991607bc5e7120d6c115ddcbdd02c022b262602139081e61eee4aba7193f13992":112:"e3ede170386e76321a575c095966":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,1024,1024,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"086b77b5731f971f0bf5b8227361b216746daf8b08c583ad38f114a64aa7877b":"629317212ff8bd8a7676e4c00b81a9577de6397c832f99ac974fa2bbbccb6e3b8aa776db6922eed0b014bf3923799da7d9d0854c8817470e1e2f7fc7a572f9d0316ee60cde7ef025d59b897d29a6fee721aeb2f7bb44f9afb471e8a7b0b43a39b5497a3b4d6beb4b511f0cefa12ce5e6d843609d3e06999acfbee50a22ca1eee":"164058e5e425f9da40d22c9098a16204":"6633eae08a1df85f2d36e162f2d7ddd92b0c56b7477f3c6cdb9919d0e4b1e54ea7635c202dcf52d1c688afbbb15552adda32b4cd30aa462b367f02ded02e0d64eeee2a6b95462b191784143c25607fd08a23a2fbc75cf6bee294daf2042587fdd8fe3d22c3a242c624cf0a51a7c14db4f0f766ec437de4c83b64f23706a24437":104:"2eb6eb6d516ed4cf1778b4e378":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"0f9e806b0d937268561c0eafbbdd14ec715b7e9cef4118d6eb28abbb91266745":"2ae4baef22ace26f464a9b0c75802303f2d7c0f9a1ed1d0180135189765bdd347fea0cc2b73ee7fbbf95ea1fda22597b8aad826f63e744069a9c349488b2cc1cf9372f423cc650302082125724730ae5a4d878e07385ddc99034c6b6b46748f02c80b179fe6406b1d33581950cb9bcd1d1ea1ec7b5becfd6c1f5b279412c433a":"8657996634e74d4689f292645f103a2e":"2ca253355e893e58cb1a900fbb62d61595de5c4186dc8a9129da3657a92b4a631bbdc3d5f86395385a9aa8557b67f886e3bb807620e558c93aea8e65826eadeb21544418ee40f5420c2d2b8270491be6fc2dcbfd12847fa350910dd615e9a1881bc2ced3b0ac3bde445b735e43c0c84f9d120ca5edd655779fc13c6f88b484f7":104:"83155ebb1a42112dd1c474f37b":"":"87d69fc3cbc757b2b57b180c6ba34db4e20dde19976bfb3d274d32e7cea13f0c7d9e840d59ce857718c985763b7639e448516ddbbda559457cd8cb364fa99addd5ba44ef45c11060d9be82b4ebe1f0711ac95433074649b6c08eeab539fdfc99c77498b420427e4d70e316111845793de1f67fb0d04e3389a8862f46f4582dc8":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c24c17911f6db4b3e37c46bcc6fa35efc1a55f7754f0bb99f2eea93398116447":"0bd92cb106867e25ad427ff6e5f384d2d0f432fc389852187fcc7b0bf9f6d11a102a872b99ed1ad9a05dab0f79fa634745535efed804ff42b0af8dad20ba44709391fb263f245e5a2c52d9ce904179633282f57a1229b0a9c4557a5c0aeda29bbc5a7a871fa8b62d58100c3722c21e51e3b3e913185235526e7a5a91c559717d":"5098cc52a69ee044197e2c000c2d4ab8":"9ad4dee311d854925fc7f10eca4f5dd4e6990cb2d4325da2ef25a9a23690f5c5590be285d33aaeba76506c59edec64b8c3ff8e62716d1c385fbce2a42bc7bd5d8e8584de1944543ab6f340c20911f8b7b3be1a1db18a4bb94119333339de95815cae09365b016edc184e11f3c5b851f1fa92b1b63cfa3872a127109c1294b677":96:"f7930e3fab74a91cb6543e72":"":"6124ede608d416baa5e653a898ca76e9f47f08403c1984feec112e670ded2226e0073f8881ab2161cfda541dccae19691285f7391a729f07aba18f340bb452c1da39cbe83cf476cfc105b64187e0d2227dd283dcba8b6a350f9956b18861fa131d3f00c034443e8f60e0fdfcfaabbed93381ae374a8bf66523d33646183e1379":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d267a8379260036ff3d1ec07a7b086ff75706bad12d37d9656f04776f3d8b85c":"80c68a330ef50e3e516681f1e535868b03466e7edbb86cb385d01db487da3dd3edad940fdc98d918b7db9b59f8d61369eee2928c88557306c4a13e366af0708d94cb90a15f1c3bc45544bdb05ff964da5e06c5ae965f20adb504620aed7bce2e82f4e408d00219c15ef85fae1ff13fea53deb78afa5f2a50edbd622446e4a894":"674dc34e8c74c51fa42aacd625a1bd5b":"6a9a8af732ae96d0b5a9730ad792e296150d59770a20a3fdbbc2a3a035a88ac445d64f37d684e22003c214b771c1995719da72f3ed24a96618284dd414f0cac364640b23c680dc80492a435c8ec10add53b0d9e3374f1cf5bfc663e3528fa2f6209846421ea6f481b7ecf57714f7bc2527edc4e0466b13e750dd4d4c0cc0cdfc":96:"bea660e963b08fc657741bc8":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c86cb637753010f639fa3aa3bff7c28b74f012ad6090f2a31b0801d086f183ad":"6b7858557e0fd0f957842fb30e8d54dedbc127eb4bbf9de319f731fa28a606df2c046a0bce8ecda4e75d3596e4e988efd6bc279aa005bc52fad92ba07f5b1dfda4cc417029f9778c88d6fe5341a0fd48893dcb7c68d0df310a060f2a5235aee422d380f7209bc0909b2aa7e876044056f0b915dab0bc13cbea5a3b86d40ca802":"87ff6e0bb313502fedf3d2696bff99b5":"2816f1132724f42e40deabab25e325b282f8c615a79e0c98c00d488ee56237537240234966565e46bfb0c50f2b10366d1589620e6e78bd90ade24d38a272f3fff53c09466aa2d3ef793d7f814a064b713821850a6e6a058f5139a1088347a9fa0f54e38abd51ddfc7ef040bf41d188f3f86c973551ced019812c1fc668649621":96:"7859f047f32b51833333accf":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2c31ca0cac3efe467168198f06beacf39565a6f57f82e1048a5c06a231315882":"65261d6e29b2369b1828a7cef2df9873d6e6057c499301afedd6cb65b5036ddb95f9e353fbf38e54c4f46f88164325b33620ce183beb2e411fbb89a0e0002e542fc161cad32a61ee6f1e1717e0b4dcd0340b116f795bc1009dbbc65bc31c9b549bf03c40bc204cd0d02ec884be907777ebeed8b527ec3af7cbb508193c0745de":"95cae6e85f33f3043182460589be3639":"67523751a9b1b643d00de4511b55e4268cb2d18e79e01a55fc7b677d529bd6400940fb25ea6ae135c1a816e61b69e90b966981aeda685934b107066e1467db78973492ad791e20aef430db3a047447141def8be6e6a9a15089607c3af9368cdb11b7b5fbf90691505d0c33664766945d387904e7089b915a3c28886ba1763bb5":64:"21309d0351cac45e":"":"1d5f2cb921f54aeb552b4304142facd49497837deb1f00d26fbeddbab922fd80b00dba782961f8fce84f1f7973e81eed6ee168b1760c575c891f40a1dae0fa1a08738025d13ef6e0b30be4f054d874f1b8a2427a19ebb071d98365c32316a88a68c2b40daf1ea831a64519ac3679acb4e04986ecc614ec673c498c6fee459e40":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ca9fa36ca2159dff9723f6cfdb13280446eb6bc3688043c7e2e2504184791596":"ac04c4293554cd832aa400c811cb202d815d6178aa1343b4628592b7f3ae45dc5f12ea47be4b43e1865f40b06ab67b3a9fb3644248a9b3efe131a8addb7447978bb51ccf749e75574fea60e8781677200af023b2f8c415f4e6d8c575a9e374916d9ec3a612b16e37beb589444b588e0b770d9f8e818ad83f83aa4ecf386d17a7":"d13ca73365e57114fc698ee60ba0ad84":"2aa510b7f1620bfce90080e0e25f5468dbc5314b50914e793b5278369c51ac017eace9fd15127fca5a726ad9e67bdee5af298988d9a57ec4bbc43d4eb849535eb10521ac7cd7ed647479a42876af2ebc9e2108b539febdaa9127c49bda1bda800f6034050b8576e944311dfbca59d64d259571b6d2ed5b2fc07127239b03f4b7":64:"2111d55d96a4d84d":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2f802e838250064c15fdee28d7bd4872850355870847701ad9742b2d6eb4b0c0":"e2ca8c8d172ff90232879f510d1225af91bc323bdf636363c2903fcd1790692c8bcb03a1cccb18814678852c6b3a441552e541b843ee5e4f86a152fa73d05aea659fe08aa6428bb257eaa2a7b579fdc4022c1dec359a854253c1aefc983c5ede8c97517ea69fc4606e25f13ffb0f5f49160691454fbb74e704326738353525f7":"2dd550cfd97f8e1d8d31ba5537ae4710":"72b9630dda40306e785b961934c56e20948f8eac0e981f49787eb3dbd6e4607f7d08d10ca643746bf1efa7e5066993683d527a90f2d45ec9cf73113f1f17bb67958be669acd4e2927f1dacfde902cd3048056d7f6dfdd8630ff054efce4526db7c9321d6d2be2236f4d60e27b89d8ec94f65a06dc0953c8c4533a51b6a29bd2c":64:"bd6c8823c9005c85":"":"f6dd0b5f3d1a393a1837112962dba175a13c2d1e525ef95734caf34949d8b2d63b4fe5603226b5f632f2d7f927361ba639dc0e3c63414f45462342695916d5792133b4a24c7c4cbe2b97c712bf27ab62d3d68b3875d58ffe4b7c30a8171bff1a9e2f3995768faacda2ea9213ff35798b9e4513f6a87bd3f5a9d93e847e768359":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"84dd53ce0146cb71c32776033bb243098d78a22ac17f52a62a122f5653fb4e33":"68222bffa782dcfe4f328fc20eb520e75a9a5fedbe13ec7fcf0e82fba08bb87a8a8e02902638e32fe0e2294344b380797f8028426ffcc0531c739c884892394c48ff0779c5f5edf0a36a3fb8aa91213347774ec4bf0fe1049bd53746b13beef3c637169826c367056cb1aa0a3868e23f886a9c7b8015c26af9e40794662f6b21":"f0c90a1bca52f30fab3670df0d3beab0":"a3ea8032f36a5ca3d7a1088fd08ac50ae6bdc06ad3a534b773ac3e3d4a3d524499e56274a0062c58c3b0685cc850f4725e5c221af8f51c6df2bbd5fbcff4a93ba4c1054f7f9c67fd9285511a08d328d76a642f067227d378f95a1e67587b90251f9103ed3cacdb6bf69e0794e366d8b92d8de37b4e028de0778841f356ac044d":32:"b1ece9fb":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9bb36fe25e966a075ae2c3bb43b5877679ebc379d5123c8eda3fa0e30b95cae0":"fb3a4be643c10343251c6f0745aaa54349463f622ca04a792e9b4780866844b30aeef3269fc60cac0ea031c5f3780b535e15154f7c76eb4a371b8ae368550f3fa2ce693c34511ec96b839cac567f1b0de0e7e3116d729b45d1b16e453703a43db73f5d0c3e430f16b142420b5f0d26d72ac3dba543d7d813603b0bfdca3dd63e":"59869df4ef5754b406478a2fb608ee99":"ecd125682e8a8e26757c888b0c8b95dec5e7ed7ac991768f93e8af5bcf6f21ed4d4d38699ee7984ed13635fff72f938150157c9a27fcda121ffced7b492d2b18dad299cb6495ed5f68441aefc8219d2cf717d15d5cd2dbce4606fcf90fe45f3601127cf6acee210bd7df97309f773974a35bef1d33df984101c2fc9d4b55259e":32:"cb3f5338":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ca264e7caecad56ee31c8bf8dde9592f753a6299e76c60ac1e93cff3b3de8ce9":"8d03cf6fac31182ad3e6f32e4c823e3b421aef786d5651afafbf70ef14c00524ab814bc421b1d4181b4d3d82d6ae4e8032e43a6c4e0691184425b37320798f865c88b9b306466311d79e3e42076837474c37c9f6336ed777f05f70b0c7d72bd4348a4cd754d0f0c3e4587f9a18313ea2d2bace502a24ea417d3041b709a0471f":"4763a4e37b806a5f4510f69fd8c63571":"07daeba37a66ebe15f3d6451d1176f3a7107a302da6966680c425377e621fd71610d1fc9c95122da5bf85f83b24c4b783b1dcd6b508d41e22c09b5c43693d072869601fc7e3f5a51dbd3bc6508e8d095b9130fb6a7f2a043f3a432e7ce68b7de06c1379e6bab5a1a48823b76762051b4e707ddc3201eb36456e3862425cb011a":32:"3105dddb":"FAIL":"":0 + +AES-GCM Bad IV (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_bad_parameters:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT:"ca264e7caecad56ee31c8bf8dde9592f753a6299e76c60ac1e93cff3b3de8ce9":"":"":"":32:MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT + +AES-GCM Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes256_en.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes256_en.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..761a914b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.aes256_en.data @@ -0,0 +1,679 @@ +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"fb8094dd2eddb3d8004bb79134023ca2be4de9b668a9e4608abdf2130e8becb8":"":"491a14e13b591cf2f39da96b6882b5e5":"":"":128:"80883f2c925434a5edfcefd5b123d520":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"725313f4cb3f6a0d29cefc174b7e4f43cef11b761ef75e1995cb64c1306795f1":"":"27d1ed08aba23d79fc49ad8d92a2a0ea":"":"":128:"d5d6637ba35ef2ad88e9725f938d3d2d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4e766584ce0e885e1bba1327e5335796de0831a40f74a5cec178081dd15bfd10":"":"cece0dea024ff47851af0500d146cbfe":"":"":128:"1abe16eeab56bd0fb1ab909b8d528771":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ce7f2207f83a952451e714ba3807ddb3ed67c2739a628980411aa68366b1f2f5":"":"652fd951ace288db397020687135a5d1":"":"":120:"985227b14de16722987a3d34976442":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"855f8fa4ec6a1206173509d504d0b29dfbfbfa9aa528254b189cd72e6ebc1c1f":"":"1ad1507e6463e4e2e1a63155ac0e638f":"":"":120:"693146a8b833f324c1d4cbeeb8c146":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ef8dd1294a85dd39e366f65e1076d53e046188c06c96b2c9e84ebc81f5c9f550":"":"9698a07447552d1a4ecd2b4c47858f06":"":"":120:"b00590cac6e398eeb3dcb98abe1912":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"25896e587570ff1823639e1e51e9c89192d551b573dd747e7c0c1c10916ece4c":"":"f0516457c09c372c358064eb6b470146":"":"":112:"5a7cadec600a180e696d946425b0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"02fc9cfffbe72e7954182993088e09d24ea8cad91a8ca9a336d9f1fe4156486d":"":"0e189e162e097eb2060b30c46d9afa70":"":"":112:"7d3d5cc55e6182ec5413ef622d4f":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f24e3d631d8961d3d4b9912d4fa7a317db837a7b81cd52f90c703a4835c632e2":"":"510740bfa2562ce99ca3839229145a46":"":"":112:"1402ddc1854e5adb33664be85ad1":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"720ab5aceb80ff1f864379add9b0d63607227f7c3f58425dd6ec3d4cea3fe2ea":"":"58f2317afb64d894243c192ef5191300":"":"":104:"e8e772402cc6bfd96a140b24c1":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f57dd16fa92a8f8c09d8f13cb5b6633a43b8762e90c670232f55949cdfdf700c":"":"3b7c14ee357b3c6b0dc09e3209ab69f2":"":"":104:"43e609664e48ad1f5478087f24":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"87c17ab919a4bc0d50343c0bb282a969283c2ada25f9a96d2858c7f89bc5139a":"":"02813d3faf30d3e186d119e89fe36574":"":"":104:"d1a1f82a8462c783b15c92b57e":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dd8d5b6c5c938c905c17eab9f5ab7cd68d27f3f09d75177119010d070b91e646":"":"1df1c3ad363c973bffe29975574ffdf6":"":"":96:"749ac7ffda825fc973475b83":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4d60a14cb789099c77b8991e7b0b40f787d3458f448501e8108e4d76110f94ef":"":"ca6b3485eb5dcd9dbfa7cffcdb22daa5":"":"":96:"3f868b6510d64098adc1d640":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"405b690717de993ad945d80159c2800848060de0b7d2b277efd0350a99ba609a":"":"63730acb957869f0c091f22d964cc6a3":"":"":96:"739688362337d61dab2591f0":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ab5563a387e72d7d10468c99df590e1de25ec10363aa90d1448a9ffcd1de6867":"":"c511406701bad20a2fa29b1e76924d2f":"":"":64:"390291ed142ba760":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"abef7c24daaa21f308a5af03df936ba3f70aa525190af0d959d6e50d836f4624":"":"e9f15950130b9524e2b09f77be39109a":"":"":64:"db2fb2b004bc8dc4":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"6ca630b0b6779a8de7a19e5279eac94bf29f76f8b0cf8ecf8f11c4f8eb04aa0d":"":"7373befc2c8007f42eef47be1086842f":"":"":64:"e2b8620bcc7472a8":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,128) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8e888721514fd01fb67513cb56bfd29af67a9ce525e3e697af47450f02053161":"":"9f6bd4a93e4f3f2f5f4a7c2c5b4790bf":"867d50923967535ce6f00395930083523c22f373cfb6c8817764f5623cd60b555572404e54f2fe7083ef32b9a4593a1f70a736d6e8fe61b77def51f3b1d8f679d3a8d50d0aad49e51ec1eb4d4a25f13d14f3e5253555c73eac759e484c6131cc868b46c18b26acd040c3e1cb27afecba7b7fc3f5ff4883f4eafc26c7f3084751":"":128:"ea269094330b6926627889fcdb06aab4":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"398bb37bb991898c7dad7bf5930dbad20d121f68d5ec6c56ffe66f23c0c37f8e":"":"0c3bd55b54c1221b0cf25d88ea4dfe24":"4c48b929f31180e697ea6199cd96c47cecc95c9ed4c442d6a23ca3a23d4b4833601ac4bbcdbc333cd1b3a0cd90338e1c88ef8561fed7ad0f4f54120b76281958995c95e4c9daabff75d71e2d5770420211c341c6b062b6c8b31b8fe8990588fbad1e651a49b0badd9a8d8042206337a1f2aa980b3ba3b5ee8e3396a2b9150a34":"":120:"8528950bd5371681a78176ae1ea5dc":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9143f00e31c72bd9fced31585d047f67f1004e6244c3d9c10c8ae005feeabc84":"":"e49cd6af9a2f0da2a7198317da92ab2f":"ab9193a155140d265aabfe2dd5efca7d3fa6129498532bccd77f09fa1a480702620b3ab53df91b01262122f1a6fc387b5fc55dadfcdb99ada83d4a5b0666c8526de309f41eb54d69b52595c43550a6bf7b4b8f0e0c48311b521762eaa567744c4c4704dd977f84068b59db98a67e33cc65302ba59360d600a22138c5ad3317f3":"":112:"8293e361fe0308a067f89aea393f":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a86ec688222c50c07274ed2d2c8ae6f883e25f8f95d404a7538fd83224199327":"":"99c73fdb8f97f225f7a17cf79c011112":"cf5f707de0357262c0997fa3ebfe6e07192df8db5f029e418989e85e6b71e186b00c612ecedbfe3c847e58081847f39697337ae7c815d2cd0263986d06bf3a5d2db4e986dbe69071fd4b80a580f5a2cf734fc56c6d70202ea3494f67539797252d87cd7646296932959c99797a0446532f264d3089dd5f4bcceaaa7289a54380":"":104:"c2093ad4705e613b09eee74057":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"ce6b846bcedc6ae747e66e72cd9f7664e6cad9627ba5f1f1923f3d3a6ed590d1":"":"ac865ff8a6255e501b347a6650510d05":"1658b9f8469af1dfa60458cf8107db1edd1e4bba70a0bd23e13e1bba0d397abf51af8348f983fcdfcc8315ef1ffc9a26371377c62ddba08363bd2bf0ff7d0c3b603fad10be24ecee97b36d2255a8b2efc63f037123cef4bb4fe384aa0c58548b2f317c36ef3ef204b24769de6ba3e9d89e159e2bf1f9d79aeb3eb80c42eb255e":"":96:"7ee87acd138c558455fff063":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,64) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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(AES-256,128,0,1024,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3b5d3b1920b5a105b148153ae1f1027c6d48bc99640ea853f5955fed4eb3d625":"":"9a4091c2eb7e88759bd9169fee303485":"aa680d07143ba49a9099d555105fc3cfcb898cec11ade96776dc9778cc50fe972e1e83c52c837b71e27f81d1577f9bd09afe2260dfd9a5d9dfbd3b8b09a346a2ab48647f5dd2ff43700aecce7fa6f4aeea6ea01b2463c4e82ec116e4d92b309c5879fb4e2ca820d0183a2057ae4ad96f38a7d50643a835511aedd0442b290be3":"":64:"033bfee6b228d59b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,32) #0 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"461566cac74f9220df97c1ab2f8bb74189a634bc752f7f04526923d30506949c":"":"546d821e437371061cf3207f3d866c15":"":"":128:"44193072791c435d6e8ea7756a0bd7bf":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7736dbb38f1fe351a7fa101d91da62124c22ac02ee06b9413f56691067572f73":"":"5f01779e5e4471cd95a591f08445eb5b":"":"":128:"1a1f08c8f40b93e7b5a63008dff54777":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,128) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"eedcae924105c86190032650e2d66cf6927dd314de96a339db48e2081d19ad4a":"":"a39d400ee763a22d2a97c1983a8a06a6":"":"":128:"3b4294d34352743c4b48c40794047bea":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"714df4b69dc00067c4ab550f37ff72358b0a905dea2c01f00be28cec130313c2":"":"c46d63d6fead2cee03bd033fbc2e6478":"":"":120:"2a0271b0666889d2d0b34e82bf17d8":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"454021ece9a87a9543a1626820d39edd1eff3dca38a287d8fb68bd315a7a2677":"":"51de54b633a7c9f3b7b2c1e4b47d26a4":"":"":120:"114708102a434e3a30088b5944c272":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"d7e90b539c99e8c2187ed72823258c1149890a69a9c0081ff8c66e1cdea9f2f6":"":"6dba3273560f30f118a2e0251f7b7d76":"":"":120:"5f45e00181cd2d7feb4723e0cdca24":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2948233eec9bf8adf7250b20d62df9219d30e314c5932383203805ff9f3dc5cf":"":"d6b8e723272e26922b78756d66e03432":"":"":112:"14c9a9a217a33d4c0b8e627641fe":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"c73fb5e732ebc1dc7c91ac25de0d01d427de12baf05ff251c04d3290d77c34d1":"":"c31220835b11d61920ae2c91e335907e":"":"":112:"9eb18097d3e6b6b7d5e161ae4e96":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,112) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"a46aff2121825814c603b258f71d47bd9c9d3db4c6fe0f900e0e99d36c8f8d66":"":"7cb5550a20d958490739be8a5c72440f":"":"":112:"8c76eebda0f1fd57f05a62c5f93d":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"61a612c76de551f794a146962d913f60fbd4431365b711217aaa4beaa115f726":"":"2d25462c90ad9a21073729e5efc99957":"":"":104:"e4d3b277dc9a107c0392ca1e5b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"4b233480239fabd2035a7c9207a8e1ab2da45a90a472b30848fe4b4757c628db":"":"50d45096afd0571e171e1ab1ffb3720f":"":"":104:"5393bc06b8c5ecef1264fd6084":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,104) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"dc051ac63e6b051594158399291ed101a3efbb1701b98819c4835a4863734371":"":"1f304d4d7f84ab560366215649b0a064":"":"":104:"1081dda9e0a793916dc82f7848":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"75f76df772af8e3019a4c1588a7d59925f80ce0d5647030f29548374e7bcc9e8":"":"d407264e09fbc853b131c8a9f808f1de":"":"":96:"d515522db52bb872a4d3f9d1":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"608d7592c094322b31d4583a430986bdf6aa639cc4b4a0b3903e588b45c38d38":"":"6a631952e4990ae6bdd51052eb407168":"":"":96:"eb8851cfdd4fc841173c4985":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,96) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"86a90631e5341e67dfa55e68b07522507b437fbab7f3e2e26cfc6e89ef9d2410":"":"67763ee1890e4bb430ac3c0dbc2af997":"":"":96:"c6d11901b53cf6b13ac03cc5":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b8d12783ba2548b499ea56e77491d2794057e05fd7af7da597241d91d832b33a":"":"0365436099fe57b4c027c7e58182e0b9":"":"":64:"41fc42d8c9999d8c":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"eb17c1bbcd356070ca58fc3899bb3751eea5b9f3663c8e51d32c1fc3060b7ac2":"":"aca76b23575d4ec1a52a3d7214a4da2f":"":"":64:"fbcfd13a2126b2af":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"916aea7c3283aadb60908ec747bcf82364c1827ec29bedcbadacbb9b935221c1":"":"e4aefe6f81872729ff5a3acf164922aa":"":"":64:"2035a7ce818b1eb4":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"47b4b7feb91582a2f6121d12fd465967352e58d9f3d1bf27478da39514510055":"":"137bc31639a8a5d6b3c410151078c662":"":"":32:"822955ba":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8955cddce65978bd64ef5228308317a1ba6a9fbb5a80cf5905f3aed03058b797":"":"1370e72b56d97b9b9531ec02e2a5a937":"":"":32:"b2f779e8":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"7795d631f7e988bf53020d2b4607c04d1fab338a58b09484fe6659c500fd846b":"":"f3f5cc7c1ec0b7b113442269e478ed81":"":"":32:"e4e6dfcc":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,128) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f9aab5d2ea01b9dc35c728ae24e07c54e6d1452e49d9644776f65878199bc5e4":"":"96ec2252e51ebfb731b680729be73297":"983a102a67359f4eecac465b0d65908a487c98c593be89494a39b721728edc991726e1fba49607eed1f8ba75ae9ab82a1a95b65ebdf48d7ee3c4a2b56832f21a483d48c8400dea71537f4c459d1cfcf9d2cc97b32eb7c5146cbf44d7e5ac779e9be0ae758eafff2138d4c5370b8cb62d70ebb713dfd2fd7772fa250590609844":"":128:"766b6dcf491a5836ef90f47ac6ab91ec":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,128) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"303930b8ba50f65a50c33eccd879990d5d87b569e46f1a59db54371fcbda7fd6":"":"2b2b28d8a5c94b6f7ee50e130268a078":"c2ff20441d96bae4d2d760dcbae636ca7e01d263c28db5faed201bdb39bcacc82ebdc943968aa0accd920d258709c270df65d46d3f09910d2ea701c018ec9a68af7fb3d76a9b360de266b2ac05e95c538417fec59cec1f07d47c03511751978baebd2e0e4f7483f7351b5e61c2a60138c97b751f6a8c8323970f6be05357aeb2":"":120:"b597491dfe599eaa414b71c54063ed":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1e3b94f5883239c45ed4df6930c453c9ffd70b1c6cee845bbcfe6f29a762713b":"":"61155f27c629dcb6cf49b192b0b505d6":"5b7482e9b638cb23dba327cc08309bdb40d38100a407c36091457971bad3ab263efa8f36d8d04fdc4dea38369efe7ae5e8b9c190dad2688bda857e48dfd400748a359cfe1b2a3f3d5be7ae0f64a3f44738a7c7cf840a2e6b90ec43f8c9322c60dd91e4f27fa12197fab7ed092990879e964ce014f6be2a1ef70bfefe880a75d5":"":120:"7003f04d6b6d9dc794be27b9c5d5e5":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,120) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"9080effb27994ef831689da10600e7a219db93d690647457702c217b08057eb3":"":"f45514696ff5ee1e6e5797f7bcff05c0":"5251f800f7c7106c008c0122971f0070d6325b7343a82fc35f3853d25c878215e7a929bf63cc8996f0ffb817174a351b71d691f23021f58777f962fd1d45ff849e4612e3304ae3303ace7b8ca1a43f54e662071c183a1695873f5567397587283433d1e76cec1103ee76f8e0472814424b8981caea1f624131fb7353afcd2cd2":"":120:"cfb6d9bccf0378fabae08fd230edc1":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8c291f0ad78908377039f59591d0e305bdc915a3e5bfb0b4364e1af9946339c0":"":"a9830d5663418add5f3c0b1140967b06":"e43c04e1f7304c1d83235120e24429af8dc29dc94399474d06047fd09d61ddc682684776c81ef08d97f06db6e4cfb02daea728ec6ac637e1ecfdb5d48f0440d8d8ffee43146f58a396e5151701b0d61d5f713b2816d3f56d6ee19f038ccc36493d9ad1809a49aa5798e181679d82cba22b0b4e064f56af5ec05c012b132bda87":"":112:"275480889efe55c4b9a08cef720b":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,112) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"2b17652f7f04073afe9d9eb8b2615c7550968b9776b139fcc4f9b0300912cbdb":"":"9a8ac23ea74b292b7386138666a0fb60":"2732107241e6136f1dd28d233373079d75d6ac13828ae7afc751b6f9c57e77268c52ae91f4ab3016af2764597994573cd6b41f72e21b60ffbb3aafc9487ac19d0ffe8db2ae2c7505ae5963b032d1ee1bffb4c5bd88bb0c9a350ba26ee3eb8dc0a157955333e4f28c5ec7349c39229dff9f440da72909f2870aea873a76545ee8":"":104:"f7b94229439088142619a1a6bc":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,104) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"8340d604770c778ee83d0fdd5703b1fb304c3bffeb6f4c65e2dd0e12c19bddcc":"":"c0a580465b1b2e8344f795a6578a5151":"799f228962ef87865dfcfa0addde7366de2e4aa78029dbc8d57d7e50fa7c74343458df3465103556a3bfc5ce217fbbb5b2835c9f76b70240b40fd605bcfa6b790d5985a8ba54354e0625263c628e8746c451504fc58a179f90f77f2b293d8dbf5582b031082025c806e60143da9ebb6133ac8367376d0572b32569ee799540ae":"":96:"318f56bd0f3832d043ef700a":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,0,1024,96) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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#1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"3adf0da24394a98c7beae01d28f261a9cbd887aeeecc0c29e84540264d5a6bad":"8cf023d717b0f82f2b81750b53fb665c1c90f4740af4a3534b36b847df33ba5eec19eb24ead70a4b613a82572878216181d59b0c4c4df99be08d021cf182724d8ff5ec4e85884d0f69c16238fbbdbc5529ffcc4e418405e4e95139f79d3115a1ac56820cd39fc413ab72f7d447f947cb0541fc2be261f1246c0a786199013b22":"ad41288817577316df2d881ac93fcdef":"ad33ce922372fbe3531c0dece69f85f18eb1bbfb09a178403832308de0e54b1010db2636c4b7d9caa478138f61db5149c9fd7f3b45b7a1876729fe67622a37f0b322ef9cf6043b301a5d4c81e6f347d22bd3e40722059d3be945845c6b0629fbcfcaf885c7f393aa81f242c48c61a439574761ef6b671972cac664403250750e":"9d465e9c4228323946b1261892243d8455edb9eb8633d026d4033fa3965d20730979ba6952c0f6f2c5768f03c19256b64bc759d2e7b92424bbc668308504ba34384c2bb37baaf91a3a4f0952a050a3d69853141b49e86eda3bf0c4db4ebcd1c41e7f13eca20bf574a47ec45b8c98def17c0741805bf8f37923ba2b5221428578":64:"507618cec6d03964":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,64) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C 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#0 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"f14ac79f35bc5a685433eea5bb7fd69fc959aabda24cbd8b7795fb2e41f90ab0":"8a20da14819079960b77ed5e548d0aa0bdcffb752817c1abe4195e612cfbb58c8e5a8af69f75bad10ee8afdf0b0d5c46c4dc11c32bff16d5e7e82e77fd80e475c6a5a0be36718af232697ab22314306b8ee32484b3461da657710c06170e80a6a8844f898c2be29366c8430f2392d100ffd419603cbce406dc7315577e6e9ee2":"353e1d08edce44c966430513cb7a0383":"cb1dde4ff5a6867038c170192fc2d292f5bb349d5b9a903cf3d88c09ce78fb1f4a776ff7588a25abb5e5f6a44791d7296afef3f32ed31db1def37dd25be0570a204955121f9c65b79a3ea88fc452dbcb82719243c11bc27e3408adf802b6e8b4e701ee4e9dfd140cb3277bf605bd5fb757d2325f7805fc6f0d1ea5a6207fac5f":"49b5e4ea0421034c074cde67dd39a0310c3f31e8138672ba2ecc0777be542f1c6529836d5206b79dac83d96aab56787a35c584b31228f007f11630328c3f40a57be37487689ee5babb576e7d14ff0f1f1ba6e4be11637352a4336327681058b99df2e44f9772de4e0e456d2e34dec5eeb335b238e862841d166e0612cc0f18f3":32:"88aed643":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,32) #1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"b55ac909e73989e310ae37d13c54bbd5a126f419a3b01a2ad8961d89bd247f81":"8a663e8b21a027c4a9545d145d42d9c67b4fcd5d0e39aa68822aedbd609e2c681f60e6315035321de739858b2b082bc05551fe9b8456c2e89c6151282c6068b915eae5762e4d6d765d667de58a315e061b3d60035ada50f59258eb6e2a1cd6b52eea7eb9d404fd96e71f19feff65b74a4b4f07061adf7c1b0e54e2ece7a2cd49":"9328abab0d3f63c75ddafd8559d96b4f":"cbae20aa1996abb62471aac91cd78080953fbe3b165d4c9435832ef1106e7e3424db8850f44a431c289ab4f2bbbea9e5c0c7aaf2e8de69c0ced176283662cadd280d8fda0c859551f0f90893ca57695c95803a1546826922ac78703d7ccae285b7ccd4bbab551756cccc6869dcf34b6af8d8b80c25c6fb1d2caa7f28161fb854":"457e13ff4eeaaae75d14bbf1bff91706c3168b9b146aed29dbe31b12ad90c1c158833be95701229ac6e4a13997e0a2d961d4a0021c4d8920ec54a9a935e5ea73b17e8fa60559df76bd07d966dfa7d86d1a77a313228b2ae7f66b5b696726c02af2c808bf75e0b9591a220e762f57c680ca68f20b2b5413b07731bbd49de039bf":32:"5de0434a":0 + +AES-GCM NIST Validation (AES-256,128,1024,1024,32) #2 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:"1477e189fb3546efac5cc144f25e132ffd0081be76e912e25cbce7ad63f1c2c4":"7bd3ea956f4b938ebe83ef9a75ddbda16717e924dd4e45202560bf5f0cffbffcdd23be3ae08ff30503d698ed08568ff6b3f6b9fdc9ea79c8e53a838cc8566a8b52ce7c21b2b067e778925a066c970a6c37b8a6cfc53145f24bf698c352078a7f0409b53196e00c619237454c190b970842bb6629c0def7f166d19565127cbce0":"c109f35893aff139db8ed51c85fee237":"8f7f9f71a4b2bb0aaf55fced4eb43c57415526162070919b5f8c08904942181820d5847dfd54d9ba707c5e893a888d5a38d0130f7f52c1f638b0119cf7bc5f2b68f51ff5168802e561dff2cf9c5310011c809eba002b2fa348718e8a5cb732056273cc7d01cce5f5837ab0b09b6c4c5321a7f30a3a3cd21f29da79fce3f3728b":"7841e3d78746f07e5614233df7175931e3c257e09ebd7b78545fae484d835ffe3db3825d3aa1e5cc1541fe6cac90769dc5aaeded0c148b5b4f397990eb34b39ee7881804e5a66ccc8d4afe907948780c4e646cc26479e1da874394cb3537a8f303e0aa13bd3cc36f6cc40438bcd41ef8b6a1cdee425175dcd17ee62611d09b02":32:"cb13ce59":0 + +AES-GCM Bad IV (AES-256,128,0,0,32) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_bad_parameters:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT:"ca264e7caecad56ee31c8bf8dde9592f753a6299e76c60ac1e93cff3b3de8ce9":"":"":"":32:MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT + +AES-GCM Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +gcm_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.camellia.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.camellia.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b71d7c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.camellia.data @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #1 (128-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"000000000000000000000000":"":"":128:"f5574acc3148dfcb9015200631024df9":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #2 (128-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":"":"defe3e0b5c54c94b4f2a0f5a46f6210d":128:"f672b94d192266c7c8c8dbb427cc989a":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #3 (128-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"":"d0d94a13b632f337a0cc9955b94fa020c815f903aab12f1efaf2fe9d90f729a6cccbfa986ef2ff2c33de418d9a2529091cf18fe652c1cfde13f8260614bab815":128:"86e318012dd8329dc9dae6a170f61b24":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #4 (128-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":"d0d94a13b632f337a0cc9955b94fa020c815f903aab12f1efaf2fe9d90f729a6cccbfa986ef2ff2c33de418d9a2529091cf18fe652c1cfde13f82606":128:"9f458869431576ea6a095456ec6b8101":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #5 (128-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39":"cafebabefacedbad":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":"28fd7434d5cd424a5353818fc21a982460d20cf632eb1e6c4fbfca17d5abcf6a52111086162fe9570e7774c7a912aca3dfa10067ddaad40688645bdd":128:"e86f8f2e730c49d536f00fb5225d28b1":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #6 (128-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39":"9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":"2e582b8417c93f2ff4f6f7ee3c361e4496e710ee12433baa964987d02f42953e402e6f4af407fe08cd2f35123696014c34db19128df4056faebcd647":128:"ceae5569b2af8641572622731aed3e53":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #7 (192-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"000000000000000000000000":"":"":128:"ba9ae89fddce4b51131e17c4d65ce587":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #8 (192-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":"":"8f9c0aa2549714c88bb2665e8af86d41":128:"783cff5c5aca7197320658a74279ab37":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #9 (192-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"":"0f009e88410d84ad93c90d55efbe20ffa855492f4dfd0fb485c4f02f536feffbb4d967729e5c67f1de0750255cc500716ba483eb3b0a2bf607af28f6a60bb2e9":128:"8d645a0b0e48d3c3b60a014157cb49b4":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #10 (192-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":"0f009e88410d84ad93c90d55efbe20ffa855492f4dfd0fb485c4f02f536feffbb4d967729e5c67f1de0750255cc500716ba483eb3b0a2bf607af28f6":128:"01b15bb5ab6fac0c422014e91eacbf2b":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #11 (192-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39":"cafebabefacedbad":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":"678b3dcb270faa206dc5f6fbb5014996e86d6f3e35cdcdfeb03b37b9b06ff4ff2682248823bd3c84124dc76af7bde3dd440c228b5efbc795dd80dfb6":128:"f876143d933214a5035ff0bb96ff650b":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #12 (192-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C 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+gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":"":"3d4b2cde666761ba5dfb305178e667fb":128:"284b63bb143c40ce100fb4dea6bb617b":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #15 (256-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"":"ad142c11579dd95e41f3c1f324dabc255864d920f1b65759d8f560d4948d447758dfdcf77aa9f62581c7ff572a037f810cb1a9c4b3ca6ed638179b776549e092":128:"c912686270a2b9966415fca3be75c468":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #16 (256-en) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C 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+gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c":"9733ea567c3bad2259ccd63ef7012f5de709e50b1fdc31f1a16db02ede1b66f11dcc4d953f2d4d4671587b65882afbf9545fdb6deab22413d091b703":"9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a328a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":128:"4b72e520b2521e63d240ed5c903216fa":"FAIL":"":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #13 (256-bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001":"":"000000000000000000000000":"":128:"9cdb269b5d293bc5db9c55b057d9b591":"FAIL":"":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #14 (256-bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"3d4b2cde666761ba5dfb305178e667fb":"000000000000000000000001":"":128:"284b63bb143c40ce100fb4dea6bb617b":"FAIL":"":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #15 (256-bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"ad142c11579dd95e41f3c1f324dabc255864d920f1b65759d8f560d4949d447758dfdcf77aa9f62581c7ff572a037f810cb1a9c4b3ca6ed638179b776549e092":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"":128:"c912686270a2b9966415fca3be75c468":"FAIL":"":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #16 (256-bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"ad142c11579dd95e41f3c1f324dabc255864d920f1b65759d8f560d4948d447758dfdcf77aa9f62581c7ff572a037f810cb1a9c4b3ca6ed638179b77":"cafebabefacedbaddecaf888":"ffedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":128:"4e4b178d8fe26fdc95e2e7246dd94bec":"FAIL":"":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #17 (256-bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"6ca95fbb7d16577a9ef2fded94dc85b5d40c629f6bef2c649888e3cbb0ededc7810c04b12c2983bbbbc482e16e45c9215ae12c15c55f2f4809d06652":"cafebabefacedbad":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":128:"e6472b8ebd331bfcc7c0fa63ce094462":"FAIL":"":0 + +Camellia-GCM test vect draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-gcm #18 (256-bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +gcm_decrypt_and_verify:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"feffe9928665731c6d6a9f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308":"e0cddd7564d09c4dc522dd65949262bbf9dcdb07421cf67f3032becb7253c284a16e5bf0f556a308043f53fab9eebb526be7f7ad33d697ac77c67862":"9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b":"feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2":128:"5791883f822013f8bd136fc36fb9946b":"FAIL":"":0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b7b0ee1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_GCM_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void gcm_bad_parameters( int cipher_id, int direction, + data_t *key_str, data_t *src_str, + data_t *iv_str, data_t *add_str, + int tag_len_bits, int gcm_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[128]; + unsigned char tag_output[16]; + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + size_t tag_len = tag_len_bits / 8; + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( tag_output, 0x00, sizeof( tag_output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, direction, src_str->len, iv_str->x, iv_str->len, + add_str->x, add_str->len, src_str->x, output, tag_len, tag_output ) == gcm_result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void gcm_encrypt_and_tag( int cipher_id, data_t * key_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * add_str, data_t * dst, + int tag_len_bits, data_t * tag, + int init_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[128]; + unsigned char tag_output[16]; + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + size_t tag_len = tag_len_bits / 8; + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + memset(output, 0x00, 128); + memset(tag_output, 0x00, 16); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == init_result ); + if( init_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, iv_str->len, add_str->x, add_str->len, src_str->x, output, tag_len, tag_output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( tag_output, tag->x, + tag_len, tag->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void gcm_decrypt_and_verify( int cipher_id, data_t * key_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * add_str, int tag_len_bits, + data_t * tag_str, char * result, + data_t * pt_result, int init_result ) +{ + unsigned char output[128]; + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + int ret; + size_t tag_len = tag_len_bits / 8; + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + memset(output, 0x00, 128); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key_str->x, key_str->len * 8 ) == init_result ); + if( init_result == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, src_str->len, iv_str->x, iv_str->len, add_str->x, add_str->len, tag_str->x, tag_len, src_str->x, output ); + + if( strcmp( "FAIL", result ) == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, pt_result->x, + src_str->len, + pt_result->len ) == 0 ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void gcm_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + unsigned char valid_buffer[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06 }; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t valid_cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + int valid_mode = MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT; + int valid_len = sizeof(valid_buffer); + int valid_bitlen = 128, invalid_bitlen = 1; + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + /* mbedtls_gcm_init() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_gcm_init( NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_gcm_setkey */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_setkey( NULL, valid_cipher, valid_buffer, valid_bitlen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, valid_cipher, NULL, valid_bitlen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, valid_cipher, valid_buffer, invalid_bitlen ) ); + + /* mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( NULL, valid_mode, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_len, valid_buffer ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_len, valid_buffer ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_len, valid_buffer ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_buffer, + valid_len, valid_buffer ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, NULL, + valid_len, valid_buffer ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer, + valid_len, NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_buffer) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, NULL) ); + + /* mbedtls_gcm_starts() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_starts( NULL, valid_mode, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, valid_mode, + NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, valid_mode, + valid_buffer, valid_len, + NULL, valid_len ) ); + + /* mbedtls_gcm_update() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_update( NULL, valid_len, + valid_buffer, valid_buffer ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, valid_len, + NULL, valid_buffer ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, valid_len, + valid_buffer, NULL ) ); + + /* mbedtls_gcm_finish() */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_finish( NULL, valid_buffer, valid_len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT, + mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, NULL, valid_len ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void gcm_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_gcm_free( NULL ) ); +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void gcm_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_gcm_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf015265 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +GCM - Invalid parameters +gcm_invalid_param: + +GCM - Valid parameters +gcm_valid_param: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..15837365 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.data @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +HKDF extract fails with hash_len of 0 +test_hkdf_extract_ret:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +HKDF expand fails with NULL okm +test_hkdf_expand_ret:32:32:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +HKDF expand fails with hash_len of 0 +test_hkdf_expand_ret:0:32:32:MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +HKDF expand fails with prk_len < hash_len +test_hkdf_expand_ret:32:16:32:MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +HKDF expand fails with okm_len / hash_len > 255 +test_hkdf_expand_ret:32:32:8192:MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +test_hkdf:6:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +test_hkdf:6:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"b11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a49344f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f1d87" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +test_hkdf:6:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"":"8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d9d201395faa4b61a96c8" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf:4:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":"085a01ea1b10f36933068b56efa5ad81a4f14b822f5b091568a9cdd4f155fda2c22e422478d305f3f896" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf:4:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"0bd770a74d1160f7c9f12cd5912a06ebff6adcae899d92191fe4305673ba2ffe8fa3f1a4e5ad79f3f334b3b202b2173c486ea37ce3d397ed034c7f9dfeb15c5e927336d0441f4c4300e2cff0d0900b52d3b4" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf:4:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"":"0ac1af7002b3d761d1e55298da9d0506b9ae52057220a306e07b6b87e8df21d0ea00033de03984d34918" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf:4:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":"":"":"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #1 Extract +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +test_hkdf_extract:6:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #2 Extract +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +test_hkdf_extract:6:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":"06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45cef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #3 Extract +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +test_hkdf_extract:6:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #4 Extract +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf_extract:4:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #5 Extract +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf_extract:4:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":"8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #6 Extract +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf_extract:4:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"da8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #7 Extract +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf_extract:4:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":"":"2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #1 Expand +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +test_hkdf_expand:6:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":"077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5":"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #2 Expand +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +test_hkdf_expand:6:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45cef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244":"b11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a49344f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f1d87" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #3 Expand +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +test_hkdf_expand:6:"":"19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04":"8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d9d201395faa4b61a96c8" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #4 Expand +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf_expand:4:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":"9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243":"085a01ea1b10f36933068b56efa5ad81a4f14b822f5b091568a9cdd4f155fda2c22e422478d305f3f896" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #5 Expand +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf_expand:4:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6":"0bd770a74d1160f7c9f12cd5912a06ebff6adcae899d92191fe4305673ba2ffe8fa3f1a4e5ad79f3f334b3b202b2173c486ea37ce3d397ed034c7f9dfeb15c5e927336d0441f4c4300e2cff0d0900b52d3b4" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #6 Expand +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf_expand:4:"":"da8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01":"0ac1af7002b3d761d1e55298da9d0506b9ae52057220a306e07b6b87e8df21d0ea00033de03984d34918" + +HKDF RFC5869 Test Vector #7 Expand +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +test_hkdf_expand:4:"":"2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd":"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c597c3f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hkdf.function @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void test_hkdf( int md_alg, data_t *ikm, data_t *salt, data_t *info, + data_t *expected_okm ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char okm[128] = { '\0' }; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( expected_okm->len <= sizeof( okm ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_hkdf( md, salt->x, salt->len, ikm->x, ikm->len, + info->x, info->len, okm, expected_okm->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( okm , expected_okm->len, + expected_okm->x, expected_okm->len ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void test_hkdf_extract( int md_alg, char *hex_ikm_string, + char *hex_salt_string, char *hex_prk_string ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *ikm = NULL; + unsigned char *salt = NULL; + unsigned char *prk = NULL; + unsigned char *output_prk = NULL; + size_t ikm_len, salt_len, prk_len, output_prk_len; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md != NULL ); + + output_prk_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + output_prk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, output_prk_len ); + + ikm = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_ikm_string, &ikm_len ); + salt = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_salt_string, &salt_len ); + prk = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_prk_string, &prk_len ); + + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, output_prk ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output_prk, output_prk_len, prk, prk_len ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free(ikm); + mbedtls_free(salt); + mbedtls_free(prk); + mbedtls_free(output_prk); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void test_hkdf_expand( int md_alg, char *hex_info_string, + char *hex_prk_string, char *hex_okm_string ) +{ + enum { OKM_LEN = 1024 }; + int ret; + unsigned char *info = NULL; + unsigned char *prk = NULL; + unsigned char *okm = NULL; + unsigned char *output_okm = NULL; + size_t info_len, prk_len, okm_len; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md != NULL ); + + output_okm = mbedtls_calloc( OKM_LEN, 1 ); + + prk = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_prk_string, &prk_len ); + info = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_info_string, &info_len ); + okm = mbedtls_test_unhexify_alloc( hex_okm_string, &okm_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( prk_len == mbedtls_md_get_size( md ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( okm_len < OKM_LEN ); + + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, + output_okm, OKM_LEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output_okm, okm_len, okm, okm_len ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free(info); + mbedtls_free(prk); + mbedtls_free(okm); + mbedtls_free(output_okm); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void test_hkdf_extract_ret( int hash_len, int ret ) +{ + int output_ret; + unsigned char *salt = NULL; + unsigned char *ikm = NULL; + unsigned char *prk = NULL; + size_t salt_len, ikm_len; + struct mbedtls_md_info_t fake_md_info; + + memset( &fake_md_info, 0, sizeof( fake_md_info ) ); + fake_md_info.type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + fake_md_info.size = hash_len; + + prk = mbedtls_calloc( MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE, 1 ); + salt_len = 0; + ikm_len = 0; + + output_ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( &fake_md_info, salt, salt_len, + ikm, ikm_len, prk ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_ret == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free(prk); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void test_hkdf_expand_ret( int hash_len, int prk_len, int okm_len, int ret ) +{ + int output_ret; + unsigned char *info = NULL; + unsigned char *prk = NULL; + unsigned char *okm = NULL; + size_t info_len; + struct mbedtls_md_info_t fake_md_info; + + memset( &fake_md_info, 0, sizeof( fake_md_info ) ); + fake_md_info.type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + fake_md_info.size = hash_len; + + info_len = 0; + + if (prk_len > 0) + prk = mbedtls_calloc( prk_len, 1 ); + + if (okm_len > 0) + okm = mbedtls_calloc( okm_len, 1 ); + + output_ret = mbedtls_hkdf_expand( &fake_md_info, prk, prk_len, + info, info_len, okm, okm_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_ret == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free(prk); + mbedtls_free(okm); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b83d760d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.function @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#include "string.h" + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned char *p; + size_t len; +} entropy_ctx; + +static int mbedtls_test_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + entropy_ctx *ctx = (entropy_ctx *) data; + + if( len > ctx->len ) + return( -1 ); + + memcpy( buf, ctx->p, len ); + + ctx->p += len; + ctx->len -= len; + + return( 0 ); +} +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hmac_drbg_entropy_usage( int md_alg ) +{ + unsigned char out[16]; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; + entropy_ctx entropy; + size_t i, reps = 10; + size_t default_entropy_len; + size_t expected_consumed_entropy = 0; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) ); + + entropy.len = sizeof( buf ); + entropy.p = buf; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + if( mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) <= 20 ) + default_entropy_len = 16; + else if( mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) <= 28 ) + default_entropy_len = 24; + else + default_entropy_len = 32; + + /* Set reseed interval before seed */ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( &ctx, 2 * reps ); + + /* Init must use entropy */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, mbedtls_test_entropy_func, &entropy, + NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + /* default_entropy_len of entropy, plus half as much for the nonce */ + expected_consumed_entropy += default_entropy_len * 3 / 2; + TEST_EQUAL( sizeof( buf ) - entropy.len, expected_consumed_entropy ); + + /* By default, PR is off, and reseed interval was set to + * 2 * reps so the next few calls should not use entropy */ + for( i = 0; i < reps; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) - 4 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) - 4, + buf, 16 ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_EQUAL( sizeof( buf ) - entropy.len, expected_consumed_entropy ); + + /* While at it, make sure we didn't write past the requested length */ + TEST_ASSERT( out[sizeof( out ) - 4] == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( out[sizeof( out ) - 3] == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( out[sizeof( out ) - 2] == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( out[sizeof( out ) - 1] == 0 ); + + /* There have been 2 * reps calls to random. The next call should reseed */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + expected_consumed_entropy += default_entropy_len; + TEST_EQUAL( sizeof( buf ) - entropy.len, expected_consumed_entropy ); + + /* Set reseed interval after seed */ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( &ctx, 4 * reps + 1); + + /* The new few calls should not reseed */ + for( i = 0; i < (2 * reps); i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) , + buf, 16 ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_EQUAL( sizeof( buf ) - entropy.len, expected_consumed_entropy ); + + /* Now enable PR, so the next few calls should all reseed */ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + expected_consumed_entropy += default_entropy_len; + TEST_EQUAL( sizeof( buf ) - entropy.len, expected_consumed_entropy ); + + /* Finally, check setting entropy_len */ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, 42 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + expected_consumed_entropy += 42; + TEST_EQUAL( sizeof( buf ) - entropy.len, expected_consumed_entropy ); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, 13 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + expected_consumed_entropy += 13; + TEST_EQUAL( sizeof( buf ) - entropy.len, expected_consumed_entropy ); + +exit: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void hmac_drbg_seed_file( int md_alg, char * path, int ret ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, + NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( &ctx, path ) == ret ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( &ctx, path ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hmac_drbg_buf( int md_alg ) +{ + unsigned char out[16]; + unsigned char buf[100]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; + size_t i; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &ctx, md_info, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Make sure it never tries to reseed (would segfault otherwise) */ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( &ctx, 3 ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ); + + for( i = 0; i < 30; i++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hmac_drbg_no_reseed( int md_alg, data_t * entropy, + data_t * custom, data_t * add1, + data_t * add2, data_t * output ) +{ + unsigned char data[1024]; + unsigned char my_output[512]; + entropy_ctx p_entropy; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + p_entropy.p = entropy->x; + p_entropy.len = entropy->len; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + /* Test the simplified buffer-based variant */ + memcpy( data, entropy->x, p_entropy.len ); + memcpy( data + p_entropy.len, custom->x, custom->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &ctx, md_info, + data, p_entropy.len + custom->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, my_output, output->len, + add1->x, add1->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, my_output, output->len, + add2->x, add2->len ) == 0 ); + + /* Reset context for second run */ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( my_output, output->x, output->len ) == 0 ); + + /* And now the normal entropy-based variant */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, mbedtls_test_entropy_func, &p_entropy, + custom->x, custom->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, my_output, output->len, + add1->x, add1->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, my_output, output->len, + add2->x, add2->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( my_output, output->x, output->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hmac_drbg_nopr( int md_alg, data_t * entropy, data_t * custom, + data_t * add1, data_t * add2, data_t * add3, + data_t * output ) +{ + unsigned char my_output[512]; + entropy_ctx p_entropy; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + p_entropy.p = entropy->x; + p_entropy.len = entropy->len; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, mbedtls_test_entropy_func, &p_entropy, + custom->x, custom->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( &ctx, add1->x, add1->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, my_output, output->len, + add2->x, add2->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, my_output, output->len, + add3->x, add3->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( my_output, output->x, output->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hmac_drbg_pr( int md_alg, data_t * entropy, data_t * custom, + data_t * add1, data_t * add2, data_t * output ) +{ + unsigned char my_output[512]; + entropy_ctx p_entropy; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + p_entropy.p = entropy->x; + p_entropy.len = entropy->len; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, mbedtls_test_entropy_func, &p_entropy, + custom->x, custom->len ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, my_output, output->len, + add1->x, add1->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( &ctx, my_output, output->len, + add2->x, add2->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( my_output, output->x, output->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void hmac_drbg_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.misc.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.misc.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a3170fdf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.misc.data @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +HMAC_DRBG entropy usage SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_entropy_usage:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 + +HMAC_DRBG entropy usage SHA-224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_entropy_usage:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 + +HMAC_DRBG entropy usage SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_entropy_usage:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +HMAC_DRBG entropy usage SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_entropy_usage:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 + +HMAC_DRBG entropy usage SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_entropy_usage:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-1 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"data_files/hmac_drbg_seed":0 + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-1 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"no_such_dir/file":MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-224 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"data_files/hmac_drbg_seed":0 + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-224 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"no_such_dir/file":MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-256 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"data_files/hmac_drbg_seed":0 + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-256 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"no_such_dir/file":MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-384 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"data_files/hmac_drbg_seed":0 + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-384 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"no_such_dir/file":MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-512 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"data_files/hmac_drbg_seed":0 + +HMAC_DRBG write/update seed file SHA-512 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_seed_file:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"no_such_dir/file":MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR + +HMAC_DRBG from buffer SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_buf:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 + +HMAC_DRBG from buffer SHA-224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_buf:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 + +HMAC_DRBG from buffer SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_buf:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +HMAC_DRBG from buffer SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_buf:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 + +HMAC_DRBG from buffer SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_buf:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 + +HMAC_DRBG self test +hmac_drbg_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.no_reseed.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.no_reseed.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8a726bc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.no_reseed.data @@ -0,0 +1,1200 @@ +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e91b63309e93d1d08e30e8d556906875f59747c468b0d0da":"":"":"":"b7928f9503a417110788f9d0c2585f8aee6fb73b220a626b3ab9825b7a9facc79723d7e1ba9255e40e65c249b6082a7bc5e3f129d3d8f69b04ed1183419d6c4f2a13b304d2c5743f41c8b0ee73225347" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d0c57f7dc0308115b1ea30e2ea2f770289cebdda617d132c":"":"":"":"b797615a78d1afe74ebedb9d8948d82cf2bb586ed80146b96d41a709f689178b772dd342d29af5449694bf8eaf33a664a24c0ad29a12529eeaba478a799917ab4666de1b6eb2c7332017d67eea6fabd8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"286e9d9e39e4024dea0c885fd6f7f107586b6a1a8ac3ac0e":"":"":"":"ca25aa9ef286a3cd52d101db01cdf0ce14c7add124f1b6a9a8b3a48c74989baf01f6ff704da7c5d5785b6e9c21914892102313e7a15cb2f9977a513ada0d3f242819aef2c1699b72cbd358c59435101f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6b20dda65a96f564fc0253d38dbc290b813e538d040d8dd9":"":"":"":"66b6ef57a3282838dea05d122ccdfa842dda19333ded2015d381394da38c8309a6e9703ec065335b116efb97daaac9c53ceb7a218ed0db61c3ba969dc629b95f5418eadfa43c58714fb02176bc0b17ec" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"32339fc82b655051042e3038e3161c4fb252e495ff396be2":"":"":"":"e95e4551a37e338faae4419e3a70e4c1e3d516be7e554cabb00007c591ba7cb6c3247889a9b08e46c6619f166d996e4e34bbf6cd8a354de9964de906041f73f2ade2eb82c6e82627d3257738c2821fcb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"deaa9d0c2ca7a05cba12eeb7db24277e1605e1d030d76ddc":"":"":"":"bab5be6001da5951c1e7873f4e2be318e879370eae8a51ed8424ed6f12b2d294b45d006b1c2cd8c1ce047fd16f2fbbc09954a8b464cc986f23e86e1d9398d20780190aa5be0505cdfc826c7a01dcab99" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"589766be3c03b0a351a81b1203f944e2928e95f8a3bc7452":"":"":"":"5bee2482667220462ac6d3c234f7333703c5abced2ff2ad91d52193e86a61cfa43be0b4f7e831e1e563e260178f23976b2f3e132356ab54567b37580bf9d751223fad7793f0ac11fc450817536116b1f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"07cc4d22b010335045cca142d91494bf4d5e842af4155d17":"":"":"":"8e13a574d17dc8b44382d3b263e857f50816755917603a07ca4987fd40340042a1e6a82a227647130304d73d8704fd9ad4db3ae42daaa55b1f93948e70c451a12724fed870e02a1a8ec4eeab716c6854" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6425624a98ab3018eb4ef827f5a4fbbac1022d70155ef375":"":"":"":"16fd6abb10dba1659ed56d4296b65fe3f2449996bdb8eee5c94b249f04808cdd9563569a4152bd99a32592d35d6a4cc806c228284487fc1e088b178d4c8ecb6b0e3cfaacd7d39d754d8bd4e6662f44a4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"01d11d2b631be240de2f41d10bdce47c89fa32427410cc61":"":"":"":"4640a063e65ef0c0de97f98a39297219e2a1eceed7e6426199719911edbb3d06fbde6fbab83878e9ba9fa8e1d044f7a40f3627d7cfc49d17f101ee64f6b8c6e6154a01b4d39fb9ba6b33ca2c27f9fd52" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"5e0a89b3aba1cf5ed94756083726de8db5d79162f73a5031":"":"":"":"cae7b2c25dce1c12e2c4f61b3e53155b9177e92bfb8faefc425d1cbb507713921378ed880986709bfbd7cda66d18dbe0732137a86d47b7e8223e345af0cd9a0219ba290040bc6ff44c1de5b16f32b933" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"3b76d32d5982daf6e2164340941a1707441bbb99a2668ba4":"":"":"":"63640e406e16b3b82723a6cb3830657b756fe61cf2ada96f667e0f2df0c9d33c6f164ee78d4976281a84d3024ff67074acecd65391a84aafaec9d6b088bc33616543b61a4c603e5a21bd39e2a72401c8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"45fcafba2278bf8e6d437396f60f0e84654de44e0bd6cb8a":"":"":"":"7e2325cb2ced372b640c2496a3970cb7771fd494e40ae17239bfffd9ea2ab0ee74c2d3c369328a3b465e67bcbea86f50a32f9ff820505df5adbc032d3adb83581443877f85c60b3b701f59b1fc38c063" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4201db977ef90d08f017c8e38204c2995bbb47efe9fa4cad":"":"":"":"101c7318e26693bc11d64b780e9b32d4d958c7475ab99fdd6fe86554dcef54ccdc2ca9f4ec355eb25d7b3f570ff95ec7abc2e9e2fb879bb045debf6c8a98ff46668c0de21bd8d4d18fb9e11550878e32" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"5d80883ce24feb3911fdeb8e730f95886a63c01478ecd62b":"":"":"":"9e351b853091add2047e9ea2da07d41fa4ace03db3d4a43217e802352f1c97382ed7afee5cb2cf5848a93ce0a25a28cdc8e96ccdf14875cb9f845790800d542bac81d0be53376385baa5e7cbe2c3b469" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"32c1ca125223de8de569697f92a37c6772d4cc4f0544d409":"":"9e98cc8e0f8eb84d1911c1775a5703bb":"593aa3a300e5c907a011dd5a3dcd77e2":"942909a9d380aa5d4e3af69093a8fa513ee545b9bf9e1b81c5f30966db3e5cb52f8b1b6fe440d592e5fe4a972c36aa498035e2442f82910c5cd095c7f4b4c7e7555c4669cca481cdfbfda167b5d6f8d5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"172a2d24ef128dadc93e0b74f277e7c3692f86e6ca5e1117":"":"93b4a1fdbf9dd30996298804dd86c0f7":"69d792dc9b6fe1601f31a68e4d007187":"13f30b4698d6e973556c3f92dff6241bbfbde300ed58d07fd5f64efdcd0c1b62ca3de6358d505dcf972fdce20f7b891c4cab493721d80cb108fcee915835b02dea33041b38e28252c30a71fad85878e6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4a17b8069ae3a74d77c9c94514ba90cd2abfac0002d2c5da":"":"cc39d1a2a425f00e220d721fbfd5b6e5":"1ccee25f5868e863a05b72d744e64aeb":"d787b355629779ff2916397d6094f44dec06337571ccb0abf5a17b6cfabe00557894e9ddab8caafef467faa4514582b5073e7d1d9fdd6fa34c565d1aca23742ed4e87133253a9664ec085bc6c76965f4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d60c4860d9ba3ebb64e2095231e07792ba6b5e9e22e14043":"":"776273bb22f5e62a793692127bcbd785":"8795e45f82160cb1096a509fd3572f92":"3122c1d3a6de8b25fd180b159731f975f78601360155e43f694b289822a25948d2c20a673f181be06b59c566960339f25015d2acbf5c7d3f68a2bade779e00faa24623c1313da888dc8cee901fa05573" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"494983c04581b811e0b2b846c54bd31824bd70fd182558f1":"":"935200a7edf1e2903581fedb7c04533d":"49c0133cca2457fa7cbbd4c68cc5e78f":"0fd2ec47fa2e31326ee9b894fdd6224818190168640d91a2a0c247b1e27ccfa343e9370d182d95b2b5bd74b4b09c44d04094364a6fd02ba70ee2c55e04d65ad9c6da65b9c0742f9fb5ca95daafa48df1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"77ea86ce59f2466e55ce2057e7855035c09295c02f1c51cb":"":"f36d65f22b5afd3f51e13ea38dcff555":"6b613b56e470b5c2c30c30aab9a772e1":"41cd8ef82609012d33b4e5b51a39ec17eda4317962627796f7845045920becd7caef56d4a2c3a8e849e299babe92367ef34a8910bebd498248ccc2b3f5f63920b31cfe856973e15e48b060871a9cf9a7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2dffb03703023f65b757b7ee87899a14a9c8ce788fb2bddc":"":"da42b213071252adb755a6cb24094c17":"c83fc2beb60a7ee9b374f3fb7bfc8900":"8f54271e3578e60e8989e49f5b426e1a0296afbfcc7da0ffbdd5dea71ec6b339b6d866bd3756ba745e42c8cddf997cac5fed72b33ac81e5f4d6f2d15f030a41c684552fc94d48c0d97323ef7eb656857" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"890e7323502313bc7d617805360d5968b6c68c0280cef5ed":"":"257f1f60cf2d36924c3e7b6e4cc35135":"89235cc472c6e2e1e92c70324459a9d3":"55283453e82662c8d92f54cb4a5d784e83b1b3527bc5e71a53f04508172eb5156ba2a9ba92116cdaceed17118c7637af4b574d364187a52cf0c20d768da518021c3d95cb5ce6bc108b1bef19bad66677" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"167ce6bad165eb640eebfece7ca6690ec5c6b5f8c7fa9304":"":"c0e7ef13138ec4a7d52baf8592484ca0":"472a47e3fc098c7cb92fb953a26e25c6":"e2aa2650c84be79ec410ff9bac93e5caff8a46a8c39495856ff64c8c5399e81654ba90c8a8b26cdca2810ce68e4ab646e50a1f6fa7a829cfd72c9a61e1a0b415c031067dcd417baac9553cf7d84a7742" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6b8aeaf70460e83a124899d705dc0900acd811698669fcee":"":"94a53808df5ebaa7693934d7fda92b95":"4d4e7d88f44fe556c5ccdc56f8b2f098":"165aae6bcdd799fe325ddafce3b645900eabc87552c0bb47ee2eb6ad51462a8a4f4498c4bd24fcfc46de5d12351143d5a838060f617258c218035a4f29fb34a54673205b2e1b362991693d7b99972954" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"00f30f92bd44a9b2b04a6cae67533ed85b4ae1335b98109a":"":"77ec4274fe5f8f22dbb4a1ed6050811e":"ef041b6516825d51bf76d2f651a55576":"8c664357b01425668ea5daf07a2b5b8c50dbbd71d9f48c50f275a02b6cfc4717eb7db286fa49f17d05d44230f7d82c251a6f0fe0a2add5d2cc9a92a527f63a9bd3c8ec93e9a404e0829629c5eeb997b0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2eafeebb58a2fb54474280112c5668d61be2aa4df98598af":"":"389a36ecd687080a5d2cace8a326f03a":"495965bdbbb1bb01ba61191e9dd4b038":"f17db045b0af4913d79f99e018c1f726f4fe02f08477cccc0d6a068a808bfc6ccb797e6022dc3b99ea18086a56428884110c49128a51e10c15f6ecbfe0a5a1e97e72a578fefea6c66c436c91a2b6395b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b6497197b783d1f493a6430748b45932895ea2a9d8204f5d":"":"ac26665e796d1b00951c725da88d992f":"5f08c7951106dfec5096d90097449cc2":"170b58ac3342a968c96aa29f1ce820debe7934d9db46216c03ae3afd304188cd38b6208e1cad5fce5c26179a30a8771015a99d2902d51899ab0c42e0b400d18f1e89411248db96f9d62b466f828de150" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4ffafd1f20dd38699bfca029c0558483fbeed3cb29aa0eb8":"":"96abfcee883d8dcad967c071c12dde19":"9fd7cc292cd55d8364862f5fd675c08b":"5e8612c6ce8f5b6838a1e4fb9e14370fb2d66bc885f6fe8a3ff232f16340c2af58eb2734494e0ce920f36046b7a807f4b55caf3a45bdcaefa4bb23f352601c0769749f0257428918b931606c7b395135" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,0,128) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"89a6f070afad5ccf4d117c4e44baa2c7b28941fa7e828c04":"":"7206a271499fb2ef9087fb8843b1ed64":"f14b17febd813294b3c4b22b7bae71b0":"49c35814f44b54bf13f0db52bd8a7651d060ddae0b6dde8edbeb003dbc30a7ffea1ea5b08ebe1d50b52410b972bec51fd174190671eecae201568b73deb0454194ef5c7b57b13320a0ac4dd60c04ae3b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"49058e6773ed2b7ab309c0949fdf9c9ea457cb8ec0e7fd01":"dc477641d89c7fc4a30f1430197dd159":"":"":"4e891f4e281100453b70788929ec743a3c5edd9b81dc798bc93771368c39b612037b6f42f60c5d8924b646848151b0c295be491d4a28d1927deed523fd04d3d2dda95ed42166312e5c3392d22893b0dc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4ccc7d83009a28db14e839176774d45d9345358f336a1622":"e6db32976d9262b1d3dc487f22e1f5b3":"":"":"5a171e9f0065ece37ba53df81ac3d88054d53d0cb695a901e1a1ca91352420b508c461ac91095ccea81621b800ddcff905020f96dad2a50377d3945047420c3b902e8e361f4525c1d4bfa8af164925d2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fc7d0c3ef1c404ada968dae35581b6cd31e0a46c39ce49dc":"14158a65fc9b3bc1ac04c7854493852d":"":"":"918494f47dadda22667dc1d066f44f3ccbb61d3f84b2eeab7d26f4e999aab94e79d282287ab76d4e3eeeef2ef79c2ad571382abdea55d5d8642f604f8f27f3f73a5bc1413dc87bfdf91da1c6045ec223" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1f0df7933dc99eaf7b284b02ee773ec46461fd762c595408":"abd1d8af4ae46d7e5f1f4e0b71b54edc":"":"":"f1eba7596c6c20118f86017ff86514d745ce7ea02c49719094e5c2a96d3dfa1dd5079b8eff8078ba9793900dba145a260e672837422c351c3f231c201dfaa21e48d3f7ee28bcd08dac680e80bf87ec20" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"09988a36abad74c3cf377db9c9200baf6c27be4e21932166":"17b7a40f4c37894bc948456e37ad482a":"":"":"091e5fb9c6c218f2460c514fa215061460ca90cfb35c1a9f5ea125fc49aa0b2beb42dcb0fed865f8510c3141cd51d1b33216e2e72cebcabd3e1bc0eab201d8e72a0d1de1c2b7915a0cf242708092f211" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"ce1934b6561ebaaa851accf8ceae5b0dc587922ff68836aa":"602e9086f44d03ce61039c2e81fed620":"":"":"441da7552b2d45533fc924ea985fd4b0b95942fc7997a37128d3e96d4c2792b241dbe921d61f3898852d4f93740cc3649cb5279a7f0f09be3990e9ee599fb0717c308e7a939a441b5c3ba0cb8aa19647" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"58f1a9eb935fd08a4c3c894a06ad00ca0576589700a4d50c":"b14f2a74cbe3881069f30507919c6870":"":"":"ae9c6b40d951aab9c2d9cb920a05f3e154898c83e392dfbd7ffcbe2283eb2b75842fa5e7bd9626ad12e814874f1966fea1eb817793d2eb0a9cb9270cc9aa4267118fba0c7b6fcf487a97ebcbadc67496" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0abf2f845295bb1dd283daa24e75fa08c9e9202793c479b3":"f8742f44932bae2d65a032ada2b76382":"":"":"8847696e8edd2c7b751b780a6fc69d8434a3144593936943217465362b3c3f7b25b75149f7c69d10ecd169f00ed98b53e0e498af6d9f600441ee2c01a9e74ed845d24cdab4543dff7d1f7800a278671d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0f9bc6935e7baf17d560931ec3e75d9fda7b19214e0ffb9c":"c13bb26e9349a56866f821c10a2ae28c":"":"":"12a849651f310fbae04c4da4680a21a50a9889806194be470b8b111a32ea741794cbe725d98ae9d40c0d60c04c8b7b32917f9dc18c27dfb8c64579a176a2c4b23cc32e5237fa5f904ab1249aafa7cd88" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"79d96ff5ec92af9fee0af7effdc15ce56b9cbdfbbbe5b49a":"23d1288ae41e65e56e7b783f85ae8b47":"":"":"206c2564950995ac6ca6d2ad51e9cacd7540f254a335d6d7eed7ef17956949cb5d7d3f4e197e82aa4442d08d1d0f933e641f703be1be4a9ca5747e524687a7a034761493dcf2e1101789f135de5d3f49" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"94e852ffbff4f20078181221b5fbb8048f3e95de313a52c1":"1841dcabae24c156a17a1d0eda6f8bb2":"":"":"15319b06c05d47deeaeab540e649cc6e2989843de07dcaa966d799a36902f72943585e2773912040185ac1efa060c6edecef800e3116c66ccfeeec9fe7ee70f3dae2ac1c0210310ea164f4c4402d2f77" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"473c743205bb375fad15f537dfeb402d879754b2b4987cbd":"4f88f4db50a6806d6899f71981beec49":"":"":"46b0694bc8afc6d86dcb8b80cf8815104007ebedb06050ae625b890060c4dad3d9e2661042d26a3cfded0383829ddcf616ec84d3f32d307480caf0f87ba9b00e88812f5cb2a4e94e354092d0c50b9bc7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"20208c9ac4830512786fce7ebde344a82cee0d7d7a5607d6":"2602c5f52c7ee2620486ce56366cc8eb":"":"":"b0bd2c0739ed1608848dd0e9c1db9f547c64268754af09716da40b2682fbc45f56de954cbce0d8a3f53eb2c3afac9e3afeab4038fe042c897786fd3da70f2d6b62b12981630bf30d76dd879e2926ab40" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"3011c31a44ccfd1260ae9e431da41e883b1a6ac9060f2fa4":"6b36a1fcb2a2173fc7e0c120c2627a6f":"":"":"a781d9970c7272e98d941438d311cf7e80d2d56b29eb0b4b1c76d00908401ec5b4bb1c5f159dbf42ab30100933b1628faa92d2e25bd37ead4c3354c823013cd9e331bdf5e2c5c7d11d5bd9f50fd110fc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"ee6d57635e5ab4b3d73a2652c1443b32296bfe331b6578e6":"4fccbf2d3c73a8e1e92273a33e648eaa":"":"":"90dc6e1532022a9fe2161604fc79536b4afd9af06ab8adbb77f7490b355d0db3368d102d723a0d0f70d10475f9e99771fb774f7ad0ba7b5fe22a50bfda89e0215a014dc1f1605939590aa783360eb52e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c27f80b1d085dd15cb163f0336d077457ecb3f32a90242f7":"4deb622a31b4c530348b5f08008fb7ee":"5a84f94804e2d04ead773d2a324b34d6":"226d9f4d720f580c2be44d4eaf2ec8db":"6db76a0a003a64dec6801dd3271fae8a43aa8ce2e0d205e3830e267072abe28d2a6f707494d15638559fa4282843760daa90eec5d2865ea11e836e60345160d5112445ab1754b578b55471a1d9caf275" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"517dadbd6e20fd83aeaced197732b1d5ce221a60f8210685":"bd9911bc192da45c00c47d5ee079473d":"33254154ffeb4983d27ac08980ec4943":"349db52f09422883536d11ac4aaaf7ba":"dd7be811d3a9fdd194e8f8f18b35e1d9f1788844c371d811cb898ebc561d000cc285afc8f486dabe37d6c85e614d3d196c544ca560ac6e0337b0700e1ded8fb28903e66329afdd589308d56c50d73803" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c763149ba95e7d054da52e4d3d06287253bc2f43ae7c9da0":"305d6aa3c6148a0eb2e91b9385de5903":"a36918edaf5add6f0f81d3f991ee30a1":"5c65b09e744317db86d78aaefa66af44":"5560d27fc55b885a29a449a1f8835966549c4956ebb0393ba9fe748e74a5a303f1478bb3e507a9daa1159dd8dd6d171bff2e3830581d7f6fdbccd91a8748d20c1d981cf909c31db6eedf5587722ac257" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b479a14d125fe4601053989439f85200e198df756aff7543":"8f590670f88d8c2c713d63643f93ba55":"cda7c7ee77e667b96ef0ba330c9ca6ac":"a60fd147f6cdfb408d160e388c20d8d8":"5f088bcebd816551c4b22c3024aeab2f75c906dc8fd0ab0c80055e0445c1dc151a06df81bd39b8535261a7a5dcedc7f9b17c062ee6f120f2099f2ab5aa93f27a08d7b5cf1027e26adf54a520916c2cb4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bd46fc253e9334d4aa8bdff5e21c12e261515159b01a4516":"1735486e5ea8be74fa158b2fea8e5cad":"c3517d58cdbd0262655174cc1d1eb324":"404f7b8eb461d077368e2ff06ddb4189":"7f1cf172b67ec7c566c9e24c071b79b5a4a135a369ded5e78b8cd2467749e30c401bf176d88cc0e05a587bb2b8ed09206bb314df59009e88a01ef007e61eba2e40093aa003dada48314869c0f3b99d50" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"600a31b8f55c85ce27ece4705e6fe8cd17a01e7827ec2383":"6deef06a079ad2062e77dba21fef6441":"ca5512ab329ee941b22f327fe0dad499":"c1ffc97289d8d363729daa1628a2c735":"a81cf5563940ffbbee9dbdcaf7db1e7e53b427fd3a0e795c35a1b8eb6f6316e43b804690a44897e0f42fbdfa8c9f1777024d2a530eda994ed038de60b90602545cef99b69f371f79619babda9360c665" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f38b0cd16e9434da916b63e8b7ce1a91883ec208c3baf76d":"534799e3fe51bc370af6568072e2e579":"9520ad24a61d29716342d2b7bd35dd45":"c4e92d6da37a9f6236a396f352c53c86":"5dc0b3bebde5bac6d4d24ec08f1510dc88e1e06c97c3031dc9519f3392e83a09e1a7db99b2148d992a928bb5c1f68265086f7a84e697a7a0aeda4b41590606ed139063def46fa2a625657b17f18845cb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"06a5e76d0ee90ed0206a07a914dc20796a8a2fb2c0ebbf14":"2a49312af91926a37b5f7c009e8047ef":"0cda72090ebb007ab27156957e64e7bf":"24695b221f42a5be6d4399c6444c4aa3":"2b0aeca45ed44ca34a2fc741c5e4e2091e115a4148e71bd8fa90588e32253ffcf360df213b48a19f6f45186b67dcef6327729ac8f3c08d658de89e71539783fb66ae834455407e7827114317299835bb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6c12df5d2ba1f6a6e1e733baae42daafeb47cc188d1b0be0":"f510139561b292a7a1a0292b7de4b162":"f57a0c1dc69eae7473394ad1b950dc61":"9dded4779fab0c8843fa693146837689":"2be15d2ea87099a8c0430ba8e9451208a898379da075169568196f656eadbab59637c1f949b4506a851ae0394e135542137bd0daf1c188decfce92f6ef2396aa5bb125cf3187230ac81c3864632d9234" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0e6a7843e29e5f16d2bbb4021d6389ae692298b9f62ad22d":"f0434f112699d116cfa7eddad486c544":"146eb042377cdf6a0831558ac17ad971":"b29c26d483fde8489263accafc10d698":"ecf0812aebee7a452339071d9906709fe00fccbb0d94cc101b507646f554ebf3602459a4f20b82325b0e083ca189f59d68c5753dbe942643f07c7afcde99f9d0cc2883923cb80456fcedc535bfa7d647" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b6bc57d663b671868265fdb756e142fe6da9c07dd0821c6e":"f43c5223bfe726a3164afdcabe931eb7":"ddf419d8e074a4ff2daf06a1adad4bed":"e0862e71c4ac52194cd320d196e446a2":"4f9b9e9aab493571160c732881dc358f73a08450a152124775e559889a9298d034ce1882dd2116f4863f1524393e1a3f1aceadcd9c4163dab7c543cd375c3f4b61ed72475d1812017ac83bf22846d14c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f5649fc184f33c63cf8484011fa27578c1651fcd1a0780c6":"153f7b2c9bc9494a20ed0bf16b97ffdc":"6106fd4fe0e1d894837ba8624cebbe2f":"fdc2988e6b358929645d27594fa98df8":"49130a750b4758e7e8dec8d82bf66ae771d51181c33cbba9d84093ee4f83f6e3aadd3f40fbcc441fcf90ed83b83c9d9671b9092907a36231ec3e2c56775c5699fce16abad104b291dd13f67ad4e1ff4d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fc3dfb2f29b649391437aff6920760671e470ebf09e8fd68":"4e7d48fe49ecefebed749979b965d8f6":"ae7405de4957947dc09fb1be2227c763":"3fa22158d9bb1948c64102f3ac00bfed":"ffb49be8c714b502595da9248248fb009eace24ff77d298dfe8b05efe6441352213bd236bdf4b3de34fee35b051747f4e549f69bbad8c729f3b5cf2db29a0ab6aeb590857e0f48babff3a9ea3e4079b6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"32018afb07a6141e9a6badda9b647f650090ba3475d0149b":"fa92f66bb7a06a1652d4084c15d2f778":"13c32c456c799cf0808e00c6de7efce0":"693728213798dde84176dabfb50434d5":"12c9d6683e6ebb5136253db60b39b3203f52607e44d13ae80709cdf2fa61ff5befb0838f544e39e135830b573ac5a31b7535c0a2502370400906658e6b1e9a0f5755f360d9bff68fa55ad628b49a8937" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-1,128+64,128,128) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"3e325daab3301856044f416f250b6161e447e63d85ca084f":"a9d2a53dbd7ef4b9150dd0ed4d002e56":"4de6c923346d7adc16bbe89b9a184a79":"9e9e3412635aec6fcfb9d00da0c49fb3":"48ac8646b334e7434e5f73d60a8f6741e472baabe525257b78151c20872f331c169abe25faf800991f3d0a45c65e71261be0c8e14a1a8a6df9c6a80834a4f2237e23abd750f845ccbb4a46250ab1bb63" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"a76e77a969ab92645181f0157802523746c34bf321867641051ed6ba39368033adc93d4e":"":"":"":"8925987db5566e60520f09bdddab488292bed92cd385e5b6fc223e1919640b4e34e34575033e56c0a8f608be21d3d221c67d39abec98d81312f3a2653d55ffbf44c337c82bed314c211be23ec394399ba351c4687dce649e7c2a1ba7b0b5dab125671b1bcf9008da65cad612d95ddc92" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"65cdaa5ab147d0c79fdd02b24fc94d0e427f59ef9a31f447458c6befe0c2cde5a58c6b7d":"":"":"":"0d164682b5bb552a53a2a942373639d98576450ca632faebc15060691a4219467c5aa106034cd19a214a0a4f31d402e68c4c565f49b33b680d522ef25f541e8202be779730376fdcf5b7b58fd6ac959204a88f91008651d2c02ada82505f914d4d9b9aea7967784e5320e185e1248270" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"650996f1477112af7604386be5ace78232904315d99d87d72a06709d331a6f930b447cf5":"":"":"":"d3341d7767cfd95640a107b3abaed7b4e1855b348e3ae5bcc53a0b0d49d4b4976837ec8f376f38327135578eca7ee583215bd5c79ebf499816f79afcc402ff1e9ffc4ad0f896761c9cff75050bf84baa194c355763b16b5d2648d480a2b48f22662685de39c7cee90aa0b6edf8062e42" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"898640ce467201a53e7731bdfb572977f7eb3e49050bc1e367ca74bf0a27376d339d09f4":"":"":"":"4f5eea927023b4abab5d4d9944e84ca001ee081cbc21d4080e1534ee6d1d8a6f60361029ffa983bcc79b5d65d4aaaaaf98983de13ddde39a739f9d95878fb31f57f96184e5f2f3adf654a468c616237fcbc6b2c194e247178cb90294f631c449a01f1fe09c02587c460305be9fc71b5a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"fe405dd73956bf6ec875515eebd8c5ecd60553643da750914c83dfc93611d57390af7324":"":"":"":"d8ae0eb81913a190c439f8ffa56c06155a73f84b20608b2b2e9eab3061202cebad18ab8b3eba81672152c1c02ef573cd6e8623c392facb6a857425c6795cd7999c1e7f56f3fa9accca018076e0bfc106d075df98f5fb66f28933215e9276777dfc479e71a8d506a66197918d9b0f7a8f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"b06892f6f455afddc8eb60aae35b35a64f63b2aa85a2dae4ef489266f7bc354f72d68b71":"":"":"":"fc10c03fc37d3bd5fba6591a97f6354a9ed8ba2b6806744432851f43a3ce6418e39ccb417b8539e349acea588e2abe5da06147c9825c6e50a31f8589a57ca3bfb10f0da9c8e89fe2e372b5af1cf96e0fbeec5d99228770c41a76e587da7d8764d5f235f5d1d6188d84ae61c52c2164fb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"9174e174e9e031f62b2e19ae5c0bef22eed7d5598e6e73504759a2c15b05c2473a721d26":"":"":"":"1962f2d473b31a2576dbd78022f4eeb974641fa2e9cb582f03ab741929f51f0f4663129e68ddc242e1c2ceafacec3dccb97e09527aff46b948f0abcea1451699dc3ae4d3fb5e04c84337e17b504af2fb5f1aa6ec0033ddf138a188ee162c497526563a67da8015275d89f0e1e902b2ef" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"eb1d45ba0d8951b7b1d7ce922b7d1f6e94da8b821940126c9da5b0b4382425930743a051":"":"":"":"306b1f733e6f69b6f26b7baa5441af4967a5cad8faad18029440aa989aef6024dbf3ba02dfc2c694dad6496ff760d72ae6914a4dcd5e3a443f4bcb14bf2b64986f35c32449f15e3084d46fadfa2ae213da6b26f787cef89b6a23084a929608a9f6acd8315808c29f8ae435a40202a012" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"78cdc1567caf2ff529ef8e3475c0fbb09a48b687a544f7399f503948621f29686fb15216":"":"":"":"2367067d8ec189b0819eda34602768a0698b4b545c7d5214fad58c9787b89809b97f3af5f9349907d2954f8c0dccbdbe63cc019bde3a6fae10497ae57f33e91ed55b6fc4a83fe8a2463552796d5120da8066f7285a8388958817b1218e006d7fc617f453ad0f9217966a0731ba99f093" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"25f9ee24ee25ad3d29a974f8f552b178cb292b847a6be80694213a6c0b33e25e29fd3ecc":"":"":"":"32fe251a619d164c217365b12a313a942b6a9c3df007751a5fa9f356412d1142c785c292e3dc9d0b1d77e080892e5d39b91c58fd142458c71182061920a0721db453a32fe7ffc8b2c20bf11894fa37d8f0e9463edd43a97f65362295119be03d5e06f617fdff6accaab8c4da72ac8f81" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"0b644221788c266aae00a3b63a87f32ca96a6c32b116cd37caa4f75ff5d7e56be3b4e20f":"":"":"":"dc9245da77502cadd1a8ac4d1cf6a199c8e529deda10c87ab6c69ceea6fdef36d45f4d036021b93fe5b342c52fe1e71d81e617bebc58804af3109bab93dbb2e5c546e108bd0891710128b5e8e4a4f01df2003d038fec8cef426fad7f72dd5e091b4850e9bf4932d60deacb6e9ea3c5e6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"a6677badff70966a3cd2febaad7de7aa5849ba763789b20d0a39b6c569261b826cdb15e8":"":"":"":"e04838c970f5d7208a2a7310da893d65391666a5dc62d9ede71fc30816cfc3e8064ac59cc9aaf30283356078c812676ca20beb044a6d78db6c5ef9718a88559607f225002452c01459944433013cfffea84d6fe404fbbbc2d66bb50a2fa01d8a5d6e4ea9b402dc5256752461bf6fcb7f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"2301d8c053312db04882f4284cf8b47966c1c9b8c49de847d0c11f14c5f70ce19346562b":"":"":"":"b46246526b28f3ad7f6d8732ca3bfc40f005d97a519640a4ce728486d8bf830d661be5a97b11113e89096d9bf15cbef73ec28ac13e3fbeadc9bca500918bbe92ea23e131cc622dbffe2272db16ec5d4ca30e9bd986d1709ae22d10180514bcd11bd6218ea1fbaba101444945a17a4c4b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"78644ea1b0c4c55c4addeb476fc34471ea2c4393697aa4f170726010c443b8e1c4a6b3ea":"":"":"":"ef1b41bd03ee8460d55759db65a4c97758f48e3a09127be04c7ed08bbee5fa5cf119929df42c187e2a347a8df99c502b693a7ae41946f4918d84686880ae29d6d8fbbc4fccc9e295876a249cfa59effd331994e84717b4c76637df36beb960761880daab3d43376341439af2ce8e33cc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"71acb71235e88e3aa6d8bbf27ccef8ef28043ebe8663f7bcf49cb642b3d915cf03b90e65":"":"":"":"144aeb56a11cb648b5ec7d40c2816e368426690db55b559f5633f856b79efe5f784944144756825b8fd7bf98beb758efe2ac1f650d54fc436a4bcd7dfaf3a66c192a7629eea8a357eef24b117a6e7d578797980eaefcf9a961452c4c1315119ca960ad08764fe76e2462ae1a191baeca" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"c5c89c26ac4ca8b1106ba90a8ef4d6d687dfd88743caa5fbafa4745d9c1f8371120b10c8":"":"d3483ae5f9ed97efd3f852e4a6f20f25c947a03f39a4b75c":"2cd523c5958cdf403caa61abe5c4739cdb9d40152f0e769a":"1fef4e6abc2778d1c3e3ce00fdb5eae1ebebdd5cff0a7087644c8565d1e8b876b2c05264ca81498468851fc7b9e5a2163a06f377d2ed754c095adc59dc015a77edd69e4eecbe48d9dc127eedfff5cc73ae38127ae3a518fe7fa5abd1a9c53eeaf144420873341e2efa3d81493c69b04e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"6860e44bf582db9818ffbe4c699d4218965c29f463d7a02fe1f36c8442b0a5d103def7a2":"":"e9f598357109e2a532dc980388b8a5991256166d67c3bc01":"58ebbf7402be041724701e5c0132abe604c11a62a9de1d2f":"52fad34b27113c146595a6740f505bc2d3edf6618975cb9c4a5155788eaf08b96d232610d9b4ee06264fd92f319df5a52b8f9e31b016a6c21d27d31d9d42bbb7588a7142f26ece3ddf211c8cf4530947adee302aa71c0d7fe9060c1b25f1c1f2e053598a7fb72c4db55fb1b02352d60a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"27b9f78ae07821f2b5625c8fc3a03ceec4fc8062be860c2db20403dd88a8751dcad56158":"":"1b6c848fce706abd73612dd3fd421c1c7ce9f4c2d0ecc670":"14a43645c1b6ae394f795af6ca2e9084e7e707f3f2cedd7a":"33c592017af545b3a9cf3419ce1c604e9c7c687ebf6418fbef47ec96e61f1951068eec9b60005d24574313f04ffc16c30872ec83e41e248e3d5c6951930d6a88b8931d5502d1142ce50676b3adf48453d1a008189658db8511d19a06ac97b4d5cfac19b54e8e6b899d501715f401ef85" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"8d7cf5c2e360ef755c1e9f5b7a44a1e29f09cee7ca44e15925ffe9a47b2d55fd7750b356":"":"0e691c9a435939c615f0686eae88e090ba5c4b3f5e6e00c0":"1e3a452295617e5a9e6f78256d2781feeb3812753b4aad9a":"a307569d8adf3f7e6ee4567a5b2bd338badb9234e7b27c92429ffa75e4c56c0529fdc6c15df5d47c46e3d2eeadcf1b9e93a5dd6cde99a82f04b0d97f7a3bfd05c0e1d8370987222310ab18c980ce48b2679361c3d9011dd355a9b06337c054ee37913d5f4dd30d1fc942cd733a0fa5f8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"1a0d2c734918c539c1b306a464eb6b54f92e958e8636032aec23ba8ae817bec48384461f":"":"b8ad9e613a891fd0db89571fddda77827382e406cd3cdf7e":"1e172a708aa4ffa3618ff0d7b1f9ba341f4811507851dfb4":"674df1f3095d6c87bc54dd9b2aaa2c786bd50e4ddc02493745d820dad8552131fb3e389e99b0709478b65d4268f2a3b468a8447dc572a6ee024be6be9be9d428c12cc92894d15dd1c959d6222dc9ec30478c7a0b57f5bd8bd53868b98d7674738b54cf74100ae215693babb6db3b3890" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"95a30a0ca779a4038ea920cccfa4cdd814ca17d560d53a75cf170f4712994f9bcb2efb74":"":"1da6c8726bbfa3c8bee6dcff6f76f2d55d60527c4f0db26b":"595ebd903a596a1f12175080185bd94c2336eb8dd29a387d":"317c19cf4a45b8cf3f645da084ada54d1b1f81379152424fddad22a6dc9bd22841e0c4c5a36bfb7879eafbd1a939121905a938ae034c7fc01afb56607e35f895f46f13e91ce4e8e75b6a87a1e5544e18eb194fd6754b06885ac05e332a05ed436e889965e405e0f2069b04b40ea0f635" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"8af8930562510231a592a72587fa6ad7c234e133046965907642fbc785c0b86cba844f0f":"":"9ee7b221064966582dc836437b82386f5204a302a4179079":"473d917f5b66f0f6e3fb4670ba08c2cbd2ea765b46b10838":"5c2fc9cc7148dbe40a692b3636778eb80188949d198bba3e8355386b78b54bfb963f5f2d9202988da20ccbf336a7c737a66c90149b9e8e306477151c4d912f7c61e872de0d0e47701cbe765864de536d599946b8bd65e4d89d4e61deb53de9974fbbe634501800feea100fea573e2e50" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"2b9554ecf94c7d647a4e117f43326cab54466eba56a09a52741b2445057c491935c067d2":"":"0144be6978dba85aa645d793c1881dc2deb1bd210811ec9e":"1cd265f3812568274b643954c70923a76dfcc9f123360111":"f7459b0c23966dc1a53e0c6406c9e78ebe728e3484224cd88b6b2ea554522e75eb4a1c8a3fdc66561426464f50b8d0ff95b266677d91776b344a820eb4fd7d554678300558011a7cd85d22e92dc8ec2c2fa15c6330ba157c3e71728304447c1ad4d64f3da4fbf26d92e1e7c58a1b289c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"335ede8603fcde78ea9869da2dbcab4a6e72f1b53439f3085d06b856e627411a9ce1c297":"":"ededc73fe268935c10832c463549f8204a29cf0fe00a4d87":"ef1b8a80dd49d2c263999ddc0d5a1d9205c1b1c66239fd80":"05bfe97c398b1e33ee1c547c0edb5b654b7060b76604195440d06dd2f614a398c6c43f1803893c4c8888bedecdf998367cf992301a25f24c263f5d36bbfc6fe8b839cad293b3617c1d2c60a814bda0359e3f717fa80fc7324af8827d438c88642754b39b10d18cf5bf42f11177a0bc6b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"9b0275d861117553ecd3c4d7cfe762f88df22c4c4190dac8e0be5872818e2dd765261d58":"":"cfc0b07082d514425b17ce3cb334ec62bc1b3be0be58ca4b":"d3c70ab5ff7a364a9e6dc75132ac67e0d373fa2df301afb5":"09fb41bcceb016e754795e1cce582f0cae91d7bb50245975eb75274819e1e4dcdfbc5e2f13fd26b9a9f9e945cd807ffec4e275681ea7bd33eae13efd8a01edbe02562e77b44b6312f416c3dd0be64f2bae0ba4b9bb36fc3a44841d21d8b3571c0ef644d88cf3cc3c851b256a15f4d716" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"1981c3f9ca58fd10e8377a8d0eb3cf02102aab6f7a033af3135533d9fd850e29ecb8dc9b":"":"f9978ba41df22894ad5f3849c1bdf21f7bbc0128c782e79b":"b4d57de5e18d393273ee9f3ef9736599c6d639f437239219":"fee23db2fcc71624fb39f573e33a1490efc7230c27e9278188251634f9c045bcb26e79ece6a173491475ae44a957c4269570f5469234ca8b6873cc973c8d97178c58cec658a352bad0d4c6001cae5664258db59ad76eb6304d166267eafb46f4dd536a914fa6d1ac58317e7c557d4653" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"c10d4e521350f7cd1853576d03c4bece3e58c8c740859e4e16979499ec1365fc073736a3":"":"78b245520153baacc66846e7a83a2a925f892d4c2ee63c0f":"c8ca7a33de5991d44d7ef7da2d3368cc2cdb93895c394d41":"f92c15f5833800b28dba2d134d4dcfc41abf72f5a700469551e8ccb83bdb0772d14d6b26ba6978169e3ddbe5f214d57930dfcad719bf10d306749246d2624bedd4a18d327b8ae6bee67cf0bfb5f649824bbd0440f042146b95a83e5845ced69a55ba055d5dfc7183c3bb28d61312d274" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"7608b5617785995a1f7144ee5229e4f9c138e418bcc3b5e061a422e8cf875f58650e996d":"":"961c2d33039e60a2871e1f5b82097f6b1cb03836dba5f440":"b18cb52d3858ac5bf59f216a28c0ad49f3dc88c67b5870e0":"4b0313ae873ce5ebf08aec160416492e4c4c797a5017061ea42aefa0685ab19b74a7af11f019b9fb63072b797f7ea3354efd32c4abd1e866405a319ed2fa13fc81019d61326e70e503141b9c77b4879a45e9f36f101dbfff4359147282ef814888fee81640def25f551cee41d12609aa" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"fef7a43fea2ff1a0f624086985e535778d7a73dbc47bc23e9da92edd5d2f273cdbbc0251":"":"836731a57497a69e31f8db4f729774ad65f31d968dbc55a8":"bcca96d808ba98bb50e90afe58fc88e95dc14c3e90c56004":"4f2c64ecd146689064fbf4fcffce2a2ab3910e72ec4faec277f7b9e9ed510381312b01f21650e175ebe9c45c11e977276f13be015243a0cd16a191abbac6462ba96e4e4a1120b28083da933419e8c8f03099906eb1ee012ae291104c6530f51b5e32e6631cab8ef5aad68c0045255ba9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"00197c70b2f0d3e98e4b387ec42a65c4106a1689ab5de61101ee76f4b5e530e7efeaf964":"":"03015311cddd0961ec7a74cb84d835c058a69b964f18a1c1":"5e0d99e0e7c57769a43ea771c467fb5e2df6d06dae035fd6":"72e8ca7666e440ac6a84ab6f7be7e00a536d77315b119b49e5544bf3ead564bd06740f09f6e20564542e0d597ac15a43b5fb5a0239a3362bc3a9efe1ce358ddd9d4f30b72e12ed9d78340c66b194beb4b12e973213931b9cfd0ccbdf540d2c36ce074e2beac7a4ddac59e06e4c7178d3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"c5c89c26ac4ca8b1106ba90a8ef4d6d687dfd88743caa5fbafa4745d9c1f8371120b10c8":"":"d3483ae5f9ed97efd3f852e4a6f20f25c947a03f39a4b75c":"2cd523c5958cdf403caa61abe5c4739cdb9d40152f0e769a":"1fef4e6abc2778d1c3e3ce00fdb5eae1ebebdd5cff0a7087644c8565d1e8b876b2c05264ca81498468851fc7b9e5a2163a06f377d2ed754c095adc59dc015a77edd69e4eecbe48d9dc127eedfff5cc73ae38127ae3a518fe7fa5abd1a9c53eeaf144420873341e2efa3d81493c69b04e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"6860e44bf582db9818ffbe4c699d4218965c29f463d7a02fe1f36c8442b0a5d103def7a2":"":"e9f598357109e2a532dc980388b8a5991256166d67c3bc01":"58ebbf7402be041724701e5c0132abe604c11a62a9de1d2f":"52fad34b27113c146595a6740f505bc2d3edf6618975cb9c4a5155788eaf08b96d232610d9b4ee06264fd92f319df5a52b8f9e31b016a6c21d27d31d9d42bbb7588a7142f26ece3ddf211c8cf4530947adee302aa71c0d7fe9060c1b25f1c1f2e053598a7fb72c4db55fb1b02352d60a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"27b9f78ae07821f2b5625c8fc3a03ceec4fc8062be860c2db20403dd88a8751dcad56158":"":"1b6c848fce706abd73612dd3fd421c1c7ce9f4c2d0ecc670":"14a43645c1b6ae394f795af6ca2e9084e7e707f3f2cedd7a":"33c592017af545b3a9cf3419ce1c604e9c7c687ebf6418fbef47ec96e61f1951068eec9b60005d24574313f04ffc16c30872ec83e41e248e3d5c6951930d6a88b8931d5502d1142ce50676b3adf48453d1a008189658db8511d19a06ac97b4d5cfac19b54e8e6b899d501715f401ef85" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"8d7cf5c2e360ef755c1e9f5b7a44a1e29f09cee7ca44e15925ffe9a47b2d55fd7750b356":"":"0e691c9a435939c615f0686eae88e090ba5c4b3f5e6e00c0":"1e3a452295617e5a9e6f78256d2781feeb3812753b4aad9a":"a307569d8adf3f7e6ee4567a5b2bd338badb9234e7b27c92429ffa75e4c56c0529fdc6c15df5d47c46e3d2eeadcf1b9e93a5dd6cde99a82f04b0d97f7a3bfd05c0e1d8370987222310ab18c980ce48b2679361c3d9011dd355a9b06337c054ee37913d5f4dd30d1fc942cd733a0fa5f8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"1a0d2c734918c539c1b306a464eb6b54f92e958e8636032aec23ba8ae817bec48384461f":"":"b8ad9e613a891fd0db89571fddda77827382e406cd3cdf7e":"1e172a708aa4ffa3618ff0d7b1f9ba341f4811507851dfb4":"674df1f3095d6c87bc54dd9b2aaa2c786bd50e4ddc02493745d820dad8552131fb3e389e99b0709478b65d4268f2a3b468a8447dc572a6ee024be6be9be9d428c12cc92894d15dd1c959d6222dc9ec30478c7a0b57f5bd8bd53868b98d7674738b54cf74100ae215693babb6db3b3890" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"95a30a0ca779a4038ea920cccfa4cdd814ca17d560d53a75cf170f4712994f9bcb2efb74":"":"1da6c8726bbfa3c8bee6dcff6f76f2d55d60527c4f0db26b":"595ebd903a596a1f12175080185bd94c2336eb8dd29a387d":"317c19cf4a45b8cf3f645da084ada54d1b1f81379152424fddad22a6dc9bd22841e0c4c5a36bfb7879eafbd1a939121905a938ae034c7fc01afb56607e35f895f46f13e91ce4e8e75b6a87a1e5544e18eb194fd6754b06885ac05e332a05ed436e889965e405e0f2069b04b40ea0f635" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"8af8930562510231a592a72587fa6ad7c234e133046965907642fbc785c0b86cba844f0f":"":"9ee7b221064966582dc836437b82386f5204a302a4179079":"473d917f5b66f0f6e3fb4670ba08c2cbd2ea765b46b10838":"5c2fc9cc7148dbe40a692b3636778eb80188949d198bba3e8355386b78b54bfb963f5f2d9202988da20ccbf336a7c737a66c90149b9e8e306477151c4d912f7c61e872de0d0e47701cbe765864de536d599946b8bd65e4d89d4e61deb53de9974fbbe634501800feea100fea573e2e50" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"2b9554ecf94c7d647a4e117f43326cab54466eba56a09a52741b2445057c491935c067d2":"":"0144be6978dba85aa645d793c1881dc2deb1bd210811ec9e":"1cd265f3812568274b643954c70923a76dfcc9f123360111":"f7459b0c23966dc1a53e0c6406c9e78ebe728e3484224cd88b6b2ea554522e75eb4a1c8a3fdc66561426464f50b8d0ff95b266677d91776b344a820eb4fd7d554678300558011a7cd85d22e92dc8ec2c2fa15c6330ba157c3e71728304447c1ad4d64f3da4fbf26d92e1e7c58a1b289c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"335ede8603fcde78ea9869da2dbcab4a6e72f1b53439f3085d06b856e627411a9ce1c297":"":"ededc73fe268935c10832c463549f8204a29cf0fe00a4d87":"ef1b8a80dd49d2c263999ddc0d5a1d9205c1b1c66239fd80":"05bfe97c398b1e33ee1c547c0edb5b654b7060b76604195440d06dd2f614a398c6c43f1803893c4c8888bedecdf998367cf992301a25f24c263f5d36bbfc6fe8b839cad293b3617c1d2c60a814bda0359e3f717fa80fc7324af8827d438c88642754b39b10d18cf5bf42f11177a0bc6b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"9b0275d861117553ecd3c4d7cfe762f88df22c4c4190dac8e0be5872818e2dd765261d58":"":"cfc0b07082d514425b17ce3cb334ec62bc1b3be0be58ca4b":"d3c70ab5ff7a364a9e6dc75132ac67e0d373fa2df301afb5":"09fb41bcceb016e754795e1cce582f0cae91d7bb50245975eb75274819e1e4dcdfbc5e2f13fd26b9a9f9e945cd807ffec4e275681ea7bd33eae13efd8a01edbe02562e77b44b6312f416c3dd0be64f2bae0ba4b9bb36fc3a44841d21d8b3571c0ef644d88cf3cc3c851b256a15f4d716" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"1981c3f9ca58fd10e8377a8d0eb3cf02102aab6f7a033af3135533d9fd850e29ecb8dc9b":"":"f9978ba41df22894ad5f3849c1bdf21f7bbc0128c782e79b":"b4d57de5e18d393273ee9f3ef9736599c6d639f437239219":"fee23db2fcc71624fb39f573e33a1490efc7230c27e9278188251634f9c045bcb26e79ece6a173491475ae44a957c4269570f5469234ca8b6873cc973c8d97178c58cec658a352bad0d4c6001cae5664258db59ad76eb6304d166267eafb46f4dd536a914fa6d1ac58317e7c557d4653" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"c10d4e521350f7cd1853576d03c4bece3e58c8c740859e4e16979499ec1365fc073736a3":"":"78b245520153baacc66846e7a83a2a925f892d4c2ee63c0f":"c8ca7a33de5991d44d7ef7da2d3368cc2cdb93895c394d41":"f92c15f5833800b28dba2d134d4dcfc41abf72f5a700469551e8ccb83bdb0772d14d6b26ba6978169e3ddbe5f214d57930dfcad719bf10d306749246d2624bedd4a18d327b8ae6bee67cf0bfb5f649824bbd0440f042146b95a83e5845ced69a55ba055d5dfc7183c3bb28d61312d274" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"7608b5617785995a1f7144ee5229e4f9c138e418bcc3b5e061a422e8cf875f58650e996d":"":"961c2d33039e60a2871e1f5b82097f6b1cb03836dba5f440":"b18cb52d3858ac5bf59f216a28c0ad49f3dc88c67b5870e0":"4b0313ae873ce5ebf08aec160416492e4c4c797a5017061ea42aefa0685ab19b74a7af11f019b9fb63072b797f7ea3354efd32c4abd1e866405a319ed2fa13fc81019d61326e70e503141b9c77b4879a45e9f36f101dbfff4359147282ef814888fee81640def25f551cee41d12609aa" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"fef7a43fea2ff1a0f624086985e535778d7a73dbc47bc23e9da92edd5d2f273cdbbc0251":"":"836731a57497a69e31f8db4f729774ad65f31d968dbc55a8":"bcca96d808ba98bb50e90afe58fc88e95dc14c3e90c56004":"4f2c64ecd146689064fbf4fcffce2a2ab3910e72ec4faec277f7b9e9ed510381312b01f21650e175ebe9c45c11e977276f13be015243a0cd16a191abbac6462ba96e4e4a1120b28083da933419e8c8f03099906eb1ee012ae291104c6530f51b5e32e6631cab8ef5aad68c0045255ba9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,0,192) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"00197c70b2f0d3e98e4b387ec42a65c4106a1689ab5de61101ee76f4b5e530e7efeaf964":"":"03015311cddd0961ec7a74cb84d835c058a69b964f18a1c1":"5e0d99e0e7c57769a43ea771c467fb5e2df6d06dae035fd6":"72e8ca7666e440ac6a84ab6f7be7e00a536d77315b119b49e5544bf3ead564bd06740f09f6e20564542e0d597ac15a43b5fb5a0239a3362bc3a9efe1ce358ddd9d4f30b72e12ed9d78340c66b194beb4b12e973213931b9cfd0ccbdf540d2c36ce074e2beac7a4ddac59e06e4c7178d3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"e4547261c9dda6bafe9fddf435a80ebc96354c7c2c8847c5d26c6e73a967bfc4ebaf8613":"42849dc8eec611eaa49252067fa60d7d7267d711dc35b576":"815f50fc233f157f96ad0627c355bce407b269dca91af661":"775a1c9da6f58d4eb95b27935ecc01dde31ff17ce2e4e65d":"25adb777523a80a6dbb6ac1fd08e02bfc4b4686cec5efe3ae9aa2d4469eae8c9c3693fdc8e0fc107720b7789ef7331e23fe3799412ec86857ffbba515a5af4d91013b2f17669421c822005b4747942790a11a24c4974f27d54de69727b0ed507b6a48a9d6c53f93e2f3d33df73dd643f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"06d677001d9b3c97fda4d09778aee3de131b4123696b109f81bb6b0d7fbcab3c5842bb83":"f99638d2d4365b662cd83ab4e6a7bbb624e6c72b7b38e81b":"20b7d56f6222bafeeeee59dbca1933d8086218891f3a9bfe":"9de4f2847fe239cb1a3df4b8ff64c25d7b0870f3c9ebe3a3":"e18ff19837ce21e68944659321311b8584dd515ed8a6a1f2b0ac06e69009c3d0cf0489af876201efad962cfd1ba54f540b94131d788d3fea797c4bc079593bc7932baa70abb145a355741a98c584f0fa3298b8310b01e1a6debf5359d7d02b1a6c663100acb56975450bec20e91b736b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"abd38c0465cdfe018f36ffbb7a0ee51d67675ab4f0f1d1e93418bb4cdf6499a371af4d3a":"9a07d5571d841e3c1a9eb3fb48cde3b3e080e1c2e0db6a6d":"a392f79022aebbec0c82b981293627d139dfb5232eb490b4":"f5ce1f6b1e6715c49bea42ff439fdecd9b3b7f2e578133cc":"885c54ad25992fc38260498d6f4d8c73d6159af5f7efef06174da03afcd8384cb28690fd9ded1d26e2dff74aee4dd0c47a0d99c6fc1ec8d8faccbdcf6fdb12a528564ad0d8131bcf5222d7e6c69c52da1acba01b721c98ac5a33725111f12f6d8100009d7cc9efb7ad8d7d95ea4e620d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"b52620e58e0b52b8eed0d6a6c5f4ff6c1483c61fc41dacf72bf475b37d068d061d1edcea":"ef0d233de00d24622b7d4ff4215aa720787fe80aaeb65d7a":"81b735acd3dcb13e65231c2d980fb40ca850370581f230d2":"b2302d024d92cdaed4b12f79b0aeb20c98b2321710fefab2":"ae94204670196baf740768f97b3a095134b384afea667fd90a77a16c8ae390a732ff49a3073a27db0f7a2c8ad5d7cb527d334a37abf0472f292a20f2a28e667d7c9e9f7b8fbdd177f36bf92d66223aee3f712b6c9b064e07ab96f6a77613ea55008fb4f8fbcb2f1ccbb0da75316c1faa" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"2592a5ed86ff64b9b4c1fbb81222d1bfbc53f3a639571ecc356084058b8855237da15c50":"a626c51ec99e72431485d2ba027ed9cabcae7b86116abe4f":"c430876552d28776570923c6b74e42c3210f01104006bf11":"fe2ebc239690a4eb18a0b5e75d08831cc2eb07c982c63973":"005045ade7cc15467b5ea784649d9804540a842ffba4db8d44df4f44c69480bd4fe965b645aed09d62190daeb2693a2192aec3d71453a8218e4700201ab922ac35d241d95150b47cc7a051897be4d958f2da5c2ebbfceb1c550cb67b32ff83ce4fd845fd826a0d2469b506f5158765fa" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"376785f5ff8a82ceb0aaeb010533cc1089059ec583c302b14bc47e2cb8c2711839ce7f68":"6d345e248339e893f75696c039ac47e5678696fd489a393c":"b0f3fa1131c3fdd5c7fd2de93931e45a66fa030422ac65db":"c66341e3f9fb82e3ba85f229fcb7d34457e4a6ba8396b548":"b92d17e1be94b0385a8cc3e16189811fef7b284a1b0b6b2520fde79af7826c745e746486a70cd8dd9930b163da75f7eea7c216e758d9ed6c745dcd7bde19bb9382c1f7c37cd15b703b884d7d452c255b25048a836844c5ff28aaacf733a52c28904b36e1b51729d7aed81d601c0872dd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"2cc2557582c5a90cd2ad0c4a5578eb0bbc9bde41b126e46d8e9c3563341ba238414eb628":"9d2fbb9153e3ffefae0770c79de10db069a5ff9f50e31787":"2e54e32539e27ef76ac1eeae2e30c2385647652e20903b39":"1f4e01255908c3c8049521f8972c01ede7dc76c425c59640":"7d6ccdfab33f322898c470be02d8257e0e952dd10f407b3a8eaeeba47c541d968d79eca29e15541c1505fe4f19a41797c9ca2280c06261fe9d0c58bab65d16f5794b57566b8795c38c7b43d4761c8fd107beb95147a0fe61ae8dc31e25eb2957e44c0463ca7c1b589ea587f0cae1428c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"e670f896326b76034e43cd85f6f6f11fe6582d3471a8eb88d37a2302de010aac0e556860":"5e218091abee1960ef81f4d5a80415e388bd0cc79bed70cf":"7cf84b9ff30dbd0f608fb21646d7c5b542fba50adb38d5df":"c1c4aabe7616a4c97a4dbdadb08a9b63c6e10cef8d463fd8":"d8fbd557fccf31829b5ee11b05d0353e725bff15fdaac94d21ce95d40eff55edd852b264b515ec6384e2d28d014e47a2df0d4f56a4ec79309b06affc62915e231d62d02bfc60220c72b7ca7ba5671f882839b791ef534e707a04e5274c1011f7941fe1075a5d06a47af9fb2f65c1f211" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"0576bb2d4c663b781193509251e2f76b0a8bb792e79449600c2c154feb70cf33ca942508":"ad15e4fce9f4dea43c12ff9f9d50c963b335a01332541154":"3c8a4d6ab96cebf9d02b5663dcb0e0db23699623455cd4b5":"43d2d3a8d023fa1785ce4781a15eb20ad787685a47da08f0":"a68e648cb07da2eb795a8c898c8631e565f33c2fe9c35e686d6f85fef145446cb79bb6d17bdc8224bfe437468a9630ed03c517caf1226c278ae510c869d67d50b6bf1cb378a34035041f290d8dbc123650ab4fbe5cf6074ed0ba90e45d9a8ae08566ea3d3a00ee3741c8ec8f56dcc78c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"f597ce05b9a5b1cf3847bbd4171e5085384cc256f77ac61573b435726cbd538b93de9f55":"573cf859f8fea05f16c6d03cb4e524b91e917f39eeeb1d68":"2a842454870c3f7936f8036b453d219557ca341f261d2519":"7afd8cc269899acd88f5c55af29fb0c4ce678a0d8ebf924f":"8162c16c1ce3d5c6b7c96f0281f4220569a882277935752b86e7d3f54646b276cb77ed96da73799911fca3d19d34c1f0b21068a472afcb77410412eff2abd03c753a009ce02b0e995477546366020294eff0ef0da66f31a413313e2774ca04f09a4d5076e0e85ca97d5bb6faac4c0c27" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"d5b5374fe143035c4fea41667bc8bc7d46000998cc82ab32a0040c705e01f9b354e8f16e":"ed8bb219e67515874c5b9e3f6ae6e4dfa9c42d1e69204e8b":"70f03fe6e78cc34ec1678b2708fcd8ae3300183ea15ccfc7":"9c641d7e73d1a2b819e113747d74a979b74c444ed36b7391":"d50df8e3e17c0f5e19673ba2097d1d0c4cf7a9def7465a5b91ac8d49ae1b6a821fe9efde841ec9064555c0e2d6cdfa41f1089f22a5c27090c5a136660d1af586a1e131a853f19bc3c8f4c79aa09e39c2f22b4456c667ec907e2a4124218665e7cce50399ae1e19ba9c2399f470444839" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"74d7c8c9b170e59e4f128c8df1955838df5c8071a5e85439d71e785c68b37e10efb39c9a":"be3d54203a1078d051519137774d5d851e81be026155eb78":"23f7b6758d79de580ed3eb995fc173da74939837aa8d9eb4":"6f0d5a333ddea0d38362df0dc3ebaa2be2fe5825ddb0ce84":"4462fc32110b25b3797c5cafaad830e8a4346d9270fed98b30f1345a7a8dde19bf5365d6f3788e7f715feb2762af263839c8c8188908c61120743d977d71c51f6324d887bbda380fc07eff09a31c2332e7b1aa1692c59c3379db95fc21cf711c004c4d385fe14f48f2f2a31bcce6aaec" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"eaf27c3f69279fd523c0c3a1da5fc4f01ed64c27ffcfe3c1c596482f5baae1434e8c687c":"b038829fc95dcba8645ce40a306491c893f48139ae30a071":"fbbf7abb8cc2612eeea6d9463efd55c47245e01713332bd6":"ccd7e81f529de1ff4e65fc63d34c262ffde7ee49e6707197":"96dfb7445057633b2f0deb69135d10d0a2dc53faa9cded55ddfb8edc63f5424f8fec7627597a30328177dde7963f76f9e5412b5b440256c6a3f0c7c7fa02ca49e19ea176abac013696e9d529f65e51d4a7348e42dd254bbf19d9632d6c875b8ecd7a4139f1bf020a159d2a30af8d645f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"319cbf2b11b37c831c654b6cec2570dc6d7abeeab185272a518eaef30faa5acf5c8b254d":"9effa141f7466b659eaa50c32c8e683c2640f54027ab6aa5":"63b3acc237588cdf41c0d4bef16c4890cf3d458fcf1de8ea":"573d6a7960aeccc3280a8aee4d72e587e9d196b7b270e329":"8a568086fdd9f01206a5aaee34d253bbc9339112d3170699b9a1392e97062d5d0f16240114dc1789269217c5b4b2974895b20903890f7dacfef46fa4a4d02891c70425ab3b42f53d72f852faf3713ac7b8207dc453279f4df345091b8bfeb54983095c2d190358293ba507bdfdc39b24" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-224,192+96,192,192) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"56f3f5b08da10ead0c986dd2ae5553e4b2eeeb47ad5d22197b12b89b4a871c51c0d85554":"96c8630a1f4187fb0794601cf51e7e333e71756a0421ff43":"875e5bc9548917a82b6dc95200d92bf4218dba7ab316a5fe":"4d3f5678b00d47bb9d0936486de60407eaf1282fda99f595":"90969961ef9283b9e600aead7985455e692db817165189665f498f219b1e5f277e586b237851305d5205548b565faeb02bb7b5f477c80ba94b0563e24d9309d2957a675848140f5601f698459db5899b20dda68f000ccb18dcd39dfae49955b8478fd50bb59d772045beb338622efa5a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"ca851911349384bffe89de1cbdc46e6831e44d34a4fb935ee285dd14b71a7488659ba96c601dc69fc902940805ec0ca8":"":"":"":"e528e9abf2dece54d47c7e75e5fe302149f817ea9fb4bee6f4199697d04d5b89d54fbb978a15b5c443c9ec21036d2460b6f73ebad0dc2aba6e624abf07745bc107694bb7547bb0995f70de25d6b29e2d3011bb19d27676c07162c8b5ccde0668961df86803482cb37ed6d5c0bb8d50cf1f50d476aa0458bdaba806f48be9dcb8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"79737479ba4e7642a221fcfd1b820b134e9e3540a35bb48ffae29c20f5418ea33593259c092bef4129bc2c6c9e19f343":"":"":"":"cf5ad5984f9e43917aa9087380dac46e410ddc8a7731859c84e9d0f31bd43655b924159413e2293b17610f211e09f770f172b8fb693a35b85d3b9e5e63b1dc252ac0e115002e9bedfb4b5b6fd43f33b8e0eafb2d072e1a6fee1f159df9b51e6c8da737e60d5032dd30544ec51558c6f080bdbdab1de8a939e961e06b5f1aca37" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b340907445b97a8b589264de4a17c0bea11bb53ad72f9f33297f05d2879d898d65cb27735d83c0708f72684ea58f7ee5":"":"":"":"75183aaaf3574bc68003352ad655d0e9ce9dd17552723b47fab0e84ef903694a32987eeddbdc48efd24195dbdac8a46ba2d972f5808f23a869e71343140361f58b243e62722088fe10a98e43372d252b144e00c89c215a76a121734bdc485486f65c0b16b8963524a3a70e6f38f169c12f6cbdd169dd48fe4421a235847a23ff" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"8e159f60060a7d6a7e6fe7c9f769c30b98acb1240b25e7ee33f1da834c0858e7c39d35052201bdcce4e127a04f04d644":"":"":"":"62910a77213967ea93d6457e255af51fc79d49629af2fccd81840cdfbb4910991f50a477cbd29edd8a47c4fec9d141f50dfde7c4d8fcab473eff3cc2ee9e7cc90871f180777a97841597b0dd7e779eff9784b9cc33689fd7d48c0dcd341515ac8fecf5c55a6327aea8d58f97220b7462373e84e3b7417a57e80ce946d6120db5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"74755f196305f7fb6689b2fe6835dc1d81484fc481a6b8087f649a1952f4df6ac36387a544a5f2b78007651a7b74b749":"":"":"":"b2896f3af4375dab67e8062d82c1a005ef4ed119d13a9f18371b1b873774418684805fd659bfd69964f83a5cfe08667ddad672cafd16befffa9faed49865214f703951b443e6dca22edb636f3308380144b9333de4bcb0735710e4d9266786342fc53babe7bdbe3c01a3addb7f23c63ce2834729fabbd419b47beceb4a460236" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"4b222718f56a3260b3c2625a4cf80950b7d6c1250f170bd5c28b118abdf23b2f7aed52d0016fcaef0b6492bc40bbe0e9":"":"":"":"a6da029b3665cd39fd50a54c553f99fed3626f4902ffe322dc51f0670dfe8742ed48415cf04bbad5ed3b23b18b7892d170a7dcf3ef8052d5717cb0c1a8b3010d9a9ea5de70ae5356249c0e098946030c46d9d3d209864539444374d8fbcae068e1d6548fa59e6562e6b2d1acbda8da0318c23752ebc9be0c1c1c5b3cf66dd967" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b512633f27fb182a076917e39888ba3ff35d23c3742eb8f3c635a044163768e0e2c39b84629a3de5c301db5643af1c21":"":"":"":"fb931d0d0194a97b48d5d4c231fdad5c61aedf1c3a55ac24983ecbf38487b1c93396c6b86ff3920cfa8c77e0146de835ea5809676e702dee6a78100da9aa43d8ec0bf5720befa71f82193205ac2ea403e8d7e0e6270b366dc4200be26afd9f63b7e79286a35c688c57cbff55ac747d4c28bb80a2b2097b3b62ea439950d75dff" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"aae3ffc8605a975befefcea0a7a286642bc3b95fb37bd0eb0585a4cabf8b3d1e9504c3c0c4310c1c0746a036c91d9034":"":"":"":"2819bd3b0d216dad59ddd6c354c4518153a2b04374b07c49e64a8e4d055575dfbc9a8fcde68bd257ff1ba5c6000564b46d6dd7ecd9c5d684fd757df62d85211575d3562d7814008ab5c8bc00e7b5a649eae2318665b55d762de36eba00c2906c0e0ec8706edb493e51ca5eb4b9f015dc932f262f52a86b11c41e9a6d5b3bd431" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b9475210b79b87180e746df704b3cbc7bf8424750e416a7fbb5ce3ef25a82cc624baf03599c10df6ef44065d715a93f7":"":"":"":"ae12d784f796183c50db5a1a283aa35ed9a2b685dacea97c596ff8c294906d1b1305ba1f80254eb062b874a8dfffa3378c809ab2869aa51a4e6a489692284a25038908a347342175c38401193b8afc498077e10522bec5c70882b7f760ea5946870bd9fc72961eedbe8bff4fd58c7cc1589bb4f369ed0d3bf26c5bbc62e0b2b2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"27838eb44ceccb4e36210703ebf38f659bc39dd3277cd76b7a9bcd6bc964b62839cfe0210db2e7b0eb52a387476e7ea1":"":"":"":"e5e72a53605d2aaa67832f97536445ab774dd9bff7f13a0d11fd27bf6593bfb52309f2d4f09d147192199ea584503181de87002f4ee085c7dc18bf32ce5315647a3708e6f404d6588c92b2dda599c131aa350d18c747b33dc8eda15cf40e95263d1231e1b4b68f8d829f86054d49cfdb1b8d96ab0465110569c8583a424a099a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"d7129e4f47008ad60c9b5d081ff4ca8eb821a6e4deb91608bf4e2647835373a5a72882773f78c2fc4878295840a53012":"":"":"":"0cbf48585c5de9183b7ff76557f8fc9ebcfdfde07e588a8641156f61b7952725bbee954f87e9b937513b16bba0f2e523d095114658e00f0f3772175acfcb3240a01de631c19c5a834c94cc58d04a6837f0d2782fa53d2f9f65178ee9c837222494c799e64c60406069bd319549b889fa00a0032dd7ba5b1cc9edbf58de82bfcd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"67fe5e300c513371976c80de4b20d4473889c9f1214bce718bc32d1da3ab7532e256d88497738a33923aa003a8d7845c":"":"":"":"b44660d64ef7bcebc7a1ab71f8407a02285c7592d755ae6766059e894f694373ed9c776c0cfc8594413eefb400ed427e158d687e28da3ecc205e0f7370fb089676bbb0fa591ec8d916c3d5f18a3eb4a417120705f3e2198154cd60648dbfcfc901242e15711cacd501b2c2826abe870ba32da785ed6f1fdc68f203d1ab43a64f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"de8142541255c46d66efc6173b0fe3ffaf5936c897a3ce2e9d5835616aafa2cbd01f9002c407127bc3297a561d89b81d":"":"":"":"64d1020929d74716446d8a4e17205d0756b5264867811aa24d0d0da8644db25d5cde474143c57d12482f6bf0f31d10af9d1da4eb6d701bdd605a8db74fb4e77f79aaa9e450afda50b18d19fae68f03db1d7b5f1738d2fdce9ad3ee9461b58ee242daf7a1d72c45c9213eca34e14810a9fca5208d5c56d8066bab1586f1513de7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"4a8e0bd90bdb12f7748ad5f147b115d7385bb1b06aee7d8b76136a25d779bcb77f3cce4af8c8ce3c45bdf23c6b181a00":"":"":"":"320c7ca4bbeb7af977bc054f604b5086a3f237aa5501658112f3e7a33d2231f5536d2c85c1dad9d9b0bf7f619c81be4854661626839c8c10ae7fdc0c0b571be34b58d66da553676167b00e7d8e49f416aacb2926c6eb2c66ec98bffae20864cf92496db15e3b09e530b7b9648be8d3916b3c20a3a779bec7d66da63396849aaf" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"451ed024bc4b95f1025b14ec3616f5e42e80824541dc795a2f07500f92adc6652f28e6ee8de5879db1eccd58c994e5f0":"":"":"":"3fb637085ab75f4e95655faae95885166a5fbb423bb03dbf0543be063bcd48799c4f05d4e522634d9275fe02e1edd920e26d9accd43709cb0d8f6e50aa54a5f3bdd618be23cf73ef736ed0ef7524b0d14d5bef8c8aec1cf1ed3e1c38a808b35e61a44078127c7cb3a8fd7addfa50fcf3ff3bc6d6bc355d5436fe9b71eb44f7fd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"d3cc4d1acf3dde0c4bd2290d262337042dc632948223d3a2eaab87da44295fbd0109b0e729f457328aa18569a9224921":"":"3c311848183c9a212a26f27f8c6647e40375e466a0857cc39c4e47575d53f1f6":"fcb9abd19ccfbccef88c9c39bfb3dd7b1c12266c9808992e305bc3cff566e4e4":"9c7b758b212cd0fcecd5daa489821712e3cdea4467b560ef5ddc24ab47749a1f1ffdbbb118f4e62fcfca3371b8fbfc5b0646b83e06bfbbab5fac30ea09ea2bc76f1ea568c9be0444b2cc90517b20ca825f2d0eccd88e7175538b85d90ab390183ca6395535d34473af6b5a5b88f5a59ee7561573337ea819da0dcc3573a22974" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"f97a3cfd91faa046b9e61b9493d436c4931f604b22f1081521b3419151e8ff0611f3a7d43595357d58120bd1e2dd8aed":"":"517289afe444a0fe5ed1a41dbbb5eb17150079bdd31e29cf2ff30034d8268e3b":"88028d29ef80b4e6f0fe12f91d7449fe75062682e89c571440c0c9b52c42a6e0":"c6871cff0824fe55ea7689a52229886730450e5d362da5bf590dcf9acd67fed4cb32107df5d03969a66b1f6494fdf5d63d5b4d0d34ea7399a07d0116126d0d518c7c55ba46e12f62efc8fe28a51c9d428e6d371d7397ab319fc73ded4722e5b4f30004032a6128df5e7497ecf82ca7b0a50e867ef6728a4f509a8c859087039c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"0f2f23d64f481cabec7abb01db3aabf125c3173a044b9bf26844300b69dcac8b9a5ae13232b43aa19cfe8d7958b4b590":"":"ec4c7a62acab73385f567da10e892ff395a0929f959231a5628188ce0c26e818":"6b97b8c6b6bb8935e676c410c17caa8042aa3145f856d0a32b641e4ae5298648":"7480a361058bd9afa3db82c9d7586e42269102013f6ec5c269b6d05f17987847748684766b44918fd4b65e1648622fc0e0954178b0279dfc9fa99b66c6f53e51c4860131e9e0644287a4afe4ca8e480417e070db68008a97c3397e4b320b5d1a1d7e1d18a95cfedd7d1e74997052bf649d132deb9ec53aae7dafdab55e6dae93" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"53c56660c78481be9c63284e005fcc14fbc7fb27732c9bf1366d01a426765a31dc7a14d0eb5b0b3534e717a0b3c64614":"":"3aa848706ecb877f5bedf4ffc332d57c22e08747a47e75cff6f0fd1316861c95":"9a401afa739b8f752fddacd291e0b854f5eff4a55b515e20cb319852189d3722":"5c0eb420e0bf41ce9323e815310e4e8303cd677a8a8b023f31f0d79f0ca15aeb636099a369fd074d69889865eac1b72ab3cbfebdb8cf460b00072802e2ec648b1349a5303be4ccaadd729f1a9ea17482fd026aaeb93f1602bc1404b9853adde40d6c34b844cf148bc088941ecfc1642c8c0b9778e45f3b07e06e21ee2c9e0300" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"f63c804404902db334c54bb298fc271a21d7acd9f770278e089775710bf4fdd73e45009ea9cb2a36ba1aa4bf39178200":"":"d165a13dc8cc43f3f0952c3f5d3de4136954d983683d4a3e6d2dc4c89bf23423":"75106bc86d0336df85097f6af8e80e2da59046a03fa65b06706b8bbc7ffc6785":"6363139bba32c22a0f5cd23ca6d437b5669b7d432f786b8af445471bee0b2d24c9d5f2f93717cbe00d1f010cc3b9c515fc9f7336d53d4d26ba5c0d76a90186663c8582eb739c7b6578a3328bf68dc2cec2cd89b3a90201f6993adcc854df0f5c6974d0f5570765a15fe03dbce28942dd2fd16ba2027e68abac83926969349af8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"2aaca9147da66c176615726b69e3e851cc3537f5f279fe7344233d8e44cfc99d4e171f080af9a6081bee9f183ac9e340":"":"d75a2a6eb66c3833e50f5ec3d2e434cf791448d618026d0c360806d120ded669":"b643b74c15b37612e6577ed7ca2a4c67a78d560af9eb50a4108fca742e87b8d6":"501dcdc977f4ba856f24eaa4968b374bebb3166b280334cb510232c31ebffde10fa47b7840ef3fe3b77725c2272d3a1d4219baf23e0290c622271edcced58838cf428f0517425d2e19e0d8c89377eecfc378245f283236fafa466c914b99672ceafab369e8889a0c866d8bd639db9fb797254262c6fd44cfa9045ad6340a60ef" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a2e4cd48a5cf918d6f55942d95fcb4e8465cdc4f77b7c52b6fae5b16a25ca306bef036716440db6e6d333d9d760b7ca8":"":"bfa591c7287f3f931168f95e38869441d1f9a11035ad8ea625bb61b9ea17591c":"c00c735463bca215adc372cb892b05e939bf669583341c06d4e31d0e5b363a37":"e7d136af69926a5421d4266ee0420fd729f2a4f7c295d3c966bdfa05268180b508b8a2852d1b3a06fd2ab3e13c54005123ef319f42d0c6d3a575e6e7e1496cb28aacadbcf83740fba8f35fcee04bb2ed8a51db3d3362b01094a62fb57e33c99a432f29fce6676cffbbcc05107e794e75e44a02d5e6d9d748c5fbff00a0178d65" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"95a67771cba69011a79776e713145d309edae56fad5fd6d41d83eaff89df6e5ebe5b5164e31ecc51ba6f7c3c5199eb33":"":"065f693b229a7c4fd373cd15b3807552dd9bf98c5485cef361949d4e7d774b53":"9afb62406f0e812c4f156d58b19a656c904813c1b4a45a0029ae7f50731f8014":"f61b61a6e79a41183e8ed6647899d2dc85cdaf5c3abf5c7f3bf37685946dc28f4923dc842f2d4326bd6ce0d50a84cb3ba869d72a36e246910eba6512ba36cd7ed3a5437c9245b00a344308c792b668b458d3c3e16dee2fbec41867da31084d46d8ec168de2148ef64fc5b72069abf5a6ada1ead2b7146bb793ff1c9c3690fa56" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a459e1815cbca4514ec8094d5ab2414a557ba6fe10e613c345338d0521e4bf9062221392e2552e76cd0d36df6e6068eb":"":"0a3642b02b23b3ef62c701a63401124022f5b896de86dab6e6c7451497aa1dcc":"c80514865901371c45ba92d9f95d50bb7c9dd1768cb3dfbc45b968da94965c6e":"464e6977b8adaef307c9623e41c357013249c9ffd77f405f3925cebb69f151ce8fbb6a277164002aee7858fc224f6499042aa1e6322deee9a5d133c31d640e12a7487c731ba03ad866a24675badb1d79220c40be689f79c2a0be93cb4dada3e0eac4ab140cb91998b6f11953e68f2319b050c40f71c34de9905ae41b2de1c2f6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"252c2cad613e002478162861880979ee4e323025eebb6fb2e0aa9f200e28e0a1d001bc9a8f2c8c242e4369df0c191989":"":"9bcfc61cb2bc000034bb3db980eb47c76fb5ecdd40553eff113368d639b947fd":"8b0565c767c2610ee0014582e9fbecb96e173005b60e9581503a6dca5637a26e":"e96c15fe8a60692b0a7d67171e0195ff6e1c87aab844221e71700d1bbee75feea695f6a740c9760bbe0e812ecf4061d8f0955bc0195e18c4fd1516ebca50ba6a6db86881737dbab8321707675479b87611db6af2c97ea361a5484555ead454defb1a64335de964fc803d40f3a6f057893d2afc25725754f4f00abc51920743dc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"8be0ca6adc8b3870c9d69d6021bc1f1d8eb9e649073d35ee6c5aa0b7e56ad8a59d1265f7d51fdb65377f1e6edd6ae0e4":"":"da86167ac997c406bb7979f423986a84ec6614d6caa7afc10aff0699a9b2cf7f":"e4baa3c555950b53e2bfdba480cb4c94b59381bac1e33947e0c22e838a9534cf":"64384ecc4ea6b458efc227ca697eac5510092265520c0a0d8a0ccf9ed3ca9d58074671188c6a7ad16d0b050cdc072c125d7298d3a31d9f044a9ee40da0089a84fea28cc7f05f1716db952fad29a0e779635cb7a912a959be67be2f0a4170aace2981802e2ff6467e5b46f0ffbff3b42ba5935fd553c82482ac266acf1cd247d7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"d43a75b6adf26d60322284cb12ac38327792442aa8f040f60a2f331b33ac4a8f0682f8b091f811afacaacaec9b04d279":"":"7fd3b8f512940da7de5d80199d9a7b42670c04a945775a3dba869546cbb9bc65":"2575db20bc7aafc2a90a5dabab760db851d754777bc9f05616af1858b24ff3da":"0da7a8dc73c163014bf0841913d3067806456bbca6d5de92b85534c6545467313648d71ef17c923d090dc92cff8d4d1a9a2bb63e001dc2e8ab1a597999be3d6cf70ff63fee9985801395fbd4f4990430c4259fcae4fa1fcd73dc3187ccc102d04af7c07532885e5a226fc42809c48f22eecf4f6ab996ae4fcb144786957d9f41" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"64352f236af5d32067a529a8fd05ba00a338c9de306371a0b00c36e610a48d18df99ed2c7608c870624b962a5dc68acd":"":"da416335e7aaf60cf3d06fb438735ce796aad09034f8969c8f8c3f81e32fef24":"a28c07c21a2297311adf172c19e83ca0a87731bdffb80548978d2d1cd82cf8a3":"132b9f25868729e3853d3c51f99a3b5fae6d4204bea70890daf62e042b776a526c8fb831b80a6d5d3f153237df1fd39b6fd9137963f5516d9cdd4e3f9195c46e9972c15d3edc6606e3368bde1594977fb88d0ca6e6f5f3d057ccadc7d7dab77dfc42658a1e972aa446b20d418286386a52dfc1c714d2ac548713268b0b709729" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"282f4d2e05a2cd30e9087f5633089389449f04bac11df718c90bb351cd3653a590a7daf3c0de9ea286081efc4a684dfb":"":"2630b4ccc7271cc379cb580b0aaede3d3aa8c1c7ba002cf791f0752c3d739007":"c31d69de499f1017be44e3d4fa77ecebc6a9b9934749fcf136f267b29115d2cc":"c899094520e0197c37b91dd50778e20a5b950decfb308d39f1db709447ae48f6101d9abe63a783fbb830eec1d359a5f61a2013728966d349213ee96382614aa4135058a967627183810c6622a2158cababe3b8ab99169c89e362108bf5955b4ffc47440f87e4bad0d36bc738e737e072e64d8842e7619f1be0af1141f05afe2d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,0,256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"13c752b9e745ce77bbc7c0dbda982313d3fe66f903e83ebd8dbe4ff0c11380e9f1a533095d6174164bd7c82532464ae7":"":"4f53db89b9ba7fc00767bc751fb8f3c103fe0f76acd6d5c7891ab15b2b7cf67c":"582c2a7d34679088cca6bd28723c99aac07db46c332dc0153d1673256903b446":"6311f4c0c4cd1f86bd48349abb9eb930d4f63df5e5f7217d1d1b91a71d8a6938b0ad2b3e897bd7e3d8703db125fab30e03464fad41e5ddf5bf9aeeb5161b244468cfb26a9d956931a5412c97d64188b0da1bd907819c686f39af82e91cfeef0cbffb5d1e229e383bed26d06412988640706815a6e820796876f416653e464961" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"5cacc68165a2e2ee20812f35ec73a79dbf30fd475476ac0c44fc6174cdac2b556f885496c1e63af620becd9e71ecb824":"e72dd8590d4ed5295515c35ed6199e9d211b8f069b3058caa6670b96ef1208d0":"":"":"f1012cf543f94533df27fedfbf58e5b79a3dc517a9c402bdbfc9a0c0f721f9d53faf4aafdc4b8f7a1b580fcaa52338d4bd95f58966a243cdcd3f446ed4bc546d9f607b190dd69954450d16cd0e2d6437067d8b44d19a6af7a7cfa8794e5fbd728e8fb2f2e8db5dd4ff1aa275f35886098e80ff844886060da8b1e7137846b23b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"8df013b4d103523073917ddf6a869793059e9943fc8654549e7ab22f7c29f122da2625af2ddd4abcce3cf4fa4659d84e":"b571e66d7c338bc07b76ad3757bb2f9452bf7e07437ae8581ce7bc7c3ac651a9":"":"":"b91cba4cc84fa25df8610b81b641402768a2097234932e37d590b1154cbd23f97452e310e291c45146147f0da2d81761fe90fba64f94419c0f662b28c1ed94da487bb7e73eec798fbcf981b791d1be4f177a8907aa3c401643a5b62b87b89d66b3a60e40d4a8e4e9d82af6d2700e6f535cdb51f75c321729103741030ccc3a56" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"565b2b77937ba46536b0f693b3d5e4a8a24563f9ef1f676e8b5b2ef17823832f4ef3064ec29f5b7f9686d75a23d170e3":"3b722433226c9dba745087270ab3af2c909425ba6d39f5ce46f07256068319d9":"":"":"d144ee7f8363d128872f82c15663fe658413cd42651098e0a7c51a970de75287ec943f9061e902280a5a9e183a7817a44222d198fbfab184881431b4adf35d3d1019da5a90b3696b2349c8fba15a56d0f9d010a88e3f9eeedb67a69bcaa71281b41afa11af576b765e66858f0eb2e4ec4081609ec81da81df0a0eb06787340ea" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"fc3832a91b1dcdcaa944f2d93cbceb85c267c491b7b59d017cde4add79a836b6d5e76ce9eabafed06e33a913e395c5e0":"ffc5f6eefd51da64a0f67b5f0cf60d7ab43fc7836bca650022a0cee57a43c148":"":"":"0e713c6cc9a4dbd4249201d12b7bf5c69c3e18eb504bf3252db2f43675e17d99b6a908400cea304011c2e54166dae1f20260008efe4e06a87e0ce525ca482bca223a902a14adcf2374a739a5dfeaf14cadd72efa4d55d15154c974d9521535bcb70658c5b6c944020afb04a87b223b4b8e5d89821704a9985bb010405ba8f3d4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"8009eb2cb49fdf16403bcdfd4a9f952191062acb9cc111eca019f957fb9f4451355598866952394b1eddd85d59f81c9d":"09ff1d4b97d83b223d002e05f754be480d13ba968e5aac306d71cc9fc49cc2dd":"":"":"9550903c2f02cf77c8f9c9a37041d0040ee1e3ef65ba1a1fbbcf44fb7a2172bd6b3aaabe850281c3a1778277bacd09614dfefececac64338ae24a1bf150cbf9d9541173a82ecba08aa19b75abb779eb10efa4257d5252e8afcac414bc3bb5d3006b6f36fb9daea4c8c359ef6cdbeff27c1068571dd3c89dc87eda9190086888d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a6e4c9a8bd6da23b9c2b10a7748fd08c4f782fadbac7ea501c17efdc6f6087bdacdc47edf1d3b21d0aec7631abb6d7d5":"c16ee0908a5886dccf332fbc61de9ec7b7972d2c4c83c477409ce8a15c623294":"":"":"a52f93ccb363e2bdf0903622c3caedb7cffd04b726052b8d455744c71b76dee1b71db9880dc3c21850489cb29e412d7d80849cfa9151a151dcbf32a32b4a54cac01d3200200ed66a3a5e5c131a49655ffbf1a8824ff7f265690dffb4054df46a707b9213924c631c5bce379944c856c4f7846e281ac89c64fad3a49909dfb92b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"59d6307460a9bdd392dfc0904973991d585696010a71e52d590a5039b4849fa434a0aafb95917cbf8c38fc5548373c05":"0407b7c57bc11361747c3d67526c36e228028a5d0b145d66ab9a2fe4b07507a0":"":"":"299aba0661315211b09d2861855d0b4b125ab24649461341af6abd903ed6f025223b3299f2126fcad44c675166d800619cf49540946b12138989417904324b0ddad121327211a297f11259c9c34ce4c70c322a653675f78d385e4e2443f8058d141195e17e0bd1b9d44bf3e48c376e6eb44ef020b11cf03eb141c46ecb43cf3d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"9ae3506aadbc8358696ba1ba17e876e1157b7048235921503d36d9211b4303429abf7d66afee5d2b811cba358bbc527d":"0d645f6238e9ceb038e4af9772426ca110c5be052f8673b8b5a65c4e53d2f519":"":"":"5f032c7fec6320fe423b6f38085cbad59d826085afe915247b3d546c4c6b174554dd4877c0d671de9554b505393a44e71f209b70f991ac8aa6e08f983fff2a4c817b0cd26c12b2c929378506489a75b2025b358cb5d0400821e7e252ac6376cd94a40c911a7ed8b6087e3de5fa39fa6b314c3ba1c593b864ce4ff281a97c325b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"96ae3b8775b36da2a29b889ad878941f43c7d51295d47440cd0e3c49991931091fe022a6fc0237b055d4d6a7036b18d5":"1e40e97362d0a823d3964c26b81ab53825c56446c5261689011886f19b08e5c2":"":"":"e707cd14b06ce1e6dbcceaedbf08d88891b03f44ad6a797bd12fdeb557d0151df9346a028dec004844ca46adec3051dafb345895fa9f4604d8a13c8ff66ae093fa63c4d9c0816d55a0066d31e8404c841e87b6b2c7b5ae9d7afb6840c2f7b441bf2d3d8bd3f40349c1c014347c1979213c76103e0bece26ad7720601eff42275" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"33f5120396336e51ee3b0b619b5f873db05ca57cda86aeae2964f51480d149926f1f6e9807ba5393edcf3cb4e4bb6113":"3709605af44d90196867c927512aa8ba31837063337b4879408d91a05c8efa9f":"":"":"8b8291126ded9acef12516025c99ccce225d844308b584b872c903c7bc6467599a1cead003dc4c70f6d519f5b51ce0da57f53da90dbe8f666a1a1dde297727fee2d44cebd1301fc1ca75956a3fcae0d374e0df6009b668fd21638d2b733e6902d22d5bfb4af1b455975e08eef0ebe4dc87705801e7776583c8de11672729f723" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"ad300b799005f290fee7f930eebce158b98fb6cb449987fe433f955456b3530006aa2514e4bd114edf7ac105cfef2772":"87ada711465e4169da2a74c931afb9b5a5b190d07b7af342aa99570401c3ee8a":"":"":"80d7c606ff49415a3a92ba1f2943235c01339c8f9cd0b0511fbfdf3ef23c42ffff008524193faaa4b7f2f2eb0cfa221d9df89bd373fe4e158ec06fad3ecf1eb48b8239b0bb826ee69d773883a3e8edac66254610ff70b6609836860e39ea1f3bfa04596fee1f2baca6cebb244774c6c3eb4af1f02899eba8f4188f91776de16f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"130b044e2c15ab89375e54b72e7baae6d4cad734b013a090f4df057e634f6ff065fd6ac602cd44107d705dbc066e52b6":"f374aba16f34d54aae5e494505b67d3818ef1c08ea24967a76876d4361379aec":"":"":"5d179534fb0dba3526993ed8e27ec9f915183d967336bb24352c67f4ab5d7935d3168e57008da851515efbaecb69904b6d899d3bfa6e9805659aef2942c4903875b8fcbc0d1d24d1c075f0ff667c1fc240d8b410dff582fa71fa30878955ce2ed786ef32ef852706e62439b69921f26e84e0f54f62b938f04905f05fcd7c2204" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"716430e999964b35459c17921fe5f60e09bd9ab234cb8f4ba4932bec4a60a1d59533b711e061b07d505da707cafbca03":"372ae616d1a1fc45c5aecad0939c49b9e01c93bfb40c835eebd837af747f079d":"":"":"a80d6a1b2d0ce01fe0d26e70fb73da20d45841cf01bfbd50b90d2751a46114c0e758cb787d281a0a9cf62f5c8ce2ee7ca74fefff330efe74926acca6d6f0646e4e3c1a1e52fce1d57b88beda4a5815896f25f38a652cc240deb582921c8b1d03a1da966dd04c2e7eee274df2cd1837096b9f7a0d89a82434076bc30173229a60" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"7679f154296e6d580854826539003a82d1c54e2e062c619d00da6c6ac820789b55d12941b0896462e7d888e5322a99a3":"ba4d1ed696f58ef64596c76cee87cc1ca83069a79e7982b9a06f9d62f4209faf":"":"":"10dc7cd2bb68c2c28f76d1b04ae2aa287071e04c3b688e1986b05cc1209f691daa55868ebb05b633c75a40a32b49663185fe5bb8f906008347ef51590530948b87613920014802e5864e0758f012e1eae31f0c4c031ef823aecfb2f8a73aaa946fc507037f9050b277bdeaa023123f9d22da1606e82cb7e56de34bf009eccb46" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"8ca4a964e1ff68753db86753d09222e09b888b500be46f2a3830afa9172a1d6da59394e0af764e2f21cf751f623ffa6c":"eb8164b3bf6c1750a8de8528af16cffdf400856d82260acd5958894a98afeed5":"":"":"fc5701b508f0264f4fdb88414768e1afb0a5b445400dcfdeddd0eba67b4fea8c056d79a69fd050759fb3d626b29adb8438326fd583f1ba0475ce7707bd294ab01743d077605866425b1cbd0f6c7bba972b30fbe9fce0a719b044fcc1394354895a9f8304a2b5101909808ddfdf66df6237142b6566588e4e1e8949b90c27fc1f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"5d3286bc53a258a53ba781e2c4dcd79a790e43bbe0e89fb3eed39086be34174bc5422294b7318952ace7055ab7570abf":"2dba094d008e150d51c4135bb2f03dcde9cbf3468a12908a1b025c120c985b9d":"793a7ef8f6f0482beac542bb785c10f8b7b406a4de92667ab168ecc2cf7573c6":"2238cdb4e23d629fe0c2a83dd8d5144ce1a6229ef41dabe2a99ff722e510b530":"d04678198ae7e1aeb435b45291458ffde0891560748b43330eaf866b5a6385e74c6fa5a5a44bdb284d436e98d244018d6acedcdfa2e9f499d8089e4db86ae89a6ab2d19cb705e2f048f97fb597f04106a1fa6a1416ad3d859118e079a0c319eb95686f4cbcce3b5101c7a0b010ef029c4ef6d06cdfac97efb9773891688c37cf" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"c2a566a9a1817b15c5c3b778177ac87c24e797be0a845f11c2fe399dd37732f2cb1894eb2b97b3c56e628329516f86ec":"13ce4d8dd2db9796f94156c8e8f0769b0aa1c82c1323b61536603bca37c9ee29":"413dd83fe56835abd478cb9693d67635901c40239a266462d3133b83e49c820b":"d5c4a71f9d6d95a1bedf0bd2247c277d1f84a4e57a4a8825b82a2d097de63ef1":"b3a3698d777699a0dd9fa3f0a9fa57832d3cefac5df24437c6d73a0fe41040f1729038aef1e926352ea59de120bfb7b073183a34106efed6278ff8ad844ba0448115dfddf3319a82de6bb11d80bd871a9acd35c73645e1270fb9fe4fa88ec0e465409ea0cba809fe2f45e04943a2e396bbb7dd2f4e0795303524cc9cc5ea54a1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a33288a96f41dd54b945e060c8bd0c094f1e28267cc1dcbba52063c1a9d54c4d36918c977e1a7276a2bb475591c367b7":"6aa528c940962638dc2201738850fd1fe6f5d0eb9f687ff1af39d9c7b36830d9":"37ee633a635e43af59abdb1762c7ea45bfe060ec1d9077ecd2a43a658673f3c7":"2eb96f2e28fa9f674bb03ade703b8f791ee5356e2ee85c7ed5bda96325256c61":"db2f91932767eb846961ce5321c7003431870508e8c6f8d432ca1f9cee5cdc1aed6e0f133d317eb6990c4b3b0a360cdfb5b43a6e712bd46bca04c414868fab22c6a49c4b89c812697c3a7fbfc8ddf10c8aa5ebf13a09fd114eb2a02a07f69786f3ce7fd30231f22779bc8db103b13fa546dbc45a89a86275281172761683d384" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"5f37b6e47e1776e735adc03d4b999879477ff4a206231924033d94c0114f911b7d12d62c79c9f6234ae0314156947459":"92d4d9fab5f8bf5119f2663a9df7334f50dcde74fb9d7732f7eba56501e60d54":"c9aef0d7a9ba7345d08b6d5b5ce5645c7495b8685e6b93846ffcf470f5abd40d":"50d9d1f5074f7d9f1a24a9c63aa47b94da5ba78db1b0f18e4d4fe45c6875813c":"20d942bbd7d98700faa37e94d53bf74f2d6bd1d8c95c0b88d842c4857797d59e7c8788aeeac29740122f208f703bf35dc32b0035db0648384feb6aa17a3274bc09b2d2b746c5a06fd82f4469fb86131a49482cb7be7d9b4b95042394cfb18b13f333ec0fe5c227bf1d8f33ecb2e42e358b6c3e034cb585331bd1d27f638029b9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"2311c5afd64c584484b2729e84db80c0b4063fe9ca7edc83350488d7e67264a06a6dfd975a0dc7b72df1f107c4b3b3a6":"2abd870ec5fe26ed14dfa57a3309f920131b70580c3639af2645cd1af93db1b1":"c6e532a3b25653b6002aed5269cc2118749306e736bde039d4d569d4f967773f":"5e7d26c4da769c373092b2b4f72b109fe34bdb7d169ea38f78ebae5df4a15759":"cacaeb1b4ac2305d8714eb50cbe1c67c5a2c0bbc7938fdfdcafef7c85fc40becbf777a4cfb6f14c6eee320943a493d2b0a744a6eb3c256ee9a3763037437df9adce3e2260f0c35e958af0edb5a81debd8bdaf2b8bb2b98b9186e5a222a21609ff58df4cbe1d4898d10d6e7c46f31f5cb1041bfd83a5fb27d5c56c961e91403fc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"362ece9d330e1172a8f9e50258476d0c79c3ee50346524ba12d970ee3a6ef8c5cf11bcb4d9d51311ceacfca8705e833f":"abb5a8edde02e526449284ecc31bc713383df3ed085f752e3b6a32f305861eed":"746302ab1f4a86b17546bea762e929360f2e95c7788a63545a264ef997c8c65e":"b907c5b2a8833a48e56e819228ce9a050b41b3309f5ca37bed720311d92b33af":"73c7131a558350590053580873ef956ff952f2aa6ff1bea452e013d1bc2afddea2311756dbe756e63ba6258480c48f3f6c1319b5f572f67ca530af09e39413d1d432bea8f89206619618cb0e7c88e9f2033639d0eb0efc20616b64f940da99b88231984c3fb23f19e890576f555fde394dbd4351f17a7ffd5c369379001bda03" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"cf614bc29946bc0095f415e8bdeda10aab05392f9cc9187a86ea6ec95ee422e177fb5ec22dc0432cc13f4693e2e3bd9a":"e4ce77914ffbc5fddf1fb51edfafdc196109139b84c741354135ec8d314c7c43":"e1e83ee1205acaf6164dc287aec08e5b32789e5be818078db39e53cad589db51":"4e20c0226d5e1e7e805679f03f72452b5bea2d0ba41e0c12329bf60eb3016dd1":"838fdf1418a746aa52ae4005d90c3fd301f648c5770ffef2a9f3912e37a93850cc4b8bfcce910aead0cb75958823b1a62e283901c5e4a3980e4ea36257458e2e4953555819b8852a26489b1d74821f80c9908469b43f124ff7ea62497c36159a47353098a1b9ec32e54800d6704371cc37f357ad74aacc203e9b6db97f94d0c4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a8da1d3e233f393fd44d204c200202f7d01896e72c5ac652940cfd15b5d4b0bd0a112b4cb0890af0a495e0f49fcf6874":"d2e32799bc822b8d033299bdf63dc35774f7649e935d25be5b10512c430d1bda":"920a82d76fcd2cd106ada64bba232b7b2344f3afe6b1d1d20ee8795144571009":"eeaac5878275372025f8231febed64db6a11273c3c00d625fc80a95f18ad7d3f":"5f6dae489b53d89027b2cc333c700f090152d77b3eaf01d47f56ce6eca9893ef877b4cb560fab0fbdb34e3d1c6cd8480b33c053d2661a10aa531df4961b97d659c7492584236582b3fe701055efa59c328194cd1e07fcffd910d9ee01b7b9e8c8fda7f7ac01a8e203b8b26eb8078a9b9a5021562c44af24089e3ef84c1d5a6bd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a77b1ed4ecaa650374e1052c405f1d88881c25c87d13dbe1334d8c1a847fa76b05c143e2f145db216fe7be9ed23635d0":"b5c750968ff09ed251d4a1c05342ac843db5246b19045728a634fa4f6e752e54":"ff5937bcd01a363696bf8e40adc8e4ab3e56dbf7e7d09451c99e538785fe6697":"4acb34eea8266badcf8f6557a0eecf3eb4d7a295c876d6175598cb66a388efb8":"ec13eadfcc84e77d2a2efa1a2cd8b1355587cb27feb3d19d75b37f0446333ddb8236e751c63b7a6e595ec24a25051a696dbe8c062dd8896d1446db228a2f10e8094ee07e7ee648ed6bebb2f5ec5aae24c9c640665c28355cc11c116795ecc070790f7fdfc4398900311b6695d5da0175091ed1828d2731085bfb4a20bd86cce0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"491686c781e83eb4e21d9989e8d718100b0d21a2c56295888baef1a65f219651499085296d21065feabf3106101c8d6f":"d208a72f9ae34f0817669fb04f49239dd31700f3dc9a93db8d75fb79f9b686c1":"9ffc61893a293a864008fdd56d3292600d9e2ec8a1ea8f34ac5931e968905a23":"4ff3a397dfdae0912032a302a5e7a07dceca8d9013a21545689319b7c024cd07":"3c258ebf2203fca3b322ad1b016e21c7f5c148425f81e4fb0a0e462dce9dfa569c37a006527768297a5b68461b08912642a341b88c85597e30e7561206886098c4e2d861f11513f0ffdbbc78d3a2dd60c105abbb33c5e05ae27081b690fb8b3610917aa9bf1a4ad74481b5ff8334f14e5ad6a6a1eb2259476078076fb7e3a992" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"36a5267eeeb5a1a7d46de0f8f9281f73cd9611f01198fdaa78c5315205e5a177b66b5337970df36219321badacc624eb":"c2a7b164949da102bece44a423197682ff97627d1fe9654266b8527f64e5b386":"a977e2d8637b019c74063d163bb25387dc56f4eb40e502cefc5ae6ad26a6abdc":"c5c9819557b1e7d8a86fa8c60be42993edc3ef539c13d9a51fb64b0de06e145e":"b471711a4fc7ab7247e65d2c2fe49a50169187187b7978cd2fdb0f8318be3ec55fc68ed4577ad9b42cbb57100b5d35ac86c244c4c93a5b28c1a11c2dfe905d608ec7804dec5bb15cf8d79695534d5e13a6a7e18a887ec9cf184da0cbbc6267f3a952a769403bafcdbb559401be0d8b3300ea7258b4026fc892175efd55ba1a67" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a76b0366df89e4073a6b6b9c04da1d6817ce26f1c4825cad4097bdf4d7b9445e773d3cc3290176773847869be528d1a4":"1bfd3bcfb9287a5ad055d1b2b8615fa81c94ac24bc1c219a0f8de58789e0404a":"edd879fa56f21d93029da875b683ce50f6fdc4c0da41da051d000eed2afefefa":"f528ffd29160039260133ed9654589ce60e39e7f667c34f82cda65ddcf5fff14":"39d1ff8848e74dd2cdc6b818ad69823878062116fdf1679942f892c7e191be1c4b6ea268ecdff001b22af0d510f30c2c25b90fc34927f46e3f45d36b0e1848b3a5d54c36c7c65ee7287d325dfbb51b56a438feb6650ce13df88bf06b87ac4a35d2a199ea888629fb0d83f82f0ea160dc79ed220d8ef195b9e80c542f60c2d320" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"46571e1df43e5e141235e2a9ec85bb0faf1dc0566031e14d41a2fbd0315653ecb60ef6a3347967519aabeaf748e4e991":"759fd8593e3688b23c4a003b655311770d670789878570eb3b155a8e6c2d8c45":"033128460b449e1accb0e9c54508759ddc2538bc64b51e6277553f0c60a02723":"a5e4a717240bdeac18a0c0e231a11dc04a47d7550f342fa9a7a5ff334eb9327d":"9d222df1d530ea7f8f2297a0c79d637da570b48042ecddded75956bba0f0e70b271ffa3c9a53bada6ee1b8a4203c22bfde82a5e2eb1b150f54c6483458569422c1a34a8997d42cc09750167a78bf52a0bd158397af9f83caabe689185c099bf0a9a4853dd3cf8b8e89efebb6a27dba873e65e9927741b22968f2875789b44e01" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"d63980e63bbe4ac08d2ac5646bf085b82c75995e3fdfc23bb9cc734cd85ca7d2d33ed1dcae13fb634ba08272d6697590":"acd0da070072a5340c4f5f4395568e1a36374e074196ae87f3692ee40487e1df":"f567677b5e12e26f3544be3da9314c88fc475bf84804a89a51f12b191392c02b":"c01cc7873e93c86e2bfb8fc984cfc2eab5cc58eeef018fedb5cba5aedd386156":"b133446f633bcb40724bbf9fa187c39a44b9c094a0a0d40e98977e5466dc2c9adf62a5f4551eeb6406a14658de8a0ed7487c3bf6277e811101284a941745ce16176acc875f1435e14161772fa84609e8123c53dd03cbb868030835c0d11d8d6aa04a1b6f908248b028997737f54735ec4ed7a81fc868199ffb61a779d9340334" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-256,256+128,256,256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"3d99f9b7ac3a2fbe9cf15d960bf41f5588fc4db1e0d2a5c9c0fe9059f03593fb411f504bb63a9b3afa7ffa1357bb48be":"0bb5ebd55981a25ba69164da49fa92f2871fd3fc65eb30d0f0d0b8d798a4f8f2":"288e948a551284eb3cb23e26299955c2fb8f063c132a92683c1615ecaed80f30":"d975b22f79e34acf5db25a2a167ef60a10682dd9964e15533d75f7fa9efc5dcb":"ee8d707eea9bc7080d58768c8c64a991606bb808600cafab834db8bc884f866941b4a7eb8d0334d876c0f1151bccc7ce8970593dad0c1809075ce6dbca54c4d4667227331eeac97f83ccb76901762f153c5e8562a8ccf12c8a1f2f480ec6f1975ac097a49770219107d4edea54fb5ee23a8403874929d073d7ef0526a647011a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"a1dc2dfeda4f3a1124e0e75ebfbe5f98cac11018221dda3fdcf8f9125d68447abae5ea27166540515268a493a96b5187":"":"":"":"228293e59b1e4545a4ff9f232616fc5108a1128debd0f7c20ace837ca105cbf24c0dac1f9847dafd0d0500721ffad3c684a992d110a549a264d14a8911c50be8cd6a7e8fac783ad95b24f64fd8cc4c8b649eac2b15b363e30df79541a6b8a1caac238949b46643694c85e1d5fcbcd9aaae6260acee660b8a79bea48e079ceb6a5eaf4993a82c3f1b758d7c53e3094eeac63dc255be6dcdcc2b51e5ca45d2b20684a5a8fa5806b96f8461ebf51bc515a7dd8c5475c0e70f2fd0faf7869a99ab6c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"067fa0e25d71ea392671c24f38ef782ab3587a7b3c77ea756f7bd496b445b7a3ce6acc722768ca0e03784b2217bc60e4":"":"":"":"16eaa49510ffad8cc21ec32858640a0d6f34cb03e8649022aa5c3f566b44e8ace7c3b056cf2a44b242de09ae21dba4275418933611875841b4f0944a8272848c5dc1aad685935e12511d5ee27e9162d4bb968afab53c4b338269c1c77da9d78617911ed4390cb20e88bf30b74fda66fe05df5537a759061d3ffd9231d811e8b34213f22ab0b0ddafff7749a40243a901c310776e09d2e529806d4d6f0655178953c16707519c3c19b9aaa0d09fb676a9d23525c8bc388053bfccfbc368e3eb04" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"9f76503e84727297bc7056c7af917a1c98baa725295457db4fcf54ed09af7f15f39c46142b85a67b4b323594b7e97bde":"":"":"":"7d6a8bc5a7f057ceed6109bfac2486f80f81373b6b31d062aa1fad6d9eda5874867b9ef007ba5a92ba8f3fca624bfd9f7ee5770bbeb0391394fef783c16a7f003c06e5469bab03445bb28a2111def415d162e40472d3e5ae628c5c63170bb19f741c79a5331c883c12bca429f518bf71b14683a071b6c6e1e55d8c7a0f3942bc12a103556c49ca173e498b3b4a15027145cdaeb195bc8a7e1aa82ebdf6ecd516481a4d21f400d0d71b5894545888fee8beed80d3251647947f5abc4735b47fd0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"e242e5b3b49d87289fe02840dc742a2a6cd9490fe2cce581833dddb1edc0d103f987f5de5c68cd345c81b032ea55f36d":"":"":"":"3a858345dfaf00defdf6c83114b760ef53b131fbf14bcc4052cd948820eee78a11cbbd8f4baa308e1d187fced74cbf019c1080d9efffd93fda07df051433876d9900c1f9ad36ea1cb04989bb0c55fd6d01e46923f3bc8887ac00ebd4710212114165355361e240b04232df55a81add3fb363f0d4c9c5e3d313bc7caac7d49dca8517cedacf571fde9686ae93d901fb9b17097a638bb9899cfab0ebc9d1f8a43c2eed7c9f326a711d0f5b9cfc5166c9b561824cbd7775ec601ca712b3ddaaa05b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"42cc17365f5ea5fd22bdc4ade715e293064d6794d82bed5b77c4c107a73de1f76d759e4b191ba01e0ed5dea788ab018d":"":"":"":"de06dee8c8fe453aa03ac2546c39f5cda12412864d52ed5cbd0d4905dd226746d50d1af9fd3e1d90de0f16295cb7f6f4d3271ef00564709df4b05eb9f8adc0f8e8522b05b9f32c37d8526813898b9f71db57fc8328e3b79144482e8aa55c83934d6e097e43ec6d0bc32edaf8c0e6ca449b2e8388b32b286e2d4f85266b0605fb99d1a647565c95ff7857bcab73662b7218719189d792514edca2b1d0cdcd9b6347e132ef4c323da24ad5afd5ed6f96d27b0f879288e962fa0baca3d5b72b5c70" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"d57024a230b825b241c206f7b55e2114461ecc9b75353f12ac1d9ad7e7871481fe401c320f74afdb07f566ea500b0628":"":"":"":"e8930bd55a0a5a6d83a9b3b2cde7085c2ae467ea4a2e65ca303697d492ca878bcb801769eb1b7ec564586ec8b36d350e192c4fbf03a98be0ddecf56d465914ba353ed7734d19a680fc4593d9234c4ac8c23b7dfa1e26b013f590cca43b9fef126121b4842496b11dea3ef5e981cb357341f03f92a546a62609236ded6f7d814456acc0596d555cbdc02cbd47dae2caa1897831ea464225922c6600a8bb92e711653067f83b21e1df054309858948c11a1399736fc8391c5b0fc35629abfa5650" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"059ded79125b2d56d9d52bcc950bf608d1a2373515dafcc81efb6588005a5722d8f5f4181f9f2a316c93fdfbadf50e75":"":"":"":"db65d2000632c3d7009c227e99c210e5897f4d7edae608a242b5a4f17708613f8c19a4dd65d6bc3ca57737c9bfdcca068288eea49440af768d1fc977c32b065bb71aa3d8c4d77c9e8e8a6166f332a247978a6c41ed253a1b68ad934a3416b40344a681de28638f00b0a0ffb75514c3f62253372f809906043de35e4805b8e962e5eb957f04212835f802b2c0b3e76c7cf239c89adf31909cd6224d542d929f9b20a10ab99a7c631e4e6188fe2ba8f552c9c88fdadb528679fe950431641b8f37" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"4630406b475b1263b6078e93e5d4282205958d94eb97d1e66b429fb69ec9fccd0dd9982c338df935e929c42fab66adaf":"":"":"":"5d80ec072f550981bcaac6787c0488cc470406249ec80f4bf11050630227f8b5ac6b3b369db237d7c24a0980dffe8d3abd9b64fd4efa492349bd4eb6902edb94553546110227d7de5a864ddae8b9fed8de9f0df9c596e39de903fda323ee6f788831452eb9e49c5eef3e058b5bf84f61f735a93e042bb9e458df6b25f42a6eb8fb03d437cfab757fab4990c721a757eaa5e9048208abbcce6e52f177b20dcf52f1fa551a92b68bcdb01680855b8f79131266378cd1f0c2a4141c9675f01d1e48" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"6ea9c6f784f12a9707ceac8a7162ee5381dc893ee139f8f4b4d93db266829db4ae92bc52ff860d8ecdc9fc16bd070130":"":"":"":"234366f1591cfe244956f9496cdf446e0d390ba64beaa066945b1b4c5337dded2619dd2bd0133a5d612bab7c251ab79e3951cb134894c422553fc8cc7b3ccb29c20adbf52dda35af779142d7efc735342db2ee067649fda25f3e8a74f8e4f6620cf5a17cb943602609cafb85bdf482873efa4c74928cc0d69444b72aa6bc72694a3a21c6a721aa4e0fccab0a98aef375a37a3e8a15dccad13b6d70b3483581004642d879804aa00cba207b51affca43490bb98f67953265574366ec3829e67aa" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"5c13056be92a7f71236fcfef460298acc8595dd474310727f5ccb9a7acb2254ac7226f86349e20e2aca737068ab0f2ce":"":"":"":"16d415eddefa4dc295a64adcbbcb8c6fe8c8f123c6b09dc08a56d723cff5978cc120fd0a68a2f4c202c220db372d3128ef52385d5786c12dfc6e60ecfc3461a09fa80453e2b1b6365eaeb4df602d192aacb25ab6b4a59689d4bf8d1c4c42a32779f62b06baca6461f154cf40901f5787c1aa2bf67cbfe7546ef5b2bdff20790d8c72d077d48c59c92d1af90a90ccfcdf643dd9d6cee0b1faf5f2f35cfd01d2077ced5e2d013ec1e09336dfab9d9e51ba9a3a2837306213bca2d79abf8dc3282c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"38f08a099fc2d405c32d1e0f867e5450d5ee0d53783c31de9ddeae46d962999da01f13a43320c715612cedb920cf12eb":"":"":"":"079ce7a5b540cae96c2883e95acde3039048a6c45a2d259cc648639e7205392d91fa3ee080e615f1e0741a0e536c9e05844651b93461bfc547fb452fec61f853e1bd6e08eabd0cf1c5f84f85eca9d42b53d1e5bae51be5fd35189e4f1c02b843c6361fccf4ca6648bf30a23ccb8ebc16fcf158746eb39cd96f19d46707c001e11c4e0e8ccbc89fec66c69fc92843b6bb2ee1cc7595b65ba89ccaccd6130a8417faf705e8e203e90ee64ae970c409389b5cd0ca80a4e40b642689741691b20621" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"0863c868c32442a1a64095a71ab6ae2f9e61c119b58dfa4f34efd26593bbbf68bc407904c43300452dd4e61df47fa98f":"":"":"":"585334828cf531828fc7127fee0c926f85b8e71e8522ea921296dc62b83a09a00397cd45e0664d0f26fa24edd3e3d8ecef8fdd77ab22431d4066f0efaf3882c97f179a7060efe9e8cba5d8145bebd502c0e09ee791231d539983c08860d7783edb58440d193ed82bc77c27723381a0da45bb1fc2a609f8b73b90446e39869a5af5038aff603b44db9771113927a5297fdc3450eaa228e313afe43c31b0a95b476c5ca312b4f589f809749481722cea9990c02b647976aa6c6f02ce1e5e6ea6df" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"a41ad223e41e2bb9c131ec945ca310600ab00c51f6e4fcddd803bd9ab9be8af5483373838894d32745a81ba9d6967751":"":"":"":"95ca31a7eeebdd2348cf1d43411d2c35faffdbcaed4052d50cf92f0e9d2e757686b72d631a56ca98b68215e7014cfed943abc1e13441c1d660f13adf2188d0975154e1b42a592a62a43b57f82cc21a428873a92fda83abe420efb5233140e4d6c7852cf81e85961fa5c606c5f33e06077f414b0f814cbbe50cc606bffbd474364e608825fdaaf5e74d862795539be8697e2ce05d71446881e3f65bb54ed95e941586988f6e0c34e1beef426696e9dbd9a214013d826a8c99a2a686d8402c583f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"62a26c1327c0ebf8b40691fb4c8f812e81f5474b0c7db70aa9424110fee3a05e41c0cf2e87210e34d0c6bffc269bf2ba":"":"":"":"6e20a00df1af37e6cc55e580ba21335111eb375395343618df7d630b9dc234496e3964cd45c5de34bda46a28964f6148704c30925feeaecae0574038434cd33c1dd943207a8dbdcd72dc9ecb76a25728b3c2a8ac13c1de3a126d7d43a46e12e0d0ca8991469e582b78ef6aa691b5a0e3e85cba7d7aea3c1e8e031674e85f5af36546eb2a0a28d4ffbaa316a9a6c944fce291cc0c235e8499882eb62b22b548ae07cf9430329e009f4443cb94f7a14e8661166b0d681dcec867205abed48145e9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"fd54cf77ed35022a3fd0dec88e58a207c8c069250066481388f12841d38ad98591f9c02a1d205cdbcdf4d93054fde5f5":"":"":"":"f6d5bf594f44a1c7c9954ae498fe993f67f4e67ef4e349509719b7fd597311f2c123889203d90f147a242cfa863c691dc74cfe7027de25860c67d8ecd06bcd22dfec34f6b6c838e5aab34d89624378fb5598b9f30add2e10bdc439dcb1535878cec90a7cf7251675ccfb9ee37932b1a07cd9b523c07eff45a5e14d888be830c5ab06dcd5032278bf9627ff20dbec322e84038bac3b46229425e954283c4e061383ffe9b0558c59b1ece2a167a4ee27dd59afeeb16b38fbdb3c415f34b1c83a75" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"5e919d353357671566d2c6ab6e1acd46f47d0c878fe36114d7fea9fecb88a3a27efca9e3d1e1b09d7f16832f3af75141":"":"442f17cb3cb1482a19729bfd58f46f6ef16285554892c01b0718968d6e011082":"f9557c93eb841bfd7b5d4b71da928efcbe3f55e1870493ef90d16eb238380d65":"36902134f1989cfe7eb518a56c06aada98997d9bacd04aee21f879a57b515ca3b5e0c2d5fed05ca1a8b054e8c46b389d9d9186feb0abe8e2e60b3a267281cc5b4b7341116ced35a0e07bc2b0330bbfd8b07f07248fa6d8fc5c9df13445324162bdfa22a91ba71453ab123c92f91c70b8bd540b3b180b11ab45ae2c59e57c7c43dab7576594959a96eb502d182267c86576b1846ccee1a694cabdfb42e0c8214192efb502926fa3c27eed020b7cc8866a5af9d838a57e78bf7acd230e1f4d8361" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"7a5d1efc9b7043060cabd67de7fe22740bcd6a8ceb355d69f118829a2b3c92006a5633e613f8769c1114b1822ffb5408":"":"f2ad962d992434468681c644587639901ff74e2bbdd8761961ec34edc4a0c36d":"75aae0d1bca9484c89fc4de3d1b34275ef0656775f3f8c96f2bbc50401aaa718":"5ca21af4b399db38f8b74a406aace69f994691f2765bb9c47b240000152739e059b163cd007de5f28bba17e485fcf9ff6f41f76e93998510e302282cbdbde09fe8b1a96187e57c9a3df94e2e748f20026476ca682dfa890b478f7a21f4927f74f99aedd9ae782ba10fcda1dc34c31b4f784722e01cc4679737276f56df23c5bd8c6985797b83c0ccde2b4c7a65c652745de7fc8a235ad7ed0f456f1e7568b2dad475f0bc46f02a7f35c05cfef9d0e2c773ff895e291a2cfc2424b106096d8864" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"611586ee40cb3ca4a9238ce112a237449bba5422ac9b18ea53480875334d8fa026da9d96c4e87f94b2f9a7c261be3edb":"":"2f835c336a3aa0019b0bf940c24643bc8fca58c9cfa6509aa9241de9e0e1a046":"1911a59c5f2568860ae71e803688889dc44d14ffb0d93e324c39f32d95c1c3ea":"27bf42f50476d8a2cc23f455e9ef477cb8e9c90f2e97c8a483093ebf55b2aee02e0356cff919e2ec9811b42c73498a6c2b96aa5b761ef7e715cbf66ad2e3ff8a6c92419dbf2e653ce70a87b51e26d9f607eb25b45b91f947d0026a38977143c8bbd94076e663b9cee35505b48e453e7cca83e540975ae8a53f26390aa63aaf1e2669410cc83427eea09428776a2d520eebd170602c52dd491c98042018a0372a0b39cb565cbe5e474f927f91515a6a7444fdbe1d89d8ae2c2482a0deb8ff236d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"85b1e5da599efd4a20ffcefd4737fa3ea1d2b14be33861c2a4ac3ac2a49d3947b14cf18f4ff426cb6345f1a7653e9630":"":"cf5bbf98d8577077b0b84475dee0f0e9aa95eedd1d916507b5233b688bcc856c":"b333ec111e1e7d78c9ac916e420704832539d2db46aca3bdc4732e8ce72b5e80":"4773d32a9fba37acc6900f3ac70f6978ff1e40039d6e3286c264fb7fc59f1bfe0188c7979380c8922bdd0e363c8e09a49faef59ea85a9f0e400b94c74a8a50687e4e51e25266eabb86276f22628d0d2e19c5696cd221a9b80f94045d001ca4c20dc916ca0ff22c93a41fc822912dd7e247927fd45982e94d3d1fde77cbe78beecba830b753079326ae33274f13fb7cd875e85fb5e9e703e61cbd41bc4ad47d7b4d14afc873a39dd810ad8eed95adff8dce3adb7659b7c1d4e3f62403767940b4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"50f986f6efb413fba3e8e0beb84d4948c2db0661ab8e064d9fee8b3c2f0a910fc35d37512f88bdfcfde797a21a006e01":"":"37c7b08222ba63f2136bb28f5ec09b9a899b56371615be41bef49a0b640590e4":"4a1e34a5d60ca08e3e6c0f1b86547ba2d12fa293275e7d75f83a0b846daa48df":"e27738c6fae66125fcaf4e725a0881d5a450fb5b02a55057d6cb7babd91d502c4f4a8431a83352f47ea8e5fd7e815f5080d144318a1dcbc755e0b935785cd5397955da22e3ff633b34a64ac72b2e6b7c51e78ff553731e6e8da911d147a6e05b36b74898cac6d3171bc8650e445ffd19ede2aa8218be17671321c186465d852dd80d73290546b88ef7a978b41c4c549e9c7fc6ef86e47084778fb5aed5d41e794ee0e700b77c0314a307b10df69daba605f3fdbe2dec708ba0b20d6b650befbd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"641dbcbf99b61437c2bf65a13dc3e0324eb940335da123870d9429636dfc82979d0cc913c73e8a6321fc3eb9e973c0aa":"":"72580c11a87ce6b4207908aaf5bcaaa1bd217fce3e8bc0726568c64639b70767":"cf9f4527e074b72be735558dcaa1fc82f26ae286bf944b49649f769bf6faf49f":"345395723d048c2270c0eac990498689bcb862a4996e82995b4e7169e671eb03bb2242c4669c874c1aeaffec58aa653c7d7431abd1650f0cbce8cf5db8316693f3ed501fd9b48c1a44b34f7878aa386d65afc31f94f908a322b03d06c2a1074a03bd2b579cafb0f7cee6d6934588ae1ce9e4ed37b03737c553ca19af4b46b5e43767cee2e459ab91407df6cfd13a6f186abdb148b85a5f49bf92ac6674fb055c7fe123e9355a0d33de281c03a56f91891dd496dabfd6eaa6fff6c9cfb4e67c44" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"b9c305ada943a64a2b00494e869f9a640173eb1c2518dd9be93abc3c93c7e6b5bd0627a199d15f77b188824df00d5997":"":"ffc6760f9af02d35666275c074eda03f53dbcb5690580bb25768a6566b328dfb":"f26f436a820ef71597b75134b8d9dca6e9a6afd9b429222a4c9c878f3b92716e":"e5413a234859511cd837312bb31aac4d31962c5f7f27aec47417f367ca99b8400a4287e60412fc356cb40d96ddf5cb801285ebca42b2f6fe4a711451c1574174c58dccb2cd3342b7092a196ac7d2881a08e7f5de939ccc8f4eedc8f867c81aa88655d96ae50f618279d5009ba2ac4b1df4e63030cc0ec3541b6a94bd9a2ae5d1fcf4d847114a783c997a7c6b9d549010bf7b649abef692cdea3aa8ada14574e0f78b7fcbe17b587ac14980e40264d6de030e429586593d5ce3ae571f95454dcf" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"9875dbf59b760eab9998bf3341847910526d10071dc179f96081dd793a6001936881e7f39075cd382293a1aaa8c845d2":"":"1196583a99afe1d377b344585c8252a0690704b8f7a2b7582387ec91a60fd7e4":"20147a88e0f9f1e8caa8cb14488c9b5c38e5520a36ae913b4703d15af27218dd":"c808f6f296683d26208359a766fe61bc70ee8b6ed9ffb94ce269578fb5568fe2358d603638324b63b29bb36ae71a542e38ee69a2b93ad7e4a887a27a2852cdcd541a5fa6d0c8b087aa1185bd5788256e7d95c2aa2d5c11407b7bf762f416b01d8e747c45298f875200a2e67679d6d5ff7a7c0e50a010690b1920df1baf0afcfaee7ab0862004e23b5aa1ff47b8273d503bd74a54e7b39ac7e6d6fb0a594d30531cab8a67b22783470a65f24faba1c231b3ba45efae9f0be04e2338529cfec008" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"ac92a6c791aba0406d6ea8255c3c0901eb711a424501c2c2c847076d78bdcfc3266b7c3bc578c7501daac6dda8366d4f":"":"13379a77d84a0c4cec95e62ac4c8a98ceede0d89b8bd317352a95300963415ed":"04d47ec89a3e1b7f22580167331225a00ff258da72446241a6c09c517ee4d48c":"c2e6528584c6dbec436ffec4075fd3aebe953fdc0b46b4b225a3c2886e60d21879e6ccce3746d881f6d80e33876afad439ab9f68fcc458492de12811fbd57ac49d868754da19279b4c0a38979201a588884def5677392dec97cafc94bccf8914d9f78575711bb6f2adf4116db91c8b54e36e9ac2f5e01caebd300acd7bd45eada69d20f1b4139013a8a614069315a1c99137a6f23e38f91c210e0c156c6fb498056e823dc41a05348ab43c2f6f4ce188d4e05a13d38f8025731ac1670949a040" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"63954ac7a0f989a458d2b4a6b7013dd66683624584b545060bd03a57b92822ef422764bbbc35fa5d40d34145afe44bec":"":"7b25d875dfb03333cc27b9d4286d00a85ea5921f4b8a4717b957349eb3509053":"8b70d28c5c80086c0cbbd01337ad45297af271d4bafc764b0fc5705700cd419d":"297752e61c4ebc4e1c68391335e2cdb49b0f19dafe359e451f8158fb7958d32a98455a852002d8f05169f438816ae6fccba1eae4d1fdd7a1176b04831d7ce892f711ec825062ea1c6b12144bbd3a0aca7f92520ebb87ac6045d2ac3a4a74fa559926f0daceb59d44fdb39f5fc3b877f34241531e863c153286f3f1b2ba2db4e2c8e2344be40c2a7a8cd01daf168696ce19f83ddb64d50e2313e78c5dfcf077f25e5b4d6f687279119ce856d4131a63ad133cedd020881939bf70f82eabfe46db" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"d0944e0a3f3604a588271c8eb65913ad9b07ee2b29620f8106ca70ec10aeb896bc9b2b519c77fec5fc419e953ceb0be5":"":"d58593f2488f0a292ab552dac006c94b20ff500dd57af32be808921a5ee251c1":"ea9e579c9dca67f07ffd67d2483ec1fac3d2ec22fefff73c7ac9f125888d7a4b":"ae736da6632a7d8bdcc9e279cb7d3f9101a8f7dddeff253277d1d99b45c76a1a5c193334e912c3dfdff1bc389b209c3b29359a4ca53765a1e40cb900c6055d8a285cf63ebec79b46019efe95d5199f215f11961f3319d225bf3d60734fbfbf3593ab105cec2a17e308af469b3220ef7f055675396d289e6f4f8009881c8a2b4e9de88d53ad13e8bed8b38be6d8988f615b4590fde3d91caf50a86eac3fbf29924743145803978d261132b5975a9f108499250314e098e57c56e2f9327307cff8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"1ef53464bc7a441227a27ea7b5c558dbb3f509aaf880213cdef7e8f6a1d287c173cd5b3148d46c48c83c5cad3ccc1f50":"":"b052a66992fd8a8cb02c593edfe4766fcbcd3505af29d698e1f4db398acf717d":"37333448311c2c6edee19aadb8f1036cb60cff2a945c1a0ea087713bff31e915":"4ea7054659cae1cc178ef431aebb64c2c8dda3a965ea940a84c00d9790e2e3a33521395cc4d49038994aa4c7dcaf0b52b44375d93b625ac2281991a85a5acebf3de552355e17b3528faf39d392fed981400f28540f5ca64a4d2eeb952c88856c8f7388a49611810941b46b1000ee4a8aaaadcd39944c4abca9110fd6580093f9303f86a6e129d56b5aeff5422c2261af33523cc6a174e0782e13a026c003c17430b8371bbfc3d51c3e06fbdc30769a278b109238bbe383cd5523053fe589b72e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"14148d69d583d4c1758c307e0eb0b762511165823fc54096f9da5513e87df53b96a7be8d31b8a38f24a82d846b0e13ef":"":"e05f81f6402c52dff5c221a2f191155bb56abe160ce7dc8a6bedfa029195a612":"214777e3faee7d953b5c796675e106d50cdc12836b3114d14447ae91cea3c1db":"eb0497b32af8a91ed3959c31b079b8cc5c39db3100913332fffbb6b1d5ebbcdc97d6e67c934f3336197c9b730d80995a7d7445e36cf3047cab22895f244cac803eabd001eb1ff5d5645a803c41ea6dde6c972b47de0372ce901667d03e2e02aa0a5aea809e0bdc7430440365908418ce6066c24191ace05d6a797ef9b94409989cacbb9d9ec31f3cf0112b72e1420b47e0c184a8aacc214d55a0d5e0869d09303e4014de0430c07380006ea75984e6c32b06067d7d7b931e2b74666b4b569f71" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"27d47020acc3a80a55149fa0ef43f684843ba89fda4bff1c29d20baa2b21956780569b7fa0c4078d9ff71a3790f1be3f":"":"c03ea0b88e2f9b53f902b22746bf4dde09439c190a7a638e3cb990d86739dbed":"3ef05e71487cdbc209b5ab6e808e55f0a93bcc02df766b01c1c1ae5875b1023e":"3ee49e2a58d800d922cfb66284da84bbb5944c85f194d95f1156b673392132a430e47ae74f1ed7c1d0e632d8cb604c88777437d8f37e7d0428b834555a96800540bf5bce6f430328fd328baf4b22b7f8e663c1d8583bc0119248588840510e11203cf47dfc4f6cdf8344170a341fbb7d93999ba86be3fb94d9c03922fd3d75e3fd5b42365aa62606e352676b2a0c51fb030d8d5605e8ac6bac2b4f8417d8e060148e3d4ba67b31e5e704d866bc87741ba877d12b10e8a9b37f3feca908fe1fc4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,0,256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"88b6550d49182ca7321d8015f780121223a93343dabaf21978ee2818e7bce6591d32b48eb4642069adcaa5986224e6d3":"":"809639f48ebf6756a530e1b6aad2036082b07b13ed3c13e80dc2b6ea56e70a04":"3395902e0004e584123bb6926f89954a5d03cc13c3c3e3b70fd0cbe975c339a7":"4a5a29bf725c8240ae6558641a6b8f2e584db031ef158124c4d1041fe56988fdaee91ca13925fee6d5e5748b26cc0275d45ef35abb56ad12e65aa6fe1d28a198f5aa7938fca4794c1a35f9a60a37c7360baf860efd20398c72a36b3c4805c67a185e2f099f034b80d04008c54d6a6e7ec727b1cace12e0119c171a02515ab18ea3d0a3463622dd88027b40567be96e5c301469b47d83f5a2056d1dc9341e0de101d6d5f1b78c61cc4a6bfd6f9184ebde7a97ccf53d393f26fd2afcae5ebedb7e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"2cd968bacda2bc314d2fb41fe43354fb761134eb19eec60431e2f36755b85126e3dedf2af9382a1e652143e952212d39":"59fa8235108821accbd3c14eaf76856d6a07f43383db4cc6038040b18810d53c":"":"":"06051ce6b2f1c34378e08caf8fe836201ff7ec2db8fc5a2519add2524d90470194b247af3a34a673298e57070b256f59fd098632768e2d55137d6c17b1a53fe45d6ed0e31d49e64820db145014e2f038b69b7220e042a8efc98985706ab9635451230a128aee801d4e3718ff59511c3f3ff1b20f109774a8ddc1fadf41afcc13d40096d997948857a894d0ef8b3235c3213ba85c50c2f3d61b0d104eccfcf36c35fe5e49e7602cb1533de12f0bec613a0ed9633821957e5b7cb32f60b7c02fa4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"023f5673dac29f62245510d0a866629c43c64bf35a0bad30f1270050876cfb1ce80b615a5a47ecb51217a46079e11fd3":"a6f797b155d6da01f5d155cb7291442e1b82d4190e93e279fe5b4aaa7d04ecc0":"":"":"507b824443af5db28f746229e03ab00c73cc3ee4956aa14b33eda00dd2b9b645c132dab7dcdbc659c8ba0e1a3575fe7dbc7cf9691f9b714acb1b33bef96943003c992f661e04fe9e8b9f648f4af9a58a45b08b8fa7fa3704e6bdc289abbe14a8c7e1747a52ac916c31ed079de0b900672e658a201279824d0d75ae35dbdd43aeab915653765d83e46f347fcb4fe3321fc28abd2d0d26a662661582ce21b6dc4ea6d1b236e9692a83c8ba0fb299157b80623ad4f448d25d57f537b10e5e30f80b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"96b5bc16ce0d101b90d54da6c4b3d85a70ee19d54cf4cde3d048afb5f758a6b52ea2c10c16feb71cedfab9bfa9e462f8":"2ff415e2432d2e6c4279910a5e56c0f5354a5af0099132d891943b4a8901ca6c":"":"":"ecebe717afe6dc08dbff3ed626bb06de0f9784283b70e378dec19d4fbb50e61b7be48ceb69851b2bb94641aec5027d53d314a96500a9bbb38a87c9aa42ebeb96a23cf29a0fbd5e48b399daa1b24dbdc85223f24b7d77332bb1a137ec709d27c008c709696cbe44bb2fc19fb10a2fad4ffd8a9d89492a939f2268d1557f44b6a64e2a57887830fd8bca1b6306aaedbd7f3f476b827995a1ed121388497edc7e639c87d092f6591a45b5647c6c091c15ed39f594b7fc4ae92331f96dd8e17be970" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"364a833a283a3e0b8a5b681daa50df96d806d4b54828f2b016de5d88597e6287d98cba8fda464d21aa1cfb7b26b9b226":"35b0e7534014dc2d7eb0f20ff78a69d5548d0a64122d4936a6ed177fb3ec66a6":"":"":"df4c799cae37173a81c545d019ffa336ef2c039a5865af425e5b60bc3d7202f4bc1aac5a84022bf4088061abd5c39d0fb047ba80163eb5dc8b9dd515948f16915832c6f76b45acc25b9c01e7f70955c0eb51bf50f00b24bb8e7ff53bd7c051b53d8b1a837a17a00355d7eb21e43b2b5b249dadced37d06e7047c2fd12012705a59d051afd26245ce3a59acb4b996b718c7dc1ae964bf12b1db02fd6c06ac2fec6ee5deb02c2c830110e9bbbd3c778a136b646ce2a0738563555a89409c56b81e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"bb4d38c775acdeed663256abb747ec25182bc16efd0de02cb4b05e4ad4749c92be6f1e856e423a8f3bfb0c0f27ad8210":"21591e796b7e68e7913fefbef4872af9c062f21c8023c0dbf47e040c3aed3733":"":"":"12575776e1b9f54b0fbc39e85a77b6912160bace4f1e9f049e3a1c5bcb452cf9be42ea10c028c3cc249401ac236dd3baa53ff327735435f4869d3289bc9465ccf15f826e4e4fff099986bdde0d09bd12e3caddcf452eed6ca1206ae4561b84770a9cc6e962567304ef79d8d3608529a3b5e4067fa83c8c35a06f1855da5f5ea7eb106e4c60181d12ba00cfbf7eac60bda00571d95c45c9d75c43b42e27a238aa5e0f02bbd96cde59a2e572934a99d05c399ffdf15c65f173748734c51999a29e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"f9d041d24158f480600c3747cbfd868c3f7e9ac7f74b3760eae5320839e4f5130f8477d88b1d914c0d8b375d089a4c83":"b148049f4093f0032c7f105dae219aa9e3f70487ce3a6b6ecd99429f66be5406":"":"":"84c58bf473061da92fa8d56aab3a75598428f18dca504191a51746eb5fcad8f784eafac5ea81d636d579e330baf7db95c8d706432e9f585e84da090c0eb40dcd819bf10e0d5b8600150d186f732af50b431c596c920eca742e6555129fdf5df96b44005083d7a33087b150d63529bee4b6e1ed4189ae2d93cee8dc671d47c0e74ba04218dfe273484a4bb59a57743ea56843d516ff2c72ef9841996d31b0d6c5beef367a6b44cc84cf4d403a06b40406e4c9f47da401e3cf31412694e6164dcb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c18f511ffc3479a59357c17c2fb3d1e0e6f0edda4c8b567f2413323c2037f2fd140fb0cf33eb59526d8c0dbd216939b5":"7387aa3b0b3d92afb29761d3d5ea16e32a68297b9ea6751e1d54c8612f6351c1":"":"":"949bf03868563c7d1498c69c327686682656374b2efdef6342e69a388229c580ca2217a9332d3ae77c2d1223f5dedf4b34ec50b79d5baa7283168ed7cbe71c6c3c9193bbe01b76e011c39d2d462017c2c74b7e698fa2140e16886a9ec0fc6c36decbae37537638ccf17777f1cfa49d2c2c7ba3aadd0a1565d61942de94aa6fa16ecafc2dafabc9082f23e75a0e2f8f79d1c0a15ce57fef7655f1a4fc6fc4d4a694bf6ca9e333959f35ad354524f614905c6a52ef8f524cdf01c5fadadf207772" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"6b09295110384eb56726f61474bdc532fdace31ceadb5fc23d587356cfac74338ab6f9d89394b907edb646650865a3fc":"7cafcb4db31ab411c396015b8bbbc990607e08bd1cef3337dfa0e295ae024f9e":"":"":"e51bc5b3a6bb2a2667f5d62c2ff9902dd07b566870b4c14242627da7581449ec985739cdc2bb5ef036033fa798112ce20df06d46d61aad7121b8282fe7556bdd363cdabbf47184e55edd85ee0b7b0be17b9a7f822f4d8906465b525c16385d0899b6c27728ff2a600870aef65f58f9d3777e8987d86e59fdb69cd232e7289fc75cf2174304137f988a17b60c57af84cd8e556aaad458f511fc0b3009516435c0c60098f35fb6a4a90d90bc6071d38000703ef57cbc19d6b78a0f797f3ba044c9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"ec6d0f68240f5c47e822d9088364c6cd03ca53808162b4f06f5956da65290946f4d26653d079e50604f836c1d798243d":"b40b5737cc76c5f6d1df0f13bfbac7e26f92aa933125705b6197d9bedb11f2e1":"":"":"207833cf65599e1406ddaf3452f060c872099cbf7483f1f7f14033490f7258ca5fd7f5339f914498b6e61fa426cb872c880a9fda9b8ba590cd8006b990af7ad412f60c8b2ad969c2f9cb0e9d005943d4dd2dd7af9699046ce89d6405597716d43b9ad54641c2278b04b2bcc5b8ecbcd5e2044e4e6ec5a628605fcbd67249e813bb769d7df01b60404d030e69e9672b4fdeddf82a22042b83ca036578b69f9a0ad9702bcf95fe846705b49b0a0795dfbc4f671e0158ded6242bd8f8fbc2410c46" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"df59ac224e4ba1b6dff348f17bcf9c5a94a3235a54f2799a6cae29d8654b79d18b09b444a28a7d537e1a2bc89e95abd8":"14a0a91e0cfd63ef5fcbe2e8c7a44bcf5769c9f95b6c50bbe9d3b48b82a09053":"":"":"656438e7738d441b9ac116361e9f26adc0e303da7889cf559841b3e44127318edd356051bd0b3ecea78feb2b928227921a0c183c9f56bfd11ef31b28da6c78f3891d8ae1804bc158fa56e8b7a1a46be4954de493ef65a7f9beb46949a323a04e944034db30b19cebd8b70bfc155882ddfaca1bd5acb981c2c1b3e0862c6234d13093ddbcdff15129d586fc24ea2fd20946fe45b467bbbc77a6b6973eb6ea02994607c657eec29e4c4b3915cb730db056babf1779127047b401e25f97f606063b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"8da1ad6810c1d6b7ead210e48f51c370d4520547a330a4d591e61a9847aa043463f69d1b237999fda9b5697f1e7aaa07":"291c536dac72409e31e71cafb1b5f55c14421b2c7a44d792cfdc663dc8f62692":"":"":"c2bff571554c26bbd4442fbb3b0f8eb4db09840337658a7425613e0fd4f96e60da39b250c3a77379a53325a56ec02248c4d67fb9154e3b0eb8972a3109aed531eccc027705b267d2b9c037da79860d76e5e980b5b30b7ea588fa221d24d973f6d4c625de65123e91613a1528cdee59993aa827f319a759412f20aad6c50fa79a3debeb346ad92809470daf228cf344e09f03c839a28d580a2b3d7050685ef51e95649aba7228a2f0c82a2dfd89cae6ce549e8b27fd46f02feb473645765018ef" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"5e8d6571f514519de6c4c0a7cc5b85df616735b8dd09c3bed2377499aaabb296a9b2c94642da10e8fa737cdfb3129334":"6ae29c71b76fc48f14a3d731a0f6f276f73e7672eff631dbb1d22b06463bb236":"":"":"5cadc1264314fb4bc7ed7fa74bfa16aefa624bf2fd60c992d0cba10429c56e0028ebb430b1a1c6662a9b3c7f6de244ca000ae63db9570f1aa3e7ffb1e97a9d848021d8e632fedc037712a29abec4063b9d57c60738f0af0b1aab3844b03f7aacc65d38bec91a11b7c3bf8d970f01e00fed9dbbe9e2e499a21c72a7c5a22864125133ecb073a4c9f6d9fd46024f5c1ee7fa447209afa6ccef1f97ae77ca67fca5959dde209d2597f87af6e154408579cec42c69fa9b7cc075ee3e37ee3d91ad9f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"5c9481b2642855fac8931eccd1bd6c5a05b560a55f96d37e865f057a95812d81fe65c84c96a990eb7a302b58de723cb4":"b6a61b9a31207363d62c0b88f1632290f4f18feb41a6dedb85b7450ff9157016":"":"":"9cc77b68e1ac23fdd2e2a6ff697053f816bb48b39b1162f7aa3fdd2dd1867f68b13980c9e5989d4631b7983248501731326bd7bf6e967b3dee7d2d5625d3cc2e198623af9f77f86103491ebb4aefda5c333b51557b8f643e6d6c593fd7e27e4bccca13140f6129cbd024de076e4688567fd7e41dc7b2bd0bd9b3e966d5d3c461502221b52b001a4d2102894da04172efb900171a0eabab1fd134217580cfc33a0a94edc0bc132af91d048c6f5ea4e34ebc9686a99f81d19118ba4da63ae3df7a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c43f883d0adc2b56984d4a497a8ad76813a01df5a0ba22b53144763b65c7bf3f6f722e4ceac59966a6e44ed898e6109b":"769bace2c263edb87101743673724ef67a935e1ae9cace87202b6015d20fd9ca":"":"":"ce61480953190453247d091838dd80117f7f85a7e9a1237c92edf10cfa26b423735788b1e89f33625480d9faae57112ee62c8e4840475a6a738018ad3fd4a77efdd8f15ffb621c429419b6adb20431fd35f9d62fb33d500b87beac4856aa4971eb89710576b609ecfe758f3682dd316e7ee9d6560b444c2446656c8941dca7d6eaa70fdf8a70f18386ee5d4c86738bc261c0e8e5f509dabffd0425a86858ea3c71de5be98570dabd80a37b4f7f954002727c0b712e58693603c23130a45e98df" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"d083f7f8c65374627ddb51582b3a39e2bf074508d5f28ecce25787f386058de8afafaf2ad7e6449308e176be01edbc59":"ddb4ced192f52bdfa17aa82391f57142ac50e77f428fa191e298c23899611aad":"":"":"b978826b890ce8a264bf1ad1c486aaf5a80aa407428c0201dd047fa1b26e9ea9ff25a9149215b04c2f32b65e007e0059a8efe11481926925061c748678835c0066f596352123f0b883e0c6ab027da2486244da5e6033953af9e41eec02f15bebdb4e1215d964905e67c9e3945ec8177b8c4869efc70a165719b8e1f153c41744d44d3c56a15822d522e69bd277c0c0435fa93e5e1bc49bc9d02aee058a01a04580a6cad821e9f85cf764fc70dfae494cbfa924eab0eff7842e3541bc29156f6b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c2feb900032f2cca98d3f60536f563d8ac9af5fb2e90dba36c371c0a1c58cf5e4a60f2be0fa13b8266b715be8aad128c":"8e6f9be0c692648072d19c750804b10e2ec313c8013abd363de7a467787859f2":"72f54ba3f8e71ad69a040bb8493283acfc8815f17dbcea220ecd68372a2dffae":"adce8157ef60482841dd2ac5ac512bf7649120c1dba81ea75f2a70b7512bb6f3":"e76e4326ac69ddbc6b2408c529b05a96425c65cc65671601191238e9434d2a0147f3a25ce9b6818774f5263c92459bca421d2b492f9a9c2971359baaa1426d6e2c36d8924f39d02ee2fb5502c4e0b206dbe9aeeacd508abe6c055d547b5f9f35de4fdc9c05a2c63ad699a3a7e265598b8f40a8a295d7376b88c49af9edc790b8a5ee221e19877616678e2a5135d7b3756109200439d9ec8bfe0cc5f3c334ca9c022ab9192d5d554dc7ae76af1dc06d814427f46a7cfa2dcc62f4777d07ebde7d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"ad500edbe28b9a4338b55451b81c652797eb48fba753c186ce0aa9ad02a84ea2c995b7ade6de0fb4ec97bcbd61b711d5":"5770c41832a4cdc4039a8c332a4b45e7a7b2dabb678ccd2e56452aabeab14925":"d8d5516d158b41cb9d66566b88064900af78183f765f2f72a19548fb797377b2":"60a3a01a72e6b3f33a0c236db08237e7d656bdf4bab1db57ae23b7305569dea5":"c5ac3df66bc664e8bf84c758c7926992f0e8a03cd3f3f5fb8277c85b4da526601e8131f9d205f35594e101a86fb83ccf4c1e98c8e609062256701ff2132e337cb7287f0ee2e8fe3ef11ae703d7efe52e63cf89119ced05950c55aae6c822b6b0a8e1b91b537e5bb2de165a4b5b43a1c41fbfd65fff9bc5329d303caca84f5d1fc6acacee622623ed5dde36aeda0816749557c924d6ed26cd80e456fd0ae2146477ccb63a203fe16ac1d0eb2d12b6a2cabb21d412422e95f2df8ccdc23b4ef0dc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"51a29bac53961792077e88ed3603d33bd1f51b3fdb2b5cd1ea131c6f643af65de81eb2e260396d2a69b4184c4eb98a15":"72e5285b92c4ea4458e8a2159687cd46e7df9c1f4513d8b72cc88be41c2e1522":"16a69f7aee34c567595f3d362ccbdbb7b9e9372c4b1729fbb80d9a089eee31a4":"825197262a43f6523182f0a91005d70b17d81c2bb692edfd02ab988130c7d5b9":"f63f531c242a295d7796c3b4844fc74821af5a53e0e7ae822cd8a7f9de91e6164164f3448fd7d18feafb97c9500e0625d501dcb3927e6fb39ef65dd9586d157076436452bd3066cb30d1f47dc0a3ffa5f2e9ab4e183018b40a82b39b0d170aa21b05600eefea906838b95456e04cf046808030a56951d2502c5eb6271228905ed08549bb171d6c0408d88250785f42e349ce1d9e74a6cd0360a008ec804e7ecdcb4d1fe24aa5a18cbb65f4de1619a29c6062b409a386ea6f43e60adb9ea3dd28" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"b30ff9c6e5b6bd258f1cea0fd5ef9adb81fbec233ff2fab01e79b7422878b2e950604e10ab80ddceb9d2b968d0d37ba9":"e8acd4b380aace0b27572057eaa947e10e6b49516140139c74a1d4f472221dac":"1d2ded0003521e2ba6a4a3e732e0949c1d858fdf0925fedd9cfd7f603e0e692a":"688ac5e7b4400d962c106fd2ce712a1cda6a0b8ac5196ad727f9b882329a3d5a":"c5208fec1d67517311a42bec07782ceb247e9c818e4f5f3bd160c9e53d462b61884feb278cdc8f64e22f59d27dfa98d3a90da8c7c5ba28ca40bd0d18934595a376553d1a8a19de07a83e2e9db42748c982cbcbf4a975c20084ea9cc6c6a41b571faf66b364e4b7e4d32efc80c30b219da1c02a1ea02f6922adbc31a057f999605a2d827f10907835c2bdde4157d7bf2906a0ad27bb72f113c6ec4f23631a2b8517bbce91b560d90d73fbf0699bab21da23e27cfec513bb5e375f50108197d664" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"56715dcbaa4f5bdbd157bdd950d1c1b46c1f4f8d7818ab321d72c0ff3c0a928064b0439f7bf021dcdc7febf2126e5432":"cd5547991b525f7795e075a59af1701375175bd760db99d316b91463f87f7f3c":"b2e4f02f1c14866f538eddab402356ff3b405abbb9154e88b98483a83be70f7c":"b8db321ab30285eee7f9e377ad62def6caada447d00a4ec882081daafe2ec009":"7ed8c2be58e3553eb65508377d63d7f24518d1a7235dd4c740bd987dd8bc1c1e3ca97a69a37dc9a270ad88989e4868e6cf8e4cf01703c0b1eb6aed8c3f8af431d819e68b6947ae134d360d87e33668cdef0e45e11f5cd79329ff95ed00e4a6952750f1574f489394b5fde3c6f07311a1e5d9c4e070a0943ef9d4a130a9e4b0a80c256e96ca5042961766874898ea0f772b78d1a33e866351a4eb425b822b5ad596cf249bce8ccd6dafb334b71a503fce2c8fa3fbac9943910ce5ff02ebbedde8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"1c60a31760019e6a571e2987e57e19adbc1accf3edd44e501061cbec331b197eb68d0fa8fa5e3071d6f8b7c9c0a3c35d":"d4d84dc7311096791dd9c9d7f2cd291071f877afd86b9644427482d09ac9df64":"6473f4430398d7e5a2d218bd05e6aedac1e317269df3e4705d56c22d6e7abb0f":"379649b56a46399b9ab5f3880e1a73993a58cf52821d3cac87890aa0e6322a94":"d34152fa12fa341d0326a525aa838558630013857747f02634d24e9deec2da12f52fb405e7f1b973dc2d982d26eb2ddb4b49c35a9308b06809171dc990a4248e6da0c329a259f495247b9fa8c73af06604db7b629168e34081696a043977dd29a3c0362d5895f9aac24bcba58dd74078ef6f8d33eac864f2e6cdc479da3d224bad8099d011e914b6ccc3631a7369586e18c71a4087de0d47a7c29a09c12438c7de2d4b47768f47685b742c25b860e716c31e2afe4ce6d92bc2fb9f34400602f9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"eeccce7f7edc52f0e2559250be36526cd1839151a77c59d527f66fa24ea4d86b3fb298c8d72b6a0a8e191b60259d1fc1":"26d35895723ba3d431991a0e6fb2154ae5bff7e58609c926ee3269afc5cd631f":"227b9a71a6c17ecbf627161fc627f8f6f1a28ce39772b7a3d36064e2cc6dc4d5":"eb59f780c5a955e1355dfe15cc4a4e90a6ec75584e63bd0de734399f47b95070":"78ac77657dc56b23e617a9b38168da945c1cf52b6062c2b10f1d7a3814d9b9efa5545da050b0db5a65a2d2d2e02fa12e97eb970fa8e83c524bc809d675e0db35c9762323f327f1edb9b534ce16d02519750b41ebe51f747e9da43fd1afc60e46c7aba72e15cc7a22fad19ed55189f287a14737483eb6b32d966c3e3969d8198f01f2ed841f20d7d2e156d6285a29e07f6d7fff42bd575806c4092522b03e0d1b8df0cc88f5b82d24a7fd0feff6ada03a60ef2541a4ab041a49aa973c7163bf94" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"86f8104a081c9565dea5652f20145a068dadff125debf818262d8931cec6ba937fd5b51affcebee952fb67f29f197267":"c7ba5ff828855e6e78fa1732d63aac1f49701ff7ac1f3506e97941f998b4e9d2":"6917bca15db53a5359e5c4d30ab4d37fc6a1bc660faaf2e74864cb4aa52e0e02":"eea8db0cfc04f8de14d6053442b5b4f8733f822df4be5966a0de8b0f7d2036f6":"562b8b2fa3bb15cfc3f7e57f309e31b13c790c928ad6b32a005f5431c28576c5706c4ac0dc2c7a4435bebfa06571278f485932bd94382efcf727b300b230da9b9e9f377d2659ac75dd8247351d5ed8185effa0f255a2a2136e63717e0265d561a34c75ecee1c774c25e33fd938696825686acf9a419c1da3fa1ce8f695e231087aa0927dde6ab487dc61291ad4700c5c608fab1a418f6b30ff97b8b8f01ef8164287849a77b21be5d11d82d0c19056e07d59a30f6c576705c6cedcb9f22d3a8f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"0db6f73ab6d31ddf8f78d76961310d68f081c9e6d5985e1883978c2dec48d9f58875ab658b3a8b795bf464af9470a90c":"d886936ad36549a10b5dc5d6e21203abd75ad63f826794b4adaad45a70424c5f":"76993d3bcc32546430efa30e3b30acc34c7672b6e18c7e2e9a1f1cc26f7f7a22":"54c72cf3457e6f5f6b35dc14167fee9383c44c867f233ec9d81f187bce438c0f":"c3523894d273c85d605d39f5b89e3388afad8c20787897b903d8db7e3de7590340174be3abd7598daba7806ab934e0feca02bbe66282d469ec01476bad5ccba59fc14cd9549bf4af49641f4326b1052b179c89194d21bec0501c97ef2c24aaf045fd348b765910fe92c0039612e37baad2445b57d9db6c1e550adf6688a79b117f6b7a37e0209d89f194a1bfe1ff2e3b28f0454b383af8872f32322bd5313a3c9ca48d33eab7c3807bb98f8f402c43b99b2176f0b33be08c7e84c86b26e971ab" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"3b1ffbfae6ec54a175a80a33c8768fb60f2af9ee2b8620c4e800a17fb9241ae47f77da414f67b5d7b24dd100355d2afb":"0d50cf61e2020a909ba6e36ba4d0a394579d3e4377cd4bf0068967e8d0fe7a78":"5d4efb3f6e6503c5d85a1c43398d0441ce8aefafaabe2f6d86988a24e033f502":"cfb6156a1b139abf21c73001240997ee1a8cad91a4bd777c0372c1e8fcfd3fac":"d3ef776c8d77fcc5e947bf53e0be11777e69c7dce138f24c1a3212d1b6b932580371479b7619fc82f029d92969628f810b54a8fdab8eba799e750945f3545f6a96226bc760ad736101516efff5d8581f5864b38c29885d39843a4adca17046e1e388c890542988797b576da64804eb4101638328d3f8bfa398ffaf83cb7290a2cfd39ead13290ae773a8958b33914ca02c8ff6a069aa25ac8b36f6f0f1dcd8f1c5fc838083a64ae7ae11b85be3a9fa80ed83949b622002e91776273fa32d6cfd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"19767ce1f18aea366539642fad400a03a675b2f3c0b1cfd49925e535b2c2779043c5a1c57ef550acae733729516aa62e":"6bfa882c1e895eeffbb85578182653c022a4703091529780c075cd482809b990":"11236df1dca3de6e3e3a57d2741d1b77f15f45b05beb47cc500100b31188a42d":"98708a88fafae56c4f6fa780c6c0e33ca8f2592983b5ae607146cd6e92204416":"b6514a3779dcef2c9ea0ed7ddfa808d045c5907314c358302ca32b2055987a38ef601637cdcf77b1b8f7eac479f8f18972013c2e1a6dfe612e8a586dc529ece486505534c0ff3dc0b2049a0e46d7ac504a1fdfaa9b08d9fa017c5803415fa391ba7eeb576fd6ddba4404feb46e7cde56e090dd280be5edba7d6df9c5ba7d3454bcbd4d443b08fb51a117c1d5916f225dcd6c1c3fe2b2880f4d42962befe3ab76bdc086e29381dd985206e3e00ce722c9c040af5ff4cd4a8183b446d91b310845" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"f63292bab50668eb14b83975422a0c853fe55714a9edf9d8a817ba0b2f26ec40063a86ee3c79c694273342a02f68ecd0":"3c525956838e26b77b8cfc37f024ec398ed825076dbb749cf49a7d868c201e6d":"d9a41b47c3bf8743099dc8fd228f77dff01ae304761eaf57d751e11cf094bef1":"b790c37dbda20fbeafe9d1339a1151144253bdfbffe17ba87240eae49c606bf3":"3586b63315020b3ba1121314a0fa6c66d57de0ec44abeef7b7325e960832b7944cb0a81a747ee5c5d3163001536d3e5ad2ec869b0e5ceb14aee2e6915073619528c1421b59b80254dfc3cab0584898b0bca72c76ae25f52b7405b9dad38cb2b841e1d6a34fc5b277129db49928b2f6c0dd22900ee786ec128164ed12eb324b502499f1c5c89be2101901476b39c56034cc293e320e63a3e019186d4eaf9a098136e8c0ce7f6326f84ec95992dde2585ad3945a9534aa2954b8c15a48e3324d76" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"3df74683f298ba48648714e384989145c1b84246736dc275636809d64c75ff603056e703c435eacf21c0bb152d9fc2a0":"371217ca2337db03c4d06714624fa11f90d5dc575bdbe12a457c610be066dc2b":"f26b9cac8df57a33e4b5868c36f2b9322994a98269dcbd7956b93d147dd0aa27":"0a6db86c3abdc39878045b8fc2d5f0f77a8e298efdacb4cb9f74762fc23b96fc":"ff5252b7a39460a73094b9d668b53d1932243caa885c0ecd850612fdbe7e46cb275d079bb75a6b050191282ccb11ef255d52cb763618c4b624560d79bb9a5bc99319783de43c152e7aa7c4cd879a75869285320a9b749c897bf07220cc1bef1edc494bffa6ab93dcf839dc15f6f2e508b9e216e2a1786b75abfb01bb7bdeda722b47af895f551670f9562d9f9b78e98ee7ea5c5ca4f836af5bf153925b2aec055eee8164edf3f7b72e24b1203cfae1834705f74cac8c6043a3c2abf6bdf28fc9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"53d70692f0f4dbda23d78660f0f08c7e70ca94441f1440348f76108874d13ea14652725abd1a94d315364416c90e662a":"6deee916ad660811cf05b5652f32df4e97f544ebb57762617359159cc9a425c2":"acda427eea1c8c6791be6e4d2b60be30302abc84d5c5a13be7d510004b8710c9":"d27d7f598a14205c45788665cd062135b6b65547d3188959e38ab675401d2b62":"f77f9de60e95da3f1d0d67b5dde29b31df59ce980ebdbad7b5e0a0051fee39e1d6fc4311f21efa016039bb05f3b009b223be6f2c007b468388a8a19bb468c7b82cc93dab3e160b2b72fda1240fcceea01c2638e9c8bd2d1ed9ff9b55bf69fba4b6ae8e694c150896ac6233b75567993f9a9adf25ca0f0835b9991ff4b8d3f4f1a3e4c5f9866d98b7a75196804f996492a61dbab5bf72f87658e2300a1b0777ef7f43ffe8962f6b6708d2d91dcdf6b430cfaacb3289f74cb0f67370bcc9af249c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-384,256+128,256,256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"85186650694f742c3f5f228f943788f05602d4827518908fd09a1fb445d8333db2d65f376d48c66eb9e0498999e1ff49":"499928c41841324749143be9cc769899c38d6f6e6933e56898896fabcd802931":"9574ca51f21865c2fb0efc75cc9d90ec5e9c43104979cd64d00ea5544ea01c96":"c0df840a18d7584b62c70b2f057bf824168edb673cb517cd9dac89a0fc80c9b4":"b31e50202f883a8563cf129a0d5f8a33abad79d8ec8a97167ed7fca778e5892480617cdf50b5e51547f7ec1bede35020a311572c61e33e9c82968e8f69586daea3dc19063bea56503f8ca482918d229949acd6f1c52cccdc5f7f4cd43602a72a5375f3aabfd2834ee0494823beada2daeccbed8d46984d1756fe2207ca92186b506115f6de7d840c0b3b658e4d422dbf07210f620c71545f74cdf39ff82de2b0b6b53fbfa0cf58014038184d34fc9617b71ccd22031b27a8fc5c7b338eeaf0fc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"35049f389a33c0ecb1293238fd951f8ffd517dfde06041d32945b3e26914ba15f7328760be6168e6aa9fb54784989a11":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4cc8214cd7e85a76bfa735bbbfce926c0323fc348de6c05ed1800c2c8f58c6b1001eb1f6b29b35242a3f8fa2e90003f4":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d046270e6b7997cd5f4e9ed1193e55382191f78547a660854cf60bb03d039a3950cd147a3445f6d32d14cbfb9da0c327":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"8c7c80b169160c78104c205e4492a9477e6f7ba1c3bb4daa86d222deb6241bfd2d2dcd5c40b46fa553ca6a2f6be96991":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"cd394508d86c384c0c998b58cf7017b7124269428e4cf39519b5815cc2d88734fd2cbc87c79063db588d90b9cb1569f3":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"a14be417001030f6a9c543f829715b075d0efd8fa35acc7eed02a1401c6f59dfc87b8b9255e62fcda6a35e52fa4a6f9d":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"b8ceee088f3b13dbd1e7cf230449f246a456f504d63fd4288838a50ab76576a3f400502913cf57cb2341c5e6a63fe9fa":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"3c1e8a0199786fc268ee0ca0c0446d7363bd781069cf3a3faef2592cba06ce1e70c7c691af73d6d59addbd6e3f646d64":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e8a0925bfce66dee7e6a54fe0311d259bd7f7a22b8576d64840cc51c731212cb1763365deab3ab82de9996e5c8570eb9":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"c493ad96bb20b2480bd3122b4b1ea51379f5fa2bfd8bc0fed4080995b162c609b6d6197f432c8597163feb9c5439525d":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"1e868c5fe4b59e6d4249854226bf1120a74386ea590e9c35c58d7ccdfad56d71dbf557da684289e96cbdd66cbd9cb879":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"55bc1c7358dc334b26412ab472dcf4210740cfa0ea688812d8b1a7fb257b979edbab14240cf59fcc8a7007553ac480eb":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d894820d9cb243859447cd3a3f6cdd125a9c4faece6ad756d288a15c5d24c39d776c5ea9838c4c34f39f12c1a9df6700":"":"":"":"ba23f7aa0b7f6a93bc0df32e68e78786fffb5acd7fbc2864468568753e3ddf31fc2187b20c229d0d0b261510f6442816d2226024b57306b474079c92c66a00be482fc104cdbccef0450b3f2ce94f6bb6a5125e0774a28a2a083f802d3c45e9d4253295f80ca4bc439f539a7f82eec6fd450bd196ab468ec6902752dced44ab557fcd3f6a72c47c0f18cec6545ac669cf432e2db308d70a7394ec772a34f14f26d7bf7d0bd7e4437248618efa2c08adc7de9231ddcc976ef8bcbd11be54dd17ca9fa515fee6827bf5efb602fe8f1cf5d67078b17601803c5be05c24edccad2837d0be191f918d6dc62742241728a8690db5836c2045ec9f8bfa87b768f4febf2f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"17facdf2fca2e1134674ea8e8daa609b4477f415c6a13a5c157f3fb7727dda6d3c1dd89ad63e781588e4b3f8cb1f2f6e":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"2c13e44674e89aa105fc11b05e8526769a53ab0b4688f3d0d9cf23af4c8469bb700ac6a616c1d1bb7bd8ff7e96a4d250":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"a3da06bc88e2f2ea5181292c194a10b3db38a11d02ac2f9c65951d0c71f63e36c74e5e3d7ba0193bcd6839e9ae93d70d":"":"dbb7270760d8d262557807ce746ff314fd06598143611ab69bfc7e10ca5784b3":"8cdea882f894e5fdc5f0a0b16b7d9ac8cde35ed17bcaf2665564d4ee74059e29":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"462cb274b7def1ac0f9db135c8fa2e48599cfe2badf2ae9f6d06886b25dfb0cc250461f0dadd9e23cc6c08ddf4ae12b9":"":"b087ff5e230284aef4c90b5f9c48fec91b486f3d936d422475a2b12ff47a05b0":"150a4ca383c3863d9ae3212de9ab9da7442fcd5367af157714d74c149f69eb9d":"12d4740dd0c5356fa76cc441f9088e361d3e636dc7b1ee27a26e28218eff470e28f51b76540939d624cacf2e3facf0967e7396a42017f68789e53f4b1d216fbae675801b8869b06d173d42126bf88fbbfef60aea6c4ba15538b2d64f8f22f389ee35e01e4ea88fd7c9e4d10c145a5f6e4dd33a55f2cafbd5f56856ea945b3b596b4900cf78936732bda49a52bc5a648c6561f48b820699533d48ff04eccd81aaa5bd25fa277ef314026effe2e65a9c38d45832cbb89579535782bf6299327339591a3e66d82aef6fcfa0a21b6b50a398b737a83a6a9b34dd46f3d15162dfa488fcadd18dd06f856f6d6c4cac2677eca641bd4e044ef4cddf6c95f1725fd8c606" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"727337765db704e7b9d23dd139e63b5ac97adea990b7d04881b6b2de045c974a0265210aa4e336ac32f4b0a428ff272a":"":"48b452cbaeb990b6ca4ba64ae8f2a91d792ab83ad499093d9c4566ed8c7cee9b":"e7e32096873180e03c9f7bb33c5af4edc3fb9a36113275839302d40f0890dbad":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"8ce3f77c4ba4f40d4eb3e80d03f9b138bea725d44f7a47f4a1f7ee3afb45c2a0e8fa75683ba03964a8e3312ccc6e1b66":"":"83260430843b586cfa50ab51120ea5675d63402074d45b0bf80dfbbec74fdc63":"0640b6427bdd6ead525962b228392b3c28abe131719feb0c0f738288ee87acbb":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"96b0d3b13a65ae1010bf40e6e2dc6e6585db8fdb8fbd2b272611e51c62e1111ae93babde207a42980c9ac9018ab01153":"":"b67c2ecbc4d4c46c3573883b61311a2655cdff0e01a12a20ea0cfa4e91034c2b":"9ca69103d5af577da056d4d5e95f53be87aae4689918bdf0d011789f2ccba9b5":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"49913e04b653d82abc54cbddcdf898c409819dbdda4af93bc97b434dd1e319706504b1c76f34ca6d9dfb181c7057ed8c":"":"68b8f6f749ad588ff2c7477fd7c55be648134d57be6846674f2659d75785c39f":"cd7b2d7b24070e501843f0caa20666fbf963760893f4e277d944991ec965fbe3":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4687135763568418f6f30af400d37d794f712b10a42087fd832d840b9e8b1f818dadd1aba09e78a1925ecd9ee0d106f2":"":"ac00dc729c5526698fb80f685ffe93e9c25bf93b22424c15c20043e1fcafbc7d":"948555d8a6e0473a769b7019e6909a8565e386a624a47a1f9c96ff5e6609a894":"4f09384ba8a34f819a0d4473c3387f74299753fd16e386be51a5ee70d1b164be6fa53a3face06379da2d961bfd6ba21eb437bc77b527960352790bbc978217549006e7409b86ee97d6a042957d27a02fa5f04de94791bcd7d02cc6798bc66d3b6cd887f2a984224b3c279382558ff64459703d93b40fcdbaa7abe1bcdf0b95f4c6ec6583a86a41f837c6cbdefee3de4767e330cb2f4a0d8915f192f02c1ebfc78345f80d5e0f21185c647376d588991486ca9a8fe5c68d0b71a5f81b08bb112c56f69c89412f0282eb1bed0d05c959608d1eb6b1eb4a76a76ae927cfd8d651a651fe83668f24bc0d19e5de86813b16bfe8c771dc9f16a7d6d0441b3278de136c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4ccc3c6cd73101efb7833ce1195b28b3aa3e5628db02be166f2a7f6bf7e8efdad5ff3f1c375ef981336af28252756647":"":"8396edacbe629826be44543bece17ede600f7f877d1138af5e83c3ec44b8b0de":"98545ad6268e604fedeacaa10b727ced0b0e284a00c29081a41c0d2e3675bacf":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"85ef33038e0bee3e40ce8eefd3648e89c521ad537b0c8003617824b08a154b75c89f036845a6f24fb9a15513ed28eda2":"":"2c675110a2bbcee5c6096cfd8f363441e3473664cf09577a95996928519a9292":"f1db097abed76cdbb1fe6aaba94bb51c2af8f43c5cdd2eafdf6b40a234d3897d":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"77a48fcd8cbea1be145a65c9e20cbc4e660dd439c7ec7e2dabc6f0430c5ba716182f05e834e84e89565714fe8ccf0de6":"":"1b838d460961b8f1623667fb316772cf50aa462ceeb58c36e2a6482ce7aa9f9f":"ccd4048bae7f8166c35e932cf3a09feb2f97dbb31af61a3fe5e4edb881ba6930":"af5afbb8d60d77c36c20a8f4c20b68ccd7fddb703d1ae83b5981605c4483e4f092329bd75aaeeb6fb4e6552540bd772edba5e5a96dd227acef73241257fe8774f757c673dc3370423de5a85b9118b5aa98682db6a89f520174a25e8e4b71f83ef432a91ddd8f69c1431c40d282d7e789427f18d9c5673131d5d3797d1335ffda64319d642f5ea5c1641092893a4008f076b649170916a03e06f0854848607c6c44a9f27bd3b17b293a914a86139e9a1b11c8652eae3757162f9f7161a2ee6f412a40002781e8fc8b80242331528225e70b9b23c6b2c970db12eab61bc290fec9b4c6c13d6454d7336f439d9b4b1df59248ab84e3a79d7f37df07e88c20f9ed92" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"71cea1ba7a7dc792ca33288ccfb67570d9b1eab34e35296209db20c6676f174df4e062d1f660522881aeb11a651581f3":"":"c9667d28614fa05f112ec31487cdb3d925f2cb312202f7d85695a8f7336573b9":"6363dc485ddb9bdd61db33fb1beae9bfe2d0e7788a86b50774f8658bac094214":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"3a23653a34334db7d3abbf747d9d47d6b18589ab3516b0600bc93517d206a1a9c74a51766beec0563db655273d5dbcf9":"":"89922f45e6637e7fcae0a98d7ccdcf36650bbf7fe3253b7716014047a0983e98":"5d7519b3f442e1246185e1e7a56fd37473f18824f3c9d21656f54f1fa8d2947f":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"24cd11e75f2b0ab60c5b7a35020d716cea2e4f5b7748327c0cf355b11805189334889dc3198f13c36cf7beb42b2a1a6f":"":"cf9571fecac5d79d65617a885815703de3459cf739db097f8ff2ee557d0b0745":"2282cbdba64ac2a4053c070efd1dd0638fc31dff97dfa15f76bc077bf173a821":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4931d76a7ceb2238c1f0ed76be24d2fe1a925d1084a392fc8c43d93535da0e9351e52abb58a9bc34c46f254b8313d387":"":"92a8eb05034555680bc937d0d958e820b09785009e5e05739f29d9af17a63976":"d37465a30f837fe05f04f6b7ad4bb1c83bbae83f9c78f027b4831f5e2ad2dd78":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,0,256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"ffa596ed725daea92273519c279d0a26be7f77cee1fc4fca44dc99b97ad8125a3172e5a36ebc671df1fcaaa54bd7218a":"":"6cfccdd8253cc5b284701ef8d16f8888f79100373a7df50f43a122591bbddafc":"5795ae5be47a7f793423820352505e3890bac3805c102020e48226deab70140a":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e97a4631d0a08d549cde8af9a1aae058e3e9585575a726c76a27bc62bed18a4b227221d5fe5a5db9810f9afe56a3ee78":"94084b11d55e0f9c2ef577741753af66ad7a25b28524b50ea970105c3545e97d":"24c81d4773938371b906cf4801957ac22f87432b9c8a84bc5ac04ad5b1cc3f57":"c8c878451e2b76577c36393ca253888c1038885bbfdacd8539615a611e2ac00b":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"5c96609e9de807efed31d3c2d63e284be5c44c1b5ab84672664de8d8d8e2f8181b95a5290fdafeb05dc902a9a7bd639b":"135aafb3bbc89ef1e00a2a35ef32f122b7511cc55d86e7822a34859b630b4d29":"115774904a953af07936e3efdcf6054b4c534dc8654f563bb10610444d30625f":"4705ec7525e63919f7483fe76cdf7397b19f22d2a9d54b6cf0ff9abcf0a7c46d":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4cbbd0538535994cf00354ff8609ddfd04e80dc4174b9542cdab52385dd968ddbef8157a6e3f26f040229a450f8e564f":"ed81729d1aef522f7bf9c127207d8a680ce4432964ed4025b5bbb12964374f3e":"1259073b57358935b7149fa4349793c5ff28d3ce98b483ec48986aa285451abc":"b350a4e931bb5db50a866aa3c01ead7d48d5859bb97b675e77ebb844ac832eb9":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9b2bb0f34e6f0a31eff00e6604e6ca77643f69895877f77197a06e2b42bf047b3c1ee55a2a28fb3579324a54458310b2":"895e7060956784e5ea113ca785214bcf608e2a53c175e6edf5b78f1ad90e67c6":"c0b1980d57fb797c4907aad1fb5662bcc8d6ee30f6bed951e77c11d1893346e9":"af3357fd21fc04d1d1bd162b94bf129c45d41fee90366a180d98d41325336b5c":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9c8306c6941098408c56518a44d3075c22e02f19a6041d2e9c4e296fda435db917c99d538ab65f6f1bfab0d479a1833a":"3a80e9f5b71b242ae07ce7b617057dabae189c5468da2cf049b5b529abc877d5":"3c151e92dd3121a8d2d11604632df00cf90706d3e843737445de0f2fde1ea924":"f53cb5fe673201f5eaf4115382d48ba45be405b37a31a56e41d1d76202038b06":"9bf31156e54d7142490e620afec2217931fb2389215a3609b384b0551bb3c9d90c3b3053054046a324db9b34633e41b66114bfa7ee86bbd22d08d53e349a4dc875265b32151d3e475df348a22d5226478184f372b0ba3be92ec1b284fc66dfa3609463214b6b468b29478acb0c55e1d4674882cb75e3eaa3a66ea0f4d7b1a571206a761d636bd3519afb6f05a0f1b6bb38c00bd68530a6c9b445b6b4a9c7457a055627b606f4508ed676fb5ba0d27589b7f464271c3e561215905c50ec48f5ddd1b8549e8d163453083db96c7ec8eeedaf6804369e76760b08abcca937c497900be385db8804b443e8a1489b8f3e3e4cf367dac3e15cb8e95cdabad04f08856c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"87a8fce521df0a2e26f1b1f9c7ec9e98968474915a085a95cbdca7d8c669e08a69b8c3c3df07f9ada368be448938bf92":"b1bfaead04743bdcfdb193d32260918ff803abbcc0d5ddc50439bd01f6e42a3c":"12a07384e9c74fb3f33df1a089dddb7d416151a0270d0c0216e085f1ec4c249b":"9b42567093112cb5889703b77b4b372276b5bbccadf86eeb9ef6d3cd395b2acd":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"69d667bde79e41cb78742426ca5ebd48086cf1ded5cad7293fcf910e5ab23cc8cad75bd989c3ffd05817d1aaa5493c05":"5f72346eb50ea82cb111d5b3c91dc9b7c61c92fa1a062177d513fb616b1226d5":"0465b8aa89d9cbbe8e1cfa2e64e64b8d1f5dbec7f710a6d37fce898e3f81e57b":"173135f31c2320cccf513e88a21f2d207e00cbe4330d2f550e0be77405eef47a":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"f1f6e5a55fb2180de436d48115aa1aa38a6242eeb0959de3690f259c1d8395a5862d1ac4843404d25215c83bca90f44e":"f467ef083c745a1bfc9be44f1d468b2518e3ff1c0cee6819fdde354d4071b17e":"fdda9f0888c4439cded15a768300d163c1e326ee5571c22ab95ab3e44b1676d2":"6b8d60c565604c8fa8d7adaf0b07ed268a491fb79794d2770356e191daa1cb50":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"0db9d437153149e101d5818b263b975735994dfc33d8b3f158a05760867757ab438a5024e1d43006226018c378af55d3":"275bdc5fc78b0d8afb5c8aa5f7854c319a81bb8cc9300210a9990fb7933a352e":"809da54d1830545672f180fa3e0441a0d3fe472e7cd7a6d707fee5af7e9b21c2":"ebe66cee6efbf583c881a25e346ca7d99741dacfce0d8785c659e92774e26ff2":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4106f6ba6a291fa54e4ecfd9fa61b961554e4e8e03e19d9bfd82bd35c3471e8bc5bdcd2f810079c1bbfe906929e88d27":"5a7e61b86ca70939e64af613a667695c7c915e667c79998e76e55eb33fef6d86":"86c7d5883aee568aa74d25782019fbd6f5acf4196752ff3d1dd96ec1e7436424":"3a5d80e739f5a30e6bb507d82b60ff987d5bd9cbbff4b47daff278a3252db3ef":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"5d1fcdabb70dad1428c8be291720c92b8565f331ee3438d79bcddc968efedcdb9319f5ee91124b93b965d504211fef04":"6c8c8a066c6208dbc18a40a30b9f689048877e038bf76d65acbdde7ae4c566f8":"bfa2e9ebe0d70d3b62cdbd78c775a62e0e22fa75f168123a336b66b9a2b68c06":"e48b5245ea241baeb7f665a9daaad662d7b2422c3e3711cfbed81d73691864ee":"1586e0761c4a39013dcb552a0e363e709f4303c0e575653c9b240be7449ea26e4bb1dc93f06ec958b6c06217757fc550b356c135063c00fce9d856aec0edd20735b46b7c9a8e7df780db3072fc2b314fa5cda653ba3690132f10d30ee94c8458846be75659ef3868086bcf54ff55a8db1ea65c3e747a8ddab3f2304738e0c75adfc10c23ba651ccf0de64a39cab3beef667f466391a61a87a981afe883f09c4edbd3eae98d51cd3e7b31ee179f8a4e10feac96ea210a4b8415c9f2cfeb2bc8bf51f13801dc542ba1badda1c30141d72abb1bbb35c9bb481d91db5691c44bf3526a02d0bf776304a951858aa2fcf3f45bc656abcaeea94cbdc851a914b4b3a3ea" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9fc58d0785adbf033ce6642dcc9a861df44a35e89d06b346b165074a048b500994b4c0b3e27306b8c805c97b0ea14bb5":"e02f7a856266195fb5f4810232cd5c71a4465e1d95625c01e8e7eb69c63f6796":"7cd18b8d035b57bd01464280abe891b7faf55f9ed9910d9a148b030340c67cdb":"918c4d43fecf993227f7c120d239a30d3c315602800d6d58b9e9e0715964cfa3":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d43927d1e633fc3433536cd03617a97a3a10a7ecad3f0c781602829f8ec7feb2dd5922f2a2dee51db93bcf35100a8364":"3335a02aba1ea28d2e56973e21109e0adfb5068613c447e625fd83a8d0e34494":"bfde33c52407d3137123812c4818ca1e4b61878b8f9dbaec47935e3948a88d0d":"42597cf03bbee0e003d8677159918f5318402f7329f08e1d93c850e2a2a2f1bb":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"0bd69ce9a0a66dffefba83ae563e8df0fc6c7d7bdf491bf52cbf3f3777025cdf92b32217f550a1fe735b8519b44b040d":"820da3187bc879cd1f40476fd9677f3b67e02b35b6632ab68891e25f10555b69":"903b882de013695b4683316ffbd7c7809288d54c72e369f70cf172bff85e5629":"cfb5f494e76486ceef12dfe1bafd6ccf9b0754d8d2306fb0c41c0f4e921317ef":"ebad5e5a358ceab806ae5590d80bc0ba5d4061f49f4cb79a8a9da4fd1e8cb8f41cd8edc657c5180d18e62da2b53a50085b7e18b957eaf4edc975ca9d43e380434f51542dcfa947c322c708f3d3593c520717230df17f9341f02a5596b2058a27ba23f72a862b391be884570b22e20c80dd20d0a935f068465d554c8291fcd88eff608e92200f90cccdc82cb5697f0406654d9582e8db54225aaa28697bf2c4f47eba086a575298b991098c212c9e8d95bfa48f7e500c7223d9cbffd1df6f725909ab6e9aa837ff9e69158af434d18e5a7f99d1aaf10931f380d88344ad841064130cae50edf8687615743735f80457a228475bab7559015c4f45f91bdfa31d87" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"45784684d6004731689e33e45b344d7b68dc4fa841133cb2dd65c4b326dffa901109dfac2e48bf17f2fea33b412dc653":"7c6f4675f7a0b8c424d5be9e809efa305493874d9a950cb343afdfb64e77ecb5":"2b2dbe3834d8be93f1396b19be83bd96823dd82740da71c5eeb7b21865021884":"49c322fc1bec86d3e20628d9bdc1644e6f5e0237c7c694746bfee32a00145696":"9110cec7d07e6e32724bf043e73021b3ca0e4516b619d036ac9a00914e12f01ece71989f55c1caccd542c60a9cccffb91e203fd39dca2d92c8eb03ee7ee88abf21dc6891de326c3190f25ee9ab44ca72d178db0f846969465b25a07dcc83777e6b63a7f9f1a8246dd31ce50cd9eb70e6e383c9ad4dae19f7cec8bfe079b36d309c28b10161c28b8d66c357c7ee01f07403a596366725fd5bd3a5de3cb40dcf60aac10635615b866ae633fbdb7ece41695d533757d9d16c6d44fd170fae77c15b7426ed6ec8c9d6e9245cd5e19e8dc3c8c7e671007ce8454413bd07407e8a2248bee95a7669db6ee47377b4490a6251abb60cd4e2e404ab88aa4948e71ecec50c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e97a4631d0a08d549cde8af9a1aae058e3e9585575a726c76a27bc62bed18a4b227221d5fe5a5db9810f9afe56a3ee78":"94084b11d55e0f9c2ef577741753af66ad7a25b28524b50ea970105c3545e97d":"24c81d4773938371b906cf4801957ac22f87432b9c8a84bc5ac04ad5b1cc3f57":"c8c878451e2b76577c36393ca253888c1038885bbfdacd8539615a611e2ac00b":"761422dea283262998c0ffffefc77de2d395c818b9cf1ac2bcd1153235e0d8b63199c51e195135a75f1f87b454484ecc560c532c7ba5923c9490a423c177453459d81efc38ce2939226043cb733062eae303a009b48ee0cf3c7e40abe2b57a70a6062c669a9fbff20b4c94b4ecbc5f744a80d7be8134359581d441da921737b1329470b214f3e679fb7ad48baf046bac59a36b5770806cdef28cc4a8fd0e049b924c3c9216e00ba63c2ff771d66b7520dd33a85382a84b622717e594e447c919926a5b2e94d490ee626da9df587fed674067917963fd51d383e55730c17a124555e2e46e1395c9920d07dae4d67ffee5c759b6a326eec6d7b3ba6dee012e4807" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"5c96609e9de807efed31d3c2d63e284be5c44c1b5ab84672664de8d8d8e2f8181b95a5290fdafeb05dc902a9a7bd639b":"135aafb3bbc89ef1e00a2a35ef32f122b7511cc55d86e7822a34859b630b4d29":"115774904a953af07936e3efdcf6054b4c534dc8654f563bb10610444d30625f":"4705ec7525e63919f7483fe76cdf7397b19f22d2a9d54b6cf0ff9abcf0a7c46d":"ae2cfbb29fde23e8c22d77d7a50ba66798da93be4e49ef78b38c9be2411e2d8a9954eb29fbad0a967c51b26d8d746801539aceb32e2459d07baa994869d3b6db2c88fb9d7250fac00de8f79990d501ad985590031f7c45a00cd9b6d1b5531b238f3a31d33237c40a3da31356171cafd52cbb7929e32b38fe523d8212de801f554348a3cc468daca70e05affc9af97f172aba00b2acc50d7dcb5f0ecbce741c71a65c657e9d0f250c44f73865962b1a0d19738e9ffe9f17c3e03363bedf5312c444375529fa8df9dd72b7c09f20c2ef37abb93e6fa57cadbcd7b23036bb9924fcfb9bf83b09ea360fd3988639151b1ab22939e9ea1cdc413f7a2cf04cf2778345" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4cbbd0538535994cf00354ff8609ddfd04e80dc4174b9542cdab52385dd968ddbef8157a6e3f26f040229a450f8e564f":"ed81729d1aef522f7bf9c127207d8a680ce4432964ed4025b5bbb12964374f3e":"1259073b57358935b7149fa4349793c5ff28d3ce98b483ec48986aa285451abc":"b350a4e931bb5db50a866aa3c01ead7d48d5859bb97b675e77ebb844ac832eb9":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9b2bb0f34e6f0a31eff00e6604e6ca77643f69895877f77197a06e2b42bf047b3c1ee55a2a28fb3579324a54458310b2":"895e7060956784e5ea113ca785214bcf608e2a53c175e6edf5b78f1ad90e67c6":"c0b1980d57fb797c4907aad1fb5662bcc8d6ee30f6bed951e77c11d1893346e9":"af3357fd21fc04d1d1bd162b94bf129c45d41fee90366a180d98d41325336b5c":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9c8306c6941098408c56518a44d3075c22e02f19a6041d2e9c4e296fda435db917c99d538ab65f6f1bfab0d479a1833a":"3a80e9f5b71b242ae07ce7b617057dabae189c5468da2cf049b5b529abc877d5":"3c151e92dd3121a8d2d11604632df00cf90706d3e843737445de0f2fde1ea924":"f53cb5fe673201f5eaf4115382d48ba45be405b37a31a56e41d1d76202038b06":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"87a8fce521df0a2e26f1b1f9c7ec9e98968474915a085a95cbdca7d8c669e08a69b8c3c3df07f9ada368be448938bf92":"b1bfaead04743bdcfdb193d32260918ff803abbcc0d5ddc50439bd01f6e42a3c":"12a07384e9c74fb3f33df1a089dddb7d416151a0270d0c0216e085f1ec4c249b":"9b42567093112cb5889703b77b4b372276b5bbccadf86eeb9ef6d3cd395b2acd":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"69d667bde79e41cb78742426ca5ebd48086cf1ded5cad7293fcf910e5ab23cc8cad75bd989c3ffd05817d1aaa5493c05":"5f72346eb50ea82cb111d5b3c91dc9b7c61c92fa1a062177d513fb616b1226d5":"0465b8aa89d9cbbe8e1cfa2e64e64b8d1f5dbec7f710a6d37fce898e3f81e57b":"173135f31c2320cccf513e88a21f2d207e00cbe4330d2f550e0be77405eef47a":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"f1f6e5a55fb2180de436d48115aa1aa38a6242eeb0959de3690f259c1d8395a5862d1ac4843404d25215c83bca90f44e":"f467ef083c745a1bfc9be44f1d468b2518e3ff1c0cee6819fdde354d4071b17e":"fdda9f0888c4439cded15a768300d163c1e326ee5571c22ab95ab3e44b1676d2":"6b8d60c565604c8fa8d7adaf0b07ed268a491fb79794d2770356e191daa1cb50":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"0db9d437153149e101d5818b263b975735994dfc33d8b3f158a05760867757ab438a5024e1d43006226018c378af55d3":"275bdc5fc78b0d8afb5c8aa5f7854c319a81bb8cc9300210a9990fb7933a352e":"809da54d1830545672f180fa3e0441a0d3fe472e7cd7a6d707fee5af7e9b21c2":"ebe66cee6efbf583c881a25e346ca7d99741dacfce0d8785c659e92774e26ff2":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4106f6ba6a291fa54e4ecfd9fa61b961554e4e8e03e19d9bfd82bd35c3471e8bc5bdcd2f810079c1bbfe906929e88d27":"5a7e61b86ca70939e64af613a667695c7c915e667c79998e76e55eb33fef6d86":"86c7d5883aee568aa74d25782019fbd6f5acf4196752ff3d1dd96ec1e7436424":"3a5d80e739f5a30e6bb507d82b60ff987d5bd9cbbff4b47daff278a3252db3ef":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"5d1fcdabb70dad1428c8be291720c92b8565f331ee3438d79bcddc968efedcdb9319f5ee91124b93b965d504211fef04":"6c8c8a066c6208dbc18a40a30b9f689048877e038bf76d65acbdde7ae4c566f8":"bfa2e9ebe0d70d3b62cdbd78c775a62e0e22fa75f168123a336b66b9a2b68c06":"e48b5245ea241baeb7f665a9daaad662d7b2422c3e3711cfbed81d73691864ee":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9fc58d0785adbf033ce6642dcc9a861df44a35e89d06b346b165074a048b500994b4c0b3e27306b8c805c97b0ea14bb5":"e02f7a856266195fb5f4810232cd5c71a4465e1d95625c01e8e7eb69c63f6796":"7cd18b8d035b57bd01464280abe891b7faf55f9ed9910d9a148b030340c67cdb":"918c4d43fecf993227f7c120d239a30d3c315602800d6d58b9e9e0715964cfa3":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d43927d1e633fc3433536cd03617a97a3a10a7ecad3f0c781602829f8ec7feb2dd5922f2a2dee51db93bcf35100a8364":"3335a02aba1ea28d2e56973e21109e0adfb5068613c447e625fd83a8d0e34494":"bfde33c52407d3137123812c4818ca1e4b61878b8f9dbaec47935e3948a88d0d":"42597cf03bbee0e003d8677159918f5318402f7329f08e1d93c850e2a2a2f1bb":"e53c7d0b376a94809f472961acff314079014958935cd67acc476abdd919a43cd3f7d1462d0d6e628ef5d0c8e04a6d243838c61ea36b015e84d7ad59e49b45c9b04f6ec78687ba47156e429b2fb6dc2c0da4f5677d1f689cd28612cfa6d95628c26b5b3e01186153a1c25c02f5ce5fc287623358687d2034347b2433ffc1445a2d93cb0103ccdaf0c585f7f4e7d41aef310be127208b3da90523aceac5fa13ffe77eaa4d1fd058957c8dd2f355cae7f9e3d8f29ec7099599ba6c755689d53d6ccd84e33407a066506d97decd7e306d22ca6e0faa7b94f91f4eb004422ddf9dd6b1f49b6400ea55d40e25c67103ab50bcc92d100e89ba569b6d51aacddf02daf1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"0bd69ce9a0a66dffefba83ae563e8df0fc6c7d7bdf491bf52cbf3f3777025cdf92b32217f550a1fe735b8519b44b040d":"820da3187bc879cd1f40476fd9677f3b67e02b35b6632ab68891e25f10555b69":"903b882de013695b4683316ffbd7c7809288d54c72e369f70cf172bff85e5629":"cfb5f494e76486ceef12dfe1bafd6ccf9b0754d8d2306fb0c41c0f4e921317ef":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 No Reseed (SHA-512,256+128,256,256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_no_reseed:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"45784684d6004731689e33e45b344d7b68dc4fa841133cb2dd65c4b326dffa901109dfac2e48bf17f2fea33b412dc653":"7c6f4675f7a0b8c424d5be9e809efa305493874d9a950cb343afdfb64e77ecb5":"2b2dbe3834d8be93f1396b19be83bd96823dd82740da71c5eeb7b21865021884":"49c322fc1bec86d3e20628d9bdc1644e6f5e0237c7c694746bfee32a00145696":"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" + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.nopr.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.nopr.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a1400e6a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.nopr.data @@ -0,0 +1,1200 @@ +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"79349bbf7cdda5799557866621c913831146733abf8c35c8c7215b5b96c48e9b338c74e3e99dfedf":"":"":"":"":"c6a16ab8d420706f0f34ab7fec5adca9d8ca3a133e159ca6ac43c6f8a2be22834a4c0a0affb10d7194f1c1a5cf7322ec1ae0964ed4bf122746e087fdb5b3e91b3493d5bb98faed49e85f130fc8a459b7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"ee57fc23600fb9029a9ec6c82e7b51e43e9721e4393ef9ad841d276ca9519061d92d7ddfa6628ca3":"":"":"":"":"ee26a5c8ef08a1ca8f14154d67c88f5e7ed8219d931b9842ac0039f2145539f2142b44117a998c22f590f6c9b38b465b783ecff13a7750201f7ecf1b8ab393604c73b2389336609af3440cde43298b84" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"ebfdad13c8f941d279dbb4de8d7706ddfdaa279f5e4428d6f785c5b2f833b69b09b71a57cf5701d4":"":"":"":"":"66e35f9b8e05a861a0b3d01c66c416d5e8b77d4d21328c625cff9163ffc92e753015aa9d7f36ae3a961681d39f271d0b627787868cec3dedc520ecb303f96a43cec67369117af268a19f5284880cb3be" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4fc0ec777ec5a5f3b9ea06831a36acbb9e9add057dbb73a83367ba7c163f7b99a56ab64274ee64cd":"":"":"":"":"7910a801b68a20570ab0e593bd565021c8a543ba3942bd726021a7198f1d84c8806a6f9cc12d196e1cbfebf325d0e1971746921b4d55483fc366d2ca837c4fc9751fadea7b04c0a47d1e37649f7beb6b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"85a41bafaa923240dcf613a53e28d8535474e05fb59ba1eaccb5e28b1f2493675cc4f63475a69b0d":"":"":"":"":"2735fb69bfcac5b2f7f64e747c27d9957fc6a3cd0b3eee984641b2677655606e6b0ad6c875c7bf1333ab1f9b15ab1d522968059f78eaa05a70437c6974ec8e29c8ca5a0eae5464b32e9474e4fa5d4236" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b64416ea406772f955fbd7da30c67f6a42e0b9a889d55454e03a88205eaafdd584dd54a40ea5c7df":"":"":"":"":"44bc26482a49da5249e8785a4e44d91ccdc6103fd666b480350ea3a09d8a8cf9e30c103f53559cbf55e13078b7c6949e4e90e1ef79ddd234166981f715b8649834c27b17bdf0f0689ed18eb850b43e85" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b3d4041201f4345e0a818de136c6aa7e6b0612e1ac6b3f2f26f6ec328ac7f8966dca90e162c297ef":"":"":"":"":"d9245a4a0ab0ca97e747c0d29098979e8248e53f0ec6b91678972f3b5691e7995ad2eb99640d3e9a8364891d0ff179732d633f762d6592a4d49c4e667c699b2678929c81d9bdfc74d6575f5b727f4d65" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"06dbf57699df40ff67287ec11573b75b47e40e643c47f4db89bb41a3cb66446449b503b38a1e21fe":"":"":"":"":"0d06c663f9105198a34229b0e3fcffd0de9a445f4fc5d5bb58b55e43cacaf0c27c07e5a9c3734e8a8e0885dd78cd1bde0777e3330d2fb3b04203f6c2749a45cb96bafba3bf9d1875dcbc46b6af558228" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"cc1ca95eadbd1bdb2459f44c6653c441f225685240438aff26a3447e8f504be4c42beeeffd884455":"":"":"":"":"e8f3cbe8e1f8738b4fef6ae67662524c99cefdf7b416eafc15750054ffd7c288af1c13ee9a61d19f7163aa21f92207b66348228b56d64438ad7eec55670860fda3da9bb0773f5647c2bd03378d795c71" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e68bbe5c6bb3a37207e6742ddb79c0b1640fcd3512909acd16aea846c8db1d76ede51d5562f20639":"":"":"":"":"5cfad20546a1cc19922f0be7b7d04ba7d8335684354541b1ec8ce0adf3607446c8742d7737a566c92fcf3b2fde205197e9aa95c739d677631e28403eafed1cf45f22fe29d3979126eaaa46a4040a4c55" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"ac79be87bfbab344797fa6da775516be0923da6ca517407e790d1e3cb052983146f9a757fa910ce7":"":"":"":"":"5b4444cb58df47502374fd6bda064cf1d70d253b994f1a6e5d4e62741846472d9f1cf14a2468aafd4ca7875b31987b8ba0de9144648a82602c19e293f2668c9519be3eb8a12f15543395348aa51697b2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"cddc43355e651255dedf171c9aa1334452e3e830cc4c21605e927085657e7422b68bffab74d8f78e":"":"":"":"":"e57f32e6a8a847f033802a92e6282c967eb18f3c9837b8bbe5f5e8d9d6fbc4d571412b873944d20bb8a354f787c3004d0b5dd5a92bdbab600f55d1ccc52275715df239a1e2a79040862680f34f5cd4f1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"eb1a31c96683124985c9b412d16dd899d5da8c43273b3173417ca1a9392265b273221bbe87831466":"":"":"":"":"59e4d915349514f4aace3d9eebfd30b58e8246c7dce23bd4c4e47bb9ac8c2696441d5b5bb2fbb2a1b585373ec5ee55071f2ea868b2df342b5f2df48cd026ddac9114f9142db999fbcde7a0c23403fb37" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6a086e671327087dde91396dd73d5400d59a4fc5b26c0558b7d5321e4f22584409b7e6e014e7d062":"":"":"":"":"70e17ca71ad75e40ed31629cae3fa9c23374f78e020c56e551907f2252706bd4cd4c47d099dbc072429ae53e34ed208fdae5e6ec13e5cd9b435c1b25dcbd099132570491e7c3544cf8ff2fba553c197d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8b7086efac1e3c3c87c3798471d4afd028b8bab0217d403fb61206715d219a93505b62cd619be51b":"":"":"":"":"0dcd502c6e884a366b50f208a1b8c59ffb85dbcd72a6e2d75aea94c9692a55a45fa7c2900a277dcd38b79cf463ac8961fe54df47bcfe5a60555ee4ea2be76faefedae3ce65db4b3f04301cf5c43ada43" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"7d7052a776fd2fb3d7191f733304ee8bbe4a0ceedca8020749047e879d610955eed916e4060e00c9":"":"fd8bb33aab2f6cdfbc541811861d518d":"99afe347540461ddf6abeb491e0715b4":"02f773482dd7ae66f76e381598a64ef0":"a736343844fc92511391db0addd9064dbee24c8976aa259a9e3b6368aa6de4c9bf3a0effcda9cb0e9dc33652ab58ecb7650ed80467f76a849fb1cfc1ed0a09f7155086064db324b1e124f3fc9e614fcb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"29c62afa3c52208a3fdecb43fa613f156c9eb59ac3c2d48bbd87be99d184165412314140d4027141":"":"433ddaf259d14bcf897630ccaa27338c":"141146d404f284c2d02b6a10156e3382":"edc343dbffe71ab4114ac3639d445b65":"8c730f0526694d5a9a45dbab057a1975357d65afd3eff303320bd14061f9ad38759102b6c60116f6db7a6e8e7ab94c05500b4d1e357df8e957ac8937b05fb3d080a0f90674d44de1bd6f94d295c4519d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0c0d1c0328a384e697678ac87303dd62c8780b4ac33f18674ea4dce5b190d4e381eb7a5b5e12b4f1":"":"0557bc052aa8eabab0baa42ca38fbbe9":"985865c180e0bfb7cdbed11b58b5e509":"f40452f8c5b8f4cbc1675f70bb803740":"4a1f442eae6c861b622014b079dfd47543176b82bc60826cfa02d3923ef0563f8deba8362c8d1950a70e80d67189fb4d904b855ed0ac39942aa8673e0951b4876354b849a6c1c51d0c35a3f4ed4e2f22" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"7cad65e5cc2888ae4e960f5d143c1425fc0785db471cc55e66451d29cf65d899a281905ff9b29e87":"":"800d583b2560d2a2300132ee2d13f19f":"42eae705c2225d212fa0554ac6ac564b":"72081e7e70200f1982c3ad9cb1d3ddbe":"953e92258be7ff61b97077252ab9835231e366dfa5b635fb889c337562a2641d3aa9e46feeb2a4ea03cb73f1f801594c3cc71d2945c11a52bb0e93419df5d0854ad5f2e36d223c119e145cad507495a7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"3084c8811564168bf7834d9a6c9d0ad0821b13a0b66dddc5ec2c90278236c08b6f657611a16636d7":"":"9a7665b3883bed37a48b07f98efa4b8b":"28bfe9605ba856073ee69145ccdda4e0":"c26d7c962574aa587b3eb7a8c29b2e08":"36908adee4c1e7ea4e2f266b65aa7d7b5113e4b4377adadf4406bc573e04374a7e8b9b9b36eb0384e9336a9e7b4f308b463bd7aa9476154ab13181da5c2da9675a376b9c82ace5391e378fdd0cd4ef28" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a0410a32703720abf2e28e252b5b9176cb96935082bc9ef4ca7bcab78fce7da97b0158379041bd6c":"":"b70982af7b5e337cfe989703bffc09e9":"8df8b08f648518f7526c24bb95df1e44":"6775865f451ee055ed2242076debe237":"548f66f0acd9ed887ceb7f95d1c9a0c29e2f6007b92c581e615139256bea63d0fcd7a9b950e3e89419d2142c5d8f5bbcc2ba5b0dd67689b7ade01d984e303a529165dbdd140edd69c3ec6a4ddd63e091" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c2e9a6e2e29f47dee0e808660c446a4faff465073a97862c2ab6787095e944c5276d29bbbbd7a777":"":"358ffeab6a24f932abd4c9577f84cb13":"37578c2d9b68d43d6c83164a4c43ce37":"02a7c9575d9527a33df9fb566373db3a":"fcd318c83563f72e5a21d4a93a84254e0c3bb6d3ded55c3d5939dbd5d1525062fd587a422012437aeb88589e669e5a5d57f7ebb16e30590f6debd0eced84f8e57d47a3d123a52361145a8fab258ed19b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c93859e7fed1163b070bbefcf5ffb0a66a6f5b986116adbd959d37ea3b79a197449169bb01e0143d":"":"c62840816ae06eb725be9dd3e2954cd5":"5dc60578a6a309fae33ebf162c22fab4":"00d0fac12a9b66b7ea936411f1645d4b":"ca2eb212b29d5a38cf72409cd8cb4bc401eacbc6e59c84551cdfa12c1c8fb39c29c9d49905b25953f727ac24453ccf1c6f20a4c3fa7c33b052e4e82c7fcbab70ade865d249b6a27e0b5eddccf0567d6d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"237a566e4a46994fb13af5b2d4321a03fdf5cc54f461daf30949f86b7b223fc341ddbe525c533339":"":"bc252901f8f5c9357722a424b0af1bb1":"6020d93df16b10c31d8802f6bb9ddfac":"f9104117190d905a30c65c0a76148c7a":"70e0611f1cf70ba93e3cc53da83fc3d6064b293e90c117ec12cc79c5e4edf845b6a5e2c4ce75ffce5d18a75e24bf51300bae6443f04a71047a8f522edb370689ef1b2cc13769865b69dc232963d90419" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"80c2b6fbd576cd57c38d1d1197b9e7ad43216111a1ec8b5f31dfc1a4e05c15ed96288386d0768951":"":"1af215d9b991e4f7ddc2a89fe23388a1":"d889e43410eeb2a83cb6982f38077756":"c77e7bb93115c10a56db1245e610e8b6":"af9f8c34654f44f42914070dcf1e971884902b428c7332913ddf2e342e776e01dc2fc73cd803b3a492edb15e7cc755babc23d8a5007bb0bebd7f02bd168d055948e6a5b66a3016951697617eaad371a8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d8041e31215f7c843effaec3ab722e1d271753acf2ec9ace8b5730e21c0c30f9daa98580695c4572":"":"347fc86229e2e6f6af2ead186248c2f9":"a09c1b813fd11102df392d116f127de1":"0ab6c5c7f689bda8a3a7f406bf6df33d":"e09414c8f5ff2d8d6b6523729556dc1b4bba6e4cfc7a929e4561cfd32e5484918c7f21e0b533c3e3827bb8e115cc6a2aa5def3d946001564eda8cb36fa5aa771651e4837ae60beba32e01f5d59c0be0c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b0f69a20531c5b186bf8c16b25fa1de8d6817ba362a9a00ea3aa59b018b7ce8648b7f84ab925050f":"":"2905e4b0803d221ccfba43bb4f1e3338":"0460c4ba1738dd7c662e0f4337a454c5":"b5a7870dc99f5c2ead93dae773ab55c6":"a542a3ba51f4024d3876a32fd6fdaa136c024ff36b9662ed82cf580bb1d33b531b124c0e28fd0b8ec06e50dcc11132062a55bdb961a908688ddccda12be8f1242f8a5ada53939e32d8c0381250134686" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"188ae42fbe0f4e9e17c7b0432712aaefb1667157132f8d6240fd9d19ba9f5f56f58bd08e9842e2a1":"":"88560712277f73d457f62b3769189381":"892957bfbacc684af6d31c8befca8e4d":"a9e8986ff89479fa506780b07b09c2c9":"e77187930ac661bd1a422e29cae4c67370d9e8ab0e44ea9dd86b11b2a1c5271162513587ed02df4c91b0e04158406763e72a443a196b6a2e22af72ef2732e3916cabf518fa58ab89fea5528153818a6c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"ad490819bbb9e937e0d0a749eb83465470fe146ad9f3ae0b104810bbb28773e538b466319bef5d6a":"":"e01882c8b9bc52d584274912d93367e8":"20a03700499444028da4c8fc5ba42d8f":"6574be269d5ccb5d10ad5fd6add77e2d":"5662845711b5a6c04715dcb3293f091709d87703f1a449858f074858958260ccd833d9699fcd0bcba7956f9036808984828a3a9db2041556c77b1644a7566bd8892ed53e418cb74bca1a8d65f545c3e1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 0, 128) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"aa4ea001160441917ac60f6231468f7da993e136dcce82083cc6c81b69e67ead392721ea79b63e97":"":"50f89606e793786a14ed11b3026313ce":"2445d7b670fd77bb62e0c1db75671863":"32b79488b44093ee7fdb4441bc302b70":"1b803314c8ed124bf6550bc63babf09f189e59df3d8d4103567c442b6783c32b236a107d4accd7ab3e465d29f6216349baa298ebeafd3c5cc198f0880868b8c9b67d94fd53626651200f5dfc939d4128" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"11c0a7e1472cec70fa8c1ca15759ac5bb1c73c22db39cd7bc6ab59ff708a5c1f598e75df060e1981":"b24e392cb1f3c18af2cb50feac733e32":"":"":"":"070e603cd48d56430a5ab461a751ec2a4a6aa6fb6ee52efe9a41e4611eafdfc957184b47bbb017e484ac34c7de56cd7813feb301b5befce573ad0a254e6cfe35b77c30be6b7cb5e7efa72813c7546ba5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e05141adb678c297eebd8136885b67345b9c0c54a0ff74d826e26c9323a3da3af6e5a5a1f351cb54":"4814ea71a8e11845716b22085cc65f2b":"":"":"":"5ef29a2e7e821d529d1928e6bab16fb80d6491a98dd53695473dadead4e5142c146f1e29b101c6b1a57d8315ce34db17040c02572c6455d902303dcfcb2ad3052166de790ce0c94af78a51864efd4b12" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"9747f5a2a27c65b0bd9202f0743afbfd247b3b05fce7d31cd3e34742cffe1c6d55f8f98dfc57953c":"c3fc8430972dfa880e2bfa66862bffde":"":"":"":"92137ebf7518354bd65d87235a81c79e13cb53e46b47fa091cfe342f0253e5ee4634e8fe5fcb967bfcdbdfaa60614bf96826875608c0f1b55967619db6df24efedc86498cad733e29ee9d9e3d6277273" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a9a8a0a7b8a58c239e083fa1cd2a8c968cfc5f074bbc31473cb71f26b82cdae4223fa32702f57ee3":"3fb4c2f37714039a1a2e6c68e4818eee":"":"":"":"1b5986ccdbac7da7fe7e792ddd445ca894b6ec08424a17fed5385ff8bd03ba782b42bc5a9676acd5be8061d535930a487902923148710ff17908fcb03db7ddc0e4b10be16c0a0365db387529a2398552" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"99d1822bc16f2e7bbeb6556c5215489ea6039f54a175ae86aaf4cef7d80ffedc37e3c68c7de03ddd":"e80fa03bd7c8f5acdda5754ef00cdb5c":"":"":"":"2236568252a384a7e75cefba04a94381941035b28de764d5b2518a98ba4e8f1d50e8230953df40db602b8959ee8f1b8831b29516f937aaf561679bac0ffb11207030ef33b26da28af93ba552c08bff97" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"305a4478bb85b0cdcb99618d8753494beee617d70aec26501eef2f751cad0b1cde509806d4064422":"c3fa490a01511e8410577021a307c31b":"":"":"":"f23ceadb881b945029b78366a173c20af93e43fd8c3be0588f811af31a7ddd653610cdfc3cd875a0f114fc1b887e4fe5042eb0dc0c36746961b1b7126950aff4c01245c215156715c7efd14c76539a0d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"15c178375c839866ab31b38b900ba889325baf19b84c8fadf2f78da359af10da64c42130f79f3054":"a4d50496711dcabde8e0ff21d3da7535":"":"":"":"3f38257370353677dee9127862305158b1c5b607741d62906cebf8babee4fc6cf1dee3f821d1d750c69f3ff5683d266df0a669d291f6816d86cd222b56a351c240afbb443e886ca194994b4deddc54bb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"7efb63ed1e07cf853fce80468049dd5ed5e55a8b58bbdd32341f137867c451d8d4e327733de89c94":"d89028d21cee2b223d634a9927ec036b":"":"":"":"477a1612c19b1c2fee232385ccdb5b2f32c845c07fa216ee410cca20245239d3220ac48770017c4d52f99a267d53e0acdf69e8f4bd1d76d463e9bdddc16bef7faf9d9baa9b9de3d397d740d685c158a0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c7209755b92bff93a059db79883b2866b51bae337aeec9e58c87e68de33545fa20870e5e70a190f6":"34aee961eccf0b92b833f2448720bdc9":"":"":"":"285692468053547638e65dfb7c8b69aac43e16be5a4ce9898ae0d0c8f567dc27945ef6e21f36d456ca248577829b90f96a887f96e9c2a6ff2616e21c7ec93093d68f60d2cb99f2c7632f856e33ea8ff4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1ceecebbc42f9ea1faf7494076f7937ba827b4666d0433ecc028ee75d4f55de2b223e92625e399ad":"b431a36c996ccdb5e936da7ebd216c20":"":"":"":"64d4bacdf185dd8f6eba35dc8f79fa2cab155113e020d1f12b32bbc4bfb9c85881692a5d8933a40d9fe8f6629f74bba8a99e8db0228a13c8d7776459f73dba8e59e9820ae72f8c425ac3044079c1ebfc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d5b264cec1c7acd78b902dc14a457d30b79acd3e06a12f57cf0c3e1b8fb1befb5abb9af1f58cc9ee":"12e4101d6d4505cd43710b05d52a9194":"":"":"":"b53d3bbf4a9561904ad9e100b2601db2660f415fc5caebbb1a628b7095e6de4a3895ac5da6f2c1e1c6655d76fa5b8f75f52de41564d79b09c9d2c76c1c486f462a7164ecd76f0dfa7b5f53c0c25b7730" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f440671bcbbb1bdafb22c06482ff670374cdbd69535d07980f43cfaf10aad2453d884ce5852dbb32":"8a69144ebeca59c330c9a4e0e644a7ab":"":"":"":"a5b42447f4d02504536df9e0ca8d98642a21b64a6b84bde4b2bc186c28b0f740ebdf2d60c664d4d89a867207bb8d4c62f1745cb3c971b4b2622423a4291e1cc97fce7128e3ecb3ec13ce08987f59b77c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bef3995f0d2b1051554cf7b3235809fcd2989cafbad081630c538a7ba0695ffd95f3abeabf2a867d":"e807cfc52494119188f86bfea878f2cd":"":"":"":"527bca6b945db8f2cda7f795763eb5767cfa1a4195a9d9ae70dd8129158138e687a056b64f00d29e11c37a9740d19fbd16429ce4dae79029018b984a22c1a2b2b988558b133651234b35f21ff42edcb2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"5fc1cea988adf1f7c090b14370ce169300a008a687475c464eab4611cbf3ea5583a967ef0c0ee2e7":"7fed039d998bbfa3ad62aab86c176d6a":"":"":"":"f096f7f631882f5e5a6e708d71534c19eea20a57fc210155d49fe9b872b18cc04a73cb652a03ecfa0c6dfbc174811efd0897f4bd92c916a5c835bdfb5e126048f7c17daf00a845ff024641499047097d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"9c88099af48f9053abec455b7bbb015364fd593a0f40175d9d7b6301d86b259606fbca7de73ce63a":"79e501b77f967a676fe398eb7c81cdde":"":"":"":"e8d53bd119d23cc57245a8b9b2d111811dc661555e389180e367e41f8c815ab4e7aaf5a238479117402ba17ea41c1104f475e11bb97cdc414409ac516b3b28b62f284c7d4093975279d3c31320c61061" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"03e7b41c95818eb0b667bfa8a175a82466a1e417a9b6b92fd17e98c2e50ee0db00d25c3364451e95":"126dded5eb0bc81be37c10bcd9d5f793":"dc596d188e2343802240bc7f5cc60516":"14c8ec10f5bdde6b9e75898d7f9f03d0":"31aa842afcc1daa94098241a87d6ddfc":"4739b1bcf87404a2290829bd7a61f0b391a794c71c055c7cc513b28dcb5fdc88645bc9cb490f41fab134c6b33ce9336571762754343961de671b02a47960b4b4e23c5bfb87dcc19b260b3bcb921ae325" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"5810043ca63ef5e573e118abd09d5e9caa873d3a2a2a1c7eb574167bab56e4d1ab5c1725421be3aa":"0ef00fe3e9126bc53dd61b8d2cb9a2a4":"4e19f01001d1f550ce0dd0bd4cd3e216":"684183426fb6d102f8e2ce55c599b740":"1a80710e25c78cafb81cc119adb0a2f9":"eb4c7059612d0ab63c0f28ceb7b8f89760c3d2b508f98441412bbe0ac133cafa7e2981ac2750272ebe503622b477c67e86930c9198fe21f7288394b2e11a5302e3db03b59780c49907ef720199ea1362" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c27d1abc5afd30a3025d42bf9efeb8a6f2608470db9a90f8ec4ad2a126b799402ec8a1f210d708d1":"804004607012ed7b40ff0ad8f5ca085c":"eb2393df0be0ff471d354343c43bf2ea":"92618320cace6c075dcd69a634e76666":"da54736df5d2e0daef664e905864cc1b":"eeff317050aa3bda57bdfef2d46408b3fb2e64d34d4696254c9d8a09fa1b325bb3e3a973efe7918eb03489865f5e13e9a28a0bbb43822b9ca3b209ccaa1cd5bfa5139fe59e16248e1f468f944a0228cd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"3f34680939ba128c07c5dc5aa161a8703a45440ca68c8d5c2b706e7af101ae4a669b46dfa262ada2":"e423dd11cf92c537509499eb891ef5f3":"cd32c88c56858cc5f6d39199abaf4543":"2b24bc6db1ece7a32cfe57df3f6ff74c":"3c6dc6fb353ce7e131f8d09635465d2b":"9dce0b5b3c8201c98f54501afce1595eaaa6e3e6b89abb6f6112b5bd5d1fcf549bd13e51fee87f0aab345571cfe7d7b61069660bd8cb8ea33406b6026ba28d02457e2bd3ecbe836829a4d91481fc0f75" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"94b31b718bc40b28cc5a67ea5e891c14e1683d0e243c4868db7a613beadf1433550003dcedbd227c":"5dd27ab3ea94ac5c04f4f8c13c767354":"fe1fbaabe7a2bdf4ffdcfac0e7e214e4":"d71d9f2a6887681bef91f5c1aaca50b8":"06cfc99087437ab7754c5d626ba07083":"4186f2a9518371d123473a4c96d23a44c89af9bafe17eb2ea702902b5a955a42b05188b8daf7ec7baee352b365f46a3b880810af5c9678df5503b5e2cf9d02897be81e409145c0cdbfb83949ef327f4f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6b90e0e1496de9735239ab6ec28766669c65e1a4bc0f5c04e446388a90d86a1f060ad436666204fa":"99455a5df2b13410dcb912f37c266093":"a47f245fa6f0d928c17ed8956d1535a6":"a88cdbf82362f1a2ea78ef5bbcbec7f2":"eb8da8a49c4917d71df7facd8e9399c4":"99b09a0bf4d00539f7c1f3c28b60cd86b47a33961da7a649e810a97c1388bbd712c6eb0f7df4b68cccc01b25defbec42b67f4a341c0460e7b20ab67abb34cc2a3ce5b5d7d06a186f48d95a7607ba0510" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"05474cf1bfa15e12bbea7cfa9852d152ea29f8442291c64a8c9dda22ca653f755d5a5f128972d4a5":"70d00e37a88b30c450580eaed5d4d60b":"651f8ad6d3ed2bf04262dc79ecf164a3":"3e693ddf993d63cd4c9d464f2c84c8a1":"53db0c0c12363bab7b1ed57d420998ac":"590e747956e6d01eadd1c9b7b1387bfb5c20693dac84f70e2c2931459b3ca9534325d84eeef1b245d17b8cd059e05a3bf998ffb517feba0b047553633dad642e8cce5c4b7110bf57aa6416edd204f780" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"7e9a4732f5841617395ee04ade213b80785d2e4fef267d51fe13973b675bfac30716d753cf2f6232":"0e725f5e2e3f5b9cb5ec36c4a4f99e0a":"02592ab8e4e2096733e6b300eac278ca":"2f3f8e2504bfe008aa1fee1150b47f05":"2491177e84e06c3c6b48235b29c316c4":"ca50da0839de54bd9fec1a4b1d6edba1e68b47970adc36fbf88e7757af6962d9b8ead266f8aad696f920a1bfc702d8ca43c4504cfa42d7a603a55fa524c62fe49e698f21eda7025c9b840ec1b9795066" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fc16d69df6254a9b7743ca43a64e9d1f5986d771b6cb069a65484fb4311a80479a4d00a42ce16cd6":"82fdba5fb4c04bd550eb5a8e2e4b0a31":"998b27a8e314b99b4ca06593bf9d4a17":"b97706d6068cbf8df35b28a2bcba3b55":"c24e22cf478a61f1adf5beece947e16a":"29573d54e80e43625024d149e6ea55cce5728bb456e86b75175d38ad95aeb4ae5c47270ae774374ca44e2230c5d1861ff954f9fd432a5e8367abe49a88ed8eda504b991747ea9c4cf448ba504cb7de14" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e917537e534f9433e40f8271a799f859524ce9bb84a53caaf9eea9984d8ebff701eb7c5f627074bf":"682088f3ce89ee635f5c8ec25ea8c8c8":"085a9d20a2d017c4d3e57d20cba52714":"b07122c8eeb299295858a2fd1d3b6098":"1637261b4b3e7761b5923048a46d1eb0":"be40786139aa3966fcb85198d861f5239cbf8886ae8e814571217dd4454c8646c4c8428558ee3d80c5297add64d6d1a991c4fdcd72cf42f82d73a89b8bd2364cd119821b1bf54f69acd01a7586c53925" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"85ed8611ac58af2d6b878ebca74256d3f2f20a7a4f174822de6ea8d0cd0bdf18d395785f0797d371":"f2612085c5d8338c9b77b9b1eb8092af":"f414629fe7ae0a21b211e09fb66512b9":"b943191d1882a390032339bdefd19351":"4adac9816998cb105d1c4f7cd3d53764":"dd79426f61e81d86561a98853b7e187eff7db3e8958944cc10a74e7b12db3b08bb4436bf64694c5b8bf1857e791ae7194554aef6b48d2b33ad6854bd2e9771bbea3e08c2c083a82cb07d7242ce22db2d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6652b1c0403ef16416db88e49456119115d3901cd7dce343c718324222094c25d85c33857daf5b28":"a580613da8ff7b06580db9a42bc0cdbb":"923014039cd117f924900cd330607d0d":"8b42f93d2ccdfea272f7a03bf37b831d":"28ce97668d6cc92da8ee25077cb25de9":"d31dd59237b3c8b2885838840261727ac116bae673b554fe9c8b0c64b1573a25bc4a14c1942d80563fb4165c57e1aef5c94c1f6b1f88ec6bb2bbc10ccd8149d175e4965d07341aba06a9426df0d0fee3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f297186aab4f63f6fb85c4f29d659d6e48fab200424d67dd52fcacfe725ad65c0a47de25690c0ac5":"9414f702fd050f7edb9a648cd833f8c9":"91d5eb7962ec1051004041f5d23ffc34":"94afc7023650c2edcd8c957e320b04f0":"b6b79df82780297261e00ef05389b693":"ebbdde904350c6d803fe258a3aa7a63622f2e9540f03b1cf687e20ef35fc5ba6b616254710cd4515eaf69abfba0ba778b87e4ce1f9f1fef34402c6e8d23efbdeb7da53a3db733e69527d36f24000251c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"90899d2da97759cc609f956f5f391a0edbb422f45afa0c7274a2ef5da636fec70c6d926b2670b88d":"23261c0e7226d749a0d7d0166e92dae9":"8ea2e411827c5d8b54b24da8ab41a841":"b9ee1c9923240523e7e4745ef93581bb":"bb0f785972cf68222a5eff4c7dd3e28e":"2af35b1fba0c62aae991c12d50c86ce2cc633224b158b157459c41a5444072e918b4c777bfc84f8000aa238a46c5d5258057866f2484971d2708c33497191a2686f8ee9e3657616e00dfca61e0ffb8ff" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-1, 128, 128) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4e8227e8422d674cdb79e52cc30b7b84f81cc05b03339704dba3e731fc81949e679a4257c5fd68a7":"2d6e4af02acaf230bf746157ec624ba7":"deebb368a79c1788528b589056b1194b":"1dbbc7a131e98344fd748edc6fec11a0":"0266e8a066dcabaf6991c7a91e1c6e56":"e51fc833a60b099e56996a66820368f5332822c8f9dffe8459c80d2512d451e1669ecf6e562a1c295fa6981fa651fdd3d8d936c18f88d5844393a2a371aaac8f485cfe92926f1a54980500edc43a0a6c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"09effa3906a5e93d05530edc71e62b39c5e4da020537176c23823da52dbdbae8307656cdaf8f861471dba14533c880505874098917e338f20ef8d8a1":"":"":"":"":"d5de8a3388b11e45085f6d9a009462947631c4e74523080ccd03a0196aa56b63a93a2939f490e9456e9fce3e9000e58190991b9aed6d145ac18f65cf2b1c17eb021acc5256eb6a7e9023f62aed87d15ea4e4b328f265cc34adbc062d54524365cc9c5073a8371f35dc2f459e1d027515" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"29a7071e686936e60c392061f71b68500dd6f11c563732fca9dec3b2f859e06a857fd94e3ca1817872d94c2b7c2f283a0d2d12a6443e95f7e700a910":"":"":"":"":"72c0f3cb7792bfebbc1ee6f65d40d118a6a1c4e04e589c8f70273b4c7b718c9df383658572b894838a311fc0aa2aa6258758b33783e192b0c3c1d322809375dc925a05605fed8c7e8fb878fb63c84ce639fd277d9955f91602a9f4777b7c3b15404c4e761ec8d466674e32136c7b8bdb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"abd3dafc85b23025792bcdaf9f410829d3201c1e8ca450e217e13ec2e3b744e8c54107174a6e69ad05f643ee5cec49cd47ea88c80b96a0944154b458":"":"":"":"":"152333e16b04283dfb8c43dbb3be43b5db2ec49a399facb65cebdf7ca3ed267792ba308cdb0649b0c19cb1126b144d5766b5afeca98036a1f85cd2cfe3b8071011b69b2aec382f8562d9dd4331a554f3a3ee632cff308488b30a7416be8bbdee7e250cd12f371d069a097e9eac43031a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"caa286c160d22af10922ee6088c269d0c963034e5fd2a85d2fc171d0c4ba0833b630a64ab09965f132a744656631bf2dd27430c7c2d1e59cdcf43a97":"":"":"":"":"4d6132b9ce70470dd36f551584ada639e74b85fb9bd3c3e350011d99f2dc0371f874e6b9d92eba3fceafe34e574c1441d0d476c475b704755a28733e31637962cae67e849bed18d77501383cdbc27ab6f60d5d8d26634ef39e2c60fcbb04a9bdda8bcfb9b2d3aeec12a21279ed553343" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"f79156a2321ba930e15109501ead80a3b26c1747b7a9aeb922d1a9d474df64a1fc3483f10e88a7fcdde91dc06940c58bf4d747b5a9cd8cad2c2e9870":"":"":"":"":"1b3aeaff973b2e20cee947ff283277991842a22f45cce9d22c1705daa51a56ab43aaae1b51bad7a7363edc7b548a0cec6b376b925a6e35bc7dc3b4a33a7f3b57d66b1b35256908bd2d8f0495caf2539ba4475d766c21c2c2e4acff87fefb07c662eb344d9c99ed407165f8a09a22816a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"2dfeb70fc433426e23378d048b836f899cbff52d4a92c6d7d218e3aa54c06793339a752f86f03b7fcf89bef725339f16ab1cd28ec85c20594bbdf3be":"":"":"":"":"d403dd8a6f3a914933253db9cd043421e54243a34043f5ee11a3b6a627e25d944434eac22a00172caa607ebf7de55b4c4305c2b93428d5fb4cf0a649451ec7fc5da65c4894cf4d2f3d52e90993544237e5c58745441c9cb2e047513ff81d9cf980d8b12769c21cc8c06f6d583b8be3dd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"2c6ba987bb61c4131138bb8acd877763c2c7e1f86289a81b6b54d1d8b399b5a5ac7171c0c9c0b5943bd7f54bf72b20307834e971bb637b351a756823":"":"":"":"":"7ff01def84626825fc22a62cfe28f5f95403bb2618eff22529b6531aaf1032100944d5f9703496d165c5756c0aac55b1812a72940aa5317fb6a2944d124e7f65766f231b6bda06100c5ad0d1b37c488e0e9f11a6d8f7e4cf7337e04d094ea9de2db1bbecf40e0cc8d1fc1cf5a01cd081" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"ba08acc3a00b9b40d2bad8cca4909d3bbec5471f78d0bf89a805d839b8b29fb753c9e5d3674365a7055a187a238ea1cd04f482d24d856b67eb54d71a":"":"":"":"":"9ec6ad840270051313c5825295a6f7527a8b1b9b3e7c867e5642a984b11911be60614e5737d3a0d109eea4223f0d2ee63cb19be702291a771b2e2c277f2d4559176fc5adccea52492e3d3ba7d17bad5b5f487d783639467997d7668ce2173ef777f9e31dbecb6ee716b5cedc8bc5098a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"95413345228eadb85b67674b9981af34bd6a4ae04866229921be928c06e6a6a6fde8d31a6a88f24d6a1114ccbe08ded9d7c50c3360bcb8908a615381":"":"":"":"":"d4dc08e36f94e88f8bfb1919c13186139591edc681affb61c421d32dfda69e507d59495bcadd39b73c4036ef440dc598e339473caba60e0770ac4729264b1dbfdaf32ca6d136ef6810a6660fa5cbac91940a28053c0fa405c7b6ca5e3f147b5e0096f36b67da9fce64247cfdaad70fc0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"9b6bb9589f41e8ed6969dbf1a3b3d242dd5e133711f72549334c74190e4efb1d0452016ed4fffca9561aaf219e6793bfb6fd3dd9500bd61e6a62db66":"":"":"":"":"cee02e4fe0980afe6ccbb1b0d80041ba9841461397494f0fae5188228fbe9822e3ffc5397b7caa29950d95536e7000e1249e5bb93a593e659a49689add16d2f5e02ff251c76716dc426010c2961a176bd63c29397f6e36cd4de2f2b11e1260b9f9a00bd49b4b6617fb056b82c92c471d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"f276ba0da08274a082f3b8ad989a713908873b742f96bbbf8c81b4e1a7e4857bc99aeceabe534c45105306b14860883cd56f2438a7812b43f0d911f7":"":"":"":"":"24dd3eea9a8e1f9929ebbbc2a68379caec77fb42531a97f7f3a75d16ad053799ffc25cace4f4553c271ae360eca1f5131ef87bf0390b26785880db0d92bb351e6e22409d600f6dab5cbb2278b8784e67a40be4d8ea6d994115c67b7224d721d1b3c7fc5b24e15f97eb3bbe33798d1bb8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"fa5ed9189f21d7e94764bddeff23050112868cfe35220b863e8112f691c57e6d6c4a91c752c5f0b37b97d5f3e383480054877f319a568b064e6562a4":"":"":"":"":"55eb5ef1248b5a34c741f2076ea5d568da630ce4720b7e2c86a9dd535b48faece2229866a36024fd4114249be4730e554b772d557ce3f8b9d4d86d91202582213a676a076b87f941351c7606a452816db5d0f8194825d402d2fe7ebb2815532091b3830a9616918bb0e3298faf037bf6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"d0c5003a6168163f707b25191b51211dc1ae361df1e069d0f284f66967aca4199809dc89368164213ae17285674e5574851582372fcae8cd2733bf4a":"":"":"":"":"24910e1a9304471d053af458bc3fdef527e8796e33133f5af005106b203e8fdefb274f1c0e8ff44e92c63bef3082c6e5607a7981a6076f1a1d15368f4330c7012509d5f61b4349224a87960bce9873725145f187aa931394c449f502d12b60655a0ab2a221134a51786c3683f9ffa2b2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"bf5b5d1c891f7a6f2dd3f4d486d693fbf67f49584b7f053aa96ddacd9fc0cdea0fab8209d8f4335820ce68bfa04899b63cda15242e9cd3f7acb1f103":"":"":"":"":"710c8b33ab034b50a29de657b93f3c71df4727a5219a474350c88b4e3974ffd0d3452e8c4d26f579e348f39cfe0d20045a70a866c5e16a0c22aa0d69b739f74cbe8b046bc14cf82b86498460bfb26af0771371c2750f7c59320c6f6fe1d04cfb40c048686b6c1b69dc641b8957c2c341" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"525615164dce0dac5397b357546aad049dbe5982da2c215a233557553460f8505a3e7c8224af561190099ee21a06d62f9f00e282b32b486e8d0e338f":"":"":"":"":"3fe96c9b10c4c8e43cf3cd76ced4ad85ae576f32ea6671ef284f7c97491b72152a18a1060145e4f5e7c0c373c396cb4c8c0b6d625c1f0d2ae95b0691cb1c80a3dd5eaa21632a82aaa28e09a2bbdeff7fd8812fae46deae14bbb16da24d06878fc417b3554fb47b0ef9fe18d1b9d4f4ca" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"ca81953d50430bfb09537a318a1a7b90a9200077abb721e55d9ac28946fbf75d9cebc81f11cf6d4db712a3b91d479e00ba30d736a763cbfe40b91448":"":"e50aa8bec96339cf2608bb82cf038d5fd6bf93e65271cb72":"5c5eed0d98c7fc7eb30acddfee002d5b99c965949d4e2095":"a1a7cbc79bfaf4571cd8020da094118d241b3f018ec823ba":"c8b7d9c15624ae018a8612edf6444354c45c6a788272281c16526c689a3dac36679e44d89c4acd7eb58ff40a577c3d1a9f4d0175feef9ac5674c115d5e4cd17f2369e0135e33b018bdc99e4099713ace986a145ef55e868f74846feb3592d44ca3ebba6044a928e9284b5ea75063ae81" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"b96ca1202fa959ef55a683a9021068e14c75376e15d1f0394b1c091a8b6dd6b98b6f63747dae58c29186179b4155b868f5a81ca206a5086a5759b025":"":"a35096086c1fdeb1fb60dd84fa730eccedd53e5b127eecf9":"a3269fa749e55850d4aa9e466bced0beab2edf86b926c2ae":"29f6799f7c78fdfa2d0dbdde8381aec5af249556903f6313":"c63ea73e1ddc9d55bd64a63cf73f730136ab4f6d688a9cd56b945f9875ef4ff48cdbdd8b78b898486a685d8af8cccbc2a834a9804e566ee7138c7dbf488d263fbd387041f835ea46ad27cbd66721428ed5795f6ed044cdb17c8e7e3ecbf61dd68239e8fd644ae85776050afbaa06caf7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"59af1213cfcaeea29e31400ab6b30f108d4a9a77d3b370972d29032cdc612b7c360c41f16b0c9d794219300fe0551e0e66d634a4eec396c50ec9604c":"":"66ed9352bed73224d35508754aab68fcea10aac06d60e888":"198a3526a67a0ce31ad0348bbdfecede4f82d4203d1d5ca1":"03faa2f4c34577cd8b2ed53e10c68c83c1ebc8d877379178":"5e24f1a9083f13274ed1020ab6935222cca644d0920839c2b142e2780983204453d2e6c58518cb351188bc3e5e3b64015882130d745511f004cfb6b64831139e01ae5bba64b74f1a1ede7e220a6d29b1067d7c68ba3543f4dda2fc97a3dd23590c2c18b85662618462ba2c05231534b6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"e6cc94c72f37999f28b5fe350bff622b433ae19111786c747d954adaecba47abacfea8cdf5eab05e2f750c0a679cfb9c2c2c071461178a054af40967":"":"3032528703dd66e42c7b6b5881483eca41e9eea503852eda":"ce8c03b0a05982ceadb516b1fe513da2403a9e6dcd7a39f0":"3f7ccb55376f23dfac1dc13be617894931f9c13d15fd3dcb":"558656cad7da2ad87a7a29ec5e612addcca96d72ac7b224cde80ce386c6efda12113fe9aa8e511714a42edab53ea0289c75d34b42f2313ac366f51f5dd3f6968bbd4c09ebf840dfd03852dedc1e3b6209d932889cb04062c644482106cf8b7a237d2937840f0c4d752d52725b5590d15" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"cd4dcc8fb50672611f19e0cc8adcf9285f9d76e7e28bcac34e931163f8057b9f86424e5d514a13c0a25bbb49ee485501ec5e21061e006ad1569d2610":"":"24480094a44067b86ef47db38ec3e62914351196358bd9d7":"c6ac3b879adb6c150a8ee44428c333574ed9b0d6806848d8":"92bdc1514d87daaa321655d56c6302878c2bde37700163e8":"21c51a1568aafb56af1fd424f6fa146113d14d6d63e1a24e3168130ebc10dd84925bc4077c41897aa8b3c73aeb5bcf392d496dedcb6487379bfb3e12bc07fcf5c196d59fcc1fa730e55c00edaa2bca7b1e32a40ba06500ed3dd7fcab361995319979a0fa9cdc406a4d20650814e8bfac" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"fdca0039e8485a06e6a9afbde5b07a1bbe49e13659a2164034289639d23dcf3f9874b8fb1a1af8495b6b2129b88475cc529c96271bc1bbb5c7c2ea03":"":"841f765ed5f00be838a270730ce5926659cd7cd9d5b93ca5":"825fa13ed554973768aab55917cc880183c3ebb33a532305":"736e9de931198dd1c5f18a7da3887f685fbfa22b1d6ab638":"dd8596a62847a77da81818dbbeaf0393bd5e135069ba169f8987f01dc756689342cba61d87a79d4bce2311790069d10709c3a53df974c7d6793ae1298253f13ecdbb5680928579b73d73afdcd24a703dc9b391f303d8835ba1129c3d46237ede5e44732a74f8f23b60a3a45ce42f042a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"e246e3f95d89c166768aac69fc95fb49eec49aa633adb938ce1705b68987aeb0fae7f57b7e99e4f3e3e1b1db2d1fedf443bd2618e95193cefd905e1d":"":"130701f88cc1e7545980e6c6f6cc76b0336f089bb66cc347":"95533f4cc247c887d6a7cc0ca753009bf034ba95b7b1d3b2":"464fd16f011eb2986d9982879d79349a3ce4f5905bbfe832":"0d4e6b03af7a648337abec2efa585908af40e88d1f104b3e8c352aa29ac79fe8e448f36b0dfd701a1fc0f1d86dcab7e8a8ecada6ba218d9aaea1c40aa442ca51f3116ced3c9b8ba7546688ed4f3a1378f76b8a29ec763784fc82906dc0f688c5e60d59e6d5284fcd96f361bc5b285465" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"cb0405e58270cecb34a9951adeb694c5513c499cf310f6a99985d4fb3973463e907705740e01aed4ca221d4b03ef30e69fd8dbfb4ea919a913800a1a":"":"0b57e688472e9a05baa3920417a2e8f9a9c12555fd0abc00":"cac05f79d9837c97bb39f751792624983c397fd288dd1d95":"344d2aa2b3bad1485429b66606bf215acb0a65bf2a318f6d":"b2a13d75ad389514149763199d711092a9b0e4f1e50809355cfefc1884a94f4d4a50ac5c5da0b4e9bd7537e413bb451fdd2fa77f1f894444cb5c81e4c43978ebfd96900a2c8986c885d0faf89a2ad5c6ef922dfba1b5219b0f3c4ac2095340c3b8bf0db037171b6545741c76217b2aa5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"e38ea7584fea31e48ab085c44f46b4cf68ff24b4a6b0b25867463e4a46ddc9a4de23f7272af1e9c4e0391aa9491ce7cdb5f96292e0d65cb9a9a4a3cc":"":"afe267e1491de3934054b8419b88b16731217eb4ee74c854":"bd0f3c43229a0ffc9e143e16738111e16d6a06ebf3eaa5b0":"23bd14ef8cf797cff7ff787df8ed8b87684fe7a9a33bf695":"c27a6ee5bab8f8e93783840e72894f3b024c7d3206a4a1869ce6fa8b5674bcbd24d4aab30f9866d797d850423c57684b7697913b9ef7bc0be933d0e21535bd50fea0feeb293985261fb9d4eb1ef97ab5ec6b691a08db4c8171e63745d14fb4c3a03c41f906daaa2877b7622b254f0449" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"71dc625242dcb94e6ba2bd013beb2112cfca576774e102830503b7aeda24c2c9d862f5212975ccc019ad2ea0442595f74d1d37dbcba0719d8ea32ba1":"":"0fef9f0934bb4485bfab2431f8811d963ec7fa7953ffc213":"a6a7501c4a5a93c396ef8cc969ebd93cac1c30b4783a0617":"c58ea233f35a22fd9b01592c6026aa17922070b3604c7118":"a1452d85799b54370cff65fd6dd74b575199606cc8fa64880b26972c913c372010b4c3f4ce9b7b565a8f5305072404c7b9d70f7aef6e2709c1694eefae66ffa80f16eb4b91f8041f4487427e69daa437e183e83d3b9718ba6a23fb90365884899e0d2f0bef56b27249f65e1c00c5411a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"36c1e048d16f9d6035c6b62515afb929633f356fed6a654282663e2284fd4132116d21eef66d29629bc712965d960f18cf3f7dcbf8a3ccd61b5b5fb5":"":"93bb372b7ae1035de6f13b2a36c3ae5682b9a3ea8f444383":"9715b72e4755993762e11a93857f1d50a051e70d094339a5":"2f1e73945863b237f49d6d20d0999a0203f295b9a046dca2":"ca135891b47f27c26ac891df49c80d085f90c13d236a60f1372eefd81eafc5819f4ae5aee5b32d46681be01629b078ae965f67b81a5268ef0b303d09e048f4449f5aaa11af51f80151b4697b13700930167cdcb3b6e8260eeb8bec7f6a67a2050a6ea569c825d61d4858a1cd15f70fb3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"582425e13356e7a840cae9fa435b220af6a96fb53ac91e7ee22023cf6a0eef3923907883ae540be816e0631c894520b86e8c6adb8152e55cb6aed5ad":"":"227762e137f9eec6d2b3c63476b404dc5b0c68613a93034a":"fba72c01a9e51c93ac00c1232c717d32fd4d4c791556e716":"f5258bf318457769a93ef5b3ba95fa2753ad1c5c1b81a785":"c753a84ba7f41af2ab757ac1e4c9c450d2112767ff55a9af8f58edc05c2adcaef7b5bf696e5c64f71d5685593f254a87625065ee0df51ab4f7bba38faf5799c567d783fa047957f3f965571a7b4cb477566d1c434d6b2e22ae16fdf473a6c03057d934a7e25f0ea3537be97238d74bc4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"836f5d7521f26d884dc34af2ca56ab4a752ea18b909085a87cb6d07dba32b654390a25b68ea7ba8fb790271c712f387145052ca46cb40534355c1666":"":"99d9aec334666d7c399e453455ef6ae884c2173e12e31cf2":"d74d20dc22c55c35f0b66a464dfbe8f349616916fc726298":"407b0951404079fb3b54559c0286143d9cb18957bed7fb1d":"809f372d1af60ff972049193fe9f173684a2fc9828b60b32164c1b6738e1ba6aa12cf739287a74c6ad528a3ec00095b590b44705b4975236a0b7ea02c1213f0e830f275f53bb79efd98679c4766cad27738e6fb777e98cdd606b971fa60745289d5ef72a99e1919686a53a241fe36cf0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"e555ed6c7ab344fea68d73c6432e4e6da2e67d8b33ab79e5719a2def258a852d17d93212840583fe23900949c301a29fc92095f4716018144e64583b":"":"5262cccd138256fa8424801435d118f39b9aa1db4d11ca9f":"9b55d76b743bd7fc5700fde8ffca956c0ed6091df1a22aed":"f8c99af8029110c41a6a01fd2d3d12b7103aa39cbeea90c8":"d1ec06e38af7c6e0a70b73ac62bc3556183f99a47bfea0f0c4a59e7ba4b0718df5438e369ba14be84db40d5ffe8a1a5952edfb83f61ee4d984e3d2fa67f557aacc58291cc688fa29be530e66c228e68607e25c013473b4ffbcfeda721ee35f5dfc8809528eaddad8969ce719a411216f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 0, 192) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"12f2cabd3b6f640daaf27ed6cf6bd7d06e2ac372733c6971739e36afe2ba1ebf4e7e5e9f5591480e3fae752fa59bb99a1949bdeccf0c100f6afe886d":"":"7766c36e6583cc8e3c26a8058fa0923bfeb3ee22033f46c0":"63e60d1bba9aa29adc3f3b8a5db53f3b703c7ae69bcbc2f7":"f416f36717ba5f0a78125ca52ccd004b2f4f2dcdd401f595":"6196b2b4adff14a26d64f440b6c160210266d7f5b77d5e292e94b8c67bd9cc774274741e7c0c9a7ab21c31f1194ef4218ddcbbe94059042d22ef44ecfecef214a73db64505d46d5493d7475d0684fc0e431c5265c12b35310d4404b3c4db6029facbaec88b0c0ae9799e5af0aa49e842" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"2c50da90a1f7987d5216950ea22689584b237647d96c1239f9251942f4d13d16f418b0cf7265b91c4ad97a7acbbda065a48bc1bc5c7a9ee1523c50e3":"a74c108fe870b91a2defa971fa1efcb7a209f293d29bb5ea":"":"":"":"8853eb47c4ada94a3d58a1b517784bccc8f831d02dd5239c740fd7caa3869c5ff7bbf522a78be2d510c49c496a6657a09f0ede00daee9fd77061b0f04e7342518dc6ec1f4a7ff99dd7c783882b58f5e8bc467516c6b85985fab65c6761d4fe756ffc27fd62cfb92778391a258d3b0b0e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"4606e3e19a8a53e8aba05d9d1fda1ddf15e7709aa2bae8b54efc4a14e734b45a5cbbad00a749d2bde540258de74ff8fe886d05570300af2086d0b9a2":"23ef5fbde4b270c084a745e0e299a5eba228a37074fd4f07":"":"":"":"8caf86df25de5cbc3749fee4b64fe041cf4ef2859e20704bb01abe126a90ead8cffc427c2f98aac400aab97184846125a2a66888dea9c8aa108e96e03b05bbd30e566fb90c661dc1990ebfe75f73f5b0de7be419c225bfcba3713805455dffbe5d6fcc98141743b59c2cbd70e78f5977" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"08e2e2175fb34e4111179fc2580c05afa16d224440cc7eff24082beb16133a992fc4f4e2762634fbf68177dc3f11c4d057b71661ade56e7768ab9e6b":"0a4af33e2501ba409b132459ba97603888e727aca0a0cee0":"":"":"":"39c60b6d9f85cb69b2128bde86aca2b055e21ffd7716d789f834ecacc69a043893b09459991793571d3d8070f03382a11bd1c1bf38e86fae13a932c6dc82c540fab8c8eff478e598d3295663ab75ee8a56376c0d607fe43b74ac39479b8f694a3a13826b1b96344ec67b9eb0a5858eec" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"b436ebeda1119de3fb2b2e532f7ebf59fac632a4d784d904f844bb73f2cade5a88d4790c8c1d5973fc73f6b7f929303b62d30b6818a25ddf705bdb9e":"07de5589726c49dc5a764de9b41bce74675e4ca3c71769a6":"":"":"":"2099fc754ecd19a19de8afd21d2ae2ce456c32d6ce7772a98e37ed47f54001f44fad8e9b591a70d3bb28f19bca22940321ba17c33193613b7b5be1ec54efa470b70cbd6be2931193c35cc73d80c139bb4e670e1a2cb74d3bedd3610e9d0f9d154372a70b608fef824c346fb16241b301" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"4d3e993c296c66983b9c751d2c0aa2d519f801a764ac9f1fd8d86b57eb226bdd9f69efd9ad29bf16af483e7dc170f8af65c16426c2ab7c0fa9df0175":"52ae4cfe985348408d3678d60259a78369aac02953911e74":"":"":"":"bead2cfc29315133e6f5ba2e85bd7778dcf9908081032ee634f90b0124ed9371c9009419b9e2a409fe4abd6295cad57cddcb6042986cc98f2fafdff99f7cc1185f3ba0d5f1e5f5452ee5f9df03c0e8a4f8426ca246afafe81079c2f0d165b87056e7c8528e8cccac5f49d0bb5ccfbefc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"c7c4e18c56e9191ba43c967cebe48e55bf9aff4d6449c3e6a1f9846bfd7f92d535bb7386c0155cdc5aa2beec888de0d432f695ec79b1c78841ad941e":"c36a381b1b36e6ab00ea80557b5e7451ec9771101dc22580":"":"":"":"da74b23d309fc7cf7670d7feb6cb6ff4da1b763ae2e8616edeec12c71511f5a24b9c466532283f4151a902ffa5ae211d7c1efa84477b93fc393ac95522f3673f97aa9e379e48d198d5929684875150633fcf8a0918d2050551d8daa91887f3d2685737b6456d0c61c0a117413f193346" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"78426f865483ffbcc6330db2ccd65bf8f247706cedf68d4cbcc289bacb1ef32e5caf05f28a21146a9b18e77b3a7ed0d24a0803c9af7264fe4e23d692":"e5026090f9806ff6f158c4a834588f6a39e9b4a44ef2dfa6":"":"":"":"111cd64a9950cc6f20a1b38811fce4a08929ca2654bed66c0cdebab0b81552826c06ef12ce463fc9c91c81a35d2ca0553905922b9a4975fa8fee2c7f9ffa9f2ed8cb2609f4b7d32a44927c7b5baa8f43dda137aba9b49a2b0394f7f67d37b7f71a5e4f4c151db6b96e8e4dd9cd0bd84d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"43ca11d53ad0198e4db5e136de8136bc461851a30ce59521f931ad0596d13365bd8297a68dd42b7dab7f40808b3ce6c12f14d4de741ce451b6637a10":"532b05891fe406ce72421013aceb434581be8a3a13549dfa":"":"":"":"4c42f791dc8322d779f9a1ed9a28b0cf352601a4ef6d74e4e822ee5d9eef06e700314acb7a47dcbb62805babdcfdd236e3022374defd44bbf747764f72fbfccae10893b54b29966aba448435987c22ace4c931d01dc945091860cae7744365bd9b619059b8b646b229878966049cf83f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"ddcb3024b681e30e16e05026d8e23977497fd0b2c0ac24017de2744edcb097d3a104d4e3c6b8adcb554746f9a43671f0692c01a8f89fa98ec3a54ac7":"bd9e41974f6627ac5bbb21ec690eece459e1dcedefb327f9":"":"":"":"741b2a8e82aa3ca9f3a609d05a6e2d570be463ef957f235344cdf9e0f89b3610951aa1ef0b9406785b75e59c2de8349d435e4db82fc2a4a8b94e366f4eb13c432fcf8fac08f0c7fdbe67a44e81706b53b460f78befb8cb6dd2a0ffd13c87df84f8a5197ed47158cee171e5323593df4e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"f81c4ba8605dc14072e2bda2d2ef64e71ad856061056b8d8374fff5a6fd9a54a814fd725bda8944037197492c52c62b97ea02df33325b35b91726839":"217137084f4519d046ec896144cf2c301baf911e1440852e":"":"":"":"14efd71fa13dfbd498bbe13ffa24e646d04ee0ef32c99c11004c3e9d8f748ac2f956f9899a72c8d97ae988d06275855f77a92bc30f1b957dbcfc93fffec3852715c239c5313e765affbed257d302b6d1b74977b8012522b69902adb86efc1ad768d99d657a5375dff720b4cad886877a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"8181fd2cc5f7ae2d4ed2c96b9511aeeef33e50ecf164afc4eddebaf76a96d97bfb40377959e1edc44d24df041749ec6239ff226e40d5a5feccdbeda6":"7d6ca5ab652a37cd79367d84299f1ff2c5a3c2331c77b98e":"":"":"":"5a2cac8110a24e1d8c5f8bff3e82857ec8cfcd469c316fa18b0f65a0d30866e49fed2a228121f50901dbbba561732c4fe82a98f341bbc0a397fd257a5f8a4a9122c991648b1a6507c82f866d26f9b22e0ee7c9a51c4d8e5104f0b4570043c9257bb9dd6f3730f1daf94f80baf8907acb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"a0ad012a978bed2268d05086b823f5d0dc9bb98ee03980d755bce968f9ac81db886a2a05b59df40d8346334a0276b73f528db03a118545acb7f2d70e":"1a8aca3c118f2bc0c2196df81ef22c267d20ed7c607cdae0":"":"":"":"b9dc0eb1e4aeb482dea1b4a5e6f6ef9636366face696811db2d912e9430b303f23ac95d65682694ef9513ac5b3e56a053b2e1a2ffbcb901c375cd122cab47d31fca5a0606daf8cc2e5e6e99b90fc8ab4fa67794caad91985cc92b2187dd2965be0980240d9be2fb1c4bf06e60f58f547" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"f28b143468ab87794230cef4361d047236444180d0cfda58cbb9494cd1ad21be96297ff799011042013789a928f18831ffb0169126dd046c774a4fce":"ea7fc50e1eea3d84bffcbf83b240e921348b532e7b33f094":"":"":"":"5c22e92f25acaf98f55ff06e1bd80d382da754d1d33cffb6fca933583ba758200357551640c439770f77f843e9ce1e9a054f69588d76acb9cb92b7a2fa2903bc51391bd7001ccc1da67a4cce9e5dd08c2d489295c36de2c148ce27311d0789310de1cab2641e92f859b036383a8058a4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"b628cb448e477cb439a2de687861a992e738db6b2b25cc6c27aadfc3a0a640b3411de49c920407303e80abd7a1d4f45c4749980fe1550bff69518210":"d5f4f8266da9b7f17ac97734201544104a5c0acb53c6bf22":"":"":"":"34a834dbb7da0b6a2e2353bd9795bef369cdde4d172b3feae7b1d9fdfb0446454cfb1adeff423d0a143c33c0e0d8e7905bd1720889e8b1121f1ef82cf15443c2f9c8999c5573e7df60b52ef395ca1d1b60e7eb721c012c344d06b336d519fa2b7b6dfbed8383456504bd0b4893bf2ba2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"5c7c9690a1926a4580c691c2e5327e736d5c3aec0ce8f5d32d4946bc4b607f712a8759428b010ba1b268b0de64fc5eb32d3f7fa9b8d4f20fab45c72d":"0310b2d8b5655cbb0fc2041ad15a248a7b1f2ac78845e29b":"":"":"":"6f8b6df55d9d8acf87dc2af20b7f4512f9425987495f512975de8059135e7ebb8698cb0301a8816e7299e76053cb66051c8b35bd2b00b4695cff4847f168d2d60697495cd9007ab7dd74ee7f61ee90b7827543f624b7c1412bba3d6df1242e6ffd90534ed393341429fc00bd97d9bcb7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"96ae702af50c50c7c38818a5133938bd7ce51197fc78e21815b6c5a7ff9c0395d764159f707d5813e5bf47c1b8232b44a007bf7decfef499d758ed53":"e96554644097e9932585b7f4bb14d101f24c8b0376f38c05":"3f698a5f6f4fe67ef2ddf23bd5a67c1a2df4f3b19425fb85":"fe1f6a90fc0ed396bca21c0d40a1bb583eb63df78c98adac":"5942b56148f27dd5388f00caa47ffd4925e854237fe14454":"150b9260ce9aa419fe1860332ae7c9f42d9ada1649679b53f46bc9d20de3431186a54afb5df7b6269cdc05540a93fdd50a2cd3a862372d862841768df02846b057993dd6aa32f874b7220a5a1fd9cb573d720a54af5715cedfc16f0d9a467735e253b2b1a6e97421fcee1f2d670dec1a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"4834717f669d9b599f0ee526129057b5a7c5680724ae0459ceb0e0d4eda21e5fe92e63fd23f08f8a0b094a85f3f377fdf1018ada0c461b5a05c334e8":"870b7857dae97cd361a005c3005013e4dd55ca76e46b62bd":"522534ba1a09cf9abf29bde66ce1dacd0e273e8954eccafb":"45f54169665f59d92211f266892009958ee515f14d09581a":"4633819c2ae83c71059ec8ae41ed2c68cadf9b2085a5b8bb":"7afd6cfafd9a7bad155b59a8bb2094f76b915b93764e92858821d5c32ff4a29493788d3dc1627ffe7980950394349eba88b9c2f6869ac5086296366b6f4ee37e8529d291c9d962e30662423faf375b7820e0b650db03e3c99791d8042da790cce1a1997ea21441dba4b936bd8b393300" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"f5d1d27eb344b63e907d82a2e57494b25dabcae440ac88738512d9602ac8bca243018f2495599e618dde0261e43ea38d45e7c09ccdc4bf3dd8e5c100":"12ff844e5c5bb3fd871feb37ab796002846ffaca5a741c54":"f642c19602754584afa3083f567d80fdcd1e5c29202ac3ad":"cb6dbad8ce1a5677b4825cca934336b936ccf841ff98d894":"c11fcc157c643a943e54274f1d942d998fd1ea0333e21588":"6f25ae8bf8c26d5f0b9d2a81acaf221790a09241b6e83c9e527c7784881d1f7398c2d7771174f92aab45134b4633ad96430df30b130ae34af52de90b425405959ba24a41685a04d2411e2f0e8564bf5bf3280cb6d75d0b910d06c73a625cd56646eebff14fcff81411c055921cdfb4c0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"49a10569d87a790d34bcc3c8fd77d075a1cef9eff337e8929b51bdb8d6c5df3ad31045684fd1dabb1fe6f052fc9886384fe43c0a7abc7adca043d35e":"34d6ad434a436a690e7644f0dc2207131148192ceb2e91b6":"8707328fc5a1721e4d72b23c2b8ca3c30ddd95664ac478aa":"82c8d83a9f5d5639a6a1ce26d244bd30dceb1cc978627e19":"2a53b0b80b29c7d071983b65ba835e4eda66bcfe7b3d90b5":"08e24ccaae3b44b7248b2d735af985dcadb84f74d202bca726de1cd663bb5ea1bb67c669126ac97218a9ca45491df90beb387615474249bba1afd4534be7a74c61fef308f13661ddfcce40f24b410cffb1cc3cbba2c6d20a5e4c4814d44bef07bb697cfcf1e9932e43349376dc04865d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"9a4232a59cc579867f8330c288a9218251030c00ebe50c9cd97d6cff6e49ad079df509644ec2ebe3ad4e515654af383da265d7b348dd4b89ddd49cbd":"b4498a32f664d4b489c2b47e67845d2d2bed5096e88f86de":"b8471ee87531817d81ee32578d27fa3a190df33561da7a2d":"2e74194aa62ef911599b37a51fa742817e3a4e6c254ec179":"afc7f13ae55e738cceb976ebdd01698de4d103db797f799b":"340c28cb7cf4c3e143dac3e133de864b1f458c76e3d47f3cbb6845f940be174b8819fc539f42005f4485fddc657f064c34873094e25a9bf7ec341a98cb97014a1d694b1694170ca5a8976e86f6e4e41232f526ec8536facd02394f492fbcc7c298ef0eddb3c5a148399ded7677366cf3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"b89744009793d2c118365b1d2f343d6b6c59374b41dbd805e793f27882467c5342015cf968b080a88a15fd6a7be3757b05313528525ab1e2cbd08ffd":"f3c02be0a880e194013c21b09b6703a61a7ccf7a73e8a541":"bca27f10060bb8d16d499b3f6ca05ed8462b51b0b43a1fd7":"eb6fcf75884be9112219d359013f45fcb1959ea971bd0bc8":"50a03bc3652f50cb9ed1167ea70ec1e74f896f81a8090216":"d2a529722365e7ff3e660964eeb27040a0e92a4d19bbe94592cfebad71047414676ca6ca72234f5127f313cb7f5be613b44d989fe141c9a0ec1f0b4d83c36e744cfb1c72c32a02b68c21d28832da008c57664046255ef18488ed750ec5e73b18eead939f932d2809f12939670c3c1033" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"6d2918c15be7871cad99dc9e06f73253ef905d9705c4e4ec38664043b04f9a150fe5953bfa7aebd926be162b7edd72fdc14ff97e67dae6257ad654f4":"489243eaac215f76a573b92f0709d116bd3c817eb95c2c39":"0a84cad7a1cd21a5afe6557d7d2875d9c62183cbbf49a123":"0c14578ac9504902cb9aa654086246d113039f926a87b325":"1aaab1e3a29e144cec825d29c3f42dc945cf2772ed30cb5b":"33438ba4edd0c38db99f2b6a50b35dd89aecb3491990ec4e60460bb32eb0186ff9fdc973b1b0df23ae65da31b8af5a37a69f81ab3e577a4c2c31e51cfcc4e844b044fb597e937524f59a0019ad5120c460329c982fc93e8e7a4b4e1de5619103b23a7a579633fc925d147d8fb856a277" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"1330c4aef54ff84387e0372f7c8d273cecf0af2ceb32ef6edb6a4f1ace802f3b95fa69cf578e2cda1d6060ec2554eb3152507387f325d8e26009bd80":"89d7bf8f5754cedc2e1a249f693e29276170f62c29c5edae":"a6b58f33d57570f4df05bbfb792a00087d331e17417e09ef":"f57fc701e4f8f5cc2181b5357824f932f6e07679ec0d3cc7":"586c4e8c5769156cbb54c025fb01aad0b61aa6238c231656":"0bcb6ad4f2acefb549c46271d5a4ed41d7decc095137e2044b60273388c6c6d79cb89016abcad1d6a138621720b71fc11ef82fae04026e08926e94042694a0c008f99281e03da580fbb6543aca2b4596d39699b97f1fe65ec60a70b88770eb825b716a10ce41383f31db596079a9d54e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"3f0564b9ceee32c8944c8f2bc4b4d2179b38acc880bdb91eed466b881e2cc21df77bc3901ab5ce5ecf029a066784503f80d1857979b09c4563944433":"5d54fc715556c20f5b2d01d6b0992f1c596e5ad77f81da75":"35cb6d07862fbab4f50038097cb463aadf14e519c8834651":"abb21e501e85ad1edc66108e3b88380fddf810b10b883317":"3c690cdd997dfa9c5677bee976fa93cac21f5bbf382f7f53":"bae872c9d221b1531f85c15f466b7a3af3fa9c9c6b72bb8f5dad77f3d12df52d10347ba5d6504cd0a285c3be578bb67f0a9f0137463dc01cdcb847e7853c5db4cbb6a115ebff7b80db0406baccb0e3e68a4a4a95364c2da29466e160fece7b8ddb65dfab000c66cc8109380a601d5ed9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"115c973d6df41ead464e22572dbe0761dcdb9aad930b2e55a5558075fb7c51c94efc5f8fe5dfe24d30175a89f1bbcf146037a07b324f572d0d4c27e4":"d3079ee3a3c9b2d69ee0fd316a6448bc7d8e3b730948c46d":"2348ee87bd5a3bb45d51a7b6a109043a9b6ee3db011dda28":"937fe1a7a790754bff99ad51782e8ef5b4928d0057b0c380":"3e89899f4aad241a9189ffa127c87c15b5e3bcfd80bc316d":"0ffc883aa19b3cbdeb39039fd3760160a93cd663b8b358e9fbb6300df164689303ee5f2489ab4ab2d522f6a33c93350eab553a2499b15f8ca198303ff45e946a06d8a40959f33a759c5381b3a59da22e68032abf3da3da6aadb410cb41f54b3146ce57f9bb5d28bc823e3e03c0294794" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"c28541425a7cf33e29adaa91f326f216de89976031977f104f44fcbcdcf4579337434613801fe4661642392db29f15f0924566e72b596b23ff7b18d5":"44650a29972aa8521d6fb9dffeb15c00903a283f20ea9914":"43cf4de0276483be1382f3cecc6a803551a40602584cd84b":"03eaa10612895db8f66d50a2210d73d1f563c3ca929d9f54":"8d2b20abc4e8890c772bcaa05cb7b3eb5025ac4cacb5f7ce":"aed27ff8eb54a7d2787e73ed2a51877c1250c0d4eaf10aaddb30409624289a9b7742cdebba54218c7c448b57f209182e214014cd180916a8c125ad438af2e5f5ca5b00f9cf063f0c307560ed4378382b4572b97088f8d24e0bdf0fc3489f64074f1155fbb1163b54c93098b841257c30" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"dfa52082afb4dd137cb5209f6771f04eda25794280983ba1d8cd2f3d7f9dee556ac26d8a5a368d29096ed643089b65e9ab17b5f58ec816570499fbff":"16ccfd20408082829aaf8a818885164581c9a1bd09e9fc12":"abe13d12a9f0133bdebe14785dfef5f08a133a6cb5c26a92":"485dad7804de594356cf3c571d5f22263c0b7cbd4dca1f1b":"5961f8177b6015ae0119d22e0a45a4aa1bcdc580f7e7f975":"ee48e57f1b5bd72c99c911d3353952c2c143689c3cd9b474a46e4ada83811efc67f2557d323723526809825aa338a80e833c95297d6b16490db633ac1f1648071c3ad4cdcea056c41b4eb157ffc83c3454b0cf001f1e01c31e48a61587381e293e6cff97270c1f157b069df3e591c2f9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"95f3a1aeacd07218a2ccee44c807f790e568e0032a42fdc7c8dc9a71f76bd725aa909ddbdf5457f1dc4e69746426a9c56fbec603867633ee36a7fe62":"658b7326cf6adbf7208d37cd69547805bc3f58fdd874e143":"d44350c7a668e64873ff97c31d79cb23b0f1620aed7c9d23":"dfefff80f10c3143b82de3392c395ab94ac8a2f4c0a30048":"a6d21a762aaaddcdbae9b9ecefbcb3149d514c94fe83eb21":"4f5e544491b72b84a0d0532d7f9ce01ec2de6a05ab5056fc75d8f73bbcac5ffc38e20745d0e8aa1eacdefea6dcbb92475b5cf9ce0a617e5603b7b9fe34f4f4cb04ade2db35cce1fd315140e3e4ab8472216c7cfdaf004181351f210b397c3147dcd279f6fc2ebd96050e996f77ad6ba1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"29a1897d6ea5de66e551f8c106f601e421ddd940812530df00f634682f249aebdaf86938c895c11f9fcb0bd1fcdb183b4f8cf86b3429a5372caafe1d":"d655a179edaf4b8381a9f6a332ed5b754dbf34f650d19867":"31c87be686b6f90f3d1b0ea90c541e16f3430292a5c4755f":"ed49403700cebec30d1057503be7baacbeb45bcdfd9a43a2":"952763380af3243c6c327f23cb74f8368919e0b6b9c25934":"fb29067bdb23c0f0153932523edf32d0e3c18e46616e07f39a4b78091eca90349f636ffcf26b68a4cd0902431f2ada91bcc86dc223db4aa7a42e7cb57a852095704a27f9f07962880a50d2ce16c125be1e8d4f54a0cc5eaf63150c32408db6f39b22fc93b853caaba9e49581f13a8815" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-224, 192, 192) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"387e31bcfffa51323a92d90713b438a1f4ded69707be3aa517e1e72d448abbdf0a17989b3de7c43c621e904f52db52ad823daabff9c10b3fca93acfa":"e08fff320a493d70ea4cc85a4cc604664a0deec8f6c7666d":"969cafc33e99964833c4d0f88f906f5429b5daa552f53bf0":"8d6e6f05301ef5cefba752f3d0ef58a25775d6b69f6c15a4":"72292aaa69fbef6f010fa4d5bb63d6d7a595395d79a8c110":"77ead908484044482da529f9a6f4ca6e6d8d49954d2e2d5c7dc455e03bebf484021673727bbc40adc8812600201b8c2de8e658191422b80d23502329c84c0ca061b212952fdb2ecf3106dd20e6455f1f231e1dad1cfbf2fa019dfe9c162a670ae20b252ae2e5a4ca0eaae1c679a7fd3b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"06032cd5eed33f39265f49ecb142c511da9aff2af71203bffaf34a9ca5bd9c0d0e66f71edc43e42a45ad3c6fc6cdc4df01920a4e669ed3a85ae8a33b35a74ad7fb2a6bb4cf395ce00334a9c9a5a5d552":"":"":"":"":"76fc79fe9b50beccc991a11b5635783a83536add03c157fb30645e611c2898bb2b1bc215000209208cd506cb28da2a51bdb03826aaf2bd2335d576d519160842e7158ad0949d1a9ec3e66ea1b1a064b005de914eac2e9d4f2d72a8616a80225422918250ff66a41bd2f864a6a38cc5b6499dc43f7f2bd09e1e0f8f5885935124" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"aadcf337788bb8ac01976640726bc51635d417777fe6939eded9ccc8a378c76a9ccc9d80c89ac55a8cfe0f99942f5a4d03a57792547e0c98ea1776e4ba80c007346296a56a270a35fd9ea2845c7e81e2":"":"":"":"":"17d09f40a43771f4a2f0db327df637dea972bfff30c98ebc8842dc7a9e3d681c61902f71bffaf5093607fbfba9674a70d048e562ee88f027f630a78522ec6f706bb44ae130e05c8d7eac668bf6980d99b4c0242946452399cb032cc6f9fd96284709bd2fa565b9eb9f2004be6c9ea9ff9128c3f93b60dc30c5fc8587a10de68c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"62cda441dd802c7652c00b99cac3652a64fc75388dc9adcf763530ac31df92145fdc897a0c1c482204ef07e0805c014bbd9bbf717467bf4b5db2aa344dd0d90997c8201b2265f4451270128f5ac05a1a":"":"":"":"":"7e41f9647a5e6750eb8acf13a02f23f3be77611e51992cedb6602c314531aff2a6e4c557da0777d4e85faefcb143f1a92e0dbac8de8b885ced62a124f0b10620f1409ae87e228994b830eca638ccdceedd3fcd07d024b646704f44d5d9c4c3a7b705f37104b45b9cfc2d933ae43c12f53e3e6f798c51be5f640115d45cf919a4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"6bdc6ca8eef0e3533abd02580ebbc8a92f382c5b1c8e3eaa12566ecfb90389a38f8481cc7735827477e0e4acb7f4a0fa72eca6f1560720e6bd1ff0152c12eeff1f959462fd62c72b7dde96abcb7f79fb":"":"":"":"":"d5a2e2f254b5ae65590d4fd1ff5c758e425be4bacdeede7989669f0a22d34274fdfc2bf87135e30abdae2691629c2f6f425bd4e119904d4785ecd9328f15259563e5a71f915ec0c02b66655471067b01016fdf934a47b017e07c21332641400bbe5719050dba22c020b9b2d2cdb933dbc70f76fec4b1d83980fd1a13c4565836" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"096ef37294d369face1add3eb8b425895e921626495705c5a03ee566b34158ec6e2e0825534d2989715cc85956e0148d1b4f7125f472c253837fa787d5acf0382a3b89c3f41c211d263052402dcc62c5":"":"":"":"":"4541f24f759b5f2ac2b57b51125077cc740b3859a719a9bab1196e6c0ca2bd057af9d3892386a1813fc8875d8d364f15e7fd69d1cc6659470415278164df656295ba9cfcee79f6cbe26ee136e6b45ec224ad379c6079b10a2e0cb5f7f785ef0ab7a7c3fcd9cb6506054d20e2f3ec610cbba9b045a248af56e4f6d3f0c8d96a23" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a7dccdd431ae5726b83585b54eae4108f7b7a25c70187c0acbb94c96cc277aa894c8f4b8e195a47356a89a50d1389ab551733eee2e922f4055e53939e222e71fae730eb037443db2c7679708abb86a65":"":"":"":"":"99ba2691a622afecc9472418e6a8f9f1cdc1e3583c3bc7a2a650a1ab79dcbccbd656636c573179276e782569420c97438c06be898867f628b1c01eb570263d2c0f09c7aab536f6fba7df6aad19e05c236b645674667c03d1b6a04d7fc11177fe78933b309679f5bf26a4632b9a13e314c4bf4532428d3d95c689002b6dc1fbb1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"c286425ecf543a49bcc9196b0db1a80bc54e4948adba6f41712a350a02891fa6957a659a4ec2e0b7ad185483c220fd6108c2129813eea0776fba72788fdf2718759cc3c4207fa20a5fe23ac6e32cc28e":"":"":"":"":"8e1020a4fd84c99e0fc7e3f7ce48de5ed9ec9a5c2ccd624dbe6f30e2f688a31dc55957630357a5d48ca2a456241a28bfb16d8bb000877697a7ce24d9ad4d22b0c15117996f1f270b94f46d7a9bdfa7608fa1dd849177a9b8049e51b6b7a2742623854a1fddb5efc447eed1ea1aed6f02b4b2754ecf71ea0509da2e54f524a7e7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"02818bd7c1ec456ace55beeba99f646a6d3aa0ea78356ea726b763ff0dd2d656c482687d508c9b5c2a75f7ce390014e8cf319bfa63980e3cb997fd28771bb5614e3acb1149ba45c133ffbbab17433193":"":"":"":"":"19a231ff26c1865ce75d7a7185c30dd0b333126433d0c8cbf1be0d2b384d4eb3a8aff03540fbfa5f5496521a4e4a64071b44c78bd0b7e68fac9e5695c5c13fd3b9dbe7f7739781a4c8f0b980f1b17d99bce17ceb52b56866ae02456ffef83399c8cf7826f3c45c8a19315890919d20f40fc4e18d07e9c8ccd16c3327b5988f71" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"77a5c86d99be7bc2502870f4025f9f7563e9174ec67c5f481f21fcf2b41cae4bed044ad72ee822506a6d0b1211502967778100749f01a4d35c3b4a958aafe296877e0acafd089f50bc7797a42a33ab71":"":"":"":"":"831a4da566f46289904893ef1cc1cd4ad19ee48f3857e2b69e936d10afbdc29822e85d02663d346ef3e09a848b1d9cc04f4c4c6e3b3b0e56a034e2334d34ca08f8097be307ba41d020bc94f8c1937fe85644eeb5592c2b5a2138f7ded9a5b44b200c8b5beb27597c790f94d660eb61e8248391edc3ae2d77656cbe8354275b13" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"0ea458cff8bfd1dd8b1addcba9c01317d53039e533104e32f96e7d342e6c7b9b935a4b66fc74c2a48757a99c399e64e36c5f3708e7b714c4ed139b4fa9e8c763af01773484005109a85e33653bb0ce98":"":"":"":"":"373a37af84fddec13645a9768d6a785ae5a2589d64cd9b37980dde2541499210c4f408335de1d585349064f3f53a2b4c5ec6dc2a09591f99ad9fad528ac83474164b45497bf167f81e66fa08463ffea917f6891e48f149fafc20622bb1172f34886feb45c26fd446a4a4e2891b4bc594186896141aaaeeb301b49e7c1a26fec7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"bfb68be4ce1756d25bdfad5e0c2f8bec29360901cc4da51d423d1591cc57e1ba98afe4bd194c143e099680c504cceaabb97caf210e82498c3408790d41c320dd4a72007778389b44b7bc3c1c4b8c53f8":"":"":"":"":"409e0aa949fb3b38231bf8732e7959e943a338ea399026b744df15cbfeff8d71b3da023dcce059a88cf0d4b7475f628e4764c8bef13c70cfbbbb6da2a18aabcad919db09d04fc59765edb165147c88dd473a0f3c5ee19237ca955697e001ba654c5ee0bd26761b49333154426bc63286298a8be634fe0d72cfdeef0f3fc48eca" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"4f6880a64610004463031d67d7924fa446c39138d4d41007e8df3d65691a93676b33b2c13600f4b1df6ca3d1960e8dd457b87b8c8f48312b5333d43b367730c0a5ad4725a16778fcb53fe136d136cbfd":"":"":"":"":"73d0f324ed186e2ad06bd1800e262bdbda79ba54e626761bd60f74f43e3bb62958ec1e2f1d940af163e1cadc124e7ebaba2f72e67efd746c7f6d0cad53ef03d859d93cff778a32ee5be172fe7fdbdc232ded360d704a6fa0f70bebe942e56478345492f49dc5c6fc346b88a58947ad250e688e8c626fe1efe7624620e571976e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"aae352e111843219cae8f70e7b8f6eb9bb53d246cbec1e4f07d42757143295b4b84485dccd1bf93210e322eafcbebcd9f9237f00d744d8fbff21b9d0043c258e8731817e6a5fb7b4bf5011680e5bc642":"":"":"":"":"cfb28b93522c7d61d8d3ce3f080e435e4c83c7e13a9dab788db8fef0407267a14fbc9324e090e24df5491fedfa81116869983938d4d4d7324a310c3af33a6f7938f602c5e4e63f1771cdaabdab0782b5affb54eb53047c109a9606739dd0065bd21eca33132986554878354f5f9f852e674dd690163b0ff74c7a25e6bae8ce39" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"589e79e339b7d2a1b879f0b0e1a7d1ad2474eaa8025b070f1ffa877b7124d4ff0961ed64dbd62065d96e75de6d2ff9d6e928388d3af48c2968527a4d2f9c2626fbc3f3f5a5d84e0583ab6f78e7f8b081":"":"":"":"":"fce6ced1ecf474d181ab331f79c3d2cc8a768ec2818de5b3fc7cf418322716d6a6853733561a497c0c25cb288d2c9fcfbca891bafd5a834c85f3603f402acf1a7b1ea92db847ed5c252a862ad4ab5e259715f1fc81da67f5230bf8be50ee8069758095f7d0e559e03f2c6072290e61794458437609e473eb66580cddaad19b71" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"714277d408ad87fde317f0a94732fce62f1352bdc90936673b4f1daa0925aa26d16582a99f23010b4248b88d86485419bd9fc7cb2fd5063b2c3c0c4f346ad2e3879371a9c805e59b9f2cd2cc2a40894f":"":"":"":"":"62ef7a431288252e0d736c1d4e36cc9ac37107dcd0d0e971a22444a4adae73a41eff0b11c8625e118dbc9226142fd0a6aa10ac9b190919bda44e7248d6c88874612abd77fb3716ea515a2d563237c446e2a282e7c3b0a3aef27d3427cc7d0a7d38714659c3401dbc91d3595159318ebca01ae7d7fd1c89f6ad6b604173b0c744" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"05ac9fc4c62a02e3f90840da5616218c6de5743d66b8e0fbf833759c5928b53d2b89a17904922ed8f017a630448485452791126b8b52ee1fd9392a0a13e0083bed4186dc649b739607ac70ec8dcecf9b":"":"43bac13bae715092cf7eb280a2e10a962faf7233c41412f69bc74a35a584e54c":"3f2fed4b68d506ecefa21f3f5bb907beb0f17dbc30f6ffbba5e5861408c53a1e":"529030df50f410985fde068df82b935ec23d839cb4b269414c0ede6cffea5b68":"02ddff5173da2fcffa10215b030d660d61179e61ecc22609b1151a75f1cbcbb4363c3a89299b4b63aca5e581e73c860491010aa35de3337cc6c09ebec8c91a6287586f3a74d9694b462d2720ea2e11bbd02af33adefb4a16e6b370fa0effd57d607547bdcfbb7831f54de7073ad2a7da987a0016a82fa958779a168674b56524" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1bea3296f24e9242b96ed00648ac6255007c91f7c1a5088b2482c28c834942bf71073136a5cc1eb5b5fa09e1790a0bedd714329f3fbea1df9d0b0b0d88dfe3774beb63d011935923d048e521b710dc6f":"":"4ef872fd211a426ea1085ab39eb220cc698fdfeabe49b8835d620ab7885de7a4":"d74d1669e89875852d9ccbf11c20fe3c13a621ebcb3f7edeea39a2b3379fdcf5":"0c8aa67ca310bd8e58c16aba35880f747266dbf624e88ec8f9ee9be5d08fdeb1":"ce95b98f13adcdf7a32aa34709d6e02f658ae498d2ab01ce920f69e7e42c4be1d005acf0ca6b17891dfafc620dd4cd3894f8492a5c846089b9b452483eb0b91f3649ec0b6f98d1aaabc2e42cd39c2b25081b85ab50cb723007a0fd83550f32c210b7c4150b5a6bb3b0c9e3c971a09d43acb48e410a77f824b957092aa8ef98bc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a7ea449b49db48601fc3a3d5d77081fab092b8d420ed1b266f704f94352dd726d11a159b60af8d20a0e37d27e6c74aa350916ab47e8cb5dc843f9fba80639103711f86be8e3aa94f8a64a3fe0e6e5b35":"":"e2bb6768120555e7b9e0d573537a82f8f32f54560e1050b6abb1588fb3441e66":"a50cec9d1ecddb2c163d24019e81c31a2b350ccd3ad8181fd31bb8d1f64fa50e":"591dbbd48b51abced67f9c6269cf0133cd3dcbb5cfafcb6ef758569c555a5773":"0a464abcc8685158372d544635b953fcb1d3821c30aaa93982f9b788935f00f88115aad61d5cee003b3d1cb50f3e961a501e2dd0fc7e1724778b184a4bdf9f64e110dda7446e5544a30bd49a400ea1a5411800e1edfeea349323618afc5dc5782dc4b71d2da4d6a4785f8dd346feb9c8740ffd26bf644e3e4323ff24c30b9f10" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"14683ec508a29d7812e0f04a3e9d87897000dc07b4fbcfda58eb7cdabc492e58b2243e744eb980b3ece25ce76383fd4618590e0ef4ee2bdae462f76d9324b3002559f74c370cfccf96a571d6955703a7":"":"9ea3ccca1e8d791d22fcda621fc4d51b882df32d94ea8f20ee449313e6909b78":"16366a578b5ea4d0cb547790ef5b4fd45d7cd845bc8a7c45e99419c8737debb4":"a68caa29a53f1ba857e484d095805dc319fe6963e4c4daaf355f722eba746b92":"c4e7532ee816789c2d3da9ff9f4b37139a8515dbf8f9e1d0bf00c12addd79ebbd76236f75f2aa705a09f7955038ebff0d566911c5ea13214e2c2eeb46d23ad86a33b60f7b9448d63eec3e1d59f48b39552857447dc5d7944667a230e3dbfa30ca322f6eacaf7536a286706a627c5083c32de0658b9073857c30fb1d86eb8ad1b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"fa261fb230e2822458532ca2d5c39758750e6819a6fcebef10579ba995096959564e1c9fbcb12878df2bd49202cbf821bf7de29e99e7f0e1b9f96f3b1902fb4049c8c6234d20de8316ebe66d97725457":"":"8b7326621f6afbd44a726de48d03bcc5331f7306026c229ea9523497fbeaa88d":"33b00b31623d6160c4c6740363a96481be14b19bc47be95641227284c366922a":"2d812c8203575790ad6b6f2ed91a49d57460de779a3e881bef3be12e8766dc91":"5574e0b4efc17e8ce136e592beabfe32551072bddd740929e698467b40b3991f028a22c760f7034853cc53007e3793e3c4a600d9e9d94528f8dc09aeba86146cdde2b7f71255ae0efc529b49be2205979dba6525bfe155e8819e8e2aeeaa285704242da90b4c4535101cc47d94b0e388a1b2e63ad0cbe158b9e1bbae9cc0007c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"61f1471ced56aa04c57e1b512307d4cb92497d9592d7e9e35356e99d585cab1b84714e960c403a4fac06b2828cc564d97bf97db3c102edc81596d4757045fe6bdc008f35792fc6290b77d889c09c33a8":"":"5b8bdc41f76d98cfa71ed976ea3994706375c8841adb8b6b3b6418e3132e8832":"94c8a8fdf38a6ccb8571c89420d899adab169214bb0dfcd43a04622e289935b2":"8a4b46e0a7a55907365f82d4ab9376509bd44728cab8cbafb0da901012ad8dcd":"933eb159a6af7455b60e40586c064f05f1970f564281b1ebc4662701ac1f299e4eb908c4afcb2e065191281ab576f684aefedd6904bad04d96bd93c0516c62a496c3073a0cda0676a11cc08866b0cc74f62cb9d3db48673b2c3fbeada69f922b4b795ccba22df12ef7125909381f7d681f6b9caba02fb913c5437b98c040c576" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a1d5bb7d70621dee6b668b28c56d5610c2f8ced30284cc3e0e48de331af0506288a49e3e54c5ea54c98b95de81bcc807b4e2426e98f6eed97a6cdf690a89ee109e84c3dca16c883c26fa4ac671638d8d":"":"5bd1e086ed228cfd8b55c1731fea40c3a63d022599ca2da4bb23118f4821ba62":"b754b53ac226e8ebe47a3d31496ec822de06fca2e7ef5bf1dec6c83d05368ec3":"fa7e76b2805d90b3d89fff545010d84f67aa3a2c9eb2ba232e75f4d53267dac3":"df6b2460688fa537df3ddfe5575fca5eb8abad56cbc4e5a618a2b4a7daf6e215c3a497974c502f9d0ec35de3fc2ea5d4f10de9b2aee66dcc7e7ae6357983095959b817f0383e3030771bd2ed97406acf78a1a4a5f30fa0992289c9202e69e3eb1eabe227c11409ff430f6dfca1a923a8b17bc4b87e908007f5e9759c41482b01" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"68f21d14525d56233c7e263482d344c388a840103a77fb20ac60ce463cabdc7959fa80ae570f3e0c60ac7e2578cec3cb7584b4166530442f06e241dd904f562167e2fdae3247ab853a4a9d4884a5fa46":"":"f6a5482f139045c5389c9246d772c782c4ebf79c3a84b5cf779f458a69a52914":"9d37b1ce99f8079993ddf0bd54bab218016685b22655a678ce4300105f3a45b7":"4c97c67026ff43c2ee730e7b2ce8cce4794fd0588deb16185fa6792ddd0d46de":"e5f8874be0a8345aabf2f829a7c06bb40e60869508c2bdef071d73692c0265f6a5bf9ca6cf47d75cbd9df88b9cb236cdfce37d2fd4913f177dbd41887dae116edfbdad4fd6e4c1a51aad9f9d6afe7fcafced45a4913d742a7ec00fd6170d63a68f986d8c2357765e4d38835d3fea301afab43a50bd9edd2dec6a979732b25292" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"7988146cbf9598d74cf88dc314af6b25c3f7de96ae9892fb0756318cea01987e280bc1ae9bfdf8a73c2df07b82a32c9c2bbc607085232e5e12ccf7c0c19a5dc80e45eb4b3d4a147fe941fa6c13333474":"":"f3f5c1bb5da59252861753c4980c23f72be1732f899fdea7183b5c024c858a12":"44d0cfc4f56ab38fa465a659151b3461b65b2462d1ad6b3463b5cf96ad9dc577":"34fb9a3cdacc834ff6241474c4f6e73ed6f5d9ea0337ab2b7468f01ad8a26e93":"4caec9e760c4d468e47613fe50de4a366ae20ba76793744a4e14433ea4de79dc188601eb86c803b094641ab2337b99d459d37decc7d27473057be45ba848868ee0fb5f1cf303d2fcd0b3e0c36f65a65f81b3fee8778a1f22302e25dfe34e6d587fa8864e621121880f7cd55f350531c4ce0530099eec2d0059706dcd657708d9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1c974c953fa2a057c9fc9409a6843f6f839aa544bca4fa11e48afd77931d4656ed7c08285464af7a5dbdc10b944a127078146ad135acb836360d36afc50653dcc36c21662da2a6f6ae05222e75f34000":"":"263c4984c238ded333c86472866353817379502157172cfa51371d82b1efd7b5":"79b591529f9a26a0d7c8f8fd64e354b0c134ef1f757e43f9463b3dbb7a3da1ab":"7d8f7204b0b5401ddce9e88dcf5facb9a44660a9f5f1c862748e7269c29f7964":"72e2ca257b9edaf59b50e05a144f56fb517832fb9ad3489b1e664e3d5412cbf6b2883e891703b2e73aff9ab56da1009fcdef010ab4cdab996795c8f7c47fb1192bb160353997ad39d7d5fd0e2efc9103a7c3f158246afd53fe53ca6782f809698ef5f1f0d85536780a3fd6a8bafa475891c09213088bd1a3dc169257c34a517a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"56216d71984a77154569122c777ce57e1d101a6025b28163a25971d39c1c5d0f5cd148ba7e54f4975ac8e3e0f9b5d06a3580f8ca974626c77259c6e37383cb8150b4d0ab0b30e377bed0dc9d1ff1a1bf":"":"15633e3a62b21594d49d3d26c4c3509f96011d4dbb9d48bbbea1b61c453f6abe":"6068eaca85c14165b101bb3e8c387c41d3f298918c7f3da2a28786ab0738a6fc":"e34f92d2b6aeeeea4ff49bfe7e4b1f462eabb853f0e86fbae0e8b3d51409ce49":"587fdb856abc19ede9078797ecb44099e07aadcd83acdcb2b090601d653f4a14c68ab2ebdda63578c5633a825bae4c0c818f89aac58d30fd7b0b5d459a0f3d86fcad78f4bb14dfff08ad81e4ea9f487cb426e91d6e80dfed436ba38fce8d6f21ca2151c92dd5c323b077d6139c66395558f0537026c4a028affa271ef4e7ea23" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"83eb48bedc1e9294866ab8e5322ef83f6f271f8188e8fdabe5817788bd31570dd6ed90bc692237f132441ede857a6629a4e5e127f992bd5ca79ee56bb8a9bccf74c21814bfaf97ffd052211e802e12e4":"":"84136e403d9ed7f4515c188213abcfaca35715fa55de6d734aec63c4606a68f1":"fe9d8ef26e2d2e94b99943148392b2b33a581b4b97a8d7a0ecd41660a61dd10b":"594dad642183ce2cdc9494d6bcb358e0e7b767c5a0fa33e456971b8754a9abd5":"86715d43ba95fbbca9b7193ea977a820f4b61ba1b7e3b8d161b6c51b09dfd5040d94c04338b14d97ed25af577186b36ae7251a486c8a2d24a35e84a95c89d669d49e307b4a368b72164135ac54d020a970a180dfbed135d2c86f01270846d5301bd73db2c431a8aa10a0a3d03d146e5fafb9a2aa0b4efc80edab06ff3b532236" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"ba2c94203dab2e6499d8c50dca7b5c34a6b4764834f9816631aa21b9f9c3736167db133bdefb25e395085bceee5a0afcfa8984d16d35302cda35a3a355ab9242ec96fec0652d39282d4a0abf0a80df87":"":"b6fed10255a3fea6772ae1ae6d9f6cbb9bfaa34804e58a5b786f9bc60b348ccd":"445e072244edc716d3528f0e0a20ff0cd8f819c0d031736c8da122748f24d6c6":"1f856e403c4fa035bac9aa81a20e347c7d8b213aab699d69d9d6186a06ac45c1":"79f33fc36b3b47d9ac805bdbbe699909a8d0beb689a8b2723c291bd5bf7f3ce61343d4722a14e4add36312dbb0594910c8828aff1abc159915d498106f9ffb31147478d8c9ef75d1536ba5036506b313f6e85033f8f6fea2a4de817c867a59378c53c70a2f108275daedd415c05b61c4fd5d48c54be9adb9dea6c40a2ec99ee0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"0db4c51492db4fe973b4bb1c52a1e873b58fc6bb37a3a4bfc252b03b994495d1a2a3900f169bba3f78a42526c700de6229d5aab356876447e3a20d81c7e3fc6975e2b984180a91493044442999e1ca3a":"":"40b34183b4e72cdff5952b317b3d45943d0fdcfa0527f3563055f7c73ae8f892":"dc94220c99ffb595c7c4d6de8de5a6bb4b38847169e24a557ef6d879ad84149d":"b2376626fd2f5218b3ed4a5609b43aa24d371cd2176ea017c2b99cf868060021":"f0bd6bc4c506d9427a09352d9c1970b146360732841a6323f4cb602c87dedfb5ff7e6964b9144933af3c5c83017ccd6a94bdca467a504564aaa7b452591a16ff6a1e7e94ddc98f9a58016cdcb8caaed6c80671ba48cc81a832d341093dda1d4e5001ec6bf66348b21e3692a13df92538ad572bb2023822072fc95f9590293ffc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 0, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"593845f0adfeffa7c169f8a610147ae8a08c0072fc0c14c3977d3de0d00b55af9e0eb2507342ee01c02beadee7d077bdaefe591697eab678c52e20013aa424b95cfd217b259757fbe17335563f5b5706":"":"cbb5be0ef9bf0555ee58955c4d971fb9baa6d6070c3f7244a4eb88b48f0793bf":"6dd878394abdc0402146ba07005327c55f4d821bfebca08d04e66824e3760ab4":"ba86a691d6cbf452b1e2fd1dfb5d31ef9ea5b8be92c4988dc5f560733b371f69":"00735cbfafac5df82e5cb28fc619b01e2ba9571dc0023d26f09c37fb37d0e809066165a97e532bf86fa7d148078e865fe1a09e27a6889be1533b459cd9cd229494b5cf4d2abf28c38180278d47281f13820276ec85effb8d45284eb9eef5d179ab4880023ab2bd08ee3f766f990286bf32430c042f5521bbfd0c7ee09e2254d7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"fa0ee1fe39c7c390aa94159d0de97564342b591777f3e5f6a4ba2aea342ec840dd0820655cb2ffdb0da9e9310a67c9e5e0629b6d7975ddfa96a399648740e60f1f9557dc58b3d7415f9ba9d4dbb501f6":"f2e58fe60a3afc59dad37595415ffd318ccf69d67780f6fa0797dc9aa43e144c":"":"":"":"f92d4cf99a535b20222a52a68db04c5af6f5ffc7b66a473a37a256bd8d298f9b4aa4af7e8d181e02367903f93bdb744c6c2f3f3472626b40ce9bd6a70e7b8f93992a16a76fab6b5f162568e08ee6c3e804aefd952ddd3acb791c50f2ad69e9a04028a06a9c01d3a62aca2aaf6efe69ed97a016213a2dd642b4886764072d9cbe" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"cff72f345115376a57f4db8a5c9f64053e7379171a5a1e81e82aad3448d17d44d1e971ec795d098b3dae14ffcbeecfd945ec80f0c00cad0ff0b7616d2a930af3f5cf23cd61be7fbf7c65be0031e93e38":"6ec0c798c240f22740cad7e27b41f5e42dccaf66def3b7f341c4d827294f83c9":"":"":"":"17a7901e2550de088f472518d377cc4cc6979f4a64f4975c74344215e4807a1234eefef99f64cb8abc3fb86209f6fc7ddd03e94f83746c5abe5360cdde4f2525ccf7167e6f0befae05b38fd6089a2ab83719874ce8f670480d5f3ed9bf40538a15aaad112db1618a58b10687b68875f00f139a72bdf043f736e4a320c06efd2c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b7099b06fc7a8a74c58219729db6b0f780d7b4fa307bc3d3f9f22bfb763596a3b8772059a135a6b61da72f375411de269aec4f56ec5e96fbd96048b9a63ac8d047aedbbeea7712e241133b1a357ecfc4":"2ac1bfb24e0b8c6ac2803e89261822b7f72a0320df2b199171b79bcbdb40b719":"":"":"":"0e1f2bfef778f5e5be671ecb4971624ec784ed2732abc4fbb98a8b482fb68737df91fd15acfad2951403ac77c5ca3edffc1e03398ae6cf6ac24a91678db5c7290abc3fa001aa02d50399326f85d2b8942199a1575f6746364740a5910552c639804d7530c0d41339345a58ff0080eccf1711895192a3817a8dc3f00f28cc10cc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"7ba02a734c8744b15ef8b4074fe639b32e4431762ab5b7cd4d5df675ea90672b8a424f32108607c8f1f45d97f500ee12d8f02b59b6a3dd276bc69cba68efcf11ab83ead1397afd9841786bd1bb5da97a":"3ad627433f465187c48141e30c2678106091e7a680229a534b851b8d46feb957":"":"":"":"1fb91186ba4b4459d994b4b9f4ca252c7be6294d6cdb5fe56f8ff784d4b190a1c6456e0a41223bbbdf83ed8e7cfbfa765d9d8bc7ea5f4d79ea7eccb4928081a21de4cca36620d6267f55d9a352b76fc0a57375884112c31f65ff28e76d315698c29e6c4c05cb58b0a07ae66143b4abc78b9d25c78b4121e1e45bef1a6c1793e2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"9a8865dfe053ae77cb6a9365b88f34eec17ea5cbfb0b1f04d1459e7fa9c4f3cb180c0a74da3ec464df11fac172d1c63275b95108eff1fabe83613e1c4de575e72a5cdc4bb9311dd006f971a052386692":"336372ec82d0d68befad83691966ef6ffc65105388eb2d6eed826c2285037c77":"":"":"":"3c683f6d4f8f5a4018d01633dfee74266aaa68ed6fc649e81b64dfdf5f75e75d5c058d66cf5fd01a4f143a6ff695517a4a43bd3adfd1fb2c28ba9a41063140bedbffdb4d21b1ace1550d59209ec61f1e2dbacb2a9116a79cb1410bf2deca5218080aacd9c68e1d6557721a8913e23f617e30f2e594f61267d5ed81464ee730b2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"22c1af2f2a4c885f06988567da9fc90f34f80f6dd5101c281beef497a6a1b2f83fafdecf79a4174801f133131629037bf95a0e4bd24f0e2e9e444f511b7632868ead0d5bb3846771264e03f8ab8ed074":"80327dac486111b8a8b2c8e8381fb2d713a67695c2e660b2b0d4af696cc3e1de":"":"":"":"77a7fea2f35a188f6d1bfdd49b569d8c45e2dd431d35a18c6f432c724f1e33ae92cb89a9cf91519e50705a53199f5b572dc85c1aef8f28fb52dc7986228f66954d54eda84a86962cf25cf765bd9949876349291b1aae5f88fcf4b376912d205add4f53b2770c657946c0d824281f441509153f48356d9d43f8a927e0693db8fc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"d0840e3a8d629d5b883d33e053a341b21c674e67e1999f068c497ecfaabfd6f6071de7244ecb2fdf7ab27f2d84aa7b7a1dd1a8b59856c49a388f594c5f42cc2e4a56b3ccb8a65e7066e44c12f4344d50":"90d609527fad96ffe64ab153860346f3d237c8940555ae17b47842d82d3b0943":"":"":"":"7ab28a9b2d3ae999195553e6550cced4c2daccbe7ec9dcbb0d467fabba185b727fbfd9830242cd098f4db3cf4a85e8bf8e8d5974b62b28550922b32ed5bfc1a522b6605cf93bf8d90bdec1c5b9e59c6fc37a817d437068a87254be1f7c4618ada46fbc3a2efb02e44524e21d91be7534cf05fbfd858304b706d6a91ea1cc6ad5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"2e2dd56869104492767a59778652831919e1c8b970f84e824ae4116597a0ab7f01c42a7e983641de46c82fd09b4f2f767306507cd3ca7eec667e640d270cfbb033063d97520b6b7e38ff3cea0e79d12b":"bcd9e1508fcc22820a8be07180fea5045367333b569e111b011cd57dc1858765":"":"":"":"b915726c7b8c5dc3975f1a334684b973abf6a9495d930088cf5d071548e4fd29a67b55cc561ed6949ad28150a9fb4307c1fa5f783a7ea872e8d7c7e67ff0c2906081ee915737d813c25be5c30b952a36f393e6baa56ab01adc2b4776ad7b5d036a53659877c7a4e5220a897d6c0799af37beeed91173fbe9c613c3b6b9bb28e5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"d1aab0f16bd47a5ccd67c22e094daa3735eae21aa57f0bcd9e053d9d0d545cb8199310dfe1b01265b8c0d2b46d6c7c9ff50cabae4e060f3971096b78e550cda2837a26a693d905db2d992d589b268f44":"625b4b8f4de72ea9cb6f70556322dc2a19d6b2b32de623f557e419a084ba60fd":"":"":"":"987e1fdfe004c619cf1e9034576707eccd849400e19c87a1fef5b0179ec51c42a2f8c45d7942d0023a023c89f188b2634362703985695369863322f58619c50a7385a2dc91fc78f94b59f0131dc2b56a0d7c699d427285da1c104b0ad1739da10d8071c23993787045dc21f0070e1e9aa1658fc8e3add73dac7262e80e0aa2ee" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"449480eaa100aff6f48dc6286a5a81b9728b084864f78a9da98f606a00a6a41fe53c6c5ac3da9f4726389a03f97bb64073a6d64e1966ae324388dc12c14544e9dc5ae4fcb331e99d350c456ff16f9aa0":"6b8fedc084d8e28d333aef6db3702b6351f0d24e30908cccb63794282655886b":"":"":"":"a06912d362da7eb25598857f6d65344c3e23ec3deb80c6e43158845b95eaeca241c0bbbd67ac385e24693444455cc1c2c08c1134d956b8bc93b28be9c2d3322b3e09252979dfb8d39d04c94f81bebda5c73110605a237b561216bda9ee9bdee1cc0c7728bcc8304682334ca944e467a27a85313fa5395a9c790e35defd2edb12" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"9a6174166e97aa4981ddf580bc01c96754b9f0ba042750aabfda1cffe56e8581d7512ff6b7db7ce141b2bb01dcd0425e6888b9277e57dc57663d402eba8d03cf56a070dc868e6a128b18040002baf690":"ed75288f23275f9422444da5d3b53ccb3c4ac8acfb659a1e9b7655c2db52f879":"":"":"":"03519dfb2ff88cc2b53eecc48ae2a18ddcf91a5d69d5aefcdda8444e6df790a5240e67b2a4de75b4bb8a31f0f8aeb5e785ffb7a1341bb52fe00a05ee66fa2d44ea9956e055f9ffa6647c3bfe851ab364ade71a0d356de710ddafb7622b1da1bc53fd4d3210407289c68d8aeb346bf15806dbe787e781b94f63da3e1f61b5ac60" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"9c6ae1002ee1b0add0be563ce50f899da936e13efa620d08c2688c192514763afde7db5160c73044be73e9d4c1b22d86bcc28fd58e397f53f494ad8132df82c5d8c4c22ea0b7139bd81eeba65667bb69":"8fdaaeffd64e53f7b4374d902d441209964e12b65d29afec258e65db6de167ca":"":"":"":"021d938c9b4db780c7d8134aeff1053e5b8843370b8ae9a6749fca7199d809810f1bc8dfa49426470c30c3616f903e35fbacb23420a32f1bee567cc32300f704246ddc0217f236ef52c3ec9e2433ca66f05c25721f7661c43f22c1a125ed5db531bd0836eb435c27eefc7424ce9d845e1d4cc4c503097b4ffca788e674a5cb53" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"fe96a85b69d46b540918927bb609dc57642eeaefd46bb5da2163a0bc60294b5822195a410d24db45589448dfe979d3fd09cb870879d3f734214f6a4bd2e08c62a2a954bebe559416d8c3551aafe71d6a":"20f698833a4472fd7b78fb9b0c4eb68604f166a2694c4af48dac2b2376790e1e":"":"":"":"d3e96dbe29e1fcb8ed83b19dbfb240e6f41679fbe83853aa71446617e63e5af78cf98b331d15bccb8c673c4e5d5dcec467a1fe26a6cd1696d0c9bc49f78139d051287df7f3ae0dbb4bbf581cb8211931063c3f4612ced53f59d1b4ebb875729139f5d2a7d60642e8f2835eed888b7e3e49c0dffd012cd746abfa3e1c5c2308c6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a4fd693ff0a8af24bcec352d3196549fd0da5ee5d99ca58416ca03ce4c50f38e8cd67f2bf71d4366ce61396642531ff583d2be9a0d74e6a42159ae630acebf4e15271ef7f14f3de14752be0e0e822b11":"368969c15a4849d7593be8b162113b9298a535c148ff668a9e8b147fb3af4eba":"":"":"":"e9188fc0eaec74b2608e21e3a40be94aaf4ae08eb684de8f8bba2d5fd3b073aa5531c938c0fc628da65725c54b5c68bb91d7d326565e96685e0a4e7b220c50e0caf1628edba5bd755b31894f8cb90afa76e88c5eb9e61b4932444c1397dee3e32241a3fb70a3929e49f6da02eea54812abb3d6b5cee18f03af1e0b4958430ab3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"254ff5687a6dad3f1d237dc762f58d24ef2e2c084d0a48d26a3dc81e5490cda3f2ec392acca491e03ce47b95963a49fcb8494b1c1f1752fb6f80d732a89b08115857f7cc96e7dff05ebb822706889917":"f806b9b4a56682c61b55cb6a334caf87ffe135adfea6d0c3fc22b39898fbd078":"":"":"":"0e527e00494d55564f9d9b28e7110f9a61ce36c883b5be2dcb055444164cdddd1a9f2731716f22d6ff476ce413c77abfc0e946871d5481345c2e97b4bfdd12ac03df606fc56bdb99ac7b71a69b5b9160373bbec3e9dde477180af454e7acc6bc58dc0afb4281c0de4354c1bf599054e3800c6d60d892858865b5361f50bfca9b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"cdb0d9117cc6dbc9ef9dcb06a97579841d72dc18b2d46a1cb61e314012bdf416d0c0d01d156016d0eb6b7e9c7c3c8da88ec6f7d5a8e2e88f43986f70b86e050d07c84b931bcf18e601c5a3eee3064c82":"6f0fb9eab3f9ea7ab0a719bfa879bf0aaed683307fda0c6d73ce018b6e34faaa":"1ab4ca9014fa98a55938316de8ba5a68c629b0741bdd058c4d70c91cda5099b3":"16e2d0721b58d839a122852abd3bf2c942a31c84d82fca74211871880d7162ff":"53686f042a7b087d5d2eca0d2a96de131f275ed7151189f7ca52deaa78b79fb2":"dda04a2ca7b8147af1548f5d086591ca4fd951a345ce52b3cd49d47e84aa31a183e31fbc42a1ff1d95afec7143c8008c97bc2a9c091df0a763848391f68cb4a366ad89857ac725a53b303ddea767be8dc5f605b1b95f6d24c9f06be65a973a089320b3cc42569dcfd4b92b62a993785b0301b3fc452445656fce22664827b88f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"3e42348bf76c0559cce9a44704308c85d9c205b676af0ac6ba377a5da12d32449af783973c632a490f03dbb4b4852b1e45718ac567fd2660b91c8f5f1f8f186c58c6284b6968eadc9810b7beeca148a1":"2e51c7a8ac70adc37fc7e40d59a8e5bf8dfd8f7b027c77e6ec648bd0c41a78de":"63a107246a2070739aa4bed6746439d8c2ce678a54fc887c5aba29c502da7ba9":"e4576291b1cde51c5044fdc5375624cebf63333c58c7457ca7490da037a9556e":"b5a3fbd57784b15fd875e0b0c5e59ec5f089829fac51620aa998fff003534d6f":"c624d26087ffb8f39836c067ba37217f1977c47172d5dcb7d40193a1cfe20158b774558cbee8eb6f9c62d629e1bcf70a1439e46c5709ba4c94a006ba94994796e10660d6cb1e150a243f7ba5d35c8572fd96f43c08490131797e86d3ed8467b692f92f668631b1d32862c3dc43bfba686fe72fdd947db2792463e920522eb4bc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b63fdd83c674699ba473faab9c358434771c5fa0348ca0faf7ebd7cf5891826b5fd204e2598d9626edab4158a8cfd95fadea5ba92f8010bb1a6a4b6fae2caa0b384165adf721253afd635d6021f764af":"2a5dfad8494306d9d4648a805c4602216a746ae3493492693a50a86d1ba05c64":"07c69d8d2b8aa1454c5c48083dd41477fda6bfcf0385638379933a60ed2e0a77":"a14e902247a3d6493d3fbc8519518b71a660e5502cf7ecfc796cfaa5b4ee4baa":"60e690e4a1eba14aec5187112a383e9991347fab7bac7cb2a40a52579a0d2718":"792b47b6ed221623bb187d63e3f039c6983d94efd5771dc9b4c40bee65924513485a6332baeda6a96f9bb431f592d73462b61d9d914a72b56fa9d87597426fb246424ebcd7abd51b2eefec8f5b839c0b3c34015342ace296b5f2218fa194b50aea1c89663460292c92c45f112ddbf6b9406f6e7ccee9c47ed2d90a27be5dd73e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"dab85f98eaf0cfba013b97de4d9c264ca6fe120366cb83e8b3113c68b34e39d5d05108e1028ae67b4ea63bdc6d75eb881794885a64470744198b7d0bc24472ffe8daf3c7eb219df6ddf180e484fe0aa5":"09fed3822f6f5e5b9e575d31dc215de1607b0dfc927412618c2d8f79166dbaba":"8d74d01b582f70b92f53b43468084e1586d9b36465d333d5faaf6911e62fe40e":"ef7f6b6eb479ab05b3f9ab6dd72eac8b1e86d887f1bcae363cae386d0275a06f":"7442b2a792a6a29559bb8a515d56916ee18200580aa02e1237dd358619382d8f":"49d2cbfa0897b7d961c293c1e572fb26f28e7b956e746f6eda90454c1370a29e25303ceadc7837514dc638553b487ef9487c977c10625409178ad6506d103c487a66655d08659d92a4d5994d1c8ddb28fe60f2e49577d6e80cae1478068c98268f45e6293c9326c7f726ec89601351c0a26fd3a6549f8a41c6f58692c86594c0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"0f0aa84ef12e10ae2b279e799c683441862457b9bc25581c2cd3d5b58a5b3246f74f4230c2427a52f01f39e825d250ac5222b26e79f7c3b7066d581185b1a1f6376796f3d67f59d025dd2a7b1886d258":"d02b2f53da48b923c2921e0f75bd7e6139d7030aead5aeebe46c20b9ca47a38a":"d11512457bf3b92d1b1c0923989911f58f74e136b1436f00bad440dd1d6f1209":"54d9ea7d40b7255ef3d0ab16ea9fdf29b9a281920962b5c72d97b0e371b9d816":"601cef261da8864f1e30196c827143e4c363d3fa865b808e9450b13e251d47fa":"e9847cefea3b88062ea63f92dc9e96767ce9202a6e049c98dc1dcbc6d707687bd0e98ed2cc215780c454936292e44a7c6856d664581220b8c8ca1d413a2b81120380bfd0da5ff2bf737b602727709523745c2ced8daef6f47d1e93ef9bc141a135674cba23045e1f99aa78f8cead12eeffff20de2008878b1f806a2652db565a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"6a868ce39a3adcd189bd704348ba732936628f083de8208640dbd42731447d4eefdde4e22b376e5e7385e790243506990174f7f456ac06c1d789facc071701f8b60e9accebced73a634a6ad0e1a697d4":"f7285cd5647ff0e2c71a9b54b57f04392641a4bde4a4024fa11c859fecaad713":"5463bb2241d10c970b68c3abc356c0fe5ef87439fc6457c5ee94be0a3fb89834":"3ab62cdbc638c1b2b50533d28f31b1758c3b8435fe24bb6d4740005a73e54ce6":"2dbf4c9123e97177969139f5d06466c272f60d067fefadf326ccc47971115469":"8afce49dccc4ff64c65a83d8c0638bd8e3b7c13c52c3c59d110a8198753e96da512c7e03aeed30918706f3ad3b819e6571cfa87369c179fb9c9bbc88110baa490032a9d41f9931434e80c40ae0051400b7498810d769fb42dddbc7aa19bdf79603172efe9c0f5d1a65372b463a31178cbae581fa287f39c4fbf8434051b7419f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"bb6b339eae26072487084ec9e4b53f2f1d4267d205042e74c77fb9ca0591ba50c0e7bf6eb07feccbc494af4098e59d30f47fc60afbeb807236f7974d837335bc0b22288ef09ddfcb684e16b4c36a050b":"34aeec7ed0cae83701b6477709c8654a1114212401dc91cbe7de39d71f0c06e1":"e8071ccd84ac4527e5c6e85b0709ed867776f25ae0e04180dcb7105ecd3e3490":"fbac45b5952200ad7c4232500f2417a1c14723bdd1cc078821bc2fe138b86597":"c4292d7dbef3ba7c18bf46bcf26776add22ab8ee206d6c722665dec6576b1bc0":"228aa2a314fcbfe63089ce953ac457093deaa39dd9ce2a4ece56a6028a476a98129be516d6979eff5587c032cdf4739d7ac712970f600fa781a8e542e399661183e34e4b90c59ec5dc5cad86f91083529d41c77b8f36c5a8e28ba1a548223a02eaed8426f6fe9f349ebec11bc743e767482e3472ec2799c1f530ebdc6c03bc4b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"be658e56f80436039e2a9c0a62952dd7d70842244b5ab10f3b8a87d36104e62933c9627455dfde91865aee93e5071147bef24dc9a5aa23003d3825f9b2b00e7dab571ea6ad86415dbd30c0bbdce7b972":"d3a6eb29b180b791984deb056d72c0608a2c9044237aecf100ccb03700064c5e":"047c29e4d1584fa70cb66e2aa148a2aa29837c5eee64dcac60fdba356cdf90bb":"41c4792161b1b00d410cb79cd56bd311a714fb78dc3471c25bdd7479f2e9a952":"cd4936d7bc3ea0e7201bcbefbc908215a97680ca6ce8672360aea600b6564308":"2c25557f6db07db057f56ad5b6dc0427d1a0e825c48c19a526f9a65087c6d1ead7c78363a61616c84f1022653af65173a3f9ec3275f2b0a0d0bc750194673c0eaa6c623cd88abb0c8979baee4cd85bfce2e4a20bfebf2c3be61676563767dfe229e0b7be67ad6fcd116dd0b460708b1b0e5c3d60f3dd8138030404d197375d75" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"ae537f31a28ca14500e759716bc207983bfeab60b25079fa30b77b8d41244cb9fca9e27d8ab84cf9b9ce491ec5d8cb671eb52777be480f05115ae6370f30159a94d50ffcc64454678ab1d1ac6f166fa7":"8c9cb2b19aa3abe83c8fe7da96e9c11648252653a29dcd5bf0ac334ac587f032":"9cdf6f1a2bc07acd4b0f43b5f2b892a1153e2669f237d257923636094fb40b54":"692d512722de6ba720fd23c8994ac63179b5f7e611addf9cfacd60e06e144a6a":"bbeea7b2bea821f339f494947c0b4bae8056119db69a3cbef21914953729cdef":"c0c4fb7080c0fbe425c1b756fb3a090cb0d08c7027d1bb82ed3b07613e2a757f83a78d42f9d8653954b489f800a5e058ebc4f5a1747526541d8448cb72e2232db20569dc96342c36672c4be625b363b4587f44557e58cedb4597cb57d006fda27e027818ae89e15b4c6382b9e7a4453290ea43163b4f9cae38b1023de6a47f7b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"2f8994c949e08862db0204008f55d3561f3e0362df13b9d9a70fda39938f2d331bf3e94ea858160b832fe85d301256f55ecdb1e8fe12260b9bfe12d6e6f161474fa2311e12e39b0beb0fcd92a6737b73":"b46671cf7fa142e7012ed261e1fe86714711c246c7d1c0330fa692141e86d5d1":"3ce9a29f0207d079e6dc81fb830356e555f96a23ea71424972ea9308965786d3":"db950000c0776cc0e049929ce021020adc42d29cd9b5d8f7117fbe6bde3e594f":"fc18ee6dd3dac2306774f0ac36cd789e33462d72a8c75df9057123db33e5f7bc":"8546362cc8af9b78dd6e8eb2c37db96e70708852bfd9380abedc7f324575a167bea18f632f3e19d099cfbf310773f9719eec036d2e09f393a023add8ebdc4fb87af43b2fe6c7eaa4d39f8022ce247aa45fdc84d1b92cacce6eae8252a03ec2ec5330c01f56d113fd2ec3d0240af0afcf13ddde205bb5e7c2d912dcb4aee5dcf3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"0c85e31487de1d7ba4a7b998ac56dc42c6dc0eae7bf5c8aaf1e4e78875f5fb47de878f728f73f83dc2a2f550b96c8b972d5ca8af1a70cfdccd015ee3bf0665dd1941fc6a7317b9d0d06658f5744cfbd9":"9aac37bce1a6a81dc7934e23747991e3cf48c55ffe5a57781c41768a35220a01":"db881e6d0dc3b62793d7da5fe5a18e33be9b93f4a63a00a878dfbecf0d383bd2":"f743ce1b72f3de4c901369eed581c626ed3081ca707e6634fdaff46721ce0878":"cd52da3ec8a839c537dacdea8506a3eeee879de388ff5e513322d6d1bb3ff694":"a5bdd57cb8fde6298e7c5e563afcca60dd472eca484bd8c3cc17f3307be09b601744dd3ab9e8a44107c5868824575f850c0f399b280cf198006f83ede8c0b537e9be227fa140b65995ad9dfa1f2303d560c3b7f59bedd93c1282ea263924469411c2653f87fd814c74cb91c148430481d64bad0fec3cbb3dd1f39aa55c36f81b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"93161b2dc08cb0fd50171141c865a841ca935cfdd2b5907d6ff8ab0348c4ceb05cb9f6e5912b90c3349a50ab881b35a1d8e9be44b5f293482548d4787762ebfb03c73c40e45385e8b98907cd66f493dd":"0dceb4a36326c4df1685df43fddeecb5d0c76f00eb44826694f27e610290f6e1":"105a8f85d6959f3e043ef508cfea21d52123f03b7aea8034c4eec761eaba1fee":"bf781f7e489d9b4b5aa5ee6d1796468af672a8d25f311edf3c4b4dbf433d703f":"c81d6bcf1e5bf37e39dda1735c6f193df115b1a854a12e7cafe060afe4589335":"4306628124d0100fade7eaaf5edf227d50771f9e5f2e1e983800eef9a39fde0b0c280e63c8728d836b5b93ea794a32c1c04cfc54bd5300e3febb5fe2e1023eded8d7cd180279a598f76823e8d5a7dffcc93a09deec5d1f80838e938fba4de9f47e94b99382ae55f116df9c3b3ddf7e50516e203645852a415796f03a86418107" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1ae12a5e4e9a4a5bfa79da30a9e6c62ffc639572ef1254194d129a16eb53c7165399b3481fdf24d373222267790a0fec681554ff702658122e91ba017450cfdfc8e3f4911153f7bcc428403e9c7b9d68":"8280cfdcd7a575816e0199e115da0ea77cae9d30b49c891a6c225e9037ba67e2":"226732b7a457cf0ac0ef09fd4f81296573b49a68de5e7ac3070e148c95e8e323":"45942b5e9a1a128e85e12c34596374ddc85fd7502e5633c7390fc6e6f1e5ef56":"6fc59929b41e77072886aff45f737b449b105ed7eacbd74c7cbfedf533dbeaa1":"b7547332e1509663fcfea2128f7f3a3df484cd8df034b00199157d35d61e35f1a9d481c7d2e81305616d70fc371ee459b0b2267d627e928590edcac3231898b24ef378aa9c3d381619f665379be76c7c1bd535505c563db3725f034786e35bdd90429305fd71d7bf680e8cdd6d4c348d97078f5cf5e89dee2dc410fad4f2a30f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"29e20d724dfa459960df21c6ec76b1e6cabd23a9e9456d6c591d7e4529da0ef895df1f837eba47a1687aa5c4ddcf8aaf2a2a312626ca3e20034fc4f28033c7d573f66ef61ab2ea0c7bf0411a9d247264":"3713b601e164b1a51dda1ca9242ff477514648e90d311a06e10ce5aa15da5d7f":"ec68be33ac8ff3dd127e051604898c0f9a501271859376653a0516336180993d":"9935499661d699a00c622a875441b4df5204958fe95892c8ce67f7dfb2be3e4a":"256a4ba9e8f439d5487fa5eb45efcf1bc1120491724db3abe328d951f2739fc9":"73114cb3624d687d4cd49a6e769dfc7a3f8901dc41f6ad1df4ce480536fa82e52ae958d0528640d92b8bb981b755058e32c4733682e5c4c0df41f3505a1643a0dd49cfdeaf7a18adffca88256c6d2cceb838af6c92a64bc21cb7a760a0391291bfe3575e014fc156323f8eb5e86518c669dad8d29ad5fd4ef6e296f4a0764c26" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-256, 256, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1353f3543eb1134980e061fc4382394975dbc74f1f1ea5ecc02780a813ac5ee6cf584db2447afbe2c8fa0c15575ee391ba60219332a67b95d90ec9de6b8453d4c8af991ae9277461ff3af1b92fc985d3":"345b0cc016f2765a8c33fc24f1dcfa182cbe29d7eacbcdc9bcda988521458fc2":"6964b9b9842aec9c7ec2aad926d701f30eec76fe699265ae2a7765d716958069":"6a03c28a9365c558c33d3fdc7e5ebf0b4d32caac70df71403fd70ced09757528":"a58546c72a0b4d47c9bd6c19e7cf4ab73b2d7ba36c6c6dc08606f608795ebd29":"5b029ef68b6799868b04dc28dbea26bc2fa9fcc8c2b2795aafeed0127b7297fa19a4ef2ba60c42ff8259d5a759f92bd90fdfb27145e82d798bb3ab7fd60bfaefb7aefb116ca2a4fa8b01d96a03c47c8d987fdd33c460e560b138891278313bb619d0c3c6f9d7c5a37e88fce83e94943705c6ff68e00484e74ad4097b0c9e5f10" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"096349506f3a7653d54db7ec1d09e93413edd175b6ddbeb00e56752a520ac8fffc7983b918acadaa71a67e1624f1b5024260a0495fdaba58aae41df82505012d480c8e4f751fd7ebc39f9becd694b2a3":"":"":"":"":"f4c7bec0c26cf3892d214549ac6f3d82f34c6966d4295099ee56166e879a70ecae130251facda351e903d877b6c5eab5153ce87ba6c7cf8bcc61cbd14cfbe34cf1ed43678aee69cd87b60e6bcb6ff48ebd44ce9e31982d8fe20aec34fa51d625f845f61056575969bf785c2ffab4dcc754f13de63423e94bad8d5e166d96a62a602d3ee4045df162028b89cac45e6207d9097f2b3ac0ab17729251985f276f1287f5c56cc9ba1a79fbdbb291f3a945fbfdbd63cf13b82ec91f7b1085b33279e3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"aece2087b713992ff49d3bf404dcda18403e015632ac03735fed29102cfea6ec1b574952687c9bad0e9aedcfc1da568be632162a83c802ab94f32bbd87f6cf4af1f2703f4a02af7d60e22383a770b9ac":"":"":"":"":"c0344807d5e3ea29fef73afb2b83dfe0aae186047fab6b603d8608df49476be18bf1f0f4707198fefa18804404887ea3c598d887e938440e1fbb8ed0a1a330cff84d952cc6405b12e7bf51b0c67d5e4896006dedb44637e393a97925890fd5176252f69d43920043844a91d0840844d89b8715052cec31e257c121d3fc0ee807b84afabee59624a00703f464b0079f12884a6e888ae4959c5423604f8ae2e6b57f4428e10b680cb74cf20417380dd5378449a24ef95d9438b0fee386badee962" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c39e77d579755aacd454ab7ca6528596c397f28bcd5467cc7e0fb47f398e875da83892a840381c1bc03b7a223e92904a714dff45759124fa33464a97d7f0d7fd2d1c6c21663d31fe80abdad59458c228":"":"":"":"":"10f8ec63a550c31ecdaf2fb1b373f71f18d146ea033dd65cec2ec0b73b55bb6f3fbb7136dd045e09c4073247f093493cf26b6683bc9ebc98025f75fa405fb8deecbffeb0236a33f0ed6c7600d992ce5a268c86085adadf68047178ed89d93d739351f892723d8d6e4f428946e4e6dad1d640a9c11de23ce9b793324e31dfacfd367d86855a28cc544f88b8a91506753fa061cefcb9d77bccc15a23a84dba644089ee03db8374fee91dc23af6672159b0d2db219ffd07390b69879910b5c336a5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"d2e8a25249ac850fd3b01f62cd1eae3dd94d38e724f8e2644b7bb510c37f203890242b11be773beb202e9ee93899b60a00ebf08db1648c8750b14d7b784cdf0a6d4e7cdc816469cbdc3a08d6d32503b7":"":"":"":"":"019f74eeef674ef100ba4a1835bddeb925fe6fffa97113dc00d7d8c0ed486a73e831561ae44c5bd90e189fbe2bb1bfb84f3e82ec8809699ee8c2fad80b464b6b344999c364868300c1edb065ae86109dc29516f2bdfe2a046ebc8725044c382d93990f1cba185f61f71fd22fbd076d727de32a6c1d2f430bed491c9d09eb6ee669a1dc4f8048c7be199c7cbb5aa4f14d1423c8a54763869f5dee947f776ef2543ebb88d3004739089efd86b7b22327ae952747068b35d4b3d86cac1debce3e41" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"cffc6c44279e641856c39f14ed35440ea2f149c77459106f960caf910af21c109067c0f9445320adfc0aaf0c86120a38584747b4049588e5d93569fcecd358c51507bed59f96145bb8db6bfb4ade3a2e":"":"":"":"":"928d6d9f9128b0af64028d5d2e94414af9f8dddd353e4155f42a5d08f3e530930e01ec0dddf25d65de7f49de702791372c71fcaf5f20bdb24eb999752bfdfca28525b16308d46cefb0bc3b260490115778161db2faebbd687b940ba098e3d5be640565b81ed9d434b6861fbb4cf034ba77380562119aa3164dc53653d4e82ec84cf351c35b1b668343faf17f172eb4c0cc3999d7d24aaba58dedf11225336b5bd747825d2ae9100cf6da3276f26cec198e52edf9194162483aa4a45fa348d0cb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"3a1f0474c279548c086de9e12ed754c49a0322e6631f7f441c8024fea654bb6ce245c357b13ae94064d1b41c23e5e0496199e8ac9d535f8d95fcf85fdbd31eb33c20793f35075c412ba7213194a873fb":"":"":"":"":"954b58042d028abd00f7ce3d39fdb61e0cff6c40391ef8629e87101915771b8d0c7e24292751aab1219645743c6f54306866775e28b54818c759a6bf807c4982eddd4be5e22fe35a303cd503d122cc3fc5cffe50b03117457e2efc1fd91a9768964552116811b0e65856e8f8256681c722ea2652deaa2498025e84262a3fdd78bd33bc36c057e198327a33232ecd36501a0acf997d0149b4a833153b710b90c8722b232a574d22e7026a89a4d9cc3506cc9942705a162b34db9f49301a087dfe" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"e5f4fa500982bdf8b023788f9a5532482b29b12e8ae776111adaa617a958ce8977873caee6e82c5098ae77287bde1d8295b8aa125923dd7f8e05df78adc29898836be76df7c5aafba6493b211cbf8b94":"":"":"":"":"5b3fc1a7ea418debe79994bc0a8c86f487ed2f320c34293db950a1a026c239b8da6226d1dea509a0fe76f5a811c9391a622343324c293a0090587c10193a2961e358d1e71c269827e0d44e93d87984f47acf5b4751c8c066156da1c44662af4826cdfb5f7cf98b1f0200d3a0d7b99fea7f1b17dee7acfa5baee8f95ae4e0bc050bee2eeea7c09baa729e6e02ed19476ba3f8f5a8c1660de0353df8723efcd98f5fcaa56f6eda77f2d15c76d26989aa998c4afdc53ffcde47dafba8fe5818e8ee" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"b9444339a8738df6cfe95b6dc28980d02799b2ec5c8dba9ca98fa8075621a04172b0c9e414ea33c8bc4b3beeb536161cdb9a2a516f3e87bcc9f92ebbf4ac1a900559756903b72c4c1b5f9082d8b341f5":"":"":"":"":"09465004f009ed378f440c10fb122a265f464d373e7f1a1719c713f6bf38d28fb5447c269c127a0c10081533a847c0e19f4b640be0b1edf84d95025d56679e5880922f29c942e7284296a9309b4fab1b5bd9957d470db28d3d36a3585fd37573e8e3355d03690241d6f7211d8c6b054a813ba25f9cda76202d3270bf12f66d2e5ba5a946c7d28dd22d55d34a30a040aa9782d1e494603143d436cbb0212fa0df6d1bbf4f19818b99a68d9cb062aaee8fa05636fc60a072ec6e5ef24566c6b96a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"2aa822efa22d4cd65359107c46309033984b8e9c3ecb1b77078a09ad9ec746ef4f64b287bcc3064867b678f81ab209db3ee132a11f8c9246ce0a3d6deb3345f9b15e4cd048289991c64a21afc46ac98e":"":"":"":"":"7b79baf0126782bebf1794fb48633dc69ba88d63504d27a206d974854d446737da4ca1fc5bbc54368966b583dc441b105bb30b3be19f2778ed31564acf333b7c4cb1727480aa985afd80396866e10f6da31287cce07358d6308e56e3bbce8613bbf472aeaecb27e66305e34af593c8631508cf7d2c512df7c9b3ab04a4ede436b9d2e6919c03a525dceba10afbf6e8a641591d09e8a90543f1905b08537b8868337c774c20ed47df32d115a7f3306d808bb82d06bcbdc81042d0a16a3fc8d0b6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"a32ac0aaaee05d57cb3a626fd26854ef08a3ad42a3c688ec6a9f9b67bbff02f86df150db0de2e3612cf106d9f158fb570901e1efb12252666e7a680513cf22bc0172c4f8c0d8b2eecfa1d471c10c9ef8":"":"":"":"":"8271bd7aaa795b58d8f741bc207332335a68feb66ac9c3bfd5dac72f20807029f555c3bcac629d228c3a77d596d99c5d545a8dcdd0a2fb2a5eed5c3492618dab4f763ecd7c6580817c6a7acca42d81831bfc13f38ed56ed42055877c7f31dfad35a73eb2052f6f9183dfc89b5926680dc2aa85995d42a0c073c881f1ed332794a784553493bfd842225030e0056d76e52810236b17f6f067d1272372395ffe9c2df3145cc65ed2c6f2f121dfc6c1eb8fa6132b44ee0373c7c027af80383d4a7f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c586e0f5999f107281dd5c7ca1ff88d4617b4fd1bb61313895dd4bede875c27b5b0e6c5ba15e8725eba8fa009406aa3d8b8b66f13e07c8918c0f3f55262debfbedfc641329e1fcd6442c245626cfd206":"":"":"":"":"9d4f4f688406d8e57d96369553ee39267a9df9020d7fa78b39e1f246675b70a8080cac5aa6967e78c55071241e20a9446a82507a215a6c5faa3a2ea3c05c12905558d98a8eef90c8abffe6cf8b874c5ef057e365fdf179438de6a78b4dcc075b41aace875a5dd35a44f2d2b17d6ef6aa91f79354931c4d487142f7ac2120fd78caa6c7ff5298729de16c0e8285d73a3c6a95ada99f329dc9aa0924b0059a6585853296789b7e1129432baef4bbd2240a8ef7b19046fba104a85d43aee0ebf021" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"bcac6c2160455e7db38a9c94ebd329c1ac043b6ff607a9c76a86156974d30251b4f4b14e6cf01d407cb426ad61608d1599a6b7ba9402756bea2709cf3b162cbf040d0f5f38fc4584cb9cf4e6a7bb3984":"":"":"":"":"37d76ebbab0d4c8354086a5c5edd5aa6314a4770749d468b9e5d3454f2dbc9b25432f2d5d9f4b88bea7f9835edb22f8a7b09bd604703870abee1160369d0575bdd3847ee5fa93a9fe9aaaac0d436022f94d1b96655ab00feba1f40202425e51b084e372249fbc37f49410fc9d4d16173a9bc29181b62e342a8835f818d2647c45b6ce6c5b6f29add13d57e80513f767339575671bccdccdc9d093dbd72c91ba07d81c58ab5256b6744a94f0e75482e3848de891dabf384322d1419814cfe1590" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"4b667d35a481779ad919956ca06e07366a974738c09a5685fa23b3fcc1a54260cd39d725a7f2661ea86a2d57cfcd2a91e08419476bdc5534df58c6c3b077d3acd27ace0472f91854c164de7f76a9b1ac":"":"":"":"":"c82e5e2fb08171c233670e9e5403b07c600be4e91ff5b57ae284c4d733139b56ece720e82d3f9ac185e37d0f44d5281224cb5f9d230dbdfcaf1756389fe752575a2764f6ae775d0a82f2eb1d901ab04b59b54b5fadb2acc9b9af3e829ef19571dc416752b1bb0935ea2f3ad69dc452285c2f08412b11794134ba3bda0a10425576e88ea7b069b74b436aca93fe9dd1dafc78da1227b13d70157f60c9bee644451f8765e4c8badddad6c779d6b42d4e8b5ba65269186b04c38db348ab5f7a4146" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c0db9453f84c2aa74bf93ef21b9e7802bb8995f6fa5e634cd4064ca2a0075319a969bad1345bb5432df63412807a646d2008394d83989cb4a506990f59f8da80e6b3a1df3fb8d726639d59cbaed1562f":"":"":"":"":"120bc268ca0d3f55d5aff5b360ca4d29a4b8ec5cb624f9674ef0a67b90bb70c238b94b2bf804fe74ca18f8364ff8b1e50b2315f8aa0c3fea663e93c80544284136de1d162e9078e9a074a50b493bcc7e0c83a0047199164a2d32133db57abb05b751a357abd3ad5298773be21c534f98645e94f0935afa53729462acbe55993b7d801bd6b0cbc8eeb5a1c5f0c0d690702f8de0a1a78dcca8862538201fafbefee55cd5be62afa8e5111c89f1f68d0f1760cecc86bf6675cb09b20e097bace037" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"31836d292cb46aad594171e76237a3422844f62fb14d0cdf63ba587e73501051c7cbb280d4b46412e10927c9523bed1beeb5163737db7f910e444e5d5221c5469655fda4ab7218e63e1451f461b4fc70":"":"":"":"":"1cf3b49f28b791e7c81706fb1a870f1af134a0fb0d2aacfcd6e446caf0a91c04dc160f080ebd5503fb7c16ad9229bf0a7bffcaad07329d5bde4576870758a4bffebb6b5c309114688db8e59a55413b4b37689df38d72bc5358291bbcc0b05af487a33934ce626efde918d0ed5f2deb75a17bd8912a31dccd783354477fa850520c3b97b56c6d2b9e4a05d49bc36e6683271f2322c9a546fca88c502187a5f4a2035bf5c527aa312f16c357c37162d722510b52ff8357490a096692572cfd8b0f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"a0c341ddf73d9404177a5fde32cbe21319c318f35cc9afca9ad41a3b06e13491e843cc6afdf2bcd00ce77ff06ce3d8a54772c46baf142e569ecd9131d6185af3575bb62a41cb646bdcae8a7a9fe60cc5":"":"b83491ec1bd89f3fc84acf1aad6fbeb8ef6ab949f41adc6d0dedc53722c171fe":"b76cec3d6300ecc4a02e810296c7e70bd9b4e7121fc5e971cbb94337980fddbd":"2a25cb0ecf913749ad46b585c76097739a14ca7b59f1f3ce4f79bc8a4afd1378":"98c01d4527fd131cc327e9632104d9eee10407cd73ab607228d37b9b72ca2c987aa794804d505d072561ccd5016bd4189ac9e3db9187822877dd533347b5d2071818bb7683312e1e8806e9b73b021777f7f878bb7d304ec58ce92e5e36d3d05a7383dc77f3fe6eb84b615f3f290bf8a43c34ef5478a30a6ad616157c9d7dd046aa66b522bcef61c9d19382c32425d38ed3fc049e73035af1e8b97388de22c4dcba0bdc09fd36ab7eb3f67659cbd92b8d7f6d74b56fc8daf17068c65fb016e29f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"7817fe880c0a4224eaed0da5f3962727e4b3be567021d37d3b6d4cd779274378f1cdab91c4e7c1433dcdcd0afbe4b43c32a2b5ffc520ac3721bfd5352fed023d04439c176288521319b5e315b6e5e85a":"":"c7708c25003e6587fc8c8116c500d37299f5d5ffcad3405349351d4fed623874":"45f88f2df43c4b9c3d829b7cfe61904ddf658c16043271f01c5f06ad3ec7bc32":"883cfd717ad8466035e6d3f3c04813e21657ad62eeaca449785aeb0836ac94f8":"6e0633c532099ebf0b10d4ad35d78a48b82fbce37913e655484ae40e29772a25630a7ab37f1d0ecdce27773a2ce88521b171432c07c02269df1822d2b6cde0d9f768375d9c60e688f497fb7ae262cdd5f7e8b84b84411d619c36529b41576ac456a240ed94d750fa722db874098ef7200c74c3234a3e5f21fcbc2cb5d50c4297d1e70901b8936964ccd242098002f4c8ed7dbf49de8c2a924c737f248d46ac1469f676377ca52cba12f28d9b534504d6e8423b5404b7e14de954b4225bb53551" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"f2bb6edec000982bfdb301d1d88a23ce840e496a4f595a662e4127571264f1d7e9e283c567f11e7e266459fa781c6fd95339015836ebd69aa42857010f44e8a72b81f501c96931fb491dc1192f6f6a27":"":"ecd5ea33146cb74a707eedb8df881eddb1797cbb7b16c16f8d741d23795774fc":"d410d6e2e848f2241ee45c9870064ac0217d97f59a8e80f6b5107ff0e4240bd0":"8a8c58fde3b8c9711757cb17e46587d0c5187f758d64478e9968604af0367136":"990b1f68152b3607f3011f8d04ea33a3e8fc479c8a6eaeb589133569048fe1284ab44d51bdcf4f0cd4c8d64f4c6337cdbe5f4f497ea90ee4204845bebca2ffde7831cf49892829322644c4e20a45a9885ff619bdf5e79ee53c26f47072e20a46d2b108d180d6ba5859a696f472bfaa80b2fcc7eda374a3f91ac0b06c9f13afac1af244a389cab4489d0ee04a0598f9c5168f39b40e7127dad9f20d69ede6cae7683b25ded1cf9d903541fb4b0a804d7c163ab068d22949f28a8f4e853e691e51" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"6968f5b87019b4cdafcc9f3a89321f25ef5d8d70fd0781c9e3bb01b3ada18c8b61d9142b639aa75f5f9d798ca538475d09b121048e8a0cc4b2286efa12fa8b4b959938261a1ec8e607526b7a27931191":"":"fbe6b8af6685422eeeafc32327a99104b45ca5602513aed0a5c6235328e8a7a5":"04f137391e27caffecd4413c775117feda27cad839aa900ff2af47c700034b08":"f185925cc180e556a0703a5956ab6d846121f9d9cff97f65bbed3bc44904cb5f":"c8bbe16192bda74ef89d9859b248ac658896bd40b5491c90e923cab6815ec3d2126c62410370f5f44e01fbf1d1653064aed835604d5fd0633c8b71cdde6c831cd91d69e420db83e6d5d82c26c47a11f2ede616a2885a884835cf2142a6ae4cabe989700125df12902374bcce04f3fd78f034e50398d9bcf463dde6796627820c75a7efee82fe4e16375af57ad3154973042e0a92110ef745f468377f6cbec5fa1a1470eac80408f8e96d37248b100ef8476c2a85cccdfca5696ffefeeecda9e0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"e8e99ffcf08aad8e50386f5d079d79d3db783a74165c6126b42b3140f744a7c723541930c8c772adb62981dbef8d054ecdcf1c30228904bd7ba31798bfbbd64757aa251ac9a1ae8c20a050670feac59b":"":"546e04247d6cb5212a57b62f99e1cca767a5768cf79296f45f0db24732ba6368":"fd45f66c8dede41387373c38674605f3e075c9b7cfc66123a5478b8f8e3ab276":"39911a79c6edbbc805a50d2aa018742094177a8e216d647c64428c00169ab2d6":"871577ddf34b29e5caf132aa82e1d2f1586b76e39aab62acd02f6d4440908a772ac5f6fd48c5f55f1ebe0e76221ac46b834a8a4f5dd9958721ee053ba3aef1574ebd980a5da6a94693662717ee548af0f921421d1afb814e4d1799d351889d2a1bdd57570a913e428e6613b16e158c1cfed038f6578920d60db73dc10a40da9bc363a0206b4e7e49670eccea866efd9a05bc237042cf052f2a4140f9377e3c6792b88ea06323fcebb99c643fc1c3653758d6866cdb148837fb0fdf77de1564cf" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c7774e199b5a8c0b306ca236163249044ec2153dc89bd1c1459cfd40cc6069fd1921837aaa80f4dff34a97b4dd7e94c0143efa24f34924fa52abb4275a63cae7048a7fbb8b76300fa8d109f9561f1699":"":"1f437f758512071bd23d091c2b1ad8d51b99acc663e1d037fc5421092cbb1a45":"c622ac1071b50e4f899e4760cfed476adc013b6ff95c9b7be671f79cd2487ba5":"f973f45f75fb0d68e0bc5a723a72e722e6c8f3fea08d785141c78786da5101c6":"9475c697af430e94ed396c707bb7d5ee5bff18405131a0e898ed38065abc28ebdc1dc33d767c4dab69c846e3350bb414ef2d43798710958a6ff3e6b55de93c2ac31793a1dd4b07379e364ce72553323b9bcaa8839cbbbd347b4a82010b78967219b84c6fe9f9285ff741a0036aba6bfa7dd0d5a4ffc1936341b0e2a31082123b6d2af6740cb3ff43bb4a87ee74ef7eb06030745453d2ec225c8f31d214f1dead0f29af01ebfe90d2f8a8bf5e031242ebfcbd136b3e3db1f63a46f69a26d6159f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"898963d0237c58e4b7b6e894ab271555407d3ae8c1c4599f5f5490ad5701984a6e5ddd58d311b547f6fd2d4d67addb4ca6b86839b83978baef72b8cfbdd0cf180518af0e32e52ad4a73db460af05e187":"":"cbe5f14445cd310aecc97113232a0121ed2082f2c4152b4be68448f36c91b1f4":"efe0ef028e4179ae10b378bcda3d96056ff21d94404bfe022b563cb6690ad563":"98cf6a771c05f904b53ff9b12709d20bc3f1821385cf27ace7a4a584e73866c2":"5682b6bd667b45dcf16527a817852b52a7f5d0fa8c962f3dd3af63e7e71990da92b75e9fcf5de59b1565f525a734e978ba74dd80fe89a2e527960ce4207b9ca514d933676ad93e6dff5d57314a45889637a623eb7832854c3897faa511ed6dd246d2b8280e7d0524647d4bf7715b5546e0a9a1dec246b1680adea2eecdc354fb3122654102cd0bf94ac9333caef3fdc369e7649653352739783d048e08e8d231b332fa1558745e2ce89dd76d1dc442a71dc3d5eb7d3481558941e261f989b097" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"426bfdd4ead656611ce49bfd9f213843c194bb6863534ebc258415148f457e6e685fcf539922aade348a2af678038610af676246632dd70920d661518d4dc5221381b2fbf1c2f3bfed01cbb930398095":"":"971785b18e244d03e25b9a80c2c2204f5bab6dcbcaec986342450eb9b376bb5e":"5de582cba43a610866578604c9f2a542831f41c277d50b324f4edf1e2e5d498b":"46e4c325d2c45e00a3c17ab35115b5370abbae61337eb2da4e6aa91f951f55e9":"f2e8be2e994b74a4945fedabb167778523865ed27826f9c26ca2b49bf32af1626ae62bfeaab13e9bc52a081f365062a5cdbed0872f6479cfec5a5e79171d97ea898e8d10ed71203882d1d7b7d28c5d59b8872985abc628e73622f616c4c0904ecb1e4518be8b4398662dff8806c3f43750cc9be95aaac2a4730f40323d63af157d13555d043c4d0d7cb53f202df282fdfc5544a234f71121e893814f4bfa926351c5e9427e90f1117a3bce7a16f0e08cd06c3d7c458f9d07ca3269e015733aa1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"ddfb3d1d93e977aecd08efbd71dd48168e67658d93596b742670ed7c8804bd3e730d34a80ca1fb4ad2471ee22461bbda670337d675a17721ac63c3793153830a26b1871b316a3e10e49c555f44719577":"":"390c53a5ec1db52996eb042f9a76e45f0bca76ef6ea31b4642f00658342e601d":"b5436e880c15f03c3bb846d90f3ee5fc5bf5393865a112a4317d724738f5dd25":"d193f932af858698ab086bda36d04dfdbfaf487fae4298b38fef97bccdf63f38":"bdf9e1ba1fbafdb8f4628098aefae4810ee7fd565d0d285ddc3840f8e24a9985c2de57edf5a511079ba6c952c95c626e296fd62f3579ad03db536238fe69158317c9c26d373816343505c60a48e07a00edff8fbfef0ce69ed176e5484d056af02a270bb6fce7bae0b223bfd98ad359d53b159f3295be3fd630a568d2363121c7021ec23b14693be48f5b55e06be3d729c2a80948194b1266da96317bc592362809409a7666d5c168125b99de26da741f17ca52d63685ee8d8260d45764fc78ea" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"457e49a71da81a2a08bb19b97ba8e62ae4b5ad4ae64daf758a83a75506f9251149b2bd7180f69b9217346f8165b7cd8f100e0b1066e2877f5e5da21b037c2bbf178611dae627d9beaee64a9d0186462a":"":"c3181f694695c21405588f600ac33871b519e2b8e3b876424b32753da483d6ec":"68e717410f99ae13712175e402b51058b7625b7da27224414b472f9622d163d5":"f2cf13d05e853a13ed47c5d0eeb9c0416688050342f0d345ac1bb21d5ae675fe":"fc23aad02870885394ca831b72201d76cf736f08f6132b12178e8e3b016fef8d3bbb849e5d935ab732054ca701154e7d3e87d1b51b7392ccfaa19c4ad28638c67bd149ff67a93c09ee1fa5c2ef7bf9d40844baae79169e52e9990c93f099e036b63b000fb8ea67a13167b045c8f9163045beabe0575fef00b89fd90390b0124961698f4ad8884a1e1faf576de7a179c03221402279b31c93136b9436f9a07b5a67b1c199e7c6cbd0b5f53ee5bd0ef845243077c6eda0e021ac9219f6db5ad503" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"79e96cc8e77d8fe72cd6c66becb52753cea28bf71680fa541f345b83be79973db4081201bf23c94d1828e9ca1e825ac18aedc5ceb87a4c1b0c333c88d97e0f12d61b338e5ace5e15f71283d31a1ea90f":"":"4304ccb2666b227c92e2b00659ce0b34dbb53451591e32914a60d6e6cbbbfdd6":"d6e74777c02252b0613357b9a582f4d8cd7e436daf1674a663561b62d8ee7143":"0de123897d5f090b52db88e4c0f9fe736ccf27c134b0f5eac61b200d15e07986":"55a369d136e2d903c179472eebfc45ae236994669c46cd318401bc662f38a1f714f78ac9f15c819d2bd876a7af51e6caecff3c650a3e661e5d137a354cb16aed5b1554545bde08c10baaa5bce22284083b43a6dd9941a37f1a18929ced61181c137e9e38c79d107465a5a12f2a2f37788c8e398ac48b2be944d6dd3562c05922c25569c26a1203fdd244920e6c268028dbcf6807c05bbf1559969981467a479d7117a91f210118c1159749a1dbce4d8a0d5f2f8232c5152cbaa6441865ac3a88" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"b37180874dd4a7e08b1256966ed5845001b0773b5136956dca7194cd12a9d9e1f1dd35534f579307de11c1e64875e9377081de3095d83ced0ea3df2ee8d5be4daee545b431dc908bc10efc04db16ab4e":"":"d3c8aa88cc8d5b59af3685177cf3826cd675854deddcb9b501c40c4288cd9cdf":"6783f5bd86fe178e6a4d303342374ed32853925f143a5ad083c04a9c298feb99":"4774e5d062eda04b680d717f652d87bf5cf635f597287b76fc35e2d5ce593d08":"e478d45fd3eb6f4c398a0ec84f93ea6861f00666753c143506c5e417100077e2c4c9ece450d98c9372d68aeffe9e57ef9176d4084f9c6d02479b516942dd4792a90ffe1e4e49a8156bdd872f1f05facc06e71e581f919cd94fb97208515ba284fcd255ea6f1d1ebb7d351e1ceea1cdee631072d3fc3f4ef9d5fc57a9ca98c88b81003d858cb5be0a3520c34e52d3beeadf91388ec9a495b1fc7ff7a6799ab0af211abf52c15467274c04bd104df14033df000d8624acd253a6c954c0d89b7238" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"2779f20c02d086d30d53dbd6e7396a35e677214650e39f2ae83077fad70c068005faef347e7f73efb53a92f0629e012c7e1246d07b4e1bea7008dd8ecc7546e3f0a6e0e950e083373fde3fd994e114a4":"":"55edb840b85b391d4f1940be52a3e3824119349c780811c570d2c88dbefcea16":"e83ef56f09f82af4dd91a0b887d3f182dccd973435b74b7b3c432b39a61fe720":"eb9f30f2886d0486c5240f43104e426b36aae0006c4b9c64dab1bb713bcef7e3":"68c3feda06172a191184e0bb77a8f3c9096048bf71ed95b20cba1b1726660900d7d9f97b7ac648c76b50b921c28eee3d401ba81c8a46fabf82301fda8ffe9d76bd93cb275638f7c2088cfde88620661eb844cf953cc141b31e946338a0203c8ae67c2af1330a53251818aebef893010f16a519fcf22060a9aa9c597f3409465cf3c9ccf753db8c0bd3b465b028adfc447e37b5129c17ae9e8bd01f762662c466491fe57384825c163ab8a26d67efdda01b053c19d3bc6545c3661f2ad1df1e33" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"71c9fb2eb8cca98860f955a8bb3669c70b6f5374256da23fcbc4ffc2e90bc0a043b8ecbf1cb0c7b65a2cb7a47211541f2675512138964d0db8074727158bfb4f0d3c093f1e2c2bf697a48c2ebd27153b":"":"13b1d552e2c8c84f66961ac8c919166a248bc62fb896cff0b8b001cd7e147bd7":"27d626121ef579d9969809762c77068e4573af44b6e947a2892337a11404c133":"456ea206c38662750af39aed5fe0a39760f4dac85b83d7ccbc335f53a160a0c9":"464aee8af42ae68ee776780113805cade246b83a698c34bf4c92e5d81f28829ecdb808884bc7d784397f2b2f8c76a2e3517b53bcdc7257f44ec9357d014af4e8ddb44df98da72775567356f363fb85885f8f22505e5b5a80c824b4a0bc48029e3419d3d2f161b1469cead730cb123ca8387a2c8276635a91d0dcb2220797ae2702468587ac3a70b927625f3a6e2980d6fae6fddf4b380ca0d91eb4aee37b98644bdeac345f49523a241ca392972da02d70364f9401c21fcf39eeaf414a09fdfe" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 0, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c9e54bcebbbdf44051e80b91cd10c87dc24267923350b6770406551a5069ea2255201f3f15bc3a2e4caaf0b45510f19db299a41db8d56ce993ade44323c455fb1a3f504124c35a9e907d9765e810c939":"":"2819b3ee279d57145ea1020ebc77c46031d69524a843158192e081f2ac91512b":"269ac853ccd332fef61330af7e80a33791ec44b6cbb83006e5ca0670597b35b1":"fdf031b1e0a8016bdf6a6ebb533dddaae1a3a5b14b9cf52a1a8028cc720b10c4":"a1c4c1d6e72dae5e4714bddf4a1cb8d01cff8a3973b12022011270c0de7ceb85ffb6a6aedfa54d0521ff33d748fdef8f29c52c7c414e692a30dfd0013776b58f58421605369c83d4d891a19c782a2d036f9638aba9e24b0eacdee87d4a8011699b638c287f0a12f11ede86a946be9c00d21a31584a2a0da536dcbf86e2df63be9a7b771999c9c7a6b748de713b7da757de2d731a8d980b75136b0fdc75ca7aef47cd36bb9370c5ca0ef81b9a04fdc78698720f68e5d54e1a777e557a1dfb4c22" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"4d95f31b9606a5f6d04dff1d89b50becfd0882e6cf51c1c5d24ad843bc12d977eba4582c39d793a63eadb63f292568c7fc4270e6c9aec83186a20819a7d35e7f1155ea108794302d593c53ce9d25422b":"43bf6f32b3b5f580b54179e4102d063536e7c47681d6de3cfe88fd8ec66e4873":"":"":"":"e991d000b24ebdf838ba11f9849591b0029feff33604bc4d71acd94301f8d045eeb1f81f3a101a297403a35859113c099939638680d481c86067f54762892f82146f61cce7bc2c85d395348f3ea2aba6bb3e59dbcf8e41a81918b6cab304d44ea1e32573cd6936f38cdc11d3c2f96290cc27b0dfa3bbbafa9394acdf2f4435170b428563427c4b02ed25924226edf8d5a5eca4eec4aecf98ef2e6f75caa70bdd84877df2e637b7fad621c6170ca5bd86e21d0bb01cc90fe2e76353a9d5687bea" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"1378443dfec3c03d36b16bacc480edfcb1a4a509c17cf4b35787dae3bc91ade6c113a1e0df927a4449ff9e2f4f1cd9a27b07f57ccd6777f6d6bbfc9655f0676d7b4f91712efd43315be7c7f30e51da89":"f67cd35afbc96756499c68a5ea19991cd1ad4880fdc13afaa817608a141e9646":"":"":"":"b32d9838b3f45e3c4b3ede1181bf0aadab96d22790d8536f5913fe95c3ec0179dd1c7ae69430bc8c68f4f30105199b785a11adf7abec007d18abcee2e65df5a211adfda35fed8b9389a61d2fad33fe020119e72c782a316f17f8a588239567315bda461f5f4518a1aece4d0ae028c153d67a8d4ce620e571faa0403c56bcaa864822e4d8ae6d14feafefccbe879ce4baeca70d436218e0eb3a62bf15c018fd4cf66a50e3d9d7cc9e4744e29e9c945eabf03a6a2c4ca57e582b60914417da57f6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"69e9396c58ed867eb52fcd046504922e2e9a9b059234cdd3f0a09eee9fdfd45dedf5d3860b25115f8a3d0e2f3f543890a23a5aa278f836577956944a098d18f05900d1b076d30ea745be745b9efc0dcc":"1b6e1bb613d199a5e6f1b5c2ed041cf6f6633e2ef4d50ecad89b28102bf70554":"":"":"":"ee09f7b24cdc6b51a8212ca00613633c1a5f044fa921bec31baf679f5ba66bfd723721a03e0f260a44ad5cc4c580080667a781427a34c3d2fdfaceb4b040ee675491c4dd0c0d13abbe81336384806e37f2729e7fd080fd57011b54b664d58534c831c90d182d4d955676938d484087b0086d2bf2737a912afb66101575ca2bc5acf845f4970bb1ce4441eb667d5096319d6282714a8a9708ef9964cadf596ac3e7b1ba18fdec7e2e22f5e6352e825e965a494cb880aae78477aa3bcba9428107" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"d2f390fde0b50ea4afe6baf29a75e698fb0275c04c481df03910d238f4e72c6f63a6231df89123c2dbecfe0cb0313db34288f4143694ce2df2484d20884dbca097e35c3fd8ddee5273b53c1149bf5070":"2bc38d852d1ddee2e89b7174032d96c0b97f955e16bc61716c5c64248eb6232f":"":"":"":"e62346c72ef393a2904e982158992df4ccab03142c41d8d29c1454794926c48570eef34bd021d44cc9106401e9cbce6ddbb6c92257e89a787499d7f7a2dd527833307e02f44645ddbcb1303f1da95382c89805c76a2f12eb13d2b0205b7ec0ef21f596c98af608a2f2a2c5e3534e01a23ba25bd5fcba0481482e1ec8138fb1c86840060919d7620cb7b879d1096f64aecae1ea085a793a9f4dd665449ce73cb3036dd5f2a49138ce88c461a0a9e2f0c1fb8338f5eea53ab0a0ca8a8df9c315c4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"0cf86ffa1456c453b53305353ce43ad3ba44ebf4c6943cde8613cdc417ee9f6e759c0bf4676f1ebd05c519eb84dfcd3e379ce61016e48cccde24753878f7d8fd5da72518253b2f836f32e5b594d54ad6":"088c917f84679641f491aaf105eea0f02d0a8ae0b7add69645d1ef304c74b417":"":"":"":"79e71d9a974cb88d9022d35997032bb5fbf8f0daff411467217837a836aa44c493f868a333d1ebf66689895b53c9e01d58019dd1da2354fb966c88d2d6adbe66ac0b8901595a24dddba609478ec36e497f6fb6b4bcaa88b1e9a9c87088f66611446e8c2873e89ee1006b6d92d2eac54714fc6481e7782b38ed4b18d5f9714ae6a544110cb6063c8a9964c52a7026f52af448783c3427092e0339efd7d1a8522848a2faa8aa19c21363a537766c05505cb979269c73ee90679feaef8df13b6506" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"7179c434bffa377d9b6821da9571667c8b962196f7d8aad062e75b6091a34a454e8f4d14a60fb5253ae373cf50edca93b8d2eb2075076ec8c7a42b7adbe7723a6ba8b51a55fadb16fc3a6fe9da020482":"bc1c39e646afc1bb62685b746007148494209a419b733e938c1a5d02e2350860":"":"":"":"3093a2e1f502d44d8be4f35b386774162f0e10870f9cd34e3b9d4e77c7ec7cd10cdfa0bf8228be96cb5741f069440a6b6f9ec155d88ba66b7fa84959c53d3574bf1cf9f1561006c776223b881dd396e9e9830af2c1b5f7457fc45e823b411c5c2ba3b11219aefe5508f75cbdb5e40edf6b1f61453541ac98dad9ed502bf1a8afa79604261c7a89e78cf2941d520e0c10bed18820da6c23a5ed1c0dffbb04cdcc9c3284d400644e9365c995d8c99eebf444f2cb051bb62f231301d31ea815c338" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"b063333128a6ab4f433f151ae8aec4283ab6d1cbf4a69447850fa1a25930ec0f4204da52752a9bdc788c5cee6d8b92e1b8530dbe0c81b1d34037ee53f20758d5750d9863ed60c762ae2a8b4c973acc22":"067708b24df7a34811993d5c65d5348eea73e6c6680293afab5804b4328e7a96":"":"":"":"5f74a1d199f30fa22f2020baf036fc61b1cc2acaa80b48ddff1cf85fe5dd200a9afbd8bc51dd1829636fa335660f36d5d2a516e4c38e8ef0c3cad979e79e7e226b820634ef1d76ae81bc3e3807913eb0731b2e959c43afa83feb1d8da31dcdcb3dc3a4cf8f454c4ec41bbc822e58023f0d797c844bd8f20034b31d99579bff142cf53d2651d7a31b212d2b9d5705b048860d6c4e3f45ef1bf2d5e46433fec593b9f68be8b1e928ea04ddc4ce2fcecb737bb8f9d054c2ba5060fae5e5fc21a650" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"e23fa0c86c8a7b99ba0d3ec3ca47349a57798c07587b666cc4ae1c9eff83b8cbffb49d1910bf05db3c7d0db7e27285ae9f6b4411d84364b27a66398f5b0a897ee2085526d3ac4f65e70800067d57a51e":"7ffdef21683a75484f6ac304801c213dc8cb7e3cf0f94c358a2e1ccc9969e834":"":"":"":"f952956cb8c528efe2c831c67b69e8aa7e79c013161497b9c55415fd40c7fae778a6fa82109a40dd72fb2f4d92e1cbc47f52d055485c99d893fbea1cf28dab35be1f162494cb79ea45c44a63a1685217cd3733dcfa88bb6de65c68f2390e479c0fcc6b398dc5498ac93002e7e7f360535d082c8e46386611075665060845c4f8bdee38c23d2f90d2b1d78217e865ecfb6df02498db837fe581c43382cd1d3a508b6dc052ef7c4d20349679db8d8bf8dedd763da8e5df775d133970be062a9ced" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"4889013333cd1e2b3b8c4365bde690b66e06bcccbea25f04132a0962f13a7d458e823f5ec0ea091a07065593ca44fe49611602d165a35aacb352206844acdf41dc2c88b63b36912ae81875bfd3e098e3":"b4761d82a93e17d8a0a461ec8205932edf218157459a25a7f26ceddb59992192":"":"":"":"72aa3601986e6c970b8c2253118b8381264577e391e48bddff0cceeb5101975391a2c731f5611316b255c2a6c0554ed6cbf8acbbcd8609e3f99c3cec38aa060eedb863563442b7beb78f35221736c608a933aeb0d4a7cc050fbcca351cf780d42c5380284a6163520a80896ee7f71d2961d7629d673791f8fac10bd01d32d95e8efbd65381424c378bbf54b532a70c285d98bdbb559c9f37d6eae889b82d5006fba2892ae16acab103aff1b247711ef92dbc6e516c92e388fda4243808f95170" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"cc32ef3ea3b0db89c69312cad56b1ddea73ba4c302b85ff3c6605d1899a96f49909c6a54d98baf096ea5bd46abc2535309676d9d6bb9917271bf8c86c8852e29bf3ff5b2fe56ac094fa35dcc51547f62":"cb80942bfbcd8f112ed601cb12a5ca52cc0f280522db11da92ac6c76be3932fd":"":"":"":"2c972cfe1537bae42ecc46b1b41a691350f6e63c202245347e91602b93a4cbd5c8829e5a4f63f7ee0e29adb69386e8b659dca2e6000aa03beab132db6dada8dc35ab68433671cf621fe4593018b1eafd3a2191507fe015e2a5694fdfe2c3182fada71d18c5fdeed065089862249c5508f055ebeceb9fcfe5d16e4479dc17e2b59b5a0aa31cf21fc6b5925569b0ca63d1a5cd268a4d409f1039d902556236fb06e61c1c054ed3798cbe4d8c2a7b2d18206212591174cec9da519fb876c583a20f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"142bff9332c48103221359040cda6632baa92cfbd1ae7f8b3d0e33d6a8193939d9d20d17fdf6edd1b3ca9ff600fe965746b0ba1b61e9aa5141edb77ade0f191b87f0b33c0f3620801a755dca02698883":"8dbbcf0c190783122aa6da6e05ec9d82ee29f8e74e59f8fe6eb9492fe410df6a":"":"":"":"2537a8638d5759201cbc225e844208c1d08443b055fafe23329aed5eb2d814703b0fdbd0a89c2d62f8f4ea7746905b9bd90706b734060c96e4e406675576bae84317bf36d8523babab72236b71fc6087dfcfcbe765de13cd1ed316f495e3bd08d780cd6a58849c929ef24b41e9561868158046ffe8d2a89d169ba31331611f0872c6d075b9938e5170a3b8612f9ecff4743c0db5ae365fdc2678ec262eed3b7c337e65dd1ff24a867574ee460bec7c374fc6b3fe9b0eb7bd9f5507ec5988d313" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"821ed44bd793a4af223aebf52413ba5e0e231b2029b3d71475ac028d8c10f86d2382eb9c62bab540be847e22344704d339b798248d0bf2990c0621316e3c98ec07f05bba8887783adaebe8fcecc48fed":"8d2c8cdb2ddd6934271941f071ea47dfab869a5671dff9d424b916c1ccabb02d":"":"":"":"a5fcf13e4a6b9829ac30171920478a7878aeda658803f2e314f9ef8cf42c9c1933cbd8dfe5053abd30df644ca062070662f4b7e7851d28ff801cc4b878523b4610891abb29c095a70665de1199182fa193439665cb19cbdb00aaf3fd0fefaa2278194e79ebf652713a28c36f2cdb83f96c8eb1e85c9969381b52bc3444e8ad5d82c94964544b3e6649ae3f532d25a2e370e9fc8c77753239f130091c43720ffcd2bbcdb70a75223cfd9346091e8c056227f66648941552efaa5a0a369291e9ee" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"977bad4c5d1d16a2439863af8bb6fdbc206ad0bf20c4036c044645962c36e2e853f0d702a54b70421a509c25de124f27e330eba581fc82efca522e43956187c9ee4f58f971e4b91ed51cc8aeea26fdc3":"51cb91cb7ff1b39e18aacc0baad20443522bf869f26d9d7182005b5cb1d018de":"":"":"":"df4acafbe4f28ee47acc5134ef665a50deb68de9b3c7e075b26d5731049f13ffd00cda05f612f20fd901ff127277f269c069607442ed9f7b41892711a72b83ac592048bfb28ab2c64c6b9f5eb4427450f4475b1c04dd4665998b638d06fe8f463e2f07ff46073003132b66a5d4d19a65bd08230d1db0234fbd09a98864f8ca824e7a0ca9f1d1662027a60c7e95382122674d88224fb192cfc129952ed6515912aded9c72a49a39a00f9f9a16abbd361b20a12b5f3c4de54012aeb1b42f6fa3bc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"3116ef07685eafff1c77f185fa840bb5627fb9a5d79f72f8007cdcdfbfefc56bb1769991d78e9e48fca4c97b01d720d1d3ea6fa6ffbe2569da94b6bb36cd34d72c37d0218b3d02c391e0653e286b24b8":"f138ca3ec867cb7ed7d5fdb0868d7470de5f802fdb941dc400ad524d9032e23a":"":"":"":"59f01ec06c97a49cc5de469cc2b39c28db7612029e0e24e3c2b24f92c0af2383bfb9a0dccbeefdaec4bbd2607dc582ee7eaae6a4ffab251404e3c59c95e5460ccc8d8dea4db73e924ccd7528708e1b6a9d62d485c93764686f93df6fb8a9ae86bbda1e038697b5485e27e0bac9a18126bff1e7b104401306cc424e783f55ebe9940176d7123ef58c9460e5fb8311f745fdccd39ce552547adccdcd853bfba87aeb87dfe8ae72080fb7b3e5c4718e743c9f576d7752e3db1fdb29f160bde115f3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"f5ba27c487a40dfe342fe18e7f9c72bebc1ea229c7634cce87defd7aa11448e3f584d1769f3e76a017430e6e9bae6bb6c79170925e1156275311d86d4a03cfe3dfbf85f80bbd70ea98af76220833a0be":"34fd124aad5a10b852b2fe8481cd0ec46dc2d02ed9583f6e282a4c908e319024":"":"":"":"977fa5b70f4ca3c04b6f495de3bfdb4b8aef93bd14c82653e30a00a4678c602aa889766ab7caa434d9c15bd68bd14e66cdc609289a691dbcb391611be66c2056f8e675de5db9b2e2f15e5a330d00a8886eb8b8eed4076306d443ca292d783fb056186aa86e1dc9f18a113e015e535dffea954319cd26e5572f4173766207ed7d9b8b2c42a741340c1850a07139c0b358cab942bec51b159e50f5aa9d8fbe7ca9d1d2127a98fbf0f8c3094bea4e3039f7f7ab083fc9d050e29e7d4cc2d3d44caf" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c4868db5c46fde0a10008838b5be62c349209fded42fab461b01e11723c8242a618faba54acba1e0afd4b27cbd731ed9d30016b5827dc2bfe4034c6654d69775fe98432b19e3da373213d939d391f54a":"135132cf2b8a57554bdc13c68e90dc434353e4f65a4d5ca07c3e0a13c62e7265":"a0bbd02f6aa71a06d1642ca2cc7cdc5e8857e431b176bcf1ecd20f041467bd2d":"93ee30a9e7a0e244aa91da62f2215c7233bdfc415740d2770780cbbad61b9ba2":"36d922cacca00ae89db8f0c1cae5a47d2de8e61ae09357ca431c28a07907fce1":"2aac4cebed080c68ef0dcff348506eca568180f7370c020deda1a4c9050ce94d4db90fd827165846d6dd6cb2031eec1634b0e7f3e0e89504e34d248e23a8fb31cd32ff39a486946b2940f54c968f96cfc508cd871c84e68458ca7dccabc6dcfb1e9fbef9a47caae14c5239c28686e0fc0942b0c847c9d8d987970c1c5f5f06eaa8385575dacb1e925c0ed85e13edbb9922083f9bbbb79405411ff5dfe70615685df1f1e49867d0b6ed69afe8ac5e76ffab6ff3d71b4dae998faf8c7d5bc6ae4d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"46c82cb81de474ae02cccfac1555d06e5dc44b6ef526e0e28356ffc8bc6c0fd0628d4d942834b94fc977609c8ec0a6392c0693130c6215d55e37da43d67def719051e99871db68128e245217d2aa3230":"5de51e3f49951bab36460724a63f046e75f6f610be7405f55016c93a59f1890a":"5dbb13f5b4eb275cb757513e6b8af6fefd7c9c9e0f5304fdd9b4c0968458f22b":"3ebceff3232e75c6beb79d97c78e93244a257f0772f82e234518c50e322630eb":"dc64e5a1fc7b32f0294db138dc131946e5602266f4cdf00037ffe513a44ff83c":"e3480544036a3684a88e23ff41a4bbd810f827021ca45e800aaaa36ed0b9bffcbbcc99a1ef1f1528b4bfe39514c7a390ba132d1681138c4b1b9f1a0fa1758837dde35d0f6c38683ba47a904937dc5ee3d3b75f909e5fb6311c6cda5e1121edc774e66092aa1dbde83e4680ff95c0bbc2946aa4d46770f247caa7b71bdefac9641ee99700fbd1e560f9f7fbd462ede64e009ced90c44c6ff03b890e16c79c7b8c959a27defa6f062168891977c637ec22ecfe20601d499443f1fb0ecc7d9505b7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"df8053def0260ae71f67e197ae8b547a228e9b67ba7909fc1cb3adca51058b15f6d5951f0b60c972d139b75dc44a3680127a84799fd7672e429f20876c175d135e5f894edc7a4da334eb8b73a334be61":"26890036a9b17d8e805c38568630e1c196091faad546ba8eb976f3aa031a8905":"40ea6bebb0cb94b7e527787e17ef9f7d3efb889fc1e47e49893ac5c4bba988c2":"090271c307b43b951c20ad3f081d2838df0936a4bbdc5eb6f2e16b1db482b1ac":"c203cc1a3af668e45653bab6b1aa39ba0669491a06d00cd39c97b777a8bfd4d7":"0d68d903c85c0172419dc9f782c5d67a0b3367d13cb2f734fed95c7fc082291edbf4fa83354c6588227e40bbff082be2dd276c264823a8f31ba18b00955d7a1fd612a2f37d824bc82cdec972d3f8384dfc78b51dca61e815766c877ef3d2113704c805a250aee7b55b849af048feb3536fe73ec4f0bee97006881d5eed8ea38ba1b8d16a3bcd91fda749b77d688997bff09f104a2d8cd8e133ea4aa764b237787358dadae1c25092cfe09f79efeb8eb6e20c39cafdceed90e602f221fe6b1d69" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"b1a1b468e1d59716a23fb028e295588f17be6a79e589027237681fe9ce354860b1cc33918a64c8be171e595ee6a3b1ef46c2ef21df2815528482ab4c7a32449b97ac75a51dfa1c7e67a763f17e97bcd6":"77e5a3eb6ab38419f84b57997627c6bea79703c95bc1cd24ea73eba2edbed540":"52aa0be951816d21a2ede89f53913f6d5d70cc580a1cda8a49f8e49a6befa909":"5bd8e4ac61bdfe752b5a66cf2e048e812a8aeae8e20c3c8c43f31180e4b18303":"af5eab21e4dd9443b1b16f40413faebdb0e086991dd3c53c8a51bc434348311b":"d477404bcaf0ed53788354705f0fa9f46c4e2bef2cd94932b614b3c34e0b0c7c28d7483075c9745bfbd4e31e587fb1db77d557fcdfd3fea47da3f01e42635ed3fd87cf6c98a2f20aa833a1bb74a15b158e47841cebe53e4d5d8c85cae78ade156e025a7737aa9197b122e73a29ce0a881c7adc8ec228f4c14e56c722acb0165b1595f010266151801812c031efcee4a7739876777816af8baf4d29496912a012f1f33c07107b2db5ebd681722dfd76f3a58e9d7426e7fa75e326eaa416c5d820" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"098b8c107fbf943bcdd2199dfd15f130a20d518e95dc81988748e1f0ecc5c45f74622ca2940807df86fb05f0aab4727525f19d1d3bda1f70825f3e1fcb18d29e8e410616c105fda9324f4617af39f021":"220bbf23394c3cef156f683d05739b76f37538a0d360600bd52f0076425b5f5f":"af88f076ab39db1dd0e7002bae187965cd144382a3d1ca7b1ecd65d346f7c090":"bab9d09dce5073d11fcdf9539501dc998b6fffa8a0716edcf583a7d7385ff41c":"caf8d4e10513e5ceacad6f9f145a6f79e5c245aed4965ae85e2e7c5914f97510":"f556494b3849d78b06ae75571f0b9c8c108885fcb041dbd7892bf639d8ff6c82e19e8ce2d5aeb58e8b964ce4f75976a0a9c7f3ec8373b83150b88d6c58ff9b810124d4ac62d955aa64d194afef2f77de6994642ec86cee40aa7a5591e99a63edbd8bbdb22fc3c2506beee6d507fe34fdb4d4f525dcbe30b5747ff920a13f9e230899ffffbc5615e994ee96a1bfd8890cf607379be1a39d173662d0967c9dfea33b14d78cc8818c2a1956197f85e92bc11133ac4f7657f2db20eceecae8ca636a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"f54e9df92752d30eec01c3756d569bdb39abcdedab80b0aacac76ab406723f480bb359a5fc6c7aeebb6719ab44114a75afd340af202be3ca30e4de794b826237105202dcff5d1291cdaf266673275825":"b69f77d5a08850a13f8e6d06847c4bec181ac0f6b720be3c06c0b67d44843c6e":"40f14c3340e7092b898758ea3c36750943acac7fbb6a83f0df3392f7936749cb":"5bcfb0786c447675032d2a32b304f25737de59cd07c84d3875c45475b15797d4":"656ab204e2c1834f346d89c37a30164db414827d83ca732c71ec71efa8182c28":"6eb8f276a8ff516f789d94d997f33c2e40b227776fae0681c83fde659462b72d37cd48c95899530ca072bf2470986ef29dfb193be7ee9ab3f8cde2317c9bf02a5f901ccb62bb665bc3a109eab7e3910888a522c765eb49b11d1ad0fbcc45abe3841e9bb4fc0e73188497cffba54f3ff82260767d0f70ea1668f45192e6719102e75aa5cc43084c50bdbd1ba491bb61ee9e5175092c1f50d56bfb68977a567e41c1e05d2d1523c198ded737079131fb12dcf847219d71fbedb5659411d7aff2bc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"2cc330b34c976c859936c21e2ad88bb60ff153e41131567f58ad34bff5c9cb418939fed56356af7fe215986a5d0ed8e9a078dcb1d3fcee6b99714eea3bfcefb37a344a69d414965539ddce9df239be2f":"bf531083f35066ebfaeabd67b82d392ef6b121e7d9603a5407c5bc74cd596023":"51f223dc461ac2df1c4877f65ca876d635d50939fa9dd586c176d8ab73c6d605":"ff9d6807d71ded1305d9e2cdc811dac2d73746b001b53ec8a5509c4ce0a07efa":"f5222c8966659974dd8a7244d2cee588b6c9a2700f338683fff9ccc45b6d3807":"981abda0e405c976435ec7f938570d911e5bbb32add52a8b94e528486e9dafae139eb15cc2b56fedfb9e4b2d10dbcaa5e6ab985be16c62b9b75a037684986843a7a0e3baabc34859253df2a053dcb0352a0554fd2d4530de0251b1b852d1d3b6e08548e215902ec8dc46ee89f3fc262c7a35aef8216b3def65bd56f0482a18a329f96863afd951307740fd8653d333f932940e2a87523afbc162c5c1d2bbe16f33a4b0ee0ec75bcfa6aee6d8348265938738be638f78506ab731d3e9ab345551" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"b4e5aad9bf4fb03ded64e4bf40ecc6fe2214049bd5889a5aeea0bf47be8670d329e6ed04538dd6d207767c367406d482ba7ad29231fd944f00b8d9b762935b93819ec62e0ccfd48f619ac40c9c208304":"67826d2bf9651404d5df4db84ea64dcab10697ecb90c68041f421452109af3c3":"67d6983465facf33369eebe0be12dc65fe736969e8f41478e44ec25d461e4435":"65f97c99140c8c9ba2ce37710b06f822cc0eaa03589157a3b575bc9c423afc3f":"19c37886d613d24b0592ea0b3a465ec8f8a9229abde3fb5e0122032e1ac8dfc5":"05777487bc152260a852e1b31a091f8e929ed22d8a652a77e4391abce7efcf0570df3d466d56dc51ef14bbc55309c6831655ba97c6050e563083fd1f2fe65b43d0cf8762ef6598d967b473b68c4143287f70d096a6ea120e3c07f2a95b80b393ffeafac2d0309d349bff017a49b9ea547a5776b5c38b9e981ed0a4825853cafcdf0f17269b9df6189fabc30388a383e3c28949625ef3d59a2c371ef416ace8658adc0e0b0104f1acd4b349b91b660d64412168d3c9e29680a5e324e4d0ab9258" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"27ae2120824f3d416bbea1f987440c507a4f01fed08a1be27e6ec16390c92c4f8dab04203543caa3981373fb991d855340c29baf439f23bfb599a5eeb95ec2059af24dd86c0825957ea8392ce3d980f1":"cd646b0d1971f249f4c4d1eaa17e60c311d813057e0b71819a503aa41e5c6b21":"90ee2d0bf06cb94190e6505a75d12dd77c266497dc99c5f89bde60be6789099e":"7d82b50cdfaab9b5d23fb6618b59dd28cf1a83c77ff2993d9f1edb87ed7bc388":"f7f728d8ef6af8c5e77cef1e837030a6aa5c12bc81423b0ecb07a2db95a32a28":"4b25aaf436eb600a103d3fae8e301d2755132b3de3c8b4c442129a88ebb3ab20c4d3a54078ecc4197994ff04bf0e460919978d47e45c7d10d76a1e63ae34624e2f64125ae1bef304efb1af688f20d8e212f6df4e11243a49177e4b6456010d784d0e4a94e75371a75c4050b27e48359549f8268dd2a2290ebde22282d96b2f38e3f06103dafae5f54f0019bfb013df39a76482ec7f878d26ef0e34c9c21e67fbcc3412aa0739e875da0e9ea1340592144eb232385fc7e605ecd10fee45524718" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"dbd5f508e8226acb957bbc4914ab13810b9b5b2b51a1b55cd4ac60f6b6d4c370963448fd323968c27d97e005b1a079c9e3ba151887006c56593eca7809b23cb768f5b3701b456bdc85fb5672a81db2d9":"0cda5d501072cf482d3c56c49a3c929b423f6e15a3e835888b3a9873647ffddc":"d3f38ca5c0bbcef46976c6a5965a8493f714aa2c8a2c817576cbc0bd6652beb0":"20014421f9af259892f017dd5392cc973f103d4736f3866e66329e5e7704e0f8":"686aba6c9c6c221b2b4a7de766963e4d9880676e7e6ac8e644dd273fcee519bc":"b720c7c56e10c9e436036fa8e1f1d1c0c0b7246c28bd36e5f3e88f988684b95a01127bc64cbcf12b9689f718baa52042b0837fea791391ee2ae42e54acc571239e5b654486a025ac25f46f10280ecdc65ed098e65e07dc3870b17af8bfd58edba026dc12b4ff04830ef132d07dcd7c62f67172caf2620a204869a81e39809db7befa25c5ed8a74b6d306c21cfd3778180d444bd99314a430ff4ef6b7061832df9b82603d6a0f646b398e7dcd8bb33a7926bdfa085a450d3de68c1e8cb2ee4524" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"7093224d6bcf0915eb75360ab4bb789c15834a371baa24deeceb33f86e8bfb46f4e34325ddcbee671f9e45f7887c1481238993ec4a309e10d3f8e3952c840d564644062534f985a6b4e38688d2c800a3":"e7cf1f32ba369cf5545ee672cd6746ea9a336de7039ecbb25419259eabdfa44c":"bb186a460387baae27c11aa8c65d6ee003577eac47b259254a933f82ac683250":"d823535ed974b7ff9f19dc38b9494aa99f88143e3383b5a183ec00c925bdfedf":"56548af797f4a07ec42273f895822d877a311bf1f8dd5c96fd8449732a13a921":"159c6923fb71f9670db4eef12dadd143ee701bec9b0f76b56e9b1b8c473eecc3e38cf06c8f3b0c3d49580e49caeac0fd48da5f53d0d3e9c829c253fac4e4f09730177a63e0e759f043169e91459c9cf959d2230c7b94be168cf4fa02588d78aefbc855d55e444d671a69d274c66ad1851c56c0d880416bcbad08523cefa2fb384dd0f9f188e8a601ce0a92d42faaed0a299d6a9c86958854712427b35e73a0817193b50f3557e66d64ad80fa9ff87427b7de5b7e6312d1d9988ba77be90d4cca" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"ea96f8787458e505f5858e31bb85b6e335206f6d6d04bd9d333029193bd2a04e5f85ad152675ecc090119aff7720739bdbe34551ebbef10e822cd29e9ade1488c21fd9e798369d585d6f58168d509d94":"ba45df1a14e23361201a467d2cfb7a3dce3128069a8a59a9a388b8e31c48efb4":"d551272e5a60aa1232fcb4765e853de2ccec08941acc75188eca37120fa49aac":"c1b34347691ae9f1bf6be396e8b49aaedb38307526627399fc10c48748c3a7bc":"722c0efa445262f5800abf75e43d9daa44e3dcee7a7528f7313ee52fca9f1803":"e2f873758c4e71704d8545dd1eab51206ac11dfdb00dfd1ec9e53bdc7f6b57f5209727049d4d781059b0bc4b6091c9bdee947127b8c8f03f1ee5f3665720a4f6c6777682ef1937719052254aeb97e3a17b6b552bcbc9154551a7ed41d837a27b6c37b426508409b75236cc156dad89d896f25c54467fd45f9698a11c7ce01bfb1fe171e4d33faf73a30c8992c51a838e9c0537354371bf79146a79a6d42d4e987b9773377fbf384979690b2c04c332f22567fb0921c3e33088d3b011921fca6a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"92ac19b133398b7d8ddfba3c6046421b3618923241097b8f68b6c7430b6d232ae9ad8f864f358afa7cac72bbc4fd90f16ebc9c15913c11094bf7aaa510e6241face016a99ca08de6525a570bd1741dc7":"0517ea7410bde64edcc70df48f3c87f578b38b8c7087def16031e52760037df0":"439c97f62d6b7aadac64057c0003a41a44ee549f60afa92797ee7c9aebfc8164":"669d42f9901e029bce7584bbd22a13a74e6f6ba50441a2633773bf5ac745122a":"8bf3c1a08b2d8459df96d6abfa90725f1a735809da78bf99f7fded0230771804":"3b832a7f1df591bba571bf7662914b0e5a3b34d38228e377e4e7dcb4b9cb396ac268d71fbfd2e1a5cff4429feba36f55c7e45cdac49a5fc8a787292011c61f4f102bb9a5d9c8fe1cf047956f21c74987d80968d2e4cfa29bd92a35cb96dd372d9baaed8d31ba3462b42084dc1841a4042311abfe4b3358f56c9e0c69e233638d3be56d0d269cf110d5200759eceb63fdf3b0ad25937857d129b68f038fc73a842046cc7c45292d6ec3766aafbc22f1491774624751f2c50fee830e24a34a27b5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"7a346bd6d853803d07844ca348f3c4837fce3e3a727f712223da248cd82db6ed4a9710cd8b9f2e7b593cca42da7b1a1285a78d0c764b24c3e4b21d25919c5400b4adaf0684c787326c19010728bc6f94":"3e8de39ab206ed166b203c97103059e6a9317d47f7a76bf4511829cc2e27a4cc":"327976aef239b20833d36b7f352e8e6570f8f325b568975a661b54b8ada49128":"9419cdf1c59abc03013d7d443c734aff57a6d97c870a03762c50b459d38f5e09":"f2c9c49c76bd683d42dd9de9d45a97b78710f39f2ee482e877e3b0844647f9e1":"24a83991f9455a0410213cc138696cf4eece7b2caca0a627c6ce023b7f912c115768ab8aad0fb10e35591d370e0372fe020823365b5bbe713417bc2f050cbf86fd626caf91323271eeebd5f2aae36fd0aced63779565604ef2653a0770fe4e42649eceb6089bb7662ca3d744fe178f5ac5bc20ce7a90325497f55ffd9b25c59a6b82f07553c080f0c45fed23ce47d972605a2f603b72d09d608548a04031dd2bbae9ff898201e4460479548d70b176e917ff3e3683e49f3330cfa77a25cc48fe" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-384, 256, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"2d8fb8796d8a1764f8c824c55b880c53d2205559afbdf1cecda3dc2d05bf001e6252076dac013c7094ae72ca80cafce2cab30a160ce49dbd646710bc429c163231d73fe0e121f8cef8c02f70598fa853":"feea8ae0b299d5f79315383d938bcf9b536d11e036b28056bcbbc7fcede21cfc":"1a0fc47fa95cdafd2036eb5314e0f56266e58abb0f03b5e679638945b1fbcd58":"30707f376333df203eafba7fc52b40d8f1d97521a71d579c8b8457ac1328cacc":"f179c19e45c4a4f3cad8b545d116ca29e45f322580b7fc9715313be53f047658":"eaf7523b910b653a305f9122363d96e17fd22ccb9b6158cc42aceea40c34eac73e496827dd5fe4312f102ba6aa7aee934d1f41609bf3e14c29aa3aca210e3cabe70744a09f4c180f3d1ddf8be0b530403c5238761226f2c2c7ae29b24439afd65d6d5a0aa8daa11abce36df02ce61d352ab08965122e16708731d72a9fb5de071c20c6cb039273498ff1588c901d997151edbbd41870031ee337b38233edfd78aab389fae2bd280e4bc85d1bd6655269c3359753b17fdac502c3a2e871149fbf" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"48c121b18733af15c27e1dd9ba66a9a81a5579cdba0f5b657ec53c2b9e90bbf6bbb7c777428068fad9970891f879b1afe0ffefdadb9ccf990504d568bdb4d862cbe17ccce6e22dfcab8b4804fd21421a":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"8802d43f70294f532d2af0be0852b7a9ef6584e8b1631845306b583ab059111c0a88cc670b8a827e5057b902563840b6ba6f6919295f2206bc8738eee2b4e7b4d3d492b945150c76edf466cdfede4868":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"a53adcd8c8ea16ba80a57d9a55955197ce0d957bc92d8a0b548bedca149d78ffa9dddb64710d5dee89f1edd37d8b55dc2f50bd67e4a6ad0f3a01947e3673b10688178710ba2e7bb5f3dbd826c792c9d8":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"edcddc13604e036f16687e36bb576cecd71b20dc78f070033d8b6f1f8125ba2d2d3efdd9f01a93910ec29fc4718420a21385f8798218e1aebb810379a0871b534e067b04d6ec9d523f7cdc8d45bed4d2":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"7ee0378eb594bd2ef129f35c9c1d87727c71ae472363a596467a2d71871863d8476b636e2ffdc0db70be5f7792ae8a8cd40d3f03347700d3ca515880cfd7962f8ce1dcdfc5ff134daf552f8c2a911758":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"fb35f3ad6b7618735ddd273d95b442a362b6822502a217e893be3e36fd7be4553cfde0edf5d9b5f15be9288ff78fd0c09ebac49e71484169170f343f4b21e244d1391f963112dc061075d9b7d26cd171":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"a8db61234723da2f0883224563a1bc04c7b4d040a7de3b659dea0086bab7f454c73d1f918ff29e2f98cee562e05f5ad6f2781f5786228cf0cbb50d2c8d94a1307383d41229a90c0dcf142b94b704c56a":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"95d7851bcd43fc71cd9656737a0b05b5f83e55451c4672061230b9b34bff71c025bd51ccc3f4c2a14407d5d569d250b840e24828c319c1b7fe093e5551f8acd20167b2839c8d5ce9710532d69812b8a6":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"ee7a62efc8403a0f988711436efacc44b5098f9a3526dac49ad9343c80c98eec51f064968eb37d1a8bc8604e3324e5a64a99315401a2df8d8935e94fea3fc5990107bae19af886415edd6eccc95ee942":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"bf02755e4c3db98cd26c0abededb5ce360495c1a2ecf194e922d87decef4173584a3788dad5b308c50e7c0a0a10c7a42f3c7b2a52df2230cb8dc7bd71c35d448fc5b1eb4f903ec6342cde118ac284c2f":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"a188065c9ee936384c5572b0910360ecd984cd0ea926c86b269f38f1040d41679bf9a91bd4e986f500036cfafc583edfff1170cea9f22a3140e7f4d198630fa353626518062340fd2f5b0f6b4fe7e217":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"58ebcec4539f4af1b32a854181dd0f512b8c704fa47537096a769eff28c59165a18226cfc779efc9550f7be02006d83c230cd6e6909e301d1e99ecd1fff2b2cd00a56c7a684c8907bbb13ce3e9a0cbce":"":"":"":"":"6f4e86f309f69144603961c5366e4f9b16d10c10593ea689a8e7435a327d2524f4468813ea7f3248d8d4bbe17b175cfc40617149983928b267dc0c4db46d2c17fe8bc0764386758af1a824e12eb897feafc1c7ef66f80ffcd993aa016e139991cde8435ee6bb0de45a7fb61eb1a6beb76e012b848ea003f687537e4bd00ced37efdda66333b53a8dd5220c281fbf68bfd9e72285e78197881efc540da4c1ba80a226013a2d7098d34af4112e7b8c865af15409f6901b952fee4a474e4027051e1dce879ddf5e84f3947dc9b94119d67e6b48ed6fd6b1f813c13d3ff30e121efce7918533925f50c8e381e87ea685f993619bacc9efc0aebc884b450646eeaa5e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"acad606154f6ae06738d67f517cef4c8dd8dbb2ea333bac9e69bc0a4cb98877bfca3d906739d442608bfe66ca48c3d7d01f7d410f46764bf2ba4268713ba76bf7026203e35313ee75add608509de867c":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d2715947b420ca136a4cd5c921b8fae20900679d87ffde5bdadc7b0fb532f35e100d8d0b59810bf3222b07fac3a3c334e4ffd96983e51ad04c2c5bb7fea15e8a03e36b92f487b314a191b5ae4862cfe9":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e1d2d72e7907e7214cb266f1ef641395e54b39e8365304661b0bee371f3246528417ffd58420e48ec063de5df4462e39e6cae1b5f3a3a12faaaf39b98ee592c8d4f56b9d4534add5104b357d788c23ab":"":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4686a959e17dfb96c294b09c0f7a60efb386416cfb4c8972bcc55e44a151607a5226543b4c89321bbfb0f11f18ee34625ef50daaf29929047870235c17762f5df5d9ab1af656e0e215fcc6fd9fc0d85d":"":"d2383c3e528492269e6c3b3aaa2b54fbf48731f5aa52150ce7fc644679a5e7c6":"c841e7a2d9d13bdb8644cd7f5d91d241a369e12dc6c9c2be50d1ed29484bff98":"9054cf9216af66a788d3bf6757b8987e42d4e49b325e728dc645d5e107048245":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"0bfd73a55c96ecbb6104fc1f91d8601e7b57cdf85d6e6b5360920b4e7d1cd02629bb1c55e637fae1608f389d179f4fd2650251a37ad27c2b5264b1605ed5a51df949086c10ece31255701733ee1c8539":"":"15b3816392285fc665572c48a168068a10994cbe4ceaa1955f07075039c73b4a":"374241cf3073e2f82956c76897944ae9c43907fd6781202b10e953c3aab1cfb1":"4d434031e2a2b1e1ac5ec98081be46d05de1b4d25e3b4dbc8f040b627f8a6f7f":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"da5589e7fee0a023e01a50aa54987c5b6d70503b78403762cdb53c9ae7ec65f853df14cd7e30ba0eb703b912387469bf7f000e5dd78dd80722e194a4616aa373be2e093d23f2a4e7224b841ef550772d":"":"4c74a4655dcbebd1331b86bc224be30e6c3386ba844716d1a6938447ca7a317d":"6397e8fe13b3ebb08c0b7ce460b5a149b23433e110b881a9c095cf24d236cee9":"6aba359faab473d0d51f21bbe7b2ffef3a03b64364777a48f80698643d9b2504":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"8a36af663dfcbbece9653be51c8dedd7ceb125d59dbd143ab4c37f21d8cca464920dd161245835ed81ff1ef1d09e367ed43118910c2b62d4bb980d0e4305b07e8b321c5a04b46d4a7dd4611aa328543b":"":"59c96d6ec4e49b8185f275057047153ef626456085dd77a01cb89cda060bcf3a":"1492daff48d8c7c9e9e8f38130b8ab2de6e02c6cdccc25fbcd92d8aff1fdc66b":"d2f40e7dbdface320825d0b766d0317f47c74fb55a5a325d66a5834db70d5eca":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"dda69dd5af052570a7cbc2fd378eeae936cd301b197d23dcf21ce06161f411320566cf1f231111c1ef883a88f356d94f2ba7e42d84574f39ba1946450fe7394e5f3b9a21005d797dd03f27e0477ba74a":"":"0cc796ceee78dfd667c309499dc4ca1003b2d923026c65826f280946e9f3f1f0":"2483640ad6b242e5c6576df18db137a3cf0e4a3eb44bfdeadb9bb650ec816200":"ed978c3f50c3ebbf4b70a75771a940f03eaf7c468e9c4e9af5f8bf9f947a9352":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"346e27bad2b0c0029148c5db5419a124583d2021fb74677b37b13e8643ee7aa9e9bc52f5c2689ae2bacdb7c8c8d22f5a4bbd2f0ad3479decf2dfe2e9312dbd682d96e199e07f5fd4d22deedd83c77673":"":"65262e1bda7014866794713ce6bc1ae4f0dce523c82ce43e6e0cf9a64983964f":"c68c54bf2cad027cda08a3380f3bd525e354c4288a7beda1a7ed8d62931aac8a":"cbd0049d6546baf0a8df2de5f15b29b77ad07f59b4dfe6a872f0bc1cad71771c":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"09587ae0ccf5c580b44e390e68e6a0a6daf45e7162ea0418135828599918ecef9abdecba73d8c6d56bdfe005485be3b1ff284a85b127b00185f2f935356c3f87d076599f6b0fb7f93abf45f0d0bffb3f":"":"4e703f5f59cecd926fc0d94100d1c54fc8b19d165bfef16437d7be92802b38d5":"59ccdafc72e5727e303d2284b80e9224c95ce5ed0edcd816c18a55aef681b203":"36d72751e4d6a7c6cb2ead12eef191254df53622f6c0fd1f33187f09e87880e9":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"1ad037daea8ae2b9131f4490ccb453b670596978e097c7b2342c5ad8bda53de10f696e07bf91bb091c21898a1f728bf5873089840b5f022441b355f8e5cee75917400c5ca597d6fdb8f52874cba1ffae":"":"27b4177957fbb40bccb4832fd95be75ed8df2307be3cdd692e8878bad14ca8cb":"c7dd83bc2e99c2428bb243c35e2544b10857620fcdf8964b65b62c58b5069a16":"ba57de1455a25c66dfed3f8d2e3e198fc6ebfd7927f590c702d3a5ae81e80ac9":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"fd2d1b1f4150cbbf6ee3d8667e7f508b341b3c251c8b0abf3178d2fa5a80ed170a15bf55a6570f979080ead216effa5802b2e7404ad93c5cc41e17eb78168859388738fa935d1cd6b06422867a30b552":"":"8937c389fc1b905660861a4062c4e6542cc2c587284a279cbc86c432edf541f9":"c1f79f883f51e1de95afdea8392e121a9591674063411ba79b098e0869dbce33":"0ef847924d2fffbbdea4f12acd441e52ad39ff291e80c7a24802c4f03f09c8e9":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d4f64d9c63708f9294fe1b1de82e160274dc7ea857f8ab6f4ed629cc5c4fed94bd2ca16570134810e71a3a7a38fdee4e4aaf3aa82871142efe6b7d7a4888b4f0c745bdf649f6c84fe5a6519ace6336c3":"":"a8acefe33c7d7933ca6fc3c8495bb315bd4edd94668084de3a4f742ac5ca1fa1":"095006f15ac6f8f649ab217dfadd426a60ddab70c114cf7d52f5e6762a47e679":"9f095084b18d6eec18bb6ba7ff6a876344f0d6d7916c10bd510e2e0d546c4a3e":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"f30723bc93a3fac546286c2ec8faf54498eea6f8d723c32c7b648265dc75d8dc14634281f7a7d1870208bac4896e22fc72bec353ce3bbe4fe2672c0b9f6266408008d0d1fff6c9c797e93ccdbc72dd95":"":"ebc2b572f365a726531b3ddf7344590cc5f779771134ef7bd7aec4af95bfb532":"0941303cfaba20f7c7c4ee745ec65be3c4f6d217f8e6c9a1f5e6db94949645a5":"6039cc999268f1fdd5ee2979e76b584b85069f144507723e2a47e3af1d8c2355":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"070a6da7f4f59da9ecbba2daf690ee9ad0c9cad330600b7ce7b95d5c1336c96b47bcbbf8eb4d8918cebe861e959d68d7e5fa7ce34adaa38de3e36f425832e6bb0a23fe21d10c78800506d9054766ce52":"":"3b4d05963c2fb8315371c2f35f375b6e39ffec667303cd96642fdf6ff5f99102":"4189cc93c021bc2f958daa737a17f78c03ca09a1a4a73faa8a74f3f109bf2800":"5da2d3a69f10cf9a2f5276d3d54bbba4ec02826f6ee0440608ff4fd6b1ec962c":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"09b75284b738d600dcd3322b91d380db45d3efdf2dc8e9fec64cf07d7a606531ab41f05d85e3eed5f62d55c5132c75f151437d4f93dcb41145b2f95125d1daa7dd1f75dad6dc32e9e42a21dfaf35726b":"":"7ebffa04f7f0c939e1bfb4c8686ebe4ffd7a1ec3fb4aa114946a6650f2b449ea":"8d9ccf3526b655cb923ae3e1416e84af5e458a2ae4bd55aa98e900353f8bce65":"d78edf2f7211f49b70db778b0fb0eaa217860f9197ad1242cda264c3ffa3e2db":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"773a12318265c2de4d6a80ce936d4c8a13d81b646fb197d7ade8d8dca38988e6bf4fe25d32c137ff50f5e20e987ca8c5c7ca4c2bfc9f68c1a79e8a0f9bf2a1dce0c09dee4134b39f1e51f0bc10359fca":"":"4d995d9addb816122b70226a068c457ed4635e7ac9ce41f1594ff84160c1c06d":"f068497d26966dfdd57d5a8ea1a05c1db2ac2d72248dd59d17bca9c6fff28817":"641d5482fad78093210f7e542f45a8d17fdc856be5860c45465b0775bc45ed7a":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 0, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"eadb3322979308075d4bafb69cafc6dff5d55b97c4a73dd9943a0a9e4ac01b78ced5ab91508b9718f6de9da47fd7bd54797cd5a5f6365c28b1a56cd5d74721afc4424a7ca53ed8e97a2c15a727a682e6":"":"8ced860d74040dceedc0fd0f3bd36ecaf36f91e4c56372ed1a54d25d65180d42":"a19980a1c86e9ee4db41f6467144b0dff4c0692141916d46bdb7c2ab79992116":"1cdee366e7c3e7e853caabc4320ca2b63616ae86343fc5ec2a21b6c24c04ec39":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"97aef935ea33717e8e8644bb8c4789f375c48a945ded08771149e828a22dc86682580f51070ba1e991d9803f51fd9a6f63cd91c1ebb2caa15f2837df8f35cbb6fe96df2674a136990a5976cbbab63bc1":"212300f93899ff7cb144f20426028b976380a348253bcc3ff42b528cd1972549":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"549ada8de63982fcbec1d27162a51764dbd770f1da46d87759b2ced52d0ab2e8d1e8b2883fdeb221380e17ea387b3a065cd6dbb671f1caeb7b5a4bab5b901088f081afcdde5ecea10acd810735b95532":"0e7f0664ee95e3de9ef4f9d8faada0851bd1de3a3a767f85a74ba26f7fe8201d":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d3f2af83ed1071e6895b1d57d0969ec7fba3d6316df5031e452c26daababdabb58107846a2a6921ce3502614ae6cc94b9d246a8ceeece6a9cead94cd297838ca96b74a88dcbe24000f8eb719f939a3bc":"0d4223285e53c9e7d743dfafd08fa75c81582d0c507c38cdaa6fa1b398e342e8":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"43de428b90ddf2dda3280fc3628c289ea7e623b63a0ad5f568c459eb7d62f739c106327c0f3a8f59e5bed661224e433594f78b3604b10fa048e04181eed885db9665c4eb92d0cb82969a1e5dbdf11fbf":"e9cf65c1c1d8d1fb07a0a66821b810fe8893339949b50909fb9b72883a530ffd":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"af0abf3d221f4af4a4571eae06287c994beeffcd8f5df5da72eab03cf108d67f71b91ff2d70698a8578d058c181bfe715d244f5321660dcec025897d9e9b037bdb406bd97fa9c3ce5e6d01d0840cfbfd":"7ee295c84488c3f5d3b2798777f92afcfcfac175a937cb50444831ca60a58650":"":"":"":"e570a328f4aa705f4060f9a6ff38e16007e59533e1d94d039c274d105d7bc8c2ff77920748579de5c33c1465d4441332ba51d30bd8eefa90ae8a421ca662551957e1875d6515adba50a0d297640248e0a83c032b515520220ed880701650c97727d6b5e5f9980f0eafa4d709bcbca76d31c291750f52b75a165023ae40ddf4ad66f395d4cfb1f5a5873743031d2ea2a093b2da4ea175bae45cdabe00687524a3814f153c514e1c3d50abaa96159516bde73878a021b2e9b889c130cb3d016560aa9ac1ef2e4fedb67abbd2edcab3d2d74de3f8e9fb1120473687902fabb46eb183d74f22e5b3bfcb9dc1d1edd95360ebc1310651efbacd0e603b37845f2a9068" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"54c0128113a4f3e76311736c83581e6c3fa45659c20bc622132ce4f9dcc348e76575da4b0142beddbdcf51904d1febb248a116378bc69acf6d1b4b25d94e9d76145fea73f8bee448964486c39e88034c":"b147253bc1d28e988f99a53a73f5b86868b43c6ca73ec7d559f40f572f2bb74e":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"20f4687b717a31f5e818c872952385cd9ac2137abd2e49b9849f01cc2551dcd7f53dddb2449c1a9e793fb8a0447b303dd6da6110768f5d32766e3e3f171305fc68c4948dc6762d3c4d27c66fdf962cef":"0516d63709deee72cc6751191ea05d6aae7ef016dee1ad62159af167a785b353":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"ef41067a7ca9b6946155247ce8dbb619795f028d678ccf8f5f5b40e33e8cd15634db8c9141bc2cb0590a545ccd02cef6e1e96fea14fb8a55411d9ebf03633dae0ad449a2121d1c78fbc0e9cd8a78a34b":"7b90a2baa4c139e29c48db6c5b51ccf088fda54e4187611dab44409ce1c36f4b":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4d1a72a7a7efab609c6ea16e4a1150a8c1f8bcf19ec3225ad2eb10c761268d6d2c9b09f982710768aaff9d5e3337b028596f31842fd23e75a668063bdb03cf1d7e1ff419252d44335712f16720aff52b":"e5c9712ec583b2dbbfe76d5eea90b9e3b6815c2e38782192983c6a02efd91afa":"":"":"":"f4d994662acb2644e389b41c71122053b2a9bc68303f4c77870e426ac38c1b20d12cbd8adaffb611e3a3365defad82cc8c2a27d40f57e8035e16476442ce4c4beee9d8212d230f796fd92b02d7975790120bbf7a6af8115c06457d767c5543a6c1742ff745999f8e815f5caefc92b9540a6fd19ae973c52b321e7d4d7d9b6ab4900d13b7f633a7b8f1abe3e1a0540b5803b89d71b3c4d3a5dc7c4c0751e088f27b748440df9df14fe25096fdcafa1c3e16d49235defba82ed6ddd1fc8a5fe9f5d360bd72e0d19b21cbece29737037832b9ef18b96580ba50c344695d93d07b105f39c17cd91ebc291618c8862cd47459946f735fa7fc778b4489b574d6e77ee0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"5c9f5de1e3bbb5193bbdabc6211e797dd89eac092995a5539ede5ee3f769c4c3e221e65efd6daebaf2b68e4353c23d08bbfe26b69abd8dbda8e41f4f9057ad7148541cca28ab0c3ea512aadcc65eef28":"17f703c54499fe53e688c6d48b4a0604ed9f6c71b1cb4fb9cde37eb8fd2a2ee0":"":"":"":"11c40f20930a9ae087d5ae4cd93c6d8defc073888f4f8e153b163e7ded25a3313a55b341d40315d78527ae87c932c9071ad6416823d266fe23000e1e33463d2f67c73c6883aa301e5f12820640ffb50b680c3aded1f6b93d21c3c1a9ea01ecc9642f1e653551d6e8fa8af6a8ef626def69c65571f4a26a7d8b7bad126d945961797c8147c3ecad4637f915f8a3a73b3ff235aa3c71273f0cc0e023fa26b8a567db56a456d58536807817d5f9b04fbbb99dca16164652526b4e84781f08f1501364a1e3b709894f010693523facd0ec9c61c41ad9847a9ae47f3b5ee57cdd63aa179caf1cc4957b59461aff01f08180a53334ed436697688c55608a12fddf7239" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"c5de35ca4848615697693d839616a4272900db5c894bb13fa3a43afb9e2a714c47a61871bed42c6c2a9d190b946f7201b671991c43e5da4325666b140bf96f0548a7220edf2dbd9bf0bde719061c11e6":"0678789f954ea314dabfce48d090bf93acaa2f89f7e1a92e6ee0f7afb19788fd":"":"":"":"7d4f29fe94ba8748d534f3fbfdd6dd8ca00f362eed4a84b2ea4c0ea83267246343271bc9d48d6e5c0265da7c11ea0a40ba8cef9ea76c649426d9089f0fd81b69a328ec511cf96e7ca79e7cf51b9fce4a62a8fdc568a4ff19604541ba2ea428eb28ae49645dc0451708fd53ee7e6e6cb8ef7607777f959a1efdc172c10e290f2f7f3b2cee2ce5e9a83c3928c55cee180bfa18359dfd9cfad1377cc0fed321ec9d13e4babc23e4efc89754648e9c6ebe7d7f69acda85a56501b8aa8887f9b809b29c7d3b02a8afc8c1ea9bdf26179b4547b480100c9e6f7d05edd620599d3ba85c96549a20dec8084dae4c98dca554a2cff094afed966a1b3109dbbd8ac5c52304" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"cf72dc871545003348cb2e458c6f4fd6df5220ce389a792f854498cabff1b5c88e3732f6aa95eaca2b318a4d29d2d33f3a289ceb1bd858e3c86c7404825c0c0a812064a05325e09d34553a691a601866":"d8df317e505af016e86297f02fba94059b4cd31529d8c1ee1b33107df753d89d":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"c89dc15467ae09d5c514a0941f3945b1f4a1670a4df9910d14c68aa6d3c36e8f5bae0abaefd8fe5300b56a7bc38083b55602025c221e1f0d1671f2ae92bb0c86fde571ccfe8b8b5be8a94f3f1d027ee2":"8109ddb29d8395e938aa210852da6bf1f1a3d00be9df74b372e081d538983174":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"1a100ec0da9544326286b38705523ac970b896ef6e6306b2124e283a8851e46d3a4b2bc6a8152ec9b0f88d0e2bd1528b13ea307a3384c10d1fead60b90bf25c305a91558c1537e2a7ac74a85240208f4":"005612d87b6df0204c3d879b5ca30bfc49df4e189285307e2926b367ebac30ff":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"47c42df62b4dd570efd3c2722ad39a2df5f969a13f645fd27b5290877ba70916c591934d4f66000ebf8c508fafc44f75d16a2c72c63580b9bcf156862214533a47b1686c871a0165604fdd00a412a484":"94822903cb5c2003c31c6d072ab0dda435add0de7d8f9d5f08b5cba410d888fd":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"da740cbc36057a8e282ae717fe7dfbb245e9e5d49908a0119c5dbcf0a1f2d5ab46561ff612217ba3ff91baa06d4b54401d61d4d8a41c3254b92104fd555adae0569d1835bb52657ec7fbba0fe03579c5":"fc227293523ecb5b1e28c87863626627d958acc558a672b148ce19e2abd2dde4":"b9ed8e35ad018a375b61189c8d365b00507cb1b4510d21cac212356b5bbaa8b2":"b7998998eaf9e5d34e64ff7f03de765b31f407899d20535573e670c1b402c26a":"2089d49d63e0c4df58879d0cb1ba998e5b3d1a7786b785e7cf13ca5ea5e33cfd":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"c2ff911b4c93846d07e0d00eeead3423845c7215c8b5fe315aa638745e63ca26f1062321318087bf045903cd4f5cc9e61a318c2861c6a93948d779ab45f14d451bcef2d43a5ac752995bc0b365bc3fbc":"b62f8ed28a72c28d80b41e016f559bbda0a2a447f8e146eb93a509b302e03c42":"77aa1ff77bf037ae26e60d412f3341715afcc1fcd3bf971a481a15d45c794331":"55ca83dff075f4de57588dcec9bcf0fd1fa267bc280d3c48f1f1f749e1997cc2":"e42e4aeca6716181c71ebd462082309868f6faafb5d9c82357c785283f6d5285":"384383c41b4df205d19fe68e563dbfcd2f6edbd176574248f3d1ee44143b70aa5dea695b87bb6c82378953a714084ebb5619aca7d63e0dfbffc253a336edf80acbd584cd3f916d6126968d564c1dabf7b3479a62e7dfce560b80a5104389bcd771e20138dad4c59f290a4525b00f6798fb2a3c8f44605a247653d24c772d207f0ccdc19a07037429c7e79771c6a6b4ca219a1f8ed9bbad9c4cb27415d18b7278552e50ec6e25617cefa7324ad786aaeca811c3aaa35ae00d2f2152fb6d98dca82ebe579bedbb50a40e62af9e229dbf9b9b2bc6532b5d78e6333cfeb1ad01e192491193c9459b78d4e9c6e8efe69cf0c702298e325f129027145af92170b843a5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e1a333ffe4bce7b9f6bbc8dad8787a82ad66ca9b25a64f04b166face945c249b5f45cdd318c0588c7cbcd14846523943a59119683628020e901a0a7fefc21625864ecb1d76ec119a10821b49a3431348":"ce1466063de221c4fa1cc308442db476acfd8ff34b2a0dbbbe0eceeaff210293":"d481e022a80f3e60687bf153524a33bd6fe42c54c39a377a9fc27e047df53f14":"26a88acf67d5ed00184baad664c6b2d4a91d437a121c3cad9eabf3d7e676b0d0":"524e4896a22bedc62820c500ed7da2bbbb4c1ef9f07b5f374d0fb4ae9bbe50e1":"3c3cfdebca060f534a952e4933c2c00f9ee0fcb825a58abb6aebc952e160668f711068881ba8a6817500bba1c28867cf21a12a50e46792abeb9f41bc02322bce1e77d236b7a45a7807fe22b8ea9e2859d2b0164783d364f6ad84f4b9341c576cd6ab2ab249246bd76910e0abf115e4c59e37074de5f4defd03fa61ce1733e33c98849ec28ca61b845035218afa7ee2867b32ba1efc50907d76ccca5a7ba69e9700875b200cec5d1fadaac77a0960c4eb899c06134cd9cb663c62b69446a460bc9e3df7eaf2a34df00fcd838e882f5af1aa701d35dacec0cafbe74cf6dde7893b880071d3f1c9e53b205bdfde9807999e73468264d6172c952a7f5f88a836b1c3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"73cc8caea7f1f2129bd035b77bba2309ca3bec73e9f993fbcce7e3f148670bca656e3f17e5a8ce9bfe3665f4b6ca8ac8111fe051ee0e760b295b73470da27081ff17bfcd6ff9085c5e064ab844927f84":"eef338ebdf4d9399441655090136becbcaf277e5ac73426f79552b3f27819ab6":"2114d320b65a5906d04c5166ee82e727cc53f0ba33ed54a3229ad9592995695d":"e3fce46cd5c90936f20252e0065dee1940c7902198ae105017a8f50d143a50f6":"7ad27ea94de6ec7ad7cc1895381c735f007f6087d688a070b4cdfaecdd2a3345":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"5eedd039764e7af96c3ef7d9e094e861dc0839c2a2642c4082afd09f2761c392a4eb8fb607ca7c5d7d4eb8e871aa995037a297af07ba36a59572e3975138fcfea667e06d9a4bfd2e9c570e61fbc09006":"92a258c0ca5a9c030dd469ca5d8883ae5f3fdaf7d8e0fb23867d150f3d24a0a9":"954a9431a4f9b34f6c28fc41be05fefa3449c8ce0265a19b8a422935690b50c7":"1765c701b279cde38b469bf0948f500b5afea8f7eaac3f100ae5f0b147005ea2":"1f6d382b8a8967efb9feffb8557f1cf40f4f65b5fa7d9846cab0601f5150430b":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"95e33e3e1e5d24dcfbc5a534ad0e6ab6ab15dd6b094b7642e2187aba9a303137b5b7dc3d70253c3a8b446b591fab6950c4f6a33de5257fdc474a46ebbd367465127e6a9eaa97e17851f9a4d55fe4e954":"7080c7d4ddd8e32fda42ea23adddf7a4d3893be2cb87d6c7293bff521c252189":"611ec30b87ddd1096396d539ec973dcb7c408a62e6c37bfbe563dbb60d9f4932":"8a4a0f9eee67c54e3dfd846ea92981cd769a8c7ff4f2646c85e80a03fc556bc3":"05dc36b5d354f4c3b950053f925616c27e2317f886d2af09ec1eb7ac5397977a":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"b43301c1af024ba6cd7eadf985cb1c6c303479ec3ab47797392d4220788f4daec2b1f5ac6138bcb83e938be66b3232f7f022f4e548b93e7a8aa4d853fc1b4c42ed9b182ae582f6876beb268ba23c4105":"ad7fcba1f90b243689b85a4ea1dc150bbeca4093dd8b9a0a491a678011ad807d":"0410527589e72024491d4b5328b5659a330d9b167a1a27251363e262f393eb57":"5de8fac62063a676904aa9628046fe71f080ce285ef964acdcd11260734f2d90":"2f14a327bdbb9be4d9a813dd73445c8a8c911a874daf08a551e867f54983de2f":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"837e9048e5564df02e25f7b7585ac5600ce4cd6a6de8311c6b3c6084356ad0f9fcddad47e7bb6ad7ac9f33145de135605866611c2b083fd1f9e5cea98f2725cdcfb0d2ff6f0adb74d6fb61f8a6ca02b0":"1d194d69897c5a7e8c36cc4cd97784312c9b6599274e3b20d022b1349ac45c58":"b6a8880d415cc4b2aadaad6d7d2dc73484b70909345bd209520c05fe7f5cdc80":"31bd3fc264c252bd3f8102529763d5ad3e45a4e068677423e698160db284bf11":"0b845cf842d1ccc15c2fa7224ad121b9b5f8acd1e07b16c143c931da56620906":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"f840c75ce0cdb200a3bd980d6cedf1c7321e5f303cd0446c7afd2d2d66657447b215333b15d55326bc9bebae6ae36efea3a337c6fbeb6a979a4783f2b7f0f0dd6d3a9d3747de639a9047248a04a19f5b":"6d5ca4b1edf6c0afbdce02ecb30923b2f4f2b33121e21b2ffee964cc7de1abe8":"f56d2b1584ba2f129c77b29590c4e1dfdab5527b1791e3e445750ca6d4ae3542":"05bd799249411b37b80590d49f3348631b06a2408a61635c70687003a8485302":"12d26ac3b87924cda5d78a3e3c0bd81280e340723643ed1b2ebf2dfd52f5dc43":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"c91db86e3984dbaa25ae5d851ef341eb647bd1df0517e171fb86069cf6183c19a386746ccd0a7e81f3557038711db7259926089317ab7142d6ab6050b1f7dfc21080910d43a702cce93cb1d3b155d22e":"a4585c13c83f962df72b58230ea123846df652b2810766bb671f675b96125a4d":"fb31319b4e622dedaa88b64aed93bb108362234c3d3ecefc78f796aeadd9c8e8":"877bafbab3bf9c20b1a85a5f4b3dd11a5c486042b807c39d59fde1eaed89cced":"89a5af332718418758129b8212643750542bf957bf35c64d6b0a276238c808f3":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"3e4c40b9b33063edbfd21bc4e34c5bc1f454d7ed176e4f6edc3ab056a3b0d1a79170479fd91d6e30caf99166842e0175b2941a7186d8c3f54e6f5f9884e47dd22a161a3fc5e00c1c9ca5a744c6a7f7b2":"7a3d7511b93842159162176b7016106e61573aa42c57aca7bbfc97b3388c28b3":"d88781b3afe2e1500b6881aa9cc23dd150054da57be0ca127e101a9fbc4decce":"6231b0f5cf182c6f108491c5b7ebed9b2a015e9698e860623e9a12e691a38899":"bda666c5ac006d6efc2aa0da52e74eded88955f8f064bfaa52d9f2524a195f59":"2d7d62310bfc4a3347122e23655a10dfc54fac51349f0c8d586aad39236a20368f4d96623e58987f7c1184148d586022a4b96976f72636eb1aa92ad221c5866b6c6803cbf6c982e1de12bc89618aeb3f844b2a518a578714e2380075acb828685a57683179753fd1ebd2d8aa1672940446756829d6ac1cafbb21858465789adc024b8fa544bea09cd4f1f3ed35f298d4619a5f92a6e4f712a0032307ed781166d7a6af2a352694be7fd3bc8a151ea848f8b14da8150eb22e264d76e655fdb3638bf250546eb29ff27850d2b5697932c6a876743561e0894a01ce8435cef74800f11e4bf44fa5149a6fa4f4ca43267a47d3841722ae7efd09676f341a54ff1bc7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"fe4f5247dc405c12133e9cf7fe00483649d0e7b70fdb1b39f8e8ed0a4789a0c9ab78417816b54d47cf98c0aa4246ab0d68028d1e7441ab77c5eaaf9aba0f2ac6e1be2af480026d44d5eec0e46fdd31b1":"5c5a5e517b3acb6d6d75742bc293e4d091d7b0bf37559f75df98d6306bcc2d22":"5f56dc4800297a3fa8e2b38483c29505485628866ff175b19d4abaf4526bad92":"d9bc081026ea5e35a52b9d1868688e03aed785af201e355cf51e6e8cec917c34":"bcec655ee8c482e725c5b915b4085a9d678ea26b71c1ce0a85f741f9fb3c3607":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9d129142ba466c27f348d5949fafb79675e334fc3a1948e5d008ee265076467bfa435596b661c527a82e5a064fd56cb6f17f549c77a0a6a998712ef0e1f41ba4eeb354f77565f7a7627eaeab83ea48fe":"ac23c42315f2bbe54eba535a7299113cfc88216727ede9f154d7bddd88041259":"7f029d2430d49de4909a758a2bda4f219d37eff01c96de7ca2a4071d128a1c9d":"4b6a443312f10348f6aba088d1f81206c696508a75836e98951604e93fa6db51":"bc128051ddc96eef9fbc3a23ff458240d11a229d1a75888d622ceb7519e1db6a":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"2fba8ed5b2be9af95fb02183ca8ae0dcca90b209be73511a5dab31ec81e939117e529fca4f95a483bd307838ef0d779dbbfe77df481d807b309da929f319b39287d3ae0994f77ff616f0a763f35d44a3":"2de698d32010618c25ed86cccad2ea4d9fb9adf7b3dc400a2b1b4c975651d103":"f9ffcfd5bc9a08f6f9059f4bb7f49e093f404aa7fe736bbf4018734071c26334":"a309fb1f43a520a22946a6418500929e19d2b3316fb1a8c1aa5d047ddfdb8d49":"c1dbfdb9bdd4a3321074b57e11e5ec6dfc374248a918242fb3e22cc6612b3239":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR False (SHA-512, 256, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_nopr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"a9fd18764900768b7909db87dd4c7b87baa2cae6b0f62a8c2ee3e4c550041ca7435c7b35ecc6ef373dde3d989420b92c2bb32f9fc8c766ab840f5d0c73558dcac87e2102c28193e7ffd3381bc30e1d31":"8bfc5a65fa21396081d92c3d7206f92637389c60cd7a14f11811c91535c0083e":"404236bfe24b471ac7df938be6a96b8ebf8bc758787714d226ce727e9d2b4bd6":"8151ae3237ca06ca5b0373039681a9d3cf799e98c3fa2efb576822f1fe0aaa06":"11f0f8a2c16b1bc15fc93ff4793894f22d7494d11c94dde5ead2f0fb09bae6cb":"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" + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.pr.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.pr.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5a62c9a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_hmac_drbg.pr.data @@ -0,0 +1,1200 @@ +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a0c9ab58f1e2e5a4de3ebd4ff73e9c5b64efd8ca028cf81148a584fe69ab5aee42aa4d42176099d45e1397dc404d86a37bf55954756951e4":"":"":"":"9a00a2d00ed59bfe31ecb1399b608148d1969d250d3c1e94101098129325cab8fccc2d54731970c0107aa4892519955e4bc6001d7f4e6a2bf8a301ab46055c09a67188f1a740eef3e15c029b44af0344" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"07bddab06cf3d7f094cc2302abd700a9d67421aeb711f4bbe66f59e28a46794213bf3d0c3a2cbbb09205b90e0ef212c7679b37526a806789":"":"":"":"f76fd2a49d9574c3f90864f35f32253b83098ee04a4c8dba464a8035f665ca165c8a038be5e1b100d56752adcf59bea167e15b1d01c419948d2d0a85be66d19bb40e5e0a66cfd76ba7547eba6276ea49" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6d283e7705a2aa4b1abfc1ff8559c9e7962df9229000b8e432ac40bad34797345f1ed6d7a0fdea8ec01e7a20dc436aa1d62153813d59d44a":"":"":"":"60ddce57be4563b87bb59e848496f42fcef9ed79799040e0eee68fd89b330109cd3b3f761348fc7036c0cf5d69aefecf91e89a7ae0429590569a88922aeff249ea783f00f795aadca729f96996eef76d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"108a1fa539fc471e0a26a8d39633c88d1e84c26a62894e7dec15fcbeda9dcd1e40619dc03c7d3dd2db39bc8f4964949b1737b9cd69a8ff97":"":"":"":"b0fbe3f6b6667b88e2a48f3679f21ad83f28107675d43d2a5186dd6a0256afc6acaf995b3f07691325543b37ddd5bfb4934f46ff9783597b69c727c9cae1c6b83601a39227c53c99181ec18d5be60d5b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1db6fe209a51124f9eba3ae7a5690a31c9383b0d62abe0237fa6ce2b34b320b68d24927d9245a10f7216ded701c39f4d10dd6eb4ae912b78":"":"":"":"10e9661bbe14a0c768f09840979233865296fa801ee8ba97106043c067d3b01a5d3a866eb9b21f730c3ec1f11f022820a2a2db4cd07061acb85b0987e33892064b56626c962d1febe1eb97af6b99ac22" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"dac7cb5d659646246a2c3cd6cbb8b7bb9ede30c88355725c16576ca7567f52b51ea3f7e5d456b0e8b7a33faf21150e5b39999ee53fd05b2f":"":"":"":"7117fe0c0a9afa75c078b1641ba637ed2a4501e70bf38465914ea185da5a62048910040e70f279ca9f2fd5e478ffd76484f52afa62a29ca9d649f252f27a8eeca1ec95d7898f705421c92b60493e5c77" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a422e11d41ed91e458b1dff7844e7a06eb807b042fec7c42da9a7d64aea6ec843cbb5dacf8517c3f7214d02d432fc64766f6bd40f54290c5":"":"":"":"e6e1b59d47aa47ebd862fa2336d50a920f77aff6d42942a293947c24b044756c9777231aa0ce8a67d2916136cf4477dde78b6fa789b4a570460538a3da199c2c64155692bc1aef3fa94ce8ba4a43bcaf" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8020ccd23e6733f7638a6d68b4954b701dd2e3b33176d5d1a14b6cd8aead4e152e0726dd16b4d76dd9cae60e69023d0fd82b0b69b7cbaf75":"":"":"":"c2b22410ddba0466b6635ab98f7690572d7159d66b4f037fa75869276950ea4ab4a92e3011d7c3d50f921a3988906486590706c8e0eeeb487ac85ca924d8b3a4445e2af49365c10c6e99eb17d93286c3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d66ef5d12c778d8b78134704e345b08c6839471eb903bd0480169d4069d73a669a17dff2e1d6fc23f0688fdf7867f72a024ae445969458fb":"":"":"":"91ef2bacbffacbedc11da58d275448692ae26bb9920c0b14d86a42a65a9a79422ed77c3a8f941b428552caf6d15e057c2dd8b5cdee670ee151f674b4a82ff9754cb067c1a1a27302bef2d395379d6009" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"cb4ca0d6e07b341ea0d105e5128bcd6b6fc317bec49394a83c485ce4f8205361374484ac0173ef3f08fd65d0a11af2b3f90ee8bd3fcdc08b":"":"":"":"1727a7f580a267492646fc2c18e3539a131b52fa3d82ac8cb36227ebb94a396b139c0a709301b4f00b49ec63d7f48125e469443b57b16bdab66bdaf0684da425e63a596182de4674416ade17f0cef49d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"7cec0120261bbeddd34eb776464c9b80667da732cc82c365a492b4def218ba2cad59f7b4bc1afaef00861c9b62b581444f79b8977e9fbf8f":"":"":"":"3ad128a75af8144cdf5cace68166dabca9db5d5cac6eeaa0c3d608d99d5da4a2ca90fc080d832e5f97060ab2247dc5dc20bc10be47e6ab03efeb662fc9d52c89d8db340cc4903be59dfd086f6d018468" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"29dc07553bb77cad6f321bcdd5c5c758b6a77588ee43d0afb15c0d981e368cb2482663aea93ded95d82a1a2a22cdbdf8de93695862cd9429":"":"":"":"5e1d53d8db89511fa996ccf513baacee2612da201c21d51e2927dcb99caf3132f6d2ccc3376dbf95520018515b0784e98b4226671cb3f1c7915757d2e59f1c4e843ea9c98004108118b4eb53bef2baaf" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"748777316160fc175eafff578481402ccd5a38508e4ac0603f86281576c970d3316ee58a36f809a8df9ef241861c04093a284d116384d204":"":"":"":"05f179c71691c0c2c64eda58b63a27772210f0c2c6973708a5f84e6b49f547169a839f2e97ce18ac94696337a9d1c1d450bf27b7fdaf1761ee8da9b55d59031a8516eeaebb1bd48a1e3bd070c5fb4eda" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"11e2e3934d23239aa6bf1abb07aadaf8df05892d126cd4be13f2965bdcfcc8396dcb16d8742eed1b276b562702915fbb59c01cafb7044022":"":"":"":"6ec1caa762b5b87ce92ef7d254536f94d41ed5a98696da5c14fa2d29aa95182927b3e2a5ee9e2012c911ecc5e244af1a8200de37cbff2b26d0c2271659bce074d5b3c06743f08d6495286068a1e5435e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"ec11e1929e7430b914b385285801e27df4aa6783fa1e3405ae706e740dda50209b20acf90dfa8cecb4d4b4bc7cba4daa285ff88ce9e8d451":"":"":"":"74acba48f0216087f18042ff14101707c27d281e5ddbc19c722bec3f77bf17ca31239382f4fc1d4dd0f44c296bc2f10f74864951f7da19a23e3e598ac43fb8bbdd1fca8047b98689ef1c05bc81102bb5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d92b39ff610db66427613c111c002b75329734372847a88f53c1d289b30d3584d34efb884ce6d1d7174a3c20508ca0171ed9610622d454fd":"":"9980d97c65cc8b3c61b390e48abc6523":"76213356e359e94984cfa7db15220518":"e0b298f7cd1112527a506201e38f7e60d762f591603db72aca3a2cd1b9d115c3ddbc7dcb7643f2f40f53e96e6ca1590ca27abb77a6234754ff1edef86f75fd5f298872ad1544fb88a62936e238f22aef" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"3c56bd6733e9cf9d765f3d5906c60807bd1c9c11f4a1293bb4abaefe6a65c978d9c75a704239e500319d9b4b8f9f121caef7fe3c49f9ab37":"":"365f1612ecb78ad7b1140dc66082ab30":"0e5d2013782191581e4a76e0a2b5bec4":"0e509b7b436d085c1080c3d9e6ee3cc563944bba0fad352d13182c87c8c3a0f0ba71e86676729da0d2f4acc2b57e430b8791c4f30d232a0fe48bf91d5824242fb8e36333837173d702e6738291b57efd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"91a44f3e412d031bd47ec8907e32f0434a20d784db3f6ffd78b013ca0b00553698a113d75d8ebbe856554c71aa4b0d48af74bbebc97afab4":"":"9f4b3b3f1e2d849753d2cedc8d8c5d17":"64a1f4d2b10cf97a268cae7034ca4d8c":"232ade326de23ec970f66e6a540f306d962769d1b24b0675109ca7514dbc52003d154687f525f4a2220501d6dc92551df9111c8dd398356c560ce44f1959301dedbb197c0161fcad0299a9eef3e799e2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fbaa5e65ce5580d774739340e025eac46550b5d3865829eaef9b59ea37d094692b9fd15ca25468fcf7e38f7dcecd5fd85c686057e1ab9bab":"":"f0e722190994c66f64ff725e8a9b3be0":"548ed3bbccc8f9f79c70b2e85ee0e626":"2c07d2994fbf0bbefbbaf60e0dbc712f12f8ddc3aa6d94ea9e9d3083209ec35c4cf3e62bceb9ab042e60050520e0469961dbdaee0787fda6f1c49755855752753b1e87031a6821c04cda887cdedecc55" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"13747421a19855709f3c468a5b1f77c19eb589a0b18c06da3aae0078b85ee10c79d1925f5ab2045eac1f2ffdd850e7602cda7debeb042bea":"":"3c95ff221ccf82f4041fcf4e8a56de29":"3471a7ab4234fc6e8678d3613ee10835":"c346efd443cec6f21eca26eb5289e0bec5eb3f7c3785842e7690d5d35eddc87d79041aa0a9d5e4ee9ec69a4b67b26ccb70eecb59df582316b8f1b945a25c64b861a6decb59adc1447cea219947f6aa72" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4f72d884628c90261fdfa9b87bdbbce93daaf175d0290ae7f725e8a9f9b8c98807b57a591d4e8b2a5b692a6e310c4851bc4a6d986eba9cef":"":"8b3a7401800ee1bf5fdc76243b313244":"cc199f4f43036b0af63fe3f8ef4ab3d2":"6950a89759b52b6c8416600f9e0d56d19fab12b423d746af9d00a6657f3b8f3a3681c0910343569544b8b537294aa610e89b977c4db21a324317587be8b9232b38d354eb3e4032cacd561dfe42e72d23" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"59c23b4073e7c9d2871d5d882953a33b17eb2a8b0b9b068870c070deb9f1324b8fc29fdb612c52dd300889913ab120536cf9a389485859bb":"":"a6483a9e5113a45a84f6630869291461":"b93bbb79da7750f44e4561081ac4f29e":"6a298856c9b25b20de0159890135beddc415802307b87507d62b2ad32b1883e4ba036308a6669a06246d4afc43a29e183ca141f156f7b1975095bf14cceaf71cd2831fac8870d90fe0e1067434783a5e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a4b620abe19aff576cddb8f6d1e83b59c26d4ba79fb8346974ca841db33e280d59e28e110cfeafc4f033c6a45f443f528a326ed4c2de5cd9":"":"be26760cfc23c0cad1ad0978c3ec8f09":"e767cc6694242b003d6d3795415389b8":"89d79211db69679c2269dfb2e599740ff646eb9ebd5f28a68b76665e6087d15fb888bbf899e3d16d711c3db63e3dbf9cd9bcaad6984be04afe5b41c2270431948ddf4486272f136f1c5bdf37cd2a70e8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"994e455c4815ffd4a9ee168d1fccd3b661da827c4e81b102db0b28977c81bc4dd58d06819e2939883983f9ebf1356b0d01e6dc02735596ca":"":"029caa66544f6ae8f6cc5bd3791f86f0":"7f14c05c5d88acafab220aa467e3e3ca":"fde93e19f71fa97fc368f5f4454df8a39b3fce42bd4a801726b296838c3dcc6678bb387687e2c943edab86902e377a619950d36fe78cd7ba3c67aaecafdd9f7faa2076d71fa79646933387bd6bee147a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2713eb063d3876dd6c3a5903a1ef5774a180c4123eeeea8a4aa472cf07c278ac367a9a490c7ddef058d6bf34ec9db314abb119a1a017a17e":"":"4452362eed6b9c30a01f784a9a06dc5d":"e59780f291461d2665924f3af8bcb6e0":"743f529bee048d0be6f10da0101c63c746fbeed37c6cd0c0ae97854893a00c82b65acc9e6e6ec04357e5e4b3159a4ef3e5e57a38da2e00f0eb3c1538a26ee1a518f71169d59b0d9e8a021f3d623b8fc5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"ff2cb4930d26b0ee75bd9edfb77e09f50c80049f75ba95a5137ea862d086d6523bdfde203bb8c2a9bb588ef2428a173453136bdedec37eb3":"":"a52775c066b6e9f7508b30ca22944296":"5e4ad554e65a49685e8527f923cbc0cc":"4e9134db809bd07a46f40bc1a1f6d830808121eed25d17d7ce3eb81bb88ec660b7dd945ebe9fef8bdccda92139f4770ab8a467e0118f24680c6f6e5b9ad6ee94a086118b6cf69aceb8cd809d91429aa6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"72971d13d6356e68fa61d94ae1d76a91b69d8b39499393fe9eb2889d14d91a7488207bd8ee536d481b37237b0995a218fb56dd1740335992":"":"0e59b74d4ac5ab8bb51c7f4b99ff859e":"232dec60628a43216b75839ac820fe4d":"1f1adb85b8d7d1e022d5a6594ce074242683993ee4d3c5166a2aaf40c239830587b1112af2a4313e363ea4a980b06f20c5ee3207de026aaea9197c95d0e771f4f16a2cab41c0684c15e6462cb7a5a71a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"975c10933f7351262a4296aa6175471fa34e7c9b3437b5c7013e22d2a9002e9e42d27202e0518b53da23016d1f5b7b63c46c1391886934d5":"":"b7063d6ba3740d5c258303d5393f8f3b":"9161780ba6bef05da7290a77416767ba":"b68b4ebb6856af7337745e0a50caa1d34abe27594d56d846794c15bc03973d67d548bbd2680dc749c5171372e27af16900d6bf729a84e6d7626563ef0b4c90c275d9112567b8ca6e0093b34a0966f27d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e1dfa7999006aee12a2349ae1d580f5ca2a437dc0bc294f449f2670afc55e8fa8152c787a014880f670c585cfca574ea2d13f28e6a0ea677":"":"d77a830f650a3331a72f0a4b1471dab6":"37aef81e729ed0b91bf054ce98df4a76":"c009a692d7e566b58cc54a45f7d6987a48d96c3664f6034ae3ac0dae9ed5c220c46ef0c638c75353ac790124d88ca54fe43797f1a70422604507a2ab458fed576ccf6d25cf521da8d0c3b7bfa16ee6f6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 0, 128) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"310d8d08687545e48493db179e6e92a176cba53ff17cd783ba5d38da5f2e51468b0a9489c88b8db0be4a2c87c875be0e1be01aadf2efeef6":"":"a1824b07e0d2ada0fadec29beb53a9f7":"ccdb3f7d7f6a4d169f5f2e24ec481fcb":"bfcc8f2ece23d22545ec2176aabd083855923ca9a673b54b66a3e2562212aad3cc74c4c8976de259cc95a2f09a85b7acd1f18c343eff0368a80e73a547efdcd954816b38df1c19556d714897e317d69f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"db8128c27eaf3a39d5019785aa35b20c3977437fd75e8032ed340ddbe1b29eb9bedb3048a3fdd06aa957c5cff00eb87549c307400d4059d0":"4f8060506daf40819c7c58630151edc7":"":"":"4ac933b7de803c266461493a19dbb00e9db25ee768165781fc9a70c67c4e8a92db36471e3cb1714fbb65e17d74770061b0abae52be34a604d87e56a4ae1e90c6533cc764aa7419b5439e3efa193934bb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"87c80a5e334e02a36f59324befb4fae19e5b73aef691d45e8973f58a487b457d73c4312ff890b053472d95de538f1512f6432233b7d9c058":"6cc5553434148499d65f8e4ab7334938":"":"":"5ccdcb3d022eb4d72c211594c916dd2d883d2ecc190f6e78ed76f438562059e6f8800ce6d11b3b8603243f4a56f38d41672935ace8d6fab825cb6978a2d0827aa65c70523c48f7b9a8f6fe43cc2ba927" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"83c113dabd43229d4a7333147c7d84f48fc29ea3d813c0f1d45c5184906a02ea4c6f11b149db7f98812904be3ee96de25ac9a78ccdfddeb3":"77dc45d37d6d401e45c982f2c4960fd6":"":"":"e4f08087eaae11fca94bd7df816980e6608e208032f944f1efc50ac8d47834b9f10c00958837633e61f3ed2351c6885446b72d2634bf6b69f9d7b7a36f3fb8e98294f1e9d92a4a725462e60325dc41ca" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"aec809c1b7eef916569cca247cd9e7b072df669458c8af4d29fecba0c46130ba920fc8bf7d29cfaeda476607f3325566ef52fb69a3defc54":"824b11ac7e13f654ff4238e0f28a2f60":"":"":"514f1adaeb99dd2833f714a53804aca43a99fce45caf5db166b15acb0460f5e7e23c696fdaa8ecd138a937367483dc7bb7a6af51a611aa7b0671559aed14109133738e06bf2190bb85abef3a674e488a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b2f5cacdf871e742c262c7671b59a74c6a41242b2225f252cba7db3bf77d6619af46532eb9c01b72cde2978ec39e4fe5247ac5f0fea559d8":"2cbfb9bc6c318219df86e08ab11419e2":"":"":"67d393c84d05983f5acfb8883ed44e24406f216efa3d6650807fabd3028fb1f762d6c67ffb0aabe8143fd3ddfda8ca2c7ef13546dcffc4dcf95b610a28f7cc2a25ac4e7ec0944d655c56c110fa931ff7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"54ef54d0425f8cebd127fed0f395884613dc19463664d19d02af6baf06de126b55fbb3d7f114728bb4650839f1335f8c2c3be18ea3beea75":"f0cef260a2f74a425d062bb25c68c539":"":"":"dd8b96a5f3fbd0f5f69477c5b7e71099b2113888fcfa6acce713a13f040b0b5fd55100a3d0d3a344706a31e796d6999f63cc6357f5ba386f38d46bca9c42a25c4a39afdc7db8d843a032ef35bf4b15ef" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4a1781c483eae07e0a9ddd91b908fb00a21a4f5e1c6e9da58f380f407dbcc982cd0761e5f0fd6d339a646bdc6132addb7ac0cdefb1b91f7d":"c4b7084d73d399c128e0a119217c793f":"":"":"e465cbc1502709493de1d3347a07f855b2dd6435a4ebaaf00e7756c1439219546e5fc67093f0eac1055d221fde51297cdc9ff41121d582514c75e9906870f99d58806f1873f0183277510cf1f067a840" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"36974a7c276e18ed2704eedef6b627f8e57e755d554b80efd0f065c236f78964cfd3b661405b98640631fda19fefa8b5b003e8b752ef060b":"626a8bc0d1fab08c8c6afcdc3dc6ac33":"":"":"6b9ae340e5e75e1dcf6f181589a1fdba3951417c30467be4b41e9ff4ce03073ef1ba0a19d160abc8e5e23ed433bcc421ff1f428780454defb66511fc94794f3ec1c48c014d783bb173db102275b64b1f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"05f934d668e9630a131ac51e2560e45a78ceb8ef6fad7190045cd995039bfb3db624f4687302445fad08829815e7407fc962afe2779589f5":"8536223ee0184eb43e84a07cf71d445d":"":"":"97142414252556f5d5efafd39852d7a84e70316a0aff7985ed6761798eec57621271977bb950187a290dd4dd514b7a801c98103d4fd4012afdfe0f264bfe3f6e584768503831ea0211fe0415a0f59324" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e2ee5b3970ac4cb83061e5692b349df8643b6100aac55ab296fcaf7a2ef7e3a1aa54c3fb1963dfd93781ca34a95d6fc3250762bd1d31b0b4":"71a4316ea88341dcf3c9280a5cb54b7f":"":"":"bf767ed7e5f11abf1a6aa5c453fa124401297e32f23270c8d78423a98f5e6783f3e8e835aa734b36c2f11be30acf0b598c7a23ac40ce894689a24fd8de3e0812e9a5cc1791091c981bfa9ec2168daf90" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"32bd60df5e2b435c922a9e434f5f99be9c5437ff159c7e5e67b81b82f7b5ecdf6e60ec4789820d37a1071d7b91cf1e3d14f10ef7f34922cd":"c759e4ab6c8fe8a11a1f8472b06eee0f":"":"":"329cc81105343bd74f24c0a59b972892e789ea20e46ead1a74e7af036a836d46c70461c52df5038282e53e2db44143590d6015809db56754b778a2a7278d5050eeec9332fd732c9c714a676563c8c3ef" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"ac524ec09761670b96563803218a7d3589bd8e682b2a5cef64d96b968ec98839a97a4704a7a5b2b859f3ed6c370031f1027def8fa0672a26":"1531a17d3d89c1d0775f3a630ba730b8":"":"":"47e3bfaa2cbe4b085603991aa739363a639b064dd9120e0149cb5ba2ba0539c4147897a34d98538935fe25ab36cf50f6a1c3aa2892e2c06591e4c2bccfa990f6317732d5581944c8d2ef96d0329ac574" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2c9a43ef1496352ea62ced1c345de4090a9cea6898b8a53abb2f01a435ec6d2050a692b44fa152bfc42ce4ea30ef761297c1ef132839d411":"00bfb2ff2600fe1dc6a2d85642e9eced":"":"":"193d08bfb22121deb22e8079895703e2a518b79bfc3104038c2a220f6babeb8f28f5652d5d1b3a8b468d8a4ed0cb32c69c5519ded85ddc0fea62d77ec5158b6a55caec3bbdf1f6b93e449d6f15cce26a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0f15ec0c8d3c184d9b2a47bf9ffa20982685161bec91fad2c55808ccafd46ecd18081738cf835e1347e7df7e3f879f3fbb759c2051e34217":"eaef27215467d7878106ba9dae990bef":"":"":"bcf79ad50201f3498cf18288dc30c32dfbf2739490c74862d5e9c66b16195590075cfe094956e2bcba2009b64a5f8b62d144158180835a7f51b706a12884e309ab4ec198f5bd07efffd591d5cc8569e1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"56a0b6194153e0d2737f49f4e5cb77ba4d8fbf9914405833f324c09f96434ceea7e756fc2f55a0b3f043b6e11fc2f671ec00f4d478b791c6":"81a85cb2b6afa99a1f609f83c3b15105":"":"":"40e87b822b1000441884a38b8776baa69fbea99962571e8a20d8af012d50c8c211860ad579869ec880320ea8057d5cb0de9496ec57d8b594ca8be5b94219eaa800af7205f8a83b66c87e0fee9aa9732f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"680face90d7bca21d4a0edb7799ee5d8b7be9eeddd0e3b4b7cafe231630aa95a742c4e5f5f22c6a41c0d7792898827948a589f822d1af7a6":"f58c40ae70f7a55648a931a0a9313dd7":"dc3663f062789cd15cbb20c3c18cd9d7":"fe85b0ab14c696e69c24e7b5a137120c":"68004b3a28f7f01cf9e9b5712079ef80871b08b9a91bcd2b9f094da48480b34cafd5596b0c0a48e148dabc6f77b8ffaf187028e104137a4feb1c72b0c44fe8b1afaba5bcfd8667f2f55b4606632e3cbc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b481041a75b03cdaa07784e372b376897fa9e792e1fa5e078d4c7234fb9dc3f9804b4e48a32a5db74990333c4951d02823765f90a0aa8850":"f8f0f1ed3f0bda164e596ebe123b7f75":"3120e329f1d55a8c07e7472ac77e1720":"2b9ff310e63c67b5e0aeb47ff7a102fa":"7d6b3ab84bb6c014dd44eb1266fb3954f1e8ff6c48a4d91514f685f0642497cb1936a0afc40c8ddd1545204e128fd06d4d18bba05d1294e64d57a0593b803a311b37cc2d631487ab03a00fe288e5e745" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"aef9d310cfced29873b7e2b7be37572b76ed84b043364cca611917f9b12053f919cdf60ac9c0b364909f096204f21b58b0bbdcf38a3be7e9":"67e5aa83fa572ca27acfcd27d4f5e49b":"7ae90f7dc220bf5b387ed44c2425af29":"9d750dc13c19acf3cdba10155d3ca5a7":"892776bfb009fe0b1793c0ebb2ba549cbcc4a29d0374070683990c3f2c622ee08977fe9361c59838f068f6758d7f3f76c383d9f59ded8501f25eff9be4a1e2de3ee484a2e8069c51e886a75a229ae15f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b68686b8cf817da9c93cfcd7aae410c02d3a8eaff57c6ecf990f20f70c587166292b5f56cef1ccc5018c38a602f811c7cdc16ed59faaf405":"03cd598585a3a80f9a81e2780c699269":"dc761246e0a74339adb76c729ec1414b":"b2936022922202757eae4e5d59eb29e3":"6e9735b82a9da2074f93b54580aeb76bc75265e525f1b50a8ee0d6851317beb64f477f3b3457ca9c120cd8eab6d37400ae62332bc91cab803b0c44e070666f9389a9d0fbe8baab9cc5c0cd54a397c8e1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"cb68eb95bb00beb896048d5d323d737942b1a4795806fc6bbcf67d195862172f49bb319e609965feda2937165b8dffa6560e1fd434a5ea0f":"700dc7725321a0a21a70ff6aebe30d82":"d57c3dfbcb18e280cef81c7118a520f2":"6e569776b8a26d8e7d3c87f99f932aac":"b017eb98c5d782469658d47569453b8322a8db7a2abe75b4e68637a395f7c67bee75a42b39def3aacb0b1a03677a0bb4d31257964f467b7b3962d912daf6d8441e5952aaa427c246a1f1a623a8498a53" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"81e7eccf46acd145d435b80f2a6e72eb1b236d02f12554270c26e8ba13e9306856d6219ad04a8f1be3fa436bf280f579c22b64c91ac700b2":"33a186afbc44f3adec590d7e36bd9905":"bcfd99d6931ea9df679d196d8412c9ad":"6dd61af0f5077df531c151f2dbe2bad2":"41e6ced34a97afee72166239455d82fe020f5464ccbc8e875e06a05875ca844d8b7fa3ec360d31ae57f53245e7c4bed501ebb6f9b4af350ff9cd86a571360804d3a34b9dc11eb4be6427f521bd14f893" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1b76bb8a0dc7067afa193bf5dae1cd7c03dcc37b5788d22fe0f4adda99dc6d776fa545aabfb767255001063ddd99c7ef656a16e7604c5102":"b06bb683dc5018f0678c14b97547944e":"87ea4f713562b129079b49956eb88abb":"5650ef281323b6acec34c51795c67160":"afeae028a358702743b14dd64414d3350eb1de78702677e30f7ff9e71d6f9b368c53e79b0a353a43ec06e9020c7234232a07d504c163d7a8a63496bdaf670efcf2597b66bd0dea2b827e0a4ce513425e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"117ad3f68248555a2b9941cf0a56726ca162bf9b531f26e3416be004bcc6fc35be8362c6dbd9771d42bd6e187868d598f6e2647b536c9728":"16168c2a54d8dd7150cd7f122482a723":"4e4cb0001c5288c1538dccb80be01e41":"8177c1d4def6bde093f27a9894d345ee":"1e407dd8c1dd1436064f2015eab9c5fb9b88b6dd017e1196ce70fd9ec878a8cb02e2d221f4096e7998dbffbf0b392e7f4d97e0d1cdf81755507c04b5a6254086b40d153b10faf0011980bc0911275145" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"54bada0b89d9f5bbea78aa8c409dccd039acfd7b1645a0ef193b60cac97196e4cf9795fede9d898d082a9731a8ce2168a10420c5d6bd9a0c":"1c8feb149d98faf15b73622167064088":"a71ee8a522d67194bd1756c2e2898115":"669ef07679f336f529058672f861b0f3":"d72d43ff8704248a0d59a111b64128fa6bff265c52bdae38507ce5f302158be902d8380fe247abc0275dbbb502867f7ad1cddde0e404fd9d64ec494daac5d088401b4da696f47a31b4435abbea71c387" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8cd407fc7a36315f1cfef1489a2ecdec433b2cbc1fda4ae1d967e192ea8942aecaa169deca4c268246edb421a0092a12091497a5fa159327":"114a4f3446eb3c98aa9c182d329b2856":"f29994a39804004e7ac50642f99c403b":"40782cf3d002aa603026e26d3bbc6dd1":"cf381392567f9e0d1f55c642bc64075699254df6b4b375fff8f869f7a10188046276dcf41076c55990b6b997db182fcc88cbacc4782347b9f4ce39351b77e378931d5cd026d997ab104b8b7787b2f92b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"dc8d705180e22f8be91aa4bd57a02caa30fe8340a53c64ad2d460e409c3a2db9fdfde9034a4c8f306195fa6653dc29d84d26af5118fb60af":"4b51ded198d1b16f80ba9e536a2a046d":"ceacb5b37ca76de240a9f4dea89a0389":"73c614b8e273ea9203683d1b0cb2d7a6":"6a136d4218255c70913b73af480af86cd8ccb6f319937e075365ef014187c312f9069f1fd05c6e0c44a1b7ba9dd25e948ac155461e425d864cc83b63bd84289b768058f7647a8921e23bfa7c73b4476a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1796646b48a2b982fcf7a4f49fee7e3d6be673106a4a29371eb8d3598888d53f59572c63c0e4bb183b17e0f67d81a11cc878ef600d1bb810":"5297aedbca866d1754c4b6af443ab24c":"771688574b52154837bdff6ddcf24d52":"f6c627bc84b2c01a9c055d4632ec955c":"9d1c796a2343ee855859e04ed702fa233da2f73ac9ad632fd17c8c5afe15c5600c6ab2495018f808b1cebc54b14ae2b1f929347be4aed9836e0b45dd2352b23cb28d753045f1ae6aff7598a9a1c350a7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c5aa3b0e9d8f916f18e73daa0cb88a447f7510af40f9dd540f8ae4d62be2c5754f6eb10410c121388233201ff9c8121a36ae77e042a98211":"06c35c446e28f21fb1cdf2d40af53dc6":"41015c3ef3adb96edbfaea6eb8e0dea6":"e6b60016bb99415640506851c0fe3fb7":"027ff1ab4c406c048da6a8c24f04d12a5a35a5191b62b496459b750b10066cfbac502b1ac612b58527744f6ac5005d22d3f86c1adeb1c1bf1a26902474d08bf886ed5bb26e6d1b529df0143128b397f4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"57c7e29e0305e6a803a568f47acaed60d13e192c1e16bd9bc50ef5ebb52c5493bcc4d7a0e5be64d064b735deabbf67e94395544497e4816c":"89199bb960ac741082c5fe5ea34ea2f3":"53b5b2783d8191ad4eae3ed87bc059ed":"fce4d7f5f0cb2115d4c4be2294deca56":"b98839a962db8de7a17d35c35bda06c4139db3933c4ee60bf1779b16d804d7c600a62f9c57cef93a79ff281989d90481db863d23cd24c4b566d74e1de6596b7cceefcef1f161e5a51d115128e0b23c5b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-1, 128, 128) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"567d3f4c0de396ed67569c070d87f2b535ec874e881418983ec42ceb295b7d312e715e46b96f9da5998f9cde45b1dc22db6d2d7bfd4f3930":"43c16ab49ca5174f907d7899ebd242e9":"6c0b479d9e847dfbeae230bd4601d0db":"0d5a2183c9f9ca6941f6a617892f5e47":"934fe82b0951b97dafc5ba16e87b0459691156b42ff2dbbbd8f6ed9b04be952af267c6a17fbfc86de91f9f07eed482a5362b176216a8963af485503ba93b2e82c03a3ee6225077d90cd961e24f6026f6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"f3a709bb47a36838cb998fb6986ff074c57932a669670570ff6cd1b202ee1da014a011f43fc02c51ffcb4048cc060763f2c58de2edd494275da14118c9cb7fd50475c66cc7e792406213a7d00cf7623d931a5947":"":"":"":"bbe3daefa61fe302bdaa6d4d379680acfd0d456b5d35f137c145b72626f2fcf39fdf7f3708d9e88c1710408a3d7ece3b0261ff538846fd5452149960215c0c22beafe6cd24a7c392d5845774b87528912c322119a2adf4d35a0ba61dd36ffc8a7e7475afec58ad4a8cf343afb677f087" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"0f508c6330b9673e94861ae2057e200ae8f2b330b74634d79fe8a4c698211080db07e58b762a2387379f0c0e2d01b2ca40ef82fec35eb81a5493ccef709dbaa0b0e4494e460530062c8db7446bc6af2d852fd875":"":"":"":"583367bde003eb2061cdb6f51db9c6827cbcefbff0497ba823e112edbf7f2066fcffa3e92d1e8c531007783554e6aa8a633bc925690ca6d579fbedbf9cc4d6cb08133d0cf8d4c25fcd3b6fed95f00b1bb17477cf67b97a557e7da933bdc121481755f628fdf0f0b1189a097c7147169e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"9082871e73b098bbc58f324f12f6a83c321360c9f5b400d00a9bb865ef5265083d9309657c40ac94b579995902df0e2084eb4a6410cac605e482ea4abe5c8eb73bc63f68baaeaa56d47f7d74974d940555fd3861":"":"":"":"67c2fd4397af79297782af9baad2a26b993efa48c689a74531417ae102d4ea1d6a82cb0321aee3dc2572ad27299e81a7a77f1cf837119e746988f2ec60bb01eb2ac3d110a948c1c33e86833757e2670cc3947658f3b2d32ac59242f152e889d03d03056f0a265ee759d3a4488b55c63a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"4701f34326930cf93deaeb3a9c196e307a890c8ccf44a55f84593b3388a196238fdd97d201998ec734821998e7d6bef7b31fa2a81343918056c01d65f519c8576e4120a3d6b9ce28ccf57eeabd012d2c14e47045":"":"":"":"b499b86b0a25a0fc84a9a1b902972e2bb5aaf9b84f13804d6180491285b9316218cde0e73eacf722b5c664f4e618625ed35c5facbfca153cc184309754ecaad9c3678ce51ade96dfe3290e125d661e2afbdadfa73240c24939bc31d171712c7c987bfb434f1db6ed44b321bcd237f149" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"a912b6755cd2d677d63268a5203739b0785d7d956738a596e269128a583921aacbba1adb7c6d1714c164143c8f44e76711965514651680235068476ab137d5962e5e5872f3b899d0e9ca5ae8fe71bdcfaef1d241":"":"":"":"0f410304b6d88e52c8d6039ca674a06c49a5fa1094cf341c4034e39990236d9e5bb8ebb6e59849e7df82e2d02981d8df21e4ba3381e606b99c16de62860a470109c0123c69ebaf970603f451f9e6acf83e1c5951c3cb87170ef319d9a791110aea0c0dae5623c287d4c454ec93227654" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"54fb376707de02a1c385a3da78523485111a0a099066206f210ad848f29d3c270d2fd2f668cdd3a57cabed71f9d784c209259d1e4a3eee2046846a55a46965e495eb29725a86bd630dc43cd60ddb4fc93c59980d":"":"":"":"a2e3ab5390b5b79786ec7b434de48e45f590b85513106008479d8a3b7b236c884b0f871d8dee539c712509bd70de351f3881cd87c9cf77c1a9d8879986ff0f6678549c5c6acd15aeb6bbe653a9bc76829df2f194c5f6e8c7dd3058971ce15273a2d559c1ac60a0014e5e32352d6be2a1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"3a0c24b5a6106d28c02957538e76e96b3ececfa80ba4c7d01fe642a88fc822884cc36ac2703e8952ee635948715f78c542e6e3270f2757f1652474df4706490b18e649ffd95dc518a8b4259da193600af5d5bde1":"":"":"":"55dc24206aa59d34ea990ac6b31250f15ac056c8ecd52e159f3464c38e1f28840eec4c6423b0fd9971d11c5ab99225eda5d173c08f9439bb56eb1cc487fdaea934fa816f9c9e0d628f111cbe60a647e03892084f80775248d41cb587617671d99b508644476b66c1c96979e5061e025a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"ae7ff70bb69c964f05c99c0e7868210d567bcb5eb02db7708de162e6bbfd91fa17f30656420dad1ca69d356cbab80456cef922a9206f07d32c3f198c1a68e673c5583674bb1df1f2a69c554fdd3411c81a90c83f":"":"":"":"f1f3f79b1d7f988d4caf7308416f3d02371cc029a28eb4f0247c8625c4680a2dcbe9f3d56d92de6ee4d4031a254bda8a657bc147fb90c2f7783a8e3749b60633e5a921d015b846b3cb38830bc7554308af08ee8219e5acd1b699f1ac538930d257da4ef567ca570a7951bfb236d4d36b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"86704ad0286f88dbc60baebc2ed0571de7b5ab64bc8554ba8645557fa10159ec03cc9f6f299c1c3011c73b2563e571fc24f5b5b50b4bee514d7c808873ca804b147201ba7ed43430d89b066c04b00b0a17694523":"":"":"":"6b1a26d7d21308d217bc8988067ef3e21f5bc10d34e89937f2a89f8da256acef50b6ea7d9ea877bc1d15002b1766e9bc7fea3d681b147e42359ce29d6d4f8c73e7c29b9ec14277fce2f6a0c518d24aeada44990f7f92b0d1184ff96b20c76d506f6f9d963391abec5bc247a2ac6b24c7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"d0b30341b4fd48281f76a83d7de5769d05d5cb9e565b213c8e2bc8d4adcbae90107fc12fc1ed2a19f20beb563de8f05bc5c437637148154a12b1606bff071dbb366458b74a07a1c14114fab487772d436d4ce159":"":"":"":"fe2a7ced1965f013d475724eaa7d31b62740be411d899afa79f9fa6e73f18ebe0907f2f21388b6498cd365798f27f882a2c5c2744a9b25e8d351e77b9fa4471ceb1dd6c72fdef75977e4e4a246e24f56a615189e1b2a8d6782e8c5062b744a65ebe1f7c5fbcab333fdc155bfee300503" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"4a1a697e41537f28b381e05f11ebc905bd66c2c1d905d8c0b78c10c26cdf547a1b6f85ff58f48298a11bba41e3ec015d41a24d9e335e6e13b06b84b9f56b3e803bac569dae2d74c444bb58b3a6344bfbb9eee765":"":"":"":"15060b2bc827dbeefa2170ade633b0f0075a4b9b03fc24f73522174be4e4b08b93b421fa98c7c5a445c3aafed47a2eeeed63f19ef4f67e7726d8ff84bd94daa3338e397d52abea4c7d1191e30f3e8a11864f10ff56b2dbefd860655d34cf63ea22bbb54dfd0c5f64284c303a2ba2f49e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"e80b8c8896557d596e192c3226347c336dae455b50bf32a78c61b9a98c949096be51538e293d338a464eae0eb18f1ab21f9903d07a8b98ea2ad7f41fe7ffdc4b4bd0fd06138a84dc5217cc8fe39b92f9558aa619":"":"":"":"55574491d07db3aff94dcb71f519cffe2f96ef57219262860c3c03f9a5b8a1eb88869e69587f8bc0693c9919bb277dc84fa55187c0dbb20101f0c4e301dcd2fe21664e5a2f0dda3eb4f11df3878c5becddbfc3ca032a17f740d424b99be0a9bedfd99907229ecccbf459f5495533560e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"5c25f02bef1f1319cb6868d836c9cbc182fd8d86ecd87bc5cba41c163710074e80d1a30ddfd0f5d88c6682292cd50c68966d15e6ff95e117d342d974ff074ee872719d15745da624f8503a6141b0ac4b887ead5f":"":"":"":"9c5204d5471c25203f1d9786d38f71081a872f1c56604dc7570caa5439f17cddb7feff01cadaac8e0f35e7a5433cbbcd2dd4f11cc7dd14f6af629fd72a3145db6924d2bdefc262662367b7258cff36172263460f4dd52dd08faed3460bbffe18eb10ff5b3c6a97faddf65b3e21ecc98c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"68b4e1ddfd16a1c1ecb0f4221306e77ad02b07993457eace086f66566afc5f12489633c605d11d53916eee96ed778d6d6518c5681f0fa9b0160da1c71740a94ab33310bc20a18710015af25d3d667c40dc619f34":"":"":"":"5c4c9b3276d546d3b6277a3a2089d4969146d833e0ace3e1ddbd9f79fa2158531f8bb26a28b08dc64bb1e610f13eb14c9fb23559dc2f38326e145ab509b9f69259a0d1a32f471d5abf154a2585288063845f99306f9bb875ccb0d32e9d49b42900257ebaa532e8ec223aea60abc9714d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"d5ee5e2e629ea17487e593914012575daa8baf2d0e9671e1b8aad16524dbdf7d04c11130cdc10e50c630ccb235579a72b6eb4502fe146aabdab62a085c820ea46bb9091054d75a892a83c3850da0a31c15e0d021":"":"":"":"e32c0798b2040620fbc5d2a44ec7fa8038444c1910fd4a24312c8c8eadb57a78606449cf05ac51a3bc4d58ce78742c1be3a0fab6e3f5ebc92b82b5d5d64ce29e8c2787ace0f4e718a7f6cb669a0a43ba1aee0d9aef55cb7c6f5dff57c8acfe883ffd8a496d44afe06803e4c9ff62df04" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"6e531842b9b7fe2c0ee66899a1255135f784a2d5259c93ab3d63a5cb708e2e6cba955897d9b66c7fab274aa388a5db69713c86faa4a19709e9aab04638c670ffaa83806abf79a43e613e62cccafc637e1a1c0c14":"":"e628db057250fbc6fc5aba01b6c8b47062ec5632a8566730":"bd12e61e3d5218efb0c103dc49402800cfb863ec8925e76a":"037650ddf66ed42ea38cf44aaa94884effc5f831c593fb35886b5d601a58f74f868d89f2dba450b9c160e28f69fd24e30fb7a44189810e29afd0d11762d3ef07b4527f4134d6c53bdc9b024cebb6b40fbacd68b6acd4bb4d011d6705ce22f90d910ac4017d2426db7a48db3242161aa8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"3fadabd2d8879bd2298f53c54b573db2584655e08a83289cb58a4ff5170fdc30d71bb24efbb5a50def315dc69146111462e204289a64ce72767499f299c74c934f0007ddb34bf5183bc1e5afd8c15eebdebba882":"":"742f7022892c2123e62379e9367787302fd18dc3835de0bd":"b60325136fde7c858054983a977262b6390a48419725febe":"3bfa419f9bad259b871703681284c5396fa94a323d646ddbf5339398c4d8314a999c230894ac60bf231762acada672f58154a86f80a8c4e3bbc67132e22ef50c0377193cb0d13c7e2c97cb24ce5bb69c73be2e5cd3a07ca2b000b2d7eea940053156bf55d846181e3748a91c342e191f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"0784a499424dd1c2c13f765e9ed88d752fefa83cec61154f82b3fd645f642ff103db9c8d1c10b5979c56a22d58324669d4ace3994927222fa87fd049558a48adcbd6ad5a2380d2d927be57fffaae037bf8a34384":"":"9f853db57c3da0421914d2f71f9317817580c1de4ca43d50":"27071ad475b8541c1a80234bb2d110637fcf4b4e20e06a7a":"2c879a03bd719595211b526101fe85702161711c67a81184cc42c1f9da5761e853ff4b8d19deb95a2f3323d1cd58a2e066c66e7a30059732eba43a4bf3b22fffa5bea5161fd775160dc53d7cbb4c892bc122e4e0139f8f550219cf6fbccf55d16d8a4d8d7776aa143c00d9e7bd1c847a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"addb36bc9ad134c7b8fa54881db1b18e040de4f253be28efbd36b12bfcf4721b08c5833eb0a97c668c7adbc7f04a9e0299549126172e25b9e624282c8e63eccf358c0ef1a71f8fd0a8fc49451db7757eae344e48":"":"e32540418ef68c3dcca1e7a0546e5dc7d4c5e92019b8cb0f":"327e31a0619305c93e9b5eef87102d447d21e21e2d8c1cc2":"178bee4059af0282854c833e11e7bba923a1e2f1126fe8cd7e1694602c180802d67b845a88ff786147f22a74e6ffb0f8b86d352cec2714ff8f308b1f9705603faf5b04bea3c75c87c91d5e6cf7583b5c45eb5f5a74d2bac490c8415d2fe07726bc334c88e3fb7284058b006f82e89ae7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"412431badcf06f87551ec63c3860baf4b59667cb4753363d0f82fe7c968ea6f8bc5d015418adeae206005725dd9693af6f7060a2d5ba53f66dd49dc148de581737b67acd4bb70ff2f4cf20abc001ae1eb50cb75f":"":"d67f94a953e7e4e4bc0cbd517f963e599d68851cc333644a":"385281961ecf2d8175c0a718347d2132f059964c55f39f57":"357876e78a69cd4bc4e06b2c52ad28434520d54a4a310ee0eb026b87993514ba1442e25eb1ae22a3ce98529625d8db9b0e5b680d7e027523b0ba0184d3f2e4b9cdee027960ac1612295bcdbf570912ed05108541b97e3bb30ae0a122d74cb536e5db34b7d5ee5a042897d5d29fa3c126" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"ae914c3d74acb6e2d9b8487927db7992b838ede73dc918b60bcc94f0f456f454a6d100c90e119342154bc3ddb059f48db3a8d7b7288eb42d0ceb07532a2a357d20506ead28d9bd4a127d437a657a61f5d30b04cf":"":"2afb537c13fee9c4103cc6abb11225046d94df2e9838f73f":"6a9f670cb49cd9ad98a17cc19d00d4766344108f0c86804b":"2ed0c4140420c6e3798a13f917cd998b2ce6f98bac27f0fdb09e2538f573caff16904edb371f98f50964b7de552e997007fcd267b36abed12cd95d9a08852a4ca862872edd32c707e7a60e11fe0a7db4c0d34f4c70ff16e5c75e6f5d7ffaec3be383b8790ef0ff3a0d9f79850c9749c0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"38a93c3ede148c91eb7f0cd327cbe8b27ff0e569bc5262aaf30b86d31be35f83b4ff50b84b5dfd649908d0c55cd5be7ad36d4f5f7f22cce066d3b589adef804bfaf52253a0e4c6bb03e000d649541e523ae52f1d":"":"e12c05f2bf463d24da9abe89301d2acefb7957dc1bab9ef8":"d70065fa713e2d691bf554a00d063222755e7204a3e53968":"3e5ad7e96c8cee899889640d8268cbea296aee96fca7bb60308bcdc08eed36bdc8a5b3126ed8be900577e60ec0f8b3d3014deec41ac650480e08dd3a425843b37fa5d1d621b5053ba4b2fc1804d407849a84e9eb5bfcf94f27c2a535e2756b8202ede1f18e81f65e3f7f51a064b401a4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"384d6f43e7d77a381bc6bfbfbfe1a17aa35525bef01be8aaf6c488c46517d9b94380c73d3fb45a4f1b4d70375021c7df78eadb61df5d9efc6e08fe2d81ffa65df33667c23e3cc5c89893988f04be1d3634ced443":"":"a0271fd2552e037568cc857a60a550db050680fc03904fce":"ec095cc9e3bc301071a901d0289b54aefc796bffad6fda8e":"aca2571a9cf6bcd10429e146e6e94d1ae43a00db28bee2b60eb6a1bc1cde3d452dd6e04617aae7a3f813feaddc0f8fd25890004607f45ec995df970e1a3abb17b416bdbf62b6ba5625a80cb100e2b87260a73ffe15d9e6f24abfe9e6f9ba66bdfbfe71380d832418e2a4b460dd7415f4" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"98c8df867d234553e504fcdf807fb8bba51d23ac65dd8b160943bd45181764cf6df0049cad23e6aca490db57d12dc6c631604c943f153927d6d04af042e1da1b225eb8bdf4ee99dd405e3586acf8e44bb0184d68":"":"3338baea79c06f0d48ec2d47004e61c1c1e5056bf8bbecd3":"79007bfce109a682b746df074e87c845eebd665532867fa2":"ba7040193e38c4495971827fb1ddb747ea80cd0bb1fd6aaabf85ec1959c29eba8f818ef55aadadc8c34b6a7c00f210a899092b9704f2e03abf3e5e8fe6d127cac0436441d0a6f1b02a00e5fe948539c66a8c78e70f35cfeb600e1cc68c06553f47ca053b64a0534a028a73d0890034fe" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"6150b7280b3105b86b66c2a39a1f0461cfbce17e746791afb241b298741454e174650ab1e7f08500bd7eb096e40d8114e5a60668636b6ff66d2622154b7d239eaefc9ab2aa3351eda2af4fe51de36e22e70235fb":"":"6ece8aa447d2cf51d8497e303c1a202e39e06bd723c847b7":"21d890666d2c8ce4440bb453f4284c3928650f8cf38576d7":"7554b8cc8e79330ae55575f9157cd10d8eeb58af30eeebe9daa021f4b55ce365fbdf3629be7547a89c78bb9df79d35179e5d2924aa032e60d5a00281f19ee2255c17a69345ed86bf36ecfd694be0405c8b6c077b43a8c8bbea603ddc632a1aea6771a6bc117dbdc365e2714bdaa8b377" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"cb25eef7230ac2da249fe30ea94d3a3332147022bb2207aab4a50822b1564c24a047ebb46d57f45f6680f909629b43129876c75381e3b7c6d06887f68083fc423f06ecba159a90edd394cc0ca9473e9cd0f23c89":"":"2f30b005ea5d5965439bf15220b1c010e6c79306e700e6fe":"9937bf3edb3603cbbe190f3616b021fad652011854e6f6d0":"040a30b82981f71e4607c20c1f2d6e6854824c90b127517f65b6c7da99fd33dee32dc52bd0dbe902509c50492a88e5963b2b6e27d046334b356e5909f85763af2de70e93a89d6a00e2ef81ddd74f4a33d3f8406d05b383fda569a5a574fb5e3c0c86a5096e94174b79b2a4eadebccc2c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"1d7dbe4e83913bad3fa918262ab0f45cdb9e4e61667694f361ddecace06bf352b18dfab4c32bff9a013d3b92a2da8ed698168155ddc492f8ad5d65cda8eed212793cd9aec8acde7e00f952bb5d00c53c5c181e89":"":"f9c51ff8f264cae722734502f6799e4fc5bee773d31e3e31":"6a171a0a8801017a1d924f80fc5d9d6592b8b28a342f30de":"425024bd1d1a66d4527a3e8a8307b3206923bc1d693f5b7f9017f0d5527cd6591016758794ac89e2f682cb2d66f8d28f9a2f5ae2974a75f4d0de17dcd02e93bf29c69175fceba262378bafbe3eb7e3dabe974889306d0a2ebd0ad9d934c37b1ad89ac1fc28493e6b1f6f24620e40eaf7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"a6887fe41ed5a615eb030b31b86315d32d13dd5ad506566ea23ea3b162b8dd621129736c8dde31708a7fa4a4c606dc212b3440617111e94a5c6722c3a729d84d2e5858c23ba8bb249456a11d63dba9d4260a7213":"":"a52036daa8172111e89c8991ca818bdd711095a1602f2f15":"cba427a2b7bb64002e1da3159d643e002516bed279e0d442":"cf0f5881032606c21a8ea20adba6a72e176e968f10b08ab6d08f997b24fc2a24f2c5d44d1b99deb7db4f388dc8ac268f966a34c857cc5f43efc601674bc548ffeaee1c13415df6d0240835832cb75840b60711cb636f509dd9b87b698615959688e9afeffa50671ada05faa564c87ad5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"a563459889ca29b711086adfbf18f284fdd18601ff69916af1ce47510d33f205d4dcd0080f9dfedb2bc1e2e60fa0b9cae094102bc7a705cc223279e0fc3b0020b4facafc2b31b9bca92382f3810d5a4e3ef626a9":"":"5fc83f1f6dc0ad454bbacf2df366c803cc1d2fd46bf78d32":"1a9654667cfd6ad0aad9383be04ec1480a494262b3fee823":"cb45ce96a973728bdade51f91004ac09e155173769063b3fb4712493d8877f088127a3492588e99fef648a101cf1c238fdefd798dd4928b5bb3a851eed693f37d67360a28a2b27c4406e9ddefdffba662529b91a980bbe4eb381cf9734b336e2b64e7482e0328c2e2bf81e39edc30d97" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 0, 192) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"886d098731abf3140d512e0d348a384d25372667fe7e4f0ce713b1d2eca7b2ad939b25af03f78edad75bf0ab95b4110710d0e12e714e03f7df35db59fc4ef2906cf36c6c8897b802200a83e60d16f7fb064abd2a":"":"a4f42d83a492db3fc053d1275c6f264706fa932955c3da62":"4505c0664e59bb4388020470838bb098c4ae1338c268adf2":"4f9c3c60ee32042735cc539b9a23d04c2bc6bcd68db04a58240305f165bccebbb98e0f4796b283a0d78bdaccfcc8daf19f21a72945be07996bbb0b606643c7753f76ee6371292d3e681468b714e16bc32db14ad6d777677137ebd3731186ea72b840b8c4ae79ecb2c61352ea056d2d6a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"a26af93571ba84b58e14e921a6bada73083ec17f21580a152703e1741392fc9ce6046f77d6eda5000f3225ef28425e30cec138a16b0ebd885fef074c6da2a7b126fcd1f056e3a5fd5627368c63681cc10fbf750b":"0627d10b1e5b4f0fff96d0c7e684deb9fb6a4e48959dbc29":"":"":"98d6bc7ec7cd72da4c750d9173518a9a17120fe9af10cd1a7d872fac505d9276c551b821a868cb8b4d8b10eb3b05845827717d2975814b5080a2f4aa50c5b112bd01b8652f2d1b56a88c6c891db5f3f40d1d1f0648d84e6ce2138c2c879884eb4847856198579eac759a065a5d384c46" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"5fd08930ba404d13a7275227660869e7eff10e103548e6ea15f0816ea93b649f6aba408ac710c49eaddea0b4d1e219577e6f6ba4f193386228f6fdf9cdcc50d5bdcf6d1f249e9cae0a097bb341e2ba3581a3f2ca":"7a463958302109d5fb9fef1a232b5aea13ba58a60b70911c":"":"":"a1a5c9d90f9340c807efa2068c6a0b872a4ad51a7cf90e14b4797dd894361712fc9507bd61d8ba984ecf1345fa3cbcf3031e2bc4302354cdf3f615c3a1bf43f60a464698e250726c37a7a9a23e1ff7e8d96df03957e3a0b5e6c4c4fdbdcff487e467b12dbc21e07eb8a7c4cd7f779912" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"625d6a509ec43c55bbec45b4244fa0bce24c74cc270851f2d32e4bb4f1961476af40088b5ea81f7a86efba78abdfb50be09e1a68851899e0e9acd95f77f16e8b0aea5a9bf29bc1a18d32158cf69c794f3f47fe61":"bcfa259c919f6e56c77914a272959cda6d2cafeaff87d91b":"":"":"b5bc1f03099547ce1a359bede1f9f3b76b38e8b9cc781fb3909899144f4d0a4ba93272552bfb0ddcda51165d0ca3eae47d10961a62692bd9edf2a9339c8ad14469f1834eee3c3fc1074cb1493054f84273e4adc73e5eec6cba284c5b7fd8005f10cb67b0fe16ae0b4ff30d50ca245c5d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"bc0c83de31217ff6b22c719de8c6653fcbd8aff7925f04624c76f586ed3bab324b64fa8a1ec14efa8d8d0b41eb6735d517f6c647ef8bedf3036a6ca90fa1d2c528722de33f76f7375711b6b4127b86fe096e72cd":"d7ef6b5dd09c08437313871078ac730c2f85a5abae6d6e24":"":"":"6d415afc0151c3cb426eb3b90c209feb726c01e28785678bb0b8d9143d4b7f31ae07e384816072e2df31350b133a8f4e3ee18f04b154d194513d9b072a695e52bf03eeb4c9a1df85dd6ef98d2453dc39390bc3a17f3ce499d9b182c89d0591dc3dbdb7aecb626b07f0ad2737bf8200b2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"caca2b8631502fbd8bec33e89066e77b97a57b09d21a92dcc7b65897e50d7a312f287932c529f6a6fd8be6fad5c467f6c15f9bc0f39653a6e4963c0d4c4baa9d6ad39f4ad2a1d6587377ec3898e63e02cc0c454f":"33691da7461d3355659c4ca927b4d3e3bbfd8e775b535538":"":"":"89abe8e656667299705c4c8b208f0fc400897397d15aa3574cf86c0a6415dd30ac5d7d8bc629d8ba52e6e5af63818475874266e98a43ab5d3085d2856950e8d487ea22e01f9ab7fe1862be1fdb9a97cc24eb9ad05beebb202716607e8b164cf63cacb92504e80e68e641af71ad6ee47d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"5d97de97d6f81a858ad6ae0262e58169b27c25adfc2bff506854e6bfd37f3a4d8c4b46cd78d0a76b0dc67e0d3f90fb04c2131bc31239defc8eabe9be0fc589a554a4b77fa79c64c03bbf87a32031530d99bbe397":"a0d8be30a0972002f21ce2d7cf3c8e84907c638e0093354d":"":"":"67536d7352a49a1a49110a1dc1b77dd1924be34123e027aea0ba6064ae0aa051d4470ccbf923e0c96c86f2d440f17f45b67c4c7785a6f5006bf0cadc13269540b2c59bb75f642e9668feb601fc60c18b94d65ebea0dfe5fb284e003a58837f9e9e120481ec2ba972c755c6a9134af683" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"9ca7149b0c5ccb7a0f7ec5399c644dba98c418373460c59978d91db57ff714897ee71caf459c1dc164655140810992fa6cbbb708ba2e61053d5866ba6a1bbdbc639fd21be4383beb4a4d370e86d0e9739ef849ae":"2ade2ffc19de7fc94767193223aa1fb3461cb29d970c8f05":"":"":"b39d6db529fbb3c6a90d6b7057759c26a9fa26024d2b65e3bf459881ff0f88a5b93b87e0779635022cea81db313329b61613742cc82b52fff1a2e6e24ae0eebc0917d5e4573466e4aee3f0ee0053445566eaa080c3e701bc35d40ce5105b4b6572baa7b4c84a16e4aab501e6ef670164" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"cc751171d828dba023f430b3f5a7134f733f4cc1ec76495e98a6dc2a627d97924716d7e6b043cf15c62ce8da1dda2a930c88d6d4d12ca992a501f773dff5d38e42f150f1c55ee358aba1e73cbebf465baf9fd0a6":"4ba50a75424970526022c7351831c58ee75f1e3aa0c47749":"":"":"8b387e55b9c10d0cc336f5445755c0b6dbe971bf69a04682b21c9303a66e093b7dccf33fc685765c6d2bcfa3020892ed09ce6ea3e3355b3bc16741f34d40b5c96bb085c1574801d14b4f71c97cf64e75dcc330fafa1d1e626822609a9af62c894dbdd56307ccf1ebbb7ec09d500096aa" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"1f2ccd29bc38e8364a4beb0e89984b88d61dcd31d48e310ae691c0e146f495b9d8cf443ed12f3ad2da7c59c2a2f6b8df4e0202414791e106c1f879879b7a46ac207f45b5fed69c38309adf15dfd0dd75742c0df0":"e0c49aee71c4c060aac1bab1f438f9e2b0c96d710ebfef77":"":"":"593677f65ca4339c0dd8b1ae9278cc49adaef1cf889760b4631a379d82bc25123dfd2e1436d0b6b890d4155e3236fc1e2cef67d8bc0454099051e220d6925b37c47408fdacdfd54cab7be70f8b3b3dfc5a86f181dd559ff7182f225f7de87dd8bd69143be270ce76d2562c6e01ba4c4e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"f1bee9caecfd0397a6cd76f356ecacf1053981c64d315db4a51a244fe3b22ef997392f65dc13cf30f5b8f5edb7f8f55863a30156722536d02440e5f06e503795d2401775a560685f2ad3c98aaaa22726cd6ec45a":"9d42670ea4113ae02302cdcc660b497f3ffb19b9aca8babf":"":"":"78f31a24cda43acfbc4db7f17c57805a4b53353d668596247358b47e8f8deeaca312a7f9ce78832bc1da2d6b3727fcb847ca4feb1695a2edfd2ab24c486da125be1c1af4f78b749afdb57f97b4a8b892fd87228f116ba10fa739059581256de4fb865d1115c58284cb9850a24e5b7615" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"17b3146ea3ac1afdca446275f3b7539a517766b90e2da2c4c85db4802943efcd8009a9ffdd054440da16edb641a050fce3f3cab3d5f03d550111daeaa8841a9c814def76eec9c4e910788c710562428a39cd0987":"f3831c1bc859fad452a76ce513575a23e8b790c90de4575c":"":"":"c6c85936cd52b5271a6e70410e0b9d960d76f3236b548cfd4fea26504ca8a78e58ee914c6cf248f30d7ee3547eedd3a4d9869b15e326c911aaecb7f0c221f8eb9208a9b355e4b1cc7926380d25bb776f3e89904943b3fdf306012fc95d06b3b7c44ef55c9eee675150b332e2181f2a32" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"fabe526177dcd476be9950233ec56f9122a9b083e589c9264add302d4768c06020cf53e7708bc728582360cbf06a18de38e3da2642dd6751aa686dbf11734bd75a422571c9f2420915d7d79d9efea870e72d262d":"ba5858340e6a82b2ecfe1190215bd8da995ee8ef572eed8b":"":"":"10260dfc2f2322f530192e96a2396694dead62f9b206137108666cd199939184503da75598f54a89dff885a9856140b56687347c2c066a1593bfe02b8bd2cd93e939c424b33683a13678ba5f34df3f2f5f50b2a708d1d5a04683db00a607e2f80e5feb20086e3d64294e9732b0776c51" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"b7c9a1d221fe10552bb0b799e18d12cffd1f76d6a1e6dc79a36584ac7e13c355b9323d0ef2f97fc2d8a26e6c37209a485963788aeab084e923a3794c63713c2ee288ba3a99f2d407adfc1b87ba64fcc5a7f98e4e":"e563f8c8318862c7117af8946823e8570ebc64b3de1b293e":"":"":"100c460c12e5ab12a72bd4351f7b608f5578060b262f21d735fe79d13c942035a76f001adfd39fe93caa22b6274bec282e640469d3f454d108991a1b73d8acb3d392732fc24cafb15fbe248441462bb2c1278883610ba28486ef82ec2ff3d20eb9601866c7dc4eaf44cdd73e5b5ac14f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"78e5d4818964d748282fa8dd386ea9c920c4fc5ddb9d2204a3f6285082b8065dd3944ce193722e973f8300783e37991e6c4a6286a1a0fe3703dd78ae951c88a0ce47b1a23d91e0926358221713670a78732d5470":"fa058586d35f0d74d2c473e005e7f8ddc33a1f6d5bc79d75":"":"":"6b603b098ca74b7fcf3c8f9b42dde5b3b51e84cab4f67f4d87bc6575ad4fa3f1e0ee27085f88e2a5ecf4f57f9ba92638e52941535806d2cd1b5aeb5b7c81b3d44d41cf5b8073b646a9cc1b0a9f7e183b082e9f2270acd928623e8a46b46257e1b827e8b88b55c88a3a3a067cfcb9b2b0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"50241739e3f08c910baea7f9ba481511b6ee5d69bb1a2dd34f3987a231cc25f39a1a966390e391a33dc21281372589e2a667cdbbe4267710d5244fd342c959b7272b39e5cdf67701d47665b61782541e94aa224f":"6a7d2f2dcfcae8a284802c97d77917e87c6cf8417c2b16bd":"":"":"4402afee12048c1c6a44624d2df026798930ec732884899ffd20d17f1c8d7c221cf5edac8679a21ee11b177ecfd61927d4ccbb175ee6b49cc6f371450904c2666aaf2e6cb36cd55cae3af772beb80955cf67b4e8be1fce11250a39693ecb7f8ac05aa23b949ac74bc9a67060cd60cc77" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"c3005cdc5c5b7b25ed78c9684f3faf6278f9a9c5a9fb202014a29882e50b21e56ec8b7947fe871daec2626f32372123f44a8721ff4339e0a20f978ea27609eb495c2342e9ba719bbd2b44ff503db2322ada1c982":"c4506109937e0f9352fc881b0396b0a103626a15addfe525":"6ee49c76d138eaa3fc10cf411e0b8ad5488d77f74faacf13":"8825122b506dd6f3a58811fe6c9a7e9271a6e68dcdd590e2":"e818887ca1c84717e277baf00913d65ed58a8f90b8728080a03043bb2ab53f55fa605ba0cfab29b4cb694f6aae6594dedcbe6f74e1f7573c2944f3703b89a52789b0170077ea8e66d8299ba5cc139943ab96254065a27abca2098a85162fb01d294d8671b00206b7f784319384e01b3d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"9bf2ab19aa7e9ffc3461522f3cf85b3292b54bd3e1099a42dd6f5349d169d59a152b2dce675874b665fcff802260ea84b358f6fcf8011b511834e8447a73c1f675b7598d836dc9fbf40f1dd0f481f47f95f3ef4d":"38d7a2109c6fad9205abc22b9ff705b7f671c4bde5b662d4":"b46e928cb59eac0cbed65645767e96fd824fa95cb96a1cd7":"532c8d3748205cfaa826fba7f240e9926cd3811da8fd1a5a":"bc367839d1510316ac3ba17fb7bf633a6eb4b61dc0b03cf1cca564db8248ced0b47ccb36e730c0237b0812af30361b5dce662636b23f87d6ace82cd3e34d45a1133b35ff9b8bde8fb29fe82298820c0c87f0e30887ddb15c9644bfb12578f0878a710771ad22fe16935c66681378f5f8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"a3bfbed559c396b807ffa80409fc4e2c23ba952f64a41c07d3af5e5b78d8ef88171bd5022d3e02efefa644f4fddbe207e59397605a0408b0201f6a882def64d973c0714555d2c7e0a6fddf49558fd1328074ca79":"4c63bef79f71fa82168928619cd09b003aeb2ba2b04150d2":"c85bb368a82d57c70cd5ad6327187c8550f7c10380b2f030":"5d467e9c06ee058ca066dadd6f6ec6b0da59ecbaa4ddd12e":"1ce311c919c67e151b51ce3060384ca95c071a295f01e54349abaa2da8ef497ea1364454133d20f57da28985bfc6d1d2f58f84d144c85dbe3c9fd5e8958ce06f2f5ad5af7e16bf90ddb4a1e2947f78008467fcc38b5a082eb1612d68e36e3c0abfbfb3a321eef3754ac16c41f96bd635" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"1b2c2419e85386716135b3c142d749f1f5bc23edbf8c0a1c53b72f474484c545761b21aeff05cdd35621d104ee393e791737c48c5a6e6b25b58c5c5be28ecf17c410c9c9c3c3aa2b6385f66759f31b61f9fe0286":"b69011f446e50880a15bb0dd00229f765bf77b2a40040109":"67eb63a168aad8712a0e7e0f162af7ac7893e902f1aa72cd":"23bb752e6232144630e3d3a6daaa1e58a5ca315f21fe1d8b":"cd8e6c6b8a1f7f98f5d796023fdd4f1da2d72eedb96a8e85cac661da24dd0a7810fa04be0491c69db7617712582b43ec4bf112d9e2932288f25b64fb7a2a09ac8747b8f71ce75e3c80b854336a0457b8013ec6dc1268b4c7e8f7d3422a4a5d432f8d9705d6a273a09b9f9273f4928c4f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"62d059e3ecb695167e93b3cfd77f96e681985ab5d68f15473a89f9cbc4012e1c090a5a9e65f738be938f44fd6cb157fd9b737d9389e4e56b6903d4d015f9d80d96336730fdf57787296d447ea91de7e686c7a81e":"d8f121b2bbdb8530c6315c63e0a52e383c163c033d3b0854":"830e2cab11331b761aed55db61681fffad3a61a1a06adfec":"c7783d7357ff30e88cfdbc90569daf03d3fec8caf89619ff":"e44c9b35d3b847a928748094ba6754d1c5de3cbe3d90d4e2bd0c0f19dc5aed7228c541044b2b14d7e67dcc148ab04abff7c22a8f1fdbec4d68ad24a7c4b0f0e507bd7f2b4845593363da484b481906fb7207844597238b9d40c14237004e275572aac6a6d84d151fa58abc0987e54e18" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"fcf3887b4505f7a1273ad5b32e064ff51682bca23ed974ca981871a5b7f63e5ceee58131f9a01fa7c37ab14150c9323a03f694e463496c4159eb8e5d3ebc62f41264beb93098a42a3dd406b983e1fb040d108f93":"9b3e97eed077155cf181829233868d27eb773c398575dfb2":"75a75a15c622e69eba698a064b0b41c8bc80ef803df0f29e":"7b6a20a222a81dfa6fd164def816c2b6708bd4c761b2bb8f":"0b3d501f728d2f1d8b0d7dffda0160157b30d0d97932315f77022d1a6fb30d9a0ee4383f2f63377ac6e57b16b0c7480a6f5dd12ed3ec0bc6f104a26c86592daa3f68a499570703306e2c2448e784b67cd6efdb4ae64a2e8ffa5929e74c95b663c9b7fe891633f07d7b50f5f16e9fe567" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"7a6a0774f2cb5ddce6b5242782fd3d7b5c7c7e31cb5fe95367c06f29a5488fa37feb34d689c646cdb162e258ad636a030ff74f6a7ff876417fb08f5c5decdcc98692538bebf9958c627ad8287633f98c587cdaec":"fb16aea72967c43b8803bcdd3e794911f6d53f2cb7946cee":"67d89947396322ca243e2c591a3adc8fd9f1ef448414fca8":"a0d568f4fce862e5e1b22acca29e60d7bc6cdcf6cc277794":"758b4685b0db1093eebde07ba11085a9dcab64c8d5adacda070fd2b292bec49240f25e158fc96cb1d0ecc9ebcccc360b981d140e3cdba54fc697313014450a9af29d9d55dcbc5bb9a38e4f10c6a3e41874d5c6688f22d0c5714301083cbbd0014880af0f7d088dabeb4e84a64f26d2b9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"19bbbbfcb755cd9dc000abfc03343ef64193141c3d3f43120f55674616e3d96b6086adf47c906981923c98ef7dd0fbb2f7af0ecbbd2de848f2b25cba8651b7e3aeaa0c59b605e6d4710a01406565ea30d0c4f68d":"e77cce9d26d283bb5d6e8300ad0f69df723324d23928c6f7":"0586c76051462d0483071213804385d01a07bcb27db05e06":"1c9363d0b3e9f42b6c722b8d62f9c633066587577fe766e3":"6d458079264d5f3940d098aae092690b7d04cd46d6d5dde753063b7194118ab67d3848459156b8f0216d85b5c583a1bfc000e68111be459743175fd114253cc24db72ecc978ff8620301ecbf18f42fc4697d91150649a8254a9850d5c28f9c4e187e409e496e2a659b2e79c06074c5c9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"c2b577bfd802b8f599ca14bdd5fe5003ee28ae69ca5c246df4f62d9e21a7793281c48f73ffea15f3c3d444ba48367fde04cdf6d62498b8afb24966a8662461015135cb55034a63571a032d3cd2c1e6cf4a6855ef":"f0de29d4530b4af75b8defe9b3b24dcb7ce0add4aed6f72d":"90ac05703a8e0c6057dd2d8b1a6f16f0059e7c70679919df":"16935f700de9fe529a2bbe811dccad430e27dbc60549c3e5":"56988f9328a91314e4b3ae027bc6f43a01fe471615f3a319afd9bb63f55b13e681ac0ae830d4d3057882fe247ca4decbb26af811282f59ee89ea38642e4ffad9bdfae44bcdbc3a289bf431e0bfc68148c12ced1853e698e74f74e24aa434937390fd41cb4e78f823a262900f2f44c1fa" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"b5c4acc63ae5c68ca404bded2d36a391e8b2e9ef3b32eb598aa94fd6b5ede6c3d9c33ec77a195abb6f8cbcafb6c492a1d78f04439bdc442168d1eccc783d53a92e16b90ccbdb0284b383cb96af04e81728d1cda0":"b3e6df5e9ae10c63da4269de170550b92dde7c6e33af228e":"c9787b641b5c881dae53a69e2b3514ce2ea81e5879765bd1":"e4abedcfc4cc69da45467bf2bfb03d823abc19a746e3c582":"e14f46dcab0ba39965f170f01a07308090b051127685ada6601112aa236093f7a760530f856617d9e027c8279ef33d9fbc4b624ae26a277b9e6077ac71e2d2f101b84ebed007ddeddb4286aa4729cb3b28798387b757d8e99a7b6d2631601fe7ab4caad7983dede59b94f4c920ef1b29" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"7302ea40e214308136b8427e601ad61132d195f870f2a861c7b8ce1f686bf325a155d0aae1211401bb844893dba2909060c76cf9cda757d9e2cb24f5602fedf6a7412f49497c82866a8c9b56e2bbaf912f760255":"58efaa77c9bf446ce8d3f3ce73b7d1f014bdeffea2a2fdde":"68f9eab1893186d7e5cf3a8c37bf1c229344abdceecd9de5":"a0d3bf1de632fb19ca5326d936f79aafe59a0e809b13f10c":"f2c6a717ab10a9cc89f6d3a07bf6077fa33c2e5d67475ebcdd1b895fd0067941ed3fd8f251352403c2680df2319a882f39a91f8ccb7df2c06a13037f057962e23b8ea0654ef9bfc19b6ec982e539ea6afcd1145cee582d27b708691354b4c397a51d004c61687c1c9c948576009002ee" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"48ce334fcdeae603c54fc228461e7173681a8e8387e0c048c2acfdd6a78c955deb7dc25bea4e9924c4a2ae22d9fb6b227452addd0b6eda7769f9ceaaf2ca34568b3c198ebdcf5f6ed11f863097bd56f42d648862":"6bf4c173d264dce03e475fb3bde9fca2474877627bfb0c5d":"2a728f461ce1067dd38896002724b4967c1a9cfececd3437":"2b862cd7a94c1776b26022c27c0e4f2d199ccb782caae6dd":"07f80326ea781bd95efe729867d6c39465213bb698b5e486e6c5f27d3fac4fda3cfb7c831fe6291062d4db2aff59781efb4f4cf428236aad6a55111b969885a6b851d5462278d0863909a07796e5e0e8448fc0d674a4408cd9e91e98e3adcec2064ad37dcc566faa80149519f5ea261c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"b23c748a9c9d206ed4ce6b8bacb6f7e17cacf5649ea8d1e1144a96e977a4cb22c0f37139c3eedbcc8b9024c6f21412f1600fcde1488f95744446df7b6e21a858224b9294a75829a014697cc4b363c3ad0e152ca6":"325bdbd8c14b766d4a7ff0e14128585b21af76de7ca30ff1":"2e002a406bb8090eae6c950944a4d6768c89d43cc0d8bd17":"4828622ff56d0867bbad03bac51b8c939a5dfa33a362b129":"58cebdf4676a21ded5eba4dd19452f5dec909c589751879ea4249a4c9fef834d85dcfc95ada82f7fba1476451774036246d7a496d4d427f37647ebc10fc2e1125b0b71da1fa5f1479c5681e9d7acc9b88b527390734d943bff6a76c4b22bb4f6ac331f7710b95f6806fa35a29a2fa35f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"606f388e8ae35faf979434656144370991e89b7457ca5b55d5bf2b48fe8cb64f549f48a812edbbb4cff895efb21c90eb26c1db239ed72da43504a1e09c56fe144f2d09242f2670dbe2561456d938352125b19131":"5e039f38d6f9a9c4ecc67158f40d3c8de61808fd7476fbf7":"21c7d976da71bcde51a3b4bc1b9a79cc6c4ca51ec992e479":"bac1c5904816c3040eb532622f127ac3e28cd78ba68404a9":"5f951dd774bc1a0818b249ffc51348bf1f36aa4b9d6a3348d36df84b5d3e824adcdf8b87ffecfec13fe36ca354625ae8db8a69722254c3f6e7027b866c529f9bed25360e0cee7ce41f996d50d224a08e965e0e5dd67a77142e2a3de0d559b9dae8919ad0387ba5fdef699e42016d7291" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-224, 192, 192) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"be16ca52551a6a0656c40539e3155eebbc416cbfe212101f8edc2f7118472907ae9b2b9574abe81257533115472610ab401d1ce1f8998884af43fa5776a59ae38c88631a066fa85d24dfc9b2547caae598cd0fa7":"ed000ad2e479513861014e8ff45a481a494af312d2dd5563":"feb295c74975f1e1c738988fc70b9d2603c7da93832154a1":"764705681b7781573af811fa7751dbc27d667af7a1e59dce":"ba4a0583d8d6c5b4216a0875cfad594485858dc7f9ef265d4ed0c0f0fbfcaaf5ae318df2d7fc530301813d9f49826030625f7ea02d0630b3573c486b1fa0ef4269cbfb6fb86675c11fb7c0570cf7ff4fc7affdb00625ac453c23c229a4ea5f540c66f031ab3462f7d12659eec990501f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"9969e54b4703ff31785b879a7e5c0eae0d3e309559e9fe96b0676d49d591ea4d07d20d46d064757d3023cac2376127abc60f2999100f738c10f74792676a3fc4a262d13721798046e29a295181569f54c11d4524c9071bd3096015fcf7bc24a607f22fa065c937658a2a77a8699089f4":"":"":"":"abc015856094803a938dffd20da94843870ef935b82cfec17706b8f551b8385044235dd44b599f94b39be78dd476e0cf11309c995a7334e0a78b37bc9586235086fa3b637ba91cf8fb65efa22a589c137531aa7b2d4e2607aac27292b01c698e6e01ae679eb87c01a89c7422d4372d6d754ababb4bf896fcb1cd09d692d0283f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"371d2d3a50d8fef465b02d57f0f102e820c624b0e11703bb81badf8b0ca1841594b0bd16c1fc0e5e1235dfd414081164c54ffd056c9cdf688284f615cfb4814cf28ac6dac05756e07e6bc9f56033666ae35819ae359d53aad14adc9199ea154e45ee2b064955a8f334b9f62cea23d0b0":"":"":"":"b474ddc66e4cac2fdba195cb9c5ee521f4a3ebc24e3722df281774b7c9acfa87bd5b85c1e4e559e2859f2382ecc3a820d76cacdf10ad559691b7059b4e7f3d9a4453ffa241627a3a258b3439ab7f592e95751c826b6f89c92d1f85fc855d231045c405941b9a8b5101f76e6afed9c2032712eb5c60c16a7ecfc26ba0d47adf04" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"60e5cc3b260a0fdb9e994bb7c7b7fc32ef0117813a33b4f6af13ed81a61edc3c7209beb9336855fe207fcfb77356894b4fba0b7c3a93cf6cdfdafdb4b56cf0938f2cc18ed54a02a3551247ee10e606b0aaa8d30cbe0bdd3781a1b238e19cbd86a2dbdcaa9f94c3d39f9deb8c4a6801e7":"":"":"":"628ad20bad88e5b0ee30107640248a81f7c1ef77f757a40e53927d3b10adc5b734d379d71a28b3fbc0787d6054cfa926a5a74b464b818f8d185430773e7ab055f9647eec01a71dcf680abf7589329e1248ad9df205d10ceccd1bdfe4c9b3f6d7b804c5114c1406db83c921c828df36f5755e989520274669f7f06f5550c97d4f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"5b9320748b1c4c44624b26504e9e9765a136f965c5a8d787585391782c7432e33e5d97a4c05394d570402b908f54b80cafe9be7eba6c4c4424ff53adca50b522a0ec1b51efea35bf474fc6a0d6aa67d44582c01f287f8a8a9caeb571e26f86100990e5633139b56f4c733cd5ad08c4df":"":"":"":"70883300ef578f796d8f85a30cd8b9e4e2c29f84b7b127836450571408c92b5a1b5bb040f83bced508f26d7066ee0b6e6364eeb1c639a5292050f755fc78e828c08054b14e3a9993c2685791e2eb1dbf258cb762ecde1aa2ed41fc004ac989e0fc26e245ec87a96004c5b28c45d8d9e0829bdb696137f9c944f538c28be34b05" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"35a17d1251628f82da8b4b35b979783f50e76b2cd77e03ab2f64d29d26b22d82a7b89cc8ba85c70e10d42adc80da014a11cbac5342d46634dcbb33baea277a67afec23b3f50875e4b965b3565de66e36025e0db252b1b31e45683a9676b55f462abbf6887fcd770599b123f109e5c9fd":"":"":"":"86e2bb0f5ddd938978692ef93d19d34865a04484cf82aaacf4546378e2198a2d8050ddf53ab618fb98f9bc59a614e3d60be06a54eccc7e3e54bce7afaf979a6ff4d7fa19a9d7669656fa21fbefa9a70b134c01844c0b85a86b9f98a14255158ae8f5822ee506f88e81f09760810b19f4129d6b47a10d8837d633671558ec3771" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"3d6c40cceeaca0633c2dc71b7135be9d64d07aa80e6f3a86f43775855f14d3a4f5b702ec622e0c84eb3fd4662ae150ec364d343fd8068b87a8b29e9da7f181b91aa002639980da5489720068816df144ce1c01ea38915b6207374cae626f7199a42d47c9232094d16a04c368f0c11d30":"":"":"":"75eb7a740b6284358f1b2f7c8c1875c027eeb05e0350179f7bfdba23dc823285cbc33cfa6ca22c8e70bba00e903d3f71ca66a1d7081f742574613c2e8854a0d0e59cbac17356b1abb65b533bf563d8169700e196d7d1e25be8e4ed4502298b21dba8ef822c565443c46a8ec08bf3cbe11ac51eb765e53d2b035a8afa29ed1147" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"6174ea125101e34850e11dcbb0e48dfed7834efd45dc9d196a42e9bbebc9f00853467570badf39ac3366084682491479ec5e80af6d5e73e0cea43d1ce15c277ccf5bee254c2d4e57623a17653d48bd82d801b0cab2df27f804e23e4dc1dae0b7eb6160264c8ca4712d775970a8756a0e":"":"":"":"a9d269c3771e1fd3cf2a5f4470c7e6560c4db008cce0f4c0d1ed939157567cbfcc2353c19e5c1b535c02d5601b45ea2a1d8045b42df6508b7389fdf350c107dae05da4e6e1c078a26aec3d0ee5225a680c15c563e3727d352bc257d3a4defda48e6dfdd5c7001439cc587ff033c5afd3b1fb7c618b2113736a362058adf12968" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"6a7df1ea8b6d92fb4f1b66b6014c97466a9b9edfc68de647a8a4c36dcb0f4d776bb353bbd5c18ddc5aa274ff29abecc946eeae7eb7e931673c1ba88ec99d3105059dd1f9a7ba8145e0bc86459e525028dce62564a7bbb5479320d75cafe40b4c7a0daaa2bed5a48a0eaeaaa8d6c76d1b":"":"":"":"32e66872ffbc6d93da7f923f82574e3273c81a289257246d3e69b94365115e2b91ddcb077034914f0bf3b5871b62ab773decd00121c87439ad5318adeac31ac024b46e7b49cee5fe0f1dae93a4b93d4245c016ae6a7ba7e9e9857a38b4c220c3a30903eabaa3210d93a08f703626ead078d59b28a42d76081e9b67d7ab68b366" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"0a9056319735191d4eab3b70f533e59b0a5a70aeeb5c00cdeaa5dd26ba7af09f2e259bd4e04cc9f5ba8b5c8dedf7b155a1ad8112d6b1daead36cdd337266fab65c85824f878219e611d48c4f73ac7c0b96e40762c87d1a78e63e3b266f5fd7b9ce86252b9bf46b0855238602c098204e":"":"":"":"0ea1662f0b95b6c1cbeb82f7b7523eba3f569544b0841f78b1c05809fdffb776eaa6d1c77a8b60ddc680c18eaf9096013d2f4bbd41617e3c482d29aca8d84822c07b55825e46a26abe7c39fe17d2228e399cb88e36e435438ca919b37a0f868fb5243afdc2cccea3b06fd313aba67dc688203878d2be0f4f8864d831622b6f4d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"9ee3fca776f4e7336f5336e426d8208848c854c7b0b271d6ec84dd3e86a86fab42c0825cf2be769f7e31924b34a3a760c94d0db714b2a09ccbe26b2acc8071f083332c3ef50802b2aee1eef195b74e9eba52fa49901d67585a766a9465d3db843d3f0a4a3a9d535dd976dd98aedd9df8":"":"":"":"1c1151e976bdb947bdf7bed108c742428aab2e6f5ac7cbcca6fcf2459d2410bf6ad89636b02337a453a21bf1aa72f393deadc925f9a4dc7ff978ba837c58ea30267cfe61dbca4a366b9ab9904ca6223f76d2d33d8d3deb959c6c57baba368e9e67f2d9d4d3758d072df868d2aebebedfca3bfcc018cdb19ba37b593a0ae80c6e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1006e3b161fdd1f30442346fc91b3371a29531bc9964f84d3fefd0ea3a340efc06096974bbd600cb644db66b738ffcec05696a981e50c7f6864a8279e83985ddd42a9c74affdfdc8452ac25575def3af3250da95f0182331dcc7d2d50ff71dcde00f92b6874ee902e613779de0789dde":"":"":"":"3bee9fe6d08899fc7eb6e1f0978c68f5dc9dcc76fbfaea7a652d0ad22632396d6e065fef14aafac7d3afb066ea743f0cfba804cc9686405ac966ba7a291f5dbd54dde5d6a330383b2355319e3ef4056b856386cf8378a5e11d9d36b0207e2cd414f9ade2af057c53c8c31e72fe765f0582da5a685eb42a0fd969dbde2642c4f5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"83d0546d20fe18184c5ee79bea6f5818881d158dcc7780c0350baad7662d3b0578bfe5590b9923c3500ccf96a797d9fb246f31e6b2454c6a443233ce0264fcc0ffd41f0a3bdccdd9417d1614aee596880571ea5f2e62fd6c6e555613024262a26a169f17380a19f2e5020ad3359e4842":"":"":"":"0e453a3e0a4d58f418018f09c1b7ee5e3df81d309e54b77567b180437c258b870069c0257bb8db332e9d790ed325633260967e898e7933d38832fe7a677c9484992918421c75d7072b9c04162b202872200e28db3c03d157c8adb077c4c8a661c534ff5c1bdcce80ef047eb197b0bf3939daa8be31d6156e9d573cca4b11008d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"fb09b02011b54f9fa2a30783141a520e11fe3e2dd55b25799c19be9fa7bf3c20e8fbb8fe9e43014516d25c6930865c2727827cc01406aaa1827bf2d9272ebe18a44ca74d63b3b78fd67e61d5d96db509a77c857ae04e06bdcebb7aa491d1b9a99a0ecb8c7dc3d7bc69775721b75289aa":"":"":"":"ef8783f00156c497796d787c018c9c01cfef9357cff2ba8f047109a0d17f719ac46952a7147e7fe8d60fdebe2c744e50522e09aa0d18de258459840ae320d48cb71ba11432169ddcdd15ce081f3ee9719cae4ba601bda1cbbaf9ebe82559b69107111c96e468d23e0268e53c9430cebe7cb02b547d6913b76e4c1643b2a2045a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"07de9e5e57368e7833177066c804575d984bbf9ca4bf03ea3118dce063027b2a1da1e930b356722ea0c0f02e09db6e92f407fd606fbddbcb3e574f0ef548c12b97460e2079a004c1b5f4612ced9f5034d8ed92d5e98eb176db2eba898915f31af7cd0763e7da1e64ba132a08deb82864":"":"":"":"e780aa6744f592da3fef690e78fe8c4fd40c364cf5f1a8be34f23f7324ab387b09aa3b5c126bbb5fb25fdd26d4e536f2eaca8f0ea8c93ac863c1c5d80314480fd9e2382ee1d9b17828b7f3716ee669b9f369655091f0ee23163996c7c815c3f5e705c9e48c25fec05a485eb39f3814065283dd1d0c37cdb7713acf24e3484afa" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"5957069eb143c1526826c15358e0e949096108fc6e09537cf3d6426e155b4178bff8a8b7c57c3cbf8f9c78b52d76509c1ec089e083b29c0adbd7d703b3e0beeb2118a052548fb1e30455b080c111cbda6b4930e8fb7daf431060778445bad7d9c3f78dbf811e6c9c58493844d90e73c7":"":"":"":"2f5b7e172c5e291f68d9f59f0d14ec516e7e80c2eee36d1aa0734e3f819a976c74a565ad03334fbf1c60dacb1a6d150ce1316b5c256ca85c80fcee6ce0c7004a0a0ca8be5dce19a3b68f92f3f6b7f8e9c4a3177b93529b32b78a2d0ca18b27fe80b42546d1211587acee2bd5a63f3ae66b5e5d66a52154b52bea2b71cb05b9ec" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"2cad88b2b6a06e703de46185ccb2ddcf5e0ee030995ebdf95cc4fbc38441f17f32310770e04172c0cf91f6590cce44a4448bfbc5ce9e3b9da3e9642daecd994dfe373e75253e8eb585141224eca7ad7bafb57f69799c0b892b3015990e133698d543aa87829ace868e4a5e9525d62357":"":"ef6da5e6530e0d621749ab192e06327e995c3ac0c3963ab8c8cd2df2839ab5df":"44278b31ed853f0a510bd14650ac4b4971d8b426799a43511d016be68dedbb8d":"4c7dfbe509dc5a3ac26998723c6a44cad20b197fc86117c778d1568ab828923862885e97198f77a1cb45113f5d78726a0f120aec94afc45f57c8dcc1cb092b343480012858ef5bc559f57023442209326ec4a54d91ca3a77dfdf9e75f117cef50e6fd2dc9af6ddce8e6515b4a97357a97b6cd274f68a042fa41bbd7b7261b034" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b91fe9efdd9b7d20b6ece02fdb7624ce41c83a4a127f3e2fae0599eab506710d0c4cb40526c6bdf57f2a3df2b5497bdaef67509ca77ddfb72d8101a462816a695bb33745a7348e2646d926a219d4944397755353bab4a6b291607179d16b4a249a3466cc33ab0798517872b279fd2cff":"":"17c156cbcc50d6037d4576a37576c14a661b2edfb02e7d566d993bc658da03f6":"7c7b4a4b325e6f6734f5214cf996f9bf1c8c81d39b606a44c603a2fb132019b7":"9cdc638a192322660cc5b9d7fb2ab031e38a36a85aa814da1ea9ccfeb82644839ff6ffaac898b830353b3d36d249d440620a65107655efc0959ca7da3fcfb77bc6e12852fc0ce2370d83a7514b31473ce13cae7001c8a3d3c2ac779cd168779b58273ba50fc27a8b046562d5e8d6fe2aafd3d3febd18fbcdcd66b5016966a03c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a46367f0ca034a86604003faed2ba524b6c0bba8418fb158ba13a8f730d91ec49b3a7e35c619f0e1abda6d140b08af85e3cfe402b62a2e893fe0244e88b9a489a1035d287947139af7873e5f7d0485e87238bb11d4f631090c34365222eb95baf7b865be5f6410ea0aa0484e3de55483":"":"aa020a1aa92f8a426c5d0d44191c6b46f68c1abbd5dcbcff0df2c8e024a3288c":"38965ad5f163f663b3d90d4f5b67ed2f4db22c90e5878bddcd4f230dc77f4b0a":"6c7edf375281b751383211a3e09e46c61a9c425fe326041063f0f03e1cfc01e8a830f9c4bf77377c4a9946c61a8b7cc664b22973c556437c9f5557b1a1222c45789eb700e1184d5d6e52f597ba5b1deae3dd3cb2d8325ed5b3929946e3fcf9e4f199115eafba9abc87558fcecc63723cd8cdc8dfba48a3c64e8a70995b0c7ece" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"08b9db82f179055872383f58203aab4b9b701c6d7a1cd428bc1860cc70e4111dd5cff962725b20d8121fb4f484a846c8fcae938683cc1602b692ad88b2edb5ec1c8dd408f4c10ee77a460bbc40c8e365d5b0bab8b6c8fb3d6ae8f65dc91750600592d1f0f9ff661d39436329263b9213":"":"88ebaa296598dd71d22ad5cdbd16603e1982d3b00391e0e83862d765148173da":"4fe9752a5a88ec1eba5e7d85b193910f1717d166ed16e12676cf9dd417d96f2b":"b4b02be55fad8dae22716f95038cce34f654c3dceac59a39ee85c55c6a10864e19dfa5710231138efdfcfa73652e99fa3febde8b06ad06af23ded42d78bd7e05ffed6b403df2320de419a08065dd254e5c676c16aec3b82774f014811cb6f32f96bb240bca91fb9f05b57c776d4474d309cb08a730c269627b63858821657e8b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"76b0ba5992daab1aa40ebe377ca2e0f6407eb1729961151d216a9989b49733c2f7892eeee64338d8ff151db27b20e66684015bb1b433a01fd7570e2434bf39d924d19096199e367dcda87af7ac8b9f2a064e8a7bc291a904fc5a40cffb306020d718de11d3cdc5442724f4538d835f76":"":"f8b63da99a35cd63334c7f0f101a80b101990f7646d31eb58bd4cac251f434c2":"46a417f4938d88406d3ac65dffffff7e3c410b0999e9c6dc7787ac46a0b1be77":"d557b0064c6d8feadb23f9752cdaf5e443a295ba97e5fe3db8bdc3a502b12394951e69497638a758e7315323c4d9443ec8f144f9dff421b0feab8d541fdc3b5993dae6db4a732d573d27f4383f825783b8d0b93951719b95ddef703f36c1d95034b4c0b12615aed9314067c35a55a091fdbc3a459a22a75b6d1616e79d551b2a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"e82960489c01468263e8fe59ac341af1cedc5595ef1677c00190f87f10679295b0d64271e860e5e1bc2b7c24c2127c9457ab6db2495d422d24f3560a909513626cc0e0e8d74171ca51d3d1d31777fcd1b771f5b186516d45a270a7c5c96f098c5051cd79ffb04c7981cda36a68eef347":"":"9d544530ee12e9cb06172d79ae291932e17b240f9cd92698b6a2ec061fc132cf":"dd1ad16a1f9decc0cb875ce35c7ad1a3105818679a12b22149b5a7dd0a1b7d87":"9a08d941e9a1bfd9c3e059dd06caf008c636ca08bb2e136d0bdf162c433218045224bfd8d75b8241025f93c4a8203c6ea1fce63c37bb20444c5d4a68b13ee663b262c685630d2a6c40ec224027d75bfd3dc73e1d538400789f2221ffe0ff1bff8f514c0229e684422d77b2b0298c0ba8a2ab02610e880232bf516f8ab507c461" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a1982c8ea6aa75e5c0486bb26ab8c9dcf3d13034372207bcf103adca982bd902b1388afd3745a00be19abbdeb12225db35ab41471d93c02aaa2414354626246b3ea3d932dd522e5ff0fa81c9bb7bb1f372d851b57043789abc1837d33d52779b638aa2bd1693caa52ec7b0824adb8470":"":"2d0113c4f225e47b5910cbda7d27d98fe2bcc23d7bc293da1028e20848804353":"f6d92fe0603e2548fc13a560f4b1009a2cf63ff91c74b17cb4f256611173ef17":"d26b469920ec26d6891d5243d3c131f129832695a130386511f02a66e92d538bd165d9bcb70ba5e8df479576b4342a27f3ce113584e0262f8eec814f0c97d48988c39ba548e4da78601103abf9c6a47ff3705fcfb7d1a150535d4af2fa219509e94bd8e74f3a90fd0ffa63159b4b62eb533193f9df3c86864f9b5f05249175a1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"feecfb3ecb1b1322b34d90f25fffa2ff0c2af010a942a0467c04e9338832c3c0e5c5876ddf0e3dbdc2d63416fd77daf6170d67fd6b7ff621b1e844914711817ece93e5edf428a6e6325193d42bd676598ef4672cf1e4de4b54df68d0fa8d268868813162fa712d294491d338b65f27f8":"":"d1e3da59674d0ce33cc3e6e56292ef47fc1b3f495871f5a74a8c3f61edeb593e":"74d491697d72689a19c58982621e68a336ba9f7143c199dacc3f37508ef5f3a7":"78de8963019611fde15ee0c8c7b8a35c16a5ea1e86fdb435c422184cf0f7bbce3d6dd7aae11b6397ca213c0aca63188d3982c2451401845d02fa0822ad2f9190022f6c099d137c5a44d9d74a77c75bba2350f1269b6bf90507736d8576b53dfa14ccf7c685ea0acc8484d6a5d310b15bf3941666178414aae3d76d6d5f4aea9a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1d6bdef15811731f6e30d66c79104224c5ed9d455bf9fa2d3442e8d61395d53ca6e3d5b3862fd0d0b2ecf3577e2ddd124f7e33bf11a7ecebcd2b26a117c3805bc93b98ee0e70b8ed51b929cf76f2fa72b433757da47b1ec92c11fd91921b171ff51a41a996866e8c287ea130f06cd95f":"":"f25347f88fb41d65602b99a370be7c8ce1dd6a29a0a7401b4a3279b3e563cf4b":"4e5c80bd7ffc931fb57632935faff2f28c4f75336fd28f14f7fc27a12c7cb41b":"54a280962af1a839b470b42456a4381eb8cc26f16303bb97b6f709f91a914ed72a8b85d16ad4d26a900c8fec4148cc42f9416dd19f31fd1afd527f5fb266b6aff100f890b57c8a3f9228462d4dd92dbd5af2f9daf05e5ee2843e56f0e180eba8a2cabab36f739a7fd3c04228ec007ef43ebbc25841b7373f2c06fdfbc66f8322" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"294c6459958425d309d4df6617410f34e96efbc1e609178f4105071171d271cbb698b79c7f83851ab0a4e29a756b058584cd5d446a25f77749e4154628c3d6963c369585a7768baeca0fe21cc40b00a87144cbdaeba812bb1dd8a18e4d7e50e810885ac520e44c398d1b3c41fcaf6c36":"":"0e433b8a3920ebe0053e388d0f2588123c6ce644280dba77632bea8de1b6fd9d":"411a39921ad892db7d38f51c51148296cbf510a59fcf4fd2785c2acf310fae6f":"04c64a3c4ef8cd3aa322596cfe08e34b435bb55943c6ba7abf72b549d4a057e3bfeb53fa4e2adbee63c88684bbd5b84c4c1358c9c0ff0ffeb1c8fc972c4e79641c9a4ea0901d9c85fb9ac5eeb5d5dbdd324649c0db542e0946d96cec8a990147be80f46685cf8278b8cf89c9255baa566740c4fd12e6bc163be6e52ab7799c2a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1940c31637da2a1a4a3ad66826e074a0d5ce69dde50b75a55b5e09daf23c097bb31a4e9d363f3c716cd9e899cd98bbdaf67e6f909077c7051b067d9f2a6ecace36e5053b2e6329ffd364e589403a0be1af2b27d258c90e1cb2d8261bcc7bd5f910f15851a87442cafe87aa42031befd5":"":"0e21b2eae0d946c1da14153d9a3945894f43ae5331ab95a07a727b05bffe9f35":"69646ac749185da00638654c813d45e0dcc842202845cbb0a8158b2609733146":"f5dc9a88bcb19f74101fb46304bfd66fe0e245357b656e751a9ed535bed3a5b47f4f84c01068763a3fead22c29d7def5d18e32453f806424177082d1d65dbe3ee5d9765fd5364a1cf55dc64ee9f3f313697c2625327373298807a60bb4536c3040e76c9995cfc6eef225a122c98849980d40ea0f86a122756d4390096b4d8fac" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"83a44c38f699a883a91ecbbd9db952a62b65cbf75e72a1a2497810a73ea743c4d15ffcba06cd7a3338b3294afb50462b1eb4df21dbe7107a8b4c6a41b41977f38c33b1ada829517d0902a3bc0836bf899c257234f7f63219acdcdcdfa510d284e7380348296eaab4074ccfa9037e6b68":"":"3f6f8f77f3051c945afad9969af764fcf4ba5b567c0a096bec36f712f0405539":"210ab7859b1354f53e143e8b06afe84b12fc1b16aa4e3e818dc56292656eb3f3":"adc004394a5bf98be1ac40123ab1e430bf93046df87d20b04c235d16543c9a2b80f99f841a946e91a4c6f10149f7a703967de651e3af208d600ebc2c6e2c1fbc895760de537a4da2870e128fb10d8fa1f06870d758b9804c49c2ab81f90118042f78a89809b92c2abce87b230587739acbffd082aaba422c88e7ce199691dd87" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"7a45d07a2bec078c06031b79e94ba6b34ea1522504f62df3c7543d6a902a352faea5251586a8bdc562aebfd9f7175a025406525dab022350d8452cf3e187e30cb54320fe9f13a351e003727278fdd12c2ac1bf56556317ad5bffb3c2f89069c7c742be442f64972304a3a97ad40481cb":"":"16384f8c9eb749fb49fed4a667339f2284634a5f791369739d0401a84d435373":"1b81f0d21a3da462ec2f81d0bfda1fc0143673b80bc7ecdbe524ceba9ae96ddf":"a34623e01a14b87c400f681a6fb4ae66b97afbfe040758b99dc807fbac73d22a5cadad262f23ea5d27f726993c8220921125cc78d17a990145bf6845c7719bcbdd195348c40da96fcd60a54cee25af89c3b1312d88635223ea8c27564e918289fd0120b437c42d99a35f198de3e9c092c493a971c8ace8c48ab625a5a92d6fd0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"646d1c1e7c363c4cbae7e6a4f606c95812a7e0f2fb86e33f178f5b502c6457d3b57644b3bc1ab6ceb09589870c7d54ca19fe763b481308a64667913cfe25103fe738fc0a800920f0afec70ef86cb8a0ea2d9dfd3895cbf921c87e64905f81ef61dc231b6cd7a0135003726451cab95f2":"":"78566b2ffd3252772e3bba71f3445497a2150afd48bc130251baeb4332da8a27":"888b33c6abdcd475586e00eef185a69726eb9b024be447e9298b953fd8021906":"e659d60d17da14043cb919709bbb5b3cc5a203517353c8badc0634ef2f2ea2dab6fb2b327e296ed6341dc4bf431c0c14ec041de50395d25a4a4cd64a6420153a50af886f48a2973523a4ec5baff43526556959a37f3b2452d5753f4d2a3c050b2e8f9f6ac2577959f346ab37404d029ca51a789a5521ee660845f913d2452033" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 0, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"bde2de2b8d3c4b5c4af2998d70da9a21340b98c7630d687d685a71eafccec446e0194d245d2811a54ef522dcfd96abca2ecea6d7892dddaa4dcacf7e5ef3fb345c33b23a3de687ab578aac8e6757547a1b3c127a633e58903e8367a805840020d2ce3f6f0372991d7c7f234c3b31118b":"":"d903a2271f1ce24f20222120f8fee3b8709ce4fc7ba85b77d6ff049e81d7a37f":"03bffe38ef883397cfe53edf6c79e68493b7a637d1ceeed9d569ac6195b8e4db":"cc317f81c3a6cab42933d1733cfc4504dc0b232dc00502d29b8e6fe78ae11d1d1ae4a1c5c6a7f99543a844ec5413b6dc3c22e3bf0cbf12e7b57a48018c75f6ab25fe78b786d2d035de7adaa3a3b7cf1ca564f342fff4f9e6b3c9d2af384cb70f5abcd28c99a5d10f176dd2f702575bfb81a984db2507434b4a3c8c286e3dfc68" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"f7b90c797a4a376cdd9f5c435f5985e77f36ec1df1145a12072cbb2a0da378fcd95202986d45896e9f4a65f2f353fa35130ab64f41a5d49d6a241e0260b4bb8a46a16c6ac9e234c84b5b26cdb518d459f7670e817ac061ac60439be60982492000dc5da8bc6636bdac8b1cab03198dfd":"61535c5c045e784267fd0d85f2861778fa53c8e8586af67cf5c9f21a28ebb656":"":"":"8df4e349f9ea43cc509ecb2b1124358cda2de1f5cc9315edca63610a413478d68b8bb49c2814c82ce571f6e0a6780fa21c4b570610ee0c04d3edb92124f580f962d741330200c19885ca716502223247b728d66fbbeb7c6cc25cfe9866b1450b346227c7663074c8b15d189f1c6edba172a53c733d67c1c69bd7aca7e62013cd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"135496fc1b7d28f318c9a789b6b3c872ac00d459362505afa5db96cb3c584687a5aabf203bfe230ed1c7410f3fc9b367e2bdb7480806f3e1933cac79a72b11dae32ee191a50219572028adf260d7cd458bd469fcff599595c651de71685ffcf94aabec5acbbed3661ffa74d3aca67460":"64b6fc60bc6176236d3f4a0fe1b4d5209e70dd03536dbfcecd5680bcb815c8aa":"":"":"1f9eafe4d246b747414c659901e93bbb830c0ab0c13ae2b3314eeb9373ee0b26c263a5754599d45c9fa1d445876b206140ea78a532df9e6617afb1889e2e23ddc1da139788a5b65e90144eef13ab5cd92c979e7cd7f8ceea81f5cd71154944ce83b605fb7d30b5572c314ffcfe80b6c0130c5b9b2e8f3dfcc2a30c111b805ff3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"d78eab5329fe38a26ce2e54efcf8f0c15cd7462a5878537a1e3615d098b186974f48003172c7204fe6dd77c89fa92fbad4e81412c8d167bde3857b9e045bcb5c666d64aa990a7d92e46ca533b93de544238b79b6a9551ea7dc52bfa1557fd973bf6e594ad4bc0e63b651d5955da37f6a":"e934bec18cf8e9b9293029d9ed60ecde1d46621439c322203f7c22c6b2d77544":"":"":"285df697361c284753c94865081c3c25ffcbc77709fc51f37a09624bba67149156a087efa92ae709eff1bd50bed464f4f31c4b66c1cdb71a506779b50645c165a099718d599fc9a166f345abaf8b0b2f9e700c253a454cea49262a334d79a01c208caad5073644b257b2b1577dd973862c6fc7fcc3320e24e1e31063fe6e94ba" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"fad6a0fcddeefb263c27432ecc6470e44f26aeff2840e8db682ca14ab45c31cc89402a698ffd36ca8ffce986568f728afc08bc0077c95ce4cf08bccf50cdafc19004abc3c5ced1cc3e7ce2cfc938c1600a93fd50fef1245e7b9cae2834e7104335f8aeac080d4a4fd3e0c0ef0d67b690":"352270c867c34b3fb297cb2e5d3a807b087c720026576aa44fad577ec82015a9":"":"":"3622977f8aa0a0ca5f8e1235d03b76f92b2f26eb172b88323558e8f3c756c539ce1061de127247ca7553402c3d5c9439b4c9afbb4c419867baee06eafd856af9847a69247ddf6640a09a360c93577bfc353cdec7312e549bc7873f77796e062ad058ec7f3e52dd1ddafb4bb1186b05b5360200e6ea784be27b8f205de80ba145" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"be90a07ae616574d36f8366d39d6bf1408626466d40982d97380e44331f9e1885a27cab08c6a8595894de22a909dc2479cf15973a0f0b71c0ba911951f9b444050825a976c391e621c58fd4b59a7a22a7dd66d8f59a60c0010fa8aaacce99bc2aa1f365653dc0cd57b489edc2349177b":"99b88ac1958d5d62aa39eca8b8f8e598a55c08b49e895737d74b8792ca343a36":"":"":"ee76c5a6b6b4eaf9ce8dc4ac0ee91cad143f0369a2bfdf40b70fcf14e3eb28855e3c59a01ddee684bf9ce4152be5c70d290b8b780784eadb44854b03cd0a32d0aa8b8f0db1bd47502d2aa61a54e3de7fd7bdb5c74c715ae2aadfe328b4d1128bb19ce7d8166c4c1719c98b6bfeb1ce313054d8f1b6a4c5af842cf3cbea17c710" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"31c7b8f0aafa70b4b670f056e24bf141f0bd6683453d17e9b09add3d231cee1cafe818dfd7d7343f8eb1b4100d80c4d9c8e7e4d5afcd3ab82964f121847d4466471df38b849c59630900171580948f53c41425045dc4db04935aa5264891af031b08cd48670b2b1720692cc6bed3e7b1":"769f2b3e30408856f46fc3a3fcfe05295d876415555906ecf853d59badd48eef":"":"":"9b3dc767e1bd9dd67003ec99c334b94dd97c48cccbdbfb2eed4dd5bde96b1e0ea4c24cb0edadcc5386f7bec54ac5ef149374f6225aa7e78466c34b1ea0b286499e4e2a294381e6e065abeab67553c4a2cd0fbda19c59415fee5cc1249692768aebc80ec35c8331f68f1b7245602b3ebff1eaca2fed5898213fbec09acdb60cd1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"3848bad2b0631411f9168bf818a2c3cac10b6d83a82d58011367688c8d30d3fa77fe460dd459c7da7d69a3ba5576b2bc8dc15a0de18f52f79b9120b03a5bd9bb4b45547b94b301cf3ce2442ae5083c5c08b455e06fc3f80be972e2868ea019376fdf04721478289440491744df5cc1f0":"e5a3ebc7d533c214f4cd66d37f1dd4ff718891daef55959915938a177dd97088":"":"":"959bf36092622923e96ef5c038ca318048f9447003626a9f5f0c5082f65daf5c5ebdc7328e090fd68ee5d3c161506b86590e2229a479de7bbc3920852647db2a35272c305e9a309c04da1b8e58ee185183681cca89f1b9534c0e15c188f69cbed87326a83caffcabb800e2672691b7642700659ebccff375f284eae1729edcc9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"dcd74d5dda3adffcbb54be0e7c48682174b1b460622b52ad4f32bdb2b164032bc32776da1ad3913626d9e61f5b9f9877c8bdbc62d984753560f2c292ec0ece8cf0e369b64e14ecb910997b7fd81a8eec62e9ef78b1d0de6642d8404cc4cb7bd544fc5a3b3588a16c4e342dc5003d6608":"e7aa07cf4a3f90167b486c1c4ffdd5ae45aa59200e4a94caded0b85aaae8fef2":"":"":"f931b0dae43703f7ec20bb6c5667191380e7e263efbf30bf4bd4cf6e3cd5976095eb48ddcfe9f72c299dc05ab2d8846e2259600fe3723744f4ee19c75835c07bfb207e70ceaafa355bb6c6b0a4236d0e0830759cc6673af2b4dee9a3efe496e7020556b4f8ed0c08cbd4cac61831bab2f5a81a8121b240a9c6d374172e5a87e1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b72d5604401b15477b659a373caae53a8fe983e2199187546756e039e72efb7f2ad472ee90447f616b7ad5bb1dc692fd1b9e1000ee6c8ba65f39a837f27a4e5cde8cbdea58ecf1145d53c219369fa86402ac05e3fe3d52fd54343179f237ae2055277d76d9276bbf83f97901232ba6c4":"c9038b0d468153e8529089c3db418fbbe42afae5613a8eea7c8e3c2a307c4159":"":"":"9c2a9dc2504e2d943d85e1c068f7e578350dfed661cb5d82cd26ce22d083f6e158a39161f303370ee844b4f75723ffb45131223bee8efc32726bbdbb9ba2a0d8177e90e4e1c8f1d3a22e9a9eaef8b7ca4cbaf142aa1da1886d2ef9c1dc3692bb15784cfc906e12b484609403515550cc44e3b0edd42ae9c3f267ae9dd737ef28" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"c5f5e519283f7d3216f2ed7765ae2c0dd1e22596d7762c1f0707ac99ad3f6ba6b920e6d0ec15852186b77c3e9318904b252aa0e2dafc2901a5177449032a7727e523d33d6f4b5f350545e5bf21a2ab6cea23f43c73c2cc0982541c298e05e4b2dcc6fc5d1d507232d735b01ed2536317":"9835ac84c8f8cc00464ce75891074e20f050b162f73c9e91435aad5929b473c0":"":"":"85a747731638e09ec0254e7aa38e08439457e6504de94d00405d417326f3ad47f156b5e211204a83634369beffc128f3614e89e2e288d2de11f7b90bcc2b8d29f149e13a3cbc8d711d24765f480bd6596c8ef605cd72fa64ed8ab1f9a18b2d0b81c0de08a167d537b3d1c51c2a0c9ea9124c6e41613b383f13f1d20e1eaf2288" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"fb912fcad27bbb2538164f75a79a3d7651c42aba547dad64037b492a87e301809e154f0b8b099a2f584643e4e40ab34fa1466679fd0a8a1f82772ae0c8e9de2a461d820cf37b2e9bd77a609dc367b449ebaecfd0aff59cabaf224d5610069c888762f92a16553d82c917553a9e723177":"e3c8eab35fbf90cad2a69cc74a68ac0bd0fc51585231fb9c3eecb49a064043bc":"":"":"09b4a47519d4acfda506d64c0b5536fb9e72cb1b6b408da82b4b80ff794f45beb2070b05de67759b8317f40e798bf37d392cb59cbbfecc3056259c9426415df526bf3cb62f4636542689537629c0e91a9bec2a600ede3dcae82079ceaa3522524fc002e82c280724c4179e00dfdd374effa05a71fc856ceb21542be0bdb62bf7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"ead7fa32dafaec063474693e98230bfdd61ed5ee88c7a93718fdf17db771673f2c3d12d63a08b9acc2ef21531412dcdac37c5828d4ab26c1e365c043aad21c52ef9c144305e917dee8a15dd6cd751c2c45a2d6e146935458fd2ceba68b49b74bceca4329ac5d30c7a67f614d3b93a6fd":"fd3da5bb01ea75d7e32c023eec230f3bacbc163768c1c24216028e82660e1bf2":"":"":"8fc78a425f9e846ec2c757e98f0e1f67085bde0184f9ba9e8697811f6c50928de7ec9767a4fbec8bb099f534cabae4bcde69f2632fe4d1c582cb918e3370cabb2153a1d168fce23fafde95660e6987d2e8fcefbdfeb21398a5074ee76f7315cd7c517d3a4df8af26f1857b0d3e5704b7a3e5c15adc5f3c6745c063d45a2bf1ef" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"5d79c6ccee050b3c2ed52edcc16fc26ea7b6f3fd2b9199fd65c7dc2345d6566e9a0c6e01710e4c71b2820f7aa9203da23515eab85a5812c66756634804e3f5817d32f51dab3ae00443c694c59b72d526f840a166e566b7f633c7d246192ef82419e3cd733a02684d6a4ca091178ccc76":"ee4c3cfa5c79b1ff1dec4b9f9ff4ea45c916e46889130cffd7f137e6579af52d":"":"":"4f53f72462d7e9247e7ad113827d3ea741c35690fa0be027b86660e937c119e7237bbc674e826f42dd6dfa5f54d90542ed2bad21683af4b1f8741ecb75b464345111cc3d383c8b7d088718a353c2d4af93ff59057745a808203d08eba2452a1a9ade75cadd0f49fcd27ac3c024c04c0936c0237fc29dcd061b62fbb73adaa8ea" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"35f9c3b0e5947a74d90609e6ab660b4b46177a12886cc77a19aa9eaee86500a9eaec5de5672c5ee56771d778f5aa963713ffd39fae8e05ec90843505d5832ec8d999f271812d41db4f223a5d8467944f08083a81c29d9a559a960f8349fb0174a8dbcfa171be39a8c36bcb7743c5c5b9":"b4b5fafff369997074a82e064298859ad2775eb5c5979f81d2118da96e840930":"":"":"87afd3147e61c49d2029b88482eacdace56f27ccda2927799a7dd01ff63d6873804e7b5635645ff3f65b00e1bd65254933e7e57b56177db81548fbac37305d3dcb70a5f76a222999d6ba9c73670ae931b49ccc97b4f25203ee95cd68fa79e2824e2ead8bd4755a5bb4658e02788b9ced166ea9ec5373954ad8da88791e8f1047" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"cd08363e60e17bbc12d57954ef92ea38af1095ffec417a7f305b7c10d44f1e6500649786d5141793f7ee33a913b08f60457cdf6316357035abf57c2e2b19bae6973d01e9e93dac249198188be2f6849e5a9636d6b6bf7d1c01c16c03669ab7b5aea828017989c870cac6857bf327b748":"b5611807d3070200fc6257cc2b13a84f842ad45ce116fc91eda79ff14f3f25f3":"":"":"281e9ceb5a46578dfa2917d9883f1819bbbdc9901d44f3ab48ccfcb807eb596e20fc05060d6a77d92a6f630bd2a012b41232dce411ea046794ab0096b86491d3ca2a59d4405e2831b1f9f69e55542aec89417ee7ecd7a050eb28fd4d7d2739aef7aa6f30fa17c5b2bc1c69ebb10163426b8c6033ec7733cc9ffcae2f23986e63" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"4294671d493dc085b5184607d7de2ff2b6aceb734a1b026f6cfee7c5a90f03dad071544e599235d5eb38b64b551d2a6edb9b4790b62336fbb9a684b82947065393eeef8f57bd2477141ad17e776dac344a9abe80f6f522f29878bedf8245b27940a76471006fb4a4110beb4decb6c341":"63bc769ae1d95a98bde870e4db7776297041d37c8a5c688d4e024b78d83f4d78":"28848becd3f47696f124f4b14853a456156f69be583a7d4682cff8d44b39e1d3":"8bfce0b7132661c3cd78175d83926f643e36f7608eec2c5dac3ddcbacc8c2182":"e580dc969194b2b18a97478aef9d1a72390aff14562747bf080d741527a6655ce7fc135325b457483a9f9c70f91165a811cf4524b50d51199a0df3bd60d12abac27d0bf6618e6b114e05420352e23f3603dfe8a225dc19b3d1fff1dc245dc6b1df24c741744bec3f9437dbbf222df84881a457a589e7815ef132f686b760f012" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"c7ccbc677e21661e272b63dd3a78dcdf666d3f24aecf3701a90d898aa7dc8158aeb210157e18446d13eadf3785fe81fb7ba1915b3c04c41b1d192f1a1881603c6c6291b7e9f5cb96bb816accb5ae55b6992cc7787e3b8812efbed3d27d2aa586da8d58734a0ab22ebb4c7ee39ab681c1":"bc55ab3cf652b0113d7b90b824c9264e5a1e770d3d584adad181e9f8eb308f6f":"18e817ffef39c7415c730303f63de85fc8abe4ab0fade8d686885528c169dd76":"ac07fcbe870ed3ea1f7eb8e79dece8e7bcf3182577354aaa00992add0a005082":"956f95fc3bb7fe3ed04e1a146c347f7b1d0d635e489c69e64607d287f386523d98275ed754e775504ffb4dfdac2f4b77cf9e8ecc16a224cd53de3ec5555dd5263f89dfca8b4e1eb68878635ca263984e6f2559b15f2b23b04ba5185dc2157440594cb41ecf9a36fd43e203b8599130892ac85a43237c7372da3fad2bba006bd1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"20f69bc4a308d1fa40146bfb8a3171e81a66ebf4c83fd46b2c8a3b34df499a6c92f4bc9699bf6d19d5c3f45245bb0fb08310eb7a9ce51883b0c36271b5ff0a1c00219a04a6b571362c7a18cabc48f2fab0cdf3434c9f72cf5ef6a61feeedc94c72e28fb5a99345dbc7939a3b8e277c5e":"882bf0edbb66ebb288ce741997ffcd3380049f5007b30e740ece190a01612dea":"ca1da31810bfa6c02b5863f87d39668d796105430c445db157c41a0152a0d200":"c344b0bfe801da37e2320d36b9e6452235e6f6f4cf3190d414e859f4ee90e5de":"8ecac7a65cbfb7a849604505d403acaec41c6ffda3009f6080bda79e26d1de3bdfd88fc9bb9ca1dd1cd8d49e3d0cfb0f0a2e70ae1834e8f7d7f79382591e8bea0a0386ad40c98d097122dde0dc2f4fd3258d40dcdd804fdcb72d62ef9041518c34fd8a37684bcabe2f59594382767c2633bf255121ac735852fecf14440cb623" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"0a13da2edd9ed097631860dc29cb2d7eff3519910808e7eb0c6ff1485cdf758d9793ca69779117a63a47e386433f18b882ea8c8d3179dcc1b263fb263bdbf2ab818775a881964a5690a6e9af592db594a39a960e343bd4edb7747d75866e1ca7125797d2bf6a644aed6e3c8443f94274":"48445b1b6807b261d10569ab4b5d8ab5d97ebd3d9e8194088b10463abf11a2df":"6b742d07c45a031795a7771eace89fab782eff6a74555fc2eabba00d1d7b7c15":"cd0493aa84c941c1b7fce37d2e38c199fb8c86ea0c5b6a536118ae423ca7ab50":"fa005c9119a898f2fea35b805a2bd8be88c48cbdaa8582337f1f407ce3e49dee8011bb1e4ae33317ca6d5cb645687a62aed86d5803583a012d96b82e7bbfbebf59fdfc1db0a92586a843f6e57056f49726e89bf98b641ea60a3c91815edbaf415b2c4eb7bb8c56ca5d84a3587c64a945a6e3d625b6763084c2a0917de6bd6746" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"fffcaaa7ae7787e12e96521a3e29a7c40ae08a7cdea9974cfcb894352955e65a27c8b01490c9fa7593734ec27ae242a20d0371c3c664bdec7f368bf53a930cfb0933de5d50865cd757b63fa350341375f132dd2bf9bf8c6d9d2ca5354e284bbac677c269298e1a5bef536091081446bb":"5b1c1a19b28b09d08bf9cde87b4a6881d38a7961bd7ba6888de06d0c78fbef13":"5ebc76ae5779fe563362c6f99bba35b4b50eacaf7192c68b82a376fb7f2b61de":"95831949170105e9c022a7711803f9f7d617a8a137145b4c2f6ddda7ebcf3c5a":"633cb6696b97f2d4119fe242486e8affdf1b3e25a94e434592caf0270563b210df6a9f9405c2c33cbbb750c0218f718116b67232db874621832ba78b040523b2ebf715082fd23fe7e32599402af95156ebeda98eff2a8f2a4e295b9afb7fadce956cabfc1183f20e4e059d91604fa5d77065c4a006b3fb2c15750206ec936e97" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"ae8a6a25b266051cd41fd5ecc682b844aa3a09327216eb6ac63390250620113124145033b99896c21f8dcf60271ba681156406ff2691886972f53c2e4b449dc94fb09a2960a3423d2f4ac66f973b4a89f80c00af6fbe4b0bbd430b12a714d40e172e99f909916a27221020fc72259cb1":"0acbae3c085d2e5e760b0631c6ad97d935e96b0a90ed4a9867f626951596ded2":"2d74d07e82a033c0bf65643a6478856c92f33ee55a2682c17e7c42857e8e6fa7":"a1b397cd826af3fb1b949453e96878e59f0697352929b15cd678142453479e55":"c309567edb3d40fd8d828551117964e20041b031e8eb41a8c6e95e25e0f43372585854202c5d5796ca4fd38b7b789b44410ba3e3ab7016cb6793625be27c6c8d39499c402e4d52bf2c0bce21a5f4f16d80d5449d5222aea19b64de25f8f5eb81bea7c491a329ca079a99c9ea00cbf3354b5fef435e8d4cbcbfea7486d379a2a2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"e603b02ccd1b3e2cf27a2a5cbbb6e8fd205ed3531ab08ce912f915328ea1c73ba7a075a9dfd9805101ba2f0f6e42ebff7202687e99e1cc914036146e187c16b83999df442f0ff87b9d82fc7831714d820c247f1a2c3eca9d32ef0039c4a2ebb9962d844e0032a58c604d630f12884742":"27e863c2f9f91e9540f0201dba0fc63c3c623ac89d63368093dec2f17b6868bc":"93e967f73929f2be339448735c74b571a8b80c10bda2ea7fbea824b188a7db93":"1ff3a43966a8f64c42dee8889ce2626bb370afef4c0222b926abe1be719427fc":"7ca6867ef568c8c323d216db96b642576de1f5e82d08b84e6a2752000c5175cf49d6096dff7b714a45a72a69e467ee378f4eabb142eddca926a3d01120960cd7aaef1e377f447b0bcf8ee733d961d0c36be901c7f406a1dc81cb2ae2e9f6886f5ba1e481e7c1396d2c89aa456b2fb34f02a91d0eda8784c26ad5a6892ba5ffa3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"222dcb4b31c7bc37d8813be78d95e9d8c0f021363862c6bee5b01e6c9dbdba8c2ae81c52b90d4cfeb80697fcf05caa08bf81702a92a6bc90b531b363db5a5fe4f50412621ba390c1cd211a9683c47ec7ed6d15513bd49d10449f0c450183f5a7b16466a37df5fc79a4ddd3ec6bd0c56f":"bcc19eb476ac96567da10da8fb714c2f9fbdff28b7c74a5cbac80ca480e61de6":"46fe8bd4c4789c373707050d0e700e50d692ba10ff2fcba20045c9efff7373f5":"68c956a95f6a2c9cdd06e461805d5270b0df3c9fcdebbeffb30dad1a852fb35a":"8a54fa9818602032762a45c9f67f668860ed605e371a6382082509249330fc24d13c4acf27782a7d2be42721bbb9c80c6338acb57a715ed17c008928166f9a090331db4fe62a11ab47c966bc3c24a8be942e350a2dee7c7e9f620386d89a1e0bd5298d00f94f9a931e50834a2a85c0175308bc74a34ac37ab21305c511866263" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"787c1fe1498bacca291f020f80d6b556e4f0d4fa5adcf21531c447f28e14266e4f2e9de3e12557756348d8b0c73a1301f43ce41038cbb7dac60d8269495b62ca7452a9c4edcb54e7d477f0c6c6b7af61b3a3784c775a5884cc536f60132e66386dbb911577aef75fc0a68508432e255a":"91f18dd75859c2938edb0d81f9d6095a2bc7565b67403a8777cd059f2631c958":"92d2d8091cc4fe9f5cdf2ded2e358fa05a7d8e4525333b4c00697ab18dd1f995":"2263cbb6e29bb9bdbd803c7224aa039077ba43d1643d4754745f89d8bb6f888d":"620851d2a4c8b6558e18aa5e2d454cec83856d25e619e69928b578ea4d4e41c662a4cd0ae64ee756b184742154d9e7a6283d78bb8b6ce53e2fd2ce93cc12ad78749cab530a7f996c83117df6d217170927d75a0c983194816d2e21f92840791292710178b3f7d9fe1003041d2d9e7c59943b14409abd7956bd5c31190a54ba0b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1537f9380d97e98f6e02f4b10182b835f224cca2278f37a8cb1411a1c6cb89eabcf37a8b159cdee3a55329b3816f8c656c7f63835f860b4a5e3c450a2afb5b892b4da708d39614921a82d36cf23518618c9bb0f5332492c1740fb385e969d77d5d7e0aa0a4066cb6bbba4e4c7fa8ae73":"6d89190aebd160b155d5dff8cc4393f095988a1551bb154fae621739a4378430":"04a511f1d8e1994879e2372163b5a45289966df680350bbaf9baea52333e652b":"dfd8c8e467628de6c121c403816a65bdca01dcedd05778b925283f92d3cb5251":"61edfb457546493a43fe1391b8f86da01c1242b3297f3c4ee02e04e37161725f4182b144609335f0183b477744ce3370ff64ae861c728e7526148eac3fb07403a27c3f82fba5ce505233a4e38b8d40c3f44cfe3cc65c6a89127f803b11a3f24397a20409b594e193e443190155da50ff1134c8b1adc5006c7ad201887e6c1ad3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"842daa3d64b3c25210cb0ecbb251333c2ee4e090a992138a5d6f9c455a8a5f0d28be9fb51ad223ed196d5c245eeea940f822952bbcf1e2ba7d3dbf526ae44ad7e60e9d99a833b3f372f77adc440850f3fdeecf48941dbcecf6f710d99ae54939f9bf35c3ef2b7b6136d7778b95846af5":"bb9376b79ce2cede150036c0626ddaf8bbd960ec04ade2694be6aea6ce8946e3":"41431b7537968a2ffedd6d7942ee21565f34a5155de6e096646fc7d41302ed96":"946b190e855aa2d4fa7544e9858ec70ca9ac19ad510bd7d625f14d16a80896bb":"b0d45631a104c246a1af31c8bcf7f7bea92cde3c259fc029072c51e662a33c040cfb1d262c705320b7020bd1365288c1ba9b3bde9d0a9df8b9e7275e8637ce9a1896877e34323abe8ca3dd0262d3d75ee3a5af505235e354aab491dcfce11287b7c73dfc4c97c47f0373cb93baaf3def2186a53095fe8b050c94b1cef109c07c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"aaba29c12aaa011619c07efca75a186714d97eac18d75fdc8b5b36a9ef247bef0f152b758cdbd69256bd8697fce53d2b59ae1210a350319834d6721e9da6b2cc1c0e559a26804d47953e0bd5df66ea2a0c449fc0a8dcc16b9b0a82f5e6f85a218cdddaef40c254c1030a9bfa33214ae8":"02470d6898bcd119cab49242c95fa97b56a495f6d1c5b26d1e877b70b954e3b3":"e4e4293148c31ca6bbd73706e2dd2f36a22d3af3f862ddae40ad35d51dd6781e":"34c6505eebf018676a039f201507fa38338594cd015fb4d962d1577befc63ec6":"e1556a8bca38d5c2087b5c61156ab91566a5da784647e220bf4ea0374e187d4a4bc373ec891472daa31aa0dccdb56a8b42fb2805e74251976ffe5e02b446af8ac6a9f0d6f36d857fe6d3772d9fae7ab08b360e8de2529dec80dd31a5a5468034aa53b10b6a73068fd9e046b70e2f03fded8bd85f7df4322d4fa5338c9cde0471" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"742fbf9f39f9d8c4279143f88a6d30307492681ccd58e8422277259a0bf87aca24c5d6dc4f650f39c3403fe1eac1ecb079e7b9f363eb44559177701f93da93aa30dc5f4b933209073c825ab2b39b52ec23caf049f760aa385f58983d9af300ec5f831f2449d2508bb5824abb622e00dd":"c2c42e63d43a765c2a49d2b35c8ba98a7a67765a0c453d2352d9f224aeb06176":"794083185e79cf918faa846bd12287e8ff1e620770e0e08b33e8e1da8d23cfda":"ed7b902eb55b7bdb2b8bf70711c1f7a4bc00c4dade92c9d2459db060551336af":"c83af90a8c7879e98b255e9c6b1852bd759ccf8f9c5be4ea5e9a356df4c43efca41303d5a322a7e42ed12b8b0b715e1d23257aaa366bb261e39f19834c38a7a883bf2f01c47a782edb7905cc61742b8166974f5990330a08168e25d4aab6740b96493ff87a424ac6ed447ad655afcfde1d2ec6ab2ba811351385ea0f8b66e318" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1437958fbc93c701cdd09fe81a90af55f022195388264ef03758fc08bfd0dd80f63c7bc06945eedd58893df2b5f5f62b222ee423dbcc5491d1a57155891406c79e8ef51fe7575db8074c4e40f50024daf177548eb130a8c248c2b7df99b6626ee062cd5e82048019b32cd6c7319eecdd":"c443f891534c30d8d2b1e2072cb5b824e6d3ddfdd1e6c7757e54372d4420b5ed":"39f7abd306f127baaf8cb832b67c2564287efa433df8ecabc40b9744637e6bfa":"eda6950002c866c61d2e2dfcd9d69e8c5154b45f762efd688e26044adc3957c2":"8fb758b498feb1c0e961a8f86b821bddde387dac221a8191f71b6a64caa2bcc4a475460823996f8261b8e22125dfeac5c9dbda25525dab249cbe469c5e224478964793bf822446721bf5bc85e5da6ef34ddcb7c94f109193c475904099b06e2a7f53ba6dd94480dd5bc9fff90150286c4d3ccea975925cc8ed4ef9830389b9bc" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-256, 256, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"ef9292f4a7a67ac4d4eba48936391bb45f8810c2ab02ba424cc8e4add53d1c514611e3233cd8cc8f6d69494dc336cbe1cbc67c17520af442933a235c6aa6b8f98128c66fcdd77843ae32e06b7a31689c9a6a3c540a19081bcbe850278d50adfac3638ec8cf85148a0547d28d0a7025db":"f4a8721a2a873f8fe94e4b3e137e866c79212f9c14f89be156c47a5fbb9aaecb":"b38a6628647a02c0de5b7acb939d0d1896c9c730106c8667d810bd4866ebaee4":"366370899b2a0d6f049e7d820061599a675cba5d3bc82ad747fa731bead8efb3":"1947d468ae4fa4da7f45cfaf32d62a4369796e532f1b03b1495587e6bb95d8330f5b7c962a9b0a2b715d9def79194741870e5c47d15a7308843e10616b891fc9e5cab7db901e0f1efbe1217dd627c71b54c98cec0fe1b25a84caa56f0bde247a9d9183587742a38825234b6b6cc808afde36ef5e17bcdb2c72c7645949289369" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"51ec4987ddacbcf6348e4a891fa571c6e3aec02879eb0181a121a4846344a687cdff9798761875320256e5a59bc94663faab8864cc0bb1e64343c0b978fcc0d6e84d0d17c1c1f4093fac3b4c01837c6b37d189d7608f0c335eb38fe1f43573e0c525093f60ef618bab297b8a4d9d8c16":"":"":"":"ade04730059471b1829bec8dfbb0ec708be7b4e77d688ce7cfba9ddde059a52f969407291440aa79492f827fe1a2f6568989fd36b4fd84e6699152536bff15388af319fb306f07de4309eb92ba3da5f7007948335993698d398bac42029912bec6ba39226c2bf238733b5081aa0a2ca392a719385184be619d9ca56771d8e3716a46cfb339f93ff48abe406ef788db2ada45ab5fcb7f689bd801a5ccad855b52cd4bf1d6e338f2c3eac94ce9fdd0dd06632d01ded3753e87957e8569a67eccad" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"f8dfa70524d46f3545db3c687fe85a8ea35e32eda470b4e14b8b12f4e9c6bbf6c08efa9ae1df90ae6f14b895c342ae07b5e8d563199a141c34e709c6e743260b573f88186f40f800c4c0ec9f9fbeba49f103bfa2d62d7ed8fc9ff88cb1ddc5d4ca4d074e0053c069393d70a5b3f1df3e":"":"":"":"05f4e609b085d28958f5702eb7b99f2e0c7a80f095907abd5b7329628aa6dce2e2f8bdb7a2992261ea414e6434dc98162d02c51936542218a31c6072ed55c9ed83c79698de7ffd3835d5e4d0f3a0c2a70bef2b6c602d1e0cc814c71b2fb1a001fb83a0e2befdec7e4749629693629ea2397b299cdf491415dda446817dd7d28da431f95162de83d917f9e9325774e2f7ef02fe8067cf4bac47e2f61ba235b532af3aa95a6517e9f1286e065ccf9b3eefa6cab4c940c83ee9a11da55ee21c8d06" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"7ab7da47ff7a95ebf2367de0a25c7885d80931447d2f5cc73ae7f66844910e481e05f53ca993b0266b7cde89960d681a3d3c568d9a6e35347cf52d2e0ff7ad1142983fd7d2c848674315ed3e009adb7154fde1f2d90019cac210dbfc06279d48fc7c2e900652b5cb638c1260acd896ea":"":"":"":"f00714df243103f54b4c0c516a7a631431dbefdecc30c09e8e834f09882100c1d0276273568cc6352c3028c156371389078236afe57d00edaa226262f1a7f6e0011ba48d4b8f089cd257b6b7cfe80ca2bbeee99635c277254546d4adbf046935791be21c48a7882ef6cb81f7bccdfcf9bc430d21cef1d788d4f4df6bd6ef5bcbf48e35f116d482d880f597bcbcfbbf68bc77f591bd7346d7a1085fbc1c2707c17bb288ce6bfb0a78a54731421762f18142975b8b3b79dec0d852dca80f1638b3" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"40e83cb1fbbefb44426350916b0995fb6a1c5394f2fd625774459548cfab27f2f92e2e889d3deeb33dfd6c40f610b71b70387af8d70768c52b36bb2a59f3ad9a16be98c726c2d65af457b2f7d81c75fae82523c977cbdf6138b1cbe5a9b3ad402ba197a3009dba459d3f534ea143e5dc":"":"":"":"52cfd4a4741b6575578a1b7aab91a366341cfd483799ca08b851bb0dc2f2bf640e90c1406fd09fbf9166bd55d46aaaef38e0449b7187d019e68a3b98a7dd9cdac63ae9c966db4d901d37cc147835d017915902621216bc1835d70dc2101ae50e0541f796bd6bca2e53260ba3353e6aa4eee56f80aa329173e347d83d050ddeb465d8e1aa5450e6e7eb515a92fbcdfd8530f04fae3d1a41b13151a4827f0634d6e80424c1e934ce0e2077f5f31fd177e9a42acfcaa67d4043fd31a8ec72a39e6b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"39927d4fd0c3eba2044002e65b60d3994c3aad0c705bce2e9e41aca30a7c2f03e7b4968d8e729e868f5fd57b49a4b862b0bd169a4e2d77bd59745e778ca6fd762901ae3c0fcc48a0d6ee22bc8520ec450630055b3b66bdd2dde9f5215d241fa266d24342b50d42e2db5436a478c7ebaf":"":"":"":"96194dd1b6ac5efb3d4787bd1fb4c9cc32c29b67ee34369a7aad9a56f64f53526e9207c1d4c541c6e0df4960c54e10168284891841fe554adaa5012f325b3aea79fa4db8c36e67a0f914d9ab361d8ba0b3d6ca4904103f14a30a90dd6fd7c3f679c272dee7f01110f7229f4f5b6ed152a0149dc5a7185bf637d10899bca417cba8f919a2800d8a72d5575f0c174f98f77a1afad850334204e66156eff4572a6703aab50b850a8df498d1d96b1e2bc1ac34aa4399f3b13e97b4989539ca78e97a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"ad10dbbedf980a0c33576f7606e14785b2a903788b9b7cb4c29cf74a8bbec877999ca28c36c835b60680bab9005d8e4f341b97213fdb6a52e783d19850906cb643bcf48c291cd186ebcbf0a287e459d1795e29ffb0c7c84b0f6dfbe219b4f85d9fb893c0cf9134263a9e6a36c76d02a9":"":"":"":"5db269714c4ab774c2eb14eb95e9b60c6ccaa6e90f9f879e295cc007069dd231894cd8fe0c09bf748e26940160cd0cad75dd2e305ed1f2527ba857c42c3d0662d25cbbcfe342910498ced309cda1894a1186ab935fb614646d299ca56f86defdd0a0f52baee1b9b9be05df85a05c225475a7ce1cc58ebc488a4f57fd1f983881754dcfe3bd78cac529e9945c89383e331f0177e721644b3a8d82deef548d161e085cff59645a345cf7af3f3582bed5b81c7de7a6a216403bb88804f7d16ceec9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"e9506dd05bac4750f5d5b43e0663ecba6444455ab6f662802897a493ca11ff05f76045b621004f4a88fc6b1ba859ae795e4846f17c3b1c127a8ef16d32381e27eeca77ec062a8a8f811f5dd7f90737147f5fca2b7cc89009b0350292b88d1de5de94e1e82bd5f7bf2e06882a925977ce":"":"":"":"abc3d68bb9b0d29655ee2057a60e59fb84afbaf9c75ac5d146a9856384022e4873a6abb963d8795ded5ce33f8df9275f8ae4c3da0037973487348645415ed51458529bd7c4996128c943ddfa21484521fc645723802318ffd5191e957ec453a8e922d48b1e83681c1463a03c34175a5d610f8f3709b3044f45084f901704547e301f9807a7d92036e08a3eef791f67659816fcb28922b9b52e2a4a2e81cb848f9ae579cba346b0507e91f26b70d199acb6da5d3544b8caea762f6f30178636d8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"f1f00ebb7cb4bbb3b0a083a290d4d3cc4db53aa9eb3f2feb1d428cf6d8104bdc56b2a30e75782693d7565c5d1ad6edd6cc22967eeb5f159989c2ed7fdb62103c055456f5e1a3163bfa034c502ccbd9aa75385d4777d03a82606a890c89a207494d082becc22efad8fe69c367fa9e3350":"":"":"":"6b75aa14c129d011191b9016b089af15b806a494e8e763a7fe902479155704e1a92eab48ce29fd0f1e9d5a2014757c3cda6e021defdb91c796cbad709658edad6c8f7ab6aebe978d507459198e0719eec49b1926a7c4e33e34e8e366966e0e4e7f3ce0aed6e51d7804d803aab57257ff1250ae8b76bfc48a505d4600bccdd992d564b39c3519db0c7dd26f5dbabdf3c098735688aad1af8525e8a6a343835bed094708b78faa300c08600e638e6f24f4b2b78df0d747ffbb9521cc6786b9c89d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"1f3bade86f64dc0770dafd6a4900f61baf003c6dccec496856b7b08cb99db8f371f1c9606602ad397e0c757f56ec6176c04e832302fd6fbac3519af6d2cb9da5a85ee70efc19c7350145e904a7fa9d3199e1f6213999ee3bbdbcd1200b4dd4e7a8f112f3a37865e494bf8549349e9e78":"":"":"":"1a420c51052534d5d77347ed5751e44817824ed75467791c9717875dadcbceff2ffe024952958d4718b2b4028af83ecf363d57349a36476c0203fcdf4952794aa66b3692e7b0810ce060601817ad0794574b1ce12d6a7b6ec1d0b1e0acb2a6c453be81bf2d17e1fca7dc1c9ac5fe4a64069285a8cb9408051ba5ae4dc0c8897b4a216109b22ec56aace995a453f28dd7d2c38c7d44739b9f09ca0e52d62f204e7f4a09c3e231c8cdaf54f941e8d5565b25155be21cb316417a4c005f7e834d0e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"1b288c94a8aa7499850d7bf82177024f20e8ccd502b7b0f529c47185aad4eb82ca1efc0104f93cc35885e9894671b9d74fa8237f5d740fec09e90b88bc75124e564f1f198081d51c950dbef6a6ebb2b5e1aec008d8a5a4c692f6467c740f5026807bafc0710dc8e9197aee4372b429cf":"":"":"":"3daf72d94056e6c7138787004f40a4a0c81a244c8aa14c332675e977330b63315916d8fe6ba8f0aea5a22def342d4136d1d6c787b3a6c6c05a44ee1cf9b2d8911974974cbf7a14ed5b83fceb8dd8d3ed59194d3fb6cce579a97244091731a4c1ca1d6e4c9d2623a41de665ee3c8236e0da8710208cee948f248329781f40f6f4b4010508c219755b6df752b9523ed0c9644b17250bbc88b4338c688e97e952a924da894fc986f7e807fca4477be94dec993cd6910709d8032fd3a5b97612cd65" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"1e1837b46486b6e65713327240bfac6c618e817787c277b995c92dbe03b9b01de8e100b303ce5bf5048dccfce4d240878ffd5ddcb6754292291d1a79ee1e62b6da6b23d7a83d0fe9e84757dcfa51d05709d54142b42dc876506876b136b6df34b485c0c129581972bcbc674b893ad61b":"":"":"":"23c258b93d4e9943783e88b244a52cde6747d8d7ff28b77e2ddfaa2edcbb29eaf41dc75cdc2c5b581b3a59fe20e705223bdd90e786f6c6498330ec9bd7ca7303e53c0b21abef1497210f8222850ca7f01e0af4fefd36d82e711fb17f581b951e949876a5ef0a212fb73af4d32f6bf9fe8c9e60849fd2311f3b5cb8a4abe856b3dd629fbac41e6dfb502d1894088fc52832cefff807555457c03ba7b7daaf02830d9ff8c9e8ed09ddbb68d6530af0cc5ae9383acd34c89ec189f5a97abbf3ed5d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"67b2a6e09bf31ecee8fe9c719491baf3c6efc0e27519155f99c94667d727420265254ee6d34c6b9c03414452d68929812f1d23aca44adfaf6b02f519dfc3f034bc32c1b763a129a97c7258e5e77ba69d6eb459be2cc96fd6150b6040babcc406143bdc2c1862c7bf6607b4be95f3151f":"":"":"":"d0f71e56e975e443bd7364eaffa9dbfb60a82bd0ea6405de0b1301911449ae6ac0dc8792acd2b0ca3e68c2abb982362eb2a7a8f95d2960579f9932070c9cd7abd57a36759b2c6f12e20dbda8a16a17c29b70f5bb8db0efa9451d9a349b9917b7bc39af6c6be8217e0a6fb52e6a4c46dfe41e6a9cfba84335d0254cad07557fd7aa3fea185c8c88a921ea665e410067395791785ebdf1793038ceef6c590e64af00ac4ce69ac3d0b497feb93b4fee7d55cf0fa40dd49ea748b33f038b5097578c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"379d0a38c8897a6524d6a59df4f09ba975c146be7a398c3cbde8c222fcf998102e98223b81dfca7fb5bc92b164afbaf50f58b8df04889dbd69acd59f7d5ac08f81984910ee20a4d58c51512a3ed893d7b736da894a0b52f75c5208d14f858dfd42290f4181b7aa249097b93fb2bceab8":"":"":"":"166f643609dcb8951161ca15b3660759b69da616b45761b8cfec01a8a7f51a0bb1cf256c9fabe69b29552f8e861cbb3160b905d24845d368a17ebf911a839384c3b3aa6c8dedf1fde12384ec9535ab9d008728978ca58ad88780cdc3d272d1dcf2059b9bdc0d2311812fb1b559e31f8e5a89efcb2b33c705555ee0efb23d2c4d312fe02b998eb78af85e3839963afd98c1c644ed4493c3f1af0cb210e660748cadcfc9ef85fa3b5fafe345756ca34e7b7f88d3aff8783e92da00dbead5d51f89" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"96041c211e97d480d149e75c876886a78fee171e0f395a952a0e873af4dc22b46cdb68a60dd1d5753027e544643c5764cd65e202eb821804300ea618e8ff9785f3bf2fbf1b1048cd4450399e2f642af38bce41df8fde3208055e34d356b1aa1b0180673e8507af2035f75e9fe629f979":"":"":"":"51475ffba32991781b17e38ea58b08bde40f03b64824187b9506153f41c233f34dbdc52b63cfc71b120b4fe6c2866d11e9aaf44f82deddaf998caa56a4dd58a6ea2e8f5e3c4ec7fef73e5620cb6a77313a4bc0b135c57d18085010a4a026059c2abd4b6d2048393c5400341928f5ee6c5a063d679e185eb9be2834a1009d03d298b9abb09f993a8ede54bdc4d9a95c2af5552aed9fb02cf598a18b5cfe6c811d1ca4ed764d0756fdfcb5d03aac1ed80fc86595539c105da6b66a00a91caf44fd" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"423cf6fb44605cf03e3063bceb92c156e38c5badfaac35593139df46d325242c84908baef2f824bf3ea66e74bb4127a0c5650c33f68b5d33502b1f55e06fe2c1169fb34688a09291d1e12e5390a73da125be4cf15692e3e6ad0ab6ffb22cf3f77b00333517ecb2239c9b81e59a72d087":"":"":"":"41f335cf727ffec9ebfe7cb348d11cdb4e5e49a9a047d8342a6656e5d235219a5d80715166698cc1f16e34f743811b820e6ea55c2bdd0db1b97ea2269fbf60c739feed818282f447bfe2bd0b9a7c479144f0016703aff450abbd87a50e5e5af0d2d9469175542737bd116de2a73acbb74d9f0077a227704f271fe0696f071914dcb9c0f0191fee35eb66248eb17991b538649457d5d5f9d4bb9cd81c33a14d2becce003c143c9cfe39ccac51048ef169f6a22143eca721d04f6e147749a44a75" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"0b2307c32f34d3f3c3d6887fb17ff68b01f158ef07438a41cde27d2d6725277f33f60888aa32b9b7406f78f47bd877a1795496f759d693f3f8bbd65cb5b2562c4a8d4a717b6bb8eeabc4d8f56118a97d3787d3065f1e20e6d71a1dee563fdb2d56561128fa83d8602fe0da3e89b019e1":"":"16815bf5482abc969179152f79aa34a04c28d483e6ac81aae14f7e0e051a5662":"938c363df2740ba9ccd39168f9bbcd7d421566955f141e13ed039c4d86195392":"959517e0b27d461d678ba2dd528bfb7e844f7bf14a15fb176efabb3a5200ff2b373c7c0683f095798951dc7ffd62b172ed814954c44087fc7a6695a5a275bc8aecd3a2ca8ed631a9ebf5e1d1c515542c67f31e16fd3ebc7e2333c7dffcf385f0d6ebe16b9ed42994be9f83d0cc1e2b3b5773cd2963639ac74ce64a311ac0726014bcd213818cecf5d562cd1c5e97be4028f64400cff31fcd587a004cf60f03c6f3222e4dabae5c4bdef8819670f77f9227eaf55eba5238f90c4bea4f03588b66" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"062f2aa7b48c983c1c6d00d06aa523a67d4e86e5bd266451bb286dcc5888f0f4940c3b022cc76d68e1706d62fea84d052a019b921335f69ed5dcd902632116759b68e09b531de276c9238faf3a9802806750454a5260bd808b796cb12116354b9a7ab9ce33f8dbd40ae7e74a07cfca02":"":"4a217bf136c3894ff7a3ca07eafafa286fafc8a827328b105b3a8aff28e49d14":"e433460e9414b21fc3d5e2705c08a21a36acde4458e24b78dcc51199b97c7a9a":"5c980247a1fa16ea086d54084281c5fd114777ed21478beee9edb175be7c4066b197065da5f4c15750783039eb4b5e2cd4ccdc2a45c49ce535f03a36657f218fc616b3e8ef0c84b78b0cd1c57477242bbddbbde098be573e20d6ddc76649d706e7f6c7ca3f44c845c2c9c9d316ac8b7389f7264c6f8cd6c56ca5503e5b37f52d19e8d47cc85a04a0196b9387433bca3c18dc30b47030fd297705101826840991eaf5b856a5ab75d2bbb70cb13e0dd1876802fc2bd776a518b9dcb9484c499644" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"0fc79576bdba77a815108bc9cd2d168ee30f9ab76db70600ac95fc40c1f6b724068c12b99cb4928247e64b2ea8e75c728ccb3de18adfebe24ef99e14ad54bc1b3a486891b00b1c55172d16adb00ae58c9d8ae0fa9809245a56c9118048199767d35c026e6664773562af011c2ca7025d":"":"b0c200b6f8548643529fd414c693054d4fe04d8f76c3fb8ccc6992ffc25e6b19":"b91bf188cbaf4b01350d726585c6f3601a26b3654db2e2690a14f1989f83ad85":"7c64e503eea5b3df44dc0eb986188c312a0f5fe1f113239984608a69ccadce8a7c7f3136169e075b0c61812b1e74dfe6ab2e7d6f247f73859da5a1068c92ef8e6aedd94c3904b973ab887ca3c38de70b8b312e32a702710829ddf962f0e08779ed9770975536557e3f912ef0d5c4969202af50252117eca8182c30389c9b84fda95118f8c748f0b1752c1e58b8e0af530376aa34cd874cf49628bebbd7353ab4a5f64bbc8e3537762fd5556c680290b2c523153432a2e0df1658f2a5507a30a6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"ffde7e2726e89cce816ab3e22572fe31434f3181d0578d51161cc77305e2562b755008c7e4ccc8ec62806bdfbcd8508ae418fcb0b57a4d1007469ee3d959a07e949094b0a3e5af69aea3a90a222630978af9139027a656151225a2183b92e980fff9ba9876824bafcf18d63c916fe7ae":"":"bda1741b0b39d9248dd062870334e33cecde5c5f63a07a3030f98b021c6849fa":"1b5336fcbb0ed183e0f80cd31ede4f324997ffb842a83957f41d291612c55e8a":"61d542e4794e9bd4acefef4b325d954c8ec6a29138476ab1bb037507cf52c17edbd511579be5c232a67269ef42364cfb4e2aaefb31d9e8e260a04e51d95c2ed6c5e0f095efd92fbd36edcae4393659af6bb98b0b71b281e91e1df37c353987a6a9e259f2735fd16b8c1277df651b26ac3d9f292c9252be7fe09ab7851f515325a078cd69a7573a4810ab460c4c9e7604e54242ab956fe471e90f86613ece7372f1aa934a50dbd0457033843b887c279f14ad6b4960f401b7fb777253ca5e295f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"7946fe7ada4b545090d7647c99f71594fa094593115c23888146b27a7ccbfd77ce305c1ae4fddbb75a65dba4f0ea18897bb7e9aff3138ba030005a7d1c5802838ebb20848f8e81e7e8018cd0d0dd921243c094aa710f6b0b2ea004bd684799e3caed8c3c8944d5da995b88fa071d7526":"":"b29a506c7bc8b2282570223230664193216dd47f7d20ccdd35943a88c58c0503":"3a4c00cd2f278f0e82498d33fb6ae9e020f4d3793e832afc9864c0b7b6cda43c":"8c0667d913b13866c7eab98471109d966901fdc66fa4dff8996ce81ec5185ce374b118da34e07bd82833f20fa4e44ef159f9b0c47c046307a484b3f52822a596bcfb49b555ec8d481fb30e13dc9898f093d34cbb4d696d70161315c48def73bb1c8b4947c8ddab101d4918f5cc00b890b7450e4e10c17c46ea7f5e0a1df65a1fe74ad2577e592e7bddeadb246fa62cfa5bb8620220b18fff296a19a5a3ae6b833321ca779b7cb5b55658931610d8b7776087c41ee4d077400753681c7da5c5aa" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"5459500d5a709b88bf067b4c390837eef5ae2e5f109c110a84cf32f561d26ddc567c5f4cf0f418cbc2a56d4325b2727f875cb1ceed3167136f0d93940417f616a3843b686ab4f5dd3d808801054c510fca5ea8fa0465f9d1afd8e0c68affa10f5af61e594e66b2bdb2372caa0712bff1":"":"eaec7b75ee03cdf0508c0ca171b005077954e2cec7230b0aedfe32a15cb1c855":"cdafe409b871625ab1b06a93c4d5a1f8196777370df18643f97050d7756adecd":"486aa4063b3840f0417034c65676d20da22c510d281bbf407855cb58a87ac9b33511d692315d88d27bd5d1ad5c35ec8b99018b5ca64897aff48544a5e578124ddc00f785deb60b0a60dc4873fa9a148da4dfa1557baa3aafa22680a40f650e4992d21e35fab3be5458dae13eb2caeddd8704d662b221bda01ac6329e2c451e865af9701a7ccb69c0ed0baeb226e6fbd2b871b99420949570bf5fc61c673aacb58feabdb304f870939d705426aae55cb3a2f3206c33abd453e077c4565c603a18" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"7e74b0a5413ee2ad8de814ea1f556ca5c54c6f11159f1fbc78faa86a74c4871a11658e917fed348e779aae510d383290bc6c4f13391709f8aa9bd79f38f310e2ffbe7fb1be3e6e3aac9d879f1e5fb3eb1fe81675cbdd098cd287f66fb9b28d50e12a64b9e08f28a40ed446fc3a12585c":"":"d152b0aa1946cf177aafc7d47322f8c756831550ec79adb40f34681fd6b3840f":"152229388caf5dc50454c2514d9ff1a4b70e3d1d9b8b29a228d59ce67e8bc586":"a1e2046729e849482bd693e21779e18370a542e2fc7baedbed054476f35447e069bfda33fa2723ad425717c027e8b30d57dd2fca8cf268849358354478cd8bb42e8f9a737c2e3d5490991e4902a52e86d1bafc1751f5908a36afca2b6b4663ccc9f1aa46e857e2ee61e4dc19d154029da48d59519dde64410b1d7daeb5b7b93213cba1bb059637023f928f16e5944e0ed2ca07be3674fed6e0da72313b3cb80b7a2d6533fc8785587366ca1b6769db803d6d840c5d1b6c4589272a3fe9371b0f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"70b5cab63391c5777e4e60516b7095dea3cf26d72b27c19f5a08de6634306d992de4c3f70bf2849a4c3dbeafb163f5d50dcbbcc8e6f4bd973636da95d71d39d6ffc9e67332088bf906921b9c48a7e3de158740a9c0f29a7b69d5545e390030965e305ac1653958360d01607bcbc39fb9":"":"ab042d23accf9a9473b43e82683e30f436fa492ba4a8911e4ed2622d481e0cd1":"b707e2d5a5020d37656009713bb100c55819a98e220fbdfd921c6c0724ba7238":"f3f82b7aa0639bcabecefc7b07b3eecc9962884250fad11b9351226f138e06e3e953e052792d0127618a28aaaa1bf5374a06393c18a326f8d3471010f9840dd16ec997f53fb981aa2b689bf1cdbf265b4ab698f9e8e9c054255147e04654b8fb1d0fd3a0b64d3880ee6e9fa87e0184f6ba307f4d3fea651556e0baeeb75f308fa32925f8c55ae0f355f8db8495ec6c46003763ad4ef36590ec40239b5e8530aadaac931feefc8e392c550ad4d89f5b314a53a0633c7a93bc05b588273e6d1d56" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c17914dd6b73d65e5af112536f52b046d4963f9c9098c77d9dfe35ca7ee6366d4c0fed576ba4cd14caa3d0c406fffad2f0748362166975f5bcb9a395d568b8dbde3383c5654bd24f26890b21ee1f1cb10f3c93cf2df64cd764187c840590a54babc9c281de88ad1a1dbc2677fa8687f9":"":"4a61ee9349d53f8b3c1af36fe0a9303ef89705fd87e06e5f34b61e1350111279":"a9ad1cad4ca7a5af4bfb83680d4b914c23a6cd551e8b002c50f30be0d8693edf":"9ab30e3729dd8b2af987dcb793d7a3e1fc4ebcfe0a4ac976d91bd3897777effb210c8076e9fd135991e54abb4bb8c7b183a80ef37077692e519d38df4a04304fd83fe1d67d32147fe0a249a6c8bc603d99878039b873588c3781a193437f098094fd8c12945ef99036442c80cd1f544725040df980c548f0a675afaf62a1b7c225c9cdf0703e613c7a5d72c8b00d8ba199b8ecb48b6e0b0d103a3b0f57ff1a4b9189a20dedeac6eb26b1f66ea0c34ddded10af2b0133f4b5b95ac2239dd94919" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"2aa5423270d0859a6e3aa3069a88f3ac4c30eda7f6e52aa891e4f995244a80d73d73f789561b00ceddf721ea59a7eda3157090ec192c578fc53d232c36453c5e8bc3c9c22f3aedb6a93f7aa63975d9bd3369cd518e570f6af0ab162e4c938d17dcd4f3ae46d7cd502ef73b2d40f50e2a":"":"32cae3ff757b79f2305a8b5f5fff5a77afb581faf5a3796c5ed7054d7c048017":"632eb6f1c827cf299f3403bf80af721fe5ff8245331f1ccfbb8f4e61ef5edadf":"1a85c36131a8c271d6c805233098bb29f9104e6254e0680c6e264a76f79ec17c7ac65c8a97610a0a7e5304b37d1ebdbe02cf9daa9e45b81d75d8c613afb974eb38dc49041eafa7462b4c272fdd3d7fd4b05b1e6142305ffd6fa634ddde90e273b51b02c0b68b823c77ddf3e93a2ab9436d0f4801f08a113eefeefefb9592683981423f83235f8e563ecdb4e44daa9afa5e1728204dde1bd254c7985e6d56897c570b0c6307fd49ae4dce18ea55eae846af2a5acaae17a71f8369b64f47b0e54d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c69c61689d1f7763d43b22b6bc2262c377c62db60835114442fd5bd65c665705b5563b3b6e9e793d0f4128696eefc5ac603b3edb35b705ae39845cefdf8fde23f5479ae4f033442aa958e979c89bc41dde68d92f05b28c3644133d19788624bc970019a10f6b3c6c5b8dd22b0cee3e26":"":"15cd6984fab6ae7db72a4c099a064cdfbd141dce361fab0021872c91b1bb65ff":"86c295fcc7f9c2ec9fad377e0e4d0119334080f59fa68c21c19d7a1212dce03b":"97b971ec13db049ccd72bc597ebc2e33fe4da647d0f74855f242884d35dcf92d0349fdb3527c87c5431c10fa85569285096d3369bd1917c8c7c8650024acb88e5b17c42b50a75419e29757a9e1ae09053cf0b51dac437883cf3f5b1abb40a71f40d279bc9d596d0f59f4c70f81087b4446c402279f4486198ee3294d0a5f72eba7ba52cd552906371aeeedb47122bffb0d5ed27c3cbb86a6fc2d83ab4db7b6e1ee467dd1ec20dc15bcee168f2e200179714cfc04eac651a495a718e1ed985bfb" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"4dcc7427dff46b7db7e2d3273e0605ce85c460cfd4269fce9ca3b10399b99e178b12f28786b9e3df457ac0015004844d6f6bef29ea562856ee82246d24982393f770d0b65d0ffc660d9d8359f10904fd8cbb76e648df60ec43237ff7dc46bc34920bba637a2c1643a53e8a88bb7bb97b":"":"4c0ab67b952186f2f85a0dbd4b2c1b0dd009dd794260ee7f321b2d2b3d994e09":"f5be66009b79f51f6aa0cd1a5a24a72c6a6c4263263cbcf80e8e0d514a2bbb1e":"211ca57a321cae2c6d1ad755ac924c92dd09bb1c6334ecc543ba78a18608479457bebda63f707fc28190b2d56e4cfd96d8c49fd146ace867236c57761ea28326e3d241d1dc35d7ca971df9d292f2563d33c5f32abe86367cf5f2f06628376752b353f72b501ffa94a50f146b8174cb7946ab8c8be382237334f37594418850a233c536d72763f10b06f728e3e60d3b4f0377d51b0de11d110a28b6fcb7c42b77e5f6b771c8e5d713a0f6c4d82ab2311cadf16b7cb441a417b2f595f32ea822ea" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"b72f34bf8209a28168ae7692e4c7d6f19feab9346971b85fb9f377f6e4a77dfb370a10addae744ac03f2f277c85423945f486830cd410f26e22c23a136d41800850113339242e1a0550bef81a239a289a8d020c14298854f0b17abb0bc461ed6d39ab2d9cfb03b835916c2a8e93710a0":"":"e919d983beae4b687bb393d90ad4104146e86564845800ecf82085d5b269f1dc":"abc8b519db05c1de8794248c5741627cc00ee35a972ecdec045a0cc557a2d967":"9777504473adadade14eefc0279f8347bb178a36dbb5fb028f0315b4309fad4ef554bf34b04146ba4bc260a89cf78195ad1c23c6e473a14385c66ba2a1c005cdfe336999245f00ffeaa41dfa3d9e68294e5d676f01f213c6d2d8a69b43e36f2a568999c0a8c07e96d7daf90f3e2e668eb9fc8e5c812a49a39507d193eb7c95b947aafe658a1065efe9370cf81014e4ffd54efffe5f863e6e4b7d875565617d8b72854ecf09263c55d1c3f1a4f4862214fafe7f03da5572095a7befcfd8e6ee63" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"35d5a6cae5aefdbc62f1efb638c15dda387a8f651810bf068a8d92601fd37e0efffd95196c09c668ddb05eef3de339222a0bd0d3b721a27e2f29be84a846c3964eb9a84cf69b214f612df3b414729df499da4d3ad8bf3613bdad3a70c73cae80556c16f8ab83adf0f2bc9391094bfd98":"":"cd603812a8444925993f2c1a0691bb4459faedd872f43852f9970675f579a1eb":"1441b6d4876b050fa4d969f1845d3f119cf5d8720c35da9c489000e6b7165db4":"259828d05b8e735fad69527cd2322f94e8e7ac2791607ccf2a74d070bf7d5574ffd8d6e447cb4e02bb15a87aa88d8f1667edc0905455b116ef7f08ce727d8f266965242e0042810f946e52acca6348d70e012d998322a18a2f3b4c4c6d6b66cfe65385312344e3eed14c6e7277eac9a4d09ddc5dcf8fcce6f79a23d34c80cb78aaaf1347ecce8c13efd450d59506513e62f527179b95b9b5d9df821c32538f8e1ccb17e911826e944ec44943ad8e726d54fa98ebc4d012d34a23771ba497ca2e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 0, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"66abf17d907a134232faaff93bfe361223b5b773980cc261fd19caaca022fd0a081c11efee01fb1f7abd0145b32a51b3237d6ace877ca6392bcae2fd2aa5b865aabfb1d1d1da33f42319a088c8dbed1124a71d39e627d5efaa1e8f3e5f70114bb03b71ce54e4f8d34e838106b2467cca":"":"1e51f2b67538f84440912c6fa20fbf009100fc3008b5b8e1308d95e7ca53b460":"301f91c659f73b618cb46a4343772f1eee9fb4949ec6328109823749bd8b0b11":"34c532082926e6d530b3a58282eb4666ac7374e8befaa4999dfc9f409e40ff966652295d2940db97061800583bc7d47b053553ad29c89ee61803c1089d30592270d2927031353592d4aa71f59a4bf3f2147cb406322367544c38fa5a3c8ccb534bd884355b06145db62161260162091c795874a2e99e01292a2e39e107738818a211750f858edbe0c2ea4734ad14f1c45bcc9f733f027616926558587f7332be55044dfd6fcdb628ff7d7d581820a217bc64aa092e450722686e0cb291eca45b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"37dc21c72dc7c82d5e13c51ecaf5a8ae06402500d92caf96c0555a95069f4f0144a961ead5d6d9bc317afc8206202bddd57fc02a2a500df1fb5c4d9d8837b52a5220fdf068fe2b8b4bcc63fbc9bfc94c8e21d987e8b6cb0f4cd37b144c668f18b7a36ed4e9758ee7b96029aa0ab2196a":"41e3b89347bd035bde510ab8ff83d5fdcc9d5f2de648bdb468a714f2c1083c52":"":"":"a929ee23c5832e5ab93ccaa40bf775593d7d04a1a8411dfa07b4c8a2da2dc91b1bcb9c27a0ba5a7152ce5ded5f76cf6b83c04c0f8a4f6b43383ae3e7d497280c0f944be91b0bca6a56df2d00641bfc1ec549b538898e559407b076164278c0eb7afb6d6f4495a50d4da178c04b259d21bb745692d3bd186edf5bb3da6f66b4418fc3d9b085b0a6c1a5e54696272c305c4b8887595b391dd6ed8da03dc9fdb2728d8c40a2defd8af05ef1c443a72323f2e0b0d268109fb7e7ee70192fa06bc6c2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"0dcbeb660cff703e059913eebff4f639a24b611a078bae8f01320ea4af5e8e0ed93b8dc4e84d224036b5da645c147359c6123c54cc2367262a7594bc9a7dc69f76549ab803af66de8f253d338d48ab827b2b1918d636d6ec92bfd9123f1f5fb59b6c37eadca0ca7792e2b7932e1ddc33":"1debeed9ba5790437a6c56dd3c9e2f6df0912aa0ce2e57fa8eec9652e2eccfc1":"":"":"5bd815b3c3bb73a45dba72c68457ccc17212af905607d827e8b5ddbffa34a058ec360abbeb6c8ba16c770ae4826135ac7e4faf208da8b5fe3b26c16fa7c7ef4000c3dfe1b8b707dde64b415c671c4615d56e2648908e047ac978a389e346cebe9228daa7bcdf5e341f72c3c7ff74672edd60c7c6341726450ffbf9e3e7a16580e7e602f9ddd3f3556129052de05991907d81a87467ff5842c6e5dcff4543e24ee48149f16e9107a9aa40cbce367d4b76042d77ef1790b0a7701b2f04873d245f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"d9bd99128fe2771918afc6db6b2514eea0b617d9bd4599a238d9d99a7ce18995e8d85542f3f9dd89920b0f79b94d7f551fef4a330e9de24eb197bc75677bc13d8361104997af99ea2c6da03f4e71c89e03191bc5e320f057afee98e98facb99d15142c61ddd71666cdc38146fbc3ea4d":"eb701a9d119cc6dc0d735254067dfe161b1052ba3f93ab0d6bcc19cc0387027a":"":"":"67b86213a84778a9a38eb9913b9db8508b53ac0a81ff85dc78c966d638255f8f7c63ce06d4a66f5d9213ec2b32f7e63ce5dcf01b59d3b30433f0cf4c06c171d839953de913093ec845670b38ecacd81162dd73501b2e4c2d9dc69b97d49bd6d9f6250070ef6b360305fcc5ff392d1adad98d6bfda67d10b725c7cc8ef6b4fc206fde1871712b96dcbc2df4f08d79f1adf7fbb01bfd8f20e76956ed4b9dd1d7e5fb4f922ad2a529bd871490e741843d839e876c4b475e2fa140f28ac8d347a07b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"0de3fed3b363d20ec5018d4aeafb25c8e0e6aa42ee8b56843043f8d9c40b9bdc8ed427d29c469d8976a5b785d050f3d2e5eb287a064c54311bab32dcd5f240682babef59c6ffa602669f3ce4590b054e2550444f249b56666b7b2fbec29b33d1b29ee653e388f9fb54b00635ff526dd9":"82b6a44b0f35f946fa0fd4628738e61a0bdd421a8de73f3d2efa25216c789080":"":"":"1f7b951d147ddbf21fef9d4849044c44b757309da8f0244f71e4d8301e1fd50c5e46407f5bcbed83eaefdf8983c330dd0a67568e866b20b48c2bc97dc63a7c0d3eb60f2488b1eefdfaa7b8dd43132511b4a2ca80bc9e82851584ec4ae463444aadd3c8e6db2d4469ad9750e18a31337613975b3fa0629b9a22bccb235d20157a4427acd619324e881e68f5615c65e59a566a73e4ce9d484fc5b0b29137c4f339be84781cad67d17de03099b1d03ac45106c1f2eb5b380ec84392b7ba5c91df4c" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"abdc2ac24ba7d92ed9f518d9576510969f8d22074bed9b7639299d2137532c50faa49b5e843f417693a2eebd0ffd3f27c0ad2d8bbfdb912ed4d1ec85165d4ae577a92b1affab63070e25dca8bb1b035c8bbc5d3a07b4fe094690e4a45b99f9e5bb6b0bfe823f3c2a148732fd43db5e5d":"8c7b18ce389664fb72e777e70b533ced4c04b0c290fdd45b86b6b95708d74187":"":"":"c3d1420055f71a43264ab8da92829fa1b8937346375349d2e256705d933a21352ddb4eeceb36cdeab38cae58da81bcbe6deafeca5d7f018a0514bbc285f436b574ffac2547d26a3f9aef21b66c1e70b45d372e4dc2281182ae94667e442f39e1b9b2fc2aee06ab306095a904614613b513cf1af5a9df12b996cbe88cc3b25401790034ad0622df43af4cdbf9cb681538c79189a8260cf9c35378955f2ea859faa78773854883cd94bde4c0f50d4c998c278e47787e3f74f3dbb98f710366d315" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"d20353e175f4ebd0ef5fe77f7f6fbf5340ba07934828dd296c041a63de841002db0d21ecbfd5eda2bce80bed6f73c23d3f18900bcc02791ba9cae668fc33fc60ba84c6eb40afbbfff18be5c4960ce57ad67dfc8c1eabe61a299881c0f326f7093c1a232c80467772e707dbe75b5558d4":"f38f23461c471181a4179323aed247299df11ce145fbab9834b85b3cb42a10f5":"":"":"76a4994edba3d0d9ffee9ccb7e12a75e79c5ec1213f45ca4c50ad629ac533e5e6dbf58f8fac193755e74f9e7a75eedf89472e91d394e32eaed86efa4fb2f9e7fe4bec1d9c7a30fe9bd17c2cda73d136e752a9b818cee6f1262028031bc09cb81b89156138b571f03afa69dd388a807a8cbe9c4de66cad764114f9a4a6419ea70ccbbbff9dd774aea8a2d6b1d20d0a577c59953661f0a87b4d795c2626a025d733f43bb5cd1df37f5cf542c7c8b6bda061cf4693e0384060e63090415d7470cb0" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"a58ca5154659ba58fc1b468c909c667e1b5087884c01ab15f86fb5a431e982c1c041be0aa014fb310019fff65f40ff13d4469b123223ae44f4f4ac0fb6877a7890f969d39047e39ab23882cd7838e16e64bc361fe18136471dea2e71a86ef2d9f8f7e1d24643d7df292409ff8cba0f13":"dc05980e40f07a02fdb150af580a7d195ba26f4fa72a1fe513ccc2cf6e4f699f":"":"":"6ad4543c218cb6aafe65e6a50c4f9ee9d5c7a3b9a0112bce262f49f5b0d20dab7225fd0acffa25165729d8fbba038eb65f7e72f136e5bb82e8d94698dd9b763c38f3041ccece3b04189aaabed79e4d4213e24218c5fccf5f9a0c3902875564431f4d670e6e60e1dbabcc4642c3ef895c115e28702927cb98d509f9341ac7ae2c6ef6c2dc4537e909c81a9804057b6e24fa63ec5edce835e624969a969e2c47c6dcb7e9bcb2bb8f344d2b9855a43e26c0606466887b28b67ffd7f99d374812d11" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"9d6e99a11d63cab5aabb1462abef66bef31a2886cd172651bbf30f65b16fb8f3b93b5042a908510d8518330538a06253959da557d2b390c6fe0b7ac6b18591e5791d275c7e3d558690719d5967d026a80604a389946e2a55486b5c49c2984990a2e14824aa2922e6a59892c5e6d969fb":"af631e7990394889b84d851920ce8877934e706b780908a07211d45b247584a6":"":"":"9f33ba9083c7f4088c9505622cd5b4937b7189b0cbcdcf352c54ef72057594b8568cd4b13a4bfeb61261d27f5febbf2cbbf902a8d55f6bdf669238ae84b8abc58826841f7f62a0c5bd9f74125cecbf8e3b4c1ec88663114e7c248c41cce92e73b05eb3f826100c1b2683cbba985d2ab694b5de1ed8624628917ec9bb97733f337298c0459f198c7a138f1670dfac0d58f287b8244f0605f97406ef528099aa2ef290db202baa7fb221a8523344ad836c9a2bb25e1ff3fb4dc20f69ebc9f0fdd9" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"df7c57519ae3914c75174b3107b7ddab95df936c5cd7c296b1cb1ea06249915cda22bac19ccf2d522137989d5a42549809277ba155d04b3353520f4b5c2f18120bb4b8442130db58e9d46a1a41f5627c40a6b65a4f9075460b7053202a6e5b12b9e07ae6ee9b4945d4235d0b736e88f2":"10a198b05830cff2fb4f5b0317c258129396edb943769292753095b58bc8fece":"":"":"17b9fc6419c17534ee16aacf32550cbf58ea1f073b8e72fb9ae6e94094e797f216703da428394a1da8236f725b191cbec11531a1f87946c70fb1440a55be7d7d18c9b5085d626dd0cd9b3bd63a9014e5d14eef636beb694dfa7f781e83f3c1b4fe5519ab1a505d1be5b812514f3a39814601db104afe5726086f6bacb61c00ab8210239b2891938e97fc53de069f18a6469999727a904403bc53c6c73c7b3a5f9f37f380563f1281cdaa1b4bb4a636f849717c307848748172ae0191997abda8" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"2e403c307a03d766b61001842f85caf91a5eec97a49934547b2ce63411916495f3e102d333269e04381bbf140a28a2d61fa6a5f2286079619f4f4fafeb5c520c602d0ac3190fd500a3402e7c0647ac76c901e7c58e012cd6b9e83d2a969f0d0ae4e08ed5cb601fc72596a72b4854f246":"ff1d9eed8cf59f5708e41924cf13fd5d30ccb7dedce3062dfbb2c4bb4d36b65b":"":"":"e5e20f2cb063c1587583a381536aecbf0b0cb4400c99a74bbb6aa15f338b3e67187316865cf90e691d99466e34bd6612985575122c6c79848d4e2f26801d98e49c002f4063019394f4b3eee908f2d6b56749c260e56ece4e0431650a8bd9735879ee6c9bfaa5d44c07e7ff6978883c36597c31126386dafbbe035579819068bb060348629f74420bd411f2dc858d46dff0bb4f79946af96046da2c2cb32e0aaded4eb1ebc8748f277317f9ffb9aadac1bf5e6654ae7131d5ee0c765ff3d49d9e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"4b1240cedb84ee3f395317e177efcf03b0fb57be1e01e3c206170877a06ec2cc077e9751b4eec964a4422d010ef1487456fc16b3e6e7ccb8a06230144535274215f00afe175d394cb04518b630ba7255ada0c6676885801a8f503c55c38850de6f7904b40cf03fa195cd16ea2999347c":"9043ef3c775f32dce1902b9efdc481f61f29220eca53bb904155f2aacc3b3706":"":"":"4facd2fff1828b9f4a63f639503cf6533a4d242f316ef7168fba44b52b876056bb0fd040d5e331d2746169cdc88ccef74dcf6c642c1d1a0db4130f8be9ff88555de4c2a7a5824f005cccdfa6074df3385672eca57a45679d69dfec232cc8b1bca87f6f9c6cac2f630498d52449a5d1b328a6d2ac1a9054a0658be589bc277b7750ab5d647a73a15a059d72608f9d299d11f9fb417a37ddc1b52c8b8859c2949e5ebae650b9cf8b4fd771288e582dee38178b154e681eaf74d4d3f35daf00a309" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"c2027d8c084e2c6fc5d535726312bc6362372872cd37bf07cc1c3870f3b59a970c62b84a10d1498b2e02027d854fd84dd615e29e7c204579968569386b6f08393322c4fb36da4398ec4881ca9c17905b7b2fa28722c98d404e93fbaadb165411d41256a0dfc806a19df0f526571c80f0":"8c5c93583dbba016531aecc1da7b010b9559785b2e8cf660ce17022f8d86be78":"":"":"54074cf184040f57716e9eef80ed0e006cd029b99ca568fd7639c4c1b0f7431933516830f5f87b157fdbbb2af7ab57f6faa26323f096c8e86136e49d833665a6cb3a22f7d5d38290c2e9a23c62dea6c51b958460b263566c5c0e4be9adcb1c123b55879f405f11b3c34c24852d33c64d6563ee46cad14ce08d5919ddbffdfaad0bef8d8ed9974f1d95917e2b108d9519b13c4f6929429d2dc44ecace7799839ffcae035904b576e71e92b0a89f39e3b3444b75ee0705419c3b3533c793605eb6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"02ef640b9f087fa48457918d7bd6e910d7379bdd89e1549118ec67880dc3c4be3ad95397b8fc88bfced5aa76941716bf4c26696e9540d759c8c6b8603d5c40df267056c79bd8a3497b77052e498953493eb853b56c41f3286c09f1ec88637f95a1cb7e6e0efd3acb8a8fa4de63d10727":"38e664b930fb072112e6d47bfc5538b0d48672a12769f3eb860243bbc1c5db75":"":"":"c399e8c39ab174fa8cabb7e73845d8d434dcebc21062edc69d02928b0de4471517496365bbd59062a43408215f5b0f35971f4c48077623860206e0e6af8de751e6fe45eb6648a66e8ac5e603043c5365be3015af858fa2709c6c7b1cd22701dbbf4ef27fa45e6d7f9df4e8a558517a38e26bdd82960db9a92a0deee98657ab514913f134cb9362756a78ae4afed3a6c89e86341a8fb20b5cdfcd56933363f83e8c55c69adbf8e8d7199bc4f93b72ae1c4d0939b564d98e7f052c66e1e0988ca5" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"2f280ffe3306764839899faa89213139a40462039f4d9c55feaef6728c24cc636819357f6ea65badc8e493b99d5af1d995d14d81e39802711977d0a1c5783bfe3c290bc469bb9af520b0faa06f230fe6c4ba3804e39e3226f0731f09579e105d726b089d1c37c72e3faeb33768d3f20e":"e3d99860e8b1e9297c60b17904be8525be831d71dbd3f454f085d1758ebe7160":"":"":"45400ec700a4cf8309fbea94aa4fcbdd22c859e0f7defa746085a2f4ddb9db16efbb0c2fff798c99ff4e9e11986f4c330f3658e34a146f8d9071467228e3b0ea486cfbc81da3e739a301fe51b620d7d27fe9da0e4b875efe3c2bd0fde31f608015ad71cac9c95bce33e516c62fc45a9fc85a78c142416d7fbff3a83602dcce3add6301ca6b9be565e3cf06ad6f22855d57d9c184ed7214adc1bb014a1b6dafb86989283fa3a4be10c410442d761c98d2d3f94bb0d97ba1d5c8966eb47b0fe6ec" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"8f3ddc4230f8320bd18cf078c04c62e248fcc326980301174617a9e54351c667ba4c31a4c0e7dbd7336c27c0b8a034f6fd947b0a21e580e6c2dbfbd44d01f5fb4a51dcd2199df9f1803f24c5e774f048815302e016aad33254d308c5457f368965c15b6204e191c2a252e4fe88dfb978":"9bfe9bc055b3215560cd285553372c47cca422fca574c0d22d7ce5f2dd40b084":"":"":"34f550231d31c1b3a3db331d341ada3b987120d94e431831eea67e8d208f9cf1800549d445fc7befbdcc2488cc7f4340560d574fcd2396e9ecc9a232f1015cfb26db451623fe47ec8bacee1756573e74e519adc62b23ce86fc191ea5e13da9c7a14496426c6c53dfa7c7ccdb67d6164dbe88cbbe7f48d4971993003ab24f3eff18bd52c2661992e8f8da93bfdd28f01fc32edb439ad130352463084041e9871c431ba26c676ecd7812991833113cbbe687651e93aeb22a6a44cffc7a3fb214b2" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"8b285ce6b4da70c83fd72aab1b4be62101bf9b29e168726ea2f670aab0deaefc5da3404c494c6019ea33679e37cec308dab13e0cb060f66c1c83fc6fba46477d1a3c802edd7594db0b297dedb9ccbc800c817f05658fb9b4c99938ae2140160c4a16d548634a353bc285cb38d0e93243":"723c0f287db4af285c195cebb1104a106f22e8b243fdcd0566228ab5f227a9e3":"881a1874c800db068b5913d195058d0726458de3782ff530af1a761f9628547f":"0c27cf271bd7931d187ec6f56038519674468fa2e7e6f994904c9f1afa346939":"51e042dd56a193908c9018c25f1c1a8b5e2734b055c3b7fde6a8ba9ec2b959349df29295abb0a24b4715f98d31de0a369e6262c2b2cd49c5462b7ae284e921f5ad2ec013edc1611343c228683f4170f34a75854b1b656d226e294172d488c10a415f09dee70984b9c49e8d36863192301d1762145e0d9e94e99bd30ce8490438ed050f418cf4ba0b07fe90a82d1ccf38578d99edf0518c4a758a199db4d3533c4dbc55b1da19840b8f365a574aa01647819032dc0ad641388c2093ebd4ab5d99" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"5b5c670d3e0e97a21cfd5bc3d038f0c3d2578cf3147f5545e5118a04c4eac727b50734939e2fd0aba704932ccaac42af316525e3fc5f1dd224131d65f8d44ff8420891c0af7c78f9cf766097fbf0f8bfdd131db1801275c28081e6063c0c4d6242f96e40fc513608289f378bc4f18518":"4cb0e590a1d575b6a2df9cb0243895263c894a990b6798424bea9ef199761d08":"feabcecf0648665b08a7c690add6ff75744de3916d5573145c35517808605beb":"fe81cf8978798311ee6d1c5d6145b3832d9ad1a1266fdac0f4fa230c631e9ba0":"62aa5e9b8a07bed2a5d3eef0c73bbc841bb8cbf544d32a2889806ba501c6768aca98c19b83fd4fb2cabf120c05716b9eac9b77d561ffdd69682308f80fcf1c78409f3b21749bf71abdb209660716a39c2562e8ae1b3478828bf35ec9d3f9712d95f49a36b9eaddaf1b249f023c36d09ff1b6f3df6d10e4e336763edef9501827d5171c507eec405bae52d56fd62f90f5c58a2f1a7310530df15ca6b7841a2871a37cae583e6b388978c118b9600840f5540af529bce0a24da8f906f601fc270f" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"64cf47e52f758df802c2b37a4841c73a3228738d14b439a7d02b13fa3024715c744721e49f25a0e73e821f69786fe2d91ec1cce1d1cbf2dcbe5bdd2371c0a5df050841b6f07b1a2c0d064bc5e06ecf2ff9904928febe0bfaf3626df5bfb79fee1474cc8dfc3ae268570df2811bc3ba3b":"c3f0b0471d5273f40e74ccd71712071fa411b72b0f5a98c9eea9a5f7f176967e":"4df90039bbb54d8753b19ccb6250ffceb7279c05f6d69b5c47801c6fdeb1ddf8":"181d12bb126ea840bbf9e6ff5e68f8ef53f69071d223bff593a63e4e0c65ee1b":"8cec490ebe0b4837f040663de29e2c6dc801d7953cb2416d245ef66173e5d7baafbb77fd2c5ce69b4b8995bfe51f5f33cfffd9e9b1284fb8657bb7a3c26f5aac500cc7d3737fc81418c94d3db1a63f4922ca49803c04fdbc9488e21d9c4bc381c48bd9f7e5cd1ed6c6fa9e889e463dfc3a313812245a66be220266707a5358e25807ccb11f24780e5ef82c84a8803f72dbd21f55d96362d7cd8abbfd9d21f4e3dfac33326a4e538476508afd87e030d92328a91c91ffb16b054740dc3d0a2130" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"690a8be904c75e41342c8e2548abde2e465612a632710179ccb9c1dab76c4615bdaeda1587772638a61747738b96cfc94879325d2cf1cc0269d877eab8aa233ba8d7f1ff44e9118a128bcd8cc687eef58940343d27ba1d800aed9e2e911a8c83b8460f9d72c7b92852cc178d3d0baf6a":"5dd031fb2df56c510b3cc3c02fdcf6cf3ffa4a881e7475a8631073b3ed5e3c62":"a0a861238b2b9ea03582eb4703bc33921b5376c27004710d416ff921d6e6fc60":"3cef66f75aa682ad5430bdf0f01dd1f2c3492fcacc6f80ab351cfacc1c6b6ce0":"92b337a3364059acfcaef789ac1ae09c9ed05fdf69f5d5da7a1c9b6962d3a3c71a4041dc234f7be58fdbb728f8f5fb10404558f21d9b4c818fcadf5d6bac8bcb044e5b2fbd26ee08398dc8904c271e8d3d184bbf61f77c62fd3c8f1cc1ee2f8c4620c513f3abf5e312b431e8608b29cdf528d892ff03bc0a9cbd202b9da1d052ae2bc2dd8723198a1b3017ade2803c3dc8733ac33ddbdcef7a9948d64f72da0716b32dc6eea224bd49a7349a1c32e8e325ac11e5fad8353cf85d9eb4b72b1954" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"0eba7b06309f0dc4e2bfabea57e1d01a5a3e711398320925647008abf19cae194efbff93968c0a7d1c7623ee1e3987cd95c3dbd1b2ba94d0b2d416fe2f2f6faeab46646a378e931bb5daac049333129ce7e20e53117a0f68baf4c86a3ee5e787b02b53b1e0140430e77ca86f242d7f90":"69adc69e03cd113c34ae6b89c7c2fcfbe987e426da865f7c8e052da4bade343a":"729489cc7ba4f3f96f77ff365fd5380cd83cc7b17b150d327c5b7632f1cb0460":"59892fcf99ce719819774539ed4f10edb7cd35cd66969137a88ebe6336da90f9":"565e3e392a9f364df0b575d9444aac262f58ce12312d5ac9832ae6351b6aae0398e0bedd3074f57bd4e9f0e89a50d627ecfe11fe9aea09fce563eb34efd27610a3255f81f953bb3f222b15c019b9d812150f7a1f19126994c505d9ce5c948882a1f6c5cdbc7050461ccdbbb7aae597dab53a12ea6bfaa4d4710188d690fb0a0a34df7fb6bba949fd6a8565fded8e4832ff7f6b08a653a72b8b88782b8d77c1f217e8487163fdbddcc88a83d8bdad479ca75fdbcaf02250db39528456942119f1" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"9dea5f271193aef61bd72c76a581d65eadc8002b258a4d548c7ad1cb587a5f681e9709eab5e146833b01a79a34c352aa642a7a376595347c0203a8a0456af4e9859aea62c887166b3483e0c7acdd5b99a1b1a466dc0709cc6ba133abe29ecf3f3150d664d04baef8854fd86a5d8cab19":"895e5039eeb3ea1d197614a683c84d7780ac8724192bd6c35fe81137bc23e4bd":"9e8669a67bf80c695889a7e875a9ad1954b91e4bddd0848313b4efb4b00b14fc":"2e93a8b96ae1966e2a052db0d5c2d5b76cd7cd23494bb1170a33a9ddf39b21ce":"71a0ea8b9884e979f4ed546cee3688ebc399b41be38578f15b99d9621de0da3e671182f6da612334edb8d3a6d5e34c2872e277942854350526c3e000834bbe18cd5f2f336bcfabb42c4aaeb19b8cefa3f7066a89593960fabba244812d15c5fa7a7281067c789745127ee2b63b14237136c54864bf86ab7c377414a7933b829fc3052e8c26c698459a83b1990c093305372aa608c967bfda719e98c4c177764b72d184586f7b63a8e75f78c9e5e1dc045c3eb5b30c7147c69100c2cf910d4f3a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"2b4c85aac528f5cf44e9018795a1e8f810220ce318aa174bed9db372602c00f68ac33625739f299241d1a8381372537bac392411a1d6849aa6610a177743afdf45cc524838fadf1b5feaaa9983ca79a4508b5e4a275514ef4c04c233c3dbbca32a00d0a1628323b91dacbe499c1ba928":"799a4b3c9f62c2f6aa9e91604e742dd06ff9f77b15d3799684e1dfcf029d807b":"1d15f59cb3e102d5ff47ad4c0aae13631ec4d300de4247137aec5b43e5aa4f79":"f43801851946f97208909f1ad0f79d6577eeda70067886b270f55d626d966fbe":"f05e50192528ba1185cb964324141c1d195f6e26c42164052a7b7244797c3084d48bc5e6e1a27e64562cf2fa36b4de30132a082de2f927059731d084e2042eb7720932ae8e1741f05f4c75079586924cc43a6cf3f5525e037b089674121c2741f836372f219a33bfcd910884abb166eeeed1840672663e0455b18bc7c9fcf20967b25dd77eb37e00d8fc40b0788c08280b0bd8878c504d982db4d3d2476f5fe6785b1959d1bfa2762c00efe436cd217b6d01adbf7da08d23254f1be1991d200a" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"a716af9e058eedbe937ef79ee21cbaf4ac1ed0e2f4863eef4ca1e3e972f33326eb6ecfa7bc9bacd3d90215a3db843b24343edf7ada9e440a206df7f38f8cbd1d38159b8511f2a93d1f0b5ace8a89c0d823fe001656c3dde659874df88dd60056ced293cc49d64a71ee6b23199c9b20e6":"648aa30cb2687d857d309f702f6dae1f30edc824493d6e83a9e26d94f28948a2":"39c5a6514f3d399ac41b2640fd619312332fe053abf1b2a19472a58c28345347":"c912a1bb84f7aeeef79d73347097e09f6b8fb7ec593176cebbbb56af866bc309":"5387674cec52da2a9743b2556fa9874c0866e579079954cb357f17fc069c2e345c1ca80081040d620fba150c22eb1b8b2c7df082f637855c396ad6417fd383f8e93b7bd91693408e951b7572269c0ae65be8bcc9844f9fd8401e68f6fafdce195162154b34fdd5db8559dc11cfd3cbd3d391a45065761372f60c5182fe4cc162304061f86e666326c3332010fd388626cfa9ce1252982cae7b6eb1b8208c79b7b689aae9084fd180d00962fa4eea79f612ab7ec5fb51394f6f498528ad5860e7" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"af405b42f8a67c349bc10d4d0b97f56cce433e1d34cebcc75c2850010d20cf74f61b23e1d2f964ad6c9a8d65c9f87749da279902d5c30fb67207d72be55451337f34aaa8e598b9ef55fd36224ebee4b5524a93f1513fc21fa984f0a76c2bcc98ddf39823d0a87d501b3515e3ee9fd4d6":"1cbd963d49b2553a9711687bc50743d820588049cf097c100739f857b3928fc0":"e0d336ea552a6dbc132f194ac9ab80a34a54f4d331a55a070dde6601d6d9084e":"91e882daaa304874fb0c063718984ac53e1f0716ca8c9210bdcdddc142c84082":"0acb19f2a65bf0e1d9f9561d8731fe0f0c178443f00faf427973ad45f2df4f4d21a4fdecdf96c34be28e389d8caed96b515ecb215ca915b38c715015e1b07949263fb65517ea4bcae361d76c418cd2c58d29010ea79b9420d1cedf937d3aaae7e29c2170ba88c8328664d884ace90e88c66200033d19ffd52f668b00b0df088b7942377c1aec37b3c304521c394ec749efbb252669e0c0415b8b04b995fc224903b0843fbaf0be1ce804c9f14a5e97afa70d0fca9cb708ad20388730aa9de020" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"e9ecd00efafeba4fa9cbab22b1b5288c98a36ff1d6856592a288325968c31d7d88fd2be5c82d79413b33c1dbe972859822ca2c8a92e7812479c14fa292a627a8909c3a953a2758d42f22a18682ffa219aa9908e06f521be8fb59ad58e5651aa9d6b95983e23e54cd57dfc82b2077bf96":"adf1f50a295d88f68e8c07a180897d8e7b49f7cc6cb78a3b25ee10b0583a0f0b":"82de6a73568ade5e5b0d8ae37c40ff25e858a7055346020c5e47feddfef75680":"cd0e15d764d2355ac9f1cbd5ea519ed1756a3bfaa55e3783b738c03bdb42e371":"1e592e5003fc0f3f81a7aef2272527980cc5a9ac7286a621513b9c7ce2ea94fbfa255ef2654d673bb8cd13f3a033a7701304acbbe8d19b82a61d2e77e7251f98b0e28e1a694f9cba2c86c7c8cb20d9c2986e52052f701596e3c837af95b166cd227f2fc00edd3ea62b57f60262712b2f71479569c119cbce9d771f8a2cfdf832aa8d70e0a912978fb2bb33b27a185fb3a4caa3a18913aeab095ac088d14381802117af0cc1d97c06fe9730bebbff0adf2ffac5995d299e4defb0722bd93f0799" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"898a6c47a5cff500ea0f5b18b5f0b4bcf7e75d6d7c92025f9920c666dbc1c5ffc48972e1d519428f8d61dfb5e300b48f2660ff53e1ffaa3950cffc50e17a874182236fbb555d35ced33302ef87b84c0ad31e87441ae365350452a39470567bc009871a3c9785bda4569af33d03d46f08":"9e16568a225b80e9011571f3b55102cf6362e26b8a60fd33680d4e6625738e5f":"b1c65d6e51ba043f63b4251ed58e9a8eebfc289f6285705f8ef44c202c9b4a22":"245ee741a2041eda22ce7053f8576c0a43eae868fd95ad7d58bb921c155b1b53":"b076210688b06ab6b57edf68126dcdfce82b6f9285ddec102ed60730aa7530863076186a3f7affbdd4ef081b7f5a32fb461bc5755ab4f860012631b74ae357fbc3cbd64f0eef8789c6c9dca894a41a005d272b4a57e761f91d221636d0ec7a49f10bb1b4264938604ff4dc7bc97eb799cea9e3e1d7a9b4bd66d88d244e22120bb311f502e66e60c5c9e42731ad320b23d6b06ae92a132b093ad924a1a7e08b5dccdc50e257bfdb63bf5705350588f61e93e4fc5042a2cad1bd6d9fbc82e875cf" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"8e92836dc5e4bbf9598803efb0d3871e5418cf18f379479bbcbd9262558af6cb6d97e73decb8781c30f69b61c1f5c91a5ea1f10fb1eef74b480e583710d9a6a2e57f8cfc9d0215fa73d1ce9c1562f3cc34be187940cd317b69139ab9aa58d064b6bca59ee6460c3db4e8b57fab0186f1":"6d9afc769985218745235e5af280eb45cec81a2e920c284ed5c77105489e8f4b":"711672f2ca12e7d8f32445a87163bc00f5d0f52c2f6799ba513b68c07c350de5":"426aeab2cfa56cd3146c0eb9facfbc048a504eec3273256b5e4db3d66c89560f":"56325373099fc1dd194555c3a1e69358fc7f80fe6610412cb31c14cdc70c73a74d040746c6cf388fb9718e7446888c6162de73ac097c32f8b4b00dd7f115fed1821d3786baaa1f64885cb93c75531e99171f98d3c3576337c1c41c5bfe83f94cef2adebc88c0790398d4c071488699edd599797c1f8f394b3e00e66bc4b68a7cacd209695961713c3bf2c9a5c8589d935e171f775f366217e2634ddf0db5f01ab31760ebd9ed9724292bec89db06d0145fb824a76292a35f39b01a06c43510a6" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"a4f1fd83e53a406163862260fb9e2ec64d4af74f5fa41ff56c07c791b6bb6abbdb203670b1849afbf0931206ad6393798ff06fba8dca3318c29d9161c0ec18ec5d7d66847b1a618bb0e4f69fa1331fd1db5d5fffdeec5a2e045c588dc95a5d5eac6d35502ebe2e6a57318f15af53e001":"39dd79397f91a97432e5124e7b9b85928f62c598ecd19626070a81a5a8ed564a":"985724541d44c8b865672759c8d36ded75c2189c2281731888a741b305eb4161":"e2dae75950e417c18f1c3e5fbd66b1cc9fa617aa695c9d03d8768b9e197fea80":"703ab1f6a5332f01fa788cf73922a9f6cf856319772eeab07b4795702562cde350a8cf9395976fd227b08134feb469ca34f675c9b6f176ad684a5b0d02b4c135a7174bf0604a1546e7d8d978ecfd8cb6ae5efce3b228dc95cb413b010732c3e7f9ef8e547a93540e5e4aaaa3b0e5a8f45b83bb11209a03883c54f41e494fcbc66c2d57c01002137567ea2f99f7a1ed6c4c6080bdaa299d18f57bb3b386278a78b2ef23a03043e850bd9fd742527c45308e5b910fc586f9f21de7022d02b1493b" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"f331ebcdbc0d2dfbf54758680dd49dd0bd666d0505ef6ba1c4bbfb7dee62edc34ea9063632c8e6719bbe140c3c840aabd66e7702c384700921dc1838c6c5a832c650a474e74270c378abff021d60d1a1884939bbdc51c547c72c929c0c73ca7f78668d33fba197642be8ac2d41cefde4":"ec299e456cd1985a3f1022d5c05f0ef9040cc8b8297ba5e404d92a6d36c3578f":"954f464877f7258f99acbfb9adfe4eedc89da71ca82e3581fb5bad127b2069e7":"515f9e746c7407196610bbae963b9bc15b1658972a30e62be6f78caee1287e88":"5aa30a796d46e789c498352ade179f0cd3336418fbeafae0d10fbf7798917672288b3b2a12267fc0435d88b4e99809c1e3067f0d65c910b12a330334b6a23d6d30910d301438c2c999353e1f78019ba7b20eaf68b499ff1e88db0431312a66f35305c4f3c3a2750c95bbc07ccbdf1e4d123eec378b9be8894b597bcc029c664e59e2b3c23fd72841af0ddc9374ecef21885a0b54d13186dc0a66ed3c3caca9e41753813ae61015a952142bd4d7ebbaa3193598be1267be937745fb0de09aa70d" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-384, 256, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"d99ddbd82ce9937cda083e30b3da47a6e6ca08b8f59f2fc934bb3f78e748bb28cfabddb375efc5f2025a53fd073a89b0fbec391290863ad862aa56fe6d945044e879ca05c3c019313f810dd559fa0e682d6b77ff7e612c7c40cd5231eece4018c5b3c0d8181ab44703f7a04c0a1c7c5e":"ebc2193d4a97b97d298f1305b2f7a54dab466f7c4e444831651cac29a6c5bd88":"6826aad41f8ac29e272884cb6d21300c7b0b3ca37205e1720afaf9f716f337ec":"5a7434648de82a3552e12aff800093776ca3e86565b29c0b3ad6c0bc3180623f":"cfc79a89a0a55dc9c6c6eccdfab5a9935335e806b73bab7f5eff5f9fea6aa3f47bf31f06d987a94e2bc2a4a6144ebe94d6f5aa8fcaabbf86a37c8d412207864322d3057b89fef358740c5962cf9e7c37072847fcaa6db693a5238ef270e8414e2b29448bbcc37dceaa75479c2ac5fee2d6fe9ed68516f6dbd90135ddcae8a12d1c1595e0edc34ea2bf00bee7ae773c240c2bc1ed828b7ff91a676891173eec1dabeecb2184df9186c3bd833e349351481655bda91bc0f4e419fb78e426de6b39" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"64a8afb71975256b6196f3f93038ba8b7a4d7089f7f268134cb3f5926868e4d104c60b44fbf3bc198f4bc58bf1260d123a5aaf8749136a86c4e5aba81692d587133d29d3b7a63fa6204ed84e93be6aebf50472d313ef5797d1a290a7cae086052b57e8d5a20ed22ec7702dd424d935ea":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e5b8dbea654b559f025c008c1f3b2eff92fe98932b0271228e3f4efa3303cd4f112660f48057fc56ed0eebacf559cdd14f523a3e948e8037427e65dd25c1eb41560f2f78dee139b3d721ba1c278c3855aeec3fd3a44a5331c8f54396ec3b9ba73c22da8ae1adc9748178d7d21341f7c9":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"abe7121c768208f174ee9e545250014d031ebc647497a60e18e3462517027fea1c0e3854cfe5429bc105916e63a0d5a7585cfba737f887852f23a41039cca6e33de94901cc1aae91ac42db0ca34724b07368b1a3ab733dad24aee03bab50eaaf2acf15c2c700e5e070097132a92ae7bd":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"07e570fa7cf079e066c5c30b6d24fd37906ab7aa07b1551be605b31f86dbc3cb3e95a0723e9344922d14185824c483bc5dc8341f10d698629736838fad6a190825a24482413b388265fb20b2a8e7c078b91090c97db01e6c6a72d1c067bedd73da1d7b1575b05870b8eee4343bc42213":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"99fa882ea5aa55ec9682719721a8e79d6afeec5cbb3577f1df7fe97e4edc479040efa1e51f8893210c302f2a2a3abbac2ddb3fa31758c8473a6f7c50d98e423ccf360a2f6a5d94f7ec6af04f656ad06d20e2be7e09f728b64f81d736ac3fb8263b0f7808abd5d7b0bbae1d4b3f445957":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"75336fb0006f7aad995ae01b3f3ec24cef46d3f7ad07798e52f609ec34b266f1cb51865817281103b3be2c2bece85487e979f3a31ba75d6e6e4b357811b4aaf5fc958406721693eeec21e8c9808ceefbd17a0a6d5664162e7b988c19dbc911b6e3b68e90a1e6a3c9c5a4662d954ef5c5":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"f6d7401663547661563e5b2da208f1f8a4a0c17b97ddf0d4a4c1a17c23ee8c7d00d037839f2d95dde6a96886cd67c9a92fb7fbf77ca088d1e46f2dc386e16fb6f1d178f7c1a3dfe202f05d52ca20fe29b8084a9d597fd6b0e53f41a13fcefbb8aa5d539c7b09d8e7b8f687b3df92c606":"":"":"":"4fe6aabcc40e158316e49160ac523c41d4df8cb041e11549dec0a40cc854fe4b160fe38a1cc22b779789ef07012735f457fcd2a5594b344783cf6661d83b046cc403b1feb96cf81b05038dfdb40d2a027ea4ba93caf77f53fdcabc361ce48abba784fd9feb722c477cb9d9651d9db6d088e097a93e1dbaa2c3db1503d65680bd4b47352b04387f9c15a1c3a434e93ecc39647dad810ed96997f107e5131101ce20d4be82cc67d05309373792e15e2974aaa9aa9bc9e681815e07111f1f980fc8ca882478c32fcc3765b8e422a5369dbf36f72390ac8d3b728b8e5deb3d48e9ea85a31a0432b813471e6b02e4a12ed1aee0ab9dbb3c3e66217c45a174f9b4ed3e" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"98bd225cfaa81e2111f83b4b3b2dfdf3507fe18aa97100062bcb5a1f665c091002fba3d84e3886048f67bc7f06750a19a65503d83a48045cd9b128c56c3e474b7d658fc590348bd9c14013fd20d2df32dbe9f9b73d47e43e58a6ecb5f85f93b3546817134746016f6886f6b63be830e1":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"7a324a646b53f28808f7c44303221ab36324d1c97660f7c333b3baa7537d1e1ea038b8ca6c159d91d02f3b206eb927570aac85674b59f419af2660cca8eb0ef996bac65dc33c08a946fb2abb9348dd7ebce4c71cb9de11b8d59aceaee2c9a29b154633df643f3787c2672ea7e789a2b6":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"59b84cf5a29b45a3f8e0ac384bed20d970f2b6d89661bbe2af90ef073eb061cbf323a13d0643dcdba902df168ded7b6094e18381181d91d3734cfb4e44cd4462de81aae064a9ae9d156bbb14079b78e2f612c2e0965d15b2563d888e2034d06e55f939ac2345c2638443f83b59152696":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"64688640a1d3f610528eabe2948e2eab2b453a8cbbccf58bb02a72b1bb466b8277f2c2f829fec66872cc8d6c03280b5074136e7f3e123d6fb72786fc29d1b55782b7283285cb53c4185801d2d7333b8ce76c1c661c1ef65864b8dddce781f5db520c666fe07fcbe4bd5ccacc115fbbdb":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d77985d85e130fa02ee13b55cc7372c23565a56f588c70154b7d81dbfb8ef66ee861c781fa258019ef91d101367726ca46a60c705e0e3a305ab6a7c5179e6a14c6e7de93e5c95956660ba7357003f08a25a42e9bfc38fc882a063586285eebead74a78296c7c3e8112062d7fe1adb232":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"ad321095c835f2c49f3abdd0f9117cf8ea30b237dc3f1eff7728fa9b08d4c0fc073c82bfae1b5771728917ae78d5e22f4989019b13c5f04a420f134d1cfcf1be81408a143e1372a468c1303292f717daf4f18ccdcb81d8c7ac6562deb4e07a9e146900123f39ef49a91e30e22cdca22c":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"67569721ff02c3862cefa68283ecb5b9afbfeb8395ae944c55e5da1b21b6c2270f0100b2cf014cef7a2e85dbf2738e97f8ee97eca692130d6541fa900eeef6b9858497faa2cd47c6874590190da6d5fbd36d2a1e124a94311c8508b9f70f34b97c32df3947aa4a0bf197b1ab35172233":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"b19d6916dd39eab11165ff2066fea53f72488a78eba473a0e141de1d5b13fecd79e678b4b108c65f9c38fb2a2e5c29c4ea9dd450593b6b3c7be76ed2cf8baa1b44794ebef1c1105a445b79aafe471d9f9881be7e81282bec46431b505ca8bc5049da52cd4cb075cc818bb79697b739e0":"":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"73afadfdf46ac9c528059ec5e4f940f120c19beda8d5b12ae692c1d3b12526754ce532c291c8ce823aeaf923b3be8c438d8b2a82162bce020237440d3445d4ef91793b983202b0f8532be2d78c34469d2c67fea05495feec67b76615967efa6f6bcde5bcf18285dd3d8f9b97b3463813":"":"7172619bf78c088c4f0d5b358f63cbcc019620c6ea9ffa31e040ec0d51665989":"a0670a6df2033cb19b082a3c83fd2eecddd9b9caebf3aed0b781ae9d4ac8bbe2":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"cd453c328ae68152e074e18b660f03668cf264eaa4109afb941816f7bf1f73cd4043d4692942472482f44e7d6ba5486dbeea1cf1de6ba6ea1606cac41a92e34839fb26b5a9bee5f4f475558a5d8f673d838247ab81aaeeb2a72be405c3d24a625df7476b1133b56f6e7aeb184f73eafb":"":"c6c23cddded140a30079f35cf9e2dda6bb2b277d8a212d2fca1a83b507808e79":"edb8c8657883a17093ffd355e8145e26f65ce7071ba38c89fc031040996a9705":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"3c4fed3a265818f6a323b9d52c04a92698223f3136c77428b29e1cd6fddc7e4da48d9115c5ad18a4182df480eddd529f35e2bd1908dfd05964cc3fefe53c38615f04ca5e12c06872a695971f9144f6b97bd32c620083a379d4f56e820105c5f5b0f98539936d05d57f6afdc191cce7f4":"":"7271afbed1b1f2be5643c5bdf0b6218247a6128bfbe2ff4d745a926a3f35d0fe":"00022d8acec09266a84673d056e7b235f0608d15989ddfd7059647522cf3c3e4":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"229b3318cb25189e12ce9ef25acd08bf56c631c6058daae6f377d58f7574576a4c0b7c634e11da5ccc02be824e6effb8ebc0d5403d79bb30572be47a5ef88fe35a0421dcf9547437cd3a563b6be7a158a7f601f75347509a12dba8d7f2abc7afdf89c43fc5538318654fbc90c3f51c5a":"":"f8f98c65ba1f619d376d41d1dd480d4a0446de56e0b3dd007ef7e1cc2bb98def":"b3bed7c4c2e1a762209b1fd2ce9ddda8fe47eb70225e60d5c5887a61bdef0009":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4cfbfda3fe8ae7ffdd8450a52c78388a6c9d93c6e3ab537c91dffe23b5693158b7919e875d9ed6827a33d5ec5bdcf061c311aee36953d13c16f0e50f455705a9ab7a436b039551187a0f42e5f90b40cbd44e98cd5295550cc46e33be6f073a9e6c02ace6b0f896f9ec56ab7e8be7a07b":"":"9d155d6754ddcebaa3dd28ba27946ce3e22de29dc1db8359378390295e5aa287":"ec634fc86bfb45f49a1197a70875d7addeb257f1245375aa1f01b3bc359ed73b":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"3351a083c1f6033be5cc879eaf34e25542ebabb2671b65f726e76ed711ae073e9bd7ef6d7888d6fc31e51dc7f60e8b07cc6fe94ea0f22cea1ad54ffad09700596f6320d980488ad48527f4e00937b6f736ebf1b9166e20c5b812c8b85a2a29d91ebb021b19d2374ed4e2895d1518e6cf":"":"9497a1c85796846de8d8b70d66d369ef59bd91203660d6df2935000e8bfcfe71":"8a681d6cbe1cda5e0f9eeaed12fdac75b7bb33d28d6855d498b6c61cd7ebca57":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"3439b57a2d19db8b7e10ff9a34ac1d29b8d789b05f4cd2bcb0376c6e184cfdc695c6e26a0b15b11a685438f48dbd7433d63119fffb5e317d97a5b3e23fa6228221caadd163b66e36e41d1df89473ad3a114d25c8093128e2219a7f2206621b99ebe673bbcaa9a369aad3339927773b57":"":"dd1602f833057b77a8c763ec5aa302326920bc2dda46b4b83b3600673c1f4627":"e2328a109a4546f4311bbe3decb53b3a1028984ae73ef8849bf682ec29c9b5af":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"f7c4995379079e036b9b10db6f163db23bce7399fa8b6268099fa5f2795b67ef06ec674197c73fe47eaf0c4986dd3566055eb14934bc8d5272baa751267c1dab1d52da6204ace6c869bef56eac006abe8eed565693e1854619266d400cd3f70222b6c671120173fe918d229d5e566886":"":"23ec7d6ba9a666ab49df45eeac006ad1f4f0e2aa4da2061d0429b510ea43d93d":"299253ffb0481d2a1dc2ccfa666123a3bda652666a77b52a32e4cf92a65f0d61":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"376829aa929aa4fcad37b41f3a23bec28386329ca689317c49bdc2beccd5066b92e763dbe8a80fa1a1d21c38130fd999df05446bbf128bf23834d8c7cf89ceb5ee6b21124eb6d4966f0f5cdfa59ef58592dd2deda2f611b6c1ac8ea1b1dfb3a51dc5760c3a7e82fee6f09cc2b7a74d7a":"":"f14c07e0ca886373c563ca544c3ed069de697c538afaf009bbfbd935995955f6":"4d71578fb5a3211d3bdda82396507fe5193d21a2f70e6c2b03828fff53f5f6a4":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"981da820fa53e7184a1a214a114a943953eedb39e5bf2c3aa7028aafe57e482bf4c0dbdf862d55afbd0f0a97f6c61204711b46a8f5d1a69089add789f39cc3d6dc7fd19af6a630f03b1496d84aa83f1eb24c0d354407fa9664ee5f4c8de4ea75f05a17621aa9dc58ef38cdb9184d24b1":"":"2f4d6b4724cb715b0d553ae1ca6f3055d7c398c1c031a3a69946f099116d13f6":"76c1d679786f1752bcde1108b9977311f4af9e3d5f5fb9eb52565d0eff90b4f0":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"909f30f7186bfbae0615a701e3fc362fc6e8ce42162cd16fed11ecff70760d7d0679e0b79fec33f83bd722f2bca339e791e5db7af16fa629c84d1f4778d1b1dc24c9813711507349c26319e18084755cc392c9c2f2241406ebef3985a4ccb46b2d7c5f8b79321163bdfc3b5e21eadc89":"":"1fcffb9b047f2e904899eb6aa815b2eb51ed696db2478118c4225b7b308ce069":"becf0c41d3930f152260e0e6f06355bd0c1701b81e699fff7d8e5a750d57b980":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9586ebe27de089218433143fadc74eec6ef7c8d077536f7ecb62d412ef0e163437f6d84e8bc6e97ec02097815a99c338c8f3434b286ef26b1c234ebf1bb1d216b14b4c3b3df48ac3283b3ec9e50c9124a717eb398941ec0801f95ba6108bd9f89d9fbd72d6248ae50961354280d92df3":"":"65d08da7a1fc390f2400efb57520e16da932bbd328a236163c40a540de585488":"a1ffc217e71d1f1047a9657d61ffad559da3ebb75d5af74f3a1ca9fc5b964f76":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"90b824b7aa16b4954d99c3fded669a83d67460ca2fa861468f0ff6e8ef61aac7eff878ac34c2bc59a14dac9659cb558b11989f8e34d1f27c68ccd71f45f7a848c94ced0b18c175c7e1eb50fe0204cf630e39ba3deddeae5de4f2c3d254d6d9a747f486e20106f5a6d7b05a67fe474e57":"":"a76ba2ac232a282b3829d9442587fcff4693350232e976439b5b9dcbc1b704c9":"06eada44600f5d5eeac046e16cf576d59c1bbe6c608d7684453f353a644cd031":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"0ad0edb50bccfc0fb68b5e7b5edf8ca338e5457cfe44af3fb5d683db120c6a09b9907dccf135c5cd0a97200abe245e144fa70365cdb06dddd7b59a557831ec9c3ac14b3de791421cbaacc609bb7659c4e178a7158d7651369655f9c570674fee2c5aed961f3c6baa0a092363b388add5":"":"f9880c0023486c8c8dcac2b40100a6e2bd78b9289e20a72f4cbf46fc156619f6":"f5bf191309d298ce4a39daa668d8c99935df9ae31f5bd1fbe77a3682858d5c0c":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 0, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"0425754d1610c14f6be928608ea3ce731ae818b200c54341aeb178f69e145fc6bd38473928da0d3638b0625d06f6b94fa009d920238b591c97ef48bdac9021fd85f19ce809a9627183e3b621036fd7e3bfe1dcf51b07ad45ea924e2d933f15c1172432b359ad72149e51e86e56ba7768":"":"f746e854338d81d89e81ba3655eac565866b56b2faccdc50a36156fe2faa661b":"06e81c2ff61b7c7e51f5238babc38887bc10d5fecd86b7a6d7c48baf4aa5adcf":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d7d2a9a0b97f4564e05de6db7bf170d2a726e0f5eb2970839c4a0c686ef372faaa5d8afc07d7e9a44904fe9f7359d8b6205c7ce06021f5dd60656247503694960c78aa5e3b3f5008d48c6a264bb94e1c2950f734611e3e10291cdc0199ab9000a9c2eb74081b3c2cb4461ad6406a38e7":"db994880895242ced06eb29157756b25052257bd49ca08c7208d51e7b0ddeeb7":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"82037584f80266988ef6d15fa6003478c20d33265530c1767e3c23f0a0a95d61c9262c26dbd37083066bacce5f93dc86e2cb95521fa6dcc9e4d01c469c4a3fee33579c21058975dd91f9043d5ddb154f5390c4ca2c813938a8270b954a7c7197ec382f02c50dd19598017d2abd1e45ec":"52a6cc9fe891945e5039e95271ccc44ba9ab57f62086837ee64409d0fcaf1973":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"5aebe22736577e69c5027cbd1dcc95146f8dccadf961020cae23562d70e9f0155bfced0ce2053114972614a45932eed8a6b4f4e746d8d9e8b25cc9d9fa67ee0b15cc5b3e3a2e4371a448c9f6bcffacb8a0a8f2c05e8a3a0abfd5d803a77a80fba75ff12cc0649af9bcb94fa5ae2edd2a":"3422191ee68de00c779434aba239e3cd7ad535c13d118bb226e1e013ea6e9511":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"f5340f1fea08877edb309b9b43228f11dfca26f340fa433f0b18eb9e6e07ccbe96f7a1d745a9b2910e21bc9522a989dbb2db642c5e4b2d59ffeed6c9e667b378588849338b385625f03a226389081858e86a222876f18a0d7ff69d0fede620a83caf254eb9376dac8ef99837dc491dd4":"98f5b7af38c1fbac43fa9cb358bec11923d103720a73591de2c6ed245e86e028":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"82738d1234a9393fab94ab99b841371f7046c6852bcdfce1b2d56825f5c58786e599005a8a79a30d89a4251d3a797cab8b3f30950b9a15d686f1259a11a516d399551928cd3cb5734c7839847bd584c364b95b8feb390567cb2ec23746543ace1371a089ed97f9968e83e75636203574":"3fa319b90a1038b544916123534aa5cb10f4da16cb12c3e00bc1306423742bad":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e554287587131cc3297b05c8adab4610cc3d1634eab65119d8c546d13e9961594f9e6cc618ea0d782547d54aae466fa243c2265aae6d575f8fe22edcf71b3e77fd9f9ebb11c9e2e81c70abfb193239adb73e4fd14c93bd84bf79c328a86a433427b305a6425dd5711d83006dd2db95d6":"2a5741cd93041be381636c081f44a9410647961ce5265211ba69e09beb6e5cd3":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"ee071e3f09552a53b8bd98d9e4b4b460577bae8629ca6e8461111a1ec08d5188654042148dfedabc409caeb5a03b26e422113d79729e75ccbe2466ae8197cf8ed14dd2a9382596da6daee3314b12ba42cd9ed90aafb911598d1863c9a72625d0ba9d711d1fd3dc462516a6b6286644dc":"fdbdc11a4f71667bd1561e87ee34d925b13d1e79967fcecee8b2656f04d6d379":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e0bc8c0b53acd8cf5e4c87ad24455bc34d456367bd2e71674d5ac59d0901a07abb52c4f264b0607bb8f1ac0efa4f974947bad42b482868d84208f064fa27f465865b910d8e536f011097bc0cfea07a934ae5023ac7098985c4e1e2d173bc835f7f6fca3200e38482a36c871386ff9b0d":"bc98fdca1133a21a2b4435105b1f96be16333f5ecc6618c54d28aab599b79549":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9c61a730a0ab38830f36a44181988afa24fa5de5f298db058fb4a3443d3b71412ebe35851a12f942b7fc379ca1e14c6319cb485e125dde2482c5632976a2a9c11221a9fb6e65bad990a5b77b55b2b8623a5509cd919819e7f8adb23a99b27c2d05fb6a3fb3936d5fbfd44cf2b24a7a87":"a60b8962b18d686ea141e0f4f01572a25b69acf19740bde9588ea63a11e904ba":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e3d186a9a4d9530906c58f9d1f3b415d1b60e2f12ca34a428d16fde09c700dc5ea9d104a92831936136691232ef64c887b71383be1523478c67387441c67fd7761e9f75fa0636e5a3caa845219f3582bddbd0017b9b95984cea6a3ddbeb0820f4f55ff15e22c00e8db7dd8fbea8f6526":"c33655a0e2973ba13785fe4edfb75749d84d818752f7658014448b7719982726":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"38eccee965505ba5136a8ab868ed1e741d343ad713075233bfebe196fcef6f4057a21d8b2d6c68abdf52633d54d9609e87542efa8f4b46f40a4e60a2dbcf3338138d46c1e14d6f752954a8fb992fb0260ca8890300556ca7092a7661b65fbbbf0c56e2d49875528aed1ebb0133f13c55":"7bf2914afa8ff9c3b384cb495d0a08bf7d8f0b7198df96db7371dfe987b2b73e":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"19222f7886766642da4a80b97b9ab8b157b58ed63dcea2512f088644791475a5c6a33a2cce394d45da2f84b02a0abcaaeca4698d50d5bda435778b808397315654878e866ba0136f9c4e206f7749b60ded4198d69d1d077564a894375291991eb125d394547d226c2da17e8cd98853e1":"af34763c141bc212271d52a260c6d6d40e9f40a8a4cc3fb7ce6359bc71941f89":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"f314eba7451a0b721622be298659a3d253ea5925f5912196c62ed149daa11e26cd94e8e647da38bcbbeeef1da21ad92e0b9a5f1ad72826bf55097621314f9859f8f8d4d62cc9a00b3e9d95e996509d77413449aac8f9d8b311577a083f80364ad1d489262058aa11ce9fd3dcc6b1e4cc":"f8b1e97ec680f637a4792a0d50fff9a0edb028619a9dac05b8ba6d57e55a1a4a":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"841cd7bfc5d87a0fa624f474af6d8ae9f2b5a1426cf1b752ddf11f792169f2f2c0b60427bf62df1b373302d91fa8dd891fd7542bf6425a7308f64e96b0c3e372d4addc747898731517a418210813f6f14d56651b2599bb2899b109b9c21367126ed5bf099f455ab5b67f47a1a3abc3f6":"c35726206d18f9fd3b8423fa9ee2fc5a896a013a95d052ff495b9cc6759d58f7":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 0) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"dd62ed0d54d930fed1cd7582e376ab47da3138f77daadeda32fab95bf881fe90d9ab4dc5b1cf0641ad966ba1761aaedebad9ebc3f3b24688e16251c409267bec9b02cca6b8ea7969a5991ef647fdbe28d3126c505bc0d9f8241fdc49e8674ffd6bbdcc5f99c6e20d4271b4215e224156":"366c8ff666c2b42d735dcca5c0b12e352afa483d48d57c908b5263ad3d2affbe":"":"":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"3aca6b55561521007c9ece085e9a6635e346fa804335d6ad42ebd6814c017fa8aa7fd3c3dd5d03d9b8efc7f70574581f4cc19fae5a456f8a53a656d23a0b665d6ddf7f43020a5febbb552714e447565d637386b3ab33f78fd9751c7b7e67e1e15f6e50ddc548a1eb5813f6d0d48381bf":"4bc9a485ec840d377ae4504aa1df41e444c4231687f3d7851c26c275bc687463":"b39c43539fdc24343085cbb65b8d36c54732476d781104c355c391a951313a30":"b6850edd4622675ef5a507eab911e249d63fcf62f330cc8a16bb2ccc5858de5d":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"2531c41a234821eec46f8aa7dae8e3ae12d167d289bfbfdca928643b343eb951015c066e2d278ea39d2a459e6434e234e55fa1145583ede74e632ee8bef2a2ff76ca3b8c9c977a5813c4041f3f9328be6c67f1689d878e8ad61bfe6a39f5b034b75c40c9b305c1eeb92a3f4169ae1720":"d1952b7d0c4c94185adc025e67a29fda50f577770115c0931bfb03e8101d1d3e":"0be3f61ece380d63c68ff0d4bde36f58233358ce62c7bc588728cf1babbd4342":"01e76a0c9addb4dc2001bec231b72e2098a6e9e8d39ada13ff0c493aec8ba65a":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"4d65ff2fd260eb6290b02b1fd71cffec840cc01807e984f07da64e6ad80ad37fb5810ed012d2ceec3a0418003a03343502219bd422c08e0321bbb86d923bbd04082f939ded421657f929b37e21604a2668b57d5606ac36456da916df82a8753d224b4f7c829d285254e9e851937b54af":"d75616aa0190a56af573e43605157c0e0d5275bca959f2c75d0e777943b200e2":"954fdc652d0bd8eea37342f5547241afb67f8d4c587bc2402c435a260144acd1":"ed07fea3a07e8846b4c3aae8cec0bf6df7c8ba7817e3e9699943e2d2e778c4ac":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"313680a6ef5cc85924575195608f3b9cd852004343ab708e89d61c24696246166b0dbcdf61c59b0041fd2c55a829c99cf8468552aabddd993687c2b4a6017024c41100510ee10034ba4f66563db4d3388a7f6d475e080faa23ed43c674254bf9ed25f73109630647fa3c85575727d2e1":"cda08cd76f3bac2c30bda2069a1a7a461f2462ad2b2ab6a727da6836896a4d2f":"431c4fdeddd3da1de6fcf19a25d74af811f72fc2367a7f33cfcdf17cf38fcb6e":"4750344c23e4686b2bfe2dbd9301705d06969fedbc77841bf6591540aebfebd7":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"95b698a454070603efe15cb4c359ae946da756d124939f916d67d77aaa0608d8e577b5f5567ba3c075128b528a6ecbcc2ff6d8d15ddd68039173c4b70df3651f4cb5ac62957781ac91563324a56b47409b02699662f68022be2d93eac367a21026ae95ff0cba67a630e4bd8e53469215":"de401ad1d2c339934a47822421eba0fb79c89863d1df0ef5d47e6be5bb3a8c48":"a002954ae5f7676a3230533dbdf59252ef051acc76574bd519ad56882bbf46e6":"5e3de2b53936a7890db7248802bb95e9093d9d7a15a9378d8f4ba42c52e679dd":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d7d3e83dd979bcfb524074f12a90f78873e983c2aa90e0241f00d2c691a4702bb452dbcc69a7793cc2081b984033295c4435495713c20295aa97bf42babb66edb4856370b9701020a8a79df7381650fd7a3aa5ace4bf54b3331a8d4092c19fde08cd51a06146cdfab9e3a32e5cd02b35":"5612ed7d790419dceab4befdce6e4e687d335a3aa972d8809db6291e3001f825":"915028d0610160a2516e926f06ed34b18ad1064b6efd56566494a92a3fa0eea5":"86cf5bdf061711d2361ab6d79c731c2fcf9aa47ae5bb5f6294486a14081b1862":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"c1e64b99394e1241b31ffb7b482cfaaacf5f2fbc251f954e7e3dc0866aa81856a16ce83d9ce70b71479ae9ccd6c59ea4e99986d1e09ab16eb1f48b99cb9bc9d63701f6a9a1af0b1d8057339d5d7ffeacc8e5729134ef2148663227e348dc31b9d56626c0d43478d5d53bfe998fb85b1f":"42be743f8a9c0187d2d54b596caf64dfa630d60bd8c6de0b126d6a151d823cdc":"e925684793bf51a8a4a46c2ac5b91ed40843efd0878336f983f1001722231f1d":"df019e78efc5d3a85fbd9056ad05f97de81be05c069b32e68792ba8f5a775fb3":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"071b46d52085a658309f2c35bdab443e1509aca159c1fb9c222951affaf1a243d0bdcfbcaa247fcb8da53fed8e5f8b3eed2fd022c96bdd6e86bff89beaa99f2bc34963d3ef118df9a5525a910c9540aeac5166f65f5d05c6277260081aa9b71ac58cbb5f1ba5000d4d8078c5a30d282c":"7ca33e3345bb333a5b1f412a6d57f8ebad65b427ccbbd7fe3ac837691da39219":"60efb3c75aeb2f4fb208659f20e79eb41d8d9b422066c235a14b9420bdf6f172":"4e2675c8009b5bde9882ce940d42daefe402fb11379e07db9a4c0c763e97f319":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"06c7a8a74b6fe9e14fa2475ef8b8a1ff9610bfc1b4b93cf53a8c844d7dbac08ff743ea1bfc6c10d7707b5172a29af054491b573dc2cde1a3e74262f4fd2e9ec819ecae830db4f0c7021028737ffc5bc025a216f658065e27314c30c04925051c0d7caf6ef440cae263f49148c0398007":"1a33793d255386d47952bfc1f63ec15caff3603d5c28b2acdd799673affab589":"7eade98e717aaa32f74b033163ad76489a7d682783d2db67b9696ecc7b9be57a":"58369a241166bcc87e713b28b4ae216a8e61f8cba83969d42b91e55283286af6":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d5552efbb7f33481a574589c4bb56dbe43000ffe9ea67fd0c8d5638092c8469944a150b0dc1315ab0484976b128ccc961734d226d66c77dab3c22558ff2225e32191aa2dcec8e47a56f757f71c081acaf5df357c07952cf6de2e3564813ded982f72069ed1bcff6b48ba4b4625ba247b":"345b4acb2b0cac82139fd516ec3d39292438a916d2d2c8e97ef265a1192a65a9":"732451ce7bf5acc84a05de3474b622d07bd3d01eb6e3724538e454c4d669a994":"7c7ef660cebee96b425485296a8e88c37c66e385eb1cf7389a95c46fa68a34f6":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"bee5dd72828806929757afa02a92c5c54d86c5015047379b717c6608a71239b15255de5a2bd27e9c6ef23046c8a8217bd89744552137b24d93e5ed41250ecbcf6ec77734fed7a40680e801ea277e8c6eae57b4328acb1e1dfa04d0b5f799ce1e2f111c3fe8c9f954fdad6aceac7d27cd":"4c3c54284845fb2a494d1e452b2ba1eb0d3456cfa9560ca7c60878e8458eb7f3":"a8a333527a2158a087879a6f950d2af8d093c4f67945a140549a5e93e405b886":"bfa0025ac9774ac767a4d3810c27a3c8e3e48780cd0597a5a401f6c9b0067e7e":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"754e542dbb453f10f41e1361164f5e1ffda67a024ba26701cc86066caf2f9477a074690faa069cfec6fa38d8b2506aca34fd27d66708876f28d8ac08d28eeefcb728fb6226559d5a0646a8e183807a8e08469cc5535712a4426ddc5a340b6c71607ee1e2df489528a266b141d7c977ca":"3a9193fbb67a0fdd732a788d3ae5783de84968794b8c4c0b5ad4de067a5d1fe5":"034db3c40c2c181cb4d635aaf08f05e724f418ecf7b3d2ba6863e9ede616857f":"50058bcdd53c9d257dab7846fedca4ef99ed069604002cf58ab27014ca7100c0":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"42824bd8944f49479f07cf6af8f02aeebda3ac074ab72a9eca8850c99b909d081f2382d4ecc9e923bf1a588f8db10bdce61c6f452c8e15c0f003d2231ce5cb69292ae1a37c602aa889f0d56df049717bd99005ff353c08eb29ebb8cee3aafeb52b3867a61a76335d86c2d7808ac94bba":"2b573345c4fbdb8382bbdac1d3e2c38fbafbcb599c67412296fb6912e1a640ac":"a5f43abb4634bedf1b199dcf6394bd3504ffa0cdc151b4e53cd0772d86a43f60":"a2f1ac52ec46d93b3b944055b7205da8fee95c9a3241418cfbdfb0e9ece9143a":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"9d899a56a0660f18b98c921b0d409550fc225ffcfb975e9ec6b2315bc9a1eb3f68fc77abc3452380e30ac761a20a91565f5ce875a82ee08a46a1fc5d4aaa8918fb23970428c863dd1b24606b0118476b150f7a47f3962dfdd8ddec93fc8f82df7cda58cb3bb5623610eec69bdd0722a0":"67bf61b3eca94013fc165b110eafcb9126917a0ce7e2d9bdf7ef1b38bab6ca4b":"db144f531cee5efadc505f4d37a6e5413f638d46d419fbac76f81ecb63ea2809":"d737b2ba62c1ec1c766f30a5dea7363b5c570c1e7a33fb65c3fb89eab41f748e":"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" + +HMAC_DRBG NIST CAVS 14.3 PR True (SHA-512, 256, 256) #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +hmac_drbg_pr:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"ae767959378e9f031c8f68d778cfc0dce1f9b4cc176c5f9f9f4c9c3aed9435f482585a0711812c3c79bda619b942c6eb8f5abbe8540aaeeedeaaeb52c156d07d8669179fc6967884db69c17186cb8fc96f2de9b0ac5922ab53c595df1e3513bb3f2642b458d96e3782dbb975a8b4faed":"830f178cf5f544140d2d8c0737790b97bc6f150784865548d73f1f37a5a39a65":"cb12a2b9a02aaaeae4c7c76cad9e006186d978bc046c1ea81532bc51601ede00":"2d3dde3b3581b863e1590bdc638c33bfd170555445e225f3a450d9e9762abec1":"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" + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bdcc8db7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data @@ -0,0 +1,1226 @@ +# Tests of the generic message digest interface +MD process +mbedtls_md_process: + +MD NULL/uninitialised arguments +md_null_args: + +Information on MD2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_info:MBEDTLS_MD_MD2:"MD2":16 + +Information on MD4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_info:MBEDTLS_MD_MD4:"MD4":16 + +Information on MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_info:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:"MD5":16 + +Information on RIPEMD160 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_info:MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:"RIPEMD160":20 + +Information on SHA1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_info:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"SHA1":20 + +Information on SHA224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_info:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"SHA224":28 + +Information on SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_info:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"SHA256":32 + +Information on SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_info:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"SHA384":48 + +Information on SHA512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_info:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"SHA512":64 + +generic mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text:"MD2":"":"8350e5a3e24c153df2275c9f80692773" + +generic mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text:"MD2":"a":"32ec01ec4a6dac72c0ab96fb34c0b5d1" + +generic mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text:"MD2":"abc":"da853b0d3f88d99b30283a69e6ded6bb" + +generic mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text:"MD2":"message digest":"ab4f496bfb2a530b219ff33031fe06b0" + +generic mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text:"MD2":"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"4e8ddff3650292ab5a4108c3aa47940b" + +generic mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text:"MD2":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"da33def2a42df13975352846c30338cd" + +generic mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text:"MD2":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"d5976f79d83d3a0dc9806c3c66f3efd8" + +generic mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text:"MD4":"":"31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" + +generic mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text:"MD4":"a":"bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24" + +generic mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text:"MD4":"abc":"a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d" + +generic mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text:"MD4":"message digest":"d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b" + +generic mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text:"MD4":"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9" + +generic mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text:"MD4":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4" + +generic mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text:"MD4":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536" + +generic mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text:"MD5":"":"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e" + +generic mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text:"MD5":"a":"0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661" + +generic mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text:"MD5":"abc":"900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72" + +generic mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text:"MD5":"message digest":"f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0" + +generic mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text:"MD5":"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b" + +generic mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text:"MD5":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f" + +generic mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text:"MD5":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a" + +generic mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text:"RIPEMD160":"":"9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31" + +generic mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text:"RIPEMD160":"a":"0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe" + +generic mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text:"RIPEMD160":"abc":"8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc" + +generic mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text:"RIPEMD160":"message digest":"5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36" + +generic mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text:"RIPEMD160":"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc" + +generic mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text:"RIPEMD160":"abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq":"12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b" + +generic mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text:"RIPEMD160":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189" + +generic mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text:"RIPEMD160":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb" + +generic HMAC-MD2 Hash File OpenSSL test #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD2":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"d5732582f494f5ddf35efd166c85af9c" + +generic HMAC-MD2 Hash File OpenSSL test #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD2":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"270fcf11f27c27448457d7049a7edb084a3e554e0b2acf5806982213f0ad516402e4c869c4ff2171e18e3489baa3125d2c3056ebb616296f9b6aa97ef68eeabcdc0b6dde47775004096a241efcf0a90d19b34e898cc7340cdc940f8bdd46e23e352f34bca131d4d67a7c2ddb8d0d68b67f06152a128168e1c341c37e0a66c5018999b7059bcc300beed2c19dd1152d2fe062853293b8f3c8b5":"54ab68503f7d1b5c7741340dff2722a9" + +generic HMAC-MD2 Hash File OpenSSL test #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD2":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"d850e5f554558cf0fe79a0612e1d0365" + +generic HMAC-MD4 Hash File OpenSSL test #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD4":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"eabd0fbefb82fb0063a25a6d7b8bdc0f" + +generic HMAC-MD4 Hash File OpenSSL test #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD4":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"270fcf11f27c27448457d7049a7edb084a3e554e0b2acf5806982213f0ad516402e4c869c4ff2171e18e3489baa3125d2c3056ebb616296f9b6aa97ef68eeabcdc0b6dde47775004096a241efcf0a90d19b34e898cc7340cdc940f8bdd46e23e352f34bca131d4d67a7c2ddb8d0d68b67f06152a128168e1c341c37e0a66c5018999b7059bcc300beed2c19dd1152d2fe062853293b8f3c8b5":"cec3c5e421a7b783aa89cacf78daf6dc" + +generic HMAC-MD4 Hash File OpenSSL test #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD4":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"ad5f0a04116109b397b57f9cc9b6df4b" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Hash File OpenSSL test #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"42552882f00bd4633ea81135a184b284" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Hash File OpenSSL test #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"270fcf11f27c27448457d7049a7edb084a3e554e0b2acf5806982213f0ad516402e4c869c4ff2171e18e3489baa3125d2c3056ebb616296f9b6aa97ef68eeabcdc0b6dde47775004096a241efcf0a90d19b34e898cc7340cdc940f8bdd46e23e352f34bca131d4d67a7c2ddb8d0d68b67f06152a128168e1c341c37e0a66c5018999b7059bcc300beed2c19dd1152d2fe062853293b8f3c8b5":"a16a842891786d01fe50ba7731db7464" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Hash File OpenSSL test #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"e97f623936f98a7f741c4bd0612fecc2" + +HMAC-MD2 Bouncy Castle test #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD2":16:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"4869205468657265":"dc1923ef5f161d35bef839ca8c807808" + +HMAC-MD4 Bouncy Castle test #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD4":16:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"4869205468657265":"5570ce964ba8c11756cdc3970278ff5a" + +HMAC-MD5 Bouncy Castle test #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"4869205468657265":"5ccec34ea9656392457fa1ac27f08fbc" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"4869205468657265":"9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"4a656665":"7768617420646f2079612077616e7420666f72206e6f7468696e673f":"750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd":"56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819":"cdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcd":"697eaf0aca3a3aea3a75164746ffaa79" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":12:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":"546573742057697468205472756e636174696f6e":"56461ef2342edc00f9bab995" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b6579202d2048617368204b6579204669727374":"6b1ab7fe4bd7bf8f0b62e6ce61b9d0cd" + +generic HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"MD5":16:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b657920616e64204c6172676572205468616e204f6e6520426c6f636b2d53697a652044617461":"6f630fad67cda0ee1fb1f562db3aa53e" + +generic HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"RIPEMD160":20:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"4869205468657265":"24cb4bd67d20fc1a5d2ed7732dcc39377f0a5668" + +generic HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"RIPEMD160":20:"4a656665":"7768617420646f2079612077616e7420666f72206e6f7468696e673f":"dda6c0213a485a9e24f4742064a7f033b43c4069" + +generic HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"RIPEMD160":20:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd":"b0b105360de759960ab4f35298e116e295d8e7c1" + +generic HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"RIPEMD160":20:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819":"cdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcd":"d5ca862f4d21d5e610e18b4cf1beb97a4365ecf4" + +generic HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"RIPEMD160":20:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":"546573742057697468205472756e636174696f6e":"7619693978f91d90539ae786500ff3d8e0518e39" + +generic HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"RIPEMD160":20:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b6579202d2048617368204b6579204669727374":"6466ca07ac5eac29e1bd523e5ada7605b791fd8b" + +generic HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"RIPEMD160":20:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b657920616e64204c6172676572205468616e204f6e6520426c6f636b2d53697a652044617461":"69ea60798d71616cce5fd0871e23754cd75d5a0a" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text_multi:"MD2":"":"8350e5a3e24c153df2275c9f80692773" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text_multi:"MD2":"a":"32ec01ec4a6dac72c0ab96fb34c0b5d1" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text_multi:"MD2":"abc":"da853b0d3f88d99b30283a69e6ded6bb" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text_multi:"MD2":"message digest":"ab4f496bfb2a530b219ff33031fe06b0" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text_multi:"MD2":"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"4e8ddff3650292ab5a4108c3aa47940b" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text_multi:"MD2":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"da33def2a42df13975352846c30338cd" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_text_multi:"MD2":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"d5976f79d83d3a0dc9806c3c66f3efd8" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text_multi:"MD4":"":"31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text_multi:"MD4":"a":"bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text_multi:"MD4":"abc":"a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text_multi:"MD4":"message digest":"d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text_multi:"MD4":"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text_multi:"MD4":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_text_multi:"MD4":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text_multi:"MD5":"":"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text_multi:"MD5":"a":"0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text_multi:"MD5":"abc":"900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text_multi:"MD5":"message digest":"f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text_multi:"MD5":"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text_multi:"MD5":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f" + +generic multi step mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_text_multi:"MD5":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a" + +generic multi step mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text_multi:"RIPEMD160":"":"9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31" + +generic multi step mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text_multi:"RIPEMD160":"a":"0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe" + +generic multi step mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text_multi:"RIPEMD160":"abc":"8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc" + +generic multi step mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text_multi:"RIPEMD160":"message digest":"5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36" + +generic multi step mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text_multi:"RIPEMD160":"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc" + +generic multi step mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text_multi:"RIPEMD160":"abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq":"12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b" + +generic multi step mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text_multi:"RIPEMD160":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189" + +generic multi step mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_text_multi:"RIPEMD160":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD2 Hash File OpenSSL test #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD2":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"d5732582f494f5ddf35efd166c85af9c" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD2 Hash File OpenSSL test #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD2":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"270fcf11f27c27448457d7049a7edb084a3e554e0b2acf5806982213f0ad516402e4c869c4ff2171e18e3489baa3125d2c3056ebb616296f9b6aa97ef68eeabcdc0b6dde47775004096a241efcf0a90d19b34e898cc7340cdc940f8bdd46e23e352f34bca131d4d67a7c2ddb8d0d68b67f06152a128168e1c341c37e0a66c5018999b7059bcc300beed2c19dd1152d2fe062853293b8f3c8b5":"54ab68503f7d1b5c7741340dff2722a9" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD2 Hash File OpenSSL test #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD2":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"d850e5f554558cf0fe79a0612e1d0365" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD4 Hash File OpenSSL test #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD4":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"eabd0fbefb82fb0063a25a6d7b8bdc0f" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD4 Hash File OpenSSL test #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD4":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"270fcf11f27c27448457d7049a7edb084a3e554e0b2acf5806982213f0ad516402e4c869c4ff2171e18e3489baa3125d2c3056ebb616296f9b6aa97ef68eeabcdc0b6dde47775004096a241efcf0a90d19b34e898cc7340cdc940f8bdd46e23e352f34bca131d4d67a7c2ddb8d0d68b67f06152a128168e1c341c37e0a66c5018999b7059bcc300beed2c19dd1152d2fe062853293b8f3c8b5":"cec3c5e421a7b783aa89cacf78daf6dc" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD4 Hash File OpenSSL test #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD4":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"ad5f0a04116109b397b57f9cc9b6df4b" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Hash File OpenSSL test #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"42552882f00bd4633ea81135a184b284" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Hash File OpenSSL test #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161":"270fcf11f27c27448457d7049a7edb084a3e554e0b2acf5806982213f0ad516402e4c869c4ff2171e18e3489baa3125d2c3056ebb616296f9b6aa97ef68eeabcdc0b6dde47775004096a241efcf0a90d19b34e898cc7340cdc940f8bdd46e23e352f34bca131d4d67a7c2ddb8d0d68b67f06152a128168e1c341c37e0a66c5018999b7059bcc300beed2c19dd1152d2fe062853293b8f3c8b5":"a16a842891786d01fe50ba7731db7464" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Hash File OpenSSL test #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":16:"61616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161":"b91ce5ac77d33c234e61002ed6":"e97f623936f98a7f741c4bd0612fecc2" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":16:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"4869205468657265":"9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":16:"4a656665":"7768617420646f2079612077616e7420666f72206e6f7468696e673f":"750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":16:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd":"56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":16:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819":"cdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcd":"697eaf0aca3a3aea3a75164746ffaa79" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":12:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":"546573742057697468205472756e636174696f6e":"56461ef2342edc00f9bab995" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":16:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b6579202d2048617368204b6579204669727374":"6b1ab7fe4bd7bf8f0b62e6ce61b9d0cd" + +generic multi step HMAC-MD5 Test Vector RFC2202 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +md_hmac_multi:"MD5":16:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b657920616e64204c6172676572205468616e204f6e6520426c6f636b2d53697a652044617461":"6f630fad67cda0ee1fb1f562db3aa53e" + +generic multi step HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_hmac_multi:"RIPEMD160":20:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"4869205468657265":"24cb4bd67d20fc1a5d2ed7732dcc39377f0a5668" + +generic multi step HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_hmac_multi:"RIPEMD160":20:"4a656665":"7768617420646f2079612077616e7420666f72206e6f7468696e673f":"dda6c0213a485a9e24f4742064a7f033b43c4069" + +generic multi step HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_hmac_multi:"RIPEMD160":20:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd":"b0b105360de759960ab4f35298e116e295d8e7c1" + +generic multi step HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_hmac_multi:"RIPEMD160":20:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819":"cdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcd":"d5ca862f4d21d5e610e18b4cf1beb97a4365ecf4" + +generic multi step HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_hmac_multi:"RIPEMD160":20:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":"546573742057697468205472756e636174696f6e":"7619693978f91d90539ae786500ff3d8e0518e39" + +generic multi step HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_hmac_multi:"RIPEMD160":20:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b6579202d2048617368204b6579204669727374":"6466ca07ac5eac29e1bd523e5ada7605b791fd8b" + +generic multi step HMAC-RIPEMD160 Test vector RFC 2286 #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +md_hmac_multi:"RIPEMD160":20:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b657920616e64204c6172676572205468616e204f6e6520426c6f636b2d53697a652044617461":"69ea60798d71616cce5fd0871e23754cd75d5a0a" + +generic MD2 Hash file #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD2":"data_files/hash_file_1":"b593c098712d2e21628c8986695451a8" + +generic MD2 Hash file #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD2":"data_files/hash_file_2":"3c027b7409909a4c4b26bbab69ad9f4f" + +generic MD2 Hash file #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD2":"data_files/hash_file_3":"6bb43eb285e81f414083a94cdbe2989d" + +generic MD2 Hash file #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD2":"data_files/hash_file_4":"8350e5a3e24c153df2275c9f80692773" + +generic MD4 Hash file #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD4":"data_files/hash_file_1":"8d19772c176bd27153b9486715e2c0b9" + +generic MD4 Hash file #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD4":"data_files/hash_file_2":"f2ac53b8542882a5a0007c6f84b4d9fd" + +generic MD4 Hash file #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD4":"data_files/hash_file_3":"195c15158e2d07881d9a654095ce4a42" + +generic MD4 Hash file #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD4":"data_files/hash_file_4":"31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" + +generic MD5 Hash file #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD5":"data_files/hash_file_1":"52bcdc983c9ed64fc148a759b3c7a415" + +generic MD5 Hash file #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD5":"data_files/hash_file_2":"d17d466f15891df10542207ae78277f0" + +generic MD5 Hash file #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD5":"data_files/hash_file_3":"d945bcc6200ea95d061a2a818167d920" + +generic MD5 Hash file #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +mbedtls_md_file:"MD5":"data_files/hash_file_4":"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e" + +generic RIPEMD160 Hash file #0 (from paper) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_file:"RIPEMD160":"data_files/hash_file_5":"52783243c1697bdbe16d37f97f68f08325dc1528" + +generic RIPEMD160 Hash file #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_file:"RIPEMD160":"data_files/hash_file_1":"82f1d072f0ec0c2b353703a7b575a04c113af1a6" + +generic RIPEMD160 Hash file #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_file:"RIPEMD160":"data_files/hash_file_2":"996fbc8b79206ba7393ebcd246584069b1c08f0f" + +generic RIPEMD160 Hash file #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_file:"RIPEMD160":"data_files/hash_file_3":"8653b46d65998fa8c8846efa17937e742533ae48" + +generic RIPEMD160 Hash file #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +mbedtls_md_file:"RIPEMD160":"data_files/hash_file_4":"9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31" + +generic HMAC-SHA-1 Test Vector FIPS-198a #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"SHA1":20:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f":"53616d706c65202331":"4f4ca3d5d68ba7cc0a1208c9c61e9c5da0403c0a" + +generic HMAC-SHA-1 Test Vector FIPS-198a #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"SHA1":20:"303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f40414243":"53616d706c65202332":"0922d3405faa3d194f82a45830737d5cc6c75d24" + +generic HMAC-SHA-1 Test Vector FIPS-198a #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"SHA1":20:"505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3":"53616d706c65202333":"bcf41eab8bb2d802f3d05caf7cb092ecf8d1a3aa" + +generic HMAC-SHA-1 Test Vector FIPS-198a #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C 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HMAC-SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"SHA1":10:"d1f01455f78c4fb4":"00d40f67b57914bec456a3e3201ef1464be319a8d188c02e157af4b54f9b5a66d67f898a9bdbb19ff63a80aba6f246d013575721d52eb1b47a65def884011c49b257bcc2817fc853f106e8138ce386d7a5ac3103de0a3fa0ed6bb7af9ff66ebd1cc46fb86e4da0013d20a3c2dcd8fb828a4b70f7f104b41bf3f44682a66497ea":"56a665a7cdfe610f9fc5" + +generic HMAC-SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_md_hmac:"SHA1":10:"4e5ef77fdf033a5b":"e59326464e3201d195e29f2a3446ec1b1c9ff31154e2a4d0e40ed466f1bc855d29f76835624fa0127d29c9b1915939a046f385af7e5d47a23ba91f28bd22f811ea258dbbf3332bcd3543b8285d5df41bd064ffd64a341c22c4edb44f9c8d9e6df0c59dbf4a052a6c83da7478e179a6f3839c6870ff8ca8b9497f9ac1d725fdda":"981c0a7a8423b63a8fa6" + +generic HMAC-SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C 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CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hmac_multi:"SHA512":48:"8ab783d5acf32efa0d9c0a21abce955e96630d89":"17371e013dce839963d54418e97be4bd9fa3cb2a368a5220f5aa1b8aaddfa3bdefc91afe7c717244fd2fb640f5cb9d9bf3e25f7f0c8bc758883b89dcdce6d749d9672fed222277ece3e84b3ec01b96f70c125fcb3cbee6d19b8ef0873f915f173bdb05d81629ba187cc8ac1934b2f75952fb7616ae6bd812946df694bd2763af":"9ac7ca8d1aefc166b046e4cf7602ebe181a0e5055474bff5b342106731da0d7e48e4d87bc0a6f05871574289a1b099f8" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"":"da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"a8":"99f2aa95e36f95c2acb0eaf23998f030638f3f15" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"3000":"f944dcd635f9801f7ac90a407fbc479964dec024" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"42749e":"a444319e9b6cc1e8464c511ec0969c37d6bb2619" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"9fc3fe08":"16a0ff84fcc156fd5d3ca3a744f20a232d172253" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"b5c1c6f1af":"fec9deebfcdedaf66dda525e1be43597a73a1f93" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"ec29561244ede706b6eb30a1c371d74450a105c3f9735f7fa9fe38cf67f304a5736a106e92e17139a6813b1c81a4f3d3fb9546ab4296fa9f722826c066869edacd73b2548035185813e22634a9da44000d95a281ff9f264ecce0a931222162d021cca28db5f3c2aa24945ab1e31cb413ae29810fd794cad5dfaf29ec43cb38d198fe4ae1da2359780221405bd6712a5305da4b1b737fce7cd21c0eb7728d08235a9011":"970111c4e77bcc88cc20459c02b69b4aa8f58217" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"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":"0423dc76a8791107d14e13f5265b343f24cc0f19" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"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":"6692a71d73e00f27df976bc56df4970650d90e45" + +generic SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex:"SHA1":"8236153781bd2f1b81ffe0def1beb46f5a70191142926651503f1b3bb1016acdb9e7f7acced8dd168226f118ff664a01a8800116fd023587bfba52a2558393476f5fc69ce9c65001f23e70476d2cc81c97ea19caeb194e224339bcb23f77a83feac5096f9b3090c51a6ee6d204b735aa71d7e996d380b80822e4dfd43683af9c7442498cacbea64842dfda238cb099927c6efae07fdf7b23a4e4456e0152b24853fe0d5de4179974b2b9d4a1cdbefcbc01d8d311b5dda059136176ea698ab82acf20dd490be47130b1235cb48f8a6710473cfc923e222d94b582f9ae36d4ca2a32d141b8e8cc36638845fbc499bce17698c3fecae2572dbbd470552430d7ef30c238c2124478f1f780483839b4fb73d63a9460206824a5b6b65315b21e3c2f24c97ee7c0e78faad3df549c7ca8ef241876d9aafe9a309f6da352bec2caaa92ee8dca392899ba67dfed90aef33d41fc2494b765cb3e2422c8e595dabbfaca217757453fb322a13203f425f6073a9903e2dc5818ee1da737afc345f0057744e3a56e1681c949eb12273a3bfc20699e423b96e44bd1ff62e50a848a890809bfe1611c6787d3d741103308f849a790f9c015098286dbacfc34c1718b2c2b77e32194a75dda37954a320fa68764027852855a7e5b5274eb1e2cbcd27161d98b59ad245822015f48af82a45c0ed59be94f9af03d9736048570d6e3ef63b1770bc98dfb77de84b1bb1708d872b625d9ab9b06c18e5dbbf34399391f0f8aa26ec0dac7ff4cb8ec97b52bcb942fa6db2385dcd1b3b9d567aaeb425d567b0ebe267235651a1ed9bf78fd93d3c1dd077fe340bb04b00529c58f45124b717c168d07e9826e33376988bc5cf62845c2009980a4dfa69fbc7e5a0b1bb20a5958ca967aec68eb31dd8fccca9afcd30a26bab26279f1bf6724ff":"11863b483809ef88413ca9b0084ac4a5390640af" + +generic SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA224":"":"d14a028c2a3a2bc9476102bb288234c415a2b01f828ea62ac5b3e42f" + +generic SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA224":"ff":"e33f9d75e6ae1369dbabf81b96b4591ae46bba30b591a6b6c62542b5" + +generic SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA224":"984c":"2fa9df9157d9e027cfbc4c6a9df32e1adc0cbe2328ec2a63c5ae934e" + +generic SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA224":"50efd0":"b5a9820413c2bf8211fbbf5df1337043b32fa4eafaf61a0c8e9ccede" + +generic SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA224":"e5e09924":"fd19e74690d291467ce59f077df311638f1c3a46e510d0e49a67062d" + +generic SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA224":"21ebecb914":"78f4a71c21c694499ce1c7866611b14ace70d905012c356323c7c713" + +generic SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA224":"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":"1302149d1e197c41813b054c942329d420e366530f5517b470e964fe" + +generic SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA256":"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855" + +generic SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA256":"bd":"68325720aabd7c82f30f554b313d0570c95accbb7dc4b5aae11204c08ffe732b" + +generic SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA256":"5fd4":"7c4fbf484498d21b487b9d61de8914b2eadaf2698712936d47c3ada2558f6788" + +generic SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA256":"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803" + +generic SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA256":"c98c8e55":"7abc22c0ae5af26ce93dbb94433a0e0b2e119d014f8e7f65bd56c61ccccd9504" + +generic SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA256":"81a723d966":"7516fb8bb11350df2bf386bc3c33bd0f52cb4c67c6e4745e0488e62c2aea2605" + +generic SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex:"SHA256":"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":"4109cdbec3240ad74cc6c37f39300f70fede16e21efc77f7865998714aad0b5e" + +generic SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex:"SHA384":"":"38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b" + +generic SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex:"SHA384":"ab":"fb94d5be118865f6fcbc978b825da82cff188faec2f66cb84b2537d74b4938469854b0ca89e66fa2e182834736629f3d" + +generic SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex:"SHA384":"7c27":"3d80be467df86d63abb9ea1d3f9cb39cd19890e7f2c53a6200bedc5006842b35e820dc4e0ca90ca9b97ab23ef07080fc" + +generic SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex:"SHA384":"31f5ca":"78d54b943421fdf7ba90a7fb9637c2073aa480454bd841d39ff72f4511fc21fb67797b652c0c823229342873d3bef955" + +generic SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex:"SHA384":"7bdee3f8":"8bdafba0777ee446c3431c2d7b1fbb631089f71d2ca417abc1d230e1aba64ec2f1c187474a6f4077d372c14ad407f99a" + +generic SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex:"SHA384":"8f05604915":"504e414bf1db1060f14c8c799e25b1e0c4dcf1504ebbd129998f0ae283e6de86e0d3c7e879c73ec3b1836c3ee89c2649" + +generic SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex:"SHA384":"665da6eda214":"4c022f112010908848312f8b8f1072625fd5c105399d562ea1d56130619a7eac8dfc3748fd05ee37e4b690be9daa9980" + +generic SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex:"SHA384":"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":"cba9e3eb12a6f83db11e8a6ff40d1049854ee094416bc527fea931d8585428a8ed6242ce81f6769b36e2123a5c23483e" + +generic SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex:"SHA512":"":"cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e" + +generic SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex:"SHA512":"8f":"e4cd2d19931b5aad9c920f45f56f6ce34e3d38c6d319a6e11d0588ab8b838576d6ce6d68eea7c830de66e2bd96458bfa7aafbcbec981d4ed040498c3dd95f22a" + +generic SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex:"SHA512":"e724":"7dbb520221a70287b23dbcf62bfc1b73136d858e86266732a7fffa875ecaa2c1b8f673b5c065d360c563a7b9539349f5f59bef8c0c593f9587e3cd50bb26a231" + +generic SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex:"SHA512":"de4c90":"33ce98281045a5c4c9df0363d8196f1d7dfcd5ee46ac89776fd8a4344c12f123a66788af5bd41ceff1941aa5637654b4064c88c14e00465ab79a2fc6c97e1014" + +generic SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex:"SHA512":"a801e94b":"dadb1b5a27f9fece8d86adb2a51879beb1787ff28f4e8ce162cad7fee0f942efcabbf738bc6f797fc7cc79a3a75048cd4c82ca0757a324695bfb19a557e56e2f" + +generic SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex:"SHA512":"94390d3502":"b6175c4c4cccf69e0ce5f0312010886ea6b34d43673f942ae42483f9cbb7da817de4e11b5d58e25a3d9bd721a22cdffe1c40411cc45df1911fa5506129b69297" + +generic SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex:"SHA512":"49297dd63e5f":"1fcc1e6f6870859d11649f5e5336a9cd16329c029baf04d5a6edf257889a2e9522b497dd656bb402da461307c4ee382e2e89380c8e6e6e7697f1e439f650fa94" + +generic SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex:"SHA512":"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":"8e4bc6f8b8c60fe4d68c61d9b159c8693c3151c46749af58da228442d927f23359bd6ccd6c2ec8fa3f00a86cecbfa728e1ad60b821ed22fcd309ba91a4138bc9" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"":"da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"a8":"99f2aa95e36f95c2acb0eaf23998f030638f3f15" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"3000":"f944dcd635f9801f7ac90a407fbc479964dec024" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"42749e":"a444319e9b6cc1e8464c511ec0969c37d6bb2619" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"9fc3fe08":"16a0ff84fcc156fd5d3ca3a744f20a232d172253" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"b5c1c6f1af":"fec9deebfcdedaf66dda525e1be43597a73a1f93" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"ec29561244ede706b6eb30a1c371d74450a105c3f9735f7fa9fe38cf67f304a5736a106e92e17139a6813b1c81a4f3d3fb9546ab4296fa9f722826c066869edacd73b2548035185813e22634a9da44000d95a281ff9f264ecce0a931222162d021cca28db5f3c2aa24945ab1e31cb413ae29810fd794cad5dfaf29ec43cb38d198fe4ae1da2359780221405bd6712a5305da4b1b737fce7cd21c0eb7728d08235a9011":"970111c4e77bcc88cc20459c02b69b4aa8f58217" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"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":"0423dc76a8791107d14e13f5265b343f24cc0f19" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"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":"6692a71d73e00f27df976bc56df4970650d90e45" + +generic multi step SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA1":"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":"11863b483809ef88413ca9b0084ac4a5390640af" + +generic multi step SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA224":"":"d14a028c2a3a2bc9476102bb288234c415a2b01f828ea62ac5b3e42f" + +generic multi step SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA224":"ff":"e33f9d75e6ae1369dbabf81b96b4591ae46bba30b591a6b6c62542b5" + +generic multi step SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA224":"984c":"2fa9df9157d9e027cfbc4c6a9df32e1adc0cbe2328ec2a63c5ae934e" + +generic multi step SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA224":"50efd0":"b5a9820413c2bf8211fbbf5df1337043b32fa4eafaf61a0c8e9ccede" + +generic multi step SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA224":"e5e09924":"fd19e74690d291467ce59f077df311638f1c3a46e510d0e49a67062d" + +generic multi step SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA224":"21ebecb914":"78f4a71c21c694499ce1c7866611b14ace70d905012c356323c7c713" + +generic multi step SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA224":"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":"1302149d1e197c41813b054c942329d420e366530f5517b470e964fe" + +generic multi step SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA256":"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855" + +generic multi step SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA256":"bd":"68325720aabd7c82f30f554b313d0570c95accbb7dc4b5aae11204c08ffe732b" + +generic multi step SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA256":"5fd4":"7c4fbf484498d21b487b9d61de8914b2eadaf2698712936d47c3ada2558f6788" + +generic multi step SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA256":"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803" + +generic multi step SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA256":"c98c8e55":"7abc22c0ae5af26ce93dbb94433a0e0b2e119d014f8e7f65bd56c61ccccd9504" + +generic multi step SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA256":"81a723d966":"7516fb8bb11350df2bf386bc3c33bd0f52cb4c67c6e4745e0488e62c2aea2605" + +generic multi step SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA256":"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":"4109cdbec3240ad74cc6c37f39300f70fede16e21efc77f7865998714aad0b5e" + +generic multi step SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex_multi:"SHA384":"":"38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b" + +generic multi step SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex_multi:"SHA384":"ab":"fb94d5be118865f6fcbc978b825da82cff188faec2f66cb84b2537d74b4938469854b0ca89e66fa2e182834736629f3d" + +generic multi step SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex_multi:"SHA384":"7c27":"3d80be467df86d63abb9ea1d3f9cb39cd19890e7f2c53a6200bedc5006842b35e820dc4e0ca90ca9b97ab23ef07080fc" + +generic multi step SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex_multi:"SHA384":"31f5ca":"78d54b943421fdf7ba90a7fb9637c2073aa480454bd841d39ff72f4511fc21fb67797b652c0c823229342873d3bef955" + +generic multi step SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex_multi:"SHA384":"7bdee3f8":"8bdafba0777ee446c3431c2d7b1fbb631089f71d2ca417abc1d230e1aba64ec2f1c187474a6f4077d372c14ad407f99a" + +generic multi step SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex_multi:"SHA384":"8f05604915":"504e414bf1db1060f14c8c799e25b1e0c4dcf1504ebbd129998f0ae283e6de86e0d3c7e879c73ec3b1836c3ee89c2649" + +generic multi step SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex_multi:"SHA384":"665da6eda214":"4c022f112010908848312f8b8f1072625fd5c105399d562ea1d56130619a7eac8dfc3748fd05ee37e4b690be9daa9980" + +generic multi step SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +md_hex_multi:"SHA384":"7f46ce506d593c4ed53c82edeb602037e0485befbee03f7f930fe532d18ff2a3f5fd6076672c8145a1bf40dd94f7abab47c9ae71c234213d2ad1069c2dac0b0ba15257ae672b8245960ae55bd50315c0097daa3a318745788d70d14706910809ca6e396237fe4934fa46f9ce782d66606d8bd6b2d283b1160513ce9c24e9f084b97891f99d4cdefc169a029e431ca772ba1bba426fce6f01d8e286014e5acc66b799e4db62bd4783322f8a32ff78e0de3957df50ce10871f4e0680df4e8ca3960af9bc6f4efa8eb3962d18f474eb178c3265cc46b8f2ff5ab1a7449fea297dfcfabfa01f28abbb7289bb354b691b5664ec6d098af51be19947ec5ba7ebd66380d1141953ba78d4aa5401679fa7b0a44db1981f864d3535c45afe4c61183d5b0ad51fae71ca07e34240283959f7530a32c70d95a088e501c230059f333b0670825009e7e22103ef22935830df1fac8ef877f5f3426dd54f7d1128dd871ad9a7d088f94c0e8712013295b8d69ae7623b880978c2d3c6ad26dc478f8dc47f5c0adcc618665dc3dc205a9071b2f2191e16cac5bd89bb59148fc719633752303aa08e518dbc389f0a5482caaa4c507b8729a6f3edd061efb39026cecc6399f51971cf7381d605e144a5928c8c2d1ad7467b05da2f202f4f3234e1aff19a0198a28685721c3d2d52311c721e3fdcbaf30214cdc3acff8c433880e104fb63f2df7ce69a97857819ba7ac00ac8eae1969764fde8f68cf8e0916d7e0c151147d4944f99f42ae50f30e1c79a42d2b6c5188d133d3cbbf69094027b354b295ccd0f7dc5a87d73638bd98ebfb00383ca0fa69cb8dcb35a12510e5e07ad8789047d0b63841a1bb928737e8b0a0c33254f47aa8bfbe3341a09c2b76dbcefa67e30df300d34f7b8465c4f869e51b6bcfe6cf68b238359a645036bf7f63f02924e087ce7457e483b6025a859903cb484574aa3b12cf946f32127d537c33bee3141b5db96d10a148c50ae045f287210757710d6846e04b202f79e87dd9a56bc6da15f84a77a7f63935e1dee00309cd276a8e7176cb04da6bb0e9009534438732cb42d008008853d38d19beba46e61006e30f7efd1bc7c2906b024e4ff898a1b58c448d68b43c6ab63f34f85b3ac6aa4475867e51b583844cb23829f4b30f4bdd817d88e2ef3e7b4fc0a624395b05ec5e8686082b24d29fef2b0d3c29e031d5f94f504b1d3df9361eb5ffbadb242e66c39a8094cfe62f85f639f3fd65fc8ae0c74a8f4c6e1d070b9183a434c722caaa0225f8bcd68614d6f0738ed62f8484ec96077d155c08e26c46be262a73e3551698bd70d8d5610cf37c4c306eed04ba6a040a9c3e6d7e15e8acda17f477c2484cf5c56b813313927be8387b1024f995e98fc87f1029091c01424bdc2b296c2eadb7d25b3e762a2fd0c2dcd1727ddf91db97c5984305265f3695a7f5472f2d72c94d68c27914f14f82aa8dd5fe4e2348b0ca967a3f98626a091552f5d0ffa2bf10350d23c996256c01fdeffb2c2c612519869f877e4929c6e95ff15040f1485e22ed14119880232fef3b57b3848f15b1766a5552879df8f06":"cba9e3eb12a6f83db11e8a6ff40d1049854ee094416bc527fea931d8585428a8ed6242ce81f6769b36e2123a5c23483e" + +generic multi step SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA512":"":"cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e" + +generic multi step SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA512":"8f":"e4cd2d19931b5aad9c920f45f56f6ce34e3d38c6d319a6e11d0588ab8b838576d6ce6d68eea7c830de66e2bd96458bfa7aafbcbec981d4ed040498c3dd95f22a" + +generic multi step SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA512":"e724":"7dbb520221a70287b23dbcf62bfc1b73136d858e86266732a7fffa875ecaa2c1b8f673b5c065d360c563a7b9539349f5f59bef8c0c593f9587e3cd50bb26a231" + +generic multi step SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA512":"de4c90":"33ce98281045a5c4c9df0363d8196f1d7dfcd5ee46ac89776fd8a4344c12f123a66788af5bd41ceff1941aa5637654b4064c88c14e00465ab79a2fc6c97e1014" + +generic multi step SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA512":"a801e94b":"dadb1b5a27f9fece8d86adb2a51879beb1787ff28f4e8ce162cad7fee0f942efcabbf738bc6f797fc7cc79a3a75048cd4c82ca0757a324695bfb19a557e56e2f" + +generic multi step SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA512":"94390d3502":"b6175c4c4cccf69e0ce5f0312010886ea6b34d43673f942ae42483f9cbb7da817de4e11b5d58e25a3d9bd721a22cdffe1c40411cc45df1911fa5506129b69297" + +generic multi step SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA512":"49297dd63e5f":"1fcc1e6f6870859d11649f5e5336a9cd16329c029baf04d5a6edf257889a2e9522b497dd656bb402da461307c4ee382e2e89380c8e6e6e7697f1e439f650fa94" + +generic multi step SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +md_hex_multi:"SHA512":"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":"8e4bc6f8b8c60fe4d68c61d9b159c8693c3151c46749af58da228442d927f23359bd6ccd6c2ec8fa3f00a86cecbfa728e1ad60b821ed22fcd309ba91a4138bc9" + +generic SHA1 Hash file #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA1":"data_files/hash_file_1":"d21c965b1e768bd7a6aa6869f5f821901d255f9f" + +generic SHA1 Hash file #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA1":"data_files/hash_file_2":"353f34271f2aef49d23a8913d4a6bd82b2cecdc6" + +generic SHA1 Hash file #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA1":"data_files/hash_file_3":"93640ed592076328096270c756db2fba9c486b35" + +generic SHA1 Hash file #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA1":"data_files/hash_file_4":"da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709" + +generic SHA-224 Hash file #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA224":"data_files/hash_file_1":"8606da018870f0c16834a21bc3385704cb1683b9dbab04c5ddb90a48" + +generic SHA-224 Hash file #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA224":"data_files/hash_file_2":"733b2ab97b6f63f2e29b9a2089756d81e14c93fe4cc9615c0d5e8a03" + +generic SHA-224 Hash file #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA224":"data_files/hash_file_3":"e1df95867580e2cc2100e9565bf9c2e42c24fe5250c19efe33d1c4fe" + +generic SHA-224 Hash file #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA224":"data_files/hash_file_4":"d14a028c2a3a2bc9476102bb288234c415a2b01f828ea62ac5b3e42f" + +generic SHA-256 Hash file #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA256":"data_files/hash_file_1":"975d0c620d3936886f8a3665e585a3e84aa0501f4225bf53029710242823e391" + +generic SHA-256 Hash file #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA256":"data_files/hash_file_2":"11fcbf1baa36ca45745f10cc5467aee86f066f80ba2c46806d876bf783022ad2" + +generic SHA-256 Hash file #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA256":"data_files/hash_file_3":"9ae4b369f9f4f03b86505b46a5469542e00aaff7cf7417a71af6d6d0aba3b70c" + +generic SHA-256 Hash file #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA256":"data_files/hash_file_4":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855" + +generic SHA-384 Hash file #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA384":"data_files/hash_file_1":"e0a3e6259d6378001b54ef82f5dd087009c5fad86d8db226a9fe1d14ecbe33a6fc916e3a4b16f5f286424de15d5a8e0e" + +generic SHA-384 Hash file #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA384":"data_files/hash_file_2":"eff727afc8495c92e2f370f97a317f93c3350324b0646b0f0e264708b3c97d3d332d3c5390e1e47130f5c92f1ef4b9cf" + +generic SHA-384 Hash file #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA384":"data_files/hash_file_3":"6fc10ebda96a1ccf61777cac72f6034f92533d42052a4bf9f9d929c672973c71e5aeb1213268043c21527ac0f7f349c4" + +generic SHA-384 Hash file #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA384":"data_files/hash_file_4":"38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b" + +generic SHA-512 Hash file #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA512":"data_files/hash_file_1":"d8207a2e1ff2b424f2c4163fe1b723c9bd42e464061eb411e8df730bcd24a7ab3956a6f3ff044a52eb2d262f9e4ca6b524092b544ab78f14d6f9c4cc8ddf335a" + +generic SHA-512 Hash file #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA512":"data_files/hash_file_2":"ecbb7f0ed8a702b49f16ad3088bcc06ea93451912a7187db15f64d93517b09630b039293aed418d4a00695777b758b1f381548c2fd7b92ce5ed996b32c8734e7" + +generic SHA-512 Hash file #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA512":"data_files/hash_file_3":"7ccc9b2da71ffde9966c3ce44d7f20945fccf33b1fade4da152b021f1afcc7293382944aa6c09eac67af25f22026758e2bf6bed86ae2a43592677ee50f8eea41" + +generic SHA-512 Hash file #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_md_file:"SHA512":"data_files/hash_file_4":"cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..da3e852c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function @@ -0,0 +1,375 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_md_process( ) +{ + const int *md_type_ptr; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *info; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + unsigned char buf[150]; + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + /* + * Very minimal testing of mbedtls_md_process, just make sure the various + * xxx_process_wrap() function pointers are valid. (Testing that they + * indeed do the right thing would require messing with the internal + * state of the underlying mbedtls_md/sha context.) + * + * Also tests that mbedtls_md_list() only returns valid MDs. + */ + for( md_type_ptr = mbedtls_md_list(); *md_type_ptr != 0; md_type_ptr++ ) + { + info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( *md_type_ptr ); + TEST_ASSERT( info != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, info, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_process( &ctx, buf ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void md_null_args( ) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( *( mbedtls_md_list() ) ); + unsigned char buf[1] = { 0 }; + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_get_size( NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_get_type( NULL ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_get_name( NULL ) == NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_info_from_string( NULL ) == NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_setup( NULL, info, 0 ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_starts( NULL ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_update( NULL, buf, 1 ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, buf, 1 ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_finish( NULL, buf ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, buf ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( NULL, buf, 1, buf ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_file( NULL, "", buf ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( NULL, buf, 1 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, buf, 1 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_hmac_update( NULL, buf, 1 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, buf, 1 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( NULL, buf ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, buf ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( NULL ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_hmac( NULL, buf, 1, buf, 1, buf ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_process( NULL, buf ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_process( &ctx, buf ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Ok, this is not NULL arg but NULL return... */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) == NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_info_from_string( "no such md" ) == NULL ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void md_info( int md_type, char * md_name, int md_size ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + const int *md_type_ptr; + int found; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info == mbedtls_md_info_from_string( md_name ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ) == (mbedtls_md_type_t) md_type ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) == (unsigned char) md_size ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info ), md_name ) == 0 ); + + found = 0; + for( md_type_ptr = mbedtls_md_list(); *md_type_ptr != 0; md_type_ptr++ ) + if( *md_type_ptr == md_type ) + found = 1; + TEST_ASSERT( found == 1 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void md_text( char * text_md_name, char * text_src_string, + data_t * hash ) +{ + char md_name[100]; + unsigned char src_str[1000]; + unsigned char output[100]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + + memset( md_name, 0x00, 100 ); + memset( src_str, 0x00, 1000 ); + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + strncpy( (char *) src_str, text_src_string, sizeof( src_str ) - 1 ); + strncpy( (char *) md_name, text_md_name, sizeof( md_name ) - 1 ); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_string(md_name); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md( md_info, src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void md_hex( char * text_md_name, data_t * src_str, data_t * hash ) +{ + char md_name[100]; + unsigned char output[100]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + + memset( md_name, 0x00, 100 ); + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + strncpy( (char *) md_name, text_md_name, sizeof( md_name ) - 1 ); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_string( md_name ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md( md_info, src_str->x, src_str->len, output ) ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void md_text_multi( char * text_md_name, char * text_src_string, + data_t * hash ) +{ + char md_name[100]; + unsigned char src_str[1000]; + unsigned char output[100]; + int halfway, len; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx, ctx_copy; + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx_copy ); + + memset( md_name, 0x00, 100 ); + memset( src_str, 0x00, 1000 ); + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + strncpy( (char *) src_str, text_src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 ); + strncpy( (char *) md_name, text_md_name, sizeof(md_name) - 1 ); + len = strlen( (char *) src_str ); + halfway = len / 2; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_string(md_name); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx_copy, md_info, 0 ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( ctx.md_ctx != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, src_str, halfway ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_clone( &ctx_copy, &ctx ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, src_str + halfway, len - halfway ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, output ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + hash->len) == 0 ); + + /* Test clone */ + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx_copy, src_str + halfway, len - halfway ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx_copy, output ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + hash->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx_copy ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void md_hex_multi( char * text_md_name, data_t * src_str, data_t * hash ) +{ + char md_name[100]; + unsigned char output[100]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx, ctx_copy; + int halfway; + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx_copy ); + + memset( md_name, 0x00, 100 ); + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + strncpy( (char *) md_name, text_md_name, sizeof( md_name ) - 1 ); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_string(md_name); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx_copy, md_info, 0 ) ); + + halfway = src_str->len / 2; + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( ctx.md_ctx != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, src_str->x, halfway ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_clone( &ctx_copy, &ctx ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, src_str->x + halfway, src_str->len - halfway) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, output ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + hash->len ) == 0 ); + + /* Test clone */ + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_update( &ctx_copy, src_str->x + halfway, src_str->len - halfway ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx_copy, output ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + hash->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx_copy ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_md_hmac( char * text_md_name, int trunc_size, + data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * hash ) +{ + char md_name[100]; + unsigned char output[100]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + + memset( md_name, 0x00, 100 ); + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + strncpy( (char *) md_name, text_md_name, sizeof( md_name ) - 1 ); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_string( md_name ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + + TEST_ASSERT ( mbedtls_md_hmac( md_info, key_str->x, key_str->len, src_str->x, src_str->len, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + trunc_size, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void md_hmac_multi( char * text_md_name, int trunc_size, data_t * key_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * hash ) +{ + char md_name[100]; + unsigned char output[100]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + int halfway; + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + memset( md_name, 0x00, 100 ); + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + strncpy( (char *) md_name, text_md_name, sizeof( md_name ) - 1 ); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_string( md_name ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) ); + + halfway = src_str->len / 2; + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, key_str->x, key_str->len ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( ctx.md_ctx != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, src_str->x, halfway ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, src_str->x + halfway, src_str->len - halfway ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + trunc_size, hash->len ) == 0 ); + + /* Test again, for reset() */ + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, src_str->x, halfway ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, src_str->x + halfway, src_str->len - halfway ) ); + TEST_ASSERT ( 0 == mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + trunc_size, hash->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void mbedtls_md_file( char * text_md_name, char * filename, + data_t * hash ) +{ + char md_name[100]; + unsigned char output[100]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + + memset( md_name, 0x00, 100 ); + memset( output, 0x00, 100 ); + + strncpy( (char *) md_name, text_md_name, sizeof( md_name ) - 1 ); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_string( md_name ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_file( md_info, filename, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d063a47 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.data @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +# Test MD2, MD4, MD5 and RIPEMD160 +mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #1 +md2_text:"":"8350e5a3e24c153df2275c9f80692773" + +mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #2 +md2_text:"a":"32ec01ec4a6dac72c0ab96fb34c0b5d1" + +mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #3 +md2_text:"abc":"da853b0d3f88d99b30283a69e6ded6bb" + +mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #4 +md2_text:"message digest":"ab4f496bfb2a530b219ff33031fe06b0" + +mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #5 +md2_text:"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"4e8ddff3650292ab5a4108c3aa47940b" + +mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #6 +md2_text:"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"da33def2a42df13975352846c30338cd" + +mbedtls_md2 Test vector RFC1319 #7 +md2_text:"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"d5976f79d83d3a0dc9806c3c66f3efd8" + +mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #1 +md4_text:"":"31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" + +mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #2 +md4_text:"a":"bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24" + +mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #3 +md4_text:"abc":"a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d" + +mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #4 +md4_text:"message digest":"d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b" + +mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #5 +md4_text:"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9" + +mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #6 +md4_text:"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4" + +mbedtls_md4 Test vector RFC1320 #7 +md4_text:"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536" + +mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #1 +md5_text:"":"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e" + +mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #2 +md5_text:"a":"0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661" + +mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #3 +md5_text:"abc":"900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72" + +mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #4 +md5_text:"message digest":"f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0" + +mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #5 +md5_text:"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b" + +mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #6 +md5_text:"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f" + +mbedtls_md5 Test vector RFC1321 #7 +md5_text:"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a" + +mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #1 +ripemd160_text:"":"9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31" + +mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #2 +ripemd160_text:"a":"0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe" + +mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #3 +ripemd160_text:"abc":"8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc" + +mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #4 +ripemd160_text:"message digest":"5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36" + +mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #5 +ripemd160_text:"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz":"f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc" + +mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #6 +ripemd160_text:"abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq":"12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b" + +mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #7 +ripemd160_text:"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789":"b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189" + +mbedtls_ripemd160 Test vector from paper #8 +ripemd160_text:"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890":"9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb" + +MD2 Selftest +md2_selftest: + +MD4 Selftest +md4_selftest: + +MD5 Selftest +md5_selftest: + +RIPEMD160 Selftest +ripemd160_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa35c583 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ +void md2_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hash ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char src_str[100]; + unsigned char output[16]; + + memset( src_str, 0x00, sizeof src_str ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof output ); + + strncpy( (char *) src_str, text_src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md2_ret( src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ) ; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + sizeof output, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ +void md4_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hash ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char src_str[100]; + unsigned char output[16]; + + memset( src_str, 0x00, sizeof src_str ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof output ); + + strncpy( (char *) src_str, text_src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md4_ret( src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + sizeof output, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +void md5_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hash ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char src_str[100]; + unsigned char output[16]; + + memset( src_str, 0x00, sizeof src_str ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof output ); + + strncpy( (char *) src_str, text_src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md5_ret( src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + sizeof output, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ +void ripemd160_text( char * text_src_string, data_t * hash ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char src_str[100]; + unsigned char output[20]; + + memset(src_str, 0x00, sizeof src_str); + memset(output, 0x00, sizeof output); + + strncpy( (char *) src_str, text_src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ), output ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, + sizeof output, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void md2_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md2_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void md4_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md4_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void md5_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md5_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void ripemd160_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_memory_buffer_alloc.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_memory_buffer_alloc.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d780fd41 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_memory_buffer_alloc.data @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +Memory buffer alloc self test +mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test: + +Memory buffer alloc - free in middle, alloc at end +memory_buffer_alloc_free_alloc:100:100:100:0:0:1:0:0:200:0 + +Memory buffer alloc - free in middle, realloc +memory_buffer_alloc_free_alloc:100:100:100:0:0:1:0:0:100:0 + +Memory buffer alloc - free in middle, merge, realloc +memory_buffer_alloc_free_alloc:100:100:100:100:0:1:1:0:201:0 + +Memory buffer alloc - free at end, merge, realloc +memory_buffer_alloc_free_alloc:100:64:100:100:0:0:0:1:200:0 + +Memory buffer alloc - Out of Memory test +memory_buffer_alloc_oom_test: + +Memory buffer: heap too small (header verification should fail) +memory_buffer_heap_too_small: + +Memory buffer: attempt to allocate SIZE_MAX +memory_buffer_underalloc: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_memory_buffer_alloc.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_memory_buffer_alloc.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc884c28 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_memory_buffer_alloc.function @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#define TEST_SUITE_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_SUITE_HELPERS */ +static int check_pointer( void *p ) +{ + if( p == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( (size_t) p % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +/* END_SUITE_HELPERS */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void memory_buffer_alloc_free_alloc( int a_bytes, int b_bytes, int c_bytes, + int d_bytes, int free_a, int free_b, + int free_c, int free_d, int e_bytes, + int f_bytes ) +{ + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned char *ptr_a = NULL, *ptr_b = NULL, *ptr_c = NULL, *ptr_d = NULL, + *ptr_e = NULL, *ptr_f = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + size_t reported_blocks; + size_t reported_bytes; +#endif + size_t allocated_bytes = 0; + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify( MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS ); + + if( a_bytes > 0 ) + { + ptr_a = mbedtls_calloc( a_bytes, sizeof(char) ); + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( ptr_a ) == 0 ); + + allocated_bytes += a_bytes * sizeof(char); + } + + if( b_bytes > 0 ) + { + ptr_b = mbedtls_calloc( b_bytes, sizeof(char) ); + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( ptr_b ) == 0 ); + + allocated_bytes += b_bytes * sizeof(char); + } + + if( c_bytes > 0 ) + { + ptr_c = mbedtls_calloc( c_bytes, sizeof(char) ); + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( ptr_c ) == 0 ); + + allocated_bytes += c_bytes * sizeof(char); + } + + if( d_bytes > 0 ) + { + ptr_d = mbedtls_calloc( d_bytes, sizeof(char) ); + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( ptr_d ) == 0 ); + + allocated_bytes += d_bytes * sizeof(char); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( &reported_bytes, &reported_blocks ); + TEST_ASSERT( reported_bytes == allocated_bytes ); +#endif + + if( free_a ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_a ); + ptr_a = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + + allocated_bytes -= a_bytes * sizeof(char); + } + + if( free_b ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_b ); + ptr_b = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + + allocated_bytes -= b_bytes * sizeof(char); + } + + if( free_c ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_c ); + ptr_c = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + + allocated_bytes -= c_bytes * sizeof(char); + } + + if( free_d ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_d ); + ptr_d = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + + allocated_bytes -= d_bytes * sizeof(char); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( &reported_bytes, &reported_blocks ); + TEST_ASSERT( reported_bytes == allocated_bytes ); +#endif + + if( e_bytes > 0 ) + { + ptr_e = mbedtls_calloc( e_bytes, sizeof(char) ); + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( ptr_e ) == 0 ); + } + + if( f_bytes > 0 ) + { + ptr_f = mbedtls_calloc( f_bytes, sizeof(char) ); + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( ptr_f ) == 0 ); + } + + /* Once blocks are reallocated, the block allocated to the memory request + * may be bigger than the request itself, which is indicated by the reported + * bytes, and makes it hard to know what the reported size will be, so + * we don't check the size after blocks have been reallocated. */ + + if( ptr_a != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_a ); + ptr_a = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + } + + if( ptr_b != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_b ); + ptr_b = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + } + + if( ptr_c != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_c ); + ptr_c = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + } + + if( ptr_d != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_d ); + ptr_d = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + } + + if( ptr_e != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_e ); + ptr_e = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + } + + if( ptr_f != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( ptr_f ); + ptr_f = NULL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( &reported_bytes, &reported_blocks ); + TEST_ASSERT( reported_bytes == 0 ); +#endif + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void memory_buffer_alloc_oom_test( ) +{ + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned char *ptr_a = NULL, *ptr_b = NULL, *ptr_c = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + size_t reported_blocks, reported_bytes; +#endif + + (void)ptr_c; + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify( MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS ); + + ptr_a = mbedtls_calloc( 432, sizeof(char) ); + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( ptr_a ) == 0 ); + + ptr_b = mbedtls_calloc( 432, sizeof(char) ); + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( ptr_b ) == 0 ); + + ptr_c = mbedtls_calloc( 431, sizeof(char) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ptr_c == NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( &reported_bytes, &reported_blocks ); + TEST_ASSERT( reported_bytes >= 864 && reported_bytes <= sizeof(buf) ); +#endif + + mbedtls_free( ptr_a ); + ptr_a = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + + mbedtls_free( ptr_b ); + ptr_b = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( &reported_bytes, &reported_blocks ); + TEST_ASSERT( reported_bytes == 0 ); +#endif + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void memory_buffer_heap_too_small( ) +{ + unsigned char buf[1]; + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + /* With MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG enabled, this prints a message + * "FATAL: verification of first header failed". + */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() != 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void memory_buffer_underalloc( ) +{ + unsigned char buf[100]; + size_t i; + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + for( i = 1; i < MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_calloc( 1, + (size_t)-( MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE - i ) ) == NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify() == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f2a86560 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.data @@ -0,0 +1,1904 @@ +MPI - Valid parameters +mpi_valid_param: + +MPI - Invalid parameters +mpi_invalid_param: + +Arguments with no value +mpi_null: + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #1 +mpi_read_write_string:10:"128":10:"128":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #1 (Leading 0) +mpi_read_write_string:10:"0128":10:"128":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #2 +mpi_read_write_string:10:"128":16:"80":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Read zero decimal) +mpi_read_write_string:10:"0":10:"0":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Read zero hex) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"0":16:"00":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Read minus zero decimal) +mpi_read_write_string:10:"-0":10:"0":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Read minus zero hex) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"-0":16:"00":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Negative decimal) +mpi_read_write_string:10:"-23":10:"-23":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Negative decimal, leading 0) +mpi_read_write_string:10:"-023":10:"-23":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Negative hex -> decimal) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"-20":10:"-32":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Negative hex) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"-23":16:"-23":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Negative hex, leading 0) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"-023":16:"-23":100:0:0 + +Base test mpi_read_write_string #4 (Buffer just fits) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"-4":4:"-10":4:0:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #1 (Invalid character) +mpi_read_write_string:10:"a28":0:"":100:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #2 (Illegal input radix) +mpi_read_write_string:19:"a28":0:"":100:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #3 (Buffer just fits) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"-23":16:"-23":4:0:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #4 (Buffer too small) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"-23":16:"-23":3:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Test mpi_read_write_string #5 (Illegal output radix) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"-23":17:"-23":4:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mpi_read_write_string #6 (Output radix of 15) +mpi_read_write_string:10:"29":15:"1e":100:0:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #7 +mpi_read_write_string:10:"56125680981752282334141896320372489490613963693556392520816017892111350604111697682705498319512049040516698827829292076808006940873974979584527073481012636016353913462376755556720019831187364993587901952757307830896531678727717924":16:"0941379d00fed1491fe15df284dfde4a142f68aa8d412023195cee66883e6290ffe703f4ea5963bf212713cee46b107c09182b5edcd955adac418bf4918e2889af48e1099d513830cec85c26ac1e158b52620e33ba8692f893efbb2f958b4424":200:0:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #8 (Empty MPI hex -> hex) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"":16:"":4:0:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #9 (Empty MPI hex -> dec) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"":10:"0":4:0:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #9 (Empty MPI hex -> base 2) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"":2:"0":4:0:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #8 (Empty MPI dec -> hex) +mpi_read_write_string:10:"":16:"":4:0:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #9 (Empty MPI dec -> dec) +mpi_read_write_string:10:"":10:"0":4:0:0 + +Test mpi_read_write_string #9 (Empty MPI dec -> base 2) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"":2:"0":4:0:0 + +Test mpi_write_string #10 (Negative hex with odd number of digits) +mpi_read_write_string:16:"-1":16:"":3:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_read_binary #1 +mbedtls_mpi_read_binary:"0941379d00fed1491fe15df284dfde4a142f68aa8d412023195cee66883e6290ffe703f4ea5963bf212713cee46b107c09182b5edcd955adac418bf4918e2889af48e1099d513830cec85c26ac1e158b52620e33ba8692f893efbb2f958b4424":10:"56125680981752282334141896320372489490613963693556392520816017892111350604111697682705498319512049040516698827829292076808006940873974979584527073481012636016353913462376755556720019831187364993587901952757307830896531678727717924" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le #1 +mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le:"0941379d00fed1491fe15df284dfde4a142f68aa8d412023195cee66883e6290ffe703f4ea5963bf212713cee46b107c09182b5edcd955adac418bf4918e2889af48e1099d513830cec85c26ac1e158b52620e33ba8692f893efbb2f958b4424":10:"219946662473865722255717126709915431768051735954189829340600976826409773245337023925691629251672268961177825243440202069039100741562168093042339401187848509859789949044607421190014088260008793380554914226244485299326152319899746569" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_write_binary #1 +mbedtls_mpi_write_binary:10:"56125680981752282334141896320372489490613963693556392520816017892111350604111697682705498319512049040516698827829292076808006940873974979584527073481012636016353913462376755556720019831187364993587901952757307830896531678727717924":"0941379d00fed1491fe15df284dfde4a142f68aa8d412023195cee66883e6290ffe703f4ea5963bf212713cee46b107c09182b5edcd955adac418bf4918e2889af48e1099d513830cec85c26ac1e158b52620e33ba8692f893efbb2f958b4424":200:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_write_binary #1 (Buffer just fits) +mbedtls_mpi_write_binary:16:"123123123123123123123123123":"0123123123123123123123123123":14:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_write_binary #2 (Buffer too small) +mbedtls_mpi_write_binary:16:"123123123123123123123123123":"23123123123123123123123123":13:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le #1 +mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le:10:"56125680981752282334141896320372489490613963693556392520816017892111350604111697682705498319512049040516698827829292076808006940873974979584527073481012636016353913462376755556720019831187364993587901952757307830896531678727717924":"24448b952fbbef93f89286ba330e62528b151eac265cc8ce3038519d09e148af89288e91f48b41acad55d9dc5e2b18097c106be4ce132721bf6359eaf403e7ff90623e8866ee5c192320418daa682f144adedf84f25de11f49d1fe009d374109":200:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le #1 (Buffer just fits) +mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le:16:"123123123123123123123123123":"2331122331122331122331122301":14:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le #2 (Buffer too small) +mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le:16:"123123123123123123123123123":"23311223311223311223311223":13:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_read_file #1 +mbedtls_mpi_read_file:10:"data_files/mpi_10":"01f55332c3a48b910f9942f6c914e58bef37a47ee45cb164a5b6b8d1006bf59a059c21449939ebebfdf517d2e1dbac88010d7b1f141e997bd6801ddaec9d05910f4f2de2b2c4d714e2c14a72fc7f17aa428d59c531627f09":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_read_file #1 (Empty file) +mbedtls_mpi_read_file:10:"data_files/hash_file_4":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR + +Test mbedtls_mpi_read_file #2 (Illegal input) +mbedtls_mpi_read_file:10:"data_files/hash_file_3":"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_read_file #3 (Input too big) +mbedtls_mpi_read_file:10:"data_files/mpi_too_big":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_write_file #1 +mbedtls_mpi_write_file:10:"56125680981752282334141896320372489490613963693556392520816017892111350604111697682705498319512049040516698827829292076808006940873974979584527073481012636016353913462376755556720019831187364993587901952757307830896531678727717924":16:"data_files/mpi_write" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_lsb: 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_lsb:16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_lsb: 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_lsb:16:"0":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lsb #1 +mbedtls_mpi_lsb:10:"56125680981752282334141896320372489490613963693556392520816017892111350604111697682705498319512049040516698827829292076808006940873974979584527073481012636016353913462376755556720019831187364993587901952757307830896531678727717924":2 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lsb #2 +mbedtls_mpi_lsb:10:"24":3 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lsb #3 +mbedtls_mpi_lsb:16:"24":2 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lsb #4 +mbedtls_mpi_lsb:16:"2000":13 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_bitlen #1 +mbedtls_mpi_bitlen:10:"56125680981752282334141896320372489490613963693556392520816017892111350604111697682705498319512049040516698827829292076808006940873974979584527073481012636016353913462376755556720019831187364993587901952757307830896531678727717924":764 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_bitlen #2 +mbedtls_mpi_bitlen:10:"24":5 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_bitlen #3 +mbedtls_mpi_bitlen:10:"1":1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_bitlen #4 +mbedtls_mpi_bitlen:10:"15":4 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_bitlen #5 +mbedtls_mpi_bitlen:10:"16":5 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_bitlen #6 +mbedtls_mpi_bitlen:10:"10":4 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_bitlen: 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_bitlen:10:"":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_bitlen: 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_bitlen:10:"0":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int #1 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int:693:693:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int #2 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int:693:692:1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int #3 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int:693:694:-1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int (Negative values) #1 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int:-2:-2:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int (Negative values) #2 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int:-2:-3:1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int (Negative values) #3 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int:-2:-1:-1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi #1 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"693":10:"693":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi #2 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"693":10:"692":1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi #3 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"693":10:"694":-1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi (Negative values) #1 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"-2":10:"-2":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi (Negative values) #2 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"-2":10:"-3":1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi (Negative values) #3 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"-2":10:"-1":-1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi (Mixed values) #4 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"-3":10:"2":-1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi (Mixed values) #5 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"2":10:"-3":1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi (Mixed values) #6 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"-2":10:"31231231289798":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (null) = 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"":10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (null) = 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"":10:"0":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (1 limb) = 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"0":10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (1 limb) = 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"0":10:"0":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (null) < positive +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"":10:"123":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (1 limb) < positive +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"0":10:"123":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (null) > negative +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"":10:"-123":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (1 limb) > negative +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"0":10:"-123":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: positive > 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"123":10:"":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: positive > 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"123":10:"0":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: negative < 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"-123":10:"":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: negative < 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:10:"-123":10:"0":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (null) < positive with leading zero limb +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"":16:"0000000000000000123":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (1 limb) < positive with leading zero limb +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"0":16:"0000000000000000123":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (null) > negative with leading zero limb +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"":16:"-0000000000000000123":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (1 limb) > negative with leading zero limb +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"0":16:"-0000000000000000123":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: positive with leading zero limb > 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"0000000000000000123":16:"":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: positive with leading zero limb > 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"0000000000000000123":16:"0":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: negative with leading zero limb < 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"-0000000000000000123":16:"":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: negative with leading zero limb < 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"-0000000000000000123":16:"0":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (null) < large positive +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"":16:"1230000000000000000":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (1 limb) < large positive +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"0":16:"1230000000000000000":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (null) > large negative +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"":16:"-1230000000000000000":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: 0 (1 limb) > large negative +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"0":16:"-1230000000000000000":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: large positive > 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"1230000000000000000":16:"":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: large positive > 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"1230000000000000000":16:"0":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: large negative < 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"-1230000000000000000":16:"":-1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi: large negative < 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi:16:"-1230000000000000000":16:"0":-1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct #1 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"2B5":1:"2B5":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct #2 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"2B5":1:"2B4":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct #3 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"2B5":1:"2B6":1:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Negative values) #1 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"-2":1:"-2":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Negative values) #2 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"-2":1:"-3":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Negative values) #3 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"-2":1:"-1":1:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Mixed values) #1 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"-3":1:"2":1:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Mixed values) #2 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"2":1:"-3":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Mixed values) #3 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"-2":2:"1C67967269C6":1:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (X is longer in storage) +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:3:"2B5":2:"2B5":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Y is longer in storage) +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:3:"2B5":4:"2B5":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (length=0) +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:0:"":0:"":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 64 bit) #1 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":2:"FF":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 64 bit) #2 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"8000000000000000":2:"7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 64 bit) #3 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"8000000000000000":2:"1":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 64 bit) #4 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"8000000000000000":2:"0":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 64 bit) #5 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":2:"FF":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 32 bit) #1 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"7FFFFFFF":1:"FF":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 32 bit) #2 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"80000000":1:"7FFFFFFF":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 32 bit) #3 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"80000000":1:"1":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 32 bit) #4 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"80000000":1:"0":0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (corner case - 32 bit) #5 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:1:"FFFFFFFF":1:"FF":0:0 + +Multi-limb mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (XY, equal MS limbs) +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"-EEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF1":2:"-EEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":0:0 + +Multi-limb mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (X=Y) +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"EEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":2:"EEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":0:0 + +Multi-limb mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (X=-Y) +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"-EEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":2:"EEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":1:0 + +Multi-limb mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Alternating limbs) #1 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"11FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":2:"FF1111111111111111":1:0 + +Multi-limb mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Alternating limbs) #2 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"FF1111111111111111":2:"11FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":0:0 + +Multi-limb mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Alternating limbs) #3 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"-11FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":2:"-FF1111111111111111":0:0 + +Multi-limb mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct (Alternating limbs) #4 +mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct:2:"-FF1111111111111111":2:"-11FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":1:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs #1 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"693":10:"693":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs #2 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"693":10:"692":1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs #3 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"693":10:"694":-1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs (Negative values) #1 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"-2":10:"-2":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs (Negative values) #2 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"-2":10:"-3":-1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs (Negative values) #3 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"-2":10:"-1":1 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs: 0 (null) = 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"":10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs: 0 (null) = 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"":10:"0":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs: 0 (1 limb) = 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"0":10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs: 0 (1 limb) = 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"0":10:"0":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs (Mix values) #1 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"-2":10:"2":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs (Mix values) #2 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"2":10:"-3":-1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs (Mix values) #3 +mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs:10:"-2":10:"1":1 + +Copy large negative to large negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy large negative to large positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy large negative to small negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"-beef" + +Copy large negative to small positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"beef" + +Copy large negative to zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"0" + +Copy large negative to zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"" + +Copy large positive to large negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy large positive to large positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy large positive to small negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"-beef" + +Copy large positive to small positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"beef" + +Copy large positive to zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"0" + +Copy large positive to zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"" + +Copy small negative to large negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-bead":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy small negative to large positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-bead":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy small negative to small negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-bead":"-beef" + +Copy small negative to small positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-bead":"beef" + +Copy small negative to zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-bead":"0" + +Copy small negative to zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"-bead":"" + +Copy small positive to large negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"bead":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy small positive to large positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"bead":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy small positive to small negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"bead":"-beef" + +Copy small positive to small positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"bead":"beef" + +Copy small positive to zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"bead":"0" + +Copy small positive to zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"bead":"" + +Copy zero (1 limb) to large negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"0":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy zero (1 limb) to large positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"0":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy zero (1 limb) to small negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"0":"-beef" + +Copy zero (1 limb) to small positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"0":"beef" + +Copy zero (1 limb) to zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"0":"0" + +Copy zero (1 limb) to zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"0":"" + +Copy zero (null) to large negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy zero (null) to large positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Copy zero (null) to small negative +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"":"-beef" + +Copy zero (null) to small positive +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"":"beef" + +Copy zero (null) to zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"":"0" + +Copy zero (null) to zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_copy:"":"" + +Copy self: large negative +mpi_copy_self:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade" + +Copy self: large positive +mpi_copy_self:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade" + +Copy self: small negative +mpi_copy_self:"-bead" + +Copy self: small positive +mpi_copy_self:"bead" + +Copy self: zero (1 limb) +mpi_copy_self:"0" + +Copy self: zero (null) +mpi_copy_self:"" + +Swap large negative with large negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap large negative with large positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap large negative with small negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"-beef" + +Swap large negative with small positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"beef" + +Swap large negative with zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"0" + +Swap large negative with zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"" + +Swap large positive with large negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap large positive with large positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap large positive with small negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"-beef" + +Swap large positive with small positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"beef" + +Swap large positive with zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"0" + +Swap large positive with zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade":"" + +Swap small negative with large negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-bead":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap small negative with large positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-bead":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap small negative with small negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-bead":"-beef" + +Swap small negative with small positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-bead":"beef" + +Swap small negative with zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-bead":"0" + +Swap small negative with zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"-bead":"" + +Swap small positive with large negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"bead":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap small positive with large positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"bead":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap small positive with small negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"bead":"-beef" + +Swap small positive with small positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"bead":"beef" + +Swap small positive with zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"bead":"0" + +Swap small positive with zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"bead":"" + +Swap zero (1 limb) with large negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"0":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap zero (1 limb) with large positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"0":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap zero (1 limb) with small negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"0":"-beef" + +Swap zero (1 limb) with small positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"0":"beef" + +Swap zero (1 limb) with zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"0":"0" + +Swap zero (1 limb) with zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"0":"" + +Swap zero (null) with large negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"":"-face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap zero (null) with large positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"":"face1e55ca11ab1ecab005e5" + +Swap zero (null) with small negative +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"":"-beef" + +Swap zero (null) with small positive +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"":"beef" + +Swap zero (null) with zero (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"":"0" + +Swap zero (null) with zero (null) +mbedtls_mpi_swap:"":"" + +Swap self: large negative +mpi_swap_self:"-ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade" + +Swap self: large positive +mpi_swap_self:"ca5cadedb01dfaceacc01ade" + +Swap self: small negative +mpi_swap_self:"-bead" + +Swap self: small positive +mpi_swap_self:"bead" + +Swap self: zero (1 limb) +mpi_swap_self:"0" + +Swap self: zero (null) +mpi_swap_self:"" + +Shrink 0 limbs in a buffer of size 0 to 0 +mbedtls_mpi_shrink:0:0:0:0 + +Shrink 2 limbs in a buffer of size 2 to 4 +mbedtls_mpi_shrink:2:2:4:4 + +Shrink 2 limbs in a buffer of size 4 to 4 +mbedtls_mpi_shrink:4:2:4:4 + +Shrink 2 limbs in a buffer of size 8 to 4 +mbedtls_mpi_shrink:8:2:4:4 + +Shrink 4 limbs in a buffer of size 8 to 4 +mbedtls_mpi_shrink:8:4:4:4 + +Shrink 6 limbs in a buffer of size 8 to 4 yielding 6 +mbedtls_mpi_shrink:8:6:4:6 + +Shrink 2 limbs in a buffer of size 4 to 0 yielding 2 +mbedtls_mpi_shrink:4:2:0:2 + +Shrink 1 limbs in a buffer of size 4 to 0 yielding 1 +mbedtls_mpi_shrink:4:1:0:1 + +Shrink 0 limbs in a buffer of size 4 to 0 yielding 1 +mbedtls_mpi_shrink:4:0:0:1 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_add_abs #1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:10:"12345678":10:"642531":10:"12988209" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_add_abs #2 +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:10:"-12345678":10:"642531":10:"12988209" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_add_abs #3 +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:10:"12345678":10:"-642531":10:"12988209" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_add_abs #4 +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:10:"-12345678":10:"-642531":10:"12988209" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_abs: 0 (null) + 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:16:"":16:"":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_abs: 0 (null) + 1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:16:"":16:"01":16:"01" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_abs: 1 + 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:16:"01":16:"":16:"01" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_abs #1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:10:"-643808006803554439230129854961492699151386107534013432918073439524138264842370630061369715394739134090922937332590384720397133335969549256322620979036686633213903952966175107096769180017646161851573147596390153":10:"56125680981752282333498088313568935051383833838594899821664631784577337171193624243181360054669678410455329112434552942717084003541384594864129940145043086760031292483340068923506115878221189886491132772739661669044958531131327771":10:"56125680981752282334141896320372489490613963693556392520816017892111350604111697682705498319512049040516698827829292076808006940873974979584527073481012636016353913462376755556720019831187364993587901952757307830896531678727717924" + +Regression mbedtls_mpi_add_abs (add small to very large MPI with carry rollover) [#1] +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:16:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8":16:"08":16:"1000000000000000000000000000000" + +Regression mbedtls_mpi_add_abs (add small to very large MPI with carry rollover) [#2] +mbedtls_mpi_add_abs:16:"08":16:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8":16:"1000000000000000000000000000000" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi #1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:10:"12345678":10:"642531":10:"12988209" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi #2 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:10:"-12345678":10:"642531":10:"-11703147" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi #3 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:10:"12345678":10:"-642531":10:"11703147" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi #4 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:10:"-12345678":10:"-642531":10:"-12988209" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi: 0 (null) + 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:16:"":16:"":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi: 0 (null) + 1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:16:"":16:"01":16:"01" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi: 1 + 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:16:"01":16:"":16:"01" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi: 0 (null) + -1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:16:"":16:"-01":16:"-01" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi: -1 + 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:16:"-01":16:"":16:"-01" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi #1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:10:"203956878356401977405765866929034577280193993314348263094772646453283062722701277632936616063144088173312372882677123879538709400158306567338328279154499698366071906766440037074217117805690872792848149112022286332144876183376326512083574821647933992961249917319836219304274280243803104015000563790123":10:"531872289054204184185084734375133399408303613982130856645299464930952178606045848877129147820387996428175564228204785846141207532462936339834139412401975338705794646595487324365194792822189473092273993580587964571659678084484152603881094176995594813302284232006001752128168901293560051833646881436219":10:"735829167410606161590850601304167976688497607296479119740072111384235241328747126510065763883532084601487937110881909725679916932621242907172467691556475037071866553361927361439411910627880345885122142692610250903804554267860479115964668998643528806263534149325837971432443181537363155848647445226342" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi #2 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi:10:"643808006803554439230129854961492699151386107534013432918073439524138264842370630061369715394739134090922937332590384720397133335969549256322620979036686633213903952966175107096769180017646161851573147596390153":10:"56125680981752282333498088313568935051383833838594899821664631784577337171193624243181360054669678410455329112434552942717084003541384594864129940145043086760031292483340068923506115878221189886491132772739661669044958531131327771":10:"56125680981752282334141896320372489490613963693556392520816017892111350604111697682705498319512049040516698827829292076808006940873974979584527073481012636016353913462376755556720019831187364993587901952757307830896531678727717924" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi inplace #1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi_inplace:10:"12345678":10:"24691356" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi inplace #2 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi_inplace:10:"643808006803554439230129854961492699151386107534013432918073439524138264842370630061369715394739134090922937332590384720397133335969549256322620979036686633213903952966175107096769180017646161851573147596390153":10:"1287616013607108878460259709922985398302772215068026865836146879048276529684741260122739430789478268181845874665180769440794266671939098512645241958073373266427807905932350214193538360035292323703146295192780306" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi inplace #3 +mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi_inplace:16:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":16:"01fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_int #1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_int:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227012776329":9871232:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227022647561" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_int #2 +mbedtls_mpi_add_int:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227012776329":-9871232:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227002905097" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_int: 0 (null) + 0 +mbedtls_mpi_add_int:16:"":0:16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_add_int: 0 (null) + 1 +mbedtls_mpi_add_int:16:"":1:16:"1" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #1 (|B| > |A|) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"5":10:"7":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #2 (|B| > |A|) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"-5":10:"-7":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #3 (|B| > |A|) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"-5":10:"7":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #4 (|B| > |A|) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"5":10:"-7":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #1 (|B| >> |A| with more limbs) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"5":16:"123456789abcdef01":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #2 (|B| >> |A| with more limbs) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"-5":16:"-123456789abcdef01":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #3 (|B| >> |A| with more limbs) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"-5":16:"123456789abcdef01":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #4 (|B| >> |A| with more limbs) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"5":16:"-123456789abcdef01":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #1 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"7":10:"5":10:"2":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #2 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"-7":10:"-5":10:"2":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #3 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"-7":10:"5":10:"2":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #4 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:10:"7":10:"-5":10:"2":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs: 0 (null) - 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"":16:"":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs: 0 (null) - 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"":16:"00":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs: 0 (1 limb) - 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"00":16:"":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs: 0 (1 limb) - 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"00":16:"00":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs: 1 - 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"01":16:"":16:"01":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs: 0 (null) - 1 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"":16:"01":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #1 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"FFFFFFFFFF":16:"01":16:"FFFFFFFFFE":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #2 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"FFFFFFFFF0":16:"01":16:"FFFFFFFFEF":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #3 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"FF00000000":16:"0F00000000":16:"F000000000":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs #4 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs:16:"FF00000000":16:"0F00000001":16:"EFFFFFFFFF":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi #1 (Test with negative result) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:10:"5":10:"7":10:"-2" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi #2 (Test with negative inputs) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:10:"-5":10:"-7":10:"2" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi #3 (Test with negative base) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:10:"-5":10:"7":10:"-12" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi #4 (Test with negative subtraction) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:10:"5":10:"-7":10:"12" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi: 0 (null) - 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:16:"":16:"":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi: 0 (null) - 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:16:"":16:"00":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi: 0 (null) - 1 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:16:"":16:"1":16:"-1" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi: 0 (null) - -1 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:16:"":16:"-1":16:"1" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi: 0 (1 limb) - 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:16:"00":16:"":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi: 1 - 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:16:"1":16:"":16:"1" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi: -1 - 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:16:"-1":16:"":16:"-1" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi #1 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:10:"531872289054204184185084734375133399408303613982130856645299464930952178606045848877129147820387996428175564228204785846141207532462936339834139412401975338705794646595487324365194792822189473092273993580587964571659678084484152603881094176995594813302284232006001752128168901293560051833646881436219":10:"203956878356401977405765866929034577280193993314348263094772646453283062722701277632936616063144088173312372882677123879538709400158306567338328279154499698366071906766440037074217117805690872792848149112022286332144876183376326512083574821647933992961249917319836219304274280243803104015000563790123":10:"327915410697802206779318867446098822128109620667782593550526818477669115883344571244192531757243908254863191345527661966602498132304629772495811133247475640339722739829047287290977675016498600299425844468565678239514801901107826091797519355347660820341034314686165532823894621049756947818646317646096" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi #2 (Test for negative result) +mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi:10:"643808006803554439230129854961492699151386107534013432918073439524138264842370630061369715394739134090922937332590384720397133335969549256322620979036686633213903952966175107096769180017646161851573147596390153":10:"56125680981752282333498088313568935051383833838594899821664631784577337171193624243181360054669678410455329112434552942717084003541384594864129940145043086760031292483340068923506115878221189886491132772739661669044958531131327771":10:"-56125680981752282332854280306765380612153703983633407122513245677043323738275550803657221789827307780393959397039813808626161066208794210143732806809073537503708671504303382290292211925255014779394363592722015507193385383534937618" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_int #1 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_int:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227012776329":-9871232:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227022647561" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_int #2 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_int:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227012776329":9871232:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227002905097" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_int: 0 (null) - 0 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_int:16:"":0:16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_int: 0 (null) - 1 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_int:16:"":1:16:"-1" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_int: 0 (null) - -1 +mbedtls_mpi_sub_int:16:"":-1:16:"1" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_l #1 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_l:10:"64":1:10:"128" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_l #2 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_l:10:"658385546911733550164516088405238961461880256029834598831972039469421755117818013653494814438931957316403111689187691446941406788869098983929874080332195117465344344350008880118042764943201875870917468833709791733282363323948005998269792207":37:10:"90487820548639020691922304619723076305400961610119884872723190678642804168382367856686134531865643066983017249846286450251272364365605022750900439437595355052945035915579216557330505438734955340526145476988250171181404966718289259743378883640981192704" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_l: 0 (null) <<= 0 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_l:16:"":0:16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_l: 0 (null) <<= 1 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_l:16:"":1:16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_l: 0 (null) <<= 64 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_l:16:"":64:16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_r #1 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_r:10:"128":1:10:"64" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_r #2 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_r:10:"120815570979701484704906977000760567182871429114712069861589084706550626575967516787438008593490722779337547394120718248995900363209947025063336882559539208430319216688889117222633155838468458047056355241515415159736436403445579777425189969":45:10:"3433785053053426415343295076376096153094051405637175942660777670498379921354157795219578264137985649407981651226029903483433269093721578004287291678324982297860947730012217028349628999378309630601971640587504883789518896817457" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_r #4 [#1] +mbedtls_mpi_shift_r:16:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":63:16:"01" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_r #4 [#2] +mbedtls_mpi_shift_r:16:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":64:16:"00" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_r #6 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_r:16:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":65:16:"00" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_r #7 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_r:16:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":128:16:"00" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_r: 0 (null) >>= 0 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_r:16:"":0:16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_r: 0 (null) >>= 1 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_r:16:"":1:16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_shift_r: 0 (null) >>= 64 +mbedtls_mpi_shift_r:16:"":64:16:"0" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:10:"5":10:"7":10:"35" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:10:"-5":10:"7":10:"-35" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #3 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:10:"5":10:"-7":10:"-35" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #4 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:10:"-5":10:"-7":10:"35" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi: 0 (null) * 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"":16:"":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi: 0 (null) * 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"":16:"00":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi: 0 (null) * 1 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"":16:"01":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi: 0 (null) * -1 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"":16:"-01":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi: 0 (1 limb) * -1 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"00":16:"-01":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi: 0 (1 limb) * 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"00":16:"":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi: 1 * 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"01":16:"":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi: -1 * 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-01":16:"":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi: -1 * 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-01":16:"00":16:"0" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in B +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"000000000000000001b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in B, A < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"000000000000000001b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in B, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-000000000000000001b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in B, A < 0, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-000000000000000001b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in A +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"000000000000000002f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in A, A < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-000000000000000002f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in A, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"000000000000000002f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in A, A < 0, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-000000000000000002f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in A and B +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"000000000000000002f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"000000000000000001b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in A and B, A < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-000000000000000002f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"000000000000000001b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in A and B, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"000000000000000002f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-000000000000000001b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #1, leading 0 limb in A and B, A < 0, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-000000000000000002f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-000000000000000001b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb59" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in A +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf24510000000000000000":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb590000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in A, A < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf24510000000000000000":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb590000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in A, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf24510000000000000000":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb590000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in A, A < 0, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf24510000000000000000":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb590000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in B +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c890000000000000000":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb590000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in B, A < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c890000000000000000":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb590000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in B, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c890000000000000000":16:"-0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb590000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in B, A < 0, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c890000000000000000":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb590000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in A and B +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf24510000000000000000":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c890000000000000000":16:"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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in A and B, A < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf24510000000000000000":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c890000000000000000":16:"-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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in A and B, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf24510000000000000000":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c890000000000000000":16:"-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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #2, trailing 0 limb in A and B, A < 0, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf24510000000000000000":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c890000000000000000":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb5900000000000000000000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #3, trailing 0 limbs in A +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf245100000000000000000000000000000000":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #3, trailing 0 limbs in A, A < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf245100000000000000000000000000000000":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #3, trailing 0 limbs in A, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf245100000000000000000000000000000000":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"-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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #3, trailing 0 limbs in A, A < 0, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf245100000000000000000000000000000000":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c89":16:"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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #3, trailing 0 limbs in B +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c8900000000000000000000000000000000":16:"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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #3, trailing 0 limbs in B, A < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c8900000000000000000000000000000000":16:"-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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #3, trailing 0 limbs in B, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c8900000000000000000000000000000000":16:"-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" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi #3, trailing 0 limbs in B, A < 0, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi:16:"-02f77b94b179d4a51360f04fa56e2c0784ce3b8a742280b016904896a5605fbe9e0f0683f82c439d979ab14e11b34e05ae96232b18fb2e0d1319f4942732d7eadf92ae90cb8c68ec8ece154d334f553564b6f6db185b33b8d3635598c3d128acde8bbb7b13697e48d1a542e5f9168d2d83a8dd05ae1eaf2451":16:"-01b0b14c432710cde936e3fc100515e95dca61e10b8a68d9632bfa0546a9731a1ce6bebc6cb5fe6f5fd7e57b25f737f6a0ce5402e216b8b81c06f0c5ccce447d7f5631d14bff9dfa16f7cc72c56c84b636d00a5f35199d17ee9bf3f8746f44374ffd4ae22cf84089f04a9f7f356d6dc9f8cf8ef208a9b88c8900000000000000000000000000000000":16:"0503ae899d35ae5b7706b067aed7cb2952da37a5d4ad58f05f69abe14e8aaae88eab2baed858177cb4595c0edc92e5ac13c2bba2bfa23276dd023e9e52f547d4c9edb138d86aad329d7afb01e15eab7281e181cb249fc91bf09d621d86561301edda156f80e3bbff853a312852fe9e3d0541cb86801390aff1dc3c05bcb592c266f625b70e419b4c7e7e85399bb06c0e50b099b4292f9eaff4d869681faa1f745b5fcb3349ed93c572739a31dcf76b43370cf9f86cc54e982dfac9467bde915c697e60554e0d698be6bb2dd1f8bc64659f6baee7641b51f4b5ed7010c04600fcd382db84a93fe3d4d86e86a459c6cebb5900000000000000000000000000000000" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_int #1 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_int:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227012776329":9871232:10:"20133056642518226042310730101376278483547239130123806338055387803943342738063359782107667328":"==" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_int #2 (Unsigned, thus failure) +mbedtls_mpi_mul_int:10:"2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227012776329":-9871232:10:"-20133056642518226042310730101376278483547239130123806338055387803943342738063359782107667328":"!=" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_int #3 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_int:10:"-2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227012776329":9871232:10:"-20133056642518226042310730101376278483547239130123806338055387803943342738063359782107667328":"==" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_int #4 (Unsigned, thus failure) +mbedtls_mpi_mul_int:10:"-2039568783564019774057658669290345772801939933143482630947726464532830627227012776329":-9871232:10:"20133056642518226042310730101376278483547239130123806338055387803943342738063359782107667328":"!=" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_int: 0 (null) * 0 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_int:16:"":0:16:"":"==" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_int: 0 (null) * 1 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_int:16:"":1:16:"":"==" + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mul_int: 0 (null) * 0x1234 +mbedtls_mpi_mul_int:16:"":0x1234:16:"":"==" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi #1 +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:10:"1000":10:"13":10:"76":10:"12":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi #2 (Divide by zero (1 limb)) +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:10:"1000":10:"0":10:"1":10:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi #2 (Divide by zero (null)) +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:10:"1000":10:"":10:"1":10:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi #3 +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:10:"1000":10:"-13":10:"-76":10:"12":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi: 0 (null) / 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:16:"":16:"":16:"":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi: 0 (null) / 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:16:"":16:"0":16:"":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi: 0 (1 limb) / 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:16:"0":16:"":16:"":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi: 0 (1 limb) / 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:16:"0":16:"0":16:"":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi: 0 (null) / 1 +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:16:"":16:"1":16:"":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi: 0 (null) / -1 +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:16:"":16:"-1":16:"":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi #1 +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:10:"20133056642518226042310730101376278483547239130123806338055387803943342738063359782107667328":10:"34":10:"592148724779947824773845002981655249516095268533053127589864347174804198178334111238460803":10:"26":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi #2 +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:10:"476221599179424887669515829231223263939342135681791605842540429321038144633323941248706405375723482912535192363845116154236465184147599697841273424891410002781967962186252583311115708128167171262206919514587899883547279647025952837516324649656913580411611297312678955801899536937577476819667861053063432906071315727948826276092545739432005962781562403795455162483159362585281248265005441715080197800335757871588045959754547836825977169125866324128449699877076762316768127816074587766799018626179199776188490087103869164122906791440101822594139648973454716256383294690817576188762":10:"28911710017320205966167820725313234361535259163045867986277478145081076845846493521348693253530011243988160148063424837895971948244167867236923919506962312185829914482993478947657472351461336729641485069323635424692930278888923450060546465883490944265147851036817433970984747733020522259537":10:"16471581891701794764704009719057349996270239948993452268812975037240586099924712715366967486587417803753916334331355573776945238871512026832810626226164346328807407669366029926221415383560814338828449642265377822759768011406757061063524768140567867350208554439342320410551341675119078050953":10:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi #3 +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:10:"1000":10:"7":10:"142":10:"6":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi #4 +mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi:10:"777":10:"7":10:"111":10:"0":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_div_int #1 +mbedtls_mpi_div_int:10:"1000":13:10:"76":10:"12":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_div_int #2 (Divide by zero) +mbedtls_mpi_div_int:10:"1000":0:10:"1":10:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_div_int #3 +mbedtls_mpi_div_int:10:"1000":-13:10:"-76":10:"12":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int #1 +mbedtls_mpi_div_int:10:"20133056642518226042310730101376278483547239130123806338055387803943342738063359782107667328":34:10:"592148724779947824773845002981655249516095268533053127589864347174804198178334111238460803":10:"26":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int #2 +mbedtls_mpi_div_int:10:"20133056642518226042310730101376278483547239130123806338055387803943342738063359782107667328":-34:10:"-592148724779947824773845002981655249516095268533053127589864347174804198178334111238460803":10:"26":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int: 0 (null) / 0 +mbedtls_mpi_div_int:16:"":0:16:"":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int: 0 (1 limb) / 0 +mbedtls_mpi_div_int:16:"00":0:16:"":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int: 0 (null) / 1 +mbedtls_mpi_div_int:16:"":1:16:"":16:"":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi #1 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi:10:"1000":10:"13":10:"12":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi #2 (Divide by zero (null)) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi:10:"1000":10:"":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi #2 (Divide by zero (1 limb)) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi:10:"1000":10:"0":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi #3 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi:10:"-1000":10:"13":10:"1":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi #4 (Negative modulo) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi:10:"1000":10:"-13":10:"-1":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi #5 (Negative modulo) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi:10:"-1000":10:"-13":10:"-12":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi: 0 (null) % 1 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi:16:"":16:"1":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi: 0 (null) % -1 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi:16:"":16:"-1":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int #1 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:10:"1000":13:12:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int #2 (Divide by zero) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:10:"1000":0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int #3 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:10:"-1000":13:1:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int #4 (Negative modulo) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:10:"1000":-13:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int #5 (Negative modulo) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:10:"-1000":-13:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int #6 (By 1) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:10:"1000":1:0:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int #7 (By 2) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:10:"1001":2:1:0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int #8 (By 2) +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:10:"1000":2:0:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int: 0 (null) % 1 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:16:"":1:0:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int: 0 (null) % 2 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:16:"":2:0:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int: 0 (null) % -1 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:16:"":-1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int: 0 (null) % -2 +mbedtls_mpi_mod_int:16:"":-2:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #1 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"23":10:"13":10:"29":10:"24":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #2 (Even N) +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"23":10:"13":10:"30":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #2 (N = 0 (null)) +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"23":10:"13":10:"":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #3 (Negative N) +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"23":10:"13":10:"-29":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #4 (Negative base) +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"-23":10:"13":10:"29":10:"5":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #5 (Negative exponent) +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"23":10:"-13":10:"29":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #6 (Negative base + exponent) +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"-23":10:"-13":10:"29":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 0 (null) ^ 0 (null) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"":16:"":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 0 (null) ^ 0 (1 limb) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"":16:"00":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 0 (null) ^ 1 mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"":16:"01":16:"09":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 0 (null) ^ 2 mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"":16:"02":16:"09":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 0 (1 limb) ^ 0 (null) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"00":16:"":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 0 (1 limb) ^ 0 (1 limb) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"00":16:"00":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 0 (1 limb) ^ 1 mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"00":16:"01":16:"09":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 0 (1 limb) ^ 2 mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"00":16:"02":16:"09":16:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 1 ^ 0 (null) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"01":16:"":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 4 ^ 0 (null) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"04":16:"":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 10 ^ 0 (null) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"0a":16:"":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 1 ^ 0 (1 limb) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"01":16:"00":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 4 ^ 0 (1 limb) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"04":16:"00":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 10 ^ 0 (1 limb) mod 9 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"0a":16:"00":16:"09":16:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE exponent +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE + 1 exponent +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:10:10:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE modulus +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE + 1 modulus +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:10:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE exponent and modulus +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:"":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE + 1 exponent and modulus +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + 1:10:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod #1 +depends_on:MPI_MAX_BITS_LARGER_THAN_792 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847":10:"5781538327977828897150909166778407659250458379645823062042492461576758526757490910073628008613977550546382774775570888130029763571528699574717583228939535960234464230882573615930384979100379102915657483866755371559811718767760594919456971354184113721":10:"583137007797276923956891216216022144052044091311388601652961409557516421612874571554415606746479105795833145583959622117418531166391184939066520869800857530421873250114773204354963864729386957427276448683092491947566992077136553066273207777134303397724679138833126700957":10:"114597449276684355144920670007147953232659436380163461553186940113929777196018164149703566472936578890991049344459204199888254907113495794730452699842273939581048142004834330369483813876618772578869083248061616444392091693787039636316845512292127097865026290173004860736":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod (Negative base) [#1] +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:10:"-10000000000":10:"10000000000":10:"99999":10:"1":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod (Negative base) [#2] +depends_on:MPI_MAX_BITS_LARGER_THAN_792 +mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod:16:"-9f13012cd92aa72fb86ac8879d2fde4f7fd661aaae43a00971f081cc60ca277059d5c37e89652e2af2585d281d66ef6a9d38a117e9608e9e7574cd142dc55278838a2161dd56db9470d4c1da2d5df15a908ee2eb886aaa890f23be16de59386663a12f1afbb325431a3e835e3fd89b98b96a6f77382f458ef9a37e1f84a03045c8676ab55291a94c2228ea15448ee96b626b998":16:"40a54d1b9e86789f06d9607fb158672d64867665c73ee9abb545fc7a785634b354c7bae5b962ce8040cf45f2c1f3d3659b2ee5ede17534c8fc2ec85c815e8df1fe7048d12c90ee31b88a68a081f17f0d8ce5f4030521e9400083bcea73a429031d4ca7949c2000d597088e0c39a6014d8bf962b73bb2e8083bd0390a4e00b9b3":16:"eeaf0ab9adb38dd69c33f80afa8fc5e86072618775ff3c0b9ea2314c9c256576d674df7496ea81d3383b4813d692c6e0e0d5d8e250b98be48e495c1d6089dad15dc7d7b46154d6b6ce8ef4ad69b15d4982559b297bcf1885c529f566660e57ec68edbc3c05726cc02fd4cbf4976eaa9afd5138fe8376435b9fc61d2fc0eb06e3":16:"21acc7199e1b90f9b4844ffe12c19f00ec548c5d32b21c647d48b6015d8eb9ec9db05b4f3d44db4227a2b5659c1a7cceb9d5fa8fa60376047953ce7397d90aaeb7465e14e820734f84aa52ad0fc66701bcbb991d57715806a11531268e1e83dd48288c72b424a6287e9ce4e5cc4db0dd67614aecc23b0124a5776d36e5c89483":0 + +Base test GCD #1 +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"693":10:"609":10:"21" + +Base test GCD #2 +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"1764":10:"868":10:"28" + +Base test GCD #3 +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"768454923":10:"542167814":10:"1" + +Test GCD: 0 (null), 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"":16:"":16:"0" + +Test GCD: 0 (null), 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"":16:"00":16:"0" + +Test GCD: 0 (null), 3 +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"":16:"03":16:"3" + +Test GCD: 0 (null), 6 +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"":16:"06":16:"6" + +Test GCD: 0 (1 limb), 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"00":16:"":16:"0" + +Test GCD: 0 (1 limb), 3 +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"00":16:"03":16:"3" + +Test GCD: 0 (1 limb), 6 +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"00":16:"06":16:"6" + +Test GCD: 3, 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"03":16:"":16:"3" + +Test GCD: 3, 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"03":16:"00":16:"3" + +Test GCD: 6, 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"06":16:"":16:"6" + +Test GCD: 6, 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:16:"06":16:"00":16:"6" + +Test GCD: gcd=1, 0 < A < B +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847":10:"5781538327977828897150909166778407659250458379645823062042492461576758526757490910073628008613977550546382774775570888130029763571528699574717583228939535960234464230882573615930384979100379102915657483866755371559811718767760594919456971354184113721":10:"1" + +Test GCD: gcd=1, 0 < B < A +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"5781538327977828897150909166778407659250458379645823062042492461576758526757490910073628008613977550546382774775570888130029763571528699574717583228939535960234464230882573615930384979100379102915657483866755371559811718767760594919456971354184113721":10:"433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847":10:"1" + +Test GCD: gcd=1, A > 0, B < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847":10:"-5781538327977828897150909166778407659250458379645823062042492461576758526757490910073628008613977550546382774775570888130029763571528699574717583228939535960234464230882573615930384979100379102915657483866755371559811718767760594919456971354184113721":10:"1" + +Test GCD: gcd=1, A < 0 < B, |A| < |B| +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"-433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847":10:"5781538327977828897150909166778407659250458379645823062042492461576758526757490910073628008613977550546382774775570888130029763571528699574717583228939535960234464230882573615930384979100379102915657483866755371559811718767760594919456971354184113721":10:"1" + +Test GCD: gcd=1, B < A < 0 +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"-433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847":10:"-5781538327977828897150909166778407659250458379645823062042492461576758526757490910073628008613977550546382774775570888130029763571528699574717583228939535960234464230882573615930384979100379102915657483866755371559811718767760594919456971354184113721":10:"1" + +Test GCD: gcd=2, 0 < A < B +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"866038481820754956434747145919120219639297294032193121047538021762345738166676571147513149114791725930190032967735626087327963892955396933002903664815184654712662526249110275464787876484571564289857507839177265358101598397874265844290169694":10:"11563076655955657794301818333556815318500916759291646124084984923153517053514981820147256017227955101092765549551141776260059527143057399149435166457879071920468928461765147231860769958200758205831314967733510743119623437535521189838913942708368227442":10:"2" + +Test GCD: gcd=2, 0 < B < A +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"11563076655955657794301818333556815318500916759291646124084984923153517053514981820147256017227955101092765549551141776260059527143057399149435166457879071920468928461765147231860769958200758205831314967733510743119623437535521189838913942708368227442":10:"866038481820754956434747145919120219639297294032193121047538021762345738166676571147513149114791725930190032967735626087327963892955396933002903664815184654712662526249110275464787876484571564289857507839177265358101598397874265844290169694":10:"2" + +Test GCD: gcd=3, 0 < A < B +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"1299057722731132434652120718878680329458945941048289681571307032643518607250014856721269723672187588895285049451603439130991945839433095399504355497222776982068993789373665413197181814726857346434786261758765898037152397596811398766435254541":10:"17344614983933486691452727500335222977751375138937469186127477384730275580272472730220884025841932651639148324326712664390089290714586098724152749686818607880703392692647720847791154937301137308746972451600266114679435156303281784758370914062552341163":10:"3" + +Test GCD: gcd=3, 0 < B < A +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"17344614983933486691452727500335222977751375138937469186127477384730275580272472730220884025841932651639148324326712664390089290714586098724152749686818607880703392692647720847791154937301137308746972451600266114679435156303281784758370914062552341163":10:"1299057722731132434652120718878680329458945941048289681571307032643518607250014856721269723672187588895285049451603439130991945839433095399504355497222776982068993789373665413197181814726857346434786261758765898037152397596811398766435254541":10:"3" + +Test GCD: gcd=4, 0 < A < B +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"1732076963641509912869494291838240439278594588064386242095076043524691476333353142295026298229583451860380065935471252174655927785910793866005807329630369309425325052498220550929575752969143128579715015678354530716203196795748531688580339388":10:"23126153311911315588603636667113630637001833518583292248169969846307034107029963640294512034455910202185531099102283552520119054286114798298870332915758143840937856923530294463721539916401516411662629935467021486239246875071042379677827885416736454884":10:"4" + +Test GCD: gcd=4, 0 < B < A +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"23126153311911315588603636667113630637001833518583292248169969846307034107029963640294512034455910202185531099102283552520119054286114798298870332915758143840937856923530294463721539916401516411662629935467021486239246875071042379677827885416736454884":10:"1732076963641509912869494291838240439278594588064386242095076043524691476333353142295026298229583451860380065935471252174655927785910793866005807329630369309425325052498220550929575752969143128579715015678354530716203196795748531688580339388":10:"4" + +Test GCD: gcd=6, 0 < A < B +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"2598115445462264869304241437757360658917891882096579363142614065287037214500029713442539447344375177790570098903206878261983891678866190799008710994445553964137987578747330826394363629453714692869572523517531796074304795193622797532870509082":10:"34689229967866973382905455000670445955502750277874938372254954769460551160544945460441768051683865303278296648653425328780178581429172197448305499373637215761406785385295441695582309874602274617493944903200532229358870312606563569516741828125104682326":10:"6" + +Test GCD: gcd=6, 0 < B < A +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"34689229967866973382905455000670445955502750277874938372254954769460551160544945460441768051683865303278296648653425328780178581429172197448305499373637215761406785385295441695582309874602274617493944903200532229358870312606563569516741828125104682326":10:"2598115445462264869304241437757360658917891882096579363142614065287037214500029713442539447344375177790570098903206878261983891678866190799008710994445553964137987578747330826394363629453714692869572523517531796074304795193622797532870509082":10:"6" + +Test GCD: 0 < A = B +mbedtls_mpi_gcd:10:"433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847":10:"433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847":10:"433019240910377478217373572959560109819648647016096560523769010881172869083338285573756574557395862965095016483867813043663981946477698466501451832407592327356331263124555137732393938242285782144928753919588632679050799198937132922145084847" + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod #1 +mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod:10:"3":10:"11":10:"4":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod: mod 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod:10:"3":10:"":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod: mod 0 (1 limb) +mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod:10:"3":10:"0":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod: mod negative +mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod:10:"3":10:"-11":10:"4":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod: 2^-1 mod 4 +mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod:10:"2":10:"4":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Test mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod: mod 1 +mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod:10:"3":10:"1":10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod: 0 (null) ^-1 +mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod:16:"":16:"11":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Test mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod: 0 (1 limb) ^-1 +mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod:16:"00":16:"11":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Test mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod #1 +mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod:16:"aa4df5cb14b4c31237f98bd1faf527c283c2d0f3eec89718664ba33f9762907c":16:"fffbbd660b94412ae61ead9c2906a344116e316a256fd387874c6c675b1d587d":16:"8d6a5c1d7adeae3e94b9bcd2c47e0d46e778bc8804a2cc25c02d775dc3d05b0c":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"0":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"2":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"3":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"4":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"5":0 + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"27":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Base test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"47":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #1a +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"83726728883146151979668243326097049289208482987685965276439157162337476477581":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #1b +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"81248637410584921454869308488899267096530643632730258201256092582281263244641":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #2a +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"827131507221654563937832686696200995595835694437983658840870036586124168186967796809117749047430768825822857042432722828096779098498192459819306321073968735177531164565305635281198148032612029767584644305912099":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #2b +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"827131507221654563937832686696200995595835694437983658840870036586124168186967796809117749047430768825822857042432722828096779098498192459819306321073968735177531164565305635281198148032612029767584644305912001":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"2833419889721787128217599":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"195845982777569926302400511":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #5 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"4776913109852041418248056622882488319":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #5 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"768614336404564651":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"201487636602438195784363":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"845100400152152934331135470251":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"56713727820156410577229101238628035243":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"203956878356401977405765866929034577280193993314348263094772646453283062722701277632936616063144088173312372882677123879538709400158306567338328279154499698366071906766440037074217117805690872792848149112022286332144876183376326512083574821647933992961249917319836219304274280243803104015000563790123":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"531872289054204184185084734375133399408303613982130856645299464930952178606045848877129147820387996428175564228204785846141207532462936339834139412401975338705794646595487324365194792822189473092273993580587964571659678084484152603881094176995594813302284232006001752128168901293560051833646881436219":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"319705304701141539155720137200974664666792526059405792539680974929469783512821793995613718943171723765238853752439032835985158829038528214925658918372196742089464683960239919950882355844766055365179937610326127675178857306260955550407044463370239890187189750909036833976197804646589380690779463976173":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"200603822195324642393516294012917598972967449320074999667103434371470616000652036570009912021332527788252300901905236578801044680456930305350440933538867383130165841118050781326291059830545891570648243241795871":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"827131507221654563937832686696200995595835694437983658840870036586124168186967796809117749047430768825822857042432722828096779098498192459819306321073968735177531164565305635281198148032612029767584644305912099":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"964274047248418797145090983157197980855078966882276492572788532954904112655338439361306213898569516593744267391754033306465125919199692703323878557833023573312685002670662846477592597659826113460619815244721311":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"170141183460469231731687303715884105727":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #16 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"2147483647":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #17 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"961748941":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #18 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"179424691":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #19 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"32452867":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime #20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime:10:"49979687":0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_det (4 non-witnesses) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_det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est mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_det (39 non-witnesses) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_det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est mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime (Too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:2:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Test mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime (OK, minimum size) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:3:0:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime (corner case limb size -1 bits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:63:0:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime (corner case limb size) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:64:0:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime (corner case limb size +1 bits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:65:0:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime (Larger) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:128:0:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime (Safe) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:128:MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime (Safe with lower error rate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:128:MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH | MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime standard RSA #1 (lower error rate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:1024:MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR:0 + +Test mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime standard RSA #2 (lower error rate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime:1536:MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR:0 + +Test bit getting (Value bit 25) +mbedtls_mpi_get_bit:10:"49979687":25:1 + +Test bit getting (Larger but same limb) +mbedtls_mpi_get_bit:10:"49979687":26:0 + +Test bit getting (Larger and non-existing limb) +mbedtls_mpi_get_bit:10:"49979687":500:0 + +Test bit getting in 0 (null) +mbedtls_mpi_get_bit:10:"":500:0 + +Test bit getting (Value bit 24) +mbedtls_mpi_get_bit:10:"49979687":24:0 + +Test bit getting (Value bit 23) +mbedtls_mpi_get_bit:10:"49979687":23:1 + +Test bit set (Change existing value with a 1) +mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:10:"49979687":24:1:10:"66756903":0 + +Test bit set (Change existing value with a 0) +mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:10:"49979687":25:0:10:"16425255":0 + +Test bit set (Add above existing limbs with a 0) +mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:10:"49979687":80:0:10:"49979687":0 + +Test bit set (Add above existing limbs with a 1) +mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:10:"49979687":80:1:10:"1208925819614629224685863":0 + +Test bit set (Add to 0 (null) with a 0) +mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:16:"":65:0:16:"":0 + +Test bit set (Add to 0 (null) with a 1) +mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:16:"":65:1:16:"020000000000000000":0 + +Test bit set (Bit index larger than 31 with a 0) +mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:16:"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF":32:0:16:"FFFFFFFEFFFFFFFF":0 + +Test bit set (Bit index larger than 31 with a 1) +mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:16:"00":32:1:16:"0100000000":0 + +Test bit set (Invalid bit value) +mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:16:"00":5:2:16:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Fill random: 0 bytes +mpi_fill_random:0:0:0:0 + +Fill random: 1 byte, good +mpi_fill_random:1:1:0:0 + +Fill random: 2 bytes, good, no leading zero +mpi_fill_random:2:2:0:0 + +Fill random: 2 bytes, good, 1 leading zero +mpi_fill_random:2:256:0:0 + +Fill random: MAX_SIZE - 7, good +mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE - 7:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE - 7:0:0 + +Fill random: MAX_SIZE, good +mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:0:0 + +Fill random: 0 bytes, previously small >0 +mpi_fill_random:0:0:1:0 + +Fill random: 0 bytes, previously small <0 +mpi_fill_random:0:0:-1:0 + +Fill random: 0 bytes, previously large >0 +mpi_fill_random:0:0:65:0 + +Fill random: 0 bytes, previously large <0 +mpi_fill_random:0:0:-65:0 + +Fill random: 1 byte, previously small >0 +mpi_fill_random:1:1:1:0 + +Fill random: 1 byte, previously small <0 +mpi_fill_random:1:1:-1:0 + +Fill random: 1 byte, previously large >0 +mpi_fill_random:1:1:65:0 + +Fill random: 1 byte, previously large <0 +mpi_fill_random:1:1:-65:0 + +Fill random: 9 bytes, previously small >0 +mpi_fill_random:1:1:1:0 + +Fill random: 9 bytes, previously small <0 +mpi_fill_random:1:1:-1:0 + +Fill random: 1 byte, RNG failure +mpi_fill_random:1:0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 2 bytes, RNG failure after 1 byte +mpi_fill_random:2:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 4 bytes, RNG failure after 3 bytes +mpi_fill_random:4:3:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 8 bytes, RNG failure after 7 bytes +mpi_fill_random:8:7:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 16 bytes, RNG failure after 1 bytes +mpi_fill_random:16:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 16 bytes, RNG failure after 8 bytes +mpi_fill_random:16:8:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: 16 bytes, RNG failure after 15 bytes +mpi_fill_random:16:15:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +Fill random: MAX_SIZE bytes, RNG failure after MAX_SIZE-1 bytes +mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE-1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + +MPI random in range: 1..2 +mpi_random_many:1:"02":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..3 +mpi_random_many:1:"03":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..4 +mpi_random_many:1:"04":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..5 +mpi_random_many:1:"05":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..6 +mpi_random_many:1:"06":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..7 +mpi_random_many:1:"07":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..8 +mpi_random_many:1:"08":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..9 +mpi_random_many:1:"09":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..10 +mpi_random_many:1:"0a":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..11 +mpi_random_many:1:"0b":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..12 +mpi_random_many:1:"0c":1000 + +MPI random in range: 1..255 +mpi_random_many:1:"ff":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..256 +mpi_random_many:1:"0100":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..257 +mpi_random_many:1:"0101":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..272 +mpi_random_many:1:"0110":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^64-1 +mpi_random_many:1:"ffffffffffffffff":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^64 +mpi_random_many:1:"010000000000000000":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^64+1 +mpi_random_many:1:"010000000000000001":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^64+2^63 +mpi_random_many:1:"018000000000000000":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^65-1 +mpi_random_many:1:"01ffffffffffffffff":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^65 +mpi_random_many:1:"020000000000000000":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^65+1 +mpi_random_many:1:"020000000000000001":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^65+2^64 +mpi_random_many:1:"030000000000000000":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^66+2^65 +mpi_random_many:1:"060000000000000000":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^71-1 +mpi_random_many:1:"7fffffffffffffffff":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^71 +mpi_random_many:1:"800000000000000000":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^71+1 +mpi_random_many:1:"800000000000000001":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^71+2^70 +mpi_random_many:1:"c00000000000000000":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^72-1 +mpi_random_many:1:"ffffffffffffffffff":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^72 +mpi_random_many:1:"01000000000000000000":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^72+1 +mpi_random_many:1:"01000000000000000001":100 + +MPI random in range: 1..2^72+2^71 +mpi_random_many:1:"01800000000000000000":100 + +MPI random in range: 0..1 +mpi_random_many:0:"04":10000 + +MPI random in range: 0..4 +mpi_random_many:0:"04":10000 + +MPI random in range: 2..4 +mpi_random_many:2:"04":10000 + +MPI random in range: 3..4 +mpi_random_many:3:"04":10000 + +MPI random in range: smaller result +mpi_random_sizes:1:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaabbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb":1:0 + +MPI random in range: same size result (32-bit limbs) +mpi_random_sizes:1:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":2:0 + +MPI random in range: same size result (64-bit limbs) +mpi_random_sizes:1:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":1:0 + +MPI random in range: larger result +mpi_random_sizes:1:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":3:0 + +## The "0 limb in upper bound" tests rely on the fact that +## mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() bases the size of the MPI on the size of +## the input, without first checking for leading zeros. If this was +## not the case, the tests would still pass, but would not exercise +## the advertised behavior. +MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #0 +mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:0 + +MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #1 +mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":1:0 + +MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #2 +mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":2:0 + +MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #3 +mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":3:0 + +MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #4 +mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":4:0 + +MPI random in range: previously small >0 +mpi_random_sizes:1:"1234567890":4:1 + +MPI random in range: previously small <0 +mpi_random_sizes:1:"1234567890":4:-1 + +MPI random in range: previously large >0 +mpi_random_sizes:1:"1234":4:65 + +MPI random in range: previously large <0 +mpi_random_sizes:1:"1234":4:-65 + +MPI random bad arguments: min < 0 +mpi_random_fail:-1:"04":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +MPI random bad arguments: min = N = 0 +mpi_random_fail:0:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +MPI random bad arguments: min = N = 1 +mpi_random_fail:1:"01":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +MPI random bad arguments: min > N = 0 +mpi_random_fail:1:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +MPI random bad arguments: min > N = 1 +mpi_random_fail:2:"01":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +MPI random bad arguments: min > N = 1, 0 limb in upper bound +mpi_random_fail:2:"000000000000000001":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +MPI Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +mpi_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..360916a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function @@ -0,0 +1,1644 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +#if MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS > 792 +#define MPI_MAX_BITS_LARGER_THAN_792 +#endif + +/* Check the validity of the sign bit in an MPI object. Reject representations + * that are not supported by the rest of the library and indicate a bug when + * constructing the value. */ +static int sign_is_valid( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + if( X->s != 1 && X->s != -1 ) + return( 0 ); // invalid sign bit, e.g. 0 + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) == 0 && X->s != 1 ) + return( 0 ); // negative zero + return( 1 ); +} + +typedef struct mbedtls_test_mpi_random +{ + data_t *data; + size_t pos; + size_t chunk_len; +} mbedtls_test_mpi_random; + +/* + * This function is called by the Miller-Rabin primality test each time it + * chooses a random witness. The witnesses (or non-witnesses as provided by the + * test) are stored in the data member of the state structure. Each number is in + * the format that mbedtls_mpi_read_string understands and is chunk_len long. + */ +int mbedtls_test_mpi_miller_rabin_determinizer( void* state, + unsigned char* buf, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_test_mpi_random *random = (mbedtls_test_mpi_random*) state; + + if( random == NULL || random->data->x == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( random->pos + random->chunk_len > random->data->len + || random->chunk_len > len ) + { + return( -1 ); + } + + memset( buf, 0, len ); + + /* The witness is written to the end of the buffer, since the buffer is + * used as big endian, unsigned binary data in mbedtls_mpi_read_binary. + * Writing the witness to the start of the buffer would result in the + * buffer being 'witness 000...000', which would be treated as + * witness * 2^n for some n. */ + memcpy( buf + len - random->chunk_len, &random->data->x[random->pos], + random->chunk_len ); + + random->pos += random->chunk_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Random generator that is told how many bytes to return. */ +static int f_rng_bytes_left( void *state, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + size_t *bytes_left = state; + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + if( *bytes_left == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + buf[i] = *bytes_left & 0xff; + --( *bytes_left ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Test whether bytes represents (in big-endian base 256) a number b that + * is significantly above a power of 2. That is, b must not have a long run + * of unset bits after the most significant bit. + * + * Let n be the bit-size of b, i.e. the integer such that 2^n <= b < 2^{n+1}. + * This function returns 1 if, when drawing a number between 0 and b, + * the probability that this number is at least 2^n is not negligible. + * This probability is (b - 2^n) / b and this function checks that this + * number is above some threshold A. The threshold value is heuristic and + * based on the needs of mpi_random_many(). + */ +static int is_significantly_above_a_power_of_2( data_t *bytes ) +{ + const uint8_t *p = bytes->x; + size_t len = bytes->len; + unsigned x; + + /* Skip leading null bytes */ + while( len > 0 && p[0] == 0 ) + { + ++p; + --len; + } + /* 0 is not significantly above a power of 2 */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + /* Extract the (up to) 2 most significant bytes */ + if( len == 1 ) + x = p[0]; + else + x = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + + /* Shift the most significant bit of x to position 8 and mask it out */ + while( ( x & 0xfe00 ) != 0 ) + x >>= 1; + x &= 0x00ff; + + /* At this point, x = floor((b - 2^n) / 2^(n-8)). b is significantly above + * a power of 2 iff x is significantly above 0 compared to 2^8. + * Testing x >= 2^4 amounts to picking A = 1/16 in the function + * description above. */ + return( x >= 0x10 ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_mpi_free( NULL ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void mpi_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + const char *s_in = "00101000101010"; + char s_out[16] = { 0 }; + unsigned char u_out[16] = { 0 }; + unsigned char u_in[16] = { 0 }; + size_t olen; + mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_mpi_init( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_grow( NULL, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_copy( NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_copy( &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_mpi_swap( NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_mpi_swap( &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( NULL, &X, 0 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &X, NULL, 0 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( NULL, &X, 0 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &X, NULL, 0 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_lset( NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( NULL, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( NULL, 42, 0 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_read_string( NULL, 2, s_in ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &X, 2, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_write_string( NULL, 2, + s_out, sizeof( s_out ), + &olen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_write_string( &X, 2, + NULL, sizeof( s_out ), + &olen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_write_string( &X, 2, + s_out, sizeof( s_out ), + NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_read_file( NULL, 2, stdin ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &X, 2, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_write_file( "", NULL, 2, NULL ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( NULL, u_in, + sizeof( u_in ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &X, NULL, + sizeof( u_in ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( NULL, u_out, + sizeof( u_out ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &X, NULL, + sizeof( u_out ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( NULL, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( NULL, &X, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( &X, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( &X, &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( NULL, &X, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &X, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &X, &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( NULL, &X, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &X, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &X, &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( NULL, &X, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_add_int( NULL, &X, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &X, NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( NULL, &X, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &X, NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( NULL, &X, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &X, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &X, &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( NULL, &X, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &X, NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &X, &X, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &X, &X, &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &X, &X, NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( 0, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( NULL, &X, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &X, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &X, &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( NULL, &X, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &mpi_uint, NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( NULL, &X, &X, &X, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &X, NULL, &X, &X, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &X, &X, NULL, &X, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &X, &X, &X, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( NULL, 42, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &X, 42, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_gcd( NULL, &X, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &X, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &X, &X, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( NULL, &X, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &X, NULL, &X ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &X, &X, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_null( ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &X, 42 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_size( &X ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_read_write_string( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_A, + char * input_A, int output_size, int result_read, + int result_write ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + char str[1000]; + size_t len; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + memset( str, '!', sizeof( str ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == result_read ); + if( result_read == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_write_string( &X, radix_A, str, output_size, &len ) == result_write ); + if( result_write == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( str, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( str[len] == '!' ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( data_t * buf, int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + char str[1000]; + size_t len; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &X, buf->x, buf->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_write_string( &X, radix_A, str, sizeof( str ), &len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) str, input_A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( data_t * buf, int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + char str[1000]; + size_t len; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &X, buf->x, buf->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_write_string( &X, radix_A, str, sizeof( str ), &len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) str, input_A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( int radix_X, char * input_X, + data_t * input_A, int output_size, + int result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + unsigned char buf[1000]; + size_t buflen; + + memset( buf, 0x00, 1000 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + + buflen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &X ); + if( buflen > (size_t) output_size ) + buflen = (size_t) output_size; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &X, buf, buflen ) == result ); + if( result == 0) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( buf, input_A->x, + buflen, input_A->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( int radix_X, char * input_X, + data_t * input_A, int output_size, + int result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + unsigned char buf[1000]; + size_t buflen; + + memset( buf, 0x00, 1000 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + + buflen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &X ); + if( buflen > (size_t) output_size ) + buflen = (size_t) output_size; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &X, buf, buflen ) == result ); + if( result == 0) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( buf, input_A->x, + buflen, input_A->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void mbedtls_mpi_read_file( int radix_X, char * input_file, + data_t * input_A, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + unsigned char buf[1000]; + size_t buflen; + FILE *file; + int ret; + + memset( buf, 0x00, 1000 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + file = fopen( input_file, "r" ); + TEST_ASSERT( file != NULL ); + ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &X, radix_X, file ); + fclose(file); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result ); + + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + buflen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &X ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &X, buf, buflen ) == 0 ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( buf, input_A->x, + buflen, input_A->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void mbedtls_mpi_write_file( int radix_X, char * input_X, int output_radix, + char * output_file ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y; + FILE *file_out, *file_in; + int ret; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + + file_out = fopen( output_file, "w" ); + TEST_ASSERT( file_out != NULL ); + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_file( NULL, &X, output_radix, file_out ); + fclose(file_out); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + file_in = fopen( output_file, "r" ); + TEST_ASSERT( file_in != NULL ); + ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file( &Y, output_radix, file_in ); + fclose(file_in); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( int radix_X, char * input_X, int pos, int val ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &X, pos ) == val ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( int radix_X, char * input_X, int pos, int val, + int radix_Y, char * output_Y, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, output_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &X, pos, val ) == result ); + + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_lsb( int radix_X, char * input_X, int nr_bits ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &X ) == (size_t) nr_bits ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( int radix_X, char * input_X, int nr_bits ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &X ) == (size_t) nr_bits ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_gcd( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi A, X, Y, Z; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &Z, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( int input_X, int input_A, int result_CMP ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &X, input_X ) == 0); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, input_A ) == result_CMP); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &Y ) == input_A ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( int size_X, char * input_X, + int size_Y, char * input_Y, + int input_ret, int input_err ) +{ + unsigned ret = -1; + unsigned input_uret = input_ret; + mbedtls_mpi X, Y; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, 16, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, 16, input_Y ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &X, size_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &Y, size_Y ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( &X, &Y, &ret ) == input_err ); + if( input_err == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( ret == input_uret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( &X, &Y ) == input_A ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_copy( char *src_hex, char *dst_hex ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi src, dst, ref; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &src ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &dst ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ref ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &src, 16, src_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ref, 16, dst_hex ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_mpi_copy() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &dst, 16, dst_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst, &src ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &dst ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &dst, &src ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(), assignment done */ + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dst ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &dst, 16, dst_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &dst, &src, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &dst ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &dst, &src ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(), assignment not done */ + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dst ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &dst, 16, dst_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &dst, &src, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &dst ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &dst, &ref ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &src ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &dst ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ref ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_copy_self( char *input_X ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, 16, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &X, &X ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, 16, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_swap( char *X_hex, char *Y_hex ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, X0, Y0; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X0 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X0, 16, X_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y0, 16, Y_hex ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_mpi_swap() */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, 16, X_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, 16, Y_hex ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_mpi_swap( &X, &Y ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Y ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &Y0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &X0 ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(), swap done */ + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, 16, X_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, 16, Y_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &X, &Y, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Y ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &Y0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &X0 ) == 0 ); + + /* mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(), swap not done */ + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, 16, X_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, 16, Y_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &X, &Y, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Y ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &X0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &Y0 ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X0 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_swap_self( char *X_hex ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, X0; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, 16, X_hex ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X0, 16, X_hex ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_swap( &X, &X ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &X0 ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_shrink( int before, int used, int min, int after ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &X, before ) == 0 ); + if( used > 0 ) + { + size_t used_bit_count = used * 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &X, used_bit_count - 1, 1 ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_EQUAL( X.n, (size_t) before ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shrink( &X, min ) == 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( X.n, (size_t) after ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &Z, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + + /* result == first operand */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &X, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + + /* result == second operand */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &Y, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Y ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi_inplace( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_A, + char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &X, &X, &X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( &X, &X, &X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &X, &X, &X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( &Z, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + + /* result == first operand */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( &X, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + + /* result == second operand */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( &Y, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Y ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_add_int( int radix_X, char * input_X, int input_Y, + int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Z, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &Z, &X, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &Z, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + + /* result == first operand */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + + /* result == second operand */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &Y, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Y ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A, + int sub_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, A; + int res; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + + res = mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &Z, &X, &Y ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == sub_result ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + if( res == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + + /* result == first operand */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &X, &X, &Y ) == sub_result ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + if( sub_result == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + + /* result == second operand */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &Y, &X, &Y ) == sub_result ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Y ) ); + if( sub_result == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( int radix_X, char * input_X, int input_Y, + int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Z, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Z, &X, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &Z, &X, &Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( int radix_X, char * input_X, int input_Y, + int radix_A, char * input_A, + char * result_comparison ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Z, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &Z, &X, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + if( strcmp( result_comparison, "==" ) == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + else if( strcmp( result_comparison, "!=" ) == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) != 0 ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( "unknown operator" == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A, + int radix_B, char * input_B, int div_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Q, R, A, B; + int res; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &B ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &B, radix_B, input_B ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &Q, &R, &X, &Y ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == div_result ); + if( res == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Q ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &R ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q, &A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R, &B ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &B ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_div_int( int radix_X, char * input_X, int input_Y, + int radix_A, char * input_A, int radix_B, + char * input_B, int div_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Q, R, A, B; + int res; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &B ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &B, radix_B, input_B ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &Q, &R, &X, input_Y ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == div_result ); + if( res == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Q ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &R ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q, &A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R, &B ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &B ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A, + int div_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, A; + int res; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &X, &X, &Y ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == div_result ); + if( res == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( int radix_X, char * input_X, int input_Y, + int input_A, int div_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + int res; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, &X, input_Y ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == div_result ); + if( res == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( r == (mbedtls_mpi_uint) input_A ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( int radix_A, char * input_A, int radix_E, + char * input_E, int radix_N, char * input_N, + int radix_X, char * input_X, int exp_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, RR, Z, X; + int res; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + + res = mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &Z, &A, &E, &N, NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == exp_result ); + if( res == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &X ) == 0 ); + } + + /* Now test again with the speed-up parameter supplied as an output. */ + res = mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == exp_result ); + if( res == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &X ) == 0 ); + } + + /* Now test again with the speed-up parameter supplied in calculated form. */ + res = mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == exp_result ); + if( res == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &X ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_size( int A_bytes, int E_bytes, int N_bytes, + int radix_RR, char * input_RR, int exp_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, RR, Z; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + /* Set A to 2^(A_bytes - 1) + 1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &A, ( A_bytes * 8 ) - 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &A, 0, 1 ) == 0 ); + + /* Set E to 2^(E_bytes - 1) + 1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &E, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &E, ( E_bytes * 8 ) - 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &E, 0, 1 ) == 0 ); + + /* Set N to 2^(N_bytes - 1) + 1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &N, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &N, ( N_bytes * 8 ) - 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &N, 0, 1 ) == 0 ); + + if( strlen( input_RR ) ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &RR, radix_RR, input_RR ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR ) == exp_result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( int radix_X, char * input_X, int radix_Y, + char * input_Y, int radix_A, char * input_A, + int div_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, A; + int res; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Y, radix_Y, input_Y ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &Z, &X, &Y ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == div_result ); + if( res == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &Z ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Z, &A ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ +void mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( int radix_X, char * input_X, int div_result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + int res; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( &X, 40, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == div_result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ +void mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_det( data_t * input_X, data_t * witnesses, + int chunk_len, int rounds ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + int res; + mbedtls_test_mpi_random rand; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + rand.data = witnesses; + rand.pos = 0; + rand.chunk_len = chunk_len; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &X, input_X->x, input_X->len ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( &X, rounds - 1, + mbedtls_test_mpi_miller_rabin_determinizer, + &rand ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == 0 ); + + rand.data = witnesses; + rand.pos = 0; + rand.chunk_len = chunk_len; + + res = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( &X, rounds, + mbedtls_test_mpi_miller_rabin_determinizer, + &rand ); + TEST_ASSERT( res == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ +void mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( int bits, int flags, int ref_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + int my_ret; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + my_ret = mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &X, bits, flags, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( my_ret == ref_ret ); + + if( ref_ret == 0 ) + { + size_t actual_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &X ); + + TEST_ASSERT( actual_bits >= (size_t) bits ); + TEST_ASSERT( actual_bits <= (size_t) bits + 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( &X, 40, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) == 0 ); + if( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH ) + { + /* X = ( X - 1 ) / 2 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &X, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( &X, 40, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) == 0 ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( int radix_X, char * input_X, int shift_X, + int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &X, shift_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( int radix_X, char * input_X, int shift_X, + int radix_A, char * input_A ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, A; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &X, radix_X, input_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &A, radix_A, input_A ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &X, shift_X ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &A ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_fill_random( int wanted_bytes, int rng_bytes, + int before, int expected_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + int ret; + size_t bytes_left = rng_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + + if( before != 0 ) + { + /* Set X to sign(before) * 2^(|before|-1) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &X, before > 0 ? 1 : -1 ) == 0 ); + if( before < 0 ) + before = - before; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &X, before - 1 ) == 0 ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &X, wanted_bytes, + f_rng_bytes_left, &bytes_left ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == expected_ret ); + + if( expected_ret == 0 ) + { + /* mbedtls_mpi_fill_random is documented to use bytes from the RNG + * as a big-endian representation of the number. We know when + * our RNG function returns null bytes, so we know how many + * leading zero bytes the number has. */ + size_t leading_zeros = 0; + if( wanted_bytes > 0 && rng_bytes % 256 == 0 ) + leading_zeros = 1; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_size( &X ) + leading_zeros == + (size_t) wanted_bytes ); + TEST_ASSERT( (int) bytes_left == rng_bytes - wanted_bytes ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &X ) ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_random_many( int min, data_t *bound_bytes, int iterations ) +{ + /* Generate numbers in the range 1..bound-1. Do it iterations times. + * This function assumes that the value of bound is at least 2 and + * that iterations is large enough that a one-in-2^iterations chance + * effectively never occurs. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi upper_bound; + size_t n_bits; + mbedtls_mpi result; + size_t b; + /* If upper_bound is small, stats[b] is the number of times the value b + * has been generated. Otherwise stats[b] is the number of times a + * value with bit b set has been generated. */ + size_t *stats = NULL; + size_t stats_len; + int full_stats; + size_t i; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &upper_bound ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &result ); + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &upper_bound, + bound_bytes->x, bound_bytes->len ) ); + n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &upper_bound ); + /* Consider a bound "small" if it's less than 2^5. This value is chosen + * to be small enough that the probability of missing one value is + * negligible given the number of iterations. It must be less than + * 256 because some of the code below assumes that "small" values + * fit in a byte. */ + if( n_bits <= 5 ) + { + full_stats = 1; + stats_len = bound_bytes->x[bound_bytes->len - 1]; + } + else + { + full_stats = 0; + stats_len = n_bits; + } + ASSERT_ALLOC( stats, stats_len ); + + for( i = 0; i < (size_t) iterations; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( i ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_random( &result, min, &upper_bound, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &result ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &result, &upper_bound ) < 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &result, min ) >= 0 ); + if( full_stats ) + { + uint8_t value; + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &result, &value, 1 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( value < stats_len ); + ++stats[value]; + } + else + { + for( b = 0; b < n_bits; b++ ) + stats[b] += mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &result, b ); + } + } + + if( full_stats ) + { + for( b = min; b < stats_len; b++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( 1000000 + b ); + /* Assert that each value has been reached at least once. + * This is almost guaranteed if the iteration count is large + * enough. This is a very crude way of checking the distribution. + */ + TEST_ASSERT( stats[b] > 0 ); + } + } + else + { + int statistically_safe_all_the_way = + is_significantly_above_a_power_of_2( bound_bytes ); + for( b = 0; b < n_bits; b++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( 1000000 + b ); + /* Assert that each bit has been set in at least one result and + * clear in at least one result. Provided that iterations is not + * too small, it would be extremely unlikely for this not to be + * the case if the results are uniformly distributed. + * + * As an exception, the top bit may legitimately never be set + * if bound is a power of 2 or only slightly above. + */ + if( statistically_safe_all_the_way || b != n_bits - 1 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( stats[b] > 0 ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( stats[b] < (size_t) iterations ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &upper_bound ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &result ); + mbedtls_free( stats ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_random_sizes( int min, data_t *bound_bytes, int nlimbs, int before ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi upper_bound; + mbedtls_mpi result; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &upper_bound ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &result ); + + if( before != 0 ) + { + /* Set result to sign(before) * 2^(|before|-1) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &result, before > 0 ? 1 : -1 ) == 0 ); + if( before < 0 ) + before = - before; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &result, before - 1 ) == 0 ); + } + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_grow( &result, nlimbs ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &upper_bound, + bound_bytes->x, bound_bytes->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_random( &result, min, &upper_bound, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( sign_is_valid( &result ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &result, &upper_bound ) < 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &result, min ) >= 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &upper_bound ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &result ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_random_fail( int min, data_t *bound_bytes, int expected_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi upper_bound; + mbedtls_mpi result; + int actual_ret; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &upper_bound ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &result ); + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &upper_bound, + bound_bytes->x, bound_bytes->len ) ); + actual_ret = mbedtls_mpi_random( &result, min, &upper_bound, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_ret, actual_ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &upper_bound ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &result ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void mpi_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..442f3218 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.data @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +MPS Reader: Single step, single round, pausing disabled +mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_single_step_single_round:0 + +MPS Reader: Single step, single round, pausing enabled but unused +mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_single_step_single_round:1 + +MPS Reader: Single step, multiple rounds, pausing disabled +mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_single_step_multiple_rounds:0 + +MPS Reader: Single step, multiple rounds, pausing enabled but unused +mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_single_step_multiple_rounds:1 + +MPS Reader: Multiple steps, single round, pausing disabled +mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_multiple_steps_single_round:0 + +MPS Reader: Multiple steps, single round, pausing enabled but unused +mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_multiple_steps_single_round:1 + +MPS Reader: Multiple steps, multiple rounds, pausing disabled +mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_multiple_steps_multiple_rounds:0 + +MPS Reader: Multiple steps, multiple rounds, pausing enabled but unused +mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_multiple_steps_multiple_rounds:1 + +MPS Reader: Pausing needed but disabled +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing_needed_disabled: + +MPS Reader: Pausing needed + enabled, but buffer too small +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing_needed_buffer_too_small: + +MPS Reader: Pausing, repeat single call without commit +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing:0 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, repeat single call with commit +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing:1 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, repeat multiple calls without commit +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing:2 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, repeat multiple calls with commit #0 +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing:3 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, repeat multiple calls with commit #1 +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing:4 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, repeat multiple calls with commit #2 +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing:5 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, feed 50 bytes in 10b + 10b + 80b +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing_multiple_feeds:0 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, feed 50 bytes in 50x1b +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing_multiple_feeds:1 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, feed 50 bytes in 49x1b + 51b +mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing_multiple_feeds:2 + +MPS Reader: Reclaim with data remaining #0 +mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim_data_left:0 + +MPS Reader: Reclaim with data remaining #1 +mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim_data_left:1 + +MPS Reader: Reclaim with data remaining #2 +mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim_data_left:2 + +MPS Reader: Reclaim with data remaining, continue fetching +mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim_data_left_retry: + +MPS Reader: Pausing several times, #0 +mbedtls_mps_reader_multiple_pausing:0 + +MPS Reader: Pausing several times, #1 +mbedtls_mps_reader_multiple_pausing:1 + +MPS Reader: Pausing several times, #2 +mbedtls_mps_reader_multiple_pausing:2 + +MPS Reader: Pausing several times, #3 +mbedtls_mps_reader_multiple_pausing:3 + +MPS Reader: Random usage, 20 rds, feed 100, get 200, acc 50 +mbedtls_mps_reader_random_usage:20:100:200:50 + +MPS Reader: Random usage, 1000 rds, feed 10, get 100, acc 80 +mbedtls_mps_reader_random_usage:1000:10:100:80 + +MPS Reader: Random usage, 10000 rds, feed 1, get 100, acc 80 +mbedtls_mps_reader_random_usage:10000:1:100:80 + +MPS Reader: Random usage, 100 rds, feed 100, get 1000, acc 500 +mbedtls_mps_reader_random_usage:100:100:1000:500 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, inconsistent continuation, #0 +mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage:0 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, inconsistent continuation, #1 +mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage:1 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, inconsistent continuation, #2 +mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage:2 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, inconsistent continuation, #3 +mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage:3 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, inconsistent continuation, #4 +mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage:4 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, inconsistent continuation, #5 +mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage:5 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, inconsistent continuation, #6 +mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage:6 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, inconsistent continuation, #7 +mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage:7 + +MPS Reader: Pausing, inconsistent continuation, #8 +mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage:8 + +MPS Reader: Feed with invalid buffer (NULL) +mbedtls_mps_reader_feed_empty: + +MPS Reader: Excess request leading to integer overflow +mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim_overflow: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9df8a3c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.function @@ -0,0 +1,1148 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +#include + +#include "mps_reader.h" + +/* + * Compile-time configuration for test suite. + */ + +/* Comment/Uncomment this to disable/enable the + * testing of the various MPS layers. + * This can be useful for time-consuming instrumentation + * tasks such as the conversion of E-ACSL annotations + * into runtime assertions. */ +#define TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER + +/* End of compile-time configuration. */ + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_single_step_single_round( int with_acc ) +{ + /* This test exercises the most basic use of the MPS reader: + * - The 'producing' layer provides a buffer + * - The 'consuming' layer fetches it in a single go. + * - After processing, the consuming layer commits the data + * and the reader is moved back to producing mode. + * + * Parameters: + * - with_acc: 0 if the reader should be initialized without accumulator. + * 1 if the reader should be initialized with accumulator. + * + * Whether the accumulator is present or not should not matter, + * since the consumer's request can be fulfilled from the data + * that the producer has provided. + */ + unsigned char bufA[100]; + unsigned char acc[10]; + unsigned char *tmp; + int paused; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufA ); i++ ) + bufA[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + if( with_acc == 0 ) + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, NULL, 0 ); + else + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufA, sizeof( bufA ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + /* Consume exactly what's available */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 100, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 100, bufA, 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + /* Wrapup (lower layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, &paused ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( paused == 0 ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_single_step_multiple_rounds( int with_acc ) +{ + /* This test exercises multiple rounds of the basic use of the MPS reader: + * - The 'producing' layer provides a buffer + * - The 'consuming' layer fetches it in a single go. + * - After processing, the consuming layer commits the data + * and the reader is moved back to producing mode. + * + * Parameters: + * - with_acc: 0 if the reader should be initialized without accumulator. + * 1 if the reader should be initialized with accumulator. + * + * Whether the accumulator is present or not should not matter, + * since the consumer's request can be fulfilled from the data + * that the producer has provided. + */ + + unsigned char bufA[100], bufB[100]; + unsigned char acc[10]; + unsigned char *tmp; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufA ); i++ ) + bufA[i] = (unsigned char) i; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufB ); i++ ) + bufB[i] = ~ ((unsigned char) i); + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + if( with_acc == 0 ) + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, NULL, 0 ); + else + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufA, sizeof( bufA ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + /* Consume exactly what's available */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 100, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 100, bufA, 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + /* Preparation */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB, sizeof( bufB ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 100, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 100, bufB, 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + /* Wrapup (lower layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_multiple_steps_single_round( int with_acc ) +{ + /* This test exercises one round of the following: + * - The 'producing' layer provides a buffer + * - The 'consuming' layer fetches it in multiple calls + * to `mbedtls_mps_reader_get()`, without committing in between. + * - After processing, the consuming layer commits the data + * and the reader is moved back to producing mode. + * + * Parameters: + * - with_acc: 0 if the reader should be initialized without accumulator. + * 1 if the reader should be initialized with accumulator. + * + * Whether the accumulator is present or not should not matter, + * since the consumer's requests can be fulfilled from the data + * that the producer has provided. + */ + + /* Lower layer provides data that the upper layer fully consumes + * through multiple `get` calls. */ + unsigned char buf[100]; + unsigned char acc[10]; + unsigned char *tmp; + mbedtls_mps_size_t tmp_len; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( buf ); i++ ) + buf[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + if( with_acc == 0 ) + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, NULL, 0 ); + else + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, buf, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 70, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 70, buf + 10, 70 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 30, &tmp, &tmp_len ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, tmp_len, buf + 80, 20 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + /* Wrapup (lower layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_no_pausing_multiple_steps_multiple_rounds( int with_acc ) +{ + /* This test exercises one round of fetching a buffer in multiple chunks + * and passing it back to the producer afterwards, followed by another + * single-step sequence of feed-fetch-commit-reclaim. + */ + unsigned char bufA[100], bufB[100]; + unsigned char acc[10]; + unsigned char *tmp; + mbedtls_mps_size_t tmp_len; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufA ); i++ ) + bufA[i] = (unsigned char) i; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufB ); i++ ) + bufB[i] = ~ ((unsigned char) i); + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + if( with_acc == 0 ) + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, NULL, 0 ); + else + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufA, sizeof( bufA ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 70, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 70, bufA + 10, 70 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 30, &tmp, &tmp_len ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, tmp_len, bufA + 80, 20 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + /* Preparation */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB, sizeof( bufB ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 100, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 100, bufB, 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + /* Wrapup */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing_needed_disabled() +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the MPS reader when a read request + * of the consumer exceeds what has been provided by the producer, and when + * no accumulator is available in the reader. + * + * In this case, we expect the reader to fail. + */ + + unsigned char buf[100]; + unsigned char *tmp; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( buf ); i++ ) + buf[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, NULL, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 50, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 50, buf, 50 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 100, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + /* Wrapup (lower layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing_needed_buffer_too_small() +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the MPS reader with accumulator + * in the situation where a read request goes beyond the bounds of the + * current read buffer, _and_ the reader's accumulator is too small to + * hold the requested amount of data. + * + * In this case, we expect mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() to fail, + * but it should be possible to continue fetching data as if + * there had been no excess request via mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * and the call to mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() had been rejected + * because of data remaining. + */ + + unsigned char buf[100]; + unsigned char acc[10]; + unsigned char *tmp; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + mbedtls_mps_size_t tmp_len; + + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( buf ); i++ ) + buf[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 50, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 50, buf, 50 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, buf + 50, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 100, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + /* Wrapup (lower layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 50, &tmp, &tmp_len ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, tmp_len, buf + 50, 50 ); + + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim_overflow() +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the MPS reader with accumulator + * in the situation where upon calling mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(), the + * uncommitted data together with the excess data missing in the last + * call to medtls_mps_reader_get() exceeds the bounds of the type + * holding the buffer length. + */ + + unsigned char buf[100]; + unsigned char acc[50]; + unsigned char *tmp; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( buf ); i++ ) + buf[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 50, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 50, buf, 50 ); + /* Excess request */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, (mbedtls_mps_size_t) -1, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + /* Wrapup (lower layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL ); + + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing( int option ) +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the reader when the + * accumulator is used to fulfill a consumer's request. + * + * More detailed: + * - The producer feeds some data. + * - The consumer asks for more data than what's available. + * - The reader remembers the request and goes back to + * producing mode, waiting for more data from the producer. + * - The producer provides another chunk of data which is + * sufficient to fulfill the original read request. + * - The consumer retries the original read request, which + * should now succeed. + * + * This test comes in multiple variants controlled by the + * `option` parameter and documented below. + */ + + unsigned char bufA[100], bufB[100]; + unsigned char *tmp; + unsigned char acc[40]; + int paused; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufA ); i++ ) + bufA[i] = (unsigned char) i; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufB ); i++ ) + bufB[i] = ~ ((unsigned char) i); + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufA, sizeof( bufA ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + /* Ask for more than what's available. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 80, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 80, bufA, 80 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 80, 10 ); + switch( option ) + { + case 0: /* Single uncommitted fetch at pausing */ + case 1: + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + break; + default: /* Multiple uncommitted fetches at pausing */ + break; + } + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + /* Preparation */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, &paused ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( paused == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB, sizeof( bufB ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Consumption */ + switch( option ) + { + case 0: /* Single fetch at pausing, re-fetch with commit. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + break; + + case 1: /* Single fetch at pausing, re-fetch without commit. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + break; + + case 2: /* Multiple fetches at pausing, repeat without commit. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 80, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + break; + + case 3: /* Multiple fetches at pausing, repeat with commit 1. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 80, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + break; + + case 4: /* Multiple fetches at pausing, repeat with commit 2. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 80, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + break; + + case 5: /* Multiple fetches at pausing, repeat with commit 3. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 80, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + break; + + default: + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + } + + /* In all cases, fetch the rest of the second buffer. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 90, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 90, bufB + 10, 90 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + + /* Wrapup */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_pausing_multiple_feeds( int option ) +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the MPS reader + * in the following situation: + * - The consumer has asked for more than what's available, so the + * reader pauses and waits for further input data via + * `mbedtls_mps_reader_feed()` + * - Multiple such calls to `mbedtls_mps_reader_feed()` are necessary + * to fulfill the original request, and the reader needs to do + * the necessary bookkeeping under the hood. + * + * This test comes in a few variants differing in the number and + * size of feed calls that the producer issues while the reader is + * accumulating the necessary data - see the comments below. + */ + + unsigned char bufA[100], bufB[100]; + unsigned char *tmp; + unsigned char acc[70]; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + mbedtls_mps_size_t fetch_len; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufA ); i++ ) + bufA[i] = (unsigned char) i; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufB ); i++ ) + bufB[i] = ~ ((unsigned char) i); + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufA, sizeof( bufA ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + /* Ask for more than what's available. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 80, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 80, bufA, 80 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + /* 20 left, ask for 70 -> 50 overhead */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 70, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + /* Preparation */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + switch( option ) + { + case 0: /* 10 + 10 + 80 byte feed */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB, 10 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB + 10, 10 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB + 20, 80 ) == 0 ); + break; + + case 1: /* 50 x 1byte */ + for( size_t num_feed = 0; num_feed < 49; num_feed++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB + num_feed, 1 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB + 49, 1 ) == 0 ); + break; + + case 2: /* 49 x 1byte + 51bytes */ + for( size_t num_feed = 0; num_feed < 49; num_feed++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB + num_feed, 1 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB + 49, 51 ) == 0 ); + break; + + default: + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + break; + } + + /* Consumption */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 70, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 20, bufA + 80, 20 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 20, 50, bufB, 50 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 1000, &tmp, &fetch_len ) == 0 ); + switch( option ) + { + case 0: + TEST_ASSERT( fetch_len == 50 ); + break; + + case 1: + TEST_ASSERT( fetch_len == 0 ); + break; + + case 2: + TEST_ASSERT( fetch_len == 50 ); + break; + + default: + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + break; + } + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + + /* Wrapup */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim_data_left( int option ) +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the MPS reader when a + * call to mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is made before all data + * provided by the producer has been fetched and committed. */ + + unsigned char buf[100]; + unsigned char *tmp; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( buf ); i++ ) + buf[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, NULL, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + switch( option ) + { + case 0: + /* Fetch (but not commit) the entire buffer. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, sizeof( buf ), &tmp, NULL ) + == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 100, buf, 100 ); + break; + + case 1: + /* Fetch (but not commit) parts of the buffer. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, sizeof( buf ) / 2, + &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, sizeof( buf ) / 2, buf, sizeof( buf ) / 2 ); + break; + + case 2: + /* Fetch and commit parts of the buffer, then + * fetch but not commit the rest of the buffer. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, sizeof( buf ) / 2, + &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, sizeof( buf ) / 2, buf, sizeof( buf ) / 2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, sizeof( buf ) / 2, + &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, sizeof( buf ) / 2, + buf + sizeof( buf ) / 2, + sizeof( buf ) / 2 ); + break; + + default: + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + break; + } + + /* Wrapup */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim_data_left_retry() +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the MPS reader when an attempt + * by the producer to reclaim the reader fails because of more data pending + * to be processed, and the consumer subsequently fetches more data. */ + unsigned char buf[100]; + unsigned char *tmp; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( buf ); i++ ) + buf[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, NULL, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 50, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 50, buf, 50 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 50, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 50, buf + 50, 50 ); + /* Preparation */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT ); + /* Consumption */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 50, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 50, buf + 50, 50 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + /* Wrapup */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_multiple_pausing( int option ) +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the MPS reader + * in the following situation: + * - A read request via `mbedtls_mps_reader_get()` can't + * be served and the reader is paused to accumulate + * the desired amount of data from the producer. + * - Once enough data is available, the consumer successfully + * reads the data from the reader, but afterwards exceeds + * the available data again - pausing is necessary for a + * second time. + */ + + unsigned char bufA[100], bufB[20], bufC[10]; + unsigned char *tmp; + unsigned char acc[50]; + mbedtls_mps_size_t tmp_len; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufA ); i++ ) + bufA[i] = (unsigned char) i; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufB ); i++ ) + bufB[i] = ~ ((unsigned char) i); + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufC ); i++ ) + bufC[i] = ~ ((unsigned char) i); + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufA, sizeof( bufA ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + /* Ask for more than what's available. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 80, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 80, bufA, 80 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 80, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + /* Preparation */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB, sizeof( bufB ) ) == 0 ); + + switch( option ) + { + case 0: /* Fetch same chunks, commit afterwards, and + * then exceed bounds of new buffer; accumulator + * large enough. */ + + /* Consume */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, &tmp_len ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, tmp_len, bufA + 80, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + /* Prepare */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufC, sizeof( bufC ) ) == 0 );; + + /* Consume */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufB + 10, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufC, 10 ); + break; + + case 1: /* Fetch same chunks, commit afterwards, and + * then exceed bounds of new buffer; accumulator + * not large enough. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 80, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 51, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + /* Prepare */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL ); + break; + + case 2: /* Fetch same chunks, don't commit afterwards, and + * then exceed bounds of new buffer; accumulator + * large enough. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 80, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + /* Prepare */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufC, sizeof( bufC ) ) == 0 );; + + /* Consume */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 50, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 20, bufA + 80, 20 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 20, 20, bufB, 20 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 40, 10, bufC, 10 ); + break; + + case 3: /* Fetch same chunks, don't commit afterwards, and + * then exceed bounds of new buffer; accumulator + * not large enough. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 80, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 10, bufA + 90, 10 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 10, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 21, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + /* Prepare */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL ); + break; + + default: + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + break; + } + + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER:MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_random_usage( int num_out_chunks, + int max_chunk_size, + int max_request, + int acc_size ) + +{ + /* Randomly pass a reader object back and forth between lower and + * upper layer and let each of them call the respective reader API + * functions in a random fashion. + * + * On the lower layer, we're tracking and concatenating + * the data passed to successful feed calls. + * + * For the upper layer, we track and concatenate buffers + * obtained from successful get calls. + * + * As long as the lower layer calls reclaim at least once, (resetting the + * fetched but not-yet-committed data), this should always lead to the same + * stream of outgoing/incoming data for the lower/upper layers, even if + * most of the random calls fail. + * + * NOTE: This test uses rand() for random data, which is not optimal. + * Instead, it would be better to get the random data from a + * static buffer. This both eases reproducibility and allows + * simple conversion to a fuzz target. + */ + int ret; + unsigned char *acc = NULL; + unsigned char *outgoing = NULL, *incoming = NULL; + unsigned char *cur_chunk = NULL; + size_t cur_out_chunk, out_pos, in_commit, in_fetch; + int rand_op; /* Lower layer: + * - Reclaim (0) + * - Feed (1) + * Upper layer: + * - Get, do tolerate smaller output (0) + * - Get, don't tolerate smaller output (1) + * - Commit (2) */ + int mode = 0; /* Lower layer (0) or Upper layer (1) */ + int reclaimed = 1; /* Have to call reclaim at least once before + * returning the reader to the upper layer. */ + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + + if( acc_size > 0 ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( acc, acc_size ); + } + + /* This probably needs to be changed because we want + * our tests to be deterministic. */ + // srand( time( NULL ) ); + + ASSERT_ALLOC( outgoing, num_out_chunks * max_chunk_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( incoming, num_out_chunks * max_chunk_size ); + + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, acc_size ); + + cur_out_chunk = 0; + in_commit = 0; + in_fetch = 0; + out_pos = 0; + while( cur_out_chunk < (unsigned) num_out_chunks ) + { + if( mode == 0 ) + { + /* Choose randomly between reclaim and feed */ + rand_op = rand() % 2; + + if( rand_op == 0 ) + { + /* Reclaim */ + ret = mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( cur_chunk != NULL ); + mbedtls_free( cur_chunk ); + cur_chunk = NULL; + } + reclaimed = 1; + } + else + { + /* Feed reader with a random chunk */ + unsigned char *tmp = NULL; + size_t tmp_size; + if( cur_out_chunk == (unsigned) num_out_chunks ) + continue; + + tmp_size = ( rand() % max_chunk_size ) + 1; + ASSERT_ALLOC( tmp, tmp_size ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, tmp, tmp_size ) == 0 ); + ret = mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, tmp, tmp_size ); + + if( ret == 0 || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE ) + { + cur_out_chunk++; + memcpy( outgoing + out_pos, tmp, tmp_size ); + out_pos += tmp_size; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( cur_chunk == NULL ); + cur_chunk = tmp; + } + else + { + mbedtls_free( tmp ); + } + + } + + /* Randomly switch to consumption mode if reclaim + * was called at least once. */ + if( reclaimed == 1 && rand() % 3 == 0 ) + { + in_fetch = 0; + mode = 1; + } + } + else + { + /* Choose randomly between get tolerating fewer data, + * get not tolerating fewer data, and commit. */ + rand_op = rand() % 3; + if( rand_op == 0 || rand_op == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_mps_size_t get_size, real_size; + unsigned char *chunk_get; + get_size = ( rand() % max_request ) + 1; + if( rand_op == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, get_size, &chunk_get, + &real_size ); + } + else + { + real_size = get_size; + ret = mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, get_size, &chunk_get, NULL ); + } + + /* Check if output is in accordance with what was written */ + if( ret == 0 ) + { + memcpy( incoming + in_commit + in_fetch, + chunk_get, real_size ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( incoming + in_commit + in_fetch, + outgoing + in_commit + in_fetch, + real_size ) == 0 ); + in_fetch += real_size; + } + } + else if( rand_op == 2 ) /* Commit */ + { + ret = mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + in_commit += in_fetch; + in_fetch = 0; + } + } + + /* Randomly switch back to preparation */ + if( rand() % 3 == 0 ) + { + reclaimed = 0; + mode = 0; + } + } + } + + /* Cleanup */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); + mbedtls_free( incoming ); + mbedtls_free( outgoing ); + mbedtls_free( acc ); + mbedtls_free( cur_chunk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_reader_inconsistent_usage( int option ) +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the MPS reader + * in the following situation: + * - The consumer asks for more data than what's available + * - The reader is paused and receives more data from the + * producer until the original read request can be fulfilled. + * - The consumer does not repeat the original request but + * requests data in a different way. + * + * The reader does not guarantee that inconsistent read requests + * after pausing will succeed, and this test triggers some cases + * where the request fails. + */ + + unsigned char bufA[100], bufB[100]; + unsigned char *tmp; + unsigned char acc[40]; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + int success = 0; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufA ); i++ ) + bufA[i] = (unsigned char) i; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( bufB ); i++ ) + bufB[i] = ~ ((unsigned char) i); + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, acc, sizeof( acc ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufA, sizeof( bufA ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 80, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 20, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + /* Preparation */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, bufB, sizeof( bufB ) ) == 0 ); + /* Consumption */ + switch( option ) + { + case 0: + /* Ask for buffered data in a single chunk, no commit */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 30, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 20, bufA + 80, 20 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 20, 10, bufB, 10 ); + success = 1; + break; + + case 1: + /* Ask for buffered data in a single chunk, with commit */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 30, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 20, bufA + 80, 20 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 20, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + success = 1; + break; + + case 2: + /* Ask for more than was requested when pausing, #1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 31, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS ); + break; + + case 3: + /* Ask for more than was requested when pausing #2 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, (mbedtls_mps_size_t) -1, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS ); + break; + + case 4: + /* Asking for buffered data in different + * chunks than before CAN fail. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 15, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 15, bufA + 80, 15 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 10, &tmp, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS ); + break; + + case 5: + /* Asking for buffered data different chunks + * than before NEED NOT fail - no commits */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 15, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 15, bufA + 80, 15 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 15, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 5, bufA + 95, 5 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 5, 10, bufB, 10 ); + success = 1; + break; + + case 6: + /* Asking for buffered data different chunks + * than before NEED NOT fail - intermediate commit */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 15, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 15, bufA + 80, 15 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 15, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 5, bufA + 95, 5 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 5, 10, bufB, 10 ); + success = 1; + break; + + case 7: + /* Asking for buffered data different chunks + * than before NEED NOT fail - end commit */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 15, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 15, bufA + 80, 15 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 15, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 5, bufA + 95, 5 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 5, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + success = 1; + break; + + case 8: + /* Asking for buffered data different chunks + * than before NEED NOT fail - intermediate & end commit */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 15, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 15, bufA + 80, 15 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 15, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 5, bufA + 95, 5 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp + 5, 10, bufB, 10 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + success = 1; + break; + + default: + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + break; + } + + if( success == 1 ) + { + /* In all succeeding cases, fetch the rest of the second buffer. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 90, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 90, bufB + 10, 90 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + + /* Wrapup */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + } + + /* Wrapup */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:TEST_SUITE_MPS_READER */ +void mbedtls_mps_reader_feed_empty() +{ + /* This test exercises the behaviour of the reader when it is + * fed with a NULL buffer. */ + unsigned char buf[100]; + unsigned char *tmp; + mbedtls_mps_reader rd; + for( size_t i=0; (unsigned) i < sizeof( buf ); i++ ) + buf[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + /* Preparation (lower layer) */ + mbedtls_mps_reader_init( &rd, NULL, 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG ); + + /* Subsequent feed-calls should still succeed. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( &rd, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Consumption (upper layer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_get( &rd, 100, &tmp, NULL ) == 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( tmp, 100, buf, 100 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( &rd ) == 0 ); + + /* Wrapup */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( &rd, NULL ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_mps_reader_free( &rd ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_net.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_net.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4f516c8b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_net.data @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +Context init-free-free +context_init_free:0 + +Context init-free-init-free +context_init_free:1 + +net_poll beyond FD_SETSIZE +poll_beyond_fd_setsize: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_net.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_net.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..08d48b32 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_net.function @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" + +#if defined(unix) || defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \ + defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__QNXNTO__) || \ + defined(__HAIKU__) || defined(__midipix__) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE) +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE) +/** Open a file on the given file descriptor. + * + * This is disruptive if there is already something open on that descriptor. + * Caller beware. + * + * \param ctx An initialized, but unopened socket context. + * On success, it refers to the opened file (\p wanted_fd). + * \param wanted_fd The desired file descriptor. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, a negative error code on error. + */ +static int open_file_on_fd( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, int wanted_fd ) +{ + int got_fd = open( "/dev/null", O_RDONLY ); + TEST_ASSERT( got_fd >= 0 ); + if( got_fd != wanted_fd ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( dup2( got_fd, wanted_fd ) >= 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( close( got_fd ) >= 0 ); + } + ctx->fd = wanted_fd; + return( 0 ); +exit: + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE */ + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_NET_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void context_init_free( int reinit ) +{ + mbedtls_net_context ctx; + + mbedtls_net_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_net_free( &ctx ); + + if( reinit ) + mbedtls_net_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_net_free( &ctx ); + + /* This test case always succeeds, functionally speaking. A plausible + * bug might trigger an invalid pointer dereference or a memory leak. */ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE */ +void poll_beyond_fd_setsize( ) +{ + /* Test that mbedtls_net_poll does not misbehave when given a file + * descriptor greater or equal to FD_SETSIZE. This code is specific to + * platforms with a Unix-like select() function, which is where + * FD_SETSIZE is a concern. */ + + struct rlimit rlim_nofile; + int restore_rlim_nofile = 0; + int ret; + mbedtls_net_context ctx; + uint8_t buf[1]; + + mbedtls_net_init( &ctx ); + + /* On many systems, by default, the maximum permitted file descriptor + * number is less than FD_SETSIZE. If so, raise the limit if + * possible. + * + * If the limit can't be raised, a file descriptor opened by the + * net_sockets module will be less than FD_SETSIZE, so the test + * is not necessary and we mark it as skipped. + * A file descriptor could still be higher than FD_SETSIZE if it was + * opened before the limit was lowered (which is something an application + * might do); but we don't do such things in our test code, so the unit + * test will run if it can. + */ + TEST_ASSERT( getrlimit( RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim_nofile ) == 0 ); + if( rlim_nofile.rlim_cur < FD_SETSIZE + 1 ) + { + rlim_t old_rlim_cur = rlim_nofile.rlim_cur; + rlim_nofile.rlim_cur = FD_SETSIZE + 1; + TEST_ASSUME( setrlimit( RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim_nofile ) == 0 ); + rlim_nofile.rlim_cur = old_rlim_cur; + restore_rlim_nofile = 1; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( open_file_on_fd( &ctx, FD_SETSIZE ) == 0 ); + + /* In principle, mbedtls_net_poll() with valid arguments should succeed. + * However, we know that on Unix-like platforms (and others), this function + * is implemented on top of select() and fd_set, which do not support + * file descriptors greater or equal to FD_SETSIZE. So we expect to hit + * this platform limitation. + * + * If mbedtls_net_poll() does not proprely check that ctx.fd is in range, + * it may still happen to return the expected failure code, but if this + * is problematic on the particular platform where the code is running, + * a memory sanitizer such as UBSan should catch it. + */ + ret = mbedtls_net_poll( &ctx, MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ, 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED ); + + /* mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() uses select() and fd_set in the same way. */ + ret = mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( &ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED ); + +exit: + mbedtls_net_free( &ctx ); + if( restore_rlim_nofile ) + setrlimit( RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim_nofile ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_nist_kw.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_nist_kw.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0178b61 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_nist_kw.data @@ -0,0 +1,483 @@ +NIST KW self test +mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test: + +NIST KW mix contexts and modes +mbedtls_nist_kw_mix_contexts: + +NIST KW init #1 wrapping AES-128: OK +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:128:1:0 + +NIST KW init #2 unwrapping AES-128: OK +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:128:1:0 + +NIST KW init #3 CAMELLIA-256: unsupported cipher +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:256:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +NIST KW init #4 AES-224: bad key size +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:224:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW init #5 BLOWFISH-128: bad cipher +depends_on:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH:128:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #1 KW plaintext OK (2 to 2^54 - 1 semiblocks) +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:16:24:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:0 + +NIST KW lengths #2 KWP plaintext OK (1 to 2^32 - 1 octets) +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:5:16:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:0 + +NIST KW lengths #3 KW ciphertext OK (3 to 2^54 semiblocks) +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:32:24:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:0 + +NIST KW lengths #4 KWP ciphertext OK (2 to 2^29 semiblocks) +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:24:16:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:0 + +NIST KW lengths #5 KW plaintext too short (2 to 2^54 - 1 semiblocks) +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:5:13:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #6 KWP plaintext too short (1 to 2^32 - 1 octets) +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:0:8:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #8 KW ciphertext too short (3 to 2^54 semiblocks) +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:16:8:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #9 KWP ciphertext too short (2 to 2^29 semiblocks) +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:8:8:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #10 KW plaintext not a multiple of semiblocks. +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:21:29:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #11 KW ciphertext not a multiple of semiblocks. +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:34:26:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #12 KWP ciphertext not a multiple of semiblocks. +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:30:22:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #13 KW wrapping output buffer too short +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:16:16:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #14 KWP wrapping output buffer too short +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:5:10:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #15 KW unwrapping output buffer too short +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:32:16:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #16 KWP unwrapping output buffer too short +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:24:12:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #17 KW plaintext NULL (2 to 2^54 - 1 semiblocks) +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:0:8:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #18 KW wrapping output NULL +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:8:0:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #19 KWP wrapping output NULL +nist_kw_plaintext_lengths:8:0:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #20 KW ciphertext NULL +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:0:8:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #21 KWP ciphertext NULL +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:0:8:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #15 KW unwrapping output NULL +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:32:0:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW lengths #16 KWP unwrapping output NULL +nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths:24:0:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +NIST KW wrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 128 count 7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"095e293f31e317ba6861114b95c90792":"64349d506ae85ecd84459c7a5c423f55":"97de4425572274bd7fb2d6688d5afd4454d992348d42a643" + +NIST KW wrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 256 count 11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"ca8f6c56a9c9300549e9eae75a4604b8":"1542b8662136245162c64d45af1a982302f69f1d01a1a6bc29ef8facafbeaea0":"4d340c10bbbddf5b2014ded264bffce49901bd22adaee074b0f25a2d19c134eb3c7f38c5d0444766" + +NIST KW wrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 192 count 8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"b4902b13ea73f17829b4e334fb359ec4":"2073399c7794c8b73dd782dc250dab31c80a8cba33477ab2":"37eda4eec3096135f5193c37bdeaf498b71e3a205c5638682fe746f236566b11" + +NIST KW wrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 320 count 14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"579448a3d638f093742ae6b24d729849":"464d3162469899955d8bc8bfc0a22555bce609b2415bedf17a942abfe96ad4e124d4a832fbcff49f":"dadd1440a06946eabddf18e784b7719d36caa33cb626aa03aca057585584ea07a8714ecb90ceb232d6b0760845105fbb" + +NIST KW wrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"98311985c4661d7e811ee56070e6fecf":"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":"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" + +NIST KW wrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 128 count 7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"13df8fa68a6e096b9b5bbaebb64ace2e6a05485b5cb7e43f":"3ee9367f631fb375ba47241966ad4ab8":"d0309b1291a06c595fcaa6dcf97817dbd7b7ad2cf48ddec2" + +NIST KW wrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 256 count 11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"17c25023ac76a8af777a6f71c0c0f97931554b0a15a79222":"15227ef52412346e83a18c54a75374f69a24de6a07cfba9082596eeb5d758bb0":"0f8e2fe4f3a28c1fcebf20fef2bfd3489deb284e03d057337496285f4ffe62f074bafa0a0a6e44e4" + +NIST KW wrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 192 count 8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"49d1c4ec51f2695ad7e47554efd24170ab03f628eba7d5fb":"8bf961097a6fa75694cf0ea47cfda23928fc433d5fc762e6":"dc72c58faca0dd662e5fefd05cd714987cc2470219db77baf779fca865f31529" + +NIST KW wrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 320 count 14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"e06ebf0145b178ea45687abe366fdec559877dbc9300a653":"f0104e9546628d801c4f7e875f1ca4f385e915b0c7bd52ed158b6b42d7301f1df6dd5bfc80d0318a":"5b4b1d4ef349fcf5eb7d720d84b2e79fbabf3db18277ada0752b9883c21f0e24281854420e6751af8fbcc4b98be0c1d7" + +NIST KW wrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"932ed6ee1db1c4cf7fd81efce5609641cb5f3409563089dc":"da8dd9c1dc8cbf95b0fa280747c1007ecb086b7c944b0db4dfa3bdf6ed0c9725901cb838c2e30131250188c22bd92b068aa0871ce58a0c22307671612fc4884a655329851d54afd48a9d3a7f97976850d6fd842034548aee67df1272b06f155eb21966858731c3c35d4bb94a1ea351ef5a8c4779c077d648ec1c4f27cfaa48f47541a8f36831e35a961b076307bea928e1856e448d7695a0f7fbcd8c82800d12f530c2086f3b67bc5081d384010b47d327120def5c92f815aaae31d32893cdd18a71ba4e208445ff3a2f68a0a46689458b0f2d6d9cd3726284e56b4c020b97a82d4463f74098cfd7bd7a5f12157a0bc812266b8f2c215933cb67518f900602f0825538e05765318b6d31150007e410b92d5d957e119c5d94aadba193cf6da230387b1c5e6448515f9789a8867571ea82ad34dc5b912d6cd243bd4fc2f19d132bd8f1f5cef00a141e30ec4d3f7a546a215d5b0c7e70c3b0ec4fc34b66c4170bf403ef910dd3897caef33405827a55f943904c4e1b1aee4cc3ffd0ad27e316c164e2b5bbcf73df60d8859201b6602be01ba638aff468f3136120c117ca848ae161ecafade668e2d04b227437d4b91c6fc40ebd9490f211bcd21fd7005d200ef584f37aa2c4c769174551cec0d7f2936ae78f6c389382212703d0e7c82aef1a736056ed9c45e71439731537a2edb8a63741825c678a11c42e5b2281b43e203b0523":"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" + +NIST KW wrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 128 count 7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"e823c6ef53b110eeb3f178871cf436887cca9df061d1f26409ec3b410033d967":"f90c279e9e6423804a6505e8effd924c":"0abb50b222af66058646156d106df7c85c28b708395eb9dd" + +NIST KW wrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 256 count 11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"e5cca71056548467bc9c2849aba67cfe0fd74c44d514535d2314022a3f3e6ec8":"326b6da4dce95c94226b63c2d38c4e005c566191b00028b59cc788e0af5261cc":"2a4f331f451589fd103d9a9cbbeae5d5f5be7acf15aa6e21c45e09362263cf34b0ccab7c8a28dfed" + +NIST KW wrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 192 count 8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"6a077f95496aba1bb80831280e7563f3a187e6d014342028349f766b791108ce":"a77b3ddac0e78c9176b7445f9ec349b2d85aa2f57e6cb362":"7c065be0a2173e0f14a3418779e7f3eb6eb7fbb7a3c20fd6c08b37d408bd9423" + +NIST KW wrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 320 count 14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"752b21422647f1006de116360e88e2f6601eeb5aafd27cba56c20193fc1b941a":"a5948c20bc611187d688cb03caa04fb17774aa4f99ae3da5d821bcccfae950d72ca74b3a870008aa":"d71109224edc4233db8819aaca4db9c61ab5aad2806d0e985f1830acd8adde23ce75046b2057e0a23dec7a053bac6c4c" + +NIST KW wrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"931bf2c55eac657ae56fc0a9505a6ea7cc9af5162d844ccf01f19debfad09cbe":"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":"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" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 8 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"d060e5faa705b6c600ecfcd5252bbfba":"3d":"28ccc6da03cd79b78c7207946fcee402" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 64 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"663ee3d40628059fe01a9766d5c1c31f":"1c6ccd67438f20de":"c2717ed6e51bb4314388cd26464f4d18" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 72 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"7865e20f3c21659ab4690b629cdf3cc4":"bd6843d420378dc896":"41eca956d4aa047eb5cf4efe659661e74db6f8c564e23500" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 248 count 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"02a92285d0baa874ac94f6648988d44f":"6ac78aff505805e3145fac44eaeb6ac92945ca12d9bc0b6fee8b1e5b983f37":"18b251cf54d2a51ac903af2fd008f6aa2b1bf491fa2e0458dba272866821e98ad037eae4af654811" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"6b8ba9cc9b31068ba175abfcc60c1338":"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":"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" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 8 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"959b4595778d7b860e08fcb5e24b11f118fd5d67089f2ea4":"65":"1cf986a0fb2208977c37a4c3830eba72" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 64 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"02dfb6662e0c1b95d34aaba7eb6c1fdd41c52b89213d5b18":"27361c34c2601fe6":"089f835f3210734aa1a2282c6ff30ef9" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 72 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"9464f1af6aabad076661328bcfd15777da16a288a2660009":"431527c3a644c106bb":"d9b257b400d808a0b0386af3be9154fc7f2fb2d7edc06201" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 248 count 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"df419ca84650ef28a1c5d1cb47917e4480a3aca4bd29dd5e":"3d84df372bc0b854c058441e952738ec79474b673c94e32dc78d23745fb5e7":"497e966414475938204c3b3d606d5160461c54dfdfe903b6624208d7cfc90bb403f384bfd54d1ed2" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"a85b4359ebd240012ec749459bc928eaa52c84e887ababb9":"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":"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" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 8 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"0070492ff3aaa190496c72bb0affdb6fac7fa9cb32e6e91a46ea34863422f807":"39":"643a9706af6bd06410b70ee38f546bc2" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 64 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"c6e882f5b8e361e43bb3e54d5a7b8c690f485bcbec2dd2183c7e623f6b02c5fc":"99ae80eec64630ed":"de0680b34f7374539ad9b75f08f4d8e6" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 72 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"70da43aac823c6dd37d1109f5b18feb4503c973288989745e2cc1cc21d9570c6":"edf17d966ed896aee3":"d67b5b2ad15c645450e23b5e7b6d682f8ae20e716d470db7" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 248 count 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"e941febe4b683c02dce56194a86b72d4c569e1fc84bc7a6f24c3ae2b39bf5440":"c168cf12acb6679c24d424baa62ed56559caee163a4efa946478ad43d7dbd6":"4ad9979caa72fddff0876c0295a57fcf74e5980fec2cf622191ec6b5aebb75e0adebb12d0862ffae" + +NIST KWP wrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"20f31cded60b8ed8d9d3fd1e1fa6244e76c7cb7628bfd28a5d63ce8aa2c9494d":"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":"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" + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 128 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"e63c2cb1a2c1282d473b66753494a591":"084532f86949dfb7be2cdf09d2b7505418e7bca5185661e1":"a26e8ee007ab90f599a1bc31cdabd5fe":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 256 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"83da6e02404d5abfd47d15da591840e2":"3f4cbf3a98029243da87a756b3c52553f91366f4ff4b103b2c73e68aa8ca81f01ebda35d718741ac":"67dfd627346ebd217849a5ba5bca6e9ce07a7747bed1ba119ec01503202a075a":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 192 count 7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"e5c2fc20f9263da4f15b817874dd987d":"0538fdca42f1fd72afadbe689fa8a396996d734e4f082c8c4ef41ef11dc6246e":"35a261169f240dffe4701ce41f6dff986764afa6e84f63c9":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 320 count 8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"3f5501341f617cae30dd0afbfa247c09":"72fcc9e5942344d11c3b23503b170e39cd635da3a83aa9ffb196cfb1d6eeae6dc5f5683238da6e9b49edbf95819bbbdf":"e2a34da9ea2ad66e130251f8a7798b87d7bd7601abc5ae8f7305b024ddb4b3e00351484165e16d25":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"adf44a10a05e64f2df87db52f3ae18d3":"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":"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":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 128 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"5d4899ee66beff1bda1fc717a1ad4c50":"bb7fd0bce778bd775e4e88d904d26a7134364c53a6c493a0":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 256 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"84bc6ce7ee4fd9db512536669d0686da":"c383db930ffd02c0073ac2cc79ec289e6866bdcc6a135a3b776aa42f14ee04f9cca06ed6c0b22901":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 192 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"266b009e911bb55f9aa0661539a6fdd5":"db9c94e7236ec56982d7ddeb9427c24580bc1fb96db98ab19340e03670045b7a":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 320 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"51c2e3d090a74bfa10db090b63ae53aa":"598a16c226e6c848a78ca30fa514edc9467f704b529c02c5522d1890b4dc21588ed6c3b070ed952adc733d865eb9d468":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-128 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"6a7814a80acae9d03eda69cad200ffe5":"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 128 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"26045402548ee6196fc0a60208ffde21137ddb1c6c5d2ba0":"fcd55c2c60ff6de19ec3e6b13490c2821f0c565abf10be2d":"94b8276743184d086962ce6c4e63bd53":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 256 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"b3a0aa60fb14b658e1eb1c1a5a8e1f60307c9b9faa2f1587":"fdeda2a10e51da1817af2ba4c9f200414aec67545f5e71c608e85d14da8c5567bf51dec4ff2d8c05":"65986b3a6a3658a66cb5beb302540bb032b36c76d040b24fe278a1473ad4c32f":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 192 count 6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"f0ee8ab6f804a2629e163b58c1a9e9039b53ac60493df11d":"3593dda0daead2dcf850f8670b7d0692332f57068213a772a8244d058e5634d7":"401df0c06aa4c58a71b9438e11a11a239f577b6037adf350":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 320 count 8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"579e58b2bf9c34c31e8c644faef6b698131624063fb2d795":"b39acd09d9bf9daaa89304f76402065cc3d863e12df8a966f037146db9619e7be5ccbf50206773c5eca35e36492ef4b7":"9c1f66267c2083a42f3da4e754a073c1ff151681e2bc070e6e4682065fd109088a096e72024fdcb0":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"366af2c7a1d7a1ee5a7c239fd526024472f674ab039bba25":"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":"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":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 128 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"9200a0f688d86c0b6bfd9abeff66341684a373fe3f9a3057":"5c685c8596e374710fe327bafc45cd09190215fdcc03d010":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 256 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"95c9e644559919cace6f93f545dbfe48b130808ed66d0964":"7b8d1307e992221f6ffdcc7909d972d5f02e92187139cfd77f79345cb998bbdbabedb3ac00a6cdc4":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 192 count 7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"ffdbcbd0abc94c7f15e5b6e8a7190f1ed4f01be11f4f7ccb":"e9ad95c8e9185a001509c50ae0098d45f7032575c7b8fd90a561716d2e5804fb":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 320 count 9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"253a5cbe79a291c0af1a3d7460e7f284bd672cd026753fc4":"f71014ba711602df5cff2b93e86253775ea308bf83fde65fbc9a9a7852f87357330450072aaa3d6ef8dffbee20d2de7c":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-192 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"ff8666e4e538a6cf0a2a002b63716b06ec5f187785c2fc1b":"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 128 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"e594f0067cedb74e883e7746d29ba725c884c25375323f367cf49d17ad0f567b":"3b51ae2b0e3ddeed94efd7bfdc22630187e1f7624d15ed78":"587e3f6c75644bb5c3db9c74714f5556":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 256 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"049c7bcba03e04395c2a22e6a9215cdae0f762b077b1244b443147f5695799fa":"776b1e91e935d1f80a537902186d6b00dfc6afc12000f1bde913df5d67407061db8227fcd08953d4":"e617831c7db8038fda4c59403775c3d435136a566f3509c273e1da1ef9f50aea":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 192 count 7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"e86b9c1f74cc87ab8ca6a2fa1723fef173077e684345b90dacd3d485f587d320":"c97e8c25d498430300982cdcef592e34176e33e45cd59b19f7605f52e3c7b997":"261313cbea4b246e53affe1f84bd4c900c9b1d1842d79337":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 320 count 8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"5b7f48b8ce77007481667e9900f3077a0c9407a70082b0de29bbfbd716a07149":"3ed16c7e4fed98d76092936e94fa5696c787ab63cb764e930fd37f917be4e7e60c90f327f0865d279e6c449b96301ed7":"4e0e6c45137efbf858ce896c815268a10d9869ef5668a90739b7eff99617691fe63b911afa53feca":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"9e92fc974e09541e6cdf1415575511436ac04a56db186bc0e60f0fac9bd58c6a":"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":"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":0 + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 128 count 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"08c936b25b567a0aa679c29f201bf8b190327df0c2563e39cee061f149f4d91b":"e227eb8ae9d239ccd8928adec39c28810ca9b3dc1f366444":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 256 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"605b22935f1eee56ba884bc7a869febc159ac306b66fb9767a7cc6ab7068dffa":"6607f5a64c8f9fd96dc6f9f735b06a193762cdbacfc367e410926c1bfe6dd715490adbad5b9697a6":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 192 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"81c93da5baa5157bf700fd38d7d67662670778b690cfbca9fe11e06268b35605":"875e1ca385586f83d1e23e44ca201006df04e1854e41b933fd607a7383ae1a39":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 320 count 4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"c42c53da9bd5393e63818ecc1336ec6dfcf1d633e51ebb51c68fb0997c979e7a":"52f7b481f72bc2d41edade5388d38c2ff75765939576e49bab400040a14ff488848bef57d1502c06a3faad471f5c3178":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KW unwrap AES-256 CAVS 17.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"7b51259246dd7252f6a7215fb11fbeabfabafb0f8856afae525af8feb81d3490":"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 8 count 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"20501013aa1578ab32704a4287029098":"382179a39d75756f57763486d038b50f":"14":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 64 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"a099fff482dbaeb53aad84f81b916da0":"b831c7137facaed059cbf268767e230f":"0d24299443bcc444":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 72 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"4d49e260348172c38a79eb925b189b12":"54755a93ff5173aec60d1eaa8fd7d4090f00f638c2831aa9":"2bbe64479da7c45976":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 248 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"6a5a5ac4ccedf055d7562ac58ee7819c":"46904a5583e8a22f4b2f5aa8d071f5cbfc938130f1b33f2e6401aee7cccdef2159a89c9b682cfaf4":"33ac6837955300e569b29958985cdbd434c18208779a949d20b110b0b719e1":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"1dd51f0d3a0a784174ba81b2c9f89005":"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":"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":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 8 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"30be7ff51227f0eef786cb7be2482510":"7f61a0a8b2fe7803f2947d233ec3a255":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 64 count 7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"9ad15907cd05d77b844816b1dd806c92":"7aa0e5d322363afbdd71b531e50d4935":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 72 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"2005cbe9cc66a35cafdff1af119ae6ce":"60f9c736ec3619efdcc7cccc6b90ae5cdb8bb9eceea5dd96":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 248 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"2c3b49efbf60ed01a3ef27ee24ac90b0":"5fa5a87bec09a3e05864656f8966cd38e1c4af48a06b1dab4ec9cca35dd0f92b54015fe5332bdef9":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-128 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"4b4c43c9de4fb4a2a7a7adafeabe2dbd":"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 8 count 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"716da5cce5877d8f305b5478d671f6c73eb1bff4de15df07":"dbd5247ad2445575cafb00ee7707c218":"bf":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 64 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"b94bc10b85a8c2f74a66fa723a25ea1b398a4f627efe1ce0":"18eef64a022b2c7db27648cbb5f1d5e6":"19c0f2f78606fae7":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 72 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"f61cde8e515d59a8ca95efb1a98ed4216c4a9649151babf2":"83fce85e9bfc6ed784b052472e5780fee662f17a91faf1a9":"1c6883862ede37b31b":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 248 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"1c883af75147bae6f34205cd656ad30ec97e617456591ce6":"f24f6747711cf72fab0422026c6d548ccdba786d77ab900ac3fb8f39f116d38e92c82d5fd9a045dd":"bdd793f086d8733f69055bd79bbc448be857286e918fd4c54be4acf4eca5e4":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"1b38d4b366f844e71a8db6be2b77a05a9e81720d2d3f31ee":"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":"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":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 8 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"df8f5124b1e03228f2b96f0df31924bac1d3b5d094da22e6":"230bb26c1ea9d5c8fcf7c122ea994f41":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 64 count 7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"94c8dae772a43b5e00468e0947699b239dfe30ab5f90e2f6":"239c6bceee3583fe7825011e02f01cc0":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 72 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"d81b7162dc6e9e18bea6e258bddb53a1c9f22a4a7177d9dd":"4f3a2b7b229a665776f9cfa42e0c2a615a81f69cc0f0f465":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 248 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"688833d56cf1a0f492bf1f7e35c2fa6299a2b1b5ca2a2823":"4b7c17d7a7189e7955c03abb0ca95fc0c780953787972097ae596d46fe2a8cd75995e6309780ae5f":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-192 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"4b0faa630930b0ff8e624aeb4ddfa018a858cfa653132675":"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 8 count 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"da862b25a629d328cf9fac7be0d6ead1cb2404e9bab87a2381a46eb1a81187c5":"5e01a2b9b8413f303a3578d2cc255fda":"d4":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 64 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"362586d516d38e4d58b50a441443e75064cf6d6cdb6420862932ba7b0480b0fd":"ea7ee0f5af3a271a9777838ed13c61af":"f1b92d0db744bfee":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 72 count 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"0e6d542f960c7e61ca190d7fd719fda157030a0a013164613a8c522b52ae685d":"b5cae8a82095abb3478ab167dbc0201d2f4dfc5f81bbe44e":"a957eb4ea02e68ba8b":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 248 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"0445b86d13b7b76c0089a63dec70c32fded9607af63714b7c3cc724f49c1c6e2":"7f63167976e71e43b7b135c8cd12148f826f56e73f6fb6e7f6cefa23c34302ff374d44dd66b6bb01":"7af8c3b32e61f8b5c027383a273927b8fd09b75692bd0b713ec8ecec0bdd2c":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"08f5c088acec18e6cf1f03a8f85d772e327e7fb07f8c2939eb554e84c42ab93d":"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":"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":0 + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 8 count 5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"5fc3ef43eef256993fb00e6ccc90f60319f10a3bc9fe5ca4ec876c165e2a7720":"f3d922a948969acca293bc3daa027e48":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 64 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"398444df32841be9e699c64faa92630c834564b8384876dceb471c4056fc8299":"30032c9a3ed00d29512d8c725fa86a4b":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 72 count 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"64b69233fe392c0bcda28a931cc3527b1a8f29235c1adf6256556c685cb89b9f":"6b5fd75ad16eda04a8b29f1bc0411ae28befbad9e474f2d8":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 248 count 2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"8c35fb77766d04f48d5b52275c5c5f31f568078419e5c2335918965fbe53cedd":"bacccb1714dbaa4908c2654aa8dbb1ddbddd8ab819429b026619fb1c0fa75a8247372b2feeab1e1d":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +NIST KWP unwrap AES-256 CAVS 21.4 PLAINTEXT LENGTH = 4096 count 3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"1726706350c11e6883955f24ea11ab247ce3b2ab54d05e67ad9770b5564483dd":"b006f26a67d0e1e2cbeb5c23b6b300adc1526d1f17bbe964fe8237ae244878158e6b04cb488786b5258ac973c3a2eafd7fcf3a7ca6c825155659fbc53d112bc78b3a770cf059fdd5e68f2b4bfa36de3721231102e5041c947fba3d906bff39592ec3901a398da23035f1190e99b58659330cc2e856ee87ad4197dcc7d16e1f062275bced1ed5cd82163ae3e58da7368dc2aadac855385bd4fa0b8baadef608d0a5c27172d12b88c70b136eeccf37f36364361a990dc50815743cab1636e661bff04ca8345520c30b935a060b450526b1d6ac09170e5b0a327b88f42327b85c9a621d2ca745963c2815a2bfcf509d50b6058ed6e67f369b5608d2aa885238b67d1b8e0d83f9464aa473bf109350fcc02e360c2619236cbfbf895b607895530d8d3d2e41450750dad05b1c37ef15db7fb4707597ac252e8e58d4c1ab2713b427643d198164c908b5d8ff36e9700157284009c7b283633d8b27b378bb65eff8aa59b5fe5e6437a1d53a99c106c2c4d033d3d23950e313a10eb31d68524ae9f8e4f56437acf66db3e8f77407a15bbff4b393e5559908993146d93c673d2aeb7d4cb8fc8d0169de7ed6e2bbe6ce9958a0f5d201419e7acb17e47da827ba380d6b3ad3b5a8c2101c5fb501110c727169065f23297947f538ab3ec165d61edc1f6a9e1735e9b7fc06d4d3406cf8f9c6a68b196cf262324a986705fbc802cdd2e6b4ebcf68e6bb9e793ae644":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED + +KW AES-128 wrap rfc 3394 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF":"1FA68B0A8112B447AEF34BD8FB5A7B829D3E862371D2CFE5" + +KW AES-192 wrap rfc 3394 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617":"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF":"96778B25AE6CA435F92B5B97C050AED2468AB8A17AD84E5D" + +KW AES-256 wrap rfc 3394 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF":"64E8C3F9CE0F5BA263E9777905818A2A93C8191E7D6E8AE7" + +KW AES-128 unwrap rfc 3394 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"1FA68B0A8112B447AEF34BD8FB5A7B829D3E862371D2CFE5":"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF":0 + +KW AES-192 unwrap rfc 3394 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617":"031D33264E15D33268F24EC260743EDCE1C6C7DDEE725A936BA814915C6762D2":"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607":0 + +KW AES-256 unwrap rfc 3394 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":"A8F9BC1612C68B3FF6E6F4FBE30E71E4769C8B80A32CB8958CD5D17D6B254DA1":"00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607":0 + +KWP AES-192 wrap rfc 5649 [#1] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"5840df6e29b02af1ab493b705bf16ea1ae8338f4dcc176a8":"c37b7e6492584340bed12207808941155068f738":"138bdeaa9b8fa7fc61f97742e72248ee5ae6ae5360d1ae6a5f54f373fa543b6a" + +KWP AES-192 wrap rfc 5649 [#2] +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP:"5840df6e29b02af1ab493b705bf16ea1ae8338f4dcc176a8":"466f7250617369":"afbeb0f07dfbf5419200f2ccb50bb24f" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_nist_kw.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_nist_kw.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a810520 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_nist_kw.function @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST:MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_mix_contexts( ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx1, ctx2; + unsigned char key[16]; + unsigned char plaintext[32]; + unsigned char ciphertext1[40]; + unsigned char ciphertext2[40]; + size_t output_len, i; + + memset( plaintext, 0, sizeof( plaintext ) ); + memset( ciphertext1, 0, sizeof( ciphertext1 ) ); + memset( ciphertext2, 0, sizeof( ciphertext2 ) ); + memset( key, 0, sizeof( key ) ); + + /* + * 1. Check wrap and unwrap with two separate contexts + */ + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx1 ); + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx1, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, sizeof( key ) * 8, + 1 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( &ctx1, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, + plaintext, sizeof( plaintext ), + ciphertext1, &output_len, + sizeof( ciphertext1 ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == sizeof( ciphertext1 ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx2, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, sizeof( key ) * 8, + 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( &ctx2, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, + ciphertext1, output_len, + plaintext, &output_len, + sizeof( plaintext ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == sizeof( plaintext ) ); + for( i = 0; i < sizeof( plaintext ); i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( plaintext[i] == 0 ); + } + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx1 ); + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx2 ); + + /* + * 2. Check wrapping with two modes, on same context + */ + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx1 ); + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx2 ); + output_len = sizeof( ciphertext1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx1, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, sizeof( key ) * 8, + 1 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( &ctx1, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, + plaintext, sizeof( plaintext ), + ciphertext1, &output_len, + sizeof( ciphertext1 ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == sizeof( ciphertext1 ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( &ctx1, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, + plaintext, sizeof( plaintext ), + ciphertext2, &output_len, + sizeof( ciphertext2 ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == sizeof( ciphertext2 ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx2, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, sizeof( key ) * 8, + 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( &ctx2, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, + ciphertext1, sizeof( ciphertext1 ), + plaintext, &output_len, + sizeof( plaintext ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == sizeof( plaintext ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < sizeof( plaintext ); i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( plaintext[i] == 0 ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( &ctx2, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, + ciphertext2, sizeof( ciphertext2 ), + plaintext, &output_len, + sizeof( plaintext ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == sizeof( plaintext ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < sizeof( plaintext ); i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( plaintext[i] == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx1 ); + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx2 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( int cipher_id, int key_size, + int is_wrap, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx; + unsigned char key[32]; + int ret; + + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx ); + + memset( key, 0x2A, sizeof( key ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( (unsigned) key_size <= 8 * sizeof( key ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key, key_size, is_wrap ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +void nist_kw_plaintext_lengths( int in_len, int out_len, int mode, int res ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx; + unsigned char key[16]; + unsigned char *plaintext = NULL; + unsigned char *ciphertext = NULL; + size_t output_len = out_len; + + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx ); + + memset( key, 0, sizeof( key ) ); + + if( in_len != 0 ) + { + plaintext = mbedtls_calloc( 1, in_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( plaintext != NULL ); + } + + if( out_len != 0 ) + { + ciphertext = mbedtls_calloc( 1, output_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ciphertext != NULL ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, 8 * sizeof( key ), 1 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( &ctx, mode, plaintext, in_len, + ciphertext, &output_len, + output_len ) == res ); + if( res == 0 ) + { + if( mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP ) + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == (size_t) in_len + 8 - + ( in_len % 8 ) + 8 ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == (size_t) in_len + 8 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( ciphertext ); + mbedtls_free( plaintext ); + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +void nist_kw_ciphertext_lengths( int in_len, int out_len, int mode, int res ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx; + unsigned char key[16]; + unsigned char *plaintext = NULL; + unsigned char *ciphertext = NULL; + int unwrap_ret; + size_t output_len = out_len; + + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx ); + + memset( key, 0, sizeof( key ) ); + + if( out_len != 0 ) + { + plaintext = mbedtls_calloc( 1, output_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( plaintext != NULL ); + } + if( in_len != 0 ) + { + ciphertext = mbedtls_calloc( 1, in_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ciphertext != NULL ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, 8 * sizeof( key ), 0 ) == 0 ); + unwrap_ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( &ctx, mode, ciphertext, in_len, + plaintext, &output_len, + output_len ); + + if( res == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( unwrap_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( unwrap_ret == res ); + + TEST_ASSERT( output_len == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( ciphertext ); + mbedtls_free( plaintext ); + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( int cipher_id, int mode, data_t *key, data_t *msg, + data_t *expected_result ) +{ + unsigned char result[528]; + mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx; + size_t result_len, i, padlen; + + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx ); + + memset( result, '+', sizeof( result ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, + key->x, key->len * 8, 1 ) == 0 ); + + /* Test with input == output */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( &ctx, mode, msg->x, msg->len, + result, &result_len, sizeof( result ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( result_len == expected_result->len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( expected_result->x, result, result_len ) == 0 ); + + padlen = ( msg->len % 8 != 0 ) ? 8 - (msg->len % 8 ) : 0; + /* Check that the function didn't write beyond the end of the buffer. */ + for( i = msg->len + 8 + padlen; i < sizeof( result ); i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( result[i] == '+' ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( int cipher_id, int mode, data_t *key, data_t *msg, + data_t *expected_result, int expected_ret ) +{ + unsigned char result[528]; + mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx; + size_t result_len, i; + + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx ); + + memset( result, '+', sizeof( result ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, + key->x, key->len * 8, 0 ) == 0 ); + + /* Test with input == output */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( &ctx, mode, msg->x, msg->len, + result, &result_len, sizeof( result ) ) == expected_ret ); + if( expected_ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( result_len == expected_result->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( expected_result->x, result, result_len ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( result_len == 0 ); + } + + /* Check that the function didn't write beyond the end of the buffer. */ + for( i = msg->len - 8; i < sizeof( result ); i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( result[i] == '+' ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32619352 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.data @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +OID get Any Policy certificate policy +oid_get_certificate_policies:"551D2000":"Any Policy" + +OID get certificate policy invalid oid +oid_get_certificate_policies:"5533445566":"" + +OID get certificate policy wrong oid - id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier +oid_get_certificate_policies:"551D23":"" + +OID get Ext Key Usage - id-kp-serverAuth +oid_get_extended_key_usage:"2B06010505070301":"TLS Web Server Authentication" + +OID get Ext Key Usage - id-kp-clientAuth +oid_get_extended_key_usage:"2B06010505070302":"TLS Web Client Authentication" + +OID get Ext Key Usage - id-kp-codeSigning +oid_get_extended_key_usage:"2B06010505070303":"Code Signing" + +OID get Ext Key Usage - id-kp-emailProtection +oid_get_extended_key_usage:"2B06010505070304":"E-mail Protection" + +OID get Ext Key Usage - id-kp-timeStamping +oid_get_extended_key_usage:"2B06010505070308":"Time Stamping" + +OID get Ext Key Usage - id-kp-OCSPSigning +oid_get_extended_key_usage:"2B06010505070309":"OCSP Signing" + +OID get Ext Key Usage - id-kp-wisun-fan-device +oid_get_extended_key_usage:"2B0601040182E42501":"Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)" + +OID get Ext Key Usage invalid oid +oid_get_extended_key_usage:"5533445566":"" + +OID get Ext Key Usage wrong oid - id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier +oid_get_extended_key_usage:"551D23":"" + +OID get x509 extension - id-ce-basicConstraints +oid_get_x509_extension:"551D13":MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS + +OID get x509 extension - id-ce-keyUsage +oid_get_x509_extension:"551D0F":MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE + +OID get x509 extension - id-ce-extKeyUsage +oid_get_x509_extension:"551D25":MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + +OID get x509 extension - id-ce-subjectAltName +oid_get_x509_extension:"551D11":MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME + +OID get x509 extension - id-netscape-certtype +oid_get_x509_extension:"6086480186F8420101":MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE + +OID get x509 extension - id-ce-certificatePolicies +oid_get_x509_extension:"551D20":MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES + +OID get x509 extension - invalid oid +oid_get_x509_extension:"5533445566":0 + +OID get x509 extension - wrong oid - id-ce +oid_get_x509_extension:"551D":0 + +OID hash id - id-md5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +oid_get_md_alg_id:"2A864886f70d0205":MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 + +OID hash id - id-sha1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +oid_get_md_alg_id:"2b0e03021a":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 + +OID hash id - id-sha224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +oid_get_md_alg_id:"608648016503040204":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 + +OID hash id - id-sha256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +oid_get_md_alg_id:"608648016503040201":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +OID hash id - id-sha384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +oid_get_md_alg_id:"608648016503040202":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 + +OID hash id - id-sha512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +oid_get_md_alg_id:"608648016503040203":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 + +OID hash id - id-ripemd160 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +oid_get_md_alg_id:"2b24030201":MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 + +OID hash id - invalid oid +oid_get_md_alg_id:"2B864886f70d0204":-1 + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e8d4373 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_oid.function @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "string.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_OID_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void oid_get_certificate_policies( data_t *oid, char *result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_buf asn1_buf = { 0, 0, NULL }; + int ret; + const char *desc; + + asn1_buf.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + asn1_buf.p = oid->x; + asn1_buf.len = oid->len; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( &asn1_buf, &desc ); + if( strlen( result_str ) == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( ( char* )desc, result_str ) == 0 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void oid_get_extended_key_usage( data_t *oid, char *result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_buf asn1_buf = { 0, 0, NULL }; + int ret; + const char *desc; + + asn1_buf.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + asn1_buf.p = oid->x; + asn1_buf.len = oid->len; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &asn1_buf, &desc ); + if( strlen( result_str ) == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( ( char * )desc, result_str ) == 0 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void oid_get_x509_extension( data_t *oid, int exp_type ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_buf ext_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; + int ret; + int ext_type; + + ext_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + ext_oid.p = oid->x; + ext_oid.len = oid->len; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &ext_oid, &ext_type ); + if( exp_type == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ext_type == exp_type ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void oid_get_md_alg_id( data_t *oid, int exp_md_id ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_buf md_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; + int ret; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_id = 0; + + md_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + md_oid.p = oid->x; + md_oid.len = oid->len; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &md_oid, &md_id ); + + if( exp_md_id < 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_id == 0); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( (mbedtls_md_type_t)exp_md_id == md_id ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pem.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pem.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..77546c58 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pem.data @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +Standard PEM write +mbedtls_pem_write_buffer:"-----START TEST-----\n":"-----END TEST-----\n":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"-----START TEST-----\nAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODwABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8=\n-----END TEST-----\n" + +PEM write (zero data) +mbedtls_pem_write_buffer:"-----START TEST-----\n":"-----END TEST-----\n":"":"-----START TEST-----\n-----END TEST-----\n" + +PEM write (one byte) +mbedtls_pem_write_buffer:"-----START TEST-----\n":"-----END TEST-----\n":"00":"-----START TEST-----\nAA==\n-----END TEST-----\n" + +PEM write (more than line size) +mbedtls_pem_write_buffer:"-----START TEST-----\n":"-----END TEST-----\n":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"-----START TEST-----\nAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODwABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8AAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4P\nAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODwABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8=\n-----END TEST-----\n" + +PEM write (exactly two lines) +mbedtls_pem_write_buffer:"-----START TEST-----\n":"-----END TEST-----\n":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"-----START TEST-----\nAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODwABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8AAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4P\nAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODwABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8AAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4P\n-----END TEST-----\n" + +PEM write (exactly two lines + 1) +mbedtls_pem_write_buffer:"-----START TEST-----\n":"-----END TEST-----\n":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F00":"-----START TEST-----\nAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODwABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8AAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4P\nAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODwABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8AAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4P\nAA==\n-----END TEST-----\n" + +PEM read (DES-EDE3-CBC + invalid iv) +mbedtls_pem_read_buffer:"^":"$":"^\nProc-Type\: 4,ENCRYPTED\nDEK-Info\: DES-EDE3-CBC,00$":"pwd":MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV + +PEM read (DES-CBC + invalid iv) +mbedtls_pem_read_buffer:"^":"$":"^\nProc-Type\: 4,ENCRYPTED\nDEK-Info\: DES-CBC,00$":"pwd":MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV + +PEM read (unknown encryption algorithm) +mbedtls_pem_read_buffer:"^":"$":"^\nProc-Type\: 4,ENCRYPTED\nDEK-Info\: AES-,00$":"pwd":MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG + +PEM read (malformed PEM DES-CBC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pem_read_buffer:"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----":"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----":"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\nProc-Type\: 4,ENCRYPTED\nDEK-Info\: DES-CBC,AA94892A169FA426\n\nMAAA\n-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----":"pwd":MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +PEM read (malformed PEM DES-EDE3-CBC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pem_read_buffer:"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----":"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----":"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\nProc-Type\: 4,ENCRYPTED\nDEK-Info\: DES-EDE3-CBC,AA94892A169FA426\n\nMAAA\n-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----":"pwd":MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + +PEM read (malformed PEM AES-128-CBC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pem_read_buffer:"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----":"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----":"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\nProc-Type\: 4,ENCRYPTED\nDEK-Info\: AES-128-CBC,AA94892A169FA426AA94892A169FA426\n\nMAAA\n-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----":"pwd":MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pem.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pem.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..947f1fb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pem.function @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +void mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( char * start, char * end, data_t * buf, + char * result_str ) +{ + unsigned char *check_buf = NULL; + int ret; + size_t olen = 0, olen2 = 0; + + + ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( start, end, buf->x, buf->len, NULL, 0, &olen ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + check_buf = (unsigned char *) mbedtls_calloc( 1, olen ); + TEST_ASSERT( check_buf != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( start, end, buf->x, buf->len, check_buf, olen, &olen2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( olen2 <= olen ); + TEST_ASSERT( olen > strlen( (char*) result_str ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strncmp( (char *) check_buf, (char *) result_str, olen ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( check_buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( char *header, char *footer, char *data, + char *pwd, int res ) +{ + mbedtls_pem_context ctx; + int ret; + size_t use_len = 0; + size_t pwd_len = strlen( pwd ); + + mbedtls_pem_init( &ctx ); + + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &ctx, header, footer, (unsigned char *)data, + (unsigned char *)pwd, pwd_len, &use_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == res ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pem_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d3594b83 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@ +PK invalid parameters +invalid_parameters: + +PK valid parameters +valid_parameters: + +PK write valid parameters +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +valid_parameters_pkwrite:"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" + +PK utils: RSA 512-bit +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:512:512:64:"RSA" + +PK utils: ECKEY SECP192R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:192:24:"EC" + +PK utils: ECKEY_DH SECP192R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:192:24:"EC_DH" + +PK utils: ECKEY_DH Curve25519 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:255:32:"EC_DH" + +PK utils: ECKEY_DH Curve448 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:448:56:"EC_DH" + +PK utils: ECDSA SECP192R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:192:24:"ECDSA" + +PK utils: ECDSA SECP256R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:256:32:"ECDSA" + +PK utils: ECDSA SECP384R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:384:48:"ECDSA" + +PK utils: ECDSA SECP521R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:521:66:"ECDSA" + +PK PSA utilities: setup/free, info functions, unsupported operations +pk_psa_utils: + +RSA verify test vector #1 (good) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_rsa_verify_test_vec:"206ef4bf396c6087f8229ef196fd35f37ccb8de5efcdb238f20d556668f114257a11fbe038464a67830378e62ae9791453953dac1dbd7921837ba98e84e856eb80ed9487e656d0b20c28c8ba5e35db1abbed83ed1c7720a97701f709e3547a4bfcabca9c89c57ad15c3996577a0ae36d7c7b699035242f37954646c1cd5c08ac":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"5abc01f5de25b70867ff0c24e222c61f53c88daf42586fddcd56f3c4588f074be3c328056c063388688b6385a8167957c6e5355a510e005b8a851d69c96b36ec6036644078210e5d7d326f96365ee0648882921492bc7b753eb9c26cdbab37555f210df2ca6fec1b25b463d38b81c0dcea202022b04af5da58aa03d77be949b7":0 + +RSA verify test vector #2 (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_rsa_verify_test_vec:"d6248c3e96b1a7e5fea978870fcc4c9786b4e5156e16b7faef4557d667f730b8bc4c784ef00c624df5309513c3a5de8ca94c2152e0459618666d3148092562ebc256ffca45b27fd2d63c68bd5e0a0aefbe496e9e63838a361b1db6fc272464f191490bf9c029643c49d2d9cd08833b8a70b4b3431f56fb1eb55ccd39e77a9c92":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"3203b7647fb7e345aa457681e5131777f1adc371f2fba8534928c4e52ef6206a856425d6269352ecbf64db2f6ad82397768cafdd8cd272e512d617ad67992226da6bc291c31404c17fd4b7e2beb20eff284a44f4d7af47fd6629e2c95809fa7f2241a04f70ac70d3271bb13258af1ed5c5988c95df7fa26603515791075feccd":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +ECDSA verify test vector #1 (good) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"046FDD3028FA94A863CD4F78DBFF8B3AA561FC6D9CCBBCA88E0AE6FA437F5415F957542D0717FF8B84562DAE99872EF841":"546869732073686F756C64206265207468652068617368206F662061206D6573736167652E00":"30350218185B2A7FB5CD9C9A8488B119B68B47D6EC833509CE9FA1FF021900FB7D259A744A2348BD45D241A39DC915B81CC2084100FA24":0 + +ECDSA verify test vector #2 (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"046FDD3028FA94A863CD4F78DBFF8B3AA561FC6D9CCBBCA88E0AE6FA437F5415F957542D0717FF8B84562DAE99872EF841":"546869732073686F756C64206265207468652068617368206F662061206D6573736167652E00":"30350218185B2A7FB5CD9C9A8488B119B68B47D6EC833509CE9FA1FF021900FB7D259A744A2348BD45D241A39DC915B81CC2084100FA25":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED + +EC(DSA) verify test vector #1 (good) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"046FDD3028FA94A863CD4F78DBFF8B3AA561FC6D9CCBBCA88E0AE6FA437F5415F957542D0717FF8B84562DAE99872EF841":"546869732073686F756C64206265207468652068617368206F662061206D6573736167652E00":"30350218185B2A7FB5CD9C9A8488B119B68B47D6EC833509CE9FA1FF021900FB7D259A744A2348BD45D241A39DC915B81CC2084100FA24":0 + +EC(DSA) verify test vector #2 (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"046FDD3028FA94A863CD4F78DBFF8B3AA561FC6D9CCBBCA88E0AE6FA437F5415F957542D0717FF8B84562DAE99872EF841":"546869732073686F756C64206265207468652068617368206F662061206D6573736167652E00":"30350218185B2A7FB5CD9C9A8488B119B68B47D6EC833509CE9FA1FF021900FB7D259A744A2348BD45D241A39DC915B81CC2084100FA25":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED + +EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(r) = 256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"3046022100faecc085c6c5362b91ff1fd6dd77da80bc071bee9ff1ac0ef9509c017f13267c022100a7d0b908c938d3dd6c6a9cdc5b0a4a4ee455c519c1ff6cda959806b7e7461ba0":0 + +EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(r) = 255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"30450220639f36215b2ff09bb2beb871e122de74c8d5e29ce8a105aa2b95661f42803e72022100becd8f81b2c186f9d5d2c92378d7b9452ce6de231b0c8d17bac2d8537d2331fd":0 + +EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(r) = 248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"30450220009109f967f9082abc9c46e5ea07936529b82023a1a49b872c046f430983db2602210085f0b1960d61f8d75109b5b7ff991d3171320d2ab547104f864048455a965090":0 + +EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(r) = 247 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"3044021f461786833b50247b07194da6cedbd3caefbcd19c73b6283ccff5097cd0d73b022100d85d20b0b8c3b596eb1cdb0381e681fa0a8bccde4e89c139020af3b0f88e099c":0 + +EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(s) = 256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"30450220639f36215b2ff09bb2beb871e122de74c8d5e29ce8a105aa2b95661f42803e72022100becd8f81b2c186f9d5d2c92378d7b9452ce6de231b0c8d17bac2d8537d2331fd":0 + +EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(s) = 255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"304402206ae26950c606d08fe5e1682efdccfb3a7213ca46bd523ffd20c4213fe1400d3402207612106ada7055926167650b257da7f4c42c190b8aa9e3b680f8751fe90c63a5":0 + +EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(s) = 248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"3045022100fd4d718ab483827492e10b89745fad100d2dd257102b99aff179ee596a569f1f022000a1b777e32a8b4909763b615b805e59194e6196eb05719287a36eb5f17aa485":0 + +EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(s) = 247 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"30430220685a6994daa6a14e4411b5267edc2a00beee907f2dddd956b2a5a1df791c15f8021f675db4538c000c734489ac737fddd5a739c5a23cd6c6eceea70c286ca4fac9":0 + +ECDSA sign-verify: SECP192R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:0:0 + +ECDSA sign-verify: SECP256R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:0:0 + +ECDSA sign-verify: SECP384R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:0:0 + +ECDSA sign-verify: SECP521R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:0:0 + +ECDSA sign-verify: BP256R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:0:0 + +ECDSA sign-verify: BP512R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:0:0 + +EC(DSA) sign-verify: SECP192R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:0:0 + +EC_DH (no) sign-verify: SECP192R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +RSA sign-verify +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:512:0:0 + +RSA encrypt test vector +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_rsa_encrypt_test_vec:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA decrypt test vector #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_rsa_decrypt_test_vec:"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":2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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":16:"3":"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":0 + +RSA decrypt test vector #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_rsa_decrypt_test_vec:"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":2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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":16:"3":"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EC nocrypt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C +pk_ec_nocrypt:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY + +EC-DH nocrypt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C +pk_ec_nocrypt:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH + +ECDSA nocrypt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +pk_ec_nocrypt:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA + +RSA_ALT consistency +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +pk_rsa_alt: + +Verify ext RSA #1 (PKCS1 v2.1, salt_len = ANY, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"54657374206d657373616765":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +Verify ext RSA #2 (PKCS1 v2.1, salt_len = ANY, wrong message) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"54657374206d657373616766":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +Verify ext RSA #3 (PKCS1 v2.1, salt_len = 0, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"54657374206d657373616765":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"7fc506d26ca3b22922a1ce39faaedd273161b82d9443c56f1a034f131ae4a18cae1474271cb4b66a17d9707ca58b0bdbd3c406b7e65bbcc9bbbce94dc45de807b4989b23b3e4db74ca29298137837eb90cc83d3219249bc7d480fceaf075203a86e54c4ecfa4e312e39f8f69d76534089a36ed9049ca9cfd5ab1db1fa75fe5c8":MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0 + +Verify ext RSA #4 (PKCS1 v2.1, salt_len = max, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"54657374206d657373616765":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:94:0 + +Verify ext RSA #5 (PKCS1 v2.1, wrong salt_len) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"54657374206d657373616765":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:32:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +Verify ext RSA #6 (PKCS1 v2.1, MGF1 alg != MSG hash alg) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"c0719e9a8d5d838d861dc6f675c899d2b309a3a65bb9fe6b11e5afcbf9a2c0b1":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +Verify ext RSA #7 (PKCS1 v2.1, wrong MGF1 alg != MSG hash alg) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"c0719e9a8d5d838d861dc6f675c899d2b309a3a65bb9fe6b11e5afcbf9a2c0b1":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +Verify ext RSA #8 (PKCS1 v2.1, RSASSA-PSS without options) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"54657374206d657373616765":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:-1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Verify ext RSA #9 (PKCS1 v1.5, RSA with options) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"54657374206d657373616765":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Verify ext RSA #10 (PKCS1 v1.5, RSA without options) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"54657374206d657373616765":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:-1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +Verify ext RSA #11 (PKCS1 v2.1, asking for ECDSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"54657374206d657373616765":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:-1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +Verify ext RSA #12 (PKCS1 v1.5, good) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"206ef4bf396c6087f8229ef196fd35f37ccb8de5efcdb238f20d556668f114257a11fbe038464a67830378e62ae9791453953dac1dbd7921837ba98e84e856eb80ed9487e656d0b20c28c8ba5e35db1abbed83ed1c7720a97701f709e3547a4bfcabca9c89c57ad15c3996577a0ae36d7c7b699035242f37954646c1cd5c08ac":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"5abc01f5de25b70867ff0c24e222c61f53c88daf42586fddcd56f3c4588f074be3c328056c063388688b6385a8167957c6e5355a510e005b8a851d69c96b36ec6036644078210e5d7d326f96365ee0648882921492bc7b753eb9c26cdbab37555f210df2ca6fec1b25b463d38b81c0dcea202022b04af5da58aa03d77be949b7":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:-1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +Check pair #1 (EC, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_pk_check_pair:"data_files/ec_256_pub.pem":"data_files/ec_256_prv.pem":0 + +Check pair #2 (EC, bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_pk_check_pair:"data_files/ec_256_pub.pem":"data_files/server5.key":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +Check pair #3 (RSA, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_pk_check_pair:"data_files/server1.pubkey":"data_files/server1.key":0 + +Check pair #4 (RSA, bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_pk_check_pair:"data_files/server1.pubkey":"data_files/server2.key":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +Check pair #5 (RSA vs EC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_pk_check_pair:"data_files/ec_256_pub.pem":"data_files/server1.key":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +RSA hash_len overflow (size_t vs unsigned int) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 +pk_rsa_overflow: + +ECDSA restartable sign/verify: ECDSA, max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":0:0:0 + +ECDSA restartable sign/verify: ECKEY, max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":0:0:0 + +ECDSA restartable sign/verify: ECDSA, max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":1:1:10000 + +ECDSA restartable sign/verify: ECKEY, max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":1:1:10000 + +ECDSA restartable sign/verify: ECDSA, max_ops=10000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":10000:0:0 + +ECDSA restartable sign/verify: ECKEY, max_ops=10000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":10000:0:0 + +ECDSA restartable sign/verify: ECDSA, max_ops=250 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":250:2:64 + +ECDSA restartable sign/verify: ECKEY, max_ops=250 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":250:2:64 + +PSA wrapped sign: SECP256R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:256 + +PSA wrapped sign: SECP384R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:384 + +PSA wrapped sign: SECP521R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:521 + +PSA wrapped sign: SECP192K1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:192 + +## Currently buggy: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbed-crypto/issues/336 +# PSA wrapped sign: SECP224K1 +# depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +# pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:224 + +PSA wrapped sign: SECP256K1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:256 + +PSA wrapped sign: BP256R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:256 + +PSA wrapped sign: BP384R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:384 + +PSA wrapped sign: BP512R1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:512 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..11d4fd4b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -0,0 +1,1300 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +/* For error codes */ +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" + +#include +#include + +/* Needed only for test case data under #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO), + * but the test code generator requires test case data to be valid C code + * unconditionally (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/2023). */ +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#define RSA_KEY_SIZE 512 +#define RSA_KEY_LEN 64 + +/** Generate a key of the desired type. + * + * \param pk The PK object to fill. It must have been initialized + * with mbedtls_pk_setup(). + * \param parameter - For RSA keys, the key size in bits. + * - For EC keys, the curve (\c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx). + * + * \return The status from the underlying type-specific key + * generation function. + * \return -1 if the key type is not recognized. + */ +static int pk_genkey( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, int parameter ) +{ + ((void) pk); + (void) parameter; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + return mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, + parameter, 3 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || + mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) + { + int ret; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp, + parameter ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp, + &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->d, + &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->Q, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ); + } +#endif + return( -1 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +int mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, mode, + olen, input, output, output_max_len ) ); +} +int mbedtls_rsa_sign_func( void *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ) +{ + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, mode, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig ) ); +} +size_t mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func( void *ctx ) +{ + return( ((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +/* + * Generate a key using PSA and return the key identifier of that key, + * or 0 if the key generation failed. + * The key uses NIST P-256 and is usable for signing with SHA-256. + */ +mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pk_psa_genkey( void ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const psa_key_type_t type = + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + const size_t bits = 256; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ) ); + +exit: + return( key ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +void pk_psa_utils( ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk, pk2; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + const char * const name = "Opaque"; + const size_t bitlen = 256; /* hardcoded in genkey() */ + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + unsigned char b1[1], b2[1]; + size_t len; + mbedtls_pk_debug_item dbg; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) == PSA_SUCCESS ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( &pk, MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + key = pk_psa_genkey(); + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ) + goto exit; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( &pk, key ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pk), name ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &pk ) == bitlen ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_len( &pk ) == bitlen / 8 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) == 0 ); + + /* unsupported operations: verify, decrypt, encrypt */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, md_alg, + b1, sizeof( b1), b2, sizeof( b2 ) ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &pk, b1, sizeof( b1 ), + b2, &len, sizeof( b2 ), + NULL, NULL ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &pk, b1, sizeof( b1 ), + b2, &len, sizeof( b2 ), + NULL, NULL ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + /* unsupported functions: check_pair, debug */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk2, + mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pk, &pk2 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_debug( &pk, &dbg ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + /* test that freeing the context does not destroy the key */ + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_SUCCESS == psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_SUCCESS == psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); /* redundant except upon error */ + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk2 ); + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void valid_parameters( ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + unsigned char buf[1]; + size_t len; + void *options = NULL; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_pk_free( NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_pk_restart_free( NULL ) ); +#endif + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* In informational functions, we accept NULL where a context pointer + * is expected because that's what the library has done forever. + * We do not document that NULL is accepted, so we may wish to change + * the behavior in a future version. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_len( NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( NULL, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + NULL, 0, + buf, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, + NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + NULL, 0, + buf, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, + NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + NULL, 0, + buf, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + NULL, 0, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + NULL, 0, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, options, + &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + NULL, 0, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &pk, + NULL, 0, + NULL, &len, 0, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &pk, + NULL, 0, + NULL, &len, 0, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, NULL, 0, NULL, 1 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, NULL, 0 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ +void valid_parameters_pkwrite( data_t *key_data ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + + /* For the write tests to be effective, we need a valid key pair. */ + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, + key_data->x, key_data->len, + NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( &pk, NULL, 0 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( &pk, NULL, 0 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( &pk, NULL, 0 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( &pk, NULL, 0 ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void invalid_parameters( ) +{ + size_t len; + unsigned char *null_buf = NULL; + unsigned char buf[1]; + unsigned char *p = buf; + char str[1] = {0}; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_md_type_t valid_md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + void *options = buf; + + (void) null_buf; + (void) p; + (void) str; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_pk_init( NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_pk_restart_init( NULL ) ); +#endif + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_setup( NULL, NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( NULL, buf, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); +#endif + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( NULL, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pk, + valid_md, + NULL, 0, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify( NULL, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, + valid_md, + NULL, 0, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, options, + NULL, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, options, + &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, options, + &pk, + valid_md, + NULL, 0, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, options, + &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, &len, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, NULL, sizeof( buf ), + buf, &len, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &pk, valid_md, NULL, 0, buf, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, buf, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, &len, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_sign( NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, &len, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, NULL, sizeof( buf ), + buf, &len, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, valid_md, NULL, 0, buf, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, buf, sizeof( buf ), NULL, &len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_decrypt( NULL, buf, sizeof( buf ), buf, &len, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &pk, NULL, sizeof( buf ), buf, &len, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &pk, buf, sizeof( buf ), NULL, &len, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &pk, buf, sizeof( buf ), buf, NULL, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_encrypt( NULL, buf, sizeof( buf ), buf, &len, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &pk, NULL, sizeof( buf ), buf, &len, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &pk, buf, sizeof( buf ), NULL, &len, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &pk, buf, sizeof( buf ), buf, NULL, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_check_pair( NULL, &pk ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pk, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_debug( NULL, NULL ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_load_file( NULL, &p, &len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_load_file( str, NULL, &len ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_load_file( str, &p, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( NULL, str, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( NULL, str ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &pk, NULL ) ); +#endif + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( NULL, buf, &pk ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &null_buf, buf, &pk ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, NULL, &pk ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, buf, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_key( NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( NULL, p, &pk ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &null_buf, p, &pk ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &p, NULL, &pk ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &p, p, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( &pk, + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( &pk, + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( &pk, + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( NULL, + buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( &pk, + NULL, sizeof( buf ) ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pk_utils( int type, int parameter, int bitlen, int len, char * name ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( type ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( pk_genkey( &pk, parameter ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( (int) mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == type ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, type ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &pk ) == (unsigned) bitlen ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_len( &pk ) == (unsigned) len ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pk), name ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void mbedtls_pk_check_pair( char * pub_file, char * prv_file, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pub, prv, alt; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pub ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &prv ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &alt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &pub, pub_file ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &prv, prv_file, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &prv ) == ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &prv ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( &alt, mbedtls_pk_rsa( prv ), + mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func, mbedtls_rsa_sign_func, + mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &alt ) == ret ); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_pk_free( &pub ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &prv ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &alt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +void pk_rsa_verify_test_vec( data_t * message_str, int digest, int mod, + int radix_N, char * input_N, int radix_E, + char * input_E, data_t * result_str, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx ctx; + + rs_ctx = &ctx; + mbedtls_pk_restart_init( rs_ctx ); + // this setting would ensure restart would happen if ECC was used + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( 1 ); +#endif + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + memset( hash_result, 0x00, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 ); + rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ); + + rsa->len = mod / 8; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &rsa->N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &rsa->E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + + if( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ) != NULL ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ), message_str->x, message_str->len, hash_result ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, digest, hash_result, 0, + result_str->x, mbedtls_pk_get_len( &pk ) ) == result ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pk, digest, hash_result, 0, + result_str->x, mbedtls_pk_get_len( &pk ), rs_ctx ) == result ); + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx ); +#endif + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +void pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec( data_t * message_str, int digest, + int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N, + int radix_E, char * input_E, + data_t * result_str, int pk_type, + int mgf1_hash_id, int salt_len, int result ) +{ + unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options pss_opts; + void *options; + size_t hash_len; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + memset( hash_result, 0x00, sizeof( hash_result ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 ); + rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ); + + rsa->len = mod / 8; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &rsa->N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &rsa->E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + + if( digest != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ), + message_str->x, message_str->len, hash_result ) == 0 ); + hash_len = 0; + } + else + { + memcpy( hash_result, message_str->x, message_str->len ); + hash_len = message_str->len; + } + + if( mgf1_hash_id < 0 ) + { + options = NULL; + } + else + { + options = &pss_opts; + + pss_opts.mgf1_hash_id = mgf1_hash_id; + pss_opts.expected_salt_len = salt_len; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( pk_type, options, &pk, + digest, hash_result, hash_len, + result_str->x, mbedtls_pk_get_len( &pk ) ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +void pk_ec_test_vec( int type, int id, data_t * key, data_t * hash, + data_t * sig, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eckey; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + USE_PSA_INIT( ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( type ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ); + eckey = mbedtls_pk_ec( pk ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &eckey->grp, id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &eckey->grp, &eckey->Q, + key->x, key->len ) == 0 ); + + // MBEDTLS_MD_NONE is used since it will be ignored. + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash->x, hash->len, sig->x, sig->len ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ +void pk_sign_verify_restart( int pk_type, int grp_id, char *d_str, + char *QX_str, char *QY_str, + int md_alg, char *msg, data_t *sig_check, + int max_ops, int min_restart, int max_restart ) +{ + int ret, cnt_restart; + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx rs_ctx; + mbedtls_pk_context prv, pub; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN]; + size_t hlen, slen; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + mbedtls_pk_restart_init( &rs_ctx ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &prv ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &pub ); + memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) ); + memset( sig, 0, sizeof( sig ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &prv, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_type ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &mbedtls_pk_ec( prv )->grp, grp_id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &mbedtls_pk_ec( prv )->d, 16, d_str ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pub, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_type ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &mbedtls_pk_ec( pub )->grp, grp_id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( &mbedtls_pk_ec( pub )->Q, 16, QX_str, QY_str ) == 0 ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( md_info, + (const unsigned char *) msg, strlen( msg ), + hash ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( max_ops ); + + slen = sizeof( sig ); + cnt_restart = 0; + do { + ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &prv, md_alg, hash, hlen, + sig, &slen, NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( slen == sig_check->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( sig, sig_check->x, slen ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart >= min_restart ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart <= max_restart ); + + cnt_restart = 0; + do { + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pub, md_alg, + hash, hlen, sig, slen, &rs_ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart >= min_restart ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart <= max_restart ); + + hash[0]++; + do { + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pub, md_alg, + hash, hlen, sig, slen, &rs_ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret != 0 ); + hash[0]--; + + sig[0]++; + do { + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pub, md_alg, + hash, hlen, sig, slen, &rs_ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret != 0 ); + sig[0]--; + + /* Do we leak memory when aborting? try verify then sign + * This test only makes sense when we actually restart */ + if( min_restart > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pub, md_alg, + hash, hlen, sig, slen, &rs_ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( &rs_ctx ); + + slen = sizeof( sig ); + ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &prv, md_alg, hash, hlen, + sig, &slen, NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( &rs_ctx ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &prv ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pub ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void pk_sign_verify( int type, int parameter, int sign_ret, int verify_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + size_t sig_len, hash_len; + mbedtls_md_type_t md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + unsigned char *hash = NULL; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + void *rs_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx ctx; + + rs_ctx = &ctx; + mbedtls_pk_restart_init( rs_ctx ); + /* This value is large enough that the operation will complete in one run. + * See comments at the top of ecp_test_vect_restart in + * test_suite_ecp.function for estimates of operation counts. */ + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( 42000 ); +#endif + + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( hash, hash_len ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + USE_PSA_INIT( ); + + memset( hash, 0x2a, hash_len ); + memset( sig, 0, sizeof sig ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( type ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( pk_genkey( &pk, parameter ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( &pk, md, + hash, hash_len, sig, &sig_len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, rs_ctx ) == sign_ret ); + if( sign_ret == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( sig_len <= MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + else + sig_len = MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, md, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) == verify_ret ); + + if( verify_ret == 0 ) + { + hash[0]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, md, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) != 0 ); + hash[0]--; + + sig[0]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, md, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) != 0 ); + sig[0]--; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, md, hash, hash_len, + sig, &sig_len, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL ) == sign_ret ); + if( sign_ret == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( sig_len <= MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + else + sig_len = MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pk, md, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx ) == verify_ret ); + + if( verify_ret == 0 ) + { + hash[0]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pk, md, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx ) != 0 ); + hash[0]--; + + sig[0]++; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &pk, md, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx ) != 0 ); + sig[0]--; + } + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx ); +#endif + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + mbedtls_free( hash ); + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +void pk_rsa_encrypt_test_vec( data_t * message, int mod, int radix_N, + char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E, + data_t * result, int ret ) +{ + unsigned char output[300]; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + size_t olen; + + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + memset( output, 0, sizeof( output ) ); + + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 ); + rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ); + + rsa->len = mod / 8; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &rsa->N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &rsa->E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &pk, message->x, message->len, + output, &olen, sizeof( output ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == ret ); + TEST_ASSERT( olen == result->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, result->x, olen ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +void pk_rsa_decrypt_test_vec( data_t * cipher, int mod, int radix_P, + char * input_P, int radix_Q, char * input_Q, + int radix_N, char * input_N, int radix_E, + char * input_E, data_t * clear, int ret ) +{ + unsigned char output[256]; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + size_t olen; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + + /* init pk-rsa context */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 ); + rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk ); + + /* load public key */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + /* load private key */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) == 0 ); + + /* decryption test */ + memset( output, 0, sizeof( output ) ); + olen = 0; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &pk, cipher->x, cipher->len, + output, &olen, sizeof( output ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == ret ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( olen == clear->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, clear->x, olen ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pk_ec_nocrypt( int type ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + unsigned char output[100]; + unsigned char input[100]; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + size_t olen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + memset( output, 0, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( input, 0, sizeof( input ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( type ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &pk, input, sizeof( input ), + output, &olen, sizeof( output ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == ret ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &pk, input, sizeof( input ), + output, &olen, sizeof( output ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +void pk_rsa_overflow( ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + size_t hash_len = SIZE_MAX, sig_len = SIZE_MAX; + unsigned char hash[50], sig[100]; + + if( SIZE_MAX <= UINT_MAX ) + return; + + memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash ); + memset( sig, 0, sizeof sig ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, + mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, NULL, &pk, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, hash_len, sig, + &sig_len, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ +void pk_rsa_alt( ) +{ + /* + * An rsa_alt context can only do private operations (decrypt, sign). + * Test it against the public operations (encrypt, verify) of a + * corresponding rsa context. + */ + mbedtls_rsa_context raw; + mbedtls_pk_context rsa, alt; + mbedtls_pk_debug_item dbg_items[10]; + unsigned char hash[50], sig[64]; + unsigned char msg[50], ciph[64], test[50]; + size_t sig_len, ciph_len, test_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &raw, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &rsa ); mbedtls_pk_init( &alt ); + + memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash ); + memset( sig, 0, sizeof sig ); + memset( msg, 0x2a, sizeof msg ); + memset( ciph, 0, sizeof ciph ); + memset( test, 0, sizeof test ); + + /* Initialize PK RSA context with random key */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &rsa, + mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( pk_genkey( &rsa, RSA_KEY_SIZE ) == 0 ); + + /* Extract key to the raw rsa context */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_copy( &raw, mbedtls_pk_rsa( rsa ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Initialize PK RSA_ALT context */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( &alt, (void *) &raw, + mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func, mbedtls_rsa_sign_func, mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func ) == 0 ); + + /* Test administrative functions */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &alt, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &alt ) == RSA_KEY_SIZE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_len( &alt ) == RSA_KEY_LEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &alt ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( mbedtls_pk_get_name( &alt ), "RSA-alt" ) == 0 ); + + /* Test signature */ +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, SIZE_MAX, sig, + &sig_len, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof hash, sig, + &sig_len, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( sig_len == RSA_KEY_LEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len ) == 0 ); + + /* Test decrypt */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &rsa, msg, sizeof msg, + ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof ciph, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &alt, ciph, ciph_len, + test, &test_len, sizeof test, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( test_len == sizeof msg ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( test, msg, test_len ) == 0 ); + + /* Test forbidden operations */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &alt, msg, sizeof msg, + ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof ciph, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == ret ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len ) == ret ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_debug( &alt, dbg_items ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( &raw ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &rsa ); mbedtls_pk_free( &alt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +void pk_psa_sign( int grpid_arg, + int psa_curve_arg, int expected_bits_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid = grpid_arg; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN]; + unsigned char pkey_legacy[200]; + unsigned char pkey_psa[200]; + unsigned char *pkey_legacy_start, *pkey_psa_start; + size_t sig_len, klen_legacy, klen_psa; + int ret; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t expected_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( psa_curve_arg ); + size_t expected_bits = expected_bits_arg; + + /* + * This tests making signatures with a wrapped PSA key: + * - generate a fresh ECP legacy PK context + * - wrap it in a PK context and make a signature this way + * - extract the public key + * - parse it to a PK context and verify the signature this way + */ + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Create legacy EC public/private key in PK context. */ + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk, + mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( grpid, + (mbedtls_ecp_keypair*) pk.pk_ctx, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 ); + + /* Export underlying public key for re-importing in a legacy context. */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( &pk, pkey_legacy, + sizeof( pkey_legacy ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret >= 0 ); + klen_legacy = (size_t) ret; + /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() writes backwards in the data buffer. */ + pkey_legacy_start = pkey_legacy + sizeof( pkey_legacy ) - klen_legacy; + + /* Turn PK context into an opaque one. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &pk, &key_id, + PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) == 0 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), expected_type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), expected_bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ); + + memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash ); + memset( sig, 0, sizeof sig ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + hash, sizeof hash, sig, &sig_len, + NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + + /* Export underlying public key for re-importing in a psa context. */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( &pk, pkey_psa, + sizeof( pkey_psa ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret >= 0 ); + klen_psa = (size_t) ret; + /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() writes backwards in the data buffer. */ + pkey_psa_start = pkey_psa + sizeof( pkey_psa ) - klen_psa; + + TEST_ASSERT( klen_psa == klen_legacy ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( pkey_psa_start, pkey_legacy_start, klen_psa ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_SUCCESS == psa_destroy_key( key_id ) ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, pkey_legacy_start, + klen_legacy ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8c4bab3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +PKCS#12 derive key : MD5: Zero length password and hash +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:"":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:3:"6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b":0 + +PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: NULL password and hash +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"":USE_NULL_INPUT:"":USE_NULL_INPUT:3:"6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b":0 + +PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: Zero length password +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:3:"832d8502114fcccfd3de0c2b2863b1c45fb92a8db2ed1e704727b324adc267bdd66ae4918a81fa2d1ba15febfb9e6c4e":0 + +PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: NULL password +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"":USE_NULL_INPUT:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:3:"832d8502114fcccfd3de0c2b2863b1c45fb92a8db2ed1e704727b324adc267bdd66ae4918a81fa2d1ba15febfb9e6c4e":0 + +PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: Invalid length NULL password +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"0123456789abcdef":USE_NULL_INPUT:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:3:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: Zero length salt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:"":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:3:"832d8502114fcccfd3de0c2b2863b1c45fb92a8db2ed1e704727b324adc267bdd66ae4918a81fa2d1ba15febfb9e6c4e":0 + +PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: NULL salt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:"":USE_NULL_INPUT:3:"832d8502114fcccfd3de0c2b2863b1c45fb92a8db2ed1e704727b324adc267bdd66ae4918a81fa2d1ba15febfb9e6c4e":0 + +PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: Invalid length NULL salt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:"0123456789abcdef":USE_NULL_INPUT:3:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: Valid password and salt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:"0123456789abcdef":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:3:"46559deeee036836ab1b633ec620178d4c70eacf42f72a2ad7360c812efa09ca3d7567b489a109050345c2dc6a262995":0 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a7b01f6d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.function @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +typedef enum +{ + USE_NULL_INPUT = 0, + USE_GIVEN_INPUT = 1, +} input_usage_method_t; + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs12_derive_key( int md_type, int key_size_arg, + data_t *password_arg, int password_usage, + data_t *salt_arg, int salt_usage, + int iterations, + data_t* expected_output, int expected_status ) + +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *output_data = NULL; + + unsigned char *password = NULL; + size_t password_len = 0; + unsigned char *salt = NULL; + size_t salt_len = 0; + size_t key_size = key_size_arg; + + if( password_usage == USE_GIVEN_INPUT ) + password = password_arg->x; + + password_len = password_arg->len; + + if( salt_usage == USE_GIVEN_INPUT ) + salt = salt_arg->x; + + salt_len = salt_arg->len; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, key_size ); + + ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( output_data, + key_size, + password, + password_len, + salt, + salt_len, + md_type, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY, + iterations ); + + TEST_EQUAL( ret, expected_status ); + + if( expected_status == 0 ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_output->x, expected_output->len, + output_data, key_size ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output_data ); + +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b4cf09a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.data @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +RSAES-V15 Encryption input=NULL with length=0 +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt:1024:16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:"":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f67c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e63339fc99a66320db73158a35a255d051758e95ed4abb2cdc69bb454110e827441213ddc8770e93ea141e1fc673e017e97eadc6b968f385c2aecb03bfb3267c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe34676cac0":"42c6fce63a3b858ba89fe83004cac3651d1497c15090bf0086b9a4b9ff3bd451502838a413095aefe231832ba10bb467ae3f95c889cd8e9a6e32b4df633b2170d07a2168c086745f0017cf1d9facff2eee55af2fcb03730209173b2a0bbfb2d4c34d7ea93b3b0cb84a8a7b6371670e14482e6dcedbdd9efe66d906e0238586fe":0 + +RSAES-V15 Decryption empty output with NULL buffer +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_decrypt:1024:16:"eecfae81b1b9b3c908810b10a1b5600199eb9f44aef4fda493b81a9e3d84f632124ef0236e5d1e3b7e28fae7aa040a2d5b252176459d1f397541ba2a58fb6599":16:"c97fb1f027f453f6341233eaaad1d9353f6c42d08866b1d05a0f2035028b9d869840b41666b42e92ea0da3b43204b5cfce3352524d0416a5a441e700af461503":16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:"":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"42c6fce63a3b858ba89fe83004cac3651d1497c15090bf0086b9a4b9ff3bd451502838a413095aefe231832ba10bb467ae3f95c889cd8e9a6e32b4df633b2170d07a2168c086745f0017cf1d9facff2eee55af2fcb03730209173b2a0bbfb2d4c34d7ea93b3b0cb84a8a7b6371670e14482e6dcedbdd9efe66d906e0238586fe":0 + +RSAES-V15 Encryption Test Vector Int +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt:1024:16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f67c6697351ff4aec29cdbaabf2fbe3467cc254f81be8e78d765a2e63339fc99a66320db73158a35a255d051758e95ed4abb2cdc69bb454110e827441213ddc8770e93ea141e1fc673e017e97eadc6b968f385c2aecb03bfb32":"6c5ebca6116b1e91316613fbb5e93197270a849122d549122d05815e2626f80d20f7f3f038c98295203c0f7f6bb8c3568455c67dec82bca86be86eff43b56b7ba2d15375f9a42454c2a2c709953a6e4a977462e35fd21a9c2fb3c0ad2a370f7655267bf6f04814784982988e663b869fc8588475af860d499e5a6ffdfc2c6bfd":0 + +RSAES-V15 Decryption Test Vector Int +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_decrypt:1024:16:"eecfae81b1b9b3c908810b10a1b5600199eb9f44aef4fda493b81a9e3d84f632124ef0236e5d1e3b7e28fae7aa040a2d5b252176459d1f397541ba2a58fb6599":16:"c97fb1f027f453f6341233eaaad1d9353f6c42d08866b1d05a0f2035028b9d869840b41666b42e92ea0da3b43204b5cfce3352524d0416a5a441e700af461503":16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"28818cb14236ad18f4527e7f1f7633e96cef021bc3234475d7f61e88702b6335b42a352ed3f3267ac7c3e9ba4af17e45096c63eefd8d9a7cb42dfc52fffb2f5b8afb305b46312c2eb50634123b4437a2287ac57b7509d59a583fb741989a49f32625e9267b4641a6607b7303d35c68489db53c8d387b620d0d46a852e72ea43c":0 + +RSAES-V15 Encryption Test Vector Data just fits +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt:1024:16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4293cecc8095232ae595b84c15ec26f35cf5fde88ae7a9aaa717bcb1ecc4de498da81db97425000770817b5dde5eed01ca3745ff5ab894d0fc0921e5a10b081490129d8ccbaa154ad3dd461397af8ec964ef99402d60a7591ee44b8ce1c16ef88fcb2717076c730d88223893bdd8000b23d87d38ab":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"18cdb161f40a18509a3501b7e8ec1c7522e2490319efee8581179b5bcf3750f83a865952d078efd48f58f8060b0d43f9888b43a094fe15209451826ef797195885ff9fa3e26994eee85dbe5dd0404a71565708286027b433c88c85af555b96c34c304dc7c8278233654c022ef340042cfff55e6b15b67cfea8a5a384ef64a6ac":0 + +RSAES-V15 Decryption Test Vector Data just fits +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_decrypt:1024:16:"eecfae81b1b9b3c908810b10a1b5600199eb9f44aef4fda493b81a9e3d84f632124ef0236e5d1e3b7e28fae7aa040a2d5b252176459d1f397541ba2a58fb6599":16:"c97fb1f027f453f6341233eaaad1d9353f6c42d08866b1d05a0f2035028b9d869840b41666b42e92ea0da3b43204b5cfce3352524d0416a5a441e700af461503":16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4293cecc8095232ae595b84c15ec26f35cf5fde88ae7a9aaa717bcb1ecc4de498da81db97425000770817b5dde5eed01ca3745ff5ab894d0fc0921e5a10b081490129d8ccbaa154ad3dd461397af8ec964ef99402d60a7591ee44b8ce1c16ef88fcb2717076c730d88223893bdd8000b23d87d38ab":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"18cdb161f40a18509a3501b7e8ec1c7522e2490319efee8581179b5bcf3750f83a865952d078efd48f58f8060b0d43f9888b43a094fe15209451826ef797195885ff9fa3e26994eee85dbe5dd0404a71565708286027b433c88c85af555b96c34c304dc7c8278233654c022ef340042cfff55e6b15b67cfea8a5a384ef64a6ac":0 + +RSAES-V15 Encryption Test Vector Data too long 1 +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt:1024:16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b84293cecc8095232ae595b84c15ec26f35cf5fde88ae7a9aaa717bcb1ecc4de498da81db97425000770817b5dde5eed01ca3745ff5ab894d0fc0921e5a10b081490129d8ccbaa154ad3dd461397af8ec964ef99402d60a7591ee44b8ce1c16ef88fcb2717076c730d88223893bdd8000b23d87d38ab":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"05abded6751d620a95177abdba915027b58dd6eecf4ebe71f71c400b115e1d9e12465ace4db3cc03eb57fcbbfe017770f438cf84c10bad505919aefebfa0752087f6376b055beabf0e089fbb90e10f99c795d2d5676eea196db7f94a8fd34aedaba39fb230281bb9917cc91793eb37f84dedb2421e9680c39cfda34d4a012134":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSAES-V15 Decryption Test Vector Padding too short 7 +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_decrypt:1024:16:"eecfae81b1b9b3c908810b10a1b5600199eb9f44aef4fda493b81a9e3d84f632124ef0236e5d1e3b7e28fae7aa040a2d5b252176459d1f397541ba2a58fb6599":16:"c97fb1f027f453f6341233eaaad1d9353f6c42d08866b1d05a0f2035028b9d869840b41666b42e92ea0da3b43204b5cfce3352524d0416a5a441e700af461503":16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b84293cecc8095232ae595b84c15ec26f35cf5fde88ae7a9aaa717bcb1ecc4de498da81db97425000770817b5dde5eed01ca3745ff5ab894d0fc0921e5a10b081490129d8ccbaa154ad3dd461397af8ec964ef99402d60a7591ee44b8ce1c16ef88fcb2717076c730d88223893bdd8000b23d87d38ab":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"05abded6751d620a95177abdba915027b58dd6eecf4ebe71f71c400b115e1d9e12465ace4db3cc03eb57fcbbfe017770f438cf84c10bad505919aefebfa0752087f6376b055beabf0e089fbb90e10f99c795d2d5676eea196db7f94a8fd34aedaba39fb230281bb9917cc91793eb37f84dedb2421e9680c39cfda34d4a012134":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSAES-V15 Encryption Test Vector Data too long 3 +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt:1024:16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"aa1ab84293cecc8095232ae595b84c15ec26f35cf5fde88ae7a9aaa717bcb1ecc4de498da81db97425000770817b5dde5eed01ca3745ff5ab894d0fc0921e5a10b081490129d8ccbaa154ad3dd461397af8ec964ef99402d60a7591ee44b8ce1c16ef88fcb2717076c730d88223893bdd8000b23d87d38ab":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"10d60b8040d57d8701bacb55f2f283d54601ec24d465601ac7f7d5a2f75cac380ba78ca4ab6f3c159f3a9fd6839f5adde0333852ebf876c585664c1a58a1e6885231982f2027be6d7f08ff1807d3ceda8e41ad1f02ddf97a7458832fd13a1f431de6a4ab79e3d4b88bb1df2c5c77fcde9e7b5aa1e7bb29112eae58763127752a":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSAES-V15 Decryption Test Vector Padding too short 5 +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_decrypt:1024:16:"eecfae81b1b9b3c908810b10a1b5600199eb9f44aef4fda493b81a9e3d84f632124ef0236e5d1e3b7e28fae7aa040a2d5b252176459d1f397541ba2a58fb6599":16:"c97fb1f027f453f6341233eaaad1d9353f6c42d08866b1d05a0f2035028b9d869840b41666b42e92ea0da3b43204b5cfce3352524d0416a5a441e700af461503":16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"aa1ab84293cecc8095232ae595b84c15ec26f35cf5fde88ae7a9aaa717bcb1ecc4de498da81db97425000770817b5dde5eed01ca3745ff5ab894d0fc0921e5a10b081490129d8ccbaa154ad3dd461397af8ec964ef99402d60a7591ee44b8ce1c16ef88fcb2717076c730d88223893bdd8000b23d87d38ab":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"10d60b8040d57d8701bacb55f2f283d54601ec24d465601ac7f7d5a2f75cac380ba78ca4ab6f3c159f3a9fd6839f5adde0333852ebf876c585664c1a58a1e6885231982f2027be6d7f08ff1807d3ceda8e41ad1f02ddf97a7458832fd13a1f431de6a4ab79e3d4b88bb1df2c5c77fcde9e7b5aa1e7bb29112eae58763127752a":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSAES-V15 Encryption Test Vector Data too long 8 +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt:1024:16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a5a384ef64a6acb84293cecc8095232ae595b84c15ec26f35cf5fde88ae7a9aaa717bcb1ecc4de498da81db97425000770817b5dde5eed01ca3745ff5ab894d0fc0921e5a10b081490129d8ccbaa154ad3dd461397af8ec964ef99402d60a7591ee44b8ce1c16ef88fcb2717076c730d88223893bdd8000b23d87d38ab":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"72f98d12ddc230484179ec3022d11b3719222daaa0dc016fc3dbd6771a3f2c9fdd0560f86d616dd50ef1fa5b8c7e1fc40b5abf7b845d7795b3a6af02457b97f783360575cde7497bdf9c104650d4e9a8f4034406de1af95ace39bef2b9e979b74d9a2c0a741d8a21221d9afc98992776cad52d73151613dbc10da9bd8038751a":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSAES-V15 Decryption Test Vector Padding too short 0 +pkcs1_rsaes_v15_decrypt:1024:16:"eecfae81b1b9b3c908810b10a1b5600199eb9f44aef4fda493b81a9e3d84f632124ef0236e5d1e3b7e28fae7aa040a2d5b252176459d1f397541ba2a58fb6599":16:"c97fb1f027f453f6341233eaaad1d9353f6c42d08866b1d05a0f2035028b9d869840b41666b42e92ea0da3b43204b5cfce3352524d0416a5a441e700af461503":16:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":16:"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a5a384ef64a6acb84293cecc8095232ae595b84c15ec26f35cf5fde88ae7a9aaa717bcb1ecc4de498da81db97425000770817b5dde5eed01ca3745ff5ab894d0fc0921e5a10b081490129d8ccbaa154ad3dd461397af8ec964ef99402d60a7591ee44b8ce1c16ef88fcb2717076c730d88223893bdd8000b23d87d38ab":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"72f98d12ddc230484179ec3022d11b3719222daaa0dc016fc3dbd6771a3f2c9fdd0560f86d616dd50ef1fa5b8c7e1fc40b5abf7b845d7795b3a6af02457b97f783360575cde7497bdf9c104650d4e9a8f4034406de1af95ace39bef2b9e979b74d9a2c0a741d8a21221d9afc98992776cad52d73151613dbc10da9bd8038751a":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSASSA-V15 Signing Test Vector Int +pkcs1_rsassa_v15_sign:1024:16:"d17f655bf27c8b16d35462c905cc04a26f37e2a67fa9c0ce0dced472394a0df743fe7f929e378efdb368eddff453cf007af6d948e0ade757371f8a711e278f6b":16:"c6d92b6fee7414d1358ce1546fb62987530b90bd15e0f14963a5e2635adb69347ec0c01b2ab1763fd8ac1a592fb22757463a982425bb97a3a437c5bf86d03f2f":16:"a2ba40ee07e3b2bd2f02ce227f36a195024486e49c19cb41bbbdfbba98b22b0e577c2eeaffa20d883a76e65e394c69d4b3c05a1e8fadda27edb2a42bc000fe888b9b32c22d15add0cd76b3e7936e19955b220dd17d4ea904b1ec102b2e4de7751222aa99151024c7cb41cc5ea21d00eeb41f7c800834d2c6e06bce3bce7ea9a5":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"859eef2fd78aca00308bdc471193bf55bf9d78db8f8a672b484634f3c9c26e6478ae10260fe0dd8c082e53a5293af2173cd50c6d5d354febf78b26021c25c02712e78cd4694c9f469777e451e7f8e9e04cd3739c6bbfedae487fb55644e9ca74ff77a53cb729802f6ed4a5ffa8ba159890fc":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"2154f928615e5101fcdeb57bc08fc2f35c3d5996403861ae3efb1d0712f8bb05cc21f7f5f11f62e5b6ea9f0f2b62180e5cbe7ba535032d6ac8068fff7f362f73d2c3bf5eca6062a1723d7cfd5abb6dcf7e405f2dc560ffe6fc37d38bee4dc9e24fe2bece3e3b4a3f032701d3f0947b42930083dd4ad241b3309b514595482d42":0 + +RSASSA-V15 Verification Test Vector Int +pkcs1_rsassa_v15_verify:1024:16:"a2ba40ee07e3b2bd2f02ce227f36a195024486e49c19cb41bbbdfbba98b22b0e577c2eeaffa20d883a76e65e394c69d4b3c05a1e8fadda27edb2a42bc000fe888b9b32c22d15add0cd76b3e7936e19955b220dd17d4ea904b1ec102b2e4de7751222aa99151024c7cb41cc5ea21d00eeb41f7c800834d2c6e06bce3bce7ea9a5":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"859eef2fd78aca00308bdc471193bf55bf9d78db8f8a672b484634f3c9c26e6478ae10260fe0dd8c082e53a5293af2173cd50c6d5d354febf78b26021c25c02712e78cd4694c9f469777e451e7f8e9e04cd3739c6bbfedae487fb55644e9ca74ff77a53cb729802f6ed4a5ffa8ba159890fc":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"2154f928615e5101fcdeb57bc08fc2f35c3d5996403861ae3efb1d0712f8bb05cc21f7f5f11f62e5b6ea9f0f2b62180e5cbe7ba535032d6ac8068fff7f362f73d2c3bf5eca6062a1723d7cfd5abb6dcf7e405f2dc560ffe6fc37d38bee4dc9e24fe2bece3e3b4a3f032701d3f0947b42930083dd4ad241b3309b514595482d42":0 + +RSAES-V15 decoding: good, payload=max, tight output buffer +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"0002505152535455565700":117:117:0 + +RSAES-V15 decoding: good, payload=max, larger output buffer +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"0002505152535455565700":117:128:0 + +RSAES-V15 decoding: good, payload=max-1, tight output buffer +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"000250515253545556575800":116:116:0 + +RSAES-V15 decoding: good, payload=max-1, larger output buffer +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"000250515253545556575800":116:117:0 + +RSAES-V15 decoding: good, payload=1 +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"00025050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505000":1:1:0 + +RSAES-V15 decoding: good, empty payload +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"0002505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505000":0:0:0 + +RSAES-V15 decoding: payload=max, output too large +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"0002505152535455565700":117:116:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + +RSAES-V15 decoding: payload=max-1, output too large +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"000250515253545556575800":116:115:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + +RSAES-V15 decoding: bad first byte +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"0102505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSAES-V15 decoding: bad second byte (0 instead of 2) +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"0000505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSAES-V15 decoding: bad second byte (1 instead of 2) +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"0001505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSAES-V15 decoding: padding too short (0) +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"000200":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSAES-V15 decoding: padding too short (7) +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"0002505050505050500000ffffffffffffffffff00":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSAES-V15 decoding: unfinished padding +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE:"0002505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: good, payload=max, tight output buffer +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001ffffffffffffffff00":117:117:0 + +EMSA-V15 decoding: good, payload=max, larger output buffer +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001ffffffffffffffff00":117:128:0 + +EMSA-V15 decoding: good, payload=max-1, tight output buffer +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001ffffffffffffffffff00":116:116:0 + +EMSA-V15 decoding: good, payload=max-1, larger output buffer +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001ffffffffffffffffff00":116:117:0 + +EMSA-V15 decoding: good, payload=1 +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00":1:1:0 + +EMSA-V15 decoding: good, empty payload +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00":0:0:0 + +EMSA-V15 decoding: bad first byte +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0101ffffffffffffffff00":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: bad second byte (0 instead of 1) +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0000ffffffffffffffff00":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: bad second byte (2 instead of 1) +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0002ffffffffffffffff00":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: padding too short (0) +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"000100":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: padding too short (7) +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001ffffffffffffff0000ffffffffffffffff00":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: invalid padding at first byte +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001fffffffffffffffe00":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: invalid padding at last byte +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001feffffffffffffff00":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: unfinished padding +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: unfinished padding with invalid first byte +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001feffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +EMSA-V15 decoding: unfinished padding with invalid last byte +pkcs1_v15_decode:MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC:"0001fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe":0:42:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d3553403 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.function @@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt( int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N, + int radix_E, char * input_E, int hash, + data_t * message_str, data_t * rnd_buf, + data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[128]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info info; + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + + info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand; + info.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + info.buf = rnd_buf->x; + info.length = rnd_buf->len; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, hash ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( ( mod + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + if( message_str->len == 0 ) + message_str->x = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, + &info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + message_str->len, message_str->x, + output ) == result ); + + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_rsaes_v15_decrypt( int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P, + int radix_Q, char * input_Q, int radix_N, + char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E, + int hash, data_t * result_str, + char * seed, data_t * message_str, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[128]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + size_t output_len; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E; + ((void) seed); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, hash ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( ( mod + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + if( result_str->len == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + &output_len, message_str->x, + NULL, 0 ) == result ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + &output_len, message_str->x, + output, 1000 ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + output_len, + result_str->len) == 0 ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_v15_decode( int mode, + data_t *input, + int expected_plaintext_length_arg, + int output_size_arg, + int expected_result ) +{ + size_t expected_plaintext_length = expected_plaintext_length_arg; + size_t output_size = output_size_arg; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + mbedtls_mpi Nmpi, Empi, Pmpi, Qmpi; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + static unsigned char N[128] = { + 0xc4, 0x79, 0x4c, 0x6d, 0xb2, 0xe9, 0xdf, 0xc5, + 0xe5, 0xd7, 0x55, 0x4b, 0xfb, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0xec, + 0x84, 0xd0, 0x88, 0x12, 0xaf, 0xbf, 0xb4, 0xf5, + 0x47, 0x3c, 0x7e, 0x92, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xc8, 0x73, + 0xfe, 0x8f, 0x2b, 0x8f, 0x8e, 0xc8, 0x5c, 0xf5, + 0x05, 0xeb, 0xfb, 0x0d, 0x7b, 0x2a, 0x93, 0xde, + 0x15, 0x0d, 0xc8, 0x13, 0xcf, 0xd2, 0x6f, 0x0d, + 0x9d, 0xad, 0x30, 0xe5, 0x70, 0x20, 0x92, 0x9e, + 0xb3, 0x6b, 0xba, 0x5c, 0x50, 0x0f, 0xc3, 0xb2, + 0x7e, 0x64, 0x07, 0x94, 0x7e, 0xc9, 0x4e, 0xc1, + 0x65, 0x04, 0xaf, 0xb3, 0x9f, 0xde, 0xa8, 0x46, + 0xfa, 0x6c, 0xf3, 0x03, 0xaf, 0x1c, 0x1b, 0xec, + 0x75, 0x44, 0x66, 0x77, 0xc9, 0xde, 0x51, 0x33, + 0x64, 0x27, 0xb0, 0xd4, 0x8d, 0x31, 0x6a, 0x11, + 0x27, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x22, 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x12, + 0x01, 0xc7, 0x4a, 0x73, 0xac, 0xbf, 0xc2, 0xbb + }; + static unsigned char E[1] = { 0x03 }; + static unsigned char P[64] = { + 0xe5, 0x53, 0x1f, 0x88, 0x51, 0xee, 0x59, 0xf8, + 0xc1, 0xe4, 0xcc, 0x5b, 0xb3, 0x75, 0x8d, 0xc8, + 0xe8, 0x95, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0xef, 0x37, 0xb4, 0xcd, + 0xd3, 0x9e, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x81, 0x58, 0x60, 0xb9, + 0x27, 0x1d, 0xb6, 0x28, 0x92, 0x64, 0xa3, 0xa5, + 0x64, 0xbd, 0xcc, 0x53, 0x68, 0xdd, 0x3e, 0x55, + 0xea, 0x9d, 0x5e, 0xcd, 0x1f, 0x96, 0x87, 0xf1, + 0x29, 0x75, 0x92, 0x70, 0x8f, 0x28, 0xfb, 0x2b + }; + static unsigned char Q[64] = { + 0xdb, 0x53, 0xef, 0x74, 0x61, 0xb4, 0x20, 0x3b, + 0x3b, 0x87, 0x76, 0x75, 0x81, 0x56, 0x11, 0x03, + 0x59, 0x31, 0xe3, 0x38, 0x4b, 0x8c, 0x7a, 0x9c, + 0x05, 0xd6, 0x7f, 0x1e, 0x5e, 0x60, 0xf0, 0x4e, + 0x0b, 0xdc, 0x34, 0x54, 0x1c, 0x2e, 0x90, 0x83, + 0x14, 0xef, 0xc0, 0x96, 0x5c, 0x30, 0x10, 0xcc, + 0xc1, 0xba, 0xa0, 0x54, 0x3f, 0x96, 0x24, 0xca, + 0xa3, 0xfb, 0x55, 0xbc, 0x71, 0x29, 0x4e, 0xb1 + }; + unsigned char original[128]; + unsigned char intermediate[128]; + static unsigned char default_content[128] = { + /* A randomly generated pattern. */ + 0x4c, 0x27, 0x54, 0xa0, 0xce, 0x0d, 0x09, 0x4a, + 0x1c, 0x38, 0x8e, 0x2d, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0xe0, 0x19, + 0x4c, 0x99, 0xb2, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x65, 0x7e, 0x58, + 0xd7, 0xb6, 0x8a, 0x05, 0x2f, 0xa5, 0xec, 0xa4, + 0x35, 0xad, 0x10, 0x36, 0xff, 0x0d, 0x08, 0x50, + 0x74, 0x47, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0x4a, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0xfa, + 0x83, 0x5f, 0x14, 0x5a, 0x1e, 0xe7, 0x35, 0x08, + 0xad, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x86, 0xdf, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0xcf, + 0x32, 0xb9, 0x5c, 0xbe, 0xa3, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x70, + 0x7b, 0xc6, 0x48, 0x7e, 0x58, 0x4d, 0xf3, 0xef, + 0x34, 0xb7, 0x57, 0x54, 0x79, 0xc5, 0x8e, 0x0a, + 0xa3, 0xbf, 0x6d, 0x42, 0x83, 0x25, 0x13, 0xa2, + 0x95, 0xc0, 0x0d, 0x32, 0xec, 0x77, 0x91, 0x2b, + 0x68, 0xb6, 0x8c, 0x79, 0x15, 0xfb, 0x94, 0xde, + 0xb9, 0x2b, 0x94, 0xb3, 0x28, 0x23, 0x86, 0x3d, + 0x37, 0x00, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x1f, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0x42 + }; + unsigned char final[128]; + size_t output_length = 0x7EA0; + + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Nmpi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Empi ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Pmpi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Qmpi ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Nmpi, N, sizeof( N ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Empi, E, sizeof( E ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Pmpi, P, sizeof( P ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Qmpi, Q, sizeof( Q ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &Nmpi, &Pmpi, &Qmpi, + NULL, &Empi ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( input->len <= sizeof( N ) ); + memcpy( original, input->x, input->len ); + memset( original + input->len, 'd', sizeof( original ) - input->len ); + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_public( &ctx, original, intermediate ) == 0 ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_private( &ctx, &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, original, + intermediate ) == 0 ); + + memcpy( final, default_content, sizeof( final ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, mode, &output_length, + intermediate, final, + output_size ) == expected_result ); + if( expected_result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( output_length == expected_plaintext_length ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( original + sizeof( N ) - output_length, + final, + output_length ) == 0 ); + } + else if( expected_result == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING || + expected_result == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ) + { + size_t max_payload_length = + output_size > sizeof( N ) - 11 ? sizeof( N ) - 11 : output_size; + size_t i; + size_t count = 0; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* Check that the output in invalid cases is what the default + * implementation currently does. Alternative implementations + * may produce different output, so we only perform these precise + * checks when using the default implementation. */ + TEST_ASSERT( output_length == max_payload_length ); + for( i = 0; i < max_payload_length; i++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( final[i] == 0 ); +#endif + /* Even in alternative implementations, the outputs must have + * changed, otherwise it indicates at least a timing vulnerability + * because no write to the outputs is performed in the bad case. */ + TEST_ASSERT( output_length != 0x7EA0 ); + for( i = 0; i < max_payload_length; i++ ) + count += ( final[i] == default_content[i] ); + /* If more than 16 bytes are unchanged in final, that's evidence + * that final wasn't overwritten. */ + TEST_ASSERT( count < 16 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Nmpi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Empi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Pmpi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Qmpi ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_rsassa_v15_sign( int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P, int radix_Q, + char * input_Q, int radix_N, char * input_N, + int radix_E, char * input_E, int digest, int hash, + data_t * message_str, data_t * rnd_buf, + data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char output[128]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E; + mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info info; + + info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand; + info.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + info.buf = rnd_buf->x; + info.length = rnd_buf->len; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, hash ); + + memset( hash_result, 0x00, sizeof( hash_result ) ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( ( mod + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + if( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ) != NULL ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ), message_str->x, message_str->len, hash_result ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &ctx, &mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, + &info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, digest, + 0, hash_result, output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_rsassa_v15_verify( int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N, + int radix_E, char * input_E, int digest, + int hash, data_t * message_str, char * salt, + data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + ((void) salt); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, hash ); + memset( hash_result, 0x00, sizeof( hash_result ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( ( mod + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + if( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ) != NULL ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ), message_str->x, message_str->len, hash_result ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, digest, 0, hash_result, result_str->x ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..405e16b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data @@ -0,0 +1,1042 @@ +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Test Vector Int +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1024:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"1253e04dc0a5397bb44a7ab87e9bf2a039a33d1e996fc82a94ccd30074c95df763722017069e5268da5d1c0b4f872cf653c11df82314a67968dfeae28def04bb6d84b1c31d654a1970e5783bd6eb96a024c2ca2f4a90fe9f2ef5c9c140e5bb48da9536ad8700c84fc9130adea74e558d51a74ddf85d8b50de96838d6063e0955":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Test Vector Data just fits +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1024:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"3082f2288fff275213d53168f0a272573cff81837c249dc1f380a12ac124c8f217b700708a1ce7dce154265f31a126ebdd9ed3ef9145ae29124a25f4e65aa52c5a9ff34f6cf4de9ba937ae406dc7d1f277af4f6fb7ea73bfbab2bd397b6b2c53570e173ffcf3b9f0bb96837623a4f87bd81b41446c59e681a2f3da81239e9bdf":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Test Vector Data too long +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1024:"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd00":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"1253e04dc0a5397bb44a7ab87e9bf2a039a33d1e996fc82a94ccd30074c95df763722017069e5268da5d1c0b4f872cf653c11df82314a67968dfeae28def04bb6d84b1c31d654a1970e5783bd6eb96a024c2ca2f4a90fe9f2ef5c9c140e5bb48da9536ad8700c84fc9130adea74e558d51a74ddf85d8b50de96838d6063e0955":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Test Vector 1_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1024:"a8b3b284af8eb50b387034a860f146c4919f318763cd6c5598c8ae4811a1e0abc4c7e0b082d693a5e7fced675cf4668512772c0cbc64a742c6c630f533c8cc72f62ae833c40bf25842e984bb78bdbf97c0107d55bdb662f5c4e0fab9845cb5148ef7392dd3aaff93ae1e6b667bb3d4247616d4f5ba10d4cfd226de88d39f16fb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6628194e12073db03ba94cda9ef9532397d50dba79b987004afefe34":"18b776ea21069d69776a33e96bad48e1dda0a5ef":"354fe67b4a126d5d35fe36c777791a3f7ba13def484e2d3908aff722fad468fb21696de95d0be911c2d3174f8afcc201035f7b6d8e69402de5451618c21a535fa9d7bfc5b8dd9fc243f8cf927db31322d6e881eaa91a996170e657a05a266426d98c88003f8477c1227094a0d9fa1e8c4024309ce1ecccb5210035d47ac72e8a":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Test Vector 1_2 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+pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1024:"a8b3b284af8eb50b387034a860f146c4919f318763cd6c5598c8ae4811a1e0abc4c7e0b082d693a5e7fced675cf4668512772c0cbc64a742c6c630f533c8cc72f62ae833c40bf25842e984bb78bdbf97c0107d55bdb662f5c4e0fab9845cb5148ef7392dd3aaff93ae1e6b667bb3d4247616d4f5ba10d4cfd226de88d39f16fb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"52e650d98e7f2a048b4f86852153b97e01dd316f346a19f67a85":"c4435a3e1a18a68b6820436290a37cefb85db3fb":"45ead4ca551e662c9800f1aca8283b0525e6abae30be4b4aba762fa40fd3d38e22abefc69794f6ebbbc05ddbb11216247d2f412fd0fba87c6e3acd888813646fd0e48e785204f9c3f73d6d8239562722dddd8771fec48b83a31ee6f592c4cfd4bc88174f3b13a112aae3b9f7b80e0fc6f7255ba880dc7d8021e22ad6a85f0755":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Test Vector 1_5 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+pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1025:"01947c7fce90425f47279e70851f25d5e62316fe8a1df19371e3e628e260543e4901ef6081f68c0b8141190d2ae8daba7d1250ec6db636e944ec3722877c7c1d0a67f14b1694c5f0379451a43e49a32dde83670b73da91a1c99bc23b436a60055c610f0baf99c1a079565b95a3f1526632d1d4da60f20eda25e653c4f002766f45":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a7eb2a5036931d27d4e891326d99692ffadda9bf7efd3e34e622c4adc085f721dfe885072c78a203b151739be540fa8c153a10f00a":"9a7b3b0e708bd96f8190ecab4fb9b2b3805a8156":"00a4578cbc176318a638fba7d01df15746af44d4f6cd96d7e7c495cbf425b09c649d32bf886da48fbaf989a2117187cafb1fb580317690e3ccd446920b7af82b31db5804d87d01514acbfa9156e782f867f6bed9449e0e9a2c09bcecc6aa087636965e34b3ec766f2fe2e43018a2fddeb140616a0e9d82e5331024ee0652fc7641":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Test Vector 2_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1025:"01947c7fce90425f47279e70851f25d5e62316fe8a1df19371e3e628e260543e4901ef6081f68c0b8141190d2ae8daba7d1250ec6db636e944ec3722877c7c1d0a67f14b1694c5f0379451a43e49a32dde83670b73da91a1c99bc23b436a60055c610f0baf99c1a079565b95a3f1526632d1d4da60f20eda25e653c4f002766f45":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2ef2b066f854c33f3bdcbb5994a435e73d6c6c":"eb3cebbc4adc16bb48e88c8aec0e34af7f427fd3":"00ebc5f5fda77cfdad3c83641a9025e77d72d8a6fb33a810f5950f8d74c73e8d931e8634d86ab1246256ae07b6005b71b7f2fb98351218331ce69b8ffbdc9da08bbc9c704f876deb9df9fc2ec065cad87f9090b07acc17aa7f997b27aca48806e897f771d95141fe4526d8a5301b678627efab707fd40fbebd6e792a25613e7aec":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Test Vector 2_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1025:"01947c7fce90425f47279e70851f25d5e62316fe8a1df19371e3e628e260543e4901ef6081f68c0b8141190d2ae8daba7d1250ec6db636e944ec3722877c7c1d0a67f14b1694c5f0379451a43e49a32dde83670b73da91a1c99bc23b436a60055c610f0baf99c1a079565b95a3f1526632d1d4da60f20eda25e653c4f002766f45":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8a7fb344c8b6cb2cf2ef1f643f9a3218f6e19bba89c0":"4c45cf4d57c98e3d6d2095adc51c489eb50dff84":"010839ec20c27b9052e55befb9b77e6fc26e9075d7a54378c646abdf51e445bd5715de81789f56f1803d9170764a9e93cb78798694023ee7393ce04bc5d8f8c5a52c171d43837e3aca62f609eb0aa5ffb0960ef04198dd754f57f7fbe6abf765cf118b4ca443b23b5aab266f952326ac4581100644325f8b721acd5d04ff14ef3a":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 3_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1026:"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"087820b569e8fa8d":"8ced6b196290805790e909074015e6a20b0c4894":"026a0485d96aebd96b4382085099b962e6a2bdec3d90c8db625e14372de85e2d5b7baab65c8faf91bb5504fb495afce5c988b3f6a52e20e1d6cbd3566c5cd1f2b8318bb542cc0ea25c4aab9932afa20760eaddec784396a07ea0ef24d4e6f4d37e5052a7a31e146aa480a111bbe926401307e00f410033842b6d82fe5ce4dfae80":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 3_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1026:"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4653acaf171960b01f52a7be63a3ab21dc368ec43b50d82ec3781e04":"b4291d6567550848cc156967c809baab6ca507f0":"024db89c7802989be0783847863084941bf209d761987e38f97cb5f6f1bc88da72a50b73ebaf11c879c4f95df37b850b8f65d7622e25b1b889e80fe80baca2069d6e0e1d829953fc459069de98ea9798b451e557e99abf8fe3d9ccf9096ebbf3e5255d3b4e1c6d2ecadf067a359eea86405acd47d5e165517ccafd47d6dbee4bf5":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 3_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1026:"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d94cd0e08fa404ed89":"ce8928f6059558254008badd9794fadcd2fd1f65":"0239bce681032441528877d6d1c8bb28aa3bc97f1df584563618995797683844ca86664732f4bed7a0aab083aaabfb7238f582e30958c2024e44e57043b97950fd543da977c90cdde5337d618442f99e60d7783ab59ce6dd9d69c47ad1e962bec22d05895cff8d3f64ed5261d92b2678510393484990ba3f7f06818ae6ffce8a3a":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 3_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1026:"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6cc641b6b61e6f963974dad23a9013284ef1":"6e2979f52d6814a57d83b090054888f119a5b9a3":"02994c62afd76f498ba1fd2cf642857fca81f4373cb08f1cbaee6f025c3b512b42c3e8779113476648039dbe0493f9246292fac28950600e7c0f32edf9c81b9dec45c3bde0cc8d8847590169907b7dc5991ceb29bb0714d613d96df0f12ec5d8d3507c8ee7ae78dd83f216fa61de100363aca48a7e914ae9f42ddfbe943b09d9a0":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 3_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1026:"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"df5151832b61f4f25891fb4172f328d2eddf8371ffcfdbe997939295f30eca6918017cfda1153bf7a6af87593223":"2d760bfe38c59de34cdc8b8c78a38e66284a2d27":"0162042ff6969592a6167031811a239834ce638abf54fec8b99478122afe2ee67f8c5b18b0339805bfdbc5a4e6720b37c59cfba942464c597ff532a119821545fd2e59b114e61daf71820529f5029cf524954327c34ec5e6f5ba7efcc4de943ab8ad4ed787b1454329f70db798a3a8f4d92f8274e2b2948ade627ce8ee33e43c60":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 3_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1026:"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"3c3bad893c544a6d520ab022319188c8d504b7a788b850903b85972eaa18552e1134a7ad6098826254ff7ab672b3d8eb3158fac6d4cbaef1":"f174779c5fd3cfe007badcb7a36c9b55bfcfbf0e":"00112051e75d064943bc4478075e43482fd59cee0679de6893eec3a943daa490b9691c93dfc0464b6623b9f3dbd3e70083264f034b374f74164e1a00763725e574744ba0b9db83434f31df96f6e2a26f6d8eba348bd4686c2238ac07c37aac3785d1c7eea2f819fd91491798ed8e9cef5e43b781b0e0276e37c43ff9492d005730":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 4_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1027:"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4a86609534ee434a6cbca3f7e962e76d455e3264c19f605f6e5ff6137c65c56d7fb344cd52bc93374f3d166c9f0c6f9c506bad19330972d2":"1cac19ce993def55f98203f6852896c95ccca1f3":"04cce19614845e094152a3fe18e54e3330c44e5efbc64ae16886cb1869014cc5781b1f8f9e045384d0112a135ca0d12e9c88a8e4063416deaae3844f60d6e96fe155145f4525b9a34431ca3766180f70e15a5e5d8e8b1a516ff870609f13f896935ced188279a58ed13d07114277d75c6568607e0ab092fd803a223e4a8ee0b1a8":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 4_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1027:"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b0adc4f3fe11da59ce992773d9059943c03046497ee9d9f9a06df1166db46d98f58d27ec074c02eee6cbe2449c8b9fc5080c5c3f4433092512ec46aa793743c8":"f545d5897585e3db71aa0cb8da76c51d032ae963":"0097b698c6165645b303486fbf5a2a4479c0ee85889b541a6f0b858d6b6597b13b854eb4f839af03399a80d79bda6578c841f90d645715b280d37143992dd186c80b949b775cae97370e4ec97443136c6da484e970ffdb1323a20847821d3b18381de13bb49aaea66530c4a4b8271f3eae172cd366e07e6636f1019d2a28aed15e":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 4_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1027:"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bf6d42e701707b1d0206b0c8b45a1c72641ff12889219a82bdea965b5e79a96b0d0163ed9d578ec9ada20f2fbcf1ea3c4089d83419ba81b0c60f3606da99":"ad997feef730d6ea7be60d0dc52e72eacbfdd275":"0301f935e9c47abcb48acbbe09895d9f5971af14839da4ff95417ee453d1fd77319072bb7297e1b55d7561cd9d1bb24c1a9a37c619864308242804879d86ebd001dce5183975e1506989b70e5a83434154d5cbfd6a24787e60eb0c658d2ac193302d1192c6e622d4a12ad4b53923bca246df31c6395e37702c6a78ae081fb9d065":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 4_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1027:"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fb2ef112f5e766eb94019297934794f7be2f6fc1c58e":"136454df5730f73c807a7e40d8c1a312ac5b9dd3":"02d110ad30afb727beb691dd0cf17d0af1a1e7fa0cc040ec1a4ba26a42c59d0a796a2e22c8f357ccc98b6519aceb682e945e62cb734614a529407cd452bee3e44fece8423cc19e55548b8b994b849c7ecde4933e76037e1d0ce44275b08710c68e430130b929730ed77e09b015642c5593f04e4ffb9410798102a8e96ffdfe11e4":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 4_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1027:"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"28ccd447bb9e85166dabb9e5b7d1adadc4b9d39f204e96d5e440ce9ad928bc1c2284":"bca8057f824b2ea257f2861407eef63d33208681":"00dbb8a7439d90efd919a377c54fae8fe11ec58c3b858362e23ad1b8a44310799066b99347aa525691d2adc58d9b06e34f288c170390c5f0e11c0aa3645959f18ee79e8f2be8d7ac5c23d061f18dd74b8c5f2a58fcb5eb0c54f99f01a83247568292536583340948d7a8c97c4acd1e98d1e29dc320e97a260532a8aa7a758a1ec2":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 4_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1027:"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f22242751ec6b1":"2e7e1e17f647b5ddd033e15472f90f6812f3ac4e":"00a5ffa4768c8bbecaee2db77e8f2eec99595933545520835e5ba7db9493d3e17cddefe6a5f567624471908db4e2d83a0fbee60608fc84049503b2234a07dc83b27b22847ad8920ff42f674ef79b76280b00233d2b51b8cb2703a9d42bfbc8250c96ec32c051e57f1b4ba528db89c37e4c54e27e6e64ac69635ae887d9541619a9":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 5_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1028:"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"af71a901e3a61d3132f0fc1fdb474f9ea6579257ffc24d164170145b3dbde8":"44c92e283f77b9499c603d963660c87d2f939461":"036046a4a47d9ed3ba9a89139c105038eb7492b05a5d68bfd53accff4597f7a68651b47b4a4627d927e485eed7b4566420e8b409879e5d606eae251d22a5df799f7920bfc117b992572a53b1263146bcea03385cc5e853c9a101c8c3e1bda31a519807496c6cb5e5efb408823a352b8fa0661fb664efadd593deb99fff5ed000e5":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 5_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1028:"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a3b844a08239a8ac41605af17a6cfda4d350136585903a417a79268760519a4b4ac3303ec73f0f87cfb32399":"cb28f5860659fceee49c3eeafce625a70803bd32":"03d6eb654edce615bc59f455265ed4e5a18223cbb9be4e4069b473804d5de96f54dcaaa603d049c5d94aa1470dfcd2254066b7c7b61ff1f6f6770e3215c51399fd4e34ec5082bc48f089840ad04354ae66dc0f1bd18e461a33cc1258b443a2837a6df26759aa2302334986f87380c9cc9d53be9f99605d2c9a97da7b0915a4a7ad":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 5_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1028:"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"308b0ecbd2c76cb77fc6f70c5edd233fd2f20929d629f026953bb62a8f4a3a314bde195de85b5f816da2aab074d26cb6acddf323ae3b9c678ac3cf12fbdde7":"2285f40d770482f9a9efa2c72cb3ac55716dc0ca":"0770952181649f9f9f07ff626ff3a22c35c462443d905d456a9fd0bff43cac2ca7a9f554e9478b9acc3ac838b02040ffd3e1847de2e4253929f9dd9ee4044325a9b05cabb808b2ee840d34e15d105a3f1f7b27695a1a07a2d73fe08ecaaa3c9c9d4d5a89ff890d54727d7ae40c0ec1a8dd86165d8ee2c6368141016a48b55b6967":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 5_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1028:"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"15c5b9ee1185":"49fa45d3a78dd10dfd577399d1eb00af7eed5513":"0812b76768ebcb642d040258e5f4441a018521bd96687e6c5e899fcd6c17588ff59a82cc8ae03a4b45b31299af1788c329f7dcd285f8cf4ced82606b97612671a45bedca133442144d1617d114f802857f0f9d739751c57a3f9ee400912c61e2e6992be031a43dd48fa6ba14eef7c422b5edc4e7afa04fdd38f402d1c8bb719abf":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 5_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1028:"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"21026e6800c7fa728fcaaba0d196ae28d7a2ac4ffd8abce794f0985f60c8a6737277365d3fea11db8923a2029a":"f0287413234cc5034724a094c4586b87aff133fc":"07b60e14ec954bfd29e60d0047e789f51d57186c63589903306793ced3f68241c743529aba6a6374f92e19e0163efa33697e196f7661dfaaa47aac6bde5e51deb507c72c589a2ca1693d96b1460381249b2cdb9eac44769f2489c5d3d2f99f0ee3c7ee5bf64a5ac79c42bd433f149be8cb59548361640595513c97af7bc2509723":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 5_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1028:"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"541e37b68b6c8872b84c02":"d9fba45c96f21e6e26d29eb2cdcb6585be9cb341":"08c36d4dda33423b2ed6830d85f6411ba1dcf470a1fae0ebefee7c089f256cef74cb96ea69c38f60f39abee44129bcb4c92de7f797623b20074e3d9c2899701ed9071e1efa0bdd84d4c3e5130302d8f0240baba4b84a71cc032f2235a5ff0fae277c3e8f9112bef44c9ae20d175fc9a4058bfc930ba31b02e2e4f444483710f24a":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 6_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1029:"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4046ca8baa3347ca27f49e0d81f9cc1d71be9ba517d4":"dd0f6cfe415e88e5a469a51fbba6dfd40adb4384":"0630eebcd2856c24f798806e41f9e67345eda9ceda386acc9facaea1eeed06ace583709718d9d169fadf414d5c76f92996833ef305b75b1e4b95f662a20faedc3bae0c4827a8bf8a88edbd57ec203a27a841f02e43a615bab1a8cac0701de34debdef62a088089b55ec36ea7522fd3ec8d06b6a073e6df833153bc0aefd93bd1a3":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 6_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1029:"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"5cc72c60231df03b3d40f9b57931bc31109f972527f28b19e7480c7288cb3c92b22512214e4be6c914792ddabdf57faa8aa7":"8d14bd946a1351148f5cae2ed9a0c653e85ebd85":"0ebc37376173a4fd2f89cc55c2ca62b26b11d51c3c7ce49e8845f74e7607317c436bc8d23b9667dfeb9d087234b47bc6837175ae5c0559f6b81d7d22416d3e50f4ac533d8f0812f2db9e791fe9c775ac8b6ad0f535ad9ceb23a4a02014c58ab3f8d3161499a260f39348e714ae2a1d3443208fd8b722ccfdfb393e98011f99e63f":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 6_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1029:"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b20e651303092f4bccb43070c0f86d23049362ed96642fc5632c27db4a52e3d831f2ab068b23b149879c002f6bf3feee97591112562c":"6c075bc45520f165c0bf5ea4c5df191bc9ef0e44":"0a98bf1093619394436cf68d8f38e2f158fde8ea54f3435f239b8d06b8321844202476aeed96009492480ce3a8d705498c4c8c68f01501dc81db608f60087350c8c3b0bd2e9ef6a81458b7c801b89f2e4fe99d4900ba6a4b5e5a96d865dc676c7755928794130d6280a8160a190f2df3ea7cf9aa0271d88e9e6905ecf1c5152d65":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 6_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1029:"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"684e3038c5c041f7":"3bbc3bd6637dfe12846901029bf5b0c07103439c":"008e7a67cacfb5c4e24bec7dee149117f19598ce8c45808fef88c608ff9cd6e695263b9a3c0ad4b8ba4c95238e96a8422b8535629c8d5382374479ad13fa39974b242f9a759eeaf9c83ad5a8ca18940a0162ba755876df263f4bd50c6525c56090267c1f0e09ce0899a0cf359e88120abd9bf893445b3cae77d3607359ae9a52f8":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 6_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1029:"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"32488cb262d041d6e4dd35f987bf3ca696db1f06ac29a44693":"b46b41893e8bef326f6759383a83071dae7fcabc":"00003474416c7b68bdf961c385737944d7f1f40cb395343c693cc0b4fe63b31fedf1eaeeac9ccc0678b31dc32e0977489514c4f09085f6298a9653f01aea4045ff582ee887be26ae575b73eef7f3774921e375a3d19adda0ca31aa1849887c1f42cac9677f7a2f4e923f6e5a868b38c084ef187594dc9f7f048fea2e02955384ab":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 6_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1029:"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"50ba14be8462720279c306ba":"0a2403312a41e3d52f060fbc13a67de5cf7609a7":"0a026dda5fc8785f7bd9bf75327b63e85e2c0fdee5dadb65ebdcac9ae1de95c92c672ab433aa7a8e69ce6a6d8897fac4ac4a54de841ae5e5bbce7687879d79634cea7a30684065c714d52409b928256bbf53eabcd5231eb7259504537399bd29164b726d33a46da701360a4168a091ccab72d44a62fed246c0ffea5b1348ab5470":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 7_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1030:"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"47aae909":"43dd09a07ff4cac71caa4632ee5e1c1daee4cd8f":"1688e4ce7794bba6cb7014169ecd559cede2a30b56a52b68d9fe18cf1973ef97b2a03153951c755f6294aa49adbdb55845ab6875fb3986c93ecf927962840d282f9e54ce8b690f7c0cb8bbd73440d9571d1b16cd9260f9eab4783cc482e5223dc60973871783ec27b0ae0fd47732cbc286a173fc92b00fb4ba6824647cd93c85c1":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 7_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1030:"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1d9b2e2223d9bc13bfb9f162ce735db48ba7c68f6822a0a1a7b6ae165834e7":"3a9c3cec7b84f9bd3adecbc673ec99d54b22bc9b":"1052ed397b2e01e1d0ee1c50bf24363f95e504f4a03434a08fd822574ed6b9736edbb5f390db10321479a8a139350e2bd4977c3778ef331f3e78ae118b268451f20a2f01d471f5d53c566937171b2dbc2d4bde459a5799f0372d6574239b2323d245d0bb81c286b63c89a361017337e4902f88a467f4c7f244bfd5ab46437ff3b6":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 7_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1030:"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d976fc":"76a75e5b6157a556cf8884bb2e45c293dd545cf5":"2155cd843ff24a4ee8badb7694260028a490813ba8b369a4cbf106ec148e5298707f5965be7d101c1049ea8584c24cd63455ad9c104d686282d3fb803a4c11c1c2e9b91c7178801d1b6640f003f5728df007b8a4ccc92bce05e41a27278d7c85018c52414313a5077789001d4f01910b72aad05d220aa14a58733a7489bc54556b":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 7_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1030:"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d4738623df223aa43843df8467534c41d013e0c803c624e263666b239bde40a5f29aeb8de79e3daa61dd0370f49bd4b013834b98212aef6b1c5ee373b3cb":"7866314a6ad6f2b250a35941db28f5864b585859":"0ab14c373aeb7d4328d0aaad8c094d88b9eb098b95f21054a29082522be7c27a312878b637917e3d819e6c3c568db5d843802b06d51d9e98a2be0bf40c031423b00edfbff8320efb9171bd2044653a4cb9c5122f6c65e83cda2ec3c126027a9c1a56ba874d0fea23f380b82cf240b8cf540004758c4c77d934157a74f3fc12bfac":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 7_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1030:"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bb47231ca5ea1d3ad46c99345d9a8a61":"b2166ed472d58db10cab2c6b000cccf10a7dc509":"028387a318277434798b4d97f460068df5298faba5041ba11761a1cb7316b24184114ec500257e2589ed3b607a1ebbe97a6cc2e02bf1b681f42312a33b7a77d8e7855c4a6de03e3c04643f786b91a264a0d6805e2cea91e68177eb7a64d9255e4f27e713b7ccec00dc200ebd21c2ea2bb890feae4942df941dc3f97890ed347478":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 7_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1030:"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2184827095d35c3f86f600e8e59754013296":"52673bde2ca166c2aa46131ac1dc808d67d7d3b1":"14c678a94ad60525ef39e959b2f3ba5c097a94ff912b67dbace80535c187abd47d075420b1872152bba08f7fc31f313bbf9273c912fc4c0149a9b0cfb79807e346eb332069611bec0ff9bcd168f1f7c33e77313cea454b94e2549eecf002e2acf7f6f2d2845d4fe0aab2e5a92ddf68c480ae11247935d1f62574842216ae674115":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 8_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1031:"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"050b755e5e6880f7b9e9d692a74c37aae449b31bfea6deff83747a897f6c2c825bb1adbf850a3c96994b5de5b33cbc7d4a17913a7967":"7706ffca1ecfb1ebee2a55e5c6e24cd2797a4125":"09b3683d8a2eb0fb295b62ed1fb9290b714457b7825319f4647872af889b30409472020ad12912bf19b11d4819f49614824ffd84d09c0a17e7d17309d12919790410aa2995699f6a86dbe3242b5acc23af45691080d6b1ae810fb3e3057087f0970092ce00be9562ff4053b6262ce0caa93e13723d2e3a5ba075d45f0d61b54b61":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 8_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1031:"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4eb68dcd93ca9b19df111bd43608f557026fe4aa1d5cfac227a3eb5ab9548c18a06dded23f81825986b2fcd71109ecef7eff88873f075c2aa0c469f69c92bc":"a3717da143b4dcffbc742665a8fa950585548343":"2ecf15c97c5a15b1476ae986b371b57a24284f4a162a8d0c8182e7905e792256f1812ba5f83f1f7a130e42dcc02232844edc14a31a68ee97ae564a383a3411656424c5f62ddb646093c367be1fcda426cf00a06d8acb7e57776fbbd855ac3df506fc16b1d7c3f2110f3d8068e91e186363831c8409680d8da9ecd8cf1fa20ee39d":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 8_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1031:"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8604ac56328c1ab5ad917861":"ee06209073cca026bb264e5185bf8c68b7739f86":"4bc89130a5b2dabb7c2fcf90eb5d0eaf9e681b7146a38f3173a3d9cfec52ea9e0a41932e648a9d69344c50da763f51a03c95762131e8052254dcd2248cba40fd31667786ce05a2b7b531ac9dac9ed584a59b677c1a8aed8c5d15d68c05569e2be780bf7db638fd2bfd2a85ab276860f3777338fca989ffd743d13ee08e0ca9893f":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 8_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1031:"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fdda5fbf6ec361a9d9a4ac68af216a0686f438b1e0e5c36b955f74e107f39c0dddcc":"990ad573dc48a973235b6d82543618f2e955105d":"2e456847d8fc36ff0147d6993594b9397227d577752c79d0f904fcb039d4d812fea605a7b574dd82ca786f93752348438ee9f5b5454985d5f0e1699e3e7ad175a32e15f03deb042ab9fe1dd9db1bb86f8c089ccb45e7ef0c5ee7ca9b7290ca6b15bed47039788a8a93ff83e0e8d6244c71006362deef69b6f416fb3c684383fbd0":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 8_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1031:"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4a5f4914bee25de3c69341de07":"ecc63b28f0756f22f52ac8e6ec1251a6ec304718":"1fb9356fd5c4b1796db2ebf7d0d393cc810adf6145defc2fce714f79d93800d5e2ac211ea8bbecca4b654b94c3b18b30dd576ce34dc95436ef57a09415645923359a5d7b4171ef22c24670f1b229d3603e91f76671b7df97e7317c97734476d5f3d17d21cf82b5ba9f83df2e588d36984fd1b584468bd23b2e875f32f68953f7b2":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 8_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1031:"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8e07d66f7b880a72563abcd3f35092bc33409fb7f88f2472be":"3925c71b362d40a0a6de42145579ba1e7dd459fc":"3afd9c6600147b21798d818c655a0f4c9212db26d0b0dfdc2a7594ccb3d22f5bf1d7c3e112cd73fc7d509c7a8bafdd3c274d1399009f9609ec4be6477e453f075aa33db382870c1c3409aef392d7386ae3a696b99a94b4da0589447e955d16c98b17602a59bd736279fcd8fb280c4462d590bfa9bf13fed570eafde97330a2c210":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 9_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1536:"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f735fd55ba92592c3b52b8f9c4f69aaa1cbef8fe88add095595412467f9cf4ec0b896c59eda16210e7549c8abb10cdbc21a12ec9b6b5b8fd2f10399eb6":"8ec965f134a3ec9931e92a1ca0dc8169d5ea705c":"267bcd118acab1fc8ba81c85d73003cb8610fa55c1d97da8d48a7c7f06896a4db751aa284255b9d36ad65f37653d829f1b37f97b8001942545b2fc2c55a7376ca7a1be4b1760c8e05a33e5aa2526b8d98e317088e7834c755b2a59b12631a182c05d5d43ab1779264f8456f515ce57dfdf512d5493dab7b7338dc4b7d78db9c091ac3baf537a69fc7f549d979f0eff9a94fda4169bd4d1d19a69c99e33c3b55490d501b39b1edae118ff6793a153261584d3a5f39f6e682e3d17c8cd1261fa72":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 9_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1536:"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"81b906605015a63aabe42ddf11e1978912f5404c7474b26dce3ed482bf961ecc818bf420c54659":"ecb1b8b25fa50cdab08e56042867f4af5826d16c":"93ac9f0671ec29acbb444effc1a5741351d60fdb0e393fbf754acf0de49761a14841df7772e9bc82773966a1584c4d72baea00118f83f35cca6e537cbd4d811f5583b29783d8a6d94cd31be70d6f526c10ff09c6fa7ce069795a3fcd0511fd5fcb564bcc80ea9c78f38b80012539d8a4ddf6fe81e9cddb7f50dbbbbcc7e5d86097ccf4ec49189fb8bf318be6d5a0715d516b49af191258cd32dc833ce6eb4673c03a19bbace88cc54895f636cc0c1ec89096d11ce235a265ca1764232a689ae8":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 9_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1536:"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fd326429df9b890e09b54b18b8f34f1e24":"e89bb032c6ce622cbdb53bc9466014ea77f777c0":"81ebdd95054b0c822ef9ad7693f5a87adfb4b4c4ce70df2df84ed49c04da58ba5fc20a19e1a6e8b7a3900b22796dc4e869ee6b42792d15a8eceb56c09c69914e813cea8f6931e4b8ed6f421af298d595c97f4789c7caa612c7ef360984c21b93edc5401068b5af4c78a8771b984d53b8ea8adf2f6a7d4a0ba76c75e1dd9f658f20ded4a46071d46d7791b56803d8fea7f0b0f8e41ae3f09383a6f9585fe7753eaaffd2bf94563108beecc207bbb535f5fcc705f0dde9f708c62f49a9c90371d3":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 9_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1536:"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f1459b5f0c92f01a0f723a2e5662484d8f8c0a20fc29dad6acd43bb5f3effdf4e1b63e07fdfe6628d0d74ca19bf2d69e4a0abf86d293925a796772f8088e":"606f3b99c0b9ccd771eaa29ea0e4c884f3189ccc":"bcc35f94cde66cb1136625d625b94432a35b22f3d2fa11a613ff0fca5bd57f87b902ccdc1cd0aebcb0715ee869d1d1fe395f6793003f5eca465059c88660d446ff5f0818552022557e38c08a67ead991262254f10682975ec56397768537f4977af6d5f6aaceb7fb25dec5937230231fd8978af49119a29f29e424ab8272b47562792d5c94f774b8829d0b0d9f1a8c9eddf37574d5fa248eefa9c5271fc5ec2579c81bdd61b410fa61fe36e424221c113addb275664c801d34ca8c6351e4a858":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 9_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1536:"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"53e6e8c729d6f9c319dd317e74b0db8e4ccca25f3c8305746e137ac63a63ef3739e7b595abb96e8d55e54f7bd41ab433378ffb911d":"fcbc421402e9ecabc6082afa40ba5f26522c840e":"232afbc927fa08c2f6a27b87d4a5cb09c07dc26fae73d73a90558839f4fd66d281b87ec734bce237ba166698ed829106a7de6942cd6cdce78fed8d2e4d81428e66490d036264cef92af941d3e35055fe3981e14d29cbb9a4f67473063baec79a1179f5a17c9c1832f2838fd7d5e59bb9659d56dce8a019edef1bb3accc697cc6cc7a778f60a064c7f6f5d529c6210262e003de583e81e3167b89971fb8c0e15d44fffef89b53d8d64dd797d159b56d2b08ea5307ea12c241bd58d4ee278a1f2e":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 9_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:1536:"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b6b28ea2198d0c1008bc64":"23aade0e1e08bb9b9a78d2302a52f9c21b2e1ba2":"438cc7dc08a68da249e42505f8573ba60e2c2773d5b290f4cf9dff718e842081c383e67024a0f29594ea987b9d25e4b738f285970d195abb3a8c8054e3d79d6b9c9a8327ba596f1259e27126674766907d8d582ff3a8476154929adb1e6d1235b2ccb4ec8f663ba9cc670a92bebd853c8dbf69c6436d016f61add836e94732450434207f9fd4c43dec2a12a958efa01efe2669899b5e604c255c55fb7166de5589e369597bb09168c06dd5db177e06a1740eb2d5c82faeca6d92fcee9931ba9f":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 10_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8bba6bf82a6c0f86d5f1756e97956870b08953b06b4eb205bc1694ee":"47e1ab7119fee56c95ee5eaad86f40d0aa63bd33":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 10_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:2048:"ae45ed5601cec6b8cc05f803935c674ddbe0d75c4c09fd7951fc6b0caec313a8df39970c518bffba5ed68f3f0d7f22a4029d413f1ae07e4ebe9e4177ce23e7f5404b569e4ee1bdcf3c1fb03ef113802d4f855eb9b5134b5a7c8085adcae6fa2fa1417ec3763be171b0c62b760ede23c12ad92b980884c641f5a8fac26bdad4a03381a22fe1b754885094c82506d4019a535a286afeb271bb9ba592de18dcf600c2aeeae56e02f7cf79fc14cf3bdc7cd84febbbf950ca90304b2219a7aa063aefa2c3c1980e560cd64afe779585b6107657b957857efde6010988ab7de417fc88d8f384c4e6e72c3f943e0c31c0c4a5cc36f879d8a3ac9d7d59860eaada6b83bb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e6ad181f053b58a904f2457510373e57":"6d17f5b4c1ffac351d195bf7b09d09f09a4079cf":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 10_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"510a2cf60e866fa2340553c94ea39fbc256311e83e94454b4124":"385387514deccc7c740dd8cdf9daee49a1cbfd54":"9886c3e6764a8b9a84e84148ebd8c3b1aa8050381a78f668714c16d9cfd2a6edc56979c535d9dee3b44b85c18be8928992371711472216d95dda98d2ee8347c9b14dffdff84aa48d25ac06f7d7e65398ac967b1ce90925f67dce049b7f812db0742997a74d44fe81dbe0e7a3feaf2e5c40af888d550ddbbe3bc20657a29543f8fc2913b9bd1a61b2ab2256ec409bbd7dc0d17717ea25c43f42ed27df8738bf4afc6766ff7aff0859555ee283920f4c8a63c4a7340cbafddc339ecdb4b0515002f96c932b5b79167af699c0ad3fccfdf0f44e85a70262bf2e18fe34b850589975e867ff969d48eabf212271546cdc05a69ecb526e52870c836f307bd798780ede":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 10_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:2048:"ae45ed5601cec6b8cc05f803935c674ddbe0d75c4c09fd7951fc6b0caec313a8df39970c518bffba5ed68f3f0d7f22a4029d413f1ae07e4ebe9e4177ce23e7f5404b569e4ee1bdcf3c1fb03ef113802d4f855eb9b5134b5a7c8085adcae6fa2fa1417ec3763be171b0c62b760ede23c12ad92b980884c641f5a8fac26bdad4a03381a22fe1b754885094c82506d4019a535a286afeb271bb9ba592de18dcf600c2aeeae56e02f7cf79fc14cf3bdc7cd84febbbf950ca90304b2219a7aa063aefa2c3c1980e560cd64afe779585b6107657b957857efde6010988ab7de417fc88d8f384c4e6e72c3f943e0c31c0c4a5cc36f879d8a3ac9d7d59860eaada6b83bb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bcdd190da3b7d300df9a06e22caae2a75f10c91ff667b7c16bde8b53064a2649a94045c9":"5caca6a0f764161a9684f85d92b6e0ef37ca8b65":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 10_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a7dd6c7dc24b46f9dd5f1e91ada4c3b3df947e877232a9":"95bca9e3859894b3dd869fa7ecd5bbc6401bf3e4":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption Example 10_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"eaf1a73a1b0c4609537de69cd9228bbcfb9a8ca8c6c3efaf056fe4a7f4634ed00b7c39ec6922d7b8ea2c04ebac":"9f47ddf42e97eea856a9bdbc714eb3ac22f6eb32":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Encryption input=NULL with length=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"":"9f47ddf42e97eea856a9bdbc714eb3ac22f6eb32":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector Int +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1024:"eecfae81b1b9b3c908810b10a1b5600199eb9f44aef4fda493b81a9e3d84f632124ef0236e5d1e3b7e28fae7aa040a2d5b252176459d1f397541ba2a58fb6599":"c97fb1f027f453f6341233eaaad1d9353f6c42d08866b1d05a0f2035028b9d869840b41666b42e92ea0da3b43204b5cfce3352524d0416a5a441e700af461503":"bbf82f090682ce9c2338ac2b9da871f7368d07eed41043a440d6b6f07454f51fb8dfbaaf035c02ab61ea48ceeb6fcd4876ed520d60e1ec4619719d8a5b8b807fafb8e0a3dfc737723ee6b4b7d93a2584ee6a649d060953748834b2454598394ee0aab12d7b61a51f527a9a41f6c1687fe2537298ca2a8f5946f8e5fd091dbdcb":"11":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49":"aafd12f659cae63489b479e5076ddec2f06cb58f":"1253e04dc0a5397bb44a7ab87e9bf2a039a33d1e996fc82a94ccd30074c95df763722017069e5268da5d1c0b4f872cf653c11df82314a67968dfeae28def04bb6d84b1c31d654a1970e5783bd6eb96a024c2ca2f4a90fe9f2ef5c9c140e5bb48da9536ad8700c84fc9130adea74e558d51a74ddf85d8b50de96838d6063e0955":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 1_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1024:"d32737e7267ffe1341b2d5c0d150a81b586fb3132bed2f8d5262864a9cb9f30af38be448598d413a172efb802c21acf1c11c520c2f26a471dcad212eac7ca39d":"cc8853d1d54da630fac004f471f281c7b8982d8224a490edbeb33d3e3d5cc93c4765703d1dd791642f1f116a0dd852be2419b2af72bfe9a030e860b0288b5d77":"a8b3b284af8eb50b387034a860f146c4919f318763cd6c5598c8ae4811a1e0abc4c7e0b082d693a5e7fced675cf4668512772c0cbc64a742c6c630f533c8cc72f62ae833c40bf25842e984bb78bdbf97c0107d55bdb662f5c4e0fab9845cb5148ef7392dd3aaff93ae1e6b667bb3d4247616d4f5ba10d4cfd226de88d39f16fb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6628194e12073db03ba94cda9ef9532397d50dba79b987004afefe34":"18b776ea21069d69776a33e96bad48e1dda0a5ef":"354fe67b4a126d5d35fe36c777791a3f7ba13def484e2d3908aff722fad468fb21696de95d0be911c2d3174f8afcc201035f7b6d8e69402de5451618c21a535fa9d7bfc5b8dd9fc243f8cf927db31322d6e881eaa91a996170e657a05a266426d98c88003f8477c1227094a0d9fa1e8c4024309ce1ecccb5210035d47ac72e8a":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 1_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1024:"d32737e7267ffe1341b2d5c0d150a81b586fb3132bed2f8d5262864a9cb9f30af38be448598d413a172efb802c21acf1c11c520c2f26a471dcad212eac7ca39d":"cc8853d1d54da630fac004f471f281c7b8982d8224a490edbeb33d3e3d5cc93c4765703d1dd791642f1f116a0dd852be2419b2af72bfe9a030e860b0288b5d77":"a8b3b284af8eb50b387034a860f146c4919f318763cd6c5598c8ae4811a1e0abc4c7e0b082d693a5e7fced675cf4668512772c0cbc64a742c6c630f533c8cc72f62ae833c40bf25842e984bb78bdbf97c0107d55bdb662f5c4e0fab9845cb5148ef7392dd3aaff93ae1e6b667bb3d4247616d4f5ba10d4cfd226de88d39f16fb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"750c4047f547e8e41411856523298ac9bae245efaf1397fbe56f9dd5":"0cc742ce4a9b7f32f951bcb251efd925fe4fe35f":"640db1acc58e0568fe5407e5f9b701dff8c3c91e716c536fc7fcec6cb5b71c1165988d4a279e1577d730fc7a29932e3f00c81515236d8d8e31017a7a09df4352d904cdeb79aa583adcc31ea698a4c05283daba9089be5491f67c1a4ee48dc74bbbe6643aef846679b4cb395a352d5ed115912df696ffe0702932946d71492b44":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 1_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1024:"d32737e7267ffe1341b2d5c0d150a81b586fb3132bed2f8d5262864a9cb9f30af38be448598d413a172efb802c21acf1c11c520c2f26a471dcad212eac7ca39d":"cc8853d1d54da630fac004f471f281c7b8982d8224a490edbeb33d3e3d5cc93c4765703d1dd791642f1f116a0dd852be2419b2af72bfe9a030e860b0288b5d77":"a8b3b284af8eb50b387034a860f146c4919f318763cd6c5598c8ae4811a1e0abc4c7e0b082d693a5e7fced675cf4668512772c0cbc64a742c6c630f533c8cc72f62ae833c40bf25842e984bb78bdbf97c0107d55bdb662f5c4e0fab9845cb5148ef7392dd3aaff93ae1e6b667bb3d4247616d4f5ba10d4cfd226de88d39f16fb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d94ae0832e6445ce42331cb06d531a82b1db4baad30f746dc916df24d4e3c2451fff59a6423eb0e1d02d4fe646cf699dfd818c6e97b051":"2514df4695755a67b288eaf4905c36eec66fd2fd":"423736ed035f6026af276c35c0b3741b365e5f76ca091b4e8c29e2f0befee603595aa8322d602d2e625e95eb81b2f1c9724e822eca76db8618cf09c5343503a4360835b5903bc637e3879fb05e0ef32685d5aec5067cd7cc96fe4b2670b6eac3066b1fcf5686b68589aafb7d629b02d8f8625ca3833624d4800fb081b1cf94eb":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 1_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1024:"d32737e7267ffe1341b2d5c0d150a81b586fb3132bed2f8d5262864a9cb9f30af38be448598d413a172efb802c21acf1c11c520c2f26a471dcad212eac7ca39d":"cc8853d1d54da630fac004f471f281c7b8982d8224a490edbeb33d3e3d5cc93c4765703d1dd791642f1f116a0dd852be2419b2af72bfe9a030e860b0288b5d77":"a8b3b284af8eb50b387034a860f146c4919f318763cd6c5598c8ae4811a1e0abc4c7e0b082d693a5e7fced675cf4668512772c0cbc64a742c6c630f533c8cc72f62ae833c40bf25842e984bb78bdbf97c0107d55bdb662f5c4e0fab9845cb5148ef7392dd3aaff93ae1e6b667bb3d4247616d4f5ba10d4cfd226de88d39f16fb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"52e650d98e7f2a048b4f86852153b97e01dd316f346a19f67a85":"c4435a3e1a18a68b6820436290a37cefb85db3fb":"45ead4ca551e662c9800f1aca8283b0525e6abae30be4b4aba762fa40fd3d38e22abefc69794f6ebbbc05ddbb11216247d2f412fd0fba87c6e3acd888813646fd0e48e785204f9c3f73d6d8239562722dddd8771fec48b83a31ee6f592c4cfd4bc88174f3b13a112aae3b9f7b80e0fc6f7255ba880dc7d8021e22ad6a85f0755":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 1_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1024:"d32737e7267ffe1341b2d5c0d150a81b586fb3132bed2f8d5262864a9cb9f30af38be448598d413a172efb802c21acf1c11c520c2f26a471dcad212eac7ca39d":"cc8853d1d54da630fac004f471f281c7b8982d8224a490edbeb33d3e3d5cc93c4765703d1dd791642f1f116a0dd852be2419b2af72bfe9a030e860b0288b5d77":"a8b3b284af8eb50b387034a860f146c4919f318763cd6c5598c8ae4811a1e0abc4c7e0b082d693a5e7fced675cf4668512772c0cbc64a742c6c630f533c8cc72f62ae833c40bf25842e984bb78bdbf97c0107d55bdb662f5c4e0fab9845cb5148ef7392dd3aaff93ae1e6b667bb3d4247616d4f5ba10d4cfd226de88d39f16fb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8da89fd9e5f974a29feffb462b49180f6cf9e802":"b318c42df3be0f83fea823f5a7b47ed5e425a3b5":"36f6e34d94a8d34daacba33a2139d00ad85a9345a86051e73071620056b920e219005855a213a0f23897cdcd731b45257c777fe908202befdd0b58386b1244ea0cf539a05d5d10329da44e13030fd760dcd644cfef2094d1910d3f433e1c7c6dd18bc1f2df7f643d662fb9dd37ead9059190f4fa66ca39e869c4eb449cbdc439":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 1_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1024:"d32737e7267ffe1341b2d5c0d150a81b586fb3132bed2f8d5262864a9cb9f30af38be448598d413a172efb802c21acf1c11c520c2f26a471dcad212eac7ca39d":"cc8853d1d54da630fac004f471f281c7b8982d8224a490edbeb33d3e3d5cc93c4765703d1dd791642f1f116a0dd852be2419b2af72bfe9a030e860b0288b5d77":"a8b3b284af8eb50b387034a860f146c4919f318763cd6c5598c8ae4811a1e0abc4c7e0b082d693a5e7fced675cf4668512772c0cbc64a742c6c630f533c8cc72f62ae833c40bf25842e984bb78bdbf97c0107d55bdb662f5c4e0fab9845cb5148ef7392dd3aaff93ae1e6b667bb3d4247616d4f5ba10d4cfd226de88d39f16fb":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"26521050844271":"e4ec0982c2336f3a677f6a356174eb0ce887abc2":"42cee2617b1ecea4db3f4829386fbd61dafbf038e180d837c96366df24c097b4ab0fac6bdf590d821c9f10642e681ad05b8d78b378c0f46ce2fad63f74e0ad3df06b075d7eb5f5636f8d403b9059ca761b5c62bb52aa45002ea70baace08ded243b9d8cbd62a68ade265832b56564e43a6fa42ed199a099769742df1539e8255":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 2_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1025:"0159dbde04a33ef06fb608b80b190f4d3e22bcc13ac8e4a081033abfa416edb0b338aa08b57309ea5a5240e7dc6e54378c69414c31d97ddb1f406db3769cc41a43":"012b652f30403b38b40995fd6ff41a1acc8ada70373236b7202d39b2ee30cfb46db09511f6f307cc61cc21606c18a75b8a62f822df031ba0df0dafd5506f568bd7":"01947c7fce90425f47279e70851f25d5e62316fe8a1df19371e3e628e260543e4901ef6081f68c0b8141190d2ae8daba7d1250ec6db636e944ec3722877c7c1d0a67f14b1694c5f0379451a43e49a32dde83670b73da91a1c99bc23b436a60055c610f0baf99c1a079565b95a3f1526632d1d4da60f20eda25e653c4f002766f45":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8ff00caa605c702830634d9a6c3d42c652b58cf1d92fec570beee7":"8c407b5ec2899e5099c53e8ce793bf94e71b1782":"0181af8922b9fcb4d79d92ebe19815992fc0c1439d8bcd491398a0f4ad3a329a5bd9385560db532683c8b7da04e4b12aed6aacdf471c34c9cda891addcc2df3456653aa6382e9ae59b54455257eb099d562bbe10453f2b6d13c59c02e10f1f8abb5da0d0570932dacf2d0901db729d0fefcc054e70968ea540c81b04bcaefe720e":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 2_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1025:"0159dbde04a33ef06fb608b80b190f4d3e22bcc13ac8e4a081033abfa416edb0b338aa08b57309ea5a5240e7dc6e54378c69414c31d97ddb1f406db3769cc41a43":"012b652f30403b38b40995fd6ff41a1acc8ada70373236b7202d39b2ee30cfb46db09511f6f307cc61cc21606c18a75b8a62f822df031ba0df0dafd5506f568bd7":"01947c7fce90425f47279e70851f25d5e62316fe8a1df19371e3e628e260543e4901ef6081f68c0b8141190d2ae8daba7d1250ec6db636e944ec3722877c7c1d0a67f14b1694c5f0379451a43e49a32dde83670b73da91a1c99bc23b436a60055c610f0baf99c1a079565b95a3f1526632d1d4da60f20eda25e653c4f002766f45":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2d":"b600cf3c2e506d7f16778c910d3a8b003eee61d5":"018759ff1df63b2792410562314416a8aeaf2ac634b46f940ab82d64dbf165eee33011da749d4bab6e2fcd18129c9e49277d8453112b429a222a8471b070993998e758861c4d3f6d749d91c4290d332c7a4ab3f7ea35ff3a07d497c955ff0ffc95006b62c6d296810d9bfab024196c7934012c2df978ef299aba239940cba10245":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 2_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1025:"0159dbde04a33ef06fb608b80b190f4d3e22bcc13ac8e4a081033abfa416edb0b338aa08b57309ea5a5240e7dc6e54378c69414c31d97ddb1f406db3769cc41a43":"012b652f30403b38b40995fd6ff41a1acc8ada70373236b7202d39b2ee30cfb46db09511f6f307cc61cc21606c18a75b8a62f822df031ba0df0dafd5506f568bd7":"01947c7fce90425f47279e70851f25d5e62316fe8a1df19371e3e628e260543e4901ef6081f68c0b8141190d2ae8daba7d1250ec6db636e944ec3722877c7c1d0a67f14b1694c5f0379451a43e49a32dde83670b73da91a1c99bc23b436a60055c610f0baf99c1a079565b95a3f1526632d1d4da60f20eda25e653c4f002766f45":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"74fc88c51bc90f77af9d5e9a4a70133d4b4e0b34da3c37c7ef8e":"a73768aeeaa91f9d8c1ed6f9d2b63467f07ccae3":"018802bab04c60325e81c4962311f2be7c2adce93041a00719c88f957575f2c79f1b7bc8ced115c706b311c08a2d986ca3b6a9336b147c29c6f229409ddec651bd1fdd5a0b7f610c9937fdb4a3a762364b8b3206b4ea485fd098d08f63d4aa8bb2697d027b750c32d7f74eaf5180d2e9b66b17cb2fa55523bc280da10d14be2053":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 2_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1025:"0159dbde04a33ef06fb608b80b190f4d3e22bcc13ac8e4a081033abfa416edb0b338aa08b57309ea5a5240e7dc6e54378c69414c31d97ddb1f406db3769cc41a43":"012b652f30403b38b40995fd6ff41a1acc8ada70373236b7202d39b2ee30cfb46db09511f6f307cc61cc21606c18a75b8a62f822df031ba0df0dafd5506f568bd7":"01947c7fce90425f47279e70851f25d5e62316fe8a1df19371e3e628e260543e4901ef6081f68c0b8141190d2ae8daba7d1250ec6db636e944ec3722877c7c1d0a67f14b1694c5f0379451a43e49a32dde83670b73da91a1c99bc23b436a60055c610f0baf99c1a079565b95a3f1526632d1d4da60f20eda25e653c4f002766f45":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a7eb2a5036931d27d4e891326d99692ffadda9bf7efd3e34e622c4adc085f721dfe885072c78a203b151739be540fa8c153a10f00a":"9a7b3b0e708bd96f8190ecab4fb9b2b3805a8156":"00a4578cbc176318a638fba7d01df15746af44d4f6cd96d7e7c495cbf425b09c649d32bf886da48fbaf989a2117187cafb1fb580317690e3ccd446920b7af82b31db5804d87d01514acbfa9156e782f867f6bed9449e0e9a2c09bcecc6aa087636965e34b3ec766f2fe2e43018a2fddeb140616a0e9d82e5331024ee0652fc7641":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 2_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1025:"0159dbde04a33ef06fb608b80b190f4d3e22bcc13ac8e4a081033abfa416edb0b338aa08b57309ea5a5240e7dc6e54378c69414c31d97ddb1f406db3769cc41a43":"012b652f30403b38b40995fd6ff41a1acc8ada70373236b7202d39b2ee30cfb46db09511f6f307cc61cc21606c18a75b8a62f822df031ba0df0dafd5506f568bd7":"01947c7fce90425f47279e70851f25d5e62316fe8a1df19371e3e628e260543e4901ef6081f68c0b8141190d2ae8daba7d1250ec6db636e944ec3722877c7c1d0a67f14b1694c5f0379451a43e49a32dde83670b73da91a1c99bc23b436a60055c610f0baf99c1a079565b95a3f1526632d1d4da60f20eda25e653c4f002766f45":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2ef2b066f854c33f3bdcbb5994a435e73d6c6c":"eb3cebbc4adc16bb48e88c8aec0e34af7f427fd3":"00ebc5f5fda77cfdad3c83641a9025e77d72d8a6fb33a810f5950f8d74c73e8d931e8634d86ab1246256ae07b6005b71b7f2fb98351218331ce69b8ffbdc9da08bbc9c704f876deb9df9fc2ec065cad87f9090b07acc17aa7f997b27aca48806e897f771d95141fe4526d8a5301b678627efab707fd40fbebd6e792a25613e7aec":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Test Vector 2_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1025:"0159dbde04a33ef06fb608b80b190f4d3e22bcc13ac8e4a081033abfa416edb0b338aa08b57309ea5a5240e7dc6e54378c69414c31d97ddb1f406db3769cc41a43":"012b652f30403b38b40995fd6ff41a1acc8ada70373236b7202d39b2ee30cfb46db09511f6f307cc61cc21606c18a75b8a62f822df031ba0df0dafd5506f568bd7":"01947c7fce90425f47279e70851f25d5e62316fe8a1df19371e3e628e260543e4901ef6081f68c0b8141190d2ae8daba7d1250ec6db636e944ec3722877c7c1d0a67f14b1694c5f0379451a43e49a32dde83670b73da91a1c99bc23b436a60055c610f0baf99c1a079565b95a3f1526632d1d4da60f20eda25e653c4f002766f45":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8a7fb344c8b6cb2cf2ef1f643f9a3218f6e19bba89c0":"4c45cf4d57c98e3d6d2095adc51c489eb50dff84":"010839ec20c27b9052e55befb9b77e6fc26e9075d7a54378c646abdf51e445bd5715de81789f56f1803d9170764a9e93cb78798694023ee7393ce04bc5d8f8c5a52c171d43837e3aca62f609eb0aa5ffb0960ef04198dd754f57f7fbe6abf765cf118b4ca443b23b5aab266f952326ac4581100644325f8b721acd5d04ff14ef3a":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 3_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1026:"01bf01d216d73595cf0270c2beb78d40a0d8447d31da919a983f7eea781b77d85fe371b3e9373e7b69217d3150a02d8958de7fad9d555160958b4454127e0e7eaf":"018d3399658166db3829816d7b295416759e9c91987f5b2d8aecd63b04b48bd7b2fcf229bb7f8a6dc88ba13dd2e39ad55b6d1a06160708f9700be80b8fd3744ce7":"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"087820b569e8fa8d":"8ced6b196290805790e909074015e6a20b0c4894":"026a0485d96aebd96b4382085099b962e6a2bdec3d90c8db625e14372de85e2d5b7baab65c8faf91bb5504fb495afce5c988b3f6a52e20e1d6cbd3566c5cd1f2b8318bb542cc0ea25c4aab9932afa20760eaddec784396a07ea0ef24d4e6f4d37e5052a7a31e146aa480a111bbe926401307e00f410033842b6d82fe5ce4dfae80":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 3_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1026:"01bf01d216d73595cf0270c2beb78d40a0d8447d31da919a983f7eea781b77d85fe371b3e9373e7b69217d3150a02d8958de7fad9d555160958b4454127e0e7eaf":"018d3399658166db3829816d7b295416759e9c91987f5b2d8aecd63b04b48bd7b2fcf229bb7f8a6dc88ba13dd2e39ad55b6d1a06160708f9700be80b8fd3744ce7":"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4653acaf171960b01f52a7be63a3ab21dc368ec43b50d82ec3781e04":"b4291d6567550848cc156967c809baab6ca507f0":"024db89c7802989be0783847863084941bf209d761987e38f97cb5f6f1bc88da72a50b73ebaf11c879c4f95df37b850b8f65d7622e25b1b889e80fe80baca2069d6e0e1d829953fc459069de98ea9798b451e557e99abf8fe3d9ccf9096ebbf3e5255d3b4e1c6d2ecadf067a359eea86405acd47d5e165517ccafd47d6dbee4bf5":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 3_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1026:"01bf01d216d73595cf0270c2beb78d40a0d8447d31da919a983f7eea781b77d85fe371b3e9373e7b69217d3150a02d8958de7fad9d555160958b4454127e0e7eaf":"018d3399658166db3829816d7b295416759e9c91987f5b2d8aecd63b04b48bd7b2fcf229bb7f8a6dc88ba13dd2e39ad55b6d1a06160708f9700be80b8fd3744ce7":"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d94cd0e08fa404ed89":"ce8928f6059558254008badd9794fadcd2fd1f65":"0239bce681032441528877d6d1c8bb28aa3bc97f1df584563618995797683844ca86664732f4bed7a0aab083aaabfb7238f582e30958c2024e44e57043b97950fd543da977c90cdde5337d618442f99e60d7783ab59ce6dd9d69c47ad1e962bec22d05895cff8d3f64ed5261d92b2678510393484990ba3f7f06818ae6ffce8a3a":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 3_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1026:"01bf01d216d73595cf0270c2beb78d40a0d8447d31da919a983f7eea781b77d85fe371b3e9373e7b69217d3150a02d8958de7fad9d555160958b4454127e0e7eaf":"018d3399658166db3829816d7b295416759e9c91987f5b2d8aecd63b04b48bd7b2fcf229bb7f8a6dc88ba13dd2e39ad55b6d1a06160708f9700be80b8fd3744ce7":"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6cc641b6b61e6f963974dad23a9013284ef1":"6e2979f52d6814a57d83b090054888f119a5b9a3":"02994c62afd76f498ba1fd2cf642857fca81f4373cb08f1cbaee6f025c3b512b42c3e8779113476648039dbe0493f9246292fac28950600e7c0f32edf9c81b9dec45c3bde0cc8d8847590169907b7dc5991ceb29bb0714d613d96df0f12ec5d8d3507c8ee7ae78dd83f216fa61de100363aca48a7e914ae9f42ddfbe943b09d9a0":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 3_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1026:"01bf01d216d73595cf0270c2beb78d40a0d8447d31da919a983f7eea781b77d85fe371b3e9373e7b69217d3150a02d8958de7fad9d555160958b4454127e0e7eaf":"018d3399658166db3829816d7b295416759e9c91987f5b2d8aecd63b04b48bd7b2fcf229bb7f8a6dc88ba13dd2e39ad55b6d1a06160708f9700be80b8fd3744ce7":"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"df5151832b61f4f25891fb4172f328d2eddf8371ffcfdbe997939295f30eca6918017cfda1153bf7a6af87593223":"2d760bfe38c59de34cdc8b8c78a38e66284a2d27":"0162042ff6969592a6167031811a239834ce638abf54fec8b99478122afe2ee67f8c5b18b0339805bfdbc5a4e6720b37c59cfba942464c597ff532a119821545fd2e59b114e61daf71820529f5029cf524954327c34ec5e6f5ba7efcc4de943ab8ad4ed787b1454329f70db798a3a8f4d92f8274e2b2948ade627ce8ee33e43c60":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 3_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1026:"01bf01d216d73595cf0270c2beb78d40a0d8447d31da919a983f7eea781b77d85fe371b3e9373e7b69217d3150a02d8958de7fad9d555160958b4454127e0e7eaf":"018d3399658166db3829816d7b295416759e9c91987f5b2d8aecd63b04b48bd7b2fcf229bb7f8a6dc88ba13dd2e39ad55b6d1a06160708f9700be80b8fd3744ce7":"02b58fec039a860700a4d7b6462f93e6cdd491161ddd74f4e810b40e3c1652006a5c277b2774c11305a4cbab5a78efa57e17a86df7a3fa36fc4b1d2249f22ec7c2dd6a463232accea906d66ebe80b5704b10729da6f833234abb5efdd4a292cbfad33b4d33fa7a14b8c397b56e3acd21203428b77cdfa33a6da706b3d8b0fc43e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"3c3bad893c544a6d520ab022319188c8d504b7a788b850903b85972eaa18552e1134a7ad6098826254ff7ab672b3d8eb3158fac6d4cbaef1":"f174779c5fd3cfe007badcb7a36c9b55bfcfbf0e":"00112051e75d064943bc4478075e43482fd59cee0679de6893eec3a943daa490b9691c93dfc0464b6623b9f3dbd3e70083264f034b374f74164e1a00763725e574744ba0b9db83434f31df96f6e2a26f6d8eba348bd4686c2238ac07c37aac3785d1c7eea2f819fd91491798ed8e9cef5e43b781b0e0276e37c43ff9492d005730":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 4_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1027:"027458c19ec1636919e736c9af25d609a51b8f561d19c6bf6943dd1ee1ab8a4a3f232100bd40b88decc6ba235548b6ef792a11c9de823d0a7922c7095b6eba5701":"0210ee9b33ab61716e27d251bd465f4b35a1a232e2da00901c294bf22350ce490d099f642b5375612db63ba1f20386492bf04d34b3c22bceb909d13441b53b5139":"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4a86609534ee434a6cbca3f7e962e76d455e3264c19f605f6e5ff6137c65c56d7fb344cd52bc93374f3d166c9f0c6f9c506bad19330972d2":"1cac19ce993def55f98203f6852896c95ccca1f3":"04cce19614845e094152a3fe18e54e3330c44e5efbc64ae16886cb1869014cc5781b1f8f9e045384d0112a135ca0d12e9c88a8e4063416deaae3844f60d6e96fe155145f4525b9a34431ca3766180f70e15a5e5d8e8b1a516ff870609f13f896935ced188279a58ed13d07114277d75c6568607e0ab092fd803a223e4a8ee0b1a8":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 4_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1027:"027458c19ec1636919e736c9af25d609a51b8f561d19c6bf6943dd1ee1ab8a4a3f232100bd40b88decc6ba235548b6ef792a11c9de823d0a7922c7095b6eba5701":"0210ee9b33ab61716e27d251bd465f4b35a1a232e2da00901c294bf22350ce490d099f642b5375612db63ba1f20386492bf04d34b3c22bceb909d13441b53b5139":"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b0adc4f3fe11da59ce992773d9059943c03046497ee9d9f9a06df1166db46d98f58d27ec074c02eee6cbe2449c8b9fc5080c5c3f4433092512ec46aa793743c8":"f545d5897585e3db71aa0cb8da76c51d032ae963":"0097b698c6165645b303486fbf5a2a4479c0ee85889b541a6f0b858d6b6597b13b854eb4f839af03399a80d79bda6578c841f90d645715b280d37143992dd186c80b949b775cae97370e4ec97443136c6da484e970ffdb1323a20847821d3b18381de13bb49aaea66530c4a4b8271f3eae172cd366e07e6636f1019d2a28aed15e":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 4_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1027:"027458c19ec1636919e736c9af25d609a51b8f561d19c6bf6943dd1ee1ab8a4a3f232100bd40b88decc6ba235548b6ef792a11c9de823d0a7922c7095b6eba5701":"0210ee9b33ab61716e27d251bd465f4b35a1a232e2da00901c294bf22350ce490d099f642b5375612db63ba1f20386492bf04d34b3c22bceb909d13441b53b5139":"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bf6d42e701707b1d0206b0c8b45a1c72641ff12889219a82bdea965b5e79a96b0d0163ed9d578ec9ada20f2fbcf1ea3c4089d83419ba81b0c60f3606da99":"ad997feef730d6ea7be60d0dc52e72eacbfdd275":"0301f935e9c47abcb48acbbe09895d9f5971af14839da4ff95417ee453d1fd77319072bb7297e1b55d7561cd9d1bb24c1a9a37c619864308242804879d86ebd001dce5183975e1506989b70e5a83434154d5cbfd6a24787e60eb0c658d2ac193302d1192c6e622d4a12ad4b53923bca246df31c6395e37702c6a78ae081fb9d065":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 4_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1027:"027458c19ec1636919e736c9af25d609a51b8f561d19c6bf6943dd1ee1ab8a4a3f232100bd40b88decc6ba235548b6ef792a11c9de823d0a7922c7095b6eba5701":"0210ee9b33ab61716e27d251bd465f4b35a1a232e2da00901c294bf22350ce490d099f642b5375612db63ba1f20386492bf04d34b3c22bceb909d13441b53b5139":"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fb2ef112f5e766eb94019297934794f7be2f6fc1c58e":"136454df5730f73c807a7e40d8c1a312ac5b9dd3":"02d110ad30afb727beb691dd0cf17d0af1a1e7fa0cc040ec1a4ba26a42c59d0a796a2e22c8f357ccc98b6519aceb682e945e62cb734614a529407cd452bee3e44fece8423cc19e55548b8b994b849c7ecde4933e76037e1d0ce44275b08710c68e430130b929730ed77e09b015642c5593f04e4ffb9410798102a8e96ffdfe11e4":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 4_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1027:"027458c19ec1636919e736c9af25d609a51b8f561d19c6bf6943dd1ee1ab8a4a3f232100bd40b88decc6ba235548b6ef792a11c9de823d0a7922c7095b6eba5701":"0210ee9b33ab61716e27d251bd465f4b35a1a232e2da00901c294bf22350ce490d099f642b5375612db63ba1f20386492bf04d34b3c22bceb909d13441b53b5139":"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"28ccd447bb9e85166dabb9e5b7d1adadc4b9d39f204e96d5e440ce9ad928bc1c2284":"bca8057f824b2ea257f2861407eef63d33208681":"00dbb8a7439d90efd919a377c54fae8fe11ec58c3b858362e23ad1b8a44310799066b99347aa525691d2adc58d9b06e34f288c170390c5f0e11c0aa3645959f18ee79e8f2be8d7ac5c23d061f18dd74b8c5f2a58fcb5eb0c54f99f01a83247568292536583340948d7a8c97c4acd1e98d1e29dc320e97a260532a8aa7a758a1ec2":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 4_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1027:"027458c19ec1636919e736c9af25d609a51b8f561d19c6bf6943dd1ee1ab8a4a3f232100bd40b88decc6ba235548b6ef792a11c9de823d0a7922c7095b6eba5701":"0210ee9b33ab61716e27d251bd465f4b35a1a232e2da00901c294bf22350ce490d099f642b5375612db63ba1f20386492bf04d34b3c22bceb909d13441b53b5139":"051240b6cc0004fa48d0134671c078c7c8dec3b3e2f25bc2564467339db38853d06b85eea5b2de353bff42ac2e46bc97fae6ac9618da9537a5c8f553c1e357625991d6108dcd7885fb3a25413f53efcad948cb35cd9b9ae9c1c67626d113d57dde4c5bea76bb5bb7de96c00d07372e9685a6d75cf9d239fa148d70931b5f3fb039":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f22242751ec6b1":"2e7e1e17f647b5ddd033e15472f90f6812f3ac4e":"00a5ffa4768c8bbecaee2db77e8f2eec99595933545520835e5ba7db9493d3e17cddefe6a5f567624471908db4e2d83a0fbee60608fc84049503b2234a07dc83b27b22847ad8920ff42f674ef79b76280b00233d2b51b8cb2703a9d42bfbc8250c96ec32c051e57f1b4ba528db89c37e4c54e27e6e64ac69635ae887d9541619a9":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 5_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1028:"03b0d3962f6d17549cbfca11294348dcf0e7e39f8c2bc6824f2164b606d687860dae1e632393cfedf513228229069e2f60e4acd7e633a436063f82385f48993707":"02e4c32e2f517269b7072309f00c0e31365f7ce28b236b82912df239abf39572cf0ed604b02982e53564c52d6a05397de5c052a2fddc141ef7189836346aeb331f":"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"af71a901e3a61d3132f0fc1fdb474f9ea6579257ffc24d164170145b3dbde8":"44c92e283f77b9499c603d963660c87d2f939461":"036046a4a47d9ed3ba9a89139c105038eb7492b05a5d68bfd53accff4597f7a68651b47b4a4627d927e485eed7b4566420e8b409879e5d606eae251d22a5df799f7920bfc117b992572a53b1263146bcea03385cc5e853c9a101c8c3e1bda31a519807496c6cb5e5efb408823a352b8fa0661fb664efadd593deb99fff5ed000e5":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 5_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1028:"03b0d3962f6d17549cbfca11294348dcf0e7e39f8c2bc6824f2164b606d687860dae1e632393cfedf513228229069e2f60e4acd7e633a436063f82385f48993707":"02e4c32e2f517269b7072309f00c0e31365f7ce28b236b82912df239abf39572cf0ed604b02982e53564c52d6a05397de5c052a2fddc141ef7189836346aeb331f":"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a3b844a08239a8ac41605af17a6cfda4d350136585903a417a79268760519a4b4ac3303ec73f0f87cfb32399":"cb28f5860659fceee49c3eeafce625a70803bd32":"03d6eb654edce615bc59f455265ed4e5a18223cbb9be4e4069b473804d5de96f54dcaaa603d049c5d94aa1470dfcd2254066b7c7b61ff1f6f6770e3215c51399fd4e34ec5082bc48f089840ad04354ae66dc0f1bd18e461a33cc1258b443a2837a6df26759aa2302334986f87380c9cc9d53be9f99605d2c9a97da7b0915a4a7ad":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 5_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1028:"03b0d3962f6d17549cbfca11294348dcf0e7e39f8c2bc6824f2164b606d687860dae1e632393cfedf513228229069e2f60e4acd7e633a436063f82385f48993707":"02e4c32e2f517269b7072309f00c0e31365f7ce28b236b82912df239abf39572cf0ed604b02982e53564c52d6a05397de5c052a2fddc141ef7189836346aeb331f":"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"308b0ecbd2c76cb77fc6f70c5edd233fd2f20929d629f026953bb62a8f4a3a314bde195de85b5f816da2aab074d26cb6acddf323ae3b9c678ac3cf12fbdde7":"2285f40d770482f9a9efa2c72cb3ac55716dc0ca":"0770952181649f9f9f07ff626ff3a22c35c462443d905d456a9fd0bff43cac2ca7a9f554e9478b9acc3ac838b02040ffd3e1847de2e4253929f9dd9ee4044325a9b05cabb808b2ee840d34e15d105a3f1f7b27695a1a07a2d73fe08ecaaa3c9c9d4d5a89ff890d54727d7ae40c0ec1a8dd86165d8ee2c6368141016a48b55b6967":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 5_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1028:"03b0d3962f6d17549cbfca11294348dcf0e7e39f8c2bc6824f2164b606d687860dae1e632393cfedf513228229069e2f60e4acd7e633a436063f82385f48993707":"02e4c32e2f517269b7072309f00c0e31365f7ce28b236b82912df239abf39572cf0ed604b02982e53564c52d6a05397de5c052a2fddc141ef7189836346aeb331f":"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"15c5b9ee1185":"49fa45d3a78dd10dfd577399d1eb00af7eed5513":"0812b76768ebcb642d040258e5f4441a018521bd96687e6c5e899fcd6c17588ff59a82cc8ae03a4b45b31299af1788c329f7dcd285f8cf4ced82606b97612671a45bedca133442144d1617d114f802857f0f9d739751c57a3f9ee400912c61e2e6992be031a43dd48fa6ba14eef7c422b5edc4e7afa04fdd38f402d1c8bb719abf":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 5_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1028:"03b0d3962f6d17549cbfca11294348dcf0e7e39f8c2bc6824f2164b606d687860dae1e632393cfedf513228229069e2f60e4acd7e633a436063f82385f48993707":"02e4c32e2f517269b7072309f00c0e31365f7ce28b236b82912df239abf39572cf0ed604b02982e53564c52d6a05397de5c052a2fddc141ef7189836346aeb331f":"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"21026e6800c7fa728fcaaba0d196ae28d7a2ac4ffd8abce794f0985f60c8a6737277365d3fea11db8923a2029a":"f0287413234cc5034724a094c4586b87aff133fc":"07b60e14ec954bfd29e60d0047e789f51d57186c63589903306793ced3f68241c743529aba6a6374f92e19e0163efa33697e196f7661dfaaa47aac6bde5e51deb507c72c589a2ca1693d96b1460381249b2cdb9eac44769f2489c5d3d2f99f0ee3c7ee5bf64a5ac79c42bd433f149be8cb59548361640595513c97af7bc2509723":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 5_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1028:"03b0d3962f6d17549cbfca11294348dcf0e7e39f8c2bc6824f2164b606d687860dae1e632393cfedf513228229069e2f60e4acd7e633a436063f82385f48993707":"02e4c32e2f517269b7072309f00c0e31365f7ce28b236b82912df239abf39572cf0ed604b02982e53564c52d6a05397de5c052a2fddc141ef7189836346aeb331f":"0aadf3f9c125e5d891f31ac448e993defe580f802b45f9d7f22ba5021e9c47576b5a1e68031ba9db4e6dabe4d96a1d6f3d267268cff408005f118efcadb99888d1c234467166b2a2b849a05a889c060ac0da0c5fae8b55f309ba62e703742fa0326f2d10b011021489ff497770190d895fd39f52293c39efd73a698bdab9f10ed9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"541e37b68b6c8872b84c02":"d9fba45c96f21e6e26d29eb2cdcb6585be9cb341":"08c36d4dda33423b2ed6830d85f6411ba1dcf470a1fae0ebefee7c089f256cef74cb96ea69c38f60f39abee44129bcb4c92de7f797623b20074e3d9c2899701ed9071e1efa0bdd84d4c3e5130302d8f0240baba4b84a71cc032f2235a5ff0fae277c3e8f9112bef44c9ae20d175fc9a4058bfc930ba31b02e2e4f444483710f24a":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 6_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1029:"04a6ce8b7358dfa69bdcf742617005afb5385f5f3a58a24ef74a22a8c05cb7cc38ebd4cc9d9a9d789a62cd0f60f0cb941d3423c9692efa4fe3adff290c4749a38b":"0404c9a803371fedb4c5be39f3c00b009e5e08a63be1e40035cdaca5011cc701cf7eebcb99f0ffe17cfd0a4bf7befd2dd536ac946db797fdbc4abe8f29349b91ed":"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4046ca8baa3347ca27f49e0d81f9cc1d71be9ba517d4":"dd0f6cfe415e88e5a469a51fbba6dfd40adb4384":"0630eebcd2856c24f798806e41f9e67345eda9ceda386acc9facaea1eeed06ace583709718d9d169fadf414d5c76f92996833ef305b75b1e4b95f662a20faedc3bae0c4827a8bf8a88edbd57ec203a27a841f02e43a615bab1a8cac0701de34debdef62a088089b55ec36ea7522fd3ec8d06b6a073e6df833153bc0aefd93bd1a3":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 6_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1029:"04a6ce8b7358dfa69bdcf742617005afb5385f5f3a58a24ef74a22a8c05cb7cc38ebd4cc9d9a9d789a62cd0f60f0cb941d3423c9692efa4fe3adff290c4749a38b":"0404c9a803371fedb4c5be39f3c00b009e5e08a63be1e40035cdaca5011cc701cf7eebcb99f0ffe17cfd0a4bf7befd2dd536ac946db797fdbc4abe8f29349b91ed":"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"5cc72c60231df03b3d40f9b57931bc31109f972527f28b19e7480c7288cb3c92b22512214e4be6c914792ddabdf57faa8aa7":"8d14bd946a1351148f5cae2ed9a0c653e85ebd85":"0ebc37376173a4fd2f89cc55c2ca62b26b11d51c3c7ce49e8845f74e7607317c436bc8d23b9667dfeb9d087234b47bc6837175ae5c0559f6b81d7d22416d3e50f4ac533d8f0812f2db9e791fe9c775ac8b6ad0f535ad9ceb23a4a02014c58ab3f8d3161499a260f39348e714ae2a1d3443208fd8b722ccfdfb393e98011f99e63f":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 6_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1029:"04a6ce8b7358dfa69bdcf742617005afb5385f5f3a58a24ef74a22a8c05cb7cc38ebd4cc9d9a9d789a62cd0f60f0cb941d3423c9692efa4fe3adff290c4749a38b":"0404c9a803371fedb4c5be39f3c00b009e5e08a63be1e40035cdaca5011cc701cf7eebcb99f0ffe17cfd0a4bf7befd2dd536ac946db797fdbc4abe8f29349b91ed":"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b20e651303092f4bccb43070c0f86d23049362ed96642fc5632c27db4a52e3d831f2ab068b23b149879c002f6bf3feee97591112562c":"6c075bc45520f165c0bf5ea4c5df191bc9ef0e44":"0a98bf1093619394436cf68d8f38e2f158fde8ea54f3435f239b8d06b8321844202476aeed96009492480ce3a8d705498c4c8c68f01501dc81db608f60087350c8c3b0bd2e9ef6a81458b7c801b89f2e4fe99d4900ba6a4b5e5a96d865dc676c7755928794130d6280a8160a190f2df3ea7cf9aa0271d88e9e6905ecf1c5152d65":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 6_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1029:"04a6ce8b7358dfa69bdcf742617005afb5385f5f3a58a24ef74a22a8c05cb7cc38ebd4cc9d9a9d789a62cd0f60f0cb941d3423c9692efa4fe3adff290c4749a38b":"0404c9a803371fedb4c5be39f3c00b009e5e08a63be1e40035cdaca5011cc701cf7eebcb99f0ffe17cfd0a4bf7befd2dd536ac946db797fdbc4abe8f29349b91ed":"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"684e3038c5c041f7":"3bbc3bd6637dfe12846901029bf5b0c07103439c":"008e7a67cacfb5c4e24bec7dee149117f19598ce8c45808fef88c608ff9cd6e695263b9a3c0ad4b8ba4c95238e96a8422b8535629c8d5382374479ad13fa39974b242f9a759eeaf9c83ad5a8ca18940a0162ba755876df263f4bd50c6525c56090267c1f0e09ce0899a0cf359e88120abd9bf893445b3cae77d3607359ae9a52f8":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 6_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1029:"04a6ce8b7358dfa69bdcf742617005afb5385f5f3a58a24ef74a22a8c05cb7cc38ebd4cc9d9a9d789a62cd0f60f0cb941d3423c9692efa4fe3adff290c4749a38b":"0404c9a803371fedb4c5be39f3c00b009e5e08a63be1e40035cdaca5011cc701cf7eebcb99f0ffe17cfd0a4bf7befd2dd536ac946db797fdbc4abe8f29349b91ed":"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"32488cb262d041d6e4dd35f987bf3ca696db1f06ac29a44693":"b46b41893e8bef326f6759383a83071dae7fcabc":"00003474416c7b68bdf961c385737944d7f1f40cb395343c693cc0b4fe63b31fedf1eaeeac9ccc0678b31dc32e0977489514c4f09085f6298a9653f01aea4045ff582ee887be26ae575b73eef7f3774921e375a3d19adda0ca31aa1849887c1f42cac9677f7a2f4e923f6e5a868b38c084ef187594dc9f7f048fea2e02955384ab":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 6_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1029:"04a6ce8b7358dfa69bdcf742617005afb5385f5f3a58a24ef74a22a8c05cb7cc38ebd4cc9d9a9d789a62cd0f60f0cb941d3423c9692efa4fe3adff290c4749a38b":"0404c9a803371fedb4c5be39f3c00b009e5e08a63be1e40035cdaca5011cc701cf7eebcb99f0ffe17cfd0a4bf7befd2dd536ac946db797fdbc4abe8f29349b91ed":"12b17f6dad2ecd19ff46dc13f7860f09e0e0cfb677b38a52592305ceaf022c166db90d04ac29e33f7dd12d9faf66e0816bb63ead267cc7d46c17c37be214bca2a22d723a64e44407436b6fc965729aefc2554f376cd5dcea68293780a62bf39d0029485a160bbb9e5dc0972d21a504f52e5ee028aa416332f510b2e9cff5f722af":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"50ba14be8462720279c306ba":"0a2403312a41e3d52f060fbc13a67de5cf7609a7":"0a026dda5fc8785f7bd9bf75327b63e85e2c0fdee5dadb65ebdcac9ae1de95c92c672ab433aa7a8e69ce6a6d8897fac4ac4a54de841ae5e5bbce7687879d79634cea7a30684065c714d52409b928256bbf53eabcd5231eb7259504537399bd29164b726d33a46da701360a4168a091ccab72d44a62fed246c0ffea5b1348ab5470":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 7_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1030:"0749262c111cd470ec2566e6b3732fc09329469aa19071d3b9c01906514c6f1d26baa14beab0971c8b7e611a4f79009d6fea776928ca25285b0de3643d1a3f8c71":"06bc1e50e96c02bf636e9eea8b899bbebf7651de77dd474c3e9bc23bad8182b61904c7d97dfbebfb1e00108878b6e67e415391d67942c2b2bf9b4435f88b0cb023":"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"47aae909":"43dd09a07ff4cac71caa4632ee5e1c1daee4cd8f":"1688e4ce7794bba6cb7014169ecd559cede2a30b56a52b68d9fe18cf1973ef97b2a03153951c755f6294aa49adbdb55845ab6875fb3986c93ecf927962840d282f9e54ce8b690f7c0cb8bbd73440d9571d1b16cd9260f9eab4783cc482e5223dc60973871783ec27b0ae0fd47732cbc286a173fc92b00fb4ba6824647cd93c85c1":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 7_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1030:"0749262c111cd470ec2566e6b3732fc09329469aa19071d3b9c01906514c6f1d26baa14beab0971c8b7e611a4f79009d6fea776928ca25285b0de3643d1a3f8c71":"06bc1e50e96c02bf636e9eea8b899bbebf7651de77dd474c3e9bc23bad8182b61904c7d97dfbebfb1e00108878b6e67e415391d67942c2b2bf9b4435f88b0cb023":"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1d9b2e2223d9bc13bfb9f162ce735db48ba7c68f6822a0a1a7b6ae165834e7":"3a9c3cec7b84f9bd3adecbc673ec99d54b22bc9b":"1052ed397b2e01e1d0ee1c50bf24363f95e504f4a03434a08fd822574ed6b9736edbb5f390db10321479a8a139350e2bd4977c3778ef331f3e78ae118b268451f20a2f01d471f5d53c566937171b2dbc2d4bde459a5799f0372d6574239b2323d245d0bb81c286b63c89a361017337e4902f88a467f4c7f244bfd5ab46437ff3b6":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 7_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1030:"0749262c111cd470ec2566e6b3732fc09329469aa19071d3b9c01906514c6f1d26baa14beab0971c8b7e611a4f79009d6fea776928ca25285b0de3643d1a3f8c71":"06bc1e50e96c02bf636e9eea8b899bbebf7651de77dd474c3e9bc23bad8182b61904c7d97dfbebfb1e00108878b6e67e415391d67942c2b2bf9b4435f88b0cb023":"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d976fc":"76a75e5b6157a556cf8884bb2e45c293dd545cf5":"2155cd843ff24a4ee8badb7694260028a490813ba8b369a4cbf106ec148e5298707f5965be7d101c1049ea8584c24cd63455ad9c104d686282d3fb803a4c11c1c2e9b91c7178801d1b6640f003f5728df007b8a4ccc92bce05e41a27278d7c85018c52414313a5077789001d4f01910b72aad05d220aa14a58733a7489bc54556b":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 7_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1030:"0749262c111cd470ec2566e6b3732fc09329469aa19071d3b9c01906514c6f1d26baa14beab0971c8b7e611a4f79009d6fea776928ca25285b0de3643d1a3f8c71":"06bc1e50e96c02bf636e9eea8b899bbebf7651de77dd474c3e9bc23bad8182b61904c7d97dfbebfb1e00108878b6e67e415391d67942c2b2bf9b4435f88b0cb023":"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"d4738623df223aa43843df8467534c41d013e0c803c624e263666b239bde40a5f29aeb8de79e3daa61dd0370f49bd4b013834b98212aef6b1c5ee373b3cb":"7866314a6ad6f2b250a35941db28f5864b585859":"0ab14c373aeb7d4328d0aaad8c094d88b9eb098b95f21054a29082522be7c27a312878b637917e3d819e6c3c568db5d843802b06d51d9e98a2be0bf40c031423b00edfbff8320efb9171bd2044653a4cb9c5122f6c65e83cda2ec3c126027a9c1a56ba874d0fea23f380b82cf240b8cf540004758c4c77d934157a74f3fc12bfac":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 7_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1030:"0749262c111cd470ec2566e6b3732fc09329469aa19071d3b9c01906514c6f1d26baa14beab0971c8b7e611a4f79009d6fea776928ca25285b0de3643d1a3f8c71":"06bc1e50e96c02bf636e9eea8b899bbebf7651de77dd474c3e9bc23bad8182b61904c7d97dfbebfb1e00108878b6e67e415391d67942c2b2bf9b4435f88b0cb023":"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bb47231ca5ea1d3ad46c99345d9a8a61":"b2166ed472d58db10cab2c6b000cccf10a7dc509":"028387a318277434798b4d97f460068df5298faba5041ba11761a1cb7316b24184114ec500257e2589ed3b607a1ebbe97a6cc2e02bf1b681f42312a33b7a77d8e7855c4a6de03e3c04643f786b91a264a0d6805e2cea91e68177eb7a64d9255e4f27e713b7ccec00dc200ebd21c2ea2bb890feae4942df941dc3f97890ed347478":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 7_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1030:"0749262c111cd470ec2566e6b3732fc09329469aa19071d3b9c01906514c6f1d26baa14beab0971c8b7e611a4f79009d6fea776928ca25285b0de3643d1a3f8c71":"06bc1e50e96c02bf636e9eea8b899bbebf7651de77dd474c3e9bc23bad8182b61904c7d97dfbebfb1e00108878b6e67e415391d67942c2b2bf9b4435f88b0cb023":"311179f0bcfc9b9d3ca315d00ef30d7bdd3a2cfae9911bfedcb948b3a4782d0732b6ab44aa4bf03741a644dc01bec3e69b01a033e675d8acd7c4925c6b1aec3119051dfd89762d215d45475ffcb59f908148623f37177156f6ae86dd7a7c5f43dc1e1f908254058a284a5f06c0021793a87f1ac5feff7dcaee69c5e51a3789e373":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2184827095d35c3f86f600e8e59754013296":"52673bde2ca166c2aa46131ac1dc808d67d7d3b1":"14c678a94ad60525ef39e959b2f3ba5c097a94ff912b67dbace80535c187abd47d075420b1872152bba08f7fc31f313bbf9273c912fc4c0149a9b0cfb79807e346eb332069611bec0ff9bcd168f1f7c33e77313cea454b94e2549eecf002e2acf7f6f2d2845d4fe0aab2e5a92ddf68c480ae11247935d1f62574842216ae674115":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 8_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1031:"0a02ef8448d9fad8bbd0d004c8c2aa9751ef9721c1b0d03236a54b0df947cbaed5a255ee9e8e20d491ea1723fe094704a9762e88afd16ebb5994412ca966dc4f9f":"092d362e7ed3a0bfd9e9fd0e6c0301b6df29159cf50cc83b9b0cf4d6eea71a61e002b46e0ae9f2de62d25b5d7452d498b81c9ac6fc58593d4c3fb4f5d72dfbb0a9":"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"050b755e5e6880f7b9e9d692a74c37aae449b31bfea6deff83747a897f6c2c825bb1adbf850a3c96994b5de5b33cbc7d4a17913a7967":"7706ffca1ecfb1ebee2a55e5c6e24cd2797a4125":"09b3683d8a2eb0fb295b62ed1fb9290b714457b7825319f4647872af889b30409472020ad12912bf19b11d4819f49614824ffd84d09c0a17e7d17309d12919790410aa2995699f6a86dbe3242b5acc23af45691080d6b1ae810fb3e3057087f0970092ce00be9562ff4053b6262ce0caa93e13723d2e3a5ba075d45f0d61b54b61":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 8_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1031:"0a02ef8448d9fad8bbd0d004c8c2aa9751ef9721c1b0d03236a54b0df947cbaed5a255ee9e8e20d491ea1723fe094704a9762e88afd16ebb5994412ca966dc4f9f":"092d362e7ed3a0bfd9e9fd0e6c0301b6df29159cf50cc83b9b0cf4d6eea71a61e002b46e0ae9f2de62d25b5d7452d498b81c9ac6fc58593d4c3fb4f5d72dfbb0a9":"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4eb68dcd93ca9b19df111bd43608f557026fe4aa1d5cfac227a3eb5ab9548c18a06dded23f81825986b2fcd71109ecef7eff88873f075c2aa0c469f69c92bc":"a3717da143b4dcffbc742665a8fa950585548343":"2ecf15c97c5a15b1476ae986b371b57a24284f4a162a8d0c8182e7905e792256f1812ba5f83f1f7a130e42dcc02232844edc14a31a68ee97ae564a383a3411656424c5f62ddb646093c367be1fcda426cf00a06d8acb7e57776fbbd855ac3df506fc16b1d7c3f2110f3d8068e91e186363831c8409680d8da9ecd8cf1fa20ee39d":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 8_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1031:"0a02ef8448d9fad8bbd0d004c8c2aa9751ef9721c1b0d03236a54b0df947cbaed5a255ee9e8e20d491ea1723fe094704a9762e88afd16ebb5994412ca966dc4f9f":"092d362e7ed3a0bfd9e9fd0e6c0301b6df29159cf50cc83b9b0cf4d6eea71a61e002b46e0ae9f2de62d25b5d7452d498b81c9ac6fc58593d4c3fb4f5d72dfbb0a9":"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8604ac56328c1ab5ad917861":"ee06209073cca026bb264e5185bf8c68b7739f86":"4bc89130a5b2dabb7c2fcf90eb5d0eaf9e681b7146a38f3173a3d9cfec52ea9e0a41932e648a9d69344c50da763f51a03c95762131e8052254dcd2248cba40fd31667786ce05a2b7b531ac9dac9ed584a59b677c1a8aed8c5d15d68c05569e2be780bf7db638fd2bfd2a85ab276860f3777338fca989ffd743d13ee08e0ca9893f":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 8_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1031:"0a02ef8448d9fad8bbd0d004c8c2aa9751ef9721c1b0d03236a54b0df947cbaed5a255ee9e8e20d491ea1723fe094704a9762e88afd16ebb5994412ca966dc4f9f":"092d362e7ed3a0bfd9e9fd0e6c0301b6df29159cf50cc83b9b0cf4d6eea71a61e002b46e0ae9f2de62d25b5d7452d498b81c9ac6fc58593d4c3fb4f5d72dfbb0a9":"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fdda5fbf6ec361a9d9a4ac68af216a0686f438b1e0e5c36b955f74e107f39c0dddcc":"990ad573dc48a973235b6d82543618f2e955105d":"2e456847d8fc36ff0147d6993594b9397227d577752c79d0f904fcb039d4d812fea605a7b574dd82ca786f93752348438ee9f5b5454985d5f0e1699e3e7ad175a32e15f03deb042ab9fe1dd9db1bb86f8c089ccb45e7ef0c5ee7ca9b7290ca6b15bed47039788a8a93ff83e0e8d6244c71006362deef69b6f416fb3c684383fbd0":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 8_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1031:"0a02ef8448d9fad8bbd0d004c8c2aa9751ef9721c1b0d03236a54b0df947cbaed5a255ee9e8e20d491ea1723fe094704a9762e88afd16ebb5994412ca966dc4f9f":"092d362e7ed3a0bfd9e9fd0e6c0301b6df29159cf50cc83b9b0cf4d6eea71a61e002b46e0ae9f2de62d25b5d7452d498b81c9ac6fc58593d4c3fb4f5d72dfbb0a9":"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"4a5f4914bee25de3c69341de07":"ecc63b28f0756f22f52ac8e6ec1251a6ec304718":"1fb9356fd5c4b1796db2ebf7d0d393cc810adf6145defc2fce714f79d93800d5e2ac211ea8bbecca4b654b94c3b18b30dd576ce34dc95436ef57a09415645923359a5d7b4171ef22c24670f1b229d3603e91f76671b7df97e7317c97734476d5f3d17d21cf82b5ba9f83df2e588d36984fd1b584468bd23b2e875f32f68953f7b2":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 8_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1031:"0a02ef8448d9fad8bbd0d004c8c2aa9751ef9721c1b0d03236a54b0df947cbaed5a255ee9e8e20d491ea1723fe094704a9762e88afd16ebb5994412ca966dc4f9f":"092d362e7ed3a0bfd9e9fd0e6c0301b6df29159cf50cc83b9b0cf4d6eea71a61e002b46e0ae9f2de62d25b5d7452d498b81c9ac6fc58593d4c3fb4f5d72dfbb0a9":"5bdf0e30d321dda5147f882408fa69195480df8f80d3f6e8bf5818504f36427ca9b1f5540b9c65a8f6974cf8447a244d9280201bb49fcbbe6378d1944cd227e230f96e3d10f819dcef276c64a00b2a4b6701e7d01de5fabde3b1e9a0df82f4631359cd22669647fbb1717246134ed7b497cfffbdc42b59c73a96ed90166212dff7":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8e07d66f7b880a72563abcd3f35092bc33409fb7f88f2472be":"3925c71b362d40a0a6de42145579ba1e7dd459fc":"3afd9c6600147b21798d818c655a0f4c9212db26d0b0dfdc2a7594ccb3d22f5bf1d7c3e112cd73fc7d509c7a8bafdd3c274d1399009f9609ec4be6477e453f075aa33db382870c1c3409aef392d7386ae3a696b99a94b4da0589447e955d16c98b17602a59bd736279fcd8fb280c4462d590bfa9bf13fed570eafde97330a2c210":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 9_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1536:"fc8d6c04bec4eb9a8192ca7900cbe536e2e8b519decf33b2459798c6909df4f176db7d23190fc72b8865a718af895f1bcd9145298027423b605e70a47cf58390a8c3e88fc8c48e8b32e3da210dfbe3e881ea5674b6a348c21e93f9e55ea65efd":"d200d45e788aacea606a401d0460f87dd5c1027e12dc1a0d7586e8939d9cf789b40f51ac0442961de7d21cc21e05c83155c1f2aa9193387cfdf956cb48d153ba270406f9bbba537d4987d9e2f9942d7a14cbfffea74fecdda928d23e259f5ee1":"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f735fd55ba92592c3b52b8f9c4f69aaa1cbef8fe88add095595412467f9cf4ec0b896c59eda16210e7549c8abb10cdbc21a12ec9b6b5b8fd2f10399eb6":"8ec965f134a3ec9931e92a1ca0dc8169d5ea705c":"267bcd118acab1fc8ba81c85d73003cb8610fa55c1d97da8d48a7c7f06896a4db751aa284255b9d36ad65f37653d829f1b37f97b8001942545b2fc2c55a7376ca7a1be4b1760c8e05a33e5aa2526b8d98e317088e7834c755b2a59b12631a182c05d5d43ab1779264f8456f515ce57dfdf512d5493dab7b7338dc4b7d78db9c091ac3baf537a69fc7f549d979f0eff9a94fda4169bd4d1d19a69c99e33c3b55490d501b39b1edae118ff6793a153261584d3a5f39f6e682e3d17c8cd1261fa72":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 9_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1536:"fc8d6c04bec4eb9a8192ca7900cbe536e2e8b519decf33b2459798c6909df4f176db7d23190fc72b8865a718af895f1bcd9145298027423b605e70a47cf58390a8c3e88fc8c48e8b32e3da210dfbe3e881ea5674b6a348c21e93f9e55ea65efd":"d200d45e788aacea606a401d0460f87dd5c1027e12dc1a0d7586e8939d9cf789b40f51ac0442961de7d21cc21e05c83155c1f2aa9193387cfdf956cb48d153ba270406f9bbba537d4987d9e2f9942d7a14cbfffea74fecdda928d23e259f5ee1":"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"81b906605015a63aabe42ddf11e1978912f5404c7474b26dce3ed482bf961ecc818bf420c54659":"ecb1b8b25fa50cdab08e56042867f4af5826d16c":"93ac9f0671ec29acbb444effc1a5741351d60fdb0e393fbf754acf0de49761a14841df7772e9bc82773966a1584c4d72baea00118f83f35cca6e537cbd4d811f5583b29783d8a6d94cd31be70d6f526c10ff09c6fa7ce069795a3fcd0511fd5fcb564bcc80ea9c78f38b80012539d8a4ddf6fe81e9cddb7f50dbbbbcc7e5d86097ccf4ec49189fb8bf318be6d5a0715d516b49af191258cd32dc833ce6eb4673c03a19bbace88cc54895f636cc0c1ec89096d11ce235a265ca1764232a689ae8":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 9_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1536:"fc8d6c04bec4eb9a8192ca7900cbe536e2e8b519decf33b2459798c6909df4f176db7d23190fc72b8865a718af895f1bcd9145298027423b605e70a47cf58390a8c3e88fc8c48e8b32e3da210dfbe3e881ea5674b6a348c21e93f9e55ea65efd":"d200d45e788aacea606a401d0460f87dd5c1027e12dc1a0d7586e8939d9cf789b40f51ac0442961de7d21cc21e05c83155c1f2aa9193387cfdf956cb48d153ba270406f9bbba537d4987d9e2f9942d7a14cbfffea74fecdda928d23e259f5ee1":"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fd326429df9b890e09b54b18b8f34f1e24":"e89bb032c6ce622cbdb53bc9466014ea77f777c0":"81ebdd95054b0c822ef9ad7693f5a87adfb4b4c4ce70df2df84ed49c04da58ba5fc20a19e1a6e8b7a3900b22796dc4e869ee6b42792d15a8eceb56c09c69914e813cea8f6931e4b8ed6f421af298d595c97f4789c7caa612c7ef360984c21b93edc5401068b5af4c78a8771b984d53b8ea8adf2f6a7d4a0ba76c75e1dd9f658f20ded4a46071d46d7791b56803d8fea7f0b0f8e41ae3f09383a6f9585fe7753eaaffd2bf94563108beecc207bbb535f5fcc705f0dde9f708c62f49a9c90371d3":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 9_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1536:"fc8d6c04bec4eb9a8192ca7900cbe536e2e8b519decf33b2459798c6909df4f176db7d23190fc72b8865a718af895f1bcd9145298027423b605e70a47cf58390a8c3e88fc8c48e8b32e3da210dfbe3e881ea5674b6a348c21e93f9e55ea65efd":"d200d45e788aacea606a401d0460f87dd5c1027e12dc1a0d7586e8939d9cf789b40f51ac0442961de7d21cc21e05c83155c1f2aa9193387cfdf956cb48d153ba270406f9bbba537d4987d9e2f9942d7a14cbfffea74fecdda928d23e259f5ee1":"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f1459b5f0c92f01a0f723a2e5662484d8f8c0a20fc29dad6acd43bb5f3effdf4e1b63e07fdfe6628d0d74ca19bf2d69e4a0abf86d293925a796772f8088e":"606f3b99c0b9ccd771eaa29ea0e4c884f3189ccc":"bcc35f94cde66cb1136625d625b94432a35b22f3d2fa11a613ff0fca5bd57f87b902ccdc1cd0aebcb0715ee869d1d1fe395f6793003f5eca465059c88660d446ff5f0818552022557e38c08a67ead991262254f10682975ec56397768537f4977af6d5f6aaceb7fb25dec5937230231fd8978af49119a29f29e424ab8272b47562792d5c94f774b8829d0b0d9f1a8c9eddf37574d5fa248eefa9c5271fc5ec2579c81bdd61b410fa61fe36e424221c113addb275664c801d34ca8c6351e4a858":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 9_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1536:"fc8d6c04bec4eb9a8192ca7900cbe536e2e8b519decf33b2459798c6909df4f176db7d23190fc72b8865a718af895f1bcd9145298027423b605e70a47cf58390a8c3e88fc8c48e8b32e3da210dfbe3e881ea5674b6a348c21e93f9e55ea65efd":"d200d45e788aacea606a401d0460f87dd5c1027e12dc1a0d7586e8939d9cf789b40f51ac0442961de7d21cc21e05c83155c1f2aa9193387cfdf956cb48d153ba270406f9bbba537d4987d9e2f9942d7a14cbfffea74fecdda928d23e259f5ee1":"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"53e6e8c729d6f9c319dd317e74b0db8e4ccca25f3c8305746e137ac63a63ef3739e7b595abb96e8d55e54f7bd41ab433378ffb911d":"fcbc421402e9ecabc6082afa40ba5f26522c840e":"232afbc927fa08c2f6a27b87d4a5cb09c07dc26fae73d73a90558839f4fd66d281b87ec734bce237ba166698ed829106a7de6942cd6cdce78fed8d2e4d81428e66490d036264cef92af941d3e35055fe3981e14d29cbb9a4f67473063baec79a1179f5a17c9c1832f2838fd7d5e59bb9659d56dce8a019edef1bb3accc697cc6cc7a778f60a064c7f6f5d529c6210262e003de583e81e3167b89971fb8c0e15d44fffef89b53d8d64dd797d159b56d2b08ea5307ea12c241bd58d4ee278a1f2e":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 9_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:1536:"fc8d6c04bec4eb9a8192ca7900cbe536e2e8b519decf33b2459798c6909df4f176db7d23190fc72b8865a718af895f1bcd9145298027423b605e70a47cf58390a8c3e88fc8c48e8b32e3da210dfbe3e881ea5674b6a348c21e93f9e55ea65efd":"d200d45e788aacea606a401d0460f87dd5c1027e12dc1a0d7586e8939d9cf789b40f51ac0442961de7d21cc21e05c83155c1f2aa9193387cfdf956cb48d153ba270406f9bbba537d4987d9e2f9942d7a14cbfffea74fecdda928d23e259f5ee1":"cf2cd41e34ca3a728ea5cb8aff64c36d27bdef5364e336fd68d3123c5a196a8c287013e853d5156d58d151954520fb4f6d7b17abb6817765909c576119659d902b1906ed8a2b10c155c24d124528dab9eeae379beac66e4a411786dcb8fd0062ebc030de1219a04c2a8c1b7dd3131e4d6b6caee2e31a5ed41ac1509b2ef1ee2ab18364be568ca941c25ecc84ff9d643b5ec1aaae102a20d73f479b780fd6da91075212d9eac03a0674d899eba2e431f4c44b615b6ba2232bd4b33baed73d625d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b6b28ea2198d0c1008bc64":"23aade0e1e08bb9b9a78d2302a52f9c21b2e1ba2":"438cc7dc08a68da249e42505f8573ba60e2c2773d5b290f4cf9dff718e842081c383e67024a0f29594ea987b9d25e4b738f285970d195abb3a8c8054e3d79d6b9c9a8327ba596f1259e27126674766907d8d582ff3a8476154929adb1e6d1235b2ccb4ec8f663ba9cc670a92bebd853c8dbf69c6436d016f61add836e94732450434207f9fd4c43dec2a12a958efa01efe2669899b5e604c255c55fb7166de5589e369597bb09168c06dd5db177e06a1740eb2d5c82faeca6d92fcee9931ba9f":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 10_1 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:2048:"ecf5aecd1e5515fffacbd75a2816c6ebf49018cdfb4638e185d66a7396b6f8090f8018c7fd95cc34b857dc17f0cc6516bb1346ab4d582cadad7b4103352387b70338d084047c9d9539b6496204b3dd6ea442499207bec01f964287ff6336c3984658336846f56e46861881c10233d2176bf15a5e96ddc780bc868aa77d3ce769":"bc46c464fc6ac4ca783b0eb08a3c841b772f7e9b2f28babd588ae885e1a0c61e4858a0fb25ac299990f35be85164c259ba1175cdd7192707135184992b6c29b746dd0d2cabe142835f7d148cc161524b4a09946d48b828473f1ce76b6cb6886c345c03e05f41d51b5c3a90a3f24073c7d74a4fe25d9cf21c75960f3fc3863183":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8bba6bf82a6c0f86d5f1756e97956870b08953b06b4eb205bc1694ee":"47e1ab7119fee56c95ee5eaad86f40d0aa63bd33":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 10_2 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:2048:"ecf5aecd1e5515fffacbd75a2816c6ebf49018cdfb4638e185d66a7396b6f8090f8018c7fd95cc34b857dc17f0cc6516bb1346ab4d582cadad7b4103352387b70338d084047c9d9539b6496204b3dd6ea442499207bec01f964287ff6336c3984658336846f56e46861881c10233d2176bf15a5e96ddc780bc868aa77d3ce769":"bc46c464fc6ac4ca783b0eb08a3c841b772f7e9b2f28babd588ae885e1a0c61e4858a0fb25ac299990f35be85164c259ba1175cdd7192707135184992b6c29b746dd0d2cabe142835f7d148cc161524b4a09946d48b828473f1ce76b6cb6886c345c03e05f41d51b5c3a90a3f24073c7d74a4fe25d9cf21c75960f3fc3863183":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e6ad181f053b58a904f2457510373e57":"6d17f5b4c1ffac351d195bf7b09d09f09a4079cf":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 10_3 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:2048:"ecf5aecd1e5515fffacbd75a2816c6ebf49018cdfb4638e185d66a7396b6f8090f8018c7fd95cc34b857dc17f0cc6516bb1346ab4d582cadad7b4103352387b70338d084047c9d9539b6496204b3dd6ea442499207bec01f964287ff6336c3984658336846f56e46861881c10233d2176bf15a5e96ddc780bc868aa77d3ce769":"bc46c464fc6ac4ca783b0eb08a3c841b772f7e9b2f28babd588ae885e1a0c61e4858a0fb25ac299990f35be85164c259ba1175cdd7192707135184992b6c29b746dd0d2cabe142835f7d148cc161524b4a09946d48b828473f1ce76b6cb6886c345c03e05f41d51b5c3a90a3f24073c7d74a4fe25d9cf21c75960f3fc3863183":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"510a2cf60e866fa2340553c94ea39fbc256311e83e94454b4124":"385387514deccc7c740dd8cdf9daee49a1cbfd54":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 10_4 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:2048:"ecf5aecd1e5515fffacbd75a2816c6ebf49018cdfb4638e185d66a7396b6f8090f8018c7fd95cc34b857dc17f0cc6516bb1346ab4d582cadad7b4103352387b70338d084047c9d9539b6496204b3dd6ea442499207bec01f964287ff6336c3984658336846f56e46861881c10233d2176bf15a5e96ddc780bc868aa77d3ce769":"bc46c464fc6ac4ca783b0eb08a3c841b772f7e9b2f28babd588ae885e1a0c61e4858a0fb25ac299990f35be85164c259ba1175cdd7192707135184992b6c29b746dd0d2cabe142835f7d148cc161524b4a09946d48b828473f1ce76b6cb6886c345c03e05f41d51b5c3a90a3f24073c7d74a4fe25d9cf21c75960f3fc3863183":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bcdd190da3b7d300df9a06e22caae2a75f10c91ff667b7c16bde8b53064a2649a94045c9":"5caca6a0f764161a9684f85d92b6e0ef37ca8b65":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 10_5 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:2048:"ecf5aecd1e5515fffacbd75a2816c6ebf49018cdfb4638e185d66a7396b6f8090f8018c7fd95cc34b857dc17f0cc6516bb1346ab4d582cadad7b4103352387b70338d084047c9d9539b6496204b3dd6ea442499207bec01f964287ff6336c3984658336846f56e46861881c10233d2176bf15a5e96ddc780bc868aa77d3ce769":"bc46c464fc6ac4ca783b0eb08a3c841b772f7e9b2f28babd588ae885e1a0c61e4858a0fb25ac299990f35be85164c259ba1175cdd7192707135184992b6c29b746dd0d2cabe142835f7d148cc161524b4a09946d48b828473f1ce76b6cb6886c345c03e05f41d51b5c3a90a3f24073c7d74a4fe25d9cf21c75960f3fc3863183":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a7dd6c7dc24b46f9dd5f1e91ada4c3b3df947e877232a9":"95bca9e3859894b3dd869fa7ecd5bbc6401bf3e4":"75290872ccfd4a4505660d651f56da6daa09ca1301d890632f6a992f3d565cee464afded40ed3b5be9356714ea5aa7655f4a1366c2f17c728f6f2c5a5d1f8e28429bc4e6f8f2cff8da8dc0e0a9808e45fd09ea2fa40cb2b6ce6ffff5c0e159d11b68d90a85f7b84e103b09e682666480c657505c0929259468a314786d74eab131573cf234bf57db7d9e66cc6748192e002dc0deea930585f0831fdcd9bc33d51f79ed2ffc16bcf4d59812fcebcaa3f9069b0e445686d644c25ccf63b456ee5fa6ffe96f19cdf751fed9eaf35957754dbf4bfea5216aa1844dc507cb2d080e722eba150308c2b5ff1193620f1766ecf4481bafb943bd292877f2136ca494aba0":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption Example 10_6 +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:2048:"ecf5aecd1e5515fffacbd75a2816c6ebf49018cdfb4638e185d66a7396b6f8090f8018c7fd95cc34b857dc17f0cc6516bb1346ab4d582cadad7b4103352387b70338d084047c9d9539b6496204b3dd6ea442499207bec01f964287ff6336c3984658336846f56e46861881c10233d2176bf15a5e96ddc780bc868aa77d3ce769":"bc46c464fc6ac4ca783b0eb08a3c841b772f7e9b2f28babd588ae885e1a0c61e4858a0fb25ac299990f35be85164c259ba1175cdd7192707135184992b6c29b746dd0d2cabe142835f7d148cc161524b4a09946d48b828473f1ce76b6cb6886c345c03e05f41d51b5c3a90a3f24073c7d74a4fe25d9cf21c75960f3fc3863183":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"eaf1a73a1b0c4609537de69cd9228bbcfb9a8ca8c6c3efaf056fe4a7f4634ed00b7c39ec6922d7b8ea2c04ebac":"9f47ddf42e97eea856a9bdbc714eb3ac22f6eb32":"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":0 + +RSAES-OAEP Decryption empty output with NULL buffer +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:2048:"ecf5aecd1e5515fffacbd75a2816c6ebf49018cdfb4638e185d66a7396b6f8090f8018c7fd95cc34b857dc17f0cc6516bb1346ab4d582cadad7b4103352387b70338d084047c9d9539b6496204b3dd6ea442499207bec01f964287ff6336c3984658336846f56e46861881c10233d2176bf15a5e96ddc780bc868aa77d3ce769":"bc46c464fc6ac4ca783b0eb08a3c841b772f7e9b2f28babd588ae885e1a0c61e4858a0fb25ac299990f35be85164c259ba1175cdd7192707135184992b6c29b746dd0d2cabe142835f7d148cc161524b4a09946d48b828473f1ce76b6cb6886c345c03e05f41d51b5c3a90a3f24073c7d74a4fe25d9cf21c75960f3fc3863183":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"":"9f47ddf42e97eea856a9bdbc714eb3ac22f6eb32":"32b75304e631e94d4b02819642c7ffa66116af504cb3c4687420cc4b7f069fc6cc3b1a254611995ce2914a9e88152d38bbf87ccedcad9b9890341284e56e802a1b1f8f6bd3d5c991bd92eb8a8ea0a1d8bae141088ff8dceaebdb73515cf06ce33baa37c53093f1d1edc3502818cc70edcfddb41646374beb5b4f67f7f773e43778d4d31012e5a207c474e762ac3251ea6ede9018ad6e8e9ea65a3528a62b694eb9d8becff220a7c6c70d33eaafa52cf67a8090f67b6f9c43c6fe0b0f2375cbb9e611c0fcfef5312feb5e53d4a89d3d7e06c966e0c92ab9e5838239f390bcfd918d94c224df8e8ccb57ee364389908b6a0e550133f7565016804fbd6cb338314a":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signing Test Vector Int +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"d17f655bf27c8b16d35462c905cc04a26f37e2a67fa9c0ce0dced472394a0df743fe7f929e378efdb368eddff453cf007af6d948e0ade757371f8a711e278f6b":"c6d92b6fee7414d1358ce1546fb62987530b90bd15e0f14963a5e2635adb69347ec0c01b2ab1763fd8ac1a592fb22757463a982425bb97a3a437c5bf86d03f2f":"a2ba40ee07e3b2bd2f02ce227f36a195024486e49c19cb41bbbdfbba98b22b0e577c2eeaffa20d883a76e65e394c69d4b3c05a1e8fadda27edb2a42bc000fe888b9b32c22d15add0cd76b3e7936e19955b220dd17d4ea904b1ec102b2e4de7751222aa99151024c7cb41cc5ea21d00eeb41f7c800834d2c6e06bce3bce7ea9a5":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"859eef2fd78aca00308bdc471193bf55bf9d78db8f8a672b484634f3c9c26e6478ae10260fe0dd8c082e53a5293af2173cd50c6d5d354febf78b26021c25c02712e78cd4694c9f469777e451e7f8e9e04cd3739c6bbfedae487fb55644e9ca74ff77a53cb729802f6ed4a5ffa8ba159890fc":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"8daa627d3de7595d63056c7ec659e54406f10610128baae821c8b2a0f3936d54dc3bdce46689f6b7951bb18e840542769718d5715d210d85efbb596192032c42be4c29972c856275eb6d5a45f05f51876fc6743deddd28caec9bb30ea99e02c3488269604fe497f74ccd7c7fca1671897123cbd30def5d54a2b5536ad90a747e":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Verification Test Vector Int +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1024:"a2ba40ee07e3b2bd2f02ce227f36a195024486e49c19cb41bbbdfbba98b22b0e577c2eeaffa20d883a76e65e394c69d4b3c05a1e8fadda27edb2a42bc000fe888b9b32c22d15add0cd76b3e7936e19955b220dd17d4ea904b1ec102b2e4de7751222aa99151024c7cb41cc5ea21d00eeb41f7c800834d2c6e06bce3bce7ea9a5":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"859eef2fd78aca00308bdc471193bf55bf9d78db8f8a672b484634f3c9c26e6478ae10260fe0dd8c082e53a5293af2173cd50c6d5d354febf78b26021c25c02712e78cd4694c9f469777e451e7f8e9e04cd3739c6bbfedae487fb55644e9ca74ff77a53cb729802f6ed4a5ffa8ba159890fc":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"8daa627d3de7595d63056c7ec659e54406f10610128baae821c8b2a0f3936d54dc3bdce46689f6b7951bb18e840542769718d5715d210d85efbb596192032c42be4c29972c856275eb6d5a45f05f51876fc6743deddd28caec9bb30ea99e02c3488269604fe497f74ccd7c7fca1671897123cbd30def5d54a2b5536ad90a747e":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1016, SHA-512: minimum salt size not met +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1016:"0e3cb6845e528229e19cfb24611e6859ac1cea7d35992b6e2e796823c52affa03400e42830f90697f084499c3e3587defc19e749e72433dd7b70c28b0c8280b7":"0c48f9e45ae38fdb4a5143be37d79a10cd4f1f9782ef26a4848a4449c72cfd712c68350818736385cb4a9ab6db5aef8e96c551039cfcc8915821aee069ed660d":"00aee7874a4db2f1510044405db29f14df0f37bbcf61fcbcc994a3d31caaf858a74cc8f2a40ac9a9ce7aa9a0680f62cf9d8d4b827114533fdbf86f16fc9dfe5cbf857d86135519a4611ffc59cb7473861619a78e3ec314715e804cff82d6f32e9f57ddf390563629883bd34f40e8db413209b151cee97d817a5d65c7da54734b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd00":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-520, SHA-512: no possible salt size +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:520:"0feea5f6220fac291b9508ec2ba8ed281eb39aee4d5dc693254106816ebc700ecf":"0d68918785c3aafe31eaaa2d8d8156dce645940ff7734a457337a51bd00bc88811":"00d5a06f86e5b9d87428540165ca966fa8893a62e2a59d0bfd7617780bb039f9165a373a8e119d0766f8de556710f33f67019153bad8223775e797d451d48206f3bf":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd00":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-528, SHA-512: zero salt size +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:528:"00d272aa28ed2085ac6df3c05c6719eed5deb618afa2e4ca4a6f7330b430ad48672d":"00c578836bab27145db9dd66f17470b62d4a6100f8ca0dedf457ee3639c3b9596325":"00a2554eba715bf66e5ecdf3d6d718e3e5d907e8666e7bf5a76b415106e04eb827ec4cb2199cff66491d45419082059aa5b54b0cf5eef4443402f3047c0b0e6f025081":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd00":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e7e8942720a877517273a356053ea2a1bc0c94aa72d55c6e86296b2dfc967948c0a72cbccca7eacb35706e09a1df55a1535bd9b3cc34160b3b6dcd3eda8e6443":"b69dca1cf7d4d7ec81e75b90fcca874abcde123fd2700180aa90479b6e48de8d67ed24f9f19d85ba275874f542cd20dc723e6963364a1f9425452b269a6799fd":"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"cdc87da223d786df3b45e0bbbc721326d1ee2af806cc315475cc6f0d9c66e1b62371d45ce2392e1ac92844c310102f156a0d8d52c1f4c40ba3aa65095786cb769757a6563ba958fed0bcc984e8b517a3d5f515b23b8a41e74aa867693f90dfb061a6e86dfaaee64472c00e5f20945729cbebe77f06ce78e08f4098fba41f9d6193c0317e8b60d4b6084acb42d29e3808a3bc372d85e331170fcbf7cc72d0b71c296648b3a4d10f416295d0807aa625cab2744fd9ea8fd223c42537029828bd16be02546f130fd2e33b936d2676e08aed1b73318b750a0167d0":"dee959c7e06411361420ff80185ed57f3e6776af":"9074308fb598e9701b2294388e52f971faac2b60a5145af185df5287b5ed2887e57ce7fd44dc8634e407c8e0e4360bc226f3ec227f9d9e54638e8d31f5051215df6ebb9c2f9579aa77598a38f914b5b9c1bd83c4e2f9f382a0d0aa3542ffee65984a601bc69eb28deb27dca12c82c2d4c3f66cd500f1ff2b994d8a4e30cbb33c":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1024:"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"cdc87da223d786df3b45e0bbbc721326d1ee2af806cc315475cc6f0d9c66e1b62371d45ce2392e1ac92844c310102f156a0d8d52c1f4c40ba3aa65095786cb769757a6563ba958fed0bcc984e8b517a3d5f515b23b8a41e74aa867693f90dfb061a6e86dfaaee64472c00e5f20945729cbebe77f06ce78e08f4098fba41f9d6193c0317e8b60d4b6084acb42d29e3808a3bc372d85e331170fcbf7cc72d0b71c296648b3a4d10f416295d0807aa625cab2744fd9ea8fd223c42537029828bd16be02546f130fd2e33b936d2676e08aed1b73318b750a0167d0":"dee959c7e06411361420ff80185ed57f3e6776af":"9074308fb598e9701b2294388e52f971faac2b60a5145af185df5287b5ed2887e57ce7fd44dc8634e407c8e0e4360bc226f3ec227f9d9e54638e8d31f5051215df6ebb9c2f9579aa77598a38f914b5b9c1bd83c4e2f9f382a0d0aa3542ffee65984a601bc69eb28deb27dca12c82c2d4c3f66cd500f1ff2b994d8a4e30cbb33c":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e7e8942720a877517273a356053ea2a1bc0c94aa72d55c6e86296b2dfc967948c0a72cbccca7eacb35706e09a1df55a1535bd9b3cc34160b3b6dcd3eda8e6443":"b69dca1cf7d4d7ec81e75b90fcca874abcde123fd2700180aa90479b6e48de8d67ed24f9f19d85ba275874f542cd20dc723e6963364a1f9425452b269a6799fd":"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"851384cdfe819c22ed6c4ccb30daeb5cf059bc8e1166b7e3530c4c233e2b5f8f71a1cca582d43ecc72b1bca16dfc7013226b9e":"ef2869fa40c346cb183dab3d7bffc98fd56df42d":"3ef7f46e831bf92b32274142a585ffcefbdca7b32ae90d10fb0f0c729984f04ef29a9df0780775ce43739b97838390db0a5505e63de927028d9d29b219ca2c4517832558a55d694a6d25b9dab66003c4cccd907802193be5170d26147d37b93590241be51c25055f47ef62752cfbe21418fafe98c22c4d4d47724fdb5669e843":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1024:"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"851384cdfe819c22ed6c4ccb30daeb5cf059bc8e1166b7e3530c4c233e2b5f8f71a1cca582d43ecc72b1bca16dfc7013226b9e":"ef2869fa40c346cb183dab3d7bffc98fd56df42d":"3ef7f46e831bf92b32274142a585ffcefbdca7b32ae90d10fb0f0c729984f04ef29a9df0780775ce43739b97838390db0a5505e63de927028d9d29b219ca2c4517832558a55d694a6d25b9dab66003c4cccd907802193be5170d26147d37b93590241be51c25055f47ef62752cfbe21418fafe98c22c4d4d47724fdb5669e843":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e7e8942720a877517273a356053ea2a1bc0c94aa72d55c6e86296b2dfc967948c0a72cbccca7eacb35706e09a1df55a1535bd9b3cc34160b3b6dcd3eda8e6443":"b69dca1cf7d4d7ec81e75b90fcca874abcde123fd2700180aa90479b6e48de8d67ed24f9f19d85ba275874f542cd20dc723e6963364a1f9425452b269a6799fd":"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a4b159941761c40c6a82f2b80d1b94f5aa2654fd17e12d588864679b54cd04ef8bd03012be8dc37f4b83af7963faff0dfa225477437c48017ff2be8191cf3955fc07356eab3f322f7f620e21d254e5db4324279fe067e0910e2e81ca2cab31c745e67a54058eb50d993cdb9ed0b4d029c06d21a94ca661c3ce27fae1d6cb20f4564d66ce4767583d0e5f060215b59017be85ea848939127bd8c9c4d47b51056c031cf336f17c9980f3b8f5b9b6878e8b797aa43b882684333e17893fe9caa6aa299f7ed1a18ee2c54864b7b2b99b72618fb02574d139ef50f019c9eef416971338e7d470":"710b9c4747d800d4de87f12afdce6df18107cc77":"666026fba71bd3e7cf13157cc2c51a8e4aa684af9778f91849f34335d141c00154c4197621f9624a675b5abc22ee7d5baaffaae1c9baca2cc373b3f33e78e6143c395a91aa7faca664eb733afd14d8827259d99a7550faca501ef2b04e33c23aa51f4b9e8282efdb728cc0ab09405a91607c6369961bc8270d2d4f39fce612b1":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1024:"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a4b159941761c40c6a82f2b80d1b94f5aa2654fd17e12d588864679b54cd04ef8bd03012be8dc37f4b83af7963faff0dfa225477437c48017ff2be8191cf3955fc07356eab3f322f7f620e21d254e5db4324279fe067e0910e2e81ca2cab31c745e67a54058eb50d993cdb9ed0b4d029c06d21a94ca661c3ce27fae1d6cb20f4564d66ce4767583d0e5f060215b59017be85ea848939127bd8c9c4d47b51056c031cf336f17c9980f3b8f5b9b6878e8b797aa43b882684333e17893fe9caa6aa299f7ed1a18ee2c54864b7b2b99b72618fb02574d139ef50f019c9eef416971338e7d470":"710b9c4747d800d4de87f12afdce6df18107cc77":"666026fba71bd3e7cf13157cc2c51a8e4aa684af9778f91849f34335d141c00154c4197621f9624a675b5abc22ee7d5baaffaae1c9baca2cc373b3f33e78e6143c395a91aa7faca664eb733afd14d8827259d99a7550faca501ef2b04e33c23aa51f4b9e8282efdb728cc0ab09405a91607c6369961bc8270d2d4f39fce612b1":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e7e8942720a877517273a356053ea2a1bc0c94aa72d55c6e86296b2dfc967948c0a72cbccca7eacb35706e09a1df55a1535bd9b3cc34160b3b6dcd3eda8e6443":"b69dca1cf7d4d7ec81e75b90fcca874abcde123fd2700180aa90479b6e48de8d67ed24f9f19d85ba275874f542cd20dc723e6963364a1f9425452b269a6799fd":"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bc656747fa9eafb3f0":"056f00985de14d8ef5cea9e82f8c27bef720335e":"4609793b23e9d09362dc21bb47da0b4f3a7622649a47d464019b9aeafe53359c178c91cd58ba6bcb78be0346a7bc637f4b873d4bab38ee661f199634c547a1ad8442e03da015b136e543f7ab07c0c13e4225b8de8cce25d4f6eb8400f81f7e1833b7ee6e334d370964ca79fdb872b4d75223b5eeb08101591fb532d155a6de87":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1024:"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"bc656747fa9eafb3f0":"056f00985de14d8ef5cea9e82f8c27bef720335e":"4609793b23e9d09362dc21bb47da0b4f3a7622649a47d464019b9aeafe53359c178c91cd58ba6bcb78be0346a7bc637f4b873d4bab38ee661f199634c547a1ad8442e03da015b136e543f7ab07c0c13e4225b8de8cce25d4f6eb8400f81f7e1833b7ee6e334d370964ca79fdb872b4d75223b5eeb08101591fb532d155a6de87":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e7e8942720a877517273a356053ea2a1bc0c94aa72d55c6e86296b2dfc967948c0a72cbccca7eacb35706e09a1df55a1535bd9b3cc34160b3b6dcd3eda8e6443":"b69dca1cf7d4d7ec81e75b90fcca874abcde123fd2700180aa90479b6e48de8d67ed24f9f19d85ba275874f542cd20dc723e6963364a1f9425452b269a6799fd":"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b45581547e5427770c768e8b82b75564e0ea4e9c32594d6bff706544de0a8776c7a80b4576550eee1b2acabc7e8b7d3ef7bb5b03e462c11047eadd00629ae575480ac1470fe046f13a2bf5af17921dc4b0aa8b02bee6334911651d7f8525d10f32b51d33be520d3ddf5a709955a3dfe78283b9e0ab54046d150c177f037fdccc5be4ea5f68b5e5a38c9d7edcccc4975f455a6909b4":"80e70ff86a08de3ec60972b39b4fbfdcea67ae8e":"1d2aad221ca4d31ddf13509239019398e3d14b32dc34dc5af4aeaea3c095af73479cf0a45e5629635a53a018377615b16cb9b13b3e09d671eb71e387b8545c5960da5a64776e768e82b2c93583bf104c3fdb23512b7b4e89f633dd0063a530db4524b01c3f384c09310e315a79dcd3d684022a7f31c865a664e316978b759fad":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1024:"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"b45581547e5427770c768e8b82b75564e0ea4e9c32594d6bff706544de0a8776c7a80b4576550eee1b2acabc7e8b7d3ef7bb5b03e462c11047eadd00629ae575480ac1470fe046f13a2bf5af17921dc4b0aa8b02bee6334911651d7f8525d10f32b51d33be520d3ddf5a709955a3dfe78283b9e0ab54046d150c177f037fdccc5be4ea5f68b5e5a38c9d7edcccc4975f455a6909b4":"80e70ff86a08de3ec60972b39b4fbfdcea67ae8e":"1d2aad221ca4d31ddf13509239019398e3d14b32dc34dc5af4aeaea3c095af73479cf0a45e5629635a53a018377615b16cb9b13b3e09d671eb71e387b8545c5960da5a64776e768e82b2c93583bf104c3fdb23512b7b4e89f633dd0063a530db4524b01c3f384c09310e315a79dcd3d684022a7f31c865a664e316978b759fad":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e7e8942720a877517273a356053ea2a1bc0c94aa72d55c6e86296b2dfc967948c0a72cbccca7eacb35706e09a1df55a1535bd9b3cc34160b3b6dcd3eda8e6443":"b69dca1cf7d4d7ec81e75b90fcca874abcde123fd2700180aa90479b6e48de8d67ed24f9f19d85ba275874f542cd20dc723e6963364a1f9425452b269a6799fd":"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"10aae9a0ab0b595d0841207b700d48d75faedde3b775cd6b4cc88ae06e4694ec74ba18f8520d4f5ea69cbbe7cc2beba43efdc10215ac4eb32dc302a1f53dc6c4352267e7936cfebf7c8d67035784a3909fa859c7b7b59b8e39c5c2349f1886b705a30267d402f7486ab4f58cad5d69adb17ab8cd0ce1caf5025af4ae24b1fb8794c6070cc09a51e2f9911311e3877d0044c71c57a993395008806b723ac38373d395481818528c1e7053739282053529510e935cd0fa77b8fa53cc2d474bd4fb3cc5c672d6ffdc90a00f9848712c4bcfe46c60573659b11e6457e861f0f604b6138d144f8ce4e2da73":"a8ab69dd801f0074c2a1fc60649836c616d99681":"2a34f6125e1f6b0bf971e84fbd41c632be8f2c2ace7de8b6926e31ff93e9af987fbc06e51e9be14f5198f91f3f953bd67da60a9df59764c3dc0fe08e1cbef0b75f868d10ad3fba749fef59fb6dac46a0d6e504369331586f58e4628f39aa278982543bc0eeb537dc61958019b394fb273f215858a0a01ac4d650b955c67f4c58":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 1_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1024:"a56e4a0e701017589a5187dc7ea841d156f2ec0e36ad52a44dfeb1e61f7ad991d8c51056ffedb162b4c0f283a12a88a394dff526ab7291cbb307ceabfce0b1dfd5cd9508096d5b2b8b6df5d671ef6377c0921cb23c270a70e2598e6ff89d19f105acc2d3f0cb35f29280e1386b6f64c4ef22e1e1f20d0ce8cffb2249bd9a2137":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"10aae9a0ab0b595d0841207b700d48d75faedde3b775cd6b4cc88ae06e4694ec74ba18f8520d4f5ea69cbbe7cc2beba43efdc10215ac4eb32dc302a1f53dc6c4352267e7936cfebf7c8d67035784a3909fa859c7b7b59b8e39c5c2349f1886b705a30267d402f7486ab4f58cad5d69adb17ab8cd0ce1caf5025af4ae24b1fb8794c6070cc09a51e2f9911311e3877d0044c71c57a993395008806b723ac38373d395481818528c1e7053739282053529510e935cd0fa77b8fa53cc2d474bd4fb3cc5c672d6ffdc90a00f9848712c4bcfe46c60573659b11e6457e861f0f604b6138d144f8ce4e2da73":"a8ab69dd801f0074c2a1fc60649836c616d99681":"2a34f6125e1f6b0bf971e84fbd41c632be8f2c2ace7de8b6926e31ff93e9af987fbc06e51e9be14f5198f91f3f953bd67da60a9df59764c3dc0fe08e1cbef0b75f868d10ad3fba749fef59fb6dac46a0d6e504369331586f58e4628f39aa278982543bc0eeb537dc61958019b394fb273f215858a0a01ac4d650b955c67f4c58":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1025:"016601e926a0f8c9e26ecab769ea65a5e7c52cc9e080ef519457c644da6891c5a104d3ea7955929a22e7c68a7af9fcad777c3ccc2b9e3d3650bce404399b7e59d1":"014eafa1d4d0184da7e31f877d1281ddda625664869e8379e67ad3b75eae74a580e9827abd6eb7a002cb5411f5266797768fb8e95ae40e3e8a01f35ff89e56c079":"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"daba032066263faedb659848115278a52c44faa3a76f37515ed336321072c40a9d9b53bc05014078adf520875146aae70ff060226dcb7b1f1fc27e9360":"57bf160bcb02bb1dc7280cf0458530b7d2832ff7":"014c5ba5338328ccc6e7a90bf1c0ab3fd606ff4796d3c12e4b639ed9136a5fec6c16d8884bdd99cfdc521456b0742b736868cf90de099adb8d5ffd1deff39ba4007ab746cefdb22d7df0e225f54627dc65466131721b90af445363a8358b9f607642f78fab0ab0f43b7168d64bae70d8827848d8ef1e421c5754ddf42c2589b5b3":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1025:"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"daba032066263faedb659848115278a52c44faa3a76f37515ed336321072c40a9d9b53bc05014078adf520875146aae70ff060226dcb7b1f1fc27e9360":"57bf160bcb02bb1dc7280cf0458530b7d2832ff7":"014c5ba5338328ccc6e7a90bf1c0ab3fd606ff4796d3c12e4b639ed9136a5fec6c16d8884bdd99cfdc521456b0742b736868cf90de099adb8d5ffd1deff39ba4007ab746cefdb22d7df0e225f54627dc65466131721b90af445363a8358b9f607642f78fab0ab0f43b7168d64bae70d8827848d8ef1e421c5754ddf42c2589b5b3":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1025:"016601e926a0f8c9e26ecab769ea65a5e7c52cc9e080ef519457c644da6891c5a104d3ea7955929a22e7c68a7af9fcad777c3ccc2b9e3d3650bce404399b7e59d1":"014eafa1d4d0184da7e31f877d1281ddda625664869e8379e67ad3b75eae74a580e9827abd6eb7a002cb5411f5266797768fb8e95ae40e3e8a01f35ff89e56c079":"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e4f8601a8a6da1be34447c0959c058570c3668cfd51dd5f9ccd6ad4411fe8213486d78a6c49f93efc2ca2288cebc2b9b60bd04b1e220d86e3d4848d709d032d1e8c6a070c6af9a499fcf95354b14ba6127c739de1bb0fd16431e46938aec0cf8ad9eb72e832a7035de9b7807bdc0ed8b68eb0f5ac2216be40ce920c0db0eddd3860ed788efaccaca502d8f2bd6d1a7c1f41ff46f1681c8f1f818e9c4f6d91a0c7803ccc63d76a6544d843e084e363b8acc55aa531733edb5dee5b5196e9f03e8b731b3776428d9e457fe3fbcb3db7274442d785890e9cb0854b6444dace791d7273de1889719338a77fe":"7f6dd359e604e60870e898e47b19bf2e5a7b2a90":"010991656cca182b7f29d2dbc007e7ae0fec158eb6759cb9c45c5ff87c7635dd46d150882f4de1e9ae65e7f7d9018f6836954a47c0a81a8a6b6f83f2944d6081b1aa7c759b254b2c34b691da67cc0226e20b2f18b42212761dcd4b908a62b371b5918c5742af4b537e296917674fb914194761621cc19a41f6fb953fbcbb649dea":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1025:"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e4f8601a8a6da1be34447c0959c058570c3668cfd51dd5f9ccd6ad4411fe8213486d78a6c49f93efc2ca2288cebc2b9b60bd04b1e220d86e3d4848d709d032d1e8c6a070c6af9a499fcf95354b14ba6127c739de1bb0fd16431e46938aec0cf8ad9eb72e832a7035de9b7807bdc0ed8b68eb0f5ac2216be40ce920c0db0eddd3860ed788efaccaca502d8f2bd6d1a7c1f41ff46f1681c8f1f818e9c4f6d91a0c7803ccc63d76a6544d843e084e363b8acc55aa531733edb5dee5b5196e9f03e8b731b3776428d9e457fe3fbcb3db7274442d785890e9cb0854b6444dace791d7273de1889719338a77fe":"7f6dd359e604e60870e898e47b19bf2e5a7b2a90":"010991656cca182b7f29d2dbc007e7ae0fec158eb6759cb9c45c5ff87c7635dd46d150882f4de1e9ae65e7f7d9018f6836954a47c0a81a8a6b6f83f2944d6081b1aa7c759b254b2c34b691da67cc0226e20b2f18b42212761dcd4b908a62b371b5918c5742af4b537e296917674fb914194761621cc19a41f6fb953fbcbb649dea":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1025:"016601e926a0f8c9e26ecab769ea65a5e7c52cc9e080ef519457c644da6891c5a104d3ea7955929a22e7c68a7af9fcad777c3ccc2b9e3d3650bce404399b7e59d1":"014eafa1d4d0184da7e31f877d1281ddda625664869e8379e67ad3b75eae74a580e9827abd6eb7a002cb5411f5266797768fb8e95ae40e3e8a01f35ff89e56c079":"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"52a1d96c8ac39e41e455809801b927a5b445c10d902a0dcd3850d22a66d2bb0703e67d5867114595aabf5a7aeb5a8f87034bbb30e13cfd4817a9be76230023606d0286a3faf8a4d22b728ec518079f9e64526e3a0cc7941aa338c437997c680ccac67c66bfa1":"fca862068bce2246724b708a0519da17e648688c":"007f0030018f53cdc71f23d03659fde54d4241f758a750b42f185f87578520c30742afd84359b6e6e8d3ed959dc6fe486bedc8e2cf001f63a7abe16256a1b84df0d249fc05d3194ce5f0912742dbbf80dd174f6c51f6bad7f16cf3364eba095a06267dc3793803ac7526aebe0a475d38b8c2247ab51c4898df7047dc6adf52c6c4":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1025:"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"52a1d96c8ac39e41e455809801b927a5b445c10d902a0dcd3850d22a66d2bb0703e67d5867114595aabf5a7aeb5a8f87034bbb30e13cfd4817a9be76230023606d0286a3faf8a4d22b728ec518079f9e64526e3a0cc7941aa338c437997c680ccac67c66bfa1":"fca862068bce2246724b708a0519da17e648688c":"007f0030018f53cdc71f23d03659fde54d4241f758a750b42f185f87578520c30742afd84359b6e6e8d3ed959dc6fe486bedc8e2cf001f63a7abe16256a1b84df0d249fc05d3194ce5f0912742dbbf80dd174f6c51f6bad7f16cf3364eba095a06267dc3793803ac7526aebe0a475d38b8c2247ab51c4898df7047dc6adf52c6c4":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1025:"016601e926a0f8c9e26ecab769ea65a5e7c52cc9e080ef519457c644da6891c5a104d3ea7955929a22e7c68a7af9fcad777c3ccc2b9e3d3650bce404399b7e59d1":"014eafa1d4d0184da7e31f877d1281ddda625664869e8379e67ad3b75eae74a580e9827abd6eb7a002cb5411f5266797768fb8e95ae40e3e8a01f35ff89e56c079":"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a7182c83ac18be6570a106aa9d5c4e3dbbd4afaeb0c60c4a23e1969d79ff":"8070ef2de945c02387684ba0d33096732235d440":"009cd2f4edbe23e12346ae8c76dd9ad3230a62076141f16c152ba18513a48ef6f010e0e37fd3df10a1ec629a0cb5a3b5d2893007298c30936a95903b6ba85555d9ec3673a06108fd62a2fda56d1ce2e85c4db6b24a81ca3b496c36d4fd06eb7c9166d8e94877c42bea622b3bfe9251fdc21d8d5371badad78a488214796335b40b":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1025:"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a7182c83ac18be6570a106aa9d5c4e3dbbd4afaeb0c60c4a23e1969d79ff":"8070ef2de945c02387684ba0d33096732235d440":"009cd2f4edbe23e12346ae8c76dd9ad3230a62076141f16c152ba18513a48ef6f010e0e37fd3df10a1ec629a0cb5a3b5d2893007298c30936a95903b6ba85555d9ec3673a06108fd62a2fda56d1ce2e85c4db6b24a81ca3b496c36d4fd06eb7c9166d8e94877c42bea622b3bfe9251fdc21d8d5371badad78a488214796335b40b":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1025:"016601e926a0f8c9e26ecab769ea65a5e7c52cc9e080ef519457c644da6891c5a104d3ea7955929a22e7c68a7af9fcad777c3ccc2b9e3d3650bce404399b7e59d1":"014eafa1d4d0184da7e31f877d1281ddda625664869e8379e67ad3b75eae74a580e9827abd6eb7a002cb5411f5266797768fb8e95ae40e3e8a01f35ff89e56c079":"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"86a83d4a72ee932a4f5630af6579a386b78fe88999e0abd2d49034a4bfc854dd94f1094e2e8cd7a179d19588e4aefc1b1bd25e95e3dd461f":"17639a4e88d722c4fca24d079a8b29c32433b0c9":"00ec430824931ebd3baa43034dae98ba646b8c36013d1671c3cf1cf8260c374b19f8e1cc8d965012405e7e9bf7378612dfcc85fce12cda11f950bd0ba8876740436c1d2595a64a1b32efcfb74a21c873b3cc33aaf4e3dc3953de67f0674c0453b4fd9f604406d441b816098cb106fe3472bc251f815f59db2e4378a3addc181ecf":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1025:"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"86a83d4a72ee932a4f5630af6579a386b78fe88999e0abd2d49034a4bfc854dd94f1094e2e8cd7a179d19588e4aefc1b1bd25e95e3dd461f":"17639a4e88d722c4fca24d079a8b29c32433b0c9":"00ec430824931ebd3baa43034dae98ba646b8c36013d1671c3cf1cf8260c374b19f8e1cc8d965012405e7e9bf7378612dfcc85fce12cda11f950bd0ba8876740436c1d2595a64a1b32efcfb74a21c873b3cc33aaf4e3dc3953de67f0674c0453b4fd9f604406d441b816098cb106fe3472bc251f815f59db2e4378a3addc181ecf":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1025:"016601e926a0f8c9e26ecab769ea65a5e7c52cc9e080ef519457c644da6891c5a104d3ea7955929a22e7c68a7af9fcad777c3ccc2b9e3d3650bce404399b7e59d1":"014eafa1d4d0184da7e31f877d1281ddda625664869e8379e67ad3b75eae74a580e9827abd6eb7a002cb5411f5266797768fb8e95ae40e3e8a01f35ff89e56c079":"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"049f9154d871ac4a7c7ab45325ba7545a1ed08f70525b2667cf1":"37810def1055ed922b063df798de5d0aabf886ee":"00475b1648f814a8dc0abdc37b5527f543b666bb6e39d30e5b49d3b876dccc58eac14e32a2d55c2616014456ad2f246fc8e3d560da3ddf379a1c0bd200f10221df078c219a151bc8d4ec9d2fc2564467811014ef15d8ea01c2ebbff8c2c8efab38096e55fcbe3285c7aa558851254faffa92c1c72b78758663ef4582843139d7a6":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 2_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1025:"01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"049f9154d871ac4a7c7ab45325ba7545a1ed08f70525b2667cf1":"37810def1055ed922b063df798de5d0aabf886ee":"00475b1648f814a8dc0abdc37b5527f543b666bb6e39d30e5b49d3b876dccc58eac14e32a2d55c2616014456ad2f246fc8e3d560da3ddf379a1c0bd200f10221df078c219a151bc8d4ec9d2fc2564467811014ef15d8ea01c2ebbff8c2c8efab38096e55fcbe3285c7aa558851254faffa92c1c72b78758663ef4582843139d7a6":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1026:"01bd36e18ece4b0fdb2e9c9d548bd1a7d6e2c21c6fdc35074a1d05b1c6c8b3d558ea2639c9a9a421680169317252558bd148ad215aac550e2dcf12a82d0ebfe853":"01b1b656ad86d8e19d5dc86292b3a192fdf6e0dd37877bad14822fa00190cab265f90d3f02057b6f54d6ecb14491e5adeacebc48bf0ebd2a2ad26d402e54f61651":"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"594b37333bbb2c84524a87c1a01f75fcec0e3256f108e38dca36d70d0057":"f31ad6c8cf89df78ed77feacbcc2f8b0a8e4cfaa":"0088b135fb1794b6b96c4a3e678197f8cac52b64b2fe907d6f27de761124964a99a01a882740ecfaed6c01a47464bb05182313c01338a8cd097214cd68ca103bd57d3bc9e816213e61d784f182467abf8a01cf253e99a156eaa8e3e1f90e3c6e4e3aa2d83ed0345b89fafc9c26077c14b6ac51454fa26e446e3a2f153b2b16797f":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1026:"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"594b37333bbb2c84524a87c1a01f75fcec0e3256f108e38dca36d70d0057":"f31ad6c8cf89df78ed77feacbcc2f8b0a8e4cfaa":"0088b135fb1794b6b96c4a3e678197f8cac52b64b2fe907d6f27de761124964a99a01a882740ecfaed6c01a47464bb05182313c01338a8cd097214cd68ca103bd57d3bc9e816213e61d784f182467abf8a01cf253e99a156eaa8e3e1f90e3c6e4e3aa2d83ed0345b89fafc9c26077c14b6ac51454fa26e446e3a2f153b2b16797f":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1026:"01bd36e18ece4b0fdb2e9c9d548bd1a7d6e2c21c6fdc35074a1d05b1c6c8b3d558ea2639c9a9a421680169317252558bd148ad215aac550e2dcf12a82d0ebfe853":"01b1b656ad86d8e19d5dc86292b3a192fdf6e0dd37877bad14822fa00190cab265f90d3f02057b6f54d6ecb14491e5adeacebc48bf0ebd2a2ad26d402e54f61651":"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8b769528884a0d1ffd090cf102993e796dadcfbddd38e44ff6324ca451":"fcf9f0e1f199a3d1d0da681c5b8606fc642939f7":"02a5f0a858a0864a4f65017a7d69454f3f973a2999839b7bbc48bf78641169179556f595fa41f6ff18e286c2783079bc0910ee9cc34f49ba681124f923dfa88f426141a368a5f5a930c628c2c3c200e18a7644721a0cbec6dd3f6279bde3e8f2be5e2d4ee56f97e7ceaf33054be7042bd91a63bb09f897bd41e81197dee99b11af":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1026:"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8b769528884a0d1ffd090cf102993e796dadcfbddd38e44ff6324ca451":"fcf9f0e1f199a3d1d0da681c5b8606fc642939f7":"02a5f0a858a0864a4f65017a7d69454f3f973a2999839b7bbc48bf78641169179556f595fa41f6ff18e286c2783079bc0910ee9cc34f49ba681124f923dfa88f426141a368a5f5a930c628c2c3c200e18a7644721a0cbec6dd3f6279bde3e8f2be5e2d4ee56f97e7ceaf33054be7042bd91a63bb09f897bd41e81197dee99b11af":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1026:"01bd36e18ece4b0fdb2e9c9d548bd1a7d6e2c21c6fdc35074a1d05b1c6c8b3d558ea2639c9a9a421680169317252558bd148ad215aac550e2dcf12a82d0ebfe853":"01b1b656ad86d8e19d5dc86292b3a192fdf6e0dd37877bad14822fa00190cab265f90d3f02057b6f54d6ecb14491e5adeacebc48bf0ebd2a2ad26d402e54f61651":"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1abdba489c5ada2f995ed16f19d5a94d9e6ec34a8d84f84557d26e5ef9b02b22887e3f9a4b690ad1149209c20c61431f0c017c36c2657b35d7b07d3f5ad8708507a9c1b831df835a56f831071814ea5d3d8d8f6ade40cba38b42db7a2d3d7a29c8f0a79a7838cf58a9757fa2fe4c40df9baa193bfc6f92b123ad57b07ace3e6ac068c9f106afd9eeb03b4f37c25dbfbcfb3071f6f9771766d072f3bb070af6605532973ae25051":"986e7c43dbb671bd41b9a7f4b6afc80e805f2423":"0244bcd1c8c16955736c803be401272e18cb990811b14f72db964124d5fa760649cbb57afb8755dbb62bf51f466cf23a0a1607576e983d778fceffa92df7548aea8ea4ecad2c29dd9f95bc07fe91ecf8bee255bfe8762fd7690aa9bfa4fa0849ef728c2c42c4532364522df2ab7f9f8a03b63f7a499175828668f5ef5a29e3802c":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1026:"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1abdba489c5ada2f995ed16f19d5a94d9e6ec34a8d84f84557d26e5ef9b02b22887e3f9a4b690ad1149209c20c61431f0c017c36c2657b35d7b07d3f5ad8708507a9c1b831df835a56f831071814ea5d3d8d8f6ade40cba38b42db7a2d3d7a29c8f0a79a7838cf58a9757fa2fe4c40df9baa193bfc6f92b123ad57b07ace3e6ac068c9f106afd9eeb03b4f37c25dbfbcfb3071f6f9771766d072f3bb070af6605532973ae25051":"986e7c43dbb671bd41b9a7f4b6afc80e805f2423":"0244bcd1c8c16955736c803be401272e18cb990811b14f72db964124d5fa760649cbb57afb8755dbb62bf51f466cf23a0a1607576e983d778fceffa92df7548aea8ea4ecad2c29dd9f95bc07fe91ecf8bee255bfe8762fd7690aa9bfa4fa0849ef728c2c42c4532364522df2ab7f9f8a03b63f7a499175828668f5ef5a29e3802c":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1026:"01bd36e18ece4b0fdb2e9c9d548bd1a7d6e2c21c6fdc35074a1d05b1c6c8b3d558ea2639c9a9a421680169317252558bd148ad215aac550e2dcf12a82d0ebfe853":"01b1b656ad86d8e19d5dc86292b3a192fdf6e0dd37877bad14822fa00190cab265f90d3f02057b6f54d6ecb14491e5adeacebc48bf0ebd2a2ad26d402e54f61651":"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8fb431f5ee792b6c2ac7db53cc428655aeb32d03f4e889c5c25de683c461b53acf89f9f8d3aabdf6b9f0c2a1de12e15b49edb3919a652fe9491c25a7fce1f722c2543608b69dc375ec":"f8312d9c8eea13ec0a4c7b98120c87509087c478":"0196f12a005b98129c8df13c4cb16f8aa887d3c40d96df3a88e7532ef39cd992f273abc370bc1be6f097cfebbf0118fd9ef4b927155f3df22b904d90702d1f7ba7a52bed8b8942f412cd7bd676c9d18e170391dcd345c06a730964b3f30bcce0bb20ba106f9ab0eeb39cf8a6607f75c0347f0af79f16afa081d2c92d1ee6f836b8":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1026:"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8fb431f5ee792b6c2ac7db53cc428655aeb32d03f4e889c5c25de683c461b53acf89f9f8d3aabdf6b9f0c2a1de12e15b49edb3919a652fe9491c25a7fce1f722c2543608b69dc375ec":"f8312d9c8eea13ec0a4c7b98120c87509087c478":"0196f12a005b98129c8df13c4cb16f8aa887d3c40d96df3a88e7532ef39cd992f273abc370bc1be6f097cfebbf0118fd9ef4b927155f3df22b904d90702d1f7ba7a52bed8b8942f412cd7bd676c9d18e170391dcd345c06a730964b3f30bcce0bb20ba106f9ab0eeb39cf8a6607f75c0347f0af79f16afa081d2c92d1ee6f836b8":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1026:"01bd36e18ece4b0fdb2e9c9d548bd1a7d6e2c21c6fdc35074a1d05b1c6c8b3d558ea2639c9a9a421680169317252558bd148ad215aac550e2dcf12a82d0ebfe853":"01b1b656ad86d8e19d5dc86292b3a192fdf6e0dd37877bad14822fa00190cab265f90d3f02057b6f54d6ecb14491e5adeacebc48bf0ebd2a2ad26d402e54f61651":"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fef4161dfaaf9c5295051dfc1ff3810c8c9ec2e866f7075422c8ec4216a9c4ff49427d483cae10c8534a41b2fd15fee06960ec6fb3f7a7e94a2f8a2e3e43dc4a40576c3097ac953b1de86f0b4ed36d644f23ae14425529622464ca0cbf0b1741347238157fab59e4de5524096d62baec63ac64":"50327efec6292f98019fc67a2a6638563e9b6e2d":"021eca3ab4892264ec22411a752d92221076d4e01c0e6f0dde9afd26ba5acf6d739ef987545d16683e5674c9e70f1de649d7e61d48d0caeb4fb4d8b24fba84a6e3108fee7d0705973266ac524b4ad280f7ae17dc59d96d3351586b5a3bdb895d1e1f7820ac6135d8753480998382ba32b7349559608c38745290a85ef4e9f9bd83":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1026:"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"fef4161dfaaf9c5295051dfc1ff3810c8c9ec2e866f7075422c8ec4216a9c4ff49427d483cae10c8534a41b2fd15fee06960ec6fb3f7a7e94a2f8a2e3e43dc4a40576c3097ac953b1de86f0b4ed36d644f23ae14425529622464ca0cbf0b1741347238157fab59e4de5524096d62baec63ac64":"50327efec6292f98019fc67a2a6638563e9b6e2d":"021eca3ab4892264ec22411a752d92221076d4e01c0e6f0dde9afd26ba5acf6d739ef987545d16683e5674c9e70f1de649d7e61d48d0caeb4fb4d8b24fba84a6e3108fee7d0705973266ac524b4ad280f7ae17dc59d96d3351586b5a3bdb895d1e1f7820ac6135d8753480998382ba32b7349559608c38745290a85ef4e9f9bd83":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1026:"01bd36e18ece4b0fdb2e9c9d548bd1a7d6e2c21c6fdc35074a1d05b1c6c8b3d558ea2639c9a9a421680169317252558bd148ad215aac550e2dcf12a82d0ebfe853":"01b1b656ad86d8e19d5dc86292b3a192fdf6e0dd37877bad14822fa00190cab265f90d3f02057b6f54d6ecb14491e5adeacebc48bf0ebd2a2ad26d402e54f61651":"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"efd237bb098a443aeeb2bf6c3f8c81b8c01b7fcb3feb":"b0de3fc25b65f5af96b1d5cc3b27d0c6053087b3":"012fafec862f56e9e92f60ab0c77824f4299a0ca734ed26e0644d5d222c7f0bde03964f8e70a5cb65ed44e44d56ae0edf1ff86ca032cc5dd4404dbb76ab854586c44eed8336d08d457ce6c03693b45c0f1efef93624b95b8ec169c616d20e5538ebc0b6737a6f82b4bc0570924fc6b35759a3348426279f8b3d7744e2d222426ce":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 3_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1026:"02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"efd237bb098a443aeeb2bf6c3f8c81b8c01b7fcb3feb":"b0de3fc25b65f5af96b1d5cc3b27d0c6053087b3":"012fafec862f56e9e92f60ab0c77824f4299a0ca734ed26e0644d5d222c7f0bde03964f8e70a5cb65ed44e44d56ae0edf1ff86ca032cc5dd4404dbb76ab854586c44eed8336d08d457ce6c03693b45c0f1efef93624b95b8ec169c616d20e5538ebc0b6737a6f82b4bc0570924fc6b35759a3348426279f8b3d7744e2d222426ce":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1027:"029232336d2838945dba9dd7723f4e624a05f7375b927a87abe6a893a1658fd49f47f6c7b0fa596c65fa68a23f0ab432962d18d4343bd6fd671a5ea8d148413995":"020ef5efe7c5394aed2272f7e81a74f4c02d145894cb1b3cab23a9a0710a2afc7e3329acbb743d01f680c4d02afb4c8fde7e20930811bb2b995788b5e872c20bb1":"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"9fb03b827c8217d9":"ed7c98c95f30974fbe4fbddcf0f28d6021c0e91d":"0323d5b7bf20ba4539289ae452ae4297080feff4518423ff4811a817837e7d82f1836cdfab54514ff0887bddeebf40bf99b047abc3ecfa6a37a3ef00f4a0c4a88aae0904b745c846c4107e8797723e8ac810d9e3d95dfa30ff4966f4d75d13768d20857f2b1406f264cfe75e27d7652f4b5ed3575f28a702f8c4ed9cf9b2d44948":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1027:"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"9fb03b827c8217d9":"ed7c98c95f30974fbe4fbddcf0f28d6021c0e91d":"0323d5b7bf20ba4539289ae452ae4297080feff4518423ff4811a817837e7d82f1836cdfab54514ff0887bddeebf40bf99b047abc3ecfa6a37a3ef00f4a0c4a88aae0904b745c846c4107e8797723e8ac810d9e3d95dfa30ff4966f4d75d13768d20857f2b1406f264cfe75e27d7652f4b5ed3575f28a702f8c4ed9cf9b2d44948":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1027:"029232336d2838945dba9dd7723f4e624a05f7375b927a87abe6a893a1658fd49f47f6c7b0fa596c65fa68a23f0ab432962d18d4343bd6fd671a5ea8d148413995":"020ef5efe7c5394aed2272f7e81a74f4c02d145894cb1b3cab23a9a0710a2afc7e3329acbb743d01f680c4d02afb4c8fde7e20930811bb2b995788b5e872c20bb1":"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0ca2ad77797ece86de5bf768750ddb5ed6a3116ad99bbd17edf7f782f0db1cd05b0f677468c5ea420dc116b10e80d110de2b0461ea14a38be68620392e7e893cb4ea9393fb886c20ff790642305bf302003892e54df9f667509dc53920df583f50a3dd61abb6fab75d600377e383e6aca6710eeea27156e06752c94ce25ae99fcbf8592dbe2d7e27453cb44de07100ebb1a2a19811a478adbeab270f94e8fe369d90b3ca612f9f":"22d71d54363a4217aa55113f059b3384e3e57e44":"049d0185845a264d28feb1e69edaec090609e8e46d93abb38371ce51f4aa65a599bdaaa81d24fba66a08a116cb644f3f1e653d95c89db8bbd5daac2709c8984000178410a7c6aa8667ddc38c741f710ec8665aa9052be929d4e3b16782c1662114c5414bb0353455c392fc28f3db59054b5f365c49e1d156f876ee10cb4fd70598":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1027:"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0ca2ad77797ece86de5bf768750ddb5ed6a3116ad99bbd17edf7f782f0db1cd05b0f677468c5ea420dc116b10e80d110de2b0461ea14a38be68620392e7e893cb4ea9393fb886c20ff790642305bf302003892e54df9f667509dc53920df583f50a3dd61abb6fab75d600377e383e6aca6710eeea27156e06752c94ce25ae99fcbf8592dbe2d7e27453cb44de07100ebb1a2a19811a478adbeab270f94e8fe369d90b3ca612f9f":"22d71d54363a4217aa55113f059b3384e3e57e44":"049d0185845a264d28feb1e69edaec090609e8e46d93abb38371ce51f4aa65a599bdaaa81d24fba66a08a116cb644f3f1e653d95c89db8bbd5daac2709c8984000178410a7c6aa8667ddc38c741f710ec8665aa9052be929d4e3b16782c1662114c5414bb0353455c392fc28f3db59054b5f365c49e1d156f876ee10cb4fd70598":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1027:"029232336d2838945dba9dd7723f4e624a05f7375b927a87abe6a893a1658fd49f47f6c7b0fa596c65fa68a23f0ab432962d18d4343bd6fd671a5ea8d148413995":"020ef5efe7c5394aed2272f7e81a74f4c02d145894cb1b3cab23a9a0710a2afc7e3329acbb743d01f680c4d02afb4c8fde7e20930811bb2b995788b5e872c20bb1":"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"288062afc08fcdb7c5f8650b29837300461dd5676c17a20a3c8fb5148949e3f73d66b3ae82c7240e27c5b3ec4328ee7d6ddf6a6a0c9b5b15bcda196a9d0c76b119d534d85abd123962d583b76ce9d180bce1ca":"4af870fbc6516012ca916c70ba862ac7e8243617":"03fbc410a2ced59500fb99f9e2af2781ada74e13145624602782e2994813eefca0519ecd253b855fb626a90d771eae028b0c47a199cbd9f8e3269734af4163599090713a3fa910fa0960652721432b971036a7181a2bc0cab43b0b598bc6217461d7db305ff7e954c5b5bb231c39e791af6bcfa76b147b081321f72641482a2aad":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1027:"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"288062afc08fcdb7c5f8650b29837300461dd5676c17a20a3c8fb5148949e3f73d66b3ae82c7240e27c5b3ec4328ee7d6ddf6a6a0c9b5b15bcda196a9d0c76b119d534d85abd123962d583b76ce9d180bce1ca":"4af870fbc6516012ca916c70ba862ac7e8243617":"03fbc410a2ced59500fb99f9e2af2781ada74e13145624602782e2994813eefca0519ecd253b855fb626a90d771eae028b0c47a199cbd9f8e3269734af4163599090713a3fa910fa0960652721432b971036a7181a2bc0cab43b0b598bc6217461d7db305ff7e954c5b5bb231c39e791af6bcfa76b147b081321f72641482a2aad":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1027:"029232336d2838945dba9dd7723f4e624a05f7375b927a87abe6a893a1658fd49f47f6c7b0fa596c65fa68a23f0ab432962d18d4343bd6fd671a5ea8d148413995":"020ef5efe7c5394aed2272f7e81a74f4c02d145894cb1b3cab23a9a0710a2afc7e3329acbb743d01f680c4d02afb4c8fde7e20930811bb2b995788b5e872c20bb1":"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6f4f9ab9501199cef55c6cf408fe7b36c557c49d420a4763d2463c8ad44b3cfc5be2742c0e7d9b0f6608f08c7f47b693ee":"40d2e180fae1eac439c190b56c2c0e14ddf9a226":"0486644bc66bf75d28335a6179b10851f43f09bded9fac1af33252bb9953ba4298cd6466b27539a70adaa3f89b3db3c74ab635d122f4ee7ce557a61e59b82ffb786630e5f9db53c77d9a0c12fab5958d4c2ce7daa807cd89ba2cc7fcd02ff470ca67b229fcce814c852c73cc93bea35be68459ce478e9d4655d121c8472f371d4f":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1027:"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"6f4f9ab9501199cef55c6cf408fe7b36c557c49d420a4763d2463c8ad44b3cfc5be2742c0e7d9b0f6608f08c7f47b693ee":"40d2e180fae1eac439c190b56c2c0e14ddf9a226":"0486644bc66bf75d28335a6179b10851f43f09bded9fac1af33252bb9953ba4298cd6466b27539a70adaa3f89b3db3c74ab635d122f4ee7ce557a61e59b82ffb786630e5f9db53c77d9a0c12fab5958d4c2ce7daa807cd89ba2cc7fcd02ff470ca67b229fcce814c852c73cc93bea35be68459ce478e9d4655d121c8472f371d4f":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1027:"029232336d2838945dba9dd7723f4e624a05f7375b927a87abe6a893a1658fd49f47f6c7b0fa596c65fa68a23f0ab432962d18d4343bd6fd671a5ea8d148413995":"020ef5efe7c5394aed2272f7e81a74f4c02d145894cb1b3cab23a9a0710a2afc7e3329acbb743d01f680c4d02afb4c8fde7e20930811bb2b995788b5e872c20bb1":"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e17d20385d501955823c3f666254c1d3dd36ad5168b8f18d286fdcf67a7dad94097085fab7ed86fe2142a28771717997ef1a7a08884efc39356d76077aaf82459a7fad45848875f2819b098937fe923bcc9dc442d72d754d812025090c9bc03db3080c138dd63b355d0b4b85d6688ac19f4de15084a0ba4e373b93ef4a555096691915dc23c00e954cdeb20a47cd55d16c3d8681d46ed7f2ed5ea42795be17baed25f0f4d113b3636addd585f16a8b5aec0c8fa9c5f03cbf3b9b73":"2497dc2b4615dfae5a663d49ffd56bf7efc11304":"022a80045353904cb30cbb542d7d4990421a6eec16a8029a8422adfd22d6aff8c4cc0294af110a0c067ec86a7d364134459bb1ae8ff836d5a8a2579840996b320b19f13a13fad378d931a65625dae2739f0c53670b35d9d3cbac08e733e4ec2b83af4b9196d63e7c4ff1ddeae2a122791a125bfea8deb0de8ccf1f4ffaf6e6fb0a":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1027:"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e17d20385d501955823c3f666254c1d3dd36ad5168b8f18d286fdcf67a7dad94097085fab7ed86fe2142a28771717997ef1a7a08884efc39356d76077aaf82459a7fad45848875f2819b098937fe923bcc9dc442d72d754d812025090c9bc03db3080c138dd63b355d0b4b85d6688ac19f4de15084a0ba4e373b93ef4a555096691915dc23c00e954cdeb20a47cd55d16c3d8681d46ed7f2ed5ea42795be17baed25f0f4d113b3636addd585f16a8b5aec0c8fa9c5f03cbf3b9b73":"2497dc2b4615dfae5a663d49ffd56bf7efc11304":"022a80045353904cb30cbb542d7d4990421a6eec16a8029a8422adfd22d6aff8c4cc0294af110a0c067ec86a7d364134459bb1ae8ff836d5a8a2579840996b320b19f13a13fad378d931a65625dae2739f0c53670b35d9d3cbac08e733e4ec2b83af4b9196d63e7c4ff1ddeae2a122791a125bfea8deb0de8ccf1f4ffaf6e6fb0a":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1027:"029232336d2838945dba9dd7723f4e624a05f7375b927a87abe6a893a1658fd49f47f6c7b0fa596c65fa68a23f0ab432962d18d4343bd6fd671a5ea8d148413995":"020ef5efe7c5394aed2272f7e81a74f4c02d145894cb1b3cab23a9a0710a2afc7e3329acbb743d01f680c4d02afb4c8fde7e20930811bb2b995788b5e872c20bb1":"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"afbc19d479249018fdf4e09f618726440495de11ddeee38872d775fcea74a23896b5343c9c38d46af0dba224d047580cc60a65e9391cf9b59b36a860598d4e8216722f993b91cfae87bc255af89a6a199bca4a391eadbc3a24903c0bd667368f6be78e3feabfb4ffd463122763740ffbbefeab9a25564bc5d1c24c93e422f75073e2ad72bf45b10df00b52a147128e73fee33fa3f0577d77f80fbc2df1bed313290c12777f50":"a334db6faebf11081a04f87c2d621cdec7930b9b":"00938dcb6d583046065f69c78da7a1f1757066a7fa75125a9d2929f0b79a60b627b082f11f5b196f28eb9daa6f21c05e5140f6aef1737d2023075c05ecf04a028c686a2ab3e7d5a0664f295ce12995e890908b6ad21f0839eb65b70393a7b5afd9871de0caa0cedec5b819626756209d13ab1e7bb9546a26ff37e9a51af9fd562e":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 4_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1027:"054adb7886447efe6f57e0368f06cf52b0a3370760d161cef126b91be7f89c421b62a6ec1da3c311d75ed50e0ab5fff3fd338acc3aa8a4e77ee26369acb81ba900fa83f5300cf9bb6c53ad1dc8a178b815db4235a9a9da0c06de4e615ea1277ce559e9c108de58c14a81aa77f5a6f8d1335494498848c8b95940740be7bf7c3705":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"afbc19d479249018fdf4e09f618726440495de11ddeee38872d775fcea74a23896b5343c9c38d46af0dba224d047580cc60a65e9391cf9b59b36a860598d4e8216722f993b91cfae87bc255af89a6a199bca4a391eadbc3a24903c0bd667368f6be78e3feabfb4ffd463122763740ffbbefeab9a25564bc5d1c24c93e422f75073e2ad72bf45b10df00b52a147128e73fee33fa3f0577d77f80fbc2df1bed313290c12777f50":"a334db6faebf11081a04f87c2d621cdec7930b9b":"00938dcb6d583046065f69c78da7a1f1757066a7fa75125a9d2929f0b79a60b627b082f11f5b196f28eb9daa6f21c05e5140f6aef1737d2023075c05ecf04a028c686a2ab3e7d5a0664f295ce12995e890908b6ad21f0839eb65b70393a7b5afd9871de0caa0cedec5b819626756209d13ab1e7bb9546a26ff37e9a51af9fd562e":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1028:"03f2f331f4142d4f24b43aa10279a89652d4e7537221a1a7b2a25deb551e5de9ac497411c227a94e45f91c2d1c13cc046cf4ce14e32d058734210d44a87ee1b73f":"034f090d73b55803030cf0361a5d8081bfb79f851523feac0a2124d08d4013ff08487771a870d0479dc0686c62f7718dfecf024b17c9267678059171339cc00839":"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"30c7d557458b436decfdc14d06cb7b96b06718c48d7de57482a868ae7f065870a6216506d11b779323dfdf046cf5775129134b4d5689e4d9c0ce1e12d7d4b06cb5fc5820decfa41baf59bf257b32f025b7679b445b9499c92555145885992f1b76f84891ee4d3be0f5150fd5901e3a4c8ed43fd36b61d022e65ad5008dbf33293c22bfbfd07321f0f1d5fa9fdf0014c2fcb0358aad0e354b0d29":"081b233b43567750bd6e78f396a88b9f6a445151":"0ba373f76e0921b70a8fbfe622f0bf77b28a3db98e361051c3d7cb92ad0452915a4de9c01722f6823eeb6adf7e0ca8290f5de3e549890ac2a3c5950ab217ba58590894952de96f8df111b2575215da6c161590c745be612476ee578ed384ab33e3ece97481a252f5c79a98b5532ae00cdd62f2ecc0cd1baefe80d80b962193ec1d":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1028:"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"30c7d557458b436decfdc14d06cb7b96b06718c48d7de57482a868ae7f065870a6216506d11b779323dfdf046cf5775129134b4d5689e4d9c0ce1e12d7d4b06cb5fc5820decfa41baf59bf257b32f025b7679b445b9499c92555145885992f1b76f84891ee4d3be0f5150fd5901e3a4c8ed43fd36b61d022e65ad5008dbf33293c22bfbfd07321f0f1d5fa9fdf0014c2fcb0358aad0e354b0d29":"081b233b43567750bd6e78f396a88b9f6a445151":"0ba373f76e0921b70a8fbfe622f0bf77b28a3db98e361051c3d7cb92ad0452915a4de9c01722f6823eeb6adf7e0ca8290f5de3e549890ac2a3c5950ab217ba58590894952de96f8df111b2575215da6c161590c745be612476ee578ed384ab33e3ece97481a252f5c79a98b5532ae00cdd62f2ecc0cd1baefe80d80b962193ec1d":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1028:"03f2f331f4142d4f24b43aa10279a89652d4e7537221a1a7b2a25deb551e5de9ac497411c227a94e45f91c2d1c13cc046cf4ce14e32d058734210d44a87ee1b73f":"034f090d73b55803030cf0361a5d8081bfb79f851523feac0a2124d08d4013ff08487771a870d0479dc0686c62f7718dfecf024b17c9267678059171339cc00839":"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e7b32e1556ea1b2795046ac69739d22ac8966bf11c116f614b166740e96b90653e5750945fcf772186c03790a07fda323e1a61916b06ee2157db3dff80d67d5e39a53ae268c8f09ed99a732005b0bc6a04af4e08d57a00e7201b3060efaadb73113bfc087fd837093aa25235b8c149f56215f031c24ad5bde7f29960df7d524070f7449c6f785084be1a0f733047f336f9154738674547db02a9f44dfc6e60301081e1ce99847f3b5b601ff06b4d5776a9740b9aa0d34058fd3b906e4f7859dfb07d7173e5e6f6350adac21f27b2307469":"bd0ce19549d0700120cbe51077dbbbb00a8d8b09":"08180de825e4b8b014a32da8ba761555921204f2f90d5f24b712908ff84f3e220ad17997c0dd6e706630ba3e84add4d5e7ab004e58074b549709565d43ad9e97b5a7a1a29e85b9f90f4aafcdf58321de8c5974ef9abf2d526f33c0f2f82e95d158ea6b81f1736db8d1af3d6ac6a83b32d18bae0ff1b2fe27de4c76ed8c7980a34e":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1028:"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e7b32e1556ea1b2795046ac69739d22ac8966bf11c116f614b166740e96b90653e5750945fcf772186c03790a07fda323e1a61916b06ee2157db3dff80d67d5e39a53ae268c8f09ed99a732005b0bc6a04af4e08d57a00e7201b3060efaadb73113bfc087fd837093aa25235b8c149f56215f031c24ad5bde7f29960df7d524070f7449c6f785084be1a0f733047f336f9154738674547db02a9f44dfc6e60301081e1ce99847f3b5b601ff06b4d5776a9740b9aa0d34058fd3b906e4f7859dfb07d7173e5e6f6350adac21f27b2307469":"bd0ce19549d0700120cbe51077dbbbb00a8d8b09":"08180de825e4b8b014a32da8ba761555921204f2f90d5f24b712908ff84f3e220ad17997c0dd6e706630ba3e84add4d5e7ab004e58074b549709565d43ad9e97b5a7a1a29e85b9f90f4aafcdf58321de8c5974ef9abf2d526f33c0f2f82e95d158ea6b81f1736db8d1af3d6ac6a83b32d18bae0ff1b2fe27de4c76ed8c7980a34e":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1028:"03f2f331f4142d4f24b43aa10279a89652d4e7537221a1a7b2a25deb551e5de9ac497411c227a94e45f91c2d1c13cc046cf4ce14e32d058734210d44a87ee1b73f":"034f090d73b55803030cf0361a5d8081bfb79f851523feac0a2124d08d4013ff08487771a870d0479dc0686c62f7718dfecf024b17c9267678059171339cc00839":"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8d8396e36507fe1ef6a19017548e0c716674c2fec233adb2f775665ec41f2bd0ba396b061a9daa7e866f7c23fd3531954300a342f924535ea1498c48f6c879932865fc02000c528723b7ad0335745b51209a0afed932af8f0887c219004d2abd894ea92559ee3198af3a734fe9b9638c263a728ad95a5ae8ce3eb15839f3aa7852bb390706e7760e43a71291a2e3f827237deda851874c517665f545f27238df86557f375d09ccd8bd15d8ccf61f5d78ca5c7f5cde782e6bf5d0057056d4bad98b3d2f9575e824ab7a33ff57b0ac100ab0d6ead7aa0b50f6e4d3e5ec0b966b":"815779a91b3a8bd049bf2aeb920142772222c9ca":"05e0fdbdf6f756ef733185ccfa8ced2eb6d029d9d56e35561b5db8e70257ee6fd019d2f0bbf669fe9b9821e78df6d41e31608d58280f318ee34f559941c8df13287574bac000b7e58dc4f414ba49fb127f9d0f8936638c76e85356c994f79750f7fa3cf4fd482df75e3fb9978cd061f7abb17572e6e63e0bde12cbdcf18c68b979":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1028:"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8d8396e36507fe1ef6a19017548e0c716674c2fec233adb2f775665ec41f2bd0ba396b061a9daa7e866f7c23fd3531954300a342f924535ea1498c48f6c879932865fc02000c528723b7ad0335745b51209a0afed932af8f0887c219004d2abd894ea92559ee3198af3a734fe9b9638c263a728ad95a5ae8ce3eb15839f3aa7852bb390706e7760e43a71291a2e3f827237deda851874c517665f545f27238df86557f375d09ccd8bd15d8ccf61f5d78ca5c7f5cde782e6bf5d0057056d4bad98b3d2f9575e824ab7a33ff57b0ac100ab0d6ead7aa0b50f6e4d3e5ec0b966b":"815779a91b3a8bd049bf2aeb920142772222c9ca":"05e0fdbdf6f756ef733185ccfa8ced2eb6d029d9d56e35561b5db8e70257ee6fd019d2f0bbf669fe9b9821e78df6d41e31608d58280f318ee34f559941c8df13287574bac000b7e58dc4f414ba49fb127f9d0f8936638c76e85356c994f79750f7fa3cf4fd482df75e3fb9978cd061f7abb17572e6e63e0bde12cbdcf18c68b979":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1028:"03f2f331f4142d4f24b43aa10279a89652d4e7537221a1a7b2a25deb551e5de9ac497411c227a94e45f91c2d1c13cc046cf4ce14e32d058734210d44a87ee1b73f":"034f090d73b55803030cf0361a5d8081bfb79f851523feac0a2124d08d4013ff08487771a870d0479dc0686c62f7718dfecf024b17c9267678059171339cc00839":"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"328c659e0a6437433cceb73c14":"9aec4a7480d5bbc42920d7ca235db674989c9aac":"0bc989853bc2ea86873271ce183a923ab65e8a53100e6df5d87a24c4194eb797813ee2a187c097dd872d591da60c568605dd7e742d5af4e33b11678ccb63903204a3d080b0902c89aba8868f009c0f1c0cb85810bbdd29121abb8471ff2d39e49fd92d56c655c8e037ad18fafbdc92c95863f7f61ea9efa28fea401369d19daea1":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1028:"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"328c659e0a6437433cceb73c14":"9aec4a7480d5bbc42920d7ca235db674989c9aac":"0bc989853bc2ea86873271ce183a923ab65e8a53100e6df5d87a24c4194eb797813ee2a187c097dd872d591da60c568605dd7e742d5af4e33b11678ccb63903204a3d080b0902c89aba8868f009c0f1c0cb85810bbdd29121abb8471ff2d39e49fd92d56c655c8e037ad18fafbdc92c95863f7f61ea9efa28fea401369d19daea1":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1028:"03f2f331f4142d4f24b43aa10279a89652d4e7537221a1a7b2a25deb551e5de9ac497411c227a94e45f91c2d1c13cc046cf4ce14e32d058734210d44a87ee1b73f":"034f090d73b55803030cf0361a5d8081bfb79f851523feac0a2124d08d4013ff08487771a870d0479dc0686c62f7718dfecf024b17c9267678059171339cc00839":"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f37b962379a47d415a376eec8973150bcb34edd5ab654041b61430560c2144582ba133c867d852d6b8e23321901302ecb45b09ec88b1527178fa043263f3067d9ffe973032a99f4cb08ad2c7e0a2456cdd57a7df56fe6053527a5aeb67d7e552063c1ca97b1beffa7b39e997caf27878ea0f62cbebc8c21df4c889a202851e949088490c249b6e9acf1d8063f5be2343989bf95c4da01a2be78b4ab6b378015bc37957f76948b5e58e440c28453d40d7cfd57e7d690600474ab5e75973b1ea0c5f1e45d14190afe2f4eb6d3bdf71f1d2f8bb156a1c295d04aaeb9d689dce79ed62bc443e":"e20c1e9878512c39970f58375e1549a68b64f31d":"0aefa943b698b9609edf898ad22744ac28dc239497cea369cbbd84f65c95c0ad776b594740164b59a739c6ff7c2f07c7c077a86d95238fe51e1fcf33574a4ae0684b42a3f6bf677d91820ca89874467b2c23add77969c80717430d0efc1d3695892ce855cb7f7011630f4df26def8ddf36fc23905f57fa6243a485c770d5681fcd":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1028:"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f37b962379a47d415a376eec8973150bcb34edd5ab654041b61430560c2144582ba133c867d852d6b8e23321901302ecb45b09ec88b1527178fa043263f3067d9ffe973032a99f4cb08ad2c7e0a2456cdd57a7df56fe6053527a5aeb67d7e552063c1ca97b1beffa7b39e997caf27878ea0f62cbebc8c21df4c889a202851e949088490c249b6e9acf1d8063f5be2343989bf95c4da01a2be78b4ab6b378015bc37957f76948b5e58e440c28453d40d7cfd57e7d690600474ab5e75973b1ea0c5f1e45d14190afe2f4eb6d3bdf71f1d2f8bb156a1c295d04aaeb9d689dce79ed62bc443e":"e20c1e9878512c39970f58375e1549a68b64f31d":"0aefa943b698b9609edf898ad22744ac28dc239497cea369cbbd84f65c95c0ad776b594740164b59a739c6ff7c2f07c7c077a86d95238fe51e1fcf33574a4ae0684b42a3f6bf677d91820ca89874467b2c23add77969c80717430d0efc1d3695892ce855cb7f7011630f4df26def8ddf36fc23905f57fa6243a485c770d5681fcd":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1028:"03f2f331f4142d4f24b43aa10279a89652d4e7537221a1a7b2a25deb551e5de9ac497411c227a94e45f91c2d1c13cc046cf4ce14e32d058734210d44a87ee1b73f":"034f090d73b55803030cf0361a5d8081bfb79f851523feac0a2124d08d4013ff08487771a870d0479dc0686c62f7718dfecf024b17c9267678059171339cc00839":"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c6103c330c1ef718c141e47b8fa859be4d5b96259e7d142070ecd485839dba5a8369c17c1114035e532d195c74f44a0476a2d3e8a4da210016caced0e367cb867710a4b5aa2df2b8e5daf5fdc647807d4d5ebb6c56b9763ccdae4dea3308eb0ac2a89501cb209d2639fa5bf87ce790747d3cb2d295e84564f2f637824f0c13028129b0aa4a422d162282":"23291e4a3307e8bbb776623ab34e4a5f4cc8a8db":"02802dccfa8dfaf5279bf0b4a29ba1b157611faeaaf419b8919d15941900c1339e7e92e6fae562c53e6cc8e84104b110bce03ad18525e3c49a0eadad5d3f28f244a8ed89edbafbb686277cfa8ae909714d6b28f4bf8e293aa04c41efe7c0a81266d5c061e2575be032aa464674ff71626219bd74cc45f0e7ed4e3ff96eee758e8f":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 5_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1028:"0d10f661f29940f5ed39aa260966deb47843679d2b6fb25b3de370f3ac7c19916391fd25fb527ebfa6a4b4df45a1759d996c4bb4ebd18828c44fc52d0191871740525f47a4b0cc8da325ed8aa676b0d0f626e0a77f07692170acac8082f42faa7dc7cd123e730e31a87985204cabcbe6670d43a2dd2b2ddef5e05392fc213bc507":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c6103c330c1ef718c141e47b8fa859be4d5b96259e7d142070ecd485839dba5a8369c17c1114035e532d195c74f44a0476a2d3e8a4da210016caced0e367cb867710a4b5aa2df2b8e5daf5fdc647807d4d5ebb6c56b9763ccdae4dea3308eb0ac2a89501cb209d2639fa5bf87ce790747d3cb2d295e84564f2f637824f0c13028129b0aa4a422d162282":"23291e4a3307e8bbb776623ab34e4a5f4cc8a8db":"02802dccfa8dfaf5279bf0b4a29ba1b157611faeaaf419b8919d15941900c1339e7e92e6fae562c53e6cc8e84104b110bce03ad18525e3c49a0eadad5d3f28f244a8ed89edbafbb686277cfa8ae909714d6b28f4bf8e293aa04c41efe7c0a81266d5c061e2575be032aa464674ff71626219bd74cc45f0e7ed4e3ff96eee758e8f":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1029:"04f0548c9626ab1ebf1244934741d99a06220efa2a5856aa0e75730b2ec96adc86be894fa2803b53a5e85d276acbd29ab823f80a7391bb54a5051672fb04eeb543":"0483e0ae47915587743ff345362b555d3962d98bb6f15f848b4c92b1771ca8ed107d8d3ee65ec44517dd0faa481a387e902f7a2e747c269e7ea44480bc538b8e5b":"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0a20b774addc2fa51245ed7cb9da609e50cac6636a52543f97458eed7340f8d53ffc64918f949078ee03ef60d42b5fec246050bd5505cd8cb597bad3c4e713b0ef30644e76adabb0de01a1561efb255158c74fc801e6e919e581b46f0f0ddd08e4f34c7810b5ed8318f91d7c8c":"5b4ea2ef629cc22f3b538e016904b47b1e40bfd5":"04c0cfacec04e5badbece159a5a1103f69b3f32ba593cb4cc4b1b7ab455916a96a27cd2678ea0f46ba37f7fc9c86325f29733b389f1d97f43e7201c0f348fc45fe42892335362eee018b5b161f2f9393031225c713012a576bc88e23052489868d9010cbf033ecc568e8bc152bdc59d560e41291915d28565208e22aeec9ef85d1":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1029:"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0a20b774addc2fa51245ed7cb9da609e50cac6636a52543f97458eed7340f8d53ffc64918f949078ee03ef60d42b5fec246050bd5505cd8cb597bad3c4e713b0ef30644e76adabb0de01a1561efb255158c74fc801e6e919e581b46f0f0ddd08e4f34c7810b5ed8318f91d7c8c":"5b4ea2ef629cc22f3b538e016904b47b1e40bfd5":"04c0cfacec04e5badbece159a5a1103f69b3f32ba593cb4cc4b1b7ab455916a96a27cd2678ea0f46ba37f7fc9c86325f29733b389f1d97f43e7201c0f348fc45fe42892335362eee018b5b161f2f9393031225c713012a576bc88e23052489868d9010cbf033ecc568e8bc152bdc59d560e41291915d28565208e22aeec9ef85d1":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1029:"04f0548c9626ab1ebf1244934741d99a06220efa2a5856aa0e75730b2ec96adc86be894fa2803b53a5e85d276acbd29ab823f80a7391bb54a5051672fb04eeb543":"0483e0ae47915587743ff345362b555d3962d98bb6f15f848b4c92b1771ca8ed107d8d3ee65ec44517dd0faa481a387e902f7a2e747c269e7ea44480bc538b8e5b":"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2aaff6631f621ce615760a9ebce94bb333077ad86488c861d4b76d29c1f48746c611ae1e03ced4445d7cfa1fe5f62e1b3f08452bde3b6ef81973bafbb57f97bceef873985395b8260589aa88cb7db50ab469262e551bdcd9a56f275a0ac4fe484700c35f3dbf2b469ede864741b86fa59172a360ba95a02e139be50ddfb7cf0b42faeabbfbbaa86a4497699c4f2dfd5b08406af7e14144427c253ec0efa20eaf9a8be8cd49ce1f1bc4e93e619cf2aa8ed4fb39bc8590d0f7b96488f7317ac9abf7bee4e3a0e715":"83146a9e782722c28b014f98b4267bda2ac9504f":"0a2314250cf52b6e4e908de5b35646bcaa24361da8160fb0f9257590ab3ace42b0dc3e77ad2db7c203a20bd952fbb56b1567046ecfaa933d7b1000c3de9ff05b7d989ba46fd43bc4c2d0a3986b7ffa13471d37eb5b47d64707bd290cfd6a9f393ad08ec1e3bd71bb5792615035cdaf2d8929aed3be098379377e777ce79aaa4773":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1029:"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2aaff6631f621ce615760a9ebce94bb333077ad86488c861d4b76d29c1f48746c611ae1e03ced4445d7cfa1fe5f62e1b3f08452bde3b6ef81973bafbb57f97bceef873985395b8260589aa88cb7db50ab469262e551bdcd9a56f275a0ac4fe484700c35f3dbf2b469ede864741b86fa59172a360ba95a02e139be50ddfb7cf0b42faeabbfbbaa86a4497699c4f2dfd5b08406af7e14144427c253ec0efa20eaf9a8be8cd49ce1f1bc4e93e619cf2aa8ed4fb39bc8590d0f7b96488f7317ac9abf7bee4e3a0e715":"83146a9e782722c28b014f98b4267bda2ac9504f":"0a2314250cf52b6e4e908de5b35646bcaa24361da8160fb0f9257590ab3ace42b0dc3e77ad2db7c203a20bd952fbb56b1567046ecfaa933d7b1000c3de9ff05b7d989ba46fd43bc4c2d0a3986b7ffa13471d37eb5b47d64707bd290cfd6a9f393ad08ec1e3bd71bb5792615035cdaf2d8929aed3be098379377e777ce79aaa4773":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1029:"04f0548c9626ab1ebf1244934741d99a06220efa2a5856aa0e75730b2ec96adc86be894fa2803b53a5e85d276acbd29ab823f80a7391bb54a5051672fb04eeb543":"0483e0ae47915587743ff345362b555d3962d98bb6f15f848b4c92b1771ca8ed107d8d3ee65ec44517dd0faa481a387e902f7a2e747c269e7ea44480bc538b8e5b":"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0f6195d04a6e6fc7e2c9600dbf840c39ea8d4d624fd53507016b0e26858a5e0aecd7ada543ae5c0ab3a62599cba0a54e6bf446e262f989978f9ddf5e9a41":"a87b8aed07d7b8e2daf14ddca4ac68c4d0aabff8":"086df6b500098c120f24ff8423f727d9c61a5c9007d3b6a31ce7cf8f3cbec1a26bb20e2bd4a046793299e03e37a21b40194fb045f90b18bf20a47992ccd799cf9c059c299c0526854954aade8a6ad9d97ec91a1145383f42468b231f4d72f23706d9853c3fa43ce8ace8bfe7484987a1ec6a16c8daf81f7c8bf42774707a9df456":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1029:"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0f6195d04a6e6fc7e2c9600dbf840c39ea8d4d624fd53507016b0e26858a5e0aecd7ada543ae5c0ab3a62599cba0a54e6bf446e262f989978f9ddf5e9a41":"a87b8aed07d7b8e2daf14ddca4ac68c4d0aabff8":"086df6b500098c120f24ff8423f727d9c61a5c9007d3b6a31ce7cf8f3cbec1a26bb20e2bd4a046793299e03e37a21b40194fb045f90b18bf20a47992ccd799cf9c059c299c0526854954aade8a6ad9d97ec91a1145383f42468b231f4d72f23706d9853c3fa43ce8ace8bfe7484987a1ec6a16c8daf81f7c8bf42774707a9df456":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1029:"04f0548c9626ab1ebf1244934741d99a06220efa2a5856aa0e75730b2ec96adc86be894fa2803b53a5e85d276acbd29ab823f80a7391bb54a5051672fb04eeb543":"0483e0ae47915587743ff345362b555d3962d98bb6f15f848b4c92b1771ca8ed107d8d3ee65ec44517dd0faa481a387e902f7a2e747c269e7ea44480bc538b8e5b":"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"337d25fe9810ebca0de4d4658d3ceb8e0fe4c066aba3bcc48b105d3bf7e0257d44fecea6596f4d0c59a08402833678f70620f9138dfeb7ded905e4a6d5f05c473d55936652e2a5df43c0cfda7bacaf3087f4524b06cf42157d01539739f7fddec9d58125df31a32eab06c19b71f1d5bf":"a37932f8a7494a942d6f767438e724d6d0c0ef18":"0b5b11ad549863ffa9c51a14a1106c2a72cc8b646e5c7262509786105a984776534ca9b54c1cc64bf2d5a44fd7e8a69db699d5ea52087a4748fd2abc1afed1e5d6f7c89025530bdaa2213d7e030fa55df6f34bcf1ce46d2edf4e3ae4f3b01891a068c9e3a44bbc43133edad6ecb9f35400c4252a5762d65744b99cb9f4c559329f":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1029:"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"337d25fe9810ebca0de4d4658d3ceb8e0fe4c066aba3bcc48b105d3bf7e0257d44fecea6596f4d0c59a08402833678f70620f9138dfeb7ded905e4a6d5f05c473d55936652e2a5df43c0cfda7bacaf3087f4524b06cf42157d01539739f7fddec9d58125df31a32eab06c19b71f1d5bf":"a37932f8a7494a942d6f767438e724d6d0c0ef18":"0b5b11ad549863ffa9c51a14a1106c2a72cc8b646e5c7262509786105a984776534ca9b54c1cc64bf2d5a44fd7e8a69db699d5ea52087a4748fd2abc1afed1e5d6f7c89025530bdaa2213d7e030fa55df6f34bcf1ce46d2edf4e3ae4f3b01891a068c9e3a44bbc43133edad6ecb9f35400c4252a5762d65744b99cb9f4c559329f":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1029:"04f0548c9626ab1ebf1244934741d99a06220efa2a5856aa0e75730b2ec96adc86be894fa2803b53a5e85d276acbd29ab823f80a7391bb54a5051672fb04eeb543":"0483e0ae47915587743ff345362b555d3962d98bb6f15f848b4c92b1771ca8ed107d8d3ee65ec44517dd0faa481a387e902f7a2e747c269e7ea44480bc538b8e5b":"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"84ec502b072e8287789d8f9235829ea3b187afd4d4c785611bda5f9eb3cb96717efa7007227f1c08cbcb972e667235e0fb7d431a6570326d2ecce35adb373dc753b3be5f829b89175493193fab16badb41371b3aac0ae670076f24bef420c135add7cee8d35fbc944d79fafb9e307a13b0f556cb654a06f973ed22672330197ef5a748bf826a5db2383a25364b686b9372bb2339aeb1ac9e9889327d016f1670776db06201adbdcaf8a5e3b74e108b73":"7b790c1d62f7b84e94df6af28917cf571018110e":"02d71fa9b53e4654fefb7f08385cf6b0ae3a817942ebf66c35ac67f0b069952a3ce9c7e1f1b02e480a9500836de5d64cdb7ecde04542f7a79988787e24c2ba05f5fd482c023ed5c30e04839dc44bed2a3a3a4fee01113c891a47d32eb8025c28cb050b5cdb576c70fe76ef523405c08417faf350b037a43c379339fcb18d3a356b":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1029:"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"84ec502b072e8287789d8f9235829ea3b187afd4d4c785611bda5f9eb3cb96717efa7007227f1c08cbcb972e667235e0fb7d431a6570326d2ecce35adb373dc753b3be5f829b89175493193fab16badb41371b3aac0ae670076f24bef420c135add7cee8d35fbc944d79fafb9e307a13b0f556cb654a06f973ed22672330197ef5a748bf826a5db2383a25364b686b9372bb2339aeb1ac9e9889327d016f1670776db06201adbdcaf8a5e3b74e108b73":"7b790c1d62f7b84e94df6af28917cf571018110e":"02d71fa9b53e4654fefb7f08385cf6b0ae3a817942ebf66c35ac67f0b069952a3ce9c7e1f1b02e480a9500836de5d64cdb7ecde04542f7a79988787e24c2ba05f5fd482c023ed5c30e04839dc44bed2a3a3a4fee01113c891a47d32eb8025c28cb050b5cdb576c70fe76ef523405c08417faf350b037a43c379339fcb18d3a356b":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1029:"04f0548c9626ab1ebf1244934741d99a06220efa2a5856aa0e75730b2ec96adc86be894fa2803b53a5e85d276acbd29ab823f80a7391bb54a5051672fb04eeb543":"0483e0ae47915587743ff345362b555d3962d98bb6f15f848b4c92b1771ca8ed107d8d3ee65ec44517dd0faa481a387e902f7a2e747c269e7ea44480bc538b8e5b":"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"9906d89f97a9fdedd3ccd824db687326f30f00aa25a7fca2afcb3b0f86cd41e73f0e8ff7d2d83f59e28ed31a5a0d551523374de22e4c7e8ff568b386ee3dc41163f10bf67bb006261c9082f9af90bf1d9049a6b9fae71c7f84fbe6e55f02789de774f230f115026a4b4e96c55b04a95da3aacbb2cece8f81764a1f1c99515411087cf7d34aeded0932c183":"fbbe059025b69b89fb14ae2289e7aaafe60c0fcd":"0a40a16e2fe2b38d1df90546167cf9469c9e3c3681a3442b4b2c2f581deb385ce99fc6188bb02a841d56e76d301891e24560550fcc2a26b55f4ccb26d837d350a154bcaca8392d98fa67959e9727b78cad03269f56968fc56b68bd679926d83cc9cb215550645ccda31c760ff35888943d2d8a1d351e81e5d07b86182e751081ef":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 6_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1029:"164ca31cff609f3a0e7101b039f2e4fe6dd37519ab98598d179e174996598071f47d3a04559158d7be373cf1aa53f0aa6ef09039e5678c2a4c63900514c8c4f8aaed5de12a5f10b09c311af8c0ffb5b7a297f2efc63b8d6b0510931f0b98e48bf5fc6ec4e7b8db1ffaeb08c38e02adb8f03a48229c99e969431f61cb8c4dc698d1":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"9906d89f97a9fdedd3ccd824db687326f30f00aa25a7fca2afcb3b0f86cd41e73f0e8ff7d2d83f59e28ed31a5a0d551523374de22e4c7e8ff568b386ee3dc41163f10bf67bb006261c9082f9af90bf1d9049a6b9fae71c7f84fbe6e55f02789de774f230f115026a4b4e96c55b04a95da3aacbb2cece8f81764a1f1c99515411087cf7d34aeded0932c183":"fbbe059025b69b89fb14ae2289e7aaafe60c0fcd":"0a40a16e2fe2b38d1df90546167cf9469c9e3c3681a3442b4b2c2f581deb385ce99fc6188bb02a841d56e76d301891e24560550fcc2a26b55f4ccb26d837d350a154bcaca8392d98fa67959e9727b78cad03269f56968fc56b68bd679926d83cc9cb215550645ccda31c760ff35888943d2d8a1d351e81e5d07b86182e751081ef":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1030:"07eefb424b0e3a40e4208ee5afb280b22317308114dde0b4b64f730184ec68da6ce2867a9f48ed7726d5e2614ed04a5410736c8c714ee702474298c6292af07535":"070830dbf947eac0228de26314b59b66994cc60e8360e75d3876298f8f8a7d141da064e5ca026a973e28f254738cee669c721b034cb5f8e244dadd7cd1e159d547":"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"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":"b7867a59958cb54328f8775e6546ec06d27eaa50":"187f390723c8902591f0154bae6d4ecbffe067f0e8b795476ea4f4d51ccc810520bb3ca9bca7d0b1f2ea8a17d873fa27570acd642e3808561cb9e975ccfd80b23dc5771cdb3306a5f23159dacbd3aa2db93d46d766e09ed15d900ad897a8d274dc26b47e994a27e97e2268a766533ae4b5e42a2fcaf755c1c4794b294c60555823":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1030:"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"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":"b7867a59958cb54328f8775e6546ec06d27eaa50":"187f390723c8902591f0154bae6d4ecbffe067f0e8b795476ea4f4d51ccc810520bb3ca9bca7d0b1f2ea8a17d873fa27570acd642e3808561cb9e975ccfd80b23dc5771cdb3306a5f23159dacbd3aa2db93d46d766e09ed15d900ad897a8d274dc26b47e994a27e97e2268a766533ae4b5e42a2fcaf755c1c4794b294c60555823":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1030:"07eefb424b0e3a40e4208ee5afb280b22317308114dde0b4b64f730184ec68da6ce2867a9f48ed7726d5e2614ed04a5410736c8c714ee702474298c6292af07535":"070830dbf947eac0228de26314b59b66994cc60e8360e75d3876298f8f8a7d141da064e5ca026a973e28f254738cee669c721b034cb5f8e244dadd7cd1e159d547":"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8d80d2d08dbd19c154df3f14673a14bd03735231f24e86bf153d0e69e74cbff7b1836e664de83f680124370fc0f96c9b65c07a366b644c4ab3":"0c09582266df086310821ba7e18df64dfee6de09":"10fd89768a60a67788abb5856a787c8561f3edcf9a83e898f7dc87ab8cce79429b43e56906941a886194f137e591fe7c339555361fbbe1f24feb2d4bcdb80601f3096bc9132deea60ae13082f44f9ad41cd628936a4d51176e42fc59cb76db815ce5ab4db99a104aafea68f5d330329ebf258d4ede16064bd1d00393d5e1570eb8":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1030:"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"8d80d2d08dbd19c154df3f14673a14bd03735231f24e86bf153d0e69e74cbff7b1836e664de83f680124370fc0f96c9b65c07a366b644c4ab3":"0c09582266df086310821ba7e18df64dfee6de09":"10fd89768a60a67788abb5856a787c8561f3edcf9a83e898f7dc87ab8cce79429b43e56906941a886194f137e591fe7c339555361fbbe1f24feb2d4bcdb80601f3096bc9132deea60ae13082f44f9ad41cd628936a4d51176e42fc59cb76db815ce5ab4db99a104aafea68f5d330329ebf258d4ede16064bd1d00393d5e1570eb8":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1030:"07eefb424b0e3a40e4208ee5afb280b22317308114dde0b4b64f730184ec68da6ce2867a9f48ed7726d5e2614ed04a5410736c8c714ee702474298c6292af07535":"070830dbf947eac0228de26314b59b66994cc60e8360e75d3876298f8f8a7d141da064e5ca026a973e28f254738cee669c721b034cb5f8e244dadd7cd1e159d547":"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"808405cdfc1a58b9bb0397c720722a81fffb76278f335917ef9c473814b3e016ba2973cd2765f8f3f82d6cc38aa7f8551827fe8d1e3884b7e61c94683b8f82f1843bdae2257eeec9812ad4c2cf283c34e0b0ae0fe3cb990cf88f2ef9":"28039dcfe106d3b8296611258c4a56651c9e92dd":"2b31fde99859b977aa09586d8e274662b25a2a640640b457f594051cb1e7f7a911865455242926cf88fe80dfa3a75ba9689844a11e634a82b075afbd69c12a0df9d25f84ad4945df3dc8fe90c3cefdf26e95f0534304b5bdba20d3e5640a2ebfb898aac35ae40f26fce5563c2f9f24f3042af76f3c7072d687bbfb959a88460af1":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1030:"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"808405cdfc1a58b9bb0397c720722a81fffb76278f335917ef9c473814b3e016ba2973cd2765f8f3f82d6cc38aa7f8551827fe8d1e3884b7e61c94683b8f82f1843bdae2257eeec9812ad4c2cf283c34e0b0ae0fe3cb990cf88f2ef9":"28039dcfe106d3b8296611258c4a56651c9e92dd":"2b31fde99859b977aa09586d8e274662b25a2a640640b457f594051cb1e7f7a911865455242926cf88fe80dfa3a75ba9689844a11e634a82b075afbd69c12a0df9d25f84ad4945df3dc8fe90c3cefdf26e95f0534304b5bdba20d3e5640a2ebfb898aac35ae40f26fce5563c2f9f24f3042af76f3c7072d687bbfb959a88460af1":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1030:"07eefb424b0e3a40e4208ee5afb280b22317308114dde0b4b64f730184ec68da6ce2867a9f48ed7726d5e2614ed04a5410736c8c714ee702474298c6292af07535":"070830dbf947eac0228de26314b59b66994cc60e8360e75d3876298f8f8a7d141da064e5ca026a973e28f254738cee669c721b034cb5f8e244dadd7cd1e159d547":"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f337b9bad937de22a1a052dff11134a8ce26976202981939b91e0715ae5e609649da1adfcef3f4cca59b238360e7d1e496c7bf4b204b5acff9bbd6166a1d87a36ef2247373751039f8a800b8399807b3a85f44893497c0d05fb7017b82228152de6f25e6116dcc7503c786c875c28f3aa607e94ab0f19863ab1b5073770b0cd5f533acde30c6fb953cf3da680264e30fc11bff9a19bffab4779b6223c3fb3fe0f71abade4eb7c09c41e24c22d23fa148e6a173feb63984d1bc6ee3a02d915b752ceaf92a3015eceb38ca586c6801b37c34cefb2cff25ea23c08662dcab26a7a93a285d05d3044c":"a77821ebbbef24628e4e12e1d0ea96de398f7b0f":"32c7ca38ff26949a15000c4ba04b2b13b35a3810e568184d7ecabaa166b7ffabddf2b6cf4ba07124923790f2e5b1a5be040aea36fe132ec130e1f10567982d17ac3e89b8d26c3094034e762d2e031264f01170beecb3d1439e05846f25458367a7d9c02060444672671e64e877864559ca19b2074d588a281b5804d23772fbbe19":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1030:"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f337b9bad937de22a1a052dff11134a8ce26976202981939b91e0715ae5e609649da1adfcef3f4cca59b238360e7d1e496c7bf4b204b5acff9bbd6166a1d87a36ef2247373751039f8a800b8399807b3a85f44893497c0d05fb7017b82228152de6f25e6116dcc7503c786c875c28f3aa607e94ab0f19863ab1b5073770b0cd5f533acde30c6fb953cf3da680264e30fc11bff9a19bffab4779b6223c3fb3fe0f71abade4eb7c09c41e24c22d23fa148e6a173feb63984d1bc6ee3a02d915b752ceaf92a3015eceb38ca586c6801b37c34cefb2cff25ea23c08662dcab26a7a93a285d05d3044c":"a77821ebbbef24628e4e12e1d0ea96de398f7b0f":"32c7ca38ff26949a15000c4ba04b2b13b35a3810e568184d7ecabaa166b7ffabddf2b6cf4ba07124923790f2e5b1a5be040aea36fe132ec130e1f10567982d17ac3e89b8d26c3094034e762d2e031264f01170beecb3d1439e05846f25458367a7d9c02060444672671e64e877864559ca19b2074d588a281b5804d23772fbbe19":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1030:"07eefb424b0e3a40e4208ee5afb280b22317308114dde0b4b64f730184ec68da6ce2867a9f48ed7726d5e2614ed04a5410736c8c714ee702474298c6292af07535":"070830dbf947eac0228de26314b59b66994cc60e8360e75d3876298f8f8a7d141da064e5ca026a973e28f254738cee669c721b034cb5f8e244dadd7cd1e159d547":"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"45013cebafd960b255476a8e2598b9aa32efbe6dc1f34f4a498d8cf5a2b4548d08c55d5f95f7bcc9619163056f2d58b52fa032":"9d5ad8eb452134b65dc3a98b6a73b5f741609cd6":"07eb651d75f1b52bc263b2e198336e99fbebc4f332049a922a10815607ee2d989db3a4495b7dccd38f58a211fb7e193171a3d891132437ebca44f318b280509e52b5fa98fcce8205d9697c8ee4b7ff59d4c59c79038a1970bd2a0d451ecdc5ef11d9979c9d35f8c70a6163717607890d586a7c6dc01c79f86a8f28e85235f8c2f1":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1030:"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"45013cebafd960b255476a8e2598b9aa32efbe6dc1f34f4a498d8cf5a2b4548d08c55d5f95f7bcc9619163056f2d58b52fa032":"9d5ad8eb452134b65dc3a98b6a73b5f741609cd6":"07eb651d75f1b52bc263b2e198336e99fbebc4f332049a922a10815607ee2d989db3a4495b7dccd38f58a211fb7e193171a3d891132437ebca44f318b280509e52b5fa98fcce8205d9697c8ee4b7ff59d4c59c79038a1970bd2a0d451ecdc5ef11d9979c9d35f8c70a6163717607890d586a7c6dc01c79f86a8f28e85235f8c2f1":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1030:"07eefb424b0e3a40e4208ee5afb280b22317308114dde0b4b64f730184ec68da6ce2867a9f48ed7726d5e2614ed04a5410736c8c714ee702474298c6292af07535":"070830dbf947eac0228de26314b59b66994cc60e8360e75d3876298f8f8a7d141da064e5ca026a973e28f254738cee669c721b034cb5f8e244dadd7cd1e159d547":"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2358097086c899323e75d9c90d0c09f12d9d54edfbdf70a9c2eb5a04d8f36b9b2bdf2aabe0a5bda1968937f9d6ebd3b6b257efb3136d4131f9acb59b85e2602c2a3fcdc835494a1f4e5ec18b226c80232b36a75a45fdf09a7ea9e98efbde1450d1194bf12e15a4c5f9eb5c0bce5269e0c3b28cfab655d81a61a20b4be2f54459bb25a0db94c52218be109a7426de83014424789aaa90e5056e632a698115e282c1a56410f26c2072f193481a9dcd880572005e64f4082ecf":"3f2efc595880a7d47fcf3cba04983ea54c4b73fb":"18da3cdcfe79bfb77fd9c32f377ad399146f0a8e810620233271a6e3ed3248903f5cdc92dc79b55d3e11615aa056a795853792a3998c349ca5c457e8ca7d29d796aa24f83491709befcfb1510ea513c92829a3f00b104f655634f320752e130ec0ccf6754ff893db302932bb025eb60e87822598fc619e0e981737a9a4c4152d33":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 7_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1030:"37c9da4a66c8c408b8da27d0c9d79f8ccb1eafc1d2fe48746d940b7c4ef5dee18ad12647cefaa0c4b3188b221c515386759b93f02024b25ab9242f8357d8f3fd49640ee5e643eaf6c64deefa7089727c8ff03993333915c6ef21bf5975b6e50d118b51008ec33e9f01a0a545a10a836a43ddbca9d8b5c5d3548022d7064ea29ab3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"2358097086c899323e75d9c90d0c09f12d9d54edfbdf70a9c2eb5a04d8f36b9b2bdf2aabe0a5bda1968937f9d6ebd3b6b257efb3136d4131f9acb59b85e2602c2a3fcdc835494a1f4e5ec18b226c80232b36a75a45fdf09a7ea9e98efbde1450d1194bf12e15a4c5f9eb5c0bce5269e0c3b28cfab655d81a61a20b4be2f54459bb25a0db94c52218be109a7426de83014424789aaa90e5056e632a698115e282c1a56410f26c2072f193481a9dcd880572005e64f4082ecf":"3f2efc595880a7d47fcf3cba04983ea54c4b73fb":"18da3cdcfe79bfb77fd9c32f377ad399146f0a8e810620233271a6e3ed3248903f5cdc92dc79b55d3e11615aa056a795853792a3998c349ca5c457e8ca7d29d796aa24f83491709befcfb1510ea513c92829a3f00b104f655634f320752e130ec0ccf6754ff893db302932bb025eb60e87822598fc619e0e981737a9a4c4152d33":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1031:"08dad7f11363faa623d5d6d5e8a319328d82190d7127d2846c439b0ab72619b0a43a95320e4ec34fc3a9cea876422305bd76c5ba7be9e2f410c8060645a1d29edb":"0847e732376fc7900f898ea82eb2b0fc418565fdae62f7d9ec4ce2217b97990dd272db157f99f63c0dcbb9fbacdbd4c4dadb6df67756358ca4174825b48f49706d":"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"81332f4be62948415ea1d899792eeacf6c6e1db1da8be13b5cea41db2fed467092e1ff398914c714259775f595f8547f735692a575e6923af78f22c6997ddb90fb6f72d7bb0dd5744a31decd3dc3685849836ed34aec596304ad11843c4f88489f209735f5fb7fdaf7cec8addc5818168f880acbf490d51005b7a8e84e43e54287977571dd99eea4b161eb2df1f5108f12a4142a83322edb05a75487a3435c9a78ce53ed93bc550857d7a9fb":"1d65491d79c864b373009be6f6f2467bac4c78fa":"0262ac254bfa77f3c1aca22c5179f8f040422b3c5bafd40a8f21cf0fa5a667ccd5993d42dbafb409c520e25fce2b1ee1e716577f1efa17f3da28052f40f0419b23106d7845aaf01125b698e7a4dfe92d3967bb00c4d0d35ba3552ab9a8b3eef07c7fecdbc5424ac4db1e20cb37d0b2744769940ea907e17fbbca673b20522380c5":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1031:"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"81332f4be62948415ea1d899792eeacf6c6e1db1da8be13b5cea41db2fed467092e1ff398914c714259775f595f8547f735692a575e6923af78f22c6997ddb90fb6f72d7bb0dd5744a31decd3dc3685849836ed34aec596304ad11843c4f88489f209735f5fb7fdaf7cec8addc5818168f880acbf490d51005b7a8e84e43e54287977571dd99eea4b161eb2df1f5108f12a4142a83322edb05a75487a3435c9a78ce53ed93bc550857d7a9fb":"1d65491d79c864b373009be6f6f2467bac4c78fa":"0262ac254bfa77f3c1aca22c5179f8f040422b3c5bafd40a8f21cf0fa5a667ccd5993d42dbafb409c520e25fce2b1ee1e716577f1efa17f3da28052f40f0419b23106d7845aaf01125b698e7a4dfe92d3967bb00c4d0d35ba3552ab9a8b3eef07c7fecdbc5424ac4db1e20cb37d0b2744769940ea907e17fbbca673b20522380c5":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1031:"08dad7f11363faa623d5d6d5e8a319328d82190d7127d2846c439b0ab72619b0a43a95320e4ec34fc3a9cea876422305bd76c5ba7be9e2f410c8060645a1d29edb":"0847e732376fc7900f898ea82eb2b0fc418565fdae62f7d9ec4ce2217b97990dd272db157f99f63c0dcbb9fbacdbd4c4dadb6df67756358ca4174825b48f49706d":"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e2f96eaf0e05e7ba326ecca0ba7fd2f7c02356f3cede9d0faabf4fcc8e60a973e5595fd9ea08":"435c098aa9909eb2377f1248b091b68987ff1838":"2707b9ad5115c58c94e932e8ec0a280f56339e44a1b58d4ddcff2f312e5f34dcfe39e89c6a94dcee86dbbdae5b79ba4e0819a9e7bfd9d982e7ee6c86ee68396e8b3a14c9c8f34b178eb741f9d3f121109bf5c8172fada2e768f9ea1433032c004a8aa07eb990000a48dc94c8bac8aabe2b09b1aa46c0a2aa0e12f63fbba775ba7e":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1031:"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e2f96eaf0e05e7ba326ecca0ba7fd2f7c02356f3cede9d0faabf4fcc8e60a973e5595fd9ea08":"435c098aa9909eb2377f1248b091b68987ff1838":"2707b9ad5115c58c94e932e8ec0a280f56339e44a1b58d4ddcff2f312e5f34dcfe39e89c6a94dcee86dbbdae5b79ba4e0819a9e7bfd9d982e7ee6c86ee68396e8b3a14c9c8f34b178eb741f9d3f121109bf5c8172fada2e768f9ea1433032c004a8aa07eb990000a48dc94c8bac8aabe2b09b1aa46c0a2aa0e12f63fbba775ba7e":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1031:"08dad7f11363faa623d5d6d5e8a319328d82190d7127d2846c439b0ab72619b0a43a95320e4ec34fc3a9cea876422305bd76c5ba7be9e2f410c8060645a1d29edb":"0847e732376fc7900f898ea82eb2b0fc418565fdae62f7d9ec4ce2217b97990dd272db157f99f63c0dcbb9fbacdbd4c4dadb6df67756358ca4174825b48f49706d":"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"c6ebbe76df0c4aea32c474175b2f136862d04529":"2ad20509d78cf26d1b6c406146086e4b0c91a91c2bd164c87b966b8faa42aa0ca446022323ba4b1a1b89706d7f4c3be57d7b69702d168ab5955ee290356b8c4a29ed467d547ec23cbadf286ccb5863c6679da467fc9324a151c7ec55aac6db4084f82726825cfe1aa421bc64049fb42f23148f9c25b2dc300437c38d428aa75f96":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1031:"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"c6ebbe76df0c4aea32c474175b2f136862d04529":"2ad20509d78cf26d1b6c406146086e4b0c91a91c2bd164c87b966b8faa42aa0ca446022323ba4b1a1b89706d7f4c3be57d7b69702d168ab5955ee290356b8c4a29ed467d547ec23cbadf286ccb5863c6679da467fc9324a151c7ec55aac6db4084f82726825cfe1aa421bc64049fb42f23148f9c25b2dc300437c38d428aa75f96":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1031:"08dad7f11363faa623d5d6d5e8a319328d82190d7127d2846c439b0ab72619b0a43a95320e4ec34fc3a9cea876422305bd76c5ba7be9e2f410c8060645a1d29edb":"0847e732376fc7900f898ea82eb2b0fc418565fdae62f7d9ec4ce2217b97990dd272db157f99f63c0dcbb9fbacdbd4c4dadb6df67756358ca4174825b48f49706d":"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"dbc5f750a7a14be2b93e838d18d14a8695e52e8add9c0ac733b8f56d2747e529a0cca532dd49b902aefed514447f9e81d16195c2853868cb9b30f7d0d495c69d01b5c5d50b27045db3866c2324a44a110b1717746de457d1c8c45c3cd2a92970c3d59632055d4c98a41d6e99e2a3ddd5f7f9979ab3cd18f37505d25141de2a1bff17b3a7dce9419ecc385cf11d72840f19953fd0509251f6cafde2893d0e75c781ba7a5012ca401a4fa99e04b3c3249f926d5afe82cc87dab22c3c1b105de48e34ace9c9124e59597ac7ebf8":"021fdcc6ebb5e19b1cb16e9c67f27681657fe20a":"1e24e6e58628e5175044a9eb6d837d48af1260b0520e87327de7897ee4d5b9f0df0be3e09ed4dea8c1454ff3423bb08e1793245a9df8bf6ab3968c8eddc3b5328571c77f091cc578576912dfebd164b9de5454fe0be1c1f6385b328360ce67ec7a05f6e30eb45c17c48ac70041d2cab67f0a2ae7aafdcc8d245ea3442a6300ccc7":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1031:"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"dbc5f750a7a14be2b93e838d18d14a8695e52e8add9c0ac733b8f56d2747e529a0cca532dd49b902aefed514447f9e81d16195c2853868cb9b30f7d0d495c69d01b5c5d50b27045db3866c2324a44a110b1717746de457d1c8c45c3cd2a92970c3d59632055d4c98a41d6e99e2a3ddd5f7f9979ab3cd18f37505d25141de2a1bff17b3a7dce9419ecc385cf11d72840f19953fd0509251f6cafde2893d0e75c781ba7a5012ca401a4fa99e04b3c3249f926d5afe82cc87dab22c3c1b105de48e34ace9c9124e59597ac7ebf8":"021fdcc6ebb5e19b1cb16e9c67f27681657fe20a":"1e24e6e58628e5175044a9eb6d837d48af1260b0520e87327de7897ee4d5b9f0df0be3e09ed4dea8c1454ff3423bb08e1793245a9df8bf6ab3968c8eddc3b5328571c77f091cc578576912dfebd164b9de5454fe0be1c1f6385b328360ce67ec7a05f6e30eb45c17c48ac70041d2cab67f0a2ae7aafdcc8d245ea3442a6300ccc7":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1031:"08dad7f11363faa623d5d6d5e8a319328d82190d7127d2846c439b0ab72619b0a43a95320e4ec34fc3a9cea876422305bd76c5ba7be9e2f410c8060645a1d29edb":"0847e732376fc7900f898ea82eb2b0fc418565fdae62f7d9ec4ce2217b97990dd272db157f99f63c0dcbb9fbacdbd4c4dadb6df67756358ca4174825b48f49706d":"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"04dc251be72e88e5723485b6383a637e2fefe07660c519a560b8bc18bdedb86eae2364ea53ba9dca6eb3d2e7d6b806af42b3e87f291b4a8881d5bf572cc9a85e19c86acb28f098f9da0383c566d3c0f58cfd8f395dcf602e5cd40e8c7183f714996e2297ef":"c558d7167cbb4508ada042971e71b1377eea4269":"33341ba3576a130a50e2a5cf8679224388d5693f5accc235ac95add68e5eb1eec31666d0ca7a1cda6f70a1aa762c05752a51950cdb8af3c5379f18cfe6b5bc55a4648226a15e912ef19ad77adeea911d67cfefd69ba43fa4119135ff642117ba985a7e0100325e9519f1ca6a9216bda055b5785015291125e90dcd07a2ca9673ee":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1031:"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"04dc251be72e88e5723485b6383a637e2fefe07660c519a560b8bc18bdedb86eae2364ea53ba9dca6eb3d2e7d6b806af42b3e87f291b4a8881d5bf572cc9a85e19c86acb28f098f9da0383c566d3c0f58cfd8f395dcf602e5cd40e8c7183f714996e2297ef":"c558d7167cbb4508ada042971e71b1377eea4269":"33341ba3576a130a50e2a5cf8679224388d5693f5accc235ac95add68e5eb1eec31666d0ca7a1cda6f70a1aa762c05752a51950cdb8af3c5379f18cfe6b5bc55a4648226a15e912ef19ad77adeea911d67cfefd69ba43fa4119135ff642117ba985a7e0100325e9519f1ca6a9216bda055b5785015291125e90dcd07a2ca9673ee":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1031:"08dad7f11363faa623d5d6d5e8a319328d82190d7127d2846c439b0ab72619b0a43a95320e4ec34fc3a9cea876422305bd76c5ba7be9e2f410c8060645a1d29edb":"0847e732376fc7900f898ea82eb2b0fc418565fdae62f7d9ec4ce2217b97990dd272db157f99f63c0dcbb9fbacdbd4c4dadb6df67756358ca4174825b48f49706d":"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0ea37df9a6fea4a8b610373c24cf390c20fa6e2135c400c8a34f5c183a7e8ea4c9ae090ed31759f42dc77719cca400ecdcc517acfc7ac6902675b2ef30c509665f3321482fc69a9fb570d15e01c845d0d8e50d2a24cbf1cf0e714975a5db7b18d9e9e9cb91b5cb16869060ed18b7b56245503f0caf90352b8de81cb5a1d9c6336092f0cd":"76fd4e64fdc98eb927a0403e35a084e76ba9f92a":"1ed1d848fb1edb44129bd9b354795af97a069a7a00d0151048593e0c72c3517ff9ff2a41d0cb5a0ac860d736a199704f7cb6a53986a88bbd8abcc0076a2ce847880031525d449da2ac78356374c536e343faa7cba42a5aaa6506087791c06a8e989335aed19bfab2d5e67e27fb0c2875af896c21b6e8e7309d04e4f6727e69463e":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 8_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1031:"495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0ea37df9a6fea4a8b610373c24cf390c20fa6e2135c400c8a34f5c183a7e8ea4c9ae090ed31759f42dc77719cca400ecdcc517acfc7ac6902675b2ef30c509665f3321482fc69a9fb570d15e01c845d0d8e50d2a24cbf1cf0e714975a5db7b18d9e9e9cb91b5cb16869060ed18b7b56245503f0caf90352b8de81cb5a1d9c6336092f0cd":"76fd4e64fdc98eb927a0403e35a084e76ba9f92a":"1ed1d848fb1edb44129bd9b354795af97a069a7a00d0151048593e0c72c3517ff9ff2a41d0cb5a0ac860d736a199704f7cb6a53986a88bbd8abcc0076a2ce847880031525d449da2ac78356374c536e343faa7cba42a5aaa6506087791c06a8e989335aed19bfab2d5e67e27fb0c2875af896c21b6e8e7309d04e4f6727e69463e":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1536:"f8eb97e98df12664eefdb761596a69ddcd0e76daece6ed4bf5a1b50ac086f7928a4d2f8726a77e515b74da41988f220b1cc87aa1fc810ce99a82f2d1ce821edced794c6941f42c7a1a0b8c4d28c75ec60b652279f6154a762aed165d47dee367":"ed4d71d0a6e24b93c2e5f6b4bbe05f5fb0afa042d204fe3378d365c2f288b6a8dad7efe45d153eef40cacc7b81ff934002d108994b94a5e4728cd9c963375ae49965bda55cbf0efed8d6553b4027f2d86208a6e6b489c176128092d629e49d3d":"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a88e265855e9d7ca36c68795f0b31b591cd6587c71d060a0b3f7f3eaef43795922028bc2b6ad467cfc2d7f659c5385aa70ba3672cdde4cfe4970cc7904601b278872bf51321c4a972f3c95570f3445d4f57980e0f20df54846e6a52c668f1288c03f95006ea32f562d40d52af9feb32f0fa06db65b588a237b34e592d55cf979f903a642ef64d2ed542aa8c77dc1dd762f45a59303ed75e541ca271e2b60ca709e44fa0661131e8d5d4163fd8d398566ce26de8730e72f9cca737641c244159420637028df0a18079d6208ea8b4711a2c750f5":"c0a425313df8d7564bd2434d311523d5257eed80":"586107226c3ce013a7c8f04d1a6a2959bb4b8e205ba43a27b50f124111bc35ef589b039f5932187cb696d7d9a32c0c38300a5cdda4834b62d2eb240af33f79d13dfbf095bf599e0d9686948c1964747b67e89c9aba5cd85016236f566cc5802cb13ead51bc7ca6bef3b94dcbdbb1d570469771df0e00b1a8a06777472d2316279edae86474668d4e1efff95f1de61c6020da32ae92bbf16520fef3cf4d88f61121f24bbd9fe91b59caf1235b2a93ff81fc403addf4ebdea84934a9cdaf8e1a9e":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1536:"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"a88e265855e9d7ca36c68795f0b31b591cd6587c71d060a0b3f7f3eaef43795922028bc2b6ad467cfc2d7f659c5385aa70ba3672cdde4cfe4970cc7904601b278872bf51321c4a972f3c95570f3445d4f57980e0f20df54846e6a52c668f1288c03f95006ea32f562d40d52af9feb32f0fa06db65b588a237b34e592d55cf979f903a642ef64d2ed542aa8c77dc1dd762f45a59303ed75e541ca271e2b60ca709e44fa0661131e8d5d4163fd8d398566ce26de8730e72f9cca737641c244159420637028df0a18079d6208ea8b4711a2c750f5":"c0a425313df8d7564bd2434d311523d5257eed80":"586107226c3ce013a7c8f04d1a6a2959bb4b8e205ba43a27b50f124111bc35ef589b039f5932187cb696d7d9a32c0c38300a5cdda4834b62d2eb240af33f79d13dfbf095bf599e0d9686948c1964747b67e89c9aba5cd85016236f566cc5802cb13ead51bc7ca6bef3b94dcbdbb1d570469771df0e00b1a8a06777472d2316279edae86474668d4e1efff95f1de61c6020da32ae92bbf16520fef3cf4d88f61121f24bbd9fe91b59caf1235b2a93ff81fc403addf4ebdea84934a9cdaf8e1a9e":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1536:"f8eb97e98df12664eefdb761596a69ddcd0e76daece6ed4bf5a1b50ac086f7928a4d2f8726a77e515b74da41988f220b1cc87aa1fc810ce99a82f2d1ce821edced794c6941f42c7a1a0b8c4d28c75ec60b652279f6154a762aed165d47dee367":"ed4d71d0a6e24b93c2e5f6b4bbe05f5fb0afa042d204fe3378d365c2f288b6a8dad7efe45d153eef40cacc7b81ff934002d108994b94a5e4728cd9c963375ae49965bda55cbf0efed8d6553b4027f2d86208a6e6b489c176128092d629e49d3d":"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c8c9c6af04acda414d227ef23e0820c3732c500dc87275e95b0d095413993c2658bc1d988581ba879c2d201f14cb88ced153a01969a7bf0a7be79c84c1486bc12b3fa6c59871b6827c8ce253ca5fefa8a8c690bf326e8e37cdb96d90a82ebab69f86350e1822e8bd536a2e":"b307c43b4850a8dac2f15f32e37839ef8c5c0e91":"80b6d643255209f0a456763897ac9ed259d459b49c2887e5882ecb4434cfd66dd7e1699375381e51cd7f554f2c271704b399d42b4be2540a0eca61951f55267f7c2878c122842dadb28b01bd5f8c025f7e228418a673c03d6bc0c736d0a29546bd67f786d9d692ccea778d71d98c2063b7a71092187a4d35af108111d83e83eae46c46aa34277e06044589903788f1d5e7cee25fb485e92949118814d6f2c3ee361489016f327fb5bc517eb50470bffa1afa5f4ce9aa0ce5b8ee19bf5501b958":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1536:"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"c8c9c6af04acda414d227ef23e0820c3732c500dc87275e95b0d095413993c2658bc1d988581ba879c2d201f14cb88ced153a01969a7bf0a7be79c84c1486bc12b3fa6c59871b6827c8ce253ca5fefa8a8c690bf326e8e37cdb96d90a82ebab69f86350e1822e8bd536a2e":"b307c43b4850a8dac2f15f32e37839ef8c5c0e91":"80b6d643255209f0a456763897ac9ed259d459b49c2887e5882ecb4434cfd66dd7e1699375381e51cd7f554f2c271704b399d42b4be2540a0eca61951f55267f7c2878c122842dadb28b01bd5f8c025f7e228418a673c03d6bc0c736d0a29546bd67f786d9d692ccea778d71d98c2063b7a71092187a4d35af108111d83e83eae46c46aa34277e06044589903788f1d5e7cee25fb485e92949118814d6f2c3ee361489016f327fb5bc517eb50470bffa1afa5f4ce9aa0ce5b8ee19bf5501b958":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1536:"f8eb97e98df12664eefdb761596a69ddcd0e76daece6ed4bf5a1b50ac086f7928a4d2f8726a77e515b74da41988f220b1cc87aa1fc810ce99a82f2d1ce821edced794c6941f42c7a1a0b8c4d28c75ec60b652279f6154a762aed165d47dee367":"ed4d71d0a6e24b93c2e5f6b4bbe05f5fb0afa042d204fe3378d365c2f288b6a8dad7efe45d153eef40cacc7b81ff934002d108994b94a5e4728cd9c963375ae49965bda55cbf0efed8d6553b4027f2d86208a6e6b489c176128092d629e49d3d":"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0afad42ccd4fc60654a55002d228f52a4a5fe03b8bbb08ca82daca558b44dbe1266e50c0e745a36d9d2904e3408abcd1fd569994063f4a75cc72f2fee2a0cd893a43af1c5b8b487df0a71610024e4f6ddf9f28ad0813c1aab91bcb3c9064d5ff742deffea657094139369e5ea6f4a96319a5cc8224145b545062758fefd1fe3409ae169259c6cdfd6b5f2958e314faecbe69d2cace58ee55179ab9b3e6d1ecc14a557c5febe988595264fc5da1c571462eca798a18a1a4940cdab4a3e92009ccd42e1e947b1314e32238a2dece7d23a89b5b30c751fd0a4a430d2c548594":"9a2b007e80978bbb192c354eb7da9aedfc74dbf5":"484408f3898cd5f53483f80819efbf2708c34d27a8b2a6fae8b322f9240237f981817aca1846f1084daa6d7c0795f6e5bf1af59c38e1858437ce1f7ec419b98c8736adf6dd9a00b1806d2bd3ad0a73775e05f52dfef3a59ab4b08143f0df05cd1ad9d04bececa6daa4a2129803e200cbc77787caf4c1d0663a6c5987b605952019782caf2ec1426d68fb94ed1d4be816a7ed081b77e6ab330b3ffc073820fecde3727fcbe295ee61a050a343658637c3fd659cfb63736de32d9f90d3c2f63eca":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1536:"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0afad42ccd4fc60654a55002d228f52a4a5fe03b8bbb08ca82daca558b44dbe1266e50c0e745a36d9d2904e3408abcd1fd569994063f4a75cc72f2fee2a0cd893a43af1c5b8b487df0a71610024e4f6ddf9f28ad0813c1aab91bcb3c9064d5ff742deffea657094139369e5ea6f4a96319a5cc8224145b545062758fefd1fe3409ae169259c6cdfd6b5f2958e314faecbe69d2cace58ee55179ab9b3e6d1ecc14a557c5febe988595264fc5da1c571462eca798a18a1a4940cdab4a3e92009ccd42e1e947b1314e32238a2dece7d23a89b5b30c751fd0a4a430d2c548594":"9a2b007e80978bbb192c354eb7da9aedfc74dbf5":"484408f3898cd5f53483f80819efbf2708c34d27a8b2a6fae8b322f9240237f981817aca1846f1084daa6d7c0795f6e5bf1af59c38e1858437ce1f7ec419b98c8736adf6dd9a00b1806d2bd3ad0a73775e05f52dfef3a59ab4b08143f0df05cd1ad9d04bececa6daa4a2129803e200cbc77787caf4c1d0663a6c5987b605952019782caf2ec1426d68fb94ed1d4be816a7ed081b77e6ab330b3ffc073820fecde3727fcbe295ee61a050a343658637c3fd659cfb63736de32d9f90d3c2f63eca":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1536:"f8eb97e98df12664eefdb761596a69ddcd0e76daece6ed4bf5a1b50ac086f7928a4d2f8726a77e515b74da41988f220b1cc87aa1fc810ce99a82f2d1ce821edced794c6941f42c7a1a0b8c4d28c75ec60b652279f6154a762aed165d47dee367":"ed4d71d0a6e24b93c2e5f6b4bbe05f5fb0afa042d204fe3378d365c2f288b6a8dad7efe45d153eef40cacc7b81ff934002d108994b94a5e4728cd9c963375ae49965bda55cbf0efed8d6553b4027f2d86208a6e6b489c176128092d629e49d3d":"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1dfd43b46c93db82629bdae2bd0a12b882ea04c3b465f5cf93023f01059626dbbe99f26bb1be949dddd16dc7f3debb19a194627f0b224434df7d8700e9e98b06e360c12fdbe3d19f51c9684eb9089ecbb0a2f0450399d3f59eac7294085d044f5393c6ce737423d8b86c415370d389e30b9f0a3c02d25d0082e8ad6f3f1ef24a45c3cf82b383367063a4d4613e4264f01b2dac2e5aa42043f8fb5f69fa871d14fb273e767a531c40f02f343bc2fb45a0c7e0f6be2561923a77211d66a6e2dbb43c366350beae22da3ac2c1f5077096fcb5c4bf255f7574351ae0b1e1f03632817c0856d4a8ba97afbdc8b85855402bc56926fcec209f9ea8":"70f382bddf4d5d2dd88b3bc7b7308be632b84045":"84ebeb481be59845b46468bafb471c0112e02b235d84b5d911cbd1926ee5074ae0424495cb20e82308b8ebb65f419a03fb40e72b78981d88aad143053685172c97b29c8b7bf0ae73b5b2263c403da0ed2f80ff7450af7828eb8b86f0028bd2a8b176a4d228cccea18394f238b09ff758cc00bc04301152355742f282b54e663a919e709d8da24ade5500a7b9aa50226e0ca52923e6c2d860ec50ff480fa57477e82b0565f4379f79c772d5c2da80af9fbf325ece6fc20b00961614bee89a183e":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1536:"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1dfd43b46c93db82629bdae2bd0a12b882ea04c3b465f5cf93023f01059626dbbe99f26bb1be949dddd16dc7f3debb19a194627f0b224434df7d8700e9e98b06e360c12fdbe3d19f51c9684eb9089ecbb0a2f0450399d3f59eac7294085d044f5393c6ce737423d8b86c415370d389e30b9f0a3c02d25d0082e8ad6f3f1ef24a45c3cf82b383367063a4d4613e4264f01b2dac2e5aa42043f8fb5f69fa871d14fb273e767a531c40f02f343bc2fb45a0c7e0f6be2561923a77211d66a6e2dbb43c366350beae22da3ac2c1f5077096fcb5c4bf255f7574351ae0b1e1f03632817c0856d4a8ba97afbdc8b85855402bc56926fcec209f9ea8":"70f382bddf4d5d2dd88b3bc7b7308be632b84045":"84ebeb481be59845b46468bafb471c0112e02b235d84b5d911cbd1926ee5074ae0424495cb20e82308b8ebb65f419a03fb40e72b78981d88aad143053685172c97b29c8b7bf0ae73b5b2263c403da0ed2f80ff7450af7828eb8b86f0028bd2a8b176a4d228cccea18394f238b09ff758cc00bc04301152355742f282b54e663a919e709d8da24ade5500a7b9aa50226e0ca52923e6c2d860ec50ff480fa57477e82b0565f4379f79c772d5c2da80af9fbf325ece6fc20b00961614bee89a183e":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1536:"f8eb97e98df12664eefdb761596a69ddcd0e76daece6ed4bf5a1b50ac086f7928a4d2f8726a77e515b74da41988f220b1cc87aa1fc810ce99a82f2d1ce821edced794c6941f42c7a1a0b8c4d28c75ec60b652279f6154a762aed165d47dee367":"ed4d71d0a6e24b93c2e5f6b4bbe05f5fb0afa042d204fe3378d365c2f288b6a8dad7efe45d153eef40cacc7b81ff934002d108994b94a5e4728cd9c963375ae49965bda55cbf0efed8d6553b4027f2d86208a6e6b489c176128092d629e49d3d":"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1bdc6e7c98fb8cf54e9b097b66a831e9cfe52d9d4888448ee4b0978093ba1d7d73ae78b3a62ba4ad95cd289ccb9e005226bb3d178bccaa821fb044a4e21ee97696c14d0678c94c2dae93b0ad73922218553daa7e44ebe57725a7a45cc72b9b2138a6b17c8db411ce8279ee1241aff0a8bec6f77f87edb0c69cb27236e3435a800b192e4f11e519e3fe30fc30eaccca4fbb41769029bf708e817a9e683805be67fa100984683b74838e3bcffa79366eed1d481c76729118838f31ba8a048a93c1be4424598e8df6328b7a77880a3f9c7e2e8dfca8eb5a26fb86bdc556d42bbe01d9fa6ed80646491c9341":"d689257a86effa68212c5e0c619eca295fb91b67":"82102df8cb91e7179919a04d26d335d64fbc2f872c44833943241de8454810274cdf3db5f42d423db152af7135f701420e39b494a67cbfd19f9119da233a23da5c6439b5ba0d2bc373eee3507001378d4a4073856b7fe2aba0b5ee93b27f4afec7d4d120921c83f606765b02c19e4d6a1a3b95fa4c422951be4f52131077ef17179729cddfbdb56950dbaceefe78cb16640a099ea56d24389eef10f8fecb31ba3ea3b227c0a86698bb89e3e9363905bf22777b2a3aa521b65b4cef76d83bde4c":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1536:"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"1bdc6e7c98fb8cf54e9b097b66a831e9cfe52d9d4888448ee4b0978093ba1d7d73ae78b3a62ba4ad95cd289ccb9e005226bb3d178bccaa821fb044a4e21ee97696c14d0678c94c2dae93b0ad73922218553daa7e44ebe57725a7a45cc72b9b2138a6b17c8db411ce8279ee1241aff0a8bec6f77f87edb0c69cb27236e3435a800b192e4f11e519e3fe30fc30eaccca4fbb41769029bf708e817a9e683805be67fa100984683b74838e3bcffa79366eed1d481c76729118838f31ba8a048a93c1be4424598e8df6328b7a77880a3f9c7e2e8dfca8eb5a26fb86bdc556d42bbe01d9fa6ed80646491c9341":"d689257a86effa68212c5e0c619eca295fb91b67":"82102df8cb91e7179919a04d26d335d64fbc2f872c44833943241de8454810274cdf3db5f42d423db152af7135f701420e39b494a67cbfd19f9119da233a23da5c6439b5ba0d2bc373eee3507001378d4a4073856b7fe2aba0b5ee93b27f4afec7d4d120921c83f606765b02c19e4d6a1a3b95fa4c422951be4f52131077ef17179729cddfbdb56950dbaceefe78cb16640a099ea56d24389eef10f8fecb31ba3ea3b227c0a86698bb89e3e9363905bf22777b2a3aa521b65b4cef76d83bde4c":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1536:"f8eb97e98df12664eefdb761596a69ddcd0e76daece6ed4bf5a1b50ac086f7928a4d2f8726a77e515b74da41988f220b1cc87aa1fc810ce99a82f2d1ce821edced794c6941f42c7a1a0b8c4d28c75ec60b652279f6154a762aed165d47dee367":"ed4d71d0a6e24b93c2e5f6b4bbe05f5fb0afa042d204fe3378d365c2f288b6a8dad7efe45d153eef40cacc7b81ff934002d108994b94a5e4728cd9c963375ae49965bda55cbf0efed8d6553b4027f2d86208a6e6b489c176128092d629e49d3d":"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"88c7a9f1360401d90e53b101b61c5325c3c75db1b411fbeb8e830b75e96b56670ad245404e16793544ee354bc613a90cc9848715a73db5893e7f6d279815c0c1de83ef8e2956e3a56ed26a888d7a9cdcd042f4b16b7fa51ef1a0573662d16a302d0ec5b285d2e03ad96529c87b3d374db372d95b2443d061b6b1a350ba87807ed083afd1eb05c3f52f4eba5ed2227714fdb50b9d9d9dd6814f62f6272fcd5cdbce7a9ef797":"c25f13bf67d081671a0481a1f1820d613bba2276":"a7fdb0d259165ca2c88d00bbf1028a867d337699d061193b17a9648e14ccbbaadeacaacdec815e7571294ebb8a117af205fa078b47b0712c199e3ad05135c504c24b81705115740802487992ffd511d4afc6b854491eb3f0dd523139542ff15c3101ee85543517c6a3c79417c67e2dd9aa741e9a29b06dcb593c2336b3670ae3afbac7c3e76e215473e866e338ca244de00b62624d6b9426822ceae9f8cc460895f41250073fd45c5a1e7b425c204a423a699159f6903e710b37a7bb2bc8049f":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 9_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1536:"e6bd692ac96645790403fdd0f5beb8b9bf92ed10007fc365046419dd06c05c5b5b2f48ecf989e4ce269109979cbb40b4a0ad24d22483d1ee315ad4ccb1534268352691c524f6dd8e6c29d224cf246973aec86c5bf6b1401a850d1b9ad1bb8cbcec47b06f0f8c7f45d3fc8f319299c5433ddbc2b3053b47ded2ecd4a4caefd614833dc8bb622f317ed076b8057fe8de3f84480ad5e83e4a61904a4f248fb397027357e1d30e463139815c6fd4fd5ac5b8172a45230ecb6318a04f1455d84e5a8b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"88c7a9f1360401d90e53b101b61c5325c3c75db1b411fbeb8e830b75e96b56670ad245404e16793544ee354bc613a90cc9848715a73db5893e7f6d279815c0c1de83ef8e2956e3a56ed26a888d7a9cdcd042f4b16b7fa51ef1a0573662d16a302d0ec5b285d2e03ad96529c87b3d374db372d95b2443d061b6b1a350ba87807ed083afd1eb05c3f52f4eba5ed2227714fdb50b9d9d9dd6814f62f6272fcd5cdbce7a9ef797":"c25f13bf67d081671a0481a1f1820d613bba2276":"a7fdb0d259165ca2c88d00bbf1028a867d337699d061193b17a9648e14ccbbaadeacaacdec815e7571294ebb8a117af205fa078b47b0712c199e3ad05135c504c24b81705115740802487992ffd511d4afc6b854491eb3f0dd523139542ff15c3101ee85543517c6a3c79417c67e2dd9aa741e9a29b06dcb593c2336b3670ae3afbac7c3e76e215473e866e338ca244de00b62624d6b9426822ceae9f8cc460895f41250073fd45c5a1e7b425c204a423a699159f6903e710b37a7bb2bc8049f":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_1 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"cfd50283feeeb97f6f08d73cbc7b3836f82bbcd499479f5e6f76fdfcb8b38c4f71dc9e88bd6a6f76371afd65d2af1862b32afb34a95f71b8b132043ffebe3a952baf7592448148c03f9c69b1d68e4ce5cf32c86baf46fed301ca1ab403069b32f456b91f71898ab081cd8c4252ef5271915c9794b8f295851da7510f99cb73eb":"cc4e90d2a1b3a065d3b2d1f5a8fce31b544475664eab561d2971b99fb7bef844e8ec1f360b8c2ac8359692971ea6a38f723fcc211f5dbcb177a0fdac5164a1d4ff7fbb4e829986353cb983659a148cdd420c7d31ba3822ea90a32be46c030e8c17e1fa0ad37859e06b0aa6fa3b216d9cbe6c0e22339769c0a615913e5da719cf":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"883177e5126b9be2d9a9680327d5370c6f26861f5820c43da67a3ad609":"04e215ee6ff934b9da70d7730c8734abfcecde89":"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":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_1 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"883177e5126b9be2d9a9680327d5370c6f26861f5820c43da67a3ad609":"04e215ee6ff934b9da70d7730c8734abfcecde89":"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":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_2 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"cfd50283feeeb97f6f08d73cbc7b3836f82bbcd499479f5e6f76fdfcb8b38c4f71dc9e88bd6a6f76371afd65d2af1862b32afb34a95f71b8b132043ffebe3a952baf7592448148c03f9c69b1d68e4ce5cf32c86baf46fed301ca1ab403069b32f456b91f71898ab081cd8c4252ef5271915c9794b8f295851da7510f99cb73eb":"cc4e90d2a1b3a065d3b2d1f5a8fce31b544475664eab561d2971b99fb7bef844e8ec1f360b8c2ac8359692971ea6a38f723fcc211f5dbcb177a0fdac5164a1d4ff7fbb4e829986353cb983659a148cdd420c7d31ba3822ea90a32be46c030e8c17e1fa0ad37859e06b0aa6fa3b216d9cbe6c0e22339769c0a615913e5da719cf":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"dd670a01465868adc93f26131957a50c52fb777cdbaa30892c9e12361164ec13979d43048118e4445db87bee58dd987b3425d02071d8dbae80708b039dbb64dbd1de5657d9fed0c118a54143742e0ff3c87f74e45857647af3f79eb0a14c9d75ea9a1a04b7cf478a897a708fd988f48e801edb0b7039df8c23bb3c56f4e821ac":"8b2bdd4b40faf545c778ddf9bc1a49cb57f9b71b":"14ae35d9dd06ba92f7f3b897978aed7cd4bf5ff0b585a40bd46ce1b42cd2703053bb9044d64e813d8f96db2dd7007d10118f6f8f8496097ad75e1ff692341b2892ad55a633a1c55e7f0a0ad59a0e203a5b8278aec54dd8622e2831d87174f8caff43ee6c46445345d84a59659bfb92ecd4c818668695f34706f66828a89959637f2bf3e3251c24bdba4d4b7649da0022218b119c84e79a6527ec5b8a5f861c159952e23ec05e1e717346faefe8b1686825bd2b262fb2531066c0de09acde2e4231690728b5d85e115a2f6b92b79c25abc9bd9399ff8bcf825a52ea1f56ea76dd26f43baafa18bfa92a504cbd35699e26d1dcc5a2887385f3c63232f06f3244c3":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_2 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"dd670a01465868adc93f26131957a50c52fb777cdbaa30892c9e12361164ec13979d43048118e4445db87bee58dd987b3425d02071d8dbae80708b039dbb64dbd1de5657d9fed0c118a54143742e0ff3c87f74e45857647af3f79eb0a14c9d75ea9a1a04b7cf478a897a708fd988f48e801edb0b7039df8c23bb3c56f4e821ac":"8b2bdd4b40faf545c778ddf9bc1a49cb57f9b71b":"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":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_3 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"cfd50283feeeb97f6f08d73cbc7b3836f82bbcd499479f5e6f76fdfcb8b38c4f71dc9e88bd6a6f76371afd65d2af1862b32afb34a95f71b8b132043ffebe3a952baf7592448148c03f9c69b1d68e4ce5cf32c86baf46fed301ca1ab403069b32f456b91f71898ab081cd8c4252ef5271915c9794b8f295851da7510f99cb73eb":"cc4e90d2a1b3a065d3b2d1f5a8fce31b544475664eab561d2971b99fb7bef844e8ec1f360b8c2ac8359692971ea6a38f723fcc211f5dbcb177a0fdac5164a1d4ff7fbb4e829986353cb983659a148cdd420c7d31ba3822ea90a32be46c030e8c17e1fa0ad37859e06b0aa6fa3b216d9cbe6c0e22339769c0a615913e5da719cf":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"48b2b6a57a63c84cea859d65c668284b08d96bdcaabe252db0e4a96cb1bac6019341db6fbefb8d106b0e90eda6bcc6c6262f37e7ea9c7e5d226bd7df85ec5e71efff2f54c5db577ff729ff91b842491de2741d0c631607df586b905b23b91af13da12304bf83eca8a73e871ff9db":"4e96fc1b398f92b44671010c0dc3efd6e20c2d73":"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":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_3 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"48b2b6a57a63c84cea859d65c668284b08d96bdcaabe252db0e4a96cb1bac6019341db6fbefb8d106b0e90eda6bcc6c6262f37e7ea9c7e5d226bd7df85ec5e71efff2f54c5db577ff729ff91b842491de2741d0c631607df586b905b23b91af13da12304bf83eca8a73e871ff9db":"4e96fc1b398f92b44671010c0dc3efd6e20c2d73":"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":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_4 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"cfd50283feeeb97f6f08d73cbc7b3836f82bbcd499479f5e6f76fdfcb8b38c4f71dc9e88bd6a6f76371afd65d2af1862b32afb34a95f71b8b132043ffebe3a952baf7592448148c03f9c69b1d68e4ce5cf32c86baf46fed301ca1ab403069b32f456b91f71898ab081cd8c4252ef5271915c9794b8f295851da7510f99cb73eb":"cc4e90d2a1b3a065d3b2d1f5a8fce31b544475664eab561d2971b99fb7bef844e8ec1f360b8c2ac8359692971ea6a38f723fcc211f5dbcb177a0fdac5164a1d4ff7fbb4e829986353cb983659a148cdd420c7d31ba3822ea90a32be46c030e8c17e1fa0ad37859e06b0aa6fa3b216d9cbe6c0e22339769c0a615913e5da719cf":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0b8777c7f839baf0a64bbbdbc5ce79755c57a205b845c174e2d2e90546a089c4e6ec8adffa23a7ea97bae6b65d782b82db5d2b5a56d22a29a05e7c4433e2b82a621abba90add05ce393fc48a840542451a":"c7cd698d84b65128d8835e3a8b1eb0e01cb541ec":"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":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_4 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"0b8777c7f839baf0a64bbbdbc5ce79755c57a205b845c174e2d2e90546a089c4e6ec8adffa23a7ea97bae6b65d782b82db5d2b5a56d22a29a05e7c4433e2b82a621abba90add05ce393fc48a840542451a":"c7cd698d84b65128d8835e3a8b1eb0e01cb541ec":"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":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_5 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"cfd50283feeeb97f6f08d73cbc7b3836f82bbcd499479f5e6f76fdfcb8b38c4f71dc9e88bd6a6f76371afd65d2af1862b32afb34a95f71b8b132043ffebe3a952baf7592448148c03f9c69b1d68e4ce5cf32c86baf46fed301ca1ab403069b32f456b91f71898ab081cd8c4252ef5271915c9794b8f295851da7510f99cb73eb":"cc4e90d2a1b3a065d3b2d1f5a8fce31b544475664eab561d2971b99fb7bef844e8ec1f360b8c2ac8359692971ea6a38f723fcc211f5dbcb177a0fdac5164a1d4ff7fbb4e829986353cb983659a148cdd420c7d31ba3822ea90a32be46c030e8c17e1fa0ad37859e06b0aa6fa3b216d9cbe6c0e22339769c0a615913e5da719cf":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f1036e008e71e964dadc9219ed30e17f06b4b68a955c16b312b1eddf028b74976bed6b3f6a63d4e77859243c9cccdc98016523abb02483b35591c33aad81213bb7c7bb1a470aabc10d44256c4d4559d916":"efa8bff96212b2f4a3f371a10d574152655f5dfb":"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":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_5 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:2048:"a5dd867ac4cb02f90b9457d48c14a770ef991c56c39c0ec65fd11afa8937cea57b9be7ac73b45c0017615b82d622e318753b6027c0fd157be12f8090fee2a7adcd0eef759f88ba4997c7a42d58c9aa12cb99ae001fe521c13bb5431445a8d5ae4f5e4c7e948ac227d3604071f20e577e905fbeb15dfaf06d1de5ae6253d63a6a2120b31a5da5dabc9550600e20f27d3739e2627925fea3cc509f21dff04e6eea4549c540d6809ff9307eede91fff58733d8385a237d6d3705a33e391900992070df7adf1357cf7e3700ce3667de83f17b8df1778db381dce09cb4ad058a511001a738198ee27cf55a13b754539906582ec8b174bd58d5d1f3d767c613721ae05":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"f1036e008e71e964dadc9219ed30e17f06b4b68a955c16b312b1eddf028b74976bed6b3f6a63d4e77859243c9cccdc98016523abb02483b35591c33aad81213bb7c7bb1a470aabc10d44256c4d4559d916":"efa8bff96212b2f4a3f371a10d574152655f5dfb":"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":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_6 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"cfd50283feeeb97f6f08d73cbc7b3836f82bbcd499479f5e6f76fdfcb8b38c4f71dc9e88bd6a6f76371afd65d2af1862b32afb34a95f71b8b132043ffebe3a952baf7592448148c03f9c69b1d68e4ce5cf32c86baf46fed301ca1ab403069b32f456b91f71898ab081cd8c4252ef5271915c9794b8f295851da7510f99cb73eb":"cc4e90d2a1b3a065d3b2d1f5a8fce31b544475664eab561d2971b99fb7bef844e8ec1f360b8c2ac8359692971ea6a38f723fcc211f5dbcb177a0fdac5164a1d4ff7fbb4e829986353cb983659a148cdd420c7d31ba3822ea90a32be46c030e8c17e1fa0ad37859e06b0aa6fa3b216d9cbe6c0e22339769c0a615913e5da719cf":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"25f10895a87716c137450bb9519dfaa1f207faa942ea88abf71e9c17980085b555aebab76264ae2a3ab93c2d12981191ddac6fb5949eb36aee3c5da940f00752c916d94608fa7d97ba6a2915b688f20323d4e9d96801d89a72ab5892dc2117c07434fcf972e058cf8c41ca4b4ff554f7d5068ad3155fced0f3125bc04f9193378a8f5c4c3b8cb4dd6d1cc69d30ecca6eaa51e36a05730e9e342e855baf099defb8afd7":"ad8b1523703646224b660b550885917ca2d1df28":"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":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10_6 (verify) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"25f10895a87716c137450bb9519dfaa1f207faa942ea88abf71e9c17980085b555aebab76264ae2a3ab93c2d12981191ddac6fb5949eb36aee3c5da940f00752c916d94608fa7d97ba6a2915b688f20323d4e9d96801d89a72ab5892dc2117c07434fcf972e058cf8c41ca4b4ff554f7d5068ad3155fced0f3125bc04f9193378a8f5c4c3b8cb4dd6d1cc69d30ecca6eaa51e36a05730e9e342e855baf099defb8afd7":"ad8b1523703646224b660b550885917ca2d1df28":"6d3b5b87f67ea657af21f75441977d2180f91b2c5f692de82955696a686730d9b9778d970758ccb26071c2209ffbd6125be2e96ea81b67cb9b9308239fda17f7b2b64ecda096b6b935640a5a1cb42a9155b1c9ef7a633a02c59f0d6ee59b852c43b35029e73c940ff0410e8f114eed46bbd0fae165e42be2528a401c3b28fd818ef3232dca9f4d2a0f5166ec59c42396d6c11dbc1215a56fa17169db9575343ef34f9de32a49cdc3174922f229c23e18e45df9353119ec4319cedce7a17c64088c1f6f52be29634100b3919d38f3d1ed94e6891e66a73b8fb849f5874df59459e298c7bbce2eee782a195aa66fe2d0732b25e595f57d3e061b1fc3e4063bf98f":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #1 (OK) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:"25f10895a87716c137450bb9519dfaa1f207faa942ea88abf71e9c17980085b555aebab76264ae2a3ab93c2d12981191ddac6fb5949eb36aee3c5da940f00752c916d94608fa7d97ba6a2915b688f20323d4e9d96801d89a72ab5892dc2117c07434fcf972e058cf8c41ca4b4ff554f7d5068ad3155fced0f3125bc04f9193378a8f5c4c3b8cb4dd6d1cc69d30ecca6eaa51e36a05730e9e342e855baf099defb8afd7":"6d3b5b87f67ea657af21f75441977d2180f91b2c5f692de82955696a686730d9b9778d970758ccb26071c2209ffbd6125be2e96ea81b67cb9b9308239fda17f7b2b64ecda096b6b935640a5a1cb42a9155b1c9ef7a633a02c59f0d6ee59b852c43b35029e73c940ff0410e8f114eed46bbd0fae165e42be2528a401c3b28fd818ef3232dca9f4d2a0f5166ec59c42396d6c11dbc1215a56fa17169db9575343ef34f9de32a49cdc3174922f229c23e18e45df9353119ec4319cedce7a17c64088c1f6f52be29634100b3919d38f3d1ed94e6891e66a73b8fb849f5874df59459e298c7bbce2eee782a195aa66fe2d0732b25e595f57d3e061b1fc3e4063bf98f":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #2 (ctx_hash none) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:"25f10895a87716c137450bb9519dfaa1f207faa942ea88abf71e9c17980085b555aebab76264ae2a3ab93c2d12981191ddac6fb5949eb36aee3c5da940f00752c916d94608fa7d97ba6a2915b688f20323d4e9d96801d89a72ab5892dc2117c07434fcf972e058cf8c41ca4b4ff554f7d5068ad3155fced0f3125bc04f9193378a8f5c4c3b8cb4dd6d1cc69d30ecca6eaa51e36a05730e9e342e855baf099defb8afd7":"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":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #3 (ctx_hash diverging) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:"25f10895a87716c137450bb9519dfaa1f207faa942ea88abf71e9c17980085b555aebab76264ae2a3ab93c2d12981191ddac6fb5949eb36aee3c5da940f00752c916d94608fa7d97ba6a2915b688f20323d4e9d96801d89a72ab5892dc2117c07434fcf972e058cf8c41ca4b4ff554f7d5068ad3155fced0f3125bc04f9193378a8f5c4c3b8cb4dd6d1cc69d30ecca6eaa51e36a05730e9e342e855baf099defb8afd7":"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #4 (mgf1_hash diverging) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:"25f10895a87716c137450bb9519dfaa1f207faa942ea88abf71e9c17980085b555aebab76264ae2a3ab93c2d12981191ddac6fb5949eb36aee3c5da940f00752c916d94608fa7d97ba6a2915b688f20323d4e9d96801d89a72ab5892dc2117c07434fcf972e058cf8c41ca4b4ff554f7d5068ad3155fced0f3125bc04f9193378a8f5c4c3b8cb4dd6d1cc69d30ecca6eaa51e36a05730e9e342e855baf099defb8afd7":"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":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #5 (wrong msg_hash) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:"25f10895a87716c137450bb9519dfaa1f207faa942ea88abf71e9c17980085b555aebab76264ae2a3ab93c2d12981191ddac6fb5949eb36aee3c5da940f00752c916d94608fa7d97ba6a2915b688f20323d4e9d96801d89a72ab5892dc2117c07434fcf972e058cf8c41ca4b4ff554f7d5068ad3155fced0f3125bc04f9193378a8f5c4c3b8cb4dd6d1cc69d30ecca6eaa51e36a05730e9e342e855baf099defb8afd7":"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #6 (wrong expected_salt_len) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:2048:"a5dd867ac4cb02f90b9457d48c14a770ef991c56c39c0ec65fd11afa8937cea57b9be7ac73b45c0017615b82d622e318753b6027c0fd157be12f8090fee2a7adcd0eef759f88ba4997c7a42d58c9aa12cb99ae001fe521c13bb5431445a8d5ae4f5e4c7e948ac227d3604071f20e577e905fbeb15dfaf06d1de5ae6253d63a6a2120b31a5da5dabc9550600e20f27d3739e2627925fea3cc509f21dff04e6eea4549c540d6809ff9307eede91fff58733d8385a237d6d3705a33e391900992070df7adf1357cf7e3700ce3667de83f17b8df1778db381dce09cb4ad058a511001a738198ee27cf55a13b754539906582ec8b174bd58d5d1f3d767c613721ae05":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:21:"25f10895a87716c137450bb9519dfaa1f207faa942ea88abf71e9c17980085b555aebab76264ae2a3ab93c2d12981191ddac6fb5949eb36aee3c5da940f00752c916d94608fa7d97ba6a2915b688f20323d4e9d96801d89a72ab5892dc2117c07434fcf972e058cf8c41ca4b4ff554f7d5068ad3155fced0f3125bc04f9193378a8f5c4c3b8cb4dd6d1cc69d30ecca6eaa51e36a05730e9e342e855baf099defb8afd7":"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":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #7 (wrong expected_salt_len) +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:2048:"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:19:"25f10895a87716c137450bb9519dfaa1f207faa942ea88abf71e9c17980085b555aebab76264ae2a3ab93c2d12981191ddac6fb5949eb36aee3c5da940f00752c916d94608fa7d97ba6a2915b688f20323d4e9d96801d89a72ab5892dc2117c07434fcf972e058cf8c41ca4b4ff554f7d5068ad3155fced0f3125bc04f9193378a8f5c4c3b8cb4dd6d1cc69d30ecca6eaa51e36a05730e9e342e855baf099defb8afd7":"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":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #8 (non-default salt_len: max) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:1024:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:94:"54657374206d657373616765":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #9 (non-default salt_len: 0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:1024:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"54657374206d657373616765":"7fc506d26ca3b22922a1ce39faaedd273161b82d9443c56f1a034f131ae4a18cae1474271cb4b66a17d9707ca58b0bdbd3c406b7e65bbcc9bbbce94dc45de807b4989b23b3e4db74ca29298137837eb90cc83d3219249bc7d480fceaf075203a86e54c4ecfa4e312e39f8f69d76534089a36ed9049ca9cfd5ab1db1fa75fe5c8":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #10 (non-default salt_len: 0, ANY) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:1024:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"54657374206d657373616765":"7fc506d26ca3b22922a1ce39faaedd273161b82d9443c56f1a034f131ae4a18cae1474271cb4b66a17d9707ca58b0bdbd3c406b7e65bbcc9bbbce94dc45de807b4989b23b3e4db74ca29298137837eb90cc83d3219249bc7d480fceaf075203a86e54c4ecfa4e312e39f8f69d76534089a36ed9049ca9cfd5ab1db1fa75fe5c8":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #11 (MGF1 alg != MSG hash alg) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:1024:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"c0719e9a8d5d838d861dc6f675c899d2b309a3a65bb9fe6b11e5afcbf9a2c0b1":"7fc506d26ca3b22922a1ce39faaedd273161b82d9443c56f1a034f131ae4a18cae1474271cb4b66a17d9707ca58b0bdbd3c406b7e65bbcc9bbbce94dc45de807b4989b23b3e4db74ca29298137837eb90cc83d3219249bc7d480fceaf075203a86e54c4ecfa4e312e39f8f69d76534089a36ed9049ca9cfd5ab1db1fa75fe5c8":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #12 (MGF1 alg != MSG hash alg, ctx wrong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:1024:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"c0719e9a8d5d838d861dc6f675c899d2b309a3a65bb9fe6b11e5afcbf9a2c0b1":"7fc506d26ca3b22922a1ce39faaedd273161b82d9443c56f1a034f131ae4a18cae1474271cb4b66a17d9707ca58b0bdbd3c406b7e65bbcc9bbbce94dc45de807b4989b23b3e4db74ca29298137837eb90cc83d3219249bc7d480fceaf075203a86e54c4ecfa4e312e39f8f69d76534089a36ed9049ca9cfd5ab1db1fa75fe5c8":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature verify options #13 (MGF1 alg != MSG hash alg, arg wrong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:1024:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"c0719e9a8d5d838d861dc6f675c899d2b309a3a65bb9fe6b11e5afcbf9a2c0b1":"7fc506d26ca3b22922a1ce39faaedd273161b82d9443c56f1a034f131ae4a18cae1474271cb4b66a17d9707ca58b0bdbd3c406b7e65bbcc9bbbce94dc45de807b4989b23b3e4db74ca29298137837eb90cc83d3219249bc7d480fceaf075203a86e54c4ecfa4e312e39f8f69d76534089a36ed9049ca9cfd5ab1db1fa75fe5c8":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 512-bit key, empty salt, good signature +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"":"ace8b03347da1b9a7a5e94a0d76359bb39c819bb170bef38ea84995ed653446c0ae87ede434cdf9d0cb2d7bf164cf427892363e6855a1d24d0ce5dd72acaf246":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 512-bit key, empty salt, bad signature +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"":"ace8b03347da1b9a7a5e94a0d76359bb39c819bb170bef38ea84995ed653446c0ae87ede434cdf9d0cb2d7bf164cf427892363e6855a1d24d0ce5dd72acaf247":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 522-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, good signature +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:522:"02d302753e3dda28f42f4d9f92c8647420ea6fbc97c10f8498b966a953f357698d6581060dfe32c8ab98db4bc5ce2acdf0c1e6e404a75a13282550c1aa37d3cdc8bf":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"016752ae0b5dfbade6bbd3dd37868d48c8d741f92dca41c360aeda553204c2212a117b1a3d77e0d3f48723503c46e16c8a64de00f1dee3e37e478417452630859486":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 522-bit key, SHA-512, saltlen=64, good signature with saltlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:522:"02d302753e3dda28f42f4d9f92c8647420ea6fbc97c10f8498b966a953f357698d6581060dfe32c8ab98db4bc5ce2acdf0c1e6e404a75a13282550c1aa37d3cdc8bf":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:64:"":"016752ae0b5dfbade6bbd3dd37868d48c8d741f92dca41c360aeda553204c2212a117b1a3d77e0d3f48723503c46e16c8a64de00f1dee3e37e478417452630859486":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 528-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, good signature +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:528:"00e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"a9ad7994ba3a1071124153486924448cc67a5af3a5d34e9261d53770782cc85f58e2edde5f7004652a645e3e9606530eb57de41df7298ae2be9dec69cc0d613ab629":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 528-bit key, SHA-512, saltlen=64, good signature with saltlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:528:"00e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:64:"":"a9ad7994ba3a1071124153486924448cc67a5af3a5d34e9261d53770782cc85f58e2edde5f7004652a645e3e9606530eb57de41df7298ae2be9dec69cc0d613ab629":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 512-bit key, SHA-512 (hash too large) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"ace8b03347da1b9a7a5e94a0d76359bb39c819bb170bef38ea84995ed653446c0ae87ede434cdf9d0cb2d7bf164cf427892363e6855a1d24d0ce5dd72acaf246":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, bad signature +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"00471794655837da498cbf27242807b40593a353c707eb22fd2cc5a3259e728ac4f1df676043eeec8e16c1175b3d9ac8cae72ec1d5772dd69de71c5677f19031568e":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-256, empty salt, good signature +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"41":"009c4941157fa36288e467310b198ab0c615c40963d611ffeef03000549ded809235955ecc57adba44782e9497c004f480ba2b3d58db8335fe0b391075c02c843a6d":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-256, empty salt, flipped-highest-bit signature +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"41":"00e11a2403df681c44a1f73f014b6c9ad17847d0b673f7c2a801cee208d10ab5792c10cd0cd495a4b331aaa521409fca7cb1b0d978b3a84cd67e28078b98753e9466":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, all-zero padding, automatic salt length +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"":"63a35294577c7e593170378175b7df27c293dae583ec2a971426eb2d66f2af483e897bfae5dc20300a9d61a3644e08c3aee61a463690a3498901563c46041056":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1024, SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"00e8f95a716c127d5147dcc241a7c1fe8d5487b3e8b6e95e48a83334d21d00c79ad0a90e29941c0c53065b20059de95e9e406061416f7ac12edca1983b9ee28cc3":"00d72348b297e7e5dc4329f6ab874b17982584e0ab43174070a9be983c0f040320d6f893c40d2717cb3044380cb3230b7133621eb1c55a3ea56d0e7cee694b5df3":"00c3c9873548543591c1f947e412c33da56b9d1b94a58c2f410a8a620e9b4f1d9197643ebf527f5f62b202b9d67a32654d05f326a9b61e0106efdf4829673c4f3d23655996e2424059916ab47aa67e406c129679e5979ca46708866608ffa21f619843b959b4442e422598a2faab54a8cef1f131992677d2cf5bcaf2b5564f7419":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"653df9730e14e03f2ffb3374d6b75295aa4a52c38540b2d501adc1eb659a4d7a050769a3d11d0d5d6f3efb734200ade241fdc271c0f5eeed85b4bf00b2327bc8":"655d1cf86a7af5113d1791ab7b6627845ea2aa7efbae82705a3563e5ba0337a1d033cb9283b38c042056e0a1d0529891173e3df6621dd8b184930caec8b3cbe4d1068524dab0ec6854f6638d86b77434cd792ddec0d02327a9eebffcd6911ffd32ad9bcb569d3237398c8169d9c62e7eea81c1b456fd36019aad1e4b268c604d":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Verification RSA-1024, SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1022:"00c3c9873548543591c1f947e412c33da56b9d1b94a58c2f410a8a620e9b4f1d9197643ebf527f5f62b202b9d67a32654d05f326a9b61e0106efdf4829673c4f3d23655996e2424059916ab47aa67e406c129679e5979ca46708866608ffa21f619843b959b4442e422598a2faab54a8cef1f131992677d2cf5bcaf2b5564f7419":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"653df9730e14e03f2ffb3374d6b75295aa4a52c38540b2d501adc1eb659a4d7a050769a3d11d0d5d6f3efb734200ade241fdc271c0f5eeed85b4bf00b2327bc8":"655d1cf86a7af5113d1791ab7b6627845ea2aa7efbae82705a3563e5ba0337a1d033cb9283b38c042056e0a1d0529891173e3df6621dd8b184930caec8b3cbe4d1068524dab0ec6854f6638d86b77434cd792ddec0d02327a9eebffcd6911ffd32ad9bcb569d3237398c8169d9c62e7eea81c1b456fd36019aad1e4b268c604d":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1032, SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1032:"0dfaedb709ada2105223e5e7764a5f31d07ae7a37bdc7b4a56c2499e1173147bcdcb165b8fb01a2528190cb6874656a936491898fca330db8af5a9ed5417268ed7":"0c339c56797a90c641292560d0ef675f71ac2c99fcaba6260c38e4f167dfd179eb7a9e255f9bdbc549e4181f9a2a19b1f30a80b292d5ef1ad75b9e658eaa6fb0bb":"00aa94ab91b4c26be257e469528228c4b0b6b4c99e73a84a272b3101892c07406911372b83ec4a7b8191f0ba4b4cb4cb3b732074e96c668297e1323b8ad0822a7e151182def03871a66a47b704b92845c6194142d4eeda19903e04043581f7a835dc288117863d21944c3aeded518458f1a30a41c7638aa4e098a88fdf2c2097270d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"653df9730e14e03f2ffb3374d6b75295aa4a52c38540b2d501adc1eb659a4d7a050769a3d11d0d5d6f3efb734200ade241fdc271c0f5eeed85b4bf00b2327bc8":"13ad40169494129b907f061d885fbe50ab654fc7b4be657ff8629d7ca291838159e9a7b7adc93560dda2bb9127966eb8d57377fb19d5b043dca67a07ba3c23069b391ddd921b507a8cca2d5eb7ccc84b90089092ca88530e074e629c3cb6902b2d0475000269a28c4cd89cec0dca66571fa7fbe4976373abe905cbe4c66c8d5fbb":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Verification RSA-1032, SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1032:"00aa94ab91b4c26be257e469528228c4b0b6b4c99e73a84a272b3101892c07406911372b83ec4a7b8191f0ba4b4cb4cb3b732074e96c668297e1323b8ad0822a7e151182def03871a66a47b704b92845c6194142d4eeda19903e04043581f7a835dc288117863d21944c3aeded518458f1a30a41c7638aa4e098a88fdf2c2097270d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"653df9730e14e03f2ffb3374d6b75295aa4a52c38540b2d501adc1eb659a4d7a050769a3d11d0d5d6f3efb734200ade241fdc271c0f5eeed85b4bf00b2327bc8":"13ad40169494129b907f061d885fbe50ab654fc7b4be657ff8629d7ca291838159e9a7b7adc93560dda2bb9127966eb8d57377fb19d5b043dca67a07ba3c23069b391ddd921b507a8cca2d5eb7ccc84b90089092ca88530e074e629c3cb6902b2d0475000269a28c4cd89cec0dca66571fa7fbe4976373abe905cbe4c66c8d5fbb":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Verification of OpenSSL-generated signature RSA-1032, SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1032:"00aa94ab91b4c26be257e469528228c4b0b6b4c99e73a84a272b3101892c07406911372b83ec4a7b8191f0ba4b4cb4cb3b732074e96c668297e1323b8ad0822a7e151182def03871a66a47b704b92845c6194142d4eeda19903e04043581f7a835dc288117863d21944c3aeded518458f1a30a41c7638aa4e098a88fdf2c2097270d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"653df9730e14e03f2ffb3374d6b75295aa4a52c38540b2d501adc1eb659a4d7a050769a3d11d0d5d6f3efb734200ade241fdc271c0f5eeed85b4bf00b2327bc8":"1de40b1c452691dfd8ceb42ecf5f0cbda944d871141b4407c1e30a6657c58c2e496b2a3ad10e025d45ca9606d25602ac1de04af8e0d24aa06e57ec3fea5c961ecf1e0a4e442fda0cdaba42469288cde5d7d0c223facceaf4c7caabe93505acd5664c9b4fae64272af4d5b74326a01724a25fabdb10b177821d2273650a84426dbd":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1040, SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1040:"00fc7f4b490b4d3ef729db23fb5afbb5f2fc620a472342d8b8ff310cfdc124be76dc22ab6f4be35a38ddd31f24d7f64d310f67ab3a375e83f4e0559e4cb5dc43e875":"00d51e8680ab71dc01e1a8a68a298636bb1658cfab8d73ce528a62697722d485ab90cdafc5e27768b761839ff93420458ae55f15a69465dbc0c7b524dc9a385ff925":"00d2340538231dcd5a61edf83ab94b2e4b3a784394c4ed35a424c050c294157b7625f9aca8258c21e2d0a7aa9b7c9db576404e63090dba50d998f9a3ec72b1a5cf28d83251ab93341c7d2c1a90403d70f67bc1a9e413bc62facccb52441e24c3f2bc9fdeca1a783012e70b9528176260580c4e1026c58209e8dcc4de3bf3f5be5565e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"653df9730e14e03f2ffb3374d6b75295aa4a52c38540b2d501adc1eb659a4d7a050769a3d11d0d5d6f3efb734200ade241fdc271c0f5eeed85b4bf00b2327bc8":"13e695948d59ded5a975cd9fb14bffc48e4ff9725576a96a6693da1a3c4c90d17d6811a97a633180d76dba5b957d2244e3b97e7bf3463a77d0b6c39b28a88e0b6739113726cd74937ad5f693ae5a8fd77febc270a115df05c344ddffebc2438ae67a5eea6572f434881bdf350aed4ec8f3a530d279d3fff07bb78e510807114e6ee7":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Verification RSA-1040, SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1040:"00d2340538231dcd5a61edf83ab94b2e4b3a784394c4ed35a424c050c294157b7625f9aca8258c21e2d0a7aa9b7c9db576404e63090dba50d998f9a3ec72b1a5cf28d83251ab93341c7d2c1a90403d70f67bc1a9e413bc62facccb52441e24c3f2bc9fdeca1a783012e70b9528176260580c4e1026c58209e8dcc4de3bf3f5be5565e9":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"653df9730e14e03f2ffb3374d6b75295aa4a52c38540b2d501adc1eb659a4d7a050769a3d11d0d5d6f3efb734200ade241fdc271c0f5eeed85b4bf00b2327bc8":"13e695948d59ded5a975cd9fb14bffc48e4ff9725576a96a6693da1a3c4c90d17d6811a97a633180d76dba5b957d2244e3b97e7bf3463a77d0b6c39b28a88e0b6739113726cd74937ad5f693ae5a8fd77febc270a115df05c344ddffebc2438ae67a5eea6572f434881bdf350aed4ec8f3a530d279d3fff07bb78e510807114e6ee7":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1048, SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1048:"0f39b79809516becc2e3481b6b47584aa2299bd2027ab8a303b9de5b0adcb4a5d38e38edb8c1fac3ea1dbd7e1d50b84323e362cff4df3f5a5182dafa9bb9217a73d7":"0d18164f8bd0d58d019998c8cb17c4c0354e62b8a9462acca30816894f982c2ae114e73993e30698930437b4eec44adec24d32ccbcbae7cc4c9f8911b1eb2100685b":"00c75d0f9fa17d1d24b939537a434017f390c6604444c35a13360d6b1fc986baf40159b84275d37b883278df5064dd9eb0f29b0d325acc790c4b59672737dbbf3acb88f5e2f2d54c919cafd072272c494591d52e158993315e71e2ca60b1c74feff8f3d77842b415d4e71734a498206a5cd9315c87b23e583e25eb4ca97056b45c96856d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"653df9730e14e03f2ffb3374d6b75295aa4a52c38540b2d501adc1eb659a4d7a050769a3d11d0d5d6f3efb734200ade241fdc271c0f5eeed85b4bf00b2327bc8":"9442a8ec48f87ebc81cc1273b03e528e7643c9e2fcc60ed85827d9341c5a36e5c76059baa8e9891df437e44c4047a266b46bcaaad3de1f1d4d3576defff080b791b013491636187fc45a930b70a533ed92abfd168f050df91b4c35d68d160a243ce589807a7d32661fc18b9547cdc0fd86d33acd349c98b34fb016ddd1bff23c58170e":MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Verification RSA-1048, SHA-512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:1048:"00c75d0f9fa17d1d24b939537a434017f390c6604444c35a13360d6b1fc986baf40159b84275d37b883278df5064dd9eb0f29b0d325acc790c4b59672737dbbf3acb88f5e2f2d54c919cafd072272c494591d52e158993315e71e2ca60b1c74feff8f3d77842b415d4e71734a498206a5cd9315c87b23e583e25eb4ca97056b45c96856d":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"e35c6ed98f64a6d5a648fcab8adb16331db32e5d15c74a40edf94c3dc4a4de792d190889f20f1e24ed12054a6b28798fcb42d1c548769b734c96373142092aed277603f4738df4dc1446586d0ec64da4fb60536db2ae17fc7e3c04bbfbbbd907bf117c08636fa16f95f51a6216934d3e34f85030f17bbbc5ba69144058aff081e0b19cf03c17195c5e888ba58f6fe0a02e5c3bda9719a7":"653df9730e14e03f2ffb3374d6b75295aa4a52c38540b2d501adc1eb659a4d7a050769a3d11d0d5d6f3efb734200ade241fdc271c0f5eeed85b4bf00b2327bc8":"9442a8ec48f87ebc81cc1273b03e528e7643c9e2fcc60ed85827d9341c5a36e5c76059baa8e9891df437e44c4047a266b46bcaaad3de1f1d4d3576defff080b791b013491636187fc45a930b70a533ed92abfd168f050df91b4c35d68d160a243ce589807a7d32661fc18b9547cdc0fd86d33acd349c98b34fb016ddd1bff23c58170e":0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1024, SHA-224, Salt Length 20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e5563b145db6ff5a16280d3e80eff02f181dbd03324ef247f596a4d4a7b8daa32b9934e3c7f4dcf6a3105462dec63839638618418b51db02693fabb4e6838725":"d2a4ec0fa2226cde82da77653b072cd098535d3e90ed4d7224dcb8cb8b9314768dc517e22d7c8fa13f253daa7465a79956098aa4cc3a6e35e8b1fcc4f97e774f":"bcb47b2e0dafcba81ff2a2b5cb115ca7e757184c9d72bcdcda707a146b3b4e29989ddc660bd694865b932b71ca24a335cf4d339c719183e6222e4c9ea6875acd528a49ba21863fe08147c3a47e41990b51a03f77d22137f8d74c43a5a45f4e9e18a2d15db051dc89385db9cf8374b63a8cc88113710e6d8179075b7dc79ee76b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"1248f62a4389f42f7b4bb131053d6c88a994db2075b912ccbe3ea7dc611714f14e075c104858f2f6e6cfd6abdedf015a821d03608bf4eba3169a6725ec422cd9069498b5515a9608ae7cc30e3d2ecfc1db6825f3e996ce9a5092926bc1cf61aa42d7f240e6f7aa0edb38bf81aa929d66bb5d890018088458720d72d569247b0c":"6f2841166a64471d4f0b8ed0dbb7db32161da13b":"53d859c9f10abf1c00284a4b55bf2bd84d8e313b4f3c35b8dec7bc3afe39b9b8a155418ead1931895769ce2340be2091f2385bbcf10d9e92bcf5d0e2960d10e792e7d865c64e50d19ffa13e52817d7d8d8db34392c2374a2e9b69184f92a4ad9b1b8bae99ca614d204b65a438e38dbbfc8c7cc44ed5677af70ce6c4f951f0244":20:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1024, SHA-256, Salt Length 20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-3072, SHA-256, Salt Length 20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-3072, SHA-384, Salt Length 20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-3072, SHA-512, Salt Length 20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-4096, SHA-224, Salt Length 20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-4096, SHA-256, Salt Length 20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-4096, SHA-384, Salt Length 20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-4096, SHA-512, Salt Length 20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:4096:"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":"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":"cfcae49f88b80dc12186d53c57162dbecba6e348094f9fb3743e39d99d5355d87e3efca9d488d39d705671e58634309cbd7cf53fccd52d9a84edb99ffdad0680e9ec826d625728370717b39321c7d4b6882785cf6884275f6c7b6d681bfa710593679e99b67d5bc28121dd603617dc8cfdb2557c2a04533893f593f0f7e59cbe6d46623d22642a7161a4c685b293c7edcc9aaec48e3810ec74a884a41108610d000b591fbf5da44b5501e63781264edf3c73706321ecf44d0e14b5932a2d69ca3d180c5cee86b4ccad850c766e0beb5f20e6b142055d551aeb453bd099eac67eb92cf13e34ef0d0e34fc599a6e5d4d14f74e08190c66c66ad3473de9ae8f53dd2c1c0c41f4b4a8d4690f4b77354c76e05ab76b7a6c7c9edf0955fee799a2bb42c86c6a06631398d38cceb71ec9aaa9a0fb83850f62342f3f781f9d453229b1a709bbce83a44c225ebffd4f518f94a7935f4669f65d02ff3defbbd1d5efd9191365808cdf9460371ede1eae735af03f21431239d5cd57cc0cc88fb3965d187eba98359409aaa944a7af8e85e20b67c43c82e78fa967fc0d629bcd7483d17dcaa25915571a15c3f0c730e81095139d71a28858dd9d83b65bf9c9273a8a40b12a2c87107a71f984818f7dc766374d31b4c3a1d284adb2a17f8ac85dbe3f58cf78b14c0fdce00a79daf348aa0557290ef5f9dd305c15fa73d40c6822b75fda13ec43":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"fc5b9da74a8afff53e53f7558b69fcad8a924d948cace26f6eeea2d96e71d6493cefdeee55ca22de8c504c70e93db5e6b7811c50d9449ead5d28e25254ce9590e09b16918ebc7283e66792f84164b38ddbcd17ca2912fa4a6d3fc81c87828d680ee8ad569f67d52b752131b63ae7e0ea1dfca5cc251cdf90c5bdbbfeb095a81b":"6f2841166a64471d4f0b8ed0dbb7db32161da13b":"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":20:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-2048, SHA-224, Salt Length 15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"e28da1aa250390bc8fd27d6f601830febbdd5a309bcd5d1d3cebda111110851563d1fb4d141e8129bf25721aa144b104b7c5adbb8540f02a7402788ae72c93c9f59d6d1bcf1541c3354b5cd3dcb91e35ed100d78857cf2ab6ed04b2dc1cc81fa1307bb18c635fdacfb7f656d0b4743d9f487048a8aaf5d5ec6fd09a01b28d4b1":"dea1faf22b760cbfa9ba11a486edd9b9faee04f22f15abfff5b2c079a2c932cfa641660da16213adfbbb568ecbaac18511031f428cd3ae4e0bf01928a1db6360511c26501c7bda7bf4fc4cc792d79efb86ec15ba2fc82aa41bce08e0807859a41b57e9e3f15804c81bf8ed017dea62e53489f955949651ddcb1da5297465ac9f":"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":"86c94f":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"37ddd9901478ae5c16878702cea4a19e786d35582de44ae65a16cd5370fbe3ffdd9e7ee83c7d2f27c8333bbe1754f090059939b1ee3d71e020a675528f48fdb2cbc72c65305b65125c796162e7b07e044ed15af52f52a1febcf4237e6aa42a69e99f0a9159daf924bba12176a57ef4013a5cc0ab5aec83471648005d67d7122e":"463729b3eaf43502d9cff129925681":"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":15:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-2048, SHA-384, Salt Length 25 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"e28da1aa250390bc8fd27d6f601830febbdd5a309bcd5d1d3cebda111110851563d1fb4d141e8129bf25721aa144b104b7c5adbb8540f02a7402788ae72c93c9f59d6d1bcf1541c3354b5cd3dcb91e35ed100d78857cf2ab6ed04b2dc1cc81fa1307bb18c635fdacfb7f656d0b4743d9f487048a8aaf5d5ec6fd09a01b28d4b1":"dea1faf22b760cbfa9ba11a486edd9b9faee04f22f15abfff5b2c079a2c932cfa641660da16213adfbbb568ecbaac18511031f428cd3ae4e0bf01928a1db6360511c26501c7bda7bf4fc4cc792d79efb86ec15ba2fc82aa41bce08e0807859a41b57e9e3f15804c81bf8ed017dea62e53489f955949651ddcb1da5297465ac9f":"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":"86c94f":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"833aa2b1dcc77607a44e804ee77d45408586c536861f6648adcd2fb65063368767c55c6fe2f237f6404250d75dec8fa68bcaf3b6e561863ae01c91aa23d80c6999a558a4c4cb317d540cde69f829aad674a89812f4d353689f04648c7020a73941620018295a4ae4083590cc603e801867a51c105a7fb319130f1022de44f13e":"b750587671afd76886e8ffb7865e78f706641b2e4251b48706":"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":25:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-2048, SHA-512, Salt Length 30 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"e28da1aa250390bc8fd27d6f601830febbdd5a309bcd5d1d3cebda111110851563d1fb4d141e8129bf25721aa144b104b7c5adbb8540f02a7402788ae72c93c9f59d6d1bcf1541c3354b5cd3dcb91e35ed100d78857cf2ab6ed04b2dc1cc81fa1307bb18c635fdacfb7f656d0b4743d9f487048a8aaf5d5ec6fd09a01b28d4b1":"dea1faf22b760cbfa9ba11a486edd9b9faee04f22f15abfff5b2c079a2c932cfa641660da16213adfbbb568ecbaac18511031f428cd3ae4e0bf01928a1db6360511c26501c7bda7bf4fc4cc792d79efb86ec15ba2fc82aa41bce08e0807859a41b57e9e3f15804c81bf8ed017dea62e53489f955949651ddcb1da5297465ac9f":"c5062b58d8539c765e1e5dbaf14cf75dd56c2e13105fecfd1a930bbb5948ff328f126abe779359ca59bca752c308d281573bc6178b6c0fef7dc445e4f826430437b9f9d790581de5749c2cb9cb26d42b2fee15b6b26f09c99670336423b86bc5bec71113157be2d944d7ff3eebffb28413143ea36755db0ae62ff5b724eecb3d316b6bac67e89cacd8171937e2ab19bd353a89acea8c36f81c89a620d5fd2effea896601c7f9daca7f033f635a3a943331d1b1b4f5288790b53af352f1121ca1bef205f40dc012c412b40bdd27585b946466d75f7ee0a7f9d549b4bece6f43ac3ee65fe7fd37123359d9f1a850ad450aaf5c94eb11dea3fc0fc6e9856b1805ef":"86c94f":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"5f0fe2afa61b628c43ea3b6ba60567b1ae95f682076f01dfb64de011f25e9c4b3602a78b94cecbc14cd761339d2dc320dba504a3c2dcdedb0a78eb493bb11879c31158e5467795163562ec0ca26c19e0531530a815c28f9b52061076e61f831e2fc45b86631ea7d3271444be5dcb513a3d6de457a72afb67b77db65f9bb1c380":"aa10fec3f83b7a97e092877a5bf9081283f502a0a46b50e395ab983a49ac":"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":30:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-3072, SHA-512, Salt Length 62 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:3072:"dd553696db8ccb107609b8917e688bdd8373a8926bc9d114c1c77f7958070e236ca1bd2025ded59a71093b63afbfce39e92bde9ffca983959e7c3e18d75650612258c24eebb61a1b4a68603a2721e3e2483d6da27475a228b1341c78f140948b5c922822ccaed76dae338dddec1e4c5c34b9c53f34a09ff0b2b61a62254e73e6f0ac8013edc2cfa7ecbeb86fcc7309cb0f5b5eddb707af4b9337d34d672af413f3b6efd11e3b49c978f06a356f6f4e0ea50a90797fe32ccaa983547ff18ea167":"c1e3089e1bea1141638ca912da01c134f67231a2f737d97e28486e004a43e9c5592ff968ee18109fc71aa4c1a97aa88ece5c4734352bc0c1f67726bc4aac59c19301f23a705be5b3f7825fb284e58a950d795f63d18fe72231eaba9d6a5f90866f8dd34b2b0dfc132db8348efa5a62634e5584a788aebbf073ccb4f3e9f5cde8d0c2e831412485c7f8cf1473abffabcc5d51d8a2a87a22f39d1a250b3cb66d90c573669071aeba9b1080dc079243094a9ae0e5a62e4e8b653cb57f54f4eeaf3d":"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":"1415a7":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"44240ce519f00239bd66ba03c84d3160b1ce39e3932866e531a62b1c37cf4170c3dc4809236fb1ade181db49fc9c7ccd794b433d1ad0bc056e14738e0ae45c0e155972a40a989fa4b9bcdc308f11990818835fa2c256b47ee4173fb4fed22ccf4385d2dd54d593c74f0004df08134eb8965dd53a122317f59b95d6b69d017958":"2d0c49b20789f39502eefd092a2b6a9b2757c1456147569a685fca4492a8d5b0e6234308385d3d629644ca37e3399616c266f199b6521a9987b2be9ee783":"8f47abc2326e22cf62404508b442e81ad45afff7274096b9a13e478cdd0a72f99a76bf517f1bb0f872a523d8c588d4402569e948fd6a108ae1a45c65830828a10e94d432765314ba82ead310fc87ac99a5b39f30ab8820bf69e6934a9c1c915c19f36ea7717eaff7af67b4991315b1873ba929bedf18a975be808e7aa14a6726126c79cc93f69541c5cefdeb5b67ec279d8f5a446583e4b4faed1685140ee4b3b757c8ff4a1ef9cd76a88e05319ee62003d2d77290c94c579b0ca2ab0deb3176ef10a3fdb85c80ffbc9e2a665a23744fc836f9a9a103cd9fb756952356a2f1acdd68a645e20179006558b5d4d0b9b0bd3adf5e290f49dae60b9d19920953ea8bb237d5b3dcfe149a60f12a4ee3a889b33bcd3a3b753d610757cbcd093dd5a734255333689695ab636963e3d215a8e77ff31973718a4944a1e9e44f45754d39f6fa431c53f9a2ef36e16a5f70636eb5fba54e15c20a714f2809a7cff4b8dc1165f836607eb5a5a3bb0c4567eee26941fef46fb41e73b565c0cf8c72e404221264":62:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1024, SHA-256, Salt Length 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e5563b145db6ff5a16280d3e80eff02f181dbd03324ef247f596a4d4a7b8daa32b9934e3c7f4dcf6a3105462dec63839638618418b51db02693fabb4e6838725":"d2a4ec0fa2226cde82da77653b072cd098535d3e90ed4d7224dcb8cb8b9314768dc517e22d7c8fa13f253daa7465a79956098aa4cc3a6e35e8b1fcc4f97e774f":"bcb47b2e0dafcba81ff2a2b5cb115ca7e757184c9d72bcdcda707a146b3b4e29989ddc660bd694865b932b71ca24a335cf4d339c719183e6222e4c9ea6875acd528a49ba21863fe08147c3a47e41990b51a03f77d22137f8d74c43a5a45f4e9e18a2d15db051dc89385db9cf8374b63a8cc88113710e6d8179075b7dc79ee76b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1248f62a4389f42f7b4bb131053d6c88a994db2075b912ccbe3ea7dc611714f14e075c104858f2f6e6cfd6abdedf015a821d03608bf4eba3169a6725ec422cd9069498b5515a9608ae7cc30e3d2ecfc1db6825f3e996ce9a5092926bc1cf61aa42d7f240e6f7aa0edb38bf81aa929d66bb5d890018088458720d72d569247b0c":"6f2841166a64471d4f0b8ed0dbb7db32161da13b3af3c4bd6d4cfcad8a03290e237b0cb3f05a4640d4ff655aa36fd36b4089817a7d4538ea9134971c37c12a5b3c360e2c90546c6553d2bff7419262821ce3fc99283483b9691ad5a0dbff":"ac777fd1f72fb4598b30ec1d343488e83bc03cac3380492225efad8c0d7e2c15a0031b8e027bf4e80747ce3de188b405dfeec2b4b5439599bef733a120fd80532e0fcc0629f86cc990e312b2b73ee1f3586198bf81f3af05ef0cfbed3d1b5c620927d2084f31847784c2ba8d55a0f038a5eaf8c2ea85ea81eebdc0fe1f0d75c1":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1024, SHA-256, Salt Length = max +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e5563b145db6ff5a16280d3e80eff02f181dbd03324ef247f596a4d4a7b8daa32b9934e3c7f4dcf6a3105462dec63839638618418b51db02693fabb4e6838725":"d2a4ec0fa2226cde82da77653b072cd098535d3e90ed4d7224dcb8cb8b9314768dc517e22d7c8fa13f253daa7465a79956098aa4cc3a6e35e8b1fcc4f97e774f":"bcb47b2e0dafcba81ff2a2b5cb115ca7e757184c9d72bcdcda707a146b3b4e29989ddc660bd694865b932b71ca24a335cf4d339c719183e6222e4c9ea6875acd528a49ba21863fe08147c3a47e41990b51a03f77d22137f8d74c43a5a45f4e9e18a2d15db051dc89385db9cf8374b63a8cc88113710e6d8179075b7dc79ee76b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1248f62a4389f42f7b4bb131053d6c88a994db2075b912ccbe3ea7dc611714f14e075c104858f2f6e6cfd6abdedf015a821d03608bf4eba3169a6725ec422cd9069498b5515a9608ae7cc30e3d2ecfc1db6825f3e996ce9a5092926bc1cf61aa42d7f240e6f7aa0edb38bf81aa929d66bb5d890018088458720d72d569247b0c":"6f2841166a64471d4f0b8ed0dbb7db32161da13b3af3c4bd6d4cfcad8a03290e237b0cb3f05a4640d4ff655aa36fd36b4089817a7d4538ea9134971c37c12a5b3c360e2c90546c6553d2bff7419262821ce3fc99283483b9691ad5a0dbff":"6708ae77c8c32056d89d8186f1d74d84a02cf69a084516c3525901e7c2c8359c1e8939f95b1184ca8e57508a28673243f1580f0eaef13a8eb64c9b78c8a5c2249f7601faa9a55743d056c08bbf213bd5d461e134078b11458a76707fe80df58ca477c2455665734cb498dde2a87065d8bdb8851f7943f4c38ae243752dc79da3":94:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1024, SHA-256, Salt Length = max+1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:1024:"e5563b145db6ff5a16280d3e80eff02f181dbd03324ef247f596a4d4a7b8daa32b9934e3c7f4dcf6a3105462dec63839638618418b51db02693fabb4e6838725":"d2a4ec0fa2226cde82da77653b072cd098535d3e90ed4d7224dcb8cb8b9314768dc517e22d7c8fa13f253daa7465a79956098aa4cc3a6e35e8b1fcc4f97e774f":"bcb47b2e0dafcba81ff2a2b5cb115ca7e757184c9d72bcdcda707a146b3b4e29989ddc660bd694865b932b71ca24a335cf4d339c719183e6222e4c9ea6875acd528a49ba21863fe08147c3a47e41990b51a03f77d22137f8d74c43a5a45f4e9e18a2d15db051dc89385db9cf8374b63a8cc88113710e6d8179075b7dc79ee76b":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"1248f62a4389f42f7b4bb131053d6c88a994db2075b912ccbe3ea7dc611714f14e075c104858f2f6e6cfd6abdedf015a821d03608bf4eba3169a6725ec422cd9069498b5515a9608ae7cc30e3d2ecfc1db6825f3e996ce9a5092926bc1cf61aa42d7f240e6f7aa0edb38bf81aa929d66bb5d890018088458720d72d569247b0c":"6f2841166a64471d4f0b8ed0dbb7db32161da13b3af3c4bd6d4cfcad8a03290e237b0cb3f05a4640d4ff655aa36fd36b4089817a7d4538ea9134971c37c12a5b3c360e2c90546c6553d2bff7419262821ce3fc99283483b9691ad5a0dbff":"":95:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-2048, SHA-256, Salt Length = 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"f7b664093cabf8334b1c0ff824564db5c13f941a279733893a7e5abed536d2b51a2beac80730b5194a0c722f57354ce4b7db447ea3286b1cd1c754548ea3c91a0df1bde3ff70820b63ef3c74a0119671d14db3e2603868a0d607a81bf14f3f41f810c3a24bf52a94f9b694078a556194dd0cb36c56a91846d3569096c631b61f":"e0a1111aa114d5b1702e34d29565d65320e05c21d794f38572ad28a60b2ffe50d0dd3df3fb5a0eef048ec50e144bfe52be30ebf2eaceec9f110a600bb0c2bcacf6b4dabec09b9387c89a8fde19de5ceec780be38dca846d795f82608cf2844e9bced8d81da2d9258c3ef412154f9e590a158ea0ad9180ac6a798614ba3410937":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"cd74ae6152d5fe5ce3d9073c921e861a24208f0c68477f49c825338e1ef877c0c977c1d2ffcb20e964db6fbedcccce449ec8538c8bfffce5bdece84762dac7f2cba69052c0c67226178a0ce185a2e050b3e1057e94411dd5f726878558e7d62afc8a81a93dcfdb5a2271466d32a8a4868af20fab2e13ca609d5a7710a8278aaf":"6f2841166a64471d4f0b8ed0dbb7db32161da13b":"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":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-2048, SHA-256, Salt Length = max +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:2048:"f7b664093cabf8334b1c0ff824564db5c13f941a279733893a7e5abed536d2b51a2beac80730b5194a0c722f57354ce4b7db447ea3286b1cd1c754548ea3c91a0df1bde3ff70820b63ef3c74a0119671d14db3e2603868a0d607a81bf14f3f41f810c3a24bf52a94f9b694078a556194dd0cb36c56a91846d3569096c631b61f":"e0a1111aa114d5b1702e34d29565d65320e05c21d794f38572ad28a60b2ffe50d0dd3df3fb5a0eef048ec50e144bfe52be30ebf2eaceec9f110a600bb0c2bcacf6b4dabec09b9387c89a8fde19de5ceec780be38dca846d795f82608cf2844e9bced8d81da2d9258c3ef412154f9e590a158ea0ad9180ac6a798614ba3410937":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"cd74ae6152d5fe5ce3d9073c921e861a24208f0c68477f49c825338e1ef877c0c977c1d2ffcb20e964db6fbedcccce449ec8538c8bfffce5bdece84762dac7f2cba69052c0c67226178a0ce185a2e050b3e1057e94411dd5f726878558e7d62afc8a81a93dcfdb5a2271466d32a8a4868af20fab2e13ca609d5a7710a8278aaf":"6f2841166a64471d4f0b8ed0dbb7db32161da13b3f04e3159073f7ad2fe70738168779091facbabfc4df54d6f49c7c7849a2e888a6cb9d363e94e46d7ceba692721f9b92cc56519035a5662941e2a18a8489122b55af6193444501c030a752a3c6ed3592438623782c89a16d6c42f8f0cc0a1b21ba7db4fec2b5bef35c109623fdcbb54151d8b97d625bebce9de3be69edda8aa7573fa519f4630c5173a274716d29b2bf026b3c64c62732640af0cdf8ca589f2197453b8ba847dc1cea508d577a3f167caa53e0717a12d58502a27dcdfa1cee9161291d0a71f9265b4ab3":"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":222:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-2048, SHA-256, Salt Length = max+1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1024, SHA-512, Salt Length 0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1024, SHA-512, Salt Length max +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-1024, SHA-512, Salt Length max+1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C 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+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 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+ +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-3072, SHA-384, Salt Length max +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:3072:"ca7b50c5f65f2115fea7691f7d90c124866e774e68e9eb89306538956fc217593d46017b7dd7942d636e384a34c802a14d5fd9916798d7d6193ef1a29e2fdbefd955261496d8ac9713922d43bfc43a7a410752ccbc854cc85268f411e793f9b5279007bbcaca30fb16fd9033a6ea31566b4f2c27f0161107e2cd890bcf563a522ee0eb96a016e9007595a94172a4aeded11fadcb8ab5f03cd154f8b8e0e0666ff62b1ccda02599ea44bbfcfaea541a5ac26bf267a56a8177a50f6b87b460a54d":"c591723042d4b8737f4ef9dfeb40c6d62d439ee8688158a4be24c0ad130f851113cc53d776c63cd782b95ccfd266bdb2578b78439c121de34e8955a7fbd2c6ae1a1c37b24c12f5dce15175dd9e203a3abd5bf9e736b1fc183d10c4540c5cf2cbe26768e94c1eab2ba3008b32d6d50716699c6bfcbec5bbeb94a054dbcd16d10f74972ca5fe53256cd0ade8f502eceaed633414a9bdb623035a234f65c6662a23d792cc0eeb21a1f55ebca26ffa1c56c96fbb7d870fc3ffb181de8398238ab1b5":"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":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"692acaaf5e277cdd4b3fdc0a1ff1785bfd28a3a8ec1bc97fd072ff6c99aade77baba92efdcf72e66d43542fdd32fb0e2dd29bb167dd36174b671ebef3c39c21be5fc84ef5a0957c9124f7eb281c12ae38cff9289413245c6c537bff88d013b3dd138c9373e26a00cecd4b5b18f708d69f1f24f88a0001d7de30ea40ff3c9f2e7":"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":"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":334:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Signature RSA-3072, SHA-384, Salt Length max + 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:3072:"ca7b50c5f65f2115fea7691f7d90c124866e774e68e9eb89306538956fc217593d46017b7dd7942d636e384a34c802a14d5fd9916798d7d6193ef1a29e2fdbefd955261496d8ac9713922d43bfc43a7a410752ccbc854cc85268f411e793f9b5279007bbcaca30fb16fd9033a6ea31566b4f2c27f0161107e2cd890bcf563a522ee0eb96a016e9007595a94172a4aeded11fadcb8ab5f03cd154f8b8e0e0666ff62b1ccda02599ea44bbfcfaea541a5ac26bf267a56a8177a50f6b87b460a54d":"c591723042d4b8737f4ef9dfeb40c6d62d439ee8688158a4be24c0ad130f851113cc53d776c63cd782b95ccfd266bdb2578b78439c121de34e8955a7fbd2c6ae1a1c37b24c12f5dce15175dd9e203a3abd5bf9e736b1fc183d10c4540c5cf2cbe26768e94c1eab2ba3008b32d6d50716699c6bfcbec5bbeb94a054dbcd16d10f74972ca5fe53256cd0ade8f502eceaed633414a9bdb623035a234f65c6662a23d792cc0eeb21a1f55ebca26ffa1c56c96fbb7d870fc3ffb181de8398238ab1b5":"9c43ef522cab18022297d3d70fa491d03b975b844b76cedba35d8d885ddb2825e31fd5c101bd9e9a215520bb8cdddeb6ab2cf2dc86065179477d80f733016929d7334cdfdf818c1378a4b9428fa1ee2e525321f905d0b949d3abc9e93d3f30b077795338bd55c28a1ced134bb2d575bfa44b2fd8cf1d5c54168a12a1d6c511f62ca973cdb704c233487e1fd39e5adc8870af352ec3c6a6a64152fc82a1c16ecc43d1d5817f76a1b46a5fab9db8923311edd3cc032fed7eb6252e77db69d7bf9ee35dc4ddd0fbdb9a76afe25a82f4495aa4f072cef9b1247cb368bcc8677565a47095242702e6341281f506805e20e8c89e9af28adff21c804c70cab10ee2fe5212ec07987d13e7d4b60529611e4d33a062d724cdfb16cdc48b964ba07dfa2620d5a8805d0be93380850c66f3fada059802a5946bfe3b0b10e19a8289ec01f6514abb883bb53c49dadbba42d412ea264c8a5122fda1ea9b742289642b0ea34ceb76ae8256a97845d37594cfbff8c7a4430176223bacc3bef395ceda13fd211c71":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"692acaaf5e277cdd4b3fdc0a1ff1785bfd28a3a8ec1bc97fd072ff6c99aade77baba92efdcf72e66d43542fdd32fb0e2dd29bb167dd36174b671ebef3c39c21be5fc84ef5a0957c9124f7eb281c12ae38cff9289413245c6c537bff88d013b3dd138c9373e26a00cecd4b5b18f708d69f1f24f88a0001d7de30ea40ff3c9f2e7":"6f2841166a64471d4f0b8ed0dbb7db32161da13b":"":335:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSASSA-PSS Sign. RSA-520 SHA-512: Salt Len. 0, no possible salt size +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:520:"0feea5f6220fac291b9508ec2ba8ed281eb39aee4d5dc693254106816ebc700ecf":"0d68918785c3aafe31eaaa2d8d8156dce645940ff7734a457337a51bd00bc88811":"00d5a06f86e5b9d87428540165ca966fa8893a62e2a59d0bfd7617780bb039f9165a373a8e119d0766f8de556710f33f67019153bad8223775e797d451d48206f3bf":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd00":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSASSA-PSS Sign. RSA-528 SHA-512: Salt Len. 0, only room for empty salt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:528:"00d272aa28ed2085ac6df3c05c6719eed5deb618afa2e4ca4a6f7330b430ad48672d":"00c578836bab27145db9dd66f17470b62d4a6100f8ca0dedf457ee3639c3b9596325":"00a2554eba715bf66e5ecdf3d6d718e3e5d907e8666e7bf5a76b415106e04eb827ec4cb2199cff66491d45419082059aa5b54b0cf5eef4443402f3047c0b0e6f025081":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd00":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"5bf02a1ff652052be266d0630fb802bde71d363904e2e001267dba592c88e755befb9b8004ecf1c5de07ad8cd260ede04971b201d524434e657396d6bfd8917def84":0:0 + +RSASSA-PSS Sign. RSA-528 SHA-512: Salt Len. 1, only room for empty salt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:528:"00d272aa28ed2085ac6df3c05c6719eed5deb618afa2e4ca4a6f7330b430ad48672d":"00c578836bab27145db9dd66f17470b62d4a6100f8ca0dedf457ee3639c3b9596325":"00a2554eba715bf66e5ecdf3d6d718e3e5d907e8666e7bf5a76b415106e04eb827ec4cb2199cff66491d45419082059aa5b54b0cf5eef4443402f3047c0b0e6f025081":"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd32a7c8a05bbc90d32c49d436e99569fd00":"e3b5d5d002c1bce50c2b65ef88a188d83bce7e61":"":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c23a4ade --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.function @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( int mod, data_t * input_N, data_t * input_E, + int hash, data_t * message_str, data_t * rnd_buf, + data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[256]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info info; + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + + info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand; + info.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + info.buf = rnd_buf->x; + info.length = rnd_buf->len; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, hash ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &N, input_N->x, input_N->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &E, input_E->x, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( ( mod + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + if( message_str->len == 0 ) + message_str->x = NULL; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, + &info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + message_str->len, message_str->x, + output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, ctx.len, result_str->x, result_str->len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( int mod, data_t * input_P, data_t * input_Q, + data_t * input_N, data_t * input_E, int hash, + data_t * result_str, char * seed, data_t * message_str, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[64]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + size_t output_len; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E; + ((void) seed); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, hash ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &P, input_P->x, input_P->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Q, input_Q->x, input_Q->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &N, input_N->x, input_N->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &E, input_E->x, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( ( mod + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + if( result_str->len == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + &output_len, message_str->x, + NULL, 0 ) == result ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + &output_len, message_str->x, + output, + sizeof( output ) ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_len, result_str->x, result_str->len ); + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign( int mod, data_t * input_P, data_t * input_Q, + data_t * input_N, data_t * input_E, int digest, + int hash, data_t * message_str, data_t * rnd_buf, + data_t * result_str, int fixed_salt_length, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char output[512]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info info; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E; + + info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand; + info.fallback_p_rng = NULL; + info.buf = rnd_buf->x; + info.length = rnd_buf->len; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, hash ); + + memset( hash_result, 0x00, sizeof( hash_result ) ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &P, input_P->x, input_P->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Q, input_Q->x, input_Q->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &N, input_N->x, input_N->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &E, input_E->x, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( ( mod + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + if( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ) != NULL ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ), message_str->x, message_str->len, hash_result ) == 0 ); + + if (fixed_salt_length == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &ctx, &mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, + &info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, digest, 0, + hash_result, output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, ctx.len, result_str->x, result_str->len ); + } + + info.buf = rnd_buf->x; + info.length = rnd_buf->len; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( &ctx, &mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, + &info, digest, 0, hash_result, + fixed_salt_length, output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, ctx.len, result_str->x, result_str->len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify( int mod, data_t * input_N, data_t * input_E, + int digest, int hash, data_t * message_str, + char * salt, data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + ((void) salt); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, hash ); + memset( hash_result, 0x00, sizeof( hash_result ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &N, input_N->x, input_N->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &E, input_E->x, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( ( mod + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + if( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ) != NULL ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ), message_str->x, message_str->len, hash_result ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, digest, 0, hash_result, result_str->x ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( int mod, data_t * input_N, data_t * input_E, + int msg_digest_id, int ctx_hash, + int mgf_hash, int salt_len, + data_t * message_str, + data_t * result_str, int result_simple, + int result_full ) +{ + unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + size_t hash_len; + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, ctx_hash ); + memset( hash_result, 0x00, sizeof( hash_result ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &N, input_N->x, input_N->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &E, input_E->x, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( ( mod + 7 ) / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + if( msg_digest_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( msg_digest_id ), + message_str->x, message_str->len, hash_result ) == 0 ); + hash_len = 0; + } + else + { + memcpy( hash_result, message_str->x, message_str->len ); + hash_len = message_str->len; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + msg_digest_id, hash_len, hash_result, + result_str->x ) == result_simple ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + msg_digest_id, hash_len, hash_result, + mgf_hash, salt_len, + result_str->x ) == result_full ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e51a7d26 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +PBKDF2 RFC 6070 Test Vector #1 (SHA1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":1:20:"0c60c80f961f0e71f3a9b524af6012062fe037a6" + +PBKDF2 RFC 6070 Test Vector #2 (SHA1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":2:20:"ea6c014dc72d6f8ccd1ed92ace1d41f0d8de8957" + +PBKDF2 RFC 6070 Test Vector #3 (SHA1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":4096:20:"4b007901b765489abead49d926f721d065a429c1" + +PBKDF2 RFC 6070 Test Vector #5 (SHA1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"70617373776f726450415353574f524470617373776f7264":"73616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c74":4096:25:"3d2eec4fe41c849b80c8d83662c0e44a8b291a964cf2f07038" + +PBKDF2 RFC 6070 Test Vector #6 (SHA1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:"7061737300776f7264":"7361006c74":4096:16:"56fa6aa75548099dcc37d7f03425e0c3" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #1 (SHA224) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":1:20:"3c198cbdb9464b7857966bd05b7bc92bc1cc4e6e" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #2 (SHA224) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":2:20:"93200ffa96c5776d38fa10abdf8f5bfc0054b971" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #3 (SHA224) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":4096:20:"218c453bf90635bd0a21a75d172703ff6108ef60" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #5 (SHA224) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"70617373776f726450415353574f524470617373776f7264":"73616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c74":4096:25:"056c4ba438ded91fc14e0594e6f52b87e1f3690c0dc0fbc057" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #6 (SHA224) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:"7061737300776f7264":"7361006c74":4096:16:"9b4011b641f40a2a500a31d4a392d15c" + +PBKDF2 RFC 7914 Sec 11 Test Vector #1 (SHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"706173737764":"73616c74":1:64:"55ac046e56e3089fec1691c22544b605f94185216dde0465e68b9d57c20dacbc49ca9cccf179b645991664b39d77ef317c71b845b1e30bd509112041d3a19783" + +PBKDF2 RFC 7914 Sec 11 Test Vector #2 (SHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"50617373776f7264":"4e61436c":80000:64:"4ddcd8f60b98be21830cee5ef22701f9641a4418d04c0414aeff08876b34ab56a1d425a1225833549adb841b51c9b3176a272bdebba1d078478f62b397f33c8d" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #1 (SHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":1:20:"120fb6cffcf8b32c43e7225256c4f837a86548c9" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #2 (SHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":2:20:"ae4d0c95af6b46d32d0adff928f06dd02a303f8e" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #3 (SHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":4096:20:"c5e478d59288c841aa530db6845c4c8d962893a0" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #5 (SHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"70617373776f726450415353574f524470617373776f7264":"73616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c74":4096:25:"348c89dbcbd32b2f32d814b8116e84cf2b17347ebc1800181c" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #6 (SHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"7061737300776f7264":"7361006c74":4096:16:"89b69d0516f829893c696226650a8687" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #1 (SHA384) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":1:20:"c0e14f06e49e32d73f9f52ddf1d0c5c719160923" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #2 (SHA384) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":2:20:"54f775c6d790f21930459162fc535dbf04a93918" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #3 (SHA384) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":4096:20:"559726be38db125bc85ed7895f6e3cf574c7a01c" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #5 (SHA384) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"70617373776f726450415353574f524470617373776f7264":"73616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c74":4096:25:"819143ad66df9a552559b9e131c52ae6c5c1b0eed18f4d283b" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #6 (SHA384) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:"7061737300776f7264":"7361006c74":4096:16:"a3f00ac8657e095f8e0823d232fc60b3" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #1 (SHA512) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":1:20:"867f70cf1ade02cff3752599a3a53dc4af34c7a6" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #2 (SHA512) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":2:20:"e1d9c16aa681708a45f5c7c4e215ceb66e011a2e" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #3 (SHA512) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"70617373776f7264":"73616c74":4096:20:"d197b1b33db0143e018b12f3d1d1479e6cdebdcc" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #5 (SHA512) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"70617373776f726450415353574f524470617373776f7264":"73616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c7453414c5473616c74":4096:25:"8c0511f4c6e597c6ac6315d8f0362e225f3c501495ba23b868" + +PBKDF2 Python hashlib Test Vector #6 (SHA512) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +pbkdf2_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:"7061737300776f7264":"7361006c74":4096:16:"9d9e9c4cd21fe4be24d5b8244c759665" + +PBES2 Decrypt (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ecrypt (bad params tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad KDF AlgId: not a sequence) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"31":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad KDF AlgId: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"3001":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (KDF != PBKDF2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300B06092A864886F70D01050D":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params: not a sequence) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300D06092A864886F70D01050C3100":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300D06092A864886F70D01050C3001":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params salt: not an octet string) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300E06092A864886F70D01050C30010500":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params salt: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"300E06092A864886F70D01050C30010401":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params iter: not an int) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301906092A864886F70D01050C300C04082ED7F24A1D516DD70300":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad PBKDF2 params iter: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301906092A864886F70D01050C300C04082ED7F24A1D516DD70201":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (OK, PBKDF2 params explicit keylen) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301E06092A864886F70D01050C301104082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800020118301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ecrypt (bad PBKDF2 params explicit keylen: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301D06092A864886F70D01050C301004082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208000201":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (OK, PBKDF2 params explicit prf_alg) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301A04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D0207301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ecrypt (bad, PBKDF2 params explicit prf_alg not a sequence) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301D06092A864886F70D01050C301004082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003100":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad, PBKDF2 params explicit prf_alg overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301D06092A864886F70D01050C301004082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003001":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad, PBKDF2 params explicit prf_alg != HMAC-SHA*) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301A04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D0206":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad, PBKDF2 params extra data) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302806092A864886F70D01050C301B04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D020700":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg: not a sequence) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003100":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD7020208003001":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg: unknown oid) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300A06082A864886F70D03FF":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg params: not an octet string) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300C06082A864886F70D03070500":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg params: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800300C06082A864886F70D03070401":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad enc_scheme_alg params: len != iv_len) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301306082A864886F70D030704078A4FCC9DCC3949":"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT:"" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad password) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"F0617373776f7264":"1B60098D4834CA752D37B430E70B7A085CFF86E21F4849F969DD1DF623342662443F8BD1252BF83CEF6917551B08EF55A69C8F2BFFC93BCB2DFE2E354DA28F896D1BD1BFB972A1251219A6EC7183B0A4CF2C4998449ED786CAE2138437289EB2203974000C38619DA57A4E685D29649284602BD1806131772DA11A682674DC22B2CF109128DDB7FD980E1C5741FC0DB7":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH:"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D55CD8A2A0EFA01C8B4EDFF060606060606" + +PBES2 Decrypt (bad iter value) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020801301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f7264":"1B60098D4834CA752D37B430E70B7A085CFF86E21F4849F969DD1DF623342662443F8BD1252BF83CEF6917551B08EF55A69C8F2BFFC93BCB2DFE2E354DA28F896D1BD1BFB972A1251219A6EC7183B0A4CF2C4998449ED786CAE2138437289EB2203974000C38619DA57A4E685D29649284602BD1806131772DA11A682674DC22B2CF109128DDB7FD980E1C5741FC0DB7":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH:"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D55CD8A2A0EFA01C8B4EDFF060606060606" + +PKCS#5 Selftest +pkcs5_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0b0c937c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.function @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pbkdf2_hmac( int hash, data_t * pw_str, data_t * salt_str, + int it_cnt, int key_len, data_t * result_key_string ) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *info; + + unsigned char key[100]; + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash ); + TEST_ASSERT( info != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, info, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &ctx, pw_str->x, pw_str->len, salt_str->x, salt_str->len, + it_cnt, key_len, key ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( key, result_key_string->x, + key_len, result_key_string->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( int params_tag, data_t *params_hex, data_t *pw, + data_t *data, int ref_ret, data_t *ref_out ) +{ + int my_ret; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + unsigned char *my_out = NULL; + + params.tag = params_tag; + params.p = params_hex->x; + params.len = params_hex->len; + + my_out = mbedtls_test_zero_alloc( ref_out->len ); + + my_ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( ¶ms, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, + pw->x, pw->len, data->x, data->len, my_out ); + TEST_ASSERT( my_ret == ref_ret ); + + if( ref_ret == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( my_out, ref_out->x, ref_out->len ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( my_out ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void pkcs5_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4964bfae --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data @@ -0,0 +1,1155 @@ +Parse RSA Key #1 (No password when required) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_DES_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/test-ca.key":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #2 (Correct password) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_DES_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #3 (Wrong password) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_DES_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLWRONG":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #4 (DES Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_des.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #5 (3DES Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_3des.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #6 (AES-128 Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes128.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #7 (AES-192 Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes192.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #8 (AES-256 Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_1024_aes256.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #9 (2048-bit, DES Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_des.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #10 (2048-bit, 3DES Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_3des.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #11 (2048-bit, AES-128 Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes128.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #12 (2048-bit, AES-192 Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes192.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #13 (2048-bit, AES-256 Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_aes256.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #14 (4096-bit, DES Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_des.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #15 (4096-bit, 3DES Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_3des.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #16 (4096-bit, AES-128 Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes128.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #17 (4096-bit, AES-192 Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes192.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #18 (4096-bit, AES-256 Encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_4096_aes256.pem":"testkey":0 + +Parse RSA Key #19 (PKCS#8 wrapped) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/format_gen.key":"":0 + +Parse RSA Key #20 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #20.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #20.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #21 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #21.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #21.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #22 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #22.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #22.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #23 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_3des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #24 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_3des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #25 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-3DES DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_3des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #26 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #26.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.pem":"PolarSLTest":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #26.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #27 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #27.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.pem":"PolarSLTest":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #27.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES, 2048-bit no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #28 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #28.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.pem":"PolarSLTest":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #28.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #29 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_2des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #30 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_2des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #31 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-2DES DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_2des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #32 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #32.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.pem":"PolarSSLTe":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #32.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #33 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #33.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.pem":"PolarSSLTe":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #33.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #34 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #34.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.pem":"PolarSSLTe":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #34.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #35 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_1024_rc4_128.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #36 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_2048_rc4_128.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #37 (PKCS#8 encrypted SHA1-RC4-128 DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbe_sha1_4096_rc4_128.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #38 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #38.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #38.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #39 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #39.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #39.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #40 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #40.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #40.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #41 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #41.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #41.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #42 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #42.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #42.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #43 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #43.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #43.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #44 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #44.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #44.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #45 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #45.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #45.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #46 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #46.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #46.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #47 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #47.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #47.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #48 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #48.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #48.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #49 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #49.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #49.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #50 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #50.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #50.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #51 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #51.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #51.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #52 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #52.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #52.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #53 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #53.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #53.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha224.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #54 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #54.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #54.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha224.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #55 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #55.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #55.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha224.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #56 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #56.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #56.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #57 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #57.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #57.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #58 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #58.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #58.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #59 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #59.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #59.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha224.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #60 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #60.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #60.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha224.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #61 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #61.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #61.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA224 DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha224.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #62 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #62.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #62.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #63 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #63.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #63.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #64 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #64.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #64.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #65 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #65.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #65.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha256.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #66 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #66.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #66.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha256.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #67 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #68.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #68.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha256.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #69 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #69.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #69.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #70 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #70.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #70.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #71 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #71.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #71.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #72 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #72.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #72.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha256.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #73 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #73.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #73.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha256.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #74 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #74.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #74.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA256 DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha256.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #75 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #75.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #75.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #76 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #76.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #76.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #77 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #77.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #77.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #78 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #78.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #78.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha384.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #79 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #79.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #79.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #80 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #80.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #80.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha384.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #81 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #81.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #81.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #82 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #82.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #82.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #83 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #83.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #83.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #84 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #84.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #85.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha384.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #86 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #86.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #86.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #87 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #87.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #87.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA384 DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha384.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #88 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #88.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #88.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #89 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #89.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #89.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #90 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #90.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #90.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #91 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #91.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #91.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_3des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #92 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #92.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #92.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #93 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #93.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #93.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 3DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_3des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #94 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #94.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #94.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #95 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #95.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #95.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #96 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #96.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.pem":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #96.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.pem":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED + +Parse RSA Key #97 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #97.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #97.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_1024_des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #98 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #98.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 2048-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #98.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 2048-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse RSA Key #99 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 4096-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #99.1 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 4096-bit, wrong PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der":"PolarSSLTes":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH + +Parse RSA Key #99.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 4096-bit, no PW) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Parse Public RSA Key #1 (PKCS#8 wrapped) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +pk_parse_public_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.pem":0 + +Parse Public RSA Key #1 (PKCS#8 wrapped, DER) +pk_parse_public_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.der":0 + +Parse Public RSA Key #3 (PKCS#1 wrapped) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +pk_parse_public_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.pem":0 + +Parse Public RSA Key #4 (PKCS#1 wrapped, DER) +pk_parse_public_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs1_2048_public.der":0 + +Parse Public EC Key #1 (RFC 5480, DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_pub.der":0 + +Parse Public EC Key #2 (RFC 5480, PEM) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_pub.pem":0 + +Parse Public EC Key #3 (RFC 5480, secp224r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_224_pub.pem":0 + +Parse Public EC Key #4 (RFC 5480, secp256r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_256_pub.pem":0 + +Parse Public EC Key #5 (RFC 5480, secp384r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_384_pub.pem":0 + +Parse Public EC Key #6 (RFC 5480, secp521r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_521_pub.pem":0 + +Parse Public EC Key #7 (RFC 5480, brainpoolP256r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_bp256_pub.pem":0 + +Parse Public EC Key #8 (RFC 5480, brainpoolP384r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_bp384_pub.pem":0 + +Parse Public EC Key #9 (RFC 5480, brainpoolP512r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_bp512_pub.pem":0 + +Parse EC Key #1 (SEC1 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.sec1.der":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #2 (SEC1 PEM) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.sec1.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #3 (SEC1 PEM encrypted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.sec1.pw.pem":"polar":0 + +Parse EC Key #4 (PKCS8 DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8.der":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #4a (PKCS8 DER, no public key) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8nopub.der":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #4b (PKCS8 DER, no public key, with parameters) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8nopubparam.der":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #4c (PKCS8 DER, with parameters) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8param.der":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #5 (PKCS8 PEM) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #5a (PKCS8 PEM, no public key) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8nopub.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #5b (PKCS8 PEM, no public key, with parameters) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8nopubparam.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #5c (PKCS8 PEM, with parameters) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8param.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #6 (PKCS8 encrypted DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8.pw.der":"polar":0 + +Parse EC Key #7 (PKCS8 encrypted PEM) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8.pw.pem":"polar":0 + +Parse EC Key #8 (SEC1 PEM, secp224r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_224_prv.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #9 (SEC1 PEM, secp256r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_256_prv.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #10 (SEC1 PEM, secp384r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_384_prv.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #11 (SEC1 PEM, secp521r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_521_prv.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #12 (SEC1 PEM, bp256r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_bp256_prv.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #13 (SEC1 PEM, bp384r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_bp384_prv.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #14 (SEC1 PEM, bp512r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_bp512_prv.pem":"NULL":0 + +Parse EC Key #15 (SEC1 DER, secp256k1, SpecifiedECDomain) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED +pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.specdom.der":"NULL":0 + +Key ASN1 (No data) +pk_parse_key:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (First tag not Sequence) +pk_parse_key:"020100":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, incorrect version tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"300100":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, version tag missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3000":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, invalid version) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3003020101":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct version, incorrect tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"300402010000":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format+values, minimal modulus size (128 bit)) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":0 + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format, modulus too small (127 bit)) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format, modulus even) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857002030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format, d == 0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format, d == p == q == 0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900000000000000000002090000000000000000000209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, trailing garbage) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3064020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c00":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, n wrong tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100FF1100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, e wrong tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571FF030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, d wrong tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c85710203010001FF11009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, p wrong tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201FF0900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, q wrong tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61FF0900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, dp wrong tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a211FF09009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, dq wrong tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401FF0813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, qp wrong tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b7221FF08052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + +Key ASN1 (ECPrivateKey, empty parameters) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C +pk_parse_key:"30070201010400a000":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4650d331 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void pk_parse_keyfile_rsa( char * key_file, char * password, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context ctx; + int res; + char *pwd = password; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx ); + + if( strcmp( pwd, "NULL" ) == 0 ) + pwd = NULL; + + res = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &ctx, key_file, pwd ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res == result ); + + if( res == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ctx, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ); + rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( rsa ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void pk_parse_public_keyfile_rsa( char * key_file, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context ctx; + int res; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx ); + + res = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &ctx, key_file ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res == result ); + + if( res == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ctx, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ); + rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +void pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec( char * key_file, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context ctx; + int res; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx ); + + res = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &ctx, key_file ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res == result ); + + if( res == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eckey; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ctx, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ); + eckey = mbedtls_pk_ec( ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &eckey->grp, &eckey->Q ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +void pk_parse_keyfile_ec( char * key_file, char * password, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context ctx; + int res; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx ); + + res = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &ctx, key_file, password ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res == result ); + + if( res == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eckey; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ctx, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ); + eckey = mbedtls_pk_ec( ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &eckey->grp, &eckey->d ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void pk_parse_key( data_t * buf, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, buf->x, buf->len, NULL, 0 ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e0101ccd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.data @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +Public key write check RSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +pk_write_pubkey_check:"data_files/server1.pubkey" + +Public key write check RSA 4096 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +pk_write_pubkey_check:"data_files/rsa4096_pub.pem" + +Public key write check EC 192 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_write_pubkey_check:"data_files/ec_pub.pem" + +Public key write check EC 521 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +pk_write_pubkey_check:"data_files/ec_521_pub.pem" + +Public key write check EC Brainpool 512 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +pk_write_pubkey_check:"data_files/ec_bp512_pub.pem" + +Private key write check RSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +pk_write_key_check:"data_files/server1.key" + +Private key write check RSA 4096 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +pk_write_key_check:"data_files/rsa4096_prv.pem" + +Private key write check EC 192 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_prv.sec1.pem" + +Private key write check EC 256 bits (top bit set) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_256_long_prv.pem" + +Private key write check EC 521 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_521_prv.pem" + +Private key write check EC 521 bits (top byte is 0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_521_short_prv.pem" + +Private key write check EC Brainpool 512 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_BASE64_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +pk_write_key_check:"data_files/ec_bp512_prv.pem" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2bad4ed1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +void pk_write_pubkey_check( char * key_file ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context key; + unsigned char buf[5000]; + unsigned char check_buf[5000]; + int ret; + FILE *f; + size_t ilen, pem_len, buf_index; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( check_buf, 0, sizeof( check_buf ) ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &key ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &key, key_file ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( &key, buf, sizeof( buf )); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + pem_len = strlen( (char *) buf ); + + // check that the rest of the buffer remains clear + for( buf_index = pem_len; buf_index < sizeof( buf ); ++buf_index ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( buf[buf_index] == 0 ); + } + + f = fopen( key_file, "r" ); + TEST_ASSERT( f != NULL ); + ilen = fread( check_buf, 1, sizeof( check_buf ), f ); + fclose( f ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ilen == pem_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( (char *) buf, (char *) check_buf, ilen ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &key ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +void pk_write_key_check( char * key_file ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context key; + unsigned char buf[5000]; + unsigned char check_buf[5000]; + int ret; + FILE *f; + size_t ilen, pem_len, buf_index; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + memset( check_buf, 0, sizeof( check_buf ) ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &key ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, key_file, NULL ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( &key, buf, sizeof( buf )); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + pem_len = strlen( (char *) buf ); + + // check that the rest of the buffer remains clear + for( buf_index = pem_len; buf_index < sizeof( buf ); ++buf_index ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( buf[buf_index] == 0 ); + } + + f = fopen( key_file, "r" ); + TEST_ASSERT( f != NULL ); + ilen = fread( check_buf, 1, sizeof( check_buf ), f ); + fclose( f ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ilen == strlen( (char *) buf ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( (char *) buf, (char *) check_buf, ilen ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &key ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13912e99 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.data @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Example And Test Vector +mbedtls_poly1305:"85d6be7857556d337f4452fe42d506a80103808afb0db2fd4abff6af4149f51b":"a8061dc1305136c6c22b8baf0c0127a9":"43727970746f6772617068696320466f72756d2052657365617263682047726f7570" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 +mbedtls_poly1305:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #2 +mbedtls_poly1305:"0000000000000000000000000000000036e5f6b5c5e06070f0efca96227a863e":"36e5f6b5c5e06070f0efca96227a863e":"416e79207375626d697373696f6e20746f20746865204945544620696e74656e6465642062792074686520436f6e7472696275746f7220666f72207075626c69636174696f6e20617320616c6c206f722070617274206f6620616e204945544620496e7465726e65742d4472616674206f722052464320616e6420616e792073746174656d656e74206d6164652077697468696e2074686520636f6e74657874206f6620616e204945544620616374697669747920697320636f6e7369646572656420616e20224945544620436f6e747269627574696f6e222e20537563682073746174656d656e747320696e636c756465206f72616c2073746174656d656e747320696e20494554462073657373696f6e732c2061732077656c6c206173207772697474656e20616e6420656c656374726f6e696320636f6d6d756e69636174696f6e73206d61646520617420616e792074696d65206f7220706c6163652c207768696368206172652061646472657373656420746f" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #3 +mbedtls_poly1305:"36e5f6b5c5e06070f0efca96227a863e00000000000000000000000000000000":"f3477e7cd95417af89a6b8794c310cf0":"416e79207375626d697373696f6e20746f20746865204945544620696e74656e6465642062792074686520436f6e7472696275746f7220666f72207075626c69636174696f6e20617320616c6c206f722070617274206f6620616e204945544620496e7465726e65742d4472616674206f722052464320616e6420616e792073746174656d656e74206d6164652077697468696e2074686520636f6e74657874206f6620616e204945544620616374697669747920697320636f6e7369646572656420616e20224945544620436f6e747269627574696f6e222e20537563682073746174656d656e747320696e636c756465206f72616c2073746174656d656e747320696e20494554462073657373696f6e732c2061732077656c6c206173207772697474656e20616e6420656c656374726f6e696320636f6d6d756e69636174696f6e73206d61646520617420616e792074696d65206f7220706c6163652c207768696368206172652061646472657373656420746f" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #4 +mbedtls_poly1305:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"4541669a7eaaee61e708dc7cbcc5eb62":"2754776173206272696c6c69672c20616e642074686520736c6974687920746f7665730a446964206779726520616e642067696d626c6520696e2074686520776162653a0a416c6c206d696d737920776572652074686520626f726f676f7665732c0a416e6420746865206d6f6d65207261746873206f757467726162652e" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #5 +mbedtls_poly1305:"0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"03000000000000000000000000000000":"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #6 +mbedtls_poly1305:"02000000000000000000000000000000ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"03000000000000000000000000000000":"02000000000000000000000000000000" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #7 +mbedtls_poly1305:"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"05000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff11000000000000000000000000000000" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #8 +mbedtls_poly1305:"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffbfefefefefefefefefefefefefefefe01010101010101010101010101010101" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #9 +mbedtls_poly1305:"0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"faffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"fdffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #10 +mbedtls_poly1305:"0100000000000000040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"14000000000000005500000000000000":"e33594d7505e43b900000000000000003394d7505e4379cd01000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000" + +Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #11 +mbedtls_poly1305:"0100000000000000040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"13000000000000000000000000000000":"e33594d7505e43b900000000000000003394d7505e4379cd010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +Poly1305 Parameter validation +poly1305_bad_params: + +Poly1305 Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +poly1305_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b8995b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_poly1305.function @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#include +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_poly1305( data_t *key, data_t *expected_mac, data_t *src_str ) +{ + unsigned char mac[16]; /* size set by the standard */ + mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx; + + memset( mac, 0x00, sizeof( mac ) ); + + /* + * Test the integrated API + */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_mac( key->x, src_str->x, + src_str->len, mac ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( mac, expected_mac->len, + expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len ); + + /* + * Test the streaming API + */ + mbedtls_poly1305_init( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_starts( &ctx, key->x ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx, src_str->x, src_str->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx, mac ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( mac, expected_mac->len, + expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len ); + + /* + * Test the streaming API again, piecewise + */ + + /* Don't free/init the context, in order to test that starts() does the + * right thing. */ + if( src_str->len >= 1 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_starts( &ctx, key->x ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx, src_str->x, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx, src_str->x + 1, src_str->len - 1 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx, mac ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( mac, expected_mac->len, + expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len ); + } + + /* + * Again with more pieces + */ + if( src_str->len >= 2 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_starts( &ctx, key->x ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx, src_str->x, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx, src_str->x + 1, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx, src_str->x + 2, src_str->len - 2 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx, mac ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( mac, expected_mac->len, + expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len ); + } + + mbedtls_poly1305_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void poly1305_bad_params() +{ + unsigned char src[1]; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char mac[16]; + size_t src_len = sizeof( src ); + mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_poly1305_init( NULL ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_poly1305_free( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_poly1305_starts( NULL, key ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_poly1305_starts( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_poly1305_update( NULL, src, 0 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx, NULL, src_len ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_poly1305_finish( NULL, mac ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_poly1305_mac( NULL, src, 0, mac ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_poly1305_mac( key, NULL, src_len, mac ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_poly1305_mac( key, src, 0, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void poly1305_selftest() +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_poly1305_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5636ed4a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -0,0 +1,4022 @@ +PSA compile-time sanity checks +static_checks: + +PSA import/export raw: 1 bytes +import_export:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:8:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export raw: 1 bytes, larger buffer +import_export:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:8:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export raw: 2 bytes, buffer too small +import_export:"2a2b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:16:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1 + +PSA import/export AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:128:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export AES-192 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:192:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export AES-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_export:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import: bad usage flag +import_with_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:0x40000000:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import AES: bad key size +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_with_data:"0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import/export RSA public key: good, 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (+1 byte) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2-1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:161:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:162:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2+1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:163:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA public key: export buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (+1 byte) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (*2-1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:609:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (*2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:610:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, larger buffer (*2+1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:611:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: export buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: trailing garbage ignored +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:-1:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA import RSA keypair: truncated +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_with_data:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import RSA keypair: public key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_with_data:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import RSA public key: key pair +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_with_data:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import RSA keypair: valid key but EC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_with_data:"3077020101042049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eeea00a06082a8648ce3d030107a144034200047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import/export-public RSA public key: good, 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +PSA import/export-public RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +PSA import/export-public RSA public key: buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +PSA import/export-public RSA keypair: buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +PSA import/export RSA public key: 1016-bit (good) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"30818802818000cde684f1aee96917b89c8a0a72523cfce4686ed5a5fbd32abab12038fc75148e45314b7e31fe60d8258e7e78234a23df0f00cc20fd008b64cb5b0f4ced8c47aa048f767f859961adc22b3df14e63bd9e08c9707bbf4e0eba32b1cc35a020e7e815ca47e0d39601a80d683ab4a07f4d3a7acebaba6c87d25bce2d091ee115c50203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: 1016-bit (good) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import RSA public key: 1022-bit (not supported) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +import_with_data:"30818802818036e4b95f847dcd7a91b0972b7ba096e040ec04e42d59f733029fb2600b8ae9e4fd8ea76f3d7ec576288102285b612db7abc53770006046fef321172a6ad84053710d48528a8d51b6481db53c09e1524d6704b58bd30313016535eefe9bcff89eb599608daaa0a72ab7720af31486b51020421fdd3c6974cc445a78dd134450230203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA import RSA keypair: 1022-bit (not supported) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +import_with_data:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA import RSA public key: 1023-bit (not supported) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +import_with_data:"3081880281806c49704e91f3df44fc99e9b3c0fee5025cc04d09529a1dd05754f2da2751d7a9aa5a79f7070132f2c47b31963e37cd74675f9c93ee7c85a143fefe303e94d1ee0e4d30898d17ab3a229e8457ef21fd179039f748305babe7f134f6d58ce5d721a1a5da98f63503d2466c6a515e53494a41180a91e535bd5b55d4dce2c17419870203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA import RSA keypair: 1023-bit (not supported) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +import_with_data:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA import/export EC secp224r1 key pair: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 +import_export:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:224:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export-public EC secp224r1: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 +import_export_public_key:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"041693a290f7f0b571fe2b41d5d84b01327631f4a860f995fa332c097f54192bb10f00113f2affb13c1a24ce44914571a95440ae014a00cbf7" + +PSA import/export EC secp256r1 key pair: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_export:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export-public EC secp256r1: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_export_public_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +PSA import/export EC secp384r1 key pair: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +import_export:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:384:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export-public EC secp384r1: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +import_export_public_key:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +PSA import/export EC secp521r1 key pair: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +import_export:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:521:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export-public EC secp521r1: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +import_export_public_key:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +PSA import/export EC brainpool256r1 key pair: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +import_export:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export-public EC brainpool256r1: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +import_export_public_key:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +PSA import/export EC brainpool384r1 key pair: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +import_export:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:384:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export-public EC brainpool384r1: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +import_export_public_key:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +PSA import/export EC brainpool512r1 key pair: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +import_export:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:512:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export-public EC brainpool512r1: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +import_export_public_key:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +PSA import/export EC curve25519 key pair: good (already properly masked) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +import_export:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export EC curve25519 key pair: unmasked input (check export-import-export yields properly masked output) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +import_export:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA import/export-public EC curve25519: accept unmasked input +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +import_export_public_key:"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a" + +PSA import/export-public EC curve25519: accept masked input +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +import_export_public_key:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a" + +PSA import/export-public: cannot export-public a symmetric key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export_public_key:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c" + +PSA import/export EC secp256r1 public key: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_export:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export EC secp521r1 public key: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +import_export:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:521:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export EC brainpoolP256r1 public key: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +import_export:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export curve25519 public key: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +import_export:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:255:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA import/export AES key: policy forbids export +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_export:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:128:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1 + +PSA import/export HMAC key: policy forbids export +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +import_export:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):256:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: policy forbids export (crypt) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:1024:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: policy forbids export (sign) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1 + +# Test PEM import. Note that this is not a PSA feature, it's an Mbed TLS +# extension which we may drop in the future. +PSA import/export RSA public key: import PEM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA import/export RSA keypair: import PEM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA import: reject raw data key of length 0 +# The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED +import_with_data:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import: reject raw data key of length 0 and declared size 1 bit +# The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED +import_with_data:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import: reject raw data key of length 0 and declared size 8 bits +# The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED +import_with_data:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size=255 for secp256r1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):255:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size=521 for secp521r1 (good) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +import_with_data:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size=528 for secp521r1 (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +import_with_data:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):528:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size, DER format +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"3077020101042049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eeea00a06082a8648ce3d030107a144034200047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size, too short +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13e":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size, too long (00 start) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"0049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size, too long (00 end) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee00":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size, public key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import EC keypair: implicit bit-size, not a valid length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA import EC keypair: secp256r1, all-bits-zero (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import EC keypair: secp256r1, d == n - 1 (good) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632550":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):0:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA import EC keypair: secp256r1, d == n (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import EC keypair: secp256r1, d > n (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632552":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import EC public key: key pair +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_with_data:"3078020101042100ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3aa00a06082a8648ce3d030107a14403420004dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import AES: bits=0 ok +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_with_data:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA import AES: bits=128 ok +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_with_data:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA import AES: bits=256 wrong +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_with_data:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import AES: bits=256 ok +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_with_data:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA import AES: bits=128 wrong +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_with_data:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import large key: raw, 65528 bits (ok) +import_large_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8191:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA import large key: raw, 65536 bits (not supported) +import_large_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8192:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA import RSA key pair: maximum size exceeded +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +import_rsa_made_up:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS+8:1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA import RSA public key: maximum size exceeded +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +import_rsa_made_up:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS+8:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key policy: AES ECB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING + +PSA key policy: AES CBC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING + +PSA key policy: ECC SECP256R1, SIGN_HASH -> SIGN_HASH+MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY + +PSA key policy: ECC SECP256R1, VERIFY_HASH -> VERIFY_HASH+MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY + +PSA key policy: ECC SECP256R1, SIGN+VERIFY_HASH -> {SIGN,VERIFY}_{HASH,MESSAGE} +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY + +PSA key policy: ECC SECP256R1, {SIGN,VERIFY}_{HASH,MESSAGE} +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY + +PSA key policy: ECC SECP256R1, SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy: ECC SECP256R1, VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy: ECC SECP256R1, SIGN+VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +check_key_policy:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +Key attributes initializers zero properly +key_attributes_init: + +PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN_HASH -> SIGN_HASH+MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: MAC, VERIFY_HASH -> VERIFY_HASH+MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN+VERIFY_HASH -> {SIGN,VERIFY}_{HASH,MESSAGE} +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: MAC, {SIGN,VERIFY}_{HASH,MESSAGE} +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: MAC, VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN+VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: MAC, neither sign nor verify +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: MAC, wrong algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: MAC, alg=0 in policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: MAC, ANY_HASH in policy is not meaningful +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length > min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 30):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length = min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length < min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: CMAC, sign-verify, tag length > min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 16):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: CMAC, sign-verify, tag length = min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: CMAC, sign-verify, tag length < min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 8):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, default tag length > min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 31):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, default tag length = min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 32):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, default tag length < min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 33):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy, unmatched base alg +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy, unmatched base alg (different hash base) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy, unmatched base alg (different algorithm) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy used as algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length > exact-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length = exact-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length < exact-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: cipher, encrypt | decrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CTR + +PSA key policy: cipher, wrong algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING + +PSA key policy: cipher, encrypt but not decrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CTR + +PSA key policy: cipher, decrypt but not encrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CTR + +PSA key policy: cipher, neither encrypt nor decrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CTR + +PSA key policy: cipher, alg=0 in policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CTR + +PSA key policy: AEAD, encrypt | decrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, wrong algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":16:16:PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, alg=0 in policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":16:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, encrypt but not decrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, decrypt but not encrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, neither encrypt nor decrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length > min-length policy, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:8:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length = min-length policy, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length < min-length policy, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length > min-length policy, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":12:8:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 8):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length = min-length policy, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":12:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length < min-length policy, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":12:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, default tag length > min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, default tag length = min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, default tag length < min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 17):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, min-length policy, unmatched base alg +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, min-length policy used as algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:8:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length > exact-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:8:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length = exact-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length < exact-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, encrypt | decrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + +PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, wrong algorithm (v1.5/OAEP) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, wrong algorithm (OAEP with different hash) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082013b020100024100ee2b131d6b1818a94ca8e91c42387eb15a7c271f57b89e7336b144d4535b16c83097ecdefbbb92d1b5313b5a37214d0e8f25922dca778b424b25295fc8a1a7070203010001024100978ac8eadb0dc6035347d6aba8671215ff21283385396f7897c04baf5e2a835f3b53ef80a82ed36ae687a925380b55a0c73eb85656e989dcf0ed7fb4887024e1022100fdad8e1c6853563f8b921d2d112462ae7d6b176082d2ba43e87e1a37fc1a8b33022100f0592cf4c55ba44307b18981bcdbda376c51e590ffa5345ba866f6962dca94dd02201995f1a967d44ff4a4cd1de837bc65bf97a2bf7eda730a9a62cea53254591105022027f96cf4b8ee68ff8d04062ec1ce7f18c0b74e4b3379b29f9bfea3fc8e592731022100cefa6d220496b43feb83194255d8fb930afcf46f36606e3aa0eb7a93ad88c10c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, alg=0 in policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + +PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, ANY_HASH in policy is not meaningful +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, encrypt but not decrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + +PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, decrypt but not encrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + +PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, neither encrypt nor decrypt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, sign | verify hash, PKCS#1v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, sign | verify hash, PKCS#1v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, sign | verify hash, ECDSA SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, sign, key usage extension +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, verify, key usage extension +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082013b020100024100ee2b131d6b1818a94ca8e91c42387eb15a7c271f57b89e7336b144d4535b16c83097ecdefbbb92d1b5313b5a37214d0e8f25922dca778b424b25295fc8a1a7070203010001024100978ac8eadb0dc6035347d6aba8671215ff21283385396f7897c04baf5e2a835f3b53ef80a82ed36ae687a925380b55a0c73eb85656e989dcf0ed7fb4887024e1022100fdad8e1c6853563f8b921d2d112462ae7d6b176082d2ba43e87e1a37fc1a8b33022100f0592cf4c55ba44307b18981bcdbda376c51e590ffa5345ba866f6962dca94dd02201995f1a967d44ff4a4cd1de837bc65bf97a2bf7eda730a9a62cea53254591105022027f96cf4b8ee68ff8d04062ec1ce7f18c0b74e4b3379b29f9bfea3fc8e592731022100cefa6d220496b43feb83194255d8fb930afcf46f36606e3aa0eb7a93ad88c10c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, sign | verify, key usage extension +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (PSS std/any salt) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (PSS any/std salt) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (RSA v15/PSS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, wrong alg family +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082013b020100024100ee2b131d6b1818a94ca8e91c42387eb15a7c271f57b89e7336b144d4535b16c83097ecdefbbb92d1b5313b5a37214d0e8f25922dca778b424b25295fc8a1a7070203010001024100978ac8eadb0dc6035347d6aba8671215ff21283385396f7897c04baf5e2a835f3b53ef80a82ed36ae687a925380b55a0c73eb85656e989dcf0ed7fb4887024e1022100fdad8e1c6853563f8b921d2d112462ae7d6b176082d2ba43e87e1a37fc1a8b33022100f0592cf4c55ba44307b18981bcdbda376c51e590ffa5345ba866f6962dca94dd02201995f1a967d44ff4a4cd1de837bc65bf97a2bf7eda730a9a62cea53254591105022027f96cf4b8ee68ff8d04062ec1ce7f18c0b74e4b3379b29f9bfea3fc8e592731022100cefa6d220496b43feb83194255d8fb930afcf46f36606e3aa0eb7a93ad88c10c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, ECDSA SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, PKCS#1v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, PKCS#1v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, wrong hash algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, alg=0 in policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, sign but not verify +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, verify but not sign +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082013b020100024100ee2b131d6b1818a94ca8e91c42387eb15a7c271f57b89e7336b144d4535b16c83097ecdefbbb92d1b5313b5a37214d0e8f25922dca778b424b25295fc8a1a7070203010001024100978ac8eadb0dc6035347d6aba8671215ff21283385396f7897c04baf5e2a835f3b53ef80a82ed36ae687a925380b55a0c73eb85656e989dcf0ed7fb4887024e1022100fdad8e1c6853563f8b921d2d112462ae7d6b176082d2ba43e87e1a37fc1a8b33022100f0592cf4c55ba44307b18981bcdbda376c51e590ffa5345ba866f6962dca94dd02201995f1a967d44ff4a4cd1de837bc65bf97a2bf7eda730a9a62cea53254591105022027f96cf4b8ee68ff8d04062ec1ce7f18c0b74e4b3379b29f9bfea3fc8e592731022100cefa6d220496b43feb83194255d8fb930afcf46f36606e3aa0eb7a93ad88c10c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, neither sign nor verify +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:0 + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, sign | verify +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (PSS std/any salt) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (PSS any/std salt) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wrong alg family (RSA v15/PSS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, wrong alg family +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082013b020100024100ee2b131d6b1818a94ca8e91c42387eb15a7c271f57b89e7336b144d4535b16c83097ecdefbbb92d1b5313b5a37214d0e8f25922dca778b424b25295fc8a1a7070203010001024100978ac8eadb0dc6035347d6aba8671215ff21283385396f7897c04baf5e2a835f3b53ef80a82ed36ae687a925380b55a0c73eb85656e989dcf0ed7fb4887024e1022100fdad8e1c6853563f8b921d2d112462ae7d6b176082d2ba43e87e1a37fc1a8b33022100f0592cf4c55ba44307b18981bcdbda376c51e590ffa5345ba866f6962dca94dd02201995f1a967d44ff4a4cd1de837bc65bf97a2bf7eda730a9a62cea53254591105022027f96cf4b8ee68ff8d04062ec1ce7f18c0b74e4b3379b29f9bfea3fc8e592731022100cefa6d220496b43feb83194255d8fb930afcf46f36606e3aa0eb7a93ad88c10c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, ECDSA SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wildcard in policy, PKCS#1v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, wrong hash algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, alg=0 in policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, sign but not verify +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: msg asymmetric signature, verify but not sign +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_signature_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA key policy: derive via HKDF, permitted +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy: derive via TLS 1.2 PRF, permitted +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy: derive via HKDF, not permitted +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy: derive via TLS 1.2 PRF, not permitted +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy: derive via HKDF, wrong algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224) + +PSA key policy: derive via TLS 1.2 PRF, wrong algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224) + +PSA key policy: agreement + KDF, permitted +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: agreement + KDF, not permitted +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +agreement_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: agreement + KDF, wrong agreement algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: agreement + KDF, wrong KDF algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: agreement + KDF, key permits raw agreement +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: raw agreement, permitted +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +raw_agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: raw agreement, not permitted +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +raw_agreement_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: raw agreement, wrong algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +raw_agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: raw agreement, key permits raw agreement, but algorithm is not raw +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +raw_agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key policy: raw agreement, key specifies KDF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +raw_agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy algorithm2: CTR, CBC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_policy_alg2:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING + +PSA key policy algorithm2: ECDH, ECDSA, HASH usage +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_policy_alg2:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy algorithm2: ECDH, ECDSA, HASH+MESSAGE usage +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_policy_alg2:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key policy algorithm2: ECDH, ECDSA, MESSAGE usage +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_policy_alg2:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +Copy key: raw, 1 byte +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"2a":1:-1:-1:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0 + +Copy key: AES, copy attributes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":1:-1:-1:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0 + +Copy key: AES, same usage flags +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0 + +Copy key: AES, fewer usage flags (-EXPORT) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0 + +Copy key: AES, fewer usage flags (-COPY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0 + +Copy key: AES, 1 more usage flag +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0 + +Copy key: AES, 2 more usage flags +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0 + +Copy key: AES, intersect usage flags #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0 + +Copy key: AES, intersect usage flags #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0 + +Copy key: RSA key pair, same usage flags +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: RSA key pair, extended usage flags +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: RSA key pair, fewer usage flags +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: RSA key pair, more usage flags +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: RSA key pair, intersect usage flags #0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: RSA key pair, intersect usage flags #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: RSA key pair, wildcard algorithm in source +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: RSA key pair, wildcard algorithm in target +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: RSA key pair, wildcard algorithm in source and target +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0 + +Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=ECDSA+ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH + +Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=ECDSA+ECDH, extended usage flags +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH + +Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=ECDSA+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: source=ECDSA+ECDH, target=0+ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH + +Copy key: source=ECDSA(any)+ECDH, target=ECDSA(SHA256)+ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH + +Copy key: source=ECDH+ECDSA(any), target=ECDH+ECDSA(SHA256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +Copy fail: raw data, no COPY flag +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +Copy key: AES, no COPY flag +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +Copy fail: AES, incompatible target policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC extended usage flags +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 + +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC length > min-length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0 + +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC length = min-length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0 + +Copy fail: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC length < min-length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 16):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC min-length, src > tgt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0 + +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC min-length, src = tgt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0 + +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC min-length, src < tgt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0 + +Copy fail: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length > length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length = length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0 + +Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length < length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 16):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length > min-length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length = min-length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0 + +Copy fail: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length < min-length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src > tgt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src = tgt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src < tgt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy fail: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length > length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy key: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length = length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length < length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0 + +Copy fail: RSA, incompatible target policy (source wildcard) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy fail: RSA, incompatible target policy (target wildcard) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy fail: RSA, incompatible target policy (source and target wildcard) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy fail: RSA, ANY_HASH is not meaningful with OAEP +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy fail: incorrect type in attributes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy fail: incorrect size in attributes +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:42:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy fail: source=ECDSA(SHA224)+ECDH, target=ECDSA(SHA256)+ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy fail: source=ECDH+ECDSA(SHA224), target=ECDH+ECDSA(SHA256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy fail: AES, invalid persistent key identifier in attributes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:0:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy fail: AES, invalid lifetime (unknown location) in attributes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:1:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, 11):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Hash operation object initializers zero properly +hash_operation_init: + +PSA hash setup: good, SHA-1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash setup: good, SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash setup: good, SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash setup: good, SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash setup: good, SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash setup: good, MD2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_MD2:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash setup: good, MD4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_MD4:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash setup: good, MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_MD5:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash setup: good, RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash setup: bad (unknown hash algorithm) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash setup: bad (wildcard instead of hash algorithm) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash setup: bad (not a hash algorithm) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_setup:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash: bad order function calls +hash_bad_order: + +PSA hash verify: bad arguments +hash_verify_bad_args: + +PSA hash finish: bad arguments +hash_finish_bad_args: + +PSA hash compute: bad algorithm (unknown hash) +hash_compute_fail:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH:"":32:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash compute: bad algorithm (wildcard) +hash_compute_fail:PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH:"":32:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash compute: bad algorithm (not a hash) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compute_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":32:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash compute: output buffer empty +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compute_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA hash compute: output buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compute_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":31:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA hash compare: bad algorithm (unknown hash) +hash_compare_fail:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash compare: bad algorithm (wildcard) +hash_compare_fail:PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash compare: bad algorithm (not a hash) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compare_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash compare: hash of a prefix +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compare_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"00":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA hash compare: hash with flipped bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compare_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b854":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA hash compare: hash with trailing garbage +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compare_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b85500":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA hash compare: truncated hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compare_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b8":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA hash compare: empty hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compare_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA hash compare: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compare_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA hash compute: good, SHA-1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_compute_compare:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"42749e":"a444319e9b6cc1e8464c511ec0969c37d6bb2619" + +PSA hash compute: good, SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_compute_compare:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"50efd0":"b5a9820413c2bf8211fbbf5df1337043b32fa4eafaf61a0c8e9ccede" + +PSA hash compute: good, SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compute_compare:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803" + +PSA hash compute: good, SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_compute_compare:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"31f5ca":"78d54b943421fdf7ba90a7fb9637c2073aa480454bd841d39ff72f4511fc21fb67797b652c0c823229342873d3bef955" + +PSA hash compute: good, SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_compute_compare:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"de4c90":"33ce98281045a5c4c9df0363d8196f1d7dfcd5ee46ac89776fd8a4344c12f123a66788af5bd41ceff1941aa5637654b4064c88c14e00465ab79a2fc6c97e1014" + +PSA hash compute: good, MD2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_compute_compare:PSA_ALG_MD2:"616263":"da853b0d3f88d99b30283a69e6ded6bb" + +PSA hash compute: good, MD4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_compute_compare:PSA_ALG_MD4:"616263":"a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d" + +PSA hash compute: good, MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_compute_compare:PSA_ALG_MD5:"616263":"900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72" + +PSA hash compute: good, RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_compute_compare:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"616263":"8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc" + +PSA hash clone: source state +hash_clone_source_state: + +PSA hash clone: target state +hash_clone_target_state: + +MAC operation object initializers zero properly +mac_operation_init: + +PSA MAC setup: good, HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA MAC setup: good, AES-CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA MAC setup: bad algorithm (HMAC without specified hash) +# Either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED would be reasonable here +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(0):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC setup: bad algorithm (unsupported HMAC hash algorithm) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC setup: bad algorithm (not a MAC algorithm) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA MAC setup: truncated MAC too small (1 byte) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ), 1 ):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC setup: truncated MAC too large (33 bytes for SHA-256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ), 33 ):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA MAC setup: invalid key type, HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA MAC setup: incompatible key HMAC for CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +# Either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED would be reasonable here +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA MAC setup: algorithm known but not supported, long key +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC setup: algorithm known but not supported, short key +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC: bad order function calls +mac_bad_order: + +PSA MAC sign: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22" + +PSA MAC sign: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4869205468657265":"b0344c61d8db38535ca8afceaf0bf12b881dc200c9833da726e9376c2e32cff7" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4869205468657265":"b0344c61d8db38535ca8afceaf0bf12b881dc200c9833da726e9376c2e32cff7" + +PSA MAC sign: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4869205468657265":"afd03944d84895626b0825f4ab46907f15f9dadbe4101ec682aa034c7cebc59cfaea9ea9076ede7f4af152e8b2fa9cb6" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4869205468657265":"afd03944d84895626b0825f4ab46907f15f9dadbe4101ec682aa034c7cebc59cfaea9ea9076ede7f4af152e8b2fa9cb6" + +PSA MAC sign: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4869205468657265":"87aa7cdea5ef619d4ff0b4241a1d6cb02379f4e2ce4ec2787ad0b30545e17cdedaa833b7d6b8a702038b274eaea3f4e4be9d914eeb61f1702e696c203a126854" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4869205468657265":"87aa7cdea5ef619d4ff0b4241a1d6cb02379f4e2ce4ec2787ad0b30545e17cdedaa833b7d6b8a702038b274eaea3f4e4be9d914eeb61f1702e696c203a126854" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 2 - HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"4a656665":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"7768617420646f2079612077616e7420666f72206e6f7468696e673f":"a30e01098bc6dbbf45690f3a7e9e6d0f8bbea2a39e6148008fd05e44" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 2 - HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"4a656665":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"7768617420646f2079612077616e7420666f72206e6f7468696e673f":"5bdcc146bf60754e6a042426089575c75a003f089d2739839dec58b964ec3843" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 2 - HMAC-SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"4a656665":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"7768617420646f2079612077616e7420666f72206e6f7468696e673f":"af45d2e376484031617f78d2b58a6b1b9c7ef464f5a01b47e42ec3736322445e8e2240ca5e69e2c78b3239ecfab21649" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 2 - HMAC-SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"4a656665":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"7768617420646f2079612077616e7420666f72206e6f7468696e673f":"164b7a7bfcf819e2e395fbe73b56e0a387bd64222e831fd610270cd7ea2505549758bf75c05a994a6d034f65f8f0e6fdcaeab1a34d4a6b4b636e070a38bce737" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 3 - HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd":"7fb3cb3588c6c1f6ffa9694d7d6ad2649365b0c1f65d69d1ec8333ea" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 3 - HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd":"773ea91e36800e46854db8ebd09181a72959098b3ef8c122d9635514ced565fe" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 3 - HMAC-SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd":"88062608d3e6ad8a0aa2ace014c8a86f0aa635d947ac9febe83ef4e55966144b2a5ab39dc13814b94e3ab6e101a34f27" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 3 - HMAC-SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd":"fa73b0089d56a284efb0f0756c890be9b1b5dbdd8ee81a3655f83e33b2279d39bf3e848279a722c806b485a47e67c807b946a337bee8942674278859e13292fb" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 4 - HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"cdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcd":"6c11506874013cac6a2abc1bb382627cec6a90d86efc012de7afec5a" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 4 - HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"cdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcd":"82558a389a443c0ea4cc819899f2083a85f0faa3e578f8077a2e3ff46729665b" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 4 - HMAC-SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"cdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcd":"3e8a69b7783c25851933ab6290af6ca77a9981480850009cc5577c6e1f573b4e6801dd23c4a7d679ccf8a386c674cffb" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 4 - HMAC-SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"cdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcdcd":"b0ba465637458c6990e5a8c5f61d4af7e576d97ff94b872de76f8050361ee3dba91ca5c11aa25eb4d679275cc5788063a5f19741120c4f2de2adebeb10a298dd" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 6 - HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b6579202d2048617368204b6579204669727374":"95e9a0db962095adaebe9b2d6f0dbce2d499f112f2d2b7273fa6870e" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 6 - HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b6579202d2048617368204b6579204669727374":"60e431591ee0b67f0d8a26aacbf5b77f8e0bc6213728c5140546040f0ee37f54" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 6 - HMAC-SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b6579202d2048617368204b6579204669727374":"4ece084485813e9088d2c63a041bc5b44f9ef1012a2b588f3cd11f05033ac4c60c2ef6ab4030fe8296248df163f44952" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 6 - HMAC-SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"54657374205573696e67204c6172676572205468616e20426c6f636b2d53697a65204b6579202d2048617368204b6579204669727374":"80b24263c7c1a3ebb71493c1dd7be8b49b46d1f41b4aeec1121b013783f8f3526b56d037e05f2598bd0fd2215d6a1e5295e64f73f63f0aec8b915a985d786598" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 7 - HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"5468697320697320612074657374207573696e672061206c6172676572207468616e20626c6f636b2d73697a65206b657920616e642061206c6172676572207468616e20626c6f636b2d73697a6520646174612e20546865206b6579206e6565647320746f20626520686173686564206265666f7265206265696e6720757365642062792074686520484d414320616c676f726974686d2e":"3a854166ac5d9f023f54d517d0b39dbd946770db9c2b95c9f6f565d1" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 7 - HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"5468697320697320612074657374207573696e672061206c6172676572207468616e20626c6f636b2d73697a65206b657920616e642061206c6172676572207468616e20626c6f636b2d73697a6520646174612e20546865206b6579206e6565647320746f20626520686173686564206265666f7265206265696e6720757365642062792074686520484d414320616c676f726974686d2e":"9b09ffa71b942fcb27635fbcd5b0e944bfdc63644f0713938a7f51535c3a35e2" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 7 - HMAC-SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"5468697320697320612074657374207573696e672061206c6172676572207468616e20626c6f636b2d73697a65206b657920616e642061206c6172676572207468616e20626c6f636b2d73697a6520646174612e20546865206b6579206e6565647320746f20626520686173686564206265666f7265206265696e6720757365642062792074686520484d414320616c676f726974686d2e":"6617178e941f020d351e2f254e8fd32c602420feb0b8fb9adccebb82461e99c5a678cc31e799176d3860e6110c46523e" + +PSA MAC verify: RFC4231 Test case 7 - HMAC-SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"5468697320697320612074657374207573696e672061206c6172676572207468616e20626c6f636b2d73697a65206b657920616e642061206c6172676572207468616e20626c6f636b2d73697a6520646174612e20546865206b6579206e6565647320746f20626520686173686564206265666f7265206265696e6720757365642062792074686520484d414320616c676f726974686d2e":"e37b6a775dc87dbaa4dfa9f96e5e3ffddebd71f8867289865df5a32d20cdc944b6022cac3c4982b10d5eeb55c3e4de15134676fb6de0446065c97440fa8c6a58" + +PSA MAC sign: HMAC-SHA-224, truncated to 28 bytes (actual size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 28):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22" + +PSA MAC verify: HMAC-SHA-224, truncated to 28 bytes (actual size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 28):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22" + +PSA MAC sign: HMAC-SHA-512, truncated to 64 bytes (actual size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 64):"4869205468657265":"87aa7cdea5ef619d4ff0b4241a1d6cb02379f4e2ce4ec2787ad0b30545e17cdedaa833b7d6b8a702038b274eaea3f4e4be9d914eeb61f1702e696c203a126854" + +PSA MAC verify: HMAC-SHA-512, truncated to 64 bytes (actual size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 64):"4869205468657265":"87aa7cdea5ef619d4ff0b4241a1d6cb02379f4e2ce4ec2787ad0b30545e17cdedaa833b7d6b8a702038b274eaea3f4e4be9d914eeb61f1702e696c203a126854" + +PSA MAC sign: HMAC-SHA-224, truncated to 27 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 27):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b" + +PSA MAC verify: HMAC-SHA-224, truncated to 27 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 27):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b" + +PSA MAC sign: HMAC-SHA-512, truncated to 63 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 63):"4869205468657265":"87aa7cdea5ef619d4ff0b4241a1d6cb02379f4e2ce4ec2787ad0b30545e17cdedaa833b7d6b8a702038b274eaea3f4e4be9d914eeb61f1702e696c203a1268" + +PSA MAC verify: HMAC-SHA-512, truncated to 63 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 63):"4869205468657265":"87aa7cdea5ef619d4ff0b4241a1d6cb02379f4e2ce4ec2787ad0b30545e17cdedaa833b7d6b8a702038b274eaea3f4e4be9d914eeb61f1702e696c203a1268" + +PSA MAC sign: HMAC-SHA-224, truncated to 4 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 4):"4869205468657265":"896fb112" + +PSA MAC verify: HMAC-SHA-224, truncated to 4 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 4):"4869205468657265":"896fb112" + +PSA MAC sign: HMAC-SHA-512, truncated to 4 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 4):"4869205468657265":"87aa7cde" + +PSA MAC verify: HMAC-SHA-512, truncated to 4 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 4):"4869205468657265":"87aa7cde" + +PSA MAC sign: CMAC-3DES (CAVP vector #95) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"7c34e67a2a8fef581cc4f7dceaea130dad52c189739e401f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"eb3365a0a9d141270334065547418fe64c47823c024082b94d54a66d149f2af1":"e1d7c3736739e726" + +PSA MAC verify: CMAC-3DES (CAVP vector #95) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"7c34e67a2a8fef581cc4f7dceaea130dad52c189739e401f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"eb3365a0a9d141270334065547418fe64c47823c024082b94d54a66d149f2af1":"e1d7c3736739e726" + +PSA MAC: CMAC-3DES-2key (not supported in PSA) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"89fe91f1c1ef2f01efc4c18f5715894c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC: CMAC-DES (not supported in PSA) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"89fe91f1c1ef2f01":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC sign: CMAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827" + +PSA MAC verify: CMAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827" + +PSA MAC sign: CMAC-AES-128, truncated to 16 bytes (actual size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 16):"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827" + +PSA MAC verify: CMAC-AES-128, truncated to 16 bytes (actual size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 16):"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827" + +PSA MAC sign: CMAC-AES-128, truncated to 15 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 15):"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c8" + +PSA MAC verify: CMAC-AES-128, truncated to 15 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 15):"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c8" + +PSA MAC sign: CMAC-AES-128, truncated to 4 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 4):"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747" + +PSA MAC verify: CMAC-AES-128, truncated to 4 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 4):"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747" + +Cipher operation object initializers zero properly +cipher_operation_init: + +PSA cipher setup: good, AES-CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA cipher setup: bad algorithm (unknown cipher algorithm) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +cipher_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher setup: bad algorithm (not a cipher algorithm) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher setup: invalid key type, CTR +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +# Either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED would be reasonable here +cipher_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher setup: incompatible key ARC4 for CTR +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +# Either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED would be reasonable here +cipher_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher: bad order function calls +cipher_bad_order: + +PSA cipher: incorrect key type (HMAC) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +cipher_bad_key:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f" + +PSA cipher: incorrect key type (RSA) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_bad_key:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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" + +PSA cipher: incorrect key type (ECC Family Sep R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +cipher_bad_key:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320" + +PSA cipher encrypt: without initialization +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"":"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA cipher encrypt: invalid key type +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING +cipher_encrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher encrypt: incompatible key ARC4 for CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +# Either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED would be reasonable here +cipher_encrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher encrypt: bad algorithm (unknown cipher algorithm) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher encrypt: bad algorithm (not a cipher algorithm) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_MD4:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric encrypt: AES-ECB, input too short (15 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric encrypt: AES-CBC-nopad, input too short +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee223":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric encrypt: AES-ECB, 0 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_alg_without_iv:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"" + +PSA symmetric encrypt: AES-ECB, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_alg_without_iv:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97" + +PSA symmetric encrypt: AES-ECB, 32 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_alg_without_iv:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97":"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef972249a2638c6f1c755a84f9681a9f08c1" + +PSA symmetric encrypt: 2-key 3DES-ECB, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_alg_without_iv:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce":"c78e2b38139610e3":"5d0652429c5b0ac7" + +PSA symmetric encrypt: 3-key 3DES-ECB, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_alg_without_iv:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"c78e2b38139610e3":"817ca7d69b80d86a" + +PSA symmetric encrypt: 128-bit ARC4, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_alg_without_iv:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"9ac7cc9a609d1ef7b2932899cde41b97" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CBC-nopad, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 15 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CTR, 15 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0e":"eda4011239bc3ac9" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: 2-key 3DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce":"eda4011239bc3ac9" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: 3-key 3DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"eda4011239bc3ac9" + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-ECB, 0 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"":0:0:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-ECB, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-ECB, 32 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97":32:32:0:"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef972249a2638c6f1c755a84f9681a9f08c1":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743bca7e8a15dc3c776436314293031cd4f3":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 15 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:0:0:"6279b49d7f7a8dd87b685175d4276e24":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-ECB, input too short (15 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":0:0:0:"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, input too short +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee223":0:0:0:"6bc1bee223":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 15 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:15:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0e":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"eda4011239bc3ac9":8:8:0:"64f917b0152f8f05":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: 2-key 3DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"eda4011239bc3ac9":8:8:0:"5d0652429c5b0ac7":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: 3-key 3DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"eda4011239bc3ac9":8:8:0:"817ca7d69b80d86a":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: 2-key 3DES-ECB, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce":"":"c78e2b38139610e3":8:8:0:"5d0652429c5b0ac7":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: 3-key 3DES-ECB, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"":"c78e2b38139610e3":8:8:0:"817ca7d69b80d86a":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA cipher decrypt: without initialization +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"":"":"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA cipher decrypt: invalid key type +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING +cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher decrypt: incompatible key ARC4 for CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +# Either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED would be reasonable here +cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher decrypt: bad algorithm (unknown cipher algorithm) +cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher decrypt: bad algorithm (not a cipher algorithm) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_MD4:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, input too short (15 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-ECB, input too short (15 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CBC-nopad, input too short (5 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee223":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-ECB, 0 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"":"" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-ECB, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":"63cecc46a382414d5fa7d2b79387437f" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-ECB, 32 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef972249a2638c6f1c755a84f9681a9f08c1":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CBC-nopad, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":"49e4e66c89a86b67758df89db9ad6955" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743bca7e8a15dc3c776436314293031cd4f3":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 15 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6279b49d7f7a8dd87b685175d4276e24":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":"dd3b5e5319b7591daab1e1a92687feb2" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0e":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"64f917b0152f8f05":"eda4011239bc3ac9" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: 2-key 3DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"5d0652429c5b0ac7":"eda4011239bc3ac9" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: 3-key 3DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"817ca7d69b80d86a":"eda4011239bc3ac9" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: 2-key 3DES-ECB, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce":"":"5d0652429c5b0ac7":"c78e2b38139610e3" + +PSA symmetric decrypt: 3-key 3DES-ECB, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"":"817ca7d69b80d86a":"c78e2b38139610e3" + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-ECB, 0 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"":0:0:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-ECB, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":16:16:0:"63cecc46a382414d5fa7d2b79387437f":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-ECB, 32 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef972249a2638c6f1c755a84f9681a9f08c1":32:32:0:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef97":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":16:16:0:"49e4e66c89a86b67758df89db9ad6955":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743bca7e8a15dc3c776436314293031cd4f3":16:0:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 15 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6279b49d7f7a8dd87b685175d4276e24":16:0:0:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, input too short (15 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":0:0:0:"49e4e66c89a86b67758df89db9ad6955":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":16:16:0:"dd3b5e5319b7591daab1e1a92687feb2":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-ECB, input too short (15 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654":0:0:0:"63cecc46a382414d5fa7d2b7938743":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, input too short (5 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee223":0:0:0:"6bc1bee223":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0e":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"64f917b0152f8f05":8:8:0:"eda4011239bc3ac9":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: 2-key 3DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"5d0652429c5b0ac7":8:8:0:"eda4011239bc3ac9":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: 3-key 3DES-CBC-nopad, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"817ca7d69b80d86a":8:8:0:"eda4011239bc3ac9":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: 2-key 3DES-ECB, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce":"":"5d0652429c5b0ac7":8:8:0:"c78e2b38139610e3":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: 3-key 3DES-ECB, 8 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"01020407080b0d0ec1c2c4c7c8cbcdce31323437383b3d3e":"":"817ca7d69b80d86a":8:8:0:"c78e2b38139610e3":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt: AES-ECB, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt: AES-CBC-nopad, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 15 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317" + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt: AES-CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-ECB, 16+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef9755ed5e9e066820fa52c729886d18854c":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-ECB, 13+19 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":13:0:32:"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef9755ed5e9e066820fa52c729886d18854c":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-ECB, 24+12 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":24:16:16:"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef9755ed5e9e066820fa52c729886d18854c":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 7+9 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":7:0:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 3+13 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":3:0:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 4+12 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":4:0:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 11+5 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":11:0:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 16+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 12+20 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":12:0:32:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 20+12 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":20:16:16:"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 11+5 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":11:11:5:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+20 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":12:12:20:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 20+12 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":20:20:12:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+10 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597":12:12:10:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7b":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+15 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":0:0:15:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 15+0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:15:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":0:0:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-ECB, 16+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef9755ed5e9e066820fa52c729886d18854c":16:16:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-ECB, 11+21 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef9755ed5e9e066820fa52c729886d18854c":11:0:32:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-ECB, 28+4 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"":"3ad77bb40d7a3660a89ecaf32466ef9755ed5e9e066820fa52c729886d18854c":28:16:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 7+9 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":7:0:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 3+13 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":3:0:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 11+5 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":11:0:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 16+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f":16:16:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 12+20 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f":12:0:32:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 20+12 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b89906f2f9207ac02aa658cb4ef19c61f":20:16:16:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 11+5 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":11:11:5:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+20 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":12:12:20:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 20+12 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":20:20:12:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+10 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597":12:12:10:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7b":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+15 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":0:0:15:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 15+0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:15:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":0:0:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt multipart: AES-ECB, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output_multipart:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16 + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16 + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16 + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-PKCS#7, 15 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15 + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt multipart: AES-CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16 + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-nopad, 11+5 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":11 + +PSA symmetric encrypt/decrypt multipart: AES-CBC-PKCS#7 padding, 4+12 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_verify_output_multipart:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"a076ec9dfbe47d52afc357336f20743b":4 + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: ChaCha20, K=0 N=0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: ChaCha20, K=rand N=rand +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"4bddc98c551a95395ef719557f813656b566bc45aac04eca3866324cc75489f2":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: ChaCha20, K=0 N=0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":64:64:0:"76b8e0ada0f13d90405d6ae55386bd28bdd219b8a08ded1aa836efcc8b770dc7da41597c5157488d7724e03fb8d84a376a43b8f41518a11cc387b669b2ee6586":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: ChaCha20, K=rand N=rand +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"4bddc98c551a95395ef719557f813656b566bc45aac04eca3866324cc75489f2":"a170d9349d24955aa4501891":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":64:64:0:"9ba7d8de0c6b579fc436e368619e09228070d23246c836d6c6b4c476af6f5eb2b78fbe809d03f7881e6af28cfe3746e8dcf1eb7f762fe7d003141f1539a6cec4":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: ChaCha20, 14+50 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"4bddc98c551a95395ef719557f813656b566bc45aac04eca3866324cc75489f2":"a170d9349d24955aa4501891":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":14:14:50:"9ba7d8de0c6b579fc436e368619e09228070d23246c836d6c6b4c476af6f5eb2b78fbe809d03f7881e6af28cfe3746e8dcf1eb7f762fe7d003141f1539a6cec4":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: ChaCha20, K=rand N=rand +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"4bddc98c551a95395ef719557f813656b566bc45aac04eca3866324cc75489f2":"a170d9349d24955aa4501891":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":64:64:0:"9ba7d8de0c6b579fc436e368619e09228070d23246c836d6c6b4c476af6f5eb2b78fbe809d03f7881e6af28cfe3746e8dcf1eb7f762fe7d003141f1539a6cec4":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: ChaCha20, 14+50 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"4bddc98c551a95395ef719557f813656b566bc45aac04eca3866324cc75489f2":"a170d9349d24955aa4501891":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":14:14:50:"9ba7d8de0c6b579fc436e368619e09228070d23246c836d6c6b4c476af6f5eb2b78fbe809d03f7881e6af28cfe3746e8dcf1eb7f762fe7d003141f1539a6cec4":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt: AES-CCM, 19 bytes #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":PSA_ALG_CCM:"000102030405060708090A0B":"000102030405060708090A0B":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt: AES-CCM, 19 bytes #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"000102030405060708090A0B":"EC46BB63B02520C33C49FD70":"B96B49E21D621741632875DB7F6C9243D2D7C2":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt: DES-CCM not supported +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"000102030405060708090A0B":"EC46BB63B02520C33C49FD70":"B96B49E21D621741632875DB7F6C9243D2D7C2":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 23 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"00412B4EA9CDBE3C9696766CFA":"0BE1A88BACE018B1":"08E8CF97D820EA258460E96AD9CF5289054D895CEAC47C":"4CB97F86A2A4689A877947AB8091EF5386A6FFBDD080F8120333D1FCB691F3406CBF531F83A4D8" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 4 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6643b4f39" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 6 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b63fdffcd729bc" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=8 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 8 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b64cf2c3bf5f220776" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=10 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 10 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b69613343621327defd18e" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=12 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 12 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b69a2e5d8faee3138fa5cf9846" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=14 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 14 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6c99af01cdb6aa76df73c8646c27f" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=16 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 16 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9" + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 39 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"00412B4EA9CDBE3C9696766CFA":"0BE1A88BACE018B1":"4CB97F86A2A4689A877947AB8091EF5386A6FFBDD080F8120333D1FCB691F3406CBF531F83A4D8":"08E8CF97D820EA258460E96AD9CF5289054D895CEAC47C":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-CCM, 40 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 4 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6643b4f39":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 6 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b63fdffcd729bc":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=8 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 8 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b64cf2c3bf5f220776":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=10 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 10 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b69613343621327defd18e":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=12 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 12 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b69a2e5d8faee3138fa5cf9846":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=14 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 14 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6c99af01cdb6aa76df73c8646c27f":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, T=16 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 16 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid signature +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26d56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid signature, T=4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 4 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6643b4f38":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, T=4, tag is truncated tag for T=16 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 4 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid tag length 0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid tag length 2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 2 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid tag length 15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 15 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid tag length 18 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 18 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid nonce length 6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c090693056":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, invalid nonce length 14 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd97200":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM_8, invalid nonce length 6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 8 ):"48c090693056":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM_8, invalid nonce length 14 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 8 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd97200":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt, AES-GCM, 19 bytes #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":PSA_ALG_GCM:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"000102030405060708090A0B":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt, AES GCM, 19 bytes #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_GCM:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"EC46BB63B02520C33C49FD70":"B96B49E21D621741632875DB7F6C9243D2D7C2":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt, AES-GCM, 19 bytes, 12 byte nonce , 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":PSA_ALG_GCM:"E462C58482FE8264AEEB7231":"000102030405060708090A0B":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt, AES GCM, 19 bytes, 12 byte nonce , 2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_GCM:"E462C58482FE8264AEEB7231":"EC46BB63B02520C33C49FD70":"B96B49E21D621741632875DB7F6C9243D2D7C2":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fe96eab10ff48c7942025422583d0377":PSA_ALG_GCM:"97ce3f848276783599c6875de324361e":"127628b6dcbce6fc8a8ef60798eb67b2088415635119697d20bb878c24d9c6f9c29e148521cb5e0feff892c7855d4f1c0bfb32ad33420976714dce87a0bbc18e4378bd1ef35197d0ca73051148f1199010f63caf122df5f71ad8d9c71df3eb2fbe3b2529d0ba657570358d3776f687bdb9c96d5e0e9e00c4b42d5d7a268d6a08":"194c8bbbfae4a671386b8cd38f390f46f9df6b8661b470c310921a1c858a938045834bb10380037fbf5f5e00688554537be0fcafe8270b9b59068fa056ab1268fc166c2d729243a06650a171c929c7845c85330c04568d62977eedf3b1ba9dca13bdb8f9522817c8cb99e635e37465ec1c9f6f148d51437aa9f994a62e1bd013":"12495120056ca3cac70d583603a476821bac6c57c9733b81cfb83538dc9e850f8bdf46065069591c23ebcbc6d1e2523375fb7efc80c09507fa25477ed07cee54fc4eb90168b3ef988f651fc40652474a644b1b311decf899660aef2347bb081af48950f06ebf799911e37120de94c55c20e5f0a77119be06e2b6e557f872fa0f6bac793bdc2190a195122c98544ccf56" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, T=4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847f" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, T=15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, T=16 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aa740abfadcda779220d3b406c5d7ec09a77fe9d94104539":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"ab2265b4c168955561f04315":"":"":"f149e2b5f0adaa9842ca5f45b768a8fc" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=16, TAG=16, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"41c5da8667ef725220ffe39ae0ac590ac9fca729ab60ada0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"05ad13a5e2c2ab667e1a6fbc":"8b5c124bef6e2f0fe4d8c95cd5fa4cf1":"":"204bdb1bd62154bf08922aaa54eed705" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=16, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"093ef7551ebbff8eb0c0a8a4a62b198f0c2e838de10eeeee":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"e656e93930ed5210ba3f0322":"3da22dacfd11b21b0a713157f60aec0cd22f1add":"":"1b2d2764573e20ae640bf29d48e5fe05" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=15, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"31389612d244c9792a510eca3f9c94f9f48c97ed67ae965a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"df6b54ec8b58114df5b09279":"0863bec42ee93385efbec665adfc46dafcd793f29e859e3b531c15b168f1888dd13e905cd7d5bc03f9f1f6495717df62":"":"77e5682a49243d5b9016eb1adafa2d" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=16, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fbc0b4c56a714c83217b2d1bcadd2ed2e9efb0dcac6cc19f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"5f4b43e811da9c470d6a9b01":"":"d2ae38c4375954835d75b8e4c2f9bbb4":"69482957e6be5c54882d00314e0259cf191e9f29bef63a26860c1e020a21137e" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=8, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"c50ac59e50556e47b834380018c0dc0380af9df3bf6714e6":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 8 ):"f303bf4b6cfbba7104cd9436":"":"d3f3f57033df30c22860231334b099cb":"2269c72d77f2b6f9d57da1820ec5a5d3d62d4491e3e4e9e7" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=14, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"8ef391e4b7a2fe05b959be27823357080f963ed2f64b9e59":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"0080052a2a5bb0e95222a419":"290322092d57479e20f6281e331d95a9":"e7fb0631eebf9bdba87045b33650c4ce":"88d674044031414af7ba9da8b89dd68e69897d99d8e1706f38c613896c18" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=4, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"1cb5a0db778d3eb430b2816ceef9e455f519a8977b074183":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"c1df5e9e2e3165c54242a306":"7134e5ddc396c2a8a7da23906c8f7b40":"636871d4c0aae3da7b55abd8b5f21297":"14eb02562aa1d963d0033626cdc8a5c8972f4bdf" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=20, TAG=13, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"45148f42669f8ab8fad689d9b9180e39d7ea8fc95696297e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 13 ):"5afcb134acc78b4eb9d11e79":"aec409e5fd82e50b824ebc1f45e75188d80615c6":"3d952be11deb421b56e0ce9d7ce99553":"077c0d53869869e191df116fd7baa8a293d2b577a29b0953c91b5d3b9d" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=15, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"5255428457fe75e64447971ec5af0d13c5b60a07ee2d07b0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"40cb6ebafc202f82223db097":"b2da2bd05ab1f3e39613efc8d80c5d0f240ee08f6abad5791649e9c1d0f48fa3dc59c1e535d1db1a4d3fa2263f5a1117":"fdd8a462c86d4365c8bfee0e25fc8a62":"9ca4a6d08267038f6f7999c84105bb5eaf8f7b3b9310ec688e033088a03482" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"b52c505a37d78eda5dd34f20c22540ea1b58963cf8e5bf8ffa85f9f2492505b4":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"516c33929df5a3284ff463d7":"":"":"bdc1ac884d332457a1d2664f168c76f0" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=12, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"98ebf7a58db8b8371d9069171190063cc1fdc1927e49a3385f890d41a838619c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"3e6db953bd4e641de644e50a":"":"":"2fb9c3e41fff24ef07437c47" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=16, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"886cff5f3e6b8d0e1ad0a38fcdb26de97e8acbe79f6bed66959a598fa5047d65":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"3a8efa1cd74bbab5448f9945":"519fee519d25c7a304d6c6aa1897ee1eb8c59655":"":"f6d47505ec96c98a42dc3ae719877b87" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=13, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a7c928738b89c3258b910ac31bc465338b2e133b143fd52d9c9859eb1d01f2a0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 13 ):"a483a7e94fbb2d694d3c4a8d":"bdb613cd3c2f0edd37b3ed43041bacb949ee51fa":"":"5233f95bdcf5d666fb957acdcb" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=15, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"16a5b58a1dbb273a8fc6a4af722d46dbb898dd86ab128cb93d8388a8647a80a3":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"59e0c40d6675923cf5e004d5":"5b4b4ffc9c66bd394abeed3f03b695b949b3b69a42198cc3bfad971174915df913b967ccf36ee1f001f54efbcd117b68":"":"d57e27914ecb4a764359d3c0f8d4d6" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=4, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"5dd13092dd695b90ab835ed6343031c4cdb710d32f4d3804d72b46d921fcfa18":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"1de4bd816c8ec6bffc1e6453":"1b63d6278702abacf8b6c2faf542a808659fd5da03cdc1061a8593ea8ce9fc8ff54ffef6ebf3e15f7a832b4ae750a6ce":"":"72901467" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=15, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"ef9f9284cf599eac3b119905a7d18851e7e374cf63aea04358586b0f757670f8":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"b6ac8e4963f49207ffd6374c":"":"722ee47da4b77424733546c2d400c4e5":"1224dfefb72a20d49e09256908874979882eafea22adf8dbed06a2265f907b" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=12, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"b33b0e4c5b9f7ef77cec1a29ed5844bda3853238bdf7766e7645029931f169f0":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"f226d65e8654fdf5193ed721":"":"bcf48ddcfe9d011a1003973d68d2d78a":"d2eb20898a301b5d8e69e9926272021393af01abb6a970047a7fc010" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=14, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"c6e126a65faec77ab62318e30d8a50c39a664670039a66ae5a6874201bc68f9f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"0ba5193b2d3a8378d67163ce":"5844b289dc74327f9fd93f7aae1c3d39":"c37aada3d4408e880d47e41df77da9b9":"b5cd7563989b460a2fe187e90c41fc3179c73d0d1e3a4484909969de93b0" + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, CAVS 14.0, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=15, +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2e6942d537f1a98444c2f9dbdb5d8db42a503a00a17b57d516399569e044a703":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"7eb67721581ed52cfcfc2c4d":"a96cc73451502c7278b467ac85d5fc14fc1a2f51bc685645b173f0cd9af02d383095de063e6eaa50374ce9bc951e9e61":"e5f410fe939e79b7ad33fbd3aaf5856f":"727f5e19a5582e5782bbbe73517f0c04c492319abf12b03b380724ff1483a3" + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fe96eab10ff48c7942025422583d0377":PSA_ALG_GCM:"97ce3f848276783599c6875de324361e":"127628b6dcbce6fc8a8ef60798eb67b2088415635119697d20bb878c24d9c6f9c29e148521cb5e0feff892c7855d4f1c0bfb32ad33420976714dce87a0bbc18e4378bd1ef35197d0ca73051148f1199010f63caf122df5f71ad8d9c71df3eb2fbe3b2529d0ba657570358d3776f687bdb9c96d5e0e9e00c4b42d5d7a268d6a08":"12495120056ca3cac70d583603a476821bac6c57c9733b81cfb83538dc9e850f8bdf46065069591c23ebcbc6d1e2523375fb7efc80c09507fa25477ed07cee54fc4eb90168b3ef988f651fc40652474a644b1b311decf899660aef2347bb081af48950f06ebf799911e37120de94c55c20e5f0a77119be06e2b6e557f872fa0f6bac793bdc2190a195122c98544ccf56":"194c8bbbfae4a671386b8cd38f390f46f9df6b8661b470c310921a1c858a938045834bb10380037fbf5f5e00688554537be0fcafe8270b9b59068fa056ab1268fc166c2d729243a06650a171c929c7845c85330c04568d62977eedf3b1ba9dca13bdb8f9522817c8cb99e635e37465ec1c9f6f148d51437aa9f994a62e1bd013":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes, T=4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847f":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes, T=15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes, T=16 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, invalid signature +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"fe96eab10ff48c7942025422583d0377":PSA_ALG_GCM:"97ce3f848276783599c6875de324361e":"127628b6dcbce6fc8a8ef60798eb67b2088415635119697d20bb878c24d9c6f9c29e148521cb5e0feff892c7855d4f1c0bfb32ad33420976714dce87a0bbc18e4378bd1ef35197d0ca73051148f1199010f63caf122df5f71ad8d9c71df3eb2fbe3b2529d0ba657570358d3776f687bdb9c96d5e0e9e00c4b42d5d7a268d6a08":"12195120056ca3cac70d583603a476821bac6c57c9733b81cfb83538dc9e850f8bdf46065069591c23ebcbc6d1e2523375fb7efc80c09507fa25477ed07cee54fc4eb90168b3ef988f651fc40652474a644b1b311decf899660aef2347bb081af48950f06ebf799911e37120de94c55c20e5f0a77119be06e2b6e557f872fa0f6bac793bdc2190a195122c98544ccf56":"194c8bbbfae4a671386b8cd38f390f46f9df6b8661b470c310921a1c858a938045834bb10380037fbf5f5e00688554537be0fcafe8270b9b59068fa056ab1268fc166c2d729243a06650a171c929c7845c85330c04568d62977eedf3b1ba9dca13bdb8f9522817c8cb99e635e37465ec1c9f6f148d51437aa9f994a62e1bd013":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, T=15 but passing 16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-GCM, invalid tag length 0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-GCM, invalid tag length 2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 2 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-GCM, nonce=0 (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-GCM, nonce=0 (bad), TAG=12 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-GCM, invalid tag length 18 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 18 ):"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"0e5d6e68f82f32bea3f0b69498c1a31ef6d955cd3d27a2a8":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"caf72ee1e62e1001e8cfbc63":"":"db1a74ffb5f7de26f5742e0942b1b9cb":"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=14 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"e79fb7defce4f650402e6b521170686d3eb2a0b9514f3a64":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"40e0d2d836c0519e7042419b":"41c5b5d971c0723bc1b63a259fe7e06c2961de1241bc34c13965f43636e4da3da8c75ed5956abe3a42f3039af005925a":"434ff68f2436f48418fd69f52158":"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"e41d1f533d5b342ffe434b94b1372683bfd5d9d8cb79f9ee":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"5fe11a596dfcd3a305c1d711":"":"1847f64fff986476d1d2f758692f856da4a0ff98c0c1101694c84fd86680c9":"b03c2c20f758a93a8d1220232ad87098":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=20, TAG=15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"8e7da473c057a2a4669a0d22bf9b7c9913fba48930ca0c9b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"f9ff8ef80d76c50f9ca0e9ff":"f141bae18a1b54f065554fd34aa02c91c90f505c":"5deb093b6e7c766a64bb9d5170af1ff8bf130b64eebdce06a9bdb2cf1da15a":"b22b2dcdcc18adc30d16297b84b459d8":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=12 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"01bf150add51bb11623e3bfbebd62a7ea81c5b192b8eb6de":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 12 ):"dfacbc6791b785d324c646b7":"e35412a625324257bef35399a7eacca34fec2d2d24166e6bb3e94d96f5c57599ded45e2a74503f07116caa1692398a07":"77579db3c6da769e17731faac4732d7cce65d960a49f94f6b583e54a":"7e5fd8b595ddc4753676107951d900e2":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=48, TAG=8 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"551266c4ed166fe1c43761927801ed50cb9c0b3864fc97df":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 8 ):"e711afbeccd567f866340abb":"562d1697237ebc563941076d459727dfa094eb9ac00d30ed5836825d163dd27517c7660a01056b2d868c7fc5d0343830":"2b54cc27f6ee71882e8b1ead207d2b042d262e87eac97b58":"37245449db8f72b1ecdb420f629d3d80":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=0, TAG=15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"78fa4a2a5b5b1b1d9580ea527f2e1653e9336e15cc5462f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"98b774f7110e0bea624b487f":"":"a642aabed8b99e15e297ee705a40c3e2e506cb889727b327b7e044a8":"496909523f574b205d757659c5":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=16, TAG=15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"61f4c2e55d729c4657e503dfe2b604e2853675dbdeb0982a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"0c4d5548aa2d8d54964e1e63":"5affdf8886dabb14790aff3dbfcbdd80":"0d4eacc3db304f46cb7a9eba6ec105bf86d9dc0639b7cebbd5260f47":"b6e056de521a27266dffbc0d96":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=20, TAG=13 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"73245c4f115a74fe71d6fefb9094c57c75f28033a3c7372b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 13 ):"536a82485999b93b0bb7ef24":"64dcad870a42eeec0730fd7a7e4154638a85d739":"29333e87bfe65d0e37da2936f695824d4e3f37fab3b8e2b868f6":"f6d56f8c86f27d957fa63aea22":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=24, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=48, TAG=4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"9002e74638e09dd1f091439518e1460cdd5905bd9e1a37ae":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"76c81a95d24be5c8bac63b50":"aa3ae4531aaac8f3eb07f748712c55a680bc8df5cf845edc66d09049500b41688b8023f5746879b45bdd586af29c4ede":"31bf37acbc53ca3fdbc9e5eaaebbb85a7f":"bd94b34511bc65ae47684805cb":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=0, TAG=16 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"f5a2b27c74355872eb3ef6c5feafaa740e6ae990d9d48c3bd9bb8235e589f010":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"58d2240f580a31c1d24948e9":"":"15e051a5e4a5f5da6cea92e2ebee5bac":"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=16, TAG=15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"3395a1485315c5b5e6353acb05ae9499c440a2e9f5c57494662f827235ea314c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"3b7e632571602456b49880f0":"f283f80226dacb69c8af089ec6b59e81":"84c8beff4b0d160ee68ac613097f51":"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=20, TAG=15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4dc46ca55c1c1fcb4720c274c0e675c2ac5bf93d8dd5e951ca9f6b61f884edc9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"6473ab77dc885127422f5594":"e2cf8172ab4cf77eba45cd2c8ff939b938080a90":"8d6351f18d873242204c20144e2b83":"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=0, AAD=48, TAG=14 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a7f95798434f9a0fe6fd8acd30b8bad96dbdcfacee4594f01cbf26479be7d154":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"9ef5a77b02137b46e8461d09":"5595a16fa12d4dcdba6b128480dce2d39c1211c3fb6068cde6013f6a80dfcda5eb92af8879e40ee9c177fd0e446fc8ca":"3bfd3d99fe2063e8ef8255519fe0":"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=16 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4c8ebfe1444ec1b2d503c6986659af2c94fafe945f72c1e8486a5acfedb8a0f8":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 16 ):"473360e0ad24889959858995":"":"d2c78110ac7e8f107c0df0570bd7c90cc26a379b6d98ef2852ead8ce83a833a7":"7789b41cb3ee548814ca0b388c10b343":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=0, TAG=4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"57805f98aae1b8b64bb49756529ab8181b3ada674a90c55422e9eb26c48bcd7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 4 ):"9735945d8ca161777206632a":"":"58375442ab1c0e6a8952c83d128d9fc5f45bb315":"4860116a6d2deb9bf794bfd6ac5bbbd6":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=16, TAG=8 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"f913bb823a1d0c10b0b72d56866907b893f2266f15de1abc17f93600824db55a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 8 ):"d4fe686a14592b6ca1bd6b42":"e35d880c1c53688eb83869de9dd8a473":"35af9b502ea6b56269f896bf98affdd59c2aa418b38bc7fd":"ff426dd751190ff826e8b4a0792d746e":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=16, AAD=20, TAG=14 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"74e9d9d7cd0728cea94e169af485f21f9d2447e022f16008f803dcf5c4f7cc0c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"ecba39edc96667da726122c0":"ae9ab021f86f5b81bb2e0fcbd4b855e1501e9f82":"e5745ce0e02dbba05363b548c3ac7047eacca7e61db6f72fc9b9e5bdb2bb":"0a0b284515694188b6b6c15bc8a09036":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=0, TAG=14 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"60667fce64b8c7169ddf45f335e46951248f69abc4e0f4f292d0ffe3dfd5219f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 14 ):"1057322a39f08ef761c3c8fc":"":"501b033c841acb430c52d88fe9cb44c751f2f1641d1e801a534ac8":"f386b28e7eb4c2fb8eb5dc66a2":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, CAVS14.0, AES-GCM, KEY=32, IV=12, IN=13, AAD=20, TAG=15 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"e67590da399cbcdcddcc56110562ade8665b50287a8ab38e8b9ee7520531b560":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 15 ):"2c36ab6b686a66fba1805196":"823493d42f4f60b2d1433ad75eccaafd7e7c7d12":"cff6b6f03c67152f3ce1030653d9bd9a6559f5b04b48d77c2a1fc364":"da1c61fbfcdb73445ad4c7d889":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC7539) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (zero-length input) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04" + +PSA AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC7539, good tag) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC7539, bad tag) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7":"d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b61161ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600690":"4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (good tag, zero-length input) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"070000004041424344454647":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (nonce=8, not supported) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"0700000040414243":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (nonce=11, too short) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"0700000040414243444546":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD decrypt: ChaCha20-Poly1305 (nonce=13, too long) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"07000000404142434445464700":"":"a0784d7a4716f3feb4f64e7f4b39bf04":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt: invalid algorithm (CTR) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CTR:"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":"":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA AEAD encrypt/decrypt: invalid algorithm (ChaCha20) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +aead_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:"":"":"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA signature size: RSA keypair, 1024 bits, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:128 + +PSA signature size: RSA public key, 1024 bits, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:128 + +PSA signature size: RSA keypair, 1024 bits, PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):128 + +PSA signature size: RSA keypair, 1024 bits, PSS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):128 + +PSA signature size: RSA keypair, 1024 bits, PSS-any-salt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):128 + +PSA signature size: RSA keypair, 1023 bits, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1023:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:128 + +PSA signature size: RSA keypair, 1025 bits, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +signature_size:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1025:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:129 + +PSA import/exercise RSA keypair, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +import_and_exercise_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW + +PSA import/exercise RSA keypair, PSS-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +import_and_exercise_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA import/exercise RSA keypair, PSS-any-salt-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +import_and_exercise_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA import/exercise RSA public key, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +import_and_exercise_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW + +PSA import/exercise RSA public key, PSS-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +import_and_exercise_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA import/exercise RSA public key, PSS-any-salt-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +import_and_exercise_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA import/exercise: ECP SECP256R1 keypair, ECDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_and_exercise_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY + +PSA import/exercise: ECP SECP256R1 keypair, deterministic ECDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +import_and_exercise_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) + +PSA import/exercise: ECP SECP256R1 keypair, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_and_exercise_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDH + +PSA import/exercise: HKDF SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +import_and_exercise_key:"c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:192:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA import/exercise: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +import_and_exercise_key:"c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:192:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a" + +PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311" + +PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f" + +PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDLTS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":"cd40ba1b555ca5994d30ddffc4ad734b1f5c604675b0f249814aa5de3992ef3ddf4d5dc5d2aab1979ce210b560754df671363d99795475882894c048e3b986ca" + +PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":"52d92aac1fcc0fea3ecce01a9ed4bc9ac342f92470fd3f54d0d6d2fa5d2940405057a9d49a817c2b193322f05fc93ac1c7a055edac93bec0ade6814ab27b86b5295ac1ddb323818200f00c3d94d959f714f128b64a2e19628037ac009b14774f" + +PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong hash size +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid hash (wildcard) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw, input too large +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, output buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":127:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA sign hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, wrong hash length (0 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, wrong hash length (0 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, wrong hash length (129 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, wrong hash length (129 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, output buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":63:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA sign hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, empty output buffer +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, empty output buffer +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1, invalid hash algorithm (0) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( 0 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1, invalid hash algorithm (wildcard) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: invalid key type, signing with a public key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: invalid algorithm for ECC key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824":96:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263" + +PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad" + +PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, 32 bytes (hash size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad" + +PSA sign/verify hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, 32 bytes (hash size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad" + +PSA sign/verify hash: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b" + +PSA sign/verify hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b" + +PSA sign/verify hash: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f" + +PSA sign/verify hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f" + +PSA sign/verify hash: randomized ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b" + +PSA sign/verify hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b" + +PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311" + +PSA verify hash with keypair: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311" + +PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong hash length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (same size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"111164d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (empty) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (truncated) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc73":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (trailing junk) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc731121":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (leading junk) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"21a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=0 (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"abc4b612c6b71e13fa5965b2e25ee6adec5b1f211b2db158e9f3c4547d6cbef909a73dfb474b8caaf6c8fcafa10ec0bbadfd1883289ce33ad08ad533c61ea004fef4d9b76a1efc267efd066ae8918cb8e994faad30ff5e340e14c941926ba7ca9422b86e8055df1c1b90a5959a59cc7a5fc15cbd0d848cd40f7857b7629b668b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"abc4b612c6b71e13fa5965b2e25ee6adec5b1f211b2db158e9f3c4547d6cbef909a73dfb474b8caaf6c8fcafa10ec0bbadfd1883289ce33ad08ad533c61ea004fef4d9b76a1efc267efd066ae8918cb8e994faad30ff5e340e14c941926ba7ca9422b86e8055df1c1b90a5959a59cc7a5fc15cbd0d848cd40f7857b7629b668b" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=31 (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"797914eadbbe8293a7b0fe29d2db9fb246b519128d46d3ec93142a1a08a2992ba5325ad9b5ce55344b37996dbb81eb89628263cae4e3fc0e947dec0b8b0c7b0ee94bca02dd287f9cc619e2d88fb2279fb2a8f8301271c58009bb1223f3cfa730cb852947685678cfdef2968c82a9b8bffd8c0d518476b1ea2a5ad6c100045d8e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=31 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"797914eadbbe8293a7b0fe29d2db9fb246b519128d46d3ec93142a1a08a2992ba5325ad9b5ce55344b37996dbb81eb89628263cae4e3fc0e947dec0b8b0c7b0ee94bca02dd287f9cc619e2d88fb2279fb2a8f8301271c58009bb1223f3cfa730cb852947685678cfdef2968c82a9b8bffd8c0d518476b1ea2a5ad6c100045d8e" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=32 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=32 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=94 (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"44a09fa66f1b2e790474960e90517e418747cfcd18423dff957516a598569d74f26ef1eae4a200d12d801e16fc6fde375330c79c0d8430825e0a7f69c664faefccfa25e7fbfc68af02af0f67fe4c49f68f6abc68c8f66d3fd77fc838961f4415827340c66e39c79ed7dae0738c08ce8272aebe50c72e31994b9b6db640b51800":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=94 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"44a09fa66f1b2e790474960e90517e418747cfcd18423dff957516a598569d74f26ef1eae4a200d12d801e16fc6fde375330c79c0d8430825e0a7f69c664faefccfa25e7fbfc68af02af0f67fe4c49f68f6abc68c8f66d3fd77fc838961f4415827340c66e39c79ed7dae0738c08ce8272aebe50c72e31994b9b6db640b51800" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-512, slen=61 (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"23f5b30c8d612d8f31206c177ac2023c4f44754d03c7ff67daff99f24fa369b3e5f7c15b228a4417a1ff1c93fb8d645d619c2f4f559ac6c7f7bac20ba9df32353d19941265a4e74261adaf45d48682c0bc86cea6128f11ad172ff461fb1d97bded615861843996e2a98e7b8313b695519d001ae35305d6cbf3c0ee6c7ab06d1a":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-512, slen=61 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"23f5b30c8d612d8f31206c177ac2023c4f44754d03c7ff67daff99f24fa369b3e5f7c15b228a4417a1ff1c93fb8d645d619c2f4f559ac6c7f7bac20ba9df32353d19941265a4e74261adaf45d48682c0bc86cea6128f11ad172ff461fb1d97bded615861843996e2a98e7b8313b695519d001ae35305d6cbf3c0ee6c7ab06d1a" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-512, slen=62 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"6b215d77cf88b2d08be53b4f3ac6e72ebfbf7e0dc6c1e77b238cfb661c247a011b8746709fbefe4bc05d37343391683e9489d720ecbb7df37f4e36967918958996939461703465c2014a4c12faf875f8def70070e55b765b165c7e9c6f2eb05c98351b1e82219c31a2fb3ddce05f8988f552ff92f0b3471f63c0e53824c550a4" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-512, slen=62 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"6b215d77cf88b2d08be53b4f3ac6e72ebfbf7e0dc6c1e77b238cfb661c247a011b8746709fbefe4bc05d37343391683e9489d720ecbb7df37f4e36967918958996939461703465c2014a4c12faf875f8def70070e55b765b165c7e9c6f2eb05c98351b1e82219c31a2fb3ddce05f8988f552ff92f0b3471f63c0e53824c550a4" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-528 PSS SHA-512, slen=0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"304a024300e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f0203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"a14ad0fef77d36c28658a66129ee632e40e1032003eefe7fcda8e52b06675a051c80b2ca1cb99ed0762e90c9a48c434cd1063638eed7895a9c770e5435af750a1955" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-528 PSS-any-salt SHA-512, slen=0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"304a024300e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f0203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"a14ad0fef77d36c28658a66129ee632e40e1032003eefe7fcda8e52b06675a051c80b2ca1cb99ed0762e90c9a48c434cd1063638eed7895a9c770e5435af750a1955" + +PSA verify hash: RSA-520 PSS SHA-512 (hash too large) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"3049024200d5a06f86e5b9d87428540165ca966fa8893a62e2a59d0bfd7617780bb039f9165a373a8e119d0766f8de556710f33f67019153bad8223775e797d451d48206f3bf0203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"deaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddead42":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA verify hash: RSA-520 PSS-any-salt SHA-512 (hash too large) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"3049024200d5a06f86e5b9d87428540165ca966fa8893a62e2a59d0bfd7617780bb039f9165a373a8e119d0766f8de556710f33f67019153bad8223775e797d451d48206f3bf0203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55d39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94fa54ca49f":"deaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddead42":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, wrong hash length (0 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"34c011b625c32d992f4ab8fcfa52b616ea66270b5b75a4fc71af712f9b8806bcdd374ce50eafcbb489562b93347885f93c2de1d404c45cacccefceb112ff6ffdfe4264f91d66320bbbe09304b851b8ad6280bbccc571eebcd49c7db5dfa399a6289e1978407904598751613d9870770cdd8507e3dc7b46851dbf05ae1df2988d":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA verify hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, wrong hash length (0 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"34c011b625c32d992f4ab8fcfa52b616ea66270b5b75a4fc71af712f9b8806bcdd374ce50eafcbb489562b93347885f93c2de1d404c45cacccefceb112ff6ffdfe4264f91d66320bbbe09304b851b8ad6280bbccc571eebcd49c7db5dfa399a6289e1978407904598751613d9870770cdd8507e3dc7b46851dbf05ae1df2988d":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA verify hash: RSA PSS SHA-256, wrong hash length (129 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"1491cead330b4ad5b092f8351518141ac11d0888591572669c1e79d6e932c488acd62d44479b0e14cd91a048778bc02398a772ad6bdb4f7764780cf0afe70293d0cac86f2695a1dcb54568bb37d7086f9e86f95a6802d2ee5a4facaa762beff5261bb2816b62cb5af86404974c3f6b67985ac1fbfdf46d6de54f6e29d9274308":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA verify hash: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, wrong hash length (129 bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"1491cead330b4ad5b092f8351518141ac11d0888591572669c1e79d6e932c488acd62d44479b0e14cd91a048778bc02398a772ad6bdb4f7764780cf0afe70293d0cac86f2695a1dcb54568bb37d7086f9e86f95a6802d2ee5a4facaa762beff5261bb2816b62cb5af86404974c3f6b67985ac1fbfdf46d6de54f6e29d9274308":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f" + +PSA verify hash with keypair: ECDSA SECP256R1, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f" + +PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature size (correct but ASN1-encoded) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"304502206a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151022100ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature of correct size +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (empty) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (truncated) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f5":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (trailing junk) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f21":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (leading junk) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"216a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify hash: invalid algorithm for ECC key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311" + +PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548" + +PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDLTS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"616263":"7ea712a20e3a8cbe0c6e64195362ba7635bbe78af51ddedd7a5fd858395250c592654c35d3b0614ae0e3b329c25cf5b4a5fcb243af3e3ad15c8446fe401be066" + +PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"3548ea85eb66d756ae90fd64a3104b5b9a17aa282f8722409762e9da4811ec5d3060a97d3450b4bc484cd21ac588f563c4873843506fed8609b7d093db0e9a2496c36995ee74c906528af6898feb502f45bfb1e9ccf371416c68d32bb5ebc1b6" + +PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid hash (wildcard) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"616263":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid hash algorithm (0) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(0):"616263":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, output buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":127:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, empty output buffer +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 without hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, invalid key type +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"4bddc98c551a95395ef719557f813656b566bc45aac04eca3866324cc75489f2":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, invalid hash (wildcard) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"616263":64:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, invalid hash algorithm (0) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(0):"616263":64:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, output buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":63:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, empty output buffer +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA sign message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, invalid key type +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"4bddc98c551a95395ef719557f813656b566bc45aac04eca3866324cc75489f2":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":64:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign message: invalid algorithm for ECC key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":96:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign message: ECDSA without hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"616263":96:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign/verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263" + +PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263" + +PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263" + +PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, 0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"" + +PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, 32 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, 128 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +PSA sign/verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, 129 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263" + +PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, 0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"" + +PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, 32 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, 64 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, 65 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +PSA sign/verify message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263" + +PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"616263" + +PSA sign/verify message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDLTS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"616263" + +PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263" + +PSA sign/verify message: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263" + +PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311" + +PSA verify message with keypair: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311" + +PSA verify message: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=0 (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"abc4b612c6b71e13fa5965b2e25ee6adec5b1f211b2db158e9f3c4547d6cbef909a73dfb474b8caaf6c8fcafa10ec0bbadfd1883289ce33ad08ad533c61ea004fef4d9b76a1efc267efd066ae8918cb8e994faad30ff5e340e14c941926ba7ca9422b86e8055df1c1b90a5959a59cc7a5fc15cbd0d848cd40f7857b7629b668b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"abc4b612c6b71e13fa5965b2e25ee6adec5b1f211b2db158e9f3c4547d6cbef909a73dfb474b8caaf6c8fcafa10ec0bbadfd1883289ce33ad08ad533c61ea004fef4d9b76a1efc267efd066ae8918cb8e994faad30ff5e340e14c941926ba7ca9422b86e8055df1c1b90a5959a59cc7a5fc15cbd0d848cd40f7857b7629b668b" + +PSA verify message: RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256, slen=32 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df" + +PSA verify message: RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256, slen=32 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df" + +PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 32 bytes (hash size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"6b65e1fdc900dce8a2b82130ae8ccfac27b6d0eb5f2c0c1085b80f34ceaaf064c8ff237e74a24a3c6fb7a842f172e5146315616281bbbeeae90febaab139a212decf1c68923f2a48e242b1fd72105e3a3f2329c30d78abe8673335ad08c5ba1aa515360bb5660050f1994bb08d3dd17e3407a379403bafa4e229b3c851283f6d" + +PSA verify message: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, good signature, 32 bytes (hash size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"6b65e1fdc900dce8a2b82130ae8ccfac27b6d0eb5f2c0c1085b80f34ceaaf064c8ff237e74a24a3c6fb7a842f172e5146315616281bbbeeae90febaab139a212decf1c68923f2a48e242b1fd72105e3a3f2329c30d78abe8673335ad08c5ba1aa515360bb5660050f1994bb08d3dd17e3407a379403bafa4e229b3c851283f6d" + +PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 128 bytes (signature size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"29b65db0936b7fe408bda672077b0bc5e176177ba9a550fb548c292f7b4af1bb6475e0a979ba43dd644780801fabe5b62a1359cf7692918f30013e90c2362235765abc2078905d13b345dd689bf15e4e94ca51535d12f0675d5f13e9f254ba7696f0096d62deb023d106e9a96a5da3162bead6a745c8b9000868d2f9a447d5c5" + +PSA verify message: RSA-any-salt PSS SHA-256, good signature, 128 bytes (signature size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"29b65db0936b7fe408bda672077b0bc5e176177ba9a550fb548c292f7b4af1bb6475e0a979ba43dd644780801fabe5b62a1359cf7692918f30013e90c2362235765abc2078905d13b345dd689bf15e4e94ca51535d12f0675d5f13e9f254ba7696f0096d62deb023d106e9a96a5da3162bead6a745c8b9000868d2f9a447d5c5" + +PSA verify message: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 129 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"43286cc0fc599603fbb0cd1fd70c3a17b08d2adf4f90202dddfa4b9d74be8c720bbb1c714665466de6452d401ca061b68225785ff387c2615f03c81351cc3838cd3014a031a4f4c9f70bba06f504c6a9942ac2dbfed2329e590d526a9be26b4025a6d7c4151b4e795cfe756c9a8a5e8fa9228a6f5f6f427a5a070e5c0ea69830" + +PSA verify message: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256, good signature, 129 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"43286cc0fc599603fbb0cd1fd70c3a17b08d2adf4f90202dddfa4b9d74be8c720bbb1c714665466de6452d401ca061b68225785ff387c2615f03c81351cc3838cd3014a031a4f4c9f70bba06f504c6a9942ac2dbfed2329e590d526a9be26b4025a6d7c4151b4e795cfe756c9a8a5e8fa9228a6f5f6f427a5a070e5c0ea69830" + +PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf0b" + +PSA verify message with keypair: ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf0b" + +PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (same size) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"111164d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (empty) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (truncated) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc73":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (trailing junk) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc731121":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature (leading junk) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"21a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 without hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"616263":"21a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature size (correct but ASN1-encoded) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"304502200b295f3dc3ac2bde92f550b7e73a2de15a753b4ebc761c521a32d1ed9bf5800a022100fe7301254058347c3dec7768f62dfc63f7c049d28bfdd1d6712126fd888e9f04":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature of correct size +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf00":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (empty) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (truncated) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (trailing junk) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf0bff":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature (leading junk) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"ff0f8c19f5affea6d593a33e176aa52717bff8d5875165fc63e80a2d65580d295789db5ffb5397ba4c67834e2731ee268ea6f7e83846fbb02145b35442db18cf0b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + +PSA verify message: invalid algorithm for ECC key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA verify message: ECDSA without hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +verify_message_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, good, with label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"746869730069730061006c6162656c00":128:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-384, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-384, good, with label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e":"746869730069730061006c6162656c00":128:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, key pair +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, key pair +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, input too large +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5: salt not allowed +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-384, input too large +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA encrypt: invalid algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5: invalid key type +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA encrypt-decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 vector #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"" + +PSA encrypt-decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 vector #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"99e8a6144bcb9a29660303bdc4305bb5eca8c64b96788cad062be9967bdab2f7ffff":"" + +PSA encrypt-decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"" + +PSA encrypt-decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, with label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"746869730069730061006c6162656c00" + +PSA encrypt-decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +asymmetric_encrypt_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e":"" + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5: good #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"99ffde2fcc00c9cc01972ebfa7779b298dbbaf7f50707a7405296dd2783456fc792002f462e760500e02afa25a859ace8701cb5d3b0262116431c43af8eb08f5a88301057cf1c156a2a5193c143e7a5b03fac132b7e89e6dcd8f4c82c9b28452329c260d30bc39b3816b7c46b41b37b4850d2ae74e729f99c6621fbbe2e46872":"":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad" + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5: good #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"adeecba2db7f867a733853f0136c554e5e01c7a2015721a9bfe30c3ad163b93a9c7589170311209f91420ad8a1a8280c7e890a6d7bca3c500b4da4f53a17bd84a21d58f979a9b4b8f2246b482d930804f12b3aeb2ac8b5ac7938d452ca13be8eb8e973c4e2b19fd454058cbae037bcef7ef68a5fbabf050de5f283cf1998c695":"":"99e8a6144bcb9a29660303bdc4305bb5eca8c64b96788cad062be9967bdab2f7ffff" + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, 0 bytes, output too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"adeecba2db7f867a733853f0136c554e5e01c7a2015721a9bfe30c3ad163b93a9c7589170311209f91420ad8a1a8280c7e890a6d7bca3c500b4da4f53a17bd84a21d58f979a9b4b8f2246b482d930804f12b3aeb2ac8b5ac7938d452ca13be8eb8e973c4e2b19fd454058cbae037bcef7ef68a5fbabf050de5f283cf1998c695":"":0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, 0 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"1b4c1d06439b99f886048b8544607b5e8e5ac6828ad9d0b7ad4ec0b314a4d8052f8bbeab6c85dbddff0b90cc76395a7a0c4f9cc29cd7be20be0b38ff611800d6":"":"" + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, 0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"3d3146b1c982004273a9ebb9b063e6ae53b1a85bfc802324bcdd04faa0f7211fb2bdeea40358095554df9c250866c7361e738f0d270eaa27738e87928c5e31815506346727900ff03cef0be6f9dd6bba63ce89074e8194fe68b5a5739422d4f138bbbb61f49b76cf1f18def2c993e3113b08c191ea1da0feb94f8fd9b30109a1":"":"" + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, 0 bytes, with label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"14e57648fbbd3c2c195d71fcb9b6c332e2ad9e3402aa701e7270b05775e9ddd025e2330d7b84e67866524c67f9c38b11e4679e28a38574b47f8d218a1a04a7466754d6ea7f959ab1f5b85d066d3f90076e8219f66653f7b78a9789d76213505b4e75ec28081608ed2f1ea1238e3eeab011ce4ec147327cd0ca029c2818133cb6":"746869730069730061006c6162656c00":"" + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, 30 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"3fd3c81e3919a19014400d91098090f273312e0150e09eff7f66fb9624d2ec9764fc80befcb592e9d102493c882b8bc0334a257e73aba23a0ee13f826cbc64f8200b9150784d004ccb2955c877c95ab888e3917f423dd52f3c8a49cb61c1966ec04f336068729ae0bce7d7fb3e680f9d15d658db9b906efcbf2c2fae45e75429":"":"74686973206973206e6f2073717565616d697368206f7373696672616765" + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, 30 bytes, with label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"46edc9984a6d4b7c7fd88fda9ea91ddbd30b28a0793cc75a9fcdd94d867c69090a697d46a6f336a3e48a122dd3ee3b51566b445ff78adb613d09b7d8c59c25a27d8cf7f5e36455f2e71ff6c6ee98d5740e66b23794acc72906561951c2be5064f6a250646ab627ecbfa48c02f82c29fe9b8c8e6be8eb752432124974373b542c":"746869730069730061006c6162656c00":"74686973206973206e6f2073717565616d697368206f7373696672616765" + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-384, 30 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 +asymmetric_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0df6750b8fed749359c016887d2cf097cc512c065526a91a7ee9b345a1bfff833737e7326e54d03f6bb65971962885a7661a16858d53ea55821052f4c7798d395b5c5495332fd4174451a1a437f36c27f446b96f309ff1cb6837274aa8ae2b51a8a479d736d25b8d2ca8ab96fe589553a3e52818b7df75544eb5469977b29aa4":"":"74686973206973206e6f2073717565616d697368206f7373696672616765" + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, 30 bytes, wrong label (should be empty) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"3fd3c81e3919a19014400d91098090f273312e0150e09eff7f66fb9624d2ec9764fc80befcb592e9d102493c882b8bc0334a257e73aba23a0ee13f826cbc64f8200b9150784d004ccb2955c877c95ab888e3917f423dd52f3c8a49cb61c1966ec04f336068729ae0bce7d7fb3e680f9d15d658db9b906efcbf2c2fae45e75429":"00":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, 30 bytes, wrong label (empty) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"46edc9984a6d4b7c7fd88fda9ea91ddbd30b28a0793cc75a9fcdd94d867c69090a697d46a6f336a3e48a122dd3ee3b51566b445ff78adb613d09b7d8c59c25a27d8cf7f5e36455f2e71ff6c6ee98d5740e66b23794acc72906561951c2be5064f6a250646ab627ecbfa48c02f82c29fe9b8c8e6be8eb752432124974373b542c":"":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, 30 bytes, wrong label (same length) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"46edc9984a6d4b7c7fd88fda9ea91ddbd30b28a0793cc75a9fcdd94d867c69090a697d46a6f336a3e48a122dd3ee3b51566b445ff78adb613d09b7d8c59c25a27d8cf7f5e36455f2e71ff6c6ee98d5740e66b23794acc72906561951c2be5064f6a250646ab627ecbfa48c02f82c29fe9b8c8e6be8eb752432124974373b542c":"746869730069730061006c6162656c01":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid padding +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"99ffde2fcc00c9cc01972ebfa7779b298dbbaf7f50707a7405296dd2783456fc792002f462e760500e02afa25a859ace8701cb5d3b0262116431c43af8eb08f5a88301057cf1c156a2a5193c143e7a5b03fac132b7e89e6dcd8f4c82c9b28452329c260d30bc39b3816b7c46b41b37b4850d2ae74e729f99c6621fbbe2e46873":"":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5: salt not allowed +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"99ffde2fcc00c9cc01972ebfa7779b298dbbaf7f50707a7405296dd2783456fc792002f462e760500e02afa25a859ace8701cb5d3b0262116431c43af8eb08f5a88301057cf1c156a2a5193c143e7a5b03fac132b7e89e6dcd8f4c82c9b28452329c260d30bc39b3816b7c46b41b37b4850d2ae74e729f99c6621fbbe2e46872":"eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, invalid padding +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"3fd3c81e3919a19014400d91098090f273312e0150e09eff7f66fb9624d2ec9764fc80befcb592e9d102493c882b8bc0334a257e73aba23a0ee13f826cbc64f8200b9150784d004ccb2955c877c95ab888e3917f423dd52f3c8a49cb61c1966ec04f336068729ae0bce7d7fb3e680f9d15d658db9b906efcbf2c2fae45e75428":"":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + +PSA decrypt: invalid algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"adeecba2db7f867a733853f0136c554e5e01c7a2015721a9bfe30c3ad163b93a9c7589170311209f91420ad8a1a8280c7e890a6d7bca3c500b4da4f53a17bd84a21d58f979a9b4b8f2246b482d930804f12b3aeb2ac8b5ac7938d452ca13be8eb8e973c4e2b19fd454058cbae037bcef7ef68a5fbabf050de5f283cf1998c695":"":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid key type (RSA public key) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"adeecba2db7f867a733853f0136c554e5e01c7a2015721a9bfe30c3ad163b93a9c7589170311209f91420ad8a1a8280c7e890a6d7bca3c500b4da4f53a17bd84a21d58f979a9b4b8f2246b482d930804f12b3aeb2ac8b5ac7938d452ca13be8eb8e973c4e2b19fd454058cbae037bcef7ef68a5fbabf050de5f283cf1998c695":"":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP, invalid key type (RSA public key) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"adeecba2db7f867a733853f0136c554e5e01c7a2015721a9bfe30c3ad163b93a9c7589170311209f91420ad8a1a8280c7e890a6d7bca3c500b4da4f53a17bd84a21d58f979a9b4b8f2246b482d930804f12b3aeb2ac8b5ac7938d452ca13be8eb8e973c4e2b19fd454058cbae037bcef7ef68a5fbabf050de5f283cf1998c695":"":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5: invalid key type (AES) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396e":"":16:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, input too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ffde2fcc00c9cc01972ebfa7779b298dbbaf7f50707a7405296dd2783456fc792002f462e760500e02afa25a859ace8701cb5d3b0262116431c43af8eb08f5a88301057cf1c156a2a5193c143e7a5b03fac132b7e89e6dcd8f4c82c9b28452329c260d30bc39b3816b7c46b41b37b4850d2ae74e729f99c6621fbbe2e46872":"":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, input too large +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"0099ffde2fcc00c9cc01972ebfa7779b298dbbaf7f50707a7405296dd2783456fc792002f462e760500e02afa25a859ace8701cb5d3b0262116431c43af8eb08f5a88301057cf1c156a2a5193c143e7a5b03fac132b7e89e6dcd8f4c82c9b28452329c260d30bc39b3816b7c46b41b37b4850d2ae74e729f99c6621fbbe2e46872":"":129:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, input too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ffde2fcc00c9cc01972ebfa7779b298dbbaf7f50707a7405296dd2783456fc792002f462e760500e02afa25a859ace8701cb5d3b0262116431c43af8eb08f5a88301057cf1c156a2a5193c143e7a5b03fac132b7e89e6dcd8f4c82c9b28452329c260d30bc39b3816b7c46b41b37b4850d2ae74e729f99c6621fbbe2e46872":"":127:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, input too large +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0099ffde2fcc00c9cc01972ebfa7779b298dbbaf7f50707a7405296dd2783456fc792002f462e760500e02afa25a859ace8701cb5d3b0262116431c43af8eb08f5a88301057cf1c156a2a5193c143e7a5b03fac132b7e89e6dcd8f4c82c9b28452329c260d30bc39b3816b7c46b41b37b4850d2ae74e729f99c6621fbbe2e46872":"":129:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Crypto derivation operation object initializers zero properly +key_derivation_init: + +PSA key derivation setup: HKDF-SHA-256, good case +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation setup: HKDF-SHA-512, good case +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation setup: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, good case +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_setup:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation setup: not a key derivation algorithm (HMAC) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key derivation setup: algorithm from bad hash +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key derivation setup: bad algorithm +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +derive_setup:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, direct output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, omitted salt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, info first +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, info after salt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, omitted salt, info first +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, key output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-512, good case +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, bad key type +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, bad key type, key output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +# Whether we get NOT_PERMITTED or BAD_STATE for the output is an implementation +# detail. +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, direct secret, direct output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, direct empty secret, direct output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, direct secret, key output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, direct empty secret, key output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, missing secret, key output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, RAW_DATA key as salt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"412073616c74":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, RAW_DATA key as info +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"4120696e666f":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, DERIVE key as salt, direct output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"412073616c74":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, DERIVE key as salt, key output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +# Whether we get NOT_PERMITTED or BAD_STATE for the output is an implementation +# detail. +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"412073616c74":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, DERIVE key as info +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"4120696e666f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, salt after secret +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, missing secret +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, missing info +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate salt step +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate secret step (direct, direct) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate secret step (direct, key) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate secret step (key, direct) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0a0a0a0a":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate secret step (key, key) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0a0a0a0a":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate info step (non-consecutive) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate info step (consecutive) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, reject label step +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, reject seed step +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, good case +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, good case +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, missing label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, missing label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, missing label and secret +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, missing label and secret +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, no inputs +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, no inputs +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, key first +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, key first +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, label first +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, early label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, double seed +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, double key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, bad key type +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, direct secret +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, direct empty secret +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, RAW_DATA key as seed +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"612073656564":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, RAW_DATA key as label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"61206c6162656c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, DERIVE key as seed +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"612073656564":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, DERIVE key as label +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"61206c6162656c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, SHA-256, PSK too long (160 Bytes) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"01020304050607080102030405060708010203040506070801020304050607080102030405060708010203040506070801020304050607080102030405060708010203040506070801020304050607080102030405060708010203040506070801020304050607080102030405060708010203040506070801020304050607080102030405060708010203040506070801020304050607080102030405060708":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, raw output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, omitted salt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, info first +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, key output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, salt after secret +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, missing info +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + +PSA key derivation over capacity: HKDF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_over_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key derivation over capacity: TLS 1.2 PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_over_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key derivation: actions without setup +derive_actions_without_setup: + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, output 42+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, output 32+10 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf":"34007208d5b887185865" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, output 0+42 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"":"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, output 1+41 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"3c":"b25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, output 41+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b8871858":"" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, output 1+40 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"3c":"b25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b8871858" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, RFC5869 #2, output 82+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":82:"b11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a49344f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f1d87":"" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, RFC5869 #3, output 42+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":42:"8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d9d201395faa4b61a96c8":"" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-1, RFC5869 #4, output 42+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"085a01ea1b10f36933068b56efa5ad81a4f14b822f5b091568a9cdd4f155fda2c22e422478d305f3f896":"" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-1, RFC5869 #5, output 82+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":82:"0bd770a74d1160f7c9f12cd5912a06ebff6adcae899d92191fe4305673ba2ffe8fa3f1a4e5ad79f3f334b3b202b2173c486ea37ce3d397ed034c7f9dfeb15c5e927336d0441f4c4300e2cff0d0900b52d3b4":"" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-1, RFC5869 #6, output 42+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":42:"0ac1af7002b3d761d1e55298da9d0506b9ae52057220a306e07b6b87e8df21d0ea00033de03984d34918":"" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-1, RFC5869 #7, output 42+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":42:"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48":"" + +# Test vectors taken from https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg03416.html +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, output 100+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"a0ba9f936cda311827a6f796ffd5198c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"9bbe436ba940f017b17652849a71db35":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":100:"e3f229ba727be17b8d122620557cd453c2aab21d07c3d495329b52d4e61edb5a6b301791e90d35c9c9a46b4e14baf9af0fa022f7077def17abfd3797c0564bab4fbc91666e9def9b97fce34f796789baa48082d122ee42c5a72e5a5110fff70187347b66":"" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, output 99+1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"a0ba9f936cda311827a6f796ffd5198c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"9bbe436ba940f017b17652849a71db35":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":100:"e3f229ba727be17b8d122620557cd453c2aab21d07c3d495329b52d4e61edb5a6b301791e90d35c9c9a46b4e14baf9af0fa022f7077def17abfd3797c0564bab4fbc91666e9def9b97fce34f796789baa48082d122ee42c5a72e5a5110fff70187347b":"66" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, output 1+99 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"a0ba9f936cda311827a6f796ffd5198c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"9bbe436ba940f017b17652849a71db35":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":100:"e3":"f229ba727be17b8d122620557cd453c2aab21d07c3d495329b52d4e61edb5a6b301791e90d35c9c9a46b4e14baf9af0fa022f7077def17abfd3797c0564bab4fbc91666e9def9b97fce34f796789baa48082d122ee42c5a72e5a5110fff70187347b66" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, output 50+50 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"a0ba9f936cda311827a6f796ffd5198c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"9bbe436ba940f017b17652849a71db35":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":100:"e3f229ba727be17b8d122620557cd453c2aab21d07c3d495329b52d4e61edb5a6b301791e90d35c9c9a46b4e14baf9af0fa0":"22f7077def17abfd3797c0564bab4fbc91666e9def9b97fce34f796789baa48082d122ee42c5a72e5a5110fff70187347b66" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, output 50+49 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"a0ba9f936cda311827a6f796ffd5198c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"9bbe436ba940f017b17652849a71db35":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":100:"e3f229ba727be17b8d122620557cd453c2aab21d07c3d495329b52d4e61edb5a6b301791e90d35c9c9a46b4e14baf9af0fa0":"22f7077def17abfd3797c0564bab4fbc91666e9def9b97fce34f796789baa48082d122ee42c5a72e5a5110fff70187347b" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-384, output 148+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"cd665cf6a8447dd6ff8b27555edb7465":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"b80b733d6ceefcdc71566ea48e5567df":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":148:"7b0c18e9ced410ed1804f2cfa34a336a1c14dffb4900bb5fd7942107e81c83cde9ca0faa60be9fe34f82b1233c9146a0e534cb400fed2700884f9dc236f80edd8bfa961144c9e8d792eca722a7b32fc3d416d473ebc2c5fd4abfdad05d9184259b5bf8cd4d90fa0d31e2dec479e4f1a26066f2eea9a69236a3e52655c9e9aee691c8f3a26854308d5eaa3be85e0990703d73e56f":"" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-384, output 147+1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"cd665cf6a8447dd6ff8b27555edb7465":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"b80b733d6ceefcdc71566ea48e5567df":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":148:"7b0c18e9ced410ed1804f2cfa34a336a1c14dffb4900bb5fd7942107e81c83cde9ca0faa60be9fe34f82b1233c9146a0e534cb400fed2700884f9dc236f80edd8bfa961144c9e8d792eca722a7b32fc3d416d473ebc2c5fd4abfdad05d9184259b5bf8cd4d90fa0d31e2dec479e4f1a26066f2eea9a69236a3e52655c9e9aee691c8f3a26854308d5eaa3be85e0990703d73e5":"6f" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-384, output 1+147 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"cd665cf6a8447dd6ff8b27555edb7465":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"b80b733d6ceefcdc71566ea48e5567df":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":148:"7b":"0c18e9ced410ed1804f2cfa34a336a1c14dffb4900bb5fd7942107e81c83cde9ca0faa60be9fe34f82b1233c9146a0e534cb400fed2700884f9dc236f80edd8bfa961144c9e8d792eca722a7b32fc3d416d473ebc2c5fd4abfdad05d9184259b5bf8cd4d90fa0d31e2dec479e4f1a26066f2eea9a69236a3e52655c9e9aee691c8f3a26854308d5eaa3be85e0990703d73e56f" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-384, output 74+74 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"cd665cf6a8447dd6ff8b27555edb7465":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"b80b733d6ceefcdc71566ea48e5567df":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":148:"7b0c18e9ced410ed1804f2cfa34a336a1c14dffb4900bb5fd7942107e81c83cde9ca0faa60be9fe34f82b1233c9146a0e534cb400fed2700884f9dc236f80edd8bfa961144c9e8d792ec":"a722a7b32fc3d416d473ebc2c5fd4abfdad05d9184259b5bf8cd4d90fa0d31e2dec479e4f1a26066f2eea9a69236a3e52655c9e9aee691c8f3a26854308d5eaa3be85e0990703d73e56f" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-384, output 74+73 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"cd665cf6a8447dd6ff8b27555edb7465":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"b80b733d6ceefcdc71566ea48e5567df":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"74657374206c6162656c":148:"7b0c18e9ced410ed1804f2cfa34a336a1c14dffb4900bb5fd7942107e81c83cde9ca0faa60be9fe34f82b1233c9146a0e534cb400fed2700884f9dc236f80edd8bfa961144c9e8d792ec":"a722a7b32fc3d416d473ebc2c5fd4abfdad05d9184259b5bf8cd4d90fa0d31e2dec479e4f1a26066f2eea9a69236a3e52655c9e9aee691c8f3a26854308d5eaa3be85e0990703d73e5" + +# Test case manually extracted from debug output of TLS-PSK run +# Label: "master secret" +# Salt: Concatenation of ClientHello.Random and ServerHello.Random +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, SHA-256, 48+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"01020304":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"6d617374657220736563726574":48:"5a9dd5ffa78b4d1f28f40d91b4e6e6ed37849042d61ba32ca43d866e744cee7cd1baaa497e1ecd5c2e60f9f13030a710":"" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, SHA-256, 24+24 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"01020304":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"6d617374657220736563726574":48:"5a9dd5ffa78b4d1f28f40d91b4e6e6ed37849042d61ba32c":"a43d866e744cee7cd1baaa497e1ecd5c2e60f9f13030a710" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, SHA-256, 0+48 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"01020304":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"6d617374657220736563726574":48:"":"5a9dd5ffa78b4d1f28f40d91b4e6e6ed37849042d61ba32ca43d866e744cee7cd1baaa497e1ecd5c2e60f9f13030a710" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, SHA-384, 48+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"5bed47716a11a49a6268a8350b085929116ad9ccc8181f09a05b07a7741576d65bed47718dfd82f2d3f57544afe52decae6819b970dc716ada72ae0dd3072e9a":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"01020304":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"6d617374657220736563726574":48:"f5a61fbdd2ec415762abb8042a6c16645a53d2edb6dec8c85ca71689301f9f4d875128c87608b75250b20a9550e4fe18":"" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, SHA-384, 24+24 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"5bed47716a11a49a6268a8350b085929116ad9ccc8181f09a05b07a7741576d65bed47718dfd82f2d3f57544afe52decae6819b970dc716ada72ae0dd3072e9a":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"01020304":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"6d617374657220736563726574":48:"":"f5a61fbdd2ec415762abb8042a6c16645a53d2edb6dec8c85ca71689301f9f4d875128c87608b75250b20a9550e4fe18" + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, SHA-384, 0+48 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_output:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:"5bed47716a11a49a6268a8350b085929116ad9ccc8181f09a05b07a7741576d65bed47718dfd82f2d3f57544afe52decae6819b970dc716ada72ae0dd3072e9a":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"01020304":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:"6d617374657220736563726574":48:"f5a61fbdd2ec415762abb8042a6c16645a53d2edb6dec8c8":"5ca71689301f9f4d875128c87608b75250b20a9550e4fe18" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, request maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-1, request maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0ab3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5673a081d70cce7acfc48":"" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-1, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 42+1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"ff" + +PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 41+2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b8871858":"65ff" + +PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 43+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865ff":"" + +PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 43+1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865ff":"ff" + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1 + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1 + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise AES128-CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise AES256-CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise DES-CBC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise 2-key 3DES-CBC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise 3-key 3DES-CBC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, exercise AES128-CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, exercise AES256-CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, exercise DES-CBC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, exercise 2-key 3DES-CBC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, exercise 3-key 3DES-CBC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, exercise HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, exercise HKDF-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:400:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, derive key export, 16+32 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key_export:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":16:32 + +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, derive key export, 1+41 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key_export:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":1:41 + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, derive key export, 16+32 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_key_export:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":16:32 + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, derive key export, 1+41 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +derive_key_export:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":1:41 + +PSA key derivation: invalid type (0) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA key derivation: invalid type (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK:128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA key derivation: invalid length (0) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +# The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED +derive_key:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA key derivation: invalid length (7 bits) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA key derivation: raw data, 8 bits +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA key derivation: invalid length (9 bits) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_key:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:9:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +# This test assumes that PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS (currently 65536-8 bits = 8191 bytes +# and not expected to be raised any time soon) is less than the maximum +# output from HKDF-SHA512 (255*64 = 16320 bytes). +PSA key derivation: largest possible key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_key:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA key derivation: key too large +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_key:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS + 1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0 + +PSA key agreement setup: ECDH + HKDF-SHA-256: good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key agreement setup: ECDH + HKDF-SHA-256: good, key algorithm broader than required +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDH:"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key agreement setup: ECDH + HKDF-SHA-256: key algorithm KDF mismatch +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key agreement setup: ECDH + HKDF-SHA-256: public key not on curve +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ff":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key agreement setup: ECDH + HKDF-SHA-256: public key on different curve +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04e558dbef53eecde3d3fccfc1aea08a89a987475d12fd950d83cfa41732bc509d0d1ac43a0336def96fda41d0774a3571dcfbec7aacf3196472169e838430367f66eebe3c6e70c416dd5f0c68759dd1fff83fa40142209dff5eaad96db9e6386c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key agreement setup: ECDH + HKDF-SHA-256: public key instead of private key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key agreement setup: ECDH, unknown KDF +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key agreement setup: bad key agreement algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(0, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(0, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key agreement setup: KDF instead of a key agreement algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA raw key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de" + +PSA raw key agreement: ECDH SECP384R1 (RFC 5903) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"099f3c7034d4a2c699884d73a375a67f7624ef7c6b3c0f160647b67414dce655e35b538041e649ee3faef896783ab194":"04e558dbef53eecde3d3fccfc1aea08a89a987475d12fd950d83cfa41732bc509d0d1ac43a0336def96fda41d0774a3571dcfbec7aacf3196472169e838430367f66eebe3c6e70c416dd5f0c68759dd1fff83fa40142209dff5eaad96db9e6386c":"11187331c279962d93d604243fd592cb9d0a926f422e47187521287e7156c5c4d603135569b9e9d09cf5d4a270f59746" + +PSA raw key agreement: ECDH SECP521R1 (RFC 5903) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"0037ade9319a89f4dabdb3ef411aaccca5123c61acab57b5393dce47608172a095aa85a30fe1c2952c6771d937ba9777f5957b2639bab072462f68c27a57382d4a52":"0400d0b3975ac4b799f5bea16d5e13e9af971d5e9b984c9f39728b5e5739735a219b97c356436adc6e95bb0352f6be64a6c2912d4ef2d0433ced2b6171640012d9460f015c68226383956e3bd066e797b623c27ce0eac2f551a10c2c724d9852077b87220b6536c5c408a1d2aebb8e86d678ae49cb57091f4732296579ab44fcd17f0fc56a":"01144c7d79ae6956bc8edb8e7c787c4521cb086fa64407f97894e5e6b2d79b04d1427e73ca4baa240a34786859810c06b3c715a3a8cc3151f2bee417996d19f3ddea" + +PSA raw key agreement: ECDH brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 7027) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"81db1ee100150ff2ea338d708271be38300cb54241d79950f77b063039804f1d":"048d2d688c6cf93e1160ad04cc4429117dc2c41825e1e9fca0addd34e6f1b39f7b990c57520812be512641e47034832106bc7d3e8dd0e4c7f1136d7006547cec6a":"89afc39d41d3b327814b80940b042590f96556ec91e6ae7939bce31f3a18bf2b" + +PSA raw key agreement: ECDH brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 7027) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"1e20f5e048a5886f1f157c74e91bde2b98c8b52d58e5003d57053fc4b0bd65d6f15eb5d1ee1610df870795143627d042":"044d44326f269a597a5b58bba565da5556ed7fd9a8a9eb76c25f46db69d19dc8ce6ad18e404b15738b2086df37e71d1eb462d692136de56cbe93bf5fa3188ef58bc8a3a0ec6c1e151a21038a42e9185329b5b275903d192f8d4e1f32fe9cc78c48":"0bd9d3a7ea0b3d519d09d8e48d0785fb744a6b355e6304bc51c229fbbce239bbadf6403715c35d4fb2a5444f575d4f42" + +PSA raw key agreement: ECDH brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 7027) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"16302ff0dbbb5a8d733dab7141c1b45acbc8715939677f6a56850a38bd87bd59b09e80279609ff333eb9d4c061231fb26f92eeb04982a5f1d1764cad57665422":"049d45f66de5d67e2e6db6e93a59ce0bb48106097ff78a081de781cdb31fce8ccbaaea8dd4320c4119f1e9cd437a2eab3731fa9668ab268d871deda55a5473199f2fdc313095bcdd5fb3a91636f07a959c8e86b5636a1e930e8396049cb481961d365cc11453a06c719835475b12cb52fc3c383bce35e27ef194512b71876285fa":"a7927098655f1f9976fa50a9d566865dc530331846381c87256baf3226244b76d36403c024d7bbf0aa0803eaff405d3d24f11a9b5c0bef679fe1454b21c4cd1f" + +PSA raw key agreement: X25519 (RFC 7748: Alice) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a":"de9edb7d7b7dc1b4d35b61c2ece435373f8343c85b78674dadfc7e146f882b4f":"4a5d9d5ba4ce2de1728e3bf480350f25e07e21c947d19e3376f09b3c1e161742" + +PSA raw key agreement: X25519 (RFC 7748: Bob) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"5dab087e624a8a4b79e17f8b83800ee66f3bb1292618b6fd1c2f8b27ff88e0eb":"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":"4a5d9d5ba4ce2de1728e3bf480350f25e07e21c947d19e3376f09b3c1e161742" + +PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) + HKDF-SHA-256: capacity=8160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":8160 + +PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) + HKDF-SHA-256: read 32+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"3bf511eebadf44c1f7b0282a1262fe4ddd9da23bb1555cfda591ac46b088c441":"" + +PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) + HKDF-SHA-256: read 31+1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"3bf511eebadf44c1f7b0282a1262fe4ddd9da23bb1555cfda591ac46b088c4":"41" + +PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) + HKDF-SHA-256: read 1+31 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"3b":"f511eebadf44c1f7b0282a1262fe4ddd9da23bb1555cfda591ac46b088c441" + +PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) + HKDF-SHA-256: read 0+32 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"":"3bf511eebadf44c1f7b0282a1262fe4ddd9da23bb1555cfda591ac46b088c441" + +PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) + HKDF-SHA-256: read 32+32 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"3bf511eebadf44c1f7b0282a1262fe4ddd9da23bb1555cfda591ac46b088c441":"7883c010f6e37cd6942c63bd8a65d8648c736bf8330b539760e18db13888d992" + +PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) + HKDF-SHA-256: read 64+0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"3bf511eebadf44c1f7b0282a1262fe4ddd9da23bb1555cfda591ac46b088c4417883c010f6e37cd6942c63bd8a65d8648c736bf8330b539760e18db13888d992":"" + +PSA generate random: 0 bytes +generate_random:0 + +PSA generate random: 1 byte +generate_random:1 + +PSA generate random: 4 bytes +generate_random:4 + +PSA generate random: 16 bytes +generate_random:16 + +PSA generate random: 19 bytes +generate_random:19 + +PSA generate random: 260 bytes +generate_random:260 + +PSA generate random: MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST bytes +generate_random:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + +PSA generate random: MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST+1 bytes +generate_random:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1 + +PSA generate random: 2*MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST+1 bytes +generate_random:2 * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1 + +PSA generate key: bad type (RSA public key) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA generate key: raw data, 0 bits: invalid argument +# The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA generate key: raw data, 7 bits: invalid argument +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:7:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA generate key: raw data, 8 bits +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: raw data, 9 bits: invalid argument +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:9:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA generate key: raw data, (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1) * 8 bits +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1) * 8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: raw data, (2 * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1) * 8 bits +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:(2 * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1) * 8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: raw data, 65528 bits (large key, ok if it fits) +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:65528:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +PSA generate key: raw data, 65536 bits (not supported) +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:65536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0 + +PSA generate key: AES, 128 bits, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: AES, 128 bits, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: DES, 64 bits, CBC-nopad +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: DES, 128 bits, CBC-nopad +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: DES, 192 bits, CBC-nopad +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: invalid key size: AES, 64 bits +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, 512 bits, good, sign (PKCS#1 v1.5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, 1016 bits, good, sign (PKCS#1 v1.5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_MD_C +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1016:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, 1024 bits, good, sign (PSS SHA-256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_MD_C +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, 1024 bits, good, sign (PSS-any-salt SHA-256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_MD_C +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, 512 bits, good, encrypt (PKCS#1 v1.5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, 1024 bits, good, encrypt (OAEP SHA-256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_MD_C +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, 0 bits: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +# The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, 1022 bits: not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1022:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, 1023 bits: not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1023:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, maximum size exceeded +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS+1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0 + +PSA generate key: ECC, SECP256R1, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: ECC, SECP256R1, incorrect bit size +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +# INVALID_ARGUMENT would make more sense, but our code as currently structured +# doesn't fully relate the curve with its size. +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0 + +PSA generate key: ECC, Curve25519, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +PSA generate key: RSA, default e +generate_key_rsa:512:"":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA generate key: RSA, e=3 +generate_key_rsa:512:"03":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA generate key: RSA, e=65537 +generate_key_rsa:512:"010001":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA generate key: RSA, e=513 +generate_key_rsa:512:"0201":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA generate key: RSA, e=1 +generate_key_rsa:512:"01":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA generate key: RSA, e=2 +generate_key_rsa:512:"01":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA import persistent key: raw data, 8 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:IMPORT_KEY + +PSA import persistent key: AES, 128 bits, exportable +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:IMPORT_KEY + +PSA import persistent key: AES, 128 bits, non-exportable +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:IMPORT_KEY + +PSA generate persistent key: raw data, 8 bits, exportable +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:GENERATE_KEY + +PSA generate persistent key: AES, 128 bits, exportable +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:GENERATE_KEY + +PSA generate persistent key: AES, 128 bits, non-exportable +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:GENERATE_KEY + +PSA generate persistent key: DES, 64 bits, exportable +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:GENERATE_KEY + +PSA generate persistent key: RSA, 1024 bits, exportable +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):GENERATE_KEY + +PSA generate persistent key: ECC, SECP256R1, exportable +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:GENERATE_KEY + +PSA derive persistent key: HKDF SHA-256, exportable +persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:DERIVE_KEY diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f9e90937 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -0,0 +1,5630 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" + +/* For MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST, knowing that psa_generate_random() + * uses mbedtls_ctr_drbg internally. */ +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" + +#include "test/asn1_helpers.h" +#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h" +#include "test/psa_exercise_key.h" + +/* If this comes up, it's a bug in the test code or in the test data. */ +#define UNUSED 0xdeadbeef + +/* Assert that an operation is (not) active. + * This serves as a proxy for checking if the operation is aborted. */ +#define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id != 0 ) +#define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id == 0 ) + +/** An invalid export length that will never be set by psa_export_key(). */ +static const size_t INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH = ~0U; + +/** Test if a buffer contains a constant byte value. + * + * `mem_is_char(buffer, c, size)` is true after `memset(buffer, c, size)`. + * + * \param buffer Pointer to the beginning of the buffer. + * \param c Expected value of every byte. + * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 1 if the buffer is all-bits-zero. + * \return 0 if there is at least one nonzero byte. + */ +static int mem_is_char( void *buffer, unsigned char c, size_t size ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < size; i++ ) + { + if( ( (unsigned char *) buffer )[i] != c ) + return( 0 ); + } + return( 1 ); +} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +/* Write the ASN.1 INTEGER with the value 2^(bits-1)+x backwards from *p. */ +static int asn1_write_10x( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + size_t bits, + unsigned char x ) +{ + int ret; + int len = bits / 8 + 1; + if( bits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + if( bits <= 8 && x >= 1 << ( bits - 1 ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + if( *p < start || *p - start < (ptrdiff_t) len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + *p -= len; + ( *p )[len-1] = x; + if( bits % 8 == 0 ) + ( *p )[1] |= 1; + else + ( *p )[0] |= 1 << ( bits % 8 ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + return( len ); +} + +static int construct_fake_rsa_key( unsigned char *buffer, + size_t buffer_size, + unsigned char **p, + size_t bits, + int keypair ) +{ + size_t half_bits = ( bits + 1 ) / 2; + int ret; + int len = 0; + /* Construct something that looks like a DER encoding of + * as defined by PKCS#1 v2.2 (RFC 8017) section A.1.2: + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + * Or, for a public key, the same structure with only + * version, modulus and publicExponent. + */ + *p = buffer + buffer_size; + if( keypair ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, /* pq */ + asn1_write_10x( p, buffer, half_bits, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, /* dq */ + asn1_write_10x( p, buffer, half_bits, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, /* dp */ + asn1_write_10x( p, buffer, half_bits, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, /* q */ + asn1_write_10x( p, buffer, half_bits, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, /* p != q to pass mbedtls sanity checks */ + asn1_write_10x( p, buffer, half_bits, 3 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, /* d */ + asn1_write_10x( p, buffer, bits, 1 ) ); + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, /* e = 65537 */ + asn1_write_10x( p, buffer, 17, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, /* n */ + asn1_write_10x( p, buffer, bits, 1 ) ); + if( keypair ) + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, /* version = 0 */ + mbedtls_asn1_write_int( p, buffer, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, buffer, len ) ); + { + const unsigned char tag = + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, buffer, tag ) ); + } + return( len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ + +int exercise_mac_setup( psa_key_type_t key_type, + const unsigned char *key_bytes, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_status_t *status ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_bytes, key_length, &key ) ); + + *status = psa_mac_sign_setup( operation, key, alg ); + /* Whether setup succeeded or failed, abort must succeed. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( operation ) ); + /* If setup failed, reproduce the failure, so that the caller can + * test the resulting state of the operation object. */ + if( *status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_sign_setup( operation, key, alg ), *status ); + } + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( 1 ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( 0 ); +} + +int exercise_cipher_setup( psa_key_type_t key_type, + const unsigned char *key_bytes, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + psa_status_t *status ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_bytes, key_length, &key ) ); + + *status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( operation, key, alg ); + /* Whether setup succeeded or failed, abort must succeed. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( operation ) ); + /* If setup failed, reproduce the failure, so that the caller can + * test the resulting state of the operation object. */ + if( *status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( operation, key, alg ), + *status ); + } + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( 1 ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static int test_operations_on_invalid_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 0x6964 ); + uint8_t buffer[1]; + size_t length; + int ok = 0; + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, PSA_ALG_CTR ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + TEST_EQUAL( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( psa_get_key_id( &attributes ) ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( psa_get_key_id( &attributes ) ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_export_key( key, buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_export_public_key( key, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + + ok = 1; + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + return( ok ); +} + +/* Assert that a key isn't reported as having a slot number. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#define ASSERT_NO_SLOT_NUMBER( attributes ) \ + do \ + { \ + psa_key_slot_number_t ASSERT_NO_SLOT_NUMBER_slot_number; \ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_slot_number( \ + attributes, \ + &ASSERT_NO_SLOT_NUMBER_slot_number ), \ + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); \ + } \ + while( 0 ) +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +#define ASSERT_NO_SLOT_NUMBER( attributes ) \ + ( (void) 0 ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/* An overapproximation of the amount of storage needed for a key of the + * given type and with the given content. The API doesn't make it easy + * to find a good value for the size. The current implementation doesn't + * care about the value anyway. */ +#define KEY_BITS_FROM_DATA( type, data ) \ + ( data )->len + +typedef enum { + IMPORT_KEY = 0, + GENERATE_KEY = 1, + DERIVE_KEY = 2 +} generate_method; + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void static_checks( ) +{ + size_t max_truncated_mac_size = + PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET; + + /* Check that the length for a truncated MAC always fits in the algorithm + * encoding. The shifted mask is the maximum truncated value. The + * untruncated algorithm may be one byte larger. */ + TEST_LE_U( PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, 1 + max_truncated_mac_size ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) + /* Check deprecated constants. */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT, PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT, PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED, PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R2, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT239K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R2, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R2, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); + + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R2, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R2, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ECC_CURVE_MONTGOMERY, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); + + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE2048, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE3072, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE4096, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE6144, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE8192, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_DH_GROUP_RFC7919, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_DH_GROUP_CUSTOM, PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ); +#endif +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void import_with_policy( int type_arg, + int usage_arg, int alg_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t got_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + const uint8_t key_material[16] = {0}; + psa_status_t status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + &key ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &got_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &got_attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &got_attributes ), + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( usage ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &got_attributes ), alg ); + ASSERT_NO_SLOT_NUMBER( &got_attributes ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + test_operations_on_invalid_key( key ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &got_attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void import_with_data( data_t *data, int type_arg, + int attr_bits_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t got_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t attr_bits = attr_bits_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_status_t status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, attr_bits ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, data->x, data->len, &key ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &got_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &got_attributes ), type ); + if( attr_bits != 0 ) + TEST_EQUAL( attr_bits, psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ) ); + ASSERT_NO_SLOT_NUMBER( &got_attributes ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + test_operations_on_invalid_key( key ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &got_attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void import_large_key( int type_arg, int byte_size_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t byte_size = byte_size_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t *buffer = NULL; + size_t buffer_size = byte_size + 1; + size_t n; + + /* Skip the test case if the target running the test cannot + * accommodate large keys due to heap size constraints */ + ASSERT_ALLOC_WEAK( buffer, buffer_size ); + memset( buffer, 'K', byte_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Try importing the key */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, buffer, byte_size, &key ); + TEST_ASSUME( status != PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), + PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( byte_size ) ); + ASSERT_NO_SLOT_NUMBER( &attributes ); + memset( buffer, 0, byte_size + 1 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( key, buffer, byte_size, &n ) ); + for( n = 0; n < byte_size; n++ ) + TEST_EQUAL( buffer[n], 'K' ); + for( n = byte_size; n < buffer_size; n++ ) + TEST_EQUAL( buffer[n], 0 ); + } + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( buffer ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ +void import_rsa_made_up( int bits_arg, int keypair, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t type = + keypair ? PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR : PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY; + size_t buffer_size = /* Slight overapproximations */ + keypair ? bits * 9 / 16 + 80 : bits / 8 + 20; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + unsigned char *p; + int ret; + size_t length; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( buffer, buffer_size ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ( ret = construct_fake_rsa_key( buffer, buffer_size, &p, + bits, keypair ) ) >= 0 ); + length = ret; + + /* Try importing the key */ + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, p, length, &key ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( buffer ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void import_export( data_t *data, + int type_arg, + int usage_arg, int alg_arg, + int expected_bits, + int export_size_delta, + int expected_export_status_arg, + int canonical_input ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_export_status = expected_export_status_arg; + psa_status_t status; + unsigned char *exported = NULL; + unsigned char *reexported = NULL; + size_t export_size; + size_t exported_length = INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH; + size_t reexported_length; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t got_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + export_size = (ptrdiff_t) data->len + export_size_delta; + ASSERT_ALLOC( exported, export_size ); + if( ! canonical_input ) + ASSERT_ALLOC( reexported, export_size ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage_arg ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + + /* Import the key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, data->x, data->len, &key ) ); + + /* Test the key information */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &got_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &got_attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ), (size_t) expected_bits ); + ASSERT_NO_SLOT_NUMBER( &got_attributes ); + + /* Export the key */ + status = psa_export_key( key, exported, export_size, &exported_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_export_status ); + + /* The exported length must be set by psa_export_key() to a value between 0 + * and export_size. On errors, the exported length must be 0. */ + TEST_ASSERT( exported_length != INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH ); + TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_SUCCESS || exported_length == 0 ); + TEST_LE_U( exported_length, export_size ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mem_is_char( exported + exported_length, 0, + export_size - exported_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( exported_length, 0 ); + goto destroy; + } + + /* Run sanity checks on the exported key. For non-canonical inputs, + * this validates the canonical representations. For canonical inputs, + * this doesn't directly validate the implementation, but it still helps + * by cross-validating the test data with the sanity check code. */ + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( key, usage_arg, 0 ) ) + goto exit; + + if( canonical_input ) + ASSERT_COMPARE( data->x, data->len, exported, exported_length ); + else + { + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key2 = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, exported, exported_length, + &key2 ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( key2, + reexported, + export_size, + &reexported_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( exported, exported_length, + reexported, reexported_length ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key2 ) ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( exported_length <= + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, + psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ) ) ); + TEST_LE_U( exported_length, PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE ); + +destroy: + /* Destroy the key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + test_operations_on_invalid_key( key ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &got_attributes ); + + mbedtls_free( exported ); + mbedtls_free( reexported ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void import_export_public_key( data_t *data, + int type_arg, + int alg_arg, + int export_size_delta, + int expected_export_status_arg, + data_t *expected_public_key ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_export_status = expected_export_status_arg; + psa_status_t status; + unsigned char *exported = NULL; + size_t export_size = expected_public_key->len + export_size_delta; + size_t exported_length = INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + + /* Import the key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, data->x, data->len, &key ) ); + + /* Export the public key */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( exported, export_size ); + status = psa_export_public_key( key, + exported, export_size, + &exported_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_export_status ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_type_t public_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( type ); + size_t bits; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + TEST_LE_U( expected_public_key->len, + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_type, bits ) ); + TEST_LE_U( expected_public_key->len, + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( public_type, bits ) ); + TEST_LE_U( expected_public_key->len, + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_public_key->x, expected_public_key->len, + exported, exported_length ); + } + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + mbedtls_free( exported ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void import_and_exercise_key( data_t *data, + int type_arg, + int bits_arg, + int alg_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage = mbedtls_test_psa_usage_to_exercise( type, alg ); + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t got_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + + /* Import the key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, data->x, data->len, &key ) ); + + /* Test the key information */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &got_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &got_attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ), bits ); + + /* Do something with the key according to its type and permitted usage. */ + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( key, usage, alg ) ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + test_operations_on_invalid_key( key ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &got_attributes ); + + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void effective_key_attributes( int type_arg, int expected_type_arg, + int bits_arg, int expected_bits_arg, + int usage_arg, int expected_usage_arg, + int alg_arg, int expected_alg_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = type_arg; + psa_key_type_t expected_key_type = expected_type_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + size_t expected_bits = expected_bits_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t expected_alg = expected_alg_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = expected_usage_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ) ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), expected_key_type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), expected_bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), expected_usage ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), expected_alg ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void check_key_policy( int type_arg, int bits_arg, + int usage_arg, int alg_arg ) +{ + test_effective_key_attributes( type_arg, type_arg, bits_arg, bits_arg, + usage_arg, + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( usage_arg ), + alg_arg, alg_arg ); + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_attributes_init( ) +{ + /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as + * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even + * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need + * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */ + psa_key_attributes_t func = psa_key_attributes_init( ); + psa_key_attributes_t init = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t zero; + + memset( &zero, 0, sizeof( zero ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &func ), PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &init ), PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &zero ), PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &func ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &init ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &zero ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &func ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &init ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &zero ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &func ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &init ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &zero ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &func ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &init ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &zero ), 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mac_key_policy( int policy_usage_arg, + int policy_alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int exercise_alg_arg, + int expected_status_sign_arg, + int expected_status_verify_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg = policy_alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t exercise_alg = exercise_alg_arg; + psa_key_usage_t policy_usage = policy_usage_arg; + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status_sign = expected_status_sign_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status_verify = expected_status_verify_arg; + unsigned char mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, policy_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, policy_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( policy_usage ) ); + + status = psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, exercise_alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_sign ); + + /* Calculate the MAC, one-shot case. */ + uint8_t input[128] = {0}; + size_t mac_len; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_compute( key, exercise_alg, + input, 128, + mac, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, &mac_len ), + expected_status_sign ); + + /* Verify correct MAC, one-shot case. */ + status = psa_mac_verify( key, exercise_alg, input, 128, + mac, mac_len ); + + if( expected_status_sign != PSA_SUCCESS && expected_status_verify == PSA_SUCCESS ) + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_verify ); + + psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + + memset( mac, 0, sizeof( mac ) ); + status = psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, exercise_alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_verify ); + +exit: + psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_key_policy( int policy_usage_arg, + int policy_alg, + int key_type, + data_t *key_data, + int exercise_alg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t policy_usage = policy_usage_arg; + psa_status_t status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, policy_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, policy_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* Check if no key usage flag implication is done */ + TEST_EQUAL( policy_usage, + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( policy_usage ) ); + + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, exercise_alg ); + if( policy_alg == exercise_alg && + ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) != 0 ) + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, exercise_alg ); + if( policy_alg == exercise_alg && + ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ) != 0 ) + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aead_key_policy( int policy_usage_arg, + int policy_alg, + int key_type, + data_t *key_data, + int nonce_length_arg, + int tag_length_arg, + int exercise_alg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t policy_usage = policy_usage_arg; + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + unsigned char nonce[16] = {0}; + size_t nonce_length = nonce_length_arg; + unsigned char tag[16]; + size_t tag_length = tag_length_arg; + size_t output_length; + + TEST_LE_U( nonce_length, sizeof( nonce ) ); + TEST_LE_U( tag_length, sizeof( tag ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, policy_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, policy_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* Check if no key usage implication is done */ + TEST_EQUAL( policy_usage, + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( policy_usage ) ); + + status = psa_aead_encrypt( key, exercise_alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + tag, tag_length, + &output_length ); + if( ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) != 0 ) + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + memset( tag, 0, sizeof( tag ) ); + status = psa_aead_decrypt( key, exercise_alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + NULL, 0, + tag, tag_length, + NULL, 0, + &output_length ); + if( ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ) == 0 ) + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + else if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_encryption_key_policy( int policy_usage_arg, + int policy_alg, + int key_type, + data_t *key_data, + int exercise_alg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t policy_usage = policy_usage_arg; + psa_status_t status; + size_t key_bits; + size_t buffer_length; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + size_t output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, policy_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, policy_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* Check if no key usage implication is done */ + TEST_EQUAL( policy_usage, + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( policy_usage ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + buffer_length = PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, + exercise_alg ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( buffer, buffer_length ); + + status = psa_asymmetric_encrypt( key, exercise_alg, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + buffer, buffer_length, + &output_length ); + if( policy_alg == exercise_alg && + ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) != 0 ) + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + if( buffer_length != 0 ) + memset( buffer, 0, buffer_length ); + status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key, exercise_alg, + buffer, buffer_length, + NULL, 0, + buffer, buffer_length, + &output_length ); + if( policy_alg == exercise_alg && + ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ) != 0 ) + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( buffer ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_signature_key_policy( int policy_usage_arg, + int policy_alg, + int key_type, + data_t *key_data, + int exercise_alg, + int payload_length_arg, + int expected_usage_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t policy_usage = policy_usage_arg; + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = expected_usage_arg; + psa_status_t status; + unsigned char payload[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE] = {1}; + /* If `payload_length_arg > 0`, `exercise_alg` is supposed to be + * compatible with the policy and `payload_length_arg` is supposed to be + * a valid input length to sign. If `payload_length_arg <= 0`, + * `exercise_alg` is supposed to be forbidden by the policy. */ + int compatible_alg = payload_length_arg > 0; + size_t payload_length = compatible_alg ? payload_length_arg : 0; + unsigned char signature[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t signature_length; + + /* Check if all implicit usage flags are deployed + in the expected usage flags. */ + TEST_EQUAL( expected_usage, + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( policy_usage ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, policy_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, policy_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), expected_usage ); + + status = psa_sign_hash( key, exercise_alg, + payload, payload_length, + signature, sizeof( signature ), + &signature_length ); + if( compatible_alg && ( expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) != 0 ) + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + memset( signature, 0, sizeof( signature ) ); + status = psa_verify_hash( key, exercise_alg, + payload, payload_length, + signature, sizeof( signature ) ); + if( compatible_alg && ( expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) != 0 ) + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( exercise_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( exercise_alg ) ) ) + { + status = psa_sign_message( key, exercise_alg, + payload, payload_length, + signature, sizeof( signature ), + &signature_length ); + if( compatible_alg && ( expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ) != 0 ) + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + memset( signature, 0, sizeof( signature ) ); + status = psa_verify_message( key, exercise_alg, + payload, payload_length, + signature, sizeof( signature ) ); + if( compatible_alg && ( expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ) != 0 ) + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + } + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_key_policy( int policy_usage, + int policy_alg, + int key_type, + data_t *key_data, + int exercise_alg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, policy_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, policy_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, exercise_alg ) ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( exercise_alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( exercise_alg ) ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + (const uint8_t*) "", 0) ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( &operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + key ); + + if( policy_alg == exercise_alg && + ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) != 0 ) + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void agreement_key_policy( int policy_usage, + int policy_alg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int exercise_alg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, policy_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, policy_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, exercise_alg ) ); + status = mbedtls_test_psa_key_agreement_with_self( &operation, key ); + + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_policy_alg2( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int usage_arg, int alg_arg, int alg2_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t got_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg2 = alg2_arg; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &attributes, alg2 ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* Update the usage flags to obtain implicit usage flags */ + usage = mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( usage ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &got_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &got_attributes ), usage ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &got_attributes ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &got_attributes ), alg2 ); + + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( key, usage, alg ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( key, usage, alg2 ) ) + goto exit; + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &got_attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void raw_agreement_key_policy( int policy_usage, + int policy_alg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int exercise_alg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, policy_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, policy_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + status = mbedtls_test_psa_raw_key_agreement_with_self( exercise_alg, key ); + + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void copy_success( int source_usage_arg, + int source_alg_arg, int source_alg2_arg, + int type_arg, data_t *material, + int copy_attributes, + int target_usage_arg, + int target_alg_arg, int target_alg2_arg, + int expected_usage_arg, + int expected_alg_arg, int expected_alg2_arg ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t source_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t target_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = expected_usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t expected_alg = expected_alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t expected_alg2 = expected_alg2_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t *export_buffer = NULL; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Prepare the source key. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &source_attributes, source_usage_arg ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg_arg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg2_arg ); + psa_set_key_type( &source_attributes, type_arg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &source_attributes, + material->x, material->len, + &source_key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( source_key, &source_attributes ) ); + + /* Prepare the target attributes. */ + if( copy_attributes ) + { + target_attributes = source_attributes; + /* Set volatile lifetime to reset the key identifier to 0. */ + psa_set_key_lifetime( &target_attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ); + } + + if( target_usage_arg != -1 ) + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &target_attributes, target_usage_arg ); + if( target_alg_arg != -1 ) + psa_set_key_algorithm( &target_attributes, target_alg_arg ); + if( target_alg2_arg != -1 ) + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &target_attributes, target_alg2_arg ); + + /* Copy the key. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_copy_key( source_key, + &target_attributes, &target_key ) ); + + /* Destroy the source to ensure that this doesn't affect the target. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( source_key ) ); + + /* Test that the target slot has the expected content and policy. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( target_key, &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &source_attributes ), + psa_get_key_type( &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &source_attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_usage, psa_get_key_usage_flags( &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_alg, psa_get_key_algorithm( &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_alg2, + psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &target_attributes ) ); + if( expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) + { + size_t length; + ASSERT_ALLOC( export_buffer, material->len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( target_key, export_buffer, + material->len, &length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( material->x, material->len, + export_buffer, length ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( target_key, expected_usage, expected_alg ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( target_key, expected_usage, expected_alg2 ) ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( target_key ) ); + +exit: + /* + * Source and target key attributes may have been returned by + * psa_get_key_attributes() thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &source_attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &target_attributes ); + + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( export_buffer ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void copy_fail( int source_usage_arg, + int source_alg_arg, int source_alg2_arg, + int type_arg, data_t *material, + int target_type_arg, int target_bits_arg, + int target_usage_arg, + int target_alg_arg, int target_alg2_arg, + int target_id_arg, int target_lifetime_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t source_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t target_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, target_id_arg ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Prepare the source key. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &source_attributes, source_usage_arg ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg_arg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg2_arg ); + psa_set_key_type( &source_attributes, type_arg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &source_attributes, + material->x, material->len, + &source_key ) ); + + /* Prepare the target attributes. */ + psa_set_key_id( &target_attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &target_attributes, target_lifetime_arg ); + psa_set_key_type( &target_attributes, target_type_arg ); + psa_set_key_bits( &target_attributes, target_bits_arg ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &target_attributes, target_usage_arg ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &target_attributes, target_alg_arg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &target_attributes, target_alg2_arg ); + + /* Try to copy the key. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_copy_key( source_key, + &target_attributes, &target_key ), + expected_status_arg ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( source_key ) ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &source_attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &target_attributes ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_operation_init( ) +{ + const uint8_t input[1] = { 0 }; + /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as + * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even + * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need + * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */ + psa_hash_operation_t func = psa_hash_operation_init( ); + psa_hash_operation_t init = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t zero; + + memset( &zero, 0, sizeof( zero ) ); + + /* A freshly-initialized hash operation should not be usable. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_update( &func, input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_update( &init, input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_update( &zero, input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* A default hash operation should be abortable without error. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &func ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &init ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &zero ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_setup( int alg_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + status = psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + /* Whether setup succeeded or failed, abort must succeed. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* If setup failed, reproduce the failure, so as to + * test the resulting state of the operation object. */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ), status ); + + /* Now the operation object should be reusable. */ +#if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, KNOWN_SUPPORTED_HASH_ALG ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); +#endif + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_compute_fail( int alg_arg, data_t *input, + int output_size_arg, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + uint8_t *output = NULL; + size_t output_size = output_size_arg; + size_t output_length = INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_status_t status; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + status = psa_hash_compute( alg, input->x, input->len, + output, output_size, &output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + TEST_LE_U( output_length, output_size ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_compare_fail( int alg_arg, data_t *input, + data_t *reference_hash, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_status_t status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + status = psa_hash_compare( alg, input->x, input->len, + reference_hash->x, reference_hash->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_compute_compare( int alg_arg, data_t *input, + data_t *expected_output ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + uint8_t output[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + 1]; + size_t output_length = INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH; + size_t i; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Compute with tight buffer */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_compute( alg, input->x, input->len, + output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ), + &output_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( output_length, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + + /* Compute with larger buffer */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_compute( alg, input->x, input->len, + output, sizeof( output ), + &output_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( output_length, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + + /* Compare with correct hash */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_compare( alg, input->x, input->len, + output, output_length ) ); + + /* Compare with trailing garbage */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_compare( alg, input->x, input->len, + output, output_length + 1 ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + /* Compare with truncated hash */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_compare( alg, input->x, input->len, + output, output_length - 1 ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + /* Compare with corrupted value */ + for( i = 0; i < output_length; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( i ); + output[i] ^= 1; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_compare( alg, input->x, input->len, + output, output_length ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + output[i] ^= 1; + } + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ +void hash_bad_order( ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + unsigned char input[] = ""; + /* SHA-256 hash of an empty string */ + const unsigned char valid_hash[] = { + 0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xc8, + 0x99, 0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b, 0x93, 0x4c, + 0xa4, 0x95, 0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55 }; + unsigned char hash[sizeof(valid_hash)] = { 0 }; + size_t hash_len; + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Call setup twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Call update without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Check that update calls abort on error. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + operation.id = UINT_MAX; + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Call update after finish. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call verify without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_verify( &operation, + valid_hash, sizeof( valid_hash ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call verify after finish. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_verify( &operation, + valid_hash, sizeof( valid_hash ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call verify twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_verify( &operation, + valid_hash, sizeof( valid_hash ) ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_verify( &operation, + valid_hash, sizeof( valid_hash ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call finish without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call finish twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call finish after calling verify. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_verify( &operation, + valid_hash, sizeof( valid_hash ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ +void hash_verify_bad_args( ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + /* SHA-256 hash of an empty string with 2 extra bytes (0xaa and 0xbb) + * appended to it */ + unsigned char hash[] = { + 0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xc8, + 0x99, 0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b, 0x93, 0x4c, + 0xa4, 0x95, 0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55, 0xaa, 0xbb }; + size_t expected_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ); + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* psa_hash_verify with a smaller hash than expected */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_verify( &operation, hash, expected_size - 1 ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* psa_hash_verify with a non-matching hash */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_verify( &operation, hash + 1, expected_size ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + /* psa_hash_verify with a hash longer than expected */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_verify( &operation, hash, sizeof( hash ) ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ +void hash_finish_bad_args( ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t expected_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ); + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_len; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* psa_hash_finish with a smaller hash buffer than expected */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + hash, expected_size - 1, &hash_len ), + PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ +void hash_clone_source_state( ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_hash_operation_t op_source = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t op_init = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t op_setup = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t op_finished = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t op_aborted = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_len; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_source, alg ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_setup, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_finished, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_finished, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_aborted, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &op_aborted ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &op_source, &op_setup ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &op_source, &op_init ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_init, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &op_source, &op_finished ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_finished, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &op_source, &op_aborted ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_aborted, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) ); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &op_source ); + psa_hash_abort( &op_init ); + psa_hash_abort( &op_setup ); + psa_hash_abort( &op_finished ); + psa_hash_abort( &op_aborted ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ +void hash_clone_target_state( ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_hash_operation_t op_init = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t op_setup = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t op_finished = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t op_aborted = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t op_target = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_len; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_setup, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_finished, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_finished, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_aborted, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &op_aborted ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &op_setup, &op_target ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_target, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &op_init, &op_target ), PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &op_finished, &op_target ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &op_aborted, &op_target ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &op_target ); + psa_hash_abort( &op_init ); + psa_hash_abort( &op_setup ); + psa_hash_abort( &op_finished ); + psa_hash_abort( &op_aborted ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mac_operation_init( ) +{ + const uint8_t input[1] = { 0 }; + + /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as + * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even + * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need + * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */ + psa_mac_operation_t func = psa_mac_operation_init( ); + psa_mac_operation_t init = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_mac_operation_t zero; + + memset( &zero, 0, sizeof( zero ) ); + + /* A freshly-initialized MAC operation should not be usable. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_update( &func, + input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_update( &init, + input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_update( &zero, + input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* A default MAC operation should be abortable without error. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &func ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &init ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &zero ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mac_setup( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key, + int alg_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; +#if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_ALG) + const uint8_t smoke_test_key_data[16] = "kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk"; +#endif + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + if( ! exercise_mac_setup( key_type, key->x, key->len, alg, + &operation, &status ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + /* The operation object should be reusable. */ +#if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_ALG) + if( ! exercise_mac_setup( KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_KEY_TYPE, + smoke_test_key_data, + sizeof( smoke_test_key_data ), + KNOWN_SUPPORTED_MAC_ALG, + &operation, &status ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); +#endif + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ +void mac_bad_order( ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + const uint8_t key_data[] = { + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa }; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t sign_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE + 10] = { 0 }; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; + const uint8_t input[] = { 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb }; + const uint8_t verify_mac[] = { + 0x74, 0x65, 0x93, 0x8c, 0xeb, 0x1d, 0xb3, 0x76, 0x5a, 0x38, 0xe7, 0xdd, + 0x85, 0xc5, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xd5, 0xb2, 0x64, 0xf0, 0x1a, 0x1a, + 0x2c, 0xf9, 0x18, 0xca, 0x59, 0x7e, 0x5d, 0xf6 }; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data, sizeof( key_data ), + &key ) ); + + /* Call update without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call sign finish without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation, sign_mac, sizeof( sign_mac ), + &sign_mac_length), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call verify finish without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + verify_mac, sizeof( verify_mac ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call setup twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Call update after sign finish. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation, + sign_mac, sizeof( sign_mac ), + &sign_mac_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call update after verify finish. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + verify_mac, sizeof( verify_mac ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call sign finish twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation, + sign_mac, sizeof( sign_mac ), + &sign_mac_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation, + sign_mac, sizeof( sign_mac ), + &sign_mac_length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call verify finish twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + verify_mac, sizeof( verify_mac ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + verify_mac, sizeof( verify_mac ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Setup sign but try verify. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + verify_mac, sizeof( verify_mac ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Setup verify but try sign. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, input, sizeof( input ) ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation, + sign_mac, sizeof( sign_mac ), + &sign_mac_length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mac_sign( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input, + data_t *expected_mac ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t *actual_mac = NULL; + size_t mac_buffer_size = + PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( key_data->len ), alg ); + size_t mac_length = 0; + const size_t output_sizes_to_test[] = { + 0, + 1, + expected_mac->len - 1, + expected_mac->len, + expected_mac->len + 1, + }; + + TEST_LE_U( mac_buffer_size, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ); + /* We expect PSA_MAC_LENGTH to be exact. */ + TEST_ASSERT( expected_mac->len == mac_buffer_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + for( size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( output_sizes_to_test ); i++ ) + { + const size_t output_size = output_sizes_to_test[i]; + psa_status_t expected_status = + ( output_size >= expected_mac->len ? PSA_SUCCESS : + PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + mbedtls_test_set_step( output_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( actual_mac, output_size ); + + /* Calculate the MAC, one-shot case. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_compute( key, alg, + input->x, input->len, + actual_mac, output_size, &mac_length ), + expected_status ); + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len, + actual_mac, mac_length ); + } + + if( output_size > 0 ) + memset( actual_mac, 0, output_size ); + + /* Calculate the MAC, multi-part case. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation, + actual_mac, output_size, + &mac_length ), + expected_status ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len, + actual_mac, mac_length ); + } + mbedtls_free( actual_mac ); + actual_mac = NULL; + } + +exit: + psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( actual_mac ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mac_verify( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input, + data_t *expected_mac ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t *perturbed_mac = NULL; + + TEST_LE_U( expected_mac->len, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* Verify correct MAC, one-shot case. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify( key, alg, input->x, input->len, + expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len ) ); + + /* Verify correct MAC, multi-part case. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + expected_mac->x, + expected_mac->len ) ); + + /* Test a MAC that's too short, one-shot case. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify( key, alg, + input->x, input->len, + expected_mac->x, + expected_mac->len - 1 ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + /* Test a MAC that's too short, multi-part case. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + expected_mac->x, + expected_mac->len - 1 ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + /* Test a MAC that's too long, one-shot case. */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( perturbed_mac, expected_mac->len + 1 ); + memcpy( perturbed_mac, expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify( key, alg, + input->x, input->len, + perturbed_mac, expected_mac->len + 1 ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + /* Test a MAC that's too long, multi-part case. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + perturbed_mac, + expected_mac->len + 1 ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + /* Test changing one byte. */ + for( size_t i = 0; i < expected_mac->len; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( i ); + perturbed_mac[i] ^= 1; + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify( key, alg, + input->x, input->len, + perturbed_mac, expected_mac->len ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + perturbed_mac, + expected_mac->len ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + perturbed_mac[i] ^= 1; + } + +exit: + psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( perturbed_mac ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_operation_init( ) +{ + const uint8_t input[1] = { 0 }; + unsigned char output[1] = { 0 }; + size_t output_length; + /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as + * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even + * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need + * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */ + psa_cipher_operation_t func = psa_cipher_operation_init( ); + psa_cipher_operation_t init = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_cipher_operation_t zero; + + memset( &zero, 0, sizeof( zero ) ); + + /* A freshly-initialized cipher operation should not be usable. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_update( &func, + input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), + &output_length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_update( &init, + input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), + &output_length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_update( &zero, + input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), + &output_length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* A default cipher operation should be abortable without error. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &func ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &init ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &zero ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_setup( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key, + int alg_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; +#if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_ALG) + const uint8_t smoke_test_key_data[16] = "kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk"; +#endif + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + if( ! exercise_cipher_setup( key_type, key->x, key->len, alg, + &operation, &status ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + /* The operation object should be reusable. */ +#if defined(KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_ALG) + if( ! exercise_cipher_setup( KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_KEY_TYPE, + smoke_test_key_data, + sizeof( smoke_test_key_data ), + KNOWN_SUPPORTED_CIPHER_ALG, + &operation, &status ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); +#endif + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ +void cipher_bad_order( ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + unsigned char iv[PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES)] = { 0 }; + const uint8_t key_data[] = { + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa }; + const uint8_t text[] = { + 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, + 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb }; + uint8_t buffer[PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES)] = { 0 }; + size_t length = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data, sizeof( key_data ), + &key ) ); + + /* Call encrypt setup twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Call decrypt setup twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Generate an IV without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Generate an IV twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + &length ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Generate an IV after it's already set. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + iv, sizeof( iv ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Set an IV without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + iv, sizeof( iv ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Set an IV after it's already set. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + iv, sizeof( iv ) ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + iv, sizeof( iv ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Set an IV after it's already generated. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + &length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + iv, sizeof( iv ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call update without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + text, sizeof( text ), + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call update without an IV where an IV is required. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + text, sizeof( text ), + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Call update after finish. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + iv, sizeof( iv ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + text, sizeof( text ), + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call finish without calling setup beforehand. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Call finish without an IV where an IV is required. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + /* Not calling update means we are encrypting an empty buffer, which is OK + * for cipher modes with padding. */ + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ); + + /* Call finish twice in a row. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + iv, sizeof( iv ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_encrypt_fail( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *input, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + if ( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE != expected_status ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, + input->len ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + } + + status = psa_cipher_encrypt( key, alg, input->x, input->len, output, + output_buffer_size, &output_length ); + + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_alg_without_iv( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + data_t *plaintext, data_t *ciphertext ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t iv[1] = { 0x5a }; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output_length, length; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Validate size macros */ + TEST_LE_U( ciphertext->len, + PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, plaintext->len ) ); + TEST_LE_U( PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, plaintext->len ), + PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( plaintext->len ) ); + TEST_LE_U( plaintext->len, + PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, ciphertext->len ) ); + TEST_LE_U( PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, ciphertext->len ), + PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( ciphertext->len ) ); + + + /* Set up key and output buffer */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, + plaintext->len ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size ); + + /* set_iv() is not allowed */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv, sizeof( iv ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv, sizeof( iv ) ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* generate_iv() is not allowed */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, iv, sizeof( iv ), + &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, iv, sizeof( iv ), + &length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Multipart encryption */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + output_length = 0; + length = ~0; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + plaintext->x, plaintext->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( length, output_buffer_size ); + output_length += length; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + output + output_length, + output_buffer_size - output_length, + &length ) ); + output_length += length; + ASSERT_COMPARE( ciphertext->x, ciphertext->len, + output, output_length ); + + /* Multipart encryption */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + output_length = 0; + length = ~0; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + ciphertext->x, ciphertext->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( length, output_buffer_size ); + output_length += length; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + output + output_length, + output_buffer_size - output_length, + &length ) ); + output_length += length; + ASSERT_COMPARE( plaintext->x, plaintext->len, + output, output_length ); + + /* One-shot encryption */ + output_length = ~0; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt( key, alg, plaintext->x, plaintext->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &output_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( ciphertext->x, ciphertext->len, + output, output_length ); + + /* One-shot decryption */ + output_length = ~0; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt( key, alg, ciphertext->x, ciphertext->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &output_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( plaintext->x, plaintext->len, + output, output_length ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_bad_key( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + /* Usage of either of these two size macros would cause divide by zero + * with incorrect key types previously. Input length should be irrelevant + * here. */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, 16 ), + 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, 16 ), 0 ); + + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* Should fail due to invalid alg type (to support invalid key type). + * Encrypt or decrypt will end up in the same place. */ + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_encrypt_validation( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *input ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t iv_size = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH ( key_type, alg ); + unsigned char *output1 = NULL; + size_t output1_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output1_length = 0; + unsigned char *output2 = NULL; + size_t output2_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output2_length = 0; + size_t function_output_length = 0; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + output1_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ); + output2_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) + + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output1, output1_buffer_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output2, output2_buffer_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* The one-shot cipher encryption uses generated iv so validating + the output is not possible. Validating with multipart encryption. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt( key, alg, input->x, input->len, output1, + output1_buffer_size, &output1_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output1_length, + PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output1_length, + PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, output1, iv_size ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len, + output2, output2_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) ); + output2_length += function_output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + output2 + output2_length, + output2_buffer_size - output2_length, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + output2_length += function_output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output1 + iv_size, output1_length - iv_size, + output2, output2_length ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output1 ); + mbedtls_free( output2 ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_encrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, data_t *iv, + data_t *input, + int first_part_size_arg, + int output1_length_arg, int output2_length_arg, + data_t *expected_output, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + size_t first_part_size = first_part_size_arg; + size_t output1_length = output1_length_arg; + size_t output2_length = output2_length_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t function_output_length = 0; + size_t total_output_length = 0; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + + if( iv->len > 0 ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ) ); + } + + output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) + + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size ); + + TEST_LE_U( first_part_size, input->len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, input->x, first_part_size, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output1_length ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, first_part_size ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( first_part_size) ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + + if( first_part_size < input->len ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x + first_part_size, + input->len - first_part_size, + ( output_buffer_size == 0 ? NULL : + output + total_output_length ), + output_buffer_size - total_output_length, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output2_length ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, + alg, + input->len - first_part_size ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + ( output_buffer_size == 0 ? NULL : + output + total_output_length ), + output_buffer_size - total_output_length, + &function_output_length ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_output->x, expected_output->len, + output, total_output_length ); + } + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_decrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, data_t *iv, + data_t *input, + int first_part_size_arg, + int output1_length_arg, int output2_length_arg, + data_t *expected_output, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + size_t first_part_size = first_part_size_arg; + size_t output1_length = output1_length_arg; + size_t output2_length = output2_length_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t function_output_length = 0; + size_t total_output_length = 0; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + + if( iv->len > 0 ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ) ); + } + + output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) + + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size ); + + TEST_LE_U( first_part_size, input->len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, first_part_size, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output1_length ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, first_part_size ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( first_part_size ) ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + + if( first_part_size < input->len ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x + first_part_size, + input->len - first_part_size, + ( output_buffer_size == 0 ? NULL : + output + total_output_length ), + output_buffer_size - total_output_length, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output2_length ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, + alg, + input->len - first_part_size ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + ( output_buffer_size == 0 ? NULL : + output + total_output_length ), + output_buffer_size - total_output_length, + &function_output_length ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_output->x, expected_output->len, + output, total_output_length ); + } + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_decrypt_fail( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *iv, + data_t *input_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + unsigned char *input = NULL; + size_t input_buffer_size = 0; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + if ( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE != expected_status ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + } + + /* Allocate input buffer and copy the iv and the plaintext */ + input_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input_arg->len + (size_t) iv->len ); + if ( input_buffer_size > 0 ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( input, input_buffer_size ); + memcpy( input, iv->x, iv->len ); + memcpy( input + iv->len, input_arg->x, input_arg->len ); + } + + output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_buffer_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size ); + + status = psa_cipher_decrypt( key, alg, input, input_buffer_size, output, + output_buffer_size, &output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( input ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_decrypt( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *iv, + data_t *input_arg, + data_t *expected_output ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + unsigned char *input = NULL; + size_t input_buffer_size = 0; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + /* Allocate input buffer and copy the iv and the plaintext */ + input_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input_arg->len + (size_t) iv->len ); + if ( input_buffer_size > 0 ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( input, input_buffer_size ); + memcpy( input, iv->x, iv->len ); + memcpy( input + iv->len, input_arg->x, input_arg->len ); + } + + output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_buffer_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt( key, alg, input, input_buffer_size, output, + output_buffer_size, &output_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_buffer_size ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input_buffer_size ) ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_output->x, expected_output->len, + output, output_length ); +exit: + mbedtls_free( input ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_verify_output( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *input ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + unsigned char *output1 = NULL; + size_t output1_size = 0; + size_t output1_length = 0; + unsigned char *output2 = NULL; + size_t output2_size = 0; + size_t output2_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + output1_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output1, output1_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt( key, alg, input->x, input->len, + output1, output1_size, + &output1_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output1_length, + PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output1_length, + PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) ); + + output2_size = output1_length; + ASSERT_ALLOC( output2, output2_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt( key, alg, output1, output1_length, + output2, output2_size, + &output2_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output2_length, + PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, output1_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output2_length, + PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( output1_length ) ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( input->x, input->len, output2, output2_length ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output1 ); + mbedtls_free( output2 ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_verify_output_multipart( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *input, + int first_part_size_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t first_part_size = first_part_size_arg; + unsigned char iv[16] = {0}; + size_t iv_size = 16; + size_t iv_length = 0; + unsigned char *output1 = NULL; + size_t output1_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output1_length = 0; + unsigned char *output2 = NULL; + size_t output2_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output2_length = 0; + size_t function_output_length; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation1 = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation2 = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation1, key, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation2, key, alg ) ); + + if( alg != PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation1, + iv, iv_size, + &iv_length ) ); + } + + output1_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ); + TEST_LE_U( output1_buffer_size, + PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output1, output1_buffer_size ); + + TEST_LE_U( first_part_size, input->len ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation1, input->x, first_part_size, + output1, output1_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, first_part_size ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( first_part_size ) ); + output1_length += function_output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation1, + input->x + first_part_size, + input->len - first_part_size, + output1, output1_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, + alg, + input->len - first_part_size ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input->len - first_part_size ) ); + output1_length += function_output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation1, + output1 + output1_length, + output1_buffer_size - output1_length, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + output1_length += function_output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation1 ) ); + + output2_buffer_size = output1_length; + TEST_LE_U( output2_buffer_size, + PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, output1_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output2_buffer_size, + PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( output1_length ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output2, output2_buffer_size ); + + if( iv_length > 0 ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation2, + iv, iv_length ) ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation2, output1, first_part_size, + output2, output2_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, first_part_size ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( first_part_size ) ); + output2_length += function_output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation2, + output1 + first_part_size, + output1_length - first_part_size, + output2, output2_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, + alg, + output1_length - first_part_size ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( output1_length - first_part_size ) ); + output2_length += function_output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation2, + output2 + output2_length, + output2_buffer_size - output2_length, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ) ); + TEST_LE_U( function_output_length, + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + output2_length += function_output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation2 ) ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( input->x, input->len, output2, output2_length ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation1 ); + psa_cipher_abort( &operation2 ); + mbedtls_free( output1 ); + mbedtls_free( output2 ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aead_encrypt_decrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *nonce, + data_t *additional_data, + data_t *input_data, + int expected_result_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *output_data = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + unsigned char *output_data2 = NULL; + size_t output_length2 = 0; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_status_t expected_result = expected_result_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + output_size = input_data->len + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, + alg ); + /* For all currently defined algorithms, PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE + * should be exact. */ + if( expected_result != PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT && + expected_result != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( output_size, + PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_data->len ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_size <= + PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input_data->len ) ); + } + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, output_size ); + + status = psa_aead_encrypt( key, alg, + nonce->x, nonce->len, + additional_data->x, + additional_data->len, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + output_data, output_size, + &output_length ); + + /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the + * encryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and + * an alternative implementation. */ + if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 ); + MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce->len ); + } + + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_result ); + + if( PSA_SUCCESS == expected_result ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data2, output_length ); + + /* For all currently defined algorithms, PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE + * should be exact. */ + TEST_EQUAL( input_data->len, + PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, output_length ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( input_data->len <= + PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( output_length ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_aead_decrypt( key, alg, + nonce->x, nonce->len, + additional_data->x, + additional_data->len, + output_data, output_length, + output_data2, output_length, + &output_length2 ), + expected_result ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( input_data->x, input_data->len, + output_data2, output_length2 ); + } + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( output_data ); + mbedtls_free( output_data2 ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aead_encrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *nonce, + data_t *additional_data, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *expected_result ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *output_data = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + output_size = input_data->len + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, + alg ); + /* For all currently defined algorithms, PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE + * should be exact. */ + TEST_EQUAL( output_size, + PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_data->len ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_size <= + PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input_data->len ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, output_size ); + + status = psa_aead_encrypt( key, alg, + nonce->x, nonce->len, + additional_data->x, additional_data->len, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + output_data, output_size, + &output_length ); + + /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the + * encryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and + * an alternative implementation. */ + if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 ); + MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce->len ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_result->x, expected_result->len, + output_data, output_length ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( output_data ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aead_decrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *nonce, + data_t *additional_data, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *expected_data, + int expected_result_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *output_data = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t expected_result = expected_result_arg; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + output_size = input_data->len - PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, + alg ); + if( expected_result != PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT && + expected_result != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + /* For all currently defined algorithms, PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE + * should be exact. */ + TEST_EQUAL( output_size, + PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_data->len ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_size <= + PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input_data->len ) ); + } + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, output_size ); + + status = psa_aead_decrypt( key, alg, + nonce->x, nonce->len, + additional_data->x, + additional_data->len, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + output_data, output_size, + &output_length ); + + /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the + * decryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and + * an alternative implementation. */ + if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 ); + MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce->len ); + } + + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_result ); + + if( expected_result == PSA_SUCCESS ) + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_data->x, expected_data->len, + output_data, output_length ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( output_data ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void signature_size( int type_arg, + int bits, + int alg_arg, + int expected_size_arg ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t actual_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, bits, alg ); + + TEST_EQUAL( actual_size, (size_t) expected_size_arg ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) + TEST_EQUAL( actual_size, + PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, bits, alg ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED */ + +exit: + ; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_hash_deterministic( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, data_t *input_data, + data_t *output_data ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *signature = NULL; + size_t signature_size; + size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + /* Allocate a buffer which has the size advertised by the + * library. */ + signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, + key_bits, alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( signature_size != 0 ); + TEST_LE_U( signature_size, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size ); + + /* Perform the signature. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ) ); + /* Verify that the signature is what is expected. */ + ASSERT_COMPARE( output_data->x, output_data->len, + signature, signature_length ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) + memset( signature, 0, signature_size ); + signature_length = INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_sign( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output_data->x, output_data->len, + signature, signature_length ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED */ + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( signature ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_hash_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, data_t *input_data, + int signature_size_arg, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t signature_size = signature_size_arg; + psa_status_t actual_status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + unsigned char *signature = NULL; + size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + actual_status = psa_sign_hash( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + /* The value of *signature_length is unspecified on error, but + * whatever it is, it should be less than signature_size, so that + * if the caller tries to read *signature_length bytes without + * checking the error code then they don't overflow a buffer. */ + TEST_LE_U( signature_length, signature_size ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) + signature_length = INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_asymmetric_sign( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ), + expected_status ); + TEST_LE_U( signature_length, signature_size ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED */ + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( signature ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_verify_hash( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, data_t *input_data ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *signature = NULL; + size_t signature_size; + size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + /* Allocate a buffer which has the size advertised by the + * library. */ + signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, + key_bits, alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( signature_size != 0 ); + TEST_LE_U( signature_size, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size ); + + /* Perform the signature. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ) ); + /* Check that the signature length looks sensible. */ + TEST_LE_U( signature_length, signature_size ); + TEST_ASSERT( signature_length > 0 ); + + /* Use the library to verify that the signature is correct. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_verify_hash( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_length ) ); + + if( input_data->len != 0 ) + { + /* Flip a bit in the input and verify that the signature is now + * detected as invalid. Flip a bit at the beginning, not at the end, + * because ECDSA may ignore the last few bits of the input. */ + input_data->x[0] ^= 1; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_verify_hash( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_length ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + } + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( signature ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void verify_hash( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, data_t *hash_data, + data_t *signature_data ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + TEST_LE_U( signature_data->len, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_verify_hash( key, alg, + hash_data->x, hash_data->len, + signature_data->x, signature_data->len ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_verify( key, alg, + hash_data->x, hash_data->len, + signature_data->x, + signature_data->len ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED */ + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void verify_hash_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, data_t *hash_data, + data_t *signature_data, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t actual_status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + actual_status = psa_verify_hash( key, alg, + hash_data->x, hash_data->len, + signature_data->x, signature_data->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) + TEST_EQUAL( psa_asymmetric_verify( key, alg, + hash_data->x, hash_data->len, + signature_data->x, signature_data->len ), + expected_status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED */ + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_message_deterministic( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *output_data ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *signature = NULL; + size_t signature_size; + size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( signature_size != 0 ); + TEST_LE_U( signature_size, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_message( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ) ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output_data->x, output_data->len, + signature, signature_length ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( signature ); + PSA_DONE( ); + +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_message_fail( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input_data, + int signature_size_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t signature_size = signature_size_arg; + psa_status_t actual_status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + unsigned char *signature = NULL; + size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + actual_status = psa_sign_message( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + /* The value of *signature_length is unspecified on error, but + * whatever it is, it should be less than signature_size, so that + * if the caller tries to read *signature_length bytes without + * checking the error code then they don't overflow a buffer. */ + TEST_LE_U( signature_length, signature_size ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( signature ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_verify_message( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input_data ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *signature = NULL; + size_t signature_size; + size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( signature_size != 0 ); + TEST_LE_U( signature_size, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_message( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ) ); + TEST_LE_U( signature_length, signature_size ); + TEST_ASSERT( signature_length > 0 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_verify_message( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_length ) ); + + if( input_data->len != 0 ) + { + /* Flip a bit in the input and verify that the signature is now + * detected as invalid. Flip a bit at the beginning, not at the end, + * because ECDSA may ignore the last few bits of the input. */ + input_data->x[0] ^= 1; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_verify_message( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature, signature_length ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( signature ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void verify_message( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *signature_data ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + TEST_LE_U( signature_data->len, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_verify_message( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + signature_data->x, signature_data->len ) ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void verify_message_fail( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *hash_data, + data_t *signature_data, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t actual_status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + actual_status = psa_verify_message( key, alg, + hash_data->x, hash_data->len, + signature_data->x, + signature_data->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_encrypt( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *label, + int expected_output_length_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t expected_output_length = expected_output_length_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_size; + size_t output_length = ~0; + psa_status_t actual_status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Import the key */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* Determine the maximum output length */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + output_size = PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + TEST_LE_U( output_size, PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size ); + + /* Encrypt the input */ + actual_status = psa_asymmetric_encrypt( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + label->x, label->len, + output, output_size, + &output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( output_length, expected_output_length ); + + /* If the label is empty, the test framework puts a non-null pointer + * in label->x. Test that a null pointer works as well. */ + if( label->len == 0 ) + { + output_length = ~0; + if( output_size != 0 ) + memset( output, 0, output_size ); + actual_status = psa_asymmetric_encrypt( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + NULL, label->len, + output, output_size, + &output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( output_length, expected_output_length ); + } + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_encrypt_decrypt( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *label ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_size; + size_t output_length = ~0; + unsigned char *output2 = NULL; + size_t output2_size; + size_t output2_length = ~0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* Determine the maximum ciphertext length */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + output_size = PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + TEST_LE_U( output_size, PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size ); + + output2_size = input_data->len; + TEST_LE_U( output2_size, + PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) ); + TEST_LE_U( output2_size, PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output2, output2_size ); + + /* We test encryption by checking that encrypt-then-decrypt gives back + * the original plaintext because of the non-optional random + * part of encryption process which prevents using fixed vectors. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_encrypt( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + label->x, label->len, + output, output_size, + &output_length ) ); + /* We don't know what ciphertext length to expect, but check that + * it looks sensible. */ + TEST_LE_U( output_length, output_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key, alg, + output, output_length, + label->x, label->len, + output2, output2_size, + &output2_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( input_data->x, input_data->len, + output2, output2_length ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + mbedtls_free( output2 ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_decrypt( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *label, + data_t *expected_data ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + size_t output_length = ~0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + /* Determine the maximum ciphertext length */ + output_size = PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + TEST_LE_U( output_size, PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + label->x, label->len, + output, + output_size, + &output_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_data->x, expected_data->len, + output, output_length ); + + /* If the label is empty, the test framework puts a non-null pointer + * in label->x. Test that a null pointer works as well. */ + if( label->len == 0 ) + { + output_length = ~0; + if( output_size != 0 ) + memset( output, 0, output_size ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + NULL, label->len, + output, + output_size, + &output_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_data->x, expected_data->len, + output, output_length ); + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_decrypt_fail( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *label, + int output_size_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_size = output_size_arg; + size_t output_length = ~0; + psa_status_t actual_status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + actual_status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + label->x, label->len, + output, output_size, + &output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + TEST_LE_U( output_length, output_size ); + + /* If the label is empty, the test framework puts a non-null pointer + * in label->x. Test that a null pointer works as well. */ + if( label->len == 0 ) + { + output_length = ~0; + if( output_size != 0 ) + memset( output, 0, output_size ); + actual_status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key, alg, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + NULL, label->len, + output, output_size, + &output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + TEST_LE_U( output_length, output_size ); + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_derivation_init( ) +{ + /* Test each valid way of initializing the object, except for `= {0}`, as + * Clang 5 complains when `-Wmissing-field-initializers` is used, even + * though it's OK by the C standard. We could test for this, but we'd need + * to suppress the Clang warning for the test. */ + size_t capacity; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t func = psa_key_derivation_operation_init( ); + psa_key_derivation_operation_t init = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t zero; + + memset( &zero, 0, sizeof( zero ) ); + + /* A default operation should not be able to report its capacity. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( &func, &capacity ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( &init, &capacity ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( &zero, &capacity ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* A default operation should be abortable without error. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort(&func) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort(&init) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort(&zero) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_setup( int alg_arg, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ), + expected_status ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_set_capacity( int alg_arg, int capacity_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t capacity = capacity_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( &operation, capacity ), + expected_status ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_input( int alg_arg, + int step_arg1, int key_type_arg1, data_t *input1, + int expected_status_arg1, + int step_arg2, int key_type_arg2, data_t *input2, + int expected_status_arg2, + int step_arg3, int key_type_arg3, data_t *input3, + int expected_status_arg3, + int output_key_type_arg, int expected_output_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_derivation_step_t steps[] = {step_arg1, step_arg2, step_arg3}; + psa_key_type_t key_types[] = {key_type_arg1, key_type_arg2, key_type_arg3}; + psa_status_t expected_statuses[] = {expected_status_arg1, + expected_status_arg2, + expected_status_arg3}; + data_t *inputs[] = {input1, input2, input3}; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t keys[] = { MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT }; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + size_t i; + psa_key_type_t output_key_type = output_key_type_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t output_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t expected_output_status = expected_output_status_arg; + psa_status_t actual_output_status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( steps ); i++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( i ); + if( steps[i] == 0 ) + { + /* Skip this step */ + } + else if( key_types[i] != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + { + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_types[i] ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + inputs[i]->x, inputs[i]->len, + &keys[i] ) ); + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( key_types[i] ) && + steps[i] == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + { + // When taking a private key as secret input, use key agreement + // to add the shared secret to the derivation + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_psa_key_agreement_with_self( + &operation, keys[i] ), + expected_statuses[i] ); + } + else + { + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &operation, steps[i], + keys[i] ), + expected_statuses[i] ); + } + } + else + { + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, steps[i], + inputs[i]->x, inputs[i]->len ), + expected_statuses[i] ); + } + } + + if( output_key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + { + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, output_key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, 8 ); + actual_output_status = + psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, &operation, + &output_key ); + } + else + { + uint8_t buffer[1]; + actual_output_status = + psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ) ); + } + TEST_EQUAL( actual_output_status, expected_output_status ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( keys ); i++ ) + psa_destroy_key( keys[i] ); + psa_destroy_key( output_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_over_capacity( int alg_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + size_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + unsigned char input1[] = "Input 1"; + size_t input1_length = sizeof( input1 ); + unsigned char input2[] = "Input 2"; + size_t input2_length = sizeof( input2 ); + uint8_t buffer[42]; + size_t capacity = sizeof( buffer ); + const uint8_t key_data[22] = { 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b}; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_data, sizeof( key_data ), + &key ) ); + + /* valid key derivation */ + if( !mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( &operation, key, alg, + input1, input1_length, + input2, input2_length, + capacity ) ) + goto exit; + + /* state of operation shouldn't allow additional generation */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, buffer, capacity ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, buffer, capacity ), + PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_actions_without_setup( ) +{ + uint8_t output_buffer[16]; + size_t buffer_size = 16; + size_t capacity = 0; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + output_buffer, buffer_size ) + == PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( &operation, &capacity ) + == PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + output_buffer, buffer_size ) + == PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( &operation, &capacity ) + == PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_output( int alg_arg, + int step1_arg, data_t *input1, + int step2_arg, data_t *input2, + int step3_arg, data_t *input3, + int requested_capacity_arg, + data_t *expected_output1, + data_t *expected_output2 ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_derivation_step_t steps[] = {step1_arg, step2_arg, step3_arg}; + data_t *inputs[] = {input1, input2, input3}; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t keys[] = { MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT }; + size_t requested_capacity = requested_capacity_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t *expected_outputs[2] = + {expected_output1->x, expected_output2->x}; + size_t output_sizes[2] = + {expected_output1->len, expected_output2->len}; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + uint8_t *output_buffer = NULL; + size_t expected_capacity; + size_t current_capacity; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( expected_outputs ); i++ ) + { + if( output_sizes[i] > output_buffer_size ) + output_buffer_size = output_sizes[i]; + if( output_sizes[i] == 0 ) + expected_outputs[i] = NULL; + } + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_buffer, output_buffer_size ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + + /* Extraction phase. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( &operation, + requested_capacity ) ); + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( steps ); i++ ) + { + switch( steps[i] ) + { + case 0: + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + inputs[i]->x, inputs[i]->len, + &keys[i] ) ); + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( keys[i], &attributes ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) ) <= + PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( + &operation, steps[i], keys[i] ) ); + break; + default: + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, steps[i], + inputs[i]->x, inputs[i]->len ) ); + break; + } + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( &operation, + ¤t_capacity ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( current_capacity, requested_capacity ); + expected_capacity = requested_capacity; + + /* Expansion phase. */ + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( expected_outputs ); i++ ) + { + /* Read some bytes. */ + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + output_buffer, output_sizes[i] ); + if( expected_capacity == 0 && output_sizes[i] == 0 ) + { + /* Reading 0 bytes when 0 bytes are available can go either way. */ + TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_SUCCESS || + status == PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); + continue; + } + else if( expected_capacity == 0 || + output_sizes[i] > expected_capacity ) + { + /* Capacity exceeded. */ + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); + expected_capacity = 0; + continue; + } + /* Success. Check the read data. */ + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + if( output_sizes[i] != 0 ) + ASSERT_COMPARE( output_buffer, output_sizes[i], + expected_outputs[i], output_sizes[i] ); + /* Check the operation status. */ + expected_capacity -= output_sizes[i]; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( &operation, + ¤t_capacity ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_capacity, current_capacity ); + } + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output_buffer ); + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( keys ); i++ ) + psa_destroy_key( keys[i] ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_full( int alg_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *input1, + data_t *input2, + int requested_capacity_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t requested_capacity = requested_capacity_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + unsigned char output_buffer[16]; + size_t expected_capacity = requested_capacity; + size_t current_capacity; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( &operation, key, alg, + input1->x, input1->len, + input2->x, input2->len, + requested_capacity ) ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( &operation, + ¤t_capacity ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( current_capacity, expected_capacity ); + + /* Expansion phase. */ + while( current_capacity > 0 ) + { + size_t read_size = sizeof( output_buffer ); + if( read_size > current_capacity ) + read_size = current_capacity; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + output_buffer, + read_size ) ); + expected_capacity -= read_size; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( &operation, + ¤t_capacity ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( current_capacity, expected_capacity ); + } + + /* Check that the operation refuses to go over capacity. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, output_buffer, 1 ), + PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ) ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_key_exercise( int alg_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *input1, + data_t *input2, + int derived_type_arg, + int derived_bits_arg, + int derived_usage_arg, + int derived_alg_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t base_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t derived_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t derived_type = derived_type_arg; + size_t derived_bits = derived_bits_arg; + psa_key_usage_t derived_usage = derived_usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t derived_alg = derived_alg_arg; + size_t capacity = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( derived_bits ); + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t got_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &base_key ) ); + + /* Derive a key. */ + if ( mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( &operation, base_key, alg, + input1->x, input1->len, + input2->x, input2->len, + capacity ) ) + goto exit; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, derived_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, derived_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, derived_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, derived_bits ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, &operation, + &derived_key ) ); + + /* Test the key information */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( derived_key, &got_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &got_attributes ), derived_type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ), derived_bits ); + + /* Exercise the derived key. */ + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( derived_key, derived_usage, derived_alg ) ) + goto exit; + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &got_attributes ); + + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( base_key ); + psa_destroy_key( derived_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_key_export( int alg_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *input1, + data_t *input2, + int bytes1_arg, + int bytes2_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t base_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t derived_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t bytes1 = bytes1_arg; + size_t bytes2 = bytes2_arg; + size_t capacity = bytes1 + bytes2; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t *output_buffer = NULL; + uint8_t *export_buffer = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t base_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t derived_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + size_t length; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_buffer, capacity ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( export_buffer, capacity ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &base_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &base_attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &base_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &base_attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &base_key ) ); + + /* Derive some material and output it. */ + if( !mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( &operation, base_key, alg, + input1->x, input1->len, + input2->x, input2->len, + capacity ) ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + output_buffer, + capacity ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ) ); + + /* Derive the same output again, but this time store it in key objects. */ + if( !mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( &operation, base_key, alg, + input1->x, input1->len, + input2->x, input2->len, + capacity ) ) + goto exit; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &derived_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &derived_attributes, 0 ); + psa_set_key_type( &derived_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + psa_set_key_bits( &derived_attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( bytes1 ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_key( &derived_attributes, &operation, + &derived_key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( derived_key, + export_buffer, bytes1, + &length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( length, bytes1 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( derived_key ) ); + psa_set_key_bits( &derived_attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( bytes2 ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_key( &derived_attributes, &operation, + &derived_key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( derived_key, + export_buffer + bytes1, bytes2, + &length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( length, bytes2 ); + + /* Compare the outputs from the two runs. */ + ASSERT_COMPARE( output_buffer, bytes1 + bytes2, + export_buffer, capacity ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output_buffer ); + mbedtls_free( export_buffer ); + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( base_key ); + psa_destroy_key( derived_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void derive_key( int alg_arg, + data_t *key_data, data_t *input1, data_t *input2, + int type_arg, int bits_arg, + int expected_status_arg, + int is_large_output ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t base_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t derived_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t base_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t derived_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &base_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &base_attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &base_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &base_attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &base_key ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( &operation, base_key, alg, + input1->x, input1->len, + input2->x, input2->len, + SIZE_MAX ) ) + goto exit; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &derived_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &derived_attributes, 0 ); + psa_set_key_type( &derived_attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &derived_attributes, bits ); + + psa_status_t status = + psa_key_derivation_output_key( &derived_attributes, + &operation, + &derived_key ); + if( is_large_output > 0 ) + TEST_ASSUME( status != PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( base_key ); + psa_destroy_key( derived_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_agreement_setup( int alg_arg, + int our_key_type_arg, int our_key_alg_arg, + data_t *our_key_data, data_t *peer_key_data, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t our_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t our_key_alg = our_key_alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t our_key_type = our_key_type_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_status_t status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, our_key_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, our_key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + our_key_data->x, our_key_data->len, + &our_key ) ); + + /* The tests currently include inputs that should fail at either step. + * Test cases that fail at the setup step should be changed to call + * key_derivation_setup instead, and this function should be renamed + * to key_agreement_fail. */ + status = psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + our_key, + peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ), + expected_status ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( status == expected_status ); + } + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( our_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void raw_key_agreement( int alg_arg, + int our_key_type_arg, data_t *our_key_data, + data_t *peer_key_data, + data_t *expected_output ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t our_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t our_key_type = our_key_type_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_length = ~0; + size_t key_bits; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, our_key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + our_key_data->x, our_key_data->len, + &our_key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( our_key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + /* Validate size macros */ + TEST_LE_U( expected_output->len, + PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE( our_key_type, key_bits ) ); + TEST_LE_U( PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE( our_key_type, key_bits ), + PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ); + + /* Good case with exact output size */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, expected_output->len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_raw_key_agreement( alg, our_key, + peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len, + output, expected_output->len, + &output_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + output = NULL; + output_length = ~0; + + /* Larger buffer */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, expected_output->len + 1 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_raw_key_agreement( alg, our_key, + peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len, + output, expected_output->len + 1, + &output_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + output = NULL; + output_length = ~0; + + /* Buffer too small */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, expected_output->len - 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_raw_key_agreement( alg, our_key, + peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len, + output, expected_output->len - 1, + &output_length ), + PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + /* Not required by the spec, but good robustness */ + TEST_LE_U( output_length, expected_output->len - 1 ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + output = NULL; + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( our_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_agreement_capacity( int alg_arg, + int our_key_type_arg, data_t *our_key_data, + data_t *peer_key_data, + int expected_capacity_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t our_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t our_key_type = our_key_type_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + size_t actual_capacity; + unsigned char output[16]; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, our_key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + our_key_data->x, our_key_data->len, + &our_key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + &operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, our_key, + peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ) ); + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ) ) ) + { + /* The test data is for info="" */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + NULL, 0 ) ); + } + + /* Test the advertised capacity. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( + &operation, &actual_capacity ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_capacity, (size_t) expected_capacity_arg ); + + /* Test the actual capacity by reading the output. */ + while( actual_capacity > sizeof( output ) ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + output, sizeof( output ) ) ); + actual_capacity -= sizeof( output ); + } + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + output, actual_capacity ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, output, 1 ), + PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( our_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_agreement_output( int alg_arg, + int our_key_type_arg, data_t *our_key_data, + data_t *peer_key_data, + data_t *expected_output1, data_t *expected_output2 ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t our_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t our_key_type = our_key_type_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t *actual_output = NULL; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( actual_output, MAX( expected_output1->len, + expected_output2->len ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, our_key_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + our_key_data->x, our_key_data->len, + &our_key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + &operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, our_key, + peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ) ); + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ) ) ) + { + /* The test data is for info="" */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + NULL, 0 ) ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + actual_output, + expected_output1->len ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( actual_output, expected_output1->len, + expected_output1->x, expected_output1->len ); + if( expected_output2->len != 0 ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &operation, + actual_output, + expected_output2->len ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( actual_output, expected_output2->len, + expected_output2->x, expected_output2->len ); + } + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( our_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( actual_output ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void generate_random( int bytes_arg ) +{ + size_t bytes = bytes_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + unsigned char *changed = NULL; + size_t i; + unsigned run; + + TEST_ASSERT( bytes_arg >= 0 ); + + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, bytes ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( changed, bytes ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Run several times, to ensure that every output byte will be + * nonzero at least once with overwhelming probability + * (2^(-8*number_of_runs)). */ + for( run = 0; run < 10; run++ ) + { + if( bytes != 0 ) + memset( output, 0, bytes ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( output, bytes ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < bytes; i++ ) + { + if( output[i] != 0 ) + ++changed[i]; + } + } + + /* Check that every byte was changed to nonzero at least once. This + * validates that psa_generate_random is overwriting every byte of + * the output buffer. */ + for( i = 0; i < bytes; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( changed[i] != 0 ); + } + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + mbedtls_free( changed ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void generate_key( int type_arg, + int bits_arg, + int usage_arg, + int alg_arg, + int expected_status_arg, + int is_large_key ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t got_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + + /* Generate a key */ + psa_status_t status = psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ); + + if( is_large_key > 0 ) + TEST_ASSUME( status != PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + TEST_EQUAL( status , expected_status ); + if( expected_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Test the key information */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &got_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &got_attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &got_attributes ), bits ); + + /* Do something with the key according to its type and permitted usage. */ + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( key, usage, alg ) ) + goto exit; + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &got_attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ +void generate_key_rsa( int bits_arg, + data_t *e_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t *exported = NULL; + size_t exported_size = + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY, bits ); + size_t exported_length = SIZE_MAX; + uint8_t *e_read_buffer = NULL; + int is_default_public_exponent = 0; + size_t e_read_size = PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE( type, bits ); + size_t e_read_length = SIZE_MAX; + + if( e_arg->len == 0 || + ( e_arg->len == 3 && + e_arg->x[0] == 1 && e_arg->x[1] == 0 && e_arg->x[2] == 1 ) ) + { + is_default_public_exponent = 1; + e_read_size = 0; + } + ASSERT_ALLOC( e_read_buffer, e_read_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( exported, exported_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_set_key_domain_parameters( &attributes, type, + e_arg->x, e_arg->len ) ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + + /* Generate a key */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ), expected_status ); + if( expected_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Test the key information */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), bits ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_domain_parameters( &attributes, + e_read_buffer, e_read_size, + &e_read_length ) ); + if( is_default_public_exponent ) + TEST_EQUAL( e_read_length, 0 ); + else + ASSERT_COMPARE( e_read_buffer, e_read_length, e_arg->x, e_arg->len ); + + /* Do something with the key according to its type and permitted usage. */ + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( key, usage, alg ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Export the key and check the public exponent. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( key, + exported, exported_size, + &exported_length ) ); + { + uint8_t *p = exported; + uint8_t *end = exported + exported_length; + size_t len; + /* RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + */ + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_asn1_skip_integer( &p, end, bits, bits, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + if( len >= 1 && p[0] == 0 ) + { + ++p; + --len; + } + if( e_arg->len == 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( len, 3 ); + TEST_EQUAL( p[0], 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( p[1], 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( p[2], 1 ); + } + else + ASSERT_COMPARE( p, len, e_arg->x, e_arg->len ); + } + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() or + * set by psa_set_key_domain_parameters() thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( e_read_buffer ); + mbedtls_free( exported ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ +void persistent_key_load_key_from_storage( data_t *data, + int type_arg, int bits_arg, + int usage_flags_arg, int alg_arg, + int generation_method ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t base_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags = usage_flags_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + unsigned char *first_export = NULL; + unsigned char *second_export = NULL; + size_t export_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( type, bits ); + size_t first_exported_length; + size_t second_exported_length; + + if( usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( first_export, export_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( second_export, export_size ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init() ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage_flags ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + + switch( generation_method ) + { + case IMPORT_KEY: + /* Import the key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, data->x, data->len, + &key ) ); + break; + + case GENERATE_KEY: + /* Generate a key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ) ); + break; + + case DERIVE_KEY: +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) + { + /* Create base key */ + psa_algorithm_t derive_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); + psa_key_attributes_t base_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &base_attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &base_attributes, derive_alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &base_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &base_attributes, + data->x, data->len, + &base_key ) ); + /* Derive a key. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, derive_alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( + &operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, base_key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + NULL, 0 ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, + &operation, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( base_key ) ); + base_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } +#else + TEST_ASSUME( ! "KDF not supported in this configuration" ); +#endif + break; + + default: + TEST_ASSERT( ! "generation_method not implemented in test" ); + break; + } + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + /* Export the key if permitted by the key policy. */ + if( usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( key, + first_export, export_size, + &first_exported_length ) ); + if( generation_method == IMPORT_KEY ) + ASSERT_COMPARE( data->x, data->len, + first_export, first_exported_length ); + } + + /* Shutdown and restart */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_purge_key( key ) ); + PSA_DONE(); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init() ); + + /* Check key slot still contains key data */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &attributes ), key_id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( usage_flags ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), alg ); + + /* Export the key again if permitted by the key policy. */ + if( usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( key, + second_export, export_size, + &second_exported_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( first_export, first_exported_length, + second_export, second_exported_length ); + } + + /* Do something with the key according to its type and permitted usage. */ + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( key, usage_flags, alg ) ) + goto exit; + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + mbedtls_free( first_export ); + mbedtls_free( second_export ); + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( base_key ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_attributes.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_attributes.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a710971c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_attributes.data @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +PSA key attributes structure +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +attributes_set_get:0xffff1234:0x6963:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128 + +PSA key attributes: id only +persistence_attributes:0x1234:0x5678:-1:-1:0:0x1234:0x5678:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT + +PSA key attributes: lifetime=3 only +persistence_attributes:-1:0:3:-1:0:0:0:3 + +PSA key attributes: id then back to volatile +persistence_attributes:0x1234:0x5678:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:-1:0:0:0x5678:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE + +PSA key attributes: id then back to non local volatile +persistence_attributes:0x1234:0x5678:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE,1):-1:0:0:0x5678:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE,1) + +PSA key attributes: id then lifetime +persistence_attributes:0x1234:0x5678:3:-1:0:0x1234:0x5678:3 + +PSA key attributes: lifetime then id +persistence_attributes:0x1234:0x5678:3:0x1235:0x5679:0x1235:0x5679:3 + +PSA key attributes: non local volatile lifetime then id +persistence_attributes:0x1234:0x5678:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE,3):0x1235:0x5679:0x1235:0x5679:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT,3) + +PSA key attributes: slot number +slot_number_attribute: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_attributes.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_attributes.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ce34fae7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_attributes.function @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "psa/crypto.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void attributes_set_get( int owner_id_arg, int id_arg, int lifetime_arg, + int usage_flags_arg, int alg_arg, + int type_arg, int bits_arg ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id_arg, id_arg ); + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags = usage_flags_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + + TEST_EQUAL( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( psa_get_key_id( &attributes ) ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( psa_get_key_id( &attributes ) ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), 0 ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage_flags ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &attributes ), id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), lifetime ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), usage_flags ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), bits ); + + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + TEST_EQUAL( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( psa_get_key_id( &attributes ) ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( psa_get_key_id( &attributes ) ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void persistence_attributes( int id1_arg, int owner_id1_arg, int lifetime_arg, + int id2_arg, int owner_id2_arg, + int expected_id_arg, int expected_owner_id_arg, + int expected_lifetime_arg ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1 = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id1_arg, id1_arg ); + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2 = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id2_arg, id2_arg ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t expected_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( expected_owner_id_arg, expected_id_arg ); + psa_key_lifetime_t expected_lifetime = expected_lifetime_arg; + + if( id1_arg != -1 ) + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id1 ); + if( lifetime_arg != -1 ) + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + if( id2_arg != -1 ) + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &attributes ), expected_id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), expected_lifetime ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +void slot_number_attribute( ) +{ + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + /* Initially, there is no slot number. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_slot_number( &attributes, &slot_number ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Test setting a slot number. */ + psa_set_key_slot_number( &attributes, 0 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_slot_number( &attributes, &slot_number ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( slot_number, 0 ); + + /* Test changing the slot number. */ + psa_set_key_slot_number( &attributes, 42 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_slot_number( &attributes, &slot_number ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( slot_number, 42 ); + + /* Test clearing the slot number. */ + psa_clear_key_slot_number( &attributes ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_slot_number( &attributes, &slot_number ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Clearing again should have no effect. */ + psa_clear_key_slot_number( &attributes ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_slot_number( &attributes, &slot_number ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Test that reset clears the slot number. */ + psa_set_key_slot_number( &attributes, 42 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_slot_number( &attributes, &slot_number ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( slot_number, 42 ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_slot_number( &attributes, &slot_number ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e14516b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data @@ -0,0 +1,610 @@ +sign_hash transparent driver: in driver ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_hash transparent driver: fallback ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_hash transparent driver: error ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +sign_hash transparent driver: fake ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":1:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_hash transparent driver: in driver RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_SUCCESS:"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":"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_hash transparent driver: fallback RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"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":"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_hash transparent driver: error RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"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":"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a":0:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +sign_hash transparent driver: fake RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_SUCCESS:"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":"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a":1:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_hash transparent driver: in driver RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_hash transparent driver: fallback RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"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":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_hash transparent driver: error RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"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":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":0:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +sign_hash transparent driver: fake RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:"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":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":1:PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: in driver ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_SUCCESS:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: fallback ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: error ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_hash transparent driver: in driver Public Key ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_SUCCESS:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: fallback Public Key ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: error Public Key ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_hash transparent driver: in driver Key Pair RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_SUCCESS:0:"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":"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: fallback Key Pair RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:"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":"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: error Key Pair RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:0:"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":"616263":"2c7744983f023ac7bb1c55529d83ed11a76a7898a1bb5ce191375a4aa7495a633d27879ff58eba5a57371c34feb1180e8b850d552476ebb5634df620261992f12ebee9097041dbbea85a42d45b344be5073ceb772ffc604954b9158ba81ec3dc4d9d65e3ab7aa318165f38c36f841f1c69cb1cfa494aa5cbb4d6c0efbafb043a":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_hash transparent driver: in driver Key Pair RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0:"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":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: fallback Key Pair RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:"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":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: error Key Pair RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:0:"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":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_hash transparent driver: in driver Public Key RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: fallback Public Key RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: error Public Key RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_hash transparent driver: in driver Public Key RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: fallback Public Key RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: error Public Key RSA-1024 PSS SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_hash transparent driver: in driver Public Key RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: fallback Public Key RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_hash transparent driver: error Public Key RSA-1024 PSS-any-salt SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"6b201c50637962338d1b218c1d26f031205a0e3c47bc4c54856aa037e5a332d2981e80a51648e902e46046e5507a255c4c73f5ff40d5a54c0a11d2eca7804e1767b20ea12c945a23f5473181d379689c1ba634a2c47c0a8ec90c922ca6466ae9e9fb92871c9043b5858ae34828bceb4ead82db8f21a18ebe1d95b469bbdef1df":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +sign_message transparent driver: calculate in driver ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +sign_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_message transparent driver: fallback ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA +sign_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_message transparent driver: error ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +sign_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":0:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +sign_message transparent driver: fake ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +sign_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F":1:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_message transparent driver: calculate in driver RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:"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":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_message transparent driver: fallback RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +sign_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"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":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +sign_message transparent driver: error RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":0:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +sign_message transparent driver: fake RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +sign_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:"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":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":1:PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: calculate in driver ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: fallback ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: error ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:0:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_message transparent driver: calculate in driver Public Key ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: fallback Public Key ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: error Public Key ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_message transparent driver: calculate in driver RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0:"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":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: fallback RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:"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":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: error RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:0:"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":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_message transparent driver: calculate in driver Public Key RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: fallback Public Key RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: error Public Key RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"616263":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_message transparent driver: calculate in driver Public Key RSA PSS SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"29b65db0936b7fe408bda672077b0bc5e176177ba9a550fb548c292f7b4af1bb6475e0a979ba43dd644780801fabe5b62a1359cf7692918f30013e90c2362235765abc2078905d13b345dd689bf15e4e94ca51535d12f0675d5f13e9f254ba7696f0096d62deb023d106e9a96a5da3162bead6a745c8b9000868d2f9a447d5c5":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: fallback Public Key RSA PSS SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"29b65db0936b7fe408bda672077b0bc5e176177ba9a550fb548c292f7b4af1bb6475e0a979ba43dd644780801fabe5b62a1359cf7692918f30013e90c2362235765abc2078905d13b345dd689bf15e4e94ca51535d12f0675d5f13e9f254ba7696f0096d62deb023d106e9a96a5da3162bead6a745c8b9000868d2f9a447d5c5":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: error Public Key RSA PSS SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"29b65db0936b7fe408bda672077b0bc5e176177ba9a550fb548c292f7b4af1bb6475e0a979ba43dd644780801fabe5b62a1359cf7692918f30013e90c2362235765abc2078905d13b345dd689bf15e4e94ca51535d12f0675d5f13e9f254ba7696f0096d62deb023d106e9a96a5da3162bead6a745c8b9000868d2f9a447d5c5":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +verify_message transparent driver: calculate in driver Public Key RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"6b65e1fdc900dce8a2b82130ae8ccfac27b6d0eb5f2c0c1085b80f34ceaaf064c8ff237e74a24a3c6fb7a842f172e5146315616281bbbeeae90febaab139a212decf1c68923f2a48e242b1fd72105e3a3f2329c30d78abe8673335ad08c5ba1aa515360bb5660050f1994bb08d3dd17e3407a379403bafa4e229b3c851283f6d":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: fallback Public Key RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"6b65e1fdc900dce8a2b82130ae8ccfac27b6d0eb5f2c0c1085b80f34ceaaf064c8ff237e74a24a3c6fb7a842f172e5146315616281bbbeeae90febaab139a212decf1c68923f2a48e242b1fd72105e3a3f2329c30d78abe8673335ad08c5ba1aa515360bb5660050f1994bb08d3dd17e3407a379403bafa4e229b3c851283f6d":PSA_SUCCESS + +verify_message transparent driver: error Public Key RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C +verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:1:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"6b65e1fdc900dce8a2b82130ae8ccfac27b6d0eb5f2c0c1085b80f34ceaaf064c8ff237e74a24a3c6fb7a842f172e5146315616281bbbeeae90febaab139a212decf1c68923f2a48e242b1fd72105e3a3f2329c30d78abe8673335ad08c5ba1aa515360bb5660050f1994bb08d3dd17e3407a379403bafa4e229b3c851283f6d":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +generate_key through transparent driver: fake +generate_key:PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_SUCCESS + +generate_key through transparent driver: in-driver +generate_key:PSA_SUCCESS:"":PSA_SUCCESS + +generate_key through transparent driver: fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +generate_key:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"":PSA_SUCCESS + +generate_key through transparent driver: fallback not available +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +generate_key:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +generate_key through transparent driver: error +generate_key:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +validate key through transparent driver: good private key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +validate_key:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:130:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_SUCCESS + +validate key through transparent driver: good public key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +validate_key:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:131:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_SUCCESS + +validate key through transparent driver: fallback private key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +validate_key:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:132:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_SUCCESS + +validate key through transparent driver: fallback public key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +validate_key:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:133:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_SUCCESS + +validate key through transparent driver: error +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +validate_key:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:134:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +export_key private to public through driver: fake +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +export_key:PSA_SUCCESS:"0102030405":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"":PSA_SUCCESS + +export_key private to public through driver: in-driver +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +export_key:PSA_SUCCESS:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":PSA_SUCCESS + +export_key private to public through driver: fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +export_key:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":PSA_SUCCESS + +export_key private to public through driver: error +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +export_key:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CTR, 15 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CTR, 15 bytes, fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317" + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 15 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:15:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, fallback +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 15 bytes, fallback +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:15:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, fake +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:8:0:"d07a6a6e2687feb2":1:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 15 bytes, fake +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:8:0:"d07a6a6e2687feb2":1:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":"dd3b5e5319b7591daab1e1a92687feb2":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":"dd3b5e5319b7591daab1e1a92687feb2":0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, fake +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":"d07a6a6e2687feb2":1:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, good +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":16:16:0:"dd3b5e5319b7591daab1e1a92687feb2":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, fallback +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":16:16:0:"dd3b5e5319b7591daab1e1a92687feb2":0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decrypt multipart: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, fake +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa":16:8:0:"d07a6a6e2687feb2":1:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 11+5 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":11:11:5:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+20 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":12:12:20:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 20+12 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":20:20:12:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+10 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597":12:12:10:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7b":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+15 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":0:0:15:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 15+0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:15:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":0:0:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric encryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_encrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 11+5 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":11:11:5:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":16:16:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+20 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":12:12:20:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 20+12 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597bcef1389318c7fc865ef":20:20:12:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7baf71025f6ef6393ca587":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 12+10 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a5434f378a597":12:12:10:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd321c965bb1de7b":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+15 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":0:0:15:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 15+0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e11739317":15:15:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 0+16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":0:0:16:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA symmetric decryption multipart: AES-CTR, 16+0 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_decrypt_multipart:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a":16:16:0:"8f9408fe80a81d3e813da3c7b0b2bd32":0:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +Cipher driver: negative testing on all entry points +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_entry_points:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a" + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA AEAD encrypt: AES-CCM, 24 bytes, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"4189351B5CAEA375A0299E81C621BF43":PSA_ALG_CCM:"48c0906930561e0ab0ef4cd972":"40a27c1d1e23ea3dbe8056b2774861a4a201cce49f19997d19206d8c8a343951":"4535d12b4377928a7c0a61c9f825a48671ea05910748c8ef":"26c56961c035a7e452cce61bc6ee220d77b3f94d18fd10b6d80e8bf80f4a46cab06d4313f0db9be9":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA AEAD encrypt, AES-GCM, 128 bytes #1, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 39 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"00412B4EA9CDBE3C9696766CFA":"0BE1A88BACE018B1":"4CB97F86A2A4689A877947AB8091EF5386A6FFBDD080F8120333D1FCB691F3406CBF531F83A4D8":"08E8CF97D820EA258460E96AD9CF5289054D895CEAC47C":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 39 bytes, fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"00412B4EA9CDBE3C9696766CFA":"0BE1A88BACE018B1":"4CB97F86A2A4689A877947AB8091EF5386A6FFBDD080F8120333D1FCB691F3406CBF531F83A4D8":"08E8CF97D820EA258460E96AD9CF5289054D895CEAC47C":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA AEAD decrypt: AES-CCM, 39 bytes, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"D7828D13B2B0BDC325A76236DF93CC6B":PSA_ALG_CCM:"00412B4EA9CDBE3C9696766CFA":"0BE1A88BACE018B1":"4CB97F86A2A4689A877947AB8091EF5386A6FFBDD080F8120333D1FCB691F3406CBF531F83A4D8":"08E8CF97D820EA258460E96AD9CF5289054D895CEAC47C":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes #1, fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA AEAD decrypt, AES-GCM, 144 bytes #1, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_decrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"a0ec7b0052541d9e9c091fb7fc481409":PSA_ALG_GCM:"00e440846db73a490573deaf3728c94f":"a3cfcb832e935eb5bc3812583b3a1b2e82920c07fda3668a35d939d8f11379bb606d39e6416b2ef336fffb15aec3f47a71e191f4ff6c56ff15913562619765b26ae094713d60bab6ab82bfc36edaaf8c7ce2cf5906554dcc5933acdb9cb42c1d24718efdc4a09256020b024b224cfe602772bd688c6c8f1041a46f7ec7d51208":"3b6de52f6e582d317f904ee768895bd4d0790912efcf27b58651d0eb7eb0b2f07222c6ffe9f7e127d98ccb132025b098a67dc0ec0083235e9f83af1ae1297df4319547cbcb745cebed36abc1f32a059a05ede6c00e0da097521ead901ad6a73be20018bda4c323faa135169e21581e5106ac20853642e9d6b17f1dd925c872814365847fe0b7b7fbed325953df344a96":"5431d93278c35cfcd7ffa9ce2de5c6b922edffd5055a9eaa5b54cae088db007cf2d28efaf9edd1569341889073e87c0a88462d77016744be62132fd14a243ed6e30e12cd2f7d08a8daeec161691f3b27d4996df8745d74402ee208e4055615a8cb069d495cf5146226490ac615d7b17ab39fb4fdd098e4e7ee294d34c1312826":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + +PSA MAC sign, through driver: HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA MAC sign, fallback: HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC sign, driver reports error: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +PSA MAC sign, through driver: CMAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA MAC sign, fallback: CMAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC sign, driver reports error: CMAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +PSA MAC verify, through driver: HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA MAC verify, fallback: HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC verify, driver reports error: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4869205468657265":"896fb1128abbdf196832107cd49df33f47b4b1169912ba4f53684b22":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +PSA MAC verify, through driver: CMAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA MAC verify, fallback: CMAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA MAC verify, driver reports error: CMAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411":"dfa66747de9ae63030ca32611497c827":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + +PSA opaque driver builtin key export: AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA opaque driver builtin key export: AES (registered to ID_MAX-1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX - 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA opaque driver builtin key export: AES (registered to ID_MAX) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA opaque driver builtin key export: key ID out of range (ID_MIN - 1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN - 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + +PSA opaque driver builtin key export: key ID out of range (ID_MAX + 1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX + 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR:"3677397A24432646294A404E63526655":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + +PSA opaque driver builtin key export: secp256r1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +builtin_key_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"dc7d9d26d67a4f632c34c2dc0b6986183882c206df04cdb7d69aabe28be4f81a":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA opaque driver builtin pubkey export: secp256r1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +builtin_pubkey_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + 1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"0485f64d89f00be66c88dd937efd6d7c445648dcb701150b8a9509295850f41c1931e571fb8f8c78317a20b380e866584bbc2516c3d2702d792f131a922095fd6c":PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA opaque driver builtin pubkey export: not a public key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +builtin_pubkey_export:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"0485f64d89f00be66c88dd937efd6d7c445648dcb701150b8a9509295850f41c1931e571fb8f8c78317a20b380e866584bbc2516c3d2702d792f131a922095fd6c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Hash compute: SHA-256, computed by the driver +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compute:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +Hash compute: SHA-256, fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compute:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_SUCCESS + +Hash compute: SHA-256, no fallback +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_compute:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Hash compute: SHA-256, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY +hash_compute:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + +Hash multi-part setup: SHA-256, computed by the driver +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multipart_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +Hash multi-part setup: SHA-256, fallback +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multipart_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_SUCCESS + +Hash multi-part setup: SHA-256, no fallback +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multipart_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Hash multi-part setup: SHA-256, INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY +hash_multipart_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + +Hash multi-part update: SHA-256, update successful +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multipart_update:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_SUCCESS + +Hash multi-part update: SHA-256, update failure +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multipart_update:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Hash multi-part finish: SHA-256, finish successful +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multipart_update:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_SUCCESS + +Hash multi-part finish: SHA-256, finish failure +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multipart_update:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Hash clone: SHA-256, clone successful +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_clone:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_SUCCESS + +Hash clone: SHA-256, clone failure +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_clone:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d191e01c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function @@ -0,0 +1,1833 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_hash( int key_type_arg, + int alg_arg, + int force_status_arg, + data_t *key_input, + data_t *data_input, + data_t *expected_output, + int fake_output, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + unsigned char *signature = NULL; + size_t signature_size; + size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_status_t actual_status; + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init(); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, + key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_input->x, key_input->len, + &key ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + if( fake_output == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output = + expected_output->x; + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length = + expected_output->len; + } + + /* Allocate a buffer which has the size advertized by the + * library. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + + TEST_ASSERT( signature_size != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( signature_size <= PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size ); + + actual_status = psa_sign_hash( key, alg, + data_input->x, data_input->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( signature, signature_length, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + } + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.hits, 1 ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( signature ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void verify_hash( int key_type_arg, + int key_type_public_arg, + int alg_arg, + int force_status_arg, + int register_public_key, + data_t *key_input, + data_t *data_input, + data_t *signature_input, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type_public = key_type_public_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t actual_status; + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init(); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + if( register_public_key ) + { + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type_public ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_input->x, key_input->len, + &key ); + } + else + { + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_input->x, key_input->len, + &key ); + } + + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + + actual_status = psa_verify_hash( key, alg, + data_input->x, data_input->len, + signature_input->x, signature_input->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.hits, 1 ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_message( int key_type_arg, + int alg_arg, + int force_status_arg, + data_t *key_input, + data_t *data_input, + data_t *expected_output, + int fake_output, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + unsigned char *signature = NULL; + size_t signature_size; + size_t signature_length = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_status_t actual_status; + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init(); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_input->x, key_input->len, + &key ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + if( fake_output == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output = + expected_output->x; + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.forced_output_length = + expected_output->len; + } + + /* Allocate a buffer which has the size advertized by the + * library. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + signature_size = PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + + TEST_ASSERT( signature_size != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( signature_size <= PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size ); + + actual_status = psa_sign_message( key, alg, + data_input->x, data_input->len, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( signature, signature_length, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + } + /* In the builtin algorithm the driver is called twice. */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks.hits, + force_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ? 2 : 1 ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( signature ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_sign_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void verify_message( int key_type_arg, + int key_type_public_arg, + int alg_arg, + int force_status_arg, + int register_public_key, + data_t *key_input, + data_t *data_input, + data_t *signature_input, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type_public = key_type_public_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t actual_status; + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init(); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + if( register_public_key ) + { + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type_public ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_input->x, key_input->len, + &key ); + } + else + { + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_input->x, key_input->len, + &key ); + } + + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + + actual_status = psa_verify_message( key, alg, + data_input->x, data_input->len, + signature_input->x, signature_input->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + /* In the builtin algorithm the driver is called twice. */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks.hits, + force_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ? 2 : 1 ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_verify_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_signature_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ +void generate_key( int force_status_arg, + data_t *fake_output, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); + const uint8_t *expected_output = NULL; + size_t expected_output_length = 0; + psa_status_t actual_status; + uint8_t actual_output[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(256)] = {0}; + size_t actual_output_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_init(); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, 256 ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + + if( fake_output->len > 0 ) + { + expected_output = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output = + fake_output->x; + + expected_output_length = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output_length = + fake_output->len; + } + + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.hits = 0; + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + actual_status = psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + + if( actual_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_export_key( key, actual_output, sizeof(actual_output), &actual_output_length ); + + if( fake_output->len > 0 ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( actual_output, actual_output_length, + expected_output, expected_output_length ); + } + else + { + size_t zeroes = 0; + for( size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(actual_output); i++ ) + { + if( actual_output[i] == 0) + zeroes++; + } + TEST_ASSERT( zeroes != sizeof(actual_output) ); + } + } +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void validate_key( int force_status_arg, + int location, + int owner_id_arg, + int id_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_input, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, location); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id_arg, id_arg ); + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t actual_status; + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_init(); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, + key_type ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, 0 ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + actual_status = psa_import_key( &attributes, key_input->x, key_input->len, &key ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.location, location ); +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void export_key( int force_status_arg, + data_t *fake_output, + int key_in_type_arg, + data_t *key_in, + int key_out_type_arg, + data_t *expected_output, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_handle_t handle = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t input_key_type = key_in_type_arg; + psa_key_type_t output_key_type = key_out_type_arg; + const uint8_t *expected_output_ptr = NULL; + size_t expected_output_length = 0; + psa_status_t actual_status; + uint8_t actual_output[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(256)] = {0}; + size_t actual_output_length; + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_init(); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, input_key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, 256 ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_in->x, key_in->len, &handle ) ); + + if( fake_output->len > 0 ) + { + expected_output_ptr = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output = + fake_output->x; + + expected_output_length = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_output_length = + fake_output->len; + } + else + { + expected_output_ptr = expected_output->x; + expected_output_length = expected_output->len; + } + + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.hits = 0; + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( output_key_type ) ) + actual_status = psa_export_public_key( handle, actual_output, sizeof(actual_output), &actual_output_length ); + else + actual_status = psa_export_key( handle, actual_output, sizeof(actual_output), &actual_output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( output_key_type ) && + !PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( input_key_type ) ) + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks.hits, 1 ); + + if( actual_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( actual_output, actual_output_length, + expected_output_ptr, expected_output_length ); + } +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( handle ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks = + mbedtls_test_driver_key_management_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_encrypt_validation( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *input ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t iv_size = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH ( key_type, alg ); + unsigned char *output1 = NULL; + size_t output1_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output1_length = 0; + unsigned char *output2 = NULL; + size_t output2_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output2_length = 0; + size_t function_output_length = 0; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + output1_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ); + output2_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input->len ) + + PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output1, output1_buffer_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output2, output2_buffer_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt( key, alg, input->x, input->len, output1, + output1_buffer_size, &output1_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, output1, iv_size ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len, + output2, output2_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + output2_length += function_output_length; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + output2 + output2_length, + output2_buffer_size - output2_length, + &function_output_length ) ); + /* Finish will have called abort as well, so expecting two hits here */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 2 ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + output2_length += function_output_length; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + // driver function should've been called as part of the finish() core routine + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 0 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output1 + iv_size, output1_length - iv_size, + output2, output2_length ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output1 ); + mbedtls_free( output2 ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_encrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *iv, + data_t *input, + int first_part_size_arg, + int output1_length_arg, + int output2_length_arg, + data_t *expected_output, + int mock_output_arg, + int force_status_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + size_t first_part_size = first_part_size_arg; + size_t output1_length = output1_length_arg; + size_t output2_length = output2_length_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t function_output_length = 0; + size_t total_output_length = 0; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + + /* Test operation initialization */ + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_operation = + MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t tranparent_operation = + MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_operation = + MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + + operation.ctx.mbedtls_ctx = mbedtls_operation; + operation.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx = tranparent_operation; + operation.ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx = opaque_operation; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, ( force_status == PSA_SUCCESS ? 1 : 0 ) ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + output_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input->len + + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size ); + + if( mock_output_arg ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output = expected_output->x; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length = expected_output->len; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( first_part_size <= input->len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, input->x, first_part_size, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, ( force_status == PSA_SUCCESS ? 1 : 0 ) ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output1_length ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + + if( first_part_size < input->len ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x + first_part_size, + input->len - first_part_size, + output + total_output_length, + output_buffer_size - total_output_length, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output2_length ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + } + + if( mock_output_arg ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output = NULL; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length = 0; + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + output + total_output_length, + output_buffer_size - total_output_length, + &function_output_length ); + /* Finish will have called abort as well, so expecting two hits here */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, ( force_status == PSA_SUCCESS ? 2 : 0 ) ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0 ; + total_output_length += function_output_length; + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_output->x, expected_output->len, + output, total_output_length ); + } + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_decrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *iv, + data_t *input, + int first_part_size_arg, + int output1_length_arg, + int output2_length_arg, + data_t *expected_output, + int mock_output_arg, + int force_status_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + size_t first_part_size = first_part_size_arg; + size_t output1_length = output1_length_arg; + size_t output2_length = output2_length_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t function_output_length = 0; + size_t total_output_length = 0; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + + /* Test operation initialization */ + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_operation = + MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t tranparent_operation = + MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_operation = + MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + + operation.ctx.mbedtls_ctx = mbedtls_operation; + operation.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx = tranparent_operation; + operation.ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx = opaque_operation; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, ( force_status == PSA_SUCCESS ? 1 : 0 ) ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + output_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input->len + + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size ); + + if( mock_output_arg ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output = expected_output->x; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length = expected_output->len; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( first_part_size <= input->len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, first_part_size, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, ( force_status == PSA_SUCCESS ? 1 : 0 ) ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output1_length ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + + if( first_part_size < input->len ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x + first_part_size, + input->len - first_part_size, + output + total_output_length, + output_buffer_size - total_output_length, + &function_output_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, ( force_status == PSA_SUCCESS ? 1 : 0 ) ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + TEST_ASSERT( function_output_length == output2_length ); + total_output_length += function_output_length; + } + + if( mock_output_arg ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output = NULL; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length = 0; + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + output + total_output_length, + output_buffer_size - total_output_length, + &function_output_length ); + /* Finish will have called abort as well, so expecting two hits here */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, ( force_status == PSA_SUCCESS ? 2 : 0 ) ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + total_output_length += function_output_length; + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &operation ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_output->x, expected_output->len, + output, total_output_length ); + } + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_decrypt( int alg_arg, + int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + data_t *iv, + data_t *input_arg, + data_t *expected_output, + int mock_output_arg, + int force_status_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg; + unsigned char *input = NULL; + size_t input_buffer_size = 0; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = force_status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + /* Allocate input buffer and copy the iv and the plaintext */ + input_buffer_size = ( (size_t) input_arg->len + (size_t) iv->len ); + if ( input_buffer_size > 0 ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( input, input_buffer_size ); + memcpy( input, iv->x, iv->len ); + memcpy( input + iv->len, input_arg->x, input_arg->len ); + } + + output_buffer_size = PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_buffer_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_buffer_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + if( mock_output_arg ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output = expected_output->x; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_output_length = expected_output->len; + } + + status = psa_cipher_decrypt( key, alg, input, input_buffer_size, output, + output_buffer_size, &output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_output->x, expected_output->len, + output, output_length ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( input ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_entry_points( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, data_t *iv, + data_t *input ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_buffer_size = 0; + size_t function_output_length = 0; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); + + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, input->len + 16 ); + output_buffer_size = input->len + 16; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + /* + * Test encrypt failure + * First test that if we don't force a driver error, encryption is + * successful, then force driver error. + */ + status = psa_cipher_encrypt( + key, alg, input->x, input->len, + output, output_buffer_size, &function_output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + /* Set the output buffer in a given state. */ + for( size_t i = 0; i < output_buffer_size; i++ ) + output[i] = 0xa5; + + status = psa_cipher_encrypt( + key, alg, input->x, input->len, + output, output_buffer_size, &function_output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); + /* + * Check that the output buffer is still in the same state. + * This will fail if the output buffer is used by the core to pass the IV + * it generated to the driver (and is not restored). + */ + for( size_t i = 0; i < output_buffer_size; i++ ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( output[i], 0xa5 ); + } + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + /* Test setup call, encrypt */ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + /* When setup fails, it shouldn't call any further entry points */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 0 ); + + /* Test setup call failure, decrypt */ + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + /* When setup fails, it shouldn't call any further entry points */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 0 ); + + /* Test IV setting failure */ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_SUCCESS; + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ); + /* When setting the IV fails, it should call abort too */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + /* Failure should prevent further operations from executing on the driver */ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + status = psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 0 ); + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + + /* Test IV generation failure */ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_SUCCESS; + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + /* Set the output buffer in a given state. */ + for( size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = 0xa5; + + status = psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, output, 16, &function_output_length ); + /* When generating the IV fails, it should call abort too */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + /* + * Check that the output buffer is still in the same state. + * This will fail if the output buffer is used by the core to pass the IV + * it generated to the driver (and is not restored). + */ + for( size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( output[i], 0xa5 ); + } + /* Failure should prevent further operations from executing on the driver */ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + status = psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 0 ); + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + + /* Test update failure */ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_SUCCESS; + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + status = psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ); + /* When the update call fails, it should call abort too */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + /* Failure should prevent further operations from executing on the driver */ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + status = psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 0 ); + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + + /* Test finish failure */ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_SUCCESS; + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv->x, iv->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + status = psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + status = psa_cipher_finish( &operation, + output + function_output_length, + output_buffer_size - function_output_length, + &function_output_length ); + /* When the finish call fails, it should call abort too */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.forced_status ); + /* Failure should prevent further operations from executing on the driver */ + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits = 0; + status = psa_cipher_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len, + output, output_buffer_size, + &function_output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks.hits, 0 ); + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_cipher_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aead_encrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *nonce, + data_t *additional_data, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *expected_result, + int forced_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg; + unsigned char *output_data = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_init(); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + output_size = input_data->len + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, + alg ); + /* For all currently defined algorithms, PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE + * should be exact. */ + TEST_EQUAL( output_size, + PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg, input_data->len ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_size <= + PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( input_data->len ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, output_size ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + status = psa_aead_encrypt( key, alg, + nonce->x, nonce->len, + additional_data->x, additional_data->len, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + output_data, output_size, + &output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status, forced_status ); + + TEST_EQUAL( status, ( forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : forced_status ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_result->x, expected_result->len, + output_data, output_length ); + } + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( output_data ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aead_decrypt( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *nonce, + data_t *additional_data, + data_t *input_data, + data_t *expected_data, + int forced_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg; + unsigned char *output_data = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_init(); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + + output_size = input_data->len - PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, + alg ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_data, output_size ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + status = psa_aead_decrypt( key, alg, + nonce->x, nonce->len, + additional_data->x, + additional_data->len, + input_data->x, input_data->len, + output_data, output_size, + &output_length ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks.driver_status, forced_status ); + + TEST_EQUAL( status, ( forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : forced_status ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_data->x, expected_data->len, + output_data, output_length ); + } + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + mbedtls_free( output_data ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_aead_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mac_sign( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input, + data_t *expected_mac, + int forced_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t *actual_mac = NULL; + size_t mac_buffer_size = + PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( key_data->len ), alg ); + size_t mac_length = 0; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init(); + + TEST_ASSERT( mac_buffer_size <= PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ); + /* We expect PSA_MAC_LENGTH to be exact. */ + TEST_ASSERT( expected_mac->len == mac_buffer_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + ASSERT_ALLOC( actual_mac, mac_buffer_size ); + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + + /* + * Calculate the MAC, one-shot case. + */ + status = psa_mac_compute( key, alg, + input->x, input->len, + actual_mac, mac_buffer_size, + &mac_length ); + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS || + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + } + else + TEST_EQUAL( forced_status, status ); + + if( mac_buffer_size > 0 ) + memset( actual_mac, 0, mac_buffer_size ); + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init(); + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + + /* + * Calculate the MAC, multipart case. + */ + status = psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS || + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + } + else + TEST_EQUAL( forced_status, status ); + + status = psa_mac_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len ); + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 2 ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS || + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + } + else + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, status ); + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation, + actual_mac, mac_buffer_size, + &mac_length ); + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 4 ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS || + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + } + else + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, status ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 4 ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len, + actual_mac, mac_length ); + } + + mbedtls_free( actual_mac ); + actual_mac = NULL; + +exit: + psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( actual_mac ); + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mac_verify( int key_type_arg, + data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, + data_t *input, + data_t *expected_mac, + int forced_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg; + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init(); + + TEST_ASSERT( expected_mac->len <= PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + + /* + * Verify the MAC, one-shot case. + */ + status = psa_mac_verify( key, alg, + input->x, input->len, + expected_mac->x, expected_mac->len ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS || + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + } + else + TEST_EQUAL( forced_status, status ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init(); + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + + /* + * Verify the MAC, multi-part case. + */ + status = psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS || + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + } + else + TEST_EQUAL( forced_status, status ); + + status = psa_mac_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len ); + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 2 ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS || + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + } + else + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, status ); + + status = psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation, + expected_mac->x, + expected_mac->len ); + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 4 ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS || + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + } + else + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, status ); + + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &operation ) ); + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 4 ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks.hits, 1 ); + +exit: + psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_mac_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +void builtin_key_export( int builtin_key_id_arg, + int builtin_key_type_arg, + int builtin_key_bits_arg, + int builtin_key_algorithm_arg, + data_t *expected_output, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_id_t builtin_key_id = (psa_key_id_t) builtin_key_id_arg; + psa_key_type_t builtin_key_type = (psa_key_type_t) builtin_key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t builtin_key_alg = (psa_algorithm_t) builtin_key_algorithm_arg; + size_t builtin_key_bits = (size_t) builtin_key_bits_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0, builtin_key_id ); + uint8_t* output_buffer = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + psa_status_t actual_status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_buffer, expected_output->len ); + + actual_status = psa_export_key( key, output_buffer, expected_output->len, &output_size ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( actual_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( output_size, expected_output->len ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output_buffer, output_size, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), builtin_key_bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), builtin_key_type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), builtin_key_alg ); + } + else + { + if( actual_status != expected_status ) + fprintf( stderr, "Expected %d but got %d\n", expected_status, actual_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( output_size, 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output_buffer ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +void builtin_pubkey_export( int builtin_key_id_arg, + int builtin_key_type_arg, + int builtin_key_bits_arg, + int builtin_key_algorithm_arg, + data_t *expected_output, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_id_t builtin_key_id = (psa_key_id_t) builtin_key_id_arg; + psa_key_type_t builtin_key_type = (psa_key_type_t) builtin_key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t builtin_key_alg = (psa_algorithm_t) builtin_key_algorithm_arg; + size_t builtin_key_bits = (size_t) builtin_key_bits_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0, builtin_key_id ); + uint8_t* output_buffer = NULL; + size_t output_size = 0; + psa_status_t actual_status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output_buffer, expected_output->len ); + + actual_status = psa_export_public_key( key, output_buffer, expected_output->len, &output_size ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( actual_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( output_size, expected_output->len ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( output_buffer, output_size, + expected_output->x, expected_output->len ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), builtin_key_bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), builtin_key_type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), builtin_key_alg ); + } + else + { + TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( output_size, 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output_buffer ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_compute( int alg_arg, + data_t *input, data_t *hash, + int forced_status_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + size_t output_length; + + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_compute( alg, input->x, input->len, + output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ), + &output_length ), expected_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, forced_status ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length, hash->x, hash->len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_multipart_setup( int alg_arg, + data_t *input, data_t *hash, + int forced_status_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t output_length; + + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ), expected_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, forced_status ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation, input->x, input->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ? 1 : 2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, forced_status ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ), + &output_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, + forced_status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ? 1 : 4 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, forced_status ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length, hash->x, hash->len ); + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_multipart_update( int alg_arg, + data_t *input, data_t *hash, + int forced_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t output_length; + + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* + * Update inactive operation, the driver shouldn't be called. + */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_update( &operation, input->x, input->len ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 0 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_update( &operation, input->x, input->len ), + forced_status ); + /* One or two more calls to the driver interface: update or update + abort */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, + forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ? 2 : 3 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, forced_status ); + + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ), + &output_length ) ); + /* Two calls to the driver interface: update + abort */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length, hash->x, hash->len ); + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_multipart_finish( int alg_arg, + data_t *input, data_t *hash, + int forced_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t output_length; + + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* + * Finish inactive operation, the driver shouldn't be called. + */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_finish( &operation, output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ), + &output_length ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 0 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation, input->x, input->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ), + &output_length ), + forced_status ); + /* Two more calls to the driver interface: finish + abort */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 4 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, forced_status ); + + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length, hash->x, hash->len ); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_clone( int alg_arg, + data_t *input, data_t *hash, + int forced_status_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_status_t forced_status = forced_status_arg; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + psa_hash_operation_t source_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t target_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t output_length; + + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* + * Clone inactive operation, the driver shouldn't be called. + */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &source_operation, &target_operation ), + PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 0 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &source_operation, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.forced_status = forced_status; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &source_operation, &target_operation ), + forced_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, + forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ? 2 : 3 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, forced_status ); + + if( forced_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &target_operation, + input->x, input->len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &target_operation, + output, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ), + &output_length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.hits, 3 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks.driver_status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( output, output_length, hash->x, hash->len ); + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &source_operation ); + psa_hash_abort( &target_operation ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks = mbedtls_test_driver_hash_hooks_init(); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..322363d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +PSA external RNG failure: generate random and key +external_rng_failure_generate: + +# When verifying the impact of a forced RNG failure, depend on the built-in +# implementation of the algorithm that uses randomization, whether it's +# because the algorithm is randomized or because our implementation uses +# randomization for (e.g.) blinding. An external implementation could use +# its own randomness source which is not affected by the forced failure of +# the RNG driver. +# Key types and non-randomized auxiliary algorithms (in practice, hashes) can +# use an external implementation. +PSA external RNG failure: randomized ECDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +external_rng_failure_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:32 + +PSA external RNG failure: deterministic ECDSA (software implementation) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +external_rng_failure_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32 + +PSA external RNG failure: RSA-PSS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS +external_rng_failure_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):32 + +PSA external RNG failure: RSA PKCS#1v1.5 (software implementation) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +external_rng_failure_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:32 + +PSA validate entropy injection: good, minimum size +validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA validate entropy injection: good, max size +validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA validate entropy injection: bad, too big +validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE+1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA validate entropy injection: bad, too small using MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM +validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM-1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA validate entropy injection: bad, too small using MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE +validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE-1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA validate entropy injection: before and after crypto_init +run_entropy_inject_with_crypto_init: + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dcbb36a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" + +/* Calculating the minimum allowed entropy size in bytes */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE MAX(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +/* Remove the entropy seed file. Since the library does not expose a way + * to do this (it would be a security risk if such a function was ever + * accessible in production), implement this functionality in a white-box + * manner. */ +psa_status_t remove_seed_file( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + if( remove( "00000000ffffff52.psa_its" ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); +#else + return( psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID ) ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +void external_rng_failure_generate( ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, 128 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t output[1]; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( output, sizeof( output ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + + mbedtls_test_disable_insecure_external_rng( ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY, + psa_generate_random( output, sizeof( output ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY, + psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ) ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +void external_rng_failure_sign( int key_type, data_t *key_data, int alg, + int input_size_arg ) +{ + /* This test case is only expected to pass if the signature mechanism + * requires randomness, either because it is a randomized signature + * or because the implementation uses blinding. */ + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + size_t input_size = input_size_arg; + uint8_t *input = NULL; + uint8_t *signature = NULL; + size_t signature_size = PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE; + size_t signature_length; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( input, input_size ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( key, alg, + input, input_size, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + + mbedtls_test_disable_insecure_external_rng( ); + /* Import the key again, because for RSA Mbed TLS caches blinding values + * in the key object and this could perturb the test. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY, + psa_sign_hash( key, alg, + input, input_size, + signature, signature_size, + &signature_length ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( input ); + mbedtls_free( signature ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ +void validate_entropy_seed_injection( int seed_length_a, + int expected_status_a, + int seed_length_b, + int expected_status_b ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t output[32] = { 0 }; + uint8_t zeros[32] = { 0 }; + uint8_t *seed = NULL; + int i; + int seed_size; + if( seed_length_a > seed_length_b ) + { + seed_size = seed_length_a; + } + else + { + seed_size = seed_length_b; + } + ASSERT_ALLOC( seed, seed_size ); + /* fill seed with some data */ + for( i = 0; i < seed_size; ++i ) + { + seed[i] = i; + } + status = remove_seed_file( ); + TEST_ASSERT( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) || + ( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) ); + status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, seed_length_a ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_a ); + status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, seed_length_b ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_b ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( output, + sizeof( output ) ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, zeros, sizeof( output ) ) != 0 ); +exit: + mbedtls_free( seed ); + remove_seed_file( ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ +void run_entropy_inject_with_crypto_init( ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t i; + uint8_t seed[MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE] = { 0 }; + /* fill seed with some data */ + for( i = 0; i < sizeof( seed ); ++i ) + { + seed[i] = i; + } + status = remove_seed_file( ); + TEST_ASSERT( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) || + ( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) ); + status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, sizeof( seed ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + status = remove_seed_file( ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_SUCCESS ); + status = psa_crypto_init( ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, sizeof( seed ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + status = psa_crypto_init( ); + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + PSA_DONE( ); + /* The seed is written by nv_seed callback functions therefore the injection will fail */ + status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, sizeof( seed ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); +exit: + remove_seed_file( ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dbe9a0ec --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h" + +#define INVALID_KEY_ID mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0, 0xfedcba98 ) + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void generate_key( int key_type_arg, int bits_arg, int expected_status_arg) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = INVALID_KEY_ID; + + // key lifetiem, usage flags, algorithm are irrelevant for this test + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key_id ), + expected_status ); + + // Verify attributes of the created key on success + if ( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), key_type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), bits ); + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.generated.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.generated.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7199c68c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.generated.data @@ -0,0 +1,342 @@ +# Automatically generated by generate_psa_tests.py. Do not edit! + +PSA AES 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA AES 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA AES 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ARC4 8-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:8:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ARC4 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:128:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ARC4 2048-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:2048:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ARIA 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ARIA 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ARIA 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA CAMELLIA 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA CAMELLIA 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA CAMELLIA 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA CHACHA20 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:256:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA DERIVE 120-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:120:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA DERIVE 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:128:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA DES 64-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA DES 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA DES 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA HMAC 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA HMAC 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA HMAC 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA HMAC 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA HMAC 512-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA RAW_DATA 8-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA RAW_DATA 40-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:40:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA RAW_DATA 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:128:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA RSA_KEY_PAIR 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA RSA_KEY_PAIR 1536-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1024-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1536-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 320-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 512-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 160-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 192-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 224-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 256-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 320-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 384-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 512-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) 255-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) 448-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) 192-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) 224-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) 256-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 225-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 256-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 384-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 521-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) 160-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 163-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 233-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 239-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 283-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 409-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 571-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 163-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 233-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 283-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 409-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 571-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) 163-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_SUCCESS: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +PSA ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit +generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + +# End of automatically generated file. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..67158d0e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.data @@ -0,0 +1,587 @@ +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"":"da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"a8":"99f2aa95e36f95c2acb0eaf23998f030638f3f15" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"3000":"f944dcd635f9801f7ac90a407fbc479964dec024" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"42749e":"a444319e9b6cc1e8464c511ec0969c37d6bb2619" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"9fc3fe08":"16a0ff84fcc156fd5d3ca3a744f20a232d172253" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"b5c1c6f1af":"fec9deebfcdedaf66dda525e1be43597a73a1f93" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"ec29561244ede706b6eb30a1c371d74450a105c3f9735f7fa9fe38cf67f304a5736a106e92e17139a6813b1c81a4f3d3fb9546ab4296fa9f722826c066869edacd73b2548035185813e22634a9da44000d95a281ff9f264ecce0a931222162d021cca28db5f3c2aa24945ab1e31cb413ae29810fd794cad5dfaf29ec43cb38d198fe4ae1da2359780221405bd6712a5305da4b1b737fce7cd21c0eb7728d08235a9011":"970111c4e77bcc88cc20459c02b69b4aa8f58217" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"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":"0423dc76a8791107d14e13f5265b343f24cc0f19" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #9 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"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":"6692a71d73e00f27df976bc56df4970650d90e45" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #10 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"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":"11863b483809ef88413ca9b0084ac4a5390640af" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"":"d14a028c2a3a2bc9476102bb288234c415a2b01f828ea62ac5b3e42f" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"ff":"e33f9d75e6ae1369dbabf81b96b4591ae46bba30b591a6b6c62542b5" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"984c":"2fa9df9157d9e027cfbc4c6a9df32e1adc0cbe2328ec2a63c5ae934e" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"50efd0":"b5a9820413c2bf8211fbbf5df1337043b32fa4eafaf61a0c8e9ccede" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"e5e09924":"fd19e74690d291467ce59f077df311638f1c3a46e510d0e49a67062d" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"21ebecb914":"78f4a71c21c694499ce1c7866611b14ace70d905012c356323c7c713" + +PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"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":"1302149d1e197c41813b054c942329d420e366530f5517b470e964fe" 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+ +PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"":"d14a028c2a3a2bc9476102bb288234c415a2b01f828ea62ac5b3e42f" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"ff":"e33f9d75e6ae1369dbabf81b96b4591ae46bba30b591a6b6c62542b5" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"984c":"2fa9df9157d9e027cfbc4c6a9df32e1adc0cbe2328ec2a63c5ae934e" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"50efd0":"b5a9820413c2bf8211fbbf5df1337043b32fa4eafaf61a0c8e9ccede" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"e5e09924":"fd19e74690d291467ce59f077df311638f1c3a46e510d0e49a67062d" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"21ebecb914":"78f4a71c21c694499ce1c7866611b14ace70d905012c356323c7c713" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"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":"1302149d1e197c41813b054c942329d420e366530f5517b470e964fe" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"bd":"68325720aabd7c82f30f554b313d0570c95accbb7dc4b5aae11204c08ffe732b" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"5fd4":"7c4fbf484498d21b487b9d61de8914b2eadaf2698712936d47c3ada2558f6788" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"c98c8e55":"7abc22c0ae5af26ce93dbb94433a0e0b2e119d014f8e7f65bd56c61ccccd9504" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"81a723d966":"7516fb8bb11350df2bf386bc3c33bd0f52cb4c67c6e4745e0488e62c2aea2605" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"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":"4109cdbec3240ad74cc6c37f39300f70fede16e21efc77f7865998714aad0b5e" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"":"38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"ab":"fb94d5be118865f6fcbc978b825da82cff188faec2f66cb84b2537d74b4938469854b0ca89e66fa2e182834736629f3d" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"7c27":"3d80be467df86d63abb9ea1d3f9cb39cd19890e7f2c53a6200bedc5006842b35e820dc4e0ca90ca9b97ab23ef07080fc" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"31f5ca":"78d54b943421fdf7ba90a7fb9637c2073aa480454bd841d39ff72f4511fc21fb67797b652c0c823229342873d3bef955" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"7bdee3f8":"8bdafba0777ee446c3431c2d7b1fbb631089f71d2ca417abc1d230e1aba64ec2f1c187474a6f4077d372c14ad407f99a" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"8f05604915":"504e414bf1db1060f14c8c799e25b1e0c4dcf1504ebbd129998f0ae283e6de86e0d3c7e879c73ec3b1836c3ee89c2649" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"665da6eda214":"4c022f112010908848312f8b8f1072625fd5c105399d562ea1d56130619a7eac8dfc3748fd05ee37e4b690be9daa9980" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"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":"cba9e3eb12a6f83db11e8a6ff40d1049854ee094416bc527fea931d8585428a8ed6242ce81f6769b36e2123a5c23483e" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"":"cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"8f":"e4cd2d19931b5aad9c920f45f56f6ce34e3d38c6d319a6e11d0588ab8b838576d6ce6d68eea7c830de66e2bd96458bfa7aafbcbec981d4ed040498c3dd95f22a" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"e724":"7dbb520221a70287b23dbcf62bfc1b73136d858e86266732a7fffa875ecaa2c1b8f673b5c065d360c563a7b9539349f5f59bef8c0c593f9587e3cd50bb26a231" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"de4c90":"33ce98281045a5c4c9df0363d8196f1d7dfcd5ee46ac89776fd8a4344c12f123a66788af5bd41ceff1941aa5637654b4064c88c14e00465ab79a2fc6c97e1014" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"a801e94b":"dadb1b5a27f9fece8d86adb2a51879beb1787ff28f4e8ce162cad7fee0f942efcabbf738bc6f797fc7cc79a3a75048cd4c82ca0757a324695bfb19a557e56e2f" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"94390d3502":"b6175c4c4cccf69e0ce5f0312010886ea6b34d43673f942ae42483f9cbb7da817de4e11b5d58e25a3d9bd721a22cdffe1c40411cc45df1911fa5506129b69297" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"49297dd63e5f":"1fcc1e6f6870859d11649f5e5336a9cd16329c029baf04d5a6edf257889a2e9522b497dd656bb402da461307c4ee382e2e89380c8e6e6e7697f1e439f650fa94" + +PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"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":"8e4bc6f8b8c60fe4d68c61d9b159c8693c3151c46749af58da228442d927f23359bd6ccd6c2ec8fa3f00a86cecbfa728e1ad60b821ed22fcd309ba91a4138bc9" + +PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"":"8350e5a3e24c153df2275c9f80692773" + +PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"61":"32ec01ec4a6dac72c0ab96fb34c0b5d1" + +PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"616263":"da853b0d3f88d99b30283a69e6ded6bb" + +PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"ab4f496bfb2a530b219ff33031fe06b0" + +PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"4e8ddff3650292ab5a4108c3aa47940b" + +PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"da33def2a42df13975352846c30338cd" + +PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"d5976f79d83d3a0dc9806c3c66f3efd8" + +PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"":"31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" + +PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"61":"bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24" + +PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"616263":"a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d" + +PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b" + +PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9" + +PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4" + +PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536" + +PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"":"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e" + +PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"61":"0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661" + +PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"616263":"900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72" + +PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0" + +PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b" + +PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f" + +PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a" + +PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"":"9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31" + +PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"61":"0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe" + +PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #3 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"616263":"8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc" + +PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36" + +PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc" + +PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #6 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"6162636462636465636465666465666765666768666768696768696a68696a6b696a6b6c6a6b6c6d6b6c6d6e6c6d6e6f6d6e6f706e6f7071":"12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b" + +PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189" + +PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #8 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b0da2bf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.function @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +#include + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_finish( int alg_arg, data_t *input, data_t *expected_hash ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + unsigned char actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation, + input->x, input->len ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ), + &actual_hash_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_hash->x, expected_hash->len, + actual_hash, actual_hash_length ); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_verify( int alg_arg, data_t *input, data_t *expected_hash ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation, + input->x, + input->len ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_verify( &operation, + expected_hash->x, + expected_hash->len ) ); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_multi_part( int alg_arg, data_t *input, data_t *expected_hash ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + unsigned char actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_hash_operation_t operation2 = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + uint32_t len = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + do + { + memset( actual_hash, 0, sizeof( actual_hash ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation, + input->x, len ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &operation, &operation2 ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation, + input->x + len, input->len - len ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation2, + input->x + len, input->len - len ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation, + actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ), + &actual_hash_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_hash->x, expected_hash->len, + actual_hash, actual_hash_length ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation2, + actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ), + &actual_hash_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_hash->x, expected_hash->len, + actual_hash, actual_hash_length ); + } while( len++ != input->len ); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + psa_hash_abort( &operation2 ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9620a642 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.data @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +Create NV seed file +create_nv_seed: + +PSA init/deinit +init_deinit:2 + +PSA deinit without init +deinit_without_init:0 + +PSA deinit twice +deinit_without_init:1 + +No random without init +validate_module_init_generate_random:0 + +No key slot access without init +validate_module_init_key_based:0 + +No random after deinit +validate_module_init_generate_random:1 + +No key slot access after deinit +validate_module_init_key_based:1 + +Custom entropy sources: all standard +custom_entropy_sources:0x0000ffff:PSA_SUCCESS + +Custom entropy sources: none +custom_entropy_sources:0:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + +Fake entropy: never returns anything +fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:0:0:0:0:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + +Fake entropy: less than the block size +fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:-1:-1:-1:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + +Fake entropy: not enough for a nonce +depends_on:ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN != 0 +fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN - 1:-1:-1:-1:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + +Fake entropy: one block eventually +depends_on:ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN == 0 +fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:0:0:0:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS + +Fake entropy: one block in two steps +depends_on:ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN == 0 +fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:1:-1:-1:PSA_SUCCESS + +Fake entropy: more than one block in two steps +depends_on:ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN == 0 +fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:-1:-1:PSA_SUCCESS + +Fake entropy: two blocks eventually +fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:0:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:0:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS + +NV seed only: less than minimum +entropy_from_nv_seed:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM - 1:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + +NV seed only: less than one block +entropy_from_nv_seed:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + +NV seed only: just enough +entropy_from_nv_seed:ENTROPY_MIN_NV_SEED_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS + +Recreate NV seed file +create_nv_seed: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40efb87c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.function @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include + +/* Some tests in this module configure entropy sources. */ +#include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" + +#define ENTROPY_MIN_NV_SEED_SIZE \ + MAX(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) + +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) +/* PSA crypto uses the HMAC_DRBG module. It reads from the entropy source twice: + * once for the initial entropy and once for a nonce. The nonce length is + * half the entropy length. For SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512, the + * entropy length is 256 per the documentation of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(), + * and PSA crypto doesn't support other hashes for HMAC_DRBG. */ +#define ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN ( 256 / 2 ) +#else +/* PSA crypto uses the CTR_DRBG module. In some configurations, it needs + * to read from the entropy source twice: once for the initial entropy + * and once for a nonce. */ +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#define ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + +typedef struct +{ + size_t threshold; /* Minimum bytes to make mbedtls_entropy_func happy */ + size_t max_steps; + size_t *length_sequence; + size_t step; +} fake_entropy_state_t; +static int fake_entropy_source( void *state_arg, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + fake_entropy_state_t *state = state_arg; + size_t i; + + if( state->step >= state->max_steps ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + *olen = MIN( len, state->length_sequence[state->step] ); + for( i = 0; i < *olen; i++ ) + output[i] = i; + ++state->step; + return( 0 ); +} + +#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_PLATFORM 0x00000001 +#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_TIMING 0x00000002 +#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_HAVEGE 0x00000004 +#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_HARDWARE 0x00000008 +#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_NV_SEED 0x00000010 +#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAKE 0x40000000 + +static uint32_t custom_entropy_sources_mask; +static fake_entropy_state_t fake_entropy_state; + +/* This is a modified version of mbedtls_entropy_init() from entropy.c + * which chooses entropy sources dynamically. */ +static void custom_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->source_count = 0; + memset( ctx->source, 0, sizeof( ctx->source ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + ctx->accumulator_started = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx->accumulator ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx->accumulator ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + mbedtls_havege_init( &ctx->havege_data ); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_PLATFORM ) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_TIMING ) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardclock_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_HAVEGE ) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_havege_poll, &ctx->havege_data, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_HARDWARE ) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_NV_SEED ) + { + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0; + } + else + { + /* Skip the NV seed even though it's compiled in. */ + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 1; + } +#endif + + if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAKE ) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, + fake_entropy_source, &fake_entropy_state, + fake_entropy_state.threshold, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +} + +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +void create_nv_seed( ) +{ + static unsigned char seed[ENTROPY_MIN_NV_SEED_SIZE]; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nv_seed_write( seed, sizeof( seed ) ) >= 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void init_deinit( int count ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int i; + for( i = 0; i < count; i++ ) + { + status = psa_crypto_init( ); + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + status = psa_crypto_init( ); + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + PSA_DONE( ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void deinit_without_init( int count ) +{ + int i; + for( i = 0; i < count; i++ ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + PSA_DONE( ); + } + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void validate_module_init_generate_random( int count ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t random[10] = { 0 }; + int i; + for( i = 0; i < count; i++ ) + { + status = psa_crypto_init( ); + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + PSA_DONE( ); + } + status = psa_generate_random( random, sizeof( random ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void validate_module_init_key_based( int count ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t data[10] = { 0 }; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0xdead, 0xdead ); + int i; + + for( i = 0; i < count; i++ ) + { + status = psa_crypto_init( ); + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + PSA_DONE( ); + } + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, data, sizeof( data ), &key ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +void custom_entropy_sources( int sources_arg, int expected_init_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_init_status = expected_init_status_arg; + uint8_t random[10] = { 0 }; + + custom_entropy_sources_mask = sources_arg; + PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + custom_entropy_init, mbedtls_entropy_free ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_crypto_init( ), expected_init_status ); + if( expected_init_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( random, sizeof( random ) ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +void fake_entropy_source( int threshold, + int amount1, + int amount2, + int amount3, + int amount4, + int expected_init_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_init_status = expected_init_status_arg; + uint8_t random[10] = { 0 }; + size_t lengths[4]; + + fake_entropy_state.threshold = threshold; + fake_entropy_state.step = 0; + fake_entropy_state.max_steps = 0; + if( amount1 >= 0 ) + lengths[fake_entropy_state.max_steps++] = amount1; + if( amount2 >= 0 ) + lengths[fake_entropy_state.max_steps++] = amount2; + if( amount3 >= 0 ) + lengths[fake_entropy_state.max_steps++] = amount3; + if( amount4 >= 0 ) + lengths[fake_entropy_state.max_steps++] = amount4; + fake_entropy_state.length_sequence = lengths; + + custom_entropy_sources_mask = ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAKE; + PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + custom_entropy_init, mbedtls_entropy_free ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_crypto_init( ), expected_init_status ); + if( expected_init_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( random, sizeof( random ) ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +void entropy_from_nv_seed( int seed_size_arg, + int expected_init_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_init_status = expected_init_status_arg; + uint8_t random[10] = { 0 }; + uint8_t *seed = NULL; + size_t seed_size = seed_size_arg; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( seed, seed_size ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nv_seed_write( seed, seed_size ) >= 0 ); + + custom_entropy_sources_mask = ENTROPY_SOURCE_NV_SEED; + PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + custom_entropy_init, mbedtls_entropy_free ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_crypto_init( ), expected_init_status ); + if( expected_init_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( random, sizeof( random ) ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( seed ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..72a11ab7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data @@ -0,0 +1,435 @@ +Hash: MD2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_MD2:16 + +Hash: MD4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_MD4:16 + +Hash: MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_MD5:16 + +Hash: RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:20 + +Hash: SHA-1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:20 + +Hash: SHA-2 SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:28 + +Hash: SHA-2 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:32 + +Hash: SHA-2 SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:48 + +Hash: SHA-2 SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:64 + +MAC: HMAC-MD2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_MD2 ):16:16 + +MAC: HMAC-MD4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_MD4 ):16:64 + +MAC: HMAC-MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_MD5 ):16:64 + +MAC: HMAC-RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ):20:64 + +MAC: HMAC-SHA-1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ):20:64 + +MAC: HMAC-SHA-224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ):28:64 + +MAC: HMAC-SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):32:64 + +MAC: HMAC-SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):48:128 + +MAC: HMAC-SHA-512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ):64:128 + +MAC: CBC_MAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128 + +MAC: CBC_MAC-AES-192 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192 + +MAC: CBC_MAC-AES-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256 + +MAC: CBC_MAC-3DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:8:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192 + +MAC: CMAC-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128 + +MAC: CMAC-AES-192 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192 + +MAC: CMAC-AES-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256 + +MAC: CMAC-3DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:8:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192 + +Cipher: STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER +cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER + +Cipher: CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CTR:ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER + +Cipher: CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CFB:ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER + +Cipher: OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_OFB:ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER + +Cipher: ECB-nopad +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0 + +Cipher: CBC-nopad +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0 + +Cipher: CBC-PKCS#7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0 + +Cipher: XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_XTS:0 + +AEAD: CCM-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128 + +AEAD: CCM-AES-192 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192 + +AEAD: CCM-AES-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256 + +AEAD: CCM-ARIA-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128 + +AEAD: CCM-ARIA-192 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192 + +AEAD: CCM-ARIA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256 + +AEAD: CCM-CAMELLIA-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128 + +AEAD: CCM-CAMELLIA-192 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192 + +AEAD: CCM-CAMELLIA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256 + +AEAD: GCM-AES-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128 + +AEAD: GCM-AES-192 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192 + +AEAD: GCM-AES-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256 + +AEAD: GCM-ARIA-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128 + +AEAD: GCM-ARIA-192 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192 + +AEAD: GCM-ARIA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256 + +AEAD: GCM-CAMELLIA-128 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128 + +AEAD: GCM-CAMELLIA-192 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192 + +AEAD: GCM-CAMELLIA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256 + +AEAD: ChaCha20_Poly1305 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 +aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:256 + +Asymmetric signature: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH + +Asymmetric signature: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN + +Asymmetric signature: RSA PSS SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS | ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN + +Asymmetric signature: RSA PSS-any-salt SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS | ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN + +Asymmetric signature: randomized ECDSA (no hashing) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH + +Asymmetric signature: SHA-256 + randomized ECDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN + +Asymmetric signature: SHA-256 + deterministic ECDSA using SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA | ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN + +Asymmetric signature: pure EdDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_EDDSA +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0 + +Asymmetric signature: Ed25519ph +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_EDDSA +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN + +Asymmetric signature: Ed448ph +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_EDDSA +asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA | ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH | ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN + +Asymmetric signature: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with wildcard hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +asymmetric_signature_wildcard:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN + +Asymmetric signature: RSA PSS with wildcard hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +asymmetric_signature_wildcard:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS | ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT + +Asymmetric signature: RSA PSS-any-salt with wildcard hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +asymmetric_signature_wildcard:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS | ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT + +Asymmetric signature: randomized ECDSA with wildcard hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA +asymmetric_signature_wildcard:PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA + +Asymmetric signature: deterministic ECDSA with wildcard hash +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA +asymmetric_signature_wildcard:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA | ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC + +Asymmetric encryption: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +asymmetric_encryption_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0 + +Asymmetric encryption: RSA OAEP using SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +asymmetric_encryption_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP + +Key derivation: HKDF using SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_HKDF + +Key derivation: HKDF using SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):ALG_IS_HKDF + +Key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF using SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF + +Key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF using SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF + +Key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS using SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS + +Key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS using SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS + +Key agreement: FFDH, raw output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_FFDH:ALG_IS_FFDH | ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION + +Key agreement: FFDH, HKDF using SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ):ALG_IS_FFDH:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) + +Key agreement: FFDH, HKDF using SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) ):ALG_IS_FFDH:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) + +Key agreement: ECDH, raw output +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH +key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDH:ALG_IS_ECDH | ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION + +Key agreement: ECDH, HKDF using SHA-256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ):ALG_IS_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) + +Key agreement: ECDH, HKDF using SHA-384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) ):ALG_IS_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) + +Key type: raw data +key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED + +Key type: HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED + +Key type: secret for key derivation +key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED + +Block cipher key type: AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +block_cipher_key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:16 + +Block cipher key type: ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +block_cipher_key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:16 + +Block cipher key type: DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +block_cipher_key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:8 + +Block cipher key type: Camellia +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +block_cipher_key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:16 + +Stream cipher key type: ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +stream_cipher_key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 + +Stream cipher key type: ChaCha20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +stream_cipher_key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 + +Key type: RSA public key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY | KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA + +Key type: RSA key pair +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR | KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA + +ECC key family: SECP K1 +ecc_key_family:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 + +ECC key family: SECP R1 +ecc_key_family:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 + +ECC key family: SECP R2 +ecc_key_family:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 + +ECC key family: SECT K1 +ecc_key_family:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 + +ECC key family: SECT R1 +ecc_key_family:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 + +ECC key family: SECT R2 +ecc_key_family:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 + +ECC key family: Brainpool P R1 +ecc_key_family:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 + +ECC key family: Montgomery (Curve25519, Curve448) +ecc_key_family:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY + +ECC key family: Twisted Edwards (Ed25519, Ed448) +ecc_key_family:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS + +DH group family: RFC 7919 +dh_key_family:PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 + +Lifetime: VOLATILE +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE:PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + +Lifetime: PERSISTENT +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0:PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + +Lifetime: volatile, local storage +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE:PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + +Lifetime: default, local storage +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):0:PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + +Lifetime: 2, local storage +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):0:2:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + +Lifetime: 254, local storage +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(254, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):0:254:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + +Lifetime: read-only, local storage +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY:PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + +Lifetime: volatile, 0x123456 +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, 0x123456):KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE:PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE:0x123456 + +Lifetime: default, 0x123456 +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, 0x123456):0:PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT:0x123456 + +Lifetime: 2, 0x123456 +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, 0x123456):0:2:0x123456 + +Lifetime: 254, 0x123456 +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(254, 0x123456):0:254:0x123456 + +Lifetime: read-only, 0x123456 +lifetime:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, 0x123456):KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY:PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY:0x123456 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f2ba16a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function @@ -0,0 +1,713 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +/* Test macros that provide metadata about algorithms and key types. + * This test suite only contains tests that don't require executing + * code. Other test suites validate macros that require creating a key + * and using it. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) +#include "spm/psa_defs.h" +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" + +/* Flags for algorithm classification macros. There is a flag for every + * algorithm classification macro PSA_ALG_IS_xxx except for the + * category test macros, which are hard-coded in each + * category-specific function. The name of the flag is the name of the + * classification macro without the PSA_ prefix. */ +#define ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED ( 1u << 0 ) +#define ALG_IS_HMAC ( 1u << 1 ) +#define ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC ( 1u << 2 ) +#define ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER ( 1u << 3 ) +#define ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN ( 1u << 4 ) +#define ALG_IS_RSA_PSS ( 1u << 5 ) +#define ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT ( 1u << 6 ) +#define ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT ( 1u << 7 ) +#define ALG_IS_DSA ( 1u << 8 ) +#define ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC ( 1u << 9 ) +#define ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA ( 1u << 10 ) +#define ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA ( 1u << 11 ) +#define ALG_IS_ECDSA ( 1u << 12 ) +#define ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC ( 1u << 13 ) +#define ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA ( 1u << 14 ) +#define ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA ( 1u << 15 ) +#define ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA ( 1u << 16 ) +#define ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH ( 1u << 17 ) +#define ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN ( 1u << 18 ) +#define ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP ( 1u << 19 ) +#define ALG_IS_HKDF ( 1u << 20 ) +#define ALG_IS_FFDH ( 1u << 21 ) +#define ALG_IS_ECDH ( 1u << 22 ) +#define ALG_IS_WILDCARD ( 1u << 23 ) +#define ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT ( 1u << 24 ) +#define ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER ( 1u << 25 ) +#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF ( 1u << 26 ) +#define ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS ( 1u << 27 ) +#define ALG_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE ( 1u << 28 ) /* must be last! */ + +/* Flags for key type classification macros. There is a flag for every + * key type classification macro PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_xxx except for some that + * are tested as derived from other macros. The name of the flag is + * the name of the classification macro without the PSA_ prefix. */ +#define KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED ( 1u << 0 ) +#define KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED ( 1u << 1 ) +#define KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY ( 1u << 2 ) +#define KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR ( 1u << 3 ) +#define KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA ( 1u << 4 ) +#define KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA ( 1u << 5 ) +#define KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC ( 1u << 6 ) +#define KEY_TYPE_IS_DH ( 1u << 7 ) +#define KEY_TYPE_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE ( 1u << 8 ) /* must be last! */ + +/* Flags for lifetime classification macros. There is a flag for every + * lifetime classification macro PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_xxx. The name of the + * flag is the name of the classification macro without the PSA_ prefix. */ +#define KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE ( 1u << 0 ) +#define KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY ( 1u << 1 ) +#define KEY_LIFETIME_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE ( 1u << 2 ) /* must be last! */ + +/* Check that in the value of flags, the bit flag (which should be a macro + * expanding to a number of the form 1 << k) is set if and only if + * PSA_##flag(alg) is true. + * + * Only perform this check if cond is true. Typically cond is 1, but it can + * be different if the value of the flag bit is only specified under specific + * conditions. + * + * Unconditionally mask flag into the ambient variable + * classification_flags_tested. + */ +#define TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( cond, flag, alg, flags ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( cond ) \ + { \ + if( ( flags ) & ( flag ) ) \ + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_##flag( alg ) ); \ + else \ + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_##flag( alg ) ); \ + } \ + classification_flags_tested |= ( flag ); \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +/* Check the parity of value. + * + * There are several numerical encodings for which the PSA Cryptography API + * specification deliberately defines encodings that all have the same + * parity. This way, a data glitch that flips one bit in the data cannot + * possibly turn a valid encoding into another valid encoding. Here in + * the tests, we check that the values (including Mbed TLS vendor-specific + * values) have the expected parity. + * + * The expected parity is even so that 0 is considered a valid encoding. + * + * Return a nonzero value if value has even parity and 0 otherwise. */ +int has_even_parity( uint32_t value ) +{ + value ^= value >> 16; + value ^= value >> 8; + value ^= value >> 4; + return( 0x9669 & 1 << ( value & 0xf ) ); +} +#define TEST_PARITY( value ) \ + TEST_ASSERT( has_even_parity( value ) ) + +void algorithm_classification( psa_algorithm_t alg, unsigned flags ) +{ + unsigned classification_flags_tested = 0; + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HMAC, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_PSS, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_DSA, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( PSA_ALG_IS_DSA( alg ), + ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_ECDSA, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ), + ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_HKDF, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_WILDCARD, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_ECDH, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_FFDH, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF, alg, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS, alg, flags ); + TEST_EQUAL( classification_flags_tested, ALG_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE - 1 ); +exit: ; +} + +void key_type_classification( psa_key_type_t type, unsigned flags ) +{ + unsigned classification_flags_tested = 0; + + /* Macros tested based on the test case parameter */ + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED, type, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED, type, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY, type, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR, type, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA, type, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA, type, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC, type, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_TYPE_IS_DH, type, flags ); + TEST_EQUAL( classification_flags_tested, KEY_TYPE_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE - 1 ); + + /* Macros with derived semantics */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( type ), + ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( type ), + ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( type ), + ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR( type ), + ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH( type ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY( type ), + ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH( type ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) ); + + TEST_PARITY( type ); + +exit: ; +} + +void mac_algorithm_core( psa_algorithm_t alg, int classification_flags, + psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, + size_t length ) +{ + /* Algorithm classification */ + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ); + algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags ); + + /* Length */ + TEST_EQUAL( length, PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_key_can_do( alg, key_type ) ); +#endif + +exit: ; +} + +void aead_algorithm_core( psa_algorithm_t alg, int classification_flags, + psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, + size_t tag_length ) +{ + /* Algorithm classification */ + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ); + algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags ); + + /* Tag length */ + TEST_EQUAL( tag_length, PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg ) ); + +exit: ; +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_algorithm( int alg_arg, int length_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t length = length_arg; + psa_algorithm_t hmac_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t rsa_pkcs1v15_sign_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t rsa_pss_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t dsa_alg = PSA_ALG_DSA( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t deterministic_dsa_alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t ecdsa_alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t deterministic_ecdsa_alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t rsa_oaep_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t hkdf_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF( alg ); + + /* Algorithm classification */ + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ); + algorithm_classification( alg, 0 ); + + /* Dependent algorithms */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( hmac_alg ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( rsa_pkcs1v15_sign_alg ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( rsa_pss_alg ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( dsa_alg ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( deterministic_dsa_alg ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( ecdsa_alg ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( deterministic_ecdsa_alg ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH( rsa_oaep_alg ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( hkdf_alg ), alg ); + + /* Hash length */ + TEST_EQUAL( length, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( length <= PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mac_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags, + int length_arg, + int key_type_arg, int key_bits_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t length = length_arg; + size_t n; + size_t key_type = key_type_arg; + size_t key_bits = key_bits_arg; + + mac_algorithm_core( alg, classification_flags, + key_type, key_bits, length ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ), alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( length <= PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ); + + /* Truncated versions */ + for( n = 1; n <= length; n++ ) + { + psa_algorithm_t truncated_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, n ); + mac_algorithm_core( truncated_alg, classification_flags, + key_type, key_bits, n ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( truncated_alg ), alg ); + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC twice gives the length + * of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is smaller than + * the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( truncated_alg, 1 ), + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( truncated_alg, length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( truncated_alg, length ), + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length ) ); + + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC on an algorithm + * earlier constructed with PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC gives the + * length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is smaller + * than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( truncated_alg, n ), 1 ), + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( truncated_alg, n ), length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( truncated_alg, n ), length ), + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length ) ); + } + + /* At-leat-this-length versions */ + for( n = 1; n <= length; n++ ) + { + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg = PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, n ); + mac_algorithm_core( policy_alg, classification_flags | ALG_IS_WILDCARD, + key_type, key_bits, n ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg ), alg ); + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC twice gives the + * length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is smaller + * than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg, 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg, length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg, length ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, length ) ); + + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC on an algorithm + * earlier constructed with PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC gives the length of + * the outer truncation (even if the outer length is smaller than the + * inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( policy_alg, n ), 1), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( policy_alg, n ), length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( policy_alg, n ), length ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, length ) ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hmac_algorithm( int alg_arg, + int length_arg, + int block_size_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg ); + size_t block_size = block_size_arg; + size_t length = length_arg; + size_t n; + + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( hash_alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ), alg ); + + TEST_ASSERT( block_size == PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( block_size <= PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + test_mac_algorithm( alg_arg, ALG_IS_HMAC, length, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( length ) ); + + for( n = 1; n <= length; n++ ) + { + psa_algorithm_t truncated_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, n ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( truncated_alg ), hash_alg ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + + /* Algorithm classification */ + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ); + algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aead_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags, + int tag_length_arg, + int key_type_arg, int key_bits_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t tag_length = tag_length_arg; + size_t n; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + size_t key_bits = key_bits_arg; + + aead_algorithm_core( alg, classification_flags, + key_type, key_bits, tag_length ); + + /* Truncated versions */ + for( n = 1; n <= tag_length; n++ ) + { + psa_algorithm_t truncated_alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, n ); + aead_algorithm_core( truncated_alg, classification_flags, + key_type, key_bits, n ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG( truncated_alg ), + alg ); + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG twice gives + * the length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is + * smaller than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( truncated_alg, 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( truncated_alg, tag_length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, tag_length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( truncated_alg, tag_length ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, tag_length ) ); + + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG on an algorithm + * earlier constructed with PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG + * gives the length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is + * smaller than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( truncated_alg, n ), 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( truncated_alg, n ), tag_length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, tag_length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( truncated_alg, n ), tag_length ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, tag_length ) ); + } + + /* At-leat-this-length versions */ + for( n = 1; n <= tag_length; n++ ) + { + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, n ); + aead_algorithm_core( policy_alg, classification_flags | ALG_IS_WILDCARD, + key_type, key_bits, n ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG( policy_alg ), + alg ); + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG twice + * gives the length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is + * smaller than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( policy_alg, 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( policy_alg, tag_length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, tag_length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( policy_alg, tag_length ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, tag_length ) ); + + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG on an + * algorithm earlier constructed with PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG + * gives the length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is + * smaller than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, n ), 1), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, n ), tag_length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, tag_length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, n ), tag_length ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, tag_length ) ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_signature_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + + /* Algorithm classification */ + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ); + algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_signature_wildcard( int alg_arg, int classification_flags ) +{ + classification_flags |= ALG_IS_WILDCARD; + classification_flags |= ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH; + classification_flags |= ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN; + test_asymmetric_signature_algorithm( alg_arg, classification_flags ); + /* Any failure of this test function comes from + * asymmetric_signature_algorithm. Pacify -Werror=unused-label. */ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_encryption_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + + /* Algorithm classification */ + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ); + algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_derivation_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t ecdh_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH, alg ); + psa_algorithm_t ffdh_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_FFDH, alg ); + + /* Algorithm classification */ + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ); + algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags ); + + /* Check combinations with key agreements */ + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( ecdh_alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( ffdh_alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( ecdh_alg ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( ffdh_alg ), alg ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_agreement_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags, + int ka_alg_arg, int kdf_alg_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t actual_ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t expected_ka_alg = ka_alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t actual_kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t expected_kdf_alg = kdf_alg_arg; + + /* Algorithm classification */ + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ); + algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags ); + + /* Shared secret derivation properties */ + TEST_EQUAL( actual_ka_alg, expected_ka_alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( actual_kdf_alg, expected_kdf_alg ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_type( int type_arg, int classification_flags ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + + key_type_classification( type, classification_flags ); + + /* For asymmetric types, check the corresponding pair/public type */ + if( classification_flags & KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY ) + { + psa_key_type_t pair_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY( type ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( pair_type ), type ); + key_type_classification( pair_type, + ( classification_flags + & ~KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY ) + | KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( type ), type ); + } + if( classification_flags & KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR ) + { + psa_key_type_t public_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( type ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY( public_type ), type ); + key_type_classification( public_type, + ( classification_flags + & ~KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR ) + | KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY( type ), type ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void block_cipher_key_type( int type_arg, int block_size_arg ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t block_size = block_size_arg; + + test_key_type( type_arg, KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED ); + + TEST_EQUAL( type & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( type ), block_size ); + + /* Check that the block size is a power of 2. This is required, at least, + for PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(block_size, length) in crypto_sizes.h. */ + TEST_ASSERT( ( ( block_size - 1 ) & block_size ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void stream_cipher_key_type( int type_arg ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + + test_key_type( type_arg, KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED ); + + TEST_EQUAL( type & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( type ), 1 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ +void ecc_key_family( int curve_arg ) +{ + psa_ecc_family_t curve = curve_arg; + psa_key_type_t public_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( curve ); + psa_key_type_t pair_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( curve ); + + TEST_PARITY( curve ); + + test_key_type( public_type, KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC | KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY ); + test_key_type( pair_type, KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC | KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR ); + + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( public_type ), curve ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( pair_type ), curve ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ +void dh_key_family( int group_arg ) +{ + psa_dh_family_t group = group_arg; + psa_key_type_t public_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY( group ); + psa_key_type_t pair_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR( group ); + + TEST_PARITY( group ); + + test_key_type( public_type, KEY_TYPE_IS_DH | KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY ); + test_key_type( pair_type, KEY_TYPE_IS_DH | KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR ); + + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY( public_type ), group ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY( pair_type ), group ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void lifetime( int lifetime_arg, int classification_flags, + int persistence_arg, int location_arg ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg; + psa_key_persistence_t persistence = persistence_arg; + psa_key_location_t location = location_arg; + unsigned flags = classification_flags; + unsigned classification_flags_tested = 0; + + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE, lifetime, flags ); + TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( 1, KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY, lifetime, flags ); + TEST_EQUAL( classification_flags_tested, + KEY_LIFETIME_FLAG_MASK_PLUS_ONE - 1 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE( lifetime ), persistence ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ), location ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e3253d84 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.function @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h" + +#define INVALID_KEY_ID mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0, 0xfedcba98 ) + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void import_not_supported( int key_type, data_t *key_material ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = INVALID_KEY_ID; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material->x, key_material->len, + &key_id ), + PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key_id, MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ) ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void generate_not_supported( int key_type, int bits ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = INVALID_KEY_ID; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key_id ), + PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key_id, MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ) ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5c8a528 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated.data @@ -0,0 +1,947 @@ +# Automatically generated by generate_psa_tests.py. Do not edit! + +PSA import AES 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate AES 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128 + +PSA import AES 192-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +PSA generate AES 192-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192 + +PSA import AES 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate AES 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256 + +PSA import ARC4 8-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48" + +PSA generate ARC4 8-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:8 + +PSA import ARC4 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate ARC4 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:128 + +PSA import ARC4 2048-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate ARC4 2048-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:2048 + +PSA import ARIA 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate ARIA 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128 + +PSA import ARIA 192-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +PSA generate ARIA 192-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192 + +PSA import ARIA 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate ARIA 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256 + +PSA import CAMELLIA 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate CAMELLIA 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128 + +PSA import CAMELLIA 192-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +PSA generate CAMELLIA 192-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192 + +PSA import CAMELLIA 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate CAMELLIA 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256 + +PSA import CHACHA20 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate CHACHA20 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:256 + +PSA import DES 64-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901" + +PSA generate DES 64-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64 + +PSA import DES 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901644573206b457902" + +PSA generate DES 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128 + +PSA import DES 192-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904" + +PSA generate DES 192-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192 + +PSA import HMAC 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate HMAC 128-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128 + +PSA import HMAC 160-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +PSA generate HMAC 160-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160 + +PSA import HMAC 224-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +PSA generate HMAC 224-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224 + +PSA import HMAC 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate HMAC 256-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256 + +PSA import HMAC 384-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate HMAC 384-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384 + +PSA import HMAC 512-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +PSA generate HMAC 512-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512 + +PSA import RSA_KEY_PAIR 1024-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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" + +PSA generate RSA_KEY_PAIR 1024-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024 + +PSA import RSA_KEY_PAIR 1536-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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" + +PSA generate RSA_KEY_PAIR 1536-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536 + +PSA import RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1024-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +PSA import RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1536-bit not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 160-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 160-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 192-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 192-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 224-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 224-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 256-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 256-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 320-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 320-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 384-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 384-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 512-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 512-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 160-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 160-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 192-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 192-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 224-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 224-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 256-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 256-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 320-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 320-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 384-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 384-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 512-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 512-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512 + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 160-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 192-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 224-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 256-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 320-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 384-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 512-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 160-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 192-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 224-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 256-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 320-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 384-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) 512-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 255-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 255-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 448-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 448-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 255-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 255-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 448-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) 448-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448 + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) 255-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) 448-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"c0d3a5a2b416a573dc9909f92f134ac01323ab8f8e36804e578588ba2d09fe7c3e737f771ca112825b548a0ffded6d6a2fd09a3e77dec30e" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) 255-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) 448-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"c0d3a5a2b416a573dc9909f92f134ac01323ab8f8e36804e578588ba2d09fe7c3e737f771ca112825b548a0ffded6d6a2fd09a3e77dec30e" + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256 + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) 192-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) 224-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) 256-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) 192-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) 224-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) 256-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521 + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 225-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 256-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 384-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 521-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 225-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 256-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 384-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) 521-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160 + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) 160-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) 160-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571 + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 163-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 233-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 239-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 283-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 409-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 571-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 163-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 233-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 239-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 283-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 409-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) 571-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571 + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 163-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 233-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 283-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 409-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 571-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 163-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 233-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 283-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 409-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) 571-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163 + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) 163-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) 163-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255 + +PSA import ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b" + +PSA generate ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:!PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448 + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit type not supported +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a" + +PSA import ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit curve not supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:!PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:DEPENDENCY_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180" + +# End of automatically generated file. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.misc.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.misc.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c3673e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.misc.data @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +PSA import PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE never supported +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"1234" + +PSA generate PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE never supported +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:16 + +PSA import PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC never supported +import_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC:"1234" + +PSA generate PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC never supported +generate_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC:16 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1138e748 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.function @@ -0,0 +1,384 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h" + +static int test_equal_status( const char *test, + int line_no, const char* filename, + psa_status_t value1, + psa_status_t value2 ) +{ + if( ( value1 == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT && + value2 == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) || + ( value1 == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED && + value2 == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ) ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + return( mbedtls_test_equal( test, line_no, filename, value1, value2 ) ); +} + +/** Like #TEST_EQUAL, but expects #psa_status_t values and treats + * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT and #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED as + * interchangeable. + * + * This test suite currently allows NOT_SUPPORTED and INVALID_ARGUMENT + * to be interchangeable in places where the library's behavior does not + * match the strict expectations of the test case generator. In the long + * run, it would be better to clarify the expectations and reconcile the + * library and the test case generator. + */ +#define TEST_STATUS( expr1, expr2 ) \ + do { \ + if( ! test_equal_status( #expr1 " == " #expr2, __LINE__, __FILE__, \ + expr1, expr2 ) ) \ + goto exit; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void hash_fail( int alg_arg, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t input[1] = {'A'}; + uint8_t output[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t length = SIZE_MAX; + + PSA_INIT( ); + + TEST_EQUAL( expected_status, + psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_status, + psa_hash_compute( alg, input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), &length ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_status, + psa_hash_compare( alg, input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ) ) ); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mac_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t input[1] = {'A'}; + uint8_t output[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t length = SIZE_MAX; + + PSA_INIT( ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key_id ) ); + + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key_id, alg ) ); + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key_id, alg ) ); + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_mac_compute( key_id, alg, + input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), &length ) ); + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_mac_verify( key_id, alg, + input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ) ) ); + +exit: + psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void cipher_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t input[1] = {'A'}; + uint8_t output[64] = {0}; + size_t length = SIZE_MAX; + + PSA_INIT( ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key_id ) ); + + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key_id, alg ) ); + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key_id, alg ) ); + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_cipher_encrypt( key_id, alg, + input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), &length ) ); + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_cipher_decrypt( key_id, alg, + input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), &length ) ); + +exit: + psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void aead_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t input[16] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO"; + uint8_t output[64] = {0}; + size_t length = SIZE_MAX; + + PSA_INIT( ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key_id ) ); + + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_aead_encrypt( key_id, alg, + input, sizeof( input ), + NULL, 0, input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), &length ) ); + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_aead_decrypt( key_id, alg, + input, sizeof( input ), + NULL, 0, input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), &length ) ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, int private_only, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t input[1] = {'A'}; + uint8_t output[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t length = SIZE_MAX; + + PSA_INIT( ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key_id ) ); + + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_sign_hash( key_id, alg, + input, sizeof( input ), + output, sizeof( output ), &length ) ); + if( ! private_only ) + { + /* Determine a plausible signature size to avoid an INVALID_SIGNATURE + * error based on this. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) ); + size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + size_t output_length = sizeof( output ); + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( key_type ) ) + output_length = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( key_bits ); + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( key_type ) ) + output_length = 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( key_bits ); + TEST_ASSERT( output_length <= sizeof( output ) ); + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_verify_hash( key_id, alg, + input, sizeof( input ), + output, output_length ) ); + } + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void asymmetric_encryption_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, int private_only, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t plaintext[PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + uint8_t ciphertext[PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t length = SIZE_MAX; + + PSA_INIT( ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key_id ) ); + + if( ! private_only ) + { + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_asymmetric_encrypt( key_id, alg, + plaintext, 1, + NULL, 0, + ciphertext, sizeof( ciphertext ), + &length ) ); + } + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key_id, alg, + ciphertext, sizeof( ciphertext ), + NULL, 0, + plaintext, sizeof( plaintext ), + &length ) ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_derivation_fail( int alg_arg, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + PSA_INIT( ); + + TEST_EQUAL( expected_status, + psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, alg ) ); + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_agreement_fail( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int alg_arg, int private_only, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t public_key[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t public_key_length = SIZE_MAX; + uint8_t output[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; + size_t length = SIZE_MAX; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + PSA_INIT( ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key_id ) ); + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( key_type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( key_type ) ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( key_id, + public_key, sizeof( public_key ), + &public_key_length ) ); + } + + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_raw_key_agreement( alg, key_id, + public_key, public_key_length, + output, sizeof( output ), &length ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &operation, + PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ) ); + TEST_STATUS( expected_status, + psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + &operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + key_id, + public_key, public_key_length ) ); +#endif + + /* There are no public-key operations. */ + (void) private_only; + +exit: + psa_key_derivation_abort( &operation ); + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.generated.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.generated.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c674a61 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.generated.data @@ -0,0 +1,32526 @@ +# Automatically generated by generate_psa_tests.py. Do not edit! + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(GCM,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): !CCM with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): !CCM with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): !CCM with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,13): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): !CCM with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): !CCM with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): !CCM with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): !CCM with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): !CCM with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): !CCM with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(CCM,63): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ANY_HASH: invalid +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash CBC_MAC: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: !CBC_MAC with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: !CBC_MAC with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: !CBC_MAC with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_MAC: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_MAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_MAC: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_MAC: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_MAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_MAC: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_MAC: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_MAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_MAC: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_MAC: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_MAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_MAC: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_MAC: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation CBC_MAC: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_MAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_MAC: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_MAC: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: !CBC_NO_PADDING with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: !CBC_NO_PADDING with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: !CBC_NO_PADDING with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: !CBC_NO_PADDING with DES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_NO_PADDING: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash CBC_PKCS7: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_PKCS7: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_PKCS7: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_PKCS7: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CBC_PKCS7: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: !CBC_PKCS7 with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: !CBC_PKCS7 with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: !CBC_PKCS7 with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: !CBC_PKCS7 with DES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CBC_PKCS7: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_PKCS7: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_PKCS7: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_PKCS7: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CBC_PKCS7: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_PKCS7: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_PKCS7: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_PKCS7: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CBC_PKCS7: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_PKCS7: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_PKCS7: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_PKCS7: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CBC_PKCS7: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation CBC_PKCS7: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_PKCS7: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_PKCS7: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_PKCS7: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CBC_PKCS7: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash CCM: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: !CCM with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: !CCM with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead CCM: !CCM with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CCM: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation CCM: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash CFB: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CFB: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CFB: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: !CFB with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: !CFB with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CFB: !CFB with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CFB: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CFB: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CFB: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CFB: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CFB: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CFB: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CFB: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation CFB: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_CFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CFB: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CFB: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash CHACHA20_POLY1305: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CHACHA20_POLY1305: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CHACHA20_POLY1305: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: !CHACHA20_POLY1305 with CHACHA20 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CHACHA20_POLY1305: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CHACHA20_POLY1305: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CHACHA20_POLY1305: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation CHACHA20_POLY1305: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CHACHA20_POLY1305: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash CMAC: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: !CMAC with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CMAC: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CMAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CMAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CMAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CMAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation CMAC: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CMAC: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CMAC:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash CTR: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CTR: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CTR: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac CTR: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: !CTR with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: !CTR with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CTR: !CTR with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher CTR: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CTR: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CTR: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead CTR: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CTR: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CTR: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign CTR: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CTR: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CTR: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption CTR: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation CTR: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CTR: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CTR: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement CTR: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_DSA(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_DSA(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_DSA(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DSA(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD2): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DSA(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DSA(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD4): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DSA(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DSA(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(MD5): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DSA(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DSA(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DSA(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DSA(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DSA(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DSA(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DSA(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DSA(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DSA(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DSA(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DSA(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash DSA(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign DSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation DSA(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: !ECB_NO_PADDING with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: !ECB_NO_PADDING with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: !ECB_NO_PADDING with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: !ECB_NO_PADDING with DES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECB_NO_PADDING: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECB_NO_PADDING: invalid with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDH: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDH: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDH: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): !MD2 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD2): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD2): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): !MD4 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD4): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD4): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): !MD5 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(MD5): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(MD5): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(RIPEMD160): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_1): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_224): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_256): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_384): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !ECDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA(SHA_512): invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ECDSA_ANY: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: !ECDSA_ANY with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ECDSA_ANY: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ECDSA_ANY: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ECDSA_ANY: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ED25519PH: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: !ED25519PH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: !ED25519PH with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ED25519PH: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED25519PH: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ED25519PH: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ED25519PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash ED448PH: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ED448PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac ED448PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ED448PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher ED448PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ED448PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead ED448PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: !ED448PH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: !ED448PH with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign ED448PH: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign ED448PH: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ED448PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption ED448PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation ED448PH: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ED448PH: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement ED448PH: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash FFDH: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation FFDH: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement FFDH: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash GCM: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac GCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac GCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac GCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher GCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher GCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher GCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: !GCM with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: !GCM with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead GCM: !GCM with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead GCM: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign GCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign GCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign GCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption GCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption GCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption GCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation GCM: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement GCM: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement GCM: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement GCM: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash HKDF(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(MD2): !HKDF +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(MD2): !MD2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash HKDF(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(MD4): !HKDF +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(MD4): !MD4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash HKDF(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(MD5): !HKDF +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(MD5): !MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash HKDF(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(RIPEMD160): !HKDF +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash HKDF(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_1): !HKDF +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_1): !SHA_1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash HKDF(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_224): !HKDF +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_224): !SHA_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash HKDF(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_256): !HKDF +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_256): !SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash HKDF(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_384): !HKDF +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_384): !SHA_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash HKDF(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_512): !HKDF +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation HKDF(SHA_512): !SHA_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash HMAC(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): !HMAC with HMAC +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): !MD2 with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD2): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher HMAC(MD2): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead HMAC(MD2): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign HMAC(MD2): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption HMAC(MD2): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HMAC(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement HMAC(MD2): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash HMAC(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): !HMAC with HMAC +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): !MD4 with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD4): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher HMAC(MD4): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead HMAC(MD4): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign HMAC(MD4): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption HMAC(MD4): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HMAC(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement HMAC(MD4): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash HMAC(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): !HMAC with HMAC +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): !MD5 with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(MD5): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher HMAC(MD5): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead HMAC(MD5): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign HMAC(MD5): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption HMAC(MD5): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HMAC(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement HMAC(MD5): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash HMAC(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): !HMAC with HMAC +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher HMAC(RIPEMD160): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead HMAC(RIPEMD160): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign HMAC(RIPEMD160): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption HMAC(RIPEMD160): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HMAC(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement HMAC(RIPEMD160): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash HMAC(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): !HMAC with HMAC +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher HMAC(SHA_1): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead HMAC(SHA_1): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign HMAC(SHA_1): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption HMAC(SHA_1): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HMAC(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement HMAC(SHA_1): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash HMAC(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): !HMAC with HMAC +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_224): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher HMAC(SHA_224): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead HMAC(SHA_224): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign HMAC(SHA_224): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption HMAC(SHA_224): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HMAC(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement HMAC(SHA_224): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash HMAC(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): !HMAC with HMAC +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_256): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher HMAC(SHA_256): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead HMAC(SHA_256): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign HMAC(SHA_256): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption HMAC(SHA_256): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HMAC(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement HMAC(SHA_256): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash HMAC(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): !HMAC with HMAC +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_384): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher HMAC(SHA_384): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead HMAC(SHA_384): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign HMAC(SHA_384): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption HMAC(SHA_384): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HMAC(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement HMAC(SHA_384): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash HMAC(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): !HMAC with HMAC +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac HMAC(SHA_512): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher HMAC(SHA_512): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead HMAC(SHA_512): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign HMAC(SHA_512): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption HMAC(SHA_512): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation HMAC(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement HMAC(SHA_512): invalid with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !ECDH +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !FFDH +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !HKDF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !ECDH +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !ECDH +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !ECDH +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PRF with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !ECDH +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !SHA_256 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256)): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !ECDH +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !ECDH with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(ECDH,TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384)): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !FFDH +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !HKDF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:!PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): !SHA_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement KEY_AGREEMENT(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash MD2: !MD2 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_MD2:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation MD2: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_MD2:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash MD4: !MD4 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_MD4:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation MD4: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_MD4:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash MD5: !MD5 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_MD5:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation MD5: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_MD5:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash OFB: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac OFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: !OFB with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher OFB: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead OFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign OFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption OFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation OFB: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_OFB:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement OFB: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_OFB:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash PURE_EDDSA: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: !PURE_EDDSA with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: !PURE_EDDSA with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: public with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign PURE_EDDSA: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation PURE_EDDSA: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement PURE_EDDSA: invalid with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RIPEMD160: !RIPEMD160 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation RIPEMD160: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): !MD2 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): !MD2 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD2): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): !MD4 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): !MD4 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD4): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): !MD5 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): !MD5 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(MD5): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): !RSA_OAEP with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_OAEP(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: !RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: !RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): !MD2 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): !MD2 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): !MD4 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): !MD4 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): !MD5 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): !MD5 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: !RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW: invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): !MD2 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): !RSA_PSS with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): !MD2 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): !RSA_PSS with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD2): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): !MD4 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): !RSA_PSS with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): !MD4 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): !RSA_PSS with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD4): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): !MD5 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): !RSA_PSS with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): !MD5 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): !RSA_PSS with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(MD5): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): !RSA_PSS with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): !RSA_PSS with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): !RSA_PSS with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): !RSA_PSS with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_1): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): !RSA_PSS with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): !RSA_PSS with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_224): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): !RSA_PSS with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): !RSA_PSS with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): !RSA_PSS with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): !RSA_PSS with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_384): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): !RSA_PSS with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): !RSA_PSS with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_512): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): !MD2 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): !MD2 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): !MD4 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): !MD4 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): !MD5 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): !MD5 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): !SHA_1 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): !SHA_224 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): !SHA_256 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): !SHA_384 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): !RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): !SHA_512 with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): public with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512): invalid with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA3_224: !SHA3_224 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA3_224:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA3_224: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA3_224:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA3_256: !SHA3_256 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA3_256:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA3_256: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA3_256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA3_384: !SHA3_384 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA3_384:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA3_384: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA3_384:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA3_512: !SHA3_512 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA3_512:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA3_512: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA3_512:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHAKE256_512: !SHAKE256_512 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHAKE256_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHAKE256_512: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHAKE256_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA_1: !SHA_1 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA_1: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA_224: !SHA_224 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA_224: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA_256: !SHA_256 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA_256: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA_384: !SHA_384 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA_384: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA_512: !SHA_512 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA_512: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA_512_224: !SHA_512_224 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA_512_224: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash SHA_512_256: !SHA_512_256 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation SHA_512_256: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash STREAM_CIPHER: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: !STREAM_CIPHER with ARC4 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: !STREAM_CIPHER with CHACHA20 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation STREAM_CIPHER: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement STREAM_CIPHER: invalid with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TLS12_PRF(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(MD2): !MD2 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(MD2): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PRF(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(MD4): !MD4 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(MD4): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PRF(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(MD5): !MD5 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(MD5): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PRF(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(RIPEMD160): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PRF(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_1): !SHA_1 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_1): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PRF(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_224): !SHA_224 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_224): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PRF(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_256): !SHA_256 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_256): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PRF(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_384): !SHA_384 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_384): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PRF(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_512): !SHA_512 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PRF(SHA_512): !TLS12_PRF +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(MD2): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(MD2): !MD2 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(MD2): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(MD4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(MD4): !MD4 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(MD4): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(MD5): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(MD5): !MD5 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(MD5): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD5):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(RIPEMD160): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(RIPEMD160): !RIPEMD160 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(RIPEMD160): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_1): !SHA_1 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_1): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_224): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_224): !SHA_224 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_224): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256): !SHA_256 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_256): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384): !SHA_384 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_384): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_512): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_512): !SHA_512 +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA key_derivation TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(SHA_512): !TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:!PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC,1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512),1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): !CBC_MAC with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): !CBC_MAC with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): !CBC_MAC with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): !CBC_MAC with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): !CBC_MAC with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): !CBC_MAC with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): !CBC_MAC with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): !CBC_MAC with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): !CBC_MAC with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): !CBC_MAC with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): !CBC_MAC with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): !CBC_MAC with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16): invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63): invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,63):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA hash XTS: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac XTS: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac XTS: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA mac XTS: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +mac_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: !XTS with AES +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ARC4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"48":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: !XTS with ARIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher XTS: !XTS with CAMELLIA +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with CHACHA20 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with DES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:"644573206b457901":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_KEY_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(BRAINPOOL_P_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MONTGOMERY) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECP_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_K1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(SECT_R2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(TWISTED_EDWARDS) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with HMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with RAW_DATA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"48":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with RSA_KEY_PAIR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA cipher XTS: incompatible with RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead XTS: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead XTS: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA aead XTS: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +aead_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign XTS: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign XTS: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA sign XTS: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption XTS: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption XTS: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA asymmetric_encryption XTS: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +asymmetric_encryption_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_derivation XTS: invalid +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS +key_derivation_fail:PSA_ALG_XTS:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement XTS: invalid with AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement XTS: invalid with ARIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key_agreement XTS: invalid with CAMELLIA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_agreement_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_XTS:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +# End of automatically generated file. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.misc.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.misc.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8ab7489 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.misc.data @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +# Most operation failure test cases are automatically generated in +# test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.generated.data. The manually written +# test cases in this file cover some edge cases, plus a few to help with +# with debugging the test code. + +# Redundant, to help debugging the test code +PSA hash: invalid algorithm +hash_fail:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +# For ARC4, Mbed TLS only supports 128-bit keys. PSA allows 40 to 2048 bits. +# The ARC4 construction allows any whole number of bytes from 1 to 256 bytes +# (8 to 2048 bits). +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: 8-bit ARC4 never supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"41":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: 40-bit ARC4 never supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"4152433420":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: 120-bit ARC4 never supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"41524334206b657941524334206b65":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: 136-bit ARC4 never supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"41524334206b657941524334206b657941":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: 256-bit ARC4 never supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"41524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b6579":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +PSA cipher STREAM_CIPHER: 2048-bit ARC4 never supported +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +cipher_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:"41524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b657941524334206b6579":PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +# Redundant, to help debugging the test code +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): incompatible key type +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +# Redundant, to help debugging the test code +PSA sign RSA_PSS(SHA_256): RSA_PSS not enabled, key pair +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d208e9e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +# Note that if you need to make a change that affects how keys are +# stored, this may indicate that the key store is changing in a +# backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward compatibility +# before changing how test data is constructed or validated. + +Format for storage: RSA private key +format_storage_data_check:"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":"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":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN + +Format for storage: AES-128 key +format_storage_data_check:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024800000030000000250050000000010000000404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0 + +Parse storage: RSA private key +parse_storage_data_check:"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":"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":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN:PSA_SUCCESS + +Parse storage: AES-128 key +parse_storage_data_check:"505341004b45590000000000010000000024800000030000000250050000000010000000404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0:PSA_SUCCESS + +Parse storage: wrong version +parse_storage_data_check:"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":"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":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + +Parse storage: data too big +parse_storage_data_check:"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":"":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + +Parse storage: bad magic +parse_storage_data_check:"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":"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":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + +Parse storage: truncated magic +parse_storage_data_check:"505341004b4559":"":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + +Parse storage: truncated header +parse_storage_data_check:"505341004b455900000000000100000001700000010000000000001200000010620200":"":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + +Parse storage: truncated key +parse_storage_data_check:"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":"":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + +# Not specific to files, but only run this test in an environment where the maximum size could be reached. +Save maximum-size persistent raw key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C +save_large_persistent_key:PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS + +Save larger than maximum-size persistent raw key +save_large_persistent_key:PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE + 1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Persistent key destroy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +persistent_key_destroy:2:1:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"deadbeef" + +Persistent key destroy after restart +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +persistent_key_destroy:17:1:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"deadbeef" + +Persistent key import (RSA) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +persistent_key_import:256:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_SUCCESS + +Persistent key import with restart (RSA) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +persistent_key_import:256:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":1:PSA_SUCCESS + +Persistent key import (RSA) invalid key id (VENDOR_MIN) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +persistent_key_import:256:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Persistent key import (RSA) invalid key id (VOLATILE_MIN) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +persistent_key_import:256:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Persistent key import (RSA) invalid key id (VENDOR_MAX) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +persistent_key_import:256:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Persistent key import garbage data, should fail +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +persistent_key_import:256:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"11111111":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +import/export persistent raw key: 1 byte +import_export_persistent_key:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:0:0 + +import/export persistent key RSA public key: good, 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:0:0 + +import/export persistent key RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:0:0 + +import/export persistent raw key file not exist: 1 byte +import_export_persistent_key:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:0:1 + +import/export persistent key RSA public key file not exist: 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:0:1 + +import/export persistent key RSA keypair file not exist: 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:0:1 + +import/export-persistent symmetric key: 16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:0:0 + +import/export persistent raw key with restart: 1 byte +import_export_persistent_key:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:1:0 + +import/export persistent key RSA public key with restart: good, 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:1:0 + +import/export persistent key RSA keypair with restart: good, 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:1:0 + +import/export persistent raw key file not exist with restart: 1 byte +import_export_persistent_key:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:1:1 + +import/export persistent key RSA public key file not exist with restart: 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:1:1 + +import/export persistent key RSA keypair file not exist with restart: 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:1:1 + +import/export-persistent symmetric key with restart: 16 bytes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +import_export_persistent_key:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:1:0 + +Destroy invalid id: 0 +destroy_nonexistent:0:PSA_SUCCESS + +Destroy non-existent key +destroy_nonexistent:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + +Destroy invalid id: 0xffffffff +destroy_nonexistent:0xffffffff:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..08db34aa --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +/* The tests in this module verify the contents of key store files. They + * access internal key storage functions directly. Some of the tests depend + * on the the storage format. On the other hand, these tests treat the storage + * subsystem as a black box, and in particular have no reliance on the + * internals of the ITS implementation. + * + * Note that if you need to make a change that affects how files are + * stored, this may indicate that the key store is changing in a + * backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward compatibility + * before changing how test data is constructed or validated. + */ + +#include + +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER "PSA\0KEY" +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ( sizeof( PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER ) ) + +/* Enforce the storage format for keys. The storage format is not a public + * documented interface, but it must be preserved between versions so that + * upgrades work smoothly, so it's a stable interface nonetheless. + */ +typedef struct { + uint8_t magic[PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH]; + uint8_t version[4]; + uint8_t lifetime[sizeof( psa_key_lifetime_t )]; + uint8_t type[4]; + uint8_t policy[sizeof( psa_key_policy_t )]; + uint8_t data_len[4]; + uint8_t key_data[]; +} psa_persistent_key_storage_format; + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void format_storage_data_check( data_t *key_data, + data_t *expected_file_data, + int key_lifetime, int key_type, int key_bits, + int key_usage, int key_alg, int key_alg2 ) +{ + uint8_t *file_data = NULL; + size_t file_data_length = + key_data->len + sizeof( psa_persistent_key_storage_format ); + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, key_lifetime ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, key_bits ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, key_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, key_alg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &attributes, key_alg2 ); + + ASSERT_ALLOC( file_data, file_data_length ); + psa_format_key_data_for_storage( key_data->x, key_data->len, + &attributes.core, + file_data ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_file_data->x, expected_file_data->len, + file_data, file_data_length ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( file_data ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void parse_storage_data_check( data_t *file_data, + data_t *expected_key_data, + int expected_key_lifetime, + int expected_key_type, + int expected_key_bits, + int expected_key_usage, + int expected_key_alg, + int expected_key_alg2, + int expected_status ) +{ + uint8_t *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_data_length = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( file_data->x, file_data->len, + &key_data, &key_data_length, + &attributes.core ); + + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), + (psa_key_type_t) expected_key_lifetime ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), + (psa_key_type_t) expected_key_type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), + (psa_key_bits_t) expected_key_bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), + (uint32_t) expected_key_usage ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), + (uint32_t) expected_key_alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &attributes ), + (uint32_t) expected_key_alg2 ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_key_data->x, expected_key_data->len, + key_data, key_data_length ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( key_data ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void save_large_persistent_key( int data_length_arg, int expected_status ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 42 ); + uint8_t *data = NULL; + size_t data_length = data_length_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( data, data_length ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init() ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_import_key( &attributes, data, data_length, &key_id ), + expected_status ); + + if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key_id ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data ); + PSA_DONE(); + psa_destroy_persistent_key( key_id ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void persistent_key_destroy( int owner_id_arg, int key_id_arg, int restart, + int first_type_arg, data_t *first_data, + int second_type_arg, data_t *second_data ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id_arg, key_id_arg ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t first_type = (psa_key_type_t) first_type_arg; + psa_key_type_t second_type = (psa_key_type_t) second_type_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init() ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, first_type ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, first_data->x, first_data->len, + &returned_key_id ) ); + + if( restart ) + { + psa_close_key( key_id ); + PSA_DONE(); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init() ); + } + TEST_EQUAL( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key_id ), 1 ); + + /* Destroy the key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key_id ) ); + + /* Check key slot storage is removed */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key_id ), 0 ); + + /* Shutdown and restart */ + PSA_DONE(); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init() ); + + /* Create another key in the same slot */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, second_type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, second_data->x, second_data->len, + &returned_key_id ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key_id ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE(); + psa_destroy_persistent_key( key_id ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void persistent_key_import( int owner_id_arg, int key_id_arg, int type_arg, + data_t *data, int restart, int expected_status ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id_arg, key_id_arg ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_key_id; + psa_key_type_t type = (psa_key_type_t) type_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init() ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_import_key( &attributes, data->x, data->len, &returned_key_id ), + expected_status ); + + if( expected_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( returned_key_id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key_id ), 0 ); + goto exit; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( returned_key_id, key_id ) ); + + if( restart ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_purge_key( key_id ) ); + PSA_DONE(); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init() ); + } + + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( psa_get_key_id( &attributes ), + key_id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), 0 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key_id ) ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_persistent_key( key_id ); + PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void import_export_persistent_key( data_t *data, int type_arg, + int expected_bits, + int restart, int key_not_exist ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 42 ); + psa_key_type_t type = (psa_key_type_t) type_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + unsigned char *exported = NULL; + size_t export_size = data->len; + size_t exported_length; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( exported, export_size ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + + /* Import the key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, data->x, data->len, + &returned_key_id ) ); + + + if( restart ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_purge_key( key_id ) ); + PSA_DONE(); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init() ); + } + + /* Test the key information */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &attributes ), key_id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), (size_t) expected_bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key_id ), 1 ); + + if( key_not_exist ) + { + psa_destroy_persistent_key( key_id ); + } + /* Export the key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( key_id, exported, export_size, + &exported_length ) ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( data->x, data->len, exported, exported_length ); + + /* Destroy the key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key_id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key_id ), 0 ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + mbedtls_free( exported ); + PSA_DONE( ); + psa_destroy_persistent_key( key_id ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void destroy_nonexistent( int id_arg, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, id_arg ); + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + + PSA_INIT( ); + + TEST_EQUAL( expected_status, psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2bcf4e4b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +Register SE driver: good +register_one:2:PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION:PSA_SUCCESS + +# Run this test case a second time to verify that the library deinit +# unregistered the first driver. +Register SE driver: good, again +register_one:2:PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION:PSA_SUCCESS + +Register SE driver: invalid location (0) +register_one:0:PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Register SE driver: invalid location (local) +register_one:PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Register SE driver: invalid version (ancient) +register_one:2:0x00000003:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Register SE driver: invalid version (future) +register_one:2:PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION + 1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Register SE driver: already registered +register_twice:3 + +Register SE driver: maximum number of drivers +register_max: + +SE key import-export persistent (p_allocate allows all slots) +key_creation_import_export:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:0:0 + +SE key import-export persistent (p_allocate allows 1 slot) +key_creation_import_export:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) - 1:0 + +SE key import-export persistent, check after restart (slot 0) +key_creation_import_export:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:0:1 + +SE key import-export persistent, check after restart (slot 3) +key_creation_import_export:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:3:1 + +SE key import-export volatile (p_allocate allows all slots) +key_creation_import_export:TEST_SE_VOLATILE_LIFETIME:0:0 + +SE key import-export volatile (p_allocate allows 1 slot) +key_creation_import_export:TEST_SE_VOLATILE_LIFETIME:ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) - 1:0 + +SE key import-export volatile, check after restart (slot 0) +key_creation_import_export:TEST_SE_VOLATILE_LIFETIME:0:1 + +SE key import-export volatile, check after restart (slot 3) +key_creation_import_export:TEST_SE_VOLATILE_LIFETIME:3:1 + +Key creation in a specific slot (0) +key_creation_in_chosen_slot:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS + +Key creation in a specific slot (max) +key_creation_in_chosen_slot:ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) - 1:0:PSA_SUCCESS + +Key creation in a specific slot (0, restart) +key_creation_in_chosen_slot:0:1:PSA_SUCCESS + +Key creation in a specific slot (max, restart) +key_creation_in_chosen_slot:ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) - 1:1:PSA_SUCCESS + +Key creation in a specific slot (too large) +key_creation_in_chosen_slot:ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Key import smoke test: AES-CTR +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_CTR:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: AES-CBC +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: AES-CMAC +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_CMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: AES-CCM +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_CCM:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: AES-GCM +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_ALG_GCM:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: ARIA-CTR +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_CTR:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: ARIA-CBC +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: ARIA-CMAC +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_CMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: ARIA-CCM +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_CCM:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: ARIA-GCM +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:PSA_ALG_GCM:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: CAMELLIA-CTR +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_ALG_CTR:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: CAMELLIA-CBC +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: CAMELLIA-CMAC +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_ALG_CMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: CAMELLIA-CCM +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_ALG_CCM:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: CAMELLIA-GCM +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:PSA_ALG_GCM:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: HMAC-SHA-256 +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: HKDF-SHA-256 +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + +Key import smoke test: RSA PKCS#1v1.5 signature +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +Key import smoke test: RSA PKCS#1v1.5 encryption +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +Key import smoke test: RSA OAEP encryption +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +Key import smoke test: ECDSA secp256r1 +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +Key import smoke test: ECDH secp256r1 +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDH:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +Key import smoke test: ECDH secp256r1 with HKDF +import_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +Generate key: not supported +generate_key_not_supported:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128 + +Key generation smoke test: AES-128-CTR +generate_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR + +Key generation smoke test: AES-256-CTR +generate_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_ALG_CTR + +Key generation smoke test: HMAC-SHA-256 +generate_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) + +Key registration: smoke test +register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:1:1:PSA_SUCCESS + +Key registration: invalid lifetime (volatile internal storage) +register_key_smoke_test:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:7:1:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Key registration: invalid lifetime (internal storage) +register_key_smoke_test:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:7:1:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Key registration: invalid lifetime (no registered driver) +register_key_smoke_test:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION + 1 ):7:1:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Key registration: rejected +register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:1:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +Key registration: not supported +register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:1:-1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Key registration: key id out of range +register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX+1:-1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Key registration: key id min vendor +register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Key registration: key id max vendor except volatile +register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN-1:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Key registration: key id min volatile +register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Key registration: key id max volatile +register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Import-sign-verify: sign in driver, ECDSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify:SIGN_IN_DRIVER_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e" + +Import-sign-verify: sign in driver then export_public, ECDSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify:SIGN_IN_DRIVER_THEN_EXPORT_PUBLIC:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e" + +Import-sign-verify: sign in software, ECDSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify:SIGN_IN_SOFTWARE_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e" + +Generate-sign-verify: sign in driver, ECDSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify:SIGN_IN_DRIVER_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e" + +Generate-sign-verify: sign in driver then export_public, ECDSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify:SIGN_IN_DRIVER_THEN_EXPORT_PUBLIC:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e" + +Generate-sign-verify: sign in software, ECDSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +sign_verify:SIGN_IN_SOFTWARE_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..79d658fd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.function @@ -0,0 +1,1518 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" + +/* Invasive peeking: check the persistent data */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Test driver helpers */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/** The minimum valid location value for a secure element driver. */ +#define MIN_DRIVER_LOCATION 1 + +/** The location and lifetime used for tests that use a single driver. */ +#define TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION 1 +#define TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME \ + ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ) ) + +#define TEST_SE_VOLATILE_LIFETIME \ + ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ) ) + +/** The driver detected a condition that shouldn't happen. + * This is probably a bug in the library. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DETECTED_BY_DRIVER ((psa_status_t)( -500 )) + +/** Like #TEST_ASSERT for use in a driver method, with no cleanup. + * + * If an error happens, this macro returns from the calling function. + * + * Use this macro to assert on guarantees provided by the core. + */ +#define DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( TEST ) \ + do { \ + if( ! (TEST) ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_test_fail( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + return( PSA_ERROR_DETECTED_BY_DRIVER ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/** Like #TEST_ASSERT for use in a driver method, with cleanup. + * + * In case of error, this macro sets `status` and jumps to the + * label `exit`. + * + * Use this macro to assert on guarantees provided by the core. + */ +#define DRIVER_ASSERT( TEST ) \ + do { \ + if( ! (TEST) ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_test_fail( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + status = PSA_ERROR_DETECTED_BY_DRIVER; \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/** Like #PSA_ASSERT for a PSA API call that calls a driver underneath. + * + * Run the code \p expr. If this returns \p expected_status, + * do nothing. If this returns #PSA_ERROR_DETECTED_BY_DRIVER, + * jump directly to the `exit` label. If this returns any other + * status, call mbedtls_test_fail() then jump to `exit`. + * + * The special case for #PSA_ERROR_DETECTED_BY_DRIVER is because in this + * case, the test driver code is expected to have called mbedtls_test_fail() + * already, so we make sure not to overwrite the failure information. + */ +#define PSA_ASSERT_VIA_DRIVER( expr, expected_status ) \ + do { \ + psa_status_t PSA_ASSERT_VIA_DRIVER_status = ( expr ); \ + if( PSA_ASSERT_VIA_DRIVER_status == PSA_ERROR_DETECTED_BY_DRIVER ) \ + goto exit; \ + if( PSA_ASSERT_VIA_DRIVER_status != ( expected_status ) ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_test_fail( #expr, __LINE__, __FILE__ ); \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Domain support functions */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* Return the exact bit size given a curve family and a byte length. */ +static size_t ecc_curve_bits( psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t data_length ) +{ + switch( curve ) + { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + if( data_length == PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( 521 ) ) + return( 521 ); + break; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + if( data_length == PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( 255 ) ) + return( 255 ); + } + /* If not listed above, assume a multiple of 8 bits. */ + return( PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ) ); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Miscellaneous driver methods */ +/****************************************************************/ + +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + psa_key_creation_method_t method; + psa_status_t status; +} validate_slot_number_directions_t; +static validate_slot_number_directions_t validate_slot_number_directions; + +/* Validate a choice of slot number as directed. */ +static psa_status_t validate_slot_number_as_directed( + psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) persistent_data; + (void) attributes; + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( slot_number == + validate_slot_number_directions.slot_number ); + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( method == + validate_slot_number_directions.method ); + return( validate_slot_number_directions.status ); +} + +/* Allocate slot numbers with a monotonic counter. */ +static psa_key_slot_number_t shadow_counter; +static void counter_reset( void ) +{ + shadow_counter = 0; +} +static psa_status_t counter_allocate( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ) +{ + psa_key_slot_number_t *p_counter = persistent_data; + (void) attributes; + (void) method; + if( context->persistent_data_size != sizeof( psa_key_slot_number_t ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DETECTED_BY_DRIVER ); + ++*p_counter; + if( *p_counter == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ); + shadow_counter = *p_counter; + *slot_number = *p_counter; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/* Null import: do nothing, but pretend it worked. */ +static psa_status_t null_import( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *bits ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) slot_number; + (void) attributes; + (void) data; + /* We're supposed to return a key size. Return one that's correct for + * plain data keys. */ + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/* Null generate: do nothing, but pretend it worked. */ +static psa_status_t null_generate( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *pubkey, + size_t pubkey_size, + size_t *pubkey_length ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) slot_number; + (void) attributes; + + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( *pubkey_length == 0 ); + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) ) ) + { + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( pubkey == NULL ); + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( pubkey_size == 0 ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/* Null destroy: do nothing, but pretend it worked. */ +static psa_status_t null_destroy( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) persistent_data; + (void) slot_number; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* RAM-based test driver */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#define RAM_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64 +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + psa_key_type_t type; + size_t bits; + uint8_t content[RAM_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; +} ram_slot_t; +static ram_slot_t ram_slots[16]; + +/* A type with at least ARRAY_LENGTH(ram_slots) bits, containing a + * bit vector indicating which slots are in use. */ +typedef uint16_t ram_slot_usage_t; + +static ram_slot_usage_t ram_shadow_slot_usage; + +static uint8_t ram_min_slot = 0; + +static void ram_slots_reset( void ) +{ + memset( ram_slots, 0, sizeof( ram_slots ) ); + ram_min_slot = 0; + ram_shadow_slot_usage = 0; +} + +/* Common parts of key creation. + * + * In case of error, zero out ram_slots[slot_number]. But don't + * do that if the error is PSA_ERROR_DETECTED_BY_DRIVER: in this case + * you don't need to clean up (ram_slot_reset() will take care of it + * in the test case function's cleanup code) and it might be wrong + * (if slot_number is invalid). + */ +static psa_status_t ram_create_common( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t required_storage ) +{ + (void) context; + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( slot_number < ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) ); + + ram_slots[slot_number].lifetime = psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ); + ram_slots[slot_number].type = psa_get_key_type( attributes ); + ram_slots[slot_number].bits = psa_get_key_bits( attributes ); + + if( required_storage > sizeof( ram_slots[slot_number].content ) ) + { + memset( &ram_slots[slot_number], 0, sizeof( ram_slots[slot_number] ) ); + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/* This function does everything except actually generating key material. + * After calling it, you must copy the desired key material to + * ram_slots[slot_number].content. */ +static psa_status_t ram_fake_generate( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *pubkey, + size_t pubkey_size, + size_t *pubkey_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t required_storage = + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( psa_get_key_type( attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) ); + + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( *pubkey_length == 0 ); + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) ) ) + { + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( pubkey == NULL ); + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( pubkey_size == 0 ); + } + + status = ram_create_common( context, slot_number, attributes, + required_storage ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t ram_import( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = psa_get_key_type( attributes ); + psa_status_t status = ram_create_common( context, slot_number, attributes, + data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* The RAM driver only works for certain key types: raw keys, + * and ECC key pairs. This is true in particular of the bit-size + * calculation here. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED( type ) ) + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ); + else if ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + *bits = ecc_curve_bits( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ), data_length ); + if( *bits == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DETECTED_BY_DRIVER ); + } + else + { + memset( &ram_slots[slot_number], 0, sizeof( ram_slots[slot_number] ) ); + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + ram_slots[slot_number].bits = *bits; + memcpy( ram_slots[slot_number].content, data, data_length ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t ram_export( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + size_t actual_size; + (void) context; + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( slot_number < ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) ); + actual_size = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ram_slots[slot_number].bits ); + if( actual_size > data_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + *data_length = actual_size; + memcpy( data, ram_slots[slot_number].content, actual_size ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t ram_export_public( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + (void) context; + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( slot_number < ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) ); + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( ram_slots[slot_number].type ) ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, ram_slots[slot_number].type ); + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, + ram_slots[slot_number].content, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ram_slots[slot_number].bits ), + &key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_export_public_key( key, data, data_size, data_length ); + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t ram_destroy( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + ram_slot_usage_t *slot_usage = persistent_data; + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( context->persistent_data_size == sizeof( ram_slot_usage_t ) ); + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( slot_number < ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) ); + memset( &ram_slots[slot_number], 0, sizeof( ram_slots[slot_number] ) ); + *slot_usage &= ~(ram_slot_usage_t)( 1 << slot_number ); + ram_shadow_slot_usage = *slot_usage; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t ram_allocate( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ) +{ + ram_slot_usage_t *slot_usage = persistent_data; + (void) attributes; + (void) method; + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( context->persistent_data_size == sizeof( ram_slot_usage_t ) ); + for( *slot_number = ram_min_slot; + *slot_number < ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ); + ++( *slot_number ) ) + { + if( ! ( *slot_usage & 1 << *slot_number ) ) + { + ram_shadow_slot_usage = *slot_usage; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + } + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ); +} + +static psa_status_t ram_validate_slot_number( + psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) persistent_data; + (void) attributes; + (void) method; + if( slot_number >= ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t ram_sign( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + ram_slot_t *slot; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + (void) context; + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( slot_number < ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) ); + slot = &ram_slots[slot_number]; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, slot->type ); + DRIVER_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + slot->content, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( slot->bits ), + &key ) == PSA_SUCCESS ); + status = psa_sign_hash( key, alg, + hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t ram_verify( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + ram_slot_t *slot; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + (void) context; + DRIVER_ASSERT_RETURN( slot_number < ARRAY_LENGTH( ram_slots ) ); + slot = &ram_slots[slot_number]; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, slot->type ); + DRIVER_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + slot->content, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( slot->bits ), + &key ) == + PSA_SUCCESS ); + status = psa_verify_hash( key, alg, + hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); + +exit: + psa_destroy_key( key ); + return( status ); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Other test helper functions */ +/****************************************************************/ + +typedef enum +{ + SIGN_IN_SOFTWARE_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION, + SIGN_IN_DRIVER_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION, + SIGN_IN_DRIVER_THEN_EXPORT_PUBLIC, +} sign_verify_method_t; + +/* Check that the attributes of a key reported by psa_get_key_attributes() + * are consistent with the attributes used when creating the key. */ +static int check_key_attributes( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *reference_attributes ) +{ + int ok = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &actual_attributes ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &actual_attributes ), + psa_get_key_id( reference_attributes ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &actual_attributes ), + psa_get_key_lifetime( reference_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &actual_attributes ), + psa_get_key_type( reference_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &actual_attributes ), + psa_get_key_usage_flags( reference_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &actual_attributes ), + psa_get_key_algorithm( reference_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &actual_attributes ), + psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( reference_attributes ) ); + if( psa_get_key_bits( reference_attributes ) != 0 ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &actual_attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( reference_attributes ) ); + } + + { + psa_key_slot_number_t actual_slot_number = 0xdeadbeef; + psa_key_slot_number_t desired_slot_number = 0xb90cc011; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = + psa_get_key_lifetime( &actual_attributes ); + psa_status_t status = psa_get_key_slot_number( &actual_attributes, + &actual_slot_number ); + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ) < MIN_DRIVER_LOCATION ) + { + /* The key is not in a secure element. */ + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + /* The key is in a secure element. If it had been created + * in a specific slot, check that it is reported there. */ + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + status = psa_get_key_slot_number( reference_attributes, + &desired_slot_number ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + TEST_EQUAL( desired_slot_number, actual_slot_number ); + } + } + } + ok = 1; + +exit: + /* + * Actual key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &actual_attributes ); + + return( ok ); +} + +/* Get the file UID corresponding to the specified location. + * If this changes, the storage format version must change. + * See psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid() in psa_crypto_se.c. + */ +psa_storage_uid_t file_uid_for_location( psa_key_location_t location ) +{ + if( location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( 0 ); + return( 0xfffffe00 + location ); +} + +/* Check that the persistent data of a driver has its expected content. */ +static int check_persistent_data( psa_key_location_t location, + const void *expected_data, + size_t size ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid = file_uid_for_location( location ); + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + uint8_t *loaded = NULL; + int ok = 0; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get_info( uid, &info ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( loaded, info.size ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get( uid, 0, info.size, loaded, NULL ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_data, size, loaded, info.size ); + ok = 1; + +exit: + mbedtls_free( loaded ); + return( ok ); +} + +/* Check that no persistent data exists for the given location. */ +static int check_no_persistent_data( psa_key_location_t location ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid = file_uid_for_location( location ); + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + int ok = 0; + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_its_get_info( uid, &info ), PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + ok = 1; + +exit: + return( ok ); +} + +/* Check that a function's return status is "smoke-free", i.e. that + * it's an acceptable error code when calling an API function that operates + * on a key with potentially bogus parameters. */ +static int is_status_smoke_free( psa_status_t status ) +{ + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE: + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING: + return( 1 ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#define SMOKE_ASSERT( expr ) \ + TEST_ASSERT( is_status_smoke_free( expr ) ) + +/* Smoke test a key. There are mostly no wrong answers here since we pass + * mostly bogus parameters: the goal is to ensure that there is no memory + * corruption or crash. This test function is most useful when run under + * an environment with sanity checks such as ASan or MSan. */ +static int smoke_test_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + int ok = 0; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_mac_operation_t mac_operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation_operation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t buffer[80]; /* large enough for a public key for ECDH */ + size_t length; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key2 = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_export_key( key, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ) ); + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( key, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ) ); + + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_copy_key( key, &attributes, &key2 ) ); + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key2 ) ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key2 ) ); + + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_setup( &mac_operation, key, PSA_ALG_CMAC ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &mac_operation ) ); + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &mac_operation, key, + PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_abort( &mac_operation ) ); + + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &cipher_operation, key, + PSA_ALG_CTR ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &cipher_operation ) ); + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &cipher_operation, key, + PSA_ALG_CTR ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_abort( &cipher_operation ) ); + + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt( key, PSA_ALG_CCM, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + NULL, 0, + buffer, sizeof( buffer), + buffer, sizeof( buffer), &length ) ); + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_aead_decrypt( key, PSA_ALG_CCM, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), + NULL, 0, + buffer, sizeof( buffer), + buffer, sizeof( buffer), &length ) ); + + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( key, PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY, + buffer, 32, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ) ); + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_verify_hash( key, PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY, + buffer, 32, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ) ) ); + + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_encrypt( key, PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, + buffer, 10, NULL, 0, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ) ); + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_asymmetric_decrypt( key, PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), NULL, 0, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + /* Try the key in a plain key derivation. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &derivation_operation, + PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &derivation_operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + NULL, 0 ) ); + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &derivation_operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation_operation ) ); + + /* If the key is asymmetric, try it in a key agreement, both as + * part of a derivation operation and standalone. */ + if( psa_export_public_key( key, buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ) == + PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_algorithm_t alg = + PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH, + PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &derivation_operation, alg ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + &derivation_operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + NULL, 0 ) ); + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + &derivation_operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + key, buffer, length ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation_operation ) ); + + SMOKE_ASSERT( psa_raw_key_agreement( + alg, key, buffer, length, + buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + + ok = 1; + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + return( ok ); +} + +static void psa_purge_storage( void ) +{ + /* The generic code in mbedtls_test_psa_purge_key_storage() + * (which is called by PSA_DONE()) doesn't take care of things that are + * specific to dynamic secure elements. */ + psa_key_location_t location; + /* Purge the transaction file. */ + psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + /* Purge driver persistent data. */ + for( location = 0; location < PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION; location++ ) + psa_destroy_se_persistent_data( location ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void register_one( int location, int version, int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_drv_se_t driver; + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + driver.hal_version = version; + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ), + expected_status ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void register_twice( int count ) +{ + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_key_location_t location; + psa_key_location_t max = MIN_DRIVER_LOCATION + count; + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + + for( location = MIN_DRIVER_LOCATION; location < max; location++ ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + for( location = MIN_DRIVER_LOCATION; location < max; location++ ) + TEST_EQUAL( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ), + PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void register_max( ) +{ + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_key_location_t location; + psa_key_location_t max = MIN_DRIVER_LOCATION + PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + + for( location = MIN_DRIVER_LOCATION; location < max; location++ ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ), + PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_creation_import_export( int lifetime_arg, int min_slot, int restart ) +{ + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = (psa_key_lifetime_t) lifetime_arg; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_handle_t handle; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const uint8_t key_material[3] = {0xfa, 0xca, 0xde}; + uint8_t exported[sizeof( key_material )]; + size_t exported_length; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + driver.persistent_data_size = sizeof( ram_slot_usage_t ); + key_management.p_allocate = ram_allocate; + key_management.p_import = ram_import; + key_management.p_destroy = ram_destroy; + key_management.p_export = ram_export; + ram_min_slot = min_slot; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Create a key. */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + &returned_id ) ); + + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + /* For volatile keys, check no persistent data was created */ + if( ! check_no_persistent_data( location ) ) + goto exit; + } + else + { + /* For persistent keys, check persistent data */ + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &ram_shadow_slot_usage, + sizeof( ram_shadow_slot_usage ) ) ) + goto exit; + } + + /* Test that the key was created in the expected slot. */ + TEST_EQUAL( ram_slots[min_slot].type, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + + /* Maybe restart, to check that the information is saved correctly. */ + if( restart ) + { + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + /* Check that the PSA core has no knowledge of the volatile key */ + TEST_ASSERT( psa_open_key( returned_id, &handle ) == + PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + + /* Drop data from our mockup driver */ + ram_slots_reset(); + ram_min_slot = min_slot; + + /* Re-import key */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + &returned_id ) ); + } + else + { + /* Check the persistent key file */ + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &ram_shadow_slot_usage, + sizeof( ram_shadow_slot_usage ) ) ) + goto exit; + } + } + + /* Test that the key was created in the expected slot. */ + TEST_EQUAL( ram_slots[min_slot].type, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + + /* Test the key attributes, including the reported slot number. */ + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, + PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( sizeof( key_material ) ) ); + psa_set_key_slot_number( &attributes, min_slot ); + + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + attributes.core.id = returned_id; + else + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, returned_id ); + + if( ! check_key_attributes( returned_id, &attributes ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Test the key data. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( returned_id, + exported, sizeof( exported ), + &exported_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + exported, exported_length ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( returned_id ) ); + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &ram_shadow_slot_usage, + sizeof( ram_shadow_slot_usage ) ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( returned_id, &handle ), + PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + + /* Test that the key has been erased from the designated slot. */ + TEST_EQUAL( ram_slots[min_slot].type, 0 ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + ram_slots_reset( ); + psa_purge_storage( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_creation_in_chosen_slot( int slot_arg, + int restart, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_slot_number_t wanted_slot = slot_arg; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_status_t status; + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_handle_t handle; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const uint8_t key_material[3] = {0xfa, 0xca, 0xde}; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + driver.persistent_data_size = sizeof( ram_slot_usage_t ); + key_management.p_validate_slot_number = ram_validate_slot_number; + key_management.p_import = ram_import; + key_management.p_destroy = ram_destroy; + key_management.p_export = ram_export; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Create a key. */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + psa_set_key_slot_number( &attributes, wanted_slot ); + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + &returned_id ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &ram_shadow_slot_usage, + sizeof( ram_shadow_slot_usage ) ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Maybe restart, to check that the information is saved correctly. */ + if( restart ) + { + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &ram_shadow_slot_usage, + sizeof( ram_shadow_slot_usage ) ) ) + goto exit; + } + + /* Test that the key was created in the expected slot. */ + TEST_EQUAL( ram_slots[wanted_slot].type, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + + /* Test that the key is reported with the correct attributes, + * including the expected slot. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( id, &attributes ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &ram_shadow_slot_usage, + sizeof( ram_shadow_slot_usage ) ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( id, &handle ), PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + PSA_DONE( ); + ram_slots_reset( ); + psa_purge_storage( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void import_key_smoke( int type_arg, int alg_arg, + data_t *key_material ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_handle_t handle; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + driver.persistent_data_size = sizeof( psa_key_slot_number_t ); + key_management.p_allocate = counter_allocate; + key_management.p_import = null_import; + key_management.p_destroy = null_destroy; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Create a key. */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material->x, key_material->len, + &returned_id ) ); + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &shadow_counter, sizeof( shadow_counter ) ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Do stuff with the key. */ + if( ! smoke_test_key( id ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Restart and try again. */ + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &shadow_counter, sizeof( shadow_counter ) ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! smoke_test_key( id ) ) + goto exit; + + /* We're done. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &shadow_counter, sizeof( shadow_counter ) ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( id, &handle ), PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + counter_reset( ); + psa_purge_storage( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void generate_key_not_supported( int type_arg, int bits_arg ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + driver.persistent_data_size = sizeof( psa_key_slot_number_t ); + key_management.p_allocate = counter_allocate; + /* No p_generate method */ + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &returned_id ), + PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + counter_reset( ); + psa_purge_storage( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void generate_key_smoke( int type_arg, int bits_arg, int alg_arg ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + psa_key_bits_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_handle_t handle; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + driver.persistent_data_size = sizeof( psa_key_slot_number_t ); + key_management.p_allocate = counter_allocate; + key_management.p_generate = null_generate; + key_management.p_destroy = null_destroy; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Create a key. */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &returned_id ) ); + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &shadow_counter, sizeof( shadow_counter ) ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Do stuff with the key. */ + if( ! smoke_test_key( id ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Restart and try again. */ + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &shadow_counter, sizeof( shadow_counter ) ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! smoke_test_key( id ) ) + goto exit; + + /* We're done. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + if( ! check_persistent_data( location, + &shadow_counter, sizeof( shadow_counter ) ) ) + goto exit; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( id, &handle ), PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + counter_reset( ); + psa_purge_storage( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void sign_verify( int flow, + int type_arg, int alg_arg, + int bits_arg, data_t *key_material, + data_t *input ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + /* Pass bits=0 to import, bits>0 to fake-generate */ + int generating = ( bits != 0 ); + + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t asymmetric; + + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t sw_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t sw_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t drv_attributes; + uint8_t signature[PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t signature_length; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + memset( &asymmetric, 0, sizeof( asymmetric ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + driver.asymmetric = &asymmetric; + driver.persistent_data_size = sizeof( ram_slot_usage_t ); + key_management.p_allocate = ram_allocate; + key_management.p_destroy = ram_destroy; + if( generating ) + key_management.p_generate = ram_fake_generate; + else + key_management.p_import = ram_import; + switch( flow ) + { + case SIGN_IN_SOFTWARE_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION: + break; + case SIGN_IN_DRIVER_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION: + asymmetric.p_sign = ram_sign; + break; + case SIGN_IN_DRIVER_THEN_EXPORT_PUBLIC: + asymmetric.p_sign = ram_sign; + key_management.p_export_public = ram_export_public; + break; + default: + TEST_ASSERT( ! "unsupported flow (should be SIGN_IN_xxx)" ); + break; + } + asymmetric.p_verify = ram_verify; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Prepare to create two keys with the same key material: a transparent + * key, and one that goes through the driver. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &sw_attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &sw_attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &sw_attributes, type ); + drv_attributes = sw_attributes; + psa_set_key_id( &drv_attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &drv_attributes, lifetime ); + + /* Create the key in the driver. */ + if( generating ) + { + psa_set_key_bits( &drv_attributes, bits ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_key( &drv_attributes, &returned_id ) ); + /* Since we called a generate method that does not actually + * generate material, store the desired result of generation in + * the mock secure element storage. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( id, &drv_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( key_material->len, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) ); + memcpy( ram_slots[ram_min_slot].content, key_material->x, + key_material->len ); + } + else + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &drv_attributes, + key_material->x, key_material->len, + &returned_id ) ); + } + + /* Either import the same key in software, or export the driver's + * public key and import that. */ + switch( flow ) + { + case SIGN_IN_SOFTWARE_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION: + case SIGN_IN_DRIVER_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION: + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &sw_attributes, + key_material->x, key_material->len, + &sw_key ) ); + break; + case SIGN_IN_DRIVER_THEN_EXPORT_PUBLIC: + { + uint8_t public_key[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE( PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS )]; + size_t public_key_length; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( id, + public_key, sizeof( public_key ), + &public_key_length ) ); + psa_set_key_type( &sw_attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( type ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &sw_attributes, + public_key, public_key_length, + &sw_key ) ); + break; + } + } + + /* Sign with the chosen key. */ + switch( flow ) + { + case SIGN_IN_DRIVER_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION: + case SIGN_IN_DRIVER_THEN_EXPORT_PUBLIC: + PSA_ASSERT_VIA_DRIVER( + psa_sign_hash( id, alg, + input->x, input->len, + signature, sizeof( signature ), + &signature_length ), + PSA_SUCCESS ); + break; + case SIGN_IN_SOFTWARE_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION: + PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( sw_key, alg, + input->x, input->len, + signature, sizeof( signature ), + &signature_length ) ); + break; + } + + /* Verify with both keys. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_verify_hash( sw_key, alg, + input->x, input->len, + signature, signature_length ) ); + PSA_ASSERT_VIA_DRIVER( + psa_verify_hash( id, alg, + input->x, input->len, + signature, signature_length ), + PSA_SUCCESS ); + + /* Change the signature and verify again. */ + signature[0] ^= 1; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_verify_hash( sw_key, alg, + input->x, input->len, + signature, signature_length ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + PSA_ASSERT_VIA_DRIVER( + psa_verify_hash( id, alg, + input->x, input->len, + signature, signature_length ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + +exit: + /* + * Driver key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &drv_attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( id ); + psa_destroy_key( sw_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + ram_slots_reset( ); + psa_purge_storage( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void register_key_smoke_test( int lifetime_arg, + int owner_id_arg, + int id_arg, + int validate, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id_arg, id_arg ); + psa_key_handle_t handle; + size_t bit_size = 48; + psa_key_slot_number_t wanted_slot = 0x123456789; + psa_status_t status; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.key_management = &key_management; + key_management.p_destroy = null_destroy; + if( validate >= 0 ) + { + key_management.p_validate_slot_number = validate_slot_number_as_directed; + validate_slot_number_directions.slot_number = wanted_slot; + validate_slot_number_directions.method = PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER; + validate_slot_number_directions.status = + ( validate > 0 ? PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + } + + mbedtls_test_set_step( 1 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( MIN_DRIVER_LOCATION, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bit_size ); + psa_set_key_slot_number( &attributes, wanted_slot ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( &attributes ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Test that the key exists and has the expected attributes. */ + if( ! check_key_attributes( id, &attributes ) ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t invalid_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id_arg + 1, id_arg ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( invalid_id, &handle ), PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); +#endif + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_purge_key( id ) ); + + /* Restart and try again. */ + mbedtls_test_set_step( 2 ); + PSA_SESSION_DONE( ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + if( ! check_key_attributes( id, &attributes ) ) + goto exit; + /* This time, destroy the key. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( id, &handle ), PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( id ); + PSA_DONE( ); + psa_purge_storage( ); + memset( &validate_slot_number_directions, 0, + sizeof( validate_slot_number_directions ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal_mocks.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal_mocks.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..23e035a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal_mocks.data @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +SE init mock test: success +mock_init:1:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:1 + +SE init mock test: failure +mock_init:1:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:1 + +SE init mock test: invalid location (0) +mock_init:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +SE init mock test: location not supported (INT_MAX) +mock_init:INT_MAX:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_SUCCESS:0 + +SE key importing mock test +mock_import:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:0:PSA_SUCCESS + +SE key importing mock test: max key bits +mock_import:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS:PSA_SUCCESS + +SE key importing mock test: more than max key bits +mock_import:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS+1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +SE key importing mock test: alloc failed +mock_import:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:PSA_SUCCESS:0:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + +SE key importing mock test: import failed +mock_import:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:0:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + +SE key exporting mock test +mock_export:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +SE key exporting mock test: export failed +mock_export:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + +SE public key exporting mock test +mock_export_public:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +SE public key exporting mock test: export failed +mock_export_public:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + +SE key generating mock test +mock_generate:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +SE key generating mock test: alloc failed +mock_generate:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + +SE key generating mock test: generating failed +mock_generate:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + +SE signing mock test +mock_sign:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +SE signing mock test: sign failed +mock_sign:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + +SE verification mock test +mock_verify:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS + +SE verification mock test: verify failed +mock_verify:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal_mocks.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal_mocks.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12c58ebb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal_mocks.function @@ -0,0 +1,684 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" + +/** The location and lifetime used for tests that use a single driver. */ +#define TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION 1 +#define TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME \ + ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ) ) + +static struct +{ + uint16_t called; + psa_key_location_t location; + psa_status_t return_value; +} mock_init_data; + +static struct +{ + uint16_t called; + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + size_t pubkey_size; + psa_status_t return_value; +} mock_generate_data; + +static struct +{ + uint16_t called; + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + size_t bits; + size_t data_length; + psa_status_t return_value; +} mock_import_data; + +static struct +{ + uint16_t called; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + size_t data_size; + psa_status_t return_value; +} mock_export_data; + +static struct +{ + uint16_t called; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + size_t data_size; + psa_status_t return_value; +} mock_export_public_data; + +static struct +{ + uint16_t called; + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t hash_length; + size_t signature_size; + psa_status_t return_value; +} mock_sign_data; + +static struct +{ + uint16_t called; + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t hash_length; + size_t signature_length; + psa_status_t return_value; +} mock_verify_data; + +static struct +{ + uint16_t called; + psa_status_t return_value; +} mock_allocate_data; + +static struct +{ + uint16_t called; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + psa_status_t return_value; +} mock_destroy_data; + +#define MAX_KEY_ID_FOR_TEST 10 +static void psa_purge_storage( void ) +{ + psa_key_id_t id; + psa_key_location_t location; + + /* The tests may have potentially created key ids from 1 to + * MAX_KEY_ID_FOR_TEST. In addition, run the destroy function on key id + * 0, which file-based storage uses as a temporary file. */ + for( id = 0; id <= MAX_KEY_ID_FOR_TEST; id++ ) + psa_destroy_persistent_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, id ) ); + + /* Purge the transaction file. */ + psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + /* Purge driver persistent data. */ + for( location = 0; location < PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION; location++ ) + psa_destroy_se_persistent_data( location ); +} + +static void mock_teardown( void ) +{ + memset( &mock_init_data, 0, sizeof( mock_init_data ) ); + memset( &mock_import_data, 0, sizeof( mock_import_data ) ); + memset( &mock_export_data, 0, sizeof( mock_export_data ) ); + memset( &mock_export_public_data, 0, sizeof( mock_export_public_data ) ); + memset( &mock_sign_data, 0, sizeof( mock_sign_data ) ); + memset( &mock_verify_data, 0, sizeof( mock_verify_data ) ); + memset( &mock_allocate_data, 0, sizeof( mock_allocate_data ) ); + memset( &mock_destroy_data, 0, sizeof( mock_destroy_data ) ); + memset( &mock_generate_data, 0, sizeof( mock_generate_data ) ); + psa_purge_storage( ); +} + +static psa_status_t mock_init( psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_location_t location ) +{ + (void) drv_context; + (void) persistent_data; + + mock_init_data.called++; + mock_init_data.location = location; + return( mock_init_data.return_value ); +} + +static psa_status_t mock_generate( psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *pubkey, + size_t pubkey_size, + size_t *pubkey_length ) +{ + (void) drv_context; + (void) pubkey; + (void) pubkey_length; + + mock_generate_data.called++; + mock_generate_data.key_slot = key_slot; + mock_generate_data.attributes = *attributes; + mock_generate_data.pubkey_size = pubkey_size; + + return( mock_generate_data.return_value ); +} + +static psa_status_t mock_import( psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *bits ) +{ + (void) drv_context; + (void) data; + + *bits = mock_import_data.bits; + + mock_import_data.called++; + mock_import_data.key_slot = key_slot; + mock_import_data.attributes = *attributes; + mock_import_data.data_length = data_length; + + return( mock_import_data.return_value ); +} + +psa_status_t mock_export( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + uint8_t *p_data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *p_data_length ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) p_data; + (void) p_data_length; + + mock_export_data.called++; + mock_export_data.slot_number = slot_number; + mock_export_data.data_size = data_size; + + return( mock_export_data.return_value ); +} + +psa_status_t mock_export_public( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number, + uint8_t *p_data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *p_data_length ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) p_data; + (void) p_data_length; + + mock_export_public_data.called++; + mock_export_public_data.slot_number = slot_number; + mock_export_public_data.data_size = data_size; + + return( mock_export_public_data.return_value ); +} + +psa_status_t mock_sign( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *p_signature_length ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) p_hash; + (void) p_signature; + (void) p_signature_length; + + mock_sign_data.called++; + mock_sign_data.key_slot = key_slot; + mock_sign_data.alg = alg; + mock_sign_data.hash_length = hash_length; + mock_sign_data.signature_size = signature_size; + + return mock_sign_data.return_value; +} + +psa_status_t mock_verify( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) p_hash; + (void) p_signature; + + mock_verify_data.called++; + mock_verify_data.key_slot = key_slot; + mock_verify_data.alg = alg; + mock_verify_data.hash_length = hash_length; + mock_verify_data.signature_length = signature_length; + + return mock_verify_data.return_value; +} + +psa_status_t mock_allocate( psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t *key_slot ) +{ + (void) drv_context; + (void) persistent_data; + (void) attributes; + (void) method; + (void) key_slot; + + mock_allocate_data.called++; + *key_slot = 0; + + return( mock_allocate_data.return_value ); +} + +psa_status_t mock_destroy( psa_drv_se_context_t *context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + (void) context; + (void) persistent_data; + + mock_destroy_data.called++; + mock_destroy_data.slot_number = slot_number; + + return( mock_destroy_data.return_value ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mock_init( int location_arg, + int expected_register_status_arg, + int driver_status_arg, + int expected_psa_status_arg, + int expected_called ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = location_arg; + psa_status_t expected_register_status = expected_register_status_arg; + psa_status_t driver_status = driver_status_arg; + psa_status_t expected_psa_status = expected_psa_status_arg; + psa_drv_se_t driver = { + .hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION, + .p_init = mock_init, + }; + int psa_crypto_init_called = 0; + + mock_init_data.return_value = driver_status; + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ), + expected_register_status ); + + psa_crypto_init_called = 1; + TEST_EQUAL( psa_crypto_init( ), expected_psa_status ); + + TEST_EQUAL( mock_init_data.called, expected_called ); + if( expected_called ) + TEST_EQUAL( mock_init_data.location, location ); + +exit: + if( psa_crypto_init_called ) + PSA_DONE( ); + mock_teardown( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mock_import( int mock_alloc_return_value, + int mock_import_return_value, + int bits, + int expected_result ) +{ + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const uint8_t key_material[3] = {0xfa, 0xca, 0xde}; + + mock_allocate_data.return_value = mock_alloc_return_value; + mock_import_data.return_value = mock_import_return_value; + mock_import_data.bits = bits; + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + key_management.p_import = mock_import; + key_management.p_destroy = mock_destroy; + key_management.p_allocate = mock_allocate; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + &returned_id ) == expected_result ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mock_allocate_data.called == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_import_data.called == + ( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS? 1 : 0 ) ); + + if( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + mock_import_data.attributes.core.id, id ) ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( + mock_import_data.attributes.core.id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( + mock_import_data.attributes.core.id ) == 0 ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mock_import_data.attributes.core.lifetime == + ( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS? lifetime : 0 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_import_data.attributes.core.policy.usage == + ( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS? PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT : 0 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_import_data.attributes.core.type == + ( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS? PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA : 0 ) ); + + if( expected_result == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_destroy_data.called == 1 ); + } +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + mock_teardown( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mock_export( int mock_export_return_value, int expected_result ) +{ + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const uint8_t key_material[3] = {0xfa, 0xca, 0xde}; + uint8_t exported[sizeof( key_material )]; + size_t exported_length; + + mock_export_data.return_value = mock_export_return_value; + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + driver.p_init = mock_init; + key_management.p_import = mock_import; + key_management.p_export = mock_export; + key_management.p_destroy = mock_destroy; + key_management.p_allocate = mock_allocate; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + &returned_id ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_export_key( id, + exported, sizeof( exported ), + &exported_length ) == expected_result ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mock_export_data.called == 1 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mock_destroy_data.called == 1 ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + mock_teardown( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mock_generate( int mock_alloc_return_value, + int mock_generate_return_value, + int expected_result ) +{ + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + mock_allocate_data.return_value = mock_alloc_return_value; + mock_generate_data.return_value = mock_generate_return_value; + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + key_management.p_generate = mock_generate; + key_management.p_destroy = mock_destroy; + key_management.p_allocate = mock_allocate; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, 8 ); + TEST_ASSERT( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &returned_id) == expected_result ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_allocate_data.called == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_generate_data.called == + ( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS? 1 : 0 ) ); + + if( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + mock_generate_data.attributes.core.id, id ) ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( + mock_generate_data.attributes.core.id ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( + mock_generate_data.attributes.core.id ) == 0 ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mock_generate_data.attributes.core.lifetime == + ( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS? lifetime : 0 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_generate_data.attributes.core.policy.usage == + ( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS? PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT : 0 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_generate_data.attributes.core.type == + ( mock_alloc_return_value == PSA_SUCCESS? PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA : 0 ) ); + + if( expected_result == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_destroy_data.called == 1 ); + } + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + mock_teardown( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mock_export_public( int mock_export_public_return_value, + int expected_result ) +{ + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const uint8_t key_material[3] = {0xfa, 0xca, 0xde}; + uint8_t exported[sizeof( key_material )]; + size_t exported_length; + + mock_export_public_data.return_value = mock_export_public_return_value; + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + driver.key_management = &key_management; + key_management.p_import = mock_import; + key_management.p_export_public = mock_export_public; + key_management.p_destroy = mock_destroy; + key_management.p_allocate = mock_allocate; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + &returned_id ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_export_public_key( id, exported, sizeof(exported), + &exported_length ) == expected_result ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_export_public_data.called == 1 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_destroy_data.called == 1 ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + mock_teardown( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mock_sign( int mock_sign_return_value, int expected_result ) +{ + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t asymmetric; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const uint8_t key_material[3] = {0xfa, 0xca, 0xde}; + psa_algorithm_t algorithm = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + const uint8_t hash[1] = {'H'}; + uint8_t signature[1] = {'S'}; + size_t signature_length; + + mock_sign_data.return_value = mock_sign_return_value; + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + memset( &asymmetric, 0, sizeof( asymmetric ) ); + + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + + driver.key_management = &key_management; + key_management.p_import = mock_import; + key_management.p_destroy = mock_destroy; + key_management.p_allocate = mock_allocate; + + driver.asymmetric = &asymmetric; + asymmetric.p_sign = mock_sign; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, algorithm ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + &returned_id ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( id, algorithm, + hash, sizeof( hash ), + signature, sizeof( signature ), + &signature_length) + == expected_result ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_sign_data.called == 1 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_destroy_data.called == 1 ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + mock_teardown( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mock_verify( int mock_verify_return_value, int expected_result ) +{ + psa_drv_se_t driver; + psa_drv_se_key_management_t key_management; + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t asymmetric; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, 1 ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const uint8_t key_material[3] = {0xfa, 0xca, 0xde}; + psa_algorithm_t algorithm = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + const uint8_t hash[1] = {'H'}; + const uint8_t signature[1] = {'S'}; + + mock_verify_data.return_value = mock_verify_return_value; + memset( &driver, 0, sizeof( driver ) ); + memset( &key_management, 0, sizeof( key_management ) ); + memset( &asymmetric, 0, sizeof( asymmetric ) ); + + driver.hal_version = PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION; + + driver.key_management = &key_management; + key_management.p_import = mock_import; + key_management.p_destroy = mock_destroy; + key_management.p_allocate = mock_allocate; + + driver.asymmetric = &asymmetric; + asymmetric.p_verify = mock_verify; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_register_se_driver( location, &driver ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, algorithm ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + key_material, sizeof( key_material ), + &returned_id ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_verify_hash( id, algorithm, + hash, sizeof( hash ), + signature, sizeof( signature ) ) + == expected_result ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_verify_data.called == 1 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mock_destroy_data.called == 1 ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + mock_teardown( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..14777341 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.data @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +Transient slot, check after closing +transient_slot_lifecycle:0x1:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING + +Transient slot, check after closing and restarting +transient_slot_lifecycle:0x13:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Transient slot, check after destroying +transient_slot_lifecycle:0x135:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING + +Transient slot, check after destroying and restarting +transient_slot_lifecycle:0x1357:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Transient slot, check after restart with live handles +transient_slot_lifecycle:0x13579:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot, check after closing, id=min +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:124:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING + +Persistent slot, check after closing and restarting, id=min +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:125:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot, check after destroying, id=min +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:126:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING + +Persistent slot, check after destroying and restarting, id=min +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:127:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot, check after purging, id=min +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:200:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING + +Persistent slot, check after purging and restarting, id=min +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:201:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot, check after restart with live handle, id=min +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:128:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot, check after closing, id=max +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:129:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING + +Persistent slot, check after destroying, id=max +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:130:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING + +Persistent slot, check after purging, id=max +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:202:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING + +Persistent slot, check after restart, id=max +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:131:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot: ECP keypair (ECDSA, exportable), close +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:132:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING + +Persistent slot: ECP keypair (ECDSA, exportable), close+restart +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:133:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot: ECP keypair (ECDSA, exportable), purge +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:132:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING + +Persistent slot: ECP keypair (ECDSA, exportable), restart +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:134:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot: ECP keypair (ECDH+ECDSA, exportable), close +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:135:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING + +Persistent slot: ECP keypair (ECDH+ECDSA, exportable), close+restart +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:136:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot: ECP keypair (ECDH+ECDSA, exportable), purge +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:135:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING + +Persistent slot: ECP keypair (ECDH+ECDSA, exportable), restart +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:137:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot, check after closing, persistence=2 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):124:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING + +Persistent slot, check after closing and restarting, persistence=2 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):125:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot, check after destroying, persistence=2 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):126:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING + +Persistent slot, check after destroying and restarting, persistence=2 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):127:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot, check after purging, persistence=2 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):200:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING + +Persistent slot, check after purging and restarting, persistence=2 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):201:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING_WITH_SHUTDOWN + +Persistent slot, check after restart with live handle, persistence=2 +persistent_slot_lifecycle:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):128:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:0:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN + +Attempt to overwrite: close before +create_existent:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x1736:1:CLOSE_BEFORE + +Attempt to overwrite: close after +create_existent:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x7361:1:CLOSE_AFTER + +Attempt to overwrite: keep open +create_existent:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x3617:1:KEEP_OPEN + +Open failure: invalid identifier (0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +open_fail:0:PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + +Open failure: invalid identifier (random seed UID) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +open_fail:PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID:PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + +Open failure: invalid identifier (reserved range) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +open_fail:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + 1:PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + +Open failure: invalid identifier (implementation range) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +open_fail:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX + 1:PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + +Open failure: non-existent identifier +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +open_fail:1:PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + +Create failure: read-only key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Create failure: invalid location for a persistent key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, 0xbad10cU):1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Create failure: invalid location for a volatile key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, 0xbad10cU):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Create failure: invalid key id (0) for a persistent key +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Create failure: invalid key id (1) for a volatile key +create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Create failure: invalid key id (random seed UID) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Create failure: invalid key id (reserved range) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Create failure: invalid key id (implementation range) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Open not supported +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS +open_fail:1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Create not supported +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +create_fail:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:1:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + +Copy volatile to volatile +copy_across_lifetimes:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:0x10:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"4142434445":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:0x10:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0 + +Copy volatile to persistent +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +copy_across_lifetimes:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:0x100:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"4142434445":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x100:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0 + +Copy persistent to volatile +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +copy_across_lifetimes:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x1000:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"4142434445":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:0x1000:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0 + +Copy persistent to persistent +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +copy_across_lifetimes:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x10000:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"4142434445":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x10000:2:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0 + +Copy persistent to persistent, same id but different owner +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER +copy_across_lifetimes:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x10000:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"4142434445":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x10001:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:0 + +Copy persistent to persistent with enrollment algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +copy_across_lifetimes:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x100000:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:0x100000:2:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING + +Copy volatile to occupied +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +copy_to_occupied:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:2:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f" + +Copy persistent to occupied +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +copy_to_occupied:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:2:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f" + +Copy persistent to same +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +copy_to_occupied:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f" + +invalid handle: 0 +invalid_handle:INVALID_HANDLE_0:PSA_SUCCESS + +invalid handle: never opened +invalid_handle:INVALID_HANDLE_UNOPENED:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + +invalid handle: already closed +invalid_handle:INVALID_HANDLE_CLOSED:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + +invalid handle: huge +invalid_handle:INVALID_HANDLE_HUGE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + +Open many transient keys +many_transient_keys:42 + +# Eviction from a key slot to be able to import a new persistent key. +Key slot eviction to import a new persistent key +key_slot_eviction_to_import_new_key:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT + +# Eviction from a key slot to be able to import a new volatile key. +Key slot eviction to import a new volatile key +key_slot_eviction_to_import_new_key:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE + +# Check that non reusable key slots are not deleted/overwritten in case of key +# slot starvation: +# . An attempt to access a persistent key while all RAM key slots are occupied +# by volatile keys fails and does not lead to volatile key data to be +# spoiled. +# . With all key slot in use with one containing a persistent key, an attempt +# to copy the persistent key fails (the persistent key slot cannot be +# reclaimed as it is accessed by the copy process) without the persistent key +# data and volatile key data being spoiled. +Non reusable key slots integrity in case of key slot starvation +non_reusable_key_slots_integrity_in_case_of_key_slot_starvation diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d5776631 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.function @@ -0,0 +1,1061 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include + +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" + +typedef enum +{ + /**< Close key(s) */ + INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING, + + /**< Destroy key(s) */ + INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING, + + /**< Purge key(s) */ + INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING, + + /**< Terminate and reinitialize without closing/destroying keys */ + INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN, + + /**< Close key(s) then terminate and re-initialize */ + INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING_WITH_SHUTDOWN, + + /**< Destroy key(s) then terminate and re-initialize */ + INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING_WITH_SHUTDOWN, + + /**< Purge key(s) then terminate and re-initialize */ + INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING_WITH_SHUTDOWN, +} invalidate_method_t; + +typedef enum +{ + KEEP_OPEN, + CLOSE_BEFORE, + CLOSE_AFTER, +} reopen_policy_t; + +typedef enum +{ + INVALID_HANDLE_0, + INVALID_HANDLE_UNOPENED, + INVALID_HANDLE_CLOSED, + INVALID_HANDLE_HUGE, +} invalid_handle_construction_t; + +/** Apply \p invalidate_method to invalidate the specified key: + * close it, destroy it, or do nothing; + */ +static int invalidate_key( invalidate_method_t invalidate_method, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + switch( invalidate_method ) + { + /* Closing the key invalidate only volatile keys, not persistent ones. */ + case INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING: + case INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING_WITH_SHUTDOWN: + PSA_ASSERT( psa_close_key( key ) ); + break; + case INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING: + case INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING_WITH_SHUTDOWN: + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + break; + /* Purging the key just purges RAM data of persistent keys. */ + case INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING: + case INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING_WITH_SHUTDOWN: + PSA_ASSERT( psa_purge_key( key ) ); + break; + case INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN: + break; + } + return( 1 ); +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +/** Restart the PSA subsystem if \p invalidate_method says so. */ +static int invalidate_psa( invalidate_method_t invalidate_method ) +{ + switch( invalidate_method ) + { + case INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING: + case INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING: + case INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING: + return( 1 ); + case INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING_WITH_SHUTDOWN: + case INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING_WITH_SHUTDOWN: + case INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING_WITH_SHUTDOWN: + /* All keys must have been closed. */ + PSA_SESSION_DONE( ); + break; + case INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN: + /* Some keys may remain behind, and we're testing that this + * properly closes them. */ + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + break; + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + ASSERT_PSA_PRISTINE( ); + return( 1 ); + +exit: + return( 0 ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void transient_slot_lifecycle( int owner_id_arg, + int usage_arg, int alg_arg, + int type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int invalidate_method_arg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags = usage_arg; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + invalidate_method_t invalidate_method = invalidate_method_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + mbedtls_test_set_step( 1 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Import a key. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id = owner_id_arg; + + mbedtls_set_key_owner_id( &attributes, owner_id ); +#else + (void)owner_id_arg; +#endif + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage_flags ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &key ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + { + psa_key_handle_t handle; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_with_invalid_owner = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id + 1, + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal( + owner_id, + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( key ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( key_with_invalid_owner, &handle ), + PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } +#endif + + /* + * Purge the key and make sure that it is still valid, as purging a + * volatile key shouldn't invalidate/destroy it. + */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_purge_key( key ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + /* Do something that invalidates the key. */ + mbedtls_test_set_step( 2 ); + if( ! invalidate_key( invalidate_method, key ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! invalidate_psa( invalidate_method ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Test that the key is now invalid. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_close_key( key ), PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ +void persistent_slot_lifecycle( int lifetime_arg, int owner_id_arg, int id_arg, + int usage_arg, int alg_arg, int alg2_arg, + int type_arg, data_t *key_data, + int invalidate_method_arg ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id_arg, id_arg ); + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg2 = alg2_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags = usage_arg; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + invalidate_method_t invalidate_method = invalidate_method_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_handle_t handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t read_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t *reexported = NULL; + size_t reexported_length = -1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t wrong_owner_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id_arg + 1, id_arg ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t invalid_svc_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + mbedtls_test_set_step( 1 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage_flags ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &attributes, alg2 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, + &returned_id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( id, returned_id ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( wrong_owner_id, &invalid_svc_key_id ), + PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); +#endif + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( id, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), lifetime ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &attributes ), id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( usage_flags ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &attributes ), alg2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + + /* Close the key and then open it. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_close_key( id ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( wrong_owner_id, &invalid_svc_key_id ), + PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); +#endif + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_open_key( id, &handle ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! psa_key_handle_is_null( handle ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( handle, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), lifetime ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &attributes ), id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( usage_flags ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), alg ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &attributes ), alg2 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type ); + + /* + * Do something that wipes key data in volatile memory or destroy the + * key. + */ + mbedtls_test_set_step( 2 ); + if( ! invalidate_key( invalidate_method, id ) ) + goto exit; + if( ! invalidate_psa( invalidate_method ) ) + goto exit; + + /* Try to reaccess the key. If we destroyed it, check that it doesn't + * exist. Otherwise check that it still exists and has the expected + * content. */ + switch( invalidate_method ) + { + case INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING: + case INVALIDATE_BY_CLOSING_WITH_SHUTDOWN: + case INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING: + case INVALIDATE_BY_PURGING_WITH_SHUTDOWN: + case INVALIDATE_BY_SHUTDOWN: + PSA_ASSERT( psa_open_key( id, &handle ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( id, &read_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), + psa_get_key_lifetime( &read_attributes ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &attributes ), + psa_get_key_id( &read_attributes ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), + mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( usage_flags ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), + psa_get_key_algorithm( &read_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &attributes ), + psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &read_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), + psa_get_key_type( &read_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( &read_attributes ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( reexported, key_data->len ); + if( usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( id, reexported, key_data->len, + &reexported_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( key_data->x, key_data->len, + reexported, reexported_length ); + } + else + { + TEST_EQUAL( psa_export_key( id, reexported, + key_data->len, &reexported_length ), + PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + } + PSA_ASSERT( psa_close_key( handle ) ); + break; + + case INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING: + case INVALIDATE_BY_DESTROYING_WITH_SHUTDOWN: + /* + * Test that the key handle and identifier are now not referring to an + * existing key. + */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_attributes( handle, &read_attributes ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_close_key( handle ), PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_attributes( id, &read_attributes ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + break; + } + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &read_attributes ); + + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( reexported ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ +void create_existent( int lifetime_arg, int owner_id_arg, int id_arg, + int reopen_policy_arg ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( owner_id_arg, id_arg ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type1 = PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA; + const uint8_t material1[5] = "a key"; + const uint8_t material2[5] = "b key"; + size_t bits1 = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( sizeof( material1 ) ); + uint8_t reexported[sizeof( material1 )]; + size_t reexported_length; + reopen_policy_t reopen_policy = reopen_policy_arg; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Create a key. */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type1 ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, 0 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, material1, sizeof( material1 ), + &returned_id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( id, returned_id ) ); + + if( reopen_policy == CLOSE_BEFORE ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_close_key( id ) ); + + /* Attempt to create a new key in the same slot. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_import_key( &attributes, material2, sizeof( material2 ), + &returned_id ), + PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( returned_id ) ); + + if( reopen_policy == CLOSE_AFTER ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_close_key( id ) ); + + /* Check that the original key hasn't changed. */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( id, &attributes ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &attributes ), id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes ), lifetime ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), type1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), bits1 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes ), PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes ), 0 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( id, + reexported, sizeof( reexported ), + &reexported_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( material1, sizeof( material1 ), + reexported, reexported_length ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_close_key( id ) ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void open_fail( int id_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, id_arg ); + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + psa_key_handle_t handle = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0xdead, 0xdead ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + TEST_EQUAL( psa_open_key( id, &handle ), expected_status ); + TEST_ASSERT( psa_key_handle_is_null( handle ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void create_fail( int lifetime_arg, int id_arg, + int expected_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, id_arg ); + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0xdead, 0xdead ); + uint8_t material[1] = {'k'}; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( id ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + /* + * Not possible to set a key identifier different from 0 through + * PSA key attributes APIs thus accessing to the attributes + * directly. + */ + attributes.core.id = id; + } + else + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, id ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_import_key( &attributes, material, sizeof( material ), + &returned_id ), + expected_status ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( returned_id ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void copy_across_lifetimes( int source_lifetime_arg, int source_owner_id_arg, + int source_id_arg, int source_usage_arg, + int source_alg_arg, int source_alg2_arg, + int type_arg, data_t *material, + int target_lifetime_arg, int target_owner_id_arg, + int target_id_arg, int target_usage_arg, + int target_alg_arg, int target_alg2_arg, + int expected_usage_arg, + int expected_alg_arg, int expected_alg2_arg ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t source_lifetime = source_lifetime_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( source_owner_id_arg, source_id_arg ); + psa_key_usage_t source_usage = source_usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t source_alg = source_alg_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t source_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t source_type = type_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_source_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_lifetime_t target_lifetime = target_lifetime_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t target_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( target_owner_id_arg, target_id_arg ); + psa_key_usage_t target_usage = target_usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t target_alg = target_alg_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t target_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_target_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_handle_t target_handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = expected_usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t expected_alg = expected_alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t expected_alg2 = expected_alg2_arg; + uint8_t *export_buffer = NULL; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( source_id ); + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( target_id ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Populate the source slot. */ + psa_set_key_id( &source_attributes, source_id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &source_attributes, source_lifetime ); + + psa_set_key_type( &source_attributes, source_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &source_attributes, source_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &source_attributes, source_alg2_arg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &source_attributes, + material->x, material->len, + &returned_source_id ) ); + /* Update the attributes with the bit size. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( returned_source_id, + &source_attributes ) ); + + /* Prepare the target slot. */ + psa_set_key_id( &target_attributes, target_id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &target_attributes, target_lifetime ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &target_attributes, target_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &target_attributes, target_alg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &target_attributes, target_alg2_arg ); + + /* Copy the key. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_copy_key( returned_source_id, + &target_attributes, &returned_target_id ) ); + + /* Destroy the source to ensure that this doesn't affect the target. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( returned_source_id ) ); + + /* If the target key is persistent, restart the system to make + * sure that the material is still alive. */ + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( target_lifetime ) ) + { + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_open_key( target_id, &target_handle ) ); + } + + /* Test that the target slot has the expected content. */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &target_attributes ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( returned_target_id, + &target_attributes ) ); + + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( target_lifetime ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + target_id, psa_get_key_id( &target_attributes ) ) ); + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( returned_target_id ), + target_owner_id_arg ); +#endif + } + + TEST_EQUAL( target_lifetime, psa_get_key_lifetime( &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( source_type, psa_get_key_type( &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &source_attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_usage, psa_get_key_usage_flags( &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_alg, psa_get_key_algorithm( &target_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( expected_alg2, + psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &target_attributes ) ); + if( expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) + { + size_t length; + ASSERT_ALLOC( export_buffer, material->len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( returned_target_id, export_buffer, + material->len, &length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( material->x, material->len, + export_buffer, length ); + } + else + { + size_t length; + /* Check that the key is actually non-exportable. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_export_key( returned_target_id, export_buffer, + material->len, &length ), + PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( returned_target_id ) ); + +exit: + /* + * Source and target key attributes may have been returned by + * psa_get_key_attributes() thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &source_attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &target_attributes ); + + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( export_buffer ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void copy_to_occupied( int source_lifetime_arg, int source_id_arg, + int source_usage_arg, int source_alg_arg, + int source_type_arg, data_t *source_material, + int target_lifetime_arg, int target_id_arg, + int target_usage_arg, int target_alg_arg, + int target_type_arg, data_t *target_material ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t source_lifetime = source_lifetime_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, source_id_arg ); + psa_key_usage_t source_usage = source_usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t source_alg = source_alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t source_type = source_type_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_source_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_lifetime_t target_lifetime = target_lifetime_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t target_id = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 1, target_id_arg ); + psa_key_usage_t target_usage = target_usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t target_alg = target_alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t target_type = target_type_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_target_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t new_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t *export_buffer = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes1 = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes2 = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( source_id ); + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( target_id ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Populate the source slot. */ + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( source_lifetime ) ) + { + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, source_id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, source_lifetime ); + } + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, source_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, source_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, source_alg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + source_material->x, source_material->len, + &returned_source_id ) ); + + /* Populate the target slot. */ + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( target_id, source_id ) ) + { + returned_target_id = returned_source_id; + } + else + { + psa_set_key_id( &attributes1, target_id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes1, target_lifetime ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes1, target_type ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes1, target_usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes1, target_alg ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes1, + target_material->x, target_material->len, + &returned_target_id ) ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( returned_target_id, &attributes1 ) ); + + /* Make a copy attempt. */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, target_id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, target_lifetime ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_copy_key( returned_source_id, + &attributes, &new_key ), + PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( new_key ) ); + + /* Test that the target slot is unaffected. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( returned_target_id, &attributes2 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( + psa_get_key_id( &attributes1 ), + psa_get_key_id( &attributes2 ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes1 ), + psa_get_key_lifetime( &attributes2 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes1 ), + psa_get_key_type( &attributes2 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes1 ), + psa_get_key_bits( &attributes2 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes1 ), + psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes2 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes1 ), + psa_get_key_algorithm( &attributes2 ) ); + if( target_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) + { + size_t length; + ASSERT_ALLOC( export_buffer, target_material->len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( returned_target_id, export_buffer, + target_material->len, &length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( target_material->x, target_material->len, + export_buffer, length ); + } + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( returned_source_id ) ); + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( target_id, source_id ) ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( returned_target_id ) ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes1 ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes2 ); + + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( export_buffer ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void invalid_handle( int handle_construction, + int close_status_arg ) +{ + psa_key_handle_t valid_handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + psa_key_handle_t invalid_handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key_id; + psa_status_t close_status = close_status_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t material[1] = "a"; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + /* Allocate a handle and store a key in it. */ + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, 0 ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, 0 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + material, sizeof( material ), + &valid_handle ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! psa_key_handle_is_null( valid_handle ) ); + + /* Construct an invalid handle as specified in the test case data. */ + switch( handle_construction ) + { + case INVALID_HANDLE_0: + invalid_handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + break; + case INVALID_HANDLE_UNOPENED: + + /* + * MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( valid_handle ) is a volatile + * key identifier as the imported key is a volatile key. Volatile + * key identifiers are in the range from PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + * to PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX included. Thus pick a key identifier + * in the range from PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN to + * PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX different from + * MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( valid_handle ) to build an + * unopened and thus invalid identifier. + */ + + if( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( valid_handle ) == + PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ) + key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + 1; + else + key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( valid_handle ) - 1; + + invalid_handle = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0, key_id ); + break; + case INVALID_HANDLE_CLOSED: + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + material, sizeof( material ), + &invalid_handle ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( invalid_handle ) ); + break; + case INVALID_HANDLE_HUGE: + invalid_handle = + mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0, PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + 1 ); + break; + default: + TEST_ASSERT( ! "unknown handle construction" ); + } + + /* Attempt to use the invalid handle. */ + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_attributes( invalid_handle, &attributes ), + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_close_key( invalid_handle ), close_status ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_destroy_key( invalid_handle ), close_status ); + + /* After all this, check that the original handle is intact. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( valid_handle, &attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( &attributes ), PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ), + PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( sizeof( material ) ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_close_key( valid_handle ) ); + +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void many_transient_keys( int max_keys_arg ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *keys = NULL; + size_t max_keys = max_keys_arg; + size_t i, j; + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t exported[sizeof( size_t )]; + size_t exported_length; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( keys, max_keys ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, 0 ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + + for( i = 0; i < max_keys; i++ ) + { + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, + (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof( i ), + &keys[i] ); + if( status == PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ) + break; + PSA_ASSERT( status ); + TEST_ASSERT( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( keys[i] ) ); + for( j = 0; j < i; j++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( keys[i], keys[j] ) ); + } + max_keys = i; + + for( i = 1; i < max_keys; i++ ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_close_key( keys[i - 1] ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( keys[i], + exported, sizeof( exported ), + &exported_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( exported, exported_length, + (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof( i ) ); + } + PSA_ASSERT( psa_close_key( keys[i - 1] ) ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( keys ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ +void key_slot_eviction_to_import_new_key( int lifetime_arg ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = (psa_key_lifetime_t)lifetime_arg; + size_t i; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t exported[sizeof( size_t )]; + size_t exported_length; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, returned_key_id; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, 0 ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + + /* + * Create MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT persistent keys. + */ + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; i++ ) + { + key = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( i, i + 1 ); + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof( i ), + &returned_key_id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( returned_key_id, key ) ); + } + + /* + * Create a new persistent or volatile key. When creating the key, + * one of the descriptions of the previously created persistent keys + * is removed from the RAM key slots. This makes room to store its + * description in RAM. + */ + i = MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; + key = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( i, i + 1 ); + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof( i ), + &returned_key_id ) ); + if( lifetime != PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( returned_key_id, key ) ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( psa_key_id_is_volatile( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( returned_key_id ) ) ); + + /* + * Check that we can export all ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + 1 ) keys, + * that they have the expected value and destroy them. In that process, + * the description of the persistent key that was evicted from the RAM + * slots when creating the last key is restored in a RAM slot to export + * its value. + */ + for( i = 0; i <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; i++ ) + { + if( i < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT ) + key = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( i, i + 1 ); + else + key = returned_key_id; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( key, + exported, sizeof( exported ), + &exported_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( exported, exported_length, + (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof( i ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) ); + } + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ +void non_reusable_key_slots_integrity_in_case_of_key_slot_starvation( ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t i; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t exported[sizeof( size_t )]; + size_t exported_length; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t persistent_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t persistent_key2 = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t returned_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *keys = NULL; + + TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT >= 1 ); + + ASSERT_ALLOC( keys, MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, 0 ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ); + + /* + * Create a persistent key + */ + persistent_key = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0x100, 0x205 ); + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, persistent_key ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + (uint8_t *) &persistent_key, + sizeof( persistent_key ), + &returned_key_id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( returned_key_id, persistent_key ) ); + + /* + * Create MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT volatile keys + */ + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ); + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; i++ ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, + (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof( i ), + &keys[i]) ); + } + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + /* + * Check that we cannot access the persistent key as all slots are + * occupied by volatile keys and the implementation needs to load the + * persistent key description in a slot to be able to access it. + */ + status = psa_get_key_attributes( persistent_key, &attributes ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + /* + * Check we can export the volatile key created last and that it has the + * expected value. Then, destroy it. + */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( keys[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT - 1], + exported, sizeof( exported ), + &exported_length ) ); + i = MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT - 1; + ASSERT_COMPARE( exported, exported_length, (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof( i ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( keys[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT - 1] ) ); + + /* + * Check that we can now access the persistent key again. + */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( persistent_key, &attributes ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( attributes.core.id, + persistent_key ) ); + + /* + * Check that we cannot copy the persistent key as all slots are occupied + * by the persistent key and the volatile keys and the slot containing the + * persistent key cannot be reclaimed as it contains the key to copy. + */ + persistent_key2 = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0x100, 0x204 ); + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, persistent_key2 ); + status = psa_copy_key( persistent_key, &attributes, &returned_key_id ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + /* + * Check we can export the remaining volatile keys and that they have the + * expected values. + */ + for( i = 0; i < ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT - 1 ); i++ ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( keys[i], + exported, sizeof( exported ), + &exported_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( exported, exported_length, + (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof( i ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( keys[i] ) ); + } + + /* + * Check we can export the persistent key and that it have the expected + * value. + */ + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( persistent_key, exported, sizeof( exported ), + &exported_length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( exported, exported_length, + (uint8_t *) &persistent_key, sizeof( persistent_key ) ); +exit: + /* + * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes() + * thus reset them as required. + */ + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + psa_destroy_key( persistent_key ); + PSA_DONE( ); + mbedtls_free( keys ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c12900d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current.data @@ -0,0 +1,8571 @@ +# Automatically generated by generate_psa_tests.py. Do not edit! + +save lifetime: (DEFAULT,LOCAL_STORAGE) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c" + +save lifetime: (2,LOCAL_STORAGE) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000200000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c" + +save lifetime: (254,LOCAL_STORAGE) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(254, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000fe00000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c" + +save lifetime: PERSISTENT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c" + +save usage without implication: 0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:0:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000000000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: COPY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800020000000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: DECRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000200000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800004000000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: ENCRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000100000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: SIGN_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800001400000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000400000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002800000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000800000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: COPY|DECRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800020200000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: DECRYPT|DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800004200000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: DERIVE|ENCRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800004100000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: ENCRYPT|EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010100000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: EXPORT|SIGN_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800011400000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: SIGN_HASH|SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800001400000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: SIGN_MESSAGE|VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002c00000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: VERIFY_HASH|VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002800000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: VERIFY_MESSAGE|COPY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800020800000000000000000000010000004b" + +save usage without implication: all known +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800037f00000000000000000000010000004b" + +save type: AES 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000014405000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000014e05000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000015005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001c003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000404004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000414004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000015005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000010300000011c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CMAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000002c003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000010300000010c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000444004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000025005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_OFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000010300000012c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001c403000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001cd03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001ce03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001d003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 128-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000ff4004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000100000000000000000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000014405000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000014e05000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001c003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000404004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000414004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000010300000011c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CMAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000002c003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000010300000010c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000444004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000025005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_OFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000010300000012c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001c403000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001cd03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001ce03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001d003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 192-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000ff4004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: AES 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000014405000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000014e05000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001013c00000001c003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000404004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000414004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001010300000011c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CMAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001013c00000002c003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: AES 256-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | 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PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001c003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000404004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000414004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000015005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000010300000011c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000010300000010c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000444004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000025005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001c403000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001cd03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001ce03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001d003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000ff4004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000100000000000000000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000014405000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000014e05000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001c003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000404004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000414004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000010300000011c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000010300000010c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000444004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000025005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001c403000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001cd03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001ce03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001d003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000ff4004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000014405000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000014e05000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001c003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000404004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000414004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001010300000011c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001010300000010c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000444004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000025005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001c403000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001cd03000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001ce03000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001d003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000ff4004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CHACHA20 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000042000010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CHACHA20 256-bit, CHACHA20_POLY1305 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000042000010103000000051005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: CHACHA20 256-bit, STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000042000010103000000018004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: DERIVE 120-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:120:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001278000100000000000000000000000f00000048657265006973206b6579a0646174" + +save type: DERIVE 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001280000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: DES 64-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"644573206b457901":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123400001000000000000000000000008000000644573206b457901" + +save type: DES 64-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123400001030000004040040000000008000000644573206b457901" + +save type: DES 64-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"644573206b457901":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123400001030000004140040000000008000000644573206b457901" + +save type: DES 64-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123400001030000004440040000000008000000644573206b457901" + +save type: DES 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123800001000000000000000000000010000000644573206b457901644573206b457902" + +save type: DES 128-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123800001030000004040040000000010000000644573206b457901644573206b457902" + +save type: DES 128-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123800001030000004140040000000010000000644573206b457901644573206b457902" + +save type: DES 128-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123800001030000004440040000000010000000644573206b457901644573206b457902" + +save type: DES 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123c00001000000000000000000000018000000644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904" + +save type: DES 192-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123c00001030000004040040000000018000000644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904" + +save type: DES 192-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123c00001030000004140040000000018000000644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904" + +save type: DES 192-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123c00001030000004440040000000018000000644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000100000000000000000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000001070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000002070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000003070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000004070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000005070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000008070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000009070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c00000a070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c00000b070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000140000000000209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000001060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000002060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000003060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000004060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000005060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000008060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000009060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c00000a060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c00000b060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000000060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000140000009010209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000014000000a010209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000140000009020209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000014000000a020209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000140000009030209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000014000000a030209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000010000000000000000000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000107000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000207000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000307000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000407000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000507000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000807000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000907000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000a07000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000b07000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000000020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000106000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000206000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000306000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000406000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000506000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000806000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000906000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000a06000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000b06000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000006000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000901020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000a01020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000902020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000a02020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000903020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000a03020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000100000000000000000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000001070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000002070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000003070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000004070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000005070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000008070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000009070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c00000a070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c00000b070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000140000000000209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000001060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000002060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000003060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000004060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000005060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000008060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000009060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c00000a060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c00000b060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000000060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000140000009010209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000014000000a010209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000140000009020209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000014000000a020209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000140000009030209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000014000000a030209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001010000000000000000000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000107000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000207000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000307000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000407000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000507000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000807000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000907000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000a07000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000b07000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000000020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000106000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000206000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000306000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000406000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000506000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000806000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000906000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000a06000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000b06000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000006000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000901020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000a01020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000902020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000a02020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000903020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000a03020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010100000000000000000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000001070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000002070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000003070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000004070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000005070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000008070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000009070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c00000a070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c00000b070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010140000000000209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000001060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000002060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000003060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000004060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000005060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000008060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000009060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c00000a060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c00000b060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000000060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010140000009010209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001014000000a010209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010140000009020209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001014000000a020209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010140000009030209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001014000000a030209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001010000000000000000000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000107000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000207000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000307000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000407000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000507000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000807000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000907000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000a07000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000b07000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000000020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000106000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000206000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000306000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000406000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000506000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000806000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000906000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000a06000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000b06000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000006000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000901020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000a01020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000902020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000a02020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000903020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000a03020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201000000000000000000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000010700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000020700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000030700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000040700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000050700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000080700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000090700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c00000a0700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c00000b0700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201400000000002090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000010600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000020600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000030600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000040600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000050600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000080600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000090600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c00000a0600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c00000b0600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000000600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201400000090102090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002014000000a0102090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201400000090202090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002014000000a0202090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201400000090302090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002014000000a0302090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000100000000000000000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000140000000000209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000140000009010209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff00014000000a010209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000140000009020209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff00014000000a020209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000140000009030209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff00014000000a030209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101000000000000000000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101400000000002090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101400000090102090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c001014000000a0102090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101400000090202090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c001014000000a0202090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101400000090302090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c001014000000a0302090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001000000000000000000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000010700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000020700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000030700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000040700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000050700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000080700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000090700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c00000a0700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c00000b0700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001400000000002090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000010600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000020600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000030600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000040600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000050600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000080600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000090600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c00000a0600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c00000b0600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000000600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001400000090102090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000014000000a0102090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001400000090202090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000014000000a0202090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001400000090302090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000014000000a0302090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000100000000000000000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000001070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000002070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000003070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000004070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000005070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000008070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000009070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c00000a070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c00000b070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000140000000000209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000001060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000002060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000003060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000004060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000005060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000008060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000009060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c00000a060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c00000b060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000000060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000140000009010209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000014000000a010209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000140000009020209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000014000000a020209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000140000009030209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000014000000a030209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001010000000000000000000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000107000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000207000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000307000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000407000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000507000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000807000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000907000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000a07000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000b07000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000000020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000106000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000206000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000306000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000406000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000506000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000806000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000906000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000a06000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000b06000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000006000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000901020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000a01020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000902020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000a02020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000903020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000a03020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000100000000000000000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000001070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000002070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000003070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000004070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000005070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000008070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000009070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c00000a070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c00000b070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000140000000000209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000001060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000002060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000003060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000004060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000005060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000008060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000009060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c00000a060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c00000b060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000000060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000140000009010209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100014000000a010209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000140000009020209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100014000000a020209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000140000009030209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100014000000a030209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010100000000000000000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000001070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000002070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000003070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000004070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000005070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000008070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000009070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c00000a070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c00000b070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010140000000000209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000001060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000002060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000003060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000004060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000005060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000008060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000009060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c00000a060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c00000b060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000000060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010140000009010209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001014000000a010209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010140000009020209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001014000000a020209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010140000009030209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001014000000a030209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001010000000000000000000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000107000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000207000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000307000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000407000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000507000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000807000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000907000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000a07000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000b07000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000000020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000106000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000206000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000306000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000406000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000506000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000806000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000906000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000a06000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000b06000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000006000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000901020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000a01020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000902020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000a02020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000903020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | 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PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000008060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000009060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c00000a060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c00000b060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000000060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127109020140000009010209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902014000000a010209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127109020140000009020209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902014000000a020209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127109020140000009030209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902014000000a030209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000100000000000000000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000001070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000002070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000003070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000004070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000005070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000008070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000009070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c00000a070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c00000b070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000140000000000209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000001060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000002060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000003060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000004060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000005060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000008060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000009060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c00000a060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c00000b060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000000060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000140000009010209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000014000000a010209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000140000009020209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000014000000a020209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000140000009030209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000014000000a030209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000100000000000000000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000001070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000002070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000003070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000004070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000005070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000008070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000009070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c00000a070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c00000b070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000140000000000209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000001060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000002060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000003060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000004060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000005060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000008060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000009060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c00000a060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c00000b060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000000060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000140000009010209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300014000000a010209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000140000009020209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300014000000a020209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000140000009030209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300014000000a030209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000100000000000000000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000001070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000002070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000003070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000004070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000005070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000008070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000009070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c00000a070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c00000b070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000140000000000209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000001060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000002060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000003060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000004060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000005060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000008060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000009060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c00000a060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c00000b060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000000060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000140000009010209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900014000000a010209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000140000009020209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900014000000a020209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000140000009030209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900014000000a030209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000100000000000000000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000001070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000002070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000003070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000004070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000005070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000008070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000009070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c00000a070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c00000b070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000140000000000209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000001060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000002060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000003060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000004060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000005060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000008060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000009060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c00000a060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c00000b060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000000060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000140000009010209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00014000000a010209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000140000009020209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00014000000a020209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000140000009030209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00014000000a030209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101000000000000000000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000010700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000020700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000030700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000040700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000050700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000080700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000090700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c00000a0700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c00000b0700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101400000000002090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000010600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000020600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000030600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000040600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000050600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000080600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000090600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c00000a0600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c00000b0600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000000600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101400000090102090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01014000000a0102090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101400000090202090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01014000000a0202090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101400000090302090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01014000000a0302090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901010000000000000000000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000107000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000207000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000307000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000407000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000507000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000807000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000907000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000a07000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000b07000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000000020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000106000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000206000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000306000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000406000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000506000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000806000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000906000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000a06000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000b06000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000006000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000901020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000a01020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000902020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000a02020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000903020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000a03020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201000000000000000000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000010700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000020700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000030700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000040700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000050700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000080700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000090700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c00000a0700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c00000b0700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201400000000002090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000010600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000020600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000030600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000040600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000050600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000080600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000090600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c00000a0600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c00000b0600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000000600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201400000090102090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02014000000a0102090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201400000090202090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02014000000a0202090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201400000090302090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02014000000a0302090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001000000000000000000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000010700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000020700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000030700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000040700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000050700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000080700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000090700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c00000a0700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c00000b0700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001400000000002090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000010600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000020600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000030600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000040600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000050600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000080600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000090600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c00000a0600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c00000b0600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000000600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001400000090102090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300014000000a0102090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001400000090202090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300014000000a0202090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001400000090302090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300014000000a0302090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000100000000000000000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000001070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000002070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000003070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000004070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000005070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000008070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000009070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c00000a070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c00000b070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000140000000000209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000001060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000002060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000003060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000004060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000005060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000008060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000009060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c00000a060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c00000b060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000000060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000140000009010209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900014000000a010209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000140000009020209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900014000000a020209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000140000009030209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900014000000a030209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101000000000000000000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000010700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000020700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000030700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000040700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000050700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000080700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000090700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c00000a0700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c00000b0700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101400000000002090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000010600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000020600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000030600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000040600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000050600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000080600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000090600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c00000a0600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c00000b0600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000000600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101400000090102090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01014000000a0102090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101400000090202090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01014000000a0202090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101400000090302090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01014000000a0302090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010100000000000000000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000001070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000002070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000003070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000004070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000005070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000008070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000009070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c00000a070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c00000b070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010140000000000209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000001060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000002060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000003060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000004060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000005060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000008060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000009060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c00000a060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c00000b060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000000060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010140000009010209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901014000000a010209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010140000009020209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901014000000a020209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010140000009030209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901014000000a030209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201000000000000000000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000010700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000020700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000030700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000040700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000050700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000080700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000090700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c00000a0700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c00000b0700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201400000000002090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000010600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000020600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000030600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000040600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000050600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000080600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000090600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c00000a0600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c00000b0600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000000600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201400000090102090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02014000000a0102090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201400000090202090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02014000000a0202090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201400000090302090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02014000000a0302090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300010000000000000000000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000107000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000207000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000307000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000407000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000507000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000807000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000907000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000a07000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000b07000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000000020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000106000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000206000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000306000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000406000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000506000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000806000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000906000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000a06000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000b06000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000006000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000901020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000a01020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000902020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000a02020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000903020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000a03020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00010000000000000000000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00013c00000b09000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00013c00001509000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00013c00000008000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271c001010000000000000000000000390000006c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271c001013c00000b09000600000000390000006c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271c001013c00001509000600000000390000006c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b" + +save type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271c001013c00000008000600000000390000006c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000100000000000000000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000001070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000002070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000003070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000004070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000005070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000008070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000009070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a000012800000a070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a000012800000b070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000001060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000002060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000003060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000004060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000005060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000008060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000009060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a000012800000a060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a000012800000b060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000000060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001000000000000000000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000010700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000020700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000030700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000040700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000050700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000080700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000090700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c000012800000a0700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c000012800000b0700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000010600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000020600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000030600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000040600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000050600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000080600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000090600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c000012800000a0600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c000012800000b0600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000000600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001000000000000000000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000010700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000020700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000030700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000040700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000050700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000080700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000090700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e000012800000a0700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e000012800000b0700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000010600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000020600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000030600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000040600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000050600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000080600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000090600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e000012800000a0600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e000012800000b0600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000000600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010100000000000000000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000001070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000002070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000003070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000004070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000005070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000008070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000009070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410001012800000a070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410001012800000b070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000001060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000002060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000003060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000004060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000005060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000008060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000009060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410001012800000a060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410001012800000b060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000000060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101000000000000000000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000010700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000020700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000030700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000040700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000050700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000080700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000090700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b455900000000000100000030414001012800000a0700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b455900000000000100000030414001012800000b0700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000010600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000020600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000030600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000040600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000050600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000080600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000090600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b455900000000000100000030414001012800000a0600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b455900000000000100000030414001012800000b0600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000000600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010100000000000000000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000001070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000002070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000003070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000004070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000005070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000008070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000009070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030418001012800000a070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030418001012800000b070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000001060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000002060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000003060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000004060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000005060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000008060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000009060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030418001012800000a060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030418001012800000b060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000000060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002010000000000000000000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000107000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000207000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000307000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000407000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000507000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000807000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000907000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000a07000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000b07000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000106000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000206000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000306000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000406000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000506000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000806000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000906000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000a06000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000b06000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000006000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(MGM) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004141ff00010000000000000000000000200000008520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(MGM) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"c0d3a5a2b416a573dc9909f92f134ac01323ab8f8e36804e578588ba2d09fe7c3e737f771ca112825b548a0ffded6d6a2fd09a3e77dec30e":"505341004b45590000000000010000004141c00101000000000000000000000038000000c0d3a5a2b416a573dc9909f92f134ac01323ab8f8e36804e578588ba2d09fe7c3e737f771ca112825b548a0ffded6d6a2fd09a3e77dec30e" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000010000000000000000000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000107000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000207000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000307000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000407000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000507000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000807000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000907000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000a07000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000b07000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000106000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000206000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000306000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000406000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000506000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000806000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000906000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000a06000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000b06000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000006000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001000000000000000000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000010700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000020700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000030700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000040700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000050700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000080700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000090700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e000012800000a0700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e000012800000b0700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000010600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000020600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000030600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000040600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000050600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000080600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000090600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e000012800000a0600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e000012800000b0600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000000600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101000000000000000000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000010700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000020700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000030700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000040700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000050700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000080700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000090700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b455900000000000100000017410001012800000a0700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b455900000000000100000017410001012800000b0700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000010600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000020600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000030600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000040600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000050600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000080600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000090600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b455900000000000100000017410001012800000a0600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b455900000000000100000017410001012800000b0600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000000600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001000000000000000000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000010700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000020700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000030700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000040700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000050700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000080700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000090700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e100012800000a0700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e100012800000b0700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000010600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000020600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000030600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000040600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000050600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000080600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000090600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e100012800000a0600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e100012800000b0600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000000600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101000000000000000000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000010700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000020700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000030700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000040700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000050700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000080700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000090700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410001012800000a0700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410001012800000b0700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000010600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000020600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000030600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000040600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000050600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000080600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000090600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410001012800000a0600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410001012800000b0600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000000600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010100000000000000000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000001070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000002070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000003070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000004070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000005070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000008070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000009070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b455900000000000100000012418001012800000a070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b455900000000000100000012418001012800000b070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000001060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000002060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000003060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000004060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000005060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000008060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000009060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b455900000000000100000012418001012800000a060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b455900000000000100000012418001012800000b060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000000060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020100000000000000000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000001070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000002070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000003070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000004070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000005070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000008070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000009070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410902012800000a070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410902012800000b070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000001060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000002060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000003060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000004060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000005060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000008060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000009060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410902012800000a060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410902012800000b060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000000060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001000000000000000000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000010700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000020700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000030700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000040700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000050700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000080700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000090700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a000012800000a0700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a000012800000b0700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000010600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000020600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000030600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000040600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000050600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000080600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000090600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a000012800000a0600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a000012800000b0600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000000600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000100000000000000000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000001070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000002070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000003070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000004070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000005070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000008070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000009070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a300012800000a070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a300012800000b070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000001060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000002060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000003060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000004060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000005060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000008060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000009060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a300012800000a060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a300012800000b060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000000060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000100000000000000000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000001070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000002070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000003070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000004070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000005070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000008070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000009070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e900012800000a070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e900012800000b070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000001060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000002060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000003060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000004060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000005060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000008060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000009060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e900012800000a060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e900012800000b060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000000060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000100000000000000000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000001070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000002070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000003070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000004070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000005070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000008070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000009070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef00012800000a070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef00012800000b070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000001060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000002060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000003060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000004060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000005060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000008060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000009060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef00012800000a060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef00012800000b060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000000060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01010000000000000000000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000107000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000207000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000307000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000407000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000507000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000807000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000907000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000a07000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000b07000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000106000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000206000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000306000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000406000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000506000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000806000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000906000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000a06000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000b06000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000006000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010100000000000000000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000001070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000002070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000003070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000004070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000005070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000008070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000009070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b455900000000000100000027419901012800000a070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b455900000000000100000027419901012800000b070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000001060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000002060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000003060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000004060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000005060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000008060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000009060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b455900000000000100000027419901012800000a060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b455900000000000100000027419901012800000b060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000000060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020100000000000000000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000001070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) 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ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000003070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000004070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000005070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000008070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000009070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) 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+save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | 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ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000004060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save 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PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000008060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 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type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000000060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a" + +save type: 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PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000001070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000002070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000003070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000004070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000005070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000008070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000009070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a300012800000a070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a300012800000b070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000001060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000002060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000003060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000004060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000005060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000008060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000009060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a300012800000a060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a300012800000b060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000000060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000100000000000000000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000001070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000002070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000003070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000004070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000005070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000008070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000009070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e900012800000a070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e900012800000b070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000001060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000002060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000003060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000004060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000005060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000008060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000009060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e900012800000a060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e900012800000b060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000000060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010100000000000000000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000001070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000002070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000003070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000004070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000005070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000008070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000009070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b01012800000a070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b01012800000b070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000001060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000002060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000003060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000004060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000005060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000008060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000009060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b01012800000a060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b01012800000b060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000000060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901010000000000000000000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000107000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000207000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000307000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000407000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000507000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000807000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000907000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000a07000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000b07000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000106000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000206000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000306000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000406000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000506000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000806000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000906000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000a06000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000b06000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000006000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201000000000000000000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000010700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000020700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000030700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000040700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000050700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000080700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000090700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b02012800000a0700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b02012800000b0700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000010600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000020600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000030600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000040600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000050600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000080600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000090600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b02012800000a0600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b02012800000b0600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000000600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000100000000000000000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000001070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000002070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000003070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000004070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000005070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000008070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000009070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a300012800000a070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a300012800000b070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000001060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000002060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000003060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000004060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000005060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000008060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000009060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a300012800000a060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a300012800000b060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000000060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f" + +save type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff0001000000000000000000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff00012800000b0900060000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff0001280000150900060000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff0001280000000800060000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a" + +save type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241c001010000000000000000000000390000005fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180" + +save type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241c001012800000b09000600000000390000005fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180" + +save type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241c001012800001509000600000000390000005fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180" + +save type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241c001012800000008000600000000390000005fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000001008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000002008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000003008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000004008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000005008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000008008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000009008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c00000a008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c00000b008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a0000100000000000000000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000001008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000002008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000003008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000004008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000005008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000008008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000009008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c00000a008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c00000b008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e0000100000000000000000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000001008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000002008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000003008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000004008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000005008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000008008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000009008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c00000a008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c00000b008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001100010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000001008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000002008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000003008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000004008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000005008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000008008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000009008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c00000a008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c00000b008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180010100000000000000000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000001008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000002008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000003008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000004008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000005008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000008008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000009008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c00000a008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c00000b008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001100020100000000000000000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000001008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000002008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000003008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000004008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000005008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000008008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000009008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c00000a008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c00000b008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: RAW_DATA 8-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000000000000100000048" + +save type: RAW_DATA 40-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:40:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4865726500":"505341004b455900000000000100000001102800010000000000000000000000050000004865726500" + +save type: RAW_DATA 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011080000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004010000000000000000000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004010300000a03000700000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000302000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000402000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000902000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000b02000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000103000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000503000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000b03000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700006013c000004020006000000007f0300003082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"3082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040100000000000000000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000001030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000002030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000003030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000004030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000005030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000008030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000009030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004010100000a030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004010100000b030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000000020007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000001020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000002020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000003020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000004020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000005020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000008020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000009020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000a020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000b020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000000020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000001030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000002030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000003030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000004030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000005030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000008030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000009030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000a030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000b030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000001130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000002130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000003130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000004130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000005130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000008130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000009130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000a130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000b130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010000000000000000000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000103000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000203000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000303000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000403000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000503000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000803000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000903000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000a03000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000b03000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000002000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000102000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000202000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000302000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000402000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000502000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000802000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000902000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000a02000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000b02000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000002000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000103000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000203000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000303000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000403000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000503000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000803000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000903000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000a03000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000b03000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000113000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000213000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000313000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000413000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000513000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000813000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000913000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000a13000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000b13000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001" + +save alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081410500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000814105010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000085010500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000850105010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000082410500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000824105010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081440500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000814405010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 13):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000814d0500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 13):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000814d05010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 14):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000814e0500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 14):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000814e05010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081500500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000815005010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 63):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000817f0500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 63):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000817f05010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001410500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000014105010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_SHORT(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000005010500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000050105010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_SHORT(GCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002410500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_SHORT(GCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000024105010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001440500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000014405010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 13):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000014d0500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 13):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000014d05010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 14):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000014e0500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 14):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000014e05010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001500500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000015005010000004c" + +save alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 63):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000017f0500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 63):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000017f05010000004c" + +save alg: ANY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff00000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ANY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH:"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff000002010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081c10300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081c103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000082c10300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000082c103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000180810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001808103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000280810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002808103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000380810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003808103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000480810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004808103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000580810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005808103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000880810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008808103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000980810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009808103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a80810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384), 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a808103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b80810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b808103010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081c40300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 4):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081c403010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 13):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081cd0300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 13):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081cd03010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 14):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081ce0300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 14):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081ce03010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 16):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081d00300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 16):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081d003010000004c" + +save alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 63):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081ff0300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 63):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081ff03010000004c" + +save alg: CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001c00300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001c003010000004c" + +save alg: CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000040400400000000010000004b" + +save alg2: CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000404004010000004c" + +save alg: CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000041400400000000010000004b" + +save alg2: CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000414004010000004c" + +save alg: CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001500500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CCM:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000015005010000004c" + +save alg: CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000011c00400000000010000004b" + +save alg2: CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CFB:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000011c004010000004c" + +save alg: CHACHA20_POLY1305 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000005100500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: CHACHA20_POLY1305 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000051005010000004c" + +save alg: CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CMAC:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002c00300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CMAC:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000002c003010000004c" + +save alg: CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000010c00400000000010000004b" + +save alg2: CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CTR:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000010c004010000004c" + +save alg: DET_DSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000105000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_DSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001050006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_DSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000205000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_DSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002050006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_DSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000305000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_DSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003050006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_DSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000405000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_DSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004050006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_DSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000505000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005050006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_DSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000805000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008050006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_DSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000905000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009050006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_DSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a05000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a050006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_DSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b05000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b050006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000107000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001070006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000207000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002070006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000307000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003070006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000407000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004070006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000507000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005070006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000807000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008070006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000907000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009070006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a07000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a070006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b07000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b070006010000004c" + +save alg: DET_ECDSA(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff07000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DET_ECDSA(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff070006010000004c" + +save alg: DSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000104000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001040006010000004c" + +save alg: DSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000204000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002040006010000004c" + +save alg: DSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000304000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003040006010000004c" + +save alg: DSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000404000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004040006010000004c" + +save alg: DSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000504000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005040006010000004c" + +save alg: DSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000804000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008040006010000004c" + +save alg: DSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000904000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009040006010000004c" + +save alg: DSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a04000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a040006010000004c" + +save alg: DSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b04000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: DSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b040006010000004c" + +save alg: ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000044400400000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000444004010000004c" + +save alg: ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000020900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDH:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000209010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000106000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000206000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000306000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000406000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000506000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000806000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000906000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a06000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b06000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff06000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff060006010000004c" + +save alg: ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000006000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000060006010000004c" + +save alg: ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b09000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b090006010000004c" + +save alg: ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001509000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000015090006010000004c" + +save alg: FFDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000010900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: FFDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_FFDH:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000109010000004c" + +save alg: GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002500500000000010000004b" + +save alg2: GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_GCM:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000025005010000004c" + +save alg: HKDF(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000101000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HKDF(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001010008010000004c" + +save alg: HKDF(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000201000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HKDF(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002010008010000004c" + +save alg: HKDF(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000301000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HKDF(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003010008010000004c" + +save alg: HKDF(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000401000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HKDF(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004010008010000004c" + +save alg: HKDF(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000501000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HKDF(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005010008010000004c" + +save alg: HKDF(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000801000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HKDF(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008010008010000004c" + +save alg: HKDF(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000901000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HKDF(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009010008010000004c" + +save alg: HKDF(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a01000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HKDF(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a010008010000004c" + +save alg: HKDF(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b01000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HKDF(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b010008010000004c" + +save alg: HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000100800300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001008003010000004c" + +save alg: HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000200800300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002008003010000004c" + +save alg: HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000300800300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003008003010000004c" + +save alg: HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000400800300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004008003010000004c" + +save alg: HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000500800300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005008003010000004c" + +save alg: HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000800800300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008008003010000004c" + +save alg: HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000900800300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009008003010000004c" + +save alg: HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a00800300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a008003010000004c" + +save alg: HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b00800300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b008003010000004c" + +save alg: KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000901020900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009010209010000004c" + +save alg: KA(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000901010900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: KA(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009010109010000004c" + +save alg: KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a01020900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a010209010000004c" + +save alg: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000902020900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009020209010000004c" + +save alg: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a02020900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a020209010000004c" + +save alg: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000903020900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009030209010000004c" + +save alg: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a03020900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a030209010000004c" + +save alg: KA(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a01010900000000010000004b" + +save alg2: KA(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a010109010000004c" + +save alg: MD2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_MD2:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000100000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: MD2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_MD2:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001000002010000004c" + +save alg: MD4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_MD4:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000200000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: MD4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_MD4:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002000002010000004c" + +save alg: MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_MD5:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000300000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_MD5:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003000002010000004c" + +save alg: OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_OFB:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000012c00400000000010000004b" + +save alg2: OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_OFB:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000012c004010000004c" + +save alg: PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000008000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000080006010000004c" + +save alg: RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000400000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004000002010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000103000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001030007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000203000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002030007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000303000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003030007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000403000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004030007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000503000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005030007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000803000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008030007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000903000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009030007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a03000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a030007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b03000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b030007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002000700000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000020007010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000102000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000202000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000302000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000402000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000502000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000802000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000902000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a02000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b02000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff02000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000020006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000103000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000203000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000303000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000403000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000503000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000803000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000903000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a03000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b03000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff03000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff030006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000113000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001130006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000213000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002130006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000313000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003130006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000413000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004130006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000513000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005130006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000813000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008130006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000913000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009130006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a13000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a130006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b13000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b130006010000004c" + +save alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff13000600000000010000004b" + +save alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff130006010000004c" + +save alg: SHA3_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA3_224:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001000000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA3_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA3_224:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000010000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA3_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA3_256:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001100000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA3_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA3_256:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000011000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA3_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA3_384:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001200000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA3_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA3_384:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000012000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA3_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA3_512:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001300000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA3_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA3_512:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000013000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHAKE256_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHAKE256_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001500000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHAKE256_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHAKE256_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000015000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA_1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000500000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA_1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000800000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000900000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a00000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b00000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA_512_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000c00000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA_512_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000c000002010000004c" + +save alg: SHA_512_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000d00000200000000010000004b" + +save alg2: SHA_512_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000d000002010000004c" + +save alg: STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001800400000000010000004b" + +save alg2: STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000018004010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PRF(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000102000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PRF(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001020008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PRF(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000202000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PRF(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002020008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PRF(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000302000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PRF(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003020008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PRF(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000402000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PRF(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004020008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000502000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005020008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000802000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008020008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000902000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009020008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a02000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a020008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b02000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b020008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000103000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001030008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000203000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002030008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000303000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003030008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000403000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004030008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000503000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005030008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000803000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008030008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000903000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009030008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a03000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a030008010000004c" + +save alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b03000800000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b030008010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001c10300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001c103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002c10300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000002c103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000100810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001008103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000200810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002008103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000300810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003008103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000400810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004008103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000500810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005008103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000800810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008008103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000900810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009008103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a00810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384), 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a008103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b00810300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b008103010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001c40300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 4):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001c403010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 13):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001cd0300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 13):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001cd03010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 14):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001ce0300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 14):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001ce03010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 16):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001d00300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 16):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001d003010000004c" + +save alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 63):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001ff0300000000010000004b" + +save alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 63):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001ff03010000004c" + +save alg: XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000ff400400000000010000004b" + +save alg2: XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_save:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_XTS:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000ff4004010000004c" + +# End of automatically generated file. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f0a00e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.function @@ -0,0 +1,392 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include + +#define TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE 0x00000001 +#define TEST_FLAG_READ_ONLY 0x00000002 + +/** Write a key with the given attributes and key material to storage. + * Test that it has the expected representation. + * + * On error, including if the key representation in storage differs, + * mark the test case as failed and return 0. On success, return 1. + */ +static int test_written_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const data_t *material, + psa_storage_uid_t uid, + const data_t *expected_representation ) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t created_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + uint8_t *actual_representation = NULL; + size_t length; + struct psa_storage_info_t storage_info; + int ok = 0; + + /* Create a key with the given parameters. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( attributes, material->x, material->len, + &created_key_id ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( psa_get_key_id( attributes ), + created_key_id ) ); + + /* Check that the key is represented as expected. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get_info( uid, &storage_info ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( storage_info.size, expected_representation->len ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( actual_representation, storage_info.size ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get( uid, 0, storage_info.size, + actual_representation, &length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_representation->x, expected_representation->len, + actual_representation, length ); + + ok = 1; + +exit: + mbedtls_free( actual_representation ); + return( ok ); +} + +/** Check if a key is exportable. */ +static int can_export( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + if( psa_get_key_usage_flags( attributes ) & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ) + return( 1 ); + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) ) ) + return( 1 ); + else + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +static int is_accelerated_rsa( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + (void) alg; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Whether the algorithm is implemented as a builtin, i.e. not accelerated, + * and calls mbedtls_md() functions that require the hash algorithm to + * also be built-in. */ +static int is_builtin_calling_md( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + (void) alg; + return( 0 ); +} + +static int has_builtin_hash( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_MD2 ) + return( 0 ); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_MD4 ) + return( 0 ); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_MD5 ) + return( 0 ); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ) + return( 0 ); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ) + return( 0 ); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ) + return( 0 ); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) + return( 0 ); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) + return( 0 ); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ) + return( 0 ); +#endif + (void) alg; + return( 1 ); +} +#endif + +/* Mbed TLS doesn't support certain combinations of key type and algorithm + * in certain configurations. */ +static int can_exercise( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type( attributes ); + psa_algorithm_t alg = psa_get_key_algorithm( attributes ); + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = + PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) ? PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) : + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) ? PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH( alg ) : + PSA_ALG_NONE; + psa_key_usage_t usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags( attributes ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) + /* We test some configurations using drivers where the driver doesn't + * support certain hash algorithms, but declares that it supports + * compound algorithms that use those hashes. Until this is fixed, + * in those configurations, don't try to actually perform operations. + * + * Hash-and-sign algorithms where the asymmetric part doesn't use + * a hash operation are ok. So randomized ECDSA signature is fine, + * ECDSA verification is fine, but deterministic ECDSA signature is + * affected. All RSA signatures are affected except raw PKCS#1v1.5. + * OAEP is also affected. + */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( alg ) && + ! ( usage & ( PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ) ) ) + { + /* Verification only. Verification doesn't use the hash algorithm. */ + return( 1 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( alg ) && + ( hash_alg == PSA_ALG_MD5 || + hash_alg == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 || + hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + if( is_accelerated_rsa( alg ) && + ( hash_alg == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) && + ( hash_alg == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + + /* The built-in implementation of asymmetric algorithms that use a + * hash internally only dispatch to the internal md module, not to + * PSA. Until this is supported, don't try to actually perform + * operations when the operation is built-in and the hash isn't. */ + if( is_builtin_calling_md( alg ) && ! has_builtin_hash( hash_alg ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 */ + + (void) key_type; + (void) alg; + (void) hash_alg; + (void) usage; + return( 1 ); +} + +/** Write a key with the given representation to storage, then check + * that it has the given attributes and (if exportable) key material. + * + * On error, including if the key representation in storage differs, + * mark the test case as failed and return 0. On success, return 1. + */ +static int test_read_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *expected_attributes, + const data_t *expected_material, + psa_storage_uid_t uid, + const data_t *representation, + int flags ) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = psa_get_key_id( expected_attributes ); + struct psa_storage_info_t storage_info; + int ok = 0; + uint8_t *exported_material = NULL; + size_t length; + + /* Prime the storage with a key file. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_set( uid, representation->len, representation->x, 0 ) ); + + /* Check that the injected key exists and looks as expected. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &actual_attributes ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key_id, + psa_get_key_id( &actual_attributes ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_lifetime( expected_attributes ), + psa_get_key_lifetime( &actual_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_type( expected_attributes ), + psa_get_key_type( &actual_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_bits( expected_attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( &actual_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_usage_flags( expected_attributes ), + psa_get_key_usage_flags( &actual_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_algorithm( expected_attributes ), + psa_get_key_algorithm( &actual_attributes ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( expected_attributes ), + psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( &actual_attributes ) ); + if( can_export( expected_attributes ) ) + { + ASSERT_ALLOC( exported_material, expected_material->len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_export_key( key_id, + exported_material, expected_material->len, + &length ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_material->x, expected_material->len, + exported_material, length ); + } + + if( ( flags & TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE ) && can_exercise( &actual_attributes ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( + key_id, + psa_get_key_usage_flags( expected_attributes ), + psa_get_key_algorithm( expected_attributes ) ) ); + } + + + if( flags & TEST_FLAG_READ_ONLY ) + { + /* Read-only keys cannot be removed through the API. + * The key will be removed through ITS in the cleanup code below. */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, psa_destroy_key( key_id ) ); + } + else + { + /* Destroy the key. Confirm through direct access to the storage. */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key_id ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST, + psa_its_get_info( uid, &storage_info ) ); + } + + ok = 1; + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &actual_attributes ); + psa_its_remove( uid ); + mbedtls_free( exported_material ); + return( ok ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_storage_save( int lifetime_arg, int type_arg, int bits_arg, + int usage_arg, int alg_arg, int alg2_arg, + data_t *material, + data_t *representation ) +{ + /* Forward compatibility: save a key in the current format and + * check that it has the expected format so that future versions + * will still be able to read it. */ + + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg2 = alg2_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0, 1 ); + psa_storage_uid_t uid = 1; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_INIT( ); + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( key_id ); + + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &attributes, alg2 ); + + /* This is the current storage format. Test that we know exactly how + * the key is stored. The stability of the test data in future + * versions of Mbed TLS will guarantee that future versions + * can read back what this version wrote. */ + TEST_ASSERT( test_written_key( &attributes, material, + uid, representation ) ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void key_storage_read( int lifetime_arg, int type_arg, int bits_arg, + int usage_arg, int alg_arg, int alg2_arg, + data_t *material, + data_t *representation, int flags ) +{ + /* Backward compatibility: read a key in the format of a past version + * and check that this version can use it. */ + + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = lifetime_arg; + psa_key_type_t type = type_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg2 = alg2_arg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( 0, 1 ); + psa_storage_uid_t uid = 1; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + PSA_INIT( ); + TEST_USES_KEY_ID( key_id ); + + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, key_id ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, usage ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( &attributes, alg2 ); + + /* Test that we can use a key with the given representation. This + * guarantees backward compatibility with keys that were stored by + * past versions of Mbed TLS. */ + TEST_ASSERT( test_read_key( &attributes, material, + uid, representation, flags ) ); + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.misc.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.misc.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..48e3804b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.misc.data @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# The following two manually crafted test cases are redundant with +# systematically generated test cases, but useful to have as an anchor when +# debugging changes to the test code or to the test case generation. + +PSA storage read: AES-GCM+CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR +key_storage_read:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ALG_CTR:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024800001010000000250050010c00410000000404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":1 + +PSA storage save: AES-GCM+CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_save:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ALG_CTR:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024800001010000000250050010c00410000000404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f" diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.v0.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.v0.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0be10666 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.v0.data @@ -0,0 +1,8939 @@ +# Automatically generated by generate_psa_tests.py. Do not edit! + +read lifetime: (DEFAULT,LOCAL_STORAGE) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":0 + +read lifetime: (READ_ONLY,LOCAL_STORAGE) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000ff00000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":TEST_FLAG_READ_ONLY + +read lifetime: (2,LOCAL_STORAGE) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(2, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000200000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":0 + +read lifetime: (254,LOCAL_STORAGE) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(254, PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000fe00000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":0 + +read lifetime: PERSISTENT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":0 + +read usage without implication: 0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:0:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: COPY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800020000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: DECRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000200000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800004000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: ENCRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000100000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: SIGN_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800001400000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000400000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002800000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000800000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: COPY|DECRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800020200000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: DECRYPT|DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800004200000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: DERIVE|ENCRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800004100000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: ENCRYPT|EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010100000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: EXPORT|SIGN_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800011400000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: SIGN_HASH|SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800001400000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: SIGN_MESSAGE|VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002c00000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: VERIFY_HASH|VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002800000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: VERIFY_MESSAGE|COPY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800020800000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage without implication: all known +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800037f00000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: 0 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:0:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: COPY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800020000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: DECRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000200000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800004000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: ENCRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000100000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: SIGN_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800001000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000400000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800000800000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: COPY|DECRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800020200000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: DECRYPT|DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800004200000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: DERIVE|ENCRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800004100000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: ENCRYPT|EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010100000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: EXPORT|SIGN_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800011000000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: SIGN_HASH|SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800001400000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: SIGN_MESSAGE|VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002400000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: VERIFY_HASH|VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800002800000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read usage: VERIFY_MESSAGE|COPY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY:0x0000:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800020800000000000000000000010000004b":0 + +read type: AES 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000014405000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000014e05000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000015005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001c003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000404004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000414004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000015005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000010300000011c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CMAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000002c003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000010300000010c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000444004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000025005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_OFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000010300000012c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001c403000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001cd03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001ce03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000248000013c00000001d003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 128-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002480000103000000ff4004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000100000000000000000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000014405000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000014e05000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001c003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000404004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000414004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000010300000011c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CMAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000002c003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000010300000010c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000444004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000025005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_OFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000010300000012c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001c403000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001cd03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001ce03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c000013c00000001d003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 192-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000024c0000103000000ff4004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000014405000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000014e05000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001013c00000001c003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000404004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000414004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001010300000011c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CMAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001013c00000002c003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001010300000010c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000444004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000025005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_OFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001010300000012c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001013c00000001c403000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001013c00000001cd03000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001013c00000001ce03000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000240001013c00000001d003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: AES 256-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000002400010103000000ff4004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARC4 8-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48":"505341004b4559000000000001000000022008000100000000000000000000000100000048":0 + +read type: ARC4 8-bit, STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0x0000:"48":"505341004b4559000000000001000000022008000103000000018004000000000100000048":0 + +read type: ARC4 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000022080000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARC4 128-bit, STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000022080000103000000018004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARC4 2048-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:2048:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000022000080100000000000000000000000001000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":0 + +read type: ARC4 2048-bit, STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:2048:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000022000080103000000018004000000000001000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":0 + +read type: ARIA 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000103000000014405000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000103000000014e05000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000103000000015005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006248000013c00000001c003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000103000000404004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000103000000414004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000103000000015005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006248000010300000011c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006248000010300000010c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000103000000444004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000103000000025005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006248000013c00000001c403000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006248000013c00000001cd03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006248000013c00000001ce03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006248000013c00000001d003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 128-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062480000103000000ff4004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000100000000000000000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000103000000014405000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000103000000014e05000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c000013c00000001c003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000103000000404004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000103000000414004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c000010300000011c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c000010300000010c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000103000000444004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000103000000025005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c000013c00000001c403000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c000013c00000001cd03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c000013c00000001ce03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c000013c00000001d003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 192-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000624c0000103000000ff4004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010103000000014405000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010103000000014e05000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006240001013c00000001c003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010103000000404004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010103000000414004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006240001010300000011c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006240001010300000010c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010103000000444004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010103000000025005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006240001013c00000001c403000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006240001013c00000001cd03000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006240001013c00000001ce03000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000006240001013c00000001d003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ARIA 256-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000062400010103000000ff4004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000014405000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000014e05000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000015005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001c003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000404004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000414004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000015005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000010300000011c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000010300000010c004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000444004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000025005000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001c403000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001cd03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001ce03000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003248000013c00000001d003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 128-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032480000103000000ff4004000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000100000000000000000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000014405000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000014e05000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001c003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000404004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000414004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000015005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000010300000011c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000010300000010c004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000444004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000025005000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001c403000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001cd03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001ce03000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c000013c00000001d003000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 192-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":"505341004b45590000000000010000000324c0000103000000ff4004000000001800000048657265006973206b6579a0646174614865726500697320":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000014405000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000014e05000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001c003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000404004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000414004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000015005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001010300000011c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001010300000010c004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000444004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000025005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001c403000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,13):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001cd03000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,14):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001ce03000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC,16):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000003240001013c00000001d003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CAMELLIA 256-bit, XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000032400010103000000ff4004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CHACHA20 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000042000010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CHACHA20 256-bit, CHACHA20_POLY1305 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000042000010103000000051005000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: CHACHA20 256-bit, STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000042000010103000000018004000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DERIVE 120-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:120:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a0646174":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001278000100000000000000000000000f00000048657265006973206b6579a0646174":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DERIVE 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001280000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 64-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"644573206b457901":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123400001000000000000000000000008000000644573206b457901":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 64-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123400001030000004040040000000008000000644573206b457901":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 64-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"644573206b457901":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123400001030000004140040000000008000000644573206b457901":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 64-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123400001030000004440040000000008000000644573206b457901":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123800001000000000000000000000010000000644573206b457901644573206b457902":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 128-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123800001030000004040040000000010000000644573206b457901644573206b457902":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 128-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123800001030000004140040000000010000000644573206b457901644573206b457902":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 128-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123800001030000004440040000000010000000644573206b457901644573206b457902":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123c00001000000000000000000000018000000644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 192-bit, CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123c00001030000004040040000000018000000644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 192-bit, CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123c00001030000004140040000000018000000644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: DES 192-bit, ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":"505341004b45590000000000010000000123c00001030000004440040000000018000000644573206b457901644573206b457902644573206b457904":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000100000000000000000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000001070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000002070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000003070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000004070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000005070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000008070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000009070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c00000a070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c00000b070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000140000000000209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000001060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000002060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000003060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000004060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000005060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000008060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000009060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c00000a060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c00000b060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000013c000000060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000140000009010209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000014000000a010209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000140000009020209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000014000000a020209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000140000009030209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a000014000000a030209000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000010000000000000000000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000107000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000207000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000307000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000407000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000507000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000807000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000907000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000a07000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000b07000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000000020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000106000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000206000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000306000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000406000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000506000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000806000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000906000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000a06000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000b06000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000013c00000006000600000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000901020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000a01020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000902020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000a02020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000903020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071c000014000000a03020900000000180000001688a2c5fbf4a3c851d76a98c3ec88f445a97996283db59f":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000100000000000000000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000001070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000002070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000003070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000004070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000005070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000008070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000009070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c00000a070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c00000b070006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000140000000000209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000001060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000002060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000003060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000004060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000005060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000008060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000009060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c00000a060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c00000b060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000013c000000060006000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000140000009010209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000014000000a010209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000140000009020209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000014000000a020209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e0000140000009030209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071e000014000000a030209000000001c000000a69835dafeb5da5ab89c59860dddebcfd80b529a99f59b880882923c":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001010000000000000000000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000107000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000207000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000307000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000407000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000507000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000807000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000907000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000a07000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000b07000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000000020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000106000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000206000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000306000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000406000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000506000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000806000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000906000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000a06000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000b06000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001013c00000006000600000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000901020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000a01020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000902020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000a02020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000903020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710001014000000a03020900000000200000002161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010100000000000000000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000001070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000002070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000003070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000004070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000005070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000008070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000009070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c00000a070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c00000b070006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010140000000000209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000001060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000002060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000003060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000004060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000005060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000008060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000009060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c00000a060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c00000b060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001013c000000060006000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010140000009010209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001014000000a010209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010140000009020209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001014000000a020209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b4559000000000001000000307140010140000009030209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 320-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"61b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":"505341004b455900000000000100000030714001014000000a030209000000002800000061b8daa7a6e5aa9fccf1ef504220b2e5a5b8c6dc7475d16d3172d7db0b2778414e4f6e8fa2032ead":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001010000000000000000000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000107000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000207000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000307000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000407000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000507000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000807000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000907000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000a07000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000b07000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000000020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000106000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000206000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000306000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000406000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000506000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000806000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000906000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000a06000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000b06000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001013c00000006000600000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000901020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000a01020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000902020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000a02020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000903020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":"505341004b455900000000000100000030718001014000000a03020900000000300000003dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201000000000000000000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000010700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000020700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000030700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000040700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000050700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000080700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000090700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c00000a0700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c00000b0700060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201400000000002090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000010600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000020600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000030600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000040600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000050600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000080600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000090600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c00000a0600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c00000b0600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002013c0000000600060000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201400000090102090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002014000000a0102090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201400000090202090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002014000000a0202090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071000201400000090302090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 512-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":"505341004b455900000000000100000030710002014000000a0302090000000040000000372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":0 + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000100000000000000000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000140000000000209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000140000009010209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff00014000000a010209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000140000009020209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff00014000000a020209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff000140000009030209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 255-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171ff00014000000a030209000000002000000070076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101000000000000000000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101400000000002090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101400000090102090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c001014000000a0102090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101400000090202090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c001014000000a0202090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c00101400000090302090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(MGM) 448-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":"505341004b45590000000000010000004171c001014000000a0302090000000038000000e4e49f52686f9ee3b638528f721f1596196ffd0a1cddb64c3f216f06541805cfeb1a286dc78018095cdfec050e8007b5f4908962ba20d6c1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001000000000000000000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000010700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000020700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000030700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000040700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000050700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000080700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000090700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c00000a0700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c00000b0700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001400000000002090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000010600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000020600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000030600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000040600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000050600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000080600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000090600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c00000a0600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c00000b0600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000013c0000000600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001400000090102090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000014000000a0102090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001400000090202090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000014000000a0202090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001400000090302090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c000014000000a0302090000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000100000000000000000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000001070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000002070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000003070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000004070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000005070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000008070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000009070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c00000a070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c00000b070006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000140000000000209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000001060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000002060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000003060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000004060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000005060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000008060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000009060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c00000a060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c00000b060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000013c000000060006000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000140000009010209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000014000000a010209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000140000009020209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000014000000a020209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e0000140000009030209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 224-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771e000014000000a030209000000001d0000000024122bf020fa113f6c0ac978dfbd41f749257a9468febdbe0dc9f7e8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001010000000000000000000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000107000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000207000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000307000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000407000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000507000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000807000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000907000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000a07000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000b07000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000000020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000106000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000206000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000306000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000406000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000506000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000806000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000906000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000a06000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000b06000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001013c00000006000600000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000901020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000a01020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000902020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000a02020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000903020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"7fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":"505341004b455900000000000100000017710001014000000a03020900000000200000007fa06fa02d0e911b9a47fdc17d2d962ca01e2f31d60c6212d0ed7e3bba23a7b9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000100000000000000000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000001070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000002070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000003070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000004070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000005070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000008070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000009070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c00000a070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c00000b070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000140000000000209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000001060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000002060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000003060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000004060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000005060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000008060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000009060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c00000a060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c00000b060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100013c000000060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000140000009010209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100014000000a010209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000140000009020209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100014000000a020209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000140000009030209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e100014000000a030209000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010100000000000000000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000001070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000002070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000003070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000004070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000005070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000008070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000009070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c00000a070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c00000b070006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010140000000000209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000001060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000002060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000003060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000004060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000005060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000008060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000009060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c00000a060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c00000b060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001013c000000060006000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010140000009010209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001014000000a010209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010140000009020209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001014000000a020209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127100010140000009030209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 256-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710001014000000a030209000000002000000049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001010000000000000000000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000107000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000207000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000307000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000407000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000507000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000807000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000907000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000a07000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000b07000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000000020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000106000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000206000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000306000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000406000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000506000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000806000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000906000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000a06000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000b06000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001013c00000006000600000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000901020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000a01020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000902020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000a02020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000903020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 384-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":"505341004b455900000000000100000012718001014000000a03020900000000300000003f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127109020100000000000000000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000001070006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000002070006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000003070006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000004070006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000005070006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000008070006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000009070006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c00000a070006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c00000b070006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127109020140000000000209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000001060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000002060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000003060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000004060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000005060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000008060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000009060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c00000a060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c00000b060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902013c000000060006000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127109020140000009010209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902014000000a010209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127109020140000009020209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902014000000a020209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b4559000000000001000000127109020140000009030209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 521-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":"505341004b455900000000000100000012710902014000000a030209000000004200000001b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000100000000000000000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000001070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000002070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000003070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000004070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000005070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000008070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000009070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c00000a070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c00000b070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000140000000000209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000001060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000002060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000003060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000004060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000005060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000008060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000009060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c00000a060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c00000b060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000013c000000060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000140000009010209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000014000000a010209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000140000009020209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000014000000a020209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000140000009030209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a000014000000a030209000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000100000000000000000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000001070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000002070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000003070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000004070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000005070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000008070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000009070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c00000a070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c00000b070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000140000000000209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000001060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000002060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000003060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000004060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000005060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000008060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000009060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c00000a060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c00000b060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300013c000000060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000140000009010209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300014000000a010209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000140000009020209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300014000000a020209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000140000009030209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a300014000000a030209000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000100000000000000000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000001070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000002070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000003070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000004070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000005070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000008070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000009070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c00000a070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c00000b070006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000140000000000209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000001060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000002060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000003060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000004060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000005060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000008060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000009060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c00000a060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c00000b060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900013c000000060006000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000140000009010209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900014000000a010209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000140000009020209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900014000000a020209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e9000140000009030209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"41f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771e900014000000a030209000000001d00000041f08485ce587b06061c087e76e247c359de2ba9927ee013b2f1ed9ca8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000100000000000000000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000001070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000002070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000003070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000004070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000005070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000008070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000009070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c00000a070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c00000b070006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000140000000000209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000001060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000002060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000003060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000004060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000005060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000008060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000009060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c00000a060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c00000b060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00013c000000060006000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000140000009010209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00014000000a010209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000140000009020209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00014000000a020209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef000140000009030209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 239-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"1a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771ef00014000000a030209000000001e0000001a8069ce2c2c8bdd7087f2a6ab49588797e6294e979495602ab9650b9c61":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101000000000000000000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000010700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000020700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000030700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000040700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000050700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000080700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000090700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c00000a0700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c00000b0700060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101400000000002090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000010600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000020600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000030600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000040600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000050600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000080600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000090600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c00000a0600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c00000b0600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01013c0000000600060000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101400000090102090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01014000000a0102090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101400000090202090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01014000000a0202090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b0101400000090302090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":"505341004b455900000000000100000027711b01014000000a0302090000000024000000006d627885dd48b9ec6facb5b3865377d755b75a5d51440e45211c1f600e15eff8a881a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901010000000000000000000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000107000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000207000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000307000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000407000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000507000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000807000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000907000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000a07000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000b07000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000000020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000106000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000206000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000306000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000406000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000506000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000806000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000906000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000a06000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000b06000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901013c00000006000600000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000901020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000a01020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000902020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000a02020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000903020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"3ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":"505341004b455900000000000100000027719901014000000a03020900000000330000003ff5e74d932fa77db139b7c948c81e4069c72c24845574064beea8976b70267f1c6f9a503e3892ea1dcbb71fcea423faa370a8":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201000000000000000000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000010700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000020700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000030700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000040700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000050700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000080700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000090700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c00000a0700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c00000b0700060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201400000000002090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000010600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000020600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000030600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000040600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000050600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000080600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000090600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c00000a0600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c00000b0600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02013c0000000600060000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201400000090102090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02014000000a0102090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201400000090202090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02014000000a0202090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b0201400000090302090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":"505341004b455900000000000100000027713b02014000000a0302090000000048000000005008c97b4a161c0db1bac6452c72846d57337aa92d8ecb4a66eb01d2f29555ffb61a5317225dcc8ca6917d91789e227efc0bfe9eeda7ee21998cd11c3c9885056b0e55b4f75d51":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001000000000000000000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000010700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000020700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000030700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000040700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000050700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000080700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000090700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c00000a0700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c00000b0700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001400000000002090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000010600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000020600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000030600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000040600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000050600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000080600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000090600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c00000a0600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c00000b0600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300013c0000000600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001400000090102090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300014000000a0102090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001400000090202090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300014000000a0202090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001400000090302090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a300014000000a0302090000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000100000000000000000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000001070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000002070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000003070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000004070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000005070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000008070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000009070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c00000a070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c00000b070006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000140000000000209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000001060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000002060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000003060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000004060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000005060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000008060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000009060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c00000a060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c00000b060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900013c000000060006000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000140000009010209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900014000000a010209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000140000009020209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900014000000a020209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e9000140000009030209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 233-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271e900014000000a030209000000001e00000000e5e42834e3c78758088b905deea975f28dc20ef6173e481f96e88afe7f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101000000000000000000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000010700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000020700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000030700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000040700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000050700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000080700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000090700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c00000a0700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c00000b0700060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101400000000002090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000010600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000020600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000030600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000040600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000050600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000080600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000090600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c00000a0600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c00000b0600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01013c0000000600060000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101400000090102090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01014000000a0102090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101400000090202090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01014000000a0202090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b0101400000090302090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 283-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":"505341004b455900000000000100000022711b01014000000a0302090000000024000000004cecad915f6f3c9bbbd92d1eb101eda23f16c7dad60a57c87c7e1fd2b29b22f6d666ad":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010100000000000000000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000001070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000002070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000003070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000004070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000005070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000008070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000009070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c00000a070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c00000b070006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010140000000000209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000001060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000002060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000003060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000004060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000005060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000008060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000009060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c00000a060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c00000b060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901013c000000060006000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010140000009010209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901014000000a010209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010140000009020209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901014000000a020209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b4559000000000001000000227199010140000009030209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 409-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"00c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":"505341004b455900000000000100000022719901014000000a030209000000003400000000c22422d265721a3ae2b3b2baeb77bee50416e19877af97b5fc1c700a0a88916ecb9050135883accb5e64edc77a3703f4f67a64":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201000000000000000000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000010700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000020700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000030700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000040700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000050700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000080700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000090700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c00000a0700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c00000b0700060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201400000000002090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000010600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000020600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000030600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000040600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000050600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000080600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000090600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c00000a0600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c00000b0600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02013c0000000600060000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201400000090102090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02014000000a0102090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201400000090202090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02014000000a0202090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b0201400000090302090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 571-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":"505341004b455900000000000100000022713b02014000000a0302090000000048000000026ac1cdf92a13a1b8d282da9725847908745138f5c6706b52d164e3675fcfbf86fc3e6ab2de732193267db029dd35a0599a94a118f480231cfc6ccca2ebfc1d8f54176e0f5656a1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300010000000000000000000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000107000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000207000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000307000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000407000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000507000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000807000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000907000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000a07000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000b07000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000000020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000106000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000206000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000306000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000406000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000506000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000806000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000906000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000a06000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000b06000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300013c00000006000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000901020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000a01020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000902020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000a02020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000903020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit, KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH,PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300014000000a03020900000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00010000000000000000000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00013c00000b09000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00013c00001509000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00013c00000008000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271c001010000000000000000000000390000006c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271c001013c00000b09000600000000390000006c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271c001013c00001509000600000000390000006c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271c001013c00000008000600000000390000006c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000100000000000000000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000001070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000002070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000003070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000004070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000005070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000008070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000009070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a000012800000a070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a000012800000b070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000001060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000002060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000003060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000004060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000005060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000008060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000009060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a000012800000a060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a000012800000b060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000128000000060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001000000000000000000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000010700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000020700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000030700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000040700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000050700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000080700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000090700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c000012800000a0700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c000012800000b0700060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000010600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000020600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000030600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000040600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000050600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000080600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000090600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c000012800000a0600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c000012800000b0600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 192-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041c00001280000000600060000000031000000043fdd168c179ff5363dd71dcd58de9617caad791ae0c37328be9ca0bfc79cebabf6a95d1c52df5b5f3c8b1a2441cf6c88":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001000000000000000000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000010700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000020700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000030700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000040700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000050700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000080700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000090700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e000012800000a0700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e000012800000b0700060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000010600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000020600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000030600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000040600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000050600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000080600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000090600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e000012800000a0600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e000012800000b0600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 224-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041e00001280000000600060000000039000000045fbea378fc8583b3837e3f21a457c31eaf20a54e18eb11d104b3adc47f9d1c97eb9ea4ac21740d70d88514b98bf0bc31addac1d19c4ab3cc":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010100000000000000000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000001070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000002070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000003070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000004070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000005070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000008070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000009070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410001012800000a070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410001012800000b070006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000001060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000002060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000003060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000004060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000005060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000008060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000009060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410001012800000a060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410001012800000b060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304100010128000000060006000000004100000004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101000000000000000000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000010700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000020700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000030700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000040700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000050700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000080700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000090700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b455900000000000100000030414001012800000a0700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b455900000000000100000030414001012800000b0700060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000010600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000020600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000030600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000040600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000050600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000080600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000090600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b455900000000000100000030414001012800000a0600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b455900000000000100000030414001012800000b0600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 320-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_320:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):320:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041400101280000000600060000000051000000049caed8fb4742956cc2ad12a9a1c995e21759ef26a07bc2054136d3d2f28bb331a70e26c4c687275ab1f434be7871e115d2350c0c5f61d4d06d2bcdb67f5cb63fdb794e5947c87dc6849a58694e37e6cd":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010100000000000000000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000001070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000002070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000003070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000004070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000005070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000008070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000009070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030418001012800000a070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030418001012800000b070006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000001060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000002060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000003060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000004060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000005060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000008060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000009060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030418001012800000a060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030418001012800000b060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":"505341004b4559000000000001000000304180010128000000060006000000006100000004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002010000000000000000000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000107000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000207000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000307000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000407000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000507000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000807000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000907000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000a07000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000b07000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000106000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000206000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000306000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000406000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000506000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000806000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000906000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000a06000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000b06000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":0 + +read type: ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 512-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":"505341004b455900000000000100000030410002012800000006000600000000810000000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(MGM) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004141ff00010000000000000000000000200000008520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(MGM) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"c0d3a5a2b416a573dc9909f92f134ac01323ab8f8e36804e578588ba2d09fe7c3e737f771ca112825b548a0ffded6d6a2fd09a3e77dec30e":"505341004b45590000000000010000004141c00101000000000000000000000038000000c0d3a5a2b416a573dc9909f92f134ac01323ab8f8e36804e578588ba2d09fe7c3e737f771ca112825b548a0ffded6d6a2fd09a3e77dec30e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000010000000000000000000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000107000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000207000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000307000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000407000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000507000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000807000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000907000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000a07000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000b07000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000106000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000206000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000306000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000406000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000506000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000806000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000906000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000a06000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000b06000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012800000006000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001000000000000000000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000010700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000020700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000030700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000040700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000050700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000080700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000090700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e000012800000a0700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e000012800000b0700060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000010600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000020600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000030600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000040600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000050600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000080600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000090600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e000012800000a0600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e000012800000b0600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 224-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741e00001280000000600060000000039000000042cc7335f4b76042bed44ef45959a62aa215f7a5ff0c8111b8c44ed654ee71c1918326ad485b2d599fe2a6eab096ee26d977334d2bac6d61d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101000000000000000000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000010700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000020700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000030700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000040700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000050700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000080700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000090700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b455900000000000100000017410001012800000a0700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b455900000000000100000017410001012800000b0700060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000010600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000020600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000030600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000040600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000050600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000080600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000090600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b455900000000000100000017410001012800000a0600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b455900000000000100000017410001012800000b0600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741000101280000000600060000000041000000045c39154579efd667adc73a81015a797d2c8682cdfbd3c3553c4a185d481cdc50e42a0e1cbc3ca29a32a645e927f54beaed14c9dbbf8279d725f5495ca924b24d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001000000000000000000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000010700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000020700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000030700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000040700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000050700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000080700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000090700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e100012800000a0700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e100012800000b0700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000010600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000020600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000030600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000040600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000050600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000080600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000090600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e100012800000a0600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e100012800000b0600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001280000000600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101000000000000000000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000010700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000020700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000030700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000040700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000050700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000080700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000090700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410001012800000a0700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410001012800000b0700060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000010600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000020600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000030600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000040600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000050600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000080600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000090600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410001012800000a0600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410001012800000b0600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 256-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241000101280000000600060000000041000000047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010100000000000000000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000001070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000002070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000003070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000004070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000005070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000008070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000009070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b455900000000000100000012418001012800000a070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b455900000000000100000012418001012800000b070006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000001060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000002060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000003060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000004060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000005060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000008060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000009060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b455900000000000100000012418001012800000a060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b455900000000000100000012418001012800000b060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 384-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124180010128000000060006000000006100000004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020100000000000000000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000001070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000002070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000003070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000004070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000005070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000008070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000009070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410902012800000a070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410902012800000b070006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000001060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000002060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000003060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000004060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000005060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000008060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000009060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410902012800000a060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b455900000000000100000012410902012800000b060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 521-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":"505341004b4559000000000001000000124109020128000000060006000000008500000004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001000000000000000000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000010700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000020700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000030700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000040700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000050700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000080700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000090700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a000012800000a0700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a000012800000b0700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000010600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000020600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000030600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000040600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000050600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000080600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000090600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a000012800000a0600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a000012800000b0600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001280000000600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000100000000000000000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000001070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000002070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000003070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000004070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000005070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000008070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000009070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a300012800000a070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a300012800000b070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000001060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000002060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000003060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000004060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000005060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000008060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000009060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a300012800000a060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a300012800000b060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000128000000060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000100000000000000000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000001070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000002070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000003070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000004070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000005070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000008070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000009070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e900012800000a070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e900012800000b070006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000001060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000002060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000003060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000004060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000005060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000008060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000009060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e900012800000a060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e900012800000b060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 233-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741e9000128000000060006000000003d0000000401e9d7189189f773bd8f71be2c10774ba18842434dfa9312595ea545104400f45a9d5675647513ba75b079fe66a29daac2ec86a6a5d4e75c5f290c1f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000100000000000000000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000001070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000002070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000003070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000004070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000005070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000008070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000009070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef00012800000a070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef00012800000b070006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000001060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000002060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000003060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000004060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000005060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000008060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000009060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef00012800000a060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef00012800000b060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 239-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_239:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):239:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741ef000128000000060006000000003d00000004068d76b9f4508762c2379db9ee8b87ad8d86d9535132ffba3b5680440cfa28eb133d4232faf1c9aba96af11aefe634a551440800d5f8185105d3072d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01010000000000000000000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000107000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000207000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000307000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000407000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000507000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000807000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000907000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000a07000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000b07000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000106000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000206000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000306000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000406000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000506000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000806000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000906000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000a06000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000b06000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 283-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":"505341004b455900000000000100000027411b01012800000006000600000000490000000405f48374debceaadb46ba385fd92048fcc5b9af1a1c90408bf94a68b9378df1cbfdfb6fb026a96bea06d8f181bf10c020adbcc88b6ecff96bdc564a9649c247cede601c4be63afc3":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010100000000000000000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000001070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000002070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000003070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000004070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000005070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000008070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000009070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b455900000000000100000027419901012800000a070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b455900000000000100000027419901012800000b070006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000001060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000002060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000003060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000004060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000005060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000008060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000009060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b455900000000000100000027419901012800000a060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b455900000000000100000027419901012800000b060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 409-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000274199010128000000060006000000006900000004012c587f69f68b308ba6dcb238797f4e22290ca939ae806604e2b5ab4d9caef5a74a98fd87c4f88d292dd39d92e556e16c6ecc3c019a105826eef507cd9a04119f54d5d850b3720b3792d5d03410e9105610f7e4b420166ed45604a7a1f229d80975ba6be2060e8b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020100000000000000000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000001070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000002070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000003070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000004070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000005070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000008070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000009070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b02012800000a070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b02012800000b070006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000001060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000002060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000003060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000004060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000005060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000008060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000009060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b02012800000a060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b02012800000b060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 571-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":"505341004b455900000000000100000027413b020128000000060006000000009100000004050172a7fd7adf98e4e2ed2742faa5cd12731a15fb0dbbdf75b1c3cc771a4369af6f2fa00e802735650881735759ea9c79961ded18e0daa0ac59afb1d513b5bbda9962e435f454fc020b4afe1445c2302ada07d295ec2580f8849b2dfa7f956b09b4cbe4c88d3b1c217049f75d3900d36df0fa12689256b58dd2ef784ebbeb0564600cf47a841485f8cf897a68accd5a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000100000000000000000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000001070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000002070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000003070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000004070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000005070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000008070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000009070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a300012800000a070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a300012800000b070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000001060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000002060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000003060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000004060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000005060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000008060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000009060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a300012800000a060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a300012800000b060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000128000000060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000100000000000000000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000001070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000002070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000003070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000004070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000005070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000008070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000009070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e900012800000a070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e900012800000b070006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000001060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000002060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000003060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000004060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000005060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000008060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000009060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e900012800000a060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e900012800000b060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 233-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_233:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):233:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241e9000128000000060006000000003d0000000400cd68c8af4430c92ec7a7048becfdf00a6bae8d1b4c37286f2d336f2a0e017eca3748f4ad6d435c85867aa014eea1bd6d9d005bbd8319cab629001d":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010100000000000000000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000001070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000002070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000003070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000004070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000005070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000008070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000009070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b01012800000a070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b01012800000b070006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000001060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000002060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000003060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000004060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000005060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000008060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000009060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b01012800000a060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b01012800000b060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 283-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_283:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):283:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"04052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":"505341004b455900000000000100000022411b010128000000060006000000004900000004052f9ff887254c2d1440ba9e30f13e2185ba53c373b2c410dae21cf8c167f796c08134f601cbc4c570bffbc2433082cf4d9eb5ba173ecb8caec15d66a02673f60807b2daa729b765":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901010000000000000000000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000107000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000207000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000307000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000407000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000507000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000807000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000907000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000a07000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000b07000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000106000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000206000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000306000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000406000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000506000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000806000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000906000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000a06000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000b06000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 409-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_409:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):409:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":"505341004b455900000000000100000022419901012800000006000600000000690000000401aa25466b1d291846db365957b25431591e50d9c109fe2106e93bb369775896925b15a7bfec397406ab4fe6f6b1a13bf8fdcb9300fa5500a813228676b0a6c572ed96b0f4aec7e87832e7e20f17ca98ecdfd36f59c82bddb8665f1f357a73900e827885ec9e1f22":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201000000000000000000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000010700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000020700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000030700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000040700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000050700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000080700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000090700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b02012800000a0700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b02012800000b0700060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000010600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000020600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000030600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000040600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000050600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000080600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000090600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b02012800000a0600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b02012800000b0600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 571-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_571:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):571:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":"505341004b455900000000000100000022413b0201280000000600060000000091000000040708f3403ee9948114855c17572152a08f8054d486defef5f29cbffcfb7cfd9280746a1ac5f751a6ad902ec1e0525120e9be56f03437af196fbe60ee7856e3542ab2cf87880632d80290e39b1a2bd03c6bbf6225511c567bd2ff41d2325dc58346f2b60b1feee4dc8b2af2296c2dc52b153e0556b5d24152b07f690c3fa24e4d1d19efbdeb1037833a733654d2366c74":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000100000000000000000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000001070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000002070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000003070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000004070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000005070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000008070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000009070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a300012800000a070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a300012800000b070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000001060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000002060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000003060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000004060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000005060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000008060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000009060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a300012800000a060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a300012800000b060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit, ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000128000000060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff0001000000000000000000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff00012800000b0900060000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff0001280000150900060000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit, PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff0001280000000800060000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241c001010000000000000000000000390000005fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241c001012800000b09000600000000390000005fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241c001012800001509000600000000390000005fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 448-bit, PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_448:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241c001012800000008000600000000390000005fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000001008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000002008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000003008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000004008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000005008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000008008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c000009008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c00000a008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 128-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000013c00000b008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a0000100000000000000000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000001008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000002008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000003008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000004008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000005008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000008008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c000009008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c00000a008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 160-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011a000013c00000b008003000000001400000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e0000100000000000000000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000001008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000002008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000003008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000004008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000005008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000008008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c000009008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c00000a008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 224-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:224:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":"505341004b45590000000000010000000011e000013c00000b008003000000001c00000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a0":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001100010100000000000000000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000001008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000002008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000003008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000004008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000005008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000008008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c000009008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c00000a008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 256-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110001013c00000b008003000000002000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180010100000000000000000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000001008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000002008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000003008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000004008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000005008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000008008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c000009008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c00000a008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 384-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:384:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118001013c00000b008003000000003000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001100020100000000000000000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000001008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000002008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000003008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000004008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000005008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000008008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c000009008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c00000a008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: HMAC 512-bit, HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:512:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000110002013c00000b008003000000004000000048657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a06461746148657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RAW_DATA 8-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000000000000100000048":0 + +read type: RAW_DATA 40-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:40:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"4865726500":"505341004b455900000000000100000001102800010000000000000000000000050000004865726500":0 + +read type: RAW_DATA 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011080000100000000000000000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":0 + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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":0 + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000203000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000803000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004013c00000413000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"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":"505341004b4559000000000001000000017000060100000000000000000000007f0300003082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700006013c000001030006000000007f0300003082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700006013c000005030006000000007f0300003082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3082037b0201000281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc3502030100010281c06d2d670047973a87752a9d5bc14f3dae00acb01f593aa0e24cf4a49f932931de4bbfb332e2d38083da80bc0b6d538edba479f7f77d0deffb4a28e6e67ff6273585bb4cd862535c946605ab0809d65f0e38f76e4ec2c3d9b8cd6e14bcf667943892cd4b34cc6420a439abbf3d7d35ef73976dd6f9cbde35a51fa5213f0107f83e3425835d16d3c9146fc9e36ce75a09bb66cdff21dd5a776899f1cb07e282cca27be46510e9c799f0d8db275a6be085d9f3f803218ee3384265bfb1a3640e8ca1026100e6848c31d466fffefc547e3a3b0d3785de6f78b0dd12610843512e495611a0675509b1650b27415009838dd8e68eec6e7530553b637d602424643b33e8bc5b762e1799bc79d56b13251d36d4f201da2182416ce13574e88278ff04467ad602d9026100de994fdf181f02be2bf9e5f5e4e517a94993b827d1eaf609033e3a6a6f2396ae7c44e9eb594cf1044cb3ad32ea258f0c82963b27bb650ed200cde82cb993374be34be5b1c7ead5446a2b82a4486e8c1810a0b01551609fb0841d474bada802bd026076ddae751b73a959d0bfb8ff49e7fcd378e9be30652ecefe35c82cb8003bc29cc60ae3809909baf20c95db9516fe680865417111d8b193dbcf30281f1249de57c858bf1ba32f5bb1599800e8398a9ef25c7a642c95261da6f9c17670e97265b10260732482b837d5f2a9443e23c1aa0106d83e82f6c3424673b5fdc3769c0f992d1c5c93991c7038e882fcda04414df4d7a5f4f698ead87851ce37344b60b72d7b70f9c60cae8566e7a257f8e1bef0e89df6e4c2f9d24d21d9f8889e4c7eccf91751026009050d94493da8f00a4ddbe9c800afe3d44b43f78a48941a79b2814a1f0b81a18a8b2347642a03b27998f5a18de9abc9ae0e54ab8294feac66dc87e854cce6f7278ac2710cb5878b592ffeb1f4f0a1853e4e8d1d0561b6efcc831a296cf7eeaf":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PAIR 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040100000000000000000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000001030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000002030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000003030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000004030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000005030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000008030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000009030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004010100000a030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004010100000b030007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":0 + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040101000000020007000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000001020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000002020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000003020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000004020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000005020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000008020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000009020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000a020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000b020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000000020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000001030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000002030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000003030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000004030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000005030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000008030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000009030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000a030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000b030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000001130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000002130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000003130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000004130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000005130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000008130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040128000009130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000a130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1024-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400004012800000b130006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010000000000000000000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000103000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000203000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000303000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000403000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000503000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000803000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000903000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000a03000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000b03000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006010100000002000700000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000102000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000202000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000302000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000402000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000502000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000802000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000902000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000a02000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000b02000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000002000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000103000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000203000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000303000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000403000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000503000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000803000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000903000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000a03000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000b03000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000113000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000213000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000313000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000413000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000513000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000813000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000913000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000a13000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read type: RSA_PUB 1536-bit, RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"3081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":"505341004b455900000000000100000001400006012800000b13000600000000cc0000003081c90281c100c870feb6ca6b1d2bd9f2dd99e20f1fe2d7e5192de662229dbe162bd1ba66336a7182903ca0b72796cd441c83d24bcdc3e9a2f5e4399c8a043f1c3ddf04754a66d4cfe7b3671a37dd31a9b4c13bfe06ee90f9d94ddaa06de67a52ac863e68f756736ceb014405a6160579640f831dddccc34ad0b05070e3f9954a58d1815813e1b83bcadba814789c87f1ef2ba5d738b793ec456a67360eea1b5faf1c7cc7bf24f3b2a9d0f8958b1096e0f0c335f8888d0c63a51c3c0337214fa3f5efdf6dcc350203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081410500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000814105010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000085010500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000850105010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000082410500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(GCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000824105010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081440500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000814405010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 13):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000814d0500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 13):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000814d05010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 14):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000814e0500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 14):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000814e05010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081500500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000815005010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 63):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000817f0500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(CCM,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 63):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000817f05010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001410500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000014105010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_SHORT(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000005010500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CHACHA20_POLY1305,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000050105010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_SHORT(GCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002410500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_SHORT(GCM,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000024105010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001440500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000014405010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 13):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000014d0500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 13):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000014d05010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 14):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000014e0500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 14):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000014e05010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001500500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000015005010000004c":0 + +read alg: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 63):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000017f0500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AEAD_SHORT(CCM,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 63):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000017f05010000004c":0 + +read alg: ANY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff00000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ANY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH:"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081c10300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081c103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000082c10300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CMAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000082c103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000180810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001808103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000280810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002808103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000380810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003808103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000480810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004808103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000580810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005808103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000880810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008808103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000980810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009808103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a80810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384), 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a808103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b80810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b808103010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081c40300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 4):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081c403010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 13):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081cd0300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 13):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081cd03010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 14):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081ce0300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 14):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081ce03010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 16):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081d00300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 16):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081d003010000004c":0 + +read alg: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 63):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000081ff0300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(CBC_MAC,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 63):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000081ff03010000004c":0 + +read alg: CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001c00300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: CBC_MAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001c003010000004c":0 + +read alg: CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000040400400000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: CBC_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000404004010000004c":0 + +read alg: CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000041400400000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: CBC_PKCS7 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000414004010000004c":0 + +read alg: CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CCM:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001500500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: CCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CCM:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000015005010000004c":0 + +read alg: CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CFB:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000011c00400000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: CFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CFB:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000011c004010000004c":0 + +read alg: CHACHA20_POLY1305 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000005100500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: CHACHA20_POLY1305 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000051005010000004c":0 + +read alg: CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CMAC:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002c00300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: CMAC +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CMAC:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000002c003010000004c":0 + +read alg: CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000010c00400000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: CTR +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_CTR:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000010c004010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_DSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000105000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_DSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001050006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_DSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000205000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_DSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002050006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_DSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000305000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_DSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003050006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_DSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000405000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_DSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004050006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_DSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000505000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005050006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_DSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000805000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008050006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_DSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000905000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009050006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_DSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a05000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a050006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_DSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b05000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_DSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b050006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000107000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000207000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000307000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000407000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000507000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000807000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000907000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a07000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b07000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DET_ECDSA(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff07000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DET_ECDSA(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff070006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000104000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001040006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000204000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002040006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000304000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003040006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000404000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004040006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000504000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005040006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000804000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008040006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000904000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009040006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a04000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a040006010000004c":0 + +read alg: DSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b04000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: DSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_DSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b040006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000044400400000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECB_NO_PADDING +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000444004010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000020900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDH:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000209010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000106000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000206000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000306000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000406000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000506000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000806000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000906000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a06000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b06000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff06000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000006000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ECDSA_ANY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000060006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b09000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ED25519PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b090006010000004c":0 + +read alg: ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001509000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: ED448PH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000015090006010000004c":0 + +read alg: FFDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000010900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: FFDH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_FFDH:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000109010000004c":0 + +read alg: GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_GCM:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002500500000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: GCM +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_GCM:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000025005010000004c":0 + +read alg: HKDF(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000101000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HKDF(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001010008010000004c":0 + +read alg: HKDF(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000201000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HKDF(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002010008010000004c":0 + +read alg: HKDF(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000301000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HKDF(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003010008010000004c":0 + +read alg: HKDF(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000401000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HKDF(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004010008010000004c":0 + +read alg: HKDF(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000501000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HKDF(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005010008010000004c":0 + +read alg: HKDF(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000801000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HKDF(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008010008010000004c":0 + +read alg: HKDF(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000901000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HKDF(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009010008010000004c":0 + +read alg: HKDF(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a01000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HKDF(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a010008010000004c":0 + +read alg: HKDF(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b01000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HKDF(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b010008010000004c":0 + +read alg: HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000100800300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HMAC(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001008003010000004c":0 + +read alg: HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000200800300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HMAC(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002008003010000004c":0 + +read alg: HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000300800300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HMAC(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003008003010000004c":0 + +read alg: HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000400800300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HMAC(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004008003010000004c":0 + +read alg: HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000500800300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HMAC(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005008003010000004c":0 + +read alg: HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000800800300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HMAC(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008008003010000004c":0 + +read alg: HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000900800300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HMAC(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009008003010000004c":0 + +read alg: HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a00800300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HMAC(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a008003010000004c":0 + +read alg: HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b00800300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: HMAC(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b008003010000004c":0 + +read alg: KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000901020900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009010209010000004c":0 + +read alg: KA(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000901010900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: KA(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009010109010000004c":0 + +read alg: KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a01020900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: KA(ECDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a010209010000004c":0 + +read alg: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000902020900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009020209010000004c":0 + +read alg: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a02020900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PRF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a020209010000004c":0 + +read alg: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000903020900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009030209010000004c":0 + +read alg: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a03020900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: KA(ECDH,TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a030209010000004c":0 + +read alg: KA(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a01010900000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: KA(FFDH,HKDF(SHA_384)) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384)):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a010109010000004c":0 + +read alg: MD2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_MD2:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000100000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: MD2 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_MD2:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: MD4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_MD4:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000200000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: MD4 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_MD4:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_MD5:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000300000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_MD5:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_OFB:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000012c00400000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: OFB +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_OFB:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000012c004010000004c":0 + +read alg: PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000008000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: PURE_EDDSA +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000080006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000400000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000103000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_OAEP(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001030007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000203000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_OAEP(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002030007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000303000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_OAEP(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003030007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000403000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_OAEP(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004030007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000503000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005030007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000803000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008030007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000903000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009030007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a03000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a030007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b03000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_OAEP(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b030007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002000700000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000020007010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000102000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000202000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000302000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000402000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000502000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000802000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000902000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a02000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b02000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff02000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000020006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000103000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000203000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000303000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000403000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000503000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000803000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000903000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a03000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b03000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff03000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff030006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000113000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000213000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000313000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000413000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000513000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000813000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000913000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a13000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b13000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000ff13000600000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(ANY_HASH) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"4c":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000000000ff130006010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA3_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA3_224:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001000000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA3_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA3_224:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000010000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA3_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA3_256:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001100000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA3_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA3_256:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000011000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA3_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA3_384:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001200000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA3_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA3_384:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000012000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA3_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA3_512:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001300000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA3_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA3_512:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000013000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHAKE256_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHAKE256_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000001500000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHAKE256_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHAKE256_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000015000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA_1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000500000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA_1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000800000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000900000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a00000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b00000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA_512_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000c00000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA_512_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000c000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: SHA_512_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000d00000200000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: SHA_512_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256:"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000d000002010000004c":0 + +read alg: STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001800400000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: STREAM_CIPHER +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000018004010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PRF(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000102000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PRF(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001020008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PRF(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000202000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PRF(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002020008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PRF(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000302000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PRF(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003020008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PRF(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000402000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PRF(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004020008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000502000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005020008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000802000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008020008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000902000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009020008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a02000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a020008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PRF(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b02000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PRF(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b020008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000103000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD2) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD2):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001030008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000203000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD4):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002030008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000303000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(MD5) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_MD5):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003030008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000403000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(RIPEMD160) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004030008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000503000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005030008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000803000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_224) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008030008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000903000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_256) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009030008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a03000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_384) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a030008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b03000800000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TLS12_PSK2MS(SHA_512) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b030008010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001c10300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001c103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000002c10300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CMAC,1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000002c103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000100810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD2),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000001008103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000200810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD4),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000002008103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000300810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(MD5),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000003008103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000400810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(RIPEMD160),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000004008103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000500810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_1),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000005008103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000800810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_224),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000008008103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000900810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_256),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 1):"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000009008103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000a00810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_384),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384), 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000a008103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 1):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000b00810300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(HMAC(SHA_512),1) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), 1):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000b008103010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 4):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001c40300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,4) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 4):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001c403010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 13):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001cd0300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,13) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 13):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001cd03010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 14):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001ce0300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,14) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 14):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001ce03010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 16):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001d00300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,16) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 16):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001d003010000004c":0 + +read alg: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 63):0x0000:"4b":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000001ff0300000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: TRUNCATED_MAC(CBC_MAC,63) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC, 63):"4c":"505341004b45590000000000010000000110080001000000000000000001ff03010000004c":0 + +read alg: XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_XTS:0x0000:"4b":"505341004b4559000000000001000000011008000100000000ff400400000000010000004b":0 + +read alg2: XTS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0x0000:PSA_ALG_XTS:"4c":"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000ff4004010000004c":0 + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000110000009070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001100000090700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000110000009070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000110000009070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000110000009070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001100000090700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300011000000907000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000110000009060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001100000090600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000110000009060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000110000009060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000110000009060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001100000090600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300011000000906000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: ED25519PH ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00011000000b09000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: ED448PH ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00011000001509000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: HMAC(MD2) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000110000001008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: HMAC(MD4) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000110000002008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: HMAC(MD5) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000110000003008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: HMAC(RIPEMD160) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000110000004008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: HMAC(SHA_1) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000110000005008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: HMAC(SHA_224) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000110000008008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: HMAC(SHA_256) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000110000009008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: HMAC(SHA_384) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000011000000a008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: HMAC(SHA_512) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000011000000b008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) RSA_PAIR 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004011000000902000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by SIGN_HASH: RSA_PSS(SHA_256) RSA_PAIR 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000120000009070006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001200000090700060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000120000009070006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000120000009070006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000120000009070006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001200000090700060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300012000000907000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000120000009070006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012000000907000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001200000090700060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001200000090700060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000120000009070006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000120000009070006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: DET_ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000120000009070006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"69502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":"505341004b45590000000000010000003071a0000120000009060006000000001400000069502c4fdaf48d4fa617bdd24498b0406d0eeaac":0 + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":"505341004b45590000000000010000001771c00001200000090600060000000018000000297ac1722ccac7589ecb240dc719842538ca974beb79f228":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":"505341004b45590000000000010000001271e1000120000009060006000000001c000000872f203b3ad35b7f2ecc803c3a0e1e0b1ed61cc1afe71b189cd4c995":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"00bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b71a0000120000009060006000000001500000000bf539a1cdda0d7f71a50a3f98aec0a2e8e4ced1e":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"03ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":"505341004b45590000000000010000002771a3000120000009060006000000001500000003ebc8fcded2d6ab72ec0f75bdb4fd080481273e71":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":"505341004b45590000000000010000002271a30001200000090600060000000015000000009b05dc82d46d64a04a22e6e5ca70ca1231e68c50":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PAIR(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b71a300012000000906000600000000150000000210b482a458b4822d0cb21daa96819a67c8062d34":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(BP_R1) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"04d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":"505341004b45590000000000010000003041a0000120000009060006000000002900000004d4b9186816358e2f9c59cf70748cb70641b22fbab65473db4b4e22a361ed7e3de7e8a8ddc4130c5c":0 + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECP_K1) 192-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":"505341004b45590000000000010000001741c000012000000906000600000000310000000426b7bb38da649ac2138fc050c6548b32553dab68afebc36105d325b75538c12323cb0764789ecb992671beb2b6bef2f5":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECP_R1) 225-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_225:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):225:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":"505341004b45590000000000010000001241e10001200000090600060000000039000000046f00eadaa949fee3e9e1c7fa1247eecec86a0dce46418b9bd3117b981d4bd0ae7a990de912f9d060d6cb531a42d22e394ac29e81804bf160":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECP_R2) 160-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R2_160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2):160:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":"505341004b45590000000000010000001b41a00001200000090600060000000029000000049570d541398665adb5cfa16f5af73b3196926bbd4b876bdb80f8eab20d0f540c22f4de9c140f6d7b":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECT_K1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_K1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":"505341004b45590000000000010000002741a3000120000009060006000000002b0000000406f88f90b4b65950f06ce433afdb097e320f433dc2062b8a65db8fafd3c110f46bc45663fbf021ee7eb9":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECT_R1) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R1_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":"505341004b45590000000000010000002241a3000120000009060006000000002b0000000400465eeb9e7258b11e33c02266bfe834b20bcb118700772796ee4704ec67651bd447e3011959a79a04cb":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ECDSA(SHA_256) ECC_PUB(SECT_R2) 163-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECT_R2_163:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2):163:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"0403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":"505341004b45590000000000010000002b41a3000120000009060006000000002b0000000403692601144c32a6cfa369ae20ae5d43c1c764678c037bafe80c6fd2e42b7ced96171d9c5367fd3dca6f":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ED25519PH ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00012000000b09000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ED25519PH ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED25519PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED25519PH:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff00012000000b0900060000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ED448PH ECC_PAIR(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":"505341004b45590000000000010000004271ff00012000001509000600000000200000009d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: ED448PH ECC_PUB(TWISTED_EDWARDS) 255-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ED448PH:PSA_WANT_ECC_TWISTED_EDWARDS_255:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ED448PH:0x0000:"d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":"505341004b45590000000000010000004241ff0001200000150900060000000020000000d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: HMAC(MD2) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000120000001008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: HMAC(MD4) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD4):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000120000002008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: HMAC(MD5) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD5):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000120000003008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: HMAC(RIPEMD160) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000120000004008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: HMAC(SHA_1) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000120000005008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: HMAC(SHA_224) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000120000008008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: HMAC(SHA_256) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b4559000000000001000000001180000120000009008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: HMAC(SHA_384) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000012000000a008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: HMAC(SHA_512) HMAC 128-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):0x0000:"48657265006973206b6579a064617461":"505341004b455900000000000100000000118000012000000b008003000000001000000048657265006973206b6579a064617461":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) RSA_PAIR 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"505341004b455900000000000100000001700004012000000902000600000000620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA_256) RSA_PUB 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040120000009020006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: RSA_PSS(SHA_256) RSA_PAIR 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"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":"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":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +read implied by VERIFY_HASH: RSA_PSS(SHA_256) RSA_PUB 1024-bit +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY +key_storage_read:0x0001:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0x0000:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":"505341004b4559000000000001000000014000040120000009030006000000008c00000030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE + +# End of automatically generated file. diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..06aed07d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.data @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +Set/get/remove 0 bytes +set_get_remove:1:0:"" + +Set/get/remove 42 bytes +set_get_remove:1:0:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f20212223242526272829" + +Set/get/remove 1000 bytes +set_get_remove:1:0:"6a07ecfcc7c7bfe0129d56d2dcf2955a12845b9e6e0034b0ed7226764261c6222a07b9f654deb682130eb1cd07ed298324e60a46f9c76c8a5a0be000c69e93dd81054ca21fbc6190cef7745e9d5436f70e20e10cbf111d1d40c9ceb83be108775199d81abaf0fecfe30eaa08e7ed82517cba939de4449f7ac5c730fcbbf56e691640b0129db0e178045dd2034262de9138873d9bdca57685146a3d516ff13c29e6628a00097435a8e10fef7faff62d2963c303a93793e2211d8604556fec08cd59c0f5bd1f22eea64be13e88b3f454781e83fe6e771d3d81eb2fbe2021e276f42a93db5343d767d854115e74f5e129a8036b1e81aced9872709d515e00bcf2098ccdee23006b0e836b27dc8aaf30f53fe58a31a6408abb79b13098c22e262a98040f9b09809a3b43bd42eb01cf1d17bbc8b4dfe51fa6573d4d8741943e3ae71a649e194c1218f2e20556c7d8cfe8c64d8cc1aa94531fbf638768c7d19b3c079299cf4f26ed3f964efb8fd23d82b4157a51f46da11156c74e2d6e2fd788869ebb52429e12a82da2ba083e2e74565026162f29ca22582da72a2698e7c5d958b919bc2cdfe12f50364ccfed30efd5cd120a7d5f196b2bd7f911bb44d5871eb3dedcd70ece7faf464988f9fe361f23d7244b1e08bee921d0f28bdb4912675809d099876d4d15b7d13ece356e1f2a5dce64feb3d6749a07a4f2b7721190e17a9ab2966e48b6d25187070b81eb45b1c44608b2f0e175958ba57fcf1b2cd145eea5fd4de858d157ddac69dfbb5d5d6f0c1691b0fae5a143b6e58cdf5000f28d74b3322670ed11e740c828c7bfad4e2f392012da3ac931ea26ed15fd003e604071f5900c6e1329d021805d50da9f1e732a49bcc292d9f8e07737cfd59442e8d7aaa813b18183a68e22bf6b4519545dd7d2d519db3652be4131bad4f4b0625dbaa749e979f6ee8c1b97803cb50a2fa20dc883eac932a824b777b226e15294de6a80be3ddef41478fe18172d64407a004de6bae18bc60e90c902c1cbb0e1633395b42391f5011be0d480541987609b0cd8d902ea29f86f73e7362340119323eb0ea4f672b70d6e9a9df5235f9f1965f5cb0c2998c5a7f4754e83eeda5d95fefbbaaa0875fe37b7ca461e7281cc5479162627c5a709b45fd9ddcde4dfb40659e1d70fa7361d9fc7de24f9b8b13259423fdae4dbb98d691db687467a5a7eb027a4a0552a03e430ac8a32de0c30160ba60a036d6b9db2d6182193283337b92e7438dc5d6eb4fa00200d8efa9127f1c3a32ac8e202262773aaa5a965c6b8035b2e5706c32a55511560429ddf1df4ac34076b7eedd9cf94b6915a894fdd9084ffe3db0e7040f382c3cd04f0484595de95865c36b6bf20f46a78cdfb37228acbeb218de798b9586f6d99a0cbae47e80d" + +Set/get/remove with flags +set_get_remove:1:0x12345678:"abcdef" + +Overwrite 0 -> 3 +set_overwrite:1:0x12345678:"":0x01020304:"abcdef" + +Overwrite 3 -> 0 +set_overwrite:1:0x12345678:"abcdef":0x01020304:"" + +Overwrite 3 -> 3 +set_overwrite:1:0x12345678:"123456":0x01020304:"abcdef" + +Overwrite 3 -> 18 +set_overwrite:1:0x12345678:"abcdef":0x01020304:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f5051" + +Overwrite 18 -> 3 +set_overwrite:1:0x12345678:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f5051":0x01020304:"abcdef" + +Multiple files +set_multiple:1:5 + +Set UID 0 +set_fail:0:"40414243444546474849":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + +Non-existent file +nonexistent:1:0 + +Removed file +nonexistent:1:1 + +Get 0 bytes of 10 at 10 +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":10:0:PSA_SUCCESS + +Get 1 byte of 10 at 9 +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":9:1:PSA_SUCCESS + +Get 0 bytes of 10 at 0 +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":0:0:PSA_SUCCESS + +Get 1 byte of 10 at 0 +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":0:1:PSA_SUCCESS + +Get 2 bytes of 10 at 1 +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":1:2:PSA_SUCCESS + +Get 1 byte of 10 at 10: out of range +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":10:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Get 1 byte of 10 at 11: out of range +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":11:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Get 0 bytes of 10 at 11: out of range +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":11:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Get -1 byte of 10 at 10: out of range +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":10:-1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Get 1 byte of 10 at -1: out of range +get_at:1:"40414243444546474849":-1:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Overwrite ITS header magic +get_fail:1:"40414243444546474849":1:0:PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + +Truncate ITS header +get_fail:1:"40414243444546474849":0:1:PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12878b53 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_its.function @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +/* This test file is specific to the ITS implementation in PSA Crypto + * on top of stdio. It expects to know what the stdio name of a file is + * based on its keystore name. + * + * Note that if you need to make a change that affects how files are + * stored, this may indicate that the key store is changing in a + * backward-incompatible way! Think carefully about backward compatibility + * before changing how test data is constructed or validated. + */ + +#include "../library/psa_crypto_its.h" + +#include "test/psa_helpers.h" + +/* Internal definitions of the implementation, copied for the sake of + * some of the tests and of the cleanup code. */ +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%08lx%08lx" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ".psa_its" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH \ + ( sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX ) - 1 + /*prefix without terminating 0*/ \ + 16 + /*UID (64-bit number in hex)*/ \ + 16 + /*UID (64-bit number in hex)*/ \ + sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ) - 1 + /*suffix without terminating 0*/ \ + 1 /*terminating null byte*/ ) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP \ + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX +static void psa_its_fill_filename( psa_storage_uid_t uid, char *filename ) +{ + /* Break up the UID into two 32-bit pieces so as not to rely on + * long long support in snprintf. */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH, + "%s" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%s", + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX, + (unsigned long) ( uid >> 32 ), + (unsigned long) ( uid & 0xffffffff ), + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ); +} + +/* Maximum uid used by the test, recorded so that cleanup() can delete + * all files. 0xffffffffffffffff is always cleaned up, so it does not + * need to and should not be taken into account for uid_max. */ +static psa_storage_uid_t uid_max = 0; + +static void cleanup( void ) +{ + /* Call remove() on all the files that a test might have created. + * We ignore the error if the file exists but remove() fails because + * it can't be checked portably (except by attempting to open the file + * first, which is needlessly slow and complicated here). A failure of + * remove() on an existing file is very unlikely anyway and would not + * have significant consequences other than perhaps failing the next + * test case. */ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + for( uid = 0; uid < uid_max; uid++ ) + { + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + (void) remove( filename ); + } + psa_its_fill_filename( (psa_storage_uid_t)( -1 ), filename ); + (void) remove( filename ); + (void) remove( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP ); + uid_max = 0; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_its_set_wrap( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags ) +{ + if( uid_max != (psa_storage_uid_t)( -1 ) && uid_max < uid ) + uid_max = uid; + return( psa_its_set( uid, data_length, p_data, create_flags ) ); +} + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void set_get_remove( int uid_arg, int flags_arg, data_t *data ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid = uid_arg; + uint32_t flags = flags_arg; + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + size_t ret_len = 0; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( buffer, data->len ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_set_wrap( uid, data->len, data->x, flags ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get_info( uid, &info ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( info.size == data->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( info.flags == flags ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get( uid, 0, data->len, buffer, &ret_len ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( data->x, data->len, buffer, ret_len ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_remove( uid ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( buffer ); + cleanup( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void set_overwrite( int uid_arg, + int flags1_arg, data_t *data1, + int flags2_arg, data_t *data2 ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid = uid_arg; + uint32_t flags1 = flags1_arg; + uint32_t flags2 = flags2_arg; + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + size_t ret_len = 0; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( buffer, MAX( data1->len, data2->len ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_set_wrap( uid, data1->len, data1->x, flags1 ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get_info( uid, &info ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( info.size == data1->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( info.flags == flags1 ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get( uid, 0, data1->len, buffer, &ret_len ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( data1->x, data1->len, buffer, ret_len ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_set_wrap( uid, data2->len, data2->x, flags2 ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get_info( uid, &info ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( info.size == data2->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( info.flags == flags2 ); + ret_len = 0; + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get( uid, 0, data2->len, buffer, &ret_len ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( data2->x, data2->len, buffer, ret_len ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_remove( uid ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( buffer ); + cleanup( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void set_multiple( int first_id, int count ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid0 = first_id; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + char stored[40]; + char retrieved[40]; + size_t ret_len = 0; + + memset( stored, '.', sizeof( stored ) ); + for( uid = uid0; uid < uid0 + count; uid++ ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( stored, sizeof( stored ), + "Content of file 0x%08lx", (unsigned long) uid ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_set_wrap( uid, sizeof( stored ), stored, 0 ) ); + } + + for( uid = uid0; uid < uid0 + count; uid++ ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( stored, sizeof( stored ), + "Content of file 0x%08lx", (unsigned long) uid ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_get( uid, 0, sizeof( stored ), retrieved, &ret_len ) ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( retrieved, ret_len, + stored, sizeof( stored ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_remove( uid ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( psa_its_get( uid, 0, 0, NULL, NULL ) == + PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } + +exit: + cleanup( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void nonexistent( int uid_arg, int create_and_remove ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid = uid_arg; + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + + if( create_and_remove ) + { + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_set_wrap( uid, 0, NULL, 0 ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_remove( uid ) ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( psa_its_remove( uid ) == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + TEST_ASSERT( psa_its_get_info( uid, &info ) == + PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + TEST_ASSERT( psa_its_get( uid, 0, 0, NULL, NULL ) == + PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + +exit: + cleanup( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void get_at( int uid_arg, data_t *data, + int offset, int length_arg, + int expected_status ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid = uid_arg; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + psa_status_t status; + size_t length = length_arg >= 0 ? length_arg : 0; + unsigned char *trailer; + size_t i; + size_t ret_len = 0; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( buffer, length + 16 ); + trailer = buffer + length; + memset( trailer, '-', 16 ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_set_wrap( uid, data->len, data->x, 0 ) ); + + status = psa_its_get( uid, offset, length_arg, buffer, &ret_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( status == (psa_status_t) expected_status ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + ASSERT_COMPARE( data->x + offset, (size_t) length_arg, + buffer, ret_len ); + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( trailer[i] == '-' ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_remove( uid ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_free( buffer ); + cleanup( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void get_fail( int uid_arg, data_t *data, + int overwrite_magic, int cut_header, + int expected_status ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid = uid_arg; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + psa_status_t status; + size_t n; + size_t ret_len = 0; + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream = NULL; + char bad_char = 'X'; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_set_wrap( uid, data->len, data->x, 0 ) ); + + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + stream = fopen( filename, "rb+" ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != stream ); + if( 0 != overwrite_magic ) + { + /* Overwrite the 1st byte of the file, the ITS magic number */ + TEST_ASSERT( fseek( stream, 0, SEEK_SET ) == 0 ); + n = fwrite( &bad_char, 1, 1, stream ); + TEST_ASSERT( 1 == n ); + } + if( 0 != cut_header ) + { + /* Reopen file and truncate it to 0 byte by specifying the 'w' flag */ + stream = freopen( filename, "wb", stream ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL != stream ); + } + fclose( stream ); + stream = NULL; + + status = psa_its_get( uid, 0, 0, buffer, &ret_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( status == (psa_status_t) expected_status ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == ret_len ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_its_remove( uid ) ); + + /* Check if the file is really deleted. */ + stream = fopen( filename, "rb" ); + TEST_ASSERT( NULL == stream ); + +exit: + if( stream != NULL ) + fclose( stream ); + + mbedtls_free( buffer ); + cleanup( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void set_fail( int uid_arg, data_t *data, + int expected_status ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid = uid_arg; + TEST_ASSERT( psa_its_set_wrap( uid, data->len, data->x, 0 ) == + (psa_status_t) expected_status ); + + exit: + cleanup( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_random.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_random.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c23d9223 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_random.data @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +Generate random twice with CTR_DRBG +random_twice_with_ctr_drbg: + +Generate random twice with HMAC_DRBG(SHA-1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +random_twice_with_hmac_drbg:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 + +Generate random twice with HMAC_DRBG(SHA-256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +random_twice_with_hmac_drbg:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +Generate random twice with HMAC_DRBG(SHA-512) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +random_twice_with_hmac_drbg:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 + +Generate random twice with PSA classic wrapper +random_twice_with_psa_from_classic: + +Generate random twice with PSA API +random_twice_with_psa_from_psa: + +# This bad-usage test case currently crashes in the default configuration +# because CTR_DRBG crashes when given an unseeded context. This is arguably +# a good thing because it prevents misuse of mbedtls_psa_get_random(). +#PSA classic wrapper: PSA not active +#mbedtls_psa_get_random_no_init: + +PSA classic wrapper: 0 bytes +mbedtls_psa_get_random_length:0 + +PSA classic wrapper: 1 byte +mbedtls_psa_get_random_length:1 + +PSA classic wrapper: 256 bytes +mbedtls_psa_get_random_length:256 + +# An external RNG is supposed to handle arbitrary request lengths. Test it +# with something larger than any RNG call made by Mbed TLS itself expects. +# CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG have their own maximum request lengths which may +# be lower than the value chosen here and are tested separately. +PSA classic wrapper: external RNG large +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG +mbedtls_psa_get_random_length:1024 + +PSA classic wrapper: CTR_DRBG max +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +mbedtls_psa_get_random_length:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + +PSA classic wrapper: HMAC_DRBG max +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG:!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C:MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +mbedtls_psa_get_random_length:MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + +PSA classic wrapper: ECDSA signature (SECP256R1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_psa_get_random_ecdsa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_random.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_random.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..37fa36ec --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_random.function @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +/* Test random generation as a whole. */ + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +/* How many bytes to generate in each test case for repeated generation. + * This must be high enough that the probability of generating the same + * output twice is infinitesimal, but low enough that random generators + * are willing to deliver that much. */ +#define OUTPUT_SIZE 32 + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:!MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void random_twice_with_ctr_drbg( ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context drbg; + unsigned char output1[OUTPUT_SIZE]; + unsigned char output2[OUTPUT_SIZE]; + + /* First round */ + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &drbg ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &drbg, + mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + NULL, 0 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &drbg, + output1, sizeof( output1 ) ) ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + /* Second round */ + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &drbg ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &drbg, + mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + NULL, 0 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &drbg, + output2, sizeof( output2 ) ) ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + /* The two rounds must generate different random data. */ + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output1, output2, OUTPUT_SIZE ) != 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:!MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY:MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ +void random_twice_with_hmac_drbg( int md_type ) +{ + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context drbg; + unsigned char output1[OUTPUT_SIZE]; + unsigned char output2[OUTPUT_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + + /* First round */ + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &drbg ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &drbg, md_info, + mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + NULL, 0 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &drbg, + output1, sizeof( output1 ) ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + /* Second round */ + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &drbg ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &drbg, md_info, + mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + NULL, 0 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &drbg, + output2, sizeof( output2 ) ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + /* The two rounds must generate different random data. */ + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output1, output2, OUTPUT_SIZE ) != 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:!MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +void random_twice_with_psa_from_classic( ) +{ + unsigned char output1[OUTPUT_SIZE]; + unsigned char output2[OUTPUT_SIZE]; + + /* First round */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_psa_get_random( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output1, sizeof( output1 ) ) ); + PSA_DONE( ); + + /* Second round */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_psa_get_random( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output2, sizeof( output2 ) ) ); + PSA_DONE( ); + + /* The two rounds must generate different random data. */ + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output1, output2, OUTPUT_SIZE ) != 0 ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:!MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +void random_twice_with_psa_from_psa( ) +{ + unsigned char output1[OUTPUT_SIZE]; + unsigned char output2[OUTPUT_SIZE]; + + /* First round */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( output1, sizeof( output1 ) ) ); + PSA_DONE( ); + + /* Second round */ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( output2, sizeof( output2 ) ) ); + PSA_DONE( ); + + /* The two rounds must generate different random data. */ + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output1, output2, OUTPUT_SIZE ) != 0 ); + +exit: + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +void mbedtls_psa_get_random_no_init( ) +{ + unsigned char output[1]; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_psa_get_random( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output, sizeof( output ) ) != 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +void mbedtls_psa_get_random_length( int n ) +{ + unsigned char *output = NULL; + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, n ); + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_psa_get_random( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output, n ) ); +exit: + mbedtls_free( output ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +void mbedtls_psa_get_random_ecdsa_sign( int curve ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_mpi d, r, s; + unsigned char buf[] = "This is not a hash."; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &d ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_lset( &d, 123456789 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, curve ) ); + PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &grp, &r, &s, &d, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &d ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2da814db --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -0,0 +1,627 @@ +RSA parameter validation +rsa_invalid_param: + +RSA init-free-free +rsa_init_free:0 + +RSA init-free-init-free +rsa_init_free:1 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +# Good padding but wrong hash +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"d6248c3e96b1a7e5fea978870fcc4c9786b4e5156e16b7faef4557d667f730b8bc4c784ef00c624df5309513c3a5de8ca94c2152e0459618666d3148092562ebc256ffca45b27fd2d63c68bd5e0a0aefbe496e9e63838a361b1db6fc272464f191490bf9c029643c49d2d9cd08833b8a70b4b3431f56fb1eb55ccd39e77a9c92":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"3203b7647fb7e345aa457681e5131777f1adc371f2fba8534928c4e52ef6206a856425d6269352ecbf64db2f6ad82397768cafdd8cd272e512d617ad67992226da6bc291c31404c17fd4b7e2beb20eff284a44f4d7af47fd6629e2c95809fa7f2241a04f70ac70d3271bb13258af1ed5c5988c95df7fa26603515791075feccd":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"206ef4bf396c6087f8229ef196fd35f37ccb8de5efcdb238f20d556668f114257a11fbe038464a67830378e62ae9791453953dac1dbd7921837ba98e84e856eb80ed9487e656d0b20c28c8ba5e35db1abbed83ed1c7720a97701f709e3547a4bfcabca9c89c57ad15c3996577a0ae36d7c7b699035242f37954646c1cd5c08ac":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"5abc01f5de25b70867ff0c24e222c61f53c88daf42586fddcd56f3c4588f074be3c328056c063388688b6385a8167957c6e5355a510e005b8a851d69c96b36ec6036644078210e5d7d326f96365ee0648882921492bc7b753eb9c26cdbab37555f210df2ca6fec1b25b463d38b81c0dcea202022b04af5da58aa03d77be949b7":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"206ef4bf396c6087f8229ef196fd35f37ccb8de5efcdb238f20d556668f114257a11fbe038464a67830378e62ae9791453953dac1dbd7921837ba98e84e856eb80ed9487e656d0b20c28c8ba5e35db1abbed83ed1c7720a97701f709e3547a4bfcabca9c89c57ad15c3996577a0ae36d7c7b699035242f37954646c1cd5c08ac":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"5abc01f5de25b70867ff0c24e222c61f53c88daf42586fddcd56f3c4588f074be3c328056c063388688b6385a8167957c6e5355a510e005b8a851d69c96b36ec6036644078210e5d7d326f96365ee0648882921492bc7b753eb9c26cdbab37555f210df2ca6fec1b25b463d38b81c0dcea202022b04af5da58aa03d77be949b7":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"867ac26e11a13b7ac34a42a1e177648692861226effb55bb597fbde10f299bf7fffd6fc8ddb2a46a73b97b67387a461b23e1d65dc119366286979add615b926b9272832fc0c058b946fc752dcffceca12233f4c63f7897cbaa08aa7e07cf02b5e7e3e5ece252bf2fe61d163bce84c0e0368454a98e9fdebf6edbd70b290d549b":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"3bb7b1c5f3391de4549e2e96fd33afa4d647dd90e321d9d576f3808e32213e948b697ef4fd2dd12923de6ec3ffd625078a57f86af38dc07052bb50547c616ed51fa1352b3ab66788408168d21263ef2d3388d567d2ce8cf674f45491ab2b0319d47be1266bda39e343b2a38ea2d6aaaee6c4465aee1d7bb33e93a1c40a8e3ae4":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"cd810e97dc21095ea7a0238027a7bafd343e01444785ea9184a44a79f80438c41fc0b57aa95693407da38fe5ff0ec1398e03361e51a3dbe134b99cca2df0cef1c444ca54d2b7db2789455b6bb41918c24001fd82fc20ee089de3f34f053699c1c5f7954ce0aaabb9d26fce39d032894152229d98cf64ecafc7089530073c61d9":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"7b5fba70ec5b521638f182bcab39cec30b76e7bc017bdbd1059658a9a1db0969ab482dce32f3e9865952f0a0de0978272c951e3c015328ea3758f47029a379ab4200550fba58f11d51264878406fc717d5f7b72b3582946f16a7e5314a220881fc820f7d29949710273421533d8ac0a449dc6d0fd1a21c22444edd1c0d5b44d3":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"44637d3b8de525fd589237bc81229c8966d3af24540850c24036330db8007e6d19a19486018b2b02074da590aaba9d2c8848c0a2d1b6de4dfaf24025b6393df9228008f83f13cc76a67cfbed77a6e3429342824a0b6a9b8dd884094acc6a54bbc8c8829930c52fe39ce5e0dcd02d9553ef899d26eb6cae0940b63584e2daeb3b":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"38fc4f6f0430bb3ea9f470a4c0f5cebdabac4dbeb3b9c99d4168e7b00f5eb294ec0ece1908eded1f3e14f1e69d10f9feb425bda0c998af945ef864298a60a675f0bb5c540a7be3f534d5faddff974eea8bffe182a44e2ee1f4f653e71967a11869ee1a850edb03cb44a340378cb7a1bc9616d3649b78002b390a05a7e54edec6":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +# Bad padding after performing the public key operation +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"d03f12276f6ba7545b8fce719471bd253791878809694e8754f3b389f26c9253a758ed28b4c62535a8d5702d7a778731d5759ff2b3b39b192db680e791632918b6093c0e8ca25c2bf756a07fde4144a37f769fe4054455a45cb8cefe4462e7a9a45ce71f2189b4fef01b47aee8585d44dc9d6fa627a3e5f08801871731f234cd":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"d93a878c1ce86571590b0e43794b3edb23552797c4b8c9e3da4fe1cc4ac0566acd3b10541fe9a7a79f5ea4892d3069ca6903efb5c40c47eb8a9c781eb4249281d40c3d96aae16da1bb4daaece6a26eca5f41c062b4124a64fc9d340cba5ab0d1f5affff6515a87f0933774fd4322d2fa497cd6f708a429ca56dcb1fd3db623d0":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"b2f2e6e09fd19b0a8c06447554d6a236c69e2b334017488881d8c02ab81d74cae0c64efd50a374998eeec162651975e637cb2ba594250c750a4943253f1db0613e4ce1d50f8e3e968a2a83bd6cb97455ab2ccc77071076b3e211ffb251bd4c1a738b88b2021c61c727c074ce933c054acbcbf4f0c362ec09af38de191686aebe":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"a853e67f928281d11506c9d39e5ea9b2d742782c663c37d0a7c9e9fe15379cde1e75d94adbfb1ca08691f320af4ff2b0a29a4d2ea10a20cb95d85f3dabac3d56cca9039c851d0181408c00b385fc82cafa4cfa7380d0c2c024fb83fec59d5ee591d63806dcb18b21ea440c3d3f12c1e7795eb15b7ce4c4b288d646cf1d34bdf1":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"647586ba587b09aa555d1b8da4cdf5c6e777e08859379ca45789019f2041e708d97c4408d4d6943b11dd7ebe05c6b48a9b5f1b0079452cc484579acfa66a34c0cf3f0e7339b2dbd5f1339ef7937a8261547705a846885c43d8ef139a9c83f5604ea52b231176a821fb48c45ed45226f31ba7e8a94a69f6c65c39b7278bf3f08f":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"10001":"e27a90b644c3a11f234132d6727ada397774cd7fdf5eb0160a665ffccedabb8ae9e357966939a71c973e75e5ff771fb01a6483fcaf82f16dee65e6826121e2ae9c69d2c92387b33a641f397676776cde501e7314a9a4e76c0f4538edeea163e8de7bd21c93c298df748c6f5c26b7d03bfa3671f2a7488fe311309e8218a71171":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"55013a489e09b6553262aab59fb041b49437b86d52876f8e5d5e405b77ca0ff6ce8ea2dd75c7b3b411cf4445d56233c5b0ff0e58c49128d81b4fedd295e172d225c451e13defb34b87b7aea6d6f0d20f5c55feb71d2a789fa31f3d9ff47896adc16bec5ce0c9dda3fde190e08ca2451c01ff3091449887695f96dac97ad6a30e":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"10001":"dd82b7be791c454fbbf6f1de47cbe585a687e4e8bbae0b6e2a77f8ca4efd06d71498f9a74b931bd59c377e71daf708a624c51303f377006c676487bad57f7067b09b7bb94a6189119ab8cf7321c321b2dc7df565bfbec833a28b86625fb5fd6a035d4ed79ff0f9aee9fa78935eec65069439ee449d7f5249cdae6fdd6d8c2a63":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #11 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"f4a990b8d434a5914340c0ca3ca4e4a70856c55e13e938c1f854e91cdef54c6107d6d682a62e6c1ff12b1c6178ee0b26b5d8ae5ee4043db4151465727f313e9e174d7c6961abe9cb86a21367a89e41b47267ac5ef3a6eceaaca5b19ae756b3904b97ec35aeb404dc2a2d0da373ba709a678d2728e7d72daae68d335cbf6c957d":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"10001":"d8ef7bdc0f111b1249d5ad6515b6fe37f2ff327f493832f1385c10e975c07b0266497716fcb84f5039cd60f5a050614fde27f354a6c45e8a7d74f9821e2f301500ac1953feafeb9d98cf88d2c928413f337813135c66abfc3dc7a4d80655d925bf96f21872ca2b3a2684b976ca768fe37feae20a69eeec3cc8f1de0db34b3462":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #12 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"c81f04c79982971fa176d64e8f7f8812f86a94c49e84672ff10996a2d6dfc444a884c7a87c4606a1aab22558894ee59b798b457827f5ee0b0cadcd94371902cc4ddaf97acefed641997717bcb3cc74cd440f0a31e20fb95812cecb740c36d6d1bf07e3641514cfa678aff2a39562ff4d60e02b17583a92bf0c56d66bde9e09f8":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"10001":"52111f4798da3c11b3c74394358348ab0fc797bde99080f238d33a69b04b08ac2bd767b33872473943e23af27ca32fd568a43a8c7d6cc55b4fbb380212fdfcb60487e20694d4287e233efdf7b04737c0037a592d03077801828b051998c42b9f9e2420063331d5b2349918a64d8b65b21a2011ee7318fcef48aced95b8ddf501":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #13 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"a97824871770b79da979a111f6decfb1dd11bd946cfa800b008f0ad5aea5aa92e205d27a46c31d4fe6cb909091bd21f082fb75074000ee46c2f3e530d77b34c7c5d6f8453025950d3e0afae1f9752655f5bbea8432e9f1014357ff11b08076179a101e4f9d3f25bffb5e656bf6afe6c97d7aa4740b5d9224cde4dede035a7768":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"10001":"d5dcd27c74e040ea86f106b63d3275fa7b7e98d2dd701f38ec15fc7301b72df127f6d3bd5571253a0b9e0e719d7d522893896941a1aeccc697912282b5308d829b91905b5dd7b7e1b8fe27e2bd4003b09dfe7fe295f8a43c076c0cb52f2aac067e87de7ffe3a275d21a870c3dfc9b1d06d7f018667de9eb187bdf53d282e5d8b":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #14 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"4ce61930c79dc017c2dea0c5085d73a3b0e4a6f341e9a5061a6658af11e5edf95bdad915ac3619969e39bee15788a8de667f92f4efc84f35082d52d562aa74e12cc7f22d3425b58f5056d74afcf162cd44e65b9ee510ff91af094c3d2d42c3b088536d62a98f1c689edcf3ea3fc228d711c109d76ae83d82d6a34dcfbad563cf":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"10001":"27280b92eab5cbf0d787ff6fa6b0151d6610adfd25116113f2f186f3f8d39736d91ae510ec2bd96f2de135aefda79178138696dcc6d302e4a79ddabbe16e39ab96075776afce863e84a2e6013cb457e4047e22d43f67bf64ae5e1d844a7c12ac696efbb3cda7c0e0aca71f8a7ada9a0547bfaefe1ba2e04058c672c803720dd9":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #19 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #20 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #22 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #23 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #24 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #25 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #33 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 CAVS #34 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:1536:16:"a59d9b7269b102b7be684ec5e28db79992e6d3231e77c90b78960c2638b35ef6dbdac1ac59e7249d96d426e7f99397eabc6b8903fe1942da580322b98bafacd81bb911c29666f83886a2a2864f3552044300e60cedd5a8c321c43e280413dc41673c39a11b98a885486f8187a70f270185c4c12bc48a1968305269776c070ef69d4913589a887c4d0f5e7dd58bd806d0d49a14a1762c38665cef4646ff13a0cd29c3a60460703c3d051d5b28c660bffb5f8bd43d495ffa64175f72b8abe5fddd":16:"11":"0b4d96f411c727a262d6d0ade34195b78603551061917d060f89add47b09dfe8715f4f9147d327dc25e91fe457e5d1a2f22cd8fe6fe8e29d2060658307c87a40640650fef3d4b289a6c3febc5a100b29a8b56623afb29fd3c13ea372bf3c638c1db25f8bd8c74c821beec7b5affcace1d05d056a6c2d3035926c7a268df4751a54bc20a6b8cfd729a7cba309ae817daccbef9950a482cf23950a8ca1d3a13ddb7d8d0f87ad5587d4d9ebe19fe93457597a7bdd056c2fd4cea7d31e4a0e595a7b":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 padding too short +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"AABBCC03020100FFFFFFFFFF1122330A0B0CCCDDDDDDDDDD":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D7888ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEADDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A81AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79":16:"10001":"6edd56f397d9bc6d176bbe3d80946fc352ad6127b85b1d67d849c0a38cbde7222c5fafbb18dcef791178a8e15f5c8cd91869f8ca4b758c46ce3e229bf666d2e3e296544351bcb5db7e0004f6c0800f76a432071297e405759d4324d1cf1c412758be93a39f834e03dee59e28ac571ce2b0b3c8fe639979f516223b54027340a5":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +# The following tests check whether the use of reduced length encodings (as mandated for DER in contrast to BER) is enforced in +# the verification of PKCS1 v1.5 signatures - this is relevant to prevent Bleichenbacher signature forgery attacks. +# The test data has been generated by signing a test file using `programs/pkey/rsa_sign` after making modifications +# to `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode` to force the use of non-reduced encodings in different places as indicated in the respective tests. +# See the documentation of `mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode` for the layout of the relevant ASN.1 structure. +# Correct signature with DER-compliant reduced length encodings +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 reduced length encoding +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"7369676e617475726520746573740a":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"A1D46FBA2318F8DCEF16C280948B1CF27966B9B47225ED2989F8D74B45BD36049C0AAB5AD0FF003553BA843C8E12782FC5873BB89A3DC84B883D25666CD22BF3ACD5B675969F8BEBFBCAC93FDD927C7442B178B10D1DFF9398E52316AAE0AF74E594650BDC3C670241D418684593CDA1A7B9DC4F20D2FDC6F66344074003E211":16:"10001":"5B56096ECADA4DAC299FD3D6091C1BE4D7C4210086E61ADA6FFC267A690034DAFB3734035880B9E71CEB0331C32C8DE1A254D777DFE3C848AC7764907602452EC16FD8EB3664E2E682DB3AA8979059BFADFE6192D9029844C8CAF310552717DD5B5B36A9910CFABE5C54AC16F3A3461DEE730060981BD9B47EE8D6644963B7CA":0 + +# Non-reduced 1-byte length encoding in `DigestInfo` ASN.1 element +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 non-reduced length encoding #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"7369676e617475726520746573740a":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"A1D46FBA2318F8DCEF16C280948B1CF27966B9B47225ED2989F8D74B45BD36049C0AAB5AD0FF003553BA843C8E12782FC5873BB89A3DC84B883D25666CD22BF3ACD5B675969F8BEBFBCAC93FDD927C7442B178B10D1DFF9398E52316AAE0AF74E594650BDC3C670241D418684593CDA1A7B9DC4F20D2FDC6F66344074003E211":16:"10001":"2FCF7FC1B60B3C083872B1BD9C666745921951A8A9E099FD629675F620B670713519C4A97B870591B97FE5C5DB2FC2A0A3FCB0016536D1205AA32BA8BFCF54ABD542C02F7FCEA3C3531D7A87C82ED5B151A9599F1BDB070A905F5B721DE3C22F8AC35034C607920CE0699D7F79E5913915F3A01856B5D30F9E68F0CD7856D40F":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +# Non-reduced 2-byte length encoding for `digestAlgorithm` ASN.1 element +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 non-reduced length encoding #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"7369676e617475726520746573740a":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"A1D46FBA2318F8DCEF16C280948B1CF27966B9B47225ED2989F8D74B45BD36049C0AAB5AD0FF003553BA843C8E12782FC5873BB89A3DC84B883D25666CD22BF3ACD5B675969F8BEBFBCAC93FDD927C7442B178B10D1DFF9398E52316AAE0AF74E594650BDC3C670241D418684593CDA1A7B9DC4F20D2FDC6F66344074003E211":16:"10001":"3C27512A8FDC973D856C0F288BE27D00D54FC0B359C520DA73A05156D98CDD6A83E6657BFA81D7B9716EEDFD98C08CD82F399298782782AE341D9AABCBB6B5F9C6552DE1D8B93047E1135032653F4F65A8937352E903864E008429E049680E3AA80F5DE1C7408C403011CEF4A3ECA549C027C8954BFBCA21F2A41C3EB0278029":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +# Non-reduced 3-byte length encoding for optional parameters in `digestAlgorithm` ASN.1 element +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 non-reduced length encoding #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"7369676e617475726520746573740a":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"A1D46FBA2318F8DCEF16C280948B1CF27966B9B47225ED2989F8D74B45BD36049C0AAB5AD0FF003553BA843C8E12782FC5873BB89A3DC84B883D25666CD22BF3ACD5B675969F8BEBFBCAC93FDD927C7442B178B10D1DFF9398E52316AAE0AF74E594650BDC3C670241D418684593CDA1A7B9DC4F20D2FDC6F66344074003E211":16:"10001":"24BEB8502F24E0D11D9C10CEE4435EA972CEC93C23936E815ED2DF41BECEDDE889AF85BBEAF1B8C6928913AC523EA1D6653832E9D4E74F55B76771EA84F5A607342C341A14AB258019F38DBAEE4B967C8C8D26D6AF2583D32988471BA38751B6A67BA3D1147619C266A9AAC34244740BB59CD9DB3AFF19438B04C619AB719123":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +# Non-reduced 4-byte length encoding in `digest` ASN.1 element +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 non-reduced length encoding #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"7369676e617475726520746573740a":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"A1D46FBA2318F8DCEF16C280948B1CF27966B9B47225ED2989F8D74B45BD36049C0AAB5AD0FF003553BA843C8E12782FC5873BB89A3DC84B883D25666CD22BF3ACD5B675969F8BEBFBCAC93FDD927C7442B178B10D1DFF9398E52316AAE0AF74E594650BDC3C670241D418684593CDA1A7B9DC4F20D2FDC6F66344074003E211":16:"10001":"13172EF7362CF421103FE1893429FAE85F83636BA8AF545252599A39892E62CEC317DC47C1D6B19328B63CDFD02FA0B49CE7980504635251FF08C0A1308C64D6466DFBF1EF2BA49EFDD6C2C888A30870EC2DC0FA4D67FDE6631C85ED2CEF8EEBF5578C974CBA4A04034D9B579B420D6CA93E4BFC09E014542A0EFB902AF90C5E":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +# Non-reduced 3-byte length encoding for OID in `digestAlgorithm` ASN.1 element +RSA PKCS1 Verify v1.5 non-reduced length encoding #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"7369676e617475726520746573740a":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:16:"A1D46FBA2318F8DCEF16C280948B1CF27966B9B47225ED2989F8D74B45BD36049C0AAB5AD0FF003553BA843C8E12782FC5873BB89A3DC84B883D25666CD22BF3ACD5B675969F8BEBFBCAC93FDD927C7442B178B10D1DFF9398E52316AAE0AF74E594650BDC3C670241D418684593CDA1A7B9DC4F20D2FDC6F66344074003E211":16:"10001":"65DD518F63A2E289C035E9F2A9927BF5A6A74FF6FEFFF61AFCC52ED4A8A5B93534A3AD1709136306EE1379B47A4863BC6ED879E92CD6F99AA5B5F106102BDAE8DAFB15CF6EF00CB5FA63967706528DEE8876F3D04E8D75533009C73DA4C5744D20FFDB18EA78EE4D5D9D6F7BD3AFC2AD9A0EDDD56AA40AAEF789E6FB12AB6DE7":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #1 (SHA512, 1536 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:1536:16:"c8c67df894c882045ede26a9008ab09ea0672077d7bc71d412511cd93981ddde8f91b967da404056c39f105f7f239abdaff92923859920f6299e82b95bd5b8c959948f4a035cbd693ad83014294d349813d1ad57911a6355d0731fe3a034e9db":16:"f15147d0e7c04a1e3f37adde802cdc610999bf7ab0088434aaeda0c0ab3910b14d2ce56cb66bffd97552195fae8b061077e03920814d8b9cfb5a3958b3a82c2a7fc97e55db5978b47a922156eb8a3e55c06a54a45d1670abdfb995489c4d0051":16:"bd429bb7c3b00bbea19ba664c0f8172d1a73c3cfa05e2ed656d570c1590918bb7e372ed25e2cd71395ba0a9b1a30f3ee012ffb0546cab8e3581fe3e23f44ab57a8aee9717e71a936a580fa8572d450fb00339a6f6704b717df0c149a465bab768c61500cd93b61113ff3e4389167f7b2c8e3c0da2d4765286bee555b0bcb4998f59b14fad03180a17c8b4f69bcd1234f4ae85950137665ac2ba80b55cc9b1aafb454b83771aa755acd2a00e93ddb65e696dbed8bdca69fb5e0c5c2097b9cfe4b":16:"3":"93b6fa99485c116ca6efdd4202ea1cf49f4c6345fae692584413743ce5b65510e8e4690aee9a19ea1ff10d57f22aa3548d839f28a8525a34354e9e58e0f3947e056ce2554e21bf287e220b98db3b551258cd42b495e5d1a3bbc83c9d1a02f2a300ef6d866ea75108e44ebb3e16b47df2f6de28feb2be3874dbbf21599451082d86e9f2f462575a8185c69aa1f1fcb6a363c5d71aeba2103449eaf3845285291148d5f78d1646b8dc95cbcc4082f987d948b0e7d4e80b60595f8a7517584e1643":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #1 Verify +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:1536:16:"bd429bb7c3b00bbea19ba664c0f8172d1a73c3cfa05e2ed656d570c1590918bb7e372ed25e2cd71395ba0a9b1a30f3ee012ffb0546cab8e3581fe3e23f44ab57a8aee9717e71a936a580fa8572d450fb00339a6f6704b717df0c149a465bab768c61500cd93b61113ff3e4389167f7b2c8e3c0da2d4765286bee555b0bcb4998f59b14fad03180a17c8b4f69bcd1234f4ae85950137665ac2ba80b55cc9b1aafb454b83771aa755acd2a00e93ddb65e696dbed8bdca69fb5e0c5c2097b9cfe4b":16:"3":"93b6fa99485c116ca6efdd4202ea1cf49f4c6345fae692584413743ce5b65510e8e4690aee9a19ea1ff10d57f22aa3548d839f28a8525a34354e9e58e0f3947e056ce2554e21bf287e220b98db3b551258cd42b495e5d1a3bbc83c9d1a02f2a300ef6d866ea75108e44ebb3e16b47df2f6de28feb2be3874dbbf21599451082d86e9f2f462575a8185c69aa1f1fcb6a363c5d71aeba2103449eaf3845285291148d5f78d1646b8dc95cbcc4082f987d948b0e7d4e80b60595f8a7517584e1643":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #2 (SHA256, 2048 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #2 Verify +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #2 Verify (Fail) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Sign #3 (SHA224, 2048 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Sign #3 Verify +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #4 (SHA384, 2048 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Sign #4 Verify +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #5 (MD2, 2048 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Sign #5 Verify +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_MD2:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #6 (MD4, 2048 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Sign #6 Verify +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_MD4:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #7 (MD5, 2048 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 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+ +RSA PKCS1 Sign #7 Verify +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #8 (RAW, 2048 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +rsa_pkcs1_sign_raw:"1234567890deadbeef":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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":16:"3":"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" + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #8 Verify +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +rsa_pkcs1_verify_raw:"1234567890deadbeef":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #8 Verify (Wrong raw hash) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +rsa_pkcs1_verify_raw:"1234567890deadcafe":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"605baf947c0de49e4f6a0dfb94a43ae318d5df8ed20ba4ba5a37a73fb009c5c9e5cce8b70a25b1c7580f389f0d7092485cdfa02208b70d33482edf07a7eafebdc54862ca0e0396a5a7d09991b9753eb1ffb6091971bb5789c6b121abbcd0a3cbaa39969fa7c28146fce96c6d03272e3793e5be8f5abfa9afcbebb986d7b3050604a2af4d3a40fa6c003781a539a60259d1e84f13322da9e538a49c369b83e7286bf7d30b64bbb773506705da5d5d5483a563a1ffacc902fb75c9a751b1e83cdc7a6db0470056883f48b5a5446b43b1d180ea12ba11a6a8d93b3b32a30156b6084b7fb142998a2a0d28014b84098ece7d9d5e4d55cc342ca26f5a0167a679dec8":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #9 (Invalid Digest type) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:255:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"b38ac65c8141f7f5c96e14470e851936a67bf94cc6821a39ac12c05f7c0b06d9e6ddba2224703b02e25f31452f9c4a8417b62675fdc6df46b94813bc7b9769a892c482b830bfe0ad42e46668ace68903617faf6681f4babf1cc8e4b0420d3c7f61dc45434c6b54e2c3ee0fc07908509d79c9826e673bf8363255adb0add2401039a7bcd1b4ecf0fbe6ec8369d2da486eec59559dd1d54c9b24190965eafbdab203b35255765261cd0909acf93c3b8b8428cbb448de4715d1b813d0c94829c229543d391ce0adab5351f97a3810c1f73d7b1458b97daed4209c50e16d064d2d5bfda8c23893d755222793146d0a78c3d64f35549141486c3b0961a7b4c1a2034f":16:"3":"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #9 Verify (Invalid Digest type) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"59779fd2a39e56640c4fc1e67b60aeffcecd78aed7ad2bdfa464e93d04198d48466b8da7445f25bfa19db2844edd5c8f539cf772cc132b483169d390db28a43bc4ee0f038f6568ffc87447746cb72fefac2d6d90ee3143a915ac4688028805905a68eb8f8a96674b093c495eddd8704461eaa2b345efbb2ad6930acd8023f870":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:255:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA PKCS1 Sign #10 (RIPEMD160, 2048 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign:"616263":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Verify #10 (RIPEMD160, 2048 bits RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify:"616263":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Encrypt #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Decrypt #1 (Verify) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt:"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":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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":16:"3":32:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":0 + +RSA PKCS1 Encrypt #2 (Data too large) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt:"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":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA PKCS1 Decrypt #2 (Data too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt:"deadbeafcafedeadbeeffedcba9876":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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":16:"3":32:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA PKCS1 Decrypt #4 (Output buffer too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt:"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":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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":16:"3":15:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + +RSA Check empty private key +rsa_check_privkey_null: + +RSA Check Private key #1 (Correct) +mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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heck Private key #2 (No P) +mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey:2048:16:"":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"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heck Private key #3 (No Q) +mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"":16:"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heck Private key #4 (No N) +mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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heck Private key #5 (No E) 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+ +RSA Check Private key #6 (No D) 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+ +RSA Check Private key #7 (No DP) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT 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+ +RSA Check Private key #8 (No DQ) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT 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+ +RSA Check Private key #9 (No QP) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT +mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"b38ac65c8141f7f5c96e14470e851936a67bf94cc6821a39ac12c05f7c0b06d9e6ddba2224703b02e25f31452f9c4a8417b62675fdc6df46b94813bc7b9769a892c482b830bfe0ad42e46668ace68903617faf6681f4babf1cc8e4b0420d3c7f61dc45434c6b54e2c3ee0fc07908509d79c9826e673bf8363255adb0add2401039a7bcd1b4ecf0fbe6ec8369d2da486eec59559dd1d54c9b24190965eafbdab203b35255765261cd0909acf93c3b8b8428cbb448de4715d1b813d0c94829c229543d391ce0adab5351f97a3810c1f73d7b1458b97daed4209c50e16d064d2d5bfda8c23893d755222793146d0a78c3d64f35549141486c3b0961a7b4c1a2034f":16:"3":16:"77B1D99300D6A54E864962DA09AE10CF19A7FB888456BC2672B72AEA52B204914493D16C184AD201EC3F762E1FBD8702BA796EF953D9EA2F26300D285264F11B0C8301D0207FEB1E2C984445C899B0ACEBAA74EF014DD1D4BDDB43202C08D2FF9692D8D788478DEC829EB52AFB5AE068FBDBAC499A27FACECC391E75C936D55F07BB45EE184DAB45808E15722502F279F89B38C1CB292557E5063597F52C75D61001EDC33F4739353E33E56AD273B067C1A2760208529EA421774A5FFFCB3423B1E0051E7702A55D80CBF2141569F18F87BFF538A1DA8EDBB2693A539F68E0D62D77743F89EACF3B1723BDB25CE2F333FA63CACF0E67DF1A431893BB9B352FCB":16:"9A66CF76572A71A17475794FA1C8C70D987E581E990D772BB27C77C53FF1ECBB31260E9EDAFAEBC79991807E48918EAB8C3A5F03A600F30C69511546AE788EDF53168E2D035D300EDCD5E4BF3AA2A6D603EA0A7BD11E1C1089657306DF8A64E7F1BC6B266B825C1A6C5F0FC85775F4CF7ACD63367E42EAFE46511D58AD6DFE0F":16:"844DBDD20925D9164F9A1E2F707076C261CCA8337D0241392B38AE3C12342F3AC14F8FD6DF4A1C36839662BD0D227344CD55A32AE5DBD2309A9A2B8A2C82BE6DDDDCE81D1B694775D9047AA765CA0C6E1BB8E61C8B7BE27ED711E8EE2FEAD87F3491F76A6D2262C14189EACDFD4CEFE0BF9D0A5B49857E0ED22CBEB98DC8D45B":16:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA Check Private key #10 (Incorrect) +mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey:2048:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"b38ac65c8141f7f5c96e14470e851936a67bf94cc6821a39ac12c05f7c0b06d9e6ddba2224703b02e25f31452f9c4a8417b62675fdc6df46b94813bc7b9769a892c482b830bfe0ad42e46668ace68903617faf6681f4babf1cc8e4b0420d3c7f61dc45434c6b54e2c3ee0fc07908509d79c9826e673bf8363255adb0add2401039a7bcd1b4ecf0fbe6ec8369d2da486eec59559dd1d54c9b24190965eafbdab203b35255765261cd0909acf93c3b8b8428cbb448de4715d1b813d0c94829c229543d391ce0adab5351f97a3810c1f73d7b1458b97daed4209c50e16d064d2d5bfda8c23893d755222793146d0a78c3d64f35549141486c3b0961a7b4c1a2034f":16:"3":16:"77B1D99300D6A54E864962DA09AE10CF19A7FB888456BC2672B72AEA52B204914493D16C184AD201EC3F762E1FBD8702BA796EF953D9EA2F26300D285264F11B0C8301D0207FEB1E2C984445C899B0ACEBAA74EF014DD1D4BDDB43202C08D2FF9692D8D788478DEC829EB52AFB5AE068FBDBAC499A27FACECC391E75C936D55F07BB45EE184DAB45808E15722502F279F89B38C1CB292557E5063597F52C75D61001EDC33F4739353E33E56AD273B067C1A2760208529EA421774A5FFFCB3423B1E0051E7702A55D80CBF2141569F18F87BFF538A1DA8EDBB2693A539F68E0D62D77743F89EACF3B1723BDB25CE2F333FA63CACF0E67DF1A431893BB9B352FCC":16:"9A66CF76572A71A17475794FA1C8C70D987E581E990D772BB27C77C53FF1ECBB31260E9EDAFAEBC79991807E48918EAB8C3A5F03A600F30C69511546AE788EDF53168E2D035D300EDCD5E4BF3AA2A6D603EA0A7BD11E1C1089657306DF8A64E7F1BC6B266B825C1A6C5F0FC85775F4CF7ACD63367E42EAFE46511D58AD6DFE0F":16:"844DBDD20925D9164F9A1E2F707076C261CCA8337D0241392B38AE3C12342F3AC14F8FD6DF4A1C36839662BD0D227344CD55A32AE5DBD2309A9A2B8A2C82BE6DDDDCE81D1B694775D9047AA765CA0C6E1BB8E61C8B7BE27ED711E8EE2FEAD87F3491F76A6D2262C14189EACDFD4CEFE0BF9D0A5B49857E0ED22CBEB98DC8D45B":16:"4951A7B174DF972C37BADCC38457B5EDD1F078BC613E75CE25E08814E12461C7A1C189A70EB8138294298D141244C7A9DE31AB4F6D38B40B04D6353CD30F77ADBF66BBDE41C7BE463C5E30AAA3F7BAD6CEE99506DEAAFA2F335C1B1C5C88B8ABB0D0387EE0D1B4E7027F7F085A025CEDB5CCE18B88C0462F1C3C910D47C0D4AB":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA Check Public key #1 (Correct) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"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":16:"3":0 + +RSA Check Public key #2 (Even N) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"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":16:"3":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA Check Public key #3 (Even E) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"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":16:"65536":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA Check Public key #4 (N exactly 128 bits) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"fedcba9876543210deadbeefcafe4321":16:"3":0 + +RSA Check Public key #5 (N smaller than 128 bits) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"7edcba9876543210deadbeefcafe4321":16:"3":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA Check Public key #6 (N exactly 8192 bits) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE>=1024 +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey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heck Public key #7 (N larger than 8192 bits) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey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heck Public key #8 (E exactly 2 bits) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"fedcba9876543210deadbeefcafe4321":16:"3":0 + +RSA Check Public key #8 (E exactly 1 bits) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"fedcba9876543210deadbeefcafe4321":16:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA Check Public key #8 (E exactly 64 bits) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"fedcba9876543210deadbeefcafe4321":16:"00fedcba9876543213":0 + +RSA Check Public key #8 (E larger than 64 bits) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"fedcba9876543210deadbeefcafe4321":16:"01fedcba9876543213":0 + +RSA Check Public key #9 (E has size N-2) +mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey:16:"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":16:"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":0 + +RSA Check Public key #10 (E has size N) 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+ +RSA Check Public-Private key #1 (Correct) 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+ +RSA Check Public-Private key #2 (Public no N) 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+ +RSA Check Public-Private key #3 (Private no N) 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+ +RSA Check Public-Private key #4 (N mismatch) 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+ +RSA Public (Correct) +mbedtls_rsa_public:"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":2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":0 + +RSA Public (Data larger than N) +mbedtls_rsa_public:"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":2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA Public (Data = 0) +mbedtls_rsa_public:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":2048:16:"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":16:"3":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +RSA Generate Key - 128bit key +mbedtls_rsa_gen_key:128:3:0 + +RSA Generate Key (Number of bits too small) +mbedtls_rsa_gen_key:127:3:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA Generate Key (Exponent too small) +mbedtls_rsa_gen_key:128:2:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA Generate Key - 1024 bit key +mbedtls_rsa_gen_key:1024:3:0 + +RSA Generate Key - 2048 bit key +mbedtls_rsa_gen_key:2048:3:0 + +RSA Generate Key - 1025 bit key +# mbedtls_rsa_gen_key only supports even-sized keys +mbedtls_rsa_gen_key:1025:3:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA Validate Params, toy example +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:10:"15":10:"3":10:"5":10:"3":10:"3":0:0 + +RSA Validate Params, toy example, N missing +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:10:"":10:"3":10:"5":10:"3":10:"3":0:0 + +RSA Validate Params, toy example, E missing +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:10:"15":10:"3":10:"5":10:"3":10:"":0:0 + +RSA Validate Params, toy example, corrupted +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:10:"16":10:"3":10:"5":10:"3":10:"3":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA Validate Params, toy example, non-primes, no PRNG +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:10:"45":10:"9":10:"5":10:"7":10:"23":0:0 + +RSA Validate Params, toy example, non-primes, PRNG +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:10:"45":10:"9":10:"5":10:"7":10:"23":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA Validate Params +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:16:"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":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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alidate Params, N missing +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:16:"":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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alidate Params, bad N +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:16:"b38bc65c8141f7f5c96e14470e851936a67bf94cc6821a39ac12c05f7c0b06d9e6ddba2224703b02e25f31452f9c4a8417b62675fdc6df46b94813bc7b9769a892c482b830bfe0ad42e46668ace68903617faf6681f4babf1cc8e4b0420d3c7f61dc45434c6b54e2c3ee0fc07908509d79c9826e673bf8363255adb0add2401039a7bcd1b4ecf0fbe6ec8369d2da486eec59559dd1d54c9b24190965eafbdab203b35255765261cd0909acf93c3b8b8428cbb448de4715d1b813d0c94829c229543d391ce0adab5351f97a3810c1f73d7b1458b97daed4209c50e16d064d2d5bfda8c23893d755222793146d0a78c3d64f35549141486c3b0961a7b4c1a2034f":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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alidate Params, non-prime, no PRNG +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:16:"":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd18":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"":16:"":0:0 + +RSA Validate Params, non-prime, PRNG +mbedtls_rsa_validate_params:16:"":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd18":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"":16:"":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA Deduce Private, toy example +mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent:10:"7":10:"11":10:"7":10:"13":0:0 + +RSA Deduce Private, toy example, corrupted +mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent:10:"3":10:"5":10:"3":10:"3":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE + +RSA Deduce Private +mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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educe Private, corrupted +mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent:16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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educe Primes, toy example +mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes:10:"35":10:"5":10:"5":10:"5":10:"7":0:0 + +RSA Deduce Primes, toy example, corrupted +mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes:10:"35":10:"5":10:"5":10:"5":10:"7":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA Deduce Moduli +mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes:16:"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e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":0:0 + +RSA Deduce Moduli, corrupted +mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes:16:"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e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"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":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (N,P,Q,D,E), inconsistent +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"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":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (N,P,Q,D,E), successive +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"b38ac65c8141f7f5c96e14470e851936a67bf94cc6821a39ac12c05f7c0b06d9e6ddba2224703b02e25f31452f9c4a8417b62675fdc6df46b94813bc7b9769a892c482b830bfe0ad42e46668ace68903617faf6681f4babf1cc8e4b0420d3c7f61dc45434c6b54e2c3ee0fc07908509d79c9826e673bf8363255adb0add2401039a7bcd1b4ecf0fbe6ec8369d2da486eec59559dd1d54c9b24190965eafbdab203b35255765261cd0909acf93c3b8b8428cbb448de4715d1b813d0c94829c229543d391ce0adab5351f97a3810c1f73d7b1458b97daed4209c50e16d064d2d5bfda8c23893d755222793146d0a78c3d64f35549141486c3b0961a7b4c1a2034f":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (N,P,Q,D,E), successive, inconsistent +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"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":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (-,P,Q,D,E) +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (-,P,Q,D,E), successive +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"77B1D99300D6A54E864962DA09AE10CF19A7FB888456BC2672B72AEA52B204914493D16C184AD201EC3F762E1FBD8702BA796EF953D9EA2F26300D285264F11B0C8301D0207FEB1E2C984445C899B0ACEBAA74EF014DD1D4BDDB43202C08D2FF9692D8D788478DEC829EB52AFB5AE068FBDBAC499A27FACECC391E75C936D55F07BB45EE184DAB45808E15722502F279F89B38C1CB292557E5063597F52C75D61001EDC33F4739353E33E56AD273B067C1A2760208529EA421774A5FFFCB3423B1E0051E7702A55D80CBF2141569F18F87BFF538A1DA8EDBB2693A539F68E0D62D77743F89EACF3B1723BDB25CE2F333FA63CACF0E67DF1A431893BB9B352FCB":16:"3":1:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,D,E) 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+ +RSA Import (N,P,Q,-,E) 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+ +RSA Import (N,P,Q,-,E), successive 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+ +RSA Import (-,P,Q,-,E) +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"":16:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"":16:"3":0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (-,P,Q,-,E), successive 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+mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"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":16:"":16:"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":16:"":16:"3":1:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E), complete public key +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"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":16:"":16:"":16:"":16:"3":0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E), complete public key, successive +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"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":16:"":16:"":16:"":16:"3":1:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E), complete public key, corrupted +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"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":16:"":16:"":16:"":16:"4":0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E), complete public key, successive, corrupted +mbedtls_rsa_import:16:"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":16:"":16:"":16:"":16:"4":1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED:0 + +RSA Import Raw (N,P,Q,D,E), complete private key 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+ +RSA Import Raw (N,P,Q,D,E), successive 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+ +RSA Import Raw (N,-,-,D,E) 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+ +RSA Import Raw (N,P,Q,-,E) 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+ +RSA Import Raw (N,P,Q,-,E), successive 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+ +RSA Import Raw (-,P,Q,-,E) +mbedtls_rsa_import_raw:"":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"03":0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import Raw (-,P,Q,-,E), successive 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+ +RSA Export Raw (N,-,-,D,E) +mbedtls_rsa_export_raw:"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xport Raw (N,-,-,D,E), successive +mbedtls_rsa_export_raw:"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xport Raw (N,P,Q,-,E) +mbedtls_rsa_export_raw:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"03":1:0 + +RSA Export Raw (N,P,Q,-,E), successive +mbedtls_rsa_export_raw:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"03":1:1 + +RSA Export Raw (N,-,-,-,E) +mbedtls_rsa_export_raw:"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":"":"":"":"03":0:0 + +RSA PKCS1 Encrypt Bad RNG +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +rsa_pkcs1_encrypt_bad_rng:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:2048:16:"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":16:"3":"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":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + +RSA Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +rsa_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2d7fb8ef --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -0,0 +1,1865 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void rsa_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + const int valid_padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21; + const int invalid_padding = 42; + const int valid_mode = MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE; + const int invalid_mode = 42; + unsigned char buf[42] = { 0 }; + size_t olen; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_rsa_init( NULL, valid_padding, 0 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, invalid_padding, 0 ) ); + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_rsa_free( NULL ) ); + + /* No more variants because only the first argument must be non-NULL. */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_import( NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( NULL, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_complete( NULL ) ); + + /* No more variants because only the first argument must be non-NULL. */ + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_export( NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( NULL, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( NULL, + valid_padding, 0 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( &ctx, + invalid_padding, 0 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( NULL, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, + NULL, 0, 0 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, 0, 0 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( NULL, &ctx ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_public( NULL, buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_public( &ctx, NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_public( &ctx, buf, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_private( NULL, NULL, NULL, + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_private( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_private( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + buf, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), NULL, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), buf, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( NULL, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + invalid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), NULL, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, + sizeof( buf ), buf, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + sizeof( buf ), NULL, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + sizeof( buf ), buf, + NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, &olen, + buf, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, &olen, + buf, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, NULL, + buf, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, &olen, + NULL, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, &olen, + buf, NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( NULL, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, &olen, + buf, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + invalid_mode, &olen, + buf, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, NULL, + buf, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, &olen, + NULL, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, &olen, + buf, NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + &olen, + buf, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + &olen, + buf, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + NULL, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, + buf, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + &olen, + NULL, buf, 42 ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + buf, sizeof( buf ), + &olen, + buf, NULL, 42 ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), NULL, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 0, NULL, + buf ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), NULL, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 0, NULL, + buf ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), NULL, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 0, NULL, + buf ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( NULL, NULL, NULL, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + 0, sizeof( buf ), NULL, + MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 0, NULL, + MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + buf ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), NULL, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, NULL, + buf ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( NULL, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + invalid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), buf, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( &ctx, NULL, + NULL, + valid_mode, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 0, NULL, + buf ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), + buf, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), + buf, NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 0, NULL, + buf ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( NULL, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), + buf, + 0, 0, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + invalid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), + buf, + 0, 0, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), + NULL, 0, 0, + buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + 0, sizeof( buf ), + buf, 0, 0, + NULL ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( &ctx, NULL, NULL, + valid_mode, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 0, NULL, + 0, 0, + buf ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_copy( NULL, &ctx ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_rsa_copy( &ctx, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void rsa_init_free( int reinit ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + + /* Double free is not explicitly documented to work, but we rely on it + * even inside the library so that you can call mbedtls_rsa_free() + * unconditionally on an error path without checking whether it has + * already been called in the success path. */ + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); + + if( reinit ) + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); + + /* This test case always succeeds, functionally speaking. A plausible + * bug might trigger an invalid pointer dereference or a memory leak. */ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( data_t * message_str, int padding_mode, + int digest, int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P, + int radix_Q, char * input_Q, int radix_N, + char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E, + data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char output[256]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, padding_mode, 0 ); + + memset( hash_result, 0x00, sizeof( hash_result ) ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + if( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ) != NULL ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ), message_str->x, message_str->len, hash_result ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &ctx, &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, digest, + 0, hash_result, output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( data_t * message_str, int padding_mode, + int digest, int mod, int radix_N, + char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E, + data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char hash_result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, padding_mode, 0 ); + memset( hash_result, 0x00, sizeof( hash_result ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + if( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ) != NULL ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( digest ), message_str->x, message_str->len, hash_result ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, digest, 0, hash_result, result_str->x ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void rsa_pkcs1_sign_raw( data_t * hash_result, + int padding_mode, int mod, int radix_P, + char * input_P, int radix_Q, char * input_Q, + int radix_N, char * input_N, int radix_E, + char * input_E, data_t * result_str ) +{ + unsigned char output[256]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, padding_mode, 0 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &ctx, &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash_result->len, + hash_result->x, output ) == 0 ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + /* For PKCS#1 v1.5, there is an alternative way to generate signatures */ + if( padding_mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + { + int res; + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output) ); + + res = mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( &ctx, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, hash_result->len, + hash_result->x, output ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + TEST_ASSERT( res == 0 ); +#else + TEST_ASSERT( ( res == 0 ) || + ( res == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION ) ); +#endif + + if( res == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, + result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void rsa_pkcs1_verify_raw( data_t * hash_result, + int padding_mode, int mod, int radix_N, + char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E, + data_t * result_str, int correct ) +{ + unsigned char output[256]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, padding_mode, 0 ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash_result->len, hash_result->x, result_str->x ) == correct ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + /* For PKCS#1 v1.5, there is an alternative way to verify signatures */ + if( padding_mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + { + int res; + int ok; + size_t olen; + + res = mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( &ctx, + NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + &olen, result_str->x, output, sizeof( output ) ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + TEST_ASSERT( res == 0 ); +#else + TEST_ASSERT( ( res == 0 ) || + ( res == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION ) ); +#endif + + if( res == 0 ) + { + ok = olen == hash_result->len && memcmp( output, hash_result->x, olen ) == 0; + if( correct == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( ok == 1 ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( ok == 0 ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( data_t * message_str, int padding_mode, + int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N, + int radix_E, char * input_E, + data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[256]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, padding_mode, 0 ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + message_str->len, message_str->x, + output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void rsa_pkcs1_encrypt_bad_rng( data_t * message_str, int padding_mode, + int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N, + int radix_E, char * input_E, + data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[256]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, padding_mode, 0 ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, &mbedtls_test_rnd_zero_rand, + NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + message_str->len, message_str->x, + output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( data_t * message_str, int padding_mode, + int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P, + int radix_Q, char * input_Q, int radix_N, + char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E, + int max_output, data_t * result_str, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[32]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + size_t output_len; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, padding_mode, 0 ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + output_len = 0; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + &output_len, message_str->x, output, + max_output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + output_len, + result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_public( data_t * message_str, int mod, int radix_N, + char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E, + data_t * result_str, int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[256]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx, ctx2; /* Also test mbedtls_rsa_copy() while at it */ + + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx2, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + + /* Check test data consistency */ + TEST_ASSERT( message_str->len == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_public( &ctx, message_str->x, output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + + /* And now with the copy */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_copy( &ctx2, &ctx ) == 0 ); + /* clear the original to be sure */ + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx2 ) == 0 ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_public( &ctx2, message_str->x, output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx2 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_private( data_t * message_str, int mod, int radix_P, + char * input_P, int radix_Q, char * input_Q, + int radix_N, char * input_N, int radix_E, + char * input_E, data_t * result_str, + int result ) +{ + unsigned char output[256]; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx, ctx2; /* Also test mbedtls_rsa_copy() while at it */ + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + int i; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx2, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + memset( &rnd_info, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + + /* Check test data consistency */ + TEST_ASSERT( message_str->len == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) == (size_t) ( mod / 8 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + /* repeat three times to test updating of blinding values */ + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_private( &ctx, mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, message_str->x, + output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx.len, + result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + } + + /* And now one more time with the copy */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_copy( &ctx2, &ctx ) == 0 ); + /* clear the original to be sure */ + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx2 ) == 0 ); + + memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_private( &ctx2, mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info, message_str->x, + output ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + ctx2.len, + result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx2 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void rsa_check_privkey_null( ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + memset( &ctx, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( int radix_N, char * input_N, int radix_E, + char * input_E, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_mpi N, E; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + if( strlen( input_N ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_E ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P, + int radix_Q, char * input_Q, int radix_N, + char * input_N, int radix_E, char * input_E, + int radix_D, char * input_D, int radix_DP, + char * input_DP, int radix_DQ, + char * input_DQ, int radix_QP, + char * input_QP, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + ctx.len = mod / 8; + if( strlen( input_P ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx.P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_Q ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx.Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_N ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx.N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_E ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx.E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_D ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx.D, radix_D, input_D ) == 0 ); + } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if( strlen( input_DP ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx.DP, radix_DP, input_DP ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_DQ ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx.DQ, radix_DQ, input_DQ ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_QP ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &ctx.QP, radix_QP, input_QP ) == 0 ); + } +#else + ((void) radix_DP); ((void) input_DP); + ((void) radix_DQ); ((void) input_DQ); + ((void) radix_QP); ((void) input_QP); +#endif + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void rsa_check_pubpriv( int mod, int radix_Npub, char * input_Npub, + int radix_Epub, char * input_Epub, int radix_P, + char * input_P, int radix_Q, char * input_Q, + int radix_N, char * input_N, int radix_E, + char * input_E, int radix_D, char * input_D, + int radix_DP, char * input_DP, int radix_DQ, + char * input_DQ, int radix_QP, char * input_QP, + int result ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context pub, prv; + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &pub, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &prv, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + pub.len = mod / 8; + prv.len = mod / 8; + + if( strlen( input_Npub ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &pub.N, radix_Npub, input_Npub ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_Epub ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &pub.E, radix_Epub, input_Epub ) == 0 ); + } + + if( strlen( input_P ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &prv.P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_Q ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &prv.Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_N ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &prv.N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_E ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &prv.E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_D ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &prv.D, radix_D, input_D ) == 0 ); + } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if( strlen( input_DP ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &prv.DP, radix_DP, input_DP ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_DQ ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &prv.DQ, radix_DQ, input_DQ ) == 0 ); + } + if( strlen( input_QP ) ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &prv.QP, radix_QP, input_QP ) == 0 ); + } +#else + ((void) radix_DP); ((void) input_DP); + ((void) radix_DQ); ((void) input_DQ); + ((void) radix_QP); ((void) input_QP); +#endif + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( &pub, &prv ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( &pub ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &prv ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG */ +void mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( int nrbits, int exponent, int result) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + const char *pers = "test_suite_rsa"; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_rsa_init ( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, + &entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( &ctx, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, nrbits, exponent ) == result ); + if( result == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx.P, &ctx.Q ) > 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ +void mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( int radix_N, char *input_N, + int radix_D, char *input_D, + int radix_E, char *input_E, + int radix_P, char *output_P, + int radix_Q, char *output_Q, + int corrupt, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Pp, Q, Qp, D, E; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Pp ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Qp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &D, radix_D, input_D ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Qp, radix_P, output_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Pp, radix_Q, output_Q ) == 0 ); + + if( corrupt ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &D, &D, 2 ) == 0 ); + + /* Try to deduce P, Q from N, D, E only. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( &N, &D, &E, &P, &Q ) == result ); + + if( !corrupt ) + { + /* Check if (P,Q) = (Pp, Qp) or (P,Q) = (Qp, Pp) */ + TEST_ASSERT( ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P, &Pp ) == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q, &Qp ) == 0 ) || + ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P, &Qp ) == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q, &Pp ) == 0 ) ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Pp ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Qp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( int radix_P, char *input_P, + int radix_Q, char *input_Q, + int radix_E, char *input_E, + int radix_D, char *output_D, + int corrupt, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi P, Q, D, Dp, E, R, Rp; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Dp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Rp ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Dp, radix_D, output_D ) == 0 ); + + if( corrupt ) + { + /* Make E even */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &E, 0, 0 ) == 0 ); + } + + /* Try to deduce D from N, P, Q, E. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( &P, &Q, + &E, &D ) == result ); + + if( !corrupt ) + { + /* + * Check that D and Dp agree modulo LCM(P-1, Q-1). + */ + + /* Replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P, &P, 1 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q, &Q, 1 ) == 0 ); + + /* Check D == Dp modulo P-1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R, &D, &P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &Rp, &Dp, &P ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R, &Rp ) == 0 ); + + /* Check D == Dp modulo Q-1 */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R, &D, &Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &Rp, &Dp, &Q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R, &Rp ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Dp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Rp ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG */ +void mbedtls_rsa_import( int radix_N, char *input_N, + int radix_P, char *input_P, + int radix_Q, char *input_Q, + int radix_D, char *input_D, + int radix_E, char *input_E, + int successive, + int is_priv, + int res_check, + int res_complete ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E; + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + + /* Buffers used for encryption-decryption test */ + unsigned char *buf_orig = NULL; + unsigned char *buf_enc = NULL; + unsigned char *buf_dec = NULL; + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + const char *pers = "test_suite_rsa"; + + const int have_N = ( strlen( input_N ) > 0 ); + const int have_P = ( strlen( input_P ) > 0 ); + const int have_Q = ( strlen( input_Q ) > 0 ); + const int have_D = ( strlen( input_D ) > 0 ); + const int have_E = ( strlen( input_E ) > 0 ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, + (const unsigned char *) pers, strlen( pers ) ) == 0 ); + + if( have_N ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + + if( have_P ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + + if( have_Q ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + + if( have_D ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &D, radix_D, input_D ) == 0 ); + + if( have_E ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + if( !successive ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, + have_N ? &N : NULL, + have_P ? &P : NULL, + have_Q ? &Q : NULL, + have_D ? &D : NULL, + have_E ? &E : NULL ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + /* Import N, P, Q, D, E separately. + * This should make no functional difference. */ + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, + have_N ? &N : NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, + NULL, + have_P ? &P : NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, + NULL, NULL, + have_Q ? &Q : NULL, + NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, + NULL, NULL, NULL, + have_D ? &D : NULL, + NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + have_E ? &E : NULL ) == 0 ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == res_complete ); + + /* On expected success, perform some public and private + * key operations to check if the key is working properly. */ + if( res_complete == 0 ) + { + if( is_priv ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == res_check ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == res_check ); + + if( res_check != 0 ) + goto exit; + + buf_orig = mbedtls_calloc( 1, mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ); + buf_enc = mbedtls_calloc( 1, mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ); + buf_dec = mbedtls_calloc( 1, mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ); + if( buf_orig == NULL || buf_enc == NULL || buf_dec == NULL ) + goto exit; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctr_drbg, + buf_orig, mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Make sure the number we're generating is smaller than the modulus */ + buf_orig[0] = 0x00; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_public( &ctx, buf_orig, buf_enc ) == 0 ); + + if( is_priv ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_private( &ctx, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, + &ctr_drbg, buf_enc, + buf_dec ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf_orig, buf_dec, + mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ) == 0 ); + } + } + +exit: + + mbedtls_free( buf_orig ); + mbedtls_free( buf_enc ); + mbedtls_free( buf_dec ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mbedtls_rsa_export( int radix_N, char *input_N, + int radix_P, char *input_P, + int radix_Q, char *input_Q, + int radix_D, char *input_D, + int radix_E, char *input_E, + int is_priv, + int successive ) +{ + /* Original MPI's with which we set up the RSA context */ + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E; + + /* Exported MPI's */ + mbedtls_mpi Ne, Pe, Qe, De, Ee; + + const int have_N = ( strlen( input_N ) > 0 ); + const int have_P = ( strlen( input_P ) > 0 ); + const int have_Q = ( strlen( input_Q ) > 0 ); + const int have_D = ( strlen( input_D ) > 0 ); + const int have_E = ( strlen( input_E ) > 0 ); + + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Ne ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Pe ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Qe ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &De ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Ee ); + + /* Setup RSA context */ + + if( have_N ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + + if( have_P ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + + if( have_Q ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + + if( have_D ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &D, radix_D, input_D ) == 0 ); + + if( have_E ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import( &ctx, + strlen( input_N ) ? &N : NULL, + strlen( input_P ) ? &P : NULL, + strlen( input_Q ) ? &Q : NULL, + strlen( input_D ) ? &D : NULL, + strlen( input_E ) ? &E : NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + /* + * Export parameters and compare to original ones. + */ + + /* N and E must always be present. */ + if( !successive ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export( &ctx, &Ne, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Ee ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export( &ctx, &Ne, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export( &ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Ee ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &N, &Ne ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &E, &Ee ) == 0 ); + + /* If we were providing enough information to setup a complete private context, + * we expect to be able to export all core parameters. */ + + if( is_priv ) + { + if( !successive ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export( &ctx, NULL, &Pe, &Qe, + &De, NULL ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export( &ctx, NULL, &Pe, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export( &ctx, NULL, NULL, &Qe, + NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export( &ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &De, NULL ) == 0 ); + } + + if( have_P ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P, &Pe ) == 0 ); + + if( have_Q ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q, &Qe ) == 0 ); + + if( have_D ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &D, &De ) == 0 ); + + /* While at it, perform a sanity check */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( &Ne, &Pe, &Qe, &De, &Ee, + NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Ne ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Pe ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Qe ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &De ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Ee ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( int radix_N, char *input_N, + int radix_P, char *input_P, + int radix_Q, char *input_Q, + int radix_D, char *input_D, + int radix_E, char *input_E, + int prng, int result ) +{ + /* Original MPI's with which we set up the RSA context */ + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E; + + const int have_N = ( strlen( input_N ) > 0 ); + const int have_P = ( strlen( input_P ) > 0 ); + const int have_Q = ( strlen( input_Q ) > 0 ); + const int have_D = ( strlen( input_D ) > 0 ); + const int have_E = ( strlen( input_E ) > 0 ); + + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + const char *pers = "test_suite_rsa"; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, + &entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) == 0 ); + + if( have_N ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 ); + + if( have_P ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 ); + + if( have_Q ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &Q, radix_Q, input_Q ) == 0 ); + + if( have_D ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &D, radix_D, input_D ) == 0 ); + + if( have_E ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &E, radix_E, input_E ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( have_N ? &N : NULL, + have_P ? &P : NULL, + have_Q ? &Q : NULL, + have_D ? &D : NULL, + have_E ? &E : NULL, + prng ? mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random : NULL, + prng ? &ctr_drbg : NULL ) == result ); +exit: + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ +void mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( data_t *input_N, data_t *input_P, + data_t *input_Q, data_t *input_D, + data_t *input_E, int is_priv, + int successive ) +{ + /* Exported buffers */ + unsigned char bufNe[256]; + unsigned char bufPe[128]; + unsigned char bufQe[128]; + unsigned char bufDe[256]; + unsigned char bufEe[1]; + + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + + /* Setup RSA context */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( &ctx, + input_N->len ? input_N->x : NULL, input_N->len, + input_P->len ? input_P->x : NULL, input_P->len, + input_Q->len ? input_Q->x : NULL, input_Q->len, + input_D->len ? input_D->x : NULL, input_D->len, + input_E->len ? input_E->x : NULL, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == 0 ); + + /* + * Export parameters and compare to original ones. + */ + + /* N and E must always be present. */ + if( !successive ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( &ctx, bufNe, input_N->len, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + bufEe, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( &ctx, bufNe, input_N->len, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( &ctx, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + bufEe, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( input_N->x, bufNe, input_N->len ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( input_E->x, bufEe, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + + /* If we were providing enough information to setup a complete private context, + * we expect to be able to export all core parameters. */ + + if( is_priv ) + { + if( !successive ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( &ctx, NULL, 0, + bufPe, input_P->len ? input_P->len : sizeof( bufPe ), + bufQe, input_Q->len ? input_Q->len : sizeof( bufQe ), + bufDe, input_D->len ? input_D->len : sizeof( bufDe ), + NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( &ctx, NULL, 0, + bufPe, input_P->len ? input_P->len : sizeof( bufPe ), + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( &ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + bufQe, input_Q->len ? input_Q->len : sizeof( bufQe ), + NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( &ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + bufDe, input_D->len ? input_D->len : sizeof( bufDe ), + NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + } + + if( input_P->len ) + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( input_P->x, bufPe, input_P->len ) == 0 ); + + if( input_Q->len ) + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( input_Q->x, bufQe, input_Q->len ) == 0 ); + + if( input_D->len ) + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( input_D->x, bufDe, input_D->len ) == 0 ); + + } + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG */ +void mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( data_t *input_N, + data_t *input_P, data_t *input_Q, + data_t *input_D, data_t *input_E, + int successive, + int is_priv, + int res_check, + int res_complete ) +{ + /* Buffers used for encryption-decryption test */ + unsigned char *buf_orig = NULL; + unsigned char *buf_enc = NULL; + unsigned char *buf_dec = NULL; + + mbedtls_rsa_context ctx; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + + const char *pers = "test_suite_rsa"; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, + &entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers, + strlen( pers ) ) == 0 ); + + if( !successive ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( &ctx, + ( input_N->len > 0 ) ? input_N->x : NULL, input_N->len, + ( input_P->len > 0 ) ? input_P->x : NULL, input_P->len, + ( input_Q->len > 0 ) ? input_Q->x : NULL, input_Q->len, + ( input_D->len > 0 ) ? input_D->x : NULL, input_D->len, + ( input_E->len > 0 ) ? input_E->x : NULL, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + /* Import N, P, Q, D, E separately. + * This should make no functional difference. */ + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( &ctx, + ( input_N->len > 0 ) ? input_N->x : NULL, input_N->len, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( &ctx, + NULL, 0, + ( input_P->len > 0 ) ? input_P->x : NULL, input_P->len, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( &ctx, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + ( input_Q->len > 0 ) ? input_Q->x : NULL, input_Q->len, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( &ctx, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + ( input_D->len > 0 ) ? input_D->x : NULL, input_D->len, + NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( &ctx, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + ( input_E->len > 0 ) ? input_E->x : NULL, input_E->len ) == 0 ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &ctx ) == res_complete ); + + /* On expected success, perform some public and private + * key operations to check if the key is working properly. */ + if( res_complete == 0 ) + { + if( is_priv ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == res_check ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == res_check ); + + if( res_check != 0 ) + goto exit; + + buf_orig = mbedtls_calloc( 1, mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ); + buf_enc = mbedtls_calloc( 1, mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ); + buf_dec = mbedtls_calloc( 1, mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ); + if( buf_orig == NULL || buf_enc == NULL || buf_dec == NULL ) + goto exit; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctr_drbg, + buf_orig, mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Make sure the number we're generating is smaller than the modulus */ + buf_orig[0] = 0x00; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_public( &ctx, buf_orig, buf_enc ) == 0 ); + + if( is_priv ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_private( &ctx, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, + &ctr_drbg, buf_enc, + buf_dec ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf_orig, buf_dec, + mbedtls_rsa_get_len( &ctx ) ) == 0 ); + } + } + +exit: + + mbedtls_free( buf_orig ); + mbedtls_free( buf_enc ); + mbedtls_free( buf_dec ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); + +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void rsa_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_rsa_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f67731e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.data @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +SHA-1 - Valid parameters +sha1_valid_param: + +SHA-1 - Invalid parameters +sha1_invalid_param: + +# Test the operation of SHA-1 and SHA-2 +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_sha1:"":"da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709" + +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_sha1:"a8":"99f2aa95e36f95c2acb0eaf23998f030638f3f15" + +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_sha1:"3000":"f944dcd635f9801f7ac90a407fbc479964dec024" + +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_sha1:"42749e":"a444319e9b6cc1e8464c511ec0969c37d6bb2619" + +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_sha1:"9fc3fe08":"16a0ff84fcc156fd5d3ca3a744f20a232d172253" + +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_sha1:"b5c1c6f1af":"fec9deebfcdedaf66dda525e1be43597a73a1f93" + +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_sha1:"ec29561244ede706b6eb30a1c371d74450a105c3f9735f7fa9fe38cf67f304a5736a106e92e17139a6813b1c81a4f3d3fb9546ab4296fa9f722826c066869edacd73b2548035185813e22634a9da44000d95a281ff9f264ecce0a931222162d021cca28db5f3c2aa24945ab1e31cb413ae29810fd794cad5dfaf29ec43cb38d198fe4ae1da2359780221405bd6712a5305da4b1b737fce7cd21c0eb7728d08235a9011":"970111c4e77bcc88cc20459c02b69b4aa8f58217" + +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_sha1:"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":"0423dc76a8791107d14e13f5265b343f24cc0f19" + +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #9 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_sha1:"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":"6692a71d73e00f27df976bc56df4970650d90e45" + +SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #10 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C 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+ +SHA-256 Valid parameters +sha256_valid_param: + +SHA-256 Invalid parameters +sha256_invalid_param: + +SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +sha224:"":"d14a028c2a3a2bc9476102bb288234c415a2b01f828ea62ac5b3e42f" + +SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +sha224:"ff":"e33f9d75e6ae1369dbabf81b96b4591ae46bba30b591a6b6c62542b5" + +SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +sha224:"984c":"2fa9df9157d9e027cfbc4c6a9df32e1adc0cbe2328ec2a63c5ae934e" + +SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +sha224:"50efd0":"b5a9820413c2bf8211fbbf5df1337043b32fa4eafaf61a0c8e9ccede" + +SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +sha224:"e5e09924":"fd19e74690d291467ce59f077df311638f1c3a46e510d0e49a67062d" + +SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +sha224:"21ebecb914":"78f4a71c21c694499ce1c7866611b14ace70d905012c356323c7c713" + +SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +sha224:"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":"1302149d1e197c41813b054c942329d420e366530f5517b470e964fe" + +SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_sha256:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855" + +SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_sha256:"bd":"68325720aabd7c82f30f554b313d0570c95accbb7dc4b5aae11204c08ffe732b" + +SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_sha256:"5fd4":"7c4fbf484498d21b487b9d61de8914b2eadaf2698712936d47c3ada2558f6788" + +SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_sha256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803" + +SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_sha256:"c98c8e55":"7abc22c0ae5af26ce93dbb94433a0e0b2e119d014f8e7f65bd56c61ccccd9504" + +SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_sha256:"81a723d966":"7516fb8bb11350df2bf386bc3c33bd0f52cb4c67c6e4745e0488e62c2aea2605" + +SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C 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+ +SHA-512 Invalid parameters +sha512_invalid_param: + +SHA-512 Valid parameters +sha512_valid_param: + +SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +sha384:"":"38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b" + +SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +sha384:"ab":"fb94d5be118865f6fcbc978b825da82cff188faec2f66cb84b2537d74b4938469854b0ca89e66fa2e182834736629f3d" + +SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +sha384:"7c27":"3d80be467df86d63abb9ea1d3f9cb39cd19890e7f2c53a6200bedc5006842b35e820dc4e0ca90ca9b97ab23ef07080fc" + +SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +sha384:"31f5ca":"78d54b943421fdf7ba90a7fb9637c2073aa480454bd841d39ff72f4511fc21fb67797b652c0c823229342873d3bef955" + +SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +sha384:"7bdee3f8":"8bdafba0777ee446c3431c2d7b1fbb631089f71d2ca417abc1d230e1aba64ec2f1c187474a6f4077d372c14ad407f99a" + +SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +sha384:"8f05604915":"504e414bf1db1060f14c8c799e25b1e0c4dcf1504ebbd129998f0ae283e6de86e0d3c7e879c73ec3b1836c3ee89c2649" + +SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +sha384:"665da6eda214":"4c022f112010908848312f8b8f1072625fd5c105399d562ea1d56130619a7eac8dfc3748fd05ee37e4b690be9daa9980" + +SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +sha384:"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":"cba9e3eb12a6f83db11e8a6ff40d1049854ee094416bc527fea931d8585428a8ed6242ce81f6769b36e2123a5c23483e" + +SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_sha512:"":"cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e" + +SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_sha512:"8f":"e4cd2d19931b5aad9c920f45f56f6ce34e3d38c6d319a6e11d0588ab8b838576d6ce6d68eea7c830de66e2bd96458bfa7aafbcbec981d4ed040498c3dd95f22a" + +SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_sha512:"e724":"7dbb520221a70287b23dbcf62bfc1b73136d858e86266732a7fffa875ecaa2c1b8f673b5c065d360c563a7b9539349f5f59bef8c0c593f9587e3cd50bb26a231" + +SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_sha512:"de4c90":"33ce98281045a5c4c9df0363d8196f1d7dfcd5ee46ac89776fd8a4344c12f123a66788af5bd41ceff1941aa5637654b4064c88c14e00465ab79a2fc6c97e1014" + +SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_sha512:"a801e94b":"dadb1b5a27f9fece8d86adb2a51879beb1787ff28f4e8ce162cad7fee0f942efcabbf738bc6f797fc7cc79a3a75048cd4c82ca0757a324695bfb19a557e56e2f" + +SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_sha512:"94390d3502":"b6175c4c4cccf69e0ce5f0312010886ea6b34d43673f942ae42483f9cbb7da817de4e11b5d58e25a3d9bd721a22cdffe1c40411cc45df1911fa5506129b69297" + +SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_sha512:"49297dd63e5f":"1fcc1e6f6870859d11649f5e5336a9cd16329c029baf04d5a6edf257889a2e9522b497dd656bb402da461307c4ee382e2e89380c8e6e6e7697f1e439f650fa94" + +SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_sha512:"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":"8e4bc6f8b8c60fe4d68c61d9b159c8693c3151c46749af58da228442d927f23359bd6ccd6c2ec8fa3f00a86cecbfa728e1ad60b821ed22fcd309ba91a4138bc9" + +SHA-1 Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +sha1_selftest: + +SHA-256 Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +sha256_selftest: + +SHA-512 Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +sha512_selftest: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3477ec7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_shax.function @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +void sha1_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha1_free( NULL ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void sha1_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[64] = { 0 }; + size_t const buflen = sizeof( buf ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha1_init( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha1_clone( NULL, &ctx ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha1_clone( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( NULL, buf, buflen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, NULL, buflen ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha1_ret( NULL, buflen, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf, buflen, NULL ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +void mbedtls_sha1( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash ) +{ + unsigned char output[41]; + + memset(output, 0x00, 41); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha1_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 20, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void sha256_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha256_free( NULL ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void sha256_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[64] = { 0 }; + size_t const buflen = sizeof( buf ); + int valid_type = 0; + int invalid_type = 42; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha256_init( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha256_clone( NULL, &ctx ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha256_clone( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( NULL, valid_type ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx, invalid_type ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( NULL, buf, buflen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, NULL, buflen ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha256_ret( NULL, buflen, + buf, valid_type ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha256_ret( buf, buflen, + NULL, valid_type ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha256_ret( buf, buflen, + buf, invalid_type ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void sha224( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash ) +{ + unsigned char output[57]; + + memset(output, 0x00, 57); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha256_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output, 1 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 28, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +void mbedtls_sha256( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash ) +{ + unsigned char output[65]; + + memset(output, 0x00, 65); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha256_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 32, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +void sha512_valid_param( ) +{ + TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha512_free( NULL ) ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */ +void sha512_invalid_param( ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[64] = { 0 }; + size_t const buflen = sizeof( buf ); + int valid_type = 0; + int invalid_type = 42; + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha512_init( NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha512_clone( NULL, &ctx ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_sha512_clone( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( NULL, valid_type ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx, invalid_type ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( NULL, buf, buflen ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, NULL, buflen ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( NULL, buf ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( &ctx, NULL ) ); + + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha512_ret( NULL, buflen, + buf, valid_type ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha512_ret( buf, buflen, + NULL, valid_type ) ); + TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + mbedtls_sha512_ret( buf, buflen, + buf, invalid_type ) ); + +exit: + return; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +void sha384( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash ) +{ + unsigned char output[97]; + + memset(output, 0x00, 97); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha512_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output, 1 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 48, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +void mbedtls_sha512( data_t * src_str, data_t * hash ) +{ + unsigned char output[129]; + + memset(output, 0x00, 129); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha512_ret( src_str->x, src_str->len, output, 0 ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, hash->x, 64, hash->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void sha1_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha1_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void sha256_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha256_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void sha512_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_sha512_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0e97e6fe --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -0,0 +1,10709 @@ +Test calback buffer sanity +test_callback_buffer_sanity: + +Callback buffer test: Exercise simple write/read +test_callback_buffer:50:25:25:25:25:0:0:0:0 + +Callback buffer test: Filling up the buffer +test_callback_buffer:50:50:50:50:50:0:0:0:0 + +Callback buffer test: Filling up the buffer in two steps +test_callback_buffer:50:20:20:0:0:30:30:50:50 + +Callback buffer test: Reading out the buffer in two steps +test_callback_buffer:50:50:50:30:30:0:0:20:20 + +Callback buffer test: Data wraps in buffer +test_callback_buffer:50:45:45:10:10:10:10:45:45 + +Callback buffer test: Data starts at the end +test_callback_buffer:50:50:50:49:49:10:10:11:11 + +Callback buffer test: Can write less than requested +test_callback_buffer:50:75:50:30:30:25:25:45:45 + +Callback buffer test: Can read less than requested +test_callback_buffer:50:25:25:30:25:5:5:5:5 + +Callback buffer test: Writing to full buffer +test_callback_buffer:50:50:50:0:0:10:0:60:50 + +Callback buffer test: Reading from empty buffer +test_callback_buffer:50:0:0:10:0:0:0:0:0 + +Test mock socket sanity +ssl_mock_sanity: + +Test mock blocking TCP connection +ssl_mock_tcp:1 + +Test mock non-blocking TCP connection +ssl_mock_tcp:0 + +Test mock blocking TCP connection (interleaving) +ssl_mock_tcp_interleaving:1 + +Test mock non-blocking TCP connection (interleaving) +ssl_mock_tcp_interleaving:0 + +Message queue - sanity +ssl_message_queue_sanity: + +Message queue - basic test +ssl_message_queue_basic: + +Message queue - overflow/underflow +ssl_message_queue_overflow_underflow: + +Message queue - interleaved +ssl_message_queue_interleaved: + +Message queue - insufficient buffer +ssl_message_queue_insufficient_buffer: + +Message transport mock - uninitialized structures +ssl_message_mock_uninitialized: + +Message transport mock - basic test +ssl_message_mock_basic: + +Message transport mock - queue overflow/underflow +ssl_message_mock_queue_overflow_underflow: + +Message transport mock - socket overflow +ssl_message_mock_socket_overflow: + +Message transport mock - truncated message +ssl_message_mock_truncated: + +Message transport mock - socket read error +ssl_message_mock_socket_read_error: + +Message transport mock - one-way interleaved sends/reads +ssl_message_mock_interleaved_one_way: + +Message transport mock - two-way interleaved sends/reads +ssl_message_mock_interleaved_two_ways: + +Test mbedtls_endpoint sanity for the client +mbedtls_endpoint_sanity:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT + +Test mbedtls_endpoint sanity for the server +mbedtls_endpoint_sanity:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER + +Test moving clients handshake to state: HELLO_REQUEST +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: CLIENT_HELLO +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: SERVER_HELLO +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: SERVER_CERTIFICATE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: SERVER_HELLO_DONE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: CLIENT_CERTIFICATE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: CLIENT_FINISHED +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: SERVER_FINISHED +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: FLUSH_BUFFERS +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:1 + +Test moving clients handshake to state: HANDSHAKE_OVER +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: HELLO_REQUEST +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: CLIENT_HELLO +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: SERVER_HELLO +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: SERVER_CERTIFICATE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: SERVER_HELLO_DONE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: CLIENT_CERTIFICATE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: CLIENT_FINISHED +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: SERVER_FINISHED +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: FLUSH_BUFFERS +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:1 + +Test moving servers handshake to state: HANDSHAKE_OVER +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER:1 + +Negative test moving clients ssl to state: VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT:0 + +Negative test moving servers ssl to state: NEW_SESSION_TICKET +move_handshake_to_state:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:0 + +Handshake, SSL3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 + +Handshake, tls1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 + +Handshake, tls1_1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 + +Handshake, tls1_2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + +Handshake, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +handshake_cipher:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0 + +Handshake, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +handshake_cipher:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0 + +Handshake, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +handshake_cipher:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0 + +Handshake, ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +handshake_cipher:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0 + +Handshake, ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +handshake_cipher:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0 + +Handshake, PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +handshake_psk_cipher:"TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":0 + +DTLS Handshake, tls1_1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +handshake_version:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 + +DTLS Handshake, tls1_2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +handshake_version:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + +DTLS Handshake, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +handshake_cipher:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1 + +DTLS Handshake, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +handshake_cipher:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1 + +DTLS Handshake, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +handshake_cipher:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1 + +DTLS Handshake, ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +handshake_cipher:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1 + +DTLS Handshake, ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +handshake_cipher:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1 + +DTLS Handshake, PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +handshake_psk_cipher:"TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"abc123":1 + +DTLS Handshake with serialization, tls1_2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +handshake_serialization + +DTLS Handshake fragmentation, MFL=512 +handshake_fragmentation:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:1:1 + +DTLS Handshake fragmentation, MFL=1024 +handshake_fragmentation:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:0:1 + +Handshake min/max version check, all -> 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +handshake_version:0:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + +Handshake min/max version check, cli max 1.1 -> 1.1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +handshake_version:0:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 + +Handshake min/max version check, srv max 1.1 -> 1.1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +handshake_version:0:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 + +Handshake min/max version check, cli+srv max 1.1 -> 1.1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +handshake_version:0:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 + +Handshake min/max version check, cli max 1.1, srv min 1.1 -> 1.1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +handshake_version:0:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 + +Handshake min/max version check, cli min 1.1, srv max 1.1 -> 1.1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 + +Handshake min/max version check, cli min 1.2, srv max 1.1 -> fail +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +handshake_version:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE + +Handshake min/max version check, srv min 1.2, cli max 1.1 -> fail +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +handshake_version:0:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE:TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE + +Sending app data via TLS, MFL=512 without fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:400:512:1:1 + +Sending app data via TLS, MFL=512 with fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:513:1536:2:3 + +Sending app data via TLS, MFL=1024 without fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:1000:1024:1:1 + +Sending app data via TLS, MFL=1024 with fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:1025:5120:2:5 + +Sending app data via TLS, MFL=2048 without fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:2000:2048:1:1 + +Sending app data via TLS, MFL=2048 with fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:2049:8192:2:4 + +Sending app data via TLS, MFL=4096 without fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:4000:4096:1:1 + +Sending app data via TLS, MFL=4096 with fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:4097:12288:2:3 + +Sending app data via TLS without MFL and without fragmentation +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE:16001:16384:1:1 + +Sending app data via TLS without MFL and with fragmentation +app_data_tls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE:16385:100000:2:7 + +Sending app data via DTLS, MFL=512 without fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:400:512:1:1 + +Sending app data via DTLS, MFL=512 with fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:513:1536:0:0 + +Sending app data via DTLS, MFL=1024 without fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:1000:1024:1:1 + +Sending app data via DTLS, MFL=1024 with fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:1025:5120:0:0 + +Sending app data via DTLS, MFL=2048 without fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:2000:2048:1:1 + +Sending app data via DTLS, MFL=2048 with fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:2049:8192:0:0 + +Sending app data via DTLS, MFL=4096 without fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:4000:4096:1:1 + +Sending app data via DTLS, MFL=4096 with fragmentation +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:4097:12288:0:0 + +Sending app data via DTLS, without MFL and without fragmentation +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE:16001:16384:1:1 + +Sending app data via DTLS, without MFL and with fragmentation +app_data_dtls:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE:16385:100000:0:0 + +DTLS renegotiation: no legacy renegotiation +renegotiation:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION + +DTLS renegotiation: legacy renegotiation +renegotiation:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION + +DTLS renegotiation: legacy break handshake +renegotiation:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE + +DTLS serialization with MFL=512 +resize_buffers_serialize_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 + +DTLS serialization with MFL=1024 +resize_buffers_serialize_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 + +DTLS serialization with MFL=2048 +resize_buffers_serialize_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 + +DTLS serialization with MFL=4096 +resize_buffers_serialize_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=512 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=1024 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=2048 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=4096 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=512 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=1024 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=2048 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=4096 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=512 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=1024 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=2048 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=4096 +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=512, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=1024, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=2048, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=4096, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=512, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=1024, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=2048, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=4096, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=512, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=1024, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=2048, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=4096, ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=512, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=1024, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=2048, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=4096, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=512, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=1024, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=2048, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=4096, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=512, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=1024, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=2048, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=4096, RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_AES_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=512, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=1024, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=2048, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS no legacy renegotiation with MFL=4096, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=512, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=1024, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=2048, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS legacy allow renegotiation with MFL=4096, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=512, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=1024, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=2048, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +DTLS legacy break handshake renegotiation with MFL=4096, DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096:MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE:"TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256" + +SSL DTLS replay: initial state, seqnum 0 +ssl_dtls_replay:"":"000000000000":0 + +SSL DTLS replay: 0 seen, 1 arriving +ssl_dtls_replay:"000000000000":"000000000001":0 + +SSL DTLS replay: 0 seen, 0 replayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"000000000000":"000000000000":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: 0-1 seen, 2 arriving +ssl_dtls_replay:"000000000000000000000001":"000000000002":0 + +SSL DTLS replay: 0-1 seen, 1 replayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"000000000000000000000001":"000000000001":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: 0-1 seen, 0 replayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"000000000000000000000001":"000000000000":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: new +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340001abcd12340003":"abcd12340004":0 + +SSL DTLS replay: way new +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340001abcd12340003":"abcd12350000":0 + +SSL DTLS replay: delayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340001abcd12340003":"abcd12340002":0 + +SSL DTLS replay: last replayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340001abcd12340003":"abcd12340003":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: older replayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340001abcd12340003":"abcd12340001":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: most recent in window, replayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340002abcd12340003":"abcd12340002":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: oldest in window, replayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340001abcd1234003f":"abcd12340000":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: oldest in window, not replayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340001abcd12340002abcd1234003f":"abcd12340000":0 + +SSL DTLS replay: just out of the window +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340001abcd12340002abcd1234003f":"abcd1233ffff":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: way out of the window +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340001abcd12340002abcd1234003f":"abcd12330000":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: big jump then replay +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340100":"abcd12340100":-1 + +SSL DTLS replay: big jump then new +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340100":"abcd12340101":0 + +SSL DTLS replay: big jump then just delayed +ssl_dtls_replay:"abcd12340000abcd12340100":"abcd123400ff":0 + +SSL SET_HOSTNAME memory leak: call ssl_set_hostname twice +ssl_set_hostname_twice:"server0":"server1" + +SSL session serialization: Wrong major version +ssl_session_serialize_version_check:1:0:0:0 + +SSL session serialization: Wrong minor version +ssl_session_serialize_version_check:0:1:0:0 + +SSL session serialization: Wrong patch version +ssl_session_serialize_version_check:0:0:1:0 + +SSL session serialization: Wrong config +ssl_session_serialize_version_check:0:0:0:1 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-GCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-GCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-GCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ARC4-128, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, NULL cipher, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, ChachaPoly +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, ChachaPoly, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL +ssl_crypt_record:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ChachaPoly +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ChachaPoly, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ChachaPoly, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ChachaPoly, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, BLOWFISH-CBC, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-GCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-GCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-GCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-GCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CCM, 1.3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, AES-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-128-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-192-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:4 + +Record crypt, little space, CAMELLIA-256-CCM, 1.2, short tag, CID 4+0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:4:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, ARC4-128, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.2, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.1, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-384, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-384, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-256, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-256, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, 1.0, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, SSL3, SHA-1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, SSL3, SHA-1, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, SSL3, SHA-1, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, SSL3, MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, SSL3, MD5, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, SSL3, MD5, short tag +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Record crypt, little space, NULL cipher, SSL3, MD5, short tag, EtM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +ssl_crypt_record_small:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1:MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES MD5 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA1 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA256 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, AES SHA384 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA MD5 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, ARIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA MD5 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA1 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA256 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=240 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:240 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=241 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:241 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:15 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, CAMELLIA SHA384 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 !trunc, padlen=248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:248 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 trunc, padlen=248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:248 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 !trunc, padlen=249 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:249 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 trunc, padlen=249 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:249 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 !trunc, padlen=7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:7 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 trunc, padlen=7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:7 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES MD5 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:248 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 trunc, padlen=248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:248 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=249 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:249 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 trunc, padlen=249 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:249 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:7 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 trunc, padlen=7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:7 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA1 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:248 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 trunc, padlen=248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:248 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=249 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:249 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 trunc, padlen=249 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:249 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:7 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 trunc, padlen=7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:7 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA256 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 !trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 trunc, empty plaintext, minpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:-1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 trunc, empty plaintext, maxpad +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:-2 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:248 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 trunc, padlen=0 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:0 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 trunc, padlen=248 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:248 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=249 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:249 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 trunc, padlen=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:1 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 trunc, padlen=249 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:249 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:7 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 !trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:255 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 trunc, padlen=7 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:7 + +Decrypt CBC !EtM, 3DES SHA384 trunc, padlen=255 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:1:255 + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Secret evolution #1 +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Initial secret to Early Secret +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL +ssl_tls1_3_key_evolution:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"":"":"33ad0a1c607ec03b09e6cd9893680ce210adf300aa1f2660e1b22e10f170f92a" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Secret evolution #2 +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Early secret to Handshake Secret +ssl_tls1_3_key_evolution:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"33ad0a1c607ec03b09e6cd9893680ce210adf300aa1f2660e1b22e10f170f92a":"df4a291baa1eb7cfa6934b29b474baad2697e29f1f920dcc77c8a0a088447624":"fb9fc80689b3a5d02c33243bf69a1b1b20705588a794304a6e7120155edf149a" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Secret evolution #3 +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Handshake secret to Master Secret +ssl_tls1_3_key_evolution:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"fb9fc80689b3a5d02c33243bf69a1b1b20705588a794304a6e7120155edf149a":"":"7f2882bb9b9a46265941653e9c2f19067118151e21d12e57a7b6aca1f8150c8d" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #1 +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Server handshake traffic secret -> Server traffic key +# HKDF-Expand-Label(server_handshake_secret, "key", "", 16) +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a2067265e7f0652a923d5d72ab0467c46132eeb968b6a32d311c805868548814":tls1_3_label_key:"":16:"844780a7acad9f980fa25c114e43402a" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #2 +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Server handshake traffic secret -> Server traffic IV +# HKDF-Expand-Label(server_handshake_secret, "iv", "", 12) +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a2067265e7f0652a923d5d72ab0467c46132eeb968b6a32d311c805868548814":tls1_3_label_iv:"":12:"4c042ddc120a38d1417fc815" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #3 +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Client handshake traffic secret -> Client traffic key +# HKDF-Expand-Label(client_handshake_secret, "key", "", 16) +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"ff0e5b965291c608c1e8cd267eefc0afcc5e98a2786373f0db47b04786d72aea":tls1_3_label_key:"":16:"7154f314e6be7dc008df2c832baa1d39" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #4 +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Client handshake traffic secret -> Client traffic IV +# HKDF-Expand-Label(client_handshake_secret, "iv", "", 12) +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"ff0e5b965291c608c1e8cd267eefc0afcc5e98a2786373f0db47b04786d72aea":tls1_3_label_iv:"":12:"71abc2cae4c699d47c600268" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #5 (RFC 8448) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +# Server handshake traffic secret -> Server traffic IV +# HKDF-Expand-Label(server_handshake_secret, "iv", "", 12) +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b67b7d690cc16c4e75e54213cb2d37b4e9c912bcded9105d42befd59d391ad38":tls1_3_label_iv:"":12:"5d313eb2671276ee13000b30" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #6 (RFC 8448) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +# Server handshake traffic secret -> Server traffic Key +# HKDF-Expand-Label(server_handshake_secret, "key", "", 16) +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b67b7d690cc16c4e75e54213cb2d37b4e9c912bcded9105d42befd59d391ad38":tls1_3_label_key:"":16:"3fce516009c21727d0f2e4e86ee403bc" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #7 (RFC 8448) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +# Client handshake traffic secret -> Client traffic IV +# HKDF-Expand-Label(client_handshake_secret, "iv", "", 12) +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b3eddb126e067f35a780b3abf45e2d8f3b1a950738f52e9600746a0e27a55a21":tls1_3_label_iv:"":12:"5bd3c71b836e0b76bb73265f" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #8 (RFC 8448) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +# Client handshake traffic secret -> Client traffic Key +# HKDF-Expand-Label(client_handshake_secret, "key", "", 16) +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"b3eddb126e067f35a780b3abf45e2d8f3b1a950738f52e9600746a0e27a55a21":tls1_3_label_key:"":16:"dbfaa693d1762c5b666af5d950258d01" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #9 (RFC 8448) +# Calculation of finished_key +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"2faac08f851d35fea3604fcb4de82dc62c9b164a70974d0462e27f1ab278700f":tls1_3_label_finished:"":32:"5ace394c26980d581243f627d1150ae27e37fa52364e0a7f20ac686d09cd0e8e" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: HKDF Expand Label #10 (RFC 8448) +# Calculation of resumption key +ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"7df235f2031d2a051287d02b0241b0bfdaf86cc856231f2d5aba46c434ec196c":tls1_3_label_resumption:"0000":32:"4ecd0eb6ec3b4d87f5d6028f922ca4c5851a277fd41311c9e62d2c9492e1c4f3" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Traffic key generation #1 +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Client/Server handshake traffic secrets -> Client/Server traffic {Key,IV} +ssl_tls1_3_traffic_key_generation:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a2067265e7f0652a923d5d72ab0467c46132eeb968b6a32d311c805868548814":"ff0e5b965291c608c1e8cd267eefc0afcc5e98a2786373f0db47b04786d72aea":12:16:"844780a7acad9f980fa25c114e43402a":"4c042ddc120a38d1417fc815":"7154f314e6be7dc008df2c832baa1d39":"71abc2cae4c699d47c600268" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Traffic key generation #2 (RFC 8448) +# Vector RFC 8448 +# Client/Server handshake traffic secrets -> Client/Server traffic {Key,IV} +ssl_tls1_3_traffic_key_generation:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"a2067265e7f0652a923d5d72ab0467c46132eeb968b6a32d311c805868548814":"ff0e5b965291c608c1e8cd267eefc0afcc5e98a2786373f0db47b04786d72aea":12:16:"844780a7acad9f980fa25c114e43402a":"4c042ddc120a38d1417fc815":"7154f314e6be7dc008df2c832baa1d39":"71abc2cae4c699d47c600268" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Derive-Secret( Early-Secret, "derived", "") +# Tests the case where context isn't yet hashed (empty string here, +# but still needs to be hashed) +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"33ad0a1c607ec03b09e6cd9893680ce210adf300aa1f2660e1b22e10f170f92a":tls1_3_label_derived:"":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED:"6f2615a108c702c5678f54fc9dbab69716c076189c48250cebeac3576c3611ba" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", hash) #1 +# Vector from TLS 1.3 Byte by Byte (https://tls13.ulfheim.net/) +# Derive-Secret( MasterSecret, "s ap traffic", hash) +# Tests the case where context is already hashed +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"7f2882bb9b9a46265941653e9c2f19067118151e21d12e57a7b6aca1f8150c8d":tls1_3_label_s_ap_traffic:"22844b930e5e0a59a09d5ac35fc032fc91163b193874a265236e568077378d8b":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED:"3fc35ea70693069a277956afa23b8f4543ce68ac595f2aace05cd7a1c92023d5" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "c e traffic", hash) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"9b2188e9b2fc6d64d71dc329900e20bb41915000f678aa839cbb797cb7d8332c":tls1_3_label_c_e_traffic:"08ad0fa05d7c7233b1775ba2ff9f4c5b8b59276b7f227f13a976245f5d960913":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED:"3fbbe6a60deb66c30a32795aba0eff7eaa10105586e7be5c09678d63b6caab62" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "e exp master", hash) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"9b2188e9b2fc6d64d71dc329900e20bb41915000f678aa839cbb797cb7d8332c":tls1_3_label_e_exp_master:"08ad0fa05d7c7233b1775ba2ff9f4c5b8b59276b7f227f13a976245f5d960913":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED:"b2026866610937d7423e5be90862ccf24c0e6091186d34f812089ff5be2ef7df" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", hash) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"005cb112fd8eb4ccc623bb88a07c64b3ede1605363fc7d0df8c7ce4ff0fb4ae6":tls1_3_label_c_hs_traffic:"f736cb34fe25e701551bee6fd24c1cc7102a7daf9405cb15d97aafe16f757d03":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED:"2faac08f851d35fea3604fcb4de82dc62c9b164a70974d0462e27f1ab278700f" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", hash) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"005cb112fd8eb4ccc623bb88a07c64b3ede1605363fc7d0df8c7ce4ff0fb4ae6":tls1_3_label_s_hs_traffic:"f736cb34fe25e701551bee6fd24c1cc7102a7daf9405cb15d97aafe16f757d03":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED:"fe927ae271312e8bf0275b581c54eef020450dc4ecffaa05a1a35d27518e7803" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", hash) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"e2d32d4ed66dd37897a0e80c84107503ce58bf8aad4cb55a5002d77ecb890ece":tls1_3_label_c_ap_traffic:"b0aeffc46a2cfe33114e6fd7d51f9f04b1ca3c497dab08934a774a9d9ad7dbf3":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED:"2abbf2b8e381d23dbebe1dd2a7d16a8bf484cb4950d23fb7fb7fa8547062d9a1" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", hash) #2 +# Vector from RFC 8448 +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"e2d32d4ed66dd37897a0e80c84107503ce58bf8aad4cb55a5002d77ecb890ece":tls1_3_label_s_ap_traffic:"b0aeffc46a2cfe33114e6fd7d51f9f04b1ca3c497dab08934a774a9d9ad7dbf3":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED:"cc21f1bf8feb7dd5fa505bd9c4b468a9984d554a993dc49e6d285598fb672691" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", hash) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"e2d32d4ed66dd37897a0e80c84107503ce58bf8aad4cb55a5002d77ecb890ece":tls1_3_label_exp_master:"b0aeffc46a2cfe33114e6fd7d51f9f04b1ca3c497dab08934a774a9d9ad7dbf3":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED:"3fd93d4ffddc98e64b14dd107aedf8ee4add23f4510f58a4592d0b201bee56b4" + +SSL TLS 1.3 Key schedule: Derive-Secret( ., "res master", hash) +# Vector from RFC 8448 +ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"e2d32d4ed66dd37897a0e80c84107503ce58bf8aad4cb55a5002d77ecb890ece":tls1_3_label_res_master:"c3c122e0bd907a4a3ff6112d8fd53dbf89c773d9552e8b6b9d56d361b3a97bf6":32:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED:"5e95bdf1f89005ea2e9aa0ba85e728e3c19c5fe0c699e3f5bee59faebd0b5406" + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE:"":"":"test tls_prf label":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3:"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"test tls_prf label":"3ff3d192aa599255339def5a9723444a":0 + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1 TLS 1.0 enabled +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1:"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"test tls_prf label":"8defca540d41d4c79d390027295bb4e6":0 + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1 TLS 1.1 enabled +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1:"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"test tls_prf label":"8defca540d41d4c79d390027295bb4e6":0 + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384:"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"test tls_prf label":"a4206a36eef93f496611c2b7806625c3":0 + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256:"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"test tls_prf label":"7f9998393198a02c8d731ccc2ef90b2c":0 + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3 not enabled +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3:"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"test tls_prf label":"3ff3d192aa599255339def5a9723444a":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1 TLS 1.X not enabled +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1:"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"test tls_prf label":"8defca540d41d4c79d390027295bb4e6":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384 SHA-512 not enabled +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384:"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"test tls_prf label":"a4206a36eef93f496611c2b7806625c3":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +SSL TLS_PRF MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 SHA-256 not enabled +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_tls_prf:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256:"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef":"test tls_prf label":"7f9998393198a02c8d731ccc2ef90b2c":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +Session serialization, save-load: no ticket, no cert +ssl_serialize_session_save_load:0:"" + +Session serialization, save-load: small ticket, no cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +ssl_serialize_session_save_load:42:"" + +Session serialization, save-load: large ticket, no cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +ssl_serialize_session_save_load:1023:"" + +Session serialization, save-load: no ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_save_load:0:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, save-load: small ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_save_load:42:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, save-load: large ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_save_load:1023:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, load-save: no ticket, no cert +ssl_serialize_session_load_save:0:"" + +Session serialization, load-save: small ticket, no cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +ssl_serialize_session_load_save:42:"" + +Session serialization, load-save: large ticket, no cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +ssl_serialize_session_load_save:1023:"" + +Session serialization, load-save: no ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_load_save:0:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, load-save: small ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_load_save:42:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, load-save: large ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_load_save:1023:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, save buffer size: no ticket, no cert +ssl_serialize_session_save_buf_size:0:"" + +Session serialization, save buffer size: small ticket, no cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +ssl_serialize_session_save_buf_size:42:"" + +Session serialization, save buffer size: large ticket, no cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +ssl_serialize_session_save_buf_size:1023:"" + +Session serialization, save buffer size: no ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_save_buf_size:0:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, save buffer size: small ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_save_buf_size:42:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, save buffer size: large ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_save_buf_size:1023:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, load buffer size: no ticket, no cert +ssl_serialize_session_load_buf_size:0:"" + +Session serialization, load buffer size: small ticket, no cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +ssl_serialize_session_load_buf_size:42:"" + +Session serialization, load buffer size: large ticket, no cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +ssl_serialize_session_load_buf_size:1023:"" + +Session serialization, load buffer size: no ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_load_buf_size:0:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, load buffer size: small ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_load_buf_size:42:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Session serialization, load buffer size: large ticket, cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO +ssl_serialize_session_load_buf_size:1023:"data_files/server5.crt" + +Constant-flow HMAC: MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 + +Constant-flow HMAC: SHA1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 + +Constant-flow HMAC: SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +Constant-flow HMAC: SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 + +# these are the numbers we'd get with an empty plaintext and truncated HMAC +Constant-flow memcpy from offset: small +ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:5:10 + +# we could get this with 255-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-256 +Constant-flow memcpy from offset: medium +ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:255:32 + +# we could get this with 255-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-384 +Constant-flow memcpy from offset: large +ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:100:339:48 + +Raw key agreement: nominal +raw_key_agreement_fail:0 + +Raw key agreement: bad server key +raw_key_agreement_fail:1 + +Cookie parsing: nominal run +cookie_parsing:"16fefd0000000000000000002F010000de000000000000011efefd7b7272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727d00200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR + +Cookie parsing: cookie_len overflow +cookie_parsing:"16fefd000000000000000000ea010000de000000000000011efefd7b7272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727db97b7373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737373737db963":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO + +Cookie parsing: non-zero fragment offset +cookie_parsing:"16fefd00000000000000000032010000de000072000000011efefd7b7272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727d01730143":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO + +Cookie parsing: sid_len overflow +cookie_parsing:"16fefd00000000000000000032010000de000000000000011efefd7b7272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727dFF730143":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO + +Cookie parsing: record too short +cookie_parsing:"16fefd0000000000000000002f010000de000000000000011efefd7b7272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727dFF":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO + +Cookie parsing: one byte overread +cookie_parsing:"16fefd0000000000000000002F010000de000000000000011efefd7b7272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727272727d0001":MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a1e660f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -0,0 +1,4654 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include + +enum +{ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + tls1_3_label_ ## name, +MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL +}; + +typedef struct log_pattern +{ + const char *pattern; + size_t counter; +} log_pattern; + +/* + * This function can be passed to mbedtls to receive output logs from it. In + * this case, it will count the instances of a log_pattern in the received + * logged messages. + */ +void log_analyzer( void *ctx, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + log_pattern *p = (log_pattern *) ctx; + + (void) level; + (void) line; + (void) file; + + if( NULL != p && + NULL != p->pattern && + NULL != strstr( str, p->pattern ) ) + { + p->counter++; + } +} + +/* Invalid minor version used when not specifying a min/max version or expecting a test to fail */ +#define TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE -1 + +typedef struct handshake_test_options +{ + const char *cipher; + int client_min_version; + int client_max_version; + int server_min_version; + int server_max_version; + int expected_negotiated_version; + int pk_alg; + data_t *psk_str; + int dtls; + int srv_auth_mode; + int serialize; + int mfl; + int cli_msg_len; + int srv_msg_len; + int expected_cli_fragments; + int expected_srv_fragments; + int renegotiate; + int legacy_renegotiation; + void *srv_log_obj; + void *cli_log_obj; + void (*srv_log_fun)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); + void (*cli_log_fun)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); + int resize_buffers; +} handshake_test_options; + +void init_handshake_options( handshake_test_options *opts ) +{ + opts->cipher = ""; + opts->client_min_version = TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE; + opts->client_max_version = TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE; + opts->server_min_version = TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE; + opts->server_max_version = TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE; + opts->expected_negotiated_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + opts->pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + opts->psk_str = NULL; + opts->dtls = 0; + opts->srv_auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE; + opts->serialize = 0; + opts->mfl = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE; + opts->cli_msg_len = 100; + opts->srv_msg_len = 100; + opts->expected_cli_fragments = 1; + opts->expected_srv_fragments = 1; + opts->renegotiate = 0; + opts->legacy_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION; + opts->srv_log_obj = NULL; + opts->srv_log_obj = NULL; + opts->srv_log_fun = NULL; + opts->cli_log_fun = NULL; + opts->resize_buffers = 1; +} +/* + * Buffer structure for custom I/O callbacks. + */ + +typedef struct mbedtls_test_buffer +{ + size_t start; + size_t content_length; + size_t capacity; + unsigned char *buffer; +} mbedtls_test_buffer; + +/* + * Initialises \p buf. After calling this function it is safe to call + * `mbedtls_test_buffer_free()` on \p buf. + */ +void mbedtls_test_buffer_init( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf ) +{ + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( *buf ) ); +} + +/* + * Sets up \p buf. After calling this function it is safe to call + * `mbedtls_test_buffer_put()` and `mbedtls_test_buffer_get()` on \p buf. + */ +int mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf, size_t capacity ) +{ + buf->buffer = (unsigned char*) mbedtls_calloc( capacity, + sizeof(unsigned char) ); + if( NULL == buf->buffer ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + buf->capacity = capacity; + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_test_buffer_free( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf ) +{ + if( buf->buffer != NULL ) + mbedtls_free( buf->buffer ); + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( *buf ) ); +} + +/* + * Puts \p input_len bytes from the \p input buffer into the ring buffer \p buf. + * + * \p buf must have been initialized and set up by calling + * `mbedtls_test_buffer_init()` and `mbedtls_test_buffer_setup()`. + * + * \retval \p input_len, if the data fits. + * \retval 0 <= value < \p input_len, if the data does not fit. + * \retval -1, if \p buf is NULL, it hasn't been set up or \p input_len is not + * zero and \p input is NULL. + */ +int mbedtls_test_buffer_put( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len ) +{ + size_t overflow = 0; + + if( ( buf == NULL ) || ( buf->buffer == NULL ) ) + return -1; + + /* Reduce input_len to a number that fits in the buffer. */ + if ( ( buf->content_length + input_len ) > buf->capacity ) + { + input_len = buf->capacity - buf->content_length; + } + + if( input == NULL ) + { + return ( input_len == 0 ) ? 0 : -1; + } + + /* Check if the buffer has not come full circle and free space is not in + * the middle */ + if( buf->start + buf->content_length < buf->capacity ) + { + + /* Calculate the number of bytes that need to be placed at lower memory + * address */ + if( buf->start + buf->content_length + input_len + > buf->capacity ) + { + overflow = ( buf->start + buf->content_length + input_len ) + % buf->capacity; + } + + memcpy( buf->buffer + buf->start + buf->content_length, input, + input_len - overflow ); + memcpy( buf->buffer, input + input_len - overflow, overflow ); + + } + else + { + /* The buffer has come full circle and free space is in the middle */ + memcpy( buf->buffer + buf->start + buf->content_length - buf->capacity, + input, input_len ); + } + + buf->content_length += input_len; + return input_len; +} + +/* + * Gets \p output_len bytes from the ring buffer \p buf into the + * \p output buffer. The output buffer can be NULL, in this case a part of the + * ring buffer will be dropped, if the requested length is available. + * + * \p buf must have been initialized and set up by calling + * `mbedtls_test_buffer_init()` and `mbedtls_test_buffer_setup()`. + * + * \retval \p output_len, if the data is available. + * \retval 0 <= value < \p output_len, if the data is not available. + * \retval -1, if \buf is NULL or it hasn't been set up. + */ +int mbedtls_test_buffer_get( mbedtls_test_buffer *buf, + unsigned char* output, size_t output_len ) +{ + size_t overflow = 0; + + if( ( buf == NULL ) || ( buf->buffer == NULL ) ) + return -1; + + if( output == NULL && output_len == 0 ) + return 0; + + if( buf->content_length < output_len ) + output_len = buf->content_length; + + /* Calculate the number of bytes that need to be drawn from lower memory + * address */ + if( buf->start + output_len > buf->capacity ) + { + overflow = ( buf->start + output_len ) % buf->capacity; + } + + if( output != NULL ) + { + memcpy( output, buf->buffer + buf->start, output_len - overflow ); + memcpy( output + output_len - overflow, buf->buffer, overflow ); + } + + buf->content_length -= output_len; + buf->start = ( buf->start + output_len ) % buf->capacity; + + return output_len; +} + +/* + * Errors used in the message transport mock tests + */ + #define MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_ARG_NULL -11 + #define MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_MESSAGE_TRUNCATED -44 + +/* + * Context for a message metadata queue (fifo) that is on top of the ring buffer. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_test_message_queue +{ + size_t *messages; + int pos; + int num; + int capacity; +} mbedtls_test_message_queue; + +/* + * Setup and free functions for the message metadata queue. + * + * \p capacity describes the number of message metadata chunks that can be held + * within the queue. + * + * \retval 0, if a metadata queue of a given length can be allocated. + * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED, if allocation failed. + */ +int mbedtls_test_message_queue_setup( mbedtls_test_message_queue *queue, + size_t capacity ) +{ + queue->messages = (size_t*) mbedtls_calloc( capacity, sizeof(size_t) ); + if( NULL == queue->messages ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + + queue->capacity = capacity; + queue->pos = 0; + queue->num = 0; + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_test_message_queue_free( mbedtls_test_message_queue *queue ) +{ + if( queue == NULL ) + return; + + if( queue->messages != NULL ) + mbedtls_free( queue->messages ); + + memset( queue, 0, sizeof( *queue ) ); +} + +/* + * Push message length information onto the message metadata queue. + * This will become the last element to leave it (fifo). + * + * \retval MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_ARG_NULL, if the queue is null. + * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, if the queue is full. + * \retval \p len, if the push was successful. + */ +int mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( mbedtls_test_message_queue *queue, + size_t len ) +{ + int place; + if( queue == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_ARG_NULL; + + if( queue->num >= queue->capacity ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE; + + place = ( queue->pos + queue->num ) % queue->capacity; + queue->messages[place] = len; + queue->num++; + return len; +} + +/* + * Pop information about the next message length from the queue. This will be + * the oldest inserted message length(fifo). \p msg_len can be null, in which + * case the data will be popped from the queue but not copied anywhere. + * + * \retval MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_ARG_NULL, if the queue is null. + * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, if the queue is empty. + * \retval message length, if the pop was successful, up to the given + \p buf_len. + */ +int mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( mbedtls_test_message_queue *queue, + size_t buf_len ) +{ + size_t message_length; + if( queue == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_ARG_NULL; + if( queue->num == 0 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + + message_length = queue->messages[queue->pos]; + queue->messages[queue->pos] = 0; + queue->num--; + queue->pos++; + queue->pos %= queue->capacity; + if( queue->pos < 0 ) + queue->pos += queue->capacity; + + return ( message_length > buf_len ) ? buf_len : message_length; +} + +/* + * Take a peek on the info about the next message length from the queue. + * This will be the oldest inserted message length(fifo). + * + * \retval MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_ARG_NULL, if the queue is null. + * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, if the queue is empty. + * \retval 0, if the peek was successful. + * \retval MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_MESSAGE_TRUNCATED, if the given buffer length is + * too small to fit the message. In this case the \p msg_len will be + * set to the full message length so that the + * caller knows what portion of the message can be dropped. + */ +int mbedtls_test_message_queue_peek_info( mbedtls_test_message_queue *queue, + size_t buf_len, size_t* msg_len ) +{ + if( queue == NULL || msg_len == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_ARG_NULL; + if( queue->num == 0 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + + *msg_len = queue->messages[queue->pos]; + return ( *msg_len > buf_len ) ? MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_MESSAGE_TRUNCATED : 0; +} +/* + * Context for the I/O callbacks simulating network connection. + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED 1 + +typedef struct mbedtls_mock_socket +{ + int status; + mbedtls_test_buffer *input; + mbedtls_test_buffer *output; + struct mbedtls_mock_socket *peer; +} mbedtls_mock_socket; + +/* + * Setup and teardown functions for mock sockets. + */ +void mbedtls_mock_socket_init( mbedtls_mock_socket *socket ) +{ + memset( socket, 0, sizeof( *socket ) ); +} + +/* + * Closes the socket \p socket. + * + * \p socket must have been previously initialized by calling + * mbedtls_mock_socket_init(). + * + * This function frees all allocated resources and both sockets are aware of the + * new connection state. + * + * That is, this function does not simulate half-open TCP connections and the + * phenomenon that when closing a UDP connection the peer is not aware of the + * connection having been closed. + */ +void mbedtls_mock_socket_close( mbedtls_mock_socket* socket ) +{ + if( socket == NULL ) + return; + + if( socket->input != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_test_buffer_free( socket->input ); + mbedtls_free( socket->input ); + } + + if( socket->output != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_test_buffer_free( socket->output ); + mbedtls_free( socket->output ); + } + + if( socket->peer != NULL ) + memset( socket->peer, 0, sizeof( *socket->peer ) ); + + memset( socket, 0, sizeof( *socket ) ); +} + +/* + * Establishes a connection between \p peer1 and \p peer2. + * + * \p peer1 and \p peer2 must have been previously initialized by calling + * mbedtls_mock_socket_init(). + * + * The capacites of the internal buffers are set to \p bufsize. Setting this to + * the correct value allows for simulation of MTU, sanity testing the mock + * implementation and mocking TCP connections with lower memory cost. + */ +int mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( mbedtls_mock_socket* peer1, + mbedtls_mock_socket* peer2, + size_t bufsize ) +{ + int ret = -1; + + peer1->output = + (mbedtls_test_buffer*) mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_test_buffer) ); + if( peer1->output == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_test_buffer_init( peer1->output ); + if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( peer1->output, bufsize ) ) ) + { + goto exit; + } + + peer2->output = + (mbedtls_test_buffer*) mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_test_buffer) ); + if( peer2->output == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_test_buffer_init( peer2->output ); + if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( peer2->output, bufsize ) ) ) + { + goto exit; + } + + peer1->peer = peer2; + peer2->peer = peer1; + peer1->input = peer2->output; + peer2->input = peer1->output; + + peer1->status = peer2->status = MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED; + ret = 0; + +exit: + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( peer1 ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( peer2 ); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Callbacks for simulating blocking I/O over connection-oriented transport. + */ + +int mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_mock_socket *socket = (mbedtls_mock_socket*) ctx; + + if( socket == NULL || socket->status != MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED ) + return -1; + + return mbedtls_test_buffer_put( socket->output, buf, len ); +} + +int mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_mock_socket *socket = (mbedtls_mock_socket*) ctx; + + if( socket == NULL || socket->status != MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED ) + return -1; + + return mbedtls_test_buffer_get( socket->input, buf, len ); +} + +/* + * Callbacks for simulating non-blocking I/O over connection-oriented transport. + */ + +int mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_nb( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_mock_socket *socket = (mbedtls_mock_socket*) ctx; + + if( socket == NULL || socket->status != MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED ) + return -1; + + if( socket->output->capacity == socket->output->content_length ) + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE; + } + + return mbedtls_test_buffer_put( socket->output, buf, len ); +} + +int mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_nb( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_mock_socket *socket = (mbedtls_mock_socket*) ctx; + + if( socket == NULL || socket->status != MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED ) + return -1; + + if( socket->input->content_length == 0 ) + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } + + return mbedtls_test_buffer_get( socket->input, buf, len ); +} + +/* Errors used in the message socket mocks */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_CONTEXT_ERROR -55 +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_SEND_FAILED -66 +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_RECV_FAILED -77 + +/* + * Structure used as an addon, or a wrapper, around the mocked sockets. + * Contains an input queue, to which the other socket pushes metadata, + * and an output queue, to which this one pushes metadata. This context is + * considered as an owner of the input queue only, which is initialized and + * freed in the respective setup and free calls. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_test_message_socket_context +{ + mbedtls_test_message_queue* queue_input; + mbedtls_test_message_queue* queue_output; + mbedtls_mock_socket* socket; +} mbedtls_test_message_socket_context; + +void mbedtls_message_socket_init( mbedtls_test_message_socket_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->queue_input = NULL; + ctx->queue_output = NULL; + ctx->socket = NULL; +} + +/* + * Setup a given mesasge socket context including initialization of + * input/output queues to a chosen capacity of messages. Also set the + * corresponding mock socket. + * + * \retval 0, if everything succeeds. + * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED, if allocation of a message + * queue failed. + */ +int mbedtls_message_socket_setup( mbedtls_test_message_queue* queue_input, + mbedtls_test_message_queue* queue_output, + size_t queue_capacity, + mbedtls_mock_socket* socket, + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context* ctx ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_test_message_queue_setup( queue_input, queue_capacity ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return ret; + ctx->queue_input = queue_input; + ctx->queue_output = queue_output; + ctx->socket = socket; + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( socket ); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Close a given message socket context, along with the socket itself. Free the + * memory allocated by the input queue. + */ +void mbedtls_message_socket_close( mbedtls_test_message_socket_context* ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_test_message_queue_free( ctx->queue_input ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( ctx->socket ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( *ctx ) ); +} + +/* + * Send one message through a given message socket context. + * + * \retval \p len, if everything succeeds. + * \retval MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_CONTEXT_ERROR, if any of the needed context + * elements or the context itself is null. + * \retval MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_SEND_FAILED if mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b failed. + * \retval MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, if the output queue is full. + * + * This function will also return any error from + * mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info. + */ +int mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_test_message_queue* queue; + mbedtls_mock_socket* socket; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context *context = (mbedtls_test_message_socket_context*) ctx; + + if( context == NULL || context->socket == NULL + || context->queue_output == NULL ) + { + return MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_CONTEXT_ERROR; + } + + queue = context->queue_output; + socket = context->socket; + + if( queue->num >= queue->capacity ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE; + + if( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b( socket, buf, len ) != (int) len ) + return MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_SEND_FAILED; + + return mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( queue, len ); +} + +/* + * Receive one message from a given message socket context and return message + * length or an error. + * + * \retval message length, if everything succeeds. + * \retval MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_CONTEXT_ERROR, if any of the needed context + * elements or the context itself is null. + * \retval MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_RECV_FAILED if mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b failed. + * + * This function will also return any error other than + * MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_MESSAGE_TRUNCATED from mbedtls_test_message_queue_peek_info. + */ +int mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + mbedtls_test_message_queue* queue; + mbedtls_mock_socket* socket; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context *context = (mbedtls_test_message_socket_context*) ctx; + size_t drop_len = 0; + size_t msg_len; + int ret; + + if( context == NULL || context->socket == NULL + || context->queue_input == NULL ) + { + return MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_CONTEXT_ERROR; + } + + queue = context->queue_input; + socket = context->socket; + + /* Peek first, so that in case of a socket error the data remains in + * the queue. */ + ret = mbedtls_test_message_queue_peek_info( queue, buf_len, &msg_len ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_MESSAGE_TRUNCATED ) + { + /* Calculate how much to drop */ + drop_len = msg_len - buf_len; + + /* Set the requested message len to be buffer length */ + msg_len = buf_len; + } else if( ret != 0 ) + { + return ret; + } + + if( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b( socket, buf, msg_len ) != (int) msg_len ) + return MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_RECV_FAILED; + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_MESSAGE_TRUNCATED ) + { + /* Drop the remaining part of the message */ + if( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b( socket, NULL, drop_len ) != (int) drop_len ) + { + /* Inconsistent state - part of the message was read, + * and a part couldn't. Not much we can do here, but it should not + * happen in test environment, unless forced manually. */ + } + } + mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( queue, buf_len ); + + return msg_len; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +/* + * Structure with endpoint's certificates for SSL communication tests. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_endpoint_certificate +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt ca_cert; + mbedtls_x509_crt cert; + mbedtls_pk_context pkey; +} mbedtls_endpoint_certificate; + +/* + * Endpoint structure for SSL communication tests. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_endpoint +{ + const char *name; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_mock_socket socket; + mbedtls_endpoint_certificate cert; +} mbedtls_endpoint; + +/* + * Initializes \p ep_cert structure and assigns it to endpoint + * represented by \p ep. + * + * \retval 0 on success, otherwise error code. + */ +int mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, int pk_alg ) +{ + int i = 0; + int ret = -1; + mbedtls_endpoint_certificate *cert; + + if( ep == NULL ) + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + cert = &( ep->cert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &( cert->ca_cert ) ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &( cert->cert ) ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &( cert->pkey ) ); + + /* Load the trusted CA */ + + for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas_der[i] != NULL; i++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( &( cert->ca_cert ), + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_der[i], + mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[i] ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + + /* Load own certificate and private key */ + + if( ep->conf.endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &( cert->cert ), + (const unsigned char*) mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &( cert->pkey ), + (const unsigned char*) mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len, NULL, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &( cert->cert ), + (const unsigned char*) mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der, + mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &( cert->pkey ), + (const unsigned char*) mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der, + mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len, NULL, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + } + else + { + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &( cert->cert ), + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der, + mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &( cert->pkey ), + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der, + mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len, NULL, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &( cert->cert ), + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der, + mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &( cert->pkey ), + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der, + mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len, NULL, 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &( ep->conf ), &( cert->ca_cert ), NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &( ep->conf ), &( cert->cert ), + &( cert->pkey ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + +exit: + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->ca_cert ) ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->cert ) ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &( cert->pkey ) ); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Initializes \p ep structure. It is important to call `mbedtls_endpoint_free()` + * after calling this function even if it fails. + * + * \p endpoint_type must be set as MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT. + * \p pk_alg the algorithm to use, currently only MBEDTLS_PK_RSA and + * MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA are supported. + * \p dtls_context - in case of DTLS - this is the context handling metadata. + * \p input_queue - used only in case of DTLS. + * \p output_queue - used only in case of DTLS. + * + * \retval 0 on success, otherwise error code. + */ +int mbedtls_endpoint_init( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, int endpoint_type, int pk_alg, + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context *dtls_context, + mbedtls_test_message_queue *input_queue, + mbedtls_test_message_queue *output_queue, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves ) +{ + int ret = -1; + + if( dtls_context != NULL && ( input_queue == NULL || output_queue == NULL ) ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if( ep == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + memset( ep, 0, sizeof( *ep ) ); + + ep->name = ( endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) ? "Server" : "Client"; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &( ep->ssl ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &( ep->conf ) ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &( ep->ctr_drbg ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &( ep->conf ), + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, + &( ep->ctr_drbg ) ); + mbedtls_entropy_init( &( ep->entropy ) ); + if( dtls_context != NULL ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( input_queue, output_queue, + 100, &( ep->socket ), + dtls_context ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &( ep->socket ) ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &( ep->ctr_drbg ), mbedtls_entropy_func, + &( ep->entropy ), (const unsigned char *) ( ep->name ), + strlen( ep->name ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + /* Non-blocking callbacks without timeout */ + if( dtls_context != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &( ep->ssl ), dtls_context, + mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg, + mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg, + NULL ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &( ep->ssl ), &( ep->socket ), + mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_nb, + mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_nb, + NULL ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &( ep->conf ), endpoint_type, + ( dtls_context != NULL ) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM : + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( curves != NULL ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( &(ep->conf), curves ); +#else + (void) curves; +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &( ep->ssl ), &( ep->conf ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && dtls_context != NULL ) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( &( ep->conf ), NULL, NULL, NULL ); +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( ep, pk_alg ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + +exit: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Deinitializes certificates from endpoint represented by \p ep. + */ +void mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_free( mbedtls_endpoint *ep ) +{ + mbedtls_endpoint_certificate *cert = &( ep->cert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->ca_cert ) ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &( cert->cert ) ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &( cert->pkey ) ); +} + +/* + * Deinitializes endpoint represented by \p ep. + */ +void mbedtls_endpoint_free( mbedtls_endpoint *ep, + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context *context ) +{ + mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_free( ep ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &( ep->ssl ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &( ep->conf ) ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &( ep->ctr_drbg ) ); + mbedtls_entropy_free( &( ep->entropy ) ); + + if( context != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_message_socket_close( context ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &( ep->socket ) ); + } +} + +/* + * This function moves ssl handshake from \p ssl to prescribed \p state. + * /p second_ssl is used as second endpoint and their sockets have to be + * connected before calling this function. + * + * \retval 0 on success, otherwise error code. + */ +int mbedtls_move_handshake_to_state( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_context *second_ssl, + int state ) +{ + enum { BUFFSIZE = 1024 }; + int max_steps = 1000; + int ret = 0; + + if( ssl == NULL || second_ssl == NULL ) + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Perform communication via connected sockets */ + while( ( ssl->state != state ) && ( --max_steps >= 0 ) ) + { + /* If /p second_ssl ends the handshake procedure before /p ssl then + * there is no need to call the next step */ + if( second_ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( second_ssl ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + return ret; + } + } + + /* We only care about the \p ssl state and returns, so we call it last, + * to leave the iteration as soon as the state is as expected. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) + { + return ret; + } + } + + return ( max_steps >= 0 ) ? ret : -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + +/* + * Write application data. Increase write counter if necessary. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, + int buf_len, int *written, + const int expected_fragments ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( ssl, buf + *written, buf_len - *written ); + if( ret > 0 ) + { + *written += ret; + } + + if( expected_fragments == 0 ) + { + /* Used for DTLS and the message size larger than MFL. In that case + * the message can not be fragmented and the library should return + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA error. This error must be returned + * to prevent a dead loop inside mbedtls_exchange_data(). */ + return ret; + } + else if( expected_fragments == 1 ) + { + /* Used for TLS/DTLS and the message size lower than MFL */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == buf_len || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + } + else + { + /* Used for TLS and the message size larger than MFL */ + TEST_ASSERT( expected_fragments > 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ( ret >= 0 && ret <= buf_len ) || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + } + + return 0; + +exit: + /* Some of the tests failed */ + return -1; +} + +/* + * Read application data and increase read counter and fragments counter if necessary. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, + int buf_len, int *read, + int *fragments, const int expected_fragments ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( ssl, buf + *read, buf_len - *read ); + if( ret > 0 ) + { + ( *fragments )++; + *read += ret; + } + + if( expected_fragments == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + else if( expected_fragments == 1 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == buf_len || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( expected_fragments > 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ( ret >= 0 && ret <= buf_len ) || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + } + + return 0; + +exit: + /* Some of the tests failed */ + return -1; +} + +/* + * Helper function setting up inverse record transformations + * using given cipher, hash, EtM mode, authentication tag length, + * and version. + */ + +#define CHK( x ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( !( x ) ) \ + { \ + ret = -1; \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +void set_ciphersuite( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *cipher, + int* forced_ciphersuite ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + forced_ciphersuite[0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( cipher ); + forced_ciphersuite[1] = 0; + + ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( forced_ciphersuite[0] ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ciphersuite_info != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver <= conf->max_minor_ver ); + TEST_ASSERT( ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver >= conf->min_minor_ver ); + + if( conf->max_minor_ver > ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver ) + { + conf->max_minor_ver = ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver; + } + if( conf->min_minor_ver < ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver ) + { + conf->min_minor_ver = ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( conf, forced_ciphersuite ); + +exit: + return; +} + +int psk_dummy_callback( void *p_info, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *name, size_t name_len ) +{ + (void) p_info; + (void) ssl; + (void) name; + (void) name_len; + + return ( 0 ); +} + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#define SSL_CID_LEN_MIN MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#else +#define SSL_CID_LEN_MIN MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX +#endif + +static int build_transforms( mbedtls_ssl_transform *t_in, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *t_out, + int cipher_type, int hash_id, + int etm, int tag_mode, int ver, + size_t cid0_len, + size_t cid1_len ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_info_t const *cipher_info; + int ret = 0; + + size_t keylen, maclen, ivlen; + unsigned char *key0 = NULL, *key1 = NULL; + unsigned char *md0 = NULL, *md1 = NULL; + unsigned char iv_enc[16], iv_dec[16]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char cid0[ SSL_CID_LEN_MIN ]; + unsigned char cid1[ SSL_CID_LEN_MIN ]; + + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, cid0, sizeof( cid0 ) ); + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, cid1, sizeof( cid1 ) ); +#else + ((void) cid0_len); + ((void) cid1_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + maclen = 0; + + /* Pick cipher */ + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ); + CHK( cipher_info != NULL ); + CHK( cipher_info->iv_size <= 16 ); + CHK( cipher_info->key_bitlen % 8 == 0 ); + + /* Pick keys */ + keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + /* Allocate `keylen + 1` bytes to ensure that we get + * a non-NULL pointers from `mbedtls_calloc` even if + * `keylen == 0` in the case of the NULL cipher. */ + CHK( ( key0 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, keylen + 1 ) ) != NULL ); + CHK( ( key1 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, keylen + 1 ) ) != NULL ); + memset( key0, 0x1, keylen ); + memset( key1, 0x2, keylen ); + + /* Setup cipher contexts */ + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &t_in->cipher_ctx_enc, cipher_info ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &t_in->cipher_ctx_dec, cipher_info ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &t_out->cipher_ctx_enc, cipher_info ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_setup( &t_out->cipher_ctx_dec, cipher_info ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &t_in->cipher_ctx_enc, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &t_in->cipher_ctx_dec, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &t_out->cipher_ctx_enc, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &t_out->cipher_ctx_dec, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) == 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &t_in->cipher_ctx_enc, key0, + keylen << 3, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &t_in->cipher_ctx_dec, key1, + keylen << 3, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &t_out->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, + keylen << 3, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &t_out->cipher_ctx_dec, key0, + keylen << 3, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) == 0 ); + + /* Setup MAC contexts */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + mbedtls_md_info_t const *md_info; + + /* Pick hash */ + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_id ); + CHK( md_info != NULL ); + + /* Pick hash keys */ + maclen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + CHK( ( md0 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, maclen ) ) != NULL ); + CHK( ( md1 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, maclen ) ) != NULL ); + memset( md0, 0x5, maclen ); + memset( md1, 0x6, maclen ); + + CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &t_out->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1 ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &t_out->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1 ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &t_in->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1 ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &t_in->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1 ) == 0 ); + + if( ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &t_in->md_ctx_enc, + md0, maclen ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &t_in->md_ctx_dec, + md1, maclen ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &t_out->md_ctx_enc, + md1, maclen ) == 0 ); + CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &t_out->md_ctx_dec, + md0, maclen ) == 0 ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + else + { + memcpy( &t_in->mac_enc, md0, maclen ); + memcpy( &t_in->mac_dec, md1, maclen ); + memcpy( &t_out->mac_enc, md1, maclen ); + memcpy( &t_out->mac_dec, md0, maclen ); + } +#endif + } +#else + ((void) hash_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + + + /* Pick IV's (regardless of whether they + * are being used by the transform). */ + ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size; + memset( iv_enc, 0x3, sizeof( iv_enc ) ); + memset( iv_dec, 0x4, sizeof( iv_dec ) ); + + /* + * Setup transforms + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + t_out->encrypt_then_mac = etm; + t_in->encrypt_then_mac = etm; +#else + ((void) etm); +#endif + + t_out->minor_ver = ver; + t_in->minor_ver = ver; + t_out->ivlen = ivlen; + t_in->ivlen = ivlen; + + switch( cipher_info->mode ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + t_out->fixed_ivlen = 12; + t_in->fixed_ivlen = 12; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + { + t_out->fixed_ivlen = 4; + t_in->fixed_ivlen = 4; + } + t_out->maclen = 0; + t_in->maclen = 0; + switch( tag_mode ) + { + case 0: /* Full tag */ + t_out->taglen = 16; + t_in->taglen = 16; + break; + case 1: /* Partial tag */ + t_out->taglen = 8; + t_in->taglen = 8; + break; + default: + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY: + t_out->fixed_ivlen = 12; + t_in->fixed_ivlen = 12; + t_out->maclen = 0; + t_in->maclen = 0; + switch( tag_mode ) + { + case 0: /* Full tag */ + t_out->taglen = 16; + t_in->taglen = 16; + break; + case 1: /* Partial tag */ + t_out->taglen = 8; + t_in->taglen = 8; + break; + default: + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + t_out->fixed_ivlen = 0; /* redundant, must be 0 */ + t_in->fixed_ivlen = 0; /* redundant, must be 0 */ + t_out->taglen = 0; + t_in->taglen = 0; + switch( tag_mode ) + { + case 0: /* Full tag */ + t_out->maclen = maclen; + t_in->maclen = maclen; + break; + case 1: /* Partial tag */ + t_out->maclen = 10; + t_in->maclen = 10; + break; + default: + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + break; + default: + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + break; + } + + /* Setup IV's */ + + memcpy( &t_in->iv_dec, iv_dec, sizeof( iv_dec ) ); + memcpy( &t_in->iv_enc, iv_enc, sizeof( iv_enc ) ); + memcpy( &t_out->iv_dec, iv_enc, sizeof( iv_enc ) ); + memcpy( &t_out->iv_enc, iv_dec, sizeof( iv_dec ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Add CID */ + memcpy( &t_in->in_cid, cid0, cid0_len ); + memcpy( &t_in->out_cid, cid1, cid1_len ); + t_in->in_cid_len = cid0_len; + t_in->out_cid_len = cid1_len; + memcpy( &t_out->in_cid, cid1, cid1_len ); + memcpy( &t_out->out_cid, cid0, cid0_len ); + t_out->in_cid_len = cid1_len; + t_out->out_cid_len = cid0_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_free( key0 ); + mbedtls_free( key1 ); + + mbedtls_free( md0 ); + mbedtls_free( md1 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Populate a session structure for serialization tests. + * Choose dummy values, mostly non-0 to distinguish from the init default. + */ +static int ssl_populate_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + int ticket_len, + const char *crt_file ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + session->start = mbedtls_time( NULL ) - 42; +#endif + session->ciphersuite = 0xabcd; + session->compression = 1; + session->id_len = sizeof( session->id ); + memset( session->id, 66, session->id_len ); + memset( session->master, 17, sizeof( session->master ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + if( strlen( crt_file ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt tmp_crt; + int ret; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &tmp_crt ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &tmp_crt, crt_file ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* Move temporary CRT. */ + session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *session->peer_cert ) ); + if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + *session->peer_cert = tmp_crt; + memset( &tmp_crt, 0, sizeof( tmp_crt ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Calculate digest of temporary CRT. */ + session->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ); + if( session->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE ), + tmp_crt.raw.p, tmp_crt.raw.len, + session->peer_cert_digest ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + session->peer_cert_digest_type = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &tmp_crt ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + (void) crt_file; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + session->verify_result = 0xdeadbeef; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ticket_len != 0 ) + { + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ); + if( session->ticket == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + memset( session->ticket, 33, ticket_len ); + } + session->ticket_len = ticket_len; + session->ticket_lifetime = 86401; +#else + (void) ticket_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + session->mfl_code = 1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + session->trunc_hmac = 1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + session->encrypt_then_mac = 1; +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Perform data exchanging between \p ssl_1 and \p ssl_2 and check if the + * message was sent in the correct number of fragments. + * + * /p ssl_1 and /p ssl_2 Endpoints represented by mbedtls_ssl_context. Both + * of them must be initialized and connected beforehand. + * /p msg_len_1 and /p msg_len_2 specify the size of the message to send. + * /p expected_fragments_1 and /p expected_fragments_2 determine in how many + * fragments the message should be sent. + * expected_fragments is 0: can be used for DTLS testing while the message + * size is larger than MFL. In that case the message + * cannot be fragmented and sent to the second endpoint. + * This value can be used for negative tests. + * expected_fragments is 1: can be used for TLS/DTLS testing while the + * message size is below MFL + * expected_fragments > 1: can be used for TLS testing while the message + * size is larger than MFL + * + * \retval 0 on success, otherwise error code. + */ +int mbedtls_exchange_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl_1, + int msg_len_1, const int expected_fragments_1, + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl_2, + int msg_len_2, const int expected_fragments_2 ) +{ + unsigned char *msg_buf_1 = malloc( msg_len_1 ); + unsigned char *msg_buf_2 = malloc( msg_len_2 ); + unsigned char *in_buf_1 = malloc( msg_len_2 ); + unsigned char *in_buf_2 = malloc( msg_len_1 ); + int msg_type, ret = -1; + + /* Perform this test with two message types. At first use a message + * consisting of only 0x00 for the client and only 0xFF for the server. + * At the second time use message with generated data */ + for( msg_type = 0; msg_type < 2; msg_type++ ) + { + int written_1 = 0; + int written_2 = 0; + int read_1 = 0; + int read_2 = 0; + int fragments_1 = 0; + int fragments_2 = 0; + + if( msg_type == 0 ) + { + memset( msg_buf_1, 0x00, msg_len_1 ); + memset( msg_buf_2, 0xff, msg_len_2 ); + } + else + { + int i, j = 0; + for( i = 0; i < msg_len_1; i++ ) + { + msg_buf_1[i] = j++ & 0xFF; + } + for( i = 0; i < msg_len_2; i++ ) + { + msg_buf_2[i] = ( j -= 5 ) & 0xFF; + } + } + + while( read_1 < msg_len_2 || read_2 < msg_len_1 ) + { + /* ssl_1 sending */ + if( msg_len_1 > written_1 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_fragment( ssl_1, msg_buf_1, + msg_len_1, &written_1, + expected_fragments_1 ); + if( expected_fragments_1 == 0 ) + { + /* This error is expected when the message is too large and + * cannot be fragmented */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + msg_len_1 = 0; + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + } + + /* ssl_2 sending */ + if( msg_len_2 > written_2 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_fragment( ssl_2, msg_buf_2, + msg_len_2, &written_2, + expected_fragments_2 ); + if( expected_fragments_2 == 0 ) + { + /* This error is expected when the message is too large and + * cannot be fragmented */ + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + msg_len_2 = 0; + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + } + + /* ssl_1 reading */ + if( read_1 < msg_len_2 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_fragment( ssl_1, in_buf_1, + msg_len_2, &read_1, + &fragments_2, + expected_fragments_2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + + /* ssl_2 reading */ + if( read_2 < msg_len_1 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_fragment( ssl_2, in_buf_2, + msg_len_1, &read_2, + &fragments_1, + expected_fragments_1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + } + + ret = -1; + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( msg_buf_1, in_buf_2, msg_len_1 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( msg_buf_2, in_buf_1, msg_len_2 ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( fragments_1 == expected_fragments_1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( fragments_2 == expected_fragments_2 ); + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + free( msg_buf_1 ); + free( in_buf_1 ); + free( msg_buf_2 ); + free( in_buf_2 ); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Perform data exchanging between \p ssl_1 and \p ssl_2. Both of endpoints + * must be initialized and connected beforehand. + * + * \retval 0 on success, otherwise error code. + */ +int exchange_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl_1, + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl_2 ) +{ + return mbedtls_exchange_data( ssl_1, 256, 1, + ssl_2, 256, 1 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +void perform_handshake( handshake_test_options* options ) +{ + /* forced_ciphersuite needs to last until the end of the handshake */ + int forced_ciphersuite[2]; + enum { BUFFSIZE = 17000 }; + mbedtls_endpoint client, server; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + const char *psk_identity = "foo"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_timing_delay_context timer_client, timer_server; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + unsigned char *context_buf = NULL; + size_t context_buf_len; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int ret = -1; +#endif + int expected_handshake_result = 0; + + mbedtls_test_message_queue server_queue, client_queue; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context; + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context ); + + /* Client side */ + if( options->dtls != 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + options->pk_alg, &client_context, + &client_queue, + &server_queue, NULL ) == 0 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &client.ssl, &timer_client, + mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); +#endif + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + options->pk_alg, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + } + + if( options->client_min_version != TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( &client.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + options->client_min_version ); + } + + if( options->client_max_version != TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( &client.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + options->client_max_version ); + } + + if( strlen( options->cipher ) > 0 ) + { + set_ciphersuite( &client.conf, options->cipher, forced_ciphersuite ); + } + +#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( options->cli_log_fun ) + { + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( 4 ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &client.conf, options->cli_log_fun, + options->cli_log_obj ); + } +#endif + + /* Server side */ + if( options->dtls != 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + options->pk_alg, &server_context, + &server_queue, + &client_queue, NULL ) == 0 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &server.ssl, &timer_server, + mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); +#endif + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + options->pk_alg, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) == 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &server.conf, options->srv_auth_mode ); + + if( options->server_min_version != TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( &server.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + options->server_min_version ); + } + + if( options->server_max_version != TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( &server.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + options->server_max_version ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( &(server.conf), + (unsigned char) options->mfl ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( &(client.conf), + (unsigned char) options->mfl ) == 0 ); +#else + TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE == options->mfl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( options->psk_str != NULL && options->psk_str->len > 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &client.conf, options->psk_str->x, + options->psk_str->len, + (const unsigned char *) psk_identity, + strlen( psk_identity ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &server.conf, options->psk_str->x, + options->psk_str->len, + (const unsigned char *) psk_identity, + strlen( psk_identity ) ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( &server.conf, psk_dummy_callback, NULL ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( options->renegotiate ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( &(server.conf), + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( &(client.conf), + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED ); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( &(server.conf), + options->legacy_renegotiation ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( &(client.conf), + options->legacy_renegotiation ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( options->srv_log_fun ) + { + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( 4 ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &server.conf, options->srv_log_fun, + options->srv_log_obj ); + } +#endif + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &(client.socket), + &(server.socket), + BUFFSIZE ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + if( options->resize_buffers != 0 ) + { + /* Ensure that the buffer sizes are appropriate before resizes */ + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.out_buf_len == MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.in_buf_len == MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.out_buf_len == MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.in_buf_len == MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); + } +#endif + + if( options->expected_negotiated_version == TEST_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_NONE ) + { + expected_handshake_result = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_move_handshake_to_state( &(client.ssl), + &(server.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + == expected_handshake_result ); + + if( expected_handshake_result != 0 ) + { + /* Connection will have failed by this point, skip to cleanup */ + goto exit; + } + + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ); + + /* Check that we agree on the version... */ + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.minor_ver == server.ssl.minor_ver ); + + /* And check that the version negotiated is the expected one. */ + TEST_EQUAL( client.ssl.minor_ver, options->expected_negotiated_version ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + if( options->resize_buffers != 0 ) + { + if( options->expected_negotiated_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && + options->expected_negotiated_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + /* A server, when using DTLS, might delay a buffer resize to happen + * after it receives a message, so we force it. */ + TEST_ASSERT( exchange_data( &(client.ssl), &(server.ssl) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.out_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( &client.ssl ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.in_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( &client.ssl ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.out_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( &server.ssl ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.in_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( &server.ssl ) ); + } + } +#endif + + if( options->cli_msg_len != 0 || options->srv_msg_len != 0 ) + { + /* Start data exchanging test */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_exchange_data( &(client.ssl), options->cli_msg_len, + options->expected_cli_fragments, + &(server.ssl), options->srv_msg_len, + options->expected_srv_fragments ) + == 0 ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + if( options->serialize == 1 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( options->dtls == 1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_context_save( &(server.ssl), NULL, + 0, &context_buf_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + context_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, context_buf_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( context_buf != NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_context_save( &(server.ssl), context_buf, + context_buf_len, + &context_buf_len ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &(server.ssl) ); + mbedtls_ssl_init( &(server.ssl) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &(server.ssl), &(server.conf) ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &( server.ssl ), &server_context, + mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg, + mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg, + NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &server.ssl, &timer_server, + mbedtls_timing_set_delay, + mbedtls_timing_get_delay ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + if( options->resize_buffers != 0 ) + { + /* Ensure that the buffer sizes are appropriate before resizes */ + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.out_buf_len == MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.in_buf_len == MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); + } +#endif + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_context_load( &( server.ssl ), context_buf, + context_buf_len ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* Validate buffer sizes after context deserialization */ + if( options->resize_buffers != 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.out_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( &server.ssl ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.in_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( &server.ssl ) ); + } +#endif + /* Retest writing/reading */ + if( options->cli_msg_len != 0 || options->srv_msg_len != 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_exchange_data( &(client.ssl), + options->cli_msg_len, + options->expected_cli_fragments, + &(server.ssl), + options->srv_msg_len, + options->expected_srv_fragments ) + == 0 ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( options->renegotiate ) + { + /* Start test with renegotiation */ + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ); + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ); + + /* After calling this function for the server, it only sends a handshake + * request. All renegotiation should happen during data exchanging */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( &(server.ssl) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ); + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ); + + TEST_ASSERT( exchange_data( &(client.ssl), &(server.ssl) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE ); + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE ); + + /* After calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate for the client all renegotiation + * should happen inside this function. However in this test, we cannot + * perform simultaneous communication between client and server so this + * function will return waiting error on the socket. All rest of + * renegotiation should happen during data exchanging */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( &(client.ssl) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + if( options->resize_buffers != 0 ) + { + /* Ensure that the buffer sizes are appropriate before resizes */ + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.out_buf_len == MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.in_buf_len == MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ); + } +#endif + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE ); + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ); + + TEST_ASSERT( exchange_data( &(client.ssl), &(server.ssl) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE ); + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.renego_status == + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* Validate buffer sizes after renegotiation */ + if( options->resize_buffers != 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.out_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( &client.ssl ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( client.ssl.in_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( &client.ssl ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.out_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( &server.ssl ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( server.ssl.in_buf_len == + mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( &server.ssl ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +exit: + mbedtls_endpoint_free( &client, options->dtls != 0 ? &client_context : NULL ); + mbedtls_endpoint_free( &server, options->dtls != 0 ? &server_context : NULL ); +#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( options->cli_log_fun || options->srv_log_fun ) + { + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( 0 ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + if( context_buf != NULL ) + mbedtls_free( context_buf ); +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void test_callback_buffer_sanity() +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 10 }; + mbedtls_test_buffer buf; + unsigned char input[MSGLEN]; + unsigned char output[MSGLEN]; + + memset( input, 0, sizeof(input) ); + + /* Make sure calling put and get on NULL buffer results in error. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( NULL, input, sizeof( input ) ) + == -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( NULL, output, sizeof( output ) ) + == -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( NULL, NULL, sizeof( input ) ) == -1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( NULL, NULL, 0 ) == -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( NULL, NULL, 0 ) == -1 ); + + /* Make sure calling put and get on a buffer that hasn't been set up results + * in error. */ + mbedtls_test_buffer_init( &buf ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, sizeof( input ) ) == -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, output, sizeof( output ) ) + == -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, NULL, sizeof( input ) ) == -1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, NULL, 0 ) == -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, NULL, 0 ) == -1 ); + + /* Make sure calling put and get on NULL input only results in + * error if the length is not zero, and that a NULL output is valid for data + * dropping. + */ + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( &buf, sizeof( input ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, NULL, sizeof( input ) ) == -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, NULL, sizeof( output ) ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, NULL, 0 ) == 0 ); + + /* Make sure calling put several times in the row is safe */ + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, sizeof( input ) ) + == sizeof( input ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, output, 2 ) == 2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, 2 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, input, 2 ) == 0 ); + + +exit: + + mbedtls_test_buffer_free( &buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* + * Test if the implementation of `mbedtls_test_buffer` related functions is + * correct and works as expected. + * + * That is + * - If we try to put in \p put1 bytes then we can put in \p put1_ret bytes. + * - Afterwards if we try to get \p get1 bytes then we can get \get1_ret bytes. + * - Next, if we try to put in \p put1 bytes then we can put in \p put1_ret + * bytes. + * - Afterwards if we try to get \p get1 bytes then we can get \get1_ret bytes. + * - All of the bytes we got match the bytes we put in in a FIFO manner. + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void test_callback_buffer( int size, int put1, int put1_ret, + int get1, int get1_ret, int put2, int put2_ret, + int get2, int get2_ret ) +{ + enum { ROUNDS = 2 }; + size_t put[ROUNDS]; + int put_ret[ROUNDS]; + size_t get[ROUNDS]; + int get_ret[ROUNDS]; + mbedtls_test_buffer buf; + unsigned char* input = NULL; + size_t input_len; + unsigned char* output = NULL; + size_t output_len; + size_t i, j, written, read; + + mbedtls_test_buffer_init( &buf ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_buffer_setup( &buf, size ) == 0 ); + + /* Check the sanity of input parameters and initialise local variables. That + * is, ensure that the amount of data is not negative and that we are not + * expecting more to put or get than we actually asked for. */ + TEST_ASSERT( put1 >= 0 ); + put[0] = put1; + put_ret[0] = put1_ret; + TEST_ASSERT( put1_ret <= put1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( put2 >= 0 ); + put[1] = put2; + put_ret[1] = put2_ret; + TEST_ASSERT( put2_ret <= put2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( get1 >= 0 ); + get[0] = get1; + get_ret[0] = get1_ret; + TEST_ASSERT( get1_ret <= get1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( get2 >= 0 ); + get[1] = get2; + get_ret[1] = get2_ret; + TEST_ASSERT( get2_ret <= get2 ); + + input_len = 0; + /* Calculate actual input and output lengths */ + for( j = 0; j < ROUNDS; j++ ) + { + if( put_ret[j] > 0 ) + { + input_len += put_ret[j]; + } + } + /* In order to always have a valid pointer we always allocate at least 1 + * byte. */ + if( input_len == 0 ) + input_len = 1; + ASSERT_ALLOC( input, input_len ); + + output_len = 0; + for( j = 0; j < ROUNDS; j++ ) + { + if( get_ret[j] > 0 ) + { + output_len += get_ret[j]; + } + } + TEST_ASSERT( output_len <= input_len ); + /* In order to always have a valid pointer we always allocate at least 1 + * byte. */ + if( output_len == 0 ) + output_len = 1; + ASSERT_ALLOC( output, output_len ); + + /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < input_len; i++ ) + { + input[i] = i & 0xFF; + } + + written = read = 0; + for( j = 0; j < ROUNDS; j++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( put_ret[j] == mbedtls_test_buffer_put( &buf, + input + written, put[j] ) ); + written += put_ret[j]; + TEST_ASSERT( get_ret[j] == mbedtls_test_buffer_get( &buf, + output + read, get[j] ) ); + read += get_ret[j]; + TEST_ASSERT( read <= written ); + if( get_ret[j] > 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output + read - get_ret[j], + input + read - get_ret[j], get_ret[j] ) + == 0 ); + } + } + +exit: + + mbedtls_free( input ); + mbedtls_free( output ); + mbedtls_test_buffer_free( &buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* + * Test if the implementation of `mbedtls_mock_socket` related I/O functions is + * correct and works as expected on unconnected sockets. + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_mock_sanity( ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 105 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN] = { 0 }; + unsigned char received[MSGLEN] = { 0 }; + mbedtls_mock_socket socket; + + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &socket ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b( &socket, message, MSGLEN ) < 0 ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &socket ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b( &socket, received, MSGLEN ) < 0 ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket ); + + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &socket ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_nb( &socket, message, MSGLEN ) < 0 ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &socket ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_nb( &socket, received, MSGLEN ) < 0 ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket ); + +exit: + + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &socket ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* + * Test if the implementation of `mbedtls_mock_socket` related functions can + * send a single message from the client to the server. + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_mock_tcp( int blocking ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 105 }; + enum { BUFLEN = MSGLEN / 5 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN]; + unsigned char received[MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client; + mbedtls_mock_socket server; + size_t written, read; + int send_ret, recv_ret; + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *send; + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *recv; + unsigned i; + + if( blocking == 0 ) + { + send = mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_nb; + recv = mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_nb; + } + else + { + send = mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b; + recv = mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b; + } + + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &client ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &server ); + + /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < MSGLEN; i++ ) + { + message[i] = i & 0xFF; + } + + /* Make sure that sending a message takes a few iterations. */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, BUFLEN ) ); + + /* Send the message to the server */ + send_ret = recv_ret = 1; + written = read = 0; + while( send_ret != 0 || recv_ret != 0 ) + { + send_ret = send( &client, message + written, MSGLEN - written ); + + TEST_ASSERT( send_ret >= 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( send_ret <= BUFLEN ); + written += send_ret; + + /* If the buffer is full we can test blocking and non-blocking send */ + if ( send_ret == BUFLEN ) + { + int blocking_ret = send( &client, message , 1 ); + if ( blocking ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + } + } + + recv_ret = recv( &server, received + read, MSGLEN - read ); + + /* The result depends on whether any data was sent */ + if ( send_ret > 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret > 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret <= BUFLEN ); + read += recv_ret; + } + else if( blocking ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + recv_ret = 0; + } + + /* If the buffer is empty we can test blocking and non-blocking read */ + if ( recv_ret == BUFLEN ) + { + int blocking_ret = recv( &server, received, 1 ); + if ( blocking ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } + } + } + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + +exit: + + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &client ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &server ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* + * Test if the implementation of `mbedtls_mock_socket` related functions can + * send messages in both direction at the same time (with the I/O calls + * interleaving). + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_mock_tcp_interleaving( int blocking ) +{ + enum { ROUNDS = 2 }; + enum { MSGLEN = 105 }; + enum { BUFLEN = MSGLEN / 5 }; + unsigned char message[ROUNDS][MSGLEN]; + unsigned char received[ROUNDS][MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client; + mbedtls_mock_socket server; + size_t written[ROUNDS]; + size_t read[ROUNDS]; + int send_ret[ROUNDS]; + int recv_ret[ROUNDS]; + unsigned i, j, progress; + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *send; + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *recv; + + if( blocking == 0 ) + { + send = mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_nb; + recv = mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_nb; + } + else + { + send = mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_b; + recv = mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_b; + } + + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &client ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_init( &server ); + + /* Fill up the buffers with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ ) + { + for( j = 0; j < MSGLEN; j++ ) + { + message[i][j] = ( i * MSGLEN + j ) & 0xFF; + } + } + + /* Make sure that sending a message takes a few iterations. */ + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, BUFLEN ) ); + + /* Send the message from both sides, interleaving. */ + progress = 1; + for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ ) + { + written[i] = 0; + read[i] = 0; + } + /* This loop does not stop as long as there was a successful write or read + * of at least one byte on either side. */ + while( progress != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mock_socket *socket; + + for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ ) + { + /* First sending is from the client */ + socket = ( i % 2 == 0 ) ? ( &client ) : ( &server ); + + send_ret[i] = send( socket, message[i] + written[i], + MSGLEN - written[i] ); + TEST_ASSERT( send_ret[i] >= 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( send_ret[i] <= BUFLEN ); + written[i] += send_ret[i]; + + /* If the buffer is full we can test blocking and non-blocking + * send */ + if ( send_ret[i] == BUFLEN ) + { + int blocking_ret = send( socket, message[i] , 1 ); + if ( blocking ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + } + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ ) + { + /* First receiving is from the server */ + socket = ( i % 2 == 0 ) ? ( &server ) : ( &client ); + + recv_ret[i] = recv( socket, received[i] + read[i], + MSGLEN - read[i] ); + + /* The result depends on whether any data was sent */ + if ( send_ret[i] > 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret[i] > 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret[i] <= BUFLEN ); + read[i] += recv_ret[i]; + } + else if( blocking ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret[i] == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( recv_ret[i] == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + recv_ret[i] = 0; + } + + /* If the buffer is empty we can test blocking and non-blocking + * read */ + if ( recv_ret[i] == BUFLEN ) + { + int blocking_ret = recv( socket, received[i], 1 ); + if ( blocking ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( blocking_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } + } + } + + progress = 0; + for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ ) + { + progress += send_ret[i] + recv_ret[i]; + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++ ) + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message[i], received[i], MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + +exit: + + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &client ); + mbedtls_mock_socket_close( &server ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_queue_sanity( ) +{ + mbedtls_test_message_queue queue; + + /* Trying to push/pull to an empty queue */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( NULL, 1 ) + == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_ARG_NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( NULL, 1 ) + == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_ARG_NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_setup( &queue, 3 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( queue.capacity == 3 ); + TEST_ASSERT( queue.num == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_test_message_queue_free( &queue ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_queue_basic( ) +{ + mbedtls_test_message_queue queue; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_setup( &queue, 3 ) == 0 ); + + /* Sanity test - 3 pushes and 3 pops with sufficient space */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( queue.capacity == 3 ); + TEST_ASSERT( queue.num == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( queue.capacity == 3 ); + TEST_ASSERT( queue.num == 2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 2 ) == 2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( queue.capacity == 3 ); + TEST_ASSERT( queue.num == 3 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 2 ) == 2 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_test_message_queue_free( &queue ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_queue_overflow_underflow( ) +{ + mbedtls_test_message_queue queue; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_setup( &queue, 3 ) == 0 ); + + /* 4 pushes (last one with an error), 4 pops (last one with an error) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 2 ) == 2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 3 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 2 ) == 2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 1 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + +exit: + mbedtls_test_message_queue_free( &queue ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_queue_interleaved( ) +{ + mbedtls_test_message_queue queue; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_setup( &queue, 3 ) == 0 ); + + /* Interleaved test - [2 pushes, 1 pop] twice, and then two pops + * (to wrap around the buffer) */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 2 ) == 2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 3 ) == 3 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 1 ) == 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 2 ) == 2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 5 ) == 5 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, 8 ) == 8 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 3 ) == 3 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 5 ) == 5 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, 8 ) == 8 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_test_message_queue_free( &queue ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_queue_insufficient_buffer( ) +{ + mbedtls_test_message_queue queue; + size_t message_len = 10; + size_t buffer_len = 5; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_setup( &queue, 1 ) == 0 ); + + /* Popping without a sufficient buffer */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &queue, message_len ) + == (int) message_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_pop_info( &queue, buffer_len ) + == (int) buffer_len ); +exit: + mbedtls_test_message_queue_free( &queue ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_mock_uninitialized( ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 10 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN] = {0}, received[MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client, server; + mbedtls_test_message_queue server_queue, client_queue; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context; + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context ); + + /* Send with a NULL context */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( NULL, message, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_CONTEXT_ERROR ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( NULL, message, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_CONTEXT_ERROR ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &server_queue, &client_queue, 1, + &server, + &server_context ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &client_queue, &server_queue, 1, + &client, + &client_context ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_SEND_FAILED ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + + /* Push directly to a queue to later simulate a disconnected behavior */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_message_queue_push_info( &server_queue, MSGLEN ) + == MSGLEN ); + + /* Test if there's an error when trying to read from a disconnected + * socket */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_RECV_FAILED ); + exit: + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &client_context ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_mock_basic( ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 10 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN], received[MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client, server; + unsigned i; + mbedtls_test_message_queue server_queue, client_queue; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context; + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &server_queue, &client_queue, 1, + &server, + &server_context ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &client_queue, &server_queue, 1, + &client, + &client_context ) == 0 ); + + /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < MSGLEN; i++ ) + { + message[i] = i & 0xFF; + } + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, + MSGLEN ) ); + + /* Send the message to the server */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + /* Read from the server */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + memset( received, 0, MSGLEN ); + + /* Send the message to the client */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &server_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + /* Read from the client */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &client_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MSGLEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + + exit: + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &client_context ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_mock_queue_overflow_underflow( ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 10 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN], received[MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client, server; + unsigned i; + mbedtls_test_message_queue server_queue, client_queue; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context; + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &server_queue, &client_queue, 2, + &server, + &server_context ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &client_queue, &server_queue, 2, + &client, + &client_context ) == 0 ); + + /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < MSGLEN; i++ ) + { + message[i] = i & 0xFF; + } + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, + MSGLEN*2 ) ); + + /* Send three message to the server, last one with an error */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN - 1 ) == MSGLEN - 1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + + /* Read three messages from the server, last one with an error */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, + MSGLEN - 1 ) == MSGLEN - 1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + + exit: + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &client_context ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_mock_socket_overflow( ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 10 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN], received[MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client, server; + unsigned i; + mbedtls_test_message_queue server_queue, client_queue; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context; + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &server_queue, &client_queue, 2, + &server, + &server_context ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &client_queue, &server_queue, 2, + &client, + &client_context ) == 0 ); + + /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < MSGLEN; i++ ) + { + message[i] = i & 0xFF; + } + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, + MSGLEN ) ); + + /* Send two message to the server, second one with an error */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_SEND_FAILED ); + + /* Read the only message from the server */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + + exit: + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &client_context ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_mock_truncated( ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 10 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN], received[MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client, server; + unsigned i; + mbedtls_test_message_queue server_queue, client_queue; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context; + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &server_queue, &client_queue, 2, + &server, + &server_context ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &client_queue, &server_queue, 2, + &client, + &client_context ) == 0 ); + + memset( received, 0, MSGLEN ); + /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < MSGLEN; i++ ) + { + message[i] = i & 0xFF; + } + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, + 2 * MSGLEN ) ); + + /* Send two messages to the server, the second one small enough to fit in the + * receiver's buffer. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN / 2 ) == MSGLEN / 2 ); + /* Read a truncated message from the server */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN/2 ) + == MSGLEN/2 ); + + /* Test that the first half of the message is valid, and second one isn't */ + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN/2 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message + MSGLEN/2, received + MSGLEN/2, MSGLEN/2 ) + != 0 ); + memset( received, 0, MSGLEN ); + + /* Read a full message from the server */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN/2 ) + == MSGLEN / 2 ); + + /* Test that the first half of the message is valid */ + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN/2 ) == 0 ); + + exit: + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &client_context ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_mock_socket_read_error( ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 10 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN], received[MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client, server; + unsigned i; + mbedtls_test_message_queue server_queue, client_queue; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context; + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &server_queue, &client_queue, 1, + &server, + &server_context ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &client_queue, &server_queue, 1, + &client, + &client_context ) == 0 ); + + /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < MSGLEN; i++ ) + { + message[i] = i & 0xFF; + } + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, + MSGLEN ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + /* Force a read error by disconnecting the socket by hand */ + server.status = 0; + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_TEST_ERROR_RECV_FAILED ); + /* Return to a valid state */ + server.status = MBEDTLS_MOCK_SOCKET_CONNECTED; + + memset( received, 0, sizeof( received ) ); + + /* Test that even though the server tried to read once disconnected, the + * continuity is preserved */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + + exit: + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &client_context ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_mock_interleaved_one_way( ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 10 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN], received[MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client, server; + unsigned i; + mbedtls_test_message_queue server_queue, client_queue; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context; + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &server_queue, &client_queue, 3, + &server, + &server_context ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &client_queue, &server_queue, 3, + &client, + &client_context ) == 0 ); + + /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < MSGLEN; i++ ) + { + message[i] = i & 0xFF; + } + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, + MSGLEN*3 ) ); + + /* Interleaved test - [2 sends, 1 read] twice, and then two reads + * (to wrap around the buffer) */ + for( i = 0; i < 2; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + memset( received, 0, sizeof( received ) ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 2; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + exit: + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &client_context ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_message_mock_interleaved_two_ways( ) +{ + enum { MSGLEN = 10 }; + unsigned char message[MSGLEN], received[MSGLEN]; + mbedtls_mock_socket client, server; + unsigned i; + mbedtls_test_message_queue server_queue, client_queue; + mbedtls_test_message_socket_context server_context, client_context; + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_init( &client_context ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &server_queue, &client_queue, 3, + &server, + &server_context ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_message_socket_setup( &client_queue, &server_queue, 3, + &client, + &client_context ) == 0 ); + + /* Fill up the buffer with structured data so that unwanted changes + * can be detected */ + for( i = 0; i < MSGLEN; i++ ) + { + message[i] = i & 0xFF; + } + TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &client, &server, + MSGLEN*3 ) ); + + /* Interleaved test - [2 sends, 1 read] twice, both ways, and then two reads + * (to wrap around the buffer) both ways. */ + for( i = 0; i < 2; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &client_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &server_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_send_msg( &server_context, message, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + + memset( received, 0, sizeof( received ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &client_context, received, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + + memset( received, 0, sizeof( received ) ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 2; i++ ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + memset( received, 0, sizeof( received ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &client_context, received, + MSGLEN ) == MSGLEN ); + + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( message, received, MSGLEN ) == 0 ); + memset( received, 0, sizeof( received ) ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &server_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mock_tcp_recv_msg( &client_context, received, MSGLEN ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + exit: + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &server_context ); + mbedtls_message_socket_close( &client_context ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ +void ssl_dtls_replay( data_t * prevs, data_t * new, int ret ) +{ + uint32_t len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) == 0 ); + + /* Read previous record numbers */ + for( len = 0; len < prevs->len; len += 6 ) + { + memcpy( ssl.in_ctr + 2, prevs->x + len, 6 ); + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( &ssl ); + } + + /* Check new number */ + memcpy( ssl.in_ctr + 2, new->x, 6 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( &ssl ) == ret ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void ssl_set_hostname_twice( char *hostname0, char *hostname1 ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, hostname0 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, hostname1 ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_crypt_record( int cipher_type, int hash_id, + int etm, int tag_mode, int ver, + int cid0_len, int cid1_len ) +{ + /* + * Test several record encryptions and decryptions + * with plenty of space before and after the data + * within the record buffer. + */ + + int ret; + int num_records = 16; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; /* ONLY for debugging */ + + mbedtls_ssl_transform t0, t1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t const buflen = 512; + mbedtls_record rec, rec_backup; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( &t0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( &t1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( build_transforms( &t0, &t1, cipher_type, hash_id, + etm, tag_mode, ver, + (size_t) cid0_len, + (size_t) cid1_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ( buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buflen ) ) != NULL ); + + while( num_records-- > 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform *t_dec, *t_enc; + /* Take turns in who's sending and who's receiving. */ + if( num_records % 3 == 0 ) + { + t_dec = &t0; + t_enc = &t1; + } + else + { + t_dec = &t1; + t_enc = &t0; + } + + /* + * The record header affects the transformation in two ways: + * 1) It determines the AEAD additional data + * 2) The record counter sometimes determines the IV. + * + * Apart from that, the fields don't have influence. + * In particular, it is currently not the responsibility + * of ssl_encrypt/decrypt_buf to check if the transform + * version matches the record version, or that the + * type is sensible. + */ + + memset( rec.ctr, num_records, sizeof( rec.ctr ) ); + rec.type = 42; + rec.ver[0] = num_records; + rec.ver[1] = num_records; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + rec.cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + rec.buf = buf; + rec.buf_len = buflen; + rec.data_offset = 16; + /* Make sure to vary the length to exercise different + * paddings. */ + rec.data_len = 1 + num_records; + + memset( rec.buf + rec.data_offset, 42, rec.data_len ); + + /* Make a copy for later comparison */ + rec_backup = rec; + + /* Encrypt record */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( &ssl, t_enc, &rec, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + continue; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec.cid_len != 0 ) + { + /* DTLS 1.2 + CID hides the real content type and + * uses a special CID content type in the protected + * record. Double-check this. */ + TEST_ASSERT( rec.type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( t_enc->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + /* TLS 1.3 hides the real content type and + * always uses Application Data as the content type + * for protected records. Double-check this. */ + TEST_ASSERT( rec.type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + + /* Decrypt record with t_dec */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( &ssl, t_dec, &rec ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + /* Compare results */ + TEST_ASSERT( rec.type == rec_backup.type ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( rec.ctr, rec_backup.ctr, 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( rec.ver[0] == rec_backup.ver[0] ); + TEST_ASSERT( rec.ver[1] == rec_backup.ver[1] ); + TEST_ASSERT( rec.data_len == rec_backup.data_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( rec.data_offset == rec_backup.data_offset ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( rec.buf + rec.data_offset, + rec_backup.buf + rec_backup.data_offset, + rec.data_len ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + + /* Cleanup */ + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( &t0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( &t1 ); + + mbedtls_free( buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_crypt_record_small( int cipher_type, int hash_id, + int etm, int tag_mode, int ver, + int cid0_len, int cid1_len ) +{ + /* + * Test pairs of encryption and decryption with an increasing + * amount of space in the record buffer - in more detail: + * 1) Try to encrypt with 0, 1, 2, ... bytes available + * in front of the plaintext, and expect the encryption + * to succeed starting from some offset. Always keep + * enough space in the end of the buffer. + * 2) Try to encrypt with 0, 1, 2, ... bytes available + * at the end of the plaintext, and expect the encryption + * to succeed starting from some offset. Always keep + * enough space at the beginning of the buffer. + * 3) Try to encrypt with 0, 1, 2, ... bytes available + * both at the front and end of the plaintext, + * and expect the encryption to succeed starting from + * some offset. + * + * If encryption succeeds, check that decryption succeeds + * and yields the original record. + */ + + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; /* ONLY for debugging */ + + mbedtls_ssl_transform t0, t1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t const buflen = 256; + mbedtls_record rec, rec_backup; + + int ret; + int mode; /* Mode 1, 2 or 3 as explained above */ + size_t offset; /* Available space at beginning/end/both */ + size_t threshold = 96; /* Maximum offset to test against */ + + size_t default_pre_padding = 64; /* Pre-padding to use in mode 2 */ + size_t default_post_padding = 128; /* Post-padding to use in mode 1 */ + + int seen_success; /* Indicates if in the current mode we've + * already seen a successful test. */ + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( &t0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( &t1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( build_transforms( &t0, &t1, cipher_type, hash_id, + etm, tag_mode, ver, + (size_t) cid0_len, + (size_t) cid1_len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ( buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buflen ) ) != NULL ); + + for( mode=1; mode <= 3; mode++ ) + { + seen_success = 0; + for( offset=0; offset <= threshold; offset++ ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform *t_dec, *t_enc; + t_dec = &t0; + t_enc = &t1; + + memset( rec.ctr, offset, sizeof( rec.ctr ) ); + rec.type = 42; + rec.ver[0] = offset; + rec.ver[1] = offset; + rec.buf = buf; + rec.buf_len = buflen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + rec.cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + switch( mode ) + { + case 1: /* Space in the beginning */ + rec.data_offset = offset; + rec.data_len = buflen - offset - default_post_padding; + break; + + case 2: /* Space in the end */ + rec.data_offset = default_pre_padding; + rec.data_len = buflen - default_pre_padding - offset; + break; + + case 3: /* Space in the beginning and end */ + rec.data_offset = offset; + rec.data_len = buflen - 2 * offset; + break; + + default: + TEST_ASSERT( 0 ); + break; + } + + memset( rec.buf + rec.data_offset, 42, rec.data_len ); + + /* Make a copy for later comparison */ + rec_backup = rec; + + /* Encrypt record */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( &ssl, t_enc, &rec, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ); + + if( ( mode == 1 || mode == 2 ) && seen_success ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + if( ret == 0 ) + seen_success = 1; + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + continue; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec.cid_len != 0 ) + { + /* DTLS 1.2 + CID hides the real content type and + * uses a special CID content type in the protected + * record. Double-check this. */ + TEST_ASSERT( rec.type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( t_enc->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + /* TLS 1.3 hides the real content type and + * always uses Application Data as the content type + * for protected records. Double-check this. */ + TEST_ASSERT( rec.type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + + /* Decrypt record with t_dec */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( &ssl, t_dec, &rec ) == 0 ); + + /* Compare results */ + TEST_ASSERT( rec.type == rec_backup.type ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( rec.ctr, rec_backup.ctr, 8 ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( rec.ver[0] == rec_backup.ver[0] ); + TEST_ASSERT( rec.ver[1] == rec_backup.ver[1] ); + TEST_ASSERT( rec.data_len == rec_backup.data_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( rec.data_offset == rec_backup.data_offset ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( rec.buf + rec.data_offset, + rec_backup.buf + rec_backup.data_offset, + rec.data_len ) == 0 ); + } + + TEST_ASSERT( seen_success == 1 ); + } + +exit: + + /* Cleanup */ + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( &t0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( &t1 ); + + mbedtls_free( buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +void ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc( int cipher_type, int hash_id, int trunc_hmac, + int length_selector ) +{ + /* + * Test record decryption for CBC without EtM, focused on the verification + * of padding and MAC. + * + * Actually depends on TLS >= 1.0 (SSL 3.0 computes the MAC differently), + * and either AES, ARIA, Camellia or DES, but since the test framework + * doesn't support alternation in dependency statements, just depend on + * TLS 1.2 and AES. + * + * The length_selector argument is interpreted as follows: + * - if it's -1, the plaintext length is 0 and minimal padding is applied + * - if it's -2, the plaintext length is 0 and maximal padding is applied + * - otherwise it must be in [0, 255] and is padding_length from RFC 5246: + * it's the length of the rest of the padding, that is, excluding the + * byte that encodes the length. The minimal non-zero plaintext length + * that gives this padding_length is automatically selected. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; /* ONLY for debugging */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform t0, t1; + mbedtls_record rec, rec_save; + unsigned char *buf = NULL, *buf_save = NULL; + size_t buflen, olen = 0; + size_t plaintext_len, block_size, i; + unsigned char padlen; /* excluding the padding_length byte */ + unsigned char add_data[13]; + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + int exp_ret; + const unsigned char pad_max_len = 255; /* Per the standard */ + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( &t0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( &t1 ); + + /* Set up transforms with dummy keys */ + TEST_ASSERT( build_transforms( &t0, &t1, cipher_type, hash_id, + 0, trunc_hmac, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 , 0 ) == 0 ); + + /* Determine padding/plaintext length */ + TEST_ASSERT( length_selector >= -2 && length_selector <= 255 ); + block_size = t0.ivlen; + if( length_selector < 0 ) + { + plaintext_len = 0; + + /* Minimal padding + * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ + padlen = block_size - ( t0.maclen + 1 ) % block_size; + + /* Maximal padding? */ + if( length_selector == -2 ) + padlen += block_size * ( ( pad_max_len - padlen ) / block_size ); + } + else + { + padlen = length_selector; + + /* Minimal non-zero plaintext_length giving desired padding. + * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ + plaintext_len = block_size - ( padlen + t0.maclen + 1 ) % block_size; + } + + /* Prepare a buffer for record data */ + buflen = block_size + + plaintext_len + + t0.maclen + + padlen + 1; + ASSERT_ALLOC( buf, buflen ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( buf_save, buflen ); + + /* Prepare a dummy record header */ + memset( rec.ctr, 0, sizeof( rec.ctr ) ); + rec.type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + rec.ver[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + rec.ver[1] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + rec.cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* Prepare dummy record content */ + rec.buf = buf; + rec.buf_len = buflen; + rec.data_offset = block_size; + rec.data_len = plaintext_len; + memset( rec.buf + rec.data_offset, 42, rec.data_len ); + + /* Serialized version of record header for MAC purposes */ + memcpy( add_data, rec.ctr, 8 ); + add_data[8] = rec.type; + add_data[9] = rec.ver[0]; + add_data[10] = rec.ver[1]; + add_data[11] = ( rec.data_len >> 8 ) & 0xff; + add_data[12] = ( rec.data_len >> 0 ) & 0xff; + + /* Set dummy IV */ + memset( t0.iv_enc, 0x55, t0.ivlen ); + memcpy( rec.buf, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen ); + + /* + * Prepare a pre-encryption record (with MAC and padding), and save it. + */ + + /* MAC with additional data */ + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &t0.md_ctx_enc, add_data, 13 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &t0.md_ctx_enc, + rec.buf + rec.data_offset, + rec.data_len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &t0.md_ctx_enc, mac ) ); + + memcpy( rec.buf + rec.data_offset + rec.data_len, mac, t0.maclen ); + rec.data_len += t0.maclen; + + /* Pad */ + memset( rec.buf + rec.data_offset + rec.data_len, padlen, padlen + 1 ); + rec.data_len += padlen + 1; + + /* Save correct pre-encryption record */ + rec_save = rec; + rec_save.buf = buf_save; + memcpy( buf_save, buf, buflen ); + + /* + * Encrypt and decrypt the correct record, expecting success + */ + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &t0.cipher_ctx_enc, + t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, + rec.buf + rec.data_offset, rec.data_len, + rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen ) ); + rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; + rec.data_len += t0.ivlen; + + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( &ssl, &t1, &rec ) ); + + /* + * Modify each byte of the pre-encryption record before encrypting and + * decrypting it, expecting failure every time. + */ + for( i = block_size; i < buflen; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( i ); + + /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ + rec = rec_save; + rec.buf = buf; + memcpy( buf, buf_save, buflen ); + + /* Corrupt one byte of the data (could be plaintext, MAC or padding) */ + rec.buf[i] ^= 0x01; + + /* Encrypt */ + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &t0.cipher_ctx_enc, + t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, + rec.buf + rec.data_offset, rec.data_len, + rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen ) ); + rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; + rec.data_len += t0.ivlen; + + /* Decrypt and expect failure */ + TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC, + mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( &ssl, &t1, &rec ) ); + } + + /* + * Use larger values of the padding bytes - with small buffers, this tests + * the case where the announced padlen would be larger than the buffer + * (and before that, than the buffer minus the size of the MAC), to make + * sure our padding checking code does not perform any out-of-bounds reads + * in this case. (With larger buffers, ie when the plaintext is long or + * maximal length padding is used, this is less relevant but still doesn't + * hurt to test.) + * + * (Start the loop with correct padding, just to double-check that record + * saving did work, and that we're overwriting the correct bytes.) + */ + for( i = padlen; i <= pad_max_len; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( i ); + + /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ + rec = rec_save; + rec.buf = buf; + memcpy( buf, buf_save, buflen ); + + /* Set padding bytes to new value */ + memset( buf + buflen - padlen - 1, i, padlen + 1 ); + + /* Encrypt */ + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &t0.cipher_ctx_enc, + t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, + rec.buf + rec.data_offset, rec.data_len, + rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen ) ); + rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; + rec.data_len += t0.ivlen; + + /* Decrypt and expect failure except the first time */ + exp_ret = ( i == padlen ) ? 0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + TEST_EQUAL( exp_ret, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( &ssl, &t1, &rec ) ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( &t0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( &t1 ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + mbedtls_free( buf_save ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( int hash_alg, + data_t *secret, + int label_idx, + data_t *ctx, + int desired_length, + data_t *expected ) +{ + unsigned char dst[ 100 ]; + + unsigned char const *lbl = NULL; + size_t lbl_len; +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + if( label_idx == (int) tls1_3_label_ ## name ) \ + { \ + lbl = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.name; \ + lbl_len = sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.name ); \ + } +MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + TEST_ASSERT( lbl != NULL ); + + /* Check sanity of test parameters. */ + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t) desired_length <= sizeof(dst) ); + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t) desired_length == expected->len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) hash_alg, + secret->x, secret->len, + lbl, lbl_len, + ctx->x, ctx->len, + dst, desired_length ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( dst, (size_t) desired_length, + expected->x, (size_t) expected->len ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +void ssl_tls1_3_traffic_key_generation( int hash_alg, + data_t *server_secret, + data_t *client_secret, + int desired_iv_len, + int desired_key_len, + data_t *expected_server_write_key, + data_t *expected_server_write_iv, + data_t *expected_client_write_key, + data_t *expected_client_write_iv ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_set keys; + + /* Check sanity of test parameters. */ + TEST_ASSERT( client_secret->len == server_secret->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( expected_client_write_iv->len == expected_server_write_iv->len && + expected_client_write_iv->len == (size_t) desired_iv_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( expected_client_write_key->len == expected_server_write_key->len && + expected_client_write_key->len == (size_t) desired_key_len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) hash_alg, + client_secret->x, + server_secret->x, + client_secret->len /* == server_secret->len */, + desired_key_len, desired_iv_len, + &keys ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( keys.client_write_key, + keys.key_len, + expected_client_write_key->x, + (size_t) desired_key_len ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( keys.server_write_key, + keys.key_len, + expected_server_write_key->x, + (size_t) desired_key_len ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( keys.client_write_iv, + keys.iv_len, + expected_client_write_iv->x, + (size_t) desired_iv_len ); + ASSERT_COMPARE( keys.server_write_iv, + keys.iv_len, + expected_server_write_iv->x, + (size_t) desired_iv_len ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +void ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( int hash_alg, + data_t *secret, + int label_idx, + data_t *ctx, + int desired_length, + int already_hashed, + data_t *expected ) +{ + unsigned char dst[ 100 ]; + + unsigned char const *lbl = NULL; + size_t lbl_len; +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + if( label_idx == (int) tls1_3_label_ ## name ) \ + { \ + lbl = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.name; \ + lbl_len = sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.name ); \ + } +MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + TEST_ASSERT( lbl != NULL ); + + /* Check sanity of test parameters. */ + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t) desired_length <= sizeof(dst) ); + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t) desired_length == expected->len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) hash_alg, + secret->x, secret->len, + lbl, lbl_len, + ctx->x, ctx->len, + already_hashed, + dst, desired_length ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( dst, desired_length, + expected->x, desired_length ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +void ssl_tls1_3_key_evolution( int hash_alg, + data_t *secret, + data_t *input, + data_t *expected ) +{ + unsigned char secret_new[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) hash_alg, + secret->len ? secret->x : NULL, + input->len ? input->x : NULL, input->len, + secret_new ) == 0 ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( secret_new, (size_t) expected->len, + expected->x, (size_t) expected->len ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_tls_prf( int type, data_t * secret, data_t * random, + char *label, data_t *result_str, int exp_ret ) +{ + unsigned char *output; + + output = mbedtls_calloc( 1, result_str->len ); + if( output == NULL ) + goto exit; + + USE_PSA_INIT( ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( type, secret->x, secret->len, + label, random->x, random->len, + output, result_str->len ) == exp_ret ); + + if( exp_ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, result_str->x, + result_str->len, result_str->len ) == 0 ); + } +exit: + + mbedtls_free( output ); + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_serialize_session_save_load( int ticket_len, char *crt_file ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session original, restored; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t len; + + /* + * Test that a save-load pair is the identity + */ + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &original ); + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &restored ); + + /* Prepare a dummy session to work on */ + TEST_ASSERT( ssl_populate_session( &original, ticket_len, crt_file ) == 0 ); + + /* Serialize it */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &original, NULL, 0, &len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + TEST_ASSERT( ( buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len ) ) != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &original, buf, len, &len ) + == 0 ); + + /* Restore session from serialized data */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_load( &restored, buf, len) == 0 ); + + /* + * Make sure both session structures are identical + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + TEST_ASSERT( original.start == restored.start ); +#endif + TEST_ASSERT( original.ciphersuite == restored.ciphersuite ); + TEST_ASSERT( original.compression == restored.compression ); + TEST_ASSERT( original.id_len == restored.id_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( original.id, + restored.id, sizeof( original.id ) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( original.master, + restored.master, sizeof( original.master ) ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + TEST_ASSERT( ( original.peer_cert == NULL ) == + ( restored.peer_cert == NULL ) ); + if( original.peer_cert != NULL ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( original.peer_cert->raw.len == + restored.peer_cert->raw.len ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( original.peer_cert->raw.p, + restored.peer_cert->raw.p, + original.peer_cert->raw.len ) == 0 ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + TEST_ASSERT( original.peer_cert_digest_type == + restored.peer_cert_digest_type ); + TEST_ASSERT( original.peer_cert_digest_len == + restored.peer_cert_digest_len ); + TEST_ASSERT( ( original.peer_cert_digest == NULL ) == + ( restored.peer_cert_digest == NULL ) ); + if( original.peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( original.peer_cert_digest, + restored.peer_cert_digest, + original.peer_cert_digest_len ) == 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + TEST_ASSERT( original.verify_result == restored.verify_result ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + TEST_ASSERT( original.ticket_len == restored.ticket_len ); + if( original.ticket_len != 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( original.ticket != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( restored.ticket != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( original.ticket, + restored.ticket, original.ticket_len ) == 0 ); + } + TEST_ASSERT( original.ticket_lifetime == restored.ticket_lifetime ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + TEST_ASSERT( original.mfl_code == restored.mfl_code ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + TEST_ASSERT( original.trunc_hmac == restored.trunc_hmac ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + TEST_ASSERT( original.encrypt_then_mac == restored.encrypt_then_mac ); +#endif + +exit: + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &original ); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &restored ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_serialize_session_load_save( int ticket_len, char *crt_file ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + unsigned char *buf1 = NULL, *buf2 = NULL; + size_t len0, len1, len2; + + /* + * Test that a load-save pair is the identity + */ + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); + + /* Prepare a dummy session to work on */ + TEST_ASSERT( ssl_populate_session( &session, ticket_len, crt_file ) == 0 ); + + /* Get desired buffer size for serializing */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &session, NULL, 0, &len0 ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Allocate first buffer */ + buf1 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( buf1 != NULL ); + + /* Serialize to buffer and free live session */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &session, buf1, len0, &len1 ) + == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( len0 == len1 ); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); + + /* Restore session from serialized data */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_load( &session, buf1, len1 ) == 0 ); + + /* Allocate second buffer and serialize to it */ + buf2 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( buf2 != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &session, buf2, len0, &len2 ) + == 0 ); + + /* Make sure both serialized versions are identical */ + TEST_ASSERT( len1 == len2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf1, buf2, len1 ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); + mbedtls_free( buf1 ); + mbedtls_free( buf2 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_serialize_session_save_buf_size( int ticket_len, char *crt_file ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t good_len, bad_len, test_len; + + /* + * Test that session_save() fails cleanly on small buffers + */ + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); + + /* Prepare dummy session and get serialized size */ + TEST_ASSERT( ssl_populate_session( &session, ticket_len, crt_file ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &session, NULL, 0, &good_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Try all possible bad lengths */ + for( bad_len = 1; bad_len < good_len; bad_len++ ) + { + /* Allocate exact size so that asan/valgrind can detect any overwrite */ + mbedtls_free( buf ); + TEST_ASSERT( ( buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, bad_len ) ) != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &session, buf, bad_len, + &test_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + TEST_ASSERT( test_len == good_len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_serialize_session_load_buf_size( int ticket_len, char *crt_file ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + unsigned char *good_buf = NULL, *bad_buf = NULL; + size_t good_len, bad_len; + + /* + * Test that session_load() fails cleanly on small buffers + */ + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); + + /* Prepare serialized session data */ + TEST_ASSERT( ssl_populate_session( &session, ticket_len, crt_file ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &session, NULL, 0, &good_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + TEST_ASSERT( ( good_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, good_len ) ) != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &session, good_buf, good_len, + &good_len ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); + + /* Try all possible bad lengths */ + for( bad_len = 0; bad_len < good_len; bad_len++ ) + { + /* Allocate exact size so that asan/valgrind can detect any overread */ + mbedtls_free( bad_buf ); + bad_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, bad_len ? bad_len : 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( bad_buf != NULL ); + memcpy( bad_buf, good_buf, bad_len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_load( &session, bad_buf, bad_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); + mbedtls_free( good_buf ); + mbedtls_free( bad_buf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ssl_session_serialize_version_check( int corrupt_major, + int corrupt_minor, + int corrupt_patch, + int corrupt_config ) +{ + unsigned char serialized_session[ 2048 ]; + size_t serialized_session_len; + unsigned cur_byte; + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + uint8_t should_corrupt_byte[] = { corrupt_major == 1, + corrupt_minor == 1, + corrupt_patch == 1, + corrupt_config == 1, + corrupt_config == 1 }; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); + + /* Infer length of serialized session. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &session, + serialized_session, + sizeof( serialized_session ), + &serialized_session_len ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); + + /* Without any modification, we should be able to successfully + * de-serialize the session - double-check that. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_load( &session, + serialized_session, + serialized_session_len ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); + + /* Go through the bytes in the serialized session header and + * corrupt them bit-by-bit. */ + for( cur_byte = 0; cur_byte < sizeof( should_corrupt_byte ); cur_byte++ ) + { + int cur_bit; + unsigned char * const byte = &serialized_session[ cur_byte ]; + + if( should_corrupt_byte[ cur_byte ] == 0 ) + continue; + + for( cur_bit = 0; cur_bit < CHAR_BIT; cur_bit++ ) + { + unsigned char const corrupted_bit = 0x1u << cur_bit; + /* Modify a single bit in the serialized session. */ + *byte ^= corrupted_bit; + + /* Attempt to deserialize */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_session_load( &session, + serialized_session, + serialized_session_len ) == + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH ); + + /* Undo the change */ + *byte ^= corrupted_bit; + } + } + +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void mbedtls_endpoint_sanity( int endpoint_type ) +{ + enum { BUFFSIZE = 1024 }; + mbedtls_endpoint ep; + int ret = -1; + + ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( NULL, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA == ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_endpoint_certificate_init( NULL, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + TEST_ASSERT( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA == ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &ep, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_endpoint_free( &ep, NULL ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void move_handshake_to_state(int endpoint_type, int state, int need_pass) +{ + enum { BUFFSIZE = 1024 }; + mbedtls_endpoint base_ep, second_ep; + int ret = -1; + + ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &base_ep, endpoint_type, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_endpoint_init( &second_ep, + ( endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &(base_ep.socket), + &(second_ep.socket), + BUFFSIZE ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_move_handshake_to_state( &(base_ep.ssl), + &(second_ep.ssl), + state ); + if( need_pass ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( base_ep.ssl.state == state ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( base_ep.ssl.state != state ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_endpoint_free( &base_ep, NULL ); + mbedtls_endpoint_free( &second_ep, NULL ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void handshake_version( int dtls, int client_min_version, int client_max_version, + int server_min_version, int server_max_version, + int expected_negotiated_version ) +{ + handshake_test_options options; + init_handshake_options( &options ); + + options.client_min_version = client_min_version; + options.client_max_version = client_max_version; + options.server_min_version = server_min_version; + options.server_max_version = server_max_version; + + options.expected_negotiated_version = expected_negotiated_version; + + options.dtls = dtls; + /* By default, SSLv3.0 and TLSv1.0 use 1/n-1 splitting when sending data, so + * the number of fragments will be twice as big. */ + if( expected_negotiated_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || + expected_negotiated_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + options.expected_cli_fragments = 2; + options.expected_srv_fragments = 2; + } + perform_handshake( &options ); + + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void handshake_psk_cipher( char* cipher, int pk_alg, data_t *psk_str, int dtls ) +{ + handshake_test_options options; + init_handshake_options( &options ); + + options.cipher = cipher; + options.dtls = dtls; + options.psk_str = psk_str; + options.pk_alg = pk_alg; + + perform_handshake( &options ); + + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void handshake_cipher( char* cipher, int pk_alg, int dtls ) +{ + test_handshake_psk_cipher( cipher, pk_alg, NULL, dtls ); + + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void app_data( int mfl, int cli_msg_len, int srv_msg_len, + int expected_cli_fragments, + int expected_srv_fragments, int dtls ) +{ + handshake_test_options options; + init_handshake_options( &options ); + + options.mfl = mfl; + options.cli_msg_len = cli_msg_len; + options.srv_msg_len = srv_msg_len; + options.expected_cli_fragments = expected_cli_fragments; + options.expected_srv_fragments = expected_srv_fragments; + options.dtls = dtls; + + perform_handshake( &options ); + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void app_data_tls( int mfl, int cli_msg_len, int srv_msg_len, + int expected_cli_fragments, + int expected_srv_fragments ) +{ + test_app_data( mfl, cli_msg_len, srv_msg_len, expected_cli_fragments, + expected_srv_fragments, 0 ); + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void app_data_dtls( int mfl, int cli_msg_len, int srv_msg_len, + int expected_cli_fragments, + int expected_srv_fragments ) +{ + test_app_data( mfl, cli_msg_len, srv_msg_len, expected_cli_fragments, + expected_srv_fragments, 1 ); + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION:MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void handshake_serialization( ) +{ + handshake_test_options options; + init_handshake_options( &options ); + + options.serialize = 1; + options.dtls = 1; + perform_handshake( &options ); + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void handshake_fragmentation( int mfl, int expected_srv_hs_fragmentation, int expected_cli_hs_fragmentation) +{ + handshake_test_options options; + log_pattern srv_pattern, cli_pattern; + + srv_pattern.pattern = cli_pattern.pattern = "found fragmented DTLS handshake"; + srv_pattern.counter = 0; + cli_pattern.counter = 0; + + init_handshake_options( &options ); + options.dtls = 1; + options.mfl = mfl; + /* Set cipher to one using CBC so that record splitting can be tested */ + options.cipher = "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256"; + options.srv_auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; + options.srv_log_obj = &srv_pattern; + options.cli_log_obj = &cli_pattern; + options.srv_log_fun = log_analyzer; + options.cli_log_fun = log_analyzer; + + perform_handshake( &options ); + + /* Test if the server received a fragmented handshake */ + if( expected_srv_hs_fragmentation ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( srv_pattern.counter >= 1 ); + } + /* Test if the client received a fragmented handshake */ + if( expected_cli_hs_fragmentation ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( cli_pattern.counter >= 1 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void renegotiation( int legacy_renegotiation ) +{ + handshake_test_options options; + init_handshake_options( &options ); + + options.renegotiate = 1; + options.legacy_renegotiation = legacy_renegotiation; + options.dtls = 1; + + perform_handshake( &options ); + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void resize_buffers( int mfl, int renegotiation, int legacy_renegotiation, + int serialize, int dtls, char *cipher ) +{ + handshake_test_options options; + init_handshake_options( &options ); + + options.mfl = mfl; + options.cipher = cipher; + options.renegotiate = renegotiation; + options.legacy_renegotiation = legacy_renegotiation; + options.serialize = serialize; + options.dtls = dtls; + options.resize_buffers = 1; + + perform_handshake( &options ); + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void resize_buffers_serialize_mfl( int mfl ) +{ + test_resize_buffers( mfl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION, 1, 1, + (char *) "" ); + + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +void resize_buffers_renegotiate_mfl( int mfl, int legacy_renegotiation, + char *cipher ) +{ + test_resize_buffers( mfl, 1, legacy_renegotiation, 0, 1, cipher ); + + /* The goto below is used to avoid an "unused label" warning.*/ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +void ssl_cf_hmac( int hash ) +{ + /* + * Test the function mbedtls_ct_hmac() against a reference + * implementation. + */ + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx, ref_ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + size_t out_len, block_size; + size_t min_in_len, in_len, max_in_len, i; + /* TLS additional data is 13 bytes (hence the "lucky 13" name) */ + unsigned char add_data[13]; + unsigned char ref_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *data = NULL; + unsigned char *out = NULL; + unsigned char rec_num = 0; + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_md_init( &ref_ctx ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL ); + out_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( out_len != 0 ); + block_size = hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; + + /* Use allocated out buffer to catch overwrites */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( out, out_len ); + + /* Set up contexts with the given hash and a dummy key */ + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_setup( &ref_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ); + memset( ref_out, 42, sizeof( ref_out ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, ref_out, out_len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ref_ctx, ref_out, out_len ) ); + memset( ref_out, 0, sizeof( ref_out ) ); + + /* + * Test all possible lengths up to a point. The difference between + * max_in_len and min_in_len is at most 255, and make sure they both vary + * by at least one block size. + */ + for( max_in_len = 0; max_in_len <= 255 + block_size; max_in_len++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( max_in_len * 10000 ); + + /* Use allocated in buffer to catch overreads */ + ASSERT_ALLOC( data, max_in_len ); + + min_in_len = max_in_len > 255 ? max_in_len - 255 : 0; + for( in_len = min_in_len; in_len <= max_in_len; in_len++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( max_in_len * 10000 + in_len ); + + /* Set up dummy data and add_data */ + rec_num++; + memset( add_data, rec_num, sizeof( add_data ) ); + for( i = 0; i < in_len; i++ ) + data[i] = ( i & 0xff ) ^ rec_num; + + /* Get the function's result */ + TEST_CF_SECRET( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ct_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ), + data, in_len, + min_in_len, max_in_len, + out ) ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( out, out_len ); + + /* Compute the reference result */ + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ref_ctx, add_data, + sizeof( add_data ) ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ref_ctx, data, in_len ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ref_ctx, ref_out ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ref_ctx ) ); + + /* Compare */ + ASSERT_COMPARE( out, out_len, ref_out, out_len ); + } + + mbedtls_free( data ); + data = NULL; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ref_ctx ); + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_free( data ); + mbedtls_free( out ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +void ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( int offset_min, int offset_max, int len ) +{ + unsigned char *dst = NULL; + unsigned char *src = NULL; + size_t src_len = offset_max + len; + size_t secret; + + ASSERT_ALLOC( dst, len ); + ASSERT_ALLOC( src, src_len ); + + /* Fill src in a way that we can detect if we copied the right bytes */ + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, src, src_len ); + + for( secret = offset_min; secret <= (size_t) offset_max; secret++ ) + { + mbedtls_test_set_step( (int) secret ); + + TEST_CF_SECRET( &secret, sizeof( secret ) ); + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret, + offset_min, offset_max, len ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &secret, sizeof( secret ) ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst, len ); + + ASSERT_COMPARE( dst, len, src + secret, len ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free( dst ); + mbedtls_free( src ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +void raw_key_agreement_fail( int bad_server_ecdhe_key ) +{ + enum { BUFFSIZE = 17000 }; + mbedtls_endpoint client, server; + mbedtls_psa_stats_t stats; + size_t free_slots_before = -1; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve_list[] = { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE }; + USE_PSA_INIT( ); + + /* Client side, force SECP256R1 to make one key bitflip fail + * the raw key agreement. Flipping the first byte makes the + * required 0x04 identifier invalid. */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, NULL, NULL, + NULL, curve_list ), 0 ); + + /* Server side */ + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_endpoint_init( &server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mock_socket_connect( &(client.socket), + &(server.socket), + BUFFSIZE ), 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_move_handshake_to_state( &(client.ssl), + &(server.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ) + , 0 ); + + mbedtls_psa_get_stats( &stats ); + /* Save the number of slots in use up to this point. + * With PSA, one can be used for the ECDH private key. */ + free_slots_before = stats.empty_slots; + + if( bad_server_ecdhe_key ) + { + /* Force a simulated bitflip in the server key. to make the + * raw key agreement in ssl_write_client_key_exchange fail. */ + (client.ssl).handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey[0] ^= 0x02; + } + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_move_handshake_to_state( &(client.ssl), + &(server.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ), + bad_server_ecdhe_key ? MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED : 0 ); + + mbedtls_psa_get_stats( &stats ); + + /* Make sure that the key slot is already destroyed in case of failure, + * without waiting to close the connection. */ + if( bad_server_ecdhe_key ) + TEST_EQUAL( free_slots_before, stats.empty_slots ); + +exit: + mbedtls_endpoint_free( &client, NULL ); + mbedtls_endpoint_free( &server, NULL ); + + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +void cookie_parsing( data_t *cookie, int exp_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + size_t len; + + mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ), + 0 ); + + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( &ssl, ssl.cli_id, + ssl.cli_id_len, + cookie->x, cookie->len, + ssl.out_buf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + &len ), + exp_ret ); + + mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2522da1e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +Timing: hardclock +timing_hardclock: + +Timing: get timer +timing_get_timer: + +Timing: set alarm with no delay +timing_set_alarm:0: + +Timing: set alarm with 1s delay +timing_set_alarm:1: + +Timing: delay 0ms +timing_delay:0: + +Timing: delay 100ms +timing_delay:100: diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..74dc8231 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.function @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ + +/* This test module exercises the timing module. Since, depending on the + * underlying operating system, the timing routines are not always reliable, + * this suite only performs very basic sanity checks of the timing API. + */ + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void timing_hardclock( ) +{ + (void) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); + /* This goto is added to avoid warnings from the generated code. */ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void timing_get_timer( ) +{ + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time time; + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &time, 1 ); + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &time, 0 ); + /* This goto is added to avoid warnings from the generated code. */ + goto exit; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void timing_set_alarm( int seconds ) +{ + if( seconds == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_set_alarm( seconds ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_timing_alarmed == 1 ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_set_alarm( seconds ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_timing_alarmed == 0 || + mbedtls_timing_alarmed == 1 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void timing_delay( int fin_ms ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_delay_context ctx; + int result; + if( fin_ms == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + result = mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( result == -1 ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, fin_ms / 2, fin_ms ); + result = mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( result >= 0 && result <= 2 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b0a20b5a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +Check compile time library version +check_compiletime_version:"2.28.1" + +Check runtime library version +check_runtime_version:"2.28.1" + +Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C +check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0 + +Check for MBEDTLS_AES_C when already present +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C +check_feature:"MBEDTLS_AES_C":0 + +Check for unknown define +check_feature:"MBEDTLS_UNKNOWN":-1 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_version.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_version.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d59794b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_version.function @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void check_compiletime_version( char * version_str ) +{ + char build_str[100]; + char build_str_full[100]; + unsigned int build_int; + + memset( build_str, 0, 100 ); + memset( build_str_full, 0, 100 ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( build_str, 100, "%d.%d.%d", MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( build_str_full, 100, "mbed TLS %d.%d.%d", MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH ); + + build_int = MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR << 24 | + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR << 16 | + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH << 8; + + TEST_ASSERT( build_int == MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( build_str, MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( build_str_full, MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( version_str, MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void check_runtime_version( char * version_str ) +{ + char build_str[100]; + char get_str[100]; + char build_str_full[100]; + char get_str_full[100]; + unsigned int get_int; + + memset( build_str, 0, 100 ); + memset( get_str, 0, 100 ); + memset( build_str_full, 0, 100 ); + memset( get_str_full, 0, 100 ); + + get_int = mbedtls_version_get_number(); + mbedtls_version_get_string( get_str ); + mbedtls_version_get_string_full( get_str_full ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( build_str, 100, "%u.%u.%u", + (get_int >> 24) & 0xFF, + (get_int >> 16) & 0xFF, + (get_int >> 8) & 0xFF ); + mbedtls_snprintf( build_str_full, 100, "mbed TLS %s", version_str ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( build_str, version_str ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( build_str_full, get_str_full ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( version_str, get_str ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ +void check_feature( char *feature, int result ) +{ + int check = mbedtls_version_check_feature( feature ); + TEST_ASSERT( check == result ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..066d6e49 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data @@ -0,0 +1,2881 @@ +X509 CRT information #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server1.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 01\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information #1 (DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server1.crt.der":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 01\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server2.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 02\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information #2 (DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server2.crt.der":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 02\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 03\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:00\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:00\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\n" + +X509 CRT information #3 (DER) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca.crt.der":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 03\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:00\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:00\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\n" + +X509 CRT information MD2 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD2_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_md2.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 09\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert MD2\nissued on \: 2000-01-01 12\:12\:12\nexpires on \: 2030-01-01 12\:12\:12\nsigned using \: RSA with MD2\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information MD4 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD4_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_md4.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 05\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert MD4\nissued on \: 2000-01-01 12\:12\:12\nexpires on \: 2030-01-01 12\:12\:12\nsigned using \: RSA with MD4\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information MD5 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_md5.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 06\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert MD5\nissued on \: 2000-01-01 12\:12\:12\nexpires on \: 2030-01-01 12\:12\:12\nsigned using \: RSA with MD5\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information SHA1 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_sha1.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 07\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA1\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information SHA224 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_sha224.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 08\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA224\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-224\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information SHA256 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_sha256.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 09\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA256\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information SHA384 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_sha384.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 0A\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA384\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-384\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information SHA512 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_sha512.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 0B\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Cert SHA512\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-512\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information RSA-PSS, SHA1 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server9.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 16\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2014-01-20 13\:38\:16\nexpires on \: 2024-01-18 13\:38\:16\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA1, MGF1-SHA1, 0xEA)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information RSA-PSS, SHA224 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server9-sha224.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 17\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2014-01-20 13\:57\:36\nexpires on \: 2024-01-18 13\:57\:36\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA224, MGF1-SHA224, 0xE2)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information RSA-PSS, SHA256 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server9-sha256.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 18\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2014-01-20 13\:57\:45\nexpires on \: 2024-01-18 13\:57\:45\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA256, MGF1-SHA256, 0xDE)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information RSA-PSS, SHA384 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server9-sha384.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 19\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2014-01-20 13\:57\:58\nexpires on \: 2024-01-18 13\:57\:58\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA384, MGF1-SHA384, 0xCE)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information RSA-PSS, SHA512 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server9-sha512.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 1A\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2014-01-20 13\:58\:12\nexpires on \: 2024-01-18 13\:58\:12\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA512, MGF1-SHA512, 0xBE)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information EC, SHA1 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server5-sha1.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 12\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2013-09-24 16\:21\:27\nexpires on \: 2023-09-22 16\:21\:27\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 256 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information EC, SHA224 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server5-sha224.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 13\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2013-09-24 16\:21\:27\nexpires on \: 2023-09-22 16\:21\:27\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA224\nEC key size \: 256 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information EC, SHA256 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server5.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 09\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2013-09-24 15\:52\:04\nexpires on \: 2023-09-22 15\:52\:04\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 256 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information EC, SHA384 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server5-sha384.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 14\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2013-09-24 16\:21\:27\nexpires on \: 2023-09-22 16\:21\:27\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA384\nEC key size \: 256 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information EC, SHA512 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server5-sha512.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 15\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2013-09-24 16\:21\:27\nexpires on \: 2023-09-22 16\:21\:27\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA512\nEC key size \: 256 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information EC, SHA256 Digest, hardware module name SAN +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server5-othername.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 4D\nissuer name \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS othername SAN\nsubject name \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS othername SAN\nissued on \: 2019-03-24 09\:06\:02\nexpires on \: 2029-03-21 09\:06\:02\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 256 bits\nsubject alt name \:\n otherName \:\n hardware module name \:\n hardware type \: 1.3.6.1.4.1.17.3\n hardware serial number \: 123456\n" + +X509 CRT information EC, SHA256 Digest, Wisun Fan device +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server5-fan.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 4D\nissuer name \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS FAN\nsubject name \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS FAN\nissued on \: 2019-03-25 09\:03\:46\nexpires on \: 2029-03-22 09\:03\:46\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 256 bits\next key usage \: Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)\n" + +X509 CRT information, NS Cert Type +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server1.cert_type.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 01\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\ncert. type \: SSL Server\n" + +X509 CRT information, Key Usage +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 01\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nissued on \: 2019-02-10 14\:44\:06\nexpires on \: 2029-02-10 14\:44\:06\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n" + +X509 CRT information, Key Usage with decipherOnly +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/keyUsage.decipherOnly.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 9B\:13\:CE\:4C\:A5\:6F\:DE\:52\nissuer name \: C=GB, L=Cambridge, O=Default Company Ltd\nsubject name \: C=GB, L=Cambridge, O=Default Company Ltd\nissued on \: 2015-05-12 10\:36\:55\nexpires on \: 2018-05-11 10\:36\:55\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Decipher Only\n" + +X509 CRT information, Subject Alt Name +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_example_multi.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 11\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=www.example.com\nissued on \: 2019-07-10 11\:27\:52\nexpires on \: 2029-07-10 11\:27\:52\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: example.com\n dNSName \: example.net\n dNSName \: *.example.org\n" + +X509 CRT information, Multiple different Subject Alt Name +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/multiple_san.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 04\nissuer name \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS multiple othername SAN\nsubject name \: C=UK, O=Mbed TLS, CN=Mbed TLS multiple othername SAN\nissued on \: 2019-04-22 16\:10\:48\nexpires on \: 2029-04-19 16\:10\:48\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 256 bits\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: example.com\n otherName \:\n hardware module name \:\n hardware type \: 1.3.6.1.4.1.17.3\n hardware serial number \: 123456\n dNSName \: example.net\n dNSName \: *.example.org\n" + +X509 CRT information, Subject Alt Name + Key Usage +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_example_multi_nocn.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: F7\:C6\:7F\:F8\:E9\:A9\:63\:F9\nissuer name \: C=NL\nsubject name \: C=NL\nissued on \: 2014-01-22 10\:04\:33\nexpires on \: 2024-01-22 10\:04\:33\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: www.shotokan-braunschweig.de\n dNSName \: www.massimo-abate.eu\n \n \nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n" + +X509 CRT information, RSA Certificate Policy any +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca-any_policy.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 00\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nissued on \: 2019-03-21 16\:40\:59\nexpires on \: 2029-03-21 16\:40\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\ncertificate policies \: Any Policy\n" + +X509 CRT information, ECDSA Certificate Policy any +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca-any_policy_ec.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 00\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nissued on \: 2019-03-25 09\:02\:45\nexpires on \: 2029-03-25 09\:02\:45\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 384 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\ncertificate policies \: Any Policy\n" + +X509 CRT information, RSA Certificate Policy any with qualifier +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca-any_policy_with_qualifier.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 00\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nissued on \: 2019-04-28 13\:14\:31\nexpires on \: 2029-04-28 13\:14\:31\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\ncertificate policies \: Any Policy\n" + +X509 CRT information, ECDSA Certificate Policy any with qualifier +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca-any_policy_with_qualifier_ec.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 00\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nissued on \: 2019-04-28 10\:16\:05\nexpires on \: 2029-04-28 10\:16\:05\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 384 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\ncertificate policies \: Any Policy\n" + +X509 CRT information, RSA Certificate multiple Policies +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca-multi_policy.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 00\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nissued on \: 2019-04-28 12\:59\:19\nexpires on \: 2029-04-28 12\:59\:19\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\ncertificate policies \: ???, Any Policy\n" + +X509 CRT information, ECDSA Certificate multiple Policies +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca-multi_policy_ec.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 00\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nissued on \: 2019-04-28 12\:59\:51\nexpires on \: 2029-04-28 12\:59\:51\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 384 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\ncertificate policies \: ???, Any Policy\n" + +X509 CRT information, RSA Certificate unsupported policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca-unsupported_policy.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 00\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nissued on \: 2019-04-28 13\:00\:13\nexpires on \: 2029-04-28 13\:00\:13\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\ncertificate policies \: ???\n" + +X509 CRT information, ECDSA Certificate unsupported policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/test-ca-unsupported_policy_ec.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 00\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nissued on \: 2019-04-28 13\:00\:19\nexpires on \: 2029-04-28 13\:00\:19\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 384 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\ncertificate policies \: ???\n" + +X509 CRT information, Key Usage + Extended Key Usage +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server1.ext_ku.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 21\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nissued on \: 2014-04-01 14\:44\:43\nexpires on \: 2024-03-29 14\:44\:43\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\next key usage \: TLS Web Server Authentication\n" + +X509 CRT information RSA signed by EC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server4.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 08\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2013-09-24 15\:52\:04\nexpires on \: 2023-09-22 15\:52\:04\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information EC signed by RSA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/server3.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 0D\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nissued on \: 2013-08-09 09\:17\:03\nexpires on \: 2023-08-07 09\:17\:03\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 192 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\n" + +X509 CRT information Bitstring in subject name +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/bitstring-in-dn.pem":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 02\nissuer name \: CN=Test CA 01, ST=Ecnivorp, C=XX, emailAddress=tca@example.com, O=Test CA Authority\nsubject name \: C=XX, O=tca, ST=Ecnivorp, OU=TCA, CN=Client, emailAddress=client@example.com, serialNumber=7101012255, uniqueIdentifier=?7101012255\nissued on \: 2015-03-11 12\:06\:51\nexpires on \: 2025-03-08 12\:06\:51\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=false\nsubject alt name \:\n \next key usage \: TLS Web Client Authentication\n" + +X509 CRT information Non-ASCII string in issuer name and subject name +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/non-ascii-string-in-issuer.crt":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 05\:E6\:53\:E7\:1B\:74\:F0\:B5\:D3\:84\:6D\:0C\:6D\:DC\:FA\:3F\:A4\:5A\:2B\:E0\nissuer name \: C=JP, ST=Tokyo, O=?????????????????? Ltd, CN=?????????????????? CA\nsubject name \: C=JP, ST=Tokyo, O=?????????????????? Ltd, CN=?????????????????? CA\nissued on \: 2020-05-20 16\:17\:23\nexpires on \: 2020-06-19 16\:17\:23\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\n" + +X509 certificate v1 with extension +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_v1_with_ext.crt":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: BD\:ED\:44\:C7\:D2\:3E\:C2\:A4\nissuer name \: C=XX, ST=XX, L=XX, O=XX, OU=XX, emailAddress=admin@identity-check.org, CN=identity-check.org\nsubject name \: C=XX, ST=XX, L=XX, O=XX, OU=XX, emailAddress=admin@identity-check.org, CN=identity-check.org\nissued on \: 2013-07-04 16\:17\:02\nexpires on \: 2014-07-04 16\:17\:02\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: identity-check.org\n dNSName \: www.identity-check.org\n \n" + +X509 SAN parsing otherName +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_san:"data_files/server5-othername.crt":"type \: 0\notherName \: hardware module name \: hardware type \: 1.3.6.1.4.1.17.3, hardware serial number \: 123456\n" + +X509 SAN parsing dNSName +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_san:"data_files/cert_example_multi.crt":"type \: 2\ndNSName \: example.com\ntype \: 2\ndNSName \: example.net\ntype \: 2\ndNSName \: *.example.org\n" + +X509 SAN parsing Multiple different types +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_san:"data_files/multiple_san.crt":"type \: 2\ndNSName \: example.com\ntype \: 0\notherName \: hardware module name \: hardware type \: 1.3.6.1.4.1.17.3, hardware serial number \: 123456\ntype \: 2\ndNSName \: example.net\ntype \: 2\ndNSName \: *.example.org\n" + +X509 SAN parsing, no subject alt name +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +x509_parse_san:"data_files/server4.crt":"" + +X509 SAN parsing, unsupported otherName name +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_san:"data_files/server5-unsupported_othername.crt":"" + +X509 CRL information #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_expired.pem":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2011-02-20 10\:24\:19\nnext update \: 2011-02-20 11\:24\:19\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\n" + +X509 CRL Information MD2 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD2_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_md2.pem":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2009-07-19 19\:56\:37\nnext update \: 2009-09-17 19\:56\:37\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2009-02-09 21\:12\:36\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2009-02-09 21\:12\:36\nsigned using \: RSA with MD2\n" + +X509 CRL Information MD4 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD4_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_md4.pem":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nnext update \: 2011-04-13 14\:44\:07\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nsigned using \: RSA with MD4\n" + +X509 CRL Information MD5 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_md5.pem":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nnext update \: 2011-04-13 14\:44\:07\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nsigned using \: RSA with MD5\n" + +X509 CRL Information SHA1 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_sha1.pem":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nnext update \: 2011-04-13 14\:44\:07\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\n" + +X509 CRL Information SHA224 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_sha224.pem":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nnext update \: 2011-04-13 14\:44\:07\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-224\n" + +X509 CRL Information SHA256 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_sha256.pem":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nnext update \: 2011-04-13 14\:44\:07\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\n" + +X509 CRL Information SHA384 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_sha384.pem":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nnext update \: 2011-04-13 14\:44\:07\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-384\n" + +X509 CRL Information SHA512 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl_sha512.pem":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nnext update \: 2011-04-13 14\:44\:07\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 01 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nserial number\: 03 revocation date\: 2011-02-12 14\:44\:07\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-512\n" + +X509 CRL information RSA-PSS, SHA1 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha1.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2014-01-20 13\:46\:35\nnext update \: 2024-01-18 13\:46\:35\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nserial number\: 16 revocation date\: 2014-01-20 13\:43\:05\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA1, MGF1-SHA1, 0xEA)\n" + +X509 CRL information RSA-PSS, SHA224 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha224.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2014-01-20 13\:56\:06\nnext update \: 2024-01-18 13\:56\:06\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nserial number\: 16 revocation date\: 2014-01-20 13\:43\:05\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA224, MGF1-SHA224, 0xE2)\n" + +X509 CRL information RSA-PSS, SHA256 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha256.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2014-01-20 13\:56\:16\nnext update \: 2024-01-18 13\:56\:16\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nserial number\: 16 revocation date\: 2014-01-20 13\:43\:05\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA256, MGF1-SHA256, 0xDE)\n" + +X509 CRL information RSA-PSS, SHA384 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha384.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2014-01-20 13\:56\:28\nnext update \: 2024-01-18 13\:56\:28\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nserial number\: 16 revocation date\: 2014-01-20 13\:43\:05\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA384, MGF1-SHA384, 0xCE)\n" + +X509 CRL information RSA-PSS, SHA512 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha512.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2014-01-20 13\:56\:38\nnext update \: 2024-01-18 13\:56\:38\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nserial number\: 16 revocation date\: 2014-01-20 13\:43\:05\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA512, MGF1-SHA512, 0xBE)\n" + +X509 CRL Information EC, SHA1 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nthis update \: 2013-09-24 16\:31\:08\nnext update \: 2023-09-22 16\:31\:08\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\n" + +X509 CRL Information EC, SHA224 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-ec-sha224.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nthis update \: 2013-09-24 16\:31\:08\nnext update \: 2023-09-22 16\:31\:08\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA224\n" + +X509 CRL Information EC, SHA256 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nthis update \: 2013-09-24 16\:31\:08\nnext update \: 2023-09-22 16\:31\:08\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\n" + +X509 CRL Information EC, SHA384 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-ec-sha384.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nthis update \: 2013-09-24 16\:31\:08\nnext update \: 2023-09-22 16\:31\:08\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA384\n" + +X509 CRL Information EC, SHA512 Digest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_info:"data_files/crl-ec-sha512.pem":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA\nthis update \: 2013-09-24 16\:31\:08\nnext update \: 2023-09-22 16\:31\:08\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: 0A revocation date\: 2013-09-24 16\:28\:38\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA512\n" + +X509 CRL Malformed Input (trailing spaces at end of file) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_parse:"data_files/crl-malformed-trailing-spaces.pem":MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT + +X509 CRL Unsupported critical extension (issuingDistributionPoint) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_parse:"data_files/crl-idp.pem":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRL Unsupported non-critical extension (issuingDistributionPoint) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_crl_parse:"data_files/crl-idpnc.pem":0 + +X509 CSR Information RSA with MD4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD4_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.md4":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with MD4\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA with MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.md5":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with MD5\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA with SHA1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.sha1":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA with SHA224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.sha224":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-224\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA with SHA-256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA with SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.sha384":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-384\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA with SHA512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.sha512":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-512\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA with SHA-256, containing commas +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTS_X509_INFO +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1.req.commas.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL\, Commas, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information EC with SHA1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha1":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information EC with SHA224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha224":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA224\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information EC with SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information EC with SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha384":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA384\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information EC with SHA512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha512":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA512\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha1":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA1, MGF1-SHA1, 0x6A)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha224":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA224, MGF1-SHA224, 0x62)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA256, MGF1-SHA256, 0x5E)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha384":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA384, MGF1-SHA384, 0x4E)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha512":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA512, MGF1-SHA512, 0x3E)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n" + +X509 CSR Information RSA with SHA-256 - Microsoft header +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1-ms.req.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n" + +X509 Verify Information: empty +x509_verify_info:0:"":"" + +X509 Verify Information: one issue +x509_verify_info:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING:"":"Certificate was missing\n" + +X509 Verify Information: two issues +x509_verify_info:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED:"":"The certificate validity has expired\nThe CRL is expired\n" + +X509 Verify Information: two issues, one unknown +x509_verify_info:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER | 0x80000000:"":"Other reason (can be used by verify callback)\nUnknown reason (this should not happen)\n" + +X509 Verify Information: empty, with prefix +x509_verify_info:0:" ! ":"" + +X509 Verify Information: one issue, with prefix +x509_verify_info:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING:" ! ":" ! Certificate was missing\n" + +X509 Verify Information: two issues, with prefix +x509_verify_info:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED:" ! ":" ! The certificate validity has expired\n ! The CRL is expired\n" + +X509 Get Distinguished Name #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets:"data_files/server1.crt":"subject":"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1" + +X509 Get Distinguished Name #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets:"data_files/server1.crt":"issuer":"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA" + +X509 Get Distinguished Name #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets:"data_files/server2.crt":"subject":"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost" + +X509 Get Distinguished Name #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets:"data_files/server2.crt":"issuer":"C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA" + +X509 Get Distinguished Name #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets:"data_files/server1.commas.crt":"subject":"C=NL, O=PolarSSL\, Commas, CN=PolarSSL Server 1" + +X509 Get Modified DN #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"Modified":"C=NL, O=Modified, CN=PolarSSL Server 1":0 + +X509 Get Modified DN #2 Name exactly 255 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345":"C=NL, O=123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345, CN=PolarSSL Server 1":0 + +X509 Get Modified DN #3 Name exceeds 255 bytes +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +X509 Get Modified DN #4 Name exactly 255 bytes, with comma requiring escaping +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"1234567890,1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +X509 Get Modified DN #5 Name exactly 255 bytes, ending with comma requiring escaping +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace:"data_files/server1.crt":"12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234,":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + +X509 Time Expired #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_past:"data_files/server1.crt":"valid_from":1 + +X509 Time Expired #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_past:"data_files/server1.crt":"valid_to":0 + +X509 Time Expired #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_past:"data_files/server2.crt":"valid_from":1 + +X509 Time Expired #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_past:"data_files/server2.crt":"valid_to":0 + +X509 Time Expired #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_past:"data_files/test-ca.crt":"valid_from":1 + +X509 Time Expired #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_past:"data_files/test-ca.crt":"valid_to":0 + +X509 Time Future #1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_future:"data_files/server5.crt":"valid_from":0 + +X509 Time Future #2 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_future:"data_files/server5.crt":"valid_to":1 + +X509 Time Future #3 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_future:"data_files/server5-future.crt":"valid_from":1 + +X509 Time Future #4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_future:"data_files/server5-future.crt":"valid_to":1 + +X509 Time Future #5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_future:"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"valid_from":0 + +X509 Time Future #6 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +mbedtls_x509_time_is_future:"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"valid_to":1 + +X509 CRT verification #1 (Revoked Cert, Expired CRL, no CN) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl_expired.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #1a (Revoked Cert, Future CRL, no CN) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server6.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-future.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #2 (Revoked Cert, Expired CRL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl_expired.pem":"PolarSSL Server 1":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #2a (Revoked Cert, Future CRL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server6.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-future.pem":"localhost":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #3 (Revoked Cert, Future CRL, CN Mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl_expired.pem":"PolarSSL Wrong CN":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #3a (Revoked Cert, Expired CRL, CN Mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server6.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-future.pem":"Wrong CN":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #4 (Valid Cert, Expired CRL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl_expired.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #4a (Revoked Cert, Future CRL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-future.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #5 (Revoked Cert) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #5' (Revoked Cert, differing DN string formats #1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca_utf8.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #5'' (Revoked Cert, differing DN string formats #2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca_printable.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #5''' (Revoked Cert, differing upper and lower case) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca_uppercase.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #6 (Revoked Cert) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"PolarSSL Server 1":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #7 (Revoked Cert, CN Mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"PolarSSL Wrong CN":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #8 (Valid Cert) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #8a (Expired Cert) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-expired.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #8b (Future Cert) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-future.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #8c (Expired Cert, longer chain) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server7-expired.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #8d (Future Cert, longer chain) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server7-future.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #9 (Not trusted Cert) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #10 (Not trusted Cert, Expired CRL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/crl_expired.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #12 (Valid Cert MD2 Digest, MD2 forbidden) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_md2.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #12 (Valid Cert MD4 Digest, MD4 forbidden) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_md4.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #13 (Valid Cert MD5 Digest, MD5 forbidden) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_md5.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #12 (Valid Cert MD2 Digest, MD2 allowed) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_md2.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"all":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #12 (Valid Cert MD4 Digest, MD4 allowed) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_md4.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"all":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #13 (Valid Cert MD5 Digest, MD5 allowed) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_md5.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"all":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #14 (Valid Cert SHA1 Digest explicitly allowed in profile) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #14 (Valid Cert SHA1 Digest forbidden in default profile) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD:"":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #15 (Valid Cert SHA224 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha224.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #16 (Valid Cert SHA256 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha256.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #17 (Valid Cert SHA384 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha384.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #18 (Valid Cert SHA512 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha512.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #19 (Valid Cert, denying callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha512.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER:"compat":"verify_none" + +X509 CRT verification #19 (Not trusted Cert, allowing callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/crl_expired.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"verify_all" + +X509 CRT verification #21 (domain matching wildcard certificate, case insensitive) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_wildcard.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"mail.ExAmPlE.com":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #22 (domain not matching wildcard certificate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_wildcard.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"mail.example.net":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #23 (domain not matching wildcard certificate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_wildcard.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"example.com":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #24 (domain matching CN of multi certificate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_multi.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"www.example.com":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #25 (domain matching multi certificate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_multi.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"example.net":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #26 (domain not matching multi certificate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_multi.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"www.example.net":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #27.1 (domain not matching multi certificate: suffix) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_multi.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"xample.net":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #27.2 (domain not matching multi certificate: head junk) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_multi.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"bexample.net":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #28 (domain not matching wildcard in multi certificate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_multi.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"example.org":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #29 (domain matching wildcard in multi certificate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_multi.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"mail.example.org":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #30 (domain matching multi certificate without CN) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_multi_nocn.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"www.shotokan-braunschweig.de":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #31 (domain not matching multi certificate without CN) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_example_multi_nocn.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"www.example.net":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #32 (Valid, EC cert, RSA CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server3.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #33 (Valid, RSA cert, EC CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server4.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #34 (Valid, EC cert, EC CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #35 (Revoked, EC CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server6.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #36 (Valid, EC CA, SHA1 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-sha1.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #37 (Valid, EC CA, SHA224 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-sha224.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #38 (Valid, EC CA, SHA384 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-sha384.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #39 (Valid, EC CA, SHA512 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-sha512.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #40 (Valid, depth 0, RSA, CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #41 (Valid, depth 0, EC, CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #42 (Depth 0, not CA, RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #43 (Depth 0, not CA, EC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #44 (Corrupted signature, EC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #45 (Corrupted signature, RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server2-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #45b (Corrupted signature, intermediate CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server7-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #46 (Valid, depth 2, EC-RSA-EC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server7_int-ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #47 (Untrusted, depth 2, EC-RSA-EC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server7_int-ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #48 (Missing intermediate CA, EC-RSA-EC) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server7.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #49 (Valid, depth 2, RSA-EC-RSA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server8_int-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #50 (Valid, multiple CAs) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #51 (Valid, multiple CAs, reverse order) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat21.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #52 (CA keyUsage valid) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.ku-crt_crl.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #53 (CA keyUsage missing cRLSign) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.ku-crt.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #54 (CA keyUsage missing cRLSign, no CRL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.ku-crt.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #55 (CA keyUsage missing keyCertSign) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.ku-crl.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #56 (CA keyUsage plain wrong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.ku-ds.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #57 (Valid, RSASSA-PSS, SHA-1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/server9.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #58 (Valid, RSASSA-PSS, SHA-224) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9-sha224.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha224.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #59 (Valid, RSASSA-PSS, SHA-256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9-sha256.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #60 (Valid, RSASSA-PSS, SHA-384) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9-sha384.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha384.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #61 (Valid, RSASSA-PSS, SHA-512) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9-sha512.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha512.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #62 (Revoked, RSASSA-PSS, SHA-1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server9.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha1.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #63 (Revoked, RSASSA-PSS, SHA-1, CRL badsign) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha1-badsign.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #64 (Valid, RSASSA-PSS, SHA-1, not top) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/server9-with-ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #65 (RSASSA-PSS, SHA1, bad cert signature) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #66 (RSASSA-PSS, SHA1, no RSA CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #67 (Valid, RSASSA-PSS, all defaults) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9-defaults.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-rsa-pss-sha1.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #68 (RSASSA-PSS, wrong salt_len) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9-bad-saltlen.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #69 (RSASSA-PSS, wrong mgf_hash) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server9-bad-mgfhash.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #70 (v1 trusted CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server1-v1.crt":"data_files/test-ca-v1.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #71 (v1 trusted CA, other) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server2-v1.crt":"data_files/server1-v1.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #72 (v1 chain) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server2-v1-chain.crt":"data_files/test-ca-v1.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #73 (selfsigned trusted without CA bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #74 (signed by selfsigned trusted without CA bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server6-ss-child.crt":"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #75 (encoding mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/enco-cert-utf8str.pem":"data_files/enco-ca-prstr.pem":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #76 (multiple CRLs, not revoked) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"data_files/crl_cat_ec-rsa.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #77 (multiple CRLs, revoked) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server6.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"data_files/crl_cat_ec-rsa.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #78 (multiple CRLs, revoked by second) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server6.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"data_files/crl_cat_rsa-ec.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #79 (multiple CRLs, revoked by future) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server6.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"data_files/crl_cat_ecfut-rsa.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #80 (multiple CRLs, first future, revoked by second) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"data_files/crl_cat_ecfut-rsa.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #81 (multiple CRLs, none relevant) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/enco-cert-utf8str.pem":"data_files/enco-ca-prstr.pem":"data_files/crl_cat_rsa-ec.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #82 (Not yet valid CA and valid CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2_cat-future-present.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #83 (valid CA and Not yet valid CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2_cat-present-future.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #84 (valid CA and Not yet valid CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2_cat-present-past.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #85 (Not yet valid CA and valid CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2_cat-past-present.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #86 (Not yet valid CA and invalid CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2_cat-future-invalid.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #87 (Expired CA and invalid CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2_cat-past-invalid.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #88 (Spurious cert in the chain) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/server7_spurious_int-ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #89 (Spurious cert later in the chain) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify:"data_files/server10_int3_spurious_int-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #90 (EE with same name as trusted root) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-ss-forgeca.crt":"data_files/test-int-ca3.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha1.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:"":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #91 (same CA with good then bad key) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca-good-alt.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #91 (same CA with bad then good key) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca-alt-good.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #92 (bad name, allowing callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"globalhost":0:0:"":"verify_all" + +X509 CRT verification #93 (Suite B invalid, EC cert, RSA CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server3.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK:"suite_b":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #94 (Suite B invalid, RSA cert, EC CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server4.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK:"suite_b":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #95 (Suite B Valid, EC cert, EC CA) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"suite_b":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #96 (next profile Invalid Cert SHA224 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha224.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD:"next":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #97 (next profile Valid Cert SHA256 Digest) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha256.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-ec-sha256.pem":"NULL":0:0:"next":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #98 (Revoked Cert, revocation date in the future, _with_ MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-futureRevocationDate.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification #99 (Revoked Cert, revocation date in the future, _without_ MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:!MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl-futureRevocationDate.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED:"compat":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification: domain identical to IPv4 in SubjectAltName +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-tricky-ip-san.crt":"data_files/server5-tricky-ip-san.crt":"data_files/crl_sha256.pem":"abcd":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification: domain identical to IPv6 in SubjectAltName +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify:"data_files/server5-tricky-ip-san.crt":"data_files/server5-tricky-ip-san.crt":"data_files/crl_sha256.pem":"abcd.example.com":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH:"":"NULL" + +X509 CRT verification with ca callback: failure +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK +x509_verify_ca_cb_failure:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR + +X509 CRT verification callback: bad name +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"globalhost":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"depth 1 - serial C1\:43\:E2\:7E\:62\:43\:CC\:E8 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 09 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000004\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: trusted EE cert +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 0 - serial 53\:A2\:CB\:4B\:12\:4E\:AD\:83\:7D\:A8\:94\:B2 - subject CN=selfsigned, OU=testing, O=PolarSSL, C=NL - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: trusted EE cert, expired +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server5-ss-expired.crt":"data_files/server5-ss-expired.crt":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"depth 0 - serial D8\:64\:61\:05\:E3\:A3\:CD\:78 - subject C=UK, O=mbed TLS, OU=testsuite, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000001\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: simple +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 1 - serial 03 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 01 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1 - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: simple, EE expired +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server5-expired.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"depth 1 - serial C1\:43\:E2\:7E\:62\:43\:CC\:E8 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 1E - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000001\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: simple, root expired +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2-expired.crt":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"depth 1 - serial 01 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA - flags 0x00000001\ndepth 0 - serial 09 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: two trusted roots +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 1 - serial 03 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 01 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1 - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: two trusted roots, reversed order +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat21.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 1 - serial 03 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 01 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1 - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: root included +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server1_ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat21.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 1 - serial 03 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 01 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1 - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: intermediate ca +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server7_int-ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 2 - serial C1\:43\:E2\:7E\:62\:43\:CC\:E8 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 1 - serial 0E - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 10 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: intermediate ca, root included +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server7_int-ca_ca2.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 2 - serial C1\:43\:E2\:7E\:62\:43\:CC\:E8 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 1 - serial 0E - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 10 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: intermediate ca trusted +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server7_int-ca_ca2.crt":"data_files/test-int-ca.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 1 - serial 0E - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 10 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: intermediate ca, EE expired +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server7-expired.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"depth 2 - serial C1\:43\:E2\:7E\:62\:43\:CC\:E8 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 1 - serial 0E - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 10 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000001\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: intermediate ca, int expired +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server7_int-ca-exp.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"depth 2 - serial C1\:43\:E2\:7E\:62\:43\:CC\:E8 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 1 - serial 0E - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate CA - flags 0x00000001\ndepth 0 - serial 10 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: intermediate ca, root expired +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server7_int-ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca2-expired.crt":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"depth 2 - serial 01 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA - flags 0x00000001\ndepth 1 - serial 0E - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 10 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: two intermediates +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat21.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 3 - serial 03 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 2 - serial 0F - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 1 - serial 4D - subject C=UK, O=mbed TLS, CN=mbed TLS Test intermediate CA 3 - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 4B - subject CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: two intermediates, root included +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2_ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat21.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 3 - serial 03 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 2 - serial 0F - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 1 - serial 4D - subject C=UK, O=mbed TLS, CN=mbed TLS Test intermediate CA 3 - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 4B - subject CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: two intermediates, top int trusted +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 2 - serial 0F - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 1 - serial 4D - subject C=UK, O=mbed TLS, CN=mbed TLS Test intermediate CA 3 - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 4B - subject CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: two intermediates, low int trusted +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2_ca.crt":"data_files/test-int-ca3.crt":"NULL":0:"depth 1 - serial 4D - subject C=UK, O=mbed TLS, CN=mbed TLS Test intermediate CA 3 - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 4B - subject CN=localhost - flags 0x00000000\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: no intermediate, bad signature +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server5-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"depth 0 - serial 09 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000008\n" + +X509 CRT verification callback: one intermediate, bad signature +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_verify_callback:"data_files/server7-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"depth 2 - serial C1\:43\:E2\:7E\:62\:43\:CC\:E8 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=Polarssl Test EC CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 1 - serial 0E - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test Intermediate CA - flags 0x00000000\ndepth 0 - serial 10 - subject C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost - flags 0x00000008\n" + +X509 Parse Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_CERTS_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_selftest: + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Empty Certificate) +x509parse_crt:"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Certificate, bad tag) +x509parse_crt:"0500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Certificate, no length) +x509parse_crt:"30":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Certificate, bad length encoding) +x509parse_crt:"3085":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Certificate, length data incomplete) +x509parse_crt:"308200":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Certificate, length out of bounds) +x509parse_crt:"3001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv TBS, invalid tag) +x509parse_crt:"30020500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv TBS, length missing) +x509parse_crt:"300130":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv TBS, invalid length encoding) +x509parse_crt:"30023085":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv TBS, length data incomplete) +x509parse_crt:"300430839999":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv TBS, length out of bounds) +x509parse_crt:"30023003":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"30153000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, invalid version tag, serial missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"301730020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid outer version tag, no outer length) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"30163001a0300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv inner version tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"30193004a0020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid inner version tag, no inner length) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"30183003a00102300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid inner version tag, inv inner length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"30193004a0020285300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid inner version tag, inner length too large for int) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +# tbsCertificate.version = 0x01000000000000000000000000000000 rejected by mbedtls_asn1_get_int +x509parse_crt:"30293014a012021001000000000000000000000000000000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid inner version tag, inner vs. outer length mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"301b3006a00402010200300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid version tag, length exceeds TBS) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"30293014a012021100000000000000000000000000000000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid version tag + length, unknown version number 3) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201038204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid version tag + length, unknown version number 4) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201048204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid version tag + length, version number overflow) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"308199308183a00602047FFFFFFF8204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, serial missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"301a3005a003020102300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv serial, tag wrong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"301c3007a0030201020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv serial, length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"301b3006a00302010282300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv serial, inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"301c3007a0030201028285300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv serial, length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"301c3007a0030201028201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, AlgID missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"3020300ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, tag wrong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"3022300da0030201028204deadbeef0500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, OID missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"307b3073a0030201008204deadbeef3000300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff3000030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, OID tag wrong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"307f3075a0030201008204deadbeef30020500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff30020500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, OID inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"307f3075a0030201008204deadbeef30020685300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff30020685030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, OID length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"307f3075a0030201008204deadbeef30020601300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff30020601030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, OID empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"307f3075a0030201008204deadbeef30020600300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff30020600030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, OID unknown) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"3081873079a0030201008204deadbeef30060604deadbeef300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff30060604deadbeef030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, param inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0685300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0685030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, param length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0601300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0601030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, param length mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"30819a308182a0030201008204deadbeef300f06092a864886f70d01010b06010000300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300f06092a864886f70d01010b06010000030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, params present but empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0600300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0600030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv AlgID, bad RSASSA-PSS params) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010a3100300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010a3100030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, Issuer missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"302f301aa0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, RDNSequence inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"3031301ca0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b05000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, RDNSequence length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"3030301ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, RDNSequence inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"3031301ca0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b05003085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, RDNSequence length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"3031301ca0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b05003001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, RDNSequence empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081893074a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b05003000301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, RDN inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818b3076a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030020500301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, RDN inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818b3076a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030023185301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, RDN length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818b3076a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030023101301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, RDN empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818b3076a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030023100301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818d3078a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300431020500301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818d3078a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300431023085301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818d3078a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300431023001301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818d3078a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300431023000301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue type inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818f307aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b05003006310430020500301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue type inv no length data) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818e3079a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030053103300106301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue type inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818f307aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b05003006310430020685301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue type length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818f307aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b05003006310430020601301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue value missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818f307aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b05003006310430020600301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue value inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308191307ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030083106300406000500301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG; + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue value length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308190307ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030073105300306000c301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue value inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308191307ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030083106300406000C85301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue value length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308191307ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030083106300406000c01301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, AttrTypeAndValue value length mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308193307ea0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300a3108300606000c010000301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Issuer, 2nd AttributeTypeValue empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300e310c300806000c04546573743000301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, Validity missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"303d3028a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c0454657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"303f302aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c04546573740500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, length field missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"303e3029a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c045465737430300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"303f302aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c04546573743085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"303f302aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c04546573743001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notBefore missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30793064a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c04546573743000300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notBefore inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307b3066a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c045465737430020500300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notBefore no length) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307a3065a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c0454657374300117300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notBefore inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307b3066a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c04546573743002178f300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notBefore length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307b3066a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806000c045465737430021701300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notBefore empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081893074a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a3008060013045465737430101700170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notBefore invalid) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303000000000170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notAfter missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374300e170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notAfter inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081893074a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806001304546573743010170c3039313233313233353935390500300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notAfter length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081883073a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374300f170c30393132333132333539353917300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notAfter inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081893074a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806001304546573743010170c3039313233313233353935391785300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notAfter length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081893074a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806001304546573743010170c3039313233313233353935391701300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notAfter empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081893074a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a300806001304546573743010170c3039313233313233353935391700300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, notAfter invalid) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303931323331323335393539170c303930313031303000000000300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Validity, data remaining after 'notAfter') +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301e170c303930313031303030303030170c3039313233313233353935391700300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, Subject missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"305b3046a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, RDNSequence inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"305c3047a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353900300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, RDNSequence length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"305c3047a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, RDNSequence inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"305d3048a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c3039313233313233353935393085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, RDNSequence length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"305d3048a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c3039313233313233353935393001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, RDN inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818b3076a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930020500302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, RDN inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818b3076a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930023185302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, RDN length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818b3076a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930023101302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, RDN empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818b3076a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930023100302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818d3078a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300431020500302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818d3078a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300431023085302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818d3078a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300431023001302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818d3078a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300431023000302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue type inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818f307aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c3039313233313233353935393006310430020500302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue type inv no length data) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818e3079a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930053103300106302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue type inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818f307aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c3039313233313233353935393006310430020685302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue type length out of bounds ) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818f307aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c3039313233313233353935393006310430020601302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue value missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30818f307aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c3039313233313233353935393006310430020600302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue value inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308191307ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930083106300406000500302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG; + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue value length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308190307ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930073105300306000c302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue value inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308191307ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930083106300406000C85302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue value length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308191307ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c30393132333132333539353930083106300406000c01302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, AttrTypeAndValue value length mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308193307ea0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300a3108300606000c010000302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv Subject, 2nd AttributeTypeValue empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300e310c300806000c04546573743000302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, SubPubKeyInfo missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30693054a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"306b3056a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573740500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"306a3055a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a3008060013045465737430300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"306b3056a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"306b3056a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"306b3056a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv algorithm tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"306d3058a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a3008060013045465737430020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, algorithm length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"306c3057a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374300130300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, algorithm inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"306d3058a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a3008060013045465737430023085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, algorithm length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"306d3058a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a3008060013045465737430023001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, algorithm empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081883073a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301d300003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, algorithm unknown) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010100050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, bitstring missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307a3065a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374300f300d06092A864886F70D0101010500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, bitstring inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307c3067a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743011300d06092A864886F70D01010105000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, bitstring length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307b3066a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743010300d06092A864886F70D010101050003300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, bitstring inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307c3067a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743011300d06092A864886F70D01010105000385300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, bitstring length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307c3067a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743011300d06092A864886F70D01010105000301300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, no bitstring data) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307c3067a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743011300d06092A864886F70D01010105000300300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv bitstring start) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"307d3068a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743012300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030101300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv internal bitstring length) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400300000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv internal bitstring tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400310000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv RSA modulus) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0302ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, total length mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081893074a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301e300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0202ffff0500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, check failed) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, check failed, expanded length notation) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + +# We expect an extension parsing error here because the IssuerID is optional. +# Hence, if we find an ASN.1 tag doesn't match the IssuerID, we assume the +# IssuerID is skipped and that the tag should hence belong to the next field, +# namely the v3 extensions. However, the tag the test exercises is a NULL tag, +# and hence we obtain an INVALID_TAG error during extension parsing. +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv IssuerID, inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff0500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv IssuerID, length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308197308181a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa1300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv IssuerID, inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa185300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv IssuerID, length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa101300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, no IssuerID, inv SubjectID, length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308197308181a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa2300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, no IssuerID, inv SubjectID, inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa285300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, no IssuerID, inv SubjectID, length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid IssuerID, inv SubjectID, inv tag) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa1000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, ext SubjectAlternativeName malformed) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509parse_crt:"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid IssuerID, inv SubjectID, length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308199308183a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a2300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid IssuerID, inv SubjectID, inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a285300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid IssuerID, inv SubjectID, length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, IssuerID unsupported in v1 CRT) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, IssuerID unsupported in v1 CRT, ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, SubjectID unsupported in v1 CRT) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa200a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, SubjectID unsupported in v1 CRT, ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa200a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819c308186a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a2000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, outer length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819b308185a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, outer length inv encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819c308186a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a385300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, outer length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819c308186a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a301300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, outer length 0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819c308186a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a300300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, inner tag invalid) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819e308188a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, inner length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819d308187a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30130300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, inner length inv encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819e308188a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3023085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, inner length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819e308188a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3023001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, inner/outer length mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819f308189a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a303300000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, first ext inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a030818aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30430020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, first ext length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819f308189a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a303300130300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, inv first ext length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a030818aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30430023085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, first ext length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a030818aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30430023001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, first ext empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a030818aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30430023000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, first ext extnID inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a230818ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a306300430020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, first ext extnID length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a130818ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3053003300106300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, first ext extnID inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a230818ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a306300430020685300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, first ext extnID length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a230818ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a306300430020601300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, no extnValue) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a230818ca0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a306300430020600300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, inv critical tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a430818ea0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3083006300406000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, critical length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a330818da0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30730053003060001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, critical inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a430818ea0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3083006300406000185300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, critical length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a430818ea0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3083006300406000101300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, critical length 0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a430818ea0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3083006300406000100300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, critical length 2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a6308190a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30a30083006060001020000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, extnValue inv tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a7308191a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30b3009300706000101000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, extnValue length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a6308190a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30a30083006060001010004300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, extnValue length inv encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a7308191a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30b3009300706000101000485300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, extnValue length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a7308191a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30b3009300706000101000401300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, data remaining after extnValue) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a9308193a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30d300b3009060001010004000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, data missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a7308191a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30b300930070603551d200400300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, invalid outer tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a9308193a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30d300b30090603551d2004020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, outer length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a8308192a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30c300a30080603551d20040130300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, outer length inv encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a9308193a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30d300b30090603551d2004023085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, outer length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a9308193a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30d300b30090603551d2004023001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, no policies) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081a9308193a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30d300b30090603551d2004023000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy invalid tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ab308195a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30f300d300b0603551d20040430020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081aa308194a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30e300c300a0603551d200403300130300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy length inv encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ab308195a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30f300d300b0603551d20040430023085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ab308195a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30f300d300b0603551d20040430023001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, empty policy) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ab308195a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a30f300d300b0603551d20040430023000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy invalid OID tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ad308197a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a311300f300d0603551d200406300430020500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy no OID length) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ac308196a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a310300e300c0603551d2004053003300106300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy OID length inv encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ad308197a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a311300f300d0603551d200406300430020685300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy OID length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ad308197a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a311300f300d0603551d200406300430020601300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, unknown critical policy) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION +x509parse_crt:"3081b130819ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a315301330110603551d20010101040730053003060100300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy qualifier invalid tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b030819aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a314301230100603551d200409300730050601000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy qualifier no length) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081af308199a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a3133011300f0603551d2004083006300406010030300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy qualifier inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b030819aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a314301230100603551d200409300730050601003085300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, inv CertificatePolicies, policy qualifier length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b030819aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a314301230100603551d200409300730050601003001300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv extBasicConstraint, no pathlen length) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b030819aa0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a314301230100603551d130101010406300402010102300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv extBasicConstraint, pathlen is INT_MAX) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/server1_pathlen_int_max.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (pathlen is INT_MAX-1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/server1_pathlen_int_max-1.crt":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv extBasicConstraint, pathlen inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b130819ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a315301330110603551d13010101040730050201010285300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv extBasicConstraint, pathlen length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b130819ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a315301330110603551d13010101040730050201010201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv extBasicConstraint, pathlen empty) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b130819ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a315301330110603551d13010101040730050201010200300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv extBasicConstraint, pathlen length mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b430819ea0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a318301630140603551d13010101040a30080201010201010500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, ExtKeyUsage bad second tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081bd3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d250416301406082b0601050507030107082b06010505070302300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, SubjectAltName repeated) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081dc3081c6a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a340303e301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, ExtKeyUsage repeated) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081dc3081c6a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a340303e301d0603551d250416301406082b0601050507030106082b06010505070302301d0603551d250416301406082b0601050507030106082b06010505070302300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, SubjectAltName repeated outside Extensions) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081dc3081c6a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT (TBS, valid v3Ext in v1 CRT, ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ??=Test\nsubject name \: ??=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: foo.test\n dNSName \: bar.test\n":0 + +X509 CRT (TBS, valid v3Ext in v2 CRT, ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201018204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 2\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ??=Test\nsubject name \: ??=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: foo.test\n dNSName \: bar.test\n":0 + +X509 CRT (TBS, valid v3Ext in v3 CRT) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ??=Test\nsubject name \: ??=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: foo.test\n dNSName \: bar.test\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid v3Ext in v1 CRT) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid v3Ext in v2 CRT) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201018204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid SubjectID, valid IssuerID, inv v3Ext, SubjectAltName repeated outside Extensions, inv SubjectAltNames tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509parse_crt:"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (SignatureAlgorithm missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081aa3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv SignatureAlgorithm, bad tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ac3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e746573740500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv SignatureAlgorithm, length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ab3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e7465737430":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv SignatureAlgorithm, inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ac3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e746573743085":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv SignatureAlgorithm, length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ac3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e746573743001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv SignatureAlgorithm, not the same as SignatureAlgorithm in TBS) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081bd3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010a0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Signature missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Signature, bad tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081bb3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b05000500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Signature, length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081ba3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b050003":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Signature, inv length encoding) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081bb3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b05000385":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Signature, length out of bounds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081bb3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b05000301":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Signature, inv data #1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +# signature = bit string with invalid encoding (missing number of unused bits) +x509parse_crt:"3081bb3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b05000300":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Signature, inv data #2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +# signature = bit string with invalid encoding (number of unused bits too large) +x509parse_crt:"3081bc3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030108":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (empty Signature) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +# signature = empty bit string in DER encoding +x509parse_crt:"3081bc3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030100":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ??=Test\nsubject name \: ??=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: foo.test\n dNSName \: bar.test\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (dummy 24-bit Signature) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +# signature = bit string "011001100110111101101111" +x509parse_crt:"3081bf3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030400666f6f":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ??=Test\nsubject name \: ??=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: foo.test\n dNSName \: bar.test\n":0 + +# The ASN.1 module rejects non-octet-aligned bit strings. +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Signature: not octet-aligned) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +# signature = bit string "01100110011011110110111" +x509parse_crt:"3081bf3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030401666f6e":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +X509 CRT ASN1 (inv Signature, length mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"3081be3081a7a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff00":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRT ASN1 (well-formed) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ?\?=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (GeneralizedTime in notBefore, UTCTime in notAfter) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301e180e3230313030313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ?\?=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2010-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (UTCTime in notBefore, GeneralizedTime in notAfter) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301e170c303931323331323335393539180e3230313030313031303030303030300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ?\?=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nexpires on \: 2010-01-01 00\:00\:00\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with X520 CN) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308199308183a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300f310d300b0603550403130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: CN=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with X520 C) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308199308183a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300f310d300b0603550406130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: C=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with X520 L) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308199308183a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300f310d300b0603550407130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: L=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with X520 ST) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308199308183a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300f310d300b0603550408130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ST=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with X520 O) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308199308183a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300f310d300b060355040a130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: O=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with X520 OU) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308199308183a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300f310d300b060355040b130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: OU=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with unknown X520 part) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"308199308183a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300f310d300b06035504de130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ?\?=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with composite RDN) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509parse_crt:"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":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 4C\:20\:E3\:BD\nissuer name \: C=US, ST=CA, O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, CN=Frankencert CA\nsubject name \: C=US, ST=Washington, ??=US, ??=Delaware, O=Authorize.Net LLC, ??=Private Organization, serialNumber=4369191 + CN=www.authorize.net, L=San Francisco\nissued on \: 2013-08-02 15\:14\:37\nexpires on \: 2015-08-17 05\:54\:31\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with PKCS9 email) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819f308189a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030153113301106092a864886f70d010901130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: emailAddress=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Name with unknown PKCS9 part) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt:"30819f308189a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b050030153113301106092a864886f70d0109ab130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ?\?=Test\nsubject name \: ?\?=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (ECDSA signature, RSA key) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +x509parse_crt:"3081e630819e020103300906072a8648ce3d0401300f310d300b0603550403130454657374301e170d3133303731303039343631385a170d3233303730383039343631385a300f310d300b0603550403130454657374304c300d06092a864886f70d0101010500033b003038023100e8f546061d3b49bc2f6b7524b7ea4d73a8d5293ee8c64d9407b70b5d16baebc32b8205591eab4e1eb57e9241883701250203010001300906072a8648ce3d0401033800303502186e18209afbed14a0d9a796efcad68891e3ccd5f75815c833021900e92b4fd460b1994693243b9ffad54729de865381bda41d25":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: 03\nissuer name \: CN=Test\nsubject name \: CN=Test\nissued on \: 2013-07-10 09\:46\:18\nexpires on \: 2023-07-08 09\:46\:18\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nRSA key size \: 384 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (ECDSA signature, EC key) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509parse_crt:"3081eb3081a3020900f41534662ec7e912300906072a8648ce3d0401300f310d300b0603550403130454657374301e170d3133303731303039343031395a170d3233303730383039343031395a300f310d300b06035504031304546573743049301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030101033200042137969fabd4e370624a0e1a33e379cab950cce00ef8c3c3e2adaeb7271c8f07659d65d3d777dcf21614363ae4b6e617300906072a8648ce3d04010338003035021858cc0f957946fe6a303d92885a456aa74c743c7b708cbd37021900fe293cac21af352d16b82eb8ea54e9410b3abaadd9f05dd6":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: F4\:15\:34\:66\:2E\:C7\:E9\:12\nissuer name \: CN=Test\nsubject name \: CN=Test\nissued on \: 2013-07-10 09\:40\:19\nexpires on \: 2023-07-08 09\:40\:19\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 192 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (RSA signature, EC key) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt:"3081e430819f020104300d06092a864886f70d0101050500300f310d300b0603550403130454657374301e170d3133303731303135303233375a170d3233303730383135303233375a300f310d300b06035504031304546573743049301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010103320004e962551a325b21b50cf6b990e33d4318fd16677130726357a196e3efe7107bcb6bdc6d9db2a4df7c964acfe81798433d300d06092a864886f70d01010505000331001a6c18cd1e457474b2d3912743f44b571341a7859a0122774a8e19a671680878936949f904c9255bdd6fffdb33a7e6d8":"cert. version \: 1\nserial number \: 04\nissuer name \: CN=Test\nsubject name \: CN=Test\nissued on \: 2013-07-10 15\:02\:37\nexpires on \: 2023-07-08 15\:02\:37\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 192 bits\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Unsupported critical extension) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION +x509parse_crt:"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Unsupported critical extension recognized by callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt_cb:"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":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 4D\:3E\:BB\:B8\:A8\:70\:F9\:C7\:8C\:55\:A8\:A7\:E1\:2F\:D5\:16\nissuer name \: CN=dummy\nsubject name \: CN=dummy\nissued on \: 2020-04-28 17\:42\:43\nexpires on \: 2020-06-27 17\:42\:43\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: dummy\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Key Cert Sign\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Unsupported critical extension not recognized by callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt_cb:"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Unsupported non critical extension recognized by callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt_cb:"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":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 4D\:3E\:BB\:B8\:A8\:70\:F9\:C7\:8C\:55\:A8\:A7\:E1\:2F\:D5\:16\nissuer name \: CN=dummy\nsubject name \: CN=dummy\nissued on \: 2020-04-28 17\:42\:43\nexpires on \: 2020-06-27 17\:42\:43\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: dummy\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Key Cert Sign\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Unsupported non critical extension not recognized by callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt_cb:"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":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: 4D\:3E\:BB\:B8\:A8\:70\:F9\:C7\:8C\:55\:A8\:A7\:E1\:2F\:D5\:16\nissuer name \: CN=dummy\nsubject name \: CN=dummy\nissued on \: 2020-04-28 17\:42\:43\nexpires on \: 2020-06-27 17\:42\:43\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: dummy\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Key Cert Sign\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Unsupported critical policy recognized by callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt_cb:"3081b130819ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a315301330110603551d20010101040730053003060101300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ??=Test\nsubject name \: ??=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\ncertificate policies \: ???\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Unsupported critical policy not recognized by callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt_cb:"3081b130819ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a315301330110603551d20010101040730053003060100300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Unsupported non critical policy recognized by callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt_cb:"3081b130819ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a315301330110603551d20010100040730053003060101300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ??=Test\nsubject name \: ??=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\ncertificate policies \: ???\n":0 + +X509 CRT ASN1 (Unsupported non critical policy not recognized by callback) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crt_cb:"3081b130819ba0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092a864886f70d010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a315301330110603551d20010100040730053003060100300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version \: 3\nserial number \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name \: ??=Test\nsubject name \: ??=Test\nissued on \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 128 bits\ncertificate policies \: ???\n":0 + +X509 CRL ASN1 (Incorrect first tag) +x509parse_crl:"":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + +X509 CRL ASN1 (Correct first tag, data length does not match) +x509parse_crl:"300000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, tag missing) +x509parse_crl:"3000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, version tag len missing) +x509parse_crl:"3003300102":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, version correct, alg missing) +x509parse_crl:"30053003020100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, alg correct, incorrect version) +x509parse_crl:"300b3009020102300406000500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, correct version, sig_oid1 unknown) +x509parse_crl:"300b3009020100300406000500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, sig_oid1 id unknown) +x509parse_crl:"30143012020100300d06092a864886f70d01010f0500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, sig_oid1 correct, issuer missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"30143012020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, issuer set missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"30163014020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e05003000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, correct issuer, thisUpdate missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"30253023020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, correct thisUpdate, nextUpdate missing, entries length missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"30343032020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c30393031303130303030303030":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, entries present, invalid sig_alg) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"304a3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c30383132333132333539353900":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, entries present, date in entry invalid) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"304a3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd190c30383132333132333539353900":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, sig_alg present, sig_alg does not match) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"30583047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010d0500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, sig present, len mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"305d3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e05000302000100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +# 305c +# 3047 tbsCertList TBSCertList +# 020100 version INTEGER OPTIONAL +# 300d signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifi +# 06092a864886f70d01010e +# 0500 +# 300f issuer Name +# 310d300b0603550403130441424344 +# 170c303930313031303030303030 thisUpdate Time +# 3014 revokedCertificates +# 3012 entry 1 +# 8202abcd userCertificate CertificateSerialNum +# 170c303831323331323335393539 revocationDate Time +# 300d signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifi +# 06092a864886f70d01010e +# 0500 +# 03020001 signatureValue BIT STRING +# The subsequent TBSCertList negative tests remove or modify some elements. +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, sig present) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"305c3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: CN=ABCD\nthis update \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nnext update \: 0000-00-00 00\:00\:00\nRevoked certificates\:\nserial number\: AB\:CD revocation date\: 2008-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-224\n":0 + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, signatureValue missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"30583047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, signatureAlgorithm missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"30493047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd170c303831323331323335393539":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, single empty entry at end) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"30373035020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c30393031303130303030303030023000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, good entry then empty entry at end) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"304b3049020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301630128202abcd170c3038313233313233353935393000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, missing time in entry) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"304e3039020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030300630048202abcd300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, missing time in entry at end) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"303b3039020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030300630048202abcd":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, invalid tag for time in entry) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"305c3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128202abcd190c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, invalid tag for serial) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"305c3047020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030301430128402abcd170c303831323331323335393539300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CRL ASN1 (TBSCertList, no entries) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"30463031020100300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"CRL version \: 1\nissuer name \: CN=ABCD\nthis update \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nnext update \: 0000-00-00 00\:00\:00\nRevoked certificates\:\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-224\n":0 + +X509 CRL ASN1 (invalid version 2) +x509parse_crl:"30463031020102300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION + +X509 CRL ASN1 (invalid version overflow) +x509parse_crl:"3049303102047fffffff300d06092a864886f70d01010e0500300f310d300b0603550403130441424344170c303930313031303030303030300d06092a864886f70d01010e050003020001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION + +X509 CRL ASN1 (extension seq too long, crl-idp.pem byte 121) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (extension oid too long, crl-idp.pem byte 123) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (extension critical invalid length, crl-idp.pem byte 128) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"308201b330819c020101300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500303b310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c3119301706035504031310506f6c617253534c2054657374204341170d3138303331343037333134385a170d3238303331343037333134385aa02d302b30290603551d1c0102ff041f301da01ba0198617687474703a2f2f706b692e6578616d706c652e636f6d2f300d06092a864886f70d01010b05000382010100b3fbe9d586eaf4b8ff60cf8edae06a85135db78f78198498719725b5b403c0b803c2c150f52faae7306d6a7871885dc2e9dc83a164bac7263776474ef642b660040b35a1410ac291ac8f6f18ab85e7fd6e22bd1af1c41ca95cf2448f6e2b42a018493dfc03c6b6aa1b9e3fe7b76af2182fb2121db4166bf0167d6f379c5a58adee5082423434d97be2909f5e7488053f996646db10dd49782626da53ad8eada01813c031b2bacdb0203bc017aac1735951a11d013ee4d1d5f7143ccbebf2371e66a1bec6e1febe69148f50784eef8adbb66664c96196d7e0c0bcdc807f447b54e058f37642a3337995bfbcd332208bd6016936705c82263eabd7affdba92fae3":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +X509 CRL ASN1 (extension data too long, crl-idp.pem byte 131) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CRL ASN1 (extension data too short, crl-idp.pem byte 131) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CRL ASN1 (extension not critical explicit, crl-idp.pem byte 129) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509parse_crl:"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":"CRL version \: 2\nissuer name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Test CA\nthis update \: 2018-03-14 07\:31\:48\nnext update \: 2028-03-14 07\:31\:48\nRevoked certificates\:\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\n":0 + +X509 CRT parse path #2 (one cert) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path:"data_files/dir1":0:1 + +X509 CRT parse path #3 (two certs) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path:"data_files/dir2":0:2 + +X509 CRT parse path #4 (two certs, one non-cert) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path:"data_files/dir3":1:2 + +X509 CRT verify long chain (max intermediate CA, trusted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_max:"data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt":"data_files/dir-maxpath":MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify long chain (max intermediate CA, untrusted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_max:"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/dir-maxpath":MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA-1:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED + +X509 CRT verify long chain (max intermediate CA + 1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_max:"data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt":"data_files/dir-maxpath":MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA+1:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR:-1 + +X509 CRT verify chain #1 (zero pathlen intermediate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert14.crt data_files/dir4/cert13.crt data_files/dir4/cert12.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert11.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #2 (zero pathlen root) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert23.crt data_files/dir4/cert22.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert21.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #3 (nonzero pathlen root) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert34.crt data_files/dir4/cert33.crt data_files/dir4/cert32.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert31.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #4 (nonzero pathlen intermediate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert45.crt data_files/dir4/cert44.crt data_files/dir4/cert43.crt data_files/dir4/cert42.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert41.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #5 (nonzero maxpathlen intermediate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert54.crt data_files/dir4/cert53.crt data_files/dir4/cert52.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert51.crt":0:0:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #6 (nonzero maxpathlen root) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert63.crt data_files/dir4/cert62.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert61.crt":0:0:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #7 (maxpathlen root, self signed in path) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert74.crt data_files/dir4/cert73.crt data_files/dir4/cert72.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert71.crt":0:0:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #8 (self signed maxpathlen root) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert61.crt data_files/dir4/cert63.crt data_files/dir4/cert62.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert61.crt":0:0:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #9 (zero pathlen first intermediate, valid) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert83.crt data_files/dir4/cert82.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert81.crt":0:0:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #10 (zero pathlen root, valid) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert92.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert91.crt":0:0:"":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #11 (valid chain, missing profile) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/dir4/cert92.crt":"data_files/dir4/cert91.crt":-1:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA:"nonesuch":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #12 (suiteb profile, RSA root) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server3.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"suiteb":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #13 (RSA only profile, EC root) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server4.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"rsa3072":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #13 (RSA only profile, EC trusted EE) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"rsa3072":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #14 (RSA-3072 profile, root key too small) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"rsa3072":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #15 (suiteb profile, rsa intermediate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server7.crt data_files/test-int-ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"suiteb":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #16 (RSA-only profile, EC intermediate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server8.crt data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK|MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"rsa3072":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #17 (SHA-512 profile) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server7.crt data_files/test-int-ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:"sha512":0 + +X509 CRT verify chain #18 (len=1, vrfy fatal on depth 1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":-1:-2:"":2 + +X509 CRT verify chain #19 (len=0, vrfy fatal on depth 0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":-1:-1:"":1 + +X509 CRT verify chain #20 (len=1, vrfy fatal on depth 0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":-1:-1:"":1 + +X509 CRT verify chain #21 (len=3, vrfy fatal on depth 3) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2_ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":-1:-4:"":8 + +X509 CRT verify chain #22 (len=3, vrfy fatal on depth 2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2_ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":-1:-3:"":4 + +X509 CRT verify chain #23 (len=3, vrfy fatal on depth 1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2_ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":-1:-2:"":2 + +X509 CRT verify chain #24 (len=3, vrfy fatal on depth 0) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2_ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":-1:-1:"":1 + +X509 CRT verify chain #25 (len=3, vrfy fatal on depth 3, untrusted) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2_ca.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":-1:-4:"":8 + +X509 OID description #1 +x509_oid_desc:"2b06010505070301":"TLS Web Server Authentication" + +X509 OID description #2 +x509_oid_desc:"2b0601050507030f":"notfound" + +X509 OID description #3 +x509_oid_desc:"2b0601050507030100":"notfound" + +X509 OID numstring #1 (wide buffer) +x509_oid_numstr:"2b06010505070301":"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1":20:17 + +X509 OID numstring #2 (buffer just fits) +x509_oid_numstr:"2b06010505070301":"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1":18:17 + +X509 OID numstring #3 (buffer too small) +x509_oid_numstr:"2b06010505070301":"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1":17:MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +X509 OID numstring #4 (larger number) +x509_oid_numstr:"2a864886f70d":"1.2.840.113549":15:14 + +X509 OID numstring #5 (arithmetic overflow) +x509_oid_numstr:"2a8648f9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f001":"":100:MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +X509 CRT keyUsage #1 (no extension, expected KU) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/server1.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:0 + +X509 CRT keyUsage #2 (no extension, surprising KU) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/server1.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN:0 + +X509 CRT keyUsage #3 (extension present, no KU) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":0:0 + +X509 CRT keyUsage #4 (extension present, single KU present) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:0 + +X509 CRT keyUsage #5 (extension present, single KU absent) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +X509 CRT keyUsage #6 (extension present, combined KU present) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:0 + +X509 CRT keyUsage #7 (extension present, combined KU both absent) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN|MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +X509 CRT keyUsage #8 (extension present, combined KU one absent) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +X509 CRT keyUsage #9 (extension present, decOnly allowed absent) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY:0 + +X509 CRT keyUsage #10 (extension present, decOnly non-allowed present) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/keyUsage.decipherOnly.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +X509 CRT keyUsage #11 (extension present, decOnly allowed present) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_check_key_usage:"data_files/keyUsage.decipherOnly.crt":MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY:0 + +X509 CRT extendedKeyUsage #1 (no extension, serverAuth) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_check_extended_key_usage:"data_files/server5.crt":"2b06010505070301":0 + +X509 CRT extendedKeyUsage #2 (single value, present) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_check_extended_key_usage:"data_files/server5.eku-srv.crt":"2b06010505070301":0 + +X509 CRT extendedKeyUsage #3 (single value, absent) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_check_extended_key_usage:"data_files/server5.eku-cli.crt":"2b06010505070301":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +X509 CRT extendedKeyUsage #4 (two values, first) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_check_extended_key_usage:"data_files/server5.eku-srv_cli.crt":"2b06010505070301":0 + +X509 CRT extendedKeyUsage #5 (two values, second) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_check_extended_key_usage:"data_files/server5.eku-srv_cli.crt":"2b06010505070302":0 + +X509 CRT extendedKeyUsage #6 (two values, other) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_check_extended_key_usage:"data_files/server5.eku-srv_cli.crt":"2b06010505070303":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +X509 CRT extendedKeyUsage #7 (any, random) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_check_extended_key_usage:"data_files/server5.eku-cs_any.crt":"2b060105050703ff":0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (good, all defaults) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (wrong initial tag) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"":MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (unknown tag in top-level sequence) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a400":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (good, HashAlg SHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a00d300b0609608648016503040201":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (good, explicit HashAlg = default) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a009300706052b0e03021a":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (HashAlg wrong len #1) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a00a300706052b0e03021a":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (HashAlg wrong len #2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a00a300706052b0e03021a00":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (HashAlg with parameters) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a00f300d06096086480165030402013000":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (HashAlg unknown OID) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a00d300b06096086480165030402ff":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (good, MGAlg = MGF1-SHA256) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040201":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (good, explicit MGAlg = default) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a116301406092a864886f70d010108300706052b0e03021a":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg wrong len #1) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11b301806092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040201":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg wrong len #2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11b301806092a864886f70d010108300b060960864801650304020100":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg AlgId wrong len #1) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11a301906092a864886f70d010108300b0609608648016503040201":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg OID != MGF1) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11a301806092a864886f70d010109300b0609608648016503040201":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg.params wrong tag) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11a301806092a864886f70d010108310b0609608648016503040201":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg.params wrong len #1a) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a10f300d06092a864886f70d0101083000":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg.params wrong len #1b) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11b301906092a864886f70d010108300c0609608648016503040201":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg.params.alg not an OID) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b0709608648016503040201":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg.params.alg unknown OID) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b06096086480165030402ff":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg.params.params NULL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11c301a06092a864886f70d010108300d06096086480165030402010500":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg.params.params wrong tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11c301a06092a864886f70d010108300d06096086480165030402013000":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg.params wrong len #1c) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11d301b06092a864886f70d010108300e06096086480165030402010500":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (MGAlg.params wrong len #2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a11d301b06092a864886f70d010108300e0609608648016503040201050000":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (good, saltLen = 94) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a20302015e":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:94:0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (good, explicit saltLen = default) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a203020114":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (saltLen wrong len #1) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a20402015e":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:94:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (saltLen wrong len #2) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a20402015e00":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:94:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (saltLen not an int) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a2023000":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:94:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (good, explicit trailerField = default) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a303020101":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:0 + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (trailerField wrong len #1) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a304020101":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (trailerField wrong len #2) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a30402010100":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (trailerField not an int) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a3023000":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 RSASSA-PSS parameters ASN1 (trailerField not 1) +x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params:"a303020102":MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:20:MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"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":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n":0 + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad first tag) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad sequence: overlong) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (total length mistmatch) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30010000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad CRI: not a sequence) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30023100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad CRI: overlong) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30023001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad CRI.Version: overlong) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30053002020100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad CRI.Version: not v1) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30053003020101":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad CRI.Name: not a sequence) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"300730050201003100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad CRI.Name: overlong) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30083005020100300100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad CRI.Name payload: not a set) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3009300702010030023000":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad CRI.Name payload: overlong) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"300a30080201003002310100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad SubjectPublicKeyInfo: missing) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30143012020100300d310b3009060355040613024e4c":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad SubjectPublicKeyInfo: not a sequence) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30163014020100300d310b3009060355040613024e4c3100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad SubjectPublicKeyInfo: overlong) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30173014020100300d310b3009060355040613024e4c300100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad attributes: missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3081973081940201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad attributes: bad tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3081993081960201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff0500":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad attributes: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"30819a3081960201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edffa00100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad sigAlg: missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3081c23081bf0201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edffa029302706092a864886f70d01090e311a301830090603551d1304023000300b0603551d0f0404030205e0":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad sigAlg: not a sequence) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3081c43081bf0201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edffa029302706092a864886f70d01090e311a301830090603551d1304023000300b0603551d0f0404030205e03100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad sigAlg: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3081c43081bf0201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edffa029302706092a864886f70d01090e311a301830090603551d1304023000300b0603551d0f0404030205e03001":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad sigAlg: unknown) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3081cd3081bf0201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edffa029302706092a864886f70d01090e311a301830090603551d1304023000300b0603551d0f0404030205e0300906072a8648ce3d04ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad sig: missing) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3081cd3081bf0201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edffa029302706092a864886f70d01090e311a301830090603551d1304023000300b0603551d0f0404030205e0300906072a8648ce3d0401":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad sig: not a bit string) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3081cf3081bf0201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edffa029302706092a864886f70d01090e311a301830090603551d1304023000300b0603551d0f0404030205e0300906072a8648ce3d04010400":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad sig: overlong) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3081cf3081bf0201003034310b3009060355040613024e4c3111300f060355040a1308506f6c617253534c31123010060355040313096c6f63616c686f73743059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edffa029302706092a864886f70d01090e311a301830090603551d1304023000300b0603551d0f0404030205e0300906072a8648ce3d04010301":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (extra data after signature) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"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":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +X509 CSR ASN.1 (invalid version overflow) +mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3008300602047fffffff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION + +X509 File parse (no issues) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/server7_int-ca.crt":0 + +X509 File parse (extra space in one certificate) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/server7_pem_space.crt":1 + +X509 File parse (all certificates fail) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/server7_all_space.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA + MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER + +X509 File parse (trailing spaces, OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/server7_trailing_space.crt":0 + +X509 File parse (Algorithm Params Tag mismatch) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/cli-rsa-sha256-badalg.crt.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH + +X509 Get time (UTC no issues) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"500101000000Z":0:1950:1:1:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (Generalized Time no issues) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME:"99991231235959Z":0:9999:12:31:23:59:59 + +X509 Get time (UTC year without leap day) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"490229121212Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC year with leap day) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"000229121212Z":0:2000:2:29:12:12:12 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid day of month #1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"000132121212Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid day of month #2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"001131121212Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid hour) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"001130241212Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid min) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"001130236012Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid sec) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"001130235960Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC without time zone) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"000229121212":0:2000:2:29:12:12:12 + +X509 Get time (UTC with invalid time zone #1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"000229121212J":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC with invalid time zone #2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"000229121212+0300":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (Date with invalid tag) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC:"000229121212":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC, truncated) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"000229121":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (Generalized Time, truncated) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME:"20000229121":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC without seconds) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"0002291212":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:2000:2:29:12:12:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC without seconds and with invalid time zone #1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"0002291212J":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC without second and with invalid time zone #2) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"0002291212+0300":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid character in year) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"0\1130231212Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid character in month) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"001%30231212Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid character in day) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"0011`0231212Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid character in hour) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"0011302h1212Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid character in min) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"00113023u012Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (UTC invalid character in sec) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"0011302359n0Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (Generalized Time, year multiple of 100 but not 400 is not a leap year) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME:"19000229000000Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (Generalized Time, year multiple of 4 but not 100 is a leap year) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME:"19920229000000Z":0:1992:2:29:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (Generalized Time, year multiple of 400 is a leap year) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME:"20000229000000Z":0:2000:2:29:0:0:0 + +X509 Get time (Generalized Time invalid leap year not multiple of 4, 100 or 400) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME:"19910229000000Z":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE:0:0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: trusted EE, max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: trusted EE, max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt":0:0:1:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: no intermediate, max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: no intermediate, max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":0:0:1:100:10000 + +X509 CRT verify restart: no intermediate, max_ops=40000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":0:0:40000:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: no intermediate, max_ops=500 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":0:0:500:20:80 + +X509 CRT verify restart: no intermediate, badsign, max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:0:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: no intermediate, badsign, max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:1:100:10000 + +X509 CRT verify restart: no intermediate, badsign, max_ops=40000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:40000:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: no intermediate, badsign, max_ops=500 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server5-badsign.crt":"data_files/test-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:500:20:80 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":0:0:0:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":0:0:1:100:10000 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, max_ops=30000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":0:0:30000:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, max_ops=500 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10_int3_int-ca2.crt":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":0:0:500:25:100 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, EE badsign, max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10-bs_int3.pem":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:0:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, EE badsign, max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10-bs_int3.pem":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:1:100:10000 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, EE badsign, max_ops=30000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10-bs_int3.pem":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:30000:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, EE badsign, max_ops=500 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10-bs_int3.pem":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:500:25:100 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, int badsign, max_ops=0 (disabled) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10_int3-bs.pem":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:0:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, int badsign, max_ops=1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10_int3-bs.pem":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:1:100:10000 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, int badsign, max_ops=30000 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10_int3-bs.pem":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:30000:0:0 + +X509 CRT verify restart: one int, int badsign, max_ops=500 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C +x509_verify_restart:"data_files/server10_int3-bs.pem":"data_files/test-int-ca2.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:500:25:100 diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..77f3d233 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function @@ -0,0 +1,1287 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "string.h" + +#if MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA > 19 +#error "The value of MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_C is larger \ +than the current threshold 19. To test larger values, please \ +adapt the script tests/data_files/dir-max/long.sh." +#endif + +/* Test-only profile allowing all digests, PK algorithms, and curves. */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile profile_all = +{ + 0xFFFFFFFF, /* Any MD */ + 0xFFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ + 0xFFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */ + 1024, +}; + +/* Profile for backward compatibility. Allows SHA-1, unlike the default + profile. */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile compat_profile = +{ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), + 0xFFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ + 0xFFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */ + 1024, +}; + +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile profile_rsa3072 = +{ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ), + 0, + 3072, +}; + +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile profile_sha512 = +{ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), + 0xFFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ + 0xFFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */ + 1024, +}; + +int verify_none( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth, uint32_t *flags ) +{ + ((void) data); + ((void) crt); + ((void) certificate_depth); + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER; + + return 0; +} + +int verify_all( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth, uint32_t *flags ) +{ + ((void) data); + ((void) crt); + ((void) certificate_depth); + *flags = 0; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +int ca_callback_fail( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt const *child, mbedtls_x509_crt **candidates ) +{ + ((void) data); + ((void) child); + ((void) candidates); + + return -1; +} + +int ca_callback( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt const *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt **candidates ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca = (mbedtls_x509_crt *) data; + mbedtls_x509_crt *first; + + /* This is a test-only implementation of the CA callback + * which always returns the entire list of trusted certificates. + * Production implementations managing a large number of CAs + * should use an efficient presentation and lookup for the + * set of trusted certificates (such as a hashtable) and only + * return those trusted certificates which satisfy basic + * parental checks, such as the matching of child `Issuer` + * and parent `Subject` field. */ + ((void) child); + + first = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + if( first == NULL ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( first ); + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( first, ca->raw.p, ca->raw.len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + + while( ca->next != NULL ) + { + ca = ca->next; + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( first, ca->raw.p, ca->raw.len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + } + +exit: + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( first ); + mbedtls_free( first ); + first = NULL; + } + + *candidates = first; + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +int verify_fatal( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth, uint32_t *flags ) +{ + int *levels = (int *) data; + + ((void) crt); + ((void) certificate_depth); + + /* Simulate a fatal error in the callback */ + if( *levels & ( 1 << certificate_depth ) ) + { + *flags |= ( 1 << certificate_depth ); + return( -1 - certificate_depth ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* strsep() not available on Windows */ +char *mystrsep(char **stringp, const char *delim) +{ + const char *p; + char *ret = *stringp; + + if( *stringp == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + for( ; ; (*stringp)++ ) + { + if( **stringp == '\0' ) + { + *stringp = NULL; + goto done; + } + + for( p = delim; *p != '\0'; p++ ) + if( **stringp == *p ) + { + **stringp = '\0'; + (*stringp)++; + goto done; + } + } + +done: + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +typedef struct { + char buf[512]; + char *p; +} verify_print_context; + +void verify_print_init( verify_print_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( verify_print_context ) ); + ctx->p = ctx->buf; +} + +int verify_print( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth, uint32_t *flags ) +{ + int ret; + verify_print_context *ctx = (verify_print_context *) data; + char *p = ctx->p; + size_t n = ctx->buf + sizeof( ctx->buf ) - ctx->p; + ((void) flags); + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "depth %d - serial ", certificate_depth ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &crt->serial ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " - subject " ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->subject ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " - flags 0x%08x\n", *flags ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ctx->p = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int verify_parse_san( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san, + char **buf, size_t *size ) +{ + int ret; + size_t i; + char *p = *buf; + size_t n = *size; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "type : %d", san->type ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + switch( san->type ) + { + case( MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ): + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\notherName :"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, + &san->san.other_name.value.hardware_module_name.oid ) != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " hardware module name :" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " hardware type : " ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( p, n, + &san->san.other_name.value.hardware_module_name.oid ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ", hardware serial number : " ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( san->san.other_name.value.hardware_module_name.val.len >= n ) + { + *p = '\0'; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + for( i=0; i < san->san.other_name.value.hardware_module_name.val.len; i++ ) + { + *p++ = san->san.other_name.value.hardware_module_name.val.p[i]; + } + n -= san->san.other_name.value.hardware_module_name.val.len; + } + break;/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ + case( MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ): + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\ndNSName : " ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if( san->san.unstructured_name.len >= n ) + { + *p = '\0'; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + n -= san->san.unstructured_name.len; + for( i = 0; i < san->san.unstructured_name.len; i++ ) + *p++ = san->san.unstructured_name.p[i]; + break;/* MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME */ + + default: + /* + * Should not happen. + */ + return( -1 ); + } + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int parse_crt_ext_cb( void *p_ctx, mbedtls_x509_crt const *crt, mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid, + int critical, const unsigned char *cp, const unsigned char *end ) +{ + ( void ) crt; + ( void ) critical; + mbedtls_x509_buf *new_oid = (mbedtls_x509_buf *)p_ctx; + if( oid->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID && + MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, oid ) == 0 ) + { + /* Handle unknown certificate policy */ + int ret, parse_ret = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char **p = (unsigned char **)&cp; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Cannot be an empty sequence. + */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + const unsigned char *policy_end; + + /* + * Get the policy sequence + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + policy_end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + /* + * Recognize exclusively the policy with OID 1 + */ + if( len != 1 || *p[0] != 1 ) + parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + *p += len; + + /* + * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end + * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end. + */ + if( *p < policy_end ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + /* + * Skip the optional policy qualifiers. + */ + *p += len; + } + + if( *p != policy_end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( parse_ret ); + } + else if( new_oid != NULL && new_oid->tag == oid->tag && new_oid->len == oid->len && + memcmp( new_oid->p, oid->p, oid->len ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void x509_parse_san( char * crt_file, char * result_str ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = NULL; + char buf[2000]; + char *p = buf; + size_t n = sizeof( buf ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( buf, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + + if( crt.ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) + { + cur = &crt.subject_alt_names; + while( cur != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &cur->buf, &san ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + /* + * If san type not supported, ignore. + */ + if( ret == 0) + TEST_ASSERT( verify_parse_san( &san, &p, &n ) == 0 ); + cur = cur->next; + } + } + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void x509_cert_info( char * crt_file, char * result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + char buf[2000]; + int res; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( buf, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( buf, 2000, "", &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char * crl_file, char * result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crl crl; + char buf[2000]; + int res; + + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( &crl ); + memset( buf, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( &crl, crl_file ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_x509_crl_info( buf, 2000, "", &crl ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &crl ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( char * crl_file, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crl crl; + char buf[2000]; + + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( &crl ); + memset( buf, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( &crl, crl_file ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &crl ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char * csr_file, char * result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_csr csr; + char buf[2000]; + int res; + + mbedtls_x509_csr_init( &csr ); + memset( buf, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( &csr, csr_file ) == 0 ); + res = mbedtls_x509_csr_info( buf, 2000, "", &csr ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( &csr ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void x509_verify_info( int flags, char * prefix, char * result_str ) +{ + char buf[2000]; + int res; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( buf, sizeof( buf ), prefix, flags ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res >= 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buf, result_str ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +void x509_verify_restart( char *crt_file, char *ca_file, + int result, int flags_result, + int max_ops, int min_restart, int max_restart ) +{ + int ret, cnt_restart; + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx rs_ctx; + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt ca; + uint32_t flags = 0; + + /* + * See comments on ecp_test_vect_restart() for op count precision. + * + * For reference, with mbed TLS 2.6 and default settings: + * - ecdsa_verify() for P-256: ~ 6700 + * - ecdsa_verify() for P-384: ~ 18800 + * - x509_verify() for server5 -> test-ca2: ~ 18800 + * - x509_verify() for server10 -> int-ca3 -> int-ca2: ~ 25500 + */ + + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( &rs_ctx ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &ca ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &ca, ca_file ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( max_ops ); + + cnt_restart = 0; + do { + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( &crt, &ca, NULL, + &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, NULL, &flags, + NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx ); + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result ); + TEST_ASSERT( flags == (uint32_t) flags_result ); + + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart >= min_restart ); + TEST_ASSERT( cnt_restart <= max_restart ); + + /* Do we leak memory when aborting? */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( &crt, &ca, NULL, + &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, NULL, &flags, + NULL, NULL, &rs_ctx ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( &rs_ctx ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &ca ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ +void x509_verify( char *crt_file, char *ca_file, char *crl_file, + char *cn_name_str, int result, int flags_result, + char *profile_str, + char *verify_callback ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt ca; + mbedtls_x509_crl crl; + uint32_t flags = 0; + int res; + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *) = NULL; + char * cn_name = NULL; + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &ca ); + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( &crl ); + + USE_PSA_INIT( ); + + if( strcmp( cn_name_str, "NULL" ) != 0 ) + cn_name = cn_name_str; + + if( strcmp( profile_str, "" ) == 0 ) + profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; + else if( strcmp( profile_str, "next" ) == 0 ) + profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; + else if( strcmp( profile_str, "suite_b" ) == 0 ) + profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; + else if( strcmp( profile_str, "compat" ) == 0 ) + profile = &compat_profile; + else if( strcmp( profile_str, "all" ) == 0 ) + profile = &profile_all; + else + TEST_ASSERT( "Unknown algorithm profile" == 0 ); + + if( strcmp( verify_callback, "NULL" ) == 0 ) + f_vrfy = NULL; + else if( strcmp( verify_callback, "verify_none" ) == 0 ) + f_vrfy = verify_none; + else if( strcmp( verify_callback, "verify_all" ) == 0 ) + f_vrfy = verify_all; + else + TEST_ASSERT( "No known verify callback selected" == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &ca, ca_file ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( &crl, crl_file ) == 0 ); + + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( &crt, &ca, &crl, profile, cn_name, &flags, f_vrfy, NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res == ( result ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( flags == (uint32_t)( flags_result ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* CRLs aren't supported with CA callbacks, so skip the CA callback + * version of the test if CRLs are in use. */ + if( crl_file == NULL || strcmp( crl_file, "" ) == 0 ) + { + flags = 0; + + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( &crt, ca_callback, &ca, profile, cn_name, &flags, f_vrfy, NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res == ( result ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( flags == (uint32_t)( flags_result ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &ca ); + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &crl ); + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +void x509_verify_ca_cb_failure( char *crt_file, char *ca_file, char *name, + int exp_ret ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt ca; + uint32_t flags = 0; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &ca ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &ca, ca_file ) == 0 ); + + if( strcmp( name, "NULL" ) == 0 ) + name = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( &crt, ca_callback_fail, &ca, + &compat_profile, name, &flags, + NULL, NULL ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == exp_ret ); + TEST_ASSERT( flags == (uint32_t)( -1 ) ); +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &ca ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void x509_verify_callback( char *crt_file, char *ca_file, char *name, + int exp_ret, char *exp_vrfy_out ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt ca; + uint32_t flags = 0; + verify_print_context vrfy_ctx; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &ca ); + verify_print_init( &vrfy_ctx ); + + USE_PSA_INIT( ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &ca, ca_file ) == 0 ); + + if( strcmp( name, "NULL" ) == 0 ) + name = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( &crt, &ca, NULL, + &compat_profile, + name, &flags, + verify_print, &vrfy_ctx ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == exp_ret ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( vrfy_ctx.buf, exp_vrfy_out ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &ca ); + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char * crt_file, char * entity, char * result_str ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + char buf[2000]; + int res = 0; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( buf, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + if( strcmp( entity, "subject" ) == 0 ) + res = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( buf, 2000, &crt.subject ); + else if( strcmp( entity, "issuer" ) == 0 ) + res = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( buf, 2000, &crt.issuer ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( "Unknown entity" == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ +void mbedtls_x509_dn_gets_subject_replace( char * crt_file, char * new_subject_ou, char * result_str, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + char buf[2000]; + int res = 0; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( buf, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + crt.subject.next->val.p = (unsigned char *) new_subject_ou; + crt.subject.next->val.len = strlen( new_subject_ou ); + + res = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( buf, 2000, &crt.subject ); + + if ( ret != 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( res == ret ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( buf, result_str ) == 0 ); + } +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( char * crt_file, char * entity, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + + if( strcmp( entity, "valid_from" ) == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &crt.valid_from ) == result ); + else if( strcmp( entity, "valid_to" ) == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &crt.valid_to ) == result ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( "Unknown entity" == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( char * crt_file, char * entity, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + + if( strcmp( entity, "valid_from" ) == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &crt.valid_from ) == result ); + else if( strcmp( entity, "valid_to" ) == 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &crt.valid_to ) == result ); + else + TEST_ASSERT( "Unknown entity" == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +void x509parse_crt_file( char * crt_file, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == result ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void x509parse_crt( data_t * buf, char * result_str, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + unsigned char output[2000]; + int res; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( output, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( &crt, buf->x, buf->len ) == ( result ) ); + if( ( result ) == 0 ) + { + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) output, 2000, "", &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) output, result_str ) == 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( output, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( &crt, buf->x, buf->len ) == ( result ) ); + if( ( result ) == 0 ) + { + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) output, 2000, "", &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) output, result_str ) == 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( output, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( &crt, buf->x, buf->len, 0, NULL, NULL ) == ( result ) ); + if( ( result ) == 0 ) + { + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) output, 2000, "", &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) output, result_str ) == 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( output, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( &crt, buf->x, buf->len, 1, NULL, NULL ) == ( result ) ); + if( ( result ) == 0 ) + { + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) output, 2000, "", &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) output, result_str ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void x509parse_crt_cb( data_t * buf, char * result_str, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + mbedtls_x509_buf oid; + unsigned char output[2000]; + int res; + + oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + oid.len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x01\x1F"); + oid.p = (unsigned char *)MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x01\x1F"; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( output, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( &crt, buf->x, buf->len, 0, parse_crt_ext_cb, &oid ) == ( result ) ); + if( ( result ) == 0 ) + { + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) output, 2000, "", &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) output, result_str ) == 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + memset( output, 0, 2000 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( &crt, buf->x, buf->len, 1, parse_crt_ext_cb, &oid ) == ( result ) ); + if( ( result ) == 0 ) + { + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_info( (char *) output, 2000, "", &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) output, result_str ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ +void x509parse_crl( data_t * buf, char * result_str, int result ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crl crl; + unsigned char output[2000]; + int res; + + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( &crl ); + memset( output, 0, 2000 ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( &crl, buf->x, buf->len ) == ( result ) ); + if( ( result ) == 0 ) + { + res = mbedtls_x509_crl_info( (char *) output, 2000, "", &crl ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res != -1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( res != -2 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) output, result_str ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &crl ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( data_t * csr_der, char * ref_out, int ref_ret ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_csr csr; + char my_out[1000]; + int my_ret; + + mbedtls_x509_csr_init( &csr ); + memset( my_out, 0, sizeof( my_out ) ); + + my_ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( &csr, csr_der->x, csr_der->len ); + TEST_ASSERT( my_ret == ref_ret ); + + if( ref_ret == 0 ) + { + size_t my_out_len = mbedtls_x509_csr_info( my_out, sizeof( my_out ), "", &csr ); + TEST_ASSERT( my_out_len == strlen( ref_out ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( my_out, ref_out ) == 0 ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( &csr ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( char * crt_path, int ret, int nb_crt ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt chain, *cur; + int i; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &chain ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( &chain, crt_path ) == ret ); + + /* Check how many certs we got */ + for( i = 0, cur = &chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + if( cur->raw.p != NULL ) + i++; + + TEST_ASSERT( i == nb_crt ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &chain ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_max( char *ca_file, char *chain_dir, int nb_int, + int ret_chk, int flags_chk ) +{ + char file_buf[128]; + int ret; + uint32_t flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt trusted, chain; + + /* + * We expect chain_dir to contain certificates 00.crt, 01.crt, etc. + * with NN.crt signed by NN-1.crt + */ + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &trusted ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &chain ); + + USE_PSA_INIT( ); + + /* Load trusted root */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &trusted, ca_file ) == 0 ); + + /* Load a chain with nb_int intermediates (from 01 to nb_int), + * plus one "end-entity" cert (nb_int + 1) */ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( file_buf, sizeof file_buf, "%s/c%02d.pem", chain_dir, + nb_int + 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret > 0 && (size_t) ret < sizeof file_buf ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &chain, file_buf ) == 0 ); + + /* Try to verify that chain */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( &chain, &trusted, NULL, NULL, &flags, + NULL, NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == ret_chk ); + TEST_ASSERT( flags == (uint32_t) flags_chk ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &chain ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &trusted ); + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain( char *chain_paths, char *trusted_ca, + int flags_result, int result, + char *profile_name, int vrfy_fatal_lvls ) +{ + char* act; + uint32_t flags; + int res; + mbedtls_x509_crt trusted, chain; + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile = NULL; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &chain ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &trusted ); + + USE_PSA_INIT( ); + + while( ( act = mystrsep( &chain_paths, " " ) ) != NULL ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &chain, act ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &trusted, trusted_ca ) == 0 ); + + if( strcmp( profile_name, "" ) == 0 ) + profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; + else if( strcmp( profile_name, "next" ) == 0 ) + profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; + else if( strcmp( profile_name, "suiteb" ) == 0 ) + profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; + else if( strcmp( profile_name, "rsa3072" ) == 0 ) + profile = &profile_rsa3072; + else if( strcmp( profile_name, "sha512" ) == 0 ) + profile = &profile_sha512; + + res = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( &chain, &trusted, NULL, profile, + NULL, &flags, verify_fatal, &vrfy_fatal_lvls ); + + TEST_ASSERT( res == ( result ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( flags == (uint32_t)( flags_result ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &trusted ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &chain ); + USE_PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ +void x509_oid_desc( data_t * buf, char * ref_desc ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_buf oid; + const char *desc = NULL; + int ret; + + + oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + oid.p = buf->x; + oid.len = buf->len; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &oid, &desc ); + + if( strcmp( ref_desc, "notfound" ) == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret != 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( desc == NULL ); + } + else + { + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( desc != NULL ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( desc, ref_desc ) == 0 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ +void x509_oid_numstr( data_t * oid_buf, char * numstr, int blen, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_buf oid; + char num_buf[100]; + + memset( num_buf, 0x2a, sizeof num_buf ); + + oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + oid.p = oid_buf->x; + oid.len = oid_buf->len; + + TEST_ASSERT( (size_t) blen <= sizeof num_buf ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( num_buf, blen, &oid ) == ret ); + + if( ret >= 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( num_buf[ret] == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( num_buf, numstr ) == 0 ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ +void x509_check_key_usage( char * crt_file, int usage, int ret ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( &crt, usage ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ +void x509_check_extended_key_usage( char * crt_file, data_t * oid, int ret + ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt crt; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &crt ); + + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &crt, crt_file ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( &crt, (const char *)oid->x, oid->len ) == ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &crt ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ +void x509_get_time( int tag, char * time_str, int ret, int year, int mon, + int day, int hour, int min, int sec ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_time time; + unsigned char buf[21]; + unsigned char* start = buf; + unsigned char* end = buf; + + memset( &time, 0x00, sizeof( time ) ); + *end = (unsigned char)tag; end++; + *end = strlen( time_str ); + TEST_ASSERT( *end < 20 ); + end++; + memcpy( end, time_str, (size_t)*(end - 1) ); + end += *(end - 1); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_get_time( &start, end, &time ) == ret ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( year == time.year ); + TEST_ASSERT( mon == time.mon ); + TEST_ASSERT( day == time.day ); + TEST_ASSERT( hour == time.hour ); + TEST_ASSERT( min == time.min ); + TEST_ASSERT( sec == time.sec ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ +void x509_parse_rsassa_pss_params( data_t * params, int params_tag, + int ref_msg_md, int ref_mgf_md, + int ref_salt_len, int ref_ret ) +{ + int my_ret; + mbedtls_x509_buf buf; + mbedtls_md_type_t my_msg_md, my_mgf_md; + int my_salt_len; + + buf.p = params->x; + buf.len = params->len; + buf.tag = params_tag; + + my_ret = mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( &buf, &my_msg_md, &my_mgf_md, + &my_salt_len ); + + TEST_ASSERT( my_ret == ref_ret ); + + if( ref_ret == 0 ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( my_msg_md == (mbedtls_md_type_t) ref_msg_md ); + TEST_ASSERT( my_mgf_md == (mbedtls_md_type_t) ref_mgf_md ); + TEST_ASSERT( my_salt_len == ref_salt_len ); + } + +exit: + ;; +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void x509_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c1cf303 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +Certificate Request check Server1 SHA1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.sha1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0 + +Certificate Request check Server1 SHA224 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.sha224":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:0:0:0:0 + +Certificate Request check Server1 SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.sha256":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:0:0 + +Certificate Request check Server1 SHA384 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.sha384":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:0:0:0:0 + +Certificate Request check Server1 SHA512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.sha512":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:0:0:0 + +Certificate Request check Server1 MD4 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.md4":MBEDTLS_MD_MD4:0:0:0:0 + +Certificate Request check Server1 MD5 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.md5":MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:0:0:0:0 + +Certificate Request check Server1 key_usage +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.key_usage":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:0:0 + +Certificate Request check Server1 key_usage empty +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.key_usage_empty":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:1:0:0 + +Certificate Request check Server1 ns_cert_type +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.cert_type":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1 + +Certificate Request check Server1 ns_cert_type empty +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.cert_type_empty":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:1 + +Certificate Request check Server1 key_usage + ns_cert_type +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server1.key":"data_files/server1.req.ku-ct":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1 + +Certificate Request check Server5 ECDSA, key_usage +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +x509_csr_check:"data_files/server5.key":"data_files/server5.req.ku.sha1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION:1:0:0 + +Certificate Request check opaque Server5 ECDSA, key_usage +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +x509_csr_check_opaque:"data_files/server5.key":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.crt":0:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, not before 1970 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"19700210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:1:-1:"":0:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, not after 2050 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20500210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:1:-1:"":0:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, not before 1970, not after 2050 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"19700210144406":"20500210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:1:-1:"":0:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, not before 2050, not after 2059 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20500210144406":"20590210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:1:-1:"":0:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, key_usage +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":0:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, ns_cert_type +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1:1:-1:"data_files/server1.cert_type.crt":0:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, version 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:1:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1:"data_files/server1.v1.crt":0:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, CA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.ca.crt":0:1 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:0:-1:"data_files/server1.noauthid.crt":1:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT, key_usage +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:0:0:0:-1:"data_files/server1.key_usage_noauthid.crt":1:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT, ns_cert_type +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1:0:-1:"data_files/server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt":1:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT, version 1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:0:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1:"data_files/server1.v1.crt":1:0 + +Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT, CA +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_MD5_C +x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:0:0:0:-1:"data_files/server1.ca_noauthid.crt":1:1 + + +X509 String to Names #1 +mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL,O=Offspark\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":0 + +X509 String to Names #2 +mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID + +X509 String to Names #3 (Name precisely 255 bytes) +mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345,OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345, OU=PolarSSL":0 + +X509 String to Names #4 (Name larger than 255 bytes) +mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456, OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + +X509 String to Names #5 (Escape non-allowed characters) +mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark\a Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + +X509 String to Names #6 (Escape at end) +mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark\":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a9cfebd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +int mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, NULL, NULL, mode, olen, + input, output, output_max_len ) ); +} +int mbedtls_rsa_sign_func( void *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ) +{ + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig ) ); +} +size_t mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func( void *ctx ) +{ + return( ((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) +static int x509_crt_verifycsr( const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_x509_csr csr; + int ret = 0; + + mbedtls_x509_csr_init( &csr ); + + if( mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( &csr, buf, buflen ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( csr.sig_md ); + if( mbedtls_md( md_info, csr.cri.p, csr.cri.len, hash ) != 0 ) + { + /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( csr.sig_pk, csr.sig_opts, &csr.pk, + csr.sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + csr.sig.p, csr.sig.len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( &csr ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ + +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ +void x509_csr_check( char * key_file, char * cert_req_check_file, int md_type, + int key_usage, int set_key_usage, int cert_type, + int set_cert_type ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context key; + mbedtls_x509write_csr req; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + unsigned char check_buf[4000]; + int ret; + size_t olen = 0, pem_len = 0, buf_index; + int der_len = -1; + FILE *f; + const char *subject_name = "C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1"; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + memset( &rnd_info, 0x2a, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &key ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, key_file, NULL ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( &req ); + mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( &req, md_type ); + mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( &req, &key ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( &req, subject_name ) == 0 ); + if( set_key_usage != 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( &req, key_usage ) == 0 ); + if( set_cert_type != 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( &req, cert_type ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( &req, buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + pem_len = strlen( (char *) buf ); + + for( buf_index = pem_len; buf_index < sizeof( buf ); ++buf_index ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( buf[buf_index] == 0 ); + } + + f = fopen( cert_req_check_file, "r" ); + TEST_ASSERT( f != NULL ); + olen = fread( check_buf, 1, sizeof( check_buf ), f ); + fclose( f ); + + TEST_ASSERT( olen >= pem_len - 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, check_buf, pem_len - 1 ) == 0 ); + + der_len = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( &req, buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( der_len >= 0 ); + + if( der_len == 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( &req, buf, (size_t)( der_len - 1 ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( &req ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &key ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +void x509_csr_check_opaque( char *key_file, int md_type, int key_usage, + int cert_type ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context key; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t md_alg_psa; + mbedtls_x509write_csr req; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + int ret; + size_t pem_len = 0; + const char *subject_name = "C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1"; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + PSA_INIT( ); + memset( &rnd_info, 0x2a, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + + md_alg_psa = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( (mbedtls_md_type_t) md_type ); + TEST_ASSERT( md_alg_psa != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &key ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, key_file, NULL ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &key, &key_id, md_alg_psa ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( &req ); + mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( &req, md_type ); + mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( &req, &key ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( &req, subject_name ) == 0 ); + if( key_usage != 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( &req, key_usage ) == 0 ); + if( cert_type != 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( &req, cert_type ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( &req, buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ); + + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + pem_len = strlen( (char *) buf ); + buf[pem_len] = '\0'; + TEST_ASSERT( x509_crt_verifycsr( buf, pem_len + 1 ) == 0 ); + + +exit: + mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( &req ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &key ); + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + PSA_DONE( ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +void x509_crt_check( char *subject_key_file, char *subject_pwd, + char *subject_name, char *issuer_key_file, + char *issuer_pwd, char *issuer_name, + char *serial_str, char *not_before, char *not_after, + int md_type, int key_usage, int set_key_usage, + int cert_type, int set_cert_type, int auth_ident, + int ver, char *cert_check_file, int rsa_alt, int is_ca ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context subject_key, issuer_key, issuer_key_alt; + mbedtls_pk_context *key = &issuer_key; + + mbedtls_x509write_cert crt; + unsigned char buf[4096]; + unsigned char check_buf[5000]; + unsigned char *p, *end; + unsigned char tag, sz; + mbedtls_mpi serial; + int ret, before_tag, after_tag; + size_t olen = 0, pem_len = 0, buf_index = 0; + int der_len = -1; + FILE *f; + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + + memset( &rnd_info, 0x2a, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &serial ); + + mbedtls_pk_init( &subject_key ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &issuer_key ); + mbedtls_pk_init( &issuer_key_alt ); + + mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( &crt ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &subject_key, subject_key_file, + subject_pwd ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &issuer_key, issuer_key_file, + issuer_pwd ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + /* For RSA PK contexts, create a copy as an alternative RSA context. */ + if( rsa_alt == 1 && mbedtls_pk_get_type( &issuer_key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( &issuer_key_alt, + mbedtls_pk_rsa( issuer_key ), + mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func, + mbedtls_rsa_sign_func, + mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func ) == 0 ); + + key = &issuer_key_alt; + } +#else + (void) rsa_alt; +#endif + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_read_mpi( &serial, 10, serial_str ) == 0 ); + + if( ver != -1 ) + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( &crt, ver ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( &crt, &serial ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( &crt, not_before, + not_after ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( &crt, md_type ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( &crt, issuer_name ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( &crt, subject_name ) == 0 ); + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( &crt, &subject_key ); + + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( &crt, key ); + + if( crt.version >= MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* For the CA case, a path length of -1 means unlimited. */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( &crt, is_ca, + (is_ca ? -1 : 0) ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( &crt ) == 0 ); + if( auth_ident ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( &crt ) == 0 ); + if( set_key_usage != 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( &crt, key_usage ) == 0 ); + if( set_cert_type != 0 ) + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( &crt, cert_type ) == 0 ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( &crt, buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 ); + + pem_len = strlen( (char *) buf ); + + // check that the rest of the buffer remains clear + for( buf_index = pem_len; buf_index < sizeof( buf ); ++buf_index ) + { + TEST_ASSERT( buf[buf_index] == 0 ); + } + + if( *cert_check_file != '\0' ) + { + f = fopen( cert_check_file, "r" ); + TEST_ASSERT( f != NULL ); + olen = fread( check_buf, 1, sizeof( check_buf ), f ); + fclose( f ); + TEST_ASSERT( olen < sizeof( check_buf ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( olen >= pem_len - 1 ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, check_buf, pem_len - 1 ) == 0 ); + } + + der_len = mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( &crt, buf, sizeof( buf ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, + &rnd_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( der_len >= 0 ); + + if( der_len == 0 ) + goto exit; + + // Not testing against file, check date format + if( *cert_check_file == '\0' ) + { + // UTC tag if before 2050, 2 digits less for year + if( not_before[0] == '2' && ( not_before[1] > '0' || not_before[2] > '4' ) ) + { + before_tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME; + } + else + { + before_tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME; + not_before += 2; + } + if( not_after[0] == '2' && ( not_after[1] > '0' || not_after[2] > '4' ) ) + { + after_tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME; + } + else + { + after_tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME; + not_after += 2; + } + end = buf + sizeof( buf ); + for( p = end - der_len ; p < end ; ) + { + tag = *p++; + sz = *p++; + if( tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME || tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) + { + // Check correct tag and time written + TEST_ASSERT( before_tag == tag ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( p, not_before, sz - 1 ) == 0 ); + p += sz; + tag = *p++; + sz = *p++; + TEST_ASSERT( after_tag == tag ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( p, not_after, sz - 1 ) == 0 ); + break; + } + // Increment if long form ASN1 length + if( sz & 0x80 ) + p += sz & 0x0F; + if( tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + p += sz; + } + TEST_ASSERT( p < end ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( &crt, buf, (size_t)( der_len - 1 ), + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + +exit: + mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( &crt ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &issuer_key_alt ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &subject_key ); + mbedtls_pk_free( &issuer_key ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &serial ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ +void mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( char * name, char * parsed_name, int result + ) +{ + int ret; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *names = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_name parsed, *parsed_cur, *parsed_prv; + unsigned char buf[1024], out[1024], *c; + + memset( &parsed, 0, sizeof( parsed ) ); + memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) ); + memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); + c = buf + sizeof( buf ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &names, name ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret == result ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, names ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret > 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &c, buf + sizeof( buf ), &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_get_name( &c, buf + sizeof( buf ), &parsed ) == 0 ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( (char *) out, sizeof( out ), &parsed ); + TEST_ASSERT( ret > 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) out, parsed_name ) == 0 ); + +exit: + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &names ); + + parsed_cur = parsed.next; + while( parsed_cur != 0 ) + { + parsed_prv = parsed_cur; + parsed_cur = parsed_cur->next; + mbedtls_free( parsed_prv ); + } +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.data b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.data new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d9d06d71 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.data @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +XTEA Encrypt_ecb #1 +xtea_encrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"4142434445464748":"497df3d072612cb5" + +XTEA Encrypt_ecb #2 +xtea_encrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"4141414141414141":"e78f2d13744341d8" + +XTEA Encrypt_ecb #3 +xtea_encrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"5a5b6e278948d77f":"4141414141414141" + +XTEA Encrypt_ecb #4 +xtea_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4142434445464748":"a0390589f8b8efa5" + +XTEA Encrypt_ecb #5 +xtea_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4141414141414141":"ed23375a821a8c2d" + +XTEA Encrypt_ecb #6 +xtea_encrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"70e1225d6e4e7655":"4141414141414141" + +XTEA Decrypt_ecb #1 +xtea_decrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"497df3d072612cb5":"4142434445464748" + +XTEA Decrypt_ecb #2 +xtea_decrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"e78f2d13744341d8":"4141414141414141" + +XTEA Decrypt_ecb #3 +xtea_decrypt_ecb:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"4141414141414141":"5a5b6e278948d77f" + +XTEA Decrypt_ecb #4 +xtea_decrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"a0390589f8b8efa5":"4142434445464748" + +XTEA Decrypt_ecb #5 +xtea_decrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ed23375a821a8c2d":"4141414141414141" + +XTEA Decrypt_ecb #6 +xtea_decrypt_ecb:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4141414141414141":"70e1225d6e4e7655" + +XTEA Encrypt CBC #1 +xtea_encrypt_cbc:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"6162636465666768":"4142434445464748":"6b982bec15a7b558" + +XTEA Encrypt CBC #2 +xtea_encrypt_cbc:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"4142434445464748":"41414141414141414141414141414141":"2c6aeb799561c8e973b0927f072e3801" + +XTEA Encrypt CBC #3 +xtea_encrypt_cbc:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"0000000000000000":"5a5b6e278948d77f70e1225d6e4e7655e78f2d13744341d8":"41414141414141415fee100fe2c030025d8a557f2677cb33" + +XTEA Encrypt CBC #4 +xtea_encrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6162636465666768":"4142434445464748":"5b0c065a3803900d" + +XTEA Encrypt CBC #5 +xtea_encrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4142434445464748":"41414141414141414141414141414141":"bdae508aa320aa5caa7cd79dbc9c38aa" + +XTEA Encrypt CBC #6 +xtea_encrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0000000000000000":"5a5b6e278948d77f70e1225d6e4e7655e78f2d13744341d8":"61f5082a2c996f632da3ea16ff8e06558b69f069d8637b31" + +XTEA Decrypt CBC #1 +xtea_decrypt_cbc:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"6162636465666768":"4142434445464748":"359def46515c71b2" + +XTEA Decrypt CBC #2 +xtea_decrypt_cbc:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"4142434445464748":"41414141414141414141414141414141":"1b192d63cc0e90371b1a2f66c809963e" + +XTEA Decrypt CBC #3 +xtea_decrypt_cbc:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":"0000000000000000":"5a5b6e278948d77f70e1225d6e4e7655e78f2d13744341d8":"2e76e5cc03543cdc40ca03358a5764c331a0631c2f0f3714" + +XTEA Decrypt CBC #4 +xtea_decrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6162636465666768":"4142434445464748":"81476a15138174dc" + +XTEA Decrypt CBC #5 +xtea_decrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"4142434445464748":"41414141414141414141414141414141":"31a361192b08311d31a0631c2f0f3714" + +XTEA Decrypt CBC #6 +xtea_decrypt_cbc:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0000000000000000":"5a5b6e278948d77f70e1225d6e4e7655e78f2d13744341d8":"c1e2dbbf67ee786e29e051bea18c6abc66f1de5c2daefc2a" + +XTEA Selftest +depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +xtea_selftest: + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.function b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.function new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1d5b29b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_xtea.function @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void xtea_encrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, + data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_xtea_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + + + mbedtls_xtea_setup( &ctx, key_str->x ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void xtea_decrypt_ecb( data_t * key_str, data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_xtea_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + + + mbedtls_xtea_setup( &ctx, key_str->x ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT, src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, 8, dst->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void xtea_encrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_xtea_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + + + mbedtls_xtea_setup( &ctx, key_str->x ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, + src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +void xtea_decrypt_cbc( data_t * key_str, data_t * iv_str, + data_t * src_str, data_t * dst ) +{ + unsigned char output[100]; + mbedtls_xtea_context ctx; + + memset(output, 0x00, 100); + + + mbedtls_xtea_setup( &ctx, key_str->x ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT, src_str->len, iv_str->x, + src_str->x, output ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_hexcmp( output, dst->x, + src_str->len, dst->len ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +void xtea_selftest( ) +{ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_xtea_self_test( 1 ) == 0 ); +} +/* END_CASE */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/benchmark.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/benchmark.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3ff1445b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/benchmark.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {90EFD9A4-C6B0-3EE8-1F06-0A0E0D55AEDA} + Win32Proj + benchmark + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_app.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_app.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8afb1ff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_app.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {D4D691D4-137C-CBFA-735B-D46636D7E4D8} + Win32Proj + cert_app + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_req.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_req.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7a3f9bf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_req.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {C9E2AB15-8AEF-DD48-60C3-557ECC5215BE} + Win32Proj + cert_req + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_write.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_write.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d16ddd88 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/cert_write.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {35E52E46-3BA9-4361-41D3-53663C2E9B8A} + Win32Proj + cert_write + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/crl_app.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/crl_app.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..030aa1f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/crl_app.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2} + Win32Proj + crl_app + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/crypt_and_hash.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/crypt_and_hash.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6489dc1e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/crypt_and_hash.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {5DBB9FC3-6FD6-CA8D-E0FA-35F1E75EFAE7} + Win32Proj + crypt_and_hash + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/crypto_examples.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/crypto_examples.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b81114b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/crypto_examples.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {020C31BD-C4DF-BABA-E537-F517C4E98537} + Win32Proj + crypto_examples + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dh_client.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dh_client.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..400913dd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dh_client.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {4D29BE4A-979C-C5AE-44B5-30FB37D8D4EE} + Win32Proj + dh_client + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dh_genprime.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dh_genprime.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d53575ba --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dh_genprime.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {718960D9-5DA6-7B56-39AD-637E81076C71} + Win32Proj + dh_genprime + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dh_server.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dh_server.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..31ca6752 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dh_server.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {8D91B804-E2CE-142D-8E06-FBB037ED1F65} + Win32Proj + dh_server + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dtls_client.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dtls_client.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0027c9e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dtls_client.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {FE7AB78F-DBF1-0721-3522-0D7C3011D2E5} + Win32Proj + dtls_client + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dtls_server.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dtls_server.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ae781360 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/dtls_server.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {BFE89EAA-D98B-34E1-C5A4-4080F6FFE317} + Win32Proj + dtls_server + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ecdh_curve25519.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ecdh_curve25519.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a1cf0955 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ecdh_curve25519.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {82EE497E-12CC-7C5B-A072-665678ACB43E} + Win32Proj + ecdh_curve25519 + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ecdsa.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ecdsa.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc30bc4d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ecdsa.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {F58142CC-0CC7-0B18-5A0F-53642CFBA18E} + Win32Proj + ecdsa + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_entropy.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_entropy.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17bc2356 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_entropy.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {DE695064-13C3-18B0-378D-8B22672BF3F4} + Win32Proj + gen_entropy + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_key.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_key.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e148e9c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_key.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {BF782A50-E9AE-00CC-C28A-C9DA8AAB4D52} + Win32Proj + gen_key + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_random_ctr_drbg.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_random_ctr_drbg.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e259d6c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_random_ctr_drbg.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {5FCC71F6-FF33-EBCF-FBA2-8FC783D5318E} + Win32Proj + gen_random_ctr_drbg + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_random_havege.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_random_havege.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dfec102e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/gen_random_havege.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {71257802-BBCA-99F5-E9D2-905738F30893} + Win32Proj + gen_random_havege + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/generic_sum.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/generic_sum.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d17776ee --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/generic_sum.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {D071CCF7-ACA0-21F8-D382-52A759AEA261} + Win32Proj + generic_sum + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/hello.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/hello.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5595cb88 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/hello.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {B02D4AE1-0218-1CD4-F44E-EFAE19B01B8D} + Win32Proj + hello + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/key_app.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/key_app.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..87ef50c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/key_app.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {10AE376F-1A70-0297-0216-1FD01AD15D19} + Win32Proj + key_app + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/key_app_writer.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/key_app_writer.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f147030c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/key_app_writer.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {E8ED79F9-8034-1B09-263E-D3F8C4C5C4A8} + Win32Proj + key_app_writer + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/key_ladder_demo.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/key_ladder_demo.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d08b9989 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/key_ladder_demo.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {778777A0-393D-45E8-83C1-EAF487236F1F} + Win32Proj + key_ladder_demo + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/load_roots.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/load_roots.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..212b3e4c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/load_roots.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220} + Win32Proj + load_roots + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.sln b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.sln new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d126c03 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.sln @@ -0,0 +1,702 @@ + +Microsoft Visual Studio Solution File, Format Version 11.00 +# Visual C++ Express 2010 +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "mbedTLS", "mbedTLS.vcxproj", "{46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}" +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "crypt_and_hash", "crypt_and_hash.vcxproj", "{5DBB9FC3-6FD6-CA8D-E0FA-35F1E75EFAE7}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "generic_sum", "generic_sum.vcxproj", "{D071CCF7-ACA0-21F8-D382-52A759AEA261}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "hello", "hello.vcxproj", "{B02D4AE1-0218-1CD4-F44E-EFAE19B01B8D}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "dh_client", "dh_client.vcxproj", "{4D29BE4A-979C-C5AE-44B5-30FB37D8D4EE}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "dh_genprime", "dh_genprime.vcxproj", "{718960D9-5DA6-7B56-39AD-637E81076C71}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "dh_server", "dh_server.vcxproj", "{8D91B804-E2CE-142D-8E06-FBB037ED1F65}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ecdh_curve25519", "ecdh_curve25519.vcxproj", "{82EE497E-12CC-7C5B-A072-665678ACB43E}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ecdsa", "ecdsa.vcxproj", "{F58142CC-0CC7-0B18-5A0F-53642CFBA18E}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "gen_key", "gen_key.vcxproj", "{BF782A50-E9AE-00CC-C28A-C9DA8AAB4D52}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "key_app", "key_app.vcxproj", "{10AE376F-1A70-0297-0216-1FD01AD15D19}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "key_app_writer", "key_app_writer.vcxproj", "{E8ED79F9-8034-1B09-263E-D3F8C4C5C4A8}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "mpi_demo", "mpi_demo.vcxproj", "{A59FAA0B-9C34-1F99-794D-A365A3AA8CCE}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "pk_decrypt", "pk_decrypt.vcxproj", "{1EC6CBA3-6187-D456-D9B7-A35399395D71}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "pk_encrypt", "pk_encrypt.vcxproj", "{55007179-7746-9CFB-97EC-65102FB272C8}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "pk_sign", "pk_sign.vcxproj", "{F2E8CA55-597F-7FDC-6456-D8650FB970A3}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "pk_verify", "pk_verify.vcxproj", "{C429B336-1B30-119C-3B34-21A186D6744F}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "rsa_decrypt", "rsa_decrypt.vcxproj", "{E0D71D72-8DF4-CCFC-EF60-741EADAB8BF9}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "rsa_encrypt", "rsa_encrypt.vcxproj", "{D06CF12E-F222-9273-41BF-B8A052FA5527}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "rsa_genkey", "rsa_genkey.vcxproj", "{F472475C-F677-0E7F-F127-45BF5B64F622}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "rsa_sign", "rsa_sign.vcxproj", "{10790F49-6887-AAB6-2D86-BCBD516F8D26}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "rsa_sign_pss", "rsa_sign_pss.vcxproj", "{DCD3A1B6-5EC1-8266-93EF-BD2B9BEFE12D}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "rsa_verify", "rsa_verify.vcxproj", "{689E28CF-89ED-BA38-3A14-78A75D891D46}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "rsa_verify_pss", "rsa_verify_pss.vcxproj", "{95C50864-854C-2A11-4C91-BCE654E344FB}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "crypto_examples", "crypto_examples.vcxproj", "{020C31BD-C4DF-BABA-E537-F517C4E98537}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "key_ladder_demo", "key_ladder_demo.vcxproj", "{778777A0-393D-45E8-83C1-EAF487236F1F}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "psa_constant_names", "psa_constant_names.vcxproj", "{A0BAD8F0-69B5-8382-86ED-C36ACBE54117}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "gen_entropy", "gen_entropy.vcxproj", "{DE695064-13C3-18B0-378D-8B22672BF3F4}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "gen_random_ctr_drbg", "gen_random_ctr_drbg.vcxproj", "{5FCC71F6-FF33-EBCF-FBA2-8FC783D5318E}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "gen_random_havege", "gen_random_havege.vcxproj", "{71257802-BBCA-99F5-E9D2-905738F30893}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "dtls_client", "dtls_client.vcxproj", "{FE7AB78F-DBF1-0721-3522-0D7C3011D2E5}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "dtls_server", "dtls_server.vcxproj", "{BFE89EAA-D98B-34E1-C5A4-4080F6FFE317}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "mini_client", "mini_client.vcxproj", "{C4FE29EA-266D-5295-4840-976B9B5B3843}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ssl_client1", "ssl_client1.vcxproj", "{487A2F80-3CA3-678D-88D5-82194872CF08}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ssl_client2", "ssl_client2.vcxproj", "{4E590E9D-E28F-87FF-385B-D58736388231}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ssl_context_info", "ssl_context_info.vcxproj", "{017ECC7D-FB6D-46D8-076B-F64172E8E3BC}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ssl_fork_server", "ssl_fork_server.vcxproj", "{918CD402-047D-8467-E11C-E1132053F916}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ssl_mail_client", "ssl_mail_client.vcxproj", "{7C4863A1-941A-C5AE-E1F9-30F062E4B2FD}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ssl_server", "ssl_server.vcxproj", "{E08E0065-896A-7487-DEA5-D3B80B71F975}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ssl_server2", "ssl_server2.vcxproj", "{A4DA7463-1047-BDF5-E1B3-5632CB573F41}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "benchmark", "benchmark.vcxproj", "{90EFD9A4-C6B0-3EE8-1F06-0A0E0D55AEDA}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "query_compile_time_config", "query_compile_time_config.vcxproj", "{D6F58AF2-9D80-562A-E2B0-F743281522B9}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "selftest", "selftest.vcxproj", "{7DBC5F77-3DA1-5F73-8421-E693D95FC66A}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "udp_proxy", "udp_proxy.vcxproj", "{7E2C80FE-3CC3-82B4-0CAD-65DC233DE13A}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "zeroize", "zeroize.vcxproj", "{10C01E94-4926-063E-9F56-C84ED190D349}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "pem2der", "pem2der.vcxproj", "{D3C6FBD6-D78E-7180-8345-5E09B492DBEC}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "strerror", "strerror.vcxproj", "{23EF735C-CC4C-3EC4-A75E-903DB340F04A}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "cert_app", "cert_app.vcxproj", "{D4D691D4-137C-CBFA-735B-D46636D7E4D8}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "cert_req", "cert_req.vcxproj", "{C9E2AB15-8AEF-DD48-60C3-557ECC5215BE}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "cert_write", "cert_write.vcxproj", "{35E52E46-3BA9-4361-41D3-53663C2E9B8A}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "crl_app", "crl_app.vcxproj", "{DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "load_roots", "load_roots.vcxproj", "{65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "req_app", "req_app.vcxproj", "{486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3}" + ProjectSection(ProjectDependencies) = postProject + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} = {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + EndProjectSection +EndProject +Global + GlobalSection(SolutionConfigurationPlatforms) = preSolution + Debug|Win32 = Debug|Win32 + Debug|x64 = Debug|x64 + Release|Win32 = Release|Win32 + Release|x64 = Release|x64 + EndGlobalSection + GlobalSection(ProjectConfigurationPlatforms) = postSolution + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 + 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{10C01E94-4926-063E-9F56-C84ED190D349}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 + {10C01E94-4926-063E-9F56-C84ED190D349}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|x64 + {10C01E94-4926-063E-9F56-C84ED190D349}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {10C01E94-4926-063E-9F56-C84ED190D349}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {10C01E94-4926-063E-9F56-C84ED190D349}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64 + {10C01E94-4926-063E-9F56-C84ED190D349}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64 + {D3C6FBD6-D78E-7180-8345-5E09B492DBEC}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {D3C6FBD6-D78E-7180-8345-5E09B492DBEC}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {D3C6FBD6-D78E-7180-8345-5E09B492DBEC}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 + {D3C6FBD6-D78E-7180-8345-5E09B492DBEC}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|x64 + {D3C6FBD6-D78E-7180-8345-5E09B492DBEC}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {D3C6FBD6-D78E-7180-8345-5E09B492DBEC}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {D3C6FBD6-D78E-7180-8345-5E09B492DBEC}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64 + 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{35E52E46-3BA9-4361-41D3-53663C2E9B8A}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {35E52E46-3BA9-4361-41D3-53663C2E9B8A}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 + {35E52E46-3BA9-4361-41D3-53663C2E9B8A}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|x64 + {35E52E46-3BA9-4361-41D3-53663C2E9B8A}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {35E52E46-3BA9-4361-41D3-53663C2E9B8A}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {35E52E46-3BA9-4361-41D3-53663C2E9B8A}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64 + {35E52E46-3BA9-4361-41D3-53663C2E9B8A}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64 + {DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 + {DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|x64 + {DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64 + {DB904B85-AD31-B7FB-114F-88760CC485F2}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64 + {65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 + {65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|x64 + {65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64 + {65EB85E6-C928-689F-8335-126F78025220}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64 + {486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 + {486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|x64 + {486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64 + {486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64 + EndGlobalSection + GlobalSection(SolutionProperties) = preSolution + HideSolutionNode = FALSE + EndGlobalSection +EndGlobal diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6f95170f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mbedTLS.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,410 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + {46CF2D25-6A36-4189-B59C-E4815388E554} + Win32Proj + mbedTLS + + + + StaticLibrary + true + Unicode + + + StaticLibrary + true + Unicode + + + StaticLibrary + false + true + Unicode + + + StaticLibrary + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + _USRDLL;MBEDTLS_EXPORTS;KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../library;../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + CompileAsC + + + Windows + true + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + _USRDLL;MBEDTLS_EXPORTS;KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../library;../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + CompileAsC + + + Windows + true + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;_USRDLL;MBEDTLS_EXPORTS;KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../library;../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Windows + true + true + true + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + WIN64;NDEBUG;_WINDOWS;_USRDLL;MBEDTLS_EXPORTS;KRML_VERIFIED_UINT128;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../library;../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Windows + true + true + true + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mini_client.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mini_client.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d0c82b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mini_client.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {C4FE29EA-266D-5295-4840-976B9B5B3843} + Win32Proj + mini_client + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mpi_demo.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mpi_demo.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8f200bbe --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/mpi_demo.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {A59FAA0B-9C34-1F99-794D-A365A3AA8CCE} + Win32Proj + mpi_demo + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pem2der.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pem2der.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2132a5e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pem2der.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {D3C6FBD6-D78E-7180-8345-5E09B492DBEC} + Win32Proj + pem2der + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_decrypt.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_decrypt.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..11e49ed6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_decrypt.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {1EC6CBA3-6187-D456-D9B7-A35399395D71} + Win32Proj + pk_decrypt + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_encrypt.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_encrypt.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1772cad1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_encrypt.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {55007179-7746-9CFB-97EC-65102FB272C8} + Win32Proj + pk_encrypt + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_sign.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_sign.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b040f575 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_sign.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {F2E8CA55-597F-7FDC-6456-D8650FB970A3} + Win32Proj + pk_sign + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_verify.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_verify.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b11e591 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/pk_verify.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {C429B336-1B30-119C-3B34-21A186D6744F} + Win32Proj + pk_verify + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/psa_constant_names.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/psa_constant_names.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a78a788 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/psa_constant_names.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {A0BAD8F0-69B5-8382-86ED-C36ACBE54117} + Win32Proj + psa_constant_names + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/query_compile_time_config.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/query_compile_time_config.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cb75e527 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/query_compile_time_config.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {D6F58AF2-9D80-562A-E2B0-F743281522B9} + Win32Proj + query_compile_time_config + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/req_app.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/req_app.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a18cc474 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/req_app.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {486B1375-5CFA-C2D2-DD89-C9F497BADCB3} + Win32Proj + req_app + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_decrypt.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_decrypt.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8dcf558 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_decrypt.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {E0D71D72-8DF4-CCFC-EF60-741EADAB8BF9} + Win32Proj + rsa_decrypt + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_encrypt.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_encrypt.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c0f88abd --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_encrypt.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {D06CF12E-F222-9273-41BF-B8A052FA5527} + Win32Proj + rsa_encrypt + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_genkey.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_genkey.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..84599685 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_genkey.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {F472475C-F677-0E7F-F127-45BF5B64F622} + Win32Proj + rsa_genkey + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_sign.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_sign.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9edb6326 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_sign.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {10790F49-6887-AAB6-2D86-BCBD516F8D26} + Win32Proj + rsa_sign + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_sign_pss.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_sign_pss.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4cd0125a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_sign_pss.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {DCD3A1B6-5EC1-8266-93EF-BD2B9BEFE12D} + Win32Proj + rsa_sign_pss + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_verify.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_verify.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f231c883 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_verify.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {689E28CF-89ED-BA38-3A14-78A75D891D46} + Win32Proj + rsa_verify + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_verify_pss.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_verify_pss.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8ef9bf1b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/rsa_verify_pss.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {95C50864-854C-2A11-4C91-BCE654E344FB} + Win32Proj + rsa_verify_pss + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/selftest.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/selftest.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..76600be2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/selftest.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {7DBC5F77-3DA1-5F73-8421-E693D95FC66A} + Win32Proj + selftest + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_client1.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_client1.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8a731c16 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_client1.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {487A2F80-3CA3-678D-88D5-82194872CF08} + Win32Proj + ssl_client1 + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_client2.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_client2.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34cca661 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_client2.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {4E590E9D-E28F-87FF-385B-D58736388231} + Win32Proj + ssl_client2 + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_context_info.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_context_info.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..99a95c2c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_context_info.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {017ECC7D-FB6D-46D8-076B-F64172E8E3BC} + Win32Proj + ssl_context_info + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_fork_server.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_fork_server.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8534bba9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_fork_server.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {918CD402-047D-8467-E11C-E1132053F916} + Win32Proj + ssl_fork_server + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_mail_client.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_mail_client.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..989ba917 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_mail_client.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {7C4863A1-941A-C5AE-E1F9-30F062E4B2FD} + Win32Proj + ssl_mail_client + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_server.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_server.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4447fedf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_server.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {E08E0065-896A-7487-DEA5-D3B80B71F975} + Win32Proj + ssl_server + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_server2.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_server2.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..274d1492 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/ssl_server2.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {A4DA7463-1047-BDF5-E1B3-5632CB573F41} + Win32Proj + ssl_server2 + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/strerror.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/strerror.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..586693ae --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/strerror.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {23EF735C-CC4C-3EC4-A75E-903DB340F04A} + Win32Proj + strerror + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/udp_proxy.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/udp_proxy.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9977fd64 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/udp_proxy.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {7E2C80FE-3CC3-82B4-0CAD-65DC233DE13A} + Win32Proj + udp_proxy + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/zeroize.vcxproj b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/zeroize.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97c4fd52 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls/visualc/VS2010/zeroize.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Debug + x64 + + + Release + Win32 + + + Release + x64 + + + + + + + + {46cf2d25-6a36-4189-b59c-e4815388e554} + true + + + + {10C01E94-4926-063E-9F56-C84ED190D349} + Win32Proj + zeroize + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + Application + false + true + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + true + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + false + $(Configuration)\$(TargetName)\ + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + Disabled + %(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + Debug + + + false + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + kernel32.lib;user32.lib;gdi32.lib;winspool.lib;comdlg32.lib;advapi32.lib;shell32.lib;ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;uuid.lib;odbc32.lib;odbccp32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + + + + + Level3 + MaxSpeed + true + true + NDEBUG;%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + +../../include;../../3rdparty/everest/include/;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010;../../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib;../../tests/include + + + Console + true + true + true + Release + %(AdditionalDependencies); + + + + + + diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls_sample_config.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls_sample_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..78d05ca3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/mbedtls_sample_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/** + * \file config.h + * + * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable + * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global + * memory footprint. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES + +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + +//XXX TODO remove bl606p +#if defined(CFG_CHIP_BL606P) || defined(CFG_CHIP_BL808) +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + +//#define MBEDTLS_NET_C + +//#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO + +#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR "mbedtls_port_bouffalo_sdk.h" + +// Define BL_MPI_LARGE_NUM_SOFTWARE_MPI to allow operate on very big bignums +/* #define BL_MPI_LARGE_NUM_SOFTWARE_MPI */ + +// Hash HW +#ifdef CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA1_USE_HW +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_HW +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_HW +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +#endif + +// AES HW +#ifdef CONFIG_MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HW +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +#endif + +// ECC HW +#ifdef CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECC_USE_HW +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECC_USE_HW) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#error "ECP Restartable is not implemented with ECP HW acceleration!" +#endif + +/* Target and application specific configurations + * + * Allow user to override any previous default. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/aes_alt.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/aes_alt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42a6eae4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/aes_alt.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_AES_ALT_H +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT_H + +#include + +/** + * \brief The AES context-type definition. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_aes_context +{ + bl_sec_aes_t ctx; +} +mbedtls_aes_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/** + * \brief The AES XTS context-type definition. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context +{ + mbedtls_aes_context crypt; /*!< The AES context to use for AES block + encryption or decryption. */ + mbedtls_aes_context tweak; /*!< The AES context used for tweak + computation. */ +} mbedtls_aes_xts_context; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#endif /* aes_alt.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/bignum.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/bignum.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c6320874 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/bignum.c @@ -0,0 +1,3101 @@ +/* + * Multi-precision integer library + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this Multi-precision + * Integer library: + * + * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + * [2] Multi-Precision Math + * Tom St Denis + * https://github.com/libtom/libtommath/blob/develop/tommath.pdf + * + * [3] GNU Multi-Precision Arithmetic Library + * https://gmplib.org/manual/index.html + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls_port_bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define MPI_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ +#define biH (ciL << 2) /* half limb size */ + +#define MPI_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ + +/* + * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs + * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows + */ +#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ( (i) / biL + ( (i) % biL != 0 ) ) +#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ( (i) / ciL + ( (i) % ciL != 0 ) ) + +/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ +static void mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( mbedtls_mpi_uint *v, size_t n ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( v, ciL * n ); +} + +/* + * Initialize one MPI + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_init( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); + + X->s = 1; + X->n = 0; + X->p = NULL; +} + +/* + * Unallocate one MPI + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_free( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + if( X == NULL ) + return; + + if( X->p != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); + mbedtls_free( X->p ); + } + + X->s = 1; + X->n = 0; + X->p = NULL; +} + +/* + * Enlarge to the specified number of limbs + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_grow( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( X->n < nblimbs ) + { + if( ( p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint*)mbedtls_calloc( nblimbs, ciL ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( X->p != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, X->p, X->n * ciL ); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); + mbedtls_free( X->p ); + } + + X->n = nblimbs; + X->p = p; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Resize down as much as possible, + * while keeping at least the specified number of limbs + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t i; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + /* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */ + if( X->n <= nblimbs ) + return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, nblimbs ) ); + /* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */ + + for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i] != 0 ) + break; + i++; + + if( i < nblimbs ) + i = nblimbs; + + if( ( p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint*)mbedtls_calloc( i, ciL ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( X->p != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, X->p, i * ciL ); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); + mbedtls_free( X->p ); + } + + X->n = i; + X->p = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Resize X to have exactly n limbs and set it to 0. */ +static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs ) +{ + if( limbs == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + else if( X->n == limbs ) + { + memset( X->p, 0, limbs * ciL ); + X->s = 1; + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) ); + } +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of Y into X. + * + * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed. + * + * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API, + * but some code in the bignum module relies on this property, for example + * in mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + if( X == Y ) + return( 0 ); + + if( Y->n == 0 ) + { + if( X->n != 0 ) + { + X->s = 1; + memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); + } + return( 0 ); + } + + for( i = Y->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + if( Y->p[i] != 0 ) + break; + i++; + + X->s = Y->s; + + if( X->n < i ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i ) ); + } + else + { + memset( X->p + i, 0, ( X->n - i ) * ciL ); + } + + memcpy( X->p, Y->p, i * ciL ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Swap the contents of X and Y + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE( Y != NULL ); + + memcpy( &T, X, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + memcpy( X, Y, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + memcpy( Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); +} + +/* + * Set value from integer + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, 1 ) ); + memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); + + X->p[0] = ( z < 0 ) ? -z : z; + X->s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Get a specific bit + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( X->n * biL <= pos ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ( X->p[pos / biL] >> ( pos % biL ) ) & 0x01 ); +} + +/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ +#define GET_BYTE( X, i ) \ + ( ( ( X )->p[( i ) / ciL] >> ( ( ( i ) % ciL ) * 8 ) ) & 0xff ) + +/* + * Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1 + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t off = pos / biL; + size_t idx = pos % biL; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( val != 0 && val != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( X->n * biL <= pos ) + { + if( val == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, off + 1 ) ); + } + + X->p[off] &= ~( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0x01 << idx ); + X->p[off] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) val << idx; + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Return the number of less significant zero-bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + size_t i, j, count = 0; + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL, 0 ); + + for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) + for( j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++ ) + if( ( ( X->p[i] >> j ) & 1 ) != 0 ) + return( count ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Count leading zero bits in a given integer + */ +static size_t mbedtls_clz( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ + size_t j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1); + + for( j = 0; j < biL; j++ ) + { + if( x & mask ) break; + + mask >>= 1; + } + + return j; +} + +/* + * Return the number of bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + size_t i, j; + + if( X->n == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i] != 0 ) + break; + + j = biL - mbedtls_clz( X->p[i] ); + + return( ( i * biL ) + j ); +} + +/* + * Return the total size in bytes + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_size( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + return( ( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) + 7 ) >> 3 ); +} + +/* + * Convert an ASCII character to digit value + */ +static int mpi_get_digit( mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, int radix, char c ) +{ + *d = 255; + + if( c >= 0x30 && c <= 0x39 ) *d = c - 0x30; + if( c >= 0x41 && c <= 0x46 ) *d = c - 0x37; + if( c >= 0x61 && c <= 0x66 ) *d = c - 0x57; + + if( *d >= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) radix ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Import from an ASCII string + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j, slen, n; + int sign = 1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint d; + mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + if( s[0] == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( s[0] == '-' ) + { + ++s; + sign = -1; + } + + slen = strlen( s ); + + if( radix == 16 ) + { + if( slen > MPI_SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( slen << 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + + for( i = slen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i - 1] ) ); + X->p[j / ( 2 * ciL )] |= d << ( ( j % ( 2 * ciL ) ) << 2 ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < slen; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T, X, radix ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, &T, d ) ); + } + } + + if( sign < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) != 0 ) + X->s = -1; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Helper to write the digits high-order first. + */ +static int mpi_write_hlp( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char **p, const size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + size_t length = 0; + char *p_end = *p + buflen; + + do + { + if( length >= buflen ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, radix ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( X, NULL, X, radix ) ); + /* + * Write the residue in the current position, as an ASCII character. + */ + if( r < 0xA ) + *(--p_end) = (char)( '0' + r ); + else + *(--p_end) = (char)( 'A' + ( r - 0xA ) ); + + length++; + } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) != 0 ); + + memmove( *p, p_end, length ); + *p += length; + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export into an ASCII string + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t n; + char *p; + mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + n = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); /* Number of bits necessary to present `n`. */ + if( radix >= 4 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of 4-adic digits necessary to present + * `n`. If radix > 4, this might be a strict + * overapproximation of the number of + * radix-adic digits needed to present `n`. */ + if( radix >= 16 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of hexadecimal digits necessary to + * present `n`. */ + + n += 1; /* Terminating null byte */ + n += 1; /* Compensate for the divisions above, which round down `n` + * in case it's not even. */ + n += 1; /* Potential '-'-sign. */ + n += ( n & 1 ); /* Make n even to have enough space for hexadecimal writing, + * which always uses an even number of hex-digits. */ + + if( buflen < n ) + { + *olen = n; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + p = buf; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + if( X->s == -1 ) + { + *p++ = '-'; + buflen--; + } + + if( radix == 16 ) + { + int c; + size_t i, j, k; + + for( i = X->n, k = 0; i > 0; i-- ) + { + for( j = ciL; j > 0; j-- ) + { + c = ( X->p[i - 1] >> ( ( j - 1 ) << 3) ) & 0xFF; + + if( c == 0 && k == 0 && ( i + j ) != 2 ) + continue; + + *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c / 16]; + *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c % 16]; + k = 1; + } + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T, X ) ); + + if( T.s == -1 ) + T.s = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( &T, radix, &p, buflen ) ); + } + + *p++ = '\0'; + *olen = p - buf; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Read X from an opened file + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint d; + size_t slen; + char *p; + /* + * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, + * newline characters and '\0' + */ + char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( fin != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); + if( fgets( s, sizeof( s ) - 1, fin ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + slen = strlen( s ); + if( slen == sizeof( s ) - 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\n' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } + if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\r' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } + + p = s + slen; + while( p-- > s ) + if( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, *p ) != 0 ) + break; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( X, radix, p + 1 ) ); +} + +/* + * Write X into an opened file (or stdout if fout == NULL) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n, slen, plen; + /* + * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, + * newline characters and '\0' + */ + char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_string( X, radix, s, sizeof( s ) - 2, &n ) ); + + if( p == NULL ) p = ""; + + plen = strlen( p ); + slen = strlen( s ); + s[slen++] = '\r'; + s[slen++] = '\n'; + + if( fout != NULL ) + { + if( fwrite( p, 1, plen, fout ) != plen || + fwrite( s, 1, slen, fout ) != slen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + else + mbedtls_printf( "%s%s", p, s ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + +/* Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint + * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. */ + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ + uint8_t i; + unsigned char *x_ptr; + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = 0; + + for( i = 0, x_ptr = (unsigned char*) &x; i < ciL; i++, x_ptr++ ) + { + tmp <<= CHAR_BIT; + tmp |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) *x_ptr; + } + + return( tmp ); +} + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ +#if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) + +/* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ +#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ ) + return( x ); +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ */ + +#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ ) + +/* For GCC and Clang, have builtins for byte swapping. */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) +#define have_bswap +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && \ + __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) +#define have_bswap +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(have_bswap) + /* The compiler is hopefully able to statically evaluate this! */ + switch( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) ) + { + case 4: + return( __builtin_bswap32(x) ); + case 8: + return( __builtin_bswap64(x) ); + } +#endif +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ */ +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ */ + + /* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order + * or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */ + return( mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( x ) ); +} + +static void mpi_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint * const p, size_t limbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; + if( limbs == 0 ) + return; + + /* + * Traverse limbs and + * - adapt byte-order in each limb + * - swap the limbs themselves. + * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right + * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger + * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the + * indices coincide in the last iteration). + */ + for( cur_limb_left = p, cur_limb_right = p + ( limbs - 1 ); + cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; + cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right-- ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, + * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ + tmp = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_left ); + *cur_limb_left = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_right ); + *cur_limb_right = tmp; + } +} + +/* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < buflen; i++ ) + X->p[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i]) << ((i % ciL) << 3); + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - buflen; + unsigned char *Xp; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + + /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source or destination argument, + * even if buflen is 0. */ + if( buflen != 0 ) + { + Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p; + memcpy( Xp + overhead, buf, buflen ); + + mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); + } + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + size_t i; + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + } + else + { + bytes_to_copy = buflen; + + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) + { + if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) + buf[i] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ + memset( buf + stored_bytes, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t stored_bytes; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + unsigned char *p; + size_t i; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial + * null bytes and record the position at which to start + * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution + * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the + * number. */ + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + p = buf + buflen - stored_bytes; + memset( buf, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); + } + else + { + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + bytes_to_copy = buflen; + p = buf; + for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) + { + if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) + p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Left-shift: X <<= count + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, v0, t1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + v0 = count / (biL ); + t1 = count & (biL - 1); + + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) + count; + + if( X->n * biL < i ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, BITS_TO_LIMBS( i ) ) ); + + ret = 0; + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if( v0 > 0 ) + { + for( i = X->n; i > v0; i-- ) + X->p[i - 1] = X->p[i - v0 - 1]; + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + X->p[i - 1] = 0; + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if( t1 > 0 ) + { + for( i = v0; i < X->n; i++ ) + { + r1 = X->p[i] >> (biL - t1); + X->p[i] <<= t1; + X->p[i] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Right-shift: X >>= count + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) +{ + size_t i, v0, v1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + v0 = count / biL; + v1 = count & (biL - 1); + + if( v0 > X->n || ( v0 == X->n && v1 > 0 ) ) + return mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ); + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if( v0 > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < X->n - v0; i++ ) + X->p[i] = X->p[i + v0]; + + for( ; i < X->n; i++ ) + X->p[i] = 0; + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if( v1 > 0 ) + { + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + { + r1 = X->p[i - 1] << (biL - v1); + X->p[i - 1] >>= v1; + X->p[i - 1] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare unsigned values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + size_t i, j; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + for( j = Y->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( Y->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( i == 0 && j == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( i > j ) return( 1 ); + if( j > i ) return( -1 ); + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + if( X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1] ) return( 1 ); + if( X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] ) return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare signed values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + size_t i, j; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + for( j = Y->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( Y->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( i == 0 && j == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( i > j ) return( X->s ); + if( j > i ) return( -Y->s ); + + if( X->s > 0 && Y->s < 0 ) return( 1 ); + if( Y->s > 0 && X->s < 0 ) return( -1 ); + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + if( X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1] ) return( X->s ); + if( X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] ) return( -X->s ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare signed values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi Y; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + *p = ( z < 0 ) ? -z : z; + Y.s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + Y.n = 1; + Y.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( X, &Y ) ); +} + +/* + * Unsigned addition: X = |A| + |B| (HAC 14.7) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *o, *p, c, tmp; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + if( X == B ) + { + const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T; + } + + if( X != A ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); + + /* + * X should always be positive as a result of unsigned additions. + */ + X->s = 1; + + for( j = B->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) ); + + o = B->p; p = X->p; c = 0; + + /* + * tmp is used because it might happen that p == o + */ + for( i = 0; i < j; i++, o++, p++ ) + { + tmp= *o; + *p += c; c = ( *p < c ); + *p += tmp; c += ( *p < tmp ); + } + + while( c != 0 ) + { + if( i >= X->n ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i + 1 ) ); + p = X->p + i; + } + + *p += c; c = ( *p < c ); i++; p++; + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/** + * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction. + * + * Calculate l - r where l and r have the same size. + * This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `l < r`, and 0 otherwise). + * + * d may be aliased to l or r. + * + * \param n Number of limbs of \p d, \p l and \p r. + * \param[out] d The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] l The left operand. + * \param[in] r The right operand. + * + * \return 1 if `l < r`. + * 0 if `l >= r`. + */ +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *l, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t, z; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + z = ( l[i] < c ); t = l[i] - c; + c = ( t < r[i] ) + z; d[i] = t - r[i]; + } + + return( c ); +} + +/* + * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + for( n = B->n; n > 0; n-- ) + if( B->p[n - 1] != 0 ) + break; + if( n > A->n ) + { + /* B >= (2^ciL)^n > A */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, A->n ) ); + + /* Set the high limbs of X to match A. Don't touch the lower limbs + * because X might be aliased to B, and we must not overwrite the + * significant digits of B. */ + if( A->n > n ) + memcpy( X->p + n, A->p + n, ( A->n - n ) * ciL ); + if( X->n > A->n ) + memset( X->p + A->n, 0, ( X->n - A->n ) * ciL ); + + carry = mpi_sub_hlp( n, X->p, A->p, B->p ); + if( carry != 0 ) + { + /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */ + for( ; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++ ) + --X->p[n]; + /* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result + * is negative. */ + if( n == X->n ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } + --X->p[n]; + } + + /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */ + X->s = 1; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Signed addition: X = A + B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret, s; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + s = A->s; + if( A->s * B->s < 0 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, A, B ) ); + X->s = s; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, B, A ) ); + X->s = -s; + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( X, A, B ) ); + X->s = s; + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Signed subtraction: X = A - B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret, s; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + s = A->s; + if( A->s * B->s > 0 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, A, B ) ); + X->s = s; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, B, A ) ); + X->s = -s; + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( X, A, B ) ); + X->s = s; + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Signed addition: X = A + b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; + B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); +} + +/* + * Signed subtraction: X = A - b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; + B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); +} + +/** Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication. + * + * Add \p b * \p s to \p d. + * + * \param i The number of limbs of \p s. + * \param[in] s A bignum to multiply, of size \p i. + * It may overlap with \p d, but only if + * \p d <= \p s. + * Its leading limb must not be \c 0. + * \param[in,out] d The bignum to add to. + * It must be sufficiently large to store the + * result of the multiplication. This means + * \p i + 1 limbs if \p d[\p i - 1] started as 0 and \p b + * is not known a priori. + * \param b A scalar to multiply. + */ +static +#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__arm__) +/* + * Apple LLVM version 4.2 (clang-425.0.24) (based on LLVM 3.2svn) + * appears to need this to prevent bad ARM code generation at -O3. + */ +__attribute__ ((noinline)) +#endif +void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t = 0; + +#if defined(MULADDC_HUIT) + for( ; i >= 8; i -= 8 ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_HUIT + MULADDC_STOP + } + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } +#else /* MULADDC_HUIT */ + for( ; i >= 16; i -= 16 ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } + + for( ; i >= 8; i -= 8 ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } +#endif /* MULADDC_HUIT */ + + t++; + + while( c != 0 ) + { + *d += c; c = ( *d < c ); d++; + } +} + +/* + * Baseline multiplication: X = A * B (HAC 14.12) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; + int result_is_zero = 0; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); + + if( X == A ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); A = &TA; } + if( X == B ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); B = &TB; } + + for( i = A->n; i > 0; i-- ) + if( A->p[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + if( i == 0 ) + result_is_zero = 1; + + for( j = B->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + if( j == 0 ) + result_is_zero = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i + j ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + + for( ; j > 0; j-- ) + mpi_mul_hlp( i, A->p, X->p + j - 1, B->p[j - 1] ); + + /* If the result is 0, we don't shortcut the operation, which reduces + * but does not eliminate side channels leaking the zero-ness. We do + * need to take care to set the sign bit properly since the library does + * not fully support an MPI object with a value of 0 and s == -1. */ + if( result_is_zero ) + X->s = 1; + else + X->s = A->s * B->s; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Baseline multiplication: X = A * b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + /* mpi_mul_hlp can't deal with a leading 0. */ + size_t n = A->n; + while( n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0 ) + --n; + + /* The general method below doesn't work if n==0 or b==0. By chance + * calculating the result is trivial in those cases. */ + if( b == 0 || n == 0 ) + { + return( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + } + + /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mpi_mul_hlp */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If + * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same + * number of limbs as A and the call to grow() is not required since + * copy() will take care of the growth if needed. However, experimentally, + * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer + * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the + * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly + * grow to its final size. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); + mpi_mul_hlp( n, A->p, X->p, b - 1 ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Unsigned integer divide - double mbedtls_mpi_uint dividend, u1/u0, and + * mbedtls_mpi_uint divisor, d + */ +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint u1, + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, mbedtls_mpi_uint d, mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + mbedtls_t_udbl dividend, quotient; +#else + const mbedtls_mpi_uint radix = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint uint_halfword_mask = ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH ) - 1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint d0, d1, q0, q1, rAX, r0, quotient; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0_msw, u0_lsw; + size_t s; +#endif + + /* + * Check for overflow + */ + if( 0 == d || u1 >= d ) + { + if (r != NULL) *r = ~0; + + return ( ~0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + dividend = (mbedtls_t_udbl) u1 << biL; + dividend |= (mbedtls_t_udbl) u0; + quotient = dividend / d; + if( quotient > ( (mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL ) - 1 ) + quotient = ( (mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL ) - 1; + + if( r != NULL ) + *r = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( dividend - (quotient * d ) ); + + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) quotient; +#else + + /* + * Algorithm D, Section 4.3.1 - The Art of Computer Programming + * Vol. 2 - Seminumerical Algorithms, Knuth + */ + + /* + * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1 + */ + s = mbedtls_clz( d ); + d = d << s; + + u1 = u1 << s; + u1 |= ( u0 >> ( biL - s ) ) & ( -(mbedtls_mpi_sint)s >> ( biL - 1 ) ); + u0 = u0 << s; + + d1 = d >> biH; + d0 = d & uint_halfword_mask; + + u0_msw = u0 >> biH; + u0_lsw = u0 & uint_halfword_mask; + + /* + * Find the first quotient and remainder + */ + q1 = u1 / d1; + r0 = u1 - d1 * q1; + + while( q1 >= radix || ( q1 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_msw ) ) + { + q1 -= 1; + r0 += d1; + + if ( r0 >= radix ) break; + } + + rAX = ( u1 * radix ) + ( u0_msw - q1 * d ); + q0 = rAX / d1; + r0 = rAX - q0 * d1; + + while( q0 >= radix || ( q0 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_lsw ) ) + { + q0 -= 1; + r0 += d1; + + if ( r0 >= radix ) break; + } + + if (r != NULL) + *r = ( rAX * radix + u0_lsw - q0 * d ) >> s; + + quotient = q1 * radix + q0; + + return quotient; +#endif +} + +/* + * Division by mbedtls_mpi: A = Q * B + R (HAC 14.20) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n, t, k; + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; + mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); + /* + * Avoid dynamic memory allocations for constant-size T2. + * + * T2 is used for comparison only and the 3 limbs are assigned explicitly, + * so nobody increase the size of the MPI and we're safe to use an on-stack + * buffer. + */ + T2.s = 1; + T2.n = sizeof( TP2 ) / sizeof( *TP2 ); + T2.p = TP2; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) < 0 ) + { + if( Q != NULL ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( Q, 0 ) ); + if( R != NULL ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( R, A ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &X, A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Y, B ) ); + X.s = Y.s = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &Z, A->n + 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Z, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T1, A->n + 2 ) ); + + k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &Y ) % biL; + if( k < biL - 1 ) + { + k = biL - 1 - k; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &X, k ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &Y, k ) ); + } + else k = 0; + + n = X.n - 1; + t = Y.n - 1; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &Y, biL * ( n - t ) ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &Y ) >= 0 ) + { + Z.p[n - t]++; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &Y ) ); + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Y, biL * ( n - t ) ) ); + + for( i = n; i > t ; i-- ) + { + if( X.p[i] >= Y.p[t] ) + Z.p[i - t - 1] = ~0; + else + { + Z.p[i - t - 1] = mbedtls_int_div_int( X.p[i], X.p[i - 1], + Y.p[t], NULL); + } + + T2.p[0] = ( i < 2 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2]; + T2.p[1] = ( i < 1 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1]; + T2.p[2] = X.p[i]; + + Z.p[i - t - 1]++; + do + { + Z.p[i - t - 1]--; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &T1, 0 ) ); + T1.p[0] = ( t < 1 ) ? 0 : Y.p[t - 1]; + T1.p[1] = Y.p[t]; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &T1, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T1, &T2 ) > 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &Y, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T1, biL * ( i - t - 1 ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 0 ) < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T1, &Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T1, biL * ( i - t - 1 ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + Z.p[i - t - 1]--; + } + } + + if( Q != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &Z ) ); + Q->s = A->s * B->s; + } + + if( R != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &X, k ) ); + X.s = A->s; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( R, &X ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 0 ) == 0 ) + R->s = 1; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( TP2, sizeof( TP2 ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Division by int: A = Q * b + R + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b; + B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( Q, R, A, &B ) ); +} + +/* + * Modulo: R = A mod B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( NULL, R, A, B ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 0 ) < 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( R, R, B ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( R, B ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( R, R, B ) ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Modulo: r = A mod b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + if( b == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); + + if( b < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); + + /* + * handle trivial cases + */ + if( b == 1 || A->n == 0 ) + { + *r = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + if( b == 2 ) + { + *r = A->p[0] & 1; + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * general case + */ + for( i = A->n, y = 0; i > 0; i-- ) + { + x = A->p[i - 1]; + y = ( y << biH ) | ( x >> biH ); + z = y / b; + y -= z * b; + + x <<= biH; + y = ( y << biH ) | ( x >> biH ); + z = y / b; + y -= z * b; + } + + /* + * If A is negative, then the current y represents a negative value. + * Flipping it to the positive side. + */ + if( A->s < 0 && y != 0 ) + y = b - y; + + *r = y; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis) + */ +static void mpi_montg_init( mbedtls_mpi_uint *mm, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint x, m0 = N->p[0]; + unsigned int i; + + x = m0; + x += ( ( m0 + 2 ) & 4 ) << 1; + + for( i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2 ) + x *= ( 2 - ( m0 * x ) ); + + *mm = ~x + 1; +} + +/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) + * + * \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must have at least as many limbs as N + * (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored. + * On successful completion, A contains the result of + * the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where + * R = (2^ciL)^n. + * \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N + * (B->n <= N->n). + * \param[in] N The modulo. N must be odd. + * \param mm The value calculated by `mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`. + * This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL. + * \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage. + * It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 2 + * (T->n >= 2 * (N->n + 1)). + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * Note that unlike the usual convention in the library + * for `const mbedtls_mpi*`, the content of T can change. + */ +static void mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi *T ) +{ + size_t i, n, m; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, u1, *d; + + memset( T->p, 0, T->n * ciL ); + + d = T->p; + n = N->n; + m = ( B->n < n ) ? B->n : n; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + /* + * T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL + */ + u0 = A->p[i]; + u1 = ( d[0] + u0 * B->p[0] ) * mm; + + mpi_mul_hlp( m, B->p, d, u0 ); + mpi_mul_hlp( n, N->p, d, u1 ); + + *d++ = u0; d[n + 1] = 0; + } + + /* At this point, d is either the desired result or the desired result + * plus N. We now potentially subtract N, avoiding leaking whether the + * subtraction is performed through side channels. */ + + /* Copy the n least significant limbs of d to A, so that + * A = d if d < N (recall that N has n limbs). */ + memcpy( A->p, d, n * ciL ); + /* If d >= N then we want to set A to d - N. To prevent timing attacks, + * do the calculation without using conditional tests. */ + /* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */ + d[n] += 1; + d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp( n, d, d, N->p ); + /* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is. + * If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction + * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d. + * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */ + mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] ); +} + +/* + * Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N + * + * See mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the parameters. + */ +static void mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1; + mbedtls_mpi U; + + U.n = U.s = (int) z; + U.p = &z; + + mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ); +} + +/** + * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, T[idx]) except it + * reads the entire table in order to avoid leaking the value of idx to an + * attacker able to observe memory access patterns. + * + * \param[out] R Where to write the selected MPI. + * \param[in] T The table to read from. + * \param[in] T_size The number of elements in the table. + * \param[in] idx The index of the element to select; + * this must satisfy 0 <= idx < T_size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +static int mpi_select( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *T, size_t T_size, size_t idx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for( size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( R, &T[i], + (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N (HAC 14.85) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_original( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t wbits, wsize, one = 1; + size_t i, j, nblimbs; + size_t bufsize, nbits; + mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state; + mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], WW, Apos; + int neg; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( E != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 || ( N->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Init temps and window size + */ + mpi_montg_init( &mm, N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Apos ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &WW ); + memset( W, 0, sizeof( W ) ); + + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ); + + wsize = ( i > 671 ) ? 6 : ( i > 239 ) ? 5 : + ( i > 79 ) ? 4 : ( i > 23 ) ? 3 : 1; + +#if( MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 ) + if( wsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) + wsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE; +#endif + + j = N->n + 1; + /* All W[i] and X must have at least N->n limbs for the mpi_montmul() + * and mpi_montred() calls later. Here we ensure that W[1] and X are + * large enough, and later we'll grow other W[i] to the same length. + * They must not be shrunk midway through this function! + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], j ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T, j * 2 ) ); + + /* + * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end) + */ + neg = ( A->s == -1 ); + if( neg ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Apos, A ) ); + Apos.s = 1; + A = &Apos; + } + + /* + * If 1st call, pre-compute R^2 mod N + */ + if( prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &RR, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &RR, N->n * 2 * biL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &RR, &RR, N ) ); + + if( prec_RR != NULL ) + memcpy( prec_RR, &RR, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + } + else + memcpy( &RR, prec_RR, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + + /* + * W[1] = A * R^2 * R^-1 mod N = A * R mod N + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( A, N ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &W[1], A, N ) ); + /* This should be a no-op because W[1] is already that large before + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(), but it's necessary to avoid an overflow + * in mpi_montmul() below, so let's make sure. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], N->n + 1 ) ); + } + else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[1], A ) ); + + /* Note that this is safe because W[1] always has at least N->n limbs + * (it grew above and was preserved by mbedtls_mpi_copy()). */ + mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ); + + /* + * X = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &RR ) ); + mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); + + if( wsize > 1 ) + { + /* + * W[1 << (wsize - 1)] = W[1] ^ (wsize - 1) + */ + j = one << ( wsize - 1 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[j], N->n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[j], &W[1] ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < wsize - 1; i++ ) + mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T ); + + /* + * W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1] + */ + for( i = j + 1; i < ( one << wsize ); i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[i], N->n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[i], &W[i - 1] ) ); + + mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T ); + } + } + + nblimbs = E->n; + bufsize = 0; + nbits = 0; + wbits = 0; + state = 0; + + while( 1 ) + { + if( bufsize == 0 ) + { + if( nblimbs == 0 ) + break; + + nblimbs--; + + bufsize = sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) << 3; + } + + bufsize--; + + ei = (E->p[nblimbs] >> bufsize) & 1; + + /* + * skip leading 0s + */ + if( ei == 0 && state == 0 ) + continue; + + if( ei == 0 && state == 1 ) + { + /* + * out of window, square X + */ + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); + continue; + } + + /* + * add ei to current window + */ + state = 2; + + nbits++; + wbits |= ( ei << ( wsize - nbits ) ); + + if( nbits == wsize ) + { + /* + * X = X^wsize R^-1 mod N + */ + for( i = 0; i < wsize; i++ ) + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); + + /* + * X = X * W[wbits] R^-1 mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, (size_t) 1 << wsize, wbits ) ); + mpi_montmul( X, &WW, N, mm, &T ); + + state--; + nbits = 0; + wbits = 0; + } + } + + /* + * process the remaining bits + */ + for( i = 0; i < nbits; i++ ) + { + mpi_montmul( X, X, N, mm, &T ); + + wbits <<= 1; + + if( ( wbits & ( one << wsize ) ) != 0 ) + mpi_montmul( X, &W[1], N, mm, &T ); + } + + /* + * X = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N + */ + mpi_montred( X, N, mm, &T ); + + if( neg && E->n != 0 && ( E->p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) + { + X->s = -1; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, N, X ) ); + } + +cleanup: + + for( i = ( one << ( wsize - 1 ) ); i < ( one << wsize ); i++ ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[i] ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[1] ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Apos ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &WW ); + + if( prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR ) +{ + return bl_mpi_exp_mod(X, A, E, N, prec_RR); +} + +/* + * Greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) (HAC 14.54) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t lz, lzt; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); + + lz = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ); + lzt = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ); + + /* The loop below gives the correct result when A==0 but not when B==0. + * So have a special case for B==0. Leverage the fact that we just + * calculated the lsb and lsb(B)==0 iff B is odd or 0 to make the test + * slightly more efficient than cmp_int(). */ + if( lzt == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &TB, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, A ); + goto cleanup; + } + + if( lzt < lz ) + lz = lzt; + + TA.s = TB.s = 1; + + /* We mostly follow the procedure described in HAC 14.54, but with some + * minor differences: + * - Sequences of multiplications or divisions by 2 are grouped into a + * single shift operation. + * - The procedure in HAC assumes that 0 < TB <= TA. + * - The condition TB <= TA is not actually necessary for correctness. + * TA and TB have symmetric roles except for the loop termination + * condition, and the shifts at the beginning of the loop body + * remove any significance from the ordering of TA vs TB before + * the shifts. + * - If TA = 0, the loop goes through 0 iterations and the result is + * correctly TB. + * - The case TB = 0 was short-circuited above. + * + * For the correctness proof below, decompose the original values of + * A and B as + * A = sa * 2^a * A' with A'=0 or A' odd, and sa = +-1 + * B = sb * 2^b * B' with B'=0 or B' odd, and sb = +-1 + * Then gcd(A, B) = 2^{min(a,b)} * gcd(A',B'), + * and gcd(A',B') is odd or 0. + * + * At the beginning, we have TA = |A| and TB = |B| so gcd(A,B) = gcd(TA,TB). + * The code maintains the following invariant: + * gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k (I) + */ + + /* Proof that the loop terminates: + * At each iteration, either the right-shift by 1 is made on a nonzero + * value and the nonnegative integer bitlen(TA) + bitlen(TB) decreases + * by at least 1, or the right-shift by 1 is made on zero and then + * TA becomes 0 which ends the loop (TB cannot be 0 if it is right-shifted + * since in that case TB is calculated from TB-TA with the condition TB>TA). + */ + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &TA, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + /* Divisions by 2 preserve the invariant (I). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ) ) ); + + /* Set either TA or TB to |TA-TB|/2. Since TA and TB are both odd, + * TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result. + * Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB + * also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2 + * also divides TB, and any odd divisor of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also + * divides TA. + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TA, &TB ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TA, &TA, &TB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, 1 ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TB, &TB, &TA ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, 1 ) ); + } + /* Note that one of TA or TB is still odd. */ + } + + /* By invariant (I), gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k. + * At the loop exit, TA = 0, so gcd(TA,TB) = TB. + * - If there was at least one loop iteration, then one of TA or TB is odd, + * and TA = 0, so TB is odd and gcd(TA,TB) = gcd(A',B'). In this case, + * lz = min(a,b) so gcd(A,B) = 2^lz * TB. + * - If there was no loop iteration, then A was 0, and gcd(A,B) = B. + * In this case, lz = 0 and B = TB so gcd(A,B) = B = 2^lz * TB as well. + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &TB, lz ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, &TB ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. + * X must already have room for those bytes. + * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for + * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and mbedtls_mpi_random()). + * The size and sign of X are unchanged. + * n_bytes must not be 0. + */ +static int mpi_fill_random_internal( + mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t n_bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( n_bytes ); + const size_t overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - n_bytes; + + if( X->n < limbs ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( X->p, 0, overhead ); + memset( (unsigned char *) X->p + limbs * ciL, 0, ( X->n - limbs ) * ciL ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, (unsigned char *) X->p + overhead, n_bytes ) ); + mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Fill X with size bytes of random. + * + * Use a temporary bytes representation to make sure the result is the same + * regardless of the platform endianness (useful when f_rng is actually + * deterministic, eg for tests). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( size ); + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + ret = mpi_fill_random_internal( X, size, f_rng, p_rng ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi_sint min, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + int count; + unsigned lt_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0; + size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ); + size_t n_bytes = ( n_bits + 7 ) / 8; + mbedtls_mpi lower_bound; + + if( min < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, min ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing + * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will + * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). + * + * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating + * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with + * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, + * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has + * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. + * + * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible + * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but + * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N + * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of + * failure is macroscopic. + */ + count = ( n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &lower_bound ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs + * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros. + * This is necessary for the mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() check. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &lower_bound, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &lower_bound, min ) ); + + /* + * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: + * - use the same byte ordering; + * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; + * - try until result is in the desired range. + * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. + */ + do + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random_internal( X, n_bytes, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits ) ); + + if( --count == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, &lower_bound, <_lower ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, N, <_upper ) ); + } + while( lt_lower != 0 || lt_upper == 0 ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &lower_bound ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N (HAC 14.61 / 14.64) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 1 ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TU ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TV ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &V1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &V2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, A, N ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &TA, A, N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TU, &TA ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TV, N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &U1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &U2, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &V1, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &V2, 1 ) ); + + do + { + while( ( TU.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TU, 1 ) ); + + if( ( U1.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 || ( U2.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &U1, &U1, &TB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U2, &U2, &TA ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &U1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &U2, 1 ) ); + } + + while( ( TV.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TV, 1 ) ); + + if( ( V1.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 || ( V2.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &V1, &V1, &TB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V2, &V2, &TA ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &V1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &V2, 1 ) ); + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TU, &TV ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &TU, &TU, &TV ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U1, &U1, &V1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U2, &U2, &V2 ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &TV, &TV, &TU ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V1, &V1, &U1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V2, &V2, &U2 ) ); + } + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &TU, 0 ) != 0 ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &V1, 0 ) < 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &V1, &V1, N ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &V1, N ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V1, &V1, N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &V1 ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TU ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TV ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &V1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V2 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + +static const int small_prime[] = +{ + 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, + 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, + 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, + 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, + 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, + 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, + 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, + 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, + 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, + 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, + 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, + 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, + 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, + 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, + 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, + 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, + 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, + 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, + 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, + 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, + 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997, -103 +}; + +/* + * Small divisors test (X must be positive) + * + * Return values: + * 0: no small factor (possible prime, more tests needed) + * 1: certain prime + * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: certain non-prime + * other negative: error + */ +static int mpi_check_small_factors( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + + if( ( X->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + + for( i = 0; small_prime[i] > 0; i++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, small_prime[i] ) <= 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, small_prime[i] ) ); + + if( r == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Miller-Rabin pseudo-primality test (HAC 4.24) + */ +static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret, count; + size_t i, j, k, s; + mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); + + /* + * W = |X| - 1 + * R = W >> lsb( W ) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &W, X, 1 ) ); + s = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &W ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R, &W ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &R, s ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < rounds; i++ ) + { + /* + * pick a random A, 1 < A < |X| - 1 + */ + count = 0; + do { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A ); + k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W ); + if (j > k) { + A.p[A.n - 1] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << ( k - ( A.n - 1 ) * biL - 1 ) ) - 1; + } + + if (count++ > 30) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + } while ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) <= 0 ); + + /* + * A = A^R mod |X| + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &A, &A, &R, X, &RR ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) + continue; + + j = 1; + while( j < s && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * A = A * A mod |X| + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &A, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &A, &T, X ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) + break; + + j++; + } + + /* + * not prime if A != |X| - 1 or A == 1 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Pseudo-primality test: small factors, then Miller-Rabin + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi XX; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + XX.s = 1; + XX.n = X->n; + XX.p = X->p; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 0 ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 1 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 2 ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &XX ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == 1 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ret ); + } + + return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80 + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + /* + * In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most + * 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty + * here as well. + */ + return( mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, 40, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} +#endif + +/* + * Prime number generation + * + * To generate an RSA key in a way recommended by FIPS 186-4, both primes must + * be either 1024 bits or 1536 bits long, and flags must contain + * MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 +// ceil(2^63.5) +#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f333f9de6485ULL +#else +// ceil(2^31.5) +#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f334U +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + size_t k, n; + int rounds; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + mbedtls_mpi Y; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + if( nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + + n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( nbits ); + + if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR ) == 0 ) + { + /* + * 2^-80 error probability, number of rounds chosen per HAC, table 4.4 + */ + rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 3 : + ( nbits >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 350 ) ? 8 : + ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 ); + } + else + { + /* + * 2^-100 error probability, number of rounds computed based on HAC, + * fact 4.48 + */ + rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1450 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 1150 ) ? 5 : + ( nbits >= 1000 ) ? 6 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 7 : + ( nbits >= 750 ) ? 8 : ( nbits >= 500 ) ? 13 : + ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 28 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 40 : 51 ); + } + + while( 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( X, n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + /* make sure generated number is at least (nbits-1)+0.5 bits (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 steps 4.4, 5.5) */ + if( X->p[n-1] < CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 ) continue; + + k = n * biL; + if( k > nbits ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, k - nbits ) ); + X->p[0] |= 1; + + if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ); + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + /* + * An necessary condition for Y and X = 2Y + 1 to be prime + * is X = 2 mod 3 (which is equivalent to Y = 2 mod 3). + * Make sure it is satisfied, while keeping X = 3 mod 4 + */ + + X->p[0] |= 2; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, 3 ) ); + if( r == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 8 ) ); + else if( r == 1 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 4 ) ); + + /* Set Y = (X-1) / 2, which is X / 2 because X is odd */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Y, X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Y, 1 ) ); + + while( 1 ) + { + /* + * First, check small factors for X and Y + * before doing Miller-Rabin on any of them + */ + if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( X ) ) == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &Y ) ) == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) + == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) + == 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Next candidates. We want to preserve Y = (X-1) / 2 and + * Y = 1 mod 2 and Y = 2 mod 3 (eq X = 3 mod 4 and X = 2 mod 3) + * so up Y by 6 and X by 12. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 12 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &Y, &Y, 6 ) ); + } + } + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#define GCD_PAIR_COUNT 3 + +static const int gcd_pairs[GCD_PAIR_COUNT][3] = +{ + { 693, 609, 21 }, + { 1764, 868, 28 }, + { 768454923, 542167814, 1 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret, i; + mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, X, Y, U, V; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &V ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &A, 16, + "EFE021C2645FD1DC586E69184AF4A31E" \ + "D5F53E93B5F123FA41680867BA110131" \ + "944FE7952E2517337780CB0DB80E61AA" \ + "E7C8DDC6C5C6AADEB34EB38A2F40D5E6" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &E, 16, + "B2E7EFD37075B9F03FF989C7C5051C20" \ + "34D2A323810251127E7BF8625A4F49A5" \ + "F3E27F4DA8BD59C47D6DAABA4C8127BD" \ + "5B5C25763222FEFCCFC38B832366C29E" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &N, 16, + "0066A198186C18C10B2F5ED9B522752A" \ + "9830B69916E535C8F047518A889A43A5" \ + "94B6BED27A168D31D4A52F88925AA8F5" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &X, &A, &N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "602AB7ECA597A3D6B56FF9829A5E8B85" \ + "9E857EA95A03512E2BAE7391688D264A" \ + "A5663B0341DB9CCFD2C4C5F421FEC814" \ + "8001B72E848A38CAE1C65F78E56ABDEF" \ + "E12D3C039B8A02D6BE593F0BBBDA56F1" \ + "ECF677152EF804370C1A305CAF3B5BF1" \ + "30879B56C61DE584A0F53A2447A51E" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #1 (mul_mpi): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &X, &Y, &A, &N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "256567336059E52CAE22925474705F39A94" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &V, 16, + "6613F26162223DF488E9CD48CC132C7A" \ + "0AC93C701B001B092E4E5B9F73BCD27B" \ + "9EE50D0657C77F374E903CDFA4C642" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #2 (div_mpi): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &V ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &X, &A, &E, &N, NULL ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "36E139AEA55215609D2816998ED020BB" \ + "BD96C37890F65171D948E9BC7CBAA4D9" \ + "325D24D6A3C12710F10A09FA08AB87" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #3 (exp_mod): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &X, &A, &N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "003A0AAEDD7E784FC07D8F9EC6E3BFD5" \ + "C3DBA76456363A10869622EAC2DD84EC" \ + "C5B8A74DAC4D09E03B5E0BE779F2DF61" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #4 (inv_mod): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #5 (simple gcd): " ); + + for( i = 0; i < GCD_PAIR_COUNT; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &X, gcd_pairs[i][0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Y, gcd_pairs[i][1] ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &A, &X, &Y ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, gcd_pairs[i][2] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed at %d\n", i ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 && verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/bignum_ext.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/bignum_ext.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2f73a618 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/bignum_ext.c @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include +#include "bignum_ext.h" + +void dump_mpi(const char *tag, const mbedtls_mpi *bn) +{ + const size_t buf_len = 4096 + 1; + char *buf = (char *)mbedtls_calloc(1, buf_len); + if (!buf) + return; + size_t olen; + if (tag) + printf("%s: ", tag); + if (bn) { + mbedtls_mpi_write_string(bn, 16, buf, buf_len, &olen); + } else { + strcpy(buf, ""); + } + puts(buf); + puts("\r\n"); + mbedtls_free(buf); +} + +size_t mpi_words(const mbedtls_mpi *mpi) +{ + for (size_t i = mpi->n; i > 0; i--) { + if (mpi->p[i - 1] != 0) { + return i; + } + } + return 0; +} + +// clear upper bits starting from bit(inclusion, zero-indexed) +int mpi_clear_upper_bits(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t bit) +{ + const size_t limb_bits = sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8; + + if (!X) + return -1; + size_t higher_limb_idx = (bit + limb_bits - 1) / limb_bits; + + for (size_t i = higher_limb_idx; i < X->n; ++i) + X->p[i] = 0; + + size_t bit_offset = bit % limb_bits; + if (bit_offset && higher_limb_idx - 1 < X->n) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = 1; + mask <<= bit_offset; + mask -= 1; + X->p[higher_limb_idx - 1] &= mask; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mpi_mod_2n(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_uint n) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi R; + if (!X) + return -1; + + mpi_clear_upper_bits(X, n); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); + if (X->s < 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&R, n, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, X, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(X, n, 0)); + } +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&R); + return ret; +} + +int mpi_hensel_quad_mod_inv_prime_n(mbedtls_mpi *U, const mbedtls_mpi *a, mbedtls_mpi_uint m) +{ + int ret; + if (!(U && a && m)) + return -1; + + if ((a->p[0] & 1) == 0) + return -1; + + mbedtls_mpi tmp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&tmp); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(U, 1)); + for (size_t i = 2; i < m; i <<= 1) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&tmp, U, U)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_mod_2n(&tmp, i)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&tmp, &tmp, a)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_mod_2n(&tmp, i)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(U, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(U, U, &tmp)); + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&tmp, U, U)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_mod_2n(&tmp, m)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&tmp, &tmp, a)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_mod_2n(&tmp, m)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(U, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(U, U, &tmp)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_mod_2n(U, m)); + + mbedtls_mpi zero; + mbedtls_mpi_uint z_ = 0; + zero.s = 1; + zero.n = 1; + zero.p = &z_; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(U, &zero, U)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_mod_2n(U, m)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&tmp); + + return 0; +} + +// scalar_len: number of uint32_t +// output: length should be >= scalar_len * 4 + 1 +int mpi_scalar_encode(const uint32_t *scalar, size_t scalar_len, int w, int8_t *output, size_t *out_len) +{ + if (!(scalar && scalar_len && output && out_len)) + return -1; + if (!(w >= 2 && w <= 8)) + return -1; + + const size_t bits = scalar_len * 32; + memset(output, 0, bits + 1); + const uint32_t width = 1 << w; + const uint32_t window_mask = width - 1; + + size_t output_len = 0; + size_t pos = 0; + uint32_t carry = 0; + while (pos < bits) { + size_t u32_idx = pos / 32; + size_t bit_idx = pos % 32; + uint32_t bit_buf; + if (bit_idx < 32 - w) { + bit_buf = scalar[u32_idx] >> bit_idx; + } else { + if (u32_idx + 1 < scalar_len) + bit_buf = (scalar[u32_idx] >> bit_idx) | (scalar[u32_idx + 1] << (32 - bit_idx)); + else + bit_buf = (scalar[u32_idx] >> bit_idx); + } + + const uint32_t window = carry + (bit_buf & window_mask); + if ((window & 1) == 0) { + pos += 1; + continue; + } + output_len = pos + 1; + if (window < width / 2) { + carry = 0; + output[pos] = window; + } else { + carry = 1; + output[pos] = window - width; + } + + pos += w; + } + if (carry) { + output[pos] = 1; + output_len = pos + 1; + } + if (output_len > 0) + *out_len = output_len; + else + *out_len = 1; + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/bignum_ext.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/bignum_ext.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8067940 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/bignum_ext.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +#pragma once + +#include + +void dump_mpi(const char *tag, const mbedtls_mpi *bn); + +size_t mpi_words(const mbedtls_mpi *mpi); +int mpi_clear_upper_bits(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t bit); +int mpi_mod_2n(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_uint n); +int mpi_hensel_quad_mod_inv_prime_n(mbedtls_mpi *U, const mbedtls_mpi *a, mbedtls_mpi_uint m); +int mpi_scalar_encode(const uint32_t *scalar, size_t scalar_len, int w, int8_t *output, size_t *out_len); diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/ecp_alt.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/ecp_alt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7b3f88c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/ecp_alt.h @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_H + +/* + * default mbed TLS elliptic curve arithmetic implementation + * + * (in case MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined then the developer has to provide an + * alternative implementation for the whole module and it will replace this + * one.) + */ + +/** + * \brief The ECP group structure. + * + * We consider two types of curve equations: + *
  • Short Weierstrass: y^2 = x^3 + A x + B mod P + * (SEC1 + RFC-4492)
    • + *
  • Montgomery: y^2 = x^3 + A x^2 + x mod P (Curve25519, + * Curve448)
+ * In both cases, the generator (\p G) for a prime-order subgroup is fixed. + * + * For Short Weierstrass, this subgroup is the whole curve, and its + * cardinality is denoted by \p N. Our code requires that \p N is an + * odd prime as mbedtls_ecp_mul() requires an odd number, and + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() requires that it is prime for blinding purposes. + * + * For Montgomery curves, we do not store \p A, but (A + 2) / 4, + * which is the quantity used in the formulas. Additionally, \p nbits is + * not the size of \p N but the required size for private keys. + * + * If \p modp is NULL, reduction modulo \p P is done using a generic algorithm. + * Otherwise, \p modp must point to a function that takes an \p mbedtls_mpi in the + * range of 0..2^(2*pbits)-1, and transforms it in-place to an integer + * which is congruent mod \p P to the given MPI, and is close enough to \p pbits + * in size, so that it may be efficiently brought in the 0..P-1 range by a few + * additions or subtractions. Therefore, it is only an approximative modular + * reduction. It must return 0 on success and non-zero on failure. + * + * \note Alternative implementations must keep the group IDs distinct. If + * two group structures have the same ID, then they must be + * identical. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; /*!< An internal group identifier. */ + mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus of the base field. */ + mbedtls_mpi A; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p A in the equation. For + Montgomery curves: (A + 2) / 4. */ + mbedtls_mpi B; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p B in the equation. + For Montgomery curves: unused. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /*!< The generator of the subgroup used. */ + mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The order of \p G. */ + size_t pbits; /*!< The number of bits in \p P.*/ + size_t nbits; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: The number of bits in \p P. + For Montgomery curves: the number of bits in the + private keys. */ + unsigned int h; /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ + void *PrimeN; + void *Table; +} +mbedtls_ecp_group; + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS) + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS < MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is smaller than the largest supported curve" +#endif + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN + +#else +/* MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is not relevant without MBEDTLS_ECP_C, but set it + * to a nonzero value so that code that unconditionally allocates an array + * of a size based on it keeps working if built without ECC support. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 1 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ( ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7 ) / 8 ) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1 ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) +/* + * Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication. + * Default: a point where higher memory usage yields disminishing performance + * returns. + * Minimum value: 2. Maximum value: 7. + * + * Result is an array of at most ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) ) + * points used for point multiplication. This value is directly tied to EC + * peak memory usage, so decreasing it by one should roughly cut memory usage + * by two (if large curves are in use). + * + * Reduction in size may reduce speed, but larger curves are impacted first. + * Sample performances (in ECDHE handshakes/s, with FIXED_POINT_OPTIM = 1): + * w-size: 6 5 4 3 2 + * 521 145 141 135 120 97 + * 384 214 209 198 177 146 + * 256 320 320 303 262 226 + * 224 475 475 453 398 342 + * 192 640 640 633 587 476 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< The maximum window size used. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM) +/* + * Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication. + * + * This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the + * multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in + * ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4. + * + * The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2. + * + * Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */ + +/* \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#endif /* ecp_alt.h */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/aes_alt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/aes_alt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..74e2c80c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/aes_alt.c @@ -0,0 +1,726 @@ +/* + * Description: AES hardware acceleration + * Copyright (C) Bouffalo Lab 2016-2022 + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * File Name: aes_alt.c + * Author: Chien Wong(qwang@bouffalolab.com) + * Start Date: Jun 13, 2022 + * Last Update: Jun 13, 2022 + */ + +/* + * FIPS-197 compliant AES implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The AES block cipher was designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/rijndael/Rijndael.pdf + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) +#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define AES_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define AES_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) +{ + AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + bl_aes_init( &ctx->ctx ); +} + +void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) +{ + AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->crypt ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->tweak ); +} + +void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->crypt ); + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->tweak ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/* + * AES key schedule (encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + unsigned int key_len; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + switch( keybits ) + { + case 128: key_len = 128 / 8; break; + case 192: key_len = 192 / 8; break; + case 256: key_len = 256 / 8; break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + } + + bl_aes_set_key( &ctx->ctx, BL_AES_ENCRYPT, key, key_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * AES key schedule (decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + // Do not care about encryption or decryption + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( ctx, key, keybits ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits, + const unsigned char **key1, + unsigned int *key1bits, + const unsigned char **key2, + unsigned int *key2bits ) +{ + const unsigned int half_keybits = keybits / 2; + const unsigned int half_keybytes = half_keybits / 8; + + switch( keybits ) + { + case 256: break; + case 512: break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + } + + *key1bits = half_keybits; + *key2bits = half_keybits; + *key1 = &key[0]; + *key2 = &key[half_keybytes]; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *key1, *key2; + unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, + &key2, &key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for the encryption mode. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set crypt key for encryption. */ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits ); +} + +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *key1, *key2; + unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, + &key2, &key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for encryption. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set crypt key for decryption. */ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/* + * AES-ECB block encryption + */ +int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + bl_aes_acquire_hw(); + bl_aes_transform( &ctx->ctx, BL_AES_ENCRYPT, input, output ); + bl_aes_release_hw(); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * AES-ECB block decryption + */ +int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + bl_aes_acquire_hw(); + bl_aes_transform( &ctx->ctx, BL_AES_DECRYPT, input, output ); + bl_aes_release_hw(); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) + return( mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + { + if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to + // unaccelerated mode + // + } +#endif + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) + return( mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); + else + return( mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * AES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[16]; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + if( length % 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + { + if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to + // unaccelerated mode + // + } +#endif + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + memcpy( iv, output, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + +typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16]; + +/* + * GF(2^128) multiplication function + * + * This function multiplies a field element by x in the polynomial field + * representation. It uses 64-bit word operations to gain speed but compensates + * for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little + * endian machines. + */ +static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( unsigned char r[16], + const unsigned char x[16] ) +{ + uint64_t a, b, ra, rb; + + a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 0 ); + b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 8 ); + + ra = ( a << 1 ) ^ 0x0087 >> ( 8 - ( ( b >> 63 ) << 3 ) ); + rb = ( a >> 63 ) | ( b << 1 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( ra, r, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( rb, r, 8 ); +} + +/* + * AES-XTS buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t blocks = length / 16; + size_t leftover = length % 16; + unsigned char tweak[16]; + unsigned char prev_tweak[16]; + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( data_unit != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + /* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */ + if( length < 16 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + + /* NIST SP 800-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */ + if( length > ( 1 << 20 ) * 16 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + + /* Compute the tweak. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->tweak, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + data_unit, tweak ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + while( blocks-- ) + { + size_t i; + + if( leftover && ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) && blocks == 0 ) + { + /* We are on the last block in a decrypt operation that has + * leftover bytes, so we need to use the next tweak for this block, + * and this tweak for the lefover bytes. Save the current tweak for + * the leftovers and then update the current tweak for use on this, + * the last full block. */ + memcpy( prev_tweak, tweak, sizeof( tweak ) ); + mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + tmp[i] = input[i] ^ tweak[i]; + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = tmp[i] ^ tweak[i]; + + /* Update the tweak for the next block. */ + mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak ); + + output += 16; + input += 16; + } + + if( leftover ) + { + /* If we are on the leftover bytes in a decrypt operation, we need to + * use the previous tweak for these bytes (as saved in prev_tweak). */ + unsigned char *t = mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ? prev_tweak : tweak; + + /* We are now on the final part of the data unit, which doesn't divide + * evenly by 16. It's time for ciphertext stealing. */ + size_t i; + unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16; + + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each + * byte of cyphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the + * remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds + * are the same). */ + for( i = 0; i < leftover; i++ ) + { + output[i] = prev_output[i]; + tmp[i] = input[i] ^ t[i]; + } + + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block for input in this + * round. */ + for( ; i < 16; i++ ) + tmp[i] = prev_output[i] ^ t[i]; + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return ret; + + /* Write the result back to the previous block, overriding the previous + * output we copied. */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + prev_output[i] = tmp[i] ^ t[i]; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * AES-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + if( n > 15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] ); + iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + else + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * AES-CFB8 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char c; + unsigned char ov[17]; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + while( length-- ) + { + memcpy( ov, iv, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + ov[16] = *input; + + c = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[0] ^ *input++ ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) + ov[16] = c; + + memcpy( iv, ov + 1, 16 ); + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +/* + * AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode) buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + if( n > 15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + *output++ = *input++ ^ iv[n]; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *iv_off = n; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * AES-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c, i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + + if ( n > 0x0F ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 16; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *nc_off = n; + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/bignum_hw.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/bignum_hw.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c3519f0e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/bignum_hw.c @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "bignum_ext.h" +#include "hw_common.h" + +// Enable large number exp_mod to support RSA-4096, etc operations +#define BL_MPI_LARGE_NUM_SOFTWARE_MPI + +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, ret ) \ + do { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + return( ret ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) +#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + +#ifdef HW_PORTED + +int bl_mpi_exp_mod_wo_lock(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *_RN) +{ + int ret; + uint8_t *tmp; + int wsize; + int i, j; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET(E != NULL); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET(N != NULL); + + const size_t a_words = mpi_words(A); + const size_t e_words = mpi_words(E); + const size_t n_words = mpi_words(N); + + const size_t m_words = HW_MAX(a_words, HW_MAX(e_words, n_words)); + + const int reg_size = mpi_words_to_reg_size(m_words); + const int words = mpi_reg_size_to_words(reg_size); + const int reg_size_N = mpi_words_to_reg_size(n_words); + const int words_N = mpi_reg_size_to_words(reg_size_N); + const int reg_size_E = mpi_words_to_reg_size(e_words); + const int words_E = mpi_reg_size_to_words(reg_size_E); + const int d_reg_size = mpi_words_to_reg_size(mpi_reg_size_to_words(reg_size) * 2); + mbedtls_mpi PrimeN_new; + mbedtls_mpi *PrimeN = &PrimeN_new; + int reg_idx_E; + const int e_bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(E); + int e_bit_idx; + bool first = true; + const int sN = reg_size_N; + + // TODO more precise check + if (reg_size > SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_256) { +#ifdef BL_MPI_LARGE_NUM_SOFTWARE_MPI + return mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_original(X, A, E, N, _RN); +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; +#endif + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 || (N->p[0] & 1) == 0) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 0) < 0) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 0) == 0) { + return mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, words))) { + return ret; + } + + if ((tmp = mbedtls_calloc(1, words * 4)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + Sec_Eng_PKA_Reset(); + Sec_Eng_PKA_BigEndian_Enable(); + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&PrimeN_new); + + if (_RN == NULL || _RN->p == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_hensel_quad_mod_inv_prime_n(&PrimeN_new, N, words_N * 32)); + if (_RN != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(_RN, PrimeN)); + } + } else { + PrimeN = _RN; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(N, tmp, words_N * 4)); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Data(sN, 0, (uint32_t *)tmp, words_N, 1); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(A, tmp, words * 4)); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Data(reg_size, 2, (uint32_t *)tmp, words, 1); + Sec_Eng_PKA_GF2Mont(sN, 3, reg_size, 2, words_N * 32, d_reg_size, 2, sN, 0); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(PrimeN, tmp, words_N * 4)); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Data(sN, 1, (uint32_t *)tmp, words_N, 1); + + i = e_bitlen; + wsize = i > 79 ? 4 : i > 23 ? 3 : 1; + if (words_N > 128 / 4 && wsize > 1) + wsize = 3; + + if (wsize > 1) { + int ri = 5; + Sec_Eng_PKA_Move_Data(sN, 4, sN, 3, 1); + Sec_Eng_PKA_MSQR(sN, 3, sN, 3, sN, 0, 1); + + j = (1 << (wsize - 1)) - 1; + for (i = 0; i < j; ++i, ++ri) + Sec_Eng_PKA_MMUL(sN, ri, sN, ri - 1, sN, 3, sN, 0, 1); + } else { + reg_idx_E = (4 * words_N + words_E - 1) / words_E; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(E, tmp, words_E * 4)); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Data(reg_size_E, reg_idx_E, (uint32_t *)tmp, words_E, 1); + + Sec_Eng_PKA_MEXP(sN, 2, sN, 3, reg_size_E, reg_idx_E, sN, 0, 1); + goto cvt_back; + } + + e_bit_idx = e_bitlen - 1; + while (e_bit_idx >= 0) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(E, e_bit_idx) == 0) { + Sec_Eng_PKA_MSQR(sN, 2, sN, 2, sN, 0, 1); + e_bit_idx--; + } else { + int bitstring_len = wsize; + int bitstring_val = 0; + if (e_bit_idx + 1 < bitstring_len) + bitstring_len = e_bit_idx + 1; + + while (bitstring_len > 0) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(E, e_bit_idx - bitstring_len + 1)) + break; + bitstring_len--; + } + for (i = 0; i < bitstring_len; ++i) { + int cur_bit = mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(E, e_bit_idx - i); + if (i == 0) + bitstring_val = cur_bit; + else + bitstring_val = (bitstring_val << 1) + cur_bit; + if (!first) + Sec_Eng_PKA_MSQR(sN, 2, sN, 2, sN, 0, 1); + } + i = ((bitstring_val - 1) >> 1) + 4; + if (first) { + Sec_Eng_PKA_Move_Data(sN, 2, sN, i, 1); + first = false; + } else { + Sec_Eng_PKA_MMUL(sN, 2, sN, 2, sN, i, sN, 0, 1); + } + + e_bit_idx -= bitstring_len; + } + } + +cvt_back: + memset(tmp, 0, words_N * 4); + tmp[words_N * 4 - 1] = 1; + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Data(sN, 3, (uint32_t *)tmp, words_N, 1); + Sec_Eng_PKA_MMUL(sN, 4, sN, 2, sN, 3, sN, 0, 1); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Read_Data(sN, 4, (uint32_t *)tmp, words_N); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(X, tmp, words_N * 4)); + + // Compensate for negative X + if (A->s == -1 && (E->p[0] & 1) != 0) { + X->s = -1; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, N, X)); + } else { + X->s = 1; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(tmp); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&PrimeN_new); + return ret; +} + +int bl_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *_RN) +{ + int ret; + if (bl_sec_pka_mutex_take()) + return -1; + ret = bl_mpi_exp_mod_wo_lock(X, A, E, N, _RN); + if (bl_sec_pka_mutex_give()) + return -1; + return ret; +} + +#endif // HW_PORTED diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/ecp_alt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/ecp_alt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..19453d76 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/ecp_alt.c @@ -0,0 +1,2861 @@ +/* + * Description: ECC over GF(p) hardware acceleration + * Copyright (C) Bouffalo Lab 2016-2022 + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * File Name: ecp_alt.c + * Author: Chien Wong(qwang@bouffalolab.com) + * Start Date: May 28, 2022 + * Last Update: Jun 9, 2022 + */ + +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): generic functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + * GECC = Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone + * FIPS 186-3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf + * RFC 4492 for the related TLS structures and constants + * RFC 7748 for the Curve448 and Curve25519 curve definitions + * + * [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * + * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis + * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and + * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. + * + * + * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to + * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology + * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/** + * \brief Function level alternative implementation. + * + * The MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT macro enables alternative implementations to + * replace certain functions in this module. The alternative implementations are + * typically hardware accelerators and need to activate the hardware before the + * computation starts and deactivate it after it finishes. The + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() functions serve + * this purpose. + * + * To preserve the correct functionality the following conditions must hold: + * + * - The alternative implementation must be activated by + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() before any of the replaceable functions is + * called. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() must \b only be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() must \b not be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - Public functions must not return while the alternative implementation is + * activated. + * - Replaceable functions are guarded by \c MBEDTLS_ECP_XXX_ALT macros and + * before calling them an \code if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + * \endcode ensures that the alternative implementation supports the current + * group. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" + +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#include "hw_common.h" +#include + +#define MADD(d, s1, s2) Sec_Eng_PKA_MADD( s, d, s, s1, s, s2, s, 0, 1 ) +#define MSUB(d, s1, s2) Sec_Eng_PKA_MSUB( s, d, s, s1, s, s2, s, 0, 1 ) +#define MMUL(d, s1, s2) Sec_Eng_PKA_MMUL( s, d, s, s1, s, s2, s, 0, 1 ) +#define LCMP(d, s1, s2) Sec_Eng_PKA_LCMP( &d, s, s1, s, s2 ) +#define REGW(d, s1) Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Data( s, d, s1, op_ws, 1 ); +#define REGR(s1, d) Sec_Eng_PKA_Read_Data( s, s1, d, op_ws ); +#define MOVE(d, s1) Sec_Eng_PKA_Move_Data( s, d, s, s1, 1 ) +#define MREM(d, s1) Sec_Eng_PKA_MREM( s, d, s, s1, s, 0, 1 ) +#define MINV(d, s1) Sec_Eng_PKA_MINV( s, d, s, s1, s, 0, 1 ) +#define MSQR(d, s1) Sec_Eng_PKA_MSQR( s, d, s, s1, s, 0, 1 ) +#define CREG(d) Sec_Eng_PKA_CREG( s, d, mpi_reg_size_to_words( s ), 1 ) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECP_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#else +#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications. + * Used to test resistance of point multiplication to simple timing attacks. + */ +static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) +/* + * Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for + * side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was + * that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but + * unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with + * no opportunity for the user to do anything about it. + * + * The obvious strategies for addressing that include: + * - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments; + * - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules. + * + * Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is + * have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar. + * + * The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with + * HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +/* DRBG context type */ +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; + +/* DRBG context init */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG context free */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG function */ +static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) ); +} + +/* DRBG context seeding */ +static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + /* The list starts with strong hashes */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + + if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, + secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +/* DRBG context type */ +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; + +/* DRBG context init */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG context free */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG function */ +static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does, + * we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy + * function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string. + * (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are + * concatenated before being used to update the secret state.) + */ +static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + (void) ctx; + memset( out, 0, len ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* DRBG context seeding */ +static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + + if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, + secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL, + secret_bytes, secret_len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#else +#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." +#endif /* DRBG modules */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row. + * + * Default value 0 means that ECC operations will not yield. + * Note that regardless of the value of ecp_max_ops, always at + * least one step is performed before yielding. + * + * Setting ecp_max_ops=1 can be suitable for testing purposes + * as it will interrupt computation at all possible points. + */ +static unsigned ecp_max_ops = 0; + +/* + * Set ecp_max_ops + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( unsigned max_ops ) +{ + ecp_max_ops = max_ops; +} + +/* + * Check if restart is enabled + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled( void ) +{ + return( ecp_max_ops != 0 ); +} + +/* + * Restart sub-context for ecp_mul_comb() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* current intermediate result */ + size_t i; /* current index in various loops, 0 outside */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /* table for precomputed points */ + unsigned char T_size; /* number of points in table T */ + enum { /* what were we doing last time we returned? */ + ecp_rsm_init = 0, /* nothing so far, dummy initial state */ + ecp_rsm_pre_dbl, /* precompute 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl, /* normalize precomputed 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_add, /* precompute remaining points by adding */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add, /* normalize all precomputed points */ + ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */ + ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */ + } state; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; + unsigned char drbg_seeded; +#endif +}; + +/* + * Init restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->R ); + ctx->i = 0; + ctx->T = NULL; + ctx->T_size = 0; + ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_init( &ctx->drbg_ctx ); + ctx->drbg_seeded = 0; +#endif +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx ) +{ + unsigned char i; + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->R ); + + if( ctx->T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < ctx->T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( ctx->T + i ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->T ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_free( &ctx->drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + ecp_restart_rsm_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Restart context for ecp_muladd() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; /* mP value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* R intermediate result */ + enum { /* what should we do next? */ + ecp_rsma_mul1 = 0, /* first multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_mul2, /* second multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_add, /* addition */ + ecp_rsma_norm, /* normalization */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->mP ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->R ); + ctx->state = ecp_rsma_mul1; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->mP ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->R ); + + ecp_restart_ma_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + ctx->ops_done = 0; + ctx->depth = 0; + ctx->rsm = NULL; + ctx->ma = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + ecp_restart_rsm_free( ctx->rsm ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->rsm ); + + ecp_restart_ma_free( ctx->ma ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->ma ); + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Check if we can do the next step + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + unsigned ops ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ecp_max_ops != 0 ) + { + /* scale depending on curve size: the chosen reference is 256-bit, + * and multiplication is quadratic. Round to the closest integer. */ + if( grp->pbits >= 512 ) + ops *= 4; + else if( grp->pbits >= 384 ) + ops *= 2; + + /* Avoid infinite loops: always allow first step. + * Because of that, however, it's not generally true + * that ops_done <= ecp_max_ops, so the check + * ops_done > ecp_max_ops below is mandatory. */ + if( ( rs_ctx->ops_done != 0 ) && + ( rs_ctx->ops_done > ecp_max_ops || + ops > ecp_max_ops - rs_ctx->ops_done ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + + /* update running count */ + rs_ctx->ops_done += ops; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_ENTER( SUB ) do { \ + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 ) \ + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; \ + \ + /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ + if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ + rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + { \ + rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) ); \ + if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) do { \ + /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) \ + { \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) \ + rs_ctx->depth--; \ +} while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define ECP_RS_ENTER( sub ) (void) rs_ctx; +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE( sub ) (void) rs_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * List of supported curves: + * - internal ID + * - TLS NamedCurve ID (RFC 4492 sec. 5.1.1, RFC 7071 sec. 2, RFC 8446 sec. 4.2.7) + * - size in bits + * - readable name + * + * Curves are listed in order: largest curves first, and for a given size, + * fastest curves first. This provides the default order for the SSL module. + * + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new curves! + */ +static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, 25, 521, "secp521r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, 28, 512, "brainpoolP512r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, 24, 384, "secp384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, 27, 384, "brainpoolP384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, 23, 256, "secp256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, 22, 256, "secp256k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, 26, 256, "brainpoolP256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, 21, 224, "secp224r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, 20, 224, "secp224k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, 19, 192, "secp192r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, 18, 192, "secp192k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, 29, 256, "x25519" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, 30, 448, "x448" }, +#endif + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define ECP_NB_CURVES sizeof( ecp_supported_curves ) / \ + sizeof( ecp_supported_curves[0] ) + +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_supported_grp_id[ECP_NB_CURVES]; + +/* + * List of supported curves and associated info + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( void ) +{ + return( ecp_supported_curves ); +} + +/* + * List of supported curves, group ID only + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list( void ) +{ + static int init_done = 0; + + if( ! init_done ) + { + size_t i = 0; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + ecp_supported_grp_id[i++] = curve_info->grp_id; + } + ecp_supported_grp_id[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + + init_done = 1; + } + + return( ecp_supported_grp_id ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info for the internal identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( curve_info->grp_id == grp_id ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the TLS identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( uint16_t tls_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( curve_info->tls_id == tls_id ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the name + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + if( name == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( strcmp( curve_info->name, name ) == 0 ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the type of a curve + */ +mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + if( grp->G.X.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE ); + + if( grp->G.Y.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ); +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_init( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( pt != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->X ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Y ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Z ); +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_init( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( grp != NULL ); + + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->A ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->B ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &grp->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->N ); + grp->pbits = 0; + grp->nbits = 0; + grp->h = 0; + grp->PrimeN = NULL; + grp->Table = NULL; +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( key != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &key->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &key->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &key->Q ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + if( pt == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->X ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Y ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Z ) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + if( grp == NULL ) + return; + + if( grp->h != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->B ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->N ); + } + + mbedtls_free( grp->PrimeN ); + mbedtls_free( grp->Table ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( grp, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_group ) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + if( key == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &key->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &key->Q ); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->X, &Q->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a group object + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( dst, src->id ) ); +} + +/* + * Set point to zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->X , 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Y , 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z , 0 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Tell if a point is zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare two points lazily + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &Q->X ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Import a non-zero point from ASCII strings + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, + const char *x, const char *y ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( x != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( y != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->X, radix, x ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->Y, radix, y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export a point into unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.3 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ); + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + (void) format; /* Montgomery curves always use the same point format */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + *olen = plen; + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &P->X, buf, plen ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + /* + * Common case: P == 0 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + if( buflen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x00; + *olen = 1; + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = 2 * plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x04; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + } + else if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x02 + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &P->Y, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + } + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + if( ilen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + if( plen != ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &pt->X, buf, plen ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &pt->Y ); + + if( grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + /* Set most significant bit to 0 as prescribed in RFC7748 §5 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &pt->X, plen * 8 - 1, 0 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + if( buf[0] == 0x00 ) + { + if( ilen == 1 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( pt ) ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( buf[0] != 0x04 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ilen != 2 * plen + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->Y, + buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import a point from a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + unsigned char data_len; + const unsigned char *buf_start; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + /* + * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data) + */ + if( buf_len < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + data_len = *(*buf)++; + if( data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len - 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Save buffer start for read_binary and update buf + */ + buf_start = *buf; + *buf += data_len; + + return( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, pt, buf_start, data_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Export a point as a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ); + + /* + * buffer length must be at least one, for our length byte + */ + if( blen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( grp, pt, format, + olen, buf + 1, blen - 1) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * write length to the first byte and update total length + */ + buf[0] = (unsigned char) *olen; + ++*olen; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set a group from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( &grp_id, buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, grp_id ) ); +} + +/* + * Read a group id from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) and convert it to + * mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + /* + * We expect at least three bytes (see below) + */ + if( len < 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled + */ + if( *(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + tls_id = *(*buf)++; + tls_id <<= 8; + tls_id |= *(*buf)++; + + if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + *grp = curve_info->grp_id; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Write the ECParameters record corresponding to a group (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp->id ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * We are going to write 3 bytes (see below) + */ + *olen = 3; + if( blen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* + * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve + */ + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( curve_info->tls_id, buf, 0 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Wrapper around fast quasi-modp functions, with fall-back to mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi. + * See the documentation of struct mbedtls_ecp_group. + * + * This function is in the critial loop for mbedtls_ecp_mul, so pay attention to perf. + */ +static int ecp_modp( mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + return( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); +} + +/* + * Fast mod-p functions expect their argument to be in the 0..p^2 range. + * + * In order to guarantee that, we need to ensure that operands of + * mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi are in the 0..p range. So, after each operation we will + * bring the result back to this range. + * + * The following macros are shortcuts for doing that. + */ + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, general case, to use after mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#define INC_MUL_COUNT mul_count++; +#else +#define INC_MUL_COUNT +#endif + +#define MOD_MUL( N ) \ + do \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_modp( &(N), grp ) ); \ + INC_MUL_COUNT \ + } while( 0 ) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_MUL( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi + * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0 + */ +#define MOD_SUB( N ) \ + while( (N).s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &(N), 0 ) != 0 ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) ) || \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) ) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_SUB( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int. + * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and + * a bit faster. + */ +#define MOD_ADD( N ) \ + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &(N), &grp->P ) >= 0 ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + size_t count ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( X, count ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static void ecp_normalize_swst( uint8_t s, uint8_t dst, uint8_t src ) +{ + MINV( 9, src + 2 ); + MSQR( 10, 9 ); + MMUL( dst, src, 10 ); + MMUL( dst + 1, src + 1, 10 ); + MMUL( dst + 1, dst + 1, 9 ); +} + +static void ecp_double_swst( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, uint8_t s, uint8_t dst, uint8_t src ) +{ + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if( grp->A.p == NULL ) + { + MSQR( 10, src + 2 ); + MADD( 11, src, 10 ); + MSUB( 12, src, 10 ); + MMUL( 10, 11, 12 ); + MMUL( 9, 10, 5 ); + MREM( 9, 9 ); + } + else + { + MSQR( 10, src ); + MMUL( 9, 10, 5 ); + MREM( 9, 9 ); + + /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &grp->A, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + MSQR( 10, src + 2 ); + MSQR( 11, 10 ); + MMUL( 10, 11, 8 ); + MADD( 9, 9, 10 ); + } + } + + MSQR( 11, src + 1 ); + MMUL( 11, 11, 4 ); + MMUL( 10, src, 11 ); + MMUL( 10, 10, 4 ); + + MSQR( 12, 11 ); + MMUL( 12, 12, 4 ); + + MSQR( 11, 9 ); + MSUB( 11, 11, 10 ); + MSUB( 11, 11, 10 ); + + MSUB( 10, 10, 11 ); + MMUL( 10, 10, 9 ); + MSUB( 10, 10, 12 ); + + MMUL( 12, src + 1, src + 2 ); + MMUL( 12, 12, 4 ); + + MOVE( dst, 11 ); + MOVE( dst + 1, 10 ); + MOVE( dst + 2, 12 ); +} + +static int ecp_add_mixed_swst( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, uint8_t s, uint8_t dst, uint8_t src1, uint8_t src2 ) +{ + uint8_t zero; + + MSQR( 9, src1 + 2 ); + MMUL( 10, 9, src1 + 2 ); + MMUL( 9, 9, src2 ); + MMUL( 10, 10, src2 + 1 ); + MSUB( 9, 9, src1 ); + MSUB( 10, 10, src1 + 1 ); + + LCMP( zero, 9, 3 ); + if( zero ) + { + LCMP( zero, 10, 3 ); + if( zero ) + { + ecp_double_swst( grp, s, dst, src1 ); + return 0; + } + else + { + return 1; + } + } + + MMUL( 15, src1 + 2, 9 ); + MSQR( 11, 9 ); + MMUL( 12, 11, 9 ); + MMUL( 11, 11, src1 ); + MOVE( 9, 11 ); + MMUL( 9, 9, 4 ); + MSQR( 13, 10 ); + MSUB( 13, 13, 9 ); + MSUB( 13, 13, 12 ); + MSUB( 11, 11, 13 ); + MMUL( 11, 11, 10 ); + MMUL( 12, 12, src1 + 1 ); + MSUB( 11, 11, 12 ); + + MOVE( dst, 13 ); + MOVE( dst + 1, 11 ); + MOVE( dst + 2, 15 ); + + return 0; +} + +static int ecp_normalize_many_swst( uint8_t s, uint8_t op_sz, uint8_t op_ws, void *T, void *TZ, uint8_t T_size ) +{ + int ret = 0; + void *c = NULL; + int i; + + if( ( c = mbedtls_calloc( T_size, op_sz ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + memcpy( c, TZ, op_sz ); + for( i = 1; i < T_size; ++i ) + { + REGW( 9, c + op_sz * (i - 1) ); + REGW( 10, TZ + op_sz * i ); + MMUL( 11, 9, 10 ); + REGR( 11, c + op_sz * i ); + } + + REGW( 10, c + op_sz * (T_size - 1) ); + MINV( 9, 10 ); + for( i = T_size - 1; ; i-- ) + { + if( i == 0 ) + { + MOVE( 10, 9 ); + } + else + { + REGW( 12, c + op_sz * (i - 1) ); + REGW( 13, TZ + op_sz * i ); + MMUL( 10, 9, 12 ); + MMUL( 9, 9, 13 ); + } + + MSQR( 11, 10 ); + REGW( 12, T + op_sz * 2 * i ); + REGW( 13, T + op_sz * 2 * i + op_sz ); + MMUL( 12, 12, 11 ); + MMUL( 13, 13, 11 ); + MMUL( 13, 13, 10 ); + REGR( 12, T + op_sz * 2 * i ); + REGR( 13, T + op_sz * 2 * i + op_sz ); + + if( i == 0 ) + break; + } +cleanup: + mbedtls_free( c ); + return ret; +} + +static int ecp_mul_swst( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = 0; + // w=5 is enough for 256, 384, 521 bit curves + const uint8_t w = 5; + size_t m_u32_len; + int8_t *m_encoding = NULL; + size_t encoding_len = 0; + void *T = NULL; + void *TZ = NULL; + size_t table_size; + mbedtls_mpi PrimeN; + void *tmp_buf = NULL; + uint8_t op_sz = 0, op_ws = 0; + uint8_t s = 0; // 0 is invalid reg size + uint8_t r2s; + int i; + uint8_t t_start_idx; + uint8_t p_eq_g, T_ok = 0; + uint8_t R_zero; + + (void)ecp_drbg_seed; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &PrimeN ); + m_u32_len = mpi_words(m); + table_size = 1 << (w - 2); + + i = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; // bytes + i = ( i + 3 ) / 4; // words + if( ( s = mpi_words_to_reg_size( i ) ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + op_ws = mpi_reg_size_to_words( s ); + op_sz = op_ws * 4; + + if( ( r2s = mpi_words_to_reg_size( op_ws * 2 + 1 ) ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( tmp_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, op_sz ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + if( ( m_encoding = mbedtls_calloc( 1, m_u32_len * 32 + 1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + if( mpi_scalar_encode( m->p, m_u32_len, w, m_encoding, &encoding_len ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( grp->PrimeN == NULL ) + { + if( ( grp->PrimeN = mbedtls_calloc( 1, op_sz ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_hensel_quad_mod_inv_prime_n( &PrimeN, &grp->P, op_sz * 8 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &PrimeN, grp->PrimeN, op_sz ) ); + } + + /* Is P the base point ? */ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 + p_eq_g = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &grp->G.Y ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &grp->G.X ) == 0 ); +#else + p_eq_g = 0; +#endif + + /* Pre-computed table: do we have it already for the base point? */ + if( p_eq_g && grp->Table != NULL ) + { + /* second pointer to the same table, will be deleted on exit */ + T = grp->Table; + T_ok = 1; + } + else + { + if( ( T = mbedtls_calloc( table_size, op_sz * 2 ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + if( ( TZ = mbedtls_calloc( table_size - 1, op_sz ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + Sec_Eng_PKA_Reset(); + Sec_Eng_PKA_BigEndian_Enable(); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &grp->P, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 0, tmp_buf ); + REGW( 1, grp->PrimeN ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_CREG( r2s, 2, mpi_reg_size_to_words( r2s ), 1 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Immediate( r2s, 2, 0x1, 1 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_LMUL2N( r2s, 2, r2s, 2, op_ws * 32 * 2, 0 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_MREM( s, 2, r2s, 2, s, 0, 1 ); +#define LOAD_C(r, v) \ + Sec_Eng_PKA_CREG( s, r, op_ws, 1 ); \ + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Immediate( s, r, v, 1 ); + + LOAD_C( 3, 1 ); + LOAD_C( 4, 2 ); + LOAD_C( 5, 3 ); + LOAD_C( 6, 4 ); + LOAD_C( 7, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &grp->A, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 8, tmp_buf ); + + for( i = 4; i <= 8; ++i ) + MMUL( i, i, 2 ); + + t_start_idx = 24; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 17, tmp_buf ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Y, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 18, tmp_buf ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Z, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 19, tmp_buf ); + MMUL( 17, 17, 2 ); + MMUL( 18, 18, 2 ); + MMUL( 19, 19, 2 ); + + if( !T_ok ) + { + REGR( 17, T ); + REGR( 18, T + op_sz ); + + ecp_double_swst( grp, s, 20, 17 ); + ecp_normalize_swst( s, t_start_idx, 20 ); + for( i = 1; i < table_size; ++i ) + { + size_t offset_x = op_sz * 2 * i; + size_t offset_y = offset_x + op_sz; + size_t offset_z = op_sz * (i - 1); + ecp_add_mixed_swst( grp, s, 17, 17, t_start_idx ); + REGR( 17, T + offset_x ); + REGR( 18, T + offset_y ); + REGR( 19, TZ + offset_z ); + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_many_swst( s, op_sz, op_ws, T + op_sz * 2, TZ, table_size - 1 ) ); + + if( p_eq_g ) + /* almost transfer ownership of T to the group, but keep a copy of + * the pointer to use for calling the next function more easily */ + grp->Table = T; + } + + R_zero = 1; + for( i = encoding_len - 1; i >= 0; --i ) + { + int8_t symbol = m_encoding[i]; + + if( !R_zero ) + { + ecp_double_swst( grp, s, 17, 17 ); + } + if( symbol != 0 ) + { + size_t index; + size_t offset_x, offset_y; + int neg = symbol < 0; + + if( neg ) + symbol = -symbol; + index = symbol / 2; + offset_x = index * 2 * op_sz; + offset_y = offset_x + op_sz; + REGW( 20, T + offset_x ); + REGW( 21, T + offset_y ); + if( neg ) + MSUB( 21, 0, 21 ); + if( !R_zero ) + { + ecp_add_mixed_swst( grp, s, 17, 17, 20 ); + } + else + { + R_zero = 0; + MOVE( 17, 20 ); + MOVE( 18, 21 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_CREG( s, 19, op_ws, 1 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Immediate( s, 19, 1, 1 ); + MMUL( 19, 19, 2 ); + } + } + } + ecp_normalize_swst( s, 17, 17 ); + MMUL( 17, 17, 3 ); + MMUL( 18, 18, 3 ); + REGR( 17, tmp_buf ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &R->X, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGR( 18, tmp_buf ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &R->Y, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + /* does T belong to the group? */ + if( T == grp->Table ) + T = NULL; + + mbedtls_free( T ); + mbedtls_free( TZ ); + mbedtls_free( tmp_buf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &PrimeN ); + mbedtls_free( m_encoding ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/* + * For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective + * coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is + * internaly represented as X / Z. + * + * For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder. + */ + +/* + * Multiplication with Montgomery ladder in x/z coordinates, + * for curves in Montgomery form + */ +static int ecp_mul_mont( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int i; + unsigned char b; + mbedtls_mpi rand; + mbedtls_mpi PrimeN; + void *tmp_buf = NULL; + uint8_t op_sz = 0, op_ws = 0; + uint8_t s = 0; // 0 is invalid reg size +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; + + ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + mbedtls_mpi_init( &rand ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &PrimeN ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &drbg_ctx, m, m_len ) ); + f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; + p_rng = &drbg_ctx; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + if( grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + op_sz = 32; + op_ws = 32 / 4; + s = SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_32; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + if( grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ) + { + op_sz = 64; + op_ws = 64 / 4; + s = SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_64; + } +#endif + if( ( tmp_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, op_sz ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( grp->PrimeN == NULL ) + { + if( ( grp->PrimeN = mbedtls_calloc( 1, op_sz ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_hensel_quad_mod_inv_prime_n( &PrimeN, &grp->P, op_sz * 8 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &PrimeN, grp->PrimeN, op_sz ) ); + } + + Sec_Eng_PKA_Reset(); + Sec_Eng_PKA_BigEndian_Enable(); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &grp->P, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 0, tmp_buf ); + REGW( 1, grp->PrimeN ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + if( grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + Sec_Eng_PKA_CREG( s, 2, op_ws, 1 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Immediate( s, 2, 0x5a4, 1 ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + if( grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ) + { + uint8_t *vu8 = tmp_buf; + memset( tmp_buf, 0, op_sz ); + vu8[ 63 - 16 ] = 0x02; + vu8[ 63 - 44 ] = 0x03; + REGW( 2, tmp_buf ); + } +#endif + + Sec_Eng_PKA_CREG( s, 3, op_ws, 1 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Write_Immediate( s, 3, 0x1, 1 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R->Y ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 4, tmp_buf ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Move_Data( s, 7, s, 4, 1 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Z, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 8, tmp_buf ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_CREG( s, 5, op_ws, 1 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Move_Data( s, 5, s, 3, 1 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_CREG( s, 6, op_ws, 1 ); + Sec_Eng_PKA_MREM( s, 7, s, 7, s, 0, 1 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &grp->A, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 9, tmp_buf ); + + for( i = 4; i <= 9; ++i ) + MMUL( i, i, 2 ); + + /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng != NULL ) +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &rand, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &rand, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 19, tmp_buf ); + MMUL( 19, 19, 2 ); + MMUL( 7, 7, 19 ); + MMUL( 8, 8, 19 ); + } + + /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */ + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( m ); /* one past the (zero-based) most significant bit */ + while( i-- > 0 ) + { + uint8_t ix, iz, jx, jz, px, pz, qx, qz; + b = mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, i ); + ix = 5; + jx = 7; + if( b ) + { + ix = 7; + jx = 5; + } + iz = ix + 1; jz = jx + 1; + px = ix; pz = px + 1; + qx = jx; qz = qx + 1; + MADD( 10, px, pz ); + MSQR( 11, 10 ); + MSUB( 12, px, pz ); + MSQR( 13, 12 ); + MSUB( 14, 11, 13 ); + MADD( 15, qx, qz ); + MSUB( 16, qx, qz ); + MMUL( 17, 16, 10 ); + MMUL( 18, 15, 12 ); + MADD( jx, 17, 18 ); + MSQR( jx, jx ); + MSUB( jz, 17, 18 ); + MSQR( jz, jz ); + MMUL( jz, jz, 4 ); + MMUL( ix, 11, 13 ); + MMUL( iz, 9, 14 ); + MADD( iz, iz, 13 ); + MMUL( iz, iz, 14 ); + MMUL( 20, iz, 3 ); + } + + /* + * Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng != NULL ) +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &rand, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &rand, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGW( 19, tmp_buf ); + MMUL( 19, 19, 2 ); + MMUL( 5, 5, 19 ); + MMUL( 6, 6, 19 ); + } + + MINV( 2, 6 ); + MMUL( 5, 5, 2 ); + MMUL( 5, 5, 3 ); + REGR( 5, tmp_buf ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &R->X, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + mbedtls_free( tmp_buf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &rand ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &PrimeN ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + */ +static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable_wo_lock( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 ) + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* skip argument check when restarting */ + if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL ) +#endif + { + /* check_privkey is free */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK ); + + /* Common sanity checks */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ); + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_mont( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_swst( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( is_grp_capable ) + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) + rs_ctx->depth--; +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret; + bl_sec_pka_mutex_take(); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable_wo_lock( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ); + bl_sec_pka_mutex_give(); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * Check that an affine point is valid as a public key, + * short weierstrass curves (SEC1 3.2.3.1) + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS; + + /* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Y, 0 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->X, &grp->P ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->Y, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &RHS ); + + /* + * YY = Y^2 + * RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X ) ); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if( grp->A.p == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &RHS, &RHS, 3 ) ); MOD_SUB( RHS ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &YY, &RHS ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &RHS ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 0, m == 1 and m == -1 + * NOT constant-time - ONLY for short Weierstrass! + */ +static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( R ) ); + } + else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + } + else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, -1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R->Y, 0 ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &R->Y, &grp->P, &R->Y ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable_wo_lock( grp, R, m, P, + NULL, NULL, rs_ctx ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable_impl( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pmP = &mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pR = R; + int i; + void *tmp_buf = NULL; + uint8_t op_sz = 0, op_ws = 0; + uint8_t s = 0; // 0 is invalid reg size + int zero; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) != MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + i = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8; // bytes + i = ( i + 3 ) / 4; // words + if( ( s = mpi_words_to_reg_size( i ) ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + op_ws = mpi_reg_size_to_words( s ); + op_sz = op_ws * 4; + + if( ( tmp_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, op_sz ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &mP ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, pmP, m, P, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, pR, n, Q, NULL ) ); + +#define LOAD_COORDINATE_X(x, reg) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( x, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); \ + REGW( reg, tmp_buf ); \ + MMUL( reg, reg, 2 ); + + LOAD_COORDINATE_X( &pmP->X, 17 ); + LOAD_COORDINATE_X( &pmP->Y, 18 ); + LOAD_COORDINATE_X( &pmP->Z, 19 ); + + LOAD_COORDINATE_X( &pR->X, 20 ); + LOAD_COORDINATE_X( &pR->Y, 21 ); + + zero = ecp_add_mixed_swst( grp, s, 17, 17, 20 ); + if( !zero ) + { + ecp_normalize_swst( s, 17, 17 ); + MMUL( 17, 17, 3 ); + MMUL( 18, 18, 3 ); + + REGR( 17, tmp_buf ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pR->X, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + REGR( 18, tmp_buf ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pR->Y, tmp_buf, op_sz ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pR->Z, 1 ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( pR ) ); + } + + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free( tmp_buf ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &mP ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret; + bl_sec_pka_mutex_take(); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable_impl( grp, R, m, P, n, Q ); + bl_sec_pka_mutex_give(); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)} +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) +/* + * Constants for the two points other than 0, 1, -1 (mod p) in + * https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate + * See ecp_check_pubkey_x25519(). + */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_1[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x56, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32, 0xb1, 0xfd ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_2[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5f, 0x9c, 0x95, 0xbc, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xb1, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x83, 0xef, 0x5b ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x44, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0x58, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xd8, 0x22, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x11, 0x57 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_1 ); +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_2 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that the input point is not one of the low-order points. + * This is recommended by the "May the Fourth" paper: + * https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806.pdf + * Those points are never sent by an honest peer. + */ +static int ecp_check_bad_points_mx( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi XmP; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &XmP ); + + /* Reduce X mod P so that we only need to check values less than P. + * We know X < 2^256 so we can proceed by subtraction. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &XmP, X ) ); + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, P ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &XmP, &XmP, P ) ); + + /* Check against the known bad values that are less than P. For Curve448 + * these are 0, 1 and -1. For Curve25519 we check the values less than P + * from the following list: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XmP, 1 ) <= 0 ) /* takes care of 0 and 1 */ + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + } +#else + (void) grp_id; +#endif + + /* Final check: check if XmP + 1 is P (final because it changes XmP!) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &XmP, &XmP, 1 ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, P ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &XmP ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check validity of a public key for Montgomery curves with x-only schemes + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + /* [Curve25519 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */ + /* Allow any public value, if it's too big then we'll just reduce it mod p + * (RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 3). */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &pt->X ) > ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + /* Implicit in all standards (as they don't consider negative numbers): + * X must be non-negative. This is normally ensured by the way it's + * encoded for transmission, but let's be extra sure. */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + return( ecp_check_bad_points_mx( &pt->X, &grp->P, grp->id ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that a point is valid as a public key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + /* Must use affine coordinates */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return( ecp_check_pubkey_mx( grp, pt ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( ecp_check_pubkey_sw( grp, pt ) ); +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Check that an mbedtls_mpi is valid as a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 0 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 1 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) - 1 != grp->nbits ) /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + /* see [Curve25519] page 5 */ + if( grp->nbits == 254 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 2 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + /* see SEC1 3.2 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + else + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t high_bit, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + size_t n_random_bytes = high_bit / 8 + 1; + + /* [Curve25519] page 5 */ + /* Generate a (high_bit+1)-bit random number by generating just enough + * random bytes, then shifting out extra bits from the top (necessary + * when (high_bit+1) is not a multiple of 8). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_random_bytes, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_random_bytes - high_bit - 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, high_bit, 1 ) ); + + /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for + Curve25519 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) ); + if( high_bit == 254 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( + const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_random( d, 1, N, f_rng, p_rng ); + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + default: + return( ret ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Generate a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( &grp->N, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Generate a keypair with configurable base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate key pair, wrapper for conventional base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( grp, &grp->G, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Generate a keypair, prettier wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32 +/* + * Read a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_read_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* + * If it is Curve25519 curve then mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 + */ + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen != ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + /* Set the three least significant bits to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 1, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 2, 0 ) ); + + /* Set the most significant bit to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 0 ) + ); + + /* Set the second most significant bit to 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 2, 1 ) + ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &key->grp, &key->d ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Write a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + if( key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen < ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + + +/* + * Check a public-private key pair + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + + if( pub->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || + pub->grp.id != prv->grp.id || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + + /* mbedtls_ecp_mul() needs a non-const group... */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &grp, &prv->grp ); + + /* Also checks d is valid */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve. + * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents + * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */ +static int self_test_adjust_exponent( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *m ) +{ + int ret = 0; + switch( grp->id ) + { + /* If Curve25519 is available, then that's what we use for the + * Montgomery test, so we don't need the adjustment code. */ +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + /* Move highest bit from 254 to N-1. Setting bit N-1 is + * necessary to enforce the highest-bit-set constraint. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, 254, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits, 1 ) ); + /* Copy second-highest bit from 253 to N-2. This is not + * necessary but improves the test variety a bit. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits - 1, + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 253 ) ) ); + break; +#endif +#endif /* ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) */ + default: + /* Non-Montgomery curves and Curve25519 need no adjustment. */ + (void) grp; + (void) m; + goto cleanup; + } +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* Calculate R = m.P for each m in exponents. Check that the number of + * basic operations doesn't depend on the value of m. */ +static int self_test_point( int verbose, + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const char *const *exponents, + size_t n_exponents ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i = 0; + unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) ); + + for( i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++ ) + { + add_c_prev = add_count; + dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; + mul_c_prev = mul_count; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) ); + + if( add_count != add_c_prev || + dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || + mul_count != mul_c_prev ) + { + ret = 1; + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + if( verbose != 0 ) + { + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i ); + else + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; + mbedtls_mpi m; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Exponents especially adapted for secp192k1, which has the lowest + * order n of all supported curves (secp192r1 is in a slightly larger + * field but the order of its base point is slightly smaller). */ + const char *sw_exponents[] = + { + "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8C", /* n - 1 */ + "5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */ + "400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */ + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */ + "555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */ + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + const char *m_exponents[] = + { + /* Valid private values for Curve25519. In a build with Curve448 + * but not Curve25519, they will be adjusted in + * self_test_adjust_exponent(). */ + "4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "5C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C30", + "5715ECCE24583F7A7023C24164390586842E816D7280A49EF6DF4EAE6B280BF8", + "41A2B017516F6D254E1F002BCCBADD54BE30F8CEC737A0E912B4963B6BA74460", + "5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555550", + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8", + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &m ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ) ); +#else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id ) ); +#endif + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " ); + /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " ); + /* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */ + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &P, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count): " ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ) ); +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED is defined, but no curve is supported for self-test" +#endif + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + m_exponents, + sizeof( m_exponents ) / sizeof( m_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +cleanup: + + if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &m ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/ecp_curves_alt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/ecp_curves_alt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2b9c9f09 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/ecp_curves_alt.c @@ -0,0 +1,1492 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" + +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECP_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)} + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) + +/* + * Note: the constants are in little-endian order + * to be directly usable in MPIs + */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp192r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp224r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp256r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp384r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp521r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x51, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xC6, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x18, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x03, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x05, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x07, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +/* + * Create an MPI from embedded constants + * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof mbedtls_mpi_uint) + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_load( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len ) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = len / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; +} + +/* + * Set an MPI to static value 1 + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_set1( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint one[] = { 1 }; + X->s = 1; + X->n = 1; + X->p = one; +} + +/* + * Make group available from embedded constants + */ +static int ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen) +{ + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->P, p, plen ); + if( a != NULL ) + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->A, a, alen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->B, b, blen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->N, n, nlen ); + + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.X, gx, gxlen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.Y, gy, gylen ); + ecp_mpi_set1( &grp->G.Z ); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); + + grp->h = 1; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) && MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL +/* Forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif + +#define NIST_MODP( P ) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P; +#else +#define NIST_MODP( P ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM && MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL */ + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL +/* Additional forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +#define LOAD_GROUP_A( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ + G ## _a, sizeof( G ## _a ), \ + G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ + G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) ) + +#define LOAD_GROUP( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ + NULL, 0, \ + G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ + G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) ) +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42; +static const unsigned char curve25519_part_of_n[] = { + 0x14, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0xA2, 0xF7, 0x9C, 0xD6, + 0x58, 0x12, 0x63, 0x1A, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xED, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve25519( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->A, curve25519_a24 ) ); + + /* P = 2^255 - 19 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 255 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 19 ) ); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + /* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->N, + curve25519_part_of_n, sizeof( curve25519_part_of_n ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 252, 1 ) ); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 9 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 254; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA; +static const unsigned char curve448_part_of_n[] = { + 0x83, 0x35, 0xDC, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0x24, + 0xB6, 0x51, 0x29, 0xC9, 0x6F, 0xDE, 0x93, + 0x3D, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x70, 0xAA, 0xDC, + 0x87, 0x3D, 0x6D, 0x54, 0xA7, 0xBB, 0x0D, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve448( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi Ns; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Ns ); + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->A, curve448_a24 ) ); + + /* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 5 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); + + /* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 446, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Ns, + curve448_part_of_n, sizeof( curve448_part_of_n ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &grp->N, &grp->N, &Ns ) ); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 447; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Ns ); + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Set a group using well-known domain parameters + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( grp ); + + grp->id = id; + + switch( id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + NIST_MODP( p192 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp192r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + NIST_MODP( p224 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp224r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + NIST_MODP( p256 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp256r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + NIST_MODP( p384 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp384r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + NIST_MODP( p521 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp521r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1; +#endif + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp192k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1; +#endif + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp224k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1; +#endif + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp256k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP256r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP384r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP512r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255; +#endif + return( ecp_use_curve25519( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448; +#endif + return( ecp_use_curve448( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + + default: + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +} + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* + * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves. + * + * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct + * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our + * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and + * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and + * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2, + * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left, + * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk. + * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros, + * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach. + * + * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits. + * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can + * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it. + */ + +/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */ +static inline void add64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) +{ + unsigned char i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++, src++ ) + { + *dst += c; c = ( *dst < c ); + *dst += *src; c += ( *dst < *src ); + } + *carry += c; +} + +/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */ +static inline void carry64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) +{ + unsigned char i; + for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++ ) + { + *dst += *carry; + *carry = ( *dst < *carry ); + } +} + +#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) +#define A( i ) N->p + (i) * WIDTH +#define ADD( i ) add64( p, A( i ), &c ) +#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64( p, &c ) +#define LAST p += WIDTH; *p = c; while( ++p < end ) *p = 0 + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; + + /* Make sure we have enough blocks so that A(5) is legal */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, 6 * WIDTH ) ); + + p = N->p; + end = p + N->n; + + ADD( 3 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5 + ADD( 3 ); ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5 + ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); LAST; // A2 += A4 + A5 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#undef WIDTH +#undef A +#undef ADD +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same + * general structure is used here, but with additional complications: + * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions. + */ + +/* + * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits. + * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI, + * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192. + * + * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks, + * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done. + * + * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks. + */ +#define LOAD32 cur = A( i ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n +#define A( j ) N->p[j] +#define STORE32 N->p[i] = cur; + +#else /* 64-bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n * 2 +#define A( j ) (j) % 2 ? (uint32_t)( N->p[(j)/2] >> 32 ) : \ + (uint32_t)( N->p[(j)/2] ) +#define STORE32 \ + if( i % 2 ) { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + N->p[i/2] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur) << 32; \ + } else { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + N->p[i/2] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; \ + } + +#endif /* sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) */ + +/* + * Helpers for addition and subtraction of chunks, with signed carry. + */ +static inline void add32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) +{ + *dst += src; + *carry += ( *dst < src ); +} + +static inline void sub32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) +{ + *carry -= ( *dst < src ); + *dst -= src; +} + +#define ADD( j ) add32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); +#define SUB( j ) sub32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ + +/* + * Helpers for the main 'loop' + */ +#define INIT( b ) \ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; \ + signed char c = 0, cc; \ + uint32_t cur; \ + size_t i = 0, bits = (b); \ + /* N is the size of the product of two b-bit numbers, plus one */ \ + /* limb for fix_negative */ \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, ( b ) * 2 / biL + 1 ) ); \ + LOAD32; + +#define NEXT \ + STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \ + cc = c; c = 0; \ + if( cc < 0 ) \ + sub32( &cur, -cc, &c ); \ + else \ + add32( &cur, cc, &c ); \ + +#define LAST \ + STORE32; i++; \ + cur = c > 0 ? c : 0; STORE32; \ + cur = 0; while( ++i < MAX32 ) { STORE32; } \ + if( c < 0 ) mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( N, c, bits ); + +/* + * If the result is negative, we get it in the form + * c * 2^bits + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits' + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Set N := 2^bits - 1 - N. We know that 0 <= N < 2^bits, so + * set the absolute value to 0xfff...fff - N. There is no carry + * since we're subtracting from all-bits-one. */ + for( i = 0; i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++ ) + { + N->p[i] = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint)0 - N->p[i]; + } + /* Add 1, taking care of the carry. */ + i = 0; + do + ++N->p[i]; + while( N->p[i++] == 0 && i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + /* Invert the sign. + * Now N = N0 - 2^bits where N0 is the initial value of N. */ + N->s = -1; + + /* Add |c| * 2^bits to the absolute value. Since c and N are + * negative, this adds c * 2^bits. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint msw = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + if( bits == 224 ) + msw <<= 32; +#endif + N->p[bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint)] += msw; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 224 ); + + SUB( 7 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11 + SUB( 8 ); SUB( 12 ); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12 + SUB( 9 ); SUB( 13 ); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13 + SUB( 10 ); ADD( 7 ); ADD( 11 ); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11 + SUB( 11 ); ADD( 8 ); ADD( 12 ); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12 + SUB( 12 ); ADD( 9 ); ADD( 13 ); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13 + SUB( 13 ); ADD( 10 ); LAST; // A6 += -A13 + A10 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 256 ); + + ADD( 8 ); ADD( 9 ); + SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD( 9 ); ADD( 10 ); + SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD( 10 ); ADD( 11 ); + SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 11 ); ADD( 11 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); + SUB( 15 ); SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); + SUB( 9 ); SUB( 10 ); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); + SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); + SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 8 ); + SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); LAST; // A7 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 384 ); + + ADD( 12 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 20 ); + SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD( 13 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 12 ); SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 14 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 13 ); SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 15 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 21 ); + SUB( 14 ); SUB( 22 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD( 21 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 22 ); + SUB( 15 ); SUB( 23 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD( 22 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 16 ); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD( 23 ); ADD( 23 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 22 ); + SUB( 17 ); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD( 19 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 18 ); NEXT; // A7 + + ADD( 20 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 16 ); + SUB( 19 ); NEXT; // A8 + + ADD( 21 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 17 ); + SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A9 + + ADD( 22 ); ADD( 19 ); ADD( 18 ); + SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A10 + + ADD( 23 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 19 ); + SUB( 22 ); LAST; // A11 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#undef A +#undef LOAD32 +#undef STORE32 +#undef MAX32 +#undef INIT +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Here we have an actual Mersenne prime, so things are more straightforward. + * However, chunks are aligned on a 'weird' boundary (521 bits). + */ + +/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_WIDTH ( 521 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) + +/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_MASK 0x01FF + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + * Write N as A1 + 2^521 A0, return A0 + A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P521_WIDTH + 1]; + /* Worst case for the size of M is when mbedtls_mpi_uint is 16 bits: + * we need to hold bits 513 to 1056, which is 34 limbs, that is + * P521_WIDTH + 1. Otherwise P521_WIDTH is enough. */ + + if( N->n < P521_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P521_WIDTH - 1 ); + if( M.n > P521_WIDTH + 1 ) + M.n = P521_WIDTH + 1; + M.p = Mp; + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P521_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 521 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); + + /* N = A0 */ + N->p[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK; + for( i = P521_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#undef P521_WIDTH +#undef P521_MASK +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P255_WIDTH ( 255 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * Write N as A0 + 2^255 A1, return A0 + 19 * A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH + 2]; + + if( N->n < P255_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P255_WIDTH - 1 ); + if( M.n > P255_WIDTH + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + M.p = Mp; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P255_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 255 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); + M.n++; /* Make room for multiplication by 19 */ + + /* N = A0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( N, 255, 0 ) ); + for( i = P255_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + 19 * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &M, 19 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P448_WIDTH ( 448 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) + +/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ +#define DIV_ROUND_UP( X, Y ) ( ( ( X ) + ( Y ) - 1 ) / ( Y ) ) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN ( 28 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP( 28, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) +#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ( ( P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 ) - 224 ) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write N as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return + * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference + * implementation of Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather + * than a generic bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on + * 32-bit machines by splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the + * arithmetic using the limbs directly as we do for the NIST primes above, + * but for 64-bit targets it should use half the number of operations if we do + * the reduction with 224-bit limbs, since mpi_add_mpi will then use 64-bit adds. + */ +static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, Q; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P448_WIDTH + 1], Qp[P448_WIDTH]; + + if( N->n <= P448_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P448_WIDTH ); + if( M.n > P448_WIDTH ) + /* Shouldn't be called with N larger than 2^896! */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + M.p = Mp; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof( Mp ) ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P448_WIDTH, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + + /* N = A0 */ + for( i = P448_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N += A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); + + /* Q = B1, N += B1 */ + Q = M; + Q.p = Qp; + memcpy( Qp, Mp, sizeof( Qp ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Q, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &Q ) ); + + /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224, N += M */ + if( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) > 4 ) + Mp[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1 ) >> ( P224_UNUSED_BITS ); + for( i = P224_WIDTH_MAX; i < M.n; ++i ) + Mp[i] = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &M, &M, &Q ) ); + M.n = P448_WIDTH + 1; /* Make room for shifted carry bit from the addition */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &M, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R, + * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves. + * + * Write N as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1. + * Actually do two passes, since R is big. + */ +#define P_KOBLITZ_MAX ( 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Max limbs in P +#define P_KOBLITZ_R ( 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Limbs in R +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz( mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, + size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, R; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P_KOBLITZ_MAX + P_KOBLITZ_R + 1]; + + if( N->n < p_limbs ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Init R */ + R.s = 1; + R.p = Rp; + R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R; + + /* Common setup for M */ + M.s = 1; + M.p = Mp; + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); + if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) + M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + if( shift != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if( mask != 0 ) + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + + /* Second pass */ + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); + if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) + M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + if( shift != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if( mask != 0 ) + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x0100001119 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 192 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 4, 1, 32, 0xFFFFFFFF ) ); +#else + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 224 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT_KEEP_ORIGINAL */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/hw_common.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/hw_common.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..62e082dc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/hw_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +#include "hw_common.h" + +#include +#include + +int mpi_words_to_reg_size(size_t words) +{ + size_t bytes = words * 4; + if (bytes <= 8) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_8; + else if (bytes <= 16) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_16; + else if (bytes <= 32) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_32; + else if (bytes <= 64) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_64; + else if (bytes <= 96) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_96; + else if (bytes <= 128) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_128; + else if (bytes <= 192) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_192; + else if (bytes <= 256) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_256; + else if (bytes <= 384) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_384; + else if (bytes <= 512) return SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_512; + else return 0; // too large +} + +size_t mpi_reg_size_to_words(int reg_size) +{ + if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_8) return 8 / 4; + else if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_16) return 16 / 4; + else if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_32) return 32 / 4; + else if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_64) return 64 / 4; + else if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_96) return 96 / 4; + else if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_128) return 128 / 4; + else if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_192) return 192 / 4; + else if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_256) return 256 / 4; + else if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_384) return 384 / 4; + else if (reg_size == SEC_ENG_PKA_REG_SIZE_512) return 512 / 4; + else return 0; +} + +#if MBEDTLS_HW_ACC_DBG +void dump_pka_reg(const char *tag, int s, uint8_t reg) +{ + mbedtls_mpi num; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&num); + static uint32_t tmp_buf[512/4]; + printf("reg %s:\r\n", tag); + size_t words = mpi_reg_size_to_words(s); + memset(tmp_buf, 0, sizeof(tmp_buf)); + Sec_Eng_PKA_Read_Data(s, reg, (void *)tmp_buf, words); + if (mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&num, (uint8_t *)tmp_buf, words * 4)) { + printf("\r\n"); + return; + } + dump_mpi(NULL, &num); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&num); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/hw_common.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/hw_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2ef92d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/hw_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#pragma once + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_HW_ACC_DBG 1 + + +#define HW_MAX(x, y) ((x) > (y) ? (x) : (y)) + +#define HW_PORTED + +#include + +#ifdef BL602 +#include +#elif defined BL616 +#include +#elif defined BL702 +#include +#elif defined BL808 +#include +#else +#error "Chip is not ported!" +#undef HW_PORTED +#endif + +int mpi_words_to_reg_size(size_t words); +size_t mpi_reg_size_to_words(int reg_size); +#if MBEDTLS_HW_ACC_DBG +void dump_pka_reg(const char *tag, int s, uint8_t reg); +#else +#define dump_pka_reg(...) do {} while (0) +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/sha1_alt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/sha1_alt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..53ba5679 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/sha1_alt.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + +#define SHA1_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha1_context *src ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + bl_sha_clone( (bl_sha_ctx_t *)dst, (bl_sha_ctx_t *)src ); +} + +/* + * SHA-1 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + return bl_sha_init( (bl_sha_ctx_t *)ctx, BL_SHA1 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret; + bl_sha_mutex_take(); + ret = bl_sha_update( (bl_sha_ctx_t *)ctx, input, ilen ); + bl_sha_mutex_give(); + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret; + bl_sha_mutex_take(); + ret = bl_sha_finish( (bl_sha_ctx_t *)ctx, output ); + bl_sha_mutex_give(); + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/sha256_alt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/sha256_alt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1f2a238 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/sha256_alt.c @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define SHA256_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA256_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha256_free( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha256_context *src ) +{ + SHA256_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + bl_sha_clone( (bl_sha_ctx_t *)dst, (bl_sha_ctx_t *)src ); +} + +/* + * SHA-256 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ) +{ + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); + return bl_sha_init( (bl_sha_ctx_t *)ctx, is224 ? BL_SHA224 : BL_SHA256 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + int is224 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx, is224 ); +} +#endif + +int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret; + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + bl_sha_mutex_take(); + ret = bl_sha_update( (bl_sha_ctx_t *)ctx, input, ilen ); + bl_sha_mutex_give(); + + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * SHA-256 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + bl_sha_mutex_take(); + ret = bl_sha_finish( (bl_sha_ctx_t *)ctx, output ); + bl_sha_mutex_give(); + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/sha512_alt.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/sha512_alt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f5ea170 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_acc/sha512_alt.c @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__WATCOMC__) + #define UL64(x) x##ui64 +#else + #define UL64(x) x##ULL +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define SHA512_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA512_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha512_free( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha512_context *src ) +{ + SHA512_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + bl_sha512_clone( (bl_sha512_ctx_t *)dst, (bl_sha512_ctx_t *)src ); +} + +/* + * SHA-512 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) +{ + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); +#else + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); +#endif + + return bl_sha512_init( (bl_sha512_ctx_t *)ctx, is384 ? BL_SHA384 : BL_SHA512 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + int is384 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx, is384 ); +} +#endif + +/* + * SHA-512 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret; + + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + bl_sha_mutex_take(); + ret = bl_sha512_update( (bl_sha512_ctx_t *)ctx, input, ilen ); + bl_sha_mutex_give(); + + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * SHA-512 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ) +{ + int ret; + + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + bl_sha_mutex_take(); + ret = bl_sha512_finish( (bl_sha512_ctx_t *)ctx, output ); + bl_sha_mutex_give(); + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_entropy_poll.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_entropy_poll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..777d0d3f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/hw_entropy_poll.c @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +#include "common.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) +int mbedtls_hardware_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + bflb_trng_readlen( output, len ); + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/mbedtls_port_bignum.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/mbedtls_port_bignum.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7c1d377e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/mbedtls_port_bignum.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PORT_BIGNUM_H_ERFVHYLQ +#define MBEDTLS_PORT_BIGNUM_H_ERFVHYLQ + +#include + +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_original( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *_RR ); + +int bl_mpi_exp_mod_wo_lock(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *_RN); +int bl_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *_RN); + +#endif /* end of include guard: MBEDTLS_PORT_BIGNUM_H_ERFVHYLQ */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/net_sockets.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/net_sockets.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a370864 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/net_sockets.c @@ -0,0 +1,745 @@ +/* + * TCP/IP or UDP/IP networking functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must + * be set before config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. + * Harmless on other platforms. */ +#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif +#ifndef _XOPEN_SOURCE +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 /* sockaddr_storage */ +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + +#if 0 // ORIGINAL +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in config.h" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + +#define IS_EINTR( ret ) ( ( ret ) == WSAEINTR ) + +#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) +/* Enables getaddrinfo() & Co */ +#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501 +#endif + +#include + +#include +#include +#if (_WIN32_WINNT < 0x0501) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if defined(_WIN32_WCE) +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2.lib" ) +#else +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2_32.lib" ) +#endif +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ + +#define read(fd,buf,len) recv( fd, (char*)( buf ), (int)( len ), 0 ) +#define write(fd,buf,len) send( fd, (char*)( buf ), (int)( len ), 0 ) +#define close(fd) closesocket(fd) + +static int wsa_init_done = 0; + +#else /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +#if 0 // ORIGINAL +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#else // PORT +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#define IS_EINTR( ret ) ( ( ret ) == EINTR ) + +#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* Some MS functions want int and MSVC warns if we pass size_t, + * but the standard functions use socklen_t, so cast only for MSVC */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#define MSVC_INT_CAST (int) +#else +#define MSVC_INT_CAST +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include +#endif + +#include + +/* + * Prepare for using the sockets interface + */ +static int net_prepare( void ) +{ +#if 0 // ORIGINAL +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + WSADATA wsaData; + + if( wsa_init_done == 0 ) + { + if( WSAStartup( MAKEWORD(2,0), &wsaData ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED ); + + wsa_init_done = 1; + } +#else +#if !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + signal( SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN ); +#endif +#endif +#endif + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Return 0 if the file descriptor is valid, an error otherwise. + * If for_select != 0, check whether the file descriptor is within the range + * allowed for fd_set used for the FD_xxx macros and the select() function. + */ +static int check_fd( int fd, int for_select ) +{ + if( fd < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + (void) for_select; +#else + /* A limitation of select() is that it only works with file descriptors + * that are strictly less than FD_SETSIZE. This is a limitation of the + * fd_set type. Error out early, because attempting to call FD_SET on a + * large file descriptor is a buffer overflow on typical platforms. */ + if( for_select && fd >= FD_SETSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED ); +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a context + */ +void mbedtls_net_init( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +/* + * Initiate a TCP connection with host:port and the given protocol + */ +int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, + const char *port, int proto ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; + + if( ( ret = net_prepare() ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Do name resolution with both IPv6 and IPv4 */ + memset( &hints, 0, sizeof( hints ) ); + hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + + if( getaddrinfo( host, port, &hints, &addr_list ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST ); + + /* Try the sockaddrs until a connection succeeds */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + for( cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next ) + { + ctx->fd = (int) socket( cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype, + cur->ai_protocol ); + if( ctx->fd < 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + if( connect( ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen ) == 0 ) + { + ret = 0; + break; + } + + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED; + } + + freeaddrinfo( addr_list ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Create a listening socket on bind_ip:port + */ +int mbedtls_net_bind( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *port, int proto ) +{ + int n, ret; + struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; + + if( ( ret = net_prepare() ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Bind to IPv6 and/or IPv4, but only in the desired protocol */ + memset( &hints, 0, sizeof( hints ) ); + hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + if( bind_ip == NULL ) + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + + if( getaddrinfo( bind_ip, port, &hints, &addr_list ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST ); + + /* Try the sockaddrs until a binding succeeds */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + for( cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next ) + { + ctx->fd = (int) socket( cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype, + cur->ai_protocol ); + if( ctx->fd < 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + n = 1; + if( setsockopt( ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (const char *) &n, sizeof( n ) ) != 0 ) + { + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + if( bind( ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen ) != 0 ) + { + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED; + continue; + } + + /* Listen only makes sense for TCP */ + if( proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) + { + if( listen( ctx->fd, MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG ) != 0 ) + { + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED; + continue; + } + } + + /* Bind was successful */ + ret = 0; + break; + } + + freeaddrinfo( addr_list ); + + return( ret ); + +} + +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) +/* + * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket + * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value. + */ +static int net_would_block( const mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + return( WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK ); +} +#else +/* + * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket + * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value. + * + * Note: on a blocking socket this function always returns 0! + */ +static int net_would_block( const mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + int err = errno; + + /* + * Never return 'WOULD BLOCK' on a blocking socket + */ +#if 0 // ORIGINAL + if( ( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) & O_NONBLOCK ) != O_NONBLOCK ) +#else // PORT + if( ( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL, 0 ) & O_NONBLOCK ) != O_NONBLOCK ) +#endif + { + errno = err; + return( 0 ); + } + + switch( errno = err ) + { +#if defined EAGAIN + case EAGAIN: +#endif +#if defined EWOULDBLOCK && EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN + case EWOULDBLOCK: +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Accept a connection from a remote client + */ +int mbedtls_net_accept( mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, + mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int type; + + struct sockaddr_storage client_addr; + +#if defined(__socklen_t_defined) || defined(_SOCKLEN_T) || \ + defined(_SOCKLEN_T_DECLARED) || defined(__DEFINED_socklen_t) || \ + defined(socklen_t) || (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L) + socklen_t n = (socklen_t) sizeof( client_addr ); + socklen_t type_len = (socklen_t) sizeof( type ); +#else +#if 0 // ORIGINAL + int n = (int) sizeof( client_addr ); + int type_len = (int) sizeof( type ); +#else // PORT + socklen_t n = (socklen_t) sizeof( client_addr ); + socklen_t type_len = (socklen_t) sizeof( type ); +#endif +#endif + + /* Is this a TCP or UDP socket? */ + if( getsockopt( bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE, + (void *) &type, &type_len ) != 0 || + ( type != SOCK_STREAM && type != SOCK_DGRAM ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ); + } + + if( type == SOCK_STREAM ) + { + /* TCP: actual accept() */ + ret = client_ctx->fd = (int) accept( bind_ctx->fd, + (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n ); + } + else + { + /* UDP: wait for a message, but keep it in the queue */ + char buf[1] = { 0 }; + + ret = (int) recvfrom( bind_ctx->fd, buf, sizeof( buf ), MSG_PEEK, + (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + if( ret == SOCKET_ERROR && + WSAGetLastError() == WSAEMSGSIZE ) + { + /* We know buf is too small, thanks, just peeking here */ + ret = 0; + } +#endif + } + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + if( net_would_block( bind_ctx ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ); + } + + /* UDP: hijack the listening socket to communicate with the client, + * then bind a new socket to accept new connections */ + if( type != SOCK_STREAM ) + { + struct sockaddr_storage local_addr; + int one = 1; + + if( connect( bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, n ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ); + + client_ctx->fd = bind_ctx->fd; + bind_ctx->fd = -1; /* In case we exit early */ + + n = sizeof( struct sockaddr_storage ); + if( getsockname( client_ctx->fd, + (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, &n ) != 0 || + ( bind_ctx->fd = (int) socket( local_addr.ss_family, + SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP ) ) < 0 || + setsockopt( bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (const char *) &one, sizeof( one ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED ); + } + + if( bind( bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, n ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED ); + } + } + + if( client_ip != NULL ) + { + if( client_addr.ss_family == AF_INET ) + { + struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &client_addr; + *ip_len = sizeof( addr4->sin_addr.s_addr ); + + if( buf_size < *ip_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *ip_len ); + } +#if LWIP_IPV6 // PORT + else + { + struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &client_addr; + *ip_len = sizeof( addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr ); + + if( buf_size < *ip_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *ip_len); + } +#endif + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set the socket blocking or non-blocking + */ +int mbedtls_net_set_block( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + u_long n = 0; + return( ioctlsocket( ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n ) ); +#else +#if 0 // ORIGINAL + return( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) & ~O_NONBLOCK ) ); +#else // PORT + return( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL, 0 ) & ~O_NONBLOCK ) ); +#endif +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + u_long n = 1; + return( ioctlsocket( ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n ) ); +#else +#if 0 // ORIGINAL + return( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) | O_NONBLOCK ) ); +#else // PORT + return( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL, 0 ) | O_NONBLOCK ) ); +#endif +#endif +} + +/* + * Check if data is available on the socket + */ + +int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct timeval tv; + + fd_set read_fds; + fd_set write_fds; + + int fd = ctx->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) + /* Ensure that memory sanitizers consider read_fds and write_fds as + * initialized even on platforms such as Glibc/x86_64 where FD_ZERO + * is implemented in assembly. */ + memset( &read_fds, 0, sizeof( read_fds ) ); + memset( &write_fds, 0, sizeof( write_fds ) ); +#endif +#endif + + FD_ZERO( &read_fds ); + if( rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ ) + { + rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ; + FD_SET( fd, &read_fds ); + } + + FD_ZERO( &write_fds ); + if( rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE ) + { + rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE; + FD_SET( fd, &write_fds ); + } + + if( rw != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = ( timeout % 1000 ) * 1000; + + do + { + ret = select( fd + 1, &read_fds, &write_fds, NULL, + timeout == (uint32_t) -1 ? NULL : &tv ); + } + while( IS_EINTR( ret ) ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED ); + + ret = 0; + if( FD_ISSET( fd, &read_fds ) ) + ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ; + if( FD_ISSET( fd, &write_fds ) ) + ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE; + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Portable usleep helper + */ +void mbedtls_net_usleep( unsigned long usec ) +{ +#if defined(_WIN32) + Sleep( ( usec + 999 ) / 1000 ); +#else + struct timeval tv; + tv.tv_sec = usec / 1000000; +#if defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \ + ( defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__) ) + tv.tv_usec = (suseconds_t) usec % 1000000; +#else + tv.tv_usec = usec % 1000000; +#endif + select( 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Read at most 'len' characters + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = (int) read( fd, buf, len ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + if( net_would_block( ctx ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if( WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); +#else + if( errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); + + if( errno == EINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#endif + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read at most 'len' characters, blocking for at most 'timeout' ms + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, uint32_t timeout ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct timeval tv; + fd_set read_fds; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + FD_ZERO( &read_fds ); + FD_SET( fd, &read_fds ); + + tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = ( timeout % 1000 ) * 1000; + + ret = select( fd + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, timeout == 0 ? NULL : &tv ); + + /* Zero fds ready means we timed out */ + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if( WSAGetLastError() == WSAEINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#else + if( errno == EINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#endif + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED ); + } + + /* This call will not block */ + return( mbedtls_net_recv( ctx, buf, len ) ); +} + +/* + * Write at most 'len' characters + */ +int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = (int) write( fd, buf, len ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + if( net_would_block( ctx ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if( WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); +#else + if( errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); + + if( errno == EINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); +#endif + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_close( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx->fd == -1 ) + return; + + close( ctx->fd ); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +/* + * Gracefully close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_free( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx->fd == -1 ) + return; + + shutdown( ctx->fd, 2 ); + close( ctx->fd ); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/pkparse.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/pkparse.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..abc330f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/pkparse.c @@ -0,0 +1,1540 @@ +/* + * Public Key layer for parsing key files and structures + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#include +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#define mbedtls_free free +#endif + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + * + * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. + * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced + * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) +{ + off_t size; + int fd; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + + if ( ( fd = aos_open( path, 0 ) ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + if( ( size = aos_lseek( fd, 0, SEEK_END ) ) < 0 ) + { + aos_close( fd ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + aos_lseek( fd, 0, SEEK_SET ); + + *n = (size_t)size; + + if( *n + 1 == 0 || + ( *buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *n + 1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + aos_close( fd ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + if( aos_read( fd, *buf, *n ) != *n ) + { + aos_close( fd ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buf, *n ); + mbedtls_free( *buf ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + + aos_close( fd ); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + + if( strstr( (const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN " ) != NULL ) + ++*n; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Load and parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const char *path, const char *pwd ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( pwd == NULL ) + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0 ); + else + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, + (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen( pwd ) ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Load and parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( ctx, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* Minimally parse an ECParameters buffer to and mbedtls_asn1_buf + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + * } + */ +static int pk_get_ecparams( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ( end - *p < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + /* Tag may be either OID or SEQUENCE */ + params->tag = **p; + if( params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + && params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) +#endif + ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + params->p = *p; + *p += params->len; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) +/* + * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and (mostly) fill the group with it. + * WARNING: the resulting group should only be used with + * pk_group_id_from_specified(), since its base point may not be set correctly + * if it was encoded compressed. + * + * SpecifiedECDomain ::= SEQUENCE { + * version SpecifiedECDomainVersion(ecdpVer1 | ecdpVer2 | ecdpVer3, ...), + * fieldID FieldID {{FieldTypes}}, + * curve Curve, + * base ECPoint, + * order INTEGER, + * cofactor INTEGER OPTIONAL, + * hash HashAlgorithm OPTIONAL, + * ... + * } + * + * We only support prime-field as field type, and ignore hash and cofactor. + */ +static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = params->p; + const unsigned char * const end = params->p + params->len; + const unsigned char *end_field, *end_curve; + size_t len; + int ver; + + /* SpecifiedECDomainVersion ::= INTEGER { 1, 2, 3 } */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &ver ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ver < 1 || ver > 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + /* + * FieldID { FIELD-ID:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE { -- Finite field + * fieldType FIELD-ID.&id({IOSet}), + * parameters FIELD-ID.&Type({IOSet}{@fieldType}) + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end_field = p + len; + + /* + * FIELD-ID ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER + * FieldTypes FIELD-ID ::= { + * { Prime-p IDENTIFIED BY prime-field } | + * { Characteristic-two IDENTIFIED BY characteristic-two-field } + * } + * prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-fieldType 1 } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_field, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( len != MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD ) || + memcmp( p, MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD, len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + p += len; + + /* Prime-p ::= INTEGER -- Field of size p. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end_field, &grp->P ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + if( p != end_field ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Curve ::= SEQUENCE { + * a FieldElement, + * b FieldElement, + * seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * -- Shall be present if used in SpecifiedECDomain + * -- with version equal to ecdpVer2 or ecdpVer3 + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end_curve = p + len; + + /* + * FieldElement ::= OCTET STRING + * containing an integer in the case of a prime field + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->A, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->B, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + /* Ignore seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) == 0 ) + p += len; + + if( p != end_curve ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, &grp->G, + ( const unsigned char *) p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * If we can't read the point because it's compressed, cheat by + * reading only the X coordinate and the parity bit of Y. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE || + ( p[0] != 0x02 && p[0] != 0x03 ) || + len != mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ) + 1 || + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->G.X, p + 1, len - 1 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Y, p[0] - 2 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + } + + p += len; + + /* + * order INTEGER + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &grp->N ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); + + /* + * Allow optional elements by purposefully not enforcing p == end here. + */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Find the group id associated with an (almost filled) group as generated by + * pk_group_from_specified(), or return an error if unknown. + */ +static int pk_group_id_from_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_group ref; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *id; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ref ); + + for( id = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); *id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; id++ ) + { + /* Load the group associated to that id */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ref ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ref, *id ) ); + + /* Compare to the group we were given, starting with easy tests */ + if( grp->pbits == ref.pbits && grp->nbits == ref.nbits && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->P, &ref.P ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->A, &ref.A ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->B, &ref.B ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->N, &ref.N ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->G.X, &ref.G.X ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->G.Z, &ref.G.Z ) == 0 && + /* For Y we may only know the parity bit, so compare only that */ + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &grp->G.Y, 0 ) == mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ref.G.Y, 0 ) ) + { + break; + } + + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ref ); + + *grp_id = *id; + + if( ret == 0 && *id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and find the associated group ID + */ +static int pk_group_id_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + + if( ( ret = pk_group_from_specified( params, &grp ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = pk_group_id_from_group( &grp, grp_id ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ + +/* + * Use EC parameters to initialise an EC group + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + */ +static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + if( params->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp( params, &grp_id ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE ); + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + if( ( ret = pk_group_id_from_specified( params, &grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); +#endif + } + + /* + * grp may already be initilialized; if so, make sure IDs match + */ + if( grp->id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && grp->id != grp_id ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * EC public key is an EC point + * + * The caller is responsible for clearing the structure upon failure if + * desired. Take care to pass along the possible ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + * return code of mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary() and leave p in a usable state. + */ +static int pk_get_ecpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &key->grp, &key->Q, + (const unsigned char *) *p, end - *p ) ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &key->grp, &key->Q ); + } + + /* + * We know mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary consumed all bytes or failed + */ + *p = (unsigned char *) end; + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +static int pk_get_rsapubkey( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* Import N */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY ); + + *p += len; + + /* Import E */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, *p, len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY ); + + *p += len; + + if( mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY ); + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +/* Get a PK algorithm identifier + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + */ +static int pk_get_pk_alg( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid; + + memset( params, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, &alg_oid, params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg( &alg_oid, pk_alg ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + /* + * No parameters with RSA (only for EC) + */ + if( *pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA && + ( ( params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && params->tag != 0 ) || + params->len != 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_params; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( *p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pk != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = pk_get_pk_alg( p, end, &pk_alg, &alg_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( p, end, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ) ); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + ret = pk_use_ecparams( &alg_params, &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = pk_get_ecpubkey( p, end, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ) ); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + + if( ret == 0 && *p != end ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( p, end, X ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key + */ +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + end = p + keylen; + + /* + * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( version != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION ); + } + + /* Import N */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import E */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import D */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import P */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import Q */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DP, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import DQ */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DQ, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import QP */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->QP, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +#else + /* Verify existance of the CRT params */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ + if( ( ret & 0xff80 ) == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key + */ +static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int version, pubkey_done; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = p + keylen; + unsigned char *end2; + + /* + * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 + * + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), + * privateKey OCTET STRING, + * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( version != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &eck->d, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + pubkey_done = 0; + if( p != end ) + { + /* + * Is 'parameters' present? + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_get_ecparams( &p, p + len, ¶ms) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_use_ecparams( ¶ms, &eck->grp ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + } + + if( p != end ) + { + /* + * Is 'publickey' present? If not, or if we can't read it (eg because it + * is compressed), create it from the private key. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1 ) ) == 0 ) + { + end2 = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( &p, end2, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( p + len != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + if( ( ret = pk_get_ecpubkey( &p, end2, eck ) ) == 0 ) + pubkey_done = 1; + else + { + /* + * The only acceptable failure mode of pk_get_ecpubkey() above + * is if the point format is not recognized. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + } + + if( ! pubkey_done && + ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul( &eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &eck->grp, &eck->d ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* + * Parse an unencrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key + * + * Notes: + * + * - This function does not own the key buffer. It is the + * responsibility of the caller to take care of zeroizing + * and freeing it after use. + * + * - The function is responsible for freeing the provided + * PK context on failure. + * + */ +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char* key, + size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = p + keylen; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; + + /* + * This function parses the PrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8 v1.2 = RFC 5208) + * + * PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, + * privateKey PrivateKey, + * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL } + * + * Version ::= INTEGER + * PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING + * + * The PrivateKey OCTET STRING is a SEC1 ECPrivateKey + */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( version != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = pk_get_pk_alg( &p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( len < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + return( ret ); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_use_ecparams( ¶ms, &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + return( ret ); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse an encrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key + * + * To save space, the decryption happens in-place on the given key buffer. + * Also, while this function may modify the keybuffer, it doesn't own it, + * and instead it is the responsibility of the caller to zeroize and properly + * free it after use. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + int ret, decrypted = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_asn1_buf pbe_alg_oid, pbe_params; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; +#endif + + p = key; + end = p + keylen; + + if( pwdlen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + + /* + * This function parses the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8) + * + * EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * encryptionAlgorithm EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, + * encryptedData EncryptedData + * } + * + * EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * EncryptedData ::= OCTET STRING + * + * The EncryptedData OCTET STRING is a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo + * + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &pbe_alg_oid, &pbe_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + buf = p; + + /* + * Decrypt EncryptedData with appropriate PBE + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + if( mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg( &pbe_alg_oid, &md_alg, &cipher_alg ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( &pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, + cipher_alg, md_alg, + pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); + } + + decrypted = 1; + } + else if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128, &pbe_alg_oid ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( &pbe_params, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, + pwd, pwdlen, + p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + // Best guess for password mismatch when using RC4. If first tag is + // not MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE + // + if( *buf != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + + decrypted = 1; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2, &pbe_alg_oid ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( &pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen, + p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); + } + + decrypted = 1; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + { + ((void) pwd); + } + + if( decrypted == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, buf, len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + +/* + * Parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + size_t len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pk != NULL ); + if( keylen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, pwd, pwdlen, &len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, pwd, pwdlen, &len ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen, + pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#else + ((void) pwd); + ((void) pwdlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * At this point we only know it's not a PEM formatted key. Could be any + * of the known DER encoded private key formats + * + * We try the different DER format parsers to see if one passes without + * error + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + { + unsigned char *key_copy; + + if( ( key_copy = mbedtls_calloc( 1, keylen ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( key_copy, key, keylen ); + + ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, key_copy, keylen, + pwd, pwdlen ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_copy, keylen ); + mbedtls_free( key_copy ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + + ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, key, keylen ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 && + pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), key, keylen ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ); + if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 && + pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), + key, keylen ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + /* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_ECP_C isn't, + * it is ok to leave the PK context initialized but not + * freed: It is the caller's responsibility to call pk_init() + * before calling this function, and to call pk_free() + * when it fails. If MBEDTLS_ECP_C is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * isn't, this leads to mbedtls_pk_free() being called + * twice, once here and once by the caller, but this is + * also ok and in line with the mbedtls_pk_free() calls + * on failed PEM parsing attempts. */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); +} + +/* + * Parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + size_t len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( keylen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL || keylen == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", + "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + p = pem.buf; + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( ctx, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if ( ( ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( &p, p + pem.buflen, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ) ) ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_pk_free( ctx ); + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----", + "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + p = pem.buf; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, p + pem.buflen, ctx ); + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( ctx, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p = (unsigned char *)key; + ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( &p, p + keylen, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + mbedtls_pk_free( ctx ); + if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + p = (unsigned char *) key; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, p + keylen, ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/platform/mbedtls_port_bouffalo_sdk.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/platform/mbedtls_port_bouffalo_sdk.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..58f4f103 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/platform/mbedtls_port_bouffalo_sdk.c @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +#include "mbedtls_port_bouffalo_sdk.h" + +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_FREERTOS +#include + +void *mbedtls_port_calloc( size_t nmemb, size_t size ) +{ + const size_t sz = nmemb * size; + void *m = malloc( sz ); + if ( m ) + memset( m, 0, sz ); + return( m ); +} + +void mbedtls_port_free( void * ptr ) { + free( ptr ); +} +#else +void *mbedtls_port_calloc( size_t nmemb, size_t size ) +{ + while(1); +} + +void mbedtls_port_free( void * ptr ) { + while(1); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/platform/mbedtls_port_bouffalo_sdk.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/platform/mbedtls_port_bouffalo_sdk.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4f18a31b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/platform/mbedtls_port_bouffalo_sdk.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PORT_PLATFORM_BOUFFALO_SDK +#define MBEDTLS_PORT_PLATFORM_BOUFFALO_SDK +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE mbedtls_port_free +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC mbedtls_port_calloc + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit + +void *mbedtls_port_calloc( size_t nmemb, size_t size ); +void mbedtls_port_free( void *ptr ); + +#endif /* end of include guard: MBEDTLS_PORT_PLATFORM_BOUFFALO_SDK */ diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/sha1_alt.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/sha1_alt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2b1778f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/sha1_alt.h @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#pragma once + +#include + +typedef bl_sha_ctx_t mbedtls_sha1_context; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/sha256_alt.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/sha256_alt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..09dc98fb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/sha256_alt.h @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#pragma once + +#include + +typedef bl_sha_ctx_t mbedtls_sha256_context; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/sha512_alt.h b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/sha512_alt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6c270b32 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/sha512_alt.h @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#pragma once + +#include + +typedef bl_sha512_ctx_t mbedtls_sha512_context; diff --git a/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/test_case.c b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/test_case.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a924de51 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/crypto/mbedtls/port/test_case.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +/* + * Description: mbedtls hardware acceleration basic test cases + * Copyright (C) Bouffalo Lab 2016-2022 + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * File Name: test_case.c + * Author: Chien Wong(qwang@bouffalolab.com) + * Start Date: Jun 8, 2022 + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define CHECK(r) \ + do { \ + if ((ret = r)) { \ + printf("%s: LN %d returned %d\r\n", __func__, __LINE__, ret); \ + goto out; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +bool mbedtls_tc_ecp_p256_mul() +{ + int ret; + bool passed = false; + mbedtls_ecp_group group; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&group); + mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&group, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); + + mbedtls_ecp_point R, R_gold; + mbedtls_mpi m; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R_gold); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&m); + + const char *tv_m_str = "99A1F7B45827419C35E67F42BC02FE7CFA7629430EBBF32AF55E77E8B5ED88F5"; + const char *tv_R_X_str = "06B8FBCE1A4909B119808FCDBE45DF209F9B2FFE5C17E12FC04F199B38FA687A"; + const char *tv_R_Y_str = "AE9FAFB90A1E91F2C1955C7D83D100C0CB5FC6F253EED2DFFD6C2C60A4F183B8"; + const char *tv_R_Z_str = "01"; + + CHECK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&m, 16, tv_m_str)); + CHECK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&R_gold.X, 16, tv_R_X_str)); + CHECK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&R_gold.Y, 16, tv_R_Y_str)); + CHECK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&R_gold.Z, 16, tv_R_Z_str)); + + CHECK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&group, &R, &m, &group.G, NULL, NULL)); + if (mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&R, &R_gold) == 0) { + passed = true; + } else { + printf("Result mismatch!\r\n"); + } +out: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&group); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R_gold); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&m); + if (ret) { + passed = false; + } + return passed; +} + +bool mbedtls_tc_mpi_exp_mod() +{ + int ret; + bool passed = false; + mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, X, X_gold; + const char *A_str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const char *E_str = "010001"; + const char *N_str = "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"; + const char *X_gold_str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mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X_gold); + CHECK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&A, 16, A_str)); + CHECK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&E, 16, E_str)); + CHECK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&N, 16, N_str)); + CHECK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&X_gold, 16, X_gold_str)); + CHECK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&X, &A, &E, &N, NULL)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &X_gold) == 0) { + passed = true; + } else { + printf("Result mismatch!\r\n"); + } +out: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&A); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X_gold); + if (ret) { + passed = false; + } + return passed; +} + +bool mbedtls_tc_aes_ecb() +{ + bool passed = true; + mbedtls_aes_context aes; + const size_t rounds = 100 * 1000; + const void *plaintext = "0123456789ABCDEF"; + const void *key = "FEDCBA9876543210"; + const uint8_t expected_ciphertext[16] = "\x38\x44\x36\x19\xc1\x70\xf5\x96\x81\xc4\xa6\xe0\xf1\x18\xc2\x49"; + uint8_t ciphertext[16]; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < rounds; ++i) { + memset(ciphertext, 0, 16); + mbedtls_aes_init(&aes); + mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes, key, 128); + mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, plaintext, ciphertext); + mbedtls_aes_free(&aes); + if (memcmp(expected_ciphertext, ciphertext, 16)) { + passed = false; + break; + } + } + + return passed; +} + +#define MD(tc) {tc, #tc} +static struct { + bool (*tc_fun)(void); + const char *desc; +} tc[] = { + MD(mbedtls_tc_ecp_p256_mul), + MD(mbedtls_tc_mpi_exp_mod), + MD(mbedtls_tc_aes_ecb), +}; + +void mbedtls_test_case_run() +{ + for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(tc) / sizeof(tc[0]); ++i) { + printf("Running test case %s\r\n", tc[i].desc); + if (tc[i].tc_fun()) { + printf("\t\tPassed\r\n"); + } else { + printf("\t\tFailed\r\n"); + } + } +} diff --git a/components/freertos/include/atomic.h b/components/freertos/include/atomic.h deleted file mode 100644 index 8d7c1076..00000000 --- a/components/freertos/include/atomic.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,419 +0,0 @@ -/* - * FreeRTOS Kernel V10.4.6 - * Copyright (C) 2021 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT - * - * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of - * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in - * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to - * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of - * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, - * subject to the following conditions: - * - * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all - * copies or substantial portions of the Software. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR - * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER - * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN - * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. - * - * https://www.FreeRTOS.org - * https://github.com/FreeRTOS - * - */ - -/** - * @file atomic.h - * @brief FreeRTOS atomic operation support. - * - * This file implements atomic functions by disabling interrupts globally. - * Implementations with architecture specific atomic instructions can be - * provided under each compiler directory. - */ - -#ifndef ATOMIC_H -#define ATOMIC_H - -#ifndef INC_FREERTOS_H - #error "include FreeRTOS.h must appear in source files before include atomic.h" -#endif - -/* Standard includes. */ -#include - -/* *INDENT-OFF* */ -#ifdef __cplusplus - extern "C" { -#endif -/* *INDENT-ON* */ - -/* - * Port specific definitions -- entering/exiting critical section. - * Refer template -- ./lib/FreeRTOS/portable/Compiler/Arch/portmacro.h - * - * Every call to ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL() must be closely paired with - * ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(). - * - */ -#if defined( portSET_INTERRUPT_MASK_FROM_ISR ) - -/* Nested interrupt scheme is supported in this port. */ - #define ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL() \ - UBaseType_t uxCriticalSectionType = portSET_INTERRUPT_MASK_FROM_ISR() - - #define ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL() \ - portCLEAR_INTERRUPT_MASK_FROM_ISR( uxCriticalSectionType ) - -#else - -/* Nested interrupt scheme is NOT supported in this port. */ - #define ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL() portENTER_CRITICAL() - #define ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL() portEXIT_CRITICAL() - -#endif /* portSET_INTERRUPT_MASK_FROM_ISR() */ - -/* - * Port specific definition -- "always inline". - * Inline is compiler specific, and may not always get inlined depending on your - * optimization level. Also, inline is considered as performance optimization - * for atomic. Thus, if portFORCE_INLINE is not provided by portmacro.h, - * instead of resulting error, simply define it away. - */ -#ifndef portFORCE_INLINE - #define portFORCE_INLINE -#endif - -#define ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS 0x1U /**< Compare and swap succeeded, swapped. */ -#define ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_FAILURE 0x0U /**< Compare and swap failed, did not swap. */ - -/*----------------------------- Swap && CAS ------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic compare-and-swap - * - * @brief Performs an atomic compare-and-swap operation on the specified values. - * - * @param[in, out] pulDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is - * to be loaded and checked. - * @param[in] ulExchange If condition meets, write this value to memory. - * @param[in] ulComparand Swap condition. - * - * @return Unsigned integer of value 1 or 0. 1 for swapped, 0 for not swapped. - * - * @note This function only swaps *pulDestination with ulExchange, if previous - * *pulDestination value equals ulComparand. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_CompareAndSwap_u32( uint32_t volatile * pulDestination, - uint32_t ulExchange, - uint32_t ulComparand ) -{ - uint32_t ulReturnValue; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - if( *pulDestination == ulComparand ) - { - *pulDestination = ulExchange; - ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS; - } - else - { - ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_FAILURE; - } - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulReturnValue; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic swap (pointers) - * - * @brief Atomically sets the address pointed to by *ppvDestination to the value - * of *pvExchange. - * - * @param[in, out] ppvDestination Pointer to memory location from where a pointer - * value is to be loaded and written back to. - * @param[in] pvExchange Pointer value to be written to *ppvDestination. - * - * @return The initial value of *ppvDestination. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE void * Atomic_SwapPointers_p32( void * volatile * ppvDestination, - void * pvExchange ) -{ - void * pReturnValue; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - pReturnValue = *ppvDestination; - *ppvDestination = pvExchange; - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return pReturnValue; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic compare-and-swap (pointers) - * - * @brief Performs an atomic compare-and-swap operation on the specified pointer - * values. - * - * @param[in, out] ppvDestination Pointer to memory location from where a pointer - * value is to be loaded and checked. - * @param[in] pvExchange If condition meets, write this value to memory. - * @param[in] pvComparand Swap condition. - * - * @return Unsigned integer of value 1 or 0. 1 for swapped, 0 for not swapped. - * - * @note This function only swaps *ppvDestination with pvExchange, if previous - * *ppvDestination value equals pvComparand. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_CompareAndSwapPointers_p32( void * volatile * ppvDestination, - void * pvExchange, - void * pvComparand ) -{ - uint32_t ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_FAILURE; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - if( *ppvDestination == pvComparand ) - { - *ppvDestination = pvExchange; - ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS; - } - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulReturnValue; -} - - -/*----------------------------- Arithmetic ------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic add - * - * @brief Atomically adds count to the value of the specified pointer points to. - * - * @param[in,out] pulAddend Pointer to memory location from where value is to be - * loaded and written back to. - * @param[in] ulCount Value to be added to *pulAddend. - * - * @return previous *pulAddend value. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_Add_u32( uint32_t volatile * pulAddend, - uint32_t ulCount ) -{ - uint32_t ulCurrent; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - ulCurrent = *pulAddend; - *pulAddend += ulCount; - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulCurrent; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic subtract - * - * @brief Atomically subtracts count from the value of the specified pointer - * pointers to. - * - * @param[in,out] pulAddend Pointer to memory location from where value is to be - * loaded and written back to. - * @param[in] ulCount Value to be subtract from *pulAddend. - * - * @return previous *pulAddend value. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_Subtract_u32( uint32_t volatile * pulAddend, - uint32_t ulCount ) -{ - uint32_t ulCurrent; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - ulCurrent = *pulAddend; - *pulAddend -= ulCount; - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulCurrent; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic increment - * - * @brief Atomically increments the value of the specified pointer points to. - * - * @param[in,out] pulAddend Pointer to memory location from where value is to be - * loaded and written back to. - * - * @return *pulAddend value before increment. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_Increment_u32( uint32_t volatile * pulAddend ) -{ - uint32_t ulCurrent; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - ulCurrent = *pulAddend; - *pulAddend += 1; - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulCurrent; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic decrement - * - * @brief Atomically decrements the value of the specified pointer points to - * - * @param[in,out] pulAddend Pointer to memory location from where value is to be - * loaded and written back to. - * - * @return *pulAddend value before decrement. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_Decrement_u32( uint32_t volatile * pulAddend ) -{ - uint32_t ulCurrent; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - ulCurrent = *pulAddend; - *pulAddend -= 1; - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulCurrent; -} - -/*----------------------------- Bitwise Logical ------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic OR - * - * @brief Performs an atomic OR operation on the specified values. - * - * @param [in, out] pulDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is - * to be loaded and written back to. - * @param [in] ulValue Value to be ORed with *pulDestination. - * - * @return The original value of *pulDestination. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_OR_u32( uint32_t volatile * pulDestination, - uint32_t ulValue ) -{ - uint32_t ulCurrent; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - ulCurrent = *pulDestination; - *pulDestination |= ulValue; - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulCurrent; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic AND - * - * @brief Performs an atomic AND operation on the specified values. - * - * @param [in, out] pulDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is - * to be loaded and written back to. - * @param [in] ulValue Value to be ANDed with *pulDestination. - * - * @return The original value of *pulDestination. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_AND_u32( uint32_t volatile * pulDestination, - uint32_t ulValue ) -{ - uint32_t ulCurrent; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - ulCurrent = *pulDestination; - *pulDestination &= ulValue; - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulCurrent; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic NAND - * - * @brief Performs an atomic NAND operation on the specified values. - * - * @param [in, out] pulDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is - * to be loaded and written back to. - * @param [in] ulValue Value to be NANDed with *pulDestination. - * - * @return The original value of *pulDestination. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_NAND_u32( uint32_t volatile * pulDestination, - uint32_t ulValue ) -{ - uint32_t ulCurrent; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - ulCurrent = *pulDestination; - *pulDestination = ~( ulCurrent & ulValue ); - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulCurrent; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/** - * Atomic XOR - * - * @brief Performs an atomic XOR operation on the specified values. - * - * @param [in, out] pulDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is - * to be loaded and written back to. - * @param [in] ulValue Value to be XORed with *pulDestination. - * - * @return The original value of *pulDestination. - */ -static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_XOR_u32( uint32_t volatile * pulDestination, - uint32_t ulValue ) -{ - uint32_t ulCurrent; - - ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); - { - ulCurrent = *pulDestination; - *pulDestination ^= ulValue; - } - ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); - - return ulCurrent; -} - -/* *INDENT-OFF* */ -#ifdef __cplusplus - } -#endif -/* *INDENT-ON* */ - -#endif /* ATOMIC_H */ diff --git a/components/fs/CMakeLists.txt b/components/fs/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc3c9db9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/fs/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_FATFS fatfs) +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_LITTLEFS littlefs) diff --git a/components/fatfs/CMakeLists.txt b/components/fs/fatfs/CMakeLists.txt similarity index 95% rename from components/fatfs/CMakeLists.txt rename to components/fs/fatfs/CMakeLists.txt index 43c1793b..c044cfc7 100644 --- a/components/fatfs/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/fs/fatfs/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -sdk_generate_library() +sdk_generate_library() sdk_library_add_sources(diskio.c) sdk_library_add_sources(ff.c) sdk_library_add_sources(ffsystem.c) diff --git a/components/fatfs/diskio.c b/components/fs/fatfs/diskio.c similarity index 100% rename from components/fatfs/diskio.c rename to components/fs/fatfs/diskio.c diff --git a/components/fatfs/diskio.h b/components/fs/fatfs/diskio.h similarity index 100% rename from components/fatfs/diskio.h rename to components/fs/fatfs/diskio.h diff --git a/components/fatfs/fatfs_errorcode.c b/components/fs/fatfs/fatfs_errorcode.c similarity index 100% rename from components/fatfs/fatfs_errorcode.c rename to components/fs/fatfs/fatfs_errorcode.c diff --git a/components/fatfs/ff.c b/components/fs/fatfs/ff.c similarity index 100% rename from components/fatfs/ff.c rename to components/fs/fatfs/ff.c diff --git a/components/fatfs/ff.h b/components/fs/fatfs/ff.h similarity index 100% rename from components/fatfs/ff.h rename to components/fs/fatfs/ff.h diff --git a/components/fatfs/ffconf.h b/components/fs/fatfs/ffconf.h similarity index 97% rename from components/fatfs/ffconf.h rename to components/fs/fatfs/ffconf.h index 1a1f5ae4..adb4d2ff 100644 --- a/components/fatfs/ffconf.h +++ b/components/fs/fatfs/ffconf.h @@ -1,349 +1,349 @@ -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ -/ FatFs Functional Configurations -/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#if defined(CONFIG_FFCONF_USER) && (CONFIG_FFCONF_USER) -#include "ffconf_user.h" -#endif - -#define FFCONF_DEF 86606 /* Revision ID */ - -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ -/ Function Configurations -/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef FF_FS_CONTINUOUS -#define FF_FS_CONTINUOUS 1 -#endif -/* Read and write as much data as possible at one time, regardless of the cluster size */ - -#ifndef FF_FS_READONLY -#define FF_FS_READONLY 0 -#endif -/* This option switches read-only configuration. (0:Read/Write or 1:Read-only) -/ Read-only configuration removes writing API functions, f_write(), f_sync(), -/ f_unlink(), f_mkdir(), f_chmod(), f_rename(), f_truncate(), f_getfree() -/ and optional writing functions as well. */ - -#ifndef FF_FS_MINIMIZE -#define FF_FS_MINIMIZE 0 -#endif -/* This option defines minimization level to remove some basic API functions. -/ -/ 0: Basic functions are fully enabled. -/ 1: f_stat(), f_getfree(), f_unlink(), f_mkdir(), f_truncate() and f_rename() -/ are removed. -/ 2: f_opendir(), f_readdir() and f_closedir() are removed in addition to 1. -/ 3: f_lseek() function is removed in addition to 2. */ - -#ifndef FF_USE_STRFUNC -#define FF_USE_STRFUNC 2 -#endif -/* This option switches string functions, f_gets(), f_putc(), f_puts() and f_printf(). -/ -/ 0: Disable string functions. -/ 1: Enable without LF-CRLF conversion. -/ 2: Enable with LF-CRLF conversion. */ - -#ifndef FF_USE_FIND -#define FF_USE_FIND 0 -#endif -/* This option switches filtered directory read functions, f_findfirst() and -/ f_findnext(). (0:Disable, 1:Enable 2:Enable with matching altname[] too) */ - -#ifndef FF_USE_MKFS -#define FF_USE_MKFS 1 -#endif -/* This option switches f_mkfs() function. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ - -#ifndef FF_USE_FASTSEEK -#define FF_USE_FASTSEEK 1 -#endif -/* This option switches fast seek function. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ - -#ifndef FF_USE_EXPAND -#define FF_USE_EXPAND 0 -#endif -/* This option switches f_expand function. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ - -#ifndef FF_USE_CHMOD -#define FF_USE_CHMOD 0 -#endif -/* This option switches attribute manipulation functions, f_chmod() and f_utime(). -/ (0:Disable or 1:Enable) Also FF_FS_READONLY needs to be 0 to enable this option. */ - -#ifndef FF_USE_LABEL -#define FF_USE_LABEL 0 -#endif -/* This option switches volume label functions, f_getlabel() and f_setlabel(). -/ (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ - -#ifndef FF_USE_FORWARD -#define FF_USE_FORWARD 0 -#endif -/* This option switches f_forward() function. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ - -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ -/ Locale and Namespace Configurations -/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef FF_CODE_PAGE -#define FF_CODE_PAGE 437 -#endif -/* This option specifies the OEM code page to be used on the target system. -/ Incorrect code page setting can cause a file open failure. -/ -/ 437 - U.S. -/ 720 - Arabic -/ 737 - Greek -/ 771 - KBL -/ 775 - Baltic -/ 850 - Latin 1 -/ 852 - Latin 2 -/ 855 - Cyrillic -/ 857 - Turkish -/ 860 - Portuguese -/ 861 - Icelandic -/ 862 - Hebrew -/ 863 - Canadian French -/ 864 - Arabic -/ 865 - Nordic -/ 866 - Russian -/ 869 - Greek 2 -/ 932 - Japanese (DBCS) -/ 936 - Simplified Chinese (DBCS) -/ 949 - Korean (DBCS) -/ 950 - Traditional Chinese (DBCS) -/ 0 - Include all code pages above and configured by f_setcp() -*/ - -#define FF_USE_LFN 3 -#define FF_MAX_LFN 255 -/* The FF_USE_LFN switches the support for LFN (long file name). -/ -/ 0: Disable LFN. FF_MAX_LFN has no effect. -/ 1: Enable LFN with static working buffer on the BSS. Always NOT thread-safe. -/ 2: Enable LFN with dynamic working buffer on the STACK. -/ 3: Enable LFN with dynamic working buffer on the HEAP. -/ -/ To enable the LFN, ffunicode.c needs to be added to the project. The LFN function -/ requiers certain internal working buffer occupies (FF_MAX_LFN + 1) * 2 bytes and -/ additional (FF_MAX_LFN + 44) / 15 * 32 bytes when exFAT is enabled. -/ The FF_MAX_LFN defines size of the working buffer in UTF-16 code unit and it can -/ be in range of 12 to 255. It is recommended to be set it 255 to fully support LFN -/ specification. -/ When use stack for the working buffer, take care on stack overflow. When use heap -/ memory for the working buffer, memory management functions, ff_memalloc() and -/ ff_memfree() exemplified in ffsystem.c, need to be added to the project. */ - -#ifndef FF_LFN_UNICODE -#define FF_LFN_UNICODE 0 -#endif -/* This option switches the character encoding on the API when LFN is enabled. -/ -/ 0: ANSI/OEM in current CP (TCHAR = char) -/ 1: Unicode in UTF-16 (TCHAR = WCHAR) -/ 2: Unicode in UTF-8 (TCHAR = char) -/ 3: Unicode in UTF-32 (TCHAR = DWORD) -/ -/ Also behavior of string I/O functions will be affected by this option. -/ When LFN is not enabled, this option has no effect. */ - -#ifndef FF_LFN_BUF -#define FF_LFN_BUF 255 -#endif - -#ifndef FF_SFN_BUF -#define FF_SFN_BUF 12 -#endif -/* This set of options defines size of file name members in the FILINFO structure -/ which is used to read out directory items. These values should be suffcient for -/ the file names to read. The maximum possible length of the read file name depends -/ on character encoding. When LFN is not enabled, these options have no effect. */ - -#ifndef FF_STRF_ENCODE -#define FF_STRF_ENCODE 3 -#endif -/* When FF_LFN_UNICODE >= 1 with LFN enabled, string I/O functions, f_gets(), -/ f_putc(), f_puts and f_printf() convert the character encoding in it. -/ This option selects assumption of character encoding ON THE FILE to be -/ read/written via those functions. -/ -/ 0: ANSI/OEM in current CP -/ 1: Unicode in UTF-16LE -/ 2: Unicode in UTF-16BE -/ 3: Unicode in UTF-8 -*/ - -#ifndef FF_FS_RPATH -#define FF_FS_RPATH 2 -#endif -/* This option configures support for relative path. -/ -/ 0: Disable relative path and remove related functions. -/ 1: Enable relative path. f_chdir() and f_chdrive() are available. -/ 2: f_getcwd() function is available in addition to 1. -*/ - -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ -/ Drive/Volume Configurations -/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#define FF_VOLUMES 6 -/* Number of volumes (logical drives) to be used. (1-10) */ - -#define FF_STR_VOLUME_ID 1 -#define FF_VOLUME_STRS "ram", "sd", "flash", "usb", "cg", "sd2", -/* FF_STR_VOLUME_ID switches support for volume ID in arbitrary strings. -/ When FF_STR_VOLUME_ID is set to 1 or 2, arbitrary strings can be used as drive -/ number in the path name. FF_VOLUME_STRS defines the volume ID strings for each -/ logical drives. Number of items must not be less than FF_VOLUMES. Valid -/ characters for the volume ID strings are A-Z, a-z and 0-9, however, they are -/ compared in case-insensitive. If FF_STR_VOLUME_ID >= 1 and FF_VOLUME_STRS is -/ not defined, a user defined volume string table needs to be defined as: -/ -/ const char* VolumeStr[FF_VOLUMES] = {"ram","flash","sd","usb",... -*/ - -#ifndef FF_MULTI_PARTITION -#define FF_MULTI_PARTITION 0 -#endif -/* This option switches support for multiple volumes on the physical drive. -/ By default (0), each logical drive number is bound to the same physical drive -/ number and only an FAT volume found on the physical drive will be mounted. -/ When this function is enabled (1), each logical drive number can be bound to -/ arbitrary physical drive and partition listed in the VolToPart[]. Also f_fdisk() -/ funciton will be available. */ - -#ifndef FF_MIN_SS -#define FF_MIN_SS 512 -#endif - -#ifndef FF_MAX_SS -#define FF_MAX_SS 512 -#endif -/* This set of options configures the range of sector size to be supported. (512, -/ 1024, 2048 or 4096) Always set both 512 for most systems, generic memory card and -/ harddisk. But a larger value may be required for on-board flash memory and some -/ type of optical media. When FF_MAX_SS is larger than FF_MIN_SS, FatFs is configured -/ for variable sector size mode and disk_ioctl() function needs to implement -/ GET_SECTOR_SIZE command. */ - -#ifndef FF_LBA64 -#define FF_LBA64 0 -#endif -/* This option switches support for 64-bit LBA. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) -/ To enable the 64-bit LBA, also exFAT needs to be enabled. (FF_FS_EXFAT == 1) */ - -#ifndef FF_MIN_GPT -#define FF_MIN_GPT 0x100000000 -#endif -/* Minimum number of sectors to switch GPT format to create partition in f_mkfs and -/ f_fdisk function. 0x100000000 max. This option has no effect when FF_LBA64 == 0. */ - -#ifndef FF_USE_TRIM -#define FF_USE_TRIM 0 -#endif -/* This option switches support for ATA-TRIM. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) -/ To enable Trim function, also CTRL_TRIM command should be implemented to the -/ disk_ioctl() function. */ - -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ -/ System Configurations -/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#ifndef FF_FS_TINY -#define FF_FS_TINY 0 -#endif -/* This option switches tiny buffer configuration. (0:Normal or 1:Tiny) -/ At the tiny configuration, size of file object (FIL) is shrinked FF_MAX_SS bytes. -/ Instead of private sector buffer eliminated from the file object, common sector -/ buffer in the filesystem object (FATFS) is used for the file data transfer. */ - -#ifndef FF_FS_EXFAT -#define FF_FS_EXFAT 0 -#endif -/* This option switches support for exFAT filesystem. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) -/ To enable exFAT, also LFN needs to be enabled. (FF_USE_LFN >= 1) -/ Note that enabling exFAT discards ANSI C (C89) compatibility. */ - -#ifndef FF_FS_NORTC -#define FF_FS_NORTC 1 -#endif - -#ifndef FF_NORTC_MON -#define FF_NORTC_MON 1 -#endif - -#ifndef FF_NORTC_MDAY -#define FF_NORTC_MDAY 1 -#endif - -#ifndef FF_NORTC_YEAR -#define FF_NORTC_YEAR 2022 -#endif -/* The option FF_FS_NORTC switches timestamp functiton. If the system does not have -/ any RTC function or valid timestamp is not needed, set FF_FS_NORTC = 1 to disable -/ the timestamp function. Every object modified by FatFs will have a fixed timestamp -/ defined by FF_NORTC_MON, FF_NORTC_MDAY and FF_NORTC_YEAR in local time. -/ To enable timestamp function (FF_FS_NORTC = 0), get_fattime() function need to be -/ added to the project to read current time form real-time clock. FF_NORTC_MON, -/ FF_NORTC_MDAY and FF_NORTC_YEAR have no effect. -/ These options have no effect in read-only configuration (FF_FS_READONLY = 1). */ - -#ifndef FF_FS_NOFSINFO -#define FF_FS_NOFSINFO 0 -#endif -/* If you need to know correct free space on the FAT32 volume, set bit 0 of this -/ option, and f_getfree() function at first time after volume mount will force -/ a full FAT scan. Bit 1 controls the use of last allocated cluster number. -/ -/ bit0=0: Use free cluster count in the FSINFO if available. -/ bit0=1: Do not trust free cluster count in the FSINFO. -/ bit1=0: Use last allocated cluster number in the FSINFO if available. -/ bit1=1: Do not trust last allocated cluster number in the FSINFO. -*/ - -#ifndef FF_FS_LOCK -#define FF_FS_LOCK 0 -#endif -/* The option FF_FS_LOCK switches file lock function to control duplicated file open -/ and illegal operation to open objects. This option must be 0 when FF_FS_READONLY -/ is 1. -/ -/ 0: Disable file lock function. To avoid volume corruption, application program -/ should avoid illegal open, remove and rename to the open objects. -/ >0: Enable file lock function. The value defines how many files/sub-directories -/ can be opened simultaneously under file lock control. Note that the file -/ lock control is independent of re-entrancy. */ - -/* #include // O/S definitions */ -#ifndef FF_FS_REENTRANT -#define FF_FS_REENTRANT 0 -#endif - -#if (FF_FS_REENTRANT) -#include "FreeRTOS.h" -#include "task.h" -#include "semphr.h" -#define FF_FS_TIMEOUT 1000 -#define FF_SYNC_t SemaphoreHandle_t -#endif -/* The option FF_FS_REENTRANT switches the re-entrancy (thread safe) of the FatFs -/ module itself. Note that regardless of this option, file access to different -/ volume is always re-entrant and volume control functions, f_mount(), f_mkfs() -/ and f_fdisk() function, are always not re-entrant. Only file/directory access -/ to the same volume is under control of this function. -/ -/ 0: Disable re-entrancy. FF_FS_TIMEOUT and FF_SYNC_t have no effect. -/ 1: Enable re-entrancy. Also user provided synchronization handlers, -/ ff_req_grant(), ff_rel_grant(), ff_del_syncobj() and ff_cre_syncobj() -/ function, must be added to the project. Samples are available in -/ option/syscall.c. -/ -/ The FF_FS_TIMEOUT defines timeout period in unit of time tick. -/ The FF_SYNC_t defines O/S dependent sync object type. e.g. HANDLE, ID, OS_EVENT*, -/ SemaphoreHandle_t and etc. A header file for O/S definitions needs to be -/ included somewhere in the scope of ff.h. */ - -/*--- End of configuration options ---*/ +/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ +/ FatFs Functional Configurations +/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#if defined(CONFIG_FFCONF_USER) && (CONFIG_FFCONF_USER) +#include "ffconf_user.h" +#endif + +#define FFCONF_DEF 86606 /* Revision ID */ + +/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ +/ Function Configurations +/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#ifndef FF_FS_CONTINUOUS +#define FF_FS_CONTINUOUS 1 +#endif +/* Read and write as much data as possible at one time, regardless of the cluster size */ + +#ifndef FF_FS_READONLY +#define FF_FS_READONLY 0 +#endif +/* This option switches read-only configuration. (0:Read/Write or 1:Read-only) +/ Read-only configuration removes writing API functions, f_write(), f_sync(), +/ f_unlink(), f_mkdir(), f_chmod(), f_rename(), f_truncate(), f_getfree() +/ and optional writing functions as well. */ + +#ifndef FF_FS_MINIMIZE +#define FF_FS_MINIMIZE 0 +#endif +/* This option defines minimization level to remove some basic API functions. +/ +/ 0: Basic functions are fully enabled. +/ 1: f_stat(), f_getfree(), f_unlink(), f_mkdir(), f_truncate() and f_rename() +/ are removed. +/ 2: f_opendir(), f_readdir() and f_closedir() are removed in addition to 1. +/ 3: f_lseek() function is removed in addition to 2. */ + +#ifndef FF_USE_STRFUNC +#define FF_USE_STRFUNC 2 +#endif +/* This option switches string functions, f_gets(), f_putc(), f_puts() and f_printf(). +/ +/ 0: Disable string functions. +/ 1: Enable without LF-CRLF conversion. +/ 2: Enable with LF-CRLF conversion. */ + +#ifndef FF_USE_FIND +#define FF_USE_FIND 0 +#endif +/* This option switches filtered directory read functions, f_findfirst() and +/ f_findnext(). (0:Disable, 1:Enable 2:Enable with matching altname[] too) */ + +#ifndef FF_USE_MKFS +#define FF_USE_MKFS 1 +#endif +/* This option switches f_mkfs() function. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ + +#ifndef FF_USE_FASTSEEK +#define FF_USE_FASTSEEK 1 +#endif +/* This option switches fast seek function. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ + +#ifndef FF_USE_EXPAND +#define FF_USE_EXPAND 0 +#endif +/* This option switches f_expand function. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ + +#ifndef FF_USE_CHMOD +#define FF_USE_CHMOD 0 +#endif +/* This option switches attribute manipulation functions, f_chmod() and f_utime(). +/ (0:Disable or 1:Enable) Also FF_FS_READONLY needs to be 0 to enable this option. */ + +#ifndef FF_USE_LABEL +#define FF_USE_LABEL 0 +#endif +/* This option switches volume label functions, f_getlabel() and f_setlabel(). +/ (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ + +#ifndef FF_USE_FORWARD +#define FF_USE_FORWARD 0 +#endif +/* This option switches f_forward() function. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) */ + +/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ +/ Locale and Namespace Configurations +/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#ifndef FF_CODE_PAGE +#define FF_CODE_PAGE 437 +#endif +/* This option specifies the OEM code page to be used on the target system. +/ Incorrect code page setting can cause a file open failure. +/ +/ 437 - U.S. +/ 720 - Arabic +/ 737 - Greek +/ 771 - KBL +/ 775 - Baltic +/ 850 - Latin 1 +/ 852 - Latin 2 +/ 855 - Cyrillic +/ 857 - Turkish +/ 860 - Portuguese +/ 861 - Icelandic +/ 862 - Hebrew +/ 863 - Canadian French +/ 864 - Arabic +/ 865 - Nordic +/ 866 - Russian +/ 869 - Greek 2 +/ 932 - Japanese (DBCS) +/ 936 - Simplified Chinese (DBCS) +/ 949 - Korean (DBCS) +/ 950 - Traditional Chinese (DBCS) +/ 0 - Include all code pages above and configured by f_setcp() +*/ + +#define FF_USE_LFN 3 +#define FF_MAX_LFN 255 +/* The FF_USE_LFN switches the support for LFN (long file name). +/ +/ 0: Disable LFN. FF_MAX_LFN has no effect. +/ 1: Enable LFN with static working buffer on the BSS. Always NOT thread-safe. +/ 2: Enable LFN with dynamic working buffer on the STACK. +/ 3: Enable LFN with dynamic working buffer on the HEAP. +/ +/ To enable the LFN, ffunicode.c needs to be added to the project. The LFN function +/ requiers certain internal working buffer occupies (FF_MAX_LFN + 1) * 2 bytes and +/ additional (FF_MAX_LFN + 44) / 15 * 32 bytes when exFAT is enabled. +/ The FF_MAX_LFN defines size of the working buffer in UTF-16 code unit and it can +/ be in range of 12 to 255. It is recommended to be set it 255 to fully support LFN +/ specification. +/ When use stack for the working buffer, take care on stack overflow. When use heap +/ memory for the working buffer, memory management functions, ff_memalloc() and +/ ff_memfree() exemplified in ffsystem.c, need to be added to the project. */ + +#ifndef FF_LFN_UNICODE +#define FF_LFN_UNICODE 0 +#endif +/* This option switches the character encoding on the API when LFN is enabled. +/ +/ 0: ANSI/OEM in current CP (TCHAR = char) +/ 1: Unicode in UTF-16 (TCHAR = WCHAR) +/ 2: Unicode in UTF-8 (TCHAR = char) +/ 3: Unicode in UTF-32 (TCHAR = DWORD) +/ +/ Also behavior of string I/O functions will be affected by this option. +/ When LFN is not enabled, this option has no effect. */ + +#ifndef FF_LFN_BUF +#define FF_LFN_BUF 255 +#endif + +#ifndef FF_SFN_BUF +#define FF_SFN_BUF 12 +#endif +/* This set of options defines size of file name members in the FILINFO structure +/ which is used to read out directory items. These values should be suffcient for +/ the file names to read. The maximum possible length of the read file name depends +/ on character encoding. When LFN is not enabled, these options have no effect. */ + +#ifndef FF_STRF_ENCODE +#define FF_STRF_ENCODE 3 +#endif +/* When FF_LFN_UNICODE >= 1 with LFN enabled, string I/O functions, f_gets(), +/ f_putc(), f_puts and f_printf() convert the character encoding in it. +/ This option selects assumption of character encoding ON THE FILE to be +/ read/written via those functions. +/ +/ 0: ANSI/OEM in current CP +/ 1: Unicode in UTF-16LE +/ 2: Unicode in UTF-16BE +/ 3: Unicode in UTF-8 +*/ + +#ifndef FF_FS_RPATH +#define FF_FS_RPATH 2 +#endif +/* This option configures support for relative path. +/ +/ 0: Disable relative path and remove related functions. +/ 1: Enable relative path. f_chdir() and f_chdrive() are available. +/ 2: f_getcwd() function is available in addition to 1. +*/ + +/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ +/ Drive/Volume Configurations +/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#define FF_VOLUMES 6 +/* Number of volumes (logical drives) to be used. (1-10) */ + +#define FF_STR_VOLUME_ID 1 +#define FF_VOLUME_STRS "ram", "sd", "flash", "usb", "cg", "sd2", +/* FF_STR_VOLUME_ID switches support for volume ID in arbitrary strings. +/ When FF_STR_VOLUME_ID is set to 1 or 2, arbitrary strings can be used as drive +/ number in the path name. FF_VOLUME_STRS defines the volume ID strings for each +/ logical drives. Number of items must not be less than FF_VOLUMES. Valid +/ characters for the volume ID strings are A-Z, a-z and 0-9, however, they are +/ compared in case-insensitive. If FF_STR_VOLUME_ID >= 1 and FF_VOLUME_STRS is +/ not defined, a user defined volume string table needs to be defined as: +/ +/ const char* VolumeStr[FF_VOLUMES] = {"ram","flash","sd","usb",... +*/ + +#ifndef FF_MULTI_PARTITION +#define FF_MULTI_PARTITION 0 +#endif +/* This option switches support for multiple volumes on the physical drive. +/ By default (0), each logical drive number is bound to the same physical drive +/ number and only an FAT volume found on the physical drive will be mounted. +/ When this function is enabled (1), each logical drive number can be bound to +/ arbitrary physical drive and partition listed in the VolToPart[]. Also f_fdisk() +/ funciton will be available. */ + +#ifndef FF_MIN_SS +#define FF_MIN_SS 512 +#endif + +#ifndef FF_MAX_SS +#define FF_MAX_SS 512 +#endif +/* This set of options configures the range of sector size to be supported. (512, +/ 1024, 2048 or 4096) Always set both 512 for most systems, generic memory card and +/ harddisk. But a larger value may be required for on-board flash memory and some +/ type of optical media. When FF_MAX_SS is larger than FF_MIN_SS, FatFs is configured +/ for variable sector size mode and disk_ioctl() function needs to implement +/ GET_SECTOR_SIZE command. */ + +#ifndef FF_LBA64 +#define FF_LBA64 0 +#endif +/* This option switches support for 64-bit LBA. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) +/ To enable the 64-bit LBA, also exFAT needs to be enabled. (FF_FS_EXFAT == 1) */ + +#ifndef FF_MIN_GPT +#define FF_MIN_GPT 0x100000000 +#endif +/* Minimum number of sectors to switch GPT format to create partition in f_mkfs and +/ f_fdisk function. 0x100000000 max. This option has no effect when FF_LBA64 == 0. */ + +#ifndef FF_USE_TRIM +#define FF_USE_TRIM 0 +#endif +/* This option switches support for ATA-TRIM. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) +/ To enable Trim function, also CTRL_TRIM command should be implemented to the +/ disk_ioctl() function. */ + +/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------/ +/ System Configurations +/---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#ifndef FF_FS_TINY +#define FF_FS_TINY 0 +#endif +/* This option switches tiny buffer configuration. (0:Normal or 1:Tiny) +/ At the tiny configuration, size of file object (FIL) is shrinked FF_MAX_SS bytes. +/ Instead of private sector buffer eliminated from the file object, common sector +/ buffer in the filesystem object (FATFS) is used for the file data transfer. */ + +#ifndef FF_FS_EXFAT +#define FF_FS_EXFAT 0 +#endif +/* This option switches support for exFAT filesystem. (0:Disable or 1:Enable) +/ To enable exFAT, also LFN needs to be enabled. (FF_USE_LFN >= 1) +/ Note that enabling exFAT discards ANSI C (C89) compatibility. */ + +#ifndef FF_FS_NORTC +#define FF_FS_NORTC 1 +#endif + +#ifndef FF_NORTC_MON +#define FF_NORTC_MON 1 +#endif + +#ifndef FF_NORTC_MDAY +#define FF_NORTC_MDAY 1 +#endif + +#ifndef FF_NORTC_YEAR +#define FF_NORTC_YEAR 2022 +#endif +/* The option FF_FS_NORTC switches timestamp functiton. If the system does not have +/ any RTC function or valid timestamp is not needed, set FF_FS_NORTC = 1 to disable +/ the timestamp function. Every object modified by FatFs will have a fixed timestamp +/ defined by FF_NORTC_MON, FF_NORTC_MDAY and FF_NORTC_YEAR in local time. +/ To enable timestamp function (FF_FS_NORTC = 0), get_fattime() function need to be +/ added to the project to read current time form real-time clock. FF_NORTC_MON, +/ FF_NORTC_MDAY and FF_NORTC_YEAR have no effect. +/ These options have no effect in read-only configuration (FF_FS_READONLY = 1). */ + +#ifndef FF_FS_NOFSINFO +#define FF_FS_NOFSINFO 0 +#endif +/* If you need to know correct free space on the FAT32 volume, set bit 0 of this +/ option, and f_getfree() function at first time after volume mount will force +/ a full FAT scan. Bit 1 controls the use of last allocated cluster number. +/ +/ bit0=0: Use free cluster count in the FSINFO if available. +/ bit0=1: Do not trust free cluster count in the FSINFO. +/ bit1=0: Use last allocated cluster number in the FSINFO if available. +/ bit1=1: Do not trust last allocated cluster number in the FSINFO. +*/ + +#ifndef FF_FS_LOCK +#define FF_FS_LOCK 0 +#endif +/* The option FF_FS_LOCK switches file lock function to control duplicated file open +/ and illegal operation to open objects. This option must be 0 when FF_FS_READONLY +/ is 1. +/ +/ 0: Disable file lock function. To avoid volume corruption, application program +/ should avoid illegal open, remove and rename to the open objects. +/ >0: Enable file lock function. The value defines how many files/sub-directories +/ can be opened simultaneously under file lock control. Note that the file +/ lock control is independent of re-entrancy. */ + +/* #include // O/S definitions */ +#ifndef FF_FS_REENTRANT +#define FF_FS_REENTRANT 0 +#endif + +#if (FF_FS_REENTRANT) +#include "FreeRTOS.h" +#include "task.h" +#include "semphr.h" +#define FF_FS_TIMEOUT 1000 +#define FF_SYNC_t SemaphoreHandle_t +#endif +/* The option FF_FS_REENTRANT switches the re-entrancy (thread safe) of the FatFs +/ module itself. Note that regardless of this option, file access to different +/ volume is always re-entrant and volume control functions, f_mount(), f_mkfs() +/ and f_fdisk() function, are always not re-entrant. Only file/directory access +/ to the same volume is under control of this function. +/ +/ 0: Disable re-entrancy. FF_FS_TIMEOUT and FF_SYNC_t have no effect. +/ 1: Enable re-entrancy. Also user provided synchronization handlers, +/ ff_req_grant(), ff_rel_grant(), ff_del_syncobj() and ff_cre_syncobj() +/ function, must be added to the project. Samples are available in +/ option/syscall.c. +/ +/ The FF_FS_TIMEOUT defines timeout period in unit of time tick. +/ The FF_SYNC_t defines O/S dependent sync object type. e.g. HANDLE, ID, OS_EVENT*, +/ SemaphoreHandle_t and etc. A header file for O/S definitions needs to be +/ included somewhere in the scope of ff.h. */ + +/*--- End of configuration options ---*/ diff --git a/components/fatfs/ffsystem.c b/components/fs/fatfs/ffsystem.c similarity index 100% rename from components/fatfs/ffsystem.c rename to components/fs/fatfs/ffsystem.c diff --git a/components/fatfs/ffunicode.c b/components/fs/fatfs/ffunicode.c similarity index 100% rename from components/fatfs/ffunicode.c rename to components/fs/fatfs/ffunicode.c diff --git a/components/fatfs/port/fatfs_sdh_sdcard.c b/components/fs/fatfs/port/fatfs_sdh_sdcard.c similarity index 100% rename from components/fatfs/port/fatfs_sdh_sdcard.c rename to components/fs/fatfs/port/fatfs_sdh_sdcard.c diff --git a/components/fs/littlefs/.gitignore b/components/fs/littlefs/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..84fea743 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/fs/littlefs/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +littlefs diff --git a/components/fs/littlefs/CMakeLists.txt b/components/fs/littlefs/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bf27793a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/fs/littlefs/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +sdk_generate_library() +sdk_library_add_sources(littlefs/lfs_util.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(littlefs/lfs.c) +sdk_add_include_directories(littlefs) + +# sdk_library_add_sources(littlefs/bd/lfs_filebd.c.c) +# sdk_library_add_sources(littlefs/bd/lfs_rambd.c.c) +# sdk_library_add_sources(littlefs/bd/lfs_testbd.c.c) +# sdk_add_include_directories(littlefs/bd) +sdk_library_add_sources(port/lfs_xip_flash.c) +sdk_add_include_directories(port) + +sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_LITTLEFS) + +if(CONFIG_LITTLEFS_FLASH_ADDRESS) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_LITTLEFS_FLASH_ADDRESS=${CONFIG_LITTLEFS_FLASH_ADDRESS}) +endif() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/fs/littlefs/README.md b/components/fs/littlefs/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1abff3b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/fs/littlefs/README.md @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +LittleFS Porting for Bouffalo SDK diff --git a/components/fs/littlefs/port/lfs_port.h b/components/fs/littlefs/port/lfs_port.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a45dbc08 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/fs/littlefs/port/lfs_port.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +#ifndef _LFS_PORT_H +#define _LFS_PORT_H + +#include "lfs.h" + +extern int lfs_xip_flash_read(const struct lfs_config *c, lfs_block_t block, + lfs_off_t off, void *buffer, lfs_size_t size); +extern int lfs_xip_flash_prog(const struct lfs_config *c, lfs_block_t block, + lfs_off_t off, const void *buffer, lfs_size_t size); +extern int lfs_xip_flash_erase(const struct lfs_config *c, lfs_block_t block); +extern int lfs_xip_flash_sync(const struct lfs_config *c); + +#endif \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/fs/littlefs/port/lfs_xip_flash.c b/components/fs/littlefs/port/lfs_xip_flash.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..447d921c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/fs/littlefs/port/lfs_xip_flash.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +#include "lfs.h" +#include "bflb_flash.h" +#include "bflb_l1c.h" + +#ifndef CONFIG_LITTLEFS_FLASH_ADDRESS +#error "must define CONFIG_LITTLEFS_FLASH_ADDRESS" +#endif + +/***************************************************************************** +* @brief Read a region in a block. Negative error codes are propagated +* to the user. +* @param[in] c +* @param[in] block +* @param[in] off +* @param[out] buffer +* @param[in] size +* +* @retval int +*****************************************************************************/ +int lfs_xip_flash_read(const struct lfs_config *c, lfs_block_t block, + lfs_off_t off, void *buffer, lfs_size_t size) +{ + return bflb_flash_read(CONFIG_LITTLEFS_FLASH_ADDRESS + block * c->block_size + off, + (uint8_t *)buffer, size); +} + +/***************************************************************************** +* @brief Program a region in a block. The block must have previously +* been erased. Negative error codes are propagated to the user. +* May return LFS_ERR_CORRUPT if the block should be considered bad. +* @param[in] c +* @param[in] block +* @param[in] off +* @param[in] buffer +* @param[in] size +* +* @retval int +*****************************************************************************/ +int lfs_xip_flash_prog(const struct lfs_config *c, lfs_block_t block, + lfs_off_t off, const void *buffer, lfs_size_t size) +{ + return bflb_flash_write(CONFIG_LITTLEFS_FLASH_ADDRESS + block * c->block_size + off, + (uint8_t *)buffer, size); +} + +/***************************************************************************** +* @brief Erase a block. A block must be erased before being programmed. +* The state of an erased block is undefined. Negative error codes +* are propagated to the user. +* May return LFS_ERR_CORRUPT if the block should be considered bad. +* @param[in] c +* @param[in] block +* +* @retval int +*****************************************************************************/ +int lfs_xip_flash_erase(const struct lfs_config *c, lfs_block_t block) +{ + return bflb_flash_erase(CONFIG_LITTLEFS_FLASH_ADDRESS + block * c->block_size, c->block_size); +} + +/***************************************************************************** +* @brief Sync the state of the underlying block device. Negative error +* codes are propagated to the user. +* @param[in] c +* +* @retval int +*****************************************************************************/ +int lfs_xip_flash_sync(const struct lfs_config *c) +{ + /*!< if use xip, may need to clean cache */ + return 0; +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/graphics/CMakeLists.txt b/components/graphics/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b37dd18d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/graphics/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_LVGL lvgl) diff --git a/components/lvgl/CMakeLists.txt b/components/graphics/lvgl/CMakeLists.txt similarity index 96% rename from components/lvgl/CMakeLists.txt rename to components/graphics/lvgl/CMakeLists.txt index a4de5a0c..ea71caa3 100644 --- a/components/lvgl/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/graphics/lvgl/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -sdk_generate_library() - -file(GLOB_RECURSE sources "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/*.c") - -sdk_library_add_sources(${sources}) - -sdk_add_include_directories(port) +sdk_generate_library() + +file(GLOB_RECURSE sources "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/*.c") + +sdk_library_add_sources(${sources}) + +sdk_add_include_directories(port) sdk_add_include_directories(.) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_core.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_core.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_core.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_core.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_disp.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_disp.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_disp.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_disp.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_disp.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_disp.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_disp.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_disp.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_event.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_event.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_event.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_event.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_event.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_event.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_event.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_event.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_group.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_group.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_group.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_group.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_group.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_group.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_group.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_group.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_indev.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_indev.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_indev.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_indev.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_indev.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_indev.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_indev.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_indev.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_indev_scroll.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_indev_scroll.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_indev_scroll.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_indev_scroll.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_indev_scroll.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_indev_scroll.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_indev_scroll.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_indev_scroll.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_class.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_class.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_class.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_class.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_class.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_class.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_class.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_class.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_draw.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_draw.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_draw.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_draw.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_draw.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_draw.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_draw.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_draw.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_pos.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_pos.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_pos.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_pos.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_pos.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_pos.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_pos.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_pos.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_scroll.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_scroll.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_scroll.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_scroll.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_scroll.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_scroll.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_scroll.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_scroll.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style_gen.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style_gen.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style_gen.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style_gen.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style_gen.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style_gen.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style_gen.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_style_gen.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_tree.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_tree.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_tree.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_tree.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_tree.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_tree.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_obj_tree.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_obj_tree.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_refr.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_refr.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_refr.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_refr.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_refr.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_refr.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_refr.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_refr.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_theme.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_theme.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_theme.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_theme.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/core/lv_theme.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_theme.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/core/lv_theme.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/core/lv_theme.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_draw_arm2d.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_draw_arm2d.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_draw_arm2d.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_draw_arm2d.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_gpu_arm2d.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_gpu_arm2d.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_gpu_arm2d.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_gpu_arm2d.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_gpu_arm2d.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_gpu_arm2d.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_gpu_arm2d.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/arm2d/lv_gpu_arm2d.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_arc.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_arc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_arc.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_arc.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_arc.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_arc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_arc.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_arc.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_img.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_img.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_img.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_img.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_img.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_img.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_img.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_img.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_label.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_label.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_label.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_label.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_label.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_label.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_label.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_label.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_layer.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_layer.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_layer.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_layer.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_layer.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_layer.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_layer.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_layer.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_line.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_line.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_line.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_line.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_line.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_line.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_line.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_line.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_mask.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_mask.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_mask.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_mask.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_mask.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_mask.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_mask.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_mask.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_rect.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_rect.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_rect.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_rect.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_rect.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_rect.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_rect.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_rect.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_transform.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_transform.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_transform.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_transform.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_transform.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_transform.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_transform.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_transform.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_triangle.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_triangle.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_triangle.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_triangle.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_triangle.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_triangle.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_triangle.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_draw_triangle.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_buf.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_buf.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_buf.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_buf.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_buf.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_buf.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_buf.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_buf.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_cache.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_cache.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_cache.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_cache.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_cache.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_cache.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_cache.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_cache.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_decoder.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_decoder.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_decoder.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_decoder.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_decoder.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_decoder.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/lv_img_decoder.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/lv_img_decoder.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_draw_nxp.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_draw_nxp.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_draw_nxp.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_draw_nxp.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_gpu_nxp.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_gpu_nxp.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_gpu_nxp.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_gpu_nxp.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_gpu_nxp.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_gpu_nxp.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_gpu_nxp.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/lv_gpu_nxp.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_nxp_pxp.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_nxp_pxp.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_nxp_pxp.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_nxp_pxp.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_pxp_blend.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_pxp_blend.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_pxp_blend.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_pxp_blend.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_pxp_blend.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_pxp_blend.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_pxp_blend.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_draw_pxp_blend.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp_osa.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp_osa.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp_osa.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp_osa.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp_osa.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp_osa.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp_osa.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/pxp/lv_gpu_nxp_pxp_osa.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_nxp_vglite.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_nxp_vglite.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_nxp_vglite.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_nxp_vglite.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_arc.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_arc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_arc.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_arc.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_arc.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_arc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_arc.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_arc.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_blend.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_blend.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_blend.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_blend.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_blend.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_blend.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_blend.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_blend.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_rect.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_rect.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_rect.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_rect.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_rect.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_rect.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_rect.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_draw_vglite_rect.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_gpu_nxp_vglite.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_gpu_nxp_vglite.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_gpu_nxp_vglite.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_gpu_nxp_vglite.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_gpu_nxp_vglite.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_gpu_nxp_vglite.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_gpu_nxp_vglite.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/nxp/vglite/lv_gpu_nxp_vglite.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/README.md b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/README.md similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/README.md rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/README.md diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_arc.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_arc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_arc.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_arc.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_bg.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_bg.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_bg.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_bg.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_composite.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_composite.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_composite.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_composite.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_composite.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_composite.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_composite.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_composite.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_img.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_img.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_img.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_img.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_img.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_img.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_img.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_img.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_label.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_label.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_label.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_label.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_layer.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_layer.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_layer.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_layer.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_layer.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_layer.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_layer.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_layer.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_line.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_line.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_line.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_line.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_mask.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_mask.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_mask.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_mask.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_mask.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_mask.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_mask.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_mask.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_polygon.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_polygon.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_polygon.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_polygon.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_priv.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_priv.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_priv.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_priv.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_rect.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_rect.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_rect.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_rect.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_rect.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_rect.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_rect.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_rect.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_stack_blur.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_stack_blur.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_stack_blur.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_stack_blur.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_stack_blur.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_stack_blur.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_stack_blur.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_stack_blur.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_texture_cache.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_texture_cache.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_texture_cache.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_texture_cache.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_texture_cache.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_texture_cache.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_texture_cache.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_texture_cache.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_utils.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_utils.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_utils.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_utils.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_utils.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_utils.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_utils.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sdl/lv_draw_sdl_utils.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_draw_stm32_dma2d.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_draw_stm32_dma2d.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_draw_stm32_dma2d.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_draw_stm32_dma2d.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_gpu_stm32_dma2d.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_gpu_stm32_dma2d.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_gpu_stm32_dma2d.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_gpu_stm32_dma2d.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_gpu_stm32_dma2d.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_gpu_stm32_dma2d.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_gpu_stm32_dma2d.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/stm32_dma2d/lv_gpu_stm32_dma2d.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_arc.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_arc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_arc.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_arc.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_blend.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_blend.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_blend.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_blend.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_blend.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_blend.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_blend.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_blend.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_dither.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_dither.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_dither.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_dither.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_dither.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_dither.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_dither.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_dither.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_gradient.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_gradient.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_gradient.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_gradient.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_gradient.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_gradient.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_gradient.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_gradient.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_img.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_img.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_img.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_img.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_layer.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_layer.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_layer.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_layer.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_letter.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_letter.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_letter.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_letter.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_line.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_line.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_line.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_line.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_polygon.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_polygon.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_polygon.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_polygon.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_rect.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_rect.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_rect.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_rect.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_transform.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_transform.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_transform.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/sw/lv_draw_sw_transform.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_draw_swm341_dma2d.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_draw_swm341_dma2d.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_draw_swm341_dma2d.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_draw_swm341_dma2d.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_gpu_swm341_dma2d.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_gpu_swm341_dma2d.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_gpu_swm341_dma2d.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_gpu_swm341_dma2d.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_gpu_swm341_dma2d.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_gpu_swm341_dma2d.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_gpu_swm341_dma2d.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/draw/swm341_dma2d/lv_gpu_swm341_dma2d.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/README.md b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/README.md similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/README.md rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/README.md diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/layouts/flex/lv_flex.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/flex/lv_flex.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/layouts/flex/lv_flex.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/flex/lv_flex.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/layouts/flex/lv_flex.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/flex/lv_flex.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/layouts/flex/lv_flex.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/flex/lv_flex.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/layouts/grid/lv_grid.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/grid/lv_grid.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/layouts/grid/lv_grid.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/grid/lv_grid.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/layouts/grid/lv_grid.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/grid/lv_grid.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/layouts/grid/lv_grid.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/grid/lv_grid.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/layouts/lv_layouts.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/lv_layouts.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/layouts/lv_layouts.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/layouts/lv_layouts.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/bmp/lv_bmp.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/bmp/lv_bmp.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/bmp/lv_bmp.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/bmp/lv_bmp.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/bmp/lv_bmp.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/bmp/lv_bmp.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/bmp/lv_bmp.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/bmp/lv_bmp.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/ffmpeg/lv_ffmpeg.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/ffmpeg/lv_ffmpeg.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/ffmpeg/lv_ffmpeg.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/ffmpeg/lv_ffmpeg.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/ffmpeg/lv_ffmpeg.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/ffmpeg/lv_ffmpeg.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/ffmpeg/lv_ffmpeg.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/ffmpeg/lv_ffmpeg.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/arial.ttf b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/arial.ttf similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/arial.ttf rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/arial.ttf diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/lv_freetype.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/lv_freetype.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/lv_freetype.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/lv_freetype.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/lv_freetype.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/lv_freetype.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/lv_freetype.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/freetype/lv_freetype.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_fatfs.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_fatfs.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_fatfs.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_fatfs.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_posix.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_posix.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_posix.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_posix.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_stdio.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_stdio.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_stdio.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_stdio.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_win32.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_win32.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_win32.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fs_win32.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fsdrv.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fsdrv.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fsdrv.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/fsdrv/lv_fsdrv.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/gifdec.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/gifdec.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/gifdec.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/gifdec.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/gifdec.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/gifdec.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/gifdec.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/gifdec.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/lv_gif.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/lv_gif.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/lv_gif.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/lv_gif.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/lv_gif.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/lv_gif.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/lv_gif.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/gif/lv_gif.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/lv_libs.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/lv_libs.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/lv_libs.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/lv_libs.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lodepng.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lodepng.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lodepng.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lodepng.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lodepng.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lodepng.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lodepng.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lodepng.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lv_png.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lv_png.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lv_png.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lv_png.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lv_png.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lv_png.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lv_png.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/png/lv_png.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/lv_qrcode.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/lv_qrcode.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/lv_qrcode.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/lv_qrcode.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/lv_qrcode.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/lv_qrcode.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/lv_qrcode.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/lv_qrcode.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/qrcodegen.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/qrcodegen.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/qrcodegen.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/qrcodegen.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/qrcodegen.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/qrcodegen.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/qrcodegen.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/qrcode/qrcodegen.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/rlottie/lv_rlottie.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/rlottie/lv_rlottie.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/rlottie/lv_rlottie.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/rlottie/lv_rlottie.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/rlottie/lv_rlottie.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/rlottie/lv_rlottie.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/rlottie/lv_rlottie.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/rlottie/lv_rlottie.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/lv_sjpg.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/lv_sjpg.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/lv_sjpg.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/lv_sjpg.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/lv_sjpg.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/lv_sjpg.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/lv_sjpg.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/lv_sjpg.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgd.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgd.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgd.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgd.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgd.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgd.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgd.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgd.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgdcnf.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgdcnf.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgdcnf.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/libs/sjpg/tjpgdcnf.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/lv_extra.mk diff --git a/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/README.md b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e69de29b diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment_manager.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment_manager.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment_manager.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/fragment/lv_fragment_manager.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/gridnav/lv_gridnav.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/gridnav/lv_gridnav.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/gridnav/lv_gridnav.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/gridnav/lv_gridnav.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/gridnav/lv_gridnav.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/gridnav/lv_gridnav.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/gridnav/lv_gridnav.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/gridnav/lv_gridnav.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/ime/lv_ime_pinyin.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/ime/lv_ime_pinyin.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/ime/lv_ime_pinyin.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/ime/lv_ime_pinyin.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/ime/lv_ime_pinyin.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/ime/lv_ime_pinyin.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/ime/lv_ime_pinyin.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/ime/lv_ime_pinyin.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/imgfont/lv_imgfont.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/imgfont/lv_imgfont.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/imgfont/lv_imgfont.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/imgfont/lv_imgfont.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/imgfont/lv_imgfont.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/imgfont/lv_imgfont.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/imgfont/lv_imgfont.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/imgfont/lv_imgfont.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/lv_others.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/lv_others.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/lv_others.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/lv_others.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/monkey/lv_monkey.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/monkey/lv_monkey.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/monkey/lv_monkey.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/monkey/lv_monkey.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/monkey/lv_monkey.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/monkey/lv_monkey.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/monkey/lv_monkey.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/monkey/lv_monkey.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/msg/lv_msg.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/msg/lv_msg.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/msg/lv_msg.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/msg/lv_msg.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/msg/lv_msg.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/msg/lv_msg.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/msg/lv_msg.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/msg/lv_msg.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/snapshot/lv_snapshot.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/snapshot/lv_snapshot.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/snapshot/lv_snapshot.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/snapshot/lv_snapshot.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/others/snapshot/lv_snapshot.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/snapshot/lv_snapshot.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/others/snapshot/lv_snapshot.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/others/snapshot/lv_snapshot.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/themes/basic/lv_theme_basic.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/basic/lv_theme_basic.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/themes/basic/lv_theme_basic.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/basic/lv_theme_basic.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/themes/basic/lv_theme_basic.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/basic/lv_theme_basic.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/themes/basic/lv_theme_basic.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/basic/lv_theme_basic.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/themes/default/lv_theme_default.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/default/lv_theme_default.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/themes/default/lv_theme_default.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/default/lv_theme_default.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/themes/default/lv_theme_default.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/default/lv_theme_default.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/themes/default/lv_theme_default.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/default/lv_theme_default.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/themes/lv_themes.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/lv_themes.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/themes/lv_themes.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/lv_themes.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/themes/mono/lv_theme_mono.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/mono/lv_theme_mono.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/themes/mono/lv_theme_mono.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/mono/lv_theme_mono.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/themes/mono/lv_theme_mono.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/mono/lv_theme_mono.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/themes/mono/lv_theme_mono.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/themes/mono/lv_theme_mono.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/animimg/lv_animimg.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/animimg/lv_animimg.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/animimg/lv_animimg.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/animimg/lv_animimg.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/animimg/lv_animimg.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/animimg/lv_animimg.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/animimg/lv_animimg.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/animimg/lv_animimg.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_arrow.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_arrow.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_arrow.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_arrow.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_arrow.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_arrow.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_arrow.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_arrow.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_dropdown.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_dropdown.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_dropdown.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_dropdown.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_dropdown.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_dropdown.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_dropdown.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/calendar/lv_calendar_header_dropdown.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/chart/lv_chart.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/chart/lv_chart.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/chart/lv_chart.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/chart/lv_chart.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/chart/lv_chart.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/chart/lv_chart.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/chart/lv_chart.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/chart/lv_chart.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/colorwheel/lv_colorwheel.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/colorwheel/lv_colorwheel.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/colorwheel/lv_colorwheel.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/colorwheel/lv_colorwheel.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/colorwheel/lv_colorwheel.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/colorwheel/lv_colorwheel.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/colorwheel/lv_colorwheel.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/colorwheel/lv_colorwheel.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/imgbtn/lv_imgbtn.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/imgbtn/lv_imgbtn.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/imgbtn/lv_imgbtn.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/imgbtn/lv_imgbtn.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/imgbtn/lv_imgbtn.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/imgbtn/lv_imgbtn.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/imgbtn/lv_imgbtn.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/imgbtn/lv_imgbtn.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/keyboard/lv_keyboard.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/keyboard/lv_keyboard.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/keyboard/lv_keyboard.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/keyboard/lv_keyboard.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/keyboard/lv_keyboard.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/keyboard/lv_keyboard.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/keyboard/lv_keyboard.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/keyboard/lv_keyboard.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/led/lv_led.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/led/lv_led.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/led/lv_led.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/led/lv_led.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/led/lv_led.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/led/lv_led.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/led/lv_led.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/led/lv_led.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/list/lv_list.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/list/lv_list.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/list/lv_list.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/list/lv_list.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/list/lv_list.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/list/lv_list.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/list/lv_list.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/list/lv_list.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/lv_widgets.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/lv_widgets.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/lv_widgets.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/lv_widgets.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/menu/lv_menu.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/menu/lv_menu.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/menu/lv_menu.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/menu/lv_menu.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/menu/lv_menu.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/menu/lv_menu.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/menu/lv_menu.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/menu/lv_menu.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/meter/lv_meter.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/meter/lv_meter.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/meter/lv_meter.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/meter/lv_meter.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/meter/lv_meter.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/meter/lv_meter.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/meter/lv_meter.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/meter/lv_meter.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/msgbox/lv_msgbox.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/msgbox/lv_msgbox.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/msgbox/lv_msgbox.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/msgbox/lv_msgbox.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/msgbox/lv_msgbox.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/msgbox/lv_msgbox.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/msgbox/lv_msgbox.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/msgbox/lv_msgbox.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/span/lv_span.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/span/lv_span.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/span/lv_span.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/span/lv_span.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/span/lv_span.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/span/lv_span.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/span/lv_span.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/span/lv_span.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinbox/lv_spinbox.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinbox/lv_spinbox.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinbox/lv_spinbox.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinbox/lv_spinbox.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinbox/lv_spinbox.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinbox/lv_spinbox.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinbox/lv_spinbox.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinbox/lv_spinbox.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinner/lv_spinner.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinner/lv_spinner.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinner/lv_spinner.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinner/lv_spinner.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinner/lv_spinner.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinner/lv_spinner.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinner/lv_spinner.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/spinner/lv_spinner.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/tabview/lv_tabview.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/tabview/lv_tabview.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/tabview/lv_tabview.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/tabview/lv_tabview.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/tabview/lv_tabview.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/tabview/lv_tabview.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/tabview/lv_tabview.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/tabview/lv_tabview.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/tileview/lv_tileview.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/tileview/lv_tileview.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/tileview/lv_tileview.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/tileview/lv_tileview.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/tileview/lv_tileview.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/tileview/lv_tileview.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/tileview/lv_tileview.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/tileview/lv_tileview.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/win/lv_win.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/win/lv_win.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/win/lv_win.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/win/lv_win.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/extra/widgets/win/lv_win.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/win/lv_win.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/extra/widgets/win/lv_win.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/extra/widgets/win/lv_win.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/korean.ttf b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/korean.ttf similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/korean.ttf rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/korean.ttf diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_dejavu_16_persian_hebrew.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_dejavu_16_persian_hebrew.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_dejavu_16_persian_hebrew.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_dejavu_16_persian_hebrew.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_fmt_txt.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_fmt_txt.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_fmt_txt.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_fmt_txt.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_fmt_txt.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_fmt_txt.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_fmt_txt.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_fmt_txt.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_loader.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_loader.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_loader.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_loader.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_loader.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_loader.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_loader.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_loader.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_10.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_10.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_10.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_10.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_12.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_12.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_12.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_12.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_12_subpx.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_12_subpx.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_12_subpx.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_12_subpx.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_14.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_14.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_14.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_14.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_16.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_16.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_16.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_16.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_18.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_18.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_18.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_18.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_20.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_20.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_20.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_20.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_22.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_22.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_22.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_22.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_24.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_24.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_24.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_24.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_26.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_26.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_26.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_26.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_28.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_28.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_28.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_28.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_28_compressed.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_28_compressed.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_28_compressed.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_28_compressed.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_30.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_30.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_30.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_30.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_32.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_32.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_32.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_32.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_34.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_34.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_34.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_34.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_36.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_36.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_36.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_36.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_38.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_38.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_38.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_38.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_40.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_40.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_40.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_40.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_42.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_42.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_42.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_42.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_44.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_44.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_44.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_44.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_46.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_46.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_46.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_46.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_48.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_48.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_48.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_48.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_8.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_8.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_8.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_montserrat_8.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_simsun_16_cjk.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_simsun_16_cjk.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_simsun_16_cjk.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_simsun_16_cjk.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_unscii_16.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_unscii_16.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_unscii_16.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_unscii_16.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_font_unscii_8.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_unscii_8.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_font_unscii_8.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_font_unscii_8.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/font/lv_symbol_def.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_symbol_def.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/font/lv_symbol_def.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/font/lv_symbol_def.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_disp.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_disp.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_disp.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_disp.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_disp.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_disp.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_disp.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_disp.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_indev.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_indev.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_indev.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_indev.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_indev.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_indev.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_indev.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_indev.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_tick.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_tick.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_tick.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_tick.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_tick.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_tick.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_tick.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/hal/lv_hal_tick.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/lv_api_map.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/lv_api_map.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/lv_api_map.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/lv_api_map.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/lv_conf_internal.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/lv_conf_internal.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/lv_conf_internal.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/lv_conf_internal.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/lv_conf_kconfig.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/lv_conf_kconfig.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/lv_conf_kconfig.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/lv_conf_kconfig.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/lvgl.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/lvgl.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/lvgl.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/lvgl.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_anim.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_anim.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_anim.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_anim.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_anim.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_anim.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_anim.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_anim.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_anim_timeline.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_anim_timeline.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_anim_timeline.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_anim_timeline.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_anim_timeline.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_anim_timeline.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_anim_timeline.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_anim_timeline.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_area.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_area.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_area.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_area.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_area.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_area.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_area.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_area.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_assert.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_assert.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_assert.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_assert.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_async.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_async.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_async.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_async.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_async.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_async.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_async.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_async.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_bidi.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_bidi.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_bidi.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_bidi.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_bidi.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_bidi.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_bidi.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_bidi.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_color.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_color.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_color.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_color.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_color.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_color.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_color.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_color.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_fs.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_fs.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_fs.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_fs.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_fs.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_fs.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_fs.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_fs.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_gc.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_gc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_gc.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_gc.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_gc.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_gc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_gc.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_gc.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_ll.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_ll.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_ll.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_ll.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_ll.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_ll.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_ll.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_ll.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_log.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_log.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_log.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_log.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_log.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_log.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_log.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_log.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_lru.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_lru.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_lru.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_lru.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_lru.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_lru.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_lru.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_lru.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_math.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_math.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_math.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_math.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_math.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_math.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_math.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_math.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_mem.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_mem.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_mem.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_mem.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_mem.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_mem.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_mem.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_mem.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_misc.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_misc.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_misc.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_misc.mk diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_printf.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_printf.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_printf.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_printf.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_printf.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_printf.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_printf.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_printf.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_style.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_style.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_style.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_style.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_style.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_style.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_style.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_style.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_style_gen.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_style_gen.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_style_gen.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_style_gen.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_style_gen.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_style_gen.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_style_gen.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_style_gen.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_templ.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_templ.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_templ.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_templ.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_templ.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_templ.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_templ.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_templ.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_timer.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_timer.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_timer.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_timer.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_timer.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_timer.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_timer.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_timer.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_tlsf.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_tlsf.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_tlsf.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_tlsf.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_tlsf.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_tlsf.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_tlsf.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_tlsf.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_txt.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_txt.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_txt.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_txt.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_txt.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_txt.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_txt.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_txt.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_txt_ap.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_txt_ap.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_txt_ap.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_txt_ap.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_txt_ap.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_txt_ap.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_txt_ap.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_txt_ap.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_types.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_types.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_types.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_types.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_utils.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_utils.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_utils.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_utils.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/misc/lv_utils.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_utils.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/misc/lv_utils.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/misc/lv_utils.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/port/lv_port_disp.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_disp.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/port/lv_port_disp.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_disp.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/port/lv_port_disp.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_disp.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/port/lv_port_disp.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_disp.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/port/lv_port_fs.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_fs.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/port/lv_port_fs.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_fs.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/port/lv_port_fs.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_fs.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/port/lv_port_fs.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_fs.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.c similarity index 99% rename from components/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.c index eff3c5c4..02a45d43 100644 --- a/components/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.c +++ b/components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.c @@ -4,15 +4,13 @@ */ /*Copy this file as "lv_port_indev.c" and set this value to "1" to enable content*/ -#if 0 +#if 1 /********************* * INCLUDES *********************/ #include "lv_port_indev.h" -#include "bflb_platform.h" -#include "hal_gpio.h" -#include "hal_dma.h" +#include "bflb_core.h" /********************* * DEFINES @@ -197,7 +195,6 @@ void lv_port_indev_init(void) * Touchpad * -----------------*/ #include "touch.h" -#include "hal_spi.h" /*Initialize your touchpad*/ static void touchpad_init(void) diff --git a/components/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/port/lv_port_indev.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_arc.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_arc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_arc.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_arc.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_arc.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_arc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_arc.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_arc.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_bar.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_bar.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_bar.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_bar.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_bar.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_bar.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_bar.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_bar.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_btn.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_btn.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_btn.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_btn.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_btn.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_btn.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_btn.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_btn.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_btnmatrix.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_btnmatrix.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_btnmatrix.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_btnmatrix.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_btnmatrix.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_btnmatrix.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_btnmatrix.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_btnmatrix.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_canvas.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_canvas.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_canvas.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_canvas.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_canvas.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_canvas.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_canvas.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_canvas.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_checkbox.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_checkbox.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_checkbox.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_checkbox.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_checkbox.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_checkbox.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_checkbox.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_checkbox.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_dropdown.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_dropdown.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_dropdown.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_dropdown.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_dropdown.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_dropdown.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_dropdown.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_dropdown.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_img.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_img.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_img.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_img.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_img.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_img.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_img.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_img.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_label.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_label.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_label.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_label.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_label.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_label.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_label.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_label.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_line.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_line.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_line.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_line.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_line.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_line.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_line.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_line.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_objx_templ.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_objx_templ.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_objx_templ.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_objx_templ.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_objx_templ.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_objx_templ.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_objx_templ.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_objx_templ.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_roller.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_roller.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_roller.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_roller.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_roller.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_roller.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_roller.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_roller.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_slider.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_slider.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_slider.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_slider.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_slider.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_slider.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_slider.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_slider.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_switch.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_switch.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_switch.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_switch.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_switch.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_switch.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_switch.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_switch.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_table.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_table.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_table.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_table.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_table.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_table.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_table.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_table.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.c b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.c rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.c diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.h b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.h rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_textarea.h diff --git a/components/lvgl/widgets/lv_widgets.mk b/components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_widgets.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/lvgl/widgets/lv_widgets.mk rename to components/graphics/lvgl/widgets/lv_widgets.mk diff --git a/components/libc/CMakeLists.txt b/components/libc/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7188070c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +sdk_generate_library() + +sdk_library_add_sources( +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_abs.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atof.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoi.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atol.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoll.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_bsearch.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_checkbase.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_itoa.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_llabs.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_lldiv.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_qsort.c +nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtod.c +# nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtof.c +# nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtol.c +# nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtold.c +# nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoll.c +# nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoull.c +) + +sdk_library_add_sources( +nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffs.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffsl.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffsll.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_fls.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_flsl.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_flsll.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_index.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_memccpy.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_memchr.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_memcmp.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_memmove.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_memrchr.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_memset.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_stpcpy.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_stpncpy.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcasecmp.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcasestr.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcat.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strchr.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcmp.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcspn.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strdup.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strnlen.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strpbrk.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strrchr.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strsep.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strspn.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strstr.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strtok.c +nuttx/libc/string/lib_strtokr.c +# nuttx/libc/string/lib_isbasedigit.c +# nuttx/libc/string/lib_skipspace.c +) + +sdk_library_add_sources( +nuttx/libc/string/lib_vikmemcpy.c +) + +sdk_add_include_directories(.) + +# libc or vlibc select +if(CONFIG_VLIBC) + # vsnprintf config + if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_FLOAT=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT}) + endif() + + if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT_EX) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_FLOAT_EX=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT_EX}) + endif() + + if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_LONG_LONG) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_LONG_LONG=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_LONG_LONG}) + endif() + + if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_WRITEBACK) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_WRITEBACK=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_WRITEBACK}) + endif() + + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC) + + # vlibc debug enable + if(CONFIG_VLIBC_DEBUG) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_DEBUG) + endif() + + # vlibc fatfs port enable + if(CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS) + endif() + + sdk_library_add_sources(vlibc/printf.c) + sdk_library_add_sources(vlibc/vlibc_stdio.c) + sdk_library_add_sources(vlibc/vlibc_vsnprintf.c) + sdk_add_include_directories(vlibc) +else() + # vsnprintf config + if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_LIBC_FLOAT=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT}) + endif() + + if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT_EX) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_LIBC_FLOAT_EX=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT_EX}) + endif() + + if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_LONG_LONG) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_LIBC_LONG_LONG=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_LONG_LONG}) + endif() + + if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_NANO) + sdk_library_add_sources(vsnprintf_nano.c) + else() + sdk_library_add_sources(vsnprintf.c) + endif() + + sdk_library_add_sources(printf.c) +endif() + +sdk_library_add_sources(snprintf.c) + +# use custom apis first, if not exist, then use builtin apis +sdk_add_compile_options(-fno-builtin) diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/compiler.h b/components/libc/nuttx/compiler.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85385fd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/compiler.h @@ -0,0 +1,714 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * include/nuttx/compiler.h + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef __INCLUDE_NUTTX_COMPILER_H +#define __INCLUDE_NUTTX_COMPILER_H + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* GCC-specific definitions *************************************************/ + +#ifdef __GNUC__ + +/* Pre-processor */ + +# define CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_VARARGS 1 /* Supports variable argument macros */ +# define CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_WARNING 1 /* Supports #warning */ + +/* Intriniscs. GCC supports __func__ but provides __FUNCTION__ for backward + * compatibility with older versions of GCC. + */ + +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTIONNAME 1 /* Has __FUNCTION__ */ +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FILENAME 1 /* Has __FILE__ */ + +/* Indicate that a local variable is not used */ + +# define UNUSED(a) ((void)(1 || (a))) + +/* Built-in functions */ + +/* GCC 4.x have __builtin_ctz(|l|ll) and __builtin_clz(|l|ll). These count + * trailing/leading zeros of input number and typically will generate few + * fast bit-counting instructions. Inputting zero to these functions is + * undefined and needs to be taken care of by the caller. + */ + +#if __GNUC__ >= 4 +# define CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_CTZ 1 +# define CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_CLZ 1 +# define CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_POPCOUNT 1 +#endif + +/* C++ support */ + +#if defined(__cplusplus) && __cplusplus >= 201402L +# define CONFIG_HAVE_CXX14 1 +#else +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_CXX14 +#endif + +/* Attributes + * + * GCC supports weak symbols which can be used to reduce code size because + * unnecessary "weak" functions can be excluded from the link. + */ + +# if !defined(__CYGWIN__) && !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_GNU_NO_WEAKFUNCTIONS) +# define CONFIG_HAVE_WEAKFUNCTIONS 1 +# define weak_alias(name, aliasname) \ + extern __typeof (name) aliasname __attribute__ ((weak, alias (#name))); +# define weak_data __attribute__ ((weak)) +# define weak_function __attribute__ ((weak)) +# define weak_const_function __attribute__ ((weak, __const__)) +# else +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_WEAKFUNCTIONS +# define weak_alias(name, aliasname) +# define weak_data +# define weak_function +# define weak_const_function +# endif + +/* The noreturn attribute informs GCC that the function will not return. + * C11 adds _Noreturn keyword (see stdnoreturn.h) + */ + +# define noreturn_function __attribute__ ((noreturn)) + +/* The farcall_function attribute informs GCC that is should use long calls + * (even though -mlong-calls does not appear in the compilation options) + */ + +# define farcall_function __attribute__ ((long_call)) + +/* Code locate */ + +# define locate_code(n) __attribute__ ((section(n))) + +/* Data alignment */ + +# define aligned_data(n) __attribute__ ((aligned(n))) + +/* Data location */ + +# define locate_data(n) __attribute__ ((section(n))) + +/* The packed attribute informs GCC that the structure elements are packed, + * ignoring other alignment rules. + */ + +# define begin_packed_struct +# define end_packed_struct __attribute__ ((packed)) + +/* GCC does not support the reentrant attribute */ + +# define reentrant_function + +/* The naked attribute informs GCC that the programmer will take care of + * the function prolog and epilog. + */ + +# define naked_function __attribute__ ((naked,no_instrument_function)) + +/* The inline_function attribute informs GCC that the function should always + * be inlined, regardless of the level of optimization. The + * noinline_function indicates that the function should never be inlined. + */ + +# define inline_function __attribute__ ((always_inline,no_instrument_function)) +# define noinline_function __attribute__ ((noinline)) + +/* Some versions of GCC have a separate __syslog__ format. + * http://mail-index.netbsd.org/source-changes/2015/10/14/msg069435.html + * Use it if available. Otherwise, assume __printf__ accepts %m. + */ + +# if !defined(__syslog_attribute__) +# define __syslog__ __printf__ +# endif + +# define printflike(a, b) __attribute__((__format__ (__printf__, a, b))) +# define sysloglike(a, b) __attribute__((__format__ (__syslog__, a, b))) +# define scanflike(a, b) __attribute__((__format__ (__scanf__, a, b))) +# define strftimelike(a) __attribute__((__format__ (__strftime__, a, 0))) + +/* GCC does not use storage classes to qualify addressing */ + +# define FAR +# define NEAR +# define DSEG +# define CODE + +/* Handle cases where sizeof(int) is 16-bits, sizeof(long) is 32-bits, and + * pointers are 16-bits. + */ + +#if defined(__m32c__) +/* No I-space access qualifiers */ + +# define IOBJ +# define IPTR + +/* Select the small, 16-bit addressing model */ + +# define CONFIG_SMALL_MEMORY 1 + +/* Long and int are not the same size */ + +# define CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT 1 + +/* Pointers and int are the same size */ + +# undef CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT + +#elif defined(__AVR__) +# if defined(CONFIG_AVR_HAS_MEMX_PTR) + /* I-space access qualifiers needed by Harvard architecture */ + +# define IOBJ __flash +# define IPTR __memx + +# else +/* No I-space access qualifiers */ + +# define IOBJ +# define IPTR +# endif + +/* Select the small, 16-bit addressing model (for D-Space) */ + +# define CONFIG_SMALL_MEMORY 1 + +/* Long and int are not the same size */ + +# define CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT 1 + +/* Pointers and int are the same size */ + +# undef CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT + +/* Uses a 32-bit FAR pointer only from accessing data outside of the 16-bit + * data space. + */ + +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FARPOINTER 1 + +#elif defined(__mc68hc1x__) + +/* No I-space access qualifiers */ + +# define IOBJ +# define IPTR + +/* Select the small, 16-bit addressing model */ + +# define CONFIG_SMALL_MEMORY 1 + +/* Normally, mc68hc1x code is compiled with the -mshort option + * which results in a 16-bit integer. If -mnoshort is defined + * then an integer is 32-bits. GCC will defined __INT__ accordingly: + */ + +# if __INT__ == 16 +/* int is 16-bits, long is 32-bits */ + +# define CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT 1 + +/* Pointers and int are the same size (16-bits) */ + +# undef CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT +# else +/* int and long are both 32-bits */ + +# undef CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT + +/* Pointers and int are NOT the same size */ + +# define CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT 1 +# endif + +#else + +/* No I-space access qualifiers */ + +# define IOBJ +# define IPTR + +/* Select the large, 32-bit addressing model */ + +# undef CONFIG_SMALL_MEMORY + +/* Long and int are (probably) the same size (32-bits) */ + +# undef CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT + +/* Pointers and int are the same size (32-bits) */ + +# undef CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT +#endif + +/* ISO C11 supports anonymous (unnamed) structures and unions, added in + * GCC 4.6 (but might be suppressed with -std= option). ISO C++11 also + * adds un-named unions, but NOT unnamed structures (although compilers + * may support them). + * + * CAREFUL: This can cause issues for shared data structures shared between + * C and C++ if the two versions do not support the same features. + * Structures and unions can lose binary compatibility! + * + * NOTE: The NuttX coding standard forbids the use of unnamed structures and + * unions within the OS. + */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_STRUCT +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_UNION + +# if (defined(__cplusplus) && __cplusplus >= 201103L) || \ + (defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L) +# define CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_STRUCT 1 +# define CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_UNION 1 +# endif + +// # define CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG 1 +// # define CONFIG_HAVE_FLOAT 1 +// # define CONFIG_HAVE_DOUBLE 1 +// # define CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1 + +/* Indicate that a local variable is not used */ + +# define UNUSED(a) ((void)(1 || (a))) + +/* SDCC-specific definitions ************************************************/ + +#elif defined(SDCC) || defined(__SDCC) + +/* No I-space access qualifiers */ + +# define IOBJ +# define IPTR + +/* Pre-processor */ + +# define CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_VARARGS 1 /* Supports variable argument macros */ +# define CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_WARNING 1 /* Supports #warning */ + +/* Intriniscs */ + +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTIONNAME 1 /* Has __FUNCTION__ */ +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FILENAME 1 /* Has __FILE__ */ +# define __FUNCTION__ __func__ /* SDCC supports on __func__ */ + +/* Pragmas + * + * Disable warnings for unused function arguments + */ + +# pragma disable_warning 85 + +/* C++ support */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_CXX14 + +/* Attributes + * + * SDCC does not support weak symbols + */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_WEAKFUNCTIONS +# define weak_alias(name, aliasname) +# define weak_data +# define weak_function +# define weak_const_function +# define restrict /* REVISIT */ + +/* SDCC does not support the noreturn or packed attributes */ + +/* Current SDCC supports noreturn via C11 _Noreturn keyword (see + * stdnoreturn.h). + */ + +# define noreturn_function +# define locate_code(n) +# define aligned_data(n) +# define locate_data(n) +# define begin_packed_struct +# define end_packed_struct + +/* REVISIT: */ + +# define farcall_function + +/* SDCC does support "naked" functions */ + +# define naked_function __naked + +/* SDCC does not support forced inlining. */ + +# define inline_function +# define noinline_function + +# define printflike(a, b) +# define sysloglike(a, b) +# define scanflike(a, b) +# define strftimelike(a) + +/* The reentrant attribute informs SDCC that the function + * must be reentrant. In this case, SDCC will store input + * arguments on the stack to support reentrancy. + * + * SDCC functions are always reentrant (except for the mcs51, + * ds390, hc08 and s08 backends) + */ + +# define reentrant_function __reentrant + +/* ISO C11 supports anonymous (unnamed) structures and unions. Does SDCC? */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_STRUCT +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_UNION + +/* Indicate that a local variable is not used */ + +# define UNUSED(a) ((void)(1 || (a))) + +/* It is assumed that the system is build using the small + * data model with storage defaulting to internal RAM. + * The NEAR storage class can also be used to address data + * in internal RAM; FAR can be used to address data in + * external RAM. + */ + +#if defined(__SDCC_z80) || defined(__SDCC_z180) || defined(__SDCC_gbz80) +# define FAR +# define NEAR +# define CODE +# define DSEG +#else +# define FAR __xdata +# define NEAR __data +# define CODE __code +# if defined(SDCC_MODEL_SMALL) +# define DSEG __data +# else +# define DSEG __xdata +# endif +#endif + +/* Select small, 16-bit address model */ + +# define CONFIG_SMALL_MEMORY 1 + +/* Long and int are not the same size */ + +# define CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT 1 + +/* The generic pointer and int are not the same size (for some SDCC + * architectures). REVISIT: SDCC now has more backends where pointers are + * the same size as int than just z80 and z180. + */ + +#if !defined(__z80) && !defined(__gbz80) +# define CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT 1 +#endif + +/* SDCC does types long long and float, but not types double and long + * double. + */ + +# define CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG 1 +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FLOAT 1 +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_DOUBLE +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE + +/* Indicate that a local variable is not used */ + +# define UNUSED(a) ((void)(1 || (a))) + +/* Zilog-specific definitions ***********************************************/ + +#elif defined(__ZILOG__) + +/* At present, only the following Zilog compilers are recognized */ + +# if !defined(__ZNEO__) && !defined(__EZ8__) && !defined(__EZ80__) +# warning "Unrecognized Zilog compiler" +# endif + +/* Pre-processor */ + +# undef CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_VARARGS /* No variable argument macros */ +# undef CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_WARNING /* Does not support #warning */ + +/* Intrinsics */ + +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTIONNAME 1 /* Has __FUNCTION__ */ +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FILENAME 1 /* Has __FILE__ */ + +/* No I-space access qualifiers */ + +# define IOBJ +# define IPTR + +/* C++ support */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_CXX14 + +/* Attributes + * + * The Zilog compiler does not support weak symbols + */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_WEAKFUNCTIONS +# define weak_alias(name, aliasname) +# define weak_data +# define weak_function +# define weak_const_function +# define restrict + +/* The Zilog compiler does not support the noreturn, packed, naked + * attributes. + */ + +# define noreturn_function +# define aligned_data(n) +# define locate_code(n) +# define locate_data(n) +# define begin_packed_struct +# define end_packed_struct +# define naked_function +# define inline_function +# define noinline_function +# define printflike(a, b) +# define sysloglike(a, b) +# define scanflike(a, b) +# define strftimelike(a) + +/* REVISIT: */ + +# define farcall_function + +/* The Zilog compiler does not support the reentrant attribute */ + +# define reentrant_function + +/* Addressing. + * + * Z16F ZNEO: Far is 24-bits; near is 16-bits of address. + * The supported model is (1) all code on ROM, and (2) all data + * and stacks in external (far) RAM. + * Z8Encore!: Far is 16-bits; near is 8-bits of address. + * The supported model is (1) all code on ROM, and (2) all data + * and stacks in internal (far) RAM. + * Z8Acclaim: In Z80 mode, all pointers are 16-bits. In ADL mode, all + * pointers are 24 bits. + */ + +# if defined(__ZNEO__) +# define FAR _Far +# define NEAR _Near +# define DSEG _Far +# define CODE _Erom +# undef CONFIG_SMALL_MEMORY /* Select the large, 32-bit addressing model */ +# undef CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT /* Long and int are the same size */ +# undef CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT /* FAR pointers and int are the same size */ +# elif defined(__EZ8__) +# define FAR far +# define NEAR near +# define DSEG far +# define CODE rom +# define CONFIG_SMALL_MEMORY 1 /* Select small, 16-bit address model */ +# define CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT 1 /* Long and int are not the same size */ +# undef CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT /* FAR pointers and int are the same size */ +# elif defined(__EZ80__) +# define FAR +# define NEAR +# define DSEG +# define CODE +# undef CONFIG_SMALL_MEMORY /* Select the large, 32-bit addressing model */ +# define CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT 1 /* Long and int are not the same size */ +# ifdef CONFIG_EZ80_Z80MODE +# define CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT 1 /* Pointers and int are not the same size */ +# else +# undef CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT /* Pointers and int are the same size */ +# endif +# endif + +/* ISO C11 supports anonymous (unnamed) structures and unions. Zilog does + * not support C11 + */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_STRUCT +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_UNION + +/* Older Zilog compilers support both types double and long long, but the + * size is 32-bits (same as long and single precision) so it is safer to say + * that they are not supported. Later versions are more ANSII compliant and + * simply do not support long long or double. + */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FLOAT 1 +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_DOUBLE +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE + +/* Indicate that a local variable is not used */ + +# define UNUSED(a) ((void)(1 || (a))) + +/* ICCARM-specific definitions **********************************************/ + +#elif defined(__ICCARM__) + +# define CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_VARARGS 1 /* Supports variable argument macros */ +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FILENAME 1 /* Has __FILE__ */ +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FLOAT 1 + +/* Indicate that a local variable is not used */ + +# define UNUSED(a) ((void)(1 || (a))) + +# define weak_alias(name, aliasname) +# define weak_data __weak +# define weak_function __weak +# define weak_const_function +# define noreturn_function +# define farcall_function +# define locate_code(n) +# define aligned_data(n) +# define locate_data(n) +# define begin_packed_struct __packed +# define end_packed_struct +# define reentrant_function +# define naked_function +# define inline_function +# define noinline_function +# define printflike(a, b) +# define sysloglike(a, b) +# define scanflike(a, b) +# define strftimelike(a) + +# define FAR +# define NEAR +# define DSEG +# define CODE +# define IOBJ +# define IPTR + +# define __asm__ asm +# define __volatile__ volatile + +/* For operatots __sfb() and __sfe() */ + +# pragma section = ".bss" +# pragma section = ".data" +# pragma section = ".data_init" +# pragma section = ".text" + +/* C++ support */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_CXX14 + +/* ISO C11 supports anonymous (unnamed) structures and unions. Does + * ICCARM? + */ + +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_STRUCT +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_UNION + +/* Unknown compiler *********************************************************/ + +#else + +# undef CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_VARARGS +# undef CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_WARNING +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTIONNAME +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_FILENAME +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_WEAKFUNCTIONS +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_CXX14 +# define weak_alias(name, aliasname) +# define weak_data +# define weak_function +# define weak_const_function +# define restrict +# define noreturn_function +# define farcall_function +# define aligned_data(n) +# define locate_code(n) +# define locate_data(n) +# define begin_packed_struct +# define end_packed_struct +# define reentrant_function +# define naked_function +# define inline_function +# define noinline_function +# define printflike(a, b) +# define sysloglike(a, b) +# define scanflike(a, b) +# define strftimelike(a) + +# define FAR +# define NEAR +# define DSEG +# define CODE + +# undef CONFIG_SMALL_MEMORY +# undef CONFIG_LONG_IS_NOT_INT +# undef CONFIG_PTR_IS_NOT_INT +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG +# define CONFIG_HAVE_FLOAT 1 +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_DOUBLE +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_STRUCT +# undef CONFIG_HAVE_ANONYMOUS_UNION + +# define UNUSED(a) ((void)(1 || (a))) + +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Function Prototypes + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Function Prototypes + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +#define EXTERN extern "C" +extern "C" +{ +#else +#define EXTERN extern +#endif + +#undef EXTERN +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* __INCLUDE_NUTTX_COMPILER_H */ diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/config.h b/components/libc/nuttx/config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cb71d7d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/config.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +#ifndef __INCLUDE_NUTTX_CONFIG_H +#define __INCLUDE_NUTTX_CONFIG_H + +#include +#include +#include + +#define FAR +#define CODE +#define set_errno(e) + +/* Defined in lib_skipspace.c */ + +void lib_skipspace(FAR const char **pptr); + +/* Defined in lib_isbasedigit.c */ + +bool lib_isbasedigit(int ch, int base, FAR int *value); + +/* Defined in lib_checkbase.c */ + +int lib_checkbase(int base, FAR const char **pptr); + +#if defined(CPU_D0) +#define CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG +#else +#define CONFIG_ARCH_RV32IM +#endif + +// # define CONFIG_HAVE_FLOAT 1 +// # define CONFIG_HAVE_DOUBLE 1 +// # define CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1 + +#define lib_malloc(s) malloc(s) +#define lib_zalloc(s) zalloc(s) +#define lib_realloc(p, s) realloc(p, s) +#define lib_memalign(p, s) memalign(p, s) +#define lib_free(p) free(p) + +#include "nuttx_limits.h" + +#endif \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/Kconfig b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 00000000..50e23174 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +# +# For a description of the syntax of this configuration file, +# see the file kconfig-language.txt in the NuttX tools repository. +# + +menu "stdlib Options" + +config LIB_RAND_ORDER + int "Order of the random number generate" + default 1 + range 1 3 + ---help--- + The order of the random number generator. 1=fast but very bad random + numbers, 3=slow but very good random numbers. + +config LIB_HOMEDIR + string "Home directory" + default "/" + depends on !DISABLE_ENVIRON + ---help--- + The home directory to use with operations like such as 'cd ~' + +config LIBC_TMPDIR + string "Temporary file directory" + default "/tmp" + ---help--- + If a write-able file system is selected, this string will be + provided to specify the full path to a directory where temporary + files can be created. This would be a good application of RAM disk: + To provide temporary storage for application data. + +config LIBC_MAX_TMPFILE + int "Maximum size of a temporary file path" + default 32 + ---help--- + If a write-able file system is selected, then temporary file may be + supported at the path provided by LIBC_TMPDIR. The tmpnam() interface + keeps a static copy of this last filename produced; this value is the + maximum size of that last filename. This size is the size of the full + file path. + +endmenu # stdlib Options diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/Make.defs b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/Make.defs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3cb62695 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/Make.defs @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +############################################################################ +# libs/libc/stdlib/Make.defs +# +# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more +# contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with +# this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The +# ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the +# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the +# License. You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. +# +############################################################################ + +# Add the stdlib C files to the build + +CSRCS += lib_abs.c lib_abort.c lib_atof.c lib_atoi.c +CSRCS += lib_atol.c lib_atoll.c lib_div.c lib_ldiv.c lib_lldiv.c lib_Exit.c +CSRCS += lib_itoa.c lib_labs.c lib_llabs.c lib_realpath.c lib_bsearch.c +CSRCS += lib_rand.c lib_qsort.c lib_srand.c lib_strtol.c +CSRCS += lib_strtoll.c lib_strtoul.c lib_strtoull.c lib_strtod.c lib_strtof.c +CSRCS += lib_strtold.c lib_checkbase.c lib_mktemp.c lib_mkstemp.c lib_mkdtemp.c + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_LIBC_WCHAR),y) +CSRCS += lib_mblen.c lib_mbtowc.c lib_wctomb.c +CSRCS += lib_mbstowcs.c lib_wcstombs.c +endif + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_PSEUDOTERM_SUSV1),y) +CSRCS += lib_ptsname.c lib_ptsnamer.c +endif + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_PSEUDOTERM),y) +CSRCS += lib_unlockpt.c +endif + +# Add the stdlib directory to the build + +DEPPATH += --dep-path stdlib +VPATH += :stdlib diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_Exit.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_Exit.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d8306f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_Exit.c @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_Exit.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +void _Exit(int status) +{ + _exit(status); +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_abort.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_abort.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..903e3f62 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_abort.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_abort.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: Abort + * + * Description: + * The abort() first unblocks the SIGABRT signal, and then raises that + * signal for the calling process. This results in the abnormal + * termination of the process unless the SIGABRT signal is caught and + * the signal handler does not return. + * + * If the abort() function causes process termination, all open + * streams are closed and flushed. + * + * If the SIGABRT signal is ignored, or caught by a handler that + * returns, the abort() function will still terminate the process. + * It does this by restoring the default disposition for SIGABRT and + * then raising the signal for a second time. + * + * Input Parameters: + * None + * + * Returned Value: + * This function does not return, + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void abort(void) +{ + /* NuttX does not support standard signal functionality (like the + * behavior of the SIGABRT signal). So no attempt is made to provide + * a conformant version of abort() at this time. This version does not + * signal the calling thread all. + * + * Note that pthread_exit() is called instead of exit(). That is because + * we do no know if abort was called from a pthread or a normal thread + * (we could find out, of course). If abort() is called from a + * non-pthread, then pthread_exit() should fail and fall back to call + * exit() anyway. + * + * If exit() is called (either below or via pthread_exit()), then exit() + * will flush and close all open files and terminate the thread. If this + * function was called from a pthread, then pthread_exit() will complete + * any joins, but will not flush or close any streams. + */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_DISABLE_PTHREAD + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); +#else + pthread_exit(NULL); +#endif +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_abs.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_abs.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7926406b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_abs.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_abs.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +int abs(int j) +{ + if (j < 0) + { + j = -j; + } + + return j; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atof.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atof.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c75173b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atof.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_atof.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_DOUBLE +double atof(FAR const char *nptr) +{ + return strtod(nptr, NULL); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoi.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoi.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..75e7f9e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoi.c @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_atoi.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +int atoi(FAR const char *nptr) +{ + return strtol(nptr, NULL, 10); +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atol.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atol.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..696a0fde --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atol.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_atol.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +long atol(FAR const char *nptr) +{ + return strtol(nptr, NULL, 10); +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoll.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e42a0654 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_atoll.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_atoll.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG +long long atoll(FAR const char *nptr) +{ + return strtoll(nptr, NULL, 10); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_bsearch.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_bsearch.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7e420392 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_bsearch.c @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_bsearch.c + * + * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bsearch + * + * Description: + * The bsearch() function will search an array of nel objects, the initial + * element of which is pointed to by 'base', for an element that matches + * the object pointed to by 'key'. The size of each element in the array + * is specified by 'width'. If the nel argument has the value zero, the + * comparison function pointed to by 'compar' will not be called and no + * match will be found. + * + * The comparison function pointed to by 'compar' will be called with two + * arguments that point to the 'key' object and to an array element, in + * that order. + * + * The application will ensure that the comparison function pointed to by + * 'compar 'does not alter the contents of the array. The implementation + * may reorder elements of the array between calls to the comparison + * function, but will not alter the contents of any individual element. + * + * The implementation will ensure that the first argument is always a + * pointer to the 'key'. + * + * When the same objects (consisting of width bytes, irrespective of their + * current positions in the array) are passed more than once to the + * comparison function, the results will be consistent with one another. + * That is, the same object will always compare the same way with the key. + * + * The application will ensure that the function returns an integer less + * than, equal to, or greater than 0 if the key object is considered, + * respectively, to be less than, to match, or to be greater than the + * array element. The application will ensure that the array consists of + * all the elements that compare less than, all the elements that compare + * equal to, and all the elements that compare greater than the key + * object, in that order. + * + * (Based on description from OpenGroup.org). + * + * Returned Value: + * The bsearch() function will return a pointer to a matching member of + * the array, or a null pointer if no match is found. If two or more + * members compare equal, which member is returned is unspecified. + * + * Notes from the NetBSD version: + * The code below is a bit sneaky. After a comparison fails, we divide + * the work in half by moving either left or right. If 'lim' is odd, + * moving left simply involves halving 'lim': e.g., when 'lim' is 5 we + * look at item 2, so we change 'lim' to 2 so that we will look at items + * 0 & 1. If 'lim' is even, the same applies. If 'lim' is odd, moving + * right again involes halving 'lim', this time moving the base up one + * item past 'middle': e.g., when 'lim' is 5 we change base to item 3 and + * make 'lim' 2 so that we will look at items 3 and 4. If 'lim' is + * even, however, we have to shrink it by one before halving: e.g., + * when 'lim' is 4, we still looked at item 2, so we have to make 'lim' + * 3, then halve, obtaining 1, so that we will only look at item 3. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR void *bsearch(FAR const void *key, FAR const void *base, size_t nel, + size_t width, CODE int (*compar)(FAR const void *, + FAR const void *)) +{ + FAR const void *middle; /* Current entry being tested */ + FAR const char *lower; /* The lower limit of the search region */ + size_t lim; /* The number of elements in the region */ + int cmp; /* Boolean comparison result */ + + // DEBUGASSERT(key != NULL); + // DEBUGASSERT(base != NULL || nel == 0); + // DEBUGASSERT(compar != NULL); + + for (lim = nel, lower = (const char *)base; lim != 0; lim >>= 1) + { + middle = lower + (lim >> 1) * width; + cmp = (*compar)(key, middle); + + if (cmp == 0) + { + return (FAR void *)middle; + } + + if (cmp > 0) + { + /* key > middle: move right (else move left) */ + + lower = (FAR const char *)middle + width; + lim--; + } + } + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_checkbase.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_checkbase.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bfccf27a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_checkbase.c @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_checkbase.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: lib_checkbase + * + * Description: + * This is part of the strol() family implementation. This function checks + * the initial part of a string to see if it can determine the numeric + * base that is represented. + * + * Assumptions: + * *ptr points to the first, non-whitespace character in the string. + * + * Returned Value: + * - if base is valid, the actual base to use, and pptr is updated to point + * at the first digit. + * - if base is invalid (<2 or >36), return -1. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int lib_checkbase(int base, FAR const char **pptr) +{ + FAR const char *ptr = *pptr; + + /* Check for unspecified base */ + + if (!base) + { + /* Assume base 10 */ + + base = 10; + + /* Check for leading '0' - that would signify octal + * or hex (or binary) + */ + + if (*ptr == '0') + { + /* Assume octal */ + + base = 8; + ptr++; + + /* Check for hexadecimal */ + + if ((*ptr == 'X' || *ptr == 'x') && + lib_isbasedigit(ptr[1], 16, NULL)) + { + base = 16; + ptr++; + } + } + } + + /* If it a hexadecimal representation, + * than discard any leading "0X" or "0x" + */ + + else if (base == 16) + { + if (ptr[0] == '0' && (ptr[1] == 'X' || ptr[1] == 'x')) + { + ptr += 2; + } + } + + /* Check for incorrect bases. */ + + else if (base < 2 || base > 26) + { + return -1; /* Means incorrect base */ + } + + /* Return the updated pointer and base */ + + *pptr = ptr; + return base; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_div.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_div.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..780100b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_div.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_div.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2015 Stavros Polymenis. All rights reserved. + * Author: Stavros Polymenis + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * 3. Neither the name NuttX nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, + * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS + * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED + * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: div + * + * Description: + * The div() function computes the quotient and remainder of the division + * of the numerator 'numer' by the denominator 'denom". If the division is + * inexact, the resulting quotient is the integer of lesser magnitude that + * is the nearest to the algebraic quotient. If the result cannot be + * represented, the behavior is undefined; otherwise, quot * denom + rem + * will equal 'numer'. + * + * Input Parameters: + * numer - Numerator of the Division + * denom - Denominator of the division + * + * Returned Value: + * The result of the devision represent as values of type div_t + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +div_t div(int numer, int denom) +{ + div_t f; + + f.quot = numer / denom; + f.rem = numer % denom; + return f; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_itoa.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_itoa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a1eb52db --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_itoa.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_itoa.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2013 Brooks Automation, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Author: Ryan Sundberg + * + * This file is a part of NuttX: + * + * Copyright (C) 2010-2011 Gregory Nutt. All rights reserved. + * Author: Gregory Nutt + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * 3. Neither the name NuttX nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, + * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS + * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED + * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *itoa(int val, FAR char *str, int base) +{ + static FAR const char *digits = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; + int intval = abs(val); + int digit; + int pos; + int len; + FAR char *buf = str; + char swap; + + if (base >= 2 && base <= 36) + { + do + { + digit = intval % base; + intval = intval / base; + *buf++ = digits[digit]; + } + while (intval > 0); + + if (val < 0) + { + *buf++ = '-'; + } + + for (pos = 0, len = buf - str; pos < len / 2; pos++) + { + swap = str[len - pos - 1]; + str[len - pos - 1] = str[pos]; + str[pos] = swap; + } + } + + *buf = '\0'; + + return str; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_labs.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_labs.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f8f9ff0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_labs.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_labs.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +long int labs(long int j) +{ + if (j < 0) + { + j = -j; + } + + return j; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_ldiv.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_ldiv.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c86649a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_ldiv.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_ldiv.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2015 Gregory Nutt. All rights reserved. + * Author: Gregory Nutt + * + * A direct leverage of the div() inplement by: + * + * Copyright (C) 2015 Stavros Polymenis. All rights reserved. + * Author: Stavros Polymenis + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * 3. Neither the name NuttX nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, + * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS + * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED + * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: ldiv + * + * Description: + * The ldiv() function computes the quotient and remainder of the division + * of the numerator 'numer' by the denominator 'denom". If the division is + * inexact, the resulting quotient is the integer of lesser magnitude that + * is the nearest to the algebraic quotient. If the result cannot be + * represented, the behavior is undefined; otherwise, quot * denom + rem + * will equal 'numer'. + * + * Input Parameters: + * numer - Numerator of the Division + * denom - Denominator of the division + * + * Returned Value: + * The result of the devision represent as values of type ldiv_t + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +ldiv_t ldiv(long numer, long denom) +{ + ldiv_t f; + + f.quot = numer / denom; + f.rem = numer % denom; + return f; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_llabs.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_llabs.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5eb29cdf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_llabs.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_llabs.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG +long long int llabs(long long int j) +{ + if (j < 0) + { + j = -j; + } + + return j; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_lldiv.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_lldiv.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5c54b12 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_lldiv.c @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_lldiv.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2015 Gregory Nutt. All rights reserved. + * Author: Gregory Nutt + * + * A direct leverage of the div() inplement by: + * + * Copyright (C) 2015 Stavros Polymenis. All rights reserved. + * Author: Stavros Polymenis + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * 3. Neither the name NuttX nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, + * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS + * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED + * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include + +#if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG) + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: lldiv + * + * Description: + * The lldiv() function computes the quotient and remainder of the division + * of the numerator 'numer' by the denominator 'denom". If the division is + * inexact, the resulting quotient is the integer of lesser magnitude that + * is the nearest to the algebraic quotient. If the result cannot be + * represented, the behavior is undefined; otherwise, quot * denom + rem + * will equal 'numer'. + * + * Input Parameters: + * numer - Numerator of the Division + * denom - Denominator of the division + * + * Returned Value: + * The result of the devision represent as values of type lldiv_t + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +lldiv_t lldiv(long long numer, long long denom) +{ + lldiv_t f; + + f.quot = numer / denom; + f.rem = numer % denom; + return f; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG */ diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mblen.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mblen.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e5e3e176 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mblen.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_mblen.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_LIBC_WCHAR + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: mblen + * + * Description: + * Determine number of bytes in next multibyte character + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int mblen(FAR const char *s, size_t n) +{ + return mbtowc(NULL, s, n); +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mbstowcs.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mbstowcs.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2dd4201b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mbstowcs.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_mbstowcs.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_LIBC_WCHAR + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: mbsrtowcs + * + * Description: + * Convert a multibyte string to a wide-character string + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +size_t mbstowcs(FAR wchar_t *dst, FAR const char *src, size_t len) +{ + return mbsrtowcs(dst, &src, len, NULL); +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mbtowc.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mbtowc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..abe0f8da --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mbtowc.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_mbtowc.c + * + * Copyright (c)1999 Citrus Project, + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_LIBC_WCHAR + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: mbtowc.c + * + * Description: + * Minimal multibyte to wide char converter + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int mbtowc(FAR wchar_t *pwc, FAR const char *s, size_t n) +{ + if (s == NULL) + { + return 0; + } + + if (n == 0) + { + return -1; + } + + if (pwc) + { + *pwc = (wchar_t)*s; + } + + return (*s != '\0'); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mkdtemp.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mkdtemp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..59e7a146 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mkdtemp.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_mkdtemp.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: mkdtemp + * + * Description: + * The mkdtemp() function shall create a directory with a unique name + * derived from template. The application shall ensure that the string + * provided in template is a pathname ending with at least six trailing + * 'X' characters. The mkdtemp() function shall modify the contents of + * template by replacing six or more 'X' characters at the end of the + * pathname with the same number of characters from the portable filename + * character set. The characters shall be chosen such that the resulting + * pathname does not duplicate the name of an existing file at the time + * of the call to mkdtemp(). The mkdtemp() function shall use the + * resulting pathname to create the new directory as if by a call to: + * + * Input Parameters: + * template - The base directory name that will be modified to produce + * the unique name. This must be a full path beginning with /tmp. + * This function will modify only the first XXXXXX characters within + * that full path. + * + * Returned Value: + * Upon successful completion, the mkdtemp() function shall return the + * value of template. Otherwise, it shall return a null pointer and + * shall set errno to indicate the error. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *mkdtemp(FAR char *path_template) +{ + FAR char *path = mktemp(path_template); + + if (path) + { + if (mkdir(path, S_IRWXU) < 0) + { + path = NULL; + } + } + + return path; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mkstemp.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mkstemp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b6ef6c5c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mkstemp.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_mkstemp.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: mkstemp + * + * Description: + * The mkstemp() function replaces the contents of the string pointed to + * by path_template by a unique filename, and returns a file descriptor + * for the file open for reading and writing. The function thus prevents + * any possible race condition between testing whether the file exists and + * opening it for use. The string in path_template should look like a + * filename with six trailing 'X' s; mkstemp() replaces each 'X' with a + * character from the portable filename character set. The characters are + * chosen such that the resulting name does not duplicate the name of an + * existing file at the time of a call to mkstemp(). + * + * Input Parameters: + * path_template - The base file name that will be modified to produce + * the unique file name. This must be a full path beginning with /tmp. + * This function will modify only the first XXXXXX characters within + * that full path. + * + * Returned Value: + * Upon successful completion, mkstemp() returns an open file descriptor. + * Otherwise, -1 is returned if no suitable file could be created. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int mkstemp(FAR char *path_template) +{ + FAR char *path = mktemp(path_template); + int ret = ERROR; + + if (path) + { + ret = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0666); + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mktemp.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mktemp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40114bc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_mktemp.c @@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_mktemp.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define MAX_XS 6 +#define MIN_NUMERIC 0 /* 0-9: Numeric */ +#define MAX_NUMERIC 9 +#define MIN_UPPERCASE 10 /* 10-35: Upper case */ +#define MAX_UPPERCASE 35 +#define MIN_LOWERCASE 36 /* 36-61: Lower case */ +#define MAX_LOWERCASE 61 +#define MAX_BASE62 MAX_LOWERCASE + +/* 62**1 = 62 + * 62**2 = 3844 + * 62**3 = 238328 + * 62**4 = 14776336 + * 62**5 = 916132832 + * 62**6 = 56800235584 > UINT32_MAX + */ + +#define BIG_XS 5 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +static uint8_t g_base62[MAX_XS]; +static sem_t g_b62sem = SEM_INITIALIZER(1); + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: base62_to_char + * + * Description: + * Convert a base62 value to a printable character. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static char base62_to_char(uint8_t base62) +{ + if (base62 <= MAX_NUMERIC) + { + return '0' + base62; + } + else if (base62 <= MAX_UPPERCASE) + { + return 'A' + base62 - MIN_UPPERCASE; + } + else /* if (base62 <= MAX_LOWERCASE) */ + { + DEBUGASSERT(base62 <= MAX_LOWERCASE); + return 'a' + base62 - MIN_LOWERCASE; + } +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: incr_base62 + * + * Description: + * increment the base62 value array. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void incr_base62(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = MAX_XS - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + if (g_base62[i] < MAX_LOWERCASE) + { + g_base62[i]++; + return; + } + else + { + g_base62[i] = 0; + } + } +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: get_base62 + * + * Description: + * Atomically copy and increment the base62 array. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void get_base62(FAR uint8_t *ptr) +{ + int ret; + + while ((ret = _SEM_WAIT(&g_b62sem)) < 0) + { + DEBUGASSERT(_SEM_ERRNO(ret) == EINTR || _SEM_ERRNO(ret) == ECANCELED); + } + + memcpy(ptr, g_base62, MAX_XS); + incr_base62(); + _SEM_POST(&g_b62sem); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: copy_base62 + * + * Description: + * Copy the base62 array into the template filename, converting each + * base62 value to a printable character. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void copy_base62(FAR const uint8_t *src, FAR char *dest, int len) +{ + if (len < MAX_XS) + { + src += MAX_XS - len; + } + + for (; len > 0; len--) + { + *dest++ = base62_to_char(*src++); + } +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: mktemp + * + * Description: + * The mktemp() function generates a unique temporary filename from + * template. The last six characters of template must be XXXXXX and these + * are replaced with a string that makes the filename unique. Since it + * will be modified, template must not be a string constant, but should be + * declared as a character array. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *mktemp(FAR char *path_template) +{ + uint8_t base62[MAX_XS]; + uint32_t retries; + struct stat buf; + FAR char *xptr; + int xlen; + int ret; + int i; + + /* Count the number of X's at the end of the template */ + + xptr = &path_template[strlen(path_template)]; + for (xlen = 0; xlen < MAX_XS && path_template < xptr && *(xptr - 1) == 'X'; + xlen++, xptr--); + + if (xlen == 0) + { + /* No Xs? There should always really be 6 */ + + return path_template; + } + + /* Ignore any X's after the sixth */ + + if (xlen > MAX_XS) + { + xptr += xlen - MAX_XS; + xlen = MAX_XS; + } + + /* If xlen is small, then we need to determine the maximum number of + * retries before the values will repeat. + */ + + if (xlen >= BIG_XS) + { + retries = UINT32_MAX; + } + else + { + for (i = 1, retries = 62; i < xlen; i++, retries *= 62); + } + + /* Then loop until we find a unique file name */ + + while (retries > 0) + { + /* Sample and increment the base62 counter */ + + get_base62(base62); + + /* Form the candidate file name */ + + copy_base62(base62, xptr, xlen); + + /* Attempt to stat the candidate file */ + + ret = stat(path_template, &buf); + if (ret < 0 && get_errno() == ENOENT) + { + /* We have it... Clear the errno and return the template */ + + set_errno(0); + return path_template; + } + + retries--; + } + + /* We could not find an unique filename */ + + set_errno(EINVAL); + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_ptsname.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_ptsname.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4ed9d2ae --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_ptsname.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_ptsname.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_PSEUDOTERM_SUSV1 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: ptsname + * + * Description: + * The ptsname() function returns the name of the slave pseudoterminal + * device corresponding to the master referred to by fd. + * + * Returned Value: + * On success, ptsname() returns a pointer to a string in static storage + * which will be overwritten by subsequent calls. This pointer must not + * be freed. On failure, NULL is returned. + * + * ENOTTY fd does not refer to a pseudoterminal master device. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *ptsname(int fd) +{ + static char devname[16]; + int ret = ptsname_r(fd, devname, 16); + return ret < 0 ? NULL : devname; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_PSEUDOTERM_SUSV1 */ diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_ptsnamer.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_ptsnamer.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f7ef41cc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_ptsnamer.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_ptsnamer.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_PSEUDOTERM_SUSV1 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: ptsname_r + * + * Description: + * The ptsname_r() function is the reentrant equivalent of ptsname(). + * It returns the name of the slave pseudoterminal device as a null- + * terminated string in the buffer pointed to by buf. The buflen + * argument specifies the number of bytes available in buf. + * + * Returned Value: + * On success, ptsname_r() returns 0. On failure, a nonzero value is + * returned and errno is set to indicate the error. + * + * EINVAL (ptsname_r() only) buf is NULL. + * ENOTTY fd does not refer to a pseudoterminal master device. + * ERANGE (ptsname_r() only) buf is too small. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int ptsname_r(int fd, FAR char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int ptyno; + int ret; + + DEBUGASSERT(buf != NULL); + + /* Get the slave PTY number */ + + ret = ioctl(fd, TIOCGPTN, (unsigned long)((uintptr_t)&ptyno)); + if (ret < 0) + { + return ret; + } + + /* Create the device name. This current does not handler EINVAL or ERANGE + * error detection. + */ + + snprintf(buf, buflen, "/dev/pts/%d", ptyno); + return OK; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_PSEUDOTERM_SUSV1 */ diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_qsort.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_qsort.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..293b4b0e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_qsort.c @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_qsort.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2007, 2009, 2011 Gregory Nutt. All rights reserved. + * Author: Gregory Nutt + * + * Leveraged from: + * + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define min(a, b) (a) < (b) ? a : b + +#define swapcode(TYPE, parmi, parmj, n) \ + { \ + long i = (n) / sizeof (TYPE); \ + register TYPE *pi = (TYPE *)(parmi); \ + register TYPE *pj = (TYPE *)(parmj); \ + do { \ + register TYPE t = *pi; \ + *pi++ = *pj; \ + *pj++ = t; \ + } while (--i > 0); \ + } + +#define SWAPINIT(a, width) \ + swaptype = ((FAR char *)a - (FAR char *)0) % sizeof(long) || \ + width % sizeof(long) ? 2 : width == sizeof(long)? 0 : 1; + +#define swap(a, b) \ + if (swaptype == 0) \ + { \ + long t = *(long *)(a); \ + *(long *)(a) = *(long *)(b); \ + *(long *)(b) = t; \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + swapfunc(a, b, width, swaptype); \ + } + +#define vecswap(a, b, n) if ((n) > 0) swapfunc(a, b, n, swaptype) + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Function Prototypes + ****************************************************************************/ + +static inline void swapfunc(FAR char *a, FAR char *b, int n, int swaptype); +static inline FAR char *med3(FAR char *a, FAR char *b, FAR char *c, + CODE int (*compar)(FAR const void *, + FAR const void *)); + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +static inline void swapfunc(FAR char *a, FAR char *b, int n, int swaptype) +{ + if (swaptype <= 1) + { + swapcode(long, a, b, n) + } + else + { + swapcode(char, a, b, n) + } +} + +static inline FAR char *med3(FAR char *a, FAR char *b, FAR char *c, + CODE int (*compar)(FAR const void *, + FAR const void *)) +{ + return compar(a, b) < 0 ? + (compar(b, c) < 0 ? b : (compar(a, c) < 0 ? c : a)) : + (compar(b, c) > 0 ? b : (compar(a, c) < 0 ? a : c)); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Function + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: qsort + * + * Description: + * The qsort() function will sort an array of 'nel' objects, the initial + * element of which is pointed to by 'base'. The size of each object, in + * bytes, is specified by the 'width" argument. If the 'nel' argument has + * the value zero, the comparison function pointed to by 'compar' will not + * be called and no rearrangement will take place. + * + * The application will ensure that the comparison function pointed to by + * 'compar' does not alter the contents of the array. The implementation + * may reorder elements of the array between calls to the comparison + * function, but will not alter the contents of any individual element. + * + * When the same objects (consisting of 'width" bytes, irrespective of + * their current positions in the array) are passed more than once to + * the comparison function, the results will be consistent with one + * another. That is, they will define a total ordering on the array. + * + * The contents of the array will be sorted in ascending order according + * to a comparison function. The 'compar' argument is a pointer to the + * comparison function, which is called with two arguments that point to + * the elements being compared. The application will ensure that the + * function returns an integer less than, equal to, or greater than 0, + * if the first argument is considered respectively less than, equal to, + * or greater than the second. If two members compare as equal, their + * order in the sorted array is unspecified. + * + * (Based on description from OpenGroup.org). + * + * Returned Value: + * The qsort() function will not return a value. + * + * Notes from the original BSD version: + * Qsort routine from Bentley & McIlroy's "Engineering a Sort Function". + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void qsort(FAR void *base, size_t nel, size_t width, + CODE int(*compar)(FAR const void *, FAR const void *)) +{ + FAR char *pa; + FAR char *pb; + FAR char *pc; + FAR char *pd; + FAR char *pl; + FAR char *pm; + FAR char *pn; + int swaptype; + int swap_cnt; + int d; + int r; + +loop: + SWAPINIT(base, width); + swap_cnt = 0; + + if (nel < 7) + { + for (pm = (FAR char *)base + width; + pm < (FAR char *)base + nel * width; + pm += width) + { + for (pl = pm; + pl > (FAR char *)base && compar(pl - width, pl) > 0; + pl -= width) + { + swap(pl, pl - width); + } + } + + return; + } + + pm = (FAR char *)base + (nel / 2) * width; + if (nel > 7) + { + pl = base; + pn = (FAR char *)base + (nel - 1) * width; + if (nel > 40) + { + d = (nel / 8) * width; + pl = med3(pl, pl + d, pl + 2 * d, compar); + pm = med3(pm - d, pm, pm + d, compar); + pn = med3(pn - 2 * d, pn - d, pn, compar); + } + + pm = med3(pl, pm, pn, compar); + } + + swap(base, pm); + pa = pb = (FAR char *)base + width; + + pc = pd = (FAR char *)base + (nel - 1) * width; + for (; ; ) + { + while (pb <= pc && (r = compar(pb, base)) <= 0) + { + if (r == 0) + { + swap_cnt = 1; + swap(pa, pb); + pa += width; + } + + pb += width; + } + + while (pb <= pc && (r = compar(pc, base)) >= 0) + { + if (r == 0) + { + swap_cnt = 1; + swap(pc, pd); + pd -= width; + } + + pc -= width; + } + + if (pb > pc) + { + break; + } + + swap(pb, pc); + swap_cnt = 1; + pb += width; + pc -= width; + } + + if (swap_cnt == 0) + { + /* Switch to insertion sort */ + + for (pm = (FAR char *)base + width; + pm < (FAR char *)base + nel * width; + pm += width) + { + for (pl = pm; + pl > (FAR char *)base && compar(pl - width, pl) > 0; + pl -= width) + { + swap(pl, pl - width); + } + } + + return; + } + + pn = (FAR char *)base + nel * width; + r = min(pa - (FAR char *)base, pb - pa); + vecswap(base, pb - r, r); + + r = min(pd - pc, pn - pd - width); + vecswap(pb, pn - r, r); + + if ((r = pb - pa) > width) + { + qsort(base, r / width, width, compar); + } + + if ((r = pd - pc) > width) + { + /* Iterate rather than recurse to save stack space */ + + base = pn - r; + nel = r / width; + goto loop; + } +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_rand.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_rand.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..23611da9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_rand.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_rand.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: rand + * + * Description: + * Generate a non-negative, integer random number in the range of 0 through + * (RAND_MAX - 1) + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int rand(void) +{ + return (int)nrand(INT_MAX); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: random + * + * Description: + * Generate a non-negative, integer random number in the range of 0 through + * (LONG_MAX - 1) + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +long random(void) +{ + return (long)nrand(LONG_MAX); +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_realpath.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_realpath.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..466432a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_realpath.c @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_realpath.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "libc.h" + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *realpath(FAR const char *path, FAR char *resolved) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_PSEUDOFS_SOFTLINKS + char wbuf[2][PATH_MAX]; + int nlnk = 0; + int idx = 0; + ssize_t n; +#endif + FAR const char *q; + FAR char *fres = NULL; + FAR char *p; + struct stat sb; + size_t len; + + if (path == NULL) + { + set_errno(EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + if (*path == '\0') + { + set_errno(ENOENT); + return NULL; + } + + if (resolved == NULL) + { + fres = resolved = lib_malloc(PATH_MAX); + if (resolved == NULL) + { + return NULL; + } + } + + /* Build real path one by one with paying an attention to ., + * .. and symbolic link. + */ + + /* `p' is where we'll put a new component with prepending + * a delimiter. + */ + + p = resolved; + + /* If relative path, start from current working directory. */ + + if (*path != '/') + { + /* check for resolved pointer to appease coverity */ + + if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) + { + goto out; + } + + len = strlen(resolved); + if (len > 1) + { + p += len; + } + } + +loop: + + /* Skip any slash. */ + + while (*path == '/') + { + path++; + } + + if (*path == '\0') + { + if (p == resolved) + { + *p++ = '/'; + } + + *p = '\0'; + return resolved; + } + + /* Find the end of this component. */ + + q = path; + do + { + q++; + } + while (*q != '/' && *q != '\0'); + + /* Test . or .. */ + + if (path[0] == '.') + { + if (q - path == 1) + { + path = q; + goto loop; + } + + if (path[1] == '.' && q - path == 2) + { + /* Trim the last component. */ + + if (p != resolved) + { + while (*--p != '/') + { + continue; + } + } + + path = q; + goto loop; + } + } + + /* Append this component. */ + + if (p - resolved + 1 + q - path + 1 > PATH_MAX) + { + set_errno(ENAMETOOLONG); + goto out; + } + + p[0] = '/'; + memcpy(&p[1], path, q - path); + p[1 + q - path] = '\0'; + + /* If this component is a symlink, toss it and prepend link + * target to unresolved path. + */ + + if (lstat(resolved, &sb) == -1) + { + goto out; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_PSEUDOFS_SOFTLINKS + if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) + { + if (nlnk++ >= SYMLOOP_MAX) + { + set_errno(ELOOP); + goto out; + } + + n = readlink(resolved, wbuf[idx], sizeof(wbuf[0]) - 1); + if (n <= 0) + { + if (n == 0) + { + set_errno(ENOENT); + } + + goto out; + } + + /* Append unresolved path to link target and switch to it. */ + + if (n + (len = strlen(q)) + 1 > sizeof(wbuf[0])) + { + set_errno(ENAMETOOLONG); + goto out; + } + + memcpy(&wbuf[idx][n], q, len + 1); + path = wbuf[idx]; + idx ^= 1; + + /* If absolute symlink, start from root. */ + + if (*path == '/') + { + p = resolved; + } + + goto loop; + } +#endif + + if (*q == '/' && !S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) + { + set_errno(ENOTDIR); + goto out; + } + + /* Advance both resolved and unresolved path. */ + + p += 1 + q - path; + path = q; + goto loop; + +out: + lib_free(fres); + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_srand.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_srand.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03f181a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_srand.c @@ -0,0 +1,281 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_srand.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* First, second, and thired order congruential generators are supported */ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER +# define CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER 1 +#endif + +#if CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 3 +# undef CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER +# define CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER 3 +#endif + +#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_DOUBLE +typedef float float_t; +#else +typedef double float_t; +#endif + +/* Values needed by the random number generator */ + +#define RND1_CONSTK 470001 +#define RND1_CONSTP 999563 +#define RND2_CONSTK1 366528 +#define RND2_CONSTK2 508531 +#define RND2_CONSTP 998917 +#define RND3_CONSTK1 360137 +#define RND3_CONSTK2 519815 +#define RND3_CONSTK3 616087 +#define RND3_CONSTP 997783 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Function Prototypes + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* First order congruential generators */ + +static inline unsigned long fgenerate1(void); +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER == 1) +static float_t frand1(void); +#endif + +/* Second order congruential generators */ + +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 1) +static inline unsigned long fgenerate2(void); +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER == 2) +static float_t frand2(void); +#endif + +/* Third order congruential generators */ + +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 2) +static inline unsigned long fgenerate3(void); +static float_t frand3(void); +#endif +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +static unsigned long g_randint1; +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 1) +static unsigned long g_randint2; +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 2) +static unsigned long g_randint3; +#endif +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* First order congruential generators */ + +static inline unsigned long fgenerate1(void) +{ + unsigned long randint; + + /* First order congruential generator. One may be added to the result of + * the generated value to avoid the value zero. This would be fatal for + * the first order random number generator. + */ + + randint = (RND1_CONSTK * g_randint1) % RND1_CONSTP; + g_randint1 = (randint == 0 ? 1 : randint); + return randint; +} + +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER == 1) +static float_t frand1(void) +{ + /* First order congruential generator. */ + + unsigned long randint = fgenerate1(); + + /* Construct an floating point value in the range from 0.0 up to 1.0 */ + + return ((float_t)randint) / ((float_t)RND1_CONSTP); +} +#endif + +/* Second order congruential generators */ + +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 1) +static inline unsigned long fgenerate2(void) +{ + unsigned long randint; + + /* Second order congruential generator. */ + + randint = (RND2_CONSTK1 * g_randint1 + + RND2_CONSTK2 * g_randint2) % RND2_CONSTP; + + g_randint2 = g_randint1; + g_randint1 = randint; + + /* We cannot permit both values to become zero. That would be fatal for + * the second order random number generator. + */ + + if (g_randint2 == 0 && g_randint1 == 0) + { + g_randint2 = 1; + } + + return randint; +} + +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER == 2) +static float_t frand2(void) +{ + /* Second order congruential generator */ + + unsigned long randint = fgenerate2(); + + /* Construct an floating point value in the range from 0.0 up to 1.0 */ + + return ((float_t)randint) / ((float_t)RND2_CONSTP); +} +#endif + +/* Third order congruential generators */ + +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 2) +static inline unsigned long fgenerate3(void) +{ + unsigned long randint; + + /* Third order congruential generator. */ + + randint = (RND3_CONSTK1 * g_randint1 + + RND3_CONSTK2 * g_randint2 + + RND3_CONSTK2 * g_randint3) % RND3_CONSTP; + + g_randint3 = g_randint2; + g_randint2 = g_randint1; + g_randint1 = randint; + + /* We cannot permit all three values to become zero. That would be fatal + * for the third order random number generator. + */ + + if (g_randint3 == 0 && g_randint2 == 0 && g_randint1 == 0) + { + g_randint3 = 1; + } + + return randint; +} + +static float_t frand3(void) +{ + /* Third order congruential generator */ + + unsigned long randint = fgenerate3(); + + /* Construct an floating point value in the range from 0.0 up to 1.0 */ + + return ((float_t)randint) / ((float_t)RND3_CONSTP); +} +#endif +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: srand + * + * Description: + * Seed the congruential random number generator. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void srand(unsigned int seed) +{ + g_randint1 = seed; +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 1) + g_randint2 = seed; + fgenerate1(); +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 2) + g_randint3 = seed; + fgenerate2(); +#endif +#endif +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: nrand + * + * Description: + * Return a random, unsigned long value in the range of 0 to (limit - 1) + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +unsigned long nrand(unsigned long limit) +{ + unsigned long result; + float_t ratio; + + /* Loop to be sure a legal random number is generated */ + + do + { + /* Get a random integer in the range 0.0 - 1.0 */ + +#if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER == 1) + ratio = frand1(); +#elif (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER == 2) + ratio = frand2(); +#else /* if (CONFIG_LIB_RAND_ORDER > 2) */ + ratio = frand3(); +#endif + + /* Then, produce the return-able value in the requested range */ + + result = (unsigned long)(((float_t)limit) * ratio); + + /* Loop because there is an (unlikely) possibility that rounding + * could increase the result at the limit value about the limit. + */ + } + while (result >= limit); + + return result; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtod.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtod.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..57f60787 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtod.c @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_strtod.c + * Convert string to double + * + * Copyright (C) 2002 Michael Ringgaard. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2006-2007 H. Peter Anvin. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_DOUBLE + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* These are predefined with GCC, but could be issues for other compilers. If + * not defined, an arbitrary big number is put in for now. These should be + * added to nuttx/compiler for your compiler. + */ + +#if !defined(__DBL_MIN_EXP__) || !defined(__DBL_MAX_EXP__) +# ifdef CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_WARNING +# warning "Size of exponent is unknown" +# endif +# undef __DBL_MIN_EXP__ +# define __DBL_MIN_EXP__ (-1021) +# undef __DBL_MAX_EXP__ +# define __DBL_MAX_EXP__ (1024) +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +static inline int is_real(double x) +{ + const double infinite = 1.0 / 0.0; + return (x < infinite) && (x >= -infinite); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/***************************************************(************************ + * Name: strtod + * + * Description: + * Convert a string to a double value + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +double strtod(FAR const char *str, FAR char **endptr) +{ + double number; + int exponent; + int negative; + FAR char *p = (FAR char *) str; + double p10; + int n; + int num_digits; + int num_decimals; + const double infinite = 1.0 / 0.0; + + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + + while (isspace(*p)) + { + p++; + } + + /* Handle optional sign */ + + negative = 0; + switch (*p) + { + case '-': + negative = 1; /* Fall through to increment position */ + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case '+': + p++; + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + default: + break; + } + + number = 0.; + exponent = 0; + num_digits = 0; + num_decimals = 0; + + /* Process string of digits */ + + while (isdigit(*p)) + { + number = number * 10. + (*p - '0'); + p++; + num_digits++; + } + + /* Process decimal part */ + + if (*p == '.') + { + p++; + + while (isdigit(*p)) + { + number = number * 10. + (*p - '0'); + p++; + num_digits++; + num_decimals++; + } + + exponent -= num_decimals; + } + + if (num_digits == 0) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + number = 0.0; + goto errout; + } + + /* Correct for sign */ + + if (negative) + { + number = -number; + } + + /* Process an exponent string */ + + if (*p == 'e' || *p == 'E') + { + /* Handle optional sign */ + + negative = 0; + switch (*++p) + { + case '-': + negative = 1; /* Fall through to increment pos */ + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case '+': + p++; + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + default: + break; + } + + /* Process string of digits */ + + n = 0; + while (isdigit(*p)) + { + n = n * 10 + (*p - '0'); + p++; + } + + if (negative) + { + exponent -= n; + } + else + { + exponent += n; + } + } + + if (exponent < __DBL_MIN_EXP__ || + exponent > __DBL_MAX_EXP__) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + number = infinite; + goto errout; + } + + /* Scale the result */ + + p10 = 10.; + n = exponent; + if (n < 0) + { + n = -n; + } + + while (n) + { + if (n & 1) + { + if (exponent < 0) + { + number /= p10; + } + else + { + number *= p10; + } + } + + n >>= 1; + p10 *= p10; + } + + if (!is_real(number)) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + } + +errout: + if (endptr) + { + *endptr = p; + } + + return number; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_DOUBLE */ diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtof.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtof.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c65bd21 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtof.c @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_strtof.c + * Convert string to float + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 Gregory Nutt. All rights reserved. + * + * A pretty straight forward conversion fo strtod(): + * + * Copyright (C) 2002 Michael Ringgaard. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2006-2007 H. Peter Anvin. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* These are predefined with GCC, but could be issues for other compilers. If + * not defined, an arbitrary big number is put in for now. These should be + * added to nuttx/compiler for your compiler. + */ + +#if !defined(__FLT_MIN_EXP__) || !defined(__FLT_MAX_EXP__) +# ifdef CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_WARNING +# warning "Size of exponent is unknown" +# endif +# undef __FLT_MIN_EXP__ +# define __FLT_MIN_EXP__ (-125) +# undef __FLT_MAX_EXP__ +# define __FLT_MAX_EXP__ (128) +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +static inline int is_real(float x) +{ + const float infinite = 1.0F / 0.0F; + return (x < infinite) && (x >= -infinite); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/***************************************************(************************ + * Name: strtof + * + * Description: + * Convert a string to a float value + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +float strtof(FAR const char *str, FAR char **endptr) +{ + float number; + int exponent; + int negative; + FAR char *p = (FAR char *) str; + float p10; + int n; + int num_digits; + int num_decimals; + const float infinite = 1.0F / 0.0F; + + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + + while (isspace(*p)) + { + p++; + } + + /* Handle optional sign */ + + negative = 0; + switch (*p) + { + case '-': + negative = 1; /* Fall through to increment position */ + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case '+': + p++; + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + default: + break; + } + + number = 0.0F; + exponent = 0; + num_digits = 0; + num_decimals = 0; + + /* Process string of digits */ + + while (isdigit(*p)) + { + number = number * 10.0F + (float)(*p - '0'); + p++; + num_digits++; + } + + /* Process decimal part */ + + if (*p == '.') + { + p++; + + while (isdigit(*p)) + { + number = number * 10.0F + (float)(*p - '0'); + p++; + num_digits++; + num_decimals++; + } + + exponent -= num_decimals; + } + + if (num_digits == 0) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + number = 0.0F; + goto errout; + } + + /* Correct for sign */ + + if (negative) + { + number = -number; + } + + /* Process an exponent string */ + + if (*p == 'e' || *p == 'E') + { + /* Handle optional sign */ + + negative = 0; + switch (*++p) + { + case '-': + negative = 1; /* Fall through to increment pos */ + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case '+': + p++; + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + default: + break; + } + + /* Process string of digits */ + + n = 0; + while (isdigit(*p)) + { + n = n * 10 + (*p - '0'); + p++; + } + + if (negative) + { + exponent -= n; + } + else + { + exponent += n; + } + } + + if (exponent < __FLT_MIN_EXP__ || + exponent > __FLT_MAX_EXP__) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + number = infinite; + goto errout; + } + + /* Scale the result */ + + p10 = 10.0F; + n = exponent; + if (n < 0) + { + n = -n; + } + + while (n) + { + if (n & 1) + { + if (exponent < 0) + { + number /= p10; + } + else + { + number *= p10; + } + } + + n >>= 1; + p10 *= p10; + } + + if (!is_real(number)) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + } + +errout: + if (endptr) + { + *endptr = p; + } + + return number; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtol.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtol.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cd6d2388 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtol.c @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_strtol.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strtol + * + * Description: + * The strtol() function converts the initial part of the string in + * nptr to a long integer value according to the given base, which must be + * between 2 and 36 inclusive, or be the special value 0. + * + * Returned Value: + * - The converted value, if the base and number are valid + * - 0 if an error occurs, and set errno to: + * * EINVAL if base < 2 or base > 36 + * - LONG_MIN or LONG_MAX, of correct sign, if an overflow occurs, + * and set errno to: + * * ERANGE if the number cannot be represented using long + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +long strtol(FAR const char *nptr, FAR char **endptr, int base) +{ + unsigned long accum = 0; + long retval = 0; + char sign = 0; + + if (nptr) + { + /* Skip leading spaces */ + + lib_skipspace(&nptr); + + /* Check for leading + or - */ + + if (*nptr == '-' || *nptr == '+') + { + sign = *nptr; + nptr++; + } + + /* Get the unsigned value */ + + accum = strtoul(nptr, endptr, base); + + /* Correct the sign of the result and check for overflow */ + + if (sign == '-') + { + const unsigned long limit = ((unsigned long)-(LONG_MIN + 1)) + 1; + + if (accum > limit) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + retval = LONG_MIN; + } + else + { + retval = (accum == limit) ? LONG_MIN : -(long)accum; + } + } + else + { + if (accum > LONG_MAX) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + retval = LONG_MAX; + } + else + { + retval = accum; + } + } + } + + /* Return the final pointer to the unused value */ + + if (endptr) + { + if (sign) + { + if (*((*endptr) - 1) == sign) + { + (*endptr)--; + } + } + } + + return retval; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtold.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtold.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f098f9bf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtold.c @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_strtold.c + * Convert string to long double + * + * Copyright (C) 2002 Michael Ringgaard. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2006-2007 H. Peter Anvin. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* These are predefined with GCC, but could be issues for other compilers. If + * not defined, an arbitrary big number is put in for now. These should be + * added to nuttx/compiler for your compiler. + */ + +#if !defined(__LDBL_MIN_EXP__) || !defined(__LDBL_MAX_EXP__) +# ifdef CONFIG_CPP_HAVE_WARNING +# warning "Size of exponent is unknown" +# endif +# undef __LDBL_MIN_EXP__ +# define __LDBL_MIN_EXP__ (-1021) +# undef __LDBL_MAX_EXP__ +# define __LDBL_MAX_EXP__ (1024) +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +static inline int is_real(long double x) +{ + const long double infinite = 1.0L / 0.0L; + return (x < infinite) && (x >= -infinite); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/***************************************************(************************ + * Name: strtold + * + * Description: + * Convert a string to a long double value + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +long double strtold(FAR const char *str, FAR char **endptr) +{ + long double number; + int exponent; + int negative; + FAR char *p = (FAR char *) str; + long double p10; + int n; + int num_digits; + int num_decimals; + const long double infinite = 1.0L / 0.0L; + + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + + while (isspace(*p)) + { + p++; + } + + /* Handle optional sign */ + + negative = 0; + switch (*p) + { + case '-': + negative = 1; /* Fall through to increment position */ + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case '+': + p++; + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + default: + break; + } + + number = 0.0L; + exponent = 0; + num_digits = 0; + num_decimals = 0; + + /* Process string of digits */ + + while (isdigit(*p)) + { + number = number * 10.0L + (long double)(*p - '0'); + p++; + num_digits++; + } + + /* Process decimal part */ + + if (*p == '.') + { + p++; + + while (isdigit(*p)) + { + number = number * 10.0L + (long double)(*p - '0'); + p++; + num_digits++; + num_decimals++; + } + + exponent -= num_decimals; + } + + if (num_digits == 0) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + number = 0.0L; + goto errout; + } + + /* Correct for sign */ + + if (negative) + { + number = -number; + } + + /* Process an exponent string */ + + if (*p == 'e' || *p == 'E') + { + /* Handle optional sign */ + + negative = 0; + switch (*++p) + { + case '-': + negative = 1; /* Fall through to increment pos */ + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case '+': + p++; + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + default: + break; + } + + /* Process string of digits */ + + n = 0; + while (isdigit(*p)) + { + n = n * 10 + (*p - '0'); + p++; + } + + if (negative) + { + exponent -= n; + } + else + { + exponent += n; + } + } + + if (exponent < __LDBL_MIN_EXP__ || + exponent > __LDBL_MAX_EXP__) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + number = infinite; + goto errout; + } + + /* Scale the result */ + + p10 = 10.0L; + n = exponent; + if (n < 0) + { + n = -n; + } + + while (n) + { + if (n & 1) + { + if (exponent < 0) + { + number /= p10; + } + else + { + number *= p10; + } + } + + n >>= 1; + p10 *= p10; + } + + if (!is_real(number)) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + } + +errout: + if (endptr) + { + *endptr = p; + } + + return number; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE */ diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoll.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49d6e723 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoll.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoll.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strtoll + * + * Description: + * The strtoll() function converts the initial part of the string in + * nptr to a long long integer value according to the given base, which + * must be between 2 and 36 inclusive, or be the special value 0. + * + * Returned Value: + * - The converted value, if the base and number are valid + * - 0 if an error occurs, and set errno to: + * * EINVAL if base < 2 or base > 36 + * - LLONG_MIN or LLONG_MAX, of correct sign, if an overflow occurs, + * and set errno to: + * * ERANGE if the number cannot be represented using long long + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +long long strtoll(FAR const char *nptr, FAR char **endptr, int base) +{ + unsigned long long accum = 0; + long long retval = 0; + char sign = 0; + + if (nptr) + { + /* Skip leading spaces */ + + lib_skipspace(&nptr); + + /* Check for leading + or - */ + + if (*nptr == '-' || *nptr == '+') + { + sign = *nptr; + nptr++; + } + + /* Get the unsigned value */ + + accum = strtoull(nptr, endptr, base); + + /* Correct the sign of the result and check for overflow */ + + if (sign == '-') + { + const unsigned long long limit = + ((unsigned long long)-(LLONG_MIN + 1)) + 1; + + if (accum > limit) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + retval = LLONG_MIN; + } + else + { + retval = (accum == limit) ? LLONG_MIN : -(long long)accum; + } + } + else + { + if (accum > LLONG_MAX) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + return LLONG_MAX; + } + else + { + retval = accum; + } + } + } + + /* Return the final pointer to the unused value */ + + if (endptr) + { + if (sign) + { + if (*((*endptr) - 1) == sign) + { + (*endptr)--; + } + } + } + + return retval; +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoul.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoul.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a70274d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoul.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoul.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strtoul + * + * Description: + * The strtoul() function converts the initial part of the string in + * nptr to a long unsigned integer value according to the given base, which + * must be between 2 and 36 inclusive, or be the special value 0. + * + * Returned Value: + * - The converted value, if the base and number are valid + * - 0 if an error occurs, and set errno to: + * * EINVAL if base < 2 or base > 36 + * - ULONG_MAX if an overflow occurs, and set errno to: + * * ERANGE if the number cannot be represented using unsigned long + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +unsigned long strtoul(FAR const char *nptr, FAR char **endptr, int base) +{ + unsigned long accum = 0; + unsigned long limit; + int value; + int last_digit; + char sign = 0; + + if (nptr) + { + /* Skip leading spaces */ + + lib_skipspace(&nptr); + + /* Check for leading + or - already done for strtol */ + + if (*nptr == '-' || *nptr == '+') + { + sign = *nptr; + nptr++; + } + + /* Check for unspecified or incorrect base */ + + base = lib_checkbase(base, &nptr); + + if (base < 0) + { + set_errno(EINVAL); + accum = 0; + } + else + { + limit = ULONG_MAX / base; + last_digit = ULONG_MAX % base; + + /* Accumulate each "digit" */ + + while (lib_isbasedigit(*nptr, base, &value)) + { + /* Check for overflow */ + + if (accum > limit || (accum == limit && value > last_digit)) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + accum = ULONG_MAX; + break; + } + + accum = accum * base + value; + nptr++; + } + + if (sign == '-') + { + accum = (~accum) + 1; + } + } + } + + /* Return the final pointer to the unused value */ + + if (endptr) + { + if (sign) + { + if (*(nptr - 1) == sign) + { + nptr--; + } + } + + *endptr = (FAR char *)nptr; + } + + return accum; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoull.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoull.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..add3f90d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoull.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_strtoull.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strtoull + * + * Description: + * The strtoull() function converts the initial part of the string in + * nptr to a long unsigned integer value according to the given base, which + * must be between 2 and 36 inclusive, or be the special value 0. + * + * Returned Value: + * - The converted value, if the base and number are valid + * - 0 if an error occurs, and set errno to: + * * EINVAL if base < 2 or base > 36 + * - ULLONG_MAX if an overflow occurs, and set errno to: + * * ERANGE if the number cannot be represented using unsigned long long + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +unsigned long long strtoull(FAR const char *nptr, + FAR char **endptr, int base) +{ + unsigned long long accum = 0; + unsigned long long limit; + int value; + int last_digit; + char sign = 0; + + if (nptr) + { + /* Skip leading spaces */ + + lib_skipspace(&nptr); + + /* Check for leading + or - already done for strtol */ + + if (*nptr == '-' || *nptr == '+') + { + sign = *nptr; + nptr++; + } + + /* Check for unspecified or incorrect base */ + + base = lib_checkbase(base, &nptr); + + if (base < 0) + { + set_errno(EINVAL); + accum = 0; + } + else + { + limit = ULLONG_MAX / base; + last_digit = ULLONG_MAX % base; + + /* Accumulate each "digit" */ + + while (lib_isbasedigit(*nptr, base, &value)) + { + /* Check for overflow */ + + if (accum > limit || (accum == limit && value > last_digit)) + { + set_errno(ERANGE); + accum = ULLONG_MAX; + break; + } + + accum = accum * base + value; + nptr++; + } + + if (sign == '-') + { + accum = (~accum) + 1; + } + } + } + + /* Return the final pointer to the unused value */ + + if (endptr) + { + if (sign) + { + if (*(nptr - 1) == sign) + { + nptr--; + } + } + + *endptr = (FAR char *)nptr; + } + + return accum; +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_unlockpt.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_unlockpt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aab8eb8b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_unlockpt.c @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_unlockpt.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_PSEUDOTERM + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: unlockpt + * + * Description: + * The unlockpt() function unlocks the slave pseudoterminal device + * corresponding to the master pseudoterminal referred to by fd. + * unlockpt() must be called before opening the slave side of a + * pseudoterminal. + * + * Returned Value: + * When successful, unlockpt() returns 0. Otherwise, it returns -1 and + * sets errno appropriately. + * + * EBADF - The fd argument is not a file descriptor open for writing. + * EINVAL - The fd argument is not associated with a master + * pseudoterminal + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int unlockpt(int fd) +{ + return ioctl(fd, TIOCSPTLCK, 0); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_PSEUDOTERM */ diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_wcstombs.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_wcstombs.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1560b8d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_wcstombs.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_wcstombs.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_LIBC_WCHAR + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: wcstombs + ****************************************************************************/ + +size_t wcstombs(FAR char *dst, FAR const wchar_t *src, size_t len) +{ + return wcsrtombs(dst, &src, len, NULL); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_LIBC_WCHAR */ diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_wctomb.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_wctomb.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..447c0014 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/stdlib/lib_wctomb.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/stdlib/lib_wctomb.c + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Chris Torek. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_LIBC_WCHAR + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: wctomb + * + * Description: + * Try to represent a wide character as a multi byte + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int wctomb(FAR char *s, wchar_t wc) +{ + if (s == NULL) + { + return 0; + } + + /* Verify that wchar is a valid single-byte character. */ + + if ((size_t) wc >= 0x100) + { + set_errno(EILSEQ); + return -1; + } + + *s = (char)wc; + return 1; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/Kconfig b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 00000000..302053d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +# +# For a description of the syntax of this configuration file, +# see the file kconfig-language.txt in the NuttX tools repository. +# + +menu "errno Decode Support" + +config LIBC_STRERROR + bool "Enable strerror" + default n + ---help--- + strerror() is useful because it decodes 'errno' values into a human readable + strings. But it can also require a lot of memory. If this option is not + selected, strerror() will still exist in the build but it will not decode error + values. This option should be used by other logic to decide if it should use + strerror() or not. For example, the NSH application will not use strerror() + if this option is not selected; perror() will not use strerror() is this option + is not selected (see also NSH_STRERROR). + +config LIBC_STRERROR_SHORT + bool "Use short error descriptions in strerror()" + default n + depends on LIBC_STRERROR + ---help--- + If this option is selected, then strerror() will use a shortened string when + it decodes the error. Specifically, strerror() is simply use the string that + is the common name for the error. For example, the 'errno' value of 2 will + produce the string "No such file or directory" is LIBC_STRERROR_SHORT + is not defined but the string "ENOENT" is LIBC_STRERROR_SHORT is defined. + +config LIBC_PERROR_STDOUT + bool "perror() to stdout" + default n + ---help--- + POSIX requires that perror() provide its output on stderr. This option may + be defined, however, to provide perror() output that is serialized with + other stdout messages. + +endmenu # errno Decode Support + +menu "memcpy/memset Options" + +config MEMCPY_VIK + bool "Vik memcpy()" + default n + depends on !LIBC_ARCH_MEMCPY + ---help--- + Select this option to use the optimized memcpy() function by Daniel Vik. + Select this option for improved performance at the expense of increased + size. See licensing information in the top-level LICENSE file. + +if MEMCPY_VIK + +config MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS + bool "Pre-increment pointers" + default n + ---help--- + Use pre-increment of pointers. Default is post increment of pointers. + +config MEMCPY_INDEXED_COPY + bool "Array indexing" + default y + ---help--- + Copying data using array indexing. Using this option, disables the + MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS option. + +config MEMCPY_64BIT + bool "64-bit memcpy()" + default n + ---help--- + Compiles memcpy() for architectures that support 64-bit operations + efficiently. + +endif # MEMCPY_VIK + +config MEMSET_OPTSPEED + bool "Optimize memset() for speed" + default n + depends on !LIBC_ARCH_MEMSET + ---help--- + Select this option to use a version of memcpy() optimized for speed. + Default: memcpy() is optimized for size. + +config MEMSET_64BIT + bool "64-bit memset()" + default n + depends on MEMSET_OPTSPEED + ---help--- + Compiles memset() for architectures that support 64-bit operations + efficiently. + +endmenu # memcpy/memset Options diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/Make.defs b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/Make.defs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bae71cc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/Make.defs @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +############################################################################ +# libs/libc/string/Make.defs +# +# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more +# contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with +# this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The +# ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the +# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the +# License. You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT +# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the +# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations +# under the License. +# +############################################################################ + +# Add the string C files to the build + +CSRCS += lib_ffs.c lib_ffsl.c lib_ffsll.c lib_fls.c lib_flsl.c +CSRCS += lib_flsll.c lib_isbasedigit.c lib_memset.c lib_memchr.c +CSRCS += lib_memccpy.c lib_memcmp.c lib_memmove.c lib_memrchr.c +CSRCS += lib_popcount.c lib_popcountl.c lib_popcountll.c +CSRCS += lib_skipspace.c lib_stpcpy.c lib_stpncpy.c lib_strcasecmp.c +CSRCS += lib_strcat.c lib_strchr.c lib_strcpy.c lib_strcmp.c lib_strcspn.c +CSRCS += lib_strdup.c lib_strerror.c lib_strlen.c lib_strnlen.c +CSRCS += lib_strncasecmp.c lib_strncat.c lib_strncmp.c lib_strncpy.c +CSRCS += lib_strndup.c lib_strcasestr.c lib_strpbrk.c lib_strrchr.c +CSRCS += lib_strspn.c lib_strstr.c lib_strtok.c lib_strtokr.c +CSRCS += lib_strsep.c lib_strerrorr.c lib_explicit_bzero.c lib_strsignal.c +CSRCS += lib_anbstr2cstr.c lib_ancstr2bstr.c lib_bmem2cmem.c +CSRCS += lib_bstrnlen.c lib_cmem2bmem.c lib_nbstr2cstr.c lib_ncstr2bstr.c +CSRCS += lib_index.c lib_rindex.c lib_strlcpy.c + +ifneq ($(CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_MEMCPY),y) +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MEMCPY_VIK),y) +CSRCS += lib_vikmemcpy.c +else +CSRCS += lib_memcpy.c +endif +endif + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_LIBC_LOCALE),y) +CSRCS += lib_strcoll.c lib_strxfrm.c +endif + +# Add the string directory to the build + +DEPPATH += --dep-path string +VPATH += :string diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_anbstr2cstr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_anbstr2cstr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98b92fa6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_anbstr2cstr.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_anbstr2cstr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "libc.h" + +#if CHAR_BIT != 8 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *anbstr2cstr(FAR const char *src, size_t maxlen) +{ + FAR char *dst; + size_t len; + + len = bstrnlen(src, maxlen); + dst = lib_malloc(C2B(len + 1)); + if (dst) + { + dst[C2B(len + 1) - 1] = 0; + bmem2cmem(dst, src, 0, len); + } + + return dst; +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ancstr2bstr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ancstr2bstr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fe5c1a56 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ancstr2bstr.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_ancstr2bstr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "libc.h" + +#if CHAR_BIT != 8 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *ancstr2bstr(FAR const char *src, size_t maxlen) +{ + FAR char *dst; + size_t len; + + len = strnlen(src, maxlen); + dst = lib_malloc(B2C(len + 1)); + if (dst) + { + dst[B2C(len + 1) - 1] = 0; + cmem2bmem(dst, 0, src, len); + } + + return dst; +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_bmem2cmem.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_bmem2cmem.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..56175f2b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_bmem2cmem.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_bmem2cmem.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +#if !defined(CONFIG_ENDIAN_BIG) && CHAR_BIT != 8 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +void bmem2cmem(FAR void *dst_, FAR const void *src_, size_t rem, size_t len) +{ + char *dst = dst_; + const char *src = src_; + + while (1) + { + int i; + + for (i = 8 * rem; i < CHAR_BIT; i += 8) + { + if (len-- == 0) + { + return; + } + + *dst++ = (*src >> i) & 0xff; + } + + rem = 0; + src++; + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_bstrnlen.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_bstrnlen.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7466628e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_bstrnlen.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_bstrnlen.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +#if !defined(CONFIG_ENDIAN_BIG) && CHAR_BIT != 8 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +size_t bstrnlen(FAR const char *src, size_t maxlen) +{ + size_t len = 0; + + while (1) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < CHAR_BIT; i += 8, len++) + { + if (maxlen-- == 0 || ((*src >> i) & 0xff) == 0) + { + return len; + } + } + + src++; + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_cmem2bmem.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_cmem2bmem.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0efca811 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_cmem2bmem.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_cmem2bmem.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +#if !defined(CONFIG_ENDIAN_BIG) && CHAR_BIT != 8 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +void cmem2bmem(FAR void *dst_, size_t rem, FAR const void *src_, size_t len) +{ + char *dst = dst_; + const char *src = src_; + + while (1) + { + int i; + + for (i = 8 * rem; i < CHAR_BIT; i += 8) + { + if (len-- == 0) + { + return; + } + else if (i == 8 * rem) + { + *dst = 0; + } + + *dst |= (*src++ & 0xff) << i; + } + + rem = 0; + dst++; + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_explicit_bzero.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_explicit_bzero.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..251788c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_explicit_bzero.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_explicit_bzero.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2015,2017 Haltian Ltd. All rights reserved. + * Author: Juha Niskanen + * Jussi Kivilinna + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * 3. Neither the name NuttX nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, + * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS + * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED + * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* memset that must not be optimized away by compiler (not even with LTO). */ + +void explicit_bzero(FAR void *s, size_t n) +{ + static FAR void *(*FAR const volatile memset_v)(FAR void *, int, size_t) = + &memset; + + memset_v(s, 0, n); +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffs.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffs.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1b42c4fc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffs.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_ffs.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define NBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned int)) + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: ffs + * + * Description: + * The ffs() function will find the first bit set (beginning with the least + * significant bit) in j, and return the index of that bit. Bits are + * numbered starting at one (the least significant bit). + * + * Returned Value: + * The ffs() function will return the index of the first bit set. If j is + * 0, then ffs() will return 0. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int ffs(int j) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (j != 0) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_CTZ + /* Count trailing zeros function can be used to implement ffs. */ + + ret = __builtin_ctz(j) + 1; +#else + unsigned int value = (unsigned int)j; + int bitno; + + for (bitno = 1; bitno <= NBITS; bitno++, value >>= 1) + { + if ((value & 1) != 0) + { + ret = bitno; + break; + } + } +#endif + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffsl.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffsl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5b5f877 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffsl.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_ffsl.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define NBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long)) + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: ffsl + * + * Description: + * The ffsl() function will find the first bit set (beginning with the + * least significant bit) in j, and return the index of that bit. Bits are + * numbered starting at one (the least significant bit). + * + * Returned Value: + * The ffsl() function will return the index of the first bit set. If j is + * 0, then ffsl() will return 0. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int ffsl(long j) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (j != 0) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_CTZ + /* Count trailing zeros function can be used to implement ffs. */ + + ret = __builtin_ctzl(j) + 1; +#else + unsigned long value = (unsigned long)j; + int bitno; + + for (bitno = 1; bitno <= NBITS; bitno++, value >>= 1) + { + if ((value & 1) != 0) + { + ret = bitno; + break; + } + } +#endif + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffsll.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffsll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2d71b48 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ffsll.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_ffsll.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define NBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long long)) + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: ffsll + * + * Description: + * The ffsll() function will find the first bit set (beginning with the + * least significant bit) in i, and return the index of that bit. Bits are + * numbered starting at one (the least significant bit). + * + * Returned Value: + * The ffsll() function will return the index of the first bit set. If j is + * 0, then ffsll() will return 0. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int ffsll(long long j) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (j != 0) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_CTZ + /* Count trailing zeros function can be used to implement ffs. */ + + ret = __builtin_ctzll(j) + 1; +#else + unsigned long long value = (unsigned long long)j; + int bitno; + + for (bitno = 1; bitno <= NBITS; bitno++, value >>= 1) + { + if ((value & 1) != 0) + { + ret = bitno; + break; + } + } +#endif + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_fls.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_fls.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..62230671 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_fls.c @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_fls.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Haltian Ltd. All rights reserved. + * Author: Jussi Kivilinna + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * 3. Neither the name NuttX nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, + * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS + * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED + * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define NBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned int)) + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: fls + * + * Description: + * The fls() function will find the last bit set in value and return + * the index of that bit. Bits are numbered starting at one (the least + * significant bit). + * + * Returned Value: + * The fls() function will return the index of the last bit set. If j is + * 0, then fls() will return 0. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int fls(int j) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (j != 0) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_CLZ + /* Count leading zeros function can be used to implement fls. */ + + ret = NBITS - __builtin_clz(j); +#else + unsigned int value = (unsigned int)j; + int bitno; + + for (bitno = 1; bitno <= NBITS; bitno++, value >>= 1) + { + if (value == 1) + { + ret = bitno; + break; + } + } +#endif + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_flsl.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_flsl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f5cf75a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_flsl.c @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_flsl.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Haltian Ltd. All rights reserved. + * Author: Jussi Kivilinna + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * 3. Neither the name NuttX nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, + * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS + * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED + * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define NBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long)) + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: flsl + * + * Description: + * The flsl() function will find the last bit set in value and return + * the index of that bit. Bits are numbered starting at one (the least + * significant bit). + * + * Returned Value: + * The flsl() function will return the index of the last bit set. If j is + * 0, then flsl() will return 0. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int flsl(long j) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (j != 0) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_CLZ + /* Count leading zeros function can be used to implement fls. */ + + ret = NBITS - __builtin_clzl(j); +#else + unsigned long value = (unsigned long)j; + int bitno; + + for (bitno = 1; bitno <= NBITS; bitno++, value >>= 1) + { + if (value == 1) + { + ret = bitno; + break; + } + } +#endif + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_flsll.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_flsll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9dc6ede2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_flsll.c @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_flsll.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Haltian Ltd. All rights reserved. + * Author: Jussi Kivilinna + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * 3. Neither the name NuttX nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, + * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS + * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED + * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define NBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long long)) + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: flsll + * + * Description: + * The flsll() function will find the last bit set in value and return + * the index of that bit. Bits are numbered starting at one (the least + * significant bit). + * + * Returned Value: + * The flsll() function will return the index of the last bit set. If j is + * 0, then flsll() will return 0. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int flsll(long long j) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (j != 0) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_CLZ + /* Count leading zeros function can be used to implement fls. */ + + ret = NBITS - __builtin_clzll(j); +#else + unsigned long long value = (unsigned long long)j; + int bitno; + + for (bitno = 1; bitno <= NBITS; bitno++, value >>= 1) + { + if (value == 1) + { + ret = bitno; + break; + } + } +#endif + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_index.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_index.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1bdb9d71 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_index.c @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_index.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: index + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *index(FAR const char *s, int c) +{ + return strchr(s, c); +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_isbasedigit.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_isbasedigit.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..20ab09db --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_isbasedigit.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_isbasedigit.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: lib_isbasedigit + * + * Description: + * Given an ASCII character, ch, and a base (1-36) do two + * things: 1) Determine if ch is a valid charcter, and 2) + * convert ch to its binary value. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +bool lib_isbasedigit(int ch, int base, int *value) +{ + bool ret = false; + int tmp = 0; + + if (base <= 10) + { + if (ch >= '0' && ch <= base + '0' - 1) + { + tmp = ch - '0'; + ret = true; + } + } + else if (base <= 36) + { + if (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') + { + tmp = ch - '0'; + ret = true; + } + else if (ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'a' + base - 11) + { + tmp = ch - 'a' + 10; + ret = true; + } + else if (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'A' + base - 11) + { + tmp = ch - 'A' + 10; + ret = true; + } + } + + if (value) + { + *value = tmp; + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memccpy.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memccpy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b82152e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memccpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_memccpy.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: memccpy + * + * Description: + * The memccpy() function copies bytes from memory area s2 into s1, + * stopping after the first occurrence of byte c (converted to an unsigned + * char) is copied, or after n bytes are copied, whichever comes first. If + * copying takes place between objects that overlap, the behavior is + * undefined. + * + * Returned Value: + * The memccpy() function returns a pointer to the byte after the copy of c + * in s1, or a null pointer if c was not found in the first n bytes of s2. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR void *memccpy(FAR void *s1, FAR const void *s2, int c, size_t n) +{ + FAR unsigned char *pout = (FAR unsigned char *)s1; + FAR unsigned char *pin = (FAR unsigned char *)s2; + + /* Copy at most n bytes */ + + while (n-- > 0) + { + /* Copy one byte */ + + *pout = *pin++; + + /* Did we just copy the terminating byte c? */ + + if (*pout++ == (unsigned char)c) + { + /* Yes return a pointer to the byte after the copy of c into s1 */ + + return (FAR void *)pout; + } + } + + /* C was not found in the first n bytes of s2 */ + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memchr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memchr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..51b9c236 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memchr.c @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_memchr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: memchr + * + * Description: + * The memchr() function locates the first occurrence of 'c' (converted to + * an unsigned char) in the initial 'n' bytes (each interpreted as + * unsigned char) of the object pointed to by s. + * + * Returned Value: + * The memchr() function returns a pointer to the located byte, or a null + * pointer if the byte does not occur in the object. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR void *memchr(FAR const void *s, int c, size_t n) +{ + FAR const unsigned char *p = (FAR const unsigned char *)s; + + if (s) + { + while (n--) + { + if (*p == (unsigned char)c) + { + return (FAR void *)p; + } + + p++; + } + } + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memcmp.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memcmp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..21918597 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memcmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_memcmp.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_MEMCMP +int memcmp(FAR const void *s1, FAR const void *s2, size_t n) +{ + unsigned char *p1 = (unsigned char *)s1; + unsigned char *p2 = (unsigned char *)s2; + + while (n-- > 0) + { + if (*p1 < *p2) + { + return -1; + } + else if (*p1 > *p2) + { + return 1; + } + + p1++; + p2++; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memcpy.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memcpy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d40bcc69 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memcpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_memcpy.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: memcpy + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_MEMCPY +FAR void *memcpy(FAR void *dest, FAR const void *src, size_t n) +{ + FAR unsigned char *pout = (FAR unsigned char *)dest; + FAR unsigned char *pin = (FAR unsigned char *)src; + while (n-- > 0) *pout++ = *pin++; + return dest; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memmove.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memmove.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17dfc13b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memmove.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_memmove.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_MEMMOVE +FAR void *memmove(FAR void *dest, FAR const void *src, size_t count) +{ + FAR char *tmp; + FAR char *s; + + if (dest <= src) + { + tmp = (FAR char *) dest; + s = (FAR char *) src; + + while (count--) + { + *tmp++ = *s++; + } + } + else + { + tmp = (FAR char *) dest + count; + s = (FAR char *) src + count; + + while (count--) + { + *--tmp = *--s; + } + } + + return dest; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memrchr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memrchr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a74a9bfe --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memrchr.c @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_memrchr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: memrchr + * + * Description: + * The memrchr() function locates the last occurrence of 'c' (converted to + * an unsigned char) in the initial 'n' bytes (each interpreted as + * unsigned char) of the object pointed to by s. + * + * Returned Value: + * The memrchr() function returns a pointer to the located byte, or a null + * pointer if the byte does not occur in the object. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR void *memrchr(FAR const void *s, int c, size_t n) +{ + FAR const unsigned char *p = (FAR const unsigned char *)s + n; + + while (n--) + { + if (*--p == (unsigned char)c) + { + return (FAR void *)p; + } + } + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memset.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memset.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..961843ac --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_memset.c @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_memset.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* Can't support CONFIG_MEMSET_64BIT if the platform does not have 64-bit + * integer types. + */ + +#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG +# undef CONFIG_MEMSET_64BIT +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_MEMSET +FAR void *memset(FAR void *s, int c, size_t n) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMSET_OPTSPEED + /* This version is optimized for speed (you could do better + * still by exploiting processor caching or memory burst + * knowledge.) + */ + + uintptr_t addr = (uintptr_t)s; + uint16_t val16 = ((uint16_t)c << 8) | (uint16_t)c; + uint32_t val32 = ((uint32_t)val16 << 16) | (uint32_t)val16; +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMSET_64BIT + uint64_t val64 = ((uint64_t)val32 << 32) | (uint64_t)val32; +#endif + + /* Make sure that there is something to be cleared */ + + if (n > 0) + { + /* Align to a 16-bit boundary */ + + if ((addr & 1) != 0) + { + *(FAR uint8_t *)addr = (uint8_t)c; + addr += 1; + n -= 1; + } + + /* Check if there are at least 16-bits left to be written */ + + if (n >= 2) + { + /* Align to a 32-bit boundary (we know that the destination + * address is already aligned to at least a 16-bit boundary). + */ + + if ((addr & 3) != 0) + { + *(FAR uint16_t *)addr = val16; + addr += 2; + n -= 2; + } + +#ifndef CONFIG_MEMSET_64BIT + /* Loop while there are at least 32-bits left to be written */ + + while (n >= 4) + { + *(FAR uint32_t *)addr = val32; + addr += 4; + n -= 4; + } +#else + /* Check if there are at least 32-bits left to be written */ + + if (n >= 4) + { + /* Align to a 64-bit boundary (we know that the destination + * address is already aligned to at least a 32-bit boundary). + */ + + if ((addr & 7) != 0) + { + *(FAR uint32_t *)addr = val32; + addr += 4; + n -= 4; + } + + /* Loop while there are at least 64-bits left to be written */ + + while (n >= 8) + { + *(FAR uint64_t *)addr = val64; + addr += 8; + n -= 8; + } + } +#endif + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMSET_64BIT + /* We may get here with n in the range 0..7. If n >= 4, then we should + * have 64-bit alignment. + */ + + if (n >= 4) + { + *(FAR uint32_t *)addr = val32; + addr += 4; + n -= 4; + } +#endif + + /* We may get here under the following conditions: + * + * n = 0, addr may or may not be aligned + * n = 1, addr is aligned to at least a 16-bit boundary + * n = 2, addr is aligned to a 32-bit boundary + * n = 3, addr is aligned to a 32-bit boundary + */ + + if (n >= 2) + { + *(FAR uint16_t *)addr = val16; + addr += 2; + n -= 2; + } + + if (n >= 1) + { + *(FAR uint8_t *)addr = (uint8_t)c; + } + } +#else + /* This version is optimized for size */ + + FAR unsigned char *p = (FAR unsigned char *)s; + while (n-- > 0) *p++ = c; +#endif + return s; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_nbstr2cstr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_nbstr2cstr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d593f67a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_nbstr2cstr.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_nbstr2cstr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +#if !defined(CONFIG_ENDIAN_BIG) && CHAR_BIT != 8 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +void nbstr2cstr(FAR char *dst, FAR const char *src, size_t maxlen) +{ + while (1) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < CHAR_BIT; i += 8) + { + if (maxlen-- == 0) + { + return; + } + + *dst = (*src >> i) & 0xff; + if (*dst++ == 0) + { + return; + } + } + + src++; + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ncstr2bstr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ncstr2bstr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29bcc8a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_ncstr2bstr.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_ncstr2bstr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +#if !defined(CONFIG_ENDIAN_BIG) && CHAR_BIT != 8 + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +void ncstr2bstr(FAR char *dst, FAR const char *src, size_t maxlen) +{ + while (1) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < CHAR_BIT; i += 8) + { + char tmp; + + if (maxlen-- == 0) + { + return; + } + else if (i == 0) + { + *dst = 0; + } + + tmp = *src++ & 0xff; + if (tmp == 0) + { + return; + } + + *dst |= tmp << i; + } + + dst++; + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_popcount.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_popcount.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6988a452 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_popcount.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_popcount.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: popcount + ****************************************************************************/ + +unsigned int popcount(unsigned int j) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_POPCOUNT + return __builtin_popcount(j); +#else + unsigned int count = 0; + + while (j > 0) + { + if ((j & 1) == 1) + { + count++; + } + + j >>= 1; + } + + return count; +#endif +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_popcountl.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_popcountl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..027f4af8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_popcountl.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_popcountl.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: popcount + ****************************************************************************/ + +unsigned int popcountl(unsigned long j) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_POPCOUNT + return __builtin_popcountl(j); +#else + unsigned int count = 0; + + while (j > 0) + { + if ((j & 1) == 1) + { + count++; + } + + j >>= 1; + } + + return count; +#endif +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_popcountll.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_popcountll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0854df4b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_popcountll.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_popcountll.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: popcount + ****************************************************************************/ + +unsigned int popcountll(unsigned long long j) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BUILTIN_POPCOUNT + return __builtin_popcountll(j); +#else + unsigned int count = 0; + + while (j > 0) + { + if ((j & 1) == 1) + { + count++; + } + + j >>= 1; + } + + return count; +#endif +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_rindex.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_rindex.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b59513b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_rindex.c @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_rindex.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: rindex + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *rindex(FAR const char *s, int c) +{ + return strrchr(s, c); +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_skipspace.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_skipspace.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6c1ae9ce --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_skipspace.c @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_skipspace.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: lib_skipspace + * + * Description: + * Skip over leading whitespace + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void lib_skipspace(const char **pptr) +{ + const char *ptr = *pptr; + while (isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; + *pptr = ptr; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_stpcpy.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_stpcpy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5219c513 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_stpcpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_stpcpy.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: stpcpy + * + * Description: + * Copies the string pointed to by 'src' (including the terminating NUL + * character) into the array pointed to by 'dest'. + * + * Returned Value: + * The stpcpy() function returns a pointer to the terminating NUL + * character copied into the 'dest' buffer + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_STPCPY +FAR char *stpcpy(FAR char *dest, FAR const char *src) +{ + while ((*dest++ = *src++) != '\0'); + return --dest; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_stpncpy.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_stpncpy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4346f5d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_stpncpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_stpncpy.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: stpncpy + * + * Description: + * Copies the string pointed to by 'src' (including the terminating NUL + * character) into the array pointed to by 'dest'. strncpy() will not + * copy more than 'n' bytes from 'src' to 'dest' array (including the + * NUL terminator). + * + * If the array pointed to by 'src' is a string that is shorter than 'n' + * bytes, NUL characters will be appended to the copy in the array + * pointed to by 'dest', until 'n' bytes in all are written. + * + * If copying takes place between objects that overlap, the behavior is + * undefined. + * + * Returned Value: + * If a NUL character is written to the destination, the stpncpy() + * function will return the address of the first such NUL character. + * Otherwise, it will return &dest[n] + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_STPNCPY +FAR char *stpncpy(FAR char *dest, FAR const char *src, size_t n) +{ + FAR char *end = dest + n; /* End of dest buffer + 1 byte */ + FAR char *ret; /* Value to be returned */ + + /* Copy up n bytes, breaking out of the loop early if a NUL terminator is + * encountered. + */ + + while ((dest != end) && (*dest = *src++) != '\0') + { + /* Increment the 'dest' pointer only if it does not refer to the + * NUL terminator. + */ + + dest++; + } + + /* Return the pointer to the NUL terminator (or to the end of the buffer + * + 1). + */ + + ret = dest; + + /* Pad the remainder of the array pointer to 'dest' with NULs. This + * overwrites any previously copied NUL terminator. + */ + + while (dest != end) + { + *dest++ = '\0'; + } + + return ret; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcasecmp.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcasecmp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cf59fe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcasecmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strcasecmp.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_STRCASECMP +int strcasecmp(FAR const char *cs, FAR const char *ct) +{ + int result; + for (; ; ) + { + if ((result = (int)toupper(*cs) - (int)toupper(*ct)) != 0 || !*cs) + { + break; + } + + cs++; + ct++; + } + + return result; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcasestr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcasestr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e63e644a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcasestr.c @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strcasestr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +static FAR char *strcasechr(FAR const char *s, int uc) +{ + register char ch; + + if (s) + { + for (; *s; s++) + { + ch = *s; + if (toupper(ch) == uc) + { + return (FAR char *)s; + } + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *strcasestr(FAR const char *str, FAR const char *substr) +{ + FAR const char *candidate; /* Candidate in str with matching start character */ + char ch; /* First character of the substring */ + size_t len; /* The length of the substring */ + + /* Special case the empty substring */ + + len = strlen(substr); + ch = *substr; + + if (!ch) + { + /* We'll say that an empty substring matches at the beginning of + * the string + */ + + return (FAR char *)str; + } + + /* Search for the substring */ + + candidate = str; + ch = toupper(ch); + + for (; ; ) + { + /* strcasechr() will return a pointer to the next occurrence of the + * character ch in the string (ignoring case) + */ + + candidate = strcasechr(candidate, ch); + if (!candidate || strlen(candidate) < len) + { + /* First character of the substring does not appear in the string + * or the remainder of the string is not long enough to contain the + * substring. + */ + + return NULL; + } + + /* Check if this is the beginning of a matching substring + * (ignoring case) + */ + + if (strncasecmp(candidate, substr, len) == 0) + { + /* Yes.. return the pointer to the first occurrence of the matching + * substring. + */ + + return (FAR char *)candidate; + } + + /* No, find the next candidate after this one */ + + candidate++; + } + + /* Won't get here, but some compilers might complain. Others might + * complain about this code being unreachable too. + */ + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcat.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcat.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..06f6feff --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcat.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strcat.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_STRCAT +char *strcat(char *dest, const char *src) +{ + char *ret = dest; + + dest += strlen(dest); + while (*src != '\0') + { + *dest++ = *src++; + } + + *dest = '\0'; + + return ret; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strchr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strchr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..81182b77 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strchr.c @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strchr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strchr + * + * Description: + * The strchr() function locates the first occurrence of 'c' (converted to + * a char) in the string pointed to by 's'. The terminating null byte is + * considered to be part of the string. + * + * Returned Value: + * Upon completion, strchr() returns a pointer to the byte, or a null + * pointer if the byte was not found. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_STRCHR +FAR char *strchr(FAR const char *s, int c) +{ + if (s) + { + for (; ; s++) + { + if (*s == c) + { + return (FAR char *)s; + } + + if (!*s) + { + break; + } + } + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcmp.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcmp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..15da7a8c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strcmp.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_STRCMP +int strcmp(FAR const char *cs, FAR const char *ct) +{ + register signed char result; + for (; ; ) + { + if ((result = *cs - *ct++) != 0 || !*cs++) + break; + } + + return result; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcoll.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcoll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5bed809 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcoll.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strcoll.c + * + * Copyright (c)1999 Citrus Project, + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_LIBC_LOCALE + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strcoll + * + * Description: + * The strcoll() compares the string pointed to by a to the string pointed + * to by b, using an interpretation appropriate to the current + * LC_COLLATE state. Current implementation doesn't care about locale. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int strcoll(const char *a, const char *b) +{ + return strcmp(a, b); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcpy.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcpy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f40fe603 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strcpy.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strcpy + * + * Description: + * Copies the string pointed to by 'src' (including the terminating NUL + * character) into the array pointed to by 'des'. + * + * Returned Value: + * The strcpy() function returns the 'dest' pointer + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_STRCPY +FAR char *strcpy(FAR char *dest, FAR const char *src) +{ + char *tmp = dest; + while ((*dest++ = *src++) != '\0'); + return tmp; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcspn.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcspn.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f250352 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strcspn.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strcspn.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strcspn + * + * Description: + * strcspn() calculates the length of the initial segment of s which + * consists entirely of characters not in reject. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +size_t strcspn(const char *s, const char *reject) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; s[i] && strchr(reject, s[i]) == NULL; i++); + return i; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strdup.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strdup.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8f14c57f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strdup.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strdup.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *strdup(FAR const char *s) +{ + FAR char *news = NULL; + if (s) + { + news = (FAR char *)lib_malloc(strlen(s) + 1); + if (news) + { + strcpy(news, s); + } + } + + return news; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strerror.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strerror.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..82625df2 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strerror.c @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strerror.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Types + ****************************************************************************/ + +struct errno_strmap_s +{ + uint8_t errnum; + const char *str; +}; + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_LIBC_STRERROR + +/* This table maps all error numbers to descriptive strings. + * The only assumption that the code makes with regard to this + * this table is that it is ordered by error number. + * + * The size of this table is quite large. Its size can be + * reduced by eliminating some of the more obscure error + * strings. + */ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_STRERROR_SHORT + +static const struct errno_strmap_s g_errnomap[] = +{ + { 0, "Success" }, + { EPERM, EPERM_STR }, + { ENOENT, ENOENT_STR }, + { ESRCH, ESRCH_STR }, + { EINTR, EINTR_STR }, + { EIO, EIO_STR }, + { ENXIO, ENXIO_STR }, + { E2BIG, E2BIG_STR }, + { ENOEXEC, ENOEXEC_STR }, + { EBADF, EBADF_STR }, + { ECHILD, ECHILD_STR }, + { EAGAIN, EAGAIN_STR }, + { ENOMEM, ENOMEM_STR }, + { EACCES, EACCES_STR }, + { EFAULT, EFAULT_STR }, + { ENOTBLK, ENOTBLK_STR }, + { EBUSY, EBUSY_STR }, + { EEXIST, EEXIST_STR }, + { EXDEV, EXDEV_STR }, + { ENODEV, ENODEV_STR }, + { ENOTDIR, ENOTDIR_STR }, + { EISDIR, EISDIR_STR }, + { EINVAL, EINVAL_STR }, + { ENFILE, ENFILE_STR }, + { EMFILE, EMFILE_STR }, + { ENOTTY, ENOTTY_STR }, + { ETXTBSY, ETXTBSY_STR }, + { EFBIG, EFBIG_STR }, + { ENOSPC, ENOSPC_STR }, + { ESPIPE, ESPIPE_STR }, + { EROFS, EROFS_STR }, + { EMLINK, EMLINK_STR }, + { EPIPE, EPIPE_STR }, + { EDOM, EDOM_STR }, + { ERANGE, ERANGE_STR }, + { ENOMSG, ENOMSG_STR }, + { EIDRM, EIDRM_STR }, + { ECHRNG, ECHRNG_STR }, + { EL2NSYNC, EL2NSYNC_STR }, + { EL3HLT, EL3HLT_STR }, + { EL3RST, EL3RST_STR }, + { ELNRNG, ELNRNG_STR }, + { EUNATCH, EUNATCH_STR }, + { ENOCSI, ENOCSI_STR }, + { EL2HLT, EL2HLT_STR }, + { EDEADLK, EDEADLK_STR }, + { ENOLCK, ENOLCK_STR }, + { EBADE, EBADE_STR }, + { EBADR, EBADR_STR }, + { EXFULL, EXFULL_STR }, + { ENOANO, ENOANO_STR }, + { EBADRQC, EBADRQC_STR }, + { EBADSLT, EBADSLT_STR }, + { EDEADLOCK, EDEADLOCK_STR }, + { EBFONT, EBFONT_STR }, + { ENOSTR, ENOSTR_STR }, + { ENODATA, ENODATA_STR }, + { ETIME, ETIME_STR }, + { ENOSR, ENOSR_STR }, + { ENONET, ENONET_STR }, + { ENOPKG, ENOPKG_STR }, + { EREMOTE, EREMOTE_STR }, + { ENOLINK, ENOLINK_STR }, + { EADV, EADV_STR }, + { ESRMNT, ESRMNT_STR }, + { ECOMM, ECOMM_STR }, + { EPROTO, EPROTO_STR }, + { EMULTIHOP, EMULTIHOP_STR }, + { ELBIN, ELBIN_STR }, + { EDOTDOT, EDOTDOT_STR }, + { EBADMSG, EBADMSG_STR }, + { EFTYPE, EFTYPE_STR }, + { ENOTUNIQ, ENOTUNIQ_STR }, + { EBADFD, EBADFD_STR }, + { EREMCHG, EREMCHG_STR }, + { ELIBACC, ELIBACC_STR }, + { ELIBBAD, ELIBBAD_STR }, + { ELIBSCN, ELIBSCN_STR }, + { ELIBMAX, ELIBMAX_STR }, + { ELIBEXEC, ELIBEXEC_STR }, + { ENOSYS, ENOSYS_STR }, + { ENMFILE, ENMFILE_STR }, + { ENOTEMPTY, ENOTEMPTY_STR }, + { ENAMETOOLONG, ENAMETOOLONG_STR }, + { ELOOP, ELOOP_STR }, + { EOPNOTSUPP, EOPNOTSUPP_STR }, + { EPFNOSUPPORT, EPFNOSUPPORT_STR }, + { ECONNRESET, ECONNRESET_STR }, + { ENOBUFS, ENOBUFS_STR }, + { EAFNOSUPPORT, EAFNOSUPPORT_STR }, + { EPROTOTYPE, EPROTOTYPE_STR }, + { ENOTSOCK, ENOTSOCK_STR }, + { ENOPROTOOPT, ENOPROTOOPT_STR }, + { ESHUTDOWN, ESHUTDOWN_STR }, + { ECONNREFUSED, ECONNREFUSED_STR }, + { EADDRINUSE, EADDRINUSE_STR }, + { ECONNABORTED, ECONNABORTED_STR }, + { ENETUNREACH, ENETUNREACH_STR }, + { ENETDOWN, ENETDOWN_STR }, + { ETIMEDOUT, ETIMEDOUT_STR }, + { EHOSTDOWN, EHOSTDOWN_STR }, + { EHOSTUNREACH, EHOSTUNREACH_STR }, + { EINPROGRESS, EINPROGRESS_STR }, + { EALREADY, EALREADY_STR }, + { EDESTADDRREQ, EDESTADDRREQ_STR }, + { EMSGSIZE, EMSGSIZE_STR }, + { EPROTONOSUPPORT, EPROTONOSUPPORT_STR }, + { ESOCKTNOSUPPORT, ESOCKTNOSUPPORT_STR }, + { EADDRNOTAVAIL, EADDRNOTAVAIL_STR }, + { ENETRESET, ENETRESET_STR }, + { EISCONN, EISCONN_STR }, + { ENOTCONN, ENOTCONN_STR }, + { ETOOMANYREFS, ETOOMANYREFS_STR }, + { EPROCLIM, EPROCLIM_STR }, + { EUSERS, EUSERS_STR }, + { EDQUOT, EDQUOT_STR }, + { ESTALE, ESTALE_STR }, + { ENOTSUP, ENOTSUP_STR }, + { ENOMEDIUM, ENOMEDIUM_STR }, + { ENOSHARE, ENOSHARE_STR }, + { ECASECLASH, ECASECLASH_STR }, + { EILSEQ, EILSEQ_STR }, + { EOVERFLOW, EOVERFLOW_STR }, + { ECANCELED, ECANCELED_STR }, + { ENOTRECOVERABLE, ENOTRECOVERABLE_STR }, + { EOWNERDEAD, EOWNERDEAD_STR }, + { ESTRPIPE, ESTRPIPE_STR } +}; + +#else /* CONFIG_LIBC_STRERROR_SHORT */ + +static const struct errno_strmap_s g_errnomap[] = +{ + { 0, "OK" }, + { EPERM, "EPERM" }, + { ENOENT, "ENOENT" }, + { ESRCH, "ESRCH" }, + { EINTR, "EINTR" }, + { EIO, "EIO" }, + { ENXIO, "ENXIO" }, + { E2BIG, "E2BIG" }, + { ENOEXEC, "ENOEXEC" }, + { EBADF, "EBADF" }, + { ECHILD, "ECHILD" }, + { EAGAIN, "EAGAIN" }, + { ENOMEM, "ENOMEM" }, + { EACCES, "EACCES" }, + { EFAULT, "EFAULT" }, + { ENOTBLK, "ENOTBLK" }, + { EBUSY, "EBUSY" }, + { EEXIST, "EEXIST" }, + { EXDEV, "EXDEV" }, + { ENODEV, "ENODEV" }, + { ENOTDIR, "ENOTDIR" }, + { EISDIR, "EISDIR" }, + { EINVAL, "EINVAL" }, + { ENFILE, "ENFILE" }, + { EMFILE, "EMFILE" }, + { ENOTTY, "ENOTTY" }, + { ETXTBSY, "ETXTBSY" }, + { EFBIG, "EFBIG" }, + { ENOSPC, "ENOSPC" }, + { ESPIPE, "ESPIPE" }, + { EROFS, "EROFS" }, + { EMLINK, "EMLINK" }, + { EPIPE, "EPIPE" }, + { EDOM, "EDOM" }, + { ERANGE, "ERANGE" }, + { ENOMSG, "ENOMSG" }, + { EIDRM, "EIDRM" }, + { ECHRNG, "ECHRNG" }, + { EL2NSYNC, "EL2NSYNC" }, + { EL3HLT, "EL3HLT" }, + { EL3RST, "EL3RST" }, + { ELNRNG, "ELNRNG" }, + { EUNATCH, "EUNATCH" }, + { ENOCSI, "ENOCSI" }, + { EL2HLT, "EL2HLT" }, + { EDEADLK, "EDEADLK" }, + { ENOLCK, "ENOLCK" }, + { EBADE, "EBADE" }, + { EBADR, "EBADR" }, + { EXFULL, "EXFULL" }, + { ENOANO, "ENOANO" }, + { EBADRQC, "EBADRQC" }, + { EBADSLT, "EBADSLT" }, + { EDEADLOCK, "EDEADLOCK" }, + { EBFONT, "EBFONT" }, + { ENOSTR, "ENOSTR" }, + { ENODATA, "ENODATA" }, + { ETIME, "ETIME" }, + { ENOSR, "ENOSR" }, + { ENONET, "ENONET" }, + { ENOPKG, "ENOPKG" }, + { EREMOTE, "EREMOTE" }, + { ENOLINK, "ENOLINK" }, + { EADV, "EADV" }, + { ESRMNT, "ESRMNT" }, + { ECOMM, "ECOMM" }, + { EPROTO, "EPROTO" }, + { EMULTIHOP, "EMULTIHOP" }, + { ELBIN, "ELBIN" }, + { EDOTDOT, "EDOTDOT" }, + { EBADMSG, "EBADMSG" }, + { EFTYPE, "EFTYPE" }, + { ENOTUNIQ, "ENOTUNIQ" }, + { EBADFD, "EBADFD" }, + { EREMCHG, "EREMCHG" }, + { ELIBACC, "ELIBACC" }, + { ELIBBAD, "ELIBBAD" }, + { ELIBSCN, "ELIBSCN" }, + { ELIBMAX, "ELIBMAX" }, + { ELIBEXEC, "ELIBEXEC" }, + { ENOSYS, "ENOSYS" }, + { ENMFILE, "ENMFILE" }, + { ENOTEMPTY, "ENOTEMPTY" }, + { ENAMETOOLONG, "ENAMETOOLONG" }, + { ELOOP, "ELOOP" }, + { EOPNOTSUPP, "EOPNOTSUPP" }, + { EPFNOSUPPORT, "EPFNOSUPPORT" }, + { ECONNRESET, "ECONNRESET" }, + { ENOBUFS, "ENOBUFS" }, + { EAFNOSUPPORT, "EAFNOSUPPORT" }, + { EPROTOTYPE, "EPROTOTYPE" }, + { ENOTSOCK, "ENOTSOCK" }, + { ENOPROTOOPT, "ENOPROTOOPT" }, + { ESHUTDOWN, "ESHUTDOWN" }, + { ECONNREFUSED, "ECONNREFUSED" }, + { EADDRINUSE, "EADDRINUSE" }, + { ECONNABORTED, "ECONNABORTED" }, + { ENETUNREACH, "ENETUNREACH" }, + { ENETDOWN, "ENETDOWN" }, + { ETIMEDOUT, "ETIMEDOUT" }, + { EHOSTDOWN, "EHOSTDOWN" }, + { EHOSTUNREACH, "EHOSTUNREACH" }, + { EINPROGRESS, "EINPROGRESS" }, + { EALREADY, "EALREADY" }, + { EDESTADDRREQ, "EDESTADDRREQ" }, + { EMSGSIZE, "EMSGSIZE" }, + { EPROTONOSUPPORT, "EPROTONOSUPPORT" }, + { ESOCKTNOSUPPORT, "ESOCKTNOSUPPORT" }, + { EADDRNOTAVAIL, "EADDRNOTAVAIL" }, + { ENETRESET, "ENETRESET" }, + { EISCONN, "EISCONN" }, + { ENOTCONN, "ENOTCONN" }, + { ETOOMANYREFS, "ETOOMANYREFS" }, + { EPROCLIM, "EPROCLIM" }, + { EUSERS, "EUSERS" }, + { EDQUOT, "EDQUOT" }, + { ESTALE, "ESTALE" }, + { ENOTSUP, "ENOTSUP" }, + { ENOMEDIUM, "ENOMEDIUM" }, + { ENOSHARE, "ENOSHARE" }, + { ECASECLASH, "ECASECLASH" }, + { EILSEQ, "EILSEQ" }, + { EOVERFLOW, "EOVERFLOW" }, + { ECANCELED, "ECANCELED" }, + { ENOTRECOVERABLE, "ENOTRECOVERABLE" }, + { EOWNERDEAD, "EOWNERDEAD" }, + { ESTRPIPE, "ESTRPIPE" } +}; + +#endif /* CONFIG_LIBC_STRERROR_SHORT */ + +#define NERRNO_STRS (sizeof(g_errnomap) / sizeof(struct errno_strmap_s)) + +#endif /* CONFIG_LIBC_STRERROR */ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strerror + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR const char *strerror(int errnum) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_LIBC_STRERROR + int ndxlow = 0; + int ndxhi = NERRNO_STRS - 1; + int ndxmid; + + do + { + ndxmid = (ndxlow + ndxhi) >> 1; + if (errnum > g_errnomap[ndxmid].errnum) + { + ndxlow = ndxmid + 1; + } + else if (errnum < g_errnomap[ndxmid].errnum) + { + ndxhi = ndxmid - 1; + } + else + { + return g_errnomap[ndxmid].str; + } + } + while (ndxlow <= ndxhi); +#endif + return "Unknown error"; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strerrorr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strerrorr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..65c3f3a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strerrorr.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strerrorr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strerror_r + * + * Description: + * The strerror_r() function is similar to strerror(), but is thread safe. + * It returns the error string in the user-supplied buffer 'buf' of length + * 'buflen'. + * + * Returned Value: + * strerror_r() returns 0 on success. On error, a (positive) error number is + * returned. + * + * Portability: + * Specified in POSIX.1-2001 + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +int strerror_r(int errnum, FAR char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + FAR const char *errstr = strerror(errnum); + + DEBUGASSERT(buf != NULL); + strncpy(buf, errstr, buflen); + return OK; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strlcpy.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strlcpy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ee6f2017 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strlcpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strlcpy.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strlcpy + * + * Description: + * Copy src to string dst of size dsize. At most dsize-1 characters + * will be copied. Always NUL terminates (unless dsize == 0). + * + * Returned Value: + * Returns strlen(src); if retval >= dsize, truncation occurred. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_STRLCPY +size_t strlcpy(FAR char *dst, FAR const char *src, size_t dsize) +{ + FAR const char *osrc = src; + size_t nleft = dsize; + + if (nleft != 0) + { + while (--nleft != 0) + { + if ((*dst++ = *src++) == '\0') + { + break; + } + } + } + + if (nleft == 0) + { + if (dsize != 0) + { + *dst = '\0'; + } + + while (*src++); + } + + return (src - osrc - 1); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strlen.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strlen.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c559257b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strlen.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strlen.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_STRLEN +size_t strlen(const char *s) +{ + const char *sc; + for (sc = s; *sc != '\0'; ++sc); + return sc - s; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncasecmp.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncasecmp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9a2cb52d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncasecmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strncasecmp.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_STRNCASECMP +int strncasecmp(const char *cs, const char *ct, size_t nb) +{ + int result = 0; + for (; nb > 0; nb--) + { + if ((result = (int)toupper(*cs) - (int)toupper(*ct)) != 0 || !*cs) + { + break; + } + + cs++; + ct++; + } + + return result; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncat.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncat.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c9cf3efa --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncat.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strncat.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_STRNCAT +char *strncat(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n) +{ + char *ret = dest; + + dest += strlen(dest); + for (; n > 0 && *src != '\0' ; n--) + { + *dest++ = *src++; + } + + *dest = '\0'; + + return ret; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncmp.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncmp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8d9b5122 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strncmp.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_STRNCMP +int strncmp(const char *cs, const char *ct, size_t nb) +{ + int result = 0; + for (; nb > 0; nb--) + { + if ((result = (int)*cs - (int)*ct++) != 0 || !*cs++) + { + break; + } + } + + return result; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncpy.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncpy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90acbad6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strncpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strncpy.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strncpy + * + * Description: + * Copies the string pointed to by 'src' (including the terminating NUL + * character) into the array pointed to by 'dest'. strncpy() will not + * copy more than 'n' bytes from 'src' to 'dest' array (including the + * NUL terminator). + * + * If the array pointed to by 'src' is a string that is shorter than 'n' + * bytes, NUL characters will be appended to the copy in the array + * pointed to by 'dest', until 'n' bytes in all are written. + * + * If copying takes place between objects that overlap, the behavior is + * undefined. + * + * Returned Value: + * The strncpy() function returns the pointer to 'dest' + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_STRNCPY +FAR char *strncpy(FAR char *dest, FAR const char *src, size_t n) +{ + FAR char *ret = dest; /* Value to be returned */ + FAR char *end = dest + n; /* End of dest buffer + 1 byte */ + + /* Copy up n bytes, breaking out of the loop early if a NUL terminator is + * encountered. + */ + + while ((dest != end) && (*dest++ = *src++) != '\0') + { + } + + /* Note that there may be no NUL terminator in 'dest' */ + + /* Pad the remainder of the array pointer to 'dest' with NULs */ + + while (dest != end) + { + *dest++ = '\0'; + } + + return ret; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strndup.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strndup.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..07b124ed --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strndup.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strndup.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +#include "libc.h" + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strndup + * + * Description: + * The strndup() function is equivalent to the strdup() function, + * duplicating the provided 's' in a new block of memory allocated as + * if by using malloc(), with the exception being that strndup() copies + * at most 'size' plus one bytes into the newly allocated memory, + * terminating the new string with a NUL character. If the length of 's' + * is larger than 'size', only 'size' bytes will be duplicated. If + * 'size' is larger than the length of 's', all bytes in s will be + * copied into the new memory buffer, including the terminating NUL + * character. The newly created string will always be properly + * terminated. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *strndup(FAR const char *s, size_t size) +{ + FAR char *news = NULL; + if (s) + { + /* Get the size of the new string (limited to size) */ + + size_t allocsize = strnlen(s, size); + + /* Allocate the new string, adding 1 for the NUL terminator */ + + news = (FAR char *)lib_malloc(allocsize + 1); + if (news) + { + /* Copy the string into the allocated memory and add a NUL + * terminator in any case. + */ + + memcpy(news, s, allocsize); + news[allocsize] = '\0'; + } + } + + return news; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strnlen.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strnlen.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0491e452 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strnlen.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strnlen.c + * + * This file is part of NuttX, contributed by Michael Hrabanek + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Gregory Nutt. All rights reserved. + * Author: Michael Hrabanek + * + * Derives from the file libs/libc/lib_strlen.c: + * + * Copyright (C) 2007, 2008, 2010 Gregory Nutt. All rights reserved. + * Author: Gregory Nutt + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * 3. Neither the name NuttX nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, + * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS + * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED + * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN + * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef CONFIG_LIBC_ARCH_STRNLEN +size_t strnlen(const char *s, size_t maxlen) +{ + const char *sc; + for (sc = s; maxlen != 0 && *sc != '\0'; maxlen--, ++sc); + return sc - s; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strpbrk.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strpbrk.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1f3ca0eb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strpbrk.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strpbrk.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *strpbrk(FAR const char *str, FAR const char *charset) +{ + /* Sanity checking */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FEATURES + if (!str || !charset) + { + return NULL; + } +#endif + + /* Check each character in the string */ + + while (*str) + { + /* Check if the character from the string matches any character in the + * charset + */ + + if (strchr(charset, *str) != NULL) + { + /* Yes, then this position must be the first occurrence in string */ + + return (FAR char *)str; + } + + /* This character from the strings matches none of those in the + * charset. Try the next character from the string. + */ + + str++; + } + + /* We have looked at every character in the string, and none of them match + * any of the characters in charset. + */ + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strrchr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strrchr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..80b6d7d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strrchr.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strrchr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* The strrchr() function returns a pointer to the last + * occurrence of the character c in the string s. + */ + +FAR char *strrchr(FAR const char *s, int c) +{ + if (s) + { + const char *p = &s[strlen(s)]; + for (; p >= s; p--) + { + if (*p == c) + { + return (FAR char *)p; + } + } + } + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strsep.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strsep.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c127986 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strsep.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strsep.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strsep + * + * Description: + * If *strp is NULL, the strsep() function returns NULL and does + * nothing else. Otherwise, this function finds the first token in the + * string *strp, that is delimited by one of the bytes in the string + * delim. This token is terminated by overwriting the delimiter with a + * null byte ('\0'), and *strp is updated to point past the token. + * In case no delimiter was found, the token is taken to be the entire + * string *strp, and *strp is made NULL. + * + * Returned Value: + * The strsep() function returns a pointer to the token, that is, it + * returns the original value of *strp. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *strsep(FAR char **strp, FAR const char *delim) +{ + FAR char *sbegin = *strp; + FAR char *end; + + if (sbegin == NULL) + { + return NULL; + } + + end = strpbrk(sbegin, delim); + if (end != NULL) + { + *end++ = '\0'; + } + + *strp = end; + return sbegin; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strsignal.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strsignal.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2237dcf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strsignal.c @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strsignal.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* We don't know what signals names will be assigned to which signals in + * advance and we do not want to return a volatile value. One solution is + * this silly array of useless names: + */ + +static FAR const char *g_default_sigstr[32] = +{ + "Signal 0", + "Signal 1", + "Signal 2", + "Signal 3", + "Signal 4", + "Signal 5", + "Signal 6", + "Signal 7", + "Signal 8", + "Signal 9", + "Signal 10", + "Signal 11", + "Signal 12", + "Signal 13", + "Signal 14", + "Signal 15", + "Signal 16", + "Signal 17", + "Signal 18", + "Signal 19", + "Signal 20", + "Signal 21", + "Signal 22", + "Signal 23", + "Signal 24", + "Signal 25", + "Signal 26", + "Signal 27", + "Signal 28", + "Signal 29", + "Signal 30", + "Signal 31", +}; + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strsignal + * + * Description: + * The strsignal() function will map the signal number in signum to an + * implementation-defined string and will return a pointer to it. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *strsignal(int signum) +{ + /* Handle invalid signals */ + + if (!GOOD_SIGNO(signum)) + { + return (FAR char *)"Invalid Signal"; + } + + /* Handle named signals */ + + switch (signum) + { + /* Standard signals */ + +#ifdef SIGUSR1 + case SIGUSR1: + return (FAR char *)"SIGUSR1"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGUSR2 + case SIGUSR2: + return (FAR char *)"SIGUSR2"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGALRM + case SIGALRM: + return (FAR char *)"SIGALRM"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGCHLD + case SIGCHLD: + return (FAR char *)"SIGCHLD"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGPOLL + case SIGPOLL: + return (FAR char *)"SIGPOLL"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGSTOP + case SIGSTOP: + return (FAR char *)"SIGSTOP"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGTSTP + case SIGTSTP: + return (FAR char *)"SIGTSTP"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGCONT + case SIGCONT: + return (FAR char *)"SIGCONT"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGKILL + case SIGKILL: + return (FAR char *)"SIGKILL"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGINT + case SIGINT: + return (FAR char *)"SIGINT"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGQUIT + case SIGQUIT: + return (FAR char *)"SIGQUIT"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGTERM + case SIGTERM: + return (FAR char *)"SIGTERM"; +#endif + + /* Non-standard signals */ + +#ifdef SIGCONDTIMEDOUT + case SIGCONDTIMEDOUT: + return (FAR char *)"SIGCONDTIMEDOUT"; +#endif + +#ifdef SIGWORK + case SIGWORK: + return (FAR char *)"SIGWORK"; +#endif + + default: + break; + } + + /* Return a string devoid is meaning */ + + return (FAR char *)g_default_sigstr[signum]; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strspn.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strspn.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ee88d509 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strspn.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strspn.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strspn + * + * Description: + * strspn() calculates the length of the initial segment of s which + * consists entirely of characters in accept. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +size_t strspn(const char *s, const char *accept) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; s[i] && strchr(accept, s[i]) != NULL; i++); + return i; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strstr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strstr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a9c7f9ad --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strstr.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strstr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *strstr(FAR const char *str, FAR const char *substr) +{ + FAR const char *candidate; /* Candidate in str with matching start character */ + char ch; /* First character of the substring */ + size_t len; /* The length of the substring */ + + /* Special case the empty substring */ + + len = strlen(substr); + ch = *substr; + + if (!ch) + { + /* We'll say that an empty substring matches at the beginning of + * the string + */ + + return (FAR char *)str; + } + + /* Search for the substring */ + + candidate = str; + for (; ; ) + { + /* strchr() will return a pointer to the next occurrence of the + * character ch in the string + */ + + candidate = strchr(candidate, ch); + if (!candidate || strlen(candidate) < len) + { + /* First character of the substring does not appear in the string + * or the remainder of the string is not long enough to contain the + * substring. + */ + + return NULL; + } + + /* Check if this is the beginning of a matching substring */ + + if (strncmp(candidate, substr, len) == 0) + { + return (FAR char *)candidate; + } + + /* No, find the next candidate after this one */ + + candidate++; + } + + /* Won't get here, but some compilers might complain. Other compilers + * might complain about this code being unreachable too. + */ + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strtok.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strtok.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4556d0ee --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strtok.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strtok.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +static char *g_saveptr = NULL; + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strtok + * + * Description: + * The strtok() function parses a string into a + * sequence of tokens. On the first call to strtok() the + * string to be parsed should be specified in 'str'. In + * each subsequent call that should parse the same string, + * 'str' should be NULL. + * + * The 'delim' argument specifies a set of characters that + * delimit the tokens in the parsed string. The caller + * may specify different strings in delim in successive + * calls that parse the same string. + * + * Each call to strtok() returns a pointer to a null- + * terminated string containing the next token. This + * string does not include the delimiting character. If + * no more tokens are found, strtok() returns NULL. + * + * A sequence of two or more contiguous delimiter + * characters in the parsed string is considered to be a + * single delimiter. Delimiter characters at the start or + * end of the string are ignored. The tokens returned by + * strtok() are always non-empty strings. + * + * Returned Value: + * strtok() returns a pointer to the next token, or NULL + * if there are no more tokens. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +char *strtok(char *str, const char *delim) +{ + return strtok_r(str, delim, &g_saveptr); +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strtokr.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strtokr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..11783fbe --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strtokr.c @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strtokr.c + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strtok_r + * + * Description: + * The strtok_r() function is a reentrant version strtok(). + * Like strtok(), it parses a string into a sequence of + * tokens. On the first call to strtok() the string to be + * parsed should be specified in 'str'. In each subsequent + * call that should parse the same string, 'str' should be + * NULL. + * + * The 'saveptr' argument is a pointer to a char * + * variable that is used internally by strtok_r() in + * order to maintain context between successive calls + * that parse the same string. + * + * On the first call to strtok_r(), 'str' should point to the + * string to be parsed, and the value of 'saveptr' is + * ignored. In subsequent calls, 'str' should be NULL, and + * saveptr should be unchanged since the previous call. + * + * The 'delim' argument specifies a set of characters that + * delimit the tokens in the parsed string. The caller + * may specify different strings in delim in successive + * calls that parse the same string. + * + * Each call to strtok_r() returns a pointer to a null- + * terminated string containing the next token. This + * string does not include the delimiting character. If + * no more tokens are found, strtok_r() returns NULL. + * + * A sequence of two or more contiguous delimiter + * characters in the parsed string is considered to be a + * single delimiter. Delimiter characters at the start or + * end of the string are ignored. The tokens returned by + * strtok() are always non-empty strings. + * + * Returned Value: + * strtok_r() returns a pointer to the next token, or NULL + * if there are no more tokens. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR char *strtok_r(FAR char *str, FAR const char *delim, FAR char **saveptr) +{ + char *pbegin; + char *pend = NULL; + + /* Decide if we are starting a new string or continuing from + * the point we left off. + */ + + if (str) + { + pbegin = str; + } + else if (saveptr && *saveptr) + { + pbegin = *saveptr; + } + else + { + return NULL; + } + + /* Find the beginning of the next token */ + + for (; + *pbegin && strchr(delim, *pbegin) != NULL; + pbegin++); + + /* If we are at the end of the string with nothing + * but delimiters found, then return NULL. + */ + + if (!*pbegin) + { + return NULL; + } + + /* Find the end of the token */ + + for (pend = pbegin + 1; + *pend && strchr(delim, *pend) == NULL; + pend++); + + /* pend either points to the end of the string or to + * the first delimiter after the string. + */ + + if (*pend) + { + /* Turn the delimiter into a null terminator */ + + *pend++ = '\0'; + } + + /* Save the pointer where we left off and return the + * beginning of the token. + */ + + if (saveptr) + { + *saveptr = pend; + } + + return pbegin; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strxfrm.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strxfrm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f87d1972 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_strxfrm.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_strxfrm.c + * + * Copyright (c)1999 Citrus Project, + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_LIBC_LOCALE + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: strxfrm + * + * Description: + * This function transforms the string pointed to by s2 and places the + * resulting string into the array pointed to by s1. The transformation is + * such that if the strcmp() function is applied to the two transformed + * strings, it returns a value greater than, equal to, or less than zero, + * correspoinding to the result of a <> function applied to the + * same two original strings. + * With a C locale, this function just copies. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +size_t strxfrm(FAR char *s1, FAR const char *s2, size_t n) +{ + size_t res; + res = 0; + while (n-- > 0) + { + if ((*s1++ = *s2++) != '\0') + { + ++res; + } + else + { + return res; + } + } + while (*s2) + { + ++s2; + ++res; + } + + return res; +} +#endif diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_vikmemcpy.c b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_vikmemcpy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3e93b175 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/libc/string/lib_vikmemcpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * libs/libc/string/lib_vikmemcpy.c + * + * This is version of the optimized memcpy by Daniel Vik, adapted to the + * NuttX environment. + * + * Copyright (C) 1999-2010 Daniel Vik + * + * Adaptations include: + * - File name change + * - Use of types defined in stdint.h + * - Integration with the NuttX configuration system + * - Other cosmetic changes for consistency with NuttX coding standards + * + * This software is provided 'as-is', without any express or implied + * warranty. In no event will the authors be held liable for any + * damages arising from the use of this software. + * Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any + * purpose, including commercial applications, and to alter it and + * redistribute it freely, subject to the following restrictions: + * + * 1. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented; you + * must not claim that you wrote the original software. If you + * use this software in a product, an acknowledgment in the + * use this software in a product, an acknowledgment in the + * product documentation would be appreciated but is not + * required. + * + * 2. Altered source versions must be plainly marked as such, and + * must not be misrepresented as being the original software. + * + * 3. This notice may not be removed or altered from any source + * distribution. + * + * Description: Implementation of the standard library function memcpy. + * This implementation of memcpy() is ANSI-C89 compatible. + * + * The following configuration options can be set: + * + * CONFIG_ENDIAN_BIG + * Uses processor with big endian addressing. Default is little endian. + * + * CONFIG_MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS + * Use pre increment of pointers. Default is post increment of pointers. + * + * CONFIG_MEMCPY_INDEXED_COPY + * Copying data using array indexing. Using this option, disables the + * CONFIG_MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS option. + * + * CONFIG_MEMCPY_64BIT - Compiles memcpy for 64 bit architectures + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Configuration definitions. + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define CONFIG_MEMCPY_INDEXED_COPY + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* Can't support CONFIG_MEMCPY_64BIT if the platform does not have 64-bit + * integer types. + */ + +#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_LONG_LONG +# undef CONFIG_MEMCPY_64BIT +#endif + +/* Remove definitions when CONFIG_MEMCPY_INDEXED_COPY is defined */ + +#if defined (CONFIG_MEMCPY_INDEXED_COPY) +# if defined (CONFIG_MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS) +# undef CONFIG_MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS +# endif /* CONFIG_MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS */ +#endif /* CONFIG_MEMCPY_INDEXED_COPY */ + +/* Definitions for pre and post increment of pointers */ + +#if defined (CONFIG_MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS) + +# define START_VAL(x) (x)-- +# define INC_VAL(x) *++(x) +# define CAST_TO_U8(p, o) ((uint8_t*)p + o + TYPE_WIDTH) +# define WHILE_DEST_BREAK (TYPE_WIDTH - 1) +# define PRE_LOOP_ADJUST - (TYPE_WIDTH - 1) +# define PRE_SWITCH_ADJUST + 1 + +#else /* CONFIG_MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS */ + +# define START_VAL(x) +# define INC_VAL(x) *(x)++ +# define CAST_TO_U8(p, o) ((uint8_t*)p + o) +# define WHILE_DEST_BREAK 0 +# define PRE_LOOP_ADJUST +# define PRE_SWITCH_ADJUST + +#endif /* CONFIG_MEMCPY_PRE_INC_PTRS */ + +/* Definitions for endian-ness */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_ENDIAN_BIG + +# define SHL << +# define SHR >> + +#else /* CONFIG_ENDIAN_BIG */ + +# define SHL >> +# define SHR << + +#endif /* CONFIG_ENDIAN_BIG */ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Macros for copying words of different alignment. + * Uses incremening pointers. + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define CP_INCR() \ +{ \ + INC_VAL(dstN) = INC_VAL(srcN); \ +} + +#define CP_INCR_SH(shl, shr) \ +{ \ + dstWord = srcWord SHL shl; \ + srcWord = INC_VAL(srcN); \ + dstWord |= srcWord SHR shr; \ + INC_VAL(dstN) = dstWord; \ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Macros for copying words of different alignment. + * Uses array indexes. + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define CP_INDEX(idx) \ +{ \ + dstN[idx] = srcN[idx]; \ +} + +#define CP_INDEX_SH(x, shl, shr) \ +{ \ + dstWord = srcWord SHL shl; \ + srcWord = srcN[x]; \ + dstWord |= srcWord SHR shr; \ + dstN[x] = dstWord; \ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Macros for copying words of different alignment. + * Uses incremening pointers or array indexes depending on + * configuration. + ****************************************************************************/ + +#if defined (CONFIG_MEMCPY_INDEXED_COPY) + +# define CP(idx) CP_INDEX(idx) +# define CP_SH(idx, shl, shr) CP_INDEX_SH(idx, shl, shr) + +# define INC_INDEX(p, o) ((p) += (o)) + +#else /* CONFIG_MEMCPY_INDEXED_COPY */ + +# define CP(idx) CP_INCR() +# define CP_SH(idx, shl, shr) CP_INCR_SH(shl, shr) + +# define INC_INDEX(p, o) + +#endif /* CONFIG_MEMCPY_INDEXED_COPY */ + +#define COPY_REMAINING(count) \ +{ \ + START_VAL(dst8); \ + START_VAL(src8); \ + \ + switch (count) \ + { \ + case 7: INC_VAL(dst8) = INC_VAL(src8); \ + case 6: INC_VAL(dst8) = INC_VAL(src8); \ + case 5: INC_VAL(dst8) = INC_VAL(src8); \ + case 4: INC_VAL(dst8) = INC_VAL(src8); \ + case 3: INC_VAL(dst8) = INC_VAL(src8); \ + case 2: INC_VAL(dst8) = INC_VAL(src8); \ + case 1: INC_VAL(dst8) = INC_VAL(src8); \ + case 0: \ + default: break; \ + } \ +} + +#define COPY_NO_SHIFT() \ +{ \ + uintn* dstN = (uintn*)(dst8 PRE_LOOP_ADJUST); \ + uintn* srcN = (uintn*)(src8 PRE_LOOP_ADJUST); \ + size_t length = count / TYPE_WIDTH; \ + \ + while (length & 7) \ + { \ + CP_INCR(); \ + length--; \ + } \ + \ + length /= 8; \ + \ + while (length--) \ + { \ + CP(0); \ + CP(1); \ + CP(2); \ + CP(3); \ + CP(4); \ + CP(5); \ + CP(6); \ + CP(7); \ + \ + INC_INDEX(dstN, 8); \ + INC_INDEX(srcN, 8); \ + } \ + \ + src8 = CAST_TO_U8(srcN, 0); \ + dst8 = CAST_TO_U8(dstN, 0); \ + \ + COPY_REMAINING(count & (TYPE_WIDTH - 1)); \ + \ + return dest; \ +} + +#define COPY_SHIFT(shift) \ +{ \ + uintn* dstN = (uintn*)((((uintptr_t)dst8) PRE_LOOP_ADJUST) & \ + ~(TYPE_WIDTH - 1)); \ + uintn* srcN = (uintn*)((((uintptr_t)src8) PRE_LOOP_ADJUST) & \ + ~(TYPE_WIDTH - 1)); \ + size_t length = count / TYPE_WIDTH; \ + uintn srcWord = INC_VAL(srcN); \ + uintn dstWord; \ + \ + while (length & 7) \ + { \ + CP_INCR_SH(8 * shift, 8 * (TYPE_WIDTH - shift)); \ + length--; \ + } \ + \ + length /= 8; \ + \ + while (length--) \ + { \ + CP_SH(0, 8 * shift, 8 * (TYPE_WIDTH - shift)); \ + CP_SH(1, 8 * shift, 8 * (TYPE_WIDTH - shift)); \ + CP_SH(2, 8 * shift, 8 * (TYPE_WIDTH - shift)); \ + CP_SH(3, 8 * shift, 8 * (TYPE_WIDTH - shift)); \ + CP_SH(4, 8 * shift, 8 * (TYPE_WIDTH - shift)); \ + CP_SH(5, 8 * shift, 8 * (TYPE_WIDTH - shift)); \ + CP_SH(6, 8 * shift, 8 * (TYPE_WIDTH - shift)); \ + CP_SH(7, 8 * shift, 8 * (TYPE_WIDTH - shift)); \ + \ + INC_INDEX(dstN, 8); \ + INC_INDEX(srcN, 8); \ + } \ + \ + src8 = CAST_TO_U8(srcN, (shift - TYPE_WIDTH)); \ + dst8 = CAST_TO_U8(dstN, 0); \ + \ + COPY_REMAINING(count & (TYPE_WIDTH - 1)); \ + \ + return dest; \ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Type Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCPY_64BIT +typedef uint64_t uintn; +# define TYPE_WIDTH 8L +#else +typedef uint32_t uintn; +# define TYPE_WIDTH 4L +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: memcpy + * + * Description: + * Copies count bytes from src to dest. No overlap check is performed. + * + * Input Parameters: + * dest - pointer to destination buffer + * src - pointer to source buffer + * count - number of bytes to copy + * + * Returned Value: + * A pointer to destination buffer + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +FAR void *memcpy(FAR void *dest, FAR const void *src, size_t count) +{ + FAR uint8_t *dst8 = (FAR uint8_t *)dest; + FAR uint8_t *src8 = (FAR uint8_t *)src; + + if (count < 8) + { + COPY_REMAINING(count); + return dest; + } + + START_VAL(dst8); + START_VAL(src8); + + while (((uintptr_t)dst8 & (TYPE_WIDTH - 1)) != WHILE_DEST_BREAK) + { + INC_VAL(dst8) = INC_VAL(src8); + count--; + } + + switch ((((uintptr_t)src8) PRE_SWITCH_ADJUST) & (TYPE_WIDTH - 1)) + { + case 0: COPY_NO_SHIFT(); break; + case 1: COPY_SHIFT(1); break; + case 2: COPY_SHIFT(2); break; + case 3: COPY_SHIFT(3); break; +#if TYPE_WIDTH > 4 + case 4: COPY_SHIFT(4); break; + case 5: COPY_SHIFT(5); break; + case 6: COPY_SHIFT(6); break; + case 7: COPY_SHIFT(7); break; +#endif + } + + return dest; +} diff --git a/components/libc/nuttx/nuttx_limits.h b/components/libc/nuttx/nuttx_limits.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7780f119 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/nuttx/nuttx_limits.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * arch/risc-v/include/limits.h + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef __ARCH_RISCV_INCLUDE_LIMITS_H +#define __ARCH_RISCV_INCLUDE_LIMITS_H + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define CHAR_BIT 8 +#define SCHAR_MIN (-SCHAR_MAX - 1) +#define SCHAR_MAX 127 +#define UCHAR_MAX 255 + +/* These could be different on machines where char is unsigned */ + +#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__ +#define CHAR_MIN 0 +#define CHAR_MAX UCHAR_MAX +#else +#define CHAR_MIN SCHAR_MIN +#define CHAR_MAX SCHAR_MAX +#endif + +#define SHRT_MIN (-SHRT_MAX - 1) +#define SHRT_MAX 32767 +#define USHRT_MAX 65535U + +#define INT_MIN (-INT_MAX - 1) +#define INT_MAX 2147483647 +#define UINT_MAX 4294967295U + +/* These change on 32-bit and 64-bit platforms */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_RV32IM) || defined(CONFIG_ARCH_RV32I) + +#define LONG_MIN (-LONG_MAX - 1) +#define LONG_MAX 2147483647L +#define ULONG_MAX 4294967295UL + +#define LLONG_MIN (-LLONG_MAX - 1) +#define LLONG_MAX 9223372036854775807LL +#define ULLONG_MAX 18446744073709551615ULL + +/* A pointer is 4 bytes */ + +#define PTR_MIN (-PTR_MAX - 1) +#define PTR_MAX 2147483647 +#define UPTR_MAX 4294967295U + +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_ARCH_32IM) || defined(CONFIG_ARCH_32I) */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_RV64GC) + +#define LONG_MIN (-LONG_MAX - 1) +#define LONG_MAX 9223372036854775807L +#define ULONG_MAX 18446744073709551615UL + +#define LLONG_MIN (-LLONG_MAX - 1) +#define LLONG_MAX 9223372036854775807LL +#define ULLONG_MAX 18446744073709551615ULL + +#define PTR_MIN (-PTR_MAX - 1) +#define PTR_MAX 9223372036854775807 +#define UPTR_MAX 18446744073709551615U + +#endif + +#endif /* __ARCH_RISCV_INCLUDE_LIMITS_H */ diff --git a/components/utils/libc/printf.c b/components/libc/printf.c similarity index 85% rename from components/utils/libc/printf.c rename to components/libc/printf.c index 6faee0e1..ad7cbf6c 100644 --- a/components/utils/libc/printf.c +++ b/components/libc/printf.c @@ -3,9 +3,31 @@ struct bflb_device_s *console = NULL; +int puts(const char* c) +{ + if (console == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + bflb_uart_put(console, (uint8_t *)c, 1); + + return 0; +} + +int putstring(const char* c) +{ + if (console == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + bflb_uart_put(console, (uint8_t *)c, strlen(c)); + + return 0; +} + int printf(const char *fmt, ...) { - char print_buf[128]; + char print_buf[1024]; uint32_t len; va_list ap; diff --git a/components/libc/snprintf.c b/components/libc/snprintf.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b08ddbde --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/snprintf.c @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * This function will fill a formatted string to buffer. + * + * @param buf is the buffer to save formatted string. + * + * @param size is the size of buffer. + * + * @param fmt is the format parameters. + * + * @return The number of characters actually written to buffer. + */ +int snprintf(char *__restrict buf, size_t size, const char *__restrict fmt, ...) +{ + int n; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + n = vsnprintf(buf, size, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + return n; +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/libc/sys/types.h b/components/libc/sys/types.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2dfec00 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/libc/sys/types.h @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +/* unified sys/types.h: + start with sef's sysvi386 version. + merge go32 version -- a few ifdefs. + h8300hms, h8300xray, and sysvnecv70 disagree on the following types: + + typedef int gid_t; + typedef int uid_t; + typedef int dev_t; + typedef int ino_t; + typedef int mode_t; + typedef int caddr_t; + + however, these aren't "reasonable" values, the sysvi386 ones make far + more sense, and should work sufficiently well (in particular, h8300 + doesn't have a stat, and the necv70 doesn't matter.) -- eichin + */ + +// #ifndef _SYS_TYPES_H +#include <_ansi.h> +#include +#include + +/* BSD types permitted by POSIX and always exposed as in Glibc. Only provided + for backward compatibility with BSD code. The uintN_t standard types should + be preferred in new code. */ +#if ___int8_t_defined +typedef __uint8_t u_int8_t; +#endif +#if ___int16_t_defined +typedef __uint16_t u_int16_t; +#endif +#if ___int32_t_defined +typedef __uint32_t u_int32_t; +#endif +#if ___int64_t_defined +typedef __uint64_t u_int64_t; +#endif +typedef __intptr_t register_t; +#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__ 1 + +#ifndef __need_inttypes + +#define _SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#include + +#if __BSD_VISIBLE +#include +#include +# define physadr physadr_t +# define quad quad_t + +#ifndef _IN_ADDR_T_DECLARED +typedef __uint32_t in_addr_t; /* base type for internet address */ +#define _IN_ADDR_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _IN_PORT_T_DECLARED +typedef __uint16_t in_port_t; +#define _IN_PORT_T_DECLARED +#endif + +typedef __uintptr_t u_register_t; +#endif /* __BSD_VISIBLE */ + +#if __MISC_VISIBLE +#ifndef _BSDTYPES_DEFINED +/* also defined in mingw/gmon.h and in w32api/winsock[2].h */ +#ifndef __u_char_defined +typedef unsigned char u_char; +#define __u_char_defined +#endif +#ifndef __u_short_defined +typedef unsigned short u_short; +#define __u_short_defined +#endif +#ifndef __u_int_defined +typedef unsigned int u_int; +#define __u_int_defined +#endif +#ifndef __u_long_defined +typedef unsigned long u_long; +#define __u_long_defined +#endif +#define _BSDTYPES_DEFINED +#endif +#endif /* __MISC_VISIBLE */ + +#if __MISC_VISIBLE +typedef unsigned short ushort; /* System V compatibility */ +typedef unsigned int uint; /* System V compatibility */ +typedef unsigned long ulong; /* System V compatibility */ +#endif + +#ifndef _BLKCNT_T_DECLARED +typedef __blkcnt_t blkcnt_t; +#define _BLKCNT_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _BLKSIZE_T_DECLARED +typedef __blksize_t blksize_t; +#define _BLKSIZE_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#if !defined(__clock_t_defined) && !defined(_CLOCK_T_DECLARED) +typedef _CLOCK_T_ clock_t; +#define __clock_t_defined +#define _CLOCK_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#if !defined(__time_t_defined) && !defined(_TIME_T_DECLARED) +typedef _TIME_T_ time_t; +#define __time_t_defined +#define _TIME_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef __daddr_t_defined +typedef long daddr_t; +#define __daddr_t_defined +#endif +#ifndef __caddr_t_defined +typedef char * caddr_t; +#define __caddr_t_defined +#endif + +#ifndef _FSBLKCNT_T_DECLARED /* for statvfs() */ +typedef __fsblkcnt_t fsblkcnt_t; +typedef __fsfilcnt_t fsfilcnt_t; +#define _FSBLKCNT_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _ID_T_DECLARED +typedef __id_t id_t; /* can hold a uid_t or pid_t */ +#define _ID_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _INO_T_DECLARED +typedef __ino_t ino_t; /* inode number */ +#define _INO_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#if defined(__i386__) && (defined(GO32) || defined(__MSDOS__)) +typedef char * addr_t; +typedef unsigned long vm_offset_t; +typedef unsigned long vm_size_t; +#endif /* __i386__ && (GO32 || __MSDOS__) */ + +/* + * All these should be machine specific - right now they are all broken. + * However, for all of Cygnus' embedded targets, we want them to all be + * the same. Otherwise things like sizeof (struct stat) might depend on + * how the file was compiled (e.g. -mint16 vs -mint32, etc.). + */ + +#ifndef _OFF_T_DECLARED +typedef __off_t off_t; /* file offset */ +#define _OFF_T_DECLARED +#endif +#ifndef _DEV_T_DECLARED +typedef __dev_t dev_t; /* device number or struct cdev */ +#define _DEV_T_DECLARED +#endif +#ifndef _UID_T_DECLARED +typedef __uid_t uid_t; /* user id */ +#define _UID_T_DECLARED +#endif +#ifndef _GID_T_DECLARED +typedef __gid_t gid_t; /* group id */ +#define _GID_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _PID_T_DECLARED +typedef __pid_t pid_t; /* process id */ +#define _PID_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _KEY_T_DECLARED +typedef __key_t key_t; /* IPC key */ +#define _KEY_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _SSIZE_T_DECLARED +typedef _ssize_t ssize_t; +#define _SSIZE_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _MODE_T_DECLARED +typedef __mode_t mode_t; /* permissions */ +#define _MODE_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _NLINK_T_DECLARED +typedef __nlink_t nlink_t; /* link count */ +#define _NLINK_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#if !defined(__clockid_t_defined) && !defined(_CLOCKID_T_DECLARED) +typedef __clockid_t clockid_t; +#define __clockid_t_defined +#define _CLOCKID_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#if !defined(__timer_t_defined) && !defined(_TIMER_T_DECLARED) +typedef __timer_t timer_t; +#define __timer_t_defined +#define _TIMER_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _USECONDS_T_DECLARED +typedef __useconds_t useconds_t; /* microseconds (unsigned) */ +#define _USECONDS_T_DECLARED +#endif + +#ifndef _SUSECONDS_T_DECLARED +typedef __suseconds_t suseconds_t; +#define _SUSECONDS_T_DECLARED +#endif + +typedef __int64_t sbintime_t; + +#include +// #include +#include + +#endif /* !__need_inttypes */ + +#undef __need_inttypes + +// #endif /* _SYS_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/components/utils/vlibc/printf.c b/components/libc/vlibc/printf.c similarity index 78% rename from components/utils/vlibc/printf.c rename to components/libc/vlibc/printf.c index 4cecf28b..3dcae616 100644 --- a/components/utils/vlibc/printf.c +++ b/components/libc/vlibc/printf.c @@ -8,12 +8,25 @@ struct bflb_device_s *console = NULL; -uint16_t __console_output(void *ptr, uint16_t size) +int printf(const char *fmt, ...) { - for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) { - bflb_uart_putchar(console, ((char *)ptr)[i]); + char print_buf[1024]; + uint32_t len; + va_list ap; + + if (console == NULL) { + return 0; } - return size; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + len = vsnprintf(print_buf, sizeof(print_buf), fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + len = (len > sizeof(print_buf)) ? sizeof(print_buf) : len; + + bflb_uart_put(console, (uint8_t *)print_buf, len); + + return 0; } __WEAK uint32_t __vlibc_io_init(const char *name, uint8_t mode) @@ -98,11 +111,9 @@ int bflb_data_compare(const uint8_t *expected, uint8_t *input, uint32_t len) void bflb_uart_set_console(struct bflb_device_s *dev) { console = dev; - bflb_uart_putchar(console, '\r'); - vlibc_stdout = vlibc_fopen("<" IOCONSOLE_NAME, "w"); - vlibc_setvbuf(vlibc_stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); - vlibc_stderr = vlibc_stdout; - extern void log_init(void); - log_init(); + /*!< vlibc_stdout and vlibc_stderr should config by user */ + // vlibc_stdout = vlibc_fopen("<" IOCONSOLE_NAME, "w"); + // vlibc_setvbuf(vlibc_stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); + // vlibc_stderr = vlibc_stdout; } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/utils/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.c b/components/libc/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.c similarity index 95% rename from components/utils/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.c rename to components/libc/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.c index c1fdf0c1..8d4e440b 100644 --- a/components/utils/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.c +++ b/components/libc/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.c @@ -1,1561 +1,1561 @@ -#include -#include -#include -#include "vlibc_stdio.h" - -#ifndef vlibc_malloc -#define vlibc_malloc malloc -#endif - -#ifndef vlibc_free -#define vlibc_free free -#endif - -#define _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_WRITE ((unsigned char)(0x04)) -#define _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_READ ((unsigned char)(0x08)) - -#define _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE ((unsigned char)(0x01)) -#define _VLIBC_ABUF_DISABLE ((unsigned char)(0x00)) - -#define _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO ((int)(0x01)) -#define _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE ((int)(0x02)) - -#define vlibc_file(_stream) ((vlibc_file_t *)(_stream)) - -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS -int FRESULT_to_errno[20] = { - 0, - EIO, - EPIPE, - EIO, - ENOENT, - ENOENT, - ENOEXEC, - ENOSPC, - EACCES, - ENXIO, - EROFS, - ENXIO, - ENXIO, - EPERM, - EPERM, - EBUSY, - EACCES, - ENOMEM, - EMFILE, - EINVAL -}; -#endif - -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_DEBUG -#define CHECK_FILE(_stream, __ret) \ - do { \ - if ((void *)(_stream) == NULL) { \ - errno = EINVAL; \ - return __ret; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#else -#define CHECK_FILE(_stream, __ret) \ - do { \ - } while (0) -#endif - -#define IF_IO_DEV(_stream) \ - if (((vlibc_file(_stream)->magic) & _VLIBC_MAGIC_MASK) == _VLIBC_IO_MAGIC_CODE) - -#define IF_FILE(_stream) \ - if (((vlibc_file(_stream)->magic) & _VLIBC_MAGIC_MASK) == _VLIBC_FILE_MAGIC_CODE) - -vlibc_file_t *__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[3] = { NULL, NULL, NULL }; - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - */ -void vlibc_clearerr(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, /*!< no return */); - CHECK_FILE(stream->file, /*!< no return */); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - stream->io->err = 0; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - f_error(stream->file) = 0; -#endif - } - else - { - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @return int - */ -int vlibc_feof(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - return 0; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return f_eof(stream->file); -#else - errno = EIO; - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return EOF; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @return int - */ -int vlibc_ferror(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - return stream->io->err; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - - fresult = f_error(stream->file); - - return (fresult == FR_OK) ? 0 : EOF; -#else - errno = EIO; - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return EOF; - } -} - -static int __get_mode_vlibc_fopen(const char *mode, unsigned char *iomode, unsigned char *openmode) -{ - /*!< get file and io open mode */ - switch (*mode) { - case 'r': -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - *openmode = FA_READ; -#endif - *iomode = _VLIBC_IO_READ; - break; - case 'w': -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - *openmode = FA_CREATE_ALWAYS | FA_WRITE; -#endif - *iomode = _VLIBC_IO_WRITE; - break; - case 'a': -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - *openmode = FA_OPEN_APPEND | FA_WRITE; -#endif - *iomode = _VLIBC_IO_WRITE; - break; - case 'x': -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - *openmode = FA_CREATE_NEW | FA_WRITE; -#endif - *iomode = _VLIBC_IO_WRITE; - break; - default: - errno = EINVAL; - return EOF; - } - - for (int i = 1; i < 7; ++i) { - switch (*++mode) { - case '\0': - break; - case '+': -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - *openmode |= (FA_WRITE | FA_READ); -#endif - *iomode |= (_VLIBC_IO_WRITE | _VLIBC_IO_READ); - continue; - case 'b': - continue; - default: - continue; - } - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int __check_type_vlibc_fopen(const char *name, unsigned char iomode) -{ - /*!< check type */ - switch (*name) { - case '>': - case '<': { - unsigned char count = 1; - for (int i = 0; i < VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX; i++) { - switch (*name++) { - case '\0': - if ((0 < count) && (count <= _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX)) { - break; - } else { - errno = ENOEXEC; - return EOF; - } - - /*!< output io device */ - case '<': - if (iomode & _VLIBC_IO_READ) { - errno = EINVAL; - return EOF; - } - - if ((0 < count) && (count <= _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX)) { - count = 0; - /*!< have a output io device */ - iomode |= _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_WRITE; - continue; - } else { - errno = ENOEXEC; - return EOF; - } - - /*!< input io device */ - case '>': - if (iomode & _VLIBC_IO_WRITE) { - errno = EINVAL; - return EOF; - } - - if (iomode & _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_READ) { - /*!< only can have one input io device */ - errno = EINVAL; - return EOF; - } - - if ((0 < count) && (count <= _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX)) { - count = 0; - /*!< have a input io device */ - iomode |= _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_READ; - continue; - } else { - errno = ENOEXEC; - return EOF; - } - - default: - count++; - continue; - } - break; - } - - if (iomode & (_VLIBC_IO_HAVE_READ | _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_WRITE)) { - return _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO; - } - - return _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE; - } - default: - return _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE; - } -} - -static VLIBC_FILE *__io_vlibc_open(VLIBC_FILE *fnew, const char *name, unsigned char iomode) -{ - int result = 0; - char namebuf[_VLIBC_IONAME_MAX + 2]; - char *nameend = NULL; - char nofree = 0; - - if (fnew == NULL) { - fnew = (VLIBC_FILE *)vlibc_malloc(sizeof(VLIBC_FILE)); - if (fnew == NULL) { - errno = ENOMEM; - return NULL; - } - } else { - nofree = 1; - } - - fnew->io = (void *)vlibc_malloc(sizeof(struct __vlibc_io)); - if (fnew == NULL) { - errno = ENOMEM; - if (nofree == 0) { - vlibc_free(fnew); - } - return NULL; - } - - fnew->io->bg = (void *)vlibc_malloc(VLIBC_BUFSIZ); - if (fnew->io->bg == NULL) { - vlibc_free(fnew->io); - errno = ENOMEM; - if (nofree == 0) { - vlibc_free(fnew); - } - return NULL; - } - - fnew->magic = _VLIBC_IO_MAGIC_CODE; - - fnew->io->dev = 0; - fnew->io->flag = (iomode & (_VLIBC_IO_WRITE | _VLIBC_IO_READ)); - fnew->io->vbuf = _IOLBF; - fnew->io->abuf = _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE; - fnew->io->err = 0; - - fnew->io->wp = fnew->io->bg; - fnew->io->rp = fnew->io->bg; - fnew->io->ed = fnew->io->bg + VLIBC_BUFSIZ; - - /*!< init io device */ - for (int i = 0; i < VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX; i++) { - switch (*name) { - case '\0': - break; - - case '<': - case '>': { - for (; i < VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX; i++) { - switch (*name++) { - case '\0': - name--; - break; - case '>': - case '<': - strncpy(namebuf, name, _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX + 1); - nameend = strchr(namebuf, '<'); - if (nameend != NULL) { - *nameend = '\0'; - } else { - nameend = strchr(namebuf, '>'); - if (nameend != NULL) { - *nameend = '\0'; - } - } - - result = __vlibc_io_init(namebuf, iomode & (_VLIBC_IO_READ | _VLIBC_IO_WRITE)); - fnew->io->dev = result; - if (result == 0) { - vlibc_free(fnew->io->bg); - vlibc_free(fnew->io); - fnew->magic = 0; - if (nofree == 0) { - vlibc_free(fnew); - } - errno = ENOENT; - return NULL; - } - break; - - default: - continue; - } - - break; - } - continue; - } - - default: - name++; - continue; - } - break; - } - - return fnew; -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS -static VLIBC_FILE *__file_vlibc_open(VLIBC_FILE *fnew, const char *name, unsigned char openmode) -{ - int fresult; - char nofree = 0; - - if (fnew == NULL) { - fnew = (VLIBC_FILE *)vlibc_malloc(sizeof(VLIBC_FILE)); - if (fnew == NULL) { - errno = ENOMEM; - return NULL; - } - } else { - nofree = 1; - } - - fnew->file = (FIL *)vlibc_malloc(sizeof(FIL)); - if (fnew->file == NULL) { - if (nofree == 0) { - vlibc_free(fnew); - } - errno = ENOMEM; - return NULL; - } - - fnew->magic = _VLIBC_FILE_MAGIC_CODE; - - fresult = f_open(fnew->file, name, openmode); - - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - - vlibc_free(fnew->file); - fnew->magic = 0; - if (nofree == 0) { - vlibc_free(fnew); - } - return NULL; - } - - return fnew; -} -#else -static VLIBC_FILE *__file_vlibc_open(VLIBC_FILE *fnew, const char *name, unsigned char openmode) -{ - errno = EIO; - return NULL; -} -#endif - -static int __io_vlibc_close(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - int result; - - if (stream->io->abuf == _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE) { - if (stream->io->bg == NULL) { - return EOF; - } - } - - result = __vlibc_io_deinit(stream->io); - if (result != stream->io->dev) { - errno = EINVAL; - return EOF; - } - - if (stream->io->abuf == _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE) { - vlibc_free(stream->io->bg); - } - - vlibc_free(stream->io); - stream->magic = 0; - stream->io = NULL; - return 0; -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS -static int __file_vlibc_close(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - int fresult; - - fresult = f_close(stream->file); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - return EOF; - } - - vlibc_free(stream->file); - stream->magic = 0; - stream->io = NULL; - return 0; -} -#else -static int __file_vlibc_close(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - errno = EIO; - return EOF; -} -#endif - -/** - * @brief - * @param filename - * @param mode - * @return VLIBC_FILE* - */ -VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode) -{ - CHECK_FILE(filename, NULL); - CHECK_FILE(mode, NULL); - - unsigned char iomode = 0; - unsigned char openmode = 0; - - if (__get_mode_vlibc_fopen(mode, &iomode, &openmode)) { - return NULL; - } - - switch (__check_type_vlibc_fopen(filename, iomode)) { - case EOF: - return NULL; - case _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO: - return __io_vlibc_open(NULL, filename, iomode); - case _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE: - return __file_vlibc_open(NULL, filename, openmode); - default: - return NULL; - } -} - -/** - * @brief 重定向输入输出流. - * fclose 之后的文件指针无法再 freopen. - * freopen 会关闭原先的流, 并按照 和 直接在原先的流上重建实体. - * freopen 会将两个流合并为一个流, 可以多次执行将多个流合并, - * 只需要一次 fclose 就可以关闭所有合并的流 - * @param filename - * @param mode - * @param stream - * @return VLIBC_FILE* - */ -VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_freopen(const char *filename, const char *mode, VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(filename, NULL); - CHECK_FILE(mode, NULL); - CHECK_FILE(stream, NULL); - CHECK_FILE(stream->file, NULL); - - VLIBC_FILE *fnew = NULL; - - unsigned char iomode = 0; - unsigned char openmode = 0; - - if (__get_mode_vlibc_fopen(mode, &iomode, &openmode)) { - return NULL; - } - - switch (__check_type_vlibc_fopen(filename, iomode)) { - case EOF: - return NULL; - - case _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO: - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - if (__io_vlibc_close(stream)) { - return NULL; - } - - fnew = __io_vlibc_open(stream, filename, iomode); - if (fnew == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - return fnew; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - if (__file_vlibc_close(stream)) { - return NULL; - } - - fnew = __io_vlibc_open(stream, filename, iomode); - if (fnew == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - return fnew; -#else - return NULL; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return NULL; - } - - case _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE: - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - if (__io_vlibc_close(stream)) { - return NULL; - } - - fnew = __file_vlibc_open(stream, filename, openmode); - if (fnew == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - return fnew; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - if (__file_vlibc_close(stream)) { - return NULL; - } - - fnew = __file_vlibc_open(stream, filename, openmode); - if (fnew == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - return fnew; -#else - return NULL; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return NULL; - } - default: - return NULL; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @return int - */ -int vlibc_fclose(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - if (vlibc_fflush(stream)) { - return EOF; - } - - if (__io_vlibc_close(stream)) { - return EOF; - } - - vlibc_free(stream); - - return 0; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { - if (vlibc_fflush(stream)) { - return EOF; - } - - if (__file_vlibc_close(stream)) { - return EOF; - } - - vlibc_free(stream); - - return 0; - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return EOF; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param ptr - * @param size - * @param nmemb - * @param stream - * @return size_t - */ -size_t vlibc_fread(void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(ptr, 0); - CHECK_FILE(size, 0); - CHECK_FILE(nmemb, 0); - CHECK_FILE(stream, 0); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - size_t bytes = size * nmemb; - char *bg = stream->io->bg; - char *wp = stream->io->wp; - char *rp = stream->io->rp; - char *ed = stream->io->ed; - - do { - if (rp == wp) { - break; - } - - if (rp == ed) { - rp = bg; - } - - *(char *)ptr++ = *rp++; - } while (--bytes); - - return size * nmemb - bytes; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - size_t bytes; - fresult = f_read(stream->file, ptr, size * nmemb, &bytes); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - } - - return bytes; -#else - return 0; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return 0; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param ptr - * @param size - * @param nmemb - * @param stream - * @return size_t - */ -size_t vlibc_fwrite(const void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(ptr, 0); - CHECK_FILE(size, 0); - CHECK_FILE(nmemb, 0); - CHECK_FILE(stream, 0); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - switch (stream->io->vbuf) { - case _IOFBF: { - size_t ret; - size_t bytes = size * nmemb; - char *bg = stream->io->bg; - char *wp = stream->io->wp; - char *ed = stream->io->ed; - - do { - if (wp == ed) { - ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, bg, ed - bg); - if (ret == 0) { - stream->io->wp = wp; - errno = EINVAL; - return size * nmemb - bytes; - } - wp = bg; - } - - *wp++ = *(char *)ptr++; - } while (--bytes); - - if (wp == ed) { - ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, bg, ed - bg); - if (ret == 0) { - stream->io->wp = wp; - errno = EINVAL; - return size * nmemb - bytes; - } - wp = bg; - } - - stream->io->wp = wp; - return size * nmemb - bytes; - } - case _IOLBF: { - size_t ret; - size_t bytes = size * nmemb; - char *bg = stream->io->bg; - char *wp = stream->io->wp; - char *ed = stream->io->ed; - - do { - if (wp == ed) { - ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, bg, ed - bg); - if (ret == 0) { - stream->io->wp = wp; - errno = EINVAL; - return size * nmemb - bytes; - } - wp = bg; - } - - *wp = *(char *)ptr++; - - if (*wp == '\n') { - wp++; - --bytes; - ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, bg, wp - bg); - if (ret == 0) { - stream->io->wp = wp; - errno = EINVAL; - return size * nmemb - bytes; - } - - wp = bg; - } else { - wp++; - --bytes; - } - } while (bytes); - - stream->io->wp = wp; - - return size * nmemb - bytes; - } - case _IONBF: { - size_t bytes; - bytes = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, ptr, size * nmemb); - if (bytes == 0) { - errno = EINVAL; - } - return bytes; - } - default: - errno = EINVAL; - return 0; - } - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - size_t bytes; - fresult = f_write(stream->file, ptr, size * nmemb, &bytes); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - } - - return bytes; -#else - errno = EIO; - return 0; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return 0; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @return int - */ -int vlibc_fflush(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - switch (stream->io->vbuf) { - case _IOFBF: - case _IOLBF: { - size_t ret; - ret = (size_t)(stream->io->wp - stream->io->bg); - if (ret > 0) { - ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, stream->io->bg, ret); - if (ret == 0) { - errno = EINVAL; - return EOF; - } - stream->io->wp = stream->io->bg; - } - } - return 0; - - case _IONBF: - return 0; - - default: - errno = EINVAL; - return EOF; - } - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - fresult = f_sync(stream->file); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - return EOF; - } - - return 0; -#else - errno = EIO; - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return EOF; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @param offset - * @param whence - * @return int - */ -int vlibc_fseek(VLIBC_FILE *stream, long offset, int whence) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - errno = ESPIPE; - return EOF; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - long long temp; - - switch (whence) { - case SEEK_SET: - fresult = f_lseek(stream->file, offset); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - return EOF; - } - return 0; - - case SEEK_CUR: - temp = (long)stream->file->fptr; - temp += offset; - if (temp > 0xffffffff) { - errno = ESPIPE; - return EOF; - } - - fresult = f_lseek(stream->file, temp); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - return EOF; - } - return 0; - - case SEEK_END: - temp = (long)stream->file->obj.objsize; - temp -= offset; - if (temp <= 0) { - temp = 0; - } - fresult = f_lseek(stream->file, temp); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - return EOF; - } - return 0; - default: - errno = EINVAL; - return EOF; - } -#else - errno = EIO; - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return EOF; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @return long - */ -long vlibc_ftell(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - errno = ESPIPE; - return EOF; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return (long)f_tell(stream->file); -#else - errno = EIO; - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return EOF; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param filename - * @return int - */ -int vlibc_remove(const char *filename) -{ - CHECK_FILE(filename, EOF); - -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - FILINFO finfo; - - fresult = f_stat(filename, &finfo); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - return EOF; - } - } - - fresult = f_unlink(filename); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - return EOF; - } - } - - return 0; -#else - errno = ENOENT; - return EOF; -#endif -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param old_filename - * @param new_filename - * @return int - */ -int vlibc_rename(const char *old_filename, const char *new_filename) -{ - CHECK_FILE(old_filename, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(new_filename, EOF); -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - - fresult = f_rename(old_filename, new_filename); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - return EOF; - } - } - - return 0; -#else - errno = ENOENT; - return EOF; -#endif -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - */ -void vlibc_rewind(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, /*!< no return */); - CHECK_FILE(stream->file, /*!< no return */); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - errno = ESPIPE; - return; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - fresult = f_lseek(stream->file, 0); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - } -#else - errno = EIO; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @param buffer - */ -void vlibc_setbuf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, char *buffer) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, /*!< no return */); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - if (stream->io->abuf == _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE) { - if (stream->io->bg == NULL) { - return; - } - - vlibc_free(stream->io->bg); - stream->io->abuf = _VLIBC_ABUF_DISABLE; - } - - stream->io->bg = buffer; - stream->io->wp = buffer; - stream->io->rp = buffer; - - if (buffer == NULL) { - stream->io->ed = buffer; - } else { - stream->io->ed = buffer + VLIBC_BUFSIZ; - } - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return; -#else - errno = EIO; - return; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return; - } -} - -/** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @param buffer - * @param mode - * @param size - * @return int - */ -int vlibc_setvbuf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, char *buffer, int mode, size_t size) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - switch (mode) { - case _IOFBF: - case _IOLBF: - vlibc_setbuf(stream, buffer); - if (buffer != NULL) { - stream->io->ed = buffer + size; - } - stream->io->vbuf = mode; - break; - case _IONBF: - vlibc_setbuf(stream, NULL); - stream->io->vbuf = mode; - break; - default: - return EOF; - } - return 0; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return EOF; -#else - errno = EIO; - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - errno = EBADF; - return EOF; - } -} - -VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_tmpfile(void) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return NULL; -#else - return NULL; -#endif -} - -char *vlibc_tmpnam(char *str) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return NULL; -#else - return NULL; -#endif -} - -int vlibc_fscanf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, const char *format, ...) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return EOF; -#else - return EOF; -#endif -} - -int vlibc_scanf(const char *format, ...) -{ - CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return EOF; -#else - return EOF; -#endif -} - -int vlibc_sscanf(const char *str, const char *format, ...) -{ - CHECK_FILE(str, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return EOF; -#else - return EOF; -#endif -} - -int vlibc_vfscanf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, const char *format, va_list arg) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return EOF; -#else - return EOF; -#endif -} - -int vlibc_vscanf(const char *format, va_list arg) -{ - CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return EOF; -#else - return EOF; -#endif -} - -int vlibc_vsscanf(const char *str, const char *format, va_list arg) -{ - CHECK_FILE(str, EOF); - CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return EOF; -#else - return EOF; -#endif -} - -int vlibc_fgetc(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - return EOF; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - int ch; - size_t bytes; - fresult = f_read(stream->file, &ch, 1, &bytes); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - - return EOF; - } - if (bytes != 1) { - return EOF; - } - - return ch; -#else - - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - return EOF; - } -} - -char *vlibc_fgets(char *str, int size, VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(str, NULL); - CHECK_FILE(stream, NULL); -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return NULL; -#else - return NULL; -#endif -} - -int vlibc_fputc(int chr, VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - return EOF; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - size_t bytes; - fresult = f_write(stream->file, &chr, 1, &bytes); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - - return EOF; - } - if (bytes != 1) { - return EOF; - } - - return 0; -#else - - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - return EOF; - } -} - -int vlibc_fputs(const char *str, VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - return vlibc_fprintf(stream, str); -} - -int vlibc_getc(VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - return EOF; - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - int ch; - size_t bytes; - fresult = f_read(stream->file, &ch, 1, &bytes); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - - return EOF; - } - if (bytes != 1) { - return EOF; - } - - return ch; -#else - - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - return EOF; - } -} - -int vlibc_getchar(void) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return EOF; -#else - return EOF; -#endif -} - -char *vlibc_gets(char *str) -{ - CHECK_FILE(str, NULL); -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - return NULL; -#else - return NULL; -#endif -} - -int vlibc_putc(int chr, VLIBC_FILE *stream) -{ - CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); - - IF_IO_DEV(stream) - { - size_t size; - size = vlibc_fwrite(&chr, 1, 1, stream); - if (size == 1) { - return 0; - } else { - return EOF; - } - } - else IF_FILE(stream) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - size_t bytes; - fresult = f_write(stream->file, &chr, 1, &bytes); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - - return EOF; - } - if (bytes != 1) { - return EOF; - } - - return 0; -#else - - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - return EOF; - } -} - -int vlibc_putchar(int chr) -{ - IF_IO_DEV(vlibc_stdout) - { - size_t size; - size = vlibc_fwrite(&chr, 1, 1, vlibc_stdout); - if (size == 1) { - return 0; - } else { - return EOF; - } - } - else IF_FILE(vlibc_stdout) - { -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - int fresult; - size_t bytes; - fresult = f_write(vlibc_stdout->file, &chr, 1, &bytes); - if (fresult != FR_OK) { - if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { - errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; - } - - return EOF; - } - if (bytes != 1) { - return EOF; - } - - return 0; -#else - - return EOF; -#endif - } - else - { - return EOF; - } -} - -int vlibc_puts(const char *str) -{ - return vlibc_printf(str); -} - -void vlibc_perror(const char *str) -{ - CHECK_FILE(str, /*!< no return */); -} +#include +#include +#include +#include "vlibc_stdio.h" + +#ifndef vlibc_malloc +#define vlibc_malloc malloc +#endif + +#ifndef vlibc_free +#define vlibc_free free +#endif + +#define _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_WRITE ((unsigned char)(0x04)) +#define _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_READ ((unsigned char)(0x08)) + +#define _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE ((unsigned char)(0x01)) +#define _VLIBC_ABUF_DISABLE ((unsigned char)(0x00)) + +#define _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO ((int)(0x01)) +#define _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE ((int)(0x02)) + +#define vlibc_file(_stream) ((vlibc_file_t *)(_stream)) + +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS +int FRESULT_to_errno[20] = { + 0, + EIO, + EPIPE, + EIO, + ENOENT, + ENOENT, + ENOEXEC, + ENOSPC, + EACCES, + ENXIO, + EROFS, + ENXIO, + ENXIO, + EPERM, + EPERM, + EBUSY, + EACCES, + ENOMEM, + EMFILE, + EINVAL +}; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_DEBUG +#define CHECK_FILE(_stream, __ret) \ + do { \ + if ((void *)(_stream) == NULL) { \ + errno = EINVAL; \ + return __ret; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else +#define CHECK_FILE(_stream, __ret) \ + do { \ + } while (0) +#endif + +#define IF_IO_DEV(_stream) \ + if (((vlibc_file(_stream)->magic) & _VLIBC_MAGIC_MASK) == _VLIBC_IO_MAGIC_CODE) + +#define IF_FILE(_stream) \ + if (((vlibc_file(_stream)->magic) & _VLIBC_MAGIC_MASK) == _VLIBC_FILE_MAGIC_CODE) + +vlibc_file_t *__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[3] = { NULL, NULL, NULL }; + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + */ +void vlibc_clearerr(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, /*!< no return */); + CHECK_FILE(stream->file, /*!< no return */); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + stream->io->err = 0; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + f_error(stream->file) = 0; +#endif + } + else + { + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + * @return int + */ +int vlibc_feof(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + return 0; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return f_eof(stream->file); +#else + errno = EIO; + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return EOF; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + * @return int + */ +int vlibc_ferror(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + return stream->io->err; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + + fresult = f_error(stream->file); + + return (fresult == FR_OK) ? 0 : EOF; +#else + errno = EIO; + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return EOF; + } +} + +static int __get_mode_vlibc_fopen(const char *mode, unsigned char *iomode, unsigned char *openmode) +{ + /*!< get file and io open mode */ + switch (*mode) { + case 'r': +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + *openmode = FA_READ; +#endif + *iomode = _VLIBC_IO_READ; + break; + case 'w': +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + *openmode = FA_CREATE_ALWAYS | FA_WRITE; +#endif + *iomode = _VLIBC_IO_WRITE; + break; + case 'a': +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + *openmode = FA_OPEN_APPEND | FA_WRITE; +#endif + *iomode = _VLIBC_IO_WRITE; + break; + case 'x': +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + *openmode = FA_CREATE_NEW | FA_WRITE; +#endif + *iomode = _VLIBC_IO_WRITE; + break; + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return EOF; + } + + for (int i = 1; i < 7; ++i) { + switch (*++mode) { + case '\0': + break; + case '+': +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + *openmode |= (FA_WRITE | FA_READ); +#endif + *iomode |= (_VLIBC_IO_WRITE | _VLIBC_IO_READ); + continue; + case 'b': + continue; + default: + continue; + } + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int __check_type_vlibc_fopen(const char *name, unsigned char iomode) +{ + /*!< check type */ + switch (*name) { + case '>': + case '<': { + unsigned char count = 1; + for (int i = 0; i < VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX; i++) { + switch (*name++) { + case '\0': + if ((0 < count) && (count <= _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX)) { + break; + } else { + errno = ENOEXEC; + return EOF; + } + + /*!< output io device */ + case '<': + if (iomode & _VLIBC_IO_READ) { + errno = EINVAL; + return EOF; + } + + if ((0 < count) && (count <= _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX)) { + count = 0; + /*!< have a output io device */ + iomode |= _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_WRITE; + continue; + } else { + errno = ENOEXEC; + return EOF; + } + + /*!< input io device */ + case '>': + if (iomode & _VLIBC_IO_WRITE) { + errno = EINVAL; + return EOF; + } + + if (iomode & _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_READ) { + /*!< only can have one input io device */ + errno = EINVAL; + return EOF; + } + + if ((0 < count) && (count <= _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX)) { + count = 0; + /*!< have a input io device */ + iomode |= _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_READ; + continue; + } else { + errno = ENOEXEC; + return EOF; + } + + default: + count++; + continue; + } + break; + } + + if (iomode & (_VLIBC_IO_HAVE_READ | _VLIBC_IO_HAVE_WRITE)) { + return _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO; + } + + return _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE; + } + default: + return _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE; + } +} + +static VLIBC_FILE *__io_vlibc_open(VLIBC_FILE *fnew, const char *name, unsigned char iomode) +{ + int result = 0; + char namebuf[_VLIBC_IONAME_MAX + 2]; + char *nameend = NULL; + char nofree = 0; + + if (fnew == NULL) { + fnew = (VLIBC_FILE *)vlibc_malloc(sizeof(VLIBC_FILE)); + if (fnew == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return NULL; + } + } else { + nofree = 1; + } + + fnew->io = (void *)vlibc_malloc(sizeof(struct __vlibc_io)); + if (fnew == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + if (nofree == 0) { + vlibc_free(fnew); + } + return NULL; + } + + fnew->io->bg = (void *)vlibc_malloc(VLIBC_BUFSIZ); + if (fnew->io->bg == NULL) { + vlibc_free(fnew->io); + errno = ENOMEM; + if (nofree == 0) { + vlibc_free(fnew); + } + return NULL; + } + + fnew->magic = _VLIBC_IO_MAGIC_CODE; + + fnew->io->dev = 0; + fnew->io->flag = (iomode & (_VLIBC_IO_WRITE | _VLIBC_IO_READ)); + fnew->io->vbuf = _IOLBF; + fnew->io->abuf = _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE; + fnew->io->err = 0; + + fnew->io->wp = fnew->io->bg; + fnew->io->rp = fnew->io->bg; + fnew->io->ed = fnew->io->bg + VLIBC_BUFSIZ; + + /*!< init io device */ + for (int i = 0; i < VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX; i++) { + switch (*name) { + case '\0': + break; + + case '<': + case '>': { + for (; i < VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX; i++) { + switch (*name++) { + case '\0': + name--; + break; + case '>': + case '<': + strncpy(namebuf, name, _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX + 1); + nameend = strchr(namebuf, '<'); + if (nameend != NULL) { + *nameend = '\0'; + } else { + nameend = strchr(namebuf, '>'); + if (nameend != NULL) { + *nameend = '\0'; + } + } + + result = __vlibc_io_init(namebuf, iomode & (_VLIBC_IO_READ | _VLIBC_IO_WRITE)); + fnew->io->dev = result; + if (result == 0) { + vlibc_free(fnew->io->bg); + vlibc_free(fnew->io); + fnew->magic = 0; + if (nofree == 0) { + vlibc_free(fnew); + } + errno = ENOENT; + return NULL; + } + break; + + default: + continue; + } + + break; + } + continue; + } + + default: + name++; + continue; + } + break; + } + + return fnew; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS +static VLIBC_FILE *__file_vlibc_open(VLIBC_FILE *fnew, const char *name, unsigned char openmode) +{ + int fresult; + char nofree = 0; + + if (fnew == NULL) { + fnew = (VLIBC_FILE *)vlibc_malloc(sizeof(VLIBC_FILE)); + if (fnew == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return NULL; + } + } else { + nofree = 1; + } + + fnew->file = (FIL *)vlibc_malloc(sizeof(FIL)); + if (fnew->file == NULL) { + if (nofree == 0) { + vlibc_free(fnew); + } + errno = ENOMEM; + return NULL; + } + + fnew->magic = _VLIBC_FILE_MAGIC_CODE; + + fresult = f_open(fnew->file, name, openmode); + + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + + vlibc_free(fnew->file); + fnew->magic = 0; + if (nofree == 0) { + vlibc_free(fnew); + } + return NULL; + } + + return fnew; +} +#else +static VLIBC_FILE *__file_vlibc_open(VLIBC_FILE *fnew, const char *name, unsigned char openmode) +{ + errno = EIO; + return NULL; +} +#endif + +static int __io_vlibc_close(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + int result; + + if (stream->io->abuf == _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE) { + if (stream->io->bg == NULL) { + return EOF; + } + } + + result = __vlibc_io_deinit(stream->io); + if (result != stream->io->dev) { + errno = EINVAL; + return EOF; + } + + if (stream->io->abuf == _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE) { + vlibc_free(stream->io->bg); + } + + vlibc_free(stream->io); + stream->magic = 0; + stream->io = NULL; + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS +static int __file_vlibc_close(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + int fresult; + + fresult = f_close(stream->file); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + return EOF; + } + + vlibc_free(stream->file); + stream->magic = 0; + stream->io = NULL; + return 0; +} +#else +static int __file_vlibc_close(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + errno = EIO; + return EOF; +} +#endif + +/** + * @brief + * @param filename + * @param mode + * @return VLIBC_FILE* + */ +VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode) +{ + CHECK_FILE(filename, NULL); + CHECK_FILE(mode, NULL); + + unsigned char iomode = 0; + unsigned char openmode = 0; + + if (__get_mode_vlibc_fopen(mode, &iomode, &openmode)) { + return NULL; + } + + switch (__check_type_vlibc_fopen(filename, iomode)) { + case EOF: + return NULL; + case _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO: + return __io_vlibc_open(NULL, filename, iomode); + case _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE: + return __file_vlibc_open(NULL, filename, openmode); + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +/** + * @brief 重定向输入输出流. + * fclose 之后的文件指针无法再 freopen. + * freopen 会关闭原先的流, 并按照 和 直接在原先的流上重建实体. + * freopen 会将两个流合并为一个流, 可以多次执行将多个流合并, + * 只需要一次 fclose 就可以关闭所有合并的流 + * @param filename + * @param mode + * @param stream + * @return VLIBC_FILE* + */ +VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_freopen(const char *filename, const char *mode, VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(filename, NULL); + CHECK_FILE(mode, NULL); + CHECK_FILE(stream, NULL); + CHECK_FILE(stream->file, NULL); + + VLIBC_FILE *fnew = NULL; + + unsigned char iomode = 0; + unsigned char openmode = 0; + + if (__get_mode_vlibc_fopen(mode, &iomode, &openmode)) { + return NULL; + } + + switch (__check_type_vlibc_fopen(filename, iomode)) { + case EOF: + return NULL; + + case _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO: + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + if (__io_vlibc_close(stream)) { + return NULL; + } + + fnew = __io_vlibc_open(stream, filename, iomode); + if (fnew == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + return fnew; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + if (__file_vlibc_close(stream)) { + return NULL; + } + + fnew = __io_vlibc_open(stream, filename, iomode); + if (fnew == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + return fnew; +#else + return NULL; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return NULL; + } + + case _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE: + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + if (__io_vlibc_close(stream)) { + return NULL; + } + + fnew = __file_vlibc_open(stream, filename, openmode); + if (fnew == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + return fnew; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + if (__file_vlibc_close(stream)) { + return NULL; + } + + fnew = __file_vlibc_open(stream, filename, openmode); + if (fnew == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + return fnew; +#else + return NULL; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return NULL; + } + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + * @return int + */ +int vlibc_fclose(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + if (vlibc_fflush(stream)) { + return EOF; + } + + if (__io_vlibc_close(stream)) { + return EOF; + } + + vlibc_free(stream); + + return 0; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { + if (vlibc_fflush(stream)) { + return EOF; + } + + if (__file_vlibc_close(stream)) { + return EOF; + } + + vlibc_free(stream); + + return 0; + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return EOF; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param ptr + * @param size + * @param nmemb + * @param stream + * @return size_t + */ +size_t vlibc_fread(void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(ptr, 0); + CHECK_FILE(size, 0); + CHECK_FILE(nmemb, 0); + CHECK_FILE(stream, 0); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + size_t bytes = size * nmemb; + char *bg = stream->io->bg; + char *wp = stream->io->wp; + char *rp = stream->io->rp; + char *ed = stream->io->ed; + + do { + if (rp == wp) { + break; + } + + if (rp == ed) { + rp = bg; + } + + *(char *)ptr++ = *rp++; + } while (--bytes); + + return size * nmemb - bytes; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + size_t bytes; + fresult = f_read(stream->file, ptr, size * nmemb, &bytes); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + } + + return bytes; +#else + return 0; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param ptr + * @param size + * @param nmemb + * @param stream + * @return size_t + */ +size_t vlibc_fwrite(const void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(ptr, 0); + CHECK_FILE(size, 0); + CHECK_FILE(nmemb, 0); + CHECK_FILE(stream, 0); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + switch (stream->io->vbuf) { + case _IOFBF: { + size_t ret; + size_t bytes = size * nmemb; + char *bg = stream->io->bg; + char *wp = stream->io->wp; + char *ed = stream->io->ed; + + do { + if (wp == ed) { + ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, bg, ed - bg); + if (ret == 0) { + stream->io->wp = wp; + errno = EINVAL; + return size * nmemb - bytes; + } + wp = bg; + } + + *wp++ = *(char *)ptr++; + } while (--bytes); + + if (wp == ed) { + ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, bg, ed - bg); + if (ret == 0) { + stream->io->wp = wp; + errno = EINVAL; + return size * nmemb - bytes; + } + wp = bg; + } + + stream->io->wp = wp; + return size * nmemb - bytes; + } + case _IOLBF: { + size_t ret; + size_t bytes = size * nmemb; + char *bg = stream->io->bg; + char *wp = stream->io->wp; + char *ed = stream->io->ed; + + do { + if (wp == ed) { + ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, bg, ed - bg); + if (ret == 0) { + stream->io->wp = wp; + errno = EINVAL; + return size * nmemb - bytes; + } + wp = bg; + } + + *wp = *(char *)ptr++; + + if (*wp == '\n') { + wp++; + --bytes; + ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, bg, wp - bg); + if (ret == 0) { + stream->io->wp = wp; + errno = EINVAL; + return size * nmemb - bytes; + } + + wp = bg; + } else { + wp++; + --bytes; + } + } while (bytes); + + stream->io->wp = wp; + + return size * nmemb - bytes; + } + case _IONBF: { + size_t bytes; + bytes = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, ptr, size * nmemb); + if (bytes == 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + } + return bytes; + } + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return 0; + } + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + size_t bytes; + fresult = f_write(stream->file, ptr, size * nmemb, &bytes); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + } + + return bytes; +#else + errno = EIO; + return 0; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + * @return int + */ +int vlibc_fflush(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + switch (stream->io->vbuf) { + case _IOFBF: + case _IOLBF: { + size_t ret; + ret = (size_t)(stream->io->wp - stream->io->bg); + if (ret > 0) { + ret = __vlibc_io_mem2dev(stream->io, stream->io->bg, ret); + if (ret == 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + return EOF; + } + stream->io->wp = stream->io->bg; + } + } + return 0; + + case _IONBF: + return 0; + + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return EOF; + } + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + fresult = f_sync(stream->file); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + return EOF; + } + + return 0; +#else + errno = EIO; + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return EOF; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + * @param offset + * @param whence + * @return int + */ +int vlibc_fseek(VLIBC_FILE *stream, long offset, int whence) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + errno = ESPIPE; + return EOF; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + long long temp; + + switch (whence) { + case SEEK_SET: + fresult = f_lseek(stream->file, offset); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + return EOF; + } + return 0; + + case SEEK_CUR: + temp = (long)stream->file->fptr; + temp += offset; + if (temp > 0xffffffff) { + errno = ESPIPE; + return EOF; + } + + fresult = f_lseek(stream->file, temp); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + return EOF; + } + return 0; + + case SEEK_END: + temp = (long)stream->file->obj.objsize; + temp -= offset; + if (temp <= 0) { + temp = 0; + } + fresult = f_lseek(stream->file, temp); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + return EOF; + } + return 0; + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return EOF; + } +#else + errno = EIO; + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return EOF; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + * @return long + */ +long vlibc_ftell(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(stream->file, EOF); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + errno = ESPIPE; + return EOF; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return (long)f_tell(stream->file); +#else + errno = EIO; + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return EOF; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param filename + * @return int + */ +int vlibc_remove(const char *filename) +{ + CHECK_FILE(filename, EOF); + +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + FILINFO finfo; + + fresult = f_stat(filename, &finfo); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + return EOF; + } + } + + fresult = f_unlink(filename); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + return EOF; + } + } + + return 0; +#else + errno = ENOENT; + return EOF; +#endif +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param old_filename + * @param new_filename + * @return int + */ +int vlibc_rename(const char *old_filename, const char *new_filename) +{ + CHECK_FILE(old_filename, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(new_filename, EOF); +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + + fresult = f_rename(old_filename, new_filename); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + return EOF; + } + } + + return 0; +#else + errno = ENOENT; + return EOF; +#endif +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + */ +void vlibc_rewind(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, /*!< no return */); + CHECK_FILE(stream->file, /*!< no return */); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + errno = ESPIPE; + return; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + fresult = f_lseek(stream->file, 0); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + } +#else + errno = EIO; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + * @param buffer + */ +void vlibc_setbuf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, char *buffer) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, /*!< no return */); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + if (stream->io->abuf == _VLIBC_ABUF_ENABLE) { + if (stream->io->bg == NULL) { + return; + } + + vlibc_free(stream->io->bg); + stream->io->abuf = _VLIBC_ABUF_DISABLE; + } + + stream->io->bg = buffer; + stream->io->wp = buffer; + stream->io->rp = buffer; + + if (buffer == NULL) { + stream->io->ed = buffer; + } else { + stream->io->ed = buffer + VLIBC_BUFSIZ; + } + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return; +#else + errno = EIO; + return; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return; + } +} + +/** + * @brief + * @param stream + * @param buffer + * @param mode + * @param size + * @return int + */ +int vlibc_setvbuf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, char *buffer, int mode, size_t size) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + switch (mode) { + case _IOFBF: + case _IOLBF: + vlibc_setbuf(stream, buffer); + if (buffer != NULL) { + stream->io->ed = buffer + size; + } + stream->io->vbuf = mode; + break; + case _IONBF: + vlibc_setbuf(stream, NULL); + stream->io->vbuf = mode; + break; + default: + return EOF; + } + return 0; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return EOF; +#else + errno = EIO; + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + errno = EBADF; + return EOF; + } +} + +VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_tmpfile(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return NULL; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +char *vlibc_tmpnam(char *str) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return NULL; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +int vlibc_fscanf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, const char *format, ...) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return EOF; +#else + return EOF; +#endif +} + +int vlibc_scanf(const char *format, ...) +{ + CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return EOF; +#else + return EOF; +#endif +} + +int vlibc_sscanf(const char *str, const char *format, ...) +{ + CHECK_FILE(str, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return EOF; +#else + return EOF; +#endif +} + +int vlibc_vfscanf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, const char *format, va_list arg) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return EOF; +#else + return EOF; +#endif +} + +int vlibc_vscanf(const char *format, va_list arg) +{ + CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return EOF; +#else + return EOF; +#endif +} + +int vlibc_vsscanf(const char *str, const char *format, va_list arg) +{ + CHECK_FILE(str, EOF); + CHECK_FILE(format, EOF); +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return EOF; +#else + return EOF; +#endif +} + +int vlibc_fgetc(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + return EOF; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + int ch; + size_t bytes; + fresult = f_read(stream->file, &ch, 1, &bytes); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + + return EOF; + } + if (bytes != 1) { + return EOF; + } + + return ch; +#else + + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + return EOF; + } +} + +char *vlibc_fgets(char *str, int size, VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(str, NULL); + CHECK_FILE(stream, NULL); +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return NULL; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +int vlibc_fputc(int chr, VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + return EOF; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + size_t bytes; + fresult = f_write(stream->file, &chr, 1, &bytes); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + + return EOF; + } + if (bytes != 1) { + return EOF; + } + + return 0; +#else + + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + return EOF; + } +} + +int vlibc_fputs(const char *str, VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + return vlibc_fprintf(stream, str); +} + +int vlibc_getc(VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + return EOF; + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + int ch; + size_t bytes; + fresult = f_read(stream->file, &ch, 1, &bytes); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + + return EOF; + } + if (bytes != 1) { + return EOF; + } + + return ch; +#else + + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + return EOF; + } +} + +int vlibc_getchar(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return EOF; +#else + return EOF; +#endif +} + +char *vlibc_gets(char *str) +{ + CHECK_FILE(str, NULL); +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + return NULL; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +int vlibc_putc(int chr, VLIBC_FILE *stream) +{ + CHECK_FILE(stream, EOF); + + IF_IO_DEV(stream) + { + size_t size; + size = vlibc_fwrite(&chr, 1, 1, stream); + if (size == 1) { + return 0; + } else { + return EOF; + } + } + else IF_FILE(stream) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + size_t bytes; + fresult = f_write(stream->file, &chr, 1, &bytes); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + + return EOF; + } + if (bytes != 1) { + return EOF; + } + + return 0; +#else + + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + return EOF; + } +} + +int vlibc_putchar(int chr) +{ + IF_IO_DEV(vlibc_stdout) + { + size_t size; + size = vlibc_fwrite(&chr, 1, 1, vlibc_stdout); + if (size == 1) { + return 0; + } else { + return EOF; + } + } + else IF_FILE(vlibc_stdout) + { +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + int fresult; + size_t bytes; + fresult = f_write(vlibc_stdout->file, &chr, 1, &bytes); + if (fresult != FR_OK) { + if (fresult <= FR_INVALID_PARAMETER) { + errno = FRESULT_to_errno[fresult]; + } + + return EOF; + } + if (bytes != 1) { + return EOF; + } + + return 0; +#else + + return EOF; +#endif + } + else + { + return EOF; + } +} + +int vlibc_puts(const char *str) +{ + return vlibc_printf(str); +} + +void vlibc_perror(const char *str) +{ + CHECK_FILE(str, /*!< no return */); +} diff --git a/components/utils/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.h b/components/libc/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.h similarity index 96% rename from components/utils/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.h rename to components/libc/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.h index 06a1618b..524983b7 100644 --- a/components/utils/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.h +++ b/components/libc/vlibc/vlibc_stdio.h @@ -1,170 +1,170 @@ -#ifndef _VLIBC_STDIO_H -#define _VLIBC_STDIO_H - -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS -#include "ff.h" -#endif - -/** @addtogroup Types - * @{ - */ - -struct __vlibc_io { - char *bg; /*!< buffer begin pointer */ - char *wp; /*!< buffer write pointer */ - char *rp; /*!< buffer read pointer */ - char *ed; /*!< buffer end pointer */ - - uint32_t dev; /*!< io device */ - uint8_t flag; /*!< io flag */ - uint8_t vbuf; /*!< buffer mode */ - uint8_t abuf; /*!< buffer auto */ - uint8_t err; /*!< error */ -}; - -typedef struct { - uint32_t magic; - - union { - struct __vlibc_io *io; -#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS - FIL *file; -#else - int *file; -#endif - }; -} vlibc_file_t; - -/*!< file type */ -#define VLIBC_FILE vlibc_file_t - -/** - * @} - */ - -/** @addtogroup stdio extra - * @{ - */ -extern uint32_t __vlibc_io_init(const char *name, uint8_t mode); -extern uint32_t __vlibc_io_deinit(struct __vlibc_io *io); -extern size_t __vlibc_io_mem2dev(struct __vlibc_io *io, const void *ptr, size_t size); -extern size_t __vlibc_io_dev2mem(struct __vlibc_io *io, void *ptr, size_t size); -/** - * @} - */ - -/** @addtogroup Marcos - * @{ - */ - -#define _VLIBC_MAGIC_MASK ((unsigned int)(0xffff0000)) -#define _VLIBC_IO_MAGIC_CODE ((unsigned int)(0x10de0000)) -#define _VLIBC_FILE_MAGIC_CODE ((unsigned int)(0xf11e0000)) - -#define _VLIBC_IO_WRITE ((unsigned char)(0x01)) -#define _VLIBC_IO_READ ((unsigned char)(0x02)) - -/*!< io buffer size */ -#define VLIBC_BUFSIZ 256 - -/*!< file stack buffer size */ -#define VLIBC_FBUFSIZ 256 - -/*!< max open file count at the same time */ -#define VLIBC_FOPEN_MAX 20 - -/*!< max file name length */ -#define VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX 256 - -/*!< max io name length */ -#define _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX 32 - -/*!< max tmpnam file name length */ -#define VLIBC_L_tmpnam VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX - -/*!< max tmpnam rand name */ -#define VLIBC_TMP_MAX 0 - -/*!< stand io */ -extern vlibc_file_t *__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[3]; -#define vlibc_stdin (__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[0]) -#define vlibc_stdout (__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[1]) -#define vlibc_stderr (__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[2]) - -/** - * @} - */ - -/** @addtogroup stdio functions - * @{ - */ - -extern void vlibc_clearerr(VLIBC_FILE *); -extern int vlibc_feof(VLIBC_FILE *); -extern int vlibc_ferror(VLIBC_FILE *); - -extern VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_fopen(const char *, const char *); -extern VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_freopen(const char *, const char *, VLIBC_FILE *); -extern int vlibc_fclose(VLIBC_FILE *); - -extern size_t vlibc_fread(void *, size_t, size_t, VLIBC_FILE *); -extern size_t vlibc_fwrite(const void *, size_t, size_t, VLIBC_FILE *); - -extern int vlibc_fflush(VLIBC_FILE *); -extern int vlibc_fseek(VLIBC_FILE *, long, int); -extern long vlibc_ftell(VLIBC_FILE *); - -extern int vlibc_remove(const char *); -extern int vlibc_rename(const char *, const char *); -extern void vlibc_rewind(VLIBC_FILE *); - -extern void vlibc_setbuf(VLIBC_FILE *, char *); -extern int vlibc_setvbuf(VLIBC_FILE *, char *, int, size_t); - -extern VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_tmpfile(void); -extern char *vlibc_tmpnam(char *); - -extern int vlibc_fprintf(VLIBC_FILE *, const char *, ...); -extern int vlibc_printf(const char *, ...); -extern int vlibc_sprintf(char *, const char *, ...); -extern int vlibc_snprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, ...); - -extern int vlibc_vfprintf(VLIBC_FILE *, const char *, va_list); -extern int vlibc_vprintf(const char *, va_list); -extern int vlibc_vsprintf(char *, const char *, va_list); -extern int vlibc_vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list); - -extern int vlibc_fscanf(VLIBC_FILE *, const char *, ...); -extern int vlibc_scanf(const char *, ...); -extern int vlibc_sscanf(const char *, const char *, ...); - -extern int vlibc_vfscanf(VLIBC_FILE *, const char *, va_list); -extern int vlibc_vscanf(const char *, va_list); -extern int vlibc_vsscanf(const char *, const char *, va_list); - -extern int vlibc_fgetc(VLIBC_FILE *); -extern char *vlibc_fgets(char *, int, VLIBC_FILE *); - -extern int vlibc_fputc(int, VLIBC_FILE *); -extern int vlibc_fputs(const char *, VLIBC_FILE *); - -extern int vlibc_getc(VLIBC_FILE *); -extern int vlibc_getchar(void); -extern char *vlibc_gets(char *); - -extern int vlibc_putc(int, VLIBC_FILE *); -extern int vlibc_putchar(int); -extern int vlibc_puts(const char *); - -extern void vlibc_perror(const char *); - -/** - * @} - */ - -#endif +#ifndef _VLIBC_STDIO_H +#define _VLIBC_STDIO_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS +#include "ff.h" +#endif + +/** @addtogroup Types + * @{ + */ + +struct __vlibc_io { + char *bg; /*!< buffer begin pointer */ + char *wp; /*!< buffer write pointer */ + char *rp; /*!< buffer read pointer */ + char *ed; /*!< buffer end pointer */ + + uint32_t dev; /*!< io device */ + uint8_t flag; /*!< io flag */ + uint8_t vbuf; /*!< buffer mode */ + uint8_t abuf; /*!< buffer auto */ + uint8_t err; /*!< error */ +}; + +typedef struct { + uint32_t magic; + + union { + struct __vlibc_io *io; +#ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS + FIL *file; +#else + int *file; +#endif + }; +} vlibc_file_t; + +/*!< file type */ +#define VLIBC_FILE vlibc_file_t + +/** + * @} + */ + +/** @addtogroup stdio extra + * @{ + */ +extern uint32_t __vlibc_io_init(const char *name, uint8_t mode); +extern uint32_t __vlibc_io_deinit(struct __vlibc_io *io); +extern size_t __vlibc_io_mem2dev(struct __vlibc_io *io, const void *ptr, size_t size); +extern size_t __vlibc_io_dev2mem(struct __vlibc_io *io, void *ptr, size_t size); +/** + * @} + */ + +/** @addtogroup Marcos + * @{ + */ + +#define _VLIBC_MAGIC_MASK ((unsigned int)(0xffff0000)) +#define _VLIBC_IO_MAGIC_CODE ((unsigned int)(0x10de0000)) +#define _VLIBC_FILE_MAGIC_CODE ((unsigned int)(0xf11e0000)) + +#define _VLIBC_IO_WRITE ((unsigned char)(0x01)) +#define _VLIBC_IO_READ ((unsigned char)(0x02)) + +/*!< io buffer size */ +#define VLIBC_BUFSIZ 256 + +/*!< file stack buffer size */ +#define VLIBC_FBUFSIZ 256 + +/*!< max open file count at the same time */ +#define VLIBC_FOPEN_MAX 20 + +/*!< max file name length */ +#define VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX 256 + +/*!< max io name length */ +#define _VLIBC_IONAME_MAX 32 + +/*!< max tmpnam file name length */ +#define VLIBC_L_tmpnam VLIBC_FILENAME_MAX + +/*!< max tmpnam rand name */ +#define VLIBC_TMP_MAX 0 + +/*!< stand io */ +extern vlibc_file_t *__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[3]; +#define vlibc_stdin (__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[0]) +#define vlibc_stdout (__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[1]) +#define vlibc_stderr (__vlibc_stdio_fileptrs[2]) + +/** + * @} + */ + +/** @addtogroup stdio functions + * @{ + */ + +extern void vlibc_clearerr(VLIBC_FILE *); +extern int vlibc_feof(VLIBC_FILE *); +extern int vlibc_ferror(VLIBC_FILE *); + +extern VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_fopen(const char *, const char *); +extern VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_freopen(const char *, const char *, VLIBC_FILE *); +extern int vlibc_fclose(VLIBC_FILE *); + +extern size_t vlibc_fread(void *, size_t, size_t, VLIBC_FILE *); +extern size_t vlibc_fwrite(const void *, size_t, size_t, VLIBC_FILE *); + +extern int vlibc_fflush(VLIBC_FILE *); +extern int vlibc_fseek(VLIBC_FILE *, long, int); +extern long vlibc_ftell(VLIBC_FILE *); + +extern int vlibc_remove(const char *); +extern int vlibc_rename(const char *, const char *); +extern void vlibc_rewind(VLIBC_FILE *); + +extern void vlibc_setbuf(VLIBC_FILE *, char *); +extern int vlibc_setvbuf(VLIBC_FILE *, char *, int, size_t); + +extern VLIBC_FILE *vlibc_tmpfile(void); +extern char *vlibc_tmpnam(char *); + +extern int vlibc_fprintf(VLIBC_FILE *, const char *, ...); +extern int vlibc_printf(const char *, ...); +extern int vlibc_sprintf(char *, const char *, ...); +extern int vlibc_snprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, ...); + +extern int vlibc_vfprintf(VLIBC_FILE *, const char *, va_list); +extern int vlibc_vprintf(const char *, va_list); +extern int vlibc_vsprintf(char *, const char *, va_list); +extern int vlibc_vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list); + +extern int vlibc_fscanf(VLIBC_FILE *, const char *, ...); +extern int vlibc_scanf(const char *, ...); +extern int vlibc_sscanf(const char *, const char *, ...); + +extern int vlibc_vfscanf(VLIBC_FILE *, const char *, va_list); +extern int vlibc_vscanf(const char *, va_list); +extern int vlibc_vsscanf(const char *, const char *, va_list); + +extern int vlibc_fgetc(VLIBC_FILE *); +extern char *vlibc_fgets(char *, int, VLIBC_FILE *); + +extern int vlibc_fputc(int, VLIBC_FILE *); +extern int vlibc_fputs(const char *, VLIBC_FILE *); + +extern int vlibc_getc(VLIBC_FILE *); +extern int vlibc_getchar(void); +extern char *vlibc_gets(char *); + +extern int vlibc_putc(int, VLIBC_FILE *); +extern int vlibc_putchar(int); +extern int vlibc_puts(const char *); + +extern void vlibc_perror(const char *); + +/** + * @} + */ + +#endif diff --git a/components/utils/vlibc/vlibc_vsnprintf.c b/components/libc/vlibc/vlibc_vsnprintf.c similarity index 96% rename from components/utils/vlibc/vlibc_vsnprintf.c rename to components/libc/vlibc/vlibc_vsnprintf.c index c3457dcf..d108ccc8 100644 --- a/components/utils/vlibc/vlibc_vsnprintf.c +++ b/components/libc/vlibc/vlibc_vsnprintf.c @@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ #define _VLIBC_IO_VBUF_NBF ((unsigned char)(0x00)) #define _VLIBC_IO_AUTO_BUFF ((unsigned char)(0x80)) -#define _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO ((int)(0x01)) -#define _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE ((int)(0x02)) +#define _VLIBC_TYPEIS_IO ((int)(0x01)) +#define _VLIBC_TYPEIS_FILE ((int)(0x02)) #ifdef CONFIG_VLIBC_DEBUG #define CHECK_FILE(_stream, __ret) \ @@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ extern int FRESULT_to_errno[20]; #error "At least one non-constant Taylor expansion is necessary for the log10() calculation" #endif -#define PRINTF_PREFER_DECIMAL false -#define PRINTF_PREFER_EXPONENTIAL true +#define PRINTF_PREFER_DECIMAL false +#define PRINTF_PREFER_EXPONENTIAL true /****************************************************************************** * @} @@ -155,22 +155,22 @@ extern int FRESULT_to_errno[20]; #define PRINTF_FLOAT_NOTATION_THRESHOLD PRINTF_EXPAND_THEN_CONCATENATE(1e, VLIBC_MAX_INTEGRAL_DIGITS_FOR_DECIMAL) // internal flag definitions -#define FLAGS_ZEROPAD (1U << 0U) -#define FLAGS_LEFT (1U << 1U) -#define FLAGS_PLUS (1U << 2U) -#define FLAGS_SPACE (1U << 3U) -#define FLAGS_HASH (1U << 4U) -#define FLAGS_UPPERCASE (1U << 5U) -#define FLAGS_CHAR (1U << 6U) -#define FLAGS_SHORT (1U << 7U) -#define FLAGS_INT (1U << 8U) -#define FLAGS_LONG (1U << 9U) -#define FLAGS_LONG_LONG (1U << 10U) -#define FLAGS_PRECISION (1U << 11U) -#define FLAGS_ADAPT_EXP (1U << 12U) -#define FLAGS_POINTER (1U << 13U) +#define FLAGS_ZEROPAD (1U << 0U) +#define FLAGS_LEFT (1U << 1U) +#define FLAGS_PLUS (1U << 2U) +#define FLAGS_SPACE (1U << 3U) +#define FLAGS_HASH (1U << 4U) +#define FLAGS_UPPERCASE (1U << 5U) +#define FLAGS_CHAR (1U << 6U) +#define FLAGS_SHORT (1U << 7U) +#define FLAGS_INT (1U << 8U) +#define FLAGS_LONG (1U << 9U) +#define FLAGS_LONG_LONG (1U << 10U) +#define FLAGS_PRECISION (1U << 11U) +#define FLAGS_ADAPT_EXP (1U << 12U) +#define FLAGS_POINTER (1U << 13U) // Note: Similar, but not identical, effect as FLAGS_HASH -#define FLAGS_SIGNED (1U << 14U) +#define FLAGS_SIGNED (1U << 14U) typedef unsigned int printf_flags_t; @@ -1308,11 +1308,11 @@ static int _vsnprintf(output_gadget_t *output, void (*putc_function)(output_gadg */ /** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @param format - * @param arg - * @return int + * @brief + * @param stream + * @param format + * @param arg + * @return int */ // int vfprintf(FILE *__restrict, const char *__restrict, __VALIST) __attribute__((alias("vlibc_vfprintf"))); int vlibc_vfprintf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, const char *format, va_list arg) @@ -1385,10 +1385,10 @@ int vlibc_vfprintf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, const char *format, va_list arg) } /** - * @brief - * @param format - * @param arg - * @return int + * @brief + * @param format + * @param arg + * @return int */ // int vprintf(const char *, __VALIST) __attribute__((alias("vlibc_vprintf"))); int vlibc_vprintf(const char *format, va_list arg) @@ -1397,12 +1397,12 @@ int vlibc_vprintf(const char *format, va_list arg) } /** - * @brief - * @param str - * @param size - * @param format - * @param arg - * @return int + * @brief + * @param str + * @param size + * @param format + * @param arg + * @return int */ int vsnprintf(char *__restrict, size_t, const char *__restrict, __VALIST) __attribute__((alias("vlibc_vsnprintf"))); int vlibc_vsnprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, va_list arg) @@ -1419,11 +1419,11 @@ int vlibc_vsnprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, va_list arg) } /** - * @brief - * @param str - * @param format - * @param arg - * @return int + * @brief + * @param str + * @param format + * @param arg + * @return int */ // int vsprintf(char *__restrict, const char *__restrict, __VALIST) __attribute__((alias("vlibc_vsprintf"))); int vlibc_vsprintf(char *str, const char *format, va_list arg) @@ -1432,11 +1432,11 @@ int vlibc_vsprintf(char *str, const char *format, va_list arg) } /** - * @brief - * @param stream - * @param format - * @param ... - * @return int + * @brief + * @param stream + * @param format + * @param ... + * @return int */ // int fprintf(FILE *__restrict, const char *__restrict, ...) __attribute__((alias("vlibc_fprintf"))); int vlibc_fprintf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, const char *format, ...) @@ -1449,12 +1449,12 @@ int vlibc_fprintf(VLIBC_FILE *stream, const char *format, ...) } /** - * @brief - * @param format - * @param ... - * @return int + * @brief + * @param format + * @param ... + * @return int */ -int printf(const char *__restrict, ...) __attribute__((alias("vlibc_printf"))); +//int printf(const char *__restrict, ...) __attribute__((alias("vlibc_printf"))); int vlibc_printf(const char *format, ...) { va_list args; @@ -1465,11 +1465,11 @@ int vlibc_printf(const char *format, ...) } /** - * @brief - * @param str - * @param format - * @param ... - * @return int + * @brief + * @param str + * @param format + * @param ... + * @return int */ // int sprintf(char *__restrict, const char *__restrict, ...) __attribute__((alias("vlibc_sprintf"))); int vlibc_sprintf(char *str, const char *format, ...) @@ -1482,12 +1482,12 @@ int vlibc_sprintf(char *str, const char *format, ...) } /** - * @brief - * @param str - * @param size - * @param format - * @param ... - * @return int + * @brief + * @param str + * @param size + * @param format + * @param ... + * @return int */ // int snprintf(char *__restrict, size_t, const char *__restrict, ...) __attribute__((alias("vlibc_snprintf"))); int vlibc_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...) diff --git a/components/utils/libc/vsnprintf.c b/components/libc/vsnprintf.c similarity index 99% rename from components/utils/libc/vsnprintf.c rename to components/libc/vsnprintf.c index 6febad2a..2035408a 100644 --- a/components/utils/libc/vsnprintf.c +++ b/components/libc/vsnprintf.c @@ -1068,8 +1068,7 @@ static int __vsnprintf(out_fct_type out, char* buffer, const size_t maxlen, cons return (int)idx; } -int vsnprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, va_list) __attribute__ ((alias ("_vsnprintf"))); -int _vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args) +int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args) { return __vsnprintf(out_buffer, buf, size, fmt, args); } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/utils/libc/vsnprintf_nano.c b/components/libc/vsnprintf_nano.c similarity index 98% rename from components/utils/libc/vsnprintf_nano.c rename to components/libc/vsnprintf_nano.c index a7d3637a..8b7d9dfd 100644 --- a/components/utils/libc/vsnprintf_nano.c +++ b/components/libc/vsnprintf_nano.c @@ -243,8 +243,6 @@ static char *print_number(char *buf, return buf; } -int vsnprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, va_list) __attribute__ ((alias ("rt_vsnprintf"))); - /** * This function will fill a formatted string to buffer. * @@ -258,10 +256,10 @@ int vsnprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, va_list) __attribute__ ((alias ("rt * * @return The number of characters actually written to buffer. */ -int32_t rt_vsnprintf(char *buf, - size_t size, - const char *fmt, - va_list args) +int32_t vsnprintf(char *buf, + size_t size, + const char *fmt, + va_list args) { #ifdef RT_PRINTF_LONGLONG unsigned long long num; @@ -521,4 +519,3 @@ int32_t rt_vsnprintf(char *buf, */ return str - buf; } - diff --git a/components/lzma/CMakeLists.txt b/components/lzma/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d408c89 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/lzma/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_XZ xz) diff --git a/components/xz/CMakeLists.txt b/components/lzma/xz/CMakeLists.txt similarity index 82% rename from components/xz/CMakeLists.txt rename to components/lzma/xz/CMakeLists.txt index 98452d6c..87514f3d 100644 --- a/components/xz/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/lzma/xz/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ -sdk_generate_library() +sdk_generate_library() sdk_library_add_sources(xz_crc32.c xz_dec_lzma2.c xz_dec_stream.c xz_decompress.c xz_port.c) sdk_add_include_directories(.) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/xz/Kconfig b/components/lzma/xz/Kconfig similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/Kconfig rename to components/lzma/xz/Kconfig diff --git a/components/xz/Makefile b/components/lzma/xz/Makefile similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/Makefile rename to components/lzma/xz/Makefile diff --git a/components/xz/readme.txt b/components/lzma/xz/readme.txt similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/readme.txt rename to components/lzma/xz/readme.txt diff --git a/components/xz/xz.h b/components/lzma/xz/xz.h similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz.h rename to components/lzma/xz/xz.h diff --git a/components/xz/xz.mk b/components/lzma/xz/xz.mk similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz.mk rename to components/lzma/xz/xz.mk diff --git a/components/xz/xz_config.h b/components/lzma/xz/xz_config.h similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_config.h rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_config.h diff --git a/components/xz/xz_crc32.c b/components/lzma/xz/xz_crc32.c similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_crc32.c rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_crc32.c diff --git a/components/xz/xz_crc64.c b/components/lzma/xz/xz_crc64.c similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_crc64.c rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_crc64.c diff --git a/components/xz/xz_dec_bcj.c b/components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_bcj.c similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_dec_bcj.c rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_bcj.c diff --git a/components/xz/xz_dec_lzma2.c b/components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_lzma2.c similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_dec_lzma2.c rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_lzma2.c diff --git a/components/xz/xz_dec_stream.c b/components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_stream.c similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_dec_stream.c rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_stream.c diff --git a/components/xz/xz_dec_syms.c b/components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_syms.c similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_dec_syms.c rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_syms.c diff --git a/components/xz/xz_dec_test.c b/components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_test.c similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_dec_test.c rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_dec_test.c diff --git a/components/xz/xz_decompress.c b/components/lzma/xz/xz_decompress.c similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_decompress.c rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_decompress.c diff --git a/components/xz/xz_lzma2.h b/components/lzma/xz/xz_lzma2.h similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_lzma2.h rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_lzma2.h diff --git a/components/xz/xz_port.c b/components/lzma/xz/xz_port.c similarity index 92% rename from components/xz/xz_port.c rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_port.c index 94fdd4fd..3266d11d 100644 --- a/components/xz/xz_port.c +++ b/components/lzma/xz/xz_port.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ void simple_malloc_init(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len) void *simple_malloc(uint32_t size) { uint8_t *p; - printf("Simple Malloc %ld\r\n", size); + //printf("Simple Malloc %ld\r\n", size); if (malloced + size < bufsize) { p = mallocBuf + malloced; diff --git a/components/xz/xz_private.h b/components/lzma/xz/xz_private.h similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_private.h rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_private.h diff --git a/components/xz/xz_stream.h b/components/lzma/xz/xz_stream.h similarity index 100% rename from components/xz/xz_stream.h rename to components/lzma/xz/xz_stream.h diff --git a/components/mm/CMakeLists.txt b/components/mm/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..81dc22ec --- /dev/null +++ b/components/mm/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +sdk_generate_library() + +sdk_add_include_directories(.) + +sdk_library_add_sources(mem.c) + +# memheap +if (CONFIG_TLSF) + add_subdirectory(tlsf) +else() + add_subdirectory(mmheap) +endif() diff --git a/components/mm/mem.c b/components/mm/mem.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..43d4645b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/mm/mem.c @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include "mem.h" + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +struct mem_heap_s g_memheap; + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Function Prototypes + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: kmem_init + * + * Description: + * Allocate memory from the user heap. + * + * Input Parameters: + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void kmem_init(void *heapstart, size_t heapsize) +{ + MEM_LOG("Heap: start=%p size=%zu\r\n", heapstart, heapsize); + + bflb_mem_init(KMEM_HEAP, heapstart, heapsize); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: usr_mem_init + * + * Description: + * Allocate memory from the user heap. + * + * Input Parameters: + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void umem_init(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *heapstart, size_t heapsize) +{ + bflb_mem_init(heap, heapstart, heapsize); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: malloc + * + * Description: + * Allocate memory from the user heap. + * + * Input Parameters: + * size - Size (in bytes) of the memory region to be allocated. + * + * Returned Value: + * The address of the allocated memory (NULL on failure to allocate) + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void *malloc(size_t size) +{ + return bflb_malloc(KMEM_HEAP, size); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: realloc + * + * Description: + * Re-allocate memory in the user heap. + * + * Input Parameters: + * oldmem - The old memory allocated + * newsize - Size (in bytes) of the new memory region to be re-allocated. + * + * Returned Value: + * The address of the re-allocated memory (NULL on failure to re-allocate) + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void *realloc(void *old, size_t newlen) +{ + return bflb_realloc(KMEM_HEAP, old, newlen); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: calloc + * + * Description: + * Allocate and zero memory from the user heap. + * + * Input Parameters: + * size - Size (in bytes) of the memory region to be allocated. + * + * Returned Value: + * The address of the allocated memory (NULL on failure to allocate) + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void *calloc(size_t size, size_t len) +{ + return bflb_calloc(KMEM_HEAP, size, len); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: memalign + * + * Description: + * memalign requests more than enough space from malloc, finds a region + * within that chunk that meets the alignment request and then frees any + * leading or trailing space. + * + * The alignment argument must be a power of two (not checked). 8-byte + * alignment is guaranteed by normal malloc calls. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void *memalign(size_t align, size_t size) +{ + return bflb_malloc_align(KMEM_HEAP, align, size); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: free + * + * Description: + * Returns a chunk of user memory to the list of free nodes, merging with + * adjacent free chunks if possible. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +void free(void *addr) +{ + bflb_free(KMEM_HEAP, addr); +} + + +#ifdef CONFIG_SHELL +#include + +int cmd_free(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const char *Header = "total free alloc mxblk frnode alnode \r\n"; + struct meminfo info; + char *mem; + + mem = malloc(64); + bflb_mem_usage(KMEM_HEAP, &info); + + sprintf(mem, "%-8d%-8d%-8d%-8d%-8d%-8d\r\n", info.total_size, info.free_size, info.used_size, info.max_free_size, + info.free_node, info.used_node); + + printf(Header); + printf(mem); + + free(mem); + + return 0; +} +SHELL_CMD_EXPORT_ALIAS(cmd_free, free, show memory usage); +#endif diff --git a/components/mm/mem.h b/components/mm/mem.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03f73727 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/mm/mem.h @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef __BFLB_MM_MEM_H +#define __BFLB_MM_MEM_H + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#define MEM_ASSERT(x) \ + { \ + if (!(x)) { \ + printf("[MEM] !!! assert " #x "\r\n"); \ + while (1) \ + ; \ + } \ + } + +#define MEM_LOG(fmt, ...) //printf("[MEM] "fmt, __VA_ARGS__) + +#define MEM_IS_VALID(heap) ((heap) != NULL && (heap)->mem_impl != NULL) + + +#define KMEM_HEAP &g_memheap + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Types + ****************************************************************************/ + +struct mem_heap_impl_s; /* Forward reference */ +struct mem_heap_s { + struct mem_heap_impl_s *mem_impl; +}; + +struct meminfo +{ + int total_size; /* This is the total size of memory allocated + * for use by malloc in bytes. */ + int free_node; /* This is the number of free (not in use) chunks */ + int used_node; /* This is the number of allocated (in use) chunks */ + int max_free_size; /* Size of the largest free (not in use) chunk */ + int used_size; /* This is the total size of memory occupied by + * chunks handed out by malloc. */ + int free_size; /* This is the total size of memory occupied + * by free (not in use) chunks. */ +}; + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +#undef EXTERN +#if defined(__cplusplus) +#define EXTERN extern "C" +extern "C" +{ +#else +#define EXTERN extern +#endif + + +EXTERN struct mem_heap_s g_memheap; + +/**************************************************************************** + * Public Function Prototypes + ****************************************************************************/ + +void kmem_init(void *heapstart, size_t heapsize); + +void umem_init(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *heapstart, size_t heapsize); + +/* private api for mm*/ + +void bflb_mem_init(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *heapstart, size_t heapsize); + +void *bflb_malloc(struct mem_heap_s *heap, size_t nbytes); + +void bflb_free(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *ptr); + +void *bflb_realloc(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *ptr, size_t nbytes); + +void *bflb_calloc(struct mem_heap_s *heap, size_t count, size_t size); + +void *bflb_malloc_align(struct mem_heap_s *heap, size_t align, size_t size); + +void bflb_mem_usage(struct mem_heap_s *heap, struct meminfo *info); + +#undef EXTERN +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* __BFLB_MM_MEM_H */ + diff --git a/components/mm/mmheap/CMakeLists.txt b/components/mm/mmheap/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b05030cf --- /dev/null +++ b/components/mm/mmheap/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +sdk_library_add_sources(mmheap.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(bflb_mmheap.c) + +sdk_add_include_directories(.) + +# memheap lock user config +if(CONFIG_MMHEAP_USER) + sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_MMHEAP_USER) +endif() diff --git a/components/mm/mmheap/bflb_mmheap.c b/components/mm/mmheap/bflb_mmheap.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8d29bc79 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/mm/mmheap/bflb_mmheap.c @@ -0,0 +1,415 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include "mem.h" +#include "mmheap.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_FREERTOS +#include "FreeRTOS.h" +#include "semphr.h" +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_FREERTOS + +#define _IRQ_CONTEXT() xPortIsInsideInterrupt() +#define _SCHED_LOCK() (taskSCHEDULER_RUNNING != xTaskGetSchedulerState()) +#define _ENTER_CRITICAL() portENTER_CRITICAL() +#define _EXIT_CRITICAL() portEXIT_CRITICAL() +#define _SEM_INIT(s, p, c) xSemaphoreCreateRecursiveMutexStatic(s) +#define _SEM_WAIT(s) xSemaphoreTakeRecursive((SemaphoreHandle_t)s, portMAX_DELAY) +#define _SEM_POST(s) xSemaphoreGiveRecursive((SemaphoreHandle_t)s) + +#else + +#include "bflb_irq.h" +static volatile uintptr_t s_irq_flag; +static volatile uintptr_t s_irq_entry; + +#define _IRQ_CONTEXT() (0) +#define _ENTER_CRITICAL() \ + { \ + s_irq_flag = bflb_irq_save(); \ + s_irq_entry += 1; \ + } + +#define _EXIT_CRITICAL() \ + { \ + if (s_irq_entry > 0) { \ + s_irq_entry -= 1; \ + if (s_irq_entry == 0) { \ + bflb_irq_restore(s_irq_flag); \ + } \ + } \ + } + +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_FREERTOS +#define CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Function Prototypes + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* Adapted to the lock provided by the operating system */ +#ifdef CONFIG_FREERTOS +typedef StaticSemaphore_t sem_t; +typedef TaskHandle_t task_t; +#else + +#endif /* CONFIG_FREERTOS */ + +struct mem_delaynode_s +{ + struct mem_delaynode_s *flink; +}; + +/* Private memory management structure */ +struct mem_heap_impl_s { + struct heap_info info; +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + sem_t sem; + + /* Free delay list, for some situation can't do free immdiately */ + + struct mem_delaynode_s *mem_delaylist; +#endif +}; + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_sem_init + * + * Description: + * Initialize the MM mutex + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_sem_init(struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + /* Initialize the MM semaphore to one (to support one-at-a-time access to + * private data sets). + */ + + _SEM_INIT(&impl->sem, 0, 1); +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_sem_take + * + * Description: + * Take the MM mutex. This is the normal action before all memory + * management actions. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_sem_take(struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + if (!_SCHED_LOCK()) { + _SEM_WAIT(&impl->sem); + } else { + _ENTER_CRITICAL(); + } +#else + + _ENTER_CRITICAL(); + +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_sem_give + * + * Description: + * Release the MM mutex when it is not longer needed. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_sem_give(struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + if (!_SCHED_LOCK()) { + _SEM_POST(&impl->sem); + } else { + _EXIT_CRITICAL(); + } +#else + + _EXIT_CRITICAL(); + +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_add_delaylist + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_add_delaylist(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *mem) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + struct mem_delaynode_s *tmp = mem; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Delay the deallocation until a more appropriate time. */ + + _ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + tmp->flink = impl->mem_delaylist; + impl->mem_delaylist = tmp; + + _EXIT_CRITICAL(); +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_free_delaylist + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_free_delaylist(struct mem_heap_s *heap) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + struct mem_delaynode_s *tmp; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Move the delay list to local */ + + _ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + tmp = impl->mem_delaylist; + impl->mem_delaylist = NULL; + + _EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + /* Test if the delayed is empty */ + + while (tmp) { + void *address; + + /* Get the first delayed deallocation */ + + address = tmp; + tmp = tmp->flink; + + /* The address should always be non-NULL since that was checked in the + * 'while' condition above. + */ + + bflb_free(heap, address); + } +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +void bflb_mem_init(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *heapstart, size_t heapsize) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + struct heap_region region[] = { + { NULL, 0 }, + { NULL, 0 } + }; + + /* Reserve a block space for mm_heap_impl_s context */ + + MEM_ASSERT(heapsize > sizeof(struct mem_heap_impl_s)); + + heap->mem_impl = (struct mem_heap_impl_s *)heapstart; + + heapstart += sizeof(struct mem_heap_impl_s); + heapsize -= sizeof(struct mem_heap_impl_s); + + region[0].addr = heapstart; + region[0].mem_size = heapsize; + + /* Zero implmeentation context */ + + impl = heap->mem_impl; + memset(impl, 0, sizeof(struct mem_heap_impl_s)); + + bflb_mem_sem_init(impl); + + bflb_mmheap_init(&impl->info, region); +} + +void *bflb_malloc(struct mem_heap_s *heap, size_t nbytes) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + void *ret = NULL; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + + MEM_LOG("malloc %d\r\n", nbytes); + + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Firstly, free mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_free_delaylist(heap); + + /* Allocate from the tlsf pool */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + ret = bflb_mmheap_alloc(&impl->info, nbytes); + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); + + return ret; +} + +void bflb_free(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *ptr) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + + MEM_LOG("Freeing %p\r\n", ptr); + + /* Protect against attempts to free a NULL reference */ + + if (!ptr) { + return; + } + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + if (_IRQ_CONTEXT()) { + + /* We are in ISR, add to mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_add_delaylist(heap, ptr); + return; + } + + /* We need to hold the MM semaphore while we muck with the + * nodelist. + */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + + /* Return to the tlsf pool */ + + bflb_mmheap_free(&heap->mem_impl->info, ptr); + + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); +} + +void *bflb_realloc(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *ptr, size_t nbytes) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + void *ret; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Firstly, free mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_free_delaylist(heap); + + /* Allocate from the tlsf pool */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + ret = bflb_mmheap_realloc(&impl->info, ptr, nbytes); + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); + + return ret; +} + +void *bflb_calloc(struct mem_heap_s *heap, size_t count, size_t nbytes) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + void *ret; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Firstly, free mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_free_delaylist(heap); + + /* Allocate from the tlsf pool */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + ret = bflb_mmheap_calloc(&impl->info, count, nbytes); + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); + + return ret; +} + +void *bflb_malloc_align(struct mem_heap_s *heap, size_t align, size_t size) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + void *ret; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Firstly, free mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_free_delaylist(heap); + + /* Allocate from the tlsf pool */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + ret = bflb_mmheap_align_alloc(&impl->info, align, size); + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); + + return ret; +} + +void bflb_mem_usage(struct mem_heap_s *heap, struct meminfo *info) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + struct heap_state state; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + bflb_mmheap_get_state(&impl->info, &state); + + info->total_size = impl->info.total_size; + info->free_node = state.free_node_num; + info->max_free_size = state.max_node_size; + info->free_size = state.remain_size; + info->used_size = info->total_size - info->free_size; +} diff --git a/components/utils/mmheap/bflb_mmheap.c b/components/mm/mmheap/mmheap.c similarity index 99% rename from components/utils/mmheap/bflb_mmheap.c rename to components/mm/mmheap/mmheap.c index 1d775709..c7b46142 100644 --- a/components/utils/mmheap/bflb_mmheap.c +++ b/components/mm/mmheap/mmheap.c @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ * */ -#include "bflb_mmheap.h" +#include "mmheap.h" #define MEM_MANAGE_ALIGNMENT_BYTE_DEFAULT 8 #define MEM_MANAGE_BITS_PER_BYTE 8 @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #define MEM_MANAGE_MINUM_MEM_SIZE (MEM_MANAGE_MEM_STRUCT_SIZE << 1) #define MEM_MANAGE_ALLOCA_LABAL ((size_t)((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * MEM_MANAGE_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1))) + static inline size_t mmheap_align_down(size_t data, size_t align_byte) { return data & ~(align_byte - 1); @@ -97,7 +98,7 @@ static inline void mmheap_insert_node_to_freelist(struct heap_info *pRoot, struc * @param pRoot * @param pState */ -void mmheap_get_state(struct heap_info *pRoot, struct heap_state *pState) +void bflb_mmheap_get_state(struct heap_info *pRoot, struct heap_state *pState) { MMHEAP_ASSERT(pRoot->pStart != NULL); MMHEAP_ASSERT(pRoot->pEnd != NULL); diff --git a/components/utils/mmheap/bflb_mmheap.h b/components/mm/mmheap/mmheap.h similarity index 98% rename from components/utils/mmheap/bflb_mmheap.h rename to components/mm/mmheap/mmheap.h index 874c4d6e..3585a27c 100644 --- a/components/utils/mmheap/bflb_mmheap.h +++ b/components/mm/mmheap/mmheap.h @@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ * under the License. * */ -#ifndef __BFLB_MMHEAP_H -#define __BFLB_MMHEAP_H +#ifndef __MM_MMHEAP_H +#define __MM_MMHEAP_H #include #include @@ -160,4 +160,4 @@ void bflb_mmheap_get_state(struct heap_info *pRoot, struct heap_state *pState); } #endif -#endif \ No newline at end of file +#endif diff --git a/components/tlsf/CMakeLists.txt b/components/mm/tlsf/CMakeLists.txt similarity index 81% rename from components/tlsf/CMakeLists.txt rename to components/mm/tlsf/CMakeLists.txt index 83b0e582..16e27aae 100644 --- a/components/tlsf/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/mm/tlsf/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -sdk_generate_library() sdk_library_add_sources(tlsf.c bflb_tlsf.c) sdk_add_include_directories(.) sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_TLSF) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/mm/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.c b/components/mm/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f79f25dc --- /dev/null +++ b/components/mm/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.c @@ -0,0 +1,463 @@ +/**************************************************************************** + * + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The + * ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the + * "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the + * License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the + * License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations + * under the License. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Included Files + ****************************************************************************/ + +#include "mem.h" +#include "tlsf.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_FREERTOS +#include "FreeRTOS.h" +#include "semphr.h" +#endif /* CONFIG_FREERTOS */ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Pre-processor Definitions + ****************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef CONFIG_FREERTOS + +#define _IRQ_CONTEXT() xPortIsInsideInterrupt() +#define _SCHED_LOCK() (taskSCHEDULER_RUNNING != xTaskGetSchedulerState()) +#define _ENTER_CRITICAL() portENTER_CRITICAL() +#define _EXIT_CRITICAL() portEXIT_CRITICAL() +#define _SEM_INIT(s, p, c) xSemaphoreCreateRecursiveMutexStatic(s) +#define _SEM_WAIT(s) xSemaphoreTakeRecursive((SemaphoreHandle_t)s, portMAX_DELAY) +#define _SEM_POST(s) xSemaphoreGiveRecursive((SemaphoreHandle_t)s) + +#else + +#include "bflb_irq.h" +static volatile uintptr_t s_irq_flag; +static volatile uintptr_t s_irq_entry; + +#define _GET_HOLDER(x) +#define _IRQ_CONTEXT() (0) +#define _ENTER_CRITICAL() \ + { \ + s_irq_flag = bflb_irq_save(); \ + s_irq_entry += 1; \ + } + +#define _EXIT_CRITICAL() \ + { \ + if (s_irq_entry > 0) { \ + s_irq_entry -= 1; \ + if (s_irq_entry == 0) { \ + bflb_irq_restore(s_irq_flag); \ + } \ + } \ + } + +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_FREERTOS +#define CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Function Prototypes + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* Adapted to the lock provided by the operating system */ +#ifdef CONFIG_FREERTOS +typedef StaticSemaphore_t sem_t; +typedef TaskHandle_t task_t; +#else + +#endif /* CONFIG_FREERTOS */ + + +struct mem_delaynode_s +{ + struct mem_delaynode_s *flink; +}; + +/* Private memory management structure */ +struct mem_heap_impl_s { + tlsf_t mem_tlsf; + void *heapstart; + size_t heapsize; + +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + sem_t sem; + + /* Free delay list, for some situation can't do free immdiately */ + struct mem_delaynode_s *mem_delaylist; +#endif +}; + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Data + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Private Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_sem_init + * + * Description: + * Initialize the MM mutex + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_sem_init(struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + /* Initialize the MM semaphore to one (to support one-at-a-time access to + * private data sets). + */ + + _SEM_INIT(&impl->sem, 0, 1); +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_sem_take + * + * Description: + * Take the MM mutex. This is the normal action before all memory + * management actions. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_sem_take(struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + if (!_SCHED_LOCK()) { + _SEM_WAIT(&impl->sem); + } else { + _ENTER_CRITICAL(); + } +#else + + _ENTER_CRITICAL(); + +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_sem_give + * + * Description: + * Release the MM mutex when it is not longer needed. + * + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_sem_give(struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + if (!_SCHED_LOCK()) { + _SEM_POST(&impl->sem); + } else { + _EXIT_CRITICAL(); + } + +#else + + _EXIT_CRITICAL(); + +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_add_delaylist + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_add_delaylist(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *mem) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + struct mem_delaynode_s *tmp = mem; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Delay the deallocation until a more appropriate time. */ + + _ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + tmp->flink = impl->mem_delaylist; + impl->mem_delaylist = tmp; + + _EXIT_CRITICAL(); +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: bflb_mem_free_delaylist + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void bflb_mem_free_delaylist(struct mem_heap_s *heap) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + struct mem_delaynode_s *tmp; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Move the delay list to local */ + + _ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + tmp = impl->mem_delaylist; + impl->mem_delaylist = NULL; + + _EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + /* Test if the delayed is empty */ + + while (tmp) { + void *address; + + /* Get the first delayed deallocation */ + + address = tmp; + tmp = tmp->flink; + + /* The address should always be non-NULL since that was checked in the + * 'while' condition above. + */ + + bflb_free(heap, address); + } +#endif /* CONFIG_MEM_USE_OS */ +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Name: mem_tlfsinfo_walker + ****************************************************************************/ + +static void mem_tlfsinfo_walker(void *ptr, size_t size, int used, + void *user) +{ + struct meminfo *info = user; + + if (!used) { + info->free_node++; + info->free_size += size; + if (size > info->max_free_size) { + info->max_free_size = size; + } + } +} + +/**************************************************************************** + * Functions + ****************************************************************************/ + +void bflb_mem_init(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *heapstart, size_t heapsize) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + + MEM_LOG("Heap: start=%p size=%zu\r\n", heapstart, heapsize); + + /* Reserve a block space for mem_heap_impl_s context */ + + MEM_ASSERT(heapsize > sizeof(struct mem_heap_impl_s)); + + heap->mem_impl = (struct mem_heap_impl_s *)heapstart; + + heapstart += sizeof(struct mem_heap_impl_s); + heapsize -= sizeof(struct mem_heap_impl_s); + + /* Zero implmeentation context */ + + impl = heap->mem_impl; + memset(impl, 0, sizeof(struct mem_heap_impl_s)); + + /* Allocate and create TLSF context */ + + MEM_ASSERT(heapsize > tlsf_size()); + + impl->mem_tlsf = tlsf_create(heapstart); + heapstart += tlsf_size(); + heapsize -= tlsf_size(); + + bflb_mem_sem_init(impl); + + impl->heapstart = heapstart; + impl->heapsize = heapsize; + + /* Add the initial region of memory to the heap */ + + tlsf_add_pool(impl->mem_tlsf, heapstart, heapsize); +} + +void *bflb_malloc(struct mem_heap_s *heap, size_t nbytes) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + void *ret = NULL; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + + MEM_LOG("malloc %d\r\n", nbytes); + + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Firstly, free mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_free_delaylist(heap); + + /* Allocate from the tlsf pool */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + ret = tlsf_malloc(heap->mem_impl->mem_tlsf, nbytes); + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); + + return ret; +} + +void bflb_free(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *ptr) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + + MEM_LOG("Freeing %p\r\n", ptr); + + /* Protect against attempts to free a NULL reference */ + + if (!ptr) { + return; + } + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + if (_IRQ_CONTEXT()) { + + /* We are in ISR, add to mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_add_delaylist(heap, ptr); + return; + } + + /* We need to hold the MM semaphore while we muck with the + * nodelist. + */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + + /* Return to the tlsf pool */ + + tlsf_free(heap->mem_impl->mem_tlsf, ptr); + + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); +} + +void *bflb_realloc(struct mem_heap_s *heap, void *ptr, size_t nbytes) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + void *ret; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Firstly, free mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_free_delaylist(heap); + + /* Allocate from the tlsf pool */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + + ret = tlsf_realloc(heap->mem_impl->mem_tlsf, ptr, nbytes); + + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); + + return ret; +} + +void *bflb_calloc(struct mem_heap_s *heap, size_t count, size_t size) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + void *ptr = NULL; + size_t total = count * size; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Firstly, free mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_free_delaylist(heap); + + /* Allocate from the tlsf pool */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + + if (count > 0 && size > 0) { + if (count <= (SIZE_MAX / size)) { + ptr = tlsf_malloc(heap->mem_impl->mem_tlsf, total); + if (ptr) { + memset(ptr, 0, total); + } + } + } + + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); + + return ptr; +} + +void *bflb_malloc_align(struct mem_heap_s *heap, size_t align, size_t size) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + void *ret; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + /* Firstly, free mm_delaylist */ + + bflb_mem_free_delaylist(heap); + + /* Allocate from the tlsf pool */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + + ret = tlsf_memalign(heap->mem_impl->mem_tlsf, align, size); + + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); + + return ret; +} + +void bflb_mem_usage(struct mem_heap_s *heap, struct meminfo *info) +{ + struct mem_heap_impl_s *impl; + + MEM_ASSERT(MEM_IS_VALID(heap)); + impl = heap->mem_impl; + + memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct meminfo)); + + /* Retake the semaphore for each region to reduce latencies */ + + bflb_mem_sem_take(impl); + tlsf_walk_pool(impl->heapstart, + mem_tlfsinfo_walker, info); + bflb_mem_sem_give(impl); + + info->total_size = impl->heapsize; + info->used_size = info->total_size - info->free_size; +} diff --git a/components/tlsf/tlsf.c b/components/mm/tlsf/tlsf.c similarity index 99% rename from components/tlsf/tlsf.c rename to components/mm/tlsf/tlsf.c index dfc0b851..fe309c25 100644 --- a/components/tlsf/tlsf.c +++ b/components/mm/tlsf/tlsf.c @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ enum tlsf_private #define tlsf_min(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b)) #define tlsf_max(a, b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b)) -#define tlsf_assert +#define tlsf_assert(s) /* ** Set assert macro, if it has not been provided by the user. */ diff --git a/components/tlsf/tlsf.h b/components/mm/tlsf/tlsf.h similarity index 100% rename from components/tlsf/tlsf.h rename to components/mm/tlsf/tlsf.h diff --git a/components/net/CMakeLists.txt b/components/net/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b8b281f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/net/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_LWIP lwip) diff --git a/components/net/lwip/CMakeLists.txt b/components/net/lwip/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dd6d14d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/net/lwip/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +add_subdirectory(lwip) +add_subdirectory(lwip_apps) + diff --git a/components/lwip/CHANGELOG b/components/net/lwip/lwip/CHANGELOG similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/CHANGELOG rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/CHANGELOG index 40610278..5f797e77 100644 --- a/components/lwip/CHANGELOG +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/CHANGELOG @@ -1,4548 +1,4548 @@ -HISTORY - * These are only the most important changes. For a full list, use git log: - http://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/lwip.git - -(git master) - - * [Enter new changes just after this line - do not remove this line] - -(STABLE-2.1.2): - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2018-11-21: Jens Nielsen - * netbiosns.c: fix expecting too large packet (bug #55069) - - 2018-11-19: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * smtp.c: fix compiling with strict C compatibility because of strnlen (bug #55034) - - 2018-11-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: fix overflow check in tcp_recved triggering invalid assertion (bug #55015) - - 2018-11-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: fix a bug in sending RST segments (sent from port 0) - -(STABLE-2.1.1): - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2018-11-01: Joan Lledó - * sockets.c: fix bad assertion in lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used() (bug #54933) - - 2018-11-01: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * ip4.c: don't send 127.* to default netif (bug #54670) - - 2018-10-23: David Girault - * altcp_tls_mbedtls.c: fix use-after free (bug #54774) - - 2018-10-23: Ognjen Bjelica, Dirk Ziegelmeier - * snmp_scalar.c: Avoid NULL pointer dereference (bug #54886) - - 2018-10-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * Fix missing standard includes in multiple files - - 2018-10-17: Ivan Warren - * def.h: fix casting htonX and ntohX to u16_t (bug #54850) - - 2018-10-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * Revert "tcp_abandon: no need to buffer pcb->local_port" (fix that source port was 0 for RST - called when aborting a connection) - - 2018-10-11: Jonas Rabenstein - * tcp.c: tcp_recved: check for overflow and warn about too big values (patch #9699) - - 2018-10-06: Joan Lledó - * sockets.c: alloc_socket(): Check for LWIP_SOCKET_POLL when setting select- - related variables (patch #9696) - - 2018-10-04: Spencer - * tcp.c: Update prev pointer when skipping entries in tcp_slowtmr (patch #9694) - - 2018-09-27: Martine Lenders - * lowpan6.c: Fix IEEE 802.15.4 address setting (bug #54749) - -(STABLE-2.1.0): - - ++ New features: - - 2018-06-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * lwiperf: implemented iPerf client mode - - 2018-04-23: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * added cmake build files - - 2018-03-04: Ray Abram - * netbios responder: respond to '*' queries - - 2018-02-23: Benjamin Aigner - * 6lowpan: add 6lowpan-over-BLE netif (based on existing 6lowpan netif) - - 2018-02-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * ipv6: add support for stateless DHCPv6 (to get DNS servers in SLAAC nets) - - 2018-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * add raw API http(s) client (with proxy support) - - 2018-02-01: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp: add hooks to implement additional socket options - - 2018-02-01: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp: add hooks to implement tcp md5 signatures or similar (see contrib/addons for an example) - - 2018-01-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * Added sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr() and tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback_fromisr() - These can be used to post preallocated messages from an ISR to the tcpip thread - (e.g. when using FreeRTOS) - - 2018-01-02: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * task #14780: Add debug helper asserts to ensure threading/locking requirements are met - - 2017-11-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * task #14600: tcp_alloc(): kill TF_CLOSEPEND connections before other ESTABLISHED - - 2017-11-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * makefsdata: added option "-ssi:" to control SSI tag checking/insertion - through a list of filenames, not by checking the file extension at runtime - - 2017-11-20: Joel Cunningham - * netconn: add LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE to use external DNS resolver (patch #9427) - - 2017-11-14: Joel Cunningham - * netifapi: Add thread safe ARP cache APIs (task #14724) - - 2017-11-06: Axel Lin - * TCP: kill existing connections with a LOWER priority than the one currently being opened. - Previous implementations also kill existing connections of the SAME priority. - - 2017-09-21: Kalle Olavi Niemitalo - * sockets: add poll() implementation (patch #9450) - - 2017-09-10: Joel Cunningham - * sockets: add readv() implementation (task #14610) - - 2017-08-04: Simon Goldschmidt - * Clean up DHCP a bit: no need keep msg_out and msg_in as members in struct - dhcp - they are used in a call stack only (p_out and options_out_len as well) - - 2017-08-04: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf: split pbuf_header(s16_t) into pbuf_add_header(size_t) and - pbuf_remove_header(size_t) - - 2017-07-20: Douglas - * sys: deprecate sys_arch_sem_wait and sys_arch_mbox_fetch returning the - time waited rather they are now defined to return != SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT - on success. - - 2017-07-03: Jakub Schmidtke - * tcp: added support for sending TCP SACKs - - 2017-06-20: Joel Cunningham - * netconn/netdb: added core locking support to netconn_gethostbyname (task #14523) - - 2017-04-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp: added two hooks for adding and parsing user defined DHCP options - - 2017-04-25: Joel Cunningham - * sockets: added recvmsg for UDP (together with CMSG and IP_PKTINFO) (task #14247) - - 2017-04-20: Joel Cunningham - * tcp: added Appropriate Byte Counting support (task #14128) - - 2017-04-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * netconn/sockets: remove fatal error handling, fix asynchronous error handling, - ensure data before RST can be received - - 2017-03-30: Simon Goldschmidt - * added "application layered TCP" connection API (altcp) for seamless integration - of TLS or proxy connections - - 2017-03-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets: add recvmsg for TCP - - 2017-03-02: Joel Cunningham - * netconn/sockets: vectorize netconn_write for TCP, treating a vectored I/O write - atomically in regards to TCP segmentation (patch #8882) - - 2017-03-02: Simon Goldschmidt - * netconn: added nonblocking accept/recv to netconn API (task #14396) - - 2017-02-28: Simon Goldschmidt - * Added LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF for small targets with only one netif - - 2017-02-10: David van Moolenbroek - * Implement UDP and RAW multicast support for IPv6 (core API, not netconn/sockets) - - 2017-02-04: David van Moolenbroek - * IPv6 scopes support - - 2017-01-20: Joel Cunningham - * sockets: add interface name/index APIs (task #14314) - - 2017-01-08: David van Moolenbroek - * Extensions to RAW API (patch #9208) - - Connected RAW PCBs - - Add raw_sendto_if_src() - - Support IP_HDRINCL socket option - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2018-06-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp: fix RTO timer not working if link is down - - 2018-06-15: Sylvain Rochet - * ppp: multiple smaller bugfixes - - 2018-05-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp: arp table can now be bigger than 127 entries - - 2018-04-25: Jens Nielsen - * tftp server: correctly handle retransmissions - - 2018-04-18: Simon Goldschmidt - sockets: fix race conditions when closing full-duplex sockets - - 2018-03-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * 6lowpan: fix to work against contiki; added ZigBee encapsulation netif for tests - - 2018-02-04: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets: fix inconsistencies on close (inconsistent error codes, double FIN) - - 2018-01-05: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Fix bug #52748: the bug in timeouts.c by reimplementing timer logic to use - absolute instead of relative timeout values - - 2017-12-31: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Fix bug #52704: DHCP and bad OFFER: Stop timeout only if offer is accepted - - 2017-11-08: Joel Cunningham - * netif: ensure link and admin states are up in issue reports (bug #52353) - - 2017-09-12: David Lockyer - * select: allocate select_cb from memp for LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE = 1 (bug #51990) - - 2017-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fix bug #51937 (leaking tcp_pcbs on passive close with unacked data) - - 2017-08-11: Joel Cunningham - * lwip_itoa: fix converting the number 0 (previously converted to '\0') (bug #51729) - - 2017-08-08: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * ip4_route_src: parameter order is reversed: ip4_route_src(dest, src) -> ip4_route_src(src, dest) - to make parameter order consistent with other ip*_route*() functions - Same also applies to LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC() parameter order. - - 2017-08-04: Joel Cunningham - * tcp: re-work persist timer to fully close window (details in bug #50837) - - 2017-07-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * snmp_msg.c: fix bug #51578 (SNMP failed to decode some values on non 32bit platforms) - - 2017-07-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * compatibility headers: moved from 'src/include/posix' to 'src/include/compat/posix', - 'src/include/compat/stdc' etc. - - 2017-05-09: Joel Cunningham - * tcp: add zero-window probe timeout (bug #50837) - - 2017-04-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: task #14420 (Remove sys_sem_signal from inside SYS_ARCH_PROTECT - crit section) done for LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 - - 2017-02-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed close race conditions in lwip_select (for LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX) - - 2017-02-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed that select ignored invalid/not open sockets in the fd_sets (bug #50392) - - 2017-01-11: David van Moolenbroek - * Lots of IPv6 related fixes and improvements - -(STABLE-2.0.3) - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2017-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fix bug #51937 (leaking tcp_pcbs on passive close with unacked data) - - 2017-08-02: Abroz Bizjak/Simon Goldschmidt - * multiple fixes in IPv4 reassembly (leading to corrupted datagrams received) - - 2017-03-30: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: return ERR_VAL instead of asserting on offset-out-of-pbuf - - 2017-03-23: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * dhcp.h: fix bug #50618 (dhcp_remove_struct() macro does not work) - -(STABLE-2.0.2) - - ++ New features: - - 2017-02-10: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Implement task #14367: Hooks need a better place to be defined: - We now have a #define for a header file name that is #included in every .c - file that provides hooks. - - 2017-02-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_close does not fail on memory error (instead, FIN is sent from tcp_tmr) - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2017-03-08 - * tcp: do not keep sending SYNs when getting ACKs - - 2017-03-08: Joel Cunningham - * tcp: Initialize ssthresh to TCP_SND_BUF (bug #50476) - - 2017-03-01: Simon Goldschmidt - * httpd: LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND: fixed double-free when httpd_post_data_recved - is called nested from httpd_post_receive_data() (bug #50424) - - 2017-02-28: David van Moolenbroek/Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp: fixed bug #50418: LWIP_EVENT_API: fix invalid calbacks for SYN_RCVD pcb - - 2017-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns: Improved DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST interface (bug #50325) - - 2017-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX: fixed shutdown during write (bug #50274) - - 2017-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt/Dirk Ziegelmeier - * For tiny targtes, LWIP_RAND is optional (fix compile time checks) - - 2017-02-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp: Fixed bug #47485 (tcp_close() should not fail on memory error) by retrying - to send FIN from tcp_fasttmr - - 2017-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets: Fixed bug #44032 (LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX: select might work on - invalid/reused socket) by not allowing to reallocate a socket that has - "select_waiting != 0" - - 2017-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * httpd: Fixed bug #50059 (httpd LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE vs. - LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED) - - 2017-02-08: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Rename "IPv6 mapped IPv4 addresses" to their correct name from RFC4191: - "IPv4-mapped IPv6 address" - - 2017-02-08: Luc Revardel - * mld6.c: Fix bug #50220 (mld6_leavegroup does not send ICMP6_TYPE_MLD, even - if last reporter) - - 2017-02-08: David van Moolenbroek - * ip6.c: Patch #9250: fix source substitution in ip6_output_if() - - 2017-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #50090 (last_unsent->oversize_left can become wrong value - in tcp_write error path) - - 2017-02-02: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Fix bug #50206: UDP Netconn bind to IP6_ADDR_ANY fails - - 2017-01-18: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Fix zero-copy RX, see bug bug #50064. PBUF_REFs were not supported as ARP requests. - - 2017-01-15: Axel Lin, Dirk Ziegelmeier - * minor bug fixes in mqtt - - 2017-01-11: Knut Andre Tidemann - * sockets/netconn: fix broken default ICMPv6 handling of checksums - -(STABLE-2.0.1) - - ++ New features: - - 2016-12-31: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h/.c: added function tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err() to get the error - reason when listening fails (bug #49861) - - 2016-12-20: Erik Andersen - * Add MQTT client - - 2016-12-14: Jan Breuer: - * opt.h, ndc.h/.c: add support for RDNSS option (as per RFC 6106) - - 2016-12-14: David van Moolenbroek - * opt.h, nd6.c: Added LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW() - - 2016-12-09: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * ip6_frag.c: Implemented support for LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - - 2016-12-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c: added one-shot multicast DNS queries - - 2016-11-24: Ambroz Bizjak, David van Moolenbroek - * tcp_out.c: Optimize passing contiguous nocopy buffers to tcp_write (bug #46290) - - 2016-11-16: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * sockets.c: added support for IPv6 mapped IPv4 addresses - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2016-12-16: Thomas Mueller - * api_lib.c: fixed race condition in return value of netconn_gethostbyname() - (and thus also lwip_gethostbyname/_r() and lwip_getaddrinfo()) - - 2016-12-15: David van Moolenbroek - * opt.h, tcp: added LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN() to implement less predictable initial - sequence numbers (see contrib/addons/tcp_isn for an example implementation) - - 2016-12-05: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * fixed compiling with IPv4 disabled (IPv6 only case) - - 2016-11-28: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c: fixed bug #49725 (send-timeout: netconn_write() can return - ERR_OK without all bytes being written) - - 2016-11-28: Ambroz Bizjak - * tcpi_in.c: fixed bug #49717 (window size in received SYN and SYN-ACK - assumed scaled) - - 2016-11-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #49676 (Possible endless loop when parsing dhcp options) - - 2016-11-23: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * udp.c: fixed bug #49662: multicast traffic is now only received on a UDP PCB - (and therefore on a UDP socket/netconn) when the PCB is bound to IP_ADDR_ANY - - 2016-11-16: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * *: Fixed dual-stack behaviour, IPv6 mapped IPv4 support in socket API - - 2016-11-14: Joel Cunningham - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #49533 (start persist timer when unsent seg can't fit - in window) - - 2016-11-16: Roberto Barbieri Carrera - * autoip.c: fixed bug #49610 (sometimes AutoIP fails to reuse the same address) - - 2016-11-11: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * sockets.c: fixed bug #49578 (dropping multicast membership does not work - with LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) - -(STABLE-2.0.0) - - ++ New features: - - 2016-07-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, timeouts.h/.c: added LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM to override the default - implementation of timeouts - - 2016-07-xx: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Large overhaul of doxygen documentation - - 2016-04-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * timers.h/.c: prepare for overriding current timeout implementation: all - stack-internal caclic timers are avaliable in the lwip_cyclic_timers array - - 2016-03-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp: call accept-callback with ERR_MEM when allocating a pcb fails on - passive open to inform the application about this error - ATTENTION: applications have to handle NULL pcb in accept callback! - - 2016-02-22: Ivan Delamer - * Initial 6LoWPAN support - - 2016-02-XX to 2016-03-XX: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Cleanup TCPIP thread sync methods in a way that it is possibe to use them - in arbitrary code that needs things to be done in TCPIP thread. Used to - decouple netconn, netif, ppp and 6LoWPAN from LWIP core. - - 2016-02-XX: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Implement dual-stack support in RAW, UDP and TCP. Add new IP address - type IPADDR_ANY_TYPE for this. Netconn/Socket API: Dual-stack is - automatically supported when an IPv6 netconn/socket is created. - - 2015-12-26: Martin Hentschel and Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Rewrite SNMP agent. SNMPv2c + MIB compiler. - - 2015-11-12: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Decouple SNMP stack from lwIP core and move stack to apps/ directory. - Breaking change: Users have to call snmp_init() now! - - 2015-11-12: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Implement possibility to declare private memory pools. This is useful to - decouple some apps from the core (SNMP stack) or make contrib app usage - simpler (httpserver_raw) - - 2015-10-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * started to move "private" header files containing implementation details to - "lwip/priv/" include directory to seperate the API from the implementation. - - 2015-10-07: Simon Goldschmidt - * added sntp client as first "supported" application layer protocol implementation - added 'apps' folder - - 2015-09-30: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * snmp_structs.h, mib_structs.c, mib2.c: snmp: fixed ugly inheritance - implementation by aggregating the "base class" (struct mib_node) in all - derived node classes to get more type-safe code - - 2015-09-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.h/.c, nd6.c: task #13729: Convert netif addresses (IPv4 & IPv6) to - ip_addr_t (so they can be used without conversion/temporary storage) - - 2015-09-08: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * snmp: Separate mib2 counter/table callbacks from snmp agent. This both cleans - up the code and should allow integration of a 3rd party agent/mib2. Simple - counters are kept in MIB2_STATS, tree/table change function prototypes moved to - snmp_mib2.h. - - 2015-09-03: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, dns.h/.c: DNS/IPv6: added support for AAAA records - - 2015-09-01: Simon Goldschmidt - * task #12178: hardware checksum capabilities can be configured per netif - (use NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL() in your netif's init function) - - 2015-08-30: Simon Goldschmidt - * PBUF_REF with "custom" pbufs is now supported for RX pbufs (see pcapif in - contrib for an example, LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF is required) - - 2015-08-30: Simon Goldschmidt - * support IPv4 source based routing: define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC to point - to a routing function - - 2015-08-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * many files: allow multicast socket options IP_MULTICAST_TTL, IP_MULTICAST_IF - and IP_MULTICAST_LOOP to be used without IGMP - - 2015-04-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.h/c, autoip.h/.c: added functions dhcp/autoip_supplied_address() to - check for the source of address assignment (replacement for NETIF_FLAG_DHCP) - - 2015-04-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * many files: task #13480: added LWIP_IPV4 define - IPv4 can be disabled, - leaving an IPv6-only stack - - 2015-04-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * nearly all files: task #12722 (improve IPv4/v6 address handling): renamed - ip_addr_t to ip4_addr_t, renamed ipX_addr_t to ip_addr_t and added IP - version; ip_addr_t is used for all generic IP addresses for the API, - ip(4/6)_addr_t are only used internally or when initializing netifs or when - calling version-related functions - - 2015-03-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, ip4_addr.h, ip4.c, ip6.c: loopif is not required for loopback traffic - any more but passed through any netif (ENABLE_LOOPBACK has to be enabled) - - 2015-03-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, etharp.c: with ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF== 1, duplicate (Auto)-IP - addresses on multiple netifs should now be working correctly (if correctly - addressed by routing, that is) - - 2015-03-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: Stable etharp entries that are about to expire are now refreshed - using unicast to prevent unnecessary broadcast. Only if no answer is received - after 15 seconds, broadcast is used. - - 2015-03-06: Philip Gladstone - * netif.h/.c: patch #8359 (Provide utility function to add an IPv6 address to - an interface) - - 2015-03-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c, ip4.c, dhcp.c, autoip.c: fixed bug #37068 (netif up/down handling - is unclear): correclty separated administrative status of a netif (up/down) - from 'valid address' status - ATTENTION: netif_set_up() now always has to be called, even when dhcp/autoip - is used! - - 2015-02-26: patch by TabascoEye - * netif.c, udp.h/.c: fixed bug #40753 (re-bind UDP pcbs on change of IP address) - - 2015-02-22: chrysn, Simon Goldschmidt - * *.*: Changed nearly all functions taking 'ip(X)_addr_t' pointer to take - const pointers (changed user callbacks: raw_recv_fn, udp_recv_fn; changed - port callbacks: netif_output_fn, netif_igmp_mac_filter_fn) - - 2015-02-19: Ivan Delamer - * netif.h, dhcp.c: Removed unused netif flag for DHCP. The preferred way to evaluate - if DHCP is active is through netif->dhcp field. - - 2015-02-19: Ivan Delamer - * netif.h, slipif.c, ppp.c: Removed unused netif flag for point to point connections - - 2015-02-18: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c: fixed bug #37958 "netconn API doesn't handle correctly - connections half-closed by peer" - - 2015-02-18: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: tcp_alloc() prefers killing CLOSING/LAST_ACK over active connections - (see bug #39565) - - 2015-02-16: Claudius Zingerli, Sergio Caprile - * opt.h, dhcp.h/.c: patch #8361 "Add support for NTP option in DHCP" - - 2015-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, snmp*: added support for write-access community and dedicated - community for sending traps - - 2015-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, memp.c: added hook LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE() to get informed when - a memp pool was empty and an item is now available - - 2015-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, pbuf.h/.c, etharp.c: Added the option PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN to - allocate additional header space for TX on netifs requiring additional headers - - 2015-02-12: chrysn - * timers.h/.c: introduce sys_timeouts_sleeptime (returns the time left before - the next timeout is due, for NO_SYS==1) - - 2015-02-11: Nick van Ijzendoorn - * opt.h, sockets.h/c: patch #7702 "Include ability to increase the socket number - with defined offset" - - 2015-02-11: Frederick Baksik - * opt.h, def.h, others: patch #8423 "arch/perf.h" should be made an optional item - - 2015-02-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c, opt.h: started to implement fullduplex sockets/netconns - (note that this is highly unstable yet!) - - 2015-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * api: allow enabling socket API without (public) netconn API - netconn API is - still used by sockets, but keeping it private (static) should allow better - compiler optimizations - - 2015-01-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #20506 "Initial congestion window is very small" again - by implementing the calculation formula from RFC3390 - - 2014-12-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * api: added option LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD to use a semaphore per thread - instead of using one per netconn and per select call - - 2014-12-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip6.h: fixed bug #43778: IPv6 header version not set on 16-bit platform - (macro IP6H_VTCFL_SET()) - - 2014-12-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * icmp.c, ip4.c, pbuf.c, udp.c, pbuf.h: task #11472 Support PBUF_REF for RX - (IPv6 and IPv4/v6 reassembly might not work yet) - - 2014-11-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c/.h, init.c: lwip_socket_init() is not needed any more - -> compatibility define - - 2014-09-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c, opt.h: reduced ram usage by parsing DNS responses in place - - 2014-09-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.h/.c: added pbuf_take_at() and pbuf_put_at() - - 2014-09-15: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c: added source port randomization to make the DNS client more robust - (see bug #43144) - - 2013-09-02: Simon Goldschmidt - * arch.h and many other files: added optional macros PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8() and - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S() to prevent gcc 4 from warning about struct members that - do not need packing - - 2013-08-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.h: bug #42998: made NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN overridable for some special - networks - - 2013-03-17: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Ghobad Emadi) - * opt.h, etharp.c: Added LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW to implement IPv4 routing with - multiple gateways - - 2013-04-20: Fatih Asici - * opt.h, etharp.h/.c: patch #7993: Added support for transmitting packets - with VLAN headers via hook function LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET and to check them - via hook function LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK - - 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt (based on patch by Artem Pisarenko) - * patch #7885: modification of api modules to support FreeRTOS-MPU - (don't pass stack-pointers to other threads) - - 2014-02-05: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by "xtian" and "alex_ab") - * patch #6537/#7858: TCP window scaling support - - 2014-01-17: Jiri Engelthaler - * icmp, icmp6, opt.h: patch #8027: Completed HW checksuming for IPv4 and - IPv6 ICMP's - - 2012-08-22: Sylvain Rochet - * New PPP stack for lwIP, developed in ppp-new branch. - Based from pppd 2.4.5, released 2009-11-17, with huge changes to match - code size and memory requirements for embedded devices, including: - - Gluing together the previous low-level PPP code in lwIP to pppd 2.4.5, which - is more or less what pppd sys-* files are, so that we get something working - using the unix port. - - Merged some patchs from lwIP Git repository which add interesting features - or fix bugs. - - Merged some patchs from Debian pppd package which add interesting features - or fix bugs. - - Ported PPP timeout handling to the lwIP timers system - - Disabled all the PPP code using filesystem access, replaced in necessary cases - to configuration variables. - - Disabled all the PPP code forking processes. - - Removed IPX support, lwIP does not support IPX. - - Ported and improved random module from the previous PPP port. - - Removed samba TDB (file-driven database) usage, because it needs a filesystem. - - MS-CHAP required a DES implementation, we added the latest PolarSSL DES - implementation which is under a BSD-ish license. - - Also switched to PolarSSL MD4,MD5,SHA1 implementations, which are meant to be - used in embedded devices with reduced memory footprint. - - Removed PPP configuration file parsing support. - - Added macro definition EAP_SUPPORT to make EAP support optional. - - Added macro definition CHAP_SUPPORT to make CHAP support optional. - - Added macro definition MSCHAP_SUPPORT to make MSCHAP support optional. - - Added macro definition PAP_SUPPORT to make PAP support optional. - - Cleared all Linux syscall calls. - - Disabled demand support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. - - Disabled ECP support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. - - Disabled CCP support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. - - Disabled CBCP support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. - - Disabled LQR support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. - - Print packet debug feature optional, through PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - - Removed POSIX signal usage. - - Fully ported PPPoS code from the previous port. - - Fully ported PPPoE code from the previous port. - - Fully ported VJ compression protocol code from the previous port. - - Removed all malloc()/free() use from PPP, replaced by stack usage or PBUF. - - Disabled PPP server support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. - - Switched all PPP debug to lwIP debug system. - - Created PPP Control Block (PPP PCB), removed PPP unit integer everywhere, - removed all global variables everywhere, did everything necessary for - the PPP stack to support more than one PPP session (pppd only support - one session per process). - - Removed the statically allocated output buffer, now using PBUF. - - Improved structure size of all PPP modules, deep analyze of code to reduce - variables size to the bare minimum. Switched all boolean type (char type in - most architecture) to compiler generated bitfields. - - Added PPP IPv6 support, glued lwIP IPv6 support to PPP. - - Now using a persistent netif interface which can then be used in lwIP - functions requiring a netif. - - Now initializing PPP in lwip_init() function. - - Reworked completely the PPP state machine, so that we don't end up in - anymore in inconsistent state, especially with PPPoE. - - Improved the way we handle PPP reconnection after disconnect, cleaning - everything required so that we start the PPP connection again from a - clean state. - - Added PPP holdoff support, allow the lwIP user to wait a little bit before - reconnecting, prevents connection flood, especially when using PPPoL2TP. - - Added PPPoL2TP LAC support (a.k.a. UDP tunnels), adding a VPN client - feature to lwIP, L2TP being a widely used tunnel protocol. - - Switched all used PPP types to lwIP types (u8t, u16t, u32t, ...) - - Added PPP API "sequential" thread-safe API, based from NETIFAPI. - - 2011-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c, opt.h: (bug #30185): added LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE that makes - ioctl/FIONREAD return the size of the next pending datagram. - - 2011-05-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * again nearly the whole stack, renamed ip.c to ip4.c, ip_addr.c to ip4_addr.c, - combined ipv4/ipv6 inet_chksum.c, added ip.h, ip_addr.h: Combined IPv4 - and IPv6 code where possible, added defines to access IPv4/IPv6 in non-IP - code so that the code is more readable. - - 2011-05-17: Patch by Ivan Delamer (only checked in by Simon Goldschmidt) - * nearly the whole stack: Finally, we got decent IPv6 support, big thanks to - Ivan! (this is work in progress: we're just post release anyway :-) - - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2016-08-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp: removed ETHARP_TRUST_IP_MAC since it is insecure and we don't need - it any more after implementing unicast ARP renewal towards arp entry timeout - - 2016-07-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * memp.h/.c: fixed bug #48442 (memp stats don't work for MEMP_MEM_MALLOC) - - 2016-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Ambroz Bizjak) - * tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: fixed bug #48543 (TCP sent callback may prematurely - report sent data when only part of a segment is acked) and don't include - SYN/FIN in snd_buf counter - - 2016-07-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: fixed bug #48477 (ARP input packet might update static entry) - - 2016-07-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #48476 (TCP sent callback called wrongly due to picking - up old pcb->acked - - 2016-06-30: Simon Goldschmidt (original patch by Fabian Koch) - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #48170 (Vulnerable to TCP RST spoofing) - - 2016-05-20: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * sntp.h/.c: Fix return value of sntp_getserver() call to return a pointer - - 2016-04-05: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Philip Gladstone) - * udp.c: patch #8358: allow more combinations of listening PCB for IPv6 - - 2016-04-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * netconn/socket API: fixed bug# 43739 (Accept not reporting errors about - aborted connections): netconn_accept() returns ERR_ABRT (sockets: ECONNABORTED) - for aborted connections, ERR_CLSD (sockets: EINVAL) if the listening netconn - is closed, which better seems to follow the standard. - - 2016-03-23: Florent Matignon - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #38203: DHCP options are not recorded in all DHCP ack messages - - 2016-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp: changed accept handling to be done internally: the application does not - have to call tcp_accepted() any more. Instead, when delaying accept (e.g. sockets - do), call tcp_backlog_delayed()/tcp_backlog_accepted() (fixes bug #46696) - - 2016-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c: ignore dns response parsing errors, only abort resolving for correct - responses or error responses from correct server (bug #47459) - - 2016-03-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: fixed bug #47448 (netconn/socket leak if RST is received during close) - - 2016-03-17: Joel Cunningham - * api_msg.c: don't fail closing a socket/netconn when failing to allocate the - FIN segment; blocking the calling thread for a while is better than risking - leaking a netconn/socket (see bug #46701) - - 2016-03-16: Joel Cunningham - * tcp_out.c: reset rto timer on fast retransmission - - 2016-03-16: Deomid Ryabkov - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #46384 Segment size calculation bug with MSS != TCP_MSS - - 2016-03-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * err.h/.c, sockets.c: ERR_IF is not necessarily a fatal error - - 2015-11-19: fix by Kerem Hadimli - * sockets.c: fixed bug #46471: lwip_accept() leaks socket descriptors if new - netconn was already closed because of peer behavior - - 2015-11-12: fix by Valery Ushakov - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #46365 tcp_accept_null() should call tcp_abort() - - 2015-10-02: Dirk Ziegelmeier/Simon Goldschmidt - * snmp: cleaned up snmp structs API (fixed race conditions from bug #46089, - reduce ram/rom usage of tables): incompatible change for private MIBs - - 2015-09-30: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip4_addr.c: fixed bug #46072: ip4addr_aton() does not check the number range - of all address parts - - 2015-08-28: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #44023: TCP ssthresh value is unclear: ssthresh - is set to the full send window for active open, too, and is updated once - after SYN to ensure the correct send window is used - - 2015-08-28: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp: fixed bug #45559: Window scaling casts u32_t to u16_t without checks - - 2015-08-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip6_frag.h/.c: fixed bug bug #41009: IPv6 reassembly broken on 64-bit platforms: - define IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER==1 on these platforms to copy the IPv6 header - instead of referencing it, which gives more room for struct ip6_reass_helper - - 2015-08-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed bug #45827: recvfrom: TCP window is updated with MSG_PEEK - - 2015-08-20: Manoj Kumar - * snmp_msg.h, msg_in.c: fixed bug #43790: Sending octet string of Length >255 - from SNMP agent - - 2015-08-19: Jens Nielsen - * icmp.c, ip4.c, tcp_in.c, udp.c, raw.c: fixed bug #45120: Broadcast & multiple - interfaces handling - - 2015-08-19: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by "Sandra") - * dns.c: fixed bug #45004: dns response without answer might be discarded - - 2015-08-18: Chrysn - * timers.c: patch #8704 fix sys_timeouts_sleeptime function - - 2015-07-01: Erik Ekman - * puf.c: fixed bug #45454 (pbuf_take_at() skips write and returns OK if offset - is at start of pbuf in chain) - - 2015-05-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.h/.c: fixed bugs #45140 and #45141 (dhcp was not stopped correctly after - fixing bug #38204) - - 2015-03-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Homyak) - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #44766 (LWIP_WND_SCALE: tcphdr->wnd was not scaled in - two places) - - 2015-03-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_impl.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #41318 (Bad memory ref in tcp_input() - after tcp_close()) - - 2015-03-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #38468 (tcp_sent() not called on half-open connection for - data ACKed with the same ack as FIN) - - 2015-03-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Christoffer Lind) - * dhcp.h/.c: fixed bug #38204 (DHCP lease time not handled correctly) - - 2015-03-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #38714 (Missing option and client address in DHCPRELEASE message) - - 2015-03-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, tcpip.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: fixed race conditions in assigning - netconn->last_err (fixed bugs #38121 and #37676) - - 2015-03-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip4.c: fixed the IPv4 part of bug #43904 (ip_route() must detect linkup status) - - 2015-03-04: Simon Goldschmidt - * nd6.c: fixed bug #43784 (a host should send at least one Router Solicitation) - - 2015-03-04: Valery Ushakov - * ip6.c: fixed bug #41094 (Byte-order bug in IPv6 fragmentation header test) - - 2015-03-04: Zach Smith - * nd6.c: fixed bug #38153 (nd6_input() byte order issues) - - 2015-02-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c, tcp.h/.c: fixed bug #44378 (TCP connections are not aborted on netif - remove) - - 2015-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip4.c, etharp.c: fixed bug #40177 (System hangs when dealing with corrupted - packets), implemented task #12357 (Ensure that malicious packets don't - assert-fail): improved some pbuf_header calls to not assert-fail. - - 2015-02-25: patch by Joel Cunningham - * udp.h/.c, sockets.c: fixed bug #43028 (IP_MULTICAST_TTL affects unicast - datagrams) - - 2015-02-25: patch by Greg Renda - * ip4_frag.c: fixed bug #38210 (ip reassembly while remove oldest datagram) - - 2015-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed bug #38165 (socket with mulicast): ensure igmp membership - are dropped when socket (not netconn!) is closed. - - 2015-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip4.h/.c, udp.c: fixed bug #38061 (wrong multicast routing in IPv4) by - adding an optional default netif for multicast routing - - 2015-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * netconn API: fixed that netconn_connect still used message passing for - LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 - - 2015-02-22: patch by Jens Nielsen - * icmp.c: fixed bug #38803 (Source address in broadcast ping reply) - - 2015-02-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.h, sockets.c: added proper accessor functions for pcb->multicast_ip - (previously used by get/setsockopt only) - - 2015-02-18: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Fixed select not reporting received FIN as 'readable' in certain - rare cases (bug #43779: select(), close(), and TCP retransmission error) - - 2015-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * err.h, sockets.c, api_msg.c: fixed bug #38853 "connect() use a wrong errno": - return ERR_ALREADY/EALRADY during connect, ERR_ISCONN/EISCONN when already - connected - - 2015-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_impl.h, tcp_out.c, tcp.c, api_msg.c: fixed bug #37614 "Errors from - ipX_output are not processed". Now tcp_output(_segment) checks for the return - value of ipX_output and does not try to send more on error. A netif driver - can call tcp_txnow() (from tcpip_thread!) to try to send again if TX buffers - are available again. - - 2015-02-14: patches by Freddie Chopin - * snmp*: made community writable, fixed some const pointers - - 2015-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * msg_in.c: fixed bug #22070 "MIB_OBJECT_WRITE_ONLY not implemented in SNMP" - - 2015-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.h, ip4.c, ip6.c: fixed bug #36403 "ip4_input() and ip6_input() always pass - inp to higher layers": now the accepting netif is passed up, but the input - netif is available through ip_current_input_netif() if required. - - 2015-02-11: patch by hichard - * tcpip.c: fixed bug #43094 "The function tcpip_input() forget to handle IPv6" - - 2015-02-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * netconn API: fixed that netconn_close/netconn_delete still used message passing - for LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 - - 2015-02-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * netconn/socket api: fixed bug #44225 "closing TCP socket should time out - eventually", implemented task #6930 "Implement SO_LINGER": closing TCP sockets - times out after 20 seconds or after the configured SND_TIMEOUT or depending - on the linger settings. - - 2015-01-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: fixed that SHUT_RD followed by SHUT_WR was different to SHUT_RDWR, - fixed return value of lwip_netconn_do_close on unconnected netconns - - 2015-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed bug #43361 select() crashes with stale FDs - - 2015-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c/.h, memp_std.h: fixed bug #40788 "lwip_setsockopt_internal() crashes" - by rewriting set/getsockopt functions to combine checks with the actual code - and add more NULL checks; this also fixes that CORE_LOCKING used message - passing for set/getsockopt. - - 2014-12-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, dhcp.h/.c: prevent dhcp from starting when netif link is down (only - when LWIP_DHCP_CHECK_LINK_UP==1, which is disabled by default for - compatibility reasons) - - 2014-12-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #43840 Checksum error for TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY==1 for - no-copy data with odd length - - 2014-12-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c, tcp.c, others: fixed bug #43797 set/getsockopt: SO_SNDTIMEO/SO_RCVTIMEO - take int as option but should take timeval (LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_STANDARD==0 can - be used to revert to the old 'winsock' style behaviour) - Fixed implementation of SO_ACCEPTCONN to just look at the pcb state - - 2014-12-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip4.c: fixed bug #43596 IGMP queries from 0.0.0.0 are discarded - - 2014-10-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Joel Cunningham and Albert Huitsing) - * sockts.c: fixed bugs #41495 Possible threading issue in select() and #43278 - event_callback() handle context switch when calling sys_sem_signal() - - 2014-10-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: fixed bug #38219 Assert on TCP netconn_write with sndtimeout set - - 2014-09-16: Kevin Cernekee - * dns.c: patch #8480 Fix handling of dns_seqno wraparound - - 2014-09-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #43192 tcp_enqueue_flags() should not check TCP_SND_QUEUELEN - when sending FIN - - 2014-09-03: Simon Goldschmidt - * msg_in.c: fixed bug #39355 SNMP Memory Leak in case of error - - 2014-09-02: Simon Goldschmidt - * err.h/.c, sockets.c, api_msg.c: fixed bug #43110 call getpeername() before - listen() will cause a error - - 2014-09-02: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed bug #42117 lwip_fcntl does not set errno - - 2014-09-02: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: fixed bug #42299 tcp_abort() leaves freed pcb on tcp_bound_pcbs list - - 2014-08-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c: fixed bug #42987 lwIP is vulnerable to DNS cache poisoning due to - non-randomized TXIDs - - 2014-06-03: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_impl.h, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #37969 SYN packet dropped as short packet in - tcp_input function - - 2014-05-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #37184 tcp_write problem for pcbs in the SYN_SENT state - - 2014-05-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * *.h: Fixed bug #35874 reserved identifier violation (removed leading underscores - from header include guards) - - 2014-04-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: Fixed bug #36167 tcp server crash when client closes (maximum window) - - 2014-04-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #36210 lwIP does not elicit an empty ACK when received - unacceptable ACK - - 2014-04-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c, ip4.c/.h, ip6.c/.h, udp.c/.h, ip.h: Fixed bug #41787 DHCP Discovery - is invalid when an IP is set to thet netif. - - 2014-03-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #36153 TCP Cheksum error if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY=1 - - 2014-03-11: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Mason) - * opt.h, sockets.c: fixed bug #35928 BSD sockets functions must set errno for - POSIX-compliance - - 2014-02-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #40303 DHCP xid renewed when sending a DHCPREQUEST - - 2014-02-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * raw.c: fixed bug #41680 raw socket can not receive IPv6 packet when - IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV==1 - - 2014-02-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c, sockets.c: fixed bug #38404 getpeeraddr returns success on - unconnected/listening TCP sockets - - 2014-02-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed bug #41729 Some socket functions return Exyz instead of -1 - - 2014-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip4.c: fixed bug #39514 ip_route() may return an IPv6-only interface - - 2014-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt, patch by Fatih Asici - * pbuf.c: fixed bug #39356 Wrong increment in pbuf_memfind() - - 2014-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c/.h, udp.c: fixed bug #39225 udp.c uses netif_matches_ip6_addr() incorrectly; - renamed function netif_matches_ip6_addr() to netif_get_ip6_addr_match() - - 2014-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * igmp.c: fixed bug #39145 IGMP membership report for 224.0.0.1 - - 2014-02-22: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Amir Shalem) - * etharp.c, opt.h: fixed bug #34681 Limit ARP queue length by ARP_QUEUE_LEN (=3) - - 2014-02-22: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Amir Shalem) - * etharp.h/.c: fixed bug #34682 Limit ARP request flood for unresolved entry - - 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #39683 Assertion "seg->tcphdr not aligned" failed with - MEM_ALIGNMENT = 8 - - 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed bug #39882 No function shall set errno to 0 - - 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * mib_structs.c: fixed bug #40050 SNMP problem with MIB arrays > 255 - - 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, sockets.c: fixed bug #41499 netconn::recv_avail can overflow - - 2014-01-08: Stathis Voukelatos - * memp_std.h: patch #7928 Fixed size calculation in MALLOC memory pool - creation macro - - 2014-01-18: Brian Fahs - * tcp_out.c: patch #8237: tcp_rexmit_rto fails to update pcb->unsent_oversize - when necessary - - 2014-01-17: Grant Erickson, Jay Logue, Simon Goldschmidt - * ipv6.c, netif.c: patch #7913 Enable Support for IPv6 Loopback - - 2014-01-16: Stathis Voukelatos - * netif.c: patch #7902 Fixed netif_poll() operation when LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS > 0 - - 2014-01-14: "Freddie Chopin" - * snmp.h, mib2.c: fixed constness and spelling of sysdescr - - 2014-01-14: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Thomas Faber) - * tcpip.c: patch #8241: Fix implicit declaration of ip_input with - LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT disabled - - 2014-01-14: chrysn - * timers.c: patch #8244 make timeouts usable reliably from outside of the - timeout routine - - 2014-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip_frag.c, ip6_frag.c: fixed bug #41041 Potential use-after-free in IPv6 reassembly - - 2014-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * memp.c: fixed bug #41188 Alignment error in memp_init() when MEMP_SEPARATE_POOLS==1 - - 2014-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: fixed bug #39898 tcp_fasttmr() possible lock due to infinte queue process loop - - 2013-06-29: Simon Goldschmidt - * inet.h, sockets.h: partially fixed bug #37585: IPv6 compatibility (in socket structs) - - 2013-06-29: Simon Goldschmidt - * inet6.h: bug #37585/task #12600: fixed struct in6_addr.s6_addr to conform to spec - - 2013-04-24: patch by Liam - * api_msg.c: patch #8008 Fix a potential null pointer dereference in assert - - 2013-04-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * igmp.c: fixed possible division by zero - - 2013-04-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip6.h, some ipv6 C files: fixed bug #38526 Coverity: Recursive Header Inclusion in ip6.h - - 2013-04-24: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Emil Ljungdahl): - * netif.c: fixed bug #38586 netif_loop_output() "deadlocks" - - 2013-01-15: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip4.c: fixed bug #37665 ip_canforward operates on address in wrong byte order - - 2013-01-15: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.h: fixed bug #38097 pbuf_free_ooseq() warning - - 2013-01-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c: fixed bug #37705 Possible memory corruption in DNS query - - 2013-01-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * raw.c: fixed bug #38066 Raw pcbs can alter packet without eating it - - 2012-08-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * memp.c: fixed bug #37166: memp_sanity check loops itself - - 2012-08-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #36645: Calling dhcp_release before dhcp_start - dereferences NULL - - 2012-08-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * msg_out.c: fixed bug #36840 snmp_send_trap() NULL de-reference if traps - configured but no interfaces available - - 2012-08-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c: fixed bug #36899 DNS TTL 0 is cached for a long time - - 2012-05-11: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Marty) - * memp.c: fixed bug #36412: memp.c does not compile when - MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK > zero and MEMP_SEPARATE_POOLS == 1 - - 2012-05-03: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Sylvain Rochet) - * ppp.c: fixed bug #36283 (PPP struct used on header size computation and - not packed) - - 2012-05-03: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by David Empson) - * ppp.c: fixed bug #36388 (PPP: checksum-only in last pbuf leads to pbuf with - zero length) - - 2012-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: Fixed bug #35817: do_connect() invalidly signals op_completed - for UDP/RAW with LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 - - 2012-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, netifapi.c: fixed bug #35931: Name space - pollution in api_msg.c and netifapi.c - - 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * inet6.h: fixed bug #34124 struct in6_addr does not conform to the standard - - - -(STABLE-1.4.1) - - ++ New features: - - 2012-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt (idea by Mason) - * posix/*: added posix-compatibility include files posix/netdb.h and posix/sys/socket.h - which are a simple wrapper to the correct lwIP include files. - - 2012-01-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, icmp.c: Added option CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP - - 2011-12-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.h: implemented API functions to access so_options of IP pcbs (UDP, TCP, RAW) - (fixes bug #35061) - - 2011-09-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: Implemented limiting data on ooseq queue (task #9989) - (define TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES / TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS in lwipopts.h) - - 2011-09-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h/.c, sockets.c: Implemented timeout on - send (TCP only, bug #33820) - - 2011-09-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * init.c: Converted runtime-sanity-checks into compile-time checks that can - be disabled (since runtime checks can often not be seen on embedded targets) - - 2011-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.h, ppp_impl.h: splitted ppp.h to an internal and external header file - to get a clear separation of which functions an application or port may use - (task #11281) - - 2011-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, tcp_impl.h, tcp.c, udp.h/.c: Added a config option to randomize - initial local TCP/UDP ports (so that different port ranges are used after - a reboot; bug #33818; this one added tcp_init/udp_init functions again) - - 2011-09-03: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: DHCP uses LWIP_RAND() for xid's (bug #30302) - - 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, netif.h/.c: added netif remove callback (bug #32397) - - 2011-07-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN: add support for an external VLAN filter - function instead of only checking for one VLAN (define ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN) - - 2011-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by hanhui) - * ip4.c, etharp.c, pbuf.h: bug #33634 ip_forward() have a faulty behaviour: - Added pbuf flags to mark incoming packets as link-layer broadcast/multicast. - Also added code to allow ip_forward() to forward non-broadcast packets to - the input netif (set IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF==1). - - 2011-06-26: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Cameron Gutman) - * tcp.c, tcp_out.c: bug #33604: added some more asserts to check that - pcb->state != LISTEN - - 2011-05-14: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Stéphane Lesage) - * tcpip.c/.h: patch #7449 allow tcpip callback from interrupt with static - memory message - - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2012-09-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: fixed bug #37405 'err_tcp()' uses already freed 'netconn' object - - 2012-09-26: patch by Henrik Persson - * dhcp.c: patch #7843 Fix corner case with dhcp timeouts - - 2012-09-26: patch by Henrik Persson - * dhcp.c: patch #7840 Segfault in dhcp_parse_reply if no end marker in dhcp packet - - 2012-08-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * memp.c: fixed bug #37166: memp_sanity check loops itself - - 2012-05-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug: #36380 unsent_oversize mismatch in 1.4.1RC1 (this was - a debug-check issue only) - - 2012-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * vj.c: fixed bug #35756 header length calculation problem in ppp/vj.c - - 2012-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Mason) - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #35945: SYN packet should provide the recv MSS not the - send MSS - - 2012-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip4.c: fixed bug #35927: missing refragmentaion in ip_forward - - 2012-03-20: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Mason) - * netdb.c: fixed bug #35907: lwip_gethostbyname_r returns an invalid h_addr_list - - 2012-03-12: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Bostjan Meglic) - * ppp.c: fixed bug #35809: PPP GetMask(): Compiler warning on big endian, - possible bug on little endian system - - 2012-02-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: fixed bug #35595: Impossible to send broadcast without a gateway - (introduced when fixing bug# 33551) - - 2012-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.c: fixed pbuf leak when PPP session is aborted through pppSigHUP() - (bug #35541: PPP Memory Leak) - - 2012-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: fixed bug #35531: Impossible to send multicast without a gateway - (introduced when fixing bug# 33551) - - 2012-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Stéphane Lesage) - * msg_in.c, msg_out.c: fixed bug #35536 SNMP: error too big response is malformed - - 2012-02-15: Simon Goldschmidt - * init.c: fixed bug #35537: MEMP_NUM_* sanity checks should be disabled with - MEMP_MEM_MALLOC==1 - - 2012-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: partly fixed bug #25882: TCP hangs on - MSS > pcb->snd_wnd (by not creating segments bigger than half the window) - - 2012-02-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: fixed bug #35435: No pcb state check before adding it to time-wait - queue while closing - - 2012-01-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #35305: pcb may be freed too early on shutdown(WR) - - 2012-01-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: fixed bug #34636: FIN_WAIT_2 - Incorrect shutdown of TCP pcb - - 2012-01-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #35151: DHCP asserts on incoming option lengths - - 2012-01-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.c: fixed bug #35291: NULL pointer in pbuf_copy - - 2011-11-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h/.c, tcp_impl.h, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #31177: tcp timers can corrupt - tcp_active_pcbs in some cases - - 2011-11-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * sys.c: fixed bug #34884: sys_msleep() body needs to be surrounded with - '#ifndef sys_msleep' - - 2011-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c, etharp.h/.c: fixed bug #34684: Clear the arp table cache when - netif is brought down - - 2011-10-28: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #34638: Dead code in tcp_receive - pcb->dupacks - - 2011-10-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c: fixed bug #34429: possible memory corruption with - LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT set to 1 - - 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt - * arch.h, netdb.c: fixed bug #34592: lwip_gethostbyname_r uses nonstandard - error value - - 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h: fixed default values of TCP_SNDLOWAT and TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT for small - windows (bug #34176 select after non-blocking send times out) - - 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_impl.h, tcp_out.c: fixed bug #34587: TCP_BUILD_MSS_OPTION doesn't - consider netif->mtu, causes slow network - - 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed bug #34581 missing parentheses in udplite sockets code - - 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.h: fixed bug #34580 fcntl() is missing in LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS - - 2011-10-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: fixed bug #34569: shutdown(SHUT_WR) crashes netconn/socket api - - 2011-10-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: fixed bug #34517 (persist timer is started although no - zero window is received) by starting the persist timer when a zero window is - received, not when we have more data queued for sending than fits into the - window - - 2011-10-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * def.h, timers.c: fixed bug #34541: LWIP_U32_DIFF is unnecessarily complex - - 2011-10-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c, api_lib.c: fixed bug #34540: compiler error when CORE_LOCKING is - used and not all protocols are enabled - - 2011-10-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.c: fixed bug #34534: Error in sending fragmented IP if MEM_ALIGNMENT > 4 - - 2011-10-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #34426: tcp_zero_window_probe() transmits incorrect - byte value when pcb->unacked != NULL - - 2011-10-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip4.c: fixed bug #34447 LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(dst_port) wrong - - 2011-09-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Reset pcb->unsent_oversize in 2 more places... - - 2011-09-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #28288: Data after FIN in oos queue - - 2011-09-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #34406 dhcp_option_hostname() can overflow the pbuf - - 2011-09-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.h: fixed bug #34377 MEM_SIZE_F is not defined if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC==1 - - 2011-09-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #33871: rejecting TCP_EVENT_RECV() for - the last packet including FIN can lose data - - 2011-09-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_impl.h: fixed bug #34355: nagle does not take snd_buf/snd_queuelen into - account - - 2011-09-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h: fixed default value of TCP_SND_BUF to not violate the sanity checks - in init.c - - 2011-09-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * timers.c: fixed bug #34337 (possible NULL pointer in sys_check_timeouts) - - 2011-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: use pcb->mss instead of TCP_MSS for preallocate mss-sized pbufs - (bug #34019) - - 2011-09-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.c: fixed bug #34072: UDP broadcast is received from wrong UDP pcb if - udp port matches - - 2011-09-03: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #33952 PUSH flag in incoming packet is lost when packet - is aggregated and sent to application - - 2011-09-01: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h: fixed bug #31809 LWIP_EVENT_API in opts.h is inconsistent compared - to other options - - 2011-09-01: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #34111 RST for ACK to listening pcb has wrong seqno - - 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c, sockets.c: fixed bug #33956 Wrong error returned when calling - accept() on UDP connections - - 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.h: fixed bug #34057 socklen_t should be a typedef - - 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.c: fixed bug #34112 Odd check in pbuf_alloced_custom (typo) - - 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #34122 dhcp: hostname can overflow - - 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c: fixed bug #34121 netif_add/netif_set_ipaddr fail on NULL ipaddr - - 2011-08-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #33962 TF_FIN not always set after FIN is sent. (This - merely prevents nagle from not transmitting fast after closing.) - - 2011-07-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, api.h: fixed bug #31084 (socket API returns - always EMSGSIZE on non-blocking sockets if data size > send buffers) -> now - lwip_send() sends as much as possible for non-blocking sockets - - 2011-07-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.c/.h, timers.c: freeing ooseq pbufs when the pbuf pool is empty implemented - for NO_SYS==1: when not using sys_check_timeouts(), call PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ() - at regular intervals from main level. - - 2011-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: fixed bug #33551 (ARP entries may time out although in use) by - sending an ARP request when an ARP entry is used in the last minute before - it would time out. - - 2011-07-04: Simon Goldschmidt - * sys_arch.txt: Fixed documentation after changing sys arch prototypes for 1.4.0. - - 2011-06-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: fixed bug #31723 (tcp_kill_prio() kills pcbs with the same prio) by - updating its documentation only. - - 2011-06-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c: fixed bug #33545: With MEM_USE_POOLS==1, mem_malloc can return an - unaligned pointer. - - 2011-06-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c: fixed bug #33544 "warning in mem.c in lwip 1.4.0 with NO_SYS=1" - - 2011-05-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: fixed bug #33398 (pointless conversion when checking TCP port range) - - - -(STABLE-1.4.0) - - ++ New features: - - 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_impl.h, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Removed 'dataptr' from 'struct tcp_seg' and - calculate it in tcp_zero_window_probe (the only place where it was used). - - 2010-11-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c/.h: Added a function to deallocate the struct dhcp from a netif - (fixes bug #31525). - - 2010-07-12: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Stephane Lesage) - * ip.c, udp.c/.h, pbuf.h, sockets.c: task #10495: Added support for - IP_MULTICAST_LOOP at socket- and raw-API level. - - 2010-06-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.c: Added an optional define (LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) that can allow - link-layer-addressed UDP traffic to be received while a netif is down (just - like DHCP during configuration) - - 2010-05-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * many many files: bug #27352: removed packing from ip_addr_t, the packed - version is now only used in protocol headers. Added global storage for - current src/dest IP address while in input functions. - - 2010-05-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * def.h: task #10391: Add preprocessor-macros for compile-time htonl - calculation (and use them throughout the stack where applicable) - - 2010-05-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, memp_std.h, memp.c, ppp_oe.h/.c: PPPoE now uses its own MEMP pool - instead of the heap (moved struct pppoe_softc from ppp_oe.c to ppp_oe.h) - - 2010-05-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, memp_std.h, dns.h/.c: DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC uses its own - MEMP pool instead of the heap - - 2010-05-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c, udp.c: task #6995: Implement SO_REUSEADDR (correctly), added - new option SO_REUSE_RXTOALL to pass received UDP broadcast/multicast - packets to more than one pcb. - - 2010-05-02: Simon Goldschmidt - * netbuf.h/.c, sockets.c, api_msg.c: use checksum-on-copy for sending - UDP data for LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF==1 - - 2010-04-30: Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.h/.c, pbuf.h/.c: task #6849: added udp_send(_to/_if) functions that - take a precalculated checksum, added pbuf_fill_chksum() to copy data - into a pbuf and at the same time calculating the checksum for that data - - 2010-04-29: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip_addr.h, etharp.h/.c, autoip.c: Create overridable macros for copying - 2-byte-aligned IP addresses and MAC addresses - - 2010-04-28: Patch by Bill Auerbach - * ip.c: Inline generating IP checksum to save a function call - - 2010-04-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcpip.h/.c, timers.c: Added an overridable define to get informed when the - tcpip_thread processes messages or timeouts to implement a watchdog. - - 2010-03-28: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip_frag.c: create a new (contiguous) PBUF_RAM for every outgoing - fragment if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF==1 - - 2010-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: Speedup TX by moving code from find_entry to etharp_output/ - etharp_query to prevent unnecessary function calls (inspired by - patch #7135). - - 2010-03-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, tcpip.c/.h: Added an option to disable tcpip_(un)timeout code - since the linker cannot do this automatically to save space. - - 2010-03-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, etharp.c/.h: Added support for static ARP table entries - - 2010-03-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_impl.h, tcp_out.c, inet_chksum.h/.c: task #6849: Calculate checksum - when creating TCP segments, not when (re-)transmitting them. - - 2010-03-07: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: bug #28775 (select/event_callback: only check select_cb_list - on change) plus use SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT to protect the select code. - This should speed up receiving data on sockets as the select code in - event_callback is only executed when select is waiting. - - 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: task #7013 (Create option to have all packets delivered to - netif->output in one piece): Always copy to try to create single pbufs - in tcp_write. - - 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, api_lib.c, sockets.c: task #10167 (sockets: speed up TCP recv - by not allocating a netbuf): added function netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf() - for tcp netconns to receive pbufs, not netbufs; use that function - for tcp sockets. - - 2010-03-05: Jakob Ole Stoklundsen / Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, tcp.h, tcp_impl.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: task #7040: - Work on tcp_enqueue: Don't waste memory when chaining segments, - added option TCP_OVERSIZE to prevent creating many small pbufs when - calling tcp_write with many small blocks of data. Instead, pbufs are - allocated larger than needed and the space is used for later calls to - tcp_write. - - 2010-02-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * stats.c/.h: Added const char* name to mem- and memp-stats for easier - debugging. - - 2010-02-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h (and usages), added tcp_impl.h: Splitted API and internal - implementation of tcp to make API usage cleare to application programmers - - 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt/Stephane Lesage - * ip_addr.h: Improved some defines working on ip addresses, added faster - macro to copy addresses that cannot be NULL - - 2010-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: task #7865 (implement non- - blocking send operation) - - 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c/.h: Added a minimal version of posix fctl() to have a - standardised way to set O_NONBLOCK for nonblocking sockets. - - 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c/.h, autoip.c/.h: task #10139 (Prefer statically allocated - memory): added autoip_set_struct() and dhcp_set_struct() to let autoip - and dhcp work with user-allocated structs instead of callin mem_malloc - - 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt/Jeff Barber - * tcp.c/h: patch #6865 (SO_REUSEADDR for TCP): if pcb.so_options has - SOF_REUSEADDR set, allow binding to endpoint in TIME_WAIT - - 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * sys layer: task #10139 (Prefer statically allocated memory): converted - mbox and semaphore functions to take pointers to sys_mbox_t/sys_sem_t; - converted sys_mbox_new/sys_sem_new to take pointers and return err_t; - task #7212: Add Mutex concept in sys_arch (define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX - to let sys.h use binary semaphores instead of mutexes - as before) - - 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt (Simon Kallweit) - * timers.c/.h: Added function sys_restart_timeouts() from patch #7085 - (Restart system timeout handling) - - 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c/.h, removed loopif.c/.h: task #10153 (Integrate loopif into - netif.c) - loopif does not have to be created by the port any more, - just define LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF to 1. - - 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * inet.h, ip_addr.c/.h: Added reentrant versions of inet_ntoa/ipaddr_ntoa - inet_ntoa_r/ipaddr_ntoa_r - - 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.h: Added netif_s/get_igmp_mac_filter() macros - - 2010-02-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.h: Added function-like macros to get/set the hostname on a netif - - 2010-02-04: Simon Goldschmidt - * nearly every file: Replaced struct ip_addr by typedef ip_addr_t to - make changing the actual implementation behind the typedef easier. - - 2010-02-01: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, memp_std.h, dns.h, netdb.c, memp.c: Let netdb use a memp pool - for allocating memory when getaddrinfo() is called. - - 2010-01-31: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.h, dhcp.c: Reworked the code that parses DHCP options: parse - them once instead of parsing for every option. This also removes - the need for mem_malloc from dhcp_recv and makes it possible to - correctly retrieve the BOOTP file. - - 2010-01-30: simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Use SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT instead of a semaphore to protect - the sockets array. - - 2010-01-29: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Laura Garrett) - * api.h, api_msg.c, sockets.c: Added except set support in select - (patch #6860) - - 2010-01-29: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Laura Garrett) - * api.h, sockets.h, err.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, err.c: - Add non-blocking support for connect (partly from patch #6860), - plus many cleanups in socket & netconn API. - - 2010-01-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, tcp.h, init.c, api_msg.c: Added TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT corresponding - to TCP_SNDLOWAT and added tcp_sndqueuelen() - this fixes bug #28605 - - 2010-01-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * snmp: Use memp pools for snmp instead of the heap; added 4 new pools. - - 2010-01-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.c/.h: Fixed bug #27856: PPP: Set netif link- and status-callback - by adding ppp_set_netif_statuscallback()/ppp_set_netif_linkcallback() - - 2010-01-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c: The heap now may be moved to user-defined memory by defining - LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER as a void pointer to that memory's address - (patch #6966 and bug #26133) - - 2010-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt (Bill Auerbach) - * opt.h, memp.c: patch #6822 (Add option to place memory pools in - separate arrays) - - 2010-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * init.c, igmp.c: patch #6463 (IGMP - Adding Random Delay): added define - LWIP_RAND() for lwip-wide randomization (to be defined in cc.h) - - 2009-12-31: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcpip.c, init.c, memp.c, sys.c, memp_std.h, sys.h, tcpip.h - added timers.c/.h: Separated timer implementation from semaphore/mbox - implementation, moved timer implementation to timers.c/.h, timers are - now only called from tcpip_thread or by explicitly checking them. - (TASK#7235) - - 2009-12-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, etharp.h/.c, init.c, tcpip.c: Added an additional option - LWIP_ETHERNET to support ethernet without ARP (necessary for pure PPPoE) - - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2011-04-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * sys_arch.txt: sys_arch_timeouts() is not needed any more. - - 2011-04-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c, udp.c: Fixed bug #33048 (Bad range for IP source port numbers) by - using ports in the IANA private/dynamic range (49152 through 65535). - - 2011-03-29: Simon Goldschmidt, patch by Emil Lhungdahl: - * etharp.h/.c: Fixed broken VLAN support. - - 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: Fixed bug #32926 (TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs) is called on unbound tcp - pcbs) by checking if the pcb was bound (local_port != 0). - - 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.c: Fixed bug #32280 (ppp: a pbuf is freed twice) - - 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Fixed bug #32906: lwip_connect+lwip_send did not work for udp and - raw pcbs with LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1. - - 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #32820 (Outgoing TCP connections created before route - is present never times out) by starting retransmission timer before checking - route. - - 2011-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.c: Fixed bug #32648 (PPP code crashes when terminating a link) by only - calling sio_read_abort() if the file descriptor is valid. - - 2011-03-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * err.h/.c, sockets.c, api_msg.c: fixed bug #31748 (Calling non-blocking connect - more than once can render a socket useless) since it mainly involves changing - "FATAL" classification of error codes: ERR_USE and ERR_ISCONN just aren't fatal. - - 2011-03-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed bug #32769 (ESHUTDOWN is linux-specific) by fixing - err_to_errno_table (ERR_CLSD: ENOTCONN instead of ESHUTDOWN), ERR_ISCONN: - use EALRADY instead of -1 - - 2011-03-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c: netconn_accept: return ERR_ABRT instead of ERR_CLSD if the - connection has been aborted by err_tcp (since this is not a normal closing - procedure). - - 2011-03-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: tcp_bind: return ERR_VAL instead of ERR_ISCONN when trying to bind - with pcb->state != CLOSED - - 2011-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * rawapi.txt: Fixed bug #32561 tcp_poll argument definition out-of-order in - documentation - - 2011-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * many files: Added missing U/UL modifiers to fix 16-bit-arch portability. - - 2011-01-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Fixed bug #31741: lwip_select seems to have threading problems - - 2010-12-02: Simon Goldschmidt - * err.h: Fixed ERR_IS_FATAL so that ERR_WOULDBLOCK is not fatal. - - 2010-11-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: netconn.recv_avail is only used for - LWIP_SO_RCVBUF and ioctl/FIONREAD. - - 2010-11-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: Fixed bug #31720: ARP-queueing: RFC 1122 recommends to queue at - least 1 packet -> ARP_QUEUEING==0 now queues the most recent packet. - - 2010-11-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #30577: tcp_input: don't discard ACK-only packets after - refusing 'refused_data' again. - - 2010-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Fixed bug #31590: getsockopt(... SO_ERROR ...) gives EINPROGRESS - after a successful nonblocking connection. - - 2010-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: Fixed bug #31722: IP packets sent with an AutoIP source addr - must be sent link-local - - 2010-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * timers.c: patch #7329: tcp_timer_needed prototype was ifdef'ed out for - LWIP_TIMERS==0 - - 2010-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Fixed bug #31170: lwip_setsockopt() does not set socket number - - 2010-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.h: Fixed bug #31304: Changed SHUT_RD, SHUT_WR and SHUT_RDWR to - resemble other stacks. - - 2010-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c: Fixed bug #31535: TCP_SND_QUEUELEN must be at least 2 or else - no-copy TCP writes will never succeed. - - 2010-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c: Fixed bug #31701: Error return value from dns_gethostbyname() does - not match documentation: return ERR_ARG instead of ERR_VAL if not - initialized or wrong argument. - - 2010-10-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.h: Fixed bug #31385: sizeof(struct sockaddr) is 30 but should be 16 - - 2010-10-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: Once again fixed #30038: DHCP/AutoIP cooperation failed when - replugging the network cable after an AutoIP address was assigned. - - 2010-08-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: Fixed bug #30728: tcp_new_port() did not check listen pcbs - - 2010-08-03: Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.c, raw.c: Don't chain empty pbufs when sending them (fixes bug #30625) - - 2010-08-01: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Greg Renda) - * ppp.c: Applied patch #7264 (PPP protocols are rejected incorrectly on big - endian architectures) - - 2010-07-28: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, mib2.c: Fixed compilation with TCP or UDP - disabled. - - 2010-07-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: Fixed bug #30565 (tcp_connect() check bound list): that check did no - harm but never did anything - - 2010-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.c: Fixed invalid fix for bug #30402 (CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE does not - add IP options) - - 2010-07-16: Kieran Mansley - * msg_in.c: Fixed SNMP ASN constant defines to not use ! operator - - 2010-07-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.c: Fixed bug #30402: CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE does not add IP options - - 2010-06-30: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: fixed bug #30300 (shutdown parameter was not initialized in - netconn_delete) - - 2010-06-28: Kieran Mansley - * timers.c remove unportable printing of C function pointers - - 2010-06-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * init.c, timers.c/.h, opt.h, memp_std.h: From patch #7221: added flag - NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS to drop timer support for NO_SYS==1 for easier upgrading - - 2010-06-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * api(_lib).c/.h, api_msg.c/.h, sockets.c/.h: Fixed bug #10088: Correctly - implemented shutdown at socket level. - - 2010-06-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.c/.h, ip_frag.c/.h, opt.h, memp_std.h: Fixed bug #29361 (ip_frag has - problems with zero-copy DMA MACs) by adding custom pbufs and implementing - custom pbufs that reference other (original) pbufs. Additionally set - IP_FRAG_USES_STATIC_BUF=0 as default to be on the safe side. - - 2010-06-15: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: Fixed bug #29970: DHCP endian issue parsing option responses - - 2010-06-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * autoip.c: Fixed bug #30039: AutoIP does not reuse previous addresses - - 2010-06-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: Fixed bug #30038: dhcp_network_changed doesn't reset AUTOIP coop - state - - 2010-05-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * netdb.c: Correctly NULL-terminate h_addr_list - - 2010-05-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * def.h/.c: changed the semantics of LWIP_PREFIX_BYTEORDER_FUNCS to prevent - "symbol already defined" i.e. when linking to winsock - - 2010-05-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * def.h, timers.c: Fixed bug #29769 (sys_check_timeouts: sys_now() may - overflow) - - 2010-04-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: Fixed bug #29617 (sometime cause stall on delete listening - connection) - - 2010-03-28: Luca Ceresoli - * ip_addr.c/.h: patch #7143: Add a few missing const qualifiers - - 2010-03-27: Luca Ceresoli - * mib2.c: patch #7130: remove meaningless const qualifiers - - 2010-03-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: Make LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF work for TCP, too - - 2010-03-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * various files: Fixed compiling with different options disabled (TCP/UDP), - triggered by bug #29345; don't allocate acceptmbox if LWIP_TCP is disabled - - 2010-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Fixed bug #29332: lwip_select() processes readset incorrectly - - 2010-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c, test_tcp_oos.c: Fixed bug #29080: Correctly handle remote side - overrunning our rcv_wnd in ooseq case. - - 2010-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: tcp_listen() did not copy the pcb's prio. - - 2010-03-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * snmp_msg.c: Fixed bug #29256: SNMP Trap address was not correctly set - - 2010-03-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, etharp.h: Fixed bug #29148 (Incorrect PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE for ports - where ETH_PAD_SIZE > 0) by moving definition of ETH_PAD_SIZE to opt.h - and basing PBUF_LINK_HLEN on it. - - 2010-03-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c, ipv4/ip.c: task #10241 (AutoIP: don't break existing connections - when assiging routable address): when checking incoming packets and - aborting existing connection on address change, filter out link-local - addresses. - - 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Fixed LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF for LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - - 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * ipv4/ip.c: Don't try to forward link-local addresses - - 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: Fixed bug #29087: etharp: don't send packets for LinkLocal- - addresses to gw - - 2010-03-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: Fixed bug #29072: Correctly set ciaddr based on message-type - and state. - - 2010-03-05: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: Correctly set TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE when netconn_write is split - into multiple calls to tcp_write. - - 2010-02-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, mem.h, dns.c: task #10140: Remove DNS_USES_STATIC_BUF (keep - the implementation of DNS_USES_STATIC_BUF==1) - - 2010-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Task #10088: Correctly implement - close() vs. shutdown(). Now the application does not get any more - recv callbacks after calling tcp_close(). Added tcp_shutdown(). - - 2010-02-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c/.h, pbuf.c: Renamed mem_realloc() to mem_trim() to prevent - confusion with realloc() - - 2010-02-15: Simon Goldschmidt/Stephane Lesage - * netif.c/.h: Link status does not depend on LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK - (fixes bug #28899) - - 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c: Fixed bug #28877 (Duplicate ARP gratuitous packet with - LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK set on) by only sending if both link- and - admin-status of a netif are up - - 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h: Disable ETHARP_TRUST_IP_MAC by default since it slows down packet - reception and is not really necessary - - 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c/.h: Fixed ARP input processing: only add a new entry if a - request was directed as us (RFC 826, Packet Reception), otherwise - only update existing entries; internalized some functions - - 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.h, etharp.c, tcpip.c: Fixed bug #28183 (ARP and TCP/IP cannot be - disabled on netif used for PPPoE) by adding a new netif flag - (NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET) that tells the stack the device is an ethernet - device but prevents usage of ARP (so that ethernet_input can be used - for PPPoE). - - 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c: netif_set_link_up/down: only do something if the link state - actually changes - - 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt/Stephane Lesage - * api_msg.c: Fixed bug #28865 (Cannot close socket/netconn in non-blocking - connect) - - 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.h: Fixed bug #28866 (mem_realloc function defined in mem.h) - - 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, api.h, api_msg.h: Fixed bug #22110 - (recv() makes receive window update for data that wasn't received by - application) - - 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt/Stephane Lesage - * sockets.c: Fixed bug #28853 (lwip_recvfrom() returns 0 on receive time-out - or any netconn_recv() error) - - 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.c: task #10154 (PPP: Update snmp in/out counters for tx/rx packets) - - 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c: For loopback packets, adjust the stats- and snmp-counters - for the loopback netif. - - 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * igmp.c/.h, ip.h: Moved most defines from igmp.h to igmp.c for clarity - since they are not used anywhere else. - - 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt (Stéphane Lesage) - * igmp.c, igmp.h, stats.c, stats.h: Improved IGMP stats - (patch from bug #28798) - - 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt (Stéphane Lesage) - * igmp.c: Fixed bug #28798 (Error in "Max Response Time" processing) and - another bug when LWIP_RAND() returns zero. - - 2010-02-04: Simon Goldschmidt - * nearly every file: Use macros defined in ip_addr.h (some of them new) - to work with IP addresses (preparation for bug #27352 - Change ip_addr - from struct to typedef (u32_t) - and better code). - - 2010-01-31: Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c: Don't call the link-callback from netif_set_up/down() since - this invalidly retriggers DHCP. - - 2010-01-29: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip_addr.h, inet.h, def.h, inet.c, def.c, more: Cleanly separate the - portability file inet.h and its contents from the stack: moved htonX- - functions to def.h (and the new def.c - they are not ipv4 dependent), - let inet.h depend on ip_addr.h and not the other way round. - This fixes bug #28732. - - 2010-01-28: Kieran Mansley - * tcp.c: Ensure ssthresh >= 2*MSS - - 2010-01-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #27871: Calling tcp_abort() in recv - callback can lead to accessing unallocated memory. As a consequence, - ERR_ABRT means the application has called tcp_abort()! - - 2010-01-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * snmp_structs.h, msg_in.c: Partly fixed bug #22070 (MIB_OBJECT_WRITE_ONLY - not implemented in SNMP): write-only or not-accessible are still - returned by getnext (though not by get) - - 2010-01-24: Simon Goldschmidt - * snmp: Renamed the private mib node from 'private' to 'mib_private' to - not use reserved C/C++ keywords - - 2010-01-23: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Fixed bug #28716: select() returns 0 after waiting for less - than 1 ms - - 2010-01-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c, api_msg.c: Fixed bug #28651 (tcp_connect: no callbacks called - if tcp_enqueue fails) both in raw- and netconn-API - - 2010-01-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: Fixed bug #27316: netconn: Possible deadlock in err_tcp - - 2010-01-18: Iordan Neshev/Simon Goldschmidt - * src/netif/ppp: reorganised PPP sourcecode to 2.3.11 including some - bugfix backports from 2.4.x. - - 2010-01-18: Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c: Fixed bug #28679: mem_realloc calculates mem_stats wrong - - 2010-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, (api_msg.h, api.h, sockets.c, tcpip.c): - task #10102: "netconn: clean up conn->err threading issues" by adding - error return value to struct api_msg_msg - - 2010-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, api_lib.c, sockets.c: Changed netconn_recv() and netconn_accept() - to return err_t (bugs #27709 and #28087) - - 2010-01-14: Simon Goldschmidt - * ...: Use typedef for function prototypes throughout the stack. - - 2010-01-13: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.h/.c, api_lib.c: Fixed bug #26672 (close connection when receive - window = 0) by correctly draining recvmbox/acceptmbox - - 2010-01-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * pap.c: Fixed bug #13315 (PPP PAP authentication can result in - erroneous callbacks) by copying the code from recent pppd - - 2010-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * raw.c: Fixed bug #28506 (raw_bind should filter received packets) - - 2010-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h/.c: bug #28127 (remove call to tcp_output() from tcp_ack(_now)()) - - 2010-01-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Fixed bug #28519 (lwip_recvfrom bug with len > 65535) - - 2010-01-08: Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c: Copy hostname for DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC==1 since string - passed to dns_local_addhost() might be volatile - - 2010-01-07: Simon Goldschmidt - * timers.c, tcp.h: Call tcp_timer_needed() with NO_SYS==1, too - - 2010-01-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * netdb.h: Fixed bug #28496: missing include guards in netdb.h - - 2009-12-31: Simon Goldschmidt - * many ppp files: Reorganised PPP source code from ucip structure to pppd - structure to easily compare our code against the pppd code (around v2.3.1) - - 2009-12-27: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Another fix for bug #28241 (ooseq processing) and adapted - unit test - - -(STABLE-1.3.2) - - ++ New features: - - 2009-10-27 Simon Goldschmidt/Stephan Lesage - * netifapi.c/.h: Added netifapi_netif_set_addr() - - 2009-10-07 Simon Goldschmidt/Fabian Koch - * api_msg.c, netbuf.c/.h, opt.h: patch #6888: Patch for UDP Netbufs to - support dest-addr and dest-port (optional: LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO) - - 2009-08-26 Simon Goldschmidt/Simon Kallweit - * slipif.c/.h: bug #26397: SLIP polling support - - 2009-08-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, etharp.h/.c: task #9033: Support IEEE 802.1q tagged frame (VLAN), - New configuration options ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN and ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK. - - 2009-08-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip_addr.h, netdb.c: patch #6900: added define ip_ntoa(struct ip_addr*) - - 2009-08-24 Jakob Stoklund Olesen - * autoip.c, dhcp.c, netif.c: patch #6725: Teach AutoIP and DHCP to respond - to netif_set_link_up(). - - 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h/.c: Added function tcp_debug_state_str() to convert a tcp state - to a human-readable string. - - ++ Bugfixes: - - 2009-12-24: Kieran Mansley - * tcp_in.c Apply patches from Oleg Tyshev to improve OOS processing - (BUG#28241) - - 2009-12-06: Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.h/.c: Fixed bug #27079 (Yet another leak in PPP): outpacket_buf can - be statically allocated (like in ucip) - - 2009-12-04: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Ioardan Neshev) - * pap.c: patch #6969: PPP: missing PAP authentication UNTIMEOUT - - 2009-12-03: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #28106: dup ack for fast retransmit - could have non-zero length - - 2009-12-02: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #27904: TCP sends too many ACKs: delay resetting - tcp_input_pcb until after calling the pcb's callbacks - - 2009-11-29: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #28054: Two segments with FIN flag on the out-of- - sequence queue, also fixed PBUF_POOL leak in the out-of-sequence code - - 2009-11-29: Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.c: Fixed bug #28064: pbuf_alloc(PBUF_POOL) is not thread-safe by - queueing a call into tcpip_thread to free ooseq-bufs if the pool is empty - - 2009-11-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h: Fixed bug #28098: Nagle can prevent fast retransmit from sending - segment - - 2009-11-26: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, sockets.c: Fixed bug #28099: API required to disable Nagle - algorithm at PCB level - - 2009-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #27905: FIN isn't combined with data on unsent - - 2009-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt (suggested by Bill Auerbach) - * tcp.c: tcp_alloc: prevent increasing stats.err for MEMP_TCP_PCB when - reusing time-wait pcb - - 2009-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Albert Bartel) - * sockets.c: Fixed bug #28062: Data received directly after accepting - does not wake up select - - 2009-11-11: Simon Goldschmidt - * netdb.h: Fixed bug #27994: incorrect define for freeaddrinfo(addrinfo) - - 2009-10-30: Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h: Increased default value for TCP_MSS to 536, updated default - value for TCP_WND to 4*TCP_MSS to keep delayed ACK working. - - 2009-10-28: Kieran Mansley - * tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: re-work the fast retransmission code - to follow algorithm from TCP/IP Illustrated - - 2009-10-27: Kieran Mansley - * tcp_in.c: fix BUG#27445: grow cwnd with every duplicate ACK - - 2009-10-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h: bug-fix in the TCP_EVENT_RECV macro (has to call tcp_recved if - pcb->recv is NULL to keep rcv_wnd correct) - - 2009-10-25: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #26251: RST process in TIME_WAIT TCP state - - 2009-10-23: Simon Goldschmidt (David Empson) - * tcp.c: Fixed bug #27783: Silly window avoidance for small window sizes - - 2009-10-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #27215: TCP sent() callback gives leading and - trailing 1 byte len (SYN/FIN) - - 2009-10-21: Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #27315: zero window probe and FIN - - 2009-10-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c/.h: Minor code simplification (don't store received pbuf, change - conditional code to assert where applicable), check pbuf length before - testing for valid reply - - 2009-10-19: Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: Removed most calls to udp_connect since they aren't necessary - when using udp_sendto_if() - always stay connected to IP_ADDR_ANY. - - 2009-10-16: Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.c: Fixed bug #27390: Source IP check in ip_input() causes it to drop - valid DHCP packets -> allow 0.0.0.0 as source address when LWIP_DHCP is - enabled - - 2009-10-15: Simon Goldschmidt (Oleg Tyshev) - * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #27329: dupacks by unidirectional data transmit - - 2009-10-15: Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c: Fixed bug #27709: conn->err race condition on netconn_recv() - timeout - - 2009-10-15: Simon Goldschmidt - * autoip.c: Fixed bug #27704: autoip starts with wrong address - LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR() returned address in host byte order instead - of network byte order - - 2009-10-11 Simon Goldschmidt (Jörg Kesten) - * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #27504: tcp_enqueue wrongly concatenates segments - which are not consecutive when retransmitting unacked segments - - 2009-10-09 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h: Fixed default values of some stats to only be enabled if used - Fixes bug #27338: sys_stats is defined when NO_SYS = 1 - - 2009-08-30 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.c: Fixed bug bug #27345: "ip_frag() does not use the LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK - function" by checking for loopback before calling ip_frag - - 2009-08-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed invalid dependency to etharp_query if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK==0 - - 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.c: bug #27078: Possible memory leak in pppInit() - - 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt - * netdb.c, dns.c: bug #26657: DNS, if host name is "localhost", result - is error. - - 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, init.c: bug #26649: TCP fails when TCP_MSS > TCP_SND_BUF - Fixed wrong parenthesis, added check in init.c - - 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.c: bug #27266: wait-state debug message in pppMain occurs every ms - - 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt - * many ppp files: bug #27267: Added include to string.h where needed - - 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h: patch #6843: tcp.h macro optimization patch (for little endian) - - -(STABLE-1.3.1) - - ++ New features: - - 2009-05-10 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, sockets.c, pbuf.c, netbuf.h, pbuf.h: task #7013: Added option - LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF to try to create transmit packets from only - one pbuf to help MACs that don't support scatter-gather DMA. - - 2009-05-09 Simon Goldschmidt - * icmp.h, icmp.c: Shrinked ICMP code, added option to NOT check icoming - ECHO pbuf for size (just use it): LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN - - 2009-05-05 Simon Goldschmidt, Jakob Stoklund Olesen - * ip.h, ip.c: Added ip_current_netif() & ip_current_header() to receive - extended info about the currently received packet. - - 2009-04-27 Simon Goldschmidt - * sys.h: Made SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT and sys_now() work with NO_SYS=1 - - 2009-04-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c, opt.h: Added option MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL to try the next - bigger malloc pool if one is empty (only usable with MEM_USE_POOLS). - - 2009-04-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * dns.c, init.c, dns.h, opt.h: task #7507, patch #6786: DNS supports static - hosts table. New configuration options DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST and - DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC. Also, DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN() can be defined - as an external function for lookup. - - 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: patch #6763: Global DHCP XID can be redefined to something more unique - - 2009-03-31 Kieran Mansley - * tcp.c, tcp_out.c, tcp_in.c, sys.h, tcp.h, opts.h: add support for - TCP timestamp options, off by default. Rework tcp_enqueue() to - take option flags rather than specified option data - - 2009-02-18 Simon Goldschmidt - * cc.h: Added printf formatter for size_t: SZT_F - - 2009-02-16 Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Rishi Khan) - * icmp.c, opt.h: patch #6539: (configurable) response to broadcast- and multicast - pings - - 2009-02-12 Simon Goldschmidt - * init.h: Added LWIP_VERSION to get the current version of the stack - - 2009-02-11 Simon Goldschmidt (suggested by Gottfried Spitaler) - * opt.h, memp.h/.c: added MEMP_MEM_MALLOC to use mem_malloc/mem_free instead - of the pool allocator (can save code size with MEM_LIBC_MALLOC if libc-malloc - is otherwise used) - - 2009-01-28 Jonathan Larmour (suggested by Bill Bauerbach) - * ipv4/inet_chksum.c, ipv4/lwip/inet_chksum.h: inet_chksum_pseudo_partial() - is only used by UDPLITE at present, so conditionalise it. - - 2008-12-03 Simon Goldschmidt (base on patch from Luca Ceresoli) - * autoip.c: checked in (slightly modified) patch #6683: Customizable AUTOIP - "seed" address. This should reduce AUTOIP conflicts if - LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR is overridden. - - 2008-10-02 Jonathan Larmour and Rishi Khan - * sockets.c (lwip_accept): Return EWOULDBLOCK if would block on non-blocking - socket. - - 2008-06-30 Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c, opt.h, stats.h: fixed bug #21433: Calling mem_free/pbuf_free from - interrupt context isn't safe: LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT allows - mem_free to run between mem_malloc iterations. Added illegal counter for - mem stats. - - 2008-06-27 Simon Goldschmidt - * stats.h/.c, some other files: patch #6483: stats module improvement: - Added defines to display each module's statistic individually, added stats - defines for MEM, MEMP and SYS modules, removed (unused) rexmit counter. - - 2008-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt - * err.h: patch #6459: Made err_t overridable to use a more efficient type - (define LWIP_ERR_T in cc.h) - - 2008-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt - * slipif.c: patch #6480: Added a configuration option for slipif for symmetry - to loopif - - 2008-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Luca Ceresoli) - * netif.c, loopif.c, ip.c, netif.h, loopif.h, opt.h: Checked in slightly - modified version of patch # 6370: Moved loopif code to netif.c so that - loopback traffic is supported on all netifs (all local IPs). - Added option to limit loopback packets for each netifs. - - - ++ Bugfixes: - 2009-08-12 Kieran Mansley - * tcp_in.c, tcp.c: Fix bug #27209: handle trimming of segments when - out of window or out of order properly - - 2009-08-12 Kieran Mansley - * tcp_in.c: Fix bug #27199: use snd_wl2 instead of snd_wl1 - - 2009-07-28 Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.h: Fixed bug #27105: "realloc() cannot replace mem_realloc()"s - - 2009-07-27 Kieran Mansley - * api.h api_msg.h netdb.h sockets.h: add missing #include directives - - 2009-07-09 Kieran Mansley - * api_msg.c, sockets.c, api.h: BUG23240 use signed counters for - recv_avail and don't increment counters until message successfully - sent to mbox - - 2009-06-25 Kieran Mansley - * api_msg.c api.h: BUG26722: initialise netconn write variables - in netconn_alloc - - 2009-06-25 Kieran Mansley - * tcp.h: BUG26879: set ret value in TCP_EVENT macros when function is not set - - 2009-06-25 Kieran Mansley - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: BUG26301 and BUG26267: correct - simultaneous close behaviour, and make snd_nxt have the same meaning - as in the RFCs. - - 2009-05-12 Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.h, etharp.c, netif.c: fixed bug #26507: "Gratuitous ARP depends on - arp_table / uses etharp_query" by adding etharp_gratuitous() - - 2009-05-12 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.h, ip.c, igmp.c: bug #26487: Added ip_output_if_opt that can add IP options - to the IP header (used by igmp_ip_output_if) - - 2009-05-06 Simon Goldschmidt - * inet_chksum.c: On little endian architectures, use LWIP_PLATFORM_HTONS (if - defined) for SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD to speed up checksumming. - - 2009-05-05 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: bug #26405: Prematurely released semaphore causes lwip_select() - to crash - - 2009-05-04 Simon Goldschmidt - * init.c: snmp was not initialized in lwip_init() - - 2009-05-04 Frédéric Bernon - * dhcp.c, netbios.c: Changes if IP_SOF_BROADCAST is enabled. - - 2009-05-03 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h: bug #26349: Nagle algorithm doesn't send although segment is full - (and unsent->next == NULL) - - 2009-05-02 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcpip.h, tcpip.c: fixed tcpip_untimeout (does not need the time, broken after - 1.3.0 in CVS only) - fixes compilation of ppp_oe.c - - 2009-05-02 Simon Goldschmidt - * msg_in.c: fixed bug #25636: SNMPSET value is ignored for integer fields - - 2009-05-01 Simon Goldschmidt - * pap.c: bug #21680: PPP upap_rauthnak() drops legal NAK packets - - 2009-05-01 Simon Goldschmidt - * ppp.c: bug #24228: Memory corruption with PPP and DHCP - - 2009-04-29 Frédéric Bernon - * raw.c, udp.c, init.c, opt.h, ip.h, sockets.h: bug #26309: Implement the - SO(F)_BROADCAST filter for all API layers. Avoid the unindented reception - of broadcast packets even when this option wasn't set. Port maintainers - which want to enable this filter have to set IP_SOF_BROADCAST=1 in opt.h. - If you want this option also filter broadcast on recv operations, you also - have to set IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV=1 in opt.h. - - 2009-04-28 Simon Goldschmidt, Jakob Stoklund Olesen - * dhcp.c: patch #6721, bugs #25575, #25576: Some small fixes to DHCP and - DHCP/AUTOIP cooperation - - 2009-04-25 Simon Goldschmidt, Oleg Tyshev - * tcp_out.c: bug #24212: Deadlocked tcp_retransmit due to exceeded pcb->cwnd - Fixed by sorting the unsent and unacked queues (segments are inserted at the - right place in tcp_output and tcp_rexmit). - - 2009-04-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * memp.c, mem.c, memp.h, mem_std.h: bug #26213 "Problem with memory allocation - when debugging": memp_sizes contained the wrong sizes (including sanity - regions); memp pools for MEM_USE_POOLS were too small - - 2009-04-24 Simon Goldschmidt, Frédéric Bernon - * inet.c: patch #6765: Fix a small problem with the last changes (incorrect - behavior, with with ip address string not ended by a '\0', a space or a - end of line) - - 2009-04-19 Simon Goldschmidt - * rawapi.txt: Fixed bug #26069: Corrected documentation: if tcp_connect fails, - pcb->err is called, not pcb->connected (with an error code). - - 2009-04-19 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #26236: "TCP options (timestamp) don't work with - no-copy-tcpwrite": deallocate option data, only concat segments with same flags - - 2009-04-19 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #25094: "Zero-length pbuf" (options are now allocated - in the header pbuf, not the data pbuf) - - 2009-04-18 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: fixed bug #25695: Segmentation fault in do_writemore() - - 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: tried to fix bug #23559: lwip_recvfrom problem with tcp - - 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: task #9192: mem_free of dhcp->options_in and dhcp->msg_in - - 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.c, ip6.c, tcp_out.c, ip.h: patch #6808: Add a utility function - ip_hinted_output() (for smaller code mainly) - - 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * inet.c: patch #6765: Supporting new line characters in inet_aton() - - 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: patch #6764: DHCP rebind and renew did not send hostnam option; - Converted constant OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE to netif->mtu, check if netif->mtu - is big enough in dhcp_start - - 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * netbuf.c: bug #26027: netbuf_chain resulted in pbuf memory leak - - 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c, ppp.c: bug #25763: corrected 4 occurrences of SMEMCPY to MEMCPY - - 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: bug #26121: set_errno can be overridden - - 2009-04-09 Kieran Mansley (patch from Luca Ceresoli ) - * init.c, opt.h: Patch#6774 TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ breaks compilation when - LWIP_TCP==0 - - 2009-04-09 Kieran Mansley (patch from Roy Lee ) - * tcp.h: Patch#6802 Add do-while-clauses to those function like - macros in tcp.h - - 2009-03-31 Kieran Mansley - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h, opt.h: Rework the way window - updates are calculated and sent (BUG20515) - - * tcp_in.c: cope with SYN packets received during established states, - and retransmission of initial SYN. - - * tcp_out.c: set push bit correctly when tcp segments are merged - - 2009-03-27 Kieran Mansley - * tcp_out.c set window correctly on probes (correcting change made - yesterday) - - 2009-03-26 Kieran Mansley - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp.h: add tcp_abandon() to cope with dropping - connections where no reset required (bug #25622) - - * tcp_out.c: set TCP_ACK flag on keepalive and zero window probes - (bug #20779) - - 2009-02-18 Simon Goldschmidt (Jonathan Larmour and Bill Auerbach) - * ip_frag.c: patch #6528: the buffer used for IP_FRAG_USES_STATIC_BUF could be - too small depending on MEM_ALIGNMENT - - 2009-02-16 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.h/.c, api_*.h/.c: fixed arguments of socket functions to match the standard; - converted size argument of netconn_write to 'size_t' - - 2009-02-16 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, tcp.c: fixed bug #24440: TCP connection close problem on 64-bit host - by moving accept callback function pointer to TCP_PCB_COMMON - - 2009-02-12 Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #25345 (DHCPDECLINE is sent with "Maximum message size" - option) - - 2009-02-11 Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #24480 (releasing old udp_pdb and pbuf in dhcp_start) - - 2009-02-11 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, api_msg.c: added configurable default valud for netconn->recv_bufsize: - RECV_BUFSIZE_DEFAULT (fixes bug #23726: pbuf pool exhaustion on slow recv()) - - 2009-02-10 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: fixed bug #25467: Listen backlog is not reset on timeout in SYN_RCVD: - Accepts_pending is decrease on a corresponding listen pcb when a connection - in state SYN_RCVD is close. - - 2009-01-28 Jonathan Larmour - * pbuf.c: reclaim pbufs from TCP out-of-sequence segments if we run - out of pool pbufs. - - 2008-12-19 Simon Goldschmidt - * many files: patch #6699: fixed some warnings on platform where sizeof(int) == 2 - - 2008-12-10 Tamas Somogyi, Frédéric Bernon - * sockets.c: fixed bug #25051: lwip_recvfrom problem with udp: fromaddr and - port uses deleted netbuf. - - 2008-10-18 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: fixed bug ##24596: Vulnerability on faulty TCP options length - in tcp_parseopt - - 2008-10-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip_frag.c: fixed bug #24517: IP reassembly crashes on unaligned IP headers - by packing the struct ip_reass_helper. - - 2008-10-03 David Woodhouse, Jonathan Larmour - * etharp.c (etharp_arp_input): Fix type aliasing problem copying ip address. - - 2008-10-02 Jonathan Larmour - * dns.c: Hard-code structure sizes, to avoid issues on some compilers where - padding is included. - - 2008-09-30 Jonathan Larmour - * sockets.c (lwip_accept): check addr isn't NULL. If it's valid, do an - assertion check that addrlen isn't NULL. - - 2008-09-30 Jonathan Larmour - * tcp.c: Fix bug #24227, wrong error message in tcp_bind. - - 2008-08-26 Simon Goldschmidt - * inet.h, ip_addr.h: fixed bug #24132: Cross-dependency between ip_addr.h and - inet.h -> moved declaration of struct in_addr from ip_addr.h to inet.h - - 2008-08-14 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: fixed bug #23847: do_close_internal references freed memory (when - tcp_close returns != ERR_OK) - - 2008-07-08 Frédéric Bernon - * stats.h: Fix some build bugs introduced with patch #6483 (missing some parameters - in macros, mainly if MEM_STATS=0 and MEMP_STATS=0). - - 2008-06-24 Jonathan Larmour - * tcp_in.c: Fix for bug #23693 as suggested by Art R. Ensure cseg is unused - if tcp_seg_copy fails. - - 2008-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt - * inet_chksum.c: Checked in some ideas of patch #6460 (loop optimizations) - and created defines for swapping bytes and folding u32 to u16. - - 2008-05-30 Kieran Mansley - * tcp_in.c Remove redundant "if" statement, and use real rcv_wnd - rather than rcv_ann_wnd when deciding if packets are in-window. - Contributed by - - 2008-05-30 Kieran Mansley - * mem.h: Fix BUG#23254. Change macro definition of mem_* to allow - passing as function pointers when MEM_LIBC_MALLOC is defined. - - 2008-05-09 Jonathan Larmour - * err.h, err.c, sockets.c: Fix bug #23119: Reorder timeout error code to - stop it being treated as a fatal error. - - 2008-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: fixed bug #22804: dhcp_stop doesn't clear NETIF_FLAG_DHCP - (flag now cleared) - - 2008-03-27 Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c, tcpip.c, tcpip.h, opt.h: fixed bug #21433 (Calling mem_free/pbuf_free - from interrupt context isn't safe): set LWIP_USE_HEAP_FROM_INTERRUPT to 1 - in lwipopts.h or use pbuf_free_callback(p)/mem_free_callback(m) to free pbufs - or heap memory from interrupt context - - 2008-03-26 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c, tcp.c: fixed bug #22249: division by zero could occur if a remote - host sent a zero mss as TCP option. - - -(STABLE-1.3.0) - - ++ New features: - - 2008-03-10 Jonathan Larmour - * inet_chksum.c: Allow choice of one of the sample algorithms to be - made from lwipopts.h. Fix comment on how to override LWIP_CHKSUM. - - 2008-01-22 Frédéric Bernon - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp.h, opt.h: Rename LWIP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS in - TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS to have coherent TCP options names. - - 2008-01-14 Frédéric Bernon - * rawapi.txt, api_msg.c, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp.h: changes for task #7675 "Enable - to refuse data on a TCP_EVENT_RECV call". Important, behavior changes for the - tcp_recv callback (see rawapi.txt). - - 2008-01-14 Frédéric Bernon, Marc Chaland - * ip.c: Integrate patch #6369" ip_input : checking before realloc". - - 2008-01-12 Frédéric Bernon - * tcpip.h, tcpip.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: replace the field - netconn::sem per netconn::op_completed like suggested for the task #7490 - "Add return value to sys_mbox_post". - - 2008-01-12 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.c, opt.h: replace DEFAULT_RECVMBOX_SIZE per DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE, - DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE and DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE (to optimize queues - sizes), like suggested for the task #7490 "Add return value to sys_mbox_post". - - 2008-01-10 Frédéric Bernon - * tcpip.h, tcpip.c: add tcpip_callback_with_block function for the task #7490 - "Add return value to sys_mbox_post". tcpip_callback is always defined as - "blocking" ("block" parameter = 1). - - 2008-01-10 Frédéric Bernon - * tcpip.h, tcpip.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: replace the field - netconn::mbox (sys_mbox_t) per netconn::sem (sys_sem_t) for the task #7490 - "Add return value to sys_mbox_post". - - 2008-01-05 Frédéric Bernon - * sys_arch.txt, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, tcpip.c, sys.h, opt.h: - Introduce changes for task #7490 "Add return value to sys_mbox_post" with some - modifications in the sys_mbox api: sys_mbox_new take a "size" parameters which - indicate the number of pointers query by the mailbox. There is three defines - in opt.h to indicate sizes for tcpip::mbox, netconn::recvmbox, and for the - netconn::acceptmbox. Port maintainers, you can decide to just add this new - parameter in your implementation, but to ignore it to keep the previous behavior. - The new sys_mbox_trypost function return a value to know if the mailbox is - full or if the message is posted. Take a look to sys_arch.txt for more details. - This new function is used in tcpip_input (so, can be called in an interrupt - context since the function is not blocking), and in recv_udp and recv_raw. - - 2008-01-04 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt, Jonathan Larmour - * rawapi.txt, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, sockets.c, tcp.h, tcp.c, - tcp_in.c, init.c, opt.h: rename backlog options with TCP_ prefix, limit the - "backlog" parameter in an u8_t, 0 is interpreted as "smallest queue", add - documentation in the rawapi.txt file. - - 2007-12-31 Kieran Mansley (based on patch from Per-Henrik Lundbolm) - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: Add TCP persist timer - - 2007-12-31 Frédéric Bernon, Luca Ceresoli - * autoip.c, etharp.c: ip_addr.h: Integrate patch #6348: "Broadcast ARP packets - in autoip". The change in etharp_raw could be removed, since all calls to - etharp_raw use ethbroadcast for the "ethdst_addr" parameter. But it could be - wrong in the future. - - 2007-12-30 Frédéric Bernon, Tom Evans - * ip.c: Fix bug #21846 "LwIP doesn't appear to perform any IP Source Address - Filtering" reported by Tom Evans. - - 2007-12-21 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt, Jonathan Larmour - * tcp.h, opt.h, api.h, api_msg.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, - sockets.c, init.c: task #7252: Implement TCP listen backlog: Warning: raw API - applications have to call 'tcp_accepted(pcb)' in their accept callback to - keep accepting new connections. - - 2007-12-13 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.c, err.h, err.c, sockets.c, dns.c, dns.h: replace "enum dns_result" - by err_t type. Add a new err_t code "ERR_INPROGRESS". - - 2007-12-12 Frédéric Bernon - * dns.h, dns.c, opt.h: move DNS options to the "right" place. Most visibles - are the one which have ram usage. - - 2007-12-05 Frédéric Bernon - * netdb.c: add a LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE option to decide to use a static - set of variables (=0) or a local one (=1). In this last case, your port should - provide a function "struct hostent* sys_thread_hostent( struct hostent* h)" - which have to do a copy of "h" and return a pointer ont the "per-thread" copy. - - 2007-12-03 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.c: ip_input: check if a packet is for inp first before checking all other - netifs on netif_list (speeds up packet receiving in most cases) - - 2007-11-30 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.c, raw.c: task #7497: Sort lists (pcb, netif, ...) for faster access - UDP: move a (connected) pcb selected for input to the front of the list of - pcbs so that it is found faster next time. Same for RAW pcbs that have eaten - a packet. - - 2007-11-28 Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c, stats.c, stats.h, opt.h: Introduced ETHARP_STATS - - 2007-11-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * dhcp.c: dhcp_unfold_reply() uses pbuf_copy_partial instead of its own copy - algorithm. - - 2007-11-24 Simon Goldschmidt - * netdb.h, netdb.c, sockets.h/.c: Moved lwip_gethostbyname from sockets.c - to the new file netdb.c; included lwip_getaddrinfo. - - 2007-11-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, opt.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: implemented calculating the effective send-mss - based on the MTU of the netif used to send. Enabled by default. Disable by - setting LWIP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS to 0. This fixes bug #21492. - - 2007-11-19 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.c, dns.h, dns.c: Implement DNS_DOES_NAME_CHECK option (check if name - received match the name query), implement DNS_USES_STATIC_BUF (the place where - copy dns payload to parse the response), return an error if there is no place - for a new query, and fix some minor problems. - - 2007-11-16 Simon Goldschmidt - * new files: ipv4/inet.c, ipv4/inet_chksum.c, ipv6/inet6.c - removed files: core/inet.c, core/inet6.c - Moved inet files into ipv4/ipv6 directory; splitted inet.c/inet.h into - inet and chksum part; changed includes in all lwIP files as appropriate - - 2007-11-16 Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, api_msg.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, socket.h, socket.c: Added sequential - dns resolver function for netconn api (netconn_gethostbyname) and socket api - (gethostbyname/gethostbyname_r). - - 2007-11-15 Jim Pettinato, Frédéric Bernon - * opt.h, init.c, tcpip.c, dhcp.c, dns.h, dns.c: add DNS client for simple name - requests with RAW api interface. Initialization is done in lwip_init() with - build time options. DNS timer is added in tcpip_thread context. DHCP can set - DNS server ip addresses when options are received. You need to set LWIP_DNS=1 - in your lwipopts.h file (LWIP_DNS=0 in opt.h). DNS_DEBUG can be set to get - some traces with LWIP_DEBUGF. Sanity check have been added. There is a "todo" - list with points to improve. - - 2007-11-06 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, mib2.c: Patch #6215: added ifAdminStatus write support (if explicitly - enabled by defining SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS to 0); added code to check link status - for ifOperStatus if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK is defined. - - 2007-11-06 Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, api_msg.h and dependent files: Task #7410: Removed the need to include - core header files in api.h (ip/tcp/udp/raw.h) to hide the internal - implementation from netconn api applications. - - 2007-11-03 Frédéric Bernon - * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, opt.h: add SO_RCVBUF option for UDP & - RAW netconn. You need to set LWIP_SO_RCVBUF=1 in your lwipopts.h (it's disabled - by default). Netconn API users can use the netconn_recv_bufsize macro to access - it. This is a first release which have to be improve for TCP. Note it used the - netconn::recv_avail which need to be more "thread-safe" (note there is already - the problem for FIONREAD with lwip_ioctl/ioctlsocket). - - 2007-11-01 Frédéric Bernon, Marc Chaland - * sockets.h, sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, tcp.h, tcp_out.c: - Integrate "patch #6250 : MSG_MORE flag for send". MSG_MORE is used at socket api - layer, NETCONN_MORE at netconn api layer, and TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE at raw api - layer. This option enable to delayed TCP PUSH flag on multiple "write" calls. - Note that previous "copy" parameter for "write" APIs is now called "apiflags". - - 2007-10-24 Frédéric Bernon - * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: Add macro API_EVENT in the same spirit than - TCP_EVENT_xxx macros to get a code more readable. It could also help to remove - some code (like we have talk in "patch #5919 : Create compile switch to remove - select code"), but it could be done later. - - 2007-10-08 Simon Goldschmidt - * many files: Changed initialization: many init functions are not needed any - more since we now rely on the compiler initializing global and static - variables to zero! - - 2007-10-06 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip_frag.c, memp.c, mib2.c, ip_frag.h, memp_std.h, opt.h: Changed IP_REASSEMBLY - to enqueue the received pbufs so that multiple packets can be reassembled - simultaneously and no static reassembly buffer is needed. - - 2007-10-05 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcpip.c, etharp.h, etharp.c: moved ethernet_input from tcpip.c to etharp.c so - all netifs (or ports) can use it. - - 2007-10-05 Frédéric Bernon - * netifapi.h, netifapi.c: add function netifapi_netif_set_default. Change the - common function to reduce a little bit the footprint (for all functions using - only the "netif" parameter). - - 2007-10-03 Frédéric Bernon - * netifapi.h, netifapi.c: add functions netifapi_netif_set_up, netifapi_netif_set_down, - netifapi_autoip_start and netifapi_autoip_stop. Use a common function to reduce - a little bit the footprint (for all functions using only the "netif" parameter). - - 2007-09-15 Frédéric Bernon - * udp.h, udp.c, sockets.c: Changes for "#20503 IGMP Improvement". Add IP_MULTICAST_IF - option in socket API, and a new field "multicast_ip" in "struct udp_pcb" (for - netconn and raw API users), only if LWIP_IGMP=1. Add getsockopt processing for - IP_MULTICAST_TTL and IP_MULTICAST_IF. - - 2007-09-10 Frédéric Bernon - * snmp.h, mib2.c: enable to remove SNMP timer (which consumne several cycles - even when it's not necessary). snmp_agent.txt tell to call snmp_inc_sysuptime() - each 10ms (but, it's intrusive if you use sys_timeout feature). Now, you can - decide to call snmp_add_sysuptime(100) each 1000ms (which is bigger "step", but - call to a lower frequency). Or, you can decide to not call snmp_inc_sysuptime() - or snmp_add_sysuptime(), and to define the SNMP_GET_SYSUPTIME(sysuptime) macro. - This one is undefined by default in mib2.c. SNMP_GET_SYSUPTIME is called inside - snmp_get_sysuptime(u32_t *value), and enable to change "sysuptime" value only - when it's queried (any direct call to "sysuptime" is changed by a call to - snmp_get_sysuptime). - - 2007-09-09 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac - * igmp.h, igmp.c, netif.h, netif.c, ip.c: To enable to have interfaces with IGMP, - and others without it, there is a new NETIF_FLAG_IGMP flag to set in netif->flags - if you want IGMP on an interface. igmp_stop() is now called inside netif_remove(). - igmp_report_groups() is now called inside netif_set_link_up() (need to have - LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK=1) to resend reports once the link is up (avoid to wait - the next query message to receive the matching multicast streams). - - 2007-09-08 Frédéric Bernon - * sockets.c, ip.h, api.h, tcp.h: declare a "struct ip_pcb" which only contains - IP_PCB. Add in the netconn's "pcb" union a "struct ip_pcb *ip;" (no size change). - Use this new field to access to common pcb fields (ttl, tos, so_options, etc...). - Enable to access to these fields with LWIP_TCP=0. - - 2007-09-05 Frédéric Bernon - * udp.c, ipv4/icmp.c, ipv4/ip.c, ipv6/icmp.c, ipv6/ip6.c, ipv4/icmp.h, - ipv6/icmp.h, opt.h: Integrate "task #7272 : LWIP_ICMP option". The new option - LWIP_ICMP enable/disable ICMP module inside the IP stack (enable per default). - Be careful, disabling ICMP make your product non-compliant to RFC1122, but - help to reduce footprint, and to reduce "visibility" on the Internet. - - 2007-09-05 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac - * opt.h, sys.h, tcpip.c, slipif.c, ppp.c, sys_arch.txt: Change parameters list - for sys_thread_new (see "task #7252 : Create sys_thread_new_ex()"). Two new - parameters have to be provided: a task name, and a task stack size. For this - one, since it's platform dependant, you could define the best one for you in - your lwipopts.h. For port maintainers, you can just add these new parameters - in your sys_arch.c file, and but it's not mandatory, use them in your OS - specific functions. - - 2007-09-05 Frédéric Bernon - * inet.c, autoip.c, msg_in.c, msg_out.c, init.c: Move some build time checkings - inside init.c for task #7142 "Sanity check user-configurable values". - - 2007-09-04 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac - * igmp.h, igmp.c, memp_std.h, memp.c, init.c, opt.h: Replace mem_malloc call by - memp_malloc, and use a new MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP option (see opt.h to define the - value). It will avoid potential fragmentation problems, use a counter to know - how many times a group is used on an netif, and free it when all applications - leave it. MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP got 8 as default value (and init.c got a sanity - check if LWIP_IGMP!=0). - - 2007-09-03 Frédéric Bernon - * igmp.h, igmp.c, sockets.c, api_msg.c: Changes for "#20503 IGMP Improvement". - Initialize igmp_mac_filter to NULL in netif_add (this field should be set in - the netif's "init" function). Use the "imr_interface" field (for socket layer) - and/or the "interface" field (for netconn layer), for join/leave operations. - The igmp_join/leavegroup first parameter change from a netif to an ipaddr. - This field could be a netif's ipaddr, or "any" (same meaning than ip_addr_isany). - - 2007-08-30 Frédéric Bernon - * Add netbuf.h, netbuf.c, Change api.h, api_lib.c: #7249 "Split netbuf functions - from api/api_lib". Now netbuf API is independant of netconn, and can be used - with other API (application based on raw API, or future "socket2" API). Ports - maintainers just have to add src/api/netbuf.c in their makefile/projects. - - 2007-08-30 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour - * init.c: Add first version of lwip_sanity_check for task #7142 "Sanity check - user-configurable values". - - 2007-08-29 Frédéric Bernon - * igmp.h, igmp.c, tcpip.c, init.c, netif.c: change igmp_init and add igmp_start. - igmp_start is call inside netif_add. Now, igmp initialization is in the same - spirit than the others modules. Modify some IGMP debug traces. - - 2007-08-29 Frédéric Bernon - * Add init.h, init.c, Change opt.h, tcpip.c: Task #7213 "Add a lwip_init function" - Add lwip_init function to regroup all modules initializations, and to provide - a place to add code for task #7142 "Sanity check user-configurable values". - Ports maintainers should remove direct initializations calls from their code, - and add init.c in their makefiles. Note that lwip_init() function is called - inside tcpip_init, but can also be used by raw api users since all calls are - disabled when matching options are disabled. Also note that their is new options - in opt.h, you should configure in your lwipopts.h (they are enabled per default). - - 2007-08-26 Marc Boucher - * api_msg.c: do_close_internal(): Reset the callbacks and arg (conn) to NULL - since they can under certain circumstances be called with an invalid conn - pointer after the connection has been closed (and conn has been freed). - - 2007-08-25 Frédéric Bernon (Artem Migaev's Patch) - * netif.h, netif.c: Integrate "patch #6163 : Function to check if link layer is up". - Add a netif_is_link_up() function if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK option is set. - - 2007-08-22 Frédéric Bernon - * netif.h, netif.c, opt.h: Rename LWIP_NETIF_CALLBACK in LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK - to be coherent with new LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK option before next release. - - 2007-08-22 Frédéric Bernon - * tcpip.h, tcpip.c, ethernetif.c, opt.h: remove options ETHARP_TCPIP_INPUT & - ETHARP_TCPIP_ETHINPUT, now, only "ethinput" code is supported, even if the - name is tcpip_input (we keep the name of 1.2.0 function). - - 2007-08-17 Jared Grubb - * memp_std.h, memp.h, memp.c, mem.c, stats.c: (Task #7136) Centralize mempool - settings into new memp_std.h and optional user file lwippools.h. This adds - more dynamic mempools, and allows the user to create an arbitrary number of - mempools for mem_malloc. - - 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher - * api_msg.c: Initialize newconn->state to NETCONN_NONE in accept_function; - otherwise it was left to NETCONN_CLOSE and sent_tcp() could prematurely - close the connection. - - 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher - * sockets.c: lwip_accept(): check netconn_peer() error return. - - 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher - * mem.c, mem.h: Added mem_calloc(). - - 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher - * tcpip.c, tcpip.h memp.c, memp.h: Added distinct memp (MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT) - for input packets to prevent floods from consuming all of MEMP_TCPIP_MSG - and starving other message types. - Renamed MEMP_TCPIP_MSG to MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API - - 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher - * pbuf.c, pbuf.h, etharp.c, tcp_in.c, sockets.c: Split pbuf flags in pbuf - type and flgs (later renamed to flags). - Use enum pbuf_flag as pbuf_type. Renumber PBUF_FLAG_*. - Improved lwip_recvfrom(). TCP push now propagated. - - 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher - * ethernetif.c, contrib/ports/various: ethbroadcast now a shared global - provided by etharp. - - 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher - * ppp_oe.c ppp_oe.h, auth.c chap.c fsm.c lcp.c ppp.c ppp.h, - etharp.c ethernetif.c, etharp.h, opt.h tcpip.h, tcpip.c: - Added PPPoE support and various PPP improvements. - - 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c, ip_frag.c, pbuf.c, api.h, pbuf.h: Introduced pbuf_copy_partial, - making netbuf_copy_partial use this function. - - 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Fix bug #20506: Slow start / initial congestion window starts with - 2 * mss (instead of 1 * mss previously) to comply with some newer RFCs and - other stacks. - - 2007-07-13 Jared Grubb (integrated by Frédéric Bernon) - * opt.h, netif.h, netif.c, ethernetif.c: Add new configuration option to add - a link callback in the netif struct, and functions to handle it. Be carefull - for port maintainers to add the NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP flag (like in ethernetif.c) - if you want to be sure to be compatible with future changes... - - 2007-06-30 Frédéric Bernon - * sockets.h, sockets.c: Implement MSG_PEEK flag for recv/recvfrom functions. - - 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.h, etharp.c: Combined etharp_request with etharp_raw for both - LWIP_AUTOIP =0 and =1 to remove redundant code. - - 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c, memp.c, mem.h, memp.h, opt.h: task #6863: Introduced the option - MEM_USE_POOLS to use 4 pools with different sized elements instead of a - heap. This both prevents memory fragmentation and gives a higher speed - at the cost of more memory consumption. Turned off by default. - - 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, api.h, api_msg.h: Converted the length argument of - netconn_write (and therefore also api_msg_msg.msg.w.len) from u16_t into - int to be able to send a bigger buffer than 64K with one time (mainly - used from lwip_send). - - 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, api_msg.c: Moved the nagle algorithm from netconn_write/do_write - into a define (tcp_output_nagle) in tcp.h to provide it to raw api users, too. - - 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: Fixed bug #20021: Moved sendbuf-processing in - netconn_write from api_lib.c to api_msg.c to also prevent multiple context- - changes on low memory or empty send-buffer. - - 2007-06-18 Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c, etharp.h: Changed etharp to use a defined hardware address length - of 6 to avoid loading netif->hwaddr_len every time (since this file is only - used for ethernet and struct eth_addr already had a defined length of 6). - - 2007-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c, sockets.h: Implemented socket options SO_NO_CHECK for UDP sockets - to disable UDP checksum generation on transmit. - - 2007-06-13 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - * debug.h, api_msg.c: change LWIP_ERROR to use it to check errors like invalid - pointers or parameters, and let the possibility to redefined it in cc.h. Use - this macro to check "conn" parameter in api_msg.c functions. - - 2007-06-11 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c, sockets.h: Added UDP lite support for sockets - - 2007-06-10 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.h, opt.h, api_msg.c, ip.c, udp.c: Included switch LWIP_UDPLITE (enabled - by default) to switch off UDP-Lite support if not needed (reduces udp.c code - size) - - 2007-06-09 Dominik Spies (integrated by Frédéric Bernon) - * autoip.h, autoip.c, dhcp.h, dhcp.c, netif.h, netif.c, etharp.h, etharp.c, opt.h: - AutoIP implementation available for IPv4, with new options LWIP_AUTOIP and - LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP if you want to cooperate with DHCP. Some tips to adapt - (see TODO mark in the source code). - - 2007-06-09 Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.h, etharp.c, ethernetif.c: Modified order of parameters for - etharp_output() to match netif->output so etharp_output() can be used - directly as netif->output to save one function call. - - 2007-06-08 Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.h, ethernetif.c, slipif.c, loopif.c: Added define - NETIF_INIT_SNMP(netif, type, speed) to initialize per-netif snmp variables, - added initialization of those to ethernetif, slipif and loopif. - - 2007-05-18 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, ip_frag.c, ip_frag.h, ip.c: Added option IP_FRAG_USES_STATIC_BUF - (defaulting to off for now) that can be set to 0 to send fragmented - packets by passing PBUF_REFs down the stack. - - 2007-05-23 Frédéric Bernon - * api_lib.c: Implement SO_RCVTIMEO for accept and recv on TCP - connections, such present in patch #5959. - - 2007-05-23 Frédéric Bernon - * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: group the different NETCONN_UDPxxx - code in only one part... - - 2007-05-18 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, memp.h, memp.c: Added option MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK to check for memp - elements to overflow. This is achieved by adding some bytes before and after - each pool element (increasing their size, of course), filling them with a - prominent value and checking them on freeing the element. - Set it to 2 to also check every element in every pool each time memp_malloc() - or memp_free() is called (slower but more helpful). - - 2007-05-10 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, memp.h, memp.c, pbuf.c (see task #6831): use a new memp pool for - PBUF_POOL pbufs instead of the old pool implementation in pbuf.c to reduce - code size. - - 2007-05-11 Frédéric Bernon - * sockets.c, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, netifapi.h, netifapi.c, tcpip.c: - Include a function pointer instead of a table index in the message to reduce - footprint. Disable some part of lwip_send and lwip_sendto if some options are - not set (LWIP_TCP, LWIP_UDP, LWIP_RAW). - - 2007-05-10 Simon Goldschmidt - * *.h (except netif/ppp/*.h): Included patch #5448: include '#ifdef __cplusplus - \ extern "C" {' in all header files. Now you can write your application using - the lwIP stack in C++ and simply #include the core files. Note I have left - out the netif/ppp/*h header files for now, since I don't know which files are - included by applications and which are for internal use only. - - 2007-05-09 Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, *.c/*.h: Included patch #5920: Create define to override C-library - memcpy. 2 Defines are created: MEMCPY() for normal memcpy, SMEMCPY() for - situations where some compilers might inline the copy and save a function - call. Also replaced all calls to memcpy() with calls to (S)MEMCPY(). - - 2007-05-08 Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.h: If MEM_LIBC_MALLOC==1, allow the defines (e.g. mem_malloc() -> malloc()) - to be overriden in case the C-library malloc implementation is not protected - against concurrent access. - - 2007-05-04 Simon Goldschmidt (Atte Kojo) - * etharp.c: Introduced fast one-entry-cache to speed up ARP lookup when sending - multiple packets to the same host. - - 2007-05-04 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour - * sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c: Fix bug #19162 "lwip_sento: a possible - to corrupt remote addr/port connection state". Reduce problems "not enought memory" with - netbuf (if we receive lot of datagrams). Improve lwip_sendto (only one exchange between - sockets api and api_msg which run in tcpip_thread context). Add netconn_sento function. - Warning, if you directly access to "fromaddr" & "fromport" field from netbuf struct, - these fields are now renamed "addr" & "port". - - 2007-04-11 Jonathan Larmour - * sys.h, api_lib.c: Provide new sys_mbox_tryfetch function. Require ports to provide new - sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch function to get a message if one is there, otherwise return - with SYS_MBOX_EMPTY. sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch can be implemented as a function-like macro - by the port in sys_arch.h if desired. - - 2007-04-06 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, tcpip.h, tcpip.c, netifapi.h, netifapi.c: New configuration option LWIP_NETIF_API - allow to use thread-safe functions to add/remove netif in list, and to start/stop dhcp - clients, using new functions from netifapi.h. Disable as default (no port change to do). - - 2007-04-05 Frédéric Bernon - * sockets.c: remplace ENOBUFS errors on alloc_socket by ENFILE to be more BSD compliant. - - 2007-04-04 Simon Goldschmidt - * arch.h, api_msg.c, dhcp.c, msg_in.c, sockets.c: Introduced #define LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(x) - use this for and architecture-independent form to tell the compiler you intentionally - are not using this variable. Can be overriden in cc.h. - - 2007-03-28 Frédéric Bernon - * opt.h, netif.h, dhcp.h, dhcp.c: New configuration option LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME allow to - define a hostname in netif struct (this is just a pointer, so, you can use a hardcoded - string, point on one of your's ethernetif field, or alloc a string you will free yourself). - It will be used by DHCP to register a client hostname, but can also be use when you call - snmp_set_sysname. - - 2007-03-28 Frédéric Bernon - * netif.h, netif.c: A new NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP flag is defined in netif.h, to allow to - initialize a network interface's flag with. It tell this interface is an ethernet - device, and we can use ARP with it to do a "gratuitous ARP" (RFC 3220 "IP Mobility - Support for IPv4" section 4.6) when interface is "up" with netif_set_up(). - - 2007-03-26 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour - * opt.h, tcpip.c: New configuration option LWIP_ARP allow to disable ARP init at build - time if you only use PPP or SLIP. The default is enable. Note we don't have to call - etharp_init in your port's initilization sequence if you use tcpip.c, because this call - is done in tcpip_init function. - - 2007-03-22 Frédéric Bernon - * stats.h, stats.c, msg_in.c: Stats counters can be change to u32_t if necessary with the - new option LWIP_STATS_LARGE. If you need this option, define LWIP_STATS_LARGE to 1 in - your lwipopts.h. More, unused counters are not defined in the stats structs, and not - display by stats_display(). Note that some options (SYS_STATS and RAW_STATS) are defined - but never used. Fix msg_in.c with the correct #if test for a stat display. - - 2007-03-21 Kieran Mansley - * netif.c, netif.h: Apply patch#4197 with some changes (originator: rireland@hmgsl.com). - Provides callback on netif up/down state change. - - 2007-03-11 Frédéric Bernon, Mace Gael, Steve Reynolds - * sockets.h, sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, igmp.h, igmp.c, - ip.c, netif.h, tcpip.c, opt.h: - New configuration option LWIP_IGMP to enable IGMP processing. Based on only one - filter per all network interfaces. Declare a new function in netif to enable to - control the MAC filter (to reduce lwIP traffic processing). - - 2007-03-11 Frédéric Bernon - * tcp.h, tcp.c, sockets.c, tcp_out.c, tcp_in.c, opt.h: Keepalive values can - be configured at run time with LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE, but don't change this - unless you know what you're doing (default are RFC1122 compliant). Note - that TCP_KEEPIDLE and TCP_KEEPINTVL have to be set in seconds. - - 2007-03-08 Frédéric Bernon - * tcp.h: Keepalive values can be configured at compile time, but don't change - this unless you know what you're doing (default are RFC1122 compliant). - - 2007-03-08 Frédéric Bernon - * sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, tcpip.c, sys.h, sys.c, err.c, opt.h: - Implement LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO configuration option to enable/disable SO_RCVTIMEO - on UDP sockets/netconn. - - 2007-03-08 Simon Goldschmidt - * snmp_msg.h, msg_in.c: SNMP UDP ports can be configured at compile time. - - 2007-03-06 Frédéric Bernon - * api.h, api_lib.c, sockets.h, sockets.c, tcpip.c, sys.h, sys.c, err.h: - Implement SO_RCVTIMEO on UDP sockets/netconn. - - 2007-02-28 Kieran Mansley (based on patch from Simon Goldschmidt) - * api_lib.c, tcpip.c, memp.c, memp.h: make API msg structs allocated - on the stack and remove the API msg type from memp - - 2007-02-26 Jonathan Larmour (based on patch from Simon Goldschmidt) - * sockets.h, sockets.c: Move socket initialization to new - lwip_socket_init() function. - NOTE: this changes the API with ports. Ports will have to be - updated to call lwip_socket_init() now. - - 2007-02-26 Jonathan Larmour (based on patch from Simon Goldschmidt) - * api_lib.c: Use memcpy in netbuf_copy_partial. - - - ++ Bug fixes: - - 2008-03-17 Frédéric Bernon, Ed Kerekes - * igmp.h, igmp.c: Fix bug #22613 "IGMP iphdr problem" (could have - some problems to fill the IP header on some targets, use now the - ip.h macros to do it). - - 2008-03-13 Frédéric Bernon - * sockets.c: Fix bug #22435 "lwip_recvfrom with TCP break;". Using - (lwip_)recvfrom with valid "from" and "fromlen" parameters, on a - TCP connection caused a crash. Note that using (lwip_)recvfrom - like this is a bit slow and that using (lwip)getpeername is the - good lwip way to do it (so, using recv is faster on tcp sockets). - - 2008-03-12 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour - * api_msg.c, contrib/apps/ping.c: Fix bug #22530 "api_msg.c's - recv_raw() does not consume data", and the ping sample (with - LWIP_SOCKET=1, the code did the wrong supposition that lwip_recvfrom - returned the IP payload, without the IP header). - - 2008-03-04 Jonathan Larmour - * mem.c, stats.c, mem.h: apply patch #6414 to avoid compiler errors - and/or warnings on some systems where mem_size_t and size_t differ. - * pbuf.c, ppp.c: Fix warnings on some systems with mem_malloc. - - 2008-03-04 Kieran Mansley (contributions by others) - * Numerous small compiler error/warning fixes from contributions to - mailing list after 1.3.0 release candidate made. - - 2008-01-25 Cui hengbin (integrated by Frédéric Bernon) - * dns.c: Fix bug #22108 "DNS problem" caused by unaligned structures. - - 2008-01-15 Kieran Mansley - * tcp_out.c: BUG20511. Modify persist timer to start when we are - prevented from sending by a small send window, not just a zero - send window. - - 2008-01-09 Jonathan Larmour - * opt.h, ip.c: Rename IP_OPTIONS define to IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED to avoid - conflict with Linux system headers. - - 2008-01-06 Jonathan Larmour - * dhcp.c: fix bug #19927: "DHCP NACK problem" by clearing any existing set IP - address entirely on receiving a DHCPNAK, and restarting discovery. - - 2007-12-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * sys.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: fix bug #21698: "netconn->recv_avail - is not protected" by using new macros for interlocked access to modify/test - netconn->recv_avail. - - 2007-12-20 Kieran Mansley (based on patch from Oleg Tyshev) - * tcp_in.c: fix bug# 21535 (nrtx not reset correctly in SYN_SENT state) - - 2007-12-20 Kieran Mansley (based on patch from Per-Henrik Lundbolm) - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: fix bug #20199 (better handling - of silly window avoidance and prevent lwIP from shrinking the window) - - 2007-12-04 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fix bug #21699 (segment leak in ooseq processing when last - data packet was lost): add assert that all segment lists are empty in - tcp_pcb_remove before setting pcb to CLOSED state; don't directly set CLOSED - state from LAST_ACK in tcp_process - - 2007-12-02 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.h: fix bug #21654: exclude definition of struct timeval from #ifndef FD_SET - If including for system-struct timeval, LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE now - has to be set to 0 in lwipopts.h - - 2007-12-02 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c, api_lib.c: fix bug #21656 (recvmbox problem in netconn API): always - allocate a recvmbox in netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback. For a tcp-listen - netconn, this recvmbox is later freed and a new mbox is allocated for acceptmbox. - This is a fix for thread-safety and allocates all items needed for a netconn - when the netconn is created. - - 2007-11-30 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.c: first attempt to fix bug #21655 (DHCP doesn't work reliably with multiple - netifs): if LWIP_DHCP is enabled, UDP packets to DHCP_CLIENT_PORT are passed - to netif->dhcp->pcb only (if that exists) and not to any other pcb for the same - port (only solution to let UDP pcbs 'bind' to a netif instead of an IP address) - - 2007-11-27 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip.c: fixed bug #21643 (udp_send/raw_send don't fail if netif is down) by - letting ip_route only use netifs that are up. - - 2007-11-27 Simon Goldschmidt - * err.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: Changed error handling: ERR_MEM, ERR_BUF - and ERR_RTE are seen as non-fatal, all other errors are fatal. netconns and - sockets block most operations once they have seen a fatal error. - - 2007-11-27 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.h, udp.c, dhcp.c: Implemented new function udp_sendto_if which takes the - netif to send as an argument (to be able to send on netifs that are down). - - 2007-11-26 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #21582: pcb->acked accounting can be wrong when ACKs - arrive out-of-order - - 2007-11-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, tcp_out.c, api_msg.c: Fixed bug #20287: tcp_output_nagle sends too early - Fixed the nagle algorithm; nagle now also works for all raw API applications - and has to be explicitly disabled with 'tcp_pcb->flags |= TF_NODELAY' - - 2007-11-12 Frédéric Bernon - * sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c: Fixed bug #20900. Now, most - of the netconn_peer and netconn_addr processing is done inside tcpip_thread - context in do_getaddr. - - 2007-11-10 Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c: Fixed bug: assert fired when MEMP_ARP_QUEUE was empty (which can - happen any time). Now the packet simply isn't enqueued when out of memory. - - 2007-11-01 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #21494: The send mss (pcb->mss) is set to 536 (or - TCP_MSS if that is smaller) as long as no MSS option is received from the - remote host. - - 2007-11-01 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #21491: The MSS option sent (with SYN) - is now based on TCP_MSS instead of pcb->mss (on passive open now effectively - sending our configured TCP_MSS instead of the one received). - - 2007-11-01 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #21181: On active open, the initial congestion window was - calculated based on the configured TCP_MSS, not on the MSS option received - with SYN+ACK. - - 2007-10-09 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.c, inet.c, inet.h: Fixed UDPLite: send: Checksum was always generated too - short and also was generated wrong if checksum coverage != tot_len; - receive: checksum was calculated wrong if checksum coverage != tot_len - - 2007-10-08 Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c: lfree was not updated in mem_realloc! - - 2007-10-07 Frédéric Bernon - * sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c: First step to fix "bug #20900 : Potential - crash error problem with netconn_peer & netconn_addr". VERY IMPORTANT: - this change cause an API breakage for netconn_addr, since a parameter - type change. Any compiler should cause an error without any changes in - yours netconn_peer calls (so, it can't be a "silent change"). It also - reduce a little bit the footprint for socket layer (lwip_getpeername & - lwip_getsockname use now a common lwip_getaddrname function since - netconn_peer & netconn_addr have the same parameters). - - 2007-09-20 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: Fixed bug #21080 (tcp_bind without check pcbs in TIME_WAIT state) - by checking tcp_tw_pcbs also - - 2007-09-19 Simon Goldschmidt - * icmp.c: Fixed bug #21107 (didn't reset IP TTL in ICMP echo replies) - - 2007-09-15 Mike Kleshov - * mem.c: Fixed bug #21077 (inaccuracy in calculation of lwip_stat.mem.used) - - 2007-09-06 Frédéric Bernon - * several-files: replace some #include "arch/cc.h" by "lwip/arch.h", or simply remove - it as long as "lwip/opt.h" is included before (this one include "lwip/debug.h" which - already include "lwip/arch.h"). Like that, default defines are provided by "lwip/arch.h" - if they are not defined in cc.h, in the same spirit than "lwip/opt.h" for lwipopts.h. - - 2007-08-30 Frédéric Bernon - * igmp.h, igmp.c: Some changes to remove some redundant code, add some traces, - and fix some coding style. - - 2007-08-28 Frédéric Bernon - * tcpip.c: Fix TCPIP_MSG_INPKT processing: now, tcpip_input can be used for any - kind of packets. These packets are considered like Ethernet packets (payload - pointing to ethhdr) if the netif got the NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP flag. Else, packets - are considered like IP packets (payload pointing to iphdr). - - 2007-08-27 Frédéric Bernon - * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: First fix for "bug #20900 : Potential crash error - problem with netconn_peer & netconn_addr". Introduce NETCONN_LISTEN netconn_state - and remove obsolete ones (NETCONN_RECV & NETCONN_ACCEPT). - - 2007-08-24 Kieran Mansley - * inet.c Modify (acc >> 16) test to ((acc >> 16) != 0) to help buggy - compiler (Paradigm C++) - - 2007-08-09 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac - * stats.h, stats.c, igmp.h, igmp.c, opt.h: Fix for bug #20503 : IGMP Improvement. - Introduce IGMP_STATS to centralize statistics management. - - 2007-08-09 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac - * udp.c: Fix for bug #20503 : IGMP Improvement. Enable to receive a multicast - packet on a udp pcb binded on an netif's IP address, and not on "any". - - 2007-08-09 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac - * igmp.h, igmp.c, ip.c: Fix minor changes from bug #20503 : IGMP Improvement. - This is mainly on using lookup/lookfor, and some coding styles... - - 2007-07-26 Frédéric Bernon (and "thedoctor") - * igmp.c: Fix bug #20595 to accept IGMPv3 "Query" messages. - - 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c, tcp.c: Another fix for bug #20021: by not returning an error if - tcp_output fails in tcp_close, the code in do_close_internal gets simpler - (tcp_output is called again later from tcp timers). - - 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip_frag.c: Fixed bug #20429: use the new pbuf_copy_partial instead of the old - copy_from_pbuf, which illegally modified the given pbuf. - - 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: tcp_enqueue: pcb->snd_queuelen didn't work for chaine PBUF_RAMs: - changed snd_queuelen++ to snd_queuelen += pbuf_clen(p). - - 2007-07-24 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c, tcp.c: Fix bug #20480: Check the pcb passed to tcp_listen() for the - correct state (must be CLOSED). - - 2007-07-13 Thomas Taranowski (commited by Jared Grubb) - * memp.c: Fix bug #20478: memp_malloc returned NULL+MEMP_SIZE on failed - allocation. It now returns NULL. - - 2007-07-13 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.c: Fix bug #20318: api_msg "recv" callbacks don't call pbuf_free in - all error cases. - - 2007-07-13 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.c: Fix bug #20315: possible memory leak problem if tcp_listen failed, - because current code doesn't follow rawapi.txt documentation. - - 2007-07-13 Kieran Mansley - * src/core/tcp_in.c Apply patch#5741 from Oleg Tyshev to fix bug in - out of sequence processing of received packets - - 2007-07-03 Simon Goldschmidt - * nearly-all-files: Added assertions where PBUF_RAM pbufs are used and an - assumption is made that this pbuf is in one piece (i.e. not chained). These - assumptions clash with the possibility of converting to fully pool-based - pbuf implementations, where PBUF_RAM pbufs might be chained. - - 2007-07-03 Simon Goldschmidt - * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: Final fix for bug #20021 and some other problems - when closing tcp netconns: removed conn->sem, less context switches when - closing, both netconn_close and netconn_delete should safely close tcp - connections. - - 2007-07-02 Simon Goldschmidt - * ipv4/ip.h, ipv6/ip.h, opt.h, netif.h, etharp.h, ipv4/ip.c, netif.c, raw.c, - tcp_out.c, udp.c, etharp.c: Added option LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT (default=off) - to cache ARP table indices with each pcb instead of single-entry cache for - the complete stack. - - 2007-07-02 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Added some ASSERTS and casts to prevent - warnings when assigning to smaller types. - - 2007-06-28 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp_out.c: Added check to prevent tcp_pcb->snd_queuelen from overflowing. - - 2007-06-28 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h: Fixed bug #20287: Fixed nagle algorithm (sending was done too early if - a segment contained chained pbufs) - - 2007-06-28 Frédéric Bernon - * autoip.c: replace most of rand() calls by a macro LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND which compute - a "pseudo-random" value based on netif's MAC and some autoip fields. It's always - possible to define this macro in your own lwipopts.h to always use C library's - rand(). Note that autoip_create_rand_addr doesn't use this macro. - - 2007-06-28 Frédéric Bernon - * netifapi.h, netifapi.c, tcpip.h, tcpip.c: Update code to handle the option - LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING, and do some changes to be coherent with last modifications - in api_lib/api_msg (use pointers and not type with table, etc...) - - 2007-06-26 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.h: Fixed bug #20259: struct udp_hdr was lacking the packin defines. - - 2007-06-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.c: Fixed bug #20253: icmp_dest_unreach was called with a wrong p->payload - for udp packets with no matching pcb. - - 2007-06-25 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.c: Fixed bug #20220: UDP PCB search in udp_input(): a non-local match - could get udp input packets if the remote side matched. - - 2007-06-13 Simon Goldschmidt - * netif.c: Fixed bug #20180 (TCP pcbs listening on IP_ADDR_ANY could get - changed in netif_set_ipaddr if previous netif->ip_addr.addr was 0. - - 2007-06-13 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c: pcb_new sets conn->err if protocol is not implemented - -> netconn_new_..() does not allocate a new connection for unsupported - protocols. - - 2007-06-13 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c: change return expression in netconn_addr and netconn_peer, because - conn->err was reset to ERR_OK without any reasons (and error was lost)... - - 2007-06-13 Frédéric Bernon, Matthias Weisser - * opt.h, mem.h, mem.c, memp.c, pbuf.c, ip_frag.c, vj.c: Fix bug #20162. Rename - MEM_ALIGN in LWIP_MEM_ALIGN and MEM_ALIGN_SIZE in LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE to avoid - some macro names collision with some OS macros. - - 2007-06-11 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.c: UDP Lite: corrected the use of chksum_len (based on RFC3828: if it's 0, - create checksum over the complete packet. On RX, if it's < 8 (and not 0), - discard the packet. Also removed the duplicate 'udphdr->chksum = 0' for both - UDP & UDP Lite. - - 2007-06-11 Srinivas Gollakota & Oleg Tyshev - * tcp_out.c: Fix for bug #20075 : "A problem with keep-alive timer and TCP flags" - where TCP flags wasn't initialized in tcp_keepalive. - - 2007-06-03 Simon Goldschmidt - * udp.c: udp_input(): Input pbuf was not freed if pcb had no recv function - registered, p->payload was modified without modifying p->len if sending - icmp_dest_unreach() (had no negative effect but was definitively wrong). - - 2007-06-03 Simon Goldschmidt - * icmp.c: Corrected bug #19937: For responding to an icmp echo request, icmp - re-used the input pbuf even if that didn't have enough space to include the - link headers. Now the space is tested and a new pbuf is allocated for the - echo response packet if the echo request pbuf isn't big enough. - - 2007-06-01 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: Checked in patch #5914: Moved sockopt processing into tcpip_thread. - - 2007-05-23 Frédéric Bernon - * api_lib.c, sockets.c: Fixed bug #5958 for netconn_listen (acceptmbox only - allocated by do_listen if success) and netconn_accept errors handling. In - most of api_lib functions, we replace some errors checkings like "if (conn==NULL)" - by ASSERT, except for netconn_delete. - - 2007-05-23 Frédéric Bernon - * api_lib.c: Fixed bug #5957 "Safe-thread problem inside netconn_recv" to return - an error code if it's impossible to fetch a pbuf on a TCP connection (and not - directly close the recvmbox). - - 2007-05-22 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.c: Fixed bug #1895 (tcp_bind not correct) by introducing a list of - bound but unconnected (and non-listening) tcp_pcbs. - - 2007-05-22 Frédéric Bernon - * sys.h, sys.c, api_lib.c, tcpip.c: remove sys_mbox_fetch_timeout() (was only - used for LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO option) and use sys_arch_mbox_fetch() instead of - sys_mbox_fetch() in api files. Now, users SHOULD NOT use internal lwIP features - like "sys_timeout" in their application threads. - - 2007-05-22 Frédéric Bernon - * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c: change the struct api_msg_msg to see - which parameters are used by which do_xxx function, and to avoid "misusing" - parameters (patch #5938). - - 2007-05-22 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, raw.c, api.h, api_msg.h, raw.h: Included patch #5938: - changed raw_pcb.protocol from u16_t to u8_t since for IPv4 and IPv6, proto - is only 8 bits wide. This affects the api, as there, the protocol was - u16_t, too. - - 2007-05-18 Simon Goldschmidt - * memp.c: addition to patch #5913: smaller pointer was returned but - memp_memory was the same size -> did not save memory. - - 2007-05-16 Simon Goldschmidt - * loopif.c, slipif.c: Fix bug #19729: free pbuf if netif->input() returns - != ERR_OK. - - 2007-05-16 Simon Goldschmidt - * api_msg.c, udp.c: If a udp_pcb has a local_ip set, check if it is the same - as the one of the netif used for sending to prevent sending from old - addresses after a netif address gets changed (partly fixes bug #3168). - - 2007-05-16 Frédéric Bernon - * tcpip.c, igmp.h, igmp.c: Fixed bug "#19800 : IGMP: igmp_tick() will not work - with NO_SYS=1". Note that igmp_init is always in tcpip_thread (and not in - tcpip_init) because we have to be sure that network interfaces are already - added (mac filter is updated only in igmp_init for the moment). - - 2007-05-16 Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c, memp.c: Removed semaphores from memp, changed sys_sem_wait calls - into sys_arch_sem_wait calls to prevent timers from running while waiting - for the heap. This fixes bug #19167. - - 2007-05-13 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcp.h, sockets.h, sockets.c: Fixed bug from patch #5865 by moving the defines - for socket options (lwip_set/-getsockopt) used with level IPPROTO_TCP from - tcp.h to sockets.h. - - 2007-05-07 Simon Goldschmidt - * mem.c: Another attempt to fix bug #17922. - - 2007-05-04 Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.c, pbuf.h, etharp.c: Further update to ARP queueing: Changed pbuf_copy() - implementation so that it can be reused (don't allocate the target - pbuf inside pbuf_copy()). - - 2007-05-04 Simon Goldschmidt - * memp.c: checked in patch #5913: in memp_malloc() we can return memp as mem - to save a little RAM (next pointer of memp is not used while not in pool). - - 2007-05-03 "maq" - * sockets.c: Fix ioctl FIONREAD when some data remains from last recv. - (patch #3574). - - 2007-04-23 Simon Goldschmidt - * loopif.c, loopif.h, opt.h, src/netif/FILES: fix bug #2595: "loopif results - in NULL reference for incoming TCP packets". Loopif has to be configured - (using LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTITHREADING) to directly call netif->input() - (multithreading environments, e.g. netif->input() = tcpip_input()) or - putting packets on a list that is fed to the stack by calling loopif_poll() - (single-thread / NO_SYS / polling environment where e.g. - netif->input() = ip_input). - - 2007-04-17 Jonathan Larmour - * pbuf.c: Use s32_t in pbuf_realloc(), as an s16_t can't reliably hold - the difference between two u16_t's. - * sockets.h: FD_SETSIZE needs to match number of sockets, which is - MEMP_NUM_NETCONN in sockets.c right now. - - 2007-04-12 Jonathan Larmour - * icmp.c: Reset IP header TTL in ICMP ECHO responses (bug #19580). - - 2007-04-12 Kieran Mansley - * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: Modify way the retransmission - timer is reset to fix bug#19434, with help from Oleg Tyshev. - - 2007-04-11 Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c, pbuf.c, pbuf.h: 3rd fix for bug #11400 (arp-queuing): More pbufs than - previously thought need to be copied (everything but PBUF_ROM!). Cleaned up - pbuf.c: removed functions no needed any more (by etharp). - - 2007-04-11 Kieran Mansley - * inet.c, ip_addr.h, sockets.h, sys.h, tcp.h: Apply patch #5745: Fix - "Constant is long" warnings with 16bit compilers. Contributed by - avatar@mmlab.cse.yzu.edu.tw - - 2007-04-05 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour - * api_msg.c: Fix bug #16830: "err_tcp() posts to connection mailbox when no pend on - the mailbox is active". Now, the post is only done during a connect, and do_send, - do_write and do_join_leave_group don't do anything if a previous error was signaled. - - 2007-04-03 Frédéric Bernon - * ip.c: Don't set the IP_DF ("Don't fragment") flag in the IP header in IP output - packets. See patch #5834. - - 2007-03-30 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.c: add a "pcb_new" helper function to avoid redundant code, and to add - missing pcb allocations checking (in do_bind, and for each raw_new). Fix style. - - 2007-03-30 Frédéric Bernon - * most of files: prefix all debug.h define with "LWIP_" to avoid any conflict with - others environment defines (these were too "generic"). - - 2007-03-28 Frédéric Bernon - * api.h, api_lib.c, sockets.c: netbuf_ref doesn't check its internal pbuf_alloc call - result and can cause a crash. lwip_send now check netbuf_ref result. - - 2007-03-28 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c Remove "#include " from sockets.c to avoid multiple - definition of macros (in errno.h and lwip/arch.h) if LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO is - defined. This is the way it should have been already (looking at - doc/sys_arch.txt) - - 2007-03-28 Kieran Mansley - * opt.h Change default PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE (again) to accomodate default MSS + - IP and TCP headers *and* physical link headers - - 2007-03-26 Frédéric Bernon (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) - * api_lib.c: patch for netconn_write(), fixes a possible race condition which cause - to send some garbage. It is not a definitive solution, but the patch does solve - the problem for most cases. - - 2007-03-22 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.h, api_msg.c: Remove obsolete API_MSG_ACCEPT and do_accept (never used). - - 2007-03-22 Frédéric Bernon - * api_lib.c: somes resources couldn't be freed if there was errors during - netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback. - - 2007-03-22 Frédéric Bernon - * ethernetif.c: update netif->input calls to check return value. In older ports, - it's a good idea to upgrade them, even if before, there could be another problem - (access to an uninitialized mailbox). - - 2007-03-21 Simon Goldschmidt - * sockets.c: fixed bug #5067 (essentialy a signed/unsigned warning fixed - by casting to unsigned). - - 2007-03-21 Frédéric Bernon - * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, tcpip.c: integrate sys_mbox_fetch(conn->mbox, NULL) calls from - api_lib.c to tcpip.c's tcpip_apimsg(). Now, use a local variable and not a - dynamic one from memp to send tcpip_msg to tcpip_thread in a synchrone call. - Free tcpip_msg from tcpip_apimsg is not done in tcpip_thread. This give a - faster and more reliable communication between api_lib and tcpip. - - 2007-03-21 Frédéric Bernon - * opt.h: Add LWIP_NETIF_CALLBACK (to avoid compiler warning) and set it to 0. - - 2007-03-21 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.c, igmp.c, igmp.h: Fix C++ style comments - - 2007-03-21 Kieran Mansley - * opt.h Change default PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE to accomodate default MSS + - IP and TCP headers - - 2007-03-21 Kieran Mansley - * Fix all uses of pbuf_header to check the return value. In some - cases just assert if it fails as I'm not sure how to fix them, but - this is no worse than before when they would carry on regardless - of the failure. - - 2007-03-21 Kieran Mansley - * sockets.c, igmp.c, igmp.h, memp.h: Fix C++ style comments and - comment out missing header include in icmp.c - - 2007-03-20 Frédéric Bernon - * memp.h, stats.c: Fix stats_display function where memp_names table wasn't - synchronized with memp.h. - - 2007-03-20 Frédéric Bernon - * tcpip.c: Initialize tcpip's mbox, and verify if initialized in tcpip_input, - tcpip_ethinput, tcpip_callback, tcpip_apimsg, to fix a init problem with - network interfaces. Also fix a compiler warning. - - 2007-03-20 Kieran Mansley - * udp.c: Only try and use pbuf_header() to make space for headers if - not a ROM or REF pbuf. - - 2007-03-19 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.h, api_msg.c, tcpip.h, tcpip.c: Add return types to tcpip_apimsg() - and api_msg_post(). - - 2007-03-19 Frédéric Bernon - * Remove unimplemented "memp_realloc" function from memp.h. - - 2007-03-11 Simon Goldschmidt - * pbuf.c: checked in patch #5796: pbuf_alloc: len field claculation caused - memory corruption. - - 2007-03-11 Simon Goldschmidt (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) - * api_lib.c, sockets.c, api.h, api_msg.h, sockets.h: Fixed bug #19251 - (missing `const' qualifier in socket functions), to get more compatible to - standard POSIX sockets. - - 2007-03-11 Frédéric Bernon (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) - * sockets.c: Add asserts inside bind, connect and sendto to check input - parameters. Remove excessive set_errno() calls after get_socket(), because - errno is set inside of get_socket(). Move last sock_set_errno() inside - lwip_close. - - 2007-03-09 Simon Goldschmidt - * memp.c: Fixed bug #11400: New etharp queueing introduced bug: memp_memory - was allocated too small. - - 2007-03-06 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcpip.c: Initialize dhcp timers in tcpip_thread (if LWIP_DHCP) to protect - the stack from concurrent access. - - 2007-03-06 Frédéric Bernon, Dmitry Potapov - * tcpip.c, ip_frag.c, ethernetif.c: Fix some build problems, and a redundancy - call to "lwip_stats.link.recv++;" in low_level_input() & ethernetif_input(). - - 2007-03-06 Simon Goldschmidt - * ip_frag.c, ip_frag.h: Reduce code size: don't include code in those files - if IP_FRAG == 0 and IP_REASSEMBLY == 0 - - 2007-03-06 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - * opt.h, ip_frag.h, tcpip.h, tcpip.c, ethernetif.c: add new configuration - option named ETHARP_TCPIP_ETHINPUT, which enable the new tcpip_ethinput. - Allow to do ARP processing for incoming packets inside tcpip_thread - (protecting ARP layer against concurrent access). You can also disable - old code using tcp_input with new define ETHARP_TCPIP_INPUT set to 0. - Older ports have to use tcpip_ethinput. - - 2007-03-06 Simon Goldschmidt (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) - * err.h, err.c: fixed compiler warning "initialization dircards qualifiers - from pointer target type" - - 2007-03-05 Frédéric Bernon - * opt.h, sockets.h: add new configuration options (LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES, - ETHARP_TRUST_IP_MAC, review SO_REUSE) - - 2007-03-04 Frédéric Bernon - * api_msg.c: Remove some compiler warnings : parameter "pcb" was never - referenced. - - 2007-03-04 Frédéric Bernon - * api_lib.c: Fix "[patch #5764] api_lib.c cleanup: after patch #5687" (from - Dmitry Potapov). - The api_msg struct stay on the stack (not moved to netconn struct). - - 2007-03-04 Simon Goldschmidt (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) - * pbuf.c: Fix BUG#19168 - pbuf_free can cause deadlock (if - SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT=1 & freeing PBUF_RAM when mem_sem is not available) - Also fixed cast warning in pbuf_alloc() - - 2007-03-04 Simon Goldschmidt - * etharp.c, etharp.h, memp.c, memp.h, opt.h: Fix BUG#11400 - don't corrupt - existing pbuf chain when enqueuing multiple pbufs to a pending ARP request - - 2007-03-03 Frédéric Bernon - * udp.c: remove obsolete line "static struct udp_pcb *pcb_cache = NULL;" - It is static, and never used in udp.c except udp_init(). - - 2007-03-02 Simon Goldschmidt - * tcpip.c: Moved call to ip_init(), udp_init() and tcp_init() from - tcpip_thread() to tcpip_init(). This way, raw API connections can be - initialized before tcpip_thread is running (e.g. before OS is started) - - 2007-03-02 Frédéric Bernon - * rawapi.txt: Fix documentation mismatch with etharp.h about etharp_tmr's call - interval. - - 2007-02-28 Kieran Mansley - * pbuf.c: Fix BUG#17645 - ensure pbuf payload pointer is not moved - outside the region of the pbuf by pbuf_header() - - 2007-02-28 Kieran Mansley - * sockets.c: Fix BUG#19161 - ensure milliseconds timeout is non-zero - when supplied timeout is also non-zero - -(STABLE-1.2.0) - - 2006-12-05 Leon Woestenberg - * CHANGELOG: Mention STABLE-1.2.0 release. - - ++ New features: - - 2006-12-01 Christiaan Simons - * mem.h, opt.h: Added MEM_LIBC_MALLOC option. - Note this is a workaround. Currently I have no other options left. - - 2006-10-26 Christiaan Simons (accepted patch by Jonathan Larmour) - * ipv4/ip_frag.c: rename MAX_MTU to IP_FRAG_MAX_MTU and move define - to include/lwip/opt.h. - * ipv4/lwip/ip_frag.h: Remove unused IP_REASS_INTERVAL. - Move IP_REASS_MAXAGE and IP_REASS_BUFSIZE to include/lwip/opt.h. - * opt.h: Add above new options. - - 2006-08-18 Christiaan Simons - * tcp_{in,out}.c: added SNMP counters. - * ipv4/ip.c: added SNMP counters. - * ipv4/ip_frag.c: added SNMP counters. - - 2006-08-08 Christiaan Simons - * etharp.{c,h}: added etharp_find_addr() to read - (stable) ethernet/IP address pair from ARP table - - 2006-07-14 Christiaan Simons - * mib_structs.c: added - * include/lwip/snmp_structs.h: added - * netif.{c,h}, netif/ethernetif.c: added SNMP statistics to netif struct - - 2006-07-06 Christiaan Simons - * snmp/asn1_{enc,dec}.c added - * snmp/mib2.c added - * snmp/msg_{in,out}.c added - * include/lwip/snmp_asn1.h added - * include/lwip/snmp_msg.h added - * doc/snmp_agent.txt added - - 2006-03-29 Christiaan Simons - * inet.c, inet.h: Added platform byteswap support. - Added LWIP_PLATFORM_BYTESWAP define (defaults to 0) and - optional LWIP_PLATFORM_HTONS(), LWIP_PLATFORM_HTONL() macros. - - ++ Bug fixes: - - 2006-11-30 Christiaan Simons - * dhcp.c: Fixed false triggers of request_timeout. - - 2006-11-28 Christiaan Simons - * netif.c: In netif_add() fixed missing clear of ip_addr, netmask, gw and flags. - - 2006-10-11 Christiaan Simons - * api_lib.c etharp.c, ip.c, memp.c, stats.c, sys.{c,h} tcp.h: - Partially accepted patch #5449 for ANSI C compatibility / build fixes. - * ipv4/lwip/ip.h ipv6/lwip/ip.h: Corrected UDP-Lite protocol - identifier from 170 to 136 (bug #17574). - - 2006-10-10 Christiaan Simons - * api_msg.c: Fixed Nagle algorithm as reported by Bob Grice. - - 2006-08-17 Christiaan Simons - * udp.c: Fixed bug #17200, added check for broadcast - destinations for PCBs bound to a unicast address. - - 2006-08-07 Christiaan Simons - * api_msg.c: Flushing TCP output in do_close() (bug #15926). - - 2006-06-27 Christiaan Simons - * api_msg.c: Applied patch for cold case (bug #11135). - In accept_function() ensure newconn->callback is always initialized. - - 2006-06-15 Christiaan Simons - * mem.h: added MEM_SIZE_F alias to fix an ancient cold case (bug #1748), - facilitate printing of mem_size_t and u16_t statistics. - - 2006-06-14 Christiaan Simons - * api_msg.c: Applied patch #5146 to handle allocation failures - in accept() by Kevin Lawson. - - 2006-05-26 Christiaan Simons - * api_lib.c: Removed conn->sem creation and destruction - from netconn_write() and added sys_sem_new to netconn_new_*. - -(STABLE-1_1_1) - - 2006-03-03 Christiaan Simons - * ipv4/ip_frag.c: Added bound-checking assertions on ip_reassbitmap - access and added pbuf_alloc() return value checks. - - 2006-01-01 Leon Woestenberg - * tcp_{in,out}.c, tcp_out.c: Removed 'even sndbuf' fix in TCP, which is - now handled by the checksum routine properly. - - 2006-02-27 Leon Woestenberg - * pbuf.c: Fix alignment; pbuf_init() would not work unless - pbuf_pool_memory[] was properly aligned. (Patch by Curt McDowell.) - - 2005-12-20 Leon Woestenberg - * tcp.c: Remove PCBs which stay in LAST_ACK state too long. Patch - submitted by Mitrani Hiroshi. - - 2005-12-15 Christiaan Simons - * inet.c: Disabled the added summing routine to preserve code space. - - 2005-12-14 Leon Woestenberg - * tcp_in.c: Duplicate FIN ACK race condition fix by Kelvin Lawson. - Added Curt McDowell's optimized checksumming routine for future - inclusion. Need to create test case for unaliged, aligned, odd, - even length combination of cases on various endianess machines. - - 2005-12-09 Christiaan Simons - * inet.c: Rewrote standard checksum routine in proper portable C. - - 2005-11-25 Christiaan Simons - * udp.c tcp.c: Removed SO_REUSE hack. Should reside in socket code only. - * *.c: introduced cc.h LWIP_DEBUG formatters matching the u16_t, s16_t, - u32_t, s32_t typedefs. This solves most debug word-length assumes. - - 2005-07-17 Leon Woestenberg - * inet.c: Fixed unaligned 16-bit access in the standard checksum - routine by Peter Jolasson. - * slipif.c: Fixed implementation assumption of single-pbuf datagrams. - - 2005-02-04 Leon Woestenberg - * tcp_out.c: Fixed uninitialized 'queue' referenced in memerr branch. - * tcp_{out|in}.c: Applied patch fixing unaligned access. - - 2005-01-04 Leon Woestenberg - * pbuf.c: Fixed missing semicolon after LWIP_DEBUG statement. - - 2005-01-03 Leon Woestenberg - * udp.c: UDP pcb->recv() was called even when it was NULL. - -(STABLE-1_1_0) - - 2004-12-28 Leon Woestenberg - * etharp.*: Disabled multiple packets on the ARP queue. - This clashes with TCP queueing. - - 2004-11-28 Leon Woestenberg - * etharp.*: Fixed race condition from ARP request to ARP timeout. - Halved the ARP period, doubled the period counts. - ETHARP_MAX_PENDING now should be at least 2. This prevents - the counter from reaching 0 right away (which would allow - too little time for ARP responses to be received). - - 2004-11-25 Leon Woestenberg - * dhcp.c: Decline messages were not multicast but unicast. - * etharp.c: ETHARP_CREATE is renamed to ETHARP_TRY_HARD. - Do not try hard to insert arbitrary packet's source address, - etharp_ip_input() now calls etharp_update() without ETHARP_TRY_HARD. - etharp_query() now always DOES call ETHARP_TRY_HARD so that users - querying an address will see it appear in the cache (DHCP could - suffer from this when a server invalidly gave an in-use address.) - * ipv4/ip_addr.h: Renamed ip_addr_maskcmp() to _netcmp() as we are - comparing network addresses (identifiers), not the network masks - themselves. - * ipv4/ip_addr.c: ip_addr_isbroadcast() now checks that the given - IP address actually belongs to the network of the given interface. - - 2004-11-24 Kieran Mansley - * tcp.c: Increment pcb->snd_buf when ACK is received in SYN_SENT state. - -(STABLE-1_1_0-RC1) - - 2004-10-16 Kieran Mansley - * tcp.c: Add code to tcp_recved() to send an ACK (window update) immediately, - even if one is already pending, if the rcv_wnd is above a threshold - (currently TCP_WND/2). This avoids waiting for a timer to expire to send a - delayed ACK in order to open the window if the stack is only receiving data. - - 2004-09-12 Kieran Mansley - * tcp*.*: Retransmit time-out handling improvement by Sam Jansen. - - 2004-08-20 Tony Mountifield - * etharp.c: Make sure the first pbuf queued on an ARP entry - is properly ref counted. - - 2004-07-27 Tony Mountifield - * debug.h: Added (int) cast in LWIP_DEBUGF() to avoid compiler - warnings about comparison. - * pbuf.c: Stopped compiler complaining of empty if statement - when LWIP_DEBUGF() empty. Closed an unclosed comment. - * tcp.c: Stopped compiler complaining of empty if statement - when LWIP_DEBUGF() empty. - * ip.h Corrected IPH_TOS() macro: returns a byte, so doesn't need htons(). - * inet.c: Added a couple of casts to quiet the compiler. - No need to test isascii(c) before isdigit(c) or isxdigit(c). - - 2004-07-22 Tony Mountifield - * inet.c: Made data types consistent in inet_ntoa(). - Added casts for return values of checksum routines, to pacify compiler. - * ip_frag.c, tcp_out.c, sockets.c, pbuf.c - Small corrections to some debugging statements, to pacify compiler. - - 2004-07-21 Tony Mountifield - * etharp.c: Removed spurious semicolon and added missing end-of-comment. - * ethernetif.c Updated low_level_output() to match prototype for - netif->linkoutput and changed low_level_input() similarly for consistency. - * api_msg.c: Changed recv_raw() from int to u8_t, to match prototype - of raw_recv() in raw.h and so avoid compiler error. - * sockets.c: Added trivial (int) cast to keep compiler happier. - * ip.c, netif.c Changed debug statements to use the tidier ip4_addrN() macros. - -(STABLE-1_0_0) - - ++ Changes: - - 2004-07-05 Leon Woestenberg - * sockets.*: Restructured LWIP_PRIVATE_TIMEVAL. Make sure - your cc.h file defines this either 1 or 0. If non-defined, - defaults to 1. - * .c: Added and includes where used. - * etharp.c: Made some array indices unsigned. - - 2004-06-27 Leon Woestenberg - * netif.*: Added netif_set_up()/down(). - * dhcp.c: Changes to restart program flow. - - 2004-05-07 Leon Woestenberg - * etharp.c: In find_entry(), instead of a list traversal per candidate, do a - single-pass lookup for different candidates. Should exploit locality. - - 2004-04-29 Leon Woestenberg - * tcp*.c: Cleaned up source comment documentation for Doxygen processing. - * opt.h: ETHARP_ALWAYS_INSERT option removed to comply with ARP RFC. - * etharp.c: update_arp_entry() only adds new ARP entries when adviced to by - the caller. This deprecates the ETHARP_ALWAYS_INSERT overrule option. - - ++ Bug fixes: - - 2004-04-27 Leon Woestenberg - * etharp.c: Applied patch of bug #8708 by Toni Mountifield with a solution - suggested by Timmy Brolin. Fix for 32-bit processors that cannot access - non-aligned 32-bit words, such as soms 32-bit TCP/IP header fields. Fix - is to prefix the 14-bit Ethernet headers with two padding bytes. - - 2004-04-23 Leon Woestenberg - * ip_addr.c: Fix in the ip_addr_isbroadcast() check. - * etharp.c: Fixed the case where the packet that initiates the ARP request - is not queued, and gets lost. Fixed the case where the packets destination - address is already known; we now always queue the packet and perform an ARP - request. - -(STABLE-0_7_0) - - ++ Bug fixes: - - * Fixed TCP bug for SYN_SENT to ESTABLISHED state transition. - * Fixed TCP bug in dequeueing of FIN from out of order segment queue. - * Fixed two possible NULL references in rare cases. - -(STABLE-0_6_6) - - ++ Bug fixes: - - * Fixed DHCP which did not include the IP address in DECLINE messages. - - ++ Changes: - - * etharp.c has been hauled over a bit. - -(STABLE-0_6_5) - - ++ Bug fixes: - - * Fixed TCP bug induced by bad window resizing with unidirectional TCP traffic. - * Packets sent from ARP queue had invalid source hardware address. - - ++ Changes: - - * Pass-by ARP requests do now update the cache. - - ++ New features: - - * No longer dependent on ctype.h. - * New socket options. - * Raw IP pcb support. - -(STABLE-0_6_4) - - ++ Bug fixes: - - * Some debug formatters and casts fixed. - * Numereous fixes in PPP. - - ++ Changes: - - * DEBUGF now is LWIP_DEBUGF - * pbuf_dechain() has been re-enabled. - * Mentioned the changed use of CVS branches in README. - -(STABLE-0_6_3) - - ++ Bug fixes: - - * Fixed pool pbuf memory leak in pbuf_alloc(). - Occured if not enough PBUF_POOL pbufs for a packet pbuf chain. - Reported by Savin Zlobec. - - * PBUF_POOL chains had their tot_len field not set for non-first - pbufs. Fixed in pbuf_alloc(). - - ++ New features: - - * Added PPP stack contributed by Marc Boucher - - ++ Changes: - - * Now drops short packets for ICMP/UDP/TCP protocols. More robust. - - * ARP queueuing now queues the latest packet instead of the first. - This is the RFC recommended behaviour, but can be overridden in - lwipopts.h. - -(0.6.2) - - ++ Bugfixes: - - * TCP has been fixed to deal with the new use of the pbuf->ref - counter. - - * DHCP dhcp_inform() crash bug fixed. - - ++ Changes: - - * Removed pbuf_pool_free_cache and pbuf_pool_alloc_cache. Also removed - pbuf_refresh(). This has sped up pbuf pool operations considerably. - Implemented by David Haas. - -(0.6.1) - - ++ New features: - - * The packet buffer implementation has been enhanced to support - zero-copy and copy-on-demand for packet buffers which have their - payloads in application-managed memory. - Implemented by David Haas. - - Use PBUF_REF to make a pbuf refer to RAM. lwIP will use zero-copy - if an outgoing packet can be directly sent on the link, or perform - a copy-on-demand when necessary. - - The application can safely assume the packet is sent, and the RAM - is available to the application directly after calling udp_send() - or similar function. - - ++ Bugfixes: - - * ARP_QUEUEING should now correctly work for all cases, including - PBUF_REF. - Implemented by Leon Woestenberg. - - ++ Changes: - - * IP_ADDR_ANY is no longer a NULL pointer. Instead, it is a pointer - to a '0.0.0.0' IP address. - - * The packet buffer implementation is changed. The pbuf->ref counter - meaning has changed, and several pbuf functions have been - adapted accordingly. - - * netif drivers have to be changed to set the hardware address length field - that must be initialized correctly by the driver (hint: 6 for Ethernet MAC). - See the contrib/ports/c16x cs8900 driver as a driver example. - - * netif's have a dhcp field that must be initialized to NULL by the driver. - See the contrib/ports/c16x cs8900 driver as a driver example. - -(0.5.x) This file has been unmaintained up to 0.6.1. All changes are - logged in CVS but have not been explained here. - -(0.5.3) Changes since version 0.5.2 - - ++ Bugfixes: - - * memp_malloc(MEMP_API_MSG) could fail with multiple application - threads because it wasn't protected by semaphores. - - ++ Other changes: - - * struct ip_addr now packed. - - * The name of the time variable in arp.c has been changed to ctime - to avoid conflicts with the time() function. - -(0.5.2) Changes since version 0.5.1 - - ++ New features: - - * A new TCP function, tcp_tmr(), now handles both TCP timers. - - ++ Bugfixes: - - * A bug in tcp_parseopt() could cause the stack to hang because of a - malformed TCP option. - - * The address of new connections in the accept() function in the BSD - socket library was not handled correctly. - - * pbuf_dechain() did not update the ->tot_len field of the tail. - - * Aborted TCP connections were not handled correctly in all - situations. - - ++ Other changes: - - * All protocol header structs are now packed. - - * The ->len field in the tcp_seg structure now counts the actual - amount of data, and does not add one for SYN and FIN segments. - -(0.5.1) Changes since version 0.5.0 - - ++ New features: - - * Possible to run as a user process under Linux. - - * Preliminary support for cross platform packed structs. - - * ARP timer now implemented. - - ++ Bugfixes: - - * TCP output queue length was badly initialized when opening - connections. - - * TCP delayed ACKs were not sent correctly. - - * Explicit initialization of BSS segment variables. - - * read() in BSD socket library could drop data. - - * Problems with memory alignment. - - * Situations when all TCP buffers were used could lead to - starvation. - - * TCP MSS option wasn't parsed correctly. - - * Problems with UDP checksum calculation. - - * IP multicast address tests had endianess problems. - - * ARP requests had wrong destination hardware address. - - ++ Other changes: - - * struct eth_addr changed from u16_t[3] array to u8_t[6]. - - * A ->linkoutput() member was added to struct netif. - - * TCP and UDP ->dest_* struct members where changed to ->remote_*. - - * ntoh* macros are now null definitions for big endian CPUs. - -(0.5.0) Changes since version 0.4.2 - - ++ New features: - - * Redesigned operating system emulation layer to make porting easier. - - * Better control over TCP output buffers. - - * Documenation added. - - ++ Bugfixes: - - * Locking issues in buffer management. - - * Bugfixes in the sequential API. - - * IP forwarding could cause memory leakage. This has been fixed. - - ++ Other changes: - - * Directory structure somewhat changed; the core/ tree has been - collapsed. - -(0.4.2) Changes since version 0.4.1 - - ++ New features: - - * Experimental ARP implementation added. - - * Skeleton Ethernet driver added. - - * Experimental BSD socket API library added. - - ++ Bugfixes: - - * In very intense situations, memory leakage could occur. This has - been fixed. - - ++ Other changes: - - * Variables named "data" and "code" have been renamed in order to - avoid name conflicts in certain compilers. - - * Variable++ have in appliciable cases been translated to ++variable - since some compilers generate better code in the latter case. - -(0.4.1) Changes since version 0.4 - - ++ New features: - - * TCP: Connection attempts time out earlier than data - transmissions. Nagle algorithm implemented. Push flag set on the - last segment in a burst. - - * UDP: experimental support for UDP-Lite extensions. - - ++ Bugfixes: - - * TCP: out of order segments were in some cases handled incorrectly, - and this has now been fixed. Delayed acknowledgements was broken - in 0.4, has now been fixed. Binding to an address that is in use - now results in an error. Reset connections sometimes hung an - application; this has been fixed. - - * Checksum calculation sometimes failed for chained pbufs with odd - lengths. This has been fixed. - - * API: a lot of bug fixes in the API. The UDP API has been improved - and tested. Error reporting and handling has been - improved. Logical flaws and race conditions for incoming TCP - connections has been found and removed. - - * Memory manager: alignment issues. Reallocating memory sometimes - failed, this has been fixed. - - * Generic library: bcopy was flawed and has been fixed. - - ++ Other changes: - - * API: all datatypes has been changed from generic ones such as - ints, to specified ones such as u16_t. Functions that return - errors now have the correct type (err_t). - - * General: A lot of code cleaned up and debugging code removed. Many - portability issues have been fixed. - - * The license was changed; the advertising clause was removed. - - * C64 port added. - - * Thanks: Huge thanks go to Dagan Galarneau, Horst Garnetzke, Petri - Kosunen, Mikael Caleres, and Frits Wilmink for reporting and - fixing bugs! - -(0.4) Changes since version 0.3.1 - - * Memory management has been radically changed; instead of - allocating memory from a shared heap, memory for objects that are - rapidly allocated and deallocated is now kept in pools. Allocation - and deallocation from those memory pools is very fast. The shared - heap is still present but is used less frequently. - - * The memory, memory pool, and packet buffer subsystems now support - 4-, 2-, or 1-byte alignment. - - * "Out of memory" situations are handled in a more robust way. - - * Stack usage has been reduced. - - * Easier configuration of lwIP parameters such as memory usage, - TTLs, statistics gathering, etc. All configuration parameters are - now kept in a single header file "lwipopts.h". - - * The directory structure has been changed slightly so that all - architecture specific files are kept under the src/arch - hierarchy. - - * Error propagation has been improved, both in the protocol modules - and in the API. - - * The code for the RTXC architecture has been implemented, tested - and put to use. - - * Bugs have been found and corrected in the TCP, UDP, IP, API, and - the Internet checksum modules. - - * Bugs related to porting between a 32-bit and a 16-bit architecture - have been found and corrected. - - * The license has been changed slightly to conform more with the - original BSD license, including the advertisement clause. - -(0.3.1) Changes since version 0.3 - - * Fix of a fatal bug in the buffer management. Pbufs with allocated - RAM never returned the RAM when the pbuf was deallocated. - - * TCP congestion control, window updates and retransmissions did not - work correctly. This has now been fixed. - - * Bugfixes in the API. - -(0.3) Changes since version 0.2 - - * New and improved directory structure. All include files are now - kept in a dedicated include/ directory. - - * The API now has proper error handling. A new function, - netconn_err(), now returns an error code for the connection in - case of errors. - - * Improvements in the memory management subsystem. The system now - keeps a pointer to the lowest free memory block. A new function, - mem_malloc2() tries to allocate memory once, and if it fails tries - to free some memory and retry the allocation. - - * Much testing has been done with limited memory - configurations. lwIP now does a better job when overloaded. - - * Some bugfixes and improvements to the buffer (pbuf) subsystem. - - * Many bugfixes in the TCP code: - - - Fixed a bug in tcp_close(). - - - The TCP receive window was incorrectly closed when out of - sequence segments was received. This has been fixed. - - - Connections are now timed-out of the FIN-WAIT-2 state. - - - The initial congestion window could in some cases be too - large. This has been fixed. - - - The retransmission queue could in some cases be screwed up. This - has been fixed. - - - TCP RST flag now handled correctly. - - - Out of sequence data was in some cases never delivered to the - application. This has been fixed. - - - Retransmitted segments now contain the correct acknowledgment - number and advertised window. - - - TCP retransmission timeout backoffs are not correctly computed - (ala BSD). After a number of retransmissions, TCP now gives up - the connection. - - * TCP connections now are kept on three lists, one for active - connections, one for listening connections, and one for - connections that are in TIME-WAIT. This greatly speeds up the fast - timeout processing for sending delayed ACKs. - - * TCP now provides proper feedback to the application when a - connection has been successfully set up. - - * More comments have been added to the code. The code has also been - somewhat cleaned up. - -(0.2) Initial public release. +HISTORY + * These are only the most important changes. For a full list, use git log: + http://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/lwip.git + +(git master) + + * [Enter new changes just after this line - do not remove this line] + +(STABLE-2.1.2): + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2018-11-21: Jens Nielsen + * netbiosns.c: fix expecting too large packet (bug #55069) + + 2018-11-19: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * smtp.c: fix compiling with strict C compatibility because of strnlen (bug #55034) + + 2018-11-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: fix overflow check in tcp_recved triggering invalid assertion (bug #55015) + + 2018-11-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: fix a bug in sending RST segments (sent from port 0) + +(STABLE-2.1.1): + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2018-11-01: Joan Lledó + * sockets.c: fix bad assertion in lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used() (bug #54933) + + 2018-11-01: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * ip4.c: don't send 127.* to default netif (bug #54670) + + 2018-10-23: David Girault + * altcp_tls_mbedtls.c: fix use-after free (bug #54774) + + 2018-10-23: Ognjen Bjelica, Dirk Ziegelmeier + * snmp_scalar.c: Avoid NULL pointer dereference (bug #54886) + + 2018-10-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * Fix missing standard includes in multiple files + + 2018-10-17: Ivan Warren + * def.h: fix casting htonX and ntohX to u16_t (bug #54850) + + 2018-10-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * Revert "tcp_abandon: no need to buffer pcb->local_port" (fix that source port was 0 for RST + called when aborting a connection) + + 2018-10-11: Jonas Rabenstein + * tcp.c: tcp_recved: check for overflow and warn about too big values (patch #9699) + + 2018-10-06: Joan Lledó + * sockets.c: alloc_socket(): Check for LWIP_SOCKET_POLL when setting select- + related variables (patch #9696) + + 2018-10-04: Spencer + * tcp.c: Update prev pointer when skipping entries in tcp_slowtmr (patch #9694) + + 2018-09-27: Martine Lenders + * lowpan6.c: Fix IEEE 802.15.4 address setting (bug #54749) + +(STABLE-2.1.0): + + ++ New features: + + 2018-06-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * lwiperf: implemented iPerf client mode + + 2018-04-23: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * added cmake build files + + 2018-03-04: Ray Abram + * netbios responder: respond to '*' queries + + 2018-02-23: Benjamin Aigner + * 6lowpan: add 6lowpan-over-BLE netif (based on existing 6lowpan netif) + + 2018-02-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * ipv6: add support for stateless DHCPv6 (to get DNS servers in SLAAC nets) + + 2018-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * add raw API http(s) client (with proxy support) + + 2018-02-01: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp: add hooks to implement additional socket options + + 2018-02-01: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp: add hooks to implement tcp md5 signatures or similar (see contrib/addons for an example) + + 2018-01-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * Added sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr() and tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback_fromisr() + These can be used to post preallocated messages from an ISR to the tcpip thread + (e.g. when using FreeRTOS) + + 2018-01-02: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * task #14780: Add debug helper asserts to ensure threading/locking requirements are met + + 2017-11-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * task #14600: tcp_alloc(): kill TF_CLOSEPEND connections before other ESTABLISHED + + 2017-11-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * makefsdata: added option "-ssi:" to control SSI tag checking/insertion + through a list of filenames, not by checking the file extension at runtime + + 2017-11-20: Joel Cunningham + * netconn: add LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE to use external DNS resolver (patch #9427) + + 2017-11-14: Joel Cunningham + * netifapi: Add thread safe ARP cache APIs (task #14724) + + 2017-11-06: Axel Lin + * TCP: kill existing connections with a LOWER priority than the one currently being opened. + Previous implementations also kill existing connections of the SAME priority. + + 2017-09-21: Kalle Olavi Niemitalo + * sockets: add poll() implementation (patch #9450) + + 2017-09-10: Joel Cunningham + * sockets: add readv() implementation (task #14610) + + 2017-08-04: Simon Goldschmidt + * Clean up DHCP a bit: no need keep msg_out and msg_in as members in struct + dhcp - they are used in a call stack only (p_out and options_out_len as well) + + 2017-08-04: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf: split pbuf_header(s16_t) into pbuf_add_header(size_t) and + pbuf_remove_header(size_t) + + 2017-07-20: Douglas + * sys: deprecate sys_arch_sem_wait and sys_arch_mbox_fetch returning the + time waited rather they are now defined to return != SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT + on success. + + 2017-07-03: Jakub Schmidtke + * tcp: added support for sending TCP SACKs + + 2017-06-20: Joel Cunningham + * netconn/netdb: added core locking support to netconn_gethostbyname (task #14523) + + 2017-04-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp: added two hooks for adding and parsing user defined DHCP options + + 2017-04-25: Joel Cunningham + * sockets: added recvmsg for UDP (together with CMSG and IP_PKTINFO) (task #14247) + + 2017-04-20: Joel Cunningham + * tcp: added Appropriate Byte Counting support (task #14128) + + 2017-04-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * netconn/sockets: remove fatal error handling, fix asynchronous error handling, + ensure data before RST can be received + + 2017-03-30: Simon Goldschmidt + * added "application layered TCP" connection API (altcp) for seamless integration + of TLS or proxy connections + + 2017-03-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets: add recvmsg for TCP + + 2017-03-02: Joel Cunningham + * netconn/sockets: vectorize netconn_write for TCP, treating a vectored I/O write + atomically in regards to TCP segmentation (patch #8882) + + 2017-03-02: Simon Goldschmidt + * netconn: added nonblocking accept/recv to netconn API (task #14396) + + 2017-02-28: Simon Goldschmidt + * Added LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF for small targets with only one netif + + 2017-02-10: David van Moolenbroek + * Implement UDP and RAW multicast support for IPv6 (core API, not netconn/sockets) + + 2017-02-04: David van Moolenbroek + * IPv6 scopes support + + 2017-01-20: Joel Cunningham + * sockets: add interface name/index APIs (task #14314) + + 2017-01-08: David van Moolenbroek + * Extensions to RAW API (patch #9208) + - Connected RAW PCBs + - Add raw_sendto_if_src() + - Support IP_HDRINCL socket option + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2018-06-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp: fix RTO timer not working if link is down + + 2018-06-15: Sylvain Rochet + * ppp: multiple smaller bugfixes + + 2018-05-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp: arp table can now be bigger than 127 entries + + 2018-04-25: Jens Nielsen + * tftp server: correctly handle retransmissions + + 2018-04-18: Simon Goldschmidt + sockets: fix race conditions when closing full-duplex sockets + + 2018-03-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * 6lowpan: fix to work against contiki; added ZigBee encapsulation netif for tests + + 2018-02-04: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets: fix inconsistencies on close (inconsistent error codes, double FIN) + + 2018-01-05: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Fix bug #52748: the bug in timeouts.c by reimplementing timer logic to use + absolute instead of relative timeout values + + 2017-12-31: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Fix bug #52704: DHCP and bad OFFER: Stop timeout only if offer is accepted + + 2017-11-08: Joel Cunningham + * netif: ensure link and admin states are up in issue reports (bug #52353) + + 2017-09-12: David Lockyer + * select: allocate select_cb from memp for LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE = 1 (bug #51990) + + 2017-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fix bug #51937 (leaking tcp_pcbs on passive close with unacked data) + + 2017-08-11: Joel Cunningham + * lwip_itoa: fix converting the number 0 (previously converted to '\0') (bug #51729) + + 2017-08-08: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * ip4_route_src: parameter order is reversed: ip4_route_src(dest, src) -> ip4_route_src(src, dest) + to make parameter order consistent with other ip*_route*() functions + Same also applies to LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC() parameter order. + + 2017-08-04: Joel Cunningham + * tcp: re-work persist timer to fully close window (details in bug #50837) + + 2017-07-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * snmp_msg.c: fix bug #51578 (SNMP failed to decode some values on non 32bit platforms) + + 2017-07-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * compatibility headers: moved from 'src/include/posix' to 'src/include/compat/posix', + 'src/include/compat/stdc' etc. + + 2017-05-09: Joel Cunningham + * tcp: add zero-window probe timeout (bug #50837) + + 2017-04-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: task #14420 (Remove sys_sem_signal from inside SYS_ARCH_PROTECT + crit section) done for LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 + + 2017-02-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed close race conditions in lwip_select (for LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX) + + 2017-02-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed that select ignored invalid/not open sockets in the fd_sets (bug #50392) + + 2017-01-11: David van Moolenbroek + * Lots of IPv6 related fixes and improvements + +(STABLE-2.0.3) + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2017-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fix bug #51937 (leaking tcp_pcbs on passive close with unacked data) + + 2017-08-02: Abroz Bizjak/Simon Goldschmidt + * multiple fixes in IPv4 reassembly (leading to corrupted datagrams received) + + 2017-03-30: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: return ERR_VAL instead of asserting on offset-out-of-pbuf + + 2017-03-23: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * dhcp.h: fix bug #50618 (dhcp_remove_struct() macro does not work) + +(STABLE-2.0.2) + + ++ New features: + + 2017-02-10: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Implement task #14367: Hooks need a better place to be defined: + We now have a #define for a header file name that is #included in every .c + file that provides hooks. + + 2017-02-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_close does not fail on memory error (instead, FIN is sent from tcp_tmr) + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2017-03-08 + * tcp: do not keep sending SYNs when getting ACKs + + 2017-03-08: Joel Cunningham + * tcp: Initialize ssthresh to TCP_SND_BUF (bug #50476) + + 2017-03-01: Simon Goldschmidt + * httpd: LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND: fixed double-free when httpd_post_data_recved + is called nested from httpd_post_receive_data() (bug #50424) + + 2017-02-28: David van Moolenbroek/Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp: fixed bug #50418: LWIP_EVENT_API: fix invalid calbacks for SYN_RCVD pcb + + 2017-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns: Improved DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST interface (bug #50325) + + 2017-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX: fixed shutdown during write (bug #50274) + + 2017-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt/Dirk Ziegelmeier + * For tiny targtes, LWIP_RAND is optional (fix compile time checks) + + 2017-02-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp: Fixed bug #47485 (tcp_close() should not fail on memory error) by retrying + to send FIN from tcp_fasttmr + + 2017-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets: Fixed bug #44032 (LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX: select might work on + invalid/reused socket) by not allowing to reallocate a socket that has + "select_waiting != 0" + + 2017-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * httpd: Fixed bug #50059 (httpd LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE vs. + LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED) + + 2017-02-08: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Rename "IPv6 mapped IPv4 addresses" to their correct name from RFC4191: + "IPv4-mapped IPv6 address" + + 2017-02-08: Luc Revardel + * mld6.c: Fix bug #50220 (mld6_leavegroup does not send ICMP6_TYPE_MLD, even + if last reporter) + + 2017-02-08: David van Moolenbroek + * ip6.c: Patch #9250: fix source substitution in ip6_output_if() + + 2017-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #50090 (last_unsent->oversize_left can become wrong value + in tcp_write error path) + + 2017-02-02: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Fix bug #50206: UDP Netconn bind to IP6_ADDR_ANY fails + + 2017-01-18: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Fix zero-copy RX, see bug bug #50064. PBUF_REFs were not supported as ARP requests. + + 2017-01-15: Axel Lin, Dirk Ziegelmeier + * minor bug fixes in mqtt + + 2017-01-11: Knut Andre Tidemann + * sockets/netconn: fix broken default ICMPv6 handling of checksums + +(STABLE-2.0.1) + + ++ New features: + + 2016-12-31: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h/.c: added function tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err() to get the error + reason when listening fails (bug #49861) + + 2016-12-20: Erik Andersen + * Add MQTT client + + 2016-12-14: Jan Breuer: + * opt.h, ndc.h/.c: add support for RDNSS option (as per RFC 6106) + + 2016-12-14: David van Moolenbroek + * opt.h, nd6.c: Added LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW() + + 2016-12-09: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * ip6_frag.c: Implemented support for LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + + 2016-12-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c: added one-shot multicast DNS queries + + 2016-11-24: Ambroz Bizjak, David van Moolenbroek + * tcp_out.c: Optimize passing contiguous nocopy buffers to tcp_write (bug #46290) + + 2016-11-16: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * sockets.c: added support for IPv6 mapped IPv4 addresses + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2016-12-16: Thomas Mueller + * api_lib.c: fixed race condition in return value of netconn_gethostbyname() + (and thus also lwip_gethostbyname/_r() and lwip_getaddrinfo()) + + 2016-12-15: David van Moolenbroek + * opt.h, tcp: added LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN() to implement less predictable initial + sequence numbers (see contrib/addons/tcp_isn for an example implementation) + + 2016-12-05: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * fixed compiling with IPv4 disabled (IPv6 only case) + + 2016-11-28: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c: fixed bug #49725 (send-timeout: netconn_write() can return + ERR_OK without all bytes being written) + + 2016-11-28: Ambroz Bizjak + * tcpi_in.c: fixed bug #49717 (window size in received SYN and SYN-ACK + assumed scaled) + + 2016-11-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #49676 (Possible endless loop when parsing dhcp options) + + 2016-11-23: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * udp.c: fixed bug #49662: multicast traffic is now only received on a UDP PCB + (and therefore on a UDP socket/netconn) when the PCB is bound to IP_ADDR_ANY + + 2016-11-16: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * *: Fixed dual-stack behaviour, IPv6 mapped IPv4 support in socket API + + 2016-11-14: Joel Cunningham + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #49533 (start persist timer when unsent seg can't fit + in window) + + 2016-11-16: Roberto Barbieri Carrera + * autoip.c: fixed bug #49610 (sometimes AutoIP fails to reuse the same address) + + 2016-11-11: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * sockets.c: fixed bug #49578 (dropping multicast membership does not work + with LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) + +(STABLE-2.0.0) + + ++ New features: + + 2016-07-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, timeouts.h/.c: added LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM to override the default + implementation of timeouts + + 2016-07-xx: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Large overhaul of doxygen documentation + + 2016-04-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * timers.h/.c: prepare for overriding current timeout implementation: all + stack-internal caclic timers are avaliable in the lwip_cyclic_timers array + + 2016-03-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp: call accept-callback with ERR_MEM when allocating a pcb fails on + passive open to inform the application about this error + ATTENTION: applications have to handle NULL pcb in accept callback! + + 2016-02-22: Ivan Delamer + * Initial 6LoWPAN support + + 2016-02-XX to 2016-03-XX: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Cleanup TCPIP thread sync methods in a way that it is possibe to use them + in arbitrary code that needs things to be done in TCPIP thread. Used to + decouple netconn, netif, ppp and 6LoWPAN from LWIP core. + + 2016-02-XX: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Implement dual-stack support in RAW, UDP and TCP. Add new IP address + type IPADDR_ANY_TYPE for this. Netconn/Socket API: Dual-stack is + automatically supported when an IPv6 netconn/socket is created. + + 2015-12-26: Martin Hentschel and Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Rewrite SNMP agent. SNMPv2c + MIB compiler. + + 2015-11-12: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Decouple SNMP stack from lwIP core and move stack to apps/ directory. + Breaking change: Users have to call snmp_init() now! + + 2015-11-12: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Implement possibility to declare private memory pools. This is useful to + decouple some apps from the core (SNMP stack) or make contrib app usage + simpler (httpserver_raw) + + 2015-10-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * started to move "private" header files containing implementation details to + "lwip/priv/" include directory to seperate the API from the implementation. + + 2015-10-07: Simon Goldschmidt + * added sntp client as first "supported" application layer protocol implementation + added 'apps' folder + + 2015-09-30: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * snmp_structs.h, mib_structs.c, mib2.c: snmp: fixed ugly inheritance + implementation by aggregating the "base class" (struct mib_node) in all + derived node classes to get more type-safe code + + 2015-09-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.h/.c, nd6.c: task #13729: Convert netif addresses (IPv4 & IPv6) to + ip_addr_t (so they can be used without conversion/temporary storage) + + 2015-09-08: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * snmp: Separate mib2 counter/table callbacks from snmp agent. This both cleans + up the code and should allow integration of a 3rd party agent/mib2. Simple + counters are kept in MIB2_STATS, tree/table change function prototypes moved to + snmp_mib2.h. + + 2015-09-03: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, dns.h/.c: DNS/IPv6: added support for AAAA records + + 2015-09-01: Simon Goldschmidt + * task #12178: hardware checksum capabilities can be configured per netif + (use NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL() in your netif's init function) + + 2015-08-30: Simon Goldschmidt + * PBUF_REF with "custom" pbufs is now supported for RX pbufs (see pcapif in + contrib for an example, LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF is required) + + 2015-08-30: Simon Goldschmidt + * support IPv4 source based routing: define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC to point + to a routing function + + 2015-08-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * many files: allow multicast socket options IP_MULTICAST_TTL, IP_MULTICAST_IF + and IP_MULTICAST_LOOP to be used without IGMP + + 2015-04-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.h/c, autoip.h/.c: added functions dhcp/autoip_supplied_address() to + check for the source of address assignment (replacement for NETIF_FLAG_DHCP) + + 2015-04-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * many files: task #13480: added LWIP_IPV4 define - IPv4 can be disabled, + leaving an IPv6-only stack + + 2015-04-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * nearly all files: task #12722 (improve IPv4/v6 address handling): renamed + ip_addr_t to ip4_addr_t, renamed ipX_addr_t to ip_addr_t and added IP + version; ip_addr_t is used for all generic IP addresses for the API, + ip(4/6)_addr_t are only used internally or when initializing netifs or when + calling version-related functions + + 2015-03-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, ip4_addr.h, ip4.c, ip6.c: loopif is not required for loopback traffic + any more but passed through any netif (ENABLE_LOOPBACK has to be enabled) + + 2015-03-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, etharp.c: with ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF== 1, duplicate (Auto)-IP + addresses on multiple netifs should now be working correctly (if correctly + addressed by routing, that is) + + 2015-03-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: Stable etharp entries that are about to expire are now refreshed + using unicast to prevent unnecessary broadcast. Only if no answer is received + after 15 seconds, broadcast is used. + + 2015-03-06: Philip Gladstone + * netif.h/.c: patch #8359 (Provide utility function to add an IPv6 address to + an interface) + + 2015-03-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c, ip4.c, dhcp.c, autoip.c: fixed bug #37068 (netif up/down handling + is unclear): correclty separated administrative status of a netif (up/down) + from 'valid address' status + ATTENTION: netif_set_up() now always has to be called, even when dhcp/autoip + is used! + + 2015-02-26: patch by TabascoEye + * netif.c, udp.h/.c: fixed bug #40753 (re-bind UDP pcbs on change of IP address) + + 2015-02-22: chrysn, Simon Goldschmidt + * *.*: Changed nearly all functions taking 'ip(X)_addr_t' pointer to take + const pointers (changed user callbacks: raw_recv_fn, udp_recv_fn; changed + port callbacks: netif_output_fn, netif_igmp_mac_filter_fn) + + 2015-02-19: Ivan Delamer + * netif.h, dhcp.c: Removed unused netif flag for DHCP. The preferred way to evaluate + if DHCP is active is through netif->dhcp field. + + 2015-02-19: Ivan Delamer + * netif.h, slipif.c, ppp.c: Removed unused netif flag for point to point connections + + 2015-02-18: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c: fixed bug #37958 "netconn API doesn't handle correctly + connections half-closed by peer" + + 2015-02-18: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: tcp_alloc() prefers killing CLOSING/LAST_ACK over active connections + (see bug #39565) + + 2015-02-16: Claudius Zingerli, Sergio Caprile + * opt.h, dhcp.h/.c: patch #8361 "Add support for NTP option in DHCP" + + 2015-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, snmp*: added support for write-access community and dedicated + community for sending traps + + 2015-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, memp.c: added hook LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE() to get informed when + a memp pool was empty and an item is now available + + 2015-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, pbuf.h/.c, etharp.c: Added the option PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN to + allocate additional header space for TX on netifs requiring additional headers + + 2015-02-12: chrysn + * timers.h/.c: introduce sys_timeouts_sleeptime (returns the time left before + the next timeout is due, for NO_SYS==1) + + 2015-02-11: Nick van Ijzendoorn + * opt.h, sockets.h/c: patch #7702 "Include ability to increase the socket number + with defined offset" + + 2015-02-11: Frederick Baksik + * opt.h, def.h, others: patch #8423 "arch/perf.h" should be made an optional item + + 2015-02-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c, opt.h: started to implement fullduplex sockets/netconns + (note that this is highly unstable yet!) + + 2015-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * api: allow enabling socket API without (public) netconn API - netconn API is + still used by sockets, but keeping it private (static) should allow better + compiler optimizations + + 2015-01-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #20506 "Initial congestion window is very small" again + by implementing the calculation formula from RFC3390 + + 2014-12-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * api: added option LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD to use a semaphore per thread + instead of using one per netconn and per select call + + 2014-12-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip6.h: fixed bug #43778: IPv6 header version not set on 16-bit platform + (macro IP6H_VTCFL_SET()) + + 2014-12-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * icmp.c, ip4.c, pbuf.c, udp.c, pbuf.h: task #11472 Support PBUF_REF for RX + (IPv6 and IPv4/v6 reassembly might not work yet) + + 2014-11-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c/.h, init.c: lwip_socket_init() is not needed any more + -> compatibility define + + 2014-09-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c, opt.h: reduced ram usage by parsing DNS responses in place + + 2014-09-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.h/.c: added pbuf_take_at() and pbuf_put_at() + + 2014-09-15: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c: added source port randomization to make the DNS client more robust + (see bug #43144) + + 2013-09-02: Simon Goldschmidt + * arch.h and many other files: added optional macros PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8() and + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S() to prevent gcc 4 from warning about struct members that + do not need packing + + 2013-08-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.h: bug #42998: made NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN overridable for some special + networks + + 2013-03-17: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Ghobad Emadi) + * opt.h, etharp.c: Added LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW to implement IPv4 routing with + multiple gateways + + 2013-04-20: Fatih Asici + * opt.h, etharp.h/.c: patch #7993: Added support for transmitting packets + with VLAN headers via hook function LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET and to check them + via hook function LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK + + 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt (based on patch by Artem Pisarenko) + * patch #7885: modification of api modules to support FreeRTOS-MPU + (don't pass stack-pointers to other threads) + + 2014-02-05: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by "xtian" and "alex_ab") + * patch #6537/#7858: TCP window scaling support + + 2014-01-17: Jiri Engelthaler + * icmp, icmp6, opt.h: patch #8027: Completed HW checksuming for IPv4 and + IPv6 ICMP's + + 2012-08-22: Sylvain Rochet + * New PPP stack for lwIP, developed in ppp-new branch. + Based from pppd 2.4.5, released 2009-11-17, with huge changes to match + code size and memory requirements for embedded devices, including: + - Gluing together the previous low-level PPP code in lwIP to pppd 2.4.5, which + is more or less what pppd sys-* files are, so that we get something working + using the unix port. + - Merged some patchs from lwIP Git repository which add interesting features + or fix bugs. + - Merged some patchs from Debian pppd package which add interesting features + or fix bugs. + - Ported PPP timeout handling to the lwIP timers system + - Disabled all the PPP code using filesystem access, replaced in necessary cases + to configuration variables. + - Disabled all the PPP code forking processes. + - Removed IPX support, lwIP does not support IPX. + - Ported and improved random module from the previous PPP port. + - Removed samba TDB (file-driven database) usage, because it needs a filesystem. + - MS-CHAP required a DES implementation, we added the latest PolarSSL DES + implementation which is under a BSD-ish license. + - Also switched to PolarSSL MD4,MD5,SHA1 implementations, which are meant to be + used in embedded devices with reduced memory footprint. + - Removed PPP configuration file parsing support. + - Added macro definition EAP_SUPPORT to make EAP support optional. + - Added macro definition CHAP_SUPPORT to make CHAP support optional. + - Added macro definition MSCHAP_SUPPORT to make MSCHAP support optional. + - Added macro definition PAP_SUPPORT to make PAP support optional. + - Cleared all Linux syscall calls. + - Disabled demand support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. + - Disabled ECP support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. + - Disabled CCP support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. + - Disabled CBCP support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. + - Disabled LQR support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. + - Print packet debug feature optional, through PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + - Removed POSIX signal usage. + - Fully ported PPPoS code from the previous port. + - Fully ported PPPoE code from the previous port. + - Fully ported VJ compression protocol code from the previous port. + - Removed all malloc()/free() use from PPP, replaced by stack usage or PBUF. + - Disabled PPP server support using a macro, so that it can be ported later. + - Switched all PPP debug to lwIP debug system. + - Created PPP Control Block (PPP PCB), removed PPP unit integer everywhere, + removed all global variables everywhere, did everything necessary for + the PPP stack to support more than one PPP session (pppd only support + one session per process). + - Removed the statically allocated output buffer, now using PBUF. + - Improved structure size of all PPP modules, deep analyze of code to reduce + variables size to the bare minimum. Switched all boolean type (char type in + most architecture) to compiler generated bitfields. + - Added PPP IPv6 support, glued lwIP IPv6 support to PPP. + - Now using a persistent netif interface which can then be used in lwIP + functions requiring a netif. + - Now initializing PPP in lwip_init() function. + - Reworked completely the PPP state machine, so that we don't end up in + anymore in inconsistent state, especially with PPPoE. + - Improved the way we handle PPP reconnection after disconnect, cleaning + everything required so that we start the PPP connection again from a + clean state. + - Added PPP holdoff support, allow the lwIP user to wait a little bit before + reconnecting, prevents connection flood, especially when using PPPoL2TP. + - Added PPPoL2TP LAC support (a.k.a. UDP tunnels), adding a VPN client + feature to lwIP, L2TP being a widely used tunnel protocol. + - Switched all used PPP types to lwIP types (u8t, u16t, u32t, ...) + - Added PPP API "sequential" thread-safe API, based from NETIFAPI. + + 2011-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c, opt.h: (bug #30185): added LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE that makes + ioctl/FIONREAD return the size of the next pending datagram. + + 2011-05-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * again nearly the whole stack, renamed ip.c to ip4.c, ip_addr.c to ip4_addr.c, + combined ipv4/ipv6 inet_chksum.c, added ip.h, ip_addr.h: Combined IPv4 + and IPv6 code where possible, added defines to access IPv4/IPv6 in non-IP + code so that the code is more readable. + + 2011-05-17: Patch by Ivan Delamer (only checked in by Simon Goldschmidt) + * nearly the whole stack: Finally, we got decent IPv6 support, big thanks to + Ivan! (this is work in progress: we're just post release anyway :-) + + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2016-08-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp: removed ETHARP_TRUST_IP_MAC since it is insecure and we don't need + it any more after implementing unicast ARP renewal towards arp entry timeout + + 2016-07-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * memp.h/.c: fixed bug #48442 (memp stats don't work for MEMP_MEM_MALLOC) + + 2016-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Ambroz Bizjak) + * tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: fixed bug #48543 (TCP sent callback may prematurely + report sent data when only part of a segment is acked) and don't include + SYN/FIN in snd_buf counter + + 2016-07-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: fixed bug #48477 (ARP input packet might update static entry) + + 2016-07-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #48476 (TCP sent callback called wrongly due to picking + up old pcb->acked + + 2016-06-30: Simon Goldschmidt (original patch by Fabian Koch) + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #48170 (Vulnerable to TCP RST spoofing) + + 2016-05-20: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * sntp.h/.c: Fix return value of sntp_getserver() call to return a pointer + + 2016-04-05: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Philip Gladstone) + * udp.c: patch #8358: allow more combinations of listening PCB for IPv6 + + 2016-04-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * netconn/socket API: fixed bug# 43739 (Accept not reporting errors about + aborted connections): netconn_accept() returns ERR_ABRT (sockets: ECONNABORTED) + for aborted connections, ERR_CLSD (sockets: EINVAL) if the listening netconn + is closed, which better seems to follow the standard. + + 2016-03-23: Florent Matignon + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #38203: DHCP options are not recorded in all DHCP ack messages + + 2016-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp: changed accept handling to be done internally: the application does not + have to call tcp_accepted() any more. Instead, when delaying accept (e.g. sockets + do), call tcp_backlog_delayed()/tcp_backlog_accepted() (fixes bug #46696) + + 2016-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c: ignore dns response parsing errors, only abort resolving for correct + responses or error responses from correct server (bug #47459) + + 2016-03-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: fixed bug #47448 (netconn/socket leak if RST is received during close) + + 2016-03-17: Joel Cunningham + * api_msg.c: don't fail closing a socket/netconn when failing to allocate the + FIN segment; blocking the calling thread for a while is better than risking + leaking a netconn/socket (see bug #46701) + + 2016-03-16: Joel Cunningham + * tcp_out.c: reset rto timer on fast retransmission + + 2016-03-16: Deomid Ryabkov + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #46384 Segment size calculation bug with MSS != TCP_MSS + + 2016-03-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * err.h/.c, sockets.c: ERR_IF is not necessarily a fatal error + + 2015-11-19: fix by Kerem Hadimli + * sockets.c: fixed bug #46471: lwip_accept() leaks socket descriptors if new + netconn was already closed because of peer behavior + + 2015-11-12: fix by Valery Ushakov + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #46365 tcp_accept_null() should call tcp_abort() + + 2015-10-02: Dirk Ziegelmeier/Simon Goldschmidt + * snmp: cleaned up snmp structs API (fixed race conditions from bug #46089, + reduce ram/rom usage of tables): incompatible change for private MIBs + + 2015-09-30: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip4_addr.c: fixed bug #46072: ip4addr_aton() does not check the number range + of all address parts + + 2015-08-28: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #44023: TCP ssthresh value is unclear: ssthresh + is set to the full send window for active open, too, and is updated once + after SYN to ensure the correct send window is used + + 2015-08-28: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp: fixed bug #45559: Window scaling casts u32_t to u16_t without checks + + 2015-08-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip6_frag.h/.c: fixed bug bug #41009: IPv6 reassembly broken on 64-bit platforms: + define IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER==1 on these platforms to copy the IPv6 header + instead of referencing it, which gives more room for struct ip6_reass_helper + + 2015-08-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed bug #45827: recvfrom: TCP window is updated with MSG_PEEK + + 2015-08-20: Manoj Kumar + * snmp_msg.h, msg_in.c: fixed bug #43790: Sending octet string of Length >255 + from SNMP agent + + 2015-08-19: Jens Nielsen + * icmp.c, ip4.c, tcp_in.c, udp.c, raw.c: fixed bug #45120: Broadcast & multiple + interfaces handling + + 2015-08-19: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by "Sandra") + * dns.c: fixed bug #45004: dns response without answer might be discarded + + 2015-08-18: Chrysn + * timers.c: patch #8704 fix sys_timeouts_sleeptime function + + 2015-07-01: Erik Ekman + * puf.c: fixed bug #45454 (pbuf_take_at() skips write and returns OK if offset + is at start of pbuf in chain) + + 2015-05-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.h/.c: fixed bugs #45140 and #45141 (dhcp was not stopped correctly after + fixing bug #38204) + + 2015-03-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Homyak) + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #44766 (LWIP_WND_SCALE: tcphdr->wnd was not scaled in + two places) + + 2015-03-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_impl.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #41318 (Bad memory ref in tcp_input() + after tcp_close()) + + 2015-03-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #38468 (tcp_sent() not called on half-open connection for + data ACKed with the same ack as FIN) + + 2015-03-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Christoffer Lind) + * dhcp.h/.c: fixed bug #38204 (DHCP lease time not handled correctly) + + 2015-03-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #38714 (Missing option and client address in DHCPRELEASE message) + + 2015-03-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, tcpip.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: fixed race conditions in assigning + netconn->last_err (fixed bugs #38121 and #37676) + + 2015-03-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip4.c: fixed the IPv4 part of bug #43904 (ip_route() must detect linkup status) + + 2015-03-04: Simon Goldschmidt + * nd6.c: fixed bug #43784 (a host should send at least one Router Solicitation) + + 2015-03-04: Valery Ushakov + * ip6.c: fixed bug #41094 (Byte-order bug in IPv6 fragmentation header test) + + 2015-03-04: Zach Smith + * nd6.c: fixed bug #38153 (nd6_input() byte order issues) + + 2015-02-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c, tcp.h/.c: fixed bug #44378 (TCP connections are not aborted on netif + remove) + + 2015-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip4.c, etharp.c: fixed bug #40177 (System hangs when dealing with corrupted + packets), implemented task #12357 (Ensure that malicious packets don't + assert-fail): improved some pbuf_header calls to not assert-fail. + + 2015-02-25: patch by Joel Cunningham + * udp.h/.c, sockets.c: fixed bug #43028 (IP_MULTICAST_TTL affects unicast + datagrams) + + 2015-02-25: patch by Greg Renda + * ip4_frag.c: fixed bug #38210 (ip reassembly while remove oldest datagram) + + 2015-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed bug #38165 (socket with mulicast): ensure igmp membership + are dropped when socket (not netconn!) is closed. + + 2015-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip4.h/.c, udp.c: fixed bug #38061 (wrong multicast routing in IPv4) by + adding an optional default netif for multicast routing + + 2015-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * netconn API: fixed that netconn_connect still used message passing for + LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 + + 2015-02-22: patch by Jens Nielsen + * icmp.c: fixed bug #38803 (Source address in broadcast ping reply) + + 2015-02-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.h, sockets.c: added proper accessor functions for pcb->multicast_ip + (previously used by get/setsockopt only) + + 2015-02-18: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Fixed select not reporting received FIN as 'readable' in certain + rare cases (bug #43779: select(), close(), and TCP retransmission error) + + 2015-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * err.h, sockets.c, api_msg.c: fixed bug #38853 "connect() use a wrong errno": + return ERR_ALREADY/EALRADY during connect, ERR_ISCONN/EISCONN when already + connected + + 2015-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_impl.h, tcp_out.c, tcp.c, api_msg.c: fixed bug #37614 "Errors from + ipX_output are not processed". Now tcp_output(_segment) checks for the return + value of ipX_output and does not try to send more on error. A netif driver + can call tcp_txnow() (from tcpip_thread!) to try to send again if TX buffers + are available again. + + 2015-02-14: patches by Freddie Chopin + * snmp*: made community writable, fixed some const pointers + + 2015-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * msg_in.c: fixed bug #22070 "MIB_OBJECT_WRITE_ONLY not implemented in SNMP" + + 2015-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.h, ip4.c, ip6.c: fixed bug #36403 "ip4_input() and ip6_input() always pass + inp to higher layers": now the accepting netif is passed up, but the input + netif is available through ip_current_input_netif() if required. + + 2015-02-11: patch by hichard + * tcpip.c: fixed bug #43094 "The function tcpip_input() forget to handle IPv6" + + 2015-02-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * netconn API: fixed that netconn_close/netconn_delete still used message passing + for LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 + + 2015-02-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * netconn/socket api: fixed bug #44225 "closing TCP socket should time out + eventually", implemented task #6930 "Implement SO_LINGER": closing TCP sockets + times out after 20 seconds or after the configured SND_TIMEOUT or depending + on the linger settings. + + 2015-01-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: fixed that SHUT_RD followed by SHUT_WR was different to SHUT_RDWR, + fixed return value of lwip_netconn_do_close on unconnected netconns + + 2015-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed bug #43361 select() crashes with stale FDs + + 2015-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c/.h, memp_std.h: fixed bug #40788 "lwip_setsockopt_internal() crashes" + by rewriting set/getsockopt functions to combine checks with the actual code + and add more NULL checks; this also fixes that CORE_LOCKING used message + passing for set/getsockopt. + + 2014-12-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, dhcp.h/.c: prevent dhcp from starting when netif link is down (only + when LWIP_DHCP_CHECK_LINK_UP==1, which is disabled by default for + compatibility reasons) + + 2014-12-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #43840 Checksum error for TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY==1 for + no-copy data with odd length + + 2014-12-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c, tcp.c, others: fixed bug #43797 set/getsockopt: SO_SNDTIMEO/SO_RCVTIMEO + take int as option but should take timeval (LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_STANDARD==0 can + be used to revert to the old 'winsock' style behaviour) + Fixed implementation of SO_ACCEPTCONN to just look at the pcb state + + 2014-12-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip4.c: fixed bug #43596 IGMP queries from 0.0.0.0 are discarded + + 2014-10-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Joel Cunningham and Albert Huitsing) + * sockts.c: fixed bugs #41495 Possible threading issue in select() and #43278 + event_callback() handle context switch when calling sys_sem_signal() + + 2014-10-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: fixed bug #38219 Assert on TCP netconn_write with sndtimeout set + + 2014-09-16: Kevin Cernekee + * dns.c: patch #8480 Fix handling of dns_seqno wraparound + + 2014-09-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #43192 tcp_enqueue_flags() should not check TCP_SND_QUEUELEN + when sending FIN + + 2014-09-03: Simon Goldschmidt + * msg_in.c: fixed bug #39355 SNMP Memory Leak in case of error + + 2014-09-02: Simon Goldschmidt + * err.h/.c, sockets.c, api_msg.c: fixed bug #43110 call getpeername() before + listen() will cause a error + + 2014-09-02: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed bug #42117 lwip_fcntl does not set errno + + 2014-09-02: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: fixed bug #42299 tcp_abort() leaves freed pcb on tcp_bound_pcbs list + + 2014-08-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c: fixed bug #42987 lwIP is vulnerable to DNS cache poisoning due to + non-randomized TXIDs + + 2014-06-03: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_impl.h, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #37969 SYN packet dropped as short packet in + tcp_input function + + 2014-05-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #37184 tcp_write problem for pcbs in the SYN_SENT state + + 2014-05-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * *.h: Fixed bug #35874 reserved identifier violation (removed leading underscores + from header include guards) + + 2014-04-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: Fixed bug #36167 tcp server crash when client closes (maximum window) + + 2014-04-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #36210 lwIP does not elicit an empty ACK when received + unacceptable ACK + + 2014-04-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c, ip4.c/.h, ip6.c/.h, udp.c/.h, ip.h: Fixed bug #41787 DHCP Discovery + is invalid when an IP is set to thet netif. + + 2014-03-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #36153 TCP Cheksum error if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY=1 + + 2014-03-11: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Mason) + * opt.h, sockets.c: fixed bug #35928 BSD sockets functions must set errno for + POSIX-compliance + + 2014-02-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #40303 DHCP xid renewed when sending a DHCPREQUEST + + 2014-02-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * raw.c: fixed bug #41680 raw socket can not receive IPv6 packet when + IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV==1 + + 2014-02-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c, sockets.c: fixed bug #38404 getpeeraddr returns success on + unconnected/listening TCP sockets + + 2014-02-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed bug #41729 Some socket functions return Exyz instead of -1 + + 2014-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip4.c: fixed bug #39514 ip_route() may return an IPv6-only interface + + 2014-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt, patch by Fatih Asici + * pbuf.c: fixed bug #39356 Wrong increment in pbuf_memfind() + + 2014-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c/.h, udp.c: fixed bug #39225 udp.c uses netif_matches_ip6_addr() incorrectly; + renamed function netif_matches_ip6_addr() to netif_get_ip6_addr_match() + + 2014-02-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * igmp.c: fixed bug #39145 IGMP membership report for 224.0.0.1 + + 2014-02-22: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Amir Shalem) + * etharp.c, opt.h: fixed bug #34681 Limit ARP queue length by ARP_QUEUE_LEN (=3) + + 2014-02-22: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Amir Shalem) + * etharp.h/.c: fixed bug #34682 Limit ARP request flood for unresolved entry + + 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #39683 Assertion "seg->tcphdr not aligned" failed with + MEM_ALIGNMENT = 8 + + 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed bug #39882 No function shall set errno to 0 + + 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * mib_structs.c: fixed bug #40050 SNMP problem with MIB arrays > 255 + + 2014-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, sockets.c: fixed bug #41499 netconn::recv_avail can overflow + + 2014-01-08: Stathis Voukelatos + * memp_std.h: patch #7928 Fixed size calculation in MALLOC memory pool + creation macro + + 2014-01-18: Brian Fahs + * tcp_out.c: patch #8237: tcp_rexmit_rto fails to update pcb->unsent_oversize + when necessary + + 2014-01-17: Grant Erickson, Jay Logue, Simon Goldschmidt + * ipv6.c, netif.c: patch #7913 Enable Support for IPv6 Loopback + + 2014-01-16: Stathis Voukelatos + * netif.c: patch #7902 Fixed netif_poll() operation when LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS > 0 + + 2014-01-14: "Freddie Chopin" + * snmp.h, mib2.c: fixed constness and spelling of sysdescr + + 2014-01-14: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Thomas Faber) + * tcpip.c: patch #8241: Fix implicit declaration of ip_input with + LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT disabled + + 2014-01-14: chrysn + * timers.c: patch #8244 make timeouts usable reliably from outside of the + timeout routine + + 2014-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip_frag.c, ip6_frag.c: fixed bug #41041 Potential use-after-free in IPv6 reassembly + + 2014-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * memp.c: fixed bug #41188 Alignment error in memp_init() when MEMP_SEPARATE_POOLS==1 + + 2014-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: fixed bug #39898 tcp_fasttmr() possible lock due to infinte queue process loop + + 2013-06-29: Simon Goldschmidt + * inet.h, sockets.h: partially fixed bug #37585: IPv6 compatibility (in socket structs) + + 2013-06-29: Simon Goldschmidt + * inet6.h: bug #37585/task #12600: fixed struct in6_addr.s6_addr to conform to spec + + 2013-04-24: patch by Liam + * api_msg.c: patch #8008 Fix a potential null pointer dereference in assert + + 2013-04-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * igmp.c: fixed possible division by zero + + 2013-04-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip6.h, some ipv6 C files: fixed bug #38526 Coverity: Recursive Header Inclusion in ip6.h + + 2013-04-24: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Emil Ljungdahl): + * netif.c: fixed bug #38586 netif_loop_output() "deadlocks" + + 2013-01-15: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip4.c: fixed bug #37665 ip_canforward operates on address in wrong byte order + + 2013-01-15: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.h: fixed bug #38097 pbuf_free_ooseq() warning + + 2013-01-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c: fixed bug #37705 Possible memory corruption in DNS query + + 2013-01-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * raw.c: fixed bug #38066 Raw pcbs can alter packet without eating it + + 2012-08-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * memp.c: fixed bug #37166: memp_sanity check loops itself + + 2012-08-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #36645: Calling dhcp_release before dhcp_start + dereferences NULL + + 2012-08-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * msg_out.c: fixed bug #36840 snmp_send_trap() NULL de-reference if traps + configured but no interfaces available + + 2012-08-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c: fixed bug #36899 DNS TTL 0 is cached for a long time + + 2012-05-11: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Marty) + * memp.c: fixed bug #36412: memp.c does not compile when + MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK > zero and MEMP_SEPARATE_POOLS == 1 + + 2012-05-03: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Sylvain Rochet) + * ppp.c: fixed bug #36283 (PPP struct used on header size computation and + not packed) + + 2012-05-03: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by David Empson) + * ppp.c: fixed bug #36388 (PPP: checksum-only in last pbuf leads to pbuf with + zero length) + + 2012-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: Fixed bug #35817: do_connect() invalidly signals op_completed + for UDP/RAW with LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 + + 2012-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, netifapi.c: fixed bug #35931: Name space + pollution in api_msg.c and netifapi.c + + 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * inet6.h: fixed bug #34124 struct in6_addr does not conform to the standard + + + +(STABLE-1.4.1) + + ++ New features: + + 2012-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt (idea by Mason) + * posix/*: added posix-compatibility include files posix/netdb.h and posix/sys/socket.h + which are a simple wrapper to the correct lwIP include files. + + 2012-01-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, icmp.c: Added option CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP + + 2011-12-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.h: implemented API functions to access so_options of IP pcbs (UDP, TCP, RAW) + (fixes bug #35061) + + 2011-09-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: Implemented limiting data on ooseq queue (task #9989) + (define TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES / TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS in lwipopts.h) + + 2011-09-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h/.c, sockets.c: Implemented timeout on + send (TCP only, bug #33820) + + 2011-09-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * init.c: Converted runtime-sanity-checks into compile-time checks that can + be disabled (since runtime checks can often not be seen on embedded targets) + + 2011-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.h, ppp_impl.h: splitted ppp.h to an internal and external header file + to get a clear separation of which functions an application or port may use + (task #11281) + + 2011-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, tcp_impl.h, tcp.c, udp.h/.c: Added a config option to randomize + initial local TCP/UDP ports (so that different port ranges are used after + a reboot; bug #33818; this one added tcp_init/udp_init functions again) + + 2011-09-03: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: DHCP uses LWIP_RAND() for xid's (bug #30302) + + 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, netif.h/.c: added netif remove callback (bug #32397) + + 2011-07-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN: add support for an external VLAN filter + function instead of only checking for one VLAN (define ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN) + + 2011-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by hanhui) + * ip4.c, etharp.c, pbuf.h: bug #33634 ip_forward() have a faulty behaviour: + Added pbuf flags to mark incoming packets as link-layer broadcast/multicast. + Also added code to allow ip_forward() to forward non-broadcast packets to + the input netif (set IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF==1). + + 2011-06-26: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Cameron Gutman) + * tcp.c, tcp_out.c: bug #33604: added some more asserts to check that + pcb->state != LISTEN + + 2011-05-14: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Stéphane Lesage) + * tcpip.c/.h: patch #7449 allow tcpip callback from interrupt with static + memory message + + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2012-09-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: fixed bug #37405 'err_tcp()' uses already freed 'netconn' object + + 2012-09-26: patch by Henrik Persson + * dhcp.c: patch #7843 Fix corner case with dhcp timeouts + + 2012-09-26: patch by Henrik Persson + * dhcp.c: patch #7840 Segfault in dhcp_parse_reply if no end marker in dhcp packet + + 2012-08-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * memp.c: fixed bug #37166: memp_sanity check loops itself + + 2012-05-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug: #36380 unsent_oversize mismatch in 1.4.1RC1 (this was + a debug-check issue only) + + 2012-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * vj.c: fixed bug #35756 header length calculation problem in ppp/vj.c + + 2012-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Mason) + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #35945: SYN packet should provide the recv MSS not the + send MSS + + 2012-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip4.c: fixed bug #35927: missing refragmentaion in ip_forward + + 2012-03-20: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Mason) + * netdb.c: fixed bug #35907: lwip_gethostbyname_r returns an invalid h_addr_list + + 2012-03-12: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Bostjan Meglic) + * ppp.c: fixed bug #35809: PPP GetMask(): Compiler warning on big endian, + possible bug on little endian system + + 2012-02-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: fixed bug #35595: Impossible to send broadcast without a gateway + (introduced when fixing bug# 33551) + + 2012-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.c: fixed pbuf leak when PPP session is aborted through pppSigHUP() + (bug #35541: PPP Memory Leak) + + 2012-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: fixed bug #35531: Impossible to send multicast without a gateway + (introduced when fixing bug# 33551) + + 2012-02-16: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Stéphane Lesage) + * msg_in.c, msg_out.c: fixed bug #35536 SNMP: error too big response is malformed + + 2012-02-15: Simon Goldschmidt + * init.c: fixed bug #35537: MEMP_NUM_* sanity checks should be disabled with + MEMP_MEM_MALLOC==1 + + 2012-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: partly fixed bug #25882: TCP hangs on + MSS > pcb->snd_wnd (by not creating segments bigger than half the window) + + 2012-02-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: fixed bug #35435: No pcb state check before adding it to time-wait + queue while closing + + 2012-01-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #35305: pcb may be freed too early on shutdown(WR) + + 2012-01-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: fixed bug #34636: FIN_WAIT_2 - Incorrect shutdown of TCP pcb + + 2012-01-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #35151: DHCP asserts on incoming option lengths + + 2012-01-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.c: fixed bug #35291: NULL pointer in pbuf_copy + + 2011-11-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h/.c, tcp_impl.h, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #31177: tcp timers can corrupt + tcp_active_pcbs in some cases + + 2011-11-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * sys.c: fixed bug #34884: sys_msleep() body needs to be surrounded with + '#ifndef sys_msleep' + + 2011-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c, etharp.h/.c: fixed bug #34684: Clear the arp table cache when + netif is brought down + + 2011-10-28: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #34638: Dead code in tcp_receive - pcb->dupacks + + 2011-10-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c: fixed bug #34429: possible memory corruption with + LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT set to 1 + + 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt + * arch.h, netdb.c: fixed bug #34592: lwip_gethostbyname_r uses nonstandard + error value + + 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h: fixed default values of TCP_SNDLOWAT and TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT for small + windows (bug #34176 select after non-blocking send times out) + + 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_impl.h, tcp_out.c: fixed bug #34587: TCP_BUILD_MSS_OPTION doesn't + consider netif->mtu, causes slow network + + 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed bug #34581 missing parentheses in udplite sockets code + + 2011-10-18: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.h: fixed bug #34580 fcntl() is missing in LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS + + 2011-10-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: fixed bug #34569: shutdown(SHUT_WR) crashes netconn/socket api + + 2011-10-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: fixed bug #34517 (persist timer is started although no + zero window is received) by starting the persist timer when a zero window is + received, not when we have more data queued for sending than fits into the + window + + 2011-10-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * def.h, timers.c: fixed bug #34541: LWIP_U32_DIFF is unnecessarily complex + + 2011-10-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c, api_lib.c: fixed bug #34540: compiler error when CORE_LOCKING is + used and not all protocols are enabled + + 2011-10-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.c: fixed bug #34534: Error in sending fragmented IP if MEM_ALIGNMENT > 4 + + 2011-10-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #34426: tcp_zero_window_probe() transmits incorrect + byte value when pcb->unacked != NULL + + 2011-10-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip4.c: fixed bug #34447 LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(dst_port) wrong + + 2011-09-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Reset pcb->unsent_oversize in 2 more places... + + 2011-09-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #28288: Data after FIN in oos queue + + 2011-09-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #34406 dhcp_option_hostname() can overflow the pbuf + + 2011-09-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.h: fixed bug #34377 MEM_SIZE_F is not defined if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC==1 + + 2011-09-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fixed bug #33871: rejecting TCP_EVENT_RECV() for + the last packet including FIN can lose data + + 2011-09-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_impl.h: fixed bug #34355: nagle does not take snd_buf/snd_queuelen into + account + + 2011-09-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h: fixed default value of TCP_SND_BUF to not violate the sanity checks + in init.c + + 2011-09-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * timers.c: fixed bug #34337 (possible NULL pointer in sys_check_timeouts) + + 2011-09-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: use pcb->mss instead of TCP_MSS for preallocate mss-sized pbufs + (bug #34019) + + 2011-09-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.c: fixed bug #34072: UDP broadcast is received from wrong UDP pcb if + udp port matches + + 2011-09-03: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #33952 PUSH flag in incoming packet is lost when packet + is aggregated and sent to application + + 2011-09-01: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h: fixed bug #31809 LWIP_EVENT_API in opts.h is inconsistent compared + to other options + + 2011-09-01: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug #34111 RST for ACK to listening pcb has wrong seqno + + 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c, sockets.c: fixed bug #33956 Wrong error returned when calling + accept() on UDP connections + + 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.h: fixed bug #34057 socklen_t should be a typedef + + 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.c: fixed bug #34112 Odd check in pbuf_alloced_custom (typo) + + 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #34122 dhcp: hostname can overflow + + 2011-08-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c: fixed bug #34121 netif_add/netif_set_ipaddr fail on NULL ipaddr + + 2011-08-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: fixed bug #33962 TF_FIN not always set after FIN is sent. (This + merely prevents nagle from not transmitting fast after closing.) + + 2011-07-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, api.h: fixed bug #31084 (socket API returns + always EMSGSIZE on non-blocking sockets if data size > send buffers) -> now + lwip_send() sends as much as possible for non-blocking sockets + + 2011-07-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.c/.h, timers.c: freeing ooseq pbufs when the pbuf pool is empty implemented + for NO_SYS==1: when not using sys_check_timeouts(), call PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ() + at regular intervals from main level. + + 2011-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: fixed bug #33551 (ARP entries may time out although in use) by + sending an ARP request when an ARP entry is used in the last minute before + it would time out. + + 2011-07-04: Simon Goldschmidt + * sys_arch.txt: Fixed documentation after changing sys arch prototypes for 1.4.0. + + 2011-06-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: fixed bug #31723 (tcp_kill_prio() kills pcbs with the same prio) by + updating its documentation only. + + 2011-06-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c: fixed bug #33545: With MEM_USE_POOLS==1, mem_malloc can return an + unaligned pointer. + + 2011-06-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c: fixed bug #33544 "warning in mem.c in lwip 1.4.0 with NO_SYS=1" + + 2011-05-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: fixed bug #33398 (pointless conversion when checking TCP port range) + + + +(STABLE-1.4.0) + + ++ New features: + + 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_impl.h, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Removed 'dataptr' from 'struct tcp_seg' and + calculate it in tcp_zero_window_probe (the only place where it was used). + + 2010-11-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c/.h: Added a function to deallocate the struct dhcp from a netif + (fixes bug #31525). + + 2010-07-12: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Stephane Lesage) + * ip.c, udp.c/.h, pbuf.h, sockets.c: task #10495: Added support for + IP_MULTICAST_LOOP at socket- and raw-API level. + + 2010-06-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.c: Added an optional define (LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) that can allow + link-layer-addressed UDP traffic to be received while a netif is down (just + like DHCP during configuration) + + 2010-05-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * many many files: bug #27352: removed packing from ip_addr_t, the packed + version is now only used in protocol headers. Added global storage for + current src/dest IP address while in input functions. + + 2010-05-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * def.h: task #10391: Add preprocessor-macros for compile-time htonl + calculation (and use them throughout the stack where applicable) + + 2010-05-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, memp_std.h, memp.c, ppp_oe.h/.c: PPPoE now uses its own MEMP pool + instead of the heap (moved struct pppoe_softc from ppp_oe.c to ppp_oe.h) + + 2010-05-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, memp_std.h, dns.h/.c: DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC uses its own + MEMP pool instead of the heap + + 2010-05-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c, udp.c: task #6995: Implement SO_REUSEADDR (correctly), added + new option SO_REUSE_RXTOALL to pass received UDP broadcast/multicast + packets to more than one pcb. + + 2010-05-02: Simon Goldschmidt + * netbuf.h/.c, sockets.c, api_msg.c: use checksum-on-copy for sending + UDP data for LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF==1 + + 2010-04-30: Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.h/.c, pbuf.h/.c: task #6849: added udp_send(_to/_if) functions that + take a precalculated checksum, added pbuf_fill_chksum() to copy data + into a pbuf and at the same time calculating the checksum for that data + + 2010-04-29: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip_addr.h, etharp.h/.c, autoip.c: Create overridable macros for copying + 2-byte-aligned IP addresses and MAC addresses + + 2010-04-28: Patch by Bill Auerbach + * ip.c: Inline generating IP checksum to save a function call + + 2010-04-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcpip.h/.c, timers.c: Added an overridable define to get informed when the + tcpip_thread processes messages or timeouts to implement a watchdog. + + 2010-03-28: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip_frag.c: create a new (contiguous) PBUF_RAM for every outgoing + fragment if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF==1 + + 2010-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: Speedup TX by moving code from find_entry to etharp_output/ + etharp_query to prevent unnecessary function calls (inspired by + patch #7135). + + 2010-03-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, tcpip.c/.h: Added an option to disable tcpip_(un)timeout code + since the linker cannot do this automatically to save space. + + 2010-03-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, etharp.c/.h: Added support for static ARP table entries + + 2010-03-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_impl.h, tcp_out.c, inet_chksum.h/.c: task #6849: Calculate checksum + when creating TCP segments, not when (re-)transmitting them. + + 2010-03-07: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: bug #28775 (select/event_callback: only check select_cb_list + on change) plus use SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT to protect the select code. + This should speed up receiving data on sockets as the select code in + event_callback is only executed when select is waiting. + + 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: task #7013 (Create option to have all packets delivered to + netif->output in one piece): Always copy to try to create single pbufs + in tcp_write. + + 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, api_lib.c, sockets.c: task #10167 (sockets: speed up TCP recv + by not allocating a netbuf): added function netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf() + for tcp netconns to receive pbufs, not netbufs; use that function + for tcp sockets. + + 2010-03-05: Jakob Ole Stoklundsen / Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, tcp.h, tcp_impl.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: task #7040: + Work on tcp_enqueue: Don't waste memory when chaining segments, + added option TCP_OVERSIZE to prevent creating many small pbufs when + calling tcp_write with many small blocks of data. Instead, pbufs are + allocated larger than needed and the space is used for later calls to + tcp_write. + + 2010-02-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * stats.c/.h: Added const char* name to mem- and memp-stats for easier + debugging. + + 2010-02-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h (and usages), added tcp_impl.h: Splitted API and internal + implementation of tcp to make API usage cleare to application programmers + + 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt/Stephane Lesage + * ip_addr.h: Improved some defines working on ip addresses, added faster + macro to copy addresses that cannot be NULL + + 2010-02-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: task #7865 (implement non- + blocking send operation) + + 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c/.h: Added a minimal version of posix fctl() to have a + standardised way to set O_NONBLOCK for nonblocking sockets. + + 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c/.h, autoip.c/.h: task #10139 (Prefer statically allocated + memory): added autoip_set_struct() and dhcp_set_struct() to let autoip + and dhcp work with user-allocated structs instead of callin mem_malloc + + 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt/Jeff Barber + * tcp.c/h: patch #6865 (SO_REUSEADDR for TCP): if pcb.so_options has + SOF_REUSEADDR set, allow binding to endpoint in TIME_WAIT + + 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * sys layer: task #10139 (Prefer statically allocated memory): converted + mbox and semaphore functions to take pointers to sys_mbox_t/sys_sem_t; + converted sys_mbox_new/sys_sem_new to take pointers and return err_t; + task #7212: Add Mutex concept in sys_arch (define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX + to let sys.h use binary semaphores instead of mutexes - as before) + + 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt (Simon Kallweit) + * timers.c/.h: Added function sys_restart_timeouts() from patch #7085 + (Restart system timeout handling) + + 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c/.h, removed loopif.c/.h: task #10153 (Integrate loopif into + netif.c) - loopif does not have to be created by the port any more, + just define LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF to 1. + + 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * inet.h, ip_addr.c/.h: Added reentrant versions of inet_ntoa/ipaddr_ntoa + inet_ntoa_r/ipaddr_ntoa_r + + 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.h: Added netif_s/get_igmp_mac_filter() macros + + 2010-02-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.h: Added function-like macros to get/set the hostname on a netif + + 2010-02-04: Simon Goldschmidt + * nearly every file: Replaced struct ip_addr by typedef ip_addr_t to + make changing the actual implementation behind the typedef easier. + + 2010-02-01: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, memp_std.h, dns.h, netdb.c, memp.c: Let netdb use a memp pool + for allocating memory when getaddrinfo() is called. + + 2010-01-31: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.h, dhcp.c: Reworked the code that parses DHCP options: parse + them once instead of parsing for every option. This also removes + the need for mem_malloc from dhcp_recv and makes it possible to + correctly retrieve the BOOTP file. + + 2010-01-30: simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Use SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT instead of a semaphore to protect + the sockets array. + + 2010-01-29: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Laura Garrett) + * api.h, api_msg.c, sockets.c: Added except set support in select + (patch #6860) + + 2010-01-29: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Laura Garrett) + * api.h, sockets.h, err.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, err.c: + Add non-blocking support for connect (partly from patch #6860), + plus many cleanups in socket & netconn API. + + 2010-01-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, tcp.h, init.c, api_msg.c: Added TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT corresponding + to TCP_SNDLOWAT and added tcp_sndqueuelen() - this fixes bug #28605 + + 2010-01-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * snmp: Use memp pools for snmp instead of the heap; added 4 new pools. + + 2010-01-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.c/.h: Fixed bug #27856: PPP: Set netif link- and status-callback + by adding ppp_set_netif_statuscallback()/ppp_set_netif_linkcallback() + + 2010-01-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c: The heap now may be moved to user-defined memory by defining + LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER as a void pointer to that memory's address + (patch #6966 and bug #26133) + + 2010-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt (Bill Auerbach) + * opt.h, memp.c: patch #6822 (Add option to place memory pools in + separate arrays) + + 2010-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * init.c, igmp.c: patch #6463 (IGMP - Adding Random Delay): added define + LWIP_RAND() for lwip-wide randomization (to be defined in cc.h) + + 2009-12-31: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcpip.c, init.c, memp.c, sys.c, memp_std.h, sys.h, tcpip.h + added timers.c/.h: Separated timer implementation from semaphore/mbox + implementation, moved timer implementation to timers.c/.h, timers are + now only called from tcpip_thread or by explicitly checking them. + (TASK#7235) + + 2009-12-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, etharp.h/.c, init.c, tcpip.c: Added an additional option + LWIP_ETHERNET to support ethernet without ARP (necessary for pure PPPoE) + + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2011-04-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * sys_arch.txt: sys_arch_timeouts() is not needed any more. + + 2011-04-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c, udp.c: Fixed bug #33048 (Bad range for IP source port numbers) by + using ports in the IANA private/dynamic range (49152 through 65535). + + 2011-03-29: Simon Goldschmidt, patch by Emil Lhungdahl: + * etharp.h/.c: Fixed broken VLAN support. + + 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: Fixed bug #32926 (TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs) is called on unbound tcp + pcbs) by checking if the pcb was bound (local_port != 0). + + 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.c: Fixed bug #32280 (ppp: a pbuf is freed twice) + + 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Fixed bug #32906: lwip_connect+lwip_send did not work for udp and + raw pcbs with LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1. + + 2011-03-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #32820 (Outgoing TCP connections created before route + is present never times out) by starting retransmission timer before checking + route. + + 2011-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.c: Fixed bug #32648 (PPP code crashes when terminating a link) by only + calling sio_read_abort() if the file descriptor is valid. + + 2011-03-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * err.h/.c, sockets.c, api_msg.c: fixed bug #31748 (Calling non-blocking connect + more than once can render a socket useless) since it mainly involves changing + "FATAL" classification of error codes: ERR_USE and ERR_ISCONN just aren't fatal. + + 2011-03-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed bug #32769 (ESHUTDOWN is linux-specific) by fixing + err_to_errno_table (ERR_CLSD: ENOTCONN instead of ESHUTDOWN), ERR_ISCONN: + use EALRADY instead of -1 + + 2011-03-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c: netconn_accept: return ERR_ABRT instead of ERR_CLSD if the + connection has been aborted by err_tcp (since this is not a normal closing + procedure). + + 2011-03-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: tcp_bind: return ERR_VAL instead of ERR_ISCONN when trying to bind + with pcb->state != CLOSED + + 2011-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * rawapi.txt: Fixed bug #32561 tcp_poll argument definition out-of-order in + documentation + + 2011-02-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * many files: Added missing U/UL modifiers to fix 16-bit-arch portability. + + 2011-01-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Fixed bug #31741: lwip_select seems to have threading problems + + 2010-12-02: Simon Goldschmidt + * err.h: Fixed ERR_IS_FATAL so that ERR_WOULDBLOCK is not fatal. + + 2010-11-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: netconn.recv_avail is only used for + LWIP_SO_RCVBUF and ioctl/FIONREAD. + + 2010-11-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: Fixed bug #31720: ARP-queueing: RFC 1122 recommends to queue at + least 1 packet -> ARP_QUEUEING==0 now queues the most recent packet. + + 2010-11-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #30577: tcp_input: don't discard ACK-only packets after + refusing 'refused_data' again. + + 2010-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Fixed bug #31590: getsockopt(... SO_ERROR ...) gives EINPROGRESS + after a successful nonblocking connection. + + 2010-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: Fixed bug #31722: IP packets sent with an AutoIP source addr + must be sent link-local + + 2010-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * timers.c: patch #7329: tcp_timer_needed prototype was ifdef'ed out for + LWIP_TIMERS==0 + + 2010-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Fixed bug #31170: lwip_setsockopt() does not set socket number + + 2010-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.h: Fixed bug #31304: Changed SHUT_RD, SHUT_WR and SHUT_RDWR to + resemble other stacks. + + 2010-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c: Fixed bug #31535: TCP_SND_QUEUELEN must be at least 2 or else + no-copy TCP writes will never succeed. + + 2010-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c: Fixed bug #31701: Error return value from dns_gethostbyname() does + not match documentation: return ERR_ARG instead of ERR_VAL if not + initialized or wrong argument. + + 2010-10-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.h: Fixed bug #31385: sizeof(struct sockaddr) is 30 but should be 16 + + 2010-10-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: Once again fixed #30038: DHCP/AutoIP cooperation failed when + replugging the network cable after an AutoIP address was assigned. + + 2010-08-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: Fixed bug #30728: tcp_new_port() did not check listen pcbs + + 2010-08-03: Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.c, raw.c: Don't chain empty pbufs when sending them (fixes bug #30625) + + 2010-08-01: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Greg Renda) + * ppp.c: Applied patch #7264 (PPP protocols are rejected incorrectly on big + endian architectures) + + 2010-07-28: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, mib2.c: Fixed compilation with TCP or UDP + disabled. + + 2010-07-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: Fixed bug #30565 (tcp_connect() check bound list): that check did no + harm but never did anything + + 2010-07-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.c: Fixed invalid fix for bug #30402 (CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE does not + add IP options) + + 2010-07-16: Kieran Mansley + * msg_in.c: Fixed SNMP ASN constant defines to not use ! operator + + 2010-07-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.c: Fixed bug #30402: CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE does not add IP options + + 2010-06-30: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: fixed bug #30300 (shutdown parameter was not initialized in + netconn_delete) + + 2010-06-28: Kieran Mansley + * timers.c remove unportable printing of C function pointers + + 2010-06-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * init.c, timers.c/.h, opt.h, memp_std.h: From patch #7221: added flag + NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS to drop timer support for NO_SYS==1 for easier upgrading + + 2010-06-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * api(_lib).c/.h, api_msg.c/.h, sockets.c/.h: Fixed bug #10088: Correctly + implemented shutdown at socket level. + + 2010-06-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.c/.h, ip_frag.c/.h, opt.h, memp_std.h: Fixed bug #29361 (ip_frag has + problems with zero-copy DMA MACs) by adding custom pbufs and implementing + custom pbufs that reference other (original) pbufs. Additionally set + IP_FRAG_USES_STATIC_BUF=0 as default to be on the safe side. + + 2010-06-15: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: Fixed bug #29970: DHCP endian issue parsing option responses + + 2010-06-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * autoip.c: Fixed bug #30039: AutoIP does not reuse previous addresses + + 2010-06-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: Fixed bug #30038: dhcp_network_changed doesn't reset AUTOIP coop + state + + 2010-05-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * netdb.c: Correctly NULL-terminate h_addr_list + + 2010-05-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * def.h/.c: changed the semantics of LWIP_PREFIX_BYTEORDER_FUNCS to prevent + "symbol already defined" i.e. when linking to winsock + + 2010-05-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * def.h, timers.c: Fixed bug #29769 (sys_check_timeouts: sys_now() may + overflow) + + 2010-04-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: Fixed bug #29617 (sometime cause stall on delete listening + connection) + + 2010-03-28: Luca Ceresoli + * ip_addr.c/.h: patch #7143: Add a few missing const qualifiers + + 2010-03-27: Luca Ceresoli + * mib2.c: patch #7130: remove meaningless const qualifiers + + 2010-03-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: Make LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF work for TCP, too + + 2010-03-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * various files: Fixed compiling with different options disabled (TCP/UDP), + triggered by bug #29345; don't allocate acceptmbox if LWIP_TCP is disabled + + 2010-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Fixed bug #29332: lwip_select() processes readset incorrectly + + 2010-03-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c, test_tcp_oos.c: Fixed bug #29080: Correctly handle remote side + overrunning our rcv_wnd in ooseq case. + + 2010-03-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: tcp_listen() did not copy the pcb's prio. + + 2010-03-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * snmp_msg.c: Fixed bug #29256: SNMP Trap address was not correctly set + + 2010-03-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, etharp.h: Fixed bug #29148 (Incorrect PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE for ports + where ETH_PAD_SIZE > 0) by moving definition of ETH_PAD_SIZE to opt.h + and basing PBUF_LINK_HLEN on it. + + 2010-03-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c, ipv4/ip.c: task #10241 (AutoIP: don't break existing connections + when assiging routable address): when checking incoming packets and + aborting existing connection on address change, filter out link-local + addresses. + + 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Fixed LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF for LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + + 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * ipv4/ip.c: Don't try to forward link-local addresses + + 2010-03-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: Fixed bug #29087: etharp: don't send packets for LinkLocal- + addresses to gw + + 2010-03-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: Fixed bug #29072: Correctly set ciaddr based on message-type + and state. + + 2010-03-05: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: Correctly set TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE when netconn_write is split + into multiple calls to tcp_write. + + 2010-02-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, mem.h, dns.c: task #10140: Remove DNS_USES_STATIC_BUF (keep + the implementation of DNS_USES_STATIC_BUF==1) + + 2010-02-20: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Task #10088: Correctly implement + close() vs. shutdown(). Now the application does not get any more + recv callbacks after calling tcp_close(). Added tcp_shutdown(). + + 2010-02-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c/.h, pbuf.c: Renamed mem_realloc() to mem_trim() to prevent + confusion with realloc() + + 2010-02-15: Simon Goldschmidt/Stephane Lesage + * netif.c/.h: Link status does not depend on LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK + (fixes bug #28899) + + 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c: Fixed bug #28877 (Duplicate ARP gratuitous packet with + LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK set on) by only sending if both link- and + admin-status of a netif are up + + 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h: Disable ETHARP_TRUST_IP_MAC by default since it slows down packet + reception and is not really necessary + + 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c/.h: Fixed ARP input processing: only add a new entry if a + request was directed as us (RFC 826, Packet Reception), otherwise + only update existing entries; internalized some functions + + 2010-02-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.h, etharp.c, tcpip.c: Fixed bug #28183 (ARP and TCP/IP cannot be + disabled on netif used for PPPoE) by adding a new netif flag + (NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET) that tells the stack the device is an ethernet + device but prevents usage of ARP (so that ethernet_input can be used + for PPPoE). + + 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c: netif_set_link_up/down: only do something if the link state + actually changes + + 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt/Stephane Lesage + * api_msg.c: Fixed bug #28865 (Cannot close socket/netconn in non-blocking + connect) + + 2010-02-12: Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.h: Fixed bug #28866 (mem_realloc function defined in mem.h) + + 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, api.h, api_msg.h: Fixed bug #22110 + (recv() makes receive window update for data that wasn't received by + application) + + 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt/Stephane Lesage + * sockets.c: Fixed bug #28853 (lwip_recvfrom() returns 0 on receive time-out + or any netconn_recv() error) + + 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.c: task #10154 (PPP: Update snmp in/out counters for tx/rx packets) + + 2010-02-09: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c: For loopback packets, adjust the stats- and snmp-counters + for the loopback netif. + + 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * igmp.c/.h, ip.h: Moved most defines from igmp.h to igmp.c for clarity + since they are not used anywhere else. + + 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt (Stéphane Lesage) + * igmp.c, igmp.h, stats.c, stats.h: Improved IGMP stats + (patch from bug #28798) + + 2010-02-08: Simon Goldschmidt (Stéphane Lesage) + * igmp.c: Fixed bug #28798 (Error in "Max Response Time" processing) and + another bug when LWIP_RAND() returns zero. + + 2010-02-04: Simon Goldschmidt + * nearly every file: Use macros defined in ip_addr.h (some of them new) + to work with IP addresses (preparation for bug #27352 - Change ip_addr + from struct to typedef (u32_t) - and better code). + + 2010-01-31: Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c: Don't call the link-callback from netif_set_up/down() since + this invalidly retriggers DHCP. + + 2010-01-29: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip_addr.h, inet.h, def.h, inet.c, def.c, more: Cleanly separate the + portability file inet.h and its contents from the stack: moved htonX- + functions to def.h (and the new def.c - they are not ipv4 dependent), + let inet.h depend on ip_addr.h and not the other way round. + This fixes bug #28732. + + 2010-01-28: Kieran Mansley + * tcp.c: Ensure ssthresh >= 2*MSS + + 2010-01-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #27871: Calling tcp_abort() in recv + callback can lead to accessing unallocated memory. As a consequence, + ERR_ABRT means the application has called tcp_abort()! + + 2010-01-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * snmp_structs.h, msg_in.c: Partly fixed bug #22070 (MIB_OBJECT_WRITE_ONLY + not implemented in SNMP): write-only or not-accessible are still + returned by getnext (though not by get) + + 2010-01-24: Simon Goldschmidt + * snmp: Renamed the private mib node from 'private' to 'mib_private' to + not use reserved C/C++ keywords + + 2010-01-23: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Fixed bug #28716: select() returns 0 after waiting for less + than 1 ms + + 2010-01-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c, api_msg.c: Fixed bug #28651 (tcp_connect: no callbacks called + if tcp_enqueue fails) both in raw- and netconn-API + + 2010-01-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: Fixed bug #27316: netconn: Possible deadlock in err_tcp + + 2010-01-18: Iordan Neshev/Simon Goldschmidt + * src/netif/ppp: reorganised PPP sourcecode to 2.3.11 including some + bugfix backports from 2.4.x. + + 2010-01-18: Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c: Fixed bug #28679: mem_realloc calculates mem_stats wrong + + 2010-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, (api_msg.h, api.h, sockets.c, tcpip.c): + task #10102: "netconn: clean up conn->err threading issues" by adding + error return value to struct api_msg_msg + + 2010-01-17: Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, api_lib.c, sockets.c: Changed netconn_recv() and netconn_accept() + to return err_t (bugs #27709 and #28087) + + 2010-01-14: Simon Goldschmidt + * ...: Use typedef for function prototypes throughout the stack. + + 2010-01-13: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.h/.c, api_lib.c: Fixed bug #26672 (close connection when receive + window = 0) by correctly draining recvmbox/acceptmbox + + 2010-01-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * pap.c: Fixed bug #13315 (PPP PAP authentication can result in + erroneous callbacks) by copying the code from recent pppd + + 2010-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * raw.c: Fixed bug #28506 (raw_bind should filter received packets) + + 2010-01-10: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h/.c: bug #28127 (remove call to tcp_output() from tcp_ack(_now)()) + + 2010-01-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Fixed bug #28519 (lwip_recvfrom bug with len > 65535) + + 2010-01-08: Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c: Copy hostname for DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC==1 since string + passed to dns_local_addhost() might be volatile + + 2010-01-07: Simon Goldschmidt + * timers.c, tcp.h: Call tcp_timer_needed() with NO_SYS==1, too + + 2010-01-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * netdb.h: Fixed bug #28496: missing include guards in netdb.h + + 2009-12-31: Simon Goldschmidt + * many ppp files: Reorganised PPP source code from ucip structure to pppd + structure to easily compare our code against the pppd code (around v2.3.1) + + 2009-12-27: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Another fix for bug #28241 (ooseq processing) and adapted + unit test + + +(STABLE-1.3.2) + + ++ New features: + + 2009-10-27 Simon Goldschmidt/Stephan Lesage + * netifapi.c/.h: Added netifapi_netif_set_addr() + + 2009-10-07 Simon Goldschmidt/Fabian Koch + * api_msg.c, netbuf.c/.h, opt.h: patch #6888: Patch for UDP Netbufs to + support dest-addr and dest-port (optional: LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO) + + 2009-08-26 Simon Goldschmidt/Simon Kallweit + * slipif.c/.h: bug #26397: SLIP polling support + + 2009-08-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, etharp.h/.c: task #9033: Support IEEE 802.1q tagged frame (VLAN), + New configuration options ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN and ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK. + + 2009-08-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip_addr.h, netdb.c: patch #6900: added define ip_ntoa(struct ip_addr*) + + 2009-08-24 Jakob Stoklund Olesen + * autoip.c, dhcp.c, netif.c: patch #6725: Teach AutoIP and DHCP to respond + to netif_set_link_up(). + + 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h/.c: Added function tcp_debug_state_str() to convert a tcp state + to a human-readable string. + + ++ Bugfixes: + + 2009-12-24: Kieran Mansley + * tcp_in.c Apply patches from Oleg Tyshev to improve OOS processing + (BUG#28241) + + 2009-12-06: Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.h/.c: Fixed bug #27079 (Yet another leak in PPP): outpacket_buf can + be statically allocated (like in ucip) + + 2009-12-04: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Ioardan Neshev) + * pap.c: patch #6969: PPP: missing PAP authentication UNTIMEOUT + + 2009-12-03: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #28106: dup ack for fast retransmit + could have non-zero length + + 2009-12-02: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #27904: TCP sends too many ACKs: delay resetting + tcp_input_pcb until after calling the pcb's callbacks + + 2009-11-29: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #28054: Two segments with FIN flag on the out-of- + sequence queue, also fixed PBUF_POOL leak in the out-of-sequence code + + 2009-11-29: Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.c: Fixed bug #28064: pbuf_alloc(PBUF_POOL) is not thread-safe by + queueing a call into tcpip_thread to free ooseq-bufs if the pool is empty + + 2009-11-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h: Fixed bug #28098: Nagle can prevent fast retransmit from sending + segment + + 2009-11-26: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, sockets.c: Fixed bug #28099: API required to disable Nagle + algorithm at PCB level + + 2009-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #27905: FIN isn't combined with data on unsent + + 2009-11-22: Simon Goldschmidt (suggested by Bill Auerbach) + * tcp.c: tcp_alloc: prevent increasing stats.err for MEMP_TCP_PCB when + reusing time-wait pcb + + 2009-11-20: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Albert Bartel) + * sockets.c: Fixed bug #28062: Data received directly after accepting + does not wake up select + + 2009-11-11: Simon Goldschmidt + * netdb.h: Fixed bug #27994: incorrect define for freeaddrinfo(addrinfo) + + 2009-10-30: Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h: Increased default value for TCP_MSS to 536, updated default + value for TCP_WND to 4*TCP_MSS to keep delayed ACK working. + + 2009-10-28: Kieran Mansley + * tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: re-work the fast retransmission code + to follow algorithm from TCP/IP Illustrated + + 2009-10-27: Kieran Mansley + * tcp_in.c: fix BUG#27445: grow cwnd with every duplicate ACK + + 2009-10-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h: bug-fix in the TCP_EVENT_RECV macro (has to call tcp_recved if + pcb->recv is NULL to keep rcv_wnd correct) + + 2009-10-25: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #26251: RST process in TIME_WAIT TCP state + + 2009-10-23: Simon Goldschmidt (David Empson) + * tcp.c: Fixed bug #27783: Silly window avoidance for small window sizes + + 2009-10-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #27215: TCP sent() callback gives leading and + trailing 1 byte len (SYN/FIN) + + 2009-10-21: Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #27315: zero window probe and FIN + + 2009-10-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c/.h: Minor code simplification (don't store received pbuf, change + conditional code to assert where applicable), check pbuf length before + testing for valid reply + + 2009-10-19: Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: Removed most calls to udp_connect since they aren't necessary + when using udp_sendto_if() - always stay connected to IP_ADDR_ANY. + + 2009-10-16: Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.c: Fixed bug #27390: Source IP check in ip_input() causes it to drop + valid DHCP packets -> allow 0.0.0.0 as source address when LWIP_DHCP is + enabled + + 2009-10-15: Simon Goldschmidt (Oleg Tyshev) + * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #27329: dupacks by unidirectional data transmit + + 2009-10-15: Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c: Fixed bug #27709: conn->err race condition on netconn_recv() + timeout + + 2009-10-15: Simon Goldschmidt + * autoip.c: Fixed bug #27704: autoip starts with wrong address + LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR() returned address in host byte order instead + of network byte order + + 2009-10-11 Simon Goldschmidt (Jörg Kesten) + * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #27504: tcp_enqueue wrongly concatenates segments + which are not consecutive when retransmitting unacked segments + + 2009-10-09 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h: Fixed default values of some stats to only be enabled if used + Fixes bug #27338: sys_stats is defined when NO_SYS = 1 + + 2009-08-30 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.c: Fixed bug bug #27345: "ip_frag() does not use the LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK + function" by checking for loopback before calling ip_frag + + 2009-08-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed invalid dependency to etharp_query if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK==0 + + 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.c: bug #27078: Possible memory leak in pppInit() + + 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt + * netdb.c, dns.c: bug #26657: DNS, if host name is "localhost", result + is error. + + 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, init.c: bug #26649: TCP fails when TCP_MSS > TCP_SND_BUF + Fixed wrong parenthesis, added check in init.c + + 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.c: bug #27266: wait-state debug message in pppMain occurs every ms + + 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt + * many ppp files: bug #27267: Added include to string.h where needed + + 2009-08-23 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h: patch #6843: tcp.h macro optimization patch (for little endian) + + +(STABLE-1.3.1) + + ++ New features: + + 2009-05-10 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, sockets.c, pbuf.c, netbuf.h, pbuf.h: task #7013: Added option + LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF to try to create transmit packets from only + one pbuf to help MACs that don't support scatter-gather DMA. + + 2009-05-09 Simon Goldschmidt + * icmp.h, icmp.c: Shrinked ICMP code, added option to NOT check icoming + ECHO pbuf for size (just use it): LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN + + 2009-05-05 Simon Goldschmidt, Jakob Stoklund Olesen + * ip.h, ip.c: Added ip_current_netif() & ip_current_header() to receive + extended info about the currently received packet. + + 2009-04-27 Simon Goldschmidt + * sys.h: Made SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT and sys_now() work with NO_SYS=1 + + 2009-04-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c, opt.h: Added option MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL to try the next + bigger malloc pool if one is empty (only usable with MEM_USE_POOLS). + + 2009-04-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * dns.c, init.c, dns.h, opt.h: task #7507, patch #6786: DNS supports static + hosts table. New configuration options DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST and + DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC. Also, DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN() can be defined + as an external function for lookup. + + 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: patch #6763: Global DHCP XID can be redefined to something more unique + + 2009-03-31 Kieran Mansley + * tcp.c, tcp_out.c, tcp_in.c, sys.h, tcp.h, opts.h: add support for + TCP timestamp options, off by default. Rework tcp_enqueue() to + take option flags rather than specified option data + + 2009-02-18 Simon Goldschmidt + * cc.h: Added printf formatter for size_t: SZT_F + + 2009-02-16 Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Rishi Khan) + * icmp.c, opt.h: patch #6539: (configurable) response to broadcast- and multicast + pings + + 2009-02-12 Simon Goldschmidt + * init.h: Added LWIP_VERSION to get the current version of the stack + + 2009-02-11 Simon Goldschmidt (suggested by Gottfried Spitaler) + * opt.h, memp.h/.c: added MEMP_MEM_MALLOC to use mem_malloc/mem_free instead + of the pool allocator (can save code size with MEM_LIBC_MALLOC if libc-malloc + is otherwise used) + + 2009-01-28 Jonathan Larmour (suggested by Bill Bauerbach) + * ipv4/inet_chksum.c, ipv4/lwip/inet_chksum.h: inet_chksum_pseudo_partial() + is only used by UDPLITE at present, so conditionalise it. + + 2008-12-03 Simon Goldschmidt (base on patch from Luca Ceresoli) + * autoip.c: checked in (slightly modified) patch #6683: Customizable AUTOIP + "seed" address. This should reduce AUTOIP conflicts if + LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR is overridden. + + 2008-10-02 Jonathan Larmour and Rishi Khan + * sockets.c (lwip_accept): Return EWOULDBLOCK if would block on non-blocking + socket. + + 2008-06-30 Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c, opt.h, stats.h: fixed bug #21433: Calling mem_free/pbuf_free from + interrupt context isn't safe: LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT allows + mem_free to run between mem_malloc iterations. Added illegal counter for + mem stats. + + 2008-06-27 Simon Goldschmidt + * stats.h/.c, some other files: patch #6483: stats module improvement: + Added defines to display each module's statistic individually, added stats + defines for MEM, MEMP and SYS modules, removed (unused) rexmit counter. + + 2008-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt + * err.h: patch #6459: Made err_t overridable to use a more efficient type + (define LWIP_ERR_T in cc.h) + + 2008-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt + * slipif.c: patch #6480: Added a configuration option for slipif for symmetry + to loopif + + 2008-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Luca Ceresoli) + * netif.c, loopif.c, ip.c, netif.h, loopif.h, opt.h: Checked in slightly + modified version of patch # 6370: Moved loopif code to netif.c so that + loopback traffic is supported on all netifs (all local IPs). + Added option to limit loopback packets for each netifs. + + + ++ Bugfixes: + 2009-08-12 Kieran Mansley + * tcp_in.c, tcp.c: Fix bug #27209: handle trimming of segments when + out of window or out of order properly + + 2009-08-12 Kieran Mansley + * tcp_in.c: Fix bug #27199: use snd_wl2 instead of snd_wl1 + + 2009-07-28 Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.h: Fixed bug #27105: "realloc() cannot replace mem_realloc()"s + + 2009-07-27 Kieran Mansley + * api.h api_msg.h netdb.h sockets.h: add missing #include directives + + 2009-07-09 Kieran Mansley + * api_msg.c, sockets.c, api.h: BUG23240 use signed counters for + recv_avail and don't increment counters until message successfully + sent to mbox + + 2009-06-25 Kieran Mansley + * api_msg.c api.h: BUG26722: initialise netconn write variables + in netconn_alloc + + 2009-06-25 Kieran Mansley + * tcp.h: BUG26879: set ret value in TCP_EVENT macros when function is not set + + 2009-06-25 Kieran Mansley + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: BUG26301 and BUG26267: correct + simultaneous close behaviour, and make snd_nxt have the same meaning + as in the RFCs. + + 2009-05-12 Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.h, etharp.c, netif.c: fixed bug #26507: "Gratuitous ARP depends on + arp_table / uses etharp_query" by adding etharp_gratuitous() + + 2009-05-12 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.h, ip.c, igmp.c: bug #26487: Added ip_output_if_opt that can add IP options + to the IP header (used by igmp_ip_output_if) + + 2009-05-06 Simon Goldschmidt + * inet_chksum.c: On little endian architectures, use LWIP_PLATFORM_HTONS (if + defined) for SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD to speed up checksumming. + + 2009-05-05 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: bug #26405: Prematurely released semaphore causes lwip_select() + to crash + + 2009-05-04 Simon Goldschmidt + * init.c: snmp was not initialized in lwip_init() + + 2009-05-04 Frédéric Bernon + * dhcp.c, netbios.c: Changes if IP_SOF_BROADCAST is enabled. + + 2009-05-03 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h: bug #26349: Nagle algorithm doesn't send although segment is full + (and unsent->next == NULL) + + 2009-05-02 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcpip.h, tcpip.c: fixed tcpip_untimeout (does not need the time, broken after + 1.3.0 in CVS only) - fixes compilation of ppp_oe.c + + 2009-05-02 Simon Goldschmidt + * msg_in.c: fixed bug #25636: SNMPSET value is ignored for integer fields + + 2009-05-01 Simon Goldschmidt + * pap.c: bug #21680: PPP upap_rauthnak() drops legal NAK packets + + 2009-05-01 Simon Goldschmidt + * ppp.c: bug #24228: Memory corruption with PPP and DHCP + + 2009-04-29 Frédéric Bernon + * raw.c, udp.c, init.c, opt.h, ip.h, sockets.h: bug #26309: Implement the + SO(F)_BROADCAST filter for all API layers. Avoid the unindented reception + of broadcast packets even when this option wasn't set. Port maintainers + which want to enable this filter have to set IP_SOF_BROADCAST=1 in opt.h. + If you want this option also filter broadcast on recv operations, you also + have to set IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV=1 in opt.h. + + 2009-04-28 Simon Goldschmidt, Jakob Stoklund Olesen + * dhcp.c: patch #6721, bugs #25575, #25576: Some small fixes to DHCP and + DHCP/AUTOIP cooperation + + 2009-04-25 Simon Goldschmidt, Oleg Tyshev + * tcp_out.c: bug #24212: Deadlocked tcp_retransmit due to exceeded pcb->cwnd + Fixed by sorting the unsent and unacked queues (segments are inserted at the + right place in tcp_output and tcp_rexmit). + + 2009-04-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * memp.c, mem.c, memp.h, mem_std.h: bug #26213 "Problem with memory allocation + when debugging": memp_sizes contained the wrong sizes (including sanity + regions); memp pools for MEM_USE_POOLS were too small + + 2009-04-24 Simon Goldschmidt, Frédéric Bernon + * inet.c: patch #6765: Fix a small problem with the last changes (incorrect + behavior, with with ip address string not ended by a '\0', a space or a + end of line) + + 2009-04-19 Simon Goldschmidt + * rawapi.txt: Fixed bug #26069: Corrected documentation: if tcp_connect fails, + pcb->err is called, not pcb->connected (with an error code). + + 2009-04-19 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #26236: "TCP options (timestamp) don't work with + no-copy-tcpwrite": deallocate option data, only concat segments with same flags + + 2009-04-19 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: Fixed bug #25094: "Zero-length pbuf" (options are now allocated + in the header pbuf, not the data pbuf) + + 2009-04-18 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: fixed bug #25695: Segmentation fault in do_writemore() + + 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: tried to fix bug #23559: lwip_recvfrom problem with tcp + + 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: task #9192: mem_free of dhcp->options_in and dhcp->msg_in + + 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.c, ip6.c, tcp_out.c, ip.h: patch #6808: Add a utility function + ip_hinted_output() (for smaller code mainly) + + 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * inet.c: patch #6765: Supporting new line characters in inet_aton() + + 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: patch #6764: DHCP rebind and renew did not send hostnam option; + Converted constant OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE to netif->mtu, check if netif->mtu + is big enough in dhcp_start + + 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * netbuf.c: bug #26027: netbuf_chain resulted in pbuf memory leak + + 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c, ppp.c: bug #25763: corrected 4 occurrences of SMEMCPY to MEMCPY + + 2009-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: bug #26121: set_errno can be overridden + + 2009-04-09 Kieran Mansley (patch from Luca Ceresoli ) + * init.c, opt.h: Patch#6774 TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ breaks compilation when + LWIP_TCP==0 + + 2009-04-09 Kieran Mansley (patch from Roy Lee ) + * tcp.h: Patch#6802 Add do-while-clauses to those function like + macros in tcp.h + + 2009-03-31 Kieran Mansley + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h, opt.h: Rework the way window + updates are calculated and sent (BUG20515) + + * tcp_in.c: cope with SYN packets received during established states, + and retransmission of initial SYN. + + * tcp_out.c: set push bit correctly when tcp segments are merged + + 2009-03-27 Kieran Mansley + * tcp_out.c set window correctly on probes (correcting change made + yesterday) + + 2009-03-26 Kieran Mansley + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp.h: add tcp_abandon() to cope with dropping + connections where no reset required (bug #25622) + + * tcp_out.c: set TCP_ACK flag on keepalive and zero window probes + (bug #20779) + + 2009-02-18 Simon Goldschmidt (Jonathan Larmour and Bill Auerbach) + * ip_frag.c: patch #6528: the buffer used for IP_FRAG_USES_STATIC_BUF could be + too small depending on MEM_ALIGNMENT + + 2009-02-16 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.h/.c, api_*.h/.c: fixed arguments of socket functions to match the standard; + converted size argument of netconn_write to 'size_t' + + 2009-02-16 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, tcp.c: fixed bug #24440: TCP connection close problem on 64-bit host + by moving accept callback function pointer to TCP_PCB_COMMON + + 2009-02-12 Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #25345 (DHCPDECLINE is sent with "Maximum message size" + option) + + 2009-02-11 Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #24480 (releasing old udp_pdb and pbuf in dhcp_start) + + 2009-02-11 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, api_msg.c: added configurable default valud for netconn->recv_bufsize: + RECV_BUFSIZE_DEFAULT (fixes bug #23726: pbuf pool exhaustion on slow recv()) + + 2009-02-10 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: fixed bug #25467: Listen backlog is not reset on timeout in SYN_RCVD: + Accepts_pending is decrease on a corresponding listen pcb when a connection + in state SYN_RCVD is close. + + 2009-01-28 Jonathan Larmour + * pbuf.c: reclaim pbufs from TCP out-of-sequence segments if we run + out of pool pbufs. + + 2008-12-19 Simon Goldschmidt + * many files: patch #6699: fixed some warnings on platform where sizeof(int) == 2 + + 2008-12-10 Tamas Somogyi, Frédéric Bernon + * sockets.c: fixed bug #25051: lwip_recvfrom problem with udp: fromaddr and + port uses deleted netbuf. + + 2008-10-18 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: fixed bug ##24596: Vulnerability on faulty TCP options length + in tcp_parseopt + + 2008-10-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip_frag.c: fixed bug #24517: IP reassembly crashes on unaligned IP headers + by packing the struct ip_reass_helper. + + 2008-10-03 David Woodhouse, Jonathan Larmour + * etharp.c (etharp_arp_input): Fix type aliasing problem copying ip address. + + 2008-10-02 Jonathan Larmour + * dns.c: Hard-code structure sizes, to avoid issues on some compilers where + padding is included. + + 2008-09-30 Jonathan Larmour + * sockets.c (lwip_accept): check addr isn't NULL. If it's valid, do an + assertion check that addrlen isn't NULL. + + 2008-09-30 Jonathan Larmour + * tcp.c: Fix bug #24227, wrong error message in tcp_bind. + + 2008-08-26 Simon Goldschmidt + * inet.h, ip_addr.h: fixed bug #24132: Cross-dependency between ip_addr.h and + inet.h -> moved declaration of struct in_addr from ip_addr.h to inet.h + + 2008-08-14 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: fixed bug #23847: do_close_internal references freed memory (when + tcp_close returns != ERR_OK) + + 2008-07-08 Frédéric Bernon + * stats.h: Fix some build bugs introduced with patch #6483 (missing some parameters + in macros, mainly if MEM_STATS=0 and MEMP_STATS=0). + + 2008-06-24 Jonathan Larmour + * tcp_in.c: Fix for bug #23693 as suggested by Art R. Ensure cseg is unused + if tcp_seg_copy fails. + + 2008-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt + * inet_chksum.c: Checked in some ideas of patch #6460 (loop optimizations) + and created defines for swapping bytes and folding u32 to u16. + + 2008-05-30 Kieran Mansley + * tcp_in.c Remove redundant "if" statement, and use real rcv_wnd + rather than rcv_ann_wnd when deciding if packets are in-window. + Contributed by + + 2008-05-30 Kieran Mansley + * mem.h: Fix BUG#23254. Change macro definition of mem_* to allow + passing as function pointers when MEM_LIBC_MALLOC is defined. + + 2008-05-09 Jonathan Larmour + * err.h, err.c, sockets.c: Fix bug #23119: Reorder timeout error code to + stop it being treated as a fatal error. + + 2008-04-15 Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: fixed bug #22804: dhcp_stop doesn't clear NETIF_FLAG_DHCP + (flag now cleared) + + 2008-03-27 Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c, tcpip.c, tcpip.h, opt.h: fixed bug #21433 (Calling mem_free/pbuf_free + from interrupt context isn't safe): set LWIP_USE_HEAP_FROM_INTERRUPT to 1 + in lwipopts.h or use pbuf_free_callback(p)/mem_free_callback(m) to free pbufs + or heap memory from interrupt context + + 2008-03-26 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c, tcp.c: fixed bug #22249: division by zero could occur if a remote + host sent a zero mss as TCP option. + + +(STABLE-1.3.0) + + ++ New features: + + 2008-03-10 Jonathan Larmour + * inet_chksum.c: Allow choice of one of the sample algorithms to be + made from lwipopts.h. Fix comment on how to override LWIP_CHKSUM. + + 2008-01-22 Frédéric Bernon + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp.h, opt.h: Rename LWIP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS in + TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS to have coherent TCP options names. + + 2008-01-14 Frédéric Bernon + * rawapi.txt, api_msg.c, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp.h: changes for task #7675 "Enable + to refuse data on a TCP_EVENT_RECV call". Important, behavior changes for the + tcp_recv callback (see rawapi.txt). + + 2008-01-14 Frédéric Bernon, Marc Chaland + * ip.c: Integrate patch #6369" ip_input : checking before realloc". + + 2008-01-12 Frédéric Bernon + * tcpip.h, tcpip.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: replace the field + netconn::sem per netconn::op_completed like suggested for the task #7490 + "Add return value to sys_mbox_post". + + 2008-01-12 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.c, opt.h: replace DEFAULT_RECVMBOX_SIZE per DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE, + DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE and DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE (to optimize queues + sizes), like suggested for the task #7490 "Add return value to sys_mbox_post". + + 2008-01-10 Frédéric Bernon + * tcpip.h, tcpip.c: add tcpip_callback_with_block function for the task #7490 + "Add return value to sys_mbox_post". tcpip_callback is always defined as + "blocking" ("block" parameter = 1). + + 2008-01-10 Frédéric Bernon + * tcpip.h, tcpip.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: replace the field + netconn::mbox (sys_mbox_t) per netconn::sem (sys_sem_t) for the task #7490 + "Add return value to sys_mbox_post". + + 2008-01-05 Frédéric Bernon + * sys_arch.txt, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, tcpip.c, sys.h, opt.h: + Introduce changes for task #7490 "Add return value to sys_mbox_post" with some + modifications in the sys_mbox api: sys_mbox_new take a "size" parameters which + indicate the number of pointers query by the mailbox. There is three defines + in opt.h to indicate sizes for tcpip::mbox, netconn::recvmbox, and for the + netconn::acceptmbox. Port maintainers, you can decide to just add this new + parameter in your implementation, but to ignore it to keep the previous behavior. + The new sys_mbox_trypost function return a value to know if the mailbox is + full or if the message is posted. Take a look to sys_arch.txt for more details. + This new function is used in tcpip_input (so, can be called in an interrupt + context since the function is not blocking), and in recv_udp and recv_raw. + + 2008-01-04 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt, Jonathan Larmour + * rawapi.txt, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, sockets.c, tcp.h, tcp.c, + tcp_in.c, init.c, opt.h: rename backlog options with TCP_ prefix, limit the + "backlog" parameter in an u8_t, 0 is interpreted as "smallest queue", add + documentation in the rawapi.txt file. + + 2007-12-31 Kieran Mansley (based on patch from Per-Henrik Lundbolm) + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: Add TCP persist timer + + 2007-12-31 Frédéric Bernon, Luca Ceresoli + * autoip.c, etharp.c: ip_addr.h: Integrate patch #6348: "Broadcast ARP packets + in autoip". The change in etharp_raw could be removed, since all calls to + etharp_raw use ethbroadcast for the "ethdst_addr" parameter. But it could be + wrong in the future. + + 2007-12-30 Frédéric Bernon, Tom Evans + * ip.c: Fix bug #21846 "LwIP doesn't appear to perform any IP Source Address + Filtering" reported by Tom Evans. + + 2007-12-21 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt, Jonathan Larmour + * tcp.h, opt.h, api.h, api_msg.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, + sockets.c, init.c: task #7252: Implement TCP listen backlog: Warning: raw API + applications have to call 'tcp_accepted(pcb)' in their accept callback to + keep accepting new connections. + + 2007-12-13 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.c, err.h, err.c, sockets.c, dns.c, dns.h: replace "enum dns_result" + by err_t type. Add a new err_t code "ERR_INPROGRESS". + + 2007-12-12 Frédéric Bernon + * dns.h, dns.c, opt.h: move DNS options to the "right" place. Most visibles + are the one which have ram usage. + + 2007-12-05 Frédéric Bernon + * netdb.c: add a LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE option to decide to use a static + set of variables (=0) or a local one (=1). In this last case, your port should + provide a function "struct hostent* sys_thread_hostent( struct hostent* h)" + which have to do a copy of "h" and return a pointer ont the "per-thread" copy. + + 2007-12-03 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.c: ip_input: check if a packet is for inp first before checking all other + netifs on netif_list (speeds up packet receiving in most cases) + + 2007-11-30 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.c, raw.c: task #7497: Sort lists (pcb, netif, ...) for faster access + UDP: move a (connected) pcb selected for input to the front of the list of + pcbs so that it is found faster next time. Same for RAW pcbs that have eaten + a packet. + + 2007-11-28 Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c, stats.c, stats.h, opt.h: Introduced ETHARP_STATS + + 2007-11-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * dhcp.c: dhcp_unfold_reply() uses pbuf_copy_partial instead of its own copy + algorithm. + + 2007-11-24 Simon Goldschmidt + * netdb.h, netdb.c, sockets.h/.c: Moved lwip_gethostbyname from sockets.c + to the new file netdb.c; included lwip_getaddrinfo. + + 2007-11-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, opt.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: implemented calculating the effective send-mss + based on the MTU of the netif used to send. Enabled by default. Disable by + setting LWIP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS to 0. This fixes bug #21492. + + 2007-11-19 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.c, dns.h, dns.c: Implement DNS_DOES_NAME_CHECK option (check if name + received match the name query), implement DNS_USES_STATIC_BUF (the place where + copy dns payload to parse the response), return an error if there is no place + for a new query, and fix some minor problems. + + 2007-11-16 Simon Goldschmidt + * new files: ipv4/inet.c, ipv4/inet_chksum.c, ipv6/inet6.c + removed files: core/inet.c, core/inet6.c + Moved inet files into ipv4/ipv6 directory; splitted inet.c/inet.h into + inet and chksum part; changed includes in all lwIP files as appropriate + + 2007-11-16 Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, api_msg.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, socket.h, socket.c: Added sequential + dns resolver function for netconn api (netconn_gethostbyname) and socket api + (gethostbyname/gethostbyname_r). + + 2007-11-15 Jim Pettinato, Frédéric Bernon + * opt.h, init.c, tcpip.c, dhcp.c, dns.h, dns.c: add DNS client for simple name + requests with RAW api interface. Initialization is done in lwip_init() with + build time options. DNS timer is added in tcpip_thread context. DHCP can set + DNS server ip addresses when options are received. You need to set LWIP_DNS=1 + in your lwipopts.h file (LWIP_DNS=0 in opt.h). DNS_DEBUG can be set to get + some traces with LWIP_DEBUGF. Sanity check have been added. There is a "todo" + list with points to improve. + + 2007-11-06 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, mib2.c: Patch #6215: added ifAdminStatus write support (if explicitly + enabled by defining SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS to 0); added code to check link status + for ifOperStatus if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK is defined. + + 2007-11-06 Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, api_msg.h and dependent files: Task #7410: Removed the need to include + core header files in api.h (ip/tcp/udp/raw.h) to hide the internal + implementation from netconn api applications. + + 2007-11-03 Frédéric Bernon + * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c, opt.h: add SO_RCVBUF option for UDP & + RAW netconn. You need to set LWIP_SO_RCVBUF=1 in your lwipopts.h (it's disabled + by default). Netconn API users can use the netconn_recv_bufsize macro to access + it. This is a first release which have to be improve for TCP. Note it used the + netconn::recv_avail which need to be more "thread-safe" (note there is already + the problem for FIONREAD with lwip_ioctl/ioctlsocket). + + 2007-11-01 Frédéric Bernon, Marc Chaland + * sockets.h, sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, tcp.h, tcp_out.c: + Integrate "patch #6250 : MSG_MORE flag for send". MSG_MORE is used at socket api + layer, NETCONN_MORE at netconn api layer, and TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE at raw api + layer. This option enable to delayed TCP PUSH flag on multiple "write" calls. + Note that previous "copy" parameter for "write" APIs is now called "apiflags". + + 2007-10-24 Frédéric Bernon + * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: Add macro API_EVENT in the same spirit than + TCP_EVENT_xxx macros to get a code more readable. It could also help to remove + some code (like we have talk in "patch #5919 : Create compile switch to remove + select code"), but it could be done later. + + 2007-10-08 Simon Goldschmidt + * many files: Changed initialization: many init functions are not needed any + more since we now rely on the compiler initializing global and static + variables to zero! + + 2007-10-06 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip_frag.c, memp.c, mib2.c, ip_frag.h, memp_std.h, opt.h: Changed IP_REASSEMBLY + to enqueue the received pbufs so that multiple packets can be reassembled + simultaneously and no static reassembly buffer is needed. + + 2007-10-05 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcpip.c, etharp.h, etharp.c: moved ethernet_input from tcpip.c to etharp.c so + all netifs (or ports) can use it. + + 2007-10-05 Frédéric Bernon + * netifapi.h, netifapi.c: add function netifapi_netif_set_default. Change the + common function to reduce a little bit the footprint (for all functions using + only the "netif" parameter). + + 2007-10-03 Frédéric Bernon + * netifapi.h, netifapi.c: add functions netifapi_netif_set_up, netifapi_netif_set_down, + netifapi_autoip_start and netifapi_autoip_stop. Use a common function to reduce + a little bit the footprint (for all functions using only the "netif" parameter). + + 2007-09-15 Frédéric Bernon + * udp.h, udp.c, sockets.c: Changes for "#20503 IGMP Improvement". Add IP_MULTICAST_IF + option in socket API, and a new field "multicast_ip" in "struct udp_pcb" (for + netconn and raw API users), only if LWIP_IGMP=1. Add getsockopt processing for + IP_MULTICAST_TTL and IP_MULTICAST_IF. + + 2007-09-10 Frédéric Bernon + * snmp.h, mib2.c: enable to remove SNMP timer (which consumne several cycles + even when it's not necessary). snmp_agent.txt tell to call snmp_inc_sysuptime() + each 10ms (but, it's intrusive if you use sys_timeout feature). Now, you can + decide to call snmp_add_sysuptime(100) each 1000ms (which is bigger "step", but + call to a lower frequency). Or, you can decide to not call snmp_inc_sysuptime() + or snmp_add_sysuptime(), and to define the SNMP_GET_SYSUPTIME(sysuptime) macro. + This one is undefined by default in mib2.c. SNMP_GET_SYSUPTIME is called inside + snmp_get_sysuptime(u32_t *value), and enable to change "sysuptime" value only + when it's queried (any direct call to "sysuptime" is changed by a call to + snmp_get_sysuptime). + + 2007-09-09 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac + * igmp.h, igmp.c, netif.h, netif.c, ip.c: To enable to have interfaces with IGMP, + and others without it, there is a new NETIF_FLAG_IGMP flag to set in netif->flags + if you want IGMP on an interface. igmp_stop() is now called inside netif_remove(). + igmp_report_groups() is now called inside netif_set_link_up() (need to have + LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK=1) to resend reports once the link is up (avoid to wait + the next query message to receive the matching multicast streams). + + 2007-09-08 Frédéric Bernon + * sockets.c, ip.h, api.h, tcp.h: declare a "struct ip_pcb" which only contains + IP_PCB. Add in the netconn's "pcb" union a "struct ip_pcb *ip;" (no size change). + Use this new field to access to common pcb fields (ttl, tos, so_options, etc...). + Enable to access to these fields with LWIP_TCP=0. + + 2007-09-05 Frédéric Bernon + * udp.c, ipv4/icmp.c, ipv4/ip.c, ipv6/icmp.c, ipv6/ip6.c, ipv4/icmp.h, + ipv6/icmp.h, opt.h: Integrate "task #7272 : LWIP_ICMP option". The new option + LWIP_ICMP enable/disable ICMP module inside the IP stack (enable per default). + Be careful, disabling ICMP make your product non-compliant to RFC1122, but + help to reduce footprint, and to reduce "visibility" on the Internet. + + 2007-09-05 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac + * opt.h, sys.h, tcpip.c, slipif.c, ppp.c, sys_arch.txt: Change parameters list + for sys_thread_new (see "task #7252 : Create sys_thread_new_ex()"). Two new + parameters have to be provided: a task name, and a task stack size. For this + one, since it's platform dependant, you could define the best one for you in + your lwipopts.h. For port maintainers, you can just add these new parameters + in your sys_arch.c file, and but it's not mandatory, use them in your OS + specific functions. + + 2007-09-05 Frédéric Bernon + * inet.c, autoip.c, msg_in.c, msg_out.c, init.c: Move some build time checkings + inside init.c for task #7142 "Sanity check user-configurable values". + + 2007-09-04 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac + * igmp.h, igmp.c, memp_std.h, memp.c, init.c, opt.h: Replace mem_malloc call by + memp_malloc, and use a new MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP option (see opt.h to define the + value). It will avoid potential fragmentation problems, use a counter to know + how many times a group is used on an netif, and free it when all applications + leave it. MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP got 8 as default value (and init.c got a sanity + check if LWIP_IGMP!=0). + + 2007-09-03 Frédéric Bernon + * igmp.h, igmp.c, sockets.c, api_msg.c: Changes for "#20503 IGMP Improvement". + Initialize igmp_mac_filter to NULL in netif_add (this field should be set in + the netif's "init" function). Use the "imr_interface" field (for socket layer) + and/or the "interface" field (for netconn layer), for join/leave operations. + The igmp_join/leavegroup first parameter change from a netif to an ipaddr. + This field could be a netif's ipaddr, or "any" (same meaning than ip_addr_isany). + + 2007-08-30 Frédéric Bernon + * Add netbuf.h, netbuf.c, Change api.h, api_lib.c: #7249 "Split netbuf functions + from api/api_lib". Now netbuf API is independant of netconn, and can be used + with other API (application based on raw API, or future "socket2" API). Ports + maintainers just have to add src/api/netbuf.c in their makefile/projects. + + 2007-08-30 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour + * init.c: Add first version of lwip_sanity_check for task #7142 "Sanity check + user-configurable values". + + 2007-08-29 Frédéric Bernon + * igmp.h, igmp.c, tcpip.c, init.c, netif.c: change igmp_init and add igmp_start. + igmp_start is call inside netif_add. Now, igmp initialization is in the same + spirit than the others modules. Modify some IGMP debug traces. + + 2007-08-29 Frédéric Bernon + * Add init.h, init.c, Change opt.h, tcpip.c: Task #7213 "Add a lwip_init function" + Add lwip_init function to regroup all modules initializations, and to provide + a place to add code for task #7142 "Sanity check user-configurable values". + Ports maintainers should remove direct initializations calls from their code, + and add init.c in their makefiles. Note that lwip_init() function is called + inside tcpip_init, but can also be used by raw api users since all calls are + disabled when matching options are disabled. Also note that their is new options + in opt.h, you should configure in your lwipopts.h (they are enabled per default). + + 2007-08-26 Marc Boucher + * api_msg.c: do_close_internal(): Reset the callbacks and arg (conn) to NULL + since they can under certain circumstances be called with an invalid conn + pointer after the connection has been closed (and conn has been freed). + + 2007-08-25 Frédéric Bernon (Artem Migaev's Patch) + * netif.h, netif.c: Integrate "patch #6163 : Function to check if link layer is up". + Add a netif_is_link_up() function if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK option is set. + + 2007-08-22 Frédéric Bernon + * netif.h, netif.c, opt.h: Rename LWIP_NETIF_CALLBACK in LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK + to be coherent with new LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK option before next release. + + 2007-08-22 Frédéric Bernon + * tcpip.h, tcpip.c, ethernetif.c, opt.h: remove options ETHARP_TCPIP_INPUT & + ETHARP_TCPIP_ETHINPUT, now, only "ethinput" code is supported, even if the + name is tcpip_input (we keep the name of 1.2.0 function). + + 2007-08-17 Jared Grubb + * memp_std.h, memp.h, memp.c, mem.c, stats.c: (Task #7136) Centralize mempool + settings into new memp_std.h and optional user file lwippools.h. This adds + more dynamic mempools, and allows the user to create an arbitrary number of + mempools for mem_malloc. + + 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher + * api_msg.c: Initialize newconn->state to NETCONN_NONE in accept_function; + otherwise it was left to NETCONN_CLOSE and sent_tcp() could prematurely + close the connection. + + 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher + * sockets.c: lwip_accept(): check netconn_peer() error return. + + 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher + * mem.c, mem.h: Added mem_calloc(). + + 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher + * tcpip.c, tcpip.h memp.c, memp.h: Added distinct memp (MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT) + for input packets to prevent floods from consuming all of MEMP_TCPIP_MSG + and starving other message types. + Renamed MEMP_TCPIP_MSG to MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API + + 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher + * pbuf.c, pbuf.h, etharp.c, tcp_in.c, sockets.c: Split pbuf flags in pbuf + type and flgs (later renamed to flags). + Use enum pbuf_flag as pbuf_type. Renumber PBUF_FLAG_*. + Improved lwip_recvfrom(). TCP push now propagated. + + 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher + * ethernetif.c, contrib/ports/various: ethbroadcast now a shared global + provided by etharp. + + 2007-08-16 Marc Boucher + * ppp_oe.c ppp_oe.h, auth.c chap.c fsm.c lcp.c ppp.c ppp.h, + etharp.c ethernetif.c, etharp.h, opt.h tcpip.h, tcpip.c: + Added PPPoE support and various PPP improvements. + + 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c, ip_frag.c, pbuf.c, api.h, pbuf.h: Introduced pbuf_copy_partial, + making netbuf_copy_partial use this function. + + 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Fix bug #20506: Slow start / initial congestion window starts with + 2 * mss (instead of 1 * mss previously) to comply with some newer RFCs and + other stacks. + + 2007-07-13 Jared Grubb (integrated by Frédéric Bernon) + * opt.h, netif.h, netif.c, ethernetif.c: Add new configuration option to add + a link callback in the netif struct, and functions to handle it. Be carefull + for port maintainers to add the NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP flag (like in ethernetif.c) + if you want to be sure to be compatible with future changes... + + 2007-06-30 Frédéric Bernon + * sockets.h, sockets.c: Implement MSG_PEEK flag for recv/recvfrom functions. + + 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.h, etharp.c: Combined etharp_request with etharp_raw for both + LWIP_AUTOIP =0 and =1 to remove redundant code. + + 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c, memp.c, mem.h, memp.h, opt.h: task #6863: Introduced the option + MEM_USE_POOLS to use 4 pools with different sized elements instead of a + heap. This both prevents memory fragmentation and gives a higher speed + at the cost of more memory consumption. Turned off by default. + + 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, api.h, api_msg.h: Converted the length argument of + netconn_write (and therefore also api_msg_msg.msg.w.len) from u16_t into + int to be able to send a bigger buffer than 64K with one time (mainly + used from lwip_send). + + 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, api_msg.c: Moved the nagle algorithm from netconn_write/do_write + into a define (tcp_output_nagle) in tcp.h to provide it to raw api users, too. + + 2007-06-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: Fixed bug #20021: Moved sendbuf-processing in + netconn_write from api_lib.c to api_msg.c to also prevent multiple context- + changes on low memory or empty send-buffer. + + 2007-06-18 Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c, etharp.h: Changed etharp to use a defined hardware address length + of 6 to avoid loading netif->hwaddr_len every time (since this file is only + used for ethernet and struct eth_addr already had a defined length of 6). + + 2007-06-17 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c, sockets.h: Implemented socket options SO_NO_CHECK for UDP sockets + to disable UDP checksum generation on transmit. + + 2007-06-13 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + * debug.h, api_msg.c: change LWIP_ERROR to use it to check errors like invalid + pointers or parameters, and let the possibility to redefined it in cc.h. Use + this macro to check "conn" parameter in api_msg.c functions. + + 2007-06-11 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c, sockets.h: Added UDP lite support for sockets + + 2007-06-10 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.h, opt.h, api_msg.c, ip.c, udp.c: Included switch LWIP_UDPLITE (enabled + by default) to switch off UDP-Lite support if not needed (reduces udp.c code + size) + + 2007-06-09 Dominik Spies (integrated by Frédéric Bernon) + * autoip.h, autoip.c, dhcp.h, dhcp.c, netif.h, netif.c, etharp.h, etharp.c, opt.h: + AutoIP implementation available for IPv4, with new options LWIP_AUTOIP and + LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP if you want to cooperate with DHCP. Some tips to adapt + (see TODO mark in the source code). + + 2007-06-09 Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.h, etharp.c, ethernetif.c: Modified order of parameters for + etharp_output() to match netif->output so etharp_output() can be used + directly as netif->output to save one function call. + + 2007-06-08 Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.h, ethernetif.c, slipif.c, loopif.c: Added define + NETIF_INIT_SNMP(netif, type, speed) to initialize per-netif snmp variables, + added initialization of those to ethernetif, slipif and loopif. + + 2007-05-18 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, ip_frag.c, ip_frag.h, ip.c: Added option IP_FRAG_USES_STATIC_BUF + (defaulting to off for now) that can be set to 0 to send fragmented + packets by passing PBUF_REFs down the stack. + + 2007-05-23 Frédéric Bernon + * api_lib.c: Implement SO_RCVTIMEO for accept and recv on TCP + connections, such present in patch #5959. + + 2007-05-23 Frédéric Bernon + * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: group the different NETCONN_UDPxxx + code in only one part... + + 2007-05-18 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, memp.h, memp.c: Added option MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK to check for memp + elements to overflow. This is achieved by adding some bytes before and after + each pool element (increasing their size, of course), filling them with a + prominent value and checking them on freeing the element. + Set it to 2 to also check every element in every pool each time memp_malloc() + or memp_free() is called (slower but more helpful). + + 2007-05-10 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, memp.h, memp.c, pbuf.c (see task #6831): use a new memp pool for + PBUF_POOL pbufs instead of the old pool implementation in pbuf.c to reduce + code size. + + 2007-05-11 Frédéric Bernon + * sockets.c, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, netifapi.h, netifapi.c, tcpip.c: + Include a function pointer instead of a table index in the message to reduce + footprint. Disable some part of lwip_send and lwip_sendto if some options are + not set (LWIP_TCP, LWIP_UDP, LWIP_RAW). + + 2007-05-10 Simon Goldschmidt + * *.h (except netif/ppp/*.h): Included patch #5448: include '#ifdef __cplusplus + \ extern "C" {' in all header files. Now you can write your application using + the lwIP stack in C++ and simply #include the core files. Note I have left + out the netif/ppp/*h header files for now, since I don't know which files are + included by applications and which are for internal use only. + + 2007-05-09 Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, *.c/*.h: Included patch #5920: Create define to override C-library + memcpy. 2 Defines are created: MEMCPY() for normal memcpy, SMEMCPY() for + situations where some compilers might inline the copy and save a function + call. Also replaced all calls to memcpy() with calls to (S)MEMCPY(). + + 2007-05-08 Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.h: If MEM_LIBC_MALLOC==1, allow the defines (e.g. mem_malloc() -> malloc()) + to be overriden in case the C-library malloc implementation is not protected + against concurrent access. + + 2007-05-04 Simon Goldschmidt (Atte Kojo) + * etharp.c: Introduced fast one-entry-cache to speed up ARP lookup when sending + multiple packets to the same host. + + 2007-05-04 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour + * sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c: Fix bug #19162 "lwip_sento: a possible + to corrupt remote addr/port connection state". Reduce problems "not enought memory" with + netbuf (if we receive lot of datagrams). Improve lwip_sendto (only one exchange between + sockets api and api_msg which run in tcpip_thread context). Add netconn_sento function. + Warning, if you directly access to "fromaddr" & "fromport" field from netbuf struct, + these fields are now renamed "addr" & "port". + + 2007-04-11 Jonathan Larmour + * sys.h, api_lib.c: Provide new sys_mbox_tryfetch function. Require ports to provide new + sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch function to get a message if one is there, otherwise return + with SYS_MBOX_EMPTY. sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch can be implemented as a function-like macro + by the port in sys_arch.h if desired. + + 2007-04-06 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, tcpip.h, tcpip.c, netifapi.h, netifapi.c: New configuration option LWIP_NETIF_API + allow to use thread-safe functions to add/remove netif in list, and to start/stop dhcp + clients, using new functions from netifapi.h. Disable as default (no port change to do). + + 2007-04-05 Frédéric Bernon + * sockets.c: remplace ENOBUFS errors on alloc_socket by ENFILE to be more BSD compliant. + + 2007-04-04 Simon Goldschmidt + * arch.h, api_msg.c, dhcp.c, msg_in.c, sockets.c: Introduced #define LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(x) + use this for and architecture-independent form to tell the compiler you intentionally + are not using this variable. Can be overriden in cc.h. + + 2007-03-28 Frédéric Bernon + * opt.h, netif.h, dhcp.h, dhcp.c: New configuration option LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME allow to + define a hostname in netif struct (this is just a pointer, so, you can use a hardcoded + string, point on one of your's ethernetif field, or alloc a string you will free yourself). + It will be used by DHCP to register a client hostname, but can also be use when you call + snmp_set_sysname. + + 2007-03-28 Frédéric Bernon + * netif.h, netif.c: A new NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP flag is defined in netif.h, to allow to + initialize a network interface's flag with. It tell this interface is an ethernet + device, and we can use ARP with it to do a "gratuitous ARP" (RFC 3220 "IP Mobility + Support for IPv4" section 4.6) when interface is "up" with netif_set_up(). + + 2007-03-26 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour + * opt.h, tcpip.c: New configuration option LWIP_ARP allow to disable ARP init at build + time if you only use PPP or SLIP. The default is enable. Note we don't have to call + etharp_init in your port's initilization sequence if you use tcpip.c, because this call + is done in tcpip_init function. + + 2007-03-22 Frédéric Bernon + * stats.h, stats.c, msg_in.c: Stats counters can be change to u32_t if necessary with the + new option LWIP_STATS_LARGE. If you need this option, define LWIP_STATS_LARGE to 1 in + your lwipopts.h. More, unused counters are not defined in the stats structs, and not + display by stats_display(). Note that some options (SYS_STATS and RAW_STATS) are defined + but never used. Fix msg_in.c with the correct #if test for a stat display. + + 2007-03-21 Kieran Mansley + * netif.c, netif.h: Apply patch#4197 with some changes (originator: rireland@hmgsl.com). + Provides callback on netif up/down state change. + + 2007-03-11 Frédéric Bernon, Mace Gael, Steve Reynolds + * sockets.h, sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c, igmp.h, igmp.c, + ip.c, netif.h, tcpip.c, opt.h: + New configuration option LWIP_IGMP to enable IGMP processing. Based on only one + filter per all network interfaces. Declare a new function in netif to enable to + control the MAC filter (to reduce lwIP traffic processing). + + 2007-03-11 Frédéric Bernon + * tcp.h, tcp.c, sockets.c, tcp_out.c, tcp_in.c, opt.h: Keepalive values can + be configured at run time with LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE, but don't change this + unless you know what you're doing (default are RFC1122 compliant). Note + that TCP_KEEPIDLE and TCP_KEEPINTVL have to be set in seconds. + + 2007-03-08 Frédéric Bernon + * tcp.h: Keepalive values can be configured at compile time, but don't change + this unless you know what you're doing (default are RFC1122 compliant). + + 2007-03-08 Frédéric Bernon + * sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, tcpip.c, sys.h, sys.c, err.c, opt.h: + Implement LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO configuration option to enable/disable SO_RCVTIMEO + on UDP sockets/netconn. + + 2007-03-08 Simon Goldschmidt + * snmp_msg.h, msg_in.c: SNMP UDP ports can be configured at compile time. + + 2007-03-06 Frédéric Bernon + * api.h, api_lib.c, sockets.h, sockets.c, tcpip.c, sys.h, sys.c, err.h: + Implement SO_RCVTIMEO on UDP sockets/netconn. + + 2007-02-28 Kieran Mansley (based on patch from Simon Goldschmidt) + * api_lib.c, tcpip.c, memp.c, memp.h: make API msg structs allocated + on the stack and remove the API msg type from memp + + 2007-02-26 Jonathan Larmour (based on patch from Simon Goldschmidt) + * sockets.h, sockets.c: Move socket initialization to new + lwip_socket_init() function. + NOTE: this changes the API with ports. Ports will have to be + updated to call lwip_socket_init() now. + + 2007-02-26 Jonathan Larmour (based on patch from Simon Goldschmidt) + * api_lib.c: Use memcpy in netbuf_copy_partial. + + + ++ Bug fixes: + + 2008-03-17 Frédéric Bernon, Ed Kerekes + * igmp.h, igmp.c: Fix bug #22613 "IGMP iphdr problem" (could have + some problems to fill the IP header on some targets, use now the + ip.h macros to do it). + + 2008-03-13 Frédéric Bernon + * sockets.c: Fix bug #22435 "lwip_recvfrom with TCP break;". Using + (lwip_)recvfrom with valid "from" and "fromlen" parameters, on a + TCP connection caused a crash. Note that using (lwip_)recvfrom + like this is a bit slow and that using (lwip)getpeername is the + good lwip way to do it (so, using recv is faster on tcp sockets). + + 2008-03-12 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour + * api_msg.c, contrib/apps/ping.c: Fix bug #22530 "api_msg.c's + recv_raw() does not consume data", and the ping sample (with + LWIP_SOCKET=1, the code did the wrong supposition that lwip_recvfrom + returned the IP payload, without the IP header). + + 2008-03-04 Jonathan Larmour + * mem.c, stats.c, mem.h: apply patch #6414 to avoid compiler errors + and/or warnings on some systems where mem_size_t and size_t differ. + * pbuf.c, ppp.c: Fix warnings on some systems with mem_malloc. + + 2008-03-04 Kieran Mansley (contributions by others) + * Numerous small compiler error/warning fixes from contributions to + mailing list after 1.3.0 release candidate made. + + 2008-01-25 Cui hengbin (integrated by Frédéric Bernon) + * dns.c: Fix bug #22108 "DNS problem" caused by unaligned structures. + + 2008-01-15 Kieran Mansley + * tcp_out.c: BUG20511. Modify persist timer to start when we are + prevented from sending by a small send window, not just a zero + send window. + + 2008-01-09 Jonathan Larmour + * opt.h, ip.c: Rename IP_OPTIONS define to IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED to avoid + conflict with Linux system headers. + + 2008-01-06 Jonathan Larmour + * dhcp.c: fix bug #19927: "DHCP NACK problem" by clearing any existing set IP + address entirely on receiving a DHCPNAK, and restarting discovery. + + 2007-12-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * sys.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: fix bug #21698: "netconn->recv_avail + is not protected" by using new macros for interlocked access to modify/test + netconn->recv_avail. + + 2007-12-20 Kieran Mansley (based on patch from Oleg Tyshev) + * tcp_in.c: fix bug# 21535 (nrtx not reset correctly in SYN_SENT state) + + 2007-12-20 Kieran Mansley (based on patch from Per-Henrik Lundbolm) + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: fix bug #20199 (better handling + of silly window avoidance and prevent lwIP from shrinking the window) + + 2007-12-04 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c: fix bug #21699 (segment leak in ooseq processing when last + data packet was lost): add assert that all segment lists are empty in + tcp_pcb_remove before setting pcb to CLOSED state; don't directly set CLOSED + state from LAST_ACK in tcp_process + + 2007-12-02 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.h: fix bug #21654: exclude definition of struct timeval from #ifndef FD_SET + If including for system-struct timeval, LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE now + has to be set to 0 in lwipopts.h + + 2007-12-02 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c, api_lib.c: fix bug #21656 (recvmbox problem in netconn API): always + allocate a recvmbox in netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback. For a tcp-listen + netconn, this recvmbox is later freed and a new mbox is allocated for acceptmbox. + This is a fix for thread-safety and allocates all items needed for a netconn + when the netconn is created. + + 2007-11-30 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.c: first attempt to fix bug #21655 (DHCP doesn't work reliably with multiple + netifs): if LWIP_DHCP is enabled, UDP packets to DHCP_CLIENT_PORT are passed + to netif->dhcp->pcb only (if that exists) and not to any other pcb for the same + port (only solution to let UDP pcbs 'bind' to a netif instead of an IP address) + + 2007-11-27 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip.c: fixed bug #21643 (udp_send/raw_send don't fail if netif is down) by + letting ip_route only use netifs that are up. + + 2007-11-27 Simon Goldschmidt + * err.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c, sockets.c: Changed error handling: ERR_MEM, ERR_BUF + and ERR_RTE are seen as non-fatal, all other errors are fatal. netconns and + sockets block most operations once they have seen a fatal error. + + 2007-11-27 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.h, udp.c, dhcp.c: Implemented new function udp_sendto_if which takes the + netif to send as an argument (to be able to send on netifs that are down). + + 2007-11-26 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #21582: pcb->acked accounting can be wrong when ACKs + arrive out-of-order + + 2007-11-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, tcp_out.c, api_msg.c: Fixed bug #20287: tcp_output_nagle sends too early + Fixed the nagle algorithm; nagle now also works for all raw API applications + and has to be explicitly disabled with 'tcp_pcb->flags |= TF_NODELAY' + + 2007-11-12 Frédéric Bernon + * sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c: Fixed bug #20900. Now, most + of the netconn_peer and netconn_addr processing is done inside tcpip_thread + context in do_getaddr. + + 2007-11-10 Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c: Fixed bug: assert fired when MEMP_ARP_QUEUE was empty (which can + happen any time). Now the packet simply isn't enqueued when out of memory. + + 2007-11-01 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #21494: The send mss (pcb->mss) is set to 536 (or + TCP_MSS if that is smaller) as long as no MSS option is received from the + remote host. + + 2007-11-01 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #21491: The MSS option sent (with SYN) + is now based on TCP_MSS instead of pcb->mss (on passive open now effectively + sending our configured TCP_MSS instead of the one received). + + 2007-11-01 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_in.c: Fixed bug #21181: On active open, the initial congestion window was + calculated based on the configured TCP_MSS, not on the MSS option received + with SYN+ACK. + + 2007-10-09 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.c, inet.c, inet.h: Fixed UDPLite: send: Checksum was always generated too + short and also was generated wrong if checksum coverage != tot_len; + receive: checksum was calculated wrong if checksum coverage != tot_len + + 2007-10-08 Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c: lfree was not updated in mem_realloc! + + 2007-10-07 Frédéric Bernon + * sockets.c, api.h, api_lib.c: First step to fix "bug #20900 : Potential + crash error problem with netconn_peer & netconn_addr". VERY IMPORTANT: + this change cause an API breakage for netconn_addr, since a parameter + type change. Any compiler should cause an error without any changes in + yours netconn_peer calls (so, it can't be a "silent change"). It also + reduce a little bit the footprint for socket layer (lwip_getpeername & + lwip_getsockname use now a common lwip_getaddrname function since + netconn_peer & netconn_addr have the same parameters). + + 2007-09-20 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: Fixed bug #21080 (tcp_bind without check pcbs in TIME_WAIT state) + by checking tcp_tw_pcbs also + + 2007-09-19 Simon Goldschmidt + * icmp.c: Fixed bug #21107 (didn't reset IP TTL in ICMP echo replies) + + 2007-09-15 Mike Kleshov + * mem.c: Fixed bug #21077 (inaccuracy in calculation of lwip_stat.mem.used) + + 2007-09-06 Frédéric Bernon + * several-files: replace some #include "arch/cc.h" by "lwip/arch.h", or simply remove + it as long as "lwip/opt.h" is included before (this one include "lwip/debug.h" which + already include "lwip/arch.h"). Like that, default defines are provided by "lwip/arch.h" + if they are not defined in cc.h, in the same spirit than "lwip/opt.h" for lwipopts.h. + + 2007-08-30 Frédéric Bernon + * igmp.h, igmp.c: Some changes to remove some redundant code, add some traces, + and fix some coding style. + + 2007-08-28 Frédéric Bernon + * tcpip.c: Fix TCPIP_MSG_INPKT processing: now, tcpip_input can be used for any + kind of packets. These packets are considered like Ethernet packets (payload + pointing to ethhdr) if the netif got the NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP flag. Else, packets + are considered like IP packets (payload pointing to iphdr). + + 2007-08-27 Frédéric Bernon + * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: First fix for "bug #20900 : Potential crash error + problem with netconn_peer & netconn_addr". Introduce NETCONN_LISTEN netconn_state + and remove obsolete ones (NETCONN_RECV & NETCONN_ACCEPT). + + 2007-08-24 Kieran Mansley + * inet.c Modify (acc >> 16) test to ((acc >> 16) != 0) to help buggy + compiler (Paradigm C++) + + 2007-08-09 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac + * stats.h, stats.c, igmp.h, igmp.c, opt.h: Fix for bug #20503 : IGMP Improvement. + Introduce IGMP_STATS to centralize statistics management. + + 2007-08-09 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac + * udp.c: Fix for bug #20503 : IGMP Improvement. Enable to receive a multicast + packet on a udp pcb binded on an netif's IP address, and not on "any". + + 2007-08-09 Frédéric Bernon, Bill Florac + * igmp.h, igmp.c, ip.c: Fix minor changes from bug #20503 : IGMP Improvement. + This is mainly on using lookup/lookfor, and some coding styles... + + 2007-07-26 Frédéric Bernon (and "thedoctor") + * igmp.c: Fix bug #20595 to accept IGMPv3 "Query" messages. + + 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c, tcp.c: Another fix for bug #20021: by not returning an error if + tcp_output fails in tcp_close, the code in do_close_internal gets simpler + (tcp_output is called again later from tcp timers). + + 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip_frag.c: Fixed bug #20429: use the new pbuf_copy_partial instead of the old + copy_from_pbuf, which illegally modified the given pbuf. + + 2007-07-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: tcp_enqueue: pcb->snd_queuelen didn't work for chaine PBUF_RAMs: + changed snd_queuelen++ to snd_queuelen += pbuf_clen(p). + + 2007-07-24 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c, tcp.c: Fix bug #20480: Check the pcb passed to tcp_listen() for the + correct state (must be CLOSED). + + 2007-07-13 Thomas Taranowski (commited by Jared Grubb) + * memp.c: Fix bug #20478: memp_malloc returned NULL+MEMP_SIZE on failed + allocation. It now returns NULL. + + 2007-07-13 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.c: Fix bug #20318: api_msg "recv" callbacks don't call pbuf_free in + all error cases. + + 2007-07-13 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.c: Fix bug #20315: possible memory leak problem if tcp_listen failed, + because current code doesn't follow rawapi.txt documentation. + + 2007-07-13 Kieran Mansley + * src/core/tcp_in.c Apply patch#5741 from Oleg Tyshev to fix bug in + out of sequence processing of received packets + + 2007-07-03 Simon Goldschmidt + * nearly-all-files: Added assertions where PBUF_RAM pbufs are used and an + assumption is made that this pbuf is in one piece (i.e. not chained). These + assumptions clash with the possibility of converting to fully pool-based + pbuf implementations, where PBUF_RAM pbufs might be chained. + + 2007-07-03 Simon Goldschmidt + * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.c: Final fix for bug #20021 and some other problems + when closing tcp netconns: removed conn->sem, less context switches when + closing, both netconn_close and netconn_delete should safely close tcp + connections. + + 2007-07-02 Simon Goldschmidt + * ipv4/ip.h, ipv6/ip.h, opt.h, netif.h, etharp.h, ipv4/ip.c, netif.c, raw.c, + tcp_out.c, udp.c, etharp.c: Added option LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT (default=off) + to cache ARP table indices with each pcb instead of single-entry cache for + the complete stack. + + 2007-07-02 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c: Added some ASSERTS and casts to prevent + warnings when assigning to smaller types. + + 2007-06-28 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp_out.c: Added check to prevent tcp_pcb->snd_queuelen from overflowing. + + 2007-06-28 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h: Fixed bug #20287: Fixed nagle algorithm (sending was done too early if + a segment contained chained pbufs) + + 2007-06-28 Frédéric Bernon + * autoip.c: replace most of rand() calls by a macro LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND which compute + a "pseudo-random" value based on netif's MAC and some autoip fields. It's always + possible to define this macro in your own lwipopts.h to always use C library's + rand(). Note that autoip_create_rand_addr doesn't use this macro. + + 2007-06-28 Frédéric Bernon + * netifapi.h, netifapi.c, tcpip.h, tcpip.c: Update code to handle the option + LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING, and do some changes to be coherent with last modifications + in api_lib/api_msg (use pointers and not type with table, etc...) + + 2007-06-26 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.h: Fixed bug #20259: struct udp_hdr was lacking the packin defines. + + 2007-06-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.c: Fixed bug #20253: icmp_dest_unreach was called with a wrong p->payload + for udp packets with no matching pcb. + + 2007-06-25 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.c: Fixed bug #20220: UDP PCB search in udp_input(): a non-local match + could get udp input packets if the remote side matched. + + 2007-06-13 Simon Goldschmidt + * netif.c: Fixed bug #20180 (TCP pcbs listening on IP_ADDR_ANY could get + changed in netif_set_ipaddr if previous netif->ip_addr.addr was 0. + + 2007-06-13 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c: pcb_new sets conn->err if protocol is not implemented + -> netconn_new_..() does not allocate a new connection for unsupported + protocols. + + 2007-06-13 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c: change return expression in netconn_addr and netconn_peer, because + conn->err was reset to ERR_OK without any reasons (and error was lost)... + + 2007-06-13 Frédéric Bernon, Matthias Weisser + * opt.h, mem.h, mem.c, memp.c, pbuf.c, ip_frag.c, vj.c: Fix bug #20162. Rename + MEM_ALIGN in LWIP_MEM_ALIGN and MEM_ALIGN_SIZE in LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE to avoid + some macro names collision with some OS macros. + + 2007-06-11 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.c: UDP Lite: corrected the use of chksum_len (based on RFC3828: if it's 0, + create checksum over the complete packet. On RX, if it's < 8 (and not 0), + discard the packet. Also removed the duplicate 'udphdr->chksum = 0' for both + UDP & UDP Lite. + + 2007-06-11 Srinivas Gollakota & Oleg Tyshev + * tcp_out.c: Fix for bug #20075 : "A problem with keep-alive timer and TCP flags" + where TCP flags wasn't initialized in tcp_keepalive. + + 2007-06-03 Simon Goldschmidt + * udp.c: udp_input(): Input pbuf was not freed if pcb had no recv function + registered, p->payload was modified without modifying p->len if sending + icmp_dest_unreach() (had no negative effect but was definitively wrong). + + 2007-06-03 Simon Goldschmidt + * icmp.c: Corrected bug #19937: For responding to an icmp echo request, icmp + re-used the input pbuf even if that didn't have enough space to include the + link headers. Now the space is tested and a new pbuf is allocated for the + echo response packet if the echo request pbuf isn't big enough. + + 2007-06-01 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: Checked in patch #5914: Moved sockopt processing into tcpip_thread. + + 2007-05-23 Frédéric Bernon + * api_lib.c, sockets.c: Fixed bug #5958 for netconn_listen (acceptmbox only + allocated by do_listen if success) and netconn_accept errors handling. In + most of api_lib functions, we replace some errors checkings like "if (conn==NULL)" + by ASSERT, except for netconn_delete. + + 2007-05-23 Frédéric Bernon + * api_lib.c: Fixed bug #5957 "Safe-thread problem inside netconn_recv" to return + an error code if it's impossible to fetch a pbuf on a TCP connection (and not + directly close the recvmbox). + + 2007-05-22 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.c: Fixed bug #1895 (tcp_bind not correct) by introducing a list of + bound but unconnected (and non-listening) tcp_pcbs. + + 2007-05-22 Frédéric Bernon + * sys.h, sys.c, api_lib.c, tcpip.c: remove sys_mbox_fetch_timeout() (was only + used for LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO option) and use sys_arch_mbox_fetch() instead of + sys_mbox_fetch() in api files. Now, users SHOULD NOT use internal lwIP features + like "sys_timeout" in their application threads. + + 2007-05-22 Frédéric Bernon + * api.h, api_lib.c, api_msg.h, api_msg.c: change the struct api_msg_msg to see + which parameters are used by which do_xxx function, and to avoid "misusing" + parameters (patch #5938). + + 2007-05-22 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, raw.c, api.h, api_msg.h, raw.h: Included patch #5938: + changed raw_pcb.protocol from u16_t to u8_t since for IPv4 and IPv6, proto + is only 8 bits wide. This affects the api, as there, the protocol was + u16_t, too. + + 2007-05-18 Simon Goldschmidt + * memp.c: addition to patch #5913: smaller pointer was returned but + memp_memory was the same size -> did not save memory. + + 2007-05-16 Simon Goldschmidt + * loopif.c, slipif.c: Fix bug #19729: free pbuf if netif->input() returns + != ERR_OK. + + 2007-05-16 Simon Goldschmidt + * api_msg.c, udp.c: If a udp_pcb has a local_ip set, check if it is the same + as the one of the netif used for sending to prevent sending from old + addresses after a netif address gets changed (partly fixes bug #3168). + + 2007-05-16 Frédéric Bernon + * tcpip.c, igmp.h, igmp.c: Fixed bug "#19800 : IGMP: igmp_tick() will not work + with NO_SYS=1". Note that igmp_init is always in tcpip_thread (and not in + tcpip_init) because we have to be sure that network interfaces are already + added (mac filter is updated only in igmp_init for the moment). + + 2007-05-16 Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c, memp.c: Removed semaphores from memp, changed sys_sem_wait calls + into sys_arch_sem_wait calls to prevent timers from running while waiting + for the heap. This fixes bug #19167. + + 2007-05-13 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcp.h, sockets.h, sockets.c: Fixed bug from patch #5865 by moving the defines + for socket options (lwip_set/-getsockopt) used with level IPPROTO_TCP from + tcp.h to sockets.h. + + 2007-05-07 Simon Goldschmidt + * mem.c: Another attempt to fix bug #17922. + + 2007-05-04 Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.c, pbuf.h, etharp.c: Further update to ARP queueing: Changed pbuf_copy() + implementation so that it can be reused (don't allocate the target + pbuf inside pbuf_copy()). + + 2007-05-04 Simon Goldschmidt + * memp.c: checked in patch #5913: in memp_malloc() we can return memp as mem + to save a little RAM (next pointer of memp is not used while not in pool). + + 2007-05-03 "maq" + * sockets.c: Fix ioctl FIONREAD when some data remains from last recv. + (patch #3574). + + 2007-04-23 Simon Goldschmidt + * loopif.c, loopif.h, opt.h, src/netif/FILES: fix bug #2595: "loopif results + in NULL reference for incoming TCP packets". Loopif has to be configured + (using LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTITHREADING) to directly call netif->input() + (multithreading environments, e.g. netif->input() = tcpip_input()) or + putting packets on a list that is fed to the stack by calling loopif_poll() + (single-thread / NO_SYS / polling environment where e.g. + netif->input() = ip_input). + + 2007-04-17 Jonathan Larmour + * pbuf.c: Use s32_t in pbuf_realloc(), as an s16_t can't reliably hold + the difference between two u16_t's. + * sockets.h: FD_SETSIZE needs to match number of sockets, which is + MEMP_NUM_NETCONN in sockets.c right now. + + 2007-04-12 Jonathan Larmour + * icmp.c: Reset IP header TTL in ICMP ECHO responses (bug #19580). + + 2007-04-12 Kieran Mansley + * tcp.c, tcp_in.c, tcp_out.c, tcp.h: Modify way the retransmission + timer is reset to fix bug#19434, with help from Oleg Tyshev. + + 2007-04-11 Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c, pbuf.c, pbuf.h: 3rd fix for bug #11400 (arp-queuing): More pbufs than + previously thought need to be copied (everything but PBUF_ROM!). Cleaned up + pbuf.c: removed functions no needed any more (by etharp). + + 2007-04-11 Kieran Mansley + * inet.c, ip_addr.h, sockets.h, sys.h, tcp.h: Apply patch #5745: Fix + "Constant is long" warnings with 16bit compilers. Contributed by + avatar@mmlab.cse.yzu.edu.tw + + 2007-04-05 Frédéric Bernon, Jonathan Larmour + * api_msg.c: Fix bug #16830: "err_tcp() posts to connection mailbox when no pend on + the mailbox is active". Now, the post is only done during a connect, and do_send, + do_write and do_join_leave_group don't do anything if a previous error was signaled. + + 2007-04-03 Frédéric Bernon + * ip.c: Don't set the IP_DF ("Don't fragment") flag in the IP header in IP output + packets. See patch #5834. + + 2007-03-30 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.c: add a "pcb_new" helper function to avoid redundant code, and to add + missing pcb allocations checking (in do_bind, and for each raw_new). Fix style. + + 2007-03-30 Frédéric Bernon + * most of files: prefix all debug.h define with "LWIP_" to avoid any conflict with + others environment defines (these were too "generic"). + + 2007-03-28 Frédéric Bernon + * api.h, api_lib.c, sockets.c: netbuf_ref doesn't check its internal pbuf_alloc call + result and can cause a crash. lwip_send now check netbuf_ref result. + + 2007-03-28 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c Remove "#include " from sockets.c to avoid multiple + definition of macros (in errno.h and lwip/arch.h) if LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO is + defined. This is the way it should have been already (looking at + doc/sys_arch.txt) + + 2007-03-28 Kieran Mansley + * opt.h Change default PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE (again) to accomodate default MSS + + IP and TCP headers *and* physical link headers + + 2007-03-26 Frédéric Bernon (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) + * api_lib.c: patch for netconn_write(), fixes a possible race condition which cause + to send some garbage. It is not a definitive solution, but the patch does solve + the problem for most cases. + + 2007-03-22 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.h, api_msg.c: Remove obsolete API_MSG_ACCEPT and do_accept (never used). + + 2007-03-22 Frédéric Bernon + * api_lib.c: somes resources couldn't be freed if there was errors during + netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback. + + 2007-03-22 Frédéric Bernon + * ethernetif.c: update netif->input calls to check return value. In older ports, + it's a good idea to upgrade them, even if before, there could be another problem + (access to an uninitialized mailbox). + + 2007-03-21 Simon Goldschmidt + * sockets.c: fixed bug #5067 (essentialy a signed/unsigned warning fixed + by casting to unsigned). + + 2007-03-21 Frédéric Bernon + * api_lib.c, api_msg.c, tcpip.c: integrate sys_mbox_fetch(conn->mbox, NULL) calls from + api_lib.c to tcpip.c's tcpip_apimsg(). Now, use a local variable and not a + dynamic one from memp to send tcpip_msg to tcpip_thread in a synchrone call. + Free tcpip_msg from tcpip_apimsg is not done in tcpip_thread. This give a + faster and more reliable communication between api_lib and tcpip. + + 2007-03-21 Frédéric Bernon + * opt.h: Add LWIP_NETIF_CALLBACK (to avoid compiler warning) and set it to 0. + + 2007-03-21 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.c, igmp.c, igmp.h: Fix C++ style comments + + 2007-03-21 Kieran Mansley + * opt.h Change default PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE to accomodate default MSS + + IP and TCP headers + + 2007-03-21 Kieran Mansley + * Fix all uses of pbuf_header to check the return value. In some + cases just assert if it fails as I'm not sure how to fix them, but + this is no worse than before when they would carry on regardless + of the failure. + + 2007-03-21 Kieran Mansley + * sockets.c, igmp.c, igmp.h, memp.h: Fix C++ style comments and + comment out missing header include in icmp.c + + 2007-03-20 Frédéric Bernon + * memp.h, stats.c: Fix stats_display function where memp_names table wasn't + synchronized with memp.h. + + 2007-03-20 Frédéric Bernon + * tcpip.c: Initialize tcpip's mbox, and verify if initialized in tcpip_input, + tcpip_ethinput, tcpip_callback, tcpip_apimsg, to fix a init problem with + network interfaces. Also fix a compiler warning. + + 2007-03-20 Kieran Mansley + * udp.c: Only try and use pbuf_header() to make space for headers if + not a ROM or REF pbuf. + + 2007-03-19 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.h, api_msg.c, tcpip.h, tcpip.c: Add return types to tcpip_apimsg() + and api_msg_post(). + + 2007-03-19 Frédéric Bernon + * Remove unimplemented "memp_realloc" function from memp.h. + + 2007-03-11 Simon Goldschmidt + * pbuf.c: checked in patch #5796: pbuf_alloc: len field claculation caused + memory corruption. + + 2007-03-11 Simon Goldschmidt (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) + * api_lib.c, sockets.c, api.h, api_msg.h, sockets.h: Fixed bug #19251 + (missing `const' qualifier in socket functions), to get more compatible to + standard POSIX sockets. + + 2007-03-11 Frédéric Bernon (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) + * sockets.c: Add asserts inside bind, connect and sendto to check input + parameters. Remove excessive set_errno() calls after get_socket(), because + errno is set inside of get_socket(). Move last sock_set_errno() inside + lwip_close. + + 2007-03-09 Simon Goldschmidt + * memp.c: Fixed bug #11400: New etharp queueing introduced bug: memp_memory + was allocated too small. + + 2007-03-06 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcpip.c: Initialize dhcp timers in tcpip_thread (if LWIP_DHCP) to protect + the stack from concurrent access. + + 2007-03-06 Frédéric Bernon, Dmitry Potapov + * tcpip.c, ip_frag.c, ethernetif.c: Fix some build problems, and a redundancy + call to "lwip_stats.link.recv++;" in low_level_input() & ethernetif_input(). + + 2007-03-06 Simon Goldschmidt + * ip_frag.c, ip_frag.h: Reduce code size: don't include code in those files + if IP_FRAG == 0 and IP_REASSEMBLY == 0 + + 2007-03-06 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + * opt.h, ip_frag.h, tcpip.h, tcpip.c, ethernetif.c: add new configuration + option named ETHARP_TCPIP_ETHINPUT, which enable the new tcpip_ethinput. + Allow to do ARP processing for incoming packets inside tcpip_thread + (protecting ARP layer against concurrent access). You can also disable + old code using tcp_input with new define ETHARP_TCPIP_INPUT set to 0. + Older ports have to use tcpip_ethinput. + + 2007-03-06 Simon Goldschmidt (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) + * err.h, err.c: fixed compiler warning "initialization dircards qualifiers + from pointer target type" + + 2007-03-05 Frédéric Bernon + * opt.h, sockets.h: add new configuration options (LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES, + ETHARP_TRUST_IP_MAC, review SO_REUSE) + + 2007-03-04 Frédéric Bernon + * api_msg.c: Remove some compiler warnings : parameter "pcb" was never + referenced. + + 2007-03-04 Frédéric Bernon + * api_lib.c: Fix "[patch #5764] api_lib.c cleanup: after patch #5687" (from + Dmitry Potapov). + The api_msg struct stay on the stack (not moved to netconn struct). + + 2007-03-04 Simon Goldschmidt (based on patch from Dmitry Potapov) + * pbuf.c: Fix BUG#19168 - pbuf_free can cause deadlock (if + SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT=1 & freeing PBUF_RAM when mem_sem is not available) + Also fixed cast warning in pbuf_alloc() + + 2007-03-04 Simon Goldschmidt + * etharp.c, etharp.h, memp.c, memp.h, opt.h: Fix BUG#11400 - don't corrupt + existing pbuf chain when enqueuing multiple pbufs to a pending ARP request + + 2007-03-03 Frédéric Bernon + * udp.c: remove obsolete line "static struct udp_pcb *pcb_cache = NULL;" + It is static, and never used in udp.c except udp_init(). + + 2007-03-02 Simon Goldschmidt + * tcpip.c: Moved call to ip_init(), udp_init() and tcp_init() from + tcpip_thread() to tcpip_init(). This way, raw API connections can be + initialized before tcpip_thread is running (e.g. before OS is started) + + 2007-03-02 Frédéric Bernon + * rawapi.txt: Fix documentation mismatch with etharp.h about etharp_tmr's call + interval. + + 2007-02-28 Kieran Mansley + * pbuf.c: Fix BUG#17645 - ensure pbuf payload pointer is not moved + outside the region of the pbuf by pbuf_header() + + 2007-02-28 Kieran Mansley + * sockets.c: Fix BUG#19161 - ensure milliseconds timeout is non-zero + when supplied timeout is also non-zero + +(STABLE-1.2.0) + + 2006-12-05 Leon Woestenberg + * CHANGELOG: Mention STABLE-1.2.0 release. + + ++ New features: + + 2006-12-01 Christiaan Simons + * mem.h, opt.h: Added MEM_LIBC_MALLOC option. + Note this is a workaround. Currently I have no other options left. + + 2006-10-26 Christiaan Simons (accepted patch by Jonathan Larmour) + * ipv4/ip_frag.c: rename MAX_MTU to IP_FRAG_MAX_MTU and move define + to include/lwip/opt.h. + * ipv4/lwip/ip_frag.h: Remove unused IP_REASS_INTERVAL. + Move IP_REASS_MAXAGE and IP_REASS_BUFSIZE to include/lwip/opt.h. + * opt.h: Add above new options. + + 2006-08-18 Christiaan Simons + * tcp_{in,out}.c: added SNMP counters. + * ipv4/ip.c: added SNMP counters. + * ipv4/ip_frag.c: added SNMP counters. + + 2006-08-08 Christiaan Simons + * etharp.{c,h}: added etharp_find_addr() to read + (stable) ethernet/IP address pair from ARP table + + 2006-07-14 Christiaan Simons + * mib_structs.c: added + * include/lwip/snmp_structs.h: added + * netif.{c,h}, netif/ethernetif.c: added SNMP statistics to netif struct + + 2006-07-06 Christiaan Simons + * snmp/asn1_{enc,dec}.c added + * snmp/mib2.c added + * snmp/msg_{in,out}.c added + * include/lwip/snmp_asn1.h added + * include/lwip/snmp_msg.h added + * doc/snmp_agent.txt added + + 2006-03-29 Christiaan Simons + * inet.c, inet.h: Added platform byteswap support. + Added LWIP_PLATFORM_BYTESWAP define (defaults to 0) and + optional LWIP_PLATFORM_HTONS(), LWIP_PLATFORM_HTONL() macros. + + ++ Bug fixes: + + 2006-11-30 Christiaan Simons + * dhcp.c: Fixed false triggers of request_timeout. + + 2006-11-28 Christiaan Simons + * netif.c: In netif_add() fixed missing clear of ip_addr, netmask, gw and flags. + + 2006-10-11 Christiaan Simons + * api_lib.c etharp.c, ip.c, memp.c, stats.c, sys.{c,h} tcp.h: + Partially accepted patch #5449 for ANSI C compatibility / build fixes. + * ipv4/lwip/ip.h ipv6/lwip/ip.h: Corrected UDP-Lite protocol + identifier from 170 to 136 (bug #17574). + + 2006-10-10 Christiaan Simons + * api_msg.c: Fixed Nagle algorithm as reported by Bob Grice. + + 2006-08-17 Christiaan Simons + * udp.c: Fixed bug #17200, added check for broadcast + destinations for PCBs bound to a unicast address. + + 2006-08-07 Christiaan Simons + * api_msg.c: Flushing TCP output in do_close() (bug #15926). + + 2006-06-27 Christiaan Simons + * api_msg.c: Applied patch for cold case (bug #11135). + In accept_function() ensure newconn->callback is always initialized. + + 2006-06-15 Christiaan Simons + * mem.h: added MEM_SIZE_F alias to fix an ancient cold case (bug #1748), + facilitate printing of mem_size_t and u16_t statistics. + + 2006-06-14 Christiaan Simons + * api_msg.c: Applied patch #5146 to handle allocation failures + in accept() by Kevin Lawson. + + 2006-05-26 Christiaan Simons + * api_lib.c: Removed conn->sem creation and destruction + from netconn_write() and added sys_sem_new to netconn_new_*. + +(STABLE-1_1_1) + + 2006-03-03 Christiaan Simons + * ipv4/ip_frag.c: Added bound-checking assertions on ip_reassbitmap + access and added pbuf_alloc() return value checks. + + 2006-01-01 Leon Woestenberg + * tcp_{in,out}.c, tcp_out.c: Removed 'even sndbuf' fix in TCP, which is + now handled by the checksum routine properly. + + 2006-02-27 Leon Woestenberg + * pbuf.c: Fix alignment; pbuf_init() would not work unless + pbuf_pool_memory[] was properly aligned. (Patch by Curt McDowell.) + + 2005-12-20 Leon Woestenberg + * tcp.c: Remove PCBs which stay in LAST_ACK state too long. Patch + submitted by Mitrani Hiroshi. + + 2005-12-15 Christiaan Simons + * inet.c: Disabled the added summing routine to preserve code space. + + 2005-12-14 Leon Woestenberg + * tcp_in.c: Duplicate FIN ACK race condition fix by Kelvin Lawson. + Added Curt McDowell's optimized checksumming routine for future + inclusion. Need to create test case for unaliged, aligned, odd, + even length combination of cases on various endianess machines. + + 2005-12-09 Christiaan Simons + * inet.c: Rewrote standard checksum routine in proper portable C. + + 2005-11-25 Christiaan Simons + * udp.c tcp.c: Removed SO_REUSE hack. Should reside in socket code only. + * *.c: introduced cc.h LWIP_DEBUG formatters matching the u16_t, s16_t, + u32_t, s32_t typedefs. This solves most debug word-length assumes. + + 2005-07-17 Leon Woestenberg + * inet.c: Fixed unaligned 16-bit access in the standard checksum + routine by Peter Jolasson. + * slipif.c: Fixed implementation assumption of single-pbuf datagrams. + + 2005-02-04 Leon Woestenberg + * tcp_out.c: Fixed uninitialized 'queue' referenced in memerr branch. + * tcp_{out|in}.c: Applied patch fixing unaligned access. + + 2005-01-04 Leon Woestenberg + * pbuf.c: Fixed missing semicolon after LWIP_DEBUG statement. + + 2005-01-03 Leon Woestenberg + * udp.c: UDP pcb->recv() was called even when it was NULL. + +(STABLE-1_1_0) + + 2004-12-28 Leon Woestenberg + * etharp.*: Disabled multiple packets on the ARP queue. + This clashes with TCP queueing. + + 2004-11-28 Leon Woestenberg + * etharp.*: Fixed race condition from ARP request to ARP timeout. + Halved the ARP period, doubled the period counts. + ETHARP_MAX_PENDING now should be at least 2. This prevents + the counter from reaching 0 right away (which would allow + too little time for ARP responses to be received). + + 2004-11-25 Leon Woestenberg + * dhcp.c: Decline messages were not multicast but unicast. + * etharp.c: ETHARP_CREATE is renamed to ETHARP_TRY_HARD. + Do not try hard to insert arbitrary packet's source address, + etharp_ip_input() now calls etharp_update() without ETHARP_TRY_HARD. + etharp_query() now always DOES call ETHARP_TRY_HARD so that users + querying an address will see it appear in the cache (DHCP could + suffer from this when a server invalidly gave an in-use address.) + * ipv4/ip_addr.h: Renamed ip_addr_maskcmp() to _netcmp() as we are + comparing network addresses (identifiers), not the network masks + themselves. + * ipv4/ip_addr.c: ip_addr_isbroadcast() now checks that the given + IP address actually belongs to the network of the given interface. + + 2004-11-24 Kieran Mansley + * tcp.c: Increment pcb->snd_buf when ACK is received in SYN_SENT state. + +(STABLE-1_1_0-RC1) + + 2004-10-16 Kieran Mansley + * tcp.c: Add code to tcp_recved() to send an ACK (window update) immediately, + even if one is already pending, if the rcv_wnd is above a threshold + (currently TCP_WND/2). This avoids waiting for a timer to expire to send a + delayed ACK in order to open the window if the stack is only receiving data. + + 2004-09-12 Kieran Mansley + * tcp*.*: Retransmit time-out handling improvement by Sam Jansen. + + 2004-08-20 Tony Mountifield + * etharp.c: Make sure the first pbuf queued on an ARP entry + is properly ref counted. + + 2004-07-27 Tony Mountifield + * debug.h: Added (int) cast in LWIP_DEBUGF() to avoid compiler + warnings about comparison. + * pbuf.c: Stopped compiler complaining of empty if statement + when LWIP_DEBUGF() empty. Closed an unclosed comment. + * tcp.c: Stopped compiler complaining of empty if statement + when LWIP_DEBUGF() empty. + * ip.h Corrected IPH_TOS() macro: returns a byte, so doesn't need htons(). + * inet.c: Added a couple of casts to quiet the compiler. + No need to test isascii(c) before isdigit(c) or isxdigit(c). + + 2004-07-22 Tony Mountifield + * inet.c: Made data types consistent in inet_ntoa(). + Added casts for return values of checksum routines, to pacify compiler. + * ip_frag.c, tcp_out.c, sockets.c, pbuf.c + Small corrections to some debugging statements, to pacify compiler. + + 2004-07-21 Tony Mountifield + * etharp.c: Removed spurious semicolon and added missing end-of-comment. + * ethernetif.c Updated low_level_output() to match prototype for + netif->linkoutput and changed low_level_input() similarly for consistency. + * api_msg.c: Changed recv_raw() from int to u8_t, to match prototype + of raw_recv() in raw.h and so avoid compiler error. + * sockets.c: Added trivial (int) cast to keep compiler happier. + * ip.c, netif.c Changed debug statements to use the tidier ip4_addrN() macros. + +(STABLE-1_0_0) + + ++ Changes: + + 2004-07-05 Leon Woestenberg + * sockets.*: Restructured LWIP_PRIVATE_TIMEVAL. Make sure + your cc.h file defines this either 1 or 0. If non-defined, + defaults to 1. + * .c: Added and includes where used. + * etharp.c: Made some array indices unsigned. + + 2004-06-27 Leon Woestenberg + * netif.*: Added netif_set_up()/down(). + * dhcp.c: Changes to restart program flow. + + 2004-05-07 Leon Woestenberg + * etharp.c: In find_entry(), instead of a list traversal per candidate, do a + single-pass lookup for different candidates. Should exploit locality. + + 2004-04-29 Leon Woestenberg + * tcp*.c: Cleaned up source comment documentation for Doxygen processing. + * opt.h: ETHARP_ALWAYS_INSERT option removed to comply with ARP RFC. + * etharp.c: update_arp_entry() only adds new ARP entries when adviced to by + the caller. This deprecates the ETHARP_ALWAYS_INSERT overrule option. + + ++ Bug fixes: + + 2004-04-27 Leon Woestenberg + * etharp.c: Applied patch of bug #8708 by Toni Mountifield with a solution + suggested by Timmy Brolin. Fix for 32-bit processors that cannot access + non-aligned 32-bit words, such as soms 32-bit TCP/IP header fields. Fix + is to prefix the 14-bit Ethernet headers with two padding bytes. + + 2004-04-23 Leon Woestenberg + * ip_addr.c: Fix in the ip_addr_isbroadcast() check. + * etharp.c: Fixed the case where the packet that initiates the ARP request + is not queued, and gets lost. Fixed the case where the packets destination + address is already known; we now always queue the packet and perform an ARP + request. + +(STABLE-0_7_0) + + ++ Bug fixes: + + * Fixed TCP bug for SYN_SENT to ESTABLISHED state transition. + * Fixed TCP bug in dequeueing of FIN from out of order segment queue. + * Fixed two possible NULL references in rare cases. + +(STABLE-0_6_6) + + ++ Bug fixes: + + * Fixed DHCP which did not include the IP address in DECLINE messages. + + ++ Changes: + + * etharp.c has been hauled over a bit. + +(STABLE-0_6_5) + + ++ Bug fixes: + + * Fixed TCP bug induced by bad window resizing with unidirectional TCP traffic. + * Packets sent from ARP queue had invalid source hardware address. + + ++ Changes: + + * Pass-by ARP requests do now update the cache. + + ++ New features: + + * No longer dependent on ctype.h. + * New socket options. + * Raw IP pcb support. + +(STABLE-0_6_4) + + ++ Bug fixes: + + * Some debug formatters and casts fixed. + * Numereous fixes in PPP. + + ++ Changes: + + * DEBUGF now is LWIP_DEBUGF + * pbuf_dechain() has been re-enabled. + * Mentioned the changed use of CVS branches in README. + +(STABLE-0_6_3) + + ++ Bug fixes: + + * Fixed pool pbuf memory leak in pbuf_alloc(). + Occured if not enough PBUF_POOL pbufs for a packet pbuf chain. + Reported by Savin Zlobec. + + * PBUF_POOL chains had their tot_len field not set for non-first + pbufs. Fixed in pbuf_alloc(). + + ++ New features: + + * Added PPP stack contributed by Marc Boucher + + ++ Changes: + + * Now drops short packets for ICMP/UDP/TCP protocols. More robust. + + * ARP queueuing now queues the latest packet instead of the first. + This is the RFC recommended behaviour, but can be overridden in + lwipopts.h. + +(0.6.2) + + ++ Bugfixes: + + * TCP has been fixed to deal with the new use of the pbuf->ref + counter. + + * DHCP dhcp_inform() crash bug fixed. + + ++ Changes: + + * Removed pbuf_pool_free_cache and pbuf_pool_alloc_cache. Also removed + pbuf_refresh(). This has sped up pbuf pool operations considerably. + Implemented by David Haas. + +(0.6.1) + + ++ New features: + + * The packet buffer implementation has been enhanced to support + zero-copy and copy-on-demand for packet buffers which have their + payloads in application-managed memory. + Implemented by David Haas. + + Use PBUF_REF to make a pbuf refer to RAM. lwIP will use zero-copy + if an outgoing packet can be directly sent on the link, or perform + a copy-on-demand when necessary. + + The application can safely assume the packet is sent, and the RAM + is available to the application directly after calling udp_send() + or similar function. + + ++ Bugfixes: + + * ARP_QUEUEING should now correctly work for all cases, including + PBUF_REF. + Implemented by Leon Woestenberg. + + ++ Changes: + + * IP_ADDR_ANY is no longer a NULL pointer. Instead, it is a pointer + to a '0.0.0.0' IP address. + + * The packet buffer implementation is changed. The pbuf->ref counter + meaning has changed, and several pbuf functions have been + adapted accordingly. + + * netif drivers have to be changed to set the hardware address length field + that must be initialized correctly by the driver (hint: 6 for Ethernet MAC). + See the contrib/ports/c16x cs8900 driver as a driver example. + + * netif's have a dhcp field that must be initialized to NULL by the driver. + See the contrib/ports/c16x cs8900 driver as a driver example. + +(0.5.x) This file has been unmaintained up to 0.6.1. All changes are + logged in CVS but have not been explained here. + +(0.5.3) Changes since version 0.5.2 + + ++ Bugfixes: + + * memp_malloc(MEMP_API_MSG) could fail with multiple application + threads because it wasn't protected by semaphores. + + ++ Other changes: + + * struct ip_addr now packed. + + * The name of the time variable in arp.c has been changed to ctime + to avoid conflicts with the time() function. + +(0.5.2) Changes since version 0.5.1 + + ++ New features: + + * A new TCP function, tcp_tmr(), now handles both TCP timers. + + ++ Bugfixes: + + * A bug in tcp_parseopt() could cause the stack to hang because of a + malformed TCP option. + + * The address of new connections in the accept() function in the BSD + socket library was not handled correctly. + + * pbuf_dechain() did not update the ->tot_len field of the tail. + + * Aborted TCP connections were not handled correctly in all + situations. + + ++ Other changes: + + * All protocol header structs are now packed. + + * The ->len field in the tcp_seg structure now counts the actual + amount of data, and does not add one for SYN and FIN segments. + +(0.5.1) Changes since version 0.5.0 + + ++ New features: + + * Possible to run as a user process under Linux. + + * Preliminary support for cross platform packed structs. + + * ARP timer now implemented. + + ++ Bugfixes: + + * TCP output queue length was badly initialized when opening + connections. + + * TCP delayed ACKs were not sent correctly. + + * Explicit initialization of BSS segment variables. + + * read() in BSD socket library could drop data. + + * Problems with memory alignment. + + * Situations when all TCP buffers were used could lead to + starvation. + + * TCP MSS option wasn't parsed correctly. + + * Problems with UDP checksum calculation. + + * IP multicast address tests had endianess problems. + + * ARP requests had wrong destination hardware address. + + ++ Other changes: + + * struct eth_addr changed from u16_t[3] array to u8_t[6]. + + * A ->linkoutput() member was added to struct netif. + + * TCP and UDP ->dest_* struct members where changed to ->remote_*. + + * ntoh* macros are now null definitions for big endian CPUs. + +(0.5.0) Changes since version 0.4.2 + + ++ New features: + + * Redesigned operating system emulation layer to make porting easier. + + * Better control over TCP output buffers. + + * Documenation added. + + ++ Bugfixes: + + * Locking issues in buffer management. + + * Bugfixes in the sequential API. + + * IP forwarding could cause memory leakage. This has been fixed. + + ++ Other changes: + + * Directory structure somewhat changed; the core/ tree has been + collapsed. + +(0.4.2) Changes since version 0.4.1 + + ++ New features: + + * Experimental ARP implementation added. + + * Skeleton Ethernet driver added. + + * Experimental BSD socket API library added. + + ++ Bugfixes: + + * In very intense situations, memory leakage could occur. This has + been fixed. + + ++ Other changes: + + * Variables named "data" and "code" have been renamed in order to + avoid name conflicts in certain compilers. + + * Variable++ have in appliciable cases been translated to ++variable + since some compilers generate better code in the latter case. + +(0.4.1) Changes since version 0.4 + + ++ New features: + + * TCP: Connection attempts time out earlier than data + transmissions. Nagle algorithm implemented. Push flag set on the + last segment in a burst. + + * UDP: experimental support for UDP-Lite extensions. + + ++ Bugfixes: + + * TCP: out of order segments were in some cases handled incorrectly, + and this has now been fixed. Delayed acknowledgements was broken + in 0.4, has now been fixed. Binding to an address that is in use + now results in an error. Reset connections sometimes hung an + application; this has been fixed. + + * Checksum calculation sometimes failed for chained pbufs with odd + lengths. This has been fixed. + + * API: a lot of bug fixes in the API. The UDP API has been improved + and tested. Error reporting and handling has been + improved. Logical flaws and race conditions for incoming TCP + connections has been found and removed. + + * Memory manager: alignment issues. Reallocating memory sometimes + failed, this has been fixed. + + * Generic library: bcopy was flawed and has been fixed. + + ++ Other changes: + + * API: all datatypes has been changed from generic ones such as + ints, to specified ones such as u16_t. Functions that return + errors now have the correct type (err_t). + + * General: A lot of code cleaned up and debugging code removed. Many + portability issues have been fixed. + + * The license was changed; the advertising clause was removed. + + * C64 port added. + + * Thanks: Huge thanks go to Dagan Galarneau, Horst Garnetzke, Petri + Kosunen, Mikael Caleres, and Frits Wilmink for reporting and + fixing bugs! + +(0.4) Changes since version 0.3.1 + + * Memory management has been radically changed; instead of + allocating memory from a shared heap, memory for objects that are + rapidly allocated and deallocated is now kept in pools. Allocation + and deallocation from those memory pools is very fast. The shared + heap is still present but is used less frequently. + + * The memory, memory pool, and packet buffer subsystems now support + 4-, 2-, or 1-byte alignment. + + * "Out of memory" situations are handled in a more robust way. + + * Stack usage has been reduced. + + * Easier configuration of lwIP parameters such as memory usage, + TTLs, statistics gathering, etc. All configuration parameters are + now kept in a single header file "lwipopts.h". + + * The directory structure has been changed slightly so that all + architecture specific files are kept under the src/arch + hierarchy. + + * Error propagation has been improved, both in the protocol modules + and in the API. + + * The code for the RTXC architecture has been implemented, tested + and put to use. + + * Bugs have been found and corrected in the TCP, UDP, IP, API, and + the Internet checksum modules. + + * Bugs related to porting between a 32-bit and a 16-bit architecture + have been found and corrected. + + * The license has been changed slightly to conform more with the + original BSD license, including the advertisement clause. + +(0.3.1) Changes since version 0.3 + + * Fix of a fatal bug in the buffer management. Pbufs with allocated + RAM never returned the RAM when the pbuf was deallocated. + + * TCP congestion control, window updates and retransmissions did not + work correctly. This has now been fixed. + + * Bugfixes in the API. + +(0.3) Changes since version 0.2 + + * New and improved directory structure. All include files are now + kept in a dedicated include/ directory. + + * The API now has proper error handling. A new function, + netconn_err(), now returns an error code for the connection in + case of errors. + + * Improvements in the memory management subsystem. The system now + keeps a pointer to the lowest free memory block. A new function, + mem_malloc2() tries to allocate memory once, and if it fails tries + to free some memory and retry the allocation. + + * Much testing has been done with limited memory + configurations. lwIP now does a better job when overloaded. + + * Some bugfixes and improvements to the buffer (pbuf) subsystem. + + * Many bugfixes in the TCP code: + + - Fixed a bug in tcp_close(). + + - The TCP receive window was incorrectly closed when out of + sequence segments was received. This has been fixed. + + - Connections are now timed-out of the FIN-WAIT-2 state. + + - The initial congestion window could in some cases be too + large. This has been fixed. + + - The retransmission queue could in some cases be screwed up. This + has been fixed. + + - TCP RST flag now handled correctly. + + - Out of sequence data was in some cases never delivered to the + application. This has been fixed. + + - Retransmitted segments now contain the correct acknowledgment + number and advertised window. + + - TCP retransmission timeout backoffs are not correctly computed + (ala BSD). After a number of retransmissions, TCP now gives up + the connection. + + * TCP connections now are kept on three lists, one for active + connections, one for listening connections, and one for + connections that are in TIME-WAIT. This greatly speeds up the fast + timeout processing for sending delayed ACKs. + + * TCP now provides proper feedback to the application when a + connection has been successfully set up. + + * More comments have been added to the code. The code has also been + somewhat cleaned up. + +(0.2) Initial public release. diff --git a/components/lwip/CMakeLists.txt b/components/net/lwip/lwip/CMakeLists.txt similarity index 91% rename from components/lwip/CMakeLists.txt rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/CMakeLists.txt index 8fcaec0d..755834af 100644 --- a/components/lwip/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,52 +1,53 @@ -sdk_generate_library() -sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/http/fs.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/http/fsdata_custom.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/http/fsdata.c) -# sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/http/httpd.c) - -sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/api_lib.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/api_msg.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/err.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/netbuf.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/netdb.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/netifapi.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/sockets.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/tcpip.c) - -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/autoip.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/etharp.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/icmp.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/igmp.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/ip4.c) - -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/def.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/dns.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/inet_chksum.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/init.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ip.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/mem.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/memp.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/netif.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/pbuf.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/raw.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/stats.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/sys.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/tcp_in.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/tcp_out.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/tcp.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/timeouts.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/udp.c) - -sdk_library_add_sources(src/netif/ethernet.c) -sdk_library_add_sources(system/os/sys_arch.c) - -sdk_add_include_directories(.) -sdk_add_include_directories(system) -sdk_add_include_directories(src/include) -sdk_add_include_directories(src/include/lwip) -sdk_add_include_directories(src/include/lwip/apps) - +sdk_generate_library() + +sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_LWIP) + +sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/http/fs.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/http/fsdata_custom.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/http/fsdata.c) +# sdk_library_add_sources(src/apps/http/httpd.c) + +sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/api_lib.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/api_msg.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/err.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/netbuf.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/netdb.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/netifapi.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/sockets.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/api/tcpip.c) + +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/autoip.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/etharp.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/icmp.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/igmp.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ipv4/ip4.c) + +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/def.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/dns.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/inet_chksum.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/init.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/ip.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/mem.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/memp.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/netif.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/pbuf.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/raw.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/stats.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/sys.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/tcp_in.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/tcp_out.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/tcp.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/timeouts.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(src/core/udp.c) + +sdk_library_add_sources(src/netif/ethernet.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(system/os/sys_arch.c) + +sdk_add_include_directories(system) +sdk_add_include_directories(src/include) +sdk_add_include_directories(src/include/compat/posix) + diff --git a/components/lwip/COPYING b/components/net/lwip/lwip/COPYING similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/COPYING rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/COPYING index 0d77a672..e23898b5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/COPYING +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/COPYING @@ -1,33 +1,33 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - - +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + + diff --git a/components/lwip/FEATURES b/components/net/lwip/lwip/FEATURES similarity index 99% rename from components/lwip/FEATURES rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/FEATURES index a1a3359c..a50c5a5e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/FEATURES +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/FEATURES @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ -lwIP is a small independent implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite targeted at embedded systems. - -The focus of the lwIP TCP/IP implementation is to reduce resource usage while still having a full scale TCP. This makes lwIP suitable for use in embedded systems with tens of kilobytes of free RAM and room for around 40 kilobytes of code ROM. - -Main features include: -- Protocols: IP, IPv6, ICMP, ND, MLD, UDP, TCP, IGMP, ARP, PPPoS, PPPoE, 6LowPAN (via IEEE 802.15.4, BLE or ZEP; since v2.1.0) -- DHCP client, stateless DHCPv6 (since v2.1.0), DNS client (incl. mDNS hostname resolver), AutoIP/APIPA (Zeroconf), SNMP agent (v1, v2c, v3 (since v2.1.0), private MIB support & MIB compiler) -- APIs: specialized APIs for enhanced performance & zero copy, optional Berkeley-alike socket API -- Extended features: IP forwarding over multiple network interfaces -- Extended TCP features: congestion control, RTT estimation and fast recovery/fast retransmit, sending SACKs (since v2.1.0), "altcp": nearly transparent TLS for any tcp pcb (since v2.1.0) -- Addon applications: HTTP server (HTTPS via altcp), HTTP(S) client (since v2.1.0), SNTP client, SMTP client (SMTPS via altcp), ping, NetBIOS nameserver, mDNS responder, MQTT client (TLS support since v2.1.0), TFTP server, iPerf2 counterpart +lwIP is a small independent implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite targeted at embedded systems. + +The focus of the lwIP TCP/IP implementation is to reduce resource usage while still having a full scale TCP. This makes lwIP suitable for use in embedded systems with tens of kilobytes of free RAM and room for around 40 kilobytes of code ROM. + +Main features include: +- Protocols: IP, IPv6, ICMP, ND, MLD, UDP, TCP, IGMP, ARP, PPPoS, PPPoE, 6LowPAN (via IEEE 802.15.4, BLE or ZEP; since v2.1.0) +- DHCP client, stateless DHCPv6 (since v2.1.0), DNS client (incl. mDNS hostname resolver), AutoIP/APIPA (Zeroconf), SNMP agent (v1, v2c, v3 (since v2.1.0), private MIB support & MIB compiler) +- APIs: specialized APIs for enhanced performance & zero copy, optional Berkeley-alike socket API +- Extended features: IP forwarding over multiple network interfaces +- Extended TCP features: congestion control, RTT estimation and fast recovery/fast retransmit, sending SACKs (since v2.1.0), "altcp": nearly transparent TLS for any tcp pcb (since v2.1.0) +- Addon applications: HTTP server (HTTPS via altcp), HTTP(S) client (since v2.1.0), SNTP client, SMTP client (SMTPS via altcp), ping, NetBIOS nameserver, mDNS responder, MQTT client (TLS support since v2.1.0), TFTP server, iPerf2 counterpart diff --git a/components/lwip/FILES b/components/net/lwip/lwip/FILES similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/FILES rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/FILES index e67e0861..e6e09989 100644 --- a/components/lwip/FILES +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/FILES @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -src/ - The source code for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. -doc/ - The documentation for lwIP. -test/ - Some code to test whether the sources do what they should. - -See also the FILES file in each subdirectory. +src/ - The source code for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. +doc/ - The documentation for lwIP. +test/ - Some code to test whether the sources do what they should. + +See also the FILES file in each subdirectory. diff --git a/components/lwip/README b/components/net/lwip/lwip/README similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/README rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/README index 016827b4..b95f1552 100644 --- a/components/lwip/README +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/README @@ -1,106 +1,106 @@ -INTRODUCTION - -lwIP is a small independent implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite. - -The focus of the lwIP TCP/IP implementation is to reduce the RAM usage -while still having a full scale TCP. This making lwIP suitable for use -in embedded systems with tens of kilobytes of free RAM and room for -around 40 kilobytes of code ROM. - -lwIP was originally developed by Adam Dunkels at the Computer and Networks -Architectures (CNA) lab at the Swedish Institute of Computer Science (SICS) -and is now developed and maintained by a worldwide network of developers. - -FEATURES - - * IP (Internet Protocol, IPv4 and IPv6) including packet forwarding over - multiple network interfaces - * ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) for network maintenance and debugging - * IGMP (Internet Group Management Protocol) for multicast traffic management - * MLD (Multicast listener discovery for IPv6). Aims to be compliant with - RFC 2710. No support for MLDv2 - * ND (Neighbor discovery and stateless address autoconfiguration for IPv6). - Aims to be compliant with RFC 4861 (Neighbor discovery) and RFC 4862 - (Address autoconfiguration) - * DHCP, AutoIP/APIPA (Zeroconf) and (stateless) DHCPv6 - * UDP (User Datagram Protocol) including experimental UDP-lite extensions - * TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) with congestion control, RTT estimation - fast recovery/fast retransmit and sending SACKs - * raw/native API for enhanced performance - * Optional Berkeley-like socket API - * TLS: optional layered TCP ("altcp") for nearly transparent TLS for any - TCP-based protocol (ported to mbedTLS) (see changelog for more info) - * PPPoS and PPPoE (Point-to-point protocol over Serial/Ethernet) - * DNS (Domain name resolver incl. mDNS) - * 6LoWPAN (via IEEE 802.15.4, BLE or ZEP) - - -APPLICATIONS - - * HTTP server with SSI and CGI (HTTPS via altcp) - * SNMPv2c agent with MIB compiler (Simple Network Management Protocol), v3 via altcp - * SNTP (Simple network time protocol) - * NetBIOS name service responder - * MDNS (Multicast DNS) responder - * iPerf server implementation - * MQTT client (TLS support via altcp) - - -LICENSE - -lwIP is freely available under a BSD license. - - -DEVELOPMENT - -lwIP has grown into an excellent TCP/IP stack for embedded devices, -and developers using the stack often submit bug fixes, improvements, -and additions to the stack to further increase its usefulness. - -Development of lwIP is hosted on Savannah, a central point for -software development, maintenance and distribution. Everyone can -help improve lwIP by use of Savannah's interface, Git and the -mailing list. A core team of developers will commit changes to the -Git source tree. - -The lwIP TCP/IP stack is maintained in the 'lwip' Git module and -contributions (such as platform ports) are in the 'contrib' Git module. - -See doc/savannah.txt for details on Git server access for users and -developers. - -The current Git trees are web-browsable: - http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/lwip.git - http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/lwip/lwip-contrib.git - -Submit patches and bugs via the lwIP project page: - http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip/ - -Continuous integration builds (GCC, clang): - https://travis-ci.org/yarrick/lwip-merged - - -DOCUMENTATION - -Self documentation of the source code is regularly extracted from the current -Git sources and is available from this web page: - http://www.nongnu.org/lwip/ - -There is now a constantly growing wiki about lwIP at - http://lwip.wikia.com/wiki/LwIP_Wiki - -Also, there are mailing lists you can subscribe at - http://savannah.nongnu.org/mail/?group=lwip -plus searchable archives: - http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/lwip-users/ - http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/lwip-devel/ - -lwIP was originally written by Adam Dunkels: - http://dunkels.com/adam/ - -Reading Adam's papers, the files in docs/, browsing the source code -documentation and browsing the mailing list archives is a good way to -become familiar with the design of lwIP. - -Adam Dunkels -Leon Woestenberg +INTRODUCTION + +lwIP is a small independent implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite. + +The focus of the lwIP TCP/IP implementation is to reduce the RAM usage +while still having a full scale TCP. This making lwIP suitable for use +in embedded systems with tens of kilobytes of free RAM and room for +around 40 kilobytes of code ROM. + +lwIP was originally developed by Adam Dunkels at the Computer and Networks +Architectures (CNA) lab at the Swedish Institute of Computer Science (SICS) +and is now developed and maintained by a worldwide network of developers. + +FEATURES + + * IP (Internet Protocol, IPv4 and IPv6) including packet forwarding over + multiple network interfaces + * ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) for network maintenance and debugging + * IGMP (Internet Group Management Protocol) for multicast traffic management + * MLD (Multicast listener discovery for IPv6). Aims to be compliant with + RFC 2710. No support for MLDv2 + * ND (Neighbor discovery and stateless address autoconfiguration for IPv6). + Aims to be compliant with RFC 4861 (Neighbor discovery) and RFC 4862 + (Address autoconfiguration) + * DHCP, AutoIP/APIPA (Zeroconf) and (stateless) DHCPv6 + * UDP (User Datagram Protocol) including experimental UDP-lite extensions + * TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) with congestion control, RTT estimation + fast recovery/fast retransmit and sending SACKs + * raw/native API for enhanced performance + * Optional Berkeley-like socket API + * TLS: optional layered TCP ("altcp") for nearly transparent TLS for any + TCP-based protocol (ported to mbedTLS) (see changelog for more info) + * PPPoS and PPPoE (Point-to-point protocol over Serial/Ethernet) + * DNS (Domain name resolver incl. mDNS) + * 6LoWPAN (via IEEE 802.15.4, BLE or ZEP) + + +APPLICATIONS + + * HTTP server with SSI and CGI (HTTPS via altcp) + * SNMPv2c agent with MIB compiler (Simple Network Management Protocol), v3 via altcp + * SNTP (Simple network time protocol) + * NetBIOS name service responder + * MDNS (Multicast DNS) responder + * iPerf server implementation + * MQTT client (TLS support via altcp) + + +LICENSE + +lwIP is freely available under a BSD license. + + +DEVELOPMENT + +lwIP has grown into an excellent TCP/IP stack for embedded devices, +and developers using the stack often submit bug fixes, improvements, +and additions to the stack to further increase its usefulness. + +Development of lwIP is hosted on Savannah, a central point for +software development, maintenance and distribution. Everyone can +help improve lwIP by use of Savannah's interface, Git and the +mailing list. A core team of developers will commit changes to the +Git source tree. + +The lwIP TCP/IP stack is maintained in the 'lwip' Git module and +contributions (such as platform ports) are in the 'contrib' Git module. + +See doc/savannah.txt for details on Git server access for users and +developers. + +The current Git trees are web-browsable: + http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/lwip.git + http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/lwip/lwip-contrib.git + +Submit patches and bugs via the lwIP project page: + http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip/ + +Continuous integration builds (GCC, clang): + https://travis-ci.org/yarrick/lwip-merged + + +DOCUMENTATION + +Self documentation of the source code is regularly extracted from the current +Git sources and is available from this web page: + http://www.nongnu.org/lwip/ + +There is now a constantly growing wiki about lwIP at + http://lwip.wikia.com/wiki/LwIP_Wiki + +Also, there are mailing lists you can subscribe at + http://savannah.nongnu.org/mail/?group=lwip +plus searchable archives: + http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/lwip-users/ + http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/lwip-devel/ + +lwIP was originally written by Adam Dunkels: + http://dunkels.com/adam/ + +Reading Adam's papers, the files in docs/, browsing the source code +documentation and browsing the mailing list archives is a good way to +become familiar with the design of lwIP. + +Adam Dunkels +Leon Woestenberg diff --git a/components/lwip/UPGRADING b/components/net/lwip/lwip/UPGRADING similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/UPGRADING rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/UPGRADING index acb88367..21ad8cc3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/UPGRADING +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/UPGRADING @@ -1,278 +1,278 @@ -This file lists major changes between release versions that require -ports or applications to be changed. Use it to update a port or an -application written for an older version of lwIP to correctly work -with newer versions. - - -(git master) - - * [Enter new changes just after this line - do not remove this line] - -(2.1.0) - - ++ Application changes: - - * Use the new altcp API for seamless TLS integration into existing TCP applications (see changelog) - * TCP only kills existing connections with a LOWER priority than the one currently being opened. - Previous implementations also kill existing connections of the SAME priority. - * ip4_route_src: parameter order is reversed: ip4_route_src(dest, src) -> ip4_route_src(src, dest) - to make parameter order consistent with other ip*_route*() functions. - Same also applies to LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC() parameter order. - * pbuf API: pbuf->type (an u8_t holding the enum 'pbuf_type') has changed to only hold a - description of the pbuf (e.g. data following pbuf struct, data volatile, allocation - source heap/pool/etc.). As a consequence, applications can't test pbuf->type any more. - Use pbuf_match_type(pbuf, type) instead. - * socket API: according to the standard, SO_ERROR now only returns asynchronous errors. - All other/normal/synchronous errors are (and always were) available via 'errno'. - LWIP_SOCKET_SET_ERRNO has been removed - 'errno' is always set - and required! - * httpd LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI: httpd_cgi_handler() has an additional parameter "struct fs_file *" - - ++ Port changes: - - * tcpip_trycallback() was renamed to tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback() to avoid confusion - with tcpip_try_callback() - * compatibility headers: moved from 'src/include/posix' to 'src/include/compat/posix', - 'src/include/compat/stdc' etc. - * The IPv6 implementation now supports address scopes. (See LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES documentation - and ip6_zone.h for more documentation) - * LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS() has changed, see description in opt.h (options_out_len is not - available in struct dhcp any more) - * Added debug helper asserts to ensure threading/locking requirements are met (define - LWIP_MARK_TCPIP_THREAD() and LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED()). - * Added sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr() and tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback_fromisr() - These can be used to post preallocated messages from an ISR to the tcpip thread - (e.g. when using FreeRTOS) - -(2.0.2) - - ++ Application changes: - - * slipif: The way to pass serial port number has changed. netif->num is not - supported any more, netif->state is interpreted as an u8_t port number now - (it's not a POINTER to an u8_t any more!) - -(2.0.1) - - ++ Application changes: - - * UDP does NOT receive multicast traffic from ALL netifs on an UDP PCB bound to a specific - netif any more. Users need to bind to IP_ADDR_ANY to receive multicast traffic and compare - ip_current_netif() to the desired netif for every packet. - See bug #49662 for an explanation. - -(2.0.0) - - ++ Application changes: - - * Changed netif "up" flag handling to be an administrative flag (as opposed to the previous meaning of - "ip4-address-valid", a netif will now not be used for transmission if not up) -> even a DHCP netif - has to be set "up" before starting the DHCP client - * Added IPv6 support (dual-stack or IPv4/IPv6 only) - * Changed ip_addr_t to be a union in dual-stack mode (use ip4_addr_t where referring to IPv4 only). - * Major rewrite of SNMP (added MIB parser that creates code stubs for custom MIBs); - supports SNMPv2c (experimental v3 support) - * Moved some core applications from contrib repository to src/apps (and include/lwip/apps) - - +++ Raw API: - * Changed TCP listen backlog: removed tcp_accepted(), added the function pair tcp_backlog_delayed()/ - tcp_backlog_accepted() to explicitly delay backlog handling on a connection pcb - - +++ Socket API: - * Added an implementation for posix sendmsg() - * Added LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE that makes ioctl/FIONREAD return the size of the next pending datagram - - ++ Port changes - - +++ new files: - * MANY new and moved files! - * Added src/Filelists.mk for use in Makefile projects - * Continued moving stack-internal parts from abc.h to abc_priv.h in sub-folder "priv" - to let abc.h only contain the actual application programmer's API - - +++ sys layer: - * Made LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 the default as it usually performs better than - the traditional message passing (although with LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX you are still - open to priority inversion, so this is not recommended any more) - * Added LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD to use one "op_completed" semaphore per thread - instead of using one per netconn (these semaphores are used even with core locking - enabled as some longer lasting functions like big writes still need to delay) - * Added generalized abstraction for itoa(), strnicmp(), stricmp() and strnstr() - in def.h (to be overridden in cc.h) instead of config - options for netbiosns, httpd, dns, etc. ... - * New abstraction for hton* and ntoh* functions in def.h. - To override them, use the following in cc.h: - #define lwip_htons(x) - #define lwip_htonl(x) - - +++ new options: - * TODO - - +++ new pools: - * Added LWIP_MEMPOOL_* (declare/init/alloc/free) to declare private memp pools - that share memp.c code but do not have to be made global via lwippools.h - * Added pools for IPv6, MPU_COMPATIBLE, dns-api, netif-api, etc. - * added hook LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE() to get informed when a memp pool was empty and an item - is now available - - * Signature of LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET macro was changed - - * LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED() may be used to declare aligned memory buffers (mem/memp) - or to move buffers to dedicated memory using compiler attributes - - * Standard C headers are used to define sized types and printf formatters - (disable by setting LWIP_NO_STDINT_H=1 or LWIP_NO_INTTYPES_H=1 if your compiler - does not support these) - - - ++ Major bugfixes/improvements - - * Added IPv6 support (dual-stack or IPv4/IPv6 only) - * Major rewrite of PPP (incl. keep-up with apache pppd) - see doc/ppp.txt for an upgrading how-to - * Major rewrite of SNMP (incl. MIB parser) - * Fixed timing issues that might have lead to losing a DHCP lease - * Made rx processing path more robust against crafted errors - * TCP window scaling support - * modification of api modules to support FreeRTOS-MPU (don't pass stack-pointers to other threads) - * made DNS client more robust - * support PBUF_REF for RX packets - * LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX allows netconn/sockets to be used for reading/writing from separate - threads each (needs LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD) - * Moved and reordered stats (mainly memp/mib2) - -(1.4.0) - - ++ Application changes: - - * Replaced struct ip_addr by typedef ip_addr_t (struct ip_addr is kept for - compatibility to old applications, but will be removed in the future). - - * Renamed mem_realloc() to mem_trim() to prevent confusion with realloc() - - +++ Raw API: - * Changed the semantics of tcp_close() (since it was rather a - shutdown before): Now the application does *NOT* get any calls to the recv - callback (aside from NULL/closed) after calling tcp_close() - - * When calling tcp_abort() from a raw API TCP callback function, - make sure you return ERR_ABRT to prevent accessing unallocated memory. - (ERR_ABRT now means the applicaiton has called tcp_abort!) - - +++ Netconn API: - * Changed netconn_receive() and netconn_accept() to return - err_t, not a pointer to new data/netconn. - - +++ Socket API: - * LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO: when accept() or recv() time out, they - now set errno to EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN, not ETIMEDOUT. - - * Added a minimal version of posix fctl() to have a - standardised way to set O_NONBLOCK for nonblocking sockets. - - +++ all APIs: - * correctly implemented SO(F)_REUSEADDR - - ++ Port changes - - +++ new files: - - * Added 4 new files: def.c, timers.c, timers.h, tcp_impl.h: - - * Moved stack-internal parts of tcp.h to tcp_impl.h, tcp.h now only contains - the actual application programmer's API - - * Separated timer implementation from sys.h/.c, moved to timers.h/.c; - Added timer implementation for NO_SYS==1, set NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS==1 if you - still want to use your own timer implementation for NO_SYS==0 (as before). - - +++ sys layer: - - * Converted mbox- and semaphore-functions to take pointers to sys_mbox_t/ - sys_sem_t; - - * Converted sys_mbox_new/sys_sem_new to take pointers and return err_t; - - * Added Mutex concept in sys_arch (define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX to let sys.h use - binary semaphores instead of mutexes - as before) - - +++ new options: - - * Don't waste memory when chaining segments, added option TCP_OVERSIZE to - prevent creating many small pbufs when calling tcp_write with many small - blocks of data. Instead, pbufs are allocated larger than needed and the - space is used for later calls to tcp_write. - - * Added LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF to always copy to try to create single pbufs - in tcp_write/udp_send. - - * Added an additional option LWIP_ETHERNET to support ethernet without ARP - (necessary for pure PPPoE) - - * Add MEMP_SEPARATE_POOLS to place memory pools in separate arrays. This may - be used to place these pools into user-defined memory by using external - declaration. - - * Added TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT corresponding to TCP_SNDLOWAT - - +++ new pools: - - * Netdb uses a memp pool for allocating memory when getaddrinfo() is called, - so MEMP_NUM_NETDB has to be set accordingly. - - * DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC uses a memp pool instead of the heap, so - MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST has to be set accordingly. - - * Snmp-agent uses a memp pools instead of the heap, so MEMP_NUM_SNMP_* have - to be set accordingly. - - * PPPoE uses a MEMP pool instead of the heap, so MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES - has to be set accordingly - - * Integrated loopif into netif.c - loopif does not have to be created by the - port any more, just define LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF to 1. - - * Added define LWIP_RAND() for lwip-wide randomization (needs to be defined - in cc.h, e.g. used by igmp) - - * Added printf-formatter X8_F to printf u8_t as hex - - * The heap now may be moved to user-defined memory by defining - LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER as a void pointer to that memory's address - - * added autoip_set_struct() and dhcp_set_struct() to let autoip and dhcp work - with user-allocated structs instead of calling mem_malloc - - * Added const char* name to mem- and memp-stats for easier debugging. - - * Calculate the TCP/UDP checksum while copying to only fetch data once: - Define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY to a memcpy-like function that returns the checksum - - * Added SO_REUSE_RXTOALL to pass received UDP broadcast/multicast packets to - more than one pcb. - - * Changed the semantics of ARP_QUEUEING==0: ARP_QUEUEING now cannot be turned - off any more, if this is set to 0, only one packet (the most recent one) is - queued (like demanded by RFC 1122). - - - ++ Major bugfixes/improvements - - * Implemented tcp_shutdown() to only shut down one end of a connection - * Implemented shutdown() at socket- and netconn-level - * Added errorset support to select() + improved select speed overhead - * Merged pppd to v2.3.11 (including some backported bugfixes from 2.4.x) - * Added timer implementation for NO_SYS==1 (may be disabled with NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS==1 - * Use macros defined in ip_addr.h to work with IP addresses - * Implemented many nonblocking socket/netconn functions - * Fixed ARP input processing: only add a new entry if a request was directed as us - * mem_realloc() to mem_trim() to prevent confusion with realloc() - * Some improvements for AutoIP (don't route/forward link-local addresses, don't break - existing connections when assigning a routable address) - * Correctly handle remote side overrunning our rcv_wnd in ooseq case - * Removed packing from ip_addr_t, the packed version is now only used in protocol headers - * Corrected PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE for ports where ETH_PAD_SIZE > 0 - * Added support for static ARP table entries - -(STABLE-1.3.2) - - * initial version of this file +This file lists major changes between release versions that require +ports or applications to be changed. Use it to update a port or an +application written for an older version of lwIP to correctly work +with newer versions. + + +(git master) + + * [Enter new changes just after this line - do not remove this line] + +(2.1.0) + + ++ Application changes: + + * Use the new altcp API for seamless TLS integration into existing TCP applications (see changelog) + * TCP only kills existing connections with a LOWER priority than the one currently being opened. + Previous implementations also kill existing connections of the SAME priority. + * ip4_route_src: parameter order is reversed: ip4_route_src(dest, src) -> ip4_route_src(src, dest) + to make parameter order consistent with other ip*_route*() functions. + Same also applies to LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC() parameter order. + * pbuf API: pbuf->type (an u8_t holding the enum 'pbuf_type') has changed to only hold a + description of the pbuf (e.g. data following pbuf struct, data volatile, allocation + source heap/pool/etc.). As a consequence, applications can't test pbuf->type any more. + Use pbuf_match_type(pbuf, type) instead. + * socket API: according to the standard, SO_ERROR now only returns asynchronous errors. + All other/normal/synchronous errors are (and always were) available via 'errno'. + LWIP_SOCKET_SET_ERRNO has been removed - 'errno' is always set - and required! + * httpd LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI: httpd_cgi_handler() has an additional parameter "struct fs_file *" + + ++ Port changes: + + * tcpip_trycallback() was renamed to tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback() to avoid confusion + with tcpip_try_callback() + * compatibility headers: moved from 'src/include/posix' to 'src/include/compat/posix', + 'src/include/compat/stdc' etc. + * The IPv6 implementation now supports address scopes. (See LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES documentation + and ip6_zone.h for more documentation) + * LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS() has changed, see description in opt.h (options_out_len is not + available in struct dhcp any more) + * Added debug helper asserts to ensure threading/locking requirements are met (define + LWIP_MARK_TCPIP_THREAD() and LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED()). + * Added sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr() and tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback_fromisr() + These can be used to post preallocated messages from an ISR to the tcpip thread + (e.g. when using FreeRTOS) + +(2.0.2) + + ++ Application changes: + + * slipif: The way to pass serial port number has changed. netif->num is not + supported any more, netif->state is interpreted as an u8_t port number now + (it's not a POINTER to an u8_t any more!) + +(2.0.1) + + ++ Application changes: + + * UDP does NOT receive multicast traffic from ALL netifs on an UDP PCB bound to a specific + netif any more. Users need to bind to IP_ADDR_ANY to receive multicast traffic and compare + ip_current_netif() to the desired netif for every packet. + See bug #49662 for an explanation. + +(2.0.0) + + ++ Application changes: + + * Changed netif "up" flag handling to be an administrative flag (as opposed to the previous meaning of + "ip4-address-valid", a netif will now not be used for transmission if not up) -> even a DHCP netif + has to be set "up" before starting the DHCP client + * Added IPv6 support (dual-stack or IPv4/IPv6 only) + * Changed ip_addr_t to be a union in dual-stack mode (use ip4_addr_t where referring to IPv4 only). + * Major rewrite of SNMP (added MIB parser that creates code stubs for custom MIBs); + supports SNMPv2c (experimental v3 support) + * Moved some core applications from contrib repository to src/apps (and include/lwip/apps) + + +++ Raw API: + * Changed TCP listen backlog: removed tcp_accepted(), added the function pair tcp_backlog_delayed()/ + tcp_backlog_accepted() to explicitly delay backlog handling on a connection pcb + + +++ Socket API: + * Added an implementation for posix sendmsg() + * Added LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE that makes ioctl/FIONREAD return the size of the next pending datagram + + ++ Port changes + + +++ new files: + * MANY new and moved files! + * Added src/Filelists.mk for use in Makefile projects + * Continued moving stack-internal parts from abc.h to abc_priv.h in sub-folder "priv" + to let abc.h only contain the actual application programmer's API + + +++ sys layer: + * Made LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING==1 the default as it usually performs better than + the traditional message passing (although with LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX you are still + open to priority inversion, so this is not recommended any more) + * Added LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD to use one "op_completed" semaphore per thread + instead of using one per netconn (these semaphores are used even with core locking + enabled as some longer lasting functions like big writes still need to delay) + * Added generalized abstraction for itoa(), strnicmp(), stricmp() and strnstr() + in def.h (to be overridden in cc.h) instead of config + options for netbiosns, httpd, dns, etc. ... + * New abstraction for hton* and ntoh* functions in def.h. + To override them, use the following in cc.h: + #define lwip_htons(x) + #define lwip_htonl(x) + + +++ new options: + * TODO + + +++ new pools: + * Added LWIP_MEMPOOL_* (declare/init/alloc/free) to declare private memp pools + that share memp.c code but do not have to be made global via lwippools.h + * Added pools for IPv6, MPU_COMPATIBLE, dns-api, netif-api, etc. + * added hook LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE() to get informed when a memp pool was empty and an item + is now available + + * Signature of LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET macro was changed + + * LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED() may be used to declare aligned memory buffers (mem/memp) + or to move buffers to dedicated memory using compiler attributes + + * Standard C headers are used to define sized types and printf formatters + (disable by setting LWIP_NO_STDINT_H=1 or LWIP_NO_INTTYPES_H=1 if your compiler + does not support these) + + + ++ Major bugfixes/improvements + + * Added IPv6 support (dual-stack or IPv4/IPv6 only) + * Major rewrite of PPP (incl. keep-up with apache pppd) + see doc/ppp.txt for an upgrading how-to + * Major rewrite of SNMP (incl. MIB parser) + * Fixed timing issues that might have lead to losing a DHCP lease + * Made rx processing path more robust against crafted errors + * TCP window scaling support + * modification of api modules to support FreeRTOS-MPU (don't pass stack-pointers to other threads) + * made DNS client more robust + * support PBUF_REF for RX packets + * LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX allows netconn/sockets to be used for reading/writing from separate + threads each (needs LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD) + * Moved and reordered stats (mainly memp/mib2) + +(1.4.0) + + ++ Application changes: + + * Replaced struct ip_addr by typedef ip_addr_t (struct ip_addr is kept for + compatibility to old applications, but will be removed in the future). + + * Renamed mem_realloc() to mem_trim() to prevent confusion with realloc() + + +++ Raw API: + * Changed the semantics of tcp_close() (since it was rather a + shutdown before): Now the application does *NOT* get any calls to the recv + callback (aside from NULL/closed) after calling tcp_close() + + * When calling tcp_abort() from a raw API TCP callback function, + make sure you return ERR_ABRT to prevent accessing unallocated memory. + (ERR_ABRT now means the applicaiton has called tcp_abort!) + + +++ Netconn API: + * Changed netconn_receive() and netconn_accept() to return + err_t, not a pointer to new data/netconn. + + +++ Socket API: + * LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO: when accept() or recv() time out, they + now set errno to EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN, not ETIMEDOUT. + + * Added a minimal version of posix fctl() to have a + standardised way to set O_NONBLOCK for nonblocking sockets. + + +++ all APIs: + * correctly implemented SO(F)_REUSEADDR + + ++ Port changes + + +++ new files: + + * Added 4 new files: def.c, timers.c, timers.h, tcp_impl.h: + + * Moved stack-internal parts of tcp.h to tcp_impl.h, tcp.h now only contains + the actual application programmer's API + + * Separated timer implementation from sys.h/.c, moved to timers.h/.c; + Added timer implementation for NO_SYS==1, set NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS==1 if you + still want to use your own timer implementation for NO_SYS==0 (as before). + + +++ sys layer: + + * Converted mbox- and semaphore-functions to take pointers to sys_mbox_t/ + sys_sem_t; + + * Converted sys_mbox_new/sys_sem_new to take pointers and return err_t; + + * Added Mutex concept in sys_arch (define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX to let sys.h use + binary semaphores instead of mutexes - as before) + + +++ new options: + + * Don't waste memory when chaining segments, added option TCP_OVERSIZE to + prevent creating many small pbufs when calling tcp_write with many small + blocks of data. Instead, pbufs are allocated larger than needed and the + space is used for later calls to tcp_write. + + * Added LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF to always copy to try to create single pbufs + in tcp_write/udp_send. + + * Added an additional option LWIP_ETHERNET to support ethernet without ARP + (necessary for pure PPPoE) + + * Add MEMP_SEPARATE_POOLS to place memory pools in separate arrays. This may + be used to place these pools into user-defined memory by using external + declaration. + + * Added TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT corresponding to TCP_SNDLOWAT + + +++ new pools: + + * Netdb uses a memp pool for allocating memory when getaddrinfo() is called, + so MEMP_NUM_NETDB has to be set accordingly. + + * DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC uses a memp pool instead of the heap, so + MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST has to be set accordingly. + + * Snmp-agent uses a memp pools instead of the heap, so MEMP_NUM_SNMP_* have + to be set accordingly. + + * PPPoE uses a MEMP pool instead of the heap, so MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES + has to be set accordingly + + * Integrated loopif into netif.c - loopif does not have to be created by the + port any more, just define LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF to 1. + + * Added define LWIP_RAND() for lwip-wide randomization (needs to be defined + in cc.h, e.g. used by igmp) + + * Added printf-formatter X8_F to printf u8_t as hex + + * The heap now may be moved to user-defined memory by defining + LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER as a void pointer to that memory's address + + * added autoip_set_struct() and dhcp_set_struct() to let autoip and dhcp work + with user-allocated structs instead of calling mem_malloc + + * Added const char* name to mem- and memp-stats for easier debugging. + + * Calculate the TCP/UDP checksum while copying to only fetch data once: + Define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY to a memcpy-like function that returns the checksum + + * Added SO_REUSE_RXTOALL to pass received UDP broadcast/multicast packets to + more than one pcb. + + * Changed the semantics of ARP_QUEUEING==0: ARP_QUEUEING now cannot be turned + off any more, if this is set to 0, only one packet (the most recent one) is + queued (like demanded by RFC 1122). + + + ++ Major bugfixes/improvements + + * Implemented tcp_shutdown() to only shut down one end of a connection + * Implemented shutdown() at socket- and netconn-level + * Added errorset support to select() + improved select speed overhead + * Merged pppd to v2.3.11 (including some backported bugfixes from 2.4.x) + * Added timer implementation for NO_SYS==1 (may be disabled with NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS==1 + * Use macros defined in ip_addr.h to work with IP addresses + * Implemented many nonblocking socket/netconn functions + * Fixed ARP input processing: only add a new entry if a request was directed as us + * mem_realloc() to mem_trim() to prevent confusion with realloc() + * Some improvements for AutoIP (don't route/forward link-local addresses, don't break + existing connections when assigning a routable address) + * Correctly handle remote side overrunning our rcv_wnd in ooseq case + * Removed packing from ip_addr_t, the packed version is now only used in protocol headers + * Corrected PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE for ports where ETH_PAD_SIZE > 0 + * Added support for static ARP table entries + +(STABLE-1.3.2) + + * initial version of this file diff --git a/components/lwip/lwipopts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/lwipopts.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/lwipopts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/lwipopts.h index 0a3dbf25..7bb966f6 100644 --- a/components/lwip/lwipopts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/lwipopts.h @@ -1,253 +1,253 @@ -/** - * Copyright (c) 2022 Bouffalolab team - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - ****************************************************************************** - */ - -#ifndef __LWIPOPTS_H__ -#define __LWIPOPTS_H__ - -/** - * NO_SYS==1: Provides VERY minimal functionality. Otherwise, - * use lwIP facilities. - */ -#define NO_SYS 0 - -/* ---------- Memory options ---------- */ -/* MEM_ALIGNMENT: should be set to the alignment of the CPU for which - lwIP is compiled. 4 byte alignment -> define MEM_ALIGNMENT to 4, 2 - byte alignment -> define MEM_ALIGNMENT to 2. */ -#define MEM_ALIGNMENT 4 - -/* MEM_SIZE: the size of the heap memory. If the application will send -a lot of data that needs to be copied, this should be set high. */ -#define MEM_SIZE (15 * 1024) - -/* MEMP_NUM_PBUF: the number of memp struct pbufs. If the application - sends a lot of data out of ROM (or other static memory), this - should be set high. */ -#define MEMP_NUM_PBUF 10 -/* MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB: the number of UDP protocol control blocks. One - per active UDP "connection". */ -#define MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB 6 -/* MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB: the number of simulatenously active TCP - connections. */ -#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB 10 -/* MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN: the number of listening TCP - connections. */ -#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN 5 -/* MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT: the number of simulateously active - timeouts. */ -#define MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT 10 - -/* ---------- IPv4 options ---------- */ -#define LWIP_IPV4 1 - -/* ---------- TCP options ---------- */ -#define LWIP_TCP 1 -#define TCP_TTL 255 - -/* Controls if TCP should queue segments that arrive out of - order. Define to 0 if your device is low on memory. */ -#define TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ 0 - -/* TCP Maximum segment size. */ -#define TCP_MSS (1500 - 40) /* TCP_MSS = (Ethernet MTU - IP header size - TCP header size) */ - -/* TCP sender buffer space (bytes). */ -#define TCP_SND_BUF (4 * TCP_MSS) - -/* TCP_SND_QUEUELEN: TCP sender buffer space (pbufs). This must be at least - as much as (2 * TCP_SND_BUF/TCP_MSS) for things to work. */ - -#define TCP_SND_QUEUELEN (2 * TCP_SND_BUF / TCP_MSS) - -/* MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG: the number of simultaneously queued TCP - segments. */ -#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG TCP_SND_QUEUELEN - -/* TCP receive window. */ -#define TCP_WND (2 * TCP_MSS) - -/* ---------- Pbuf options ---------- */ -/* PBUF_POOL_SIZE: the number of buffers in the pbuf pool. - @ note: used to allocate Tx pbufs only - mix pbuf size is (TCP_WND / TCP_MSS) */ -#define PBUF_POOL_SIZE (TCP_WND / TCP_MSS) - -/* PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE: the size of each pbuf in the pbuf pool. */ -#define PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE 1524 - -/* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF == 1: to pass directly MAC Rx buffers to the stack - no copy is needed */ -#define LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF 1 - -/* ---------- ICMP options ---------- */ -#define LWIP_ICMP 1 - -/* ---------- DHCP options ---------- */ -#define LWIP_DHCP 0 - -/* ---------- UDP options ---------- */ -#define LWIP_UDP 1 -#define UDP_TTL 255 - -/* ---------- Statistics options ---------- */ -#define LWIP_STATS 0 - -/* ---------- link callback options ---------- */ -/* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK==1: Support a callback function from an interface - * whenever the link changes (i.e., link down) - */ -#define LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK 1 - -/* - -------------------------------------- - ---------- Checksum options ---------- - -------------------------------------- -*/ -/* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY==1: Calculate checksum when copying data from application buffers to pbufs. */ -#define LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY 0 - -#ifdef CHECKSUM_BY_HARDWARE -/* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP==0: Generate checksums by hardware for outgoing IP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 0 -/* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP==0: Generate checksums by hardware for outgoing UDP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 0 -/* CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP==0: Generate checksums by hardware for outgoing TCP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 0 -/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming IP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 0 -/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming UDP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 0 -/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming TCP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 0 -/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming ICMP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 0 -#else -/* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing IP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 1 -/* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing UDP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 1 -/* CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing TCP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 1 -/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming IP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 1 -/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming UDP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 1 -/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming TCP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 1 -/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP==1: Check checksums by hardware for incoming ICMP packets.*/ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 1 -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP 1 -#endif - -/* - ---------------------------------------------- - ---------- Sequential layer options ---------- - ---------------------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * LWIP_NETCONN==1: Enable Netconn API (require to use api_lib.c) - */ -#define LWIP_NETCONN 1 - -/* - ------------------------------------ - ---------- Socket options ---------- - ------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * LWIP_SOCKET==1: Enable Socket API (require to use sockets.c) - */ -#define LWIP_SOCKET 1 - -/* ---------------- httpd options --------------- */ -#define HTTPD_USE_CUSTOM_FSDATA 1 - -// /** Set this to 1 to support CGI (old style).*/ -// #define LWIP_HTTPD_CGI 1 - -// /** Set this to 1 to support SSI (Server-Side-Includes)*/ -// #define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI 0 - -// /** Set this to 1 to support HTTP POST */ -// #define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST 0 - -// /** Set this to 0 to not send the SSI tag (default is on, so the tag will -// * be sent in the HTML page */ -// #define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG 0 - -// /** This is the size of a static buffer used when URIs end with '/'. -// * In this buffer, the directory requested is concatenated with all the -// * configured default file names. -// * Set to 0 to disable checking default filenames on non-root directories. -// */ -// #define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN 256 - -// /** The server port for HTTPD to use */ -// #define HTTPD_SERVER_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTP - -/* - ---------------------------------------- - ---------- Lwip Debug options ---------- - ---------------------------------------- -*/ -#define LWIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define ETHARP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define ICMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define TCPIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define TCP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define UDP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define SOCKET_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define API_LIB_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define HTTPD_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define PBUF_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#define IP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF - -/* - --------------------------------- - ---------- OS options ---------- - --------------------------------- -*/ - -#define TCPIP_THREAD_NAME "TCP/IP" -#define TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE 1024 -#define TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE 50 -#define DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 100 -#define DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 100 -#define DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE 100 -#define DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE 512 -#define TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO osPriorityHigh - -#endif /* __LWIPOPTS_H__ */ - -/************************ (C) COPYRIGHT STMicroelectronics *****END OF FILE****/ +/** + * Copyright (c) 2022 Bouffalolab team + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + ****************************************************************************** + */ + +#ifndef __LWIPOPTS_H__ +#define __LWIPOPTS_H__ + +/** + * NO_SYS==1: Provides VERY minimal functionality. Otherwise, + * use lwIP facilities. + */ +#define NO_SYS 0 + +/* ---------- Memory options ---------- */ +/* MEM_ALIGNMENT: should be set to the alignment of the CPU for which + lwIP is compiled. 4 byte alignment -> define MEM_ALIGNMENT to 4, 2 + byte alignment -> define MEM_ALIGNMENT to 2. */ +#define MEM_ALIGNMENT 4 + +/* MEM_SIZE: the size of the heap memory. If the application will send +a lot of data that needs to be copied, this should be set high. */ +#define MEM_SIZE (15 * 1024) + +/* MEMP_NUM_PBUF: the number of memp struct pbufs. If the application + sends a lot of data out of ROM (or other static memory), this + should be set high. */ +#define MEMP_NUM_PBUF 10 +/* MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB: the number of UDP protocol control blocks. One + per active UDP "connection". */ +#define MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB 6 +/* MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB: the number of simulatenously active TCP + connections. */ +#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB 10 +/* MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN: the number of listening TCP + connections. */ +#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN 5 +/* MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT: the number of simulateously active + timeouts. */ +#define MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT 10 + +/* ---------- IPv4 options ---------- */ +#define LWIP_IPV4 1 + +/* ---------- TCP options ---------- */ +#define LWIP_TCP 1 +#define TCP_TTL 255 + +/* Controls if TCP should queue segments that arrive out of + order. Define to 0 if your device is low on memory. */ +#define TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ 0 + +/* TCP Maximum segment size. */ +#define TCP_MSS (1500 - 40) /* TCP_MSS = (Ethernet MTU - IP header size - TCP header size) */ + +/* TCP sender buffer space (bytes). */ +#define TCP_SND_BUF (4 * TCP_MSS) + +/* TCP_SND_QUEUELEN: TCP sender buffer space (pbufs). This must be at least + as much as (2 * TCP_SND_BUF/TCP_MSS) for things to work. */ + +#define TCP_SND_QUEUELEN (2 * TCP_SND_BUF / TCP_MSS) + +/* MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG: the number of simultaneously queued TCP + segments. */ +#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG TCP_SND_QUEUELEN + +/* TCP receive window. */ +#define TCP_WND (2 * TCP_MSS) + +/* ---------- Pbuf options ---------- */ +/* PBUF_POOL_SIZE: the number of buffers in the pbuf pool. + @ note: used to allocate Tx pbufs only + mix pbuf size is (TCP_WND / TCP_MSS) */ +#define PBUF_POOL_SIZE (TCP_WND / TCP_MSS) + +/* PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE: the size of each pbuf in the pbuf pool. */ +#define PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE 1524 + +/* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF == 1: to pass directly MAC Rx buffers to the stack + no copy is needed */ +#define LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF 1 + +/* ---------- ICMP options ---------- */ +#define LWIP_ICMP 1 + +/* ---------- DHCP options ---------- */ +#define LWIP_DHCP 0 + +/* ---------- UDP options ---------- */ +#define LWIP_UDP 1 +#define UDP_TTL 255 + +/* ---------- Statistics options ---------- */ +#define LWIP_STATS 0 + +/* ---------- link callback options ---------- */ +/* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK==1: Support a callback function from an interface + * whenever the link changes (i.e., link down) + */ +#define LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK 1 + +/* + -------------------------------------- + ---------- Checksum options ---------- + -------------------------------------- +*/ +/* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY==1: Calculate checksum when copying data from application buffers to pbufs. */ +#define LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY 0 + +#ifdef CHECKSUM_BY_HARDWARE +/* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP==0: Generate checksums by hardware for outgoing IP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 0 +/* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP==0: Generate checksums by hardware for outgoing UDP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 0 +/* CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP==0: Generate checksums by hardware for outgoing TCP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 0 +/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming IP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 0 +/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming UDP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 0 +/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming TCP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 0 +/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP==0: Check checksums by hardware for incoming ICMP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 0 +#else +/* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing IP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 1 +/* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing UDP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 1 +/* CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing TCP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 1 +/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming IP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 1 +/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming UDP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 1 +/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming TCP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 1 +/* CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP==1: Check checksums by hardware for incoming ICMP packets.*/ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 1 +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP 1 +#endif + +/* + ---------------------------------------------- + ---------- Sequential layer options ---------- + ---------------------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * LWIP_NETCONN==1: Enable Netconn API (require to use api_lib.c) + */ +#define LWIP_NETCONN 1 + +/* + ------------------------------------ + ---------- Socket options ---------- + ------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * LWIP_SOCKET==1: Enable Socket API (require to use sockets.c) + */ +#define LWIP_SOCKET 1 + +/* ---------------- httpd options --------------- */ +#define HTTPD_USE_CUSTOM_FSDATA 1 + +// /** Set this to 1 to support CGI (old style).*/ +// #define LWIP_HTTPD_CGI 1 + +// /** Set this to 1 to support SSI (Server-Side-Includes)*/ +// #define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI 0 + +// /** Set this to 1 to support HTTP POST */ +// #define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST 0 + +// /** Set this to 0 to not send the SSI tag (default is on, so the tag will +// * be sent in the HTML page */ +// #define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG 0 + +// /** This is the size of a static buffer used when URIs end with '/'. +// * In this buffer, the directory requested is concatenated with all the +// * configured default file names. +// * Set to 0 to disable checking default filenames on non-root directories. +// */ +// #define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN 256 + +// /** The server port for HTTPD to use */ +// #define HTTPD_SERVER_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTP + +/* + ---------------------------------------- + ---------- Lwip Debug options ---------- + ---------------------------------------- +*/ +#define LWIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define ETHARP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define ICMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define TCPIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define TCP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define UDP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define SOCKET_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define API_LIB_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define HTTPD_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define PBUF_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#define IP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF + +/* + --------------------------------- + ---------- OS options ---------- + --------------------------------- +*/ + +#define TCPIP_THREAD_NAME "TCP/IP" +#define TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE 1024 +#define TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE 50 +#define DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 100 +#define DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 100 +#define DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE 100 +#define DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE 512 +#define TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO osPriorityHigh + +#endif /* __LWIPOPTS_H__ */ + +/************************ (C) COPYRIGHT STMicroelectronics *****END OF FILE****/ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/FILES b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/FILES similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/FILES rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/FILES index 300448fb..0be0741d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/FILES +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/FILES @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ -api/ - The code for the high-level wrapper API. Not needed if - you use the lowel-level call-back/raw API. - -apps/ - Higher layer applications that are specifically programmed - with the lwIP low-level raw API. - -core/ - The core of the TPC/IP stack; protocol implementations, - memory and buffer management, and the low-level raw API. - -include/ - lwIP include files. - -netif/ - Generic network interface device drivers are kept here. - -For more information on the various subdirectories, check the FILES -file in each directory. +api/ - The code for the high-level wrapper API. Not needed if + you use the lowel-level call-back/raw API. + +apps/ - Higher layer applications that are specifically programmed + with the lwIP low-level raw API. + +core/ - The core of the TPC/IP stack; protocol implementations, + memory and buffer management, and the low-level raw API. + +include/ - lwIP include files. + +netif/ - Generic network interface device drivers are kept here. + +For more information on the various subdirectories, check the FILES +file in each directory. diff --git a/components/lwip/src/Filelists.cmake b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/Filelists.cmake similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/Filelists.cmake rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/Filelists.cmake index 9448619a..c7656287 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/Filelists.cmake +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/Filelists.cmake @@ -1,279 +1,279 @@ -# This file is indended to be included in end-user CMakeLists.txt -# include(/path/to/Filelists.cmake) -# It assumes the variable LWIP_DIR is defined pointing to the -# root path of lwIP sources. -# -# This file is NOT designed (on purpose) to be used as cmake -# subdir via add_subdirectory() -# The intention is to provide greater flexibility to users to -# create their own targets using the *_SRCS variables. - -set(LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR "2") -set(LWIP_VERSION_MINOR "1") -set(LWIP_VERSION_REVISION "2") -# LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_RELEASE for official releases -# LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT for Git versions -# Numbers 1..31 are reserved for release candidates -set(LWIP_VERSION_RC "LWIP_RC_RELEASE") - -if ("${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" STREQUAL "LWIP_RC_RELEASE") - set(LWIP_VERSION_STRING - "${LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_MINOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_REVISION}" - ) -elseif ("${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" STREQUAL "LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT") - set(LWIP_VERSION_STRING - "${LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_MINOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_REVISION}.dev" - ) -else ("${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" STREQUAL "LWIP_RC_RELEASE") - set(LWIP_VERSION_STRING - "${LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_MINOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_REVISION}.rc${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" - ) -endif ("${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" STREQUAL "LWIP_RC_RELEASE") - -# The minimum set of files needed for lwIP. -set(lwipcore_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/init.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/def.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/dns.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/inet_chksum.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ip.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/mem.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/memp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/netif.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/pbuf.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/raw.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/stats.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/sys.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/altcp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/altcp_alloc.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/altcp_tcp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/tcp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/tcp_in.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/tcp_out.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/timeouts.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/udp.c -) -set(lwipcore4_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/autoip.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/etharp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/icmp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/igmp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/ip4.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c -) -set(lwipcore6_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/ethip6.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/icmp6.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/inet6.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/ip6.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/mld6.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/nd6.c -) - -# APIFILES: The files which implement the sequential and socket APIs. -set(lwipapi_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/api_lib.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/api_msg.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/err.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/if_api.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/netbuf.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/netdb.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/netifapi.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/sockets.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/tcpip.c -) - -# Files implementing various generic network interface functions -set(lwipnetif_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ethernet.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/bridgeif.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/slipif.c -) - -# 6LoWPAN -set(lwipsixlowpan_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/lowpan6_common.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/lowpan6.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/lowpan6_ble.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/zepif.c -) - -# PPP -set(lwipppp_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/auth.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ccp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/chap-new.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/demand.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/eap.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ecp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/eui64.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/fsm.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ipcp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/lcp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/magic.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/mppe.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/multilink.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ppp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppapi.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppoe.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppos.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/upap.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/utils.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/vj.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c -) - -# SNMPv3 agent -set(lwipsnmp_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c -) - -# HTTP server + client -set(lwiphttp_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/fs.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/http_client.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/httpd.c -) - -# MAKEFSDATA HTTP server host utility -set(lwipmakefsdata_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c -) - -# IPERF server -set(lwipiperf_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c -) - -# SMTP client -set(lwipsmtp_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/smtp/smtp.c -) - -# SNTP client -set(lwipsntp_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/sntp/sntp.c -) - -# MDNS responder -set(lwipmdns_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/mdns/mdns.c -) - -# NetBIOS name server -set(lwipnetbios_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c -) - -# TFTP server files -set(lwiptftp_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c -) - -# MQTT client files -set(lwipmqtt_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c -) - -# ARM MBEDTLS related files of lwIP rep -set(lwipmbedtls_SRCS - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c - ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c -) - -# All LWIP files without apps -set(lwipnoapps_SRCS - ${lwipcore_SRCS} - ${lwipcore4_SRCS} - ${lwipcore6_SRCS} - ${lwipapi_SRCS} - ${lwipnetif_SRCS} - ${lwipsixlowpan_SRCS} - ${lwipppp_SRCS} -) - -# LWIPAPPFILES: All LWIP APPs -set(lwipallapps_SRCS - ${lwipsnmp_SRCS} - ${lwiphttp_SRCS} - ${lwipiperf_SRCS} - ${lwipsmtp_SRCS} - ${lwipsntp_SRCS} - ${lwipmdns_SRCS} - ${lwipnetbios_SRCS} - ${lwiptftp_SRCS} - ${lwipmqtt_SRCS} - ${lwipmbedtls_SRCS} -) - -# Generate lwip/init.h (version info) -configure_file(${LWIP_DIR}/src/include/lwip/init.h.cmake.in ${LWIP_DIR}/src/include/lwip/init.h) - -# Documentation -set(DOXYGEN_DIR ${LWIP_DIR}/doc/doxygen) -set(DOXYGEN_OUTPUT_DIR output) -set(DOXYGEN_IN ${LWIP_DIR}/doc/doxygen/lwip.Doxyfile.cmake.in) -set(DOXYGEN_OUT ${LWIP_DIR}/doc/doxygen/lwip.Doxyfile) -configure_file(${DOXYGEN_IN} ${DOXYGEN_OUT}) - -find_package(Doxygen) -if (DOXYGEN_FOUND) - message("Doxygen build started") - - add_custom_target(lwipdocs - COMMAND ${CMAKE_COMMAND} -E remove_directory ${DOXYGEN_DIR}/${DOXYGEN_OUTPUT_DIR}/html - COMMAND ${DOXYGEN_EXECUTABLE} ${DOXYGEN_OUT} - WORKING_DIRECTORY ${DOXYGEN_DIR} - COMMENT "Generating API documentation with Doxygen" - VERBATIM) -else (DOXYGEN_FOUND) - message("Doxygen needs to be installed to generate the doxygen documentation") -endif (DOXYGEN_FOUND) - -# lwIP libraries -add_library(lwipcore EXCLUDE_FROM_ALL ${lwipnoapps_SRCS}) -target_compile_options(lwipcore PRIVATE ${LWIP_COMPILER_FLAGS}) -target_compile_definitions(lwipcore PRIVATE ${LWIP_DEFINITIONS} ${LWIP_MBEDTLS_DEFINITIONS}) -target_include_directories(lwipcore PRIVATE ${LWIP_INCLUDE_DIRS} ${LWIP_MBEDTLS_INCLUDE_DIRS}) - -add_library(lwipallapps EXCLUDE_FROM_ALL ${lwipallapps_SRCS}) -target_compile_options(lwipallapps PRIVATE ${LWIP_COMPILER_FLAGS}) -target_compile_definitions(lwipallapps PRIVATE ${LWIP_DEFINITIONS} ${LWIP_MBEDTLS_DEFINITIONS}) -target_include_directories(lwipallapps PRIVATE ${LWIP_INCLUDE_DIRS} ${LWIP_MBEDTLS_INCLUDE_DIRS}) +# This file is indended to be included in end-user CMakeLists.txt +# include(/path/to/Filelists.cmake) +# It assumes the variable LWIP_DIR is defined pointing to the +# root path of lwIP sources. +# +# This file is NOT designed (on purpose) to be used as cmake +# subdir via add_subdirectory() +# The intention is to provide greater flexibility to users to +# create their own targets using the *_SRCS variables. + +set(LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR "2") +set(LWIP_VERSION_MINOR "1") +set(LWIP_VERSION_REVISION "2") +# LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_RELEASE for official releases +# LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT for Git versions +# Numbers 1..31 are reserved for release candidates +set(LWIP_VERSION_RC "LWIP_RC_RELEASE") + +if ("${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" STREQUAL "LWIP_RC_RELEASE") + set(LWIP_VERSION_STRING + "${LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_MINOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_REVISION}" + ) +elseif ("${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" STREQUAL "LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT") + set(LWIP_VERSION_STRING + "${LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_MINOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_REVISION}.dev" + ) +else ("${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" STREQUAL "LWIP_RC_RELEASE") + set(LWIP_VERSION_STRING + "${LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_MINOR}.${LWIP_VERSION_REVISION}.rc${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" + ) +endif ("${LWIP_VERSION_RC}" STREQUAL "LWIP_RC_RELEASE") + +# The minimum set of files needed for lwIP. +set(lwipcore_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/init.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/def.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/dns.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/inet_chksum.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ip.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/mem.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/memp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/netif.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/pbuf.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/raw.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/stats.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/sys.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/altcp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/altcp_alloc.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/altcp_tcp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/tcp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/tcp_in.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/tcp_out.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/timeouts.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/udp.c +) +set(lwipcore4_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/autoip.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/etharp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/icmp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/igmp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/ip4.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c +) +set(lwipcore6_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/ethip6.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/icmp6.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/inet6.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/ip6.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/mld6.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/core/ipv6/nd6.c +) + +# APIFILES: The files which implement the sequential and socket APIs. +set(lwipapi_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/api_lib.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/api_msg.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/err.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/if_api.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/netbuf.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/netdb.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/netifapi.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/sockets.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/api/tcpip.c +) + +# Files implementing various generic network interface functions +set(lwipnetif_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ethernet.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/bridgeif.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/slipif.c +) + +# 6LoWPAN +set(lwipsixlowpan_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/lowpan6_common.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/lowpan6.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/lowpan6_ble.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/zepif.c +) + +# PPP +set(lwipppp_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/auth.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ccp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/chap-new.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/demand.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/eap.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ecp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/eui64.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/fsm.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ipcp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/lcp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/magic.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/mppe.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/multilink.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/ppp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppapi.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppoe.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/pppos.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/upap.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/utils.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/vj.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c +) + +# SNMPv3 agent +set(lwipsnmp_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c +) + +# HTTP server + client +set(lwiphttp_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/fs.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/http_client.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/httpd.c +) + +# MAKEFSDATA HTTP server host utility +set(lwipmakefsdata_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c +) + +# IPERF server +set(lwipiperf_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c +) + +# SMTP client +set(lwipsmtp_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/smtp/smtp.c +) + +# SNTP client +set(lwipsntp_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/sntp/sntp.c +) + +# MDNS responder +set(lwipmdns_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/mdns/mdns.c +) + +# NetBIOS name server +set(lwipnetbios_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c +) + +# TFTP server files +set(lwiptftp_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c +) + +# MQTT client files +set(lwipmqtt_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c +) + +# ARM MBEDTLS related files of lwIP rep +set(lwipmbedtls_SRCS + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c + ${LWIP_DIR}/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c +) + +# All LWIP files without apps +set(lwipnoapps_SRCS + ${lwipcore_SRCS} + ${lwipcore4_SRCS} + ${lwipcore6_SRCS} + ${lwipapi_SRCS} + ${lwipnetif_SRCS} + ${lwipsixlowpan_SRCS} + ${lwipppp_SRCS} +) + +# LWIPAPPFILES: All LWIP APPs +set(lwipallapps_SRCS + ${lwipsnmp_SRCS} + ${lwiphttp_SRCS} + ${lwipiperf_SRCS} + ${lwipsmtp_SRCS} + ${lwipsntp_SRCS} + ${lwipmdns_SRCS} + ${lwipnetbios_SRCS} + ${lwiptftp_SRCS} + ${lwipmqtt_SRCS} + ${lwipmbedtls_SRCS} +) + +# Generate lwip/init.h (version info) +configure_file(${LWIP_DIR}/src/include/lwip/init.h.cmake.in ${LWIP_DIR}/src/include/lwip/init.h) + +# Documentation +set(DOXYGEN_DIR ${LWIP_DIR}/doc/doxygen) +set(DOXYGEN_OUTPUT_DIR output) +set(DOXYGEN_IN ${LWIP_DIR}/doc/doxygen/lwip.Doxyfile.cmake.in) +set(DOXYGEN_OUT ${LWIP_DIR}/doc/doxygen/lwip.Doxyfile) +configure_file(${DOXYGEN_IN} ${DOXYGEN_OUT}) + +find_package(Doxygen) +if (DOXYGEN_FOUND) + message("Doxygen build started") + + add_custom_target(lwipdocs + COMMAND ${CMAKE_COMMAND} -E remove_directory ${DOXYGEN_DIR}/${DOXYGEN_OUTPUT_DIR}/html + COMMAND ${DOXYGEN_EXECUTABLE} ${DOXYGEN_OUT} + WORKING_DIRECTORY ${DOXYGEN_DIR} + COMMENT "Generating API documentation with Doxygen" + VERBATIM) +else (DOXYGEN_FOUND) + message("Doxygen needs to be installed to generate the doxygen documentation") +endif (DOXYGEN_FOUND) + +# lwIP libraries +add_library(lwipcore EXCLUDE_FROM_ALL ${lwipnoapps_SRCS}) +target_compile_options(lwipcore PRIVATE ${LWIP_COMPILER_FLAGS}) +target_compile_definitions(lwipcore PRIVATE ${LWIP_DEFINITIONS} ${LWIP_MBEDTLS_DEFINITIONS}) +target_include_directories(lwipcore PRIVATE ${LWIP_INCLUDE_DIRS} ${LWIP_MBEDTLS_INCLUDE_DIRS}) + +add_library(lwipallapps EXCLUDE_FROM_ALL ${lwipallapps_SRCS}) +target_compile_options(lwipallapps PRIVATE ${LWIP_COMPILER_FLAGS}) +target_compile_definitions(lwipallapps PRIVATE ${LWIP_DEFINITIONS} ${LWIP_MBEDTLS_DEFINITIONS}) +target_include_directories(lwipallapps PRIVATE ${LWIP_INCLUDE_DIRS} ${LWIP_MBEDTLS_INCLUDE_DIRS}) diff --git a/components/lwip/src/Filelists.mk b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/Filelists.mk similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/Filelists.mk rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/Filelists.mk index 12e1b40c..828b9f2a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/Filelists.mk +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/Filelists.mk @@ -1,205 +1,205 @@ -# -# Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. -# All rights reserved. -# -# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -# are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -# -# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -# and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -# 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products -# derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -# -# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED -# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT -# SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, -# EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT -# OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS -# INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN -# CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING -# IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY -# OF SUCH DAMAGE. -# -# This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. -# -# Author: Adam Dunkels -# - -# COREFILES, CORE4FILES: The minimum set of files needed for lwIP. -COREFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/core/init.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/def.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/dns.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/inet_chksum.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ip.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/mem.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/memp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/netif.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/pbuf.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/raw.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/stats.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/sys.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/altcp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/altcp_alloc.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/altcp_tcp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/tcp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/tcp_in.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/tcp_out.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/timeouts.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/udp.c - -CORE4FILES=$(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/autoip.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/dhcp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/etharp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/icmp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/igmp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/ip4.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c - -CORE6FILES=$(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/ethip6.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/icmp6.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/inet6.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/ip6.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/mld6.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/nd6.c - -# APIFILES: The files which implement the sequential and socket APIs. -APIFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/api/api_lib.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/api/api_msg.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/api/err.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/api/if_api.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/api/netbuf.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/api/netdb.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/api/netifapi.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/api/sockets.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/api/tcpip.c - -# NETIFFILES: Files implementing various generic network interface functions -NETIFFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/netif/ethernet.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/bridgeif.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/slipif.c - -# SIXLOWPAN: 6LoWPAN -SIXLOWPAN=$(LWIPDIR)/netif/lowpan6_common.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/lowpan6.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/lowpan6_ble.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/zepif.c - -# PPPFILES: PPP -PPPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/auth.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ccp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/chap-new.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/demand.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/eap.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ecp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/eui64.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/fsm.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ipcp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/lcp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/magic.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/mppe.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/multilink.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ppp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppapi.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppoe.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppos.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/upap.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/utils.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/vj.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c - -# LWIPNOAPPSFILES: All LWIP files without apps -LWIPNOAPPSFILES=$(COREFILES) \ - $(CORE4FILES) \ - $(CORE6FILES) \ - $(APIFILES) \ - $(NETIFFILES) \ - $(PPPFILES) \ - $(SIXLOWPAN) - -# SNMPFILES: SNMPv2c agent -SNMPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c - -# HTTPFILES: HTTP server + client -HTTPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/fs.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/http_client.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/httpd.c - -# MAKEFSDATA: MAKEFSDATA HTTP server host utility -MAKEFSDATAFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c - -# LWIPERFFILES: IPERF server -LWIPERFFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c - -# SMTPFILES: SMTP client -SMTPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/smtp/smtp.c - -# SNTPFILES: SNTP client -SNTPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/sntp/sntp.c - -# MDNSFILES: MDNS responder -MDNSFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/mdns/mdns.c - -# NETBIOSNSFILES: NetBIOS name server -NETBIOSNSFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c - -# TFTPFILES: TFTP server files -TFTPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c - -# MQTTFILES: MQTT client files -MQTTFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c - -# MBEDTLS_FILES: MBEDTLS related files of lwIP rep -MBEDTLS_FILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c \ - $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c - -# LWIPAPPFILES: All LWIP APPs -LWIPAPPFILES=$(SNMPFILES) \ - $(HTTPFILES) \ - $(LWIPERFFILES) \ - $(SMTPFILES) \ - $(SNTPFILES) \ - $(MDNSFILES) \ - $(NETBIOSNSFILES) \ - $(TFTPFILES) \ - $(MQTTFILES) \ - $(MBEDTLS_FILES) +# +# Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, +# are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, +# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation +# and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +# 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +# derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT +# SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, +# EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT +# OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +# INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +# CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING +# IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY +# OF SUCH DAMAGE. +# +# This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. +# +# Author: Adam Dunkels +# + +# COREFILES, CORE4FILES: The minimum set of files needed for lwIP. +COREFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/core/init.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/def.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/dns.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/inet_chksum.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ip.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/mem.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/memp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/netif.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/pbuf.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/raw.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/stats.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/sys.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/altcp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/altcp_alloc.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/altcp_tcp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/tcp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/tcp_in.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/tcp_out.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/timeouts.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/udp.c + +CORE4FILES=$(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/autoip.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/dhcp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/etharp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/icmp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/igmp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/ip4.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c + +CORE6FILES=$(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/ethip6.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/icmp6.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/inet6.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/ip6.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/mld6.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/core/ipv6/nd6.c + +# APIFILES: The files which implement the sequential and socket APIs. +APIFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/api/api_lib.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/api/api_msg.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/api/err.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/api/if_api.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/api/netbuf.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/api/netdb.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/api/netifapi.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/api/sockets.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/api/tcpip.c + +# NETIFFILES: Files implementing various generic network interface functions +NETIFFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/netif/ethernet.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/bridgeif.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/slipif.c + +# SIXLOWPAN: 6LoWPAN +SIXLOWPAN=$(LWIPDIR)/netif/lowpan6_common.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/lowpan6.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/lowpan6_ble.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/zepif.c + +# PPPFILES: PPP +PPPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/auth.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ccp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/chap-new.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/demand.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/eap.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ecp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/eui64.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/fsm.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ipcp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/lcp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/magic.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/mppe.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/multilink.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/ppp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppapi.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppoe.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/pppos.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/upap.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/utils.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/vj.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c + +# LWIPNOAPPSFILES: All LWIP files without apps +LWIPNOAPPSFILES=$(COREFILES) \ + $(CORE4FILES) \ + $(CORE6FILES) \ + $(APIFILES) \ + $(NETIFFILES) \ + $(PPPFILES) \ + $(SIXLOWPAN) + +# SNMPFILES: SNMPv2c agent +SNMPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c + +# HTTPFILES: HTTP server + client +HTTPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/fs.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/http_client.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/httpd.c + +# MAKEFSDATA: MAKEFSDATA HTTP server host utility +MAKEFSDATAFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c + +# LWIPERFFILES: IPERF server +LWIPERFFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c + +# SMTPFILES: SMTP client +SMTPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/smtp/smtp.c + +# SNTPFILES: SNTP client +SNTPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/sntp/sntp.c + +# MDNSFILES: MDNS responder +MDNSFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/mdns/mdns.c + +# NETBIOSNSFILES: NetBIOS name server +NETBIOSNSFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c + +# TFTPFILES: TFTP server files +TFTPFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c + +# MQTTFILES: MQTT client files +MQTTFILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c + +# MBEDTLS_FILES: MBEDTLS related files of lwIP rep +MBEDTLS_FILES=$(LWIPDIR)/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c \ + $(LWIPDIR)/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c + +# LWIPAPPFILES: All LWIP APPs +LWIPAPPFILES=$(SNMPFILES) \ + $(HTTPFILES) \ + $(LWIPERFFILES) \ + $(SMTPFILES) \ + $(SNTPFILES) \ + $(MDNSFILES) \ + $(NETBIOSNSFILES) \ + $(TFTPFILES) \ + $(MQTTFILES) \ + $(MBEDTLS_FILES) diff --git a/components/lwip/src/api/api_lib.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/api_lib.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/api/api_lib.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/api_lib.c index 2045613a..13166fa4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/api/api_lib.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/api_lib.c @@ -1,1416 +1,1416 @@ -/** - * @file - * Sequential API External module - * - * @defgroup netconn Netconn API - * @ingroup sequential_api - * Thread-safe, to be called from non-TCPIP threads only. - * TX/RX handling based on @ref netbuf (containing @ref pbuf) - * to avoid copying data around. - * - * @defgroup netconn_common Common functions - * @ingroup netconn - * For use with TCP and UDP - * - * @defgroup netconn_tcp TCP only - * @ingroup netconn - * TCP only functions - * - * @defgroup netconn_udp UDP only - * @ingroup netconn - * UDP only functions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - */ - -/* This is the part of the API that is linked with - the application */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_NETCONN /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" - -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/raw.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/api_msg.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -#include - -#define API_MSG_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) -#define API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct api_msg, name) -#define API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(name) API_VAR_ALLOC(struct api_msg, MEMP_API_MSG, name, ERR_MEM) -#define API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(name) API_VAR_ALLOC(struct api_msg, MEMP_API_MSG, name, NULL) -#define API_MSG_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_API_MSG, name) - -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG -/* need to allocate API message for accept so empty message pool does not result in event loss - * see bug #47512: MPU_COMPATIBLE may fail on empty pool */ -#define API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_ACCEPT(msg) API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg) -#define API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg) API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg) -#else /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ -#define API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_ACCEPT(msg) -#define API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg) -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -#define NETCONN_RECVMBOX_WAITABLE(conn) (sys_mbox_valid(&(conn)->recvmbox) && (((conn)->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) == 0)) -#define NETCONN_ACCEPTMBOX_WAITABLE(conn) (sys_mbox_valid(&(conn)->acceptmbox) && (((conn)->flags & (NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED | NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID)) == 0)) -#define NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_INC(conn) SYS_ARCH_INC(conn->mbox_threads_waiting, 1) -#define NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn) SYS_ARCH_DEC(conn->mbox_threads_waiting, 1) -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ -#define NETCONN_RECVMBOX_WAITABLE(conn) sys_mbox_valid(&(conn)->recvmbox) -#define NETCONN_ACCEPTMBOX_WAITABLE(conn) (sys_mbox_valid(&(conn)->acceptmbox) && (((conn)->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED) == 0)) -#define NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_INC(conn) -#define NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn) -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - -static err_t netconn_close_shutdown(struct netconn *conn, u8_t how); - -/** - * Call the lower part of a netconn_* function - * This function is then running in the thread context - * of tcpip_thread and has exclusive access to lwIP core code. - * - * @param fn function to call - * @param apimsg a struct containing the function to call and its parameters - * @return ERR_OK if the function was called, another err_t if not - */ -static err_t netconn_apimsg(tcpip_callback_fn fn, struct api_msg *apimsg) -{ - err_t err; - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - /* catch functions that don't set err */ - apimsg->err = ERR_VAL; -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - apimsg->op_completed_sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - - err = tcpip_send_msg_wait_sem(fn, apimsg, LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(apimsg)); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - return apimsg->err; - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * Create a new netconn (of a specific type) that has a callback function. - * The corresponding pcb is also created. - * - * @param t the type of 'connection' to create (@see enum netconn_type) - * @param proto the IP protocol for RAW IP pcbs - * @param callback a function to call on status changes (RX available, TX'ed) - * @return a newly allocated struct netconn or - * NULL on memory error - */ -struct netconn * -netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(enum netconn_type t, u8_t proto, netconn_callback callback) -{ - struct netconn *conn; - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(msg); - - conn = netconn_alloc(t, callback); - - if (conn != NULL) { - err_t err; - - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.n.proto = proto; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_newconn, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_ASSERT("freeing conn without freeing pcb", conn->pcb.tcp == NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn has no recvmbox", sys_mbox_valid(&conn->recvmbox)); -#if LWIP_TCP - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->acceptmbox shouldn't exist", !sys_mbox_valid(&conn->acceptmbox)); -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - LWIP_ASSERT("conn has no op_completed", sys_sem_valid(&conn->op_completed)); - sys_sem_free(&conn->op_completed); -#endif /* !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - sys_mbox_free(&conn->recvmbox); - memp_free(MEMP_NETCONN, conn); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - return NULL; - } - } - - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - return conn; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_common - * Close a netconn 'connection' and free all its resources but not the netconn itself. - * UDP and RAW connection are completely closed, TCP pcbs might still be in a waitstate - * after this returns. - * - * @param conn the netconn to delete - * @return ERR_OK if the connection was deleted - */ -err_t netconn_prepare_delete(struct netconn *conn) -{ - err_t err; - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - - /* No ASSERT here because possible to get a (conn == NULL) if we got an accept error */ - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER - /* get the time we started, which is later compared to - sys_now() + conn->send_timeout */ - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.time_started = sys_now(); -#else /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ -#if LWIP_TCP - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.polls_left = - ((LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT + TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL - 1) / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) + 1; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_delconn, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_common - * Close a netconn 'connection' and free its resources. - * UDP and RAW connection are completely closed, TCP pcbs might still be in a waitstate - * after this returns. - * - * @param conn the netconn to delete - * @return ERR_OK if the connection was deleted - */ -err_t netconn_delete(struct netconn *conn) -{ - err_t err; - - /* No ASSERT here because possible to get a (conn == NULL) if we got an accept error */ - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_OK; - } - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - - if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) { - /* Already called netconn_prepare_delete() before */ - err = ERR_OK; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - { - err = netconn_prepare_delete(conn); - } - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - netconn_free(conn); - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * Get the local or remote IP address and port of a netconn. - * For RAW netconns, this returns the protocol instead of a port! - * - * @param conn the netconn to query - * @param addr a pointer to which to save the IP address - * @param port a pointer to which to save the port (or protocol for RAW) - * @param local 1 to get the local IP address, 0 to get the remote one - * @return ERR_CONN for invalid connections - * ERR_OK if the information was retrieved - */ -err_t netconn_getaddr(struct netconn *conn, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port, u8_t local) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_getaddr: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_getaddr: invalid addr", (addr != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_getaddr: invalid port", (port != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ad.local = local; -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_getaddr, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - *addr = msg->msg.ad.ipaddr; - *port = msg->msg.ad.port; -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - msg.msg.ad.ipaddr = addr; - msg.msg.ad.port = port; - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_getaddr, &msg); -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_common - * Bind a netconn to a specific local IP address and port. - * Binding one netconn twice might not always be checked correctly! - * - * @param conn the netconn to bind - * @param addr the local IP address to bind the netconn to - * (use IP4_ADDR_ANY/IP6_ADDR_ANY to bind to all addresses) - * @param port the local port to bind the netconn to (not used for RAW) - * @return ERR_OK if bound, any other err_t on failure - */ -err_t netconn_bind(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_bind: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IP_ADDR_ANY alias) to subsequent functions */ - if (addr == NULL) { - addr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - /* "Socket API like" dual-stack support: If IP to bind to is IP6_ADDR_ANY, - * and NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY is 0, use IP_ANY_TYPE to bind - */ - if ((netconn_get_ipv6only(conn) == 0) && - ip_addr_cmp(addr, IP6_ADDR_ANY)) { - addr = IP_ANY_TYPE; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.ipaddr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(addr); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.port = port; - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_bind, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_common - * Bind a netconn to a specific interface and port. - * Binding one netconn twice might not always be checked correctly! - * - * @param conn the netconn to bind - * @param if_idx the local interface index to bind the netconn to - * @return ERR_OK if bound, any other err_t on failure - */ -err_t netconn_bind_if(struct netconn *conn, u8_t if_idx) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_bind_if: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.if_idx = if_idx; - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_bind_if, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_common - * Connect a netconn to a specific remote IP address and port. - * - * @param conn the netconn to connect - * @param addr the remote IP address to connect to - * @param port the remote port to connect to (no used for RAW) - * @return ERR_OK if connected, return value of tcp_/udp_/raw_connect otherwise - */ -err_t netconn_connect(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_connect: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IP_ADDR_ANY alias) to subsequent functions */ - if (addr == NULL) { - addr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.ipaddr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(addr); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.port = port; - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_connect, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_udp - * Disconnect a netconn from its current peer (only valid for UDP netconns). - * - * @param conn the netconn to disconnect - * @return See @ref err_t - */ -err_t netconn_disconnect(struct netconn *conn) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_disconnect: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_disconnect, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_tcp - * Set a TCP netconn into listen mode - * - * @param conn the tcp netconn to set to listen mode - * @param backlog the listen backlog, only used if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG==1 - * @return ERR_OK if the netconn was set to listen (UDP and RAW netconns - * don't return any error (yet?)) - */ -err_t netconn_listen_with_backlog(struct netconn *conn, u8_t backlog) -{ -#if LWIP_TCP - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - - /* This does no harm. If TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG is off, backlog is unused. */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(backlog); - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_listen: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.lb.backlog = backlog; -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_listen, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -#else /* LWIP_TCP */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(backlog); - return ERR_ARG; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_tcp - * Accept a new connection on a TCP listening netconn. - * - * @param conn the TCP listen netconn - * @param new_conn pointer where the new connection is stored - * @return ERR_OK if a new connection has been received or an error - * code otherwise - */ -err_t netconn_accept(struct netconn *conn, struct netconn **new_conn) -{ -#if LWIP_TCP - err_t err; - void *accept_ptr; - struct netconn *newconn; -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_accept: invalid pointer", (new_conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - *new_conn = NULL; - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_accept: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - /* NOTE: Although the opengroup spec says a pending error shall be returned to - send/recv/getsockopt(SO_ERROR) only, we return it for listening - connections also, to handle embedded-system errors */ - err = netconn_err(conn); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* return pending error */ - return err; - } - - if (!NETCONN_ACCEPTMBOX_WAITABLE(conn)) { - /* don't accept if closed: this might block the application task - waiting on acceptmbox forever! */ - return ERR_CLSD; - } - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_ACCEPT(msg); - - NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_INC(conn); - - if (netconn_is_nonblocking(conn)) { - if (sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &accept_ptr) == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); - NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); - return ERR_WOULDBLOCK; - } - } else { -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO - - if (sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &accept_ptr, conn->recv_timeout) == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); - NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); - return ERR_TIMEOUT; - } - -#else - sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &accept_ptr, 0); -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO*/ - } - - NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - - if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) { - if (lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(accept_ptr)) { - /* the netconn has been closed from another thread */ - API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); - return ERR_CONN; - } - } - -#endif - - /* Register event with callback */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS, 0); - - if (lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(accept_ptr, &err)) { - /* a connection has been aborted: e.g. out of pcbs or out of netconns during accept */ - API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); - return err; - } - - if (accept_ptr == NULL) { - /* connection has been aborted */ - API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); - return ERR_CLSD; - } - - newconn = (struct netconn *)accept_ptr; -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - /* Let the stack know that we have accepted the connection. */ - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = newconn; - /* don't care for the return value of lwip_netconn_do_recv */ - netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_accepted, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - - *new_conn = newconn; - /* don't set conn->last_err: it's only ERR_OK, anyway */ - return ERR_OK; -#else /* LWIP_TCP */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(new_conn); - return ERR_ARG; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_common - * Receive data: actual implementation that doesn't care whether pbuf or netbuf - * is received (this is internal, it's just here for describing common errors) - * - * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data - * @param new_buf pointer where a new pbuf/netbuf is stored when received data - * @param apiflags flags that control function behaviour. For now only: - * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only read data that is available now, don't wait for more data - * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, - * memory error or another error) - * ERR_CONN if not connected - * ERR_CLSD if TCP connection has been closed - * ERR_WOULDBLOCK if the netconn is nonblocking but would block to wait for data - * ERR_TIMEOUT if the netconn has a receive timeout and no data was received - */ -static err_t netconn_recv_data(struct netconn *conn, void **new_buf, u8_t apiflags) -{ - void *buf = NULL; - u16_t len; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv: invalid pointer", (new_buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - *new_buf = NULL; - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - if (!NETCONN_RECVMBOX_WAITABLE(conn)) { - err_t err = netconn_err(conn); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* return pending error */ - return err; - } - - return ERR_CONN; - } - - NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_INC(conn); - - if (netconn_is_nonblocking(conn) || (apiflags & NETCONN_DONTBLOCK) || - (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED) || (conn->pending_err != ERR_OK)) { - if (sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(&conn->recvmbox, &buf) == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - err_t err; - NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); - err = netconn_err(conn); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* return pending error */ - return err; - } - - if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED) { - return ERR_CONN; - } - - return ERR_WOULDBLOCK; - } - } else { -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO - - if (sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->recvmbox, &buf, conn->recv_timeout) == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); - return ERR_TIMEOUT; - } - -#else - sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->recvmbox, &buf, 0); -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO*/ - } - - NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - - if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) { - if (lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(buf)) { - /* the netconn has been closed from another thread */ - API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); - return ERR_CONN; - } - } - -#endif - -#if LWIP_TCP -#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) -#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ - { - err_t err; - - /* Check if this is an error message or a pbuf */ - if (lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(buf, &err)) { - /* new_buf has been zeroed above already */ - if (err == ERR_CLSD) { - /* connection closed translates to ERR_OK with *new_buf == NULL */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - return err; - } - - len = ((struct pbuf *)buf)->tot_len; - } -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_TCP && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) - else -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ -#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) - { - LWIP_ASSERT("buf != NULL", buf != NULL); - len = netbuf_len((struct netbuf *)buf); - } - -#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ - -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - SYS_ARCH_DEC(conn->recv_avail, len); -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - /* Register event with callback */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS, len); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(API_LIB_DEBUG, ("netconn_recv_data: received %p, len=%" U16_F "\n", buf, len)); - - *new_buf = buf; - /* don't set conn->last_err: it's only ERR_OK, anyway */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if LWIP_TCP -static err_t netconn_tcp_recvd_msg(struct netconn *conn, size_t len, struct api_msg *msg) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) == NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); - - msg->conn = conn; - msg->msg.r.len = len; - - return netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_recv, msg); -} - -err_t netconn_tcp_recvd(struct netconn *conn, size_t len) -{ - err_t err; - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) == NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - err = netconn_tcp_recvd_msg(conn, len, &API_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -static err_t netconn_recv_data_tcp(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags) -{ - err_t err; - struct pbuf *buf; - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - msg = NULL; -#endif - - if (!NETCONN_RECVMBOX_WAITABLE(conn)) { - /* This only happens when calling this function more than once *after* receiving FIN */ - return ERR_CONN; - } - - if (netconn_is_flag_set(conn, NETCONN_FIN_RX_PENDING)) { - netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FIN_RX_PENDING); - goto handle_fin; - } - - if (!(apiflags & NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD)) { - /* need to allocate API message here so empty message pool does not result in event loss - * see bug #47512: MPU_COMPATIBLE may fail on empty pool */ - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - } - - err = netconn_recv_data(conn, (void **)new_buf, apiflags); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - if (!(apiflags & NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD)) { - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - } - - return err; - } - - buf = *new_buf; - - if (!(apiflags & NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD)) { - /* Let the stack know that we have taken the data. */ - u16_t len = buf ? buf->tot_len : 1; - /* don't care for the return value of lwip_netconn_do_recv */ - /* @todo: this should really be fixed, e.g. by retrying in poll on error */ - netconn_tcp_recvd_msg(conn, len, &API_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - } - - /* If we are closed, we indicate that we no longer wish to use the socket */ - if (buf == NULL) { - if (apiflags & NETCONN_NOFIN) { - /* received a FIN but the caller cannot handle it right now: - re-enqueue it and return "no data" */ - netconn_set_flags(conn, NETCONN_FIN_RX_PENDING); - return ERR_WOULDBLOCK; - } else { - handle_fin: - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS, 0); - - if (conn->pcb.ip == NULL) { - /* race condition: RST during recv */ - err = netconn_err(conn); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - return ERR_RST; - } - - /* RX side is closed, so deallocate the recvmbox */ - netconn_close_shutdown(conn, NETCONN_SHUT_RD); - /* Don' store ERR_CLSD as conn->err since we are only half-closed */ - return ERR_CLSD; - } - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_tcp - * Receive data (in form of a pbuf) from a TCP netconn - * - * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data - * @param new_buf pointer where a new pbuf is stored when received data - * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, - * memory error or another error, @see netconn_recv_data) - * ERR_ARG if conn is not a TCP netconn - */ -err_t netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) == NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); - - return netconn_recv_data_tcp(conn, new_buf, 0); -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_tcp - * Receive data (in form of a pbuf) from a TCP netconn - * - * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data - * @param new_buf pointer where a new pbuf is stored when received data - * @param apiflags flags that control function behaviour. For now only: - * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only read data that is available now, don't wait for more data - * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, - * memory error or another error, @see netconn_recv_data) - * ERR_ARG if conn is not a TCP netconn - */ -err_t netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf_flags(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) == NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); - - return netconn_recv_data_tcp(conn, new_buf, apiflags); -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -/** - * Receive data (in form of a netbuf) from a UDP or RAW netconn - * - * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data - * @param new_buf pointer where a new netbuf is stored when received data - * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, - * memory error or another error) - * ERR_ARG if conn is not a UDP/RAW netconn - */ -err_t netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) != NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); - - return netconn_recv_data(conn, (void **)new_buf, 0); -} - -/** - * Receive data (in form of a netbuf) from a UDP or RAW netconn - * - * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data - * @param new_buf pointer where a new netbuf is stored when received data - * @param apiflags flags that control function behaviour. For now only: - * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only read data that is available now, don't wait for more data - * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, - * memory error or another error) - * ERR_ARG if conn is not a UDP/RAW netconn - */ -err_t netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf_flags(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) != NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); - - return netconn_recv_data(conn, (void **)new_buf, apiflags); -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_common - * Receive data (in form of a netbuf containing a packet buffer) from a netconn - * - * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data - * @param new_buf pointer where a new netbuf is stored when received data - * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, - * memory error or another error) - */ -err_t netconn_recv(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf) -{ -#if LWIP_TCP - struct netbuf *buf = NULL; - err_t err; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv: invalid pointer", (new_buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - *new_buf = NULL; - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - -#if LWIP_TCP -#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) -#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ - { - struct pbuf *p = NULL; - /* This is not a listening netconn, since recvmbox is set */ - - buf = (struct netbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETBUF); - - if (buf == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - err = netconn_recv_data_tcp(conn, &p, 0); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - memp_free(MEMP_NETBUF, buf); - return err; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - - buf->p = p; - buf->ptr = p; - buf->port = 0; - ip_addr_set_zero(&buf->addr); - *new_buf = buf; - /* don't set conn->last_err: it's only ERR_OK, anyway */ - return ERR_OK; - } -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_TCP && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) - else -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ - { -#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) - return netconn_recv_data(conn, (void **)new_buf, 0); -#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_udp - * Send data (in form of a netbuf) to a specific remote IP address and port. - * Only to be used for UDP and RAW netconns (not TCP). - * - * @param conn the netconn over which to send data - * @param buf a netbuf containing the data to send - * @param addr the remote IP address to which to send the data - * @param port the remote port to which to send the data - * @return ERR_OK if data was sent, any other err_t on error - */ -err_t netconn_sendto(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf *buf, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - if (buf != NULL) { - ip_addr_set(&buf->addr, addr); - buf->port = port; - return netconn_send(conn, buf); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_udp - * Send data over a UDP or RAW netconn (that is already connected). - * - * @param conn the UDP or RAW netconn over which to send data - * @param buf a netbuf containing the data to send - * @return ERR_OK if data was sent, any other err_t on error - */ -err_t netconn_send(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf *buf) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_send: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(API_LIB_DEBUG, ("netconn_send: sending %" U16_F " bytes\n", buf->p->tot_len)); - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.b = buf; - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_send, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_tcp - * Send data over a TCP netconn. - * - * @param conn the TCP netconn over which to send data - * @param dataptr pointer to the application buffer that contains the data to send - * @param size size of the application data to send - * @param apiflags combination of following flags : - * - NETCONN_COPY: data will be copied into memory belonging to the stack - * - NETCONN_MORE: for TCP connection, PSH flag will be set on last segment sent - * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only write the data if all data can be written at once - * @param bytes_written pointer to a location that receives the number of written bytes - * @return ERR_OK if data was sent, any other err_t on error - */ -err_t netconn_write_partly(struct netconn *conn, const void *dataptr, size_t size, - u8_t apiflags, size_t *bytes_written) -{ - struct netvector vector; - vector.ptr = dataptr; - vector.len = size; - return netconn_write_vectors_partly(conn, &vector, 1, apiflags, bytes_written); -} - -/** - * Send vectorized data atomically over a TCP netconn. - * - * @param conn the TCP netconn over which to send data - * @param vectors array of vectors containing data to send - * @param vectorcnt number of vectors in the array - * @param apiflags combination of following flags : - * - NETCONN_COPY: data will be copied into memory belonging to the stack - * - NETCONN_MORE: for TCP connection, PSH flag will be set on last segment sent - * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only write the data if all data can be written at once - * @param bytes_written pointer to a location that receives the number of written bytes - * @return ERR_OK if data was sent, any other err_t on error - */ -err_t netconn_write_vectors_partly(struct netconn *conn, struct netvector *vectors, u16_t vectorcnt, - u8_t apiflags, size_t *bytes_written) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - u8_t dontblock; - size_t size; - int i; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_write: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_write: invalid conn->type", (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP), return ERR_VAL;); - dontblock = netconn_is_nonblocking(conn) || (apiflags & NETCONN_DONTBLOCK); -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO - - if (conn->send_timeout != 0) { - dontblock = 1; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ - - if (dontblock && !bytes_written) { - /* This implies netconn_write() cannot be used for non-blocking send, since - it has no way to return the number of bytes written. */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* sum up the total size */ - size = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < vectorcnt; i++) { - size += vectors[i].len; - - if (size < vectors[i].len) { - /* overflow */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - - if (size == 0) { - return ERR_OK; - } else if (size > SSIZE_MAX) { - ssize_t limited; - - /* this is required by the socket layer (cannot send full size_t range) */ - if (!bytes_written) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* limit the amount of data to send */ - limited = SSIZE_MAX; - size = (size_t)limited; - } - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - /* non-blocking write sends as much */ - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.vector = vectors; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.vector_cnt = vectorcnt; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.vector_off = 0; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.apiflags = apiflags; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.len = size; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.offset = 0; -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO - - if (conn->send_timeout != 0) { - /* get the time we started, which is later compared to - sys_now() + conn->send_timeout */ - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.time_started = sys_now(); - } else { - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.time_started = 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ - - /* For locking the core: this _can_ be delayed on low memory/low send buffer, - but if it is, this is done inside api_msg.c:do_write(), so we can use the - non-blocking version here. */ - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_write, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - if (bytes_written != NULL) { - *bytes_written = API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.offset; - } - - /* for blocking, check all requested bytes were written, NOTE: send_timeout is - treated as dontblock (see dontblock assignment above) */ - if (!dontblock) { - LWIP_ASSERT("do_write failed to write all bytes", API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.offset == size); - } - } - - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_tcp - * Close or shutdown a TCP netconn (doesn't delete it). - * - * @param conn the TCP netconn to close or shutdown - * @param how fully close or only shutdown one side? - * @return ERR_OK if the netconn was closed, any other err_t on error - */ -static err_t netconn_close_shutdown(struct netconn *conn, u8_t how) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(how); - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_close: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; -#if LWIP_TCP - /* shutting down both ends is the same as closing */ - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.shut = how; -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER - /* get the time we started, which is later compared to - sys_now() + conn->send_timeout */ - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.time_started = sys_now(); -#else /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.polls_left = - ((LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT + TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL - 1) / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) + 1; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_close, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_tcp - * Close a TCP netconn (doesn't delete it). - * - * @param conn the TCP netconn to close - * @return ERR_OK if the netconn was closed, any other err_t on error - */ -err_t netconn_close(struct netconn *conn) -{ - /* shutting down both ends is the same as closing */ - return netconn_close_shutdown(conn, NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR); -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_common - * Get and reset pending error on a netconn - * - * @param conn the netconn to get the error from - * @return and pending error or ERR_OK if no error was pending - */ -err_t netconn_err(struct netconn *conn) -{ - err_t err; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - err = conn->pending_err; - conn->pending_err = ERR_OK; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netconn_tcp - * Shut down one or both sides of a TCP netconn (doesn't delete it). - * - * @param conn the TCP netconn to shut down - * @param shut_rx shut down the RX side (no more read possible after this) - * @param shut_tx shut down the TX side (no more write possible after this) - * @return ERR_OK if the netconn was closed, any other err_t on error - */ -err_t netconn_shutdown(struct netconn *conn, u8_t shut_rx, u8_t shut_tx) -{ - return netconn_close_shutdown(conn, (u8_t)((shut_rx ? NETCONN_SHUT_RD : 0) | (shut_tx ? NETCONN_SHUT_WR : 0))); -} - -#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) -/** - * @ingroup netconn_udp - * Join multicast groups for UDP netconns. - * - * @param conn the UDP netconn for which to change multicast addresses - * @param multiaddr IP address of the multicast group to join or leave - * @param netif_addr the IP address of the network interface on which to send - * the igmp message - * @param join_or_leave flag whether to send a join- or leave-message - * @return ERR_OK if the action was taken, any err_t on error - */ -err_t netconn_join_leave_group(struct netconn *conn, - const ip_addr_t *multiaddr, - const ip_addr_t *netif_addr, - enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_join_leave_group: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IP_ADDR_ANY alias) to subsequent functions */ - if (multiaddr == NULL) { - multiaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; - } - - if (netif_addr == NULL) { - netif_addr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.multiaddr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(multiaddr); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.netif_addr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(netif_addr); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.join_or_leave = join_or_leave; - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} -/** - * @ingroup netconn_udp - * Join multicast groups for UDP netconns. - * - * @param conn the UDP netconn for which to change multicast addresses - * @param multiaddr IP address of the multicast group to join or leave - * @param if_idx the index of the netif - * @param join_or_leave flag whether to send a join- or leave-message - * @return ERR_OK if the action was taken, any err_t on error - */ -err_t netconn_join_leave_group_netif(struct netconn *conn, - const ip_addr_t *multiaddr, - u8_t if_idx, - enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave) -{ - API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - err_t err; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_join_leave_group: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IP_ADDR_ANY alias) to subsequent functions */ - if (multiaddr == NULL) { - multiaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; - } - - if (if_idx == NETIF_NO_INDEX) { - return ERR_IF; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.multiaddr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(multiaddr); - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.if_idx = if_idx; - API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.join_or_leave = join_or_leave; - err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group_netif, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - - return err; -} -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ - -#if LWIP_DNS -/** - * @ingroup netconn_common - * Execute a DNS query, only one IP address is returned - * - * @param name a string representation of the DNS host name to query - * @param addr a preallocated ip_addr_t where to store the resolved IP address - * @param dns_addrtype IP address type (IPv4 / IPv6) - * @return ERR_OK: resolving succeeded - * ERR_MEM: memory error, try again later - * ERR_ARG: dns client not initialized or invalid hostname - * ERR_VAL: dns server response was invalid - */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -err_t netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype) -#else -err_t netconn_gethostbyname(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr) -#endif -{ - API_VAR_DECLARE(struct dns_api_msg, msg); -#if !LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - sys_sem_t sem; -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - err_t err; - err_t cberr; - - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_gethostbyname: invalid name", (name != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("netconn_gethostbyname: invalid addr", (addr != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - - if (strlen(name) >= DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - -#endif - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE(name, addr, dns_addrtype, &err)) { -#else - - if (LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE(name, addr, NETCONN_DNS_DEFAULT, &err)) { -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - return err; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE */ - - API_VAR_ALLOC(struct dns_api_msg, MEMP_DNS_API_MSG, msg, ERR_MEM); -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - strncpy(API_VAR_REF(msg).name, name, DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH - 1); - API_VAR_REF(msg).name[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH - 1] = 0; -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - msg.err = &err; - msg.sem = &sem; - API_VAR_REF(msg).addr = API_VAR_REF(addr); - API_VAR_REF(msg).name = name; -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - API_VAR_REF(msg).dns_addrtype = dns_addrtype; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - API_VAR_REF(msg).sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD*/ - err = sys_sem_new(API_EXPR_REF(API_VAR_REF(msg).sem), 0); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_DNS_API_MSG, msg); - return err; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - - cberr = tcpip_send_msg_wait_sem(lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname, &API_VAR_REF(msg), API_EXPR_REF(API_VAR_REF(msg).sem)); -#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - sys_sem_free(API_EXPR_REF(API_VAR_REF(msg).sem)); -#endif /* !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - - if (cberr != ERR_OK) { - API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_DNS_API_MSG, msg); - return cberr; - } - -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - *addr = msg->addr; - err = msg->err; -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - - API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_DNS_API_MSG, msg); - return err; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_DNS*/ - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD -void netconn_thread_init(void) -{ - sys_sem_t *sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); - - if ((sem == NULL) || !sys_sem_valid(sem)) { - /* call alloc only once */ - LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_ALLOC(); - LWIP_ASSERT("LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_ALLOC() failed", sys_sem_valid(LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET())); - } -} - -void netconn_thread_cleanup(void) -{ - sys_sem_t *sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); - - if ((sem != NULL) && sys_sem_valid(sem)) { - /* call free only once */ - LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_FREE(); - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN */ +/** + * @file + * Sequential API External module + * + * @defgroup netconn Netconn API + * @ingroup sequential_api + * Thread-safe, to be called from non-TCPIP threads only. + * TX/RX handling based on @ref netbuf (containing @ref pbuf) + * to avoid copying data around. + * + * @defgroup netconn_common Common functions + * @ingroup netconn + * For use with TCP and UDP + * + * @defgroup netconn_tcp TCP only + * @ingroup netconn + * TCP only functions + * + * @defgroup netconn_udp UDP only + * @ingroup netconn + * UDP only functions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + */ + +/* This is the part of the API that is linked with + the application */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_NETCONN /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/api.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" + +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/raw.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/api_msg.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +#include + +#define API_MSG_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) +#define API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct api_msg, name) +#define API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(name) API_VAR_ALLOC(struct api_msg, MEMP_API_MSG, name, ERR_MEM) +#define API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(name) API_VAR_ALLOC(struct api_msg, MEMP_API_MSG, name, NULL) +#define API_MSG_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_API_MSG, name) + +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG +/* need to allocate API message for accept so empty message pool does not result in event loss + * see bug #47512: MPU_COMPATIBLE may fail on empty pool */ +#define API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_ACCEPT(msg) API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg) +#define API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg) API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg) +#else /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ +#define API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_ACCEPT(msg) +#define API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg) +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +#define NETCONN_RECVMBOX_WAITABLE(conn) (sys_mbox_valid(&(conn)->recvmbox) && (((conn)->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) == 0)) +#define NETCONN_ACCEPTMBOX_WAITABLE(conn) (sys_mbox_valid(&(conn)->acceptmbox) && (((conn)->flags & (NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED | NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID)) == 0)) +#define NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_INC(conn) SYS_ARCH_INC(conn->mbox_threads_waiting, 1) +#define NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn) SYS_ARCH_DEC(conn->mbox_threads_waiting, 1) +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ +#define NETCONN_RECVMBOX_WAITABLE(conn) sys_mbox_valid(&(conn)->recvmbox) +#define NETCONN_ACCEPTMBOX_WAITABLE(conn) (sys_mbox_valid(&(conn)->acceptmbox) && (((conn)->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED) == 0)) +#define NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_INC(conn) +#define NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn) +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + +static err_t netconn_close_shutdown(struct netconn *conn, u8_t how); + +/** + * Call the lower part of a netconn_* function + * This function is then running in the thread context + * of tcpip_thread and has exclusive access to lwIP core code. + * + * @param fn function to call + * @param apimsg a struct containing the function to call and its parameters + * @return ERR_OK if the function was called, another err_t if not + */ +static err_t netconn_apimsg(tcpip_callback_fn fn, struct api_msg *apimsg) +{ + err_t err; + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + /* catch functions that don't set err */ + apimsg->err = ERR_VAL; +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + apimsg->op_completed_sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + + err = tcpip_send_msg_wait_sem(fn, apimsg, LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(apimsg)); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + return apimsg->err; + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * Create a new netconn (of a specific type) that has a callback function. + * The corresponding pcb is also created. + * + * @param t the type of 'connection' to create (@see enum netconn_type) + * @param proto the IP protocol for RAW IP pcbs + * @param callback a function to call on status changes (RX available, TX'ed) + * @return a newly allocated struct netconn or + * NULL on memory error + */ +struct netconn * +netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(enum netconn_type t, u8_t proto, netconn_callback callback) +{ + struct netconn *conn; + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(msg); + + conn = netconn_alloc(t, callback); + + if (conn != NULL) { + err_t err; + + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.n.proto = proto; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_newconn, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_ASSERT("freeing conn without freeing pcb", conn->pcb.tcp == NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn has no recvmbox", sys_mbox_valid(&conn->recvmbox)); +#if LWIP_TCP + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->acceptmbox shouldn't exist", !sys_mbox_valid(&conn->acceptmbox)); +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + LWIP_ASSERT("conn has no op_completed", sys_sem_valid(&conn->op_completed)); + sys_sem_free(&conn->op_completed); +#endif /* !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + sys_mbox_free(&conn->recvmbox); + memp_free(MEMP_NETCONN, conn); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + return NULL; + } + } + + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + return conn; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_common + * Close a netconn 'connection' and free all its resources but not the netconn itself. + * UDP and RAW connection are completely closed, TCP pcbs might still be in a waitstate + * after this returns. + * + * @param conn the netconn to delete + * @return ERR_OK if the connection was deleted + */ +err_t netconn_prepare_delete(struct netconn *conn) +{ + err_t err; + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + + /* No ASSERT here because possible to get a (conn == NULL) if we got an accept error */ + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER + /* get the time we started, which is later compared to + sys_now() + conn->send_timeout */ + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.time_started = sys_now(); +#else /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ +#if LWIP_TCP + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.polls_left = + ((LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT + TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL - 1) / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) + 1; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_delconn, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_common + * Close a netconn 'connection' and free its resources. + * UDP and RAW connection are completely closed, TCP pcbs might still be in a waitstate + * after this returns. + * + * @param conn the netconn to delete + * @return ERR_OK if the connection was deleted + */ +err_t netconn_delete(struct netconn *conn) +{ + err_t err; + + /* No ASSERT here because possible to get a (conn == NULL) if we got an accept error */ + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_OK; + } + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + + if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) { + /* Already called netconn_prepare_delete() before */ + err = ERR_OK; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + { + err = netconn_prepare_delete(conn); + } + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + netconn_free(conn); + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * Get the local or remote IP address and port of a netconn. + * For RAW netconns, this returns the protocol instead of a port! + * + * @param conn the netconn to query + * @param addr a pointer to which to save the IP address + * @param port a pointer to which to save the port (or protocol for RAW) + * @param local 1 to get the local IP address, 0 to get the remote one + * @return ERR_CONN for invalid connections + * ERR_OK if the information was retrieved + */ +err_t netconn_getaddr(struct netconn *conn, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port, u8_t local) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_getaddr: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_getaddr: invalid addr", (addr != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_getaddr: invalid port", (port != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ad.local = local; +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_getaddr, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + *addr = msg->msg.ad.ipaddr; + *port = msg->msg.ad.port; +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + msg.msg.ad.ipaddr = addr; + msg.msg.ad.port = port; + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_getaddr, &msg); +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_common + * Bind a netconn to a specific local IP address and port. + * Binding one netconn twice might not always be checked correctly! + * + * @param conn the netconn to bind + * @param addr the local IP address to bind the netconn to + * (use IP4_ADDR_ANY/IP6_ADDR_ANY to bind to all addresses) + * @param port the local port to bind the netconn to (not used for RAW) + * @return ERR_OK if bound, any other err_t on failure + */ +err_t netconn_bind(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_bind: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IP_ADDR_ANY alias) to subsequent functions */ + if (addr == NULL) { + addr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + /* "Socket API like" dual-stack support: If IP to bind to is IP6_ADDR_ANY, + * and NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY is 0, use IP_ANY_TYPE to bind + */ + if ((netconn_get_ipv6only(conn) == 0) && + ip_addr_cmp(addr, IP6_ADDR_ANY)) { + addr = IP_ANY_TYPE; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.ipaddr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(addr); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.port = port; + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_bind, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_common + * Bind a netconn to a specific interface and port. + * Binding one netconn twice might not always be checked correctly! + * + * @param conn the netconn to bind + * @param if_idx the local interface index to bind the netconn to + * @return ERR_OK if bound, any other err_t on failure + */ +err_t netconn_bind_if(struct netconn *conn, u8_t if_idx) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_bind_if: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.if_idx = if_idx; + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_bind_if, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_common + * Connect a netconn to a specific remote IP address and port. + * + * @param conn the netconn to connect + * @param addr the remote IP address to connect to + * @param port the remote port to connect to (no used for RAW) + * @return ERR_OK if connected, return value of tcp_/udp_/raw_connect otherwise + */ +err_t netconn_connect(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_connect: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IP_ADDR_ANY alias) to subsequent functions */ + if (addr == NULL) { + addr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.ipaddr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(addr); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.bc.port = port; + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_connect, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_udp + * Disconnect a netconn from its current peer (only valid for UDP netconns). + * + * @param conn the netconn to disconnect + * @return See @ref err_t + */ +err_t netconn_disconnect(struct netconn *conn) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_disconnect: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_disconnect, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_tcp + * Set a TCP netconn into listen mode + * + * @param conn the tcp netconn to set to listen mode + * @param backlog the listen backlog, only used if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG==1 + * @return ERR_OK if the netconn was set to listen (UDP and RAW netconns + * don't return any error (yet?)) + */ +err_t netconn_listen_with_backlog(struct netconn *conn, u8_t backlog) +{ +#if LWIP_TCP + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + + /* This does no harm. If TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG is off, backlog is unused. */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(backlog); + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_listen: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.lb.backlog = backlog; +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_listen, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +#else /* LWIP_TCP */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(backlog); + return ERR_ARG; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_tcp + * Accept a new connection on a TCP listening netconn. + * + * @param conn the TCP listen netconn + * @param new_conn pointer where the new connection is stored + * @return ERR_OK if a new connection has been received or an error + * code otherwise + */ +err_t netconn_accept(struct netconn *conn, struct netconn **new_conn) +{ +#if LWIP_TCP + err_t err; + void *accept_ptr; + struct netconn *newconn; +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_accept: invalid pointer", (new_conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + *new_conn = NULL; + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_accept: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + /* NOTE: Although the opengroup spec says a pending error shall be returned to + send/recv/getsockopt(SO_ERROR) only, we return it for listening + connections also, to handle embedded-system errors */ + err = netconn_err(conn); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* return pending error */ + return err; + } + + if (!NETCONN_ACCEPTMBOX_WAITABLE(conn)) { + /* don't accept if closed: this might block the application task + waiting on acceptmbox forever! */ + return ERR_CLSD; + } + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC_ACCEPT(msg); + + NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_INC(conn); + + if (netconn_is_nonblocking(conn)) { + if (sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &accept_ptr) == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); + NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); + return ERR_WOULDBLOCK; + } + } else { +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO + + if (sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &accept_ptr, conn->recv_timeout) == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); + NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); + return ERR_TIMEOUT; + } + +#else + sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &accept_ptr, 0); +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO*/ + } + + NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + + if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) { + if (lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(accept_ptr)) { + /* the netconn has been closed from another thread */ + API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); + return ERR_CONN; + } + } + +#endif + + /* Register event with callback */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS, 0); + + if (lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(accept_ptr, &err)) { + /* a connection has been aborted: e.g. out of pcbs or out of netconns during accept */ + API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); + return err; + } + + if (accept_ptr == NULL) { + /* connection has been aborted */ + API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); + return ERR_CLSD; + } + + newconn = (struct netconn *)accept_ptr; +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + /* Let the stack know that we have accepted the connection. */ + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = newconn; + /* don't care for the return value of lwip_netconn_do_recv */ + netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_accepted, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + + *new_conn = newconn; + /* don't set conn->last_err: it's only ERR_OK, anyway */ + return ERR_OK; +#else /* LWIP_TCP */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(new_conn); + return ERR_ARG; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_common + * Receive data: actual implementation that doesn't care whether pbuf or netbuf + * is received (this is internal, it's just here for describing common errors) + * + * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data + * @param new_buf pointer where a new pbuf/netbuf is stored when received data + * @param apiflags flags that control function behaviour. For now only: + * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only read data that is available now, don't wait for more data + * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, + * memory error or another error) + * ERR_CONN if not connected + * ERR_CLSD if TCP connection has been closed + * ERR_WOULDBLOCK if the netconn is nonblocking but would block to wait for data + * ERR_TIMEOUT if the netconn has a receive timeout and no data was received + */ +static err_t netconn_recv_data(struct netconn *conn, void **new_buf, u8_t apiflags) +{ + void *buf = NULL; + u16_t len; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv: invalid pointer", (new_buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + *new_buf = NULL; + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + if (!NETCONN_RECVMBOX_WAITABLE(conn)) { + err_t err = netconn_err(conn); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* return pending error */ + return err; + } + + return ERR_CONN; + } + + NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_INC(conn); + + if (netconn_is_nonblocking(conn) || (apiflags & NETCONN_DONTBLOCK) || + (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED) || (conn->pending_err != ERR_OK)) { + if (sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(&conn->recvmbox, &buf) == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + err_t err; + NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); + err = netconn_err(conn); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* return pending error */ + return err; + } + + if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED) { + return ERR_CONN; + } + + return ERR_WOULDBLOCK; + } + } else { +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO + + if (sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->recvmbox, &buf, conn->recv_timeout) == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); + return ERR_TIMEOUT; + } + +#else + sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->recvmbox, &buf, 0); +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO*/ + } + + NETCONN_MBOX_WAITING_DEC(conn); +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + + if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) { + if (lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(buf)) { + /* the netconn has been closed from another thread */ + API_MSG_VAR_FREE_ACCEPT(msg); + return ERR_CONN; + } + } + +#endif + +#if LWIP_TCP +#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) +#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ + { + err_t err; + + /* Check if this is an error message or a pbuf */ + if (lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(buf, &err)) { + /* new_buf has been zeroed above already */ + if (err == ERR_CLSD) { + /* connection closed translates to ERR_OK with *new_buf == NULL */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + return err; + } + + len = ((struct pbuf *)buf)->tot_len; + } +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_TCP && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) + else +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ +#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) + { + LWIP_ASSERT("buf != NULL", buf != NULL); + len = netbuf_len((struct netbuf *)buf); + } + +#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ + +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + SYS_ARCH_DEC(conn->recv_avail, len); +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + /* Register event with callback */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS, len); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(API_LIB_DEBUG, ("netconn_recv_data: received %p, len=%" U16_F "\n", buf, len)); + + *new_buf = buf; + /* don't set conn->last_err: it's only ERR_OK, anyway */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if LWIP_TCP +static err_t netconn_tcp_recvd_msg(struct netconn *conn, size_t len, struct api_msg *msg) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) == NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); + + msg->conn = conn; + msg->msg.r.len = len; + + return netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_recv, msg); +} + +err_t netconn_tcp_recvd(struct netconn *conn, size_t len) +{ + err_t err; + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) == NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + err = netconn_tcp_recvd_msg(conn, len, &API_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +static err_t netconn_recv_data_tcp(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags) +{ + err_t err; + struct pbuf *buf; + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + msg = NULL; +#endif + + if (!NETCONN_RECVMBOX_WAITABLE(conn)) { + /* This only happens when calling this function more than once *after* receiving FIN */ + return ERR_CONN; + } + + if (netconn_is_flag_set(conn, NETCONN_FIN_RX_PENDING)) { + netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FIN_RX_PENDING); + goto handle_fin; + } + + if (!(apiflags & NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD)) { + /* need to allocate API message here so empty message pool does not result in event loss + * see bug #47512: MPU_COMPATIBLE may fail on empty pool */ + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + } + + err = netconn_recv_data(conn, (void **)new_buf, apiflags); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + if (!(apiflags & NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD)) { + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + } + + return err; + } + + buf = *new_buf; + + if (!(apiflags & NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD)) { + /* Let the stack know that we have taken the data. */ + u16_t len = buf ? buf->tot_len : 1; + /* don't care for the return value of lwip_netconn_do_recv */ + /* @todo: this should really be fixed, e.g. by retrying in poll on error */ + netconn_tcp_recvd_msg(conn, len, &API_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + } + + /* If we are closed, we indicate that we no longer wish to use the socket */ + if (buf == NULL) { + if (apiflags & NETCONN_NOFIN) { + /* received a FIN but the caller cannot handle it right now: + re-enqueue it and return "no data" */ + netconn_set_flags(conn, NETCONN_FIN_RX_PENDING); + return ERR_WOULDBLOCK; + } else { + handle_fin: + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS, 0); + + if (conn->pcb.ip == NULL) { + /* race condition: RST during recv */ + err = netconn_err(conn); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + return ERR_RST; + } + + /* RX side is closed, so deallocate the recvmbox */ + netconn_close_shutdown(conn, NETCONN_SHUT_RD); + /* Don' store ERR_CLSD as conn->err since we are only half-closed */ + return ERR_CLSD; + } + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_tcp + * Receive data (in form of a pbuf) from a TCP netconn + * + * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data + * @param new_buf pointer where a new pbuf is stored when received data + * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, + * memory error or another error, @see netconn_recv_data) + * ERR_ARG if conn is not a TCP netconn + */ +err_t netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) == NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); + + return netconn_recv_data_tcp(conn, new_buf, 0); +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_tcp + * Receive data (in form of a pbuf) from a TCP netconn + * + * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data + * @param new_buf pointer where a new pbuf is stored when received data + * @param apiflags flags that control function behaviour. For now only: + * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only read data that is available now, don't wait for more data + * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, + * memory error or another error, @see netconn_recv_data) + * ERR_ARG if conn is not a TCP netconn + */ +err_t netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf_flags(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) == NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); + + return netconn_recv_data_tcp(conn, new_buf, apiflags); +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +/** + * Receive data (in form of a netbuf) from a UDP or RAW netconn + * + * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data + * @param new_buf pointer where a new netbuf is stored when received data + * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, + * memory error or another error) + * ERR_ARG if conn is not a UDP/RAW netconn + */ +err_t netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) != NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); + + return netconn_recv_data(conn, (void **)new_buf, 0); +} + +/** + * Receive data (in form of a netbuf) from a UDP or RAW netconn + * + * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data + * @param new_buf pointer where a new netbuf is stored when received data + * @param apiflags flags that control function behaviour. For now only: + * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only read data that is available now, don't wait for more data + * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, + * memory error or another error) + * ERR_ARG if conn is not a UDP/RAW netconn + */ +err_t netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf_flags(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf: invalid conn", (conn != NULL) && NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(conn)) != NETCONN_TCP, return ERR_ARG;); + + return netconn_recv_data(conn, (void **)new_buf, apiflags); +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_common + * Receive data (in form of a netbuf containing a packet buffer) from a netconn + * + * @param conn the netconn from which to receive data + * @param new_buf pointer where a new netbuf is stored when received data + * @return ERR_OK if data has been received, an error code otherwise (timeout, + * memory error or another error) + */ +err_t netconn_recv(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf) +{ +#if LWIP_TCP + struct netbuf *buf = NULL; + err_t err; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv: invalid pointer", (new_buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + *new_buf = NULL; + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_recv: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + +#if LWIP_TCP +#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) +#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ + { + struct pbuf *p = NULL; + /* This is not a listening netconn, since recvmbox is set */ + + buf = (struct netbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETBUF); + + if (buf == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + err = netconn_recv_data_tcp(conn, &p, 0); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + memp_free(MEMP_NETBUF, buf); + return err; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + + buf->p = p; + buf->ptr = p; + buf->port = 0; + ip_addr_set_zero(&buf->addr); + *new_buf = buf; + /* don't set conn->last_err: it's only ERR_OK, anyway */ + return ERR_OK; + } +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_TCP && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) + else +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ + { +#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) + return netconn_recv_data(conn, (void **)new_buf, 0); +#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_udp + * Send data (in form of a netbuf) to a specific remote IP address and port. + * Only to be used for UDP and RAW netconns (not TCP). + * + * @param conn the netconn over which to send data + * @param buf a netbuf containing the data to send + * @param addr the remote IP address to which to send the data + * @param port the remote port to which to send the data + * @return ERR_OK if data was sent, any other err_t on error + */ +err_t netconn_sendto(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf *buf, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + if (buf != NULL) { + ip_addr_set(&buf->addr, addr); + buf->port = port; + return netconn_send(conn, buf); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_udp + * Send data over a UDP or RAW netconn (that is already connected). + * + * @param conn the UDP or RAW netconn over which to send data + * @param buf a netbuf containing the data to send + * @return ERR_OK if data was sent, any other err_t on error + */ +err_t netconn_send(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf *buf) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_send: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(API_LIB_DEBUG, ("netconn_send: sending %" U16_F " bytes\n", buf->p->tot_len)); + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.b = buf; + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_send, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_tcp + * Send data over a TCP netconn. + * + * @param conn the TCP netconn over which to send data + * @param dataptr pointer to the application buffer that contains the data to send + * @param size size of the application data to send + * @param apiflags combination of following flags : + * - NETCONN_COPY: data will be copied into memory belonging to the stack + * - NETCONN_MORE: for TCP connection, PSH flag will be set on last segment sent + * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only write the data if all data can be written at once + * @param bytes_written pointer to a location that receives the number of written bytes + * @return ERR_OK if data was sent, any other err_t on error + */ +err_t netconn_write_partly(struct netconn *conn, const void *dataptr, size_t size, + u8_t apiflags, size_t *bytes_written) +{ + struct netvector vector; + vector.ptr = dataptr; + vector.len = size; + return netconn_write_vectors_partly(conn, &vector, 1, apiflags, bytes_written); +} + +/** + * Send vectorized data atomically over a TCP netconn. + * + * @param conn the TCP netconn over which to send data + * @param vectors array of vectors containing data to send + * @param vectorcnt number of vectors in the array + * @param apiflags combination of following flags : + * - NETCONN_COPY: data will be copied into memory belonging to the stack + * - NETCONN_MORE: for TCP connection, PSH flag will be set on last segment sent + * - NETCONN_DONTBLOCK: only write the data if all data can be written at once + * @param bytes_written pointer to a location that receives the number of written bytes + * @return ERR_OK if data was sent, any other err_t on error + */ +err_t netconn_write_vectors_partly(struct netconn *conn, struct netvector *vectors, u16_t vectorcnt, + u8_t apiflags, size_t *bytes_written) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + u8_t dontblock; + size_t size; + int i; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_write: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_write: invalid conn->type", (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP), return ERR_VAL;); + dontblock = netconn_is_nonblocking(conn) || (apiflags & NETCONN_DONTBLOCK); +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO + + if (conn->send_timeout != 0) { + dontblock = 1; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ + + if (dontblock && !bytes_written) { + /* This implies netconn_write() cannot be used for non-blocking send, since + it has no way to return the number of bytes written. */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* sum up the total size */ + size = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < vectorcnt; i++) { + size += vectors[i].len; + + if (size < vectors[i].len) { + /* overflow */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + + if (size == 0) { + return ERR_OK; + } else if (size > SSIZE_MAX) { + ssize_t limited; + + /* this is required by the socket layer (cannot send full size_t range) */ + if (!bytes_written) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* limit the amount of data to send */ + limited = SSIZE_MAX; + size = (size_t)limited; + } + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + /* non-blocking write sends as much */ + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.vector = vectors; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.vector_cnt = vectorcnt; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.vector_off = 0; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.apiflags = apiflags; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.len = size; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.offset = 0; +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO + + if (conn->send_timeout != 0) { + /* get the time we started, which is later compared to + sys_now() + conn->send_timeout */ + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.time_started = sys_now(); + } else { + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.time_started = 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ + + /* For locking the core: this _can_ be delayed on low memory/low send buffer, + but if it is, this is done inside api_msg.c:do_write(), so we can use the + non-blocking version here. */ + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_write, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + if (bytes_written != NULL) { + *bytes_written = API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.offset; + } + + /* for blocking, check all requested bytes were written, NOTE: send_timeout is + treated as dontblock (see dontblock assignment above) */ + if (!dontblock) { + LWIP_ASSERT("do_write failed to write all bytes", API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.w.offset == size); + } + } + + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_tcp + * Close or shutdown a TCP netconn (doesn't delete it). + * + * @param conn the TCP netconn to close or shutdown + * @param how fully close or only shutdown one side? + * @return ERR_OK if the netconn was closed, any other err_t on error + */ +static err_t netconn_close_shutdown(struct netconn *conn, u8_t how) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(how); + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_close: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; +#if LWIP_TCP + /* shutting down both ends is the same as closing */ + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.shut = how; +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER + /* get the time we started, which is later compared to + sys_now() + conn->send_timeout */ + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.time_started = sys_now(); +#else /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.sd.polls_left = + ((LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT + TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL - 1) / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) + 1; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_close, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_tcp + * Close a TCP netconn (doesn't delete it). + * + * @param conn the TCP netconn to close + * @return ERR_OK if the netconn was closed, any other err_t on error + */ +err_t netconn_close(struct netconn *conn) +{ + /* shutting down both ends is the same as closing */ + return netconn_close_shutdown(conn, NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR); +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_common + * Get and reset pending error on a netconn + * + * @param conn the netconn to get the error from + * @return and pending error or ERR_OK if no error was pending + */ +err_t netconn_err(struct netconn *conn) +{ + err_t err; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + err = conn->pending_err; + conn->pending_err = ERR_OK; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netconn_tcp + * Shut down one or both sides of a TCP netconn (doesn't delete it). + * + * @param conn the TCP netconn to shut down + * @param shut_rx shut down the RX side (no more read possible after this) + * @param shut_tx shut down the TX side (no more write possible after this) + * @return ERR_OK if the netconn was closed, any other err_t on error + */ +err_t netconn_shutdown(struct netconn *conn, u8_t shut_rx, u8_t shut_tx) +{ + return netconn_close_shutdown(conn, (u8_t)((shut_rx ? NETCONN_SHUT_RD : 0) | (shut_tx ? NETCONN_SHUT_WR : 0))); +} + +#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) +/** + * @ingroup netconn_udp + * Join multicast groups for UDP netconns. + * + * @param conn the UDP netconn for which to change multicast addresses + * @param multiaddr IP address of the multicast group to join or leave + * @param netif_addr the IP address of the network interface on which to send + * the igmp message + * @param join_or_leave flag whether to send a join- or leave-message + * @return ERR_OK if the action was taken, any err_t on error + */ +err_t netconn_join_leave_group(struct netconn *conn, + const ip_addr_t *multiaddr, + const ip_addr_t *netif_addr, + enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_join_leave_group: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IP_ADDR_ANY alias) to subsequent functions */ + if (multiaddr == NULL) { + multiaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; + } + + if (netif_addr == NULL) { + netif_addr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.multiaddr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(multiaddr); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.netif_addr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(netif_addr); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.join_or_leave = join_or_leave; + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} +/** + * @ingroup netconn_udp + * Join multicast groups for UDP netconns. + * + * @param conn the UDP netconn for which to change multicast addresses + * @param multiaddr IP address of the multicast group to join or leave + * @param if_idx the index of the netif + * @param join_or_leave flag whether to send a join- or leave-message + * @return ERR_OK if the action was taken, any err_t on error + */ +err_t netconn_join_leave_group_netif(struct netconn *conn, + const ip_addr_t *multiaddr, + u8_t if_idx, + enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave) +{ + API_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + err_t err; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_join_leave_group: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + API_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IP_ADDR_ANY alias) to subsequent functions */ + if (multiaddr == NULL) { + multiaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; + } + + if (if_idx == NETIF_NO_INDEX) { + return ERR_IF; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).conn = conn; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.multiaddr = API_MSG_VAR_REF(multiaddr); + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.if_idx = if_idx; + API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.jl.join_or_leave = join_or_leave; + err = netconn_apimsg(lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group_netif, &API_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + API_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + + return err; +} +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ + +#if LWIP_DNS +/** + * @ingroup netconn_common + * Execute a DNS query, only one IP address is returned + * + * @param name a string representation of the DNS host name to query + * @param addr a preallocated ip_addr_t where to store the resolved IP address + * @param dns_addrtype IP address type (IPv4 / IPv6) + * @return ERR_OK: resolving succeeded + * ERR_MEM: memory error, try again later + * ERR_ARG: dns client not initialized or invalid hostname + * ERR_VAL: dns server response was invalid + */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +err_t netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype) +#else +err_t netconn_gethostbyname(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr) +#endif +{ + API_VAR_DECLARE(struct dns_api_msg, msg); +#if !LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + sys_sem_t sem; +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + err_t err; + err_t cberr; + + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_gethostbyname: invalid name", (name != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("netconn_gethostbyname: invalid addr", (addr != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + + if (strlen(name) >= DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + +#endif + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE(name, addr, dns_addrtype, &err)) { +#else + + if (LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE(name, addr, NETCONN_DNS_DEFAULT, &err)) { +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + return err; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE */ + + API_VAR_ALLOC(struct dns_api_msg, MEMP_DNS_API_MSG, msg, ERR_MEM); +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + strncpy(API_VAR_REF(msg).name, name, DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH - 1); + API_VAR_REF(msg).name[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH - 1] = 0; +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + msg.err = &err; + msg.sem = &sem; + API_VAR_REF(msg).addr = API_VAR_REF(addr); + API_VAR_REF(msg).name = name; +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + API_VAR_REF(msg).dns_addrtype = dns_addrtype; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + API_VAR_REF(msg).sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD*/ + err = sys_sem_new(API_EXPR_REF(API_VAR_REF(msg).sem), 0); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_DNS_API_MSG, msg); + return err; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + + cberr = tcpip_send_msg_wait_sem(lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname, &API_VAR_REF(msg), API_EXPR_REF(API_VAR_REF(msg).sem)); +#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + sys_sem_free(API_EXPR_REF(API_VAR_REF(msg).sem)); +#endif /* !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + + if (cberr != ERR_OK) { + API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_DNS_API_MSG, msg); + return cberr; + } + +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + *addr = msg->addr; + err = msg->err; +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + + API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_DNS_API_MSG, msg); + return err; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_DNS*/ + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD +void netconn_thread_init(void) +{ + sys_sem_t *sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); + + if ((sem == NULL) || !sys_sem_valid(sem)) { + /* call alloc only once */ + LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_ALLOC(); + LWIP_ASSERT("LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_ALLOC() failed", sys_sem_valid(LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET())); + } +} + +void netconn_thread_cleanup(void) +{ + sys_sem_t *sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); + + if ((sem != NULL) && sys_sem_valid(sem)) { + /* call free only once */ + LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_FREE(); + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/api/api_msg.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/api_msg.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/api/api_msg.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/api_msg.c index 2e62caa9..747b0ed1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/api/api_msg.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/api_msg.c @@ -1,2368 +1,2368 @@ -/** - * @file - * Sequential API Internal module - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_NETCONN /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/priv/api_msg.h" - -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/raw.h" - -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" - -#include - -/* netconns are polled once per second (e.g. continue write on memory error) */ -#define NETCONN_TCP_POLL_INTERVAL 2 - -#define SET_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn, val) \ - do { \ - if (val) { \ - netconn_set_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT); \ - } else { \ - netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn) netconn_is_flag_set(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT) - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -#define NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, mbox) (sys_mbox_valid(mbox) && ((conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) == 0)) -#else -#define NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, mbox) sys_mbox_valid(mbox) -#endif - -/* forward declarations */ -#if LWIP_TCP -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -#define WRITE_DELAYED , 1 -#define WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM , u8_t delayed -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -#define WRITE_DELAYED -#define WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -static err_t lwip_netconn_do_writemore(struct netconn *conn WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM); -static err_t lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(struct netconn *conn WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM); -#endif - -static void netconn_drain(struct netconn *conn); - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -#define TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(m) -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -#define TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(m) \ - do { \ - sys_sem_signal(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(m)); \ - } while (0) -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -const u8_t netconn_deleted = 0; - -int lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(void *msg) -{ - if (msg == &netconn_deleted) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - -#if LWIP_TCP -const u8_t netconn_aborted = 0; -const u8_t netconn_reset = 0; -const u8_t netconn_closed = 0; - -/** Translate an error to a unique void* passed via an mbox */ -static void *lwip_netconn_err_to_msg(err_t err) -{ - switch (err) { - case ERR_ABRT: - return LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_aborted); - - case ERR_RST: - return LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_reset); - - case ERR_CLSD: - return LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_closed); - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("unhandled error", err == ERR_OK); - return NULL; - } -} - -int lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(void *msg, err_t *err) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("err != NULL", err != NULL); - - if (msg == &netconn_aborted) { - *err = ERR_ABRT; - return 1; - } else if (msg == &netconn_reset) { - *err = ERR_RST; - return 1; - } else if (msg == &netconn_closed) { - *err = ERR_CLSD; - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -#if LWIP_RAW -/** - * Receive callback function for RAW netconns. - * Doesn't 'eat' the packet, only copies it and sends it to - * conn->recvmbox - * - * @see raw.h (struct raw_pcb.recv) for parameters and return value - */ -static u8_t recv_raw(void *arg, struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *addr) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - struct netbuf *buf; - struct netconn *conn; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); - conn = (struct netconn *)arg; - - if ((conn != NULL) && NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox)) { -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - int recv_avail; - SYS_ARCH_GET(conn->recv_avail, recv_avail); - - if ((recv_avail + (int)(p->tot_len)) > conn->recv_bufsize) { - return 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - /* copy the whole packet into new pbufs */ - q = pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_RAM, p); - - if (q != NULL) { - u16_t len; - buf = (struct netbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETBUF); - - if (buf == NULL) { - pbuf_free(q); - return 0; - } - - buf->p = q; - buf->ptr = q; - ip_addr_copy(buf->addr, *ip_current_src_addr()); - buf->port = pcb->protocol; - - len = q->tot_len; - - if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, buf) != ERR_OK) { - netbuf_delete(buf); - return 0; - } else { -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - SYS_ARCH_INC(conn->recv_avail, len); -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - /* Register event with callback */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, len); - } - } - } - - return 0; /* do not eat the packet */ -} -#endif /* LWIP_RAW*/ - -#if LWIP_UDP -/** - * Receive callback function for UDP netconns. - * Posts the packet to conn->recvmbox or deletes it on memory error. - * - * @see udp.h (struct udp_pcb.recv) for parameters - */ -static void recv_udp(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - struct netbuf *buf; - struct netconn *conn; - u16_t len; -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - int recv_avail; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); /* only used for asserts... */ - LWIP_ASSERT("recv_udp must have a pcb argument", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("recv_udp must have an argument", arg != NULL); - conn = (struct netconn *)arg; - - if (conn == NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("recv_udp: recv for wrong pcb!", conn->pcb.udp == pcb); - -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - SYS_ARCH_GET(conn->recv_avail, recv_avail); - - if (!NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox) || - ((recv_avail + (int)(p->tot_len)) > conn->recv_bufsize)) { -#else /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - - if (!NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox)) { -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - buf = (struct netbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETBUF); - - if (buf == NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } else { - buf->p = p; - buf->ptr = p; - ip_addr_set(&buf->addr, addr); - buf->port = port; -#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO - - if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO) { - /* get the UDP header - always in the first pbuf, ensured by udp_input */ - const struct udp_hdr *udphdr = (const struct udp_hdr *)ip_next_header_ptr(); - buf->flags = NETBUF_FLAG_DESTADDR; - ip_addr_set(&buf->toaddr, ip_current_dest_addr()); - buf->toport_chksum = udphdr->dest; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ - } - - len = p->tot_len; - - if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, buf) != ERR_OK) { - netbuf_delete(buf); - return; - } else { -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - SYS_ARCH_INC(conn->recv_avail, len); -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - /* Register event with callback */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, len); - } -} - -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - -#if LWIP_TCP -/** - * Receive callback function for TCP netconns. - * Posts the packet to conn->recvmbox, but doesn't delete it on errors. - * - * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.recv) for parameters and return value - */ -static err_t recv_tcp(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - struct netconn *conn; - u16_t len; - void *msg; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_ASSERT("recv_tcp must have a pcb argument", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("recv_tcp must have an argument", arg != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("err != ERR_OK unhandled", err == ERR_OK); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - conn = (struct netconn *)arg; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("recv_tcp: recv for wrong pcb!", conn->pcb.tcp == pcb); - - if (!NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox)) { - /* recvmbox already deleted */ - if (p != NULL) { - tcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); - pbuf_free(p); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Unlike for UDP or RAW pcbs, don't check for available space - using recv_avail since that could break the connection - (data is already ACKed) */ - - if (p != NULL) { - msg = p; - len = p->tot_len; - } else { - msg = LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_closed); - len = 0; - } - - if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, msg) != ERR_OK) { - /* don't deallocate p: it is presented to us later again from tcp_fasttmr! */ - return ERR_MEM; - } else { -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - SYS_ARCH_INC(conn->recv_avail, len); -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - /* Register event with callback */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, len); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Poll callback function for TCP netconns. - * Wakes up an application thread that waits for a connection to close - * or data to be sent. The application thread then takes the - * appropriate action to go on. - * - * Signals the conn->sem. - * netconn_close waits for conn->sem if closing failed. - * - * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.poll) for parameters and return value - */ -static err_t poll_tcp(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct netconn *conn = (struct netconn *)arg; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", (conn != NULL)); - - if (conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE) { - lwip_netconn_do_writemore(conn WRITE_DELAYED); - } else if (conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE) { -#if !LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO && !LWIP_SO_LINGER - - if (conn->current_msg && conn->current_msg->msg.sd.polls_left) { - conn->current_msg->msg.sd.polls_left--; - } - -#endif /* !LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO && !LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(conn WRITE_DELAYED); - } - - /* @todo: implement connect timeout here? */ - - /* Did a nonblocking write fail before? Then check available write-space. */ - if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE) { - /* If the queued byte- or pbuf-count drops below the configured low-water limit, - let select mark this pcb as writable again. */ - if ((conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) && (tcp_sndbuf(conn->pcb.tcp) > TCP_SNDLOWAT) && - (tcp_sndqueuelen(conn->pcb.tcp) < TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT)) { - netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE); - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Sent callback function for TCP netconns. - * Signals the conn->sem and calls API_EVENT. - * netconn_write waits for conn->sem if send buffer is low. - * - * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.sent) for parameters and return value - */ -static err_t sent_tcp(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) -{ - struct netconn *conn = (struct netconn *)arg; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", (conn != NULL)); - - if (conn) { - if (conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE) { - lwip_netconn_do_writemore(conn WRITE_DELAYED); - } else if (conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE) { - lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(conn WRITE_DELAYED); - } - - /* If the queued byte- or pbuf-count drops below the configured low-water limit, - let select mark this pcb as writable again. */ - if ((conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) && (tcp_sndbuf(conn->pcb.tcp) > TCP_SNDLOWAT) && - (tcp_sndqueuelen(conn->pcb.tcp) < TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT)) { - netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE); - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, len); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Error callback function for TCP netconns. - * Signals conn->sem, posts to all conn mboxes and calls API_EVENT. - * The application thread has then to decide what to do. - * - * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.err) for parameters - */ -static void err_tcp(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - struct netconn *conn; - enum netconn_state old_state; - void *mbox_msg; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - conn = (struct netconn *)arg; - LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", (conn != NULL)); - - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - - /* when err is called, the pcb is deallocated, so delete the reference */ - conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; - /* store pending error */ - conn->pending_err = err; - /* prevent application threads from blocking on 'recvmbox'/'acceptmbox' */ - conn->flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED; - - /* reset conn->state now before waking up other threads */ - old_state = conn->state; - conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - - /* Notify the user layer about a connection error. Used to signal select. */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_ERROR, 0); - /* Try to release selects pending on 'read' or 'write', too. - They will get an error if they actually try to read or write. */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); - - mbox_msg = lwip_netconn_err_to_msg(err); - - /* pass error message to recvmbox to wake up pending recv */ - if (NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox)) { - /* use trypost to prevent deadlock */ - sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, mbox_msg); - } - - /* pass error message to acceptmbox to wake up pending accept */ - if (NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->acceptmbox)) { - /* use trypost to preven deadlock */ - sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, mbox_msg); - } - - if ((old_state == NETCONN_WRITE) || (old_state == NETCONN_CLOSE) || - (old_state == NETCONN_CONNECT)) { - /* calling lwip_netconn_do_writemore/lwip_netconn_do_close_internal is not necessary - since the pcb has already been deleted! */ - int was_nonblocking_connect = IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn); - SET_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn, 0); - - if (!was_nonblocking_connect) { - sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem; - /* set error return code */ - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg != NULL", conn->current_msg != NULL); - - if (old_state == NETCONN_CLOSE) { - /* let close succeed: the connection is closed after all... */ - conn->current_msg->err = ERR_OK; - } else { - /* Write and connect fail */ - conn->current_msg->err = err; - } - - op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(conn->current_msg); - LWIP_ASSERT("inavlid op_completed_sem", sys_sem_valid(op_completed_sem)); - conn->current_msg = NULL; - /* wake up the waiting task */ - sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); - } else { - /* @todo: test what happens for error on nonblocking connect */ - } - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg == NULL", conn->current_msg == NULL); - } -} - -/** - * Setup a tcp_pcb with the correct callback function pointers - * and their arguments. - * - * @param conn the TCP netconn to setup - */ -static void setup_tcp(struct netconn *conn) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - pcb = conn->pcb.tcp; - tcp_arg(pcb, conn); - tcp_recv(pcb, recv_tcp); - tcp_sent(pcb, sent_tcp); - tcp_poll(pcb, poll_tcp, NETCONN_TCP_POLL_INTERVAL); - tcp_err(pcb, err_tcp); -} - -/** - * Accept callback function for TCP netconns. - * Allocates a new netconn and posts that to conn->acceptmbox. - * - * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb_listen.accept) for parameters and return value - */ -static err_t accept_function(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *newpcb, err_t err) -{ - struct netconn *newconn; - struct netconn *conn = (struct netconn *)arg; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (!NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->acceptmbox)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(API_MSG_DEBUG, ("accept_function: acceptmbox already deleted\n")); - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (newpcb == NULL) { - /* out-of-pcbs during connect: pass on this error to the application */ - if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, lwip_netconn_err_to_msg(ERR_ABRT)) == ERR_OK) { - /* Register event with callback */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); - } - - return ERR_VAL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("expect newpcb == NULL or err == ERR_OK", err == ERR_OK); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(API_MSG_DEBUG, ("accept_function: newpcb->state: %s\n", tcp_debug_state_str(newpcb->state))); - - /* We have to set the callback here even though - * the new socket is unknown. newconn->socket is marked as -1. */ - newconn = netconn_alloc(conn->type, conn->callback); - - if (newconn == NULL) { - /* outof netconns: pass on this error to the application */ - if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, lwip_netconn_err_to_msg(ERR_ABRT)) == ERR_OK) { - /* Register event with callback */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); - } - - return ERR_MEM; - } - - newconn->pcb.tcp = newpcb; - setup_tcp(newconn); - - /* handle backlog counter */ - tcp_backlog_delayed(newpcb); - - if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, newconn) != ERR_OK) { - /* When returning != ERR_OK, the pcb is aborted in tcp_process(), - so do nothing here! */ - /* remove all references to this netconn from the pcb */ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = newconn->pcb.tcp; - tcp_arg(pcb, NULL); - tcp_recv(pcb, NULL); - tcp_sent(pcb, NULL); - tcp_poll(pcb, NULL, 0); - tcp_err(pcb, NULL); - /* remove reference from to the pcb from this netconn */ - newconn->pcb.tcp = NULL; - /* no need to drain since we know the recvmbox is empty. */ - sys_mbox_free(&newconn->recvmbox); - sys_mbox_set_invalid(&newconn->recvmbox); - netconn_free(newconn); - return ERR_MEM; - } else { - /* Register event with callback */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -/** - * Create a new pcb of a specific type. - * Called from lwip_netconn_do_newconn(). - * - * @param msg the api_msg describing the connection type - */ -static void pcb_new(struct api_msg *msg) -{ - enum lwip_ip_addr_type iptype = IPADDR_TYPE_V4; - - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb_new: pcb already allocated", msg->conn->pcb.tcp == NULL); - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV4 - - /* IPv6: Dual-stack by default, unless netconn_set_ipv6only() is called */ - if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(netconn_type(msg->conn))) { - iptype = IPADDR_TYPE_ANY; - } - -#endif - - /* Allocate a PCB for this connection */ - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { -#if LWIP_RAW - - case NETCONN_RAW: - msg->conn->pcb.raw = raw_new_ip_type(iptype, msg->msg.n.proto); - - if (msg->conn->pcb.raw != NULL) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - /* ICMPv6 packets should always have checksum calculated by the stack as per RFC 3542 chapter 3.1 */ - if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(msg->conn->type) && msg->conn->pcb.raw->protocol == IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) { - msg->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd = 1; - msg->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_offset = 2; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - raw_recv(msg->conn->pcb.raw, recv_raw, msg->conn); - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ -#if LWIP_UDP - - case NETCONN_UDP: - msg->conn->pcb.udp = udp_new_ip_type(iptype); - - if (msg->conn->pcb.udp != NULL) { -#if LWIP_UDPLITE - - if (NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(msg->conn->type)) { - udp_setflags(msg->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ - - if (NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPNOCHKSUM(msg->conn->type)) { - udp_setflags(msg->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM); - } - - udp_recv(msg->conn->pcb.udp, recv_udp, msg->conn); - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - case NETCONN_TCP: - msg->conn->pcb.tcp = tcp_new_ip_type(iptype); - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - setup_tcp(msg->conn); - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - - default: - /* Unsupported netconn type, e.g. protocol disabled */ - msg->err = ERR_VAL; - return; - } - - if (msg->conn->pcb.ip == NULL) { - msg->err = ERR_MEM; - } -} - -/** - * Create a new pcb of a specific type inside a netconn. - * Called from netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback. - * - * @param m the api_msg describing the connection type - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_newconn(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - - msg->err = ERR_OK; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp == NULL) { - pcb_new(msg); - } - - /* Else? This "new" connection already has a PCB allocated. */ - /* Is this an error condition? Should it be deleted? */ - /* We currently just are happy and return. */ - - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} - -/** - * Create a new netconn (of a specific type) that has a callback function. - * The corresponding pcb is NOT created! - * - * @param t the type of 'connection' to create (@see enum netconn_type) - * @param callback a function to call on status changes (RX available, TX'ed) - * @return a newly allocated struct netconn or - * NULL on memory error - */ -struct netconn * -netconn_alloc(enum netconn_type t, netconn_callback callback) -{ - struct netconn *conn; - int size; - u8_t init_flags = 0; - - conn = (struct netconn *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETCONN); - - if (conn == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - conn->pending_err = ERR_OK; - conn->type = t; - conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; - - /* If all sizes are the same, every compiler should optimize this switch to nothing */ - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(t)) { -#if LWIP_RAW - - case NETCONN_RAW: - size = DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE; - break; -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ -#if LWIP_UDP - - case NETCONN_UDP: - size = DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE; -#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO - init_flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO; -#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - case NETCONN_TCP: - size = DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE; - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("netconn_alloc: undefined netconn_type", 0); - goto free_and_return; - } - - if (sys_mbox_new(&conn->recvmbox, size) != ERR_OK) { - goto free_and_return; - } - -#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - - if (sys_sem_new(&conn->op_completed, 0) != ERR_OK) { - sys_mbox_free(&conn->recvmbox); - goto free_and_return; - } - -#endif - -#if LWIP_TCP - sys_mbox_set_invalid(&conn->acceptmbox); -#endif - conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; -#if LWIP_SOCKET - /* initialize socket to -1 since 0 is a valid socket */ - conn->socket = -1; -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ - conn->callback = callback; -#if LWIP_TCP - conn->current_msg = NULL; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO - conn->send_timeout = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO - conn->recv_timeout = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - conn->recv_bufsize = RECV_BUFSIZE_DEFAULT; - conn->recv_avail = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ -#if LWIP_SO_LINGER - conn->linger = -1; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - conn->flags = init_flags; - return conn; -free_and_return: - memp_free(MEMP_NETCONN, conn); - return NULL; -} - -/** - * Delete a netconn and all its resources. - * The pcb is NOT freed (since we might not be in the right thread context do this). - * - * @param conn the netconn to free - */ -void netconn_free(struct netconn *conn) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("PCB must be deallocated outside this function", conn->pcb.tcp == NULL); - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - /* in fullduplex, netconn is drained here */ - netconn_drain(conn); -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("recvmbox must be deallocated before calling this function", - !sys_mbox_valid(&conn->recvmbox)); -#if LWIP_TCP - LWIP_ASSERT("acceptmbox must be deallocated before calling this function", - !sys_mbox_valid(&conn->acceptmbox)); -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - sys_sem_free(&conn->op_completed); - sys_sem_set_invalid(&conn->op_completed); -#endif - - memp_free(MEMP_NETCONN, conn); -} - -/** - * Delete rcvmbox and acceptmbox of a netconn and free the left-over data in - * these mboxes - * - * @param conn the netconn to free - * @bytes_drained bytes drained from recvmbox - * @accepts_drained pending connections drained from acceptmbox - */ -static void netconn_drain(struct netconn *conn) -{ - void *mem; - - /* This runs when mbox and netconn are marked as closed, - so we don't need to lock against rx packets */ -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - LWIP_ASSERT("netconn marked closed", conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID); -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - - /* Delete and drain the recvmbox. */ - if (sys_mbox_valid(&conn->recvmbox)) { - while (sys_mbox_tryfetch(&conn->recvmbox, &mem) != SYS_MBOX_EMPTY) { -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - - if (!lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(mem)) -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - { -#if LWIP_TCP - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { - err_t err; - - if (!lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(mem, &err)) { - pbuf_free((struct pbuf *)mem); - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - { - netbuf_delete((struct netbuf *)mem); - } - } - } - - sys_mbox_free(&conn->recvmbox); - sys_mbox_set_invalid(&conn->recvmbox); - } - - /* Delete and drain the acceptmbox. */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - if (sys_mbox_valid(&conn->acceptmbox)) { - while (sys_mbox_tryfetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &mem) != SYS_MBOX_EMPTY) { -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - - if (!lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(mem)) -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - { - err_t err; - - if (!lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(mem, &err)) { - struct netconn *newconn = (struct netconn *)mem; - /* Only tcp pcbs have an acceptmbox, so no need to check conn->type */ - /* pcb might be set to NULL already by err_tcp() */ - /* drain recvmbox */ - netconn_drain(newconn); - - if (newconn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - tcp_abort(newconn->pcb.tcp); - newconn->pcb.tcp = NULL; - } - - netconn_free(newconn); - } - } - } - - sys_mbox_free(&conn->acceptmbox); - sys_mbox_set_invalid(&conn->acceptmbox); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -} - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -static void netconn_mark_mbox_invalid(struct netconn *conn) -{ - int i, num_waiting; - void *msg = LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_deleted); - - /* Prevent new calls/threads from reading from the mbox */ - conn->flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID; - - SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(num_waiting = conn->mbox_threads_waiting); - - for (i = 0; i < num_waiting; i++) { - if (sys_mbox_valid_val(conn->recvmbox)) { - sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, msg); - } else { - sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, msg); - } - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - -#if LWIP_TCP -/** - * Internal helper function to close a TCP netconn: since this sometimes - * doesn't work at the first attempt, this function is called from multiple - * places. - * - * @param conn the TCP netconn to close - */ -static err_t lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(struct netconn *conn WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM) -{ - err_t err; - u8_t shut, shut_rx, shut_tx, shut_close; - u8_t close_finished = 0; - struct tcp_pcb *tpcb; -#if LWIP_SO_LINGER - u8_t linger_wait_required = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid conn", (conn != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("this is for tcp netconns only", (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP)); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn must be in state NETCONN_CLOSE", (conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE)); - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb already closed", (conn->pcb.tcp != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg != NULL", conn->current_msg != NULL); - - tpcb = conn->pcb.tcp; - shut = conn->current_msg->msg.sd.shut; - shut_rx = shut & NETCONN_SHUT_RD; - shut_tx = shut & NETCONN_SHUT_WR; - - /* shutting down both ends is the same as closing - (also if RD or WR side was shut down before already) */ - if (shut == NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR) { - shut_close = 1; - } else if (shut_rx && - ((tpcb->state == FIN_WAIT_1) || - (tpcb->state == FIN_WAIT_2) || - (tpcb->state == CLOSING))) { - shut_close = 1; - } else if (shut_tx && ((tpcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED) != 0)) { - shut_close = 1; - } else { - shut_close = 0; - } - - /* Set back some callback pointers */ - if (shut_close) { - tcp_arg(tpcb, NULL); - } - - if (tpcb->state == LISTEN) { - tcp_accept(tpcb, NULL); - } else { - /* some callbacks have to be reset if tcp_close is not successful */ - if (shut_rx) { - tcp_recv(tpcb, NULL); - tcp_accept(tpcb, NULL); - } - - if (shut_tx) { - tcp_sent(tpcb, NULL); - } - - if (shut_close) { - tcp_poll(tpcb, NULL, 0); - tcp_err(tpcb, NULL); - } - } - - /* Try to close the connection */ - if (shut_close) { -#if LWIP_SO_LINGER - /* check linger possibilites before calling tcp_close */ - err = ERR_OK; - - /* linger enabled/required at all? (i.e. is there untransmitted data left?) */ - if ((conn->linger >= 0) && (conn->pcb.tcp->unsent || conn->pcb.tcp->unacked)) { - if ((conn->linger == 0)) { - /* data left but linger prevents waiting */ - tcp_abort(tpcb); - tpcb = NULL; - } else if (conn->linger > 0) { - /* data left and linger says we should wait */ - if (netconn_is_nonblocking(conn)) { - /* data left on a nonblocking netconn -> cannot linger */ - err = ERR_WOULDBLOCK; - } else if ((s32_t)(sys_now() - conn->current_msg->msg.sd.time_started) >= - (conn->linger * 1000)) { - /* data left but linger timeout has expired (this happens on further - calls to this function through poll_tcp */ - tcp_abort(tpcb); - tpcb = NULL; - } else { - /* data left -> need to wait for ACK after successful close */ - linger_wait_required = 1; - } - } - } - - if ((err == ERR_OK) && (tpcb != NULL)) -#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - { - err = tcp_close(tpcb); - } - } else { - err = tcp_shutdown(tpcb, shut_rx, shut_tx); - } - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - close_finished = 1; -#if LWIP_SO_LINGER - - if (linger_wait_required) { - /* wait for ACK of all unsent/unacked data by just getting called again */ - close_finished = 0; - err = ERR_INPROGRESS; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - } else { - if (err == ERR_MEM) { - /* Closing failed because of memory shortage, try again later. Even for - nonblocking netconns, we have to wait since no standard socket application - is prepared for close failing because of resource shortage. - Check the timeout: this is kind of an lwip addition to the standard sockets: - we wait for some time when failing to allocate a segment for the FIN */ -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER - s32_t close_timeout = LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT; -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO - - if (conn->send_timeout > 0) { - close_timeout = conn->send_timeout; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_LINGER - - if (conn->linger >= 0) { - /* use linger timeout (seconds) */ - close_timeout = conn->linger * 1000U; - } - -#endif - - if ((s32_t)(sys_now() - conn->current_msg->msg.sd.time_started) >= close_timeout) { -#else /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - - if (conn->current_msg->msg.sd.polls_left == 0) { -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - close_finished = 1; - - if (shut_close) { - /* in this case, we want to RST the connection */ - tcp_abort(tpcb); - err = ERR_OK; - } - } - } else { - /* Closing failed for a non-memory error: give up */ - close_finished = 1; - } - } - - if (close_finished) { - /* Closing done (succeeded, non-memory error, nonblocking error or timeout) */ - sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(conn->current_msg); - conn->current_msg->err = err; - conn->current_msg = NULL; - conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - if (shut_close) { - /* Set back some callback pointers as conn is going away */ - conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; - /* Trigger select() in socket layer. Make sure everybody notices activity - on the connection, error first! */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_ERROR, 0); - } - - if (shut_rx) { - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); - } - - if (shut_tx) { - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); - } - } - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - - if (delayed) -#endif - { - /* wake up the application task */ - sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - if (!close_finished) { - /* Closing failed and we want to wait: restore some of the callbacks */ - /* Closing of listen pcb will never fail! */ - LWIP_ASSERT("Closing a listen pcb may not fail!", (tpcb->state != LISTEN)); - - if (shut_tx) { - tcp_sent(tpcb, sent_tcp); - } - - /* when waiting for close, set up poll interval to 500ms */ - tcp_poll(tpcb, poll_tcp, 1); - tcp_err(tpcb, err_tcp); - tcp_arg(tpcb, conn); - /* don't restore recv callback: we don't want to receive any more data */ - } - - /* If closing didn't succeed, we get called again either - from poll_tcp or from sent_tcp */ - LWIP_ASSERT("err != ERR_OK", err != ERR_OK); - return err; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -/** - * Delete the pcb inside a netconn. - * Called from netconn_delete. - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_delconn(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - - enum netconn_state state = msg->conn->state; - LWIP_ASSERT("netconn state error", /* this only happens for TCP netconns */ - (state == NETCONN_NONE) || (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP)); -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - - /* In full duplex mode, blocking write/connect is aborted with ERR_CLSD */ - if (state != NETCONN_NONE) { - if ((state == NETCONN_WRITE) || - ((state == NETCONN_CONNECT) && !IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(msg->conn))) { - /* close requested, abort running write/connect */ - sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem; - LWIP_ASSERT("msg->conn->current_msg != NULL", msg->conn->current_msg != NULL); - op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg->conn->current_msg); - msg->conn->current_msg->err = ERR_CLSD; - msg->conn->current_msg = NULL; - msg->conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; - sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); - } - } - -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - - if (((state != NETCONN_NONE) && - (state != NETCONN_LISTEN) && - (state != NETCONN_CONNECT)) || - ((state == NETCONN_CONNECT) && !IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(msg->conn))) { - /* This means either a blocking write or blocking connect is running - (nonblocking write returns and sets state to NONE) */ - msg->err = ERR_INPROGRESS; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - { - LWIP_ASSERT("blocking connect in progress", - (state != NETCONN_CONNECT) || IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(msg->conn)); - msg->err = ERR_OK; -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - /* Mark mboxes invalid */ - netconn_mark_mbox_invalid(msg->conn); -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - netconn_drain(msg->conn); -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { -#if LWIP_RAW - - case NETCONN_RAW: - raw_remove(msg->conn->pcb.raw); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ -#if LWIP_UDP - - case NETCONN_UDP: - msg->conn->pcb.udp->recv_arg = NULL; - udp_remove(msg->conn->pcb.udp); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - case NETCONN_TCP: - LWIP_ASSERT("already writing or closing", msg->conn->current_msg == NULL); - msg->conn->state = NETCONN_CLOSE; - msg->msg.sd.shut = NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR; - msg->conn->current_msg = msg; -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - - if (lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(msg->conn, 0) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_NONE); - } - -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(msg->conn); -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - /* API_EVENT is called inside lwip_netconn_do_close_internal, before releasing - the application thread, so we can return at this point! */ - return; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - - default: - break; - } - - msg->conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; - } - - /* tcp netconns don't come here! */ - - /* @todo: this lets select make the socket readable and writable, - which is wrong! errfd instead? */ - API_EVENT(msg->conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); - API_EVENT(msg->conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); - } - - if (sys_sem_valid(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg))) { - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); - } -} - -/** - * Bind a pcb contained in a netconn - * Called from netconn_bind. - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection and containing - * the IP address and port to bind to - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_bind(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - err_t err; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { -#if LWIP_RAW - - case NETCONN_RAW: - err = raw_bind(msg->conn->pcb.raw, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ -#if LWIP_UDP - - case NETCONN_UDP: - err = udp_bind(msg->conn->pcb.udp, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr), msg->msg.bc.port); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - case NETCONN_TCP: - err = tcp_bind(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr), msg->msg.bc.port); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - - default: - err = ERR_VAL; - break; - } - } else { - err = ERR_VAL; - } - - msg->err = err; - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} -/** - * Bind a pcb contained in a netconn to an interface - * Called from netconn_bind_if. - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection and containing - * the IP address and port to bind to - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_bind_if(void *m) -{ - struct netif *netif; - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - err_t err; - - netif = netif_get_by_index(msg->msg.bc.if_idx); - - if ((netif != NULL) && (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL)) { - err = ERR_OK; - - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { -#if LWIP_RAW - - case NETCONN_RAW: - raw_bind_netif(msg->conn->pcb.raw, netif); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ -#if LWIP_UDP - - case NETCONN_UDP: - udp_bind_netif(msg->conn->pcb.udp, netif); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - case NETCONN_TCP: - tcp_bind_netif(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, netif); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - - default: - err = ERR_VAL; - break; - } - } else { - err = ERR_VAL; - } - - msg->err = err; - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} - -#if LWIP_TCP -/** - * TCP callback function if a connection (opened by tcp_connect/lwip_netconn_do_connect) has - * been established (or reset by the remote host). - * - * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.connected) for parameters and return values - */ -static err_t lwip_netconn_do_connected(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) -{ - struct netconn *conn; - int was_blocking; - sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem = NULL; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - conn = (struct netconn *)arg; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->state == NETCONN_CONNECT", conn->state == NETCONN_CONNECT); - LWIP_ASSERT("(conn->current_msg != NULL) || conn->in_non_blocking_connect", - (conn->current_msg != NULL) || IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn)); - - if (conn->current_msg != NULL) { - conn->current_msg->err = err; - op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(conn->current_msg); - } - - if ((NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) && (err == ERR_OK)) { - setup_tcp(conn); - } - - was_blocking = !IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn); - SET_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("blocking connect state error", - (was_blocking && op_completed_sem != NULL) || - (!was_blocking && op_completed_sem == NULL)); - conn->current_msg = NULL; - conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); - - if (was_blocking) { - sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -/** - * Connect a pcb contained inside a netconn - * Called from netconn_connect. - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection and containing - * the IP address and port to connect to - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_connect(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - err_t err; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp == NULL) { - /* This may happen when calling netconn_connect() a second time */ - err = ERR_CLSD; - } else { - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { -#if LWIP_RAW - - case NETCONN_RAW: - err = raw_connect(msg->conn->pcb.raw, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ -#if LWIP_UDP - - case NETCONN_UDP: - err = udp_connect(msg->conn->pcb.udp, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr), msg->msg.bc.port); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - case NETCONN_TCP: - - /* Prevent connect while doing any other action. */ - if (msg->conn->state == NETCONN_CONNECT) { - err = ERR_ALREADY; - } else if (msg->conn->state != NETCONN_NONE) { - err = ERR_ISCONN; - } else { - setup_tcp(msg->conn); - err = tcp_connect(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr), - msg->msg.bc.port, lwip_netconn_do_connected); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - u8_t non_blocking = netconn_is_nonblocking(msg->conn); - msg->conn->state = NETCONN_CONNECT; - SET_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(msg->conn, non_blocking); - - if (non_blocking) { - err = ERR_INPROGRESS; - } else { - msg->conn->current_msg = msg; - /* sys_sem_signal() is called from lwip_netconn_do_connected (or err_tcp()), - when the connection is established! */ -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_CONNECT); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state != NETCONN_CONNECT); -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - return; - } - } - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - - default: - LWIP_ERROR( - "Invalid netconn type", 0, do { - err = ERR_VAL; - } while (0)); - - break; - } - } - - msg->err = err; - /* For all other protocols, netconn_connect() calls netconn_apimsg(), - so use TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK() here. */ - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} - -/** - * Disconnect a pcb contained inside a netconn - * Only used for UDP netconns. - * Called from netconn_disconnect. - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection to disconnect - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_disconnect(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - -#if LWIP_UDP - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_UDP) { - udp_disconnect(msg->conn->pcb.udp); - msg->err = ERR_OK; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - { - msg->err = ERR_VAL; - } - - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} - -#if LWIP_TCP -/** - * Set a TCP pcb contained in a netconn into listen mode - * Called from netconn_listen. - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_listen(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - err_t err; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { - if (msg->conn->state == NETCONN_NONE) { - struct tcp_pcb *lpcb; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp->state != CLOSED) { - /* connection is not closed, cannot listen */ - err = ERR_VAL; - } else { - u8_t backlog; -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - backlog = msg->msg.lb.backlog; -#else /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - backlog = TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG; -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - /* "Socket API like" dual-stack support: If IP to listen to is IP6_ADDR_ANY, - * and NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY is NOT set, use IP_ANY_TYPE to listen - */ - if (ip_addr_cmp(&msg->conn->pcb.ip->local_ip, IP6_ADDR_ANY) && - (netconn_get_ipv6only(msg->conn) == 0)) { - /* change PCB type to IPADDR_TYPE_ANY */ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(msg->conn->pcb.tcp->local_ip, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(msg->conn->pcb.tcp->remote_ip, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - lpcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, backlog, &err); - - if (lpcb == NULL) { - /* in this case, the old pcb is still allocated */ - } else { - /* delete the recvmbox and allocate the acceptmbox */ - if (sys_mbox_valid(&msg->conn->recvmbox)) { - /** @todo: should we drain the recvmbox here? */ - sys_mbox_free(&msg->conn->recvmbox); - sys_mbox_set_invalid(&msg->conn->recvmbox); - } - - err = ERR_OK; - - if (!sys_mbox_valid(&msg->conn->acceptmbox)) { - err = sys_mbox_new(&msg->conn->acceptmbox, DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE); - } - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - msg->conn->state = NETCONN_LISTEN; - msg->conn->pcb.tcp = lpcb; - tcp_arg(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, msg->conn); - tcp_accept(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, accept_function); - } else { - /* since the old pcb is already deallocated, free lpcb now */ - tcp_close(lpcb); - msg->conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; - } - } - } - } else if (msg->conn->state == NETCONN_LISTEN) { - /* already listening, allow updating of the backlog */ - err = ERR_OK; - tcp_backlog_set(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, msg->msg.lb.backlog); - } else { - err = ERR_CONN; - } - } else { - err = ERR_ARG; - } - } else { - err = ERR_CONN; - } - - msg->err = err; - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -/** - * Send some data on a RAW or UDP pcb contained in a netconn - * Called from netconn_send - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_send(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - - err_t err = netconn_err(msg->conn); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { -#if LWIP_RAW - - case NETCONN_RAW: - if (ip_addr_isany(&msg->msg.b->addr) || IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(msg->msg.b->addr)) { - err = raw_send(msg->conn->pcb.raw, msg->msg.b->p); - } else { - err = raw_sendto(msg->conn->pcb.raw, msg->msg.b->p, &msg->msg.b->addr); - } - - break; -#endif -#if LWIP_UDP - - case NETCONN_UDP: -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - if (ip_addr_isany(&msg->msg.b->addr) || IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(msg->msg.b->addr)) { - err = udp_send_chksum(msg->conn->pcb.udp, msg->msg.b->p, - msg->msg.b->flags & NETBUF_FLAG_CHKSUM, msg->msg.b->toport_chksum); - } else { - err = udp_sendto_chksum(msg->conn->pcb.udp, msg->msg.b->p, - &msg->msg.b->addr, msg->msg.b->port, - msg->msg.b->flags & NETBUF_FLAG_CHKSUM, msg->msg.b->toport_chksum); - } - -#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - if (ip_addr_isany_val(msg->msg.b->addr) || IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(msg->msg.b->addr)) { - err = udp_send(msg->conn->pcb.udp, msg->msg.b->p); - } else { - err = udp_sendto(msg->conn->pcb.udp, msg->msg.b->p, &msg->msg.b->addr, msg->msg.b->port); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - - default: - err = ERR_CONN; - break; - } - } else { - err = ERR_CONN; - } - } - - msg->err = err; - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} - -#if LWIP_TCP -/** - * Indicate data has been received from a TCP pcb contained in a netconn - * Called from netconn_recv - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_recv(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - - msg->err = ERR_OK; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { - size_t remaining = msg->msg.r.len; - - do { - u16_t recved = (u16_t)((remaining > 0xffff) ? 0xffff : remaining); - tcp_recved(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, recved); - remaining -= recved; - } while (remaining != 0); - } - } - - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} - -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG -/** Indicate that a TCP pcb has been accepted - * Called from netconn_accept - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_accepted(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - - msg->err = ERR_OK; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { - tcp_backlog_accepted(msg->conn->pcb.tcp); - } - } - - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - -/** - * See if more data needs to be written from a previous call to netconn_write. - * Called initially from lwip_netconn_do_write. If the first call can't send all data - * (because of low memory or empty send-buffer), this function is called again - * from sent_tcp() or poll_tcp() to send more data. If all data is sent, the - * blocking application thread (waiting in netconn_write) is released. - * - * @param conn netconn (that is currently in state NETCONN_WRITE) to process - * @return ERR_OK - * ERR_MEM if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING=1 and sending hasn't yet finished - */ -static err_t lwip_netconn_do_writemore(struct netconn *conn WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM) -{ - err_t err; - const void *dataptr; - u16_t len, available; - u8_t write_finished = 0; - size_t diff; - u8_t dontblock; - u8_t apiflags; - u8_t write_more; - - LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", conn != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE", (conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE)); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg != NULL", conn->current_msg != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->pcb.tcp != NULL", conn->pcb.tcp != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset < conn->current_msg->msg.w.len", - conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset < conn->current_msg->msg.w.len); - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt > 0", conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt > 0); - - apiflags = conn->current_msg->msg.w.apiflags; - dontblock = netconn_is_nonblocking(conn) || (apiflags & NETCONN_DONTBLOCK); - -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO - - if ((conn->send_timeout != 0) && - ((s32_t)(sys_now() - conn->current_msg->msg.w.time_started) >= conn->send_timeout)) { - write_finished = 1; - - if (conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset == 0) { - /* nothing has been written */ - err = ERR_WOULDBLOCK; - } else { - /* partial write */ - err = ERR_OK; - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ - { - do { - dataptr = (const u8_t *)conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector->ptr + conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off; - diff = conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector->len - conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off; - - if (diff > 0xffffUL) /* max_u16_t */ - { - len = 0xffff; - apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; - } else { - len = (u16_t)diff; - } - - available = tcp_sndbuf(conn->pcb.tcp); - - if (available < len) { - /* don't try to write more than sendbuf */ - len = available; - - if (dontblock) { - if (!len) { - /* set error according to partial write or not */ - err = (conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset == 0) ? ERR_WOULDBLOCK : ERR_OK; - goto err_mem; - } - } else { - apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; - } - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("lwip_netconn_do_writemore: invalid length!", - ((conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off + len) <= conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector->len)); - - /* we should loop around for more sending in the following cases: - 1) We couldn't finish the current vector because of 16-bit size limitations. - tcp_write() and tcp_sndbuf() both are limited to 16-bit sizes - 2) We are sending the remainder of the current vector and have more */ - if ((len == 0xffff && diff > 0xffffUL) || - (len == (u16_t)diff && conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt > 1)) { - write_more = 1; - apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; - } else { - write_more = 0; - } - - err = tcp_write(conn->pcb.tcp, dataptr, len, apiflags); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset += len; - conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off += len; - - /* check if current vector is finished */ - if (conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off == conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector->len) { - conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt--; - - /* if we have additional vectors, move on to them */ - if (conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt > 0) { - conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector++; - conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off = 0; - } - } - } - } while (write_more && err == ERR_OK); - - /* if OK or memory error, check available space */ - if ((err == ERR_OK) || (err == ERR_MEM)) { - err_mem: - - if (dontblock && (conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset < conn->current_msg->msg.w.len)) { - /* non-blocking write did not write everything: mark the pcb non-writable - and let poll_tcp check writable space to mark the pcb writable again */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDMINUS, 0); - conn->flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE; - } else if ((tcp_sndbuf(conn->pcb.tcp) <= TCP_SNDLOWAT) || - (tcp_sndqueuelen(conn->pcb.tcp) >= TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT)) { - /* The queued byte- or pbuf-count exceeds the configured low-water limit, - let select mark this pcb as non-writable. */ - API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDMINUS, 0); - } - } - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - err_t out_err; - - if ((conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset == conn->current_msg->msg.w.len) || dontblock) { - /* return sent length (caller reads length from msg.w.offset) */ - write_finished = 1; - } - - out_err = tcp_output(conn->pcb.tcp); - - if (out_err == ERR_RTE) { - /* If tcp_output fails because no route is found, - don't try writing any more but return the error - to the application thread. */ - err = out_err; - write_finished = 1; - } - } else if (err == ERR_MEM) { - /* If ERR_MEM, we wait for sent_tcp or poll_tcp to be called. - For blocking sockets, we do NOT return to the application - thread, since ERR_MEM is only a temporary error! Non-blocking - will remain non-writable until sent_tcp/poll_tcp is called */ - - /* tcp_write returned ERR_MEM, try tcp_output anyway */ - err_t out_err = tcp_output(conn->pcb.tcp); - - if (out_err == ERR_RTE) { - /* If tcp_output fails because no route is found, - don't try writing any more but return the error - to the application thread. */ - err = out_err; - write_finished = 1; - } else if (dontblock) { - /* non-blocking write is done on ERR_MEM, set error according - to partial write or not */ - err = (conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset == 0) ? ERR_WOULDBLOCK : ERR_OK; - write_finished = 1; - } - } else { - /* On errors != ERR_MEM, we don't try writing any more but return - the error to the application thread. */ - write_finished = 1; - } - } - - if (write_finished) { - /* everything was written: set back connection state - and back to application task */ - sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(conn->current_msg); - conn->current_msg->err = err; - conn->current_msg = NULL; - conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - - if (delayed) -#endif - { - sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); - } - } -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - else { - return ERR_MEM; - } - -#endif - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -/** - * Send some data on a TCP pcb contained in a netconn - * Called from netconn_write - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_write(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - - err_t err = netconn_err(msg->conn); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { -#if LWIP_TCP - - if (msg->conn->state != NETCONN_NONE) { - /* netconn is connecting, closing or in blocking write */ - err = ERR_INPROGRESS; - } else if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - msg->conn->state = NETCONN_WRITE; - /* set all the variables used by lwip_netconn_do_writemore */ - LWIP_ASSERT("already writing or closing", msg->conn->current_msg == NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("msg->msg.w.len != 0", msg->msg.w.len != 0); - msg->conn->current_msg = msg; -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - - if (lwip_netconn_do_writemore(msg->conn, 0) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state != NETCONN_WRITE); - } - -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - lwip_netconn_do_writemore(msg->conn); -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - /* for both cases: if lwip_netconn_do_writemore was called, don't ACK the APIMSG - since lwip_netconn_do_writemore ACKs it! */ - return; - } else { - err = ERR_CONN; - } - -#else /* LWIP_TCP */ - err = ERR_VAL; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) - } else { - err = ERR_VAL; -#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ - } - } - - msg->err = err; - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} - -/** - * Return a connection's local or remote address - * Called from netconn_getaddr - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_getaddr(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.ip != NULL) { - if (msg->msg.ad.local) { - ip_addr_copy(API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.ipaddr), - msg->conn->pcb.ip->local_ip); - } else { - ip_addr_copy(API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.ipaddr), - msg->conn->pcb.ip->remote_ip); - } - - msg->err = ERR_OK; - - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { -#if LWIP_RAW - - case NETCONN_RAW: - if (msg->msg.ad.local) { - API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.port) = msg->conn->pcb.raw->protocol; - } else { - /* return an error as connecting is only a helper for upper layers */ - msg->err = ERR_CONN; - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ -#if LWIP_UDP - - case NETCONN_UDP: - if (msg->msg.ad.local) { - API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.port) = msg->conn->pcb.udp->local_port; - } else { - if ((msg->conn->pcb.udp->flags & UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED) == 0) { - msg->err = ERR_CONN; - } else { - API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.port) = msg->conn->pcb.udp->remote_port; - } - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - case NETCONN_TCP: - if ((msg->msg.ad.local == 0) && - ((msg->conn->pcb.tcp->state == CLOSED) || (msg->conn->pcb.tcp->state == LISTEN))) { - /* pcb is not connected and remote name is requested */ - msg->err = ERR_CONN; - } else { - API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.port) = (msg->msg.ad.local ? msg->conn->pcb.tcp->local_port : msg->conn->pcb.tcp->remote_port); - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid netconn_type", 0); - break; - } - } else { - msg->err = ERR_CONN; - } - - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} - -/** - * Close or half-shutdown a TCP pcb contained in a netconn - * Called from netconn_close - * In contrast to closing sockets, the netconn is not deallocated. - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_close(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - -#if LWIP_TCP - enum netconn_state state = msg->conn->state; - - /* First check if this is a TCP netconn and if it is in a correct state - (LISTEN doesn't support half shutdown) */ - if ((msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) && - (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) && - ((msg->msg.sd.shut == NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR) || (state != NETCONN_LISTEN))) { - /* Check if we are in a connected state */ - if (state == NETCONN_CONNECT) { - /* TCP connect in progress: cannot shutdown */ - msg->err = ERR_CONN; - } else if (state == NETCONN_WRITE) { -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - - if (msg->msg.sd.shut & NETCONN_SHUT_WR) { - /* close requested, abort running write */ - sys_sem_t *write_completed_sem; - LWIP_ASSERT("msg->conn->current_msg != NULL", msg->conn->current_msg != NULL); - write_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg->conn->current_msg); - msg->conn->current_msg->err = ERR_CLSD; - msg->conn->current_msg = NULL; - msg->conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; - state = NETCONN_NONE; - sys_sem_signal(write_completed_sem); - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("msg->msg.sd.shut == NETCONN_SHUT_RD", msg->msg.sd.shut == NETCONN_SHUT_RD); - /* In this case, let the write continue and do not interfere with - conn->current_msg or conn->state! */ - msg->err = tcp_shutdown(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, 1, 0); - } - } - - if (state == NETCONN_NONE) { -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - msg->err = ERR_INPROGRESS; - } else { -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - - if (msg->msg.sd.shut & NETCONN_SHUT_RD) { -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - /* Mark mboxes invalid */ - netconn_mark_mbox_invalid(msg->conn); -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - netconn_drain(msg->conn); -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("already writing or closing", msg->conn->current_msg == NULL); - msg->conn->state = NETCONN_CLOSE; - msg->conn->current_msg = msg; -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - - if (lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(msg->conn, 0) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_NONE); - } - -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(msg->conn); -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - /* for tcp netconns, lwip_netconn_do_close_internal ACKs the message */ - return; - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - { - msg->err = ERR_CONN; - } - - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} - -#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) -/** - * Join multicast groups for UDP netconns. - * Called from netconn_join_leave_group - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - - msg->err = ERR_CONN; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_UDP) { -#if LWIP_UDP -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD - - if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(msg->conn->type)) { - if (msg->msg.jl.join_or_leave == NETCONN_JOIN) { - msg->err = mld6_joingroup(ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.netif_addr)), - ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); - } else { - msg->err = mld6_leavegroup(ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.netif_addr)), - ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - { -#if LWIP_IGMP - - if (msg->msg.jl.join_or_leave == NETCONN_JOIN) { - msg->err = igmp_joingroup(ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.netif_addr)), - ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); - } else { - msg->err = igmp_leavegroup(ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.netif_addr)), - ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - } - -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if (LWIP_TCP || LWIP_RAW) - } else { - msg->err = ERR_VAL; -#endif /* (LWIP_TCP || LWIP_RAW) */ - } - } - - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} -/** - * Join multicast groups for UDP netconns. - * Called from netconn_join_leave_group_netif - * - * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group_netif(void *m) -{ - struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; - struct netif *netif; - - netif = netif_get_by_index(msg->msg.jl.if_idx); - - if (netif == NULL) { - msg->err = ERR_IF; - goto done; - } - - msg->err = ERR_CONN; - - if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_UDP) { -#if LWIP_UDP -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD - - if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(msg->conn->type)) { - if (msg->msg.jl.join_or_leave == NETCONN_JOIN) { - msg->err = mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, - ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); - } else { - msg->err = mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, - ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - { -#if LWIP_IGMP - - if (msg->msg.jl.join_or_leave == NETCONN_JOIN) { - msg->err = igmp_joingroup_netif(netif, - ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); - } else { - msg->err = igmp_leavegroup_netif(netif, - ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - } - -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if (LWIP_TCP || LWIP_RAW) - } else { - msg->err = ERR_VAL; -#endif /* (LWIP_TCP || LWIP_RAW) */ - } - } - -done: - TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ - -#if LWIP_DNS -/** - * Callback function that is called when DNS name is resolved - * (or on timeout). A waiting application thread is waked up by - * signaling the semaphore. - */ -static void lwip_netconn_do_dns_found(const char *name, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg) -{ - struct dns_api_msg *msg = (struct dns_api_msg *)arg; - - /* we trust the internal implementation to be correct :-) */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); - - if (ipaddr == NULL) { - /* timeout or memory error */ - API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) = ERR_VAL; - } else { - /* address was resolved */ - API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) = ERR_OK; - API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->addr) = *ipaddr; - } - - /* wake up the application task waiting in netconn_gethostbyname */ - sys_sem_signal(API_EXPR_REF_SEM(msg->sem)); -} - -/** - * Execute a DNS query - * Called from netconn_gethostbyname - * - * @param arg the dns_api_msg pointing to the query - */ -void lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname(void *arg) -{ - struct dns_api_msg *msg = (struct dns_api_msg *)arg; - u8_t addrtype = -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - msg->dns_addrtype; -#else - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT; -#endif - - API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) = dns_gethostbyname_addrtype(msg->name, - API_EXPR_REF(msg->addr), lwip_netconn_do_dns_found, msg, addrtype); -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - - /* For core locking, only block if we need to wait for answer/timeout */ - if (API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) == ERR_INPROGRESS) { - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - sys_sem_wait(API_EXPR_REF_SEM(msg->sem)); - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - LWIP_ASSERT("do_gethostbyname still in progress!!", API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) != ERR_INPROGRESS); - } - -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - if (API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) != ERR_INPROGRESS) { - /* on error or immediate success, wake up the application - * task waiting in netconn_gethostbyname */ - sys_sem_signal(API_EXPR_REF_SEM(msg->sem)); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -} -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN */ +/** + * @file + * Sequential API Internal module + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_NETCONN /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/priv/api_msg.h" + +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/raw.h" + +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" + +#include + +/* netconns are polled once per second (e.g. continue write on memory error) */ +#define NETCONN_TCP_POLL_INTERVAL 2 + +#define SET_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn, val) \ + do { \ + if (val) { \ + netconn_set_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT); \ + } else { \ + netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn) netconn_is_flag_set(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT) + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +#define NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, mbox) (sys_mbox_valid(mbox) && ((conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID) == 0)) +#else +#define NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, mbox) sys_mbox_valid(mbox) +#endif + +/* forward declarations */ +#if LWIP_TCP +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +#define WRITE_DELAYED , 1 +#define WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM , u8_t delayed +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +#define WRITE_DELAYED +#define WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +static err_t lwip_netconn_do_writemore(struct netconn *conn WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM); +static err_t lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(struct netconn *conn WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM); +#endif + +static void netconn_drain(struct netconn *conn); + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +#define TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(m) +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +#define TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(m) \ + do { \ + sys_sem_signal(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(m)); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +const u8_t netconn_deleted = 0; + +int lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(void *msg) +{ + if (msg == &netconn_deleted) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + +#if LWIP_TCP +const u8_t netconn_aborted = 0; +const u8_t netconn_reset = 0; +const u8_t netconn_closed = 0; + +/** Translate an error to a unique void* passed via an mbox */ +static void *lwip_netconn_err_to_msg(err_t err) +{ + switch (err) { + case ERR_ABRT: + return LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_aborted); + + case ERR_RST: + return LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_reset); + + case ERR_CLSD: + return LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_closed); + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("unhandled error", err == ERR_OK); + return NULL; + } +} + +int lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(void *msg, err_t *err) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("err != NULL", err != NULL); + + if (msg == &netconn_aborted) { + *err = ERR_ABRT; + return 1; + } else if (msg == &netconn_reset) { + *err = ERR_RST; + return 1; + } else if (msg == &netconn_closed) { + *err = ERR_CLSD; + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +#if LWIP_RAW +/** + * Receive callback function for RAW netconns. + * Doesn't 'eat' the packet, only copies it and sends it to + * conn->recvmbox + * + * @see raw.h (struct raw_pcb.recv) for parameters and return value + */ +static u8_t recv_raw(void *arg, struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *addr) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + struct netbuf *buf; + struct netconn *conn; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + conn = (struct netconn *)arg; + + if ((conn != NULL) && NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox)) { +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + int recv_avail; + SYS_ARCH_GET(conn->recv_avail, recv_avail); + + if ((recv_avail + (int)(p->tot_len)) > conn->recv_bufsize) { + return 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + /* copy the whole packet into new pbufs */ + q = pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_RAM, p); + + if (q != NULL) { + u16_t len; + buf = (struct netbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETBUF); + + if (buf == NULL) { + pbuf_free(q); + return 0; + } + + buf->p = q; + buf->ptr = q; + ip_addr_copy(buf->addr, *ip_current_src_addr()); + buf->port = pcb->protocol; + + len = q->tot_len; + + if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, buf) != ERR_OK) { + netbuf_delete(buf); + return 0; + } else { +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + SYS_ARCH_INC(conn->recv_avail, len); +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + /* Register event with callback */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, len); + } + } + } + + return 0; /* do not eat the packet */ +} +#endif /* LWIP_RAW*/ + +#if LWIP_UDP +/** + * Receive callback function for UDP netconns. + * Posts the packet to conn->recvmbox or deletes it on memory error. + * + * @see udp.h (struct udp_pcb.recv) for parameters + */ +static void recv_udp(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + struct netbuf *buf; + struct netconn *conn; + u16_t len; +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + int recv_avail; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); /* only used for asserts... */ + LWIP_ASSERT("recv_udp must have a pcb argument", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("recv_udp must have an argument", arg != NULL); + conn = (struct netconn *)arg; + + if (conn == NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("recv_udp: recv for wrong pcb!", conn->pcb.udp == pcb); + +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + SYS_ARCH_GET(conn->recv_avail, recv_avail); + + if (!NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox) || + ((recv_avail + (int)(p->tot_len)) > conn->recv_bufsize)) { +#else /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + + if (!NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox)) { +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + buf = (struct netbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETBUF); + + if (buf == NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } else { + buf->p = p; + buf->ptr = p; + ip_addr_set(&buf->addr, addr); + buf->port = port; +#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO + + if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO) { + /* get the UDP header - always in the first pbuf, ensured by udp_input */ + const struct udp_hdr *udphdr = (const struct udp_hdr *)ip_next_header_ptr(); + buf->flags = NETBUF_FLAG_DESTADDR; + ip_addr_set(&buf->toaddr, ip_current_dest_addr()); + buf->toport_chksum = udphdr->dest; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ + } + + len = p->tot_len; + + if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, buf) != ERR_OK) { + netbuf_delete(buf); + return; + } else { +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + SYS_ARCH_INC(conn->recv_avail, len); +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + /* Register event with callback */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, len); + } +} + +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + +#if LWIP_TCP +/** + * Receive callback function for TCP netconns. + * Posts the packet to conn->recvmbox, but doesn't delete it on errors. + * + * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.recv) for parameters and return value + */ +static err_t recv_tcp(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + struct netconn *conn; + u16_t len; + void *msg; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_ASSERT("recv_tcp must have a pcb argument", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("recv_tcp must have an argument", arg != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("err != ERR_OK unhandled", err == ERR_OK); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + conn = (struct netconn *)arg; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("recv_tcp: recv for wrong pcb!", conn->pcb.tcp == pcb); + + if (!NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox)) { + /* recvmbox already deleted */ + if (p != NULL) { + tcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); + pbuf_free(p); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Unlike for UDP or RAW pcbs, don't check for available space + using recv_avail since that could break the connection + (data is already ACKed) */ + + if (p != NULL) { + msg = p; + len = p->tot_len; + } else { + msg = LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_closed); + len = 0; + } + + if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, msg) != ERR_OK) { + /* don't deallocate p: it is presented to us later again from tcp_fasttmr! */ + return ERR_MEM; + } else { +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + SYS_ARCH_INC(conn->recv_avail, len); +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + /* Register event with callback */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, len); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Poll callback function for TCP netconns. + * Wakes up an application thread that waits for a connection to close + * or data to be sent. The application thread then takes the + * appropriate action to go on. + * + * Signals the conn->sem. + * netconn_close waits for conn->sem if closing failed. + * + * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.poll) for parameters and return value + */ +static err_t poll_tcp(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct netconn *conn = (struct netconn *)arg; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", (conn != NULL)); + + if (conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE) { + lwip_netconn_do_writemore(conn WRITE_DELAYED); + } else if (conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE) { +#if !LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO && !LWIP_SO_LINGER + + if (conn->current_msg && conn->current_msg->msg.sd.polls_left) { + conn->current_msg->msg.sd.polls_left--; + } + +#endif /* !LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO && !LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(conn WRITE_DELAYED); + } + + /* @todo: implement connect timeout here? */ + + /* Did a nonblocking write fail before? Then check available write-space. */ + if (conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE) { + /* If the queued byte- or pbuf-count drops below the configured low-water limit, + let select mark this pcb as writable again. */ + if ((conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) && (tcp_sndbuf(conn->pcb.tcp) > TCP_SNDLOWAT) && + (tcp_sndqueuelen(conn->pcb.tcp) < TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT)) { + netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE); + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Sent callback function for TCP netconns. + * Signals the conn->sem and calls API_EVENT. + * netconn_write waits for conn->sem if send buffer is low. + * + * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.sent) for parameters and return value + */ +static err_t sent_tcp(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) +{ + struct netconn *conn = (struct netconn *)arg; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", (conn != NULL)); + + if (conn) { + if (conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE) { + lwip_netconn_do_writemore(conn WRITE_DELAYED); + } else if (conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE) { + lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(conn WRITE_DELAYED); + } + + /* If the queued byte- or pbuf-count drops below the configured low-water limit, + let select mark this pcb as writable again. */ + if ((conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) && (tcp_sndbuf(conn->pcb.tcp) > TCP_SNDLOWAT) && + (tcp_sndqueuelen(conn->pcb.tcp) < TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT)) { + netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE); + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, len); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Error callback function for TCP netconns. + * Signals conn->sem, posts to all conn mboxes and calls API_EVENT. + * The application thread has then to decide what to do. + * + * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.err) for parameters + */ +static void err_tcp(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + struct netconn *conn; + enum netconn_state old_state; + void *mbox_msg; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + conn = (struct netconn *)arg; + LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", (conn != NULL)); + + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + + /* when err is called, the pcb is deallocated, so delete the reference */ + conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; + /* store pending error */ + conn->pending_err = err; + /* prevent application threads from blocking on 'recvmbox'/'acceptmbox' */ + conn->flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED; + + /* reset conn->state now before waking up other threads */ + old_state = conn->state; + conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + + /* Notify the user layer about a connection error. Used to signal select. */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_ERROR, 0); + /* Try to release selects pending on 'read' or 'write', too. + They will get an error if they actually try to read or write. */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); + + mbox_msg = lwip_netconn_err_to_msg(err); + + /* pass error message to recvmbox to wake up pending recv */ + if (NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->recvmbox)) { + /* use trypost to prevent deadlock */ + sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, mbox_msg); + } + + /* pass error message to acceptmbox to wake up pending accept */ + if (NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->acceptmbox)) { + /* use trypost to preven deadlock */ + sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, mbox_msg); + } + + if ((old_state == NETCONN_WRITE) || (old_state == NETCONN_CLOSE) || + (old_state == NETCONN_CONNECT)) { + /* calling lwip_netconn_do_writemore/lwip_netconn_do_close_internal is not necessary + since the pcb has already been deleted! */ + int was_nonblocking_connect = IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn); + SET_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn, 0); + + if (!was_nonblocking_connect) { + sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem; + /* set error return code */ + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg != NULL", conn->current_msg != NULL); + + if (old_state == NETCONN_CLOSE) { + /* let close succeed: the connection is closed after all... */ + conn->current_msg->err = ERR_OK; + } else { + /* Write and connect fail */ + conn->current_msg->err = err; + } + + op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(conn->current_msg); + LWIP_ASSERT("inavlid op_completed_sem", sys_sem_valid(op_completed_sem)); + conn->current_msg = NULL; + /* wake up the waiting task */ + sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); + } else { + /* @todo: test what happens for error on nonblocking connect */ + } + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg == NULL", conn->current_msg == NULL); + } +} + +/** + * Setup a tcp_pcb with the correct callback function pointers + * and their arguments. + * + * @param conn the TCP netconn to setup + */ +static void setup_tcp(struct netconn *conn) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + pcb = conn->pcb.tcp; + tcp_arg(pcb, conn); + tcp_recv(pcb, recv_tcp); + tcp_sent(pcb, sent_tcp); + tcp_poll(pcb, poll_tcp, NETCONN_TCP_POLL_INTERVAL); + tcp_err(pcb, err_tcp); +} + +/** + * Accept callback function for TCP netconns. + * Allocates a new netconn and posts that to conn->acceptmbox. + * + * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb_listen.accept) for parameters and return value + */ +static err_t accept_function(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *newpcb, err_t err) +{ + struct netconn *newconn; + struct netconn *conn = (struct netconn *)arg; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (!NETCONN_MBOX_VALID(conn, &conn->acceptmbox)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(API_MSG_DEBUG, ("accept_function: acceptmbox already deleted\n")); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (newpcb == NULL) { + /* out-of-pcbs during connect: pass on this error to the application */ + if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, lwip_netconn_err_to_msg(ERR_ABRT)) == ERR_OK) { + /* Register event with callback */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); + } + + return ERR_VAL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("expect newpcb == NULL or err == ERR_OK", err == ERR_OK); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(API_MSG_DEBUG, ("accept_function: newpcb->state: %s\n", tcp_debug_state_str(newpcb->state))); + + /* We have to set the callback here even though + * the new socket is unknown. newconn->socket is marked as -1. */ + newconn = netconn_alloc(conn->type, conn->callback); + + if (newconn == NULL) { + /* outof netconns: pass on this error to the application */ + if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, lwip_netconn_err_to_msg(ERR_ABRT)) == ERR_OK) { + /* Register event with callback */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); + } + + return ERR_MEM; + } + + newconn->pcb.tcp = newpcb; + setup_tcp(newconn); + + /* handle backlog counter */ + tcp_backlog_delayed(newpcb); + + if (sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, newconn) != ERR_OK) { + /* When returning != ERR_OK, the pcb is aborted in tcp_process(), + so do nothing here! */ + /* remove all references to this netconn from the pcb */ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = newconn->pcb.tcp; + tcp_arg(pcb, NULL); + tcp_recv(pcb, NULL); + tcp_sent(pcb, NULL); + tcp_poll(pcb, NULL, 0); + tcp_err(pcb, NULL); + /* remove reference from to the pcb from this netconn */ + newconn->pcb.tcp = NULL; + /* no need to drain since we know the recvmbox is empty. */ + sys_mbox_free(&newconn->recvmbox); + sys_mbox_set_invalid(&newconn->recvmbox); + netconn_free(newconn); + return ERR_MEM; + } else { + /* Register event with callback */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +/** + * Create a new pcb of a specific type. + * Called from lwip_netconn_do_newconn(). + * + * @param msg the api_msg describing the connection type + */ +static void pcb_new(struct api_msg *msg) +{ + enum lwip_ip_addr_type iptype = IPADDR_TYPE_V4; + + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb_new: pcb already allocated", msg->conn->pcb.tcp == NULL); + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV4 + + /* IPv6: Dual-stack by default, unless netconn_set_ipv6only() is called */ + if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(netconn_type(msg->conn))) { + iptype = IPADDR_TYPE_ANY; + } + +#endif + + /* Allocate a PCB for this connection */ + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { +#if LWIP_RAW + + case NETCONN_RAW: + msg->conn->pcb.raw = raw_new_ip_type(iptype, msg->msg.n.proto); + + if (msg->conn->pcb.raw != NULL) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + /* ICMPv6 packets should always have checksum calculated by the stack as per RFC 3542 chapter 3.1 */ + if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(msg->conn->type) && msg->conn->pcb.raw->protocol == IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) { + msg->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd = 1; + msg->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_offset = 2; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + raw_recv(msg->conn->pcb.raw, recv_raw, msg->conn); + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +#if LWIP_UDP + + case NETCONN_UDP: + msg->conn->pcb.udp = udp_new_ip_type(iptype); + + if (msg->conn->pcb.udp != NULL) { +#if LWIP_UDPLITE + + if (NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(msg->conn->type)) { + udp_setflags(msg->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ + + if (NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPNOCHKSUM(msg->conn->type)) { + udp_setflags(msg->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM); + } + + udp_recv(msg->conn->pcb.udp, recv_udp, msg->conn); + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + case NETCONN_TCP: + msg->conn->pcb.tcp = tcp_new_ip_type(iptype); + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + setup_tcp(msg->conn); + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + + default: + /* Unsupported netconn type, e.g. protocol disabled */ + msg->err = ERR_VAL; + return; + } + + if (msg->conn->pcb.ip == NULL) { + msg->err = ERR_MEM; + } +} + +/** + * Create a new pcb of a specific type inside a netconn. + * Called from netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback. + * + * @param m the api_msg describing the connection type + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_newconn(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + + msg->err = ERR_OK; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp == NULL) { + pcb_new(msg); + } + + /* Else? This "new" connection already has a PCB allocated. */ + /* Is this an error condition? Should it be deleted? */ + /* We currently just are happy and return. */ + + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} + +/** + * Create a new netconn (of a specific type) that has a callback function. + * The corresponding pcb is NOT created! + * + * @param t the type of 'connection' to create (@see enum netconn_type) + * @param callback a function to call on status changes (RX available, TX'ed) + * @return a newly allocated struct netconn or + * NULL on memory error + */ +struct netconn * +netconn_alloc(enum netconn_type t, netconn_callback callback) +{ + struct netconn *conn; + int size; + u8_t init_flags = 0; + + conn = (struct netconn *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETCONN); + + if (conn == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + conn->pending_err = ERR_OK; + conn->type = t; + conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; + + /* If all sizes are the same, every compiler should optimize this switch to nothing */ + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(t)) { +#if LWIP_RAW + + case NETCONN_RAW: + size = DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE; + break; +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +#if LWIP_UDP + + case NETCONN_UDP: + size = DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE; +#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO + init_flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO; +#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + case NETCONN_TCP: + size = DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE; + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("netconn_alloc: undefined netconn_type", 0); + goto free_and_return; + } + + if (sys_mbox_new(&conn->recvmbox, size) != ERR_OK) { + goto free_and_return; + } + +#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + + if (sys_sem_new(&conn->op_completed, 0) != ERR_OK) { + sys_mbox_free(&conn->recvmbox); + goto free_and_return; + } + +#endif + +#if LWIP_TCP + sys_mbox_set_invalid(&conn->acceptmbox); +#endif + conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; +#if LWIP_SOCKET + /* initialize socket to -1 since 0 is a valid socket */ + conn->socket = -1; +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ + conn->callback = callback; +#if LWIP_TCP + conn->current_msg = NULL; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO + conn->send_timeout = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO + conn->recv_timeout = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + conn->recv_bufsize = RECV_BUFSIZE_DEFAULT; + conn->recv_avail = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ +#if LWIP_SO_LINGER + conn->linger = -1; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + conn->flags = init_flags; + return conn; +free_and_return: + memp_free(MEMP_NETCONN, conn); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Delete a netconn and all its resources. + * The pcb is NOT freed (since we might not be in the right thread context do this). + * + * @param conn the netconn to free + */ +void netconn_free(struct netconn *conn) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("PCB must be deallocated outside this function", conn->pcb.tcp == NULL); + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + /* in fullduplex, netconn is drained here */ + netconn_drain(conn); +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("recvmbox must be deallocated before calling this function", + !sys_mbox_valid(&conn->recvmbox)); +#if LWIP_TCP + LWIP_ASSERT("acceptmbox must be deallocated before calling this function", + !sys_mbox_valid(&conn->acceptmbox)); +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + sys_sem_free(&conn->op_completed); + sys_sem_set_invalid(&conn->op_completed); +#endif + + memp_free(MEMP_NETCONN, conn); +} + +/** + * Delete rcvmbox and acceptmbox of a netconn and free the left-over data in + * these mboxes + * + * @param conn the netconn to free + * @bytes_drained bytes drained from recvmbox + * @accepts_drained pending connections drained from acceptmbox + */ +static void netconn_drain(struct netconn *conn) +{ + void *mem; + + /* This runs when mbox and netconn are marked as closed, + so we don't need to lock against rx packets */ +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + LWIP_ASSERT("netconn marked closed", conn->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID); +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + + /* Delete and drain the recvmbox. */ + if (sys_mbox_valid(&conn->recvmbox)) { + while (sys_mbox_tryfetch(&conn->recvmbox, &mem) != SYS_MBOX_EMPTY) { +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + + if (!lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(mem)) +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + { +#if LWIP_TCP + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { + err_t err; + + if (!lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(mem, &err)) { + pbuf_free((struct pbuf *)mem); + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + { + netbuf_delete((struct netbuf *)mem); + } + } + } + + sys_mbox_free(&conn->recvmbox); + sys_mbox_set_invalid(&conn->recvmbox); + } + + /* Delete and drain the acceptmbox. */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + if (sys_mbox_valid(&conn->acceptmbox)) { + while (sys_mbox_tryfetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &mem) != SYS_MBOX_EMPTY) { +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + + if (!lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(mem)) +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + { + err_t err; + + if (!lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(mem, &err)) { + struct netconn *newconn = (struct netconn *)mem; + /* Only tcp pcbs have an acceptmbox, so no need to check conn->type */ + /* pcb might be set to NULL already by err_tcp() */ + /* drain recvmbox */ + netconn_drain(newconn); + + if (newconn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + tcp_abort(newconn->pcb.tcp); + newconn->pcb.tcp = NULL; + } + + netconn_free(newconn); + } + } + } + + sys_mbox_free(&conn->acceptmbox); + sys_mbox_set_invalid(&conn->acceptmbox); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +} + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +static void netconn_mark_mbox_invalid(struct netconn *conn) +{ + int i, num_waiting; + void *msg = LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &netconn_deleted); + + /* Prevent new calls/threads from reading from the mbox */ + conn->flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID; + + SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(num_waiting = conn->mbox_threads_waiting); + + for (i = 0; i < num_waiting; i++) { + if (sys_mbox_valid_val(conn->recvmbox)) { + sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->recvmbox, msg); + } else { + sys_mbox_trypost(&conn->acceptmbox, msg); + } + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + +#if LWIP_TCP +/** + * Internal helper function to close a TCP netconn: since this sometimes + * doesn't work at the first attempt, this function is called from multiple + * places. + * + * @param conn the TCP netconn to close + */ +static err_t lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(struct netconn *conn WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM) +{ + err_t err; + u8_t shut, shut_rx, shut_tx, shut_close; + u8_t close_finished = 0; + struct tcp_pcb *tpcb; +#if LWIP_SO_LINGER + u8_t linger_wait_required = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid conn", (conn != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("this is for tcp netconns only", (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP)); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn must be in state NETCONN_CLOSE", (conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE)); + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb already closed", (conn->pcb.tcp != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg != NULL", conn->current_msg != NULL); + + tpcb = conn->pcb.tcp; + shut = conn->current_msg->msg.sd.shut; + shut_rx = shut & NETCONN_SHUT_RD; + shut_tx = shut & NETCONN_SHUT_WR; + + /* shutting down both ends is the same as closing + (also if RD or WR side was shut down before already) */ + if (shut == NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR) { + shut_close = 1; + } else if (shut_rx && + ((tpcb->state == FIN_WAIT_1) || + (tpcb->state == FIN_WAIT_2) || + (tpcb->state == CLOSING))) { + shut_close = 1; + } else if (shut_tx && ((tpcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED) != 0)) { + shut_close = 1; + } else { + shut_close = 0; + } + + /* Set back some callback pointers */ + if (shut_close) { + tcp_arg(tpcb, NULL); + } + + if (tpcb->state == LISTEN) { + tcp_accept(tpcb, NULL); + } else { + /* some callbacks have to be reset if tcp_close is not successful */ + if (shut_rx) { + tcp_recv(tpcb, NULL); + tcp_accept(tpcb, NULL); + } + + if (shut_tx) { + tcp_sent(tpcb, NULL); + } + + if (shut_close) { + tcp_poll(tpcb, NULL, 0); + tcp_err(tpcb, NULL); + } + } + + /* Try to close the connection */ + if (shut_close) { +#if LWIP_SO_LINGER + /* check linger possibilites before calling tcp_close */ + err = ERR_OK; + + /* linger enabled/required at all? (i.e. is there untransmitted data left?) */ + if ((conn->linger >= 0) && (conn->pcb.tcp->unsent || conn->pcb.tcp->unacked)) { + if ((conn->linger == 0)) { + /* data left but linger prevents waiting */ + tcp_abort(tpcb); + tpcb = NULL; + } else if (conn->linger > 0) { + /* data left and linger says we should wait */ + if (netconn_is_nonblocking(conn)) { + /* data left on a nonblocking netconn -> cannot linger */ + err = ERR_WOULDBLOCK; + } else if ((s32_t)(sys_now() - conn->current_msg->msg.sd.time_started) >= + (conn->linger * 1000)) { + /* data left but linger timeout has expired (this happens on further + calls to this function through poll_tcp */ + tcp_abort(tpcb); + tpcb = NULL; + } else { + /* data left -> need to wait for ACK after successful close */ + linger_wait_required = 1; + } + } + } + + if ((err == ERR_OK) && (tpcb != NULL)) +#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + { + err = tcp_close(tpcb); + } + } else { + err = tcp_shutdown(tpcb, shut_rx, shut_tx); + } + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + close_finished = 1; +#if LWIP_SO_LINGER + + if (linger_wait_required) { + /* wait for ACK of all unsent/unacked data by just getting called again */ + close_finished = 0; + err = ERR_INPROGRESS; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + } else { + if (err == ERR_MEM) { + /* Closing failed because of memory shortage, try again later. Even for + nonblocking netconns, we have to wait since no standard socket application + is prepared for close failing because of resource shortage. + Check the timeout: this is kind of an lwip addition to the standard sockets: + we wait for some time when failing to allocate a segment for the FIN */ +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER + s32_t close_timeout = LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT; +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO + + if (conn->send_timeout > 0) { + close_timeout = conn->send_timeout; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_LINGER + + if (conn->linger >= 0) { + /* use linger timeout (seconds) */ + close_timeout = conn->linger * 1000U; + } + +#endif + + if ((s32_t)(sys_now() - conn->current_msg->msg.sd.time_started) >= close_timeout) { +#else /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + + if (conn->current_msg->msg.sd.polls_left == 0) { +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + close_finished = 1; + + if (shut_close) { + /* in this case, we want to RST the connection */ + tcp_abort(tpcb); + err = ERR_OK; + } + } + } else { + /* Closing failed for a non-memory error: give up */ + close_finished = 1; + } + } + + if (close_finished) { + /* Closing done (succeeded, non-memory error, nonblocking error or timeout) */ + sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(conn->current_msg); + conn->current_msg->err = err; + conn->current_msg = NULL; + conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + if (shut_close) { + /* Set back some callback pointers as conn is going away */ + conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; + /* Trigger select() in socket layer. Make sure everybody notices activity + on the connection, error first! */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_ERROR, 0); + } + + if (shut_rx) { + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); + } + + if (shut_tx) { + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); + } + } + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + + if (delayed) +#endif + { + /* wake up the application task */ + sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + if (!close_finished) { + /* Closing failed and we want to wait: restore some of the callbacks */ + /* Closing of listen pcb will never fail! */ + LWIP_ASSERT("Closing a listen pcb may not fail!", (tpcb->state != LISTEN)); + + if (shut_tx) { + tcp_sent(tpcb, sent_tcp); + } + + /* when waiting for close, set up poll interval to 500ms */ + tcp_poll(tpcb, poll_tcp, 1); + tcp_err(tpcb, err_tcp); + tcp_arg(tpcb, conn); + /* don't restore recv callback: we don't want to receive any more data */ + } + + /* If closing didn't succeed, we get called again either + from poll_tcp or from sent_tcp */ + LWIP_ASSERT("err != ERR_OK", err != ERR_OK); + return err; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +/** + * Delete the pcb inside a netconn. + * Called from netconn_delete. + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_delconn(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + + enum netconn_state state = msg->conn->state; + LWIP_ASSERT("netconn state error", /* this only happens for TCP netconns */ + (state == NETCONN_NONE) || (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP)); +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + + /* In full duplex mode, blocking write/connect is aborted with ERR_CLSD */ + if (state != NETCONN_NONE) { + if ((state == NETCONN_WRITE) || + ((state == NETCONN_CONNECT) && !IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(msg->conn))) { + /* close requested, abort running write/connect */ + sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem; + LWIP_ASSERT("msg->conn->current_msg != NULL", msg->conn->current_msg != NULL); + op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg->conn->current_msg); + msg->conn->current_msg->err = ERR_CLSD; + msg->conn->current_msg = NULL; + msg->conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; + sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); + } + } + +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + + if (((state != NETCONN_NONE) && + (state != NETCONN_LISTEN) && + (state != NETCONN_CONNECT)) || + ((state == NETCONN_CONNECT) && !IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(msg->conn))) { + /* This means either a blocking write or blocking connect is running + (nonblocking write returns and sets state to NONE) */ + msg->err = ERR_INPROGRESS; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + { + LWIP_ASSERT("blocking connect in progress", + (state != NETCONN_CONNECT) || IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(msg->conn)); + msg->err = ERR_OK; +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + /* Mark mboxes invalid */ + netconn_mark_mbox_invalid(msg->conn); +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + netconn_drain(msg->conn); +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { +#if LWIP_RAW + + case NETCONN_RAW: + raw_remove(msg->conn->pcb.raw); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +#if LWIP_UDP + + case NETCONN_UDP: + msg->conn->pcb.udp->recv_arg = NULL; + udp_remove(msg->conn->pcb.udp); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + case NETCONN_TCP: + LWIP_ASSERT("already writing or closing", msg->conn->current_msg == NULL); + msg->conn->state = NETCONN_CLOSE; + msg->msg.sd.shut = NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR; + msg->conn->current_msg = msg; +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + + if (lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(msg->conn, 0) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_NONE); + } + +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(msg->conn); +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + /* API_EVENT is called inside lwip_netconn_do_close_internal, before releasing + the application thread, so we can return at this point! */ + return; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + + default: + break; + } + + msg->conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; + } + + /* tcp netconns don't come here! */ + + /* @todo: this lets select make the socket readable and writable, + which is wrong! errfd instead? */ + API_EVENT(msg->conn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); + API_EVENT(msg->conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); + } + + if (sys_sem_valid(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg))) { + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); + } +} + +/** + * Bind a pcb contained in a netconn + * Called from netconn_bind. + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection and containing + * the IP address and port to bind to + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_bind(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + err_t err; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { +#if LWIP_RAW + + case NETCONN_RAW: + err = raw_bind(msg->conn->pcb.raw, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +#if LWIP_UDP + + case NETCONN_UDP: + err = udp_bind(msg->conn->pcb.udp, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr), msg->msg.bc.port); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + case NETCONN_TCP: + err = tcp_bind(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr), msg->msg.bc.port); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + + default: + err = ERR_VAL; + break; + } + } else { + err = ERR_VAL; + } + + msg->err = err; + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} +/** + * Bind a pcb contained in a netconn to an interface + * Called from netconn_bind_if. + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection and containing + * the IP address and port to bind to + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_bind_if(void *m) +{ + struct netif *netif; + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + err_t err; + + netif = netif_get_by_index(msg->msg.bc.if_idx); + + if ((netif != NULL) && (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL)) { + err = ERR_OK; + + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { +#if LWIP_RAW + + case NETCONN_RAW: + raw_bind_netif(msg->conn->pcb.raw, netif); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +#if LWIP_UDP + + case NETCONN_UDP: + udp_bind_netif(msg->conn->pcb.udp, netif); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + case NETCONN_TCP: + tcp_bind_netif(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, netif); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + + default: + err = ERR_VAL; + break; + } + } else { + err = ERR_VAL; + } + + msg->err = err; + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} + +#if LWIP_TCP +/** + * TCP callback function if a connection (opened by tcp_connect/lwip_netconn_do_connect) has + * been established (or reset by the remote host). + * + * @see tcp.h (struct tcp_pcb.connected) for parameters and return values + */ +static err_t lwip_netconn_do_connected(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) +{ + struct netconn *conn; + int was_blocking; + sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem = NULL; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + conn = (struct netconn *)arg; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->state == NETCONN_CONNECT", conn->state == NETCONN_CONNECT); + LWIP_ASSERT("(conn->current_msg != NULL) || conn->in_non_blocking_connect", + (conn->current_msg != NULL) || IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn)); + + if (conn->current_msg != NULL) { + conn->current_msg->err = err; + op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(conn->current_msg); + } + + if ((NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) && (err == ERR_OK)) { + setup_tcp(conn); + } + + was_blocking = !IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn); + SET_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(conn, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("blocking connect state error", + (was_blocking && op_completed_sem != NULL) || + (!was_blocking && op_completed_sem == NULL)); + conn->current_msg = NULL; + conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, 0); + + if (was_blocking) { + sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +/** + * Connect a pcb contained inside a netconn + * Called from netconn_connect. + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection and containing + * the IP address and port to connect to + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_connect(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + err_t err; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp == NULL) { + /* This may happen when calling netconn_connect() a second time */ + err = ERR_CLSD; + } else { + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { +#if LWIP_RAW + + case NETCONN_RAW: + err = raw_connect(msg->conn->pcb.raw, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +#if LWIP_UDP + + case NETCONN_UDP: + err = udp_connect(msg->conn->pcb.udp, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr), msg->msg.bc.port); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + case NETCONN_TCP: + + /* Prevent connect while doing any other action. */ + if (msg->conn->state == NETCONN_CONNECT) { + err = ERR_ALREADY; + } else if (msg->conn->state != NETCONN_NONE) { + err = ERR_ISCONN; + } else { + setup_tcp(msg->conn); + err = tcp_connect(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.bc.ipaddr), + msg->msg.bc.port, lwip_netconn_do_connected); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + u8_t non_blocking = netconn_is_nonblocking(msg->conn); + msg->conn->state = NETCONN_CONNECT; + SET_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT(msg->conn, non_blocking); + + if (non_blocking) { + err = ERR_INPROGRESS; + } else { + msg->conn->current_msg = msg; + /* sys_sem_signal() is called from lwip_netconn_do_connected (or err_tcp()), + when the connection is established! */ +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_CONNECT); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state != NETCONN_CONNECT); +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + return; + } + } + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + + default: + LWIP_ERROR( + "Invalid netconn type", 0, do { + err = ERR_VAL; + } while (0)); + + break; + } + } + + msg->err = err; + /* For all other protocols, netconn_connect() calls netconn_apimsg(), + so use TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK() here. */ + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} + +/** + * Disconnect a pcb contained inside a netconn + * Only used for UDP netconns. + * Called from netconn_disconnect. + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection to disconnect + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_disconnect(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + +#if LWIP_UDP + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_UDP) { + udp_disconnect(msg->conn->pcb.udp); + msg->err = ERR_OK; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + { + msg->err = ERR_VAL; + } + + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} + +#if LWIP_TCP +/** + * Set a TCP pcb contained in a netconn into listen mode + * Called from netconn_listen. + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_listen(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + err_t err; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { + if (msg->conn->state == NETCONN_NONE) { + struct tcp_pcb *lpcb; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp->state != CLOSED) { + /* connection is not closed, cannot listen */ + err = ERR_VAL; + } else { + u8_t backlog; +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + backlog = msg->msg.lb.backlog; +#else /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + backlog = TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG; +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + /* "Socket API like" dual-stack support: If IP to listen to is IP6_ADDR_ANY, + * and NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY is NOT set, use IP_ANY_TYPE to listen + */ + if (ip_addr_cmp(&msg->conn->pcb.ip->local_ip, IP6_ADDR_ANY) && + (netconn_get_ipv6only(msg->conn) == 0)) { + /* change PCB type to IPADDR_TYPE_ANY */ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(msg->conn->pcb.tcp->local_ip, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(msg->conn->pcb.tcp->remote_ip, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + lpcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, backlog, &err); + + if (lpcb == NULL) { + /* in this case, the old pcb is still allocated */ + } else { + /* delete the recvmbox and allocate the acceptmbox */ + if (sys_mbox_valid(&msg->conn->recvmbox)) { + /** @todo: should we drain the recvmbox here? */ + sys_mbox_free(&msg->conn->recvmbox); + sys_mbox_set_invalid(&msg->conn->recvmbox); + } + + err = ERR_OK; + + if (!sys_mbox_valid(&msg->conn->acceptmbox)) { + err = sys_mbox_new(&msg->conn->acceptmbox, DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE); + } + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + msg->conn->state = NETCONN_LISTEN; + msg->conn->pcb.tcp = lpcb; + tcp_arg(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, msg->conn); + tcp_accept(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, accept_function); + } else { + /* since the old pcb is already deallocated, free lpcb now */ + tcp_close(lpcb); + msg->conn->pcb.tcp = NULL; + } + } + } + } else if (msg->conn->state == NETCONN_LISTEN) { + /* already listening, allow updating of the backlog */ + err = ERR_OK; + tcp_backlog_set(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, msg->msg.lb.backlog); + } else { + err = ERR_CONN; + } + } else { + err = ERR_ARG; + } + } else { + err = ERR_CONN; + } + + msg->err = err; + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +/** + * Send some data on a RAW or UDP pcb contained in a netconn + * Called from netconn_send + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_send(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + + err_t err = netconn_err(msg->conn); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { +#if LWIP_RAW + + case NETCONN_RAW: + if (ip_addr_isany(&msg->msg.b->addr) || IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(msg->msg.b->addr)) { + err = raw_send(msg->conn->pcb.raw, msg->msg.b->p); + } else { + err = raw_sendto(msg->conn->pcb.raw, msg->msg.b->p, &msg->msg.b->addr); + } + + break; +#endif +#if LWIP_UDP + + case NETCONN_UDP: +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + if (ip_addr_isany(&msg->msg.b->addr) || IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(msg->msg.b->addr)) { + err = udp_send_chksum(msg->conn->pcb.udp, msg->msg.b->p, + msg->msg.b->flags & NETBUF_FLAG_CHKSUM, msg->msg.b->toport_chksum); + } else { + err = udp_sendto_chksum(msg->conn->pcb.udp, msg->msg.b->p, + &msg->msg.b->addr, msg->msg.b->port, + msg->msg.b->flags & NETBUF_FLAG_CHKSUM, msg->msg.b->toport_chksum); + } + +#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + if (ip_addr_isany_val(msg->msg.b->addr) || IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(msg->msg.b->addr)) { + err = udp_send(msg->conn->pcb.udp, msg->msg.b->p); + } else { + err = udp_sendto(msg->conn->pcb.udp, msg->msg.b->p, &msg->msg.b->addr, msg->msg.b->port); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + + default: + err = ERR_CONN; + break; + } + } else { + err = ERR_CONN; + } + } + + msg->err = err; + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} + +#if LWIP_TCP +/** + * Indicate data has been received from a TCP pcb contained in a netconn + * Called from netconn_recv + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_recv(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + + msg->err = ERR_OK; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { + size_t remaining = msg->msg.r.len; + + do { + u16_t recved = (u16_t)((remaining > 0xffff) ? 0xffff : remaining); + tcp_recved(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, recved); + remaining -= recved; + } while (remaining != 0); + } + } + + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} + +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG +/** Indicate that a TCP pcb has been accepted + * Called from netconn_accept + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_accepted(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + + msg->err = ERR_OK; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { + tcp_backlog_accepted(msg->conn->pcb.tcp); + } + } + + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + +/** + * See if more data needs to be written from a previous call to netconn_write. + * Called initially from lwip_netconn_do_write. If the first call can't send all data + * (because of low memory or empty send-buffer), this function is called again + * from sent_tcp() or poll_tcp() to send more data. If all data is sent, the + * blocking application thread (waiting in netconn_write) is released. + * + * @param conn netconn (that is currently in state NETCONN_WRITE) to process + * @return ERR_OK + * ERR_MEM if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING=1 and sending hasn't yet finished + */ +static err_t lwip_netconn_do_writemore(struct netconn *conn WRITE_DELAYED_PARAM) +{ + err_t err; + const void *dataptr; + u16_t len, available; + u8_t write_finished = 0; + size_t diff; + u8_t dontblock; + u8_t apiflags; + u8_t write_more; + + LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", conn != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE", (conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE)); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg != NULL", conn->current_msg != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->pcb.tcp != NULL", conn->pcb.tcp != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset < conn->current_msg->msg.w.len", + conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset < conn->current_msg->msg.w.len); + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt > 0", conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt > 0); + + apiflags = conn->current_msg->msg.w.apiflags; + dontblock = netconn_is_nonblocking(conn) || (apiflags & NETCONN_DONTBLOCK); + +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO + + if ((conn->send_timeout != 0) && + ((s32_t)(sys_now() - conn->current_msg->msg.w.time_started) >= conn->send_timeout)) { + write_finished = 1; + + if (conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset == 0) { + /* nothing has been written */ + err = ERR_WOULDBLOCK; + } else { + /* partial write */ + err = ERR_OK; + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ + { + do { + dataptr = (const u8_t *)conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector->ptr + conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off; + diff = conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector->len - conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off; + + if (diff > 0xffffUL) /* max_u16_t */ + { + len = 0xffff; + apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; + } else { + len = (u16_t)diff; + } + + available = tcp_sndbuf(conn->pcb.tcp); + + if (available < len) { + /* don't try to write more than sendbuf */ + len = available; + + if (dontblock) { + if (!len) { + /* set error according to partial write or not */ + err = (conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset == 0) ? ERR_WOULDBLOCK : ERR_OK; + goto err_mem; + } + } else { + apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; + } + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("lwip_netconn_do_writemore: invalid length!", + ((conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off + len) <= conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector->len)); + + /* we should loop around for more sending in the following cases: + 1) We couldn't finish the current vector because of 16-bit size limitations. + tcp_write() and tcp_sndbuf() both are limited to 16-bit sizes + 2) We are sending the remainder of the current vector and have more */ + if ((len == 0xffff && diff > 0xffffUL) || + (len == (u16_t)diff && conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt > 1)) { + write_more = 1; + apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; + } else { + write_more = 0; + } + + err = tcp_write(conn->pcb.tcp, dataptr, len, apiflags); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset += len; + conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off += len; + + /* check if current vector is finished */ + if (conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off == conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector->len) { + conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt--; + + /* if we have additional vectors, move on to them */ + if (conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_cnt > 0) { + conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector++; + conn->current_msg->msg.w.vector_off = 0; + } + } + } + } while (write_more && err == ERR_OK); + + /* if OK or memory error, check available space */ + if ((err == ERR_OK) || (err == ERR_MEM)) { + err_mem: + + if (dontblock && (conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset < conn->current_msg->msg.w.len)) { + /* non-blocking write did not write everything: mark the pcb non-writable + and let poll_tcp check writable space to mark the pcb writable again */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDMINUS, 0); + conn->flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE; + } else if ((tcp_sndbuf(conn->pcb.tcp) <= TCP_SNDLOWAT) || + (tcp_sndqueuelen(conn->pcb.tcp) >= TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT)) { + /* The queued byte- or pbuf-count exceeds the configured low-water limit, + let select mark this pcb as non-writable. */ + API_EVENT(conn, NETCONN_EVT_SENDMINUS, 0); + } + } + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + err_t out_err; + + if ((conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset == conn->current_msg->msg.w.len) || dontblock) { + /* return sent length (caller reads length from msg.w.offset) */ + write_finished = 1; + } + + out_err = tcp_output(conn->pcb.tcp); + + if (out_err == ERR_RTE) { + /* If tcp_output fails because no route is found, + don't try writing any more but return the error + to the application thread. */ + err = out_err; + write_finished = 1; + } + } else if (err == ERR_MEM) { + /* If ERR_MEM, we wait for sent_tcp or poll_tcp to be called. + For blocking sockets, we do NOT return to the application + thread, since ERR_MEM is only a temporary error! Non-blocking + will remain non-writable until sent_tcp/poll_tcp is called */ + + /* tcp_write returned ERR_MEM, try tcp_output anyway */ + err_t out_err = tcp_output(conn->pcb.tcp); + + if (out_err == ERR_RTE) { + /* If tcp_output fails because no route is found, + don't try writing any more but return the error + to the application thread. */ + err = out_err; + write_finished = 1; + } else if (dontblock) { + /* non-blocking write is done on ERR_MEM, set error according + to partial write or not */ + err = (conn->current_msg->msg.w.offset == 0) ? ERR_WOULDBLOCK : ERR_OK; + write_finished = 1; + } + } else { + /* On errors != ERR_MEM, we don't try writing any more but return + the error to the application thread. */ + write_finished = 1; + } + } + + if (write_finished) { + /* everything was written: set back connection state + and back to application task */ + sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(conn->current_msg); + conn->current_msg->err = err; + conn->current_msg = NULL; + conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + + if (delayed) +#endif + { + sys_sem_signal(op_completed_sem); + } + } +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + else { + return ERR_MEM; + } + +#endif + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +/** + * Send some data on a TCP pcb contained in a netconn + * Called from netconn_write + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_write(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + + err_t err = netconn_err(msg->conn); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) { +#if LWIP_TCP + + if (msg->conn->state != NETCONN_NONE) { + /* netconn is connecting, closing or in blocking write */ + err = ERR_INPROGRESS; + } else if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + msg->conn->state = NETCONN_WRITE; + /* set all the variables used by lwip_netconn_do_writemore */ + LWIP_ASSERT("already writing or closing", msg->conn->current_msg == NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("msg->msg.w.len != 0", msg->msg.w.len != 0); + msg->conn->current_msg = msg; +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + + if (lwip_netconn_do_writemore(msg->conn, 0) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_WRITE); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state != NETCONN_WRITE); + } + +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + lwip_netconn_do_writemore(msg->conn); +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + /* for both cases: if lwip_netconn_do_writemore was called, don't ACK the APIMSG + since lwip_netconn_do_writemore ACKs it! */ + return; + } else { + err = ERR_CONN; + } + +#else /* LWIP_TCP */ + err = ERR_VAL; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) + } else { + err = ERR_VAL; +#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ + } + } + + msg->err = err; + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} + +/** + * Return a connection's local or remote address + * Called from netconn_getaddr + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_getaddr(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.ip != NULL) { + if (msg->msg.ad.local) { + ip_addr_copy(API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.ipaddr), + msg->conn->pcb.ip->local_ip); + } else { + ip_addr_copy(API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.ipaddr), + msg->conn->pcb.ip->remote_ip); + } + + msg->err = ERR_OK; + + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type)) { +#if LWIP_RAW + + case NETCONN_RAW: + if (msg->msg.ad.local) { + API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.port) = msg->conn->pcb.raw->protocol; + } else { + /* return an error as connecting is only a helper for upper layers */ + msg->err = ERR_CONN; + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +#if LWIP_UDP + + case NETCONN_UDP: + if (msg->msg.ad.local) { + API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.port) = msg->conn->pcb.udp->local_port; + } else { + if ((msg->conn->pcb.udp->flags & UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED) == 0) { + msg->err = ERR_CONN; + } else { + API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.port) = msg->conn->pcb.udp->remote_port; + } + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + case NETCONN_TCP: + if ((msg->msg.ad.local == 0) && + ((msg->conn->pcb.tcp->state == CLOSED) || (msg->conn->pcb.tcp->state == LISTEN))) { + /* pcb is not connected and remote name is requested */ + msg->err = ERR_CONN; + } else { + API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->msg.ad.port) = (msg->msg.ad.local ? msg->conn->pcb.tcp->local_port : msg->conn->pcb.tcp->remote_port); + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid netconn_type", 0); + break; + } + } else { + msg->err = ERR_CONN; + } + + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} + +/** + * Close or half-shutdown a TCP pcb contained in a netconn + * Called from netconn_close + * In contrast to closing sockets, the netconn is not deallocated. + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_close(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + +#if LWIP_TCP + enum netconn_state state = msg->conn->state; + + /* First check if this is a TCP netconn and if it is in a correct state + (LISTEN doesn't support half shutdown) */ + if ((msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) && + (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_TCP) && + ((msg->msg.sd.shut == NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR) || (state != NETCONN_LISTEN))) { + /* Check if we are in a connected state */ + if (state == NETCONN_CONNECT) { + /* TCP connect in progress: cannot shutdown */ + msg->err = ERR_CONN; + } else if (state == NETCONN_WRITE) { +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + + if (msg->msg.sd.shut & NETCONN_SHUT_WR) { + /* close requested, abort running write */ + sys_sem_t *write_completed_sem; + LWIP_ASSERT("msg->conn->current_msg != NULL", msg->conn->current_msg != NULL); + write_completed_sem = LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg->conn->current_msg); + msg->conn->current_msg->err = ERR_CLSD; + msg->conn->current_msg = NULL; + msg->conn->state = NETCONN_NONE; + state = NETCONN_NONE; + sys_sem_signal(write_completed_sem); + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("msg->msg.sd.shut == NETCONN_SHUT_RD", msg->msg.sd.shut == NETCONN_SHUT_RD); + /* In this case, let the write continue and do not interfere with + conn->current_msg or conn->state! */ + msg->err = tcp_shutdown(msg->conn->pcb.tcp, 1, 0); + } + } + + if (state == NETCONN_NONE) { +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + msg->err = ERR_INPROGRESS; + } else { +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + + if (msg->msg.sd.shut & NETCONN_SHUT_RD) { +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + /* Mark mboxes invalid */ + netconn_mark_mbox_invalid(msg->conn); +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + netconn_drain(msg->conn); +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("already writing or closing", msg->conn->current_msg == NULL); + msg->conn->state = NETCONN_CLOSE; + msg->conn->current_msg = msg; +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + + if (lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(msg->conn, 0) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_CLOSE); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + LWIP_ASSERT("state!", msg->conn->state == NETCONN_NONE); + } + +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + lwip_netconn_do_close_internal(msg->conn); +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + /* for tcp netconns, lwip_netconn_do_close_internal ACKs the message */ + return; + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + { + msg->err = ERR_CONN; + } + + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} + +#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) +/** + * Join multicast groups for UDP netconns. + * Called from netconn_join_leave_group + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + + msg->err = ERR_CONN; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_UDP) { +#if LWIP_UDP +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD + + if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(msg->conn->type)) { + if (msg->msg.jl.join_or_leave == NETCONN_JOIN) { + msg->err = mld6_joingroup(ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.netif_addr)), + ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); + } else { + msg->err = mld6_leavegroup(ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.netif_addr)), + ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + { +#if LWIP_IGMP + + if (msg->msg.jl.join_or_leave == NETCONN_JOIN) { + msg->err = igmp_joingroup(ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.netif_addr)), + ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); + } else { + msg->err = igmp_leavegroup(ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.netif_addr)), + ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + } + +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if (LWIP_TCP || LWIP_RAW) + } else { + msg->err = ERR_VAL; +#endif /* (LWIP_TCP || LWIP_RAW) */ + } + } + + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} +/** + * Join multicast groups for UDP netconns. + * Called from netconn_join_leave_group_netif + * + * @param m the api_msg pointing to the connection + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group_netif(void *m) +{ + struct api_msg *msg = (struct api_msg *)m; + struct netif *netif; + + netif = netif_get_by_index(msg->msg.jl.if_idx); + + if (netif == NULL) { + msg->err = ERR_IF; + goto done; + } + + msg->err = ERR_CONN; + + if (msg->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) { + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(msg->conn->type) == NETCONN_UDP) { +#if LWIP_UDP +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD + + if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(msg->conn->type)) { + if (msg->msg.jl.join_or_leave == NETCONN_JOIN) { + msg->err = mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, + ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); + } else { + msg->err = mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, + ip_2_ip6(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + { +#if LWIP_IGMP + + if (msg->msg.jl.join_or_leave == NETCONN_JOIN) { + msg->err = igmp_joingroup_netif(netif, + ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); + } else { + msg->err = igmp_leavegroup_netif(netif, + ip_2_ip4(API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.jl.multiaddr))); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + } + +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if (LWIP_TCP || LWIP_RAW) + } else { + msg->err = ERR_VAL; +#endif /* (LWIP_TCP || LWIP_RAW) */ + } + } + +done: + TCPIP_APIMSG_ACK(msg); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ + +#if LWIP_DNS +/** + * Callback function that is called when DNS name is resolved + * (or on timeout). A waiting application thread is waked up by + * signaling the semaphore. + */ +static void lwip_netconn_do_dns_found(const char *name, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg) +{ + struct dns_api_msg *msg = (struct dns_api_msg *)arg; + + /* we trust the internal implementation to be correct :-) */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); + + if (ipaddr == NULL) { + /* timeout or memory error */ + API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) = ERR_VAL; + } else { + /* address was resolved */ + API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) = ERR_OK; + API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->addr) = *ipaddr; + } + + /* wake up the application task waiting in netconn_gethostbyname */ + sys_sem_signal(API_EXPR_REF_SEM(msg->sem)); +} + +/** + * Execute a DNS query + * Called from netconn_gethostbyname + * + * @param arg the dns_api_msg pointing to the query + */ +void lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname(void *arg) +{ + struct dns_api_msg *msg = (struct dns_api_msg *)arg; + u8_t addrtype = +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + msg->dns_addrtype; +#else + LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT; +#endif + + API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) = dns_gethostbyname_addrtype(msg->name, + API_EXPR_REF(msg->addr), lwip_netconn_do_dns_found, msg, addrtype); +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + + /* For core locking, only block if we need to wait for answer/timeout */ + if (API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) == ERR_INPROGRESS) { + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + sys_sem_wait(API_EXPR_REF_SEM(msg->sem)); + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + LWIP_ASSERT("do_gethostbyname still in progress!!", API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) != ERR_INPROGRESS); + } + +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + if (API_EXPR_DEREF(msg->err) != ERR_INPROGRESS) { + /* on error or immediate success, wake up the application + * task waiting in netconn_gethostbyname */ + sys_sem_signal(API_EXPR_REF_SEM(msg->sem)); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +} +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/api/err.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/err.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/api/err.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/err.c index 92b5dddb..8c9314e2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/api/err.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/err.c @@ -1,115 +1,115 @@ -/** - * @file - * Error Management module - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" - -#include "lwip/errno.h" - -#if !NO_SYS -/** Table to quickly map an lwIP error (err_t) to a socket error - * by using -err as an index */ -static const int err_to_errno_table[] = { - 0, /* ERR_OK 0 No error, everything OK. */ - ENOMEM, /* ERR_MEM -1 Out of memory error. */ - ENOBUFS, /* ERR_BUF -2 Buffer error. */ - EWOULDBLOCK, /* ERR_TIMEOUT -3 Timeout */ - EHOSTUNREACH, /* ERR_RTE -4 Routing problem. */ - EINPROGRESS, /* ERR_INPROGRESS -5 Operation in progress */ - EINVAL, /* ERR_VAL -6 Illegal value. */ - EWOULDBLOCK, /* ERR_WOULDBLOCK -7 Operation would block. */ - EADDRINUSE, /* ERR_USE -8 Address in use. */ - EALREADY, /* ERR_ALREADY -9 Already connecting. */ - EISCONN, /* ERR_ISCONN -10 Conn already established.*/ - ENOTCONN, /* ERR_CONN -11 Not connected. */ - -1, /* ERR_IF -12 Low-level netif error */ - ECONNABORTED, /* ERR_ABRT -13 Connection aborted. */ - ECONNRESET, /* ERR_RST -14 Connection reset. */ - ENOTCONN, /* ERR_CLSD -15 Connection closed. */ - EIO /* ERR_ARG -16 Illegal argument. */ -}; - -int err_to_errno(err_t err) -{ - if ((err > 0) || (-err >= (err_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(err_to_errno_table))) { - return EIO; - } - - return err_to_errno_table[-err]; -} -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - -static const char *err_strerr[] = { - "Ok.", /* ERR_OK 0 */ - "Out of memory error.", /* ERR_MEM -1 */ - "Buffer error.", /* ERR_BUF -2 */ - "Timeout.", /* ERR_TIMEOUT -3 */ - "Routing problem.", /* ERR_RTE -4 */ - "Operation in progress.", /* ERR_INPROGRESS -5 */ - "Illegal value.", /* ERR_VAL -6 */ - "Operation would block.", /* ERR_WOULDBLOCK -7 */ - "Address in use.", /* ERR_USE -8 */ - "Already connecting.", /* ERR_ALREADY -9 */ - "Already connected.", /* ERR_ISCONN -10 */ - "Not connected.", /* ERR_CONN -11 */ - "Low-level netif error.", /* ERR_IF -12 */ - "Connection aborted.", /* ERR_ABRT -13 */ - "Connection reset.", /* ERR_RST -14 */ - "Connection closed.", /* ERR_CLSD -15 */ - "Illegal argument." /* ERR_ARG -16 */ -}; - -/** - * Convert an lwip internal error to a string representation. - * - * @param err an lwip internal err_t - * @return a string representation for err - */ -const char *lwip_strerr(err_t err) -{ - if ((err > 0) || (-err >= (err_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(err_strerr))) { - return "Unknown error."; - } - - return err_strerr[-err]; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ +/** + * @file + * Error Management module + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" + +#include "lwip/errno.h" + +#if !NO_SYS +/** Table to quickly map an lwIP error (err_t) to a socket error + * by using -err as an index */ +static const int err_to_errno_table[] = { + 0, /* ERR_OK 0 No error, everything OK. */ + ENOMEM, /* ERR_MEM -1 Out of memory error. */ + ENOBUFS, /* ERR_BUF -2 Buffer error. */ + EWOULDBLOCK, /* ERR_TIMEOUT -3 Timeout */ + EHOSTUNREACH, /* ERR_RTE -4 Routing problem. */ + EINPROGRESS, /* ERR_INPROGRESS -5 Operation in progress */ + EINVAL, /* ERR_VAL -6 Illegal value. */ + EWOULDBLOCK, /* ERR_WOULDBLOCK -7 Operation would block. */ + EADDRINUSE, /* ERR_USE -8 Address in use. */ + EALREADY, /* ERR_ALREADY -9 Already connecting. */ + EISCONN, /* ERR_ISCONN -10 Conn already established.*/ + ENOTCONN, /* ERR_CONN -11 Not connected. */ + -1, /* ERR_IF -12 Low-level netif error */ + ECONNABORTED, /* ERR_ABRT -13 Connection aborted. */ + ECONNRESET, /* ERR_RST -14 Connection reset. */ + ENOTCONN, /* ERR_CLSD -15 Connection closed. */ + EIO /* ERR_ARG -16 Illegal argument. */ +}; + +int err_to_errno(err_t err) +{ + if ((err > 0) || (-err >= (err_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(err_to_errno_table))) { + return EIO; + } + + return err_to_errno_table[-err]; +} +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + +static const char *err_strerr[] = { + "Ok.", /* ERR_OK 0 */ + "Out of memory error.", /* ERR_MEM -1 */ + "Buffer error.", /* ERR_BUF -2 */ + "Timeout.", /* ERR_TIMEOUT -3 */ + "Routing problem.", /* ERR_RTE -4 */ + "Operation in progress.", /* ERR_INPROGRESS -5 */ + "Illegal value.", /* ERR_VAL -6 */ + "Operation would block.", /* ERR_WOULDBLOCK -7 */ + "Address in use.", /* ERR_USE -8 */ + "Already connecting.", /* ERR_ALREADY -9 */ + "Already connected.", /* ERR_ISCONN -10 */ + "Not connected.", /* ERR_CONN -11 */ + "Low-level netif error.", /* ERR_IF -12 */ + "Connection aborted.", /* ERR_ABRT -13 */ + "Connection reset.", /* ERR_RST -14 */ + "Connection closed.", /* ERR_CLSD -15 */ + "Illegal argument." /* ERR_ARG -16 */ +}; + +/** + * Convert an lwip internal error to a string representation. + * + * @param err an lwip internal err_t + * @return a string representation for err + */ +const char *lwip_strerr(err_t err) +{ + if ((err > 0) || (-err >= (err_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(err_strerr))) { + return "Unknown error."; + } + + return err_strerr[-err]; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/api/if_api.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/if_api.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/api/if_api.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/if_api.c index 0709e231..564cf9cb 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/api/if_api.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/if_api.c @@ -1,105 +1,105 @@ -/** - * @file - * Interface Identification APIs from: - * RFC 3493: Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6 - * Section 4: Interface Identification - * - * @defgroup if_api Interface Identification API - * @ingroup socket - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Joel Cunningham, Garmin International, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Joel Cunningham - * - */ -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_SOCKET - -#include "lwip/errno.h" -#include "lwip/if_api.h" -#include "lwip/netifapi.h" -#include "lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h" - -/** - * @ingroup if_api - * Maps an interface index to its corresponding name. - * @param ifindex interface index - * @param ifname shall point to a buffer of at least {IF_NAMESIZE} bytes - * @return If ifindex is an interface index, then the function shall return the - * value supplied in ifname, which points to a buffer now containing the interface name. - * Otherwise, the function shall return a NULL pointer. - */ -char *lwip_if_indextoname(unsigned int ifindex, char *ifname) -{ -#if LWIP_NETIF_API - - if (ifindex <= 0xff) { - err_t err = netifapi_netif_index_to_name((u8_t)ifindex, ifname); - - if (!err && ifname[0] != '\0') { - return ifname; - } - } - -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ifindex); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ifname); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ - set_errno(ENXIO); - return NULL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup if_api - * Returs the interface index corresponding to name ifname. - * @param ifname Interface name - * @return The corresponding index if ifname is the name of an interface; - * otherwise, zero. - */ -unsigned int lwip_if_nametoindex(const char *ifname) -{ -#if LWIP_NETIF_API - err_t err; - u8_t idx; - - err = netifapi_netif_name_to_index(ifname, &idx); - - if (!err) { - return idx; - } - -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ifname); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ - return 0; /* invalid index */ -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ +/** + * @file + * Interface Identification APIs from: + * RFC 3493: Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6 + * Section 4: Interface Identification + * + * @defgroup if_api Interface Identification API + * @ingroup socket + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Joel Cunningham, Garmin International, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Joel Cunningham + * + */ +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_SOCKET + +#include "lwip/errno.h" +#include "lwip/if_api.h" +#include "lwip/netifapi.h" +#include "lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h" + +/** + * @ingroup if_api + * Maps an interface index to its corresponding name. + * @param ifindex interface index + * @param ifname shall point to a buffer of at least {IF_NAMESIZE} bytes + * @return If ifindex is an interface index, then the function shall return the + * value supplied in ifname, which points to a buffer now containing the interface name. + * Otherwise, the function shall return a NULL pointer. + */ +char *lwip_if_indextoname(unsigned int ifindex, char *ifname) +{ +#if LWIP_NETIF_API + + if (ifindex <= 0xff) { + err_t err = netifapi_netif_index_to_name((u8_t)ifindex, ifname); + + if (!err && ifname[0] != '\0') { + return ifname; + } + } + +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ifindex); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ifname); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ + set_errno(ENXIO); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup if_api + * Returs the interface index corresponding to name ifname. + * @param ifname Interface name + * @return The corresponding index if ifname is the name of an interface; + * otherwise, zero. + */ +unsigned int lwip_if_nametoindex(const char *ifname) +{ +#if LWIP_NETIF_API + err_t err; + u8_t idx; + + err = netifapi_netif_name_to_index(ifname, &idx); + + if (!err) { + return idx; + } + +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ifname); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ + return 0; /* invalid index */ +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/api/netbuf.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/netbuf.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/api/netbuf.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/netbuf.c index fa04e5e2..97ac5ec0 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/api/netbuf.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/netbuf.c @@ -1,260 +1,260 @@ -/** - * @file - * Network buffer management - * - * @defgroup netbuf Network buffers - * @ingroup netconn - * Network buffer descriptor for @ref netconn. Based on @ref pbuf internally - * to avoid copying data around.\n - * Buffers must not be shared accross multiple threads, all functions except - * netbuf_new() and netbuf_delete() are not thread-safe. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_NETCONN /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/netbuf.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" - -#include - -/** - * @ingroup netbuf - * Create (allocate) and initialize a new netbuf. - * The netbuf doesn't yet contain a packet buffer! - * - * @return a pointer to a new netbuf - * NULL on lack of memory - */ -struct - netbuf * - netbuf_new(void) -{ - struct netbuf *buf; - - buf = (struct netbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETBUF); - - if (buf != NULL) { - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(struct netbuf)); - } - - return buf; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netbuf - * Deallocate a netbuf allocated by netbuf_new(). - * - * @param buf pointer to a netbuf allocated by netbuf_new() - */ -void netbuf_delete(struct netbuf *buf) -{ - if (buf != NULL) { - if (buf->p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(buf->p); - buf->p = buf->ptr = NULL; - } - - memp_free(MEMP_NETBUF, buf); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup netbuf - * Allocate memory for a packet buffer for a given netbuf. - * - * @param buf the netbuf for which to allocate a packet buffer - * @param size the size of the packet buffer to allocate - * @return pointer to the allocated memory - * NULL if no memory could be allocated - */ -void *netbuf_alloc(struct netbuf *buf, u16_t size) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_alloc: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return NULL;); - - /* Deallocate any previously allocated memory. */ - if (buf->p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(buf->p); - } - - buf->p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, size, PBUF_RAM); - - if (buf->p == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold size", - (buf->p->len >= size)); - buf->ptr = buf->p; - return buf->p->payload; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netbuf - * Free the packet buffer included in a netbuf - * - * @param buf pointer to the netbuf which contains the packet buffer to free - */ -void netbuf_free(struct netbuf *buf) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_free: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return;); - - if (buf->p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(buf->p); - } - - buf->p = buf->ptr = NULL; -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - buf->flags = 0; - buf->toport_chksum = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup netbuf - * Let a netbuf reference existing (non-volatile) data. - * - * @param buf netbuf which should reference the data - * @param dataptr pointer to the data to reference - * @param size size of the data - * @return ERR_OK if data is referenced - * ERR_MEM if data couldn't be referenced due to lack of memory - */ -err_t netbuf_ref(struct netbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t size) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_ref: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - if (buf->p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(buf->p); - } - - buf->p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 0, PBUF_REF); - - if (buf->p == NULL) { - buf->ptr = NULL; - return ERR_MEM; - } - - ((struct pbuf_rom *)buf->p)->payload = dataptr; - buf->p->len = buf->p->tot_len = size; - buf->ptr = buf->p; - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netbuf - * Chain one netbuf to another (@see pbuf_chain) - * - * @param head the first netbuf - * @param tail netbuf to chain after head, freed by this function, may not be reference after returning - */ -void netbuf_chain(struct netbuf *head, struct netbuf *tail) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_chain: invalid head", (head != NULL), return;); - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_chain: invalid tail", (tail != NULL), return;); - pbuf_cat(head->p, tail->p); - head->ptr = head->p; - memp_free(MEMP_NETBUF, tail); -} - -/** - * @ingroup netbuf - * Get the data pointer and length of the data inside a netbuf. - * - * @param buf netbuf to get the data from - * @param dataptr pointer to a void pointer where to store the data pointer - * @param len pointer to an u16_t where the length of the data is stored - * @return ERR_OK if the information was retrieved, - * ERR_BUF on error. - */ -err_t netbuf_data(struct netbuf *buf, void **dataptr, u16_t *len) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_data: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_data: invalid dataptr", (dataptr != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_data: invalid len", (len != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - if (buf->ptr == NULL) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - *dataptr = buf->ptr->payload; - *len = buf->ptr->len; - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netbuf - * Move the current data pointer of a packet buffer contained in a netbuf - * to the next part. - * The packet buffer itself is not modified. - * - * @param buf the netbuf to modify - * @return -1 if there is no next part - * 1 if moved to the next part but now there is no next part - * 0 if moved to the next part and there are still more parts - */ -s8_t netbuf_next(struct netbuf *buf) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_next: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return -1;); - - if (buf->ptr->next == NULL) { - return -1; - } - - buf->ptr = buf->ptr->next; - - if (buf->ptr->next == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netbuf - * Move the current data pointer of a packet buffer contained in a netbuf - * to the beginning of the packet. - * The packet buffer itself is not modified. - * - * @param buf the netbuf to modify - */ -void netbuf_first(struct netbuf *buf) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_first: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return;); - buf->ptr = buf->p; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN */ +/** + * @file + * Network buffer management + * + * @defgroup netbuf Network buffers + * @ingroup netconn + * Network buffer descriptor for @ref netconn. Based on @ref pbuf internally + * to avoid copying data around.\n + * Buffers must not be shared accross multiple threads, all functions except + * netbuf_new() and netbuf_delete() are not thread-safe. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_NETCONN /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/netbuf.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" + +#include + +/** + * @ingroup netbuf + * Create (allocate) and initialize a new netbuf. + * The netbuf doesn't yet contain a packet buffer! + * + * @return a pointer to a new netbuf + * NULL on lack of memory + */ +struct + netbuf * + netbuf_new(void) +{ + struct netbuf *buf; + + buf = (struct netbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETBUF); + + if (buf != NULL) { + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(struct netbuf)); + } + + return buf; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netbuf + * Deallocate a netbuf allocated by netbuf_new(). + * + * @param buf pointer to a netbuf allocated by netbuf_new() + */ +void netbuf_delete(struct netbuf *buf) +{ + if (buf != NULL) { + if (buf->p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(buf->p); + buf->p = buf->ptr = NULL; + } + + memp_free(MEMP_NETBUF, buf); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup netbuf + * Allocate memory for a packet buffer for a given netbuf. + * + * @param buf the netbuf for which to allocate a packet buffer + * @param size the size of the packet buffer to allocate + * @return pointer to the allocated memory + * NULL if no memory could be allocated + */ +void *netbuf_alloc(struct netbuf *buf, u16_t size) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_alloc: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return NULL;); + + /* Deallocate any previously allocated memory. */ + if (buf->p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(buf->p); + } + + buf->p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, size, PBUF_RAM); + + if (buf->p == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold size", + (buf->p->len >= size)); + buf->ptr = buf->p; + return buf->p->payload; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netbuf + * Free the packet buffer included in a netbuf + * + * @param buf pointer to the netbuf which contains the packet buffer to free + */ +void netbuf_free(struct netbuf *buf) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_free: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return;); + + if (buf->p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(buf->p); + } + + buf->p = buf->ptr = NULL; +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + buf->flags = 0; + buf->toport_chksum = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup netbuf + * Let a netbuf reference existing (non-volatile) data. + * + * @param buf netbuf which should reference the data + * @param dataptr pointer to the data to reference + * @param size size of the data + * @return ERR_OK if data is referenced + * ERR_MEM if data couldn't be referenced due to lack of memory + */ +err_t netbuf_ref(struct netbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t size) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_ref: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + if (buf->p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(buf->p); + } + + buf->p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 0, PBUF_REF); + + if (buf->p == NULL) { + buf->ptr = NULL; + return ERR_MEM; + } + + ((struct pbuf_rom *)buf->p)->payload = dataptr; + buf->p->len = buf->p->tot_len = size; + buf->ptr = buf->p; + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netbuf + * Chain one netbuf to another (@see pbuf_chain) + * + * @param head the first netbuf + * @param tail netbuf to chain after head, freed by this function, may not be reference after returning + */ +void netbuf_chain(struct netbuf *head, struct netbuf *tail) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_chain: invalid head", (head != NULL), return;); + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_chain: invalid tail", (tail != NULL), return;); + pbuf_cat(head->p, tail->p); + head->ptr = head->p; + memp_free(MEMP_NETBUF, tail); +} + +/** + * @ingroup netbuf + * Get the data pointer and length of the data inside a netbuf. + * + * @param buf netbuf to get the data from + * @param dataptr pointer to a void pointer where to store the data pointer + * @param len pointer to an u16_t where the length of the data is stored + * @return ERR_OK if the information was retrieved, + * ERR_BUF on error. + */ +err_t netbuf_data(struct netbuf *buf, void **dataptr, u16_t *len) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_data: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_data: invalid dataptr", (dataptr != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_data: invalid len", (len != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + if (buf->ptr == NULL) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + *dataptr = buf->ptr->payload; + *len = buf->ptr->len; + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netbuf + * Move the current data pointer of a packet buffer contained in a netbuf + * to the next part. + * The packet buffer itself is not modified. + * + * @param buf the netbuf to modify + * @return -1 if there is no next part + * 1 if moved to the next part but now there is no next part + * 0 if moved to the next part and there are still more parts + */ +s8_t netbuf_next(struct netbuf *buf) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_next: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return -1;); + + if (buf->ptr->next == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + buf->ptr = buf->ptr->next; + + if (buf->ptr->next == NULL) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netbuf + * Move the current data pointer of a packet buffer contained in a netbuf + * to the beginning of the packet. + * The packet buffer itself is not modified. + * + * @param buf the netbuf to modify + */ +void netbuf_first(struct netbuf *buf) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("netbuf_first: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return;); + buf->ptr = buf->p; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/api/netdb.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/netdb.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/api/netdb.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/netdb.c index 9e7e3730..70852cf2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/api/netdb.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/netdb.c @@ -1,438 +1,438 @@ -/** - * @file - * API functions for name resolving - * - * @defgroup netdbapi NETDB API - * @ingroup socket - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include "lwip/netdb.h" - -#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" - -#include /* memset */ -#include /* atoi */ - -/** helper struct for gethostbyname_r to access the char* buffer */ -struct gethostbyname_r_helper { - ip_addr_t *addr_list[2]; - ip_addr_t addr; - char *aliases; -}; - -/** h_errno is exported in netdb.h for access by applications. */ -#if LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO -int h_errno; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO */ - -/** define "hostent" variables storage: 0 if we use a static (but unprotected) - * set of variables for lwip_gethostbyname, 1 if we use a local storage */ -#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE -#define LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE 0 -#endif - -/** define "hostent" variables storage */ -#if LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE -#define HOSTENT_STORAGE -#else -#define HOSTENT_STORAGE static -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_STATIC_HOSTENT */ - -/** - * Returns an entry containing addresses of address family AF_INET - * for the host with name name. - * Due to dns_gethostbyname limitations, only one address is returned. - * - * @param name the hostname to resolve - * @return an entry containing addresses of address family AF_INET - * for the host with name name - */ -struct hostent * -lwip_gethostbyname(const char *name) -{ - err_t err; - ip_addr_t addr; - - /* buffer variables for lwip_gethostbyname() */ - HOSTENT_STORAGE struct hostent s_hostent; - HOSTENT_STORAGE char *s_aliases; - HOSTENT_STORAGE ip_addr_t s_hostent_addr; - HOSTENT_STORAGE ip_addr_t *s_phostent_addr[2]; - HOSTENT_STORAGE char s_hostname[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 1]; - - /* query host IP address */ - err = netconn_gethostbyname(name, &addr); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("lwip_gethostbyname(%s) failed, err=%d\n", name, err)); - h_errno = HOST_NOT_FOUND; - return NULL; - } - - /* fill hostent */ - s_hostent_addr = addr; - s_phostent_addr[0] = &s_hostent_addr; - s_phostent_addr[1] = NULL; - strncpy(s_hostname, name, DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH); - s_hostname[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH] = 0; - s_hostent.h_name = s_hostname; - s_aliases = NULL; - s_hostent.h_aliases = &s_aliases; - s_hostent.h_addrtype = AF_INET; - s_hostent.h_length = sizeof(ip_addr_t); - s_hostent.h_addr_list = (char **)&s_phostent_addr; - -#if DNS_DEBUG - /* dump hostent */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_name == %s\n", s_hostent.h_name)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_aliases == %p\n", (void *)s_hostent.h_aliases)); - /* h_aliases are always empty */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_addrtype == %d\n", s_hostent.h_addrtype)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_length == %d\n", s_hostent.h_length)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_addr_list == %p\n", (void *)s_hostent.h_addr_list)); - - if (s_hostent.h_addr_list != NULL) { - u8_t idx; - - for (idx = 0; s_hostent.h_addr_list[idx]; idx++) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_addr_list[%i] == %p\n", idx, s_hostent.h_addr_list[idx])); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_addr_list[%i]-> == %s\n", idx, ipaddr_ntoa((ip_addr_t *)s_hostent.h_addr_list[idx]))); - } - } - -#endif /* DNS_DEBUG */ - -#if LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE - /* this function should return the "per-thread" hostent after copy from s_hostent */ - return sys_thread_hostent(&s_hostent); -#else - return &s_hostent; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE */ -} - -/** - * Thread-safe variant of lwip_gethostbyname: instead of using a static - * buffer, this function takes buffer and errno pointers as arguments - * and uses these for the result. - * - * @param name the hostname to resolve - * @param ret pre-allocated struct where to store the result - * @param buf pre-allocated buffer where to store additional data - * @param buflen the size of buf - * @param result pointer to a hostent pointer that is set to ret on success - * and set to zero on error - * @param h_errnop pointer to an int where to store errors (instead of modifying - * the global h_errno) - * @return 0 on success, non-zero on error, additional error information - * is stored in *h_errnop instead of h_errno to be thread-safe - */ -int lwip_gethostbyname_r(const char *name, struct hostent *ret, char *buf, - size_t buflen, struct hostent **result, int *h_errnop) -{ - err_t err; - struct gethostbyname_r_helper *h; - char *hostname; - size_t namelen; - int lh_errno; - - if (h_errnop == NULL) { - /* ensure h_errnop is never NULL */ - h_errnop = &lh_errno; - } - - if (result == NULL) { - /* not all arguments given */ - *h_errnop = EINVAL; - return -1; - } - - /* first thing to do: set *result to nothing */ - *result = NULL; - - if ((name == NULL) || (ret == NULL) || (buf == NULL)) { - /* not all arguments given */ - *h_errnop = EINVAL; - return -1; - } - - namelen = strlen(name); - - if (buflen < (sizeof(struct gethostbyname_r_helper) + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER(namelen + 1))) { - /* buf can't hold the data needed + a copy of name */ - *h_errnop = ERANGE; - return -1; - } - - h = (struct gethostbyname_r_helper *)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(buf); - hostname = ((char *)h) + sizeof(struct gethostbyname_r_helper); - - /* query host IP address */ - err = netconn_gethostbyname(name, &h->addr); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("lwip_gethostbyname(%s) failed, err=%d\n", name, err)); - *h_errnop = HOST_NOT_FOUND; - return -1; - } - - /* copy the hostname into buf */ - MEMCPY(hostname, name, namelen); - hostname[namelen] = 0; - - /* fill hostent */ - h->addr_list[0] = &h->addr; - h->addr_list[1] = NULL; - h->aliases = NULL; - ret->h_name = hostname; - ret->h_aliases = &h->aliases; - ret->h_addrtype = AF_INET; - ret->h_length = sizeof(ip_addr_t); - ret->h_addr_list = (char **)&h->addr_list; - - /* set result != NULL */ - *result = ret; - - /* return success */ - return 0; -} - -/** - * Frees one or more addrinfo structures returned by getaddrinfo(), along with - * any additional storage associated with those structures. If the ai_next field - * of the structure is not null, the entire list of structures is freed. - * - * @param ai struct addrinfo to free - */ -void lwip_freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai) -{ - struct addrinfo *next; - - while (ai != NULL) { - next = ai->ai_next; - memp_free(MEMP_NETDB, ai); - ai = next; - } -} - -/** - * Translates the name of a service location (for example, a host name) and/or - * a service name and returns a set of socket addresses and associated - * information to be used in creating a socket with which to address the - * specified service. - * Memory for the result is allocated internally and must be freed by calling - * lwip_freeaddrinfo()! - * - * Due to a limitation in dns_gethostbyname, only the first address of a - * host is returned. - * Also, service names are not supported (only port numbers)! - * - * @param nodename descriptive name or address string of the host - * (may be NULL -> local address) - * @param servname port number as string of NULL - * @param hints structure containing input values that set socktype and protocol - * @param res pointer to a pointer where to store the result (set to NULL on failure) - * @return 0 on success, non-zero on failure - * - * @todo: implement AI_V4MAPPED, AI_ADDRCONFIG - */ -int lwip_getaddrinfo(const char *nodename, const char *servname, - const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res) -{ - err_t err; - ip_addr_t addr; - struct addrinfo *ai; - struct sockaddr_storage *sa = NULL; - int port_nr = 0; - size_t total_size; - size_t namelen = 0; - int ai_family; - - if (res == NULL) { - return EAI_FAIL; - } - - *res = NULL; - - if ((nodename == NULL) && (servname == NULL)) { - return EAI_NONAME; - } - - if (hints != NULL) { - ai_family = hints->ai_family; - - if ((ai_family != AF_UNSPEC) -#if LWIP_IPV4 - && (ai_family != AF_INET) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - && (ai_family != AF_INET6) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - ) { - return EAI_FAMILY; - } - } else { - ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; - } - - if (servname != NULL) { - /* service name specified: convert to port number - * @todo?: currently, only ASCII integers (port numbers) are supported (AI_NUMERICSERV)! */ - port_nr = atoi(servname); - - if ((port_nr <= 0) || (port_nr > 0xffff)) { - return EAI_SERVICE; - } - } - - if (nodename != NULL) { - /* service location specified, try to resolve */ - if ((hints != NULL) && (hints->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST)) { - /* no DNS lookup, just parse for an address string */ - if (!ipaddr_aton(nodename, &addr)) { - return EAI_NONAME; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if ((IP_IS_V6_VAL(addr) && ai_family == AF_INET) || - (IP_IS_V4_VAL(addr) && ai_family == AF_INET6)) { - return EAI_NONAME; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - /* AF_UNSPEC: prefer IPv4 */ - u8_t type = NETCONN_DNS_IPV4_IPV6; - - if (ai_family == AF_INET) { - type = NETCONN_DNS_IPV4; - } else if (ai_family == AF_INET6) { - type = NETCONN_DNS_IPV6; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - err = netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(nodename, &addr, type); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return EAI_FAIL; - } - } - } else { - /* service location specified, use loopback address */ - if ((hints != NULL) && (hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE)) { - ip_addr_set_any_val(ai_family == AF_INET6, addr); - } else { - ip_addr_set_loopback_val(ai_family == AF_INET6, addr); - } - } - - total_size = sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); - - if (nodename != NULL) { - namelen = strlen(nodename); - - if (namelen > DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) { - /* invalid name length */ - return EAI_FAIL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("namelen is too long", total_size + namelen + 1 > total_size); - total_size += namelen + 1; - } - - /* If this fails, please report to lwip-devel! :-) */ - LWIP_ASSERT("total_size <= NETDB_ELEM_SIZE: please report this!", - total_size <= NETDB_ELEM_SIZE); - ai = (struct addrinfo *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETDB); - - if (ai == NULL) { - return EAI_MEMORY; - } - - memset(ai, 0, total_size); - /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ - sa = (struct sockaddr_storage *)(void *)((u8_t *)ai + sizeof(struct addrinfo)); - - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(addr)) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; - /* set up sockaddr */ - inet6_addr_from_ip6addr(&sa6->sin6_addr, ip_2_ip6(&addr)); - sa6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; - sa6->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); - sa6->sin6_port = lwip_htons((u16_t)port_nr); - sa6->sin6_scope_id = ip6_addr_zone(ip_2_ip6(&addr)); - ai->ai_family = AF_INET6; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - struct sockaddr_in *sa4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; - /* set up sockaddr */ - inet_addr_from_ip4addr(&sa4->sin_addr, ip_2_ip4(&addr)); - sa4->sin_family = AF_INET; - sa4->sin_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); - sa4->sin_port = lwip_htons((u16_t)port_nr); - ai->ai_family = AF_INET; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - } - - /* set up addrinfo */ - if (hints != NULL) { - /* copy socktype & protocol from hints if specified */ - ai->ai_socktype = hints->ai_socktype; - ai->ai_protocol = hints->ai_protocol; - } - - if (nodename != NULL) { - /* copy nodename to canonname if specified */ - ai->ai_canonname = ((char *)ai + sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); - MEMCPY(ai->ai_canonname, nodename, namelen); - ai->ai_canonname[namelen] = 0; - } - - ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); - ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)sa; - - *res = ai; - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET */ +/** + * @file + * API functions for name resolving + * + * @defgroup netdbapi NETDB API + * @ingroup socket + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include "lwip/netdb.h" + +#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/api.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" + +#include /* memset */ +#include /* atoi */ + +/** helper struct for gethostbyname_r to access the char* buffer */ +struct gethostbyname_r_helper { + ip_addr_t *addr_list[2]; + ip_addr_t addr; + char *aliases; +}; + +/** h_errno is exported in netdb.h for access by applications. */ +#if LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO +int h_errno; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO */ + +/** define "hostent" variables storage: 0 if we use a static (but unprotected) + * set of variables for lwip_gethostbyname, 1 if we use a local storage */ +#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE +#define LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE 0 +#endif + +/** define "hostent" variables storage */ +#if LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE +#define HOSTENT_STORAGE +#else +#define HOSTENT_STORAGE static +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_STATIC_HOSTENT */ + +/** + * Returns an entry containing addresses of address family AF_INET + * for the host with name name. + * Due to dns_gethostbyname limitations, only one address is returned. + * + * @param name the hostname to resolve + * @return an entry containing addresses of address family AF_INET + * for the host with name name + */ +struct hostent * +lwip_gethostbyname(const char *name) +{ + err_t err; + ip_addr_t addr; + + /* buffer variables for lwip_gethostbyname() */ + HOSTENT_STORAGE struct hostent s_hostent; + HOSTENT_STORAGE char *s_aliases; + HOSTENT_STORAGE ip_addr_t s_hostent_addr; + HOSTENT_STORAGE ip_addr_t *s_phostent_addr[2]; + HOSTENT_STORAGE char s_hostname[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 1]; + + /* query host IP address */ + err = netconn_gethostbyname(name, &addr); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("lwip_gethostbyname(%s) failed, err=%d\n", name, err)); + h_errno = HOST_NOT_FOUND; + return NULL; + } + + /* fill hostent */ + s_hostent_addr = addr; + s_phostent_addr[0] = &s_hostent_addr; + s_phostent_addr[1] = NULL; + strncpy(s_hostname, name, DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH); + s_hostname[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH] = 0; + s_hostent.h_name = s_hostname; + s_aliases = NULL; + s_hostent.h_aliases = &s_aliases; + s_hostent.h_addrtype = AF_INET; + s_hostent.h_length = sizeof(ip_addr_t); + s_hostent.h_addr_list = (char **)&s_phostent_addr; + +#if DNS_DEBUG + /* dump hostent */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_name == %s\n", s_hostent.h_name)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_aliases == %p\n", (void *)s_hostent.h_aliases)); + /* h_aliases are always empty */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_addrtype == %d\n", s_hostent.h_addrtype)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_length == %d\n", s_hostent.h_length)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_addr_list == %p\n", (void *)s_hostent.h_addr_list)); + + if (s_hostent.h_addr_list != NULL) { + u8_t idx; + + for (idx = 0; s_hostent.h_addr_list[idx]; idx++) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_addr_list[%i] == %p\n", idx, s_hostent.h_addr_list[idx])); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("hostent.h_addr_list[%i]-> == %s\n", idx, ipaddr_ntoa((ip_addr_t *)s_hostent.h_addr_list[idx]))); + } + } + +#endif /* DNS_DEBUG */ + +#if LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE + /* this function should return the "per-thread" hostent after copy from s_hostent */ + return sys_thread_hostent(&s_hostent); +#else + return &s_hostent; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_HOSTENT_STORAGE */ +} + +/** + * Thread-safe variant of lwip_gethostbyname: instead of using a static + * buffer, this function takes buffer and errno pointers as arguments + * and uses these for the result. + * + * @param name the hostname to resolve + * @param ret pre-allocated struct where to store the result + * @param buf pre-allocated buffer where to store additional data + * @param buflen the size of buf + * @param result pointer to a hostent pointer that is set to ret on success + * and set to zero on error + * @param h_errnop pointer to an int where to store errors (instead of modifying + * the global h_errno) + * @return 0 on success, non-zero on error, additional error information + * is stored in *h_errnop instead of h_errno to be thread-safe + */ +int lwip_gethostbyname_r(const char *name, struct hostent *ret, char *buf, + size_t buflen, struct hostent **result, int *h_errnop) +{ + err_t err; + struct gethostbyname_r_helper *h; + char *hostname; + size_t namelen; + int lh_errno; + + if (h_errnop == NULL) { + /* ensure h_errnop is never NULL */ + h_errnop = &lh_errno; + } + + if (result == NULL) { + /* not all arguments given */ + *h_errnop = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + /* first thing to do: set *result to nothing */ + *result = NULL; + + if ((name == NULL) || (ret == NULL) || (buf == NULL)) { + /* not all arguments given */ + *h_errnop = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + namelen = strlen(name); + + if (buflen < (sizeof(struct gethostbyname_r_helper) + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER(namelen + 1))) { + /* buf can't hold the data needed + a copy of name */ + *h_errnop = ERANGE; + return -1; + } + + h = (struct gethostbyname_r_helper *)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(buf); + hostname = ((char *)h) + sizeof(struct gethostbyname_r_helper); + + /* query host IP address */ + err = netconn_gethostbyname(name, &h->addr); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("lwip_gethostbyname(%s) failed, err=%d\n", name, err)); + *h_errnop = HOST_NOT_FOUND; + return -1; + } + + /* copy the hostname into buf */ + MEMCPY(hostname, name, namelen); + hostname[namelen] = 0; + + /* fill hostent */ + h->addr_list[0] = &h->addr; + h->addr_list[1] = NULL; + h->aliases = NULL; + ret->h_name = hostname; + ret->h_aliases = &h->aliases; + ret->h_addrtype = AF_INET; + ret->h_length = sizeof(ip_addr_t); + ret->h_addr_list = (char **)&h->addr_list; + + /* set result != NULL */ + *result = ret; + + /* return success */ + return 0; +} + +/** + * Frees one or more addrinfo structures returned by getaddrinfo(), along with + * any additional storage associated with those structures. If the ai_next field + * of the structure is not null, the entire list of structures is freed. + * + * @param ai struct addrinfo to free + */ +void lwip_freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai) +{ + struct addrinfo *next; + + while (ai != NULL) { + next = ai->ai_next; + memp_free(MEMP_NETDB, ai); + ai = next; + } +} + +/** + * Translates the name of a service location (for example, a host name) and/or + * a service name and returns a set of socket addresses and associated + * information to be used in creating a socket with which to address the + * specified service. + * Memory for the result is allocated internally and must be freed by calling + * lwip_freeaddrinfo()! + * + * Due to a limitation in dns_gethostbyname, only the first address of a + * host is returned. + * Also, service names are not supported (only port numbers)! + * + * @param nodename descriptive name or address string of the host + * (may be NULL -> local address) + * @param servname port number as string of NULL + * @param hints structure containing input values that set socktype and protocol + * @param res pointer to a pointer where to store the result (set to NULL on failure) + * @return 0 on success, non-zero on failure + * + * @todo: implement AI_V4MAPPED, AI_ADDRCONFIG + */ +int lwip_getaddrinfo(const char *nodename, const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res) +{ + err_t err; + ip_addr_t addr; + struct addrinfo *ai; + struct sockaddr_storage *sa = NULL; + int port_nr = 0; + size_t total_size; + size_t namelen = 0; + int ai_family; + + if (res == NULL) { + return EAI_FAIL; + } + + *res = NULL; + + if ((nodename == NULL) && (servname == NULL)) { + return EAI_NONAME; + } + + if (hints != NULL) { + ai_family = hints->ai_family; + + if ((ai_family != AF_UNSPEC) +#if LWIP_IPV4 + && (ai_family != AF_INET) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + && (ai_family != AF_INET6) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + ) { + return EAI_FAMILY; + } + } else { + ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + } + + if (servname != NULL) { + /* service name specified: convert to port number + * @todo?: currently, only ASCII integers (port numbers) are supported (AI_NUMERICSERV)! */ + port_nr = atoi(servname); + + if ((port_nr <= 0) || (port_nr > 0xffff)) { + return EAI_SERVICE; + } + } + + if (nodename != NULL) { + /* service location specified, try to resolve */ + if ((hints != NULL) && (hints->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST)) { + /* no DNS lookup, just parse for an address string */ + if (!ipaddr_aton(nodename, &addr)) { + return EAI_NONAME; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if ((IP_IS_V6_VAL(addr) && ai_family == AF_INET) || + (IP_IS_V4_VAL(addr) && ai_family == AF_INET6)) { + return EAI_NONAME; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + /* AF_UNSPEC: prefer IPv4 */ + u8_t type = NETCONN_DNS_IPV4_IPV6; + + if (ai_family == AF_INET) { + type = NETCONN_DNS_IPV4; + } else if (ai_family == AF_INET6) { + type = NETCONN_DNS_IPV6; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + err = netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(nodename, &addr, type); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return EAI_FAIL; + } + } + } else { + /* service location specified, use loopback address */ + if ((hints != NULL) && (hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE)) { + ip_addr_set_any_val(ai_family == AF_INET6, addr); + } else { + ip_addr_set_loopback_val(ai_family == AF_INET6, addr); + } + } + + total_size = sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + + if (nodename != NULL) { + namelen = strlen(nodename); + + if (namelen > DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) { + /* invalid name length */ + return EAI_FAIL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("namelen is too long", total_size + namelen + 1 > total_size); + total_size += namelen + 1; + } + + /* If this fails, please report to lwip-devel! :-) */ + LWIP_ASSERT("total_size <= NETDB_ELEM_SIZE: please report this!", + total_size <= NETDB_ELEM_SIZE); + ai = (struct addrinfo *)memp_malloc(MEMP_NETDB); + + if (ai == NULL) { + return EAI_MEMORY; + } + + memset(ai, 0, total_size); + /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ + sa = (struct sockaddr_storage *)(void *)((u8_t *)ai + sizeof(struct addrinfo)); + + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(addr)) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + /* set up sockaddr */ + inet6_addr_from_ip6addr(&sa6->sin6_addr, ip_2_ip6(&addr)); + sa6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sa6->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + sa6->sin6_port = lwip_htons((u16_t)port_nr); + sa6->sin6_scope_id = ip6_addr_zone(ip_2_ip6(&addr)); + ai->ai_family = AF_INET6; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + struct sockaddr_in *sa4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + /* set up sockaddr */ + inet_addr_from_ip4addr(&sa4->sin_addr, ip_2_ip4(&addr)); + sa4->sin_family = AF_INET; + sa4->sin_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + sa4->sin_port = lwip_htons((u16_t)port_nr); + ai->ai_family = AF_INET; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + } + + /* set up addrinfo */ + if (hints != NULL) { + /* copy socktype & protocol from hints if specified */ + ai->ai_socktype = hints->ai_socktype; + ai->ai_protocol = hints->ai_protocol; + } + + if (nodename != NULL) { + /* copy nodename to canonname if specified */ + ai->ai_canonname = ((char *)ai + sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); + MEMCPY(ai->ai_canonname, nodename, namelen); + ai->ai_canonname[namelen] = 0; + } + + ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)sa; + + *res = ai; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/api/netifapi.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/netifapi.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/api/netifapi.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/netifapi.c index 114d34a5..4fa631c2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/api/netifapi.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/netifapi.c @@ -1,379 +1,379 @@ -/** - * @file - * Network Interface Sequential API module - * - * @defgroup netifapi NETIF API - * @ingroup sequential_api - * Thread-safe functions to be called from non-TCPIP threads - * - * @defgroup netifapi_netif NETIF related - * @ingroup netifapi - * To be called from non-TCPIP threads - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_NETIF_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/netifapi.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" - -#include /* strncpy */ - -#define NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) -#define NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct netifapi_msg, name) -#define NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(name) API_VAR_ALLOC(struct netifapi_msg, MEMP_NETIFAPI_MSG, name, ERR_MEM) -#define NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_NETIFAPI_MSG, name) - -/** - * Call netif_add() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t netifapi_do_netif_add(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ - struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - if (!netif_add(msg->netif, -#if LWIP_IPV4 - API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.ipaddr), - API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.netmask), - API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.gw), -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - msg->msg.add.state, - msg->msg.add.init, - msg->msg.add.input)) { - return ERR_IF; - } else { - return ERR_OK; - } -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/** - * Call netif_set_addr() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t netifapi_do_netif_set_addr(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ - struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - netif_set_addr(msg->netif, - API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.ipaddr), - API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.netmask), - API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.gw)); - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/** -* Call netif_name_to_index() inside the tcpip_thread context. -*/ -static err_t netifapi_do_name_to_index(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ - struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - msg->msg.ifs.index = netif_name_to_index(msg->msg.ifs.name); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** -* Call netif_index_to_name() inside the tcpip_thread context. -*/ -static err_t netifapi_do_index_to_name(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ - struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - if (!netif_index_to_name(msg->msg.ifs.index, msg->msg.ifs.name)) { - /* return failure via empty name */ - msg->msg.ifs.name[0] = '\0'; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Call the "errtfunc" (or the "voidfunc" if "errtfunc" is NULL) inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t netifapi_do_netif_common(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ - struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - if (msg->msg.common.errtfunc != NULL) { - return msg->msg.common.errtfunc(msg->netif); - } else { - msg->msg.common.voidfunc(msg->netif); - return ERR_OK; - } -} - -#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 -/** - * @ingroup netifapi_arp - * Add or update an entry in the ARP cache. - * For an update, ipaddr is used to find the cache entry. - * - * @param ipaddr IPv4 address of cache entry - * @param ethaddr hardware address mapped to ipaddr - * @param type type of ARP cache entry - * @return ERR_OK: entry added/updated, else error from err_t - */ -err_t netifapi_arp_add(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr, enum netifapi_arp_entry type) -{ - err_t err; - - /* We only support permanent entries currently */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); - -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - err = etharp_add_static_entry(ipaddr, ethaddr); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); -#else - /* @todo add new vars to struct netifapi_msg and create a 'do' func */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ethaddr); - err = ERR_VAL; -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netifapi_arp - * Remove an entry in the ARP cache identified by ipaddr - * - * @param ipaddr IPv4 address of cache entry - * @param type type of ARP cache entry - * @return ERR_OK: entry removed, else error from err_t - */ -err_t netifapi_arp_remove(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, enum netifapi_arp_entry type) -{ - err_t err; - - /* We only support permanent entries currently */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); - -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - err = etharp_remove_static_entry(ipaddr); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); -#else - /* @todo add new vars to struct netifapi_msg and create a 'do' func */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - err = ERR_VAL; -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - return err; -} -#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/** - * @ingroup netifapi_netif - * Call netif_add() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - * - * @note for params @see netif_add() - */ -err_t netifapi_netif_add(struct netif *netif, -#if LWIP_IPV4 - const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input) -{ - err_t err; - NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (ipaddr == NULL) { - ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - if (netmask == NULL) { - netmask = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - if (gw == NULL) { - gw = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).netif = netif; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.ipaddr = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(ipaddr); - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.netmask = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(netmask); - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.gw = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(gw); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.state = state; - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.init = init; - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.input = input; - err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_netif_add, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); - NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/** - * @ingroup netifapi_netif - * Call netif_set_addr() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - * - * @note for params @see netif_set_addr() - */ -err_t netifapi_netif_set_addr(struct netif *netif, - const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, - const ip4_addr_t *netmask, - const ip4_addr_t *gw) -{ - err_t err; - NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - if (ipaddr == NULL) { - ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - if (netmask == NULL) { - netmask = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - if (gw == NULL) { - gw = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).netif = netif; - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.ipaddr = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(ipaddr); - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.netmask = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(netmask); - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.gw = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(gw); - err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_netif_set_addr, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); - NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/** - * call the "errtfunc" (or the "voidfunc" if "errtfunc" is NULL) in a thread-safe - * way by running that function inside the tcpip_thread context. - * - * @note use only for functions where there is only "netif" parameter. - */ -err_t netifapi_netif_common(struct netif *netif, netifapi_void_fn voidfunc, - netifapi_errt_fn errtfunc) -{ - err_t err; - NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).netif = netif; - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.common.voidfunc = voidfunc; - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.common.errtfunc = errtfunc; - err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_netif_common, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); - NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -/** -* @ingroup netifapi_netif -* Call netif_name_to_index() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the -* tcpip_thread context. -* -* @param name the interface name of the netif -* @param idx output index of the found netif -*/ -err_t netifapi_netif_name_to_index(const char *name, u8_t *idx) -{ - err_t err; - NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - *idx = 0; - -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - strncpy(NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name, name, NETIF_NAMESIZE - 1); - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name[NETIF_NAMESIZE - 1] = '\0'; -#else - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name = LWIP_CONST_CAST(char *, name); -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_name_to_index, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); - - if (!err) { - *idx = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.index; - } - - NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -/** -* @ingroup netifapi_netif -* Call netif_index_to_name() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the -* tcpip_thread context. -* -* @param idx the interface index of the netif -* @param name output name of the found netif, empty '\0' string if netif not found. -* name should be of at least NETIF_NAMESIZE bytes -*/ -err_t netifapi_netif_index_to_name(u8_t idx, char *name) -{ - err_t err; - NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.index = idx; -#if !LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name = name; -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_index_to_name, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - - if (!err) { - strncpy(name, NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name, NETIF_NAMESIZE - 1); - name[NETIF_NAMESIZE - 1] = '\0'; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ +/** + * @file + * Network Interface Sequential API module + * + * @defgroup netifapi NETIF API + * @ingroup sequential_api + * Thread-safe functions to be called from non-TCPIP threads + * + * @defgroup netifapi_netif NETIF related + * @ingroup netifapi + * To be called from non-TCPIP threads + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_NETIF_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/netifapi.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" + +#include /* strncpy */ + +#define NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) +#define NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct netifapi_msg, name) +#define NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(name) API_VAR_ALLOC(struct netifapi_msg, MEMP_NETIFAPI_MSG, name, ERR_MEM) +#define NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_NETIFAPI_MSG, name) + +/** + * Call netif_add() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t netifapi_do_netif_add(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ + struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + if (!netif_add(msg->netif, +#if LWIP_IPV4 + API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.ipaddr), + API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.netmask), + API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.gw), +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + msg->msg.add.state, + msg->msg.add.init, + msg->msg.add.input)) { + return ERR_IF; + } else { + return ERR_OK; + } +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/** + * Call netif_set_addr() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t netifapi_do_netif_set_addr(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ + struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + netif_set_addr(msg->netif, + API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.ipaddr), + API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.netmask), + API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.add.gw)); + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/** +* Call netif_name_to_index() inside the tcpip_thread context. +*/ +static err_t netifapi_do_name_to_index(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ + struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + msg->msg.ifs.index = netif_name_to_index(msg->msg.ifs.name); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** +* Call netif_index_to_name() inside the tcpip_thread context. +*/ +static err_t netifapi_do_index_to_name(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ + struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + if (!netif_index_to_name(msg->msg.ifs.index, msg->msg.ifs.name)) { + /* return failure via empty name */ + msg->msg.ifs.name[0] = '\0'; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Call the "errtfunc" (or the "voidfunc" if "errtfunc" is NULL) inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t netifapi_do_netif_common(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct netifapi_msg */ + struct netifapi_msg *msg = (struct netifapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + if (msg->msg.common.errtfunc != NULL) { + return msg->msg.common.errtfunc(msg->netif); + } else { + msg->msg.common.voidfunc(msg->netif); + return ERR_OK; + } +} + +#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 +/** + * @ingroup netifapi_arp + * Add or update an entry in the ARP cache. + * For an update, ipaddr is used to find the cache entry. + * + * @param ipaddr IPv4 address of cache entry + * @param ethaddr hardware address mapped to ipaddr + * @param type type of ARP cache entry + * @return ERR_OK: entry added/updated, else error from err_t + */ +err_t netifapi_arp_add(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr, enum netifapi_arp_entry type) +{ + err_t err; + + /* We only support permanent entries currently */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); + +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + err = etharp_add_static_entry(ipaddr, ethaddr); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); +#else + /* @todo add new vars to struct netifapi_msg and create a 'do' func */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ethaddr); + err = ERR_VAL; +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netifapi_arp + * Remove an entry in the ARP cache identified by ipaddr + * + * @param ipaddr IPv4 address of cache entry + * @param type type of ARP cache entry + * @return ERR_OK: entry removed, else error from err_t + */ +err_t netifapi_arp_remove(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, enum netifapi_arp_entry type) +{ + err_t err; + + /* We only support permanent entries currently */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); + +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + err = etharp_remove_static_entry(ipaddr); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); +#else + /* @todo add new vars to struct netifapi_msg and create a 'do' func */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + err = ERR_VAL; +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + return err; +} +#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/** + * @ingroup netifapi_netif + * Call netif_add() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + * + * @note for params @see netif_add() + */ +err_t netifapi_netif_add(struct netif *netif, +#if LWIP_IPV4 + const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input) +{ + err_t err; + NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (ipaddr == NULL) { + ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + if (netmask == NULL) { + netmask = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + if (gw == NULL) { + gw = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).netif = netif; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.ipaddr = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(ipaddr); + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.netmask = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(netmask); + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.gw = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(gw); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.state = state; + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.init = init; + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.input = input; + err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_netif_add, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); + NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/** + * @ingroup netifapi_netif + * Call netif_set_addr() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + * + * @note for params @see netif_set_addr() + */ +err_t netifapi_netif_set_addr(struct netif *netif, + const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, + const ip4_addr_t *netmask, + const ip4_addr_t *gw) +{ + err_t err; + NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + if (ipaddr == NULL) { + ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + if (netmask == NULL) { + netmask = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + if (gw == NULL) { + gw = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).netif = netif; + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.ipaddr = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(ipaddr); + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.netmask = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(netmask); + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.add.gw = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(gw); + err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_netif_set_addr, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); + NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/** + * call the "errtfunc" (or the "voidfunc" if "errtfunc" is NULL) in a thread-safe + * way by running that function inside the tcpip_thread context. + * + * @note use only for functions where there is only "netif" parameter. + */ +err_t netifapi_netif_common(struct netif *netif, netifapi_void_fn voidfunc, + netifapi_errt_fn errtfunc) +{ + err_t err; + NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).netif = netif; + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.common.voidfunc = voidfunc; + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.common.errtfunc = errtfunc; + err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_netif_common, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); + NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +/** +* @ingroup netifapi_netif +* Call netif_name_to_index() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the +* tcpip_thread context. +* +* @param name the interface name of the netif +* @param idx output index of the found netif +*/ +err_t netifapi_netif_name_to_index(const char *name, u8_t *idx) +{ + err_t err; + NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + *idx = 0; + +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + strncpy(NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name, name, NETIF_NAMESIZE - 1); + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name[NETIF_NAMESIZE - 1] = '\0'; +#else + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name = LWIP_CONST_CAST(char *, name); +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_name_to_index, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); + + if (!err) { + *idx = NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.index; + } + + NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +/** +* @ingroup netifapi_netif +* Call netif_index_to_name() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the +* tcpip_thread context. +* +* @param idx the interface index of the netif +* @param name output name of the found netif, empty '\0' string if netif not found. +* name should be of at least NETIF_NAMESIZE bytes +*/ +err_t netifapi_netif_index_to_name(u8_t idx, char *name) +{ + err_t err; + NETIFAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + NETIFAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.index = idx; +#if !LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name = name; +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + err = tcpip_api_call(netifapi_do_index_to_name, &API_VAR_REF(msg).call); +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + + if (!err) { + strncpy(name, NETIFAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ifs.name, NETIF_NAMESIZE - 1); + name[NETIF_NAMESIZE - 1] = '\0'; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + NETIFAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/api/sockets.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/sockets.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/api/sockets.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/sockets.c index 6a7f4ab1..6e9ec9e1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/api/sockets.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/sockets.c @@ -1,4534 +1,4537 @@ -/** - * @file - * Sockets BSD-Like API module - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - * Improved by Marc Boucher and David Haas - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h" -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -#include "lwip/inet.h" -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/raw.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#endif - -#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS == 2 && LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES -#include -#endif - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -/* If the netconn API is not required publicly, then we include the necessary - files here to get the implementation */ -#if !LWIP_NETCONN -#undef LWIP_NETCONN -#define LWIP_NETCONN 1 -#include "api_msg.c" -#include "api_lib.c" -#include "netbuf.c" -#undef LWIP_NETCONN -#define LWIP_NETCONN 0 -#endif - -#define API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) -#define API_SELECT_CB_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct lwip_select_cb, name) -#define API_SELECT_CB_VAR_ALLOC(name, retblock) API_VAR_ALLOC_EXT(struct lwip_select_cb, MEMP_SELECT_CB, name, retblock) -#define API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_SELECT_CB, name) - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -#define IP4ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sin, ipaddr, port) \ - do { \ - (sin)->sin_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); \ - (sin)->sin_family = AF_INET; \ - (sin)->sin_port = lwip_htons((port)); \ - inet_addr_from_ip4addr(&(sin)->sin_addr, ipaddr); \ - memset((sin)->sin_zero, 0, SIN_ZERO_LEN); \ - } while (0) -#define SOCKADDR4_TO_IP4ADDR_PORT(sin, ipaddr, port) \ - do { \ - inet_addr_to_ip4addr(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), &((sin)->sin_addr)); \ - (port) = lwip_ntohs((sin)->sin_port); \ - } while (0) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#define IP6ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sin6, ipaddr, port) \ - do { \ - (sin6)->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); \ - (sin6)->sin6_family = AF_INET6; \ - (sin6)->sin6_port = lwip_htons((port)); \ - (sin6)->sin6_flowinfo = 0; \ - inet6_addr_from_ip6addr(&(sin6)->sin6_addr, ipaddr); \ - (sin6)->sin6_scope_id = ip6_addr_zone(ipaddr); \ - } while (0) -#define SOCKADDR6_TO_IP6ADDR_PORT(sin6, ipaddr, port) \ - do { \ - inet6_addr_to_ip6addr(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), &((sin6)->sin6_addr)); \ - if (ip6_addr_has_scope(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { \ - ip6_addr_set_zone(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), (u8_t)((sin6)->sin6_scope_id)); \ - } \ - (port) = lwip_ntohs((sin6)->sin6_port); \ - } while (0) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -static void sockaddr_to_ipaddr_port(const struct sockaddr *sockaddr, ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t *port); - -#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) (((namelen) == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) || \ - ((namelen) == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))) -#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name) (((name)->sa_family == AF_INET) || \ - ((name)->sa_family == AF_INET6)) -#define SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock) \ - ((((name)->sa_family == AF_INET) && !(NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6((sock)->conn->type))) || \ - (((name)->sa_family == AF_INET6) && (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6((sock)->conn->type)))) -#define IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ - do { \ - if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(*ipaddr) || IP_IS_V6_VAL(*ipaddr)) { \ - IP6ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void *)(sockaddr), ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), port); \ - } else { \ - IP4ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR((struct sockaddr_in *)(void *)(sockaddr), ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), port); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) sockaddr_to_ipaddr_port(sockaddr, ipaddr, &(port)) -#define DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, type) (((domain) == AF_INET) ? \ - (type) : \ - (enum netconn_type)((type) | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6)) -#elif LWIP_IPV6 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) ((namelen) == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) -#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name) ((name)->sa_family == AF_INET6) -#define SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock) 1 -#define IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ - IP6ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void *)(sockaddr), ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), port) -#define SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ - SOCKADDR6_TO_IP6ADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)(const void *)(sockaddr), ipaddr, port) -#define DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, netconn_type) (netconn_type) -#else /*-> LWIP_IPV4: LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) ((namelen) == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) -#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name) ((name)->sa_family == AF_INET) -#define SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock) 1 -#define IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ - IP4ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR((struct sockaddr_in *)(void *)(sockaddr), ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), port) -#define SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ - SOCKADDR4_TO_IP4ADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr_in *)(const void *)(sockaddr), ipaddr, port) -#define DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, netconn_type) (netconn_type) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID_OR_UNSPEC(name) (((name)->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) || \ - IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name)) -#define SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH_OR_UNSPEC(name, sock) (((name)->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) || \ - SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock)) -#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_ALIGNED(name) ((((mem_ptr_t)(name)) % 4) == 0) - -#define LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN(sock, optlen, opttype) \ - do { \ - if ((optlen) < sizeof(opttype)) { \ - done_socket(sock); \ - return EINVAL; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, opttype) \ - do { \ - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN(sock, optlen, opttype); \ - if ((sock)->conn == NULL) { \ - done_socket(sock); \ - return EINVAL; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, opttype) \ - do { \ - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN(sock, optlen, opttype); \ - if (((sock)->conn == NULL) || ((sock)->conn->pcb.tcp == NULL)) { \ - done_socket(sock); \ - return EINVAL; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, opttype, netconntype) \ - do { \ - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, opttype); \ - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type((sock)->conn)) != netconntype) { \ - done_socket(sock); \ - return ENOPROTOOPT; \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) -#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data, name) -#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA, name) -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE -#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_ALLOC(name, sock) \ - do { \ - name = (struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *)memp_malloc(MEMP_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA); \ - if (name == NULL) { \ - sock_set_errno(sock, ENOMEM); \ - done_socket(sock); \ - return -1; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ -#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_ALLOC(name, sock) -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - -#if LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD -#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE int -#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_SET(optval, val) (*(int *)(optval) = (val)) -#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_GET_MS(optval) ((long)*(const int *)(optval)) -#else -#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE struct timeval -#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_SET(optval, val) \ - do { \ - u32_t loc = (val); \ - ((struct timeval *)(optval))->tv_sec = (long)((loc) / 1000U); \ - ((struct timeval *)(optval))->tv_usec = (long)(((loc) % 1000U) * 1000U); \ - } while (0) -#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_GET_MS(optval) ((((const struct timeval *)(optval))->tv_sec * 1000) + (((const struct timeval *)(optval))->tv_usec / 1000)) -#endif - -/** A struct sockaddr replacement that has the same alignment as sockaddr_in/ - * sockaddr_in6 if instantiated. - */ -union sockaddr_aligned { - struct sockaddr sa; -#if LWIP_IPV6 - struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - struct sockaddr_in sin; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -}; - -/* Define the number of IPv4 multicast memberships, default is one per socket */ -#ifndef LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS -#define LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS NUM_SOCKETS -#endif - -#if LWIP_IGMP -/* This is to keep track of IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP calls to drop the membership when - a socket is closed */ -struct lwip_socket_multicast_pair { - /** the socket */ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - /** the interface address */ - ip4_addr_t if_addr; - /** the group address */ - ip4_addr_t multi_addr; -}; - -static struct lwip_socket_multicast_pair socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS]; - -static int lwip_socket_register_membership(int s, const ip4_addr_t *if_addr, const ip4_addr_t *multi_addr); -static void lwip_socket_unregister_membership(int s, const ip4_addr_t *if_addr, const ip4_addr_t *multi_addr); -static void lwip_socket_drop_registered_memberships(int s); -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD -/* This is to keep track of IP_JOIN_GROUP calls to drop the membership when - a socket is closed */ -struct lwip_socket_multicast_mld6_pair { - /** the socket */ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - /** the interface index */ - u8_t if_idx; - /** the group address */ - ip6_addr_t multi_addr; -}; - -static struct lwip_socket_multicast_mld6_pair socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS]; - -static int lwip_socket_register_mld6_membership(int s, unsigned int if_idx, const ip6_addr_t *multi_addr); -static void lwip_socket_unregister_mld6_membership(int s, unsigned int if_idx, const ip6_addr_t *multi_addr); -static void lwip_socket_drop_registered_mld6_memberships(int s); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - -/** The global array of available sockets */ -static struct lwip_sock sockets[NUM_SOCKETS]; - -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -/* protect the select_cb_list using core lock */ -#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_DECL_PROTECT(lev) -#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_PROTECT(lev) LOCK_TCPIP_CORE() -#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_UNPROTECT(lev) UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE() -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -/* protect the select_cb_list using SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT */ -#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_DECL_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) -#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) -#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_UNPROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) -/** This counter is increased from lwip_select when the list is changed - and checked in select_check_waiters to see if it has changed. */ -static volatile int select_cb_ctr; -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -/** The global list of tasks waiting for select */ -static struct lwip_select_cb *select_cb_list; -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ - -#define sock_set_errno(sk, e) \ - do { \ - const int sockerr = (e); \ - set_errno(sockerr); \ - } while (0) - -/* Forward declaration of some functions */ -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL -static void event_callback(struct netconn *conn, enum netconn_evt evt, u16_t len); -#define DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB event_callback -static void select_check_waiters(int s, int has_recvevent, int has_sendevent, int has_errevent); -#else -#define DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB NULL -#endif -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -static void lwip_getsockopt_callback(void *arg); -static void lwip_setsockopt_callback(void *arg); -#endif -static int lwip_getsockopt_impl(int s, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen); -static int lwip_setsockopt_impl(int s, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen); -static int free_socket_locked(struct lwip_sock *sock, int is_tcp, struct netconn **conn, - union lwip_sock_lastdata *lastdata); -static void free_socket_free_elements(int is_tcp, struct netconn *conn, union lwip_sock_lastdata *lastdata); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -static void sockaddr_to_ipaddr_port(const struct sockaddr *sockaddr, ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t *port) -{ - if ((sockaddr->sa_family) == AF_INET6) { - SOCKADDR6_TO_IP6ADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)(const void *)(sockaddr), ipaddr, *port); - ipaddr->type = IPADDR_TYPE_V6; - } else { - SOCKADDR4_TO_IP4ADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr_in *)(const void *)(sockaddr), ipaddr, *port); - ipaddr->type = IPADDR_TYPE_V4; - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: initialize thread-local semaphore */ -void lwip_socket_thread_init(void) -{ - netconn_thread_init(); -} - -/** LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: destroy thread-local semaphore */ -void lwip_socket_thread_cleanup(void) -{ - netconn_thread_cleanup(); -} - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -/* Thread-safe increment of sock->fd_used, with overflow check */ -static int sock_inc_used(struct lwip_sock *sock) -{ - int ret; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - LWIP_ASSERT("sock != NULL", sock != NULL); - - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - - if (sock->fd_free_pending) { - /* prevent new usage of this socket if free is pending */ - ret = 0; - } else { - ++sock->fd_used; - ret = 1; - LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used != 0", sock->fd_used != 0); - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - return ret; -} - -/* Like sock_inc_used(), but called under SYS_ARCH_PROTECT lock. */ -static int sock_inc_used_locked(struct lwip_sock *sock) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("sock != NULL", sock != NULL); - - if (sock->fd_free_pending) { - LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used != 0", sock->fd_used != 0); - return 0; - } - - ++sock->fd_used; - LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used != 0", sock->fd_used != 0); - return 1; -} - -/* In full-duplex mode,sock->fd_used != 0 prevents a socket descriptor from being - * released (and possibly reused) when used from more than one thread - * (e.g. read-while-write or close-while-write, etc) - * This function is called at the end of functions using (try)get_socket*(). - */ -static void done_socket(struct lwip_sock *sock) -{ - int freed = 0; - int is_tcp = 0; - struct netconn *conn = NULL; - union lwip_sock_lastdata lastdata; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - LWIP_ASSERT("sock != NULL", sock != NULL); - - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used > 0", sock->fd_used > 0); - - if (--sock->fd_used == 0) { - if (sock->fd_free_pending) { - /* free the socket */ - sock->fd_used = 1; - is_tcp = sock->fd_free_pending & LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_TCP; - freed = free_socket_locked(sock, is_tcp, &conn, &lastdata); - } - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - - if (freed) { - free_socket_free_elements(is_tcp, conn, &lastdata); - } -} - -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ -#define sock_inc_used(sock) 1 -#define sock_inc_used_locked(sock) 1 -#define done_socket(sock) -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - -/* Translate a socket 'int' into a pointer (only fails if the index is invalid) */ -static struct lwip_sock *tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(int fd) -{ - int s = fd - LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; - - if ((s < 0) || (s >= NUM_SOCKETS)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("tryget_socket_unconn(%d): invalid\n", fd)); - return NULL; - } - - return &sockets[s]; -} - -struct lwip_sock * -lwip_socket_dbg_get_socket(int fd) -{ - return tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(fd); -} - -/* Translate a socket 'int' into a pointer (only fails if the index is invalid) */ -static struct lwip_sock *tryget_socket_unconn(int fd) -{ - struct lwip_sock *ret = tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(fd); - - if (ret != NULL) { - if (!sock_inc_used(ret)) { - return NULL; - } - } - - return ret; -} - -/* Like tryget_socket_unconn(), but called under SYS_ARCH_PROTECT lock. */ -static struct lwip_sock *tryget_socket_unconn_locked(int fd) -{ - struct lwip_sock *ret = tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(fd); - - if (ret != NULL) { - if (!sock_inc_used_locked(ret)) { - return NULL; - } - } - - return ret; -} - -/** - * Same as get_socket but doesn't set errno - * - * @param fd externally used socket index - * @return struct lwip_sock for the socket or NULL if not found - */ -static struct lwip_sock *tryget_socket(int fd) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket_unconn(fd); - - if (sock != NULL) { - if (sock->conn) { - return sock; - } - - done_socket(sock); - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** - * Map a externally used socket index to the internal socket representation. - * - * @param fd externally used socket index - * @return struct lwip_sock for the socket or NULL if not found - */ -static struct lwip_sock *get_socket(int fd) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket(fd); - - if (!sock) { - if ((fd < LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) || (fd >= (LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET + NUM_SOCKETS))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("get_socket(%d): invalid\n", fd)); - } - - set_errno(EBADF); - return NULL; - } - - return sock; -} - -/** - * Allocate a new socket for a given netconn. - * - * @param newconn the netconn for which to allocate a socket - * @param accepted 1 if socket has been created by accept(), - * 0 if socket has been created by socket() - * @return the index of the new socket; -1 on error - */ -static int alloc_socket(struct netconn *newconn, int accepted) -{ - int i; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(accepted); - - /* allocate a new socket identifier */ - for (i = 0; i < NUM_SOCKETS; ++i) { - /* Protect socket array */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - - if (!sockets[i].conn) { -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - - if (sockets[i].fd_used) { - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - continue; - } - - sockets[i].fd_used = 1; - sockets[i].fd_free_pending = 0; -#endif - sockets[i].conn = newconn; - /* The socket is not yet known to anyone, so no need to protect - after having marked it as used. */ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - sockets[i].lastdata.pbuf = NULL; -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL - LWIP_ASSERT("sockets[i].select_waiting == 0", sockets[i].select_waiting == 0); - sockets[i].rcvevent = 0; - /* TCP sendbuf is empty, but the socket is not yet writable until connected - * (unless it has been created by accept()). */ - sockets[i].sendevent = (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(newconn->type) == NETCONN_TCP ? (accepted != 0) : 1); - sockets[i].errevent = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ - return i + LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - } - - return -1; -} - -/** Free a socket (under lock) - * - * @param sock the socket to free - * @param is_tcp != 0 for TCP sockets, used to free lastdata - * @param conn the socekt's netconn is stored here, must be freed externally - * @param lastdata lastdata is stored here, must be freed externally - */ -static int free_socket_locked(struct lwip_sock *sock, int is_tcp, struct netconn **conn, - union lwip_sock_lastdata *lastdata) -{ -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used > 0", sock->fd_used > 0); - sock->fd_used--; - - if (sock->fd_used > 0) { - sock->fd_free_pending = LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_FREE | (is_tcp ? LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_TCP : 0); - return 0; - } - -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(is_tcp); -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - - *lastdata = sock->lastdata; - sock->lastdata.pbuf = NULL; - *conn = sock->conn; - sock->conn = NULL; - return 1; -} - -/** Free a socket's leftover members. - */ -static void free_socket_free_elements(int is_tcp, struct netconn *conn, union lwip_sock_lastdata *lastdata) -{ - if (lastdata->pbuf != NULL) { - if (is_tcp) { - pbuf_free(lastdata->pbuf); - } else { - netbuf_delete(lastdata->netbuf); - } - } - - if (conn != NULL) { - /* netconn_prepare_delete() has already been called, here we only free the conn */ - netconn_delete(conn); - } -} - -/** Free a socket. The socket's netconn must have been - * delete before! - * - * @param sock the socket to free - * @param is_tcp != 0 for TCP sockets, used to free lastdata - */ -static void free_socket(struct lwip_sock *sock, int is_tcp) -{ - int freed; - struct netconn *conn; - union lwip_sock_lastdata lastdata; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - /* Protect socket array */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - - freed = free_socket_locked(sock, is_tcp, &conn, &lastdata); - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - /* don't use 'sock' after this line, as another task might have allocated it */ - - if (freed) { - free_socket_free_elements(is_tcp, conn, &lastdata); - } -} - -/* Below this, the well-known socket functions are implemented. - * Use google.com or opengroup.org to get a good description :-) - * - * Exceptions are documented! - */ - -int lwip_accept(int s, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t *addrlen) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock, *nsock; - struct netconn *newconn; - ip_addr_t naddr; - u16_t port = 0; - int newsock; - err_t err; - int recvevent; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d)...\n", s)); - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - /* wait for a new connection */ - err = netconn_accept(sock->conn, &newconn); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d): netconn_acept failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { - sock_set_errno(sock, EOPNOTSUPP); - } else if (err == ERR_CLSD) { - sock_set_errno(sock, EINVAL); - } else { - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - } - - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("newconn != NULL", newconn != NULL); - - newsock = alloc_socket(newconn, 1); - - if (newsock == -1) { - netconn_delete(newconn); - sock_set_errno(sock, ENFILE); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket index", (newsock >= LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) && (newsock < NUM_SOCKETS + LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET)); - nsock = &sockets[newsock - LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET]; - - /* See event_callback: If data comes in right away after an accept, even - * though the server task might not have created a new socket yet. - * In that case, newconn->socket is counted down (newconn->socket--), - * so nsock->rcvevent is >= 1 here! - */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - recvevent = (s16_t)(-1 - newconn->socket); - newconn->socket = newsock; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - - if (newconn->callback) { - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - - while (recvevent > 0) { - recvevent--; - newconn->callback(newconn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); - } - - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - } - - /* Note that POSIX only requires us to check addr is non-NULL. addrlen must - * not be NULL if addr is valid. - */ - if ((addr != NULL) && (addrlen != NULL)) { - union sockaddr_aligned tempaddr; - /* get the IP address and port of the remote host */ - err = netconn_peer(newconn, &naddr, &port); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d): netconn_peer failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); - netconn_delete(newconn); - free_socket(nsock, 1); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(&tempaddr, &naddr, port); - - if (*addrlen > tempaddr.sa.sa_len) { - *addrlen = tempaddr.sa.sa_len; - } - - MEMCPY(addr, &tempaddr, *addrlen); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d) returning new sock=%d addr=", s, newsock)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, naddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F "\n", port)); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d) returning new sock=%d", s, newsock)); - } - - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - done_socket(sock); - done_socket(nsock); - return newsock; -} - -int lwip_bind(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - ip_addr_t local_addr; - u16_t local_port; - err_t err; - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - if (!SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock)) { - /* sockaddr does not match socket type (IPv4/IPv6) */ - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_VAL)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - /* check size, family and alignment of 'name' */ - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_bind: invalid address", (IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_ALIGNED(name)), - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); return -1;); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(namelen); - - SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(name, &local_addr, local_port); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_bind(%d, addr=", s)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, local_addr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F ")\n", local_port)); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - /* Dual-stack: Unmap IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses */ - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(local_addr) && ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&local_addr))) { - unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip4(&local_addr), ip_2_ip6(&local_addr)); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(local_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - err = netconn_bind(sock->conn, &local_addr, local_port); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_bind(%d) failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_bind(%d) succeeded\n", s)); - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - done_socket(sock); - return 0; -} - -int lwip_close(int s) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - int is_tcp = 0; - err_t err; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_close(%d)\n", s)); - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - if (sock->conn != NULL) { - is_tcp = NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP; - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("sock->lastdata == NULL", sock->lastdata.pbuf == NULL); - } - -#if LWIP_IGMP - /* drop all possibly joined IGMP memberships */ - lwip_socket_drop_registered_memberships(s); -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD - /* drop all possibly joined MLD6 memberships */ - lwip_socket_drop_registered_mld6_memberships(s); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - - err = netconn_prepare_delete(sock->conn); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - free_socket(sock, is_tcp); - set_errno(0); - return 0; -} - -int lwip_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - err_t err; - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - if (!SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH_OR_UNSPEC(name, sock)) { - /* sockaddr does not match socket type (IPv4/IPv6) */ - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_VAL)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(namelen); - - if (name->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_connect(%d, AF_UNSPEC)\n", s)); - err = netconn_disconnect(sock->conn); - } else { - ip_addr_t remote_addr; - u16_t remote_port; - - /* check size, family and alignment of 'name' */ - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_connect: invalid address", IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID_OR_UNSPEC(name) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_ALIGNED(name), - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); return -1;); - - SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(name, &remote_addr, remote_port); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_connect(%d, addr=", s)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, remote_addr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F ")\n", remote_port)); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - /* Dual-stack: Unmap IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses */ - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(remote_addr) && ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&remote_addr))) { - unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip4(&remote_addr), ip_2_ip6(&remote_addr)); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(remote_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - err = netconn_connect(sock->conn, &remote_addr, remote_port); - } - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_connect(%d) failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_connect(%d) succeeded\n", s)); - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - done_socket(sock); - return 0; -} - -/** - * Set a socket into listen mode. - * The socket may not have been used for another connection previously. - * - * @param s the socket to set to listening mode - * @param backlog (ATTENTION: needs TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG=1) - * @return 0 on success, non-zero on failure - */ -int lwip_listen(int s, int backlog) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - err_t err; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_listen(%d, backlog=%d)\n", s, backlog)); - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - /* limit the "backlog" parameter to fit in an u8_t */ - backlog = LWIP_MIN(LWIP_MAX(backlog, 0), 0xff); - - err = netconn_listen_with_backlog(sock->conn, (u8_t)backlog); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_listen(%d) failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { - sock_set_errno(sock, EOPNOTSUPP); - } else { - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - } - - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - done_socket(sock); - return 0; -} - -#if LWIP_TCP -/* Helper function to loop over receiving pbufs from netconn - * until "len" bytes are received or we're otherwise done. - * Keeps sock->lastdata for peeking or partly copying. - */ -static ssize_t lwip_recv_tcp(struct lwip_sock *sock, void *mem, size_t len, int flags) -{ - u8_t apiflags = NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD; - ssize_t recvd = 0; - ssize_t recv_left = (len <= SSIZE_MAX) ? (ssize_t)len : SSIZE_MAX; - - LWIP_ASSERT("no socket given", sock != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("this should be checked internally", NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP); - - if (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) { - apiflags |= NETCONN_DONTBLOCK; - } - - do { - struct pbuf *p; - err_t err; - u16_t copylen; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: top while sock->lastdata=%p\n", (void *)sock->lastdata.pbuf)); - - /* Check if there is data left from the last recv operation. */ - if (sock->lastdata.pbuf) { - p = sock->lastdata.pbuf; - } else { - /* No data was left from the previous operation, so we try to get - some from the network. */ - err = netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf_flags(sock->conn, &p, apiflags); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: netconn_recv err=%d, pbuf=%p\n", - err, (void *)p)); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - if (recvd > 0) { - /* already received data, return that (this trusts in getting the same error from - netconn layer again next time netconn_recv is called) */ - goto lwip_recv_tcp_done; - } - - /* We should really do some error checking here. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: p == NULL, error is \"%s\"!\n", - lwip_strerr(err))); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - - if (err == ERR_CLSD) { - return 0; - } else { - return -1; - } - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - sock->lastdata.pbuf = p; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: buflen=%" U16_F " recv_left=%d off=%d\n", - p->tot_len, (int)recv_left, (int)recvd)); - - if (recv_left > p->tot_len) { - copylen = p->tot_len; - } else { - copylen = (u16_t)recv_left; - } - - if (recvd + copylen < recvd) { - /* overflow */ - copylen = (u16_t)(SSIZE_MAX - recvd); - } - - /* copy the contents of the received buffer into - the supplied memory pointer mem */ - pbuf_copy_partial(p, (u8_t *)mem + recvd, copylen, 0); - - recvd += copylen; - - /* TCP combines multiple pbufs for one recv */ - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid copylen, len would underflow", recv_left >= copylen); - recv_left -= copylen; - - /* Unless we peek the incoming message... */ - if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) == 0) { - /* ... check if there is data left in the pbuf */ - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid copylen", p->tot_len >= copylen); - - if (p->tot_len - copylen > 0) { - /* If so, it should be saved in the sock structure for the next recv call. - We store the pbuf but hide/free the consumed data: */ - sock->lastdata.pbuf = pbuf_free_header(p, copylen); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: lastdata now pbuf=%p\n", (void *)sock->lastdata.pbuf)); - } else { - sock->lastdata.pbuf = NULL; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: deleting pbuf=%p\n", (void *)p)); - pbuf_free(p); - } - } - - /* once we have some data to return, only add more if we don't need to wait */ - apiflags |= NETCONN_DONTBLOCK | NETCONN_NOFIN; - /* @todo: do we need to support peeking more than one pbuf? */ - } while ((recv_left > 0) && !(flags & MSG_PEEK)); - -lwip_recv_tcp_done: - - if ((recvd > 0) && !(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { - /* ensure window update after copying all data */ - netconn_tcp_recvd(sock->conn, (size_t)recvd); - } - - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - return recvd; -} -#endif - -/* Convert a netbuf's address data to struct sockaddr */ -static int lwip_sock_make_addr(struct netconn *conn, ip_addr_t *fromaddr, u16_t port, - struct sockaddr *from, socklen_t *fromlen) -{ - int truncated = 0; - union sockaddr_aligned saddr; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); - - LWIP_ASSERT("fromaddr != NULL", fromaddr != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("from != NULL", from != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("fromlen != NULL", fromlen != NULL); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - /* Dual-stack: Map IPv4 addresses to IPv4 mapped IPv6 */ - if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(netconn_type(conn)) && IP_IS_V4(fromaddr)) { - ip4_2_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip6(fromaddr), ip_2_ip4(fromaddr)); - IP_SET_TYPE(fromaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(&saddr, fromaddr, port); - - if (*fromlen < saddr.sa.sa_len) { - truncated = 1; - } else if (*fromlen > saddr.sa.sa_len) { - *fromlen = saddr.sa.sa_len; - } - - MEMCPY(from, &saddr, *fromlen); - return truncated; -} - -#if LWIP_TCP -/* Helper function to get a tcp socket's remote address info */ -static int lwip_recv_tcp_from(struct lwip_sock *sock, struct sockaddr *from, socklen_t *fromlen, const char *dbg_fn, int dbg_s, ssize_t dbg_ret) -{ - if (sock == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_fn); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_s); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_ret); - -#if !SOCKETS_DEBUG - - if (from && fromlen) -#endif /* !SOCKETS_DEBUG */ - { - /* get remote addr/port from tcp_pcb */ - u16_t port; - ip_addr_t tmpaddr; - netconn_getaddr(sock->conn, &tmpaddr, &port, 0); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("%s(%d): addr=", dbg_fn, dbg_s)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, tmpaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F " len=%d\n", port, (int)dbg_ret)); - - if (from && fromlen) { - return lwip_sock_make_addr(sock->conn, &tmpaddr, port, from, fromlen); - } - } - - return 0; -} -#endif - -/* Helper function to receive a netbuf from a udp or raw netconn. - * Keeps sock->lastdata for peeking. - */ -static err_t lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw(struct lwip_sock *sock, int flags, struct msghdr *msg, u16_t *datagram_len, int dbg_s) -{ - struct netbuf *buf; - u8_t apiflags; - err_t err; - u16_t buflen, copylen, copied; - int i; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_s); - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw: invalid arguments", (msg->msg_iov != NULL) || (msg->msg_iovlen <= 0), return ERR_ARG;); - - if (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) { - apiflags = NETCONN_DONTBLOCK; - } else { - apiflags = 0; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw[UDP/RAW]: top sock->lastdata=%p\n", (void *)sock->lastdata.netbuf)); - /* Check if there is data left from the last recv operation. */ - buf = sock->lastdata.netbuf; - - if (buf == NULL) { - /* No data was left from the previous operation, so we try to get - some from the network. */ - err = netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf_flags(sock->conn, &buf, apiflags); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw[UDP/RAW]: netconn_recv err=%d, netbuf=%p\n", - err, (void *)buf)); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("buf != NULL", buf != NULL); - sock->lastdata.netbuf = buf; - } - - buflen = buf->p->tot_len; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw: buflen=%" U16_F "\n", buflen)); - - copied = 0; - - /* copy the pbuf payload into the iovs */ - for (i = 0; (i < msg->msg_iovlen) && (copied < buflen); i++) { - u16_t len_left = (u16_t)(buflen - copied); - - if (msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len > len_left) { - copylen = len_left; - } else { - copylen = (u16_t)msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; - } - - /* copy the contents of the received buffer into - the supplied memory buffer */ - pbuf_copy_partial(buf->p, (u8_t *)msg->msg_iov[i].iov_base, copylen, copied); - copied = (u16_t)(copied + copylen); - } - - /* Check to see from where the data was.*/ -#if !SOCKETS_DEBUG - - if (msg->msg_name && msg->msg_namelen) -#endif /* !SOCKETS_DEBUG */ - { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw(%d): addr=", dbg_s)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, *netbuf_fromaddr(buf)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F " len=%d\n", netbuf_fromport(buf), copied)); - - if (msg->msg_name && msg->msg_namelen) { - lwip_sock_make_addr(sock->conn, netbuf_fromaddr(buf), netbuf_fromport(buf), - (struct sockaddr *)msg->msg_name, &msg->msg_namelen); - } - } - - /* Initialize flag output */ - msg->msg_flags = 0; - - if (msg->msg_control) { - u8_t wrote_msg = 0; -#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO - - /* Check if packet info was recorded */ - if (buf->flags & NETBUF_FLAG_DESTADDR) { - if (IP_IS_V4(&buf->toaddr)) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (msg->msg_controllen >= CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo))) { - struct cmsghdr *chdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg); /* This will always return a header!! */ - struct in_pktinfo *pkti = (struct in_pktinfo *)CMSG_DATA(chdr); - chdr->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_IP; - chdr->cmsg_type = IP_PKTINFO; - chdr->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo)); - pkti->ipi_ifindex = buf->p->if_idx; - inet_addr_from_ip4addr(&pkti->ipi_addr, ip_2_ip4(netbuf_destaddr(buf))); - msg->msg_controllen = CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo)); - wrote_msg = 1; - } else { - msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ - - if (!wrote_msg) { - msg->msg_controllen = 0; - } - } - - /* If we don't peek the incoming message: zero lastdata pointer and free the netbuf */ - if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) == 0) { - sock->lastdata.netbuf = NULL; - netbuf_delete(buf); - } - - if (datagram_len) { - *datagram_len = buflen; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -ssize_t lwip_recvfrom(int s, void *mem, size_t len, int flags, - struct sockaddr *from, socklen_t *fromlen) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - ssize_t ret; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom(%d, %p, %" SZT_F ", 0x%x, ..)\n", s, mem, len, flags)); - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - -#if LWIP_TCP - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { - ret = lwip_recv_tcp(sock, mem, len, flags); - lwip_recv_tcp_from(sock, from, fromlen, "lwip_recvfrom", s, ret); - done_socket(sock); - return ret; - } else -#endif - { - u16_t datagram_len = 0; - struct iovec vec; - struct msghdr msg; - err_t err; - vec.iov_base = mem; - vec.iov_len = len; - msg.msg_control = NULL; - msg.msg_controllen = 0; - msg.msg_flags = 0; - msg.msg_iov = &vec; - msg.msg_iovlen = 1; - msg.msg_name = from; - msg.msg_namelen = (fromlen ? *fromlen : 0); - err = lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw(sock, flags, &msg, &datagram_len, s); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom[UDP/RAW](%d): buf == NULL, error is \"%s\"!\n", - s, lwip_strerr(err))); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - ret = (ssize_t)LWIP_MIN(LWIP_MIN(len, datagram_len), SSIZE_MAX); - - if (fromlen) { - *fromlen = msg.msg_namelen; - } - } - - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - done_socket(sock); - return ret; -} - -ssize_t lwip_read(int s, void *mem, size_t len) -{ - return lwip_recvfrom(s, mem, len, 0, NULL, NULL); -} - -ssize_t lwip_readv(int s, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt) -{ - struct msghdr msg; - - msg.msg_name = NULL; - msg.msg_namelen = 0; - /* Hack: we have to cast via number to cast from 'const' pointer to non-const. - Blame the opengroup standard for this inconsistency. */ - msg.msg_iov = LWIP_CONST_CAST(struct iovec *, iov); - msg.msg_iovlen = iovcnt; - msg.msg_control = NULL; - msg.msg_controllen = 0; - msg.msg_flags = 0; - return lwip_recvmsg(s, &msg, 0); -} - -ssize_t lwip_recv(int s, void *mem, size_t len, int flags) -{ - return lwip_recvfrom(s, mem, len, flags, NULL, NULL); -} - -ssize_t lwip_recvmsg(int s, struct msghdr *message, int flags) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - int i; - ssize_t buflen; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvmsg(%d, message=%p, flags=0x%x)\n", s, (void *)message, flags)); - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_recvmsg: invalid message pointer", message != NULL, return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_recvmsg: unsupported flags", (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK | MSG_DONTWAIT)) == 0, - set_errno(EOPNOTSUPP); - return -1;); - - if ((message->msg_iovlen <= 0) || (message->msg_iovlen > IOV_MAX)) { - set_errno(EMSGSIZE); - return -1; - } - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - /* check for valid vectors */ - buflen = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < message->msg_iovlen; i++) { - if ((message->msg_iov[i].iov_base == NULL) || ((ssize_t)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len <= 0) || - ((size_t)(ssize_t)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len != message->msg_iov[i].iov_len) || - ((ssize_t)(buflen + (ssize_t)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len) <= 0)) { - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_VAL)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - buflen = (ssize_t)(buflen + (ssize_t)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len); - } - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { -#if LWIP_TCP - int recv_flags = flags; - message->msg_flags = 0; - /* recv the data */ - buflen = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < message->msg_iovlen; i++) { - /* try to receive into this vector's buffer */ - ssize_t recvd_local = lwip_recv_tcp(sock, message->msg_iov[i].iov_base, message->msg_iov[i].iov_len, recv_flags); - - if (recvd_local > 0) { - /* sum up received bytes */ - buflen += recvd_local; - } - - if ((recvd_local < 0) || (recvd_local < (int)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len) || - (flags & MSG_PEEK)) { - /* returned prematurely (or peeking, which might actually be limitated to the first iov) */ - if (buflen <= 0) { - /* nothing received at all, propagate the error */ - buflen = recvd_local; - } - - break; - } - - /* pass MSG_DONTWAIT to lwip_recv_tcp() to prevent waiting for more data */ - recv_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT; - } - - if (buflen > 0) { - /* reset socket error since we have received something */ - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - } - - /* " If the socket is connected, the msg_name and msg_namelen members shall be ignored." */ - done_socket(sock); - return buflen; -#else /* LWIP_TCP */ - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - } - - /* else, UDP and RAW NETCONNs */ -#if LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW - { - u16_t datagram_len = 0; - err_t err; - err = lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw(sock, flags, message, &datagram_len, s); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvmsg[UDP/RAW](%d): buf == NULL, error is \"%s\"!\n", - s, lwip_strerr(err))); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - if (datagram_len > buflen) { - message->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; - } - - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - done_socket(sock); - return (int)datagram_len; - } -#else /* LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW */ - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW */ -} - -ssize_t lwip_send(int s, const void *data, size_t size, int flags) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - err_t err; - u8_t write_flags; - size_t written; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_send(%d, data=%p, size=%" SZT_F ", flags=0x%x)\n", - s, data, size, flags)); - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { -#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) - done_socket(sock); - return lwip_sendto(s, data, size, flags, NULL, 0); -#else /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; -#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ - } - - write_flags = (u8_t)(NETCONN_COPY | - ((flags & MSG_MORE) ? NETCONN_MORE : 0) | - ((flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) ? NETCONN_DONTBLOCK : 0)); - written = 0; - err = netconn_write_partly(sock->conn, data, size, write_flags, &written); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_send(%d) err=%d written=%" SZT_F "\n", s, err, written)); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - /* casting 'written' to ssize_t is OK here since the netconn API limits it to SSIZE_MAX */ - return (err == ERR_OK ? (ssize_t)written : -1); -} - -ssize_t lwip_sendmsg(int s, const struct msghdr *msg, int flags) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; -#if LWIP_TCP - u8_t write_flags; - size_t written; -#endif - err_t err = ERR_OK; - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: invalid msghdr", msg != NULL, - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); return -1;); - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: invalid msghdr iov", msg->msg_iov != NULL, - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); return -1;); - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: maximum iovs exceeded", (msg->msg_iovlen > 0) && (msg->msg_iovlen <= IOV_MAX), - sock_set_errno(sock, EMSGSIZE); - done_socket(sock); return -1;); - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: unsupported flags", (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_MORE)) == 0, - sock_set_errno(sock, EOPNOTSUPP); - done_socket(sock); return -1;); - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg->msg_control); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg->msg_controllen); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg->msg_flags); - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { -#if LWIP_TCP - write_flags = (u8_t)(NETCONN_COPY | - ((flags & MSG_MORE) ? NETCONN_MORE : 0) | - ((flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) ? NETCONN_DONTBLOCK : 0)); - - written = 0; - err = netconn_write_vectors_partly(sock->conn, (struct netvector *)msg->msg_iov, (u16_t)msg->msg_iovlen, write_flags, &written); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - /* casting 'written' to ssize_t is OK here since the netconn API limits it to SSIZE_MAX */ - return (err == ERR_OK ? (ssize_t)written : -1); -#else /* LWIP_TCP */ - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - } - - /* else, UDP and RAW NETCONNs */ -#if LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW - { - struct netbuf chain_buf; - int i; - ssize_t size = 0; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(flags); - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: invalid msghdr name", (((msg->msg_name == NULL) && (msg->msg_namelen == 0)) || IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(msg->msg_namelen)), - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); return -1;); - - /* initialize chain buffer with destination */ - memset(&chain_buf, 0, sizeof(struct netbuf)); - - if (msg->msg_name) { - u16_t remote_port; - SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr *)msg->msg_name, &chain_buf.addr, remote_port); - netbuf_fromport(&chain_buf) = remote_port; - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - - for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; i++) { - size += msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; - - if ((msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len > INT_MAX) || (size < (int)msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len)) { - /* overflow */ - goto sendmsg_emsgsize; - } - } - - if (size > 0xFFFF) { - /* overflow */ - goto sendmsg_emsgsize; - } - - /* Allocate a new netbuf and copy the data into it. */ - if (netbuf_alloc(&chain_buf, (u16_t)size) == NULL) { - err = ERR_MEM; - } else { - /* flatten the IO vectors */ - size_t offset = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; i++) { - MEMCPY(&((u8_t *)chain_buf.p->payload)[offset], msg->msg_iov[i].iov_base, msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len); - offset += msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; - } - -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - { - /* This can be improved by using LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY() and aggregating the checksum for each IO vector */ - u16_t chksum = ~inet_chksum_pbuf(chain_buf.p); - netbuf_set_chksum(&chain_buf, chksum); - } -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - err = ERR_OK; - } - -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - - /* create a chained netbuf from the IO vectors. NOTE: we assemble a pbuf chain - manually to avoid having to allocate, chain, and delete a netbuf for each iov */ - for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; i++) { - struct pbuf *p; - - if (msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len > 0xFFFF) { - /* overflow */ - goto sendmsg_emsgsize; - } - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 0, PBUF_REF); - - if (p == NULL) { - err = ERR_MEM; /* let netbuf_delete() cleanup chain_buf */ - break; - } - - p->payload = msg->msg_iov[i].iov_base; - p->len = p->tot_len = (u16_t)msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; - - /* netbuf empty, add new pbuf */ - if (chain_buf.p == NULL) { - chain_buf.p = chain_buf.ptr = p; - /* add pbuf to existing pbuf chain */ - } else { - if (chain_buf.p->tot_len + p->len > 0xffff) { - /* overflow */ - pbuf_free(p); - goto sendmsg_emsgsize; - } - - pbuf_cat(chain_buf.p, p); - } - } - - /* save size of total chain */ - if (err == ERR_OK) { - size = netbuf_len(&chain_buf); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - - if (err == ERR_OK) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - /* Dual-stack: Unmap IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses */ - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(chain_buf.addr) && ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&chain_buf.addr))) { - unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip4(&chain_buf.addr), ip_2_ip6(&chain_buf.addr)); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(chain_buf.addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - /* send the data */ - err = netconn_send(sock->conn, &chain_buf); - } - - /* deallocated the buffer */ - netbuf_free(&chain_buf); - - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return (err == ERR_OK ? size : -1); - sendmsg_emsgsize: - sock_set_errno(sock, EMSGSIZE); - netbuf_free(&chain_buf); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } -#else /* LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW */ - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW */ -} - -ssize_t lwip_sendto(int s, const void *data, size_t size, int flags, - const struct sockaddr *to, socklen_t tolen) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - err_t err; - u16_t short_size; - u16_t remote_port; - struct netbuf buf; - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { -#if LWIP_TCP - done_socket(sock); - return lwip_send(s, data, size, flags); -#else /* LWIP_TCP */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(flags); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - } - - if (size > LWIP_MIN(0xFFFF, SSIZE_MAX)) { - /* cannot fit into one datagram (at least for us) */ - sock_set_errno(sock, EMSGSIZE); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - short_size = (u16_t)size; - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendto: invalid address", (((to == NULL) && (tolen == 0)) || (IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(tolen) && ((to != NULL) && (IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(to) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_ALIGNED(to))))), - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); - done_socket(sock); return -1;); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tolen); - - /* initialize a buffer */ - buf.p = buf.ptr = NULL; -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - buf.flags = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - if (to) { - SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(to, &buf.addr, remote_port); - } else { - remote_port = 0; - ip_addr_set_any(NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(netconn_type(sock->conn)), &buf.addr); - } - - netbuf_fromport(&buf) = remote_port; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_sendto(%d, data=%p, short_size=%" U16_F ", flags=0x%x to=", - s, data, short_size, flags)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, buf.addr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F "\n", remote_port)); - - /* make the buffer point to the data that should be sent */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - - /* Allocate a new netbuf and copy the data into it. */ - if (netbuf_alloc(&buf, short_size) == NULL) { - err = ERR_MEM; - } else { -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_RAW) { - u16_t chksum = LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(buf.p->payload, data, short_size); - netbuf_set_chksum(&buf, chksum); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - { - MEMCPY(buf.p->payload, data, short_size); - } - - err = ERR_OK; - } - -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - err = netbuf_ref(&buf, data, short_size); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - - if (err == ERR_OK) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - /* Dual-stack: Unmap IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses */ - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(buf.addr) && ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&buf.addr))) { - unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip4(&buf.addr), ip_2_ip6(&buf.addr)); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(buf.addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - /* send the data */ - err = netconn_send(sock->conn, &buf); - } - - /* deallocated the buffer */ - netbuf_free(&buf); - - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return (err == ERR_OK ? short_size : -1); -} - -int lwip_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol) -{ - struct netconn *conn; - int i; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(domain); /* @todo: check this */ - - /* create a netconn */ - switch (type) { - case SOCK_RAW: - conn = netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, NETCONN_RAW), - (u8_t)protocol, DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_socket(%s, SOCK_RAW, %d) = ", - domain == PF_INET ? "PF_INET" : "UNKNOWN", protocol)); - break; - - case SOCK_DGRAM: - conn = netconn_new_with_callback(DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, - ((protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE) ? NETCONN_UDPLITE : NETCONN_UDP)), - DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_socket(%s, SOCK_DGRAM, %d) = ", - domain == PF_INET ? "PF_INET" : "UNKNOWN", protocol)); -#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO - - if (conn) { - /* netconn layer enables pktinfo by default, sockets default to off */ - conn->flags &= ~NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ - break; - - case SOCK_STREAM: - conn = netconn_new_with_callback(DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, NETCONN_TCP), DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_socket(%s, SOCK_STREAM, %d) = ", - domain == PF_INET ? "PF_INET" : "UNKNOWN", protocol)); - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_socket(%d, %d/UNKNOWN, %d) = -1\n", - domain, type, protocol)); - set_errno(EINVAL); - return -1; - } - - if (!conn) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("-1 / ENOBUFS (could not create netconn)\n")); - set_errno(ENOBUFS); - return -1; - } - - i = alloc_socket(conn, 0); - - if (i == -1) { - netconn_delete(conn); - set_errno(ENFILE); - return -1; - } - - conn->socket = i; - done_socket(&sockets[i - LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET]); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("%d\n", i)); - set_errno(0); - return i; -} - -ssize_t lwip_write(int s, const void *data, size_t size) -{ - return lwip_send(s, data, size, 0); -} - -ssize_t lwip_writev(int s, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt) -{ - struct msghdr msg; - - msg.msg_name = NULL; - msg.msg_namelen = 0; - /* Hack: we have to cast via number to cast from 'const' pointer to non-const. - Blame the opengroup standard for this inconsistency. */ - msg.msg_iov = LWIP_CONST_CAST(struct iovec *, iov); - msg.msg_iovlen = iovcnt; - msg.msg_control = NULL; - msg.msg_controllen = 0; - msg.msg_flags = 0; - return lwip_sendmsg(s, &msg, 0); -} - -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL -/* Add select_cb to select_cb_list. */ -static void lwip_link_select_cb(struct lwip_select_cb *select_cb) -{ - LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - /* Protect the select_cb_list */ - LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_PROTECT(lev); - - /* Put this select_cb on top of list */ - select_cb->next = select_cb_list; - - if (select_cb_list != NULL) { - select_cb_list->prev = select_cb; - } - - select_cb_list = select_cb; -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - /* Increasing this counter tells select_check_waiters that the list has changed. */ - select_cb_ctr++; -#endif - - /* Now we can safely unprotect */ - LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_UNPROTECT(lev); -} - -/* Remove select_cb from select_cb_list. */ -static void lwip_unlink_select_cb(struct lwip_select_cb *select_cb) -{ - LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - /* Take us off the list */ - LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_PROTECT(lev); - - if (select_cb->next != NULL) { - select_cb->next->prev = select_cb->prev; - } - - if (select_cb_list == select_cb) { - LWIP_ASSERT("select_cb->prev == NULL", select_cb->prev == NULL); - select_cb_list = select_cb->next; - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("select_cb->prev != NULL", select_cb->prev != NULL); - select_cb->prev->next = select_cb->next; - } - -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - /* Increasing this counter tells select_check_waiters that the list has changed. */ - select_cb_ctr++; -#endif - LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_UNPROTECT(lev); -} -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ - -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT -/** - * Go through the readset and writeset lists and see which socket of the sockets - * set in the sets has events. On return, readset, writeset and exceptset have - * the sockets enabled that had events. - * - * @param maxfdp1 the highest socket index in the sets - * @param readset_in set of sockets to check for read events - * @param writeset_in set of sockets to check for write events - * @param exceptset_in set of sockets to check for error events - * @param readset_out set of sockets that had read events - * @param writeset_out set of sockets that had write events - * @param exceptset_out set os sockets that had error events - * @return number of sockets that had events (read/write/exception) (>= 0) - */ -static int lwip_selscan(int maxfdp1, fd_set *readset_in, fd_set *writeset_in, fd_set *exceptset_in, - fd_set *readset_out, fd_set *writeset_out, fd_set *exceptset_out) -{ - int i, nready = 0; - fd_set lreadset, lwriteset, lexceptset; - struct lwip_sock *sock; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - FD_ZERO(&lreadset); - FD_ZERO(&lwriteset); - FD_ZERO(&lexceptset); - - /* Go through each socket in each list to count number of sockets which - currently match */ - for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp1; i++) { - /* if this FD is not in the set, continue */ - if (!(readset_in && FD_ISSET(i, readset_in)) && - !(writeset_in && FD_ISSET(i, writeset_in)) && - !(exceptset_in && FD_ISSET(i, exceptset_in))) { - continue; - } - - /* First get the socket's status (protected)... */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(i); - - if (sock != NULL) { - void *lastdata = sock->lastdata.pbuf; - s16_t rcvevent = sock->rcvevent; - u16_t sendevent = sock->sendevent; - u16_t errevent = sock->errevent; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - - /* ... then examine it: */ - /* See if netconn of this socket is ready for read */ - if (readset_in && FD_ISSET(i, readset_in) && ((lastdata != NULL) || (rcvevent > 0))) { - FD_SET(i, &lreadset); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_selscan: fd=%d ready for reading\n", i)); - nready++; - } - - /* See if netconn of this socket is ready for write */ - if (writeset_in && FD_ISSET(i, writeset_in) && (sendevent != 0)) { - FD_SET(i, &lwriteset); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_selscan: fd=%d ready for writing\n", i)); - nready++; - } - - /* See if netconn of this socket had an error */ - if (exceptset_in && FD_ISSET(i, exceptset_in) && (errevent != 0)) { - FD_SET(i, &lexceptset); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_selscan: fd=%d ready for exception\n", i)); - nready++; - } - - done_socket(sock); - } else { - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - /* no a valid open socket */ - return -1; - } - } - - /* copy local sets to the ones provided as arguments */ - *readset_out = lreadset; - *writeset_out = lwriteset; - *exceptset_out = lexceptset; - - LWIP_ASSERT("nready >= 0", nready >= 0); - return nready; -} - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -/* Mark all of the set sockets in one of the three fdsets passed to select as used. - * All sockets are marked (and later unmarked), whether they are open or not. - * This is OK as lwip_selscan aborts select when non-open sockets are found. - */ -static void lwip_select_inc_sockets_used_set(int maxfdp, fd_set *fdset, fd_set *used_sockets) -{ - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - if (fdset) { - int i; - - for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp; i++) { - /* if this FD is in the set, lock it (unless already done) */ - if (FD_ISSET(i, fdset) && !FD_ISSET(i, used_sockets)) { - struct lwip_sock *sock; - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(i); - - if (sock != NULL) { - /* leave the socket used until released by lwip_select_dec_sockets_used */ - FD_SET(i, used_sockets); - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - } - } - } -} - -/* Mark all sockets passed to select as used to prevent them from being freed - * from other threads while select is running. - * Marked sockets are added to 'used_sockets' to mark them only once an be able - * to unmark them correctly. - */ -static void lwip_select_inc_sockets_used(int maxfdp, fd_set *fdset1, fd_set *fdset2, fd_set *fdset3, fd_set *used_sockets) -{ - FD_ZERO(used_sockets); - lwip_select_inc_sockets_used_set(maxfdp, fdset1, used_sockets); - lwip_select_inc_sockets_used_set(maxfdp, fdset2, used_sockets); - lwip_select_inc_sockets_used_set(maxfdp, fdset3, used_sockets); -} - -/* Let go all sockets that were marked as used when starting select */ -static void lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(int maxfdp, fd_set *used_sockets) -{ - int i; - - for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp; i++) { - /* if this FD is not in the set, continue */ - if (FD_ISSET(i, used_sockets)) { - struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(i); - LWIP_ASSERT("socket gone at the end of select", sock != NULL); - - if (sock != NULL) { - done_socket(sock); - } - } - } -} -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ -#define lwip_select_inc_sockets_used(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, used_sockets) -#define lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, used_sockets) -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - -int lwip_select(int maxfdp1, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, fd_set *exceptset, - struct timeval *timeout) -{ - u32_t waitres = 0; - int nready; - fd_set lreadset, lwriteset, lexceptset; - u32_t msectimeout; - int i; - int maxfdp2; -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - int waited = 0; -#endif -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - fd_set used_sockets; -#endif - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select(%d, %p, %p, %p, tvsec=%" S32_F " tvusec=%" S32_F ")\n", - maxfdp1, (void *)readset, (void *)writeset, (void *)exceptset, - timeout ? (s32_t)timeout->tv_sec : (s32_t)-1, - timeout ? (s32_t)timeout->tv_usec : (s32_t)-1)); - - if ((maxfdp1 < 0) || (maxfdp1 > LWIP_SELECT_MAXNFDS)) { - set_errno(EINVAL); - return -1; - } - - lwip_select_inc_sockets_used(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, &used_sockets); - - /* Go through each socket in each list to count number of sockets which - currently match */ - nready = lwip_selscan(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, &lreadset, &lwriteset, &lexceptset); - - if (nready < 0) { - /* one of the sockets in one of the fd_sets was invalid */ - set_errno(EBADF); - lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); - return -1; - } else if (nready > 0) { - /* one or more sockets are set, no need to wait */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select: nready=%d\n", nready)); - } else { - /* If we don't have any current events, then suspend if we are supposed to */ - if (timeout && timeout->tv_sec == 0 && timeout->tv_usec == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select: no timeout, returning 0\n")); - /* This is OK as the local fdsets are empty and nready is zero, - or we would have returned earlier. */ - } else { - /* None ready: add our semaphore to list: - We don't actually need any dynamic memory. Our entry on the - list is only valid while we are in this function, so it's ok - to use local variables (unless we're running in MPU compatible - mode). */ - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_DECLARE(select_cb); - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_ALLOC(select_cb, set_errno(ENOMEM); lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); return -1); - memset(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb), 0, sizeof(struct lwip_select_cb)); - - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).readset = readset; - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).writeset = writeset; - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).exceptset = exceptset; -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - - if (sys_sem_new(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem, 0) != ERR_OK) { - /* failed to create semaphore */ - set_errno(ENOMEM); - lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(select_cb); - return -1; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - - lwip_link_select_cb(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb)); - - /* Increase select_waiting for each socket we are interested in */ - maxfdp2 = maxfdp1; - - for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp1; i++) { - if ((readset && FD_ISSET(i, readset)) || - (writeset && FD_ISSET(i, writeset)) || - (exceptset && FD_ISSET(i, exceptset))) { - struct lwip_sock *sock; - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(i); - - if (sock != NULL) { - sock->select_waiting++; - - if (sock->select_waiting == 0) { - /* overflow - too many threads waiting */ - sock->select_waiting--; - nready = -1; - maxfdp2 = i; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - done_socket(sock); - set_errno(EBUSY); - break; - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - done_socket(sock); - } else { - /* Not a valid socket */ - nready = -1; - maxfdp2 = i; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - set_errno(EBADF); - break; - } - } - } - - if (nready >= 0) { - /* Call lwip_selscan again: there could have been events between - the last scan (without us on the list) and putting us on the list! */ - nready = lwip_selscan(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, &lreadset, &lwriteset, &lexceptset); - - if (!nready) { - /* Still none ready, just wait to be woken */ - if (timeout == 0) { - /* Wait forever */ - msectimeout = 0; - } else { - long msecs_long = ((timeout->tv_sec * 1000) + ((timeout->tv_usec + 500) / 1000)); - - if (msecs_long <= 0) { - /* Wait 1ms at least (0 means wait forever) */ - msectimeout = 1; - } else { - msectimeout = (u32_t)msecs_long; - } - } - - waitres = sys_arch_sem_wait(SELECT_SEM_PTR(API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem), msectimeout); -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - waited = 1; -#endif - } - } - - /* Decrease select_waiting for each socket we are interested in */ - for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp2; i++) { - if ((readset && FD_ISSET(i, readset)) || - (writeset && FD_ISSET(i, writeset)) || - (exceptset && FD_ISSET(i, exceptset))) { - struct lwip_sock *sock; - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(i); - - if (sock != NULL) { - /* for now, handle select_waiting==0... */ - LWIP_ASSERT("sock->select_waiting > 0", sock->select_waiting > 0); - - if (sock->select_waiting > 0) { - sock->select_waiting--; - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - done_socket(sock); - } else { - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - /* Not a valid socket */ - nready = -1; - set_errno(EBADF); - } - } - } - - lwip_unlink_select_cb(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb)); - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - - if (API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem_signalled && (!waited || (waitres == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT))) { - /* don't leave the thread-local semaphore signalled */ - sys_arch_sem_wait(API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem, 1); - } - -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - sys_sem_free(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem); -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(select_cb); - - if (nready < 0) { - /* This happens when a socket got closed while waiting */ - lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); - return -1; - } - - if (waitres == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - /* Timeout */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select: timeout expired\n")); - /* This is OK as the local fdsets are empty and nready is zero, - or we would have returned earlier. */ - } else { - /* See what's set now after waiting */ - nready = lwip_selscan(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, &lreadset, &lwriteset, &lexceptset); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select: nready=%d\n", nready)); - } - } - } - - lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); - set_errno(0); - - if (readset) { - *readset = lreadset; - } - - if (writeset) { - *writeset = lwriteset; - } - - if (exceptset) { - *exceptset = lexceptset; - } - - return nready; -} -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT */ - -#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL -/** Options for the lwip_pollscan function. */ -enum lwip_pollscan_opts { - /** Clear revents in each struct pollfd. */ - LWIP_POLLSCAN_CLEAR = 1, - - /** Increment select_waiting in each struct lwip_sock. */ - LWIP_POLLSCAN_INC_WAIT = 2, - - /** Decrement select_waiting in each struct lwip_sock. */ - LWIP_POLLSCAN_DEC_WAIT = 4 -}; - -/** - * Update revents in each struct pollfd. - * Optionally update select_waiting in struct lwip_sock. - * - * @param fds array of structures to update - * @param nfds number of structures in fds - * @param opts what to update and how - * @return number of structures that have revents != 0 - */ -static int lwip_pollscan(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, enum lwip_pollscan_opts opts) -{ - int nready = 0; - nfds_t fdi; - struct lwip_sock *sock; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - /* Go through each struct pollfd in the array. */ - for (fdi = 0; fdi < nfds; fdi++) { - if ((opts & LWIP_POLLSCAN_CLEAR) != 0) { - fds[fdi].revents = 0; - } - - /* Negative fd means the caller wants us to ignore this struct. - POLLNVAL means we already detected that the fd is invalid; - if another thread has since opened a new socket with that fd, - we must not use that socket. */ - if (fds[fdi].fd >= 0 && (fds[fdi].revents & POLLNVAL) == 0) { - /* First get the socket's status (protected)... */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(fds[fdi].fd); - - if (sock != NULL) { - void *lastdata = sock->lastdata.pbuf; - s16_t rcvevent = sock->rcvevent; - u16_t sendevent = sock->sendevent; - u16_t errevent = sock->errevent; - - if ((opts & LWIP_POLLSCAN_INC_WAIT) != 0) { - sock->select_waiting++; - - if (sock->select_waiting == 0) { - /* overflow - too many threads waiting */ - sock->select_waiting--; - nready = -1; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - done_socket(sock); - break; - } - } else if ((opts & LWIP_POLLSCAN_DEC_WAIT) != 0) { - /* for now, handle select_waiting==0... */ - LWIP_ASSERT("sock->select_waiting > 0", sock->select_waiting > 0); - - if (sock->select_waiting > 0) { - sock->select_waiting--; - } - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - done_socket(sock); - - /* ... then examine it: */ - /* See if netconn of this socket is ready for read */ - if ((fds[fdi].events & POLLIN) != 0 && ((lastdata != NULL) || (rcvevent > 0))) { - fds[fdi].revents |= POLLIN; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_pollscan: fd=%d ready for reading\n", fds[fdi].fd)); - } - - /* See if netconn of this socket is ready for write */ - if ((fds[fdi].events & POLLOUT) != 0 && (sendevent != 0)) { - fds[fdi].revents |= POLLOUT; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_pollscan: fd=%d ready for writing\n", fds[fdi].fd)); - } - - /* See if netconn of this socket had an error */ - if (errevent != 0) { - /* POLLERR is output only. */ - fds[fdi].revents |= POLLERR; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_pollscan: fd=%d ready for exception\n", fds[fdi].fd)); - } - } else { - /* Not a valid socket */ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - /* POLLNVAL is output only. */ - fds[fdi].revents |= POLLNVAL; - return -1; - } - } - - /* Will return the number of structures that have events, - not the number of events. */ - if (fds[fdi].revents != 0) { - nready++; - } - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("nready >= 0", nready >= 0); - return nready; -} - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -/* Mark all sockets as used. - * - * All sockets are marked (and later unmarked), whether they are open or not. - * This is OK as lwip_pollscan aborts select when non-open sockets are found. - */ -static void lwip_poll_inc_sockets_used(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds) -{ - nfds_t fdi; - - if (fds) { - /* Go through each struct pollfd in the array. */ - for (fdi = 0; fdi < nfds; fdi++) { - /* Increase the reference counter */ - tryget_socket_unconn(fds[fdi].fd); - } - } -} - -/* Let go all sockets that were marked as used when starting poll */ -static void lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds) -{ - nfds_t fdi; - - if (fds) { - /* Go through each struct pollfd in the array. */ - for (fdi = 0; fdi < nfds; fdi++) { - struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(fds[fdi].fd); - - if (sock != NULL) { - done_socket(sock); - } - } - } -} -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ -#define lwip_poll_inc_sockets_used(fds, nfds) -#define lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds) -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ - -int lwip_poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout) -{ - u32_t waitres = 0; - int nready; - u32_t msectimeout; -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - int waited = 0; -#endif - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_poll(%p, %d, %d)\n", - (void *)fds, (int)nfds, timeout)); - LWIP_ERROR("lwip_poll: invalid fds", ((fds != NULL && nfds > 0) || (fds == NULL && nfds == 0)), - set_errno(EINVAL); - return -1;); - - lwip_poll_inc_sockets_used(fds, nfds); - - /* Go through each struct pollfd to count number of structures - which currently match */ - nready = lwip_pollscan(fds, nfds, LWIP_POLLSCAN_CLEAR); - - if (nready < 0) { - lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); - return -1; - } - - /* If we don't have any current events, then suspend if we are supposed to */ - if (!nready) { - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_DECLARE(select_cb); - - if (timeout == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_poll: no timeout, returning 0\n")); - goto return_success; - } - - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_ALLOC(select_cb, set_errno(EAGAIN); lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); return -1); - memset(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb), 0, sizeof(struct lwip_select_cb)); - - /* None ready: add our semaphore to list: - We don't actually need any dynamic memory. Our entry on the - list is only valid while we are in this function, so it's ok - to use local variables. */ - - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).poll_fds = fds; - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).poll_nfds = nfds; -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - - if (sys_sem_new(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem, 0) != ERR_OK) { - /* failed to create semaphore */ - set_errno(EAGAIN); - lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(select_cb); - return -1; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - - lwip_link_select_cb(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb)); - - /* Increase select_waiting for each socket we are interested in. - Also, check for events again: there could have been events between - the last scan (without us on the list) and putting us on the list! */ - nready = lwip_pollscan(fds, nfds, LWIP_POLLSCAN_INC_WAIT); - - if (!nready) { - /* Still none ready, just wait to be woken */ - if (timeout < 0) { - /* Wait forever */ - msectimeout = 0; - } else { - /* timeout == 0 would have been handled earlier. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("timeout > 0", timeout > 0); - msectimeout = timeout; - } - - waitres = sys_arch_sem_wait(SELECT_SEM_PTR(API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem), msectimeout); -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - waited = 1; -#endif - } - - /* Decrease select_waiting for each socket we are interested in, - and check which events occurred while we waited. */ - nready = lwip_pollscan(fds, nfds, LWIP_POLLSCAN_DEC_WAIT); - - lwip_unlink_select_cb(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb)); - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - - if (select_cb.sem_signalled && (!waited || (waitres == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT))) { - /* don't leave the thread-local semaphore signalled */ - sys_arch_sem_wait(API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem, 1); - } - -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - sys_sem_free(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem); -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(select_cb); - - if (nready < 0) { - /* This happens when a socket got closed while waiting */ - lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); - return -1; - } - - if (waitres == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - /* Timeout */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_poll: timeout expired\n")); - goto return_success; - } - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_poll: nready=%d\n", nready)); -return_success: - lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); - set_errno(0); - return nready; -} - -/** - * Check whether event_callback should wake up a thread waiting in - * lwip_poll. - */ -static int lwip_poll_should_wake(const struct lwip_select_cb *scb, int fd, int has_recvevent, int has_sendevent, int has_errevent) -{ - nfds_t fdi; - - for (fdi = 0; fdi < scb->poll_nfds; fdi++) { - const struct pollfd *pollfd = &scb->poll_fds[fdi]; - - if (pollfd->fd == fd) { - /* Do not update pollfd->revents right here; - that would be a data race because lwip_pollscan - accesses revents without protecting. */ - if (has_recvevent && (pollfd->events & POLLIN) != 0) { - return 1; - } - - if (has_sendevent && (pollfd->events & POLLOUT) != 0) { - return 1; - } - - if (has_errevent) { - /* POLLERR is output only. */ - return 1; - } - } - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ - -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL -/** - * Callback registered in the netconn layer for each socket-netconn. - * Processes recvevent (data available) and wakes up tasks waiting for select. - * - * @note for LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING any caller of this function - * must have the core lock held when signaling the following events - * as they might cause select_list_cb to be checked: - * NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS - * NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS - * NETCONN_EVT_ERROR - * This requirement will be asserted in select_check_waiters() - */ -static void event_callback(struct netconn *conn, enum netconn_evt evt, u16_t len) -{ - int s, check_waiters; - struct lwip_sock *sock; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - /* Get socket */ - if (conn) { - s = conn->socket; - - if (s < 0) { - /* Data comes in right away after an accept, even though - * the server task might not have created a new socket yet. - * Just count down (or up) if that's the case and we - * will use the data later. Note that only receive events - * can happen before the new socket is set up. */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - - if (conn->socket < 0) { - if (evt == NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS) { - /* conn->socket is -1 on initialization - lwip_accept adjusts sock->recvevent if conn->socket < -1 */ - conn->socket--; - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - return; - } - - s = conn->socket; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - } - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return; - } - } else { - return; - } - - check_waiters = 1; - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - - /* Set event as required */ - switch (evt) { - case NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS: - sock->rcvevent++; - - if (sock->rcvevent > 1) { - check_waiters = 0; - } - - break; - - case NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS: - sock->rcvevent--; - check_waiters = 0; - break; - - case NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS: - if (sock->sendevent) { - check_waiters = 0; - } - - sock->sendevent = 1; - break; - - case NETCONN_EVT_SENDMINUS: - sock->sendevent = 0; - check_waiters = 0; - break; - - case NETCONN_EVT_ERROR: - sock->errevent = 1; - break; - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("unknown event", 0); - break; - } - - if (sock->select_waiting && check_waiters) { - /* Save which events are active */ - int has_recvevent, has_sendevent, has_errevent; - has_recvevent = sock->rcvevent > 0; - has_sendevent = sock->sendevent != 0; - has_errevent = sock->errevent != 0; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - /* Check any select calls waiting on this socket */ - select_check_waiters(s, has_recvevent, has_sendevent, has_errevent); - } else { - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - } - - done_socket(sock); -} - -/** - * Check if any select waiters are waiting on this socket and its events - * - * @note on synchronization of select_cb_list: - * LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING: the select_cb_list must only be accessed while holding - * the core lock. We do a single pass through the list and signal any waiters. - * Core lock should already be held when calling here!!!! - - * !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING: we use SYS_ARCH_PROTECT but unlock on each iteration - * of the loop, thus creating a possibility where a thread could modify the - * select_cb_list during our UNPROTECT/PROTECT. We use a generational counter to - * detect this change and restart the list walk. The list is expected to be small - */ -static void select_check_waiters(int s, int has_recvevent, int has_sendevent, int has_errevent) -{ - struct lwip_select_cb *scb; -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - int last_select_cb_ctr; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); -again: - /* remember the state of select_cb_list to detect changes */ - last_select_cb_ctr = select_cb_ctr; -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - for (scb = select_cb_list; scb != NULL; scb = scb->next) { - if (scb->sem_signalled == 0) { - /* semaphore not signalled yet */ - int do_signal = 0; -#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL - - if (scb->poll_fds != NULL) { - do_signal = lwip_poll_should_wake(scb, s, has_recvevent, has_sendevent, has_errevent); - } -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT && LWIP_SOCKET_POLL - else -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT && LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT - { - /* Test this select call for our socket */ - if (has_recvevent) { - if (scb->readset && FD_ISSET(s, scb->readset)) { - do_signal = 1; - } - } - - if (has_sendevent) { - if (!do_signal && scb->writeset && FD_ISSET(s, scb->writeset)) { - do_signal = 1; - } - } - - if (has_errevent) { - if (!do_signal && scb->exceptset && FD_ISSET(s, scb->exceptset)) { - do_signal = 1; - } - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT */ - - if (do_signal) { - scb->sem_signalled = 1; - /* For !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING, we don't call SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT() before signaling - the semaphore, as this might lead to the select thread taking itself off the list, - invalidating the semaphore. */ - sys_sem_signal(SELECT_SEM_PTR(scb->sem)); - } - } - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - } - -#else - /* unlock interrupts with each step */ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - /* this makes sure interrupt protection time is short */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - - if (last_select_cb_ctr != select_cb_ctr) { - /* someone has changed select_cb_list, restart at the beginning */ - goto again; - } - - /* remember the state of select_cb_list to detect changes */ - last_select_cb_ctr = select_cb_ctr; - } - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); -#endif -} -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ - -/** - * Close one end of a full-duplex connection. - */ -int lwip_shutdown(int s, int how) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - err_t err; - u8_t shut_rx = 0, shut_tx = 0; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_shutdown(%d, how=%d)\n", s, how)); - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - if (sock->conn != NULL) { - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { - sock_set_errno(sock, EOPNOTSUPP); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - } else { - sock_set_errno(sock, ENOTCONN); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - if (how == SHUT_RD) { - shut_rx = 1; - } else if (how == SHUT_WR) { - shut_tx = 1; - } else if (how == SHUT_RDWR) { - shut_rx = 1; - shut_tx = 1; - } else { - sock_set_errno(sock, EINVAL); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - err = netconn_shutdown(sock->conn, shut_rx, shut_tx); - - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return (err == ERR_OK ? 0 : -1); -} - -static int lwip_getaddrname(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen, u8_t local) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock; - union sockaddr_aligned saddr; - ip_addr_t naddr; - u16_t port; - err_t err; - - sock = get_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - /* get the IP address and port */ - err = netconn_getaddr(sock->conn, &naddr, &port, local); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - /* Dual-stack: Map IPv4 addresses to IPv4 mapped IPv6 */ - if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(netconn_type(sock->conn)) && - IP_IS_V4_VAL(naddr)) { - ip4_2_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip6(&naddr), ip_2_ip4(&naddr)); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(naddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(&saddr, &naddr, port); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getaddrname(%d, addr=", s)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, naddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F ")\n", port)); - - if (*namelen > saddr.sa.sa_len) { - *namelen = saddr.sa.sa_len; - } - - MEMCPY(name, &saddr, *namelen); - - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - done_socket(sock); - return 0; -} - -int lwip_getpeername(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen) -{ - return lwip_getaddrname(s, name, namelen, 0); -} - -int lwip_getsockname(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen) -{ - return lwip_getaddrname(s, name, namelen, 1); -} - -int lwip_getsockopt(int s, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen) -{ - int err; - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - err_t cberr; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_DECLARE(data); -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - if ((NULL == optval) || (NULL == optlen)) { - sock_set_errno(sock, EFAULT); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - /* core-locking can just call the -impl function */ - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - err = lwip_getsockopt_impl(s, level, optname, optval, optlen); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - - /* MPU_COMPATIBLE copies the optval data, so check for max size here */ - if (*optlen > LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_MAXOPTLEN) { - sock_set_errno(sock, ENOBUFS); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_ALLOC(data, sock); - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).s = s; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).level = level; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optname = optname; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optlen = *optlen; -#if !LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optval.p = optval; -#endif /* !LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).err = 0; -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); -#else - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem = &sock->conn->op_completed; -#endif - cberr = tcpip_callback(lwip_getsockopt_callback, &LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data)); - - if (cberr != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(data); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(cberr)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - sys_arch_sem_wait((sys_sem_t *)(LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem), 0); - - /* write back optlen and optval */ - *optlen = LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optlen; -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - MEMCPY(optval, LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optval, - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optlen); -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - - /* maybe lwip_getsockopt_internal has changed err */ - err = LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).err; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(data); -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - sock_set_errno(sock, err); - done_socket(sock); - return err ? -1 : 0; -} - -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -/** lwip_getsockopt_callback: only used without CORE_LOCKING - * to get into the tcpip_thread - */ -static void lwip_getsockopt_callback(void *arg) -{ - struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *data; - LWIP_ASSERT("arg != NULL", arg != NULL); - data = (struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *)arg; - - data->err = lwip_getsockopt_impl(data->s, data->level, data->optname, -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - data->optval, -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - data->optval.p, -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - &data->optlen); - - sys_sem_signal((sys_sem_t *)(data->completed_sem)); -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - -static int lwip_sockopt_to_ipopt(int optname) -{ - /* Map SO_* values to our internal SOF_* values - * We should not rely on #defines in socket.h - * being in sync with ip.h. - */ - switch (optname) { - case SO_BROADCAST: - return SOF_BROADCAST; - - case SO_KEEPALIVE: - return SOF_KEEPALIVE; - - case SO_REUSEADDR: - return SOF_REUSEADDR; - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("Unknown socket option", 0); - return 0; - } -} - -/** lwip_getsockopt_impl: the actual implementation of getsockopt: - * same argument as lwip_getsockopt, either called directly or through callback - */ -static int lwip_getsockopt_impl(int s, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen) -{ - int err = 0; - struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return EBADF; - } - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_GETSOCKOPT - - if (LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_GETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, &err)) { - return err; - } - -#endif - - switch (level) { - /* Level: SOL_SOCKET */ - case SOL_SOCKET: - switch (optname) { -#if LWIP_TCP - - case SO_ACCEPTCONN: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(sock->conn->type) != NETCONN_TCP) { - done_socket(sock); - return ENOPROTOOPT; - } - - if ((sock->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) && (sock->conn->pcb.tcp->state == LISTEN)) { - *(int *)optval = 1; - } else { - *(int *)optval = 0; - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - - /* The option flags */ - case SO_BROADCAST: - case SO_KEEPALIVE: -#if SO_REUSE - case SO_REUSEADDR: -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - if ((optname == SO_BROADCAST) && - (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(sock->conn->type) != NETCONN_UDP)) { - done_socket(sock); - return ENOPROTOOPT; - } - - optname = lwip_sockopt_to_ipopt(optname); - - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); - *(int *)optval = ip_get_option(sock->conn->pcb.ip, optname); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, optname=0x%x, ..) = %s\n", - s, optname, (*(int *)optval ? "on" : "off"))); - break; - - case SO_TYPE: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, int); - - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn))) { - case NETCONN_RAW: - *(int *)optval = SOCK_RAW; - break; - - case NETCONN_TCP: - *(int *)optval = SOCK_STREAM; - break; - - case NETCONN_UDP: - *(int *)optval = SOCK_DGRAM; - break; - - default: /* unrecognized socket type */ - *(int *)optval = netconn_type(sock->conn); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, - ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE): unrecognized socket type %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - } /* switch (netconn_type(sock->conn)) */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; - - case SO_ERROR: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN(sock, *optlen, int); - *(int *)optval = err_to_errno(netconn_err(sock->conn)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; - -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO - - case SO_SNDTIMEO: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE); - LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_SET(optval, netconn_get_sendtimeout(sock->conn)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO - - case SO_RCVTIMEO: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE); - LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_SET(optval, netconn_get_recvtimeout(sock->conn)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - - case SO_RCVBUF: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, int); - *(int *)optval = netconn_get_recvbufsize(sock->conn); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ -#if LWIP_SO_LINGER - - case SO_LINGER: { - s16_t conn_linger; - struct linger *linger = (struct linger *)optval; - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, struct linger); - conn_linger = sock->conn->linger; - - if (conn_linger >= 0) { - linger->l_onoff = 1; - linger->l_linger = (int)conn_linger; - } else { - linger->l_onoff = 0; - linger->l_linger = 0; - } - } break; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ -#if LWIP_UDP - - case SO_NO_CHECK: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, *optlen, int, NETCONN_UDP); -#if LWIP_UDPLITE - - if (udp_is_flag_set(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE)) { - /* this flag is only available for UDP, not for UDP lite */ - done_socket(sock); - return EAFNOSUPPORT; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ - *(int *)optval = udp_is_flag_set(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM) ? 1 : 0; - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP*/ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; - - /* Level: IPPROTO_IP */ - case IPPROTO_IP: - switch (optname) { - case IP_TTL: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); - *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.ip->ttl; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TTL) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; - - case IP_TOS: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); - *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.ip->tos; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS && LWIP_UDP - - case IP_MULTICAST_TTL: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, u8_t); - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_UDP) { - done_socket(sock); - return ENOPROTOOPT; - } - - *(u8_t *)optval = udp_get_multicast_ttl(sock->conn->pcb.udp); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_TTL) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; - - case IP_MULTICAST_IF: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, struct in_addr); - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_UDP) { - done_socket(sock); - return ENOPROTOOPT; - } - - inet_addr_from_ip4addr((struct in_addr *)optval, udp_get_multicast_netif_addr(sock->conn->pcb.udp)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_IF) = 0x%" X32_F "\n", - s, *(u32_t *)optval)); - break; - - case IP_MULTICAST_LOOP: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, u8_t); - - if ((sock->conn->pcb.udp->flags & UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP) != 0) { - *(u8_t *)optval = 1; - } else { - *(u8_t *)optval = 0; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_LOOP) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS && LWIP_UDP */ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; - -#if LWIP_TCP - - /* Level: IPPROTO_TCP */ - case IPPROTO_TCP: - /* Special case: all IPPROTO_TCP option take an int */ - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, *optlen, int, NETCONN_TCP); - - if (sock->conn->pcb.tcp->state == LISTEN) { - done_socket(sock); - return EINVAL; - } - - switch (optname) { - case TCP_NODELAY: - *(int *)optval = tcp_nagle_disabled(sock->conn->pcb.tcp); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY) = %s\n", - s, (*(int *)optval) ? "on" : "off")); - break; - - case TCP_KEEPALIVE: - *(int *)optval = (int)sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPALIVE) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; - -#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE - - case TCP_KEEPIDLE: - *(int *)optval = (int)(sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle / 1000); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPIDLE) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; - - case TCP_KEEPINTVL: - *(int *)optval = (int)(sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_intvl / 1000); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPINTVL) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; - - case TCP_KEEPCNT: - *(int *)optval = (int)sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_cnt; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPCNT) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - /* Level: IPPROTO_IPV6 */ - case IPPROTO_IPV6: - switch (optname) { - case IPV6_V6ONLY: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, int); - *(int *)optval = (netconn_get_ipv6only(sock->conn) ? 1 : 0); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY) = %d\n", - s, *(int *)optval)); - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IPV6, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE - - /* Level: IPPROTO_UDPLITE */ - case IPPROTO_UDPLITE: - /* Special case: all IPPROTO_UDPLITE option take an int */ - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); - - /* If this is no UDP lite socket, ignore any options. */ - if (!NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(netconn_type(sock->conn))) { - done_socket(sock); - return ENOPROTOOPT; - } - - switch (optname) { - case UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV: - *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_tx; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV) = %d\n", - s, (*(int *)optval))); - break; - - case UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV: - *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_rx; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV) = %d\n", - s, (*(int *)optval))); - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - - /* Level: IPPROTO_RAW */ - case IPPROTO_RAW: - switch (optname) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_RAW - - case IPV6_CHECKSUM: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, *optlen, int, NETCONN_RAW); - - if (sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd == 0) { - *(int *)optval = -1; - } else { - *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_offset; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_RAW, IPV6_CHECKSUM) = %d\n", - s, (*(int *)optval))); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_RAW */ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_RAW, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, level=0x%x, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, level, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (level) */ - - done_socket(sock); - return err; -} - -int lwip_setsockopt(int s, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen) -{ - int err = 0; - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - err_t cberr; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_DECLARE(data); -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - if (NULL == optval) { - sock_set_errno(sock, EFAULT); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - /* core-locking can just call the -impl function */ - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - err = lwip_setsockopt_impl(s, level, optname, optval, optlen); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - - /* MPU_COMPATIBLE copies the optval data, so check for max size here */ - if (optlen > LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_MAXOPTLEN) { - sock_set_errno(sock, ENOBUFS); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_ALLOC(data, sock); - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).s = s; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).level = level; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optname = optname; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optlen = optlen; -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - MEMCPY(LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optval, optval, optlen); -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optval.pc = (const void *)optval; -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).err = 0; -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); -#else - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem = &sock->conn->op_completed; -#endif - cberr = tcpip_callback(lwip_setsockopt_callback, &LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data)); - - if (cberr != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(data); - sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(cberr)); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - - sys_arch_sem_wait((sys_sem_t *)(LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem), 0); - - /* maybe lwip_getsockopt_internal has changed err */ - err = LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).err; - LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(data); -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - sock_set_errno(sock, err); - done_socket(sock); - return err ? -1 : 0; -} - -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -/** lwip_setsockopt_callback: only used without CORE_LOCKING - * to get into the tcpip_thread - */ -static void lwip_setsockopt_callback(void *arg) -{ - struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *data; - LWIP_ASSERT("arg != NULL", arg != NULL); - data = (struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *)arg; - - data->err = lwip_setsockopt_impl(data->s, data->level, data->optname, -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - data->optval, -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - data->optval.pc, -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - data->optlen); - - sys_sem_signal((sys_sem_t *)(data->completed_sem)); -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - -/** lwip_setsockopt_impl: the actual implementation of setsockopt: - * same argument as lwip_setsockopt, either called directly or through callback - */ -static int lwip_setsockopt_impl(int s, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen) -{ - int err = 0; - struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket(s); - - if (!sock) { - return EBADF; - } - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_SETSOCKOPT - - if (LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_SETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, &err)) { - return err; - } - -#endif - - switch (level) { - /* Level: SOL_SOCKET */ - case SOL_SOCKET: - switch (optname) { - /* SO_ACCEPTCONN is get-only */ - - /* The option flags */ - case SO_BROADCAST: - case SO_KEEPALIVE: -#if SO_REUSE - case SO_REUSEADDR: -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - if ((optname == SO_BROADCAST) && - (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(sock->conn->type) != NETCONN_UDP)) { - done_socket(sock); - return ENOPROTOOPT; - } - - optname = lwip_sockopt_to_ipopt(optname); - - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); - - if (*(const int *)optval) { - ip_set_option(sock->conn->pcb.ip, optname); - } else { - ip_reset_option(sock->conn->pcb.ip, optname); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, optname=0x%x, ..) -> %s\n", - s, optname, (*(const int *)optval ? "on" : "off"))); - break; - - /* SO_TYPE is get-only */ - /* SO_ERROR is get-only */ - -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO - - case SO_SNDTIMEO: { - long ms_long; - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE); - ms_long = LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_GET_MS(optval); - - if (ms_long < 0) { - done_socket(sock); - return EINVAL; - } - - netconn_set_sendtimeout(sock->conn, ms_long); - break; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO - - case SO_RCVTIMEO: { - long ms_long; - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE); - ms_long = LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_GET_MS(optval); - - if (ms_long < 0) { - done_socket(sock); - return EINVAL; - } - - netconn_set_recvtimeout(sock->conn, (u32_t)ms_long); - break; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - - case SO_RCVBUF: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, int); - netconn_set_recvbufsize(sock->conn, *(const int *)optval); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ -#if LWIP_SO_LINGER - - case SO_LINGER: { - const struct linger *linger = (const struct linger *)optval; - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, struct linger); - - if (linger->l_onoff) { - int lingersec = linger->l_linger; - - if (lingersec < 0) { - done_socket(sock); - return EINVAL; - } - - if (lingersec > 0xFFFF) { - lingersec = 0xFFFF; - } - - sock->conn->linger = (s16_t)lingersec; - } else { - sock->conn->linger = -1; - } - } break; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ -#if LWIP_UDP - - case SO_NO_CHECK: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, int, NETCONN_UDP); -#if LWIP_UDPLITE - - if (udp_is_flag_set(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE)) { - /* this flag is only available for UDP, not for UDP lite */ - done_socket(sock); - return EAFNOSUPPORT; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ - - if (*(const int *)optval) { - udp_set_flags(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM); - } else { - udp_clear_flags(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM); - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - - case SO_BINDTODEVICE: { - const struct ifreq *iface; - struct netif *n = NULL; - - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, struct ifreq); - - iface = (const struct ifreq *)optval; - - if (iface->ifr_name[0] != 0) { - n = netif_find(iface->ifr_name); - - if (n == NULL) { - done_socket(sock); - return ENODEV; - } - } - - switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn))) { -#if LWIP_TCP - - case NETCONN_TCP: - tcp_bind_netif(sock->conn->pcb.tcp, n); - break; -#endif -#if LWIP_UDP - - case NETCONN_UDP: - udp_bind_netif(sock->conn->pcb.udp, n); - break; -#endif -#if LWIP_RAW - - case NETCONN_RAW: - raw_bind_netif(sock->conn->pcb.raw, n); - break; -#endif - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("Unhandled netconn type in SO_BINDTODEVICE", 0); - break; - } - } break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; - - /* Level: IPPROTO_IP */ - case IPPROTO_IP: - switch (optname) { - case IP_TTL: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); - sock->conn->pcb.ip->ttl = (u8_t)(*(const int *)optval); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TTL, ..) -> %d\n", - s, sock->conn->pcb.ip->ttl)); - break; - - case IP_TOS: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); - sock->conn->pcb.ip->tos = (u8_t)(*(const int *)optval); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, ..)-> %d\n", - s, sock->conn->pcb.ip->tos)); - break; -#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO - - case IP_PKTINFO: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, int, NETCONN_UDP); - - if (*(const int *)optval) { - sock->conn->flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO; - } else { - sock->conn->flags &= ~NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO; - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS && LWIP_UDP - - case IP_MULTICAST_TTL: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, u8_t, NETCONN_UDP); - udp_set_multicast_ttl(sock->conn->pcb.udp, (u8_t)(*(const u8_t *)optval)); - break; - - case IP_MULTICAST_IF: { - ip4_addr_t if_addr; - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, struct in_addr, NETCONN_UDP); - inet_addr_to_ip4addr(&if_addr, (const struct in_addr *)optval); - udp_set_multicast_netif_addr(sock->conn->pcb.udp, &if_addr); - } break; - - case IP_MULTICAST_LOOP: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, u8_t, NETCONN_UDP); - - if (*(const u8_t *)optval) { - udp_set_flags(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP); - } else { - udp_clear_flags(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP); - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS && LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_IGMP - - case IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP: - case IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: { - /* If this is a TCP or a RAW socket, ignore these options. */ - err_t igmp_err; - const struct ip_mreq *imr = (const struct ip_mreq *)optval; - ip4_addr_t if_addr; - ip4_addr_t multi_addr; - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, struct ip_mreq, NETCONN_UDP); - inet_addr_to_ip4addr(&if_addr, &imr->imr_interface); - inet_addr_to_ip4addr(&multi_addr, &imr->imr_multiaddr); - - if (optname == IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP) { - if (!lwip_socket_register_membership(s, &if_addr, &multi_addr)) { - /* cannot track membership (out of memory) */ - err = ENOMEM; - igmp_err = ERR_OK; - } else { - igmp_err = igmp_joingroup(&if_addr, &multi_addr); - } - } else { - igmp_err = igmp_leavegroup(&if_addr, &multi_addr); - lwip_socket_unregister_membership(s, &if_addr, &multi_addr); - } - - if (igmp_err != ERR_OK) { - err = EADDRNOTAVAIL; - } - } break; -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; - -#if LWIP_TCP - - /* Level: IPPROTO_TCP */ - case IPPROTO_TCP: - /* Special case: all IPPROTO_TCP option take an int */ - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, int, NETCONN_TCP); - - if (sock->conn->pcb.tcp->state == LISTEN) { - done_socket(sock); - return EINVAL; - } - - switch (optname) { - case TCP_NODELAY: - if (*(const int *)optval) { - tcp_nagle_disable(sock->conn->pcb.tcp); - } else { - tcp_nagle_enable(sock->conn->pcb.tcp); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY) -> %s\n", - s, (*(const int *)optval) ? "on" : "off")); - break; - - case TCP_KEEPALIVE: - sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle = (u32_t)(*(const int *)optval); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPALIVE) -> %" U32_F "\n", - s, sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle)); - break; - -#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE - - case TCP_KEEPIDLE: - sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle = 1000 * (u32_t)(*(const int *)optval); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPIDLE) -> %" U32_F "\n", - s, sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle)); - break; - - case TCP_KEEPINTVL: - sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_intvl = 1000 * (u32_t)(*(const int *)optval); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPINTVL) -> %" U32_F "\n", - s, sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_intvl)); - break; - - case TCP_KEEPCNT: - sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_cnt = (u32_t)(*(const int *)optval); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPCNT) -> %" U32_F "\n", - s, sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_cnt)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP*/ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - /* Level: IPPROTO_IPV6 */ - case IPPROTO_IPV6: - switch (optname) { - case IPV6_V6ONLY: - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); - - if (*(const int *)optval) { - netconn_set_ipv6only(sock->conn, 1); - } else { - netconn_set_ipv6only(sock->conn, 0); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, ..) -> %d\n", - s, (netconn_get_ipv6only(sock->conn) ? 1 : 0))); - break; -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD - - case IPV6_JOIN_GROUP: - case IPV6_LEAVE_GROUP: { - /* If this is a TCP or a RAW socket, ignore these options. */ - err_t mld6_err; - struct netif *netif; - ip6_addr_t multi_addr; - const struct ipv6_mreq *imr = (const struct ipv6_mreq *)optval; - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, struct ipv6_mreq, NETCONN_UDP); - inet6_addr_to_ip6addr(&multi_addr, &imr->ipv6mr_multiaddr); - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid netif index", imr->ipv6mr_interface <= 0xFFu); - netif = netif_get_by_index((u8_t)imr->ipv6mr_interface); - - if (netif == NULL) { - err = EADDRNOTAVAIL; - break; - } - - if (optname == IPV6_JOIN_GROUP) { - if (!lwip_socket_register_mld6_membership(s, imr->ipv6mr_interface, &multi_addr)) { - /* cannot track membership (out of memory) */ - err = ENOMEM; - mld6_err = ERR_OK; - } else { - mld6_err = mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, &multi_addr); - } - } else { - mld6_err = mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, &multi_addr); - lwip_socket_unregister_mld6_membership(s, imr->ipv6mr_interface, &multi_addr); - } - - if (mld6_err != ERR_OK) { - err = EADDRNOTAVAIL; - } - } break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IPV6, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE - - /* Level: IPPROTO_UDPLITE */ - case IPPROTO_UDPLITE: - /* Special case: all IPPROTO_UDPLITE option take an int */ - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); - - /* If this is no UDP lite socket, ignore any options. */ - if (!NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(netconn_type(sock->conn))) { - done_socket(sock); - return ENOPROTOOPT; - } - - switch (optname) { - case UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV: - if ((*(const int *)optval != 0) && ((*(const int *)optval < 8) || (*(const int *)optval > 0xffff))) { - /* don't allow illegal values! */ - sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_tx = 8; - } else { - sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_tx = (u16_t) * (const int *)optval; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV) -> %d\n", - s, (*(const int *)optval))); - break; - - case UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV: - if ((*(const int *)optval != 0) && ((*(const int *)optval < 8) || (*(const int *)optval > 0xffff))) { - /* don't allow illegal values! */ - sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_rx = 8; - } else { - sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_rx = (u16_t) * (const int *)optval; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV) -> %d\n", - s, (*(const int *)optval))); - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - - /* Level: IPPROTO_RAW */ - case IPPROTO_RAW: - switch (optname) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_RAW - - case IPV6_CHECKSUM: - - /* It should not be possible to disable the checksum generation with ICMPv6 - * as per RFC 3542 chapter 3.1 */ - if (sock->conn->pcb.raw->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6) { - done_socket(sock); - return EINVAL; - } - - LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, int, NETCONN_RAW); - - if (*(const int *)optval < 0) { - sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd = 0; - } else if (*(const int *)optval & 1) { - /* Per RFC3542, odd offsets are not allowed */ - done_socket(sock); - return EINVAL; - } else { - sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd = 1; - sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_offset = (u16_t) * (const int *)optval; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_RAW, IPV6_CHECKSUM, ..) -> %d\n", - s, sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_RAW */ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_RAW, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (optname) */ - - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, level=0x%x, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", - s, level, optname)); - err = ENOPROTOOPT; - break; - } /* switch (level) */ - - done_socket(sock); - return err; -} - -int lwip_ioctl(int s, long cmd, void *argp) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); - u8_t val; -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - int recv_avail; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - switch (cmd) { -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF || LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE - - case FIONREAD: - if (!argp) { - sock_set_errno(sock, EINVAL); - done_socket(sock); - return -1; - } - -#if LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { - struct netbuf *nb; - - if (sock->lastdata.netbuf) { - nb = sock->lastdata.netbuf; - *((int *)argp) = nb->p->tot_len; - } else { - struct netbuf *rxbuf; - err_t err = netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf_flags(sock->conn, &rxbuf, NETCONN_DONTBLOCK); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - *((int *)argp) = 0; - } else { - sock->lastdata.netbuf = rxbuf; - *((int *)argp) = rxbuf->p->tot_len; - } - } - - done_socket(sock); - return 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE */ - -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - /* we come here if either LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE==0 or this is a TCP socket */ - SYS_ARCH_GET(sock->conn->recv_avail, recv_avail); - - if (recv_avail < 0) { - recv_avail = 0; - } - - /* Check if there is data left from the last recv operation. /maq 041215 */ - if (sock->lastdata.netbuf) { - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { - recv_avail += sock->lastdata.pbuf->tot_len; - } else { - recv_avail += sock->lastdata.netbuf->p->tot_len; - } - } - - *((int *)argp) = recv_avail; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_ioctl(%d, FIONREAD, %p) = %" U16_F "\n", s, argp, *((u16_t *)argp))); - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - done_socket(sock); - return 0; -#else /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ - break; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF || LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE */ - - case (long)FIONBIO: - val = 0; - - if (argp && *(int *)argp) { - val = 1; - } - - netconn_set_nonblocking(sock->conn, val); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_ioctl(%d, FIONBIO, %d)\n", s, val)); - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - done_socket(sock); - return 0; - - default: - break; - } /* switch (cmd) */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_ioctl(%d, UNIMPL: 0x%lx, %p)\n", s, cmd, argp)); - sock_set_errno(sock, ENOSYS); /* not yet implemented */ - done_socket(sock); - return -1; -} - -/** A minimal implementation of fcntl. - * Currently only the commands F_GETFL and F_SETFL are implemented. - * The flag O_NONBLOCK and access modes are supported for F_GETFL, only - * the flag O_NONBLOCK is implemented for F_SETFL. - */ -int lwip_fcntl(int s, int cmd, int val) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); - int ret = -1; - int op_mode = 0; - - if (!sock) { - return -1; - } - - switch (cmd) { - case F_GETFL: - ret = netconn_is_nonblocking(sock->conn) ? O_NONBLOCK : 0; - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - - if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); -#else - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - /* the proper thing to do here would be to get into the tcpip_thread, - but locking should be OK as well since we only *read* some flags */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); -#endif -#if LWIP_TCP - - if (sock->conn->pcb.tcp) { - if (!(sock->conn->pcb.tcp->flags & TF_RXCLOSED)) { - op_mode |= O_RDONLY; - } - - if (!(sock->conn->pcb.tcp->flags & TF_FIN)) { - op_mode |= O_WRONLY; - } - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); -#else - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); -#endif - } else { - op_mode |= O_RDWR; - } - - /* ensure O_RDWR for (O_RDONLY|O_WRONLY) != O_RDWR cases */ - ret |= (op_mode == (O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY)) ? O_RDWR : op_mode; - - break; - - case F_SETFL: - /* Bits corresponding to the file access mode and the file creation flags [..] that are set in arg shall be ignored */ - val &= ~(O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY | O_RDWR); - - if ((val & ~O_NONBLOCK) == 0) { - /* only O_NONBLOCK, all other bits are zero */ - netconn_set_nonblocking(sock->conn, val & O_NONBLOCK); - ret = 0; - sock_set_errno(sock, 0); - } else { - sock_set_errno(sock, ENOSYS); /* not yet implemented */ - } - - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_fcntl(%d, UNIMPL: %d, %d)\n", s, cmd, val)); - sock_set_errno(sock, ENOSYS); /* not yet implemented */ - break; - } - - done_socket(sock); - return ret; -} - -#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS == 2 && LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES -int fcntl(int s, int cmd, ...) -{ - va_list ap; - int val; - - va_start(ap, cmd); - val = va_arg(ap, int); - va_end(ap); - return lwip_fcntl(s, cmd, val); -} -#endif - -const char *lwip_inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size) -{ - const char *ret = NULL; - int size_int = (int)size; - - if (size_int < 0) { - set_errno(ENOSPC); - return NULL; - } - - switch (af) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - case AF_INET: - ret = ip4addr_ntoa_r((const ip4_addr_t *)src, dst, size_int); - - if (ret == NULL) { - set_errno(ENOSPC); - } - - break; -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - case AF_INET6: - ret = ip6addr_ntoa_r((const ip6_addr_t *)src, dst, size_int); - - if (ret == NULL) { - set_errno(ENOSPC); - } - - break; -#endif - - default: - set_errno(EAFNOSUPPORT); - break; - } - - return ret; -} - -int lwip_inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst) -{ - int err; - - switch (af) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - case AF_INET: - err = ip4addr_aton(src, (ip4_addr_t *)dst); - break; -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - case AF_INET6: { - /* convert into temporary variable since ip6_addr_t might be larger - than in6_addr when scopes are enabled */ - ip6_addr_t addr; - err = ip6addr_aton(src, &addr); - - if (err) { - memcpy(dst, &addr.addr, sizeof(addr.addr)); - } - - break; - } - -#endif - - default: - err = -1; - set_errno(EAFNOSUPPORT); - break; - } - - return err; -} - -#if LWIP_IGMP -/** Register a new IGMP membership. On socket close, the membership is dropped automatically. - * - * ATTENTION: this function is called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). - * - * @return 1 on success, 0 on failure - */ -static int lwip_socket_register_membership(int s, const ip4_addr_t *if_addr, const ip4_addr_t *multi_addr) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); - int i; - - if (!sock) { - return 0; - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { - if (socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock == NULL) { - socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock = sock; - ip4_addr_copy(socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr, *if_addr); - ip4_addr_copy(socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr, *multi_addr); - done_socket(sock); - return 1; - } - } - - done_socket(sock); - return 0; -} - -/** Unregister a previously registered membership. This prevents dropping the membership - * on socket close. - * - * ATTENTION: this function is called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). - */ -static void lwip_socket_unregister_membership(int s, const ip4_addr_t *if_addr, const ip4_addr_t *multi_addr) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); - int i; - - if (!sock) { - return; - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { - if ((socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock == sock) && - ip4_addr_cmp(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr, if_addr) && - ip4_addr_cmp(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr, multi_addr)) { - socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock = NULL; - ip4_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr); - ip4_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); - break; - } - } - - done_socket(sock); -} - -/** Drop all memberships of a socket that were not dropped explicitly via setsockopt. - * - * ATTENTION: this function is NOT called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). - */ -static void lwip_socket_drop_registered_memberships(int s) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); - int i; - - if (!sock) { - return; - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { - if (socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock == sock) { - ip_addr_t multi_addr, if_addr; - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(multi_addr, socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(if_addr, socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr); - socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock = NULL; - ip4_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr); - ip4_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); - - netconn_join_leave_group(sock->conn, &multi_addr, &if_addr, NETCONN_LEAVE); - } - } - - done_socket(sock); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD -/** Register a new MLD6 membership. On socket close, the membership is dropped automatically. - * - * ATTENTION: this function is called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). - * - * @return 1 on success, 0 on failure - */ -static int lwip_socket_register_mld6_membership(int s, unsigned int if_idx, const ip6_addr_t *multi_addr) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); - int i; - - if (!sock) { - return 0; - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { - if (socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock == NULL) { - socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock = sock; - socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx = (u8_t)if_idx; - ip6_addr_copy(socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr, *multi_addr); - done_socket(sock); - return 1; - } - } - - done_socket(sock); - return 0; -} - -/** Unregister a previously registered MLD6 membership. This prevents dropping the membership - * on socket close. - * - * ATTENTION: this function is called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). - */ -static void lwip_socket_unregister_mld6_membership(int s, unsigned int if_idx, const ip6_addr_t *multi_addr) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); - int i; - - if (!sock) { - return; - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { - if ((socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock == sock) && - (socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx == if_idx) && - ip6_addr_cmp(&socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr, multi_addr)) { - socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock = NULL; - socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; - ip6_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); - break; - } - } - - done_socket(sock); -} - -/** Drop all MLD6 memberships of a socket that were not dropped explicitly via setsockopt. - * - * ATTENTION: this function is NOT called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). - */ -static void lwip_socket_drop_registered_mld6_memberships(int s) -{ - struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); - int i; - - if (!sock) { - return; - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { - if (socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock == sock) { - ip_addr_t multi_addr; - u8_t if_idx; - - ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(multi_addr, socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); - if_idx = socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx; - - socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock = NULL; - socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; - ip6_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); - - netconn_join_leave_group_netif(sock->conn, &multi_addr, if_idx, NETCONN_LEAVE); - } - } - - done_socket(sock); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ +/** + * @file + * Sockets BSD-Like API module + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + * Improved by Marc Boucher and David Haas + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/sockets.h" +#include "lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h" +#include "lwip/api.h" +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +#include "lwip/inet.h" +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/raw.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#endif + +#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS == 2 && LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES +#include +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +/* If the netconn API is not required publicly, then we include the necessary + files here to get the implementation */ +#if !LWIP_NETCONN +#undef LWIP_NETCONN +#define LWIP_NETCONN 1 +#include "api_msg.c" +#include "api_lib.c" +#include "netbuf.c" +#undef LWIP_NETCONN +#define LWIP_NETCONN 0 +#endif + +#define API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) +#define API_SELECT_CB_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct lwip_select_cb, name) +#define API_SELECT_CB_VAR_ALLOC(name, retblock) API_VAR_ALLOC_EXT(struct lwip_select_cb, MEMP_SELECT_CB, name, retblock) +#define API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_SELECT_CB, name) + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +#define IP4ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sin, ipaddr, port) \ + do { \ + (sin)->sin_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); \ + (sin)->sin_family = AF_INET; \ + (sin)->sin_port = lwip_htons((port)); \ + inet_addr_from_ip4addr(&(sin)->sin_addr, ipaddr); \ + memset((sin)->sin_zero, 0, SIN_ZERO_LEN); \ + } while (0) +#define SOCKADDR4_TO_IP4ADDR_PORT(sin, ipaddr, port) \ + do { \ + inet_addr_to_ip4addr(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), &((sin)->sin_addr)); \ + (port) = lwip_ntohs((sin)->sin_port); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#define IP6ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sin6, ipaddr, port) \ + do { \ + (sin6)->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); \ + (sin6)->sin6_family = AF_INET6; \ + (sin6)->sin6_port = lwip_htons((port)); \ + (sin6)->sin6_flowinfo = 0; \ + inet6_addr_from_ip6addr(&(sin6)->sin6_addr, ipaddr); \ + (sin6)->sin6_scope_id = ip6_addr_zone(ipaddr); \ + } while (0) +#define SOCKADDR6_TO_IP6ADDR_PORT(sin6, ipaddr, port) \ + do { \ + inet6_addr_to_ip6addr(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), &((sin6)->sin6_addr)); \ + if (ip6_addr_has_scope(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { \ + ip6_addr_set_zone(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), (u8_t)((sin6)->sin6_scope_id)); \ + } \ + (port) = lwip_ntohs((sin6)->sin6_port); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +static void sockaddr_to_ipaddr_port(const struct sockaddr *sockaddr, ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t *port); + +#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) (((namelen) == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) || \ + ((namelen) == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))) +#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name) (((name)->sa_family == AF_INET) || \ + ((name)->sa_family == AF_INET6)) +#define SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock) \ + ((((name)->sa_family == AF_INET) && !(NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6((sock)->conn->type))) || \ + (((name)->sa_family == AF_INET6) && (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6((sock)->conn->type)))) +#define IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ + do { \ + if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(*ipaddr) || IP_IS_V6_VAL(*ipaddr)) { \ + IP6ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void *)(sockaddr), ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), port); \ + } else { \ + IP4ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR((struct sockaddr_in *)(void *)(sockaddr), ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), port); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) sockaddr_to_ipaddr_port(sockaddr, ipaddr, &(port)) +#define DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, type) (((domain) == AF_INET) ? \ + (type) : \ + (enum netconn_type)((type) | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6)) +#elif LWIP_IPV6 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) ((namelen) == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) +#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name) ((name)->sa_family == AF_INET6) +#define SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock) 1 +#define IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ + IP6ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void *)(sockaddr), ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), port) +#define SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ + SOCKADDR6_TO_IP6ADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)(const void *)(sockaddr), ipaddr, port) +#define DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, netconn_type) (netconn_type) +#else /*-> LWIP_IPV4: LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) ((namelen) == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) +#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name) ((name)->sa_family == AF_INET) +#define SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock) 1 +#define IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ + IP4ADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR((struct sockaddr_in *)(void *)(sockaddr), ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), port) +#define SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(sockaddr, ipaddr, port) \ + SOCKADDR4_TO_IP4ADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr_in *)(const void *)(sockaddr), ipaddr, port) +#define DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, netconn_type) (netconn_type) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID_OR_UNSPEC(name) (((name)->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) || \ + IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name)) +#define SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH_OR_UNSPEC(name, sock) (((name)->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) || \ + SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock)) +#define IS_SOCK_ADDR_ALIGNED(name) ((((mem_ptr_t)(name)) % 4) == 0) + +#define LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN(sock, optlen, opttype) \ + do { \ + if ((optlen) < sizeof(opttype)) { \ + done_socket(sock); \ + return EINVAL; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, opttype) \ + do { \ + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN(sock, optlen, opttype); \ + if ((sock)->conn == NULL) { \ + done_socket(sock); \ + return EINVAL; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, opttype) \ + do { \ + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN(sock, optlen, opttype); \ + if (((sock)->conn == NULL) || ((sock)->conn->pcb.tcp == NULL)) { \ + done_socket(sock); \ + return EINVAL; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, opttype, netconntype) \ + do { \ + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, opttype); \ + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type((sock)->conn)) != netconntype) { \ + done_socket(sock); \ + return ENOPROTOOPT; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) +#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data, name) +#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA, name) +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE +#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_ALLOC(name, sock) \ + do { \ + name = (struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *)memp_malloc(MEMP_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA); \ + if (name == NULL) { \ + sock_set_errno(sock, ENOMEM); \ + done_socket(sock); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ +#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_ALLOC(name, sock) +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + +#if LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD +#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE int +#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_SET(optval, val) (*(int *)(optval) = (val)) +#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_GET_MS(optval) ((long)*(const int *)(optval)) +#else +#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE struct timeval +#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_SET(optval, val) \ + do { \ + u32_t loc = (val); \ + ((struct timeval *)(optval))->tv_sec = (long)((loc) / 1000U); \ + ((struct timeval *)(optval))->tv_usec = (long)(((loc) % 1000U) * 1000U); \ + } while (0) +#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_GET_MS(optval) ((((const struct timeval *)(optval))->tv_sec * 1000) + (((const struct timeval *)(optval))->tv_usec / 1000)) +#endif + +/** A struct sockaddr replacement that has the same alignment as sockaddr_in/ + * sockaddr_in6 if instantiated. + */ +union sockaddr_aligned { + struct sockaddr sa; +#if LWIP_IPV6 + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + struct sockaddr_in sin; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +}; + +/* Define the number of IPv4 multicast memberships, default is one per socket */ +#ifndef LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS +#define LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS NUM_SOCKETS +#endif + +#if LWIP_IGMP +/* This is to keep track of IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP calls to drop the membership when + a socket is closed */ +struct lwip_socket_multicast_pair { + /** the socket */ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + /** the interface address */ + ip4_addr_t if_addr; + /** the group address */ + ip4_addr_t multi_addr; +}; + +static struct lwip_socket_multicast_pair socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS]; + +static int lwip_socket_register_membership(int s, const ip4_addr_t *if_addr, const ip4_addr_t *multi_addr); +static void lwip_socket_unregister_membership(int s, const ip4_addr_t *if_addr, const ip4_addr_t *multi_addr); +static void lwip_socket_drop_registered_memberships(int s); +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD +/* This is to keep track of IP_JOIN_GROUP calls to drop the membership when + a socket is closed */ +struct lwip_socket_multicast_mld6_pair { + /** the socket */ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + /** the interface index */ + u8_t if_idx; + /** the group address */ + ip6_addr_t multi_addr; +}; + +static struct lwip_socket_multicast_mld6_pair socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS]; + +static int lwip_socket_register_mld6_membership(int s, unsigned int if_idx, const ip6_addr_t *multi_addr); +static void lwip_socket_unregister_mld6_membership(int s, unsigned int if_idx, const ip6_addr_t *multi_addr); +static void lwip_socket_drop_registered_mld6_memberships(int s); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + +/** The global array of available sockets */ +static struct lwip_sock sockets[NUM_SOCKETS]; + +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +/* protect the select_cb_list using core lock */ +#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_DECL_PROTECT(lev) +#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_PROTECT(lev) LOCK_TCPIP_CORE() +#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_UNPROTECT(lev) UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE() +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +/* protect the select_cb_list using SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT */ +#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_DECL_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) +#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) +#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_UNPROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) +/** This counter is increased from lwip_select when the list is changed + and checked in select_check_waiters to see if it has changed. */ +static volatile int select_cb_ctr; +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +/** The global list of tasks waiting for select */ +static struct lwip_select_cb *select_cb_list; +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ + +#define sock_set_errno(sk, e) \ + do { \ + const int sockerr = (e); \ + set_errno(sockerr); \ + } while (0) + +/* Forward declaration of some functions */ +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL +static void event_callback(struct netconn *conn, enum netconn_evt evt, u16_t len); +#define DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB event_callback +static void select_check_waiters(int s, int has_recvevent, int has_sendevent, int has_errevent); +#else +#define DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB NULL +#endif +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +static void lwip_getsockopt_callback(void *arg); +static void lwip_setsockopt_callback(void *arg); +#endif +static int lwip_getsockopt_impl(int s, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen); +static int lwip_setsockopt_impl(int s, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen); +static int free_socket_locked(struct lwip_sock *sock, int is_tcp, struct netconn **conn, + union lwip_sock_lastdata *lastdata); +static void free_socket_free_elements(int is_tcp, struct netconn *conn, union lwip_sock_lastdata *lastdata); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +static void sockaddr_to_ipaddr_port(const struct sockaddr *sockaddr, ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t *port) +{ + if ((sockaddr->sa_family) == AF_INET6) { + SOCKADDR6_TO_IP6ADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)(const void *)(sockaddr), ipaddr, *port); + ipaddr->type = IPADDR_TYPE_V6; + } else { + SOCKADDR4_TO_IP4ADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr_in *)(const void *)(sockaddr), ipaddr, *port); + ipaddr->type = IPADDR_TYPE_V4; + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: initialize thread-local semaphore */ +void lwip_socket_thread_init(void) +{ + netconn_thread_init(); +} + +/** LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: destroy thread-local semaphore */ +void lwip_socket_thread_cleanup(void) +{ + netconn_thread_cleanup(); +} + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +/* Thread-safe increment of sock->fd_used, with overflow check */ +static int sock_inc_used(struct lwip_sock *sock) +{ + int ret; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + LWIP_ASSERT("sock != NULL", sock != NULL); + + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + + if (sock->fd_free_pending) { + /* prevent new usage of this socket if free is pending */ + ret = 0; + } else { + ++sock->fd_used; + ret = 1; + LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used != 0", sock->fd_used != 0); + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + return ret; +} + +/* Like sock_inc_used(), but called under SYS_ARCH_PROTECT lock. */ +static int sock_inc_used_locked(struct lwip_sock *sock) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("sock != NULL", sock != NULL); + + if (sock->fd_free_pending) { + LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used != 0", sock->fd_used != 0); + return 0; + } + + ++sock->fd_used; + LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used != 0", sock->fd_used != 0); + return 1; +} + +/* In full-duplex mode,sock->fd_used != 0 prevents a socket descriptor from being + * released (and possibly reused) when used from more than one thread + * (e.g. read-while-write or close-while-write, etc) + * This function is called at the end of functions using (try)get_socket*(). + */ +static void done_socket(struct lwip_sock *sock) +{ + int freed = 0; + int is_tcp = 0; + struct netconn *conn = NULL; + union lwip_sock_lastdata lastdata; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + LWIP_ASSERT("sock != NULL", sock != NULL); + + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used > 0", sock->fd_used > 0); + + if (--sock->fd_used == 0) { + if (sock->fd_free_pending) { + /* free the socket */ + sock->fd_used = 1; + is_tcp = sock->fd_free_pending & LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_TCP; + freed = free_socket_locked(sock, is_tcp, &conn, &lastdata); + } + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + + if (freed) { + free_socket_free_elements(is_tcp, conn, &lastdata); + } +} + +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ +#define sock_inc_used(sock) 1 +#define sock_inc_used_locked(sock) 1 +#define done_socket(sock) +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + +/* Translate a socket 'int' into a pointer (only fails if the index is invalid) */ +static struct lwip_sock *tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(int fd) +{ + int s = fd - LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; + + if ((s < 0) || (s >= NUM_SOCKETS)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("tryget_socket_unconn(%d): invalid\n", fd)); + return NULL; + } + + return &sockets[s]; +} + +struct lwip_sock * +lwip_socket_dbg_get_socket(int fd) +{ + return tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(fd); +} + +/* Translate a socket 'int' into a pointer (only fails if the index is invalid) */ +static struct lwip_sock *tryget_socket_unconn(int fd) +{ + struct lwip_sock *ret = tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(fd); + + if (ret != NULL) { + if (!sock_inc_used(ret)) { + return NULL; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +/* Like tryget_socket_unconn(), but called under SYS_ARCH_PROTECT lock. */ +static struct lwip_sock *tryget_socket_unconn_locked(int fd) +{ + struct lwip_sock *ret = tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(fd); + + if (ret != NULL) { + if (!sock_inc_used_locked(ret)) { + return NULL; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * Same as get_socket but doesn't set errno + * + * @param fd externally used socket index + * @return struct lwip_sock for the socket or NULL if not found + */ +static struct lwip_sock *tryget_socket(int fd) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket_unconn(fd); + + if (sock != NULL) { + if (sock->conn) { + return sock; + } + + done_socket(sock); + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Map a externally used socket index to the internal socket representation. + * + * @param fd externally used socket index + * @return struct lwip_sock for the socket or NULL if not found + */ +static struct lwip_sock *get_socket(int fd) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket(fd); + + if (!sock) { + if ((fd < LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) || (fd >= (LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET + NUM_SOCKETS))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("get_socket(%d): invalid\n", fd)); + } + + set_errno(EBADF); + return NULL; + } + + return sock; +} + +/** + * Allocate a new socket for a given netconn. + * + * @param newconn the netconn for which to allocate a socket + * @param accepted 1 if socket has been created by accept(), + * 0 if socket has been created by socket() + * @return the index of the new socket; -1 on error + */ +static int alloc_socket(struct netconn *newconn, int accepted) +{ + int i; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(accepted); + + /* allocate a new socket identifier */ + for (i = 0; i < NUM_SOCKETS; ++i) { + /* Protect socket array */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + + if (!sockets[i].conn) { +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + + if (sockets[i].fd_used) { + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + continue; + } + + sockets[i].fd_used = 1; + sockets[i].fd_free_pending = 0; +#endif + sockets[i].conn = newconn; + /* The socket is not yet known to anyone, so no need to protect + after having marked it as used. */ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + sockets[i].lastdata.pbuf = NULL; +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL + LWIP_ASSERT("sockets[i].select_waiting == 0", sockets[i].select_waiting == 0); + sockets[i].rcvevent = 0; + /* TCP sendbuf is empty, but the socket is not yet writable until connected + * (unless it has been created by accept()). */ + sockets[i].sendevent = (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(newconn->type) == NETCONN_TCP ? (accepted != 0) : 1); + sockets[i].errevent = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ + return i + LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + } + + return -1; +} + +/** Free a socket (under lock) + * + * @param sock the socket to free + * @param is_tcp != 0 for TCP sockets, used to free lastdata + * @param conn the socekt's netconn is stored here, must be freed externally + * @param lastdata lastdata is stored here, must be freed externally + */ +static int free_socket_locked(struct lwip_sock *sock, int is_tcp, struct netconn **conn, + union lwip_sock_lastdata *lastdata) +{ +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + LWIP_ASSERT("sock->fd_used > 0", sock->fd_used > 0); + sock->fd_used--; + + if (sock->fd_used > 0) { + sock->fd_free_pending = LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_FREE | (is_tcp ? LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_TCP : 0); + return 0; + } + +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(is_tcp); +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + + *lastdata = sock->lastdata; + sock->lastdata.pbuf = NULL; + *conn = sock->conn; + sock->conn = NULL; + return 1; +} + +/** Free a socket's leftover members. + */ +static void free_socket_free_elements(int is_tcp, struct netconn *conn, union lwip_sock_lastdata *lastdata) +{ + if (lastdata->pbuf != NULL) { + if (is_tcp) { + pbuf_free(lastdata->pbuf); + } else { + netbuf_delete(lastdata->netbuf); + } + } + + if (conn != NULL) { + /* netconn_prepare_delete() has already been called, here we only free the conn */ + netconn_delete(conn); + } +} + +/** Free a socket. The socket's netconn must have been + * delete before! + * + * @param sock the socket to free + * @param is_tcp != 0 for TCP sockets, used to free lastdata + */ +static void free_socket(struct lwip_sock *sock, int is_tcp) +{ + int freed; + struct netconn *conn; + union lwip_sock_lastdata lastdata; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + /* Protect socket array */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + + freed = free_socket_locked(sock, is_tcp, &conn, &lastdata); + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + /* don't use 'sock' after this line, as another task might have allocated it */ + + if (freed) { + free_socket_free_elements(is_tcp, conn, &lastdata); + } +} + +/* Below this, the well-known socket functions are implemented. + * Use google.com or opengroup.org to get a good description :-) + * + * Exceptions are documented! + */ + +int lwip_accept(int s, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t *addrlen) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock, *nsock; + struct netconn *newconn; + ip_addr_t naddr; + u16_t port = 0; + int newsock; + err_t err; + int recvevent; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d)...\n", s)); + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + /* wait for a new connection */ + err = netconn_accept(sock->conn, &newconn); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d): netconn_acept failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { + sock_set_errno(sock, EOPNOTSUPP); + } else if (err == ERR_CLSD) { + sock_set_errno(sock, EINVAL); + } else { + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + } + + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("newconn != NULL", newconn != NULL); + + newsock = alloc_socket(newconn, 1); + + if (newsock == -1) { + netconn_delete(newconn); + sock_set_errno(sock, ENFILE); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket index", (newsock >= LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) && (newsock < NUM_SOCKETS + LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET)); + nsock = &sockets[newsock - LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET]; + + /* See event_callback: If data comes in right away after an accept, even + * though the server task might not have created a new socket yet. + * In that case, newconn->socket is counted down (newconn->socket--), + * so nsock->rcvevent is >= 1 here! + */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + recvevent = (s16_t)(-1 - newconn->socket); + newconn->socket = newsock; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + + if (newconn->callback) { + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + + while (recvevent > 0) { + recvevent--; + newconn->callback(newconn, NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, 0); + } + + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + } + + /* Note that POSIX only requires us to check addr is non-NULL. addrlen must + * not be NULL if addr is valid. + */ + if ((addr != NULL) && (addrlen != NULL)) { + union sockaddr_aligned tempaddr; + /* get the IP address and port of the remote host */ + err = netconn_peer(newconn, &naddr, &port); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d): netconn_peer failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); + netconn_delete(newconn); + free_socket(nsock, 1); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(&tempaddr, &naddr, port); + + if (*addrlen > tempaddr.sa.sa_len) { + *addrlen = tempaddr.sa.sa_len; + } + + MEMCPY(addr, &tempaddr, *addrlen); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d) returning new sock=%d addr=", s, newsock)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, naddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F "\n", port)); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_accept(%d) returning new sock=%d", s, newsock)); + } + + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + done_socket(sock); + done_socket(nsock); + return newsock; +} + +int lwip_bind(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + ip_addr_t local_addr; + u16_t local_port; + err_t err; + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + if (!SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH(name, sock)) { + /* sockaddr does not match socket type (IPv4/IPv6) */ + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_VAL)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + /* check size, family and alignment of 'name' */ + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_bind: invalid address", (IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(name) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_ALIGNED(name)), + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); return -1;); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(namelen); + + SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(name, &local_addr, local_port); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_bind(%d, addr=", s)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, local_addr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F ")\n", local_port)); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + /* Dual-stack: Unmap IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses */ + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(local_addr) && ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&local_addr))) { + unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip4(&local_addr), ip_2_ip6(&local_addr)); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(local_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + err = netconn_bind(sock->conn, &local_addr, local_port); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_bind(%d) failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_bind(%d) succeeded\n", s)); + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + done_socket(sock); + return 0; +} + +int lwip_close(int s) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + int is_tcp = 0; + err_t err; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_close(%d)\n", s)); + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + if (sock->conn != NULL) { + is_tcp = NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP; + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("sock->lastdata == NULL", sock->lastdata.pbuf == NULL); + } + +#if LWIP_IGMP + /* drop all possibly joined IGMP memberships */ + lwip_socket_drop_registered_memberships(s); +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD + /* drop all possibly joined MLD6 memberships */ + lwip_socket_drop_registered_mld6_memberships(s); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + + err = netconn_prepare_delete(sock->conn); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + free_socket(sock, is_tcp); + set_errno(0); + return 0; +} + +int lwip_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + err_t err; + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + if (!SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_MATCH_OR_UNSPEC(name, sock)) { + /* sockaddr does not match socket type (IPv4/IPv6) */ + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_VAL)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(namelen); + + if (name->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_connect(%d, AF_UNSPEC)\n", s)); + err = netconn_disconnect(sock->conn); + } else { + ip_addr_t remote_addr; + u16_t remote_port; + + /* check size, family and alignment of 'name' */ + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_connect: invalid address", IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(namelen) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID_OR_UNSPEC(name) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_ALIGNED(name), + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); return -1;); + + SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(name, &remote_addr, remote_port); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_connect(%d, addr=", s)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, remote_addr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F ")\n", remote_port)); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + /* Dual-stack: Unmap IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses */ + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(remote_addr) && ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&remote_addr))) { + unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip4(&remote_addr), ip_2_ip6(&remote_addr)); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(remote_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + err = netconn_connect(sock->conn, &remote_addr, remote_port); + } + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_connect(%d) failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_connect(%d) succeeded\n", s)); + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + done_socket(sock); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Set a socket into listen mode. + * The socket may not have been used for another connection previously. + * + * @param s the socket to set to listening mode + * @param backlog (ATTENTION: needs TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG=1) + * @return 0 on success, non-zero on failure + */ +int lwip_listen(int s, int backlog) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + err_t err; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_listen(%d, backlog=%d)\n", s, backlog)); + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + /* limit the "backlog" parameter to fit in an u8_t */ + backlog = LWIP_MIN(LWIP_MAX(backlog, 0), 0xff); + + err = netconn_listen_with_backlog(sock->conn, (u8_t)backlog); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_listen(%d) failed, err=%d\n", s, err)); + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { + sock_set_errno(sock, EOPNOTSUPP); + } else { + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + } + + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + done_socket(sock); + return 0; +} + +#if LWIP_TCP +/* Helper function to loop over receiving pbufs from netconn + * until "len" bytes are received or we're otherwise done. + * Keeps sock->lastdata for peeking or partly copying. + */ +static ssize_t lwip_recv_tcp(struct lwip_sock *sock, void *mem, size_t len, int flags) +{ + u8_t apiflags = NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD; + ssize_t recvd = 0; + ssize_t recv_left = (len <= SSIZE_MAX) ? (ssize_t)len : SSIZE_MAX; + + LWIP_ASSERT("no socket given", sock != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("this should be checked internally", NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP); + + if (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) { + apiflags |= NETCONN_DONTBLOCK; + } + + do { + struct pbuf *p; + err_t err; + u16_t copylen; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: top while sock->lastdata=%p\n", (void *)sock->lastdata.pbuf)); + + /* Check if there is data left from the last recv operation. */ + if (sock->lastdata.pbuf) { + p = sock->lastdata.pbuf; + } else { + /* No data was left from the previous operation, so we try to get + some from the network. */ + err = netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf_flags(sock->conn, &p, apiflags); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: netconn_recv err=%d, pbuf=%p\n", + err, (void *)p)); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + if (recvd > 0) { + /* already received data, return that (this trusts in getting the same error from + netconn layer again next time netconn_recv is called) */ + goto lwip_recv_tcp_done; + } + + /* We should really do some error checking here. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: p == NULL, error is \"%s\"!\n", + lwip_strerr(err))); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + + if (err == ERR_CLSD) { + return 0; + } else { + return -1; + } + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + sock->lastdata.pbuf = p; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: buflen=%" U16_F " recv_left=%d off=%d\n", + p->tot_len, (int)recv_left, (int)recvd)); + + if (recv_left > p->tot_len) { + copylen = p->tot_len; + } else { + copylen = (u16_t)recv_left; + } + + if (recvd + copylen < recvd) { + /* overflow */ + copylen = (u16_t)(SSIZE_MAX - recvd); + } + + /* copy the contents of the received buffer into + the supplied memory pointer mem */ + pbuf_copy_partial(p, (u8_t *)mem + recvd, copylen, 0); + + recvd += copylen; + + /* TCP combines multiple pbufs for one recv */ + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid copylen, len would underflow", recv_left >= copylen); + recv_left -= copylen; + + /* Unless we peek the incoming message... */ + if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) == 0) { + /* ... check if there is data left in the pbuf */ + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid copylen", p->tot_len >= copylen); + + if (p->tot_len - copylen > 0) { + /* If so, it should be saved in the sock structure for the next recv call. + We store the pbuf but hide/free the consumed data: */ + sock->lastdata.pbuf = pbuf_free_header(p, copylen); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: lastdata now pbuf=%p\n", (void *)sock->lastdata.pbuf)); + } else { + sock->lastdata.pbuf = NULL; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recv_tcp: deleting pbuf=%p\n", (void *)p)); + pbuf_free(p); + } + } + + /* once we have some data to return, only add more if we don't need to wait */ + apiflags |= NETCONN_DONTBLOCK | NETCONN_NOFIN; + /* @todo: do we need to support peeking more than one pbuf? */ + } while ((recv_left > 0) && !(flags & MSG_PEEK)); + +lwip_recv_tcp_done: + + if ((recvd > 0) && !(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { + /* ensure window update after copying all data */ + netconn_tcp_recvd(sock->conn, (size_t)recvd); + } + + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + return recvd; +} +#endif + +/* Convert a netbuf's address data to struct sockaddr */ +static int lwip_sock_make_addr(struct netconn *conn, ip_addr_t *fromaddr, u16_t port, + struct sockaddr *from, socklen_t *fromlen) +{ + int truncated = 0; + union sockaddr_aligned saddr; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); + + LWIP_ASSERT("fromaddr != NULL", fromaddr != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("from != NULL", from != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("fromlen != NULL", fromlen != NULL); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + /* Dual-stack: Map IPv4 addresses to IPv4 mapped IPv6 */ + if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(netconn_type(conn)) && IP_IS_V4(fromaddr)) { + ip4_2_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip6(fromaddr), ip_2_ip4(fromaddr)); + IP_SET_TYPE(fromaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(&saddr, fromaddr, port); + + if (*fromlen < saddr.sa.sa_len) { + truncated = 1; + } else if (*fromlen > saddr.sa.sa_len) { + *fromlen = saddr.sa.sa_len; + } + + MEMCPY(from, &saddr, *fromlen); + return truncated; +} + +#if LWIP_TCP +/* Helper function to get a tcp socket's remote address info */ +static int lwip_recv_tcp_from(struct lwip_sock *sock, struct sockaddr *from, socklen_t *fromlen, const char *dbg_fn, int dbg_s, ssize_t dbg_ret) +{ + if (sock == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_fn); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_s); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_ret); + +#if !SOCKETS_DEBUG + + if (from && fromlen) +#endif /* !SOCKETS_DEBUG */ + { + /* get remote addr/port from tcp_pcb */ + u16_t port; + ip_addr_t tmpaddr; + netconn_getaddr(sock->conn, &tmpaddr, &port, 0); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("%s(%d): addr=", dbg_fn, dbg_s)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, tmpaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F " len=%d\n", port, (int)dbg_ret)); + + if (from && fromlen) { + return lwip_sock_make_addr(sock->conn, &tmpaddr, port, from, fromlen); + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* Helper function to receive a netbuf from a udp or raw netconn. + * Keeps sock->lastdata for peeking. + */ +static err_t lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw(struct lwip_sock *sock, int flags, struct msghdr *msg, u16_t *datagram_len, int dbg_s) +{ + struct netbuf *buf; + u8_t apiflags; + err_t err; + u16_t buflen, copylen, copied; + int i; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_s); + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw: invalid arguments", (msg->msg_iov != NULL) || (msg->msg_iovlen <= 0), return ERR_ARG;); + + if (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) { + apiflags = NETCONN_DONTBLOCK; + } else { + apiflags = 0; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw[UDP/RAW]: top sock->lastdata=%p\n", (void *)sock->lastdata.netbuf)); + /* Check if there is data left from the last recv operation. */ + buf = sock->lastdata.netbuf; + + if (buf == NULL) { + /* No data was left from the previous operation, so we try to get + some from the network. */ + err = netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf_flags(sock->conn, &buf, apiflags); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw[UDP/RAW]: netconn_recv err=%d, netbuf=%p\n", + err, (void *)buf)); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("buf != NULL", buf != NULL); + sock->lastdata.netbuf = buf; + } + + buflen = buf->p->tot_len; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw: buflen=%" U16_F "\n", buflen)); + + copied = 0; + + /* copy the pbuf payload into the iovs */ + for (i = 0; (i < msg->msg_iovlen) && (copied < buflen); i++) { + u16_t len_left = (u16_t)(buflen - copied); + + if (msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len > len_left) { + copylen = len_left; + } else { + copylen = (u16_t)msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; + } + + /* copy the contents of the received buffer into + the supplied memory buffer */ + pbuf_copy_partial(buf->p, (u8_t *)msg->msg_iov[i].iov_base, copylen, copied); + copied = (u16_t)(copied + copylen); + } + + /* Check to see from where the data was.*/ +#if !SOCKETS_DEBUG + + if (msg->msg_name && msg->msg_namelen) +#endif /* !SOCKETS_DEBUG */ + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw(%d): addr=", dbg_s)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, *netbuf_fromaddr(buf)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F " len=%d\n", netbuf_fromport(buf), copied)); + + if (msg->msg_name && msg->msg_namelen) { + lwip_sock_make_addr(sock->conn, netbuf_fromaddr(buf), netbuf_fromport(buf), + (struct sockaddr *)msg->msg_name, &msg->msg_namelen); + } + } + + /* Initialize flag output */ + msg->msg_flags = 0; + + if (msg->msg_control) { + u8_t wrote_msg = 0; +#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO + + /* Check if packet info was recorded */ + if (buf->flags & NETBUF_FLAG_DESTADDR) { + if (IP_IS_V4(&buf->toaddr)) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (msg->msg_controllen >= CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo))) { + struct cmsghdr *chdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg); /* This will always return a header!! */ + struct in_pktinfo *pkti = (struct in_pktinfo *)CMSG_DATA(chdr); + chdr->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_IP; + chdr->cmsg_type = IP_PKTINFO; + chdr->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo)); + pkti->ipi_ifindex = buf->p->if_idx; + inet_addr_from_ip4addr(&pkti->ipi_addr, ip_2_ip4(netbuf_destaddr(buf))); + msg->msg_controllen = CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo)); + wrote_msg = 1; + } else { + msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ + + if (!wrote_msg) { + msg->msg_controllen = 0; + } + } + + /* If we don't peek the incoming message: zero lastdata pointer and free the netbuf */ + if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) == 0) { + sock->lastdata.netbuf = NULL; + netbuf_delete(buf); + } + + if (datagram_len) { + *datagram_len = buflen; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +ssize_t lwip_recvfrom(int s, void *mem, size_t len, int flags, + struct sockaddr *from, socklen_t *fromlen) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + ssize_t ret; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom(%d, %p, %" SZT_F ", 0x%x, ..)\n", s, mem, len, flags)); + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + +#if LWIP_TCP + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { + ret = lwip_recv_tcp(sock, mem, len, flags); + lwip_recv_tcp_from(sock, from, fromlen, "lwip_recvfrom", s, ret); + done_socket(sock); + return ret; + } else +#endif + { + u16_t datagram_len = 0; + struct iovec vec; + struct msghdr msg; + err_t err; + vec.iov_base = mem; + vec.iov_len = len; + msg.msg_control = NULL; + msg.msg_controllen = 0; + msg.msg_flags = 0; + msg.msg_iov = &vec; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; + msg.msg_name = from; + msg.msg_namelen = (fromlen ? *fromlen : 0); + err = lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw(sock, flags, &msg, &datagram_len, s); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvfrom[UDP/RAW](%d): buf == NULL, error is \"%s\"!\n", + s, lwip_strerr(err))); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + ret = (ssize_t)LWIP_MIN(LWIP_MIN(len, datagram_len), SSIZE_MAX); + + if (fromlen) { + *fromlen = msg.msg_namelen; + } + } + + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + done_socket(sock); + return ret; +} + +ssize_t lwip_read(int s, void *mem, size_t len) +{ + return lwip_recvfrom(s, mem, len, 0, NULL, NULL); +} + +ssize_t lwip_readv(int s, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt) +{ + struct msghdr msg; + + msg.msg_name = NULL; + msg.msg_namelen = 0; + /* Hack: we have to cast via number to cast from 'const' pointer to non-const. + Blame the opengroup standard for this inconsistency. */ + msg.msg_iov = LWIP_CONST_CAST(struct iovec *, iov); + msg.msg_iovlen = iovcnt; + msg.msg_control = NULL; + msg.msg_controllen = 0; + msg.msg_flags = 0; + return lwip_recvmsg(s, &msg, 0); +} + +ssize_t lwip_recv(int s, void *mem, size_t len, int flags) +{ + return lwip_recvfrom(s, mem, len, flags, NULL, NULL); +} + +ssize_t lwip_recvmsg(int s, struct msghdr *message, int flags) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + int i; + ssize_t buflen; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvmsg(%d, message=%p, flags=0x%x)\n", s, (void *)message, flags)); + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_recvmsg: invalid message pointer", message != NULL, return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_recvmsg: unsupported flags", (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK | MSG_DONTWAIT)) == 0, + set_errno(EOPNOTSUPP); + return -1;); + + if ((message->msg_iovlen <= 0) || (message->msg_iovlen > IOV_MAX)) { + set_errno(EMSGSIZE); + return -1; + } + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + /* check for valid vectors */ + buflen = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < message->msg_iovlen; i++) { + if ((message->msg_iov[i].iov_base == NULL) || ((ssize_t)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len <= 0) || + ((size_t)(ssize_t)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len != message->msg_iov[i].iov_len) || + ((ssize_t)(buflen + (ssize_t)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len) <= 0)) { + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_VAL)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + buflen = (ssize_t)(buflen + (ssize_t)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len); + } + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { +#if LWIP_TCP + int recv_flags = flags; + message->msg_flags = 0; + /* recv the data */ + buflen = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < message->msg_iovlen; i++) { + /* try to receive into this vector's buffer */ + ssize_t recvd_local = lwip_recv_tcp(sock, message->msg_iov[i].iov_base, message->msg_iov[i].iov_len, recv_flags); + + if (recvd_local > 0) { + /* sum up received bytes */ + buflen += recvd_local; + } + + if ((recvd_local < 0) || (recvd_local < (int)message->msg_iov[i].iov_len) || + (flags & MSG_PEEK)) { + /* returned prematurely (or peeking, which might actually be limitated to the first iov) */ + if (buflen <= 0) { + /* nothing received at all, propagate the error */ + buflen = recvd_local; + } + + break; + } + + /* pass MSG_DONTWAIT to lwip_recv_tcp() to prevent waiting for more data */ + recv_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT; + } + + if (buflen > 0) { + /* reset socket error since we have received something */ + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + } + + /* " If the socket is connected, the msg_name and msg_namelen members shall be ignored." */ + done_socket(sock); + return buflen; +#else /* LWIP_TCP */ + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + } + + /* else, UDP and RAW NETCONNs */ +#if LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW + { + u16_t datagram_len = 0; + err_t err; + err = lwip_recvfrom_udp_raw(sock, flags, message, &datagram_len, s); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_recvmsg[UDP/RAW](%d): buf == NULL, error is \"%s\"!\n", + s, lwip_strerr(err))); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + if (datagram_len > buflen) { + message->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; + } + + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + done_socket(sock); + return (int)datagram_len; + } +#else /* LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW */ + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW */ +} + +ssize_t lwip_send(int s, const void *data, size_t size, int flags) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + err_t err; + u8_t write_flags; + size_t written; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_send(%d, data=%p, size=%" SZT_F ", flags=0x%x)\n", + s, data, size, flags)); + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { +#if (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) + done_socket(sock); + return lwip_sendto(s, data, size, flags, NULL, 0); +#else /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; +#endif /* (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW) */ + } + + write_flags = (u8_t)(NETCONN_COPY | + ((flags & MSG_MORE) ? NETCONN_MORE : 0) | + ((flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) ? NETCONN_DONTBLOCK : 0)); + written = 0; + err = netconn_write_partly(sock->conn, data, size, write_flags, &written); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_send(%d) err=%d written=%" SZT_F "\n", s, err, written)); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + /* casting 'written' to ssize_t is OK here since the netconn API limits it to SSIZE_MAX */ + return (err == ERR_OK ? (ssize_t)written : -1); +} + +ssize_t lwip_sendmsg(int s, const struct msghdr *msg, int flags) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; +#if LWIP_TCP + u8_t write_flags; + size_t written; +#endif + err_t err = ERR_OK; + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: invalid msghdr", msg != NULL, + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); return -1;); + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: invalid msghdr iov", msg->msg_iov != NULL, + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); return -1;); + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: maximum iovs exceeded", (msg->msg_iovlen > 0) && (msg->msg_iovlen <= IOV_MAX), + sock_set_errno(sock, EMSGSIZE); + done_socket(sock); return -1;); + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: unsupported flags", (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_MORE)) == 0, + sock_set_errno(sock, EOPNOTSUPP); + done_socket(sock); return -1;); + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg->msg_control); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg->msg_controllen); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg->msg_flags); + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { +#if LWIP_TCP + write_flags = (u8_t)(NETCONN_COPY | + ((flags & MSG_MORE) ? NETCONN_MORE : 0) | + ((flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) ? NETCONN_DONTBLOCK : 0)); + + written = 0; + err = netconn_write_vectors_partly(sock->conn, (struct netvector *)msg->msg_iov, (u16_t)msg->msg_iovlen, write_flags, &written); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + /* casting 'written' to ssize_t is OK here since the netconn API limits it to SSIZE_MAX */ + return (err == ERR_OK ? (ssize_t)written : -1); +#else /* LWIP_TCP */ + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + } + + /* else, UDP and RAW NETCONNs */ +#if LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW + { + struct netbuf chain_buf; + int i; + ssize_t size = 0; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(flags); + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendmsg: invalid msghdr name", (((msg->msg_name == NULL) && (msg->msg_namelen == 0)) || IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(msg->msg_namelen)), + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); return -1;); + + /* initialize chain buffer with destination */ + memset(&chain_buf, 0, sizeof(struct netbuf)); + + if (msg->msg_name) { + u16_t remote_port; + SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT((const struct sockaddr *)msg->msg_name, &chain_buf.addr, remote_port); + netbuf_fromport(&chain_buf) = remote_port; + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + + for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; i++) { + size += msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; + + if ((msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len > INT_MAX) || (size < (int)msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len)) { + /* overflow */ + goto sendmsg_emsgsize; + } + } + + if (size > 0xFFFF) { + /* overflow */ + goto sendmsg_emsgsize; + } + + /* Allocate a new netbuf and copy the data into it. */ + if (netbuf_alloc(&chain_buf, (u16_t)size) == NULL) { + err = ERR_MEM; + } else { + /* flatten the IO vectors */ + size_t offset = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; i++) { + MEMCPY(&((u8_t *)chain_buf.p->payload)[offset], msg->msg_iov[i].iov_base, msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len); + offset += msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; + } + +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + { + /* This can be improved by using LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY() and aggregating the checksum for each IO vector */ + u16_t chksum = ~inet_chksum_pbuf(chain_buf.p); + netbuf_set_chksum(&chain_buf, chksum); + } +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + err = ERR_OK; + } + +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + + /* create a chained netbuf from the IO vectors. NOTE: we assemble a pbuf chain + manually to avoid having to allocate, chain, and delete a netbuf for each iov */ + for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; i++) { + struct pbuf *p; + + if (msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len > 0xFFFF) { + /* overflow */ + goto sendmsg_emsgsize; + } + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 0, PBUF_REF); + + if (p == NULL) { + err = ERR_MEM; /* let netbuf_delete() cleanup chain_buf */ + break; + } + + p->payload = msg->msg_iov[i].iov_base; + p->len = p->tot_len = (u16_t)msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; + + /* netbuf empty, add new pbuf */ + if (chain_buf.p == NULL) { + chain_buf.p = chain_buf.ptr = p; + /* add pbuf to existing pbuf chain */ + } else { + if (chain_buf.p->tot_len + p->len > 0xffff) { + /* overflow */ + pbuf_free(p); + goto sendmsg_emsgsize; + } + + pbuf_cat(chain_buf.p, p); + } + } + + /* save size of total chain */ + if (err == ERR_OK) { + size = netbuf_len(&chain_buf); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + + if (err == ERR_OK) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + /* Dual-stack: Unmap IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses */ + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(chain_buf.addr) && ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&chain_buf.addr))) { + unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip4(&chain_buf.addr), ip_2_ip6(&chain_buf.addr)); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(chain_buf.addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + /* send the data */ + err = netconn_send(sock->conn, &chain_buf); + } + + /* deallocated the buffer */ + netbuf_free(&chain_buf); + + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return (err == ERR_OK ? size : -1); + sendmsg_emsgsize: + sock_set_errno(sock, EMSGSIZE); + netbuf_free(&chain_buf); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } +#else /* LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW */ + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW */ +} + +ssize_t lwip_sendto(int s, const void *data, size_t size, int flags, + const struct sockaddr *to, socklen_t tolen) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + err_t err; + u16_t short_size; + u16_t remote_port; + struct netbuf buf; + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { +#if LWIP_TCP + done_socket(sock); + return lwip_send(s, data, size, flags); +#else /* LWIP_TCP */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(flags); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + } + + if (size > LWIP_MIN(0xFFFF, SSIZE_MAX)) { + /* cannot fit into one datagram (at least for us) */ + sock_set_errno(sock, EMSGSIZE); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + short_size = (u16_t)size; + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_sendto: invalid address", (((to == NULL) && (tolen == 0)) || (IS_SOCK_ADDR_LEN_VALID(tolen) && ((to != NULL) && (IS_SOCK_ADDR_TYPE_VALID(to) && IS_SOCK_ADDR_ALIGNED(to))))), + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(ERR_ARG)); + done_socket(sock); return -1;); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tolen); + + /* initialize a buffer */ + buf.p = buf.ptr = NULL; +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + buf.flags = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + if (to) { + SOCKADDR_TO_IPADDR_PORT(to, &buf.addr, remote_port); + } else { + remote_port = 0; + ip_addr_set_any(NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(netconn_type(sock->conn)), &buf.addr); + } + + netbuf_fromport(&buf) = remote_port; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_sendto(%d, data=%p, short_size=%" U16_F ", flags=0x%x to=", + s, data, short_size, flags)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, buf.addr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F "\n", remote_port)); + + /* make the buffer point to the data that should be sent */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + + /* Allocate a new netbuf and copy the data into it. */ + if (netbuf_alloc(&buf, short_size) == NULL) { + err = ERR_MEM; + } else { +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_RAW) { + u16_t chksum = LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(buf.p->payload, data, short_size); + netbuf_set_chksum(&buf, chksum); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + { + MEMCPY(buf.p->payload, data, short_size); + } + + err = ERR_OK; + } + +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + err = netbuf_ref(&buf, data, short_size); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + + if (err == ERR_OK) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + /* Dual-stack: Unmap IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses */ + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(buf.addr) && ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&buf.addr))) { + unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip4(&buf.addr), ip_2_ip6(&buf.addr)); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(buf.addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + /* send the data */ + err = netconn_send(sock->conn, &buf); + } + + /* deallocated the buffer */ + netbuf_free(&buf); + + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return (err == ERR_OK ? short_size : -1); +} + +int lwip_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol) +{ + struct netconn *conn; + int i; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(domain); /* @todo: check this */ + + /* create a netconn */ + switch (type) { + case SOCK_RAW: + conn = netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, NETCONN_RAW), + (u8_t)protocol, DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_socket(%s, SOCK_RAW, %d) = ", + domain == PF_INET ? "PF_INET" : "UNKNOWN", protocol)); + break; + + case SOCK_DGRAM: + conn = netconn_new_with_callback(DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, + ((protocol == IPPROTO_UDPLITE) ? NETCONN_UDPLITE : NETCONN_UDP)), + DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_socket(%s, SOCK_DGRAM, %d) = ", + domain == PF_INET ? "PF_INET" : "UNKNOWN", protocol)); +#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO + + if (conn) { + /* netconn layer enables pktinfo by default, sockets default to off */ + conn->flags &= ~NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ + break; + + case SOCK_STREAM: + conn = netconn_new_with_callback(DOMAIN_TO_NETCONN_TYPE(domain, NETCONN_TCP), DEFAULT_SOCKET_EVENTCB); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_socket(%s, SOCK_STREAM, %d) = ", + domain == PF_INET ? "PF_INET" : "UNKNOWN", protocol)); + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_socket(%d, %d/UNKNOWN, %d) = -1\n", + domain, type, protocol)); + set_errno(EINVAL); + return -1; + } + + if (!conn) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("-1 / ENOBUFS (could not create netconn)\n")); + set_errno(ENOBUFS); + return -1; + } + + i = alloc_socket(conn, 0); + + if (i == -1) { + netconn_delete(conn); + set_errno(ENFILE); + return -1; + } + + conn->socket = i; + done_socket(&sockets[i - LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET]); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("%d\n", i)); + set_errno(0); + return i; +} + +ssize_t lwip_write(int s, const void *data, size_t size) +{ + return lwip_send(s, data, size, 0); +} + +ssize_t lwip_writev(int s, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt) +{ + struct msghdr msg; + + msg.msg_name = NULL; + msg.msg_namelen = 0; + /* Hack: we have to cast via number to cast from 'const' pointer to non-const. + Blame the opengroup standard for this inconsistency. */ + msg.msg_iov = LWIP_CONST_CAST(struct iovec *, iov); + msg.msg_iovlen = iovcnt; + msg.msg_control = NULL; + msg.msg_controllen = 0; + msg.msg_flags = 0; + return lwip_sendmsg(s, &msg, 0); +} + +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL +/* Add select_cb to select_cb_list. */ +static void lwip_link_select_cb(struct lwip_select_cb *select_cb) +{ + LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + /* Protect the select_cb_list */ + LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_PROTECT(lev); + + /* Put this select_cb on top of list */ + select_cb->next = select_cb_list; + + if (select_cb_list != NULL) { + select_cb_list->prev = select_cb; + } + + select_cb_list = select_cb; +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + /* Increasing this counter tells select_check_waiters that the list has changed. */ + select_cb_ctr++; +#endif + + /* Now we can safely unprotect */ + LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_UNPROTECT(lev); +} + +/* Remove select_cb from select_cb_list. */ +static void lwip_unlink_select_cb(struct lwip_select_cb *select_cb) +{ + LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + /* Take us off the list */ + LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_PROTECT(lev); + + if (select_cb->next != NULL) { + select_cb->next->prev = select_cb->prev; + } + + if (select_cb_list == select_cb) { + LWIP_ASSERT("select_cb->prev == NULL", select_cb->prev == NULL); + select_cb_list = select_cb->next; + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("select_cb->prev != NULL", select_cb->prev != NULL); + select_cb->prev->next = select_cb->next; + } + +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + /* Increasing this counter tells select_check_waiters that the list has changed. */ + select_cb_ctr++; +#endif + LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT_UNPROTECT(lev); +} +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ + +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT +/** + * Go through the readset and writeset lists and see which socket of the sockets + * set in the sets has events. On return, readset, writeset and exceptset have + * the sockets enabled that had events. + * + * @param maxfdp1 the highest socket index in the sets + * @param readset_in set of sockets to check for read events + * @param writeset_in set of sockets to check for write events + * @param exceptset_in set of sockets to check for error events + * @param readset_out set of sockets that had read events + * @param writeset_out set of sockets that had write events + * @param exceptset_out set os sockets that had error events + * @return number of sockets that had events (read/write/exception) (>= 0) + */ +static int lwip_selscan(int maxfdp1, fd_set *readset_in, fd_set *writeset_in, fd_set *exceptset_in, + fd_set *readset_out, fd_set *writeset_out, fd_set *exceptset_out) +{ + int i, nready = 0; + fd_set lreadset, lwriteset, lexceptset; + struct lwip_sock *sock; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + FD_ZERO(&lreadset); + FD_ZERO(&lwriteset); + FD_ZERO(&lexceptset); + + /* Go through each socket in each list to count number of sockets which + currently match */ + for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp1; i++) { + /* if this FD is not in the set, continue */ + if (!(readset_in && FD_ISSET(i, readset_in)) && + !(writeset_in && FD_ISSET(i, writeset_in)) && + !(exceptset_in && FD_ISSET(i, exceptset_in))) { + continue; + } + + /* First get the socket's status (protected)... */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(i); + + if (sock != NULL) { + void *lastdata = sock->lastdata.pbuf; + s16_t rcvevent = sock->rcvevent; + u16_t sendevent = sock->sendevent; + u16_t errevent = sock->errevent; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + + /* ... then examine it: */ + /* See if netconn of this socket is ready for read */ + if (readset_in && FD_ISSET(i, readset_in) && ((lastdata != NULL) || (rcvevent > 0))) { + FD_SET(i, &lreadset); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_selscan: fd=%d ready for reading\n", i)); + nready++; + } + + /* See if netconn of this socket is ready for write */ + if (writeset_in && FD_ISSET(i, writeset_in) && (sendevent != 0)) { + FD_SET(i, &lwriteset); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_selscan: fd=%d ready for writing\n", i)); + nready++; + } + + /* See if netconn of this socket had an error */ + if (exceptset_in && FD_ISSET(i, exceptset_in) && (errevent != 0)) { + FD_SET(i, &lexceptset); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_selscan: fd=%d ready for exception\n", i)); + nready++; + } + + done_socket(sock); + } else { + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + /* no a valid open socket */ + return -1; + } + } + + /* copy local sets to the ones provided as arguments */ + *readset_out = lreadset; + *writeset_out = lwriteset; + *exceptset_out = lexceptset; + + LWIP_ASSERT("nready >= 0", nready >= 0); + return nready; +} + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +/* Mark all of the set sockets in one of the three fdsets passed to select as used. + * All sockets are marked (and later unmarked), whether they are open or not. + * This is OK as lwip_selscan aborts select when non-open sockets are found. + */ +static void lwip_select_inc_sockets_used_set(int maxfdp, fd_set *fdset, fd_set *used_sockets) +{ + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + if (fdset) { + int i; + + for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp; i++) { + /* if this FD is in the set, lock it (unless already done) */ + if (FD_ISSET(i, fdset) && !FD_ISSET(i, used_sockets)) { + struct lwip_sock *sock; + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(i); + + if (sock != NULL) { + /* leave the socket used until released by lwip_select_dec_sockets_used */ + FD_SET(i, used_sockets); + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + } + } + } +} + +/* Mark all sockets passed to select as used to prevent them from being freed + * from other threads while select is running. + * Marked sockets are added to 'used_sockets' to mark them only once an be able + * to unmark them correctly. + */ +static void lwip_select_inc_sockets_used(int maxfdp, fd_set *fdset1, fd_set *fdset2, fd_set *fdset3, fd_set *used_sockets) +{ + FD_ZERO(used_sockets); + lwip_select_inc_sockets_used_set(maxfdp, fdset1, used_sockets); + lwip_select_inc_sockets_used_set(maxfdp, fdset2, used_sockets); + lwip_select_inc_sockets_used_set(maxfdp, fdset3, used_sockets); +} + +/* Let go all sockets that were marked as used when starting select */ +static void lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(int maxfdp, fd_set *used_sockets) +{ + int i; + + for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp; i++) { + /* if this FD is not in the set, continue */ + if (FD_ISSET(i, used_sockets)) { + struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(i); + LWIP_ASSERT("socket gone at the end of select", sock != NULL); + + if (sock != NULL) { + done_socket(sock); + } + } + } +} +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ +#define lwip_select_inc_sockets_used(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, used_sockets) +#define lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, used_sockets) +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + +int lwip_select(int maxfdp1, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, fd_set *exceptset, + struct timeval *timeout) +{ + u32_t waitres = 0; + int nready; + fd_set lreadset, lwriteset, lexceptset; + u32_t msectimeout; + int i; + int maxfdp2; +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + int waited = 0; +#endif +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + fd_set used_sockets; +#endif + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select(%d, %p, %p, %p, tvsec=%" S32_F " tvusec=%" S32_F ")\n", + maxfdp1, (void *)readset, (void *)writeset, (void *)exceptset, + timeout ? (s32_t)timeout->tv_sec : (s32_t)-1, + timeout ? (s32_t)timeout->tv_usec : (s32_t)-1)); + + if ((maxfdp1 < 0) || (maxfdp1 > LWIP_SELECT_MAXNFDS)) { + set_errno(EINVAL); + return -1; + } + + lwip_select_inc_sockets_used(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, &used_sockets); + + /* Go through each socket in each list to count number of sockets which + currently match */ + nready = lwip_selscan(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, &lreadset, &lwriteset, &lexceptset); + + if (nready < 0) { + /* one of the sockets in one of the fd_sets was invalid */ + set_errno(EBADF); + lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); + return -1; + } else if (nready > 0) { + /* one or more sockets are set, no need to wait */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select: nready=%d\n", nready)); + } else { + /* If we don't have any current events, then suspend if we are supposed to */ + if (timeout && timeout->tv_sec == 0 && timeout->tv_usec == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select: no timeout, returning 0\n")); + /* This is OK as the local fdsets are empty and nready is zero, + or we would have returned earlier. */ + } else { + /* None ready: add our semaphore to list: + We don't actually need any dynamic memory. Our entry on the + list is only valid while we are in this function, so it's ok + to use local variables (unless we're running in MPU compatible + mode). */ + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_DECLARE(select_cb); + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_ALLOC(select_cb, set_errno(ENOMEM); lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); return -1); + memset(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb), 0, sizeof(struct lwip_select_cb)); + + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).readset = readset; + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).writeset = writeset; + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).exceptset = exceptset; +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + + if (sys_sem_new(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem, 0) != ERR_OK) { + /* failed to create semaphore */ + set_errno(ENOMEM); + lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(select_cb); + return -1; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + + lwip_link_select_cb(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb)); + + /* Increase select_waiting for each socket we are interested in */ + maxfdp2 = maxfdp1; + + for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp1; i++) { + if ((readset && FD_ISSET(i, readset)) || + (writeset && FD_ISSET(i, writeset)) || + (exceptset && FD_ISSET(i, exceptset))) { + struct lwip_sock *sock; + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(i); + + if (sock != NULL) { + sock->select_waiting++; + + if (sock->select_waiting == 0) { + /* overflow - too many threads waiting */ + sock->select_waiting--; + nready = -1; + maxfdp2 = i; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + done_socket(sock); + set_errno(EBUSY); + break; + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + done_socket(sock); + } else { + /* Not a valid socket */ + nready = -1; + maxfdp2 = i; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + set_errno(EBADF); + break; + } + } + } + + if (nready >= 0) { + /* Call lwip_selscan again: there could have been events between + the last scan (without us on the list) and putting us on the list! */ + nready = lwip_selscan(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, &lreadset, &lwriteset, &lexceptset); + + if (!nready) { + /* Still none ready, just wait to be woken */ + if (timeout == 0) { + /* Wait forever */ + msectimeout = 0; + } else { + long msecs_long = ((timeout->tv_sec * 1000) + ((timeout->tv_usec + 500) / 1000)); + + if (msecs_long <= 0) { + /* Wait 1ms at least (0 means wait forever) */ + msectimeout = 1; + } else { + msectimeout = (u32_t)msecs_long; + } + } + + waitres = sys_arch_sem_wait(SELECT_SEM_PTR(API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem), msectimeout); +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + waited = 1; +#endif + } + } + + /* Decrease select_waiting for each socket we are interested in */ + for (i = LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET; i < maxfdp2; i++) { + if ((readset && FD_ISSET(i, readset)) || + (writeset && FD_ISSET(i, writeset)) || + (exceptset && FD_ISSET(i, exceptset))) { + struct lwip_sock *sock; + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(i); + + if (sock != NULL) { + /* for now, handle select_waiting==0... */ + LWIP_ASSERT("sock->select_waiting > 0", sock->select_waiting > 0); + + if (sock->select_waiting > 0) { + sock->select_waiting--; + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + done_socket(sock); + } else { + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + /* Not a valid socket */ + nready = -1; + set_errno(EBADF); + } + } + } + + lwip_unlink_select_cb(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb)); + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + + if (API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem_signalled && (!waited || (waitres == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT))) { + /* don't leave the thread-local semaphore signalled */ + sys_arch_sem_wait(API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem, 1); + } + +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + sys_sem_free(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem); +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(select_cb); + + if (nready < 0) { + /* This happens when a socket got closed while waiting */ + lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); + return -1; + } + + if (waitres == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + /* Timeout */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select: timeout expired\n")); + /* This is OK as the local fdsets are empty and nready is zero, + or we would have returned earlier. */ + } else { + /* See what's set now after waiting */ + nready = lwip_selscan(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, &lreadset, &lwriteset, &lexceptset); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_select: nready=%d\n", nready)); + } + } + } + + lwip_select_dec_sockets_used(maxfdp1, &used_sockets); + set_errno(0); + + if (readset) { + *readset = lreadset; + } + + if (writeset) { + *writeset = lwriteset; + } + + if (exceptset) { + *exceptset = lexceptset; + } + + return nready; +} +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT */ + +#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL +/** Options for the lwip_pollscan function. */ +enum lwip_pollscan_opts { + /** Clear revents in each struct pollfd. */ + LWIP_POLLSCAN_CLEAR = 1, + + /** Increment select_waiting in each struct lwip_sock. */ + LWIP_POLLSCAN_INC_WAIT = 2, + + /** Decrement select_waiting in each struct lwip_sock. */ + LWIP_POLLSCAN_DEC_WAIT = 4 +}; + +/** + * Update revents in each struct pollfd. + * Optionally update select_waiting in struct lwip_sock. + * + * @param fds array of structures to update + * @param nfds number of structures in fds + * @param opts what to update and how + * @return number of structures that have revents != 0 + */ +static int lwip_pollscan(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, enum lwip_pollscan_opts opts) +{ + int nready = 0; + nfds_t fdi; + struct lwip_sock *sock; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + /* Go through each struct pollfd in the array. */ + for (fdi = 0; fdi < nfds; fdi++) { + if ((opts & LWIP_POLLSCAN_CLEAR) != 0) { + fds[fdi].revents = 0; + } + + /* Negative fd means the caller wants us to ignore this struct. + POLLNVAL means we already detected that the fd is invalid; + if another thread has since opened a new socket with that fd, + we must not use that socket. */ + if (fds[fdi].fd >= 0 && (fds[fdi].revents & POLLNVAL) == 0) { + /* First get the socket's status (protected)... */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + sock = tryget_socket_unconn_locked(fds[fdi].fd); + + if (sock != NULL) { + void *lastdata = sock->lastdata.pbuf; + s16_t rcvevent = sock->rcvevent; + u16_t sendevent = sock->sendevent; + u16_t errevent = sock->errevent; + + if ((opts & LWIP_POLLSCAN_INC_WAIT) != 0) { + sock->select_waiting++; + + if (sock->select_waiting == 0) { + /* overflow - too many threads waiting */ + sock->select_waiting--; + nready = -1; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + done_socket(sock); + break; + } + } else if ((opts & LWIP_POLLSCAN_DEC_WAIT) != 0) { + /* for now, handle select_waiting==0... */ + LWIP_ASSERT("sock->select_waiting > 0", sock->select_waiting > 0); + + if (sock->select_waiting > 0) { + sock->select_waiting--; + } + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + done_socket(sock); + + /* ... then examine it: */ + /* See if netconn of this socket is ready for read */ + if ((fds[fdi].events & POLLIN) != 0 && ((lastdata != NULL) || (rcvevent > 0))) { + fds[fdi].revents |= POLLIN; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_pollscan: fd=%d ready for reading\n", fds[fdi].fd)); + } + + /* See if netconn of this socket is ready for write */ + if ((fds[fdi].events & POLLOUT) != 0 && (sendevent != 0)) { + fds[fdi].revents |= POLLOUT; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_pollscan: fd=%d ready for writing\n", fds[fdi].fd)); + } + + /* See if netconn of this socket had an error */ + if (errevent != 0) { + /* POLLERR is output only. */ + fds[fdi].revents |= POLLERR; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_pollscan: fd=%d ready for exception\n", fds[fdi].fd)); + } + } else { + /* Not a valid socket */ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + /* POLLNVAL is output only. */ + fds[fdi].revents |= POLLNVAL; + return -1; + } + } + + /* Will return the number of structures that have events, + not the number of events. */ + if (fds[fdi].revents != 0) { + nready++; + } + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("nready >= 0", nready >= 0); + return nready; +} + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +/* Mark all sockets as used. + * + * All sockets are marked (and later unmarked), whether they are open or not. + * This is OK as lwip_pollscan aborts select when non-open sockets are found. + */ +static void lwip_poll_inc_sockets_used(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds) +{ + nfds_t fdi; + + if (fds) { + /* Go through each struct pollfd in the array. */ + for (fdi = 0; fdi < nfds; fdi++) { + /* Increase the reference counter */ + tryget_socket_unconn(fds[fdi].fd); + } + } +} + +/* Let go all sockets that were marked as used when starting poll */ +static void lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds) +{ + nfds_t fdi; + + if (fds) { + /* Go through each struct pollfd in the array. */ + for (fdi = 0; fdi < nfds; fdi++) { + struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket_unconn_nouse(fds[fdi].fd); + + if (sock != NULL) { + done_socket(sock); + } + } + } +} +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ +#define lwip_poll_inc_sockets_used(fds, nfds) +#define lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds) +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ + +int lwip_poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout) +{ + u32_t waitres = 0; + int nready; + u32_t msectimeout; +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + int waited = 0; +#endif + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_poll(%p, %d, %d)\n", + (void *)fds, (int)nfds, timeout)); + LWIP_ERROR("lwip_poll: invalid fds", ((fds != NULL && nfds > 0) || (fds == NULL && nfds == 0)), + set_errno(EINVAL); + return -1;); + + lwip_poll_inc_sockets_used(fds, nfds); + + /* Go through each struct pollfd to count number of structures + which currently match */ + nready = lwip_pollscan(fds, nfds, LWIP_POLLSCAN_CLEAR); + + if (nready < 0) { + lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); + return -1; + } + + /* If we don't have any current events, then suspend if we are supposed to */ + if (!nready) { + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_DECLARE(select_cb); + + if (timeout == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_poll: no timeout, returning 0\n")); + goto return_success; + } + + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_ALLOC(select_cb, set_errno(EAGAIN); lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); return -1); + memset(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb), 0, sizeof(struct lwip_select_cb)); + + /* None ready: add our semaphore to list: + We don't actually need any dynamic memory. Our entry on the + list is only valid while we are in this function, so it's ok + to use local variables. */ + + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).poll_fds = fds; + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).poll_nfds = nfds; +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + + if (sys_sem_new(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem, 0) != ERR_OK) { + /* failed to create semaphore */ + set_errno(EAGAIN); + lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(select_cb); + return -1; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + + lwip_link_select_cb(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb)); + + /* Increase select_waiting for each socket we are interested in. + Also, check for events again: there could have been events between + the last scan (without us on the list) and putting us on the list! */ + nready = lwip_pollscan(fds, nfds, LWIP_POLLSCAN_INC_WAIT); + + if (!nready) { + /* Still none ready, just wait to be woken */ + if (timeout < 0) { + /* Wait forever */ + msectimeout = 0; + } else { + /* timeout == 0 would have been handled earlier. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("timeout > 0", timeout > 0); + msectimeout = timeout; + } + + waitres = sys_arch_sem_wait(SELECT_SEM_PTR(API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem), msectimeout); +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + waited = 1; +#endif + } + + /* Decrease select_waiting for each socket we are interested in, + and check which events occurred while we waited. */ + nready = lwip_pollscan(fds, nfds, LWIP_POLLSCAN_DEC_WAIT); + + lwip_unlink_select_cb(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb)); + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + + if (select_cb.sem_signalled && (!waited || (waitres == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT))) { + /* don't leave the thread-local semaphore signalled */ + sys_arch_sem_wait(API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem, 1); + } + +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + sys_sem_free(&API_SELECT_CB_VAR_REF(select_cb).sem); +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + API_SELECT_CB_VAR_FREE(select_cb); + + if (nready < 0) { + /* This happens when a socket got closed while waiting */ + lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); + return -1; + } + + if (waitres == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + /* Timeout */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_poll: timeout expired\n")); + goto return_success; + } + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_poll: nready=%d\n", nready)); +return_success: + lwip_poll_dec_sockets_used(fds, nfds); + set_errno(0); + return nready; +} + +/** + * Check whether event_callback should wake up a thread waiting in + * lwip_poll. + */ +static int lwip_poll_should_wake(const struct lwip_select_cb *scb, int fd, int has_recvevent, int has_sendevent, int has_errevent) +{ + nfds_t fdi; + + for (fdi = 0; fdi < scb->poll_nfds; fdi++) { + const struct pollfd *pollfd = &scb->poll_fds[fdi]; + + if (pollfd->fd == fd) { + /* Do not update pollfd->revents right here; + that would be a data race because lwip_pollscan + accesses revents without protecting. */ + if (has_recvevent && (pollfd->events & POLLIN) != 0) { + return 1; + } + + if (has_sendevent && (pollfd->events & POLLOUT) != 0) { + return 1; + } + + if (has_errevent) { + /* POLLERR is output only. */ + return 1; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ + +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL +/** + * Callback registered in the netconn layer for each socket-netconn. + * Processes recvevent (data available) and wakes up tasks waiting for select. + * + * @note for LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING any caller of this function + * must have the core lock held when signaling the following events + * as they might cause select_list_cb to be checked: + * NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS + * NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS + * NETCONN_EVT_ERROR + * This requirement will be asserted in select_check_waiters() + */ +static void event_callback(struct netconn *conn, enum netconn_evt evt, u16_t len) +{ + int s, check_waiters; + struct lwip_sock *sock; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + /* Get socket */ + if (conn) { + s = conn->socket; + + if (s < 0) { + /* Data comes in right away after an accept, even though + * the server task might not have created a new socket yet. + * Just count down (or up) if that's the case and we + * will use the data later. Note that only receive events + * can happen before the new socket is set up. */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + + if (conn->socket < 0) { + if (evt == NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS) { + /* conn->socket is -1 on initialization + lwip_accept adjusts sock->recvevent if conn->socket < -1 */ + conn->socket--; + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + return; + } + + s = conn->socket; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + } + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return; + } + } else { + return; + } + + check_waiters = 1; + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + + /* Set event as required */ + switch (evt) { + case NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS: + sock->rcvevent++; + + if (sock->rcvevent > 1) { + check_waiters = 0; + } + + break; + + case NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS: + sock->rcvevent--; + check_waiters = 0; + break; + + case NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS: + if (sock->sendevent) { + check_waiters = 0; + } + + sock->sendevent = 1; + break; + + case NETCONN_EVT_SENDMINUS: + sock->sendevent = 0; + check_waiters = 0; + break; + + case NETCONN_EVT_ERROR: + sock->errevent = 1; + break; + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("unknown event", 0); + break; + } + + if (sock->select_waiting && check_waiters) { + /* Save which events are active */ + int has_recvevent, has_sendevent, has_errevent; + has_recvevent = sock->rcvevent > 0; + has_sendevent = sock->sendevent != 0; + has_errevent = sock->errevent != 0; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + /* Check any select calls waiting on this socket */ + select_check_waiters(s, has_recvevent, has_sendevent, has_errevent); + } else { + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + } + + done_socket(sock); +} + +/** + * Check if any select waiters are waiting on this socket and its events + * + * @note on synchronization of select_cb_list: + * LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING: the select_cb_list must only be accessed while holding + * the core lock. We do a single pass through the list and signal any waiters. + * Core lock should already be held when calling here!!!! + + * !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING: we use SYS_ARCH_PROTECT but unlock on each iteration + * of the loop, thus creating a possibility where a thread could modify the + * select_cb_list during our UNPROTECT/PROTECT. We use a generational counter to + * detect this change and restart the list walk. The list is expected to be small + */ +static void select_check_waiters(int s, int has_recvevent, int has_sendevent, int has_errevent) +{ + struct lwip_select_cb *scb; +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + int last_select_cb_ctr; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); +again: + /* remember the state of select_cb_list to detect changes */ + last_select_cb_ctr = select_cb_ctr; +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + for (scb = select_cb_list; scb != NULL; scb = scb->next) { + if (scb->sem_signalled == 0) { + /* semaphore not signalled yet */ + int do_signal = 0; +#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL + + if (scb->poll_fds != NULL) { + do_signal = lwip_poll_should_wake(scb, s, has_recvevent, has_sendevent, has_errevent); + } +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT && LWIP_SOCKET_POLL + else +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT && LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT + { + /* Test this select call for our socket */ + if (has_recvevent) { + if (scb->readset && FD_ISSET(s, scb->readset)) { + do_signal = 1; + } + } + + if (has_sendevent) { + if (!do_signal && scb->writeset && FD_ISSET(s, scb->writeset)) { + do_signal = 1; + } + } + + if (has_errevent) { + if (!do_signal && scb->exceptset && FD_ISSET(s, scb->exceptset)) { + do_signal = 1; + } + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT */ + + if (do_signal) { + scb->sem_signalled = 1; + /* For !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING, we don't call SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT() before signaling + the semaphore, as this might lead to the select thread taking itself off the list, + invalidating the semaphore. */ + sys_sem_signal(SELECT_SEM_PTR(scb->sem)); + } + } + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + } + +#else + /* unlock interrupts with each step */ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + /* this makes sure interrupt protection time is short */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + + if (last_select_cb_ctr != select_cb_ctr) { + /* someone has changed select_cb_list, restart at the beginning */ + goto again; + } + + /* remember the state of select_cb_list to detect changes */ + last_select_cb_ctr = select_cb_ctr; + } + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); +#endif +} +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ + +/** + * Close one end of a full-duplex connection. + */ +int lwip_shutdown(int s, int how) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + err_t err; + u8_t shut_rx = 0, shut_tx = 0; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_shutdown(%d, how=%d)\n", s, how)); + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + if (sock->conn != NULL) { + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { + sock_set_errno(sock, EOPNOTSUPP); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + } else { + sock_set_errno(sock, ENOTCONN); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + if (how == SHUT_RD) { + shut_rx = 1; + } else if (how == SHUT_WR) { + shut_tx = 1; + } else if (how == SHUT_RDWR) { + shut_rx = 1; + shut_tx = 1; + } else { + sock_set_errno(sock, EINVAL); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + err = netconn_shutdown(sock->conn, shut_rx, shut_tx); + + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return (err == ERR_OK ? 0 : -1); +} + +static int lwip_getaddrname(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen, u8_t local) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock; + union sockaddr_aligned saddr; + ip_addr_t naddr; + u16_t port; + err_t err; + + sock = get_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + /* get the IP address and port */ + err = netconn_getaddr(sock->conn, &naddr, &port, local); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(err)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + /* Dual-stack: Map IPv4 addresses to IPv4 mapped IPv6 */ + if (NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(netconn_type(sock->conn)) && + IP_IS_V4_VAL(naddr)) { + ip4_2_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip_2_ip6(&naddr), ip_2_ip4(&naddr)); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(naddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + IPADDR_PORT_TO_SOCKADDR(&saddr, &naddr, port); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getaddrname(%d, addr=", s)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(SOCKETS_DEBUG, naddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, (" port=%" U16_F ")\n", port)); + + if (*namelen > saddr.sa.sa_len) { + *namelen = saddr.sa.sa_len; + } + + MEMCPY(name, &saddr, *namelen); + + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + done_socket(sock); + return 0; +} + +int lwip_getpeername(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen) +{ + return lwip_getaddrname(s, name, namelen, 0); +} + +int lwip_getsockname(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen) +{ + return lwip_getaddrname(s, name, namelen, 1); +} + +int lwip_getsockopt(int s, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen) +{ + int err; + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + err_t cberr; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_DECLARE(data); +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + if ((NULL == optval) || (NULL == optlen)) { + sock_set_errno(sock, EFAULT); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + /* core-locking can just call the -impl function */ + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + err = lwip_getsockopt_impl(s, level, optname, optval, optlen); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + + /* MPU_COMPATIBLE copies the optval data, so check for max size here */ + if (*optlen > LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_MAXOPTLEN) { + sock_set_errno(sock, ENOBUFS); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_ALLOC(data, sock); + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).s = s; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).level = level; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optname = optname; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optlen = *optlen; +#if !LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optval.p = optval; +#endif /* !LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).err = 0; +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); +#else + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem = &sock->conn->op_completed; +#endif + cberr = tcpip_callback(lwip_getsockopt_callback, &LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data)); + + if (cberr != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(data); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(cberr)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + sys_arch_sem_wait((sys_sem_t *)(LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem), 0); + + /* write back optlen and optval */ + *optlen = LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optlen; +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + MEMCPY(optval, LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optval, + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optlen); +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + + /* maybe lwip_getsockopt_internal has changed err */ + err = LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).err; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(data); +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + sock_set_errno(sock, err); + done_socket(sock); + return err ? -1 : 0; +} + +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +/** lwip_getsockopt_callback: only used without CORE_LOCKING + * to get into the tcpip_thread + */ +static void lwip_getsockopt_callback(void *arg) +{ + struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *data; + LWIP_ASSERT("arg != NULL", arg != NULL); + data = (struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *)arg; + + data->err = lwip_getsockopt_impl(data->s, data->level, data->optname, +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + data->optval, +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + data->optval.p, +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + &data->optlen); + + sys_sem_signal((sys_sem_t *)(data->completed_sem)); +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + +static int lwip_sockopt_to_ipopt(int optname) +{ + /* Map SO_* values to our internal SOF_* values + * We should not rely on #defines in socket.h + * being in sync with ip.h. + */ + switch (optname) { + case SO_BROADCAST: + return SOF_BROADCAST; + + case SO_KEEPALIVE: + return SOF_KEEPALIVE; + + case SO_REUSEADDR: + return SOF_REUSEADDR; + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("Unknown socket option", 0); + return 0; + } +} + +/** lwip_getsockopt_impl: the actual implementation of getsockopt: + * same argument as lwip_getsockopt, either called directly or through callback + */ +static int lwip_getsockopt_impl(int s, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen) +{ + int err = 0; + struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return EBADF; + } + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_GETSOCKOPT + + if (LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_GETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, &err)) { + return err; + } + +#endif + + switch (level) { + /* Level: SOL_SOCKET */ + case SOL_SOCKET: + switch (optname) { +#if LWIP_TCP + + case SO_ACCEPTCONN: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(sock->conn->type) != NETCONN_TCP) { + done_socket(sock); + return ENOPROTOOPT; + } + + if ((sock->conn->pcb.tcp != NULL) && (sock->conn->pcb.tcp->state == LISTEN)) { + *(int *)optval = 1; + } else { + *(int *)optval = 0; + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + + /* The option flags */ + case SO_BROADCAST: + case SO_KEEPALIVE: +#if SO_REUSE + case SO_REUSEADDR: +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + if ((optname == SO_BROADCAST) && + (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(sock->conn->type) != NETCONN_UDP)) { + done_socket(sock); + return ENOPROTOOPT; + } + + optname = lwip_sockopt_to_ipopt(optname); + + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); + *(int *)optval = ip_get_option(sock->conn->pcb.ip, optname); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, optname=0x%x, ..) = %s\n", + s, optname, (*(int *)optval ? "on" : "off"))); + break; + + case SO_TYPE: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, int); + + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn))) { + case NETCONN_RAW: + *(int *)optval = SOCK_RAW; + break; + + case NETCONN_TCP: + *(int *)optval = SOCK_STREAM; + break; + + case NETCONN_UDP: + *(int *)optval = SOCK_DGRAM; + break; + + default: /* unrecognized socket type */ + *(int *)optval = netconn_type(sock->conn); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, + ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE): unrecognized socket type %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + } /* switch (netconn_type(sock->conn)) */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; + + case SO_ERROR: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN(sock, *optlen, int); + *(int *)optval = err_to_errno(netconn_err(sock->conn)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; + +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO + + case SO_SNDTIMEO: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE); + LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_SET(optval, netconn_get_sendtimeout(sock->conn)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO + + case SO_RCVTIMEO: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE); + LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_SET(optval, netconn_get_recvtimeout(sock->conn)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + + case SO_RCVBUF: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, int); + *(int *)optval = netconn_get_recvbufsize(sock->conn); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ +#if LWIP_SO_LINGER + + case SO_LINGER: { + s16_t conn_linger; + struct linger *linger = (struct linger *)optval; + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, struct linger); + conn_linger = sock->conn->linger; + + if (conn_linger >= 0) { + linger->l_onoff = 1; + linger->l_linger = (int)conn_linger; + } else { + linger->l_onoff = 0; + linger->l_linger = 0; + } + } break; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ +#if LWIP_UDP + + case SO_NO_CHECK: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, *optlen, int, NETCONN_UDP); +#if LWIP_UDPLITE + + if (udp_is_flag_set(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE)) { + /* this flag is only available for UDP, not for UDP lite */ + done_socket(sock); + return EAFNOSUPPORT; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ + *(int *)optval = udp_is_flag_set(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM) ? 1 : 0; + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP*/ + case SO_CONNINFO: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, void *); + *(void **)optval = sock->conn; + break; + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; + + /* Level: IPPROTO_IP */ + case IPPROTO_IP: + switch (optname) { + case IP_TTL: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); + *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.ip->ttl; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TTL) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; + + case IP_TOS: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); + *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.ip->tos; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS && LWIP_UDP + + case IP_MULTICAST_TTL: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, u8_t); + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_UDP) { + done_socket(sock); + return ENOPROTOOPT; + } + + *(u8_t *)optval = udp_get_multicast_ttl(sock->conn->pcb.udp); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_TTL) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; + + case IP_MULTICAST_IF: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, struct in_addr); + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_UDP) { + done_socket(sock); + return ENOPROTOOPT; + } + + inet_addr_from_ip4addr((struct in_addr *)optval, udp_get_multicast_netif_addr(sock->conn->pcb.udp)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_IF) = 0x%" X32_F "\n", + s, *(u32_t *)optval)); + break; + + case IP_MULTICAST_LOOP: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, u8_t); + + if ((sock->conn->pcb.udp->flags & UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP) != 0) { + *(u8_t *)optval = 1; + } else { + *(u8_t *)optval = 0; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_LOOP) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS && LWIP_UDP */ + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; + +#if LWIP_TCP + + /* Level: IPPROTO_TCP */ + case IPPROTO_TCP: + /* Special case: all IPPROTO_TCP option take an int */ + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, *optlen, int, NETCONN_TCP); + + if (sock->conn->pcb.tcp->state == LISTEN) { + done_socket(sock); + return EINVAL; + } + + switch (optname) { + case TCP_NODELAY: + *(int *)optval = tcp_nagle_disabled(sock->conn->pcb.tcp); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY) = %s\n", + s, (*(int *)optval) ? "on" : "off")); + break; + + case TCP_KEEPALIVE: + *(int *)optval = (int)sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPALIVE) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; + +#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE + + case TCP_KEEPIDLE: + *(int *)optval = (int)(sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle / 1000); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPIDLE) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; + + case TCP_KEEPINTVL: + *(int *)optval = (int)(sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_intvl / 1000); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPINTVL) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; + + case TCP_KEEPCNT: + *(int *)optval = (int)sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_cnt; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPCNT) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + /* Level: IPPROTO_IPV6 */ + case IPPROTO_IPV6: + switch (optname) { + case IPV6_V6ONLY: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, *optlen, int); + *(int *)optval = (netconn_get_ipv6only(sock->conn) ? 1 : 0); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY) = %d\n", + s, *(int *)optval)); + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IPV6, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE + + /* Level: IPPROTO_UDPLITE */ + case IPPROTO_UDPLITE: + /* Special case: all IPPROTO_UDPLITE option take an int */ + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, *optlen, int); + + /* If this is no UDP lite socket, ignore any options. */ + if (!NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(netconn_type(sock->conn))) { + done_socket(sock); + return ENOPROTOOPT; + } + + switch (optname) { + case UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV: + *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_tx; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV) = %d\n", + s, (*(int *)optval))); + break; + + case UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV: + *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_rx; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV) = %d\n", + s, (*(int *)optval))); + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + + /* Level: IPPROTO_RAW */ + case IPPROTO_RAW: + switch (optname) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_RAW + + case IPV6_CHECKSUM: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, *optlen, int, NETCONN_RAW); + + if (sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd == 0) { + *(int *)optval = -1; + } else { + *(int *)optval = sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_offset; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_RAW, IPV6_CHECKSUM) = %d\n", + s, (*(int *)optval))); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_RAW */ + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_RAW, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_getsockopt(%d, level=0x%x, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, level, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (level) */ + + done_socket(sock); + return err; +} + +int lwip_setsockopt(int s, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen) +{ + int err = 0; + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + err_t cberr; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_DECLARE(data); +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + if (NULL == optval) { + sock_set_errno(sock, EFAULT); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + /* core-locking can just call the -impl function */ + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + err = lwip_setsockopt_impl(s, level, optname, optval, optlen); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + + /* MPU_COMPATIBLE copies the optval data, so check for max size here */ + if (optlen > LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_MAXOPTLEN) { + sock_set_errno(sock, ENOBUFS); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_ALLOC(data, sock); + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).s = s; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).level = level; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optname = optname; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optlen = optlen; +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + MEMCPY(LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optval, optval, optlen); +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).optval.pc = (const void *)optval; +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).err = 0; +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); +#else + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem = &sock->conn->op_completed; +#endif + cberr = tcpip_callback(lwip_setsockopt_callback, &LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data)); + + if (cberr != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(data); + sock_set_errno(sock, err_to_errno(cberr)); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + + sys_arch_sem_wait((sys_sem_t *)(LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).completed_sem), 0); + + /* maybe lwip_getsockopt_internal has changed err */ + err = LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_REF(data).err; + LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA_VAR_FREE(data); +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + sock_set_errno(sock, err); + done_socket(sock); + return err ? -1 : 0; +} + +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +/** lwip_setsockopt_callback: only used without CORE_LOCKING + * to get into the tcpip_thread + */ +static void lwip_setsockopt_callback(void *arg) +{ + struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *data; + LWIP_ASSERT("arg != NULL", arg != NULL); + data = (struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data *)arg; + + data->err = lwip_setsockopt_impl(data->s, data->level, data->optname, +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + data->optval, +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + data->optval.pc, +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + data->optlen); + + sys_sem_signal((sys_sem_t *)(data->completed_sem)); +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + +/** lwip_setsockopt_impl: the actual implementation of setsockopt: + * same argument as lwip_setsockopt, either called directly or through callback + */ +static int lwip_setsockopt_impl(int s, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen) +{ + int err = 0; + struct lwip_sock *sock = tryget_socket(s); + + if (!sock) { + return EBADF; + } + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_SETSOCKOPT + + if (LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_SETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, &err)) { + return err; + } + +#endif + + switch (level) { + /* Level: SOL_SOCKET */ + case SOL_SOCKET: + switch (optname) { + /* SO_ACCEPTCONN is get-only */ + + /* The option flags */ + case SO_BROADCAST: + case SO_KEEPALIVE: +#if SO_REUSE + case SO_REUSEADDR: +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + if ((optname == SO_BROADCAST) && + (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(sock->conn->type) != NETCONN_UDP)) { + done_socket(sock); + return ENOPROTOOPT; + } + + optname = lwip_sockopt_to_ipopt(optname); + + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); + + if (*(const int *)optval) { + ip_set_option(sock->conn->pcb.ip, optname); + } else { + ip_reset_option(sock->conn->pcb.ip, optname); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, optname=0x%x, ..) -> %s\n", + s, optname, (*(const int *)optval ? "on" : "off"))); + break; + + /* SO_TYPE is get-only */ + /* SO_ERROR is get-only */ + +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO + + case SO_SNDTIMEO: { + long ms_long; + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE); + ms_long = LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_GET_MS(optval); + + if (ms_long < 0) { + done_socket(sock); + return EINVAL; + } + + netconn_set_sendtimeout(sock->conn, ms_long); + break; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO + + case SO_RCVTIMEO: { + long ms_long; + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_OPTTYPE); + ms_long = LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_GET_MS(optval); + + if (ms_long < 0) { + done_socket(sock); + return EINVAL; + } + + netconn_set_recvtimeout(sock->conn, (u32_t)ms_long); + break; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + + case SO_RCVBUF: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, int); + netconn_set_recvbufsize(sock->conn, *(const int *)optval); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ +#if LWIP_SO_LINGER + + case SO_LINGER: { + const struct linger *linger = (const struct linger *)optval; + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, struct linger); + + if (linger->l_onoff) { + int lingersec = linger->l_linger; + + if (lingersec < 0) { + done_socket(sock); + return EINVAL; + } + + if (lingersec > 0xFFFF) { + lingersec = 0xFFFF; + } + + sock->conn->linger = (s16_t)lingersec; + } else { + sock->conn->linger = -1; + } + } break; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ +#if LWIP_UDP + + case SO_NO_CHECK: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, int, NETCONN_UDP); +#if LWIP_UDPLITE + + if (udp_is_flag_set(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE)) { + /* this flag is only available for UDP, not for UDP lite */ + done_socket(sock); + return EAFNOSUPPORT; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ + + if (*(const int *)optval) { + udp_set_flags(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM); + } else { + udp_clear_flags(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM); + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + + case SO_BINDTODEVICE: { + const struct ifreq *iface; + struct netif *n = NULL; + + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN(sock, optlen, struct ifreq); + + iface = (const struct ifreq *)optval; + + if (iface->ifr_name[0] != 0) { + n = netif_find(iface->ifr_name); + + if (n == NULL) { + done_socket(sock); + return ENODEV; + } + } + + switch (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn))) { +#if LWIP_TCP + + case NETCONN_TCP: + tcp_bind_netif(sock->conn->pcb.tcp, n); + break; +#endif +#if LWIP_UDP + + case NETCONN_UDP: + udp_bind_netif(sock->conn->pcb.udp, n); + break; +#endif +#if LWIP_RAW + + case NETCONN_RAW: + raw_bind_netif(sock->conn->pcb.raw, n); + break; +#endif + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("Unhandled netconn type in SO_BINDTODEVICE", 0); + break; + } + } break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; + + /* Level: IPPROTO_IP */ + case IPPROTO_IP: + switch (optname) { + case IP_TTL: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); + sock->conn->pcb.ip->ttl = (u8_t)(*(const int *)optval); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TTL, ..) -> %d\n", + s, sock->conn->pcb.ip->ttl)); + break; + + case IP_TOS: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); + sock->conn->pcb.ip->tos = (u8_t)(*(const int *)optval); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, ..)-> %d\n", + s, sock->conn->pcb.ip->tos)); + break; +#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO + + case IP_PKTINFO: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, int, NETCONN_UDP); + + if (*(const int *)optval) { + sock->conn->flags |= NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO; + } else { + sock->conn->flags &= ~NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO; + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS && LWIP_UDP + + case IP_MULTICAST_TTL: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, u8_t, NETCONN_UDP); + udp_set_multicast_ttl(sock->conn->pcb.udp, (u8_t)(*(const u8_t *)optval)); + break; + + case IP_MULTICAST_IF: { + ip4_addr_t if_addr; + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, struct in_addr, NETCONN_UDP); + inet_addr_to_ip4addr(&if_addr, (const struct in_addr *)optval); + udp_set_multicast_netif_addr(sock->conn->pcb.udp, &if_addr); + } break; + + case IP_MULTICAST_LOOP: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, u8_t, NETCONN_UDP); + + if (*(const u8_t *)optval) { + udp_set_flags(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP); + } else { + udp_clear_flags(sock->conn->pcb.udp, UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP); + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS && LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_IGMP + + case IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP: + case IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: { + /* If this is a TCP or a RAW socket, ignore these options. */ + err_t igmp_err; + const struct ip_mreq *imr = (const struct ip_mreq *)optval; + ip4_addr_t if_addr; + ip4_addr_t multi_addr; + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, struct ip_mreq, NETCONN_UDP); + inet_addr_to_ip4addr(&if_addr, &imr->imr_interface); + inet_addr_to_ip4addr(&multi_addr, &imr->imr_multiaddr); + + if (optname == IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP) { + if (!lwip_socket_register_membership(s, &if_addr, &multi_addr)) { + /* cannot track membership (out of memory) */ + err = ENOMEM; + igmp_err = ERR_OK; + } else { + igmp_err = igmp_joingroup(&if_addr, &multi_addr); + } + } else { + igmp_err = igmp_leavegroup(&if_addr, &multi_addr); + lwip_socket_unregister_membership(s, &if_addr, &multi_addr); + } + + if (igmp_err != ERR_OK) { + err = EADDRNOTAVAIL; + } + } break; +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; + +#if LWIP_TCP + + /* Level: IPPROTO_TCP */ + case IPPROTO_TCP: + /* Special case: all IPPROTO_TCP option take an int */ + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, int, NETCONN_TCP); + + if (sock->conn->pcb.tcp->state == LISTEN) { + done_socket(sock); + return EINVAL; + } + + switch (optname) { + case TCP_NODELAY: + if (*(const int *)optval) { + tcp_nagle_disable(sock->conn->pcb.tcp); + } else { + tcp_nagle_enable(sock->conn->pcb.tcp); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY) -> %s\n", + s, (*(const int *)optval) ? "on" : "off")); + break; + + case TCP_KEEPALIVE: + sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle = (u32_t)(*(const int *)optval); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPALIVE) -> %" U32_F "\n", + s, sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle)); + break; + +#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE + + case TCP_KEEPIDLE: + sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle = 1000 * (u32_t)(*(const int *)optval); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPIDLE) -> %" U32_F "\n", + s, sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_idle)); + break; + + case TCP_KEEPINTVL: + sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_intvl = 1000 * (u32_t)(*(const int *)optval); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPINTVL) -> %" U32_F "\n", + s, sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_intvl)); + break; + + case TCP_KEEPCNT: + sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_cnt = (u32_t)(*(const int *)optval); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPCNT) -> %" U32_F "\n", + s, sock->conn->pcb.tcp->keep_cnt)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_TCP, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP*/ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + /* Level: IPPROTO_IPV6 */ + case IPPROTO_IPV6: + switch (optname) { + case IPV6_V6ONLY: + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); + + if (*(const int *)optval) { + netconn_set_ipv6only(sock->conn, 1); + } else { + netconn_set_ipv6only(sock->conn, 0); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, ..) -> %d\n", + s, (netconn_get_ipv6only(sock->conn) ? 1 : 0))); + break; +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD + + case IPV6_JOIN_GROUP: + case IPV6_LEAVE_GROUP: { + /* If this is a TCP or a RAW socket, ignore these options. */ + err_t mld6_err; + struct netif *netif; + ip6_addr_t multi_addr; + const struct ipv6_mreq *imr = (const struct ipv6_mreq *)optval; + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, struct ipv6_mreq, NETCONN_UDP); + inet6_addr_to_ip6addr(&multi_addr, &imr->ipv6mr_multiaddr); + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid netif index", imr->ipv6mr_interface <= 0xFFu); + netif = netif_get_by_index((u8_t)imr->ipv6mr_interface); + + if (netif == NULL) { + err = EADDRNOTAVAIL; + break; + } + + if (optname == IPV6_JOIN_GROUP) { + if (!lwip_socket_register_mld6_membership(s, imr->ipv6mr_interface, &multi_addr)) { + /* cannot track membership (out of memory) */ + err = ENOMEM; + mld6_err = ERR_OK; + } else { + mld6_err = mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, &multi_addr); + } + } else { + mld6_err = mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, &multi_addr); + lwip_socket_unregister_mld6_membership(s, imr->ipv6mr_interface, &multi_addr); + } + + if (mld6_err != ERR_OK) { + err = EADDRNOTAVAIL; + } + } break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IPV6, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE + + /* Level: IPPROTO_UDPLITE */ + case IPPROTO_UDPLITE: + /* Special case: all IPPROTO_UDPLITE option take an int */ + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB(sock, optlen, int); + + /* If this is no UDP lite socket, ignore any options. */ + if (!NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(netconn_type(sock->conn))) { + done_socket(sock); + return ENOPROTOOPT; + } + + switch (optname) { + case UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV: + if ((*(const int *)optval != 0) && ((*(const int *)optval < 8) || (*(const int *)optval > 0xffff))) { + /* don't allow illegal values! */ + sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_tx = 8; + } else { + sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_tx = (u16_t) * (const int *)optval; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV) -> %d\n", + s, (*(const int *)optval))); + break; + + case UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV: + if ((*(const int *)optval != 0) && ((*(const int *)optval < 8) || (*(const int *)optval > 0xffff))) { + /* don't allow illegal values! */ + sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_rx = 8; + } else { + sock->conn->pcb.udp->chksum_len_rx = (u16_t) * (const int *)optval; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV) -> %d\n", + s, (*(const int *)optval))); + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_UDPLITE, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + + /* Level: IPPROTO_RAW */ + case IPPROTO_RAW: + switch (optname) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_RAW + + case IPV6_CHECKSUM: + + /* It should not be possible to disable the checksum generation with ICMPv6 + * as per RFC 3542 chapter 3.1 */ + if (sock->conn->pcb.raw->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6) { + done_socket(sock); + return EINVAL; + } + + LWIP_SOCKOPT_CHECK_OPTLEN_CONN_PCB_TYPE(sock, optlen, int, NETCONN_RAW); + + if (*(const int *)optval < 0) { + sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd = 0; + } else if (*(const int *)optval & 1) { + /* Per RFC3542, odd offsets are not allowed */ + done_socket(sock); + return EINVAL; + } else { + sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd = 1; + sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_offset = (u16_t) * (const int *)optval; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_RAW, IPV6_CHECKSUM, ..) -> %d\n", + s, sock->conn->pcb.raw->chksum_reqd)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_RAW */ + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_RAW, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (optname) */ + + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_setsockopt(%d, level=0x%x, UNIMPL: optname=0x%x, ..)\n", + s, level, optname)); + err = ENOPROTOOPT; + break; + } /* switch (level) */ + + done_socket(sock); + return err; +} + +int lwip_ioctl(int s, long cmd, void *argp) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); + u8_t val; +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + int recv_avail; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + switch (cmd) { +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF || LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE + + case FIONREAD: + if (!argp) { + sock_set_errno(sock, EINVAL); + done_socket(sock); + return -1; + } + +#if LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) != NETCONN_TCP) { + struct netbuf *nb; + + if (sock->lastdata.netbuf) { + nb = sock->lastdata.netbuf; + *((int *)argp) = nb->p->tot_len; + } else { + struct netbuf *rxbuf; + err_t err = netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf_flags(sock->conn, &rxbuf, NETCONN_DONTBLOCK); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + *((int *)argp) = 0; + } else { + sock->lastdata.netbuf = rxbuf; + *((int *)argp) = rxbuf->p->tot_len; + } + } + + done_socket(sock); + return 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE */ + +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + /* we come here if either LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE==0 or this is a TCP socket */ + SYS_ARCH_GET(sock->conn->recv_avail, recv_avail); + + if (recv_avail < 0) { + recv_avail = 0; + } + + /* Check if there is data left from the last recv operation. /maq 041215 */ + if (sock->lastdata.netbuf) { + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { + recv_avail += sock->lastdata.pbuf->tot_len; + } else { + recv_avail += sock->lastdata.netbuf->p->tot_len; + } + } + + *((int *)argp) = recv_avail; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_ioctl(%d, FIONREAD, %p) = %" U16_F "\n", s, argp, *((u16_t *)argp))); + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + done_socket(sock); + return 0; +#else /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ + break; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF || LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE */ + + case (long)FIONBIO: + val = 0; + + if (argp && *(int *)argp) { + val = 1; + } + + netconn_set_nonblocking(sock->conn, val); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_ioctl(%d, FIONBIO, %d)\n", s, val)); + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + done_socket(sock); + return 0; + + default: + break; + } /* switch (cmd) */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_ioctl(%d, UNIMPL: 0x%lx, %p)\n", s, cmd, argp)); + sock_set_errno(sock, ENOSYS); /* not yet implemented */ + done_socket(sock); + return -1; +} + +/** A minimal implementation of fcntl. + * Currently only the commands F_GETFL and F_SETFL are implemented. + * The flag O_NONBLOCK and access modes are supported for F_GETFL, only + * the flag O_NONBLOCK is implemented for F_SETFL. + */ +int lwip_fcntl(int s, int cmd, int val) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); + int ret = -1; + int op_mode = 0; + + if (!sock) { + return -1; + } + + switch (cmd) { + case F_GETFL: + ret = netconn_is_nonblocking(sock->conn) ? O_NONBLOCK : 0; + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + + if (NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(netconn_type(sock->conn)) == NETCONN_TCP) { +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); +#else + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + /* the proper thing to do here would be to get into the tcpip_thread, + but locking should be OK as well since we only *read* some flags */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); +#endif +#if LWIP_TCP + + if (sock->conn->pcb.tcp) { + if (!(sock->conn->pcb.tcp->flags & TF_RXCLOSED)) { + op_mode |= O_RDONLY; + } + + if (!(sock->conn->pcb.tcp->flags & TF_FIN)) { + op_mode |= O_WRONLY; + } + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); +#else + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); +#endif + } else { + op_mode |= O_RDWR; + } + + /* ensure O_RDWR for (O_RDONLY|O_WRONLY) != O_RDWR cases */ + ret |= (op_mode == (O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY)) ? O_RDWR : op_mode; + + break; + + case F_SETFL: + /* Bits corresponding to the file access mode and the file creation flags [..] that are set in arg shall be ignored */ + val &= ~(O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY | O_RDWR); + + if ((val & ~O_NONBLOCK) == 0) { + /* only O_NONBLOCK, all other bits are zero */ + netconn_set_nonblocking(sock->conn, val & O_NONBLOCK); + ret = 0; + sock_set_errno(sock, 0); + } else { + sock_set_errno(sock, ENOSYS); /* not yet implemented */ + } + + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SOCKETS_DEBUG, ("lwip_fcntl(%d, UNIMPL: %d, %d)\n", s, cmd, val)); + sock_set_errno(sock, ENOSYS); /* not yet implemented */ + break; + } + + done_socket(sock); + return ret; +} + +#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS == 2 && LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES +int fcntl(int s, int cmd, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int val; + + va_start(ap, cmd); + val = va_arg(ap, int); + va_end(ap); + return lwip_fcntl(s, cmd, val); +} +#endif + +const char *lwip_inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size) +{ + const char *ret = NULL; + int size_int = (int)size; + + if (size_int < 0) { + set_errno(ENOSPC); + return NULL; + } + + switch (af) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + case AF_INET: + ret = ip4addr_ntoa_r((const ip4_addr_t *)src, dst, size_int); + + if (ret == NULL) { + set_errno(ENOSPC); + } + + break; +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + case AF_INET6: + ret = ip6addr_ntoa_r((const ip6_addr_t *)src, dst, size_int); + + if (ret == NULL) { + set_errno(ENOSPC); + } + + break; +#endif + + default: + set_errno(EAFNOSUPPORT); + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +int lwip_inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst) +{ + int err; + + switch (af) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + case AF_INET: + err = ip4addr_aton(src, (ip4_addr_t *)dst); + break; +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + case AF_INET6: { + /* convert into temporary variable since ip6_addr_t might be larger + than in6_addr when scopes are enabled */ + ip6_addr_t addr; + err = ip6addr_aton(src, &addr); + + if (err) { + memcpy(dst, &addr.addr, sizeof(addr.addr)); + } + + break; + } + +#endif + + default: + err = -1; + set_errno(EAFNOSUPPORT); + break; + } + + return err; +} + +#if LWIP_IGMP +/** Register a new IGMP membership. On socket close, the membership is dropped automatically. + * + * ATTENTION: this function is called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). + * + * @return 1 on success, 0 on failure + */ +static int lwip_socket_register_membership(int s, const ip4_addr_t *if_addr, const ip4_addr_t *multi_addr) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); + int i; + + if (!sock) { + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { + if (socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock == NULL) { + socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock = sock; + ip4_addr_copy(socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr, *if_addr); + ip4_addr_copy(socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr, *multi_addr); + done_socket(sock); + return 1; + } + } + + done_socket(sock); + return 0; +} + +/** Unregister a previously registered membership. This prevents dropping the membership + * on socket close. + * + * ATTENTION: this function is called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). + */ +static void lwip_socket_unregister_membership(int s, const ip4_addr_t *if_addr, const ip4_addr_t *multi_addr) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); + int i; + + if (!sock) { + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { + if ((socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock == sock) && + ip4_addr_cmp(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr, if_addr) && + ip4_addr_cmp(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr, multi_addr)) { + socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock = NULL; + ip4_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr); + ip4_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); + break; + } + } + + done_socket(sock); +} + +/** Drop all memberships of a socket that were not dropped explicitly via setsockopt. + * + * ATTENTION: this function is NOT called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). + */ +static void lwip_socket_drop_registered_memberships(int s) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); + int i; + + if (!sock) { + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { + if (socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock == sock) { + ip_addr_t multi_addr, if_addr; + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(multi_addr, socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(if_addr, socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr); + socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].sock = NULL; + ip4_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].if_addr); + ip4_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv4_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); + + netconn_join_leave_group(sock->conn, &multi_addr, &if_addr, NETCONN_LEAVE); + } + } + + done_socket(sock); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD +/** Register a new MLD6 membership. On socket close, the membership is dropped automatically. + * + * ATTENTION: this function is called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). + * + * @return 1 on success, 0 on failure + */ +static int lwip_socket_register_mld6_membership(int s, unsigned int if_idx, const ip6_addr_t *multi_addr) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); + int i; + + if (!sock) { + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { + if (socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock == NULL) { + socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock = sock; + socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx = (u8_t)if_idx; + ip6_addr_copy(socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr, *multi_addr); + done_socket(sock); + return 1; + } + } + + done_socket(sock); + return 0; +} + +/** Unregister a previously registered MLD6 membership. This prevents dropping the membership + * on socket close. + * + * ATTENTION: this function is called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). + */ +static void lwip_socket_unregister_mld6_membership(int s, unsigned int if_idx, const ip6_addr_t *multi_addr) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); + int i; + + if (!sock) { + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { + if ((socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock == sock) && + (socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx == if_idx) && + ip6_addr_cmp(&socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr, multi_addr)) { + socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock = NULL; + socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; + ip6_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); + break; + } + } + + done_socket(sock); +} + +/** Drop all MLD6 memberships of a socket that were not dropped explicitly via setsockopt. + * + * ATTENTION: this function is NOT called from tcpip_thread (or under CORE_LOCK). + */ +static void lwip_socket_drop_registered_mld6_memberships(int s) +{ + struct lwip_sock *sock = get_socket(s); + int i; + + if (!sock) { + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_SOCKET_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS; i++) { + if (socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock == sock) { + ip_addr_t multi_addr; + u8_t if_idx; + + ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(multi_addr, socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); + if_idx = socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx; + + socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].sock = NULL; + socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].if_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; + ip6_addr_set_zero(&socket_ipv6_multicast_memberships[i].multi_addr); + + netconn_join_leave_group_netif(sock->conn, &multi_addr, if_idx, NETCONN_LEAVE); + } + } + + done_socket(sock); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/api/tcpip.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/tcpip.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/api/tcpip.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/tcpip.c index 0da03c61..f8c8108a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/api/tcpip.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/api/tcpip.c @@ -1,672 +1,672 @@ -/** - * @file - * Sequential API Main thread module - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if !NO_SYS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/init.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "netif/ethernet.h" - -#define TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) -#define TCPIP_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct tcpip_msg, name) -#define TCPIP_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(name) API_VAR_ALLOC(struct tcpip_msg, MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, name, ERR_MEM) -#define TCPIP_MSG_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, name) - -/* global variables */ -static tcpip_init_done_fn tcpip_init_done; -static void *tcpip_init_done_arg; -static sys_mbox_t tcpip_mbox; - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -/** The global semaphore to lock the stack. */ -sys_mutex_t lock_tcpip_core; -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - -static void tcpip_thread_handle_msg(struct tcpip_msg *msg); - -#if !LWIP_TIMERS -/* wait for a message with timers disabled (e.g. pass a timer-check trigger into tcpip_thread) */ -#define TCPIP_MBOX_FETCH(mbox, msg) sys_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg) -#else /* !LWIP_TIMERS */ -/* wait for a message, timeouts are processed while waiting */ -#define TCPIP_MBOX_FETCH(mbox, msg) tcpip_timeouts_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg) -/** - * Wait (forever) for a message to arrive in an mbox. - * While waiting, timeouts are processed. - * - * @param mbox the mbox to fetch the message from - * @param msg the place to store the message - */ -static void tcpip_timeouts_mbox_fetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg) -{ - u32_t sleeptime, res; - -again: - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - sleeptime = sys_timeouts_sleeptime(); - - if (sleeptime == SYS_TIMEOUTS_SLEEPTIME_INFINITE) { - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - sys_arch_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg, 0); - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - return; - } else if (sleeptime == 0) { - sys_check_timeouts(); - /* We try again to fetch a message from the mbox. */ - goto again; - } - - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - res = sys_arch_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg, sleeptime); - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - - if (res == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - /* If a SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT value is returned, a timeout occurred - before a message could be fetched. */ - sys_check_timeouts(); - /* We try again to fetch a message from the mbox. */ - goto again; - } -} -#endif /* !LWIP_TIMERS */ - -/** - * The main lwIP thread. This thread has exclusive access to lwIP core functions - * (unless access to them is not locked). Other threads communicate with this - * thread using message boxes. - * - * It also starts all the timers to make sure they are running in the right - * thread context. - * - * @param arg unused argument - */ -static void tcpip_thread(void *arg) -{ - struct tcpip_msg *msg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - LWIP_MARK_TCPIP_THREAD(); - - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - - if (tcpip_init_done != NULL) { - tcpip_init_done(tcpip_init_done_arg); - } - - while (1) /* MAIN Loop */ - { - LWIP_TCPIP_THREAD_ALIVE(); - /* wait for a message, timeouts are processed while waiting */ - TCPIP_MBOX_FETCH(&tcpip_mbox, (void **)&msg); - - if (msg == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: invalid message: NULL\n")); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcpip_thread: invalid message", 0); - continue; - } - - tcpip_thread_handle_msg(msg); - } -} - -/* Handle a single tcpip_msg - * This is in its own function for access by tests only. - */ -static void tcpip_thread_handle_msg(struct tcpip_msg *msg) -{ - switch (msg->type) { -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - - case TCPIP_MSG_API: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: API message %p\n", (void *)msg)); - msg->msg.api_msg.function(msg->msg.api_msg.msg); - break; - - case TCPIP_MSG_API_CALL: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: API CALL message %p\n", (void *)msg)); - msg->msg.api_call.arg->err = msg->msg.api_call.function(msg->msg.api_call.arg); - sys_sem_signal(msg->msg.api_call.sem); - break; -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT - - case TCPIP_MSG_INPKT: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: PACKET %p\n", (void *)msg)); - - if (msg->msg.inp.input_fn(msg->msg.inp.p, msg->msg.inp.netif) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(msg->msg.inp.p); - } - - memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, msg); - break; -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS - - case TCPIP_MSG_TIMEOUT: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: TIMEOUT %p\n", (void *)msg)); - sys_timeout(msg->msg.tmo.msecs, msg->msg.tmo.h, msg->msg.tmo.arg); - memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); - break; - - case TCPIP_MSG_UNTIMEOUT: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: UNTIMEOUT %p\n", (void *)msg)); - sys_untimeout(msg->msg.tmo.h, msg->msg.tmo.arg); - memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ - - case TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: CALLBACK %p\n", (void *)msg)); - msg->msg.cb.function(msg->msg.cb.ctx); - memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); - break; - - case TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK_STATIC: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: CALLBACK_STATIC %p\n", (void *)msg)); - msg->msg.cb.function(msg->msg.cb.ctx); - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: invalid message: %d\n", msg->type)); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcpip_thread: invalid message", 0); - break; - } -} - -#ifdef TCPIP_THREAD_TEST -/** Work on queued items in single-threaded test mode */ -int tcpip_thread_poll_one(void) -{ - int ret = 0; - struct tcpip_msg *msg; - - if (sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(&tcpip_mbox, (void **)&msg) != SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - - if (msg != NULL) { - tcpip_thread_handle_msg(msg); - ret = 1; - } - - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - } - - return ret; -} -#endif - -/** - * Pass a received packet to tcpip_thread for input processing - * - * @param p the received packet - * @param inp the network interface on which the packet was received - * @param input_fn input function to call - */ -err_t tcpip_inpkt(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp, netif_input_fn input_fn) -{ -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT - err_t ret; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_inpkt: PACKET %p/%p\n", (void *)p, (void *)inp)); - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - ret = input_fn(p, inp); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - return ret; -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ - struct tcpip_msg *msg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); - - msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT); - - if (msg == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_INPKT; - msg->msg.inp.p = p; - msg->msg.inp.netif = inp; - msg->msg.inp.input_fn = input_fn; - - if (sys_mbox_trypost(&tcpip_mbox, msg) != ERR_OK) { - memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, msg); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - return ERR_OK; -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_os - * Pass a received packet to tcpip_thread for input processing with - * ethernet_input or ip_input. Don't call directly, pass to netif_add() - * and call netif->input(). - * - * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the Ethernet header or - * to an IP header (if inp doesn't have NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP or - * NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET flags) - * @param inp the network interface on which the packet was received - */ -err_t tcpip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ -#if LWIP_ETHERNET - - if (inp->flags & (NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET)) { - return tcpip_inpkt(p, inp, ethernet_input); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_ETHERNET */ - return tcpip_inpkt(p, inp, ip_input); -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_os - * Call a specific function in the thread context of - * tcpip_thread for easy access synchronization. - * A function called in that way may access lwIP core code - * without fearing concurrent access. - * Blocks until the request is posted. - * Must not be called from interrupt context! - * - * @param function the function to call - * @param ctx parameter passed to f - * @return ERR_OK if the function was called, another err_t if not - * - * @see tcpip_try_callback - */ -err_t tcpip_callback(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx) -{ - struct tcpip_msg *msg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); - - msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); - - if (msg == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK; - msg->msg.cb.function = function; - msg->msg.cb.ctx = ctx; - - sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, msg); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_os - * Call a specific function in the thread context of - * tcpip_thread for easy access synchronization. - * A function called in that way may access lwIP core code - * without fearing concurrent access. - * Does NOT block when the request cannot be posted because the - * tcpip_mbox is full, but returns ERR_MEM instead. - * Can be called from interrupt context. - * - * @param function the function to call - * @param ctx parameter passed to f - * @return ERR_OK if the function was called, another err_t if not - * - * @see tcpip_callback - */ -err_t tcpip_try_callback(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx) -{ - struct tcpip_msg *msg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); - - msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); - - if (msg == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK; - msg->msg.cb.function = function; - msg->msg.cb.ctx = ctx; - - if (sys_mbox_trypost(&tcpip_mbox, msg) != ERR_OK) { - memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS -/** - * call sys_timeout in tcpip_thread - * - * @param msecs time in milliseconds for timeout - * @param h function to be called on timeout - * @param arg argument to pass to timeout function h - * @return ERR_MEM on memory error, ERR_OK otherwise - */ -err_t tcpip_timeout(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler h, void *arg) -{ - struct tcpip_msg *msg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); - - msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); - - if (msg == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_TIMEOUT; - msg->msg.tmo.msecs = msecs; - msg->msg.tmo.h = h; - msg->msg.tmo.arg = arg; - sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, msg); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * call sys_untimeout in tcpip_thread - * - * @param h function to be called on timeout - * @param arg argument to pass to timeout function h - * @return ERR_MEM on memory error, ERR_OK otherwise - */ -err_t tcpip_untimeout(sys_timeout_handler h, void *arg) -{ - struct tcpip_msg *msg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); - - msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); - - if (msg == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_UNTIMEOUT; - msg->msg.tmo.h = h; - msg->msg.tmo.arg = arg; - sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, msg); - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ - -/** - * Sends a message to TCPIP thread to call a function. Caller thread blocks on - * on a provided semaphore, which ist NOT automatically signalled by TCPIP thread, - * this has to be done by the user. - * It is recommended to use LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING since this is the way - * with least runtime overhead. - * - * @param fn function to be called from TCPIP thread - * @param apimsg argument to API function - * @param sem semaphore to wait on - * @return ERR_OK if the function was called, another err_t if not - */ -err_t tcpip_send_msg_wait_sem(tcpip_callback_fn fn, void *apimsg, sys_sem_t *sem) -{ -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(sem); - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - fn(apimsg); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - return ERR_OK; -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - - LWIP_ASSERT("semaphore not initialized", sys_sem_valid(sem)); - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); - - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).type = TCPIP_MSG_API; - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_msg.function = fn; - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_msg.msg = apimsg; - sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, &TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - sys_arch_sem_wait(sem, 0); - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - return ERR_OK; -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -} - -/** - * Synchronously calls function in TCPIP thread and waits for its completion. - * It is recommended to use LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING (preferred) or - * LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD. - * If not, a semaphore is created and destroyed on every call which is usually - * an expensive/slow operation. - * @param fn Function to call - * @param call Call parameters - * @return Return value from tcpip_api_call_fn - */ -err_t tcpip_api_call(tcpip_api_call_fn fn, struct tcpip_api_call_data *call) -{ -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - err_t err; - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - err = fn(call); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - return err; -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - -#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - err_t err = sys_sem_new(&call->sem, 0); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); - - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).type = TCPIP_MSG_API_CALL; - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.arg = call; - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.function = fn; -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.sem = &call->sem; -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, &TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); - sys_arch_sem_wait(TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.sem, 0); - TCPIP_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); - -#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - sys_sem_free(&call->sem); -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - - return call->err; -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_os - * Allocate a structure for a static callback message and initialize it. - * The message has a special type such that lwIP never frees it. - * This is intended to be used to send "static" messages from interrupt context, - * e.g. the message is allocated once and posted several times from an IRQ - * using tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback(). - * Example usage: Trigger execution of an ethernet IRQ DPC routine in lwIP thread context. - * - * @param function the function to call - * @param ctx parameter passed to function - * @return a struct pointer to pass to tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback(). - * - * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback() - * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_delete() - */ -struct tcpip_callback_msg * -tcpip_callbackmsg_new(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx) -{ - struct tcpip_msg *msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); - - if (msg == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK_STATIC; - msg->msg.cb.function = function; - msg->msg.cb.ctx = ctx; - return (struct tcpip_callback_msg *)msg; -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_os - * Free a callback message allocated by tcpip_callbackmsg_new(). - * - * @param msg the message to free - * - * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_new() - */ -void tcpip_callbackmsg_delete(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg) -{ - memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_os - * Try to post a callback-message to the tcpip_thread tcpip_mbox. - * - * @param msg pointer to the message to post - * @return sys_mbox_trypost() return code - * - * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_new() - */ -err_t tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); - return sys_mbox_trypost(&tcpip_mbox, msg); -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_os - * Try to post a callback-message to the tcpip_thread mbox. - * Same as @ref tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback but calls sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr(), - * mainly to help FreeRTOS, where calls differ between task level and ISR level. - * - * @param msg pointer to the message to post - * @return sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr() return code (without change, so this - * knowledge can be used to e.g. propagate "bool needs_scheduling") - * - * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_new() - */ -err_t tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback_fromisr(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); - return sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr(&tcpip_mbox, msg); -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_os - * Initialize this module: - * - initialize all sub modules - * - start the tcpip_thread - * - * @param initfunc a function to call when tcpip_thread is running and finished initializing - * @param arg argument to pass to initfunc - */ -void tcpip_init(tcpip_init_done_fn initfunc, void *arg) -{ - lwip_init(); - printf("lwip init done\r\n"); - tcpip_init_done = initfunc; - tcpip_init_done_arg = arg; - - if (sys_mbox_new(&tcpip_mbox, TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_ASSERT("failed to create tcpip_thread mbox", 0); - } - printf("sys_mbox_new done!\r\n"); -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - - if (sys_mutex_new(&lock_tcpip_core) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_ASSERT("failed to create lock_tcpip_core", 0); - } - printf("sys_mutex_new done!\r\n"); -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - - sys_thread_new(TCPIP_THREAD_NAME, tcpip_thread, NULL, TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE, TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO); - printf("tcpip thread init done!\r\n"); -} - -/** - * Simple callback function used with tcpip_callback to free a pbuf - * (pbuf_free has a wrong signature for tcpip_callback) - * - * @param p The pbuf (chain) to be dereferenced. - */ -static void pbuf_free_int(void *p) -{ - struct pbuf *q = (struct pbuf *)p; - pbuf_free(q); -} - -/** - * A simple wrapper function that allows you to free a pbuf from interrupt context. - * - * @param p The pbuf (chain) to be dereferenced. - * @return ERR_OK if callback could be enqueued, an err_t if not - */ -err_t pbuf_free_callback(struct pbuf *p) -{ - return tcpip_try_callback(pbuf_free_int, p); -} - -/** - * A simple wrapper function that allows you to free heap memory from - * interrupt context. - * - * @param m the heap memory to free - * @return ERR_OK if callback could be enqueued, an err_t if not - */ -err_t mem_free_callback(void *m) -{ - return tcpip_try_callback(mem_free, m); -} - -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ +/** + * @file + * Sequential API Main thread module + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if !NO_SYS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/init.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "netif/ethernet.h" + +#define TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) +#define TCPIP_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct tcpip_msg, name) +#define TCPIP_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(name) API_VAR_ALLOC(struct tcpip_msg, MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, name, ERR_MEM) +#define TCPIP_MSG_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, name) + +/* global variables */ +static tcpip_init_done_fn tcpip_init_done; +static void *tcpip_init_done_arg; +static sys_mbox_t tcpip_mbox; + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +/** The global semaphore to lock the stack. */ +sys_mutex_t lock_tcpip_core; +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + +static void tcpip_thread_handle_msg(struct tcpip_msg *msg); + +#if !LWIP_TIMERS +/* wait for a message with timers disabled (e.g. pass a timer-check trigger into tcpip_thread) */ +#define TCPIP_MBOX_FETCH(mbox, msg) sys_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg) +#else /* !LWIP_TIMERS */ +/* wait for a message, timeouts are processed while waiting */ +#define TCPIP_MBOX_FETCH(mbox, msg) tcpip_timeouts_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg) +/** + * Wait (forever) for a message to arrive in an mbox. + * While waiting, timeouts are processed. + * + * @param mbox the mbox to fetch the message from + * @param msg the place to store the message + */ +static void tcpip_timeouts_mbox_fetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg) +{ + u32_t sleeptime, res; + +again: + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + sleeptime = sys_timeouts_sleeptime(); + + if (sleeptime == SYS_TIMEOUTS_SLEEPTIME_INFINITE) { + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + sys_arch_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg, 0); + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + return; + } else if (sleeptime == 0) { + sys_check_timeouts(); + /* We try again to fetch a message from the mbox. */ + goto again; + } + + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + res = sys_arch_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg, sleeptime); + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + + if (res == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + /* If a SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT value is returned, a timeout occurred + before a message could be fetched. */ + sys_check_timeouts(); + /* We try again to fetch a message from the mbox. */ + goto again; + } +} +#endif /* !LWIP_TIMERS */ + +/** + * The main lwIP thread. This thread has exclusive access to lwIP core functions + * (unless access to them is not locked). Other threads communicate with this + * thread using message boxes. + * + * It also starts all the timers to make sure they are running in the right + * thread context. + * + * @param arg unused argument + */ +static void tcpip_thread(void *arg) +{ + struct tcpip_msg *msg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + LWIP_MARK_TCPIP_THREAD(); + + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + + if (tcpip_init_done != NULL) { + tcpip_init_done(tcpip_init_done_arg); + } + + while (1) /* MAIN Loop */ + { + LWIP_TCPIP_THREAD_ALIVE(); + /* wait for a message, timeouts are processed while waiting */ + TCPIP_MBOX_FETCH(&tcpip_mbox, (void **)&msg); + + if (msg == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: invalid message: NULL\n")); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcpip_thread: invalid message", 0); + continue; + } + + tcpip_thread_handle_msg(msg); + } +} + +/* Handle a single tcpip_msg + * This is in its own function for access by tests only. + */ +static void tcpip_thread_handle_msg(struct tcpip_msg *msg) +{ + switch (msg->type) { +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + + case TCPIP_MSG_API: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: API message %p\n", (void *)msg)); + msg->msg.api_msg.function(msg->msg.api_msg.msg); + break; + + case TCPIP_MSG_API_CALL: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: API CALL message %p\n", (void *)msg)); + msg->msg.api_call.arg->err = msg->msg.api_call.function(msg->msg.api_call.arg); + sys_sem_signal(msg->msg.api_call.sem); + break; +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT + + case TCPIP_MSG_INPKT: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: PACKET %p\n", (void *)msg)); + + if (msg->msg.inp.input_fn(msg->msg.inp.p, msg->msg.inp.netif) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(msg->msg.inp.p); + } + + memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, msg); + break; +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS + + case TCPIP_MSG_TIMEOUT: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: TIMEOUT %p\n", (void *)msg)); + sys_timeout(msg->msg.tmo.msecs, msg->msg.tmo.h, msg->msg.tmo.arg); + memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); + break; + + case TCPIP_MSG_UNTIMEOUT: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: UNTIMEOUT %p\n", (void *)msg)); + sys_untimeout(msg->msg.tmo.h, msg->msg.tmo.arg); + memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ + + case TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: CALLBACK %p\n", (void *)msg)); + msg->msg.cb.function(msg->msg.cb.ctx); + memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); + break; + + case TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK_STATIC: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: CALLBACK_STATIC %p\n", (void *)msg)); + msg->msg.cb.function(msg->msg.cb.ctx); + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_thread: invalid message: %d\n", msg->type)); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcpip_thread: invalid message", 0); + break; + } +} + +#ifdef TCPIP_THREAD_TEST +/** Work on queued items in single-threaded test mode */ +int tcpip_thread_poll_one(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tcpip_msg *msg; + + if (sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(&tcpip_mbox, (void **)&msg) != SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + + if (msg != NULL) { + tcpip_thread_handle_msg(msg); + ret = 1; + } + + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif + +/** + * Pass a received packet to tcpip_thread for input processing + * + * @param p the received packet + * @param inp the network interface on which the packet was received + * @param input_fn input function to call + */ +err_t tcpip_inpkt(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp, netif_input_fn input_fn) +{ +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT + err_t ret; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCPIP_DEBUG, ("tcpip_inpkt: PACKET %p/%p\n", (void *)p, (void *)inp)); + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + ret = input_fn(p, inp); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + return ret; +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ + struct tcpip_msg *msg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); + + msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT); + + if (msg == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_INPKT; + msg->msg.inp.p = p; + msg->msg.inp.netif = inp; + msg->msg.inp.input_fn = input_fn; + + if (sys_mbox_trypost(&tcpip_mbox, msg) != ERR_OK) { + memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, msg); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + return ERR_OK; +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_os + * Pass a received packet to tcpip_thread for input processing with + * ethernet_input or ip_input. Don't call directly, pass to netif_add() + * and call netif->input(). + * + * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the Ethernet header or + * to an IP header (if inp doesn't have NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP or + * NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET flags) + * @param inp the network interface on which the packet was received + */ +err_t tcpip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ +#if LWIP_ETHERNET + + if (inp->flags & (NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET)) { + return tcpip_inpkt(p, inp, ethernet_input); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_ETHERNET */ + return tcpip_inpkt(p, inp, ip_input); +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_os + * Call a specific function in the thread context of + * tcpip_thread for easy access synchronization. + * A function called in that way may access lwIP core code + * without fearing concurrent access. + * Blocks until the request is posted. + * Must not be called from interrupt context! + * + * @param function the function to call + * @param ctx parameter passed to f + * @return ERR_OK if the function was called, another err_t if not + * + * @see tcpip_try_callback + */ +err_t tcpip_callback(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx) +{ + struct tcpip_msg *msg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); + + msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); + + if (msg == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK; + msg->msg.cb.function = function; + msg->msg.cb.ctx = ctx; + + sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, msg); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_os + * Call a specific function in the thread context of + * tcpip_thread for easy access synchronization. + * A function called in that way may access lwIP core code + * without fearing concurrent access. + * Does NOT block when the request cannot be posted because the + * tcpip_mbox is full, but returns ERR_MEM instead. + * Can be called from interrupt context. + * + * @param function the function to call + * @param ctx parameter passed to f + * @return ERR_OK if the function was called, another err_t if not + * + * @see tcpip_callback + */ +err_t tcpip_try_callback(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx) +{ + struct tcpip_msg *msg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); + + msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); + + if (msg == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK; + msg->msg.cb.function = function; + msg->msg.cb.ctx = ctx; + + if (sys_mbox_trypost(&tcpip_mbox, msg) != ERR_OK) { + memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS +/** + * call sys_timeout in tcpip_thread + * + * @param msecs time in milliseconds for timeout + * @param h function to be called on timeout + * @param arg argument to pass to timeout function h + * @return ERR_MEM on memory error, ERR_OK otherwise + */ +err_t tcpip_timeout(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler h, void *arg) +{ + struct tcpip_msg *msg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); + + msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); + + if (msg == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_TIMEOUT; + msg->msg.tmo.msecs = msecs; + msg->msg.tmo.h = h; + msg->msg.tmo.arg = arg; + sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, msg); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * call sys_untimeout in tcpip_thread + * + * @param h function to be called on timeout + * @param arg argument to pass to timeout function h + * @return ERR_MEM on memory error, ERR_OK otherwise + */ +err_t tcpip_untimeout(sys_timeout_handler h, void *arg) +{ + struct tcpip_msg *msg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); + + msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); + + if (msg == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_UNTIMEOUT; + msg->msg.tmo.h = h; + msg->msg.tmo.arg = arg; + sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, msg); + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ + +/** + * Sends a message to TCPIP thread to call a function. Caller thread blocks on + * on a provided semaphore, which ist NOT automatically signalled by TCPIP thread, + * this has to be done by the user. + * It is recommended to use LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING since this is the way + * with least runtime overhead. + * + * @param fn function to be called from TCPIP thread + * @param apimsg argument to API function + * @param sem semaphore to wait on + * @return ERR_OK if the function was called, another err_t if not + */ +err_t tcpip_send_msg_wait_sem(tcpip_callback_fn fn, void *apimsg, sys_sem_t *sem) +{ +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(sem); + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + fn(apimsg); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + return ERR_OK; +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + + LWIP_ASSERT("semaphore not initialized", sys_sem_valid(sem)); + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); + + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).type = TCPIP_MSG_API; + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_msg.function = fn; + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_msg.msg = apimsg; + sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, &TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + sys_arch_sem_wait(sem, 0); + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + return ERR_OK; +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +} + +/** + * Synchronously calls function in TCPIP thread and waits for its completion. + * It is recommended to use LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING (preferred) or + * LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD. + * If not, a semaphore is created and destroyed on every call which is usually + * an expensive/slow operation. + * @param fn Function to call + * @param call Call parameters + * @return Return value from tcpip_api_call_fn + */ +err_t tcpip_api_call(tcpip_api_call_fn fn, struct tcpip_api_call_data *call) +{ +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + err_t err; + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + err = fn(call); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + return err; +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + +#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + err_t err = sys_sem_new(&call->sem, 0); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); + + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).type = TCPIP_MSG_API_CALL; + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.arg = call; + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.function = fn; +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.sem = LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET(); +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.sem = &call->sem; +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + sys_mbox_post(&tcpip_mbox, &TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg)); + sys_arch_sem_wait(TCPIP_MSG_VAR_REF(msg).msg.api_call.sem, 0); + TCPIP_MSG_VAR_FREE(msg); + +#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + sys_sem_free(&call->sem); +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + + return call->err; +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_os + * Allocate a structure for a static callback message and initialize it. + * The message has a special type such that lwIP never frees it. + * This is intended to be used to send "static" messages from interrupt context, + * e.g. the message is allocated once and posted several times from an IRQ + * using tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback(). + * Example usage: Trigger execution of an ethernet IRQ DPC routine in lwIP thread context. + * + * @param function the function to call + * @param ctx parameter passed to function + * @return a struct pointer to pass to tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback(). + * + * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback() + * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_delete() + */ +struct tcpip_callback_msg * +tcpip_callbackmsg_new(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx) +{ + struct tcpip_msg *msg = (struct tcpip_msg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API); + + if (msg == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + msg->type = TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK_STATIC; + msg->msg.cb.function = function; + msg->msg.cb.ctx = ctx; + return (struct tcpip_callback_msg *)msg; +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_os + * Free a callback message allocated by tcpip_callbackmsg_new(). + * + * @param msg the message to free + * + * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_new() + */ +void tcpip_callbackmsg_delete(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg) +{ + memp_free(MEMP_TCPIP_MSG_API, msg); +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_os + * Try to post a callback-message to the tcpip_thread tcpip_mbox. + * + * @param msg pointer to the message to post + * @return sys_mbox_trypost() return code + * + * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_new() + */ +err_t tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); + return sys_mbox_trypost(&tcpip_mbox, msg); +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_os + * Try to post a callback-message to the tcpip_thread mbox. + * Same as @ref tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback but calls sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr(), + * mainly to help FreeRTOS, where calls differ between task level and ISR level. + * + * @param msg pointer to the message to post + * @return sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr() return code (without change, so this + * knowledge can be used to e.g. propagate "bool needs_scheduling") + * + * @see tcpip_callbackmsg_new() + */ +err_t tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback_fromisr(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid mbox", sys_mbox_valid_val(tcpip_mbox)); + return sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr(&tcpip_mbox, msg); +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_os + * Initialize this module: + * - initialize all sub modules + * - start the tcpip_thread + * + * @param initfunc a function to call when tcpip_thread is running and finished initializing + * @param arg argument to pass to initfunc + */ +void tcpip_init(tcpip_init_done_fn initfunc, void *arg) +{ + lwip_init(); + printf("lwip init done\r\n"); + tcpip_init_done = initfunc; + tcpip_init_done_arg = arg; + + if (sys_mbox_new(&tcpip_mbox, TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_ASSERT("failed to create tcpip_thread mbox", 0); + } + printf("sys_mbox_new done!\r\n"); +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + + if (sys_mutex_new(&lock_tcpip_core) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_ASSERT("failed to create lock_tcpip_core", 0); + } + printf("sys_mutex_new done!\r\n"); +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + + sys_thread_new(TCPIP_THREAD_NAME, tcpip_thread, NULL, TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE, TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO); + printf("tcpip thread init done!\r\n"); +} + +/** + * Simple callback function used with tcpip_callback to free a pbuf + * (pbuf_free has a wrong signature for tcpip_callback) + * + * @param p The pbuf (chain) to be dereferenced. + */ +static void pbuf_free_int(void *p) +{ + struct pbuf *q = (struct pbuf *)p; + pbuf_free(q); +} + +/** + * A simple wrapper function that allows you to free a pbuf from interrupt context. + * + * @param p The pbuf (chain) to be dereferenced. + * @return ERR_OK if callback could be enqueued, an err_t if not + */ +err_t pbuf_free_callback(struct pbuf *p) +{ + return tcpip_try_callback(pbuf_free_int, p); +} + +/** + * A simple wrapper function that allows you to free heap memory from + * interrupt context. + * + * @param m the heap memory to free + * @return ERR_OK if callback could be enqueued, an err_t if not + */ +err_t mem_free_callback(void *m) +{ + return tcpip_try_callback(mem_free, m); +} + +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c index 0290132f..6a790838 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls.c @@ -1,1291 +1,1291 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) - * - * This file provides a TLS layer using mbedTLS - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - * Watch out: - * - 'sent' is always called with len==0 to the upper layer. This is because keeping - * track of the ratio of application data and TLS overhead would be too much. - * - * Mandatory security-related configuration: - * - define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN to mbedtls_entropy_func to use the standard mbedTLS - * entropy and ensure to add at least one strong entropy source to your mbedtls port - * (implement mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll or mbedtls_hardware_poll providing strong - * entropy) - * - define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_PTR and ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_LEN to something providing - * GOOD custom entropy - * - * Missing things / @todo: - * - some unhandled/untested things migh be caught by LWIP_ASSERTs... - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" -#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" - -#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h" -#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h" - -/* @todo: which includes are really needed? */ -#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" -#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" -#include "mbedtls/certs.h" -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/net.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" - -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" /* to call mbedtls_flush_output after ERR_MEM */ - -#include - -#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_PTR -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_PTR NULL -#endif -#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_LEN -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_LEN 0 -#endif - -/* Variable prototype, the actual declaration is at the end of this file - since it contains pointers to static functions declared here */ -extern const struct altcp_functions altcp_mbedtls_functions; - -/** Our global mbedTLS configuration (server-specific, not connection-specific) */ -struct altcp_tls_config { - mbedtls_ssl_config conf; - mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; - mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; - mbedtls_pk_context *pkey; - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) && ALTCP_MBEDTLS_SESSION_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS - /** Inter-connection cache for fast connection startup */ - struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context cache; -#endif -}; - -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_setup(void *conf, struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn); -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv_process(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state); -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state); -static int altcp_mbedtls_bio_send(void *ctx, const unsigned char *dataptr, size_t size); - -/* callback functions from inner/lower connection: */ - -/** Accept callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) - * Allocate one of our structures, assign it to the new connection's 'state' and - * call the new connection's 'accepted' callback. If that succeeds, we wait - * to receive connection setup handshake bytes from the client. - */ -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_accept(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *accepted_conn, err_t err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *listen_conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (listen_conn && listen_conn->state && listen_conn->accept) { - err_t setup_err; - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *listen_state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)listen_conn->state; - /* create a new altcp_conn to pass to the next 'accept' callback */ - struct altcp_pcb *new_conn = altcp_alloc(); - - if (new_conn == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - setup_err = altcp_mbedtls_setup(listen_state->conf, new_conn, accepted_conn); - - if (setup_err != ERR_OK) { - altcp_free(new_conn); - return setup_err; - } - - return listen_conn->accept(listen_conn->arg, new_conn, err); - } - - return ERR_ARG; -} - -/** Connected callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP). - * Not really implemented/tested yet... - */ -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, err_t err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - - if (conn && conn->state) { - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); - - /* upper connected is called when handshake is done */ - if (err != ERR_OK) { - if (conn->connected) { - return conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, err); - } - } - - return altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv_process(conn, (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/* Call recved for possibly more than an u16_t */ -static void altcp_mbedtls_lower_recved(struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, int recvd_cnt) -{ - while (recvd_cnt > 0) { - u16_t recvd_part = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(recvd_cnt, 0xFFFF); - altcp_recved(inner_conn, recvd_part); - recvd_cnt -= recvd_part; - } -} - -/** Recv callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) - * This one mainly differs between connection setup/handshake (data is fed into mbedTLS only) - * and application phase (data is decoded by mbedTLS and passed on to the application). - */ -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("no err expected", err == ERR_OK); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - - if (!conn) { - /* no connection given as arg? should not happen, but prevent pbuf/conn leaks */ - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - altcp_close(inner_conn); - return ERR_CLSD; - } - - state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); - - if (!state) { - /* already closed */ - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - altcp_close(inner_conn); - return ERR_CLSD; - } - - /* handle NULL pbuf (inner connection closed) */ - if (p == NULL) { - /* remote host sent FIN, remember this (SSL state is destroyed - when both sides are closed only!) */ - if ((state->flags & (ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE | ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_UPPER_CALLED)) == - (ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE | ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_UPPER_CALLED)) { - /* need to notify upper layer (e.g. 'accept' called or 'connect' succeeded) */ - if ((state->rx != NULL) || (state->rx_app != NULL)) { - state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED; - /* this is a normal close (FIN) but we have unprocessed data, so delay the FIN */ - altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(conn, state); - return ERR_OK; - } - - state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED; - - if (conn->recv) { - return conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, NULL, ERR_OK); - } - } else { - /* before connection setup is done: call 'err' */ - if (conn->err) { - conn->err(conn->arg, ERR_CLSD); - } - - altcp_close(conn); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* If we come here, the connection is in good state (handshake phase or application data phase). - Queue up the pbuf for processing as handshake data or application data. */ - if (state->rx == NULL) { - state->rx = p; - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("rx pbuf overflow", (int)p->tot_len + (int)p->len <= 0xFFFF); - pbuf_cat(state->rx, p); - } - - return altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv_process(conn, state); -} - -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv_process(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state) -{ - if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { - /* handle connection setup (handshake not done) */ - int ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&state->ssl_context); - /* try to send data... */ - altcp_output(conn->inner_conn); - - if (state->bio_bytes_read) { - /* acknowledge all bytes read */ - altcp_mbedtls_lower_recved(conn->inner_conn, state->bio_bytes_read); - state->bio_bytes_read = 0; - } - - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) { - /* handshake not done, wait for more recv calls */ - LWIP_ASSERT("in this state, the rx chain should be empty", state->rx == NULL); - return ERR_OK; - } - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_handshake failed: %d\n", ret)); - - /* handshake failed, connection has to be closed */ - if (conn->err) { - conn->err(conn->arg, ERR_CLSD); - } - - if (altcp_close(conn) != ERR_OK) { - altcp_abort(conn); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* If we come here, handshake succeeded. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("state", state->bio_bytes_read == 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("state", state->bio_bytes_appl == 0); - state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE; - - /* issue "connect" callback" to upper connection (this can only happen for active open) */ - if (conn->connected) { - err_t err; - err = conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, ERR_OK); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - } - - if (state->rx == NULL) { - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* handle application data */ - return altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(conn, state); -} - -/* Pass queued decoded rx data to application */ -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_pass_rx_data(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state) -{ - err_t err; - struct pbuf *buf; - LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", conn != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); - buf = state->rx_app; - - if (buf) { - state->rx_app = NULL; - - if (conn->recv) { - u16_t tot_len = buf->tot_len; - /* this needs to be increased first because the 'recved' call may come nested */ - state->rx_passed_unrecved += tot_len; - state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_UPPER_CALLED; - err = conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, buf, ERR_OK); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - if (err == ERR_ABRT) { - return ERR_ABRT; - } - - /* not received, leave the pbuf(s) queued (and decrease 'unrecved' again) */ - LWIP_ASSERT("state == conn->state", state == conn->state); - state->rx_app = buf; - state->rx_passed_unrecved -= tot_len; - LWIP_ASSERT("state->rx_passed_unrecved >= 0", state->rx_passed_unrecved >= 0); - - if (state->rx_passed_unrecved < 0) { - state->rx_passed_unrecved = 0; - } - - return err; - } - } else { - pbuf_free(buf); - } - } else if ((state->flags & (ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED | ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED)) == - ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED) { - state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED; - - if (conn->recv) { - return conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, NULL, ERR_OK); - } - } - - /* application may have close the connection */ - if (conn->state != state) { - /* return error code to ensure altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata() exits the loop */ - return ERR_CLSD; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* Helper function that processes rx application data stored in rx pbuf chain */ -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state) -{ - int ret; - LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); - - if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { - /* handshake not done yet */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - do { - /* allocate a full-sized unchained PBUF_POOL: this is for RX! */ - struct pbuf *buf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE, PBUF_POOL); - - if (buf == NULL) { - /* We're short on pbufs, try again later from 'poll' or 'recv' callbacks. - @todo: close on excessive allocation failures or leave this up to upper conn? */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* decrypt application data, this pulls encrypted RX data off state->rx pbuf chain */ - ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(&state->ssl_context, (unsigned char *)buf->payload, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE); - - if (ret < 0) { - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT) { - /* client is initiating a new connection using the same source port -> close connection or make handshake */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("new connection on same source port\n")); - LWIP_ASSERT("TODO: new connection on same source port, close this connection", 0); - } else if ((ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE)) { - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("connection was closed gracefully\n")); - } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("connection was reset by peer\n")); - } - - pbuf_free(buf); - return ERR_OK; - } else { - pbuf_free(buf); - return ERR_OK; - } - - pbuf_free(buf); - altcp_abort(conn); - return ERR_ABRT; - } else { - err_t err; - - if (ret) { - LWIP_ASSERT("bogus receive length", ret <= PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE); - /* trim pool pbuf to actually decoded length */ - pbuf_realloc(buf, (u16_t)ret); - - state->bio_bytes_appl += ret; - - if (mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail(&state->ssl_context) == 0) { - /* Record is done, now we know the share between application and protocol bytes - and can adjust the RX window by the protocol bytes. - The rest is 'recved' by the application calling our 'recved' fn. */ - int overhead_bytes; - LWIP_ASSERT("bogus byte counts", state->bio_bytes_read > state->bio_bytes_appl); - overhead_bytes = state->bio_bytes_read - state->bio_bytes_appl; - altcp_mbedtls_lower_recved(conn->inner_conn, overhead_bytes); - state->bio_bytes_read = 0; - state->bio_bytes_appl = 0; - } - - if (state->rx_app == NULL) { - state->rx_app = buf; - } else { - pbuf_cat(state->rx_app, buf); - } - } else { - pbuf_free(buf); - buf = NULL; - } - - err = altcp_mbedtls_pass_rx_data(conn, state); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - if (err == ERR_ABRT) { - /* recv callback needs to return this as the pcb is deallocated */ - return ERR_ABRT; - } - - /* we hide all other errors as we retry feeding the pbuf to the app later */ - return ERR_OK; - } - } - } while (ret > 0); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Receive callback function called from mbedtls (set via mbedtls_ssl_set_bio) - * This function mainly copies data from pbufs and frees the pbufs after copying. - */ -static int altcp_mbedtls_bio_recv(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)ctx; - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; - struct pbuf *p; - u16_t ret; - u16_t copy_len; - err_t err; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - - if ((conn == NULL) || (conn->state == NULL)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT; - } - - state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; - p = state->rx; - - /* @todo: return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET/MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED? */ - - if ((p == NULL) || ((p->len == 0) && (p->next == NULL))) { - if (p) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - state->rx = NULL; - - if ((state->flags & (ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED | ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED)) == - ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED) { - /* close queued but not passed up yet */ - return 0; - } - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; - } - - /* limit number of bytes again to copy from first pbuf in a chain only */ - copy_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(len, p->len); - /* copy the data */ - ret = pbuf_copy_partial(p, buf, copy_len, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == copy_len", ret == copy_len); - /* hide the copied bytes from the pbuf */ - err = pbuf_remove_header(p, ret); - LWIP_ASSERT("error", err == ERR_OK); - - if (p->len == 0) { - /* the first pbuf has been fully read, free it */ - state->rx = p->next; - p->next = NULL; - pbuf_free(p); - } - - state->bio_bytes_read += (int)ret; - return ret; -} - -/** Sent callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) - * This only informs the upper layer to try to send more, not about - * the number of ACKed bytes. - */ -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, u16_t len) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - if (conn) { - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); - - if (!state || !(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { - /* @todo: do something here? */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* try to send more if we failed before */ - mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(&state->ssl_context); - - /* call upper sent with len==0 if the application already sent data */ - if ((state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_APPLDATA_SENT) && conn->sent) { - return conn->sent(conn->arg, conn, 0); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Poll callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) - * Just pass this on to the application. - * @todo: retry sending? - */ -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - - if (conn) { - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); - - /* check if there's unreceived rx data */ - if (conn->state) { - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; - /* try to send more if we failed before */ - mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(&state->ssl_context); - - if (altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(conn, state) == ERR_ABRT) { - return ERR_ABRT; - } - } - - if (conn->poll) { - return conn->poll(conn->arg, conn); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void altcp_mbedtls_lower_err(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (conn) { - conn->inner_conn = NULL; /* already freed */ - - if (conn->err) { - conn->err(conn->arg, err); - } - - altcp_free(conn); - } -} - -/* setup functions */ - -static void altcp_mbedtls_remove_callbacks(struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) -{ - altcp_arg(inner_conn, NULL); - altcp_recv(inner_conn, NULL); - altcp_sent(inner_conn, NULL); - altcp_err(inner_conn, NULL); - altcp_poll(inner_conn, NULL, inner_conn->pollinterval); -} - -static void altcp_mbedtls_setup_callbacks(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) -{ - altcp_arg(inner_conn, conn); - altcp_recv(inner_conn, altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv); - altcp_sent(inner_conn, altcp_mbedtls_lower_sent); - altcp_err(inner_conn, altcp_mbedtls_lower_err); - /* tcp_poll is set when interval is set by application */ - /* listen is set totally different :-) */ -} - -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_setup(void *conf, struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) -{ - int ret; - struct altcp_tls_config *config = (struct altcp_tls_config *)conf; - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; - - if (!conf) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid inner_conn", conn != inner_conn); - - /* allocate mbedtls context */ - state = altcp_mbedtls_alloc(conf); - - if (state == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* initialize mbedtls context: */ - mbedtls_ssl_init(&state->ssl_context); - ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup(&state->ssl_context, &config->conf); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_setup failed\n")); - /* @todo: convert 'ret' to err_t */ - altcp_mbedtls_free(conf, state); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* tell mbedtls about our I/O functions */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(&state->ssl_context, conn, altcp_mbedtls_bio_send, altcp_mbedtls_bio_recv, NULL); - - altcp_mbedtls_setup_callbacks(conn, inner_conn); - conn->inner_conn = inner_conn; - conn->fns = &altcp_mbedtls_functions; - conn->state = state; - return ERR_OK; -} - -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_tls_wrap(struct altcp_tls_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *ret; - - if (inner_pcb == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - ret = altcp_alloc(); - - if (ret != NULL) { - if (altcp_mbedtls_setup(config, ret, inner_pcb) != ERR_OK) { - altcp_free(ret); - return NULL; - } - } - - return ret; -} - -void *altcp_tls_context(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->state) { - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; - return &state->ssl_context; - } - - return NULL; -} - -#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG != LWIP_DBG_OFF -static void altcp_mbedtls_debug(void *ctx, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *str) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ctx); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(level); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(file); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(line); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(str); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str)); -} -#endif - -#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN -/** ATTENTION: It is *really* important to *NOT* use this dummy RNG in production code!!!! */ -static int dummy_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *buffer, size_t len) -{ - static size_t ctr; - size_t i; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ctx); - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - buffer[i] = (unsigned char)++ctr; - } - - return 0; -} -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN dummy_rng -#endif /* ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN */ - -/** Create new TLS configuration - * ATTENTION: Server certificate and private key have to be added outside this function! - */ -static struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config(int is_server, int have_cert, int have_pkey, int have_ca) -{ - size_t sz; - int ret; - struct altcp_tls_config *conf; - mbedtls_x509_crt *mem; - - if (TCP_WND < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("altcp_tls: TCP_WND is smaller than the RX decryption buffer, connection RX might stall!\n")); - } - - altcp_mbedtls_mem_init(); - - sz = sizeof(struct altcp_tls_config); - - if (have_cert) { - sz += sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt); - } - - if (have_ca) { - sz += sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt); - } - - if (have_pkey) { - sz += sizeof(mbedtls_pk_context); - } - - conf = (struct altcp_tls_config *)altcp_mbedtls_alloc_config(sz); - - if (conf == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - mem = (mbedtls_x509_crt *)(conf + 1); - - if (have_cert) { - conf->cert = mem; - mem++; - } - - if (have_ca) { - conf->ca = mem; - mem++; - } - - if (have_pkey) { - conf->pkey = (mbedtls_pk_context *)mem; - } - - mbedtls_ssl_config_init(&conf->conf); - mbedtls_entropy_init(&conf->entropy); - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&conf->ctr_drbg); - - /* Seed the RNG */ - ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&conf->ctr_drbg, ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN, &conf->entropy, ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_PTR, ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_LEN); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed failed: %d\n", ret)); - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); - return NULL; - } - - /* Setup ssl context (@todo: what's different for a client here? -> might better be done on listen/connect) */ - ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf->conf, is_server ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults failed: %d\n", ret)); - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); - return NULL; - } - - mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&conf->conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL); - - mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf->conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &conf->ctr_drbg); -#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG != LWIP_DBG_OFF - mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&conf->conf, altcp_mbedtls_debug, stdout); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) && ALTCP_MBEDTLS_SESSION_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS - mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(&conf->conf, &conf->cache, mbedtls_ssl_cache_get, mbedtls_ssl_cache_set); - mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout(&conf->cache, 30); - mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries(&conf->cache, 30); -#endif - - return conf; -} - -/** Create new TLS configuration - * This is a suboptimal version that gets the encrypted private key and its password, - * as well as the server certificate. - */ -struct altcp_tls_config * -altcp_tls_create_config_server_privkey_cert(const u8_t *privkey, size_t privkey_len, - const u8_t *privkey_pass, size_t privkey_pass_len, - const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len) -{ - int ret; - mbedtls_x509_crt *srvcert; - mbedtls_pk_context *pkey; - struct altcp_tls_config *conf = altcp_tls_create_config(1, 1, 1, 0); - - if (conf == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - srvcert = conf->cert; - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(srvcert); - - pkey = conf->pkey; - mbedtls_pk_init(pkey); - - /* Load the certificates and private key */ - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(srvcert, cert, cert_len); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_x509_crt_parse failed: %d\n", ret)); - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); - return NULL; - } - - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(pkey, (const unsigned char *)privkey, privkey_len, privkey_pass, privkey_pass_len); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key failed: %d\n", ret)); - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(srvcert); - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); - return NULL; - } - - mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&conf->conf, srvcert->next, NULL); - ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(&conf->conf, srvcert, pkey); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert failed: %d\n", ret)); - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(srvcert); - mbedtls_pk_free(pkey); - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); - return NULL; - } - - return conf; -} - -static struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config_client_common(const u8_t *ca, size_t ca_len, int is_2wayauth) -{ - int ret; - struct altcp_tls_config *conf = altcp_tls_create_config(0, is_2wayauth, is_2wayauth, ca != NULL); - - if (conf == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - /* Initialize the CA certificate if provided - * CA certificate is optional (to save memory) but recommended for production environment - * Without CA certificate, connection will be prone to man-in-the-middle attacks */ - if (ca) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(conf->ca); - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(conf->ca, ca, ca_len); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_x509_crt_parse ca failed: %d 0x%x", ret, -1 * ret)); - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); - return NULL; - } - - mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&conf->conf, conf->ca, NULL); - } - - return conf; -} - -struct altcp_tls_config * -altcp_tls_create_config_client(const u8_t *ca, size_t ca_len) -{ - return altcp_tls_create_config_client_common(ca, ca_len, 0); -} - -struct altcp_tls_config * -altcp_tls_create_config_client_2wayauth(const u8_t *ca, size_t ca_len, const u8_t *privkey, size_t privkey_len, - const u8_t *privkey_pass, size_t privkey_pass_len, - const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len) -{ - int ret; - struct altcp_tls_config *conf; - - if (!cert || !privkey) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("altcp_tls_create_config_client_2wayauth: certificate and priv key required")); - return NULL; - } - - conf = altcp_tls_create_config_client_common(ca, ca_len, 1); - - if (conf == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - /* Initialize the client certificate and corresponding private key */ - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(conf->cert); - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(conf->cert, cert, cert_len); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_x509_crt_parse cert failed: %d 0x%x", ret, -1 * ret)); - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf->cert); - return NULL; - } - - mbedtls_pk_init(conf->pkey); - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(conf->pkey, privkey, privkey_len, privkey_pass, privkey_pass_len); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_pk_parse_key failed: %d 0x%x", ret, -1 * ret)); - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); - return NULL; - } - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(&conf->conf, conf->cert, conf->pkey); - - if (ret != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert failed: %d 0x%x", ret, -1 * ret)); - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); - return NULL; - } - - return conf; -} - -void altcp_tls_free_config(struct altcp_tls_config *conf) -{ - if (conf->pkey) { - mbedtls_pk_free(conf->pkey); - } - - if (conf->cert) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(conf->cert); - } - - if (conf->ca) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(conf->ca); - } - - altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); -} - -/* "virtual" functions */ -static void altcp_mbedtls_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval) -{ - if (conn != NULL) { - altcp_poll(conn->inner_conn, altcp_mbedtls_lower_poll, interval); - } -} - -static void altcp_mbedtls_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) -{ - u16_t lower_recved; - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return; - } - - state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; - - if (state == NULL) { - return; - } - - if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { - return; - } - - lower_recved = len; - - if (lower_recved > state->rx_passed_unrecved) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("bogus recved count (len > state->rx_passed_unrecved / %d / %d)", - len, state->rx_passed_unrecved)); - lower_recved = (u16_t)state->rx_passed_unrecved; - } - - state->rx_passed_unrecved -= lower_recved; - - altcp_recved(conn->inner_conn, lower_recved); -} - -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected) -{ - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - conn->connected = connected; - return altcp_connect(conn->inner_conn, ipaddr, port, altcp_mbedtls_lower_connected); -} - -static struct altcp_pcb *altcp_mbedtls_listen(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *lpcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - lpcb = altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(conn->inner_conn, backlog, err); - - if (lpcb != NULL) { - conn->inner_conn = lpcb; - altcp_accept(lpcb, altcp_mbedtls_lower_accept); - return conn; - } - - return NULL; -} - -static void altcp_mbedtls_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn != NULL) { - altcp_abort(conn->inner_conn); - } -} - -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - inner_conn = conn->inner_conn; - - if (inner_conn) { - err_t err; - altcp_poll_fn oldpoll = inner_conn->poll; - altcp_mbedtls_remove_callbacks(conn->inner_conn); - err = altcp_close(conn->inner_conn); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* not closed, set up all callbacks again */ - altcp_mbedtls_setup_callbacks(conn, inner_conn); - /* poll callback is not included in the above */ - altcp_poll(inner_conn, oldpoll, inner_conn->pollinterval); - return err; - } - - conn->inner_conn = NULL; - } - - altcp_free(conn); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Allow caller of altcp_write() to limit to negotiated chunk size - * or remaining sndbuf space of inner_conn. - */ -static u16_t altcp_mbedtls_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn) { - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; - state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; - - if (!state || !(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { - return 0; - } - - if (conn->inner_conn) { - u16_t sndbuf = altcp_sndbuf(conn->inner_conn); - /* Take care of record header, IV, AuthTag */ - int ssl_expan = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(&state->ssl_context); - - if (ssl_expan > 0) { - size_t ssl_added = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssl_expan, 0xFFFF); - - /* internal sndbuf smaller than our offset */ - if (ssl_added < sndbuf) { - size_t max_len = 0xFFFF; - size_t ret; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - /* @todo: adjust ssl_added to real value related to negociated cipher */ - size_t max_frag_len = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(&state->ssl_context); - max_len = LWIP_MIN(max_frag_len, max_len); -#endif - /* Adjust sndbuf of inner_conn with what added by SSL */ - ret = LWIP_MIN(sndbuf - ssl_added, max_len); - LWIP_ASSERT("sndbuf overflow", ret <= 0xFFFF); - return (u16_t)ret; - } - } - } - } - - /* fallback: use sendbuf of the inner connection */ - return altcp_default_sndbuf(conn); -} - -/** Write data to a TLS connection. Calls into mbedTLS, which in turn calls into - * @ref altcp_mbedtls_bio_send() to send the encrypted data - */ -static err_t altcp_mbedtls_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) -{ - int ret; - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(apiflags); - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; - - if (state == NULL) { - /* @todo: which error? */ - return ERR_CLSD; - } - - if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { - /* @todo: which error? */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* HACK: if thre is something left to send, try to flush it and only - allow sending more if this succeeded (this is a hack because neither - returning 0 nor MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE worked for me) */ - if (state->ssl_context.out_left) { - mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(&state->ssl_context); - - if (state->ssl_context.out_left) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - } - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_write(&state->ssl_context, (const unsigned char *)dataptr, len); - /* try to send data... */ - altcp_output(conn->inner_conn); - - if (ret >= 0) { - if (ret == len) { - state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_APPLDATA_SENT; - return ERR_OK; - } else { - /* @todo/@fixme: assumption: either everything sent or error */ - LWIP_ASSERT("ret <= 0", 0); - return ERR_MEM; - } - } else { - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) { - /* @todo: convert error to err_t */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("unhandled error", 0); - return ERR_VAL; - } -} - -/** Send callback function called from mbedtls (set via mbedtls_ssl_set_bio) - * This function is either called during handshake or when sending application - * data via @ref altcp_mbedtls_write (or altcp_write) - */ -static int altcp_mbedtls_bio_send(void *ctx, const unsigned char *dataptr, size_t size) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)ctx; - int written = 0; - size_t size_left = size; - u8_t apiflags = TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY; - - LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", conn != NULL); - - if ((conn == NULL) || (conn->inner_conn == NULL)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT; - } - - while (size_left) { - u16_t write_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(size_left, 0xFFFF); - err_t err = altcp_write(conn->inner_conn, (const void *)dataptr, write_len, apiflags); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - written += write_len; - size_left -= write_len; - } else if (err == ERR_MEM) { - if (written) { - return written; - } - - return 0; /* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE; */ - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("tls_write, tcp_write: err != ERR MEM", 0); - /* @todo: return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET or MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED; - } - } - - return written; -} - -static u16_t altcp_mbedtls_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - /* @todo: LWIP_MIN(mss, mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len()) ? */ - return altcp_mss(conn->inner_conn); -} - -static void altcp_mbedtls_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - /* clean up and free tls state */ - if (conn) { - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; - - if (state) { - mbedtls_ssl_free(&state->ssl_context); - state->flags = 0; - - if (state->rx) { - /* free leftover (unhandled) rx pbufs */ - pbuf_free(state->rx); - state->rx = NULL; - } - - altcp_mbedtls_free(state->conf, state); - conn->state = NULL; - } - } -} - -const struct altcp_functions altcp_mbedtls_functions = { - altcp_mbedtls_set_poll, - altcp_mbedtls_recved, - altcp_default_bind, - altcp_mbedtls_connect, - altcp_mbedtls_listen, - altcp_mbedtls_abort, - altcp_mbedtls_close, - altcp_default_shutdown, - altcp_mbedtls_write, - altcp_default_output, - altcp_mbedtls_mss, - altcp_mbedtls_sndbuf, - altcp_default_sndqueuelen, - altcp_default_nagle_disable, - altcp_default_nagle_enable, - altcp_default_nagle_disabled, - altcp_default_setprio, - altcp_mbedtls_dealloc, - altcp_default_get_tcp_addrinfo, - altcp_default_get_ip, - altcp_default_get_port -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - , - altcp_default_dbg_get_tcp_state -#endif -}; - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS */ -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) + * + * This file provides a TLS layer using mbedTLS + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + * Watch out: + * - 'sent' is always called with len==0 to the upper layer. This is because keeping + * track of the ratio of application data and TLS overhead would be too much. + * + * Mandatory security-related configuration: + * - define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN to mbedtls_entropy_func to use the standard mbedTLS + * entropy and ensure to add at least one strong entropy source to your mbedtls port + * (implement mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll or mbedtls_hardware_poll providing strong + * entropy) + * - define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_PTR and ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_LEN to something providing + * GOOD custom entropy + * + * Missing things / @todo: + * - some unhandled/untested things migh be caught by LWIP_ASSERTs... + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" +#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" + +#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h" +#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h" + +/* @todo: which includes are really needed? */ +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/net.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" /* to call mbedtls_flush_output after ERR_MEM */ + +#include + +#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_PTR +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_PTR NULL +#endif +#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_LEN +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_LEN 0 +#endif + +/* Variable prototype, the actual declaration is at the end of this file + since it contains pointers to static functions declared here */ +extern const struct altcp_functions altcp_mbedtls_functions; + +/** Our global mbedTLS configuration (server-specific, not connection-specific) */ +struct altcp_tls_config { + mbedtls_ssl_config conf; + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; + mbedtls_pk_context *pkey; + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) && ALTCP_MBEDTLS_SESSION_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS + /** Inter-connection cache for fast connection startup */ + struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context cache; +#endif +}; + +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_setup(void *conf, struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn); +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv_process(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state); +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state); +static int altcp_mbedtls_bio_send(void *ctx, const unsigned char *dataptr, size_t size); + +/* callback functions from inner/lower connection: */ + +/** Accept callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) + * Allocate one of our structures, assign it to the new connection's 'state' and + * call the new connection's 'accepted' callback. If that succeeds, we wait + * to receive connection setup handshake bytes from the client. + */ +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_accept(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *accepted_conn, err_t err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *listen_conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (listen_conn && listen_conn->state && listen_conn->accept) { + err_t setup_err; + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *listen_state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)listen_conn->state; + /* create a new altcp_conn to pass to the next 'accept' callback */ + struct altcp_pcb *new_conn = altcp_alloc(); + + if (new_conn == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + setup_err = altcp_mbedtls_setup(listen_state->conf, new_conn, accepted_conn); + + if (setup_err != ERR_OK) { + altcp_free(new_conn); + return setup_err; + } + + return listen_conn->accept(listen_conn->arg, new_conn, err); + } + + return ERR_ARG; +} + +/** Connected callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP). + * Not really implemented/tested yet... + */ +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, err_t err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + + if (conn && conn->state) { + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); + + /* upper connected is called when handshake is done */ + if (err != ERR_OK) { + if (conn->connected) { + return conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, err); + } + } + + return altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv_process(conn, (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/* Call recved for possibly more than an u16_t */ +static void altcp_mbedtls_lower_recved(struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, int recvd_cnt) +{ + while (recvd_cnt > 0) { + u16_t recvd_part = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(recvd_cnt, 0xFFFF); + altcp_recved(inner_conn, recvd_part); + recvd_cnt -= recvd_part; + } +} + +/** Recv callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) + * This one mainly differs between connection setup/handshake (data is fed into mbedTLS only) + * and application phase (data is decoded by mbedTLS and passed on to the application). + */ +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("no err expected", err == ERR_OK); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + + if (!conn) { + /* no connection given as arg? should not happen, but prevent pbuf/conn leaks */ + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + altcp_close(inner_conn); + return ERR_CLSD; + } + + state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); + + if (!state) { + /* already closed */ + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + altcp_close(inner_conn); + return ERR_CLSD; + } + + /* handle NULL pbuf (inner connection closed) */ + if (p == NULL) { + /* remote host sent FIN, remember this (SSL state is destroyed + when both sides are closed only!) */ + if ((state->flags & (ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE | ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_UPPER_CALLED)) == + (ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE | ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_UPPER_CALLED)) { + /* need to notify upper layer (e.g. 'accept' called or 'connect' succeeded) */ + if ((state->rx != NULL) || (state->rx_app != NULL)) { + state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED; + /* this is a normal close (FIN) but we have unprocessed data, so delay the FIN */ + altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(conn, state); + return ERR_OK; + } + + state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED; + + if (conn->recv) { + return conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, NULL, ERR_OK); + } + } else { + /* before connection setup is done: call 'err' */ + if (conn->err) { + conn->err(conn->arg, ERR_CLSD); + } + + altcp_close(conn); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* If we come here, the connection is in good state (handshake phase or application data phase). + Queue up the pbuf for processing as handshake data or application data. */ + if (state->rx == NULL) { + state->rx = p; + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("rx pbuf overflow", (int)p->tot_len + (int)p->len <= 0xFFFF); + pbuf_cat(state->rx, p); + } + + return altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv_process(conn, state); +} + +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv_process(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state) +{ + if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + /* handle connection setup (handshake not done) */ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&state->ssl_context); + /* try to send data... */ + altcp_output(conn->inner_conn); + + if (state->bio_bytes_read) { + /* acknowledge all bytes read */ + altcp_mbedtls_lower_recved(conn->inner_conn, state->bio_bytes_read); + state->bio_bytes_read = 0; + } + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) { + /* handshake not done, wait for more recv calls */ + LWIP_ASSERT("in this state, the rx chain should be empty", state->rx == NULL); + return ERR_OK; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_handshake failed: %d\n", ret)); + + /* handshake failed, connection has to be closed */ + if (conn->err) { + conn->err(conn->arg, ERR_CLSD); + } + + if (altcp_close(conn) != ERR_OK) { + altcp_abort(conn); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* If we come here, handshake succeeded. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("state", state->bio_bytes_read == 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("state", state->bio_bytes_appl == 0); + state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE; + + /* issue "connect" callback" to upper connection (this can only happen for active open) */ + if (conn->connected) { + err_t err; + err = conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, ERR_OK); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + } + + if (state->rx == NULL) { + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* handle application data */ + return altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(conn, state); +} + +/* Pass queued decoded rx data to application */ +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_pass_rx_data(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state) +{ + err_t err; + struct pbuf *buf; + LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", conn != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); + buf = state->rx_app; + + if (buf) { + state->rx_app = NULL; + + if (conn->recv) { + u16_t tot_len = buf->tot_len; + /* this needs to be increased first because the 'recved' call may come nested */ + state->rx_passed_unrecved += tot_len; + state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_UPPER_CALLED; + err = conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, buf, ERR_OK); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + if (err == ERR_ABRT) { + return ERR_ABRT; + } + + /* not received, leave the pbuf(s) queued (and decrease 'unrecved' again) */ + LWIP_ASSERT("state == conn->state", state == conn->state); + state->rx_app = buf; + state->rx_passed_unrecved -= tot_len; + LWIP_ASSERT("state->rx_passed_unrecved >= 0", state->rx_passed_unrecved >= 0); + + if (state->rx_passed_unrecved < 0) { + state->rx_passed_unrecved = 0; + } + + return err; + } + } else { + pbuf_free(buf); + } + } else if ((state->flags & (ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED | ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED)) == + ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED) { + state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED; + + if (conn->recv) { + return conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, NULL, ERR_OK); + } + } + + /* application may have close the connection */ + if (conn->state != state) { + /* return error code to ensure altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata() exits the loop */ + return ERR_CLSD; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* Helper function that processes rx application data stored in rx pbuf chain */ +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state) +{ + int ret; + LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); + + if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + /* handshake not done yet */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + do { + /* allocate a full-sized unchained PBUF_POOL: this is for RX! */ + struct pbuf *buf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE, PBUF_POOL); + + if (buf == NULL) { + /* We're short on pbufs, try again later from 'poll' or 'recv' callbacks. + @todo: close on excessive allocation failures or leave this up to upper conn? */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* decrypt application data, this pulls encrypted RX data off state->rx pbuf chain */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(&state->ssl_context, (unsigned char *)buf->payload, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE); + + if (ret < 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT) { + /* client is initiating a new connection using the same source port -> close connection or make handshake */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("new connection on same source port\n")); + LWIP_ASSERT("TODO: new connection on same source port, close this connection", 0); + } else if ((ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE)) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("connection was closed gracefully\n")); + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("connection was reset by peer\n")); + } + + pbuf_free(buf); + return ERR_OK; + } else { + pbuf_free(buf); + return ERR_OK; + } + + pbuf_free(buf); + altcp_abort(conn); + return ERR_ABRT; + } else { + err_t err; + + if (ret) { + LWIP_ASSERT("bogus receive length", ret <= PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE); + /* trim pool pbuf to actually decoded length */ + pbuf_realloc(buf, (u16_t)ret); + + state->bio_bytes_appl += ret; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail(&state->ssl_context) == 0) { + /* Record is done, now we know the share between application and protocol bytes + and can adjust the RX window by the protocol bytes. + The rest is 'recved' by the application calling our 'recved' fn. */ + int overhead_bytes; + LWIP_ASSERT("bogus byte counts", state->bio_bytes_read > state->bio_bytes_appl); + overhead_bytes = state->bio_bytes_read - state->bio_bytes_appl; + altcp_mbedtls_lower_recved(conn->inner_conn, overhead_bytes); + state->bio_bytes_read = 0; + state->bio_bytes_appl = 0; + } + + if (state->rx_app == NULL) { + state->rx_app = buf; + } else { + pbuf_cat(state->rx_app, buf); + } + } else { + pbuf_free(buf); + buf = NULL; + } + + err = altcp_mbedtls_pass_rx_data(conn, state); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + if (err == ERR_ABRT) { + /* recv callback needs to return this as the pcb is deallocated */ + return ERR_ABRT; + } + + /* we hide all other errors as we retry feeding the pbuf to the app later */ + return ERR_OK; + } + } + } while (ret > 0); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Receive callback function called from mbedtls (set via mbedtls_ssl_set_bio) + * This function mainly copies data from pbufs and frees the pbufs after copying. + */ +static int altcp_mbedtls_bio_recv(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)ctx; + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; + struct pbuf *p; + u16_t ret; + u16_t copy_len; + err_t err; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + + if ((conn == NULL) || (conn->state == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } + + state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; + p = state->rx; + + /* @todo: return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET/MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED? */ + + if ((p == NULL) || ((p->len == 0) && (p->next == NULL))) { + if (p) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + state->rx = NULL; + + if ((state->flags & (ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED | ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED)) == + ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED) { + /* close queued but not passed up yet */ + return 0; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } + + /* limit number of bytes again to copy from first pbuf in a chain only */ + copy_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(len, p->len); + /* copy the data */ + ret = pbuf_copy_partial(p, buf, copy_len, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == copy_len", ret == copy_len); + /* hide the copied bytes from the pbuf */ + err = pbuf_remove_header(p, ret); + LWIP_ASSERT("error", err == ERR_OK); + + if (p->len == 0) { + /* the first pbuf has been fully read, free it */ + state->rx = p->next; + p->next = NULL; + pbuf_free(p); + } + + state->bio_bytes_read += (int)ret; + return ret; +} + +/** Sent callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) + * This only informs the upper layer to try to send more, not about + * the number of ACKed bytes. + */ +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, u16_t len) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + if (conn) { + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); + + if (!state || !(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + /* @todo: do something here? */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* try to send more if we failed before */ + mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(&state->ssl_context); + + /* call upper sent with len==0 if the application already sent data */ + if ((state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_APPLDATA_SENT) && conn->sent) { + return conn->sent(conn->arg, conn, 0); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Poll callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) + * Just pass this on to the application. + * @todo: retry sending? + */ +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_lower_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + + if (conn) { + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); + + /* check if there's unreceived rx data */ + if (conn->state) { + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; + /* try to send more if we failed before */ + mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(&state->ssl_context); + + if (altcp_mbedtls_handle_rx_appldata(conn, state) == ERR_ABRT) { + return ERR_ABRT; + } + } + + if (conn->poll) { + return conn->poll(conn->arg, conn); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void altcp_mbedtls_lower_err(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (conn) { + conn->inner_conn = NULL; /* already freed */ + + if (conn->err) { + conn->err(conn->arg, err); + } + + altcp_free(conn); + } +} + +/* setup functions */ + +static void altcp_mbedtls_remove_callbacks(struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) +{ + altcp_arg(inner_conn, NULL); + altcp_recv(inner_conn, NULL); + altcp_sent(inner_conn, NULL); + altcp_err(inner_conn, NULL); + altcp_poll(inner_conn, NULL, inner_conn->pollinterval); +} + +static void altcp_mbedtls_setup_callbacks(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) +{ + altcp_arg(inner_conn, conn); + altcp_recv(inner_conn, altcp_mbedtls_lower_recv); + altcp_sent(inner_conn, altcp_mbedtls_lower_sent); + altcp_err(inner_conn, altcp_mbedtls_lower_err); + /* tcp_poll is set when interval is set by application */ + /* listen is set totally different :-) */ +} + +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_setup(void *conf, struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) +{ + int ret; + struct altcp_tls_config *config = (struct altcp_tls_config *)conf; + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; + + if (!conf) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid inner_conn", conn != inner_conn); + + /* allocate mbedtls context */ + state = altcp_mbedtls_alloc(conf); + + if (state == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* initialize mbedtls context: */ + mbedtls_ssl_init(&state->ssl_context); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup(&state->ssl_context, &config->conf); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_setup failed\n")); + /* @todo: convert 'ret' to err_t */ + altcp_mbedtls_free(conf, state); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* tell mbedtls about our I/O functions */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(&state->ssl_context, conn, altcp_mbedtls_bio_send, altcp_mbedtls_bio_recv, NULL); + + altcp_mbedtls_setup_callbacks(conn, inner_conn); + conn->inner_conn = inner_conn; + conn->fns = &altcp_mbedtls_functions; + conn->state = state; + return ERR_OK; +} + +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_tls_wrap(struct altcp_tls_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *ret; + + if (inner_pcb == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + ret = altcp_alloc(); + + if (ret != NULL) { + if (altcp_mbedtls_setup(config, ret, inner_pcb) != ERR_OK) { + altcp_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +void *altcp_tls_context(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->state) { + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; + return &state->ssl_context; + } + + return NULL; +} + +#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG != LWIP_DBG_OFF +static void altcp_mbedtls_debug(void *ctx, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *str) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ctx); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(level); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(file); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(line); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(str); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str)); +} +#endif + +#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN +/** ATTENTION: It is *really* important to *NOT* use this dummy RNG in production code!!!! */ +static int dummy_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *buffer, size_t len) +{ + static size_t ctr; + size_t i; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ctx); + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + buffer[i] = (unsigned char)++ctr; + } + + return 0; +} +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN dummy_rng +#endif /* ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN */ + +/** Create new TLS configuration + * ATTENTION: Server certificate and private key have to be added outside this function! + */ +static struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config(int is_server, int have_cert, int have_pkey, int have_ca) +{ + size_t sz; + int ret; + struct altcp_tls_config *conf; + mbedtls_x509_crt *mem; + + if (TCP_WND < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("altcp_tls: TCP_WND is smaller than the RX decryption buffer, connection RX might stall!\n")); + } + + altcp_mbedtls_mem_init(); + + sz = sizeof(struct altcp_tls_config); + + if (have_cert) { + sz += sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt); + } + + if (have_ca) { + sz += sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt); + } + + if (have_pkey) { + sz += sizeof(mbedtls_pk_context); + } + + conf = (struct altcp_tls_config *)altcp_mbedtls_alloc_config(sz); + + if (conf == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + mem = (mbedtls_x509_crt *)(conf + 1); + + if (have_cert) { + conf->cert = mem; + mem++; + } + + if (have_ca) { + conf->ca = mem; + mem++; + } + + if (have_pkey) { + conf->pkey = (mbedtls_pk_context *)mem; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_config_init(&conf->conf); + mbedtls_entropy_init(&conf->entropy); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&conf->ctr_drbg); + + /* Seed the RNG */ + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&conf->ctr_drbg, ALTCP_MBEDTLS_RNG_FN, &conf->entropy, ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_PTR, ALTCP_MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_LEN); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed failed: %d\n", ret)); + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); + return NULL; + } + + /* Setup ssl context (@todo: what's different for a client here? -> might better be done on listen/connect) */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf->conf, is_server ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults failed: %d\n", ret)); + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&conf->conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf->conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &conf->ctr_drbg); +#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG != LWIP_DBG_OFF + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&conf->conf, altcp_mbedtls_debug, stdout); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) && ALTCP_MBEDTLS_SESSION_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(&conf->conf, &conf->cache, mbedtls_ssl_cache_get, mbedtls_ssl_cache_set); + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout(&conf->cache, 30); + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries(&conf->cache, 30); +#endif + + return conf; +} + +/** Create new TLS configuration + * This is a suboptimal version that gets the encrypted private key and its password, + * as well as the server certificate. + */ +struct altcp_tls_config * +altcp_tls_create_config_server_privkey_cert(const u8_t *privkey, size_t privkey_len, + const u8_t *privkey_pass, size_t privkey_pass_len, + const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_x509_crt *srvcert; + mbedtls_pk_context *pkey; + struct altcp_tls_config *conf = altcp_tls_create_config(1, 1, 1, 0); + + if (conf == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + srvcert = conf->cert; + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(srvcert); + + pkey = conf->pkey; + mbedtls_pk_init(pkey); + + /* Load the certificates and private key */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(srvcert, cert, cert_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_x509_crt_parse failed: %d\n", ret)); + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); + return NULL; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(pkey, (const unsigned char *)privkey, privkey_len, privkey_pass, privkey_pass_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key failed: %d\n", ret)); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(srvcert); + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&conf->conf, srvcert->next, NULL); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(&conf->conf, srvcert, pkey); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert failed: %d\n", ret)); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(srvcert); + mbedtls_pk_free(pkey); + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); + return NULL; + } + + return conf; +} + +static struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config_client_common(const u8_t *ca, size_t ca_len, int is_2wayauth) +{ + int ret; + struct altcp_tls_config *conf = altcp_tls_create_config(0, is_2wayauth, is_2wayauth, ca != NULL); + + if (conf == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + /* Initialize the CA certificate if provided + * CA certificate is optional (to save memory) but recommended for production environment + * Without CA certificate, connection will be prone to man-in-the-middle attacks */ + if (ca) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(conf->ca); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(conf->ca, ca, ca_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_x509_crt_parse ca failed: %d 0x%x", ret, -1 * ret)); + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&conf->conf, conf->ca, NULL); + } + + return conf; +} + +struct altcp_tls_config * +altcp_tls_create_config_client(const u8_t *ca, size_t ca_len) +{ + return altcp_tls_create_config_client_common(ca, ca_len, 0); +} + +struct altcp_tls_config * +altcp_tls_create_config_client_2wayauth(const u8_t *ca, size_t ca_len, const u8_t *privkey, size_t privkey_len, + const u8_t *privkey_pass, size_t privkey_pass_len, + const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len) +{ + int ret; + struct altcp_tls_config *conf; + + if (!cert || !privkey) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("altcp_tls_create_config_client_2wayauth: certificate and priv key required")); + return NULL; + } + + conf = altcp_tls_create_config_client_common(ca, ca_len, 1); + + if (conf == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + /* Initialize the client certificate and corresponding private key */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(conf->cert); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(conf->cert, cert, cert_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_x509_crt_parse cert failed: %d 0x%x", ret, -1 * ret)); + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf->cert); + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_pk_init(conf->pkey); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(conf->pkey, privkey, privkey_len, privkey_pass, privkey_pass_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_pk_parse_key failed: %d 0x%x", ret, -1 * ret)); + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); + return NULL; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(&conf->conf, conf->cert, conf->pkey); + + if (ret != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert failed: %d 0x%x", ret, -1 * ret)); + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); + return NULL; + } + + return conf; +} + +void altcp_tls_free_config(struct altcp_tls_config *conf) +{ + if (conf->pkey) { + mbedtls_pk_free(conf->pkey); + } + + if (conf->cert) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(conf->cert); + } + + if (conf->ca) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(conf->ca); + } + + altcp_mbedtls_free_config(conf); +} + +/* "virtual" functions */ +static void altcp_mbedtls_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval) +{ + if (conn != NULL) { + altcp_poll(conn->inner_conn, altcp_mbedtls_lower_poll, interval); + } +} + +static void altcp_mbedtls_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) +{ + u16_t lower_recved; + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return; + } + + state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; + + if (state == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + return; + } + + lower_recved = len; + + if (lower_recved > state->rx_passed_unrecved) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG, ("bogus recved count (len > state->rx_passed_unrecved / %d / %d)", + len, state->rx_passed_unrecved)); + lower_recved = (u16_t)state->rx_passed_unrecved; + } + + state->rx_passed_unrecved -= lower_recved; + + altcp_recved(conn->inner_conn, lower_recved); +} + +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected) +{ + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + conn->connected = connected; + return altcp_connect(conn->inner_conn, ipaddr, port, altcp_mbedtls_lower_connected); +} + +static struct altcp_pcb *altcp_mbedtls_listen(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *lpcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + lpcb = altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(conn->inner_conn, backlog, err); + + if (lpcb != NULL) { + conn->inner_conn = lpcb; + altcp_accept(lpcb, altcp_mbedtls_lower_accept); + return conn; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static void altcp_mbedtls_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn != NULL) { + altcp_abort(conn->inner_conn); + } +} + +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + inner_conn = conn->inner_conn; + + if (inner_conn) { + err_t err; + altcp_poll_fn oldpoll = inner_conn->poll; + altcp_mbedtls_remove_callbacks(conn->inner_conn); + err = altcp_close(conn->inner_conn); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* not closed, set up all callbacks again */ + altcp_mbedtls_setup_callbacks(conn, inner_conn); + /* poll callback is not included in the above */ + altcp_poll(inner_conn, oldpoll, inner_conn->pollinterval); + return err; + } + + conn->inner_conn = NULL; + } + + altcp_free(conn); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Allow caller of altcp_write() to limit to negotiated chunk size + * or remaining sndbuf space of inner_conn. + */ +static u16_t altcp_mbedtls_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn) { + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; + state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; + + if (!state || !(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + return 0; + } + + if (conn->inner_conn) { + u16_t sndbuf = altcp_sndbuf(conn->inner_conn); + /* Take care of record header, IV, AuthTag */ + int ssl_expan = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(&state->ssl_context); + + if (ssl_expan > 0) { + size_t ssl_added = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssl_expan, 0xFFFF); + + /* internal sndbuf smaller than our offset */ + if (ssl_added < sndbuf) { + size_t max_len = 0xFFFF; + size_t ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + /* @todo: adjust ssl_added to real value related to negociated cipher */ + size_t max_frag_len = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(&state->ssl_context); + max_len = LWIP_MIN(max_frag_len, max_len); +#endif + /* Adjust sndbuf of inner_conn with what added by SSL */ + ret = LWIP_MIN(sndbuf - ssl_added, max_len); + LWIP_ASSERT("sndbuf overflow", ret <= 0xFFFF); + return (u16_t)ret; + } + } + } + } + + /* fallback: use sendbuf of the inner connection */ + return altcp_default_sndbuf(conn); +} + +/** Write data to a TLS connection. Calls into mbedTLS, which in turn calls into + * @ref altcp_mbedtls_bio_send() to send the encrypted data + */ +static err_t altcp_mbedtls_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) +{ + int ret; + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(apiflags); + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; + + if (state == NULL) { + /* @todo: which error? */ + return ERR_CLSD; + } + + if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + /* @todo: which error? */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* HACK: if thre is something left to send, try to flush it and only + allow sending more if this succeeded (this is a hack because neither + returning 0 nor MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE worked for me) */ + if (state->ssl_context.out_left) { + mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(&state->ssl_context); + + if (state->ssl_context.out_left) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write(&state->ssl_context, (const unsigned char *)dataptr, len); + /* try to send data... */ + altcp_output(conn->inner_conn); + + if (ret >= 0) { + if (ret == len) { + state->flags |= ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_APPLDATA_SENT; + return ERR_OK; + } else { + /* @todo/@fixme: assumption: either everything sent or error */ + LWIP_ASSERT("ret <= 0", 0); + return ERR_MEM; + } + } else { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) { + /* @todo: convert error to err_t */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("unhandled error", 0); + return ERR_VAL; + } +} + +/** Send callback function called from mbedtls (set via mbedtls_ssl_set_bio) + * This function is either called during handshake or when sending application + * data via @ref altcp_mbedtls_write (or altcp_write) + */ +static int altcp_mbedtls_bio_send(void *ctx, const unsigned char *dataptr, size_t size) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)ctx; + int written = 0; + size_t size_left = size; + u8_t apiflags = TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY; + + LWIP_ASSERT("conn != NULL", conn != NULL); + + if ((conn == NULL) || (conn->inner_conn == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } + + while (size_left) { + u16_t write_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(size_left, 0xFFFF); + err_t err = altcp_write(conn->inner_conn, (const void *)dataptr, write_len, apiflags); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + written += write_len; + size_left -= write_len; + } else if (err == ERR_MEM) { + if (written) { + return written; + } + + return 0; /* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE; */ + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("tls_write, tcp_write: err != ERR MEM", 0); + /* @todo: return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET or MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED; + } + } + + return written; +} + +static u16_t altcp_mbedtls_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* @todo: LWIP_MIN(mss, mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len()) ? */ + return altcp_mss(conn->inner_conn); +} + +static void altcp_mbedtls_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + /* clean up and free tls state */ + if (conn) { + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)conn->state; + + if (state) { + mbedtls_ssl_free(&state->ssl_context); + state->flags = 0; + + if (state->rx) { + /* free leftover (unhandled) rx pbufs */ + pbuf_free(state->rx); + state->rx = NULL; + } + + altcp_mbedtls_free(state->conf, state); + conn->state = NULL; + } + } +} + +const struct altcp_functions altcp_mbedtls_functions = { + altcp_mbedtls_set_poll, + altcp_mbedtls_recved, + altcp_default_bind, + altcp_mbedtls_connect, + altcp_mbedtls_listen, + altcp_mbedtls_abort, + altcp_mbedtls_close, + altcp_default_shutdown, + altcp_mbedtls_write, + altcp_default_output, + altcp_mbedtls_mss, + altcp_mbedtls_sndbuf, + altcp_default_sndqueuelen, + altcp_default_nagle_disable, + altcp_default_nagle_enable, + altcp_default_nagle_disabled, + altcp_default_setprio, + altcp_mbedtls_dealloc, + altcp_default_get_tcp_addrinfo, + altcp_default_get_ip, + altcp_default_get_port +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + , + altcp_default_dbg_get_tcp_state +#endif +}; + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS */ +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c index e97bc8a8..9d230fb3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.c @@ -1,219 +1,219 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) - * - * This file contains memory management functions for a TLS layer using mbedTLS. - * - * ATTENTION: For production usage, you might want to override this file with - * your own implementation since this implementation simply uses the - * lwIP heap without caring for fragmentation or leaving heap for - * other parts of lwIP! - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - * Missing things / @todo: - * - RX data is acknowledged after receiving (tcp_recved is called when enqueueing - * the pbuf for mbedTLS receive, not when processed by mbedTLS or the inner - * connection; altcp_recved() from inner connection does nothing) - * - TX data is marked as 'sent' (i.e. acknowledged; sent callback is called) right - * after enqueueing for transmission, not when actually ACKed be the remote host. - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS - -#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h" -#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#include - -#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_DEBUG -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && \ - (!defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO)) -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC 1 -#else -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC 0 -#endif - -#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC - -#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS 0 -#endif - -/* This is an example/debug implementation of alloc/free functions only */ -typedef struct altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_s { - size_t c; - size_t len; -} altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t; - -#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS -typedef struct altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats_s { - size_t allocedBytes; - size_t allocCnt; - size_t maxBytes; - size_t totalBytes; -} altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats_t; -altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats_t altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats; -volatile int altcp_mbedtls_malloc_clear_stats; -#endif - -static void *tls_malloc(size_t c, size_t len) -{ - altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t *hlpr; - void *ret; - size_t alloc_size; -#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS - - if (altcp_mbedtls_malloc_clear_stats) { - altcp_mbedtls_malloc_clear_stats = 0; - memset(&altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats, 0, sizeof(altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats)); - } - -#endif - alloc_size = sizeof(altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t) + (c * len); - - /* check for maximum allocation size, mainly to prevent mem_size_t overflow */ - if (alloc_size > MEM_SIZE) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_DEBUG, ("mbedtls allocation too big: %c * %d bytes vs MEM_SIZE=%d", - (int)c, (int)len, (int)MEM_SIZE)); - return NULL; - } - - hlpr = (altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t *)mem_malloc((mem_size_t)alloc_size); - - if (hlpr == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_DEBUG, ("mbedtls alloc callback failed for %c * %d bytes", (int)c, (int)len)); - return NULL; - } - -#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS - altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocCnt++; - altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocedBytes += c * len; - - if (altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocedBytes > altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.maxBytes) { - altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.maxBytes = altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocedBytes; - } - - altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.totalBytes += c * len; -#endif - hlpr->c = c; - hlpr->len = len; - ret = hlpr + 1; - /* zeroing the allocated chunk is required by mbedTLS! */ - memset(ret, 0, c * len); - return ret; -} - -static void tls_free(void *ptr) -{ - altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t *hlpr; - - if (ptr == NULL) { - /* this obviously happened in mbedtls... */ - return; - } - - hlpr = ((altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t *)ptr) - 1; -#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS - - if (!altcp_mbedtls_malloc_clear_stats) { - altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocedBytes -= hlpr->c * hlpr->len; - } - -#endif - mem_free(hlpr); -} -#endif /* ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC*/ - -void altcp_mbedtls_mem_init(void) -{ - /* not much to do here when using the heap */ - -#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC - /* set mbedtls allocation methods */ - mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(&tls_malloc, &tls_free); -#endif -} - -altcp_mbedtls_state_t *altcp_mbedtls_alloc(void *conf) -{ - altcp_mbedtls_state_t *ret = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(altcp_mbedtls_state_t)); - - if (ret != NULL) { - ret->conf = conf; - } - - return ret; -} - -void altcp_mbedtls_free(void *conf, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conf); - LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); - mem_free(state); -} - -void *altcp_mbedtls_alloc_config(size_t size) -{ - void *ret; - size_t checked_size = (mem_size_t)size; - - if (size != checked_size) { - /* allocation too big (mem_size_t overflow) */ - return NULL; - } - - ret = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)mem_calloc(1, (mem_size_t)size); - return ret; -} - -void altcp_mbedtls_free_config(void *item) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("item != NULL", item != NULL); - mem_free(item); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS */ -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) + * + * This file contains memory management functions for a TLS layer using mbedTLS. + * + * ATTENTION: For production usage, you might want to override this file with + * your own implementation since this implementation simply uses the + * lwIP heap without caring for fragmentation or leaving heap for + * other parts of lwIP! + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + * Missing things / @todo: + * - RX data is acknowledged after receiving (tcp_recved is called when enqueueing + * the pbuf for mbedTLS receive, not when processed by mbedTLS or the inner + * connection; altcp_recved() from inner connection does nothing) + * - TX data is marked as 'sent' (i.e. acknowledged; sent callback is called) right + * after enqueueing for transmission, not when actually ACKed be the remote host. + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS + +#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h" +#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include + +#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_DEBUG +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO)) +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC 1 +#else +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC 0 +#endif + +#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC + +#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS 0 +#endif + +/* This is an example/debug implementation of alloc/free functions only */ +typedef struct altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_s { + size_t c; + size_t len; +} altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t; + +#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS +typedef struct altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats_s { + size_t allocedBytes; + size_t allocCnt; + size_t maxBytes; + size_t totalBytes; +} altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats_t; +altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats_t altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats; +volatile int altcp_mbedtls_malloc_clear_stats; +#endif + +static void *tls_malloc(size_t c, size_t len) +{ + altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t *hlpr; + void *ret; + size_t alloc_size; +#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS + + if (altcp_mbedtls_malloc_clear_stats) { + altcp_mbedtls_malloc_clear_stats = 0; + memset(&altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats, 0, sizeof(altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats)); + } + +#endif + alloc_size = sizeof(altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t) + (c * len); + + /* check for maximum allocation size, mainly to prevent mem_size_t overflow */ + if (alloc_size > MEM_SIZE) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_DEBUG, ("mbedtls allocation too big: %c * %d bytes vs MEM_SIZE=%d", + (int)c, (int)len, (int)MEM_SIZE)); + return NULL; + } + + hlpr = (altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t *)mem_malloc((mem_size_t)alloc_size); + + if (hlpr == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_DEBUG, ("mbedtls alloc callback failed for %c * %d bytes", (int)c, (int)len)); + return NULL; + } + +#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS + altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocCnt++; + altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocedBytes += c * len; + + if (altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocedBytes > altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.maxBytes) { + altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.maxBytes = altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocedBytes; + } + + altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.totalBytes += c * len; +#endif + hlpr->c = c; + hlpr->len = len; + ret = hlpr + 1; + /* zeroing the allocated chunk is required by mbedTLS! */ + memset(ret, 0, c * len); + return ret; +} + +static void tls_free(void *ptr) +{ + altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t *hlpr; + + if (ptr == NULL) { + /* this obviously happened in mbedtls... */ + return; + } + + hlpr = ((altcp_mbedtls_malloc_helper_t *)ptr) - 1; +#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC_STATS + + if (!altcp_mbedtls_malloc_clear_stats) { + altcp_mbedtls_malloc_stats.allocedBytes -= hlpr->c * hlpr->len; + } + +#endif + mem_free(hlpr); +} +#endif /* ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC*/ + +void altcp_mbedtls_mem_init(void) +{ + /* not much to do here when using the heap */ + +#if ALTCP_MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ALLOC + /* set mbedtls allocation methods */ + mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(&tls_malloc, &tls_free); +#endif +} + +altcp_mbedtls_state_t *altcp_mbedtls_alloc(void *conf) +{ + altcp_mbedtls_state_t *ret = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(altcp_mbedtls_state_t)); + + if (ret != NULL) { + ret->conf = conf; + } + + return ret; +} + +void altcp_mbedtls_free(void *conf, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conf); + LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); + mem_free(state); +} + +void *altcp_mbedtls_alloc_config(size_t size) +{ + void *ret; + size_t checked_size = (mem_size_t)size; + + if (size != checked_size) { + /* allocation too big (mem_size_t overflow) */ + return NULL; + } + + ret = (altcp_mbedtls_state_t *)mem_calloc(1, (mem_size_t)size); + return ret; +} + +void altcp_mbedtls_free_config(void *item) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("item != NULL", item != NULL); + mem_free(item); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS */ +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h index 8458193a..b391bf87 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_mem.h @@ -1,72 +1,72 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) - * - * This file contains memory management function prototypes for a TLS layer using mbedTLS. - * - * Memory management contains: - * - allocating/freeing altcp_mbedtls_state_t - * - allocating/freeing memory used in the mbedTLS library - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS - -#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -void altcp_mbedtls_mem_init(void); -altcp_mbedtls_state_t *altcp_mbedtls_alloc(void *conf); -void altcp_mbedtls_free(void *conf, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state); -void *altcp_mbedtls_alloc_config(size_t size); -void altcp_mbedtls_free_config(void *item); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS */ -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_H */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) + * + * This file contains memory management function prototypes for a TLS layer using mbedTLS. + * + * Memory management contains: + * - allocating/freeing altcp_mbedtls_state_t + * - allocating/freeing memory used in the mbedTLS library + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS + +#include "altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +void altcp_mbedtls_mem_init(void); +altcp_mbedtls_state_t *altcp_mbedtls_alloc(void *conf); +void altcp_mbedtls_free(void *conf, altcp_mbedtls_state_t *state); +void *altcp_mbedtls_alloc_config(size_t size); +void altcp_mbedtls_free_config(void *item); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS */ +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_MEM_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h index 4b6bb56c..04cc8ce7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/altcp_tls/altcp_tls_mbedtls_structs.h @@ -1,83 +1,83 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) - * - * This file contains structure definitions for a TLS layer using mbedTLS. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_STRUCTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_STRUCTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" - -#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x01 -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_UPPER_CALLED 0x02 -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED 0x04 -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED 0x08 -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_APPLDATA_SENT 0x10 - -typedef struct altcp_mbedtls_state_s { - void *conf; - mbedtls_ssl_context ssl_context; - /* chain of rx pbufs (before decryption) */ - struct pbuf *rx; - struct pbuf *rx_app; - u8_t flags; - int rx_passed_unrecved; - int bio_bytes_read; - int bio_bytes_appl; -} altcp_mbedtls_state_t; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS */ -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_STRUCTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) + * + * This file contains structure definitions for a TLS layer using mbedTLS. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_STRUCTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_STRUCTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x01 +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_UPPER_CALLED 0x02 +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSE_QUEUED 0x04 +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_RX_CLOSED 0x08 +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_FLAGS_APPLDATA_SENT 0x10 + +typedef struct altcp_mbedtls_state_s { + void *conf; + mbedtls_ssl_context ssl_context; + /* chain of rx pbufs (before decryption) */ + struct pbuf *rx; + struct pbuf *rx_app; + u8_t flags; + int rx_passed_unrecved; + int bio_bytes_read; + int bio_bytes_appl; +} altcp_mbedtls_state_t; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS */ +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_MBEDTLS_STRUCTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c index b0816c3e..0ac1d7de 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/altcp_proxyconnect.c @@ -1,628 +1,628 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP connection API that executes a proxy-connect. - * - * This file provides a starting layer that executes a proxy-connect e.g. to - * set up TLS connections through a http proxy. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/altcp_proxyconnect.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" - -#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" - -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/init.h" - -#include - -/** This string is passed in the HTTP header as "User-Agent: " */ -#ifndef ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_CLIENT_AGENT -#define ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_CLIENT_AGENT "lwIP/" LWIP_VERSION_STRING " (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip)" -#endif - -#define ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_CONNECT_STARTED 0x01 -#define ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x02 - -typedef struct altcp_proxyconnect_state_s { - ip_addr_t outer_addr; - u16_t outer_port; - struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *conf; - u8_t flags; -} altcp_proxyconnect_state_t; - -/* Variable prototype, the actual declaration is at the end of this file - since it contains pointers to static functions declared here */ -extern const struct altcp_functions altcp_proxyconnect_functions; - -/* memory management functions: */ - -static altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *altcp_proxyconnect_state_alloc(void) -{ - altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *ret = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(altcp_proxyconnect_state_t)); - return ret; -} - -static void altcp_proxyconnect_state_free(altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); - mem_free(state); -} - -/* helper functions */ - -#define PROXY_CONNECT "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* HOST, PORT */ \ - "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ - "Proxy-Connection: keep-alive\r\n" \ - "Connection: keep-alive\r\n" \ - "\r\n" -#define PROXY_CONNECT_FORMAT(host, port) PROXY_CONNECT, host, port, ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_CLIENT_AGENT - -/* Format the http proxy connect request via snprintf */ -static int altcp_proxyconnect_format_request(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, const char *host, int port) -{ - return snprintf(buffer, bufsize, PROXY_CONNECT_FORMAT(host, port)); -} - -/* Create and send the http proxy connect request */ -static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_send_request(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - int len, len2; - mem_size_t alloc_len; - char *buffer, *host; - altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; - - if (!state) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* Use printf with zero length to get the required allocation size */ - len = altcp_proxyconnect_format_request(NULL, 0, "", state->outer_port); - - if (len < 0) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* add allocation size for IP address strings */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - len += 40; /* worst-case IPv6 address length */ -#else - len += 16; /* worst-case IPv4 address length */ -#endif - alloc_len = (mem_size_t)len; - - if ((len < 0) || (int)alloc_len != len) { - /* overflow */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Allocate a bufer for the request string */ - buffer = (char *)mem_malloc(alloc_len); - - if (buffer == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - host = ipaddr_ntoa(&state->outer_addr); - len2 = altcp_proxyconnect_format_request(buffer, alloc_len, host, state->outer_port); - - if ((len2 > 0) && (len2 <= len) && (len2 <= 0xFFFF)) { - err_t err = altcp_write(conn->inner_conn, buffer, (u16_t)len2, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* @todo: abort? */ - mem_free(buffer); - return err; - } - } - - mem_free(buffer); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* callback functions from inner/lower connection: */ - -/** Connected callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP). - * Not really implemented/tested yet... - */ -static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_lower_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, err_t err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (conn && conn->state) { - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - - /* upper connected is called when handshake is done */ - if (err != ERR_OK) { - if (conn->connected) { - if (conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, err) == ERR_ABRT) { - return ERR_ABRT; - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* send proxy connect request here */ - return altcp_proxyconnect_send_request(conn); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** Recv callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) - * This one mainly differs between connection setup (wait for proxy OK string) - * and application phase (data is passed on to the application). - */ -static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_lower_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("no err expected", err == ERR_OK); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - - if (!conn) { - /* no connection given as arg? should not happen, but prevent pbuf/conn leaks */ - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - altcp_close(inner_conn); - return ERR_CLSD; - } - - state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); - - if (!state) { - /* already closed */ - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - altcp_close(inner_conn); - return ERR_CLSD; - } - - if (state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE) { - /* application phase, just pass this through */ - if (conn->recv) { - return conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, p, err); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } else { - /* setup phase */ - /* handle NULL pbuf (inner connection closed) */ - if (p == NULL) { - if (altcp_close(conn) != ERR_OK) { - altcp_abort(conn); - return ERR_ABRT; - } - - return ERR_OK; - } else { - /* @todo: parse setup phase rx data - for now, we just wait for the end of the header... */ - u16_t idx = pbuf_memfind(p, "\r\n\r\n", 4, 0); - altcp_recved(inner_conn, p->tot_len); - pbuf_free(p); - - if (idx != 0xFFFF) { - state->flags |= ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE; - - if (conn->connected) { - return conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, ERR_OK); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - } -} - -/** Sent callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) - * This only informs the upper layer to try to send more, not about - * the number of ACKed bytes. - */ -static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_lower_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, u16_t len) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - if (conn) { - altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - - if (!state || !(state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { - /* @todo: do something here? */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* pass this on to upper sent */ - if (conn->sent) { - return conn->sent(conn->arg, conn, len); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Poll callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) - * Just pass this on to the application. - * @todo: retry sending? - */ -static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_lower_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (conn) { - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - - if (conn->poll) { - return conn->poll(conn->arg, conn); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void altcp_proxyconnect_lower_err(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (conn) { - conn->inner_conn = NULL; /* already freed */ - - if (conn->err) { - conn->err(conn->arg, err); - } - - altcp_free(conn); - } -} - -/* setup functions */ - -static void altcp_proxyconnect_setup_callbacks(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) -{ - altcp_arg(inner_conn, conn); - altcp_recv(inner_conn, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_recv); - altcp_sent(inner_conn, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_sent); - altcp_err(inner_conn, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_err); - /* tcp_poll is set when interval is set by application */ - /* listen is set totally different :-) */ -} - -static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_setup(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) -{ - altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; - - if (!config) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid inner_conn", conn != inner_conn); - - /* allocate proxyconnect context */ - state = altcp_proxyconnect_state_alloc(); - - if (state == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - state->flags = 0; - state->conf = config; - altcp_proxyconnect_setup_callbacks(conn, inner_conn); - conn->inner_conn = inner_conn; - conn->fns = &altcp_proxyconnect_functions; - conn->state = state; - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Allocate a new altcp layer connecting through a proxy. - * This function gets the inner pcb passed. - * - * @param config struct altcp_proxyconnect_config that contains the proxy settings - * @param inner_pcb pcb that makes the connection to the proxy (i.e. tcp pcb) - */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_proxyconnect_new(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *ret; - - if (inner_pcb == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - ret = altcp_alloc(); - - if (ret != NULL) { - if (altcp_proxyconnect_setup(config, ret, inner_pcb) != ERR_OK) { - altcp_free(ret); - return NULL; - } - } - - return ret; -} - -/** Allocate a new altcp layer connecting through a proxy. - * This function allocates the inner pcb as tcp pcb, resulting in a direct tcp - * connection to the proxy. - * - * @param config struct altcp_proxyconnect_config that contains the proxy settings - * @param ip_type IP type of the connection (@ref lwip_ip_addr_type) - */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_proxyconnect_new_tcp(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, u8_t ip_type) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb, *ret; - - /* inner pcb is tcp */ - inner_pcb = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); - - if (inner_pcb == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - ret = altcp_proxyconnect_new(config, inner_pcb); - - if (ret == NULL) { - altcp_close(inner_pcb); - } - - return ret; -} - -/** Allocator function to allocate a proxy connect altcp pcb connecting directly - * via tcp to the proxy. - * - * The returned pcb is a chain: altcp_proxyconnect - altcp_tcp - tcp pcb - * - * This function is meant for use with @ref altcp_new. - * - * @param arg struct altcp_proxyconnect_config that contains the proxy settings - * @param ip_type IP type of the connection (@ref lwip_ip_addr_type) - */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_proxyconnect_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type) -{ - return altcp_proxyconnect_new_tcp((struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *)arg, ip_type); -} - -#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS - -/** Allocator function to allocate a TLS connection through a proxy. - * - * The returned pcb is a chain: altcp_tls - altcp_proxyconnect - altcp_tcp - tcp pcb - * - * This function is meant for use with @ref altcp_new. - * - * @param arg struct altcp_proxyconnect_tls_config that contains the proxy settings - * and tls settings - * @param ip_type IP type of the connection (@ref lwip_ip_addr_type) - */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_proxyconnect_tls_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type) -{ - struct altcp_proxyconnect_tls_config *cfg = (struct altcp_proxyconnect_tls_config *)arg; - struct altcp_pcb *proxy_pcb; - struct altcp_pcb *tls_pcb; - - proxy_pcb = altcp_proxyconnect_new_tcp(&cfg->proxy, ip_type); - tls_pcb = altcp_tls_wrap(cfg->tls_config, proxy_pcb); - - if (tls_pcb == NULL) { - altcp_close(proxy_pcb); - } - - return tls_pcb; -} -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ - -/* "virtual" functions */ -static void altcp_proxyconnect_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval) -{ - if (conn != NULL) { - altcp_poll(conn->inner_conn, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_poll, interval); - } -} - -static void altcp_proxyconnect_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) -{ - altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return; - } - - state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; - - if (state == NULL) { - return; - } - - if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { - return; - } - - altcp_recved(conn->inner_conn, len); -} - -static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected) -{ - altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; - - if ((conn == NULL) || (ipaddr == NULL)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; - - if (state == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_CONNECT_STARTED) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - state->flags |= ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_CONNECT_STARTED; - - conn->connected = connected; - /* connect to our proxy instead, but store the requested address and port */ - ip_addr_copy(state->outer_addr, *ipaddr); - state->outer_port = port; - - return altcp_connect(conn->inner_conn, &state->conf->proxy_addr, state->conf->proxy_port, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_connected); -} - -static struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_listen(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(backlog); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - /* listen not supported! */ - return NULL; -} - -static void altcp_proxyconnect_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn != NULL) { - if (conn->inner_conn != NULL) { - altcp_abort(conn->inner_conn); - } - - altcp_free(conn); - } -} - -static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (conn->inner_conn != NULL) { - err_t err = altcp_close(conn->inner_conn); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* closing inner conn failed, return the error */ - return err; - } - } - - /* no inner conn or closing it succeeded, deallocate myself */ - altcp_free(conn); - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) -{ - altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(apiflags); - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; - - if (state == NULL) { - /* @todo: which error? */ - return ERR_CLSD; - } - - if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { - /* @todo: which error? */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - return altcp_write(conn->inner_conn, dataptr, len, apiflags); -} - -static void altcp_proxyconnect_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - /* clean up and free tls state */ - if (conn) { - altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; - - if (state) { - altcp_proxyconnect_state_free(state); - conn->state = NULL; - } - } -} -const struct altcp_functions altcp_proxyconnect_functions = { - altcp_proxyconnect_set_poll, - altcp_proxyconnect_recved, - altcp_default_bind, - altcp_proxyconnect_connect, - altcp_proxyconnect_listen, - altcp_proxyconnect_abort, - altcp_proxyconnect_close, - altcp_default_shutdown, - altcp_proxyconnect_write, - altcp_default_output, - altcp_default_mss, - altcp_default_sndbuf, - altcp_default_sndqueuelen, - altcp_default_nagle_disable, - altcp_default_nagle_enable, - altcp_default_nagle_disabled, - altcp_default_setprio, - altcp_proxyconnect_dealloc, - altcp_default_get_tcp_addrinfo, - altcp_default_get_ip, - altcp_default_get_port -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - , - altcp_default_dbg_get_tcp_state -#endif -}; - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP connection API that executes a proxy-connect. + * + * This file provides a starting layer that executes a proxy-connect e.g. to + * set up TLS connections through a http proxy. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/altcp_proxyconnect.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" + +#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" + +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/init.h" + +#include + +/** This string is passed in the HTTP header as "User-Agent: " */ +#ifndef ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_CLIENT_AGENT +#define ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_CLIENT_AGENT "lwIP/" LWIP_VERSION_STRING " (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip)" +#endif + +#define ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_CONNECT_STARTED 0x01 +#define ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x02 + +typedef struct altcp_proxyconnect_state_s { + ip_addr_t outer_addr; + u16_t outer_port; + struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *conf; + u8_t flags; +} altcp_proxyconnect_state_t; + +/* Variable prototype, the actual declaration is at the end of this file + since it contains pointers to static functions declared here */ +extern const struct altcp_functions altcp_proxyconnect_functions; + +/* memory management functions: */ + +static altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *altcp_proxyconnect_state_alloc(void) +{ + altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *ret = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(altcp_proxyconnect_state_t)); + return ret; +} + +static void altcp_proxyconnect_state_free(altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); + mem_free(state); +} + +/* helper functions */ + +#define PROXY_CONNECT "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* HOST, PORT */ \ + "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ + "Proxy-Connection: keep-alive\r\n" \ + "Connection: keep-alive\r\n" \ + "\r\n" +#define PROXY_CONNECT_FORMAT(host, port) PROXY_CONNECT, host, port, ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_CLIENT_AGENT + +/* Format the http proxy connect request via snprintf */ +static int altcp_proxyconnect_format_request(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, const char *host, int port) +{ + return snprintf(buffer, bufsize, PROXY_CONNECT_FORMAT(host, port)); +} + +/* Create and send the http proxy connect request */ +static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_send_request(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + int len, len2; + mem_size_t alloc_len; + char *buffer, *host; + altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; + + if (!state) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* Use printf with zero length to get the required allocation size */ + len = altcp_proxyconnect_format_request(NULL, 0, "", state->outer_port); + + if (len < 0) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* add allocation size for IP address strings */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + len += 40; /* worst-case IPv6 address length */ +#else + len += 16; /* worst-case IPv4 address length */ +#endif + alloc_len = (mem_size_t)len; + + if ((len < 0) || (int)alloc_len != len) { + /* overflow */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Allocate a bufer for the request string */ + buffer = (char *)mem_malloc(alloc_len); + + if (buffer == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + host = ipaddr_ntoa(&state->outer_addr); + len2 = altcp_proxyconnect_format_request(buffer, alloc_len, host, state->outer_port); + + if ((len2 > 0) && (len2 <= len) && (len2 <= 0xFFFF)) { + err_t err = altcp_write(conn->inner_conn, buffer, (u16_t)len2, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* @todo: abort? */ + mem_free(buffer); + return err; + } + } + + mem_free(buffer); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* callback functions from inner/lower connection: */ + +/** Connected callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP). + * Not really implemented/tested yet... + */ +static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_lower_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, err_t err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (conn && conn->state) { + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + + /* upper connected is called when handshake is done */ + if (err != ERR_OK) { + if (conn->connected) { + if (conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, err) == ERR_ABRT) { + return ERR_ABRT; + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* send proxy connect request here */ + return altcp_proxyconnect_send_request(conn); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** Recv callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) + * This one mainly differs between connection setup (wait for proxy OK string) + * and application phase (data is passed on to the application). + */ +static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_lower_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("no err expected", err == ERR_OK); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + + if (!conn) { + /* no connection given as arg? should not happen, but prevent pbuf/conn leaks */ + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + altcp_close(inner_conn); + return ERR_CLSD; + } + + state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); + + if (!state) { + /* already closed */ + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + altcp_close(inner_conn); + return ERR_CLSD; + } + + if (state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE) { + /* application phase, just pass this through */ + if (conn->recv) { + return conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, p, err); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } else { + /* setup phase */ + /* handle NULL pbuf (inner connection closed) */ + if (p == NULL) { + if (altcp_close(conn) != ERR_OK) { + altcp_abort(conn); + return ERR_ABRT; + } + + return ERR_OK; + } else { + /* @todo: parse setup phase rx data + for now, we just wait for the end of the header... */ + u16_t idx = pbuf_memfind(p, "\r\n\r\n", 4, 0); + altcp_recved(inner_conn, p->tot_len); + pbuf_free(p); + + if (idx != 0xFFFF) { + state->flags |= ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE; + + if (conn->connected) { + return conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, ERR_OK); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + } +} + +/** Sent callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) + * This only informs the upper layer to try to send more, not about + * the number of ACKed bytes. + */ +static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_lower_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, u16_t len) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + if (conn) { + altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + + if (!state || !(state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + /* @todo: do something here? */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* pass this on to upper sent */ + if (conn->sent) { + return conn->sent(conn->arg, conn, len); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Poll callback from lower connection (i.e. TCP) + * Just pass this on to the application. + * @todo: retry sending? + */ +static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_lower_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (conn) { + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->inner_conn == inner_conn); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inner_conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + + if (conn->poll) { + return conn->poll(conn->arg, conn); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void altcp_proxyconnect_lower_err(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (conn) { + conn->inner_conn = NULL; /* already freed */ + + if (conn->err) { + conn->err(conn->arg, err); + } + + altcp_free(conn); + } +} + +/* setup functions */ + +static void altcp_proxyconnect_setup_callbacks(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) +{ + altcp_arg(inner_conn, conn); + altcp_recv(inner_conn, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_recv); + altcp_sent(inner_conn, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_sent); + altcp_err(inner_conn, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_err); + /* tcp_poll is set when interval is set by application */ + /* listen is set totally different :-) */ +} + +static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_setup(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn) +{ + altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; + + if (!config) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid inner_conn", conn != inner_conn); + + /* allocate proxyconnect context */ + state = altcp_proxyconnect_state_alloc(); + + if (state == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + state->flags = 0; + state->conf = config; + altcp_proxyconnect_setup_callbacks(conn, inner_conn); + conn->inner_conn = inner_conn; + conn->fns = &altcp_proxyconnect_functions; + conn->state = state; + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Allocate a new altcp layer connecting through a proxy. + * This function gets the inner pcb passed. + * + * @param config struct altcp_proxyconnect_config that contains the proxy settings + * @param inner_pcb pcb that makes the connection to the proxy (i.e. tcp pcb) + */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_proxyconnect_new(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *ret; + + if (inner_pcb == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + ret = altcp_alloc(); + + if (ret != NULL) { + if (altcp_proxyconnect_setup(config, ret, inner_pcb) != ERR_OK) { + altcp_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +/** Allocate a new altcp layer connecting through a proxy. + * This function allocates the inner pcb as tcp pcb, resulting in a direct tcp + * connection to the proxy. + * + * @param config struct altcp_proxyconnect_config that contains the proxy settings + * @param ip_type IP type of the connection (@ref lwip_ip_addr_type) + */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_proxyconnect_new_tcp(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, u8_t ip_type) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb, *ret; + + /* inner pcb is tcp */ + inner_pcb = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); + + if (inner_pcb == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + ret = altcp_proxyconnect_new(config, inner_pcb); + + if (ret == NULL) { + altcp_close(inner_pcb); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** Allocator function to allocate a proxy connect altcp pcb connecting directly + * via tcp to the proxy. + * + * The returned pcb is a chain: altcp_proxyconnect - altcp_tcp - tcp pcb + * + * This function is meant for use with @ref altcp_new. + * + * @param arg struct altcp_proxyconnect_config that contains the proxy settings + * @param ip_type IP type of the connection (@ref lwip_ip_addr_type) + */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_proxyconnect_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type) +{ + return altcp_proxyconnect_new_tcp((struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *)arg, ip_type); +} + +#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS + +/** Allocator function to allocate a TLS connection through a proxy. + * + * The returned pcb is a chain: altcp_tls - altcp_proxyconnect - altcp_tcp - tcp pcb + * + * This function is meant for use with @ref altcp_new. + * + * @param arg struct altcp_proxyconnect_tls_config that contains the proxy settings + * and tls settings + * @param ip_type IP type of the connection (@ref lwip_ip_addr_type) + */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_proxyconnect_tls_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type) +{ + struct altcp_proxyconnect_tls_config *cfg = (struct altcp_proxyconnect_tls_config *)arg; + struct altcp_pcb *proxy_pcb; + struct altcp_pcb *tls_pcb; + + proxy_pcb = altcp_proxyconnect_new_tcp(&cfg->proxy, ip_type); + tls_pcb = altcp_tls_wrap(cfg->tls_config, proxy_pcb); + + if (tls_pcb == NULL) { + altcp_close(proxy_pcb); + } + + return tls_pcb; +} +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ + +/* "virtual" functions */ +static void altcp_proxyconnect_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval) +{ + if (conn != NULL) { + altcp_poll(conn->inner_conn, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_poll, interval); + } +} + +static void altcp_proxyconnect_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) +{ + altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return; + } + + state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; + + if (state == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + return; + } + + altcp_recved(conn->inner_conn, len); +} + +static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected) +{ + altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; + + if ((conn == NULL) || (ipaddr == NULL)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; + + if (state == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_CONNECT_STARTED) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + state->flags |= ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_CONNECT_STARTED; + + conn->connected = connected; + /* connect to our proxy instead, but store the requested address and port */ + ip_addr_copy(state->outer_addr, *ipaddr); + state->outer_port = port; + + return altcp_connect(conn->inner_conn, &state->conf->proxy_addr, state->conf->proxy_port, altcp_proxyconnect_lower_connected); +} + +static struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_listen(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(backlog); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + /* listen not supported! */ + return NULL; +} + +static void altcp_proxyconnect_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn != NULL) { + if (conn->inner_conn != NULL) { + altcp_abort(conn->inner_conn); + } + + altcp_free(conn); + } +} + +static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (conn->inner_conn != NULL) { + err_t err = altcp_close(conn->inner_conn); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* closing inner conn failed, return the error */ + return err; + } + } + + /* no inner conn or closing it succeeded, deallocate myself */ + altcp_free(conn); + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t altcp_proxyconnect_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) +{ + altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(apiflags); + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; + + if (state == NULL) { + /* @todo: which error? */ + return ERR_CLSD; + } + + if (!(state->flags & ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + /* @todo: which error? */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + return altcp_write(conn->inner_conn, dataptr, len, apiflags); +} + +static void altcp_proxyconnect_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + /* clean up and free tls state */ + if (conn) { + altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *state = (altcp_proxyconnect_state_t *)conn->state; + + if (state) { + altcp_proxyconnect_state_free(state); + conn->state = NULL; + } + } +} +const struct altcp_functions altcp_proxyconnect_functions = { + altcp_proxyconnect_set_poll, + altcp_proxyconnect_recved, + altcp_default_bind, + altcp_proxyconnect_connect, + altcp_proxyconnect_listen, + altcp_proxyconnect_abort, + altcp_proxyconnect_close, + altcp_default_shutdown, + altcp_proxyconnect_write, + altcp_default_output, + altcp_default_mss, + altcp_default_sndbuf, + altcp_default_sndqueuelen, + altcp_default_nagle_disable, + altcp_default_nagle_enable, + altcp_default_nagle_disabled, + altcp_default_setprio, + altcp_proxyconnect_dealloc, + altcp_default_get_tcp_addrinfo, + altcp_default_get_ip, + altcp_default_get_port +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + , + altcp_default_dbg_get_tcp_state +#endif +}; + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs.c index d85cac1d..f9e1b0ba 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs.c @@ -1,180 +1,180 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" -#include - -#include HTTPD_FSDATA_FILE - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES -int fs_open_custom(struct fs_file *file, const char *name); -void fs_close_custom(struct fs_file *file); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ -u8_t fs_canread_custom(struct fs_file *file); -u8_t fs_wait_read_custom(struct fs_file *file, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg); -int fs_read_async_custom(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg); -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ -int fs_read_custom(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -err_t fs_open(struct fs_file *file, const char *name) -{ - const struct fsdata_file *f; - - if ((file == NULL) || (name == NULL)) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES - - if (fs_open_custom(file, name)) { - file->is_custom_file = 1; - return ERR_OK; - } - - file->is_custom_file = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ - - for (f = FS_ROOT; f != NULL; f = f->next) { - if (!strcmp(name, (const char *)f->name)) { - file->data = (const char *)f->data; - file->len = f->len; - file->index = f->len; - file->pextension = NULL; - file->flags = f->flags; -#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM - file->chksum_count = f->chksum_count; - file->chksum = f->chksum; -#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE - file->state = fs_state_init(file, name); -#endif /* #if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* file not found */ - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -void fs_close(struct fs_file *file) -{ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES - - if (file->is_custom_file) { - fs_close_custom(file); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE - fs_state_free(file, file->state); -#endif /* #if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(file); -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ -int fs_read_async(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg) -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ -int fs_read(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ -{ - int read; - - if (file->index == file->len) { - return FS_READ_EOF; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(callback_fn); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(callback_arg); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES - - if (file->is_custom_file) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ - return fs_read_async_custom(file, buffer, count, callback_fn, callback_arg); -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ - return fs_read_custom(file, buffer, count); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ - - read = file->len - file->index; - - if (read > count) { - read = count; - } - - MEMCPY(buffer, (file->data + file->index), read); - file->index += read; - - return (read); -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ -int fs_is_file_ready(struct fs_file *file, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg) -{ - if (file != NULL) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES - - if (!fs_canread_custom(file)) { - if (fs_wait_read_custom(file, callback_fn, callback_arg)) { - return 0; - } - } - -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(callback_fn); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(callback_arg); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ - } - - return 1; -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -int fs_bytes_left(struct fs_file *file) -{ - return file->len - file->index; -} +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" +#include + +#include HTTPD_FSDATA_FILE + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES +int fs_open_custom(struct fs_file *file, const char *name); +void fs_close_custom(struct fs_file *file); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ +u8_t fs_canread_custom(struct fs_file *file); +u8_t fs_wait_read_custom(struct fs_file *file, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg); +int fs_read_async_custom(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg); +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ +int fs_read_custom(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +err_t fs_open(struct fs_file *file, const char *name) +{ + const struct fsdata_file *f; + + if ((file == NULL) || (name == NULL)) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES + + if (fs_open_custom(file, name)) { + file->is_custom_file = 1; + return ERR_OK; + } + + file->is_custom_file = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ + + for (f = FS_ROOT; f != NULL; f = f->next) { + if (!strcmp(name, (const char *)f->name)) { + file->data = (const char *)f->data; + file->len = f->len; + file->index = f->len; + file->pextension = NULL; + file->flags = f->flags; +#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM + file->chksum_count = f->chksum_count; + file->chksum = f->chksum; +#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE + file->state = fs_state_init(file, name); +#endif /* #if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* file not found */ + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +void fs_close(struct fs_file *file) +{ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES + + if (file->is_custom_file) { + fs_close_custom(file); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE + fs_state_free(file, file->state); +#endif /* #if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(file); +} +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ +int fs_read_async(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg) +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ +int fs_read(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ +{ + int read; + + if (file->index == file->len) { + return FS_READ_EOF; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(callback_fn); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(callback_arg); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES + + if (file->is_custom_file) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ + return fs_read_async_custom(file, buffer, count, callback_fn, callback_arg); +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ + return fs_read_custom(file, buffer, count); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ + + read = file->len - file->index; + + if (read > count) { + read = count; + } + + MEMCPY(buffer, (file->data + file->index), read); + file->index += read; + + return (read); +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ +int fs_is_file_ready(struct fs_file *file, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg) +{ + if (file != NULL) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES + + if (!fs_canread_custom(file)) { + if (fs_wait_read_custom(file, callback_fn, callback_arg)) { + return 0; + } + } + +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(callback_fn); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(callback_arg); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +int fs_bytes_left(struct fs_file *file) +{ + return file->len - file->index; +} diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/404.html b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/404.html similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/404.html rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/404.html index 8a1303b5..40b343a9 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/404.html +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/404.html @@ -1,21 +1,21 @@ - -lwIP - A Lightweight TCP/IP Stack - - - - -
- SICS logo - -

lwIP - A Lightweight TCP/IP Stack

-

404 - Page not found

-

- Sorry, the page you are requesting was not found on this - server. -

- 		-   -
- - + +lwIP - A Lightweight TCP/IP Stack + + + + +
+ SICS logo + +

lwIP - A Lightweight TCP/IP Stack

+

404 - Page not found

+

+ Sorry, the page you are requesting was not found on this + server. +

+ 		+   +
+ + diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/img/sics.gif b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/img/sics.gif similarity index 100% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/img/sics.gif rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/img/sics.gif diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/index.html b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/index.html similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/index.html rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/index.html index 0922eb88..ab575ef0 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/index.html +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fs/index.html @@ -1,47 +1,47 @@ - -lwIP - A Lightweight TCP/IP Stack - - - - -
- SICS logo - -

lwIP - A Lightweight TCP/IP Stack

-

- The web page you are watching was served by a simple web - server running on top of the lightweight TCP/IP stack lwIP. -

-

- lwIP is an open source implementation of the TCP/IP - protocol suite that was originally written by Adam Dunkels - of the Swedish Institute of Computer Science but now is - being actively developed by a team of developers - distributed world-wide. Since it's release, lwIP has - spurred a lot of interest and has been ported to several - platforms and operating systems. lwIP can be used either - with or without an underlying OS. -

-

- The focus of the lwIP TCP/IP implementation is to reduce - the RAM usage while still having a full scale TCP. This - makes lwIP suitable for use in embedded systems with tens - of kilobytes of free RAM and room for around 40 kilobytes - of code ROM. -

-

- More information about lwIP can be found at the lwIP - homepage at http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip/ - or at the lwIP wiki at http://lwip.wikia.com/. -

- 		-   -
- - - + +lwIP - A Lightweight TCP/IP Stack + + + + +
+ SICS logo + +

lwIP - A Lightweight TCP/IP Stack

+

+ The web page you are watching was served by a simple web + server running on top of the lightweight TCP/IP stack lwIP. +

+

+ lwIP is an open source implementation of the TCP/IP + protocol suite that was originally written by Adam Dunkels + of the Swedish Institute of Computer Science but now is + being actively developed by a team of developers + distributed world-wide. Since it's release, lwIP has + spurred a lot of interest and has been ported to several + platforms and operating systems. lwIP can be used either + with or without an underlying OS. +

+

+ The focus of the lwIP TCP/IP implementation is to reduce + the RAM usage while still having a full scale TCP. This + makes lwIP suitable for use in embedded systems with tens + of kilobytes of free RAM and room for around 40 kilobytes + of code ROM. +

+

+ More information about lwIP can be found at the lwIP + homepage at http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip/ + or at the lwIP wiki at http://lwip.wikia.com/. +

+ 		+   +
+ + + diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.c similarity index 98% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.c index 05c686f3..dc837ac4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.c @@ -1,336 +1,336 @@ -#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" - -#define file_NULL (struct fsdata_file *)NULL - -#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED -#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED 1 -#endif -#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT -#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT 0 -#endif -/* FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT: 0=off, 1=by variable, 2=by include */ -#ifndef FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT -#define FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT 0 -#endif -#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE -#define FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE -#endif -#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_POST -#define FSDATA_ALIGN_POST -#endif -#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT == 2 -#include "fsdata_alignment.h" -#endif -#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT == 1 -static const unsigned int dummy_align__img_sics_gif = 0; -#endif -// clang-format off - -static const unsigned char FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE data__img_sics_gif[] FSDATA_ALIGN_POST = { -/* /img/sics.gif (14 chars) */ -0x2f,0x69,0x6d,0x67,0x2f,0x73,0x69,0x63,0x73,0x2e,0x67,0x69,0x66,0x00,0x00,0x00, - -/* HTTP header */ -/* "HTTP/1.0 200 OK -" (17 bytes) */ -0x48,0x54,0x54,0x50,0x2f,0x31,0x2e,0x30,0x20,0x32,0x30,0x30,0x20,0x4f,0x4b,0x0d, -0x0a, -/* "Server: lwIP/2.0.3d (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip) -" (64 bytes) */ -0x53,0x65,0x72,0x76,0x65,0x72,0x3a,0x20,0x6c,0x77,0x49,0x50,0x2f,0x32,0x2e,0x30, -0x2e,0x33,0x64,0x20,0x28,0x68,0x74,0x74,0x70,0x3a,0x2f,0x2f,0x73,0x61,0x76,0x61, -0x6e,0x6e,0x61,0x68,0x2e,0x6e,0x6f,0x6e,0x67,0x6e,0x75,0x2e,0x6f,0x72,0x67,0x2f, -0x70,0x72,0x6f,0x6a,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x73,0x2f,0x6c,0x77,0x69,0x70,0x29,0x0d,0x0a, - -/* "Content-Length: 724 -" (18+ bytes) */ 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sizeof(data__img_sics_gif) - 16, - FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, -} }; - -const struct fsdata_file file__404_html[] = { { - file__img_sics_gif, - data__404_html, - data__404_html + 12, - sizeof(data__404_html) - 12, - FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, -} }; - -const struct fsdata_file file__index_html[] = { { - file__404_html, - data__index_html, - data__index_html + 12, - sizeof(data__index_html) - 12, - FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, -} }; - -#define FS_ROOT file__index_html -#define FS_NUMFILES 3 +#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" + +#define file_NULL (struct fsdata_file *)NULL + +#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED +#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED 1 +#endif +#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT +#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT 0 +#endif +/* FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT: 0=off, 1=by variable, 2=by include */ +#ifndef FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT +#define FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT 0 +#endif +#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE +#define FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE +#endif +#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_POST +#define FSDATA_ALIGN_POST +#endif +#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT == 2 +#include "fsdata_alignment.h" +#endif +#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT == 1 +static const unsigned int dummy_align__img_sics_gif = 0; +#endif +// clang-format off + +static const unsigned char FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE data__img_sics_gif[] FSDATA_ALIGN_POST = { +/* /img/sics.gif (14 chars) */ +0x2f,0x69,0x6d,0x67,0x2f,0x73,0x69,0x63,0x73,0x2e,0x67,0x69,0x66,0x00,0x00,0x00, + +/* HTTP header */ +/* "HTTP/1.0 200 OK +" (17 bytes) */ +0x48,0x54,0x54,0x50,0x2f,0x31,0x2e,0x30,0x20,0x32,0x30,0x30,0x20,0x4f,0x4b,0x0d, +0x0a, +/* "Server: lwIP/2.0.3d (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip) +" (64 bytes) */ +0x53,0x65,0x72,0x76,0x65,0x72,0x3a,0x20,0x6c,0x77,0x49,0x50,0x2f,0x32,0x2e,0x30, +0x2e,0x33,0x64,0x20,0x28,0x68,0x74,0x74,0x70,0x3a,0x2f,0x2f,0x73,0x61,0x76,0x61, 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+0x6d,0x6c,0x3e,0x0d,0x0a,0x0d,0x0a,}; + +// clang-format on + +const struct fsdata_file file__img_sics_gif[] = { { + file_NULL, + data__img_sics_gif, + data__img_sics_gif + 16, + sizeof(data__img_sics_gif) - 16, + FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, +} }; + +const struct fsdata_file file__404_html[] = { { + file__img_sics_gif, + data__404_html, + data__404_html + 12, + sizeof(data__404_html) - 12, + FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, +} }; + +const struct fsdata_file file__index_html[] = { { + file__404_html, + data__index_html, + data__index_html + 12, + sizeof(data__index_html) - 12, + FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, +} }; + +#define FS_ROOT file__index_html +#define FS_NUMFILES 3 diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.h index bd73419d..d31550d7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata.h @@ -1,41 +1,41 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_FSDATA_H -#define LWIP_FSDATA_H - -#include "lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h" -#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" - -/* THIS FILE IS DEPRECATED AND WILL BE REMOVED IN THE FUTURE */ -/* content was moved to fs.h to simplify #include structure */ - -#endif /* LWIP_FSDATA_H */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_FSDATA_H +#define LWIP_FSDATA_H + +#include "lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h" +#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" + +/* THIS FILE IS DEPRECATED AND WILL BE REMOVED IN THE FUTURE */ +/* content was moved to fs.h to simplify #include structure */ + +#endif /* LWIP_FSDATA_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata_custom.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata_custom.c similarity index 98% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata_custom.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata_custom.c index 0ca3ca90..8a92c15b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata_custom.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/fsdata_custom.c @@ -1,794 +1,794 @@ -#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" - -#define file_NULL (struct fsdata_file *)NULL - -// clang-format off -#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED -#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED 1 -#endif -#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT -#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT 0 -#endif -/* FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT: 0=off, 1=by variable, 2=by include */ -#ifndef FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT -#define FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT 0 -#endif -#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE -#define FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE -#endif -#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_POST -#define FSDATA_ALIGN_POST -#endif -#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==2 -#include "fsdata_alignment.h" -#endif -#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==1 -static const unsigned int dummy_align__asset_favicon_ico = 0; -#endif -static const unsigned char FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE data__asset_favicon_ico[] FSDATA_ALIGN_POST = { -/* /asset/favicon.ico (19z chars) */ -0x2f,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x65,0x74,0x2f,0x66,0x61,0x76,0x69,0x63,0x6f,0x6e,0x2e,0x69, -0x63,0x6f,0x00,0x00, - -/* HTTP header */ -/* "HTTP/1.0 200 OK -" (17z bytes) */ -0x48,0x54,0x54,0x50,0x2f,0x31,0x2e,0x30,0x20,0x32,0x30,0x30,0x20,0x4f,0x4b,0x0d, -0x0a, -/* "Server: lwIP/2.1.3d (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip) -" (64z bytes) */ -0x53,0x65,0x72,0x76,0x65,0x72,0x3a,0x20,0x6c,0x77,0x49,0x50,0x2f,0x32,0x2e,0x31, -0x2e,0x33,0x64,0x20,0x28,0x68,0x74,0x74,0x70,0x3a,0x2f,0x2f,0x73,0x61,0x76,0x61, -0x6e,0x6e,0x61,0x68,0x2e,0x6e,0x6f,0x6e,0x67,0x6e,0x75,0x2e,0x6f,0x72,0x67,0x2f, -0x70,0x72,0x6f,0x6a,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x73,0x2f,0x6c,0x77,0x69,0x70,0x29,0x0d,0x0a, - -/* "Content-Length: 1935 -" (18z+ bytes) */ -0x43,0x6f,0x6e,0x74,0x65,0x6e,0x74,0x2d,0x4c,0x65,0x6e,0x67,0x74,0x68,0x3a,0x20, 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| FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, -}}; - -const struct fsdata_file file__asset_ok_json[] = { { -file__asset_off_png, -data__asset_ok_json, -data__asset_ok_json + 16, -sizeof(data__asset_ok_json) - 16, -FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI, -}}; - -const struct fsdata_file file__asset_on_png[] = { { -file__asset_ok_json, -data__asset_on_png, -data__asset_on_png + 16, -sizeof(data__asset_on_png) - 16, -FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, -}}; - -const struct fsdata_file file__css_style_css[] = { { -file__asset_on_png, -data__css_style_css, -data__css_style_css + 16, -sizeof(data__css_style_css) - 16, -FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, -}}; - -const struct fsdata_file file__js_main_js[] = { { -file__css_style_css, -data__js_main_js, -data__js_main_js + 12, -sizeof(data__js_main_js) - 12, -FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, -}}; - -const struct fsdata_file file__404_html[] = { { -file__js_main_js, -data__404_html, -data__404_html + 12, -sizeof(data__404_html) - 12, -FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, -}}; - -const struct fsdata_file file__index_html[] = { { -file__404_html, -data__index_html, -data__index_html + 12, -sizeof(data__index_html) - 12, -FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, -}}; - -#define FS_ROOT file__index_html -#define FS_NUMFILES 8 -// clang-format on +#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" + +#define file_NULL (struct fsdata_file *)NULL + +// clang-format off +#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED +#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED 1 +#endif +#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT +#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT 0 +#endif +/* FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT: 0=off, 1=by variable, 2=by include */ +#ifndef FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT +#define FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT 0 +#endif +#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE +#define FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE +#endif +#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_POST +#define FSDATA_ALIGN_POST +#endif +#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==2 +#include "fsdata_alignment.h" +#endif +#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==1 +static const unsigned int dummy_align__asset_favicon_ico = 0; +#endif +static const unsigned char FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE data__asset_favicon_ico[] FSDATA_ALIGN_POST = { +/* /asset/favicon.ico (19z chars) */ +0x2f,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x65,0x74,0x2f,0x66,0x61,0x76,0x69,0x63,0x6f,0x6e,0x2e,0x69, +0x63,0x6f,0x00,0x00, + +/* HTTP header */ +/* "HTTP/1.0 200 OK +" (17z bytes) */ +0x48,0x54,0x54,0x50,0x2f,0x31,0x2e,0x30,0x20,0x32,0x30,0x30,0x20,0x4f,0x4b,0x0d, +0x0a, +/* "Server: lwIP/2.1.3d (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip) +" (64z bytes) */ +0x53,0x65,0x72,0x76,0x65,0x72,0x3a,0x20,0x6c,0x77,0x49,0x50,0x2f,0x32,0x2e,0x31, +0x2e,0x33,0x64,0x20,0x28,0x68,0x74,0x74,0x70,0x3a,0x2f,0x2f,0x73,0x61,0x76,0x61, +0x6e,0x6e,0x61,0x68,0x2e,0x6e,0x6f,0x6e,0x67,0x6e,0x75,0x2e,0x6f,0x72,0x67,0x2f, +0x70,0x72,0x6f,0x6a,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x73,0x2f,0x6c,0x77,0x69,0x70,0x29,0x0d,0x0a, + +/* 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+0x4e,0xce,0x70,0xe1,0x1b,0x6f,0x1c,0x81,0x92,0x92,0x50,0x4c,0x52,0xe6,0xac,0xa2, +0x88,0x49,0x50,0xb6,0xe3,0xfd,0xa3,0xd0,0xbc,0x3e,0xef,0xa0,0xbc,0xbe,0x24,0x0e, +0x88,0xee,0x29,0xbd,0xa8,0xef,0x4e,0x1c,0x8a,0x59,0xcf,0xe9,0x62,0x76,0x4e,0xf0, +0x73,0x45,0x64,0x45,0x01,0x88,0x46,0x94,0xbb,0xec,0xe6,0x4a,0x17,0x91,0x9d,0x44, +0xb6,0x86,0x1d,0xb4,0x9d,0x42,0xf4,0x97,0x97,0xeb,0x3f,0x3f,0xec,0x38,0x66,0xde, +0xb6,0xc9,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x49,0x45,0x4e,0x44,0xae,0x42,0x60,0x82,}; + +#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==1 +static const unsigned int dummy_align__asset_off_png = 1; +#endif +static const unsigned char FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE data__asset_off_png[] FSDATA_ALIGN_POST = { +/* /asset/off.png (15z chars) */ +0x2f,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x65,0x74,0x2f,0x6f,0x66,0x66,0x2e,0x70,0x6e,0x67,0x00,0x00, + +/* HTTP header */ +/* "HTTP/1.0 200 OK +" (17z bytes) */ +0x48,0x54,0x54,0x50,0x2f,0x31,0x2e,0x30,0x20,0x32,0x30,0x30,0x20,0x4f,0x4b,0x0d, +0x0a, +/* "Server: lwIP/2.1.3d (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip) +" (64z bytes) */ +0x53,0x65,0x72,0x76,0x65,0x72,0x3a,0x20,0x6c,0x77,0x49,0x50,0x2f,0x32,0x2e,0x31, +0x2e,0x33,0x64,0x20,0x28,0x68,0x74,0x74,0x70,0x3a,0x2f,0x2f,0x73,0x61,0x76,0x61, +0x6e,0x6e,0x61,0x68,0x2e,0x6e,0x6f,0x6e,0x67,0x6e,0x75,0x2e,0x6f,0x72,0x67,0x2f, +0x70,0x72,0x6f,0x6a,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x73,0x2f,0x6c,0x77,0x69,0x70,0x29,0x0d,0x0a, + +/* "Content-Length: 449 +" (18z+ bytes) */ +0x43,0x6f,0x6e,0x74,0x65,0x6e,0x74,0x2d,0x4c,0x65,0x6e,0x67,0x74,0x68,0x3a,0x20, +0x34,0x34,0x39,0x0d,0x0a, +/* "Content-Type: image/png + +" (27z bytes) */ +0x43,0x6f,0x6e,0x74,0x65,0x6e,0x74,0x2d,0x54,0x79,0x70,0x65,0x3a,0x20,0x69,0x6d, +0x61,0x67,0x65,0x2f,0x70,0x6e,0x67,0x0d,0x0a,0x0d,0x0a, +/* raw file data (449 bytes) */ +0x89,0x50,0x4e,0x47,0x0d,0x0a,0x1a,0x0a,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0d,0x49,0x48,0x44,0x52, +0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x08,0x06,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x57,0x02,0xf9, 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+0xc6,0x1a,0xa7,0x97,0xb1,0xc3,0x28,0xa5,0x94,0x52,0xbf,0xf2,0x0c,0x2c,0x65,0x66, +0x1b,0xdc,0xfd,0xdf,0xa1,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x49,0x45,0x4e,0x44,0xae,0x42,0x60, +0x82,}; + +#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==1 +static const unsigned int dummy_align__asset_ok_json = 2; +#endif +static const unsigned char FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE data__asset_ok_json[] FSDATA_ALIGN_POST = { +/* /asset/ok.json (15z chars) */ +0x2f,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x65,0x74,0x2f,0x6f,0x6b,0x2e,0x6a,0x73,0x6f,0x6e,0x00,0x00, + +/* HTTP header */ +/* "HTTP/1.0 200 OK +" (17z bytes) */ +0x48,0x54,0x54,0x50,0x2f,0x31,0x2e,0x30,0x20,0x32,0x30,0x30,0x20,0x4f,0x4b,0x0d, +0x0a, +/* "Server: lwIP/2.1.3d (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip) +" (64z bytes) */ +0x53,0x65,0x72,0x76,0x65,0x72,0x3a,0x20,0x6c,0x77,0x49,0x50,0x2f,0x32,0x2e,0x31, +0x2e,0x33,0x64,0x20,0x28,0x68,0x74,0x74,0x70,0x3a,0x2f,0x2f,0x73,0x61,0x76,0x61, +0x6e,0x6e,0x61,0x68,0x2e,0x6e,0x6f,0x6e,0x67,0x6e,0x75,0x2e,0x6f,0x72,0x67,0x2f, 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+0x64,0xe7,0x9f,0xcc,0xa7,0x3c,0x96,0xce,0x12,0x0b,0x0f,0x50,0xc8,0x67,0xa9,0xdf, +0x9e,0xc6,0x7f,0x75,0xc1,0x5d,0x01,0x63,0x28,0x24,0x18,0x7e,0xe9,0x78,0x7f,0x07, +0x8c,0xf9,0x7c,0x76,0x57,0xe0,0x9f,0x48,0x01,0xdf,0xa4,0x80,0x6f,0x52,0xc0,0x37, +0x29,0xe0,0x9b,0x14,0xf0,0x4d,0x0a,0xf8,0x26,0x05,0x7c,0x93,0x02,0xbe,0xb9,0x2b, +0xa0,0x35,0x83,0x71,0x98,0xf8,0xb6,0xfd,0xd1,0x0c,0xf4,0x57,0x6c,0x77,0x05,0x32, +0x39,0xca,0x8d,0x5e,0xa2,0x25,0xfa,0xa3,0x19,0xe5,0x66,0x2f,0x9e,0x4c,0x2c,0x28, +0x2a,0x2f,0x13,0x1c,0x4e,0x26,0xe2,0xb1,0x8a,0x59,0xbf,0x76,0x13,0x5a,0xaf,0x8c, +0x55,0xd4,0x38,0x8d,0xb5,0x6d,0x94,0xba,0x49,0xe6,0x84,0x15,0xa9,0xec,0xf7,0x19, +0x4e,0xf2,0x94,0x69,0x69,0xac,0xa9,0x00,0x43,0x77,0xa7,0x38,0xf3,0x46,0x64,0xee, +0x34,0xb5,0xa0,0x4b,0xca,0x06,0xc0,0x13,0x30,0xf1,0x9d,0x6a,0x03,0x13,0x94,0x6d, +0x62,0xa2,0x0b,0x6a,0x41,0xdf,0x77,0x18,0x21,0x84,0x10,0xe2,0x4f,0x3e,0x00,0x0a, +0xb5,0x60,0x22,0x58,0x89,0x57,0x9c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x49,0x45,0x4e,0x44,0xae, +0x42,0x60,0x82,}; + +#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==1 +static const unsigned int dummy_align__css_style_css = 4; +#endif +static const unsigned char FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE data__css_style_css[] FSDATA_ALIGN_POST = { +/* /css/style.css (15z chars) */ +0x2f,0x63,0x73,0x73,0x2f,0x73,0x74,0x79,0x6c,0x65,0x2e,0x63,0x73,0x73,0x00,0x00, + +/* HTTP header */ +/* "HTTP/1.0 200 OK +" (17z bytes) */ +0x48,0x54,0x54,0x50,0x2f,0x31,0x2e,0x30,0x20,0x32,0x30,0x30,0x20,0x4f,0x4b,0x0d, +0x0a, +/* "Server: lwIP/2.1.3d (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip) +" (64z bytes) */ +0x53,0x65,0x72,0x76,0x65,0x72,0x3a,0x20,0x6c,0x77,0x49,0x50,0x2f,0x32,0x2e,0x31, +0x2e,0x33,0x64,0x20,0x28,0x68,0x74,0x74,0x70,0x3a,0x2f,0x2f,0x73,0x61,0x76,0x61, +0x6e,0x6e,0x61,0x68,0x2e,0x6e,0x6f,0x6e,0x67,0x6e,0x75,0x2e,0x6f,0x72,0x67,0x2f, +0x70,0x72,0x6f,0x6a,0x65,0x63,0x74,0x73,0x2f,0x6c,0x77,0x69,0x70,0x29,0x0d,0x0a, + +/* "Content-Length: 1132 +" (18z+ bytes) */ 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+data__asset_off_png + 16, +sizeof(data__asset_off_png) - 16, +FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, +}}; + +const struct fsdata_file file__asset_ok_json[] = { { +file__asset_off_png, +data__asset_ok_json, +data__asset_ok_json + 16, +sizeof(data__asset_ok_json) - 16, +FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI, +}}; + +const struct fsdata_file file__asset_on_png[] = { { +file__asset_ok_json, +data__asset_on_png, +data__asset_on_png + 16, +sizeof(data__asset_on_png) - 16, +FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, +}}; + +const struct fsdata_file file__css_style_css[] = { { +file__asset_on_png, +data__css_style_css, +data__css_style_css + 16, +sizeof(data__css_style_css) - 16, +FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, +}}; + +const struct fsdata_file file__js_main_js[] = { { +file__css_style_css, +data__js_main_js, +data__js_main_js + 12, +sizeof(data__js_main_js) - 12, +FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, +}}; + +const struct fsdata_file file__404_html[] = { { +file__js_main_js, +data__404_html, +data__404_html + 12, +sizeof(data__404_html) - 12, +FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, +}}; + +const struct fsdata_file file__index_html[] = { { +file__404_html, +data__index_html, +data__index_html + 12, +sizeof(data__index_html) - 12, +FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT, +}}; + +#define FS_ROOT file__index_html +#define FS_NUMFILES 8 +// clang-format on diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/http_client.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/http_client.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/http_client.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/http_client.c index d6449bc5..0b05e9ce 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/http_client.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/http_client.c @@ -1,964 +1,964 @@ -/** - * @file - * HTTP client - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - */ - -/** - * @defgroup httpc HTTP client - * @ingroup apps - * @todo: - * - persistent connections - * - select outgoing http version - * - optionally follow redirect - * - check request uri for invalid characters? (e.g. encode spaces) - * - IPv6 support - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/http_client.h" - -#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "lwip/debug.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" -#include "lwip/init.h" - -#include -#include -#include - -#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API - -/** - * HTTPC_DEBUG: Enable debugging for HTTP client. - */ -#ifndef HTTPC_DEBUG -#define HTTPC_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to keep server name and uri in request state */ -#ifndef HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST -#define HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST 0 -#endif - -/** This string is passed in the HTTP header as "User-Agent: " */ -#ifndef HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT -#define HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT "lwIP/" LWIP_VERSION_STRING " (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip)" -#endif - -/* the various debug levels for this file */ -#define HTTPC_DEBUG_TRACE (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE) -#define HTTPC_DEBUG_STATE (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE) -#define HTTPC_DEBUG_WARN (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) -#define HTTPC_DEBUG_WARN_STATE (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING | LWIP_DBG_STATE) -#define HTTPC_DEBUG_SERIOUS (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS) - -#define HTTPC_POLL_INTERVAL 1 -#define HTTPC_POLL_TIMEOUT 30 /* 15 seconds */ - -#define HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID 0xFFFFFFFF - -/* GET request basic */ -#define HTTPC_REQ_11 "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* URI */ \ - "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ - "Accept: */*\r\n" \ - "Connection: Close\r\n" /* we don't support persistent connections, yet */ \ - "\r\n" -#define HTTPC_REQ_11_FORMAT(uri) HTTPC_REQ_11, uri, HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT - -/* GET request with host */ -#define HTTPC_REQ_11_HOST "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* URI */ \ - "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ - "Accept: */*\r\n" \ - "Host: %s\r\n" /* server name */ \ - "Connection: Close\r\n" /* we don't support persistent connections, yet */ \ - "\r\n" -#define HTTPC_REQ_11_HOST_FORMAT(uri, srv_name) HTTPC_REQ_11_HOST, uri, HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT, srv_name - -/* GET request with proxy */ -#define HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY "GET http://%s%s HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* HOST, URI */ \ - "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ - "Accept: */*\r\n" \ - "Host: %s\r\n" /* server name */ \ - "Connection: Close\r\n" /* we don't support persistent connections, yet */ \ - "\r\n" -#define HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_FORMAT(host, uri, srv_name) HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY, host, uri, HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT, srv_name - -/* GET request with proxy (non-default server port) */ -#define HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_PORT "GET http://%s:%d%s HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* HOST, host-port, URI */ \ - "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ - "Accept: */*\r\n" \ - "Host: %s\r\n" /* server name */ \ - "Connection: Close\r\n" /* we don't support persistent connections, yet */ \ - "\r\n" -#define HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_PORT_FORMAT(host, host_port, uri, srv_name) HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_PORT, host, host_port, uri, HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT, srv_name - -typedef enum ehttpc_parse_state { - HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_FIRST_LINE = 0, - HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_HEADERS, - HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA -} httpc_parse_state_t; - -typedef struct _httpc_state { - struct altcp_pcb *pcb; - ip_addr_t remote_addr; - u16_t remote_port; - int timeout_ticks; - struct pbuf *request; - struct pbuf *rx_hdrs; - u16_t rx_http_version; - u16_t rx_status; - altcp_recv_fn recv_fn; - const httpc_connection_t *conn_settings; - void *callback_arg; - u32_t rx_content_len; - u32_t hdr_content_len; - httpc_parse_state_t parse_state; -#if HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST - char *server_name; - char *uri; -#endif -} httpc_state_t; - -/** Free http client state and deallocate all resources within */ -static err_t httpc_free_state(httpc_state_t *req) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *tpcb; - - if (req->request != NULL) { - pbuf_free(req->request); - req->request = NULL; - } - - if (req->rx_hdrs != NULL) { - pbuf_free(req->rx_hdrs); - req->rx_hdrs = NULL; - } - - tpcb = req->pcb; - mem_free(req); - req = NULL; - - if (tpcb != NULL) { - err_t r; - altcp_arg(tpcb, NULL); - altcp_recv(tpcb, NULL); - altcp_err(tpcb, NULL); - altcp_poll(tpcb, NULL, 0); - altcp_sent(tpcb, NULL); - r = altcp_close(tpcb); - - if (r != ERR_OK) { - altcp_abort(tpcb); - return ERR_ABRT; - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Close the connection: call finished callback and free the state */ -static err_t httpc_close(httpc_state_t *req, httpc_result_t result, u32_t server_response, err_t err) -{ - if (req != NULL) { - if (req->conn_settings != NULL) { - if (req->conn_settings->result_fn != NULL) { - req->conn_settings->result_fn(req->callback_arg, result, req->rx_content_len, server_response, err); - } - } - - return httpc_free_state(req); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Parse http header response line 1 */ -static err_t http_parse_response_status(struct pbuf *p, u16_t *http_version, u16_t *http_status, u16_t *http_status_str_offset) -{ - u16_t end1 = pbuf_memfind(p, "\r\n", 2, 0); - - if (end1 != 0xFFFF) { - /* get parts of first line */ - u16_t space1, space2; - space1 = pbuf_memfind(p, " ", 1, 0); - - if (space1 != 0xFFFF) { - if ((pbuf_memcmp(p, 0, "HTTP/", 5) == 0) && (pbuf_get_at(p, 6) == '.')) { - char status_num[10]; - size_t status_num_len; - /* parse http version */ - u16_t version = pbuf_get_at(p, 5) - '0'; - version <<= 8; - version |= pbuf_get_at(p, 7) - '0'; - *http_version = version; - - /* parse http status number */ - space2 = pbuf_memfind(p, " ", 1, space1 + 1); - - if (space2 != 0xFFFF) { - *http_status_str_offset = space2 + 1; - status_num_len = space2 - space1 - 1; - } else { - status_num_len = end1 - space1 - 1; - } - - memset(status_num, 0, sizeof(status_num)); - - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, status_num, (u16_t)status_num_len, space1 + 1) == status_num_len) { - int status = atoi(status_num); - - if ((status > 0) && (status <= 0xFFFF)) { - *http_status = (u16_t)status; - return ERR_OK; - } - } - } - } - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** Wait for all headers to be received, return its length and content-length (if available) */ -static err_t http_wait_headers(struct pbuf *p, u32_t *content_length, u16_t *total_header_len) -{ - u16_t end1 = pbuf_memfind(p, "\r\n\r\n", 4, 0); - - if (end1 < (0xFFFF - 2)) { - /* all headers received */ - /* check if we have a content length (@todo: case insensitive?) */ - u16_t content_len_hdr; - *content_length = HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID; - *total_header_len = end1 + 4; - - content_len_hdr = pbuf_memfind(p, "Content-Length: ", 16, 0); - - if (content_len_hdr != 0xFFFF) { - u16_t content_len_line_end = pbuf_memfind(p, "\r\n", 2, content_len_hdr); - - if (content_len_line_end != 0xFFFF) { - char content_len_num[16]; - u16_t content_len_num_len = (u16_t)(content_len_line_end - content_len_hdr - 16); - memset(content_len_num, 0, sizeof(content_len_num)); - - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, content_len_num, content_len_num_len, content_len_hdr + 16) == content_len_num_len) { - int len = atoi(content_len_num); - - if ((len >= 0) && ((u32_t)len < HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID)) { - *content_length = (u32_t)len; - } - } - } - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** http client tcp recv callback */ -static err_t httpc_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t r) -{ - httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(r); - - if (p == NULL) { - httpc_result_t result; - - if (req->parse_state != HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA) { - /* did not get RX data yet */ - result = HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED; - } else if ((req->hdr_content_len != HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID) && - (req->hdr_content_len != req->rx_content_len)) { - /* header has been received with content length but not all data received */ - result = HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CONTENT_LEN; - } else { - /* receiving data and either all data received or no content length header */ - result = HTTPC_RESULT_OK; - } - - return httpc_close(req, result, req->rx_status, ERR_OK); - } - - if (req->parse_state != HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA) { - if (req->rx_hdrs == NULL) { - req->rx_hdrs = p; - } else { - pbuf_cat(req->rx_hdrs, p); - } - - if (req->parse_state == HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_FIRST_LINE) { - u16_t status_str_off; - err_t err = http_parse_response_status(req->rx_hdrs, &req->rx_http_version, &req->rx_status, &status_str_off); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - /* don't care status string */ - req->parse_state = HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_HEADERS; - } - } - - if (req->parse_state == HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_HEADERS) { - u16_t total_header_len; - err_t err = http_wait_headers(req->rx_hdrs, &req->hdr_content_len, &total_header_len); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - struct pbuf *q; - /* full header received, send window update for header bytes and call into client callback */ - altcp_recved(pcb, total_header_len); - - if (req->conn_settings) { - if (req->conn_settings->headers_done_fn) { - err = req->conn_settings->headers_done_fn(req, req->callback_arg, req->rx_hdrs, total_header_len, req->hdr_content_len); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return httpc_close(req, HTTPC_RESULT_LOCAL_ABORT, req->rx_status, err); - } - } - } - - /* hide header bytes in pbuf */ - q = pbuf_free_header(req->rx_hdrs, total_header_len); - p = q; - req->rx_hdrs = NULL; - /* go on with data */ - req->parse_state = HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA; - } - } - } - - if ((p != NULL) && (req->parse_state == HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA)) { - req->rx_content_len += p->tot_len; - - if (req->recv_fn != NULL) { - /* directly return here: the connection migth already be aborted from the callback! */ - return req->recv_fn(req->callback_arg, pcb, p, r); - } else { - altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); - pbuf_free(p); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** http client tcp err callback */ -static void httpc_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; - - if (req != NULL) { - /* pcb has already been deallocated */ - req->pcb = NULL; - httpc_close(req, HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED, 0, err); - } -} - -/** http client tcp poll callback */ -static err_t httpc_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - /* implement timeout */ - httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - if (req != NULL) { - if (req->timeout_ticks) { - req->timeout_ticks--; - } - - if (!req->timeout_ticks) { - return httpc_close(req, HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT, 0, ERR_OK); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** http client tcp sent callback */ -static err_t httpc_tcp_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) -{ - /* nothing to do here for now */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** http client tcp connected callback */ -static err_t httpc_tcp_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) -{ - err_t r; - httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - - /* send request; last char is zero termination */ - r = altcp_write(req->pcb, req->request->payload, req->request->len - 1, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - - if (r != ERR_OK) { - /* could not write the single small request -> fail, don't retry */ - return httpc_close(req, HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_MEM, 0, r); - } - - /* everything written, we can free the request */ - pbuf_free(req->request); - req->request = NULL; - - altcp_output(req->pcb); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Start the http request when the server IP addr is known */ -static err_t httpc_get_internal_addr(httpc_state_t *req, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - err_t err; - LWIP_ASSERT("req != NULL", req != NULL); - - if (&req->remote_addr != ipaddr) { - /* fill in remote addr if called externally */ - req->remote_addr = *ipaddr; - } - - err = altcp_connect(req->pcb, &req->remote_addr, req->remote_port, httpc_tcp_connected); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPC_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("tcp_connect failed: %d\n", (int)err)); - return err; -} - -#if LWIP_DNS -/** DNS callback - * If ipaddr is non-NULL, resolving succeeded and the request can be sent, otherwise it failed. - */ -static void httpc_dns_found(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg) -{ - httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; - err_t err; - httpc_result_t result; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hostname); - - if (ipaddr != NULL) { - err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, ipaddr); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - return; - } - - result = HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPC_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("httpc_dns_found: failed to resolve hostname: %s\n", - hostname)); - result = HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME; - err = ERR_ARG; - } - - httpc_close(req, result, 0, err); -} -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -/** Start the http request after converting 'server_name' to ip address (DNS or address string) */ -static err_t httpc_get_internal_dns(httpc_state_t *req, const char *server_name) -{ - err_t err; - LWIP_ASSERT("req != NULL", req != NULL); - -#if LWIP_DNS - err = dns_gethostbyname(server_name, &req->remote_addr, httpc_dns_found, req); -#else - err = ipaddr_aton(server_name, &req->remote_addr) ? ERR_OK : ERR_ARG; -#endif - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - /* cached or IP-string */ - err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &req->remote_addr); - } else if (err == ERR_INPROGRESS) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - return err; -} - -static int httpc_create_request_string(const httpc_connection_t *settings, const char *server_name, int server_port, const char *uri, - int use_host, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) -{ - if (settings->use_proxy) { - LWIP_ASSERT("server_name != NULL", server_name != NULL); - - if (server_port != HTTP_DEFAULT_PORT) { - return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_PORT_FORMAT(server_name, server_port, uri, server_name)); - } else { - return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_FORMAT(server_name, uri, server_name)); - } - } else if (use_host) { - LWIP_ASSERT("server_name != NULL", server_name != NULL); - return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, HTTPC_REQ_11_HOST_FORMAT(uri, server_name)); - } else { - return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, HTTPC_REQ_11_FORMAT(uri)); - } -} - -/** Initialize the connection struct */ -static err_t httpc_init_connection_common(httpc_state_t **connection, const httpc_connection_t *settings, const char *server_name, - u16_t server_port, const char *uri, altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, int use_host) -{ - size_t alloc_len; - mem_size_t mem_alloc_len; - int req_len, req_len2; - httpc_state_t *req; -#if HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST - size_t server_name_len, uri_len; -#endif - - LWIP_ASSERT("uri != NULL", uri != NULL); - - /* get request len */ - req_len = httpc_create_request_string(settings, server_name, server_port, uri, use_host, NULL, 0); - - if ((req_len < 0) || (req_len > 0xFFFF)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* alloc state and request in one block */ - alloc_len = sizeof(httpc_state_t); -#if HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST - server_name_len = server_name ? strlen(server_name) : 0; - uri_len = strlen(uri); - alloc_len += server_name_len + 1 + uri_len + 1; -#endif - mem_alloc_len = (mem_size_t)alloc_len; - - if ((mem_alloc_len < alloc_len) || (req_len + 1 > 0xFFFF)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - req = (httpc_state_t *)mem_malloc((mem_size_t)alloc_len); - - if (req == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memset(req, 0, sizeof(httpc_state_t)); - req->timeout_ticks = HTTPC_POLL_TIMEOUT; - req->request = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(req_len + 1), PBUF_RAM); - - if (req->request == NULL) { - httpc_free_state(req); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (req->request->next != NULL) { - /* need a pbuf in one piece */ - httpc_free_state(req); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - req->hdr_content_len = HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID; -#if HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST - req->server_name = (char *)(req + 1); - - if (server_name) { - memcpy(req->server_name, server_name, server_name_len + 1); - } - - req->uri = req->server_name + server_name_len + 1; - memcpy(req->uri, uri, uri_len + 1); -#endif - req->pcb = altcp_new(settings->altcp_allocator); - - if (req->pcb == NULL) { - httpc_free_state(req); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - req->remote_port = settings->use_proxy ? settings->proxy_port : server_port; - altcp_arg(req->pcb, req); - altcp_recv(req->pcb, httpc_tcp_recv); - altcp_err(req->pcb, httpc_tcp_err); - altcp_poll(req->pcb, httpc_tcp_poll, HTTPC_POLL_INTERVAL); - altcp_sent(req->pcb, httpc_tcp_sent); - - /* set up request buffer */ - req_len2 = httpc_create_request_string(settings, server_name, server_port, uri, use_host, - (char *)req->request->payload, req_len + 1); - - if (req_len2 != req_len) { - httpc_free_state(req); - return ERR_VAL; - } - - req->recv_fn = recv_fn; - req->conn_settings = settings; - req->callback_arg = callback_arg; - - *connection = req; - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Initialize the connection struct - */ -static err_t httpc_init_connection(httpc_state_t **connection, const httpc_connection_t *settings, const char *server_name, - u16_t server_port, const char *uri, altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg) -{ - return httpc_init_connection_common(connection, settings, server_name, server_port, uri, recv_fn, callback_arg, 1); -} - -/** - * Initialize the connection struct (from IP address) - */ -static err_t httpc_init_connection_addr(httpc_state_t **connection, const httpc_connection_t *settings, - const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t server_port, const char *uri, - altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg) -{ - char *server_addr_str = ipaddr_ntoa(server_addr); - - if (server_addr_str == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - return httpc_init_connection_common(connection, settings, server_addr_str, server_port, uri, - recv_fn, callback_arg, 1); -} - -/** - * @ingroup httpc - * HTTP client API: get a file by passing server IP address - * - * @param server_addr IP address of the server to connect - * @param port tcp port of the server - * @param uri uri to get from the server, remember leading "/"! - * @param settings connection settings (callbacks, proxy, etc.) - * @param recv_fn the http body (not the headers) are passed to this callback - * @param callback_arg argument passed to all the callbacks - * @param connection retreives the connection handle (to match in callbacks) - * @return ERR_OK if starting the request succeeds (callback_fn will be called later) - * or an error code - */ -err_t httpc_get_file(const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, - altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, httpc_state_t **connection) -{ - err_t err; - httpc_state_t *req; - - LWIP_ERROR("invalid parameters", (server_addr != NULL) && (uri != NULL) && (recv_fn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - err = httpc_init_connection_addr(&req, settings, server_addr, port, - uri, recv_fn, callback_arg); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - if (settings->use_proxy) { - err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &settings->proxy_addr); - } else { - err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, server_addr); - } - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - httpc_free_state(req); - return err; - } - - if (connection != NULL) { - *connection = req; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup httpc - * HTTP client API: get a file by passing server name as string (DNS name or IP address string) - * - * @param server_name server name as string (DNS name or IP address string) - * @param port tcp port of the server - * @param uri uri to get from the server, remember leading "/"! - * @param settings connection settings (callbacks, proxy, etc.) - * @param recv_fn the http body (not the headers) are passed to this callback - * @param callback_arg argument passed to all the callbacks - * @param connection retreives the connection handle (to match in callbacks) - * @return ERR_OK if starting the request succeeds (callback_fn will be called later) - * or an error code - */ -err_t httpc_get_file_dns(const char *server_name, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, - altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, httpc_state_t **connection) -{ - err_t err; - httpc_state_t *req; - - LWIP_ERROR("invalid parameters", (server_name != NULL) && (uri != NULL) && (recv_fn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - err = httpc_init_connection(&req, settings, server_name, port, uri, recv_fn, callback_arg); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - if (settings->use_proxy) { - err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &settings->proxy_addr); - } else { - err = httpc_get_internal_dns(req, server_name); - } - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - httpc_free_state(req); - return err; - } - - if (connection != NULL) { - *connection = req; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO -/* Implementation to disk via fopen/fwrite/fclose follows */ - -typedef struct _httpc_filestate { - const char *local_file_name; - FILE *file; - httpc_connection_t settings; - const httpc_connection_t *client_settings; - void *callback_arg; -} httpc_filestate_t; - -static void httpc_fs_result(void *arg, httpc_result_t httpc_result, u32_t rx_content_len, - u32_t srv_res, err_t err); - -/** Initalize http client state for download to file system */ -static err_t httpc_fs_init(httpc_filestate_t **filestate_out, const char *local_file_name, - const httpc_connection_t *settings, void *callback_arg) -{ - httpc_filestate_t *filestate; - size_t file_len, alloc_len; - FILE *f; - - file_len = strlen(local_file_name); - alloc_len = sizeof(httpc_filestate_t) + file_len + 1; - - filestate = (httpc_filestate_t *)mem_malloc((mem_size_t)alloc_len); - - if (filestate == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memset(filestate, 0, sizeof(httpc_filestate_t)); - filestate->local_file_name = (const char *)(filestate + 1); - memcpy((char *)(filestate + 1), local_file_name, file_len + 1); - filestate->file = NULL; - filestate->client_settings = settings; - filestate->callback_arg = callback_arg; - /* copy client settings but override result callback */ - memcpy(&filestate->settings, settings, sizeof(httpc_connection_t)); - filestate->settings.result_fn = httpc_fs_result; - - f = fopen(local_file_name, "wb"); - - if (f == NULL) { - /* could not open file */ - mem_free(filestate); - return ERR_VAL; - } - - filestate->file = f; - *filestate_out = filestate; - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Free http client state for download to file system */ -static void httpc_fs_free(httpc_filestate_t *filestate) -{ - if (filestate != NULL) { - if (filestate->file != NULL) { - fclose(filestate->file); - filestate->file = NULL; - } - - mem_free(filestate); - } -} - -/** Connection closed (success or error) */ -static void httpc_fs_result(void *arg, httpc_result_t httpc_result, u32_t rx_content_len, - u32_t srv_res, err_t err) -{ - httpc_filestate_t *filestate = (httpc_filestate_t *)arg; - - if (filestate != NULL) { - if (filestate->client_settings->result_fn != NULL) { - filestate->client_settings->result_fn(filestate->callback_arg, httpc_result, rx_content_len, - srv_res, err); - } - - httpc_fs_free(filestate); - } -} - -/** tcp recv callback */ -static err_t httpc_fs_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - httpc_filestate_t *filestate = (httpc_filestate_t *)arg; - struct pbuf *q; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - - for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - fwrite(q->payload, 1, q->len, filestate->file); - } - - altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup httpc - * HTTP client API: get a file to disk by passing server IP address - * - * @param server_addr IP address of the server to connect - * @param port tcp port of the server - * @param uri uri to get from the server, remember leading "/"! - * @param settings connection settings (callbacks, proxy, etc.) - * @param callback_arg argument passed to all the callbacks - * @param connection retreives the connection handle (to match in callbacks) - * @return ERR_OK if starting the request succeeds (callback_fn will be called later) - * or an error code - */ -err_t httpc_get_file_to_disk(const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, - void *callback_arg, const char *local_file_name, httpc_state_t **connection) -{ - err_t err; - httpc_state_t *req; - httpc_filestate_t *filestate; - - LWIP_ERROR("invalid parameters", (server_addr != NULL) && (uri != NULL) && (local_file_name != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - err = httpc_fs_init(&filestate, local_file_name, settings, callback_arg); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - err = httpc_init_connection_addr(&req, &filestate->settings, server_addr, port, - uri, httpc_fs_tcp_recv, filestate); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - httpc_fs_free(filestate); - return err; - } - - if (settings->use_proxy) { - err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &settings->proxy_addr); - } else { - err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, server_addr); - } - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - httpc_fs_free(filestate); - httpc_free_state(req); - return err; - } - - if (connection != NULL) { - *connection = req; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup httpc - * HTTP client API: get a file to disk by passing server name as string (DNS name or IP address string) - * - * @param server_name server name as string (DNS name or IP address string) - * @param port tcp port of the server - * @param uri uri to get from the server, remember leading "/"! - * @param settings connection settings (callbacks, proxy, etc.) - * @param callback_arg argument passed to all the callbacks - * @param connection retreives the connection handle (to match in callbacks) - * @return ERR_OK if starting the request succeeds (callback_fn will be called later) - * or an error code - */ -err_t httpc_get_file_dns_to_disk(const char *server_name, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, - void *callback_arg, const char *local_file_name, httpc_state_t **connection) -{ - err_t err; - httpc_state_t *req; - httpc_filestate_t *filestate; - - LWIP_ERROR("invalid parameters", (server_name != NULL) && (uri != NULL) && (local_file_name != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - - err = httpc_fs_init(&filestate, local_file_name, settings, callback_arg); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - err = httpc_init_connection(&req, &filestate->settings, server_name, port, - uri, httpc_fs_tcp_recv, filestate); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - httpc_fs_free(filestate); - return err; - } - - if (settings->use_proxy) { - err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &settings->proxy_addr); - } else { - err = httpc_get_internal_dns(req, server_name); - } - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - httpc_fs_free(filestate); - httpc_free_state(req); - return err; - } - - if (connection != NULL) { - *connection = req; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO */ - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ +/** + * @file + * HTTP client + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + */ + +/** + * @defgroup httpc HTTP client + * @ingroup apps + * @todo: + * - persistent connections + * - select outgoing http version + * - optionally follow redirect + * - check request uri for invalid characters? (e.g. encode spaces) + * - IPv6 support + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/http_client.h" + +#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "lwip/debug.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" +#include "lwip/init.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API + +/** + * HTTPC_DEBUG: Enable debugging for HTTP client. + */ +#ifndef HTTPC_DEBUG +#define HTTPC_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to keep server name and uri in request state */ +#ifndef HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST +#define HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST 0 +#endif + +/** This string is passed in the HTTP header as "User-Agent: " */ +#ifndef HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT +#define HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT "lwIP/" LWIP_VERSION_STRING " (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip)" +#endif + +/* the various debug levels for this file */ +#define HTTPC_DEBUG_TRACE (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE) +#define HTTPC_DEBUG_STATE (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE) +#define HTTPC_DEBUG_WARN (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) +#define HTTPC_DEBUG_WARN_STATE (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING | LWIP_DBG_STATE) +#define HTTPC_DEBUG_SERIOUS (HTTPC_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS) + +#define HTTPC_POLL_INTERVAL 1 +#define HTTPC_POLL_TIMEOUT 30 /* 15 seconds */ + +#define HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID 0xFFFFFFFF + +/* GET request basic */ +#define HTTPC_REQ_11 "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* URI */ \ + "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ + "Accept: */*\r\n" \ + "Connection: Close\r\n" /* we don't support persistent connections, yet */ \ + "\r\n" +#define HTTPC_REQ_11_FORMAT(uri) HTTPC_REQ_11, uri, HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT + +/* GET request with host */ +#define HTTPC_REQ_11_HOST "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* URI */ \ + "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ + "Accept: */*\r\n" \ + "Host: %s\r\n" /* server name */ \ + "Connection: Close\r\n" /* we don't support persistent connections, yet */ \ + "\r\n" +#define HTTPC_REQ_11_HOST_FORMAT(uri, srv_name) HTTPC_REQ_11_HOST, uri, HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT, srv_name + +/* GET request with proxy */ +#define HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY "GET http://%s%s HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* HOST, URI */ \ + "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ + "Accept: */*\r\n" \ + "Host: %s\r\n" /* server name */ \ + "Connection: Close\r\n" /* we don't support persistent connections, yet */ \ + "\r\n" +#define HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_FORMAT(host, uri, srv_name) HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY, host, uri, HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT, srv_name + +/* GET request with proxy (non-default server port) */ +#define HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_PORT "GET http://%s:%d%s HTTP/1.1\r\n" /* HOST, host-port, URI */ \ + "User-Agent: %s\r\n" /* User-Agent */ \ + "Accept: */*\r\n" \ + "Host: %s\r\n" /* server name */ \ + "Connection: Close\r\n" /* we don't support persistent connections, yet */ \ + "\r\n" +#define HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_PORT_FORMAT(host, host_port, uri, srv_name) HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_PORT, host, host_port, uri, HTTPC_CLIENT_AGENT, srv_name + +typedef enum ehttpc_parse_state { + HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_FIRST_LINE = 0, + HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_HEADERS, + HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA +} httpc_parse_state_t; + +typedef struct _httpc_state { + struct altcp_pcb *pcb; + ip_addr_t remote_addr; + u16_t remote_port; + int timeout_ticks; + struct pbuf *request; + struct pbuf *rx_hdrs; + u16_t rx_http_version; + u16_t rx_status; + altcp_recv_fn recv_fn; + const httpc_connection_t *conn_settings; + void *callback_arg; + u32_t rx_content_len; + u32_t hdr_content_len; + httpc_parse_state_t parse_state; +#if HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST + char *server_name; + char *uri; +#endif +} httpc_state_t; + +/** Free http client state and deallocate all resources within */ +static err_t httpc_free_state(httpc_state_t *req) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *tpcb; + + if (req->request != NULL) { + pbuf_free(req->request); + req->request = NULL; + } + + if (req->rx_hdrs != NULL) { + pbuf_free(req->rx_hdrs); + req->rx_hdrs = NULL; + } + + tpcb = req->pcb; + mem_free(req); + req = NULL; + + if (tpcb != NULL) { + err_t r; + altcp_arg(tpcb, NULL); + altcp_recv(tpcb, NULL); + altcp_err(tpcb, NULL); + altcp_poll(tpcb, NULL, 0); + altcp_sent(tpcb, NULL); + r = altcp_close(tpcb); + + if (r != ERR_OK) { + altcp_abort(tpcb); + return ERR_ABRT; + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Close the connection: call finished callback and free the state */ +static err_t httpc_close(httpc_state_t *req, httpc_result_t result, u32_t server_response, err_t err) +{ + if (req != NULL) { + if (req->conn_settings != NULL) { + if (req->conn_settings->result_fn != NULL) { + req->conn_settings->result_fn(req->callback_arg, result, req->rx_content_len, server_response, err); + } + } + + return httpc_free_state(req); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Parse http header response line 1 */ +static err_t http_parse_response_status(struct pbuf *p, u16_t *http_version, u16_t *http_status, u16_t *http_status_str_offset) +{ + u16_t end1 = pbuf_memfind(p, "\r\n", 2, 0); + + if (end1 != 0xFFFF) { + /* get parts of first line */ + u16_t space1, space2; + space1 = pbuf_memfind(p, " ", 1, 0); + + if (space1 != 0xFFFF) { + if ((pbuf_memcmp(p, 0, "HTTP/", 5) == 0) && (pbuf_get_at(p, 6) == '.')) { + char status_num[10]; + size_t status_num_len; + /* parse http version */ + u16_t version = pbuf_get_at(p, 5) - '0'; + version <<= 8; + version |= pbuf_get_at(p, 7) - '0'; + *http_version = version; + + /* parse http status number */ + space2 = pbuf_memfind(p, " ", 1, space1 + 1); + + if (space2 != 0xFFFF) { + *http_status_str_offset = space2 + 1; + status_num_len = space2 - space1 - 1; + } else { + status_num_len = end1 - space1 - 1; + } + + memset(status_num, 0, sizeof(status_num)); + + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, status_num, (u16_t)status_num_len, space1 + 1) == status_num_len) { + int status = atoi(status_num); + + if ((status > 0) && (status <= 0xFFFF)) { + *http_status = (u16_t)status; + return ERR_OK; + } + } + } + } + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** Wait for all headers to be received, return its length and content-length (if available) */ +static err_t http_wait_headers(struct pbuf *p, u32_t *content_length, u16_t *total_header_len) +{ + u16_t end1 = pbuf_memfind(p, "\r\n\r\n", 4, 0); + + if (end1 < (0xFFFF - 2)) { + /* all headers received */ + /* check if we have a content length (@todo: case insensitive?) */ + u16_t content_len_hdr; + *content_length = HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID; + *total_header_len = end1 + 4; + + content_len_hdr = pbuf_memfind(p, "Content-Length: ", 16, 0); + + if (content_len_hdr != 0xFFFF) { + u16_t content_len_line_end = pbuf_memfind(p, "\r\n", 2, content_len_hdr); + + if (content_len_line_end != 0xFFFF) { + char content_len_num[16]; + u16_t content_len_num_len = (u16_t)(content_len_line_end - content_len_hdr - 16); + memset(content_len_num, 0, sizeof(content_len_num)); + + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, content_len_num, content_len_num_len, content_len_hdr + 16) == content_len_num_len) { + int len = atoi(content_len_num); + + if ((len >= 0) && ((u32_t)len < HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID)) { + *content_length = (u32_t)len; + } + } + } + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** http client tcp recv callback */ +static err_t httpc_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t r) +{ + httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(r); + + if (p == NULL) { + httpc_result_t result; + + if (req->parse_state != HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA) { + /* did not get RX data yet */ + result = HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED; + } else if ((req->hdr_content_len != HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID) && + (req->hdr_content_len != req->rx_content_len)) { + /* header has been received with content length but not all data received */ + result = HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CONTENT_LEN; + } else { + /* receiving data and either all data received or no content length header */ + result = HTTPC_RESULT_OK; + } + + return httpc_close(req, result, req->rx_status, ERR_OK); + } + + if (req->parse_state != HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA) { + if (req->rx_hdrs == NULL) { + req->rx_hdrs = p; + } else { + pbuf_cat(req->rx_hdrs, p); + } + + if (req->parse_state == HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_FIRST_LINE) { + u16_t status_str_off; + err_t err = http_parse_response_status(req->rx_hdrs, &req->rx_http_version, &req->rx_status, &status_str_off); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + /* don't care status string */ + req->parse_state = HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_HEADERS; + } + } + + if (req->parse_state == HTTPC_PARSE_WAIT_HEADERS) { + u16_t total_header_len; + err_t err = http_wait_headers(req->rx_hdrs, &req->hdr_content_len, &total_header_len); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + struct pbuf *q; + /* full header received, send window update for header bytes and call into client callback */ + altcp_recved(pcb, total_header_len); + + if (req->conn_settings) { + if (req->conn_settings->headers_done_fn) { + err = req->conn_settings->headers_done_fn(req, req->callback_arg, req->rx_hdrs, total_header_len, req->hdr_content_len); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return httpc_close(req, HTTPC_RESULT_LOCAL_ABORT, req->rx_status, err); + } + } + } + + /* hide header bytes in pbuf */ + q = pbuf_free_header(req->rx_hdrs, total_header_len); + p = q; + req->rx_hdrs = NULL; + /* go on with data */ + req->parse_state = HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA; + } + } + } + + if ((p != NULL) && (req->parse_state == HTTPC_PARSE_RX_DATA)) { + req->rx_content_len += p->tot_len; + + if (req->recv_fn != NULL) { + /* directly return here: the connection migth already be aborted from the callback! */ + return req->recv_fn(req->callback_arg, pcb, p, r); + } else { + altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); + pbuf_free(p); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** http client tcp err callback */ +static void httpc_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; + + if (req != NULL) { + /* pcb has already been deallocated */ + req->pcb = NULL; + httpc_close(req, HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED, 0, err); + } +} + +/** http client tcp poll callback */ +static err_t httpc_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + /* implement timeout */ + httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + if (req != NULL) { + if (req->timeout_ticks) { + req->timeout_ticks--; + } + + if (!req->timeout_ticks) { + return httpc_close(req, HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT, 0, ERR_OK); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** http client tcp sent callback */ +static err_t httpc_tcp_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) +{ + /* nothing to do here for now */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** http client tcp connected callback */ +static err_t httpc_tcp_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) +{ + err_t r; + httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + + /* send request; last char is zero termination */ + r = altcp_write(req->pcb, req->request->payload, req->request->len - 1, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + + if (r != ERR_OK) { + /* could not write the single small request -> fail, don't retry */ + return httpc_close(req, HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_MEM, 0, r); + } + + /* everything written, we can free the request */ + pbuf_free(req->request); + req->request = NULL; + + altcp_output(req->pcb); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Start the http request when the server IP addr is known */ +static err_t httpc_get_internal_addr(httpc_state_t *req, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + err_t err; + LWIP_ASSERT("req != NULL", req != NULL); + + if (&req->remote_addr != ipaddr) { + /* fill in remote addr if called externally */ + req->remote_addr = *ipaddr; + } + + err = altcp_connect(req->pcb, &req->remote_addr, req->remote_port, httpc_tcp_connected); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPC_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("tcp_connect failed: %d\n", (int)err)); + return err; +} + +#if LWIP_DNS +/** DNS callback + * If ipaddr is non-NULL, resolving succeeded and the request can be sent, otherwise it failed. + */ +static void httpc_dns_found(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg) +{ + httpc_state_t *req = (httpc_state_t *)arg; + err_t err; + httpc_result_t result; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hostname); + + if (ipaddr != NULL) { + err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, ipaddr); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + return; + } + + result = HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPC_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("httpc_dns_found: failed to resolve hostname: %s\n", + hostname)); + result = HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME; + err = ERR_ARG; + } + + httpc_close(req, result, 0, err); +} +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +/** Start the http request after converting 'server_name' to ip address (DNS or address string) */ +static err_t httpc_get_internal_dns(httpc_state_t *req, const char *server_name) +{ + err_t err; + LWIP_ASSERT("req != NULL", req != NULL); + +#if LWIP_DNS + err = dns_gethostbyname(server_name, &req->remote_addr, httpc_dns_found, req); +#else + err = ipaddr_aton(server_name, &req->remote_addr) ? ERR_OK : ERR_ARG; +#endif + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + /* cached or IP-string */ + err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &req->remote_addr); + } else if (err == ERR_INPROGRESS) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + return err; +} + +static int httpc_create_request_string(const httpc_connection_t *settings, const char *server_name, int server_port, const char *uri, + int use_host, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) +{ + if (settings->use_proxy) { + LWIP_ASSERT("server_name != NULL", server_name != NULL); + + if (server_port != HTTP_DEFAULT_PORT) { + return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_PORT_FORMAT(server_name, server_port, uri, server_name)); + } else { + return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, HTTPC_REQ_11_PROXY_FORMAT(server_name, uri, server_name)); + } + } else if (use_host) { + LWIP_ASSERT("server_name != NULL", server_name != NULL); + return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, HTTPC_REQ_11_HOST_FORMAT(uri, server_name)); + } else { + return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, HTTPC_REQ_11_FORMAT(uri)); + } +} + +/** Initialize the connection struct */ +static err_t httpc_init_connection_common(httpc_state_t **connection, const httpc_connection_t *settings, const char *server_name, + u16_t server_port, const char *uri, altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, int use_host) +{ + size_t alloc_len; + mem_size_t mem_alloc_len; + int req_len, req_len2; + httpc_state_t *req; +#if HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST + size_t server_name_len, uri_len; +#endif + + LWIP_ASSERT("uri != NULL", uri != NULL); + + /* get request len */ + req_len = httpc_create_request_string(settings, server_name, server_port, uri, use_host, NULL, 0); + + if ((req_len < 0) || (req_len > 0xFFFF)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* alloc state and request in one block */ + alloc_len = sizeof(httpc_state_t); +#if HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST + server_name_len = server_name ? strlen(server_name) : 0; + uri_len = strlen(uri); + alloc_len += server_name_len + 1 + uri_len + 1; +#endif + mem_alloc_len = (mem_size_t)alloc_len; + + if ((mem_alloc_len < alloc_len) || (req_len + 1 > 0xFFFF)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + req = (httpc_state_t *)mem_malloc((mem_size_t)alloc_len); + + if (req == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memset(req, 0, sizeof(httpc_state_t)); + req->timeout_ticks = HTTPC_POLL_TIMEOUT; + req->request = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(req_len + 1), PBUF_RAM); + + if (req->request == NULL) { + httpc_free_state(req); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (req->request->next != NULL) { + /* need a pbuf in one piece */ + httpc_free_state(req); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + req->hdr_content_len = HTTPC_CONTENT_LEN_INVALID; +#if HTTPC_DEBUG_REQUEST + req->server_name = (char *)(req + 1); + + if (server_name) { + memcpy(req->server_name, server_name, server_name_len + 1); + } + + req->uri = req->server_name + server_name_len + 1; + memcpy(req->uri, uri, uri_len + 1); +#endif + req->pcb = altcp_new(settings->altcp_allocator); + + if (req->pcb == NULL) { + httpc_free_state(req); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + req->remote_port = settings->use_proxy ? settings->proxy_port : server_port; + altcp_arg(req->pcb, req); + altcp_recv(req->pcb, httpc_tcp_recv); + altcp_err(req->pcb, httpc_tcp_err); + altcp_poll(req->pcb, httpc_tcp_poll, HTTPC_POLL_INTERVAL); + altcp_sent(req->pcb, httpc_tcp_sent); + + /* set up request buffer */ + req_len2 = httpc_create_request_string(settings, server_name, server_port, uri, use_host, + (char *)req->request->payload, req_len + 1); + + if (req_len2 != req_len) { + httpc_free_state(req); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + req->recv_fn = recv_fn; + req->conn_settings = settings; + req->callback_arg = callback_arg; + + *connection = req; + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Initialize the connection struct + */ +static err_t httpc_init_connection(httpc_state_t **connection, const httpc_connection_t *settings, const char *server_name, + u16_t server_port, const char *uri, altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg) +{ + return httpc_init_connection_common(connection, settings, server_name, server_port, uri, recv_fn, callback_arg, 1); +} + +/** + * Initialize the connection struct (from IP address) + */ +static err_t httpc_init_connection_addr(httpc_state_t **connection, const httpc_connection_t *settings, + const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t server_port, const char *uri, + altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg) +{ + char *server_addr_str = ipaddr_ntoa(server_addr); + + if (server_addr_str == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + return httpc_init_connection_common(connection, settings, server_addr_str, server_port, uri, + recv_fn, callback_arg, 1); +} + +/** + * @ingroup httpc + * HTTP client API: get a file by passing server IP address + * + * @param server_addr IP address of the server to connect + * @param port tcp port of the server + * @param uri uri to get from the server, remember leading "/"! + * @param settings connection settings (callbacks, proxy, etc.) + * @param recv_fn the http body (not the headers) are passed to this callback + * @param callback_arg argument passed to all the callbacks + * @param connection retreives the connection handle (to match in callbacks) + * @return ERR_OK if starting the request succeeds (callback_fn will be called later) + * or an error code + */ +err_t httpc_get_file(const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, + altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, httpc_state_t **connection) +{ + err_t err; + httpc_state_t *req; + + LWIP_ERROR("invalid parameters", (server_addr != NULL) && (uri != NULL) && (recv_fn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + err = httpc_init_connection_addr(&req, settings, server_addr, port, + uri, recv_fn, callback_arg); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + if (settings->use_proxy) { + err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &settings->proxy_addr); + } else { + err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, server_addr); + } + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + httpc_free_state(req); + return err; + } + + if (connection != NULL) { + *connection = req; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup httpc + * HTTP client API: get a file by passing server name as string (DNS name or IP address string) + * + * @param server_name server name as string (DNS name or IP address string) + * @param port tcp port of the server + * @param uri uri to get from the server, remember leading "/"! + * @param settings connection settings (callbacks, proxy, etc.) + * @param recv_fn the http body (not the headers) are passed to this callback + * @param callback_arg argument passed to all the callbacks + * @param connection retreives the connection handle (to match in callbacks) + * @return ERR_OK if starting the request succeeds (callback_fn will be called later) + * or an error code + */ +err_t httpc_get_file_dns(const char *server_name, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, + altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, httpc_state_t **connection) +{ + err_t err; + httpc_state_t *req; + + LWIP_ERROR("invalid parameters", (server_name != NULL) && (uri != NULL) && (recv_fn != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + err = httpc_init_connection(&req, settings, server_name, port, uri, recv_fn, callback_arg); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + if (settings->use_proxy) { + err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &settings->proxy_addr); + } else { + err = httpc_get_internal_dns(req, server_name); + } + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + httpc_free_state(req); + return err; + } + + if (connection != NULL) { + *connection = req; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO +/* Implementation to disk via fopen/fwrite/fclose follows */ + +typedef struct _httpc_filestate { + const char *local_file_name; + FILE *file; + httpc_connection_t settings; + const httpc_connection_t *client_settings; + void *callback_arg; +} httpc_filestate_t; + +static void httpc_fs_result(void *arg, httpc_result_t httpc_result, u32_t rx_content_len, + u32_t srv_res, err_t err); + +/** Initalize http client state for download to file system */ +static err_t httpc_fs_init(httpc_filestate_t **filestate_out, const char *local_file_name, + const httpc_connection_t *settings, void *callback_arg) +{ + httpc_filestate_t *filestate; + size_t file_len, alloc_len; + FILE *f; + + file_len = strlen(local_file_name); + alloc_len = sizeof(httpc_filestate_t) + file_len + 1; + + filestate = (httpc_filestate_t *)mem_malloc((mem_size_t)alloc_len); + + if (filestate == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memset(filestate, 0, sizeof(httpc_filestate_t)); + filestate->local_file_name = (const char *)(filestate + 1); + memcpy((char *)(filestate + 1), local_file_name, file_len + 1); + filestate->file = NULL; + filestate->client_settings = settings; + filestate->callback_arg = callback_arg; + /* copy client settings but override result callback */ + memcpy(&filestate->settings, settings, sizeof(httpc_connection_t)); + filestate->settings.result_fn = httpc_fs_result; + + f = fopen(local_file_name, "wb"); + + if (f == NULL) { + /* could not open file */ + mem_free(filestate); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + filestate->file = f; + *filestate_out = filestate; + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Free http client state for download to file system */ +static void httpc_fs_free(httpc_filestate_t *filestate) +{ + if (filestate != NULL) { + if (filestate->file != NULL) { + fclose(filestate->file); + filestate->file = NULL; + } + + mem_free(filestate); + } +} + +/** Connection closed (success or error) */ +static void httpc_fs_result(void *arg, httpc_result_t httpc_result, u32_t rx_content_len, + u32_t srv_res, err_t err) +{ + httpc_filestate_t *filestate = (httpc_filestate_t *)arg; + + if (filestate != NULL) { + if (filestate->client_settings->result_fn != NULL) { + filestate->client_settings->result_fn(filestate->callback_arg, httpc_result, rx_content_len, + srv_res, err); + } + + httpc_fs_free(filestate); + } +} + +/** tcp recv callback */ +static err_t httpc_fs_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + httpc_filestate_t *filestate = (httpc_filestate_t *)arg; + struct pbuf *q; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + + for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + fwrite(q->payload, 1, q->len, filestate->file); + } + + altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup httpc + * HTTP client API: get a file to disk by passing server IP address + * + * @param server_addr IP address of the server to connect + * @param port tcp port of the server + * @param uri uri to get from the server, remember leading "/"! + * @param settings connection settings (callbacks, proxy, etc.) + * @param callback_arg argument passed to all the callbacks + * @param connection retreives the connection handle (to match in callbacks) + * @return ERR_OK if starting the request succeeds (callback_fn will be called later) + * or an error code + */ +err_t httpc_get_file_to_disk(const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, + void *callback_arg, const char *local_file_name, httpc_state_t **connection) +{ + err_t err; + httpc_state_t *req; + httpc_filestate_t *filestate; + + LWIP_ERROR("invalid parameters", (server_addr != NULL) && (uri != NULL) && (local_file_name != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + err = httpc_fs_init(&filestate, local_file_name, settings, callback_arg); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + err = httpc_init_connection_addr(&req, &filestate->settings, server_addr, port, + uri, httpc_fs_tcp_recv, filestate); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + httpc_fs_free(filestate); + return err; + } + + if (settings->use_proxy) { + err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &settings->proxy_addr); + } else { + err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, server_addr); + } + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + httpc_fs_free(filestate); + httpc_free_state(req); + return err; + } + + if (connection != NULL) { + *connection = req; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup httpc + * HTTP client API: get a file to disk by passing server name as string (DNS name or IP address string) + * + * @param server_name server name as string (DNS name or IP address string) + * @param port tcp port of the server + * @param uri uri to get from the server, remember leading "/"! + * @param settings connection settings (callbacks, proxy, etc.) + * @param callback_arg argument passed to all the callbacks + * @param connection retreives the connection handle (to match in callbacks) + * @return ERR_OK if starting the request succeeds (callback_fn will be called later) + * or an error code + */ +err_t httpc_get_file_dns_to_disk(const char *server_name, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, + void *callback_arg, const char *local_file_name, httpc_state_t **connection) +{ + err_t err; + httpc_state_t *req; + httpc_filestate_t *filestate; + + LWIP_ERROR("invalid parameters", (server_name != NULL) && (uri != NULL) && (local_file_name != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + + err = httpc_fs_init(&filestate, local_file_name, settings, callback_arg); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + err = httpc_init_connection(&req, &filestate->settings, server_name, port, + uri, httpc_fs_tcp_recv, filestate); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + httpc_fs_free(filestate); + return err; + } + + if (settings->use_proxy) { + err = httpc_get_internal_addr(req, &settings->proxy_addr); + } else { + err = httpc_get_internal_dns(req, server_name); + } + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + httpc_fs_free(filestate); + httpc_free_state(req); + return err; + } + + if (connection != NULL) { + *connection = req; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO */ + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd.c index 16bab893..a7340f1c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd.c @@ -1,2931 +1,2931 @@ -/** - * @file - * LWIP HTTP server implementation - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -/** - * @defgroup httpd HTTP server - * @ingroup apps - * - * This httpd supports for a - * rudimentary server-side-include facility which will replace tags of the form - * in any file whose extension is .shtml, .shtm or .ssi with - * strings provided by an include handler whose pointer is provided to the - * module via function http_set_ssi_handler(). - * Additionally, a simple common - * gateway interface (CGI) handling mechanism has been added to allow clients - * to hook functions to particular request URIs. - * - * To enable SSI support, define label LWIP_HTTPD_SSI in lwipopts.h. - * To enable CGI support, define label LWIP_HTTPD_CGI in lwipopts.h. - * - * By default, the server assumes that HTTP headers are already present in - * each file stored in the file system. By defining LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS in - * lwipopts.h, this behavior can be changed such that the server inserts the - * headers automatically based on the extension of the file being served. If - * this mode is used, be careful to ensure that the file system image used - * does not already contain the header information. - * - * File system images without headers can be created using the makefsfile - * tool with the -h command line option. - * - * - * Notes about valid SSI tags - * -------------------------- - * - * The following assumptions are made about tags used in SSI markers: - * - * 1. No tag may contain '-' or whitespace characters within the tag name. - * 2. Whitespace is allowed between the tag leadin "". - * 3. The maximum tag name length is LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN, currently 8 characters. - * - * Notes on CGI usage - * ------------------ - * - * The simple CGI support offered here works with GET method requests only - * and can handle up to 16 parameters encoded into the URI. The handler - * function may not write directly to the HTTP output but must return a - * filename that the HTTP server will send to the browser as a response to - * the incoming CGI request. - * - * - * - * The list of supported file types is quite short, so if makefsdata complains - * about an unknown extension, make sure to add it (and its doctype) to - * the 'g_psHTTPHeaders' list. - */ -#include "lwip/init.h" -#include "lwip/apps/httpd.h" -#include "lwip/debug.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" -#include "httpd_structs.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" -#if HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS -#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" -#endif -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif -#if LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING */ - -#include /* memset */ -#include /* atoi */ -#include - -#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API - -/** Minimum length for a valid HTTP/0.9 request: "GET /\r\n" -> 7 bytes */ -#define MIN_REQ_LEN 7 - -#define CRLF "\r\n" -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE -#define HTTP11_CONNECTIONKEEPALIVE "Connection: keep-alive" -#define HTTP11_CONNECTIONKEEPALIVE2 "Connection: Keep-Alive" -#endif - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ -#define HTTP_IS_DYNAMIC_FILE(hs) ((hs)->buf != NULL) -#else -#define HTTP_IS_DYNAMIC_FILE(hs) 0 -#endif - -/* This defines checks whether tcp_write has to copy data or not */ - -#ifndef HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE -/** tcp_write does not have to copy data when sent from rom-file-system directly */ -#define HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs) (HTTP_IS_DYNAMIC_FILE(hs) ? TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY : 0) -#endif -/** Default: dynamic headers are sent from ROM (non-dynamic headers are handled like file data) */ -#ifndef HTTP_IS_HDR_VOLATILE -#define HTTP_IS_HDR_VOLATILE(hs, ptr) 0 -#endif - -/* Return values for http_send_*() */ -#define HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_FREED 3 -#define HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_BREAK 2 -#define HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_CONTINUE 1 -#define HTTP_NO_DATA_TO_SEND 0 - -typedef struct -{ - const char *name; - u8_t shtml; -} default_filename; - -static const default_filename httpd_default_filenames[] = { - { "/index.shtml", 1 }, - { "/index.ssi", 1 }, - { "/index.shtm", 1 }, - { "/index.html", 0 }, - { "/index.htm", 0 } -}; - -#define NUM_DEFAULT_FILENAMES LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(httpd_default_filenames) - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST -/** HTTP request is copied here from pbufs for simple parsing */ -static char httpd_req_buf[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH + 1]; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST -#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MAX_RESPONSE_URI_LEN > LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN -#define LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MAX_RESPONSE_URI_LEN -#endif -#endif -#ifndef LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN -#define LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN -#endif -#if LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN -/* Filename for response file to send when POST is finished or - * search for default files when a directory is requested. */ -static char http_uri_buf[LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN + 1]; -#endif - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS -/* The number of individual strings that comprise the headers sent before each - * requested file. - */ -#define NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS 5 -#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS 0 /* e.g. "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n" */ -#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_SERVER_NAME 1 /* e.g. "Server: "HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT"\r\n" */ -#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE 2 /* e.g. "Content-Length: xy\r\n" and/or "Connection: keep-alive\r\n" */ -#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_NR 3 /* the byte count, when content-length is used */ -#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE 4 /* the content type (or default answer content type including default document) */ - -/* The dynamically generated Content-Length buffer needs space for CRLF + NULL */ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_OFFSET 3 -#ifndef LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE -/* The dynamically generated Content-Length buffer shall be able to work with - ~953 MB (9 digits) */ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE (9 + LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_OFFSET) -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - -#define HTTPD_LAST_TAG_PART 0xFFFF - -enum tag_check_state { - TAG_NONE, /* Not processing an SSI tag */ - TAG_LEADIN, /* Tag lead in "" being processed */ - TAG_SENDING /* Sending tag replacement string */ -}; - -struct http_ssi_state { - const char *parsed; /* Pointer to the first unparsed byte in buf. */ -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG - const char *tag_started; /* Pointer to the first opening '<' of the tag. */ -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG */ - const char *tag_end; /* Pointer to char after the closing '>' of the tag. */ - u32_t parse_left; /* Number of unparsed bytes in buf. */ - u16_t tag_index; /* Counter used by tag parsing state machine */ - u16_t tag_insert_len; /* Length of insert in string tag_insert */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART - u16_t tag_part; /* Counter passed to and changed by tag insertion function to insert multiple times */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ - u8_t tag_type; /* index into http_ssi_tag_desc array */ - u8_t tag_name_len; /* Length of the tag name in string tag_name */ - char tag_name[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN + 1]; /* Last tag name extracted */ - char tag_insert[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN + 1]; /* Insert string for tag_name */ - enum tag_check_state tag_state; /* State of the tag processor */ -}; - -struct http_ssi_tag_description { - const char *lead_in; - const char *lead_out; -}; - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - -struct http_state { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED - struct http_state *next; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ - struct fs_file file_handle; - struct fs_file *handle; - const char *file; /* Pointer to first unsent byte in buf. */ - - struct altcp_pcb *pcb; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST - struct pbuf *req; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ - char *buf; /* File read buffer. */ - int buf_len; /* Size of file read buffer, buf. */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ - u32_t left; /* Number of unsent bytes in buf. */ - u8_t retries; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE - u8_t keepalive; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - struct http_ssi_state *ssi; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI - char *params[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS]; /* Params extracted from the request URI */ - char *param_vals[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS]; /* Values for each extracted param */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS - const char *hdrs[NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS]; /* HTTP headers to be sent. */ - char hdr_content_len[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE]; - u16_t hdr_pos; /* The position of the first unsent header byte in the - current string */ - u16_t hdr_index; /* The index of the hdr string currently being sent. */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING - u32_t time_started; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - u32_t post_content_len_left; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - u32_t unrecved_bytes; - u8_t no_auto_wnd; - u8_t post_finished; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST*/ -}; - -#if HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL -LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(HTTPD_STATE, MEMP_NUM_PARALLEL_HTTPD_CONNS, sizeof(struct http_state), "HTTPD_STATE") -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI -LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(HTTPD_SSI_STATE, MEMP_NUM_PARALLEL_HTTPD_SSI_CONNS, sizeof(struct http_ssi_state), "HTTPD_SSI_STATE") -#define HTTP_FREE_SSI_STATE(x) LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(HTTPD_SSI_STATE, (x)) -#define HTTP_ALLOC_SSI_STATE() (struct http_ssi_state *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(HTTPD_SSI_STATE) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ -#define HTTP_ALLOC_HTTP_STATE() (struct http_state *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(HTTPD_STATE) -#define HTTP_FREE_HTTP_STATE(x) LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(HTTPD_STATE, (x)) -#else /* HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL */ -#define HTTP_ALLOC_HTTP_STATE() (struct http_state *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct http_state)) -#define HTTP_FREE_HTTP_STATE(x) mem_free(x) -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI -#define HTTP_ALLOC_SSI_STATE() (struct http_ssi_state *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct http_ssi_state)) -#define HTTP_FREE_SSI_STATE(x) mem_free(x) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ -#endif /* HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL */ - -static err_t http_close_conn(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs); -static err_t http_close_or_abort_conn(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs, u8_t abort_conn); -static err_t http_find_file(struct http_state *hs, const char *uri, int is_09); -static err_t http_init_file(struct http_state *hs, struct fs_file *file, int is_09, const char *uri, u8_t tag_check, char *params); -static err_t http_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb); -static u8_t http_check_eof(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ -static void http_continue(void *connection); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI -/* SSI insert handler function pointer. */ -static tSSIHandler httpd_ssi_handler; -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW -static int httpd_num_tags; -static const char **httpd_tags; -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - -/* Define the available tag lead-ins and corresponding lead-outs. - * ATTENTION: for the algorithm below using this array, it is essential - * that the lead in differs in the first character! */ -const struct http_ssi_tag_description http_ssi_tag_desc[] = { - { "" }, - { "/*#", "*/" } -}; - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI -/* CGI handler information */ -static const tCGI *httpd_cgis; -static int httpd_num_cgis; -static int http_cgi_paramcount; -#define http_cgi_params hs->params -#define http_cgi_param_vals hs->param_vals -#elif LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI -static char *http_cgi_params[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS]; /* Params extracted from the request URI */ -static char *http_cgi_param_vals[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS]; /* Values for each extracted param */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED -/** global list of active HTTP connections, use to kill the oldest when - running out of memory */ -static struct http_state *http_connections; - -static void http_add_connection(struct http_state *hs) -{ - /* add the connection to the list */ - hs->next = http_connections; - http_connections = hs; -} - -static void http_remove_connection(struct http_state *hs) -{ - /* take the connection off the list */ - if (http_connections) { - if (http_connections == hs) { - http_connections = hs->next; - } else { - struct http_state *last; - - for (last = http_connections; last->next != NULL; last = last->next) { - if (last->next == hs) { - last->next = hs->next; - break; - } - } - } - } -} - -static void http_kill_oldest_connection(u8_t ssi_required) -{ - struct http_state *hs = http_connections; - struct http_state *hs_free_next = NULL; - - while (hs && hs->next) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - - if (ssi_required) { - if (hs->next->ssi != NULL) { - hs_free_next = hs; - } - } else -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ssi_required); - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - { - hs_free_next = hs; - } - LWIP_ASSERT("broken list", hs != hs->next); - hs = hs->next; - } - - if (hs_free_next != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("hs_free_next->next != NULL", hs_free_next->next != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("hs_free_next->next->pcb != NULL", hs_free_next->next->pcb != NULL); - /* send RST when killing a connection because of memory shortage */ - http_close_or_abort_conn(hs_free_next->next->pcb, hs_free_next->next, 1); /* this also unlinks the http_state from the list */ - } -} -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ - -#define http_add_connection(hs) -#define http_remove_connection(hs) - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI -/** Allocate as struct http_ssi_state. */ -static struct http_ssi_state *http_ssi_state_alloc(void) -{ - struct http_ssi_state *ret = HTTP_ALLOC_SSI_STATE(); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED - - if (ret == NULL) { - http_kill_oldest_connection(1); - ret = HTTP_ALLOC_SSI_STATE(); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ - - if (ret != NULL) { - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(struct http_ssi_state)); - } - - return ret; -} - -/** Free a struct http_ssi_state. */ -static void http_ssi_state_free(struct http_ssi_state *ssi) -{ - if (ssi != NULL) { - HTTP_FREE_SSI_STATE(ssi); - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - -/** Initialize a struct http_state. - */ -static void http_state_init(struct http_state *hs) -{ - /* Initialize the structure. */ - memset(hs, 0, sizeof(struct http_state)); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS - /* Indicate that the headers are not yet valid */ - hs->hdr_index = NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ -} - -/** Allocate a struct http_state. */ -static struct http_state *http_state_alloc(void) -{ - struct http_state *ret = HTTP_ALLOC_HTTP_STATE(); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED - - if (ret == NULL) { - http_kill_oldest_connection(0); - ret = HTTP_ALLOC_HTTP_STATE(); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ - - if (ret != NULL) { - http_state_init(ret); - http_add_connection(ret); - } - - return ret; -} - -/** Free a struct http_state. - * Also frees the file data if dynamic. - */ -static void http_state_eof(struct http_state *hs) -{ - if (hs->handle) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING - u32_t ms_needed = sys_now() - hs->time_started; - u32_t needed = LWIP_MAX(1, (ms_needed / 100)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG_TIMING, ("httpd: needed %" U32_F " ms to send file of %d bytes -> %" U32_F " bytes/sec\n", - ms_needed, hs->handle->len, ((((u32_t)hs->handle->len) * 10) / needed))); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING */ - fs_close(hs->handle); - hs->handle = NULL; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ - - if (hs->buf != NULL) { - mem_free(hs->buf); - hs->buf = NULL; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - - if (hs->ssi) { - http_ssi_state_free(hs->ssi); - hs->ssi = NULL; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST - - if (hs->req) { - pbuf_free(hs->req); - hs->req = NULL; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ -} - -/** Free a struct http_state. - * Also frees the file data if dynamic. - */ -static void http_state_free(struct http_state *hs) -{ - if (hs != NULL) { - http_state_eof(hs); - http_remove_connection(hs); - HTTP_FREE_HTTP_STATE(hs); - } -} - -/** Call tcp_write() in a loop trying smaller and smaller length - * - * @param pcb altcp_pcb to send - * @param ptr Data to send - * @param length Length of data to send (in/out: on return, contains the - * amount of data sent) - * @param apiflags directly passed to tcp_write - * @return the return value of tcp_write - */ -static err_t http_write(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, const void *ptr, u16_t *length, u8_t apiflags) -{ - u16_t len, max_len; - err_t err; - LWIP_ASSERT("length != NULL", length != NULL); - len = *length; - - if (len == 0) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* We cannot send more data than space available in the send buffer. */ - max_len = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); - - if (max_len < len) { - len = max_len; - } - -#ifdef HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN - /* Additional limitation: e.g. don't enqueue more than 2*mss at once */ - max_len = HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN(pcb); - - if (len > max_len) { - len = max_len; - } - -#endif /* HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN */ - - do { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Trying to send %d bytes\n", len)); - err = altcp_write(pcb, ptr, len, apiflags); - - if (err == ERR_MEM) { - if ((altcp_sndbuf(pcb) == 0) || - (altcp_sndqueuelen(pcb) >= TCP_SND_QUEUELEN)) { - /* no need to try smaller sizes */ - len = 1; - } else { - len /= 2; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("Send failed, trying less (%d bytes)\n", len)); - } - } while ((err == ERR_MEM) && (len > 1)); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Sent %d bytes\n", len)); - *length = len; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Send failed with err %d (\"%s\")\n", err, lwip_strerr(err))); - *length = 0; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE - /* ensure nagle is normally enabled (only disabled for persistent connections - when all data has been enqueued but the connection stays open for the next - request */ - altcp_nagle_enable(pcb); -#endif - - return err; -} - -/** - * The connection shall be actively closed (using RST to close from fault states). - * Reset the sent- and recv-callbacks. - * - * @param pcb the tcp pcb to reset callbacks - * @param hs connection state to free - */ -static err_t http_close_or_abort_conn(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs, u8_t abort_conn) -{ - err_t err; - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Closing connection %p\n", (void *)pcb)); - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - - if (hs != NULL) { - if ((hs->post_content_len_left != 0) -#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - || ((hs->no_auto_wnd != 0) && (hs->unrecved_bytes != 0)) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ - ) { - /* make sure the post code knows that the connection is closed */ - http_uri_buf[0] = 0; - httpd_post_finished(hs, http_uri_buf, LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN); - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST*/ - - altcp_arg(pcb, NULL); - altcp_recv(pcb, NULL); - altcp_err(pcb, NULL); - altcp_poll(pcb, NULL, 0); - altcp_sent(pcb, NULL); - - if (hs != NULL) { - http_state_free(hs); - } - - if (abort_conn) { - altcp_abort(pcb); - return ERR_OK; - } - - err = altcp_close(pcb); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Error %d closing %p\n", err, (void *)pcb)); - /* error closing, try again later in poll */ - altcp_poll(pcb, http_poll, HTTPD_POLL_INTERVAL); - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * The connection shall be actively closed. - * Reset the sent- and recv-callbacks. - * - * @param pcb the tcp pcb to reset callbacks - * @param hs connection state to free - */ -static err_t http_close_conn(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) -{ - return http_close_or_abort_conn(pcb, hs, 0); -} - -/** End of file: either close the connection (Connection: close) or - * close the file (Connection: keep-alive) - */ -static void http_eof(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) -{ - /* HTTP/1.1 persistent connection? (Not supported for SSI) */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE - if (hs->keepalive) { - http_remove_connection(hs); - - http_state_eof(hs); - http_state_init(hs); - /* restore state: */ - hs->pcb = pcb; - hs->keepalive = 1; - http_add_connection(hs); - /* ensure nagle doesn't interfere with sending all data as fast as possible: */ - altcp_nagle_disable(pcb); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ - { - http_close_conn(pcb, hs); - } -} - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI -/** - * Extract URI parameters from the parameter-part of an URI in the form - * "test.cgi?x=y" @todo: better explanation! - * Pointers to the parameters are stored in hs->param_vals. - * - * @param hs http connection state - * @param params pointer to the NULL-terminated parameter string from the URI - * @return number of parameters extracted - */ -static int extract_uri_parameters(struct http_state *hs, char *params) -{ - char *pair; - char *equals; - int loop; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hs); - - /* If we have no parameters at all, return immediately. */ - if (!params || (params[0] == '\0')) { - return (0); - } - - /* Get a pointer to our first parameter */ - pair = params; - - /* Parse up to LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS from the passed string and ignore the - * remainder (if any) */ - for (loop = 0; (loop < LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS) && pair; loop++) { - /* Save the name of the parameter */ - http_cgi_params[loop] = pair; - - /* Remember the start of this name=value pair */ - equals = pair; - - /* Find the start of the next name=value pair and replace the delimiter - * with a 0 to terminate the previous pair string. */ - pair = strchr(pair, '&'); - - if (pair) { - *pair = '\0'; - pair++; - } else { - /* We didn't find a new parameter so find the end of the URI and - * replace the space with a '\0' */ - pair = strchr(equals, ' '); - - if (pair) { - *pair = '\0'; - } - - /* Revert to NULL so that we exit the loop as expected. */ - pair = NULL; - } - - /* Now find the '=' in the previous pair, replace it with '\0' and save - * the parameter value string. */ - equals = strchr(equals, '='); - - if (equals) { - *equals = '\0'; - http_cgi_param_vals[loop] = equals + 1; - } else { - http_cgi_param_vals[loop] = NULL; - } - } - - return loop; -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI -/** - * Insert a tag (found in an shtml in the form of "" into the file. - * The tag's name is stored in ssi->tag_name (NULL-terminated), the replacement - * should be written to hs->tag_insert (up to a length of LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN). - * The amount of data written is stored to ssi->tag_insert_len. - * - * @todo: return tag_insert_len - maybe it can be removed from struct http_state? - * - * @param hs http connection state - */ -static void get_tag_insert(struct http_state *hs) -{ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW - const char *tag; -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - int tag; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - size_t len; - struct http_ssi_state *ssi; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART - u16_t current_tag_part; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("hs != NULL", hs != NULL); - ssi = hs->ssi; - LWIP_ASSERT("ssi != NULL", ssi != NULL); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART - current_tag_part = ssi->tag_part; - ssi->tag_part = HTTPD_LAST_TAG_PART; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW - tag = ssi->tag_name; -#endif - - if (httpd_ssi_handler -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW - && httpd_tags && httpd_num_tags -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - ) { - - /* Find this tag in the list we have been provided. */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW - { -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - - for (tag = 0; tag < httpd_num_tags; tag++) { - if (strcmp(ssi->tag_name, httpd_tags[tag]) == 0) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - { - ssi->tag_insert_len = httpd_ssi_handler(tag, ssi->tag_insert, - LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART - , - current_tag_part, &ssi->tag_part -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE - , - (hs->handle ? hs->handle->state : NULL) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ - ); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW - - if (ssi->tag_insert_len != HTTPD_SSI_TAG_UNKNOWN) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - { - return; - } - } - } - } - - /* If we drop out, we were asked to serve a page which contains tags that - * we don't have a handler for. Merely echo back the tags with an error - * marker. */ -#define UNKNOWN_TAG1_TEXT "***UNKNOWN TAG " -#define UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN 18 -#define UNKNOWN_TAG2_TEXT "***" -#define UNKNOWN_TAG2_LEN 7 - len = LWIP_MIN(sizeof(ssi->tag_name), LWIP_MIN(strlen(ssi->tag_name), - LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN - (UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN + UNKNOWN_TAG2_LEN))); - MEMCPY(ssi->tag_insert, UNKNOWN_TAG1_TEXT, UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN); - MEMCPY(&ssi->tag_insert[UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN], ssi->tag_name, len); - MEMCPY(&ssi->tag_insert[UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN + len], UNKNOWN_TAG2_TEXT, UNKNOWN_TAG2_LEN); - ssi->tag_insert[UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN + len + UNKNOWN_TAG2_LEN] = 0; - - len = strlen(ssi->tag_insert); - LWIP_ASSERT("len <= 0xffff", len <= 0xffff); - ssi->tag_insert_len = (u16_t)len; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS -/** - * Generate the relevant HTTP headers for the given filename and write - * them into the supplied buffer. - */ -static void get_http_headers(struct http_state *hs, const char *uri) -{ - size_t content_type; - char *tmp; - char *ext; - char *vars; - - /* In all cases, the second header we send is the server identification - so set it here. */ - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_SERVER_NAME] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_SERVER]; - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] = NULL; - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_NR] = NULL; - - /* Is this a normal file or the special case we use to send back the - default "404: Page not found" response? */ - if (uri == NULL) { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND]; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE - - if (hs->keepalive) { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[DEFAULT_404_HTML_PERSISTENT]; - } else -#endif - { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[DEFAULT_404_HTML]; - } - - /* Set up to send the first header string. */ - hs->hdr_index = 0; - hs->hdr_pos = 0; - return; - } - - /* We are dealing with a particular filename. Look for one other - special case. We assume that any filename with "404" in it must be - indicative of a 404 server error whereas all other files require - the 200 OK header. */ - if (strstr(uri, "404")) { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND]; - } else if (strstr(uri, "400")) { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST]; - } else if (strstr(uri, "501")) { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL]; - } else { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_OK]; - } - - /* Determine if the URI has any variables and, if so, temporarily remove - them. */ - vars = strchr(uri, '?'); - - if (vars) { - *vars = '\0'; - } - - /* Get a pointer to the file extension. We find this by looking for the - last occurrence of "." in the filename passed. */ - ext = NULL; - tmp = strchr(uri, '.'); - - while (tmp) { - ext = tmp + 1; - tmp = strchr(ext, '.'); - } - - if (ext != NULL) { - /* Now determine the content type and add the relevant header for that. */ - for (content_type = 0; content_type < NUM_HTTP_HEADERS; content_type++) { - /* Have we found a matching extension? */ - if (!lwip_stricmp(g_psHTTPHeaders[content_type].extension, ext)) { - break; - } - } - } else { - content_type = NUM_HTTP_HEADERS; - } - - /* Reinstate the parameter marker if there was one in the original URI. */ - if (vars) { - *vars = '?'; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_OMIT_HEADER_FOR_EXTENSIONLESS_URI - - /* Does the URL passed have any file extension? If not, we assume it - is a special-case URL used for control state notification and we do - not send any HTTP headers with the response. */ - if (!ext) { - /* Force the header index to a value indicating that all headers - have already been sent. */ - hs->hdr_index = NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS; - return; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_OMIT_HEADER_FOR_EXTENSIONLESS_URI */ - - /* Did we find a matching extension? */ - if (content_type < NUM_HTTP_HEADERS) { - /* yes, store it */ - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = g_psHTTPHeaders[content_type].content_type; - } else if (!ext) { - /* no, no extension found -> use binary transfer to prevent the browser adding '.txt' on save */ - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = HTTP_HDR_APP; - } else { - /* No - use the default, plain text file type. */ - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = HTTP_HDR_DEFAULT_TYPE; - } - - /* Set up to send the first header string. */ - hs->hdr_index = 0; - hs->hdr_pos = 0; -} - -/* Add content-length header? */ -static void get_http_content_length(struct http_state *hs) -{ - u8_t add_content_len = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT("already been here?", hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] == NULL); - - add_content_len = 0; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - - if (hs->ssi == NULL) /* @todo: get maximum file length from SSI */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - { - if ((hs->handle != NULL) && (hs->handle->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT)) { - add_content_len = 1; - } - } - - if (add_content_len) { - size_t len; - lwip_itoa(hs->hdr_content_len, (size_t)LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE, - hs->handle->len); - len = strlen(hs->hdr_content_len); - - if (len <= LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE - LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_OFFSET) { - SMEMCPY(&hs->hdr_content_len[len], CRLF, 3); - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_NR] = hs->hdr_content_len; - } else { - add_content_len = 0; - } - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE - - if (add_content_len) { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_KEEPALIVE_LEN]; - } else { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONN_CLOSE]; - hs->keepalive = 0; - } - -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ - - if (add_content_len) { - hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LENGTH]; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ -} - -/** Sub-function of http_send(): send dynamic headers - * - * @returns: - HTTP_NO_DATA_TO_SEND: no new data has been enqueued - * - HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_CONTINUE: continue with sending HTTP body - * - HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_BREAK: data has been enqueued, headers pending, - * so don't send HTTP body yet - * - HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_FREED: http_state and pcb are already freed - */ -static u8_t http_send_headers(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) -{ - err_t err; - u16_t len; - u8_t data_to_send = HTTP_NO_DATA_TO_SEND; - u16_t hdrlen, sendlen; - - if (hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] == NULL) { - /* set up "content-length" and "connection:" headers */ - get_http_content_length(hs); - } - - /* How much data can we send? */ - len = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); - sendlen = len; - - while (len && (hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) && sendlen) { - const void *ptr; - u16_t old_sendlen; - u8_t apiflags; - /* How much do we have to send from the current header? */ - hdrlen = (u16_t)strlen(hs->hdrs[hs->hdr_index]); - - /* How much of this can we send? */ - sendlen = (len < (hdrlen - hs->hdr_pos)) ? len : (hdrlen - hs->hdr_pos); - - /* Send this amount of data or as much as we can given memory - * constraints. */ - ptr = (const void *)(hs->hdrs[hs->hdr_index] + hs->hdr_pos); - old_sendlen = sendlen; - apiflags = HTTP_IS_HDR_VOLATILE(hs, ptr); - - if (hs->hdr_index == HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_NR) { - /* content-length is always volatile */ - apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY; - } - - if (hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS - 1) { - apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; - } - - err = http_write(pcb, ptr, &sendlen, apiflags); - - if ((err == ERR_OK) && (old_sendlen != sendlen)) { - /* Remember that we added some more data to be transmitted. */ - data_to_send = HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_CONTINUE; - } else if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* special case: http_write does not try to send 1 byte */ - sendlen = 0; - } - - /* Fix up the header position for the next time round. */ - hs->hdr_pos += sendlen; - len -= sendlen; - - /* Have we finished sending this string? */ - if (hs->hdr_pos == hdrlen) { - /* Yes - move on to the next one */ - hs->hdr_index++; - - /* skip headers that are NULL (not all headers are required) */ - while ((hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) && - (hs->hdrs[hs->hdr_index] == NULL)) { - hs->hdr_index++; - } - - hs->hdr_pos = 0; - } - } - - if ((hs->hdr_index >= NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) && (hs->file == NULL)) { - /* When we are at the end of the headers, check for data to send - * instead of waiting for ACK from remote side to continue - * (which would happen when sending files from async read). */ - if (http_check_eof(pcb, hs)) { - data_to_send = HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_BREAK; - } else { - /* At this point, for non-keepalive connections, hs is deallocated an - pcb is closed. */ - return HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_FREED; - } - } - - /* If we get here and there are still header bytes to send, we send - * the header information we just wrote immediately. If there are no - * more headers to send, but we do have file data to send, drop through - * to try to send some file data too. */ - if ((hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) || !hs->file) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("tcp_output\n")); - return HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_BREAK; - } - - return data_to_send; -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ - -/** Sub-function of http_send(): end-of-file (or block) is reached, - * either close the file or read the next block (if supported). - * - * @returns: 0 if the file is finished or no data has been read - * 1 if the file is not finished and data has been read - */ -static u8_t http_check_eof(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) -{ - int bytes_left; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ - int count; -#ifdef HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN - int max_write_len; -#endif /* HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ - - /* Do we have a valid file handle? */ - if (hs->handle == NULL) { - /* No - close the connection. */ - http_eof(pcb, hs); - return 0; - } - - bytes_left = fs_bytes_left(hs->handle); - - if (bytes_left <= 0) { - /* We reached the end of the file so this request is done. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("End of file.\n")); - http_eof(pcb, hs); - return 0; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ - - /* Do we already have a send buffer allocated? */ - if (hs->buf) { - /* Yes - get the length of the buffer */ - count = LWIP_MIN(hs->buf_len, bytes_left); - } else { - /* We don't have a send buffer so allocate one now */ - count = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); - - if (bytes_left < count) { - count = bytes_left; - } - -#ifdef HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN - /* Additional limitation: e.g. don't enqueue more than 2*mss at once */ - max_write_len = HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN(pcb); - - if (count > max_write_len) { - count = max_write_len; - } - -#endif /* HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN */ - - do { - hs->buf = (char *)mem_malloc((mem_size_t)count); - - if (hs->buf != NULL) { - hs->buf_len = count; - break; - } - - count = count / 2; - } while (count > 100); - - /* Did we get a send buffer? If not, return immediately. */ - if (hs->buf == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("No buff\n")); - return 0; - } - } - - /* Read a block of data from the file. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Trying to read %d bytes.\n", count)); - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ - count = fs_read_async(hs->handle, hs->buf, count, http_continue, hs); -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ - count = fs_read(hs->handle, hs->buf, count); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ - - if (count < 0) { - if (count == FS_READ_DELAYED) { - /* Delayed read, wait for FS to unblock us */ - return 0; - } - - /* We reached the end of the file so this request is done. - * @todo: close here for HTTP/1.1 when reading file fails */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("End of file.\n")); - http_eof(pcb, hs); - return 0; - } - - /* Set up to send the block of data we just read */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Read %d bytes.\n", count)); - hs->left = count; - hs->file = hs->buf; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - - if (hs->ssi) { - hs->ssi->parse_left = count; - hs->ssi->parsed = hs->buf; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ - LWIP_ASSERT("SSI and DYNAMIC_HEADERS turned off but eof not reached", 0); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI || LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ - return 1; -} - -/** Sub-function of http_send(): This is the normal send-routine for non-ssi files - * - * @returns: - 1: data has been written (so call tcp_ouput) - * - 0: no data has been written (no need to call tcp_output) - */ -static u8_t http_send_data_nonssi(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) -{ - err_t err; - u16_t len; - u8_t data_to_send = 0; - - /* We are not processing an SHTML file so no tag checking is necessary. - * Just send the data as we received it from the file. */ - len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(hs->left, 0xffff); - - err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - data_to_send = 1; - hs->file += len; - hs->left -= len; - } - - return data_to_send; -} - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI -/** Sub-function of http_send(): This is the send-routine for ssi files - * - * @returns: - 1: data has been written (so call tcp_ouput) - * - 0: no data has been written (no need to call tcp_output) - */ -static u8_t http_send_data_ssi(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) -{ - err_t err = ERR_OK; - u16_t len; - u8_t data_to_send = 0; - u8_t tag_type; - - struct http_ssi_state *ssi = hs->ssi; - LWIP_ASSERT("ssi != NULL", ssi != NULL); - /* We are processing an SHTML file so need to scan for tags and replace - * them with insert strings. We need to be careful here since a tag may - * straddle the boundary of two blocks read from the file and we may also - * have to split the insert string between two tcp_write operations. */ - - /* How much data could we send? */ - len = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); - - /* Do we have remaining data to send before parsing more? */ - if (ssi->parsed > hs->file) { - len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->parsed - hs->file, 0xffff); - - err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - data_to_send = 1; - hs->file += len; - hs->left -= len; - } - - /* If the send buffer is full, return now. */ - if (altcp_sndbuf(pcb) == 0) { - return data_to_send; - } - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("State %d, %d left\n", ssi->tag_state, (int)ssi->parse_left)); - - /* We have sent all the data that was already parsed so continue parsing - * the buffer contents looking for SSI tags. */ - while (((ssi->tag_state == TAG_SENDING) || ssi->parse_left) && (err == ERR_OK)) { - if (len == 0) { - return data_to_send; - } - - switch (ssi->tag_state) { - case TAG_NONE: - - /* We are not currently processing an SSI tag so scan for the - * start of the lead-in marker. */ - for (tag_type = 0; tag_type < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(http_ssi_tag_desc); tag_type++) { - if (*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[tag_type].lead_in[0]) { - /* We found what could be the lead-in for a new tag so change - * state appropriately. */ - ssi->tag_type = tag_type; - ssi->tag_state = TAG_LEADIN; - ssi->tag_index = 1; -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG - ssi->tag_started = ssi->parsed; -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG */ - break; - } - } - - /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ - ssi->parse_left--; - ssi->parsed++; - break; - - case TAG_LEADIN: - - /* We are processing the lead-in marker, looking for the start of - * the tag name. */ - - /* Have we reached the end of the leadin? */ - if (http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_in[ssi->tag_index] == 0) { - ssi->tag_index = 0; - ssi->tag_state = TAG_FOUND; - } else { - /* Have we found the next character we expect for the tag leadin? */ - if (*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_in[ssi->tag_index]) { - /* Yes - move to the next one unless we have found the complete - * leadin, in which case we start looking for the tag itself */ - ssi->tag_index++; - } else { - /* We found an unexpected character so this is not a tag. Move - * back to idle state. */ - ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; - } - - /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ - ssi->parse_left--; - ssi->parsed++; - } - - break; - - case TAG_FOUND: - - /* We are reading the tag name, looking for the start of the - * lead-out marker and removing any whitespace found. */ - - /* Remove leading whitespace between the tag leading and the first - * tag name character. */ - if ((ssi->tag_index == 0) && ((*ssi->parsed == ' ') || - (*ssi->parsed == '\t') || (*ssi->parsed == '\n') || - (*ssi->parsed == '\r'))) { - /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ - ssi->parse_left--; - ssi->parsed++; - break; - } - - /* Have we found the end of the tag name? This is signalled by - * us finding the first leadout character or whitespace */ - if ((*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_out[0]) || - (*ssi->parsed == ' ') || (*ssi->parsed == '\t') || - (*ssi->parsed == '\n') || (*ssi->parsed == '\r')) { - if (ssi->tag_index == 0) { - /* We read a zero length tag so ignore it. */ - ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; - } else { - /* We read a non-empty tag so go ahead and look for the - * leadout string. */ - ssi->tag_state = TAG_LEADOUT; - LWIP_ASSERT("ssi->tag_index <= 0xff", ssi->tag_index <= 0xff); - ssi->tag_name_len = (u8_t)ssi->tag_index; - ssi->tag_name[ssi->tag_index] = '\0'; - - if (*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_out[0]) { - ssi->tag_index = 1; - } else { - ssi->tag_index = 0; - } - } - } else { - /* This character is part of the tag name so save it */ - if (ssi->tag_index < LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN) { - ssi->tag_name[ssi->tag_index++] = *ssi->parsed; - } else { - /* The tag was too long so ignore it. */ - ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; - } - } - - /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ - ssi->parse_left--; - ssi->parsed++; - - break; - - /* We are looking for the end of the lead-out marker. */ - case TAG_LEADOUT: - - /* Remove leading whitespace between the tag leading and the first - * tag leadout character. */ - if ((ssi->tag_index == 0) && ((*ssi->parsed == ' ') || - (*ssi->parsed == '\t') || (*ssi->parsed == '\n') || - (*ssi->parsed == '\r'))) { - /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ - ssi->parse_left--; - ssi->parsed++; - break; - } - - /* Have we found the next character we expect for the tag leadout? */ - if (*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_out[ssi->tag_index]) { - /* Yes - move to the next one unless we have found the complete - * leadout, in which case we need to call the client to process - * the tag. */ - - /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ - ssi->parse_left--; - ssi->parsed++; - ssi->tag_index++; - - if (http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_out[ssi->tag_index] == 0) { - /* Call the client to ask for the insert string for the - * tag we just found. */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART - ssi->tag_part = 0; /* start with tag part 0 */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ - get_tag_insert(hs); - - /* Next time through, we are going to be sending data - * immediately, either the end of the block we start - * sending here or the insert string. */ - ssi->tag_index = 0; - ssi->tag_state = TAG_SENDING; - ssi->tag_end = ssi->parsed; -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG - ssi->parsed = ssi->tag_started; -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ - - /* If there is any unsent data in the buffer prior to the - * tag, we need to send it now. */ - if (ssi->tag_end > hs->file) { - /* How much of the data can we send? */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG - len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->tag_end - hs->file, 0xffff); -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ - /* we would include the tag in sending */ - len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->tag_started - hs->file, 0xffff); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ - - err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - data_to_send = 1; -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG - - if (ssi->tag_started <= hs->file) { - /* pretend to have sent the tag, too */ - len += (u16_t)(ssi->tag_end - ssi->tag_started); - } - -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ - hs->file += len; - hs->left -= len; - } - } - } - } else { - /* We found an unexpected character so this is not a tag. Move - * back to idle state. */ - ssi->parse_left--; - ssi->parsed++; - ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; - } - - break; - - /* - * We have found a valid tag and are in the process of sending - * data as a result of that discovery. We send either remaining data - * from the file prior to the insert point or the insert string itself. - */ - case TAG_SENDING: - - /* Do we have any remaining file data to send from the buffer prior - * to the tag? */ - if (ssi->tag_end > hs->file) { - /* How much of the data can we send? */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG - len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->tag_end - hs->file, 0xffff); -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ - LWIP_ASSERT("hs->started >= hs->file", ssi->tag_started >= hs->file); - /* we would include the tag in sending */ - len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->tag_started - hs->file, 0xffff); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ - - if (len != 0) { - err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); - } else { - err = ERR_OK; - } - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - data_to_send = 1; -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG - - if (ssi->tag_started <= hs->file) { - /* pretend to have sent the tag, too */ - len += (u16_t)(ssi->tag_end - ssi->tag_started); - } - -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ - hs->file += len; - hs->left -= len; - } - } else { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART - - if (ssi->tag_index >= ssi->tag_insert_len) { - /* Did the last SSIHandler have more to send? */ - if (ssi->tag_part != HTTPD_LAST_TAG_PART) { - /* If so, call it again */ - ssi->tag_index = 0; - get_tag_insert(hs); - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ - - /* Do we still have insert data left to send? */ - if (ssi->tag_index < ssi->tag_insert_len) { - /* We are sending the insert string itself. How much of the - * insert can we send? */ - len = (ssi->tag_insert_len - ssi->tag_index); - - /* Note that we set the copy flag here since we only have a - * single tag insert buffer per connection. If we don't do - * this, insert corruption can occur if more than one insert - * is processed before we call tcp_output. */ - err = http_write(pcb, &(ssi->tag_insert[ssi->tag_index]), &len, - HTTP_IS_TAG_VOLATILE(hs)); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - data_to_send = 1; - ssi->tag_index += len; - /* Don't return here: keep on sending data */ - } - } else { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART - - if (ssi->tag_part == HTTPD_LAST_TAG_PART) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ - { - /* We have sent all the insert data so go back to looking for - * a new tag. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Everything sent.\n")); - ssi->tag_index = 0; - ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG - ssi->parsed = ssi->tag_end; -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ - } - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - } - } - - /* If we drop out of the end of the for loop, this implies we must have - * file data to send so send it now. In TAG_SENDING state, we've already - * handled this so skip the send if that's the case. */ - if ((ssi->tag_state != TAG_SENDING) && (ssi->parsed > hs->file)) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ && !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG - - if ((ssi->tag_state != TAG_NONE) && (ssi->tag_started > ssi->tag_end)) { - /* If we found tag on the edge of the read buffer: just throw away the first part - (we have copied/saved everything required for parsing on later). */ - len = (u16_t)(ssi->tag_started - hs->file); - hs->left -= (ssi->parsed - ssi->tag_started); - ssi->parsed = ssi->tag_started; - ssi->tag_started = hs->buf; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ && !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG */ - { - len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->parsed - hs->file, 0xffff); - } - - err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - data_to_send = 1; - hs->file += len; - hs->left -= len; - } - } - - return data_to_send; -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - -/** - * Try to send more data on this pcb. - * - * @param pcb the pcb to send data - * @param hs connection state - */ -static u8_t http_send(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) -{ - u8_t data_to_send = HTTP_NO_DATA_TO_SEND; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_send: pcb=%p hs=%p left=%d\n", (void *)pcb, - (void *)hs, hs != NULL ? (int)hs->left : 0)); - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - - if (hs->unrecved_bytes != 0) { - return 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ - - /* If we were passed a NULL state structure pointer, ignore the call. */ - if (hs == NULL) { - return 0; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ - - /* Check if we are allowed to read from this file. - (e.g. SSI might want to delay sending until data is available) */ - if (!fs_is_file_ready(hs->handle, http_continue, hs)) { - return 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS - - /* Do we have any more header data to send for this file? */ - if (hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) { - data_to_send = http_send_headers(pcb, hs); - - if ((data_to_send == HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_FREED) || - ((data_to_send != HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_CONTINUE) && - (hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS))) { - return data_to_send; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ - - /* Have we run out of file data to send? If so, we need to read the next - * block from the file. */ - if (hs->left == 0) { - if (!http_check_eof(pcb, hs)) { - return 0; - } - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - - if (hs->ssi) { - data_to_send = http_send_data_ssi(pcb, hs); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - { - data_to_send = http_send_data_nonssi(pcb, hs); - } - - if ((hs->left == 0) && (fs_bytes_left(hs->handle) <= 0)) { - /* We reached the end of the file so this request is done. - * This adds the FIN flag right into the last data segment. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("End of file.\n")); - http_eof(pcb, hs); - return 0; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("send_data end.\n")); - return data_to_send; -} - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS -/** Initialize a http connection with a file to send for an error message - * - * @param hs http connection state - * @param error_nr HTTP error number - * @return ERR_OK if file was found and hs has been initialized correctly - * another err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t http_find_error_file(struct http_state *hs, u16_t error_nr) -{ - const char *uri, *uri1, *uri2, *uri3; - - if (error_nr == 501) { - uri1 = "/501.html"; - uri2 = "/501.htm"; - uri3 = "/501.shtml"; - } else { - /* 400 (bad request is the default) */ - uri1 = "/400.html"; - uri2 = "/400.htm"; - uri3 = "/400.shtml"; - } - - if (fs_open(&hs->file_handle, uri1) == ERR_OK) { - uri = uri1; - } else if (fs_open(&hs->file_handle, uri2) == ERR_OK) { - uri = uri2; - } else if (fs_open(&hs->file_handle, uri3) == ERR_OK) { - uri = uri3; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Error page for error %" U16_F " not found\n", - error_nr)); - return ERR_ARG; - } - - return http_init_file(hs, &hs->file_handle, 0, uri, 0, NULL); -} -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS */ -#define http_find_error_file(hs, error_nr) ERR_ARG -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS */ - -/** - * Get the file struct for a 404 error page. - * Tries some file names and returns NULL if none found. - * - * @param uri pointer that receives the actual file name URI - * @return file struct for the error page or NULL no matching file was found - */ -static struct fs_file *http_get_404_file(struct http_state *hs, const char **uri) -{ - err_t err; - - *uri = "/404.html"; - err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, *uri); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* 404.html doesn't exist. Try 404.htm instead. */ - *uri = "/404.htm"; - err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, *uri); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* 404.htm doesn't exist either. Try 404.shtml instead. */ - *uri = "/404.shtml"; - err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, *uri); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* 404.htm doesn't exist either. Indicate to the caller that it should - * send back a default 404 page. - */ - *uri = NULL; - return NULL; - } - } - } - - return &hs->file_handle; -} - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST -static err_t http_handle_post_finished(struct http_state *hs) -{ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - - /* Prevent multiple calls to httpd_post_finished, since it might have already - been called before from httpd_post_data_recved(). */ - if (hs->post_finished) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - hs->post_finished = 1; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ - /* application error or POST finished */ - /* NULL-terminate the buffer */ - http_uri_buf[0] = 0; - httpd_post_finished(hs, http_uri_buf, LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN); - return http_find_file(hs, http_uri_buf, 0); -} - -/** Pass received POST body data to the application and correctly handle - * returning a response document or closing the connection. - * ATTENTION: The application is responsible for the pbuf now, so don't free it! - * - * @param hs http connection state - * @param p pbuf to pass to the application - * @return ERR_OK if passed successfully, another err_t if the response file - * hasn't been found (after POST finished) - */ -static err_t http_post_rxpbuf(struct http_state *hs, struct pbuf *p) -{ - err_t err; - - if (p != NULL) { - /* adjust remaining Content-Length */ - if (hs->post_content_len_left < p->tot_len) { - hs->post_content_len_left = 0; - } else { - hs->post_content_len_left -= p->tot_len; - } - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - /* prevent connection being closed if httpd_post_data_recved() is called nested */ - hs->unrecved_bytes++; -#endif - - if (p != NULL) { - err = httpd_post_receive_data(hs, p); - } else { - err = ERR_OK; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - hs->unrecved_bytes--; -#endif - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* Ignore remaining content in case of application error */ - hs->post_content_len_left = 0; - } - - if (hs->post_content_len_left == 0) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - - if (hs->unrecved_bytes != 0) { - return ERR_OK; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ - /* application error or POST finished */ - return http_handle_post_finished(hs); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Handle a post request. Called from http_parse_request when method 'POST' - * is found. - * - * @param p The input pbuf (containing the POST header and body). - * @param hs The http connection state. - * @param data HTTP request (header and part of body) from input pbuf(s). - * @param data_len Size of 'data'. - * @param uri The HTTP URI parsed from input pbuf(s). - * @param uri_end Pointer to the end of 'uri' (here, the rest of the HTTP - * header starts). - * @return ERR_OK: POST correctly parsed and accepted by the application. - * ERR_INPROGRESS: POST not completely parsed (no error yet) - * another err_t: Error parsing POST or denied by the application - */ -static err_t http_post_request(struct pbuf *inp, struct http_state *hs, - char *data, u16_t data_len, char *uri, char *uri_end) -{ - err_t err; - /* search for end-of-header (first double-CRLF) */ - char *crlfcrlf = lwip_strnstr(uri_end + 1, CRLF CRLF, data_len - (uri_end + 1 - data)); - - if (crlfcrlf != NULL) { - /* search for "Content-Length: " */ -#define HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN "Content-Length: " -#define HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_LEN 16 -#define HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_DIGIT_MAX_LEN 10 - char *scontent_len = lwip_strnstr(uri_end + 1, HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN, crlfcrlf - (uri_end + 1)); - - if (scontent_len != NULL) { - char *scontent_len_end = lwip_strnstr(scontent_len + HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_LEN, CRLF, HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_DIGIT_MAX_LEN); - - if (scontent_len_end != NULL) { - int content_len; - char *content_len_num = scontent_len + HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_LEN; - content_len = atoi(content_len_num); - - if (content_len == 0) { - /* if atoi returns 0 on error, fix this */ - if ((content_len_num[0] != '0') || (content_len_num[1] != '\r')) { - content_len = -1; - } - } - - if (content_len >= 0) { - /* adjust length of HTTP header passed to application */ - const char *hdr_start_after_uri = uri_end + 1; - u16_t hdr_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(data_len, crlfcrlf + 4 - data); - u16_t hdr_data_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(data_len, crlfcrlf + 4 - hdr_start_after_uri); - u8_t post_auto_wnd = 1; - http_uri_buf[0] = 0; - /* trim http header */ - *crlfcrlf = 0; - err = httpd_post_begin(hs, uri, hdr_start_after_uri, hdr_data_len, content_len, - http_uri_buf, LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN, &post_auto_wnd); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - /* try to pass in data of the first pbuf(s) */ - struct pbuf *q = inp; - u16_t start_offset = hdr_len; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - hs->no_auto_wnd = !post_auto_wnd; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ - /* set the Content-Length to be received for this POST */ - hs->post_content_len_left = (u32_t)content_len; - - /* get to the pbuf where the body starts */ - while ((q != NULL) && (q->len <= start_offset)) { - start_offset -= q->len; - q = q->next; - } - - if (q != NULL) { - /* hide the remaining HTTP header */ - pbuf_remove_header(q, start_offset); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - - if (!post_auto_wnd) { - /* already tcp_recved() this data... */ - hs->unrecved_bytes = q->tot_len; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ - pbuf_ref(q); - return http_post_rxpbuf(hs, q); - } else if (hs->post_content_len_left == 0) { - q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_REF); - return http_post_rxpbuf(hs, q); - } else { - return ERR_OK; - } - } else { - /* return file passed from application */ - return http_find_file(hs, http_uri_buf, 0); - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("POST received invalid Content-Length: %s\n", - content_len_num)); - return ERR_ARG; - } - } - } - - /* If we come here, headers are fully received (double-crlf), but Content-Length - was not included. Since this is currently the only supported method, we have - to fail in this case! */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Error when parsing Content-Length\n")); - return ERR_ARG; - } - - /* if we come here, the POST is incomplete */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST - return ERR_INPROGRESS; -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ - return ERR_ARG; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ -} - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * A POST implementation can call this function to update the TCP window. - * This can be used to throttle data reception (e.g. when received data is - * programmed to flash and data is received faster than programmed). - * - * @param connection A connection handle passed to httpd_post_begin for which - * httpd_post_finished has *NOT* been called yet! - * @param recved_len Length of data received (for window update) - */ -void httpd_post_data_recved(void *connection, u16_t recved_len) -{ - struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)connection; - - if (hs != NULL) { - if (hs->no_auto_wnd) { - u16_t len = recved_len; - - if (hs->unrecved_bytes >= recved_len) { - hs->unrecved_bytes -= recved_len; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("httpd_post_data_recved: recved_len too big\n")); - len = (u16_t)hs->unrecved_bytes; - hs->unrecved_bytes = 0; - } - - if (hs->pcb != NULL) { - if (len != 0) { - altcp_recved(hs->pcb, len); - } - - if ((hs->post_content_len_left == 0) && (hs->unrecved_bytes == 0)) { - /* finished handling POST */ - http_handle_post_finished(hs); - http_send(hs->pcb, hs); - } - } - } - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ -/** Try to send more data if file has been blocked before - * This is a callback function passed to fs_read_async(). - */ -static void http_continue(void *connection) -{ - struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)connection; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (hs && (hs->pcb) && (hs->handle)) { - LWIP_ASSERT("hs->pcb != NULL", hs->pcb != NULL); - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("httpd_continue: try to send more data\n")); - - if (http_send(hs->pcb, hs)) { - /* If we wrote anything to be sent, go ahead and send it now. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("tcp_output\n")); - altcp_output(hs->pcb); - } - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ - -/** - * When data has been received in the correct state, try to parse it - * as a HTTP request. - * - * @param inp the received pbuf - * @param hs the connection state - * @param pcb the altcp_pcb which received this packet - * @return ERR_OK if request was OK and hs has been initialized correctly - * ERR_INPROGRESS if request was OK so far but not fully received - * another err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t http_parse_request(struct pbuf *inp, struct http_state *hs, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - char *data; - char *crlf; - u16_t data_len; - struct pbuf *p = inp; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST - u16_t clen; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - err_t err; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); /* only used for post */ - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("hs != NULL", hs != NULL); - - if ((hs->handle != NULL) || (hs->file != NULL)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Received data while sending a file\n")); - /* already sending a file */ - /* @todo: abort? */ - return ERR_USE; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Received %" U16_F " bytes\n", p->tot_len)); - - /* first check allowed characters in this pbuf? */ - - /* enqueue the pbuf */ - if (hs->req == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("First pbuf\n")); - hs->req = p; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("pbuf enqueued\n")); - pbuf_cat(hs->req, p); - } - - /* increase pbuf ref counter as it is freed when we return but we want to - keep it on the req list */ - pbuf_ref(p); - - if (hs->req->next != NULL) { - data_len = LWIP_MIN(hs->req->tot_len, LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH); - pbuf_copy_partial(hs->req, httpd_req_buf, data_len, 0); - data = httpd_req_buf; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ - { - data = (char *)p->payload; - data_len = p->len; - - if (p->len != p->tot_len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Warning: incomplete header due to chained pbufs\n")); - } - } - - /* received enough data for minimal request? */ - if (data_len >= MIN_REQ_LEN) { - /* wait for CRLF before parsing anything */ - crlf = lwip_strnstr(data, CRLF, data_len); - - if (crlf != NULL) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - int is_post = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - int is_09 = 0; - char *sp1, *sp2; - u16_t left_len, uri_len; - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("CRLF received, parsing request\n")); - - /* parse method */ - if (!strncmp(data, "GET ", 4)) { - sp1 = data + 3; - /* received GET request */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Received GET request\"\n")); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - } else if (!strncmp(data, "POST ", 5)) { - /* store request type */ - is_post = 1; - sp1 = data + 4; - /* received GET request */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Received POST request\n")); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - } else { - /* null-terminate the METHOD (pbuf is freed anyway wen returning) */ - data[4] = 0; - /* unsupported method! */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Unsupported request method (not implemented): \"%s\"\n", - data)); - return http_find_error_file(hs, 501); - } - - /* if we come here, method is OK, parse URI */ - left_len = (u16_t)(data_len - ((sp1 + 1) - data)); - sp2 = lwip_strnstr(sp1 + 1, " ", left_len); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 - - if (sp2 == NULL) { - /* HTTP 0.9: respond with correct protocol version */ - sp2 = lwip_strnstr(sp1 + 1, CRLF, left_len); - is_09 = 1; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - - if (is_post) { - /* HTTP/0.9 does not support POST */ - goto badrequest; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 */ - uri_len = (u16_t)(sp2 - (sp1 + 1)); - - if ((sp2 != 0) && (sp2 > sp1)) { - /* wait for CRLFCRLF (indicating end of HTTP headers) before parsing anything */ - if (lwip_strnstr(data, CRLF CRLF, data_len) != NULL) { - char *uri = sp1 + 1; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE - - /* This is HTTP/1.0 compatible: for strict 1.1, a connection - would always be persistent unless "close" was specified. */ - if (!is_09 && (lwip_strnstr(data, HTTP11_CONNECTIONKEEPALIVE, data_len) || - lwip_strnstr(data, HTTP11_CONNECTIONKEEPALIVE2, data_len))) { - hs->keepalive = 1; - } else { - hs->keepalive = 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ - /* null-terminate the METHOD (pbuf is freed anyway wen returning) */ - *sp1 = 0; - uri[uri_len] = 0; - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Received \"%s\" request for URI: \"%s\"\n", - data, uri)); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - - if (is_post) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST - struct pbuf *q = hs->req; -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ - struct pbuf *q = inp; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ - err = http_post_request(q, hs, data, data_len, uri, sp2); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* restore header for next try */ - *sp1 = ' '; - *sp2 = ' '; - uri[uri_len] = ' '; - } - - if (err == ERR_ARG) { - goto badrequest; - } - - return err; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - { - return http_find_file(hs, uri, is_09); - } - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("invalid URI\n")); - } - } - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST - clen = pbuf_clen(hs->req); - - if ((hs->req->tot_len <= LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_BUFSIZE) && - (clen <= LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_QUEUELEN)) { - /* request not fully received (too short or CRLF is missing) */ - return ERR_INPROGRESS; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ - { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - badrequest: -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("bad request\n")); - /* could not parse request */ - return http_find_error_file(hs, 400); - } -} - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI && (LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION == 1) -/* Check if SSI should be parsed for this file/URL - * (With LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION == 2, this function can be - * overridden by an external implementation.) - * - * @return 1 for SSI, 0 for standard files - */ -static u8_t http_uri_is_ssi(struct fs_file *file, const char *uri) -{ - size_t loop; - u8_t tag_check = 0; - - if (file != NULL) { - /* See if we have been asked for an shtml file and, if so, - enable tag checking. */ - const char *ext = NULL, *sub; - char *param = (char *)strstr(uri, "?"); - - if (param != NULL) { - /* separate uri from parameters for now, set back later */ - *param = 0; - } - - sub = uri; - ext = uri; - - for (sub = strstr(sub, "."); sub != NULL; sub = strstr(sub, ".")) { - ext = sub; - sub++; - } - - for (loop = 0; loop < NUM_SHTML_EXTENSIONS; loop++) { - if (!lwip_stricmp(ext, g_pcSSIExtensions[loop])) { - tag_check = 1; - break; - } - } - - if (param != NULL) { - *param = '?'; - } - } - - return tag_check; -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - -/** Try to find the file specified by uri and, if found, initialize hs - * accordingly. - * - * @param hs the connection state - * @param uri the HTTP header URI - * @param is_09 1 if the request is HTTP/0.9 (no HTTP headers in response) - * @return ERR_OK if file was found and hs has been initialized correctly - * another err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t http_find_file(struct http_state *hs, const char *uri, int is_09) -{ - size_t loop; - struct fs_file *file = NULL; - char *params = NULL; - err_t err; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI - int i; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - const -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - /* By default, assume we will not be processing server-side-includes tags */ - u8_t tag_check = 0; - - /* Have we been asked for the default file (in root or a directory) ? */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN - size_t uri_len = strlen(uri); - - if ((uri_len > 0) && (uri[uri_len - 1] == '/') && - ((uri != http_uri_buf) || (uri_len == 1))) { - size_t copy_len = LWIP_MIN(sizeof(http_uri_buf) - 1, uri_len - 1); - - if (copy_len > 0) { - MEMCPY(http_uri_buf, uri, copy_len); - http_uri_buf[copy_len] = 0; - } - -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN */ - - if ((uri[0] == '/') && (uri[1] == 0)) { -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN */ - - /* Try each of the configured default filenames until we find one - that exists. */ - for (loop = 0; loop < NUM_DEFAULT_FILENAMES; loop++) { - const char *file_name; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN - - if (copy_len > 0) { - size_t len_left = sizeof(http_uri_buf) - copy_len - 1; - - if (len_left > 0) { - size_t name_len = strlen(httpd_default_filenames[loop].name); - size_t name_copy_len = LWIP_MIN(len_left, name_len); - MEMCPY(&http_uri_buf[copy_len], httpd_default_filenames[loop].name, name_copy_len); - http_uri_buf[copy_len + name_copy_len] = 0; - } - - file_name = http_uri_buf; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN */ - { - file_name = httpd_default_filenames[loop].name; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Looking for %s...\n", file_name)); - err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, file_name); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - uri = file_name; - file = &hs->file_handle; - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Opened.\n")); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - tag_check = httpd_default_filenames[loop].shtml; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - break; - } - } - } - - if (file == NULL) { - /* No - we've been asked for a specific file. */ - /* First, isolate the base URI (without any parameters) */ - params = (char *)strchr(uri, '?'); - - if (params != NULL) { - /* URI contains parameters. NULL-terminate the base URI */ - *params = '\0'; - params++; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI - http_cgi_paramcount = -1; - - /* Does the base URI we have isolated correspond to a CGI handler? */ - if (httpd_num_cgis && httpd_cgis) { - for (i = 0; i < httpd_num_cgis; i++) { - if (strcmp(uri, httpd_cgis[i].pcCGIName) == 0) { - /* - * We found a CGI that handles this URI so extract the - * parameters and call the handler. - */ - http_cgi_paramcount = extract_uri_parameters(hs, params); - uri = httpd_cgis[i].pfnCGIHandler(i, http_cgi_paramcount, hs->params, - hs->param_vals); - break; - } - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Opening %s\n", uri)); - - err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, uri); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - file = &hs->file_handle; - } else { - file = http_get_404_file(hs, &uri); - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - - if (file != NULL) { - if (file->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI) { - tag_check = 1; - } else { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION - tag_check = http_uri_is_ssi(file, uri); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION */ - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - } - - if (file == NULL) { - /* None of the default filenames exist so send back a 404 page */ - file = http_get_404_file(hs, &uri); - } - - return http_init_file(hs, file, is_09, uri, tag_check, params); -} - -/** Initialize a http connection with a file to send (if found). - * Called by http_find_file and http_find_error_file. - * - * @param hs http connection state - * @param file file structure to send (or NULL if not found) - * @param is_09 1 if the request is HTTP/0.9 (no HTTP headers in response) - * @param uri the HTTP header URI - * @param tag_check enable SSI tag checking - * @param params != NULL if URI has parameters (separated by '?') - * @return ERR_OK if file was found and hs has been initialized correctly - * another err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t http_init_file(struct http_state *hs, struct fs_file *file, int is_09, const char *uri, - u8_t tag_check, char *params) -{ -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(is_09); -#endif - - if (file != NULL) { - /* file opened, initialise struct http_state */ -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ - /* If dynamic read is disabled, file data must be in one piece and available now */ - LWIP_ASSERT("file->data != NULL", file->data != NULL); -#endif - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - - if (tag_check) { - struct http_ssi_state *ssi = http_ssi_state_alloc(); - - if (ssi != NULL) { - ssi->tag_index = 0; - ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; - ssi->parsed = file->data; - ssi->parse_left = file->len; - ssi->tag_end = file->data; - hs->ssi = ssi; - } - } - -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tag_check); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - hs->handle = file; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI - - if (params != NULL) { - /* URI contains parameters, call generic CGI handler */ - int count; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI - - if (http_cgi_paramcount >= 0) { - count = http_cgi_paramcount; - } else -#endif - { - count = extract_uri_parameters(hs, params); - } - - httpd_cgi_handler(file, uri, count, http_cgi_params, http_cgi_param_vals -#if defined(LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE) && LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE - , - file->state -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ - ); - } - -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(params); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ - hs->file = file->data; - LWIP_ASSERT("File length must be positive!", (file->len >= 0)); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES - - if (file->is_custom_file && (file->data == NULL)) { - /* custom file, need to read data first (via fs_read_custom) */ - hs->left = 0; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ - { - hs->left = (u32_t)file->len; - } - - hs->retries = 0; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING - hs->time_started = sys_now(); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING */ -#if !LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS - LWIP_ASSERT("HTTP headers not included in file system", - (hs->handle->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED) != 0); -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 - - if (is_09 && ((hs->handle->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED) != 0)) { - /* HTTP/0.9 responses are sent without HTTP header, - search for the end of the header. */ - char *file_start = lwip_strnstr(hs->file, CRLF CRLF, hs->left); - - if (file_start != NULL) { - int diff = file_start + 4 - hs->file; - hs->file += diff; - hs->left -= (u32_t)diff; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09*/ - } else { - hs->handle = NULL; - hs->file = NULL; - hs->left = 0; - hs->retries = 0; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS - - /* Determine the HTTP headers to send based on the file extension of - * the requested URI. */ - if ((hs->handle == NULL) || ((hs->handle->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED) == 0)) { - get_http_headers(hs, uri); - } - -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(uri); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE - - if (hs->keepalive) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - - if (hs->ssi != NULL) { - hs->keepalive = 0; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - { - if ((hs->handle != NULL) && - ((hs->handle->flags & (FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT)) == FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED)) { - hs->keepalive = 0; - } - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * The pcb had an error and is already deallocated. - * The argument might still be valid (if != NULL). - */ -static void http_err(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_err: %s", lwip_strerr(err))); - - if (hs != NULL) { - http_state_free(hs); - } -} - -/** - * Data has been sent and acknowledged by the remote host. - * This means that more data can be sent. - */ -static err_t http_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) -{ - struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)arg; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_sent %p\n", (void *)pcb)); - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - if (hs == NULL) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - hs->retries = 0; - - http_send(pcb, hs); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * The poll function is called every 2nd second. - * If there has been no data sent (which resets the retries) in 8 seconds, close. - * If the last portion of a file has not been sent in 2 seconds, close. - * - * This could be increased, but we don't want to waste resources for bad connections. - */ -static err_t http_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)arg; - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_poll: pcb=%p hs=%p pcb_state=%s\n", - (void *)pcb, (void *)hs, tcp_debug_state_str(altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(pcb)))); - - if (hs == NULL) { - err_t closed; - /* arg is null, close. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_poll: arg is NULL, close\n")); - closed = http_close_conn(pcb, NULL); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(closed); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_ABORT_ON_CLOSE_MEM_ERROR - - if (closed == ERR_MEM) { - altcp_abort(pcb); - return ERR_ABRT; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_ABORT_ON_CLOSE_MEM_ERROR */ - return ERR_OK; - } else { - hs->retries++; - - if (hs->retries == HTTPD_MAX_RETRIES) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_poll: too many retries, close\n")); - http_close_conn(pcb, hs); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* If this connection has a file open, try to send some more data. If - * it has not yet received a GET request, don't do this since it will - * cause the connection to close immediately. */ - if (hs->handle) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_poll: try to send more data\n")); - - if (http_send(pcb, hs)) { - /* If we wrote anything to be sent, go ahead and send it now. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("tcp_output\n")); - altcp_output(pcb); - } - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Data has been received on this pcb. - * For HTTP 1.0, this should normally only happen once (if the request fits in one packet). - */ -static err_t http_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)arg; - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_recv: pcb=%p pbuf=%p err=%s\n", (void *)pcb, - (void *)p, lwip_strerr(err))); - - if ((err != ERR_OK) || (p == NULL) || (hs == NULL)) { - /* error or closed by other side? */ - if (p != NULL) { - /* Inform TCP that we have taken the data. */ - altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); - pbuf_free(p); - } - - if (hs == NULL) { - /* this should not happen, only to be robust */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Error, http_recv: hs is NULL, close\n")); - } - - http_close_conn(pcb, hs); - return ERR_OK; - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND - - if (hs->no_auto_wnd) { - hs->unrecved_bytes += p->tot_len; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ - { - /* Inform TCP that we have taken the data. */ - altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); - } - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - - if (hs->post_content_len_left > 0) { - /* reset idle counter when POST data is received */ - hs->retries = 0; - /* this is data for a POST, pass the complete pbuf to the application */ - http_post_rxpbuf(hs, p); - - /* pbuf is passed to the application, don't free it! */ - if (hs->post_content_len_left == 0) { - /* all data received, send response or close connection */ - http_send(pcb, hs); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - { - if (hs->handle == NULL) { - err_t parsed = http_parse_request(p, hs, pcb); - LWIP_ASSERT("http_parse_request: unexpected return value", parsed == ERR_OK || parsed == ERR_INPROGRESS || parsed == ERR_ARG || parsed == ERR_USE); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST - - if (parsed != ERR_INPROGRESS) { - /* request fully parsed or error */ - if (hs->req != NULL) { - pbuf_free(hs->req); - hs->req = NULL; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ - pbuf_free(p); - - if (parsed == ERR_OK) { -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - - if (hs->post_content_len_left == 0) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_recv: data %p len %" S32_F "\n", (const void *)hs->file, hs->left)); - http_send(pcb, hs); - } - } else if (parsed == ERR_ARG) { - /* @todo: close on ERR_USE? */ - http_close_conn(pcb, hs); - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_recv: already sending data\n")); - /* already sending but still receiving data, we might want to RST here? */ - pbuf_free(p); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * A new incoming connection has been accepted. - */ -static err_t http_accept(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) -{ - struct http_state *hs; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_accept %p / %p\n", (void *)pcb, arg)); - - if ((err != ERR_OK) || (pcb == NULL)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* Set priority */ - altcp_setprio(pcb, HTTPD_TCP_PRIO); - - /* Allocate memory for the structure that holds the state of the - connection - initialized by that function. */ - hs = http_state_alloc(); - - if (hs == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_accept: Out of memory, RST\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - hs->pcb = pcb; - - /* Tell TCP that this is the structure we wish to be passed for our - callbacks. */ - altcp_arg(pcb, hs); - - /* Set up the various callback functions */ - altcp_recv(pcb, http_recv); - altcp_err(pcb, http_err); - altcp_poll(pcb, http_poll, HTTPD_POLL_INTERVAL); - altcp_sent(pcb, http_sent); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void httpd_init_pcb(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t port) -{ - err_t err; - - if (pcb) { - altcp_setprio(pcb, HTTPD_TCP_PRIO); - /* set SOF_REUSEADDR here to explicitly bind httpd to multiple interfaces */ - err = altcp_bind(pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, port); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_ASSERT("httpd_init: tcp_bind failed", err == ERR_OK); - pcb = altcp_listen(pcb); - LWIP_ASSERT("httpd_init: tcp_listen failed", pcb != NULL); - altcp_accept(pcb, http_accept); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Initialize the httpd: set up a listening PCB and bind it to the defined port - */ -void httpd_init(void) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *pcb; - -#if HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL - LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(HTTPD_STATE); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(HTTPD_SSI_STATE); -#endif -#endif - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("httpd_init\n")); - - /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by tcp_new() */ - - pcb = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - LWIP_ASSERT("httpd_init: tcp_new failed", pcb != NULL); - httpd_init_pcb(pcb, HTTPD_SERVER_PORT); -} - -#if HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Initialize the httpd: set up a listening PCB and bind it to the defined port. - * Also set up TLS connection handling (HTTPS). - */ -void httpd_inits(struct altcp_tls_config *conf) -{ -#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS - struct altcp_pcb *pcb_tls = altcp_tls_new(conf, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - LWIP_ASSERT("httpd_init: altcp_tls_new failed", pcb_tls != NULL); - httpd_init_pcb(pcb_tls, HTTPD_SERVER_PORT_HTTPS); -#else /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conf); -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ -} -#endif /* HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Set the SSI handler function. - * - * @param ssi_handler the SSI handler function - * @param tags an array of SSI tag strings to search for in SSI-enabled files - * @param num_tags number of tags in the 'tags' array - */ -void http_set_ssi_handler(tSSIHandler ssi_handler, const char **tags, int num_tags) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_set_ssi_handler\n")); - - LWIP_ASSERT("no ssi_handler given", ssi_handler != NULL); - httpd_ssi_handler = ssi_handler; - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tags); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(num_tags); -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - LWIP_ASSERT("no tags given", tags != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid number of tags", num_tags > 0); - - httpd_tags = tags; - httpd_num_tags = num_tags; -#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Set an array of CGI filenames/handler functions - * - * @param cgis an array of CGI filenames/handler functions - * @param num_handlers number of elements in the 'cgis' array - */ -void http_set_cgi_handlers(const tCGI *cgis, int num_handlers) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("no cgis given", cgis != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid number of handlers", num_handlers > 0); - - httpd_cgis = cgis; - httpd_num_cgis = num_handlers; -} -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ +/** + * @file + * LWIP HTTP server implementation + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +/** + * @defgroup httpd HTTP server + * @ingroup apps + * + * This httpd supports for a + * rudimentary server-side-include facility which will replace tags of the form + * in any file whose extension is .shtml, .shtm or .ssi with + * strings provided by an include handler whose pointer is provided to the + * module via function http_set_ssi_handler(). + * Additionally, a simple common + * gateway interface (CGI) handling mechanism has been added to allow clients + * to hook functions to particular request URIs. + * + * To enable SSI support, define label LWIP_HTTPD_SSI in lwipopts.h. + * To enable CGI support, define label LWIP_HTTPD_CGI in lwipopts.h. + * + * By default, the server assumes that HTTP headers are already present in + * each file stored in the file system. By defining LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS in + * lwipopts.h, this behavior can be changed such that the server inserts the + * headers automatically based on the extension of the file being served. If + * this mode is used, be careful to ensure that the file system image used + * does not already contain the header information. + * + * File system images without headers can be created using the makefsfile + * tool with the -h command line option. + * + * + * Notes about valid SSI tags + * -------------------------- + * + * The following assumptions are made about tags used in SSI markers: + * + * 1. No tag may contain '-' or whitespace characters within the tag name. + * 2. Whitespace is allowed between the tag leadin "". + * 3. The maximum tag name length is LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN, currently 8 characters. + * + * Notes on CGI usage + * ------------------ + * + * The simple CGI support offered here works with GET method requests only + * and can handle up to 16 parameters encoded into the URI. The handler + * function may not write directly to the HTTP output but must return a + * filename that the HTTP server will send to the browser as a response to + * the incoming CGI request. + * + * + * + * The list of supported file types is quite short, so if makefsdata complains + * about an unknown extension, make sure to add it (and its doctype) to + * the 'g_psHTTPHeaders' list. + */ +#include "lwip/init.h" +#include "lwip/apps/httpd.h" +#include "lwip/debug.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" +#include "httpd_structs.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" +#if HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS +#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" +#endif +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif +#if LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING */ + +#include /* memset */ +#include /* atoi */ +#include + +#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API + +/** Minimum length for a valid HTTP/0.9 request: "GET /\r\n" -> 7 bytes */ +#define MIN_REQ_LEN 7 + +#define CRLF "\r\n" +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE +#define HTTP11_CONNECTIONKEEPALIVE "Connection: keep-alive" +#define HTTP11_CONNECTIONKEEPALIVE2 "Connection: Keep-Alive" +#endif + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ +#define HTTP_IS_DYNAMIC_FILE(hs) ((hs)->buf != NULL) +#else +#define HTTP_IS_DYNAMIC_FILE(hs) 0 +#endif + +/* This defines checks whether tcp_write has to copy data or not */ + +#ifndef HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE +/** tcp_write does not have to copy data when sent from rom-file-system directly */ +#define HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs) (HTTP_IS_DYNAMIC_FILE(hs) ? TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY : 0) +#endif +/** Default: dynamic headers are sent from ROM (non-dynamic headers are handled like file data) */ +#ifndef HTTP_IS_HDR_VOLATILE +#define HTTP_IS_HDR_VOLATILE(hs, ptr) 0 +#endif + +/* Return values for http_send_*() */ +#define HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_FREED 3 +#define HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_BREAK 2 +#define HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_CONTINUE 1 +#define HTTP_NO_DATA_TO_SEND 0 + +typedef struct +{ + const char *name; + u8_t shtml; +} default_filename; + +static const default_filename httpd_default_filenames[] = { + { "/index.shtml", 1 }, + { "/index.ssi", 1 }, + { "/index.shtm", 1 }, + { "/index.html", 0 }, + { "/index.htm", 0 } +}; + +#define NUM_DEFAULT_FILENAMES LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(httpd_default_filenames) + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST +/** HTTP request is copied here from pbufs for simple parsing */ +static char httpd_req_buf[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH + 1]; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST +#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MAX_RESPONSE_URI_LEN > LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN +#define LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MAX_RESPONSE_URI_LEN +#endif +#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN +#define LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN +#endif +#if LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN +/* Filename for response file to send when POST is finished or + * search for default files when a directory is requested. */ +static char http_uri_buf[LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN + 1]; +#endif + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS +/* The number of individual strings that comprise the headers sent before each + * requested file. + */ +#define NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS 5 +#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS 0 /* e.g. "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n" */ +#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_SERVER_NAME 1 /* e.g. "Server: "HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT"\r\n" */ +#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE 2 /* e.g. "Content-Length: xy\r\n" and/or "Connection: keep-alive\r\n" */ +#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_NR 3 /* the byte count, when content-length is used */ +#define HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE 4 /* the content type (or default answer content type including default document) */ + +/* The dynamically generated Content-Length buffer needs space for CRLF + NULL */ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_OFFSET 3 +#ifndef LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE +/* The dynamically generated Content-Length buffer shall be able to work with + ~953 MB (9 digits) */ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE (9 + LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_OFFSET) +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + +#define HTTPD_LAST_TAG_PART 0xFFFF + +enum tag_check_state { + TAG_NONE, /* Not processing an SSI tag */ + TAG_LEADIN, /* Tag lead in "" being processed */ + TAG_SENDING /* Sending tag replacement string */ +}; + +struct http_ssi_state { + const char *parsed; /* Pointer to the first unparsed byte in buf. */ +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG + const char *tag_started; /* Pointer to the first opening '<' of the tag. */ +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG */ + const char *tag_end; /* Pointer to char after the closing '>' of the tag. */ + u32_t parse_left; /* Number of unparsed bytes in buf. */ + u16_t tag_index; /* Counter used by tag parsing state machine */ + u16_t tag_insert_len; /* Length of insert in string tag_insert */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART + u16_t tag_part; /* Counter passed to and changed by tag insertion function to insert multiple times */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ + u8_t tag_type; /* index into http_ssi_tag_desc array */ + u8_t tag_name_len; /* Length of the tag name in string tag_name */ + char tag_name[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN + 1]; /* Last tag name extracted */ + char tag_insert[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN + 1]; /* Insert string for tag_name */ + enum tag_check_state tag_state; /* State of the tag processor */ +}; + +struct http_ssi_tag_description { + const char *lead_in; + const char *lead_out; +}; + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + +struct http_state { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED + struct http_state *next; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ + struct fs_file file_handle; + struct fs_file *handle; + const char *file; /* Pointer to first unsent byte in buf. */ + + struct altcp_pcb *pcb; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST + struct pbuf *req; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ + char *buf; /* File read buffer. */ + int buf_len; /* Size of file read buffer, buf. */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ + u32_t left; /* Number of unsent bytes in buf. */ + u8_t retries; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE + u8_t keepalive; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + struct http_ssi_state *ssi; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI + char *params[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS]; /* Params extracted from the request URI */ + char *param_vals[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS]; /* Values for each extracted param */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS + const char *hdrs[NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS]; /* HTTP headers to be sent. */ + char hdr_content_len[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE]; + u16_t hdr_pos; /* The position of the first unsent header byte in the + current string */ + u16_t hdr_index; /* The index of the hdr string currently being sent. */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING + u32_t time_started; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + u32_t post_content_len_left; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + u32_t unrecved_bytes; + u8_t no_auto_wnd; + u8_t post_finished; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST*/ +}; + +#if HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL +LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(HTTPD_STATE, MEMP_NUM_PARALLEL_HTTPD_CONNS, sizeof(struct http_state), "HTTPD_STATE") +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI +LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(HTTPD_SSI_STATE, MEMP_NUM_PARALLEL_HTTPD_SSI_CONNS, sizeof(struct http_ssi_state), "HTTPD_SSI_STATE") +#define HTTP_FREE_SSI_STATE(x) LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(HTTPD_SSI_STATE, (x)) +#define HTTP_ALLOC_SSI_STATE() (struct http_ssi_state *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(HTTPD_SSI_STATE) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ +#define HTTP_ALLOC_HTTP_STATE() (struct http_state *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(HTTPD_STATE) +#define HTTP_FREE_HTTP_STATE(x) LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(HTTPD_STATE, (x)) +#else /* HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL */ +#define HTTP_ALLOC_HTTP_STATE() (struct http_state *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct http_state)) +#define HTTP_FREE_HTTP_STATE(x) mem_free(x) +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI +#define HTTP_ALLOC_SSI_STATE() (struct http_ssi_state *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct http_ssi_state)) +#define HTTP_FREE_SSI_STATE(x) mem_free(x) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ +#endif /* HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL */ + +static err_t http_close_conn(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs); +static err_t http_close_or_abort_conn(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs, u8_t abort_conn); +static err_t http_find_file(struct http_state *hs, const char *uri, int is_09); +static err_t http_init_file(struct http_state *hs, struct fs_file *file, int is_09, const char *uri, u8_t tag_check, char *params); +static err_t http_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb); +static u8_t http_check_eof(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ +static void http_continue(void *connection); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI +/* SSI insert handler function pointer. */ +static tSSIHandler httpd_ssi_handler; +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW +static int httpd_num_tags; +static const char **httpd_tags; +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + +/* Define the available tag lead-ins and corresponding lead-outs. + * ATTENTION: for the algorithm below using this array, it is essential + * that the lead in differs in the first character! */ +const struct http_ssi_tag_description http_ssi_tag_desc[] = { + { "" }, + { "/*#", "*/" } +}; + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI +/* CGI handler information */ +static const tCGI *httpd_cgis; +static int httpd_num_cgis; +static int http_cgi_paramcount; +#define http_cgi_params hs->params +#define http_cgi_param_vals hs->param_vals +#elif LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI +static char *http_cgi_params[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS]; /* Params extracted from the request URI */ +static char *http_cgi_param_vals[LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS]; /* Values for each extracted param */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED +/** global list of active HTTP connections, use to kill the oldest when + running out of memory */ +static struct http_state *http_connections; + +static void http_add_connection(struct http_state *hs) +{ + /* add the connection to the list */ + hs->next = http_connections; + http_connections = hs; +} + +static void http_remove_connection(struct http_state *hs) +{ + /* take the connection off the list */ + if (http_connections) { + if (http_connections == hs) { + http_connections = hs->next; + } else { + struct http_state *last; + + for (last = http_connections; last->next != NULL; last = last->next) { + if (last->next == hs) { + last->next = hs->next; + break; + } + } + } + } +} + +static void http_kill_oldest_connection(u8_t ssi_required) +{ + struct http_state *hs = http_connections; + struct http_state *hs_free_next = NULL; + + while (hs && hs->next) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + + if (ssi_required) { + if (hs->next->ssi != NULL) { + hs_free_next = hs; + } + } else +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ssi_required); + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + { + hs_free_next = hs; + } + LWIP_ASSERT("broken list", hs != hs->next); + hs = hs->next; + } + + if (hs_free_next != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("hs_free_next->next != NULL", hs_free_next->next != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("hs_free_next->next->pcb != NULL", hs_free_next->next->pcb != NULL); + /* send RST when killing a connection because of memory shortage */ + http_close_or_abort_conn(hs_free_next->next->pcb, hs_free_next->next, 1); /* this also unlinks the http_state from the list */ + } +} +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ + +#define http_add_connection(hs) +#define http_remove_connection(hs) + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI +/** Allocate as struct http_ssi_state. */ +static struct http_ssi_state *http_ssi_state_alloc(void) +{ + struct http_ssi_state *ret = HTTP_ALLOC_SSI_STATE(); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED + + if (ret == NULL) { + http_kill_oldest_connection(1); + ret = HTTP_ALLOC_SSI_STATE(); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ + + if (ret != NULL) { + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(struct http_ssi_state)); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** Free a struct http_ssi_state. */ +static void http_ssi_state_free(struct http_ssi_state *ssi) +{ + if (ssi != NULL) { + HTTP_FREE_SSI_STATE(ssi); + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + +/** Initialize a struct http_state. + */ +static void http_state_init(struct http_state *hs) +{ + /* Initialize the structure. */ + memset(hs, 0, sizeof(struct http_state)); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS + /* Indicate that the headers are not yet valid */ + hs->hdr_index = NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ +} + +/** Allocate a struct http_state. */ +static struct http_state *http_state_alloc(void) +{ + struct http_state *ret = HTTP_ALLOC_HTTP_STATE(); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED + + if (ret == NULL) { + http_kill_oldest_connection(0); + ret = HTTP_ALLOC_HTTP_STATE(); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED */ + + if (ret != NULL) { + http_state_init(ret); + http_add_connection(ret); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** Free a struct http_state. + * Also frees the file data if dynamic. + */ +static void http_state_eof(struct http_state *hs) +{ + if (hs->handle) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING + u32_t ms_needed = sys_now() - hs->time_started; + u32_t needed = LWIP_MAX(1, (ms_needed / 100)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG_TIMING, ("httpd: needed %" U32_F " ms to send file of %d bytes -> %" U32_F " bytes/sec\n", + ms_needed, hs->handle->len, ((((u32_t)hs->handle->len) * 10) / needed))); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING */ + fs_close(hs->handle); + hs->handle = NULL; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ + + if (hs->buf != NULL) { + mem_free(hs->buf); + hs->buf = NULL; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + + if (hs->ssi) { + http_ssi_state_free(hs->ssi); + hs->ssi = NULL; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST + + if (hs->req) { + pbuf_free(hs->req); + hs->req = NULL; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ +} + +/** Free a struct http_state. + * Also frees the file data if dynamic. + */ +static void http_state_free(struct http_state *hs) +{ + if (hs != NULL) { + http_state_eof(hs); + http_remove_connection(hs); + HTTP_FREE_HTTP_STATE(hs); + } +} + +/** Call tcp_write() in a loop trying smaller and smaller length + * + * @param pcb altcp_pcb to send + * @param ptr Data to send + * @param length Length of data to send (in/out: on return, contains the + * amount of data sent) + * @param apiflags directly passed to tcp_write + * @return the return value of tcp_write + */ +static err_t http_write(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, const void *ptr, u16_t *length, u8_t apiflags) +{ + u16_t len, max_len; + err_t err; + LWIP_ASSERT("length != NULL", length != NULL); + len = *length; + + if (len == 0) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* We cannot send more data than space available in the send buffer. */ + max_len = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); + + if (max_len < len) { + len = max_len; + } + +#ifdef HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN + /* Additional limitation: e.g. don't enqueue more than 2*mss at once */ + max_len = HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN(pcb); + + if (len > max_len) { + len = max_len; + } + +#endif /* HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN */ + + do { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Trying to send %d bytes\n", len)); + err = altcp_write(pcb, ptr, len, apiflags); + + if (err == ERR_MEM) { + if ((altcp_sndbuf(pcb) == 0) || + (altcp_sndqueuelen(pcb) >= TCP_SND_QUEUELEN)) { + /* no need to try smaller sizes */ + len = 1; + } else { + len /= 2; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("Send failed, trying less (%d bytes)\n", len)); + } + } while ((err == ERR_MEM) && (len > 1)); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Sent %d bytes\n", len)); + *length = len; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Send failed with err %d (\"%s\")\n", err, lwip_strerr(err))); + *length = 0; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE + /* ensure nagle is normally enabled (only disabled for persistent connections + when all data has been enqueued but the connection stays open for the next + request */ + altcp_nagle_enable(pcb); +#endif + + return err; +} + +/** + * The connection shall be actively closed (using RST to close from fault states). + * Reset the sent- and recv-callbacks. + * + * @param pcb the tcp pcb to reset callbacks + * @param hs connection state to free + */ +static err_t http_close_or_abort_conn(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs, u8_t abort_conn) +{ + err_t err; + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Closing connection %p\n", (void *)pcb)); + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + + if (hs != NULL) { + if ((hs->post_content_len_left != 0) +#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + || ((hs->no_auto_wnd != 0) && (hs->unrecved_bytes != 0)) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ + ) { + /* make sure the post code knows that the connection is closed */ + http_uri_buf[0] = 0; + httpd_post_finished(hs, http_uri_buf, LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN); + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST*/ + + altcp_arg(pcb, NULL); + altcp_recv(pcb, NULL); + altcp_err(pcb, NULL); + altcp_poll(pcb, NULL, 0); + altcp_sent(pcb, NULL); + + if (hs != NULL) { + http_state_free(hs); + } + + if (abort_conn) { + altcp_abort(pcb); + return ERR_OK; + } + + err = altcp_close(pcb); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Error %d closing %p\n", err, (void *)pcb)); + /* error closing, try again later in poll */ + altcp_poll(pcb, http_poll, HTTPD_POLL_INTERVAL); + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * The connection shall be actively closed. + * Reset the sent- and recv-callbacks. + * + * @param pcb the tcp pcb to reset callbacks + * @param hs connection state to free + */ +static err_t http_close_conn(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) +{ + return http_close_or_abort_conn(pcb, hs, 0); +} + +/** End of file: either close the connection (Connection: close) or + * close the file (Connection: keep-alive) + */ +static void http_eof(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) +{ + /* HTTP/1.1 persistent connection? (Not supported for SSI) */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE + if (hs->keepalive) { + http_remove_connection(hs); + + http_state_eof(hs); + http_state_init(hs); + /* restore state: */ + hs->pcb = pcb; + hs->keepalive = 1; + http_add_connection(hs); + /* ensure nagle doesn't interfere with sending all data as fast as possible: */ + altcp_nagle_disable(pcb); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ + { + http_close_conn(pcb, hs); + } +} + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI +/** + * Extract URI parameters from the parameter-part of an URI in the form + * "test.cgi?x=y" @todo: better explanation! + * Pointers to the parameters are stored in hs->param_vals. + * + * @param hs http connection state + * @param params pointer to the NULL-terminated parameter string from the URI + * @return number of parameters extracted + */ +static int extract_uri_parameters(struct http_state *hs, char *params) +{ + char *pair; + char *equals; + int loop; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hs); + + /* If we have no parameters at all, return immediately. */ + if (!params || (params[0] == '\0')) { + return (0); + } + + /* Get a pointer to our first parameter */ + pair = params; + + /* Parse up to LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS from the passed string and ignore the + * remainder (if any) */ + for (loop = 0; (loop < LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS) && pair; loop++) { + /* Save the name of the parameter */ + http_cgi_params[loop] = pair; + + /* Remember the start of this name=value pair */ + equals = pair; + + /* Find the start of the next name=value pair and replace the delimiter + * with a 0 to terminate the previous pair string. */ + pair = strchr(pair, '&'); + + if (pair) { + *pair = '\0'; + pair++; + } else { + /* We didn't find a new parameter so find the end of the URI and + * replace the space with a '\0' */ + pair = strchr(equals, ' '); + + if (pair) { + *pair = '\0'; + } + + /* Revert to NULL so that we exit the loop as expected. */ + pair = NULL; + } + + /* Now find the '=' in the previous pair, replace it with '\0' and save + * the parameter value string. */ + equals = strchr(equals, '='); + + if (equals) { + *equals = '\0'; + http_cgi_param_vals[loop] = equals + 1; + } else { + http_cgi_param_vals[loop] = NULL; + } + } + + return loop; +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI +/** + * Insert a tag (found in an shtml in the form of "" into the file. + * The tag's name is stored in ssi->tag_name (NULL-terminated), the replacement + * should be written to hs->tag_insert (up to a length of LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN). + * The amount of data written is stored to ssi->tag_insert_len. + * + * @todo: return tag_insert_len - maybe it can be removed from struct http_state? + * + * @param hs http connection state + */ +static void get_tag_insert(struct http_state *hs) +{ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW + const char *tag; +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + int tag; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + size_t len; + struct http_ssi_state *ssi; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART + u16_t current_tag_part; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("hs != NULL", hs != NULL); + ssi = hs->ssi; + LWIP_ASSERT("ssi != NULL", ssi != NULL); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART + current_tag_part = ssi->tag_part; + ssi->tag_part = HTTPD_LAST_TAG_PART; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW + tag = ssi->tag_name; +#endif + + if (httpd_ssi_handler +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW + && httpd_tags && httpd_num_tags +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + ) { + + /* Find this tag in the list we have been provided. */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW + { +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + + for (tag = 0; tag < httpd_num_tags; tag++) { + if (strcmp(ssi->tag_name, httpd_tags[tag]) == 0) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + { + ssi->tag_insert_len = httpd_ssi_handler(tag, ssi->tag_insert, + LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART + , + current_tag_part, &ssi->tag_part +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE + , + (hs->handle ? hs->handle->state : NULL) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ + ); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW + + if (ssi->tag_insert_len != HTTPD_SSI_TAG_UNKNOWN) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + { + return; + } + } + } + } + + /* If we drop out, we were asked to serve a page which contains tags that + * we don't have a handler for. Merely echo back the tags with an error + * marker. */ +#define UNKNOWN_TAG1_TEXT "***UNKNOWN TAG " +#define UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN 18 +#define UNKNOWN_TAG2_TEXT "***" +#define UNKNOWN_TAG2_LEN 7 + len = LWIP_MIN(sizeof(ssi->tag_name), LWIP_MIN(strlen(ssi->tag_name), + LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN - (UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN + UNKNOWN_TAG2_LEN))); + MEMCPY(ssi->tag_insert, UNKNOWN_TAG1_TEXT, UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN); + MEMCPY(&ssi->tag_insert[UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN], ssi->tag_name, len); + MEMCPY(&ssi->tag_insert[UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN + len], UNKNOWN_TAG2_TEXT, UNKNOWN_TAG2_LEN); + ssi->tag_insert[UNKNOWN_TAG1_LEN + len + UNKNOWN_TAG2_LEN] = 0; + + len = strlen(ssi->tag_insert); + LWIP_ASSERT("len <= 0xffff", len <= 0xffff); + ssi->tag_insert_len = (u16_t)len; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS +/** + * Generate the relevant HTTP headers for the given filename and write + * them into the supplied buffer. + */ +static void get_http_headers(struct http_state *hs, const char *uri) +{ + size_t content_type; + char *tmp; + char *ext; + char *vars; + + /* In all cases, the second header we send is the server identification + so set it here. */ + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_SERVER_NAME] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_SERVER]; + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] = NULL; + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_NR] = NULL; + + /* Is this a normal file or the special case we use to send back the + default "404: Page not found" response? */ + if (uri == NULL) { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND]; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE + + if (hs->keepalive) { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[DEFAULT_404_HTML_PERSISTENT]; + } else +#endif + { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[DEFAULT_404_HTML]; + } + + /* Set up to send the first header string. */ + hs->hdr_index = 0; + hs->hdr_pos = 0; + return; + } + + /* We are dealing with a particular filename. Look for one other + special case. We assume that any filename with "404" in it must be + indicative of a 404 server error whereas all other files require + the 200 OK header. */ + if (strstr(uri, "404")) { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND]; + } else if (strstr(uri, "400")) { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST]; + } else if (strstr(uri, "501")) { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL]; + } else { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_HTTP_STATUS] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_OK]; + } + + /* Determine if the URI has any variables and, if so, temporarily remove + them. */ + vars = strchr(uri, '?'); + + if (vars) { + *vars = '\0'; + } + + /* Get a pointer to the file extension. We find this by looking for the + last occurrence of "." in the filename passed. */ + ext = NULL; + tmp = strchr(uri, '.'); + + while (tmp) { + ext = tmp + 1; + tmp = strchr(ext, '.'); + } + + if (ext != NULL) { + /* Now determine the content type and add the relevant header for that. */ + for (content_type = 0; content_type < NUM_HTTP_HEADERS; content_type++) { + /* Have we found a matching extension? */ + if (!lwip_stricmp(g_psHTTPHeaders[content_type].extension, ext)) { + break; + } + } + } else { + content_type = NUM_HTTP_HEADERS; + } + + /* Reinstate the parameter marker if there was one in the original URI. */ + if (vars) { + *vars = '?'; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_OMIT_HEADER_FOR_EXTENSIONLESS_URI + + /* Does the URL passed have any file extension? If not, we assume it + is a special-case URL used for control state notification and we do + not send any HTTP headers with the response. */ + if (!ext) { + /* Force the header index to a value indicating that all headers + have already been sent. */ + hs->hdr_index = NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS; + return; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_OMIT_HEADER_FOR_EXTENSIONLESS_URI */ + + /* Did we find a matching extension? */ + if (content_type < NUM_HTTP_HEADERS) { + /* yes, store it */ + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = g_psHTTPHeaders[content_type].content_type; + } else if (!ext) { + /* no, no extension found -> use binary transfer to prevent the browser adding '.txt' on save */ + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = HTTP_HDR_APP; + } else { + /* No - use the default, plain text file type. */ + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_TYPE] = HTTP_HDR_DEFAULT_TYPE; + } + + /* Set up to send the first header string. */ + hs->hdr_index = 0; + hs->hdr_pos = 0; +} + +/* Add content-length header? */ +static void get_http_content_length(struct http_state *hs) +{ + u8_t add_content_len = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT("already been here?", hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] == NULL); + + add_content_len = 0; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + + if (hs->ssi == NULL) /* @todo: get maximum file length from SSI */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + { + if ((hs->handle != NULL) && (hs->handle->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT)) { + add_content_len = 1; + } + } + + if (add_content_len) { + size_t len; + lwip_itoa(hs->hdr_content_len, (size_t)LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE, + hs->handle->len); + len = strlen(hs->hdr_content_len); + + if (len <= LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_SIZE - LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CONTENT_LEN_OFFSET) { + SMEMCPY(&hs->hdr_content_len[len], CRLF, 3); + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_NR] = hs->hdr_content_len; + } else { + add_content_len = 0; + } + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE + + if (add_content_len) { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_KEEPALIVE_LEN]; + } else { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONN_CLOSE]; + hs->keepalive = 0; + } + +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ + + if (add_content_len) { + hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LENGTH]; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ +} + +/** Sub-function of http_send(): send dynamic headers + * + * @returns: - HTTP_NO_DATA_TO_SEND: no new data has been enqueued + * - HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_CONTINUE: continue with sending HTTP body + * - HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_BREAK: data has been enqueued, headers pending, + * so don't send HTTP body yet + * - HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_FREED: http_state and pcb are already freed + */ +static u8_t http_send_headers(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) +{ + err_t err; + u16_t len; + u8_t data_to_send = HTTP_NO_DATA_TO_SEND; + u16_t hdrlen, sendlen; + + if (hs->hdrs[HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_KEEPALIVE] == NULL) { + /* set up "content-length" and "connection:" headers */ + get_http_content_length(hs); + } + + /* How much data can we send? */ + len = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); + sendlen = len; + + while (len && (hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) && sendlen) { + const void *ptr; + u16_t old_sendlen; + u8_t apiflags; + /* How much do we have to send from the current header? */ + hdrlen = (u16_t)strlen(hs->hdrs[hs->hdr_index]); + + /* How much of this can we send? */ + sendlen = (len < (hdrlen - hs->hdr_pos)) ? len : (hdrlen - hs->hdr_pos); + + /* Send this amount of data or as much as we can given memory + * constraints. */ + ptr = (const void *)(hs->hdrs[hs->hdr_index] + hs->hdr_pos); + old_sendlen = sendlen; + apiflags = HTTP_IS_HDR_VOLATILE(hs, ptr); + + if (hs->hdr_index == HDR_STRINGS_IDX_CONTENT_LEN_NR) { + /* content-length is always volatile */ + apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY; + } + + if (hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS - 1) { + apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; + } + + err = http_write(pcb, ptr, &sendlen, apiflags); + + if ((err == ERR_OK) && (old_sendlen != sendlen)) { + /* Remember that we added some more data to be transmitted. */ + data_to_send = HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_CONTINUE; + } else if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* special case: http_write does not try to send 1 byte */ + sendlen = 0; + } + + /* Fix up the header position for the next time round. */ + hs->hdr_pos += sendlen; + len -= sendlen; + + /* Have we finished sending this string? */ + if (hs->hdr_pos == hdrlen) { + /* Yes - move on to the next one */ + hs->hdr_index++; + + /* skip headers that are NULL (not all headers are required) */ + while ((hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) && + (hs->hdrs[hs->hdr_index] == NULL)) { + hs->hdr_index++; + } + + hs->hdr_pos = 0; + } + } + + if ((hs->hdr_index >= NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) && (hs->file == NULL)) { + /* When we are at the end of the headers, check for data to send + * instead of waiting for ACK from remote side to continue + * (which would happen when sending files from async read). */ + if (http_check_eof(pcb, hs)) { + data_to_send = HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_BREAK; + } else { + /* At this point, for non-keepalive connections, hs is deallocated an + pcb is closed. */ + return HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_FREED; + } + } + + /* If we get here and there are still header bytes to send, we send + * the header information we just wrote immediately. If there are no + * more headers to send, but we do have file data to send, drop through + * to try to send some file data too. */ + if ((hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) || !hs->file) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("tcp_output\n")); + return HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_BREAK; + } + + return data_to_send; +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ + +/** Sub-function of http_send(): end-of-file (or block) is reached, + * either close the file or read the next block (if supported). + * + * @returns: 0 if the file is finished or no data has been read + * 1 if the file is not finished and data has been read + */ +static u8_t http_check_eof(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) +{ + int bytes_left; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ + int count; +#ifdef HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN + int max_write_len; +#endif /* HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ + + /* Do we have a valid file handle? */ + if (hs->handle == NULL) { + /* No - close the connection. */ + http_eof(pcb, hs); + return 0; + } + + bytes_left = fs_bytes_left(hs->handle); + + if (bytes_left <= 0) { + /* We reached the end of the file so this request is done. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("End of file.\n")); + http_eof(pcb, hs); + return 0; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ + + /* Do we already have a send buffer allocated? */ + if (hs->buf) { + /* Yes - get the length of the buffer */ + count = LWIP_MIN(hs->buf_len, bytes_left); + } else { + /* We don't have a send buffer so allocate one now */ + count = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); + + if (bytes_left < count) { + count = bytes_left; + } + +#ifdef HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN + /* Additional limitation: e.g. don't enqueue more than 2*mss at once */ + max_write_len = HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN(pcb); + + if (count > max_write_len) { + count = max_write_len; + } + +#endif /* HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN */ + + do { + hs->buf = (char *)mem_malloc((mem_size_t)count); + + if (hs->buf != NULL) { + hs->buf_len = count; + break; + } + + count = count / 2; + } while (count > 100); + + /* Did we get a send buffer? If not, return immediately. */ + if (hs->buf == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("No buff\n")); + return 0; + } + } + + /* Read a block of data from the file. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Trying to read %d bytes.\n", count)); + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ + count = fs_read_async(hs->handle, hs->buf, count, http_continue, hs); +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ + count = fs_read(hs->handle, hs->buf, count); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ + + if (count < 0) { + if (count == FS_READ_DELAYED) { + /* Delayed read, wait for FS to unblock us */ + return 0; + } + + /* We reached the end of the file so this request is done. + * @todo: close here for HTTP/1.1 when reading file fails */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("End of file.\n")); + http_eof(pcb, hs); + return 0; + } + + /* Set up to send the block of data we just read */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Read %d bytes.\n", count)); + hs->left = count; + hs->file = hs->buf; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + + if (hs->ssi) { + hs->ssi->parse_left = count; + hs->ssi->parsed = hs->buf; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ + LWIP_ASSERT("SSI and DYNAMIC_HEADERS turned off but eof not reached", 0); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI || LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ + return 1; +} + +/** Sub-function of http_send(): This is the normal send-routine for non-ssi files + * + * @returns: - 1: data has been written (so call tcp_ouput) + * - 0: no data has been written (no need to call tcp_output) + */ +static u8_t http_send_data_nonssi(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) +{ + err_t err; + u16_t len; + u8_t data_to_send = 0; + + /* We are not processing an SHTML file so no tag checking is necessary. + * Just send the data as we received it from the file. */ + len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(hs->left, 0xffff); + + err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + data_to_send = 1; + hs->file += len; + hs->left -= len; + } + + return data_to_send; +} + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI +/** Sub-function of http_send(): This is the send-routine for ssi files + * + * @returns: - 1: data has been written (so call tcp_ouput) + * - 0: no data has been written (no need to call tcp_output) + */ +static u8_t http_send_data_ssi(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) +{ + err_t err = ERR_OK; + u16_t len; + u8_t data_to_send = 0; + u8_t tag_type; + + struct http_ssi_state *ssi = hs->ssi; + LWIP_ASSERT("ssi != NULL", ssi != NULL); + /* We are processing an SHTML file so need to scan for tags and replace + * them with insert strings. We need to be careful here since a tag may + * straddle the boundary of two blocks read from the file and we may also + * have to split the insert string between two tcp_write operations. */ + + /* How much data could we send? */ + len = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); + + /* Do we have remaining data to send before parsing more? */ + if (ssi->parsed > hs->file) { + len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->parsed - hs->file, 0xffff); + + err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + data_to_send = 1; + hs->file += len; + hs->left -= len; + } + + /* If the send buffer is full, return now. */ + if (altcp_sndbuf(pcb) == 0) { + return data_to_send; + } + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("State %d, %d left\n", ssi->tag_state, (int)ssi->parse_left)); + + /* We have sent all the data that was already parsed so continue parsing + * the buffer contents looking for SSI tags. */ + while (((ssi->tag_state == TAG_SENDING) || ssi->parse_left) && (err == ERR_OK)) { + if (len == 0) { + return data_to_send; + } + + switch (ssi->tag_state) { + case TAG_NONE: + + /* We are not currently processing an SSI tag so scan for the + * start of the lead-in marker. */ + for (tag_type = 0; tag_type < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(http_ssi_tag_desc); tag_type++) { + if (*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[tag_type].lead_in[0]) { + /* We found what could be the lead-in for a new tag so change + * state appropriately. */ + ssi->tag_type = tag_type; + ssi->tag_state = TAG_LEADIN; + ssi->tag_index = 1; +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG + ssi->tag_started = ssi->parsed; +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG */ + break; + } + } + + /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ + ssi->parse_left--; + ssi->parsed++; + break; + + case TAG_LEADIN: + + /* We are processing the lead-in marker, looking for the start of + * the tag name. */ + + /* Have we reached the end of the leadin? */ + if (http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_in[ssi->tag_index] == 0) { + ssi->tag_index = 0; + ssi->tag_state = TAG_FOUND; + } else { + /* Have we found the next character we expect for the tag leadin? */ + if (*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_in[ssi->tag_index]) { + /* Yes - move to the next one unless we have found the complete + * leadin, in which case we start looking for the tag itself */ + ssi->tag_index++; + } else { + /* We found an unexpected character so this is not a tag. Move + * back to idle state. */ + ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; + } + + /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ + ssi->parse_left--; + ssi->parsed++; + } + + break; + + case TAG_FOUND: + + /* We are reading the tag name, looking for the start of the + * lead-out marker and removing any whitespace found. */ + + /* Remove leading whitespace between the tag leading and the first + * tag name character. */ + if ((ssi->tag_index == 0) && ((*ssi->parsed == ' ') || + (*ssi->parsed == '\t') || (*ssi->parsed == '\n') || + (*ssi->parsed == '\r'))) { + /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ + ssi->parse_left--; + ssi->parsed++; + break; + } + + /* Have we found the end of the tag name? This is signalled by + * us finding the first leadout character or whitespace */ + if ((*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_out[0]) || + (*ssi->parsed == ' ') || (*ssi->parsed == '\t') || + (*ssi->parsed == '\n') || (*ssi->parsed == '\r')) { + if (ssi->tag_index == 0) { + /* We read a zero length tag so ignore it. */ + ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; + } else { + /* We read a non-empty tag so go ahead and look for the + * leadout string. */ + ssi->tag_state = TAG_LEADOUT; + LWIP_ASSERT("ssi->tag_index <= 0xff", ssi->tag_index <= 0xff); + ssi->tag_name_len = (u8_t)ssi->tag_index; + ssi->tag_name[ssi->tag_index] = '\0'; + + if (*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_out[0]) { + ssi->tag_index = 1; + } else { + ssi->tag_index = 0; + } + } + } else { + /* This character is part of the tag name so save it */ + if (ssi->tag_index < LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN) { + ssi->tag_name[ssi->tag_index++] = *ssi->parsed; + } else { + /* The tag was too long so ignore it. */ + ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; + } + } + + /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ + ssi->parse_left--; + ssi->parsed++; + + break; + + /* We are looking for the end of the lead-out marker. */ + case TAG_LEADOUT: + + /* Remove leading whitespace between the tag leading and the first + * tag leadout character. */ + if ((ssi->tag_index == 0) && ((*ssi->parsed == ' ') || + (*ssi->parsed == '\t') || (*ssi->parsed == '\n') || + (*ssi->parsed == '\r'))) { + /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ + ssi->parse_left--; + ssi->parsed++; + break; + } + + /* Have we found the next character we expect for the tag leadout? */ + if (*ssi->parsed == http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_out[ssi->tag_index]) { + /* Yes - move to the next one unless we have found the complete + * leadout, in which case we need to call the client to process + * the tag. */ + + /* Move on to the next character in the buffer */ + ssi->parse_left--; + ssi->parsed++; + ssi->tag_index++; + + if (http_ssi_tag_desc[ssi->tag_type].lead_out[ssi->tag_index] == 0) { + /* Call the client to ask for the insert string for the + * tag we just found. */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART + ssi->tag_part = 0; /* start with tag part 0 */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ + get_tag_insert(hs); + + /* Next time through, we are going to be sending data + * immediately, either the end of the block we start + * sending here or the insert string. */ + ssi->tag_index = 0; + ssi->tag_state = TAG_SENDING; + ssi->tag_end = ssi->parsed; +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG + ssi->parsed = ssi->tag_started; +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ + + /* If there is any unsent data in the buffer prior to the + * tag, we need to send it now. */ + if (ssi->tag_end > hs->file) { + /* How much of the data can we send? */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG + len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->tag_end - hs->file, 0xffff); +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ + /* we would include the tag in sending */ + len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->tag_started - hs->file, 0xffff); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ + + err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + data_to_send = 1; +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG + + if (ssi->tag_started <= hs->file) { + /* pretend to have sent the tag, too */ + len += (u16_t)(ssi->tag_end - ssi->tag_started); + } + +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ + hs->file += len; + hs->left -= len; + } + } + } + } else { + /* We found an unexpected character so this is not a tag. Move + * back to idle state. */ + ssi->parse_left--; + ssi->parsed++; + ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; + } + + break; + + /* + * We have found a valid tag and are in the process of sending + * data as a result of that discovery. We send either remaining data + * from the file prior to the insert point or the insert string itself. + */ + case TAG_SENDING: + + /* Do we have any remaining file data to send from the buffer prior + * to the tag? */ + if (ssi->tag_end > hs->file) { + /* How much of the data can we send? */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG + len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->tag_end - hs->file, 0xffff); +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ + LWIP_ASSERT("hs->started >= hs->file", ssi->tag_started >= hs->file); + /* we would include the tag in sending */ + len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->tag_started - hs->file, 0xffff); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ + + if (len != 0) { + err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); + } else { + err = ERR_OK; + } + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + data_to_send = 1; +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG + + if (ssi->tag_started <= hs->file) { + /* pretend to have sent the tag, too */ + len += (u16_t)(ssi->tag_end - ssi->tag_started); + } + +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ + hs->file += len; + hs->left -= len; + } + } else { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART + + if (ssi->tag_index >= ssi->tag_insert_len) { + /* Did the last SSIHandler have more to send? */ + if (ssi->tag_part != HTTPD_LAST_TAG_PART) { + /* If so, call it again */ + ssi->tag_index = 0; + get_tag_insert(hs); + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ + + /* Do we still have insert data left to send? */ + if (ssi->tag_index < ssi->tag_insert_len) { + /* We are sending the insert string itself. How much of the + * insert can we send? */ + len = (ssi->tag_insert_len - ssi->tag_index); + + /* Note that we set the copy flag here since we only have a + * single tag insert buffer per connection. If we don't do + * this, insert corruption can occur if more than one insert + * is processed before we call tcp_output. */ + err = http_write(pcb, &(ssi->tag_insert[ssi->tag_index]), &len, + HTTP_IS_TAG_VOLATILE(hs)); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + data_to_send = 1; + ssi->tag_index += len; + /* Don't return here: keep on sending data */ + } + } else { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART + + if (ssi->tag_part == HTTPD_LAST_TAG_PART) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ + { + /* We have sent all the insert data so go back to looking for + * a new tag. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Everything sent.\n")); + ssi->tag_index = 0; + ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG + ssi->parsed = ssi->tag_end; +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG*/ + } + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + } + } + + /* If we drop out of the end of the for loop, this implies we must have + * file data to send so send it now. In TAG_SENDING state, we've already + * handled this so skip the send if that's the case. */ + if ((ssi->tag_state != TAG_SENDING) && (ssi->parsed > hs->file)) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ && !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG + + if ((ssi->tag_state != TAG_NONE) && (ssi->tag_started > ssi->tag_end)) { + /* If we found tag on the edge of the read buffer: just throw away the first part + (we have copied/saved everything required for parsing on later). */ + len = (u16_t)(ssi->tag_started - hs->file); + hs->left -= (ssi->parsed - ssi->tag_started); + ssi->parsed = ssi->tag_started; + ssi->tag_started = hs->buf; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ && !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG */ + { + len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(ssi->parsed - hs->file, 0xffff); + } + + err = http_write(pcb, hs->file, &len, HTTP_IS_DATA_VOLATILE(hs)); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + data_to_send = 1; + hs->file += len; + hs->left -= len; + } + } + + return data_to_send; +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + +/** + * Try to send more data on this pcb. + * + * @param pcb the pcb to send data + * @param hs connection state + */ +static u8_t http_send(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct http_state *hs) +{ + u8_t data_to_send = HTTP_NO_DATA_TO_SEND; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_send: pcb=%p hs=%p left=%d\n", (void *)pcb, + (void *)hs, hs != NULL ? (int)hs->left : 0)); + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + + if (hs->unrecved_bytes != 0) { + return 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ + + /* If we were passed a NULL state structure pointer, ignore the call. */ + if (hs == NULL) { + return 0; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ + + /* Check if we are allowed to read from this file. + (e.g. SSI might want to delay sending until data is available) */ + if (!fs_is_file_ready(hs->handle, http_continue, hs)) { + return 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS + + /* Do we have any more header data to send for this file? */ + if (hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS) { + data_to_send = http_send_headers(pcb, hs); + + if ((data_to_send == HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_FREED) || + ((data_to_send != HTTP_DATA_TO_SEND_CONTINUE) && + (hs->hdr_index < NUM_FILE_HDR_STRINGS))) { + return data_to_send; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ + + /* Have we run out of file data to send? If so, we need to read the next + * block from the file. */ + if (hs->left == 0) { + if (!http_check_eof(pcb, hs)) { + return 0; + } + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + + if (hs->ssi) { + data_to_send = http_send_data_ssi(pcb, hs); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + { + data_to_send = http_send_data_nonssi(pcb, hs); + } + + if ((hs->left == 0) && (fs_bytes_left(hs->handle) <= 0)) { + /* We reached the end of the file so this request is done. + * This adds the FIN flag right into the last data segment. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("End of file.\n")); + http_eof(pcb, hs); + return 0; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("send_data end.\n")); + return data_to_send; +} + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS +/** Initialize a http connection with a file to send for an error message + * + * @param hs http connection state + * @param error_nr HTTP error number + * @return ERR_OK if file was found and hs has been initialized correctly + * another err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t http_find_error_file(struct http_state *hs, u16_t error_nr) +{ + const char *uri, *uri1, *uri2, *uri3; + + if (error_nr == 501) { + uri1 = "/501.html"; + uri2 = "/501.htm"; + uri3 = "/501.shtml"; + } else { + /* 400 (bad request is the default) */ + uri1 = "/400.html"; + uri2 = "/400.htm"; + uri3 = "/400.shtml"; + } + + if (fs_open(&hs->file_handle, uri1) == ERR_OK) { + uri = uri1; + } else if (fs_open(&hs->file_handle, uri2) == ERR_OK) { + uri = uri2; + } else if (fs_open(&hs->file_handle, uri3) == ERR_OK) { + uri = uri3; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Error page for error %" U16_F " not found\n", + error_nr)); + return ERR_ARG; + } + + return http_init_file(hs, &hs->file_handle, 0, uri, 0, NULL); +} +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS */ +#define http_find_error_file(hs, error_nr) ERR_ARG +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS */ + +/** + * Get the file struct for a 404 error page. + * Tries some file names and returns NULL if none found. + * + * @param uri pointer that receives the actual file name URI + * @return file struct for the error page or NULL no matching file was found + */ +static struct fs_file *http_get_404_file(struct http_state *hs, const char **uri) +{ + err_t err; + + *uri = "/404.html"; + err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, *uri); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* 404.html doesn't exist. Try 404.htm instead. */ + *uri = "/404.htm"; + err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, *uri); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* 404.htm doesn't exist either. Try 404.shtml instead. */ + *uri = "/404.shtml"; + err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, *uri); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* 404.htm doesn't exist either. Indicate to the caller that it should + * send back a default 404 page. + */ + *uri = NULL; + return NULL; + } + } + } + + return &hs->file_handle; +} + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST +static err_t http_handle_post_finished(struct http_state *hs) +{ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + + /* Prevent multiple calls to httpd_post_finished, since it might have already + been called before from httpd_post_data_recved(). */ + if (hs->post_finished) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + hs->post_finished = 1; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ + /* application error or POST finished */ + /* NULL-terminate the buffer */ + http_uri_buf[0] = 0; + httpd_post_finished(hs, http_uri_buf, LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN); + return http_find_file(hs, http_uri_buf, 0); +} + +/** Pass received POST body data to the application and correctly handle + * returning a response document or closing the connection. + * ATTENTION: The application is responsible for the pbuf now, so don't free it! + * + * @param hs http connection state + * @param p pbuf to pass to the application + * @return ERR_OK if passed successfully, another err_t if the response file + * hasn't been found (after POST finished) + */ +static err_t http_post_rxpbuf(struct http_state *hs, struct pbuf *p) +{ + err_t err; + + if (p != NULL) { + /* adjust remaining Content-Length */ + if (hs->post_content_len_left < p->tot_len) { + hs->post_content_len_left = 0; + } else { + hs->post_content_len_left -= p->tot_len; + } + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + /* prevent connection being closed if httpd_post_data_recved() is called nested */ + hs->unrecved_bytes++; +#endif + + if (p != NULL) { + err = httpd_post_receive_data(hs, p); + } else { + err = ERR_OK; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + hs->unrecved_bytes--; +#endif + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* Ignore remaining content in case of application error */ + hs->post_content_len_left = 0; + } + + if (hs->post_content_len_left == 0) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + + if (hs->unrecved_bytes != 0) { + return ERR_OK; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ + /* application error or POST finished */ + return http_handle_post_finished(hs); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Handle a post request. Called from http_parse_request when method 'POST' + * is found. + * + * @param p The input pbuf (containing the POST header and body). + * @param hs The http connection state. + * @param data HTTP request (header and part of body) from input pbuf(s). + * @param data_len Size of 'data'. + * @param uri The HTTP URI parsed from input pbuf(s). + * @param uri_end Pointer to the end of 'uri' (here, the rest of the HTTP + * header starts). + * @return ERR_OK: POST correctly parsed and accepted by the application. + * ERR_INPROGRESS: POST not completely parsed (no error yet) + * another err_t: Error parsing POST or denied by the application + */ +static err_t http_post_request(struct pbuf *inp, struct http_state *hs, + char *data, u16_t data_len, char *uri, char *uri_end) +{ + err_t err; + /* search for end-of-header (first double-CRLF) */ + char *crlfcrlf = lwip_strnstr(uri_end + 1, CRLF CRLF, data_len - (uri_end + 1 - data)); + + if (crlfcrlf != NULL) { + /* search for "Content-Length: " */ +#define HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN "Content-Length: " +#define HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_LEN 16 +#define HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_DIGIT_MAX_LEN 10 + char *scontent_len = lwip_strnstr(uri_end + 1, HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN, crlfcrlf - (uri_end + 1)); + + if (scontent_len != NULL) { + char *scontent_len_end = lwip_strnstr(scontent_len + HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_LEN, CRLF, HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_DIGIT_MAX_LEN); + + if (scontent_len_end != NULL) { + int content_len; + char *content_len_num = scontent_len + HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LEN_LEN; + content_len = atoi(content_len_num); + + if (content_len == 0) { + /* if atoi returns 0 on error, fix this */ + if ((content_len_num[0] != '0') || (content_len_num[1] != '\r')) { + content_len = -1; + } + } + + if (content_len >= 0) { + /* adjust length of HTTP header passed to application */ + const char *hdr_start_after_uri = uri_end + 1; + u16_t hdr_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(data_len, crlfcrlf + 4 - data); + u16_t hdr_data_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(data_len, crlfcrlf + 4 - hdr_start_after_uri); + u8_t post_auto_wnd = 1; + http_uri_buf[0] = 0; + /* trim http header */ + *crlfcrlf = 0; + err = httpd_post_begin(hs, uri, hdr_start_after_uri, hdr_data_len, content_len, + http_uri_buf, LWIP_HTTPD_URI_BUF_LEN, &post_auto_wnd); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + /* try to pass in data of the first pbuf(s) */ + struct pbuf *q = inp; + u16_t start_offset = hdr_len; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + hs->no_auto_wnd = !post_auto_wnd; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ + /* set the Content-Length to be received for this POST */ + hs->post_content_len_left = (u32_t)content_len; + + /* get to the pbuf where the body starts */ + while ((q != NULL) && (q->len <= start_offset)) { + start_offset -= q->len; + q = q->next; + } + + if (q != NULL) { + /* hide the remaining HTTP header */ + pbuf_remove_header(q, start_offset); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + + if (!post_auto_wnd) { + /* already tcp_recved() this data... */ + hs->unrecved_bytes = q->tot_len; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ + pbuf_ref(q); + return http_post_rxpbuf(hs, q); + } else if (hs->post_content_len_left == 0) { + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_REF); + return http_post_rxpbuf(hs, q); + } else { + return ERR_OK; + } + } else { + /* return file passed from application */ + return http_find_file(hs, http_uri_buf, 0); + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("POST received invalid Content-Length: %s\n", + content_len_num)); + return ERR_ARG; + } + } + } + + /* If we come here, headers are fully received (double-crlf), but Content-Length + was not included. Since this is currently the only supported method, we have + to fail in this case! */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Error when parsing Content-Length\n")); + return ERR_ARG; + } + + /* if we come here, the POST is incomplete */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST + return ERR_INPROGRESS; +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ + return ERR_ARG; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ +} + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * A POST implementation can call this function to update the TCP window. + * This can be used to throttle data reception (e.g. when received data is + * programmed to flash and data is received faster than programmed). + * + * @param connection A connection handle passed to httpd_post_begin for which + * httpd_post_finished has *NOT* been called yet! + * @param recved_len Length of data received (for window update) + */ +void httpd_post_data_recved(void *connection, u16_t recved_len) +{ + struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)connection; + + if (hs != NULL) { + if (hs->no_auto_wnd) { + u16_t len = recved_len; + + if (hs->unrecved_bytes >= recved_len) { + hs->unrecved_bytes -= recved_len; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("httpd_post_data_recved: recved_len too big\n")); + len = (u16_t)hs->unrecved_bytes; + hs->unrecved_bytes = 0; + } + + if (hs->pcb != NULL) { + if (len != 0) { + altcp_recved(hs->pcb, len); + } + + if ((hs->post_content_len_left == 0) && (hs->unrecved_bytes == 0)) { + /* finished handling POST */ + http_handle_post_finished(hs); + http_send(hs->pcb, hs); + } + } + } + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ +/** Try to send more data if file has been blocked before + * This is a callback function passed to fs_read_async(). + */ +static void http_continue(void *connection) +{ + struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)connection; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (hs && (hs->pcb) && (hs->handle)) { + LWIP_ASSERT("hs->pcb != NULL", hs->pcb != NULL); + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("httpd_continue: try to send more data\n")); + + if (http_send(hs->pcb, hs)) { + /* If we wrote anything to be sent, go ahead and send it now. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("tcp_output\n")); + altcp_output(hs->pcb); + } + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ + +/** + * When data has been received in the correct state, try to parse it + * as a HTTP request. + * + * @param inp the received pbuf + * @param hs the connection state + * @param pcb the altcp_pcb which received this packet + * @return ERR_OK if request was OK and hs has been initialized correctly + * ERR_INPROGRESS if request was OK so far but not fully received + * another err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t http_parse_request(struct pbuf *inp, struct http_state *hs, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + char *data; + char *crlf; + u16_t data_len; + struct pbuf *p = inp; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST + u16_t clen; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + err_t err; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); /* only used for post */ + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("hs != NULL", hs != NULL); + + if ((hs->handle != NULL) || (hs->file != NULL)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Received data while sending a file\n")); + /* already sending a file */ + /* @todo: abort? */ + return ERR_USE; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Received %" U16_F " bytes\n", p->tot_len)); + + /* first check allowed characters in this pbuf? */ + + /* enqueue the pbuf */ + if (hs->req == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("First pbuf\n")); + hs->req = p; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("pbuf enqueued\n")); + pbuf_cat(hs->req, p); + } + + /* increase pbuf ref counter as it is freed when we return but we want to + keep it on the req list */ + pbuf_ref(p); + + if (hs->req->next != NULL) { + data_len = LWIP_MIN(hs->req->tot_len, LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH); + pbuf_copy_partial(hs->req, httpd_req_buf, data_len, 0); + data = httpd_req_buf; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ + { + data = (char *)p->payload; + data_len = p->len; + + if (p->len != p->tot_len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Warning: incomplete header due to chained pbufs\n")); + } + } + + /* received enough data for minimal request? */ + if (data_len >= MIN_REQ_LEN) { + /* wait for CRLF before parsing anything */ + crlf = lwip_strnstr(data, CRLF, data_len); + + if (crlf != NULL) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + int is_post = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + int is_09 = 0; + char *sp1, *sp2; + u16_t left_len, uri_len; + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("CRLF received, parsing request\n")); + + /* parse method */ + if (!strncmp(data, "GET ", 4)) { + sp1 = data + 3; + /* received GET request */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Received GET request\"\n")); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + } else if (!strncmp(data, "POST ", 5)) { + /* store request type */ + is_post = 1; + sp1 = data + 4; + /* received GET request */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Received POST request\n")); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + } else { + /* null-terminate the METHOD (pbuf is freed anyway wen returning) */ + data[4] = 0; + /* unsupported method! */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Unsupported request method (not implemented): \"%s\"\n", + data)); + return http_find_error_file(hs, 501); + } + + /* if we come here, method is OK, parse URI */ + left_len = (u16_t)(data_len - ((sp1 + 1) - data)); + sp2 = lwip_strnstr(sp1 + 1, " ", left_len); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 + + if (sp2 == NULL) { + /* HTTP 0.9: respond with correct protocol version */ + sp2 = lwip_strnstr(sp1 + 1, CRLF, left_len); + is_09 = 1; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + + if (is_post) { + /* HTTP/0.9 does not support POST */ + goto badrequest; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 */ + uri_len = (u16_t)(sp2 - (sp1 + 1)); + + if ((sp2 != 0) && (sp2 > sp1)) { + /* wait for CRLFCRLF (indicating end of HTTP headers) before parsing anything */ + if (lwip_strnstr(data, CRLF CRLF, data_len) != NULL) { + char *uri = sp1 + 1; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE + + /* This is HTTP/1.0 compatible: for strict 1.1, a connection + would always be persistent unless "close" was specified. */ + if (!is_09 && (lwip_strnstr(data, HTTP11_CONNECTIONKEEPALIVE, data_len) || + lwip_strnstr(data, HTTP11_CONNECTIONKEEPALIVE2, data_len))) { + hs->keepalive = 1; + } else { + hs->keepalive = 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ + /* null-terminate the METHOD (pbuf is freed anyway wen returning) */ + *sp1 = 0; + uri[uri_len] = 0; + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Received \"%s\" request for URI: \"%s\"\n", + data, uri)); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + + if (is_post) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST + struct pbuf *q = hs->req; +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ + struct pbuf *q = inp; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ + err = http_post_request(q, hs, data, data_len, uri, sp2); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* restore header for next try */ + *sp1 = ' '; + *sp2 = ' '; + uri[uri_len] = ' '; + } + + if (err == ERR_ARG) { + goto badrequest; + } + + return err; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + { + return http_find_file(hs, uri, is_09); + } + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("invalid URI\n")); + } + } + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST + clen = pbuf_clen(hs->req); + + if ((hs->req->tot_len <= LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_BUFSIZE) && + (clen <= LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_QUEUELEN)) { + /* request not fully received (too short or CRLF is missing) */ + return ERR_INPROGRESS; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ + { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + badrequest: +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("bad request\n")); + /* could not parse request */ + return http_find_error_file(hs, 400); + } +} + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI && (LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION == 1) +/* Check if SSI should be parsed for this file/URL + * (With LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION == 2, this function can be + * overridden by an external implementation.) + * + * @return 1 for SSI, 0 for standard files + */ +static u8_t http_uri_is_ssi(struct fs_file *file, const char *uri) +{ + size_t loop; + u8_t tag_check = 0; + + if (file != NULL) { + /* See if we have been asked for an shtml file and, if so, + enable tag checking. */ + const char *ext = NULL, *sub; + char *param = (char *)strstr(uri, "?"); + + if (param != NULL) { + /* separate uri from parameters for now, set back later */ + *param = 0; + } + + sub = uri; + ext = uri; + + for (sub = strstr(sub, "."); sub != NULL; sub = strstr(sub, ".")) { + ext = sub; + sub++; + } + + for (loop = 0; loop < NUM_SHTML_EXTENSIONS; loop++) { + if (!lwip_stricmp(ext, g_pcSSIExtensions[loop])) { + tag_check = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (param != NULL) { + *param = '?'; + } + } + + return tag_check; +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + +/** Try to find the file specified by uri and, if found, initialize hs + * accordingly. + * + * @param hs the connection state + * @param uri the HTTP header URI + * @param is_09 1 if the request is HTTP/0.9 (no HTTP headers in response) + * @return ERR_OK if file was found and hs has been initialized correctly + * another err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t http_find_file(struct http_state *hs, const char *uri, int is_09) +{ + size_t loop; + struct fs_file *file = NULL; + char *params = NULL; + err_t err; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI + int i; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + const +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + /* By default, assume we will not be processing server-side-includes tags */ + u8_t tag_check = 0; + + /* Have we been asked for the default file (in root or a directory) ? */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN + size_t uri_len = strlen(uri); + + if ((uri_len > 0) && (uri[uri_len - 1] == '/') && + ((uri != http_uri_buf) || (uri_len == 1))) { + size_t copy_len = LWIP_MIN(sizeof(http_uri_buf) - 1, uri_len - 1); + + if (copy_len > 0) { + MEMCPY(http_uri_buf, uri, copy_len); + http_uri_buf[copy_len] = 0; + } + +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN */ + + if ((uri[0] == '/') && (uri[1] == 0)) { +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN */ + + /* Try each of the configured default filenames until we find one + that exists. */ + for (loop = 0; loop < NUM_DEFAULT_FILENAMES; loop++) { + const char *file_name; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN + + if (copy_len > 0) { + size_t len_left = sizeof(http_uri_buf) - copy_len - 1; + + if (len_left > 0) { + size_t name_len = strlen(httpd_default_filenames[loop].name); + size_t name_copy_len = LWIP_MIN(len_left, name_len); + MEMCPY(&http_uri_buf[copy_len], httpd_default_filenames[loop].name, name_copy_len); + http_uri_buf[copy_len + name_copy_len] = 0; + } + + file_name = http_uri_buf; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN */ + { + file_name = httpd_default_filenames[loop].name; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Looking for %s...\n", file_name)); + err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, file_name); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + uri = file_name; + file = &hs->file_handle; + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Opened.\n")); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + tag_check = httpd_default_filenames[loop].shtml; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + break; + } + } + } + + if (file == NULL) { + /* No - we've been asked for a specific file. */ + /* First, isolate the base URI (without any parameters) */ + params = (char *)strchr(uri, '?'); + + if (params != NULL) { + /* URI contains parameters. NULL-terminate the base URI */ + *params = '\0'; + params++; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI + http_cgi_paramcount = -1; + + /* Does the base URI we have isolated correspond to a CGI handler? */ + if (httpd_num_cgis && httpd_cgis) { + for (i = 0; i < httpd_num_cgis; i++) { + if (strcmp(uri, httpd_cgis[i].pcCGIName) == 0) { + /* + * We found a CGI that handles this URI so extract the + * parameters and call the handler. + */ + http_cgi_paramcount = extract_uri_parameters(hs, params); + uri = httpd_cgis[i].pfnCGIHandler(i, http_cgi_paramcount, hs->params, + hs->param_vals); + break; + } + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Opening %s\n", uri)); + + err = fs_open(&hs->file_handle, uri); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + file = &hs->file_handle; + } else { + file = http_get_404_file(hs, &uri); + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + + if (file != NULL) { + if (file->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI) { + tag_check = 1; + } else { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION + tag_check = http_uri_is_ssi(file, uri); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION */ + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + } + + if (file == NULL) { + /* None of the default filenames exist so send back a 404 page */ + file = http_get_404_file(hs, &uri); + } + + return http_init_file(hs, file, is_09, uri, tag_check, params); +} + +/** Initialize a http connection with a file to send (if found). + * Called by http_find_file and http_find_error_file. + * + * @param hs http connection state + * @param file file structure to send (or NULL if not found) + * @param is_09 1 if the request is HTTP/0.9 (no HTTP headers in response) + * @param uri the HTTP header URI + * @param tag_check enable SSI tag checking + * @param params != NULL if URI has parameters (separated by '?') + * @return ERR_OK if file was found and hs has been initialized correctly + * another err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t http_init_file(struct http_state *hs, struct fs_file *file, int is_09, const char *uri, + u8_t tag_check, char *params) +{ +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(is_09); +#endif + + if (file != NULL) { + /* file opened, initialise struct http_state */ +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ + /* If dynamic read is disabled, file data must be in one piece and available now */ + LWIP_ASSERT("file->data != NULL", file->data != NULL); +#endif + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + + if (tag_check) { + struct http_ssi_state *ssi = http_ssi_state_alloc(); + + if (ssi != NULL) { + ssi->tag_index = 0; + ssi->tag_state = TAG_NONE; + ssi->parsed = file->data; + ssi->parse_left = file->len; + ssi->tag_end = file->data; + hs->ssi = ssi; + } + } + +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tag_check); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + hs->handle = file; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI + + if (params != NULL) { + /* URI contains parameters, call generic CGI handler */ + int count; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI + + if (http_cgi_paramcount >= 0) { + count = http_cgi_paramcount; + } else +#endif + { + count = extract_uri_parameters(hs, params); + } + + httpd_cgi_handler(file, uri, count, http_cgi_params, http_cgi_param_vals +#if defined(LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE) && LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE + , + file->state +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ + ); + } + +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(params); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ + hs->file = file->data; + LWIP_ASSERT("File length must be positive!", (file->len >= 0)); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES + + if (file->is_custom_file && (file->data == NULL)) { + /* custom file, need to read data first (via fs_read_custom) */ + hs->left = 0; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ + { + hs->left = (u32_t)file->len; + } + + hs->retries = 0; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING + hs->time_started = sys_now(); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING */ +#if !LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS + LWIP_ASSERT("HTTP headers not included in file system", + (hs->handle->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED) != 0); +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 + + if (is_09 && ((hs->handle->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED) != 0)) { + /* HTTP/0.9 responses are sent without HTTP header, + search for the end of the header. */ + char *file_start = lwip_strnstr(hs->file, CRLF CRLF, hs->left); + + if (file_start != NULL) { + int diff = file_start + 4 - hs->file; + hs->file += diff; + hs->left -= (u32_t)diff; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09*/ + } else { + hs->handle = NULL; + hs->file = NULL; + hs->left = 0; + hs->retries = 0; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS + + /* Determine the HTTP headers to send based on the file extension of + * the requested URI. */ + if ((hs->handle == NULL) || ((hs->handle->flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED) == 0)) { + get_http_headers(hs, uri); + } + +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(uri); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE + + if (hs->keepalive) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + + if (hs->ssi != NULL) { + hs->keepalive = 0; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + { + if ((hs->handle != NULL) && + ((hs->handle->flags & (FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED | FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT)) == FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED)) { + hs->keepalive = 0; + } + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * The pcb had an error and is already deallocated. + * The argument might still be valid (if != NULL). + */ +static void http_err(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_err: %s", lwip_strerr(err))); + + if (hs != NULL) { + http_state_free(hs); + } +} + +/** + * Data has been sent and acknowledged by the remote host. + * This means that more data can be sent. + */ +static err_t http_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) +{ + struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)arg; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_sent %p\n", (void *)pcb)); + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + if (hs == NULL) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + hs->retries = 0; + + http_send(pcb, hs); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * The poll function is called every 2nd second. + * If there has been no data sent (which resets the retries) in 8 seconds, close. + * If the last portion of a file has not been sent in 2 seconds, close. + * + * This could be increased, but we don't want to waste resources for bad connections. + */ +static err_t http_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)arg; + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_poll: pcb=%p hs=%p pcb_state=%s\n", + (void *)pcb, (void *)hs, tcp_debug_state_str(altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(pcb)))); + + if (hs == NULL) { + err_t closed; + /* arg is null, close. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_poll: arg is NULL, close\n")); + closed = http_close_conn(pcb, NULL); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(closed); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_ABORT_ON_CLOSE_MEM_ERROR + + if (closed == ERR_MEM) { + altcp_abort(pcb); + return ERR_ABRT; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_ABORT_ON_CLOSE_MEM_ERROR */ + return ERR_OK; + } else { + hs->retries++; + + if (hs->retries == HTTPD_MAX_RETRIES) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_poll: too many retries, close\n")); + http_close_conn(pcb, hs); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* If this connection has a file open, try to send some more data. If + * it has not yet received a GET request, don't do this since it will + * cause the connection to close immediately. */ + if (hs->handle) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_poll: try to send more data\n")); + + if (http_send(pcb, hs)) { + /* If we wrote anything to be sent, go ahead and send it now. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("tcp_output\n")); + altcp_output(pcb); + } + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Data has been received on this pcb. + * For HTTP 1.0, this should normally only happen once (if the request fits in one packet). + */ +static err_t http_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + struct http_state *hs = (struct http_state *)arg; + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_recv: pcb=%p pbuf=%p err=%s\n", (void *)pcb, + (void *)p, lwip_strerr(err))); + + if ((err != ERR_OK) || (p == NULL) || (hs == NULL)) { + /* error or closed by other side? */ + if (p != NULL) { + /* Inform TCP that we have taken the data. */ + altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); + pbuf_free(p); + } + + if (hs == NULL) { + /* this should not happen, only to be robust */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("Error, http_recv: hs is NULL, close\n")); + } + + http_close_conn(pcb, hs); + return ERR_OK; + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND + + if (hs->no_auto_wnd) { + hs->unrecved_bytes += p->tot_len; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST && LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ + { + /* Inform TCP that we have taken the data. */ + altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); + } + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + + if (hs->post_content_len_left > 0) { + /* reset idle counter when POST data is received */ + hs->retries = 0; + /* this is data for a POST, pass the complete pbuf to the application */ + http_post_rxpbuf(hs, p); + + /* pbuf is passed to the application, don't free it! */ + if (hs->post_content_len_left == 0) { + /* all data received, send response or close connection */ + http_send(pcb, hs); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + { + if (hs->handle == NULL) { + err_t parsed = http_parse_request(p, hs, pcb); + LWIP_ASSERT("http_parse_request: unexpected return value", parsed == ERR_OK || parsed == ERR_INPROGRESS || parsed == ERR_ARG || parsed == ERR_USE); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST + + if (parsed != ERR_INPROGRESS) { + /* request fully parsed or error */ + if (hs->req != NULL) { + pbuf_free(hs->req); + hs->req = NULL; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ + pbuf_free(p); + + if (parsed == ERR_OK) { +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + + if (hs->post_content_len_left == 0) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("http_recv: data %p len %" S32_F "\n", (const void *)hs->file, hs->left)); + http_send(pcb, hs); + } + } else if (parsed == ERR_ARG) { + /* @todo: close on ERR_USE? */ + http_close_conn(pcb, hs); + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_recv: already sending data\n")); + /* already sending but still receiving data, we might want to RST here? */ + pbuf_free(p); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * A new incoming connection has been accepted. + */ +static err_t http_accept(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) +{ + struct http_state *hs; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_accept %p / %p\n", (void *)pcb, arg)); + + if ((err != ERR_OK) || (pcb == NULL)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* Set priority */ + altcp_setprio(pcb, HTTPD_TCP_PRIO); + + /* Allocate memory for the structure that holds the state of the + connection - initialized by that function. */ + hs = http_state_alloc(); + + if (hs == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_accept: Out of memory, RST\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + hs->pcb = pcb; + + /* Tell TCP that this is the structure we wish to be passed for our + callbacks. */ + altcp_arg(pcb, hs); + + /* Set up the various callback functions */ + altcp_recv(pcb, http_recv); + altcp_err(pcb, http_err); + altcp_poll(pcb, http_poll, HTTPD_POLL_INTERVAL); + altcp_sent(pcb, http_sent); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void httpd_init_pcb(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t port) +{ + err_t err; + + if (pcb) { + altcp_setprio(pcb, HTTPD_TCP_PRIO); + /* set SOF_REUSEADDR here to explicitly bind httpd to multiple interfaces */ + err = altcp_bind(pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, port); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_ASSERT("httpd_init: tcp_bind failed", err == ERR_OK); + pcb = altcp_listen(pcb); + LWIP_ASSERT("httpd_init: tcp_listen failed", pcb != NULL); + altcp_accept(pcb, http_accept); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Initialize the httpd: set up a listening PCB and bind it to the defined port + */ +void httpd_init(void) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *pcb; + +#if HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL + LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(HTTPD_STATE); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(HTTPD_SSI_STATE); +#endif +#endif + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("httpd_init\n")); + + /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by tcp_new() */ + + pcb = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + LWIP_ASSERT("httpd_init: tcp_new failed", pcb != NULL); + httpd_init_pcb(pcb, HTTPD_SERVER_PORT); +} + +#if HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Initialize the httpd: set up a listening PCB and bind it to the defined port. + * Also set up TLS connection handling (HTTPS). + */ +void httpd_inits(struct altcp_tls_config *conf) +{ +#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS + struct altcp_pcb *pcb_tls = altcp_tls_new(conf, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + LWIP_ASSERT("httpd_init: altcp_tls_new failed", pcb_tls != NULL); + httpd_init_pcb(pcb_tls, HTTPD_SERVER_PORT_HTTPS); +#else /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conf); +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ +} +#endif /* HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Set the SSI handler function. + * + * @param ssi_handler the SSI handler function + * @param tags an array of SSI tag strings to search for in SSI-enabled files + * @param num_tags number of tags in the 'tags' array + */ +void http_set_ssi_handler(tSSIHandler ssi_handler, const char **tags, int num_tags) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(HTTPD_DEBUG, ("http_set_ssi_handler\n")); + + LWIP_ASSERT("no ssi_handler given", ssi_handler != NULL); + httpd_ssi_handler = ssi_handler; + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tags); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(num_tags); +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + LWIP_ASSERT("no tags given", tags != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid number of tags", num_tags > 0); + + httpd_tags = tags; + httpd_num_tags = num_tags; +#endif /* !LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Set an array of CGI filenames/handler functions + * + * @param cgis an array of CGI filenames/handler functions + * @param num_handlers number of elements in the 'cgis' array + */ +void http_set_cgi_handlers(const tCGI *cgis, int num_handlers) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("no cgis given", cgis != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid number of handlers", num_handlers > 0); + + httpd_cgis = cgis; + httpd_num_cgis = num_handlers; +} +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd_structs.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd_structs.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd_structs.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd_structs.h index 8385f9a6..54d38127 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd_structs.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/httpd_structs.h @@ -1,126 +1,126 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HTTPD_STRUCTS_H -#define LWIP_HTTPD_STRUCTS_H - -#include "lwip/apps/httpd.h" - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS -/** This struct is used for a list of HTTP header strings for various - * filename extensions. */ -typedef struct -{ - const char *extension; - const char *content_type; -} tHTTPHeader; - -/** A list of strings used in HTTP headers (see RFC 1945 HTTP/1.0 and - * RFC 2616 HTTP/1.1 for header field definitions) */ -static const char *const g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[] = { - "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n", - "HTTP/1.0 404 File not found\r\n", - "HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request\r\n", - "HTTP/1.0 501 Not Implemented\r\n", - "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n", - "HTTP/1.1 404 File not found\r\n", - "HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n", - "HTTP/1.1 501 Not Implemented\r\n", - "Content-Length: ", - "Connection: Close\r\n", - "Connection: keep-alive\r\n", - "Connection: keep-alive\r\nContent-Length: ", - "Server: " HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT "\r\n", - "\r\n

404: The requested file cannot be found.

\r\n" -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE - , - "Connection: keep-alive\r\nContent-Length: 77\r\n\r\n

404: The requested file cannot be found.

\r\n" -#endif -}; - -/* Indexes into the g_psHTTPHeaderStrings array */ -#define HTTP_HDR_OK 0 /* 200 OK */ -#define HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND 1 /* 404 File not found */ -#define HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST 2 /* 400 Bad request */ -#define HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL 3 /* 501 Not Implemented */ -#define HTTP_HDR_OK_11 4 /* 200 OK */ -#define HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND_11 5 /* 404 File not found */ -#define HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST_11 6 /* 400 Bad request */ -#define HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL_11 7 /* 501 Not Implemented */ -#define HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LENGTH 8 /* Content-Length: (HTTP 1.0)*/ -#define HTTP_HDR_CONN_CLOSE 9 /* Connection: Close (HTTP 1.1) */ -#define HTTP_HDR_CONN_KEEPALIVE 10 /* Connection: keep-alive (HTTP 1.1) */ -#define HTTP_HDR_KEEPALIVE_LEN 11 /* Connection: keep-alive + Content-Length: (HTTP 1.1)*/ -#define HTTP_HDR_SERVER 12 /* Server: HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT */ -#define DEFAULT_404_HTML 13 /* default 404 body */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE -#define DEFAULT_404_HTML_PERSISTENT 14 /* default 404 body, but including Connection: keep-alive */ -#endif - -#define HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE(contenttype) "Content-Type: " contenttype "\r\n\r\n" -#define HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE_ENCODING(contenttype, encoding) "Content-Type: " contenttype "\r\nContent-Encoding: " encoding "\r\n\r\n" - -#define HTTP_HDR_HTML HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/html") -#define HTTP_HDR_SSI HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/html\r\nExpires: Fri, 10 Apr 2008 14:00:00 GMT\r\nPragma: no-cache") -#define HTTP_HDR_GIF HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/gif") -#define HTTP_HDR_PNG HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/png") -#define HTTP_HDR_JPG HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/jpeg") -#define HTTP_HDR_BMP HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/bmp") -#define HTTP_HDR_ICO HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/x-icon") -#define HTTP_HDR_APP HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/octet-stream") -#define HTTP_HDR_JS HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/javascript") -#define HTTP_HDR_RA HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/javascript") -#define HTTP_HDR_CSS HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/css") -#define HTTP_HDR_SWF HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/x-shockwave-flash") -#define HTTP_HDR_XML HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/xml") -#define HTTP_HDR_PDF HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/pdf") -#define HTTP_HDR_JSON HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/json") -#define HTTP_HDR_CSV HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/csv") -#define HTTP_HDR_TSV HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/tsv") -#define HTTP_HDR_SVG HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/svg+xml") -#define HTTP_HDR_SVGZ HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE_ENCODING("image/svg+xml", "gzip") - -#define HTTP_HDR_DEFAULT_TYPE HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/plain") - -/** A list of extension-to-HTTP header strings (see outdated RFC 1700 MEDIA TYPES - * and http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types for registered content types - * and subtypes) */ -static const tHTTPHeader g_psHTTPHeaders[] = { - { "html", HTTP_HDR_HTML }, - { "htm", HTTP_HDR_HTML }, - { "shtml", HTTP_HDR_SSI }, - { "shtm", HTTP_HDR_SSI }, - { "ssi", HTTP_HDR_SSI }, - { "gif", HTTP_HDR_GIF }, - { "png", HTTP_HDR_PNG }, - { "jpg", HTTP_HDR_JPG }, - { "bmp", HTTP_HDR_BMP }, - { "ico", HTTP_HDR_ICO }, - { "class", HTTP_HDR_APP }, - { "cls", HTTP_HDR_APP }, - { "js", HTTP_HDR_JS }, - { "ram", HTTP_HDR_RA }, - { "css", HTTP_HDR_CSS }, - { "swf", HTTP_HDR_SWF }, - { "xml", HTTP_HDR_XML }, - { "xsl", HTTP_HDR_XML }, - { "pdf", HTTP_HDR_PDF }, - { "json", HTTP_HDR_JSON } -#ifdef HTTPD_ADDITIONAL_CONTENT_TYPES - /* If you need to add content types not listed here: - * #define HTTPD_ADDITIONAL_CONTENT_TYPES {"ct1", HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/ct1")}, {"exe", HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/exe")} - */ - , - HTTPD_ADDITIONAL_CONTENT_TYPES -#endif -}; - -#define NUM_HTTP_HEADERS LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(g_psHTTPHeaders) - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI -static const char *const g_pcSSIExtensions[] = { - ".shtml", ".shtm", ".ssi", ".xml", ".json" -}; -#define NUM_SHTML_EXTENSIONS LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(g_pcSSIExtensions) -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_STRUCTS_H */ +#ifndef LWIP_HTTPD_STRUCTS_H +#define LWIP_HTTPD_STRUCTS_H + +#include "lwip/apps/httpd.h" + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS +/** This struct is used for a list of HTTP header strings for various + * filename extensions. */ +typedef struct +{ + const char *extension; + const char *content_type; +} tHTTPHeader; + +/** A list of strings used in HTTP headers (see RFC 1945 HTTP/1.0 and + * RFC 2616 HTTP/1.1 for header field definitions) */ +static const char *const g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[] = { + "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n", + "HTTP/1.0 404 File not found\r\n", + "HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request\r\n", + "HTTP/1.0 501 Not Implemented\r\n", + "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n", + "HTTP/1.1 404 File not found\r\n", + "HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n", + "HTTP/1.1 501 Not Implemented\r\n", + "Content-Length: ", + "Connection: Close\r\n", + "Connection: keep-alive\r\n", + "Connection: keep-alive\r\nContent-Length: ", + "Server: " HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT "\r\n", + "\r\n

404: The requested file cannot be found.

\r\n" +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE + , + "Connection: keep-alive\r\nContent-Length: 77\r\n\r\n

404: The requested file cannot be found.

\r\n" +#endif +}; + +/* Indexes into the g_psHTTPHeaderStrings array */ +#define HTTP_HDR_OK 0 /* 200 OK */ +#define HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND 1 /* 404 File not found */ +#define HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST 2 /* 400 Bad request */ +#define HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL 3 /* 501 Not Implemented */ +#define HTTP_HDR_OK_11 4 /* 200 OK */ +#define HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND_11 5 /* 404 File not found */ +#define HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST_11 6 /* 400 Bad request */ +#define HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL_11 7 /* 501 Not Implemented */ +#define HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LENGTH 8 /* Content-Length: (HTTP 1.0)*/ +#define HTTP_HDR_CONN_CLOSE 9 /* Connection: Close (HTTP 1.1) */ +#define HTTP_HDR_CONN_KEEPALIVE 10 /* Connection: keep-alive (HTTP 1.1) */ +#define HTTP_HDR_KEEPALIVE_LEN 11 /* Connection: keep-alive + Content-Length: (HTTP 1.1)*/ +#define HTTP_HDR_SERVER 12 /* Server: HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT */ +#define DEFAULT_404_HTML 13 /* default 404 body */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE +#define DEFAULT_404_HTML_PERSISTENT 14 /* default 404 body, but including Connection: keep-alive */ +#endif + +#define HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE(contenttype) "Content-Type: " contenttype "\r\n\r\n" +#define HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE_ENCODING(contenttype, encoding) "Content-Type: " contenttype "\r\nContent-Encoding: " encoding "\r\n\r\n" + +#define HTTP_HDR_HTML HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/html") +#define HTTP_HDR_SSI HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/html\r\nExpires: Fri, 10 Apr 2008 14:00:00 GMT\r\nPragma: no-cache") +#define HTTP_HDR_GIF HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/gif") +#define HTTP_HDR_PNG HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/png") +#define HTTP_HDR_JPG HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/jpeg") +#define HTTP_HDR_BMP HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/bmp") +#define HTTP_HDR_ICO HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/x-icon") +#define HTTP_HDR_APP HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/octet-stream") +#define HTTP_HDR_JS HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/javascript") +#define HTTP_HDR_RA HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/javascript") +#define HTTP_HDR_CSS HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/css") +#define HTTP_HDR_SWF HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/x-shockwave-flash") +#define HTTP_HDR_XML HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/xml") +#define HTTP_HDR_PDF HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/pdf") +#define HTTP_HDR_JSON HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/json") +#define HTTP_HDR_CSV HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/csv") +#define HTTP_HDR_TSV HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/tsv") +#define HTTP_HDR_SVG HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("image/svg+xml") +#define HTTP_HDR_SVGZ HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE_ENCODING("image/svg+xml", "gzip") + +#define HTTP_HDR_DEFAULT_TYPE HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/plain") + +/** A list of extension-to-HTTP header strings (see outdated RFC 1700 MEDIA TYPES + * and http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types for registered content types + * and subtypes) */ +static const tHTTPHeader g_psHTTPHeaders[] = { + { "html", HTTP_HDR_HTML }, + { "htm", HTTP_HDR_HTML }, + { "shtml", HTTP_HDR_SSI }, + { "shtm", HTTP_HDR_SSI }, + { "ssi", HTTP_HDR_SSI }, + { "gif", HTTP_HDR_GIF }, + { "png", HTTP_HDR_PNG }, + { "jpg", HTTP_HDR_JPG }, + { "bmp", HTTP_HDR_BMP }, + { "ico", HTTP_HDR_ICO }, + { "class", HTTP_HDR_APP }, + { "cls", HTTP_HDR_APP }, + { "js", HTTP_HDR_JS }, + { "ram", HTTP_HDR_RA }, + { "css", HTTP_HDR_CSS }, + { "swf", HTTP_HDR_SWF }, + { "xml", HTTP_HDR_XML }, + { "xsl", HTTP_HDR_XML }, + { "pdf", HTTP_HDR_PDF }, + { "json", HTTP_HDR_JSON } +#ifdef HTTPD_ADDITIONAL_CONTENT_TYPES + /* If you need to add content types not listed here: + * #define HTTPD_ADDITIONAL_CONTENT_TYPES {"ct1", HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("text/ct1")}, {"exe", HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE("application/exe")} + */ + , + HTTPD_ADDITIONAL_CONTENT_TYPES +#endif +}; + +#define NUM_HTTP_HEADERS LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(g_psHTTPHeaders) + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI +static const char *const g_pcSSIExtensions[] = { + ".shtml", ".shtm", ".ssi", ".xml", ".json" +}; +#define NUM_SHTML_EXTENSIONS LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(g_pcSSIExtensions) +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_STRUCTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata index 981c3d18..37b4203e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata @@ -1,97 +1,97 @@ -#!/usr/bin/perl - -open(OUTPUT, "> fsdata.c"); - -chdir("fs"); -open(FILES, "find . -type f |"); - -while($file = ) { - - # Do not include files in CVS directories nor backup files. - if($file =~ /(CVS|~)/) { - next; - } - - chop($file); - - open(HEADER, "> /tmp/header") || die $!; - if($file =~ /404/) { - print(HEADER "HTTP/1.0 404 File not found\r\n"); - } else { - print(HEADER "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n"); - } - print(HEADER "Server: lwIP/pre-0.6 (http://www.sics.se/~adam/lwip/)\r\n"); - if($file =~ /\.html$/) { - print(HEADER "Content-type: text/html\r\n"); - } elsif($file =~ /\.gif$/) { - print(HEADER "Content-type: image/gif\r\n"); - } elsif($file =~ /\.png$/) { - print(HEADER "Content-type: image/png\r\n"); - } elsif($file =~ /\.jpg$/) { - print(HEADER "Content-type: image/jpeg\r\n"); - } elsif($file =~ /\.class$/) { - print(HEADER "Content-type: application/octet-stream\r\n"); - } elsif($file =~ /\.ram$/) { - print(HEADER "Content-type: audio/x-pn-realaudio\r\n"); - } else { - print(HEADER "Content-type: text/plain\r\n"); - } - print(HEADER "\r\n"); - close(HEADER); - - unless($file =~ /\.plain$/ || $file =~ /cgi/) { - system("cat /tmp/header $file > /tmp/file"); - } else { - system("cp $file /tmp/file"); - } - - open(FILE, "/tmp/file"); - unlink("/tmp/file"); - unlink("/tmp/header"); - - $file =~ s/\.//; - $fvar = $file; - $fvar =~ s-/-_-g; - $fvar =~ s-\.-_-g; - print(OUTPUT "static const unsigned char data".$fvar."[] = {\n"); - print(OUTPUT "\t/* $file */\n\t"); - for($j = 0; $j < length($file); $j++) { - printf(OUTPUT "%#02x, ", unpack("C", substr($file, $j, 1))); - } - printf(OUTPUT "0,\n"); - - - $i = 0; - while(read(FILE, $data, 1)) { - if($i == 0) { - print(OUTPUT "\t"); - } - printf(OUTPUT "%#02x, ", unpack("C", $data)); - $i++; - if($i == 10) { - print(OUTPUT "\n"); - $i = 0; - } - } - print(OUTPUT "};\n\n"); - close(FILE); - push(@fvars, $fvar); - push(@files, $file); -} - -for($i = 0; $i < @fvars; $i++) { - $file = $files[$i]; - $fvar = $fvars[$i]; - - if($i == 0) { - $prevfile = "NULL"; - } else { - $prevfile = "file" . $fvars[$i - 1]; - } - print(OUTPUT "const struct fsdata_file file".$fvar."[] = {{$prevfile, data$fvar, "); - print(OUTPUT "data$fvar + ". (length($file) + 1) .", "); - print(OUTPUT "sizeof(data$fvar) - ". (length($file) + 1) ."}};\n\n"); -} - -print(OUTPUT "#define FS_ROOT file$fvars[$i - 1]\n\n"); -print(OUTPUT "#define FS_NUMFILES $i\n"); +#!/usr/bin/perl + +open(OUTPUT, "> fsdata.c"); + +chdir("fs"); +open(FILES, "find . -type f |"); + +while($file = ) { + + # Do not include files in CVS directories nor backup files. + if($file =~ /(CVS|~)/) { + next; + } + + chop($file); + + open(HEADER, "> /tmp/header") || die $!; + if($file =~ /404/) { + print(HEADER "HTTP/1.0 404 File not found\r\n"); + } else { + print(HEADER "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n"); + } + print(HEADER "Server: lwIP/pre-0.6 (http://www.sics.se/~adam/lwip/)\r\n"); + if($file =~ /\.html$/) { + print(HEADER "Content-type: text/html\r\n"); + } elsif($file =~ /\.gif$/) { + print(HEADER "Content-type: image/gif\r\n"); + } elsif($file =~ /\.png$/) { + print(HEADER "Content-type: image/png\r\n"); + } elsif($file =~ /\.jpg$/) { + print(HEADER "Content-type: image/jpeg\r\n"); + } elsif($file =~ /\.class$/) { + print(HEADER "Content-type: application/octet-stream\r\n"); + } elsif($file =~ /\.ram$/) { + print(HEADER "Content-type: audio/x-pn-realaudio\r\n"); + } else { + print(HEADER "Content-type: text/plain\r\n"); + } + print(HEADER "\r\n"); + close(HEADER); + + unless($file =~ /\.plain$/ || $file =~ /cgi/) { + system("cat /tmp/header $file > /tmp/file"); + } else { + system("cp $file /tmp/file"); + } + + open(FILE, "/tmp/file"); + unlink("/tmp/file"); + unlink("/tmp/header"); + + $file =~ s/\.//; + $fvar = $file; + $fvar =~ s-/-_-g; + $fvar =~ s-\.-_-g; + print(OUTPUT "static const unsigned char data".$fvar."[] = {\n"); + print(OUTPUT "\t/* $file */\n\t"); + for($j = 0; $j < length($file); $j++) { + printf(OUTPUT "%#02x, ", unpack("C", substr($file, $j, 1))); + } + printf(OUTPUT "0,\n"); + + + $i = 0; + while(read(FILE, $data, 1)) { + if($i == 0) { + print(OUTPUT "\t"); + } + printf(OUTPUT "%#02x, ", unpack("C", $data)); + $i++; + if($i == 10) { + print(OUTPUT "\n"); + $i = 0; + } + } + print(OUTPUT "};\n\n"); + close(FILE); + push(@fvars, $fvar); + push(@files, $file); +} + +for($i = 0; $i < @fvars; $i++) { + $file = $files[$i]; + $fvar = $fvars[$i]; + + if($i == 0) { + $prevfile = "NULL"; + } else { + $prevfile = "file" . $fvars[$i - 1]; + } + print(OUTPUT "const struct fsdata_file file".$fvar."[] = {{$prevfile, data$fvar, "); + print(OUTPUT "data$fvar + ". (length($file) + 1) .", "); + print(OUTPUT "sizeof(data$fvar) - ". (length($file) + 1) ."}};\n\n"); +} + +print(OUTPUT "#define FS_ROOT file$fvars[$i - 1]\n\n"); +print(OUTPUT "#define FS_NUMFILES $i\n"); diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c index fc35b769..7fd3cd7a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/makefsdata.c @@ -1,1391 +1,1391 @@ -/** - * makefsdata: Converts a directory structure for use with the lwIP httpd. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Jim Pettinato - * Simon Goldschmidt - * - * @todo: - * - take TCP_MSS, LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS and - * PAYLOAD_ALIGN_TYPE/PAYLOAD_ALIGNMENT as arguments - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "tinydir.h" - -/** Makefsdata can generate *all* files deflate-compressed (where file size shrinks). - * Since nearly all browsers support this, this is a good way to reduce ROM size. - * To compress the files, "miniz.c" must be downloaded seperately. - */ -#ifndef MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE -#define MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE 0 -#endif - -#define COPY_BUFSIZE (1024 * 1024) /* 1 MByte */ - -#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE -#include "../miniz.c" - -typedef unsigned char uint8; -typedef unsigned short uint16; -typedef unsigned int uint; - -#define my_max(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) -#define my_min(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) - -/* COMP_OUT_BUF_SIZE is the size of the output buffer used during compression. - COMP_OUT_BUF_SIZE must be >= 1 and <= OUT_BUF_SIZE */ -#define COMP_OUT_BUF_SIZE COPY_BUFSIZE - -/* OUT_BUF_SIZE is the size of the output buffer used during decompression. - OUT_BUF_SIZE must be a power of 2 >= TINFL_LZ_DICT_SIZE (because the low-level decompressor not only writes, but reads from the output buffer as it decompresses) */ -#define OUT_BUF_SIZE COPY_BUFSIZE -static uint8 s_outbuf[OUT_BUF_SIZE]; -static uint8 s_checkbuf[OUT_BUF_SIZE]; - -/* tdefl_compressor contains all the state needed by the low-level compressor so it's a pretty big struct (~300k). - This example makes it a global vs. putting it on the stack, of course in real-world usage you'll probably malloc() or new it. */ -tdefl_compressor g_deflator; -tinfl_decompressor g_inflator; - -int deflate_level = 10; /* default compression level, can be changed via command line */ -#define USAGE_ARG_DEFLATE " [-defl<:compr_level>]" -#else /* MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE */ -#define USAGE_ARG_DEFLATE "" -#endif /* MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE */ - -#ifdef WIN32 - -#define GETCWD(path, len) GetCurrentDirectoryA(len, path) -#define CHDIR(path) SetCurrentDirectoryA(path) -#define CHDIR_SUCCEEDED(ret) (ret == TRUE) - -#elif __linux__ - -#define GETCWD(path, len) getcwd(path, len) -#define CHDIR(path) chdir(path) -#define CHDIR_SUCCEEDED(ret) (ret == 0) - -#else - -#error makefsdata not supported on this platform - -#endif - -#define NEWLINE "\r\n" -#define NEWLINE_LEN 2 - -/* define this to get the header variables we use to build HTTP headers */ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS 1 -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI 1 -#include "lwip/init.h" -#include "../httpd_structs.h" -#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" - -#include "../core/inet_chksum.c" -#include "../core/def.c" - -/** (Your server name here) */ -const char *serverID = "Server: " HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT "\r\n"; -char serverIDBuffer[1024]; - -/* change this to suit your MEM_ALIGNMENT */ -#define PAYLOAD_ALIGNMENT 4 -/* set this to 0 to prevent aligning payload */ -#define ALIGN_PAYLOAD 1 -/* define this to a type that has the required alignment */ -#define PAYLOAD_ALIGN_TYPE "unsigned int" -static int payload_alingment_dummy_counter = 0; - -#define HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE 16 - -#define MAX_PATH_LEN 256 - -struct file_entry { - struct file_entry *next; - const char *filename_c; -}; - -int process_sub(FILE *data_file, FILE *struct_file); -int process_file(FILE *data_file, FILE *struct_file, const char *filename); -int file_write_http_header(FILE *data_file, const char *filename, int file_size, u16_t *http_hdr_len, - u16_t *http_hdr_chksum, u8_t provide_content_len, int is_compressed); -int file_put_ascii(FILE *file, const char *ascii_string, int len, int *i); -int s_put_ascii(char *buf, const char *ascii_string, int len, int *i); -void concat_files(const char *file1, const char *file2, const char *targetfile); -int check_path(char *path, size_t size); -static int checkSsiByFilelist(const char *filename_listfile); -static int ext_in_list(const char *filename, const char *ext_list); -static int file_to_exclude(const char *filename); -static int file_can_be_compressed(const char *filename); - -/* 5 bytes per char + 3 bytes per line */ -static char file_buffer_c[COPY_BUFSIZE * 5 + ((COPY_BUFSIZE / HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE) * 3)]; - -char curSubdir[MAX_PATH_LEN]; -char lastFileVar[MAX_PATH_LEN]; -char hdr_buf[4096]; - -unsigned char processSubs = 1; -unsigned char includeHttpHeader = 1; -unsigned char useHttp11 = 0; -unsigned char supportSsi = 1; -unsigned char precalcChksum = 0; -unsigned char includeLastModified = 0; -#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE -unsigned char deflateNonSsiFiles = 0; -size_t deflatedBytesReduced = 0; -size_t overallDataBytes = 0; -#endif -const char *exclude_list = NULL; -const char *ncompress_list = NULL; - -struct file_entry *first_file = NULL; -struct file_entry *last_file = NULL; - -static char *ssi_file_buffer; -static char **ssi_file_lines; -static size_t ssi_file_num_lines; - -static void print_usage(void) -{ - printf(" Usage: htmlgen [targetdir] [-s] [-e] [-11] [-nossi] [-ssi:] [-c] [-f:] [-m] [-svr:] [-x:] [-xc:" USAGE_ARG_DEFLATE NEWLINE NEWLINE); - printf(" targetdir: relative or absolute path to files to convert" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -s: toggle processing of subdirectories (default is on)" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -e: exclude HTTP header from file (header is created at runtime, default is off)" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -11: include HTTP 1.1 header (1.0 is default)" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -nossi: no support for SSI (cannot calculate Content-Length for SSI)" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -ssi: ssi filename (ssi support controlled by file list, not by extension)" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -c: precalculate checksums for all pages (default is off)" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -f: target filename (default is \"fsdata.c\")" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -m: include \"Last-Modified\" header based on file time" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -svr: server identifier sent in HTTP response header ('Server' field)" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -x: comma separated list of extensions of files to exclude (e.g., -x:json,txt)" NEWLINE); - printf(" switch -xc: comma separated list of extensions of files to not compress (e.g., -xc:mp3,jpg)" NEWLINE); -#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE - printf(" switch -defl: deflate-compress all non-SSI files (with opt. compr.-level, default=10)" NEWLINE); - printf(" ATTENTION: browser has to support \"Content-Encoding: deflate\"!" NEWLINE); -#endif - printf(" if targetdir not specified, htmlgen will attempt to" NEWLINE); - printf(" process files in subdirectory 'fs'" NEWLINE); -} - -int main(int argc, char *argv[]) -{ - char path[MAX_PATH_LEN]; - char appPath[MAX_PATH_LEN]; - FILE *data_file; - FILE *struct_file; - int filesProcessed; - int i; - char targetfile[MAX_PATH_LEN]; - strcpy(targetfile, "fsdata.c"); - - memset(path, 0, sizeof(path)); - memset(appPath, 0, sizeof(appPath)); - - printf(NEWLINE " makefsdata - HTML to C source converter" NEWLINE); - printf(" by Jim Pettinato - circa 2003 " NEWLINE); - printf(" extended by Simon Goldschmidt - 2009 " NEWLINE NEWLINE); - - LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(hdr_buf) must fit into an u16_t", sizeof(hdr_buf) <= 0xffff); - - strcpy(path, "fs"); - - for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { - if (argv[i] == NULL) { - continue; - } - - if (argv[i][0] == '-') { - if (strstr(argv[i], "-svr:") == argv[i]) { - snprintf(serverIDBuffer, sizeof(serverIDBuffer), "Server: %s\r\n", &argv[i][5]); - serverID = serverIDBuffer; - printf("Using Server-ID: \"%s\"\n", serverID); - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-s")) { - processSubs = 0; - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-e")) { - includeHttpHeader = 0; - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-11")) { - useHttp11 = 1; - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-nossi")) { - supportSsi = 0; - } else if (strstr(argv[i], "-ssi:") == argv[i]) { - const char *ssi_list_filename = &argv[i][5]; - - if (checkSsiByFilelist(ssi_list_filename)) { - printf("Reading list of SSI files from \"%s\"\n", ssi_list_filename); - } else { - printf("Failed to load list of SSI files from \"%s\"\n", ssi_list_filename); - } - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-c")) { - precalcChksum = 1; - } else if (strstr(argv[i], "-f:") == argv[i]) { - strncpy(targetfile, &argv[i][3], sizeof(targetfile) - 1); - targetfile[sizeof(targetfile) - 1] = 0; - printf("Writing to file \"%s\"\n", targetfile); - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-m")) { - includeLastModified = 1; - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-defl")) { -#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE - char *colon = strstr(argv[i], ":"); - - if (colon) { - if (colon[1] != 0) { - int defl_level = atoi(&colon[1]); - - if ((defl_level >= 0) && (defl_level <= 10)) { - deflate_level = defl_level; - } else { - printf("ERROR: deflate level must be [0..10]" NEWLINE); - exit(0); - } - } - } - - deflateNonSsiFiles = 1; - printf("Deflating all non-SSI files with level %d (but only if size is reduced)" NEWLINE, deflate_level); -#else - printf("WARNING: Deflate support is disabled\n"); -#endif - } else if (strstr(argv[i], "-x:") == argv[i]) { - exclude_list = &argv[i][3]; - printf("Excluding files with extensions %s" NEWLINE, exclude_list); - } else if (strstr(argv[i], "-xc:") == argv[i]) { - ncompress_list = &argv[i][4]; - printf("Skipping compresion for files with extensions %s" NEWLINE, ncompress_list); - } else if ((strstr(argv[i], "-?")) || (strstr(argv[i], "-h"))) { - print_usage(); - exit(0); - } - } else if ((argv[i][0] == '/') && (argv[i][1] == '?') && (argv[i][2] == 0)) { - print_usage(); - exit(0); - } else { - strncpy(path, argv[i], sizeof(path) - 1); - path[sizeof(path) - 1] = 0; - } - } - - if (!check_path(path, sizeof(path))) { - printf("Invalid path: \"%s\"." NEWLINE, path); - exit(-1); - } - - GETCWD(appPath, MAX_PATH_LEN); - - /* if command line param or subdir named 'fs' not found spout usage verbiage */ - if (!CHDIR_SUCCEEDED(CHDIR(path))) { - /* if no subdir named 'fs' (or the one which was given) exists, spout usage verbiage */ - printf(" Failed to open directory \"%s\"." NEWLINE NEWLINE, path); - print_usage(); - exit(-1); - } - - CHDIR(appPath); - - printf("HTTP %sheader will %s statically included." NEWLINE, - (includeHttpHeader ? (useHttp11 ? "1.1 " : "1.0 ") : ""), - (includeHttpHeader ? "be" : "not be")); - - curSubdir[0] = '\0'; /* start off in web page's root directory - relative paths */ - printf(" Processing all files in directory %s", path); - - if (processSubs) { - printf(" and subdirectories..." NEWLINE NEWLINE); - } else { - printf("..." NEWLINE NEWLINE); - } - - data_file = fopen("fsdata.tmp", "wb"); - - if (data_file == NULL) { - printf("Failed to create file \"fsdata.tmp\"\n"); - exit(-1); - } - - struct_file = fopen("fshdr.tmp", "wb"); - - if (struct_file == NULL) { - printf("Failed to create file \"fshdr.tmp\"\n"); - fclose(data_file); - exit(-1); - } - - CHDIR(path); - - fprintf(data_file, "#include \"lwip/apps/fs.h\"" NEWLINE); - fprintf(data_file, "#include \"lwip/def.h\"" NEWLINE NEWLINE NEWLINE); - - fprintf(data_file, "#define file_NULL (struct fsdata_file *) NULL" NEWLINE NEWLINE NEWLINE); - /* define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED to 1 if not defined (compatibility with older httpd/fs) */ - fprintf(data_file, "#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED" NEWLINE "#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED 1" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); - /* define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT to 0 if not defined (compatibility with older httpd/fs: wasn't supported back then) */ - fprintf(data_file, "#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT" NEWLINE "#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT 0" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); - - /* define alignment defines */ -#if ALIGN_PAYLOAD - fprintf(data_file, "/* FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT: 0=off, 1=by variable, 2=by include */" NEWLINE "#ifndef FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT" NEWLINE "#define FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT 0" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); -#endif - fprintf(data_file, "#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE" NEWLINE "#define FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); - fprintf(data_file, "#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_POST" NEWLINE "#define FSDATA_ALIGN_POST" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); -#if ALIGN_PAYLOAD - fprintf(data_file, "#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==2" NEWLINE "#include \"fsdata_alignment.h\"" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); -#endif - - sprintf(lastFileVar, "NULL"); - - filesProcessed = process_sub(data_file, struct_file); - - /* data_file now contains all of the raw data.. now append linked list of - * file header structs to allow embedded app to search for a file name */ - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE NEWLINE); - fprintf(struct_file, "#define FS_ROOT file_%s" NEWLINE, lastFileVar); - fprintf(struct_file, "#define FS_NUMFILES %d" NEWLINE NEWLINE, filesProcessed); - - fclose(data_file); - fclose(struct_file); - - CHDIR(appPath); - /* append struct_file to data_file */ - printf(NEWLINE "Creating target file..." NEWLINE NEWLINE); - concat_files("fsdata.tmp", "fshdr.tmp", targetfile); - - /* if succeeded, delete the temporary files */ - if (remove("fsdata.tmp") != 0) { - printf("Warning: failed to delete fsdata.tmp\n"); - } - - if (remove("fshdr.tmp") != 0) { - printf("Warning: failed to delete fshdr.tmp\n"); - } - - printf(NEWLINE "Processed %d files - done." NEWLINE, filesProcessed); -#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE - - if (deflateNonSsiFiles) { - printf("(Deflated total byte reduction: %d bytes -> %d bytes (%.02f%%)" NEWLINE, - (int)overallDataBytes, (int)deflatedBytesReduced, (float)((deflatedBytesReduced * 100.0) / overallDataBytes)); - } - -#endif - printf(NEWLINE); - - while (first_file != NULL) { - struct file_entry *fe = first_file; - first_file = fe->next; - free(fe); - } - - if (ssi_file_buffer) { - free(ssi_file_buffer); - } - - if (ssi_file_lines) { - free(ssi_file_lines); - } - - return 0; -} - -int check_path(char *path, size_t size) -{ - size_t slen; - - if (path[0] == 0) { - /* empty */ - return 0; - } - - slen = strlen(path); - - if (slen >= size) { - /* not NULL-terminated */ - return 0; - } - - while ((slen > 0) && ((path[slen] == '\\') || (path[slen] == '/'))) { - /* path should not end with trailing backslash */ - path[slen] = 0; - slen--; - } - - if (slen == 0) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static void copy_file(const char *filename_in, FILE *fout) -{ - FILE *fin; - size_t len; - void *buf; - fin = fopen(filename_in, "rb"); - - if (fin == NULL) { - printf("Failed to open file \"%s\"\n", filename_in); - exit(-1); - } - - buf = malloc(COPY_BUFSIZE); - - while ((len = fread(buf, 1, COPY_BUFSIZE, fin)) > 0) { - fwrite(buf, 1, len, fout); - } - - free(buf); - fclose(fin); -} - -void concat_files(const char *file1, const char *file2, const char *targetfile) -{ - FILE *fout; - fout = fopen(targetfile, "wb"); - - if (fout == NULL) { - printf("Failed to open file \"%s\"\n", targetfile); - exit(-1); - } - - copy_file(file1, fout); - copy_file(file2, fout); - fclose(fout); -} - -int process_sub(FILE *data_file, FILE *struct_file) -{ - tinydir_dir dir; - int filesProcessed = 0; - - if (processSubs) { - /* process subs recursively */ - size_t sublen = strlen(curSubdir); - size_t freelen = sizeof(curSubdir) - sublen - 1; - int ret; - LWIP_ASSERT("sublen < sizeof(curSubdir)", sublen < sizeof(curSubdir)); - - ret = tinydir_open_sorted(&dir, TINYDIR_STRING(".")); - - if (ret == 0) { - unsigned int i; - - for (i = 0; i < dir.n_files; i++) { - tinydir_file file; - - ret = tinydir_readfile_n(&dir, &file, i); - - if (ret == 0) { -#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) && (defined _UNICODE) - size_t num_char_converted; - char currName[256]; - wcstombs_s(&num_char_converted, currName, sizeof(currName), file.name, sizeof(currName)); -#else - const char *currName = file.name; -#endif - - if (currName[0] == '.') { - continue; - } - - if (!file.is_dir) { - continue; - } - - if (freelen > 0) { - CHDIR(currName); - strncat(curSubdir, "/", freelen); - strncat(curSubdir, currName, freelen - 1); - curSubdir[sizeof(curSubdir) - 1] = 0; - printf("processing subdirectory %s/..." NEWLINE, curSubdir); - filesProcessed += process_sub(data_file, struct_file); - CHDIR(".."); - curSubdir[sublen] = 0; - } else { - printf("WARNING: cannot process sub due to path length restrictions: \"%s/%s\"\n", curSubdir, currName); - } - } - } - } - - ret = tinydir_open_sorted(&dir, TINYDIR_STRING(".")); - - if (ret == 0) { - unsigned int i; - - for (i = 0; i < dir.n_files; i++) { - tinydir_file file; - - ret = tinydir_readfile_n(&dir, &file, i); - - if (ret == 0) { - if (!file.is_dir) { -#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) && (defined _UNICODE) - size_t num_char_converted; - char curName[256]; - wcstombs_s(&num_char_converted, curName, sizeof(curName), file.name, sizeof(curName)); -#else - const char *curName = file.name; -#endif - - if (strcmp(curName, "fsdata.tmp") == 0) { - continue; - } - - if (strcmp(curName, "fshdr.tmp") == 0) { - continue; - } - - if (file_to_exclude(curName)) { - printf("skipping %s/%s by exclude list (-x option)..." NEWLINE, curSubdir, curName); - continue; - } - - printf("processing %s/%s..." NEWLINE, curSubdir, curName); - - if (process_file(data_file, struct_file, curName) < 0) { - printf(NEWLINE "Error... aborting" NEWLINE); - return -1; - } - - filesProcessed++; - } - } - } - } - } - - return filesProcessed; -} - -static u8_t *get_file_data(const char *filename, int *file_size, int can_be_compressed, int *is_compressed) -{ - FILE *inFile; - size_t fsize = 0; - u8_t *buf; - size_t r; - int rs; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(r); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - inFile = fopen(filename, "rb"); - - if (inFile == NULL) { - printf("Failed to open file \"%s\"\n", filename); - exit(-1); - } - - fseek(inFile, 0, SEEK_END); - rs = ftell(inFile); - - if (rs < 0) { - printf("ftell failed with %d\n", errno); - exit(-1); - } - - fsize = (size_t)rs; - fseek(inFile, 0, SEEK_SET); - buf = (u8_t *)malloc(fsize); - LWIP_ASSERT("buf != NULL", buf != NULL); - r = fread(buf, 1, fsize, inFile); - LWIP_ASSERT("r == fsize", r == fsize); - *file_size = fsize; - *is_compressed = 0; -#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE - overallDataBytes += fsize; - - if (deflateNonSsiFiles) { - if (can_be_compressed) { - if (fsize < OUT_BUF_SIZE) { - u8_t *ret_buf; - tdefl_status status; - size_t in_bytes = fsize; - size_t out_bytes = OUT_BUF_SIZE; - const void *next_in = buf; - void *next_out = s_outbuf; - /* create tdefl() compatible flags (we have to compose the low-level flags ourselves, or use tdefl_create_comp_flags_from_zip_params() but that means MINIZ_NO_ZLIB_APIS can't be defined). */ - mz_uint comp_flags = s_tdefl_num_probes[MZ_MIN(10, deflate_level)] | ((deflate_level <= 3) ? TDEFL_GREEDY_PARSING_FLAG : 0); - - if (!deflate_level) { - comp_flags |= TDEFL_FORCE_ALL_RAW_BLOCKS; - } - - status = tdefl_init(&g_deflator, NULL, NULL, comp_flags); - - if (status != TDEFL_STATUS_OKAY) { - printf("tdefl_init() failed!\n"); - exit(-1); - } - - memset(s_outbuf, 0, sizeof(s_outbuf)); - status = tdefl_compress(&g_deflator, next_in, &in_bytes, next_out, &out_bytes, TDEFL_FINISH); - - if (status != TDEFL_STATUS_DONE) { - printf("deflate failed: %d\n", status); - exit(-1); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("out_bytes <= COPY_BUFSIZE", out_bytes <= OUT_BUF_SIZE); - - if (out_bytes < fsize) { - ret_buf = (u8_t *)malloc(out_bytes); - LWIP_ASSERT("ret_buf != NULL", ret_buf != NULL); - memcpy(ret_buf, s_outbuf, out_bytes); - { - /* sanity-check compression be inflating and comparing to the original */ - tinfl_status dec_status; - tinfl_decompressor inflator; - size_t dec_in_bytes = out_bytes; - size_t dec_out_bytes = OUT_BUF_SIZE; - next_out = s_checkbuf; - - tinfl_init(&inflator); - memset(s_checkbuf, 0, sizeof(s_checkbuf)); - dec_status = tinfl_decompress(&inflator, (const mz_uint8 *)ret_buf, &dec_in_bytes, s_checkbuf, (mz_uint8 *)next_out, &dec_out_bytes, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("tinfl_decompress failed", dec_status == TINFL_STATUS_DONE); - LWIP_ASSERT("tinfl_decompress size mismatch", fsize == dec_out_bytes); - LWIP_ASSERT("decompressed memcmp failed", !memcmp(s_checkbuf, buf, fsize)); - } - /* free original buffer, use compressed data + size */ - free(buf); - buf = ret_buf; - *file_size = out_bytes; - printf(" - deflate: %d bytes -> %d bytes (%.02f%%)" NEWLINE, (int)fsize, (int)out_bytes, (float)((out_bytes * 100.0) / fsize)); - deflatedBytesReduced += (size_t)(fsize - out_bytes); - *is_compressed = 1; - } else { - printf(" - uncompressed: (would be %d bytes larger using deflate)" NEWLINE, (int)(out_bytes - fsize)); - } - } else { - printf(" - uncompressed: (file is larger than deflate bufer)" NEWLINE); - } - } else { - printf(" - cannot be compressed" NEWLINE); - } - } - -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(can_be_compressed); -#endif - fclose(inFile); - return buf; -} - -static void process_file_data(FILE *data_file, u8_t *file_data, size_t file_size) -{ - size_t written, i, src_off = 0; - size_t off = 0; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(written); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - - for (i = 0; i < file_size; i++) { - LWIP_ASSERT("file_buffer_c overflow", off < sizeof(file_buffer_c) - 5); - sprintf(&file_buffer_c[off], "0x%02x,", file_data[i]); - off += 5; - - if ((++src_off % HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE) == 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("file_buffer_c overflow", off < sizeof(file_buffer_c) - NEWLINE_LEN); - memcpy(&file_buffer_c[off], NEWLINE, NEWLINE_LEN); - off += NEWLINE_LEN; - } - - if (off + 20 >= sizeof(file_buffer_c)) { - written = fwrite(file_buffer_c, 1, off, data_file); - LWIP_ASSERT("written == off", written == off); - off = 0; - } - } - - written = fwrite(file_buffer_c, 1, off, data_file); - LWIP_ASSERT("written == off", written == off); -} - -static int write_checksums(FILE *struct_file, const char *varname, - u16_t hdr_len, u16_t hdr_chksum, const u8_t *file_data, size_t file_size) -{ - int chunk_size = TCP_MSS; - int offset, src_offset; - size_t len; - int i = 0; -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - /* when timestamps are used, usable space is 12 bytes less per segment */ - chunk_size -= 12; -#endif - - fprintf(struct_file, "#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM" NEWLINE); - fprintf(struct_file, "const struct fsdata_chksum chksums_%s[] = {" NEWLINE, varname); - - if (hdr_len > 0) { - /* add checksum for HTTP header */ - fprintf(struct_file, "{%d, 0x%04x, %d}," NEWLINE, 0, hdr_chksum, hdr_len); - i++; - } - - src_offset = 0; - - for (offset = hdr_len;; offset += len) { - unsigned short chksum; - const void *data = (const void *)&file_data[src_offset]; - len = LWIP_MIN(chunk_size, (int)file_size - src_offset); - - if (len == 0) { - break; - } - - chksum = ~inet_chksum(data, (u16_t)len); - /* add checksum for data */ - fprintf(struct_file, "{%d, 0x%04x, %" SZT_F "}," NEWLINE, offset, chksum, len); - i++; - } - - fprintf(struct_file, "};" NEWLINE); - fprintf(struct_file, "#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */" NEWLINE); - return i; -} - -static int is_valid_char_for_c_var(char x) -{ - if (((x >= 'A') && (x <= 'Z')) || - ((x >= 'a') && (x <= 'z')) || - ((x >= '0') && (x <= '9')) || - (x == '_')) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} - -static void fix_filename_for_c(char *qualifiedName, size_t max_len) -{ - struct file_entry *f; - size_t len = strlen(qualifiedName); - char *new_name = (char *)malloc(len + 2); - int filename_ok; - int cnt = 0; - size_t i; - - if (len + 3 == max_len) { - printf("File name too long: \"%s\"\n", qualifiedName); - exit(-1); - } - - strcpy(new_name, qualifiedName); - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - if (!is_valid_char_for_c_var(new_name[i])) { - new_name[i] = '_'; - } - } - - do { - filename_ok = 1; - - for (f = first_file; f != NULL; f = f->next) { - if (!strcmp(f->filename_c, new_name)) { - filename_ok = 0; - cnt++; - /* try next unique file name */ - sprintf(&new_name[len], "%d", cnt); - break; - } - } - } while (!filename_ok && (cnt < 999)); - - if (!filename_ok) { - printf("Failed to get unique file name: \"%s\"\n", qualifiedName); - exit(-1); - } - - strcpy(qualifiedName, new_name); - free(new_name); -} - -static void register_filename(const char *qualifiedName) -{ - struct file_entry *fe = (struct file_entry *)malloc(sizeof(struct file_entry)); - fe->filename_c = strdup(qualifiedName); - fe->next = NULL; - - if (first_file == NULL) { - first_file = last_file = fe; - } else { - last_file->next = fe; - last_file = fe; - } -} - -static int checkSsiByFilelist(const char *filename_listfile) -{ - FILE *f = fopen(filename_listfile, "r"); - - if (f != NULL) { - char *buf; - long rs; - size_t fsize, readcount; - size_t i, l, num_lines; - char **lines; - int state; - - fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); - rs = ftell(f); - - if (rs < 0) { - printf("ftell failed with %d\n", errno); - fclose(f); - return 0; - } - - fsize = (size_t)rs; - fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); - buf = (char *)malloc(fsize); - - if (!buf) { - printf("failed to allocate ssi file buffer\n"); - fclose(f); - return 0; - } - - memset(buf, 0, fsize); - readcount = fread(buf, 1, fsize, f); - fclose(f); - - if ((readcount > fsize) || !readcount) { - printf("failed to read data from ssi file\n"); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - - /* first pass: get the number of lines (and convert newlines to '0') */ - num_lines = 1; - - for (i = 0; i < readcount; i++) { - if (buf[i] == '\n') { - num_lines++; - buf[i] = 0; - } else if (buf[i] == '\r') { - buf[i] = 0; - } - } - - /* allocate the line pointer array */ - lines = (char **)malloc(sizeof(char *) * num_lines); - - if (!lines) { - printf("failed to allocate ssi line buffer\n"); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - - memset(lines, 0, sizeof(char *) * num_lines); - l = 0; - state = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < readcount; i++) { - if (state) { - /* waiting for null */ - if (buf[i] == 0) { - state = 0; - } - } else { - /* waiting for beginning of new string */ - if (buf[i] != 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("lines array overflow", l < num_lines); - lines[l] = &buf[i]; - state = 1; - l++; - } - } - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("lines array overflow", l < num_lines); - - ssi_file_buffer = buf; - ssi_file_lines = lines; - ssi_file_num_lines = l; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int is_ssi_file(const char *filename) -{ - if (supportSsi) { - if (ssi_file_buffer) { - /* compare by list */ - size_t i; - int ret = 0; - /* build up the relative path to this file */ - size_t sublen = strlen(curSubdir); - size_t freelen = sizeof(curSubdir) - sublen - 1; - strncat(curSubdir, "/", freelen); - strncat(curSubdir, filename, freelen - 1); - curSubdir[sizeof(curSubdir) - 1] = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < ssi_file_num_lines; i++) { - const char *listed_file = ssi_file_lines[i]; - - /* compare without the leading '/' */ - if (!strcmp(&curSubdir[1], listed_file)) { - ret = 1; - } - } - - curSubdir[sublen] = 0; - return ret; - } else { - /* check file extension */ - size_t loop; - - for (loop = 0; loop < NUM_SHTML_EXTENSIONS; loop++) { - if (strstr(filename, g_pcSSIExtensions[loop])) { - return 1; - } - } - } - } - - return 0; -} - -static int ext_in_list(const char *filename, const char *ext_list) -{ - int found = 0; - const char *ext = ext_list; - - if (ext_list == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - while (*ext != '\0') { - const char *comma = strchr(ext, ','); - size_t ext_size; - size_t filename_size = strlen(filename); - - if (comma == NULL) { - comma = strchr(ext, '\0'); - } - - ext_size = comma - ext; - - if ((filename[filename_size - ext_size - 1] == '.') && - !strncmp(&filename[filename_size - ext_size], ext, ext_size)) { - found = 1; - break; - } - - ext = comma + 1; - } - - return found; -} - -static int file_to_exclude(const char *filename) -{ - return (exclude_list != NULL) && ext_in_list(filename, exclude_list); -} - -static int file_can_be_compressed(const char *filename) -{ - return (ncompress_list == NULL) || !ext_in_list(filename, ncompress_list); -} - -int process_file(FILE *data_file, FILE *struct_file, const char *filename) -{ - char varname[MAX_PATH_LEN]; - int i = 0; - char qualifiedName[MAX_PATH_LEN]; - int file_size; - u16_t http_hdr_chksum = 0; - u16_t http_hdr_len = 0; - int chksum_count = 0; - u8_t flags = 0; - u8_t has_content_len; - u8_t *file_data; - int is_ssi; - int can_be_compressed; - int is_compressed = 0; - int flags_printed; - - /* create qualified name (@todo: prepend slash or not?) */ - sprintf(qualifiedName, "%s/%s", curSubdir, filename); - /* create C variable name */ - strcpy(varname, qualifiedName); - /* convert slashes & dots to underscores */ - fix_filename_for_c(varname, MAX_PATH_LEN); - register_filename(varname); -#if ALIGN_PAYLOAD - /* to force even alignment of array, type 1 */ - fprintf(data_file, "#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==1" NEWLINE); - fprintf(data_file, "static const " PAYLOAD_ALIGN_TYPE " dummy_align_%s = %d;" NEWLINE, varname, payload_alingment_dummy_counter++); - fprintf(data_file, "#endif" NEWLINE); -#endif /* ALIGN_PAYLOAD */ - fprintf(data_file, "static const unsigned char FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE data_%s[] FSDATA_ALIGN_POST = {" NEWLINE, varname); - /* encode source file name (used by file system, not returned to browser) */ - fprintf(data_file, "/* %s (%" SZT_F " chars) */" NEWLINE, qualifiedName, strlen(qualifiedName) + 1); - file_put_ascii(data_file, qualifiedName, strlen(qualifiedName) + 1, &i); -#if ALIGN_PAYLOAD - - /* pad to even number of bytes to assure payload is on aligned boundary */ - while (i % PAYLOAD_ALIGNMENT != 0) { - fprintf(data_file, "0x%02x,", 0); - i++; - } - -#endif /* ALIGN_PAYLOAD */ - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE); - - is_ssi = is_ssi_file(filename); - - if (is_ssi) { - flags |= FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI; - } - - has_content_len = !is_ssi; - can_be_compressed = includeHttpHeader && !is_ssi && file_can_be_compressed(filename); - file_data = get_file_data(filename, &file_size, can_be_compressed, &is_compressed); - - if (includeHttpHeader) { - file_write_http_header(data_file, filename, file_size, &http_hdr_len, &http_hdr_chksum, has_content_len, is_compressed); - flags |= FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED; - - if (has_content_len) { - flags |= FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT; - - if (useHttp11) { - flags |= FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_HTTPVER_1_1; - } - } - } - - if (precalcChksum) { - chksum_count = write_checksums(struct_file, varname, http_hdr_len, http_hdr_chksum, file_data, file_size); - } - - /* build declaration of struct fsdata_file in temp file */ - fprintf(struct_file, "const struct fsdata_file file_%s[] = { {" NEWLINE, varname); - fprintf(struct_file, "file_%s," NEWLINE, lastFileVar); - fprintf(struct_file, "data_%s," NEWLINE, varname); - fprintf(struct_file, "data_%s + %d," NEWLINE, varname, i); - fprintf(struct_file, "sizeof(data_%s) - %d," NEWLINE, varname, i); - - flags_printed = 0; - - if (flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED) { - fputs("FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED", struct_file); - flags_printed = 1; - } - - if (flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT) { - if (flags_printed) { - fputs(" | ", struct_file); - } - - fputs("FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT", struct_file); - flags_printed = 1; - } - - if (flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_HTTPVER_1_1) { - if (flags_printed) { - fputs(" | ", struct_file); - } - - fputs("FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_HTTPVER_1_1", struct_file); - flags_printed = 1; - } - - if (flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI) { - if (flags_printed) { - fputs(" | ", struct_file); - } - - fputs("FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI", struct_file); - flags_printed = 1; - } - - if (!flags_printed) { - fputs("0", struct_file); - } - - fputs("," NEWLINE, struct_file); - - if (precalcChksum) { - fprintf(struct_file, "#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM" NEWLINE); - fprintf(struct_file, "%d, chksums_%s," NEWLINE, chksum_count, varname); - fprintf(struct_file, "#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */" NEWLINE); - } - - fprintf(struct_file, "}};" NEWLINE NEWLINE); - strcpy(lastFileVar, varname); - - /* write actual file contents */ - i = 0; - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* raw file data (%d bytes) */" NEWLINE, file_size); - process_file_data(data_file, file_data, file_size); - fprintf(data_file, "};" NEWLINE NEWLINE); - free(file_data); - return 0; -} - -int file_write_http_header(FILE *data_file, const char *filename, int file_size, u16_t *http_hdr_len, - u16_t *http_hdr_chksum, u8_t provide_content_len, int is_compressed) -{ - int i = 0; - int response_type = HTTP_HDR_OK; - const char *file_type; - const char *cur_string; - size_t cur_len; - int written = 0; - size_t hdr_len = 0; - u16_t acc; - const char *file_ext; - size_t j; - u8_t provide_last_modified = includeLastModified; - - memset(hdr_buf, 0, sizeof(hdr_buf)); - - if (useHttp11) { - response_type = HTTP_HDR_OK_11; - } - - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* HTTP header */"); - - if (strstr(filename, "404") == filename) { - response_type = HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND; - - if (useHttp11) { - response_type = HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND_11; - } - } else if (strstr(filename, "400") == filename) { - response_type = HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST; - - if (useHttp11) { - response_type = HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST_11; - } - } else if (strstr(filename, "501") == filename) { - response_type = HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL; - - if (useHttp11) { - response_type = HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL_11; - } - } - - cur_string = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[response_type]; - cur_len = strlen(cur_string); - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%" SZT_F " bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); - written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); - i = 0; - - if (precalcChksum) { - memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); - hdr_len += cur_len; - } - - cur_string = serverID; - cur_len = strlen(cur_string); - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%" SZT_F " bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); - written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); - i = 0; - - if (precalcChksum) { - memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); - hdr_len += cur_len; - } - - file_ext = filename; - - if (file_ext != NULL) { - while (strstr(file_ext, ".") != NULL) { - file_ext = strstr(file_ext, "."); - file_ext++; - } - } - - if ((file_ext == NULL) || (*file_ext == 0)) { - printf("failed to get extension for file \"%s\", using default.\n", filename); - file_type = HTTP_HDR_DEFAULT_TYPE; - } else { - file_type = NULL; - - for (j = 0; j < NUM_HTTP_HEADERS; j++) { - if (!strcmp(file_ext, g_psHTTPHeaders[j].extension)) { - file_type = g_psHTTPHeaders[j].content_type; - break; - } - } - - if (file_type == NULL) { - printf("failed to get file type for extension \"%s\", using default.\n", file_ext); - file_type = HTTP_HDR_DEFAULT_TYPE; - } - } - - /* Content-Length is used for persistent connections in HTTP/1.1 but also for - download progress in older versions - @todo: just use a big-enough buffer and let the HTTPD send spaces? */ - if (provide_content_len) { - char intbuf[MAX_PATH_LEN]; - int content_len = file_size; - memset(intbuf, 0, sizeof(intbuf)); - cur_string = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LENGTH]; - cur_len = strlen(cur_string); - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s%d\r\n\" (%" SZT_F "+ bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, content_len, cur_len + 2); - written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); - - if (precalcChksum) { - memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); - hdr_len += cur_len; - } - - lwip_itoa(intbuf, sizeof(intbuf), content_len); - strcat(intbuf, "\r\n"); - cur_len = strlen(intbuf); - written += file_put_ascii(data_file, intbuf, cur_len, &i); - i = 0; - - if (precalcChksum) { - memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], intbuf, cur_len); - hdr_len += cur_len; - } - } - - if (provide_last_modified) { - char modbuf[256]; - struct stat stat_data; - struct tm *t; - memset(modbuf, 0, sizeof(modbuf)); - memset(&stat_data, 0, sizeof(stat_data)); - cur_string = modbuf; - strcpy(modbuf, "Last-Modified: "); - - if (stat(filename, &stat_data) != 0) { - printf("stat(%s) failed with error %d\n", filename, errno); - exit(-1); - } - - t = gmtime(&stat_data.st_mtime); - - if (t == NULL) { - printf("gmtime() failed with error %d\n", errno); - exit(-1); - } - - strftime(&modbuf[15], sizeof(modbuf) - 15, "%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S GMT", t); - cur_len = strlen(cur_string); - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\"\r\n\" (%" SZT_F "+ bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len + 2); - written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); - - if (precalcChksum) { - memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); - hdr_len += cur_len; - } - - modbuf[0] = 0; - strcat(modbuf, "\r\n"); - cur_len = strlen(modbuf); - written += file_put_ascii(data_file, modbuf, cur_len, &i); - i = 0; - - if (precalcChksum) { - memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], modbuf, cur_len); - hdr_len += cur_len; - } - } - - /* HTTP/1.1 implements persistent connections */ - if (useHttp11) { - if (provide_content_len) { - cur_string = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONN_KEEPALIVE]; - } else { - /* no Content-Length available, so a persistent connection is no possible - because the client does not know the data length */ - cur_string = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONN_CLOSE]; - } - - cur_len = strlen(cur_string); - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%" SZT_F " bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); - written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); - i = 0; - - if (precalcChksum) { - memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); - hdr_len += cur_len; - } - } - -#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE - - if (is_compressed) { - /* tell the client about the deflate encoding */ - LWIP_ASSERT("error", deflateNonSsiFiles); - cur_string = "Content-Encoding: deflate\r\n"; - cur_len = strlen(cur_string); - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%d bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); - written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); - i = 0; - } - -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(is_compressed); -#endif - - /* write content-type, ATTENTION: this includes the double-CRLF! */ - cur_string = file_type; - cur_len = strlen(cur_string); - fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%" SZT_F " bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); - written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); - i = 0; - - /* ATTENTION: headers are done now (double-CRLF has been written!) */ - - if (precalcChksum) { - LWIP_ASSERT("hdr_len + cur_len <= sizeof(hdr_buf)", hdr_len + cur_len <= sizeof(hdr_buf)); - memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); - hdr_len += cur_len; - - LWIP_ASSERT("strlen(hdr_buf) == hdr_len", strlen(hdr_buf) == hdr_len); - acc = ~inet_chksum(hdr_buf, (u16_t)hdr_len); - *http_hdr_len = (u16_t)hdr_len; - *http_hdr_chksum = acc; - } - - return written; -} - -int file_put_ascii(FILE *file, const char *ascii_string, int len, int *i) -{ - int x; - - for (x = 0; x < len; x++) { - unsigned char cur = ascii_string[x]; - fprintf(file, "0x%02x,", cur); - - if ((++(*i) % HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE) == 0) { - fprintf(file, NEWLINE); - } - } - - return len; -} - -int s_put_ascii(char *buf, const char *ascii_string, int len, int *i) -{ - int x; - int idx = 0; - - for (x = 0; x < len; x++) { - unsigned char cur = ascii_string[x]; - sprintf(&buf[idx], "0x%02x,", cur); - idx += 5; - - if ((++(*i) % HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE) == 0) { - sprintf(&buf[idx], NEWLINE); - idx += NEWLINE_LEN; - } - } - - return len; -} +/** + * makefsdata: Converts a directory structure for use with the lwIP httpd. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Jim Pettinato + * Simon Goldschmidt + * + * @todo: + * - take TCP_MSS, LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS and + * PAYLOAD_ALIGN_TYPE/PAYLOAD_ALIGNMENT as arguments + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "tinydir.h" + +/** Makefsdata can generate *all* files deflate-compressed (where file size shrinks). + * Since nearly all browsers support this, this is a good way to reduce ROM size. + * To compress the files, "miniz.c" must be downloaded seperately. + */ +#ifndef MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE +#define MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE 0 +#endif + +#define COPY_BUFSIZE (1024 * 1024) /* 1 MByte */ + +#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE +#include "../miniz.c" + +typedef unsigned char uint8; +typedef unsigned short uint16; +typedef unsigned int uint; + +#define my_max(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) +#define my_min(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) + +/* COMP_OUT_BUF_SIZE is the size of the output buffer used during compression. + COMP_OUT_BUF_SIZE must be >= 1 and <= OUT_BUF_SIZE */ +#define COMP_OUT_BUF_SIZE COPY_BUFSIZE + +/* OUT_BUF_SIZE is the size of the output buffer used during decompression. + OUT_BUF_SIZE must be a power of 2 >= TINFL_LZ_DICT_SIZE (because the low-level decompressor not only writes, but reads from the output buffer as it decompresses) */ +#define OUT_BUF_SIZE COPY_BUFSIZE +static uint8 s_outbuf[OUT_BUF_SIZE]; +static uint8 s_checkbuf[OUT_BUF_SIZE]; + +/* tdefl_compressor contains all the state needed by the low-level compressor so it's a pretty big struct (~300k). + This example makes it a global vs. putting it on the stack, of course in real-world usage you'll probably malloc() or new it. */ +tdefl_compressor g_deflator; +tinfl_decompressor g_inflator; + +int deflate_level = 10; /* default compression level, can be changed via command line */ +#define USAGE_ARG_DEFLATE " [-defl<:compr_level>]" +#else /* MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE */ +#define USAGE_ARG_DEFLATE "" +#endif /* MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE */ + +#ifdef WIN32 + +#define GETCWD(path, len) GetCurrentDirectoryA(len, path) +#define CHDIR(path) SetCurrentDirectoryA(path) +#define CHDIR_SUCCEEDED(ret) (ret == TRUE) + +#elif __linux__ + +#define GETCWD(path, len) getcwd(path, len) +#define CHDIR(path) chdir(path) +#define CHDIR_SUCCEEDED(ret) (ret == 0) + +#else + +#error makefsdata not supported on this platform + +#endif + +#define NEWLINE "\r\n" +#define NEWLINE_LEN 2 + +/* define this to get the header variables we use to build HTTP headers */ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS 1 +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI 1 +#include "lwip/init.h" +#include "../httpd_structs.h" +#include "lwip/apps/fs.h" + +#include "../core/inet_chksum.c" +#include "../core/def.c" + +/** (Your server name here) */ +const char *serverID = "Server: " HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT "\r\n"; +char serverIDBuffer[1024]; + +/* change this to suit your MEM_ALIGNMENT */ +#define PAYLOAD_ALIGNMENT 4 +/* set this to 0 to prevent aligning payload */ +#define ALIGN_PAYLOAD 1 +/* define this to a type that has the required alignment */ +#define PAYLOAD_ALIGN_TYPE "unsigned int" +static int payload_alingment_dummy_counter = 0; + +#define HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE 16 + +#define MAX_PATH_LEN 256 + +struct file_entry { + struct file_entry *next; + const char *filename_c; +}; + +int process_sub(FILE *data_file, FILE *struct_file); +int process_file(FILE *data_file, FILE *struct_file, const char *filename); +int file_write_http_header(FILE *data_file, const char *filename, int file_size, u16_t *http_hdr_len, + u16_t *http_hdr_chksum, u8_t provide_content_len, int is_compressed); +int file_put_ascii(FILE *file, const char *ascii_string, int len, int *i); +int s_put_ascii(char *buf, const char *ascii_string, int len, int *i); +void concat_files(const char *file1, const char *file2, const char *targetfile); +int check_path(char *path, size_t size); +static int checkSsiByFilelist(const char *filename_listfile); +static int ext_in_list(const char *filename, const char *ext_list); +static int file_to_exclude(const char *filename); +static int file_can_be_compressed(const char *filename); + +/* 5 bytes per char + 3 bytes per line */ +static char file_buffer_c[COPY_BUFSIZE * 5 + ((COPY_BUFSIZE / HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE) * 3)]; + +char curSubdir[MAX_PATH_LEN]; +char lastFileVar[MAX_PATH_LEN]; +char hdr_buf[4096]; + +unsigned char processSubs = 1; +unsigned char includeHttpHeader = 1; +unsigned char useHttp11 = 0; +unsigned char supportSsi = 1; +unsigned char precalcChksum = 0; +unsigned char includeLastModified = 0; +#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE +unsigned char deflateNonSsiFiles = 0; +size_t deflatedBytesReduced = 0; +size_t overallDataBytes = 0; +#endif +const char *exclude_list = NULL; +const char *ncompress_list = NULL; + +struct file_entry *first_file = NULL; +struct file_entry *last_file = NULL; + +static char *ssi_file_buffer; +static char **ssi_file_lines; +static size_t ssi_file_num_lines; + +static void print_usage(void) +{ + printf(" Usage: htmlgen [targetdir] [-s] [-e] [-11] [-nossi] [-ssi:] [-c] [-f:] [-m] [-svr:] [-x:] [-xc:" USAGE_ARG_DEFLATE NEWLINE NEWLINE); + printf(" targetdir: relative or absolute path to files to convert" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -s: toggle processing of subdirectories (default is on)" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -e: exclude HTTP header from file (header is created at runtime, default is off)" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -11: include HTTP 1.1 header (1.0 is default)" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -nossi: no support for SSI (cannot calculate Content-Length for SSI)" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -ssi: ssi filename (ssi support controlled by file list, not by extension)" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -c: precalculate checksums for all pages (default is off)" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -f: target filename (default is \"fsdata.c\")" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -m: include \"Last-Modified\" header based on file time" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -svr: server identifier sent in HTTP response header ('Server' field)" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -x: comma separated list of extensions of files to exclude (e.g., -x:json,txt)" NEWLINE); + printf(" switch -xc: comma separated list of extensions of files to not compress (e.g., -xc:mp3,jpg)" NEWLINE); +#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE + printf(" switch -defl: deflate-compress all non-SSI files (with opt. compr.-level, default=10)" NEWLINE); + printf(" ATTENTION: browser has to support \"Content-Encoding: deflate\"!" NEWLINE); +#endif + printf(" if targetdir not specified, htmlgen will attempt to" NEWLINE); + printf(" process files in subdirectory 'fs'" NEWLINE); +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + char path[MAX_PATH_LEN]; + char appPath[MAX_PATH_LEN]; + FILE *data_file; + FILE *struct_file; + int filesProcessed; + int i; + char targetfile[MAX_PATH_LEN]; + strcpy(targetfile, "fsdata.c"); + + memset(path, 0, sizeof(path)); + memset(appPath, 0, sizeof(appPath)); + + printf(NEWLINE " makefsdata - HTML to C source converter" NEWLINE); + printf(" by Jim Pettinato - circa 2003 " NEWLINE); + printf(" extended by Simon Goldschmidt - 2009 " NEWLINE NEWLINE); + + LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(hdr_buf) must fit into an u16_t", sizeof(hdr_buf) <= 0xffff); + + strcpy(path, "fs"); + + for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + if (argv[i] == NULL) { + continue; + } + + if (argv[i][0] == '-') { + if (strstr(argv[i], "-svr:") == argv[i]) { + snprintf(serverIDBuffer, sizeof(serverIDBuffer), "Server: %s\r\n", &argv[i][5]); + serverID = serverIDBuffer; + printf("Using Server-ID: \"%s\"\n", serverID); + } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-s")) { + processSubs = 0; + } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-e")) { + includeHttpHeader = 0; + } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-11")) { + useHttp11 = 1; + } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-nossi")) { + supportSsi = 0; + } else if (strstr(argv[i], "-ssi:") == argv[i]) { + const char *ssi_list_filename = &argv[i][5]; + + if (checkSsiByFilelist(ssi_list_filename)) { + printf("Reading list of SSI files from \"%s\"\n", ssi_list_filename); + } else { + printf("Failed to load list of SSI files from \"%s\"\n", ssi_list_filename); + } + } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-c")) { + precalcChksum = 1; + } else if (strstr(argv[i], "-f:") == argv[i]) { + strncpy(targetfile, &argv[i][3], sizeof(targetfile) - 1); + targetfile[sizeof(targetfile) - 1] = 0; + printf("Writing to file \"%s\"\n", targetfile); + } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-m")) { + includeLastModified = 1; + } else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-defl")) { +#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE + char *colon = strstr(argv[i], ":"); + + if (colon) { + if (colon[1] != 0) { + int defl_level = atoi(&colon[1]); + + if ((defl_level >= 0) && (defl_level <= 10)) { + deflate_level = defl_level; + } else { + printf("ERROR: deflate level must be [0..10]" NEWLINE); + exit(0); + } + } + } + + deflateNonSsiFiles = 1; + printf("Deflating all non-SSI files with level %d (but only if size is reduced)" NEWLINE, deflate_level); +#else + printf("WARNING: Deflate support is disabled\n"); +#endif + } else if (strstr(argv[i], "-x:") == argv[i]) { + exclude_list = &argv[i][3]; + printf("Excluding files with extensions %s" NEWLINE, exclude_list); + } else if (strstr(argv[i], "-xc:") == argv[i]) { + ncompress_list = &argv[i][4]; + printf("Skipping compresion for files with extensions %s" NEWLINE, ncompress_list); + } else if ((strstr(argv[i], "-?")) || (strstr(argv[i], "-h"))) { + print_usage(); + exit(0); + } + } else if ((argv[i][0] == '/') && (argv[i][1] == '?') && (argv[i][2] == 0)) { + print_usage(); + exit(0); + } else { + strncpy(path, argv[i], sizeof(path) - 1); + path[sizeof(path) - 1] = 0; + } + } + + if (!check_path(path, sizeof(path))) { + printf("Invalid path: \"%s\"." NEWLINE, path); + exit(-1); + } + + GETCWD(appPath, MAX_PATH_LEN); + + /* if command line param or subdir named 'fs' not found spout usage verbiage */ + if (!CHDIR_SUCCEEDED(CHDIR(path))) { + /* if no subdir named 'fs' (or the one which was given) exists, spout usage verbiage */ + printf(" Failed to open directory \"%s\"." NEWLINE NEWLINE, path); + print_usage(); + exit(-1); + } + + CHDIR(appPath); + + printf("HTTP %sheader will %s statically included." NEWLINE, + (includeHttpHeader ? (useHttp11 ? "1.1 " : "1.0 ") : ""), + (includeHttpHeader ? "be" : "not be")); + + curSubdir[0] = '\0'; /* start off in web page's root directory - relative paths */ + printf(" Processing all files in directory %s", path); + + if (processSubs) { + printf(" and subdirectories..." NEWLINE NEWLINE); + } else { + printf("..." NEWLINE NEWLINE); + } + + data_file = fopen("fsdata.tmp", "wb"); + + if (data_file == NULL) { + printf("Failed to create file \"fsdata.tmp\"\n"); + exit(-1); + } + + struct_file = fopen("fshdr.tmp", "wb"); + + if (struct_file == NULL) { + printf("Failed to create file \"fshdr.tmp\"\n"); + fclose(data_file); + exit(-1); + } + + CHDIR(path); + + fprintf(data_file, "#include \"lwip/apps/fs.h\"" NEWLINE); + fprintf(data_file, "#include \"lwip/def.h\"" NEWLINE NEWLINE NEWLINE); + + fprintf(data_file, "#define file_NULL (struct fsdata_file *) NULL" NEWLINE NEWLINE NEWLINE); + /* define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED to 1 if not defined (compatibility with older httpd/fs) */ + fprintf(data_file, "#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED" NEWLINE "#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED 1" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); + /* define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT to 0 if not defined (compatibility with older httpd/fs: wasn't supported back then) */ + fprintf(data_file, "#ifndef FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT" NEWLINE "#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT 0" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); + + /* define alignment defines */ +#if ALIGN_PAYLOAD + fprintf(data_file, "/* FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT: 0=off, 1=by variable, 2=by include */" NEWLINE "#ifndef FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT" NEWLINE "#define FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT 0" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); +#endif + fprintf(data_file, "#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE" NEWLINE "#define FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); + fprintf(data_file, "#ifndef FSDATA_ALIGN_POST" NEWLINE "#define FSDATA_ALIGN_POST" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); +#if ALIGN_PAYLOAD + fprintf(data_file, "#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==2" NEWLINE "#include \"fsdata_alignment.h\"" NEWLINE "#endif" NEWLINE); +#endif + + sprintf(lastFileVar, "NULL"); + + filesProcessed = process_sub(data_file, struct_file); + + /* data_file now contains all of the raw data.. now append linked list of + * file header structs to allow embedded app to search for a file name */ + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE NEWLINE); + fprintf(struct_file, "#define FS_ROOT file_%s" NEWLINE, lastFileVar); + fprintf(struct_file, "#define FS_NUMFILES %d" NEWLINE NEWLINE, filesProcessed); + + fclose(data_file); + fclose(struct_file); + + CHDIR(appPath); + /* append struct_file to data_file */ + printf(NEWLINE "Creating target file..." NEWLINE NEWLINE); + concat_files("fsdata.tmp", "fshdr.tmp", targetfile); + + /* if succeeded, delete the temporary files */ + if (remove("fsdata.tmp") != 0) { + printf("Warning: failed to delete fsdata.tmp\n"); + } + + if (remove("fshdr.tmp") != 0) { + printf("Warning: failed to delete fshdr.tmp\n"); + } + + printf(NEWLINE "Processed %d files - done." NEWLINE, filesProcessed); +#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE + + if (deflateNonSsiFiles) { + printf("(Deflated total byte reduction: %d bytes -> %d bytes (%.02f%%)" NEWLINE, + (int)overallDataBytes, (int)deflatedBytesReduced, (float)((deflatedBytesReduced * 100.0) / overallDataBytes)); + } + +#endif + printf(NEWLINE); + + while (first_file != NULL) { + struct file_entry *fe = first_file; + first_file = fe->next; + free(fe); + } + + if (ssi_file_buffer) { + free(ssi_file_buffer); + } + + if (ssi_file_lines) { + free(ssi_file_lines); + } + + return 0; +} + +int check_path(char *path, size_t size) +{ + size_t slen; + + if (path[0] == 0) { + /* empty */ + return 0; + } + + slen = strlen(path); + + if (slen >= size) { + /* not NULL-terminated */ + return 0; + } + + while ((slen > 0) && ((path[slen] == '\\') || (path[slen] == '/'))) { + /* path should not end with trailing backslash */ + path[slen] = 0; + slen--; + } + + if (slen == 0) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static void copy_file(const char *filename_in, FILE *fout) +{ + FILE *fin; + size_t len; + void *buf; + fin = fopen(filename_in, "rb"); + + if (fin == NULL) { + printf("Failed to open file \"%s\"\n", filename_in); + exit(-1); + } + + buf = malloc(COPY_BUFSIZE); + + while ((len = fread(buf, 1, COPY_BUFSIZE, fin)) > 0) { + fwrite(buf, 1, len, fout); + } + + free(buf); + fclose(fin); +} + +void concat_files(const char *file1, const char *file2, const char *targetfile) +{ + FILE *fout; + fout = fopen(targetfile, "wb"); + + if (fout == NULL) { + printf("Failed to open file \"%s\"\n", targetfile); + exit(-1); + } + + copy_file(file1, fout); + copy_file(file2, fout); + fclose(fout); +} + +int process_sub(FILE *data_file, FILE *struct_file) +{ + tinydir_dir dir; + int filesProcessed = 0; + + if (processSubs) { + /* process subs recursively */ + size_t sublen = strlen(curSubdir); + size_t freelen = sizeof(curSubdir) - sublen - 1; + int ret; + LWIP_ASSERT("sublen < sizeof(curSubdir)", sublen < sizeof(curSubdir)); + + ret = tinydir_open_sorted(&dir, TINYDIR_STRING(".")); + + if (ret == 0) { + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < dir.n_files; i++) { + tinydir_file file; + + ret = tinydir_readfile_n(&dir, &file, i); + + if (ret == 0) { +#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) && (defined _UNICODE) + size_t num_char_converted; + char currName[256]; + wcstombs_s(&num_char_converted, currName, sizeof(currName), file.name, sizeof(currName)); +#else + const char *currName = file.name; +#endif + + if (currName[0] == '.') { + continue; + } + + if (!file.is_dir) { + continue; + } + + if (freelen > 0) { + CHDIR(currName); + strncat(curSubdir, "/", freelen); + strncat(curSubdir, currName, freelen - 1); + curSubdir[sizeof(curSubdir) - 1] = 0; + printf("processing subdirectory %s/..." NEWLINE, curSubdir); + filesProcessed += process_sub(data_file, struct_file); + CHDIR(".."); + curSubdir[sublen] = 0; + } else { + printf("WARNING: cannot process sub due to path length restrictions: \"%s/%s\"\n", curSubdir, currName); + } + } + } + } + + ret = tinydir_open_sorted(&dir, TINYDIR_STRING(".")); + + if (ret == 0) { + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < dir.n_files; i++) { + tinydir_file file; + + ret = tinydir_readfile_n(&dir, &file, i); + + if (ret == 0) { + if (!file.is_dir) { +#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) && (defined _UNICODE) + size_t num_char_converted; + char curName[256]; + wcstombs_s(&num_char_converted, curName, sizeof(curName), file.name, sizeof(curName)); +#else + const char *curName = file.name; +#endif + + if (strcmp(curName, "fsdata.tmp") == 0) { + continue; + } + + if (strcmp(curName, "fshdr.tmp") == 0) { + continue; + } + + if (file_to_exclude(curName)) { + printf("skipping %s/%s by exclude list (-x option)..." NEWLINE, curSubdir, curName); + continue; + } + + printf("processing %s/%s..." NEWLINE, curSubdir, curName); + + if (process_file(data_file, struct_file, curName) < 0) { + printf(NEWLINE "Error... aborting" NEWLINE); + return -1; + } + + filesProcessed++; + } + } + } + } + } + + return filesProcessed; +} + +static u8_t *get_file_data(const char *filename, int *file_size, int can_be_compressed, int *is_compressed) +{ + FILE *inFile; + size_t fsize = 0; + u8_t *buf; + size_t r; + int rs; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(r); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + inFile = fopen(filename, "rb"); + + if (inFile == NULL) { + printf("Failed to open file \"%s\"\n", filename); + exit(-1); + } + + fseek(inFile, 0, SEEK_END); + rs = ftell(inFile); + + if (rs < 0) { + printf("ftell failed with %d\n", errno); + exit(-1); + } + + fsize = (size_t)rs; + fseek(inFile, 0, SEEK_SET); + buf = (u8_t *)malloc(fsize); + LWIP_ASSERT("buf != NULL", buf != NULL); + r = fread(buf, 1, fsize, inFile); + LWIP_ASSERT("r == fsize", r == fsize); + *file_size = fsize; + *is_compressed = 0; +#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE + overallDataBytes += fsize; + + if (deflateNonSsiFiles) { + if (can_be_compressed) { + if (fsize < OUT_BUF_SIZE) { + u8_t *ret_buf; + tdefl_status status; + size_t in_bytes = fsize; + size_t out_bytes = OUT_BUF_SIZE; + const void *next_in = buf; + void *next_out = s_outbuf; + /* create tdefl() compatible flags (we have to compose the low-level flags ourselves, or use tdefl_create_comp_flags_from_zip_params() but that means MINIZ_NO_ZLIB_APIS can't be defined). */ + mz_uint comp_flags = s_tdefl_num_probes[MZ_MIN(10, deflate_level)] | ((deflate_level <= 3) ? TDEFL_GREEDY_PARSING_FLAG : 0); + + if (!deflate_level) { + comp_flags |= TDEFL_FORCE_ALL_RAW_BLOCKS; + } + + status = tdefl_init(&g_deflator, NULL, NULL, comp_flags); + + if (status != TDEFL_STATUS_OKAY) { + printf("tdefl_init() failed!\n"); + exit(-1); + } + + memset(s_outbuf, 0, sizeof(s_outbuf)); + status = tdefl_compress(&g_deflator, next_in, &in_bytes, next_out, &out_bytes, TDEFL_FINISH); + + if (status != TDEFL_STATUS_DONE) { + printf("deflate failed: %d\n", status); + exit(-1); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("out_bytes <= COPY_BUFSIZE", out_bytes <= OUT_BUF_SIZE); + + if (out_bytes < fsize) { + ret_buf = (u8_t *)malloc(out_bytes); + LWIP_ASSERT("ret_buf != NULL", ret_buf != NULL); + memcpy(ret_buf, s_outbuf, out_bytes); + { + /* sanity-check compression be inflating and comparing to the original */ + tinfl_status dec_status; + tinfl_decompressor inflator; + size_t dec_in_bytes = out_bytes; + size_t dec_out_bytes = OUT_BUF_SIZE; + next_out = s_checkbuf; + + tinfl_init(&inflator); + memset(s_checkbuf, 0, sizeof(s_checkbuf)); + dec_status = tinfl_decompress(&inflator, (const mz_uint8 *)ret_buf, &dec_in_bytes, s_checkbuf, (mz_uint8 *)next_out, &dec_out_bytes, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("tinfl_decompress failed", dec_status == TINFL_STATUS_DONE); + LWIP_ASSERT("tinfl_decompress size mismatch", fsize == dec_out_bytes); + LWIP_ASSERT("decompressed memcmp failed", !memcmp(s_checkbuf, buf, fsize)); + } + /* free original buffer, use compressed data + size */ + free(buf); + buf = ret_buf; + *file_size = out_bytes; + printf(" - deflate: %d bytes -> %d bytes (%.02f%%)" NEWLINE, (int)fsize, (int)out_bytes, (float)((out_bytes * 100.0) / fsize)); + deflatedBytesReduced += (size_t)(fsize - out_bytes); + *is_compressed = 1; + } else { + printf(" - uncompressed: (would be %d bytes larger using deflate)" NEWLINE, (int)(out_bytes - fsize)); + } + } else { + printf(" - uncompressed: (file is larger than deflate bufer)" NEWLINE); + } + } else { + printf(" - cannot be compressed" NEWLINE); + } + } + +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(can_be_compressed); +#endif + fclose(inFile); + return buf; +} + +static void process_file_data(FILE *data_file, u8_t *file_data, size_t file_size) +{ + size_t written, i, src_off = 0; + size_t off = 0; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(written); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + + for (i = 0; i < file_size; i++) { + LWIP_ASSERT("file_buffer_c overflow", off < sizeof(file_buffer_c) - 5); + sprintf(&file_buffer_c[off], "0x%02x,", file_data[i]); + off += 5; + + if ((++src_off % HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE) == 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("file_buffer_c overflow", off < sizeof(file_buffer_c) - NEWLINE_LEN); + memcpy(&file_buffer_c[off], NEWLINE, NEWLINE_LEN); + off += NEWLINE_LEN; + } + + if (off + 20 >= sizeof(file_buffer_c)) { + written = fwrite(file_buffer_c, 1, off, data_file); + LWIP_ASSERT("written == off", written == off); + off = 0; + } + } + + written = fwrite(file_buffer_c, 1, off, data_file); + LWIP_ASSERT("written == off", written == off); +} + +static int write_checksums(FILE *struct_file, const char *varname, + u16_t hdr_len, u16_t hdr_chksum, const u8_t *file_data, size_t file_size) +{ + int chunk_size = TCP_MSS; + int offset, src_offset; + size_t len; + int i = 0; +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + /* when timestamps are used, usable space is 12 bytes less per segment */ + chunk_size -= 12; +#endif + + fprintf(struct_file, "#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM" NEWLINE); + fprintf(struct_file, "const struct fsdata_chksum chksums_%s[] = {" NEWLINE, varname); + + if (hdr_len > 0) { + /* add checksum for HTTP header */ + fprintf(struct_file, "{%d, 0x%04x, %d}," NEWLINE, 0, hdr_chksum, hdr_len); + i++; + } + + src_offset = 0; + + for (offset = hdr_len;; offset += len) { + unsigned short chksum; + const void *data = (const void *)&file_data[src_offset]; + len = LWIP_MIN(chunk_size, (int)file_size - src_offset); + + if (len == 0) { + break; + } + + chksum = ~inet_chksum(data, (u16_t)len); + /* add checksum for data */ + fprintf(struct_file, "{%d, 0x%04x, %" SZT_F "}," NEWLINE, offset, chksum, len); + i++; + } + + fprintf(struct_file, "};" NEWLINE); + fprintf(struct_file, "#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */" NEWLINE); + return i; +} + +static int is_valid_char_for_c_var(char x) +{ + if (((x >= 'A') && (x <= 'Z')) || + ((x >= 'a') && (x <= 'z')) || + ((x >= '0') && (x <= '9')) || + (x == '_')) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void fix_filename_for_c(char *qualifiedName, size_t max_len) +{ + struct file_entry *f; + size_t len = strlen(qualifiedName); + char *new_name = (char *)malloc(len + 2); + int filename_ok; + int cnt = 0; + size_t i; + + if (len + 3 == max_len) { + printf("File name too long: \"%s\"\n", qualifiedName); + exit(-1); + } + + strcpy(new_name, qualifiedName); + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (!is_valid_char_for_c_var(new_name[i])) { + new_name[i] = '_'; + } + } + + do { + filename_ok = 1; + + for (f = first_file; f != NULL; f = f->next) { + if (!strcmp(f->filename_c, new_name)) { + filename_ok = 0; + cnt++; + /* try next unique file name */ + sprintf(&new_name[len], "%d", cnt); + break; + } + } + } while (!filename_ok && (cnt < 999)); + + if (!filename_ok) { + printf("Failed to get unique file name: \"%s\"\n", qualifiedName); + exit(-1); + } + + strcpy(qualifiedName, new_name); + free(new_name); +} + +static void register_filename(const char *qualifiedName) +{ + struct file_entry *fe = (struct file_entry *)malloc(sizeof(struct file_entry)); + fe->filename_c = strdup(qualifiedName); + fe->next = NULL; + + if (first_file == NULL) { + first_file = last_file = fe; + } else { + last_file->next = fe; + last_file = fe; + } +} + +static int checkSsiByFilelist(const char *filename_listfile) +{ + FILE *f = fopen(filename_listfile, "r"); + + if (f != NULL) { + char *buf; + long rs; + size_t fsize, readcount; + size_t i, l, num_lines; + char **lines; + int state; + + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); + rs = ftell(f); + + if (rs < 0) { + printf("ftell failed with %d\n", errno); + fclose(f); + return 0; + } + + fsize = (size_t)rs; + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); + buf = (char *)malloc(fsize); + + if (!buf) { + printf("failed to allocate ssi file buffer\n"); + fclose(f); + return 0; + } + + memset(buf, 0, fsize); + readcount = fread(buf, 1, fsize, f); + fclose(f); + + if ((readcount > fsize) || !readcount) { + printf("failed to read data from ssi file\n"); + free(buf); + return 0; + } + + /* first pass: get the number of lines (and convert newlines to '0') */ + num_lines = 1; + + for (i = 0; i < readcount; i++) { + if (buf[i] == '\n') { + num_lines++; + buf[i] = 0; + } else if (buf[i] == '\r') { + buf[i] = 0; + } + } + + /* allocate the line pointer array */ + lines = (char **)malloc(sizeof(char *) * num_lines); + + if (!lines) { + printf("failed to allocate ssi line buffer\n"); + free(buf); + return 0; + } + + memset(lines, 0, sizeof(char *) * num_lines); + l = 0; + state = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < readcount; i++) { + if (state) { + /* waiting for null */ + if (buf[i] == 0) { + state = 0; + } + } else { + /* waiting for beginning of new string */ + if (buf[i] != 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("lines array overflow", l < num_lines); + lines[l] = &buf[i]; + state = 1; + l++; + } + } + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("lines array overflow", l < num_lines); + + ssi_file_buffer = buf; + ssi_file_lines = lines; + ssi_file_num_lines = l; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int is_ssi_file(const char *filename) +{ + if (supportSsi) { + if (ssi_file_buffer) { + /* compare by list */ + size_t i; + int ret = 0; + /* build up the relative path to this file */ + size_t sublen = strlen(curSubdir); + size_t freelen = sizeof(curSubdir) - sublen - 1; + strncat(curSubdir, "/", freelen); + strncat(curSubdir, filename, freelen - 1); + curSubdir[sizeof(curSubdir) - 1] = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ssi_file_num_lines; i++) { + const char *listed_file = ssi_file_lines[i]; + + /* compare without the leading '/' */ + if (!strcmp(&curSubdir[1], listed_file)) { + ret = 1; + } + } + + curSubdir[sublen] = 0; + return ret; + } else { + /* check file extension */ + size_t loop; + + for (loop = 0; loop < NUM_SHTML_EXTENSIONS; loop++) { + if (strstr(filename, g_pcSSIExtensions[loop])) { + return 1; + } + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static int ext_in_list(const char *filename, const char *ext_list) +{ + int found = 0; + const char *ext = ext_list; + + if (ext_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + while (*ext != '\0') { + const char *comma = strchr(ext, ','); + size_t ext_size; + size_t filename_size = strlen(filename); + + if (comma == NULL) { + comma = strchr(ext, '\0'); + } + + ext_size = comma - ext; + + if ((filename[filename_size - ext_size - 1] == '.') && + !strncmp(&filename[filename_size - ext_size], ext, ext_size)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + + ext = comma + 1; + } + + return found; +} + +static int file_to_exclude(const char *filename) +{ + return (exclude_list != NULL) && ext_in_list(filename, exclude_list); +} + +static int file_can_be_compressed(const char *filename) +{ + return (ncompress_list == NULL) || !ext_in_list(filename, ncompress_list); +} + +int process_file(FILE *data_file, FILE *struct_file, const char *filename) +{ + char varname[MAX_PATH_LEN]; + int i = 0; + char qualifiedName[MAX_PATH_LEN]; + int file_size; + u16_t http_hdr_chksum = 0; + u16_t http_hdr_len = 0; + int chksum_count = 0; + u8_t flags = 0; + u8_t has_content_len; + u8_t *file_data; + int is_ssi; + int can_be_compressed; + int is_compressed = 0; + int flags_printed; + + /* create qualified name (@todo: prepend slash or not?) */ + sprintf(qualifiedName, "%s/%s", curSubdir, filename); + /* create C variable name */ + strcpy(varname, qualifiedName); + /* convert slashes & dots to underscores */ + fix_filename_for_c(varname, MAX_PATH_LEN); + register_filename(varname); +#if ALIGN_PAYLOAD + /* to force even alignment of array, type 1 */ + fprintf(data_file, "#if FSDATA_FILE_ALIGNMENT==1" NEWLINE); + fprintf(data_file, "static const " PAYLOAD_ALIGN_TYPE " dummy_align_%s = %d;" NEWLINE, varname, payload_alingment_dummy_counter++); + fprintf(data_file, "#endif" NEWLINE); +#endif /* ALIGN_PAYLOAD */ + fprintf(data_file, "static const unsigned char FSDATA_ALIGN_PRE data_%s[] FSDATA_ALIGN_POST = {" NEWLINE, varname); + /* encode source file name (used by file system, not returned to browser) */ + fprintf(data_file, "/* %s (%" SZT_F " chars) */" NEWLINE, qualifiedName, strlen(qualifiedName) + 1); + file_put_ascii(data_file, qualifiedName, strlen(qualifiedName) + 1, &i); +#if ALIGN_PAYLOAD + + /* pad to even number of bytes to assure payload is on aligned boundary */ + while (i % PAYLOAD_ALIGNMENT != 0) { + fprintf(data_file, "0x%02x,", 0); + i++; + } + +#endif /* ALIGN_PAYLOAD */ + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE); + + is_ssi = is_ssi_file(filename); + + if (is_ssi) { + flags |= FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI; + } + + has_content_len = !is_ssi; + can_be_compressed = includeHttpHeader && !is_ssi && file_can_be_compressed(filename); + file_data = get_file_data(filename, &file_size, can_be_compressed, &is_compressed); + + if (includeHttpHeader) { + file_write_http_header(data_file, filename, file_size, &http_hdr_len, &http_hdr_chksum, has_content_len, is_compressed); + flags |= FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED; + + if (has_content_len) { + flags |= FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT; + + if (useHttp11) { + flags |= FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_HTTPVER_1_1; + } + } + } + + if (precalcChksum) { + chksum_count = write_checksums(struct_file, varname, http_hdr_len, http_hdr_chksum, file_data, file_size); + } + + /* build declaration of struct fsdata_file in temp file */ + fprintf(struct_file, "const struct fsdata_file file_%s[] = { {" NEWLINE, varname); + fprintf(struct_file, "file_%s," NEWLINE, lastFileVar); + fprintf(struct_file, "data_%s," NEWLINE, varname); + fprintf(struct_file, "data_%s + %d," NEWLINE, varname, i); + fprintf(struct_file, "sizeof(data_%s) - %d," NEWLINE, varname, i); + + flags_printed = 0; + + if (flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED) { + fputs("FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED", struct_file); + flags_printed = 1; + } + + if (flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT) { + if (flags_printed) { + fputs(" | ", struct_file); + } + + fputs("FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT", struct_file); + flags_printed = 1; + } + + if (flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_HTTPVER_1_1) { + if (flags_printed) { + fputs(" | ", struct_file); + } + + fputs("FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_HTTPVER_1_1", struct_file); + flags_printed = 1; + } + + if (flags & FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI) { + if (flags_printed) { + fputs(" | ", struct_file); + } + + fputs("FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI", struct_file); + flags_printed = 1; + } + + if (!flags_printed) { + fputs("0", struct_file); + } + + fputs("," NEWLINE, struct_file); + + if (precalcChksum) { + fprintf(struct_file, "#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM" NEWLINE); + fprintf(struct_file, "%d, chksums_%s," NEWLINE, chksum_count, varname); + fprintf(struct_file, "#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */" NEWLINE); + } + + fprintf(struct_file, "}};" NEWLINE NEWLINE); + strcpy(lastFileVar, varname); + + /* write actual file contents */ + i = 0; + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* raw file data (%d bytes) */" NEWLINE, file_size); + process_file_data(data_file, file_data, file_size); + fprintf(data_file, "};" NEWLINE NEWLINE); + free(file_data); + return 0; +} + +int file_write_http_header(FILE *data_file, const char *filename, int file_size, u16_t *http_hdr_len, + u16_t *http_hdr_chksum, u8_t provide_content_len, int is_compressed) +{ + int i = 0; + int response_type = HTTP_HDR_OK; + const char *file_type; + const char *cur_string; + size_t cur_len; + int written = 0; + size_t hdr_len = 0; + u16_t acc; + const char *file_ext; + size_t j; + u8_t provide_last_modified = includeLastModified; + + memset(hdr_buf, 0, sizeof(hdr_buf)); + + if (useHttp11) { + response_type = HTTP_HDR_OK_11; + } + + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* HTTP header */"); + + if (strstr(filename, "404") == filename) { + response_type = HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND; + + if (useHttp11) { + response_type = HTTP_HDR_NOT_FOUND_11; + } + } else if (strstr(filename, "400") == filename) { + response_type = HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST; + + if (useHttp11) { + response_type = HTTP_HDR_BAD_REQUEST_11; + } + } else if (strstr(filename, "501") == filename) { + response_type = HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL; + + if (useHttp11) { + response_type = HTTP_HDR_NOT_IMPL_11; + } + } + + cur_string = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[response_type]; + cur_len = strlen(cur_string); + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%" SZT_F " bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); + written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); + i = 0; + + if (precalcChksum) { + memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); + hdr_len += cur_len; + } + + cur_string = serverID; + cur_len = strlen(cur_string); + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%" SZT_F " bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); + written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); + i = 0; + + if (precalcChksum) { + memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); + hdr_len += cur_len; + } + + file_ext = filename; + + if (file_ext != NULL) { + while (strstr(file_ext, ".") != NULL) { + file_ext = strstr(file_ext, "."); + file_ext++; + } + } + + if ((file_ext == NULL) || (*file_ext == 0)) { + printf("failed to get extension for file \"%s\", using default.\n", filename); + file_type = HTTP_HDR_DEFAULT_TYPE; + } else { + file_type = NULL; + + for (j = 0; j < NUM_HTTP_HEADERS; j++) { + if (!strcmp(file_ext, g_psHTTPHeaders[j].extension)) { + file_type = g_psHTTPHeaders[j].content_type; + break; + } + } + + if (file_type == NULL) { + printf("failed to get file type for extension \"%s\", using default.\n", file_ext); + file_type = HTTP_HDR_DEFAULT_TYPE; + } + } + + /* Content-Length is used for persistent connections in HTTP/1.1 but also for + download progress in older versions + @todo: just use a big-enough buffer and let the HTTPD send spaces? */ + if (provide_content_len) { + char intbuf[MAX_PATH_LEN]; + int content_len = file_size; + memset(intbuf, 0, sizeof(intbuf)); + cur_string = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONTENT_LENGTH]; + cur_len = strlen(cur_string); + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s%d\r\n\" (%" SZT_F "+ bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, content_len, cur_len + 2); + written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); + + if (precalcChksum) { + memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); + hdr_len += cur_len; + } + + lwip_itoa(intbuf, sizeof(intbuf), content_len); + strcat(intbuf, "\r\n"); + cur_len = strlen(intbuf); + written += file_put_ascii(data_file, intbuf, cur_len, &i); + i = 0; + + if (precalcChksum) { + memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], intbuf, cur_len); + hdr_len += cur_len; + } + } + + if (provide_last_modified) { + char modbuf[256]; + struct stat stat_data; + struct tm *t; + memset(modbuf, 0, sizeof(modbuf)); + memset(&stat_data, 0, sizeof(stat_data)); + cur_string = modbuf; + strcpy(modbuf, "Last-Modified: "); + + if (stat(filename, &stat_data) != 0) { + printf("stat(%s) failed with error %d\n", filename, errno); + exit(-1); + } + + t = gmtime(&stat_data.st_mtime); + + if (t == NULL) { + printf("gmtime() failed with error %d\n", errno); + exit(-1); + } + + strftime(&modbuf[15], sizeof(modbuf) - 15, "%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S GMT", t); + cur_len = strlen(cur_string); + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\"\r\n\" (%" SZT_F "+ bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len + 2); + written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); + + if (precalcChksum) { + memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); + hdr_len += cur_len; + } + + modbuf[0] = 0; + strcat(modbuf, "\r\n"); + cur_len = strlen(modbuf); + written += file_put_ascii(data_file, modbuf, cur_len, &i); + i = 0; + + if (precalcChksum) { + memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], modbuf, cur_len); + hdr_len += cur_len; + } + } + + /* HTTP/1.1 implements persistent connections */ + if (useHttp11) { + if (provide_content_len) { + cur_string = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONN_KEEPALIVE]; + } else { + /* no Content-Length available, so a persistent connection is no possible + because the client does not know the data length */ + cur_string = g_psHTTPHeaderStrings[HTTP_HDR_CONN_CLOSE]; + } + + cur_len = strlen(cur_string); + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%" SZT_F " bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); + written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); + i = 0; + + if (precalcChksum) { + memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); + hdr_len += cur_len; + } + } + +#if MAKEFS_SUPPORT_DEFLATE + + if (is_compressed) { + /* tell the client about the deflate encoding */ + LWIP_ASSERT("error", deflateNonSsiFiles); + cur_string = "Content-Encoding: deflate\r\n"; + cur_len = strlen(cur_string); + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%d bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); + written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); + i = 0; + } + +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(is_compressed); +#endif + + /* write content-type, ATTENTION: this includes the double-CRLF! */ + cur_string = file_type; + cur_len = strlen(cur_string); + fprintf(data_file, NEWLINE "/* \"%s\" (%" SZT_F " bytes) */" NEWLINE, cur_string, cur_len); + written += file_put_ascii(data_file, cur_string, cur_len, &i); + i = 0; + + /* ATTENTION: headers are done now (double-CRLF has been written!) */ + + if (precalcChksum) { + LWIP_ASSERT("hdr_len + cur_len <= sizeof(hdr_buf)", hdr_len + cur_len <= sizeof(hdr_buf)); + memcpy(&hdr_buf[hdr_len], cur_string, cur_len); + hdr_len += cur_len; + + LWIP_ASSERT("strlen(hdr_buf) == hdr_len", strlen(hdr_buf) == hdr_len); + acc = ~inet_chksum(hdr_buf, (u16_t)hdr_len); + *http_hdr_len = (u16_t)hdr_len; + *http_hdr_chksum = acc; + } + + return written; +} + +int file_put_ascii(FILE *file, const char *ascii_string, int len, int *i) +{ + int x; + + for (x = 0; x < len; x++) { + unsigned char cur = ascii_string[x]; + fprintf(file, "0x%02x,", cur); + + if ((++(*i) % HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE) == 0) { + fprintf(file, NEWLINE); + } + } + + return len; +} + +int s_put_ascii(char *buf, const char *ascii_string, int len, int *i) +{ + int x; + int idx = 0; + + for (x = 0; x < len; x++) { + unsigned char cur = ascii_string[x]; + sprintf(&buf[idx], "0x%02x,", cur); + idx += 5; + + if ((++(*i) % HEX_BYTES_PER_LINE) == 0) { + sprintf(&buf[idx], NEWLINE); + idx += NEWLINE_LEN; + } + } + + return len; +} diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/readme.txt b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/readme.txt similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/readme.txt rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/readme.txt index 41c7d800..3768585e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/readme.txt +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/readme.txt @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ -This directory contains a script ('makefsdata') to create C code suitable for -httpd for given html pages (or other files) in a directory. - -There is also a plain C console application doing the same and extended a bit. - -Usage: htmlgen [targetdir] [-s] [-i]s - targetdir: relative or absolute path to files to convert - switch -s: toggle processing of subdirectories (default is on) - switch -e: exclude HTTP header from file (header is created at runtime, default is on) - switch -11: include HTTP 1.1 header (1.0 is default) - - if targetdir not specified, makefsdata will attempt to - process files in subdirectory 'fs'. +This directory contains a script ('makefsdata') to create C code suitable for +httpd for given html pages (or other files) in a directory. + +There is also a plain C console application doing the same and extended a bit. + +Usage: htmlgen [targetdir] [-s] [-i]s + targetdir: relative or absolute path to files to convert + switch -s: toggle processing of subdirectories (default is on) + switch -e: exclude HTTP header from file (header is created at runtime, default is on) + switch -11: include HTTP 1.1 header (1.0 is default) + + if targetdir not specified, makefsdata will attempt to + process files in subdirectory 'fs'. diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/tinydir.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/tinydir.h similarity index 95% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/tinydir.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/tinydir.h index eb895d10..db27860e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/tinydir.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/http/makefsdata/tinydir.h @@ -1,822 +1,822 @@ -/* -Copyright (c) 2013-2017, tinydir authors: -- Cong Xu -- Lautis Sun -- Baudouin Feildel -- Andargor -All rights reserved. - -Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - -1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this - list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - -THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND -ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE -DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR -ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES -(INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND -ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS -SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -*/ -#ifndef TINYDIR_H -#define TINYDIR_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if ((defined _UNICODE) && !(defined UNICODE)) -#define UNICODE -#endif - -#if ((defined UNICODE) && !(defined _UNICODE)) -#define _UNICODE -#endif - -#include -#include -#include -#ifdef _MSC_VER -#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -#include -#include -#pragma warning(push) -#pragma warning(disable : 4996) -#else -#include -#include -#include -#include -#endif -#ifdef __MINGW32__ -#include -#endif - -/* types */ - -/* Windows UNICODE wide character support */ -#if defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__ -#define _tinydir_char_t TCHAR -#define TINYDIR_STRING(s) _TEXT(s) -#define _tinydir_strlen _tcslen -#define _tinydir_strcpy _tcscpy -#define _tinydir_strcat _tcscat -#define _tinydir_strcmp _tcscmp -#define _tinydir_strrchr _tcsrchr -#define _tinydir_strncmp _tcsncmp -#else -#define _tinydir_char_t char -#define TINYDIR_STRING(s) s -#define _tinydir_strlen strlen -#define _tinydir_strcpy strcpy -#define _tinydir_strcat strcat -#define _tinydir_strcmp strcmp -#define _tinydir_strrchr strrchr -#define _tinydir_strncmp strncmp -#endif - -#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) -#include -#define _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX MAX_PATH -#elif defined __linux__ -#include -#define _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX PATH_MAX -#else -#define _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX 4096 -#endif - -#ifdef _MSC_VER -/* extra chars for the "\\*" mask */ -#define _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA 2 -#else -#define _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA 0 -#endif - -#define _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX 256 - -#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) -#define _TINYDIR_DRIVE_MAX 3 -#endif - -#ifdef _MSC_VER -#define _TINYDIR_FUNC static __inline -#elif !defined __STDC_VERSION__ || __STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L -#define _TINYDIR_FUNC static __inline__ -#else -#define _TINYDIR_FUNC static inline -#endif - -/* readdir_r usage; define TINYDIR_USE_READDIR_R to use it (if supported) */ -#ifdef TINYDIR_USE_READDIR_R - -/* readdir_r is a POSIX-only function, and may not be available under various - * environments/settings, e.g. MinGW. Use readdir fallback */ -#if _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 1 || _XOPEN_SOURCE || _BSD_SOURCE || _SVID_SOURCE || \ - _POSIX_SOURCE -#define _TINYDIR_HAS_READDIR_R -#endif -#if _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L -#define _TINYDIR_HAS_FPATHCONF -#include -#endif -#if _BSD_SOURCE || _SVID_SOURCE || \ - (_POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L || _XOPEN_SOURCE >= 700) -#define _TINYDIR_HAS_DIRFD -#include -#endif -#if defined _TINYDIR_HAS_FPATHCONF && defined _TINYDIR_HAS_DIRFD && \ - defined _PC_NAME_MAX -#define _TINYDIR_USE_FPATHCONF -#endif -#if defined __MINGW32__ || !defined _TINYDIR_HAS_READDIR_R || \ - !(defined _TINYDIR_USE_FPATHCONF || defined NAME_MAX) -#define _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR -#endif - -/* Use readdir by default */ -#else -#define _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR -#endif - -/* MINGW32 has two versions of dirent, ASCII and UNICODE*/ -#ifndef _MSC_VER -#if (defined __MINGW32__) && (defined _UNICODE) -#define _TINYDIR_DIR _WDIR -#define _tinydir_dirent _wdirent -#define _tinydir_opendir _wopendir -#define _tinydir_readdir _wreaddir -#define _tinydir_closedir _wclosedir -#else -#define _TINYDIR_DIR DIR -#define _tinydir_dirent dirent -#define _tinydir_opendir opendir -#define _tinydir_readdir readdir -#define _tinydir_closedir closedir -#endif -#endif - -/* Allow user to use a custom allocator by defining _TINYDIR_MALLOC and _TINYDIR_FREE. */ -#if defined(_TINYDIR_MALLOC) && defined(_TINYDIR_FREE) -#elif !defined(_TINYDIR_MALLOC) && !defined(_TINYDIR_FREE) -#else -#error "Either define both alloc and free or none of them!" -#endif - -#if !defined(_TINYDIR_MALLOC) -#define _TINYDIR_MALLOC(_size) malloc(_size) -#define _TINYDIR_FREE(_ptr) free(_ptr) -#endif /* !defined(_TINYDIR_MALLOC) */ - -typedef struct tinydir_file { - _tinydir_char_t path[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; - _tinydir_char_t name[_TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX]; - _tinydir_char_t *extension; - int is_dir; - int is_reg; - -#ifndef _MSC_VER -#ifdef __MINGW32__ - struct _stat _s; -#else - struct stat _s; -#endif -#endif -} tinydir_file; - -typedef struct tinydir_dir { - _tinydir_char_t path[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; - int has_next; - size_t n_files; - - tinydir_file *_files; -#ifdef _MSC_VER - HANDLE _h; - WIN32_FIND_DATA _f; -#else - _TINYDIR_DIR *_d; - struct _tinydir_dirent *_e; -#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR - struct _tinydir_dirent *_ep; -#endif -#endif -} tinydir_dir; - -/* declarations */ - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_open(tinydir_dir *dir, const _tinydir_char_t *path); -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_open_sorted(tinydir_dir *dir, const _tinydir_char_t *path); -_TINYDIR_FUNC -void tinydir_close(tinydir_dir *dir); - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_next(tinydir_dir *dir); -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_readfile(const tinydir_dir *dir, tinydir_file *file); -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_readfile_n(const tinydir_dir *dir, tinydir_file *file, size_t i); -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_open_subdir_n(tinydir_dir *dir, size_t i); - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_file_open(tinydir_file *file, const _tinydir_char_t *path); -_TINYDIR_FUNC -void _tinydir_get_ext(tinydir_file *file); -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int _tinydir_file_cmp(const void *a, const void *b); -#ifndef _MSC_VER -#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR -_TINYDIR_FUNC -size_t _tinydir_dirent_buf_size(_TINYDIR_DIR *dirp); -#endif -#endif - -/* definitions*/ - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_open(tinydir_dir *dir, const _tinydir_char_t *path) -{ -#ifndef _MSC_VER -#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR - int error; - int size; /* using int size */ -#endif -#else - _tinydir_char_t path_buf[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; -#endif - _tinydir_char_t *pathp; - - if (dir == NULL || path == NULL || _tinydir_strlen(path) == 0) { - errno = EINVAL; - return -1; - } - - if (_tinydir_strlen(path) + _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA >= _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX) { - errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return -1; - } - - /* initialise dir */ - dir->_files = NULL; -#ifdef _MSC_VER - dir->_h = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; -#else - dir->_d = NULL; -#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR - dir->_ep = NULL; -#endif -#endif - tinydir_close(dir); - - _tinydir_strcpy(dir->path, path); - /* Remove trailing slashes */ - pathp = &dir->path[_tinydir_strlen(dir->path) - 1]; - - while (pathp != dir->path && (*pathp == TINYDIR_STRING('\\') || *pathp == TINYDIR_STRING('/'))) { - *pathp = TINYDIR_STRING('\0'); - pathp++; - } - -#ifdef _MSC_VER - _tinydir_strcpy(path_buf, dir->path); - _tinydir_strcat(path_buf, TINYDIR_STRING("\\*")); -#if (defined WINAPI_FAMILY) && (WINAPI_FAMILY != WINAPI_FAMILY_DESKTOP_APP) - dir->_h = FindFirstFileEx(path_buf, FindExInfoStandard, &dir->_f, FindExSearchNameMatch, NULL, 0); -#else - dir->_h = FindFirstFile(path_buf, &dir->_f); -#endif - - if (dir->_h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { - errno = ENOENT; -#else - dir->_d = _tinydir_opendir(path); - - if (dir->_d == NULL) { -#endif - goto bail; - } - - /* read first file */ - dir->has_next = 1; -#ifndef _MSC_VER -#ifdef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR - dir->_e = _tinydir_readdir(dir->_d); -#else - /* allocate dirent buffer for readdir_r */ - size = _tinydir_dirent_buf_size(dir->_d); /* conversion to int */ - - if (size == -1) { - return -1; - } - - dir->_ep = (struct _tinydir_dirent *)_TINYDIR_MALLOC(size); - - if (dir->_ep == NULL) { - return -1; - } - - error = readdir_r(dir->_d, dir->_ep, &dir->_e); - - if (error != 0) { - return -1; - } - -#endif - - if (dir->_e == NULL) { - dir->has_next = 0; - } - -#endif - - return 0; - -bail: - tinydir_close(dir); - return -1; -} - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_open_sorted(tinydir_dir *dir, const _tinydir_char_t *path) -{ - /* Count the number of files first, to pre-allocate the files array */ - size_t n_files = 0; - - if (tinydir_open(dir, path) == -1) { - return -1; - } - - while (dir->has_next) { - n_files++; - - if (tinydir_next(dir) == -1) { - goto bail; - } - } - - tinydir_close(dir); - - if (tinydir_open(dir, path) == -1) { - return -1; - } - - dir->n_files = 0; - dir->_files = (tinydir_file *)_TINYDIR_MALLOC(sizeof *dir->_files * n_files); - - if (dir->_files == NULL) { - goto bail; - } - - while (dir->has_next) { - tinydir_file *p_file; - dir->n_files++; - - p_file = &dir->_files[dir->n_files - 1]; - - if (tinydir_readfile(dir, p_file) == -1) { - goto bail; - } - - if (tinydir_next(dir) == -1) { - goto bail; - } - - /* Just in case the number of files has changed between the first and - second reads, terminate without writing into unallocated memory */ - if (dir->n_files == n_files) { - break; - } - } - - qsort(dir->_files, dir->n_files, sizeof(tinydir_file), _tinydir_file_cmp); - - return 0; - -bail: - tinydir_close(dir); - return -1; -} - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -void tinydir_close(tinydir_dir *dir) -{ - if (dir == NULL) { - return; - } - - memset(dir->path, 0, sizeof(dir->path)); - dir->has_next = 0; - dir->n_files = 0; - _TINYDIR_FREE(dir->_files); - dir->_files = NULL; -#ifdef _MSC_VER - - if (dir->_h != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { - FindClose(dir->_h); - } - - dir->_h = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; -#else - - if (dir->_d) { - _tinydir_closedir(dir->_d); - } - - dir->_d = NULL; - dir->_e = NULL; -#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR - _TINYDIR_FREE(dir->_ep); - dir->_ep = NULL; -#endif -#endif -} - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_next(tinydir_dir *dir) -{ - if (dir == NULL) { - errno = EINVAL; - return -1; - } - - if (!dir->has_next) { - errno = ENOENT; - return -1; - } - -#ifdef _MSC_VER - - if (FindNextFile(dir->_h, &dir->_f) == 0) -#else -#ifdef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR - dir->_e = _tinydir_readdir(dir->_d); - -#else - - if (dir->_ep == NULL) { - return -1; - } - - if (readdir_r(dir->_d, dir->_ep, &dir->_e) != 0) { - return -1; - } - -#endif - - if (dir->_e == NULL) -#endif - { - dir->has_next = 0; -#ifdef _MSC_VER - - if (GetLastError() != ERROR_SUCCESS && - GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES) { - tinydir_close(dir); - errno = EIO; - return -1; - } - -#endif - } - - return 0; -} - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_readfile(const tinydir_dir *dir, tinydir_file *file) -{ - if (dir == NULL || file == NULL) { - errno = EINVAL; - return -1; - } - -#ifdef _MSC_VER - - if (dir->_h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) -#else - if (dir->_e == NULL) -#endif - { - errno = ENOENT; - return -1; - } - - if (_tinydir_strlen(dir->path) + - _tinydir_strlen( -#ifdef _MSC_VER - dir->_f.cFileName -#else - dir->_e->d_name -#endif - ) + - 1 + _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA >= - _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX) { - /* the path for the file will be too long */ - errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return -1; - } - - if (_tinydir_strlen( -#ifdef _MSC_VER - dir->_f.cFileName -#else - dir->_e->d_name -#endif - ) >= _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX) { - errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return -1; - } - - _tinydir_strcpy(file->path, dir->path); - _tinydir_strcat(file->path, TINYDIR_STRING("/")); - _tinydir_strcpy(file->name, -#ifdef _MSC_VER - dir->_f.cFileName -#else - dir->_e->d_name -#endif - ); - _tinydir_strcat(file->path, file->name); -#ifndef _MSC_VER -#ifdef __MINGW32__ - - if (_tstat( -#else - if (stat( -#endif - file->path, &file->_s) == -1) { - return -1; - } -#endif - _tinydir_get_ext(file); - - file->is_dir = -#ifdef _MSC_VER - !!(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY); -#else - S_ISDIR(file->_s.st_mode); -#endif - file->is_reg = -#ifdef _MSC_VER - !!(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL) || - (!(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DEVICE) && - !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) && - !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ENCRYPTED) && -#ifdef FILE_ATTRIBUTE_INTEGRITY_STREAM - !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_INTEGRITY_STREAM) && -#endif -#ifdef FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NO_SCRUB_DATA - !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NO_SCRUB_DATA) && -#endif - !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_OFFLINE) && - !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY)); -#else - S_ISREG(file->_s.st_mode); -#endif - - return 0; -} - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_readfile_n(const tinydir_dir *dir, tinydir_file *file, size_t i) -{ - if (dir == NULL || file == NULL) { - errno = EINVAL; - return -1; - } - - if (i >= dir->n_files) { - errno = ENOENT; - return -1; - } - - memcpy(file, &dir->_files[i], sizeof(tinydir_file)); - _tinydir_get_ext(file); - - return 0; -} - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_open_subdir_n(tinydir_dir *dir, size_t i) -{ - _tinydir_char_t path[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; - - if (dir == NULL) { - errno = EINVAL; - return -1; - } - - if (i >= dir->n_files || !dir->_files[i].is_dir) { - errno = ENOENT; - return -1; - } - - _tinydir_strcpy(path, dir->_files[i].path); - tinydir_close(dir); - - if (tinydir_open_sorted(dir, path) == -1) { - return -1; - } - - return 0; -} - -/* Open a single file given its path */ -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int tinydir_file_open(tinydir_file *file, const _tinydir_char_t *path) -{ - tinydir_dir dir; - int result = 0; - int found = 0; - _tinydir_char_t dir_name_buf[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; - _tinydir_char_t file_name_buf[_TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX]; - _tinydir_char_t *dir_name; - _tinydir_char_t *base_name; -#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) - _tinydir_char_t drive_buf[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; - _tinydir_char_t ext_buf[_TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX]; -#endif - - if (file == NULL || path == NULL || _tinydir_strlen(path) == 0) { - errno = EINVAL; - return -1; - } - - if (_tinydir_strlen(path) + _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA >= _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX) { - errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return -1; - } - - /* Get the parent path */ -#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) -#if ((defined _MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER >= 1400)) - _tsplitpath_s( - path, - drive_buf, _TINYDIR_DRIVE_MAX, - dir_name_buf, _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX, - file_name_buf, _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX, - ext_buf, _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX); -#else - _tsplitpath( - path, - drive_buf, - dir_name_buf, - file_name_buf, - ext_buf); -#endif - - /* _splitpath_s not work fine with only filename and widechar support */ -#ifdef _UNICODE - - if (drive_buf[0] == L'\xFEFE') { - drive_buf[0] = '\0'; - } - - if (dir_name_buf[0] == L'\xFEFE') { - dir_name_buf[0] = '\0'; - } - -#endif - - if (errno) { - errno = EINVAL; - return -1; - } - - /* Emulate the behavior of dirname by returning "." for dir name if it's - empty */ - if (drive_buf[0] == '\0' && dir_name_buf[0] == '\0') { - _tinydir_strcpy(dir_name_buf, TINYDIR_STRING(".")); - } - - /* Concatenate the drive letter and dir name to form full dir name */ - _tinydir_strcat(drive_buf, dir_name_buf); - dir_name = drive_buf; - /* Concatenate the file name and extension to form base name */ - _tinydir_strcat(file_name_buf, ext_buf); - base_name = file_name_buf; -#else - _tinydir_strcpy(dir_name_buf, path); - dir_name = dirname(dir_name_buf); - _tinydir_strcpy(file_name_buf, path); - base_name = basename(file_name_buf); -#endif - - /* Open the parent directory */ - if (tinydir_open(&dir, dir_name) == -1) { - return -1; - } - - /* Read through the parent directory and look for the file */ - while (dir.has_next) { - if (tinydir_readfile(&dir, file) == -1) { - result = -1; - goto bail; - } - - if (_tinydir_strcmp(file->name, base_name) == 0) { - /* File found */ - found = 1; - break; - } - - tinydir_next(&dir); - } - - if (!found) { - result = -1; - errno = ENOENT; - } - -bail: - tinydir_close(&dir); - return result; -} - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -void _tinydir_get_ext(tinydir_file *file) -{ - _tinydir_char_t *period = _tinydir_strrchr(file->name, TINYDIR_STRING('.')); - - if (period == NULL) { - file->extension = &(file->name[_tinydir_strlen(file->name)]); - } else { - file->extension = period + 1; - } -} - -_TINYDIR_FUNC -int _tinydir_file_cmp(const void *a, const void *b) -{ - const tinydir_file *fa = (const tinydir_file *)a; - const tinydir_file *fb = (const tinydir_file *)b; - - if (fa->is_dir != fb->is_dir) { - return -(fa->is_dir - fb->is_dir); - } - - return _tinydir_strncmp(fa->name, fb->name, _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX); -} - -#ifndef _MSC_VER -#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR -/* -The following authored by Ben Hutchings -from https://womble.decadent.org.uk/readdir_r-advisory.html -*/ -/* Calculate the required buffer size (in bytes) for directory * -* entries read from the given directory handle. Return -1 if this * -* this cannot be done. * -* * -* This code does not trust values of NAME_MAX that are less than * -* 255, since some systems (including at least HP-UX) incorrectly * -* define it to be a smaller value. */ -_TINYDIR_FUNC -size_t _tinydir_dirent_buf_size(_TINYDIR_DIR *dirp) -{ - long name_max; - size_t name_end; - /* parameter may be unused */ - (void)dirp; - -#if defined _TINYDIR_USE_FPATHCONF - name_max = fpathconf(dirfd(dirp), _PC_NAME_MAX); - - if (name_max == -1) -#if defined(NAME_MAX) - name_max = (NAME_MAX > 255) ? NAME_MAX : 255; - -#else - return (size_t)(-1); -#endif -#elif defined(NAME_MAX) - name_max = (NAME_MAX > 255) ? NAME_MAX : 255; -#else -#error "buffer size for readdir_r cannot be determined" -#endif - name_end = (size_t)offsetof(struct _tinydir_dirent, d_name) + name_max + 1; - return (name_end > sizeof(struct _tinydir_dirent) ? - name_end : - sizeof(struct _tinydir_dirent)); -} -#endif -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning(pop) -#endif - -#endif +/* +Copyright (c) 2013-2017, tinydir authors: +- Cong Xu +- Lautis Sun +- Baudouin Feildel +- Andargor +All rights reserved. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this + list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND +ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE +DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR +ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES +(INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; +LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND +ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ +#ifndef TINYDIR_H +#define TINYDIR_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if ((defined _UNICODE) && !(defined UNICODE)) +#define UNICODE +#endif + +#if ((defined UNICODE) && !(defined _UNICODE)) +#define _UNICODE +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include +#include +#pragma warning(push) +#pragma warning(disable : 4996) +#else +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif +#ifdef __MINGW32__ +#include +#endif + +/* types */ + +/* Windows UNICODE wide character support */ +#if defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__ +#define _tinydir_char_t TCHAR +#define TINYDIR_STRING(s) _TEXT(s) +#define _tinydir_strlen _tcslen +#define _tinydir_strcpy _tcscpy +#define _tinydir_strcat _tcscat +#define _tinydir_strcmp _tcscmp +#define _tinydir_strrchr _tcsrchr +#define _tinydir_strncmp _tcsncmp +#else +#define _tinydir_char_t char +#define TINYDIR_STRING(s) s +#define _tinydir_strlen strlen +#define _tinydir_strcpy strcpy +#define _tinydir_strcat strcat +#define _tinydir_strcmp strcmp +#define _tinydir_strrchr strrchr +#define _tinydir_strncmp strncmp +#endif + +#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) +#include +#define _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX MAX_PATH +#elif defined __linux__ +#include +#define _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX PATH_MAX +#else +#define _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX 4096 +#endif + +#ifdef _MSC_VER +/* extra chars for the "\\*" mask */ +#define _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA 2 +#else +#define _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA 0 +#endif + +#define _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX 256 + +#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) +#define _TINYDIR_DRIVE_MAX 3 +#endif + +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#define _TINYDIR_FUNC static __inline +#elif !defined __STDC_VERSION__ || __STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L +#define _TINYDIR_FUNC static __inline__ +#else +#define _TINYDIR_FUNC static inline +#endif + +/* readdir_r usage; define TINYDIR_USE_READDIR_R to use it (if supported) */ +#ifdef TINYDIR_USE_READDIR_R + +/* readdir_r is a POSIX-only function, and may not be available under various + * environments/settings, e.g. MinGW. Use readdir fallback */ +#if _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 1 || _XOPEN_SOURCE || _BSD_SOURCE || _SVID_SOURCE || \ + _POSIX_SOURCE +#define _TINYDIR_HAS_READDIR_R +#endif +#if _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L +#define _TINYDIR_HAS_FPATHCONF +#include +#endif +#if _BSD_SOURCE || _SVID_SOURCE || \ + (_POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L || _XOPEN_SOURCE >= 700) +#define _TINYDIR_HAS_DIRFD +#include +#endif +#if defined _TINYDIR_HAS_FPATHCONF && defined _TINYDIR_HAS_DIRFD && \ + defined _PC_NAME_MAX +#define _TINYDIR_USE_FPATHCONF +#endif +#if defined __MINGW32__ || !defined _TINYDIR_HAS_READDIR_R || \ + !(defined _TINYDIR_USE_FPATHCONF || defined NAME_MAX) +#define _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR +#endif + +/* Use readdir by default */ +#else +#define _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR +#endif + +/* MINGW32 has two versions of dirent, ASCII and UNICODE*/ +#ifndef _MSC_VER +#if (defined __MINGW32__) && (defined _UNICODE) +#define _TINYDIR_DIR _WDIR +#define _tinydir_dirent _wdirent +#define _tinydir_opendir _wopendir +#define _tinydir_readdir _wreaddir +#define _tinydir_closedir _wclosedir +#else +#define _TINYDIR_DIR DIR +#define _tinydir_dirent dirent +#define _tinydir_opendir opendir +#define _tinydir_readdir readdir +#define _tinydir_closedir closedir +#endif +#endif + +/* Allow user to use a custom allocator by defining _TINYDIR_MALLOC and _TINYDIR_FREE. */ +#if defined(_TINYDIR_MALLOC) && defined(_TINYDIR_FREE) +#elif !defined(_TINYDIR_MALLOC) && !defined(_TINYDIR_FREE) +#else +#error "Either define both alloc and free or none of them!" +#endif + +#if !defined(_TINYDIR_MALLOC) +#define _TINYDIR_MALLOC(_size) malloc(_size) +#define _TINYDIR_FREE(_ptr) free(_ptr) +#endif /* !defined(_TINYDIR_MALLOC) */ + +typedef struct tinydir_file { + _tinydir_char_t path[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; + _tinydir_char_t name[_TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX]; + _tinydir_char_t *extension; + int is_dir; + int is_reg; + +#ifndef _MSC_VER +#ifdef __MINGW32__ + struct _stat _s; +#else + struct stat _s; +#endif +#endif +} tinydir_file; + +typedef struct tinydir_dir { + _tinydir_char_t path[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; + int has_next; + size_t n_files; + + tinydir_file *_files; +#ifdef _MSC_VER + HANDLE _h; + WIN32_FIND_DATA _f; +#else + _TINYDIR_DIR *_d; + struct _tinydir_dirent *_e; +#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR + struct _tinydir_dirent *_ep; +#endif +#endif +} tinydir_dir; + +/* declarations */ + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_open(tinydir_dir *dir, const _tinydir_char_t *path); +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_open_sorted(tinydir_dir *dir, const _tinydir_char_t *path); +_TINYDIR_FUNC +void tinydir_close(tinydir_dir *dir); + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_next(tinydir_dir *dir); +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_readfile(const tinydir_dir *dir, tinydir_file *file); +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_readfile_n(const tinydir_dir *dir, tinydir_file *file, size_t i); +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_open_subdir_n(tinydir_dir *dir, size_t i); + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_file_open(tinydir_file *file, const _tinydir_char_t *path); +_TINYDIR_FUNC +void _tinydir_get_ext(tinydir_file *file); +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int _tinydir_file_cmp(const void *a, const void *b); +#ifndef _MSC_VER +#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR +_TINYDIR_FUNC +size_t _tinydir_dirent_buf_size(_TINYDIR_DIR *dirp); +#endif +#endif + +/* definitions*/ + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_open(tinydir_dir *dir, const _tinydir_char_t *path) +{ +#ifndef _MSC_VER +#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR + int error; + int size; /* using int size */ +#endif +#else + _tinydir_char_t path_buf[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; +#endif + _tinydir_char_t *pathp; + + if (dir == NULL || path == NULL || _tinydir_strlen(path) == 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + if (_tinydir_strlen(path) + _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA >= _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return -1; + } + + /* initialise dir */ + dir->_files = NULL; +#ifdef _MSC_VER + dir->_h = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; +#else + dir->_d = NULL; +#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR + dir->_ep = NULL; +#endif +#endif + tinydir_close(dir); + + _tinydir_strcpy(dir->path, path); + /* Remove trailing slashes */ + pathp = &dir->path[_tinydir_strlen(dir->path) - 1]; + + while (pathp != dir->path && (*pathp == TINYDIR_STRING('\\') || *pathp == TINYDIR_STRING('/'))) { + *pathp = TINYDIR_STRING('\0'); + pathp++; + } + +#ifdef _MSC_VER + _tinydir_strcpy(path_buf, dir->path); + _tinydir_strcat(path_buf, TINYDIR_STRING("\\*")); +#if (defined WINAPI_FAMILY) && (WINAPI_FAMILY != WINAPI_FAMILY_DESKTOP_APP) + dir->_h = FindFirstFileEx(path_buf, FindExInfoStandard, &dir->_f, FindExSearchNameMatch, NULL, 0); +#else + dir->_h = FindFirstFile(path_buf, &dir->_f); +#endif + + if (dir->_h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { + errno = ENOENT; +#else + dir->_d = _tinydir_opendir(path); + + if (dir->_d == NULL) { +#endif + goto bail; + } + + /* read first file */ + dir->has_next = 1; +#ifndef _MSC_VER +#ifdef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR + dir->_e = _tinydir_readdir(dir->_d); +#else + /* allocate dirent buffer for readdir_r */ + size = _tinydir_dirent_buf_size(dir->_d); /* conversion to int */ + + if (size == -1) { + return -1; + } + + dir->_ep = (struct _tinydir_dirent *)_TINYDIR_MALLOC(size); + + if (dir->_ep == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + error = readdir_r(dir->_d, dir->_ep, &dir->_e); + + if (error != 0) { + return -1; + } + +#endif + + if (dir->_e == NULL) { + dir->has_next = 0; + } + +#endif + + return 0; + +bail: + tinydir_close(dir); + return -1; +} + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_open_sorted(tinydir_dir *dir, const _tinydir_char_t *path) +{ + /* Count the number of files first, to pre-allocate the files array */ + size_t n_files = 0; + + if (tinydir_open(dir, path) == -1) { + return -1; + } + + while (dir->has_next) { + n_files++; + + if (tinydir_next(dir) == -1) { + goto bail; + } + } + + tinydir_close(dir); + + if (tinydir_open(dir, path) == -1) { + return -1; + } + + dir->n_files = 0; + dir->_files = (tinydir_file *)_TINYDIR_MALLOC(sizeof *dir->_files * n_files); + + if (dir->_files == NULL) { + goto bail; + } + + while (dir->has_next) { + tinydir_file *p_file; + dir->n_files++; + + p_file = &dir->_files[dir->n_files - 1]; + + if (tinydir_readfile(dir, p_file) == -1) { + goto bail; + } + + if (tinydir_next(dir) == -1) { + goto bail; + } + + /* Just in case the number of files has changed between the first and + second reads, terminate without writing into unallocated memory */ + if (dir->n_files == n_files) { + break; + } + } + + qsort(dir->_files, dir->n_files, sizeof(tinydir_file), _tinydir_file_cmp); + + return 0; + +bail: + tinydir_close(dir); + return -1; +} + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +void tinydir_close(tinydir_dir *dir) +{ + if (dir == NULL) { + return; + } + + memset(dir->path, 0, sizeof(dir->path)); + dir->has_next = 0; + dir->n_files = 0; + _TINYDIR_FREE(dir->_files); + dir->_files = NULL; +#ifdef _MSC_VER + + if (dir->_h != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { + FindClose(dir->_h); + } + + dir->_h = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; +#else + + if (dir->_d) { + _tinydir_closedir(dir->_d); + } + + dir->_d = NULL; + dir->_e = NULL; +#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR + _TINYDIR_FREE(dir->_ep); + dir->_ep = NULL; +#endif +#endif +} + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_next(tinydir_dir *dir) +{ + if (dir == NULL) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + if (!dir->has_next) { + errno = ENOENT; + return -1; + } + +#ifdef _MSC_VER + + if (FindNextFile(dir->_h, &dir->_f) == 0) +#else +#ifdef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR + dir->_e = _tinydir_readdir(dir->_d); + +#else + + if (dir->_ep == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + if (readdir_r(dir->_d, dir->_ep, &dir->_e) != 0) { + return -1; + } + +#endif + + if (dir->_e == NULL) +#endif + { + dir->has_next = 0; +#ifdef _MSC_VER + + if (GetLastError() != ERROR_SUCCESS && + GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES) { + tinydir_close(dir); + errno = EIO; + return -1; + } + +#endif + } + + return 0; +} + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_readfile(const tinydir_dir *dir, tinydir_file *file) +{ + if (dir == NULL || file == NULL) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + +#ifdef _MSC_VER + + if (dir->_h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) +#else + if (dir->_e == NULL) +#endif + { + errno = ENOENT; + return -1; + } + + if (_tinydir_strlen(dir->path) + + _tinydir_strlen( +#ifdef _MSC_VER + dir->_f.cFileName +#else + dir->_e->d_name +#endif + ) + + 1 + _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA >= + _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX) { + /* the path for the file will be too long */ + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return -1; + } + + if (_tinydir_strlen( +#ifdef _MSC_VER + dir->_f.cFileName +#else + dir->_e->d_name +#endif + ) >= _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return -1; + } + + _tinydir_strcpy(file->path, dir->path); + _tinydir_strcat(file->path, TINYDIR_STRING("/")); + _tinydir_strcpy(file->name, +#ifdef _MSC_VER + dir->_f.cFileName +#else + dir->_e->d_name +#endif + ); + _tinydir_strcat(file->path, file->name); +#ifndef _MSC_VER +#ifdef __MINGW32__ + + if (_tstat( +#else + if (stat( +#endif + file->path, &file->_s) == -1) { + return -1; + } +#endif + _tinydir_get_ext(file); + + file->is_dir = +#ifdef _MSC_VER + !!(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY); +#else + S_ISDIR(file->_s.st_mode); +#endif + file->is_reg = +#ifdef _MSC_VER + !!(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL) || + (!(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DEVICE) && + !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) && + !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ENCRYPTED) && +#ifdef FILE_ATTRIBUTE_INTEGRITY_STREAM + !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_INTEGRITY_STREAM) && +#endif +#ifdef FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NO_SCRUB_DATA + !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NO_SCRUB_DATA) && +#endif + !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_OFFLINE) && + !(dir->_f.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY)); +#else + S_ISREG(file->_s.st_mode); +#endif + + return 0; +} + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_readfile_n(const tinydir_dir *dir, tinydir_file *file, size_t i) +{ + if (dir == NULL || file == NULL) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + if (i >= dir->n_files) { + errno = ENOENT; + return -1; + } + + memcpy(file, &dir->_files[i], sizeof(tinydir_file)); + _tinydir_get_ext(file); + + return 0; +} + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_open_subdir_n(tinydir_dir *dir, size_t i) +{ + _tinydir_char_t path[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; + + if (dir == NULL) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + if (i >= dir->n_files || !dir->_files[i].is_dir) { + errno = ENOENT; + return -1; + } + + _tinydir_strcpy(path, dir->_files[i].path); + tinydir_close(dir); + + if (tinydir_open_sorted(dir, path) == -1) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Open a single file given its path */ +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int tinydir_file_open(tinydir_file *file, const _tinydir_char_t *path) +{ + tinydir_dir dir; + int result = 0; + int found = 0; + _tinydir_char_t dir_name_buf[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; + _tinydir_char_t file_name_buf[_TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX]; + _tinydir_char_t *dir_name; + _tinydir_char_t *base_name; +#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) + _tinydir_char_t drive_buf[_TINYDIR_PATH_MAX]; + _tinydir_char_t ext_buf[_TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX]; +#endif + + if (file == NULL || path == NULL || _tinydir_strlen(path) == 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + if (_tinydir_strlen(path) + _TINYDIR_PATH_EXTRA >= _TINYDIR_PATH_MAX) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return -1; + } + + /* Get the parent path */ +#if (defined _MSC_VER || defined __MINGW32__) +#if ((defined _MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER >= 1400)) + _tsplitpath_s( + path, + drive_buf, _TINYDIR_DRIVE_MAX, + dir_name_buf, _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX, + file_name_buf, _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX, + ext_buf, _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX); +#else + _tsplitpath( + path, + drive_buf, + dir_name_buf, + file_name_buf, + ext_buf); +#endif + + /* _splitpath_s not work fine with only filename and widechar support */ +#ifdef _UNICODE + + if (drive_buf[0] == L'\xFEFE') { + drive_buf[0] = '\0'; + } + + if (dir_name_buf[0] == L'\xFEFE') { + dir_name_buf[0] = '\0'; + } + +#endif + + if (errno) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + /* Emulate the behavior of dirname by returning "." for dir name if it's + empty */ + if (drive_buf[0] == '\0' && dir_name_buf[0] == '\0') { + _tinydir_strcpy(dir_name_buf, TINYDIR_STRING(".")); + } + + /* Concatenate the drive letter and dir name to form full dir name */ + _tinydir_strcat(drive_buf, dir_name_buf); + dir_name = drive_buf; + /* Concatenate the file name and extension to form base name */ + _tinydir_strcat(file_name_buf, ext_buf); + base_name = file_name_buf; +#else + _tinydir_strcpy(dir_name_buf, path); + dir_name = dirname(dir_name_buf); + _tinydir_strcpy(file_name_buf, path); + base_name = basename(file_name_buf); +#endif + + /* Open the parent directory */ + if (tinydir_open(&dir, dir_name) == -1) { + return -1; + } + + /* Read through the parent directory and look for the file */ + while (dir.has_next) { + if (tinydir_readfile(&dir, file) == -1) { + result = -1; + goto bail; + } + + if (_tinydir_strcmp(file->name, base_name) == 0) { + /* File found */ + found = 1; + break; + } + + tinydir_next(&dir); + } + + if (!found) { + result = -1; + errno = ENOENT; + } + +bail: + tinydir_close(&dir); + return result; +} + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +void _tinydir_get_ext(tinydir_file *file) +{ + _tinydir_char_t *period = _tinydir_strrchr(file->name, TINYDIR_STRING('.')); + + if (period == NULL) { + file->extension = &(file->name[_tinydir_strlen(file->name)]); + } else { + file->extension = period + 1; + } +} + +_TINYDIR_FUNC +int _tinydir_file_cmp(const void *a, const void *b) +{ + const tinydir_file *fa = (const tinydir_file *)a; + const tinydir_file *fb = (const tinydir_file *)b; + + if (fa->is_dir != fb->is_dir) { + return -(fa->is_dir - fb->is_dir); + } + + return _tinydir_strncmp(fa->name, fb->name, _TINYDIR_FILENAME_MAX); +} + +#ifndef _MSC_VER +#ifndef _TINYDIR_USE_READDIR +/* +The following authored by Ben Hutchings +from https://womble.decadent.org.uk/readdir_r-advisory.html +*/ +/* Calculate the required buffer size (in bytes) for directory * +* entries read from the given directory handle. Return -1 if this * +* this cannot be done. * +* * +* This code does not trust values of NAME_MAX that are less than * +* 255, since some systems (including at least HP-UX) incorrectly * +* define it to be a smaller value. */ +_TINYDIR_FUNC +size_t _tinydir_dirent_buf_size(_TINYDIR_DIR *dirp) +{ + long name_max; + size_t name_end; + /* parameter may be unused */ + (void)dirp; + +#if defined _TINYDIR_USE_FPATHCONF + name_max = fpathconf(dirfd(dirp), _PC_NAME_MAX); + + if (name_max == -1) +#if defined(NAME_MAX) + name_max = (NAME_MAX > 255) ? NAME_MAX : 255; + +#else + return (size_t)(-1); +#endif +#elif defined(NAME_MAX) + name_max = (NAME_MAX > 255) ? NAME_MAX : 255; +#else +#error "buffer size for readdir_r cannot be determined" +#endif + name_end = (size_t)offsetof(struct _tinydir_dirent, d_name) + name_max + 1; + return (name_end > sizeof(struct _tinydir_dirent) ? + name_end : + sizeof(struct _tinydir_dirent)); +} +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning(pop) +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c index 26a4d895..e5bb296f 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/lwiperf/lwiperf.c @@ -1,904 +1,904 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP iPerf server implementation - */ - -/** - * @defgroup iperf Iperf server - * @ingroup apps - * - * This is a simple performance measuring client/server to check your bandwith using - * iPerf2 on a PC as server/client. - * It is currently a minimal implementation providing a TCP client/server only. - * - * @todo: - * - implement UDP mode - * - protect combined sessions handling (via 'related_master_state') against reallocation - * (this is a pointer address, currently, so if the same memory is allocated again, - * session pairs (tx/rx) can be confused on reallocation) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2014 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/lwiperf.h" - -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" - -#include - -/* Currently, only TCP is implemented */ -#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API - -/** Specify the idle timeout (in seconds) after that the test fails */ -#ifndef LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC -#define LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC 10U -#endif -#if LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC > 255 -#error LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC must fit into an u8_t -#endif - -/** Change this if you don't want to lwiperf to listen to any IP version */ -#ifndef LWIPERF_SERVER_IP_TYPE -#define LWIPERF_SERVER_IP_TYPE IPADDR_TYPE_ANY -#endif - -/* File internal memory allocation (struct lwiperf_*): this defaults to - the heap */ -#ifndef LWIPERF_ALLOC -#define LWIPERF_ALLOC(type) mem_malloc(sizeof(type)) -#define LWIPERF_FREE(type, item) mem_free(item) -#endif - -/** If this is 1, check that received data has the correct format */ -#ifndef LWIPERF_CHECK_RX_DATA -#define LWIPERF_CHECK_RX_DATA 0 -#endif - -/** This is the Iperf settings struct sent from the client */ -typedef struct _lwiperf_settings { -#define LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST 0x80000000 -#define LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_NOW 0x00000001 - u32_t flags; - u32_t num_threads; /* unused for now */ - u32_t remote_port; - u32_t buffer_len; /* unused for now */ - u32_t win_band; /* TCP window / UDP rate: unused for now */ - u32_t amount; /* pos. value: bytes?; neg. values: time (unit is 10ms: 1/100 second) */ -} lwiperf_settings_t; - -/** Basic connection handle */ -struct _lwiperf_state_base; -typedef struct _lwiperf_state_base lwiperf_state_base_t; -struct _lwiperf_state_base { - /* linked list */ - lwiperf_state_base_t *next; - /* 1=tcp, 0=udp */ - u8_t tcp; - /* 1=server, 0=client */ - u8_t server; - /* master state used to abort sessions (e.g. listener, main client) */ - lwiperf_state_base_t *related_master_state; -}; - -/** Connection handle for a TCP iperf session */ -typedef struct _lwiperf_state_tcp { - lwiperf_state_base_t base; - struct tcp_pcb *server_pcb; - struct tcp_pcb *conn_pcb; - u32_t time_started; - lwiperf_report_fn report_fn; - void *report_arg; - u8_t poll_count; - u8_t next_num; - /* 1=start server when client is closed */ - u8_t client_tradeoff_mode; - u32_t bytes_transferred; - lwiperf_settings_t settings; - u8_t have_settings_buf; - u8_t specific_remote; - ip_addr_t remote_addr; -} lwiperf_state_tcp_t; - -/** List of active iperf sessions */ -static lwiperf_state_base_t *lwiperf_all_connections; -/** A const buffer to send from: we want to measure sending, not copying! */ - -// clang-format off -static const u8_t lwiperf_txbuf_const[1600] = { - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', -}; -// clang-format on - -static err_t lwiperf_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb); -static void lwiperf_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err); -static err_t lwiperf_start_tcp_server_impl(const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, - lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg, - lwiperf_state_base_t *related_master_state, lwiperf_state_tcp_t **state); - -/** Add an iperf session to the 'active' list */ -static void lwiperf_list_add(lwiperf_state_base_t *item) -{ - item->next = lwiperf_all_connections; - lwiperf_all_connections = item; -} - -/** Remove an iperf session from the 'active' list */ -static void lwiperf_list_remove(lwiperf_state_base_t *item) -{ - lwiperf_state_base_t *prev = NULL; - lwiperf_state_base_t *iter; - - for (iter = lwiperf_all_connections; iter != NULL; prev = iter, iter = iter->next) { - if (iter == item) { - if (prev == NULL) { - lwiperf_all_connections = iter->next; - } else { - prev->next = iter->next; - } - - /* @debug: ensure this item is listed only once */ - for (iter = iter->next; iter != NULL; iter = iter->next) { - LWIP_ASSERT("duplicate entry", iter != item); - } - - break; - } - } -} - -static lwiperf_state_base_t *lwiperf_list_find(lwiperf_state_base_t *item) -{ - lwiperf_state_base_t *iter; - - for (iter = lwiperf_all_connections; iter != NULL; iter = iter->next) { - if (iter == item) { - return item; - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** Call the report function of an iperf tcp session */ -static void lwip_tcp_conn_report(lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn, enum lwiperf_report_type report_type) -{ - if ((conn != NULL) && (conn->report_fn != NULL)) { - u32_t now, duration_ms, bandwidth_kbitpsec; - now = sys_now(); - duration_ms = now - conn->time_started; - - if (duration_ms == 0) { - bandwidth_kbitpsec = 0; - } else { - bandwidth_kbitpsec = (conn->bytes_transferred / duration_ms) * 8U; - } - - conn->report_fn(conn->report_arg, report_type, - &conn->conn_pcb->local_ip, conn->conn_pcb->local_port, - &conn->conn_pcb->remote_ip, conn->conn_pcb->remote_port, - conn->bytes_transferred, duration_ms, bandwidth_kbitpsec); - } -} - -/** Close an iperf tcp session */ -static void lwiperf_tcp_close(lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn, enum lwiperf_report_type report_type) -{ - err_t err; - - lwiperf_list_remove(&conn->base); - lwip_tcp_conn_report(conn, report_type); - - if (conn->conn_pcb != NULL) { - tcp_arg(conn->conn_pcb, NULL); - tcp_poll(conn->conn_pcb, NULL, 0); - tcp_sent(conn->conn_pcb, NULL); - tcp_recv(conn->conn_pcb, NULL); - tcp_err(conn->conn_pcb, NULL); - err = tcp_close(conn->conn_pcb); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* don't want to wait for free memory here... */ - tcp_abort(conn->conn_pcb); - } - } else { - /* no conn pcb, this is the listener pcb */ - err = tcp_close(conn->server_pcb); - LWIP_ASSERT("error", err == ERR_OK); - } - - LWIPERF_FREE(lwiperf_state_tcp_t, conn); -} - -/** Try to send more data on an iperf tcp session */ -static err_t lwiperf_tcp_client_send_more(lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn) -{ - int send_more; - err_t err; - u16_t txlen; - u16_t txlen_max; - void *txptr; - u8_t apiflags; - - LWIP_ASSERT("conn invalid", (conn != NULL) && conn->base.tcp && (conn->base.server == 0)); - - do { - send_more = 0; - - if (conn->settings.amount & PP_HTONL(0x80000000)) { - /* this session is time-limited */ - u32_t now = sys_now(); - u32_t diff_ms = now - conn->time_started; - u32_t time = (u32_t) - (s32_t)lwip_htonl(conn->settings.amount); - u32_t time_ms = time * 100; - - if (diff_ms >= time_ms) { - /* time specified by the client is over -> close the connection */ - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_CLIENT); - return ERR_OK; - } - } else { - /* this session is byte-limited */ - u32_t amount_bytes = lwip_htonl(conn->settings.amount); - - /* @todo: this can send up to 1*MSS more than requested... */ - if (amount_bytes >= conn->bytes_transferred) { - /* all requested bytes transferred -> close the connection */ - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_CLIENT); - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - if (conn->bytes_transferred < 24) { - /* transmit the settings a first time */ - txptr = &((u8_t *)&conn->settings)[conn->bytes_transferred]; - txlen_max = (u16_t)(24 - conn->bytes_transferred); - apiflags = TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY; - } else if (conn->bytes_transferred < 48) { - /* transmit the settings a second time */ - txptr = &((u8_t *)&conn->settings)[conn->bytes_transferred - 24]; - txlen_max = (u16_t)(48 - conn->bytes_transferred); - apiflags = TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY | TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; - send_more = 1; - } else { - /* transmit data */ - /* @todo: every x bytes, transmit the settings again */ - txptr = LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &lwiperf_txbuf_const[conn->bytes_transferred % 10]); - txlen_max = TCP_MSS; - - if (conn->bytes_transferred == 48) /* @todo: fix this for intermediate settings, too */ - { - txlen_max = TCP_MSS - 24; - } - - apiflags = 0; /* no copying needed */ - send_more = 1; - } - - txlen = txlen_max; - - do { - err = tcp_write(conn->conn_pcb, txptr, txlen, apiflags); - - if (err == ERR_MEM) { - txlen /= 2; - } - } while ((err == ERR_MEM) && (txlen >= (TCP_MSS / 2))); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - conn->bytes_transferred += txlen; - } else { - send_more = 0; - } - } while (send_more); - - tcp_output(conn->conn_pcb); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** TCP sent callback, try to send more data */ -static err_t lwiperf_tcp_client_sent(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, u16_t len) -{ - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; - /* @todo: check 'len' (e.g. to time ACK of all data)? for now, we just send more... */ - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid conn", conn->conn_pcb == tpcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - conn->poll_count = 0; - - return lwiperf_tcp_client_send_more(conn); -} - -/** TCP connected callback (active connection), send data now */ -static err_t lwiperf_tcp_client_connected(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, err_t err) -{ - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid conn", conn->conn_pcb == tpcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_REMOTE); - return ERR_OK; - } - - conn->poll_count = 0; - conn->time_started = sys_now(); - return lwiperf_tcp_client_send_more(conn); -} - -/** Start TCP connection back to the client (either parallel or after the - * receive test has finished. - */ -static err_t lwiperf_tx_start_impl(const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, u16_t remote_port, lwiperf_settings_t *settings, lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, - void *report_arg, lwiperf_state_base_t *related_master_state, lwiperf_state_tcp_t **new_conn) -{ - err_t err; - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *client_conn; - struct tcp_pcb *newpcb; - ip_addr_t remote_addr; - - LWIP_ASSERT("remote_ip != NULL", remote_ip != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("remote_ip != NULL", settings != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("new_conn != NULL", new_conn != NULL); - *new_conn = NULL; - - client_conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)LWIPERF_ALLOC(lwiperf_state_tcp_t); - - if (client_conn == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - newpcb = tcp_new_ip_type(IP_GET_TYPE(remote_ip)); - - if (newpcb == NULL) { - LWIPERF_FREE(lwiperf_state_tcp_t, client_conn); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memset(client_conn, 0, sizeof(lwiperf_state_tcp_t)); - client_conn->base.tcp = 1; - client_conn->base.related_master_state = related_master_state; - client_conn->conn_pcb = newpcb; - client_conn->time_started = sys_now(); /* @todo: set this again on 'connected' */ - client_conn->report_fn = report_fn; - client_conn->report_arg = report_arg; - client_conn->next_num = 4; /* initial nr is '4' since the header has 24 byte */ - client_conn->bytes_transferred = 0; - memcpy(&client_conn->settings, settings, sizeof(*settings)); - client_conn->have_settings_buf = 1; - - tcp_arg(newpcb, client_conn); - tcp_sent(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_client_sent); - tcp_poll(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_poll, 2U); - tcp_err(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_err); - - ip_addr_copy(remote_addr, *remote_ip); - - err = tcp_connect(newpcb, &remote_addr, remote_port, lwiperf_tcp_client_connected); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - lwiperf_tcp_close(client_conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL); - return err; - } - - lwiperf_list_add(&client_conn->base); - *new_conn = client_conn; - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t lwiperf_tx_start_passive(lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn) -{ - err_t ret; - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *new_conn = NULL; - u16_t remote_port = (u16_t)lwip_htonl(conn->settings.remote_port); - - ret = lwiperf_tx_start_impl(&conn->conn_pcb->remote_ip, remote_port, &conn->settings, conn->report_fn, conn->report_arg, - conn->base.related_master_state, &new_conn); - - if (ret == ERR_OK) { - LWIP_ASSERT("new_conn != NULL", new_conn != NULL); - new_conn->settings.flags = 0; /* prevent the remote side starting back as client again */ - } - - return ret; -} - -/** Receive data on an iperf tcp session */ -static err_t lwiperf_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - u8_t tmp; - u16_t tot_len; - u32_t packet_idx; - struct pbuf *q; - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->conn_pcb == tpcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_REMOTE); - return ERR_OK; - } - - if (p == NULL) { - /* connection closed -> test done */ - if (conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST)) { - if ((conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_NOW)) == 0) { - /* client requested transmission after end of test */ - lwiperf_tx_start_passive(conn); - } - } - - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_SERVER); - return ERR_OK; - } - - tot_len = p->tot_len; - - conn->poll_count = 0; - - if ((!conn->have_settings_buf) || ((conn->bytes_transferred - 24) % (1024 * 128) == 0)) { - /* wait for 24-byte header */ - if (p->tot_len < sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t)) { - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_DATAERROR); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - - if (!conn->have_settings_buf) { - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &conn->settings, sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t), 0) != sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t)) { - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - - conn->have_settings_buf = 1; - - if (conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST)) { - if (conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_NOW)) { - /* client requested parallel transmission test */ - err_t err2 = lwiperf_tx_start_passive(conn); - - if (err2 != ERR_OK) { - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_TXERROR); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - } - } - } else { - if (conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST)) { - if (pbuf_memcmp(p, 0, &conn->settings, sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t)) != 0) { - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_DATAERROR); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - } - } - - conn->bytes_transferred += sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t); - - if (conn->bytes_transferred <= 24) { - conn->time_started = sys_now(); - tcp_recved(tpcb, p->tot_len); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - - conn->next_num = 4; /* 24 bytes received... */ - tmp = pbuf_remove_header(p, 24); - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed", tmp == 0); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tmp); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - } - - packet_idx = 0; - - for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { -#if LWIPERF_CHECK_RX_DATA - const u8_t *payload = (const u8_t *)q->payload; - u16_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < q->len; i++) { - u8_t val = payload[i]; - u8_t num = val - '0'; - - if (num == conn->next_num) { - conn->next_num++; - - if (conn->next_num == 10) { - conn->next_num = 0; - } - } else { - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_DATAERROR); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - } - -#endif - packet_idx += q->len; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("count mismatch", packet_idx == p->tot_len); - conn->bytes_transferred += packet_idx; - tcp_recved(tpcb, tot_len); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Error callback, iperf tcp session aborted */ -static void lwiperf_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_REMOTE); -} - -/** TCP poll callback, try to send more data */ -static err_t lwiperf_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) -{ - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->conn_pcb == tpcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); - - if (++conn->poll_count >= LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC) { - lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL); - return ERR_OK; /* lwiperf_tcp_close frees conn */ - } - - if (!conn->base.server) { - lwiperf_tcp_client_send_more(conn); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** This is called when a new client connects for an iperf tcp session */ -static err_t lwiperf_tcp_accept(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *newpcb, err_t err) -{ - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *s, *conn; - - if ((err != ERR_OK) || (newpcb == NULL) || (arg == NULL)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - s = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid session", s->base.server); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid listen pcb", s->server_pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid conn pcb", s->conn_pcb == NULL); - - if (s->specific_remote) { - LWIP_ASSERT("s->base.related_master_state != NULL", s->base.related_master_state != NULL); - - if (!ip_addr_cmp(&newpcb->remote_ip, &s->remote_addr)) { - /* this listener belongs to a client session, and this is not the correct remote */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("s->base.related_master_state == NULL", s->base.related_master_state == NULL); - } - - conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)LWIPERF_ALLOC(lwiperf_state_tcp_t); - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memset(conn, 0, sizeof(lwiperf_state_tcp_t)); - conn->base.tcp = 1; - conn->base.server = 1; - conn->base.related_master_state = &s->base; - conn->conn_pcb = newpcb; - conn->time_started = sys_now(); - conn->report_fn = s->report_fn; - conn->report_arg = s->report_arg; - - /* setup the tcp rx connection */ - tcp_arg(newpcb, conn); - tcp_recv(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_recv); - tcp_poll(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_poll, 2U); - tcp_err(conn->conn_pcb, lwiperf_tcp_err); - - if (s->specific_remote) { - /* this listener belongs to a client, so make the client the master of the newly created connection */ - conn->base.related_master_state = s->base.related_master_state; - - /* if dual mode or (tradeoff mode AND client is done): close the listener */ - if (!s->client_tradeoff_mode || !lwiperf_list_find(s->base.related_master_state)) { - /* prevent report when closing: this is expected */ - s->report_fn = NULL; - lwiperf_tcp_close(s, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL); - } - } - - lwiperf_list_add(&conn->base); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup iperf - * Start a TCP iperf server on the default TCP port (5001) and listen for - * incoming connections from iperf clients. - * - * @returns a connection handle that can be used to abort the server - * by calling @ref lwiperf_abort() - */ -void *lwiperf_start_tcp_server_default(lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg) -{ - return lwiperf_start_tcp_server(IP_ADDR_ANY, LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT, - report_fn, report_arg); -} - -/** - * @ingroup iperf - * Start a TCP iperf server on a specific IP address and port and listen for - * incoming connections from iperf clients. - * - * @returns a connection handle that can be used to abort the server - * by calling @ref lwiperf_abort() - */ -void *lwiperf_start_tcp_server(const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, - lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg) -{ - err_t err; - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *state = NULL; - - err = lwiperf_start_tcp_server_impl(local_addr, local_port, report_fn, report_arg, - NULL, &state); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - return state; - } - - return NULL; -} - -static err_t lwiperf_start_tcp_server_impl(const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, - lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg, - lwiperf_state_base_t *related_master_state, lwiperf_state_tcp_t **state) -{ - err_t err; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *s; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); - - if (local_addr == NULL) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - s = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)LWIPERF_ALLOC(lwiperf_state_tcp_t); - - if (s == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memset(s, 0, sizeof(lwiperf_state_tcp_t)); - s->base.tcp = 1; - s->base.server = 1; - s->base.related_master_state = related_master_state; - s->report_fn = report_fn; - s->report_arg = report_arg; - - pcb = tcp_new_ip_type(LWIPERF_SERVER_IP_TYPE); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - err = tcp_bind(pcb, local_addr, local_port); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - s->server_pcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog(pcb, 1); - - if (s->server_pcb == NULL) { - if (pcb != NULL) { - tcp_close(pcb); - } - - LWIPERF_FREE(lwiperf_state_tcp_t, s); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - pcb = NULL; - - tcp_arg(s->server_pcb, s); - tcp_accept(s->server_pcb, lwiperf_tcp_accept); - - lwiperf_list_add(&s->base); - *state = s; - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup iperf - * Start a TCP iperf client to the default TCP port (5001). - * - * @returns a connection handle that can be used to abort the client - * by calling @ref lwiperf_abort() - */ -void *lwiperf_start_tcp_client_default(const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, - lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg) -{ - return lwiperf_start_tcp_client(remote_addr, LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT, LWIPERF_CLIENT, - report_fn, report_arg); -} - -/** - * @ingroup iperf - * Start a TCP iperf client to a specific IP address and port. - * - * @returns a connection handle that can be used to abort the client - * by calling @ref lwiperf_abort() - */ -void *lwiperf_start_tcp_client(const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, u16_t remote_port, - enum lwiperf_client_type type, lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg) -{ - err_t ret; - lwiperf_settings_t settings; - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *state = NULL; - - memset(&settings, 0, sizeof(settings)); - - switch (type) { - case LWIPERF_CLIENT: - /* Unidirectional tx only test */ - settings.flags = 0; - break; - - case LWIPERF_DUAL: - /* Do a bidirectional test simultaneously */ - settings.flags = htonl(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST | LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_NOW); - break; - - case LWIPERF_TRADEOFF: - /* Do a bidirectional test individually */ - settings.flags = htonl(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST); - break; - - default: - /* invalid argument */ - return NULL; - } - - settings.num_threads = htonl(1); - settings.remote_port = htonl(LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT); - /* TODO: implement passing duration/amount of bytes to transfer */ - settings.amount = htonl((u32_t)-1000); - - ret = lwiperf_tx_start_impl(remote_addr, remote_port, &settings, report_fn, report_arg, NULL, &state); - - if (ret == ERR_OK) { - LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); - - if (type != LWIPERF_CLIENT) { - /* start corresponding server now */ - lwiperf_state_tcp_t *server = NULL; - ret = lwiperf_start_tcp_server_impl(&state->conn_pcb->local_ip, LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT, - report_fn, report_arg, (lwiperf_state_base_t *)state, &server); - - if (ret != ERR_OK) { - /* starting server failed, abort client */ - lwiperf_abort(state); - return NULL; - } - - /* make this server accept one connection only */ - server->specific_remote = 1; - server->remote_addr = state->conn_pcb->remote_ip; - - if (type == LWIPERF_TRADEOFF) { - /* tradeoff means that the remote host connects only after the client is done, - so keep the listen pcb open until the client is done */ - server->client_tradeoff_mode = 1; - } - } - - return state; - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup iperf - * Abort an iperf session (handle returned by lwiperf_start_tcp_server*()) - */ -void lwiperf_abort(void *lwiperf_session) -{ - lwiperf_state_base_t *i, *dealloc, *last = NULL; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - for (i = lwiperf_all_connections; i != NULL;) { - if ((i == lwiperf_session) || (i->related_master_state == lwiperf_session)) { - dealloc = i; - i = i->next; - - if (last != NULL) { - last->next = i; - } - - LWIPERF_FREE(lwiperf_state_tcp_t, dealloc); /* @todo: type? */ - } else { - last = i; - i = i->next; - } - } -} - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP iPerf server implementation + */ + +/** + * @defgroup iperf Iperf server + * @ingroup apps + * + * This is a simple performance measuring client/server to check your bandwith using + * iPerf2 on a PC as server/client. + * It is currently a minimal implementation providing a TCP client/server only. + * + * @todo: + * - implement UDP mode + * - protect combined sessions handling (via 'related_master_state') against reallocation + * (this is a pointer address, currently, so if the same memory is allocated again, + * session pairs (tx/rx) can be confused on reallocation) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/lwiperf.h" + +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" + +#include + +/* Currently, only TCP is implemented */ +#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API + +/** Specify the idle timeout (in seconds) after that the test fails */ +#ifndef LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC +#define LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC 10U +#endif +#if LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC > 255 +#error LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC must fit into an u8_t +#endif + +/** Change this if you don't want to lwiperf to listen to any IP version */ +#ifndef LWIPERF_SERVER_IP_TYPE +#define LWIPERF_SERVER_IP_TYPE IPADDR_TYPE_ANY +#endif + +/* File internal memory allocation (struct lwiperf_*): this defaults to + the heap */ +#ifndef LWIPERF_ALLOC +#define LWIPERF_ALLOC(type) mem_malloc(sizeof(type)) +#define LWIPERF_FREE(type, item) mem_free(item) +#endif + +/** If this is 1, check that received data has the correct format */ +#ifndef LWIPERF_CHECK_RX_DATA +#define LWIPERF_CHECK_RX_DATA 0 +#endif + +/** This is the Iperf settings struct sent from the client */ +typedef struct _lwiperf_settings { +#define LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST 0x80000000 +#define LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_NOW 0x00000001 + u32_t flags; + u32_t num_threads; /* unused for now */ + u32_t remote_port; + u32_t buffer_len; /* unused for now */ + u32_t win_band; /* TCP window / UDP rate: unused for now */ + u32_t amount; /* pos. value: bytes?; neg. values: time (unit is 10ms: 1/100 second) */ +} lwiperf_settings_t; + +/** Basic connection handle */ +struct _lwiperf_state_base; +typedef struct _lwiperf_state_base lwiperf_state_base_t; +struct _lwiperf_state_base { + /* linked list */ + lwiperf_state_base_t *next; + /* 1=tcp, 0=udp */ + u8_t tcp; + /* 1=server, 0=client */ + u8_t server; + /* master state used to abort sessions (e.g. listener, main client) */ + lwiperf_state_base_t *related_master_state; +}; + +/** Connection handle for a TCP iperf session */ +typedef struct _lwiperf_state_tcp { + lwiperf_state_base_t base; + struct tcp_pcb *server_pcb; + struct tcp_pcb *conn_pcb; + u32_t time_started; + lwiperf_report_fn report_fn; + void *report_arg; + u8_t poll_count; + u8_t next_num; + /* 1=start server when client is closed */ + u8_t client_tradeoff_mode; + u32_t bytes_transferred; + lwiperf_settings_t settings; + u8_t have_settings_buf; + u8_t specific_remote; + ip_addr_t remote_addr; +} lwiperf_state_tcp_t; + +/** List of active iperf sessions */ +static lwiperf_state_base_t *lwiperf_all_connections; +/** A const buffer to send from: we want to measure sending, not copying! */ + +// clang-format off +static const u8_t lwiperf_txbuf_const[1600] = { + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', +}; +// clang-format on + +static err_t lwiperf_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb); +static void lwiperf_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err); +static err_t lwiperf_start_tcp_server_impl(const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, + lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg, + lwiperf_state_base_t *related_master_state, lwiperf_state_tcp_t **state); + +/** Add an iperf session to the 'active' list */ +static void lwiperf_list_add(lwiperf_state_base_t *item) +{ + item->next = lwiperf_all_connections; + lwiperf_all_connections = item; +} + +/** Remove an iperf session from the 'active' list */ +static void lwiperf_list_remove(lwiperf_state_base_t *item) +{ + lwiperf_state_base_t *prev = NULL; + lwiperf_state_base_t *iter; + + for (iter = lwiperf_all_connections; iter != NULL; prev = iter, iter = iter->next) { + if (iter == item) { + if (prev == NULL) { + lwiperf_all_connections = iter->next; + } else { + prev->next = iter->next; + } + + /* @debug: ensure this item is listed only once */ + for (iter = iter->next; iter != NULL; iter = iter->next) { + LWIP_ASSERT("duplicate entry", iter != item); + } + + break; + } + } +} + +static lwiperf_state_base_t *lwiperf_list_find(lwiperf_state_base_t *item) +{ + lwiperf_state_base_t *iter; + + for (iter = lwiperf_all_connections; iter != NULL; iter = iter->next) { + if (iter == item) { + return item; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** Call the report function of an iperf tcp session */ +static void lwip_tcp_conn_report(lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn, enum lwiperf_report_type report_type) +{ + if ((conn != NULL) && (conn->report_fn != NULL)) { + u32_t now, duration_ms, bandwidth_kbitpsec; + now = sys_now(); + duration_ms = now - conn->time_started; + + if (duration_ms == 0) { + bandwidth_kbitpsec = 0; + } else { + bandwidth_kbitpsec = (conn->bytes_transferred / duration_ms) * 8U; + } + + conn->report_fn(conn->report_arg, report_type, + &conn->conn_pcb->local_ip, conn->conn_pcb->local_port, + &conn->conn_pcb->remote_ip, conn->conn_pcb->remote_port, + conn->bytes_transferred, duration_ms, bandwidth_kbitpsec); + } +} + +/** Close an iperf tcp session */ +static void lwiperf_tcp_close(lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn, enum lwiperf_report_type report_type) +{ + err_t err; + + lwiperf_list_remove(&conn->base); + lwip_tcp_conn_report(conn, report_type); + + if (conn->conn_pcb != NULL) { + tcp_arg(conn->conn_pcb, NULL); + tcp_poll(conn->conn_pcb, NULL, 0); + tcp_sent(conn->conn_pcb, NULL); + tcp_recv(conn->conn_pcb, NULL); + tcp_err(conn->conn_pcb, NULL); + err = tcp_close(conn->conn_pcb); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* don't want to wait for free memory here... */ + tcp_abort(conn->conn_pcb); + } + } else { + /* no conn pcb, this is the listener pcb */ + err = tcp_close(conn->server_pcb); + LWIP_ASSERT("error", err == ERR_OK); + } + + LWIPERF_FREE(lwiperf_state_tcp_t, conn); +} + +/** Try to send more data on an iperf tcp session */ +static err_t lwiperf_tcp_client_send_more(lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn) +{ + int send_more; + err_t err; + u16_t txlen; + u16_t txlen_max; + void *txptr; + u8_t apiflags; + + LWIP_ASSERT("conn invalid", (conn != NULL) && conn->base.tcp && (conn->base.server == 0)); + + do { + send_more = 0; + + if (conn->settings.amount & PP_HTONL(0x80000000)) { + /* this session is time-limited */ + u32_t now = sys_now(); + u32_t diff_ms = now - conn->time_started; + u32_t time = (u32_t) - (s32_t)lwip_htonl(conn->settings.amount); + u32_t time_ms = time * 100; + + if (diff_ms >= time_ms) { + /* time specified by the client is over -> close the connection */ + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_CLIENT); + return ERR_OK; + } + } else { + /* this session is byte-limited */ + u32_t amount_bytes = lwip_htonl(conn->settings.amount); + + /* @todo: this can send up to 1*MSS more than requested... */ + if (amount_bytes >= conn->bytes_transferred) { + /* all requested bytes transferred -> close the connection */ + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_CLIENT); + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + if (conn->bytes_transferred < 24) { + /* transmit the settings a first time */ + txptr = &((u8_t *)&conn->settings)[conn->bytes_transferred]; + txlen_max = (u16_t)(24 - conn->bytes_transferred); + apiflags = TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY; + } else if (conn->bytes_transferred < 48) { + /* transmit the settings a second time */ + txptr = &((u8_t *)&conn->settings)[conn->bytes_transferred - 24]; + txlen_max = (u16_t)(48 - conn->bytes_transferred); + apiflags = TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY | TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE; + send_more = 1; + } else { + /* transmit data */ + /* @todo: every x bytes, transmit the settings again */ + txptr = LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &lwiperf_txbuf_const[conn->bytes_transferred % 10]); + txlen_max = TCP_MSS; + + if (conn->bytes_transferred == 48) /* @todo: fix this for intermediate settings, too */ + { + txlen_max = TCP_MSS - 24; + } + + apiflags = 0; /* no copying needed */ + send_more = 1; + } + + txlen = txlen_max; + + do { + err = tcp_write(conn->conn_pcb, txptr, txlen, apiflags); + + if (err == ERR_MEM) { + txlen /= 2; + } + } while ((err == ERR_MEM) && (txlen >= (TCP_MSS / 2))); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + conn->bytes_transferred += txlen; + } else { + send_more = 0; + } + } while (send_more); + + tcp_output(conn->conn_pcb); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** TCP sent callback, try to send more data */ +static err_t lwiperf_tcp_client_sent(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, u16_t len) +{ + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; + /* @todo: check 'len' (e.g. to time ACK of all data)? for now, we just send more... */ + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid conn", conn->conn_pcb == tpcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + conn->poll_count = 0; + + return lwiperf_tcp_client_send_more(conn); +} + +/** TCP connected callback (active connection), send data now */ +static err_t lwiperf_tcp_client_connected(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, err_t err) +{ + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid conn", conn->conn_pcb == tpcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_REMOTE); + return ERR_OK; + } + + conn->poll_count = 0; + conn->time_started = sys_now(); + return lwiperf_tcp_client_send_more(conn); +} + +/** Start TCP connection back to the client (either parallel or after the + * receive test has finished. + */ +static err_t lwiperf_tx_start_impl(const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, u16_t remote_port, lwiperf_settings_t *settings, lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, + void *report_arg, lwiperf_state_base_t *related_master_state, lwiperf_state_tcp_t **new_conn) +{ + err_t err; + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *client_conn; + struct tcp_pcb *newpcb; + ip_addr_t remote_addr; + + LWIP_ASSERT("remote_ip != NULL", remote_ip != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("remote_ip != NULL", settings != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("new_conn != NULL", new_conn != NULL); + *new_conn = NULL; + + client_conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)LWIPERF_ALLOC(lwiperf_state_tcp_t); + + if (client_conn == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + newpcb = tcp_new_ip_type(IP_GET_TYPE(remote_ip)); + + if (newpcb == NULL) { + LWIPERF_FREE(lwiperf_state_tcp_t, client_conn); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memset(client_conn, 0, sizeof(lwiperf_state_tcp_t)); + client_conn->base.tcp = 1; + client_conn->base.related_master_state = related_master_state; + client_conn->conn_pcb = newpcb; + client_conn->time_started = sys_now(); /* @todo: set this again on 'connected' */ + client_conn->report_fn = report_fn; + client_conn->report_arg = report_arg; + client_conn->next_num = 4; /* initial nr is '4' since the header has 24 byte */ + client_conn->bytes_transferred = 0; + memcpy(&client_conn->settings, settings, sizeof(*settings)); + client_conn->have_settings_buf = 1; + + tcp_arg(newpcb, client_conn); + tcp_sent(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_client_sent); + tcp_poll(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_poll, 2U); + tcp_err(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_err); + + ip_addr_copy(remote_addr, *remote_ip); + + err = tcp_connect(newpcb, &remote_addr, remote_port, lwiperf_tcp_client_connected); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + lwiperf_tcp_close(client_conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL); + return err; + } + + lwiperf_list_add(&client_conn->base); + *new_conn = client_conn; + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t lwiperf_tx_start_passive(lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn) +{ + err_t ret; + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *new_conn = NULL; + u16_t remote_port = (u16_t)lwip_htonl(conn->settings.remote_port); + + ret = lwiperf_tx_start_impl(&conn->conn_pcb->remote_ip, remote_port, &conn->settings, conn->report_fn, conn->report_arg, + conn->base.related_master_state, &new_conn); + + if (ret == ERR_OK) { + LWIP_ASSERT("new_conn != NULL", new_conn != NULL); + new_conn->settings.flags = 0; /* prevent the remote side starting back as client again */ + } + + return ret; +} + +/** Receive data on an iperf tcp session */ +static err_t lwiperf_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + u8_t tmp; + u16_t tot_len; + u32_t packet_idx; + struct pbuf *q; + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->conn_pcb == tpcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_REMOTE); + return ERR_OK; + } + + if (p == NULL) { + /* connection closed -> test done */ + if (conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST)) { + if ((conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_NOW)) == 0) { + /* client requested transmission after end of test */ + lwiperf_tx_start_passive(conn); + } + } + + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_SERVER); + return ERR_OK; + } + + tot_len = p->tot_len; + + conn->poll_count = 0; + + if ((!conn->have_settings_buf) || ((conn->bytes_transferred - 24) % (1024 * 128) == 0)) { + /* wait for 24-byte header */ + if (p->tot_len < sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t)) { + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_DATAERROR); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + + if (!conn->have_settings_buf) { + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &conn->settings, sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t), 0) != sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t)) { + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + + conn->have_settings_buf = 1; + + if (conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST)) { + if (conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_NOW)) { + /* client requested parallel transmission test */ + err_t err2 = lwiperf_tx_start_passive(conn); + + if (err2 != ERR_OK) { + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_TXERROR); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + } + } + } else { + if (conn->settings.flags & PP_HTONL(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST)) { + if (pbuf_memcmp(p, 0, &conn->settings, sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t)) != 0) { + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_DATAERROR); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + } + } + + conn->bytes_transferred += sizeof(lwiperf_settings_t); + + if (conn->bytes_transferred <= 24) { + conn->time_started = sys_now(); + tcp_recved(tpcb, p->tot_len); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + + conn->next_num = 4; /* 24 bytes received... */ + tmp = pbuf_remove_header(p, 24); + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed", tmp == 0); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tmp); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + } + + packet_idx = 0; + + for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { +#if LWIPERF_CHECK_RX_DATA + const u8_t *payload = (const u8_t *)q->payload; + u16_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < q->len; i++) { + u8_t val = payload[i]; + u8_t num = val - '0'; + + if (num == conn->next_num) { + conn->next_num++; + + if (conn->next_num == 10) { + conn->next_num = 0; + } + } else { + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_DATAERROR); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + } + +#endif + packet_idx += q->len; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("count mismatch", packet_idx == p->tot_len); + conn->bytes_transferred += packet_idx; + tcp_recved(tpcb, tot_len); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Error callback, iperf tcp session aborted */ +static void lwiperf_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_REMOTE); +} + +/** TCP poll callback, try to send more data */ +static err_t lwiperf_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) +{ + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", conn->conn_pcb == tpcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); + + if (++conn->poll_count >= LWIPERF_TCP_MAX_IDLE_SEC) { + lwiperf_tcp_close(conn, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL); + return ERR_OK; /* lwiperf_tcp_close frees conn */ + } + + if (!conn->base.server) { + lwiperf_tcp_client_send_more(conn); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** This is called when a new client connects for an iperf tcp session */ +static err_t lwiperf_tcp_accept(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *newpcb, err_t err) +{ + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *s, *conn; + + if ((err != ERR_OK) || (newpcb == NULL) || (arg == NULL)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + s = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)arg; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid session", s->base.server); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid listen pcb", s->server_pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid conn pcb", s->conn_pcb == NULL); + + if (s->specific_remote) { + LWIP_ASSERT("s->base.related_master_state != NULL", s->base.related_master_state != NULL); + + if (!ip_addr_cmp(&newpcb->remote_ip, &s->remote_addr)) { + /* this listener belongs to a client session, and this is not the correct remote */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("s->base.related_master_state == NULL", s->base.related_master_state == NULL); + } + + conn = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)LWIPERF_ALLOC(lwiperf_state_tcp_t); + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memset(conn, 0, sizeof(lwiperf_state_tcp_t)); + conn->base.tcp = 1; + conn->base.server = 1; + conn->base.related_master_state = &s->base; + conn->conn_pcb = newpcb; + conn->time_started = sys_now(); + conn->report_fn = s->report_fn; + conn->report_arg = s->report_arg; + + /* setup the tcp rx connection */ + tcp_arg(newpcb, conn); + tcp_recv(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_recv); + tcp_poll(newpcb, lwiperf_tcp_poll, 2U); + tcp_err(conn->conn_pcb, lwiperf_tcp_err); + + if (s->specific_remote) { + /* this listener belongs to a client, so make the client the master of the newly created connection */ + conn->base.related_master_state = s->base.related_master_state; + + /* if dual mode or (tradeoff mode AND client is done): close the listener */ + if (!s->client_tradeoff_mode || !lwiperf_list_find(s->base.related_master_state)) { + /* prevent report when closing: this is expected */ + s->report_fn = NULL; + lwiperf_tcp_close(s, LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL); + } + } + + lwiperf_list_add(&conn->base); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup iperf + * Start a TCP iperf server on the default TCP port (5001) and listen for + * incoming connections from iperf clients. + * + * @returns a connection handle that can be used to abort the server + * by calling @ref lwiperf_abort() + */ +void *lwiperf_start_tcp_server_default(lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg) +{ + return lwiperf_start_tcp_server(IP_ADDR_ANY, LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT, + report_fn, report_arg); +} + +/** + * @ingroup iperf + * Start a TCP iperf server on a specific IP address and port and listen for + * incoming connections from iperf clients. + * + * @returns a connection handle that can be used to abort the server + * by calling @ref lwiperf_abort() + */ +void *lwiperf_start_tcp_server(const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, + lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg) +{ + err_t err; + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *state = NULL; + + err = lwiperf_start_tcp_server_impl(local_addr, local_port, report_fn, report_arg, + NULL, &state); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + return state; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static err_t lwiperf_start_tcp_server_impl(const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, + lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg, + lwiperf_state_base_t *related_master_state, lwiperf_state_tcp_t **state) +{ + err_t err; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *s; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); + + if (local_addr == NULL) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + s = (lwiperf_state_tcp_t *)LWIPERF_ALLOC(lwiperf_state_tcp_t); + + if (s == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memset(s, 0, sizeof(lwiperf_state_tcp_t)); + s->base.tcp = 1; + s->base.server = 1; + s->base.related_master_state = related_master_state; + s->report_fn = report_fn; + s->report_arg = report_arg; + + pcb = tcp_new_ip_type(LWIPERF_SERVER_IP_TYPE); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + err = tcp_bind(pcb, local_addr, local_port); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + s->server_pcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog(pcb, 1); + + if (s->server_pcb == NULL) { + if (pcb != NULL) { + tcp_close(pcb); + } + + LWIPERF_FREE(lwiperf_state_tcp_t, s); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + pcb = NULL; + + tcp_arg(s->server_pcb, s); + tcp_accept(s->server_pcb, lwiperf_tcp_accept); + + lwiperf_list_add(&s->base); + *state = s; + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup iperf + * Start a TCP iperf client to the default TCP port (5001). + * + * @returns a connection handle that can be used to abort the client + * by calling @ref lwiperf_abort() + */ +void *lwiperf_start_tcp_client_default(const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, + lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg) +{ + return lwiperf_start_tcp_client(remote_addr, LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT, LWIPERF_CLIENT, + report_fn, report_arg); +} + +/** + * @ingroup iperf + * Start a TCP iperf client to a specific IP address and port. + * + * @returns a connection handle that can be used to abort the client + * by calling @ref lwiperf_abort() + */ +void *lwiperf_start_tcp_client(const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, u16_t remote_port, + enum lwiperf_client_type type, lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg) +{ + err_t ret; + lwiperf_settings_t settings; + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *state = NULL; + + memset(&settings, 0, sizeof(settings)); + + switch (type) { + case LWIPERF_CLIENT: + /* Unidirectional tx only test */ + settings.flags = 0; + break; + + case LWIPERF_DUAL: + /* Do a bidirectional test simultaneously */ + settings.flags = htonl(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST | LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_NOW); + break; + + case LWIPERF_TRADEOFF: + /* Do a bidirectional test individually */ + settings.flags = htonl(LWIPERF_FLAGS_ANSWER_TEST); + break; + + default: + /* invalid argument */ + return NULL; + } + + settings.num_threads = htonl(1); + settings.remote_port = htonl(LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT); + /* TODO: implement passing duration/amount of bytes to transfer */ + settings.amount = htonl((u32_t)-1000); + + ret = lwiperf_tx_start_impl(remote_addr, remote_port, &settings, report_fn, report_arg, NULL, &state); + + if (ret == ERR_OK) { + LWIP_ASSERT("state != NULL", state != NULL); + + if (type != LWIPERF_CLIENT) { + /* start corresponding server now */ + lwiperf_state_tcp_t *server = NULL; + ret = lwiperf_start_tcp_server_impl(&state->conn_pcb->local_ip, LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT, + report_fn, report_arg, (lwiperf_state_base_t *)state, &server); + + if (ret != ERR_OK) { + /* starting server failed, abort client */ + lwiperf_abort(state); + return NULL; + } + + /* make this server accept one connection only */ + server->specific_remote = 1; + server->remote_addr = state->conn_pcb->remote_ip; + + if (type == LWIPERF_TRADEOFF) { + /* tradeoff means that the remote host connects only after the client is done, + so keep the listen pcb open until the client is done */ + server->client_tradeoff_mode = 1; + } + } + + return state; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup iperf + * Abort an iperf session (handle returned by lwiperf_start_tcp_server*()) + */ +void lwiperf_abort(void *lwiperf_session) +{ + lwiperf_state_base_t *i, *dealloc, *last = NULL; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + for (i = lwiperf_all_connections; i != NULL;) { + if ((i == lwiperf_session) || (i->related_master_state == lwiperf_session)) { + dealloc = i; + i = i->next; + + if (last != NULL) { + last->next = i; + } + + LWIPERF_FREE(lwiperf_state_tcp_t, dealloc); /* @todo: type? */ + } else { + last = i; + i = i->next; + } + } +} + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/mdns/mdns.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/mdns/mdns.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/mdns/mdns.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/mdns/mdns.c index cfccb856..4ff90fee 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/mdns/mdns.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/mdns/mdns.c @@ -1,2587 +1,2587 @@ -/** - * @file - * MDNS responder implementation - * - * @defgroup mdns MDNS - * @ingroup apps - * - * RFC 6762 - Multicast DNS\n - * RFC 6763 - DNS-Based Service Discovery\n - * - * @verbinclude mdns.txt - * - * Things left to implement: - * ------------------------- - * - * - Tiebreaking for simultaneous probing - * - Sending goodbye messages (zero ttl) - shutdown, DHCP lease about to expire, DHCP turned off... - * - Checking that source address of unicast requests are on the same network - * - Limiting multicast responses to 1 per second per resource record - * - Fragmenting replies if required - * - Handling multi-packet known answers - * - Individual known answer detection for all local IPv6 addresses - * - Dynamic size of outgoing packet - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Erik Ekman - * - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/mdns.h" -#include "lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/prot/dns.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER - -#if (LWIP_IPV4 && !LWIP_IGMP) -#error "If you want to use MDNS with IPv4, you have to define LWIP_IGMP=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_IPV6 && !LWIP_IPV6_MLD) -#error "If you want to use MDNS with IPv6, you have to define LWIP_IPV6_MLD=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (!LWIP_UDP) -#error "If you want to use MDNS, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -/* IPv4 multicast group 224.0.0.251 */ -static const ip_addr_t v4group = DNS_MQUERY_IPV4_GROUP_INIT; -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -/* IPv6 multicast group FF02::FB */ -static const ip_addr_t v6group = DNS_MQUERY_IPV6_GROUP_INIT; -#endif - -#define MDNS_TTL 255 - -/* Stored offsets to beginning of domain names - * Used for compression. - */ -#define NUM_DOMAIN_OFFSETS 10 -#define DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE 2 -#define DOMAIN_JUMP 0xc000 - -static u8_t mdns_netif_client_id; -static struct udp_pcb *mdns_pcb; -#if MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK -NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(netif_callback) -#endif -static mdns_name_result_cb_t mdns_name_result_cb; - -#define NETIF_TO_HOST(netif) (struct mdns_host *)(netif_get_client_data(netif, mdns_netif_client_id)) - -#define TOPDOMAIN_LOCAL "local" - -#define REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN "arpa" -#define REVERSE_PTR_V4_DOMAIN "in-addr" -#define REVERSE_PTR_V6_DOMAIN "ip6" - -#define SRV_PRIORITY 0 -#define SRV_WEIGHT 0 - -/* Payload size allocated for each outgoing UDP packet */ -#define OUTPACKET_SIZE 500 - -/* Lookup from hostname -> IPv4 */ -#define REPLY_HOST_A 0x01 -/* Lookup from IPv4/v6 -> hostname */ -#define REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4 0x02 -/* Lookup from hostname -> IPv6 */ -#define REPLY_HOST_AAAA 0x04 -/* Lookup from hostname -> IPv6 */ -#define REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6 0x08 - -/* Lookup for service types */ -#define REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR 0x10 -/* Lookup for instances of service */ -#define REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR 0x20 -/* Lookup for location of service instance */ -#define REPLY_SERVICE_SRV 0x40 -/* Lookup for text info on service instance */ -#define REPLY_SERVICE_TXT 0x80 - -#define MDNS_PROBE_DELAY_MS 250 -#define MDNS_PROBE_COUNT 3 -#ifdef LWIP_RAND -/* first probe timeout SHOULD be random 0-250 ms*/ -#define MDNS_INITIAL_PROBE_DELAY_MS (LWIP_RAND() % MDNS_PROBE_DELAY_MS) -#else -#define MDNS_INITIAL_PROBE_DELAY_MS MDNS_PROBE_DELAY_MS -#endif - -#define MDNS_PROBING_NOT_STARTED 0 -#define MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING 1 -#define MDNS_PROBING_COMPLETE 2 - -static const char *dnssd_protos[] = { - "_udp", /* DNSSD_PROTO_UDP */ - "_tcp", /* DNSSD_PROTO_TCP */ -}; - -/** Description of a service */ -struct mdns_service { - /** TXT record to answer with */ - struct mdns_domain txtdata; - /** Name of service, like 'myweb' */ - char name[MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN + 1]; - /** Type of service, like '_http' */ - char service[MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN + 1]; - /** Callback function and userdata - * to update txtdata buffer */ - service_get_txt_fn_t txt_fn; - void *txt_userdata; - /** TTL in seconds of SRV/TXT replies */ - u32_t dns_ttl; - /** Protocol, TCP or UDP */ - u16_t proto; - /** Port of the service */ - u16_t port; -}; - -/** Description of a host/netif */ -struct mdns_host { - /** Hostname */ - char name[MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN + 1]; - /** Pointer to services */ - struct mdns_service *services[MDNS_MAX_SERVICES]; - /** TTL in seconds of A/AAAA/PTR replies */ - u32_t dns_ttl; - /** Number of probes sent for the current name */ - u8_t probes_sent; - /** State in probing sequence */ - u8_t probing_state; -}; - -/** Information about received packet */ -struct mdns_packet { - /** Sender IP/port */ - ip_addr_t source_addr; - u16_t source_port; - /** If packet was received unicast */ - u16_t recv_unicast; - /** Netif that received the packet */ - struct netif *netif; - /** Packet data */ - struct pbuf *pbuf; - /** Current parsing offset in packet */ - u16_t parse_offset; - /** Identifier. Used in legacy queries */ - u16_t tx_id; - /** Number of questions in packet, - * read from packet header */ - u16_t questions; - /** Number of unparsed questions */ - u16_t questions_left; - /** Number of answers in packet, - * (sum of normal, authoritative and additional answers) - * read from packet header */ - u16_t answers; - /** Number of unparsed answers */ - u16_t answers_left; -}; - -/** Information about outgoing packet */ -struct mdns_outpacket { - /** Netif to send the packet on */ - struct netif *netif; - /** Packet data */ - struct pbuf *pbuf; - /** Current write offset in packet */ - u16_t write_offset; - /** Identifier. Used in legacy queries */ - u16_t tx_id; - /** Destination IP/port if sent unicast */ - ip_addr_t dest_addr; - u16_t dest_port; - /** Number of questions written */ - u16_t questions; - /** Number of normal answers written */ - u16_t answers; - /** Number of authoritative answers written */ - u16_t authoritative; - /** Number of additional answers written */ - u16_t additional; - /** Offsets for written domain names in packet. - * Used for compression */ - u16_t domain_offsets[NUM_DOMAIN_OFFSETS]; - /** If all answers in packet should set cache_flush bit */ - u8_t cache_flush; - /** If reply should be sent unicast */ - u8_t unicast_reply; - /** If legacy query. (tx_id needed, and write - * question again in reply before answer) */ - u8_t legacy_query; - /* Reply bitmask for host information */ - u8_t host_replies; - /* Bitmask for which reverse IPv6 hosts to answer */ - u8_t host_reverse_v6_replies; - /* Reply bitmask per service */ - u8_t serv_replies[MDNS_MAX_SERVICES]; -}; - -/** Domain, type and class. - * Shared between questions and answers */ -struct mdns_rr_info { - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t type; - u16_t klass; -}; - -struct mdns_question { - struct mdns_rr_info info; - /** unicast reply requested */ - u16_t unicast; -}; - -struct mdns_answer { - struct mdns_rr_info info; - /** cache flush command bit */ - u16_t cache_flush; - /* Validity time in seconds */ - u32_t ttl; - /** Length of variable answer */ - u16_t rd_length; - /** Offset of start of variable answer in packet */ - u16_t rd_offset; -}; - -static err_t mdns_send_outpacket(struct mdns_outpacket *outpkt, u8_t flags); -static void mdns_probe(void *arg); - -static err_t mdns_domain_add_label_base(struct mdns_domain *domain, u8_t len) -{ - if (len > MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (len > 0 && (1 + len + domain->length >= MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* Allow only zero marker on last byte */ - if (len == 0 && (1 + domain->length > MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - domain->name[domain->length] = len; - domain->length++; - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Add a label part to a domain - * @param domain The domain to add a label to - * @param label The label to add, like <hostname>, 'local', 'com' or '' - * @param len The length of the label - * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise if label too long - */ -err_t mdns_domain_add_label(struct mdns_domain *domain, const char *label, u8_t len) -{ - err_t err = mdns_domain_add_label_base(domain, len); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - if (len) { - MEMCPY(&domain->name[domain->length], label, len); - domain->length += len; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Add a label part to a domain (@see mdns_domain_add_label but copy directly from pbuf) - */ -static err_t mdns_domain_add_label_pbuf(struct mdns_domain *domain, const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u8_t len) -{ - err_t err = mdns_domain_add_label_base(domain, len); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - if (len) { - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &domain->name[domain->length], len, offset) != len) { - /* take back the ++ done before */ - domain->length--; - return ERR_ARG; - } - - domain->length += len; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Internal readname function with max 6 levels of recursion following jumps - * while decompressing name - */ -static u16_t mdns_readname_loop(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, struct mdns_domain *domain, unsigned depth) -{ - u8_t c; - - do { - if (depth > 5) { - /* Too many jumps */ - return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; - } - - c = pbuf_get_at(p, offset); - offset++; - - /* is this a compressed label? */ - if ((c & 0xc0) == 0xc0) { - u16_t jumpaddr; - - if (offset >= p->tot_len) { - /* Make sure both jump bytes fit in the packet */ - return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; - } - - jumpaddr = (((c & 0x3f) << 8) | (pbuf_get_at(p, offset) & 0xff)); - offset++; - - if (jumpaddr >= SIZEOF_DNS_HDR && jumpaddr < p->tot_len) { - u16_t res; - /* Recursive call, maximum depth will be checked */ - res = mdns_readname_loop(p, jumpaddr, domain, depth + 1); - - /* Dont return offset since new bytes were not read (jumped to somewhere in packet) */ - if (res == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR) { - return res; - } - } else { - return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; - } - - break; - } - - /* normal label */ - if (c <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN) { - err_t res; - - if (c + domain->length >= MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN) { - return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; - } - - res = mdns_domain_add_label_pbuf(domain, p, offset, c); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; - } - - offset += c; - } else { - /* bad length byte */ - return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; - } - } while (c != 0); - - return offset; -} - -/** - * Read possibly compressed domain name from packet buffer - * @param p The packet - * @param offset start position of domain name in packet - * @param domain The domain name destination - * @return The new offset after the domain, or MDNS_READNAME_ERROR - * if reading failed - */ -u16_t mdns_readname(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, struct mdns_domain *domain) -{ - memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); - return mdns_readname_loop(p, offset, domain, 0); -} - -/** - * Print domain name to debug output - * @param domain The domain name - */ -static void mdns_domain_debug_print(struct mdns_domain *domain) -{ - u8_t *src = domain->name; - u8_t i; - - while (*src) { - u8_t label_len = *src; - src++; - - for (i = 0; i < label_len; i++) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("%c", src[i])); - } - - src += label_len; - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, (".")); - } -} - -/** - * Return 1 if contents of domains match (case-insensitive) - * @param a Domain name to compare 1 - * @param b Domain name to compare 2 - * @return 1 if domains are equal ignoring case, 0 otherwise - */ -int mdns_domain_eq(struct mdns_domain *a, struct mdns_domain *b) -{ - u8_t *ptra, *ptrb; - u8_t len; - int res; - - if (a->length != b->length) { - return 0; - } - - ptra = a->name; - ptrb = b->name; - - while (*ptra && *ptrb && ptra < &a->name[a->length]) { - if (*ptra != *ptrb) { - return 0; - } - - len = *ptra; - ptra++; - ptrb++; - res = lwip_strnicmp((char *)ptra, (char *)ptrb, len); - - if (res != 0) { - return 0; - } - - ptra += len; - ptrb += len; - } - - if (*ptra != *ptrb && ptra < &a->name[a->length]) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -/** - * Call user supplied function to setup TXT data - * @param service The service to build TXT record for - */ -static void mdns_prepare_txtdata(struct mdns_service *service) -{ - memset(&service->txtdata, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); - - if (service->txt_fn) { - service->txt_fn(service, service->txt_userdata); - } -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/** - * Build domain for reverse lookup of IPv4 address - * like 12.0.168.192.in-addr.arpa. for 192.168.0.12 - * @param domain Where to write the domain name - * @param addr Pointer to an IPv4 address to encode - * @return ERR_OK if domain was written, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain, const ip4_addr_t *addr) -{ - int i; - err_t res; - const u8_t *ptr; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); - - if (!domain || !addr) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); - ptr = (const u8_t *)addr; - - for (i = sizeof(ip4_addr_t) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - char buf[4]; - u8_t val = ptr[i]; - - lwip_itoa(buf, sizeof(buf), val); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, buf, (u8_t)strlen(buf)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - } - - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, REVERSE_PTR_V4_DOMAIN, (u8_t)(sizeof(REVERSE_PTR_V4_DOMAIN) - 1)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN, (u8_t)(sizeof(REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN) - 1)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, NULL, 0); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** - * Build domain for reverse lookup of IP address - * like b.a.9.8.7.6.5.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. for 2001:db8::567:89ab - * @param domain Where to write the domain name - * @param addr Pointer to an IPv6 address to encode - * @return ERR_OK if domain was written, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain, const ip6_addr_t *addr) -{ - int i; - err_t res; - const u8_t *ptr; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); - - if (!domain || !addr) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); - ptr = (const u8_t *)addr; - - for (i = sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - char buf; - u8_t byte = ptr[i]; - int j; - - for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { - if ((byte & 0x0F) < 0xA) { - buf = '0' + (byte & 0x0F); - } else { - buf = 'a' + (byte & 0x0F) - 0xA; - } - - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, &buf, sizeof(buf)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - byte >>= 4; - } - } - - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, REVERSE_PTR_V6_DOMAIN, (u8_t)(sizeof(REVERSE_PTR_V6_DOMAIN) - 1)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN, (u8_t)(sizeof(REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN) - 1)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, NULL, 0); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif - -/* Add .local. to domain */ -static err_t mdns_add_dotlocal(struct mdns_domain *domain) -{ - err_t res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, TOPDOMAIN_LOCAL, (u8_t)(sizeof(TOPDOMAIN_LOCAL) - 1)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_add_dotlocal: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - return mdns_domain_add_label(domain, NULL, 0); -} - -/** - * Build the .local. domain name - * @param domain Where to write the domain name - * @param mdns TMDNS netif descriptor. - * @return ERR_OK if domain .local. was written, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_build_host_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain, struct mdns_host *mdns) -{ - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); - memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_host_domain: mdns != NULL", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, mdns->name, (u8_t)strlen(mdns->name)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_host_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - return mdns_add_dotlocal(domain); -} - -/** - * Build the lookup-all-services special DNS-SD domain name - * @param domain Where to write the domain name - * @return ERR_OK if domain _services._dns-sd._udp.local. was written, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_build_dnssd_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain) -{ - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); - memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, "_services", (u8_t)(sizeof("_services") - 1)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_dnssd_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, "_dns-sd", (u8_t)(sizeof("_dns-sd") - 1)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_dnssd_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, dnssd_protos[DNSSD_PROTO_UDP], (u8_t)strlen(dnssd_protos[DNSSD_PROTO_UDP])); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_dnssd_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - return mdns_add_dotlocal(domain); -} - -/** - * Build domain name for a service - * @param domain Where to write the domain name - * @param service The service struct, containing service name, type and protocol - * @param include_name Whether to include the service name in the domain - * @return ERR_OK if domain was written. If service name is included, - * ...local. will be written, otherwise ..local. - * An err_t is returned on error. - */ -static err_t mdns_build_service_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain, struct mdns_service *service, int include_name) -{ - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); - memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); - - if (include_name) { - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, service->name, (u8_t)strlen(service->name)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_service_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - } - - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, service->service, (u8_t)strlen(service->service)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_service_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, dnssd_protos[service->proto], (u8_t)strlen(dnssd_protos[service->proto])); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_service_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); - return mdns_add_dotlocal(domain); -} - -/** - * Check which replies we should send for a host/netif based on question - * @param netif The network interface that received the question - * @param rr Domain/type/class from a question - * @param reverse_v6_reply Bitmask of which IPv6 addresses to send reverse PTRs for - * if reply bit has REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6 set - * @return Bitmask of which replies to send - */ -static int check_host(struct netif *netif, struct mdns_rr_info *rr, u8_t *reverse_v6_reply) -{ - err_t res; - int replies = 0; - struct mdns_domain mydomain; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(reverse_v6_reply); /* if ipv6 is disabled */ - - if (rr->klass != DNS_RRCLASS_IN && rr->klass != DNS_RRCLASS_ANY) { - /* Invalid class */ - return replies; - } - - /* Handle PTR for our addresses */ - if (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { - res = mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain(&mydomain, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i)); - - if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain)) { - replies |= REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6; - - /* Mark which addresses where requested */ - if (reverse_v6_reply) { - *reverse_v6_reply |= (1 << i); - } - } - } - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - res = mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain(&mydomain, netif_ip4_addr(netif)); - - if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain)) { - replies |= REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4; - } - } - -#endif - } - - res = mdns_build_host_domain(&mydomain, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); - - /* Handle requests for our hostname */ - if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain)) { - /* TODO return NSEC if unsupported protocol requested */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif)) && (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_A || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY)) { - replies |= REPLY_HOST_A; - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY) { - replies |= REPLY_HOST_AAAA; - } - -#endif - } - - return replies; -} - -/** - * Check which replies we should send for a service based on question - * @param service A registered MDNS service - * @param rr Domain/type/class from a question - * @return Bitmask of which replies to send - */ -static int check_service(struct mdns_service *service, struct mdns_rr_info *rr) -{ - err_t res; - int replies = 0; - struct mdns_domain mydomain; - - if (rr->klass != DNS_RRCLASS_IN && rr->klass != DNS_RRCLASS_ANY) { - /* Invalid class */ - return 0; - } - - res = mdns_build_dnssd_domain(&mydomain); - - if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain) && - (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY)) { - /* Request for all service types */ - replies |= REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR; - } - - res = mdns_build_service_domain(&mydomain, service, 0); - - if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain) && - (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY)) { - /* Request for the instance of my service */ - replies |= REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR; - } - - res = mdns_build_service_domain(&mydomain, service, 1); - - if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain)) { - /* Request for info about my service */ - if (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_SRV || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY) { - replies |= REPLY_SERVICE_SRV; - } - - if (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_TXT || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY) { - replies |= REPLY_SERVICE_TXT; - } - } - - return replies; -} - -/** - * Return bytes needed to write before jump for best result of compressing supplied domain - * against domain in outpacket starting at specified offset. - * If a match is found, offset is updated to where to jump to - * @param pbuf Pointer to pbuf with the partially constructed DNS packet - * @param offset Start position of a domain written earlier. If this location is suitable - * for compression, the pointer is updated to where in the domain to jump to. - * @param domain The domain to write - * @return Number of bytes to write of the new domain before writing a jump to the offset. - * If compression can not be done against this previous domain name, the full new - * domain length is returned. - */ -u16_t mdns_compress_domain(struct pbuf *pbuf, u16_t *offset, struct mdns_domain *domain) -{ - struct mdns_domain target; - u16_t target_end; - u8_t target_len; - u8_t writelen = 0; - u8_t *ptr; - - if (pbuf == NULL) { - return domain->length; - } - - target_end = mdns_readname(pbuf, *offset, &target); - - if (target_end == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR) { - return domain->length; - } - - target_len = (u8_t)(target_end - *offset); - ptr = domain->name; - - while (writelen < domain->length) { - u8_t domainlen = (u8_t)(domain->length - writelen); - u8_t labellen; - - if (domainlen <= target.length && domainlen > DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE) { - /* Compare domains if target is long enough, and we have enough left of the domain */ - u8_t targetpos = (u8_t)(target.length - domainlen); - - if ((targetpos + DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE) >= target_len) { - /* We are checking at or beyond a jump in the original, stop looking */ - break; - } - - if (target.length >= domainlen && - memcmp(&domain->name[writelen], &target.name[targetpos], domainlen) == 0) { - *offset += targetpos; - return writelen; - } - } - - /* Skip to next label in domain */ - labellen = *ptr; - writelen += 1 + labellen; - ptr += 1 + labellen; - } - - /* Nothing found */ - return domain->length; -} - -/** - * Write domain to outpacket. Compression will be attempted, - * unless domain->skip_compression is set. - * @param outpkt The outpacket to write to - * @param domain The domain name to write - * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_write_domain(struct mdns_outpacket *outpkt, struct mdns_domain *domain) -{ - int i; - err_t res; - u16_t writelen = domain->length; - u16_t jump_offset = 0; - u16_t jump; - - if (!domain->skip_compression) { - for (i = 0; i < NUM_DOMAIN_OFFSETS; i++) { - u16_t offset = outpkt->domain_offsets[i]; - - if (offset) { - u16_t len = mdns_compress_domain(outpkt->pbuf, &offset, domain); - - if (len < writelen) { - writelen = len; - jump_offset = offset; - } - } - } - } - - if (writelen) { - /* Write uncompressed part of name */ - res = pbuf_take_at(outpkt->pbuf, domain->name, writelen, outpkt->write_offset); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - - /* Store offset of this new domain */ - for (i = 0; i < NUM_DOMAIN_OFFSETS; i++) { - if (outpkt->domain_offsets[i] == 0) { - outpkt->domain_offsets[i] = outpkt->write_offset; - break; - } - } - - outpkt->write_offset += writelen; - } - - if (jump_offset) { - /* Write jump */ - jump = lwip_htons(DOMAIN_JUMP | jump_offset); - res = pbuf_take_at(outpkt->pbuf, &jump, DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE, outpkt->write_offset); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - - outpkt->write_offset += DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Write a question to an outpacket - * A question contains domain, type and class. Since an answer also starts with these fields this function is also - * called from mdns_add_answer(). - * @param outpkt The outpacket to write to - * @param domain The domain name the answer is for - * @param type The DNS type of the answer (like 'AAAA', 'SRV') - * @param klass The DNS type of the answer (like 'IN') - * @param unicast If highest bit in class should be set, to instruct the responder to - * reply with a unicast packet - * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_add_question(struct mdns_outpacket *outpkt, struct mdns_domain *domain, u16_t type, u16_t klass, u16_t unicast) -{ - u16_t question_len; - u16_t field16; - err_t res; - - if (!outpkt->pbuf) { - /* If no pbuf is active, allocate one */ - outpkt->pbuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, OUTPACKET_SIZE, PBUF_RAM); - - if (!outpkt->pbuf) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - outpkt->write_offset = SIZEOF_DNS_HDR; - } - - /* Worst case calculation. Domain string might be compressed */ - question_len = domain->length + sizeof(type) + sizeof(klass); - - if (outpkt->write_offset + question_len > outpkt->pbuf->tot_len) { - /* No space */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Write name */ - res = mdns_write_domain(outpkt, domain); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - - /* Write type */ - field16 = lwip_htons(type); - res = pbuf_take_at(outpkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), outpkt->write_offset); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - - outpkt->write_offset += sizeof(field16); - - /* Write class */ - if (unicast) { - klass |= 0x8000; - } - - field16 = lwip_htons(klass); - res = pbuf_take_at(outpkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), outpkt->write_offset); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - - outpkt->write_offset += sizeof(field16); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Write answer to reply packet. - * buf or answer_domain can be null. The rd_length written will be buf_length + - * size of (compressed) domain. Most uses will need either buf or answer_domain, - * special case is SRV that starts with 3 u16 and then a domain name. - * @param reply The outpacket to write to - * @param domain The domain name the answer is for - * @param type The DNS type of the answer (like 'AAAA', 'SRV') - * @param klass The DNS type of the answer (like 'IN') - * @param cache_flush If highest bit in class should be set, to instruct receiver that - * this reply replaces any earlier answer for this domain/type/class - * @param ttl Validity time in seconds to send out for IP address data in DNS replies - * @param buf Pointer to buffer of answer data - * @param buf_length Length of variable data - * @param answer_domain A domain to write after any buffer data as answer - * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_add_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, struct mdns_domain *domain, u16_t type, u16_t klass, u16_t cache_flush, - u32_t ttl, const u8_t *buf, size_t buf_length, struct mdns_domain *answer_domain) -{ - u16_t answer_len; - u16_t field16; - u16_t rdlen_offset; - u16_t answer_offset; - u32_t field32; - err_t res; - - if (!reply->pbuf) { - /* If no pbuf is active, allocate one */ - reply->pbuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, OUTPACKET_SIZE, PBUF_RAM); - - if (!reply->pbuf) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - reply->write_offset = SIZEOF_DNS_HDR; - } - - /* Worst case calculation. Domain strings might be compressed */ - answer_len = domain->length + sizeof(type) + sizeof(klass) + sizeof(ttl) + sizeof(field16) /*rd_length*/; - - if (buf) { - answer_len += (u16_t)buf_length; - } - - if (answer_domain) { - answer_len += answer_domain->length; - } - - if (reply->write_offset + answer_len > reply->pbuf->tot_len) { - /* No space */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Answer starts with same data as question, then more fields */ - mdns_add_question(reply, domain, type, klass, cache_flush); - - /* Write TTL */ - field32 = lwip_htonl(ttl); - res = pbuf_take_at(reply->pbuf, &field32, sizeof(field32), reply->write_offset); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - - reply->write_offset += sizeof(field32); - - /* Store offsets and skip forward to the data */ - rdlen_offset = reply->write_offset; - reply->write_offset += sizeof(field16); - answer_offset = reply->write_offset; - - if (buf) { - /* Write static data */ - res = pbuf_take_at(reply->pbuf, buf, (u16_t)buf_length, reply->write_offset); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - - reply->write_offset += (u16_t)buf_length; - } - - if (answer_domain) { - /* Write name answer (compressed if possible) */ - res = mdns_write_domain(reply, answer_domain); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - } - - /* Write rd_length after when we know the answer size */ - field16 = lwip_htons(reply->write_offset - answer_offset); - res = pbuf_take_at(reply->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), rdlen_offset); - - return res; -} - -/** - * Helper function for mdns_read_question/mdns_read_answer - * Reads a domain, type and class from the packet - * @param pkt The MDNS packet to read from. The parse_offset field will be - * incremented to point to the next unparsed byte. - * @param info The struct to fill with domain, type and class - * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_read_rr_info(struct mdns_packet *pkt, struct mdns_rr_info *info) -{ - u16_t field16, copied; - pkt->parse_offset = mdns_readname(pkt->pbuf, pkt->parse_offset, &info->domain); - - if (pkt->parse_offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - copied = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), pkt->parse_offset); - - if (copied != sizeof(field16)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - pkt->parse_offset += copied; - info->type = lwip_ntohs(field16); - - copied = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), pkt->parse_offset); - - if (copied != sizeof(field16)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - pkt->parse_offset += copied; - info->klass = lwip_ntohs(field16); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Read a question from the packet. - * All questions have to be read before the answers. - * @param pkt The MDNS packet to read from. The questions_left field will be decremented - * and the parse_offset will be updated. - * @param question The struct to fill with question data - * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_read_question(struct mdns_packet *pkt, struct mdns_question *question) -{ - /* Safety check */ - if (pkt->pbuf->tot_len < pkt->parse_offset) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (pkt->questions_left) { - err_t res; - pkt->questions_left--; - - memset(question, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_question)); - res = mdns_read_rr_info(pkt, &question->info); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - - /* Extract unicast flag from class field */ - question->unicast = question->info.klass & 0x8000; - question->info.klass &= 0x7FFF; - - return ERR_OK; - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * Read an answer from the packet - * The variable length reply is not copied, its pbuf offset and length is stored instead. - * @param pkt The MDNS packet to read. The answers_left field will be decremented and - * the parse_offset will be updated. - * @param answer The struct to fill with answer data - * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mdns_read_answer(struct mdns_packet *pkt, struct mdns_answer *answer) -{ - /* Read questions first */ - if (pkt->questions_left) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* Safety check */ - if (pkt->pbuf->tot_len < pkt->parse_offset) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (pkt->answers_left) { - u16_t copied, field16; - u32_t ttl; - err_t res; - pkt->answers_left--; - - memset(answer, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_answer)); - res = mdns_read_rr_info(pkt, &answer->info); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - return res; - } - - /* Extract cache_flush flag from class field */ - answer->cache_flush = answer->info.klass & 0x8000; - answer->info.klass &= 0x7FFF; - - copied = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &ttl, sizeof(ttl), pkt->parse_offset); - - if (copied != sizeof(ttl)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - pkt->parse_offset += copied; - answer->ttl = lwip_ntohl(ttl); - - copied = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), pkt->parse_offset); - - if (copied != sizeof(field16)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - pkt->parse_offset += copied; - answer->rd_length = lwip_ntohs(field16); - - answer->rd_offset = pkt->parse_offset; - pkt->parse_offset += answer->rd_length; - - return ERR_OK; - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/** Write an IPv4 address (A) RR to outpacket */ -static err_t mdns_add_a_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct netif *netif) -{ - struct mdns_domain host; - mdns_build_host_domain(&host, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with A record\n")); - return mdns_add_answer(reply, &host, DNS_RRTYPE_A, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif))->dns_ttl, (const u8_t *)netif_ip4_addr(netif), sizeof(ip4_addr_t), NULL); -} - -/** Write a 4.3.2.1.in-addr.arpa -> hostname.local PTR RR to outpacket */ -static err_t mdns_add_hostv4_ptr_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct netif *netif) -{ - struct mdns_domain host, revhost; - mdns_build_host_domain(&host, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); - mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain(&revhost, netif_ip4_addr(netif)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with v4 PTR record\n")); - return mdns_add_answer(reply, &revhost, DNS_RRTYPE_PTR, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif))->dns_ttl, NULL, 0, &host); -} -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** Write an IPv6 address (AAAA) RR to outpacket */ -static err_t mdns_add_aaaa_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct netif *netif, int addrindex) -{ - struct mdns_domain host; - mdns_build_host_domain(&host, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with AAAA record\n")); - return mdns_add_answer(reply, &host, DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif))->dns_ttl, (const u8_t *)netif_ip6_addr(netif, addrindex), sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t), NULL); -} - -/** Write a x.y.z.ip6.arpa -> hostname.local PTR RR to outpacket */ -static err_t mdns_add_hostv6_ptr_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct netif *netif, int addrindex) -{ - struct mdns_domain host, revhost; - mdns_build_host_domain(&host, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); - mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain(&revhost, netif_ip6_addr(netif, addrindex)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with v6 PTR record\n")); - return mdns_add_answer(reply, &revhost, DNS_RRTYPE_PTR, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif))->dns_ttl, NULL, 0, &host); -} -#endif - -/** Write an all-services -> servicetype PTR RR to outpacket */ -static err_t mdns_add_servicetype_ptr_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, struct mdns_service *service) -{ - struct mdns_domain service_type, service_dnssd; - mdns_build_service_domain(&service_type, service, 0); - mdns_build_dnssd_domain(&service_dnssd); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with service type PTR record\n")); - return mdns_add_answer(reply, &service_dnssd, DNS_RRTYPE_PTR, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, 0, service->dns_ttl, NULL, 0, &service_type); -} - -/** Write a servicetype -> servicename PTR RR to outpacket */ -static err_t mdns_add_servicename_ptr_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, struct mdns_service *service) -{ - struct mdns_domain service_type, service_instance; - mdns_build_service_domain(&service_type, service, 0); - mdns_build_service_domain(&service_instance, service, 1); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with service name PTR record\n")); - return mdns_add_answer(reply, &service_type, DNS_RRTYPE_PTR, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, 0, service->dns_ttl, NULL, 0, &service_instance); -} - -/** Write a SRV RR to outpacket */ -static err_t mdns_add_srv_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct mdns_host *mdns, struct mdns_service *service) -{ - struct mdns_domain service_instance, srvhost; - u16_t srvdata[3]; - mdns_build_service_domain(&service_instance, service, 1); - mdns_build_host_domain(&srvhost, mdns); - - if (reply->legacy_query) { - /* RFC 6762 section 18.14: - * In legacy unicast responses generated to answer legacy queries, - * name compression MUST NOT be performed on SRV records. - */ - srvhost.skip_compression = 1; - } - - srvdata[0] = lwip_htons(SRV_PRIORITY); - srvdata[1] = lwip_htons(SRV_WEIGHT); - srvdata[2] = lwip_htons(service->port); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with SRV record\n")); - return mdns_add_answer(reply, &service_instance, DNS_RRTYPE_SRV, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, service->dns_ttl, - (const u8_t *)&srvdata, sizeof(srvdata), &srvhost); -} - -/** Write a TXT RR to outpacket */ -static err_t mdns_add_txt_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct mdns_service *service) -{ - struct mdns_domain service_instance; - mdns_build_service_domain(&service_instance, service, 1); - mdns_prepare_txtdata(service); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with TXT record\n")); - return mdns_add_answer(reply, &service_instance, DNS_RRTYPE_TXT, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, service->dns_ttl, - (u8_t *)&service->txtdata.name, service->txtdata.length, NULL); -} - -/** - * Setup outpacket as a reply to the incoming packet - */ -static void mdns_init_outpacket(struct mdns_outpacket *out, struct mdns_packet *in) -{ - memset(out, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_outpacket)); - out->cache_flush = 1; - out->netif = in->netif; - - /* Copy source IP/port to use when responding unicast, or to choose - * which pcb to use for multicast (IPv4/IPv6) - */ - SMEMCPY(&out->dest_addr, &in->source_addr, sizeof(ip_addr_t)); - out->dest_port = in->source_port; - - if (in->source_port != LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS) { - out->unicast_reply = 1; - out->cache_flush = 0; - - if (in->questions == 1) { - out->legacy_query = 1; - out->tx_id = in->tx_id; - } - } - - if (in->recv_unicast) { - out->unicast_reply = 1; - } -} - -/** - * Send chosen answers as a reply - * - * Add all selected answers (first write will allocate pbuf) - * Add additional answers based on the selected answers - * Send the packet - */ -static err_t mdns_send_outpacket(struct mdns_outpacket *outpkt, u8_t flags) -{ - struct mdns_service *service; - err_t res = ERR_ARG; - int i; - struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(outpkt->netif); - u16_t answers = 0; - - /* Write answers to host questions */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_A) { - res = mdns_add_a_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - answers++; - } - - if (outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4) { - res = mdns_add_hostv4_ptr_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - answers++; - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_AAAA) { - int addrindex; - - for (addrindex = 0; addrindex < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; addrindex++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(outpkt->netif, addrindex))) { - res = mdns_add_aaaa_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif, addrindex); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - answers++; - } - } - } - - if (outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6) { - u8_t rev_addrs = outpkt->host_reverse_v6_replies; - int addrindex = 0; - - while (rev_addrs) { - if (rev_addrs & 1) { - res = mdns_add_hostv6_ptr_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif, addrindex); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - answers++; - } - - addrindex++; - rev_addrs >>= 1; - } - } - -#endif - - /* Write answers to service questions */ - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - service = mdns->services[i]; - - if (!service) { - continue; - } - - if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR) { - res = mdns_add_servicetype_ptr_answer(outpkt, service); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - answers++; - } - - if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR) { - res = mdns_add_servicename_ptr_answer(outpkt, service); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - answers++; - } - - if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_SRV) { - res = mdns_add_srv_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, mdns, service); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - answers++; - } - - if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_TXT) { - res = mdns_add_txt_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, service); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - answers++; - } - } - - /* if this is a response, the data above is anwers, else this is a probe and the answers above goes into auth section */ - if (flags & DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE) { - outpkt->answers += answers; - } else { - outpkt->authoritative += answers; - } - - /* All answers written, add additional RRs */ - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - service = mdns->services[i]; - - if (!service) { - continue; - } - - if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR) { - /* Our service instance requested, include SRV & TXT - * if they are already not requested. */ - if (!(outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_SRV)) { - res = mdns_add_srv_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, mdns, service); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - outpkt->additional++; - } - - if (!(outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_TXT)) { - res = mdns_add_txt_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, service); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - outpkt->additional++; - } - } - - /* If service instance, SRV, record or an IP address is requested, - * supply all addresses for the host - */ - if ((outpkt->serv_replies[i] & (REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR | REPLY_SERVICE_SRV)) || - (outpkt->host_replies & (REPLY_HOST_A | REPLY_HOST_AAAA))) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (!(outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_AAAA)) { - int addrindex; - - for (addrindex = 0; addrindex < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; addrindex++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(outpkt->netif, addrindex))) { - res = mdns_add_aaaa_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif, addrindex); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - outpkt->additional++; - } - } - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (!(outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_A) && - !ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(outpkt->netif))) { - res = mdns_add_a_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - outpkt->additional++; - } - -#endif - } - } - - if (outpkt->pbuf) { - const ip_addr_t *mcast_destaddr; - struct dns_hdr hdr; - - /* Write header */ - memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr)); - hdr.flags1 = flags; - hdr.numquestions = lwip_htons(outpkt->questions); - hdr.numanswers = lwip_htons(outpkt->answers); - hdr.numauthrr = lwip_htons(outpkt->authoritative); - hdr.numextrarr = lwip_htons(outpkt->additional); - hdr.id = lwip_htons(outpkt->tx_id); - pbuf_take(outpkt->pbuf, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)); - - /* Shrink packet */ - pbuf_realloc(outpkt->pbuf, outpkt->write_offset); - - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(outpkt->dest_addr)) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - mcast_destaddr = &v6group; -#endif - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - mcast_destaddr = &v4group; -#endif - } - - /* Send created packet */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Sending packet, len=%d, unicast=%d\n", outpkt->write_offset, outpkt->unicast_reply)); - - if (outpkt->unicast_reply) { - res = udp_sendto_if(mdns_pcb, outpkt->pbuf, &outpkt->dest_addr, outpkt->dest_port, outpkt->netif); - } else { - res = udp_sendto_if(mdns_pcb, outpkt->pbuf, mcast_destaddr, LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS, outpkt->netif); - } - } - -cleanup: - - if (outpkt->pbuf) { - pbuf_free(outpkt->pbuf); - outpkt->pbuf = NULL; - } - - return res; -} - -/** - * Send unsolicited answer containing all our known data - * @param netif The network interface to send on - * @param destination The target address to send to (usually multicast address) - */ -static void mdns_announce(struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *destination) -{ - struct mdns_outpacket announce; - int i; - struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - - memset(&announce, 0, sizeof(announce)); - announce.netif = netif; - announce.cache_flush = 1; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - announce.host_replies = REPLY_HOST_A | REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4; - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { - announce.host_replies |= REPLY_HOST_AAAA | REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6; - announce.host_reverse_v6_replies |= (1 << i); - } - } - -#endif - - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - struct mdns_service *serv = mdns->services[i]; - - if (serv) { - announce.serv_replies[i] = REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR | REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR | - REPLY_SERVICE_SRV | REPLY_SERVICE_TXT; - } - } - - announce.dest_port = LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS; - SMEMCPY(&announce.dest_addr, destination, sizeof(announce.dest_addr)); - mdns_send_outpacket(&announce, DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE | DNS_FLAG1_AUTHORATIVE); -} - -/** - * Handle question MDNS packet - * 1. Parse all questions and set bits what answers to send - * 2. Clear pending answers if known answers are supplied - * 3. Put chosen answers in new packet and send as reply - */ -static void mdns_handle_question(struct mdns_packet *pkt) -{ - struct mdns_service *service; - struct mdns_outpacket reply; - int replies = 0; - int i; - err_t res; - struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(pkt->netif); - - if (mdns->probing_state != MDNS_PROBING_COMPLETE) { - /* Don't answer questions until we've verified our domains via probing */ - /* @todo we should check incoming questions during probing for tiebreaking */ - return; - } - - mdns_init_outpacket(&reply, pkt); - - while (pkt->questions_left) { - struct mdns_question q; - - res = mdns_read_question(pkt, &q); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Failed to parse question, skipping query packet\n")); - return; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Query for domain ")); - mdns_domain_debug_print(&q.info.domain); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, (" type %d class %d\n", q.info.type, q.info.klass)); - - if (q.unicast) { - /* Reply unicast if any question is unicast */ - reply.unicast_reply = 1; - } - - reply.host_replies |= check_host(pkt->netif, &q.info, &reply.host_reverse_v6_replies); - replies |= reply.host_replies; - - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - service = mdns->services[i]; - - if (!service) { - continue; - } - - reply.serv_replies[i] |= check_service(service, &q.info); - replies |= reply.serv_replies[i]; - } - - if (replies && reply.legacy_query) { - /* Add question to reply packet (legacy packet only has 1 question) */ - res = mdns_add_question(&reply, &q.info.domain, q.info.type, q.info.klass, 0); - reply.questions = 1; - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - } - } - - /* Handle known answers */ - while (pkt->answers_left) { - struct mdns_answer ans; - u8_t rev_v6; - int match; - - res = mdns_read_answer(pkt, &ans); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Failed to parse answer, skipping query packet\n")); - goto cleanup; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Known answer for domain ")); - mdns_domain_debug_print(&ans.info.domain); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, (" type %d class %d\n", ans.info.type, ans.info.klass)); - - if (ans.info.type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY || ans.info.klass == DNS_RRCLASS_ANY) { - /* Skip known answers for ANY type & class */ - continue; - } - - rev_v6 = 0; - match = reply.host_replies & check_host(pkt->netif, &ans.info, &rev_v6); - - if (match && (ans.ttl > (mdns->dns_ttl / 2))) { - /* The RR in the known answer matches an RR we are planning to send, - * and the TTL is less than half gone. - * If the payload matches we should not send that answer. - */ - if (ans.info.type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR) { - /* Read domain and compare */ - struct mdns_domain known_ans, my_ans; - u16_t len; - len = mdns_readname(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, &known_ans); - res = mdns_build_host_domain(&my_ans, mdns); - - if (len != MDNS_READNAME_ERROR && res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&known_ans, &my_ans)) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (match & REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: v4 PTR\n")); - reply.host_replies &= ~REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4; - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (match & REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: v6 PTR\n")); - reply.host_reverse_v6_replies &= ~rev_v6; - - if (reply.host_reverse_v6_replies == 0) { - reply.host_replies &= ~REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6; - } - } - -#endif - } - } else if (match & REPLY_HOST_A) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (ans.rd_length == sizeof(ip4_addr_t) && - pbuf_memcmp(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, netif_ip4_addr(pkt->netif), ans.rd_length) == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: A\n")); - reply.host_replies &= ~REPLY_HOST_A; - } - -#endif - } else if (match & REPLY_HOST_AAAA) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (ans.rd_length == sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t) && - /* TODO this clears all AAAA responses if first addr is set as known */ - pbuf_memcmp(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, netif_ip6_addr(pkt->netif, 0), ans.rd_length) == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: AAAA\n")); - reply.host_replies &= ~REPLY_HOST_AAAA; - } - -#endif - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - service = mdns->services[i]; - - if (!service) { - continue; - } - - match = reply.serv_replies[i] & check_service(service, &ans.info); - - if (match && (ans.ttl > (service->dns_ttl / 2))) { - /* The RR in the known answer matches an RR we are planning to send, - * and the TTL is less than half gone. - * If the payload matches we should not send that answer. - */ - if (ans.info.type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR) { - /* Read domain and compare */ - struct mdns_domain known_ans, my_ans; - u16_t len; - len = mdns_readname(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, &known_ans); - - if (len != MDNS_READNAME_ERROR) { - if (match & REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR) { - res = mdns_build_service_domain(&my_ans, service, 0); - - if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&known_ans, &my_ans)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: service type PTR\n")); - reply.serv_replies[i] &= ~REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR; - } - } - - if (match & REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR) { - res = mdns_build_service_domain(&my_ans, service, 1); - - if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&known_ans, &my_ans)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: service name PTR\n")); - reply.serv_replies[i] &= ~REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR; - } - } - } - } else if (match & REPLY_SERVICE_SRV) { - /* Read and compare to my SRV record */ - u16_t field16, len, read_pos; - struct mdns_domain known_ans, my_ans; - read_pos = ans.rd_offset; - - do { - /* Check priority field */ - len = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), read_pos); - - if (len != sizeof(field16) || lwip_ntohs(field16) != SRV_PRIORITY) { - break; - } - - read_pos += len; - /* Check weight field */ - len = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), read_pos); - - if (len != sizeof(field16) || lwip_ntohs(field16) != SRV_WEIGHT) { - break; - } - - read_pos += len; - /* Check port field */ - len = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), read_pos); - - if (len != sizeof(field16) || lwip_ntohs(field16) != service->port) { - break; - } - - read_pos += len; - /* Check host field */ - len = mdns_readname(pkt->pbuf, read_pos, &known_ans); - mdns_build_host_domain(&my_ans, mdns); - - if (len == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR || !mdns_domain_eq(&known_ans, &my_ans)) { - break; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: SRV\n")); - reply.serv_replies[i] &= ~REPLY_SERVICE_SRV; - } while (0); - } else if (match & REPLY_SERVICE_TXT) { - mdns_prepare_txtdata(service); - - if (service->txtdata.length == ans.rd_length && - pbuf_memcmp(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, service->txtdata.name, ans.rd_length) == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: TXT\n")); - reply.serv_replies[i] &= ~REPLY_SERVICE_TXT; - } - } - } - } - } - - mdns_send_outpacket(&reply, DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE | DNS_FLAG1_AUTHORATIVE); - -cleanup: - - if (reply.pbuf) { - /* This should only happen if we fail to alloc/write question for legacy query */ - pbuf_free(reply.pbuf); - reply.pbuf = NULL; - } -} - -/** - * Handle response MDNS packet - * Only prints debug for now. Will need more code to do conflict resolution. - */ -static void mdns_handle_response(struct mdns_packet *pkt) -{ - struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(pkt->netif); - - /* Ignore all questions */ - while (pkt->questions_left) { - struct mdns_question q; - err_t res; - - res = mdns_read_question(pkt, &q); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Failed to parse question, skipping response packet\n")); - return; - } - } - - while (pkt->answers_left) { - struct mdns_answer ans; - err_t res; - - res = mdns_read_answer(pkt, &ans); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Failed to parse answer, skipping response packet\n")); - return; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Answer for domain ")); - mdns_domain_debug_print(&ans.info.domain); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, (" type %d class %d\n", ans.info.type, ans.info.klass)); - - /*"Apparently conflicting Multicast DNS responses received *before* the first probe packet is sent MUST - be silently ignored" so drop answer if we haven't started probing yet*/ - if ((mdns->probing_state == MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING) && (mdns->probes_sent > 0)) { - struct mdns_domain domain; - u8_t i; - u8_t conflict = 0; - - res = mdns_build_host_domain(&domain, mdns); - - if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&ans.info.domain, &domain)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Probe response matches host domain!")); - conflict = 1; - } - - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - struct mdns_service *service = mdns->services[i]; - - if (!service) { - continue; - } - - res = mdns_build_service_domain(&domain, service, 1); - - if ((res == ERR_OK) && mdns_domain_eq(&ans.info.domain, &domain)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Probe response matches service domain!")); - conflict = 1; - } - } - - if (conflict != 0) { - sys_untimeout(mdns_probe, pkt->netif); - - if (mdns_name_result_cb != NULL) { - mdns_name_result_cb(pkt->netif, MDNS_PROBING_CONFLICT); - } - } - } - } -} - -/** - * Receive input function for MDNS packets. - * Handles both IPv4 and IPv6 UDP pcbs. - */ -static void mdns_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - struct dns_hdr hdr; - struct mdns_packet packet; - struct netif *recv_netif = ip_current_input_netif(); - u16_t offset = 0; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Received IPv%d MDNS packet, len %d\n", IP_IS_V6(addr) ? 6 : 4, p->tot_len)); - - if (NETIF_TO_HOST(recv_netif) == NULL) { - /* From netif not configured for MDNS */ - goto dealloc; - } - - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &hdr, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR, offset) < SIZEOF_DNS_HDR) { - /* Too small */ - goto dealloc; - } - - offset += SIZEOF_DNS_HDR; - - if (DNS_HDR_GET_OPCODE(&hdr)) { - /* Ignore non-standard queries in multicast packets (RFC 6762, section 18.3) */ - goto dealloc; - } - - memset(&packet, 0, sizeof(packet)); - SMEMCPY(&packet.source_addr, addr, sizeof(packet.source_addr)); - packet.source_port = port; - packet.netif = recv_netif; - packet.pbuf = p; - packet.parse_offset = offset; - packet.tx_id = lwip_ntohs(hdr.id); - packet.questions = packet.questions_left = lwip_ntohs(hdr.numquestions); - packet.answers = packet.answers_left = lwip_ntohs(hdr.numanswers) + lwip_ntohs(hdr.numauthrr) + lwip_ntohs(hdr.numextrarr); - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (IP_IS_V6(ip_current_dest_addr())) { - /* instead of having one 'v6group' per netif, just compare zoneless here */ - if (!ip_addr_cmp_zoneless(ip_current_dest_addr(), &v6group)) { - packet.recv_unicast = 1; - } - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (!IP_IS_V6(ip_current_dest_addr())) { - if (!ip_addr_cmp(ip_current_dest_addr(), &v4group)) { - packet.recv_unicast = 1; - } - } - -#endif - - if (hdr.flags1 & DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE) { - mdns_handle_response(&packet); - } else { - mdns_handle_question(&packet); - } - -dealloc: - pbuf_free(p); -} - -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK && MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK -static void mdns_netif_ext_status_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(args); - - /* MDNS enabled on netif? */ - if (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif) == NULL) { - return; - } - - if (reason & LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED) { - if (args->status_changed.state != 0) { - mdns_resp_restart(netif); - } - - /* TODO: send goodbye message */ - } - - if (reason & LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED) { - if (args->link_changed.state != 0) { - mdns_resp_restart(netif); - } - } - - if (reason & (LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED | - LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED | - LWIP_NSC_IPV6_SET | LWIP_NSC_IPV6_ADDR_STATE_CHANGED)) { - mdns_resp_announce(netif); - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK && MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK */ - -static err_t mdns_send_probe(struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *destination) -{ - struct mdns_host *mdns; - struct mdns_outpacket pkt; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u8_t i; - err_t res; - - mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - - memset(&pkt, 0, sizeof(pkt)); - pkt.netif = netif; - - /* Add unicast questions with rtype ANY for all our desired records */ - mdns_build_host_domain(&domain, mdns); - res = mdns_add_question(&pkt, &domain, DNS_RRTYPE_ANY, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, 1); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - pkt.questions++; - - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - struct mdns_service *service = mdns->services[i]; - - if (!service) { - continue; - } - - mdns_build_service_domain(&domain, service, 1); - res = mdns_add_question(&pkt, &domain, DNS_RRTYPE_ANY, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, 1); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - - pkt.questions++; - } - - /* Add answers to the questions above into the authority section for tiebreaking */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - pkt.host_replies = REPLY_HOST_A; - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { - pkt.host_replies |= REPLY_HOST_AAAA; - } - } - -#endif - - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - struct mdns_service *serv = mdns->services[i]; - - if (serv) { - pkt.serv_replies[i] = REPLY_SERVICE_SRV | REPLY_SERVICE_TXT; - } - } - - pkt.tx_id = 0; - pkt.dest_port = LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS; - SMEMCPY(&pkt.dest_addr, destination, sizeof(pkt.dest_addr)); - res = mdns_send_outpacket(&pkt, 0); - -cleanup: - - if (pkt.pbuf) { - pbuf_free(pkt.pbuf); - pkt.pbuf = NULL; - } - - return res; -} - -/** - * Timer callback for probing network. - */ -static void mdns_probe(void *arg) -{ - struct netif *netif = (struct netif *)arg; - struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - - if (mdns->probes_sent >= MDNS_PROBE_COUNT) { - /* probing successful, announce the new name */ - mdns->probing_state = MDNS_PROBING_COMPLETE; - mdns_resp_announce(netif); - - if (mdns_name_result_cb != NULL) { - mdns_name_result_cb(netif, MDNS_PROBING_SUCCESSFUL); - } - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /*if ipv4 wait with probing until address is set*/ - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif)) && - mdns_send_probe(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY) == ERR_OK) -#endif - { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (mdns_send_probe(netif, IP6_ADDR_ANY) == ERR_OK) -#endif - { - mdns->probes_sent++; - } - } - - sys_timeout(MDNS_PROBE_DELAY_MS, mdns_probe, netif); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Activate MDNS responder for a network interface. - * @param netif The network interface to activate. - * @param hostname Name to use. Queries for <hostname>.local will be answered - * with the IP addresses of the netif. The hostname will be copied, the - * given pointer can be on the stack. - * @param dns_ttl Validity time in seconds to send out for IP address data in DNS replies - * @return ERR_OK if netif was added, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mdns_resp_add_netif(struct netif *netif, const char *hostname, u32_t dns_ttl) -{ - err_t res; - struct mdns_host *mdns; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_netif: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_netif: Hostname too long", (strlen(hostname) <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); - - LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_add_netif: Double add", NETIF_TO_HOST(netif) == NULL); - mdns = (struct mdns_host *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct mdns_host)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_netif: Alloc failed", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_MEM); - - netif_set_client_data(netif, mdns_netif_client_id, mdns); - - MEMCPY(&mdns->name, hostname, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, strlen(hostname))); - mdns->dns_ttl = dns_ttl; - mdns->probes_sent = 0; - mdns->probing_state = MDNS_PROBING_NOT_STARTED; - - /* Join multicast groups */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - res = igmp_joingroup_netif(netif, ip_2_ip4(&v4group)); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - res = mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, ip_2_ip6(&v6group)); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#endif - - mdns_resp_restart(netif); - - return ERR_OK; - -cleanup: - mem_free(mdns); - netif_set_client_data(netif, mdns_netif_client_id, NULL); - return res; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Stop responding to MDNS queries on this interface, leave multicast groups, - * and free the helper structure and any of its services. - * @param netif The network interface to remove. - * @return ERR_OK if netif was removed, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mdns_resp_remove_netif(struct netif *netif) -{ - int i; - struct mdns_host *mdns; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_remove_netif: Null pointer", netif); - mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_remove_netif: Not an active netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - - if (mdns->probing_state == MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING) { - sys_untimeout(mdns_probe, netif); - } - - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - struct mdns_service *service = mdns->services[i]; - - if (service) { - mem_free(service); - } - } - - /* Leave multicast groups */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - igmp_leavegroup_netif(netif, ip_2_ip4(&v4group)); -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, ip_2_ip6(&v6group)); -#endif - - mem_free(mdns); - netif_set_client_data(netif, mdns_netif_client_id, NULL); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Update MDNS hostname for a network interface. - * @param netif The network interface to activate. - * @param hostname Name to use. Queries for <hostname>.local will be answered - * with the IP addresses of the netif. The hostname will be copied, the - * given pointer can be on the stack. - * @return ERR_OK if name could be set on netif, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mdns_resp_rename_netif(struct netif *netif, const char *hostname) -{ - struct mdns_host *mdns; - size_t len; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - len = strlen(hostname); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_netif: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_netif: Hostname too long", (len <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); - mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_netif: Not an mdns netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - - MEMCPY(&mdns->name, hostname, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, len)); - mdns->name[len] = '\0'; /* null termination in case new name is shorter than previous */ - - mdns_resp_restart(netif); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Add a service to the selected network interface. - * @param netif The network interface to publish this service on - * @param name The name of the service - * @param service The service type, like "_http" - * @param proto The service protocol, DNSSD_PROTO_TCP for TCP ("_tcp") and DNSSD_PROTO_UDP - * for others ("_udp") - * @param port The port the service listens to - * @param dns_ttl Validity time in seconds to send out for service data in DNS replies - * @param txt_fn Callback to get TXT data. Will be called each time a TXT reply is created to - * allow dynamic replies. - * @param txt_data Userdata pointer for txt_fn - * @return service_id if the service was added to the netif, an err_t otherwise - */ -s8_t mdns_resp_add_service(struct netif *netif, const char *name, const char *service, enum mdns_sd_proto proto, u16_t port, u32_t dns_ttl, service_get_txt_fn_t txt_fn, void *txt_data) -{ - s8_t i; - s8_t slot = -1; - struct mdns_service *srv; - struct mdns_host *mdns; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_add_service: netif != NULL", netif); - mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Not an mdns netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Name too long", (strlen(name) <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Service too long", (strlen(service) <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Bad proto (need TCP or UDP)", (proto == DNSSD_PROTO_TCP || proto == DNSSD_PROTO_UDP), return ERR_VAL); - - for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { - if (mdns->services[i] == NULL) { - slot = i; - break; - } - } - - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Service list full (increase MDNS_MAX_SERVICES)", (slot >= 0), return ERR_MEM); - - srv = (struct mdns_service *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct mdns_service)); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Alloc failed", (srv != NULL), return ERR_MEM); - - MEMCPY(&srv->name, name, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, strlen(name))); - MEMCPY(&srv->service, service, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, strlen(service))); - srv->txt_fn = txt_fn; - srv->txt_userdata = txt_data; - srv->proto = (u16_t)proto; - srv->port = port; - srv->dns_ttl = dns_ttl; - - mdns->services[slot] = srv; - - mdns_resp_restart(netif); - - return slot; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Delete a service on the selected network interface. - * @param netif The network interface on which service should be removed - * @param slot The service slot number returned by mdns_resp_add_service - * @return ERR_OK if the service was removed from the netif, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mdns_resp_del_service(struct netif *netif, s8_t slot) -{ - struct mdns_host *mdns; - struct mdns_service *srv; - LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_del_service: netif != NULL", netif); - mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_del_service: Not an mdns netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_del_service: Invalid Service ID", (slot >= 0) && (slot < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES), return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_del_service: Invalid Service ID", (mdns->services[slot] != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - - srv = mdns->services[slot]; - mdns->services[slot] = NULL; - mem_free(srv); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Update name for an MDNS service. - * @param netif The network interface to activate. - * @param slot The service slot number returned by mdns_resp_add_service - * @param name The new name for the service - * @return ERR_OK if name could be set on service, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mdns_resp_rename_service(struct netif *netif, s8_t slot, const char *name) -{ - struct mdns_service *srv; - struct mdns_host *mdns; - size_t len; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - len = strlen(name); - LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_rename_service: netif != NULL", netif); - mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_service: Not an mdns netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_service: Name too long", (len <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_service: Invalid Service ID", (slot >= 0) && (slot < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES), return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_service: Invalid Service ID", (mdns->services[slot] != NULL), return ERR_VAL); - - srv = mdns->services[slot]; - - MEMCPY(&srv->name, name, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, len)); - srv->name[len] = '\0'; /* null termination in case new name is shorter than previous */ - - mdns_resp_restart(netif); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Call this function from inside the service_get_txt_fn_t callback to add text data. - * Buffer for TXT data is 256 bytes, and each field is prefixed with a length byte. - * @param service The service provided to the get_txt callback - * @param txt String to add to the TXT field. - * @param txt_len Length of string - * @return ERR_OK if the string was added to the reply, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mdns_resp_add_service_txtitem(struct mdns_service *service, const char *txt, u8_t txt_len) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_add_service_txtitem: service != NULL", service); - - /* Use a mdns_domain struct to store txt chunks since it is the same encoding */ - return mdns_domain_add_label(&service->txtdata, txt, txt_len); -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Send unsolicited answer containing all our known data - * @param netif The network interface to send on - */ -void mdns_resp_announce(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct mdns_host *mdns; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_announce: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ); - - mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - - if (mdns == NULL) { - return; - } - - if (mdns->probing_state == MDNS_PROBING_COMPLETE) { - /* Announce on IPv6 and IPv4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - mdns_announce(netif, IP6_ADDR_ANY); -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - mdns_announce(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY); - } - -#endif - } /* else: ip address changed while probing was ongoing? @todo reset counter to restart? */ -} - -/** Register a callback function that is called if probing is completed successfully - * or with a conflict. */ -void mdns_resp_register_name_result_cb(mdns_name_result_cb_t cb) -{ - mdns_name_result_cb = cb; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Restart mdns responder. Call this when cable is connected after being disconnected or - * administrative interface is set up after being down - * @param netif The network interface to send on - */ -void mdns_resp_restart(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct mdns_host *mdns; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_restart: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ); - - mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); - - if (mdns == NULL) { - return; - } - - if (mdns->probing_state == MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING) { - sys_untimeout(mdns_probe, netif); - } - - /* @todo if we've failed 15 times within a 10 second period we MUST wait 5 seconds (or wait 5 seconds every time except first)*/ - mdns->probes_sent = 0; - mdns->probing_state = MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING; - sys_timeout(MDNS_INITIAL_PROBE_DELAY_MS, mdns_probe, netif); -} - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Initiate MDNS responder. Will open UDP sockets on port 5353 - */ -void mdns_resp_init(void) -{ - err_t res; - - /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by udp_new() */ - - mdns_pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to allocate pcb", mdns_pcb != NULL); -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - udp_set_multicast_ttl(mdns_pcb, MDNS_TTL); -#else - mdns_pcb->ttl = MDNS_TTL; -#endif - res = udp_bind(mdns_pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to bind pcb", res == ERR_OK); - udp_recv(mdns_pcb, mdns_recv, NULL); - - mdns_netif_client_id = netif_alloc_client_data_id(); - -#if MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK - /* register for netif events when started on first netif */ - netif_add_ext_callback(&netif_callback, mdns_netif_ext_status_callback); -#endif -} - -#endif /* LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER */ +/** + * @file + * MDNS responder implementation + * + * @defgroup mdns MDNS + * @ingroup apps + * + * RFC 6762 - Multicast DNS\n + * RFC 6763 - DNS-Based Service Discovery\n + * + * @verbinclude mdns.txt + * + * Things left to implement: + * ------------------------- + * + * - Tiebreaking for simultaneous probing + * - Sending goodbye messages (zero ttl) - shutdown, DHCP lease about to expire, DHCP turned off... + * - Checking that source address of unicast requests are on the same network + * - Limiting multicast responses to 1 per second per resource record + * - Fragmenting replies if required + * - Handling multi-packet known answers + * - Individual known answer detection for all local IPv6 addresses + * - Dynamic size of outgoing packet + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Erik Ekman + * + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/mdns.h" +#include "lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/prot/dns.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER + +#if (LWIP_IPV4 && !LWIP_IGMP) +#error "If you want to use MDNS with IPv4, you have to define LWIP_IGMP=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_IPV6 && !LWIP_IPV6_MLD) +#error "If you want to use MDNS with IPv6, you have to define LWIP_IPV6_MLD=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (!LWIP_UDP) +#error "If you want to use MDNS, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +/* IPv4 multicast group 224.0.0.251 */ +static const ip_addr_t v4group = DNS_MQUERY_IPV4_GROUP_INIT; +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +/* IPv6 multicast group FF02::FB */ +static const ip_addr_t v6group = DNS_MQUERY_IPV6_GROUP_INIT; +#endif + +#define MDNS_TTL 255 + +/* Stored offsets to beginning of domain names + * Used for compression. + */ +#define NUM_DOMAIN_OFFSETS 10 +#define DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE 2 +#define DOMAIN_JUMP 0xc000 + +static u8_t mdns_netif_client_id; +static struct udp_pcb *mdns_pcb; +#if MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK +NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(netif_callback) +#endif +static mdns_name_result_cb_t mdns_name_result_cb; + +#define NETIF_TO_HOST(netif) (struct mdns_host *)(netif_get_client_data(netif, mdns_netif_client_id)) + +#define TOPDOMAIN_LOCAL "local" + +#define REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN "arpa" +#define REVERSE_PTR_V4_DOMAIN "in-addr" +#define REVERSE_PTR_V6_DOMAIN "ip6" + +#define SRV_PRIORITY 0 +#define SRV_WEIGHT 0 + +/* Payload size allocated for each outgoing UDP packet */ +#define OUTPACKET_SIZE 500 + +/* Lookup from hostname -> IPv4 */ +#define REPLY_HOST_A 0x01 +/* Lookup from IPv4/v6 -> hostname */ +#define REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4 0x02 +/* Lookup from hostname -> IPv6 */ +#define REPLY_HOST_AAAA 0x04 +/* Lookup from hostname -> IPv6 */ +#define REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6 0x08 + +/* Lookup for service types */ +#define REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR 0x10 +/* Lookup for instances of service */ +#define REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR 0x20 +/* Lookup for location of service instance */ +#define REPLY_SERVICE_SRV 0x40 +/* Lookup for text info on service instance */ +#define REPLY_SERVICE_TXT 0x80 + +#define MDNS_PROBE_DELAY_MS 250 +#define MDNS_PROBE_COUNT 3 +#ifdef LWIP_RAND +/* first probe timeout SHOULD be random 0-250 ms*/ +#define MDNS_INITIAL_PROBE_DELAY_MS (LWIP_RAND() % MDNS_PROBE_DELAY_MS) +#else +#define MDNS_INITIAL_PROBE_DELAY_MS MDNS_PROBE_DELAY_MS +#endif + +#define MDNS_PROBING_NOT_STARTED 0 +#define MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING 1 +#define MDNS_PROBING_COMPLETE 2 + +static const char *dnssd_protos[] = { + "_udp", /* DNSSD_PROTO_UDP */ + "_tcp", /* DNSSD_PROTO_TCP */ +}; + +/** Description of a service */ +struct mdns_service { + /** TXT record to answer with */ + struct mdns_domain txtdata; + /** Name of service, like 'myweb' */ + char name[MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN + 1]; + /** Type of service, like '_http' */ + char service[MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN + 1]; + /** Callback function and userdata + * to update txtdata buffer */ + service_get_txt_fn_t txt_fn; + void *txt_userdata; + /** TTL in seconds of SRV/TXT replies */ + u32_t dns_ttl; + /** Protocol, TCP or UDP */ + u16_t proto; + /** Port of the service */ + u16_t port; +}; + +/** Description of a host/netif */ +struct mdns_host { + /** Hostname */ + char name[MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN + 1]; + /** Pointer to services */ + struct mdns_service *services[MDNS_MAX_SERVICES]; + /** TTL in seconds of A/AAAA/PTR replies */ + u32_t dns_ttl; + /** Number of probes sent for the current name */ + u8_t probes_sent; + /** State in probing sequence */ + u8_t probing_state; +}; + +/** Information about received packet */ +struct mdns_packet { + /** Sender IP/port */ + ip_addr_t source_addr; + u16_t source_port; + /** If packet was received unicast */ + u16_t recv_unicast; + /** Netif that received the packet */ + struct netif *netif; + /** Packet data */ + struct pbuf *pbuf; + /** Current parsing offset in packet */ + u16_t parse_offset; + /** Identifier. Used in legacy queries */ + u16_t tx_id; + /** Number of questions in packet, + * read from packet header */ + u16_t questions; + /** Number of unparsed questions */ + u16_t questions_left; + /** Number of answers in packet, + * (sum of normal, authoritative and additional answers) + * read from packet header */ + u16_t answers; + /** Number of unparsed answers */ + u16_t answers_left; +}; + +/** Information about outgoing packet */ +struct mdns_outpacket { + /** Netif to send the packet on */ + struct netif *netif; + /** Packet data */ + struct pbuf *pbuf; + /** Current write offset in packet */ + u16_t write_offset; + /** Identifier. Used in legacy queries */ + u16_t tx_id; + /** Destination IP/port if sent unicast */ + ip_addr_t dest_addr; + u16_t dest_port; + /** Number of questions written */ + u16_t questions; + /** Number of normal answers written */ + u16_t answers; + /** Number of authoritative answers written */ + u16_t authoritative; + /** Number of additional answers written */ + u16_t additional; + /** Offsets for written domain names in packet. + * Used for compression */ + u16_t domain_offsets[NUM_DOMAIN_OFFSETS]; + /** If all answers in packet should set cache_flush bit */ + u8_t cache_flush; + /** If reply should be sent unicast */ + u8_t unicast_reply; + /** If legacy query. (tx_id needed, and write + * question again in reply before answer) */ + u8_t legacy_query; + /* Reply bitmask for host information */ + u8_t host_replies; + /* Bitmask for which reverse IPv6 hosts to answer */ + u8_t host_reverse_v6_replies; + /* Reply bitmask per service */ + u8_t serv_replies[MDNS_MAX_SERVICES]; +}; + +/** Domain, type and class. + * Shared between questions and answers */ +struct mdns_rr_info { + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t type; + u16_t klass; +}; + +struct mdns_question { + struct mdns_rr_info info; + /** unicast reply requested */ + u16_t unicast; +}; + +struct mdns_answer { + struct mdns_rr_info info; + /** cache flush command bit */ + u16_t cache_flush; + /* Validity time in seconds */ + u32_t ttl; + /** Length of variable answer */ + u16_t rd_length; + /** Offset of start of variable answer in packet */ + u16_t rd_offset; +}; + +static err_t mdns_send_outpacket(struct mdns_outpacket *outpkt, u8_t flags); +static void mdns_probe(void *arg); + +static err_t mdns_domain_add_label_base(struct mdns_domain *domain, u8_t len) +{ + if (len > MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (len > 0 && (1 + len + domain->length >= MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* Allow only zero marker on last byte */ + if (len == 0 && (1 + domain->length > MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + domain->name[domain->length] = len; + domain->length++; + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Add a label part to a domain + * @param domain The domain to add a label to + * @param label The label to add, like <hostname>, 'local', 'com' or '' + * @param len The length of the label + * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise if label too long + */ +err_t mdns_domain_add_label(struct mdns_domain *domain, const char *label, u8_t len) +{ + err_t err = mdns_domain_add_label_base(domain, len); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + if (len) { + MEMCPY(&domain->name[domain->length], label, len); + domain->length += len; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Add a label part to a domain (@see mdns_domain_add_label but copy directly from pbuf) + */ +static err_t mdns_domain_add_label_pbuf(struct mdns_domain *domain, const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u8_t len) +{ + err_t err = mdns_domain_add_label_base(domain, len); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + if (len) { + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &domain->name[domain->length], len, offset) != len) { + /* take back the ++ done before */ + domain->length--; + return ERR_ARG; + } + + domain->length += len; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Internal readname function with max 6 levels of recursion following jumps + * while decompressing name + */ +static u16_t mdns_readname_loop(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, struct mdns_domain *domain, unsigned depth) +{ + u8_t c; + + do { + if (depth > 5) { + /* Too many jumps */ + return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; + } + + c = pbuf_get_at(p, offset); + offset++; + + /* is this a compressed label? */ + if ((c & 0xc0) == 0xc0) { + u16_t jumpaddr; + + if (offset >= p->tot_len) { + /* Make sure both jump bytes fit in the packet */ + return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; + } + + jumpaddr = (((c & 0x3f) << 8) | (pbuf_get_at(p, offset) & 0xff)); + offset++; + + if (jumpaddr >= SIZEOF_DNS_HDR && jumpaddr < p->tot_len) { + u16_t res; + /* Recursive call, maximum depth will be checked */ + res = mdns_readname_loop(p, jumpaddr, domain, depth + 1); + + /* Dont return offset since new bytes were not read (jumped to somewhere in packet) */ + if (res == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR) { + return res; + } + } else { + return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; + } + + break; + } + + /* normal label */ + if (c <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN) { + err_t res; + + if (c + domain->length >= MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN) { + return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; + } + + res = mdns_domain_add_label_pbuf(domain, p, offset, c); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; + } + + offset += c; + } else { + /* bad length byte */ + return MDNS_READNAME_ERROR; + } + } while (c != 0); + + return offset; +} + +/** + * Read possibly compressed domain name from packet buffer + * @param p The packet + * @param offset start position of domain name in packet + * @param domain The domain name destination + * @return The new offset after the domain, or MDNS_READNAME_ERROR + * if reading failed + */ +u16_t mdns_readname(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, struct mdns_domain *domain) +{ + memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); + return mdns_readname_loop(p, offset, domain, 0); +} + +/** + * Print domain name to debug output + * @param domain The domain name + */ +static void mdns_domain_debug_print(struct mdns_domain *domain) +{ + u8_t *src = domain->name; + u8_t i; + + while (*src) { + u8_t label_len = *src; + src++; + + for (i = 0; i < label_len; i++) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("%c", src[i])); + } + + src += label_len; + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, (".")); + } +} + +/** + * Return 1 if contents of domains match (case-insensitive) + * @param a Domain name to compare 1 + * @param b Domain name to compare 2 + * @return 1 if domains are equal ignoring case, 0 otherwise + */ +int mdns_domain_eq(struct mdns_domain *a, struct mdns_domain *b) +{ + u8_t *ptra, *ptrb; + u8_t len; + int res; + + if (a->length != b->length) { + return 0; + } + + ptra = a->name; + ptrb = b->name; + + while (*ptra && *ptrb && ptra < &a->name[a->length]) { + if (*ptra != *ptrb) { + return 0; + } + + len = *ptra; + ptra++; + ptrb++; + res = lwip_strnicmp((char *)ptra, (char *)ptrb, len); + + if (res != 0) { + return 0; + } + + ptra += len; + ptrb += len; + } + + if (*ptra != *ptrb && ptra < &a->name[a->length]) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Call user supplied function to setup TXT data + * @param service The service to build TXT record for + */ +static void mdns_prepare_txtdata(struct mdns_service *service) +{ + memset(&service->txtdata, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); + + if (service->txt_fn) { + service->txt_fn(service, service->txt_userdata); + } +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/** + * Build domain for reverse lookup of IPv4 address + * like 12.0.168.192.in-addr.arpa. for 192.168.0.12 + * @param domain Where to write the domain name + * @param addr Pointer to an IPv4 address to encode + * @return ERR_OK if domain was written, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain, const ip4_addr_t *addr) +{ + int i; + err_t res; + const u8_t *ptr; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); + + if (!domain || !addr) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); + ptr = (const u8_t *)addr; + + for (i = sizeof(ip4_addr_t) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + char buf[4]; + u8_t val = ptr[i]; + + lwip_itoa(buf, sizeof(buf), val); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, buf, (u8_t)strlen(buf)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + } + + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, REVERSE_PTR_V4_DOMAIN, (u8_t)(sizeof(REVERSE_PTR_V4_DOMAIN) - 1)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN, (u8_t)(sizeof(REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN) - 1)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, NULL, 0); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** + * Build domain for reverse lookup of IP address + * like b.a.9.8.7.6.5.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. for 2001:db8::567:89ab + * @param domain Where to write the domain name + * @param addr Pointer to an IPv6 address to encode + * @return ERR_OK if domain was written, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain, const ip6_addr_t *addr) +{ + int i; + err_t res; + const u8_t *ptr; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); + + if (!domain || !addr) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); + ptr = (const u8_t *)addr; + + for (i = sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + char buf; + u8_t byte = ptr[i]; + int j; + + for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { + if ((byte & 0x0F) < 0xA) { + buf = '0' + (byte & 0x0F); + } else { + buf = 'a' + (byte & 0x0F) - 0xA; + } + + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, &buf, sizeof(buf)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + byte >>= 4; + } + } + + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, REVERSE_PTR_V6_DOMAIN, (u8_t)(sizeof(REVERSE_PTR_V6_DOMAIN) - 1)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN, (u8_t)(sizeof(REVERSE_PTR_TOPDOMAIN) - 1)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, NULL, 0); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif + +/* Add .local. to domain */ +static err_t mdns_add_dotlocal(struct mdns_domain *domain) +{ + err_t res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, TOPDOMAIN_LOCAL, (u8_t)(sizeof(TOPDOMAIN_LOCAL) - 1)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_add_dotlocal: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + return mdns_domain_add_label(domain, NULL, 0); +} + +/** + * Build the .local. domain name + * @param domain Where to write the domain name + * @param mdns TMDNS netif descriptor. + * @return ERR_OK if domain .local. was written, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_build_host_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain, struct mdns_host *mdns) +{ + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); + memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_host_domain: mdns != NULL", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, mdns->name, (u8_t)strlen(mdns->name)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_host_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + return mdns_add_dotlocal(domain); +} + +/** + * Build the lookup-all-services special DNS-SD domain name + * @param domain Where to write the domain name + * @return ERR_OK if domain _services._dns-sd._udp.local. was written, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_build_dnssd_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain) +{ + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); + memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, "_services", (u8_t)(sizeof("_services") - 1)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_dnssd_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, "_dns-sd", (u8_t)(sizeof("_dns-sd") - 1)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_dnssd_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, dnssd_protos[DNSSD_PROTO_UDP], (u8_t)strlen(dnssd_protos[DNSSD_PROTO_UDP])); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_dnssd_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + return mdns_add_dotlocal(domain); +} + +/** + * Build domain name for a service + * @param domain Where to write the domain name + * @param service The service struct, containing service name, type and protocol + * @param include_name Whether to include the service name in the domain + * @return ERR_OK if domain was written. If service name is included, + * ...local. will be written, otherwise ..local. + * An err_t is returned on error. + */ +static err_t mdns_build_service_domain(struct mdns_domain *domain, struct mdns_service *service, int include_name) +{ + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); + memset(domain, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_domain)); + + if (include_name) { + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, service->name, (u8_t)strlen(service->name)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_service_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + } + + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, service->service, (u8_t)strlen(service->service)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_service_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(domain, dnssd_protos[service->proto], (u8_t)strlen(dnssd_protos[service->proto])); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_build_service_domain: Failed to add label", (res == ERR_OK), return res); + return mdns_add_dotlocal(domain); +} + +/** + * Check which replies we should send for a host/netif based on question + * @param netif The network interface that received the question + * @param rr Domain/type/class from a question + * @param reverse_v6_reply Bitmask of which IPv6 addresses to send reverse PTRs for + * if reply bit has REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6 set + * @return Bitmask of which replies to send + */ +static int check_host(struct netif *netif, struct mdns_rr_info *rr, u8_t *reverse_v6_reply) +{ + err_t res; + int replies = 0; + struct mdns_domain mydomain; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(reverse_v6_reply); /* if ipv6 is disabled */ + + if (rr->klass != DNS_RRCLASS_IN && rr->klass != DNS_RRCLASS_ANY) { + /* Invalid class */ + return replies; + } + + /* Handle PTR for our addresses */ + if (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { + res = mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain(&mydomain, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i)); + + if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain)) { + replies |= REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6; + + /* Mark which addresses where requested */ + if (reverse_v6_reply) { + *reverse_v6_reply |= (1 << i); + } + } + } + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + res = mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain(&mydomain, netif_ip4_addr(netif)); + + if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain)) { + replies |= REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4; + } + } + +#endif + } + + res = mdns_build_host_domain(&mydomain, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); + + /* Handle requests for our hostname */ + if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain)) { + /* TODO return NSEC if unsupported protocol requested */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif)) && (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_A || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY)) { + replies |= REPLY_HOST_A; + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY) { + replies |= REPLY_HOST_AAAA; + } + +#endif + } + + return replies; +} + +/** + * Check which replies we should send for a service based on question + * @param service A registered MDNS service + * @param rr Domain/type/class from a question + * @return Bitmask of which replies to send + */ +static int check_service(struct mdns_service *service, struct mdns_rr_info *rr) +{ + err_t res; + int replies = 0; + struct mdns_domain mydomain; + + if (rr->klass != DNS_RRCLASS_IN && rr->klass != DNS_RRCLASS_ANY) { + /* Invalid class */ + return 0; + } + + res = mdns_build_dnssd_domain(&mydomain); + + if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain) && + (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY)) { + /* Request for all service types */ + replies |= REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR; + } + + res = mdns_build_service_domain(&mydomain, service, 0); + + if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain) && + (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY)) { + /* Request for the instance of my service */ + replies |= REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR; + } + + res = mdns_build_service_domain(&mydomain, service, 1); + + if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&rr->domain, &mydomain)) { + /* Request for info about my service */ + if (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_SRV || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY) { + replies |= REPLY_SERVICE_SRV; + } + + if (rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_TXT || rr->type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY) { + replies |= REPLY_SERVICE_TXT; + } + } + + return replies; +} + +/** + * Return bytes needed to write before jump for best result of compressing supplied domain + * against domain in outpacket starting at specified offset. + * If a match is found, offset is updated to where to jump to + * @param pbuf Pointer to pbuf with the partially constructed DNS packet + * @param offset Start position of a domain written earlier. If this location is suitable + * for compression, the pointer is updated to where in the domain to jump to. + * @param domain The domain to write + * @return Number of bytes to write of the new domain before writing a jump to the offset. + * If compression can not be done against this previous domain name, the full new + * domain length is returned. + */ +u16_t mdns_compress_domain(struct pbuf *pbuf, u16_t *offset, struct mdns_domain *domain) +{ + struct mdns_domain target; + u16_t target_end; + u8_t target_len; + u8_t writelen = 0; + u8_t *ptr; + + if (pbuf == NULL) { + return domain->length; + } + + target_end = mdns_readname(pbuf, *offset, &target); + + if (target_end == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR) { + return domain->length; + } + + target_len = (u8_t)(target_end - *offset); + ptr = domain->name; + + while (writelen < domain->length) { + u8_t domainlen = (u8_t)(domain->length - writelen); + u8_t labellen; + + if (domainlen <= target.length && domainlen > DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE) { + /* Compare domains if target is long enough, and we have enough left of the domain */ + u8_t targetpos = (u8_t)(target.length - domainlen); + + if ((targetpos + DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE) >= target_len) { + /* We are checking at or beyond a jump in the original, stop looking */ + break; + } + + if (target.length >= domainlen && + memcmp(&domain->name[writelen], &target.name[targetpos], domainlen) == 0) { + *offset += targetpos; + return writelen; + } + } + + /* Skip to next label in domain */ + labellen = *ptr; + writelen += 1 + labellen; + ptr += 1 + labellen; + } + + /* Nothing found */ + return domain->length; +} + +/** + * Write domain to outpacket. Compression will be attempted, + * unless domain->skip_compression is set. + * @param outpkt The outpacket to write to + * @param domain The domain name to write + * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_write_domain(struct mdns_outpacket *outpkt, struct mdns_domain *domain) +{ + int i; + err_t res; + u16_t writelen = domain->length; + u16_t jump_offset = 0; + u16_t jump; + + if (!domain->skip_compression) { + for (i = 0; i < NUM_DOMAIN_OFFSETS; i++) { + u16_t offset = outpkt->domain_offsets[i]; + + if (offset) { + u16_t len = mdns_compress_domain(outpkt->pbuf, &offset, domain); + + if (len < writelen) { + writelen = len; + jump_offset = offset; + } + } + } + } + + if (writelen) { + /* Write uncompressed part of name */ + res = pbuf_take_at(outpkt->pbuf, domain->name, writelen, outpkt->write_offset); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + + /* Store offset of this new domain */ + for (i = 0; i < NUM_DOMAIN_OFFSETS; i++) { + if (outpkt->domain_offsets[i] == 0) { + outpkt->domain_offsets[i] = outpkt->write_offset; + break; + } + } + + outpkt->write_offset += writelen; + } + + if (jump_offset) { + /* Write jump */ + jump = lwip_htons(DOMAIN_JUMP | jump_offset); + res = pbuf_take_at(outpkt->pbuf, &jump, DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE, outpkt->write_offset); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + + outpkt->write_offset += DOMAIN_JUMP_SIZE; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Write a question to an outpacket + * A question contains domain, type and class. Since an answer also starts with these fields this function is also + * called from mdns_add_answer(). + * @param outpkt The outpacket to write to + * @param domain The domain name the answer is for + * @param type The DNS type of the answer (like 'AAAA', 'SRV') + * @param klass The DNS type of the answer (like 'IN') + * @param unicast If highest bit in class should be set, to instruct the responder to + * reply with a unicast packet + * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_add_question(struct mdns_outpacket *outpkt, struct mdns_domain *domain, u16_t type, u16_t klass, u16_t unicast) +{ + u16_t question_len; + u16_t field16; + err_t res; + + if (!outpkt->pbuf) { + /* If no pbuf is active, allocate one */ + outpkt->pbuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, OUTPACKET_SIZE, PBUF_RAM); + + if (!outpkt->pbuf) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + outpkt->write_offset = SIZEOF_DNS_HDR; + } + + /* Worst case calculation. Domain string might be compressed */ + question_len = domain->length + sizeof(type) + sizeof(klass); + + if (outpkt->write_offset + question_len > outpkt->pbuf->tot_len) { + /* No space */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Write name */ + res = mdns_write_domain(outpkt, domain); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + + /* Write type */ + field16 = lwip_htons(type); + res = pbuf_take_at(outpkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), outpkt->write_offset); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + + outpkt->write_offset += sizeof(field16); + + /* Write class */ + if (unicast) { + klass |= 0x8000; + } + + field16 = lwip_htons(klass); + res = pbuf_take_at(outpkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), outpkt->write_offset); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + + outpkt->write_offset += sizeof(field16); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Write answer to reply packet. + * buf or answer_domain can be null. The rd_length written will be buf_length + + * size of (compressed) domain. Most uses will need either buf or answer_domain, + * special case is SRV that starts with 3 u16 and then a domain name. + * @param reply The outpacket to write to + * @param domain The domain name the answer is for + * @param type The DNS type of the answer (like 'AAAA', 'SRV') + * @param klass The DNS type of the answer (like 'IN') + * @param cache_flush If highest bit in class should be set, to instruct receiver that + * this reply replaces any earlier answer for this domain/type/class + * @param ttl Validity time in seconds to send out for IP address data in DNS replies + * @param buf Pointer to buffer of answer data + * @param buf_length Length of variable data + * @param answer_domain A domain to write after any buffer data as answer + * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_add_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, struct mdns_domain *domain, u16_t type, u16_t klass, u16_t cache_flush, + u32_t ttl, const u8_t *buf, size_t buf_length, struct mdns_domain *answer_domain) +{ + u16_t answer_len; + u16_t field16; + u16_t rdlen_offset; + u16_t answer_offset; + u32_t field32; + err_t res; + + if (!reply->pbuf) { + /* If no pbuf is active, allocate one */ + reply->pbuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, OUTPACKET_SIZE, PBUF_RAM); + + if (!reply->pbuf) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + reply->write_offset = SIZEOF_DNS_HDR; + } + + /* Worst case calculation. Domain strings might be compressed */ + answer_len = domain->length + sizeof(type) + sizeof(klass) + sizeof(ttl) + sizeof(field16) /*rd_length*/; + + if (buf) { + answer_len += (u16_t)buf_length; + } + + if (answer_domain) { + answer_len += answer_domain->length; + } + + if (reply->write_offset + answer_len > reply->pbuf->tot_len) { + /* No space */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Answer starts with same data as question, then more fields */ + mdns_add_question(reply, domain, type, klass, cache_flush); + + /* Write TTL */ + field32 = lwip_htonl(ttl); + res = pbuf_take_at(reply->pbuf, &field32, sizeof(field32), reply->write_offset); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + + reply->write_offset += sizeof(field32); + + /* Store offsets and skip forward to the data */ + rdlen_offset = reply->write_offset; + reply->write_offset += sizeof(field16); + answer_offset = reply->write_offset; + + if (buf) { + /* Write static data */ + res = pbuf_take_at(reply->pbuf, buf, (u16_t)buf_length, reply->write_offset); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + + reply->write_offset += (u16_t)buf_length; + } + + if (answer_domain) { + /* Write name answer (compressed if possible) */ + res = mdns_write_domain(reply, answer_domain); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + } + + /* Write rd_length after when we know the answer size */ + field16 = lwip_htons(reply->write_offset - answer_offset); + res = pbuf_take_at(reply->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), rdlen_offset); + + return res; +} + +/** + * Helper function for mdns_read_question/mdns_read_answer + * Reads a domain, type and class from the packet + * @param pkt The MDNS packet to read from. The parse_offset field will be + * incremented to point to the next unparsed byte. + * @param info The struct to fill with domain, type and class + * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_read_rr_info(struct mdns_packet *pkt, struct mdns_rr_info *info) +{ + u16_t field16, copied; + pkt->parse_offset = mdns_readname(pkt->pbuf, pkt->parse_offset, &info->domain); + + if (pkt->parse_offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + copied = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), pkt->parse_offset); + + if (copied != sizeof(field16)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + pkt->parse_offset += copied; + info->type = lwip_ntohs(field16); + + copied = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), pkt->parse_offset); + + if (copied != sizeof(field16)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + pkt->parse_offset += copied; + info->klass = lwip_ntohs(field16); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Read a question from the packet. + * All questions have to be read before the answers. + * @param pkt The MDNS packet to read from. The questions_left field will be decremented + * and the parse_offset will be updated. + * @param question The struct to fill with question data + * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_read_question(struct mdns_packet *pkt, struct mdns_question *question) +{ + /* Safety check */ + if (pkt->pbuf->tot_len < pkt->parse_offset) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (pkt->questions_left) { + err_t res; + pkt->questions_left--; + + memset(question, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_question)); + res = mdns_read_rr_info(pkt, &question->info); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + + /* Extract unicast flag from class field */ + question->unicast = question->info.klass & 0x8000; + question->info.klass &= 0x7FFF; + + return ERR_OK; + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * Read an answer from the packet + * The variable length reply is not copied, its pbuf offset and length is stored instead. + * @param pkt The MDNS packet to read. The answers_left field will be decremented and + * the parse_offset will be updated. + * @param answer The struct to fill with answer data + * @return ERR_OK on success, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mdns_read_answer(struct mdns_packet *pkt, struct mdns_answer *answer) +{ + /* Read questions first */ + if (pkt->questions_left) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* Safety check */ + if (pkt->pbuf->tot_len < pkt->parse_offset) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (pkt->answers_left) { + u16_t copied, field16; + u32_t ttl; + err_t res; + pkt->answers_left--; + + memset(answer, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_answer)); + res = mdns_read_rr_info(pkt, &answer->info); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + return res; + } + + /* Extract cache_flush flag from class field */ + answer->cache_flush = answer->info.klass & 0x8000; + answer->info.klass &= 0x7FFF; + + copied = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &ttl, sizeof(ttl), pkt->parse_offset); + + if (copied != sizeof(ttl)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + pkt->parse_offset += copied; + answer->ttl = lwip_ntohl(ttl); + + copied = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), pkt->parse_offset); + + if (copied != sizeof(field16)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + pkt->parse_offset += copied; + answer->rd_length = lwip_ntohs(field16); + + answer->rd_offset = pkt->parse_offset; + pkt->parse_offset += answer->rd_length; + + return ERR_OK; + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/** Write an IPv4 address (A) RR to outpacket */ +static err_t mdns_add_a_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct netif *netif) +{ + struct mdns_domain host; + mdns_build_host_domain(&host, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with A record\n")); + return mdns_add_answer(reply, &host, DNS_RRTYPE_A, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif))->dns_ttl, (const u8_t *)netif_ip4_addr(netif), sizeof(ip4_addr_t), NULL); +} + +/** Write a 4.3.2.1.in-addr.arpa -> hostname.local PTR RR to outpacket */ +static err_t mdns_add_hostv4_ptr_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct netif *netif) +{ + struct mdns_domain host, revhost; + mdns_build_host_domain(&host, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); + mdns_build_reverse_v4_domain(&revhost, netif_ip4_addr(netif)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with v4 PTR record\n")); + return mdns_add_answer(reply, &revhost, DNS_RRTYPE_PTR, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif))->dns_ttl, NULL, 0, &host); +} +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** Write an IPv6 address (AAAA) RR to outpacket */ +static err_t mdns_add_aaaa_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct netif *netif, int addrindex) +{ + struct mdns_domain host; + mdns_build_host_domain(&host, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with AAAA record\n")); + return mdns_add_answer(reply, &host, DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif))->dns_ttl, (const u8_t *)netif_ip6_addr(netif, addrindex), sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t), NULL); +} + +/** Write a x.y.z.ip6.arpa -> hostname.local PTR RR to outpacket */ +static err_t mdns_add_hostv6_ptr_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct netif *netif, int addrindex) +{ + struct mdns_domain host, revhost; + mdns_build_host_domain(&host, NETIF_TO_HOST(netif)); + mdns_build_reverse_v6_domain(&revhost, netif_ip6_addr(netif, addrindex)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with v6 PTR record\n")); + return mdns_add_answer(reply, &revhost, DNS_RRTYPE_PTR, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif))->dns_ttl, NULL, 0, &host); +} +#endif + +/** Write an all-services -> servicetype PTR RR to outpacket */ +static err_t mdns_add_servicetype_ptr_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, struct mdns_service *service) +{ + struct mdns_domain service_type, service_dnssd; + mdns_build_service_domain(&service_type, service, 0); + mdns_build_dnssd_domain(&service_dnssd); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with service type PTR record\n")); + return mdns_add_answer(reply, &service_dnssd, DNS_RRTYPE_PTR, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, 0, service->dns_ttl, NULL, 0, &service_type); +} + +/** Write a servicetype -> servicename PTR RR to outpacket */ +static err_t mdns_add_servicename_ptr_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, struct mdns_service *service) +{ + struct mdns_domain service_type, service_instance; + mdns_build_service_domain(&service_type, service, 0); + mdns_build_service_domain(&service_instance, service, 1); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with service name PTR record\n")); + return mdns_add_answer(reply, &service_type, DNS_RRTYPE_PTR, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, 0, service->dns_ttl, NULL, 0, &service_instance); +} + +/** Write a SRV RR to outpacket */ +static err_t mdns_add_srv_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct mdns_host *mdns, struct mdns_service *service) +{ + struct mdns_domain service_instance, srvhost; + u16_t srvdata[3]; + mdns_build_service_domain(&service_instance, service, 1); + mdns_build_host_domain(&srvhost, mdns); + + if (reply->legacy_query) { + /* RFC 6762 section 18.14: + * In legacy unicast responses generated to answer legacy queries, + * name compression MUST NOT be performed on SRV records. + */ + srvhost.skip_compression = 1; + } + + srvdata[0] = lwip_htons(SRV_PRIORITY); + srvdata[1] = lwip_htons(SRV_WEIGHT); + srvdata[2] = lwip_htons(service->port); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with SRV record\n")); + return mdns_add_answer(reply, &service_instance, DNS_RRTYPE_SRV, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, service->dns_ttl, + (const u8_t *)&srvdata, sizeof(srvdata), &srvhost); +} + +/** Write a TXT RR to outpacket */ +static err_t mdns_add_txt_answer(struct mdns_outpacket *reply, u16_t cache_flush, struct mdns_service *service) +{ + struct mdns_domain service_instance; + mdns_build_service_domain(&service_instance, service, 1); + mdns_prepare_txtdata(service); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Responding with TXT record\n")); + return mdns_add_answer(reply, &service_instance, DNS_RRTYPE_TXT, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, cache_flush, service->dns_ttl, + (u8_t *)&service->txtdata.name, service->txtdata.length, NULL); +} + +/** + * Setup outpacket as a reply to the incoming packet + */ +static void mdns_init_outpacket(struct mdns_outpacket *out, struct mdns_packet *in) +{ + memset(out, 0, sizeof(struct mdns_outpacket)); + out->cache_flush = 1; + out->netif = in->netif; + + /* Copy source IP/port to use when responding unicast, or to choose + * which pcb to use for multicast (IPv4/IPv6) + */ + SMEMCPY(&out->dest_addr, &in->source_addr, sizeof(ip_addr_t)); + out->dest_port = in->source_port; + + if (in->source_port != LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS) { + out->unicast_reply = 1; + out->cache_flush = 0; + + if (in->questions == 1) { + out->legacy_query = 1; + out->tx_id = in->tx_id; + } + } + + if (in->recv_unicast) { + out->unicast_reply = 1; + } +} + +/** + * Send chosen answers as a reply + * + * Add all selected answers (first write will allocate pbuf) + * Add additional answers based on the selected answers + * Send the packet + */ +static err_t mdns_send_outpacket(struct mdns_outpacket *outpkt, u8_t flags) +{ + struct mdns_service *service; + err_t res = ERR_ARG; + int i; + struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(outpkt->netif); + u16_t answers = 0; + + /* Write answers to host questions */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_A) { + res = mdns_add_a_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + answers++; + } + + if (outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4) { + res = mdns_add_hostv4_ptr_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + answers++; + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_AAAA) { + int addrindex; + + for (addrindex = 0; addrindex < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; addrindex++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(outpkt->netif, addrindex))) { + res = mdns_add_aaaa_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif, addrindex); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + answers++; + } + } + } + + if (outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6) { + u8_t rev_addrs = outpkt->host_reverse_v6_replies; + int addrindex = 0; + + while (rev_addrs) { + if (rev_addrs & 1) { + res = mdns_add_hostv6_ptr_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif, addrindex); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + answers++; + } + + addrindex++; + rev_addrs >>= 1; + } + } + +#endif + + /* Write answers to service questions */ + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + service = mdns->services[i]; + + if (!service) { + continue; + } + + if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR) { + res = mdns_add_servicetype_ptr_answer(outpkt, service); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + answers++; + } + + if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR) { + res = mdns_add_servicename_ptr_answer(outpkt, service); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + answers++; + } + + if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_SRV) { + res = mdns_add_srv_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, mdns, service); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + answers++; + } + + if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_TXT) { + res = mdns_add_txt_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, service); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + answers++; + } + } + + /* if this is a response, the data above is anwers, else this is a probe and the answers above goes into auth section */ + if (flags & DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE) { + outpkt->answers += answers; + } else { + outpkt->authoritative += answers; + } + + /* All answers written, add additional RRs */ + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + service = mdns->services[i]; + + if (!service) { + continue; + } + + if (outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR) { + /* Our service instance requested, include SRV & TXT + * if they are already not requested. */ + if (!(outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_SRV)) { + res = mdns_add_srv_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, mdns, service); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + outpkt->additional++; + } + + if (!(outpkt->serv_replies[i] & REPLY_SERVICE_TXT)) { + res = mdns_add_txt_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, service); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + outpkt->additional++; + } + } + + /* If service instance, SRV, record or an IP address is requested, + * supply all addresses for the host + */ + if ((outpkt->serv_replies[i] & (REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR | REPLY_SERVICE_SRV)) || + (outpkt->host_replies & (REPLY_HOST_A | REPLY_HOST_AAAA))) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (!(outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_AAAA)) { + int addrindex; + + for (addrindex = 0; addrindex < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; addrindex++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(outpkt->netif, addrindex))) { + res = mdns_add_aaaa_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif, addrindex); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + outpkt->additional++; + } + } + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (!(outpkt->host_replies & REPLY_HOST_A) && + !ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(outpkt->netif))) { + res = mdns_add_a_answer(outpkt, outpkt->cache_flush, outpkt->netif); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + outpkt->additional++; + } + +#endif + } + } + + if (outpkt->pbuf) { + const ip_addr_t *mcast_destaddr; + struct dns_hdr hdr; + + /* Write header */ + memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr)); + hdr.flags1 = flags; + hdr.numquestions = lwip_htons(outpkt->questions); + hdr.numanswers = lwip_htons(outpkt->answers); + hdr.numauthrr = lwip_htons(outpkt->authoritative); + hdr.numextrarr = lwip_htons(outpkt->additional); + hdr.id = lwip_htons(outpkt->tx_id); + pbuf_take(outpkt->pbuf, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)); + + /* Shrink packet */ + pbuf_realloc(outpkt->pbuf, outpkt->write_offset); + + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(outpkt->dest_addr)) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + mcast_destaddr = &v6group; +#endif + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + mcast_destaddr = &v4group; +#endif + } + + /* Send created packet */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Sending packet, len=%d, unicast=%d\n", outpkt->write_offset, outpkt->unicast_reply)); + + if (outpkt->unicast_reply) { + res = udp_sendto_if(mdns_pcb, outpkt->pbuf, &outpkt->dest_addr, outpkt->dest_port, outpkt->netif); + } else { + res = udp_sendto_if(mdns_pcb, outpkt->pbuf, mcast_destaddr, LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS, outpkt->netif); + } + } + +cleanup: + + if (outpkt->pbuf) { + pbuf_free(outpkt->pbuf); + outpkt->pbuf = NULL; + } + + return res; +} + +/** + * Send unsolicited answer containing all our known data + * @param netif The network interface to send on + * @param destination The target address to send to (usually multicast address) + */ +static void mdns_announce(struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *destination) +{ + struct mdns_outpacket announce; + int i; + struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + + memset(&announce, 0, sizeof(announce)); + announce.netif = netif; + announce.cache_flush = 1; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + announce.host_replies = REPLY_HOST_A | REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4; + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { + announce.host_replies |= REPLY_HOST_AAAA | REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6; + announce.host_reverse_v6_replies |= (1 << i); + } + } + +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + struct mdns_service *serv = mdns->services[i]; + + if (serv) { + announce.serv_replies[i] = REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR | REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR | + REPLY_SERVICE_SRV | REPLY_SERVICE_TXT; + } + } + + announce.dest_port = LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS; + SMEMCPY(&announce.dest_addr, destination, sizeof(announce.dest_addr)); + mdns_send_outpacket(&announce, DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE | DNS_FLAG1_AUTHORATIVE); +} + +/** + * Handle question MDNS packet + * 1. Parse all questions and set bits what answers to send + * 2. Clear pending answers if known answers are supplied + * 3. Put chosen answers in new packet and send as reply + */ +static void mdns_handle_question(struct mdns_packet *pkt) +{ + struct mdns_service *service; + struct mdns_outpacket reply; + int replies = 0; + int i; + err_t res; + struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(pkt->netif); + + if (mdns->probing_state != MDNS_PROBING_COMPLETE) { + /* Don't answer questions until we've verified our domains via probing */ + /* @todo we should check incoming questions during probing for tiebreaking */ + return; + } + + mdns_init_outpacket(&reply, pkt); + + while (pkt->questions_left) { + struct mdns_question q; + + res = mdns_read_question(pkt, &q); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Failed to parse question, skipping query packet\n")); + return; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Query for domain ")); + mdns_domain_debug_print(&q.info.domain); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, (" type %d class %d\n", q.info.type, q.info.klass)); + + if (q.unicast) { + /* Reply unicast if any question is unicast */ + reply.unicast_reply = 1; + } + + reply.host_replies |= check_host(pkt->netif, &q.info, &reply.host_reverse_v6_replies); + replies |= reply.host_replies; + + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + service = mdns->services[i]; + + if (!service) { + continue; + } + + reply.serv_replies[i] |= check_service(service, &q.info); + replies |= reply.serv_replies[i]; + } + + if (replies && reply.legacy_query) { + /* Add question to reply packet (legacy packet only has 1 question) */ + res = mdns_add_question(&reply, &q.info.domain, q.info.type, q.info.klass, 0); + reply.questions = 1; + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + } + + /* Handle known answers */ + while (pkt->answers_left) { + struct mdns_answer ans; + u8_t rev_v6; + int match; + + res = mdns_read_answer(pkt, &ans); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Failed to parse answer, skipping query packet\n")); + goto cleanup; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Known answer for domain ")); + mdns_domain_debug_print(&ans.info.domain); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, (" type %d class %d\n", ans.info.type, ans.info.klass)); + + if (ans.info.type == DNS_RRTYPE_ANY || ans.info.klass == DNS_RRCLASS_ANY) { + /* Skip known answers for ANY type & class */ + continue; + } + + rev_v6 = 0; + match = reply.host_replies & check_host(pkt->netif, &ans.info, &rev_v6); + + if (match && (ans.ttl > (mdns->dns_ttl / 2))) { + /* The RR in the known answer matches an RR we are planning to send, + * and the TTL is less than half gone. + * If the payload matches we should not send that answer. + */ + if (ans.info.type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR) { + /* Read domain and compare */ + struct mdns_domain known_ans, my_ans; + u16_t len; + len = mdns_readname(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, &known_ans); + res = mdns_build_host_domain(&my_ans, mdns); + + if (len != MDNS_READNAME_ERROR && res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&known_ans, &my_ans)) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (match & REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: v4 PTR\n")); + reply.host_replies &= ~REPLY_HOST_PTR_V4; + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (match & REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: v6 PTR\n")); + reply.host_reverse_v6_replies &= ~rev_v6; + + if (reply.host_reverse_v6_replies == 0) { + reply.host_replies &= ~REPLY_HOST_PTR_V6; + } + } + +#endif + } + } else if (match & REPLY_HOST_A) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (ans.rd_length == sizeof(ip4_addr_t) && + pbuf_memcmp(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, netif_ip4_addr(pkt->netif), ans.rd_length) == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: A\n")); + reply.host_replies &= ~REPLY_HOST_A; + } + +#endif + } else if (match & REPLY_HOST_AAAA) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (ans.rd_length == sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t) && + /* TODO this clears all AAAA responses if first addr is set as known */ + pbuf_memcmp(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, netif_ip6_addr(pkt->netif, 0), ans.rd_length) == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: AAAA\n")); + reply.host_replies &= ~REPLY_HOST_AAAA; + } + +#endif + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + service = mdns->services[i]; + + if (!service) { + continue; + } + + match = reply.serv_replies[i] & check_service(service, &ans.info); + + if (match && (ans.ttl > (service->dns_ttl / 2))) { + /* The RR in the known answer matches an RR we are planning to send, + * and the TTL is less than half gone. + * If the payload matches we should not send that answer. + */ + if (ans.info.type == DNS_RRTYPE_PTR) { + /* Read domain and compare */ + struct mdns_domain known_ans, my_ans; + u16_t len; + len = mdns_readname(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, &known_ans); + + if (len != MDNS_READNAME_ERROR) { + if (match & REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR) { + res = mdns_build_service_domain(&my_ans, service, 0); + + if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&known_ans, &my_ans)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: service type PTR\n")); + reply.serv_replies[i] &= ~REPLY_SERVICE_TYPE_PTR; + } + } + + if (match & REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR) { + res = mdns_build_service_domain(&my_ans, service, 1); + + if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&known_ans, &my_ans)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: service name PTR\n")); + reply.serv_replies[i] &= ~REPLY_SERVICE_NAME_PTR; + } + } + } + } else if (match & REPLY_SERVICE_SRV) { + /* Read and compare to my SRV record */ + u16_t field16, len, read_pos; + struct mdns_domain known_ans, my_ans; + read_pos = ans.rd_offset; + + do { + /* Check priority field */ + len = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), read_pos); + + if (len != sizeof(field16) || lwip_ntohs(field16) != SRV_PRIORITY) { + break; + } + + read_pos += len; + /* Check weight field */ + len = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), read_pos); + + if (len != sizeof(field16) || lwip_ntohs(field16) != SRV_WEIGHT) { + break; + } + + read_pos += len; + /* Check port field */ + len = pbuf_copy_partial(pkt->pbuf, &field16, sizeof(field16), read_pos); + + if (len != sizeof(field16) || lwip_ntohs(field16) != service->port) { + break; + } + + read_pos += len; + /* Check host field */ + len = mdns_readname(pkt->pbuf, read_pos, &known_ans); + mdns_build_host_domain(&my_ans, mdns); + + if (len == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR || !mdns_domain_eq(&known_ans, &my_ans)) { + break; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: SRV\n")); + reply.serv_replies[i] &= ~REPLY_SERVICE_SRV; + } while (0); + } else if (match & REPLY_SERVICE_TXT) { + mdns_prepare_txtdata(service); + + if (service->txtdata.length == ans.rd_length && + pbuf_memcmp(pkt->pbuf, ans.rd_offset, service->txtdata.name, ans.rd_length) == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Skipping known answer: TXT\n")); + reply.serv_replies[i] &= ~REPLY_SERVICE_TXT; + } + } + } + } + } + + mdns_send_outpacket(&reply, DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE | DNS_FLAG1_AUTHORATIVE); + +cleanup: + + if (reply.pbuf) { + /* This should only happen if we fail to alloc/write question for legacy query */ + pbuf_free(reply.pbuf); + reply.pbuf = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * Handle response MDNS packet + * Only prints debug for now. Will need more code to do conflict resolution. + */ +static void mdns_handle_response(struct mdns_packet *pkt) +{ + struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(pkt->netif); + + /* Ignore all questions */ + while (pkt->questions_left) { + struct mdns_question q; + err_t res; + + res = mdns_read_question(pkt, &q); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Failed to parse question, skipping response packet\n")); + return; + } + } + + while (pkt->answers_left) { + struct mdns_answer ans; + err_t res; + + res = mdns_read_answer(pkt, &ans); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Failed to parse answer, skipping response packet\n")); + return; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Answer for domain ")); + mdns_domain_debug_print(&ans.info.domain); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, (" type %d class %d\n", ans.info.type, ans.info.klass)); + + /*"Apparently conflicting Multicast DNS responses received *before* the first probe packet is sent MUST + be silently ignored" so drop answer if we haven't started probing yet*/ + if ((mdns->probing_state == MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING) && (mdns->probes_sent > 0)) { + struct mdns_domain domain; + u8_t i; + u8_t conflict = 0; + + res = mdns_build_host_domain(&domain, mdns); + + if (res == ERR_OK && mdns_domain_eq(&ans.info.domain, &domain)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Probe response matches host domain!")); + conflict = 1; + } + + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + struct mdns_service *service = mdns->services[i]; + + if (!service) { + continue; + } + + res = mdns_build_service_domain(&domain, service, 1); + + if ((res == ERR_OK) && mdns_domain_eq(&ans.info.domain, &domain)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Probe response matches service domain!")); + conflict = 1; + } + } + + if (conflict != 0) { + sys_untimeout(mdns_probe, pkt->netif); + + if (mdns_name_result_cb != NULL) { + mdns_name_result_cb(pkt->netif, MDNS_PROBING_CONFLICT); + } + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Receive input function for MDNS packets. + * Handles both IPv4 and IPv6 UDP pcbs. + */ +static void mdns_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + struct dns_hdr hdr; + struct mdns_packet packet; + struct netif *recv_netif = ip_current_input_netif(); + u16_t offset = 0; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MDNS_DEBUG, ("MDNS: Received IPv%d MDNS packet, len %d\n", IP_IS_V6(addr) ? 6 : 4, p->tot_len)); + + if (NETIF_TO_HOST(recv_netif) == NULL) { + /* From netif not configured for MDNS */ + goto dealloc; + } + + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &hdr, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR, offset) < SIZEOF_DNS_HDR) { + /* Too small */ + goto dealloc; + } + + offset += SIZEOF_DNS_HDR; + + if (DNS_HDR_GET_OPCODE(&hdr)) { + /* Ignore non-standard queries in multicast packets (RFC 6762, section 18.3) */ + goto dealloc; + } + + memset(&packet, 0, sizeof(packet)); + SMEMCPY(&packet.source_addr, addr, sizeof(packet.source_addr)); + packet.source_port = port; + packet.netif = recv_netif; + packet.pbuf = p; + packet.parse_offset = offset; + packet.tx_id = lwip_ntohs(hdr.id); + packet.questions = packet.questions_left = lwip_ntohs(hdr.numquestions); + packet.answers = packet.answers_left = lwip_ntohs(hdr.numanswers) + lwip_ntohs(hdr.numauthrr) + lwip_ntohs(hdr.numextrarr); + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (IP_IS_V6(ip_current_dest_addr())) { + /* instead of having one 'v6group' per netif, just compare zoneless here */ + if (!ip_addr_cmp_zoneless(ip_current_dest_addr(), &v6group)) { + packet.recv_unicast = 1; + } + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (!IP_IS_V6(ip_current_dest_addr())) { + if (!ip_addr_cmp(ip_current_dest_addr(), &v4group)) { + packet.recv_unicast = 1; + } + } + +#endif + + if (hdr.flags1 & DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE) { + mdns_handle_response(&packet); + } else { + mdns_handle_question(&packet); + } + +dealloc: + pbuf_free(p); +} + +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK && MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK +static void mdns_netif_ext_status_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(args); + + /* MDNS enabled on netif? */ + if (NETIF_TO_HOST(netif) == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (reason & LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED) { + if (args->status_changed.state != 0) { + mdns_resp_restart(netif); + } + + /* TODO: send goodbye message */ + } + + if (reason & LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED) { + if (args->link_changed.state != 0) { + mdns_resp_restart(netif); + } + } + + if (reason & (LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED | + LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED | + LWIP_NSC_IPV6_SET | LWIP_NSC_IPV6_ADDR_STATE_CHANGED)) { + mdns_resp_announce(netif); + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK && MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK */ + +static err_t mdns_send_probe(struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *destination) +{ + struct mdns_host *mdns; + struct mdns_outpacket pkt; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u8_t i; + err_t res; + + mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + + memset(&pkt, 0, sizeof(pkt)); + pkt.netif = netif; + + /* Add unicast questions with rtype ANY for all our desired records */ + mdns_build_host_domain(&domain, mdns); + res = mdns_add_question(&pkt, &domain, DNS_RRTYPE_ANY, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, 1); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + pkt.questions++; + + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + struct mdns_service *service = mdns->services[i]; + + if (!service) { + continue; + } + + mdns_build_service_domain(&domain, service, 1); + res = mdns_add_question(&pkt, &domain, DNS_RRTYPE_ANY, DNS_RRCLASS_IN, 1); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + + pkt.questions++; + } + + /* Add answers to the questions above into the authority section for tiebreaking */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + pkt.host_replies = REPLY_HOST_A; + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { + pkt.host_replies |= REPLY_HOST_AAAA; + } + } + +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + struct mdns_service *serv = mdns->services[i]; + + if (serv) { + pkt.serv_replies[i] = REPLY_SERVICE_SRV | REPLY_SERVICE_TXT; + } + } + + pkt.tx_id = 0; + pkt.dest_port = LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS; + SMEMCPY(&pkt.dest_addr, destination, sizeof(pkt.dest_addr)); + res = mdns_send_outpacket(&pkt, 0); + +cleanup: + + if (pkt.pbuf) { + pbuf_free(pkt.pbuf); + pkt.pbuf = NULL; + } + + return res; +} + +/** + * Timer callback for probing network. + */ +static void mdns_probe(void *arg) +{ + struct netif *netif = (struct netif *)arg; + struct mdns_host *mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + + if (mdns->probes_sent >= MDNS_PROBE_COUNT) { + /* probing successful, announce the new name */ + mdns->probing_state = MDNS_PROBING_COMPLETE; + mdns_resp_announce(netif); + + if (mdns_name_result_cb != NULL) { + mdns_name_result_cb(netif, MDNS_PROBING_SUCCESSFUL); + } + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /*if ipv4 wait with probing until address is set*/ + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif)) && + mdns_send_probe(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY) == ERR_OK) +#endif + { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (mdns_send_probe(netif, IP6_ADDR_ANY) == ERR_OK) +#endif + { + mdns->probes_sent++; + } + } + + sys_timeout(MDNS_PROBE_DELAY_MS, mdns_probe, netif); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Activate MDNS responder for a network interface. + * @param netif The network interface to activate. + * @param hostname Name to use. Queries for <hostname>.local will be answered + * with the IP addresses of the netif. The hostname will be copied, the + * given pointer can be on the stack. + * @param dns_ttl Validity time in seconds to send out for IP address data in DNS replies + * @return ERR_OK if netif was added, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mdns_resp_add_netif(struct netif *netif, const char *hostname, u32_t dns_ttl) +{ + err_t res; + struct mdns_host *mdns; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_netif: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_netif: Hostname too long", (strlen(hostname) <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); + + LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_add_netif: Double add", NETIF_TO_HOST(netif) == NULL); + mdns = (struct mdns_host *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct mdns_host)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_netif: Alloc failed", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_MEM); + + netif_set_client_data(netif, mdns_netif_client_id, mdns); + + MEMCPY(&mdns->name, hostname, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, strlen(hostname))); + mdns->dns_ttl = dns_ttl; + mdns->probes_sent = 0; + mdns->probing_state = MDNS_PROBING_NOT_STARTED; + + /* Join multicast groups */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + res = igmp_joingroup_netif(netif, ip_2_ip4(&v4group)); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + res = mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, ip_2_ip6(&v6group)); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#endif + + mdns_resp_restart(netif); + + return ERR_OK; + +cleanup: + mem_free(mdns); + netif_set_client_data(netif, mdns_netif_client_id, NULL); + return res; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Stop responding to MDNS queries on this interface, leave multicast groups, + * and free the helper structure and any of its services. + * @param netif The network interface to remove. + * @return ERR_OK if netif was removed, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mdns_resp_remove_netif(struct netif *netif) +{ + int i; + struct mdns_host *mdns; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_remove_netif: Null pointer", netif); + mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_remove_netif: Not an active netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + + if (mdns->probing_state == MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING) { + sys_untimeout(mdns_probe, netif); + } + + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + struct mdns_service *service = mdns->services[i]; + + if (service) { + mem_free(service); + } + } + + /* Leave multicast groups */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + igmp_leavegroup_netif(netif, ip_2_ip4(&v4group)); +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, ip_2_ip6(&v6group)); +#endif + + mem_free(mdns); + netif_set_client_data(netif, mdns_netif_client_id, NULL); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Update MDNS hostname for a network interface. + * @param netif The network interface to activate. + * @param hostname Name to use. Queries for <hostname>.local will be answered + * with the IP addresses of the netif. The hostname will be copied, the + * given pointer can be on the stack. + * @return ERR_OK if name could be set on netif, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mdns_resp_rename_netif(struct netif *netif, const char *hostname) +{ + struct mdns_host *mdns; + size_t len; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + len = strlen(hostname); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_netif: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_netif: Hostname too long", (len <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); + mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_netif: Not an mdns netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + + MEMCPY(&mdns->name, hostname, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, len)); + mdns->name[len] = '\0'; /* null termination in case new name is shorter than previous */ + + mdns_resp_restart(netif); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Add a service to the selected network interface. + * @param netif The network interface to publish this service on + * @param name The name of the service + * @param service The service type, like "_http" + * @param proto The service protocol, DNSSD_PROTO_TCP for TCP ("_tcp") and DNSSD_PROTO_UDP + * for others ("_udp") + * @param port The port the service listens to + * @param dns_ttl Validity time in seconds to send out for service data in DNS replies + * @param txt_fn Callback to get TXT data. Will be called each time a TXT reply is created to + * allow dynamic replies. + * @param txt_data Userdata pointer for txt_fn + * @return service_id if the service was added to the netif, an err_t otherwise + */ +s8_t mdns_resp_add_service(struct netif *netif, const char *name, const char *service, enum mdns_sd_proto proto, u16_t port, u32_t dns_ttl, service_get_txt_fn_t txt_fn, void *txt_data) +{ + s8_t i; + s8_t slot = -1; + struct mdns_service *srv; + struct mdns_host *mdns; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_add_service: netif != NULL", netif); + mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Not an mdns netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Name too long", (strlen(name) <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Service too long", (strlen(service) <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Bad proto (need TCP or UDP)", (proto == DNSSD_PROTO_TCP || proto == DNSSD_PROTO_UDP), return ERR_VAL); + + for (i = 0; i < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES; i++) { + if (mdns->services[i] == NULL) { + slot = i; + break; + } + } + + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Service list full (increase MDNS_MAX_SERVICES)", (slot >= 0), return ERR_MEM); + + srv = (struct mdns_service *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct mdns_service)); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_add_service: Alloc failed", (srv != NULL), return ERR_MEM); + + MEMCPY(&srv->name, name, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, strlen(name))); + MEMCPY(&srv->service, service, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, strlen(service))); + srv->txt_fn = txt_fn; + srv->txt_userdata = txt_data; + srv->proto = (u16_t)proto; + srv->port = port; + srv->dns_ttl = dns_ttl; + + mdns->services[slot] = srv; + + mdns_resp_restart(netif); + + return slot; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Delete a service on the selected network interface. + * @param netif The network interface on which service should be removed + * @param slot The service slot number returned by mdns_resp_add_service + * @return ERR_OK if the service was removed from the netif, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mdns_resp_del_service(struct netif *netif, s8_t slot) +{ + struct mdns_host *mdns; + struct mdns_service *srv; + LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_del_service: netif != NULL", netif); + mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_del_service: Not an mdns netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_del_service: Invalid Service ID", (slot >= 0) && (slot < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES), return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_del_service: Invalid Service ID", (mdns->services[slot] != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + + srv = mdns->services[slot]; + mdns->services[slot] = NULL; + mem_free(srv); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Update name for an MDNS service. + * @param netif The network interface to activate. + * @param slot The service slot number returned by mdns_resp_add_service + * @param name The new name for the service + * @return ERR_OK if name could be set on service, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mdns_resp_rename_service(struct netif *netif, s8_t slot, const char *name) +{ + struct mdns_service *srv; + struct mdns_host *mdns; + size_t len; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + len = strlen(name); + LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_rename_service: netif != NULL", netif); + mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_service: Not an mdns netif", (mdns != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_service: Name too long", (len <= MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN), return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_service: Invalid Service ID", (slot >= 0) && (slot < MDNS_MAX_SERVICES), return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_rename_service: Invalid Service ID", (mdns->services[slot] != NULL), return ERR_VAL); + + srv = mdns->services[slot]; + + MEMCPY(&srv->name, name, LWIP_MIN(MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN, len)); + srv->name[len] = '\0'; /* null termination in case new name is shorter than previous */ + + mdns_resp_restart(netif); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Call this function from inside the service_get_txt_fn_t callback to add text data. + * Buffer for TXT data is 256 bytes, and each field is prefixed with a length byte. + * @param service The service provided to the get_txt callback + * @param txt String to add to the TXT field. + * @param txt_len Length of string + * @return ERR_OK if the string was added to the reply, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mdns_resp_add_service_txtitem(struct mdns_service *service, const char *txt, u8_t txt_len) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mdns_resp_add_service_txtitem: service != NULL", service); + + /* Use a mdns_domain struct to store txt chunks since it is the same encoding */ + return mdns_domain_add_label(&service->txtdata, txt, txt_len); +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Send unsolicited answer containing all our known data + * @param netif The network interface to send on + */ +void mdns_resp_announce(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct mdns_host *mdns; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_announce: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ); + + mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + + if (mdns == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (mdns->probing_state == MDNS_PROBING_COMPLETE) { + /* Announce on IPv6 and IPv4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + mdns_announce(netif, IP6_ADDR_ANY); +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + mdns_announce(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY); + } + +#endif + } /* else: ip address changed while probing was ongoing? @todo reset counter to restart? */ +} + +/** Register a callback function that is called if probing is completed successfully + * or with a conflict. */ +void mdns_resp_register_name_result_cb(mdns_name_result_cb_t cb) +{ + mdns_name_result_cb = cb; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Restart mdns responder. Call this when cable is connected after being disconnected or + * administrative interface is set up after being down + * @param netif The network interface to send on + */ +void mdns_resp_restart(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct mdns_host *mdns; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ERROR("mdns_resp_restart: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ); + + mdns = NETIF_TO_HOST(netif); + + if (mdns == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (mdns->probing_state == MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING) { + sys_untimeout(mdns_probe, netif); + } + + /* @todo if we've failed 15 times within a 10 second period we MUST wait 5 seconds (or wait 5 seconds every time except first)*/ + mdns->probes_sent = 0; + mdns->probing_state = MDNS_PROBING_ONGOING; + sys_timeout(MDNS_INITIAL_PROBE_DELAY_MS, mdns_probe, netif); +} + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Initiate MDNS responder. Will open UDP sockets on port 5353 + */ +void mdns_resp_init(void) +{ + err_t res; + + /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by udp_new() */ + + mdns_pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to allocate pcb", mdns_pcb != NULL); +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + udp_set_multicast_ttl(mdns_pcb, MDNS_TTL); +#else + mdns_pcb->ttl = MDNS_TTL; +#endif + res = udp_bind(mdns_pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(res); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to bind pcb", res == ERR_OK); + udp_recv(mdns_pcb, mdns_recv, NULL); + + mdns_netif_client_id = netif_alloc_client_data_id(); + +#if MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK + /* register for netif events when started on first netif */ + netif_add_ext_callback(&netif_callback, mdns_netif_ext_status_callback); +#endif +} + +#endif /* LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c index 1a2d851c..fd54cae2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/mqtt/mqtt.c @@ -1,1492 +1,1492 @@ -/** - * @file - * MQTT client - * - * @defgroup mqtt MQTT client - * @ingroup apps - * @verbinclude mqtt_client.txt - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2016 Erik Andersson - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack - * - * Author: Erik Andersson - * - * - * @todo: - * - Handle large outgoing payloads for PUBLISH messages - * - Fix restriction of a single topic in each (UN)SUBSCRIBE message (protocol has support for multiple topics) - * - Add support for legacy MQTT protocol version - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Erik Andersson - * Erik Andersson - * - */ -#include "lwip/apps/mqtt.h" -#include "lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" -#include - -#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API - -/** - * MQTT_DEBUG: Default is off. - */ -#if !defined MQTT_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MQTT_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -#define MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE) -#define MQTT_DEBUG_STATE (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE) -#define MQTT_DEBUG_WARN (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) -#define MQTT_DEBUG_WARN_STATE (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING | LWIP_DBG_STATE) -#define MQTT_DEBUG_SERIOUS (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS) - -/** - * MQTT client connection states - */ -enum { - TCP_DISCONNECTED, - TCP_CONNECTING, - MQTT_CONNECTING, - MQTT_CONNECTED -}; - -/** - * MQTT control message types - */ -enum mqtt_message_type { - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_CONNECT = 1, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_CONNACK = 2, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBLISH = 3, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBACK = 4, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREC = 5, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREL = 6, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBCOMP = 7, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBSCRIBE = 8, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBACK = 9, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_UNSUBSCRIBE = 10, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_UNSUBACK = 11, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PINGREQ = 12, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PINGRESP = 13, - MQTT_MSG_TYPE_DISCONNECT = 14 -}; - -/** Helpers to extract control packet type and qos from first byte in fixed header */ -#define MQTT_CTL_PACKET_TYPE(fixed_hdr_byte0) ((fixed_hdr_byte0 & 0xf0) >> 4) -#define MQTT_CTL_PACKET_QOS(fixed_hdr_byte0) ((fixed_hdr_byte0 & 0x6) >> 1) - -/** - * MQTT connect flags, only used in CONNECT message - */ -enum mqtt_connect_flag { - MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_USERNAME = 1 << 7, - MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_PASSWORD = 1 << 6, - MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL_RETAIN = 1 << 5, - MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL = 1 << 2, - MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_CLEAN_SESSION = 1 << 1 -}; - -static void mqtt_cyclic_timer(void *arg); - -#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) -static const char *const mqtt_message_type_str[15] = { - "UNDEFINED", - "CONNECT", - "CONNACK", - "PUBLISH", - "PUBACK", - "PUBREC", - "PUBREL", - "PUBCOMP", - "SUBSCRIBE", - "SUBACK", - "UNSUBSCRIBE", - "UNSUBACK", - "PINGREQ", - "PINGRESP", - "DISCONNECT" -}; - -/** - * Message type value to string - * @param msg_type see enum mqtt_message_type - * - * @return Control message type text string - */ -static const char *mqtt_msg_type_to_str(u8_t msg_type) -{ - if (msg_type >= LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(mqtt_message_type_str)) { - msg_type = 0; - } - - return mqtt_message_type_str[msg_type]; -} - -#endif - -/** - * Generate MQTT packet identifier - * @param client MQTT client - * @return New packet identifier, range 1 to 65535 - */ -static u16_t msg_generate_packet_id(mqtt_client_t *client) -{ - client->pkt_id_seq++; - - if (client->pkt_id_seq == 0) { - client->pkt_id_seq++; - } - - return client->pkt_id_seq; -} - -/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* Output ring buffer */ - -/** Add single item to ring buffer */ -static void mqtt_ringbuf_put(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u8_t item) -{ - rb->buf[rb->put] = item; - rb->put++; - - if (rb->put >= MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE) { - rb->put = 0; - } -} - -/** Return pointer to ring buffer get position */ -static u8_t *mqtt_ringbuf_get_ptr(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb) -{ - return &rb->buf[rb->get]; -} - -static void mqtt_ringbuf_advance_get_idx(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u16_t len) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_ringbuf_advance_get_idx: len < MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE", len < MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE); - - rb->get += len; - - if (rb->get >= MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE) { - rb->get = rb->get - MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE; - } -} - -/** Return number of bytes in ring buffer */ -static u16_t mqtt_ringbuf_len(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb) -{ - u32_t len = rb->put - rb->get; - - if (len > 0xFFFF) { - len += MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE; - } - - return (u16_t)len; -} - -/** Return number of bytes free in ring buffer */ -#define mqtt_ringbuf_free(rb) (MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE - mqtt_ringbuf_len(rb)) - -/** Return number of bytes possible to read without wrapping around */ -#define mqtt_ringbuf_linear_read_length(rb) LWIP_MIN(mqtt_ringbuf_len(rb), (MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE - (rb)->get)) - -/** - * Try send as many bytes as possible from output ring buffer - * @param rb Output ring buffer - * @param tpcb TCP connection handle - */ -static void mqtt_output_send(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, struct altcp_pcb *tpcb) -{ - err_t err; - u8_t wrap = 0; - u16_t ringbuf_lin_len = mqtt_ringbuf_linear_read_length(rb); - u16_t send_len = altcp_sndbuf(tpcb); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_output_send: tpcb != NULL", tpcb != NULL); - - if (send_len == 0 || ringbuf_lin_len == 0) { - return; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_output_send: tcp_sndbuf: %d bytes, ringbuf_linear_available: %d, get %d, put %d\n", - send_len, ringbuf_lin_len, rb->get, rb->put)); - - if (send_len > ringbuf_lin_len) { - /* Space in TCP output buffer is larger than available in ring buffer linear portion */ - send_len = ringbuf_lin_len; - /* Wrap around if more data in ring buffer after linear portion */ - wrap = (mqtt_ringbuf_len(rb) > ringbuf_lin_len); - } - - err = altcp_write(tpcb, mqtt_ringbuf_get_ptr(rb), send_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY | (wrap ? TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE : 0)); - - if ((err == ERR_OK) && wrap) { - mqtt_ringbuf_advance_get_idx(rb, send_len); - /* Use the lesser one of ring buffer linear length and TCP send buffer size */ - send_len = LWIP_MIN(altcp_sndbuf(tpcb), mqtt_ringbuf_linear_read_length(rb)); - err = altcp_write(tpcb, mqtt_ringbuf_get_ptr(rb), send_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - } - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - mqtt_ringbuf_advance_get_idx(rb, send_len); - /* Flush */ - altcp_output(tpcb); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_output_send: Send failed with err %d (\"%s\")\n", err, lwip_strerr(err))); - } -} - -/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* Request queue */ - -/** - * Create request item - * @param r_objs Pointer to request objects - * @param r_objs_len Number of array entries - * @param pkt_id Packet identifier of request - * @param cb Packet callback to call when requests lifetime ends - * @param arg Parameter following callback - * @return Request or NULL if failed to create - */ -static struct mqtt_request_t *mqtt_create_request(struct mqtt_request_t *r_objs, size_t r_objs_len, u16_t pkt_id, mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg) -{ - struct mqtt_request_t *r = NULL; - u8_t n; - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_create_request: r_objs != NULL", r_objs != NULL); - - for (n = 0; n < r_objs_len; n++) { - /* Item point to itself if not in use */ - if (r_objs[n].next == &r_objs[n]) { - r = &r_objs[n]; - r->next = NULL; - r->cb = cb; - r->arg = arg; - r->pkt_id = pkt_id; - break; - } - } - - return r; -} - -/** - * Append request to pending request queue - * @param tail Pointer to request queue tail pointer - * @param r Request to append - */ -static void mqtt_append_request(struct mqtt_request_t **tail, struct mqtt_request_t *r) -{ - struct mqtt_request_t *head = NULL; - s16_t time_before = 0; - struct mqtt_request_t *iter; - - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_append_request: tail != NULL", tail != NULL); - - /* Iterate trough queue to find head, and count total timeout time */ - for (iter = *tail; iter != NULL; iter = iter->next) { - time_before += iter->timeout_diff; - head = iter; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_append_request: time_before <= MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT", time_before <= MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT); - r->timeout_diff = MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT - time_before; - - if (head == NULL) { - *tail = r; - } else { - head->next = r; - } -} - -/** - * Delete request item - * @param r Request item to delete - */ -static void mqtt_delete_request(struct mqtt_request_t *r) -{ - if (r != NULL) { - r->next = r; - } -} - -/** - * Remove a request item with a specific packet identifier from request queue - * @param tail Pointer to request queue tail pointer - * @param pkt_id Packet identifier of request to take - * @return Request item if found, NULL if not - */ -static struct mqtt_request_t *mqtt_take_request(struct mqtt_request_t **tail, u16_t pkt_id) -{ - struct mqtt_request_t *iter = NULL, *prev = NULL; - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_take_request: tail != NULL", tail != NULL); - - /* Search all request for pkt_id */ - for (iter = *tail; iter != NULL; iter = iter->next) { - if (iter->pkt_id == pkt_id) { - break; - } - - prev = iter; - } - - /* If request was found */ - if (iter != NULL) { - /* unchain */ - if (prev == NULL) { - *tail = iter->next; - } else { - prev->next = iter->next; - } - - /* If exists, add remaining timeout time for the request to next */ - if (iter->next != NULL) { - iter->next->timeout_diff += iter->timeout_diff; - } - - iter->next = NULL; - } - - return iter; -} - -/** - * Handle requests timeout - * @param tail Pointer to request queue tail pointer - * @param t Time since last call in seconds - */ -static void mqtt_request_time_elapsed(struct mqtt_request_t **tail, u8_t t) -{ - struct mqtt_request_t *r; - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_request_time_elapsed: tail != NULL", tail != NULL); - r = *tail; - - while (t > 0 && r != NULL) { - if (t >= r->timeout_diff) { - t -= (u8_t)r->timeout_diff; - /* Unchain */ - *tail = r->next; - - /* Notify upper layer about timeout */ - if (r->cb != NULL) { - r->cb(r->arg, ERR_TIMEOUT); - } - - mqtt_delete_request(r); - /* Tail might be be modified in callback, so re-read it in every iteration */ - r = *(struct mqtt_request_t *const volatile *)tail; - } else { - r->timeout_diff -= t; - t = 0; - } - } -} - -/** - * Free all request items - * @param tail Pointer to request queue tail pointer - */ -static void mqtt_clear_requests(struct mqtt_request_t **tail) -{ - struct mqtt_request_t *iter, *next; - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_clear_requests: tail != NULL", tail != NULL); - - for (iter = *tail; iter != NULL; iter = next) { - next = iter->next; - mqtt_delete_request(iter); - } - - *tail = NULL; -} -/** - * Initialize all request items - * @param r_objs Pointer to request objects - * @param r_objs_len Number of array entries - */ -static void mqtt_init_requests(struct mqtt_request_t *r_objs, size_t r_objs_len) -{ - u8_t n; - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_init_requests: r_objs != NULL", r_objs != NULL); - - for (n = 0; n < r_objs_len; n++) { - /* Item pointing to itself indicates unused */ - r_objs[n].next = &r_objs[n]; - } -} - -/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* Output message build helpers */ - -static void mqtt_output_append_u8(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u8_t value) -{ - mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, value); -} - -static void mqtt_output_append_u16(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u16_t value) -{ - mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, value >> 8); - mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, value & 0xff); -} - -static void mqtt_output_append_buf(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, const void *data, u16_t length) -{ - u16_t n; - - for (n = 0; n < length; n++) { - mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, ((const u8_t *)data)[n]); - } -} - -static void mqtt_output_append_string(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, const char *str, u16_t length) -{ - u16_t n; - mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, length >> 8); - mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, length & 0xff); - - for (n = 0; n < length; n++) { - mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, str[n]); - } -} - -/** - * Append fixed header - * @param rb Output ring buffer - * @param msg_type see enum mqtt_message_type - * @param fdup MQTT DUP flag - * @param fqos MQTT QoS field - * @param fretain MQTT retain flag - * @param r_length Remaining length after fixed header - */ - -static void mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u8_t msg_type, u8_t fdup, - u8_t fqos, u8_t fretain, u16_t r_length) -{ - /* Start with control byte */ - mqtt_output_append_u8(rb, (((msg_type & 0x0f) << 4) | ((fdup & 1) << 3) | ((fqos & 3) << 1) | (fretain & 1))); - - /* Encode remaining length field */ - do { - mqtt_output_append_u8(rb, (r_length & 0x7f) | (r_length >= 128 ? 0x80 : 0)); - r_length >>= 7; - } while (r_length > 0); -} - -/** - * Check output buffer space - * @param rb Output ring buffer - * @param r_length Remaining length after fixed header - * @return 1 if message will fit, 0 if not enough buffer space - */ -static u8_t mqtt_output_check_space(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u16_t r_length) -{ - /* Start with length of type byte + remaining length */ - u16_t total_len = 1 + r_length; - - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_output_check_space: rb != NULL", rb != NULL); - - /* Calculate number of required bytes to contain the remaining bytes field and add to total*/ - do { - total_len++; - r_length >>= 7; - } while (r_length > 0); - - return (total_len <= mqtt_ringbuf_free(rb)); -} - -/** - * Close connection to server - * @param client MQTT client - * @param reason Reason for disconnection - */ -static void mqtt_close(mqtt_client_t *client, mqtt_connection_status_t reason) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_close: client != NULL", client != NULL); - - /* Bring down TCP connection if not already done */ - if (client->conn != NULL) { - err_t res; - altcp_recv(client->conn, NULL); - altcp_err(client->conn, NULL); - altcp_sent(client->conn, NULL); - res = altcp_close(client->conn); - - if (res != ERR_OK) { - altcp_abort(client->conn); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_close: Close err=%s\n", lwip_strerr(res))); - } - - client->conn = NULL; - } - - /* Remove all pending requests */ - mqtt_clear_requests(&client->pend_req_queue); - /* Stop cyclic timer */ - sys_untimeout(mqtt_cyclic_timer, client); - - /* Notify upper layer of disconnection if changed state */ - if (client->conn_state != TCP_DISCONNECTED) { - client->conn_state = TCP_DISCONNECTED; - - if (client->connect_cb != NULL) { - client->connect_cb(client, client->connect_arg, reason); - } - } -} - -/** - * Interval timer, called every MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL seconds in MQTT_CONNECTING and MQTT_CONNECTED states - * @param arg MQTT client - */ -static void mqtt_cyclic_timer(void *arg) -{ - u8_t restart_timer = 1; - mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_cyclic_timer: client != NULL", client != NULL); - - if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTING) { - client->cyclic_tick++; - - if ((client->cyclic_tick * MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL) >= MQTT_CONNECT_TIMOUT) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_cyclic_timer: CONNECT attempt to server timed out\n")); - /* Disconnect TCP */ - mqtt_close(client, MQTT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT); - restart_timer = 0; - } - } else if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTED) { - /* Handle timeout for pending requests */ - mqtt_request_time_elapsed(&client->pend_req_queue, MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL); - - /* keep_alive > 0 means keep alive functionality shall be used */ - if (client->keep_alive > 0) { - client->server_watchdog++; - - /* If reception from server has been idle for 1.5*keep_alive time, server is considered unresponsive */ - if ((client->server_watchdog * MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL) > (client->keep_alive + client->keep_alive / 2)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_cyclic_timer: Server incoming keep-alive timeout\n")); - mqtt_close(client, MQTT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT); - restart_timer = 0; - } - - /* If time for a keep alive message to be sent, transmission has been idle for keep_alive time */ - if ((client->cyclic_tick * MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL) >= client->keep_alive) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_cyclic_timer: Sending keep-alive message to server\n")); - - if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, 0) != 0) { - mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PINGREQ, 0, 0, 0, 0); - client->cyclic_tick = 0; - } - } else { - client->cyclic_tick++; - } - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_cyclic_timer: Timer should not be running in state %d\n", client->conn_state)); - restart_timer = 0; - } - - if (restart_timer) { - sys_timeout(MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL * 1000, mqtt_cyclic_timer, arg); - } -} - -/** - * Send PUBACK, PUBREC or PUBREL response message - * @param client MQTT client - * @param msg PUBACK, PUBREC or PUBREL - * @param pkt_id Packet identifier - * @param qos QoS value - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_MEM if out of memory - */ -static err_t pub_ack_rec_rel_response(mqtt_client_t *client, u8_t msg, u16_t pkt_id, u8_t qos) -{ - err_t err = ERR_OK; - - if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, 2)) { - mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, msg, 0, qos, 0, 2); - mqtt_output_append_u16(&client->output, pkt_id); - mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("pub_ack_rec_rel_response: OOM creating response: %s with pkt_id: %d\n", - mqtt_msg_type_to_str(msg), pkt_id)); - err = ERR_MEM; - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * Subscribe response from server - * @param r Matching request - * @param result Result code from server - */ -static void mqtt_incomming_suback(struct mqtt_request_t *r, u8_t result) -{ - if (r->cb != NULL) { - r->cb(r->arg, result < 3 ? ERR_OK : ERR_ABRT); - } -} - -/** - * Complete MQTT message received or buffer full - * @param client MQTT client - * @param fixed_hdr_idx header index - * @param length length received part - * @param remaining_length Remaining length of complete message - */ -static mqtt_connection_status_t mqtt_message_received(mqtt_client_t *client, u8_t fixed_hdr_idx, u16_t length, u32_t remaining_length) -{ - mqtt_connection_status_t res = MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED; - - u8_t *var_hdr_payload = client->rx_buffer + fixed_hdr_idx; - size_t var_hdr_payload_bufsize = sizeof(client->rx_buffer) - fixed_hdr_idx; - - /* Control packet type */ - u8_t pkt_type = MQTT_CTL_PACKET_TYPE(client->rx_buffer[0]); - u16_t pkt_id = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT("client->msg_idx < MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN", client->msg_idx < MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN); - LWIP_ASSERT("fixed_hdr_idx <= client->msg_idx", fixed_hdr_idx <= client->msg_idx); - LWIP_ERROR("buffer length mismatch", fixed_hdr_idx + length <= MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN, - return MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED); - - if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_CONNACK) { - if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTING) { - if (length < 2) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short CONNACK message\n")); - goto out_disconnect; - } - - /* Get result code from CONNACK */ - res = (mqtt_connection_status_t)var_hdr_payload[1]; - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: Connect response code %d\n", res)); - - if (res == MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED) { - /* Reset cyclic_tick when changing to connected state */ - client->cyclic_tick = 0; - client->conn_state = MQTT_CONNECTED; - - /* Notify upper layer */ - if (client->connect_cb != 0) { - client->connect_cb(client, client->connect_arg, res); - } - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received CONNACK in connected state\n")); - } - } else if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PINGRESP) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: Received PINGRESP from server\n")); - - } else if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBLISH) { - u16_t payload_offset = 0; - u16_t payload_length = length; - u8_t qos = MQTT_CTL_PACKET_QOS(client->rx_buffer[0]); - - if (client->msg_idx <= MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN) { - /* Should have topic and pkt id*/ - u8_t *topic; - u16_t after_topic; - u8_t bkp; - u16_t topic_len; - u16_t qos_len = (qos ? 2U : 0U); - - if (length < 2 + qos_len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short PUBLISH packet\n")); - goto out_disconnect; - } - - topic_len = var_hdr_payload[0]; - topic_len = (topic_len << 8) + (u16_t)(var_hdr_payload[1]); - - if ((topic_len > length - (2 + qos_len)) || - (topic_len > var_hdr_payload_bufsize - (2 + qos_len))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short PUBLISH packet (topic)\n")); - goto out_disconnect; - } - - topic = var_hdr_payload + 2; - after_topic = 2 + topic_len; - - /* Check buffer length, add one byte even for QoS 0 so that zero termination will fit */ - if ((after_topic + (qos ? 2U : 1U)) > var_hdr_payload_bufsize) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Receive buffer can not fit topic + pkt_id\n")); - goto out_disconnect; - } - - /* id for QoS 1 and 2 */ - if (qos > 0) { - if (length < after_topic + 2U) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short PUBLISH packet (after_topic)\n")); - goto out_disconnect; - } - - client->inpub_pkt_id = ((u16_t)var_hdr_payload[after_topic] << 8) + (u16_t)var_hdr_payload[after_topic + 1]; - after_topic += 2; - } else { - client->inpub_pkt_id = 0; - } - - /* Take backup of byte after topic */ - bkp = topic[topic_len]; - /* Zero terminate string */ - topic[topic_len] = 0; - /* Payload data remaining in receive buffer */ - payload_length = length - after_topic; - payload_offset = after_topic; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_incomming_publish: Received message with QoS %d at topic: %s, payload length %" U32_F "\n", - qos, topic, remaining_length + payload_length)); - - if (client->pub_cb != NULL) { - client->pub_cb(client->inpub_arg, (const char *)topic, remaining_length + payload_length); - } - - /* Restore byte after topic */ - topic[topic_len] = bkp; - } - - if (payload_length > 0 || remaining_length == 0) { - if (length < (size_t)(payload_offset + payload_length)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short packet (payload)\n")); - goto out_disconnect; - } - - client->data_cb(client->inpub_arg, var_hdr_payload + payload_offset, payload_length, remaining_length == 0 ? MQTT_DATA_FLAG_LAST : 0); - - /* Reply if QoS > 0 */ - if (remaining_length == 0 && qos > 0) { - /* Send PUBACK for QoS 1 or PUBREC for QoS 2 */ - u8_t resp_msg = (qos == 1) ? MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBACK : MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREC; - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_incomming_publish: Sending publish response: %s with pkt_id: %d\n", - mqtt_msg_type_to_str(resp_msg), client->inpub_pkt_id)); - pub_ack_rec_rel_response(client, resp_msg, client->inpub_pkt_id, 0); - } - } - } else { - /* Get packet identifier */ - pkt_id = (u16_t)var_hdr_payload[0] << 8; - pkt_id |= (u16_t)var_hdr_payload[1]; - - if (pkt_id == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Got message with illegal packet identifier: 0\n")); - goto out_disconnect; - } - - if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREC) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: PUBREC, sending PUBREL with pkt_id: %d\n", pkt_id)); - pub_ack_rec_rel_response(client, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREL, pkt_id, 1); - - } else if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: PUBREL, sending PUBCOMP response with pkt_id: %d\n", pkt_id)); - pub_ack_rec_rel_response(client, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBCOMP, pkt_id, 0); - - } else if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBACK || pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_UNSUBACK || - pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBCOMP || pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBACK) { - struct mqtt_request_t *r = mqtt_take_request(&client->pend_req_queue, pkt_id); - - if (r != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: %s response with id %d\n", mqtt_msg_type_to_str(pkt_type), pkt_id)); - - if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBACK) { - if (length < 3) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: To small SUBACK packet\n")); - goto out_disconnect; - } else { - mqtt_incomming_suback(r, var_hdr_payload[2]); - } - } else if (r->cb != NULL) { - r->cb(r->arg, ERR_OK); - } - - mqtt_delete_request(r); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received %s reply, with wrong pkt_id: %d\n", mqtt_msg_type_to_str(pkt_type), pkt_id)); - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received unknown message type: %d\n", pkt_type)); - goto out_disconnect; - } - } - - return res; -out_disconnect: - return MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED; -} - -/** - * MQTT incoming message parser - * @param client MQTT client - * @param p PBUF chain of received data - * @return Connection status - */ -static mqtt_connection_status_t mqtt_parse_incoming(mqtt_client_t *client, struct pbuf *p) -{ - u16_t in_offset = 0; - u32_t msg_rem_len = 0; - u8_t fixed_hdr_idx = 0; - u8_t b = 0; - - while (p->tot_len > in_offset) { - /* We ALWAYS parse the header here first. Even if the header was not - included in this segment, we re-parse it here by buffering it in - client->rx_buffer. client->msg_idx keeps track of this. */ - if ((fixed_hdr_idx < 2) || ((b & 0x80) != 0)) { - if (fixed_hdr_idx < client->msg_idx) { - /* parse header from old pbuf (buffered in client->rx_buffer) */ - b = client->rx_buffer[fixed_hdr_idx]; - } else { - /* parse header from this pbuf and save it in client->rx_buffer in case - it comes in segmented */ - b = pbuf_get_at(p, in_offset++); - client->rx_buffer[client->msg_idx++] = b; - } - - fixed_hdr_idx++; - - if (fixed_hdr_idx >= 2) { - /* fixed header contains at least 2 bytes but can contain more, depending on - 'remaining length'. All bytes but the last of this have 0x80 set to - indicate more bytes are coming. */ - msg_rem_len |= (u32_t)(b & 0x7f) << ((fixed_hdr_idx - 2) * 7); - - if ((b & 0x80) == 0) { - /* fixed header is done */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_parse_incoming: Remaining length after fixed header: %" U32_F "\n", msg_rem_len)); - - if (msg_rem_len == 0) { - /* Complete message with no extra headers of payload received */ - mqtt_message_received(client, fixed_hdr_idx, 0, 0); - client->msg_idx = 0; - fixed_hdr_idx = 0; - } else { - /* Bytes remaining in message (changes remaining length if this is - not the first segment of this message) */ - msg_rem_len = (msg_rem_len + fixed_hdr_idx) - client->msg_idx; - } - } - } - } else { - /* Fixed header has been parsed, parse variable header */ - u16_t cpy_len, cpy_start, buffer_space; - - cpy_start = (client->msg_idx - fixed_hdr_idx) % (MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN - fixed_hdr_idx) + fixed_hdr_idx; - - /* Allow to copy the lesser one of available length in input data or bytes remaining in message */ - cpy_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN((u16_t)(p->tot_len - in_offset), msg_rem_len); - - /* Limit to available space in buffer */ - buffer_space = MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN - cpy_start; - - if (cpy_len > buffer_space) { - cpy_len = buffer_space; - } - - pbuf_copy_partial(p, client->rx_buffer + cpy_start, cpy_len, in_offset); - - /* Advance get and put indexes */ - client->msg_idx += cpy_len; - in_offset += cpy_len; - msg_rem_len -= cpy_len; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_parse_incoming: msg_idx: %" U32_F ", cpy_len: %" U16_F ", remaining %" U32_F "\n", client->msg_idx, cpy_len, msg_rem_len)); - - if ((msg_rem_len == 0) || (cpy_len == buffer_space)) { - /* Whole message received or buffer is full */ - mqtt_connection_status_t res = mqtt_message_received(client, fixed_hdr_idx, (cpy_start + cpy_len) - fixed_hdr_idx, msg_rem_len); - - if (res != MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED) { - return res; - } - - if (msg_rem_len == 0) { - /* Reset parser state */ - client->msg_idx = 0; - /* msg_tot_len = 0; */ - fixed_hdr_idx = 0; - } - } - } - } - - return MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED; -} - -/** - * TCP received callback function. @see tcp_recv_fn - * @param arg MQTT client - * @param p PBUF chain of received data - * @param err Passed as return value if not ERR_OK - * @return ERR_OK or err passed into callback - */ -static err_t mqtt_tcp_recv_cb(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_tcp_recv_cb: client != NULL", client != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_tcp_recv_cb: client->conn == pcb", client->conn == pcb); - - if (p == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_tcp_recv_cb: Recv pbuf=NULL, remote has closed connection\n")); - mqtt_close(client, MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED); - } else { - mqtt_connection_status_t res; - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_tcp_recv_cb: Recv err=%d\n", err)); - pbuf_free(p); - return err; - } - - /* Tell remote that data has been received */ - altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); - res = mqtt_parse_incoming(client, p); - pbuf_free(p); - - if (res != MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED) { - mqtt_close(client, res); - } - - /* If keep alive functionality is used */ - if (client->keep_alive != 0) { - /* Reset server alive watchdog */ - client->server_watchdog = 0; - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * TCP data sent callback function. @see tcp_sent_fn - * @param arg MQTT client - * @param tpcb TCP connection handle - * @param len Number of bytes sent - * @return ERR_OK - */ -static err_t mqtt_tcp_sent_cb(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *tpcb, u16_t len) -{ - mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTED) { - struct mqtt_request_t *r; - - /* Reset keep-alive send timer and server watchdog */ - client->cyclic_tick = 0; - client->server_watchdog = 0; - - /* QoS 0 publish has no response from server, so call its callbacks here */ - while ((r = mqtt_take_request(&client->pend_req_queue, 0)) != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_tcp_sent_cb: Calling QoS 0 publish complete callback\n")); - - if (r->cb != NULL) { - r->cb(r->arg, ERR_OK); - } - - mqtt_delete_request(r); - } - - /* Try send any remaining buffers from output queue */ - mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * TCP error callback function. @see tcp_err_fn - * @param arg MQTT client - * @param err Error encountered - */ -static void mqtt_tcp_err_cb(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* only used for debug output */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_tcp_err_cb: TCP error callback: error %d, arg: %p\n", err, arg)); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_tcp_err_cb: client != NULL", client != NULL); - /* Set conn to null before calling close as pcb is already deallocated*/ - client->conn = 0; - mqtt_close(client, MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED); -} - -/** - * TCP poll callback function. @see tcp_poll_fn - * @param arg MQTT client - * @param tpcb TCP connection handle - * @return err ERR_OK - */ -static err_t mqtt_tcp_poll_cb(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *tpcb) -{ - mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; - - if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTED) { - /* Try send any remaining buffers from output queue */ - mqtt_output_send(&client->output, tpcb); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * TCP connect callback function. @see tcp_connected_fn - * @param arg MQTT client - * @param err Always ERR_OK, mqtt_tcp_err_cb is called in case of error - * @return ERR_OK - */ -static err_t mqtt_tcp_connect_cb(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *tpcb, err_t err) -{ - mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_tcp_connect_cb: TCP connect error %d\n", err)); - return err; - } - - /* Initiate receiver state */ - client->msg_idx = 0; - - /* Setup TCP callbacks */ - altcp_recv(tpcb, mqtt_tcp_recv_cb); - altcp_sent(tpcb, mqtt_tcp_sent_cb); - altcp_poll(tpcb, mqtt_tcp_poll_cb, 2); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_tcp_connect_cb: TCP connection established to server\n")); - /* Enter MQTT connect state */ - client->conn_state = MQTT_CONNECTING; - - /* Start cyclic timer */ - sys_timeout(MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL * 1000, mqtt_cyclic_timer, client); - client->cyclic_tick = 0; - - /* Start transmission from output queue, connect message is the first one out*/ - mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* Public API */ - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * MQTT publish function. - * @param client MQTT client - * @param topic Publish topic string - * @param payload Data to publish (NULL is allowed) - * @param payload_length Length of payload (0 is allowed) - * @param qos Quality of service, 0 1 or 2 - * @param retain MQTT retain flag - * @param cb Callback to call when publish is complete or has timed out - * @param arg User supplied argument to publish callback - * @return ERR_OK if successful - * ERR_CONN if client is disconnected - * ERR_MEM if short on memory - */ -err_t mqtt_publish(mqtt_client_t *client, const char *topic, const void *payload, u16_t payload_length, u8_t qos, u8_t retain, - mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg) -{ - struct mqtt_request_t *r; - u16_t pkt_id; - size_t topic_strlen; - size_t total_len; - u16_t topic_len; - u16_t remaining_length; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_publish: client != NULL", client); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_publish: topic != NULL", topic); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_publish: TCP disconnected", (client->conn_state != TCP_DISCONNECTED), return ERR_CONN); - - topic_strlen = strlen(topic); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_publish: topic length overflow", (topic_strlen <= (0xFFFF - 2)), return ERR_ARG); - topic_len = (u16_t)topic_strlen; - total_len = 2 + topic_len + payload_length; - - if (qos > 0) { - total_len += 2; - /* Generate pkt_id id for QoS1 and 2 */ - pkt_id = msg_generate_packet_id(client); - } else { - /* Use reserved value pkt_id 0 for QoS 0 in request handle */ - pkt_id = 0; - } - - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_publish: total length overflow", (total_len <= 0xFFFF), return ERR_ARG); - remaining_length = (u16_t)total_len; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_publish: Publish with payload length %d to topic \"%s\"\n", payload_length, topic)); - - r = mqtt_create_request(client->req_list, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(client->req_list), pkt_id, cb, arg); - - if (r == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, remaining_length) == 0) { - mqtt_delete_request(r); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Append fixed header */ - mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBLISH, 0, qos, retain, remaining_length); - - /* Append Topic */ - mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, topic, topic_len); - - /* Append packet if for QoS 1 and 2*/ - if (qos > 0) { - mqtt_output_append_u16(&client->output, pkt_id); - } - - /* Append optional publish payload */ - if ((payload != NULL) && (payload_length > 0)) { - mqtt_output_append_buf(&client->output, payload, payload_length); - } - - mqtt_append_request(&client->pend_req_queue, r); - mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * MQTT subscribe/unsubscribe function. - * @param client MQTT client - * @param topic topic to subscribe to - * @param qos Quality of service, 0 1 or 2 (only used for subscribe) - * @param cb Callback to call when subscribe/unsubscribe reponse is received - * @param arg User supplied argument to publish callback - * @param sub 1 for subscribe, 0 for unsubscribe - * @return ERR_OK if successful, @see err_t enum for other results - */ -err_t mqtt_sub_unsub(mqtt_client_t *client, const char *topic, u8_t qos, mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg, u8_t sub) -{ - size_t topic_strlen; - size_t total_len; - u16_t topic_len; - u16_t remaining_length; - u16_t pkt_id; - struct mqtt_request_t *r; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_sub_unsub: client != NULL", client); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_sub_unsub: topic != NULL", topic); - - topic_strlen = strlen(topic); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_sub_unsub: topic length overflow", (topic_strlen <= (0xFFFF - 2)), return ERR_ARG); - topic_len = (u16_t)topic_strlen; - /* Topic string, pkt_id, qos for subscribe */ - total_len = topic_len + 2 + 2 + (sub != 0); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_sub_unsub: total length overflow", (total_len <= 0xFFFF), return ERR_ARG); - remaining_length = (u16_t)total_len; - - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_sub_unsub: qos < 3", qos < 3); - - if (client->conn_state == TCP_DISCONNECTED) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_sub_unsub: Can not (un)subscribe in disconnected state\n")); - return ERR_CONN; - } - - pkt_id = msg_generate_packet_id(client); - r = mqtt_create_request(client->req_list, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(client->req_list), pkt_id, cb, arg); - - if (r == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, remaining_length) == 0) { - mqtt_delete_request(r); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_sub_unsub: Client (un)subscribe to topic \"%s\", id: %d\n", topic, pkt_id)); - - mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, sub ? MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBSCRIBE : MQTT_MSG_TYPE_UNSUBSCRIBE, 0, 1, 0, remaining_length); - /* Packet id */ - mqtt_output_append_u16(&client->output, pkt_id); - /* Topic */ - mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, topic, topic_len); - - /* QoS */ - if (sub != 0) { - mqtt_output_append_u8(&client->output, LWIP_MIN(qos, 2)); - } - - mqtt_append_request(&client->pend_req_queue, r); - mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Set callback to handle incoming publish requests from server - * @param client MQTT client - * @param pub_cb Callback invoked when publish starts, contain topic and total length of payload - * @param data_cb Callback for each fragment of payload that arrives - * @param arg User supplied argument to both callbacks - */ -void mqtt_set_inpub_callback(mqtt_client_t *client, mqtt_incoming_publish_cb_t pub_cb, - mqtt_incoming_data_cb_t data_cb, void *arg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_set_inpub_callback: client != NULL", client != NULL); - client->data_cb = data_cb; - client->pub_cb = pub_cb; - client->inpub_arg = arg; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Create a new MQTT client instance - * @return Pointer to instance on success, NULL otherwise - */ -mqtt_client_t *mqtt_client_new(void) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - return (mqtt_client_t *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(mqtt_client_t)); -} - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Free MQTT client instance - * @param client Pointer to instance to be freed - */ -void mqtt_client_free(mqtt_client_t *client) -{ - mem_free(client); -} - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Connect to MQTT server - * @param client MQTT client - * @param ip_addr Server IP - * @param port Server port - * @param cb Connection state change callback - * @param arg User supplied argument to connection callback - * @param client_info Client identification and connection options - * @return ERR_OK if successful, @see err_t enum for other results - */ -err_t mqtt_client_connect(mqtt_client_t *client, const ip_addr_t *ip_addr, u16_t port, mqtt_connection_cb_t cb, void *arg, - const struct mqtt_connect_client_info_t *client_info) -{ - err_t err; - size_t len; - u16_t client_id_length; - /* Length is the sum of 2+"MQTT", protocol level, flags and keep alive */ - u16_t remaining_length = 2 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2; - u8_t flags = 0, will_topic_len = 0, will_msg_len = 0; - u16_t client_user_len = 0, client_pass_len = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_connect: client != NULL", client != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_connect: ip_addr != NULL", ip_addr != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_connect: client_info != NULL", client_info != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_id != NULL", client_info->client_id != NULL); - - if (client->conn_state != TCP_DISCONNECTED) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_client_connect: Already connected\n")); - return ERR_ISCONN; - } - - /* Wipe clean */ - memset(client, 0, sizeof(mqtt_client_t)); - client->connect_arg = arg; - client->connect_cb = cb; - client->keep_alive = client_info->keep_alive; - mqtt_init_requests(client->req_list, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(client->req_list)); - - /* Build connect message */ - if (client_info->will_topic != NULL && client_info->will_msg != NULL) { - flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL; - flags |= (client_info->will_qos & 3) << 3; - - if (client_info->will_retain) { - flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL_RETAIN; - } - - len = strlen(client_info->will_topic); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->will_topic length overflow", len <= 0xFF, return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->will_topic length must be > 0", len > 0, return ERR_VAL); - will_topic_len = (u8_t)len; - len = strlen(client_info->will_msg); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->will_msg length overflow", len <= 0xFF, return ERR_VAL); - will_msg_len = (u8_t)len; - len = remaining_length + 2 + will_topic_len + 2 + will_msg_len; - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: remaining_length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); - remaining_length = (u16_t)len; - } - - if (client_info->client_user != NULL) { - flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_USERNAME; - len = strlen(client_info->client_user); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_user length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_user length must be > 0", len > 0, return ERR_VAL); - client_user_len = (u16_t)len; - len = remaining_length + 2 + client_user_len; - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: remaining_length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); - remaining_length = (u16_t)len; - } - - if (client_info->client_pass != NULL) { - flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_PASSWORD; - len = strlen(client_info->client_pass); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_pass length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_pass length must be > 0", len > 0, return ERR_VAL); - client_pass_len = (u16_t)len; - len = remaining_length + 2 + client_pass_len; - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: remaining_length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); - remaining_length = (u16_t)len; - } - - /* Don't complicate things, always connect using clean session */ - flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_CLEAN_SESSION; - - len = strlen(client_info->client_id); - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_id length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); - client_id_length = (u16_t)len; - len = remaining_length + 2 + client_id_length; - LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: remaining_length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); - remaining_length = (u16_t)len; - - if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, remaining_length) == 0) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - -#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS - - if (client_info->tls_config) { - client->conn = altcp_tls_new(client_info->tls_config, IP_GET_TYPE(ip_addr)); - } else -#endif - { - client->conn = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IP_GET_TYPE(ip_addr)); - } - - if (client->conn == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Set arg pointer for callbacks */ - altcp_arg(client->conn, client); - /* Any local address, pick random local port number */ - err = altcp_bind(client->conn, IP_ADDR_ANY, 0); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_client_connect: Error binding to local ip/port, %d\n", err)); - goto tcp_fail; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_client_connect: Connecting to host: %s at port:%" U16_F "\n", ipaddr_ntoa(ip_addr), port)); - - /* Connect to server */ - err = altcp_connect(client->conn, ip_addr, port, mqtt_tcp_connect_cb); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_client_connect: Error connecting to remote ip/port, %d\n", err)); - goto tcp_fail; - } - - /* Set error callback */ - altcp_err(client->conn, mqtt_tcp_err_cb); - client->conn_state = TCP_CONNECTING; - - /* Append fixed header */ - mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_CONNECT, 0, 0, 0, remaining_length); - /* Append Protocol string */ - mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, "MQTT", 4); - /* Append Protocol level */ - mqtt_output_append_u8(&client->output, 4); - /* Append connect flags */ - mqtt_output_append_u8(&client->output, flags); - /* Append keep-alive */ - mqtt_output_append_u16(&client->output, client_info->keep_alive); - /* Append client id */ - mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->client_id, client_id_length); - - /* Append will message if used */ - if ((flags & MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL) != 0) { - mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->will_topic, will_topic_len); - mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->will_msg, will_msg_len); - } - - /* Append user name if given */ - if ((flags & MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_USERNAME) != 0) { - mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->client_user, client_user_len); - } - - /* Append password if given */ - if ((flags & MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_PASSWORD) != 0) { - mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->client_pass, client_pass_len); - } - - return ERR_OK; - -tcp_fail: - altcp_abort(client->conn); - client->conn = NULL; - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Disconnect from MQTT server - * @param client MQTT client - */ -void mqtt_disconnect(mqtt_client_t *client) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_disconnect: client != NULL", client); - - /* If connection in not already closed */ - if (client->conn_state != TCP_DISCONNECTED) { - /* Set conn_state before calling mqtt_close to prevent callback from being called */ - client->conn_state = TCP_DISCONNECTED; - mqtt_close(client, (mqtt_connection_status_t)0); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Check connection with server - * @param client MQTT client - * @return 1 if connected to server, 0 otherwise - */ -u8_t mqtt_client_is_connected(mqtt_client_t *client) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_is_connected: client != NULL", client); - return client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTED; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ +/** + * @file + * MQTT client + * + * @defgroup mqtt MQTT client + * @ingroup apps + * @verbinclude mqtt_client.txt + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Erik Andersson + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack + * + * Author: Erik Andersson + * + * + * @todo: + * - Handle large outgoing payloads for PUBLISH messages + * - Fix restriction of a single topic in each (UN)SUBSCRIBE message (protocol has support for multiple topics) + * - Add support for legacy MQTT protocol version + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Erik Andersson + * Erik Andersson + * + */ +#include "lwip/apps/mqtt.h" +#include "lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" +#include + +#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API + +/** + * MQTT_DEBUG: Default is off. + */ +#if !defined MQTT_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MQTT_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +#define MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE) +#define MQTT_DEBUG_STATE (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE) +#define MQTT_DEBUG_WARN (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) +#define MQTT_DEBUG_WARN_STATE (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING | LWIP_DBG_STATE) +#define MQTT_DEBUG_SERIOUS (MQTT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS) + +/** + * MQTT client connection states + */ +enum { + TCP_DISCONNECTED, + TCP_CONNECTING, + MQTT_CONNECTING, + MQTT_CONNECTED +}; + +/** + * MQTT control message types + */ +enum mqtt_message_type { + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_CONNECT = 1, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_CONNACK = 2, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBLISH = 3, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBACK = 4, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREC = 5, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREL = 6, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBCOMP = 7, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBSCRIBE = 8, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBACK = 9, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_UNSUBSCRIBE = 10, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_UNSUBACK = 11, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PINGREQ = 12, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PINGRESP = 13, + MQTT_MSG_TYPE_DISCONNECT = 14 +}; + +/** Helpers to extract control packet type and qos from first byte in fixed header */ +#define MQTT_CTL_PACKET_TYPE(fixed_hdr_byte0) ((fixed_hdr_byte0 & 0xf0) >> 4) +#define MQTT_CTL_PACKET_QOS(fixed_hdr_byte0) ((fixed_hdr_byte0 & 0x6) >> 1) + +/** + * MQTT connect flags, only used in CONNECT message + */ +enum mqtt_connect_flag { + MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_USERNAME = 1 << 7, + MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_PASSWORD = 1 << 6, + MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL_RETAIN = 1 << 5, + MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL = 1 << 2, + MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_CLEAN_SESSION = 1 << 1 +}; + +static void mqtt_cyclic_timer(void *arg); + +#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) +static const char *const mqtt_message_type_str[15] = { + "UNDEFINED", + "CONNECT", + "CONNACK", + "PUBLISH", + "PUBACK", + "PUBREC", + "PUBREL", + "PUBCOMP", + "SUBSCRIBE", + "SUBACK", + "UNSUBSCRIBE", + "UNSUBACK", + "PINGREQ", + "PINGRESP", + "DISCONNECT" +}; + +/** + * Message type value to string + * @param msg_type see enum mqtt_message_type + * + * @return Control message type text string + */ +static const char *mqtt_msg_type_to_str(u8_t msg_type) +{ + if (msg_type >= LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(mqtt_message_type_str)) { + msg_type = 0; + } + + return mqtt_message_type_str[msg_type]; +} + +#endif + +/** + * Generate MQTT packet identifier + * @param client MQTT client + * @return New packet identifier, range 1 to 65535 + */ +static u16_t msg_generate_packet_id(mqtt_client_t *client) +{ + client->pkt_id_seq++; + + if (client->pkt_id_seq == 0) { + client->pkt_id_seq++; + } + + return client->pkt_id_seq; +} + +/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* Output ring buffer */ + +/** Add single item to ring buffer */ +static void mqtt_ringbuf_put(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u8_t item) +{ + rb->buf[rb->put] = item; + rb->put++; + + if (rb->put >= MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE) { + rb->put = 0; + } +} + +/** Return pointer to ring buffer get position */ +static u8_t *mqtt_ringbuf_get_ptr(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb) +{ + return &rb->buf[rb->get]; +} + +static void mqtt_ringbuf_advance_get_idx(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u16_t len) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_ringbuf_advance_get_idx: len < MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE", len < MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE); + + rb->get += len; + + if (rb->get >= MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE) { + rb->get = rb->get - MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE; + } +} + +/** Return number of bytes in ring buffer */ +static u16_t mqtt_ringbuf_len(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb) +{ + u32_t len = rb->put - rb->get; + + if (len > 0xFFFF) { + len += MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE; + } + + return (u16_t)len; +} + +/** Return number of bytes free in ring buffer */ +#define mqtt_ringbuf_free(rb) (MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE - mqtt_ringbuf_len(rb)) + +/** Return number of bytes possible to read without wrapping around */ +#define mqtt_ringbuf_linear_read_length(rb) LWIP_MIN(mqtt_ringbuf_len(rb), (MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE - (rb)->get)) + +/** + * Try send as many bytes as possible from output ring buffer + * @param rb Output ring buffer + * @param tpcb TCP connection handle + */ +static void mqtt_output_send(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, struct altcp_pcb *tpcb) +{ + err_t err; + u8_t wrap = 0; + u16_t ringbuf_lin_len = mqtt_ringbuf_linear_read_length(rb); + u16_t send_len = altcp_sndbuf(tpcb); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_output_send: tpcb != NULL", tpcb != NULL); + + if (send_len == 0 || ringbuf_lin_len == 0) { + return; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_output_send: tcp_sndbuf: %d bytes, ringbuf_linear_available: %d, get %d, put %d\n", + send_len, ringbuf_lin_len, rb->get, rb->put)); + + if (send_len > ringbuf_lin_len) { + /* Space in TCP output buffer is larger than available in ring buffer linear portion */ + send_len = ringbuf_lin_len; + /* Wrap around if more data in ring buffer after linear portion */ + wrap = (mqtt_ringbuf_len(rb) > ringbuf_lin_len); + } + + err = altcp_write(tpcb, mqtt_ringbuf_get_ptr(rb), send_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY | (wrap ? TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE : 0)); + + if ((err == ERR_OK) && wrap) { + mqtt_ringbuf_advance_get_idx(rb, send_len); + /* Use the lesser one of ring buffer linear length and TCP send buffer size */ + send_len = LWIP_MIN(altcp_sndbuf(tpcb), mqtt_ringbuf_linear_read_length(rb)); + err = altcp_write(tpcb, mqtt_ringbuf_get_ptr(rb), send_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + } + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + mqtt_ringbuf_advance_get_idx(rb, send_len); + /* Flush */ + altcp_output(tpcb); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_output_send: Send failed with err %d (\"%s\")\n", err, lwip_strerr(err))); + } +} + +/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* Request queue */ + +/** + * Create request item + * @param r_objs Pointer to request objects + * @param r_objs_len Number of array entries + * @param pkt_id Packet identifier of request + * @param cb Packet callback to call when requests lifetime ends + * @param arg Parameter following callback + * @return Request or NULL if failed to create + */ +static struct mqtt_request_t *mqtt_create_request(struct mqtt_request_t *r_objs, size_t r_objs_len, u16_t pkt_id, mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg) +{ + struct mqtt_request_t *r = NULL; + u8_t n; + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_create_request: r_objs != NULL", r_objs != NULL); + + for (n = 0; n < r_objs_len; n++) { + /* Item point to itself if not in use */ + if (r_objs[n].next == &r_objs[n]) { + r = &r_objs[n]; + r->next = NULL; + r->cb = cb; + r->arg = arg; + r->pkt_id = pkt_id; + break; + } + } + + return r; +} + +/** + * Append request to pending request queue + * @param tail Pointer to request queue tail pointer + * @param r Request to append + */ +static void mqtt_append_request(struct mqtt_request_t **tail, struct mqtt_request_t *r) +{ + struct mqtt_request_t *head = NULL; + s16_t time_before = 0; + struct mqtt_request_t *iter; + + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_append_request: tail != NULL", tail != NULL); + + /* Iterate trough queue to find head, and count total timeout time */ + for (iter = *tail; iter != NULL; iter = iter->next) { + time_before += iter->timeout_diff; + head = iter; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_append_request: time_before <= MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT", time_before <= MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT); + r->timeout_diff = MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT - time_before; + + if (head == NULL) { + *tail = r; + } else { + head->next = r; + } +} + +/** + * Delete request item + * @param r Request item to delete + */ +static void mqtt_delete_request(struct mqtt_request_t *r) +{ + if (r != NULL) { + r->next = r; + } +} + +/** + * Remove a request item with a specific packet identifier from request queue + * @param tail Pointer to request queue tail pointer + * @param pkt_id Packet identifier of request to take + * @return Request item if found, NULL if not + */ +static struct mqtt_request_t *mqtt_take_request(struct mqtt_request_t **tail, u16_t pkt_id) +{ + struct mqtt_request_t *iter = NULL, *prev = NULL; + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_take_request: tail != NULL", tail != NULL); + + /* Search all request for pkt_id */ + for (iter = *tail; iter != NULL; iter = iter->next) { + if (iter->pkt_id == pkt_id) { + break; + } + + prev = iter; + } + + /* If request was found */ + if (iter != NULL) { + /* unchain */ + if (prev == NULL) { + *tail = iter->next; + } else { + prev->next = iter->next; + } + + /* If exists, add remaining timeout time for the request to next */ + if (iter->next != NULL) { + iter->next->timeout_diff += iter->timeout_diff; + } + + iter->next = NULL; + } + + return iter; +} + +/** + * Handle requests timeout + * @param tail Pointer to request queue tail pointer + * @param t Time since last call in seconds + */ +static void mqtt_request_time_elapsed(struct mqtt_request_t **tail, u8_t t) +{ + struct mqtt_request_t *r; + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_request_time_elapsed: tail != NULL", tail != NULL); + r = *tail; + + while (t > 0 && r != NULL) { + if (t >= r->timeout_diff) { + t -= (u8_t)r->timeout_diff; + /* Unchain */ + *tail = r->next; + + /* Notify upper layer about timeout */ + if (r->cb != NULL) { + r->cb(r->arg, ERR_TIMEOUT); + } + + mqtt_delete_request(r); + /* Tail might be be modified in callback, so re-read it in every iteration */ + r = *(struct mqtt_request_t *const volatile *)tail; + } else { + r->timeout_diff -= t; + t = 0; + } + } +} + +/** + * Free all request items + * @param tail Pointer to request queue tail pointer + */ +static void mqtt_clear_requests(struct mqtt_request_t **tail) +{ + struct mqtt_request_t *iter, *next; + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_clear_requests: tail != NULL", tail != NULL); + + for (iter = *tail; iter != NULL; iter = next) { + next = iter->next; + mqtt_delete_request(iter); + } + + *tail = NULL; +} +/** + * Initialize all request items + * @param r_objs Pointer to request objects + * @param r_objs_len Number of array entries + */ +static void mqtt_init_requests(struct mqtt_request_t *r_objs, size_t r_objs_len) +{ + u8_t n; + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_init_requests: r_objs != NULL", r_objs != NULL); + + for (n = 0; n < r_objs_len; n++) { + /* Item pointing to itself indicates unused */ + r_objs[n].next = &r_objs[n]; + } +} + +/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* Output message build helpers */ + +static void mqtt_output_append_u8(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u8_t value) +{ + mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, value); +} + +static void mqtt_output_append_u16(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u16_t value) +{ + mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, value >> 8); + mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, value & 0xff); +} + +static void mqtt_output_append_buf(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, const void *data, u16_t length) +{ + u16_t n; + + for (n = 0; n < length; n++) { + mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, ((const u8_t *)data)[n]); + } +} + +static void mqtt_output_append_string(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, const char *str, u16_t length) +{ + u16_t n; + mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, length >> 8); + mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, length & 0xff); + + for (n = 0; n < length; n++) { + mqtt_ringbuf_put(rb, str[n]); + } +} + +/** + * Append fixed header + * @param rb Output ring buffer + * @param msg_type see enum mqtt_message_type + * @param fdup MQTT DUP flag + * @param fqos MQTT QoS field + * @param fretain MQTT retain flag + * @param r_length Remaining length after fixed header + */ + +static void mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u8_t msg_type, u8_t fdup, + u8_t fqos, u8_t fretain, u16_t r_length) +{ + /* Start with control byte */ + mqtt_output_append_u8(rb, (((msg_type & 0x0f) << 4) | ((fdup & 1) << 3) | ((fqos & 3) << 1) | (fretain & 1))); + + /* Encode remaining length field */ + do { + mqtt_output_append_u8(rb, (r_length & 0x7f) | (r_length >= 128 ? 0x80 : 0)); + r_length >>= 7; + } while (r_length > 0); +} + +/** + * Check output buffer space + * @param rb Output ring buffer + * @param r_length Remaining length after fixed header + * @return 1 if message will fit, 0 if not enough buffer space + */ +static u8_t mqtt_output_check_space(struct mqtt_ringbuf_t *rb, u16_t r_length) +{ + /* Start with length of type byte + remaining length */ + u16_t total_len = 1 + r_length; + + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_output_check_space: rb != NULL", rb != NULL); + + /* Calculate number of required bytes to contain the remaining bytes field and add to total*/ + do { + total_len++; + r_length >>= 7; + } while (r_length > 0); + + return (total_len <= mqtt_ringbuf_free(rb)); +} + +/** + * Close connection to server + * @param client MQTT client + * @param reason Reason for disconnection + */ +static void mqtt_close(mqtt_client_t *client, mqtt_connection_status_t reason) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_close: client != NULL", client != NULL); + + /* Bring down TCP connection if not already done */ + if (client->conn != NULL) { + err_t res; + altcp_recv(client->conn, NULL); + altcp_err(client->conn, NULL); + altcp_sent(client->conn, NULL); + res = altcp_close(client->conn); + + if (res != ERR_OK) { + altcp_abort(client->conn); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_close: Close err=%s\n", lwip_strerr(res))); + } + + client->conn = NULL; + } + + /* Remove all pending requests */ + mqtt_clear_requests(&client->pend_req_queue); + /* Stop cyclic timer */ + sys_untimeout(mqtt_cyclic_timer, client); + + /* Notify upper layer of disconnection if changed state */ + if (client->conn_state != TCP_DISCONNECTED) { + client->conn_state = TCP_DISCONNECTED; + + if (client->connect_cb != NULL) { + client->connect_cb(client, client->connect_arg, reason); + } + } +} + +/** + * Interval timer, called every MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL seconds in MQTT_CONNECTING and MQTT_CONNECTED states + * @param arg MQTT client + */ +static void mqtt_cyclic_timer(void *arg) +{ + u8_t restart_timer = 1; + mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_cyclic_timer: client != NULL", client != NULL); + + if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTING) { + client->cyclic_tick++; + + if ((client->cyclic_tick * MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL) >= MQTT_CONNECT_TIMOUT) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_cyclic_timer: CONNECT attempt to server timed out\n")); + /* Disconnect TCP */ + mqtt_close(client, MQTT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT); + restart_timer = 0; + } + } else if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTED) { + /* Handle timeout for pending requests */ + mqtt_request_time_elapsed(&client->pend_req_queue, MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL); + + /* keep_alive > 0 means keep alive functionality shall be used */ + if (client->keep_alive > 0) { + client->server_watchdog++; + + /* If reception from server has been idle for 1.5*keep_alive time, server is considered unresponsive */ + if ((client->server_watchdog * MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL) > (client->keep_alive + client->keep_alive / 2)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_cyclic_timer: Server incoming keep-alive timeout\n")); + mqtt_close(client, MQTT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT); + restart_timer = 0; + } + + /* If time for a keep alive message to be sent, transmission has been idle for keep_alive time */ + if ((client->cyclic_tick * MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL) >= client->keep_alive) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_cyclic_timer: Sending keep-alive message to server\n")); + + if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, 0) != 0) { + mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PINGREQ, 0, 0, 0, 0); + client->cyclic_tick = 0; + } + } else { + client->cyclic_tick++; + } + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_cyclic_timer: Timer should not be running in state %d\n", client->conn_state)); + restart_timer = 0; + } + + if (restart_timer) { + sys_timeout(MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL * 1000, mqtt_cyclic_timer, arg); + } +} + +/** + * Send PUBACK, PUBREC or PUBREL response message + * @param client MQTT client + * @param msg PUBACK, PUBREC or PUBREL + * @param pkt_id Packet identifier + * @param qos QoS value + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_MEM if out of memory + */ +static err_t pub_ack_rec_rel_response(mqtt_client_t *client, u8_t msg, u16_t pkt_id, u8_t qos) +{ + err_t err = ERR_OK; + + if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, 2)) { + mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, msg, 0, qos, 0, 2); + mqtt_output_append_u16(&client->output, pkt_id); + mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("pub_ack_rec_rel_response: OOM creating response: %s with pkt_id: %d\n", + mqtt_msg_type_to_str(msg), pkt_id)); + err = ERR_MEM; + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * Subscribe response from server + * @param r Matching request + * @param result Result code from server + */ +static void mqtt_incomming_suback(struct mqtt_request_t *r, u8_t result) +{ + if (r->cb != NULL) { + r->cb(r->arg, result < 3 ? ERR_OK : ERR_ABRT); + } +} + +/** + * Complete MQTT message received or buffer full + * @param client MQTT client + * @param fixed_hdr_idx header index + * @param length length received part + * @param remaining_length Remaining length of complete message + */ +static mqtt_connection_status_t mqtt_message_received(mqtt_client_t *client, u8_t fixed_hdr_idx, u16_t length, u32_t remaining_length) +{ + mqtt_connection_status_t res = MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED; + + u8_t *var_hdr_payload = client->rx_buffer + fixed_hdr_idx; + size_t var_hdr_payload_bufsize = sizeof(client->rx_buffer) - fixed_hdr_idx; + + /* Control packet type */ + u8_t pkt_type = MQTT_CTL_PACKET_TYPE(client->rx_buffer[0]); + u16_t pkt_id = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT("client->msg_idx < MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN", client->msg_idx < MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN); + LWIP_ASSERT("fixed_hdr_idx <= client->msg_idx", fixed_hdr_idx <= client->msg_idx); + LWIP_ERROR("buffer length mismatch", fixed_hdr_idx + length <= MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN, + return MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED); + + if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_CONNACK) { + if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTING) { + if (length < 2) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short CONNACK message\n")); + goto out_disconnect; + } + + /* Get result code from CONNACK */ + res = (mqtt_connection_status_t)var_hdr_payload[1]; + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: Connect response code %d\n", res)); + + if (res == MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED) { + /* Reset cyclic_tick when changing to connected state */ + client->cyclic_tick = 0; + client->conn_state = MQTT_CONNECTED; + + /* Notify upper layer */ + if (client->connect_cb != 0) { + client->connect_cb(client, client->connect_arg, res); + } + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received CONNACK in connected state\n")); + } + } else if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PINGRESP) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: Received PINGRESP from server\n")); + + } else if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBLISH) { + u16_t payload_offset = 0; + u16_t payload_length = length; + u8_t qos = MQTT_CTL_PACKET_QOS(client->rx_buffer[0]); + + if (client->msg_idx <= MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN) { + /* Should have topic and pkt id*/ + u8_t *topic; + u16_t after_topic; + u8_t bkp; + u16_t topic_len; + u16_t qos_len = (qos ? 2U : 0U); + + if (length < 2 + qos_len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short PUBLISH packet\n")); + goto out_disconnect; + } + + topic_len = var_hdr_payload[0]; + topic_len = (topic_len << 8) + (u16_t)(var_hdr_payload[1]); + + if ((topic_len > length - (2 + qos_len)) || + (topic_len > var_hdr_payload_bufsize - (2 + qos_len))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short PUBLISH packet (topic)\n")); + goto out_disconnect; + } + + topic = var_hdr_payload + 2; + after_topic = 2 + topic_len; + + /* Check buffer length, add one byte even for QoS 0 so that zero termination will fit */ + if ((after_topic + (qos ? 2U : 1U)) > var_hdr_payload_bufsize) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Receive buffer can not fit topic + pkt_id\n")); + goto out_disconnect; + } + + /* id for QoS 1 and 2 */ + if (qos > 0) { + if (length < after_topic + 2U) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short PUBLISH packet (after_topic)\n")); + goto out_disconnect; + } + + client->inpub_pkt_id = ((u16_t)var_hdr_payload[after_topic] << 8) + (u16_t)var_hdr_payload[after_topic + 1]; + after_topic += 2; + } else { + client->inpub_pkt_id = 0; + } + + /* Take backup of byte after topic */ + bkp = topic[topic_len]; + /* Zero terminate string */ + topic[topic_len] = 0; + /* Payload data remaining in receive buffer */ + payload_length = length - after_topic; + payload_offset = after_topic; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_incomming_publish: Received message with QoS %d at topic: %s, payload length %" U32_F "\n", + qos, topic, remaining_length + payload_length)); + + if (client->pub_cb != NULL) { + client->pub_cb(client->inpub_arg, (const char *)topic, remaining_length + payload_length); + } + + /* Restore byte after topic */ + topic[topic_len] = bkp; + } + + if (payload_length > 0 || remaining_length == 0) { + if (length < (size_t)(payload_offset + payload_length)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received short packet (payload)\n")); + goto out_disconnect; + } + + client->data_cb(client->inpub_arg, var_hdr_payload + payload_offset, payload_length, remaining_length == 0 ? MQTT_DATA_FLAG_LAST : 0); + + /* Reply if QoS > 0 */ + if (remaining_length == 0 && qos > 0) { + /* Send PUBACK for QoS 1 or PUBREC for QoS 2 */ + u8_t resp_msg = (qos == 1) ? MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBACK : MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREC; + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_incomming_publish: Sending publish response: %s with pkt_id: %d\n", + mqtt_msg_type_to_str(resp_msg), client->inpub_pkt_id)); + pub_ack_rec_rel_response(client, resp_msg, client->inpub_pkt_id, 0); + } + } + } else { + /* Get packet identifier */ + pkt_id = (u16_t)var_hdr_payload[0] << 8; + pkt_id |= (u16_t)var_hdr_payload[1]; + + if (pkt_id == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Got message with illegal packet identifier: 0\n")); + goto out_disconnect; + } + + if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREC) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: PUBREC, sending PUBREL with pkt_id: %d\n", pkt_id)); + pub_ack_rec_rel_response(client, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREL, pkt_id, 1); + + } else if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBREL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: PUBREL, sending PUBCOMP response with pkt_id: %d\n", pkt_id)); + pub_ack_rec_rel_response(client, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBCOMP, pkt_id, 0); + + } else if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBACK || pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_UNSUBACK || + pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBCOMP || pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBACK) { + struct mqtt_request_t *r = mqtt_take_request(&client->pend_req_queue, pkt_id); + + if (r != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_message_received: %s response with id %d\n", mqtt_msg_type_to_str(pkt_type), pkt_id)); + + if (pkt_type == MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBACK) { + if (length < 3) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: To small SUBACK packet\n")); + goto out_disconnect; + } else { + mqtt_incomming_suback(r, var_hdr_payload[2]); + } + } else if (r->cb != NULL) { + r->cb(r->arg, ERR_OK); + } + + mqtt_delete_request(r); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received %s reply, with wrong pkt_id: %d\n", mqtt_msg_type_to_str(pkt_type), pkt_id)); + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_message_received: Received unknown message type: %d\n", pkt_type)); + goto out_disconnect; + } + } + + return res; +out_disconnect: + return MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED; +} + +/** + * MQTT incoming message parser + * @param client MQTT client + * @param p PBUF chain of received data + * @return Connection status + */ +static mqtt_connection_status_t mqtt_parse_incoming(mqtt_client_t *client, struct pbuf *p) +{ + u16_t in_offset = 0; + u32_t msg_rem_len = 0; + u8_t fixed_hdr_idx = 0; + u8_t b = 0; + + while (p->tot_len > in_offset) { + /* We ALWAYS parse the header here first. Even if the header was not + included in this segment, we re-parse it here by buffering it in + client->rx_buffer. client->msg_idx keeps track of this. */ + if ((fixed_hdr_idx < 2) || ((b & 0x80) != 0)) { + if (fixed_hdr_idx < client->msg_idx) { + /* parse header from old pbuf (buffered in client->rx_buffer) */ + b = client->rx_buffer[fixed_hdr_idx]; + } else { + /* parse header from this pbuf and save it in client->rx_buffer in case + it comes in segmented */ + b = pbuf_get_at(p, in_offset++); + client->rx_buffer[client->msg_idx++] = b; + } + + fixed_hdr_idx++; + + if (fixed_hdr_idx >= 2) { + /* fixed header contains at least 2 bytes but can contain more, depending on + 'remaining length'. All bytes but the last of this have 0x80 set to + indicate more bytes are coming. */ + msg_rem_len |= (u32_t)(b & 0x7f) << ((fixed_hdr_idx - 2) * 7); + + if ((b & 0x80) == 0) { + /* fixed header is done */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_parse_incoming: Remaining length after fixed header: %" U32_F "\n", msg_rem_len)); + + if (msg_rem_len == 0) { + /* Complete message with no extra headers of payload received */ + mqtt_message_received(client, fixed_hdr_idx, 0, 0); + client->msg_idx = 0; + fixed_hdr_idx = 0; + } else { + /* Bytes remaining in message (changes remaining length if this is + not the first segment of this message) */ + msg_rem_len = (msg_rem_len + fixed_hdr_idx) - client->msg_idx; + } + } + } + } else { + /* Fixed header has been parsed, parse variable header */ + u16_t cpy_len, cpy_start, buffer_space; + + cpy_start = (client->msg_idx - fixed_hdr_idx) % (MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN - fixed_hdr_idx) + fixed_hdr_idx; + + /* Allow to copy the lesser one of available length in input data or bytes remaining in message */ + cpy_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN((u16_t)(p->tot_len - in_offset), msg_rem_len); + + /* Limit to available space in buffer */ + buffer_space = MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN - cpy_start; + + if (cpy_len > buffer_space) { + cpy_len = buffer_space; + } + + pbuf_copy_partial(p, client->rx_buffer + cpy_start, cpy_len, in_offset); + + /* Advance get and put indexes */ + client->msg_idx += cpy_len; + in_offset += cpy_len; + msg_rem_len -= cpy_len; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_parse_incoming: msg_idx: %" U32_F ", cpy_len: %" U16_F ", remaining %" U32_F "\n", client->msg_idx, cpy_len, msg_rem_len)); + + if ((msg_rem_len == 0) || (cpy_len == buffer_space)) { + /* Whole message received or buffer is full */ + mqtt_connection_status_t res = mqtt_message_received(client, fixed_hdr_idx, (cpy_start + cpy_len) - fixed_hdr_idx, msg_rem_len); + + if (res != MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED) { + return res; + } + + if (msg_rem_len == 0) { + /* Reset parser state */ + client->msg_idx = 0; + /* msg_tot_len = 0; */ + fixed_hdr_idx = 0; + } + } + } + } + + return MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED; +} + +/** + * TCP received callback function. @see tcp_recv_fn + * @param arg MQTT client + * @param p PBUF chain of received data + * @param err Passed as return value if not ERR_OK + * @return ERR_OK or err passed into callback + */ +static err_t mqtt_tcp_recv_cb(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_tcp_recv_cb: client != NULL", client != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_tcp_recv_cb: client->conn == pcb", client->conn == pcb); + + if (p == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_tcp_recv_cb: Recv pbuf=NULL, remote has closed connection\n")); + mqtt_close(client, MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED); + } else { + mqtt_connection_status_t res; + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_tcp_recv_cb: Recv err=%d\n", err)); + pbuf_free(p); + return err; + } + + /* Tell remote that data has been received */ + altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); + res = mqtt_parse_incoming(client, p); + pbuf_free(p); + + if (res != MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED) { + mqtt_close(client, res); + } + + /* If keep alive functionality is used */ + if (client->keep_alive != 0) { + /* Reset server alive watchdog */ + client->server_watchdog = 0; + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * TCP data sent callback function. @see tcp_sent_fn + * @param arg MQTT client + * @param tpcb TCP connection handle + * @param len Number of bytes sent + * @return ERR_OK + */ +static err_t mqtt_tcp_sent_cb(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *tpcb, u16_t len) +{ + mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTED) { + struct mqtt_request_t *r; + + /* Reset keep-alive send timer and server watchdog */ + client->cyclic_tick = 0; + client->server_watchdog = 0; + + /* QoS 0 publish has no response from server, so call its callbacks here */ + while ((r = mqtt_take_request(&client->pend_req_queue, 0)) != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_tcp_sent_cb: Calling QoS 0 publish complete callback\n")); + + if (r->cb != NULL) { + r->cb(r->arg, ERR_OK); + } + + mqtt_delete_request(r); + } + + /* Try send any remaining buffers from output queue */ + mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * TCP error callback function. @see tcp_err_fn + * @param arg MQTT client + * @param err Error encountered + */ +static void mqtt_tcp_err_cb(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* only used for debug output */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_tcp_err_cb: TCP error callback: error %d, arg: %p\n", err, arg)); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_tcp_err_cb: client != NULL", client != NULL); + /* Set conn to null before calling close as pcb is already deallocated*/ + client->conn = 0; + mqtt_close(client, MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED); +} + +/** + * TCP poll callback function. @see tcp_poll_fn + * @param arg MQTT client + * @param tpcb TCP connection handle + * @return err ERR_OK + */ +static err_t mqtt_tcp_poll_cb(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *tpcb) +{ + mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; + + if (client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTED) { + /* Try send any remaining buffers from output queue */ + mqtt_output_send(&client->output, tpcb); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * TCP connect callback function. @see tcp_connected_fn + * @param arg MQTT client + * @param err Always ERR_OK, mqtt_tcp_err_cb is called in case of error + * @return ERR_OK + */ +static err_t mqtt_tcp_connect_cb(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *tpcb, err_t err) +{ + mqtt_client_t *client = (mqtt_client_t *)arg; + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_tcp_connect_cb: TCP connect error %d\n", err)); + return err; + } + + /* Initiate receiver state */ + client->msg_idx = 0; + + /* Setup TCP callbacks */ + altcp_recv(tpcb, mqtt_tcp_recv_cb); + altcp_sent(tpcb, mqtt_tcp_sent_cb); + altcp_poll(tpcb, mqtt_tcp_poll_cb, 2); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_tcp_connect_cb: TCP connection established to server\n")); + /* Enter MQTT connect state */ + client->conn_state = MQTT_CONNECTING; + + /* Start cyclic timer */ + sys_timeout(MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL * 1000, mqtt_cyclic_timer, client); + client->cyclic_tick = 0; + + /* Start transmission from output queue, connect message is the first one out*/ + mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* Public API */ + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * MQTT publish function. + * @param client MQTT client + * @param topic Publish topic string + * @param payload Data to publish (NULL is allowed) + * @param payload_length Length of payload (0 is allowed) + * @param qos Quality of service, 0 1 or 2 + * @param retain MQTT retain flag + * @param cb Callback to call when publish is complete or has timed out + * @param arg User supplied argument to publish callback + * @return ERR_OK if successful + * ERR_CONN if client is disconnected + * ERR_MEM if short on memory + */ +err_t mqtt_publish(mqtt_client_t *client, const char *topic, const void *payload, u16_t payload_length, u8_t qos, u8_t retain, + mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg) +{ + struct mqtt_request_t *r; + u16_t pkt_id; + size_t topic_strlen; + size_t total_len; + u16_t topic_len; + u16_t remaining_length; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_publish: client != NULL", client); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_publish: topic != NULL", topic); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_publish: TCP disconnected", (client->conn_state != TCP_DISCONNECTED), return ERR_CONN); + + topic_strlen = strlen(topic); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_publish: topic length overflow", (topic_strlen <= (0xFFFF - 2)), return ERR_ARG); + topic_len = (u16_t)topic_strlen; + total_len = 2 + topic_len + payload_length; + + if (qos > 0) { + total_len += 2; + /* Generate pkt_id id for QoS1 and 2 */ + pkt_id = msg_generate_packet_id(client); + } else { + /* Use reserved value pkt_id 0 for QoS 0 in request handle */ + pkt_id = 0; + } + + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_publish: total length overflow", (total_len <= 0xFFFF), return ERR_ARG); + remaining_length = (u16_t)total_len; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_publish: Publish with payload length %d to topic \"%s\"\n", payload_length, topic)); + + r = mqtt_create_request(client->req_list, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(client->req_list), pkt_id, cb, arg); + + if (r == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, remaining_length) == 0) { + mqtt_delete_request(r); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Append fixed header */ + mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_PUBLISH, 0, qos, retain, remaining_length); + + /* Append Topic */ + mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, topic, topic_len); + + /* Append packet if for QoS 1 and 2*/ + if (qos > 0) { + mqtt_output_append_u16(&client->output, pkt_id); + } + + /* Append optional publish payload */ + if ((payload != NULL) && (payload_length > 0)) { + mqtt_output_append_buf(&client->output, payload, payload_length); + } + + mqtt_append_request(&client->pend_req_queue, r); + mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * MQTT subscribe/unsubscribe function. + * @param client MQTT client + * @param topic topic to subscribe to + * @param qos Quality of service, 0 1 or 2 (only used for subscribe) + * @param cb Callback to call when subscribe/unsubscribe reponse is received + * @param arg User supplied argument to publish callback + * @param sub 1 for subscribe, 0 for unsubscribe + * @return ERR_OK if successful, @see err_t enum for other results + */ +err_t mqtt_sub_unsub(mqtt_client_t *client, const char *topic, u8_t qos, mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg, u8_t sub) +{ + size_t topic_strlen; + size_t total_len; + u16_t topic_len; + u16_t remaining_length; + u16_t pkt_id; + struct mqtt_request_t *r; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_sub_unsub: client != NULL", client); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_sub_unsub: topic != NULL", topic); + + topic_strlen = strlen(topic); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_sub_unsub: topic length overflow", (topic_strlen <= (0xFFFF - 2)), return ERR_ARG); + topic_len = (u16_t)topic_strlen; + /* Topic string, pkt_id, qos for subscribe */ + total_len = topic_len + 2 + 2 + (sub != 0); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_sub_unsub: total length overflow", (total_len <= 0xFFFF), return ERR_ARG); + remaining_length = (u16_t)total_len; + + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_sub_unsub: qos < 3", qos < 3); + + if (client->conn_state == TCP_DISCONNECTED) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_sub_unsub: Can not (un)subscribe in disconnected state\n")); + return ERR_CONN; + } + + pkt_id = msg_generate_packet_id(client); + r = mqtt_create_request(client->req_list, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(client->req_list), pkt_id, cb, arg); + + if (r == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, remaining_length) == 0) { + mqtt_delete_request(r); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_sub_unsub: Client (un)subscribe to topic \"%s\", id: %d\n", topic, pkt_id)); + + mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, sub ? MQTT_MSG_TYPE_SUBSCRIBE : MQTT_MSG_TYPE_UNSUBSCRIBE, 0, 1, 0, remaining_length); + /* Packet id */ + mqtt_output_append_u16(&client->output, pkt_id); + /* Topic */ + mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, topic, topic_len); + + /* QoS */ + if (sub != 0) { + mqtt_output_append_u8(&client->output, LWIP_MIN(qos, 2)); + } + + mqtt_append_request(&client->pend_req_queue, r); + mqtt_output_send(&client->output, client->conn); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Set callback to handle incoming publish requests from server + * @param client MQTT client + * @param pub_cb Callback invoked when publish starts, contain topic and total length of payload + * @param data_cb Callback for each fragment of payload that arrives + * @param arg User supplied argument to both callbacks + */ +void mqtt_set_inpub_callback(mqtt_client_t *client, mqtt_incoming_publish_cb_t pub_cb, + mqtt_incoming_data_cb_t data_cb, void *arg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_set_inpub_callback: client != NULL", client != NULL); + client->data_cb = data_cb; + client->pub_cb = pub_cb; + client->inpub_arg = arg; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Create a new MQTT client instance + * @return Pointer to instance on success, NULL otherwise + */ +mqtt_client_t *mqtt_client_new(void) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + return (mqtt_client_t *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(mqtt_client_t)); +} + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Free MQTT client instance + * @param client Pointer to instance to be freed + */ +void mqtt_client_free(mqtt_client_t *client) +{ + mem_free(client); +} + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Connect to MQTT server + * @param client MQTT client + * @param ip_addr Server IP + * @param port Server port + * @param cb Connection state change callback + * @param arg User supplied argument to connection callback + * @param client_info Client identification and connection options + * @return ERR_OK if successful, @see err_t enum for other results + */ +err_t mqtt_client_connect(mqtt_client_t *client, const ip_addr_t *ip_addr, u16_t port, mqtt_connection_cb_t cb, void *arg, + const struct mqtt_connect_client_info_t *client_info) +{ + err_t err; + size_t len; + u16_t client_id_length; + /* Length is the sum of 2+"MQTT", protocol level, flags and keep alive */ + u16_t remaining_length = 2 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2; + u8_t flags = 0, will_topic_len = 0, will_msg_len = 0; + u16_t client_user_len = 0, client_pass_len = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_connect: client != NULL", client != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_connect: ip_addr != NULL", ip_addr != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_connect: client_info != NULL", client_info != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_id != NULL", client_info->client_id != NULL); + + if (client->conn_state != TCP_DISCONNECTED) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_client_connect: Already connected\n")); + return ERR_ISCONN; + } + + /* Wipe clean */ + memset(client, 0, sizeof(mqtt_client_t)); + client->connect_arg = arg; + client->connect_cb = cb; + client->keep_alive = client_info->keep_alive; + mqtt_init_requests(client->req_list, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(client->req_list)); + + /* Build connect message */ + if (client_info->will_topic != NULL && client_info->will_msg != NULL) { + flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL; + flags |= (client_info->will_qos & 3) << 3; + + if (client_info->will_retain) { + flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL_RETAIN; + } + + len = strlen(client_info->will_topic); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->will_topic length overflow", len <= 0xFF, return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->will_topic length must be > 0", len > 0, return ERR_VAL); + will_topic_len = (u8_t)len; + len = strlen(client_info->will_msg); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->will_msg length overflow", len <= 0xFF, return ERR_VAL); + will_msg_len = (u8_t)len; + len = remaining_length + 2 + will_topic_len + 2 + will_msg_len; + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: remaining_length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); + remaining_length = (u16_t)len; + } + + if (client_info->client_user != NULL) { + flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_USERNAME; + len = strlen(client_info->client_user); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_user length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_user length must be > 0", len > 0, return ERR_VAL); + client_user_len = (u16_t)len; + len = remaining_length + 2 + client_user_len; + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: remaining_length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); + remaining_length = (u16_t)len; + } + + if (client_info->client_pass != NULL) { + flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_PASSWORD; + len = strlen(client_info->client_pass); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_pass length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_pass length must be > 0", len > 0, return ERR_VAL); + client_pass_len = (u16_t)len; + len = remaining_length + 2 + client_pass_len; + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: remaining_length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); + remaining_length = (u16_t)len; + } + + /* Don't complicate things, always connect using clean session */ + flags |= MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_CLEAN_SESSION; + + len = strlen(client_info->client_id); + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: client_info->client_id length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); + client_id_length = (u16_t)len; + len = remaining_length + 2 + client_id_length; + LWIP_ERROR("mqtt_client_connect: remaining_length overflow", len <= 0xFFFF, return ERR_VAL); + remaining_length = (u16_t)len; + + if (mqtt_output_check_space(&client->output, remaining_length) == 0) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + +#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS + + if (client_info->tls_config) { + client->conn = altcp_tls_new(client_info->tls_config, IP_GET_TYPE(ip_addr)); + } else +#endif + { + client->conn = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IP_GET_TYPE(ip_addr)); + } + + if (client->conn == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Set arg pointer for callbacks */ + altcp_arg(client->conn, client); + /* Any local address, pick random local port number */ + err = altcp_bind(client->conn, IP_ADDR_ANY, 0); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_WARN, ("mqtt_client_connect: Error binding to local ip/port, %d\n", err)); + goto tcp_fail; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_client_connect: Connecting to host: %s at port:%" U16_F "\n", ipaddr_ntoa(ip_addr), port)); + + /* Connect to server */ + err = altcp_connect(client->conn, ip_addr, port, mqtt_tcp_connect_cb); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MQTT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("mqtt_client_connect: Error connecting to remote ip/port, %d\n", err)); + goto tcp_fail; + } + + /* Set error callback */ + altcp_err(client->conn, mqtt_tcp_err_cb); + client->conn_state = TCP_CONNECTING; + + /* Append fixed header */ + mqtt_output_append_fixed_header(&client->output, MQTT_MSG_TYPE_CONNECT, 0, 0, 0, remaining_length); + /* Append Protocol string */ + mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, "MQTT", 4); + /* Append Protocol level */ + mqtt_output_append_u8(&client->output, 4); + /* Append connect flags */ + mqtt_output_append_u8(&client->output, flags); + /* Append keep-alive */ + mqtt_output_append_u16(&client->output, client_info->keep_alive); + /* Append client id */ + mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->client_id, client_id_length); + + /* Append will message if used */ + if ((flags & MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_WILL) != 0) { + mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->will_topic, will_topic_len); + mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->will_msg, will_msg_len); + } + + /* Append user name if given */ + if ((flags & MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_USERNAME) != 0) { + mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->client_user, client_user_len); + } + + /* Append password if given */ + if ((flags & MQTT_CONNECT_FLAG_PASSWORD) != 0) { + mqtt_output_append_string(&client->output, client_info->client_pass, client_pass_len); + } + + return ERR_OK; + +tcp_fail: + altcp_abort(client->conn); + client->conn = NULL; + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Disconnect from MQTT server + * @param client MQTT client + */ +void mqtt_disconnect(mqtt_client_t *client) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_disconnect: client != NULL", client); + + /* If connection in not already closed */ + if (client->conn_state != TCP_DISCONNECTED) { + /* Set conn_state before calling mqtt_close to prevent callback from being called */ + client->conn_state = TCP_DISCONNECTED; + mqtt_close(client, (mqtt_connection_status_t)0); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Check connection with server + * @param client MQTT client + * @return 1 if connected to server, 0 otherwise + */ +u8_t mqtt_client_is_connected(mqtt_client_t *client) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mqtt_client_is_connected: client != NULL", client); + return client->conn_state == MQTT_CONNECTED; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c index d84039c7..0f734417 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/netbiosns/netbiosns.c @@ -1,554 +1,554 @@ -/** -* @file -* NetBIOS name service responder -*/ - -/** - * @defgroup netbiosns NETBIOS responder - * @ingroup apps - * - * This is an example implementation of a NetBIOS name server. - * It responds to name queries for a configurable name. - * Name resolving is not supported. - * - * Note that the device doesn't broadcast it's own name so can't - * detect duplicate names! - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Modifications by Ray Abram to respond to NetBIOS name requests when Incoming name = * - * - based on code from "https://github.com/esp8266/Arduino/commit/1f7989b31d26d7df9776a08f36d685eae7ac8f99" - * - with permission to relicense to BSD from original author: - * http://www.xpablo.cz/?p=751#more-751 - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/netbiosns.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_UDP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -#include - -/** size of a NetBIOS name */ -#define NETBIOS_NAME_LEN 16 - -/** The Time-To-Live for NetBIOS name responds (in seconds) - * Default is 300000 seconds (3 days, 11 hours, 20 minutes) */ -#define NETBIOS_NAME_TTL 300000u - -/** NetBIOS header flags */ -#define NETB_HFLAG_RESPONSE 0x8000U -#define NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE 0x7800U -#define NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE_NAME_QUERY 0x0000U -#define NETB_HFLAG_AUTHORATIVE 0x0400U -#define NETB_HFLAG_TRUNCATED 0x0200U -#define NETB_HFLAG_RECURS_DESIRED 0x0100U -#define NETB_HFLAG_RECURS_AVAILABLE 0x0080U -#define NETB_HFLAG_BROADCAST 0x0010U -#define NETB_HFLAG_REPLYCODE 0x0008U -#define NETB_HFLAG_REPLYCODE_NOERROR 0x0000U - -/* NetBIOS question types */ -#define NETB_QTYPE_NB 0x0020U -#define NETB_QTYPE_NBSTAT 0x0021U - -/** NetBIOS name flags */ -#define NETB_NFLAG_UNIQUE 0x8000U -#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE 0x6000U -#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_HNODE 0x6000U -#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_MNODE 0x4000U -#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_PNODE 0x2000U -#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_BNODE 0x0000U - -#define NETB_NFLAG_NAME_IN_CONFLICT 0x0800U /* 1=Yes, 0=No */ -#define NETB_NFLAG_NAME_IS_ACTIVE 0x0400U /* 1=Yes, 0=No */ -#define NETB_NFLAG_NAME_IS_PERMANENT 0x0200U /* 1=Yes (Name is Permanent Node Name), 0=No */ - -/** NetBIOS message header */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct netbios_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t trans_id); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t flags); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t questions); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t answerRRs); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t authorityRRs); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t additionalRRs); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** NetBIOS message question part */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct netbios_question_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t nametype); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t encname[(NETBIOS_NAME_LEN * 2) + 1]); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t cls); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** NetBIOS message name part */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct netbios_name_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t nametype); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t encname[(NETBIOS_NAME_LEN * 2) + 1]); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t cls); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t ttl); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t datalen); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t flags); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t addr); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** NetBIOS message */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct netbios_resp { - struct netbios_hdr resp_hdr; - struct netbios_name_hdr resp_name; -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** The NBNS Structure Responds to a Name Query */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct netbios_answer { - struct netbios_hdr answer_hdr; - /** the length of the next string */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u8_t name_size); - /** WARNING!!! this item may be of a different length (we use this struct for transmission) */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t query_name[(NETBIOS_NAME_LEN * 2) + 1]); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t packet_type); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t cls); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t ttl); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t data_length); -#define OFFSETOF_STRUCT_NETBIOS_ANSWER_NUMBER_OF_NAMES 56 - /** number of names */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t number_of_names); - /** node name */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t answer_name[NETBIOS_NAME_LEN]); - /** node flags */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t answer_name_flags); - /** Unit ID */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t unit_id[6]); - /** Jumpers */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t jumpers); - /** Test result */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t test_result); - /** Version number */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t version_number); - /** Period of statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t period_of_statistics); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_crcs); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_alignment_errors); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_collisions); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_send_aborts); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t number_of_good_sends); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t number_of_good_receives); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_retransmits); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_no_resource_condition); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_free_command_blocks); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t total_number_of_command_blocks); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t max_total_number_of_command_blocks); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_pending_sessions); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t max_number_of_pending_sessions); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t max_total_sessions_possible); - /** Statistics */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t session_data_packet_size); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#ifdef NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME -#define NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME -#else -static char netbiosns_local_name[NETBIOS_NAME_LEN]; -#define NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME netbiosns_local_name -#endif - -static struct udp_pcb *netbiosns_pcb; - -/** Decode a NetBIOS name (from packet to string) */ -static int netbiosns_name_decode(char *name_enc, char *name_dec, int name_dec_len) -{ - char *pname; - char cname; - char cnbname; - int idx = 0; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name_dec_len); - - /* Start decoding netbios name. */ - pname = name_enc; - - for (;;) { - /* Every two characters of the first level-encoded name - * turn into one character in the decoded name. */ - cname = *pname; - - if (cname == '\0') { - break; /* no more characters */ - } - - if (cname == '.') { - break; /* scope ID follows */ - } - - if (!lwip_isupper(cname)) { - /* Not legal. */ - return -1; - } - - cname -= 'A'; - cnbname = cname << 4; - pname++; - - cname = *pname; - - if (!lwip_isupper(cname)) { - /* Not legal. */ - return -1; - } - - cname -= 'A'; - cnbname |= cname; - pname++; - - /* Do we have room to store the character? */ - if (idx < NETBIOS_NAME_LEN) { - /* Yes - store the character. */ - name_dec[idx++] = (cnbname != ' ' ? cnbname : '\0'); - } - } - - return 0; -} - -#if 0 /* function currently unused */ -/** Encode a NetBIOS name (from string to packet) - currently unused because - we don't ask for names. */ -static int netbiosns_name_encode(char *name_enc, char *name_dec, int name_dec_len) -{ - char *pname; - char cname; - unsigned char ucname; - int idx = 0; - - /* Start encoding netbios name. */ - pname = name_enc; - - for(;;) - { - /* Every two characters of the first level-encoded name - * turn into one character in the decoded name. */ - cname = *pname; - - if(cname == '\0') - { - break; /* no more characters */ - } - - if(cname == '.') - { - break; /* scope ID follows */ - } - - if((cname < 'A' || cname > 'Z') && (cname < '0' || cname > '9')) - { - /* Not legal. */ - return -1; - } - - /* Do we have room to store the character? */ - if(idx >= name_dec_len) - { - return -1; - } - - /* Yes - store the character. */ - ucname = cname; - name_dec[idx++] = ('A' + ((ucname >> 4) & 0x0F)); - name_dec[idx++] = ('A' + (ucname & 0x0F)); - pname++; - } - - /* Fill with "space" coding */ - for(; idx < name_dec_len - 1;) - { - name_dec[idx++] = 'C'; - name_dec[idx++] = 'A'; - } - - /* Terminate string */ - name_dec[idx] = '\0'; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* 0 */ - -/** NetBIOS Name service recv callback */ -static void netbiosns_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *upcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - /* if packet is valid */ - if (p != NULL) { - char netbios_name[NETBIOS_NAME_LEN + 1]; - struct netbios_hdr *netbios_hdr = (struct netbios_hdr *)p->payload; - struct netbios_question_hdr *netbios_question_hdr = (struct netbios_question_hdr *)(netbios_hdr + 1); - - /* is the packet long enough (we need the header in one piece) */ - if (p->len < (sizeof(struct netbios_hdr) + sizeof(struct netbios_question_hdr))) { - /* packet too short */ - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - /* we only answer if we got a default interface */ - if (netif_default != NULL) { - /* @todo: do we need to check answerRRs/authorityRRs/additionalRRs? */ - /* if the packet is a NetBIOS name query question */ - if (((netbios_hdr->flags & PP_NTOHS(NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE)) == PP_NTOHS(NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE_NAME_QUERY)) && - ((netbios_hdr->flags & PP_NTOHS(NETB_HFLAG_RESPONSE)) == 0) && - (netbios_hdr->questions == PP_NTOHS(1))) { - /* decode the NetBIOS name */ - netbiosns_name_decode((char *)(netbios_question_hdr->encname), netbios_name, sizeof(netbios_name)); - - /* check the request type */ - if (netbios_question_hdr->type == PP_HTONS(NETB_QTYPE_NB)) { - /* if the packet is for us */ - if (lwip_strnicmp(netbios_name, NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME, sizeof(NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME)) == 0) { - struct pbuf *q; - struct netbios_resp *resp; - - q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct netbios_resp), PBUF_RAM); - - if (q != NULL) { - resp = (struct netbios_resp *)q->payload; - - /* prepare NetBIOS header response */ - resp->resp_hdr.trans_id = netbios_hdr->trans_id; - resp->resp_hdr.flags = PP_HTONS(NETB_HFLAG_RESPONSE | - NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE_NAME_QUERY | - NETB_HFLAG_AUTHORATIVE | - NETB_HFLAG_RECURS_DESIRED); - resp->resp_hdr.questions = 0; - resp->resp_hdr.answerRRs = PP_HTONS(1); - resp->resp_hdr.authorityRRs = 0; - resp->resp_hdr.additionalRRs = 0; - - /* prepare NetBIOS header datas */ - MEMCPY(resp->resp_name.encname, netbios_question_hdr->encname, sizeof(netbios_question_hdr->encname)); - resp->resp_name.nametype = netbios_question_hdr->nametype; - resp->resp_name.type = netbios_question_hdr->type; - resp->resp_name.cls = netbios_question_hdr->cls; - resp->resp_name.ttl = PP_HTONL(NETBIOS_NAME_TTL); - resp->resp_name.datalen = PP_HTONS(sizeof(resp->resp_name.flags) + sizeof(resp->resp_name.addr)); - resp->resp_name.flags = PP_HTONS(NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_BNODE); - ip4_addr_copy(resp->resp_name.addr, *netif_ip4_addr(netif_default)); - - /* send the NetBIOS response */ - udp_sendto(upcb, q, addr, port); - - /* free the "reference" pbuf */ - pbuf_free(q); - } - } - -#if LWIP_NETBIOS_RESPOND_NAME_QUERY - } else if (netbios_question_hdr->type == PP_HTONS(NETB_QTYPE_NBSTAT)) { - /* if the packet is for us or general query */ - if (!lwip_strnicmp(netbios_name, NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME, sizeof(NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME)) || - !lwip_strnicmp(netbios_name, "*", sizeof(NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME))) { - /* general query - ask for our IP address */ - struct pbuf *q; - struct netbios_answer *resp; - - q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct netbios_answer), PBUF_RAM); - - if (q != NULL) { - /* buffer to which a response is compiled */ - resp = (struct netbios_answer *)q->payload; - - /* Init response to zero, especially the statistics fields */ - memset(resp, 0, sizeof(*resp)); - - /* copy the query to the response ID */ - resp->answer_hdr.trans_id = netbios_hdr->trans_id; - /* acknowledgment of termination */ - resp->answer_hdr.flags = PP_HTONS(NETB_HFLAG_RESPONSE | NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE_NAME_QUERY | NETB_HFLAG_AUTHORATIVE); - /* resp->answer_hdr.questions = PP_HTONS(0); done by memset() */ - /* serial number of the answer */ - resp->answer_hdr.answerRRs = PP_HTONS(1); - /* resp->answer_hdr.authorityRRs = PP_HTONS(0); done by memset() */ - /* resp->answer_hdr.additionalRRs = PP_HTONS(0); done by memset() */ - /* we will copy the length of the station name */ - resp->name_size = netbios_question_hdr->nametype; - /* we will copy the queried name */ - MEMCPY(resp->query_name, netbios_question_hdr->encname, (NETBIOS_NAME_LEN * 2) + 1); - /* NBSTAT */ - resp->packet_type = PP_HTONS(0x21); - /* Internet name */ - resp->cls = PP_HTONS(1); - /* resp->ttl = PP_HTONL(0); done by memset() */ - resp->data_length = PP_HTONS(sizeof(struct netbios_answer) - offsetof(struct netbios_answer, number_of_names)); - resp->number_of_names = 1; - - /* make windows see us as workstation, not as a server */ - memset(resp->answer_name, 0x20, NETBIOS_NAME_LEN - 1); - /* strlen is checked to be < NETBIOS_NAME_LEN during initialization */ - MEMCPY(resp->answer_name, NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME, strlen(NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME)); - - /* b-node, unique, active */ - resp->answer_name_flags = PP_HTONS(NETB_NFLAG_NAME_IS_ACTIVE); - - /* Set responder netif MAC address */ - SMEMCPY(resp->unit_id, ip_current_input_netif()->hwaddr, sizeof(resp->unit_id)); - - udp_sendto(upcb, q, addr, port); - pbuf_free(q); - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETBIOS_RESPOND_NAME_QUERY */ - } - } - } - - /* free the pbuf */ - pbuf_free(p); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup netbiosns - * Init netbios responder - */ -void netbiosns_init(void) -{ - /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by udp_new() */ -#ifdef NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME - LWIP_ASSERT("NetBIOS name is too long!", strlen(NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME) < NETBIOS_NAME_LEN); -#endif - - netbiosns_pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - - if (netbiosns_pcb != NULL) { - /* we have to be allowed to send broadcast packets! */ - ip_set_option(netbiosns_pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); - udp_bind(netbiosns_pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, LWIP_IANA_PORT_NETBIOS); - udp_recv(netbiosns_pcb, netbiosns_recv, netbiosns_pcb); - } -} - -#ifndef NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME -/** - * @ingroup netbiosns - * Set netbios name. ATTENTION: the hostname must be less than 15 characters! - * the NetBIOS name spec says the name MUST be upper case, so incoming name is forced into uppercase :-) - */ -void netbiosns_set_name(const char *hostname) -{ - size_t i; - size_t copy_len = strlen(hostname); - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("NetBIOS name is too long!", copy_len < NETBIOS_NAME_LEN); - - if (copy_len >= NETBIOS_NAME_LEN) { - copy_len = NETBIOS_NAME_LEN - 1; - } - - /* make name into upper case */ - for (i = 0; i < copy_len; i++) { - netbiosns_local_name[i] = (char)lwip_toupper(hostname[i]); - } - - netbiosns_local_name[copy_len] = '\0'; -} -#endif /* NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME */ - -/** - * @ingroup netbiosns - * Stop netbios responder - */ -void netbiosns_stop(void) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netbiosns_pcb != NULL) { - udp_remove(netbiosns_pcb); - netbiosns_pcb = NULL; - } -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_UDP */ +/** +* @file +* NetBIOS name service responder +*/ + +/** + * @defgroup netbiosns NETBIOS responder + * @ingroup apps + * + * This is an example implementation of a NetBIOS name server. + * It responds to name queries for a configurable name. + * Name resolving is not supported. + * + * Note that the device doesn't broadcast it's own name so can't + * detect duplicate names! + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Modifications by Ray Abram to respond to NetBIOS name requests when Incoming name = * + * - based on code from "https://github.com/esp8266/Arduino/commit/1f7989b31d26d7df9776a08f36d685eae7ac8f99" + * - with permission to relicense to BSD from original author: + * http://www.xpablo.cz/?p=751#more-751 + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/netbiosns.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_UDP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +#include + +/** size of a NetBIOS name */ +#define NETBIOS_NAME_LEN 16 + +/** The Time-To-Live for NetBIOS name responds (in seconds) + * Default is 300000 seconds (3 days, 11 hours, 20 minutes) */ +#define NETBIOS_NAME_TTL 300000u + +/** NetBIOS header flags */ +#define NETB_HFLAG_RESPONSE 0x8000U +#define NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE 0x7800U +#define NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE_NAME_QUERY 0x0000U +#define NETB_HFLAG_AUTHORATIVE 0x0400U +#define NETB_HFLAG_TRUNCATED 0x0200U +#define NETB_HFLAG_RECURS_DESIRED 0x0100U +#define NETB_HFLAG_RECURS_AVAILABLE 0x0080U +#define NETB_HFLAG_BROADCAST 0x0010U +#define NETB_HFLAG_REPLYCODE 0x0008U +#define NETB_HFLAG_REPLYCODE_NOERROR 0x0000U + +/* NetBIOS question types */ +#define NETB_QTYPE_NB 0x0020U +#define NETB_QTYPE_NBSTAT 0x0021U + +/** NetBIOS name flags */ +#define NETB_NFLAG_UNIQUE 0x8000U +#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE 0x6000U +#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_HNODE 0x6000U +#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_MNODE 0x4000U +#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_PNODE 0x2000U +#define NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_BNODE 0x0000U + +#define NETB_NFLAG_NAME_IN_CONFLICT 0x0800U /* 1=Yes, 0=No */ +#define NETB_NFLAG_NAME_IS_ACTIVE 0x0400U /* 1=Yes, 0=No */ +#define NETB_NFLAG_NAME_IS_PERMANENT 0x0200U /* 1=Yes (Name is Permanent Node Name), 0=No */ + +/** NetBIOS message header */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct netbios_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t trans_id); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t flags); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t questions); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t answerRRs); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t authorityRRs); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t additionalRRs); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** NetBIOS message question part */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct netbios_question_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t nametype); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t encname[(NETBIOS_NAME_LEN * 2) + 1]); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t cls); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** NetBIOS message name part */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct netbios_name_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t nametype); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t encname[(NETBIOS_NAME_LEN * 2) + 1]); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t cls); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t ttl); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t datalen); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t flags); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t addr); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** NetBIOS message */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct netbios_resp { + struct netbios_hdr resp_hdr; + struct netbios_name_hdr resp_name; +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** The NBNS Structure Responds to a Name Query */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct netbios_answer { + struct netbios_hdr answer_hdr; + /** the length of the next string */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u8_t name_size); + /** WARNING!!! this item may be of a different length (we use this struct for transmission) */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t query_name[(NETBIOS_NAME_LEN * 2) + 1]); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t packet_type); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t cls); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t ttl); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t data_length); +#define OFFSETOF_STRUCT_NETBIOS_ANSWER_NUMBER_OF_NAMES 56 + /** number of names */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t number_of_names); + /** node name */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t answer_name[NETBIOS_NAME_LEN]); + /** node flags */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t answer_name_flags); + /** Unit ID */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t unit_id[6]); + /** Jumpers */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t jumpers); + /** Test result */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t test_result); + /** Version number */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t version_number); + /** Period of statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t period_of_statistics); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_crcs); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_alignment_errors); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_collisions); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_send_aborts); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t number_of_good_sends); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t number_of_good_receives); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_retransmits); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_no_resource_condition); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_free_command_blocks); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t total_number_of_command_blocks); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t max_total_number_of_command_blocks); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t number_of_pending_sessions); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t max_number_of_pending_sessions); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t max_total_sessions_possible); + /** Statistics */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t session_data_packet_size); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#ifdef NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME +#define NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME +#else +static char netbiosns_local_name[NETBIOS_NAME_LEN]; +#define NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME netbiosns_local_name +#endif + +static struct udp_pcb *netbiosns_pcb; + +/** Decode a NetBIOS name (from packet to string) */ +static int netbiosns_name_decode(char *name_enc, char *name_dec, int name_dec_len) +{ + char *pname; + char cname; + char cnbname; + int idx = 0; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name_dec_len); + + /* Start decoding netbios name. */ + pname = name_enc; + + for (;;) { + /* Every two characters of the first level-encoded name + * turn into one character in the decoded name. */ + cname = *pname; + + if (cname == '\0') { + break; /* no more characters */ + } + + if (cname == '.') { + break; /* scope ID follows */ + } + + if (!lwip_isupper(cname)) { + /* Not legal. */ + return -1; + } + + cname -= 'A'; + cnbname = cname << 4; + pname++; + + cname = *pname; + + if (!lwip_isupper(cname)) { + /* Not legal. */ + return -1; + } + + cname -= 'A'; + cnbname |= cname; + pname++; + + /* Do we have room to store the character? */ + if (idx < NETBIOS_NAME_LEN) { + /* Yes - store the character. */ + name_dec[idx++] = (cnbname != ' ' ? cnbname : '\0'); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +#if 0 /* function currently unused */ +/** Encode a NetBIOS name (from string to packet) - currently unused because + we don't ask for names. */ +static int netbiosns_name_encode(char *name_enc, char *name_dec, int name_dec_len) +{ + char *pname; + char cname; + unsigned char ucname; + int idx = 0; + + /* Start encoding netbios name. */ + pname = name_enc; + + for(;;) + { + /* Every two characters of the first level-encoded name + * turn into one character in the decoded name. */ + cname = *pname; + + if(cname == '\0') + { + break; /* no more characters */ + } + + if(cname == '.') + { + break; /* scope ID follows */ + } + + if((cname < 'A' || cname > 'Z') && (cname < '0' || cname > '9')) + { + /* Not legal. */ + return -1; + } + + /* Do we have room to store the character? */ + if(idx >= name_dec_len) + { + return -1; + } + + /* Yes - store the character. */ + ucname = cname; + name_dec[idx++] = ('A' + ((ucname >> 4) & 0x0F)); + name_dec[idx++] = ('A' + (ucname & 0x0F)); + pname++; + } + + /* Fill with "space" coding */ + for(; idx < name_dec_len - 1;) + { + name_dec[idx++] = 'C'; + name_dec[idx++] = 'A'; + } + + /* Terminate string */ + name_dec[idx] = '\0'; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* 0 */ + +/** NetBIOS Name service recv callback */ +static void netbiosns_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *upcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + /* if packet is valid */ + if (p != NULL) { + char netbios_name[NETBIOS_NAME_LEN + 1]; + struct netbios_hdr *netbios_hdr = (struct netbios_hdr *)p->payload; + struct netbios_question_hdr *netbios_question_hdr = (struct netbios_question_hdr *)(netbios_hdr + 1); + + /* is the packet long enough (we need the header in one piece) */ + if (p->len < (sizeof(struct netbios_hdr) + sizeof(struct netbios_question_hdr))) { + /* packet too short */ + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + /* we only answer if we got a default interface */ + if (netif_default != NULL) { + /* @todo: do we need to check answerRRs/authorityRRs/additionalRRs? */ + /* if the packet is a NetBIOS name query question */ + if (((netbios_hdr->flags & PP_NTOHS(NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE)) == PP_NTOHS(NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE_NAME_QUERY)) && + ((netbios_hdr->flags & PP_NTOHS(NETB_HFLAG_RESPONSE)) == 0) && + (netbios_hdr->questions == PP_NTOHS(1))) { + /* decode the NetBIOS name */ + netbiosns_name_decode((char *)(netbios_question_hdr->encname), netbios_name, sizeof(netbios_name)); + + /* check the request type */ + if (netbios_question_hdr->type == PP_HTONS(NETB_QTYPE_NB)) { + /* if the packet is for us */ + if (lwip_strnicmp(netbios_name, NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME, sizeof(NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME)) == 0) { + struct pbuf *q; + struct netbios_resp *resp; + + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct netbios_resp), PBUF_RAM); + + if (q != NULL) { + resp = (struct netbios_resp *)q->payload; + + /* prepare NetBIOS header response */ + resp->resp_hdr.trans_id = netbios_hdr->trans_id; + resp->resp_hdr.flags = PP_HTONS(NETB_HFLAG_RESPONSE | + NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE_NAME_QUERY | + NETB_HFLAG_AUTHORATIVE | + NETB_HFLAG_RECURS_DESIRED); + resp->resp_hdr.questions = 0; + resp->resp_hdr.answerRRs = PP_HTONS(1); + resp->resp_hdr.authorityRRs = 0; + resp->resp_hdr.additionalRRs = 0; + + /* prepare NetBIOS header datas */ + MEMCPY(resp->resp_name.encname, netbios_question_hdr->encname, sizeof(netbios_question_hdr->encname)); + resp->resp_name.nametype = netbios_question_hdr->nametype; + resp->resp_name.type = netbios_question_hdr->type; + resp->resp_name.cls = netbios_question_hdr->cls; + resp->resp_name.ttl = PP_HTONL(NETBIOS_NAME_TTL); + resp->resp_name.datalen = PP_HTONS(sizeof(resp->resp_name.flags) + sizeof(resp->resp_name.addr)); + resp->resp_name.flags = PP_HTONS(NETB_NFLAG_NODETYPE_BNODE); + ip4_addr_copy(resp->resp_name.addr, *netif_ip4_addr(netif_default)); + + /* send the NetBIOS response */ + udp_sendto(upcb, q, addr, port); + + /* free the "reference" pbuf */ + pbuf_free(q); + } + } + +#if LWIP_NETBIOS_RESPOND_NAME_QUERY + } else if (netbios_question_hdr->type == PP_HTONS(NETB_QTYPE_NBSTAT)) { + /* if the packet is for us or general query */ + if (!lwip_strnicmp(netbios_name, NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME, sizeof(NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME)) || + !lwip_strnicmp(netbios_name, "*", sizeof(NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME))) { + /* general query - ask for our IP address */ + struct pbuf *q; + struct netbios_answer *resp; + + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct netbios_answer), PBUF_RAM); + + if (q != NULL) { + /* buffer to which a response is compiled */ + resp = (struct netbios_answer *)q->payload; + + /* Init response to zero, especially the statistics fields */ + memset(resp, 0, sizeof(*resp)); + + /* copy the query to the response ID */ + resp->answer_hdr.trans_id = netbios_hdr->trans_id; + /* acknowledgment of termination */ + resp->answer_hdr.flags = PP_HTONS(NETB_HFLAG_RESPONSE | NETB_HFLAG_OPCODE_NAME_QUERY | NETB_HFLAG_AUTHORATIVE); + /* resp->answer_hdr.questions = PP_HTONS(0); done by memset() */ + /* serial number of the answer */ + resp->answer_hdr.answerRRs = PP_HTONS(1); + /* resp->answer_hdr.authorityRRs = PP_HTONS(0); done by memset() */ + /* resp->answer_hdr.additionalRRs = PP_HTONS(0); done by memset() */ + /* we will copy the length of the station name */ + resp->name_size = netbios_question_hdr->nametype; + /* we will copy the queried name */ + MEMCPY(resp->query_name, netbios_question_hdr->encname, (NETBIOS_NAME_LEN * 2) + 1); + /* NBSTAT */ + resp->packet_type = PP_HTONS(0x21); + /* Internet name */ + resp->cls = PP_HTONS(1); + /* resp->ttl = PP_HTONL(0); done by memset() */ + resp->data_length = PP_HTONS(sizeof(struct netbios_answer) - offsetof(struct netbios_answer, number_of_names)); + resp->number_of_names = 1; + + /* make windows see us as workstation, not as a server */ + memset(resp->answer_name, 0x20, NETBIOS_NAME_LEN - 1); + /* strlen is checked to be < NETBIOS_NAME_LEN during initialization */ + MEMCPY(resp->answer_name, NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME, strlen(NETBIOS_LOCAL_NAME)); + + /* b-node, unique, active */ + resp->answer_name_flags = PP_HTONS(NETB_NFLAG_NAME_IS_ACTIVE); + + /* Set responder netif MAC address */ + SMEMCPY(resp->unit_id, ip_current_input_netif()->hwaddr, sizeof(resp->unit_id)); + + udp_sendto(upcb, q, addr, port); + pbuf_free(q); + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETBIOS_RESPOND_NAME_QUERY */ + } + } + } + + /* free the pbuf */ + pbuf_free(p); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup netbiosns + * Init netbios responder + */ +void netbiosns_init(void) +{ + /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by udp_new() */ +#ifdef NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME + LWIP_ASSERT("NetBIOS name is too long!", strlen(NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME) < NETBIOS_NAME_LEN); +#endif + + netbiosns_pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + + if (netbiosns_pcb != NULL) { + /* we have to be allowed to send broadcast packets! */ + ip_set_option(netbiosns_pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); + udp_bind(netbiosns_pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, LWIP_IANA_PORT_NETBIOS); + udp_recv(netbiosns_pcb, netbiosns_recv, netbiosns_pcb); + } +} + +#ifndef NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME +/** + * @ingroup netbiosns + * Set netbios name. ATTENTION: the hostname must be less than 15 characters! + * the NetBIOS name spec says the name MUST be upper case, so incoming name is forced into uppercase :-) + */ +void netbiosns_set_name(const char *hostname) +{ + size_t i; + size_t copy_len = strlen(hostname); + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("NetBIOS name is too long!", copy_len < NETBIOS_NAME_LEN); + + if (copy_len >= NETBIOS_NAME_LEN) { + copy_len = NETBIOS_NAME_LEN - 1; + } + + /* make name into upper case */ + for (i = 0; i < copy_len; i++) { + netbiosns_local_name[i] = (char)lwip_toupper(hostname[i]); + } + + netbiosns_local_name[copy_len] = '\0'; +} +#endif /* NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME */ + +/** + * @ingroup netbiosns + * Stop netbios responder + */ +void netbiosns_stop(void) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netbiosns_pcb != NULL) { + udp_remove(netbiosns_pcb); + netbiosns_pcb = NULL; + } +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_UDP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/smtp/smtp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/smtp/smtp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/smtp/smtp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/smtp/smtp.c index 243a0c1a..d5006ee6 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/smtp/smtp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/smtp/smtp.c @@ -1,1661 +1,1661 @@ -/** - * @file - * SMTP client module - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - * @defgroup smtp SMTP client - * @ingroup apps - * - * This is simple SMTP client for raw API. - * It is a minimal implementation of SMTP as specified in RFC 5321. - * - * Example usage: -@code{.c} - void my_smtp_result_fn(void *arg, u8_t smtp_result, u16_t srv_err, err_t err) - { - printf("mail (%p) sent with results: 0x%02x, 0x%04x, 0x%08x\n", arg, - smtp_result, srv_err, err); - } - static void my_smtp_test(void) - { - smtp_set_server_addr("mymailserver.org"); - -> set both username and password as NULL if no auth needed - smtp_set_auth("username", "password"); - smtp_send_mail("sender", "recipient", "subject", "body", my_smtp_result_fn, - some_argument); - } -@endcode - - * When using from any other thread than the tcpip_thread (for NO_SYS==0), use - * smtp_send_mail_int()! - * - * SMTP_BODYDH usage: -@code{.c} - int my_smtp_bodydh_fn(void *arg, struct smtp_bodydh *bdh) - { - if(bdh->state >= 10) { - return BDH_DONE; - } - sprintf(bdh->buffer,"Line #%2d\r\n",bdh->state); - bdh->length = strlen(bdh->buffer); - ++bdh->state; - return BDH_WORKING; - } - - smtp_send_mail_bodycback("sender", "recipient", "subject", - my_smtp_bodydh_fn, my_smtp_result_fn, some_argument); -@endcode - * - * @todo: - * - attachments (the main difficulty here is streaming base64-encoding to - * prevent having to allocate a buffer for the whole encoded file at once) - * - test with more mail servers... - * - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/smtp.h" - -#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" - -#include /* strlen, memcpy */ -#include - -/** TCP poll interval. Unit is 0.5 sec. */ -#define SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL 4 -/** TCP poll timeout while sending message body, reset after every - * successful write. 3 minutes */ -#define SMTP_TIMEOUT_DATABLOCK (3 * 60 * SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL / 2) -/** TCP poll timeout while waiting for confirmation after sending the body. - * 10 minutes */ -#define SMTP_TIMEOUT_DATATERM (10 * 60 * SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL / 2) -/** TCP poll timeout while not sending the body. - * This is somewhat lower than the RFC states (5 minutes for initial, MAIL - * and RCPT) but still OK for us here. - * 2 minutes */ -#define SMTP_TIMEOUT (2 * 60 * SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL / 2) - -/* the various debug levels for this file */ -#define SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE) -#define SMTP_DEBUG_STATE (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE) -#define SMTP_DEBUG_WARN (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) -#define SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING | LWIP_DBG_STATE) -#define SMTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS) - -#define SMTP_RX_BUF_LEN 255 -#define SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN 255 -#define SMTP_CRLF "\r\n" -#define SMTP_CRLF_LEN 2 - -#define SMTP_RESP_220 "220" -#define SMTP_RESP_235 "235" -#define SMTP_RESP_250 "250" -#define SMTP_RESP_334 "334" -#define SMTP_RESP_354 "354" -#define SMTP_RESP_LOGIN_UNAME "VXNlcm5hbWU6" -#define SMTP_RESP_LOGIN_PASS "UGFzc3dvcmQ6" - -#define SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_SP "AUTH " -#define SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_EQ "AUTH=" -#define SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_LEN 5 -#define SMTP_AUTH_PARAM_PLAIN "PLAIN" -#define SMTP_AUTH_PARAM_LOGIN "LOGIN" - -#define SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1 "EHLO [" -#define SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN 6 -#define SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2 "]\r\n" -#define SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2_LEN 3 -#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1 "AUTH PLAIN " -#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN 11 -#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2 "\r\n" -#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2_LEN 2 -#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN "AUTH LOGIN\r\n" -#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN_LEN 12 -#define SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1 "MAIL FROM: <" -#define SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN 12 -#define SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2 ">\r\n" -#define SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2_LEN 3 -#define SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1 "RCPT TO: <" -#define SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN 10 -#define SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2 ">\r\n" -#define SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2_LEN 3 -#define SMTP_CMD_DATA "DATA\r\n" -#define SMTP_CMD_DATA_LEN 6 -#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1 "From: <" -#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1_LEN 7 -#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2 ">\r\nTo: <" -#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2_LEN 8 -#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3 ">\r\nSubject: " -#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3_LEN 12 -#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4 "\r\n\r\n" -#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4_LEN 4 -#define SMTP_CMD_BODY_FINISHED "\r\n.\r\n" -#define SMTP_CMD_BODY_FINISHED_LEN 5 -#define SMTP_CMD_QUIT "QUIT\r\n" -#define SMTP_CMD_QUIT_LEN 6 - -#if defined(SMTP_STAT_TX_BUF_MAX) && SMTP_STAT_TX_BUF_MAX -#define SMTP_TX_BUF_MAX(len) LWIP_MACRO(if ((len) > smtp_tx_buf_len_max) smtp_tx_buf_len_max = (len);) -#else /* SMTP_STAT_TX_BUF_MAX */ -#define SMTP_TX_BUF_MAX(len) -#endif /* SMTP_STAT_TX_BUF_MAX */ - -#if SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA -#define SMTP_USERNAME(session) (session)->username -#define SMTP_PASS(session) (session)->pass -#define SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_DATA(session) (session)->auth_plain -#define SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_LEN(session) (session)->auth_plain_len -#else /* SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA */ -#define SMTP_USERNAME(session) smtp_username -#define SMTP_PASS(session) smtp_pass -#define SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_DATA(session) smtp_auth_plain -#define SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_LEN(session) smtp_auth_plain_len -#endif /* SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA */ - -#if SMTP_BODYDH -#ifndef SMTP_BODYDH_MALLOC -#define SMTP_BODYDH_MALLOC(size) mem_malloc(size) -#define SMTP_BODYDH_FREE(ptr) mem_free(ptr) -#endif - -/* Some internal state return values */ -#define BDHALLDATASENT 2 -#define BDHSOMEDATASENT 1 - -enum bdh_handler_state { - BDH_SENDING, /* Serving the user function generating body content */ - BDH_STOP /* User function stopped, closing */ -}; -#endif - -/** State for SMTP client state machine */ -enum smtp_session_state { - SMTP_NULL, - SMTP_HELO, - SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN, - SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_UNAME, - SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_PASS, - SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN, - SMTP_MAIL, - SMTP_RCPT, - SMTP_DATA, - SMTP_BODY, - SMTP_QUIT, - SMTP_CLOSED -}; - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -/** State-to-string table for debugging */ -static const char *smtp_state_str[] = { - "SMTP_NULL", - "SMTP_HELO", - "SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN", - "SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_UNAME", - "SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_PASS", - "SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN", - "SMTP_MAIL", - "SMTP_RCPT", - "SMTP_DATA", - "SMTP_BODY", - "SMTP_QUIT", - "SMTP_CLOSED", -}; - -static const char *smtp_result_strs[] = { - "SMTP_RESULT_OK", - "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_UNKNOWN", - "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT", - "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME", - "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED", - "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT", - "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_SVR_RESP", - "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_MEM" -}; -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ - -#if SMTP_BODYDH -struct smtp_bodydh_state { - smtp_bodycback_fn callback_fn; /* The function to call (again) */ - u16_t state; - struct smtp_bodydh exposed; /* the user function structure */ -}; -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ - -/** struct keeping the body and state of an smtp session */ -struct smtp_session { - /** keeping the state of the smtp session */ - enum smtp_session_state state; - /** timeout handling, if this reaches 0, the connection is closed */ - u16_t timer; - /** helper buffer for transmit, not used for sending body */ - char tx_buf[SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN + 1]; - struct pbuf *p; - /** source email address */ - const char *from; - /** size of the sourceemail address */ - u16_t from_len; - /** target email address */ - const char *to; - /** size of the target email address */ - u16_t to_len; - /** subject of the email */ - const char *subject; - /** length of the subject string */ - u16_t subject_len; - /** this is the body of the mail to be sent */ - const char *body; - /** this is the length of the body to be sent */ - u16_t body_len; - /** amount of data from body already sent */ - u16_t body_sent; - /** callback function to call when closed */ - smtp_result_fn callback_fn; - /** argument for callback function */ - void *callback_arg; -#if SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA - /** Username to use for this request */ - char *username; - /** Password to use for this request */ - char *pass; - /** Username and password combined as necessary for PLAIN authentication */ - char auth_plain[SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN + SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN + 3]; - /** Length of smtp_auth_plain string (cannot use strlen since it includes \0) */ - size_t auth_plain_len; -#endif /* SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA */ -#if SMTP_BODYDH - struct smtp_bodydh_state *bodydh; -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ -}; - -/** IP address or DNS name of the server to use for next SMTP request */ -static char smtp_server[SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN + 1]; -/** TCP port of the server to use for next SMTP request */ -static u16_t smtp_server_port = SMTP_DEFAULT_PORT; -#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS -/** If this is set, mail is sent using SMTPS */ -static struct altcp_tls_config *smtp_server_tls_config; -#endif -/** Username to use for the next SMTP request */ -static char *smtp_username; -/** Password to use for the next SMTP request */ -static char *smtp_pass; -/** Username and password combined as necessary for PLAIN authentication */ -static char smtp_auth_plain[SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN + SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN + 3]; -/** Length of smtp_auth_plain string (cannot use strlen since it includes \0) */ -static size_t smtp_auth_plain_len; - -#if SMTP_CHECK_DATA -static err_t smtp_verify(const char *data, size_t data_len, u8_t linebreaks_allowed); -#endif /* SMTP_CHECK_DATA */ -static err_t smtp_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); -static void smtp_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err); -static err_t smtp_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb); -static err_t smtp_tcp_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len); -static err_t smtp_tcp_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err); -#if LWIP_DNS -static void smtp_dns_found(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg); -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN -static size_t smtp_base64_encode(char *target, size_t target_len, const char *source, size_t source_len); -#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ -static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_mail(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len); -static void smtp_send_body(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb); -static void smtp_process(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p); -#if SMTP_BODYDH -static void smtp_send_body_data_handler(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb); -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -/** Convert an smtp result to a string */ -const char *smtp_result_str(u8_t smtp_result) -{ - if (smtp_result >= LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(smtp_result_strs)) { - return "UNKNOWN"; - } - - return smtp_result_strs[smtp_result]; -} - -/** Null-terminates the payload of p for printing out messages. - * WARNING: use this only if p is not needed any more as the last byte of - * payload is deleted! - */ -static const char *smtp_pbuf_str(struct pbuf *p) -{ - if ((p == NULL) || (p->len == 0)) { - return ""; - } - - ((char *)p->payload)[p->len] = 0; - return (const char *)p->payload; -} -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ - -/** @ingroup smtp - * Set IP address or DNS name for next SMTP connection - * - * @param server IP address (in ASCII representation) or DNS name of the server - */ -err_t smtp_set_server_addr(const char *server) -{ - size_t len = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (server != NULL) { - /* strlen: returns length WITHOUT terminating 0 byte */ - len = strlen(server); - } - - if (len > SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (len != 0) { - MEMCPY(smtp_server, server, len); - } - - smtp_server[len] = 0; /* always OK because of smtp_server[SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN + 1] */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** @ingroup smtp - * Set TCP port for next SMTP connection - * - * @param port TCP port - */ -void smtp_set_server_port(u16_t port) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - smtp_server_port = port; -} - -#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS -/** @ingroup smtp - * Set TLS configuration for next SMTP connection - * - * @param tls_config TLS configuration - */ -void smtp_set_tls_config(struct altcp_tls_config *tls_config) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - smtp_server_tls_config = tls_config; -} -#endif - -/** @ingroup smtp - * Set authentication parameters for next SMTP connection - * - * @param username login name as passed to the server - * @param pass password passed to the server together with username - */ -err_t smtp_set_auth(const char *username, const char *pass) -{ - size_t uname_len = 0; - size_t pass_len = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - memset(smtp_auth_plain, 0xfa, 64); - - if (username != NULL) { - uname_len = strlen(username); - - if (uname_len > SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS, ("Username is too long, %d instead of %d\n", - (int)uname_len, SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN)); - return ERR_ARG; - } - } - - if (pass != NULL) { -#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN - pass_len = strlen(pass); - - if (pass_len > SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS, ("Password is too long, %d instead of %d\n", - (int)uname_len, SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN)); - return ERR_ARG; - } - -#else /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("Password not supported as no authentication methods are activated\n")); -#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN */ - } - - *smtp_auth_plain = 0; - - if (username != NULL) { - smtp_username = smtp_auth_plain + 1; - strcpy(smtp_username, username); - } - - if (pass != NULL) { - smtp_pass = smtp_auth_plain + uname_len + 2; - strcpy(smtp_pass, pass); - } - - smtp_auth_plain_len = uname_len + pass_len + 2; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if SMTP_BODYDH -static void smtp_free_struct(struct smtp_session *s) -{ - if (s->bodydh != NULL) { - SMTP_BODYDH_FREE(s->bodydh); - } - - SMTP_STATE_FREE(s); -} -#else /* SMTP_BODYDH */ -#define smtp_free_struct(x) SMTP_STATE_FREE(x) -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ - -static struct altcp_pcb *smtp_setup_pcb(struct smtp_session *s, const ip_addr_t *remote_ip) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *pcb; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(remote_ip); - -#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS - - if (smtp_server_tls_config) { - pcb = altcp_tls_new(smtp_server_tls_config, IP_GET_TYPE(remote_ip)); - } else -#endif - { - pcb = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IP_GET_TYPE(remote_ip)); - } - - if (pcb != NULL) { - altcp_arg(pcb, s); - altcp_recv(pcb, smtp_tcp_recv); - altcp_err(pcb, smtp_tcp_err); - altcp_poll(pcb, smtp_tcp_poll, SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL); - altcp_sent(pcb, smtp_tcp_sent); - } - - return pcb; -} - -/** The actual mail-sending function, called by smtp_send_mail and - * smtp_send_mail_static after setting up the struct smtp_session. - */ -static err_t smtp_send_mail_alloced(struct smtp_session *s) -{ - err_t err; - struct altcp_pcb *pcb = NULL; - ip_addr_t addr; - - LWIP_ASSERT("no smtp_session supplied", s != NULL); - -#if SMTP_CHECK_DATA - - /* check that body conforms to RFC: - * - convert all single-CR or -LF in body to CRLF - * - only 7-bit ASCII is allowed - */ - if (smtp_verify(s->to, s->to_len, 0) != ERR_OK) { - err = ERR_ARG; - goto leave; - } - - if (smtp_verify(s->from, s->from_len, 0) != ERR_OK) { - err = ERR_ARG; - goto leave; - } - - if (smtp_verify(s->subject, s->subject_len, 0) != ERR_OK) { - err = ERR_ARG; - goto leave; - } - -#if SMTP_BODYDH - - if (s->bodydh == NULL) -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ - { - if (smtp_verify(s->body, s->body_len, 0) != ERR_OK) { - err = ERR_ARG; - goto leave; - } - } - -#endif /* SMTP_CHECK_DATA */ - -#if SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA - /* copy auth data, ensuring the first byte is always zero */ - MEMCPY(s->auth_plain + 1, smtp_auth_plain + 1, smtp_auth_plain_len - 1); - s->auth_plain_len = smtp_auth_plain_len; - /* default username and pass is empty string */ - s->username = s->auth_plain; - s->pass = s->auth_plain; - - if (smtp_username != NULL) { - s->username += smtp_username - smtp_auth_plain; - } - - if (smtp_pass != NULL) { - s->pass += smtp_pass - smtp_auth_plain; - } - -#endif /* SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA */ - - s->state = SMTP_NULL; - s->timer = SMTP_TIMEOUT; - -#if LWIP_DNS - err = dns_gethostbyname(smtp_server, &addr, smtp_dns_found, s); -#else /* LWIP_DNS */ - err = ipaddr_aton(smtp_server, &addr) ? ERR_OK : ERR_ARG; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - pcb = smtp_setup_pcb(s, &addr); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - err = ERR_MEM; - goto leave; - } - - err = altcp_connect(pcb, &addr, smtp_server_port, smtp_tcp_connected); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("tcp_connect failed: %d\n", (int)err)); - goto deallocate_and_leave; - } - } else if (err != ERR_INPROGRESS) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("dns_gethostbyname failed: %d\n", (int)err)); - goto deallocate_and_leave; - } - - return ERR_OK; - -deallocate_and_leave: - - if (pcb != NULL) { - altcp_arg(pcb, NULL); - altcp_close(pcb); - } - -leave: - smtp_free_struct(s); - /* no need to call the callback here since we return != ERR_OK */ - return err; -} - -/** @ingroup smtp - * Send an email via the currently selected server, username and password. - * - * @param from source email address (must be NULL-terminated) - * @param to target email address (must be NULL-terminated) - * @param subject email subject (must be NULL-terminated) - * @param body email body (must be NULL-terminated) - * @param callback_fn callback function - * @param callback_arg user argument to callback_fn - * @returns - ERR_OK if structures were allocated and no error occured starting the connection - * (this does not mean the email has been successfully sent!) - * - another err_t on error. - */ -err_t smtp_send_mail(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, const char *body, - smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg) -{ - struct smtp_session *s; - size_t from_len = strlen(from); - size_t to_len = strlen(to); - size_t subject_len = strlen(subject); - size_t body_len = strlen(body); - size_t mem_len = sizeof(struct smtp_session); - char *sfrom, *sto, *ssubject, *sbody; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - mem_len += from_len + to_len + subject_len + body_len + 4; - - if (mem_len > 0xffff) { - /* too long! */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Allocate memory to keep this email's session state */ - s = (struct smtp_session *)SMTP_STATE_MALLOC((mem_size_t)mem_len); - - if (s == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* initialize the structure */ - memset(s, 0, mem_len); - s->from = sfrom = (char *)s + sizeof(struct smtp_session); - s->from_len = (u16_t)from_len; - s->to = sto = sfrom + from_len + 1; - s->to_len = (u16_t)to_len; - s->subject = ssubject = sto + to_len + 1; - s->subject_len = (u16_t)subject_len; - s->body = sbody = ssubject + subject_len + 1; - s->body_len = (u16_t)body_len; - /* copy source and target email address */ - /* cast to size_t is a hack to cast away constness */ - MEMCPY(sfrom, from, from_len + 1); - MEMCPY(sto, to, to_len + 1); - MEMCPY(ssubject, subject, subject_len + 1); - MEMCPY(sbody, body, body_len + 1); - - s->callback_fn = callback_fn; - s->callback_arg = callback_arg; - - /* call the actual implementation of this function */ - return smtp_send_mail_alloced(s); -} - -/** @ingroup smtp - * Same as smtp_send_mail, but doesn't copy from, to, subject and body into - * an internal buffer to save memory. - * WARNING: the above data must stay untouched until the callback function is - * called (unless the function returns != ERR_OK) - */ -err_t smtp_send_mail_static(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, - const char *body, smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg) -{ - struct smtp_session *s; - size_t len; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - s = (struct smtp_session *)SMTP_STATE_MALLOC(sizeof(struct smtp_session)); - - if (s == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memset(s, 0, sizeof(struct smtp_session)); - /* initialize the structure */ - s->from = from; - len = strlen(from); - LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); - s->from_len = (u16_t)len; - s->to = to; - len = strlen(to); - LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); - s->to_len = (u16_t)len; - s->subject = subject; - len = strlen(subject); - LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); - s->subject_len = (u16_t)len; - s->body = body; - len = strlen(body); - LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); - s->body_len = (u16_t)len; - s->callback_fn = callback_fn; - s->callback_arg = callback_arg; - /* call the actual implementation of this function */ - return smtp_send_mail_alloced(s); -} - -/** @ingroup smtp - * Same as smtp_send_mail but takes a struct smtp_send_request as single - * parameter which contains all the other parameters. - * To be used with tcpip_callback to send mail from interrupt context or from - * another thread. - * - * WARNING: server and authentication must stay untouched until this function has run! - * - * Usage example: - * - allocate a struct smtp_send_request (in a way that is allowed in interrupt context) - * - fill the members of the struct as if calling smtp_send_mail - * - specify a callback_function - * - set callback_arg to the structure itself - * - call this function - * - wait for the callback function to be called - * - in the callback function, deallocate the structure (passed as arg) - */ -void smtp_send_mail_int(void *arg) -{ - struct smtp_send_request *req = (struct smtp_send_request *)arg; - err_t err; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("smtp_send_mail_int: no argument given", arg != NULL); - - if (req->static_data) { - err = smtp_send_mail_static(req->from, req->to, req->subject, req->body, - req->callback_fn, req->callback_arg); - } else { - err = smtp_send_mail(req->from, req->to, req->subject, req->body, - req->callback_fn, req->callback_arg); - } - - if ((err != ERR_OK) && (req->callback_fn != NULL)) { - req->callback_fn(req->callback_arg, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_UNKNOWN, 0, err); - } -} - -#if SMTP_CHECK_DATA -/** Verify that a given string conforms to the SMTP rules - * (7-bit only, no single CR or LF, - * @todo: no line consisting of a single dot only) - */ -static err_t smtp_verify(const char *data, size_t data_len, u8_t linebreaks_allowed) -{ - size_t i; - u8_t last_was_cr = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { - char current = data[i]; - - if ((current & 0x80) != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_verify: no 8-bit data supported: %s\n", data)); - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (current == '\r') { - if (!linebreaks_allowed) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_verify: found CR where no linebreaks allowed: %s\n", data)); - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (last_was_cr) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_verify: found double CR: %s\n", data)); - return ERR_ARG; - } - - last_was_cr = 1; - } else { - if (current == '\n') { - if (!last_was_cr) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_verify: found LF without CR before: %s\n", data)); - return ERR_ARG; - } - } - - last_was_cr = 0; - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* SMTP_CHECK_DATA */ - -/** Frees the smtp_session and calls the callback function */ -static void smtp_free(struct smtp_session *s, u8_t result, u16_t srv_err, err_t err) -{ - smtp_result_fn fn = s->callback_fn; - void *arg = s->callback_arg; - - if (s->p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(s->p); - } - - smtp_free_struct(s); - - if (fn != NULL) { - fn(arg, result, srv_err, err); - } -} - -/** Try to close a pcb and free the arg if successful */ -static void smtp_close(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t result, - u16_t srv_err, err_t err) -{ - if (pcb != NULL) { - altcp_arg(pcb, NULL); - - if (altcp_close(pcb) == ERR_OK) { - if (s != NULL) { - smtp_free(s, result, srv_err, err); - } - } else { - /* close failed, set back arg */ - altcp_arg(pcb, s); - } - } else { - if (s != NULL) { - smtp_free(s, result, srv_err, err); - } - } -} - -/** Raw API TCP err callback: pcb is already deallocated */ -static void smtp_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - - if (arg != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_tcp_err: connection reset by remote host\n")); - smtp_free((struct smtp_session *)arg, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED, 0, err); - } -} - -/** Raw API TCP poll callback */ -static err_t smtp_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - if (arg != NULL) { - struct smtp_session *s = (struct smtp_session *)arg; - - if (s->timer != 0) { - s->timer--; - } - } - - smtp_process(arg, pcb, NULL); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Raw API TCP sent callback */ -static err_t smtp_tcp_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - smtp_process(arg, pcb, NULL); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Raw API TCP recv callback */ -static err_t smtp_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - - if (p != NULL) { - altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); - smtp_process(arg, pcb, p); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_tcp_recv: connection closed by remote host\n")); - smtp_close((struct smtp_session *)arg, pcb, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED, 0, err); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t smtp_tcp_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_connected: Waiting for 220\n")); - } else { - /* shouldn't happen, but we still check 'err', only to be sure */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_connected: %d\n", (int)err)); - smtp_close((struct smtp_session *)arg, pcb, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT, 0, err); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if LWIP_DNS -/** DNS callback - * If ipaddr is non-NULL, resolving succeeded, otherwise it failed. - */ -static void smtp_dns_found(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg) -{ - struct smtp_session *s = (struct smtp_session *)arg; - struct altcp_pcb *pcb; - err_t err; - u8_t result; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hostname); - - if (ipaddr != NULL) { - pcb = smtp_setup_pcb(s, ipaddr); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_dns_found: hostname resolved, connecting\n")); - err = altcp_connect(pcb, ipaddr, smtp_server_port, smtp_tcp_connected); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - return; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("tcp_connect failed: %d\n", (int)err)); - result = SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_dns_found: failed to allocate tcp pcb\n")); - result = SMTP_RESULT_ERR_MEM; - err = ERR_MEM; - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_dns_found: failed to resolve hostname: %s\n", - hostname)); - pcb = NULL; - result = SMTP_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME; - err = ERR_ARG; - } - - smtp_close(s, pcb, result, 0, err); -} -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN - -/** Table 6-bit-index-to-ASCII used for base64-encoding */ -static const char base64_table[] = { - 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', - 'I', 'J', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', - 'Q', 'R', 'S', 'T', 'U', 'V', 'W', 'X', 'Y', 'Z', - 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f', 'g', 'h', - 'i', 'j', 'k', 'l', 'm', 'n', 'o', 'p', - 'q', 'r', 's', 't', 'u', 'v', 'w', 'x', 'y', 'z', - '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', - '+', '/' -}; - -/** Base64 encoding */ -static size_t smtp_base64_encode(char *target, size_t target_len, const char *source, size_t source_len) -{ - size_t i; - s8_t j; - size_t target_idx = 0; - size_t longer = (source_len % 3) ? (3 - (source_len % 3)) : 0; - size_t source_len_b64 = source_len + longer; - size_t len = (((source_len_b64)*4) / 3); - u8_t x = 5; - u8_t current = 0; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(target_len); - - LWIP_ASSERT("target_len is too short", target_len >= len); - - for (i = 0; i < source_len_b64; i++) { - u8_t b = (i < source_len ? (u8_t)source[i] : 0); - - for (j = 7; j >= 0; j--, x--) { - if ((b & (1 << j)) != 0) { - current = (u8_t)(current | (1U << x)); - } - - if (x == 0) { - target[target_idx++] = base64_table[current]; - x = 6; - current = 0; - } - } - } - - for (i = len - longer; i < len; i++) { - target[i] = '='; - } - - return len; -} -#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ - -/** Parse pbuf to see if it contains the beginning of an answer. - * If so, it returns the contained response code as number between 1 and 999. - * If not, zero is returned. - * - * @param s smtp session struct - */ -static u16_t smtp_is_response(struct smtp_session *s) -{ - char digits[4]; - long num; - - if (s->p == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - /* copy three digits and convert them to int */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(s->p, digits, 3, 0) != 3) { - /* pbuf was too short */ - return 0; - } - - digits[3] = 0; - num = strtol(digits, NULL, 10); - - if ((num <= 0) || (num >= 1000)) { - /* failed to find response code at start of line */ - return 0; - } - - return (u16_t)num; -} - -/** Parse pbuf to see if it contains a fully received answer. - * If one is found, ERR_OK is returned. - * If none is found, ERR_VAL is returned. - * - * A fully received answer is a 3-digit number followed by a space, - * some string and a CRLF as line ending. - * - * @param s smtp session struct - */ -static err_t smtp_is_response_finished(struct smtp_session *s) -{ - u8_t sp; - u16_t crlf; - u16_t offset; - - if (s->p == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - offset = 0; -again: - /* We could check the response number here, but we trust the - * protocol definition which says the client can rely on it being - * the same on every line. */ - - /* find CRLF */ - if (offset > 0xFFFF - 4) { - /* would overflow */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - crlf = pbuf_memfind(s->p, SMTP_CRLF, SMTP_CRLF_LEN, (u16_t)(offset + 4)); - - if (crlf == 0xFFFF) { - /* no CRLF found */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - sp = pbuf_get_at(s->p, (u16_t)(offset + 3)); - - if (sp == '-') { - /* no space after response code -> try next line */ - offset = (u16_t)(crlf + 2); - - if (offset < crlf) { - /* overflow */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - goto again; - } else if (sp == ' ') { - /* CRLF found after response code + space -> valid response */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* sp contains invalid character */ - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** Prepare HELO/EHLO message */ -static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_helo(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - size_t ipa_len; - const char *ipa = ipaddr_ntoa(altcp_get_ip(pcb, 1)); - LWIP_ASSERT("ipaddr_ntoa returned NULL", ipa != NULL); - ipa_len = strlen(ipa); - LWIP_ASSERT("string too long", ipa_len <= (SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN - SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2_LEN)); - - *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN + (u16_t)ipa_len + SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2_LEN); - LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", *tx_buf_len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN); - - SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1, SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN); - MEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN], ipa, ipa_len); - SMEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN + ipa_len], SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2, SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2_LEN); - return SMTP_HELO; -} - -#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN -/** Parse last server response (in rx_buf) for supported authentication method, - * create data to send out (to tx_buf), set tx_data_len correctly - * and return the next state. - */ -static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_auth_or_mail(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) -{ - /* check response for supported authentication method */ - u16_t auth = pbuf_strstr(s->p, SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_SP); - - if (auth == 0xFFFF) { - auth = pbuf_strstr(s->p, SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_EQ); - } - - if (auth != 0xFFFF) { - u16_t crlf = pbuf_memfind(s->p, SMTP_CRLF, SMTP_CRLF_LEN, auth); - - if ((crlf != 0xFFFF) && (crlf > auth)) { - /* use tx_buf temporarily */ - u16_t copied = pbuf_copy_partial(s->p, s->tx_buf, (u16_t)(crlf - auth), auth); - - if (copied != 0) { - char *sep = s->tx_buf + SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_LEN; - s->tx_buf[copied] = 0; -#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN - - /* favour PLAIN over LOGIN since it involves less requests */ - if (strstr(sep, SMTP_AUTH_PARAM_PLAIN) != NULL) { - size_t auth_len; - /* server supports AUTH PLAIN */ - SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1, SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN); - - /* add base64-encoded string "\0username\0password" */ - auth_len = smtp_base64_encode(&s->tx_buf[SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN], - SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN, SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_DATA(s), - SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_LEN(s)); - LWIP_ASSERT("string too long", auth_len <= (SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN - SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2_LEN)); - *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN + SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2_LEN + (u16_t)auth_len); - SMEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN + auth_len], SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2, - SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2_LEN); - return SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN; - } else -#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN */ - { -#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN - - if (strstr(sep, SMTP_AUTH_PARAM_LOGIN) != NULL) { - /* server supports AUTH LOGIN */ - *tx_buf_len = SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN_LEN; - SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN, SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN_LEN); - return SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_UNAME; - } - -#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ - } - } - } - } - - /* server didnt's send correct keywords for AUTH, try sending directly */ - return smtp_prepare_mail(s, tx_buf_len); -} -#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ - -#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN -/** Send base64-encoded username */ -static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_auth_login_uname(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) -{ - size_t base64_len = smtp_base64_encode(s->tx_buf, SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN, - SMTP_USERNAME(s), strlen(SMTP_USERNAME(s))); - /* @todo: support base64-encoded longer than 64k */ - LWIP_ASSERT("string too long", base64_len <= 0xffff); - LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", base64_len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CRLF_LEN); - *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(base64_len + SMTP_CRLF_LEN); - - SMEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[base64_len], SMTP_CRLF, SMTP_CRLF_LEN); - s->tx_buf[*tx_buf_len] = 0; - return SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_PASS; -} - -/** Send base64-encoded password */ -static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_auth_login_pass(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) -{ - size_t base64_len = smtp_base64_encode(s->tx_buf, SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN, - SMTP_PASS(s), strlen(SMTP_PASS(s))); - /* @todo: support base64-encoded longer than 64k */ - LWIP_ASSERT("string too long", base64_len <= 0xffff); - LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", base64_len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CRLF_LEN); - *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(base64_len + SMTP_CRLF_LEN); - - SMEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[base64_len], SMTP_CRLF, SMTP_CRLF_LEN); - s->tx_buf[*tx_buf_len] = 0; - return SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN; -} -#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ - -/** Prepare MAIL message */ -static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_mail(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) -{ - char *target = s->tx_buf; - LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", s->from_len <= (SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN - SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2_LEN)); - *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN + SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2_LEN + s->from_len); - target[*tx_buf_len] = 0; - - SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1, SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN); - target += SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN; - MEMCPY(target, s->from, s->from_len); - target += s->from_len; - SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2, SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2_LEN); - return SMTP_MAIL; -} - -/** Prepare RCPT message */ -static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_rcpt(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) -{ - char *target = s->tx_buf; - LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", s->to_len <= (SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN - SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2_LEN)); - *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN + SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2_LEN + s->to_len); - target[*tx_buf_len] = 0; - - SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1, SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN); - target += SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN; - MEMCPY(target, s->to, s->to_len); - target += s->to_len; - SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2, SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2_LEN); - return SMTP_RCPT; -} - -/** Prepare header of body */ -static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_header(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) -{ - char *target = s->tx_buf; - int len = SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1_LEN + SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2_LEN + - SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3_LEN + SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4_LEN + s->from_len + s->to_len + - s->subject_len; - LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", len > 0 && len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN); - *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)len; - target[*tx_buf_len] = 0; - - SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1_LEN); - target += SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1_LEN; - MEMCPY(target, s->from, s->from_len); - target += s->from_len; - SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2_LEN); - target += SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2_LEN; - MEMCPY(target, s->to, s->to_len); - target += s->to_len; - SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3_LEN); - target += SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3_LEN; - MEMCPY(target, s->subject, s->subject_len); - target += s->subject_len; - SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4_LEN); - - return SMTP_BODY; -} - -/** Prepare QUIT message */ -static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_quit(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) -{ - *tx_buf_len = SMTP_CMD_QUIT_LEN; - s->tx_buf[*tx_buf_len] = 0; - SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_QUIT, SMTP_CMD_QUIT_LEN); - LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", *tx_buf_len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN); - return SMTP_CLOSED; -} - -/** If in state SMTP_BODY, try to send more body data */ -static void smtp_send_body(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - err_t err; - - if (s->state == SMTP_BODY) { -#if SMTP_BODYDH - - if (s->bodydh) { - smtp_send_body_data_handler(s, pcb); - } else -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ - { - u16_t send_len = (u16_t)(s->body_len - s->body_sent); - - if (send_len > 0) { - u16_t snd_buf = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); - - if (send_len > snd_buf) { - send_len = snd_buf; - } - - if (send_len > 0) { - /* try to send something out */ - err = altcp_write(pcb, &s->body[s->body_sent], (u16_t)send_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - s->timer = SMTP_TIMEOUT_DATABLOCK; - s->body_sent = (u16_t)(s->body_sent + send_len); - - if (s->body_sent < s->body_len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_send_body: %d of %d bytes written\n", - s->body_sent, s->body_len)); - } - } - } - } - } - - if (s->body_sent == s->body_len) { - /* the whole body has been written, write last line */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_send_body: body completely written (%d bytes), appending end-of-body\n", - s->body_len)); - err = altcp_write(pcb, SMTP_CMD_BODY_FINISHED, SMTP_CMD_BODY_FINISHED_LEN, 0); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - s->timer = SMTP_TIMEOUT_DATATERM; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_send_body: end-of-body written, changing state to %s\n", - smtp_state_str[SMTP_QUIT])); - /* last line written, change state, wait for confirmation */ - s->state = SMTP_QUIT; - } - } - } -} - -/** State machine-like implementation of an SMTP client. - */ -static void smtp_process(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct smtp_session *s = (struct smtp_session *)arg; - u16_t response_code = 0; - u16_t tx_buf_len = 0; - enum smtp_session_state next_state; - - if (arg == NULL) { - /* already closed SMTP connection */ - if (p != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Received %d bytes after closing: %s\n", - p->tot_len, smtp_pbuf_str(p))); - pbuf_free(p); - } - - return; - } - - next_state = s->state; - - if (p != NULL) { - /* received data */ - if (s->p == NULL) { - s->p = p; - } else { - pbuf_cat(s->p, p); - } - } else { - /* idle timer, close connection if timed out */ - if (s->timer == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_process: connection timed out, closing\n")); - smtp_close(s, pcb, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT, 0, ERR_TIMEOUT); - return; - } - - if (s->state == SMTP_BODY) { - smtp_send_body(s, pcb); - return; - } - } - - response_code = smtp_is_response(s); - - if (response_code) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_process: received response code: %d\n", response_code)); - - if (smtp_is_response_finished(s) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_process: partly received response code: %d\n", response_code)); - /* wait for next packet to complete the respone */ - return; - } - } else { - if (s->p != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_process: unknown data received (%s)\n", - smtp_pbuf_str(s->p))); - pbuf_free(s->p); - s->p = NULL; - } - - return; - } - - switch (s->state) { - case (SMTP_NULL): - - /* wait for 220 */ - if (response_code == 220) { - /* then send EHLO */ - next_state = smtp_prepare_helo(s, &tx_buf_len, pcb); - } - - break; - - case (SMTP_HELO): - - /* wait for 250 */ - if (response_code == 250) { -#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN - /* then send AUTH or MAIL */ - next_state = smtp_prepare_auth_or_mail(s, &tx_buf_len); - } - - break; - - case (SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN): - case (SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN): - - /* wait for 235 */ - if (response_code == 235) { -#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ - /* send MAIL */ - next_state = smtp_prepare_mail(s, &tx_buf_len); - } - - break; -#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN - - case (SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_UNAME): - - /* wait for 334 Username */ - if (response_code == 334) { - if (pbuf_strstr(s->p, SMTP_RESP_LOGIN_UNAME) != 0xFFFF) { - /* send username */ - next_state = smtp_prepare_auth_login_uname(s, &tx_buf_len); - } - } - - break; - - case (SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_PASS): - - /* wait for 334 Password */ - if (response_code == 334) { - if (pbuf_strstr(s->p, SMTP_RESP_LOGIN_PASS) != 0xFFFF) { - /* send username */ - next_state = smtp_prepare_auth_login_pass(s, &tx_buf_len); - } - } - - break; -#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ - - case (SMTP_MAIL): - - /* wait for 250 */ - if (response_code == 250) { - /* send RCPT */ - next_state = smtp_prepare_rcpt(s, &tx_buf_len); - } - - break; - - case (SMTP_RCPT): - - /* wait for 250 */ - if (response_code == 250) { - /* send DATA */ - SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_DATA, SMTP_CMD_DATA_LEN); - tx_buf_len = SMTP_CMD_DATA_LEN; - next_state = SMTP_DATA; - } - - break; - - case (SMTP_DATA): - - /* wait for 354 */ - if (response_code == 354) { - /* send email header */ - next_state = smtp_prepare_header(s, &tx_buf_len); - } - - break; - - case (SMTP_BODY): - /* nothing to be done here, handled somewhere else */ - break; - - case (SMTP_QUIT): - - /* wait for 250 */ - if (response_code == 250) { - /* send QUIT */ - next_state = smtp_prepare_quit(s, &tx_buf_len); - } - - break; - - case (SMTP_CLOSED): - /* nothing to do, wait for connection closed from server */ - return; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS, ("Invalid state: %d/%s\n", (int)s->state, - smtp_state_str[s->state])); - break; - } - - if (s->state == next_state) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_process[%s]: unexpected response_code, closing: %d (%s)\n", - smtp_state_str[s->state], response_code, smtp_pbuf_str(s->p))); - /* close connection */ - smtp_close(s, pcb, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_SVR_RESP, response_code, ERR_OK); - return; - } - - if (tx_buf_len > 0) { - SMTP_TX_BUF_MAX(tx_buf_len); - - if (altcp_write(pcb, s->tx_buf, tx_buf_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY) == ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_process[%s]: received command %d (%s)\n", - smtp_state_str[s->state], response_code, smtp_pbuf_str(s->p))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_process[%s]: sent %" U16_F " bytes: \"%s\"\n", - smtp_state_str[s->state], tx_buf_len, s->tx_buf)); - s->timer = SMTP_TIMEOUT; - pbuf_free(s->p); - s->p = NULL; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_process: changing state from %s to %s\n", - smtp_state_str[s->state], smtp_state_str[next_state])); - s->state = next_state; - - if (next_state == SMTP_BODY) { - /* try to stream-send body data right now */ - smtp_send_body(s, pcb); - } else if (next_state == SMTP_CLOSED) { - /* sent out all data, delete structure */ - altcp_arg(pcb, NULL); - smtp_free(s, SMTP_RESULT_OK, 0, ERR_OK); - } - } - } -} - -#if SMTP_BODYDH -/** Elementary sub-function to send data - * - * @returns: BDHALLDATASENT all data has been written - * BDHSOMEDATASENT some data has been written - * 0 no data has been written - */ -static int smtp_send_bodyh_data(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, const char **from, u16_t *howmany) -{ - err_t err; - u16_t len = *howmany; - - len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(len, altcp_sndbuf(pcb)); - err = altcp_write(pcb, *from, len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - *from += len; - - if ((*howmany -= len) > 0) { - return BDHSOMEDATASENT; - } - - return BDHALLDATASENT; - } - - return 0; -} - -/** Same as smtp_send_mail_static, but uses a callback function to send body data - */ -err_t smtp_send_mail_bodycback(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, - smtp_bodycback_fn bodycback_fn, smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg) -{ - struct smtp_session *s; - size_t len; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - s = (struct smtp_session *)SMTP_STATE_MALLOC(sizeof(struct smtp_session)); - - if (s == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memset(s, 0, sizeof(struct smtp_session)); - s->bodydh = (struct smtp_bodydh_state *)SMTP_BODYDH_MALLOC(sizeof(struct smtp_bodydh_state)); - - if (s->bodydh == NULL) { - SMTP_STATE_FREE(s); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memset(s->bodydh, 0, sizeof(struct smtp_bodydh_state)); - /* initialize the structure */ - s->from = from; - len = strlen(from); - LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); - s->from_len = (u16_t)len; - s->to = to; - len = strlen(to); - LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); - s->to_len = (u16_t)len; - s->subject = subject; - len = strlen(subject); - LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); - s->subject_len = (u16_t)len; - s->body = NULL; - LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); - s->callback_fn = callback_fn; - s->callback_arg = callback_arg; - s->bodydh->callback_fn = bodycback_fn; - s->bodydh->state = BDH_SENDING; - /* call the actual implementation of this function */ - return smtp_send_mail_alloced(s); -} - -static void smtp_send_body_data_handler(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct smtp_bodydh_state *bdh; - int res = 0, ret; - LWIP_ASSERT("s != NULL", s != NULL); - bdh = s->bodydh; - LWIP_ASSERT("bodydh != NULL", bdh != NULL); - - /* resume any leftovers from prior memory constraints */ - if (s->body_len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: resume\n")); - - if ((res = smtp_send_bodyh_data(pcb, (const char **)&s->body, &s->body_len)) != BDHALLDATASENT) { - s->body_sent = s->body_len - 1; - return; - } - } - - ret = res; - - /* all data on buffer has been queued, resume execution */ - if (bdh->state == BDH_SENDING) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: run\n")); - - do { - ret |= res; /* remember if we once queued something to send */ - bdh->exposed.length = 0; - - if (bdh->callback_fn(s->callback_arg, &bdh->exposed) == BDH_DONE) { - bdh->state = BDH_STOP; - } - - s->body = bdh->exposed.buffer; - s->body_len = bdh->exposed.length; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: trying to send %u bytes\n", (unsigned int)s->body_len)); - } while (s->body_len && - - ((res = smtp_send_bodyh_data(pcb, (const char **)&s->body, &s->body_len)) == BDHALLDATASENT) && (bdh->state != BDH_STOP)); - } - - if ((bdh->state != BDH_SENDING) && (ret != BDHSOMEDATASENT)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: stop\n")); - s->body_sent = s->body_len; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: pause\n")); - s->body_sent = s->body_len - 1; - } -} -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ +/** + * @file + * SMTP client module + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + * @defgroup smtp SMTP client + * @ingroup apps + * + * This is simple SMTP client for raw API. + * It is a minimal implementation of SMTP as specified in RFC 5321. + * + * Example usage: +@code{.c} + void my_smtp_result_fn(void *arg, u8_t smtp_result, u16_t srv_err, err_t err) + { + printf("mail (%p) sent with results: 0x%02x, 0x%04x, 0x%08x\n", arg, + smtp_result, srv_err, err); + } + static void my_smtp_test(void) + { + smtp_set_server_addr("mymailserver.org"); + -> set both username and password as NULL if no auth needed + smtp_set_auth("username", "password"); + smtp_send_mail("sender", "recipient", "subject", "body", my_smtp_result_fn, + some_argument); + } +@endcode + + * When using from any other thread than the tcpip_thread (for NO_SYS==0), use + * smtp_send_mail_int()! + * + * SMTP_BODYDH usage: +@code{.c} + int my_smtp_bodydh_fn(void *arg, struct smtp_bodydh *bdh) + { + if(bdh->state >= 10) { + return BDH_DONE; + } + sprintf(bdh->buffer,"Line #%2d\r\n",bdh->state); + bdh->length = strlen(bdh->buffer); + ++bdh->state; + return BDH_WORKING; + } + + smtp_send_mail_bodycback("sender", "recipient", "subject", + my_smtp_bodydh_fn, my_smtp_result_fn, some_argument); +@endcode + * + * @todo: + * - attachments (the main difficulty here is streaming base64-encoding to + * prevent having to allocate a buffer for the whole encoded file at once) + * - test with more mail servers... + * + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/smtp.h" + +#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/sockets.h" +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" + +#include /* strlen, memcpy */ +#include + +/** TCP poll interval. Unit is 0.5 sec. */ +#define SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL 4 +/** TCP poll timeout while sending message body, reset after every + * successful write. 3 minutes */ +#define SMTP_TIMEOUT_DATABLOCK (3 * 60 * SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL / 2) +/** TCP poll timeout while waiting for confirmation after sending the body. + * 10 minutes */ +#define SMTP_TIMEOUT_DATATERM (10 * 60 * SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL / 2) +/** TCP poll timeout while not sending the body. + * This is somewhat lower than the RFC states (5 minutes for initial, MAIL + * and RCPT) but still OK for us here. + * 2 minutes */ +#define SMTP_TIMEOUT (2 * 60 * SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL / 2) + +/* the various debug levels for this file */ +#define SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE) +#define SMTP_DEBUG_STATE (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE) +#define SMTP_DEBUG_WARN (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) +#define SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING | LWIP_DBG_STATE) +#define SMTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS (SMTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS) + +#define SMTP_RX_BUF_LEN 255 +#define SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN 255 +#define SMTP_CRLF "\r\n" +#define SMTP_CRLF_LEN 2 + +#define SMTP_RESP_220 "220" +#define SMTP_RESP_235 "235" +#define SMTP_RESP_250 "250" +#define SMTP_RESP_334 "334" +#define SMTP_RESP_354 "354" +#define SMTP_RESP_LOGIN_UNAME "VXNlcm5hbWU6" +#define SMTP_RESP_LOGIN_PASS "UGFzc3dvcmQ6" + +#define SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_SP "AUTH " +#define SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_EQ "AUTH=" +#define SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_LEN 5 +#define SMTP_AUTH_PARAM_PLAIN "PLAIN" +#define SMTP_AUTH_PARAM_LOGIN "LOGIN" + +#define SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1 "EHLO [" +#define SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN 6 +#define SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2 "]\r\n" +#define SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2_LEN 3 +#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1 "AUTH PLAIN " +#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN 11 +#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2 "\r\n" +#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2_LEN 2 +#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN "AUTH LOGIN\r\n" +#define SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN_LEN 12 +#define SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1 "MAIL FROM: <" +#define SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN 12 +#define SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2 ">\r\n" +#define SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2_LEN 3 +#define SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1 "RCPT TO: <" +#define SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN 10 +#define SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2 ">\r\n" +#define SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2_LEN 3 +#define SMTP_CMD_DATA "DATA\r\n" +#define SMTP_CMD_DATA_LEN 6 +#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1 "From: <" +#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1_LEN 7 +#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2 ">\r\nTo: <" +#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2_LEN 8 +#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3 ">\r\nSubject: " +#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3_LEN 12 +#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4 "\r\n\r\n" +#define SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4_LEN 4 +#define SMTP_CMD_BODY_FINISHED "\r\n.\r\n" +#define SMTP_CMD_BODY_FINISHED_LEN 5 +#define SMTP_CMD_QUIT "QUIT\r\n" +#define SMTP_CMD_QUIT_LEN 6 + +#if defined(SMTP_STAT_TX_BUF_MAX) && SMTP_STAT_TX_BUF_MAX +#define SMTP_TX_BUF_MAX(len) LWIP_MACRO(if ((len) > smtp_tx_buf_len_max) smtp_tx_buf_len_max = (len);) +#else /* SMTP_STAT_TX_BUF_MAX */ +#define SMTP_TX_BUF_MAX(len) +#endif /* SMTP_STAT_TX_BUF_MAX */ + +#if SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA +#define SMTP_USERNAME(session) (session)->username +#define SMTP_PASS(session) (session)->pass +#define SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_DATA(session) (session)->auth_plain +#define SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_LEN(session) (session)->auth_plain_len +#else /* SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA */ +#define SMTP_USERNAME(session) smtp_username +#define SMTP_PASS(session) smtp_pass +#define SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_DATA(session) smtp_auth_plain +#define SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_LEN(session) smtp_auth_plain_len +#endif /* SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA */ + +#if SMTP_BODYDH +#ifndef SMTP_BODYDH_MALLOC +#define SMTP_BODYDH_MALLOC(size) mem_malloc(size) +#define SMTP_BODYDH_FREE(ptr) mem_free(ptr) +#endif + +/* Some internal state return values */ +#define BDHALLDATASENT 2 +#define BDHSOMEDATASENT 1 + +enum bdh_handler_state { + BDH_SENDING, /* Serving the user function generating body content */ + BDH_STOP /* User function stopped, closing */ +}; +#endif + +/** State for SMTP client state machine */ +enum smtp_session_state { + SMTP_NULL, + SMTP_HELO, + SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN, + SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_UNAME, + SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_PASS, + SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN, + SMTP_MAIL, + SMTP_RCPT, + SMTP_DATA, + SMTP_BODY, + SMTP_QUIT, + SMTP_CLOSED +}; + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +/** State-to-string table for debugging */ +static const char *smtp_state_str[] = { + "SMTP_NULL", + "SMTP_HELO", + "SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN", + "SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_UNAME", + "SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_PASS", + "SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN", + "SMTP_MAIL", + "SMTP_RCPT", + "SMTP_DATA", + "SMTP_BODY", + "SMTP_QUIT", + "SMTP_CLOSED", +}; + +static const char *smtp_result_strs[] = { + "SMTP_RESULT_OK", + "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_UNKNOWN", + "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT", + "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME", + "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED", + "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT", + "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_SVR_RESP", + "SMTP_RESULT_ERR_MEM" +}; +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ + +#if SMTP_BODYDH +struct smtp_bodydh_state { + smtp_bodycback_fn callback_fn; /* The function to call (again) */ + u16_t state; + struct smtp_bodydh exposed; /* the user function structure */ +}; +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ + +/** struct keeping the body and state of an smtp session */ +struct smtp_session { + /** keeping the state of the smtp session */ + enum smtp_session_state state; + /** timeout handling, if this reaches 0, the connection is closed */ + u16_t timer; + /** helper buffer for transmit, not used for sending body */ + char tx_buf[SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN + 1]; + struct pbuf *p; + /** source email address */ + const char *from; + /** size of the sourceemail address */ + u16_t from_len; + /** target email address */ + const char *to; + /** size of the target email address */ + u16_t to_len; + /** subject of the email */ + const char *subject; + /** length of the subject string */ + u16_t subject_len; + /** this is the body of the mail to be sent */ + const char *body; + /** this is the length of the body to be sent */ + u16_t body_len; + /** amount of data from body already sent */ + u16_t body_sent; + /** callback function to call when closed */ + smtp_result_fn callback_fn; + /** argument for callback function */ + void *callback_arg; +#if SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA + /** Username to use for this request */ + char *username; + /** Password to use for this request */ + char *pass; + /** Username and password combined as necessary for PLAIN authentication */ + char auth_plain[SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN + SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN + 3]; + /** Length of smtp_auth_plain string (cannot use strlen since it includes \0) */ + size_t auth_plain_len; +#endif /* SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA */ +#if SMTP_BODYDH + struct smtp_bodydh_state *bodydh; +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ +}; + +/** IP address or DNS name of the server to use for next SMTP request */ +static char smtp_server[SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN + 1]; +/** TCP port of the server to use for next SMTP request */ +static u16_t smtp_server_port = SMTP_DEFAULT_PORT; +#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS +/** If this is set, mail is sent using SMTPS */ +static struct altcp_tls_config *smtp_server_tls_config; +#endif +/** Username to use for the next SMTP request */ +static char *smtp_username; +/** Password to use for the next SMTP request */ +static char *smtp_pass; +/** Username and password combined as necessary for PLAIN authentication */ +static char smtp_auth_plain[SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN + SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN + 3]; +/** Length of smtp_auth_plain string (cannot use strlen since it includes \0) */ +static size_t smtp_auth_plain_len; + +#if SMTP_CHECK_DATA +static err_t smtp_verify(const char *data, size_t data_len, u8_t linebreaks_allowed); +#endif /* SMTP_CHECK_DATA */ +static err_t smtp_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); +static void smtp_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err); +static err_t smtp_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb); +static err_t smtp_tcp_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len); +static err_t smtp_tcp_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err); +#if LWIP_DNS +static void smtp_dns_found(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg); +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN +static size_t smtp_base64_encode(char *target, size_t target_len, const char *source, size_t source_len); +#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ +static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_mail(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len); +static void smtp_send_body(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb); +static void smtp_process(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p); +#if SMTP_BODYDH +static void smtp_send_body_data_handler(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb); +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +/** Convert an smtp result to a string */ +const char *smtp_result_str(u8_t smtp_result) +{ + if (smtp_result >= LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(smtp_result_strs)) { + return "UNKNOWN"; + } + + return smtp_result_strs[smtp_result]; +} + +/** Null-terminates the payload of p for printing out messages. + * WARNING: use this only if p is not needed any more as the last byte of + * payload is deleted! + */ +static const char *smtp_pbuf_str(struct pbuf *p) +{ + if ((p == NULL) || (p->len == 0)) { + return ""; + } + + ((char *)p->payload)[p->len] = 0; + return (const char *)p->payload; +} +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ + +/** @ingroup smtp + * Set IP address or DNS name for next SMTP connection + * + * @param server IP address (in ASCII representation) or DNS name of the server + */ +err_t smtp_set_server_addr(const char *server) +{ + size_t len = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (server != NULL) { + /* strlen: returns length WITHOUT terminating 0 byte */ + len = strlen(server); + } + + if (len > SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (len != 0) { + MEMCPY(smtp_server, server, len); + } + + smtp_server[len] = 0; /* always OK because of smtp_server[SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN + 1] */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** @ingroup smtp + * Set TCP port for next SMTP connection + * + * @param port TCP port + */ +void smtp_set_server_port(u16_t port) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + smtp_server_port = port; +} + +#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS +/** @ingroup smtp + * Set TLS configuration for next SMTP connection + * + * @param tls_config TLS configuration + */ +void smtp_set_tls_config(struct altcp_tls_config *tls_config) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + smtp_server_tls_config = tls_config; +} +#endif + +/** @ingroup smtp + * Set authentication parameters for next SMTP connection + * + * @param username login name as passed to the server + * @param pass password passed to the server together with username + */ +err_t smtp_set_auth(const char *username, const char *pass) +{ + size_t uname_len = 0; + size_t pass_len = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + memset(smtp_auth_plain, 0xfa, 64); + + if (username != NULL) { + uname_len = strlen(username); + + if (uname_len > SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS, ("Username is too long, %d instead of %d\n", + (int)uname_len, SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN)); + return ERR_ARG; + } + } + + if (pass != NULL) { +#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN + pass_len = strlen(pass); + + if (pass_len > SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS, ("Password is too long, %d instead of %d\n", + (int)uname_len, SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN)); + return ERR_ARG; + } + +#else /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("Password not supported as no authentication methods are activated\n")); +#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN */ + } + + *smtp_auth_plain = 0; + + if (username != NULL) { + smtp_username = smtp_auth_plain + 1; + strcpy(smtp_username, username); + } + + if (pass != NULL) { + smtp_pass = smtp_auth_plain + uname_len + 2; + strcpy(smtp_pass, pass); + } + + smtp_auth_plain_len = uname_len + pass_len + 2; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if SMTP_BODYDH +static void smtp_free_struct(struct smtp_session *s) +{ + if (s->bodydh != NULL) { + SMTP_BODYDH_FREE(s->bodydh); + } + + SMTP_STATE_FREE(s); +} +#else /* SMTP_BODYDH */ +#define smtp_free_struct(x) SMTP_STATE_FREE(x) +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ + +static struct altcp_pcb *smtp_setup_pcb(struct smtp_session *s, const ip_addr_t *remote_ip) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *pcb; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(remote_ip); + +#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS + + if (smtp_server_tls_config) { + pcb = altcp_tls_new(smtp_server_tls_config, IP_GET_TYPE(remote_ip)); + } else +#endif + { + pcb = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IP_GET_TYPE(remote_ip)); + } + + if (pcb != NULL) { + altcp_arg(pcb, s); + altcp_recv(pcb, smtp_tcp_recv); + altcp_err(pcb, smtp_tcp_err); + altcp_poll(pcb, smtp_tcp_poll, SMTP_POLL_INTERVAL); + altcp_sent(pcb, smtp_tcp_sent); + } + + return pcb; +} + +/** The actual mail-sending function, called by smtp_send_mail and + * smtp_send_mail_static after setting up the struct smtp_session. + */ +static err_t smtp_send_mail_alloced(struct smtp_session *s) +{ + err_t err; + struct altcp_pcb *pcb = NULL; + ip_addr_t addr; + + LWIP_ASSERT("no smtp_session supplied", s != NULL); + +#if SMTP_CHECK_DATA + + /* check that body conforms to RFC: + * - convert all single-CR or -LF in body to CRLF + * - only 7-bit ASCII is allowed + */ + if (smtp_verify(s->to, s->to_len, 0) != ERR_OK) { + err = ERR_ARG; + goto leave; + } + + if (smtp_verify(s->from, s->from_len, 0) != ERR_OK) { + err = ERR_ARG; + goto leave; + } + + if (smtp_verify(s->subject, s->subject_len, 0) != ERR_OK) { + err = ERR_ARG; + goto leave; + } + +#if SMTP_BODYDH + + if (s->bodydh == NULL) +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ + { + if (smtp_verify(s->body, s->body_len, 0) != ERR_OK) { + err = ERR_ARG; + goto leave; + } + } + +#endif /* SMTP_CHECK_DATA */ + +#if SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA + /* copy auth data, ensuring the first byte is always zero */ + MEMCPY(s->auth_plain + 1, smtp_auth_plain + 1, smtp_auth_plain_len - 1); + s->auth_plain_len = smtp_auth_plain_len; + /* default username and pass is empty string */ + s->username = s->auth_plain; + s->pass = s->auth_plain; + + if (smtp_username != NULL) { + s->username += smtp_username - smtp_auth_plain; + } + + if (smtp_pass != NULL) { + s->pass += smtp_pass - smtp_auth_plain; + } + +#endif /* SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA */ + + s->state = SMTP_NULL; + s->timer = SMTP_TIMEOUT; + +#if LWIP_DNS + err = dns_gethostbyname(smtp_server, &addr, smtp_dns_found, s); +#else /* LWIP_DNS */ + err = ipaddr_aton(smtp_server, &addr) ? ERR_OK : ERR_ARG; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + pcb = smtp_setup_pcb(s, &addr); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + err = ERR_MEM; + goto leave; + } + + err = altcp_connect(pcb, &addr, smtp_server_port, smtp_tcp_connected); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("tcp_connect failed: %d\n", (int)err)); + goto deallocate_and_leave; + } + } else if (err != ERR_INPROGRESS) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("dns_gethostbyname failed: %d\n", (int)err)); + goto deallocate_and_leave; + } + + return ERR_OK; + +deallocate_and_leave: + + if (pcb != NULL) { + altcp_arg(pcb, NULL); + altcp_close(pcb); + } + +leave: + smtp_free_struct(s); + /* no need to call the callback here since we return != ERR_OK */ + return err; +} + +/** @ingroup smtp + * Send an email via the currently selected server, username and password. + * + * @param from source email address (must be NULL-terminated) + * @param to target email address (must be NULL-terminated) + * @param subject email subject (must be NULL-terminated) + * @param body email body (must be NULL-terminated) + * @param callback_fn callback function + * @param callback_arg user argument to callback_fn + * @returns - ERR_OK if structures were allocated and no error occured starting the connection + * (this does not mean the email has been successfully sent!) + * - another err_t on error. + */ +err_t smtp_send_mail(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, const char *body, + smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg) +{ + struct smtp_session *s; + size_t from_len = strlen(from); + size_t to_len = strlen(to); + size_t subject_len = strlen(subject); + size_t body_len = strlen(body); + size_t mem_len = sizeof(struct smtp_session); + char *sfrom, *sto, *ssubject, *sbody; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + mem_len += from_len + to_len + subject_len + body_len + 4; + + if (mem_len > 0xffff) { + /* too long! */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Allocate memory to keep this email's session state */ + s = (struct smtp_session *)SMTP_STATE_MALLOC((mem_size_t)mem_len); + + if (s == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* initialize the structure */ + memset(s, 0, mem_len); + s->from = sfrom = (char *)s + sizeof(struct smtp_session); + s->from_len = (u16_t)from_len; + s->to = sto = sfrom + from_len + 1; + s->to_len = (u16_t)to_len; + s->subject = ssubject = sto + to_len + 1; + s->subject_len = (u16_t)subject_len; + s->body = sbody = ssubject + subject_len + 1; + s->body_len = (u16_t)body_len; + /* copy source and target email address */ + /* cast to size_t is a hack to cast away constness */ + MEMCPY(sfrom, from, from_len + 1); + MEMCPY(sto, to, to_len + 1); + MEMCPY(ssubject, subject, subject_len + 1); + MEMCPY(sbody, body, body_len + 1); + + s->callback_fn = callback_fn; + s->callback_arg = callback_arg; + + /* call the actual implementation of this function */ + return smtp_send_mail_alloced(s); +} + +/** @ingroup smtp + * Same as smtp_send_mail, but doesn't copy from, to, subject and body into + * an internal buffer to save memory. + * WARNING: the above data must stay untouched until the callback function is + * called (unless the function returns != ERR_OK) + */ +err_t smtp_send_mail_static(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, + const char *body, smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg) +{ + struct smtp_session *s; + size_t len; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + s = (struct smtp_session *)SMTP_STATE_MALLOC(sizeof(struct smtp_session)); + + if (s == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memset(s, 0, sizeof(struct smtp_session)); + /* initialize the structure */ + s->from = from; + len = strlen(from); + LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); + s->from_len = (u16_t)len; + s->to = to; + len = strlen(to); + LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); + s->to_len = (u16_t)len; + s->subject = subject; + len = strlen(subject); + LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); + s->subject_len = (u16_t)len; + s->body = body; + len = strlen(body); + LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); + s->body_len = (u16_t)len; + s->callback_fn = callback_fn; + s->callback_arg = callback_arg; + /* call the actual implementation of this function */ + return smtp_send_mail_alloced(s); +} + +/** @ingroup smtp + * Same as smtp_send_mail but takes a struct smtp_send_request as single + * parameter which contains all the other parameters. + * To be used with tcpip_callback to send mail from interrupt context or from + * another thread. + * + * WARNING: server and authentication must stay untouched until this function has run! + * + * Usage example: + * - allocate a struct smtp_send_request (in a way that is allowed in interrupt context) + * - fill the members of the struct as if calling smtp_send_mail + * - specify a callback_function + * - set callback_arg to the structure itself + * - call this function + * - wait for the callback function to be called + * - in the callback function, deallocate the structure (passed as arg) + */ +void smtp_send_mail_int(void *arg) +{ + struct smtp_send_request *req = (struct smtp_send_request *)arg; + err_t err; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("smtp_send_mail_int: no argument given", arg != NULL); + + if (req->static_data) { + err = smtp_send_mail_static(req->from, req->to, req->subject, req->body, + req->callback_fn, req->callback_arg); + } else { + err = smtp_send_mail(req->from, req->to, req->subject, req->body, + req->callback_fn, req->callback_arg); + } + + if ((err != ERR_OK) && (req->callback_fn != NULL)) { + req->callback_fn(req->callback_arg, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_UNKNOWN, 0, err); + } +} + +#if SMTP_CHECK_DATA +/** Verify that a given string conforms to the SMTP rules + * (7-bit only, no single CR or LF, + * @todo: no line consisting of a single dot only) + */ +static err_t smtp_verify(const char *data, size_t data_len, u8_t linebreaks_allowed) +{ + size_t i; + u8_t last_was_cr = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { + char current = data[i]; + + if ((current & 0x80) != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_verify: no 8-bit data supported: %s\n", data)); + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (current == '\r') { + if (!linebreaks_allowed) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_verify: found CR where no linebreaks allowed: %s\n", data)); + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (last_was_cr) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_verify: found double CR: %s\n", data)); + return ERR_ARG; + } + + last_was_cr = 1; + } else { + if (current == '\n') { + if (!last_was_cr) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_verify: found LF without CR before: %s\n", data)); + return ERR_ARG; + } + } + + last_was_cr = 0; + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* SMTP_CHECK_DATA */ + +/** Frees the smtp_session and calls the callback function */ +static void smtp_free(struct smtp_session *s, u8_t result, u16_t srv_err, err_t err) +{ + smtp_result_fn fn = s->callback_fn; + void *arg = s->callback_arg; + + if (s->p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(s->p); + } + + smtp_free_struct(s); + + if (fn != NULL) { + fn(arg, result, srv_err, err); + } +} + +/** Try to close a pcb and free the arg if successful */ +static void smtp_close(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t result, + u16_t srv_err, err_t err) +{ + if (pcb != NULL) { + altcp_arg(pcb, NULL); + + if (altcp_close(pcb) == ERR_OK) { + if (s != NULL) { + smtp_free(s, result, srv_err, err); + } + } else { + /* close failed, set back arg */ + altcp_arg(pcb, s); + } + } else { + if (s != NULL) { + smtp_free(s, result, srv_err, err); + } + } +} + +/** Raw API TCP err callback: pcb is already deallocated */ +static void smtp_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + + if (arg != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_tcp_err: connection reset by remote host\n")); + smtp_free((struct smtp_session *)arg, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED, 0, err); + } +} + +/** Raw API TCP poll callback */ +static err_t smtp_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + if (arg != NULL) { + struct smtp_session *s = (struct smtp_session *)arg; + + if (s->timer != 0) { + s->timer--; + } + } + + smtp_process(arg, pcb, NULL); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Raw API TCP sent callback */ +static err_t smtp_tcp_sent(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + smtp_process(arg, pcb, NULL); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Raw API TCP recv callback */ +static err_t smtp_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + + if (p != NULL) { + altcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); + smtp_process(arg, pcb, p); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_tcp_recv: connection closed by remote host\n")); + smtp_close((struct smtp_session *)arg, pcb, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED, 0, err); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t smtp_tcp_connected(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_connected: Waiting for 220\n")); + } else { + /* shouldn't happen, but we still check 'err', only to be sure */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_connected: %d\n", (int)err)); + smtp_close((struct smtp_session *)arg, pcb, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT, 0, err); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if LWIP_DNS +/** DNS callback + * If ipaddr is non-NULL, resolving succeeded, otherwise it failed. + */ +static void smtp_dns_found(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg) +{ + struct smtp_session *s = (struct smtp_session *)arg; + struct altcp_pcb *pcb; + err_t err; + u8_t result; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hostname); + + if (ipaddr != NULL) { + pcb = smtp_setup_pcb(s, ipaddr); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_dns_found: hostname resolved, connecting\n")); + err = altcp_connect(pcb, ipaddr, smtp_server_port, smtp_tcp_connected); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + return; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("tcp_connect failed: %d\n", (int)err)); + result = SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_dns_found: failed to allocate tcp pcb\n")); + result = SMTP_RESULT_ERR_MEM; + err = ERR_MEM; + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_dns_found: failed to resolve hostname: %s\n", + hostname)); + pcb = NULL; + result = SMTP_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME; + err = ERR_ARG; + } + + smtp_close(s, pcb, result, 0, err); +} +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN + +/** Table 6-bit-index-to-ASCII used for base64-encoding */ +static const char base64_table[] = { + 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', + 'I', 'J', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', + 'Q', 'R', 'S', 'T', 'U', 'V', 'W', 'X', 'Y', 'Z', + 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f', 'g', 'h', + 'i', 'j', 'k', 'l', 'm', 'n', 'o', 'p', + 'q', 'r', 's', 't', 'u', 'v', 'w', 'x', 'y', 'z', + '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', + '+', '/' +}; + +/** Base64 encoding */ +static size_t smtp_base64_encode(char *target, size_t target_len, const char *source, size_t source_len) +{ + size_t i; + s8_t j; + size_t target_idx = 0; + size_t longer = (source_len % 3) ? (3 - (source_len % 3)) : 0; + size_t source_len_b64 = source_len + longer; + size_t len = (((source_len_b64)*4) / 3); + u8_t x = 5; + u8_t current = 0; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(target_len); + + LWIP_ASSERT("target_len is too short", target_len >= len); + + for (i = 0; i < source_len_b64; i++) { + u8_t b = (i < source_len ? (u8_t)source[i] : 0); + + for (j = 7; j >= 0; j--, x--) { + if ((b & (1 << j)) != 0) { + current = (u8_t)(current | (1U << x)); + } + + if (x == 0) { + target[target_idx++] = base64_table[current]; + x = 6; + current = 0; + } + } + } + + for (i = len - longer; i < len; i++) { + target[i] = '='; + } + + return len; +} +#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ + +/** Parse pbuf to see if it contains the beginning of an answer. + * If so, it returns the contained response code as number between 1 and 999. + * If not, zero is returned. + * + * @param s smtp session struct + */ +static u16_t smtp_is_response(struct smtp_session *s) +{ + char digits[4]; + long num; + + if (s->p == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* copy three digits and convert them to int */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(s->p, digits, 3, 0) != 3) { + /* pbuf was too short */ + return 0; + } + + digits[3] = 0; + num = strtol(digits, NULL, 10); + + if ((num <= 0) || (num >= 1000)) { + /* failed to find response code at start of line */ + return 0; + } + + return (u16_t)num; +} + +/** Parse pbuf to see if it contains a fully received answer. + * If one is found, ERR_OK is returned. + * If none is found, ERR_VAL is returned. + * + * A fully received answer is a 3-digit number followed by a space, + * some string and a CRLF as line ending. + * + * @param s smtp session struct + */ +static err_t smtp_is_response_finished(struct smtp_session *s) +{ + u8_t sp; + u16_t crlf; + u16_t offset; + + if (s->p == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + offset = 0; +again: + /* We could check the response number here, but we trust the + * protocol definition which says the client can rely on it being + * the same on every line. */ + + /* find CRLF */ + if (offset > 0xFFFF - 4) { + /* would overflow */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + crlf = pbuf_memfind(s->p, SMTP_CRLF, SMTP_CRLF_LEN, (u16_t)(offset + 4)); + + if (crlf == 0xFFFF) { + /* no CRLF found */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + sp = pbuf_get_at(s->p, (u16_t)(offset + 3)); + + if (sp == '-') { + /* no space after response code -> try next line */ + offset = (u16_t)(crlf + 2); + + if (offset < crlf) { + /* overflow */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + goto again; + } else if (sp == ' ') { + /* CRLF found after response code + space -> valid response */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* sp contains invalid character */ + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** Prepare HELO/EHLO message */ +static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_helo(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + size_t ipa_len; + const char *ipa = ipaddr_ntoa(altcp_get_ip(pcb, 1)); + LWIP_ASSERT("ipaddr_ntoa returned NULL", ipa != NULL); + ipa_len = strlen(ipa); + LWIP_ASSERT("string too long", ipa_len <= (SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN - SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2_LEN)); + + *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN + (u16_t)ipa_len + SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2_LEN); + LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", *tx_buf_len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN); + + SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1, SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN); + MEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN], ipa, ipa_len); + SMEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[SMTP_CMD_EHLO_1_LEN + ipa_len], SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2, SMTP_CMD_EHLO_2_LEN); + return SMTP_HELO; +} + +#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN +/** Parse last server response (in rx_buf) for supported authentication method, + * create data to send out (to tx_buf), set tx_data_len correctly + * and return the next state. + */ +static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_auth_or_mail(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) +{ + /* check response for supported authentication method */ + u16_t auth = pbuf_strstr(s->p, SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_SP); + + if (auth == 0xFFFF) { + auth = pbuf_strstr(s->p, SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_EQ); + } + + if (auth != 0xFFFF) { + u16_t crlf = pbuf_memfind(s->p, SMTP_CRLF, SMTP_CRLF_LEN, auth); + + if ((crlf != 0xFFFF) && (crlf > auth)) { + /* use tx_buf temporarily */ + u16_t copied = pbuf_copy_partial(s->p, s->tx_buf, (u16_t)(crlf - auth), auth); + + if (copied != 0) { + char *sep = s->tx_buf + SMTP_KEYWORD_AUTH_LEN; + s->tx_buf[copied] = 0; +#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN + + /* favour PLAIN over LOGIN since it involves less requests */ + if (strstr(sep, SMTP_AUTH_PARAM_PLAIN) != NULL) { + size_t auth_len; + /* server supports AUTH PLAIN */ + SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1, SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN); + + /* add base64-encoded string "\0username\0password" */ + auth_len = smtp_base64_encode(&s->tx_buf[SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN], + SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN, SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_DATA(s), + SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN_LEN(s)); + LWIP_ASSERT("string too long", auth_len <= (SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN - SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2_LEN)); + *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN + SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2_LEN + (u16_t)auth_len); + SMEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_1_LEN + auth_len], SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2, + SMTP_CMD_AUTHPLAIN_2_LEN); + return SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN; + } else +#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN */ + { +#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN + + if (strstr(sep, SMTP_AUTH_PARAM_LOGIN) != NULL) { + /* server supports AUTH LOGIN */ + *tx_buf_len = SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN_LEN; + SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN, SMTP_CMD_AUTHLOGIN_LEN); + return SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_UNAME; + } + +#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ + } + } + } + } + + /* server didnt's send correct keywords for AUTH, try sending directly */ + return smtp_prepare_mail(s, tx_buf_len); +} +#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ + +#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN +/** Send base64-encoded username */ +static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_auth_login_uname(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) +{ + size_t base64_len = smtp_base64_encode(s->tx_buf, SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN, + SMTP_USERNAME(s), strlen(SMTP_USERNAME(s))); + /* @todo: support base64-encoded longer than 64k */ + LWIP_ASSERT("string too long", base64_len <= 0xffff); + LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", base64_len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CRLF_LEN); + *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(base64_len + SMTP_CRLF_LEN); + + SMEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[base64_len], SMTP_CRLF, SMTP_CRLF_LEN); + s->tx_buf[*tx_buf_len] = 0; + return SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_PASS; +} + +/** Send base64-encoded password */ +static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_auth_login_pass(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) +{ + size_t base64_len = smtp_base64_encode(s->tx_buf, SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN, + SMTP_PASS(s), strlen(SMTP_PASS(s))); + /* @todo: support base64-encoded longer than 64k */ + LWIP_ASSERT("string too long", base64_len <= 0xffff); + LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", base64_len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CRLF_LEN); + *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(base64_len + SMTP_CRLF_LEN); + + SMEMCPY(&s->tx_buf[base64_len], SMTP_CRLF, SMTP_CRLF_LEN); + s->tx_buf[*tx_buf_len] = 0; + return SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN; +} +#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ + +/** Prepare MAIL message */ +static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_mail(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) +{ + char *target = s->tx_buf; + LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", s->from_len <= (SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN - SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2_LEN)); + *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN + SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2_LEN + s->from_len); + target[*tx_buf_len] = 0; + + SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1, SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN); + target += SMTP_CMD_MAIL_1_LEN; + MEMCPY(target, s->from, s->from_len); + target += s->from_len; + SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2, SMTP_CMD_MAIL_2_LEN); + return SMTP_MAIL; +} + +/** Prepare RCPT message */ +static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_rcpt(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) +{ + char *target = s->tx_buf; + LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", s->to_len <= (SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN - SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN - SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2_LEN)); + *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)(SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN + SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2_LEN + s->to_len); + target[*tx_buf_len] = 0; + + SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1, SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN); + target += SMTP_CMD_RCPT_1_LEN; + MEMCPY(target, s->to, s->to_len); + target += s->to_len; + SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2, SMTP_CMD_RCPT_2_LEN); + return SMTP_RCPT; +} + +/** Prepare header of body */ +static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_header(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) +{ + char *target = s->tx_buf; + int len = SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1_LEN + SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2_LEN + + SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3_LEN + SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4_LEN + s->from_len + s->to_len + + s->subject_len; + LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", len > 0 && len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN); + *tx_buf_len = (u16_t)len; + target[*tx_buf_len] = 0; + + SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1_LEN); + target += SMTP_CMD_HEADER_1_LEN; + MEMCPY(target, s->from, s->from_len); + target += s->from_len; + SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2_LEN); + target += SMTP_CMD_HEADER_2_LEN; + MEMCPY(target, s->to, s->to_len); + target += s->to_len; + SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3_LEN); + target += SMTP_CMD_HEADER_3_LEN; + MEMCPY(target, s->subject, s->subject_len); + target += s->subject_len; + SMEMCPY(target, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4, SMTP_CMD_HEADER_4_LEN); + + return SMTP_BODY; +} + +/** Prepare QUIT message */ +static enum smtp_session_state smtp_prepare_quit(struct smtp_session *s, u16_t *tx_buf_len) +{ + *tx_buf_len = SMTP_CMD_QUIT_LEN; + s->tx_buf[*tx_buf_len] = 0; + SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_QUIT, SMTP_CMD_QUIT_LEN); + LWIP_ASSERT("tx_buf overflow detected", *tx_buf_len <= SMTP_TX_BUF_LEN); + return SMTP_CLOSED; +} + +/** If in state SMTP_BODY, try to send more body data */ +static void smtp_send_body(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + err_t err; + + if (s->state == SMTP_BODY) { +#if SMTP_BODYDH + + if (s->bodydh) { + smtp_send_body_data_handler(s, pcb); + } else +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ + { + u16_t send_len = (u16_t)(s->body_len - s->body_sent); + + if (send_len > 0) { + u16_t snd_buf = altcp_sndbuf(pcb); + + if (send_len > snd_buf) { + send_len = snd_buf; + } + + if (send_len > 0) { + /* try to send something out */ + err = altcp_write(pcb, &s->body[s->body_sent], (u16_t)send_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + s->timer = SMTP_TIMEOUT_DATABLOCK; + s->body_sent = (u16_t)(s->body_sent + send_len); + + if (s->body_sent < s->body_len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_send_body: %d of %d bytes written\n", + s->body_sent, s->body_len)); + } + } + } + } + } + + if (s->body_sent == s->body_len) { + /* the whole body has been written, write last line */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_send_body: body completely written (%d bytes), appending end-of-body\n", + s->body_len)); + err = altcp_write(pcb, SMTP_CMD_BODY_FINISHED, SMTP_CMD_BODY_FINISHED_LEN, 0); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + s->timer = SMTP_TIMEOUT_DATATERM; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_send_body: end-of-body written, changing state to %s\n", + smtp_state_str[SMTP_QUIT])); + /* last line written, change state, wait for confirmation */ + s->state = SMTP_QUIT; + } + } + } +} + +/** State machine-like implementation of an SMTP client. + */ +static void smtp_process(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct smtp_session *s = (struct smtp_session *)arg; + u16_t response_code = 0; + u16_t tx_buf_len = 0; + enum smtp_session_state next_state; + + if (arg == NULL) { + /* already closed SMTP connection */ + if (p != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Received %d bytes after closing: %s\n", + p->tot_len, smtp_pbuf_str(p))); + pbuf_free(p); + } + + return; + } + + next_state = s->state; + + if (p != NULL) { + /* received data */ + if (s->p == NULL) { + s->p = p; + } else { + pbuf_cat(s->p, p); + } + } else { + /* idle timer, close connection if timed out */ + if (s->timer == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_process: connection timed out, closing\n")); + smtp_close(s, pcb, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT, 0, ERR_TIMEOUT); + return; + } + + if (s->state == SMTP_BODY) { + smtp_send_body(s, pcb); + return; + } + } + + response_code = smtp_is_response(s); + + if (response_code) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_process: received response code: %d\n", response_code)); + + if (smtp_is_response_finished(s) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_process: partly received response code: %d\n", response_code)); + /* wait for next packet to complete the respone */ + return; + } + } else { + if (s->p != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("smtp_process: unknown data received (%s)\n", + smtp_pbuf_str(s->p))); + pbuf_free(s->p); + s->p = NULL; + } + + return; + } + + switch (s->state) { + case (SMTP_NULL): + + /* wait for 220 */ + if (response_code == 220) { + /* then send EHLO */ + next_state = smtp_prepare_helo(s, &tx_buf_len, pcb); + } + + break; + + case (SMTP_HELO): + + /* wait for 250 */ + if (response_code == 250) { +#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN + /* then send AUTH or MAIL */ + next_state = smtp_prepare_auth_or_mail(s, &tx_buf_len); + } + + break; + + case (SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN): + case (SMTP_AUTH_PLAIN): + + /* wait for 235 */ + if (response_code == 235) { +#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN || SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ + /* send MAIL */ + next_state = smtp_prepare_mail(s, &tx_buf_len); + } + + break; +#if SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN + + case (SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_UNAME): + + /* wait for 334 Username */ + if (response_code == 334) { + if (pbuf_strstr(s->p, SMTP_RESP_LOGIN_UNAME) != 0xFFFF) { + /* send username */ + next_state = smtp_prepare_auth_login_uname(s, &tx_buf_len); + } + } + + break; + + case (SMTP_AUTH_LOGIN_PASS): + + /* wait for 334 Password */ + if (response_code == 334) { + if (pbuf_strstr(s->p, SMTP_RESP_LOGIN_PASS) != 0xFFFF) { + /* send username */ + next_state = smtp_prepare_auth_login_pass(s, &tx_buf_len); + } + } + + break; +#endif /* SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN */ + + case (SMTP_MAIL): + + /* wait for 250 */ + if (response_code == 250) { + /* send RCPT */ + next_state = smtp_prepare_rcpt(s, &tx_buf_len); + } + + break; + + case (SMTP_RCPT): + + /* wait for 250 */ + if (response_code == 250) { + /* send DATA */ + SMEMCPY(s->tx_buf, SMTP_CMD_DATA, SMTP_CMD_DATA_LEN); + tx_buf_len = SMTP_CMD_DATA_LEN; + next_state = SMTP_DATA; + } + + break; + + case (SMTP_DATA): + + /* wait for 354 */ + if (response_code == 354) { + /* send email header */ + next_state = smtp_prepare_header(s, &tx_buf_len); + } + + break; + + case (SMTP_BODY): + /* nothing to be done here, handled somewhere else */ + break; + + case (SMTP_QUIT): + + /* wait for 250 */ + if (response_code == 250) { + /* send QUIT */ + next_state = smtp_prepare_quit(s, &tx_buf_len); + } + + break; + + case (SMTP_CLOSED): + /* nothing to do, wait for connection closed from server */ + return; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS, ("Invalid state: %d/%s\n", (int)s->state, + smtp_state_str[s->state])); + break; + } + + if (s->state == next_state) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("smtp_process[%s]: unexpected response_code, closing: %d (%s)\n", + smtp_state_str[s->state], response_code, smtp_pbuf_str(s->p))); + /* close connection */ + smtp_close(s, pcb, SMTP_RESULT_ERR_SVR_RESP, response_code, ERR_OK); + return; + } + + if (tx_buf_len > 0) { + SMTP_TX_BUF_MAX(tx_buf_len); + + if (altcp_write(pcb, s->tx_buf, tx_buf_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY) == ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_process[%s]: received command %d (%s)\n", + smtp_state_str[s->state], response_code, smtp_pbuf_str(s->p))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_process[%s]: sent %" U16_F " bytes: \"%s\"\n", + smtp_state_str[s->state], tx_buf_len, s->tx_buf)); + s->timer = SMTP_TIMEOUT; + pbuf_free(s->p); + s->p = NULL; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("smtp_process: changing state from %s to %s\n", + smtp_state_str[s->state], smtp_state_str[next_state])); + s->state = next_state; + + if (next_state == SMTP_BODY) { + /* try to stream-send body data right now */ + smtp_send_body(s, pcb); + } else if (next_state == SMTP_CLOSED) { + /* sent out all data, delete structure */ + altcp_arg(pcb, NULL); + smtp_free(s, SMTP_RESULT_OK, 0, ERR_OK); + } + } + } +} + +#if SMTP_BODYDH +/** Elementary sub-function to send data + * + * @returns: BDHALLDATASENT all data has been written + * BDHSOMEDATASENT some data has been written + * 0 no data has been written + */ +static int smtp_send_bodyh_data(struct altcp_pcb *pcb, const char **from, u16_t *howmany) +{ + err_t err; + u16_t len = *howmany; + + len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(len, altcp_sndbuf(pcb)); + err = altcp_write(pcb, *from, len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + *from += len; + + if ((*howmany -= len) > 0) { + return BDHSOMEDATASENT; + } + + return BDHALLDATASENT; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Same as smtp_send_mail_static, but uses a callback function to send body data + */ +err_t smtp_send_mail_bodycback(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, + smtp_bodycback_fn bodycback_fn, smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg) +{ + struct smtp_session *s; + size_t len; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + s = (struct smtp_session *)SMTP_STATE_MALLOC(sizeof(struct smtp_session)); + + if (s == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memset(s, 0, sizeof(struct smtp_session)); + s->bodydh = (struct smtp_bodydh_state *)SMTP_BODYDH_MALLOC(sizeof(struct smtp_bodydh_state)); + + if (s->bodydh == NULL) { + SMTP_STATE_FREE(s); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memset(s->bodydh, 0, sizeof(struct smtp_bodydh_state)); + /* initialize the structure */ + s->from = from; + len = strlen(from); + LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); + s->from_len = (u16_t)len; + s->to = to; + len = strlen(to); + LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); + s->to_len = (u16_t)len; + s->subject = subject; + len = strlen(subject); + LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); + s->subject_len = (u16_t)len; + s->body = NULL; + LWIP_ASSERT("string is too long", len <= 0xffff); + s->callback_fn = callback_fn; + s->callback_arg = callback_arg; + s->bodydh->callback_fn = bodycback_fn; + s->bodydh->state = BDH_SENDING; + /* call the actual implementation of this function */ + return smtp_send_mail_alloced(s); +} + +static void smtp_send_body_data_handler(struct smtp_session *s, struct altcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct smtp_bodydh_state *bdh; + int res = 0, ret; + LWIP_ASSERT("s != NULL", s != NULL); + bdh = s->bodydh; + LWIP_ASSERT("bodydh != NULL", bdh != NULL); + + /* resume any leftovers from prior memory constraints */ + if (s->body_len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: resume\n")); + + if ((res = smtp_send_bodyh_data(pcb, (const char **)&s->body, &s->body_len)) != BDHALLDATASENT) { + s->body_sent = s->body_len - 1; + return; + } + } + + ret = res; + + /* all data on buffer has been queued, resume execution */ + if (bdh->state == BDH_SENDING) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: run\n")); + + do { + ret |= res; /* remember if we once queued something to send */ + bdh->exposed.length = 0; + + if (bdh->callback_fn(s->callback_arg, &bdh->exposed) == BDH_DONE) { + bdh->state = BDH_STOP; + } + + s->body = bdh->exposed.buffer; + s->body_len = bdh->exposed.length; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: trying to send %u bytes\n", (unsigned int)s->body_len)); + } while (s->body_len && + + ((res = smtp_send_bodyh_data(pcb, (const char **)&s->body, &s->body_len)) == BDHALLDATASENT) && (bdh->state != BDH_STOP)); + } + + if ((bdh->state != BDH_SENDING) && (ret != BDHSOMEDATASENT)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: stop\n")); + s->body_sent = s->body_len; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SMTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("smtp_send_body_data_handler: pause\n")); + s->body_sent = s->body_len - 1; + } +} +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c index 9ab0fd8f..b920aeb7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.c @@ -1,716 +1,716 @@ -/** - * @file - * Abstract Syntax Notation One (ISO 8824, 8825) encoding - * - * @todo not optimised (yet), favor correctness over speed, favor speed over size - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Christiaan Simons - * Martin Hentschel - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "snmp_asn1.h" - -#define PBUF_OP_EXEC(code) \ - if ((code) != ERR_OK) { \ - return ERR_BUF; \ - } - -/** - * Encodes a TLV into a pbuf stream. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param tlv TLV to encode - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode - */ -err_t snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_asn1_tlv *tlv) -{ - u8_t data; - u8_t length_bytes_required; - - /* write type */ - if ((tlv->type & SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_MASK) == SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_EXTENDED) { - /* extended format is not used by SNMP so we do not accept those values */ - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (tlv->type_len != 0) { - /* any other value as auto is not accepted for type (we always use one byte because extended syntax is prohibited) */ - return ERR_ARG; - } - - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, tlv->type)); - tlv->type_len = 1; - - /* write length */ - if (tlv->value_len <= 127) { - length_bytes_required = 1; - } else if (tlv->value_len <= 255) { - length_bytes_required = 2; - } else { - length_bytes_required = 3; - } - - /* check for forced min length */ - if (tlv->length_len > 0) { - if (tlv->length_len < length_bytes_required) { - /* unable to code requested length in requested number of bytes */ - return ERR_ARG; - } - - length_bytes_required = tlv->length_len; - } else { - tlv->length_len = length_bytes_required; - } - - if (length_bytes_required > 1) { - /* multi byte representation required */ - length_bytes_required--; - data = 0x80 | length_bytes_required; /* extended length definition, 1 length byte follows */ - - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, data)); - - while (length_bytes_required > 1) { - if (length_bytes_required == 2) { - /* append high byte */ - data = (u8_t)(tlv->value_len >> 8); - } else { - /* append leading 0x00 */ - data = 0x00; - } - - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, data)); - length_bytes_required--; - } - } - - /* append low byte */ - data = (u8_t)(tlv->value_len & 0xFF); - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, data)); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Encodes raw data (octet string, opaque) into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param raw_len raw data length - * @param raw points raw data - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_raw(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const u8_t *raw, u16_t raw_len) -{ - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(pbuf_stream, raw, raw_len)); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Encodes u32_t (counter, gauge, timeticks) into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param octets_needed encoding length (from snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt()) - * @param value is the host order u32_t value to be encoded - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode - * - * @see snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt() - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_u32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, u32_t value) -{ - if (octets_needed > 5) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (octets_needed == 5) { - /* not enough bits in 'value' add leading 0x00 */ - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, 0x00)); - octets_needed--; - } - - while (octets_needed > 1) { - octets_needed--; - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)(value >> (octets_needed << 3)))); - } - - /* (only) one least significant octet */ - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)value)); - - return ERR_OK; -} -/** - * Encodes s32_t integer into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param octets_needed encoding length (from snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt()) - * @param value is the host order s32_t value to be encoded - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode - * - * @see snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt() - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, s32_t value) -{ - while (octets_needed > 1) { - octets_needed--; - - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)(value >> (octets_needed << 3)))); - } - - /* (only) one least significant octet */ - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)value)); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Encodes object identifier into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param oid points to object identifier array - * @param oid_len object identifier array length - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_oid(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const u32_t *oid, u16_t oid_len) -{ - if (oid_len > 1) { - /* write compressed first two sub id's */ - u32_t compressed_byte = ((oid[0] * 40) + oid[1]); - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)compressed_byte)); - oid_len -= 2; - oid += 2; - } else { - /* @bug: allow empty varbinds for symmetry (we must decode them for getnext), allow partial compression?? */ - /* ident_len <= 1, at least we need zeroDotZero (0.0) (ident_len == 2) */ - return ERR_ARG; - } - - while (oid_len > 0) { - u32_t sub_id; - u8_t shift, tail; - - oid_len--; - sub_id = *oid; - tail = 0; - shift = 28; - - while (shift > 0) { - u8_t code; - - code = (u8_t)(sub_id >> shift); - - if ((code != 0) || (tail != 0)) { - tail = 1; - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, code | 0x80)); - } - - shift -= 7; - } - - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)sub_id & 0x7F)); - - /* proceed to next sub-identifier */ - oid++; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Returns octet count for length. - * - * @param length parameter length - * @param octets_needed points to the return value - */ -void snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(u16_t length, u8_t *octets_needed) -{ - if (length < 0x80U) { - *octets_needed = 1; - } else if (length < 0x100U) { - *octets_needed = 2; - } else { - *octets_needed = 3; - } -} - -/** - * Returns octet count for an u32_t. - * - * @param value value to be encoded - * @param octets_needed points to the return value - * - * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. E.g. +0xFFFF is coded - * as 0x00,0xFF,0xFF. Note the leading sign octet. A positive value - * of 0xFFFFFFFF is preceded with 0x00 and the length is 5 octets!! - */ -void snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt(u32_t value, u16_t *octets_needed) -{ - if (value < 0x80UL) { - *octets_needed = 1; - } else if (value < 0x8000UL) { - *octets_needed = 2; - } else if (value < 0x800000UL) { - *octets_needed = 3; - } else if (value < 0x80000000UL) { - *octets_needed = 4; - } else { - *octets_needed = 5; - } -} - -/** - * Returns octet count for an s32_t. - * - * @param value value to be encoded - * @param octets_needed points to the return value - * - * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. - */ -void snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(s32_t value, u16_t *octets_needed) -{ - if (value < 0) { - value = ~value; - } - - if (value < 0x80L) { - *octets_needed = 1; - } else if (value < 0x8000L) { - *octets_needed = 2; - } else if (value < 0x800000L) { - *octets_needed = 3; - } else { - *octets_needed = 4; - } -} - -/** - * Returns octet count for an object identifier. - * - * @param oid points to object identifier array - * @param oid_len object identifier array length - * @param octets_needed points to the return value - */ -void snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(const u32_t *oid, u16_t oid_len, u16_t *octets_needed) -{ - u32_t sub_id; - - *octets_needed = 0; - - if (oid_len > 1) { - /* compressed prefix in one octet */ - (*octets_needed)++; - oid_len -= 2; - oid += 2; - } - - while (oid_len > 0) { - oid_len--; - sub_id = *oid; - - sub_id >>= 7; - (*octets_needed)++; - - while (sub_id > 0) { - sub_id >>= 7; - (*octets_needed)++; - } - - oid++; - } -} - -/** - * Decodes a TLV from a pbuf stream. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param tlv returns decoded TLV - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_VAL if we can't decode - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_asn1_tlv *tlv) -{ - u8_t data; - - /* decode type first */ - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - tlv->type = data; - - if ((tlv->type & SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_MASK) == SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_EXTENDED) { - /* extended format is not used by SNMP so we do not accept those values */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - tlv->type_len = 1; - - /* now, decode length */ - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - - if (data < 0x80) /* short form */ - { - tlv->length_len = 1; - tlv->value_len = data; - } else if (data > 0x80) /* long form */ - { - u8_t length_bytes = data - 0x80; - - if (length_bytes > pbuf_stream->length) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - tlv->length_len = length_bytes + 1; /* this byte + defined number of length bytes following */ - tlv->value_len = 0; - - while (length_bytes > 0) { - /* we only support up to u16.maxvalue-1 (2 bytes) but have to accept leading zero bytes */ - if (tlv->value_len > 0xFF) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - tlv->value_len <<= 8; - tlv->value_len |= data; - - /* take care for special value used for indefinite length */ - if (tlv->value_len == 0xFFFF) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - length_bytes--; - } - } else /* data == 0x80 indefinite length form */ - { - /* (not allowed for SNMP; RFC 1157, 3.2.2) */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Decodes positive integer (counter, gauge, timeticks) into u32_t. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param len length of the coded integer field - * @param value return host order integer - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode - * - * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. E.g. +0xFFFF is coded - * as 0x00,0xFF,0xFF. Note the leading sign octet. A positive value - * of 0xFFFFFFFF is preceded with 0x00 and the length is 5 octets!! - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_u32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u32_t *value) -{ - u8_t data; - - if ((len > 0) && (len <= 5)) { - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - - /* expecting sign bit to be zero, only unsigned please! */ - if (((len == 5) && (data == 0x00)) || ((len < 5) && ((data & 0x80) == 0))) { - *value = data; - len--; - - while (len > 0) { - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - len--; - - *value <<= 8; - *value |= data; - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * Decodes integer into s32_t. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param len length of the coded integer field - * @param value return host order integer - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode - * - * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed! - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, s32_t *value) -{ - u8_t data; - - if ((len > 0) && (len < 5)) { - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - - if (data & 0x80) { - /* negative, start from -1 */ - *value = -1; - *value = (*value << 8) | data; - } else { - /* positive, start from 0 */ - *value = data; - } - - len--; - - /* shift in the remaining value */ - while (len > 0) { - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - *value = (*value << 8) | data; - len--; - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * Decodes object identifier from incoming message into array of u32_t. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param len length of the coded object identifier - * @param oid return decoded object identifier - * @param oid_len return decoded object identifier length - * @param oid_max_len size of oid buffer - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_oid(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u32_t *oid, u8_t *oid_len, u8_t oid_max_len) -{ - u32_t *oid_ptr; - u8_t data; - - *oid_len = 0; - oid_ptr = oid; - - if (len > 0) { - if (oid_max_len < 2) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - len--; - - /* first compressed octet */ - if (data == 0x2B) { - /* (most) common case 1.3 (iso.org) */ - *oid_ptr = 1; - oid_ptr++; - *oid_ptr = 3; - oid_ptr++; - } else if (data < 40) { - *oid_ptr = 0; - oid_ptr++; - *oid_ptr = data; - oid_ptr++; - } else if (data < 80) { - *oid_ptr = 1; - oid_ptr++; - *oid_ptr = data - 40; - oid_ptr++; - } else { - *oid_ptr = 2; - oid_ptr++; - *oid_ptr = data - 80; - oid_ptr++; - } - - *oid_len = 2; - } else { - /* accepting zero length identifiers e.g. for getnext operation. uncommon but valid */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - while ((len > 0) && (*oid_len < oid_max_len)) { - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - len--; - - if ((data & 0x80) == 0x00) { - /* sub-identifier uses single octet */ - *oid_ptr = data; - } else { - /* sub-identifier uses multiple octets */ - u32_t sub_id = (data & ~0x80); - - while ((len > 0) && ((data & 0x80) != 0)) { - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - len--; - - sub_id = (sub_id << 7) + (data & ~0x80); - } - - if ((data & 0x80) != 0) { - /* "more bytes following" bit still set at end of len */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - *oid_ptr = sub_id; - } - - oid_ptr++; - (*oid_len)++; - } - - if (len > 0) { - /* OID to long to fit in our buffer */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Decodes (copies) raw data (ip-addresses, octet strings, opaque encoding) - * from incoming message into array. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param len length of the coded raw data (zero is valid, e.g. empty string!) - * @param buf return raw bytes - * @param buf_len returns length of the raw return value - * @param buf_max_len buffer size - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_raw(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u8_t *buf, u16_t *buf_len, u16_t buf_max_len) -{ - if (len > buf_max_len) { - /* not enough dst space */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - *buf_len = len; - - while (len > 0) { - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, buf)); - buf++; - len--; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -/** - * Returns octet count for an u64_t. - * - * @param value value to be encoded - * @param octets_needed points to the return value - * - * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. E.g. +0xFFFF is coded - * as 0x00,0xFF,0xFF. Note the leading sign octet. A positive value - * of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF is preceded with 0x00 and the length is 9 octets!! - */ -void snmp_asn1_enc_u64t_cnt(u64_t value, u16_t *octets_needed) -{ - /* check if high u32 is 0 */ - if ((value >> 32) == 0) { - /* only low u32 is important */ - snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt((u32_t)value, octets_needed); - } else { - /* low u32 does not matter for length determination */ - snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt((u32_t)(value >> 32), octets_needed); - *octets_needed = *octets_needed + 4; /* add the 4 bytes of low u32 */ - } -} - -/** - * Decodes large positive integer (counter64) into 2x u32_t. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param len length of the coded integer field - * @param value return 64 bit integer - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode - * - * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. E.g. +0xFFFF is coded - * as 0x00,0xFF,0xFF. Note the leading sign octet. A positive value - * of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF is preceded with 0x00 and the length is 9 octets!! - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_u64t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u64_t *value) -{ - u8_t data; - - if ((len > 0) && (len <= 9)) { - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - - /* expecting sign bit to be zero, only unsigned please! */ - if (((len == 9) && (data == 0x00)) || ((len < 9) && ((data & 0x80) == 0))) { - *value = data; - len--; - - while (len > 0) { - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); - *value <<= 8; - *value |= data; - len--; - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * Encodes u64_t (counter64) into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. - * - * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream - * @param octets_needed encoding length (from snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt()) - * @param value is the value to be encoded - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode - * - * @see snmp_asn1_enc_u64t_cnt() - */ -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_u64t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, u64_t value) -{ - if (octets_needed > 9) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (octets_needed == 9) { - /* not enough bits in 'value' add leading 0x00 */ - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, 0x00)); - octets_needed--; - } - - while (octets_needed > 1) { - octets_needed--; - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)(value >> (octets_needed << 3)))); - } - - /* always write at least one octet (also in case of value == 0) */ - PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)(value))); - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/** + * @file + * Abstract Syntax Notation One (ISO 8824, 8825) encoding + * + * @todo not optimised (yet), favor correctness over speed, favor speed over size + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Christiaan Simons + * Martin Hentschel + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "snmp_asn1.h" + +#define PBUF_OP_EXEC(code) \ + if ((code) != ERR_OK) { \ + return ERR_BUF; \ + } + +/** + * Encodes a TLV into a pbuf stream. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param tlv TLV to encode + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode + */ +err_t snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_asn1_tlv *tlv) +{ + u8_t data; + u8_t length_bytes_required; + + /* write type */ + if ((tlv->type & SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_MASK) == SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_EXTENDED) { + /* extended format is not used by SNMP so we do not accept those values */ + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (tlv->type_len != 0) { + /* any other value as auto is not accepted for type (we always use one byte because extended syntax is prohibited) */ + return ERR_ARG; + } + + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, tlv->type)); + tlv->type_len = 1; + + /* write length */ + if (tlv->value_len <= 127) { + length_bytes_required = 1; + } else if (tlv->value_len <= 255) { + length_bytes_required = 2; + } else { + length_bytes_required = 3; + } + + /* check for forced min length */ + if (tlv->length_len > 0) { + if (tlv->length_len < length_bytes_required) { + /* unable to code requested length in requested number of bytes */ + return ERR_ARG; + } + + length_bytes_required = tlv->length_len; + } else { + tlv->length_len = length_bytes_required; + } + + if (length_bytes_required > 1) { + /* multi byte representation required */ + length_bytes_required--; + data = 0x80 | length_bytes_required; /* extended length definition, 1 length byte follows */ + + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, data)); + + while (length_bytes_required > 1) { + if (length_bytes_required == 2) { + /* append high byte */ + data = (u8_t)(tlv->value_len >> 8); + } else { + /* append leading 0x00 */ + data = 0x00; + } + + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, data)); + length_bytes_required--; + } + } + + /* append low byte */ + data = (u8_t)(tlv->value_len & 0xFF); + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, data)); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Encodes raw data (octet string, opaque) into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param raw_len raw data length + * @param raw points raw data + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_raw(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const u8_t *raw, u16_t raw_len) +{ + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(pbuf_stream, raw, raw_len)); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Encodes u32_t (counter, gauge, timeticks) into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param octets_needed encoding length (from snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt()) + * @param value is the host order u32_t value to be encoded + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode + * + * @see snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt() + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_u32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, u32_t value) +{ + if (octets_needed > 5) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (octets_needed == 5) { + /* not enough bits in 'value' add leading 0x00 */ + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, 0x00)); + octets_needed--; + } + + while (octets_needed > 1) { + octets_needed--; + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)(value >> (octets_needed << 3)))); + } + + /* (only) one least significant octet */ + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)value)); + + return ERR_OK; +} +/** + * Encodes s32_t integer into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param octets_needed encoding length (from snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt()) + * @param value is the host order s32_t value to be encoded + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode + * + * @see snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt() + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, s32_t value) +{ + while (octets_needed > 1) { + octets_needed--; + + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)(value >> (octets_needed << 3)))); + } + + /* (only) one least significant octet */ + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)value)); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Encodes object identifier into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param oid points to object identifier array + * @param oid_len object identifier array length + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_oid(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const u32_t *oid, u16_t oid_len) +{ + if (oid_len > 1) { + /* write compressed first two sub id's */ + u32_t compressed_byte = ((oid[0] * 40) + oid[1]); + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)compressed_byte)); + oid_len -= 2; + oid += 2; + } else { + /* @bug: allow empty varbinds for symmetry (we must decode them for getnext), allow partial compression?? */ + /* ident_len <= 1, at least we need zeroDotZero (0.0) (ident_len == 2) */ + return ERR_ARG; + } + + while (oid_len > 0) { + u32_t sub_id; + u8_t shift, tail; + + oid_len--; + sub_id = *oid; + tail = 0; + shift = 28; + + while (shift > 0) { + u8_t code; + + code = (u8_t)(sub_id >> shift); + + if ((code != 0) || (tail != 0)) { + tail = 1; + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, code | 0x80)); + } + + shift -= 7; + } + + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)sub_id & 0x7F)); + + /* proceed to next sub-identifier */ + oid++; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Returns octet count for length. + * + * @param length parameter length + * @param octets_needed points to the return value + */ +void snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(u16_t length, u8_t *octets_needed) +{ + if (length < 0x80U) { + *octets_needed = 1; + } else if (length < 0x100U) { + *octets_needed = 2; + } else { + *octets_needed = 3; + } +} + +/** + * Returns octet count for an u32_t. + * + * @param value value to be encoded + * @param octets_needed points to the return value + * + * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. E.g. +0xFFFF is coded + * as 0x00,0xFF,0xFF. Note the leading sign octet. A positive value + * of 0xFFFFFFFF is preceded with 0x00 and the length is 5 octets!! + */ +void snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt(u32_t value, u16_t *octets_needed) +{ + if (value < 0x80UL) { + *octets_needed = 1; + } else if (value < 0x8000UL) { + *octets_needed = 2; + } else if (value < 0x800000UL) { + *octets_needed = 3; + } else if (value < 0x80000000UL) { + *octets_needed = 4; + } else { + *octets_needed = 5; + } +} + +/** + * Returns octet count for an s32_t. + * + * @param value value to be encoded + * @param octets_needed points to the return value + * + * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. + */ +void snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(s32_t value, u16_t *octets_needed) +{ + if (value < 0) { + value = ~value; + } + + if (value < 0x80L) { + *octets_needed = 1; + } else if (value < 0x8000L) { + *octets_needed = 2; + } else if (value < 0x800000L) { + *octets_needed = 3; + } else { + *octets_needed = 4; + } +} + +/** + * Returns octet count for an object identifier. + * + * @param oid points to object identifier array + * @param oid_len object identifier array length + * @param octets_needed points to the return value + */ +void snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(const u32_t *oid, u16_t oid_len, u16_t *octets_needed) +{ + u32_t sub_id; + + *octets_needed = 0; + + if (oid_len > 1) { + /* compressed prefix in one octet */ + (*octets_needed)++; + oid_len -= 2; + oid += 2; + } + + while (oid_len > 0) { + oid_len--; + sub_id = *oid; + + sub_id >>= 7; + (*octets_needed)++; + + while (sub_id > 0) { + sub_id >>= 7; + (*octets_needed)++; + } + + oid++; + } +} + +/** + * Decodes a TLV from a pbuf stream. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param tlv returns decoded TLV + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_VAL if we can't decode + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_asn1_tlv *tlv) +{ + u8_t data; + + /* decode type first */ + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + tlv->type = data; + + if ((tlv->type & SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_MASK) == SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_EXTENDED) { + /* extended format is not used by SNMP so we do not accept those values */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + tlv->type_len = 1; + + /* now, decode length */ + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + + if (data < 0x80) /* short form */ + { + tlv->length_len = 1; + tlv->value_len = data; + } else if (data > 0x80) /* long form */ + { + u8_t length_bytes = data - 0x80; + + if (length_bytes > pbuf_stream->length) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + tlv->length_len = length_bytes + 1; /* this byte + defined number of length bytes following */ + tlv->value_len = 0; + + while (length_bytes > 0) { + /* we only support up to u16.maxvalue-1 (2 bytes) but have to accept leading zero bytes */ + if (tlv->value_len > 0xFF) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + tlv->value_len <<= 8; + tlv->value_len |= data; + + /* take care for special value used for indefinite length */ + if (tlv->value_len == 0xFFFF) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + length_bytes--; + } + } else /* data == 0x80 indefinite length form */ + { + /* (not allowed for SNMP; RFC 1157, 3.2.2) */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Decodes positive integer (counter, gauge, timeticks) into u32_t. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param len length of the coded integer field + * @param value return host order integer + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode + * + * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. E.g. +0xFFFF is coded + * as 0x00,0xFF,0xFF. Note the leading sign octet. A positive value + * of 0xFFFFFFFF is preceded with 0x00 and the length is 5 octets!! + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_u32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u32_t *value) +{ + u8_t data; + + if ((len > 0) && (len <= 5)) { + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + + /* expecting sign bit to be zero, only unsigned please! */ + if (((len == 5) && (data == 0x00)) || ((len < 5) && ((data & 0x80) == 0))) { + *value = data; + len--; + + while (len > 0) { + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + len--; + + *value <<= 8; + *value |= data; + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * Decodes integer into s32_t. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param len length of the coded integer field + * @param value return host order integer + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode + * + * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed! + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, s32_t *value) +{ + u8_t data; + + if ((len > 0) && (len < 5)) { + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + + if (data & 0x80) { + /* negative, start from -1 */ + *value = -1; + *value = (*value << 8) | data; + } else { + /* positive, start from 0 */ + *value = data; + } + + len--; + + /* shift in the remaining value */ + while (len > 0) { + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + *value = (*value << 8) | data; + len--; + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * Decodes object identifier from incoming message into array of u32_t. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param len length of the coded object identifier + * @param oid return decoded object identifier + * @param oid_len return decoded object identifier length + * @param oid_max_len size of oid buffer + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_oid(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u32_t *oid, u8_t *oid_len, u8_t oid_max_len) +{ + u32_t *oid_ptr; + u8_t data; + + *oid_len = 0; + oid_ptr = oid; + + if (len > 0) { + if (oid_max_len < 2) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + len--; + + /* first compressed octet */ + if (data == 0x2B) { + /* (most) common case 1.3 (iso.org) */ + *oid_ptr = 1; + oid_ptr++; + *oid_ptr = 3; + oid_ptr++; + } else if (data < 40) { + *oid_ptr = 0; + oid_ptr++; + *oid_ptr = data; + oid_ptr++; + } else if (data < 80) { + *oid_ptr = 1; + oid_ptr++; + *oid_ptr = data - 40; + oid_ptr++; + } else { + *oid_ptr = 2; + oid_ptr++; + *oid_ptr = data - 80; + oid_ptr++; + } + + *oid_len = 2; + } else { + /* accepting zero length identifiers e.g. for getnext operation. uncommon but valid */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + while ((len > 0) && (*oid_len < oid_max_len)) { + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + len--; + + if ((data & 0x80) == 0x00) { + /* sub-identifier uses single octet */ + *oid_ptr = data; + } else { + /* sub-identifier uses multiple octets */ + u32_t sub_id = (data & ~0x80); + + while ((len > 0) && ((data & 0x80) != 0)) { + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + len--; + + sub_id = (sub_id << 7) + (data & ~0x80); + } + + if ((data & 0x80) != 0) { + /* "more bytes following" bit still set at end of len */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + *oid_ptr = sub_id; + } + + oid_ptr++; + (*oid_len)++; + } + + if (len > 0) { + /* OID to long to fit in our buffer */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Decodes (copies) raw data (ip-addresses, octet strings, opaque encoding) + * from incoming message into array. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param len length of the coded raw data (zero is valid, e.g. empty string!) + * @param buf return raw bytes + * @param buf_len returns length of the raw return value + * @param buf_max_len buffer size + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_raw(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u8_t *buf, u16_t *buf_len, u16_t buf_max_len) +{ + if (len > buf_max_len) { + /* not enough dst space */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + *buf_len = len; + + while (len > 0) { + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, buf)); + buf++; + len--; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +/** + * Returns octet count for an u64_t. + * + * @param value value to be encoded + * @param octets_needed points to the return value + * + * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. E.g. +0xFFFF is coded + * as 0x00,0xFF,0xFF. Note the leading sign octet. A positive value + * of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF is preceded with 0x00 and the length is 9 octets!! + */ +void snmp_asn1_enc_u64t_cnt(u64_t value, u16_t *octets_needed) +{ + /* check if high u32 is 0 */ + if ((value >> 32) == 0) { + /* only low u32 is important */ + snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt((u32_t)value, octets_needed); + } else { + /* low u32 does not matter for length determination */ + snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt((u32_t)(value >> 32), octets_needed); + *octets_needed = *octets_needed + 4; /* add the 4 bytes of low u32 */ + } +} + +/** + * Decodes large positive integer (counter64) into 2x u32_t. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param len length of the coded integer field + * @param value return 64 bit integer + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) decode + * + * @note ASN coded integers are _always_ signed. E.g. +0xFFFF is coded + * as 0x00,0xFF,0xFF. Note the leading sign octet. A positive value + * of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF is preceded with 0x00 and the length is 9 octets!! + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_u64t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u64_t *value) +{ + u8_t data; + + if ((len > 0) && (len <= 9)) { + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + + /* expecting sign bit to be zero, only unsigned please! */ + if (((len == 9) && (data == 0x00)) || ((len < 9) && ((data & 0x80) == 0))) { + *value = data; + len--; + + while (len > 0) { + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_read(pbuf_stream, &data)); + *value <<= 8; + *value |= data; + len--; + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * Encodes u64_t (counter64) into a pbuf chained ASN1 msg. + * + * @param pbuf_stream points to a pbuf stream + * @param octets_needed encoding length (from snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt()) + * @param value is the value to be encoded + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if we can't (or won't) encode + * + * @see snmp_asn1_enc_u64t_cnt() + */ +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_u64t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, u64_t value) +{ + if (octets_needed > 9) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (octets_needed == 9) { + /* not enough bits in 'value' add leading 0x00 */ + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, 0x00)); + octets_needed--; + } + + while (octets_needed > 1) { + octets_needed--; + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)(value >> (octets_needed << 3)))); + } + + /* always write at least one octet (also in case of value == 0) */ + PBUF_OP_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, (u8_t)(value))); + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.h index 95fb429b..603c69c4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_asn1.h @@ -1,119 +1,119 @@ -/** - * @file - * Abstract Syntax Notation One (ISO 8824, 8825) codec. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Christiaan Simons - * Martin Hentschel - * Elias Oenal - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_ASN1_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_ASN1_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "snmp_pbuf_stream.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define SNMP_ASN1_TLV_INDEFINITE_LENGTH 0x80 - -#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_MASK 0xC0 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_MASK 0x20 -#define SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_MASK 0x1F -#define SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_EXTENDED 0x1F /* DataType indicating that datatype is encoded in following bytes */ - -/* context specific (SNMP) tags (from SNMP spec. RFC1157 and RFC1905) */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_REQ 0 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_NEXT_REQ 1 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_RESP 2 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ 3 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_TRAP 4 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ 5 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_INFORM_REQ 6 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_V2_TRAP 7 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_REPORT 8 - -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_NO_SUCH_OBJECT 0 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_END_OF_MIB_VIEW 2 - -struct snmp_asn1_tlv { - u8_t type; /* only U8 because extended types are not specified by SNMP */ - u8_t type_len; /* encoded length of 'type' field (normally 1) */ - u8_t length_len; /* indicates how many bytes are required to encode the 'value_len' field */ - u16_t value_len; /* encoded length of the value */ -}; -#define SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv) ((tlv).type_len + (tlv).length_len) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv) ((tlv).type_len + (tlv).length_len + (tlv).value_len) -#define SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, type_, length_len_, value_len_) \ - do { \ - (tlv).type = (type_); \ - (tlv).type_len = 0; \ - (tlv).length_len = (length_len_); \ - (tlv).value_len = (value_len_); \ - } while (0); - -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_asn1_tlv *tlv); -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_u32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u32_t *value); -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, s32_t *value); -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_oid(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u32_t *oid, u8_t *oid_len, u8_t oid_max_len); -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_raw(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u8_t *buf, u16_t *buf_len, u16_t buf_max_len); - -err_t snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_asn1_tlv *tlv); - -void snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(u16_t length, u8_t *octets_needed); -void snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt(u32_t value, u16_t *octets_needed); -void snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(s32_t value, u16_t *octets_needed); -void snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(const u32_t *oid, u16_t oid_len, u16_t *octets_needed); -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_oid(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const u32_t *oid, u16_t oid_len); -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, s32_t value); -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_u32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, u32_t value); -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_raw(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const u8_t *raw, u16_t raw_len); - -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -err_t snmp_asn1_dec_u64t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u64_t *value); -void snmp_asn1_enc_u64t_cnt(u64_t value, u16_t *octets_needed); -err_t snmp_asn1_enc_u64t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, u64_t value); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_ASN1_H */ +/** + * @file + * Abstract Syntax Notation One (ISO 8824, 8825) codec. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Christiaan Simons + * Martin Hentschel + * Elias Oenal + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_ASN1_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_ASN1_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "snmp_pbuf_stream.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define SNMP_ASN1_TLV_INDEFINITE_LENGTH 0x80 + +#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_MASK 0xC0 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_MASK 0x20 +#define SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_MASK 0x1F +#define SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_EXTENDED 0x1F /* DataType indicating that datatype is encoded in following bytes */ + +/* context specific (SNMP) tags (from SNMP spec. RFC1157 and RFC1905) */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_REQ 0 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_NEXT_REQ 1 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_RESP 2 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ 3 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_TRAP 4 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ 5 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_INFORM_REQ 6 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_V2_TRAP 7 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_REPORT 8 + +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_NO_SUCH_OBJECT 0 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_END_OF_MIB_VIEW 2 + +struct snmp_asn1_tlv { + u8_t type; /* only U8 because extended types are not specified by SNMP */ + u8_t type_len; /* encoded length of 'type' field (normally 1) */ + u8_t length_len; /* indicates how many bytes are required to encode the 'value_len' field */ + u16_t value_len; /* encoded length of the value */ +}; +#define SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv) ((tlv).type_len + (tlv).length_len) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv) ((tlv).type_len + (tlv).length_len + (tlv).value_len) +#define SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, type_, length_len_, value_len_) \ + do { \ + (tlv).type = (type_); \ + (tlv).type_len = 0; \ + (tlv).length_len = (length_len_); \ + (tlv).value_len = (value_len_); \ + } while (0); + +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_asn1_tlv *tlv); +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_u32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u32_t *value); +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, s32_t *value); +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_oid(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u32_t *oid, u8_t *oid_len, u8_t oid_max_len); +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_raw(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u8_t *buf, u16_t *buf_len, u16_t buf_max_len); + +err_t snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_asn1_tlv *tlv); + +void snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(u16_t length, u8_t *octets_needed); +void snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt(u32_t value, u16_t *octets_needed); +void snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(s32_t value, u16_t *octets_needed); +void snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(const u32_t *oid, u16_t oid_len, u16_t *octets_needed); +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_oid(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const u32_t *oid, u16_t oid_len); +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, s32_t value); +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_u32t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, u32_t value); +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_raw(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const u8_t *raw, u16_t raw_len); + +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +err_t snmp_asn1_dec_u64t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t len, u64_t *value); +void snmp_asn1_enc_u64t_cnt(u64_t value, u16_t *octets_needed); +err_t snmp_asn1_enc_u64t(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u16_t octets_needed, u64_t value); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_ASN1_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c index 3c583147..55879b49 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core.c @@ -1,1354 +1,1354 @@ -/** - * @file - * MIB tree access/construction functions. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Christiaan Simons - * Martin Hentschel -*/ - -/** - * @defgroup snmp SNMPv2c/v3 agent - * @ingroup apps - * SNMPv2c and SNMPv3 compatible agent\n - * There is also a MIB compiler and a MIB viewer in lwIP contrib repository - * (lwip-contrib/apps/LwipMibCompiler).\n - * The agent implements the most important MIB2 MIBs including IPv6 support - * (interfaces, UDP, TCP, SNMP, ICMP, SYSTEM). IP MIB is an older version - * without IPv6 statistics (TODO).\n - * Rewritten by Martin Hentschel and - * Dirk Ziegelmeier \n - * - * 0 Agent Capabilities - * ==================== - * - * Features: - * --------- - * - SNMPv2c support. - * - SNMPv3 support (a port to ARM mbedtls is provided, LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS option). - * - Low RAM usage - no memory pools, stack only. - * - MIB2 implementation is separated from SNMP stack. - * - Support for multiple MIBs (snmp_set_mibs() call) - e.g. for private MIB. - * - Simple and generic API for MIB implementation. - * - Comfortable node types and helper functions for scalar arrays and tables. - * - Counter64, bit and truthvalue datatype support. - * - Callbacks for SNMP writes e.g. to implement persistency. - * - Runs on two APIs: RAW and netconn. - * - Async API is gone - the stack now supports netconn API instead, - * so blocking operations can be done in MIB calls. - * SNMP runs in a worker thread when netconn API is used. - * - Simplified thread sync support for MIBs - useful when MIBs - * need to access variables shared with other threads where no locking is - * possible. Used in MIB2 to access lwIP stats from lwIP thread. - * - * MIB compiler (code generator): - * ------------------------------ - * - Provided in lwIP contrib repository. - * - Written in C#. MIB viewer used Windows Forms. - * - Developed on Windows with Visual Studio 2010. - * - Can be compiled and used on all platforms with http://www.monodevelop.com/. - * - Based on a heavily modified version of of SharpSnmpLib (a4bd05c6afb4) - * (https://sharpsnmplib.codeplex.com/SourceControl/network/forks/Nemo157/MIBParserUpdate). - * - MIB parser, C file generation framework and LWIP code generation are cleanly - * separated, which means the code may be useful as a base for code generation - * of other SNMP agents. - * - * Notes: - * ------ - * - Stack and MIB compiler were used to implement a Profinet device. - * Compiled/implemented MIBs: LLDP-MIB, LLDP-EXT-DOT3-MIB, LLDP-EXT-PNO-MIB. - * - * SNMPv1 per RFC1157 and SNMPv2c per RFC 3416 - * ------------------------------------------- - * Note the S in SNMP stands for "Simple". Note that "Simple" is - * relative. SNMP is simple compared to the complex ISO network - * management protocols CMIP (Common Management Information Protocol) - * and CMOT (CMip Over Tcp). - * - * SNMPv3 - * ------ - * When SNMPv3 is used, several functions from snmpv3.h must be implemented - * by the user. This is mainly user management and persistence handling. - * The sample provided in lwip-contrib is insecure, don't use it in production - * systems, especially the missing persistence for engine boots variable - * simplifies replay attacks. - * - * MIB II - * ------ - * The standard lwIP stack management information base. - * This is a required MIB, so this is always enabled. - * The groups EGP, CMOT and transmission are disabled by default. - * - * Most mib-2 objects are not writable except: - * sysName, sysLocation, sysContact, snmpEnableAuthenTraps. - * Writing to or changing the ARP and IP address and route - * tables is not possible. - * - * Note lwIP has a very limited notion of IP routing. It currently - * doen't have a route table and doesn't have a notion of the U,G,H flags. - * Instead lwIP uses the interface list with only one default interface - * acting as a single gateway interface (G) for the default route. - * - * The agent returns a "virtual table" with the default route 0.0.0.0 - * for the default interface and network routes (no H) for each - * network interface in the netif_list. - * All routes are considered to be up (U). - * - * Loading additional MIBs - * ----------------------- - * MIBs can only be added in compile-time, not in run-time. - * - * - * 1 Building the Agent - * ==================== - * First of all you'll need to add the following define - * to your local lwipopts.h: - * \#define LWIP_SNMP 1 - * - * and add the source files your makefile. - * - * Note you'll might need to adapt you network driver to update - * the mib2 variables for your interface. - * - * 2 Running the Agent - * =================== - * The following function calls must be made in your program to - * actually get the SNMP agent running. - * - * Before starting the agent you should supply pointers - * for sysContact, sysLocation, and snmpEnableAuthenTraps. - * You can do this by calling - * - * - snmp_mib2_set_syscontact() - * - snmp_mib2_set_syslocation() - * - snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled() - * - * You can register a callback which is called on successful write access: - * snmp_set_write_callback(). - * - * Additionally you may want to set - * - * - snmp_mib2_set_sysdescr() - * - snmp_set_device_enterprise_oid() - * - snmp_mib2_set_sysname() - * - * Also before starting the agent you need to setup - * one or more trap destinations using these calls: - * - * - snmp_trap_dst_enable() - * - snmp_trap_dst_ip_set() - * - * If you need more than MIB2, set the MIBs you want to use - * by snmp_set_mibs(). - * - * Finally, enable the agent by calling snmp_init() - * - * @defgroup snmp_core Core - * @ingroup snmp - * - * @defgroup snmp_traps Traps - * @ingroup snmp - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "snmp_core_priv.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include - -#if (LWIP_SNMP && (SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS <= 0)) -#error "If you want to use SNMP, you have to define SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS>=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (!LWIP_UDP && LWIP_SNMP) -#error "If you want to use SNMP, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN > 255 -#error "SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN must fit into an u8_t" -#endif - -struct snmp_statistics snmp_stats; -static const struct snmp_obj_id snmp_device_enterprise_oid_default = { SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID_LEN, SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID }; -static const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_device_enterprise_oid = &snmp_device_enterprise_oid_default; - -const u32_t snmp_zero_dot_zero_values[] = { 0, 0 }; -const struct snmp_obj_id_const_ref snmp_zero_dot_zero = { LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(snmp_zero_dot_zero_values), snmp_zero_dot_zero_values }; - -#if SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_SNMP_V3 -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h" -static const struct snmp_mib *const default_mibs[] = { &mib2, &snmpframeworkmib, &snmpusmmib }; -static u8_t snmp_num_mibs = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(default_mibs); -#elif SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -static const struct snmp_mib *const default_mibs[] = { &mib2 }; -static u8_t snmp_num_mibs = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(default_mibs); -#else -static const struct snmp_mib *const default_mibs[] = { NULL }; -static u8_t snmp_num_mibs = 0; -#endif - -/* List of known mibs */ -static struct snmp_mib const *const *snmp_mibs = default_mibs; - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * Sets the MIBs to use. - * Example: call snmp_set_mibs() as follows: - * static const struct snmp_mib *my_snmp_mibs[] = { - * &mib2, - * &private_mib - * }; - * snmp_set_mibs(my_snmp_mibs, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(my_snmp_mibs)); - */ -void snmp_set_mibs(const struct snmp_mib **mibs, u8_t num_mibs) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("mibs pointer must be != NULL", (mibs != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("num_mibs pointer must be != 0", (num_mibs != 0)); - snmp_mibs = mibs; - snmp_num_mibs = num_mibs; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * 'device enterprise oid' is used for 'device OID' field in trap PDU's (for identification of generating device) - * as well as for value returned by MIB-2 'sysObjectID' field (if internal MIB2 implementation is used). - * The 'device enterprise oid' shall point to an OID located under 'private-enterprises' branch (1.3.6.1.4.1.XXX). If a vendor - * wants to provide a custom object there, he has to get its own enterprise oid from IANA (http://www.iana.org). It - * is not allowed to use LWIP enterprise ID! - * In order to identify a specific device it is recommended to create a dedicated OID for each device type under its own - * enterprise oid. - * e.g. - * device a > 1.3.6.1.4.1.XXX(ent-oid).1(devices).1(device a) - * device b > 1.3.6.1.4.1.XXX(ent-oid).1(devices).2(device b) - * for more details see description of 'sysObjectID' field in RFC1213-MIB - */ -void snmp_set_device_enterprise_oid(const struct snmp_obj_id *device_enterprise_oid) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (device_enterprise_oid == NULL) { - snmp_device_enterprise_oid = &snmp_device_enterprise_oid_default; - } else { - snmp_device_enterprise_oid = device_enterprise_oid; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * Get 'device enterprise oid' - */ -const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_get_device_enterprise_oid(void) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - return snmp_device_enterprise_oid; -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/** - * Conversion from InetAddressIPv4 oid to lwIP ip4_addr - * @param oid points to u32_t ident[4] input - * @param ip points to output struct - */ -u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip4(const u32_t *oid, ip4_addr_t *ip) -{ - if ((oid[0] > 0xFF) || - (oid[1] > 0xFF) || - (oid[2] > 0xFF) || - (oid[3] > 0xFF)) { - ip4_addr_copy(*ip, *IP4_ADDR_ANY4); - return 0; - } - - IP4_ADDR(ip, oid[0], oid[1], oid[2], oid[3]); - return 1; -} - -/** - * Convert ip4_addr to InetAddressIPv4 (no InetAddressType) - * @param ip points to input struct - * @param oid points to u32_t ident[4] output - */ -void snmp_ip4_to_oid(const ip4_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid) -{ - oid[0] = ip4_addr1(ip); - oid[1] = ip4_addr2(ip); - oid[2] = ip4_addr3(ip); - oid[3] = ip4_addr4(ip); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** - * Conversion from InetAddressIPv6 oid to lwIP ip6_addr - * @param oid points to u32_t oid[16] input - * @param ip points to output struct - */ -u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip6(const u32_t *oid, ip6_addr_t *ip) -{ - if ((oid[0] > 0xFF) || - (oid[1] > 0xFF) || - (oid[2] > 0xFF) || - (oid[3] > 0xFF) || - (oid[4] > 0xFF) || - (oid[5] > 0xFF) || - (oid[6] > 0xFF) || - (oid[7] > 0xFF) || - (oid[8] > 0xFF) || - (oid[9] > 0xFF) || - (oid[10] > 0xFF) || - (oid[11] > 0xFF) || - (oid[12] > 0xFF) || - (oid[13] > 0xFF) || - (oid[14] > 0xFF) || - (oid[15] > 0xFF)) { - ip6_addr_set_any(ip); - return 0; - } - - ip->addr[0] = (oid[0] << 24) | (oid[1] << 16) | (oid[2] << 8) | (oid[3] << 0); - ip->addr[1] = (oid[4] << 24) | (oid[5] << 16) | (oid[6] << 8) | (oid[7] << 0); - ip->addr[2] = (oid[8] << 24) | (oid[9] << 16) | (oid[10] << 8) | (oid[11] << 0); - ip->addr[3] = (oid[12] << 24) | (oid[13] << 16) | (oid[14] << 8) | (oid[15] << 0); - return 1; -} - -/** - * Convert ip6_addr to InetAddressIPv6 (no InetAddressType) - * @param ip points to input struct - * @param oid points to u32_t ident[16] output - */ -void snmp_ip6_to_oid(const ip6_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid) -{ - oid[0] = (ip->addr[0] & 0xFF000000) >> 24; - oid[1] = (ip->addr[0] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16; - oid[2] = (ip->addr[0] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8; - oid[3] = (ip->addr[0] & 0x000000FF) >> 0; - oid[4] = (ip->addr[1] & 0xFF000000) >> 24; - oid[5] = (ip->addr[1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16; - oid[6] = (ip->addr[1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8; - oid[7] = (ip->addr[1] & 0x000000FF) >> 0; - oid[8] = (ip->addr[2] & 0xFF000000) >> 24; - oid[9] = (ip->addr[2] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16; - oid[10] = (ip->addr[2] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8; - oid[11] = (ip->addr[2] & 0x000000FF) >> 0; - oid[12] = (ip->addr[3] & 0xFF000000) >> 24; - oid[13] = (ip->addr[3] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16; - oid[14] = (ip->addr[3] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8; - oid[15] = (ip->addr[3] & 0x000000FF) >> 0; -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 -/** - * Convert to InetAddressType+InetAddress+InetPortNumber - * @param ip IP address - * @param port Port - * @param oid OID - * @return OID length - */ -u8_t snmp_ip_port_to_oid(const ip_addr_t *ip, u16_t port, u32_t *oid) -{ - u8_t idx; - - idx = snmp_ip_to_oid(ip, oid); - oid[idx] = port; - idx++; - - return idx; -} - -/** - * Convert to InetAddressType+InetAddress - * @param ip IP address - * @param oid OID - * @return OID length - */ -u8_t snmp_ip_to_oid(const ip_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid) -{ - if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(*ip)) { - oid[0] = 0; /* any */ - oid[1] = 0; /* no IP OIDs follow */ - return 2; - } else if (IP_IS_V6(ip)) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - oid[0] = 2; /* ipv6 */ - oid[1] = 16; /* 16 InetAddressIPv6 OIDs follow */ - snmp_ip6_to_oid(ip_2_ip6(ip), &oid[2]); - return 18; -#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - return 0; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - oid[0] = 1; /* ipv4 */ - oid[1] = 4; /* 4 InetAddressIPv4 OIDs follow */ - snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip_2_ip4(ip), &oid[2]); - return 6; -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - return 0; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - } -} - -/** - * Convert from InetAddressType+InetAddress to ip_addr_t - * @param oid OID - * @param oid_len OID length - * @param ip IP address - * @return Parsed OID length - */ -u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, ip_addr_t *ip) -{ - /* InetAddressType */ - if (oid_len < 1) { - return 0; - } - - if (oid[0] == 0) /* any */ - { - /* 1x InetAddressType, 1x OID len */ - if (oid_len < 2) { - return 0; - } - - if (oid[1] != 0) { - return 0; - } - - memset(ip, 0, sizeof(*ip)); - IP_SET_TYPE(ip, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - - return 2; - } else if (oid[0] == 1) /* ipv4 */ - { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /* 1x InetAddressType, 1x OID len, 4x InetAddressIPv4 */ - if (oid_len < 6) { - return 0; - } - - /* 4x ipv4 OID */ - if (oid[1] != 4) { - return 0; - } - - IP_SET_TYPE(ip, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - - if (!snmp_oid_to_ip4(&oid[2], ip_2_ip4(ip))) { - return 0; - } - - return 6; -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - return 0; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - } else if (oid[0] == 2) /* ipv6 */ - { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - /* 1x InetAddressType, 1x OID len, 16x InetAddressIPv6 */ - if (oid_len < 18) { - return 0; - } - - /* 16x ipv6 OID */ - if (oid[1] != 16) { - return 0; - } - - IP_SET_TYPE(ip, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); - - if (!snmp_oid_to_ip6(&oid[2], ip_2_ip6(ip))) { - return 0; - } - - return 18; -#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - return 0; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - } else /* unsupported InetAddressType */ - { - return 0; - } -} - -/** - * Convert from InetAddressType+InetAddress+InetPortNumber to ip_addr_t and u16_t - * @param oid OID - * @param oid_len OID length - * @param ip IP address - * @param port Port - * @return Parsed OID length - */ -u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip_port(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, ip_addr_t *ip, u16_t *port) -{ - u8_t idx; - - /* InetAddressType + InetAddress */ - idx = snmp_oid_to_ip(&oid[0], oid_len, ip); - - if (idx == 0) { - return 0; - } - - /* InetPortNumber */ - if (oid_len < (idx + 1)) { - return 0; - } - - if (oid[idx] > 0xffff) { - return 0; - } - - *port = (u16_t)oid[idx]; - idx++; - - return idx; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** - * Assign an OID to struct snmp_obj_id - * @param target Assignment target - * @param oid OID - * @param oid_len OID length - */ -void snmp_oid_assign(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("oid_len <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN", oid_len <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN); - - target->len = oid_len; - - if (oid_len > 0) { - MEMCPY(target->id, oid, oid_len * sizeof(u32_t)); - } -} - -/** - * Prefix an OID to OID in struct snmp_obj_id - * @param target Assignment target to prefix - * @param oid OID - * @param oid_len OID length - */ -void snmp_oid_prefix(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("target->len + oid_len <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN", (target->len + oid_len) <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN); - - if (oid_len > 0) { - /* move existing OID to make room at the beginning for OID to insert */ - int i; - - for (i = target->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - target->id[i + oid_len] = target->id[i]; - } - - /* paste oid at the beginning */ - MEMCPY(target->id, oid, oid_len * sizeof(u32_t)); - } -} - -/** - * Combine two OIDs into struct snmp_obj_id - * @param target Assignmet target - * @param oid1 OID 1 - * @param oid1_len OID 1 length - * @param oid2 OID 2 - * @param oid2_len OID 2 length - */ -void snmp_oid_combine(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len) -{ - snmp_oid_assign(target, oid1, oid1_len); - snmp_oid_append(target, oid2, oid2_len); -} - -/** - * Append OIDs to struct snmp_obj_id - * @param target Assignment target to append to - * @param oid OID - * @param oid_len OID length - */ -void snmp_oid_append(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("offset + oid_len <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN", (target->len + oid_len) <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN); - - if (oid_len > 0) { - MEMCPY(&target->id[target->len], oid, oid_len * sizeof(u32_t)); - target->len = (u8_t)(target->len + oid_len); - } -} - -/** - * Compare two OIDs - * @param oid1 OID 1 - * @param oid1_len OID 1 length - * @param oid2 OID 2 - * @param oid2_len OID 2 length - * @return -1: OID1<OID2 1: OID1 >OID2 0: equal - */ -s8_t snmp_oid_compare(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len) -{ - u8_t level = 0; - LWIP_ASSERT("'oid1' param must not be NULL or 'oid1_len' param be 0!", (oid1 != NULL) || (oid1_len == 0)); - LWIP_ASSERT("'oid2' param must not be NULL or 'oid2_len' param be 0!", (oid2 != NULL) || (oid2_len == 0)); - - while ((level < oid1_len) && (level < oid2_len)) { - if (*oid1 < *oid2) { - return -1; - } - - if (*oid1 > *oid2) { - return 1; - } - - level++; - oid1++; - oid2++; - } - - /* common part of both OID's is equal, compare length */ - if (oid1_len < oid2_len) { - return -1; - } - - if (oid1_len > oid2_len) { - return 1; - } - - /* they are equal */ - return 0; -} - -/** - * Check of two OIDs are equal - * @param oid1 OID 1 - * @param oid1_len OID 1 length - * @param oid2 OID 2 - * @param oid2_len OID 2 length - * @return 1: equal 0: non-equal - */ -u8_t snmp_oid_equal(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len) -{ - return (snmp_oid_compare(oid1, oid1_len, oid2, oid2_len) == 0) ? 1 : 0; -} - -/** - * Convert netif to interface index - * @param netif netif - * @return index - */ -u8_t netif_to_num(const struct netif *netif) -{ - return netif_get_index(netif); -} - -static const struct snmp_mib *snmp_get_mib_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) -{ - const u32_t *list_oid; - const u32_t *searched_oid; - u8_t i, l; - - u8_t max_match_len = 0; - const struct snmp_mib *matched_mib = NULL; - - LWIP_ASSERT("'oid' param must not be NULL!", (oid != NULL)); - - if (oid_len == 0) { - return NULL; - } - - for (i = 0; i < snmp_num_mibs; i++) { - LWIP_ASSERT("MIB array not initialized correctly", (snmp_mibs[i] != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("MIB array not initialized correctly - base OID is NULL", (snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid != NULL)); - - if (oid_len >= snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len) { - l = snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len; - list_oid = snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid; - searched_oid = oid; - - while (l > 0) { - if (*list_oid != *searched_oid) { - break; - } - - l--; - list_oid++; - searched_oid++; - } - - if ((l == 0) && (snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len > max_match_len)) { - max_match_len = snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len; - matched_mib = snmp_mibs[i]; - } - } - } - - return matched_mib; -} - -static const struct snmp_mib *snmp_get_next_mib(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) -{ - u8_t i; - const struct snmp_mib *next_mib = NULL; - - LWIP_ASSERT("'oid' param must not be NULL!", (oid != NULL)); - - if (oid_len == 0) { - return NULL; - } - - for (i = 0; i < snmp_num_mibs; i++) { - if (snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid != NULL) { - /* check if mib is located behind starting point */ - if (snmp_oid_compare(snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid, snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len, oid, oid_len) > 0) { - if ((next_mib == NULL) || - (snmp_oid_compare(snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid, snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len, - next_mib->base_oid, next_mib->base_oid_len) < 0)) { - next_mib = snmp_mibs[i]; - } - } - } - } - - return next_mib; -} - -static const struct snmp_mib *snmp_get_mib_between(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len) -{ - const struct snmp_mib *next_mib = snmp_get_next_mib(oid1, oid1_len); - - LWIP_ASSERT("'oid2' param must not be NULL!", (oid2 != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("'oid2_len' param must be greater than 0!", (oid2_len > 0)); - - if (next_mib != NULL) { - if (snmp_oid_compare(next_mib->base_oid, next_mib->base_oid_len, oid2, oid2_len) < 0) { - return next_mib; - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -u8_t snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance) -{ - u8_t result = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHOBJECT; - const struct snmp_mib *mib; - const struct snmp_node *mn = NULL; - - mib = snmp_get_mib_from_oid(oid, oid_len); - - if (mib != NULL) { - u8_t oid_instance_len; - - mn = snmp_mib_tree_resolve_exact(mib, oid, oid_len, &oid_instance_len); - - if ((mn != NULL) && (mn->node_type != SNMP_NODE_TREE)) { - /* get instance */ - const struct snmp_leaf_node *leaf_node = (const struct snmp_leaf_node *)(const void *)mn; - - node_instance->node = mn; - snmp_oid_assign(&node_instance->instance_oid, oid + (oid_len - oid_instance_len), oid_instance_len); - - result = leaf_node->get_instance( - oid, - oid_len - oid_instance_len, - node_instance); - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - - if (result == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ) != 0) && (node_instance->get_value == NULL)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP inconsistent access: node is readable but no get_value function is specified\n")); - } - - if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE) != 0) && (node_instance->set_value == NULL)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP inconsistent access: node is writable but no set_value and/or set_test function is specified\n")); - } - } - -#endif - } - } - - return result; -} - -u8_t snmp_get_next_node_instance_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, snmp_validate_node_instance_method validate_node_instance_method, void *validate_node_instance_arg, struct snmp_obj_id *node_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance) -{ - const struct snmp_mib *mib; - const struct snmp_node *mn = NULL; - const u32_t *start_oid = NULL; - u8_t start_oid_len = 0; - - /* resolve target MIB from passed OID */ - mib = snmp_get_mib_from_oid(oid, oid_len); - - if (mib == NULL) { - /* passed OID does not reference any known MIB, start at the next closest MIB */ - mib = snmp_get_next_mib(oid, oid_len); - - if (mib != NULL) { - start_oid = mib->base_oid; - start_oid_len = mib->base_oid_len; - } - } else { - start_oid = oid; - start_oid_len = oid_len; - } - - /* resolve target node from MIB, skip to next MIB if no suitable node is found in current MIB */ - while ((mib != NULL) && (mn == NULL)) { - u8_t oid_instance_len; - - /* check if OID directly references a node inside current MIB, in this case we have to ask this node for the next instance */ - mn = snmp_mib_tree_resolve_exact(mib, start_oid, start_oid_len, &oid_instance_len); - - if (mn != NULL) { - snmp_oid_assign(node_oid, start_oid, start_oid_len - oid_instance_len); /* set oid to node */ - snmp_oid_assign(&node_instance->instance_oid, start_oid + (start_oid_len - oid_instance_len), oid_instance_len); /* set (relative) instance oid */ - } else { - /* OID does not reference a node, search for the next closest node inside MIB; set instance_oid.len to zero because we want the first instance of this node */ - mn = snmp_mib_tree_resolve_next(mib, start_oid, start_oid_len, node_oid); - node_instance->instance_oid.len = 0; - } - - /* validate the node; if the node has no further instance or the returned instance is invalid, search for the next in MIB and validate again */ - node_instance->node = mn; - - while (mn != NULL) { - u8_t result; - - /* clear fields which may have values from previous loops */ - node_instance->asn1_type = 0; - node_instance->access = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_NOT_ACCESSIBLE; - node_instance->get_value = NULL; - node_instance->set_test = NULL; - node_instance->set_value = NULL; - node_instance->release_instance = NULL; - node_instance->reference.ptr = NULL; - node_instance->reference_len = 0; - - result = ((const struct snmp_leaf_node *)(const void *)mn)->get_next_instance(node_oid->id, node_oid->len, node_instance); - - if (result == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - - if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ) != 0) && (node_instance->get_value == NULL)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP inconsistent access: node is readable but no get_value function is specified\n")); - } - - if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE) != 0) && (node_instance->set_value == NULL)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP inconsistent access: node is writable but no set_value function is specified\n")); - } - -#endif - - /* validate node because the node may be not accessible for example (but let the caller decide what is valid */ - if ((validate_node_instance_method == NULL) || - (validate_node_instance_method(node_instance, validate_node_instance_arg) == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR)) { - /* node_oid "returns" the full result OID (including the instance part) */ - snmp_oid_append(node_oid, node_instance->instance_oid.id, node_instance->instance_oid.len); - break; - } - - if (node_instance->release_instance != NULL) { - node_instance->release_instance(node_instance); - } - - /* - the instance itself is not valid, ask for next instance from same node. - we don't have to change any variables because node_instance->instance_oid is used as input (starting point) - as well as output (resulting next OID), so we have to simply call get_next_instance method again - */ - } else { - if (node_instance->release_instance != NULL) { - node_instance->release_instance(node_instance); - } - - /* the node has no further instance, skip to next node */ - mn = snmp_mib_tree_resolve_next(mib, node_oid->id, node_oid->len, &node_instance->instance_oid); /* misuse node_instance->instance_oid as tmp buffer */ - - if (mn != NULL) { - /* prepare for next loop */ - snmp_oid_assign(node_oid, node_instance->instance_oid.id, node_instance->instance_oid.len); - node_instance->instance_oid.len = 0; - node_instance->node = mn; - } - } - } - - if (mn != NULL) { - /* - we found a suitable next node, - now we have to check if a inner MIB is located between the searched OID and the resulting OID. - this is possible because MIB's may be located anywhere in the global tree, that means also in - the subtree of another MIB (e.g. if searched OID is .2 and resulting OID is .4, then another - MIB having .3 as root node may exist) - */ - const struct snmp_mib *intermediate_mib; - intermediate_mib = snmp_get_mib_between(start_oid, start_oid_len, node_oid->id, node_oid->len); - - if (intermediate_mib != NULL) { - /* search for first node inside intermediate mib in next loop */ - if (node_instance->release_instance != NULL) { - node_instance->release_instance(node_instance); - } - - mn = NULL; - mib = intermediate_mib; - start_oid = mib->base_oid; - start_oid_len = mib->base_oid_len; - } - - /* else { we found out target node } */ - } else { - /* - there is no further (suitable) node inside this MIB, search for the next MIB with following priority - 1. search for inner MIB's (whose root is located inside tree of current MIB) - 2. search for surrouding MIB's (where the current MIB is the inner MIB) and continue there if any - 3. take the next closest MIB (not being related to the current MIB) - */ - const struct snmp_mib *next_mib; - next_mib = snmp_get_next_mib(start_oid, start_oid_len); /* returns MIB's related to point 1 and 3 */ - - /* is the found MIB an inner MIB? (point 1) */ - if ((next_mib != NULL) && (next_mib->base_oid_len > mib->base_oid_len) && - (snmp_oid_compare(next_mib->base_oid, mib->base_oid_len, mib->base_oid, mib->base_oid_len) == 0)) { - /* yes it is -> continue at inner MIB */ - mib = next_mib; - start_oid = mib->base_oid; - start_oid_len = mib->base_oid_len; - } else { - /* check if there is a surrounding mib where to continue (point 2) (only possible if OID length > 1) */ - if (mib->base_oid_len > 1) { - mib = snmp_get_mib_from_oid(mib->base_oid, mib->base_oid_len - 1); - - if (mib == NULL) { - /* no surrounding mib, use next mib encountered above (point 3) */ - mib = next_mib; - - if (mib != NULL) { - start_oid = mib->base_oid; - start_oid_len = mib->base_oid_len; - } - } - - /* else { start_oid stays the same because we want to continue from current offset in surrounding mib (point 2) } */ - } - } - } - } - - if (mib == NULL) { - /* loop is only left when mib == null (error) or mib_node != NULL (success) */ - return SNMP_ERR_ENDOFMIBVIEW; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -/** - * Searches tree for the supplied object identifier. - * - */ -const struct snmp_node *snmp_mib_tree_resolve_exact(const struct snmp_mib *mib, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, u8_t *oid_instance_len) -{ - const struct snmp_node *const *node = &mib->root_node; - u8_t oid_offset = mib->base_oid_len; - - while ((oid_offset < oid_len) && ((*node)->node_type == SNMP_NODE_TREE)) { - /* search for matching sub node */ - u32_t subnode_oid = *(oid + oid_offset); - - u32_t i = (*(const struct snmp_tree_node *const *)node)->subnode_count; - node = (*(const struct snmp_tree_node *const *)node)->subnodes; - - while ((i > 0) && ((*node)->oid != subnode_oid)) { - node++; - i--; - } - - if (i == 0) { - /* no matching subnode found */ - return NULL; - } - - oid_offset++; - } - - if ((*node)->node_type != SNMP_NODE_TREE) { - /* we found a leaf node */ - *oid_instance_len = oid_len - oid_offset; - return (*node); - } - - return NULL; -} - -const struct snmp_node *snmp_mib_tree_resolve_next(const struct snmp_mib *mib, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, struct snmp_obj_id *oidret) -{ - u8_t oid_offset = mib->base_oid_len; - const struct snmp_node *const *node; - const struct snmp_tree_node *node_stack[SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN]; - s32_t nsi = 0; /* NodeStackIndex */ - u32_t subnode_oid; - - if (mib->root_node->node_type != SNMP_NODE_TREE) { - /* a next operation on a mib with only a leaf node will always return NULL because there is no other node */ - return NULL; - } - - /* first build node stack related to passed oid (as far as possible), then go backwards to determine the next node */ - node_stack[nsi] = (const struct snmp_tree_node *)(const void *)mib->root_node; - - while (oid_offset < oid_len) { - /* search for matching sub node */ - u32_t i = node_stack[nsi]->subnode_count; - node = node_stack[nsi]->subnodes; - - subnode_oid = *(oid + oid_offset); - - while ((i > 0) && ((*node)->oid != subnode_oid)) { - node++; - i--; - } - - if ((i == 0) || ((*node)->node_type != SNMP_NODE_TREE)) { - /* no (matching) tree-subnode found */ - break; - } - - nsi++; - node_stack[nsi] = (const struct snmp_tree_node *)(const void *)(*node); - - oid_offset++; - } - - if (oid_offset >= oid_len) { - /* passed oid references a tree node -> return first useable sub node of it */ - subnode_oid = 0; - } else { - subnode_oid = *(oid + oid_offset) + 1; - } - - while (nsi >= 0) { - const struct snmp_node *subnode = NULL; - - /* find next node on current level */ - s32_t i = node_stack[nsi]->subnode_count; - node = node_stack[nsi]->subnodes; - - while (i > 0) { - if ((*node)->oid == subnode_oid) { - subnode = *node; - break; - } else if (((*node)->oid > subnode_oid) && ((subnode == NULL) || ((*node)->oid < subnode->oid))) { - subnode = *node; - } - - node++; - i--; - } - - if (subnode == NULL) { - /* no further node found on this level, go one level up and start searching with index of current node*/ - subnode_oid = node_stack[nsi]->node.oid + 1; - nsi--; - } else { - if (subnode->node_type == SNMP_NODE_TREE) { - /* next is a tree node, go into it and start searching */ - nsi++; - node_stack[nsi] = (const struct snmp_tree_node *)(const void *)subnode; - subnode_oid = 0; - } else { - /* we found a leaf node -> fill oidret and return it */ - snmp_oid_assign(oidret, mib->base_oid, mib->base_oid_len); - i = 1; - - while (i <= nsi) { - oidret->id[oidret->len] = node_stack[i]->node.oid; - oidret->len++; - i++; - } - - oidret->id[oidret->len] = subnode->oid; - oidret->len++; - - return subnode; - } - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** initialize struct next_oid_state using this function before passing it to next_oid_check */ -void snmp_next_oid_init(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, - const u32_t *start_oid, u8_t start_oid_len, - u32_t *next_oid_buf, u8_t next_oid_max_len) -{ - state->start_oid = start_oid; - state->start_oid_len = start_oid_len; - state->next_oid = next_oid_buf; - state->next_oid_len = 0; - state->next_oid_max_len = next_oid_max_len; - state->status = SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_NO_MATCH; -} - -/** checks if the passed incomplete OID may be a possible candidate for snmp_next_oid_check(); -this methid is intended if the complete OID is not yet known but it is very expensive to build it up, -so it is possible to test the starting part before building up the complete oid and pass it to snmp_next_oid_check()*/ -u8_t snmp_next_oid_precheck(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) -{ - if (state->status != SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_BUF_TO_SMALL) { - u8_t start_oid_len = (oid_len < state->start_oid_len) ? oid_len : state->start_oid_len; - - /* check passed OID is located behind start offset */ - if (snmp_oid_compare(oid, oid_len, state->start_oid, start_oid_len) >= 0) { - /* check if new oid is located closer to start oid than current closest oid */ - if ((state->status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_NO_MATCH) || - (snmp_oid_compare(oid, oid_len, state->next_oid, state->next_oid_len) < 0)) { - return 1; - } - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/** checks the passed OID if it is a candidate to be the next one (get_next); returns !=0 if passed oid is currently closest, otherwise 0 */ -u8_t snmp_next_oid_check(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, void *reference) -{ - /* do not overwrite a fail result */ - if (state->status != SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_BUF_TO_SMALL) { - /* check passed OID is located behind start offset */ - if (snmp_oid_compare(oid, oid_len, state->start_oid, state->start_oid_len) > 0) { - /* check if new oid is located closer to start oid than current closest oid */ - if ((state->status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_NO_MATCH) || - (snmp_oid_compare(oid, oid_len, state->next_oid, state->next_oid_len) < 0)) { - if (oid_len <= state->next_oid_max_len) { - MEMCPY(state->next_oid, oid, oid_len * sizeof(u32_t)); - state->next_oid_len = oid_len; - state->status = SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS; - state->reference = reference; - return 1; - } else { - state->status = SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_BUF_TO_SMALL; - } - } - } - } - - return 0; -} - -u8_t snmp_oid_in_range(const u32_t *oid_in, u8_t oid_len, const struct snmp_oid_range *oid_ranges, u8_t oid_ranges_len) -{ - u8_t i; - - if (oid_len != oid_ranges_len) { - return 0; - } - - for (i = 0; i < oid_ranges_len; i++) { - if ((oid_in[i] < oid_ranges[i].min) || (oid_in[i] > oid_ranges[i].max)) { - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -snmp_err_t snmp_set_test_ok(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(instance); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value); - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -/** - * Decodes BITS pseudotype value from ASN.1 OctetString. - * - * @note Because BITS pseudo type is encoded as OCTET STRING, it cannot directly - * be encoded/decoded by the agent. Instead call this function as required from - * get/test/set methods. - * - * @param buf points to a buffer holding the ASN1 octet string - * @param buf_len length of octet string - * @param bit_value decoded Bit value with Bit0 == LSB - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if bit value contains more than 32 bit - */ -err_t snmp_decode_bits(const u8_t *buf, u32_t buf_len, u32_t *bit_value) -{ - u8_t b; - u8_t bits_processed = 0; - *bit_value = 0; - - while (buf_len > 0) { - /* any bit set in this byte? */ - if (*buf != 0x00) { - if (bits_processed >= 32) { - /* accept more than 4 bytes, but only when no bits are set */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - b = *buf; - - do { - if (b & 0x80) { - *bit_value |= (1 << bits_processed); - } - - bits_processed++; - b <<= 1; - } while ((bits_processed & 0x07) != 0); /* &0x07 -> % 8 */ - } else { - bits_processed += 8; - } - - buf_len--; - buf++; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -err_t snmp_decode_truthvalue(const s32_t *asn1_value, u8_t *bool_value) -{ - /* defined by RFC1443: - TruthValue ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "Represents a boolean value." - SYNTAX INTEGER { true(1), false(2) } - */ - - if ((asn1_value == NULL) || (bool_value == NULL)) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (*asn1_value == 1) { - *bool_value = 1; - } else if (*asn1_value == 2) { - *bool_value = 0; - } else { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Encodes BITS pseudotype value into ASN.1 OctetString. - * - * @note Because BITS pseudo type is encoded as OCTET STRING, it cannot directly - * be encoded/decoded by the agent. Instead call this function as required from - * get/test/set methods. - * - * @param buf points to a buffer where the resulting ASN1 octet string is stored to - * @param buf_len max length of the bufffer - * @param bit_value Bit value to encode with Bit0 == LSB - * @param bit_count Number of possible bits for the bit value (according to rfc we have to send all bits independant from their truth value) - * @return number of bytes used from buffer to store the resulting OctetString - */ -u8_t snmp_encode_bits(u8_t *buf, u32_t buf_len, u32_t bit_value, u8_t bit_count) -{ - u8_t len = 0; - u8_t min_bytes = (bit_count + 7) >> 3; /* >>3 -> / 8 */ - - while ((buf_len > 0) && (bit_value != 0x00)) { - s8_t i = 7; - *buf = 0x00; - - while (i >= 0) { - if (bit_value & 0x01) { - *buf |= 0x01; - } - - if (i > 0) { - *buf <<= 1; - } - - bit_value >>= 1; - i--; - } - - buf++; - buf_len--; - len++; - } - - if (len < min_bytes) { - buf += len; - buf_len -= len; - - while ((len < min_bytes) && (buf_len > 0)) { - *buf = 0x00; - buf++; - buf_len--; - len++; - } - } - - return len; -} - -u8_t snmp_encode_truthvalue(s32_t *asn1_value, u32_t bool_value) -{ - /* defined by RFC1443: - TruthValue ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION - STATUS current - DESCRIPTION - "Represents a boolean value." - SYNTAX INTEGER { true(1), false(2) } - */ - - if (asn1_value == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - if (bool_value) { - *asn1_value = 1; /* defined by RFC1443 */ - } else { - *asn1_value = 2; /* defined by RFC1443 */ - } - - return sizeof(s32_t); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/** + * @file + * MIB tree access/construction functions. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Christiaan Simons + * Martin Hentschel +*/ + +/** + * @defgroup snmp SNMPv2c/v3 agent + * @ingroup apps + * SNMPv2c and SNMPv3 compatible agent\n + * There is also a MIB compiler and a MIB viewer in lwIP contrib repository + * (lwip-contrib/apps/LwipMibCompiler).\n + * The agent implements the most important MIB2 MIBs including IPv6 support + * (interfaces, UDP, TCP, SNMP, ICMP, SYSTEM). IP MIB is an older version + * without IPv6 statistics (TODO).\n + * Rewritten by Martin Hentschel and + * Dirk Ziegelmeier \n + * + * 0 Agent Capabilities + * ==================== + * + * Features: + * --------- + * - SNMPv2c support. + * - SNMPv3 support (a port to ARM mbedtls is provided, LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS option). + * - Low RAM usage - no memory pools, stack only. + * - MIB2 implementation is separated from SNMP stack. + * - Support for multiple MIBs (snmp_set_mibs() call) - e.g. for private MIB. + * - Simple and generic API for MIB implementation. + * - Comfortable node types and helper functions for scalar arrays and tables. + * - Counter64, bit and truthvalue datatype support. + * - Callbacks for SNMP writes e.g. to implement persistency. + * - Runs on two APIs: RAW and netconn. + * - Async API is gone - the stack now supports netconn API instead, + * so blocking operations can be done in MIB calls. + * SNMP runs in a worker thread when netconn API is used. + * - Simplified thread sync support for MIBs - useful when MIBs + * need to access variables shared with other threads where no locking is + * possible. Used in MIB2 to access lwIP stats from lwIP thread. + * + * MIB compiler (code generator): + * ------------------------------ + * - Provided in lwIP contrib repository. + * - Written in C#. MIB viewer used Windows Forms. + * - Developed on Windows with Visual Studio 2010. + * - Can be compiled and used on all platforms with http://www.monodevelop.com/. + * - Based on a heavily modified version of of SharpSnmpLib (a4bd05c6afb4) + * (https://sharpsnmplib.codeplex.com/SourceControl/network/forks/Nemo157/MIBParserUpdate). + * - MIB parser, C file generation framework and LWIP code generation are cleanly + * separated, which means the code may be useful as a base for code generation + * of other SNMP agents. + * + * Notes: + * ------ + * - Stack and MIB compiler were used to implement a Profinet device. + * Compiled/implemented MIBs: LLDP-MIB, LLDP-EXT-DOT3-MIB, LLDP-EXT-PNO-MIB. + * + * SNMPv1 per RFC1157 and SNMPv2c per RFC 3416 + * ------------------------------------------- + * Note the S in SNMP stands for "Simple". Note that "Simple" is + * relative. SNMP is simple compared to the complex ISO network + * management protocols CMIP (Common Management Information Protocol) + * and CMOT (CMip Over Tcp). + * + * SNMPv3 + * ------ + * When SNMPv3 is used, several functions from snmpv3.h must be implemented + * by the user. This is mainly user management and persistence handling. + * The sample provided in lwip-contrib is insecure, don't use it in production + * systems, especially the missing persistence for engine boots variable + * simplifies replay attacks. + * + * MIB II + * ------ + * The standard lwIP stack management information base. + * This is a required MIB, so this is always enabled. + * The groups EGP, CMOT and transmission are disabled by default. + * + * Most mib-2 objects are not writable except: + * sysName, sysLocation, sysContact, snmpEnableAuthenTraps. + * Writing to or changing the ARP and IP address and route + * tables is not possible. + * + * Note lwIP has a very limited notion of IP routing. It currently + * doen't have a route table and doesn't have a notion of the U,G,H flags. + * Instead lwIP uses the interface list with only one default interface + * acting as a single gateway interface (G) for the default route. + * + * The agent returns a "virtual table" with the default route 0.0.0.0 + * for the default interface and network routes (no H) for each + * network interface in the netif_list. + * All routes are considered to be up (U). + * + * Loading additional MIBs + * ----------------------- + * MIBs can only be added in compile-time, not in run-time. + * + * + * 1 Building the Agent + * ==================== + * First of all you'll need to add the following define + * to your local lwipopts.h: + * \#define LWIP_SNMP 1 + * + * and add the source files your makefile. + * + * Note you'll might need to adapt you network driver to update + * the mib2 variables for your interface. + * + * 2 Running the Agent + * =================== + * The following function calls must be made in your program to + * actually get the SNMP agent running. + * + * Before starting the agent you should supply pointers + * for sysContact, sysLocation, and snmpEnableAuthenTraps. + * You can do this by calling + * + * - snmp_mib2_set_syscontact() + * - snmp_mib2_set_syslocation() + * - snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled() + * + * You can register a callback which is called on successful write access: + * snmp_set_write_callback(). + * + * Additionally you may want to set + * + * - snmp_mib2_set_sysdescr() + * - snmp_set_device_enterprise_oid() + * - snmp_mib2_set_sysname() + * + * Also before starting the agent you need to setup + * one or more trap destinations using these calls: + * + * - snmp_trap_dst_enable() + * - snmp_trap_dst_ip_set() + * + * If you need more than MIB2, set the MIBs you want to use + * by snmp_set_mibs(). + * + * Finally, enable the agent by calling snmp_init() + * + * @defgroup snmp_core Core + * @ingroup snmp + * + * @defgroup snmp_traps Traps + * @ingroup snmp + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "snmp_core_priv.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include + +#if (LWIP_SNMP && (SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS <= 0)) +#error "If you want to use SNMP, you have to define SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS>=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (!LWIP_UDP && LWIP_SNMP) +#error "If you want to use SNMP, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN > 255 +#error "SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN must fit into an u8_t" +#endif + +struct snmp_statistics snmp_stats; +static const struct snmp_obj_id snmp_device_enterprise_oid_default = { SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID_LEN, SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID }; +static const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_device_enterprise_oid = &snmp_device_enterprise_oid_default; + +const u32_t snmp_zero_dot_zero_values[] = { 0, 0 }; +const struct snmp_obj_id_const_ref snmp_zero_dot_zero = { LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(snmp_zero_dot_zero_values), snmp_zero_dot_zero_values }; + +#if SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_SNMP_V3 +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h" +static const struct snmp_mib *const default_mibs[] = { &mib2, &snmpframeworkmib, &snmpusmmib }; +static u8_t snmp_num_mibs = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(default_mibs); +#elif SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +static const struct snmp_mib *const default_mibs[] = { &mib2 }; +static u8_t snmp_num_mibs = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(default_mibs); +#else +static const struct snmp_mib *const default_mibs[] = { NULL }; +static u8_t snmp_num_mibs = 0; +#endif + +/* List of known mibs */ +static struct snmp_mib const *const *snmp_mibs = default_mibs; + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * Sets the MIBs to use. + * Example: call snmp_set_mibs() as follows: + * static const struct snmp_mib *my_snmp_mibs[] = { + * &mib2, + * &private_mib + * }; + * snmp_set_mibs(my_snmp_mibs, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(my_snmp_mibs)); + */ +void snmp_set_mibs(const struct snmp_mib **mibs, u8_t num_mibs) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("mibs pointer must be != NULL", (mibs != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("num_mibs pointer must be != 0", (num_mibs != 0)); + snmp_mibs = mibs; + snmp_num_mibs = num_mibs; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * 'device enterprise oid' is used for 'device OID' field in trap PDU's (for identification of generating device) + * as well as for value returned by MIB-2 'sysObjectID' field (if internal MIB2 implementation is used). + * The 'device enterprise oid' shall point to an OID located under 'private-enterprises' branch (1.3.6.1.4.1.XXX). If a vendor + * wants to provide a custom object there, he has to get its own enterprise oid from IANA (http://www.iana.org). It + * is not allowed to use LWIP enterprise ID! + * In order to identify a specific device it is recommended to create a dedicated OID for each device type under its own + * enterprise oid. + * e.g. + * device a > 1.3.6.1.4.1.XXX(ent-oid).1(devices).1(device a) + * device b > 1.3.6.1.4.1.XXX(ent-oid).1(devices).2(device b) + * for more details see description of 'sysObjectID' field in RFC1213-MIB + */ +void snmp_set_device_enterprise_oid(const struct snmp_obj_id *device_enterprise_oid) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (device_enterprise_oid == NULL) { + snmp_device_enterprise_oid = &snmp_device_enterprise_oid_default; + } else { + snmp_device_enterprise_oid = device_enterprise_oid; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * Get 'device enterprise oid' + */ +const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_get_device_enterprise_oid(void) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + return snmp_device_enterprise_oid; +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/** + * Conversion from InetAddressIPv4 oid to lwIP ip4_addr + * @param oid points to u32_t ident[4] input + * @param ip points to output struct + */ +u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip4(const u32_t *oid, ip4_addr_t *ip) +{ + if ((oid[0] > 0xFF) || + (oid[1] > 0xFF) || + (oid[2] > 0xFF) || + (oid[3] > 0xFF)) { + ip4_addr_copy(*ip, *IP4_ADDR_ANY4); + return 0; + } + + IP4_ADDR(ip, oid[0], oid[1], oid[2], oid[3]); + return 1; +} + +/** + * Convert ip4_addr to InetAddressIPv4 (no InetAddressType) + * @param ip points to input struct + * @param oid points to u32_t ident[4] output + */ +void snmp_ip4_to_oid(const ip4_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid) +{ + oid[0] = ip4_addr1(ip); + oid[1] = ip4_addr2(ip); + oid[2] = ip4_addr3(ip); + oid[3] = ip4_addr4(ip); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** + * Conversion from InetAddressIPv6 oid to lwIP ip6_addr + * @param oid points to u32_t oid[16] input + * @param ip points to output struct + */ +u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip6(const u32_t *oid, ip6_addr_t *ip) +{ + if ((oid[0] > 0xFF) || + (oid[1] > 0xFF) || + (oid[2] > 0xFF) || + (oid[3] > 0xFF) || + (oid[4] > 0xFF) || + (oid[5] > 0xFF) || + (oid[6] > 0xFF) || + (oid[7] > 0xFF) || + (oid[8] > 0xFF) || + (oid[9] > 0xFF) || + (oid[10] > 0xFF) || + (oid[11] > 0xFF) || + (oid[12] > 0xFF) || + (oid[13] > 0xFF) || + (oid[14] > 0xFF) || + (oid[15] > 0xFF)) { + ip6_addr_set_any(ip); + return 0; + } + + ip->addr[0] = (oid[0] << 24) | (oid[1] << 16) | (oid[2] << 8) | (oid[3] << 0); + ip->addr[1] = (oid[4] << 24) | (oid[5] << 16) | (oid[6] << 8) | (oid[7] << 0); + ip->addr[2] = (oid[8] << 24) | (oid[9] << 16) | (oid[10] << 8) | (oid[11] << 0); + ip->addr[3] = (oid[12] << 24) | (oid[13] << 16) | (oid[14] << 8) | (oid[15] << 0); + return 1; +} + +/** + * Convert ip6_addr to InetAddressIPv6 (no InetAddressType) + * @param ip points to input struct + * @param oid points to u32_t ident[16] output + */ +void snmp_ip6_to_oid(const ip6_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid) +{ + oid[0] = (ip->addr[0] & 0xFF000000) >> 24; + oid[1] = (ip->addr[0] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16; + oid[2] = (ip->addr[0] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8; + oid[3] = (ip->addr[0] & 0x000000FF) >> 0; + oid[4] = (ip->addr[1] & 0xFF000000) >> 24; + oid[5] = (ip->addr[1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16; + oid[6] = (ip->addr[1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8; + oid[7] = (ip->addr[1] & 0x000000FF) >> 0; + oid[8] = (ip->addr[2] & 0xFF000000) >> 24; + oid[9] = (ip->addr[2] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16; + oid[10] = (ip->addr[2] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8; + oid[11] = (ip->addr[2] & 0x000000FF) >> 0; + oid[12] = (ip->addr[3] & 0xFF000000) >> 24; + oid[13] = (ip->addr[3] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16; + oid[14] = (ip->addr[3] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8; + oid[15] = (ip->addr[3] & 0x000000FF) >> 0; +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 +/** + * Convert to InetAddressType+InetAddress+InetPortNumber + * @param ip IP address + * @param port Port + * @param oid OID + * @return OID length + */ +u8_t snmp_ip_port_to_oid(const ip_addr_t *ip, u16_t port, u32_t *oid) +{ + u8_t idx; + + idx = snmp_ip_to_oid(ip, oid); + oid[idx] = port; + idx++; + + return idx; +} + +/** + * Convert to InetAddressType+InetAddress + * @param ip IP address + * @param oid OID + * @return OID length + */ +u8_t snmp_ip_to_oid(const ip_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid) +{ + if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(*ip)) { + oid[0] = 0; /* any */ + oid[1] = 0; /* no IP OIDs follow */ + return 2; + } else if (IP_IS_V6(ip)) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + oid[0] = 2; /* ipv6 */ + oid[1] = 16; /* 16 InetAddressIPv6 OIDs follow */ + snmp_ip6_to_oid(ip_2_ip6(ip), &oid[2]); + return 18; +#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + return 0; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + oid[0] = 1; /* ipv4 */ + oid[1] = 4; /* 4 InetAddressIPv4 OIDs follow */ + snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip_2_ip4(ip), &oid[2]); + return 6; +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + return 0; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + } +} + +/** + * Convert from InetAddressType+InetAddress to ip_addr_t + * @param oid OID + * @param oid_len OID length + * @param ip IP address + * @return Parsed OID length + */ +u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, ip_addr_t *ip) +{ + /* InetAddressType */ + if (oid_len < 1) { + return 0; + } + + if (oid[0] == 0) /* any */ + { + /* 1x InetAddressType, 1x OID len */ + if (oid_len < 2) { + return 0; + } + + if (oid[1] != 0) { + return 0; + } + + memset(ip, 0, sizeof(*ip)); + IP_SET_TYPE(ip, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + + return 2; + } else if (oid[0] == 1) /* ipv4 */ + { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /* 1x InetAddressType, 1x OID len, 4x InetAddressIPv4 */ + if (oid_len < 6) { + return 0; + } + + /* 4x ipv4 OID */ + if (oid[1] != 4) { + return 0; + } + + IP_SET_TYPE(ip, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + + if (!snmp_oid_to_ip4(&oid[2], ip_2_ip4(ip))) { + return 0; + } + + return 6; +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + return 0; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + } else if (oid[0] == 2) /* ipv6 */ + { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + /* 1x InetAddressType, 1x OID len, 16x InetAddressIPv6 */ + if (oid_len < 18) { + return 0; + } + + /* 16x ipv6 OID */ + if (oid[1] != 16) { + return 0; + } + + IP_SET_TYPE(ip, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); + + if (!snmp_oid_to_ip6(&oid[2], ip_2_ip6(ip))) { + return 0; + } + + return 18; +#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + return 0; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + } else /* unsupported InetAddressType */ + { + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Convert from InetAddressType+InetAddress+InetPortNumber to ip_addr_t and u16_t + * @param oid OID + * @param oid_len OID length + * @param ip IP address + * @param port Port + * @return Parsed OID length + */ +u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip_port(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, ip_addr_t *ip, u16_t *port) +{ + u8_t idx; + + /* InetAddressType + InetAddress */ + idx = snmp_oid_to_ip(&oid[0], oid_len, ip); + + if (idx == 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* InetPortNumber */ + if (oid_len < (idx + 1)) { + return 0; + } + + if (oid[idx] > 0xffff) { + return 0; + } + + *port = (u16_t)oid[idx]; + idx++; + + return idx; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** + * Assign an OID to struct snmp_obj_id + * @param target Assignment target + * @param oid OID + * @param oid_len OID length + */ +void snmp_oid_assign(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("oid_len <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN", oid_len <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN); + + target->len = oid_len; + + if (oid_len > 0) { + MEMCPY(target->id, oid, oid_len * sizeof(u32_t)); + } +} + +/** + * Prefix an OID to OID in struct snmp_obj_id + * @param target Assignment target to prefix + * @param oid OID + * @param oid_len OID length + */ +void snmp_oid_prefix(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("target->len + oid_len <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN", (target->len + oid_len) <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN); + + if (oid_len > 0) { + /* move existing OID to make room at the beginning for OID to insert */ + int i; + + for (i = target->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + target->id[i + oid_len] = target->id[i]; + } + + /* paste oid at the beginning */ + MEMCPY(target->id, oid, oid_len * sizeof(u32_t)); + } +} + +/** + * Combine two OIDs into struct snmp_obj_id + * @param target Assignmet target + * @param oid1 OID 1 + * @param oid1_len OID 1 length + * @param oid2 OID 2 + * @param oid2_len OID 2 length + */ +void snmp_oid_combine(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len) +{ + snmp_oid_assign(target, oid1, oid1_len); + snmp_oid_append(target, oid2, oid2_len); +} + +/** + * Append OIDs to struct snmp_obj_id + * @param target Assignment target to append to + * @param oid OID + * @param oid_len OID length + */ +void snmp_oid_append(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("offset + oid_len <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN", (target->len + oid_len) <= SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN); + + if (oid_len > 0) { + MEMCPY(&target->id[target->len], oid, oid_len * sizeof(u32_t)); + target->len = (u8_t)(target->len + oid_len); + } +} + +/** + * Compare two OIDs + * @param oid1 OID 1 + * @param oid1_len OID 1 length + * @param oid2 OID 2 + * @param oid2_len OID 2 length + * @return -1: OID1<OID2 1: OID1 >OID2 0: equal + */ +s8_t snmp_oid_compare(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len) +{ + u8_t level = 0; + LWIP_ASSERT("'oid1' param must not be NULL or 'oid1_len' param be 0!", (oid1 != NULL) || (oid1_len == 0)); + LWIP_ASSERT("'oid2' param must not be NULL or 'oid2_len' param be 0!", (oid2 != NULL) || (oid2_len == 0)); + + while ((level < oid1_len) && (level < oid2_len)) { + if (*oid1 < *oid2) { + return -1; + } + + if (*oid1 > *oid2) { + return 1; + } + + level++; + oid1++; + oid2++; + } + + /* common part of both OID's is equal, compare length */ + if (oid1_len < oid2_len) { + return -1; + } + + if (oid1_len > oid2_len) { + return 1; + } + + /* they are equal */ + return 0; +} + +/** + * Check of two OIDs are equal + * @param oid1 OID 1 + * @param oid1_len OID 1 length + * @param oid2 OID 2 + * @param oid2_len OID 2 length + * @return 1: equal 0: non-equal + */ +u8_t snmp_oid_equal(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len) +{ + return (snmp_oid_compare(oid1, oid1_len, oid2, oid2_len) == 0) ? 1 : 0; +} + +/** + * Convert netif to interface index + * @param netif netif + * @return index + */ +u8_t netif_to_num(const struct netif *netif) +{ + return netif_get_index(netif); +} + +static const struct snmp_mib *snmp_get_mib_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) +{ + const u32_t *list_oid; + const u32_t *searched_oid; + u8_t i, l; + + u8_t max_match_len = 0; + const struct snmp_mib *matched_mib = NULL; + + LWIP_ASSERT("'oid' param must not be NULL!", (oid != NULL)); + + if (oid_len == 0) { + return NULL; + } + + for (i = 0; i < snmp_num_mibs; i++) { + LWIP_ASSERT("MIB array not initialized correctly", (snmp_mibs[i] != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("MIB array not initialized correctly - base OID is NULL", (snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid != NULL)); + + if (oid_len >= snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len) { + l = snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len; + list_oid = snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid; + searched_oid = oid; + + while (l > 0) { + if (*list_oid != *searched_oid) { + break; + } + + l--; + list_oid++; + searched_oid++; + } + + if ((l == 0) && (snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len > max_match_len)) { + max_match_len = snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len; + matched_mib = snmp_mibs[i]; + } + } + } + + return matched_mib; +} + +static const struct snmp_mib *snmp_get_next_mib(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) +{ + u8_t i; + const struct snmp_mib *next_mib = NULL; + + LWIP_ASSERT("'oid' param must not be NULL!", (oid != NULL)); + + if (oid_len == 0) { + return NULL; + } + + for (i = 0; i < snmp_num_mibs; i++) { + if (snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid != NULL) { + /* check if mib is located behind starting point */ + if (snmp_oid_compare(snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid, snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len, oid, oid_len) > 0) { + if ((next_mib == NULL) || + (snmp_oid_compare(snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid, snmp_mibs[i]->base_oid_len, + next_mib->base_oid, next_mib->base_oid_len) < 0)) { + next_mib = snmp_mibs[i]; + } + } + } + } + + return next_mib; +} + +static const struct snmp_mib *snmp_get_mib_between(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len) +{ + const struct snmp_mib *next_mib = snmp_get_next_mib(oid1, oid1_len); + + LWIP_ASSERT("'oid2' param must not be NULL!", (oid2 != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("'oid2_len' param must be greater than 0!", (oid2_len > 0)); + + if (next_mib != NULL) { + if (snmp_oid_compare(next_mib->base_oid, next_mib->base_oid_len, oid2, oid2_len) < 0) { + return next_mib; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +u8_t snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance) +{ + u8_t result = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHOBJECT; + const struct snmp_mib *mib; + const struct snmp_node *mn = NULL; + + mib = snmp_get_mib_from_oid(oid, oid_len); + + if (mib != NULL) { + u8_t oid_instance_len; + + mn = snmp_mib_tree_resolve_exact(mib, oid, oid_len, &oid_instance_len); + + if ((mn != NULL) && (mn->node_type != SNMP_NODE_TREE)) { + /* get instance */ + const struct snmp_leaf_node *leaf_node = (const struct snmp_leaf_node *)(const void *)mn; + + node_instance->node = mn; + snmp_oid_assign(&node_instance->instance_oid, oid + (oid_len - oid_instance_len), oid_instance_len); + + result = leaf_node->get_instance( + oid, + oid_len - oid_instance_len, + node_instance); + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + + if (result == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ) != 0) && (node_instance->get_value == NULL)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP inconsistent access: node is readable but no get_value function is specified\n")); + } + + if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE) != 0) && (node_instance->set_value == NULL)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP inconsistent access: node is writable but no set_value and/or set_test function is specified\n")); + } + } + +#endif + } + } + + return result; +} + +u8_t snmp_get_next_node_instance_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, snmp_validate_node_instance_method validate_node_instance_method, void *validate_node_instance_arg, struct snmp_obj_id *node_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance) +{ + const struct snmp_mib *mib; + const struct snmp_node *mn = NULL; + const u32_t *start_oid = NULL; + u8_t start_oid_len = 0; + + /* resolve target MIB from passed OID */ + mib = snmp_get_mib_from_oid(oid, oid_len); + + if (mib == NULL) { + /* passed OID does not reference any known MIB, start at the next closest MIB */ + mib = snmp_get_next_mib(oid, oid_len); + + if (mib != NULL) { + start_oid = mib->base_oid; + start_oid_len = mib->base_oid_len; + } + } else { + start_oid = oid; + start_oid_len = oid_len; + } + + /* resolve target node from MIB, skip to next MIB if no suitable node is found in current MIB */ + while ((mib != NULL) && (mn == NULL)) { + u8_t oid_instance_len; + + /* check if OID directly references a node inside current MIB, in this case we have to ask this node for the next instance */ + mn = snmp_mib_tree_resolve_exact(mib, start_oid, start_oid_len, &oid_instance_len); + + if (mn != NULL) { + snmp_oid_assign(node_oid, start_oid, start_oid_len - oid_instance_len); /* set oid to node */ + snmp_oid_assign(&node_instance->instance_oid, start_oid + (start_oid_len - oid_instance_len), oid_instance_len); /* set (relative) instance oid */ + } else { + /* OID does not reference a node, search for the next closest node inside MIB; set instance_oid.len to zero because we want the first instance of this node */ + mn = snmp_mib_tree_resolve_next(mib, start_oid, start_oid_len, node_oid); + node_instance->instance_oid.len = 0; + } + + /* validate the node; if the node has no further instance or the returned instance is invalid, search for the next in MIB and validate again */ + node_instance->node = mn; + + while (mn != NULL) { + u8_t result; + + /* clear fields which may have values from previous loops */ + node_instance->asn1_type = 0; + node_instance->access = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_NOT_ACCESSIBLE; + node_instance->get_value = NULL; + node_instance->set_test = NULL; + node_instance->set_value = NULL; + node_instance->release_instance = NULL; + node_instance->reference.ptr = NULL; + node_instance->reference_len = 0; + + result = ((const struct snmp_leaf_node *)(const void *)mn)->get_next_instance(node_oid->id, node_oid->len, node_instance); + + if (result == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + + if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ) != 0) && (node_instance->get_value == NULL)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP inconsistent access: node is readable but no get_value function is specified\n")); + } + + if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE) != 0) && (node_instance->set_value == NULL)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP inconsistent access: node is writable but no set_value function is specified\n")); + } + +#endif + + /* validate node because the node may be not accessible for example (but let the caller decide what is valid */ + if ((validate_node_instance_method == NULL) || + (validate_node_instance_method(node_instance, validate_node_instance_arg) == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR)) { + /* node_oid "returns" the full result OID (including the instance part) */ + snmp_oid_append(node_oid, node_instance->instance_oid.id, node_instance->instance_oid.len); + break; + } + + if (node_instance->release_instance != NULL) { + node_instance->release_instance(node_instance); + } + + /* + the instance itself is not valid, ask for next instance from same node. + we don't have to change any variables because node_instance->instance_oid is used as input (starting point) + as well as output (resulting next OID), so we have to simply call get_next_instance method again + */ + } else { + if (node_instance->release_instance != NULL) { + node_instance->release_instance(node_instance); + } + + /* the node has no further instance, skip to next node */ + mn = snmp_mib_tree_resolve_next(mib, node_oid->id, node_oid->len, &node_instance->instance_oid); /* misuse node_instance->instance_oid as tmp buffer */ + + if (mn != NULL) { + /* prepare for next loop */ + snmp_oid_assign(node_oid, node_instance->instance_oid.id, node_instance->instance_oid.len); + node_instance->instance_oid.len = 0; + node_instance->node = mn; + } + } + } + + if (mn != NULL) { + /* + we found a suitable next node, + now we have to check if a inner MIB is located between the searched OID and the resulting OID. + this is possible because MIB's may be located anywhere in the global tree, that means also in + the subtree of another MIB (e.g. if searched OID is .2 and resulting OID is .4, then another + MIB having .3 as root node may exist) + */ + const struct snmp_mib *intermediate_mib; + intermediate_mib = snmp_get_mib_between(start_oid, start_oid_len, node_oid->id, node_oid->len); + + if (intermediate_mib != NULL) { + /* search for first node inside intermediate mib in next loop */ + if (node_instance->release_instance != NULL) { + node_instance->release_instance(node_instance); + } + + mn = NULL; + mib = intermediate_mib; + start_oid = mib->base_oid; + start_oid_len = mib->base_oid_len; + } + + /* else { we found out target node } */ + } else { + /* + there is no further (suitable) node inside this MIB, search for the next MIB with following priority + 1. search for inner MIB's (whose root is located inside tree of current MIB) + 2. search for surrouding MIB's (where the current MIB is the inner MIB) and continue there if any + 3. take the next closest MIB (not being related to the current MIB) + */ + const struct snmp_mib *next_mib; + next_mib = snmp_get_next_mib(start_oid, start_oid_len); /* returns MIB's related to point 1 and 3 */ + + /* is the found MIB an inner MIB? (point 1) */ + if ((next_mib != NULL) && (next_mib->base_oid_len > mib->base_oid_len) && + (snmp_oid_compare(next_mib->base_oid, mib->base_oid_len, mib->base_oid, mib->base_oid_len) == 0)) { + /* yes it is -> continue at inner MIB */ + mib = next_mib; + start_oid = mib->base_oid; + start_oid_len = mib->base_oid_len; + } else { + /* check if there is a surrounding mib where to continue (point 2) (only possible if OID length > 1) */ + if (mib->base_oid_len > 1) { + mib = snmp_get_mib_from_oid(mib->base_oid, mib->base_oid_len - 1); + + if (mib == NULL) { + /* no surrounding mib, use next mib encountered above (point 3) */ + mib = next_mib; + + if (mib != NULL) { + start_oid = mib->base_oid; + start_oid_len = mib->base_oid_len; + } + } + + /* else { start_oid stays the same because we want to continue from current offset in surrounding mib (point 2) } */ + } + } + } + } + + if (mib == NULL) { + /* loop is only left when mib == null (error) or mib_node != NULL (success) */ + return SNMP_ERR_ENDOFMIBVIEW; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +/** + * Searches tree for the supplied object identifier. + * + */ +const struct snmp_node *snmp_mib_tree_resolve_exact(const struct snmp_mib *mib, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, u8_t *oid_instance_len) +{ + const struct snmp_node *const *node = &mib->root_node; + u8_t oid_offset = mib->base_oid_len; + + while ((oid_offset < oid_len) && ((*node)->node_type == SNMP_NODE_TREE)) { + /* search for matching sub node */ + u32_t subnode_oid = *(oid + oid_offset); + + u32_t i = (*(const struct snmp_tree_node *const *)node)->subnode_count; + node = (*(const struct snmp_tree_node *const *)node)->subnodes; + + while ((i > 0) && ((*node)->oid != subnode_oid)) { + node++; + i--; + } + + if (i == 0) { + /* no matching subnode found */ + return NULL; + } + + oid_offset++; + } + + if ((*node)->node_type != SNMP_NODE_TREE) { + /* we found a leaf node */ + *oid_instance_len = oid_len - oid_offset; + return (*node); + } + + return NULL; +} + +const struct snmp_node *snmp_mib_tree_resolve_next(const struct snmp_mib *mib, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, struct snmp_obj_id *oidret) +{ + u8_t oid_offset = mib->base_oid_len; + const struct snmp_node *const *node; + const struct snmp_tree_node *node_stack[SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN]; + s32_t nsi = 0; /* NodeStackIndex */ + u32_t subnode_oid; + + if (mib->root_node->node_type != SNMP_NODE_TREE) { + /* a next operation on a mib with only a leaf node will always return NULL because there is no other node */ + return NULL; + } + + /* first build node stack related to passed oid (as far as possible), then go backwards to determine the next node */ + node_stack[nsi] = (const struct snmp_tree_node *)(const void *)mib->root_node; + + while (oid_offset < oid_len) { + /* search for matching sub node */ + u32_t i = node_stack[nsi]->subnode_count; + node = node_stack[nsi]->subnodes; + + subnode_oid = *(oid + oid_offset); + + while ((i > 0) && ((*node)->oid != subnode_oid)) { + node++; + i--; + } + + if ((i == 0) || ((*node)->node_type != SNMP_NODE_TREE)) { + /* no (matching) tree-subnode found */ + break; + } + + nsi++; + node_stack[nsi] = (const struct snmp_tree_node *)(const void *)(*node); + + oid_offset++; + } + + if (oid_offset >= oid_len) { + /* passed oid references a tree node -> return first useable sub node of it */ + subnode_oid = 0; + } else { + subnode_oid = *(oid + oid_offset) + 1; + } + + while (nsi >= 0) { + const struct snmp_node *subnode = NULL; + + /* find next node on current level */ + s32_t i = node_stack[nsi]->subnode_count; + node = node_stack[nsi]->subnodes; + + while (i > 0) { + if ((*node)->oid == subnode_oid) { + subnode = *node; + break; + } else if (((*node)->oid > subnode_oid) && ((subnode == NULL) || ((*node)->oid < subnode->oid))) { + subnode = *node; + } + + node++; + i--; + } + + if (subnode == NULL) { + /* no further node found on this level, go one level up and start searching with index of current node*/ + subnode_oid = node_stack[nsi]->node.oid + 1; + nsi--; + } else { + if (subnode->node_type == SNMP_NODE_TREE) { + /* next is a tree node, go into it and start searching */ + nsi++; + node_stack[nsi] = (const struct snmp_tree_node *)(const void *)subnode; + subnode_oid = 0; + } else { + /* we found a leaf node -> fill oidret and return it */ + snmp_oid_assign(oidret, mib->base_oid, mib->base_oid_len); + i = 1; + + while (i <= nsi) { + oidret->id[oidret->len] = node_stack[i]->node.oid; + oidret->len++; + i++; + } + + oidret->id[oidret->len] = subnode->oid; + oidret->len++; + + return subnode; + } + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** initialize struct next_oid_state using this function before passing it to next_oid_check */ +void snmp_next_oid_init(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, + const u32_t *start_oid, u8_t start_oid_len, + u32_t *next_oid_buf, u8_t next_oid_max_len) +{ + state->start_oid = start_oid; + state->start_oid_len = start_oid_len; + state->next_oid = next_oid_buf; + state->next_oid_len = 0; + state->next_oid_max_len = next_oid_max_len; + state->status = SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_NO_MATCH; +} + +/** checks if the passed incomplete OID may be a possible candidate for snmp_next_oid_check(); +this methid is intended if the complete OID is not yet known but it is very expensive to build it up, +so it is possible to test the starting part before building up the complete oid and pass it to snmp_next_oid_check()*/ +u8_t snmp_next_oid_precheck(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len) +{ + if (state->status != SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_BUF_TO_SMALL) { + u8_t start_oid_len = (oid_len < state->start_oid_len) ? oid_len : state->start_oid_len; + + /* check passed OID is located behind start offset */ + if (snmp_oid_compare(oid, oid_len, state->start_oid, start_oid_len) >= 0) { + /* check if new oid is located closer to start oid than current closest oid */ + if ((state->status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_NO_MATCH) || + (snmp_oid_compare(oid, oid_len, state->next_oid, state->next_oid_len) < 0)) { + return 1; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** checks the passed OID if it is a candidate to be the next one (get_next); returns !=0 if passed oid is currently closest, otherwise 0 */ +u8_t snmp_next_oid_check(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, void *reference) +{ + /* do not overwrite a fail result */ + if (state->status != SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_BUF_TO_SMALL) { + /* check passed OID is located behind start offset */ + if (snmp_oid_compare(oid, oid_len, state->start_oid, state->start_oid_len) > 0) { + /* check if new oid is located closer to start oid than current closest oid */ + if ((state->status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_NO_MATCH) || + (snmp_oid_compare(oid, oid_len, state->next_oid, state->next_oid_len) < 0)) { + if (oid_len <= state->next_oid_max_len) { + MEMCPY(state->next_oid, oid, oid_len * sizeof(u32_t)); + state->next_oid_len = oid_len; + state->status = SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS; + state->reference = reference; + return 1; + } else { + state->status = SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_BUF_TO_SMALL; + } + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +u8_t snmp_oid_in_range(const u32_t *oid_in, u8_t oid_len, const struct snmp_oid_range *oid_ranges, u8_t oid_ranges_len) +{ + u8_t i; + + if (oid_len != oid_ranges_len) { + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < oid_ranges_len; i++) { + if ((oid_in[i] < oid_ranges[i].min) || (oid_in[i] > oid_ranges[i].max)) { + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +snmp_err_t snmp_set_test_ok(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(instance); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value); + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +/** + * Decodes BITS pseudotype value from ASN.1 OctetString. + * + * @note Because BITS pseudo type is encoded as OCTET STRING, it cannot directly + * be encoded/decoded by the agent. Instead call this function as required from + * get/test/set methods. + * + * @param buf points to a buffer holding the ASN1 octet string + * @param buf_len length of octet string + * @param bit_value decoded Bit value with Bit0 == LSB + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_ARG if bit value contains more than 32 bit + */ +err_t snmp_decode_bits(const u8_t *buf, u32_t buf_len, u32_t *bit_value) +{ + u8_t b; + u8_t bits_processed = 0; + *bit_value = 0; + + while (buf_len > 0) { + /* any bit set in this byte? */ + if (*buf != 0x00) { + if (bits_processed >= 32) { + /* accept more than 4 bytes, but only when no bits are set */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + b = *buf; + + do { + if (b & 0x80) { + *bit_value |= (1 << bits_processed); + } + + bits_processed++; + b <<= 1; + } while ((bits_processed & 0x07) != 0); /* &0x07 -> % 8 */ + } else { + bits_processed += 8; + } + + buf_len--; + buf++; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +err_t snmp_decode_truthvalue(const s32_t *asn1_value, u8_t *bool_value) +{ + /* defined by RFC1443: + TruthValue ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "Represents a boolean value." + SYNTAX INTEGER { true(1), false(2) } + */ + + if ((asn1_value == NULL) || (bool_value == NULL)) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (*asn1_value == 1) { + *bool_value = 1; + } else if (*asn1_value == 2) { + *bool_value = 0; + } else { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Encodes BITS pseudotype value into ASN.1 OctetString. + * + * @note Because BITS pseudo type is encoded as OCTET STRING, it cannot directly + * be encoded/decoded by the agent. Instead call this function as required from + * get/test/set methods. + * + * @param buf points to a buffer where the resulting ASN1 octet string is stored to + * @param buf_len max length of the bufffer + * @param bit_value Bit value to encode with Bit0 == LSB + * @param bit_count Number of possible bits for the bit value (according to rfc we have to send all bits independant from their truth value) + * @return number of bytes used from buffer to store the resulting OctetString + */ +u8_t snmp_encode_bits(u8_t *buf, u32_t buf_len, u32_t bit_value, u8_t bit_count) +{ + u8_t len = 0; + u8_t min_bytes = (bit_count + 7) >> 3; /* >>3 -> / 8 */ + + while ((buf_len > 0) && (bit_value != 0x00)) { + s8_t i = 7; + *buf = 0x00; + + while (i >= 0) { + if (bit_value & 0x01) { + *buf |= 0x01; + } + + if (i > 0) { + *buf <<= 1; + } + + bit_value >>= 1; + i--; + } + + buf++; + buf_len--; + len++; + } + + if (len < min_bytes) { + buf += len; + buf_len -= len; + + while ((len < min_bytes) && (buf_len > 0)) { + *buf = 0x00; + buf++; + buf_len--; + len++; + } + } + + return len; +} + +u8_t snmp_encode_truthvalue(s32_t *asn1_value, u32_t bool_value) +{ + /* defined by RFC1443: + TruthValue ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION + STATUS current + DESCRIPTION + "Represents a boolean value." + SYNTAX INTEGER { true(1), false(2) } + */ + + if (asn1_value == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (bool_value) { + *asn1_value = 1; /* defined by RFC1443 */ + } else { + *asn1_value = 2; /* defined by RFC1443 */ + } + + return sizeof(s32_t); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core_priv.h index 3939b8ab..c5a8da47 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_core_priv.h @@ -1,82 +1,82 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Martin Hentschel - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "snmp_asn1.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* (outdated) SNMPv1 error codes - * shall not be used by MIBS anymore, nevertheless required from core for properly answering a v1 request - */ -#define SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME 2 -#define SNMP_ERR_BADVALUE 3 -#define SNMP_ERR_READONLY 4 -/* error codes which are internal and shall not be used by MIBS - * shall not be used by MIBS anymore, nevertheless required from core for properly answering a v1 request - */ -#define SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG 1 -#define SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR 16 - -#define SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_ENGINEID 30 -#define SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_SECURITYNAME 31 -#define SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL 32 -#define SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW 33 -#define SNMP_ERR_DECRYIPTION_ERROR 34 - -#define SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHOBJECT SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET + SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_NO_SUCH_OBJECT -#define SNMP_ERR_ENDOFMIBVIEW SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET + SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_END_OF_MIB_VIEW - -const struct snmp_node *snmp_mib_tree_resolve_exact(const struct snmp_mib *mib, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, u8_t *oid_instance_len); -const struct snmp_node *snmp_mib_tree_resolve_next(const struct snmp_mib *mib, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, struct snmp_obj_id *oidret); - -typedef u8_t (*snmp_validate_node_instance_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *, void *); - -u8_t snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance); -u8_t snmp_get_next_node_instance_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, snmp_validate_node_instance_method validate_node_instance_method, void *validate_node_instance_arg, struct snmp_obj_id *node_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_PRIV_H */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Martin Hentschel + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "snmp_asn1.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* (outdated) SNMPv1 error codes + * shall not be used by MIBS anymore, nevertheless required from core for properly answering a v1 request + */ +#define SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME 2 +#define SNMP_ERR_BADVALUE 3 +#define SNMP_ERR_READONLY 4 +/* error codes which are internal and shall not be used by MIBS + * shall not be used by MIBS anymore, nevertheless required from core for properly answering a v1 request + */ +#define SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG 1 +#define SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR 16 + +#define SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_ENGINEID 30 +#define SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_SECURITYNAME 31 +#define SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL 32 +#define SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW 33 +#define SNMP_ERR_DECRYIPTION_ERROR 34 + +#define SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHOBJECT SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET + SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_NO_SUCH_OBJECT +#define SNMP_ERR_ENDOFMIBVIEW SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET + SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_END_OF_MIB_VIEW + +const struct snmp_node *snmp_mib_tree_resolve_exact(const struct snmp_mib *mib, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, u8_t *oid_instance_len); +const struct snmp_node *snmp_mib_tree_resolve_next(const struct snmp_mib *mib, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, struct snmp_obj_id *oidret); + +typedef u8_t (*snmp_validate_node_instance_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *, void *); + +u8_t snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance); +u8_t snmp_get_next_node_instance_from_oid(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, snmp_validate_node_instance_method validate_node_instance_method, void *validate_node_instance_arg, struct snmp_obj_id *node_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c index a01206aa..62ae6cc1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2.c @@ -1,115 +1,115 @@ -/** - * @file - * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) objects and functions. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Christiaan Simons - */ - -/** - * @defgroup snmp_mib2 MIB2 - * @ingroup snmp - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#if !LWIP_STATS -#error LWIP_SNMP MIB2 needs LWIP_STATS (for MIB2) -#endif -#if !MIB2_STATS -#error LWIP_SNMP MIB2 needs MIB2_STATS (for MIB2) -#endif - -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" -void snmp_mib2_lwip_synchronizer(snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn, void *arg) -{ -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); - fn(arg); - UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); -#else - tcpip_callback(fn, arg); -#endif -} - -struct snmp_threadsync_instance snmp_mib2_lwip_locks; -#endif - -/* dot3 and EtherLike MIB not planned. (transmission .1.3.6.1.2.1.10) */ -/* historical (some say hysterical). (cmot .1.3.6.1.2.1.9) */ -/* lwIP has no EGP, thus may not implement it. (egp .1.3.6.1.2.1.8) */ - -/* --- mib-2 .1.3.6.1.2.1 ----------------------------------------------------- */ -extern const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_snmp_root; -extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_udp_root; -extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_tcp_root; -extern const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_icmp_root; -extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_interface_root; -extern const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_system_node; -extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_at_root; -extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_ip_root; - -static const struct snmp_node *const mib2_nodes[] = { - &snmp_mib2_system_node.node.node, - &snmp_mib2_interface_root.node, -#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 - &snmp_mib2_at_root.node, -#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - &snmp_mib2_ip_root.node, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_ICMP - &snmp_mib2_icmp_root.node.node, -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - &snmp_mib2_tcp_root.node, -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_UDP - &snmp_mib2_udp_root.node, -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - &snmp_mib2_snmp_root.node.node -}; - -static const struct snmp_tree_node mib2_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(1, mib2_nodes); - -static const u32_t mib2_base_oid_arr[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 2, 1 }; -const struct snmp_mib mib2 = SNMP_MIB_CREATE(mib2_base_oid_arr, &mib2_root.node); - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ +/** + * @file + * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) objects and functions. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Christiaan Simons + */ + +/** + * @defgroup snmp_mib2 MIB2 + * @ingroup snmp + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#if !LWIP_STATS +#error LWIP_SNMP MIB2 needs LWIP_STATS (for MIB2) +#endif +#if !MIB2_STATS +#error LWIP_SNMP MIB2 needs MIB2_STATS (for MIB2) +#endif + +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" +void snmp_mib2_lwip_synchronizer(snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn, void *arg) +{ +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + LOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); + fn(arg); + UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(); +#else + tcpip_callback(fn, arg); +#endif +} + +struct snmp_threadsync_instance snmp_mib2_lwip_locks; +#endif + +/* dot3 and EtherLike MIB not planned. (transmission .1.3.6.1.2.1.10) */ +/* historical (some say hysterical). (cmot .1.3.6.1.2.1.9) */ +/* lwIP has no EGP, thus may not implement it. (egp .1.3.6.1.2.1.8) */ + +/* --- mib-2 .1.3.6.1.2.1 ----------------------------------------------------- */ +extern const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_snmp_root; +extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_udp_root; +extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_tcp_root; +extern const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_icmp_root; +extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_interface_root; +extern const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_system_node; +extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_at_root; +extern const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_ip_root; + +static const struct snmp_node *const mib2_nodes[] = { + &snmp_mib2_system_node.node.node, + &snmp_mib2_interface_root.node, +#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 + &snmp_mib2_at_root.node, +#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + &snmp_mib2_ip_root.node, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_ICMP + &snmp_mib2_icmp_root.node.node, +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + &snmp_mib2_tcp_root.node, +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_UDP + &snmp_mib2_udp_root.node, +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + &snmp_mib2_snmp_root.node.node +}; + +static const struct snmp_tree_node mib2_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(1, mib2_nodes); + +static const u32_t mib2_base_oid_arr[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 2, 1 }; +const struct snmp_mib mib2 = SNMP_MIB_CREATE(mib2_base_oid_arr, &mib2_root.node); + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c index dd56036e..e0f8be2e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_icmp.c @@ -1,206 +1,206 @@ -/** - * @file - * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) ICMP objects and functions. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Christiaan Simons - */ - -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" -#include "lwip/icmp.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_ICMP - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ - static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); -#else -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) -#endif - -/* --- icmp .1.3.6.1.2.1.5 ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -static s16_t icmp_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) -{ - u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; - - switch (node->oid) { - case 1: /* icmpInMsgs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinmsgs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 2: /* icmpInErrors */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinerrors); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 3: /* icmpInDestUnreachs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpindestunreachs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 4: /* icmpInTimeExcds */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpintimeexcds); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 5: /* icmpInParmProbs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinparmprobs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 6: /* icmpInSrcQuenchs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinsrcquenchs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 7: /* icmpInRedirects */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinredirects); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 8: /* icmpInEchos */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinechos); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 9: /* icmpInEchoReps */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinechoreps); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 10: /* icmpInTimestamps */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpintimestamps); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 11: /* icmpInTimestampReps */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpintimestampreps); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 12: /* icmpInAddrMasks */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinaddrmasks); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 13: /* icmpInAddrMaskReps */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinaddrmaskreps); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 14: /* icmpOutMsgs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpoutmsgs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 15: /* icmpOutErrors */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpouterrors); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 16: /* icmpOutDestUnreachs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpoutdestunreachs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 17: /* icmpOutTimeExcds */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpouttimeexcds); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 18: /* icmpOutParmProbs: not supported -> always 0 */ - *uint_ptr = 0; - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 19: /* icmpOutSrcQuenchs: not supported -> always 0 */ - *uint_ptr = 0; - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 20: /* icmpOutRedirects: not supported -> always 0 */ - *uint_ptr = 0; - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 21: /* icmpOutEchos */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpoutechos); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 22: /* icmpOutEchoReps */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpoutechoreps); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 23: /* icmpOutTimestamps: not supported -> always 0 */ - *uint_ptr = 0; - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 24: /* icmpOutTimestampReps: not supported -> always 0 */ - *uint_ptr = 0; - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 25: /* icmpOutAddrMasks: not supported -> always 0 */ - *uint_ptr = 0; - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 26: /* icmpOutAddrMaskReps: not supported -> always 0 */ - *uint_ptr = 0; - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("icmp_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def icmp_nodes[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 16, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 19, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 20, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 21, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 22, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 23, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 24, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 25, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, - { 26, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY } -}; - -const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_icmp_root = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(5, icmp_nodes, icmp_get_value, NULL, NULL); - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_ICMP */ +/** + * @file + * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) ICMP objects and functions. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Christiaan Simons + */ + +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" +#include "lwip/icmp.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_ICMP + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ + static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); +#else +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) +#endif + +/* --- icmp .1.3.6.1.2.1.5 ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +static s16_t icmp_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) +{ + u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; + + switch (node->oid) { + case 1: /* icmpInMsgs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinmsgs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 2: /* icmpInErrors */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinerrors); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 3: /* icmpInDestUnreachs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpindestunreachs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 4: /* icmpInTimeExcds */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpintimeexcds); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 5: /* icmpInParmProbs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinparmprobs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 6: /* icmpInSrcQuenchs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinsrcquenchs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 7: /* icmpInRedirects */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinredirects); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 8: /* icmpInEchos */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinechos); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 9: /* icmpInEchoReps */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinechoreps); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 10: /* icmpInTimestamps */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpintimestamps); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 11: /* icmpInTimestampReps */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpintimestampreps); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 12: /* icmpInAddrMasks */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinaddrmasks); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 13: /* icmpInAddrMaskReps */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpinaddrmaskreps); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 14: /* icmpOutMsgs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpoutmsgs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 15: /* icmpOutErrors */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpouterrors); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 16: /* icmpOutDestUnreachs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpoutdestunreachs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 17: /* icmpOutTimeExcds */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpouttimeexcds); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 18: /* icmpOutParmProbs: not supported -> always 0 */ + *uint_ptr = 0; + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 19: /* icmpOutSrcQuenchs: not supported -> always 0 */ + *uint_ptr = 0; + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 20: /* icmpOutRedirects: not supported -> always 0 */ + *uint_ptr = 0; + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 21: /* icmpOutEchos */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpoutechos); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 22: /* icmpOutEchoReps */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.icmpoutechoreps); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 23: /* icmpOutTimestamps: not supported -> always 0 */ + *uint_ptr = 0; + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 24: /* icmpOutTimestampReps: not supported -> always 0 */ + *uint_ptr = 0; + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 25: /* icmpOutAddrMasks: not supported -> always 0 */ + *uint_ptr = 0; + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 26: /* icmpOutAddrMaskReps: not supported -> always 0 */ + *uint_ptr = 0; + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("icmp_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def icmp_nodes[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 16, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 19, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 20, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 21, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 22, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 23, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 24, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 25, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, + { 26, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY } +}; + +const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_icmp_root = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(5, icmp_nodes, icmp_get_value, NULL, NULL); + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_ICMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c index 4da286d6..4bb87291 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_interfaces.c @@ -1,388 +1,388 @@ -/** - * @file - * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) INTERFACES objects and functions. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Christiaan Simons - */ - -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ - static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); -#else -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) -#endif - -/* --- interfaces .1.3.6.1.2.1.2 ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -static s16_t interfaces_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - if (instance->node->oid == 1) { - s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; - s32_t num_netifs = 0; - - struct netif *netif; - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - num_netifs++; - } - - *sint_ptr = num_netifs; - return sizeof(*sint_ptr); - } - - return 0; -} - -/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ -static const struct snmp_oid_range interfaces_Table_oid_ranges[] = { - { 1, 0xff } /* netif->num is u8_t */ -}; - -static const u8_t iftable_ifOutQLen = 0; - -static const u8_t iftable_ifOperStatus_up = 1; -static const u8_t iftable_ifOperStatus_down = 2; - -static const u8_t iftable_ifAdminStatus_up = 1; -static const u8_t iftable_ifAdminStatus_lowerLayerDown = 7; -static const u8_t iftable_ifAdminStatus_down = 2; - -static snmp_err_t interfaces_Table_get_cell_instance(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance) -{ - u32_t ifIndex; - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(column); - - /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, interfaces_Table_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges))) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* get netif index from incoming OID */ - ifIndex = row_oid[0]; - - /* find netif with index */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (netif_to_num(netif) == ifIndex) { - /* store netif pointer for subsequent operations (get/test/set) */ - cell_instance->reference.ptr = netif; - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static snmp_err_t interfaces_Table_get_next_cell_instance(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance) -{ - struct netif *netif; - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges)]; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(column); - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges)); - - /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges)]; - test_oid[0] = netif_to_num(netif); - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges), netif); - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* store netif pointer for subsequent operations (get/test/set) */ - cell_instance->reference.ptr = /* (struct netif*) */ state.reference; - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static s16_t interfaces_Table_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - struct netif *netif = (struct netif *)instance->reference.ptr; - u32_t *value_u32 = (u32_t *)value; - s32_t *value_s32 = (s32_t *)value; - u16_t value_len; - - switch (SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(instance->instance_oid.id)) { - case 1: /* ifIndex */ - *value_s32 = netif_to_num(netif); - value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); - break; - - case 2: /* ifDescr */ - value_len = sizeof(netif->name); - MEMCPY(value, netif->name, value_len); - break; - - case 3: /* ifType */ - *value_s32 = netif->link_type; - value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); - break; - - case 4: /* ifMtu */ - *value_s32 = netif->mtu; - value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); - break; - - case 5: /* ifSpeed */ - *value_u32 = netif->link_speed; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 6: /* ifPhysAddress */ - value_len = sizeof(netif->hwaddr); - MEMCPY(value, &netif->hwaddr, value_len); - break; - - case 7: /* ifAdminStatus */ - if (netif_is_up(netif)) { - *value_s32 = iftable_ifOperStatus_up; - } else { - *value_s32 = iftable_ifOperStatus_down; - } - - value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); - break; - - case 8: /* ifOperStatus */ - if (netif_is_up(netif)) { - if (netif_is_link_up(netif)) { - *value_s32 = iftable_ifAdminStatus_up; - } else { - *value_s32 = iftable_ifAdminStatus_lowerLayerDown; - } - } else { - *value_s32 = iftable_ifAdminStatus_down; - } - - value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); - break; - - case 9: /* ifLastChange */ - *value_u32 = netif->ts; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 10: /* ifInOctets */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinoctets; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 11: /* ifInUcastPkts */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinucastpkts; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 12: /* ifInNUcastPkts */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinnucastpkts; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 13: /* ifInDiscards */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifindiscards; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 14: /* ifInErrors */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinerrors; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 15: /* ifInUnkownProtos */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinunknownprotos; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 16: /* ifOutOctets */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifoutoctets; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 17: /* ifOutUcastPkts */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifoutucastpkts; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 18: /* ifOutNUcastPkts */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifoutnucastpkts; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 19: /* ifOutDiscarts */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifoutdiscards; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 20: /* ifOutErrors */ - *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifouterrors; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - case 21: /* ifOutQLen */ - *value_u32 = iftable_ifOutQLen; - value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); - break; - - /** @note returning zeroDotZero (0.0) no media specific MIB support */ - case 22: /* ifSpecific */ - value_len = snmp_zero_dot_zero.len * sizeof(u32_t); - MEMCPY(value, snmp_zero_dot_zero.id, value_len); - break; - - default: - return 0; - } - - return value_len; -} - -#if !SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS - -static snmp_err_t interfaces_Table_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; - - /* stack should never call this method for another column, - because all other columns are set to readonly */ - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid column", (SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(instance->instance_oid.id) == 7)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - if (*sint_ptr == 1 || *sint_ptr == 2) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE; -} - -static snmp_err_t interfaces_Table_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - struct netif *netif = (struct netif *)instance->reference.ptr; - s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; - - /* stack should never call this method for another column, - because all other columns are set to readonly */ - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid column", (SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(instance->instance_oid.id) == 7)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - if (*sint_ptr == 1) { - netif_set_up(netif); - } else if (*sint_ptr == 2) { - netif_set_down(netif); - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -#endif /* SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS */ - -static const struct snmp_scalar_node interfaces_Number = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, interfaces_get_value); - -static const struct snmp_table_col_def interfaces_Table_columns[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifIndex */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifDescr */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifType */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifMtu */ - { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifSpeed */ - { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifPhysAddress */ -#if !SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS - { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* ifAdminStatus */ -#else - { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifAdminStatus */ -#endif - { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOperStatus */ - { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifLastChange */ - { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInOctets */ - { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInUcastPkts */ - { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInNUcastPkts */ - { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInDiscarts */ - { 14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInErrors */ - { 15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInUnkownProtos */ - { 16, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutOctets */ - { 17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutUcastPkts */ - { 18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutNUcastPkts */ - { 19, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutDiscarts */ - { 20, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutErrors */ - { 21, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutQLen */ - { 22, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY } /* ifSpecific */ -}; - -#if !SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS -static const struct snmp_table_node interfaces_Table = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE( - 2, interfaces_Table_columns, - interfaces_Table_get_cell_instance, interfaces_Table_get_next_cell_instance, - interfaces_Table_get_value, interfaces_Table_set_test, interfaces_Table_set_value); -#else -static const struct snmp_table_node interfaces_Table = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE( - 2, interfaces_Table_columns, - interfaces_Table_get_cell_instance, interfaces_Table_get_next_cell_instance, - interfaces_Table_get_value, NULL, NULL); -#endif - -/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, interfaces_Number) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(2, interfaces_Table) - -static const struct snmp_node *const interface_nodes[] = { - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(interfaces_Number).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(interfaces_Table).node.node -}; - -const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_interface_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(2, interface_nodes); - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ +/** + * @file + * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) INTERFACES objects and functions. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Christiaan Simons + */ + +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ + static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); +#else +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) +#endif + +/* --- interfaces .1.3.6.1.2.1.2 ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +static s16_t interfaces_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + if (instance->node->oid == 1) { + s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; + s32_t num_netifs = 0; + + struct netif *netif; + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + num_netifs++; + } + + *sint_ptr = num_netifs; + return sizeof(*sint_ptr); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ +static const struct snmp_oid_range interfaces_Table_oid_ranges[] = { + { 1, 0xff } /* netif->num is u8_t */ +}; + +static const u8_t iftable_ifOutQLen = 0; + +static const u8_t iftable_ifOperStatus_up = 1; +static const u8_t iftable_ifOperStatus_down = 2; + +static const u8_t iftable_ifAdminStatus_up = 1; +static const u8_t iftable_ifAdminStatus_lowerLayerDown = 7; +static const u8_t iftable_ifAdminStatus_down = 2; + +static snmp_err_t interfaces_Table_get_cell_instance(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance) +{ + u32_t ifIndex; + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(column); + + /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, interfaces_Table_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges))) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* get netif index from incoming OID */ + ifIndex = row_oid[0]; + + /* find netif with index */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (netif_to_num(netif) == ifIndex) { + /* store netif pointer for subsequent operations (get/test/set) */ + cell_instance->reference.ptr = netif; + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static snmp_err_t interfaces_Table_get_next_cell_instance(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance) +{ + struct netif *netif; + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges)]; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(column); + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges)); + + /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges)]; + test_oid[0] = netif_to_num(netif); + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(interfaces_Table_oid_ranges), netif); + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* store netif pointer for subsequent operations (get/test/set) */ + cell_instance->reference.ptr = /* (struct netif*) */ state.reference; + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static s16_t interfaces_Table_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + struct netif *netif = (struct netif *)instance->reference.ptr; + u32_t *value_u32 = (u32_t *)value; + s32_t *value_s32 = (s32_t *)value; + u16_t value_len; + + switch (SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(instance->instance_oid.id)) { + case 1: /* ifIndex */ + *value_s32 = netif_to_num(netif); + value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); + break; + + case 2: /* ifDescr */ + value_len = sizeof(netif->name); + MEMCPY(value, netif->name, value_len); + break; + + case 3: /* ifType */ + *value_s32 = netif->link_type; + value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); + break; + + case 4: /* ifMtu */ + *value_s32 = netif->mtu; + value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); + break; + + case 5: /* ifSpeed */ + *value_u32 = netif->link_speed; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 6: /* ifPhysAddress */ + value_len = sizeof(netif->hwaddr); + MEMCPY(value, &netif->hwaddr, value_len); + break; + + case 7: /* ifAdminStatus */ + if (netif_is_up(netif)) { + *value_s32 = iftable_ifOperStatus_up; + } else { + *value_s32 = iftable_ifOperStatus_down; + } + + value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); + break; + + case 8: /* ifOperStatus */ + if (netif_is_up(netif)) { + if (netif_is_link_up(netif)) { + *value_s32 = iftable_ifAdminStatus_up; + } else { + *value_s32 = iftable_ifAdminStatus_lowerLayerDown; + } + } else { + *value_s32 = iftable_ifAdminStatus_down; + } + + value_len = sizeof(*value_s32); + break; + + case 9: /* ifLastChange */ + *value_u32 = netif->ts; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 10: /* ifInOctets */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinoctets; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 11: /* ifInUcastPkts */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinucastpkts; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 12: /* ifInNUcastPkts */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinnucastpkts; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 13: /* ifInDiscards */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifindiscards; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 14: /* ifInErrors */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinerrors; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 15: /* ifInUnkownProtos */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifinunknownprotos; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 16: /* ifOutOctets */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifoutoctets; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 17: /* ifOutUcastPkts */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifoutucastpkts; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 18: /* ifOutNUcastPkts */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifoutnucastpkts; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 19: /* ifOutDiscarts */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifoutdiscards; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 20: /* ifOutErrors */ + *value_u32 = netif->mib2_counters.ifouterrors; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + case 21: /* ifOutQLen */ + *value_u32 = iftable_ifOutQLen; + value_len = sizeof(*value_u32); + break; + + /** @note returning zeroDotZero (0.0) no media specific MIB support */ + case 22: /* ifSpecific */ + value_len = snmp_zero_dot_zero.len * sizeof(u32_t); + MEMCPY(value, snmp_zero_dot_zero.id, value_len); + break; + + default: + return 0; + } + + return value_len; +} + +#if !SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS + +static snmp_err_t interfaces_Table_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; + + /* stack should never call this method for another column, + because all other columns are set to readonly */ + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid column", (SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(instance->instance_oid.id) == 7)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + if (*sint_ptr == 1 || *sint_ptr == 2) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE; +} + +static snmp_err_t interfaces_Table_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + struct netif *netif = (struct netif *)instance->reference.ptr; + s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; + + /* stack should never call this method for another column, + because all other columns are set to readonly */ + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid column", (SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(instance->instance_oid.id) == 7)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + if (*sint_ptr == 1) { + netif_set_up(netif); + } else if (*sint_ptr == 2) { + netif_set_down(netif); + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +#endif /* SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS */ + +static const struct snmp_scalar_node interfaces_Number = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, interfaces_get_value); + +static const struct snmp_table_col_def interfaces_Table_columns[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifIndex */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifDescr */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifType */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifMtu */ + { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifSpeed */ + { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifPhysAddress */ +#if !SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS + { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* ifAdminStatus */ +#else + { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifAdminStatus */ +#endif + { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOperStatus */ + { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifLastChange */ + { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInOctets */ + { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInUcastPkts */ + { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInNUcastPkts */ + { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInDiscarts */ + { 14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInErrors */ + { 15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifInUnkownProtos */ + { 16, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutOctets */ + { 17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutUcastPkts */ + { 18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutNUcastPkts */ + { 19, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutDiscarts */ + { 20, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutErrors */ + { 21, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* ifOutQLen */ + { 22, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY } /* ifSpecific */ +}; + +#if !SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS +static const struct snmp_table_node interfaces_Table = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE( + 2, interfaces_Table_columns, + interfaces_Table_get_cell_instance, interfaces_Table_get_next_cell_instance, + interfaces_Table_get_value, interfaces_Table_set_test, interfaces_Table_set_value); +#else +static const struct snmp_table_node interfaces_Table = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE( + 2, interfaces_Table_columns, + interfaces_Table_get_cell_instance, interfaces_Table_get_next_cell_instance, + interfaces_Table_get_value, NULL, NULL); +#endif + +/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, interfaces_Number) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(2, interfaces_Table) + +static const struct snmp_node *const interface_nodes[] = { + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(interfaces_Number).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(interfaces_Table).node.node +}; + +const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_interface_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(2, interface_nodes); + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c index fd031938..7cde4404 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_ip.c @@ -1,775 +1,775 @@ -/** - * @file - * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) IP objects and functions. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Christiaan Simons - */ - -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ - static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); -#else -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/* --- ip .1.3.6.1.2.1.4 ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -static s16_t ip_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; - u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; - - switch (instance->node->oid) { - case 1: /* ipForwarding */ -#if IP_FORWARD - /* forwarding */ - *sint_ptr = 1; -#else - /* not-forwarding */ - *sint_ptr = 2; -#endif - return sizeof(*sint_ptr); - - case 2: /* ipDefaultTTL */ - *sint_ptr = IP_DEFAULT_TTL; - return sizeof(*sint_ptr); - - case 3: /* ipInReceives */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipinreceives); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 4: /* ipInHdrErrors */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipinhdrerrors); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 5: /* ipInAddrErrors */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipinaddrerrors); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 6: /* ipForwDatagrams */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipforwdatagrams); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 7: /* ipInUnknownProtos */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipinunknownprotos); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 8: /* ipInDiscards */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipindiscards); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 9: /* ipInDelivers */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipindelivers); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 10: /* ipOutRequests */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipoutrequests); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 11: /* ipOutDiscards */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipoutdiscards); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 12: /* ipOutNoRoutes */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipoutnoroutes); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 13: /* ipReasmTimeout */ -#if IP_REASSEMBLY - *sint_ptr = IP_REASS_MAXAGE; -#else - *sint_ptr = 0; -#endif - return sizeof(*sint_ptr); - - case 14: /* ipReasmReqds */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipreasmreqds); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 15: /* ipReasmOKs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipreasmoks); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 16: /* ipReasmFails */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipreasmfails); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 17: /* ipFragOKs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipfragoks); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 18: /* ipFragFails */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipfragfails); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 19: /* ipFragCreates */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipfragcreates); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 23: /* ipRoutingDiscards: not supported -> always 0 */ - *uint_ptr = 0; - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("ip_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", instance->node->oid)); - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Test ip object value before setting. - * - * @param instance node instance - * @param len return value space (in bytes) - * @param value points to (varbind) space to copy value from. - * - * @note we allow set if the value matches the hardwired value, - * otherwise return badvalue. - */ -static snmp_err_t ip_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE; - s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - switch (instance->node->oid) { - case 1: /* ipForwarding */ -#if IP_FORWARD - - /* forwarding */ - if (*sint_ptr == 1) -#else - - /* not-forwarding */ - if (*sint_ptr == 2) -#endif - { - ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - - break; - - case 2: /* ipDefaultTTL */ - if (*sint_ptr == IP_DEFAULT_TTL) { - ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("ip_set_test(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", instance->node->oid)); - break; - } - - return ret; -} - -static snmp_err_t ip_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(instance); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value); - /* nothing to do here because in set_test we only accept values being the same as our own stored value -> no need to store anything */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -/* --- ipAddrTable --- */ - -/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ -static const struct snmp_oid_range ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges[] = { - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ - { 0, 0xff } /* IP D */ -}; - -static snmp_err_t ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value_core(struct netif *netif, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - - switch (*column) { - case 1: /* ipAdEntAddr */ - value->u32 = netif_ip4_addr(netif)->addr; - break; - - case 2: /* ipAdEntIfIndex */ - value->u32 = netif_to_num(netif); - break; - - case 3: /* ipAdEntNetMask */ - value->u32 = netif_ip4_netmask(netif)->addr; - break; - - case 4: /* ipAdEntBcastAddr */ - /* lwIP oddity, there's no broadcast - address in the netif we can rely on */ - value->u32 = IPADDR_BROADCAST & 1; - break; - - case 5: /* ipAdEntReasmMaxSize */ -#if IP_REASSEMBLY - /* @todo The theoretical maximum is IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS * size of the pbufs, - * but only if receiving one fragmented packet at a time. - * The current solution is to calculate for 2 simultaneous packets... - */ - value->u32 = (IP_HLEN + ((IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS / 2) * - (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN - PBUF_LINK_HLEN - IP_HLEN))); -#else - /** @todo returning MTU would be a bad thing and - returning a wild guess like '576' isn't good either */ - value->u32 = 0; -#endif - break; - - default: - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static snmp_err_t ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - ip4_addr_t ip; - struct netif *netif; - - /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges))) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* get IP from incoming OID */ - snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[0], &ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ - - /* find netif with requested ip */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (ip4_addr_cmp(&ip, netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value_core(netif, column, value, value_len); - } - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static snmp_err_t ip_AddrTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - struct netif *netif; - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges)]; - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges)); - - /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges)]; - snmp_ip4_to_oid(netif_ip4_addr(netif), &test_oid[0]); - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges), netif); - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* fill in object properties */ - return ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value_core((struct netif *)state.reference, column, value, value_len); - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -/* --- ipRouteTable --- */ - -/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ -static const struct snmp_oid_range ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges[] = { - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP D */ -}; - -static snmp_err_t ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value_core(struct netif *netif, u8_t default_route, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - switch (*column) { - case 1: /* ipRouteDest */ - if (default_route) { - /* default rte has 0.0.0.0 dest */ - value->u32 = IP4_ADDR_ANY4->addr; - } else { - /* netifs have netaddress dest */ - ip4_addr_t tmp; - ip4_addr_get_network(&tmp, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)); - value->u32 = tmp.addr; - } - - break; - - case 2: /* ipRouteIfIndex */ - value->u32 = netif_to_num(netif); - break; - - case 3: /* ipRouteMetric1 */ - if (default_route) { - value->s32 = 1; /* default */ - } else { - value->s32 = 0; /* normal */ - } - - break; - - case 4: /* ipRouteMetric2 */ - case 5: /* ipRouteMetric3 */ - case 6: /* ipRouteMetric4 */ - value->s32 = -1; /* none */ - break; - - case 7: /* ipRouteNextHop */ - if (default_route) { - /* default rte: gateway */ - value->u32 = netif_ip4_gw(netif)->addr; - } else { - /* other rtes: netif ip_addr */ - value->u32 = netif_ip4_addr(netif)->addr; - } - - break; - - case 8: /* ipRouteType */ - if (default_route) { - /* default rte is indirect */ - value->u32 = 4; /* indirect */ - } else { - /* other rtes are direct */ - value->u32 = 3; /* direct */ - } - - break; - - case 9: /* ipRouteProto */ - /* locally defined routes */ - value->u32 = 2; /* local */ - break; - - case 10: /* ipRouteAge */ - /* @todo (sysuptime - timestamp last change) / 100 */ - value->u32 = 0; - break; - - case 11: /* ipRouteMask */ - if (default_route) { - /* default rte use 0.0.0.0 mask */ - value->u32 = IP4_ADDR_ANY4->addr; - } else { - /* other rtes use netmask */ - value->u32 = netif_ip4_netmask(netif)->addr; - } - - break; - - case 12: /* ipRouteMetric5 */ - value->s32 = -1; /* none */ - break; - - case 13: /* ipRouteInfo */ - value->const_ptr = snmp_zero_dot_zero.id; - *value_len = snmp_zero_dot_zero.len * sizeof(u32_t); - break; - - default: - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static snmp_err_t ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - ip4_addr_t test_ip; - struct netif *netif; - - /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges))) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* get IP and port from incoming OID */ - snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[0], &test_ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ - - /* default route is on default netif */ - if (ip4_addr_isany_val(test_ip) && (netif_default != NULL)) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value_core(netif_default, 1, column, value, value_len); - } - - /* find netif with requested route */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - ip4_addr_t dst; - ip4_addr_get_network(&dst, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)); - - if (ip4_addr_cmp(&dst, &test_ip)) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value_core(netif, 0, column, value, value_len); - } - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static snmp_err_t ip_RouteTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - struct netif *netif; - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges)]; - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges)]; - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges)); - - /* check default route */ - if (netif_default != NULL) { - snmp_ip4_to_oid(IP4_ADDR_ANY4, &test_oid[0]); - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges), netif_default); - } - - /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - ip4_addr_t dst; - ip4_addr_get_network(&dst, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)); - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(dst)) { - snmp_ip4_to_oid(&dst, &test_oid[0]); - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges), netif); - } - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - ip4_addr_t dst; - snmp_oid_to_ip4(&result_temp[0], &dst); - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* fill in object properties */ - return ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value_core((struct netif *)state.reference, ip4_addr_isany_val(dst), column, value, value_len); - } else { - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } -} - -#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 -/* --- ipNetToMediaTable --- */ - -/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ -static const struct snmp_oid_range ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges[] = { - { 1, 0xff }, /* IfIndex */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ - { 0, 0xff } /* IP D */ -}; - -static snmp_err_t ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value_core(size_t arp_table_index, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - ip4_addr_t *ip; - struct netif *netif; - struct eth_addr *ethaddr; - - etharp_get_entry(arp_table_index, &ip, &netif, ðaddr); - - /* value */ - switch (*column) { - case 1: /* atIfIndex / ipNetToMediaIfIndex */ - value->u32 = netif_to_num(netif); - break; - - case 2: /* atPhysAddress / ipNetToMediaPhysAddress */ - value->ptr = ethaddr; - *value_len = sizeof(*ethaddr); - break; - - case 3: /* atNetAddress / ipNetToMediaNetAddress */ - value->u32 = ip->addr; - break; - - case 4: /* ipNetToMediaType */ - value->u32 = 3; /* dynamic*/ - break; - - default: - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static snmp_err_t ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - ip4_addr_t ip_in; - u8_t netif_index; - size_t i; - - /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges))) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* get IP from incoming OID */ - netif_index = (u8_t)row_oid[0]; - snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[1], &ip_in); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ - - /* find requested entry */ - for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { - ip4_addr_t *ip; - struct netif *netif; - struct eth_addr *ethaddr; - - if (etharp_get_entry(i, &ip, &netif, ðaddr)) { - if ((netif_index == netif_to_num(netif)) && ip4_addr_cmp(&ip_in, ip)) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value_core(i, column, value, value_len); - } - } - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static snmp_err_t ip_NetToMediaTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - size_t i; - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges)]; - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges)); - - /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ - for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { - ip4_addr_t *ip; - struct netif *netif; - struct eth_addr *ethaddr; - - if (etharp_get_entry(i, &ip, &netif, ðaddr)) { - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges)]; - - test_oid[0] = netif_to_num(netif); - snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip, &test_oid[1]); - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges), LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, i)); - } - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* fill in object properties */ - return ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value_core(LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(size_t, state.reference), column, value, value_len); - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ - -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_Forwarding = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE(1, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, ip_get_value, ip_set_test, ip_set_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_DefaultTTL = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE(2, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, ip_get_value, ip_set_test, ip_set_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InReceives = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InHdrErrors = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InAddrErrors = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ForwDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InUnknownProtos = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InDiscards = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InDelivers = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_OutRequests = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_OutDiscards = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_OutNoRoutes = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ReasmTimeout = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ReasmReqds = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ReasmOKs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ReasmFails = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(16, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_FragOKs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_FragFails = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_FragCreates = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(19, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_RoutingDiscards = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(23, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def ip_AddrTable_columns[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipAdEntAddr */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipAdEntIfIndex */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipAdEntNetMask */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipAdEntBcastAddr */ - { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* ipAdEntReasmMaxSize */ -}; - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_node ip_AddrTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(20, ip_AddrTable_columns, ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value, ip_AddrTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def ip_RouteTable_columns[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteDest */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteIfIndex */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric1 */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric2 */ - { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric3 */ - { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric4 */ - { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteNextHop */ - { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteType */ - { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteProto */ - { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteAge */ - { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteMask */ - { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric5 */ - { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR } /* ipRouteInfo */ -}; - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_node ip_RouteTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(21, ip_RouteTable_columns, ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value, ip_RouteTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 -static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def ip_NetToMediaTable_columns[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipNetToMediaIfIndex */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR }, /* ipNetToMediaPhysAddress */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipNetToMediaNetAddress */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* ipNetToMediaType */ -}; - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_node ip_NetToMediaTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(22, ip_NetToMediaTable_columns, ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value, ip_NetToMediaTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); -#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, ip_Forwarding) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(2, ip_DefaultTTL) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(3, ip_InReceives) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(4, ip_InHdrErrors) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(5, ip_InAddrErrors) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(6, ip_ForwDatagrams) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(7, ip_InUnknownProtos) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(8, ip_InDiscards) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(9, ip_InDelivers) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(10, ip_OutRequests) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(11, ip_OutDiscards) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(12, ip_OutNoRoutes) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(13, ip_ReasmTimeout) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(14, ip_ReasmReqds) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(15, ip_ReasmOKs) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(15, ip_ReasmFails) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(17, ip_FragOKs) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(18, ip_FragFails) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(19, ip_FragCreates) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(20, ip_AddrTable) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(21, ip_RouteTable) -#if LWIP_ARP -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(22, ip_NetToMediaTable) -#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(23, ip_RoutingDiscards) - -static const struct snmp_node *const ip_nodes[] = { - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_Forwarding).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_DefaultTTL).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InReceives).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InHdrErrors).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InAddrErrors).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ForwDatagrams).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InUnknownProtos).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InDiscards).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InDelivers).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_OutRequests).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_OutDiscards).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_OutNoRoutes).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ReasmTimeout).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ReasmReqds).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ReasmOKs).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ReasmFails).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_FragOKs).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_FragFails).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_FragCreates).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_AddrTable).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_RouteTable).node.node, -#if LWIP_ARP - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_NetToMediaTable).node.node, -#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_RoutingDiscards).node.node -}; - -const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_ip_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(4, ip_nodes); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/* --- at .1.3.6.1.2.1.3 ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 -/* at node table is a subset of ip_nettomedia table (same rows but less columns) */ -static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def at_Table_columns[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* atIfIndex */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR }, /* atPhysAddress */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* atNetAddress */ -}; - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_node at_Table = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(1, at_Table_columns, ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value, ip_NetToMediaTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); - -/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, at_Table) - -static const struct snmp_node *const at_nodes[] = { - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(at_Table).node.node -}; - -const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_at_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(3, at_nodes); -#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ +/** + * @file + * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) IP objects and functions. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Christiaan Simons + */ + +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ + static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); +#else +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/* --- ip .1.3.6.1.2.1.4 ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +static s16_t ip_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; + u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; + + switch (instance->node->oid) { + case 1: /* ipForwarding */ +#if IP_FORWARD + /* forwarding */ + *sint_ptr = 1; +#else + /* not-forwarding */ + *sint_ptr = 2; +#endif + return sizeof(*sint_ptr); + + case 2: /* ipDefaultTTL */ + *sint_ptr = IP_DEFAULT_TTL; + return sizeof(*sint_ptr); + + case 3: /* ipInReceives */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipinreceives); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 4: /* ipInHdrErrors */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipinhdrerrors); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 5: /* ipInAddrErrors */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipinaddrerrors); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 6: /* ipForwDatagrams */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipforwdatagrams); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 7: /* ipInUnknownProtos */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipinunknownprotos); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 8: /* ipInDiscards */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipindiscards); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 9: /* ipInDelivers */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipindelivers); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 10: /* ipOutRequests */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipoutrequests); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 11: /* ipOutDiscards */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipoutdiscards); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 12: /* ipOutNoRoutes */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipoutnoroutes); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 13: /* ipReasmTimeout */ +#if IP_REASSEMBLY + *sint_ptr = IP_REASS_MAXAGE; +#else + *sint_ptr = 0; +#endif + return sizeof(*sint_ptr); + + case 14: /* ipReasmReqds */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipreasmreqds); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 15: /* ipReasmOKs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipreasmoks); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 16: /* ipReasmFails */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipreasmfails); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 17: /* ipFragOKs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipfragoks); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 18: /* ipFragFails */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipfragfails); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 19: /* ipFragCreates */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.ipfragcreates); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 23: /* ipRoutingDiscards: not supported -> always 0 */ + *uint_ptr = 0; + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("ip_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", instance->node->oid)); + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Test ip object value before setting. + * + * @param instance node instance + * @param len return value space (in bytes) + * @param value points to (varbind) space to copy value from. + * + * @note we allow set if the value matches the hardwired value, + * otherwise return badvalue. + */ +static snmp_err_t ip_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE; + s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + switch (instance->node->oid) { + case 1: /* ipForwarding */ +#if IP_FORWARD + + /* forwarding */ + if (*sint_ptr == 1) +#else + + /* not-forwarding */ + if (*sint_ptr == 2) +#endif + { + ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + + break; + + case 2: /* ipDefaultTTL */ + if (*sint_ptr == IP_DEFAULT_TTL) { + ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("ip_set_test(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", instance->node->oid)); + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static snmp_err_t ip_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(instance); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value); + /* nothing to do here because in set_test we only accept values being the same as our own stored value -> no need to store anything */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +/* --- ipAddrTable --- */ + +/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ +static const struct snmp_oid_range ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges[] = { + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ + { 0, 0xff } /* IP D */ +}; + +static snmp_err_t ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value_core(struct netif *netif, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + + switch (*column) { + case 1: /* ipAdEntAddr */ + value->u32 = netif_ip4_addr(netif)->addr; + break; + + case 2: /* ipAdEntIfIndex */ + value->u32 = netif_to_num(netif); + break; + + case 3: /* ipAdEntNetMask */ + value->u32 = netif_ip4_netmask(netif)->addr; + break; + + case 4: /* ipAdEntBcastAddr */ + /* lwIP oddity, there's no broadcast + address in the netif we can rely on */ + value->u32 = IPADDR_BROADCAST & 1; + break; + + case 5: /* ipAdEntReasmMaxSize */ +#if IP_REASSEMBLY + /* @todo The theoretical maximum is IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS * size of the pbufs, + * but only if receiving one fragmented packet at a time. + * The current solution is to calculate for 2 simultaneous packets... + */ + value->u32 = (IP_HLEN + ((IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS / 2) * + (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN - PBUF_LINK_HLEN - IP_HLEN))); +#else + /** @todo returning MTU would be a bad thing and + returning a wild guess like '576' isn't good either */ + value->u32 = 0; +#endif + break; + + default: + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static snmp_err_t ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + ip4_addr_t ip; + struct netif *netif; + + /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges))) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* get IP from incoming OID */ + snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[0], &ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ + + /* find netif with requested ip */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (ip4_addr_cmp(&ip, netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value_core(netif, column, value, value_len); + } + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static snmp_err_t ip_AddrTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + struct netif *netif; + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges)]; + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges)); + + /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges)]; + snmp_ip4_to_oid(netif_ip4_addr(netif), &test_oid[0]); + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_AddrTable_oid_ranges), netif); + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* fill in object properties */ + return ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value_core((struct netif *)state.reference, column, value, value_len); + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +/* --- ipRouteTable --- */ + +/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ +static const struct snmp_oid_range ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges[] = { + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP D */ +}; + +static snmp_err_t ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value_core(struct netif *netif, u8_t default_route, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + switch (*column) { + case 1: /* ipRouteDest */ + if (default_route) { + /* default rte has 0.0.0.0 dest */ + value->u32 = IP4_ADDR_ANY4->addr; + } else { + /* netifs have netaddress dest */ + ip4_addr_t tmp; + ip4_addr_get_network(&tmp, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)); + value->u32 = tmp.addr; + } + + break; + + case 2: /* ipRouteIfIndex */ + value->u32 = netif_to_num(netif); + break; + + case 3: /* ipRouteMetric1 */ + if (default_route) { + value->s32 = 1; /* default */ + } else { + value->s32 = 0; /* normal */ + } + + break; + + case 4: /* ipRouteMetric2 */ + case 5: /* ipRouteMetric3 */ + case 6: /* ipRouteMetric4 */ + value->s32 = -1; /* none */ + break; + + case 7: /* ipRouteNextHop */ + if (default_route) { + /* default rte: gateway */ + value->u32 = netif_ip4_gw(netif)->addr; + } else { + /* other rtes: netif ip_addr */ + value->u32 = netif_ip4_addr(netif)->addr; + } + + break; + + case 8: /* ipRouteType */ + if (default_route) { + /* default rte is indirect */ + value->u32 = 4; /* indirect */ + } else { + /* other rtes are direct */ + value->u32 = 3; /* direct */ + } + + break; + + case 9: /* ipRouteProto */ + /* locally defined routes */ + value->u32 = 2; /* local */ + break; + + case 10: /* ipRouteAge */ + /* @todo (sysuptime - timestamp last change) / 100 */ + value->u32 = 0; + break; + + case 11: /* ipRouteMask */ + if (default_route) { + /* default rte use 0.0.0.0 mask */ + value->u32 = IP4_ADDR_ANY4->addr; + } else { + /* other rtes use netmask */ + value->u32 = netif_ip4_netmask(netif)->addr; + } + + break; + + case 12: /* ipRouteMetric5 */ + value->s32 = -1; /* none */ + break; + + case 13: /* ipRouteInfo */ + value->const_ptr = snmp_zero_dot_zero.id; + *value_len = snmp_zero_dot_zero.len * sizeof(u32_t); + break; + + default: + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static snmp_err_t ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + ip4_addr_t test_ip; + struct netif *netif; + + /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges))) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* get IP and port from incoming OID */ + snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[0], &test_ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ + + /* default route is on default netif */ + if (ip4_addr_isany_val(test_ip) && (netif_default != NULL)) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value_core(netif_default, 1, column, value, value_len); + } + + /* find netif with requested route */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + ip4_addr_t dst; + ip4_addr_get_network(&dst, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)); + + if (ip4_addr_cmp(&dst, &test_ip)) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value_core(netif, 0, column, value, value_len); + } + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static snmp_err_t ip_RouteTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + struct netif *netif; + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges)]; + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges)]; + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges)); + + /* check default route */ + if (netif_default != NULL) { + snmp_ip4_to_oid(IP4_ADDR_ANY4, &test_oid[0]); + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges), netif_default); + } + + /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + ip4_addr_t dst; + ip4_addr_get_network(&dst, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)); + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(dst)) { + snmp_ip4_to_oid(&dst, &test_oid[0]); + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_RouteTable_oid_ranges), netif); + } + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + ip4_addr_t dst; + snmp_oid_to_ip4(&result_temp[0], &dst); + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* fill in object properties */ + return ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value_core((struct netif *)state.reference, ip4_addr_isany_val(dst), column, value, value_len); + } else { + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } +} + +#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 +/* --- ipNetToMediaTable --- */ + +/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ +static const struct snmp_oid_range ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges[] = { + { 1, 0xff }, /* IfIndex */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ + { 0, 0xff } /* IP D */ +}; + +static snmp_err_t ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value_core(size_t arp_table_index, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + ip4_addr_t *ip; + struct netif *netif; + struct eth_addr *ethaddr; + + etharp_get_entry(arp_table_index, &ip, &netif, ðaddr); + + /* value */ + switch (*column) { + case 1: /* atIfIndex / ipNetToMediaIfIndex */ + value->u32 = netif_to_num(netif); + break; + + case 2: /* atPhysAddress / ipNetToMediaPhysAddress */ + value->ptr = ethaddr; + *value_len = sizeof(*ethaddr); + break; + + case 3: /* atNetAddress / ipNetToMediaNetAddress */ + value->u32 = ip->addr; + break; + + case 4: /* ipNetToMediaType */ + value->u32 = 3; /* dynamic*/ + break; + + default: + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static snmp_err_t ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + ip4_addr_t ip_in; + u8_t netif_index; + size_t i; + + /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges))) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* get IP from incoming OID */ + netif_index = (u8_t)row_oid[0]; + snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[1], &ip_in); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ + + /* find requested entry */ + for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { + ip4_addr_t *ip; + struct netif *netif; + struct eth_addr *ethaddr; + + if (etharp_get_entry(i, &ip, &netif, ðaddr)) { + if ((netif_index == netif_to_num(netif)) && ip4_addr_cmp(&ip_in, ip)) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value_core(i, column, value, value_len); + } + } + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static snmp_err_t ip_NetToMediaTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + size_t i; + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges)]; + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges)); + + /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ + for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { + ip4_addr_t *ip; + struct netif *netif; + struct eth_addr *ethaddr; + + if (etharp_get_entry(i, &ip, &netif, ðaddr)) { + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges)]; + + test_oid[0] = netif_to_num(netif); + snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip, &test_oid[1]); + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ip_NetToMediaTable_oid_ranges), LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, i)); + } + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* fill in object properties */ + return ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value_core(LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(size_t, state.reference), column, value, value_len); + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ + +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_Forwarding = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE(1, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, ip_get_value, ip_set_test, ip_set_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_DefaultTTL = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE(2, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, ip_get_value, ip_set_test, ip_set_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InReceives = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InHdrErrors = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InAddrErrors = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ForwDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InUnknownProtos = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InDiscards = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_InDelivers = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_OutRequests = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_OutDiscards = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_OutNoRoutes = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ReasmTimeout = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ReasmReqds = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ReasmOKs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_ReasmFails = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(16, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_FragOKs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_FragFails = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_FragCreates = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(19, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node ip_RoutingDiscards = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(23, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, ip_get_value); + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def ip_AddrTable_columns[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipAdEntAddr */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipAdEntIfIndex */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipAdEntNetMask */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipAdEntBcastAddr */ + { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* ipAdEntReasmMaxSize */ +}; + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_node ip_AddrTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(20, ip_AddrTable_columns, ip_AddrTable_get_cell_value, ip_AddrTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def ip_RouteTable_columns[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteDest */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteIfIndex */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric1 */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric2 */ + { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric3 */ + { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric4 */ + { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteNextHop */ + { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteType */ + { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteProto */ + { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteAge */ + { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipRouteMask */ + { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32 }, /* ipRouteMetric5 */ + { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR } /* ipRouteInfo */ +}; + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_node ip_RouteTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(21, ip_RouteTable_columns, ip_RouteTable_get_cell_value, ip_RouteTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 +static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def ip_NetToMediaTable_columns[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipNetToMediaIfIndex */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR }, /* ipNetToMediaPhysAddress */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* ipNetToMediaNetAddress */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* ipNetToMediaType */ +}; + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_node ip_NetToMediaTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(22, ip_NetToMediaTable_columns, ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value, ip_NetToMediaTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); +#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, ip_Forwarding) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(2, ip_DefaultTTL) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(3, ip_InReceives) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(4, ip_InHdrErrors) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(5, ip_InAddrErrors) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(6, ip_ForwDatagrams) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(7, ip_InUnknownProtos) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(8, ip_InDiscards) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(9, ip_InDelivers) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(10, ip_OutRequests) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(11, ip_OutDiscards) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(12, ip_OutNoRoutes) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(13, ip_ReasmTimeout) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(14, ip_ReasmReqds) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(15, ip_ReasmOKs) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(15, ip_ReasmFails) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(17, ip_FragOKs) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(18, ip_FragFails) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(19, ip_FragCreates) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(20, ip_AddrTable) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(21, ip_RouteTable) +#if LWIP_ARP +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(22, ip_NetToMediaTable) +#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(23, ip_RoutingDiscards) + +static const struct snmp_node *const ip_nodes[] = { + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_Forwarding).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_DefaultTTL).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InReceives).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InHdrErrors).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InAddrErrors).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ForwDatagrams).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InUnknownProtos).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InDiscards).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_InDelivers).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_OutRequests).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_OutDiscards).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_OutNoRoutes).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ReasmTimeout).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ReasmReqds).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ReasmOKs).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_ReasmFails).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_FragOKs).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_FragFails).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_FragCreates).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_AddrTable).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_RouteTable).node.node, +#if LWIP_ARP + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_NetToMediaTable).node.node, +#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(ip_RoutingDiscards).node.node +}; + +const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_ip_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(4, ip_nodes); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/* --- at .1.3.6.1.2.1.3 ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 +/* at node table is a subset of ip_nettomedia table (same rows but less columns) */ +static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def at_Table_columns[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* atIfIndex */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR }, /* atPhysAddress */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* atNetAddress */ +}; + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_node at_Table = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(1, at_Table_columns, ip_NetToMediaTable_get_cell_value, ip_NetToMediaTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); + +/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, at_Table) + +static const struct snmp_node *const at_nodes[] = { + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(at_Table).node.node +}; + +const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_at_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(3, at_nodes); +#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c index 12f42a1a..5ae1dc3e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_snmp.c @@ -1,258 +1,258 @@ -/** - * @file - * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) SNMP objects and functions. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Christiaan Simons - */ - -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 - -#define MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED 1 -#define MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED 2 - -/* --- snmp .1.3.6.1.2.1.11 ----------------------------------------------------- */ -static s16_t snmp_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) -{ - u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; - - switch (node->oid) { - case 1: /* snmpInPkts */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inpkts; - break; - - case 2: /* snmpOutPkts */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outpkts; - break; - - case 3: /* snmpInBadVersions */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inbadversions; - break; - - case 4: /* snmpInBadCommunityNames */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inbadcommunitynames; - break; - - case 5: /* snmpInBadCommunityUses */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inbadcommunityuses; - break; - - case 6: /* snmpInASNParseErrs */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inasnparseerrs; - break; - - case 8: /* snmpInTooBigs */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.intoobigs; - break; - - case 9: /* snmpInNoSuchNames */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.innosuchnames; - break; - - case 10: /* snmpInBadValues */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inbadvalues; - break; - - case 11: /* snmpInReadOnlys */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inreadonlys; - break; - - case 12: /* snmpInGenErrs */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.ingenerrs; - break; - - case 13: /* snmpInTotalReqVars */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.intotalreqvars; - break; - - case 14: /* snmpInTotalSetVars */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.intotalsetvars; - break; - - case 15: /* snmpInGetRequests */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.ingetrequests; - break; - - case 16: /* snmpInGetNexts */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.ingetnexts; - break; - - case 17: /* snmpInSetRequests */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.insetrequests; - break; - - case 18: /* snmpInGetResponses */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.ingetresponses; - break; - - case 19: /* snmpInTraps */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.intraps; - break; - - case 20: /* snmpOutTooBigs */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outtoobigs; - break; - - case 21: /* snmpOutNoSuchNames */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outnosuchnames; - break; - - case 22: /* snmpOutBadValues */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outbadvalues; - break; - - case 24: /* snmpOutGenErrs */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outgenerrs; - break; - - case 25: /* snmpOutGetRequests */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outgetrequests; - break; - - case 26: /* snmpOutGetNexts */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outgetnexts; - break; - - case 27: /* snmpOutSetRequests */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outsetrequests; - break; - - case 28: /* snmpOutGetResponses */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outgetresponses; - break; - - case 29: /* snmpOutTraps */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outtraps; - break; - - case 30: /* snmpEnableAuthenTraps */ - if (snmp_get_auth_traps_enabled() == SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED) { - *uint_ptr = MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED; - } else { - *uint_ptr = MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED; - } - - break; - - case 31: /* snmpSilentDrops */ - *uint_ptr = 0; /* not supported */ - break; - - case 32: /* snmpProxyDrops */ - *uint_ptr = 0; /* not supported */ - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("snmp_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); - return 0; - } - - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); -} - -static snmp_err_t snmp_set_test(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - if (node->oid == 30) { - /* snmpEnableAuthenTraps */ - s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; - - /* we should have writable non-volatile mem here */ - if ((*sint_ptr == MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED) || (*sint_ptr == MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED)) { - ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - } - - return ret; -} - -static snmp_err_t snmp_set_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - if (node->oid == 30) { - /* snmpEnableAuthenTraps */ - s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; - - if (*sint_ptr == MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED) { - snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled(SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED); - } else { - snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled(SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED); - } - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -/* the following nodes access variables in SNMP stack (snmp_stats) from SNMP worker thread -> OK, no sync needed */ -static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def snmp_nodes[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInPkts */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutPkts */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInBadVersions */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInBadCommunityNames */ - { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInBadCommunityUses */ - { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInASNParseErrs */ - { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInTooBigs */ - { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInNoSuchNames */ - { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInBadValues */ - { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInReadOnlys */ - { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInGenErrs */ - { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInTotalReqVars */ - { 14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInTotalSetVars */ - { 15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInGetRequests */ - { 16, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInGetNexts */ - { 17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInSetRequests */ - { 18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInGetResponses */ - { 19, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInTraps */ - { 20, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutTooBigs */ - { 21, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutNoSuchNames */ - { 22, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutBadValues */ - { 24, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutGenErrs */ - { 25, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutGetRequests */ - { 26, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutGetNexts */ - { 27, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutSetRequests */ - { 28, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutGetResponses */ - { 29, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutTraps */ - { 30, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* snmpEnableAuthenTraps */ - { 31, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpSilentDrops */ - { 32, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY } /* snmpProxyDrops */ -}; - -const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_snmp_root = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(11, snmp_nodes, snmp_get_value, snmp_set_test, snmp_set_value); - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ +/** + * @file + * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) SNMP objects and functions. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Christiaan Simons + */ + +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 + +#define MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED 1 +#define MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED 2 + +/* --- snmp .1.3.6.1.2.1.11 ----------------------------------------------------- */ +static s16_t snmp_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) +{ + u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; + + switch (node->oid) { + case 1: /* snmpInPkts */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inpkts; + break; + + case 2: /* snmpOutPkts */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outpkts; + break; + + case 3: /* snmpInBadVersions */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inbadversions; + break; + + case 4: /* snmpInBadCommunityNames */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inbadcommunitynames; + break; + + case 5: /* snmpInBadCommunityUses */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inbadcommunityuses; + break; + + case 6: /* snmpInASNParseErrs */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inasnparseerrs; + break; + + case 8: /* snmpInTooBigs */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.intoobigs; + break; + + case 9: /* snmpInNoSuchNames */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.innosuchnames; + break; + + case 10: /* snmpInBadValues */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inbadvalues; + break; + + case 11: /* snmpInReadOnlys */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.inreadonlys; + break; + + case 12: /* snmpInGenErrs */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.ingenerrs; + break; + + case 13: /* snmpInTotalReqVars */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.intotalreqvars; + break; + + case 14: /* snmpInTotalSetVars */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.intotalsetvars; + break; + + case 15: /* snmpInGetRequests */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.ingetrequests; + break; + + case 16: /* snmpInGetNexts */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.ingetnexts; + break; + + case 17: /* snmpInSetRequests */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.insetrequests; + break; + + case 18: /* snmpInGetResponses */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.ingetresponses; + break; + + case 19: /* snmpInTraps */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.intraps; + break; + + case 20: /* snmpOutTooBigs */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outtoobigs; + break; + + case 21: /* snmpOutNoSuchNames */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outnosuchnames; + break; + + case 22: /* snmpOutBadValues */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outbadvalues; + break; + + case 24: /* snmpOutGenErrs */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outgenerrs; + break; + + case 25: /* snmpOutGetRequests */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outgetrequests; + break; + + case 26: /* snmpOutGetNexts */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outgetnexts; + break; + + case 27: /* snmpOutSetRequests */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outsetrequests; + break; + + case 28: /* snmpOutGetResponses */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outgetresponses; + break; + + case 29: /* snmpOutTraps */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.outtraps; + break; + + case 30: /* snmpEnableAuthenTraps */ + if (snmp_get_auth_traps_enabled() == SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED) { + *uint_ptr = MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED; + } else { + *uint_ptr = MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED; + } + + break; + + case 31: /* snmpSilentDrops */ + *uint_ptr = 0; /* not supported */ + break; + + case 32: /* snmpProxyDrops */ + *uint_ptr = 0; /* not supported */ + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("snmp_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); + return 0; + } + + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); +} + +static snmp_err_t snmp_set_test(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + if (node->oid == 30) { + /* snmpEnableAuthenTraps */ + s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; + + /* we should have writable non-volatile mem here */ + if ((*sint_ptr == MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED) || (*sint_ptr == MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED)) { + ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +static snmp_err_t snmp_set_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + if (node->oid == 30) { + /* snmpEnableAuthenTraps */ + s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; + + if (*sint_ptr == MIB2_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED) { + snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled(SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED); + } else { + snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled(SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED); + } + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +/* the following nodes access variables in SNMP stack (snmp_stats) from SNMP worker thread -> OK, no sync needed */ +static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def snmp_nodes[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInPkts */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutPkts */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInBadVersions */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInBadCommunityNames */ + { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInBadCommunityUses */ + { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInASNParseErrs */ + { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInTooBigs */ + { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInNoSuchNames */ + { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInBadValues */ + { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInReadOnlys */ + { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInGenErrs */ + { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInTotalReqVars */ + { 14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInTotalSetVars */ + { 15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInGetRequests */ + { 16, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInGetNexts */ + { 17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInSetRequests */ + { 18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInGetResponses */ + { 19, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpInTraps */ + { 20, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutTooBigs */ + { 21, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutNoSuchNames */ + { 22, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutBadValues */ + { 24, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutGenErrs */ + { 25, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutGetRequests */ + { 26, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutGetNexts */ + { 27, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutSetRequests */ + { 28, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutGetResponses */ + { 29, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpOutTraps */ + { 30, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* snmpEnableAuthenTraps */ + { 31, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpSilentDrops */ + { 32, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY } /* snmpProxyDrops */ +}; + +const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_snmp_root = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(11, snmp_nodes, snmp_get_value, snmp_set_test, snmp_set_value); + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c index 22494f72..2108f15f 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_system.c @@ -1,380 +1,380 @@ -/** - * @file - * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) SYSTEM objects and functions. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Christiaan Simons - */ - -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ - static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); -#else -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) -#endif - -/* --- system .1.3.6.1.2.1.1 ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -/** mib-2.system.sysDescr */ -static const u8_t sysdescr_default[] = SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSDESC; -static const u8_t *sysdescr = sysdescr_default; -static const u16_t *sysdescr_len = NULL; /* use strlen for determining len */ - -/** mib-2.system.sysContact */ -static const u8_t syscontact_default[] = SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSCONTACT; -static const u8_t *syscontact = syscontact_default; -static const u16_t *syscontact_len = NULL; /* use strlen for determining len */ -static u8_t *syscontact_wr = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as syscontact (required for correct constness) */ -static u16_t *syscontact_wr_len = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as syscontact_len (required for correct constness) */ -static u16_t syscontact_bufsize = 0; /* 0=not writable */ - -/** mib-2.system.sysName */ -static const u8_t sysname_default[] = SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSNAME; -static const u8_t *sysname = sysname_default; -static const u16_t *sysname_len = NULL; /* use strlen for determining len */ -static u8_t *sysname_wr = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as sysname (required for correct constness) */ -static u16_t *sysname_wr_len = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as sysname_len (required for correct constness) */ -static u16_t sysname_bufsize = 0; /* 0=not writable */ - -/** mib-2.system.sysLocation */ -static const u8_t syslocation_default[] = SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSLOCATION; -static const u8_t *syslocation = syslocation_default; -static const u16_t *syslocation_len = NULL; /* use strlen for determining len */ -static u8_t *syslocation_wr = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as syslocation (required for correct constness) */ -static u16_t *syslocation_wr_len = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as syslocation_len (required for correct constness) */ -static u16_t syslocation_bufsize = 0; /* 0=not writable */ - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_mib2 - * Initializes sysDescr pointers. - * - * @param str if non-NULL then copy str pointer - * @param len points to string length, excluding zero terminator - */ -void snmp_mib2_set_sysdescr(const u8_t *str, const u16_t *len) -{ - if (str != NULL) { - sysdescr = str; - sysdescr_len = len; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_mib2 - * Initializes sysContact pointers - * - * @param ocstr if non-NULL then copy str pointer - * @param ocstrlen points to string length, excluding zero terminator. - * if set to NULL it is assumed that ocstr is NULL-terminated. - * @param bufsize size of the buffer in bytes. - * (this is required because the buffer can be overwritten by snmp-set) - * if ocstrlen is NULL buffer needs space for terminating 0 byte. - * otherwise complete buffer is used for string. - * if bufsize is set to 0, the value is regarded as read-only. - */ -void snmp_mib2_set_syscontact(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize) -{ - if (ocstr != NULL) { - syscontact = ocstr; - syscontact_wr = ocstr; - syscontact_len = ocstrlen; - syscontact_wr_len = ocstrlen; - syscontact_bufsize = bufsize; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_mib2 - * see \ref snmp_mib2_set_syscontact but set pointer to readonly memory - */ -void snmp_mib2_set_syscontact_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen) -{ - if (ocstr != NULL) { - syscontact = ocstr; - syscontact_len = ocstrlen; - syscontact_wr = NULL; - syscontact_wr_len = NULL; - syscontact_bufsize = 0; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_mib2 - * Initializes sysName pointers - * - * @param ocstr if non-NULL then copy str pointer - * @param ocstrlen points to string length, excluding zero terminator. - * if set to NULL it is assumed that ocstr is NULL-terminated. - * @param bufsize size of the buffer in bytes. - * (this is required because the buffer can be overwritten by snmp-set) - * if ocstrlen is NULL buffer needs space for terminating 0 byte. - * otherwise complete buffer is used for string. - * if bufsize is set to 0, the value is regarded as read-only. - */ -void snmp_mib2_set_sysname(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize) -{ - if (ocstr != NULL) { - sysname = ocstr; - sysname_wr = ocstr; - sysname_len = ocstrlen; - sysname_wr_len = ocstrlen; - sysname_bufsize = bufsize; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_mib2 - * see \ref snmp_mib2_set_sysname but set pointer to readonly memory - */ -void snmp_mib2_set_sysname_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen) -{ - if (ocstr != NULL) { - sysname = ocstr; - sysname_len = ocstrlen; - sysname_wr = NULL; - sysname_wr_len = NULL; - sysname_bufsize = 0; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_mib2 - * Initializes sysLocation pointers - * - * @param ocstr if non-NULL then copy str pointer - * @param ocstrlen points to string length, excluding zero terminator. - * if set to NULL it is assumed that ocstr is NULL-terminated. - * @param bufsize size of the buffer in bytes. - * (this is required because the buffer can be overwritten by snmp-set) - * if ocstrlen is NULL buffer needs space for terminating 0 byte. - * otherwise complete buffer is used for string. - * if bufsize is set to 0, the value is regarded as read-only. - */ -void snmp_mib2_set_syslocation(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize) -{ - if (ocstr != NULL) { - syslocation = ocstr; - syslocation_wr = ocstr; - syslocation_len = ocstrlen; - syslocation_wr_len = ocstrlen; - syslocation_bufsize = bufsize; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_mib2 - * see \ref snmp_mib2_set_syslocation but set pointer to readonly memory - */ -void snmp_mib2_set_syslocation_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen) -{ - if (ocstr != NULL) { - syslocation = ocstr; - syslocation_len = ocstrlen; - syslocation_wr = NULL; - syslocation_wr_len = NULL; - syslocation_bufsize = 0; - } -} - -static s16_t system_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) -{ - const u8_t *var = NULL; - const s16_t *var_len; - u16_t result; - - switch (node->oid) { - case 1: /* sysDescr */ - var = sysdescr; - var_len = (const s16_t *)sysdescr_len; - break; - - case 2: /* sysObjectID */ - { - const struct snmp_obj_id *dev_enterprise_oid = snmp_get_device_enterprise_oid(); - MEMCPY(value, dev_enterprise_oid->id, dev_enterprise_oid->len * sizeof(u32_t)); - return dev_enterprise_oid->len * sizeof(u32_t); - } - - case 3: /* sysUpTime */ - MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO((u32_t *)value); - return sizeof(u32_t); - - case 4: /* sysContact */ - var = syscontact; - var_len = (const s16_t *)syscontact_len; - break; - - case 5: /* sysName */ - var = sysname; - var_len = (const s16_t *)sysname_len; - break; - - case 6: /* sysLocation */ - var = syslocation; - var_len = (const s16_t *)syslocation_len; - break; - - case 7: /* sysServices */ - *(s32_t *)value = SNMP_SYSSERVICES; - return sizeof(s32_t); - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("system_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); - return 0; - } - - /* handle string values (OID 1,4,5 and 6) */ - LWIP_ASSERT("", (value != NULL)); - - if (var_len == NULL) { - result = (s16_t)strlen((const char *)var); - } else { - result = *var_len; - } - - MEMCPY(value, var, result); - return result; -} - -static snmp_err_t system_set_test(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE; - const u16_t *var_bufsize = NULL; - const u16_t *var_wr_len; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value); - - switch (node->oid) { - case 4: /* sysContact */ - var_bufsize = &syscontact_bufsize; - var_wr_len = syscontact_wr_len; - break; - - case 5: /* sysName */ - var_bufsize = &sysname_bufsize; - var_wr_len = sysname_wr_len; - break; - - case 6: /* sysLocation */ - var_bufsize = &syslocation_bufsize; - var_wr_len = syslocation_wr_len; - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("system_set_test(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); - return ret; - } - - /* check if value is writable at all */ - if (*var_bufsize > 0) { - if (var_wr_len == NULL) { - /* we have to take the terminating 0 into account */ - if (len < *var_bufsize) { - ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - } else { - if (len <= *var_bufsize) { - ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - } - } else { - ret = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; - } - - return ret; -} - -static snmp_err_t system_set_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - u8_t *var_wr = NULL; - u16_t *var_wr_len; - - switch (node->oid) { - case 4: /* sysContact */ - var_wr = syscontact_wr; - var_wr_len = syscontact_wr_len; - break; - - case 5: /* sysName */ - var_wr = sysname_wr; - var_wr_len = sysname_wr_len; - break; - - case 6: /* sysLocation */ - var_wr = syslocation_wr; - var_wr_len = syslocation_wr_len; - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("system_set_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); - return SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - - /* no need to check size of target buffer, this was already done in set_test method */ - LWIP_ASSERT("", var_wr != NULL); - MEMCPY(var_wr, value, len); - - if (var_wr_len == NULL) { - /* add terminating 0 */ - var_wr[len] = 0; - } else { - *var_wr_len = len; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def system_nodes[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* sysDescr */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* sysObjectID */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* sysUpTime */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* sysContact */ - { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* sysName */ - { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* sysLocation */ - { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY } /* sysServices */ -}; - -const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_system_node = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(1, system_nodes, system_get_value, system_set_test, system_set_value); - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ +/** + * @file + * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) SYSTEM objects and functions. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Christiaan Simons + */ + +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ + static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); +#else +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) +#endif + +/* --- system .1.3.6.1.2.1.1 ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +/** mib-2.system.sysDescr */ +static const u8_t sysdescr_default[] = SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSDESC; +static const u8_t *sysdescr = sysdescr_default; +static const u16_t *sysdescr_len = NULL; /* use strlen for determining len */ + +/** mib-2.system.sysContact */ +static const u8_t syscontact_default[] = SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSCONTACT; +static const u8_t *syscontact = syscontact_default; +static const u16_t *syscontact_len = NULL; /* use strlen for determining len */ +static u8_t *syscontact_wr = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as syscontact (required for correct constness) */ +static u16_t *syscontact_wr_len = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as syscontact_len (required for correct constness) */ +static u16_t syscontact_bufsize = 0; /* 0=not writable */ + +/** mib-2.system.sysName */ +static const u8_t sysname_default[] = SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSNAME; +static const u8_t *sysname = sysname_default; +static const u16_t *sysname_len = NULL; /* use strlen for determining len */ +static u8_t *sysname_wr = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as sysname (required for correct constness) */ +static u16_t *sysname_wr_len = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as sysname_len (required for correct constness) */ +static u16_t sysname_bufsize = 0; /* 0=not writable */ + +/** mib-2.system.sysLocation */ +static const u8_t syslocation_default[] = SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSLOCATION; +static const u8_t *syslocation = syslocation_default; +static const u16_t *syslocation_len = NULL; /* use strlen for determining len */ +static u8_t *syslocation_wr = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as syslocation (required for correct constness) */ +static u16_t *syslocation_wr_len = NULL; /* if writable, points to the same buffer as syslocation_len (required for correct constness) */ +static u16_t syslocation_bufsize = 0; /* 0=not writable */ + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_mib2 + * Initializes sysDescr pointers. + * + * @param str if non-NULL then copy str pointer + * @param len points to string length, excluding zero terminator + */ +void snmp_mib2_set_sysdescr(const u8_t *str, const u16_t *len) +{ + if (str != NULL) { + sysdescr = str; + sysdescr_len = len; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_mib2 + * Initializes sysContact pointers + * + * @param ocstr if non-NULL then copy str pointer + * @param ocstrlen points to string length, excluding zero terminator. + * if set to NULL it is assumed that ocstr is NULL-terminated. + * @param bufsize size of the buffer in bytes. + * (this is required because the buffer can be overwritten by snmp-set) + * if ocstrlen is NULL buffer needs space for terminating 0 byte. + * otherwise complete buffer is used for string. + * if bufsize is set to 0, the value is regarded as read-only. + */ +void snmp_mib2_set_syscontact(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize) +{ + if (ocstr != NULL) { + syscontact = ocstr; + syscontact_wr = ocstr; + syscontact_len = ocstrlen; + syscontact_wr_len = ocstrlen; + syscontact_bufsize = bufsize; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_mib2 + * see \ref snmp_mib2_set_syscontact but set pointer to readonly memory + */ +void snmp_mib2_set_syscontact_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen) +{ + if (ocstr != NULL) { + syscontact = ocstr; + syscontact_len = ocstrlen; + syscontact_wr = NULL; + syscontact_wr_len = NULL; + syscontact_bufsize = 0; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_mib2 + * Initializes sysName pointers + * + * @param ocstr if non-NULL then copy str pointer + * @param ocstrlen points to string length, excluding zero terminator. + * if set to NULL it is assumed that ocstr is NULL-terminated. + * @param bufsize size of the buffer in bytes. + * (this is required because the buffer can be overwritten by snmp-set) + * if ocstrlen is NULL buffer needs space for terminating 0 byte. + * otherwise complete buffer is used for string. + * if bufsize is set to 0, the value is regarded as read-only. + */ +void snmp_mib2_set_sysname(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize) +{ + if (ocstr != NULL) { + sysname = ocstr; + sysname_wr = ocstr; + sysname_len = ocstrlen; + sysname_wr_len = ocstrlen; + sysname_bufsize = bufsize; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_mib2 + * see \ref snmp_mib2_set_sysname but set pointer to readonly memory + */ +void snmp_mib2_set_sysname_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen) +{ + if (ocstr != NULL) { + sysname = ocstr; + sysname_len = ocstrlen; + sysname_wr = NULL; + sysname_wr_len = NULL; + sysname_bufsize = 0; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_mib2 + * Initializes sysLocation pointers + * + * @param ocstr if non-NULL then copy str pointer + * @param ocstrlen points to string length, excluding zero terminator. + * if set to NULL it is assumed that ocstr is NULL-terminated. + * @param bufsize size of the buffer in bytes. + * (this is required because the buffer can be overwritten by snmp-set) + * if ocstrlen is NULL buffer needs space for terminating 0 byte. + * otherwise complete buffer is used for string. + * if bufsize is set to 0, the value is regarded as read-only. + */ +void snmp_mib2_set_syslocation(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize) +{ + if (ocstr != NULL) { + syslocation = ocstr; + syslocation_wr = ocstr; + syslocation_len = ocstrlen; + syslocation_wr_len = ocstrlen; + syslocation_bufsize = bufsize; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_mib2 + * see \ref snmp_mib2_set_syslocation but set pointer to readonly memory + */ +void snmp_mib2_set_syslocation_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen) +{ + if (ocstr != NULL) { + syslocation = ocstr; + syslocation_len = ocstrlen; + syslocation_wr = NULL; + syslocation_wr_len = NULL; + syslocation_bufsize = 0; + } +} + +static s16_t system_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) +{ + const u8_t *var = NULL; + const s16_t *var_len; + u16_t result; + + switch (node->oid) { + case 1: /* sysDescr */ + var = sysdescr; + var_len = (const s16_t *)sysdescr_len; + break; + + case 2: /* sysObjectID */ + { + const struct snmp_obj_id *dev_enterprise_oid = snmp_get_device_enterprise_oid(); + MEMCPY(value, dev_enterprise_oid->id, dev_enterprise_oid->len * sizeof(u32_t)); + return dev_enterprise_oid->len * sizeof(u32_t); + } + + case 3: /* sysUpTime */ + MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO((u32_t *)value); + return sizeof(u32_t); + + case 4: /* sysContact */ + var = syscontact; + var_len = (const s16_t *)syscontact_len; + break; + + case 5: /* sysName */ + var = sysname; + var_len = (const s16_t *)sysname_len; + break; + + case 6: /* sysLocation */ + var = syslocation; + var_len = (const s16_t *)syslocation_len; + break; + + case 7: /* sysServices */ + *(s32_t *)value = SNMP_SYSSERVICES; + return sizeof(s32_t); + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("system_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); + return 0; + } + + /* handle string values (OID 1,4,5 and 6) */ + LWIP_ASSERT("", (value != NULL)); + + if (var_len == NULL) { + result = (s16_t)strlen((const char *)var); + } else { + result = *var_len; + } + + MEMCPY(value, var, result); + return result; +} + +static snmp_err_t system_set_test(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE; + const u16_t *var_bufsize = NULL; + const u16_t *var_wr_len; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value); + + switch (node->oid) { + case 4: /* sysContact */ + var_bufsize = &syscontact_bufsize; + var_wr_len = syscontact_wr_len; + break; + + case 5: /* sysName */ + var_bufsize = &sysname_bufsize; + var_wr_len = sysname_wr_len; + break; + + case 6: /* sysLocation */ + var_bufsize = &syslocation_bufsize; + var_wr_len = syslocation_wr_len; + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("system_set_test(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); + return ret; + } + + /* check if value is writable at all */ + if (*var_bufsize > 0) { + if (var_wr_len == NULL) { + /* we have to take the terminating 0 into account */ + if (len < *var_bufsize) { + ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + } else { + if (len <= *var_bufsize) { + ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + } + } else { + ret = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; + } + + return ret; +} + +static snmp_err_t system_set_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + u8_t *var_wr = NULL; + u16_t *var_wr_len; + + switch (node->oid) { + case 4: /* sysContact */ + var_wr = syscontact_wr; + var_wr_len = syscontact_wr_len; + break; + + case 5: /* sysName */ + var_wr = sysname_wr; + var_wr_len = sysname_wr_len; + break; + + case 6: /* sysLocation */ + var_wr = syslocation_wr; + var_wr_len = syslocation_wr_len; + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("system_set_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); + return SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + + /* no need to check size of target buffer, this was already done in set_test method */ + LWIP_ASSERT("", var_wr != NULL); + MEMCPY(var_wr, value, len); + + if (var_wr_len == NULL) { + /* add terminating 0 */ + var_wr[len] = 0; + } else { + *var_wr_len = len; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def system_nodes[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* sysDescr */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* sysObjectID */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* sysUpTime */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* sysContact */ + { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* sysName */ + { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE }, /* sysLocation */ + { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY } /* sysServices */ +}; + +const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmp_mib2_system_node = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(1, system_nodes, system_get_value, system_set_test, system_set_value); + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c index 654a9a19..9236a393 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_tcp.c @@ -1,640 +1,640 @@ -/** - * @file - * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) TCP objects and functions. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Christiaan Simons - */ - -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_TCP - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ - static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); -#else -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) -#endif - -/* --- tcp .1.3.6.1.2.1.6 ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -static s16_t tcp_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; - s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; - - switch (instance->node->oid) { - case 1: /* tcpRtoAlgorithm, vanj(4) */ - *sint_ptr = 4; - return sizeof(*sint_ptr); - - case 2: /* tcpRtoMin */ - /* @todo not the actual value, a guess, - needs to be calculated */ - *sint_ptr = 1000; - return sizeof(*sint_ptr); - - case 3: /* tcpRtoMax */ - /* @todo not the actual value, a guess, - needs to be calculated */ - *sint_ptr = 60000; - return sizeof(*sint_ptr); - - case 4: /* tcpMaxConn */ - *sint_ptr = MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB; - return sizeof(*sint_ptr); - - case 5: /* tcpActiveOpens */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpactiveopens); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 6: /* tcpPassiveOpens */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcppassiveopens); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 7: /* tcpAttemptFails */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpattemptfails); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 8: /* tcpEstabResets */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpestabresets); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 9: /* tcpCurrEstab */ - { - u16_t tcpcurrestab = 0; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - if ((pcb->state == ESTABLISHED) || - (pcb->state == CLOSE_WAIT)) { - tcpcurrestab++; - } - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - - *uint_ptr = tcpcurrestab; - } - - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 10: /* tcpInSegs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpinsegs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 11: /* tcpOutSegs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpoutsegs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 12: /* tcpRetransSegs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpretranssegs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 14: /* tcpInErrs */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpinerrs); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 15: /* tcpOutRsts */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpoutrsts); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 - - case 17: /* tcpHCInSegs */ - { - /* use the 32 bit counter for now... */ - u64_t val64 = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpinsegs); - *((u64_t *)value) = val64; - } - - return sizeof(u64_t); - - case 18: /* tcpHCOutSegs */ - { - /* use the 32 bit counter for now... */ - u64_t val64 = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpoutsegs); - *((u64_t *)value) = val64; - } - - return sizeof(u64_t); -#endif - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("tcp_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", instance->node->oid)); - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -/* --- tcpConnTable --- */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ -static const struct snmp_oid_range tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges[] = { - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP D */ - { 0, 0xffff }, /* Port */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP D */ - { 0, 0xffff } /* Port */ -}; - -static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value_core(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - - /* value */ - switch (*column) { - case 1: /* tcpConnState */ - value->u32 = pcb->state + 1; - break; - - case 2: /* tcpConnLocalAddress */ - value->u32 = ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)->addr; - break; - - case 3: /* tcpConnLocalPort */ - value->u32 = pcb->local_port; - break; - - case 4: /* tcpConnRemAddress */ - if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { - value->u32 = IP4_ADDR_ANY4->addr; - } else { - value->u32 = ip_2_ip4(&pcb->remote_ip)->addr; - } - - break; - - case 5: /* tcpConnRemPort */ - if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { - value->u32 = 0; - } else { - value->u32 = pcb->remote_port; - } - - break; - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid id", 0); - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - u8_t i; - ip4_addr_t local_ip; - ip4_addr_t remote_ip; - u16_t local_port; - u16_t remote_port; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges))) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* get IPs and ports from incoming OID */ - snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[0], &local_ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ - local_port = (u16_t)row_oid[4]; - snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[5], &remote_ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ - remote_port = (u16_t)row_oid[9]; - - /* find tcp_pcb with requested ips and ports */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_lists); i++) { - pcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - /* do local IP and local port match? */ - if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip) && - ip4_addr_cmp(&local_ip, ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)) && (local_port == pcb->local_port)) { - /* PCBs in state LISTEN are not connected and have no remote_ip or remote_port */ - if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { - if (ip4_addr_cmp(&remote_ip, IP4_ADDR_ANY4) && (remote_port == 0)) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value_core(pcb, column, value, value_len); - } - } else { - if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->remote_ip) && - ip4_addr_cmp(&remote_ip, ip_2_ip4(&pcb->remote_ip)) && (remote_port == pcb->remote_port)) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value_core(pcb, column, value, value_len); - } - } - } - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - u8_t i; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges)]; - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges)); - - /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_lists); i++) { - pcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges)]; - - if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { - snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), &test_oid[0]); - test_oid[4] = pcb->local_port; - - /* PCBs in state LISTEN are not connected and have no remote_ip or remote_port */ - if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { - snmp_ip4_to_oid(IP4_ADDR_ANY4, &test_oid[5]); - test_oid[9] = 0; - } else { - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(pcb->remote_ip)) /* should never happen */ - { - continue; - } - - snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->remote_ip), &test_oid[5]); - test_oid[9] = pcb->remote_port; - } - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges), pcb); - } - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* fill in object properties */ - return tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value_core((struct tcp_pcb *)state.reference, column, value, value_len); - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/* --- tcpConnectionTable --- */ - -static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value_core(const u32_t *column, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, union snmp_variant_value *value) -{ - /* all items except tcpConnectionState and tcpConnectionProcess are declared as not-accessible */ - switch (*column) { - case 7: /* tcpConnectionState */ - value->u32 = pcb->state + 1; - break; - - case 8: /* tcpConnectionProcess */ - value->u32 = 0; /* not supported */ - break; - - default: - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - ip_addr_t local_ip, remote_ip; - u16_t local_port, remote_port; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - u8_t idx = 0; - u8_t i; - struct tcp_pcb **const tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists[] = { &tcp_bound_pcbs, &tcp_active_pcbs, &tcp_tw_pcbs }; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - - /* tcpConnectionLocalAddressType + tcpConnectionLocalAddress + tcpConnectionLocalPort */ - idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &local_ip, &local_port); - - if (idx == 0) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* tcpConnectionRemAddressType + tcpConnectionRemAddress + tcpConnectionRemPort */ - idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &remote_ip, &remote_port); - - if (idx == 0) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* find tcp_pcb with requested ip and port*/ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists); i++) { - pcb = *tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists[i]; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - if (ip_addr_cmp(&local_ip, &pcb->local_ip) && - (local_port == pcb->local_port) && - ip_addr_cmp(&remote_ip, &pcb->remote_ip) && - (remote_port == pcb->remote_port)) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value_core(column, pcb, value); - } - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnectionTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - /* 1x tcpConnectionLocalAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x tcpConnectionLocalAddress + 1x tcpConnectionLocalPort - * 1x tcpConnectionRemAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x tcpConnectionRemAddress + 1x tcpConnectionRemPort */ - u32_t result_temp[38]; - u8_t i; - struct tcp_pcb **const tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists[] = { &tcp_bound_pcbs, &tcp_active_pcbs, &tcp_tw_pcbs }; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)); - - /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists); i++) { - pcb = *tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists[i]; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - u8_t idx = 0; - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)]; - - /* tcpConnectionLocalAddressType + tcpConnectionLocalAddress + tcpConnectionLocalPort */ - idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port, &test_oid[idx]); - - /* tcpConnectionRemAddressType + tcpConnectionRemAddress + tcpConnectionRemPort */ - idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port, &test_oid[idx]); - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, idx, pcb); - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* fill in object properties */ - return tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value_core(column, (struct tcp_pcb *)state.reference, value); - } else { - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } -} - -/* --- tcpListenerTable --- */ - -static snmp_err_t tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value_core(const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value) -{ - /* all items except tcpListenerProcess are declared as not-accessible */ - switch (*column) { - case 4: /* tcpListenerProcess */ - value->u32 = 0; /* not supported */ - break; - - default: - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static snmp_err_t tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - ip_addr_t local_ip; - u16_t local_port; - struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcb; - u8_t idx = 0; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - - /* tcpListenerLocalAddressType + tcpListenerLocalAddress + tcpListenerLocalPort */ - idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &local_ip, &local_port); - - if (idx == 0) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* find tcp_pcb with requested ip and port*/ - pcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - if (ip_addr_cmp(&local_ip, &pcb->local_ip) && - (local_port == pcb->local_port)) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value_core(column, value); - } - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static snmp_err_t tcp_ListenerTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcb; - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - /* 1x tcpListenerLocalAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x tcpListenerLocalAddress + 1x tcpListenerLocalPort */ - u32_t result_temp[19]; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)); - - /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ - pcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - u8_t idx = 0; - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)]; - - /* tcpListenerLocalAddressType + tcpListenerLocalAddress + tcpListenerLocalPort */ - idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port, &test_oid[idx]); - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, idx, NULL); - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* fill in object properties */ - return tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value_core(column, value); - } else { - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } -} - -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_RtoAlgorithm = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_RtoMin = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_RtoMax = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_MaxConn = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_ActiveOpens = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_PassiveOpens = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_AttemptFails = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_EstabResets = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_CurrEstab = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_InSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_OutSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_RetransSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_InErrs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_OutRsts = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_HCInSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64, tcp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_HCOutSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64, tcp_get_value); -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def tcp_ConnTable_columns[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnState */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnLocalAddress */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnLocalPort */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnRemAddress */ - { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* tcpConnRemPort */ -}; - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_node tcp_ConnTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(13, tcp_ConnTable_columns, tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value, tcp_ConnTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def tcp_ConnectionTable_columns[] = { - /* all items except tcpConnectionState and tcpConnectionProcess are declared as not-accessible */ - { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnectionState */ - { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_UNSIGNED32, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* tcpConnectionProcess */ -}; - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_node tcp_ConnectionTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(19, tcp_ConnectionTable_columns, tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value, tcp_ConnectionTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def tcp_ListenerTable_columns[] = { - /* all items except tcpListenerProcess are declared as not-accessible */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_UNSIGNED32, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* tcpListenerProcess */ -}; - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_node tcp_ListenerTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(20, tcp_ListenerTable_columns, tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value, tcp_ListenerTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); - -/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, tcp_RtoAlgorithm) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(2, tcp_RtoMin) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(3, tcp_RtoMax) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(4, tcp_MaxConn) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(5, tcp_ActiveOpens) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(6, tcp_PassiveOpens) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(7, tcp_AttemptFails) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(8, tcp_EstabResets) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(9, tcp_CurrEstab) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(10, tcp_InSegs) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(11, tcp_OutSegs) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(12, tcp_RetransSegs) -#if LWIP_IPV4 -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(13, tcp_ConnTable) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(14, tcp_InErrs) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(15, tcp_OutRsts) -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(17, tcp_HCInSegs) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(18, tcp_HCOutSegs) -#endif -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(19, tcp_ConnectionTable) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(20, tcp_ListenerTable) - -static const struct snmp_node *const tcp_nodes[] = { - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_RtoAlgorithm).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_RtoMin).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_RtoMax).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_MaxConn).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_ActiveOpens).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_PassiveOpens).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_AttemptFails).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_EstabResets).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_CurrEstab).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_InSegs).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_OutSegs).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_RetransSegs).node.node, -#if LWIP_IPV4 - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_ConnTable).node.node, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_InErrs).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_OutRsts).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_HCInSegs).node.node, -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_HCOutSegs).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_ConnectionTable).node.node, -#endif - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_ListenerTable).node.node -}; - -const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_tcp_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(6, tcp_nodes); -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_TCP */ +/** + * @file + * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) TCP objects and functions. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Christiaan Simons + */ + +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_TCP + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ + static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); +#else +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) +#endif + +/* --- tcp .1.3.6.1.2.1.6 ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +static s16_t tcp_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; + s32_t *sint_ptr = (s32_t *)value; + + switch (instance->node->oid) { + case 1: /* tcpRtoAlgorithm, vanj(4) */ + *sint_ptr = 4; + return sizeof(*sint_ptr); + + case 2: /* tcpRtoMin */ + /* @todo not the actual value, a guess, + needs to be calculated */ + *sint_ptr = 1000; + return sizeof(*sint_ptr); + + case 3: /* tcpRtoMax */ + /* @todo not the actual value, a guess, + needs to be calculated */ + *sint_ptr = 60000; + return sizeof(*sint_ptr); + + case 4: /* tcpMaxConn */ + *sint_ptr = MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB; + return sizeof(*sint_ptr); + + case 5: /* tcpActiveOpens */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpactiveopens); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 6: /* tcpPassiveOpens */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcppassiveopens); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 7: /* tcpAttemptFails */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpattemptfails); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 8: /* tcpEstabResets */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpestabresets); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 9: /* tcpCurrEstab */ + { + u16_t tcpcurrestab = 0; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + if ((pcb->state == ESTABLISHED) || + (pcb->state == CLOSE_WAIT)) { + tcpcurrestab++; + } + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + + *uint_ptr = tcpcurrestab; + } + + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 10: /* tcpInSegs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpinsegs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 11: /* tcpOutSegs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpoutsegs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 12: /* tcpRetransSegs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpretranssegs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 14: /* tcpInErrs */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpinerrs); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 15: /* tcpOutRsts */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpoutrsts); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 + + case 17: /* tcpHCInSegs */ + { + /* use the 32 bit counter for now... */ + u64_t val64 = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpinsegs); + *((u64_t *)value) = val64; + } + + return sizeof(u64_t); + + case 18: /* tcpHCOutSegs */ + { + /* use the 32 bit counter for now... */ + u64_t val64 = STATS_GET(mib2.tcpoutsegs); + *((u64_t *)value) = val64; + } + + return sizeof(u64_t); +#endif + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("tcp_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", instance->node->oid)); + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* --- tcpConnTable --- */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ +static const struct snmp_oid_range tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges[] = { + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP D */ + { 0, 0xffff }, /* Port */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP D */ + { 0, 0xffff } /* Port */ +}; + +static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value_core(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + + /* value */ + switch (*column) { + case 1: /* tcpConnState */ + value->u32 = pcb->state + 1; + break; + + case 2: /* tcpConnLocalAddress */ + value->u32 = ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)->addr; + break; + + case 3: /* tcpConnLocalPort */ + value->u32 = pcb->local_port; + break; + + case 4: /* tcpConnRemAddress */ + if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { + value->u32 = IP4_ADDR_ANY4->addr; + } else { + value->u32 = ip_2_ip4(&pcb->remote_ip)->addr; + } + + break; + + case 5: /* tcpConnRemPort */ + if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { + value->u32 = 0; + } else { + value->u32 = pcb->remote_port; + } + + break; + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid id", 0); + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + u8_t i; + ip4_addr_t local_ip; + ip4_addr_t remote_ip; + u16_t local_port; + u16_t remote_port; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges))) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* get IPs and ports from incoming OID */ + snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[0], &local_ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ + local_port = (u16_t)row_oid[4]; + snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[5], &remote_ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ + remote_port = (u16_t)row_oid[9]; + + /* find tcp_pcb with requested ips and ports */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_lists); i++) { + pcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + /* do local IP and local port match? */ + if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip) && + ip4_addr_cmp(&local_ip, ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)) && (local_port == pcb->local_port)) { + /* PCBs in state LISTEN are not connected and have no remote_ip or remote_port */ + if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { + if (ip4_addr_cmp(&remote_ip, IP4_ADDR_ANY4) && (remote_port == 0)) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value_core(pcb, column, value, value_len); + } + } else { + if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->remote_ip) && + ip4_addr_cmp(&remote_ip, ip_2_ip4(&pcb->remote_ip)) && (remote_port == pcb->remote_port)) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value_core(pcb, column, value, value_len); + } + } + } + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + u8_t i; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges)]; + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges)); + + /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_lists); i++) { + pcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges)]; + + if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { + snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), &test_oid[0]); + test_oid[4] = pcb->local_port; + + /* PCBs in state LISTEN are not connected and have no remote_ip or remote_port */ + if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { + snmp_ip4_to_oid(IP4_ADDR_ANY4, &test_oid[5]); + test_oid[9] = 0; + } else { + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(pcb->remote_ip)) /* should never happen */ + { + continue; + } + + snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->remote_ip), &test_oid[5]); + test_oid[9] = pcb->remote_port; + } + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_ConnTable_oid_ranges), pcb); + } + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* fill in object properties */ + return tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value_core((struct tcp_pcb *)state.reference, column, value, value_len); + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/* --- tcpConnectionTable --- */ + +static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value_core(const u32_t *column, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, union snmp_variant_value *value) +{ + /* all items except tcpConnectionState and tcpConnectionProcess are declared as not-accessible */ + switch (*column) { + case 7: /* tcpConnectionState */ + value->u32 = pcb->state + 1; + break; + + case 8: /* tcpConnectionProcess */ + value->u32 = 0; /* not supported */ + break; + + default: + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + ip_addr_t local_ip, remote_ip; + u16_t local_port, remote_port; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + u8_t idx = 0; + u8_t i; + struct tcp_pcb **const tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists[] = { &tcp_bound_pcbs, &tcp_active_pcbs, &tcp_tw_pcbs }; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + + /* tcpConnectionLocalAddressType + tcpConnectionLocalAddress + tcpConnectionLocalPort */ + idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &local_ip, &local_port); + + if (idx == 0) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* tcpConnectionRemAddressType + tcpConnectionRemAddress + tcpConnectionRemPort */ + idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &remote_ip, &remote_port); + + if (idx == 0) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* find tcp_pcb with requested ip and port*/ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists); i++) { + pcb = *tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists[i]; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + if (ip_addr_cmp(&local_ip, &pcb->local_ip) && + (local_port == pcb->local_port) && + ip_addr_cmp(&remote_ip, &pcb->remote_ip) && + (remote_port == pcb->remote_port)) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value_core(column, pcb, value); + } + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static snmp_err_t tcp_ConnectionTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + /* 1x tcpConnectionLocalAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x tcpConnectionLocalAddress + 1x tcpConnectionLocalPort + * 1x tcpConnectionRemAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x tcpConnectionRemAddress + 1x tcpConnectionRemPort */ + u32_t result_temp[38]; + u8_t i; + struct tcp_pcb **const tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists[] = { &tcp_bound_pcbs, &tcp_active_pcbs, &tcp_tw_pcbs }; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)); + + /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists); i++) { + pcb = *tcp_pcb_nonlisten_lists[i]; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + u8_t idx = 0; + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)]; + + /* tcpConnectionLocalAddressType + tcpConnectionLocalAddress + tcpConnectionLocalPort */ + idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port, &test_oid[idx]); + + /* tcpConnectionRemAddressType + tcpConnectionRemAddress + tcpConnectionRemPort */ + idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port, &test_oid[idx]); + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, idx, pcb); + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* fill in object properties */ + return tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value_core(column, (struct tcp_pcb *)state.reference, value); + } else { + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } +} + +/* --- tcpListenerTable --- */ + +static snmp_err_t tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value_core(const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value) +{ + /* all items except tcpListenerProcess are declared as not-accessible */ + switch (*column) { + case 4: /* tcpListenerProcess */ + value->u32 = 0; /* not supported */ + break; + + default: + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static snmp_err_t tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + ip_addr_t local_ip; + u16_t local_port; + struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcb; + u8_t idx = 0; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + + /* tcpListenerLocalAddressType + tcpListenerLocalAddress + tcpListenerLocalPort */ + idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &local_ip, &local_port); + + if (idx == 0) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* find tcp_pcb with requested ip and port*/ + pcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + if (ip_addr_cmp(&local_ip, &pcb->local_ip) && + (local_port == pcb->local_port)) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value_core(column, value); + } + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static snmp_err_t tcp_ListenerTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcb; + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + /* 1x tcpListenerLocalAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x tcpListenerLocalAddress + 1x tcpListenerLocalPort */ + u32_t result_temp[19]; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)); + + /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ + pcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + u8_t idx = 0; + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)]; + + /* tcpListenerLocalAddressType + tcpListenerLocalAddress + tcpListenerLocalPort */ + idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port, &test_oid[idx]); + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, idx, NULL); + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* fill in object properties */ + return tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value_core(column, value); + } else { + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } +} + +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_RtoAlgorithm = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_RtoMin = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_RtoMax = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_MaxConn = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_ActiveOpens = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_PassiveOpens = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_AttemptFails = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_EstabResets = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_CurrEstab = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_InSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_OutSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_RetransSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_InErrs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(14, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_OutRsts = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(15, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, tcp_get_value); +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_HCInSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(17, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64, tcp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node tcp_HCOutSegs = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(18, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64, tcp_get_value); +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def tcp_ConnTable_columns[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnState */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnLocalAddress */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnLocalPort */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnRemAddress */ + { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* tcpConnRemPort */ +}; + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_node tcp_ConnTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(13, tcp_ConnTable_columns, tcp_ConnTable_get_cell_value, tcp_ConnTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def tcp_ConnectionTable_columns[] = { + /* all items except tcpConnectionState and tcpConnectionProcess are declared as not-accessible */ + { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* tcpConnectionState */ + { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_UNSIGNED32, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* tcpConnectionProcess */ +}; + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_node tcp_ConnectionTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(19, tcp_ConnectionTable_columns, tcp_ConnectionTable_get_cell_value, tcp_ConnectionTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def tcp_ListenerTable_columns[] = { + /* all items except tcpListenerProcess are declared as not-accessible */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_UNSIGNED32, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* tcpListenerProcess */ +}; + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_node tcp_ListenerTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(20, tcp_ListenerTable_columns, tcp_ListenerTable_get_cell_value, tcp_ListenerTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); + +/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, tcp_RtoAlgorithm) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(2, tcp_RtoMin) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(3, tcp_RtoMax) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(4, tcp_MaxConn) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(5, tcp_ActiveOpens) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(6, tcp_PassiveOpens) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(7, tcp_AttemptFails) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(8, tcp_EstabResets) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(9, tcp_CurrEstab) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(10, tcp_InSegs) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(11, tcp_OutSegs) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(12, tcp_RetransSegs) +#if LWIP_IPV4 +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(13, tcp_ConnTable) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(14, tcp_InErrs) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(15, tcp_OutRsts) +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(17, tcp_HCInSegs) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(18, tcp_HCOutSegs) +#endif +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(19, tcp_ConnectionTable) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(20, tcp_ListenerTable) + +static const struct snmp_node *const tcp_nodes[] = { + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_RtoAlgorithm).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_RtoMin).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_RtoMax).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_MaxConn).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_ActiveOpens).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_PassiveOpens).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_AttemptFails).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_EstabResets).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_CurrEstab).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_InSegs).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_OutSegs).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_RetransSegs).node.node, +#if LWIP_IPV4 + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_ConnTable).node.node, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_InErrs).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_OutRsts).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_HCInSegs).node.node, +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_HCOutSegs).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_ConnectionTable).node.node, +#endif + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(tcp_ListenerTable).node.node +}; + +const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_tcp_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(6, tcp_nodes); +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_TCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c index cca3617d..ed20b2b4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_mib2_udp.c @@ -1,387 +1,387 @@ -/** - * @file - * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) UDP objects and functions. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * Christiaan Simons - */ - -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_UDP - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ - static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); -#else -#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name -#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) -#endif - -/* --- udp .1.3.6.1.2.1.7 ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -static s16_t udp_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; - - switch (instance->node->oid) { - case 1: /* udpInDatagrams */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.udpindatagrams); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 2: /* udpNoPorts */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.udpnoports); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 3: /* udpInErrors */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.udpinerrors); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); - - case 4: /* udpOutDatagrams */ - *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.udpoutdatagrams); - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 - - case 8: /* udpHCInDatagrams */ - { - /* use the 32 bit counter for now... */ - u64_t val64 = STATS_GET(mib2.udpindatagrams); - *((u64_t *)value) = val64; - } - - return sizeof(u64_t); - - case 9: /* udpHCOutDatagrams */ - { - /* use the 32 bit counter for now... */ - u64_t val64 = STATS_GET(mib2.udpoutdatagrams); - *((u64_t *)value) = val64; - } - - return sizeof(u64_t); -#endif - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("udp_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", instance->node->oid)); - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -/* --- udpEndpointTable --- */ - -static snmp_err_t udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value_core(const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value) -{ - /* all items except udpEndpointProcess are declared as not-accessible */ - switch (*column) { - case 8: /* udpEndpointProcess */ - value->u32 = 0; /* not supported */ - break; - - default: - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static snmp_err_t udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - ip_addr_t local_ip, remote_ip; - u16_t local_port, remote_port; - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - u8_t idx = 0; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - - /* udpEndpointLocalAddressType + udpEndpointLocalAddress + udpEndpointLocalPort */ - idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &local_ip, &local_port); - - if (idx == 0) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* udpEndpointRemoteAddressType + udpEndpointRemoteAddress + udpEndpointRemotePort */ - idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &remote_ip, &remote_port); - - if (idx == 0) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* udpEndpointInstance */ - if (row_oid_len < (idx + 1)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - if (row_oid[idx] != 0) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* find udp_pcb with requested ip and port*/ - pcb = udp_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - if (ip_addr_cmp(&local_ip, &pcb->local_ip) && - (local_port == pcb->local_port) && - ip_addr_cmp(&remote_ip, &pcb->remote_ip) && - (remote_port == pcb->remote_port)) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value_core(column, value); - } - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static snmp_err_t udp_endpointTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - /* 1x udpEndpointLocalAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x udpEndpointLocalAddress + 1x udpEndpointLocalPort + - * 1x udpEndpointRemoteAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x udpEndpointRemoteAddress + 1x udpEndpointRemotePort + - * 1x udpEndpointInstance = 39 - */ - u32_t result_temp[39]; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)); - - /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ - pcb = udp_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)]; - u8_t idx = 0; - - /* udpEndpointLocalAddressType + udpEndpointLocalAddress + udpEndpointLocalPort */ - idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port, &test_oid[idx]); - - /* udpEndpointRemoteAddressType + udpEndpointRemoteAddress + udpEndpointRemotePort */ - idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port, &test_oid[idx]); - - test_oid[idx] = 0; /* udpEndpointInstance */ - idx++; - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, idx, NULL); - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* fill in object properties */ - return udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value_core(column, value); - } else { - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } -} - -/* --- udpTable --- */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ -static const struct snmp_oid_range udp_Table_oid_ranges[] = { - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ - { 0, 0xff }, /* IP D */ - { 1, 0xffff } /* Port */ -}; - -static snmp_err_t udp_Table_get_cell_value_core(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); - - switch (*column) { - case 1: /* udpLocalAddress */ - /* set reference to PCB local IP and return a generic node that copies IP4 addresses */ - value->u32 = ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)->addr; - break; - - case 2: /* udpLocalPort */ - /* set reference to PCB local port and return a generic node that copies u16_t values */ - value->u32 = pcb->local_port; - break; - - default: - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static snmp_err_t udp_Table_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - ip4_addr_t ip; - u16_t port; - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - - /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, udp_Table_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges))) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* get IP and port from incoming OID */ - snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[0], &ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ - port = (u16_t)row_oid[4]; - - /* find udp_pcb with requested ip and port*/ - pcb = udp_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { - if (ip4_addr_cmp(&ip, ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)) && (port == pcb->local_port)) { - /* fill in object properties */ - return udp_Table_get_cell_value_core(pcb, column, value, value_len); - } - } - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static snmp_err_t udp_Table_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) -{ - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges)]; - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges)); - - /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ - pcb = udp_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges)]; - - if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { - snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), &test_oid[0]); - test_oid[4] = pcb->local_port; - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges), pcb); - } - - pcb = pcb->next; - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* fill in object properties */ - return udp_Table_get_cell_value_core((struct udp_pcb *)state.reference, column, value, value_len); - } else { - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_inDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, udp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_noPorts = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, udp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_inErrors = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, udp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_outDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, udp_get_value); -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_HCInDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64, udp_get_value); -static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_HCOutDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64, udp_get_value); -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def udp_Table_columns[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* udpLocalAddress */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* udpLocalPort */ -}; -static const struct snmp_table_simple_node udp_Table = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(5, udp_Table_columns, udp_Table_get_cell_value, udp_Table_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def udp_endpointTable_columns[] = { - /* all items except udpEndpointProcess are declared as not-accessible */ - { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_UNSIGNED32, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* udpEndpointProcess */ -}; - -static const struct snmp_table_simple_node udp_endpointTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(7, udp_endpointTable_columns, udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value, udp_endpointTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); - -/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, udp_inDatagrams) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(2, udp_noPorts) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(3, udp_inErrors) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(4, udp_outDatagrams) -#if LWIP_IPV4 -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(5, udp_Table) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(7, udp_endpointTable) -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(8, udp_HCInDatagrams) -CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(9, udp_HCOutDatagrams) -#endif - -static const struct snmp_node *const udp_nodes[] = { - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_inDatagrams).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_noPorts).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_inErrors).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_outDatagrams).node.node, -#if LWIP_IPV4 - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_Table).node.node, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_endpointTable).node.node -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 - , - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_HCInDatagrams).node.node, - &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_HCOutDatagrams).node.node -#endif -}; - -const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_udp_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(7, udp_nodes); -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_UDP */ +/** + * @file + * Management Information Base II (RFC1213) UDP objects and functions. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * Christiaan Simons + */ + +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_UDP + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name##_synced +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) \ + static const struct snmp_threadsync_node node_name##_synced = SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, &node_name.node, &snmp_mib2_lwip_locks); +#else +#define SYNC_NODE_NAME(node_name) node_name +#define CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(oid, node_name) +#endif + +/* --- udp .1.3.6.1.2.1.7 ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +static s16_t udp_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; + + switch (instance->node->oid) { + case 1: /* udpInDatagrams */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.udpindatagrams); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 2: /* udpNoPorts */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.udpnoports); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 3: /* udpInErrors */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.udpinerrors); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); + + case 4: /* udpOutDatagrams */ + *uint_ptr = STATS_GET(mib2.udpoutdatagrams); + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 + + case 8: /* udpHCInDatagrams */ + { + /* use the 32 bit counter for now... */ + u64_t val64 = STATS_GET(mib2.udpindatagrams); + *((u64_t *)value) = val64; + } + + return sizeof(u64_t); + + case 9: /* udpHCOutDatagrams */ + { + /* use the 32 bit counter for now... */ + u64_t val64 = STATS_GET(mib2.udpoutdatagrams); + *((u64_t *)value) = val64; + } + + return sizeof(u64_t); +#endif + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("udp_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", instance->node->oid)); + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* --- udpEndpointTable --- */ + +static snmp_err_t udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value_core(const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value) +{ + /* all items except udpEndpointProcess are declared as not-accessible */ + switch (*column) { + case 8: /* udpEndpointProcess */ + value->u32 = 0; /* not supported */ + break; + + default: + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static snmp_err_t udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + ip_addr_t local_ip, remote_ip; + u16_t local_port, remote_port; + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + u8_t idx = 0; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + + /* udpEndpointLocalAddressType + udpEndpointLocalAddress + udpEndpointLocalPort */ + idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &local_ip, &local_port); + + if (idx == 0) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* udpEndpointRemoteAddressType + udpEndpointRemoteAddress + udpEndpointRemotePort */ + idx += snmp_oid_to_ip_port(&row_oid[idx], row_oid_len - idx, &remote_ip, &remote_port); + + if (idx == 0) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* udpEndpointInstance */ + if (row_oid_len < (idx + 1)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + if (row_oid[idx] != 0) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* find udp_pcb with requested ip and port*/ + pcb = udp_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + if (ip_addr_cmp(&local_ip, &pcb->local_ip) && + (local_port == pcb->local_port) && + ip_addr_cmp(&remote_ip, &pcb->remote_ip) && + (remote_port == pcb->remote_port)) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value_core(column, value); + } + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static snmp_err_t udp_endpointTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + /* 1x udpEndpointLocalAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x udpEndpointLocalAddress + 1x udpEndpointLocalPort + + * 1x udpEndpointRemoteAddressType + 1x OID len + 16x udpEndpointRemoteAddress + 1x udpEndpointRemotePort + + * 1x udpEndpointInstance = 39 + */ + u32_t result_temp[39]; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)); + + /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ + pcb = udp_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(result_temp)]; + u8_t idx = 0; + + /* udpEndpointLocalAddressType + udpEndpointLocalAddress + udpEndpointLocalPort */ + idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port, &test_oid[idx]); + + /* udpEndpointRemoteAddressType + udpEndpointRemoteAddress + udpEndpointRemotePort */ + idx += snmp_ip_port_to_oid(&pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port, &test_oid[idx]); + + test_oid[idx] = 0; /* udpEndpointInstance */ + idx++; + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, idx, NULL); + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* fill in object properties */ + return udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value_core(column, value); + } else { + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } +} + +/* --- udpTable --- */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +/* list of allowed value ranges for incoming OID */ +static const struct snmp_oid_range udp_Table_oid_ranges[] = { + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP A */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP B */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP C */ + { 0, 0xff }, /* IP D */ + { 1, 0xffff } /* Port */ +}; + +static snmp_err_t udp_Table_get_cell_value_core(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const u32_t *column, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(value_len); + + switch (*column) { + case 1: /* udpLocalAddress */ + /* set reference to PCB local IP and return a generic node that copies IP4 addresses */ + value->u32 = ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)->addr; + break; + + case 2: /* udpLocalPort */ + /* set reference to PCB local port and return a generic node that copies u16_t values */ + value->u32 = pcb->local_port; + break; + + default: + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static snmp_err_t udp_Table_get_cell_value(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + ip4_addr_t ip; + u16_t port; + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + + /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(row_oid, row_oid_len, udp_Table_oid_ranges, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges))) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* get IP and port from incoming OID */ + snmp_oid_to_ip4(&row_oid[0], &ip); /* we know it succeeds because of oid_in_range check above */ + port = (u16_t)row_oid[4]; + + /* find udp_pcb with requested ip and port*/ + pcb = udp_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { + if (ip4_addr_cmp(&ip, ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)) && (port == pcb->local_port)) { + /* fill in object properties */ + return udp_Table_get_cell_value_core(pcb, column, value, value_len); + } + } + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static snmp_err_t udp_Table_get_next_cell_instance_and_value(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len) +{ + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges)]; + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges)); + + /* iterate over all possible OIDs to find the next one */ + pcb = udp_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges)]; + + if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { + snmp_ip4_to_oid(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), &test_oid[0]); + test_oid[4] = pcb->local_port; + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(udp_Table_oid_ranges), pcb); + } + + pcb = pcb->next; + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* fill in object properties */ + return udp_Table_get_cell_value_core((struct udp_pcb *)state.reference, column, value, value_len); + } else { + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_inDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, udp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_noPorts = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, udp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_inErrors = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, udp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_outDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, udp_get_value); +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_HCInDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64, udp_get_value); +static const struct snmp_scalar_node udp_HCOutDatagrams = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64, udp_get_value); +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def udp_Table_columns[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 }, /* udpLocalAddress */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* udpLocalPort */ +}; +static const struct snmp_table_simple_node udp_Table = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(5, udp_Table_columns, udp_Table_get_cell_value, udp_Table_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def udp_endpointTable_columns[] = { + /* all items except udpEndpointProcess are declared as not-accessible */ + { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_UNSIGNED32, SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32 } /* udpEndpointProcess */ +}; + +static const struct snmp_table_simple_node udp_endpointTable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(7, udp_endpointTable_columns, udp_endpointTable_get_cell_value, udp_endpointTable_get_next_cell_instance_and_value); + +/* the following nodes access variables in LWIP stack from SNMP worker thread and must therefore be synced to LWIP (TCPIP) thread */ +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(1, udp_inDatagrams) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(2, udp_noPorts) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(3, udp_inErrors) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(4, udp_outDatagrams) +#if LWIP_IPV4 +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(5, udp_Table) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(7, udp_endpointTable) +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(8, udp_HCInDatagrams) +CREATE_LWIP_SYNC_NODE(9, udp_HCOutDatagrams) +#endif + +static const struct snmp_node *const udp_nodes[] = { + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_inDatagrams).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_noPorts).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_inErrors).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_outDatagrams).node.node, +#if LWIP_IPV4 + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_Table).node.node, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_endpointTable).node.node +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 + , + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_HCInDatagrams).node.node, + &SYNC_NODE_NAME(udp_HCOutDatagrams).node.node +#endif +}; + +const struct snmp_tree_node snmp_mib2_udp_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(7, udp_nodes); +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 && LWIP_UDP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c index 60156f13..896e18c2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.c @@ -1,2008 +1,2008 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP message processing (RFC1157). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Christiaan Simons - * Martin Hentschel - * Elias Oenal - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "snmp_msg.h" -#include "snmp_asn1.h" -#include "snmp_core_priv.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 -#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" -#include "snmpv3_priv.h" -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif -#endif - -#include - -#define SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG 0x01 -#define SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG 0x02 - -/* Security levels */ -#define SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV 0x00 -#define SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG -#define SNMP_V3_AUTHPRIV (SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG | SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG) - -/* public (non-static) constants */ -/** SNMP community string */ -const char *snmp_community = SNMP_COMMUNITY; -/** SNMP community string for write access */ -const char *snmp_community_write = SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE; -/** SNMP community string for sending traps */ -const char *snmp_community_trap = SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP; - -snmp_write_callback_fct snmp_write_callback = NULL; -void *snmp_write_callback_arg = NULL; - -#if LWIP_SNMP_CONFIGURE_VERSIONS - -static u8_t v1_enabled = 1; -static u8_t v2c_enabled = 1; -static u8_t v3_enabled = 1; - -static u8_t snmp_version_enabled(u8_t version) -{ - if (version == SNMP_VERSION_1) { - return v1_enabled; - } else if (version == SNMP_VERSION_2c) { - return v2c_enabled; - } -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - else if (version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { - return v3_enabled; - } -#endif - else { - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid SNMP version", 0); - return 0; - } -} - -u8_t snmp_v1_enabled(void) -{ - return snmp_version_enabled(SNMP_VERSION_1); -} - -u8_t snmp_v2c_enabled(void) -{ - return snmp_version_enabled(SNMP_VERSION_2c); -} - -u8_t snmp_v3_enabled(void) -{ - return snmp_version_enabled(SNMP_VERSION_3); -} - -static void snmp_version_enable(u8_t version, u8_t enable) -{ - if (version == SNMP_VERSION_1) { - v1_enabled = enable; - } else if (version == SNMP_VERSION_2c) { - v2c_enabled = enable; - } -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - else if (version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { - v3_enabled = enable; - } -#endif - else { - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid SNMP version", 0); - } -} - -void snmp_v1_enable(u8_t enable) -{ - snmp_version_enable(SNMP_VERSION_1, enable); -} - -void snmp_v2c_enable(u8_t enable) -{ - snmp_version_enable(SNMP_VERSION_2c, enable); -} - -void snmp_v3_enable(u8_t enable) -{ - snmp_version_enable(SNMP_VERSION_3, enable); -} - -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * Returns current SNMP community string. - * @return current SNMP community string - */ -const char *snmp_get_community(void) -{ - return snmp_community; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * Sets SNMP community string. - * The string itself (its storage) must be valid throughout the whole life of - * program (or until it is changed to sth else). - * - * @param community is a pointer to new community string - */ -void snmp_set_community(const char *const community) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("community string is too long!", strlen(community) <= SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); - snmp_community = community; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * Returns current SNMP write-access community string. - * @return current SNMP write-access community string - */ -const char *snmp_get_community_write(void) -{ - return snmp_community_write; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Returns current SNMP community string used for sending traps. - * @return current SNMP community string used for sending traps - */ -const char *snmp_get_community_trap(void) -{ - return snmp_community_trap; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * Sets SNMP community string for write-access. - * The string itself (its storage) must be valid throughout the whole life of - * program (or until it is changed to sth else). - * - * @param community is a pointer to new write-access community string - */ -void snmp_set_community_write(const char *const community) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("community string must not be NULL", community != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("community string is too long!", strlen(community) <= SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); - snmp_community_write = community; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Sets SNMP community string used for sending traps. - * The string itself (its storage) must be valid throughout the whole life of - * program (or until it is changed to sth else). - * - * @param community is a pointer to new trap community string - */ -void snmp_set_community_trap(const char *const community) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("community string is too long!", strlen(community) <= SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); - snmp_community_trap = community; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * Callback fired on every successful write access - */ -void snmp_set_write_callback(snmp_write_callback_fct write_callback, void *callback_arg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - snmp_write_callback = write_callback; - snmp_write_callback_arg = callback_arg; -} - -/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* forward declarations */ -/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ - -static err_t snmp_process_get_request(struct snmp_request *request); -static err_t snmp_process_getnext_request(struct snmp_request *request); -static err_t snmp_process_getbulk_request(struct snmp_request *request); -static err_t snmp_process_set_request(struct snmp_request *request); - -static err_t snmp_parse_inbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request); -static err_t snmp_prepare_outbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request); -static err_t snmp_complete_outbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request); -static void snmp_execute_write_callbacks(struct snmp_request *request); - -/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* implementation */ -/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ - -void snmp_receive(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *source_ip, u16_t port) -{ - err_t err; - struct snmp_request request; - - memset(&request, 0, sizeof(request)); - request.handle = handle; - request.source_ip = source_ip; - request.source_port = port; - request.inbound_pbuf = p; - - snmp_stats.inpkts++; - - err = snmp_parse_inbound_frame(&request); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - err = snmp_prepare_outbound_frame(&request); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - if (request.error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - /* only process frame if we do not already have an error to return (e.g. all readonly) */ - if (request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_REQ) { - err = snmp_process_get_request(&request); - } else if (request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_NEXT_REQ) { - err = snmp_process_getnext_request(&request); - } else if (request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ) { - err = snmp_process_getbulk_request(&request); - } else if (request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) { - err = snmp_process_set_request(&request); - } - } -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - else { - struct snmp_varbind vb; - - vb.next = NULL; - vb.prev = NULL; - vb.type = SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER32; - vb.value_len = sizeof(u32_t); - - switch (request.error_status) { - case SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR: { - static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 5, 0 }; - snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); - vb.value = &snmp_stats.wrongdigests; - } break; - - case SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_ENGINEID: { - static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 4, 0 }; - snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); - vb.value = &snmp_stats.unknownengineids; - } break; - - case SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_SECURITYNAME: { - static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 3, 0 }; - snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); - vb.value = &snmp_stats.unknownusernames; - } break; - - case SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL: { - static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 1, 0 }; - snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); - vb.value = &snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels; - } break; - - case SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW: { - static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 2, 0 }; - snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); - vb.value = &snmp_stats.notintimewindows; - } break; - - case SNMP_ERR_DECRYIPTION_ERROR: { - static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 6, 0 }; - snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); - vb.value = &snmp_stats.decryptionerrors; - } break; - - default: - /* Unknown or unhandled error_status */ - err = ERR_ARG; - } - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - snmp_append_outbound_varbind(&(request.outbound_pbuf_stream), &vb); - request.error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - - request.request_out_type = (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_REPORT); - request.request_id = request.msg_id; - } - -#endif - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - err = snmp_complete_outbound_frame(&request); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - err = snmp_sendto(request.handle, request.outbound_pbuf, request.source_ip, request.source_port); - - if ((request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) && (request.error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) && (snmp_write_callback != NULL)) { - /* raise write notification for all written objects */ - snmp_execute_write_callbacks(&request); - } - } - } - } - - if (request.outbound_pbuf != NULL) { - pbuf_free(request.outbound_pbuf); - } - } -} - -static u8_t snmp_msg_getnext_validate_node_inst(struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance, void *validate_arg) -{ - if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ) != SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ) || (node_instance->get_value == NULL)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 - - if ((node_instance->asn1_type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64) && (((struct snmp_request *)validate_arg)->version == SNMP_VERSION_1)) { - /* according to RFC 2089 skip Counter64 objects in GetNext requests from v1 clients */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - -#endif - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static void snmp_process_varbind(struct snmp_request *request, struct snmp_varbind *vb, u8_t get_next) -{ - err_t err; - struct snmp_node_instance node_instance; - memset(&node_instance, 0, sizeof(node_instance)); - - if (get_next) { - struct snmp_obj_id result_oid; - request->error_status = snmp_get_next_node_instance_from_oid(vb->oid.id, vb->oid.len, snmp_msg_getnext_validate_node_inst, request, &result_oid, &node_instance); - - if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - snmp_oid_assign(&vb->oid, result_oid.id, result_oid.len); - } - } else { - request->error_status = snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(vb->oid.id, vb->oid.len, &node_instance); - - if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - /* use 'getnext_validate' method for validation to avoid code duplication (some checks have to be executed here) */ - request->error_status = snmp_msg_getnext_validate_node_inst(&node_instance, request); - - if (request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - if (node_instance.release_instance != NULL) { - node_instance.release_instance(&node_instance); - } - } - } - } - - if (request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - if (request->error_status >= SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET) { - if ((request->version == SNMP_VERSION_2c) || request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { - /* in SNMP v2c a varbind related exception is stored in varbind and not in frame header */ - vb->type = (SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | (request->error_status & SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_MASK)); - vb->value_len = 0; - - err = snmp_append_outbound_varbind(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), vb); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - /* we stored the exception in varbind -> go on */ - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } else if (err == ERR_BUF) { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG; - } else { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - } - } else { - /* according to RFC 1157/1905, all other errors only return genError */ - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - } else { - s16_t len = node_instance.get_value(&node_instance, vb->value); - - if (len >= 0) { - vb->value_len = (u16_t)len; /* cast is OK because we checked >= 0 above */ - vb->type = node_instance.asn1_type; - - LWIP_ASSERT("SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE is configured too low", (vb->value_len & ~SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA) <= SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE); - err = snmp_append_outbound_varbind(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, vb); - - if (err == ERR_BUF) { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG; - } else if (err != ERR_OK) { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - } else { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - - if (node_instance.release_instance != NULL) { - node_instance.release_instance(&node_instance); - } - } -} - -/** - * Service an internal or external event for SNMP GET. - * - * @param request points to the associated message process state - */ -static err_t snmp_process_get_request(struct snmp_request *request) -{ - snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t err; - struct snmp_varbind vb; - vb.value = request->value_buffer; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP get request\n")); - - while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); - - if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { - if ((vb.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL) && (vb.value_len == 0)) { - snmp_process_varbind(request, &vb, 0); - } else { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { - /* no more varbinds in request */ - break; - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) { - /* malformed ASN.1, don't answer */ - return ERR_ARG; - } else { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Service an internal or external event for SNMP GET. - * - * @param request points to the associated message process state - */ -static err_t snmp_process_getnext_request(struct snmp_request *request) -{ - snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t err; - struct snmp_varbind vb; - vb.value = request->value_buffer; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP get-next request\n")); - - while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); - - if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { - if ((vb.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL) && (vb.value_len == 0)) { - snmp_process_varbind(request, &vb, 1); - } else { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { - /* no more varbinds in request */ - break; - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) { - /* malformed ASN.1, don't answer */ - return ERR_ARG; - } else { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Service an internal or external event for SNMP GETBULKT. - * - * @param request points to the associated message process state - */ -static err_t snmp_process_getbulk_request(struct snmp_request *request) -{ - snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t err; - s32_t non_repeaters = request->non_repeaters; - s32_t repetitions; - u16_t repetition_offset = 0; - struct snmp_varbind_enumerator repetition_varbind_enumerator; - struct snmp_varbind vb; - vb.value = request->value_buffer; - - if (SNMP_LWIP_GETBULK_MAX_REPETITIONS > 0) { - repetitions = LWIP_MIN(request->max_repetitions, SNMP_LWIP_GETBULK_MAX_REPETITIONS); - } else { - repetitions = request->max_repetitions; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP get-bulk request\n")); - - /* process non repeaters and first repetition */ - while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - if (non_repeaters == 0) { - repetition_offset = request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset; - - if (repetitions == 0) { - /* do not resolve repeaters when repetitions is set to 0 */ - break; - } - - repetitions--; - } - - err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); - - if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { - /* no more varbinds in request */ - break; - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) { - /* malformed ASN.1, don't answer */ - return ERR_ARG; - } else if ((err != SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) || (vb.type != SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL) || (vb.value_len != 0)) { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } else { - snmp_process_varbind(request, &vb, 1); - non_repeaters--; - } - } - - /* process repetitions > 1 */ - while ((request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) && (repetitions > 0) && (request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset != repetition_offset)) { - u8_t all_endofmibview = 1; - - snmp_vb_enumerator_init(&repetition_varbind_enumerator, request->outbound_pbuf, repetition_offset, request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset - repetition_offset); - repetition_offset = request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset; /* for next loop */ - - while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - vb.value = NULL; /* do NOT decode value (we enumerate outbound buffer here, so all varbinds have values assigned) */ - err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&repetition_varbind_enumerator, &vb); - - if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { - vb.value = request->value_buffer; - snmp_process_varbind(request, &vb, 1); - - if (request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - /* already set correct error-index (here it cannot be taken from inbound varbind enumerator) */ - request->error_index = request->non_repeaters + repetition_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; - } else if (vb.type != (SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_END_OF_MIB_VIEW)) { - all_endofmibview = 0; - } - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { - /* no more varbinds in request */ - break; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("Very strange, we cannot parse the varbind output that we created just before!")); - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - request->error_index = request->non_repeaters + repetition_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; - } - } - - if ((request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) && all_endofmibview) { - /* stop when all varbinds in a loop return EndOfMibView */ - break; - } - - repetitions--; - } - - if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG) { - /* for GetBulk it is ok, if not all requested variables fit into the response -> just return the varbinds added so far */ - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Service an internal or external event for SNMP SET. - * - * @param request points to the associated message process state - */ -static err_t snmp_process_set_request(struct snmp_request *request) -{ - snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t err; - struct snmp_varbind vb; - vb.value = request->value_buffer; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP set request\n")); - - /* perform set test on all objects */ - while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); - - if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { - struct snmp_node_instance node_instance; - memset(&node_instance, 0, sizeof(node_instance)); - - request->error_status = snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(vb.oid.id, vb.oid.len, &node_instance); - - if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - if (node_instance.asn1_type != vb.type) { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_WRONGTYPE; - } else if (((node_instance.access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE) != SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE) || (node_instance.set_value == NULL)) { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; - } else { - if (node_instance.set_test != NULL) { - request->error_status = node_instance.set_test(&node_instance, vb.value_len, vb.value); - } - } - - if (node_instance.release_instance != NULL) { - node_instance.release_instance(&node_instance); - } - } - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { - /* no more varbinds in request */ - break; - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_INVALIDLENGTH) { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_WRONGLENGTH; - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) { - /* malformed ASN.1, don't answer */ - return ERR_ARG; - } else { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - } - - /* perform real set operation on all objects */ - if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - snmp_vb_enumerator_init(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, request->inbound_pbuf, request->inbound_varbind_offset, request->inbound_varbind_len); - - while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); - - if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { - struct snmp_node_instance node_instance; - memset(&node_instance, 0, sizeof(node_instance)); - request->error_status = snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(vb.oid.id, vb.oid.len, &node_instance); - - if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - if (node_instance.set_value(&node_instance, vb.value_len, vb.value) != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - if (request->inbound_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count == 1) { - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_COMMITFAILED; - } else { - /* we cannot undo the set operations done so far */ - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNDOFAILED; - } - } - - if (node_instance.release_instance != NULL) { - node_instance.release_instance(&node_instance); - } - } - } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { - /* no more varbinds in request */ - break; - } else { - /* first time enumerating varbinds work but second time not, although nothing should have changed in between ??? */ - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#define PARSE_EXEC(code, retValue) \ - if ((code) != ERR_OK) { \ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("Malformed ASN.1 detected.\n")); \ - snmp_stats.inasnparseerrs++; \ - return retValue; \ - } - -#define PARSE_ASSERT(cond, retValue) \ - if (!(cond)) { \ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP parse assertion failed!: " #cond)); \ - snmp_stats.inasnparseerrs++; \ - return retValue; \ - } - -#define BUILD_EXEC(code, retValue) \ - if ((code) != ERR_OK) { \ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP error during creation of outbound frame!: " #code)); \ - return retValue; \ - } - -#define IF_PARSE_EXEC(code) PARSE_EXEC(code, ERR_ARG) -#define IF_PARSE_ASSERT(code) PARSE_ASSERT(code, ERR_ARG) - -/** - * Checks and decodes incoming SNMP message header, logs header errors. - * - * @param request points to the current message request state return - * @return - * - ERR_OK SNMP header is sane and accepted - * - ERR_VAL SNMP header is either malformed or rejected - */ -static err_t snmp_parse_inbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request) -{ - struct snmp_pbuf_stream pbuf_stream; - struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; - s32_t parent_tlv_value_len; - s32_t s32_value; - err_t err; -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - snmpv3_auth_algo_t auth; - snmpv3_priv_algo_t priv; -#endif - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&pbuf_stream, request->inbound_pbuf, 0, request->inbound_pbuf->tot_len)); - - /* decode main container consisting of version, community and PDU */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT((tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE) && (tlv.value_len == pbuf_stream.length)); - parent_tlv_value_len = tlv.value_len; - - /* decode version */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); - - if (((s32_value != SNMP_VERSION_1) && - (s32_value != SNMP_VERSION_2c) -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - && (s32_value != SNMP_VERSION_3) -#endif - ) -#if LWIP_SNMP_CONFIGURE_VERSIONS - || (!snmp_version_enabled(s32_value)) -#endif - ) { - /* unsupported SNMP version */ - snmp_stats.inbadversions++; - return ERR_ARG; - } - - request->version = (u8_t)s32_value; - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - - if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { - u16_t u16_value; - u16_t inbound_msgAuthenticationParameters_offset; - - /* SNMPv3 doesn't use communities */ - /* @todo: Differentiate read/write access */ - strncpy((char *)request->community, snmp_community, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); - request->community[SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN] = 0; /* ensure NULL termination (strncpy does NOT guarantee it!) */ - request->community_strlen = (u16_t)strnlen((char *)request->community, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); - - /* RFC3414 globalData */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - /* decode msgID */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); - request->msg_id = s32_value; - - /* decode msgMaxSize */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); - request->msg_max_size = s32_value; - - /* decode msgFlags */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); - request->msg_flags = (u8_t)s32_value; - - /* decode msgSecurityModel */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); - request->msg_security_model = s32_value; - - /* RFC3414 msgSecurityParameters - * The User-based Security Model defines the contents of the OCTET - * STRING as a SEQUENCE. - * - * We skip the protective dummy OCTET STRING header - * to access the SEQUENCE header. - */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - /* msgSecurityParameters SEQUENCE header */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - /* decode msgAuthoritativeEngineID */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id, - &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH)); - request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len = (u8_t)u16_value; - - /* msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots)); - - /* msgAuthoritativeEngineTime */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->msg_authoritative_engine_time)); - - /* msgUserName */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_user_name, - &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH)); - request->msg_user_name_len = (u8_t)u16_value; - - /* msgAuthenticationParameters */ - memset(request->msg_authentication_parameters, 0, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - /* Remember position */ - inbound_msgAuthenticationParameters_offset = pbuf_stream.offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inbound_msgAuthenticationParameters_offset); - /* Read auth parameters */ - /* IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.value_len <= SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_authentication_parameters, - &u16_value, tlv.value_len)); - request->msg_authentication_parameters_len = (u8_t)u16_value; - - /* msgPrivacyParameters */ - memset(request->msg_privacy_parameters, 0, SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH); - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_privacy_parameters, - &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH)); - request->msg_privacy_parameters_len = (u8_t)u16_value; - - /* validate securityParameters here (do this after decoding because we don't want to increase other counters for wrong frames) - * 1) securityParameters was correctly serialized if we reach here. - * 2) securityParameters are already cached. - * 3) if msgAuthoritativeEngineID is unknown, zero-length or too long: - b) https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3414#section-7 - */ - { - const char *eid; - u8_t eid_len; - - snmpv3_get_engine_id(&eid, &eid_len); - - if ((request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len == 0) || - (request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len != eid_len) || - (memcmp(eid, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id, eid_len) != 0)) { - snmp_stats.unknownengineids++; - request->msg_flags = 0; /* noauthnopriv */ - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_ENGINEID; - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* 4) verify username */ - if (snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, &auth, NULL, &priv, NULL)) { - snmp_stats.unknownusernames++; - request->msg_flags = 0; /* noauthnopriv */ - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_SECURITYNAME; - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* 5) verify security level */ - switch (request->msg_flags & (SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG | SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG)) { - case SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV: - if ((auth != SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_INVAL) || (priv != SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_INVAL)) { - /* Invalid security level for user */ - snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL; - return ERR_OK; - } - - break; -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - - case SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV: - if ((auth == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_INVAL) || (priv != SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_INVAL)) { - /* Invalid security level for user */ - snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL; - return ERR_OK; - } - - break; - - case SNMP_V3_AUTHPRIV: - if ((auth == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_INVAL) || (priv == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_INVAL)) { - /* Invalid security level for user */ - snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL; - return ERR_OK; - } - - break; -#endif - - default: - snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL; - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* 6) if securitylevel specifies authentication, authenticate message. */ -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - - if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG) { - const u8_t zero_arr[SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH] = { 0 }; - u8_t key[20]; - u8_t hmac[LWIP_MAX(SNMP_V3_SHA_LEN, SNMP_V3_MD5_LEN)]; - struct snmp_pbuf_stream auth_stream; - - if (request->msg_authentication_parameters_len > SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH) { - snmp_stats.wrongdigests++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR; - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Rewind stream */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&auth_stream, request->inbound_pbuf, 0, request->inbound_pbuf->tot_len)); - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&auth_stream, inbound_msgAuthenticationParameters_offset)); - /* Set auth parameters to zero for verification */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(&auth_stream, zero_arr, request->msg_authentication_parameters_len)); - - /* Verify authentication */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&auth_stream, request->inbound_pbuf, 0, request->inbound_pbuf->tot_len)); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, &auth, key, NULL, NULL)); - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmpv3_auth(&auth_stream, request->inbound_pbuf->tot_len, key, auth, hmac)); - - if (memcmp(request->msg_authentication_parameters, hmac, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH)) { - snmp_stats.wrongdigests++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR; - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* 7) if securitylevel specifies authentication, verify engineboots, enginetime and lastenginetime */ - { - s32_t boots = snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(); - - if ((request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots != boots) || (boots == 2147483647UL)) { - snmp_stats.notintimewindows++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW; - return ERR_OK; - } - } - { - s32_t time = snmpv3_get_engine_time_internal(); - - if (request->msg_authoritative_engine_time > (time + 150)) { - snmp_stats.notintimewindows++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW; - return ERR_OK; - } else if (time > 150) { - if (request->msg_authoritative_engine_time < (time - 150)) { - snmp_stats.notintimewindows++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW; - return ERR_OK; - } - } - } - } - -#endif - - /* 8) if securitylevel specifies privacy, decrypt message. */ -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - - if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG) { - /* Decrypt message */ - - u8_t key[20]; - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, NULL, NULL, &priv, key)); - - if (snmpv3_crypt(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, key, - request->msg_privacy_parameters, request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots, - request->msg_authoritative_engine_time, priv, SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_DECRYPT) != ERR_OK) { - snmp_stats.decryptionerrors++; - request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV; - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_DECRYIPTION_ERROR; - return ERR_OK; - } - } - -#endif - /* 9) calculate max size of scoped pdu? - * 10) securityname for user is retrieved from usertable? - * 11) security data is cached? - * 12) - */ - - /* Scoped PDU - * Encryption context - */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - /* contextEngineID */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->context_engine_id, - &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH)); - request->context_engine_id_len = (u8_t)u16_value; - /* TODO: do we need to verify this contextengineid too? */ - - /* contextName */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->context_name, - &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH)); - request->context_name_len = (u8_t)u16_value; - /* TODO: do we need to verify this contextname too? */ - } else -#endif - { - /* decode community */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - err = snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->community, &request->community_strlen, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); - - if (err == ERR_MEM) { - /* community string does not fit in our buffer -> its too long -> its invalid */ - request->community_strlen = 0; - snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len); - } else { - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(err == ERR_OK); - } - - /* add zero terminator */ - request->community[request->community_strlen] = 0; - } - - /* decode PDU type (next container level) */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.value_len <= pbuf_stream.length); - request->inbound_padding_len = pbuf_stream.length - tlv.value_len; - parent_tlv_value_len = tlv.value_len; - - /* validate PDU type */ - switch (tlv.type) { - case (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_REQ): - /* GetRequest PDU */ - snmp_stats.ingetrequests++; - break; - - case (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_NEXT_REQ): - /* GetNextRequest PDU */ - snmp_stats.ingetnexts++; - break; - - case (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ): - - /* GetBulkRequest PDU */ - if (request->version < SNMP_VERSION_2c) { - /* RFC2089: invalid, drop packet */ - return ERR_ARG; - } - - break; - - case (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ): - /* SetRequest PDU */ - snmp_stats.insetrequests++; - break; - - default: - /* unsupported input PDU for this agent (no parse error) */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("Unknown/Invalid SNMP PDU type received: %d", tlv.type)); - - return ERR_ARG; - } - - request->request_type = tlv.type & SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_MASK; - request->request_out_type = (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_RESP); - - /* validate community (do this after decoding PDU type because we don't want to increase 'inbadcommunitynames' for wrong frame types */ - if (request->community_strlen == 0) { - /* community string was too long or really empty*/ - snmp_stats.inbadcommunitynames++; - snmp_authfail_trap(); - return ERR_ARG; - } else if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) { - if (snmp_community_write[0] == 0) { - /* our write community is empty, that means all our objects are readonly */ - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; - request->error_index = 1; - } else if (strncmp(snmp_community_write, (const char *)request->community, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN) != 0) { - /* community name does not match */ - snmp_stats.inbadcommunitynames++; - snmp_authfail_trap(); - return ERR_ARG; - } - } else { - if (strncmp(snmp_community, (const char *)request->community, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN) != 0) { - /* community name does not match */ - snmp_stats.inbadcommunitynames++; - snmp_authfail_trap(); - return ERR_ARG; - } - } - - /* decode request ID */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->request_id)); - - /* decode error status / non-repeaters */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ) { - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->non_repeaters)); - - if (request->non_repeaters < 0) { - /* RFC 1905, 4.2.3 */ - request->non_repeaters = 0; - } - } else { - /* only check valid value, don't touch 'request->error_status', maybe a response error status was already set to above; */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(s32_value == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR); - } - - /* decode error index / max-repetitions */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); - parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); - - if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ) { - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->max_repetitions)); - - if (request->max_repetitions < 0) { - /* RFC 1905, 4.2.3 */ - request->max_repetitions = 0; - } - } else { - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->error_index)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT(s32_value == 0); - } - - /* decode varbind-list type (next container level) */ - IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - IF_PARSE_ASSERT((tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE) && (tlv.value_len <= pbuf_stream.length)); - - request->inbound_varbind_offset = pbuf_stream.offset; - request->inbound_varbind_len = pbuf_stream.length - request->inbound_padding_len; - snmp_vb_enumerator_init(&(request->inbound_varbind_enumerator), request->inbound_pbuf, request->inbound_varbind_offset, request->inbound_varbind_len); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#define OF_BUILD_EXEC(code) BUILD_EXEC(code, ERR_ARG) - -static err_t snmp_prepare_outbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request) -{ - struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; - struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream = &(request->outbound_pbuf_stream); - - /* try allocating pbuf(s) for maximum response size */ - request->outbound_pbuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 1472, PBUF_RAM); - - if (request->outbound_pbuf == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - snmp_pbuf_stream_init(pbuf_stream, request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len); - - /* 'Message' sequence */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - /* version */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->version, &tlv.value_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->version)); - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - - if (request->version < SNMP_VERSION_3) { -#endif - /* community */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->community_strlen); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->community, request->community_strlen)); -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - } else { - const char *id; - - /* globalData */ - request->outbound_msg_global_data_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 1, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - /* msgID */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_id, &tlv.value_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_id)); - - /* msgMaxSize */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_max_size, &tlv.value_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_max_size)); - - /* msgFlags */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, 1); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, &request->msg_flags, 1)); - - /* msgSecurityModel */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_security_model, &tlv.value_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_security_model)); - - /* end of msgGlobalData */ - request->outbound_msg_global_data_end = pbuf_stream->offset; - - /* msgSecurityParameters */ - request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_str_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 1, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_seq_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 1, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - /* msgAuthoritativeEngineID */ - snmpv3_get_engine_id(&id, &request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len); - MEMCPY(request->msg_authoritative_engine_id, id, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len); - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len)); - - request->msg_authoritative_engine_time = snmpv3_get_engine_time(); - request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots = snmpv3_get_engine_boots(); - - /* msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots, &tlv.value_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots)); - - /* msgAuthoritativeEngineTime */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_authoritative_engine_time, &tlv.value_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_authoritative_engine_time)); - - /* msgUserName */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->msg_user_name_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->msg_user_name, request->msg_user_name_len)); - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - - /* msgAuthenticationParameters */ - if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG) { - memset(request->msg_authentication_parameters, 0, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); - request->outbound_msg_authentication_parameters_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 1, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->msg_authentication_parameters, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH)); - } else -#endif - { - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - } - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - - /* msgPrivacyParameters */ - if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG) { - snmpv3_build_priv_param(request->msg_privacy_parameters); - - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->msg_privacy_parameters, SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH)); - } else -#endif - { - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - } - - /* End of msgSecurityParameters, so we can calculate the length of this sequence later */ - request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_end = pbuf_stream->offset; - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - - /* For encryption we have to encapsulate the payload in an octet string */ - if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG) { - request->outbound_scoped_pdu_string_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 3, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - } - -#endif - /* Scoped PDU - * Encryption context - */ - request->outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - /* contextEngineID */ - snmpv3_get_engine_id(&id, &request->context_engine_id_len); - MEMCPY(request->context_engine_id, id, request->context_engine_id_len); - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->context_engine_id_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->context_engine_id, request->context_engine_id_len)); - - /* contextName */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->context_name_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->context_name, request->context_name_len)); - } - -#endif - - /* 'PDU' sequence */ - request->outbound_pdu_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, request->request_out_type, 3, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - /* request ID */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->request_id, &tlv.value_len); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->request_id)); - - /* error status */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - request->outbound_error_status_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, 0)); - - /* error index */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - request->outbound_error_index_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, 0)); - - /* 'VarBindList' sequence */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, 0); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - request->outbound_varbind_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Calculate the length of a varbind list */ -err_t snmp_varbind_length(struct snmp_varbind *varbind, struct snmp_varbind_len *len) -{ - /* calculate required lengths */ - snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(varbind->oid.id, varbind->oid.len, &len->oid_value_len); - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len->oid_value_len, &len->oid_len_len); - - if (varbind->value_len == 0) { - len->value_value_len = 0; - } else if (varbind->value_len & SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA) { - len->value_value_len = varbind->value_len & (~SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA); - } else { - switch (varbind->type) { - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER: - if (varbind->value_len != sizeof(s32_t)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(*((s32_t *)varbind->value), &len->value_value_len); - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS: - if (varbind->value_len != sizeof(u32_t)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt(*((u32_t *)varbind->value), &len->value_value_len); - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OPAQUE: - len->value_value_len = varbind->value_len; - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL: - if (varbind->value_len != 0) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - len->value_value_len = 0; - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID: - if ((varbind->value_len & 0x03) != 0) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt((u32_t *)varbind->value, varbind->value_len >> 2, &len->value_value_len); - break; -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64: - if (varbind->value_len != sizeof(u64_t)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - snmp_asn1_enc_u64t_cnt(*(u64_t *)varbind->value, &len->value_value_len); - break; -#endif - - default: - /* unsupported type */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len->value_value_len, &len->value_len_len); - - len->vb_value_len = 1 + len->oid_len_len + len->oid_value_len + 1 + len->value_len_len + len->value_value_len; - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len->vb_value_len, &len->vb_len_len); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#define OVB_BUILD_EXEC(code) BUILD_EXEC(code, ERR_ARG) - -err_t snmp_append_outbound_varbind(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_varbind *varbind) -{ - struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; - struct snmp_varbind_len len; - err_t err; - - err = snmp_varbind_length(varbind, &len); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - /* check length already before adding first data because in case of GetBulk, - * data added so far is returned and therefore no partial data shall be added - */ - if ((1 + len.vb_len_len + len.vb_value_len) > pbuf_stream->length) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - /* 'VarBind' sequence */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, len.vb_len_len, len.vb_value_len); - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - /* VarBind OID */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, len.oid_len_len, len.oid_value_len); - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_oid(pbuf_stream, varbind->oid.id, varbind->oid.len)); - - /* VarBind value */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, varbind->type, len.value_len_len, len.value_value_len); - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - if (len.value_value_len > 0) { - if (varbind->value_len & SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA) { - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (u8_t *)varbind->value, len.value_value_len)); - } else { - switch (varbind->type) { - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER: - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, len.value_value_len, *((s32_t *)varbind->value))); - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS: - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_u32t(pbuf_stream, len.value_value_len, *((u32_t *)varbind->value))); - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OPAQUE: - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (u8_t *)varbind->value, len.value_value_len)); - len.value_value_len = varbind->value_len; - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID: - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_oid(pbuf_stream, (u32_t *)varbind->value, varbind->value_len / sizeof(u32_t))); - break; -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64: - OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_u64t(pbuf_stream, len.value_value_len, *(u64_t *)varbind->value)); - break; -#endif - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("Unknown variable type", 0); - break; - } - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t snmp_complete_outbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request) -{ - struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; - u16_t frame_size; - u8_t outbound_padding = 0; - - if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_1) { - if (request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - /* map v2c error codes to v1 compliant error code (according to RFC 2089) */ - switch (request->error_status) { - /* mapping of implementation specific "virtual" error codes - * (during processing of frame we already stored them in error_status field, - * so no need to check all varbinds here for those exceptions as suggested by RFC) */ - case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE: - case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHOBJECT: - case SNMP_ERR_ENDOFMIBVIEW: - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME; - break; - - /* mapping according to RFC */ - case SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE: - case SNMP_ERR_WRONGENCODING: - case SNMP_ERR_WRONGTYPE: - case SNMP_ERR_WRONGLENGTH: - case SNMP_ERR_INCONSISTENTVALUE: - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_BADVALUE; - break; - - case SNMP_ERR_NOACCESS: - case SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE: - case SNMP_ERR_NOCREATION: - case SNMP_ERR_INCONSISTENTNAME: - case SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR: - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME; - break; - - case SNMP_ERR_RESOURCEUNAVAILABLE: - case SNMP_ERR_COMMITFAILED: - case SNMP_ERR_UNDOFAILED: - default: - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - break; - } - } - } else { - if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) { - /* map error codes to according to RFC 1905 (4.2.5. The SetRequest-PDU) return 'NotWritable' for unknown OIDs) */ - switch (request->error_status) { - case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE: - case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHOBJECT: - case SNMP_ERR_ENDOFMIBVIEW: - request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; - break; - - default: - break; - } - } - - if (request->error_status >= SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET) { - /* should never occur because v2 frames store exceptions directly inside varbinds and not as frame error_status */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("snmp_complete_outbound_frame() > Found v2 request with varbind exception code stored as error status!\n")); - return ERR_ARG; - } - } - - if ((request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) || (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ)) { - /* all inbound vars are returned in response without any modification for error responses and successful set requests*/ - struct snmp_pbuf_stream inbound_stream; - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&inbound_stream, request->inbound_pbuf, request->inbound_varbind_offset, request->inbound_varbind_len)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_pbuf, request->outbound_varbind_offset, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len - request->outbound_varbind_offset)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_writeto(&inbound_stream, &(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), 0)); - } - - frame_size = request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset; - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 && LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - - /* Calculate padding for encryption */ - if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3 && (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG)) { - u8_t i; - outbound_padding = (8 - (u8_t)((frame_size - request->outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset) & 0x07)) & 0x07; - - for (i = 0; i < outbound_padding; i++) { - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, 0)); - } - } - -#endif - - /* complete missing length in 'Message' sequence ; 'Message' tlv is located at the beginning (offset 0) */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, frame_size + outbound_padding - 1 - 3); /* - type - length_len(fixed, see snmp_prepare_outbound_frame()) */ - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - - if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { - /* complete missing length in 'globalData' sequence */ - /* - type - length_len(fixed, see snmp_prepare_outbound_frame()) */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 1, request->outbound_msg_global_data_end - request->outbound_msg_global_data_offset - 1 - 1); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_msg_global_data_offset)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - - /* complete missing length in 'msgSecurityParameters' sequence */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 1, request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_end - request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_str_offset - 1 - 1); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_str_offset)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 1, request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_end - request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_seq_offset - 1 - 1); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_seq_offset)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - - /* complete missing length in scoped PDU sequence */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, frame_size - request->outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset - 1 - 3); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - } - -#endif - - /* complete missing length in 'PDU' sequence */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, request->request_out_type, 3, - frame_size - request->outbound_pdu_offset - 1 - 3); /* - type - length_len(fixed, see snmp_prepare_outbound_frame()) */ - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_pdu_offset)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - - /* process and encode final error status */ - if (request->error_status != 0) { - u16_t len; - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->error_status, &len); - - if (len != 1) { - /* error, we only reserved one byte for it */ - return ERR_ARG; - } - - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_error_status_offset)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), len, request->error_status)); - - /* for compatibility to v1, log statistics; in v2 (RFC 1907) these statistics are obsoleted */ - switch (request->error_status) { - case SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG: - snmp_stats.outtoobigs++; - break; - - case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME: - snmp_stats.outnosuchnames++; - break; - - case SNMP_ERR_BADVALUE: - snmp_stats.outbadvalues++; - break; - - case SNMP_ERR_GENERROR: - default: - snmp_stats.outgenerrs++; - break; - } - - if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG) { - request->error_index = 0; /* defined by RFC 1157 */ - } else if (request->error_index == 0) { - /* set index to varbind where error occured (if not already set before, e.g. during GetBulk processing) */ - request->error_index = request->inbound_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; - } - } else { - if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) { - snmp_stats.intotalsetvars += request->inbound_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; - } else { - snmp_stats.intotalreqvars += request->inbound_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; - } - } - - /* encode final error index*/ - if (request->error_index != 0) { - u16_t len; - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->error_index, &len); - - if (len != 1) { - /* error, we only reserved one byte for it */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_error_index_offset)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), len, request->error_index)); - } - - /* complete missing length in 'VarBindList' sequence ; 'VarBindList' tlv is located directly before varbind offset */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, frame_size - request->outbound_varbind_offset); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_varbind_offset - 1 - 3)); /* - type - length_len(fixed, see snmp_prepare_outbound_frame()) */ - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - - /* Authenticate response */ -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 && LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - - /* Encrypt response */ - if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3 && (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG)) { - u8_t key[20]; - snmpv3_priv_algo_t algo; - - /* complete missing length in PDU sequence */ - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_scoped_pdu_string_offset)); - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 3, frame_size + outbound_padding - request->outbound_scoped_pdu_string_offset - 1 - 3); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, NULL, NULL, &algo, key)); - - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmpv3_crypt(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, key, - request->msg_privacy_parameters, request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots, - request->msg_authoritative_engine_time, algo, SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_ENCRYPT)); - } - - if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3 && (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG)) { - u8_t key[20]; - snmpv3_auth_algo_t algo; - u8_t hmac[20]; - - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, &algo, key, NULL, NULL)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), - request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmpv3_auth(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, frame_size + outbound_padding, key, algo, hmac)); - - MEMCPY(request->msg_authentication_parameters, hmac, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, - request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, - request->outbound_msg_authentication_parameters_offset)); - - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 1, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, - request->msg_authentication_parameters, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH)); - } - -#endif - - pbuf_realloc(request->outbound_pbuf, frame_size + outbound_padding); - - snmp_stats.outgetresponses++; - snmp_stats.outpkts++; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void snmp_execute_write_callbacks(struct snmp_request *request) -{ - struct snmp_varbind_enumerator inbound_varbind_enumerator; - struct snmp_varbind vb; - - snmp_vb_enumerator_init(&inbound_varbind_enumerator, request->inbound_pbuf, request->inbound_varbind_offset, request->inbound_varbind_len); - vb.value = NULL; /* do NOT decode value (we enumerate outbound buffer here, so all varbinds have values assigned, which we don't need here) */ - - while (snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb) == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { - snmp_write_callback(vb.oid.id, vb.oid.len, snmp_write_callback_arg); - } -} - -/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* VarBind enumerator methods */ -/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ - -void snmp_vb_enumerator_init(struct snmp_varbind_enumerator *enumerator, struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u16_t length) -{ - snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), p, offset, length); - enumerator->varbind_count = 0; -} - -#define VB_PARSE_EXEC(code) PARSE_EXEC(code, SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) -#define VB_PARSE_ASSERT(code) PARSE_ASSERT(code, SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) - -snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(struct snmp_varbind_enumerator *enumerator, struct snmp_varbind *varbind) -{ - struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; - u16_t varbind_len; - err_t err; - - if (enumerator->pbuf_stream.length == 0) { - return SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB; - } - - enumerator->varbind_count++; - - /* decode varbind itself (parent container of a varbind) */ - VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - VB_PARSE_ASSERT((tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE) && (tlv.value_len <= enumerator->pbuf_stream.length)); - varbind_len = tlv.value_len; - - /* decode varbind name (object id) */ - VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - VB_PARSE_ASSERT((tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID) && (SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv) < varbind_len) && (tlv.value_len < enumerator->pbuf_stream.length)); - - VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_oid(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, varbind->oid.id, &(varbind->oid.len), SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN)); - varbind_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); - - /* decode varbind value (object id) */ - VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), &tlv)); - VB_PARSE_ASSERT((SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv) == varbind_len) && (tlv.value_len <= enumerator->pbuf_stream.length)); - varbind->type = tlv.type; - - /* shall the value be decoded ? */ - if (varbind->value != NULL) { - switch (varbind->type) { - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER: - VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (s32_t *)varbind->value)); - varbind->value_len = sizeof(s32_t); - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS: - VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_u32t(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u32_t *)varbind->value)); - varbind->value_len = sizeof(u32_t); - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING: - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OPAQUE: - err = snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u8_t *)varbind->value, &varbind->value_len, SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE); - - if (err == ERR_MEM) { - return SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_INVALIDLENGTH; - } - - VB_PARSE_ASSERT(err == ERR_OK); - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL: - varbind->value_len = 0; - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID: - /* misuse tlv.length_len as OID_length transporter */ - err = snmp_asn1_dec_oid(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u32_t *)varbind->value, &tlv.length_len, SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN); - - if (err == ERR_MEM) { - return SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_INVALIDLENGTH; - } - - VB_PARSE_ASSERT(err == ERR_OK); - varbind->value_len = tlv.length_len * sizeof(u32_t); - break; - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR: - if (tlv.value_len == 4) { - /* must be exactly 4 octets! */ - VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u8_t *)varbind->value, &varbind->value_len, SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE)); - } else { - VB_PARSE_ASSERT(0); - } - - break; -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 - - case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64: - VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_u64t(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u64_t *)varbind->value)); - varbind->value_len = sizeof(u64_t); - break; -#endif - - default: - VB_PARSE_ASSERT(0); - break; - } - } else { - snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len); - varbind->value_len = tlv.value_len; - } - - return SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP message processing (RFC1157). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Christiaan Simons + * Martin Hentschel + * Elias Oenal + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "snmp_msg.h" +#include "snmp_asn1.h" +#include "snmp_core_priv.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 +#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" +#include "snmpv3_priv.h" +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif +#endif + +#include + +#define SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG 0x01 +#define SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG 0x02 + +/* Security levels */ +#define SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV 0x00 +#define SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG +#define SNMP_V3_AUTHPRIV (SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG | SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG) + +/* public (non-static) constants */ +/** SNMP community string */ +const char *snmp_community = SNMP_COMMUNITY; +/** SNMP community string for write access */ +const char *snmp_community_write = SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE; +/** SNMP community string for sending traps */ +const char *snmp_community_trap = SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP; + +snmp_write_callback_fct snmp_write_callback = NULL; +void *snmp_write_callback_arg = NULL; + +#if LWIP_SNMP_CONFIGURE_VERSIONS + +static u8_t v1_enabled = 1; +static u8_t v2c_enabled = 1; +static u8_t v3_enabled = 1; + +static u8_t snmp_version_enabled(u8_t version) +{ + if (version == SNMP_VERSION_1) { + return v1_enabled; + } else if (version == SNMP_VERSION_2c) { + return v2c_enabled; + } +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + else if (version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { + return v3_enabled; + } +#endif + else { + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid SNMP version", 0); + return 0; + } +} + +u8_t snmp_v1_enabled(void) +{ + return snmp_version_enabled(SNMP_VERSION_1); +} + +u8_t snmp_v2c_enabled(void) +{ + return snmp_version_enabled(SNMP_VERSION_2c); +} + +u8_t snmp_v3_enabled(void) +{ + return snmp_version_enabled(SNMP_VERSION_3); +} + +static void snmp_version_enable(u8_t version, u8_t enable) +{ + if (version == SNMP_VERSION_1) { + v1_enabled = enable; + } else if (version == SNMP_VERSION_2c) { + v2c_enabled = enable; + } +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + else if (version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { + v3_enabled = enable; + } +#endif + else { + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid SNMP version", 0); + } +} + +void snmp_v1_enable(u8_t enable) +{ + snmp_version_enable(SNMP_VERSION_1, enable); +} + +void snmp_v2c_enable(u8_t enable) +{ + snmp_version_enable(SNMP_VERSION_2c, enable); +} + +void snmp_v3_enable(u8_t enable) +{ + snmp_version_enable(SNMP_VERSION_3, enable); +} + +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * Returns current SNMP community string. + * @return current SNMP community string + */ +const char *snmp_get_community(void) +{ + return snmp_community; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * Sets SNMP community string. + * The string itself (its storage) must be valid throughout the whole life of + * program (or until it is changed to sth else). + * + * @param community is a pointer to new community string + */ +void snmp_set_community(const char *const community) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("community string is too long!", strlen(community) <= SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); + snmp_community = community; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * Returns current SNMP write-access community string. + * @return current SNMP write-access community string + */ +const char *snmp_get_community_write(void) +{ + return snmp_community_write; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Returns current SNMP community string used for sending traps. + * @return current SNMP community string used for sending traps + */ +const char *snmp_get_community_trap(void) +{ + return snmp_community_trap; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * Sets SNMP community string for write-access. + * The string itself (its storage) must be valid throughout the whole life of + * program (or until it is changed to sth else). + * + * @param community is a pointer to new write-access community string + */ +void snmp_set_community_write(const char *const community) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("community string must not be NULL", community != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("community string is too long!", strlen(community) <= SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); + snmp_community_write = community; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Sets SNMP community string used for sending traps. + * The string itself (its storage) must be valid throughout the whole life of + * program (or until it is changed to sth else). + * + * @param community is a pointer to new trap community string + */ +void snmp_set_community_trap(const char *const community) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("community string is too long!", strlen(community) <= SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); + snmp_community_trap = community; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * Callback fired on every successful write access + */ +void snmp_set_write_callback(snmp_write_callback_fct write_callback, void *callback_arg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + snmp_write_callback = write_callback; + snmp_write_callback_arg = callback_arg; +} + +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* forward declarations */ +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static err_t snmp_process_get_request(struct snmp_request *request); +static err_t snmp_process_getnext_request(struct snmp_request *request); +static err_t snmp_process_getbulk_request(struct snmp_request *request); +static err_t snmp_process_set_request(struct snmp_request *request); + +static err_t snmp_parse_inbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request); +static err_t snmp_prepare_outbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request); +static err_t snmp_complete_outbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request); +static void snmp_execute_write_callbacks(struct snmp_request *request); + +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* implementation */ +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +void snmp_receive(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *source_ip, u16_t port) +{ + err_t err; + struct snmp_request request; + + memset(&request, 0, sizeof(request)); + request.handle = handle; + request.source_ip = source_ip; + request.source_port = port; + request.inbound_pbuf = p; + + snmp_stats.inpkts++; + + err = snmp_parse_inbound_frame(&request); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + err = snmp_prepare_outbound_frame(&request); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + if (request.error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + /* only process frame if we do not already have an error to return (e.g. all readonly) */ + if (request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_REQ) { + err = snmp_process_get_request(&request); + } else if (request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_NEXT_REQ) { + err = snmp_process_getnext_request(&request); + } else if (request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ) { + err = snmp_process_getbulk_request(&request); + } else if (request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) { + err = snmp_process_set_request(&request); + } + } +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + else { + struct snmp_varbind vb; + + vb.next = NULL; + vb.prev = NULL; + vb.type = SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER32; + vb.value_len = sizeof(u32_t); + + switch (request.error_status) { + case SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR: { + static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 5, 0 }; + snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); + vb.value = &snmp_stats.wrongdigests; + } break; + + case SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_ENGINEID: { + static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 4, 0 }; + snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); + vb.value = &snmp_stats.unknownengineids; + } break; + + case SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_SECURITYNAME: { + static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 3, 0 }; + snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); + vb.value = &snmp_stats.unknownusernames; + } break; + + case SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL: { + static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 1, 0 }; + snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); + vb.value = &snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels; + } break; + + case SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW: { + static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 2, 0 }; + snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); + vb.value = &snmp_stats.notintimewindows; + } break; + + case SNMP_ERR_DECRYIPTION_ERROR: { + static const u32_t oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15, 1, 1, 6, 0 }; + snmp_oid_assign(&vb.oid, oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid)); + vb.value = &snmp_stats.decryptionerrors; + } break; + + default: + /* Unknown or unhandled error_status */ + err = ERR_ARG; + } + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + snmp_append_outbound_varbind(&(request.outbound_pbuf_stream), &vb); + request.error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + + request.request_out_type = (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_REPORT); + request.request_id = request.msg_id; + } + +#endif + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + err = snmp_complete_outbound_frame(&request); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + err = snmp_sendto(request.handle, request.outbound_pbuf, request.source_ip, request.source_port); + + if ((request.request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) && (request.error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) && (snmp_write_callback != NULL)) { + /* raise write notification for all written objects */ + snmp_execute_write_callbacks(&request); + } + } + } + } + + if (request.outbound_pbuf != NULL) { + pbuf_free(request.outbound_pbuf); + } + } +} + +static u8_t snmp_msg_getnext_validate_node_inst(struct snmp_node_instance *node_instance, void *validate_arg) +{ + if (((node_instance->access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ) != SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ) || (node_instance->get_value == NULL)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 + + if ((node_instance->asn1_type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64) && (((struct snmp_request *)validate_arg)->version == SNMP_VERSION_1)) { + /* according to RFC 2089 skip Counter64 objects in GetNext requests from v1 clients */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + +#endif + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static void snmp_process_varbind(struct snmp_request *request, struct snmp_varbind *vb, u8_t get_next) +{ + err_t err; + struct snmp_node_instance node_instance; + memset(&node_instance, 0, sizeof(node_instance)); + + if (get_next) { + struct snmp_obj_id result_oid; + request->error_status = snmp_get_next_node_instance_from_oid(vb->oid.id, vb->oid.len, snmp_msg_getnext_validate_node_inst, request, &result_oid, &node_instance); + + if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + snmp_oid_assign(&vb->oid, result_oid.id, result_oid.len); + } + } else { + request->error_status = snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(vb->oid.id, vb->oid.len, &node_instance); + + if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + /* use 'getnext_validate' method for validation to avoid code duplication (some checks have to be executed here) */ + request->error_status = snmp_msg_getnext_validate_node_inst(&node_instance, request); + + if (request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + if (node_instance.release_instance != NULL) { + node_instance.release_instance(&node_instance); + } + } + } + } + + if (request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + if (request->error_status >= SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET) { + if ((request->version == SNMP_VERSION_2c) || request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { + /* in SNMP v2c a varbind related exception is stored in varbind and not in frame header */ + vb->type = (SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | (request->error_status & SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_MASK)); + vb->value_len = 0; + + err = snmp_append_outbound_varbind(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), vb); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + /* we stored the exception in varbind -> go on */ + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } else if (err == ERR_BUF) { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG; + } else { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + } + } else { + /* according to RFC 1157/1905, all other errors only return genError */ + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + } else { + s16_t len = node_instance.get_value(&node_instance, vb->value); + + if (len >= 0) { + vb->value_len = (u16_t)len; /* cast is OK because we checked >= 0 above */ + vb->type = node_instance.asn1_type; + + LWIP_ASSERT("SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE is configured too low", (vb->value_len & ~SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA) <= SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE); + err = snmp_append_outbound_varbind(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, vb); + + if (err == ERR_BUF) { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG; + } else if (err != ERR_OK) { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + } else { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + + if (node_instance.release_instance != NULL) { + node_instance.release_instance(&node_instance); + } + } +} + +/** + * Service an internal or external event for SNMP GET. + * + * @param request points to the associated message process state + */ +static err_t snmp_process_get_request(struct snmp_request *request) +{ + snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t err; + struct snmp_varbind vb; + vb.value = request->value_buffer; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP get request\n")); + + while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); + + if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { + if ((vb.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL) && (vb.value_len == 0)) { + snmp_process_varbind(request, &vb, 0); + } else { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { + /* no more varbinds in request */ + break; + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) { + /* malformed ASN.1, don't answer */ + return ERR_ARG; + } else { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Service an internal or external event for SNMP GET. + * + * @param request points to the associated message process state + */ +static err_t snmp_process_getnext_request(struct snmp_request *request) +{ + snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t err; + struct snmp_varbind vb; + vb.value = request->value_buffer; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP get-next request\n")); + + while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); + + if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { + if ((vb.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL) && (vb.value_len == 0)) { + snmp_process_varbind(request, &vb, 1); + } else { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { + /* no more varbinds in request */ + break; + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) { + /* malformed ASN.1, don't answer */ + return ERR_ARG; + } else { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Service an internal or external event for SNMP GETBULKT. + * + * @param request points to the associated message process state + */ +static err_t snmp_process_getbulk_request(struct snmp_request *request) +{ + snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t err; + s32_t non_repeaters = request->non_repeaters; + s32_t repetitions; + u16_t repetition_offset = 0; + struct snmp_varbind_enumerator repetition_varbind_enumerator; + struct snmp_varbind vb; + vb.value = request->value_buffer; + + if (SNMP_LWIP_GETBULK_MAX_REPETITIONS > 0) { + repetitions = LWIP_MIN(request->max_repetitions, SNMP_LWIP_GETBULK_MAX_REPETITIONS); + } else { + repetitions = request->max_repetitions; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP get-bulk request\n")); + + /* process non repeaters and first repetition */ + while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + if (non_repeaters == 0) { + repetition_offset = request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset; + + if (repetitions == 0) { + /* do not resolve repeaters when repetitions is set to 0 */ + break; + } + + repetitions--; + } + + err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); + + if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { + /* no more varbinds in request */ + break; + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) { + /* malformed ASN.1, don't answer */ + return ERR_ARG; + } else if ((err != SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) || (vb.type != SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL) || (vb.value_len != 0)) { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } else { + snmp_process_varbind(request, &vb, 1); + non_repeaters--; + } + } + + /* process repetitions > 1 */ + while ((request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) && (repetitions > 0) && (request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset != repetition_offset)) { + u8_t all_endofmibview = 1; + + snmp_vb_enumerator_init(&repetition_varbind_enumerator, request->outbound_pbuf, repetition_offset, request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset - repetition_offset); + repetition_offset = request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset; /* for next loop */ + + while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + vb.value = NULL; /* do NOT decode value (we enumerate outbound buffer here, so all varbinds have values assigned) */ + err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&repetition_varbind_enumerator, &vb); + + if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { + vb.value = request->value_buffer; + snmp_process_varbind(request, &vb, 1); + + if (request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + /* already set correct error-index (here it cannot be taken from inbound varbind enumerator) */ + request->error_index = request->non_repeaters + repetition_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; + } else if (vb.type != (SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_END_OF_MIB_VIEW)) { + all_endofmibview = 0; + } + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { + /* no more varbinds in request */ + break; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("Very strange, we cannot parse the varbind output that we created just before!")); + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + request->error_index = request->non_repeaters + repetition_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; + } + } + + if ((request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) && all_endofmibview) { + /* stop when all varbinds in a loop return EndOfMibView */ + break; + } + + repetitions--; + } + + if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG) { + /* for GetBulk it is ok, if not all requested variables fit into the response -> just return the varbinds added so far */ + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Service an internal or external event for SNMP SET. + * + * @param request points to the associated message process state + */ +static err_t snmp_process_set_request(struct snmp_request *request) +{ + snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t err; + struct snmp_varbind vb; + vb.value = request->value_buffer; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP set request\n")); + + /* perform set test on all objects */ + while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); + + if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { + struct snmp_node_instance node_instance; + memset(&node_instance, 0, sizeof(node_instance)); + + request->error_status = snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(vb.oid.id, vb.oid.len, &node_instance); + + if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + if (node_instance.asn1_type != vb.type) { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_WRONGTYPE; + } else if (((node_instance.access & SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE) != SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE) || (node_instance.set_value == NULL)) { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; + } else { + if (node_instance.set_test != NULL) { + request->error_status = node_instance.set_test(&node_instance, vb.value_len, vb.value); + } + } + + if (node_instance.release_instance != NULL) { + node_instance.release_instance(&node_instance); + } + } + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { + /* no more varbinds in request */ + break; + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_INVALIDLENGTH) { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_WRONGLENGTH; + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) { + /* malformed ASN.1, don't answer */ + return ERR_ARG; + } else { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + } + + /* perform real set operation on all objects */ + if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + snmp_vb_enumerator_init(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, request->inbound_pbuf, request->inbound_varbind_offset, request->inbound_varbind_len); + + while (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + err = snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&request->inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb); + + if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { + struct snmp_node_instance node_instance; + memset(&node_instance, 0, sizeof(node_instance)); + request->error_status = snmp_get_node_instance_from_oid(vb.oid.id, vb.oid.len, &node_instance); + + if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + if (node_instance.set_value(&node_instance, vb.value_len, vb.value) != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + if (request->inbound_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count == 1) { + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_COMMITFAILED; + } else { + /* we cannot undo the set operations done so far */ + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNDOFAILED; + } + } + + if (node_instance.release_instance != NULL) { + node_instance.release_instance(&node_instance); + } + } + } else if (err == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB) { + /* no more varbinds in request */ + break; + } else { + /* first time enumerating varbinds work but second time not, although nothing should have changed in between ??? */ + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#define PARSE_EXEC(code, retValue) \ + if ((code) != ERR_OK) { \ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("Malformed ASN.1 detected.\n")); \ + snmp_stats.inasnparseerrs++; \ + return retValue; \ + } + +#define PARSE_ASSERT(cond, retValue) \ + if (!(cond)) { \ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP parse assertion failed!: " #cond)); \ + snmp_stats.inasnparseerrs++; \ + return retValue; \ + } + +#define BUILD_EXEC(code, retValue) \ + if ((code) != ERR_OK) { \ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP error during creation of outbound frame!: " #code)); \ + return retValue; \ + } + +#define IF_PARSE_EXEC(code) PARSE_EXEC(code, ERR_ARG) +#define IF_PARSE_ASSERT(code) PARSE_ASSERT(code, ERR_ARG) + +/** + * Checks and decodes incoming SNMP message header, logs header errors. + * + * @param request points to the current message request state return + * @return + * - ERR_OK SNMP header is sane and accepted + * - ERR_VAL SNMP header is either malformed or rejected + */ +static err_t snmp_parse_inbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request) +{ + struct snmp_pbuf_stream pbuf_stream; + struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; + s32_t parent_tlv_value_len; + s32_t s32_value; + err_t err; +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + snmpv3_auth_algo_t auth; + snmpv3_priv_algo_t priv; +#endif + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&pbuf_stream, request->inbound_pbuf, 0, request->inbound_pbuf->tot_len)); + + /* decode main container consisting of version, community and PDU */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT((tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE) && (tlv.value_len == pbuf_stream.length)); + parent_tlv_value_len = tlv.value_len; + + /* decode version */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); + + if (((s32_value != SNMP_VERSION_1) && + (s32_value != SNMP_VERSION_2c) +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + && (s32_value != SNMP_VERSION_3) +#endif + ) +#if LWIP_SNMP_CONFIGURE_VERSIONS + || (!snmp_version_enabled(s32_value)) +#endif + ) { + /* unsupported SNMP version */ + snmp_stats.inbadversions++; + return ERR_ARG; + } + + request->version = (u8_t)s32_value; + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + + if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { + u16_t u16_value; + u16_t inbound_msgAuthenticationParameters_offset; + + /* SNMPv3 doesn't use communities */ + /* @todo: Differentiate read/write access */ + strncpy((char *)request->community, snmp_community, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); + request->community[SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN] = 0; /* ensure NULL termination (strncpy does NOT guarantee it!) */ + request->community_strlen = (u16_t)strnlen((char *)request->community, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); + + /* RFC3414 globalData */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + /* decode msgID */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); + request->msg_id = s32_value; + + /* decode msgMaxSize */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); + request->msg_max_size = s32_value; + + /* decode msgFlags */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); + request->msg_flags = (u8_t)s32_value; + + /* decode msgSecurityModel */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); + request->msg_security_model = s32_value; + + /* RFC3414 msgSecurityParameters + * The User-based Security Model defines the contents of the OCTET + * STRING as a SEQUENCE. + * + * We skip the protective dummy OCTET STRING header + * to access the SEQUENCE header. + */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + /* msgSecurityParameters SEQUENCE header */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + /* decode msgAuthoritativeEngineID */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id, + &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH)); + request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len = (u8_t)u16_value; + + /* msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots)); + + /* msgAuthoritativeEngineTime */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->msg_authoritative_engine_time)); + + /* msgUserName */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_user_name, + &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH)); + request->msg_user_name_len = (u8_t)u16_value; + + /* msgAuthenticationParameters */ + memset(request->msg_authentication_parameters, 0, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + /* Remember position */ + inbound_msgAuthenticationParameters_offset = pbuf_stream.offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inbound_msgAuthenticationParameters_offset); + /* Read auth parameters */ + /* IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.value_len <= SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_authentication_parameters, + &u16_value, tlv.value_len)); + request->msg_authentication_parameters_len = (u8_t)u16_value; + + /* msgPrivacyParameters */ + memset(request->msg_privacy_parameters, 0, SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH); + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_privacy_parameters, + &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH)); + request->msg_privacy_parameters_len = (u8_t)u16_value; + + /* validate securityParameters here (do this after decoding because we don't want to increase other counters for wrong frames) + * 1) securityParameters was correctly serialized if we reach here. + * 2) securityParameters are already cached. + * 3) if msgAuthoritativeEngineID is unknown, zero-length or too long: + b) https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3414#section-7 + */ + { + const char *eid; + u8_t eid_len; + + snmpv3_get_engine_id(&eid, &eid_len); + + if ((request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len == 0) || + (request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len != eid_len) || + (memcmp(eid, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id, eid_len) != 0)) { + snmp_stats.unknownengineids++; + request->msg_flags = 0; /* noauthnopriv */ + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_ENGINEID; + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* 4) verify username */ + if (snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, &auth, NULL, &priv, NULL)) { + snmp_stats.unknownusernames++; + request->msg_flags = 0; /* noauthnopriv */ + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNKNOWN_SECURITYNAME; + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* 5) verify security level */ + switch (request->msg_flags & (SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG | SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG)) { + case SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV: + if ((auth != SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_INVAL) || (priv != SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_INVAL)) { + /* Invalid security level for user */ + snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL; + return ERR_OK; + } + + break; +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + + case SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV: + if ((auth == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_INVAL) || (priv != SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_INVAL)) { + /* Invalid security level for user */ + snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL; + return ERR_OK; + } + + break; + + case SNMP_V3_AUTHPRIV: + if ((auth == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_INVAL) || (priv == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_INVAL)) { + /* Invalid security level for user */ + snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL; + return ERR_OK; + } + + break; +#endif + + default: + snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SECLEVEL; + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* 6) if securitylevel specifies authentication, authenticate message. */ +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + + if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG) { + const u8_t zero_arr[SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH] = { 0 }; + u8_t key[20]; + u8_t hmac[LWIP_MAX(SNMP_V3_SHA_LEN, SNMP_V3_MD5_LEN)]; + struct snmp_pbuf_stream auth_stream; + + if (request->msg_authentication_parameters_len > SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH) { + snmp_stats.wrongdigests++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR; + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Rewind stream */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&auth_stream, request->inbound_pbuf, 0, request->inbound_pbuf->tot_len)); + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&auth_stream, inbound_msgAuthenticationParameters_offset)); + /* Set auth parameters to zero for verification */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(&auth_stream, zero_arr, request->msg_authentication_parameters_len)); + + /* Verify authentication */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&auth_stream, request->inbound_pbuf, 0, request->inbound_pbuf->tot_len)); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, &auth, key, NULL, NULL)); + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmpv3_auth(&auth_stream, request->inbound_pbuf->tot_len, key, auth, hmac)); + + if (memcmp(request->msg_authentication_parameters, hmac, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH)) { + snmp_stats.wrongdigests++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_NOAUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR; + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* 7) if securitylevel specifies authentication, verify engineboots, enginetime and lastenginetime */ + { + s32_t boots = snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(); + + if ((request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots != boots) || (boots == 2147483647UL)) { + snmp_stats.notintimewindows++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW; + return ERR_OK; + } + } + { + s32_t time = snmpv3_get_engine_time_internal(); + + if (request->msg_authoritative_engine_time > (time + 150)) { + snmp_stats.notintimewindows++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW; + return ERR_OK; + } else if (time > 150) { + if (request->msg_authoritative_engine_time < (time - 150)) { + snmp_stats.notintimewindows++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTINTIMEWINDOW; + return ERR_OK; + } + } + } + } + +#endif + + /* 8) if securitylevel specifies privacy, decrypt message. */ +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + + if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG) { + /* Decrypt message */ + + u8_t key[20]; + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, NULL, NULL, &priv, key)); + + if (snmpv3_crypt(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, key, + request->msg_privacy_parameters, request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots, + request->msg_authoritative_engine_time, priv, SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_DECRYPT) != ERR_OK) { + snmp_stats.decryptionerrors++; + request->msg_flags = SNMP_V3_AUTHNOPRIV; + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_DECRYIPTION_ERROR; + return ERR_OK; + } + } + +#endif + /* 9) calculate max size of scoped pdu? + * 10) securityname for user is retrieved from usertable? + * 11) security data is cached? + * 12) + */ + + /* Scoped PDU + * Encryption context + */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_HDR_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + /* contextEngineID */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->context_engine_id, + &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH)); + request->context_engine_id_len = (u8_t)u16_value; + /* TODO: do we need to verify this contextengineid too? */ + + /* contextName */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->context_name, + &u16_value, SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH)); + request->context_name_len = (u8_t)u16_value; + /* TODO: do we need to verify this contextname too? */ + } else +#endif + { + /* decode community */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + err = snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->community, &request->community_strlen, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN); + + if (err == ERR_MEM) { + /* community string does not fit in our buffer -> its too long -> its invalid */ + request->community_strlen = 0; + snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len); + } else { + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(err == ERR_OK); + } + + /* add zero terminator */ + request->community[request->community_strlen] = 0; + } + + /* decode PDU type (next container level) */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.value_len <= pbuf_stream.length); + request->inbound_padding_len = pbuf_stream.length - tlv.value_len; + parent_tlv_value_len = tlv.value_len; + + /* validate PDU type */ + switch (tlv.type) { + case (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_REQ): + /* GetRequest PDU */ + snmp_stats.ingetrequests++; + break; + + case (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_NEXT_REQ): + /* GetNextRequest PDU */ + snmp_stats.ingetnexts++; + break; + + case (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ): + + /* GetBulkRequest PDU */ + if (request->version < SNMP_VERSION_2c) { + /* RFC2089: invalid, drop packet */ + return ERR_ARG; + } + + break; + + case (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ): + /* SetRequest PDU */ + snmp_stats.insetrequests++; + break; + + default: + /* unsupported input PDU for this agent (no parse error) */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("Unknown/Invalid SNMP PDU type received: %d", tlv.type)); + + return ERR_ARG; + } + + request->request_type = tlv.type & SNMP_ASN1_DATATYPE_MASK; + request->request_out_type = (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_RESP); + + /* validate community (do this after decoding PDU type because we don't want to increase 'inbadcommunitynames' for wrong frame types */ + if (request->community_strlen == 0) { + /* community string was too long or really empty*/ + snmp_stats.inbadcommunitynames++; + snmp_authfail_trap(); + return ERR_ARG; + } else if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) { + if (snmp_community_write[0] == 0) { + /* our write community is empty, that means all our objects are readonly */ + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; + request->error_index = 1; + } else if (strncmp(snmp_community_write, (const char *)request->community, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN) != 0) { + /* community name does not match */ + snmp_stats.inbadcommunitynames++; + snmp_authfail_trap(); + return ERR_ARG; + } + } else { + if (strncmp(snmp_community, (const char *)request->community, SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN) != 0) { + /* community name does not match */ + snmp_stats.inbadcommunitynames++; + snmp_authfail_trap(); + return ERR_ARG; + } + } + + /* decode request ID */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->request_id)); + + /* decode error status / non-repeaters */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ) { + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->non_repeaters)); + + if (request->non_repeaters < 0) { + /* RFC 1905, 4.2.3 */ + request->non_repeaters = 0; + } + } else { + /* only check valid value, don't touch 'request->error_status', maybe a response error status was already set to above; */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &s32_value)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(s32_value == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR); + } + + /* decode error index / max-repetitions */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER); + parent_tlv_value_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(parent_tlv_value_len > 0); + + if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_GET_BULK_REQ) { + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->max_repetitions)); + + if (request->max_repetitions < 0) { + /* RFC 1905, 4.2.3 */ + request->max_repetitions = 0; + } + } else { + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, &request->error_index)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT(s32_value == 0); + } + + /* decode varbind-list type (next container level) */ + IF_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + IF_PARSE_ASSERT((tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE) && (tlv.value_len <= pbuf_stream.length)); + + request->inbound_varbind_offset = pbuf_stream.offset; + request->inbound_varbind_len = pbuf_stream.length - request->inbound_padding_len; + snmp_vb_enumerator_init(&(request->inbound_varbind_enumerator), request->inbound_pbuf, request->inbound_varbind_offset, request->inbound_varbind_len); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#define OF_BUILD_EXEC(code) BUILD_EXEC(code, ERR_ARG) + +static err_t snmp_prepare_outbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request) +{ + struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; + struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream = &(request->outbound_pbuf_stream); + + /* try allocating pbuf(s) for maximum response size */ + request->outbound_pbuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 1472, PBUF_RAM); + + if (request->outbound_pbuf == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + snmp_pbuf_stream_init(pbuf_stream, request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len); + + /* 'Message' sequence */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + /* version */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->version, &tlv.value_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->version)); + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + + if (request->version < SNMP_VERSION_3) { +#endif + /* community */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->community_strlen); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->community, request->community_strlen)); +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + } else { + const char *id; + + /* globalData */ + request->outbound_msg_global_data_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 1, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + /* msgID */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_id, &tlv.value_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_id)); + + /* msgMaxSize */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_max_size, &tlv.value_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_max_size)); + + /* msgFlags */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, 1); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, &request->msg_flags, 1)); + + /* msgSecurityModel */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_security_model, &tlv.value_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_security_model)); + + /* end of msgGlobalData */ + request->outbound_msg_global_data_end = pbuf_stream->offset; + + /* msgSecurityParameters */ + request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_str_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 1, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_seq_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 1, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + /* msgAuthoritativeEngineID */ + snmpv3_get_engine_id(&id, &request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len); + MEMCPY(request->msg_authoritative_engine_id, id, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len); + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id, request->msg_authoritative_engine_id_len)); + + request->msg_authoritative_engine_time = snmpv3_get_engine_time(); + request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots = snmpv3_get_engine_boots(); + + /* msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots, &tlv.value_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots)); + + /* msgAuthoritativeEngineTime */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->msg_authoritative_engine_time, &tlv.value_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->msg_authoritative_engine_time)); + + /* msgUserName */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->msg_user_name_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->msg_user_name, request->msg_user_name_len)); + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + + /* msgAuthenticationParameters */ + if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG) { + memset(request->msg_authentication_parameters, 0, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); + request->outbound_msg_authentication_parameters_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 1, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->msg_authentication_parameters, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH)); + } else +#endif + { + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + } + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + + /* msgPrivacyParameters */ + if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG) { + snmpv3_build_priv_param(request->msg_privacy_parameters); + + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->msg_privacy_parameters, SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH)); + } else +#endif + { + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + } + + /* End of msgSecurityParameters, so we can calculate the length of this sequence later */ + request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_end = pbuf_stream->offset; + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + + /* For encryption we have to encapsulate the payload in an octet string */ + if (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG) { + request->outbound_scoped_pdu_string_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 3, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + } + +#endif + /* Scoped PDU + * Encryption context + */ + request->outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + /* contextEngineID */ + snmpv3_get_engine_id(&id, &request->context_engine_id_len); + MEMCPY(request->context_engine_id, id, request->context_engine_id_len); + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->context_engine_id_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->context_engine_id, request->context_engine_id_len)); + + /* contextName */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, request->context_name_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, request->context_name, request->context_name_len)); + } + +#endif + + /* 'PDU' sequence */ + request->outbound_pdu_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, request->request_out_type, 3, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + /* request ID */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->request_id, &tlv.value_len); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, request->request_id)); + + /* error status */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + request->outbound_error_status_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, 0)); + + /* error index */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 1); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + request->outbound_error_index_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(pbuf_stream, 0)); + + /* 'VarBindList' sequence */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, 0); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + request->outbound_varbind_offset = pbuf_stream->offset; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Calculate the length of a varbind list */ +err_t snmp_varbind_length(struct snmp_varbind *varbind, struct snmp_varbind_len *len) +{ + /* calculate required lengths */ + snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(varbind->oid.id, varbind->oid.len, &len->oid_value_len); + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len->oid_value_len, &len->oid_len_len); + + if (varbind->value_len == 0) { + len->value_value_len = 0; + } else if (varbind->value_len & SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA) { + len->value_value_len = varbind->value_len & (~SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA); + } else { + switch (varbind->type) { + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER: + if (varbind->value_len != sizeof(s32_t)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(*((s32_t *)varbind->value), &len->value_value_len); + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS: + if (varbind->value_len != sizeof(u32_t)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt(*((u32_t *)varbind->value), &len->value_value_len); + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OPAQUE: + len->value_value_len = varbind->value_len; + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL: + if (varbind->value_len != 0) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + len->value_value_len = 0; + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID: + if ((varbind->value_len & 0x03) != 0) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt((u32_t *)varbind->value, varbind->value_len >> 2, &len->value_value_len); + break; +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64: + if (varbind->value_len != sizeof(u64_t)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + snmp_asn1_enc_u64t_cnt(*(u64_t *)varbind->value, &len->value_value_len); + break; +#endif + + default: + /* unsupported type */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len->value_value_len, &len->value_len_len); + + len->vb_value_len = 1 + len->oid_len_len + len->oid_value_len + 1 + len->value_len_len + len->value_value_len; + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len->vb_value_len, &len->vb_len_len); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#define OVB_BUILD_EXEC(code) BUILD_EXEC(code, ERR_ARG) + +err_t snmp_append_outbound_varbind(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_varbind *varbind) +{ + struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; + struct snmp_varbind_len len; + err_t err; + + err = snmp_varbind_length(varbind, &len); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + /* check length already before adding first data because in case of GetBulk, + * data added so far is returned and therefore no partial data shall be added + */ + if ((1 + len.vb_len_len + len.vb_value_len) > pbuf_stream->length) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + /* 'VarBind' sequence */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, len.vb_len_len, len.vb_value_len); + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + /* VarBind OID */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, len.oid_len_len, len.oid_value_len); + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_oid(pbuf_stream, varbind->oid.id, varbind->oid.len)); + + /* VarBind value */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, varbind->type, len.value_len_len, len.value_value_len); + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + if (len.value_value_len > 0) { + if (varbind->value_len & SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA) { + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (u8_t *)varbind->value, len.value_value_len)); + } else { + switch (varbind->type) { + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER: + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, len.value_value_len, *((s32_t *)varbind->value))); + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS: + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_u32t(pbuf_stream, len.value_value_len, *((u32_t *)varbind->value))); + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OPAQUE: + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (u8_t *)varbind->value, len.value_value_len)); + len.value_value_len = varbind->value_len; + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID: + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_oid(pbuf_stream, (u32_t *)varbind->value, varbind->value_len / sizeof(u32_t))); + break; +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64: + OVB_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_u64t(pbuf_stream, len.value_value_len, *(u64_t *)varbind->value)); + break; +#endif + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("Unknown variable type", 0); + break; + } + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t snmp_complete_outbound_frame(struct snmp_request *request) +{ + struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; + u16_t frame_size; + u8_t outbound_padding = 0; + + if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_1) { + if (request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + /* map v2c error codes to v1 compliant error code (according to RFC 2089) */ + switch (request->error_status) { + /* mapping of implementation specific "virtual" error codes + * (during processing of frame we already stored them in error_status field, + * so no need to check all varbinds here for those exceptions as suggested by RFC) */ + case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE: + case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHOBJECT: + case SNMP_ERR_ENDOFMIBVIEW: + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME; + break; + + /* mapping according to RFC */ + case SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE: + case SNMP_ERR_WRONGENCODING: + case SNMP_ERR_WRONGTYPE: + case SNMP_ERR_WRONGLENGTH: + case SNMP_ERR_INCONSISTENTVALUE: + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_BADVALUE; + break; + + case SNMP_ERR_NOACCESS: + case SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE: + case SNMP_ERR_NOCREATION: + case SNMP_ERR_INCONSISTENTNAME: + case SNMP_ERR_AUTHORIZATIONERROR: + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME; + break; + + case SNMP_ERR_RESOURCEUNAVAILABLE: + case SNMP_ERR_COMMITFAILED: + case SNMP_ERR_UNDOFAILED: + default: + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + break; + } + } + } else { + if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) { + /* map error codes to according to RFC 1905 (4.2.5. The SetRequest-PDU) return 'NotWritable' for unknown OIDs) */ + switch (request->error_status) { + case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE: + case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHOBJECT: + case SNMP_ERR_ENDOFMIBVIEW: + request->error_status = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; + break; + + default: + break; + } + } + + if (request->error_status >= SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET) { + /* should never occur because v2 frames store exceptions directly inside varbinds and not as frame error_status */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("snmp_complete_outbound_frame() > Found v2 request with varbind exception code stored as error status!\n")); + return ERR_ARG; + } + } + + if ((request->error_status != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) || (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ)) { + /* all inbound vars are returned in response without any modification for error responses and successful set requests*/ + struct snmp_pbuf_stream inbound_stream; + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&inbound_stream, request->inbound_pbuf, request->inbound_varbind_offset, request->inbound_varbind_len)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_pbuf, request->outbound_varbind_offset, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len - request->outbound_varbind_offset)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_writeto(&inbound_stream, &(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), 0)); + } + + frame_size = request->outbound_pbuf_stream.offset; + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 && LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + + /* Calculate padding for encryption */ + if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3 && (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG)) { + u8_t i; + outbound_padding = (8 - (u8_t)((frame_size - request->outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset) & 0x07)) & 0x07; + + for (i = 0; i < outbound_padding; i++) { + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_write(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, 0)); + } + } + +#endif + + /* complete missing length in 'Message' sequence ; 'Message' tlv is located at the beginning (offset 0) */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, frame_size + outbound_padding - 1 - 3); /* - type - length_len(fixed, see snmp_prepare_outbound_frame()) */ + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + + if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3) { + /* complete missing length in 'globalData' sequence */ + /* - type - length_len(fixed, see snmp_prepare_outbound_frame()) */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 1, request->outbound_msg_global_data_end - request->outbound_msg_global_data_offset - 1 - 1); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_msg_global_data_offset)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + + /* complete missing length in 'msgSecurityParameters' sequence */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 1, request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_end - request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_str_offset - 1 - 1); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_str_offset)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 1, request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_end - request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_seq_offset - 1 - 1); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_msg_security_parameters_seq_offset)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + + /* complete missing length in scoped PDU sequence */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, frame_size - request->outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset - 1 - 3); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + } + +#endif + + /* complete missing length in 'PDU' sequence */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, request->request_out_type, 3, + frame_size - request->outbound_pdu_offset - 1 - 3); /* - type - length_len(fixed, see snmp_prepare_outbound_frame()) */ + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_pdu_offset)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + + /* process and encode final error status */ + if (request->error_status != 0) { + u16_t len; + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->error_status, &len); + + if (len != 1) { + /* error, we only reserved one byte for it */ + return ERR_ARG; + } + + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_error_status_offset)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), len, request->error_status)); + + /* for compatibility to v1, log statistics; in v2 (RFC 1907) these statistics are obsoleted */ + switch (request->error_status) { + case SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG: + snmp_stats.outtoobigs++; + break; + + case SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME: + snmp_stats.outnosuchnames++; + break; + + case SNMP_ERR_BADVALUE: + snmp_stats.outbadvalues++; + break; + + case SNMP_ERR_GENERROR: + default: + snmp_stats.outgenerrs++; + break; + } + + if (request->error_status == SNMP_ERR_TOOBIG) { + request->error_index = 0; /* defined by RFC 1157 */ + } else if (request->error_index == 0) { + /* set index to varbind where error occured (if not already set before, e.g. during GetBulk processing) */ + request->error_index = request->inbound_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; + } + } else { + if (request->request_type == SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_SET_REQ) { + snmp_stats.intotalsetvars += request->inbound_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; + } else { + snmp_stats.intotalreqvars += request->inbound_varbind_enumerator.varbind_count; + } + } + + /* encode final error index*/ + if (request->error_index != 0) { + u16_t len; + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(request->error_index, &len); + + if (len != 1) { + /* error, we only reserved one byte for it */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_error_index_offset)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), len, request->error_index)); + } + + /* complete missing length in 'VarBindList' sequence ; 'VarBindList' tlv is located directly before varbind offset */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 3, frame_size - request->outbound_varbind_offset); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_varbind_offset - 1 - 3)); /* - type - length_len(fixed, see snmp_prepare_outbound_frame()) */ + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + + /* Authenticate response */ +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 && LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + + /* Encrypt response */ + if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3 && (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_PRIV_FLAG)) { + u8_t key[20]; + snmpv3_priv_algo_t algo; + + /* complete missing length in PDU sequence */ + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), request->outbound_scoped_pdu_string_offset)); + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 3, frame_size + outbound_padding - request->outbound_scoped_pdu_string_offset - 1 - 3); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, NULL, NULL, &algo, key)); + + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmpv3_crypt(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, key, + request->msg_privacy_parameters, request->msg_authoritative_engine_boots, + request->msg_authoritative_engine_time, algo, SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_ENCRYPT)); + } + + if (request->version == SNMP_VERSION_3 && (request->msg_flags & SNMP_V3_AUTH_FLAG)) { + u8_t key[20]; + snmpv3_auth_algo_t algo; + u8_t hmac[20]; + + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmpv3_get_user((char *)request->msg_user_name, &algo, key, NULL, NULL)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&(request->outbound_pbuf_stream), + request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmpv3_auth(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, frame_size + outbound_padding, key, algo, hmac)); + + MEMCPY(request->msg_authentication_parameters, hmac, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, + request->outbound_pbuf, 0, request->outbound_pbuf->tot_len)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, + request->outbound_msg_authentication_parameters_offset)); + + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 1, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + OF_BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(&request->outbound_pbuf_stream, + request->msg_authentication_parameters, SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH)); + } + +#endif + + pbuf_realloc(request->outbound_pbuf, frame_size + outbound_padding); + + snmp_stats.outgetresponses++; + snmp_stats.outpkts++; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void snmp_execute_write_callbacks(struct snmp_request *request) +{ + struct snmp_varbind_enumerator inbound_varbind_enumerator; + struct snmp_varbind vb; + + snmp_vb_enumerator_init(&inbound_varbind_enumerator, request->inbound_pbuf, request->inbound_varbind_offset, request->inbound_varbind_len); + vb.value = NULL; /* do NOT decode value (we enumerate outbound buffer here, so all varbinds have values assigned, which we don't need here) */ + + while (snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(&inbound_varbind_enumerator, &vb) == SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK) { + snmp_write_callback(vb.oid.id, vb.oid.len, snmp_write_callback_arg); + } +} + +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* VarBind enumerator methods */ +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +void snmp_vb_enumerator_init(struct snmp_varbind_enumerator *enumerator, struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u16_t length) +{ + snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), p, offset, length); + enumerator->varbind_count = 0; +} + +#define VB_PARSE_EXEC(code) PARSE_EXEC(code, SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) +#define VB_PARSE_ASSERT(code) PARSE_ASSERT(code, SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR) + +snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(struct snmp_varbind_enumerator *enumerator, struct snmp_varbind *varbind) +{ + struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; + u16_t varbind_len; + err_t err; + + if (enumerator->pbuf_stream.length == 0) { + return SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB; + } + + enumerator->varbind_count++; + + /* decode varbind itself (parent container of a varbind) */ + VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + VB_PARSE_ASSERT((tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE) && (tlv.value_len <= enumerator->pbuf_stream.length)); + varbind_len = tlv.value_len; + + /* decode varbind name (object id) */ + VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + VB_PARSE_ASSERT((tlv.type == SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID) && (SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv) < varbind_len) && (tlv.value_len < enumerator->pbuf_stream.length)); + + VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_oid(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, varbind->oid.id, &(varbind->oid.len), SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN)); + varbind_len -= SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv); + + /* decode varbind value (object id) */ + VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_tlv(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), &tlv)); + VB_PARSE_ASSERT((SNMP_ASN1_TLV_LENGTH(tlv) == varbind_len) && (tlv.value_len <= enumerator->pbuf_stream.length)); + varbind->type = tlv.type; + + /* shall the value be decoded ? */ + if (varbind->value != NULL) { + switch (varbind->type) { + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER: + VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_s32t(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (s32_t *)varbind->value)); + varbind->value_len = sizeof(s32_t); + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS: + VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_u32t(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u32_t *)varbind->value)); + varbind->value_len = sizeof(u32_t); + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING: + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OPAQUE: + err = snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u8_t *)varbind->value, &varbind->value_len, SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE); + + if (err == ERR_MEM) { + return SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_INVALIDLENGTH; + } + + VB_PARSE_ASSERT(err == ERR_OK); + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL: + varbind->value_len = 0; + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID: + /* misuse tlv.length_len as OID_length transporter */ + err = snmp_asn1_dec_oid(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u32_t *)varbind->value, &tlv.length_len, SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN); + + if (err == ERR_MEM) { + return SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_INVALIDLENGTH; + } + + VB_PARSE_ASSERT(err == ERR_OK); + varbind->value_len = tlv.length_len * sizeof(u32_t); + break; + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR: + if (tlv.value_len == 4) { + /* must be exactly 4 octets! */ + VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_raw(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u8_t *)varbind->value, &varbind->value_len, SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE)); + } else { + VB_PARSE_ASSERT(0); + } + + break; +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 + + case SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64: + VB_PARSE_EXEC(snmp_asn1_dec_u64t(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len, (u64_t *)varbind->value)); + varbind->value_len = sizeof(u64_t); + break; +#endif + + default: + VB_PARSE_ASSERT(0); + break; + } + } else { + snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(&(enumerator->pbuf_stream), tlv.value_len); + varbind->value_len = tlv.value_len; + } + + return SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.h index d086c03e..b9f9419d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_msg.h @@ -1,184 +1,184 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP Agent message handling structures (internal API, do not use in client code). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Christiaan Simons - * Martin Hentschel - * Elias Oenal - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MSG_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MSG_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "snmp_pbuf_stream.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 -#include "snmpv3_priv.h" -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* version defines used in PDU */ -#define SNMP_VERSION_1 0 -#define SNMP_VERSION_2c 1 -#define SNMP_VERSION_3 3 - -struct snmp_varbind_enumerator { - struct snmp_pbuf_stream pbuf_stream; - u16_t varbind_count; -}; - -typedef enum { - SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK = 0, - SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB = 1, - SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR = 2, - SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_INVALIDLENGTH = 3 -} snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t; - -void snmp_vb_enumerator_init(struct snmp_varbind_enumerator *enumerator, struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u16_t length); -snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(struct snmp_varbind_enumerator *enumerator, struct snmp_varbind *varbind); - -struct snmp_request { - /* Communication handle */ - void *handle; - /* source IP address */ - const ip_addr_t *source_ip; - /* source UDP port */ - u16_t source_port; - /* incoming snmp version */ - u8_t version; - /* community name (zero terminated) */ - u8_t community[SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN + 1]; - /* community string length (exclusive zero term) */ - u16_t community_strlen; - /* request type */ - u8_t request_type; - /* request ID */ - s32_t request_id; - /* error status */ - s32_t error_status; - /* error index */ - s32_t error_index; - /* non-repeaters (getBulkRequest (SNMPv2c)) */ - s32_t non_repeaters; - /* max-repetitions (getBulkRequest (SNMPv2c)) */ - s32_t max_repetitions; - - /* Usually response-pdu (2). When snmpv3 errors are detected report-pdu(8) */ - u8_t request_out_type; - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - s32_t msg_id; - s32_t msg_max_size; - u8_t msg_flags; - s32_t msg_security_model; - u8_t msg_authoritative_engine_id[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; - u8_t msg_authoritative_engine_id_len; - s32_t msg_authoritative_engine_boots; - s32_t msg_authoritative_engine_time; - u8_t msg_user_name[SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH]; - u8_t msg_user_name_len; - u8_t msg_authentication_parameters[SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH]; - u8_t msg_authentication_parameters_len; - u8_t msg_privacy_parameters[SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH]; - u8_t msg_privacy_parameters_len; - u8_t context_engine_id[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; - u8_t context_engine_id_len; - u8_t context_name[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; - u8_t context_name_len; -#endif - - struct pbuf *inbound_pbuf; - struct snmp_varbind_enumerator inbound_varbind_enumerator; - u16_t inbound_varbind_offset; - u16_t inbound_varbind_len; - u16_t inbound_padding_len; - - struct pbuf *outbound_pbuf; - struct snmp_pbuf_stream outbound_pbuf_stream; - u16_t outbound_pdu_offset; - u16_t outbound_error_status_offset; - u16_t outbound_error_index_offset; - u16_t outbound_varbind_offset; -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - u16_t outbound_msg_global_data_offset; - u16_t outbound_msg_global_data_end; - u16_t outbound_msg_security_parameters_str_offset; - u16_t outbound_msg_security_parameters_seq_offset; - u16_t outbound_msg_security_parameters_end; - u16_t outbound_msg_authentication_parameters_offset; - u16_t outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset; - u16_t outbound_scoped_pdu_string_offset; -#endif - - u8_t value_buffer[SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE]; -}; - -/** A helper struct keeping length information about varbinds */ -struct snmp_varbind_len { - u8_t vb_len_len; - u16_t vb_value_len; - u8_t oid_len_len; - u16_t oid_value_len; - u8_t value_len_len; - u16_t value_value_len; -}; - -/** Agent community string */ -extern const char *snmp_community; -/** Agent community string for write access */ -extern const char *snmp_community_write; -/** handle for sending traps */ -extern void *snmp_traps_handle; - -void snmp_receive(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *source_ip, u16_t port); -err_t snmp_sendto(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst, u16_t port); -u8_t snmp_get_local_ip_for_dst(void *handle, const ip_addr_t *dst, ip_addr_t *result); -err_t snmp_varbind_length(struct snmp_varbind *varbind, struct snmp_varbind_len *len); -err_t snmp_append_outbound_varbind(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_varbind *varbind); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MSG_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP Agent message handling structures (internal API, do not use in client code). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Christiaan Simons + * Martin Hentschel + * Elias Oenal + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MSG_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MSG_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "snmp_pbuf_stream.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 +#include "snmpv3_priv.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* version defines used in PDU */ +#define SNMP_VERSION_1 0 +#define SNMP_VERSION_2c 1 +#define SNMP_VERSION_3 3 + +struct snmp_varbind_enumerator { + struct snmp_pbuf_stream pbuf_stream; + u16_t varbind_count; +}; + +typedef enum { + SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_OK = 0, + SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_EOVB = 1, + SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_ASN1ERROR = 2, + SNMP_VB_ENUMERATOR_ERR_INVALIDLENGTH = 3 +} snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t; + +void snmp_vb_enumerator_init(struct snmp_varbind_enumerator *enumerator, struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u16_t length); +snmp_vb_enumerator_err_t snmp_vb_enumerator_get_next(struct snmp_varbind_enumerator *enumerator, struct snmp_varbind *varbind); + +struct snmp_request { + /* Communication handle */ + void *handle; + /* source IP address */ + const ip_addr_t *source_ip; + /* source UDP port */ + u16_t source_port; + /* incoming snmp version */ + u8_t version; + /* community name (zero terminated) */ + u8_t community[SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN + 1]; + /* community string length (exclusive zero term) */ + u16_t community_strlen; + /* request type */ + u8_t request_type; + /* request ID */ + s32_t request_id; + /* error status */ + s32_t error_status; + /* error index */ + s32_t error_index; + /* non-repeaters (getBulkRequest (SNMPv2c)) */ + s32_t non_repeaters; + /* max-repetitions (getBulkRequest (SNMPv2c)) */ + s32_t max_repetitions; + + /* Usually response-pdu (2). When snmpv3 errors are detected report-pdu(8) */ + u8_t request_out_type; + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + s32_t msg_id; + s32_t msg_max_size; + u8_t msg_flags; + s32_t msg_security_model; + u8_t msg_authoritative_engine_id[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; + u8_t msg_authoritative_engine_id_len; + s32_t msg_authoritative_engine_boots; + s32_t msg_authoritative_engine_time; + u8_t msg_user_name[SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH]; + u8_t msg_user_name_len; + u8_t msg_authentication_parameters[SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH]; + u8_t msg_authentication_parameters_len; + u8_t msg_privacy_parameters[SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH]; + u8_t msg_privacy_parameters_len; + u8_t context_engine_id[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; + u8_t context_engine_id_len; + u8_t context_name[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; + u8_t context_name_len; +#endif + + struct pbuf *inbound_pbuf; + struct snmp_varbind_enumerator inbound_varbind_enumerator; + u16_t inbound_varbind_offset; + u16_t inbound_varbind_len; + u16_t inbound_padding_len; + + struct pbuf *outbound_pbuf; + struct snmp_pbuf_stream outbound_pbuf_stream; + u16_t outbound_pdu_offset; + u16_t outbound_error_status_offset; + u16_t outbound_error_index_offset; + u16_t outbound_varbind_offset; +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + u16_t outbound_msg_global_data_offset; + u16_t outbound_msg_global_data_end; + u16_t outbound_msg_security_parameters_str_offset; + u16_t outbound_msg_security_parameters_seq_offset; + u16_t outbound_msg_security_parameters_end; + u16_t outbound_msg_authentication_parameters_offset; + u16_t outbound_scoped_pdu_seq_offset; + u16_t outbound_scoped_pdu_string_offset; +#endif + + u8_t value_buffer[SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE]; +}; + +/** A helper struct keeping length information about varbinds */ +struct snmp_varbind_len { + u8_t vb_len_len; + u16_t vb_value_len; + u8_t oid_len_len; + u16_t oid_value_len; + u8_t value_len_len; + u16_t value_value_len; +}; + +/** Agent community string */ +extern const char *snmp_community; +/** Agent community string for write access */ +extern const char *snmp_community_write; +/** handle for sending traps */ +extern void *snmp_traps_handle; + +void snmp_receive(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *source_ip, u16_t port); +err_t snmp_sendto(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst, u16_t port); +u8_t snmp_get_local_ip_for_dst(void *handle, const ip_addr_t *dst, ip_addr_t *result); +err_t snmp_varbind_length(struct snmp_varbind *varbind, struct snmp_varbind_len *len); +err_t snmp_append_outbound_varbind(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_varbind *varbind); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MSG_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c index 8eeca008..e3aa647f 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_netconn.c @@ -1,119 +1,119 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP netconn frontend. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_USE_NETCONN - -#include -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "snmp_msg.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -/** SNMP netconn API worker thread */ -static void snmp_netconn_thread(void *arg) -{ - struct netconn *conn; - struct netbuf *buf; - err_t err; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - /* Bind to SNMP port with default IP address */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - conn = netconn_new(NETCONN_UDP_IPV6); - netconn_bind(conn, IP6_ADDR_ANY, LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP); -#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - conn = netconn_new(NETCONN_UDP); - netconn_bind(conn, IP4_ADDR_ANY, LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - LWIP_ERROR("snmp_netconn: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return;); - - snmp_traps_handle = conn; - - do { - err = netconn_recv(conn, &buf); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - snmp_receive(conn, buf->p, &buf->addr, buf->port); - } - - if (buf != NULL) { - netbuf_delete(buf); - } - } while (1); -} - -err_t snmp_sendto(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst, u16_t port) -{ - err_t result; - struct netbuf buf; - - memset(&buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - buf.p = p; - result = netconn_sendto((struct netconn *)handle, &buf, dst, port); - - return result; -} - -u8_t snmp_get_local_ip_for_dst(void *handle, const ip_addr_t *dst, ip_addr_t *result) -{ - struct netconn *conn = (struct netconn *)handle; - struct netif *dst_if; - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); /* unused in case of IPV4 only configuration */ - - ip_route_get_local_ip(&conn->pcb.udp->local_ip, dst, dst_if, dst_ip); - - if ((dst_if != NULL) && (dst_ip != NULL)) { - ip_addr_copy(*result, *dst_ip); - return 1; - } else { - return 0; - } -} - -/** - * Starts SNMP Agent. - */ -void snmp_init(void) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - sys_thread_new("snmp_netconn", snmp_netconn_thread, NULL, SNMP_STACK_SIZE, SNMP_THREAD_PRIO); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_USE_NETCONN */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP netconn frontend. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_USE_NETCONN + +#include +#include "lwip/api.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "snmp_msg.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +/** SNMP netconn API worker thread */ +static void snmp_netconn_thread(void *arg) +{ + struct netconn *conn; + struct netbuf *buf; + err_t err; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + /* Bind to SNMP port with default IP address */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + conn = netconn_new(NETCONN_UDP_IPV6); + netconn_bind(conn, IP6_ADDR_ANY, LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP); +#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + conn = netconn_new(NETCONN_UDP); + netconn_bind(conn, IP4_ADDR_ANY, LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + LWIP_ERROR("snmp_netconn: invalid conn", (conn != NULL), return;); + + snmp_traps_handle = conn; + + do { + err = netconn_recv(conn, &buf); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + snmp_receive(conn, buf->p, &buf->addr, buf->port); + } + + if (buf != NULL) { + netbuf_delete(buf); + } + } while (1); +} + +err_t snmp_sendto(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst, u16_t port) +{ + err_t result; + struct netbuf buf; + + memset(&buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + buf.p = p; + result = netconn_sendto((struct netconn *)handle, &buf, dst, port); + + return result; +} + +u8_t snmp_get_local_ip_for_dst(void *handle, const ip_addr_t *dst, ip_addr_t *result) +{ + struct netconn *conn = (struct netconn *)handle; + struct netif *dst_if; + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); /* unused in case of IPV4 only configuration */ + + ip_route_get_local_ip(&conn->pcb.udp->local_ip, dst, dst_if, dst_ip); + + if ((dst_if != NULL) && (dst_ip != NULL)) { + ip_addr_copy(*result, *dst_ip); + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Starts SNMP Agent. + */ +void snmp_init(void) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + sys_thread_new("snmp_netconn", snmp_netconn_thread, NULL, SNMP_STACK_SIZE, SNMP_THREAD_PRIO); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_USE_NETCONN */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c index b6814f3c..a9789af8 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.c @@ -1,150 +1,150 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP pbuf stream wrapper implementation (internal API, do not use in client code). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Martin Hentschel - * - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "snmp_pbuf_stream.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include - -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_init(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u16_t length) -{ - pbuf_stream->offset = offset; - pbuf_stream->length = length; - pbuf_stream->pbuf = p; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_read(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u8_t *data) -{ - if (pbuf_stream->length == 0) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - if (pbuf_copy_partial(pbuf_stream->pbuf, data, 1, pbuf_stream->offset) == 0) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - pbuf_stream->offset++; - pbuf_stream->length--; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_write(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u8_t data) -{ - return snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(pbuf_stream, &data, 1); -} - -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const void *buf, u16_t buf_len) -{ - if (pbuf_stream->length < buf_len) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - if (pbuf_take_at(pbuf_stream->pbuf, buf, buf_len, pbuf_stream->offset) != ERR_OK) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - pbuf_stream->offset += buf_len; - pbuf_stream->length -= buf_len; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_writeto(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *target_pbuf_stream, u16_t len) -{ - if ((pbuf_stream == NULL) || (target_pbuf_stream == NULL)) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if ((len > pbuf_stream->length) || (len > target_pbuf_stream->length)) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (len == 0) { - len = LWIP_MIN(pbuf_stream->length, target_pbuf_stream->length); - } - - while (len > 0) { - u16_t chunk_len; - err_t err; - u16_t target_offset; - struct pbuf *pbuf = pbuf_skip(pbuf_stream->pbuf, pbuf_stream->offset, &target_offset); - - if ((pbuf == NULL) || (pbuf->len == 0)) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - chunk_len = LWIP_MIN(len, pbuf->len); - err = snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(target_pbuf_stream, &((u8_t *)pbuf->payload)[target_offset], chunk_len); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - pbuf_stream->offset += chunk_len; - pbuf_stream->length -= chunk_len; - len -= chunk_len; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, s32_t offset) -{ - if ((offset < 0) || (offset > pbuf_stream->length)) { - /* we cannot seek backwards or forward behind stream end */ - return ERR_ARG; - } - - pbuf_stream->offset += (u16_t)offset; - pbuf_stream->length -= (u16_t)offset; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u32_t offset) -{ - s32_t rel_offset = offset - pbuf_stream->offset; - return snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(pbuf_stream, rel_offset); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP pbuf stream wrapper implementation (internal API, do not use in client code). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Martin Hentschel + * + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "snmp_pbuf_stream.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include + +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_init(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u16_t length) +{ + pbuf_stream->offset = offset; + pbuf_stream->length = length; + pbuf_stream->pbuf = p; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_read(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u8_t *data) +{ + if (pbuf_stream->length == 0) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + if (pbuf_copy_partial(pbuf_stream->pbuf, data, 1, pbuf_stream->offset) == 0) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + pbuf_stream->offset++; + pbuf_stream->length--; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_write(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u8_t data) +{ + return snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(pbuf_stream, &data, 1); +} + +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const void *buf, u16_t buf_len) +{ + if (pbuf_stream->length < buf_len) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + if (pbuf_take_at(pbuf_stream->pbuf, buf, buf_len, pbuf_stream->offset) != ERR_OK) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + pbuf_stream->offset += buf_len; + pbuf_stream->length -= buf_len; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_writeto(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *target_pbuf_stream, u16_t len) +{ + if ((pbuf_stream == NULL) || (target_pbuf_stream == NULL)) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if ((len > pbuf_stream->length) || (len > target_pbuf_stream->length)) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (len == 0) { + len = LWIP_MIN(pbuf_stream->length, target_pbuf_stream->length); + } + + while (len > 0) { + u16_t chunk_len; + err_t err; + u16_t target_offset; + struct pbuf *pbuf = pbuf_skip(pbuf_stream->pbuf, pbuf_stream->offset, &target_offset); + + if ((pbuf == NULL) || (pbuf->len == 0)) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + chunk_len = LWIP_MIN(len, pbuf->len); + err = snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(target_pbuf_stream, &((u8_t *)pbuf->payload)[target_offset], chunk_len); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + pbuf_stream->offset += chunk_len; + pbuf_stream->length -= chunk_len; + len -= chunk_len; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, s32_t offset) +{ + if ((offset < 0) || (offset > pbuf_stream->length)) { + /* we cannot seek backwards or forward behind stream end */ + return ERR_ARG; + } + + pbuf_stream->offset += (u16_t)offset; + pbuf_stream->length -= (u16_t)offset; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u32_t offset) +{ + s32_t rel_offset = offset - pbuf_stream->offset; + return snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(pbuf_stream, rel_offset); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.h index fc36fc17..49fc8644 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_pbuf_stream.h @@ -1,72 +1,72 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP pbuf stream wrapper (internal API, do not use in client code). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Martin Hentschel - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_PBUF_STREAM_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_PBUF_STREAM_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct snmp_pbuf_stream { - struct pbuf *pbuf; - u16_t offset; - u16_t length; -}; - -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_init(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u16_t length); -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_read(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u8_t *data); -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_write(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u8_t data); -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const void *buf, u16_t buf_len); -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_writeto(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *target_pbuf_stream, u16_t len); -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, s32_t offset); -err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u32_t offset); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_PBUF_STREAM_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP pbuf stream wrapper (internal API, do not use in client code). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Martin Hentschel + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_PBUF_STREAM_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_PBUF_STREAM_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct snmp_pbuf_stream { + struct pbuf *pbuf; + u16_t offset; + u16_t length; +}; + +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_init(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u16_t length); +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_read(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u8_t *data); +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_write(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u8_t data); +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, const void *buf, u16_t buf_len); +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_writeto(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *target_pbuf_stream, u16_t len); +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_seek(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, s32_t offset); +err_t snmp_pbuf_stream_seek_abs(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, u32_t offset); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_PBUF_STREAM_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c index 9ac77ab1..2cef4a5d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_raw.c @@ -1,99 +1,99 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP RAW API frontend. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_USE_RAW - -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" -#include "snmp_msg.h" - -/* lwIP UDP receive callback function */ -static void snmp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - snmp_receive(pcb, p, addr, port); - - pbuf_free(p); -} - -err_t snmp_sendto(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst, u16_t port) -{ - return udp_sendto((struct udp_pcb *)handle, p, dst, port); -} - -u8_t snmp_get_local_ip_for_dst(void *handle, const ip_addr_t *dst, ip_addr_t *result) -{ - struct udp_pcb *udp_pcb = (struct udp_pcb *)handle; - struct netif *dst_if; - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(udp_pcb); /* unused in case of IPV4 only configuration */ - - ip_route_get_local_ip(&udp_pcb->local_ip, dst, dst_if, dst_ip); - - if ((dst_if != NULL) && (dst_ip != NULL)) { - ip_addr_copy(*result, *dst_ip); - return 1; - } else { - return 0; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * Starts SNMP Agent. - * Allocates UDP pcb and binds it to IP_ANY_TYPE port 161. - */ -void snmp_init(void) -{ - err_t err; - - struct udp_pcb *snmp_pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - LWIP_ERROR("snmp_raw: no PCB", (snmp_pcb != NULL), return;); - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - snmp_traps_handle = snmp_pcb; - - udp_recv(snmp_pcb, snmp_recv, NULL); - err = udp_bind(snmp_pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP); - LWIP_ERROR("snmp_raw: Unable to bind PCB", (err == ERR_OK), return;); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_USE_RAW */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP RAW API frontend. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_USE_RAW + +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" +#include "snmp_msg.h" + +/* lwIP UDP receive callback function */ +static void snmp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + snmp_receive(pcb, p, addr, port); + + pbuf_free(p); +} + +err_t snmp_sendto(void *handle, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst, u16_t port) +{ + return udp_sendto((struct udp_pcb *)handle, p, dst, port); +} + +u8_t snmp_get_local_ip_for_dst(void *handle, const ip_addr_t *dst, ip_addr_t *result) +{ + struct udp_pcb *udp_pcb = (struct udp_pcb *)handle; + struct netif *dst_if; + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(udp_pcb); /* unused in case of IPV4 only configuration */ + + ip_route_get_local_ip(&udp_pcb->local_ip, dst, dst_if, dst_ip); + + if ((dst_if != NULL) && (dst_ip != NULL)) { + ip_addr_copy(*result, *dst_ip); + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * Starts SNMP Agent. + * Allocates UDP pcb and binds it to IP_ANY_TYPE port 161. + */ +void snmp_init(void) +{ + err_t err; + + struct udp_pcb *snmp_pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + LWIP_ERROR("snmp_raw: no PCB", (snmp_pcb != NULL), return;); + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + snmp_traps_handle = snmp_pcb; + + udp_recv(snmp_pcb, snmp_recv, NULL); + err = udp_bind(snmp_pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP); + LWIP_ERROR("snmp_raw: Unable to bind PCB", (err == ERR_OK), return;); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && SNMP_USE_RAW */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c index bc7eef31..3f87e4e9 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_scalar.c @@ -1,231 +1,231 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP scalar node support implementation. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Martin Hentschel - * - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" - -static s16_t snmp_scalar_array_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value); -static snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value); -static snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value); - -snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - const struct snmp_scalar_node *scalar_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); - - /* scalar only has one dedicated instance: .0 */ - if ((instance->instance_oid.len != 1) || (instance->instance_oid.id[0] != 0)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - instance->access = scalar_node->access; - instance->asn1_type = scalar_node->asn1_type; - instance->get_value = scalar_node->get_value; - instance->set_test = scalar_node->set_test; - instance->set_value = scalar_node->set_value; - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - /* because our only instance is .0 we can only return a next instance if no instance oid is passed */ - if (instance->instance_oid.len == 0) { - instance->instance_oid.len = 1; - instance->instance_oid.id[0] = 0; - - return snmp_scalar_get_instance(root_oid, root_oid_len, instance); - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); - - if ((instance->instance_oid.len == 2) && (instance->instance_oid.id[1] == 0)) { - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = array_node->array_nodes; - u32_t i = 0; - - while (i < array_node->array_node_count) { - if (array_node_def->oid == instance->instance_oid.id[0]) { - break; - } - - array_node_def++; - i++; - } - - if (i < array_node->array_node_count) { - instance->access = array_node_def->access; - instance->asn1_type = array_node_def->asn1_type; - instance->get_value = snmp_scalar_array_get_value; - instance->set_test = snmp_scalar_array_set_test; - instance->set_value = snmp_scalar_array_set_value; - instance->reference.const_ptr = array_node_def; - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - } - - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = array_node->array_nodes; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *result = NULL; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); - - if ((instance->instance_oid.len == 0) && (array_node->array_node_count > 0)) { - /* return node with lowest OID */ - u16_t i = 0; - - result = array_node_def; - array_node_def++; - - for (i = 1; i < array_node->array_node_count; i++) { - if (array_node_def->oid < result->oid) { - result = array_node_def; - } - - array_node_def++; - } - } else if (instance->instance_oid.len >= 1) { - if (instance->instance_oid.len == 1) { - /* if we have the requested OID we return its instance, otherwise we search for the next available */ - u16_t i = 0; - - while (i < array_node->array_node_count) { - if (array_node_def->oid == instance->instance_oid.id[0]) { - result = array_node_def; - break; - } - - array_node_def++; - i++; - } - } - - if (result == NULL) { - u32_t oid_dist = 0xFFFFFFFFUL; - u16_t i = 0; - array_node_def = array_node->array_nodes; /* may be already at the end when if case before was executed without result -> reinitialize to start */ - - while (i < array_node->array_node_count) { - if ((array_node_def->oid > instance->instance_oid.id[0]) && - ((u32_t)(array_node_def->oid - instance->instance_oid.id[0]) < oid_dist)) { - result = array_node_def; - oid_dist = array_node_def->oid - instance->instance_oid.id[0]; - } - - array_node_def++; - i++; - } - } - } - - if (result == NULL) { - /* nothing to return */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - instance->instance_oid.len = 2; - instance->instance_oid.id[0] = result->oid; - instance->instance_oid.id[1] = 0; - - instance->access = result->access; - instance->asn1_type = result->asn1_type; - instance->get_value = snmp_scalar_array_get_value; - instance->set_test = snmp_scalar_array_set_test; - instance->set_value = snmp_scalar_array_set_value; - instance->reference.const_ptr = result; - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -static s16_t snmp_scalar_array_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - s16_t result = -1; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *)instance->reference.const_ptr; - - if (array_node->get_value != NULL) { - result = array_node->get_value(array_node_def, value); - } - - return result; -} - -static snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value) -{ - snmp_err_t result = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *)instance->reference.const_ptr; - - if (array_node->set_test != NULL) { - result = array_node->set_test(array_node_def, value_len, value); - } - - return result; -} - -static snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value) -{ - snmp_err_t result = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *)instance->reference.const_ptr; - - if (array_node->set_value != NULL) { - result = array_node->set_value(array_node_def, value_len, value); - } - - return result; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP scalar node support implementation. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Martin Hentschel + * + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" + +static s16_t snmp_scalar_array_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value); +static snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value); +static snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value); + +snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + const struct snmp_scalar_node *scalar_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); + + /* scalar only has one dedicated instance: .0 */ + if ((instance->instance_oid.len != 1) || (instance->instance_oid.id[0] != 0)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + instance->access = scalar_node->access; + instance->asn1_type = scalar_node->asn1_type; + instance->get_value = scalar_node->get_value; + instance->set_test = scalar_node->set_test; + instance->set_value = scalar_node->set_value; + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + /* because our only instance is .0 we can only return a next instance if no instance oid is passed */ + if (instance->instance_oid.len == 0) { + instance->instance_oid.len = 1; + instance->instance_oid.id[0] = 0; + + return snmp_scalar_get_instance(root_oid, root_oid_len, instance); + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); + + if ((instance->instance_oid.len == 2) && (instance->instance_oid.id[1] == 0)) { + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = array_node->array_nodes; + u32_t i = 0; + + while (i < array_node->array_node_count) { + if (array_node_def->oid == instance->instance_oid.id[0]) { + break; + } + + array_node_def++; + i++; + } + + if (i < array_node->array_node_count) { + instance->access = array_node_def->access; + instance->asn1_type = array_node_def->asn1_type; + instance->get_value = snmp_scalar_array_get_value; + instance->set_test = snmp_scalar_array_set_test; + instance->set_value = snmp_scalar_array_set_value; + instance->reference.const_ptr = array_node_def; + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + } + + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = array_node->array_nodes; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *result = NULL; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); + + if ((instance->instance_oid.len == 0) && (array_node->array_node_count > 0)) { + /* return node with lowest OID */ + u16_t i = 0; + + result = array_node_def; + array_node_def++; + + for (i = 1; i < array_node->array_node_count; i++) { + if (array_node_def->oid < result->oid) { + result = array_node_def; + } + + array_node_def++; + } + } else if (instance->instance_oid.len >= 1) { + if (instance->instance_oid.len == 1) { + /* if we have the requested OID we return its instance, otherwise we search for the next available */ + u16_t i = 0; + + while (i < array_node->array_node_count) { + if (array_node_def->oid == instance->instance_oid.id[0]) { + result = array_node_def; + break; + } + + array_node_def++; + i++; + } + } + + if (result == NULL) { + u32_t oid_dist = 0xFFFFFFFFUL; + u16_t i = 0; + array_node_def = array_node->array_nodes; /* may be already at the end when if case before was executed without result -> reinitialize to start */ + + while (i < array_node->array_node_count) { + if ((array_node_def->oid > instance->instance_oid.id[0]) && + ((u32_t)(array_node_def->oid - instance->instance_oid.id[0]) < oid_dist)) { + result = array_node_def; + oid_dist = array_node_def->oid - instance->instance_oid.id[0]; + } + + array_node_def++; + i++; + } + } + } + + if (result == NULL) { + /* nothing to return */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + instance->instance_oid.len = 2; + instance->instance_oid.id[0] = result->oid; + instance->instance_oid.id[1] = 0; + + instance->access = result->access; + instance->asn1_type = result->asn1_type; + instance->get_value = snmp_scalar_array_get_value; + instance->set_test = snmp_scalar_array_set_test; + instance->set_value = snmp_scalar_array_set_value; + instance->reference.const_ptr = result; + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +static s16_t snmp_scalar_array_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + s16_t result = -1; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *)instance->reference.const_ptr; + + if (array_node->get_value != NULL) { + result = array_node->get_value(array_node_def, value); + } + + return result; +} + +static snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value) +{ + snmp_err_t result = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *)instance->reference.const_ptr; + + if (array_node->set_test != NULL) { + result = array_node->set_test(array_node_def, value_len, value); + } + + return result; +} + +static snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value) +{ + snmp_err_t result = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *array_node = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_node_def = (const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *)instance->reference.const_ptr; + + if (array_node->set_value != NULL) { + result = array_node->set_value(array_node_def, value_len, value); + } + + return result; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c index eea473ce..855d03eb 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_framework.c @@ -1,94 +1,94 @@ -/* -Generated by LwipMibCompiler -*/ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" -#include "snmpv3_priv.h" - -#include "lwip/sys.h" - -#include - -const struct snmp_obj_id usmNoAuthProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 1, 1 } }; -const struct snmp_obj_id usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 1, 2 } }; -const struct snmp_obj_id usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 1, 3 } }; -/* .4 sha-224 - * .5 sha-256 - * .6 sha-384 - * .7 sha-512 - */ - -const struct snmp_obj_id usmNoPrivProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 2, 1 } }; -const struct snmp_obj_id usmDESPrivProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 2, 2 } }; -/* .3 3des-ede */ -const struct snmp_obj_id usmAESPrivProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 2, 4 } }; -/* .5 unknown - * .6 unknown - * .7 unknown - */ - -/* TODO: where should this value come from? */ -#define SNMP_FRAMEWORKMIB_SNMPENGINEMAXMESSAGESIZE 1500 - -/* --- snmpFrameworkMIBObjects 1.3.6.1.6.3.10.2 ----------------------------------------------------- */ -static s16_t snmpengine_scalars_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) -{ - const char *engineid; - u8_t engineid_len; - - switch (node->oid) { - case 1: /* snmpEngineID */ - snmpv3_get_engine_id(&engineid, &engineid_len); - MEMCPY(value, engineid, engineid_len); - return engineid_len; - - case 2: /* snmpEngineBoots */ - *(s32_t *)value = snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(); - return sizeof(s32_t); - - case 3: /* snmpEngineTime */ - *(s32_t *)value = snmpv3_get_engine_time_internal(); - return sizeof(s32_t); - - case 4: /* snmpEngineMaxMessageSize */ - *(s32_t *)value = SNMP_FRAMEWORKMIB_SNMPENGINEMAXMESSAGESIZE; - return sizeof(s32_t); - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("snmpengine_scalars_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); - return 0; - } -} - -static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def snmpengine_scalars_nodes[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpEngineID */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpEngineBoots */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpEngineTime */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpEngineMaxMessageSize */ -}; -static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmpengine_scalars = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(1, snmpengine_scalars_nodes, snmpengine_scalars_get_value, NULL, NULL); - -static const struct snmp_node *const snmpframeworkmibobjects_subnodes[] = { - &snmpengine_scalars.node.node -}; -static const struct snmp_tree_node snmpframeworkmibobjects_treenode = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(2, snmpframeworkmibobjects_subnodes); - -/* --- snmpFrameworkMIB ----------------------------------------------------- */ -static const struct snmp_node *const snmpframeworkmib_subnodes[] = { - &snmpframeworkmibobjects_treenode.node -}; -static const struct snmp_tree_node snmpframeworkmib_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(10, snmpframeworkmib_subnodes); -static const u32_t snmpframeworkmib_base_oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10 }; -const struct snmp_mib snmpframeworkmib = { snmpframeworkmib_base_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(snmpframeworkmib_base_oid), &snmpframeworkmib_root.node }; - -/* --- snmpFrameworkMIB ----------------------------------------------------- */ -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/* +Generated by LwipMibCompiler +*/ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" +#include "snmpv3_priv.h" + +#include "lwip/sys.h" + +#include + +const struct snmp_obj_id usmNoAuthProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 1, 1 } }; +const struct snmp_obj_id usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 1, 2 } }; +const struct snmp_obj_id usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 1, 3 } }; +/* .4 sha-224 + * .5 sha-256 + * .6 sha-384 + * .7 sha-512 + */ + +const struct snmp_obj_id usmNoPrivProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 2, 1 } }; +const struct snmp_obj_id usmDESPrivProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 2, 2 } }; +/* .3 3des-ede */ +const struct snmp_obj_id usmAESPrivProtocol = { 10, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10, 1, 2, 4 } }; +/* .5 unknown + * .6 unknown + * .7 unknown + */ + +/* TODO: where should this value come from? */ +#define SNMP_FRAMEWORKMIB_SNMPENGINEMAXMESSAGESIZE 1500 + +/* --- snmpFrameworkMIBObjects 1.3.6.1.6.3.10.2 ----------------------------------------------------- */ +static s16_t snmpengine_scalars_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) +{ + const char *engineid; + u8_t engineid_len; + + switch (node->oid) { + case 1: /* snmpEngineID */ + snmpv3_get_engine_id(&engineid, &engineid_len); + MEMCPY(value, engineid, engineid_len); + return engineid_len; + + case 2: /* snmpEngineBoots */ + *(s32_t *)value = snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(); + return sizeof(s32_t); + + case 3: /* snmpEngineTime */ + *(s32_t *)value = snmpv3_get_engine_time_internal(); + return sizeof(s32_t); + + case 4: /* snmpEngineMaxMessageSize */ + *(s32_t *)value = SNMP_FRAMEWORKMIB_SNMPENGINEMAXMESSAGESIZE; + return sizeof(s32_t); + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("snmpengine_scalars_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); + return 0; + } +} + +static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def snmpengine_scalars_nodes[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpEngineID */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpEngineBoots */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpEngineTime */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* snmpEngineMaxMessageSize */ +}; +static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node snmpengine_scalars = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(1, snmpengine_scalars_nodes, snmpengine_scalars_get_value, NULL, NULL); + +static const struct snmp_node *const snmpframeworkmibobjects_subnodes[] = { + &snmpengine_scalars.node.node +}; +static const struct snmp_tree_node snmpframeworkmibobjects_treenode = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(2, snmpframeworkmibobjects_subnodes); + +/* --- snmpFrameworkMIB ----------------------------------------------------- */ +static const struct snmp_node *const snmpframeworkmib_subnodes[] = { + &snmpframeworkmibobjects_treenode.node +}; +static const struct snmp_tree_node snmpframeworkmib_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(10, snmpframeworkmib_subnodes); +static const u32_t snmpframeworkmib_base_oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 10 }; +const struct snmp_mib snmpframeworkmib = { snmpframeworkmib_base_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(snmpframeworkmib_base_oid), &snmpframeworkmib_root.node }; + +/* --- snmpFrameworkMIB ----------------------------------------------------- */ +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c index 1496cdd3..2ecc9547 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_snmpv2_usm.c @@ -1,459 +1,459 @@ -/* -Generated by LwipMibCompiler -*/ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" -#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" -#include "snmpv3_priv.h" - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h" - -#include - -/* --- usmUser 1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2 ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -static const struct snmp_oid_range usmUserTable_oid_ranges[] = { - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff }, - { 0, 0xff } -}; - -static void snmp_engineid_to_oid(const char *engineid, u32_t *oid, u32_t len) -{ - u8_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - oid[i] = engineid[i]; - } -} - -static void snmp_oid_to_name(char *name, const u32_t *oid, size_t len) -{ - u8_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - name[i] = (char)oid[i]; - } -} - -static void snmp_name_to_oid(const char *name, u32_t *oid, size_t len) -{ - u8_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - oid[i] = name[i]; - } -} - -static const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_auth_algo_to_oid(snmpv3_auth_algo_t algo) -{ - if (algo == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_MD5) { - return &usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol; - } else if (algo == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_SHA) { - return &usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol; - } - - return &usmNoAuthProtocol; -} - -static const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_priv_algo_to_oid(snmpv3_priv_algo_t algo) -{ - if (algo == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_DES) { - return &usmDESPrivProtocol; - } else if (algo == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_AES) { - return &usmAESPrivProtocol; - } - - return &usmNoPrivProtocol; -} - -char username[32]; - -static snmp_err_t usmusertable_get_instance(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance) -{ - const char *engineid; - u8_t eid_len; - - u32_t engineid_oid[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; - - u8_t name_len; - u8_t engineid_len; - - u8_t name_start; - u8_t engineid_start; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(column); - - snmpv3_get_engine_id(&engineid, &eid_len); - - engineid_len = (u8_t)row_oid[0]; - engineid_start = 1; - - if (engineid_len != eid_len) { - /* EngineID length does not match! */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - if (engineid_len > row_oid_len) { - /* row OID doesn't contain enough data according to engineid_len.*/ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(&row_oid[engineid_start], engineid_len, usmUserTable_oid_ranges, engineid_len)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - snmp_engineid_to_oid(engineid, engineid_oid, engineid_len); - - /* Verify EngineID */ - if (snmp_oid_equal(&row_oid[engineid_start], engineid_len, engineid_oid, engineid_len)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - name_len = (u8_t)row_oid[engineid_start + engineid_len]; - name_start = engineid_start + engineid_len + 1; - - if (name_len > SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH) { - /* specified name is too long */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - if (1 + engineid_len + 1 + name_len != row_oid_len) { - /* Length of EngineID and name does not match row oid length. (+2 for length fields)*/ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(&row_oid[name_start], name_len, usmUserTable_oid_ranges, name_len)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* Verify if user exists */ - memset(username, 0, sizeof(username)); - snmp_oid_to_name(username, &row_oid[name_start], name_len); - - if (snmpv3_get_user(username, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) != ERR_OK) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - /* Save name in reference pointer to make it easier to handle later on */ - cell_instance->reference.ptr = username; - cell_instance->reference_len = name_len; - - /* user was found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -/* - * valid oid options - * - * . - * .. - * .. - * ... - * .... - * .... - * - */ -static snmp_err_t usmusertable_get_next_instance(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance) -{ - const char *engineid; - u8_t eid_len; - - u32_t engineid_oid[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; - - u8_t name_len; - u8_t engineid_len; - - u8_t name_start; - u8_t engineid_start = 1; - u8_t i; - - struct snmp_next_oid_state state; - - u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(usmUserTable_oid_ranges)]; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(column); - - snmpv3_get_engine_id(&engineid, &eid_len); - - /* If EngineID might be given */ - if (row_oid->len > 0) { - engineid_len = (u8_t)row_oid->id[0]; - engineid_start = 1; - - if (engineid_len != eid_len) { - /* EngineID length does not match! */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - if (engineid_len > row_oid->len) { - /* Verify partial EngineID */ - snmp_engineid_to_oid(engineid, engineid_oid, row_oid->len - 1); - - if (!snmp_oid_equal(&row_oid->id[engineid_start], row_oid->len - 1, engineid_oid, row_oid->len - 1)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - } else { - /* Verify complete EngineID */ - snmp_engineid_to_oid(engineid, engineid_oid, engineid_len); - - if (!snmp_oid_equal(&row_oid->id[engineid_start], engineid_len, engineid_oid, engineid_len)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - } - - /* At this point, the given EngineID (partially) matches the local EngineID.*/ - - /* If name might also be given */ - if (row_oid->len > engineid_start + engineid_len) { - name_len = (u8_t)row_oid->id[engineid_start + engineid_len]; - name_start = engineid_start + engineid_len + 1; - - if (name_len > SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH) { - /* specified name is too long, max length is 32 according to mib file.*/ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - if (row_oid->len < engineid_len + name_len + 2) { - /* Partial name given according to oid.*/ - u8_t tmplen = row_oid->len - engineid_len - 2; - - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(&row_oid->id[name_start], tmplen, usmUserTable_oid_ranges, tmplen)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - } else { - /* Full name given according to oid. Also test for too much data.*/ - u8_t tmplen = row_oid->len - engineid_len - 2; - - if (!snmp_oid_in_range(&row_oid->id[name_start], name_len, usmUserTable_oid_ranges, tmplen)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - } - - /* At this point the EngineID and (partial) UserName match the local EngineID and UserName.*/ - } - } - - /* init struct to search next oid */ - snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(usmUserTable_oid_ranges)); - - for (i = 0; i < snmpv3_get_amount_of_users(); i++) { - u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(usmUserTable_oid_ranges)]; - - test_oid[0] = eid_len; - snmp_engineid_to_oid(engineid, &test_oid[1], eid_len); - - snmpv3_get_username(username, i); - - test_oid[1 + eid_len] = strlen(username); - snmp_name_to_oid(username, &test_oid[2 + eid_len], strlen(username)); - - /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ - snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, (u8_t)(1 + eid_len + 1 + strlen(username)), LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, i)); - } - - /* did we find a next one? */ - if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { - snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); - /* store username for subsequent operations (get/test/set) */ - memset(username, 0, sizeof(username)); - snmpv3_get_username(username, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(u8_t, state.reference)); - cell_instance->reference.ptr = username; - cell_instance->reference_len = strlen(username); - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } - - /* not found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; -} - -static s16_t usmusertable_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance, void *value) -{ - snmpv3_user_storagetype_t storage_type; - - switch (SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(cell_instance->instance_oid.id)) { - case 3: /* usmUserSecurityName */ - MEMCPY(value, cell_instance->reference.ptr, cell_instance->reference_len); - return (s16_t)cell_instance->reference_len; - - case 4: /* usmUserCloneFrom */ - MEMCPY(value, snmp_zero_dot_zero.id, snmp_zero_dot_zero.len * sizeof(u32_t)); - return snmp_zero_dot_zero.len * sizeof(u32_t); - - case 5: /* usmUserAuthProtocol */ - { - const struct snmp_obj_id *auth_algo; - snmpv3_auth_algo_t auth_algo_val; - snmpv3_get_user((const char *)cell_instance->reference.ptr, &auth_algo_val, NULL, NULL, NULL); - auth_algo = snmp_auth_algo_to_oid(auth_algo_val); - MEMCPY(value, auth_algo->id, auth_algo->len * sizeof(u32_t)); - return auth_algo->len * sizeof(u32_t); - } - - case 6: /* usmUserAuthKeyChange */ - return 0; - - case 7: /* usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange */ - return 0; - - case 8: /* usmUserPrivProtocol */ - { - const struct snmp_obj_id *priv_algo; - snmpv3_priv_algo_t priv_algo_val; - snmpv3_get_user((const char *)cell_instance->reference.ptr, NULL, NULL, &priv_algo_val, NULL); - priv_algo = snmp_priv_algo_to_oid(priv_algo_val); - MEMCPY(value, priv_algo->id, priv_algo->len * sizeof(u32_t)); - return priv_algo->len * sizeof(u32_t); - } - - case 9: /* usmUserPrivKeyChange */ - return 0; - - case 10: /* usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange */ - return 0; - - case 11: /* usmUserPublic */ - /* TODO: Implement usmUserPublic */ - return 0; - - case 12: /* usmUserStorageType */ - snmpv3_get_user_storagetype((const char *)cell_instance->reference.ptr, &storage_type); - *(s32_t *)value = storage_type; - return sizeof(s32_t); - - case 13: /* usmUserStatus */ - *(s32_t *)value = 1; /* active */ - return sizeof(s32_t); - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("usmusertable_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(cell_instance->instance_oid.id))); - return 0; - } -} - -/* --- usmMIBObjects 1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1 ----------------------------------------------------- */ -static s16_t usmstats_scalars_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) -{ - u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; - - switch (node->oid) { - case 1: /* usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels; - break; - - case 2: /* usmStatsNotInTimeWindows */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.notintimewindows; - break; - - case 3: /* usmStatsUnknownUserNames */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.unknownusernames; - break; - - case 4: /* usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.unknownengineids; - break; - - case 5: /* usmStatsWrongDigests */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.wrongdigests; - break; - - case 6: /* usmStatsDecryptionErrors */ - *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.decryptionerrors; - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("usmstats_scalars_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); - return 0; - } - - return sizeof(*uint_ptr); -} - -/* --- snmpUsmMIB ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -/* --- usmUser 1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2 ----------------------------------------------------- */ - -static const struct snmp_table_col_def usmusertable_columns[] = { - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserSecurityName */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserCloneFrom */ - { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserAuthProtocol */ - { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserAuthKeyChange */ - { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange */ - { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserPrivProtocol */ - { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserPrivKeyChange */ - { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange */ - { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserPublic */ - { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserStorageType */ - { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserStatus */ -}; -static const struct snmp_table_node usmusertable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE(2, usmusertable_columns, usmusertable_get_instance, usmusertable_get_next_instance, usmusertable_get_value, NULL, NULL); - -static const struct snmp_node *const usmuser_subnodes[] = { - &usmusertable.node.node -}; -static const struct snmp_tree_node usmuser_treenode = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(2, usmuser_subnodes); - -/* --- usmMIBObjects 1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1 ----------------------------------------------------- */ -static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def usmstats_scalars_nodes[] = { - { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels */ - { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsNotInTimeWindows */ - { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsUnknownUserNames */ - { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs */ - { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsWrongDigests */ - { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsDecryptionErrors */ -}; -static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node usmstats_scalars = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(1, usmstats_scalars_nodes, usmstats_scalars_get_value, NULL, NULL); - -static const struct snmp_node *const usmmibobjects_subnodes[] = { - &usmstats_scalars.node.node, - &usmuser_treenode.node -}; -static const struct snmp_tree_node usmmibobjects_treenode = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(1, usmmibobjects_subnodes); - -/* --- snmpUsmMIB ----------------------------------------------------- */ -static const struct snmp_node *const snmpusmmib_subnodes[] = { - &usmmibobjects_treenode.node -}; -static const struct snmp_tree_node snmpusmmib_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(15, snmpusmmib_subnodes); -static const u32_t snmpusmmib_base_oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15 }; -const struct snmp_mib snmpusmmib = { snmpusmmib_base_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(snmpusmmib_base_oid), &snmpusmmib_root.node }; - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/* +Generated by LwipMibCompiler +*/ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" +#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" +#include "snmpv3_priv.h" + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h" + +#include + +/* --- usmUser 1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2 ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +static const struct snmp_oid_range usmUserTable_oid_ranges[] = { + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff }, + { 0, 0xff } +}; + +static void snmp_engineid_to_oid(const char *engineid, u32_t *oid, u32_t len) +{ + u8_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + oid[i] = engineid[i]; + } +} + +static void snmp_oid_to_name(char *name, const u32_t *oid, size_t len) +{ + u8_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + name[i] = (char)oid[i]; + } +} + +static void snmp_name_to_oid(const char *name, u32_t *oid, size_t len) +{ + u8_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + oid[i] = name[i]; + } +} + +static const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_auth_algo_to_oid(snmpv3_auth_algo_t algo) +{ + if (algo == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_MD5) { + return &usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol; + } else if (algo == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_SHA) { + return &usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol; + } + + return &usmNoAuthProtocol; +} + +static const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_priv_algo_to_oid(snmpv3_priv_algo_t algo) +{ + if (algo == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_DES) { + return &usmDESPrivProtocol; + } else if (algo == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_AES) { + return &usmAESPrivProtocol; + } + + return &usmNoPrivProtocol; +} + +char username[32]; + +static snmp_err_t usmusertable_get_instance(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance) +{ + const char *engineid; + u8_t eid_len; + + u32_t engineid_oid[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; + + u8_t name_len; + u8_t engineid_len; + + u8_t name_start; + u8_t engineid_start; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(column); + + snmpv3_get_engine_id(&engineid, &eid_len); + + engineid_len = (u8_t)row_oid[0]; + engineid_start = 1; + + if (engineid_len != eid_len) { + /* EngineID length does not match! */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + if (engineid_len > row_oid_len) { + /* row OID doesn't contain enough data according to engineid_len.*/ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(&row_oid[engineid_start], engineid_len, usmUserTable_oid_ranges, engineid_len)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + snmp_engineid_to_oid(engineid, engineid_oid, engineid_len); + + /* Verify EngineID */ + if (snmp_oid_equal(&row_oid[engineid_start], engineid_len, engineid_oid, engineid_len)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + name_len = (u8_t)row_oid[engineid_start + engineid_len]; + name_start = engineid_start + engineid_len + 1; + + if (name_len > SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH) { + /* specified name is too long */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + if (1 + engineid_len + 1 + name_len != row_oid_len) { + /* Length of EngineID and name does not match row oid length. (+2 for length fields)*/ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* check if incoming OID length and if values are in plausible range */ + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(&row_oid[name_start], name_len, usmUserTable_oid_ranges, name_len)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* Verify if user exists */ + memset(username, 0, sizeof(username)); + snmp_oid_to_name(username, &row_oid[name_start], name_len); + + if (snmpv3_get_user(username, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) != ERR_OK) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + /* Save name in reference pointer to make it easier to handle later on */ + cell_instance->reference.ptr = username; + cell_instance->reference_len = name_len; + + /* user was found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +/* + * valid oid options + * + * . + * .. + * .. + * ... + * .... + * .... + * + */ +static snmp_err_t usmusertable_get_next_instance(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance) +{ + const char *engineid; + u8_t eid_len; + + u32_t engineid_oid[SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH]; + + u8_t name_len; + u8_t engineid_len; + + u8_t name_start; + u8_t engineid_start = 1; + u8_t i; + + struct snmp_next_oid_state state; + + u32_t result_temp[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(usmUserTable_oid_ranges)]; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(column); + + snmpv3_get_engine_id(&engineid, &eid_len); + + /* If EngineID might be given */ + if (row_oid->len > 0) { + engineid_len = (u8_t)row_oid->id[0]; + engineid_start = 1; + + if (engineid_len != eid_len) { + /* EngineID length does not match! */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + if (engineid_len > row_oid->len) { + /* Verify partial EngineID */ + snmp_engineid_to_oid(engineid, engineid_oid, row_oid->len - 1); + + if (!snmp_oid_equal(&row_oid->id[engineid_start], row_oid->len - 1, engineid_oid, row_oid->len - 1)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + } else { + /* Verify complete EngineID */ + snmp_engineid_to_oid(engineid, engineid_oid, engineid_len); + + if (!snmp_oid_equal(&row_oid->id[engineid_start], engineid_len, engineid_oid, engineid_len)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + } + + /* At this point, the given EngineID (partially) matches the local EngineID.*/ + + /* If name might also be given */ + if (row_oid->len > engineid_start + engineid_len) { + name_len = (u8_t)row_oid->id[engineid_start + engineid_len]; + name_start = engineid_start + engineid_len + 1; + + if (name_len > SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH) { + /* specified name is too long, max length is 32 according to mib file.*/ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + if (row_oid->len < engineid_len + name_len + 2) { + /* Partial name given according to oid.*/ + u8_t tmplen = row_oid->len - engineid_len - 2; + + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(&row_oid->id[name_start], tmplen, usmUserTable_oid_ranges, tmplen)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + } else { + /* Full name given according to oid. Also test for too much data.*/ + u8_t tmplen = row_oid->len - engineid_len - 2; + + if (!snmp_oid_in_range(&row_oid->id[name_start], name_len, usmUserTable_oid_ranges, tmplen)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + } + + /* At this point the EngineID and (partial) UserName match the local EngineID and UserName.*/ + } + } + + /* init struct to search next oid */ + snmp_next_oid_init(&state, row_oid->id, row_oid->len, result_temp, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(usmUserTable_oid_ranges)); + + for (i = 0; i < snmpv3_get_amount_of_users(); i++) { + u32_t test_oid[LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(usmUserTable_oid_ranges)]; + + test_oid[0] = eid_len; + snmp_engineid_to_oid(engineid, &test_oid[1], eid_len); + + snmpv3_get_username(username, i); + + test_oid[1 + eid_len] = strlen(username); + snmp_name_to_oid(username, &test_oid[2 + eid_len], strlen(username)); + + /* check generated OID: is it a candidate for the next one? */ + snmp_next_oid_check(&state, test_oid, (u8_t)(1 + eid_len + 1 + strlen(username)), LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, i)); + } + + /* did we find a next one? */ + if (state.status == SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + snmp_oid_assign(row_oid, state.next_oid, state.next_oid_len); + /* store username for subsequent operations (get/test/set) */ + memset(username, 0, sizeof(username)); + snmpv3_get_username(username, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(u8_t, state.reference)); + cell_instance->reference.ptr = username; + cell_instance->reference_len = strlen(username); + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } + + /* not found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; +} + +static s16_t usmusertable_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance, void *value) +{ + snmpv3_user_storagetype_t storage_type; + + switch (SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(cell_instance->instance_oid.id)) { + case 3: /* usmUserSecurityName */ + MEMCPY(value, cell_instance->reference.ptr, cell_instance->reference_len); + return (s16_t)cell_instance->reference_len; + + case 4: /* usmUserCloneFrom */ + MEMCPY(value, snmp_zero_dot_zero.id, snmp_zero_dot_zero.len * sizeof(u32_t)); + return snmp_zero_dot_zero.len * sizeof(u32_t); + + case 5: /* usmUserAuthProtocol */ + { + const struct snmp_obj_id *auth_algo; + snmpv3_auth_algo_t auth_algo_val; + snmpv3_get_user((const char *)cell_instance->reference.ptr, &auth_algo_val, NULL, NULL, NULL); + auth_algo = snmp_auth_algo_to_oid(auth_algo_val); + MEMCPY(value, auth_algo->id, auth_algo->len * sizeof(u32_t)); + return auth_algo->len * sizeof(u32_t); + } + + case 6: /* usmUserAuthKeyChange */ + return 0; + + case 7: /* usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange */ + return 0; + + case 8: /* usmUserPrivProtocol */ + { + const struct snmp_obj_id *priv_algo; + snmpv3_priv_algo_t priv_algo_val; + snmpv3_get_user((const char *)cell_instance->reference.ptr, NULL, NULL, &priv_algo_val, NULL); + priv_algo = snmp_priv_algo_to_oid(priv_algo_val); + MEMCPY(value, priv_algo->id, priv_algo->len * sizeof(u32_t)); + return priv_algo->len * sizeof(u32_t); + } + + case 9: /* usmUserPrivKeyChange */ + return 0; + + case 10: /* usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange */ + return 0; + + case 11: /* usmUserPublic */ + /* TODO: Implement usmUserPublic */ + return 0; + + case 12: /* usmUserStorageType */ + snmpv3_get_user_storagetype((const char *)cell_instance->reference.ptr, &storage_type); + *(s32_t *)value = storage_type; + return sizeof(s32_t); + + case 13: /* usmUserStatus */ + *(s32_t *)value = 1; /* active */ + return sizeof(s32_t); + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("usmusertable_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(cell_instance->instance_oid.id))); + return 0; + } +} + +/* --- usmMIBObjects 1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1 ----------------------------------------------------- */ +static s16_t usmstats_scalars_get_value(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *node, void *value) +{ + u32_t *uint_ptr = (u32_t *)value; + + switch (node->oid) { + case 1: /* usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.unsupportedseclevels; + break; + + case 2: /* usmStatsNotInTimeWindows */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.notintimewindows; + break; + + case 3: /* usmStatsUnknownUserNames */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.unknownusernames; + break; + + case 4: /* usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.unknownengineids; + break; + + case 5: /* usmStatsWrongDigests */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.wrongdigests; + break; + + case 6: /* usmStatsDecryptionErrors */ + *uint_ptr = snmp_stats.decryptionerrors; + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_MIB_DEBUG, ("usmstats_scalars_get_value(): unknown id: %" S32_F "\n", node->oid)); + return 0; + } + + return sizeof(*uint_ptr); +} + +/* --- snmpUsmMIB ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* --- usmUser 1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1.2 ----------------------------------------------------- */ + +static const struct snmp_table_col_def usmusertable_columns[] = { + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserSecurityName */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserCloneFrom */ + { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserAuthProtocol */ + { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserAuthKeyChange */ + { 7, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange */ + { 8, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserPrivProtocol */ + { 9, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserPrivKeyChange */ + { 10, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange */ + { 11, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserPublic */ + { 12, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserStorageType */ + { 13, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmUserStatus */ +}; +static const struct snmp_table_node usmusertable = SNMP_TABLE_CREATE(2, usmusertable_columns, usmusertable_get_instance, usmusertable_get_next_instance, usmusertable_get_value, NULL, NULL); + +static const struct snmp_node *const usmuser_subnodes[] = { + &usmusertable.node.node +}; +static const struct snmp_tree_node usmuser_treenode = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(2, usmuser_subnodes); + +/* --- usmMIBObjects 1.3.6.1.6.3.15.1 ----------------------------------------------------- */ +static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def usmstats_scalars_nodes[] = { + { 1, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels */ + { 2, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsNotInTimeWindows */ + { 3, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsUnknownUserNames */ + { 4, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs */ + { 5, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsWrongDigests */ + { 6, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY }, /* usmStatsDecryptionErrors */ +}; +static const struct snmp_scalar_array_node usmstats_scalars = SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(1, usmstats_scalars_nodes, usmstats_scalars_get_value, NULL, NULL); + +static const struct snmp_node *const usmmibobjects_subnodes[] = { + &usmstats_scalars.node.node, + &usmuser_treenode.node +}; +static const struct snmp_tree_node usmmibobjects_treenode = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(1, usmmibobjects_subnodes); + +/* --- snmpUsmMIB ----------------------------------------------------- */ +static const struct snmp_node *const snmpusmmib_subnodes[] = { + &usmmibobjects_treenode.node +}; +static const struct snmp_tree_node snmpusmmib_root = SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(15, snmpusmmib_subnodes); +static const u32_t snmpusmmib_base_oid[] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 6, 3, 15 }; +const struct snmp_mib snmpusmmib = { snmpusmmib_base_oid, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(snmpusmmib_base_oid), &snmpusmmib_root.node }; + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c index e218a2ca..b315bd2a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_table.c @@ -1,351 +1,351 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP table support implementation. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Martin Hentschel - * - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" -#include - -snmp_err_t snmp_table_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - const struct snmp_table_node *table_node = (const struct snmp_table_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); - - /* check min. length (fixed row entry definition, column, row instance oid with at least one entry */ - /* fixed row entry always has oid 1 */ - if ((instance->instance_oid.len >= 3) && (instance->instance_oid.id[0] == 1)) { - /* search column */ - const struct snmp_table_col_def *col_def = table_node->columns; - u16_t i = table_node->column_count; - - while (i > 0) { - if (col_def->index == instance->instance_oid.id[1]) { - break; - } - - col_def++; - i--; - } - - if (i > 0) { - /* everything may be overwritten by get_cell_instance_method() in order to implement special handling for single columns/cells */ - instance->asn1_type = col_def->asn1_type; - instance->access = col_def->access; - instance->get_value = table_node->get_value; - instance->set_test = table_node->set_test; - instance->set_value = table_node->set_value; - - ret = table_node->get_cell_instance( - &(instance->instance_oid.id[1]), - &(instance->instance_oid.id[2]), - instance->instance_oid.len - 2, - instance); - } - } - - return ret; -} - -snmp_err_t snmp_table_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - const struct snmp_table_node *table_node = (const struct snmp_table_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - const struct snmp_table_col_def *col_def; - struct snmp_obj_id row_oid; - u32_t column = 0; - snmp_err_t result; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); - - /* check that first part of id is 0 or 1, referencing fixed row entry */ - if ((instance->instance_oid.len > 0) && (instance->instance_oid.id[0] > 1)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - if (instance->instance_oid.len > 1) { - column = instance->instance_oid.id[1]; - } - - if (instance->instance_oid.len > 2) { - snmp_oid_assign(&row_oid, &(instance->instance_oid.id[2]), instance->instance_oid.len - 2); - } else { - row_oid.len = 0; - } - - instance->get_value = table_node->get_value; - instance->set_test = table_node->set_test; - instance->set_value = table_node->set_value; - - /* resolve column and value */ - do { - u16_t i; - const struct snmp_table_col_def *next_col_def = NULL; - col_def = table_node->columns; - - for (i = 0; i < table_node->column_count; i++) { - if (col_def->index == column) { - next_col_def = col_def; - break; - } else if ((col_def->index > column) && ((next_col_def == NULL) || (col_def->index < next_col_def->index))) { - next_col_def = col_def; - } - - col_def++; - } - - if (next_col_def == NULL) { - /* no further column found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - instance->asn1_type = next_col_def->asn1_type; - instance->access = next_col_def->access; - - result = table_node->get_next_cell_instance( - &next_col_def->index, - &row_oid, - instance); - - if (result == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - col_def = next_col_def; - break; - } - - row_oid.len = 0; /* reset row_oid because we switch to next column and start with the first entry there */ - column = next_col_def->index + 1; - } while (1); - - /* build resulting oid */ - instance->instance_oid.len = 2; - instance->instance_oid.id[0] = 1; - instance->instance_oid.id[1] = col_def->index; - snmp_oid_append(&instance->instance_oid, row_oid.id, row_oid.len); - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -snmp_err_t snmp_table_simple_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - const struct snmp_table_simple_node *table_node = (const struct snmp_table_simple_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); - - /* check min. length (fixed row entry definition, column, row instance oid with at least one entry */ - /* fixed row entry always has oid 1 */ - if ((instance->instance_oid.len >= 3) && (instance->instance_oid.id[0] == 1)) { - ret = table_node->get_cell_value( - &(instance->instance_oid.id[1]), - &(instance->instance_oid.id[2]), - instance->instance_oid.len - 2, - &instance->reference, - &instance->reference_len); - - if (ret == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - /* search column */ - const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def *col_def = table_node->columns; - u32_t i = table_node->column_count; - - while (i > 0) { - if (col_def->index == instance->instance_oid.id[1]) { - break; - } - - col_def++; - i--; - } - - if (i > 0) { - instance->asn1_type = col_def->asn1_type; - instance->access = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY; - instance->set_test = NULL; - instance->set_value = NULL; - - switch (col_def->data_type) { - case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32: - instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_u32ref; - break; - - case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32: - instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_s32ref; - break; - - case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR: /* fall through */ - case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_CONST_PTR: - instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_refconstptr; - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("snmp_table_simple_get_instance(): unknown column data_type: %d\n", col_def->data_type)); - return SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - - ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; - } else { - ret = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - } - } - - return ret; -} - -snmp_err_t snmp_table_simple_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - const struct snmp_table_simple_node *table_node = (const struct snmp_table_simple_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def *col_def; - struct snmp_obj_id row_oid; - u32_t column = 0; - snmp_err_t result; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); - - /* check that first part of id is 0 or 1, referencing fixed row entry */ - if ((instance->instance_oid.len > 0) && (instance->instance_oid.id[0] > 1)) { - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - if (instance->instance_oid.len > 1) { - column = instance->instance_oid.id[1]; - } - - if (instance->instance_oid.len > 2) { - snmp_oid_assign(&row_oid, &(instance->instance_oid.id[2]), instance->instance_oid.len - 2); - } else { - row_oid.len = 0; - } - - /* resolve column and value */ - do { - u32_t i; - const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def *next_col_def = NULL; - col_def = table_node->columns; - - for (i = 0; i < table_node->column_count; i++) { - if (col_def->index == column) { - next_col_def = col_def; - break; - } else if ((col_def->index > column) && ((next_col_def == NULL) || - (col_def->index < next_col_def->index))) { - next_col_def = col_def; - } - - col_def++; - } - - if (next_col_def == NULL) { - /* no further column found */ - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - result = table_node->get_next_cell_instance_and_value( - &next_col_def->index, - &row_oid, - &instance->reference, - &instance->reference_len); - - if (result == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - col_def = next_col_def; - break; - } - - row_oid.len = 0; /* reset row_oid because we switch to next column and start with the first entry there */ - column = next_col_def->index + 1; - } while (1); - - instance->asn1_type = col_def->asn1_type; - instance->access = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY; - instance->set_test = NULL; - instance->set_value = NULL; - - switch (col_def->data_type) { - case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32: - instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_u32ref; - break; - - case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32: - instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_s32ref; - break; - - case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR: /* fall through */ - case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_CONST_PTR: - instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_refconstptr; - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("snmp_table_simple_get_instance(): unknown column data_type: %d\n", col_def->data_type)); - return SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; - } - - /* build resulting oid */ - instance->instance_oid.len = 2; - instance->instance_oid.id[0] = 1; - instance->instance_oid.id[1] = col_def->index; - snmp_oid_append(&instance->instance_oid, row_oid.id, row_oid.len); - - return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; -} - -s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_s32ref(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - s32_t *dst = (s32_t *)value; - *dst = instance->reference.s32; - return sizeof(*dst); -} - -s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_u32ref(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - u32_t *dst = (u32_t *)value; - *dst = instance->reference.u32; - return sizeof(*dst); -} - -s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_refconstptr(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - MEMCPY(value, instance->reference.const_ptr, instance->reference_len); - return (u16_t)instance->reference_len; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP table support implementation. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Martin Hentschel + * + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_table.h" +#include + +snmp_err_t snmp_table_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + const struct snmp_table_node *table_node = (const struct snmp_table_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); + + /* check min. length (fixed row entry definition, column, row instance oid with at least one entry */ + /* fixed row entry always has oid 1 */ + if ((instance->instance_oid.len >= 3) && (instance->instance_oid.id[0] == 1)) { + /* search column */ + const struct snmp_table_col_def *col_def = table_node->columns; + u16_t i = table_node->column_count; + + while (i > 0) { + if (col_def->index == instance->instance_oid.id[1]) { + break; + } + + col_def++; + i--; + } + + if (i > 0) { + /* everything may be overwritten by get_cell_instance_method() in order to implement special handling for single columns/cells */ + instance->asn1_type = col_def->asn1_type; + instance->access = col_def->access; + instance->get_value = table_node->get_value; + instance->set_test = table_node->set_test; + instance->set_value = table_node->set_value; + + ret = table_node->get_cell_instance( + &(instance->instance_oid.id[1]), + &(instance->instance_oid.id[2]), + instance->instance_oid.len - 2, + instance); + } + } + + return ret; +} + +snmp_err_t snmp_table_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + const struct snmp_table_node *table_node = (const struct snmp_table_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + const struct snmp_table_col_def *col_def; + struct snmp_obj_id row_oid; + u32_t column = 0; + snmp_err_t result; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); + + /* check that first part of id is 0 or 1, referencing fixed row entry */ + if ((instance->instance_oid.len > 0) && (instance->instance_oid.id[0] > 1)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + if (instance->instance_oid.len > 1) { + column = instance->instance_oid.id[1]; + } + + if (instance->instance_oid.len > 2) { + snmp_oid_assign(&row_oid, &(instance->instance_oid.id[2]), instance->instance_oid.len - 2); + } else { + row_oid.len = 0; + } + + instance->get_value = table_node->get_value; + instance->set_test = table_node->set_test; + instance->set_value = table_node->set_value; + + /* resolve column and value */ + do { + u16_t i; + const struct snmp_table_col_def *next_col_def = NULL; + col_def = table_node->columns; + + for (i = 0; i < table_node->column_count; i++) { + if (col_def->index == column) { + next_col_def = col_def; + break; + } else if ((col_def->index > column) && ((next_col_def == NULL) || (col_def->index < next_col_def->index))) { + next_col_def = col_def; + } + + col_def++; + } + + if (next_col_def == NULL) { + /* no further column found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + instance->asn1_type = next_col_def->asn1_type; + instance->access = next_col_def->access; + + result = table_node->get_next_cell_instance( + &next_col_def->index, + &row_oid, + instance); + + if (result == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + col_def = next_col_def; + break; + } + + row_oid.len = 0; /* reset row_oid because we switch to next column and start with the first entry there */ + column = next_col_def->index + 1; + } while (1); + + /* build resulting oid */ + instance->instance_oid.len = 2; + instance->instance_oid.id[0] = 1; + instance->instance_oid.id[1] = col_def->index; + snmp_oid_append(&instance->instance_oid, row_oid.id, row_oid.len); + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +snmp_err_t snmp_table_simple_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + snmp_err_t ret = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + const struct snmp_table_simple_node *table_node = (const struct snmp_table_simple_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); + + /* check min. length (fixed row entry definition, column, row instance oid with at least one entry */ + /* fixed row entry always has oid 1 */ + if ((instance->instance_oid.len >= 3) && (instance->instance_oid.id[0] == 1)) { + ret = table_node->get_cell_value( + &(instance->instance_oid.id[1]), + &(instance->instance_oid.id[2]), + instance->instance_oid.len - 2, + &instance->reference, + &instance->reference_len); + + if (ret == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + /* search column */ + const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def *col_def = table_node->columns; + u32_t i = table_node->column_count; + + while (i > 0) { + if (col_def->index == instance->instance_oid.id[1]) { + break; + } + + col_def++; + i--; + } + + if (i > 0) { + instance->asn1_type = col_def->asn1_type; + instance->access = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY; + instance->set_test = NULL; + instance->set_value = NULL; + + switch (col_def->data_type) { + case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32: + instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_u32ref; + break; + + case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32: + instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_s32ref; + break; + + case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR: /* fall through */ + case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_CONST_PTR: + instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_refconstptr; + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("snmp_table_simple_get_instance(): unknown column data_type: %d\n", col_def->data_type)); + return SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + + ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; + } else { + ret = SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + } + } + + return ret; +} + +snmp_err_t snmp_table_simple_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + const struct snmp_table_simple_node *table_node = (const struct snmp_table_simple_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def *col_def; + struct snmp_obj_id row_oid; + u32_t column = 0; + snmp_err_t result; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(root_oid_len); + + /* check that first part of id is 0 or 1, referencing fixed row entry */ + if ((instance->instance_oid.len > 0) && (instance->instance_oid.id[0] > 1)) { + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + if (instance->instance_oid.len > 1) { + column = instance->instance_oid.id[1]; + } + + if (instance->instance_oid.len > 2) { + snmp_oid_assign(&row_oid, &(instance->instance_oid.id[2]), instance->instance_oid.len - 2); + } else { + row_oid.len = 0; + } + + /* resolve column and value */ + do { + u32_t i; + const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def *next_col_def = NULL; + col_def = table_node->columns; + + for (i = 0; i < table_node->column_count; i++) { + if (col_def->index == column) { + next_col_def = col_def; + break; + } else if ((col_def->index > column) && ((next_col_def == NULL) || + (col_def->index < next_col_def->index))) { + next_col_def = col_def; + } + + col_def++; + } + + if (next_col_def == NULL) { + /* no further column found */ + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + result = table_node->get_next_cell_instance_and_value( + &next_col_def->index, + &row_oid, + &instance->reference, + &instance->reference_len); + + if (result == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + col_def = next_col_def; + break; + } + + row_oid.len = 0; /* reset row_oid because we switch to next column and start with the first entry there */ + column = next_col_def->index + 1; + } while (1); + + instance->asn1_type = col_def->asn1_type; + instance->access = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY; + instance->set_test = NULL; + instance->set_value = NULL; + + switch (col_def->data_type) { + case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32: + instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_u32ref; + break; + + case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32: + instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_s32ref; + break; + + case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR: /* fall through */ + case SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_CONST_PTR: + instance->get_value = snmp_table_extract_value_from_refconstptr; + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("snmp_table_simple_get_instance(): unknown column data_type: %d\n", col_def->data_type)); + return SNMP_ERR_GENERROR; + } + + /* build resulting oid */ + instance->instance_oid.len = 2; + instance->instance_oid.id[0] = 1; + instance->instance_oid.id[1] = col_def->index; + snmp_oid_append(&instance->instance_oid, row_oid.id, row_oid.len); + + return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR; +} + +s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_s32ref(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + s32_t *dst = (s32_t *)value; + *dst = instance->reference.s32; + return sizeof(*dst); +} + +s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_u32ref(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + u32_t *dst = (u32_t *)value; + *dst = instance->reference.u32; + return sizeof(*dst); +} + +s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_refconstptr(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + MEMCPY(value, instance->reference.const_ptr, instance->reference_len); + return (u16_t)instance->reference_len; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c index a496970b..14496bd7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_threadsync.c @@ -1,217 +1,217 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP thread synchronization implementation. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP && (NO_SYS == 0) /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include - -static void call_synced_function(struct threadsync_data *call_data, snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn) -{ - sys_mutex_lock(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem_usage_mutex); - call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sync_fn(fn, call_data); - sys_sem_wait(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); - sys_mutex_unlock(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem_usage_mutex); -} - -static void threadsync_get_value_synced(void *ctx) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; - - if (call_data->proxy_instance.get_value != NULL) { - call_data->retval.s16 = call_data->proxy_instance.get_value(&call_data->proxy_instance, call_data->arg1.value); - } else { - call_data->retval.s16 = -1; - } - - sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); -} - -static s16_t threadsync_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)instance->reference.ptr; - - call_data->arg1.value = value; - call_synced_function(call_data, threadsync_get_value_synced); - - return call_data->retval.s16; -} - -static void threadsync_set_test_synced(void *ctx) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; - - if (call_data->proxy_instance.set_test != NULL) { - call_data->retval.err = call_data->proxy_instance.set_test(&call_data->proxy_instance, call_data->arg2.len, call_data->arg1.value); - } else { - call_data->retval.err = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; - } - - sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); -} - -static snmp_err_t threadsync_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)instance->reference.ptr; - - call_data->arg1.value = value; - call_data->arg2.len = len; - call_synced_function(call_data, threadsync_set_test_synced); - - return call_data->retval.err; -} - -static void threadsync_set_value_synced(void *ctx) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; - - if (call_data->proxy_instance.set_value != NULL) { - call_data->retval.err = call_data->proxy_instance.set_value(&call_data->proxy_instance, call_data->arg2.len, call_data->arg1.value); - } else { - call_data->retval.err = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; - } - - sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); -} - -static snmp_err_t threadsync_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)instance->reference.ptr; - - call_data->arg1.value = value; - call_data->arg2.len = len; - call_synced_function(call_data, threadsync_set_value_synced); - - return call_data->retval.err; -} - -static void threadsync_release_instance_synced(void *ctx) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; - - call_data->proxy_instance.release_instance(&call_data->proxy_instance); - - sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); -} - -static void threadsync_release_instance(struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)instance->reference.ptr; - - if (call_data->proxy_instance.release_instance != NULL) { - call_synced_function(call_data, threadsync_release_instance_synced); - } -} - -static void get_instance_synced(void *ctx) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; - const struct snmp_leaf_node *leaf = (const struct snmp_leaf_node *)(const void *)call_data->proxy_instance.node; - - call_data->retval.err = leaf->get_instance(call_data->arg1.root_oid, call_data->arg2.root_oid_len, &call_data->proxy_instance); - - sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); -} - -static void get_next_instance_synced(void *ctx) -{ - struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; - const struct snmp_leaf_node *leaf = (const struct snmp_leaf_node *)(const void *)call_data->proxy_instance.node; - - call_data->retval.err = leaf->get_next_instance(call_data->arg1.root_oid, call_data->arg2.root_oid_len, &call_data->proxy_instance); - - sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); -} - -static snmp_err_t do_sync(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance, snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn) -{ - const struct snmp_threadsync_node *threadsync_node = (const struct snmp_threadsync_node *)(const void *)instance->node; - struct threadsync_data *call_data = &threadsync_node->instance->data; - - if (threadsync_node->node.node.oid != threadsync_node->target->node.oid) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("Sync node OID does not match target node OID")); - return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; - } - - memset(&call_data->proxy_instance, 0, sizeof(call_data->proxy_instance)); - - instance->reference.ptr = call_data; - snmp_oid_assign(&call_data->proxy_instance.instance_oid, instance->instance_oid.id, instance->instance_oid.len); - - call_data->proxy_instance.node = &threadsync_node->target->node; - call_data->threadsync_node = threadsync_node; - - call_data->arg1.root_oid = root_oid; - call_data->arg2.root_oid_len = root_oid_len; - call_synced_function(call_data, fn); - - if (call_data->retval.err == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { - instance->access = call_data->proxy_instance.access; - instance->asn1_type = call_data->proxy_instance.asn1_type; - instance->release_instance = threadsync_release_instance; - instance->get_value = (call_data->proxy_instance.get_value != NULL) ? threadsync_get_value : NULL; - instance->set_value = (call_data->proxy_instance.set_value != NULL) ? threadsync_set_value : NULL; - instance->set_test = (call_data->proxy_instance.set_test != NULL) ? threadsync_set_test : NULL; - snmp_oid_assign(&instance->instance_oid, call_data->proxy_instance.instance_oid.id, call_data->proxy_instance.instance_oid.len); - } - - return call_data->retval.err; -} - -snmp_err_t snmp_threadsync_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - return do_sync(root_oid, root_oid_len, instance, get_instance_synced); -} - -snmp_err_t snmp_threadsync_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) -{ - return do_sync(root_oid, root_oid_len, instance, get_next_instance_synced); -} - -/** Initializes thread synchronization instance */ -void snmp_threadsync_init(struct snmp_threadsync_instance *instance, snmp_threadsync_synchronizer_fn sync_fn) -{ - err_t err = sys_mutex_new(&instance->sem_usage_mutex); - LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to set up mutex", err == ERR_OK); - err = sys_sem_new(&instance->sem, 0); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to set up semaphore", err == ERR_OK); - instance->sync_fn = sync_fn; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP thread synchronization implementation. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP && (NO_SYS == 0) /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include + +static void call_synced_function(struct threadsync_data *call_data, snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn) +{ + sys_mutex_lock(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem_usage_mutex); + call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sync_fn(fn, call_data); + sys_sem_wait(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); + sys_mutex_unlock(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem_usage_mutex); +} + +static void threadsync_get_value_synced(void *ctx) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; + + if (call_data->proxy_instance.get_value != NULL) { + call_data->retval.s16 = call_data->proxy_instance.get_value(&call_data->proxy_instance, call_data->arg1.value); + } else { + call_data->retval.s16 = -1; + } + + sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); +} + +static s16_t threadsync_get_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)instance->reference.ptr; + + call_data->arg1.value = value; + call_synced_function(call_data, threadsync_get_value_synced); + + return call_data->retval.s16; +} + +static void threadsync_set_test_synced(void *ctx) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; + + if (call_data->proxy_instance.set_test != NULL) { + call_data->retval.err = call_data->proxy_instance.set_test(&call_data->proxy_instance, call_data->arg2.len, call_data->arg1.value); + } else { + call_data->retval.err = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; + } + + sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); +} + +static snmp_err_t threadsync_set_test(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)instance->reference.ptr; + + call_data->arg1.value = value; + call_data->arg2.len = len; + call_synced_function(call_data, threadsync_set_test_synced); + + return call_data->retval.err; +} + +static void threadsync_set_value_synced(void *ctx) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; + + if (call_data->proxy_instance.set_value != NULL) { + call_data->retval.err = call_data->proxy_instance.set_value(&call_data->proxy_instance, call_data->arg2.len, call_data->arg1.value); + } else { + call_data->retval.err = SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE; + } + + sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); +} + +static snmp_err_t threadsync_set_value(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t len, void *value) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)instance->reference.ptr; + + call_data->arg1.value = value; + call_data->arg2.len = len; + call_synced_function(call_data, threadsync_set_value_synced); + + return call_data->retval.err; +} + +static void threadsync_release_instance_synced(void *ctx) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; + + call_data->proxy_instance.release_instance(&call_data->proxy_instance); + + sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); +} + +static void threadsync_release_instance(struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)instance->reference.ptr; + + if (call_data->proxy_instance.release_instance != NULL) { + call_synced_function(call_data, threadsync_release_instance_synced); + } +} + +static void get_instance_synced(void *ctx) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; + const struct snmp_leaf_node *leaf = (const struct snmp_leaf_node *)(const void *)call_data->proxy_instance.node; + + call_data->retval.err = leaf->get_instance(call_data->arg1.root_oid, call_data->arg2.root_oid_len, &call_data->proxy_instance); + + sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); +} + +static void get_next_instance_synced(void *ctx) +{ + struct threadsync_data *call_data = (struct threadsync_data *)ctx; + const struct snmp_leaf_node *leaf = (const struct snmp_leaf_node *)(const void *)call_data->proxy_instance.node; + + call_data->retval.err = leaf->get_next_instance(call_data->arg1.root_oid, call_data->arg2.root_oid_len, &call_data->proxy_instance); + + sys_sem_signal(&call_data->threadsync_node->instance->sem); +} + +static snmp_err_t do_sync(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance, snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn) +{ + const struct snmp_threadsync_node *threadsync_node = (const struct snmp_threadsync_node *)(const void *)instance->node; + struct threadsync_data *call_data = &threadsync_node->instance->data; + + if (threadsync_node->node.node.oid != threadsync_node->target->node.oid) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("Sync node OID does not match target node OID")); + return SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE; + } + + memset(&call_data->proxy_instance, 0, sizeof(call_data->proxy_instance)); + + instance->reference.ptr = call_data; + snmp_oid_assign(&call_data->proxy_instance.instance_oid, instance->instance_oid.id, instance->instance_oid.len); + + call_data->proxy_instance.node = &threadsync_node->target->node; + call_data->threadsync_node = threadsync_node; + + call_data->arg1.root_oid = root_oid; + call_data->arg2.root_oid_len = root_oid_len; + call_synced_function(call_data, fn); + + if (call_data->retval.err == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR) { + instance->access = call_data->proxy_instance.access; + instance->asn1_type = call_data->proxy_instance.asn1_type; + instance->release_instance = threadsync_release_instance; + instance->get_value = (call_data->proxy_instance.get_value != NULL) ? threadsync_get_value : NULL; + instance->set_value = (call_data->proxy_instance.set_value != NULL) ? threadsync_set_value : NULL; + instance->set_test = (call_data->proxy_instance.set_test != NULL) ? threadsync_set_test : NULL; + snmp_oid_assign(&instance->instance_oid, call_data->proxy_instance.instance_oid.id, call_data->proxy_instance.instance_oid.len); + } + + return call_data->retval.err; +} + +snmp_err_t snmp_threadsync_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + return do_sync(root_oid, root_oid_len, instance, get_instance_synced); +} + +snmp_err_t snmp_threadsync_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance) +{ + return do_sync(root_oid, root_oid_len, instance, get_next_instance_synced); +} + +/** Initializes thread synchronization instance */ +void snmp_threadsync_init(struct snmp_threadsync_instance *instance, snmp_threadsync_synchronizer_fn sync_fn) +{ + err_t err = sys_mutex_new(&instance->sem_usage_mutex); + LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to set up mutex", err == ERR_OK); + err = sys_sem_new(&instance->sem, 0); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to set up semaphore", err == ERR_OK); + instance->sync_fn = sync_fn; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c index f369a80b..c1356d5d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmp_traps.c @@ -1,451 +1,451 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMPv1 traps implementation. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Martin Hentschel - * Christiaan Simons - * - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include - -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" -#include "snmp_msg.h" -#include "snmp_asn1.h" -#include "snmp_core_priv.h" - -struct snmp_msg_trap { - /* source enterprise ID (sysObjectID) */ - const struct snmp_obj_id *enterprise; - /* source IP address, raw network order format */ - ip_addr_t sip; - /* generic trap code */ - u32_t gen_trap; - /* specific trap code */ - u32_t spc_trap; - /* timestamp */ - u32_t ts; - /* snmp_version */ - u32_t snmp_version; - - /* output trap lengths used in ASN encoding */ - /* encoding pdu length */ - u16_t pdulen; - /* encoding community length */ - u16_t comlen; - /* encoding sequence length */ - u16_t seqlen; - /* encoding varbinds sequence length */ - u16_t vbseqlen; -}; - -static u16_t snmp_trap_varbind_sum(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds); -static u16_t snmp_trap_header_sum(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, u16_t vb_len); -static err_t snmp_trap_header_enc(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream); -static err_t snmp_trap_varbind_enc(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds); - -#define BUILD_EXEC(code) \ - if ((code) != ERR_OK) { \ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP error during creation of outbound trap frame!")); \ - return ERR_ARG; \ - } - -/** Agent community string for sending traps */ -extern const char *snmp_community_trap; - -void *snmp_traps_handle; - -struct snmp_trap_dst { - /* destination IP address in network order */ - ip_addr_t dip; - /* set to 0 when disabled, >0 when enabled */ - u8_t enable; -}; -static struct snmp_trap_dst trap_dst[SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS]; - -static u8_t snmp_auth_traps_enabled = 0; - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Sets enable switch for this trap destination. - * @param dst_idx index in 0 .. SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS-1 - * @param enable switch if 0 destination is disabled >0 enabled. - */ -void snmp_trap_dst_enable(u8_t dst_idx, u8_t enable) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (dst_idx < SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS) { - trap_dst[dst_idx].enable = enable; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Sets IPv4 address for this trap destination. - * @param dst_idx index in 0 .. SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS-1 - * @param dst IPv4 address in host order. - */ -void snmp_trap_dst_ip_set(u8_t dst_idx, const ip_addr_t *dst) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (dst_idx < SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS) { - ip_addr_set(&trap_dst[dst_idx].dip, dst); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Enable/disable authentication traps - */ -void snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled(u8_t enable) -{ - snmp_auth_traps_enabled = enable; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Get authentication traps enabled state - */ -u8_t snmp_get_auth_traps_enabled(void) -{ - return snmp_auth_traps_enabled; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Sends a generic or enterprise specific trap message. - * - * @param eoid points to enterprise object identifier - * @param generic_trap is the trap code - * @param specific_trap used for enterprise traps when generic_trap == 6 - * @param varbinds linked list of varbinds to be sent - * @return ERR_OK when success, ERR_MEM if we're out of memory - * - * @note the use of the enterprise identifier field - * is per RFC1215. - * Use .iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2.snmp for generic traps - * and .iso.org.dod.internet.private.enterprises.yourenterprise - * (sysObjectID) for specific traps. - */ -err_t snmp_send_trap(const struct snmp_obj_id *eoid, s32_t generic_trap, s32_t specific_trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds) -{ - struct snmp_msg_trap trap_msg; - struct snmp_trap_dst *td; - struct pbuf *p; - u16_t i, tot_len; - err_t err = ERR_OK; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - trap_msg.snmp_version = 0; - - for (i = 0, td = &trap_dst[0]; i < SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS; i++, td++) { - if ((td->enable != 0) && !ip_addr_isany(&td->dip)) { - /* lookup current source address for this dst */ - if (snmp_get_local_ip_for_dst(snmp_traps_handle, &td->dip, &trap_msg.sip)) { - if (eoid == NULL) { - trap_msg.enterprise = snmp_get_device_enterprise_oid(); - } else { - trap_msg.enterprise = eoid; - } - - trap_msg.gen_trap = generic_trap; - - if (generic_trap == SNMP_GENTRAP_ENTERPRISE_SPECIFIC) { - trap_msg.spc_trap = specific_trap; - } else { - trap_msg.spc_trap = 0; - } - - MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(&trap_msg.ts); - - /* pass 0, calculate length fields */ - tot_len = snmp_trap_varbind_sum(&trap_msg, varbinds); - tot_len = snmp_trap_header_sum(&trap_msg, tot_len); - - /* allocate pbuf(s) */ - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, tot_len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p != NULL) { - struct snmp_pbuf_stream pbuf_stream; - snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&pbuf_stream, p, 0, tot_len); - - /* pass 1, encode packet into the pbuf(s) */ - snmp_trap_header_enc(&trap_msg, &pbuf_stream); - snmp_trap_varbind_enc(&trap_msg, &pbuf_stream, varbinds); - - snmp_stats.outtraps++; - snmp_stats.outpkts++; - - /** send to the TRAP destination */ - snmp_sendto(snmp_traps_handle, p, &td->dip, LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP_TRAP); - pbuf_free(p); - } else { - err = ERR_MEM; - } - } else { - /* routing error */ - err = ERR_RTE; - } - } - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Send generic SNMP trap - */ -err_t snmp_send_trap_generic(s32_t generic_trap) -{ - static const struct snmp_obj_id oid = { 7, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 2, 1, 11 } }; - return snmp_send_trap(&oid, generic_trap, 0, NULL); -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Send specific SNMP trap with variable bindings - */ -err_t snmp_send_trap_specific(s32_t specific_trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds) -{ - return snmp_send_trap(NULL, SNMP_GENTRAP_ENTERPRISE_SPECIFIC, specific_trap, varbinds); -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Send coldstart trap - */ -void snmp_coldstart_trap(void) -{ - snmp_send_trap_generic(SNMP_GENTRAP_COLDSTART); -} - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_traps - * Send authentication failure trap (used internally by agent) - */ -void snmp_authfail_trap(void) -{ - if (snmp_auth_traps_enabled != 0) { - snmp_send_trap_generic(SNMP_GENTRAP_AUTH_FAILURE); - } -} - -static u16_t snmp_trap_varbind_sum(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds) -{ - struct snmp_varbind *varbind; - u16_t tot_len; - u8_t tot_len_len; - - tot_len = 0; - varbind = varbinds; - - while (varbind != NULL) { - struct snmp_varbind_len len; - - if (snmp_varbind_length(varbind, &len) == ERR_OK) { - tot_len += 1 + len.vb_len_len + len.vb_value_len; - } - - varbind = varbind->next; - } - - trap->vbseqlen = tot_len; - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(trap->vbseqlen, &tot_len_len); - tot_len += 1 + tot_len_len; - - return tot_len; -} - -/** - * Sums trap header field lengths from tail to head and - * returns trap_header_lengths for second encoding pass. - * - * @param trap Trap message - * @param vb_len varbind-list length - * @return the required length for encoding the trap header - */ -static u16_t snmp_trap_header_sum(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, u16_t vb_len) -{ - u16_t tot_len; - u16_t len; - u8_t lenlen; - - tot_len = vb_len; - - snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt(trap->ts, &len); - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); - tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; - - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->spc_trap, &len); - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); - tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; - - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->gen_trap, &len); - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); - tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; - - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(trap->sip)) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - len = sizeof(ip_2_ip6(&trap->sip)->addr); -#endif - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - len = sizeof(ip_2_ip4(&trap->sip)->addr); -#endif - } - - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); - tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; - - snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(trap->enterprise->id, trap->enterprise->len, &len); - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); - tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; - - trap->pdulen = tot_len; - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(trap->pdulen, &lenlen); - tot_len += 1 + lenlen; - - trap->comlen = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(strlen(snmp_community_trap), 0xFFFF); - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(trap->comlen, &lenlen); - tot_len += 1 + lenlen + trap->comlen; - - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->snmp_version, &len); - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); - tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; - - trap->seqlen = tot_len; - snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(trap->seqlen, &lenlen); - tot_len += 1 + lenlen; - - return tot_len; -} - -static err_t snmp_trap_varbind_enc(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds) -{ - struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; - struct snmp_varbind *varbind; - - varbind = varbinds; - - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 0, trap->vbseqlen); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - while (varbind != NULL) { - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_append_outbound_varbind(pbuf_stream, varbind)); - - varbind = varbind->next; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Encodes trap header from head to tail. - */ -static err_t snmp_trap_header_enc(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream) -{ - struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; - - /* 'Message' sequence */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 0, trap->seqlen); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - /* version */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->snmp_version, &tlv.value_len); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, trap->snmp_version)); - - /* community */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, trap->comlen); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (const u8_t *)snmp_community_trap, trap->comlen)); - - /* 'PDU' sequence */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_TRAP), 0, trap->pdulen); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - - /* object ID */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, 0, 0); - snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(trap->enterprise->id, trap->enterprise->len, &tlv.value_len); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_oid(pbuf_stream, trap->enterprise->id, trap->enterprise->len)); - - /* IP addr */ - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(trap->sip)) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, 0, sizeof(ip_2_ip6(&trap->sip)->addr)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (const u8_t *)&ip_2_ip6(&trap->sip)->addr, sizeof(ip_2_ip6(&trap->sip)->addr))); -#endif - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, 0, sizeof(ip_2_ip4(&trap->sip)->addr)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (const u8_t *)&ip_2_ip4(&trap->sip)->addr, sizeof(ip_2_ip4(&trap->sip)->addr))); -#endif - } - - /* trap length */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->gen_trap, &tlv.value_len); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, trap->gen_trap)); - - /* specific trap */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->spc_trap, &tlv.value_len); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, trap->spc_trap)); - - /* timestamp */ - SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS, 0, 0); - snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->ts, &tlv.value_len); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); - BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, trap->ts)); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +/** + * @file + * SNMPv1 traps implementation. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Martin Hentschel + * Christiaan Simons + * + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include + +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" +#include "snmp_msg.h" +#include "snmp_asn1.h" +#include "snmp_core_priv.h" + +struct snmp_msg_trap { + /* source enterprise ID (sysObjectID) */ + const struct snmp_obj_id *enterprise; + /* source IP address, raw network order format */ + ip_addr_t sip; + /* generic trap code */ + u32_t gen_trap; + /* specific trap code */ + u32_t spc_trap; + /* timestamp */ + u32_t ts; + /* snmp_version */ + u32_t snmp_version; + + /* output trap lengths used in ASN encoding */ + /* encoding pdu length */ + u16_t pdulen; + /* encoding community length */ + u16_t comlen; + /* encoding sequence length */ + u16_t seqlen; + /* encoding varbinds sequence length */ + u16_t vbseqlen; +}; + +static u16_t snmp_trap_varbind_sum(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds); +static u16_t snmp_trap_header_sum(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, u16_t vb_len); +static err_t snmp_trap_header_enc(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream); +static err_t snmp_trap_varbind_enc(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds); + +#define BUILD_EXEC(code) \ + if ((code) != ERR_OK) { \ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNMP_DEBUG, ("SNMP error during creation of outbound trap frame!")); \ + return ERR_ARG; \ + } + +/** Agent community string for sending traps */ +extern const char *snmp_community_trap; + +void *snmp_traps_handle; + +struct snmp_trap_dst { + /* destination IP address in network order */ + ip_addr_t dip; + /* set to 0 when disabled, >0 when enabled */ + u8_t enable; +}; +static struct snmp_trap_dst trap_dst[SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS]; + +static u8_t snmp_auth_traps_enabled = 0; + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Sets enable switch for this trap destination. + * @param dst_idx index in 0 .. SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS-1 + * @param enable switch if 0 destination is disabled >0 enabled. + */ +void snmp_trap_dst_enable(u8_t dst_idx, u8_t enable) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (dst_idx < SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS) { + trap_dst[dst_idx].enable = enable; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Sets IPv4 address for this trap destination. + * @param dst_idx index in 0 .. SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS-1 + * @param dst IPv4 address in host order. + */ +void snmp_trap_dst_ip_set(u8_t dst_idx, const ip_addr_t *dst) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (dst_idx < SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS) { + ip_addr_set(&trap_dst[dst_idx].dip, dst); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Enable/disable authentication traps + */ +void snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled(u8_t enable) +{ + snmp_auth_traps_enabled = enable; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Get authentication traps enabled state + */ +u8_t snmp_get_auth_traps_enabled(void) +{ + return snmp_auth_traps_enabled; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Sends a generic or enterprise specific trap message. + * + * @param eoid points to enterprise object identifier + * @param generic_trap is the trap code + * @param specific_trap used for enterprise traps when generic_trap == 6 + * @param varbinds linked list of varbinds to be sent + * @return ERR_OK when success, ERR_MEM if we're out of memory + * + * @note the use of the enterprise identifier field + * is per RFC1215. + * Use .iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2.snmp for generic traps + * and .iso.org.dod.internet.private.enterprises.yourenterprise + * (sysObjectID) for specific traps. + */ +err_t snmp_send_trap(const struct snmp_obj_id *eoid, s32_t generic_trap, s32_t specific_trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds) +{ + struct snmp_msg_trap trap_msg; + struct snmp_trap_dst *td; + struct pbuf *p; + u16_t i, tot_len; + err_t err = ERR_OK; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + trap_msg.snmp_version = 0; + + for (i = 0, td = &trap_dst[0]; i < SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS; i++, td++) { + if ((td->enable != 0) && !ip_addr_isany(&td->dip)) { + /* lookup current source address for this dst */ + if (snmp_get_local_ip_for_dst(snmp_traps_handle, &td->dip, &trap_msg.sip)) { + if (eoid == NULL) { + trap_msg.enterprise = snmp_get_device_enterprise_oid(); + } else { + trap_msg.enterprise = eoid; + } + + trap_msg.gen_trap = generic_trap; + + if (generic_trap == SNMP_GENTRAP_ENTERPRISE_SPECIFIC) { + trap_msg.spc_trap = specific_trap; + } else { + trap_msg.spc_trap = 0; + } + + MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(&trap_msg.ts); + + /* pass 0, calculate length fields */ + tot_len = snmp_trap_varbind_sum(&trap_msg, varbinds); + tot_len = snmp_trap_header_sum(&trap_msg, tot_len); + + /* allocate pbuf(s) */ + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, tot_len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p != NULL) { + struct snmp_pbuf_stream pbuf_stream; + snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&pbuf_stream, p, 0, tot_len); + + /* pass 1, encode packet into the pbuf(s) */ + snmp_trap_header_enc(&trap_msg, &pbuf_stream); + snmp_trap_varbind_enc(&trap_msg, &pbuf_stream, varbinds); + + snmp_stats.outtraps++; + snmp_stats.outpkts++; + + /** send to the TRAP destination */ + snmp_sendto(snmp_traps_handle, p, &td->dip, LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP_TRAP); + pbuf_free(p); + } else { + err = ERR_MEM; + } + } else { + /* routing error */ + err = ERR_RTE; + } + } + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Send generic SNMP trap + */ +err_t snmp_send_trap_generic(s32_t generic_trap) +{ + static const struct snmp_obj_id oid = { 7, { 1, 3, 6, 1, 2, 1, 11 } }; + return snmp_send_trap(&oid, generic_trap, 0, NULL); +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Send specific SNMP trap with variable bindings + */ +err_t snmp_send_trap_specific(s32_t specific_trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds) +{ + return snmp_send_trap(NULL, SNMP_GENTRAP_ENTERPRISE_SPECIFIC, specific_trap, varbinds); +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Send coldstart trap + */ +void snmp_coldstart_trap(void) +{ + snmp_send_trap_generic(SNMP_GENTRAP_COLDSTART); +} + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_traps + * Send authentication failure trap (used internally by agent) + */ +void snmp_authfail_trap(void) +{ + if (snmp_auth_traps_enabled != 0) { + snmp_send_trap_generic(SNMP_GENTRAP_AUTH_FAILURE); + } +} + +static u16_t snmp_trap_varbind_sum(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds) +{ + struct snmp_varbind *varbind; + u16_t tot_len; + u8_t tot_len_len; + + tot_len = 0; + varbind = varbinds; + + while (varbind != NULL) { + struct snmp_varbind_len len; + + if (snmp_varbind_length(varbind, &len) == ERR_OK) { + tot_len += 1 + len.vb_len_len + len.vb_value_len; + } + + varbind = varbind->next; + } + + trap->vbseqlen = tot_len; + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(trap->vbseqlen, &tot_len_len); + tot_len += 1 + tot_len_len; + + return tot_len; +} + +/** + * Sums trap header field lengths from tail to head and + * returns trap_header_lengths for second encoding pass. + * + * @param trap Trap message + * @param vb_len varbind-list length + * @return the required length for encoding the trap header + */ +static u16_t snmp_trap_header_sum(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, u16_t vb_len) +{ + u16_t tot_len; + u16_t len; + u8_t lenlen; + + tot_len = vb_len; + + snmp_asn1_enc_u32t_cnt(trap->ts, &len); + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); + tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; + + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->spc_trap, &len); + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); + tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; + + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->gen_trap, &len); + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); + tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; + + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(trap->sip)) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + len = sizeof(ip_2_ip6(&trap->sip)->addr); +#endif + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + len = sizeof(ip_2_ip4(&trap->sip)->addr); +#endif + } + + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); + tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; + + snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(trap->enterprise->id, trap->enterprise->len, &len); + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); + tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; + + trap->pdulen = tot_len; + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(trap->pdulen, &lenlen); + tot_len += 1 + lenlen; + + trap->comlen = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(strlen(snmp_community_trap), 0xFFFF); + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(trap->comlen, &lenlen); + tot_len += 1 + lenlen + trap->comlen; + + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->snmp_version, &len); + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(len, &lenlen); + tot_len += 1 + len + lenlen; + + trap->seqlen = tot_len; + snmp_asn1_enc_length_cnt(trap->seqlen, &lenlen); + tot_len += 1 + lenlen; + + return tot_len; +} + +static err_t snmp_trap_varbind_enc(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds) +{ + struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; + struct snmp_varbind *varbind; + + varbind = varbinds; + + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 0, trap->vbseqlen); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + while (varbind != NULL) { + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_append_outbound_varbind(pbuf_stream, varbind)); + + varbind = varbind->next; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Encodes trap header from head to tail. + */ +static err_t snmp_trap_header_enc(struct snmp_msg_trap *trap, struct snmp_pbuf_stream *pbuf_stream) +{ + struct snmp_asn1_tlv tlv; + + /* 'Message' sequence */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE, 0, trap->seqlen); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + /* version */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->snmp_version, &tlv.value_len); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, trap->snmp_version)); + + /* community */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, 0, trap->comlen); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (const u8_t *)snmp_community_trap, trap->comlen)); + + /* 'PDU' sequence */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_PDU_TRAP), 0, trap->pdulen); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + + /* object ID */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, 0, 0); + snmp_asn1_enc_oid_cnt(trap->enterprise->id, trap->enterprise->len, &tlv.value_len); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_oid(pbuf_stream, trap->enterprise->id, trap->enterprise->len)); + + /* IP addr */ + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(trap->sip)) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, 0, sizeof(ip_2_ip6(&trap->sip)->addr)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (const u8_t *)&ip_2_ip6(&trap->sip)->addr, sizeof(ip_2_ip6(&trap->sip)->addr))); +#endif + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR, 0, sizeof(ip_2_ip4(&trap->sip)->addr)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_raw(pbuf_stream, (const u8_t *)&ip_2_ip4(&trap->sip)->addr, sizeof(ip_2_ip4(&trap->sip)->addr))); +#endif + } + + /* trap length */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->gen_trap, &tlv.value_len); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, trap->gen_trap)); + + /* specific trap */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 0, 0); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->spc_trap, &tlv.value_len); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, trap->spc_trap)); + + /* timestamp */ + SNMP_ASN1_SET_TLV_PARAMS(tlv, SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS, 0, 0); + snmp_asn1_enc_s32t_cnt(trap->ts, &tlv.value_len); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_ans1_enc_tlv(pbuf_stream, &tlv)); + BUILD_EXEC(snmp_asn1_enc_s32t(pbuf_stream, tlv.value_len, trap->ts)); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c index efb72482..3b5e7518 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3.c @@ -1,135 +1,135 @@ -/** - * @file - * Additional SNMPv3 functionality RFC3414 and RFC3826. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Elias Oenal - */ - -#include "snmpv3_priv.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include - -#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 - -#ifdef LWIP_SNMPV3_INCLUDE_ENGINE -#include LWIP_SNMPV3_INCLUDE_ENGINE -#endif - -#define SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT 2147483647UL - -/** Call this if engine has been changed. Has to reset boots, see below */ -void snmpv3_engine_id_changed(void) -{ - snmpv3_set_engine_boots(0); -} - -/** According to RFC3414 2.2.2. - * - * The number of times that the SNMP engine has - * (re-)initialized itself since snmpEngineID - * was last configured. - */ -s32_t snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(void) -{ - if (snmpv3_get_engine_boots() == 0 || - snmpv3_get_engine_boots() < SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT) { - return snmpv3_get_engine_boots(); - } - - snmpv3_set_engine_boots(SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT); - return snmpv3_get_engine_boots(); -} - -/** RFC3414 2.2.2. - * - * Once the timer reaches 2147483647 it gets reset to zero and the - * engine boot ups get incremented. - */ -s32_t snmpv3_get_engine_time_internal(void) -{ - if (snmpv3_get_engine_time() >= SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT) { - snmpv3_reset_engine_time(); - - if (snmpv3_get_engine_boots() < SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT - 1) { - snmpv3_set_engine_boots(snmpv3_get_engine_boots() + 1); - } else { - snmpv3_set_engine_boots(SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT); - } - } - - return snmpv3_get_engine_time(); -} - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - -/* This function ignores the byte order suggestion in RFC3414 - * since it simply doesn't influence the effectiveness of an IV. - * - * Implementing RFC3826 priv param algorithm if LWIP_RAND is available. - * - * @todo: This is a potential thread safety issue. - */ -err_t snmpv3_build_priv_param(u8_t *priv_param) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_RAND /* Based on RFC3826 */ - static u8_t init; - static u32_t priv1, priv2; - - /* Lazy initialisation */ - if (init == 0) { - init = 1; - priv1 = LWIP_RAND(); - priv2 = LWIP_RAND(); - } - - SMEMCPY(&priv_param[0], &priv1, sizeof(priv1)); - SMEMCPY(&priv_param[4], &priv2, sizeof(priv2)); - - /* Emulate 64bit increment */ - priv1++; - - if (!priv1) /* Overflow */ - { - priv2++; - } - -#else /* Based on RFC3414 */ - static u32_t ctr; - u32_t boots = snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(); - SMEMCPY(&priv_param[0], &boots, 4); - SMEMCPY(&priv_param[4], &ctr, 4); - ctr++; -#endif - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO */ - -#endif +/** + * @file + * Additional SNMPv3 functionality RFC3414 and RFC3826. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Elias Oenal + */ + +#include "snmpv3_priv.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include + +#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 + +#ifdef LWIP_SNMPV3_INCLUDE_ENGINE +#include LWIP_SNMPV3_INCLUDE_ENGINE +#endif + +#define SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT 2147483647UL + +/** Call this if engine has been changed. Has to reset boots, see below */ +void snmpv3_engine_id_changed(void) +{ + snmpv3_set_engine_boots(0); +} + +/** According to RFC3414 2.2.2. + * + * The number of times that the SNMP engine has + * (re-)initialized itself since snmpEngineID + * was last configured. + */ +s32_t snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(void) +{ + if (snmpv3_get_engine_boots() == 0 || + snmpv3_get_engine_boots() < SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT) { + return snmpv3_get_engine_boots(); + } + + snmpv3_set_engine_boots(SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT); + return snmpv3_get_engine_boots(); +} + +/** RFC3414 2.2.2. + * + * Once the timer reaches 2147483647 it gets reset to zero and the + * engine boot ups get incremented. + */ +s32_t snmpv3_get_engine_time_internal(void) +{ + if (snmpv3_get_engine_time() >= SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT) { + snmpv3_reset_engine_time(); + + if (snmpv3_get_engine_boots() < SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT - 1) { + snmpv3_set_engine_boots(snmpv3_get_engine_boots() + 1); + } else { + snmpv3_set_engine_boots(SNMP_MAX_TIME_BOOT); + } + } + + return snmpv3_get_engine_time(); +} + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + +/* This function ignores the byte order suggestion in RFC3414 + * since it simply doesn't influence the effectiveness of an IV. + * + * Implementing RFC3826 priv param algorithm if LWIP_RAND is available. + * + * @todo: This is a potential thread safety issue. + */ +err_t snmpv3_build_priv_param(u8_t *priv_param) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_RAND /* Based on RFC3826 */ + static u8_t init; + static u32_t priv1, priv2; + + /* Lazy initialisation */ + if (init == 0) { + init = 1; + priv1 = LWIP_RAND(); + priv2 = LWIP_RAND(); + } + + SMEMCPY(&priv_param[0], &priv1, sizeof(priv1)); + SMEMCPY(&priv_param[4], &priv2, sizeof(priv2)); + + /* Emulate 64bit increment */ + priv1++; + + if (!priv1) /* Overflow */ + { + priv2++; + } + +#else /* Based on RFC3414 */ + static u32_t ctr; + u32_t boots = snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(); + SMEMCPY(&priv_param[0], &boots, 4); + SMEMCPY(&priv_param[4], &ctr, 4); + ctr++; +#endif + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO */ + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c index 79fcb3cb..3b033e43 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_mbedtls.c @@ -1,355 +1,355 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMPv3 crypto/auth functions implemented for ARM mbedtls. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal and Dirk Ziegelmeier. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Elias Oenal - * Dirk Ziegelmeier - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" -#include "snmpv3_priv.h" -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "snmp_msg.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include - -#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 && LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS - -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" - -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" - -err_t snmpv3_auth(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *stream, u16_t length, - const u8_t *key, snmpv3_auth_algo_t algo, u8_t *hmac_out) -{ - u32_t i; - u8_t key_len; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; - struct snmp_pbuf_stream read_stream; - snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&read_stream, stream->pbuf, stream->offset, stream->length); - - if (algo == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_MD5) { - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5); - key_len = SNMP_V3_MD5_LEN; - } else if (algo == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_SHA) { - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1); - key_len = SNMP_V3_SHA_LEN; - } else { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - mbedtls_md_init(&ctx); - - if (mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md_info, 1) != 0) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx, key, key_len) != 0) { - goto free_md; - } - - for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { - u8_t byte; - - if (snmp_pbuf_stream_read(&read_stream, &byte)) { - goto free_md; - } - - if (mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, &byte, 1) != 0) { - goto free_md; - } - } - - if (mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx, hmac_out) != 0) { - goto free_md; - } - - mbedtls_md_free(&ctx); - return ERR_OK; - -free_md: - mbedtls_md_free(&ctx); - return ERR_ARG; -} - -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO - -err_t snmpv3_crypt(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *stream, u16_t length, - const u8_t *key, const u8_t *priv_param, const u32_t engine_boots, - const u32_t engine_time, snmpv3_priv_algo_t algo, snmpv3_priv_mode_t mode) -{ - size_t i; - mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - - struct snmp_pbuf_stream read_stream; - struct snmp_pbuf_stream write_stream; - snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&read_stream, stream->pbuf, stream->offset, stream->length); - snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&write_stream, stream->pbuf, stream->offset, stream->length); - mbedtls_cipher_init(&ctx); - - if (algo == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_DES) { - u8_t iv_local[8]; - u8_t out_bytes[8]; - size_t out_len; - - /* RFC 3414 mandates padding for DES */ - if ((length & 0x07) != 0) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC); - - if (mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx, cipher_info) != 0) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE) != 0) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx, key, 8 * 8, (mode == SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_ENCRYPT) ? MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) != 0) { - goto error; - } - - /* Prepare IV */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(iv_local); i++) { - iv_local[i] = priv_param[i] ^ key[i + 8]; - } - - if (mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&ctx, iv_local, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(iv_local)) != 0) { - goto error; - } - - for (i = 0; i < length; i += 8) { - size_t j; - u8_t in_bytes[8]; - out_len = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(out_bytes); - - for (j = 0; j < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(in_bytes); j++) { - if (snmp_pbuf_stream_read(&read_stream, &in_bytes[j]) != ERR_OK) { - goto error; - } - } - - if (mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx, in_bytes, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(in_bytes), out_bytes, &out_len) != 0) { - goto error; - } - - if (snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(&write_stream, out_bytes, (u16_t)out_len) != ERR_OK) { - goto error; - } - } - - out_len = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(out_bytes); - - if (mbedtls_cipher_finish(&ctx, out_bytes, &out_len) != 0) { - goto error; - } - - if (snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(&write_stream, out_bytes, (u16_t)out_len) != ERR_OK) { - goto error; - } - } else if (algo == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_AES) { - u8_t iv_local[16]; - - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128); - - if (mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx, cipher_info) != 0) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - if (mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx, key, 16 * 8, (mode == SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_ENCRYPT) ? MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) != 0) { - goto error; - } - - /* - * IV is the big endian concatenation of boots, - * uptime and priv param - see RFC3826. - */ - iv_local[0 + 0] = (engine_boots >> 24) & 0xFF; - iv_local[0 + 1] = (engine_boots >> 16) & 0xFF; - iv_local[0 + 2] = (engine_boots >> 8) & 0xFF; - iv_local[0 + 3] = (engine_boots >> 0) & 0xFF; - iv_local[4 + 0] = (engine_time >> 24) & 0xFF; - iv_local[4 + 1] = (engine_time >> 16) & 0xFF; - iv_local[4 + 2] = (engine_time >> 8) & 0xFF; - iv_local[4 + 3] = (engine_time >> 0) & 0xFF; - SMEMCPY(iv_local + 8, priv_param, 8); - - if (mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&ctx, iv_local, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(iv_local)) != 0) { - goto error; - } - - for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { - u8_t in_byte; - u8_t out_byte; - size_t out_len = sizeof(out_byte); - - if (snmp_pbuf_stream_read(&read_stream, &in_byte) != ERR_OK) { - goto error; - } - - if (mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx, &in_byte, sizeof(in_byte), &out_byte, &out_len) != 0) { - goto error; - } - - if (snmp_pbuf_stream_write(&write_stream, out_byte) != ERR_OK) { - goto error; - } - } - } else { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx); - return ERR_OK; - -error: - mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx); - return ERR_OK; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO */ - -/* A.2.1. Password to Key Sample Code for MD5 */ -void snmpv3_password_to_key_md5( - const u8_t *password, /* IN */ - size_t passwordlen, /* IN */ - const u8_t *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */ - u8_t engineLength, /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */ - u8_t *key) /* OUT - pointer to caller 16-octet buffer */ -{ - mbedtls_md5_context MD; - u8_t *cp, password_buf[64]; - u32_t password_index = 0; - u8_t i; - u32_t count = 0; - - mbedtls_md5_init(&MD); /* initialize MD5 */ - mbedtls_md5_starts(&MD); - - /**********************************************/ - /* Use while loop until we've done 1 Megabyte */ - /**********************************************/ - while (count < 1048576) { - cp = password_buf; - - for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { - /*************************************************/ - /* Take the next octet of the password, wrapping */ - /* to the beginning of the password as necessary.*/ - /*************************************************/ - *cp++ = password[password_index++ % passwordlen]; - } - - mbedtls_md5_update(&MD, password_buf, 64); - count += 64; - } - - mbedtls_md5_finish(&MD, key); /* tell MD5 we're done */ - - /*****************************************************/ - /* Now localize the key with the engineID and pass */ - /* through MD5 to produce final key */ - /* May want to ensure that engineLength <= 32, */ - /* otherwise need to use a buffer larger than 64 */ - /*****************************************************/ - SMEMCPY(password_buf, key, 16); - MEMCPY(password_buf + 16, engineID, engineLength); - SMEMCPY(password_buf + 16 + engineLength, key, 16); - - mbedtls_md5_starts(&MD); - mbedtls_md5_update(&MD, password_buf, 32 + engineLength); - mbedtls_md5_finish(&MD, key); - - mbedtls_md5_free(&MD); - return; -} - -/* A.2.2. Password to Key Sample Code for SHA */ -void snmpv3_password_to_key_sha( - const u8_t *password, /* IN */ - size_t passwordlen, /* IN */ - const u8_t *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */ - u8_t engineLength, /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */ - u8_t *key) /* OUT - pointer to caller 20-octet buffer */ -{ - mbedtls_sha1_context SH; - u8_t *cp, password_buf[72]; - u32_t password_index = 0; - u8_t i; - u32_t count = 0; - - mbedtls_sha1_init(&SH); /* initialize SHA */ - mbedtls_sha1_starts(&SH); - - /**********************************************/ - /* Use while loop until we've done 1 Megabyte */ - /**********************************************/ - while (count < 1048576) { - cp = password_buf; - - for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { - /*************************************************/ - /* Take the next octet of the password, wrapping */ - /* to the beginning of the password as necessary.*/ - /*************************************************/ - *cp++ = password[password_index++ % passwordlen]; - } - - mbedtls_sha1_update(&SH, password_buf, 64); - count += 64; - } - - mbedtls_sha1_finish(&SH, key); /* tell SHA we're done */ - - /*****************************************************/ - /* Now localize the key with the engineID and pass */ - /* through SHA to produce final key */ - /* May want to ensure that engineLength <= 32, */ - /* otherwise need to use a buffer larger than 72 */ - /*****************************************************/ - SMEMCPY(password_buf, key, 20); - MEMCPY(password_buf + 20, engineID, engineLength); - SMEMCPY(password_buf + 20 + engineLength, key, 20); - - mbedtls_sha1_starts(&SH); - mbedtls_sha1_update(&SH, password_buf, 40 + engineLength); - mbedtls_sha1_finish(&SH, key); - - mbedtls_sha1_free(&SH); - return; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 && LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS */ +/** + * @file + * SNMPv3 crypto/auth functions implemented for ARM mbedtls. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal and Dirk Ziegelmeier. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Elias Oenal + * Dirk Ziegelmeier + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" +#include "snmpv3_priv.h" +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "snmp_msg.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include + +#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 && LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" + +err_t snmpv3_auth(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *stream, u16_t length, + const u8_t *key, snmpv3_auth_algo_t algo, u8_t *hmac_out) +{ + u32_t i; + u8_t key_len; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + struct snmp_pbuf_stream read_stream; + snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&read_stream, stream->pbuf, stream->offset, stream->length); + + if (algo == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_MD5) { + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5); + key_len = SNMP_V3_MD5_LEN; + } else if (algo == SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_SHA) { + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1); + key_len = SNMP_V3_SHA_LEN; + } else { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx); + + if (mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md_info, 1) != 0) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx, key, key_len) != 0) { + goto free_md; + } + + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { + u8_t byte; + + if (snmp_pbuf_stream_read(&read_stream, &byte)) { + goto free_md; + } + + if (mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, &byte, 1) != 0) { + goto free_md; + } + } + + if (mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx, hmac_out) != 0) { + goto free_md; + } + + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx); + return ERR_OK; + +free_md: + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx); + return ERR_ARG; +} + +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO + +err_t snmpv3_crypt(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *stream, u16_t length, + const u8_t *key, const u8_t *priv_param, const u32_t engine_boots, + const u32_t engine_time, snmpv3_priv_algo_t algo, snmpv3_priv_mode_t mode) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + struct snmp_pbuf_stream read_stream; + struct snmp_pbuf_stream write_stream; + snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&read_stream, stream->pbuf, stream->offset, stream->length); + snmp_pbuf_stream_init(&write_stream, stream->pbuf, stream->offset, stream->length); + mbedtls_cipher_init(&ctx); + + if (algo == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_DES) { + u8_t iv_local[8]; + u8_t out_bytes[8]; + size_t out_len; + + /* RFC 3414 mandates padding for DES */ + if ((length & 0x07) != 0) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC); + + if (mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx, cipher_info) != 0) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE) != 0) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx, key, 8 * 8, (mode == SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_ENCRYPT) ? MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + /* Prepare IV */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(iv_local); i++) { + iv_local[i] = priv_param[i] ^ key[i + 8]; + } + + if (mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&ctx, iv_local, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(iv_local)) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + for (i = 0; i < length; i += 8) { + size_t j; + u8_t in_bytes[8]; + out_len = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(out_bytes); + + for (j = 0; j < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(in_bytes); j++) { + if (snmp_pbuf_stream_read(&read_stream, &in_bytes[j]) != ERR_OK) { + goto error; + } + } + + if (mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx, in_bytes, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(in_bytes), out_bytes, &out_len) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + if (snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(&write_stream, out_bytes, (u16_t)out_len) != ERR_OK) { + goto error; + } + } + + out_len = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(out_bytes); + + if (mbedtls_cipher_finish(&ctx, out_bytes, &out_len) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + if (snmp_pbuf_stream_writebuf(&write_stream, out_bytes, (u16_t)out_len) != ERR_OK) { + goto error; + } + } else if (algo == SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_AES) { + u8_t iv_local[16]; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128); + + if (mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx, cipher_info) != 0) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + if (mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx, key, 16 * 8, (mode == SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_ENCRYPT) ? MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + /* + * IV is the big endian concatenation of boots, + * uptime and priv param - see RFC3826. + */ + iv_local[0 + 0] = (engine_boots >> 24) & 0xFF; + iv_local[0 + 1] = (engine_boots >> 16) & 0xFF; + iv_local[0 + 2] = (engine_boots >> 8) & 0xFF; + iv_local[0 + 3] = (engine_boots >> 0) & 0xFF; + iv_local[4 + 0] = (engine_time >> 24) & 0xFF; + iv_local[4 + 1] = (engine_time >> 16) & 0xFF; + iv_local[4 + 2] = (engine_time >> 8) & 0xFF; + iv_local[4 + 3] = (engine_time >> 0) & 0xFF; + SMEMCPY(iv_local + 8, priv_param, 8); + + if (mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&ctx, iv_local, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(iv_local)) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { + u8_t in_byte; + u8_t out_byte; + size_t out_len = sizeof(out_byte); + + if (snmp_pbuf_stream_read(&read_stream, &in_byte) != ERR_OK) { + goto error; + } + + if (mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx, &in_byte, sizeof(in_byte), &out_byte, &out_len) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + if (snmp_pbuf_stream_write(&write_stream, out_byte) != ERR_OK) { + goto error; + } + } + } else { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx); + return ERR_OK; + +error: + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx); + return ERR_OK; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO */ + +/* A.2.1. Password to Key Sample Code for MD5 */ +void snmpv3_password_to_key_md5( + const u8_t *password, /* IN */ + size_t passwordlen, /* IN */ + const u8_t *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */ + u8_t engineLength, /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */ + u8_t *key) /* OUT - pointer to caller 16-octet buffer */ +{ + mbedtls_md5_context MD; + u8_t *cp, password_buf[64]; + u32_t password_index = 0; + u8_t i; + u32_t count = 0; + + mbedtls_md5_init(&MD); /* initialize MD5 */ + mbedtls_md5_starts(&MD); + + /**********************************************/ + /* Use while loop until we've done 1 Megabyte */ + /**********************************************/ + while (count < 1048576) { + cp = password_buf; + + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + /*************************************************/ + /* Take the next octet of the password, wrapping */ + /* to the beginning of the password as necessary.*/ + /*************************************************/ + *cp++ = password[password_index++ % passwordlen]; + } + + mbedtls_md5_update(&MD, password_buf, 64); + count += 64; + } + + mbedtls_md5_finish(&MD, key); /* tell MD5 we're done */ + + /*****************************************************/ + /* Now localize the key with the engineID and pass */ + /* through MD5 to produce final key */ + /* May want to ensure that engineLength <= 32, */ + /* otherwise need to use a buffer larger than 64 */ + /*****************************************************/ + SMEMCPY(password_buf, key, 16); + MEMCPY(password_buf + 16, engineID, engineLength); + SMEMCPY(password_buf + 16 + engineLength, key, 16); + + mbedtls_md5_starts(&MD); + mbedtls_md5_update(&MD, password_buf, 32 + engineLength); + mbedtls_md5_finish(&MD, key); + + mbedtls_md5_free(&MD); + return; +} + +/* A.2.2. Password to Key Sample Code for SHA */ +void snmpv3_password_to_key_sha( + const u8_t *password, /* IN */ + size_t passwordlen, /* IN */ + const u8_t *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */ + u8_t engineLength, /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */ + u8_t *key) /* OUT - pointer to caller 20-octet buffer */ +{ + mbedtls_sha1_context SH; + u8_t *cp, password_buf[72]; + u32_t password_index = 0; + u8_t i; + u32_t count = 0; + + mbedtls_sha1_init(&SH); /* initialize SHA */ + mbedtls_sha1_starts(&SH); + + /**********************************************/ + /* Use while loop until we've done 1 Megabyte */ + /**********************************************/ + while (count < 1048576) { + cp = password_buf; + + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + /*************************************************/ + /* Take the next octet of the password, wrapping */ + /* to the beginning of the password as necessary.*/ + /*************************************************/ + *cp++ = password[password_index++ % passwordlen]; + } + + mbedtls_sha1_update(&SH, password_buf, 64); + count += 64; + } + + mbedtls_sha1_finish(&SH, key); /* tell SHA we're done */ + + /*****************************************************/ + /* Now localize the key with the engineID and pass */ + /* through SHA to produce final key */ + /* May want to ensure that engineLength <= 32, */ + /* otherwise need to use a buffer larger than 72 */ + /*****************************************************/ + SMEMCPY(password_buf, key, 20); + MEMCPY(password_buf + 20, engineID, engineLength); + SMEMCPY(password_buf + 20 + engineLength, key, 20); + + mbedtls_sha1_starts(&SH); + mbedtls_sha1_update(&SH, password_buf, 40 + engineLength); + mbedtls_sha1_finish(&SH, key); + + mbedtls_sha1_free(&SH); + return; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 && LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_priv.h index 67355924..da55da88 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/snmp/snmpv3_priv.h @@ -1,69 +1,69 @@ -/** - * @file - * Additional SNMPv3 functionality RFC3414 and RFC3826 (internal API, do not use in client code). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Elias Oenal - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 - -#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" -#include "snmp_pbuf_stream.h" - -/* According to RFC 3411 */ -#define SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH 32 -#define SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH 32 - -#define SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH 12 -#define SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH 8 - -#define SNMP_V3_MD5_LEN 16 -#define SNMP_V3_SHA_LEN 20 - -typedef enum { - SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_DECRYPT = 0, - SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_ENCRYPT = 1 -} snmpv3_priv_mode_t; - -s32_t snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(void); -err_t snmpv3_auth(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *stream, u16_t length, const u8_t *key, snmpv3_auth_algo_t algo, u8_t *hmac_out); -err_t snmpv3_crypt(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *stream, u16_t length, const u8_t *key, - const u8_t *priv_param, const u32_t engine_boots, const u32_t engine_time, snmpv3_priv_algo_t algo, snmpv3_priv_mode_t mode); -err_t snmpv3_build_priv_param(u8_t *priv_param); -void snmpv3_enginetime_timer(void *arg); - -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * Additional SNMPv3 functionality RFC3414 and RFC3826 (internal API, do not use in client code). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Elias Oenal + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 + +#include "lwip/apps/snmpv3.h" +#include "snmp_pbuf_stream.h" + +/* According to RFC 3411 */ +#define SNMP_V3_MAX_ENGINE_ID_LENGTH 32 +#define SNMP_V3_MAX_USER_LENGTH 32 + +#define SNMP_V3_MAX_AUTH_PARAM_LENGTH 12 +#define SNMP_V3_MAX_PRIV_PARAM_LENGTH 8 + +#define SNMP_V3_MD5_LEN 16 +#define SNMP_V3_SHA_LEN 20 + +typedef enum { + SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_DECRYPT = 0, + SNMP_V3_PRIV_MODE_ENCRYPT = 1 +} snmpv3_priv_mode_t; + +s32_t snmpv3_get_engine_boots_internal(void); +err_t snmpv3_auth(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *stream, u16_t length, const u8_t *key, snmpv3_auth_algo_t algo, u8_t *hmac_out); +err_t snmpv3_crypt(struct snmp_pbuf_stream *stream, u16_t length, const u8_t *key, + const u8_t *priv_param, const u32_t engine_boots, const u32_t engine_time, snmpv3_priv_algo_t algo, snmpv3_priv_mode_t mode); +err_t snmpv3_build_priv_param(u8_t *priv_param); +void snmpv3_enginetime_timer(void *arg); + +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/sntp/sntp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/sntp/sntp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/sntp/sntp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/sntp/sntp.c index 7ec725e9..0c95618c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/sntp/sntp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/sntp/sntp.c @@ -1,879 +1,879 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNTP client module - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2007-2009 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - */ - -/** - * @defgroup sntp SNTP - * @ingroup apps - * - * This is simple "SNTP" client for the lwIP raw API. - * It is a minimal implementation of SNTPv4 as specified in RFC 4330. - * - * For a list of some public NTP servers, see this link: - * http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Servers/NTPPoolServers - * - * @todo: - * - complete SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE checks 3 and 4 - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/sntp.h" - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp.h" - -#include -#include - -#if LWIP_UDP - -/* Handle support for more than one server via SNTP_MAX_SERVERS */ -#if SNTP_MAX_SERVERS > 1 -#define SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS 1 -#else /* NTP_MAX_SERVERS > 1 */ -#define SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS 0 -#endif /* NTP_MAX_SERVERS > 1 */ - -#ifndef SNTP_SUPPRESS_DELAY_CHECK -#if SNTP_UPDATE_DELAY < 15000 -#error "SNTPv4 RFC 4330 enforces a minimum update time of 15 seconds (define SNTP_SUPPRESS_DELAY_CHECK to disable this error)!" -#endif -#endif - -/* the various debug levels for this file */ -#define SNTP_DEBUG_TRACE (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE) -#define SNTP_DEBUG_STATE (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE) -#define SNTP_DEBUG_WARN (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) -#define SNTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING | LWIP_DBG_STATE) -#define SNTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS) - -#define SNTP_ERR_KOD 1 - -/* SNTP protocol defines */ -#define SNTP_MSG_LEN 48 - -#define SNTP_OFFSET_LI_VN_MODE 0 -#define SNTP_LI_MASK 0xC0 -#define SNTP_LI_NO_WARNING (0x00 << 6) -#define SNTP_LI_LAST_MINUTE_61_SEC (0x01 << 6) -#define SNTP_LI_LAST_MINUTE_59_SEC (0x02 << 6) -#define SNTP_LI_ALARM_CONDITION (0x03 << 6) /* (clock not synchronized) */ - -#define SNTP_VERSION_MASK 0x38 -#define SNTP_VERSION (4 /* NTP Version 4*/ << 3) - -#define SNTP_MODE_MASK 0x07 -#define SNTP_MODE_CLIENT 0x03 -#define SNTP_MODE_SERVER 0x04 -#define SNTP_MODE_BROADCAST 0x05 - -#define SNTP_OFFSET_STRATUM 1 -#define SNTP_STRATUM_KOD 0x00 - -#define SNTP_OFFSET_ORIGINATE_TIME 24 -#define SNTP_OFFSET_RECEIVE_TIME 32 -#define SNTP_OFFSET_TRANSMIT_TIME 40 - -/* Number of seconds between 1970 and Feb 7, 2036 06:28:16 UTC (epoch 1) */ -#define DIFF_SEC_1970_2036 ((u32_t)2085978496L) - -/** Convert NTP timestamp fraction to microseconds. - */ -#ifndef SNTP_FRAC_TO_US -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -#define SNTP_FRAC_TO_US(f) ((u32_t)(((u64_t)(f)*1000000UL) >> 32)) -#else -#define SNTP_FRAC_TO_US(f) ((u32_t)(f) / 4295) -#endif -#endif /* !SNTP_FRAC_TO_US */ - -/* Configure behaviour depending on native, microsecond or second precision. - * Treat NTP timestamps as signed two's-complement integers. This way, - * timestamps that have the MSB set simply become negative offsets from - * the epoch (Feb 7, 2036 06:28:16 UTC). Representable dates range from - * 1968 to 2104. - */ -#ifndef SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP -#ifdef SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_US -#define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(s, f) \ - SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_US((u32_t)((s) + DIFF_SEC_1970_2036), SNTP_FRAC_TO_US(f)) -#else -#define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(s, f) \ - SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME((u32_t)((s) + DIFF_SEC_1970_2036)) -#endif -#endif /* !SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP */ - -/* Get the system time either natively as NTP timestamp or convert from - * Unix time in seconds and microseconds. Take care to avoid overflow if the - * microsecond value is at the maximum of 999999. Also add 0.5 us fudge to - * avoid special values like 0, and to mask round-off errors that would - * otherwise break round-trip conversion identity. - */ -#ifndef SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP -#define SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(s, f) \ - do { \ - u32_t sec_, usec_; \ - SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME(sec_, usec_); \ - (s) = (s32_t)(sec_ - DIFF_SEC_1970_2036); \ - (f) = usec_ * 4295 - ((usec_ * 2143) >> 16) + 2147; \ - } while (0) -#endif /* !SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP */ - -/* Start offset of the timestamps to extract from the SNTP packet */ -#define SNTP_OFFSET_TIMESTAMPS \ - (SNTP_OFFSET_TRANSMIT_TIME + 8 - sizeof(struct sntp_timestamps)) - -/* Round-trip delay arithmetic helpers */ -#if SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP -#if !LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -#error "SNTP round-trip delay compensation requires 64-bit arithmetic" -#endif -#define SNTP_SEC_FRAC_TO_S64(s, f) \ - ((s64_t)(((u64_t)(s) << 32) | (u32_t)(f))) -#define SNTP_TIMESTAMP_TO_S64(t) \ - SNTP_SEC_FRAC_TO_S64(lwip_ntohl((t).sec), lwip_ntohl((t).frac)) -#endif /* SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP */ - -/** - * 64-bit NTP timestamp, in network byte order. - */ -struct sntp_time { - u32_t sec; - u32_t frac; -}; - -/** - * Timestamps to be extracted from the NTP header. - */ -struct sntp_timestamps { -#if SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP || SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 - struct sntp_time orig; - struct sntp_time recv; -#endif - struct sntp_time xmit; -}; - -/** - * SNTP packet format (without optional fields) - * Timestamps are coded as 64 bits: - * - signed 32 bits seconds since Feb 07, 2036, 06:28:16 UTC (epoch 1) - * - unsigned 32 bits seconds fraction (2^32 = 1 second) - */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct sntp_msg { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t li_vn_mode); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t stratum); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t poll); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t precision); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t root_delay); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t root_dispersion); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reference_identifier); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reference_timestamp[2]); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t originate_timestamp[2]); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t receive_timestamp[2]); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t transmit_timestamp[2]); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/* function prototypes */ -static void sntp_request(void *arg); - -/** The operating mode */ -static u8_t sntp_opmode; - -/** The UDP pcb used by the SNTP client */ -static struct udp_pcb *sntp_pcb; -/** Names/Addresses of servers */ -struct sntp_server { -#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS - const char *name; -#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ - ip_addr_t addr; -#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY - /** Reachability shift register as described in RFC 5905 */ - u8_t reachability; -#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ -}; -static struct sntp_server sntp_servers[SNTP_MAX_SERVERS]; - -#if SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP -static u8_t sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp; -#endif /* SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ -#if SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS -/** The currently used server (initialized to 0) */ -static u8_t sntp_current_server; -#else /* SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS */ -#define sntp_current_server 0 -#endif /* SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS */ - -#if SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP -#define SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT() sntp_retry_timeout = SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT -/** Retry time, initialized with SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT and doubled with each retry. */ -static u32_t sntp_retry_timeout; -#else /* SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP */ -#define SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT() -#define sntp_retry_timeout SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT -#endif /* SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP */ - -#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 -/** Saves the last server address to compare with response */ -static ip_addr_t sntp_last_server_address; -#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ - -#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 -/** Saves the last timestamp sent (which is sent back by the server) - * to compare against in response. Stored in network byte order. */ -static struct sntp_time sntp_last_timestamp_sent; -#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 */ - -#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) && !defined(sntp_format_time) -/* Debug print helper. */ -static const char *sntp_format_time(s32_t sec) -{ - time_t ut; - ut = (u32_t)((u32_t)sec + DIFF_SEC_1970_2036); - return ctime(&ut); -} -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG && !sntp_format_time */ - -/** - * SNTP processing of received timestamp - */ -static void sntp_process(const struct sntp_timestamps *timestamps) -{ - s32_t sec; - u32_t frac; - - sec = (s32_t)lwip_ntohl(timestamps->xmit.sec); - frac = lwip_ntohl(timestamps->xmit.frac); - -#if SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP -#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 - - if (timestamps->recv.sec != 0 || timestamps->recv.frac != 0) -#endif - { - s32_t dest_sec; - u32_t dest_frac; - u32_t step_sec; - - /* Get the destination time stamp, i.e. the current system time */ - SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(dest_sec, dest_frac); - - step_sec = (dest_sec < sec) ? ((u32_t)sec - (u32_t)dest_sec) : ((u32_t)dest_sec - (u32_t)sec); - - /* In order to avoid overflows, skip the compensation if the clock step - * is larger than about 34 years. */ - if ((step_sec >> 30) == 0) { - s64_t t1, t2, t3, t4; - - t4 = SNTP_SEC_FRAC_TO_S64(dest_sec, dest_frac); - t3 = SNTP_SEC_FRAC_TO_S64(sec, frac); - t1 = SNTP_TIMESTAMP_TO_S64(timestamps->orig); - t2 = SNTP_TIMESTAMP_TO_S64(timestamps->recv); - /* Clock offset calculation according to RFC 4330 */ - t4 += ((t2 - t1) + (t3 - t4)) / 2; - - sec = (s32_t)((u64_t)t4 >> 32); - frac = (u32_t)((u64_t)t4); - } - } - -#endif /* SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP */ - - SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(sec, frac); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(frac); /* might be unused if only seconds are set */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("sntp_process: %s, %" U32_F " us\n", - sntp_format_time(sec), SNTP_FRAC_TO_US(frac))); -} - -/** - * Initialize request struct to be sent to server. - */ -static void sntp_initialize_request(struct sntp_msg *req) -{ - memset(req, 0, SNTP_MSG_LEN); - req->li_vn_mode = SNTP_LI_NO_WARNING | SNTP_VERSION | SNTP_MODE_CLIENT; - -#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 || SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP - { - s32_t secs; - u32_t sec, frac; - /* Get the transmit timestamp */ - SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(secs, frac); - sec = lwip_htonl((u32_t)secs); - frac = lwip_htonl(frac); - -#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 - sntp_last_timestamp_sent.sec = sec; - sntp_last_timestamp_sent.frac = frac; -#endif - req->transmit_timestamp[0] = sec; - req->transmit_timestamp[1] = frac; - } -#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 || SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP */ -} - -/** - * Retry: send a new request (and increase retry timeout). - * - * @param arg is unused (only necessary to conform to sys_timeout) - */ -static void sntp_retry(void *arg) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_retry: Next request will be sent in %" U32_F " ms\n", - sntp_retry_timeout)); - - /* set up a timer to send a retry and increase the retry delay */ - sys_timeout(sntp_retry_timeout, sntp_request, NULL); - -#if SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP - { - u32_t new_retry_timeout; - /* increase the timeout for next retry */ - new_retry_timeout = sntp_retry_timeout << 1; - - /* limit to maximum timeout and prevent overflow */ - if ((new_retry_timeout <= SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_MAX) && - (new_retry_timeout > sntp_retry_timeout)) { - sntp_retry_timeout = new_retry_timeout; - } - } -#endif /* SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP */ -} - -#if SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS -/** - * If Kiss-of-Death is received (or another packet parsing error), - * try the next server or retry the current server and increase the retry - * timeout if only one server is available. - * (implicitly, SNTP_MAX_SERVERS > 1) - * - * @param arg is unused (only necessary to conform to sys_timeout) - */ -static void sntp_try_next_server(void *arg) -{ - u8_t old_server, i; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - old_server = sntp_current_server; - - for (i = 0; i < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS - 1; i++) { - sntp_current_server++; - - if (sntp_current_server >= SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { - sntp_current_server = 0; - } - - if (!ip_addr_isany(&sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr) -#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS - || (sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].name != NULL) -#endif - ) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_try_next_server: Sending request to server %" U16_F "\n", - (u16_t)sntp_current_server)); - /* new server: reset retry timeout */ - SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT(); - /* instantly send a request to the next server */ - sntp_request(NULL); - return; - } - } - - /* no other valid server found */ - sntp_current_server = old_server; - sntp_retry(NULL); -} -#else /* SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS */ -/* Always retry on error if only one server is supported */ -#define sntp_try_next_server sntp_retry -#endif /* SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS */ - -/** UDP recv callback for the sntp pcb */ -static void sntp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - struct sntp_timestamps timestamps; - u8_t mode; - u8_t stratum; - err_t err; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - err = ERR_ARG; -#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 - - /* check server address and port */ - if (((sntp_opmode != SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) || ip_addr_cmp(addr, &sntp_last_server_address)) && - (port == SNTP_PORT)) -#else /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); -#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ - { - /* process the response */ - if (p->tot_len == SNTP_MSG_LEN) { - mode = pbuf_get_at(p, SNTP_OFFSET_LI_VN_MODE) & SNTP_MODE_MASK; - - /* if this is a SNTP response... */ - if (((sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) && (mode == SNTP_MODE_SERVER)) || - ((sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_LISTENONLY) && (mode == SNTP_MODE_BROADCAST))) { - stratum = pbuf_get_at(p, SNTP_OFFSET_STRATUM); - - if (stratum == SNTP_STRATUM_KOD) { - /* Kiss-of-death packet. Use another server or increase UPDATE_DELAY. */ - err = SNTP_ERR_KOD; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_recv: Received Kiss-of-Death\n")); - } else { - pbuf_copy_partial(p, ×tamps, sizeof(timestamps), SNTP_OFFSET_TIMESTAMPS); -#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 - - /* check originate_timetamp against sntp_last_timestamp_sent */ - if (timestamps.orig.sec != sntp_last_timestamp_sent.sec || - timestamps.orig.frac != sntp_last_timestamp_sent.frac) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN, - ("sntp_recv: Invalid originate timestamp in response\n")); - } else -#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 */ - /* @todo: add code for SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 3 and >= 4 here */ - { - /* correct answer */ - err = ERR_OK; - } - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("sntp_recv: Invalid mode in response: %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)mode)); - /* wait for correct response */ - err = ERR_TIMEOUT; - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("sntp_recv: Invalid packet length: %" U16_F "\n", p->tot_len)); - } - } -#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 - else { - /* packet from wrong remote address or port, wait for correct response */ - err = ERR_TIMEOUT; - } - -#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ - - pbuf_free(p); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - /* correct packet received: process it it */ - sntp_process(×tamps); - -#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY - /* indicate that server responded */ - sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].reachability |= 1; -#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ - - /* Set up timeout for next request (only if poll response was received)*/ - if (sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) { - u32_t sntp_update_delay; - sys_untimeout(sntp_try_next_server, NULL); - sys_untimeout(sntp_request, NULL); - - /* Correct response, reset retry timeout */ - SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT(); - - sntp_update_delay = (u32_t)SNTP_UPDATE_DELAY; - sys_timeout(sntp_update_delay, sntp_request, NULL); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_recv: Scheduled next time request: %" U32_F " ms\n", - sntp_update_delay)); - } - } else if (err == SNTP_ERR_KOD) { - /* KOD errors are only processed in case of an explicit poll response */ - if (sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) { - /* Kiss-of-death packet. Use another server or increase UPDATE_DELAY. */ - sntp_try_next_server(NULL); - } - } else { - /* ignore any broken packet, poll mode: retry after timeout to avoid flooding */ - } -} - -/** Actually send an sntp request to a server. - * - * @param server_addr resolved IP address of the SNTP server - */ -static void sntp_send_request(const ip_addr_t *server_addr) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - - LWIP_ASSERT("server_addr != NULL", server_addr != NULL); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, SNTP_MSG_LEN, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p != NULL) { - struct sntp_msg *sntpmsg = (struct sntp_msg *)p->payload; - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_send_request: Sending request to server\n")); - /* initialize request message */ - sntp_initialize_request(sntpmsg); - /* send request */ - udp_sendto(sntp_pcb, p, server_addr, SNTP_PORT); - /* free the pbuf after sending it */ - pbuf_free(p); -#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY - /* indicate new packet has been sent */ - sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].reachability <<= 1; -#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ - /* set up receive timeout: try next server or retry on timeout */ - sys_timeout((u32_t)SNTP_RECV_TIMEOUT, sntp_try_next_server, NULL); -#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 - /* save server address to verify it in sntp_recv */ - ip_addr_copy(sntp_last_server_address, *server_addr); -#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS, ("sntp_send_request: Out of memory, trying again in %" U32_F " ms\n", - (u32_t)SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT)); - /* out of memory: set up a timer to send a retry */ - sys_timeout((u32_t)SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT, sntp_request, NULL); - } -} - -#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS -/** - * DNS found callback when using DNS names as server address. - */ -static void sntp_dns_found(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hostname); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - if (ipaddr != NULL) { - /* Address resolved, send request */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_dns_found: Server address resolved, sending request\n")); - sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr = *ipaddr; - sntp_send_request(ipaddr); - } else { - /* DNS resolving failed -> try another server */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("sntp_dns_found: Failed to resolve server address resolved, trying next server\n")); - sntp_try_next_server(NULL); - } -} -#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ - -/** - * Send out an sntp request. - * - * @param arg is unused (only necessary to conform to sys_timeout) - */ -static void sntp_request(void *arg) -{ - ip_addr_t sntp_server_address; - err_t err; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - /* initialize SNTP server address */ -#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS - - if (sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].name) { - /* always resolve the name and rely on dns-internal caching & timeout */ - ip_addr_set_zero(&sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr); - err = dns_gethostbyname(sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].name, &sntp_server_address, - sntp_dns_found, NULL); - - if (err == ERR_INPROGRESS) { - /* DNS request sent, wait for sntp_dns_found being called */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_request: Waiting for server address to be resolved.\n")); - return; - } else if (err == ERR_OK) { - sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr = sntp_server_address; - } - } else -#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ - { - sntp_server_address = sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr; - err = (ip_addr_isany_val(sntp_server_address)) ? ERR_ARG : ERR_OK; - } - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("sntp_request: current server address is %s\n", - ipaddr_ntoa(&sntp_server_address))); - sntp_send_request(&sntp_server_address); - } else { - /* address conversion failed, try another server */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("sntp_request: Invalid server address, trying next server.\n")); - sys_timeout((u32_t)SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT, sntp_try_next_server, NULL); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup sntp - * Initialize this module. - * Send out request instantly or after SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY(_FUNC). - */ -void sntp_init(void) -{ - /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by udp_new() */ - -#ifdef SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS -#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS - sntp_setservername(0, SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS); -#else -#error SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS string not supported SNTP_SERVER_DNS==0 -#endif -#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS */ - - if (sntp_pcb == NULL) { - sntp_pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to allocate udp pcb for sntp client", sntp_pcb != NULL); - - if (sntp_pcb != NULL) { - udp_recv(sntp_pcb, sntp_recv, NULL); - - if (sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) { - SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT(); -#if SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY - sys_timeout((u32_t)SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY_FUNC, sntp_request, NULL); -#else - sntp_request(NULL); -#endif - } else if (sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_LISTENONLY) { - ip_set_option(sntp_pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); - udp_bind(sntp_pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, SNTP_PORT); - } - } - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup sntp - * Stop this module. - */ -void sntp_stop(void) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (sntp_pcb != NULL) { -#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY - u8_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS; i++) { - sntp_servers[i].reachability = 0; - } - -#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ - sys_untimeout(sntp_request, NULL); - sys_untimeout(sntp_try_next_server, NULL); - udp_remove(sntp_pcb); - sntp_pcb = NULL; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup sntp - * Get enabled state. - */ -u8_t sntp_enabled(void) -{ - return (sntp_pcb != NULL) ? 1 : 0; -} - -/** - * @ingroup sntp - * Sets the operating mode. - * @param operating_mode one of the available operating modes - */ -void sntp_setoperatingmode(u8_t operating_mode) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid operating mode", operating_mode <= SNTP_OPMODE_LISTENONLY); - LWIP_ASSERT("Operating mode must not be set while SNTP client is running", sntp_pcb == NULL); - sntp_opmode = operating_mode; -} - -/** - * @ingroup sntp - * Gets the operating mode. - */ -u8_t sntp_getoperatingmode(void) -{ - return sntp_opmode; -} - -#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY -/** - * @ingroup sntp - * Gets the server reachability shift register as described in RFC 5905. - * - * @param idx the index of the NTP server - */ -u8_t sntp_getreachability(u8_t idx) -{ - if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { - return sntp_servers[idx].reachability; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ - -#if SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP -/** - * Config SNTP server handling by IP address, name, or DHCP; clear table - * @param set_servers_from_dhcp enable or disable getting server addresses from dhcp - */ -void sntp_servermode_dhcp(int set_servers_from_dhcp) -{ - u8_t new_mode = set_servers_from_dhcp ? 1 : 0; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp != new_mode) { - sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp = new_mode; - } -} -#endif /* SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ - -/** - * @ingroup sntp - * Initialize one of the NTP servers by IP address - * - * @param idx the index of the NTP server to set must be < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS - * @param server IP address of the NTP server to set - */ -void sntp_setserver(u8_t idx, const ip_addr_t *server) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { - if (server != NULL) { - sntp_servers[idx].addr = (*server); - } else { - ip_addr_set_zero(&sntp_servers[idx].addr); - } - -#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS - sntp_servers[idx].name = NULL; -#endif - } -} - -#if LWIP_DHCP && SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP -/** - * Initialize one of the NTP servers by IP address, required by DHCP - * - * @param num the index of the NTP server to set must be < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS - * @param server IP address of the NTP server to set - */ -void dhcp_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num, const ip4_addr_t *server) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("sntp: %s %u.%u.%u.%u as NTP server #%u via DHCP\n", - (sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp ? "Got" : "Rejected"), - ip4_addr1(server), ip4_addr2(server), ip4_addr3(server), ip4_addr4(server), num)); - - if (sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp && num) { - u8_t i; - - for (i = 0; (i < num) && (i < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS); i++) { - ip_addr_t addr; - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(addr, server[i]); - sntp_setserver(i, &addr); - } - - for (i = num; i < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS; i++) { - sntp_setserver(i, NULL); - } - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP && SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ - -/** - * @ingroup sntp - * Obtain one of the currently configured by IP address (or DHCP) NTP servers - * - * @param idx the index of the NTP server - * @return IP address of the indexed NTP server or "ip_addr_any" if the NTP - * server has not been configured by address (or at all). - */ -const ip_addr_t *sntp_getserver(u8_t idx) -{ - if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { - return &sntp_servers[idx].addr; - } - - return IP_ADDR_ANY; -} - -#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS -/** - * Initialize one of the NTP servers by name - * - * @param idx the index of the NTP server to set must be < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS - * @param server DNS name of the NTP server to set, to be resolved at contact time - */ -void sntp_setservername(u8_t idx, const char *server) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { - sntp_servers[idx].name = server; - } -} - -/** - * Obtain one of the currently configured by name NTP servers. - * - * @param idx the index of the NTP server - * @return IP address of the indexed NTP server or NULL if the NTP - * server has not been configured by name (or at all) - */ -const char *sntp_getservername(u8_t idx) -{ - if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { - return sntp_servers[idx].name; - } - - return NULL; -} -#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +/** + * @file + * SNTP client module + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2007-2009 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + */ + +/** + * @defgroup sntp SNTP + * @ingroup apps + * + * This is simple "SNTP" client for the lwIP raw API. + * It is a minimal implementation of SNTPv4 as specified in RFC 4330. + * + * For a list of some public NTP servers, see this link: + * http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Servers/NTPPoolServers + * + * @todo: + * - complete SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE checks 3 and 4 + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/sntp.h" + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp.h" + +#include +#include + +#if LWIP_UDP + +/* Handle support for more than one server via SNTP_MAX_SERVERS */ +#if SNTP_MAX_SERVERS > 1 +#define SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS 1 +#else /* NTP_MAX_SERVERS > 1 */ +#define SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS 0 +#endif /* NTP_MAX_SERVERS > 1 */ + +#ifndef SNTP_SUPPRESS_DELAY_CHECK +#if SNTP_UPDATE_DELAY < 15000 +#error "SNTPv4 RFC 4330 enforces a minimum update time of 15 seconds (define SNTP_SUPPRESS_DELAY_CHECK to disable this error)!" +#endif +#endif + +/* the various debug levels for this file */ +#define SNTP_DEBUG_TRACE (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE) +#define SNTP_DEBUG_STATE (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE) +#define SNTP_DEBUG_WARN (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) +#define SNTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING | LWIP_DBG_STATE) +#define SNTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS (SNTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS) + +#define SNTP_ERR_KOD 1 + +/* SNTP protocol defines */ +#define SNTP_MSG_LEN 48 + +#define SNTP_OFFSET_LI_VN_MODE 0 +#define SNTP_LI_MASK 0xC0 +#define SNTP_LI_NO_WARNING (0x00 << 6) +#define SNTP_LI_LAST_MINUTE_61_SEC (0x01 << 6) +#define SNTP_LI_LAST_MINUTE_59_SEC (0x02 << 6) +#define SNTP_LI_ALARM_CONDITION (0x03 << 6) /* (clock not synchronized) */ + +#define SNTP_VERSION_MASK 0x38 +#define SNTP_VERSION (4 /* NTP Version 4*/ << 3) + +#define SNTP_MODE_MASK 0x07 +#define SNTP_MODE_CLIENT 0x03 +#define SNTP_MODE_SERVER 0x04 +#define SNTP_MODE_BROADCAST 0x05 + +#define SNTP_OFFSET_STRATUM 1 +#define SNTP_STRATUM_KOD 0x00 + +#define SNTP_OFFSET_ORIGINATE_TIME 24 +#define SNTP_OFFSET_RECEIVE_TIME 32 +#define SNTP_OFFSET_TRANSMIT_TIME 40 + +/* Number of seconds between 1970 and Feb 7, 2036 06:28:16 UTC (epoch 1) */ +#define DIFF_SEC_1970_2036 ((u32_t)2085978496L) + +/** Convert NTP timestamp fraction to microseconds. + */ +#ifndef SNTP_FRAC_TO_US +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +#define SNTP_FRAC_TO_US(f) ((u32_t)(((u64_t)(f)*1000000UL) >> 32)) +#else +#define SNTP_FRAC_TO_US(f) ((u32_t)(f) / 4295) +#endif +#endif /* !SNTP_FRAC_TO_US */ + +/* Configure behaviour depending on native, microsecond or second precision. + * Treat NTP timestamps as signed two's-complement integers. This way, + * timestamps that have the MSB set simply become negative offsets from + * the epoch (Feb 7, 2036 06:28:16 UTC). Representable dates range from + * 1968 to 2104. + */ +#ifndef SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP +#ifdef SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_US +#define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(s, f) \ + SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_US((u32_t)((s) + DIFF_SEC_1970_2036), SNTP_FRAC_TO_US(f)) +#else +#define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(s, f) \ + SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME((u32_t)((s) + DIFF_SEC_1970_2036)) +#endif +#endif /* !SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP */ + +/* Get the system time either natively as NTP timestamp or convert from + * Unix time in seconds and microseconds. Take care to avoid overflow if the + * microsecond value is at the maximum of 999999. Also add 0.5 us fudge to + * avoid special values like 0, and to mask round-off errors that would + * otherwise break round-trip conversion identity. + */ +#ifndef SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP +#define SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(s, f) \ + do { \ + u32_t sec_, usec_; \ + SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME(sec_, usec_); \ + (s) = (s32_t)(sec_ - DIFF_SEC_1970_2036); \ + (f) = usec_ * 4295 - ((usec_ * 2143) >> 16) + 2147; \ + } while (0) +#endif /* !SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP */ + +/* Start offset of the timestamps to extract from the SNTP packet */ +#define SNTP_OFFSET_TIMESTAMPS \ + (SNTP_OFFSET_TRANSMIT_TIME + 8 - sizeof(struct sntp_timestamps)) + +/* Round-trip delay arithmetic helpers */ +#if SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP +#if !LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +#error "SNTP round-trip delay compensation requires 64-bit arithmetic" +#endif +#define SNTP_SEC_FRAC_TO_S64(s, f) \ + ((s64_t)(((u64_t)(s) << 32) | (u32_t)(f))) +#define SNTP_TIMESTAMP_TO_S64(t) \ + SNTP_SEC_FRAC_TO_S64(lwip_ntohl((t).sec), lwip_ntohl((t).frac)) +#endif /* SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP */ + +/** + * 64-bit NTP timestamp, in network byte order. + */ +struct sntp_time { + u32_t sec; + u32_t frac; +}; + +/** + * Timestamps to be extracted from the NTP header. + */ +struct sntp_timestamps { +#if SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP || SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 + struct sntp_time orig; + struct sntp_time recv; +#endif + struct sntp_time xmit; +}; + +/** + * SNTP packet format (without optional fields) + * Timestamps are coded as 64 bits: + * - signed 32 bits seconds since Feb 07, 2036, 06:28:16 UTC (epoch 1) + * - unsigned 32 bits seconds fraction (2^32 = 1 second) + */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct sntp_msg { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t li_vn_mode); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t stratum); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t poll); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t precision); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t root_delay); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t root_dispersion); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reference_identifier); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reference_timestamp[2]); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t originate_timestamp[2]); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t receive_timestamp[2]); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t transmit_timestamp[2]); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/* function prototypes */ +static void sntp_request(void *arg); + +/** The operating mode */ +static u8_t sntp_opmode; + +/** The UDP pcb used by the SNTP client */ +static struct udp_pcb *sntp_pcb; +/** Names/Addresses of servers */ +struct sntp_server { +#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS + const char *name; +#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ + ip_addr_t addr; +#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY + /** Reachability shift register as described in RFC 5905 */ + u8_t reachability; +#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ +}; +static struct sntp_server sntp_servers[SNTP_MAX_SERVERS]; + +#if SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP +static u8_t sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp; +#endif /* SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ +#if SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS +/** The currently used server (initialized to 0) */ +static u8_t sntp_current_server; +#else /* SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS */ +#define sntp_current_server 0 +#endif /* SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS */ + +#if SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP +#define SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT() sntp_retry_timeout = SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT +/** Retry time, initialized with SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT and doubled with each retry. */ +static u32_t sntp_retry_timeout; +#else /* SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP */ +#define SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT() +#define sntp_retry_timeout SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT +#endif /* SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP */ + +#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 +/** Saves the last server address to compare with response */ +static ip_addr_t sntp_last_server_address; +#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ + +#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 +/** Saves the last timestamp sent (which is sent back by the server) + * to compare against in response. Stored in network byte order. */ +static struct sntp_time sntp_last_timestamp_sent; +#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 */ + +#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) && !defined(sntp_format_time) +/* Debug print helper. */ +static const char *sntp_format_time(s32_t sec) +{ + time_t ut; + ut = (u32_t)((u32_t)sec + DIFF_SEC_1970_2036); + return ctime(&ut); +} +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG && !sntp_format_time */ + +/** + * SNTP processing of received timestamp + */ +static void sntp_process(const struct sntp_timestamps *timestamps) +{ + s32_t sec; + u32_t frac; + + sec = (s32_t)lwip_ntohl(timestamps->xmit.sec); + frac = lwip_ntohl(timestamps->xmit.frac); + +#if SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP +#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 + + if (timestamps->recv.sec != 0 || timestamps->recv.frac != 0) +#endif + { + s32_t dest_sec; + u32_t dest_frac; + u32_t step_sec; + + /* Get the destination time stamp, i.e. the current system time */ + SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(dest_sec, dest_frac); + + step_sec = (dest_sec < sec) ? ((u32_t)sec - (u32_t)dest_sec) : ((u32_t)dest_sec - (u32_t)sec); + + /* In order to avoid overflows, skip the compensation if the clock step + * is larger than about 34 years. */ + if ((step_sec >> 30) == 0) { + s64_t t1, t2, t3, t4; + + t4 = SNTP_SEC_FRAC_TO_S64(dest_sec, dest_frac); + t3 = SNTP_SEC_FRAC_TO_S64(sec, frac); + t1 = SNTP_TIMESTAMP_TO_S64(timestamps->orig); + t2 = SNTP_TIMESTAMP_TO_S64(timestamps->recv); + /* Clock offset calculation according to RFC 4330 */ + t4 += ((t2 - t1) + (t3 - t4)) / 2; + + sec = (s32_t)((u64_t)t4 >> 32); + frac = (u32_t)((u64_t)t4); + } + } + +#endif /* SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP */ + + SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(sec, frac); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(frac); /* might be unused if only seconds are set */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("sntp_process: %s, %" U32_F " us\n", + sntp_format_time(sec), SNTP_FRAC_TO_US(frac))); +} + +/** + * Initialize request struct to be sent to server. + */ +static void sntp_initialize_request(struct sntp_msg *req) +{ + memset(req, 0, SNTP_MSG_LEN); + req->li_vn_mode = SNTP_LI_NO_WARNING | SNTP_VERSION | SNTP_MODE_CLIENT; + +#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 || SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP + { + s32_t secs; + u32_t sec, frac; + /* Get the transmit timestamp */ + SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(secs, frac); + sec = lwip_htonl((u32_t)secs); + frac = lwip_htonl(frac); + +#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 + sntp_last_timestamp_sent.sec = sec; + sntp_last_timestamp_sent.frac = frac; +#endif + req->transmit_timestamp[0] = sec; + req->transmit_timestamp[1] = frac; + } +#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 || SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP */ +} + +/** + * Retry: send a new request (and increase retry timeout). + * + * @param arg is unused (only necessary to conform to sys_timeout) + */ +static void sntp_retry(void *arg) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_retry: Next request will be sent in %" U32_F " ms\n", + sntp_retry_timeout)); + + /* set up a timer to send a retry and increase the retry delay */ + sys_timeout(sntp_retry_timeout, sntp_request, NULL); + +#if SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP + { + u32_t new_retry_timeout; + /* increase the timeout for next retry */ + new_retry_timeout = sntp_retry_timeout << 1; + + /* limit to maximum timeout and prevent overflow */ + if ((new_retry_timeout <= SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_MAX) && + (new_retry_timeout > sntp_retry_timeout)) { + sntp_retry_timeout = new_retry_timeout; + } + } +#endif /* SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP */ +} + +#if SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS +/** + * If Kiss-of-Death is received (or another packet parsing error), + * try the next server or retry the current server and increase the retry + * timeout if only one server is available. + * (implicitly, SNTP_MAX_SERVERS > 1) + * + * @param arg is unused (only necessary to conform to sys_timeout) + */ +static void sntp_try_next_server(void *arg) +{ + u8_t old_server, i; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + old_server = sntp_current_server; + + for (i = 0; i < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS - 1; i++) { + sntp_current_server++; + + if (sntp_current_server >= SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { + sntp_current_server = 0; + } + + if (!ip_addr_isany(&sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr) +#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS + || (sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].name != NULL) +#endif + ) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_try_next_server: Sending request to server %" U16_F "\n", + (u16_t)sntp_current_server)); + /* new server: reset retry timeout */ + SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT(); + /* instantly send a request to the next server */ + sntp_request(NULL); + return; + } + } + + /* no other valid server found */ + sntp_current_server = old_server; + sntp_retry(NULL); +} +#else /* SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS */ +/* Always retry on error if only one server is supported */ +#define sntp_try_next_server sntp_retry +#endif /* SNTP_SUPPORT_MULTIPLE_SERVERS */ + +/** UDP recv callback for the sntp pcb */ +static void sntp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + struct sntp_timestamps timestamps; + u8_t mode; + u8_t stratum; + err_t err; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + err = ERR_ARG; +#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 + + /* check server address and port */ + if (((sntp_opmode != SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) || ip_addr_cmp(addr, &sntp_last_server_address)) && + (port == SNTP_PORT)) +#else /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); +#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ + { + /* process the response */ + if (p->tot_len == SNTP_MSG_LEN) { + mode = pbuf_get_at(p, SNTP_OFFSET_LI_VN_MODE) & SNTP_MODE_MASK; + + /* if this is a SNTP response... */ + if (((sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) && (mode == SNTP_MODE_SERVER)) || + ((sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_LISTENONLY) && (mode == SNTP_MODE_BROADCAST))) { + stratum = pbuf_get_at(p, SNTP_OFFSET_STRATUM); + + if (stratum == SNTP_STRATUM_KOD) { + /* Kiss-of-death packet. Use another server or increase UPDATE_DELAY. */ + err = SNTP_ERR_KOD; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_recv: Received Kiss-of-Death\n")); + } else { + pbuf_copy_partial(p, ×tamps, sizeof(timestamps), SNTP_OFFSET_TIMESTAMPS); +#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 + + /* check originate_timetamp against sntp_last_timestamp_sent */ + if (timestamps.orig.sec != sntp_last_timestamp_sent.sec || + timestamps.orig.frac != sntp_last_timestamp_sent.frac) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN, + ("sntp_recv: Invalid originate timestamp in response\n")); + } else +#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 */ + /* @todo: add code for SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 3 and >= 4 here */ + { + /* correct answer */ + err = ERR_OK; + } + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("sntp_recv: Invalid mode in response: %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)mode)); + /* wait for correct response */ + err = ERR_TIMEOUT; + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN, ("sntp_recv: Invalid packet length: %" U16_F "\n", p->tot_len)); + } + } +#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 + else { + /* packet from wrong remote address or port, wait for correct response */ + err = ERR_TIMEOUT; + } + +#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ + + pbuf_free(p); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + /* correct packet received: process it it */ + sntp_process(×tamps); + +#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY + /* indicate that server responded */ + sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].reachability |= 1; +#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ + + /* Set up timeout for next request (only if poll response was received)*/ + if (sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) { + u32_t sntp_update_delay; + sys_untimeout(sntp_try_next_server, NULL); + sys_untimeout(sntp_request, NULL); + + /* Correct response, reset retry timeout */ + SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT(); + + sntp_update_delay = (u32_t)SNTP_UPDATE_DELAY; + sys_timeout(sntp_update_delay, sntp_request, NULL); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_recv: Scheduled next time request: %" U32_F " ms\n", + sntp_update_delay)); + } + } else if (err == SNTP_ERR_KOD) { + /* KOD errors are only processed in case of an explicit poll response */ + if (sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) { + /* Kiss-of-death packet. Use another server or increase UPDATE_DELAY. */ + sntp_try_next_server(NULL); + } + } else { + /* ignore any broken packet, poll mode: retry after timeout to avoid flooding */ + } +} + +/** Actually send an sntp request to a server. + * + * @param server_addr resolved IP address of the SNTP server + */ +static void sntp_send_request(const ip_addr_t *server_addr) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + + LWIP_ASSERT("server_addr != NULL", server_addr != NULL); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, SNTP_MSG_LEN, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p != NULL) { + struct sntp_msg *sntpmsg = (struct sntp_msg *)p->payload; + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_send_request: Sending request to server\n")); + /* initialize request message */ + sntp_initialize_request(sntpmsg); + /* send request */ + udp_sendto(sntp_pcb, p, server_addr, SNTP_PORT); + /* free the pbuf after sending it */ + pbuf_free(p); +#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY + /* indicate new packet has been sent */ + sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].reachability <<= 1; +#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ + /* set up receive timeout: try next server or retry on timeout */ + sys_timeout((u32_t)SNTP_RECV_TIMEOUT, sntp_try_next_server, NULL); +#if SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 + /* save server address to verify it in sntp_recv */ + ip_addr_copy(sntp_last_server_address, *server_addr); +#endif /* SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 1 */ + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_SERIOUS, ("sntp_send_request: Out of memory, trying again in %" U32_F " ms\n", + (u32_t)SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT)); + /* out of memory: set up a timer to send a retry */ + sys_timeout((u32_t)SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT, sntp_request, NULL); + } +} + +#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS +/** + * DNS found callback when using DNS names as server address. + */ +static void sntp_dns_found(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *arg) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hostname); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + if (ipaddr != NULL) { + /* Address resolved, send request */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_dns_found: Server address resolved, sending request\n")); + sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr = *ipaddr; + sntp_send_request(ipaddr); + } else { + /* DNS resolving failed -> try another server */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("sntp_dns_found: Failed to resolve server address resolved, trying next server\n")); + sntp_try_next_server(NULL); + } +} +#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ + +/** + * Send out an sntp request. + * + * @param arg is unused (only necessary to conform to sys_timeout) + */ +static void sntp_request(void *arg) +{ + ip_addr_t sntp_server_address; + err_t err; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + /* initialize SNTP server address */ +#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS + + if (sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].name) { + /* always resolve the name and rely on dns-internal caching & timeout */ + ip_addr_set_zero(&sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr); + err = dns_gethostbyname(sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].name, &sntp_server_address, + sntp_dns_found, NULL); + + if (err == ERR_INPROGRESS) { + /* DNS request sent, wait for sntp_dns_found being called */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_STATE, ("sntp_request: Waiting for server address to be resolved.\n")); + return; + } else if (err == ERR_OK) { + sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr = sntp_server_address; + } + } else +#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ + { + sntp_server_address = sntp_servers[sntp_current_server].addr; + err = (ip_addr_isany_val(sntp_server_address)) ? ERR_ARG : ERR_OK; + } + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("sntp_request: current server address is %s\n", + ipaddr_ntoa(&sntp_server_address))); + sntp_send_request(&sntp_server_address); + } else { + /* address conversion failed, try another server */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_WARN_STATE, ("sntp_request: Invalid server address, trying next server.\n")); + sys_timeout((u32_t)SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT, sntp_try_next_server, NULL); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup sntp + * Initialize this module. + * Send out request instantly or after SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY(_FUNC). + */ +void sntp_init(void) +{ + /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by udp_new() */ + +#ifdef SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS +#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS + sntp_setservername(0, SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS); +#else +#error SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS string not supported SNTP_SERVER_DNS==0 +#endif +#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS */ + + if (sntp_pcb == NULL) { + sntp_pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + LWIP_ASSERT("Failed to allocate udp pcb for sntp client", sntp_pcb != NULL); + + if (sntp_pcb != NULL) { + udp_recv(sntp_pcb, sntp_recv, NULL); + + if (sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_POLL) { + SNTP_RESET_RETRY_TIMEOUT(); +#if SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY + sys_timeout((u32_t)SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY_FUNC, sntp_request, NULL); +#else + sntp_request(NULL); +#endif + } else if (sntp_opmode == SNTP_OPMODE_LISTENONLY) { + ip_set_option(sntp_pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); + udp_bind(sntp_pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, SNTP_PORT); + } + } + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup sntp + * Stop this module. + */ +void sntp_stop(void) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (sntp_pcb != NULL) { +#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY + u8_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS; i++) { + sntp_servers[i].reachability = 0; + } + +#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ + sys_untimeout(sntp_request, NULL); + sys_untimeout(sntp_try_next_server, NULL); + udp_remove(sntp_pcb); + sntp_pcb = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup sntp + * Get enabled state. + */ +u8_t sntp_enabled(void) +{ + return (sntp_pcb != NULL) ? 1 : 0; +} + +/** + * @ingroup sntp + * Sets the operating mode. + * @param operating_mode one of the available operating modes + */ +void sntp_setoperatingmode(u8_t operating_mode) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("Invalid operating mode", operating_mode <= SNTP_OPMODE_LISTENONLY); + LWIP_ASSERT("Operating mode must not be set while SNTP client is running", sntp_pcb == NULL); + sntp_opmode = operating_mode; +} + +/** + * @ingroup sntp + * Gets the operating mode. + */ +u8_t sntp_getoperatingmode(void) +{ + return sntp_opmode; +} + +#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY +/** + * @ingroup sntp + * Gets the server reachability shift register as described in RFC 5905. + * + * @param idx the index of the NTP server + */ +u8_t sntp_getreachability(u8_t idx) +{ + if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { + return sntp_servers[idx].reachability; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ + +#if SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP +/** + * Config SNTP server handling by IP address, name, or DHCP; clear table + * @param set_servers_from_dhcp enable or disable getting server addresses from dhcp + */ +void sntp_servermode_dhcp(int set_servers_from_dhcp) +{ + u8_t new_mode = set_servers_from_dhcp ? 1 : 0; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp != new_mode) { + sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp = new_mode; + } +} +#endif /* SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ + +/** + * @ingroup sntp + * Initialize one of the NTP servers by IP address + * + * @param idx the index of the NTP server to set must be < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS + * @param server IP address of the NTP server to set + */ +void sntp_setserver(u8_t idx, const ip_addr_t *server) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { + if (server != NULL) { + sntp_servers[idx].addr = (*server); + } else { + ip_addr_set_zero(&sntp_servers[idx].addr); + } + +#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS + sntp_servers[idx].name = NULL; +#endif + } +} + +#if LWIP_DHCP && SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP +/** + * Initialize one of the NTP servers by IP address, required by DHCP + * + * @param num the index of the NTP server to set must be < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS + * @param server IP address of the NTP server to set + */ +void dhcp_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num, const ip4_addr_t *server) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SNTP_DEBUG_TRACE, ("sntp: %s %u.%u.%u.%u as NTP server #%u via DHCP\n", + (sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp ? "Got" : "Rejected"), + ip4_addr1(server), ip4_addr2(server), ip4_addr3(server), ip4_addr4(server), num)); + + if (sntp_set_servers_from_dhcp && num) { + u8_t i; + + for (i = 0; (i < num) && (i < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS); i++) { + ip_addr_t addr; + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(addr, server[i]); + sntp_setserver(i, &addr); + } + + for (i = num; i < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS; i++) { + sntp_setserver(i, NULL); + } + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP && SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ + +/** + * @ingroup sntp + * Obtain one of the currently configured by IP address (or DHCP) NTP servers + * + * @param idx the index of the NTP server + * @return IP address of the indexed NTP server or "ip_addr_any" if the NTP + * server has not been configured by address (or at all). + */ +const ip_addr_t *sntp_getserver(u8_t idx) +{ + if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { + return &sntp_servers[idx].addr; + } + + return IP_ADDR_ANY; +} + +#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS +/** + * Initialize one of the NTP servers by name + * + * @param idx the index of the NTP server to set must be < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS + * @param server DNS name of the NTP server to set, to be resolved at contact time + */ +void sntp_setservername(u8_t idx, const char *server) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { + sntp_servers[idx].name = server; + } +} + +/** + * Obtain one of the currently configured by name NTP servers. + * + * @param idx the index of the NTP server + * @return IP address of the indexed NTP server or NULL if the NTP + * server has not been configured by name (or at all) + */ +const char *sntp_getservername(u8_t idx) +{ + if (idx < SNTP_MAX_SERVERS) { + return sntp_servers[idx].name; + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c index 6c412abc..1d36f3a7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/apps/tftp/tftp_server.c @@ -1,443 +1,443 @@ -/** - * - * @file tftp_server.c - * - * @author Logan Gunthorpe - * Dirk Ziegelmeier - * - * @brief Trivial File Transfer Protocol (RFC 1350) - * - * Copyright (c) Deltatee Enterprises Ltd. 2013 - * All rights reserved. - * - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification,are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO - * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Logan Gunthorpe - * Dirk Ziegelmeier - * - */ - -/** - * @defgroup tftp TFTP server - * @ingroup apps - * - * This is simple TFTP server for the lwIP raw API. - */ - -#include "lwip/apps/tftp_server.h" - -#if LWIP_UDP - -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include "lwip/debug.h" - -#define TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE 512 -#define TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH 4 - -#define TFTP_RRQ 1 -#define TFTP_WRQ 2 -#define TFTP_DATA 3 -#define TFTP_ACK 4 -#define TFTP_ERROR 5 - -enum tftp_error { - TFTP_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND = 1, - TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION = 2, - TFTP_ERROR_DISK_FULL = 3, - TFTP_ERROR_ILLEGAL_OPERATION = 4, - TFTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TRFR_ID = 5, - TFTP_ERROR_FILE_EXISTS = 6, - TFTP_ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER = 7 -}; - -#include - -struct tftp_state { - const struct tftp_context *ctx; - void *handle; - struct pbuf *last_data; - struct udp_pcb *upcb; - ip_addr_t addr; - u16_t port; - int timer; - int last_pkt; - u16_t blknum; - u8_t retries; - u8_t mode_write; -}; - -static struct tftp_state tftp_state; - -static void tftp_tmr(void *arg); - -static void close_handle(void) -{ - tftp_state.port = 0; - ip_addr_set_any(0, &tftp_state.addr); - - if (tftp_state.last_data != NULL) { - pbuf_free(tftp_state.last_data); - tftp_state.last_data = NULL; - } - - sys_untimeout(tftp_tmr, NULL); - - if (tftp_state.handle) { - tftp_state.ctx->close(tftp_state.handle); - tftp_state.handle = NULL; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tftp: closing\n")); - } -} - -static void send_error(const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port, enum tftp_error code, const char *str) -{ - int str_length = strlen(str); - struct pbuf *p; - u16_t *payload; - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, (u16_t)(TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH + str_length + 1), PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - return; - } - - payload = (u16_t *)p->payload; - payload[0] = PP_HTONS(TFTP_ERROR); - payload[1] = lwip_htons(code); - MEMCPY(&payload[2], str, str_length + 1); - - udp_sendto(tftp_state.upcb, p, addr, port); - pbuf_free(p); -} - -static void send_ack(u16_t blknum) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u16_t *payload; - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - return; - } - - payload = (u16_t *)p->payload; - - payload[0] = PP_HTONS(TFTP_ACK); - payload[1] = lwip_htons(blknum); - udp_sendto(tftp_state.upcb, p, &tftp_state.addr, tftp_state.port); - pbuf_free(p); -} - -static void resend_data(void) -{ - struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, tftp_state.last_data->len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - return; - } - - if (pbuf_copy(p, tftp_state.last_data) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - udp_sendto(tftp_state.upcb, p, &tftp_state.addr, tftp_state.port); - pbuf_free(p); -} - -static void send_data(void) -{ - u16_t *payload; - int ret; - - if (tftp_state.last_data != NULL) { - pbuf_free(tftp_state.last_data); - } - - tftp_state.last_data = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH + TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, PBUF_RAM); - - if (tftp_state.last_data == NULL) { - return; - } - - payload = (u16_t *)tftp_state.last_data->payload; - payload[0] = PP_HTONS(TFTP_DATA); - payload[1] = lwip_htons(tftp_state.blknum); - - ret = tftp_state.ctx->read(tftp_state.handle, &payload[2], TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE); - - if (ret < 0) { - send_error(&tftp_state.addr, tftp_state.port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Error occured while reading the file."); - close_handle(); - return; - } - - pbuf_realloc(tftp_state.last_data, (u16_t)(TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH + ret)); - resend_data(); -} - -static void recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *upcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - u16_t *sbuf = (u16_t *)p->payload; - int opcode; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(upcb); - - if (((tftp_state.port != 0) && (port != tftp_state.port)) || - (!ip_addr_isany_val(tftp_state.addr) && !ip_addr_cmp(&tftp_state.addr, addr))) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Only one connection at a time is supported"); - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - opcode = sbuf[0]; - - tftp_state.last_pkt = tftp_state.timer; - tftp_state.retries = 0; - - switch (opcode) { - case PP_HTONS(TFTP_RRQ): /* fall through */ - case PP_HTONS(TFTP_WRQ): { - const char tftp_null = 0; - char filename[TFTP_MAX_FILENAME_LEN + 1]; - char mode[TFTP_MAX_MODE_LEN + 1]; - u16_t filename_end_offset; - u16_t mode_end_offset; - - if (tftp_state.handle != NULL) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Only one connection at a time is supported"); - break; - } - - sys_timeout(TFTP_TIMER_MSECS, tftp_tmr, NULL); - - /* find \0 in pbuf -> end of filename string */ - filename_end_offset = pbuf_memfind(p, &tftp_null, sizeof(tftp_null), 2); - - if ((u16_t)(filename_end_offset - 1) > sizeof(filename)) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Filename too long/not NULL terminated"); - break; - } - - pbuf_copy_partial(p, filename, filename_end_offset - 1, 2); - - /* find \0 in pbuf -> end of mode string */ - mode_end_offset = pbuf_memfind(p, &tftp_null, sizeof(tftp_null), filename_end_offset + 1); - - if ((u16_t)(mode_end_offset - filename_end_offset) > sizeof(mode)) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Mode too long/not NULL terminated"); - break; - } - - pbuf_copy_partial(p, mode, mode_end_offset - filename_end_offset, filename_end_offset + 1); - - tftp_state.handle = tftp_state.ctx->open(filename, mode, opcode == PP_HTONS(TFTP_WRQ)); - tftp_state.blknum = 1; - - if (!tftp_state.handle) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "Unable to open requested file."); - break; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tftp: %s request from ", (opcode == PP_HTONS(TFTP_WRQ)) ? "write" : "read")); - ip_addr_debug_print(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, addr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, (" for '%s' mode '%s'\n", filename, mode)); - - ip_addr_copy(tftp_state.addr, *addr); - tftp_state.port = port; - - if (opcode == PP_HTONS(TFTP_WRQ)) { - tftp_state.mode_write = 1; - send_ack(0); - } else { - tftp_state.mode_write = 0; - send_data(); - } - - break; - } - - case PP_HTONS(TFTP_DATA): { - int ret; - u16_t blknum; - - if (tftp_state.handle == NULL) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "No connection"); - break; - } - - if (tftp_state.mode_write != 1) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Not a write connection"); - break; - } - - blknum = lwip_ntohs(sbuf[1]); - - if (blknum == tftp_state.blknum) { - pbuf_remove_header(p, TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH); - - ret = tftp_state.ctx->write(tftp_state.handle, p); - - if (ret < 0) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "error writing file"); - close_handle(); - } else { - send_ack(blknum); - } - - if (p->tot_len < TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE) { - close_handle(); - } else { - tftp_state.blknum++; - } - } else if ((u16_t)(blknum + 1) == tftp_state.blknum) { - /* retransmit of previous block, ack again (casting to u16_t to care for overflow) */ - send_ack(blknum); - } else { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TRFR_ID, "Wrong block number"); - } - - break; - } - - case PP_HTONS(TFTP_ACK): { - u16_t blknum; - int lastpkt; - - if (tftp_state.handle == NULL) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "No connection"); - break; - } - - if (tftp_state.mode_write != 0) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Not a read connection"); - break; - } - - blknum = lwip_ntohs(sbuf[1]); - - if (blknum != tftp_state.blknum) { - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TRFR_ID, "Wrong block number"); - break; - } - - lastpkt = 0; - - if (tftp_state.last_data != NULL) { - lastpkt = tftp_state.last_data->tot_len != (TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH); - } - - if (!lastpkt) { - tftp_state.blknum++; - send_data(); - } else { - close_handle(); - } - - break; - } - - default: - send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ILLEGAL_OPERATION, "Unknown operation"); - break; - } - - pbuf_free(p); -} - -static void tftp_tmr(void *arg) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - tftp_state.timer++; - - if (tftp_state.handle == NULL) { - return; - } - - sys_timeout(TFTP_TIMER_MSECS, tftp_tmr, NULL); - - if ((tftp_state.timer - tftp_state.last_pkt) > (TFTP_TIMEOUT_MSECS / TFTP_TIMER_MSECS)) { - if ((tftp_state.last_data != NULL) && (tftp_state.retries < TFTP_MAX_RETRIES)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tftp: timeout, retrying\n")); - resend_data(); - tftp_state.retries++; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tftp: timeout\n")); - close_handle(); - } - } -} - -/** @ingroup tftp - * Initialize TFTP server. - * @param ctx TFTP callback struct - */ -err_t tftp_init(const struct tftp_context *ctx) -{ - err_t ret; - - /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by udp_new() */ - struct udp_pcb *pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - ret = udp_bind(pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, TFTP_PORT); - - if (ret != ERR_OK) { - udp_remove(pcb); - return ret; - } - - tftp_state.handle = NULL; - tftp_state.port = 0; - tftp_state.ctx = ctx; - tftp_state.timer = 0; - tftp_state.last_data = NULL; - tftp_state.upcb = pcb; - - udp_recv(pcb, recv, NULL); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** @ingroup tftp - * Deinitialize ("turn off") TFTP server. - */ -void tftp_cleanup(void) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("Cleanup called on non-initialized TFTP", tftp_state.upcb != NULL); - udp_remove(tftp_state.upcb); - close_handle(); - memset(&tftp_state, 0, sizeof(tftp_state)); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +/** + * + * @file tftp_server.c + * + * @author Logan Gunthorpe + * Dirk Ziegelmeier + * + * @brief Trivial File Transfer Protocol (RFC 1350) + * + * Copyright (c) Deltatee Enterprises Ltd. 2013 + * All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification,are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO + * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Logan Gunthorpe + * Dirk Ziegelmeier + * + */ + +/** + * @defgroup tftp TFTP server + * @ingroup apps + * + * This is simple TFTP server for the lwIP raw API. + */ + +#include "lwip/apps/tftp_server.h" + +#if LWIP_UDP + +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include "lwip/debug.h" + +#define TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE 512 +#define TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH 4 + +#define TFTP_RRQ 1 +#define TFTP_WRQ 2 +#define TFTP_DATA 3 +#define TFTP_ACK 4 +#define TFTP_ERROR 5 + +enum tftp_error { + TFTP_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND = 1, + TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION = 2, + TFTP_ERROR_DISK_FULL = 3, + TFTP_ERROR_ILLEGAL_OPERATION = 4, + TFTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TRFR_ID = 5, + TFTP_ERROR_FILE_EXISTS = 6, + TFTP_ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER = 7 +}; + +#include + +struct tftp_state { + const struct tftp_context *ctx; + void *handle; + struct pbuf *last_data; + struct udp_pcb *upcb; + ip_addr_t addr; + u16_t port; + int timer; + int last_pkt; + u16_t blknum; + u8_t retries; + u8_t mode_write; +}; + +static struct tftp_state tftp_state; + +static void tftp_tmr(void *arg); + +static void close_handle(void) +{ + tftp_state.port = 0; + ip_addr_set_any(0, &tftp_state.addr); + + if (tftp_state.last_data != NULL) { + pbuf_free(tftp_state.last_data); + tftp_state.last_data = NULL; + } + + sys_untimeout(tftp_tmr, NULL); + + if (tftp_state.handle) { + tftp_state.ctx->close(tftp_state.handle); + tftp_state.handle = NULL; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tftp: closing\n")); + } +} + +static void send_error(const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port, enum tftp_error code, const char *str) +{ + int str_length = strlen(str); + struct pbuf *p; + u16_t *payload; + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, (u16_t)(TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH + str_length + 1), PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + return; + } + + payload = (u16_t *)p->payload; + payload[0] = PP_HTONS(TFTP_ERROR); + payload[1] = lwip_htons(code); + MEMCPY(&payload[2], str, str_length + 1); + + udp_sendto(tftp_state.upcb, p, addr, port); + pbuf_free(p); +} + +static void send_ack(u16_t blknum) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u16_t *payload; + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + return; + } + + payload = (u16_t *)p->payload; + + payload[0] = PP_HTONS(TFTP_ACK); + payload[1] = lwip_htons(blknum); + udp_sendto(tftp_state.upcb, p, &tftp_state.addr, tftp_state.port); + pbuf_free(p); +} + +static void resend_data(void) +{ + struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, tftp_state.last_data->len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (pbuf_copy(p, tftp_state.last_data) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + udp_sendto(tftp_state.upcb, p, &tftp_state.addr, tftp_state.port); + pbuf_free(p); +} + +static void send_data(void) +{ + u16_t *payload; + int ret; + + if (tftp_state.last_data != NULL) { + pbuf_free(tftp_state.last_data); + } + + tftp_state.last_data = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH + TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, PBUF_RAM); + + if (tftp_state.last_data == NULL) { + return; + } + + payload = (u16_t *)tftp_state.last_data->payload; + payload[0] = PP_HTONS(TFTP_DATA); + payload[1] = lwip_htons(tftp_state.blknum); + + ret = tftp_state.ctx->read(tftp_state.handle, &payload[2], TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE); + + if (ret < 0) { + send_error(&tftp_state.addr, tftp_state.port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Error occured while reading the file."); + close_handle(); + return; + } + + pbuf_realloc(tftp_state.last_data, (u16_t)(TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH + ret)); + resend_data(); +} + +static void recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *upcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + u16_t *sbuf = (u16_t *)p->payload; + int opcode; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(upcb); + + if (((tftp_state.port != 0) && (port != tftp_state.port)) || + (!ip_addr_isany_val(tftp_state.addr) && !ip_addr_cmp(&tftp_state.addr, addr))) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Only one connection at a time is supported"); + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + opcode = sbuf[0]; + + tftp_state.last_pkt = tftp_state.timer; + tftp_state.retries = 0; + + switch (opcode) { + case PP_HTONS(TFTP_RRQ): /* fall through */ + case PP_HTONS(TFTP_WRQ): { + const char tftp_null = 0; + char filename[TFTP_MAX_FILENAME_LEN + 1]; + char mode[TFTP_MAX_MODE_LEN + 1]; + u16_t filename_end_offset; + u16_t mode_end_offset; + + if (tftp_state.handle != NULL) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Only one connection at a time is supported"); + break; + } + + sys_timeout(TFTP_TIMER_MSECS, tftp_tmr, NULL); + + /* find \0 in pbuf -> end of filename string */ + filename_end_offset = pbuf_memfind(p, &tftp_null, sizeof(tftp_null), 2); + + if ((u16_t)(filename_end_offset - 1) > sizeof(filename)) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Filename too long/not NULL terminated"); + break; + } + + pbuf_copy_partial(p, filename, filename_end_offset - 1, 2); + + /* find \0 in pbuf -> end of mode string */ + mode_end_offset = pbuf_memfind(p, &tftp_null, sizeof(tftp_null), filename_end_offset + 1); + + if ((u16_t)(mode_end_offset - filename_end_offset) > sizeof(mode)) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Mode too long/not NULL terminated"); + break; + } + + pbuf_copy_partial(p, mode, mode_end_offset - filename_end_offset, filename_end_offset + 1); + + tftp_state.handle = tftp_state.ctx->open(filename, mode, opcode == PP_HTONS(TFTP_WRQ)); + tftp_state.blknum = 1; + + if (!tftp_state.handle) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "Unable to open requested file."); + break; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tftp: %s request from ", (opcode == PP_HTONS(TFTP_WRQ)) ? "write" : "read")); + ip_addr_debug_print(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, addr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, (" for '%s' mode '%s'\n", filename, mode)); + + ip_addr_copy(tftp_state.addr, *addr); + tftp_state.port = port; + + if (opcode == PP_HTONS(TFTP_WRQ)) { + tftp_state.mode_write = 1; + send_ack(0); + } else { + tftp_state.mode_write = 0; + send_data(); + } + + break; + } + + case PP_HTONS(TFTP_DATA): { + int ret; + u16_t blknum; + + if (tftp_state.handle == NULL) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "No connection"); + break; + } + + if (tftp_state.mode_write != 1) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Not a write connection"); + break; + } + + blknum = lwip_ntohs(sbuf[1]); + + if (blknum == tftp_state.blknum) { + pbuf_remove_header(p, TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH); + + ret = tftp_state.ctx->write(tftp_state.handle, p); + + if (ret < 0) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "error writing file"); + close_handle(); + } else { + send_ack(blknum); + } + + if (p->tot_len < TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE) { + close_handle(); + } else { + tftp_state.blknum++; + } + } else if ((u16_t)(blknum + 1) == tftp_state.blknum) { + /* retransmit of previous block, ack again (casting to u16_t to care for overflow) */ + send_ack(blknum); + } else { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TRFR_ID, "Wrong block number"); + } + + break; + } + + case PP_HTONS(TFTP_ACK): { + u16_t blknum; + int lastpkt; + + if (tftp_state.handle == NULL) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "No connection"); + break; + } + + if (tftp_state.mode_write != 0) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ACCESS_VIOLATION, "Not a read connection"); + break; + } + + blknum = lwip_ntohs(sbuf[1]); + + if (blknum != tftp_state.blknum) { + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TRFR_ID, "Wrong block number"); + break; + } + + lastpkt = 0; + + if (tftp_state.last_data != NULL) { + lastpkt = tftp_state.last_data->tot_len != (TFTP_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + TFTP_HEADER_LENGTH); + } + + if (!lastpkt) { + tftp_state.blknum++; + send_data(); + } else { + close_handle(); + } + + break; + } + + default: + send_error(addr, port, TFTP_ERROR_ILLEGAL_OPERATION, "Unknown operation"); + break; + } + + pbuf_free(p); +} + +static void tftp_tmr(void *arg) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + tftp_state.timer++; + + if (tftp_state.handle == NULL) { + return; + } + + sys_timeout(TFTP_TIMER_MSECS, tftp_tmr, NULL); + + if ((tftp_state.timer - tftp_state.last_pkt) > (TFTP_TIMEOUT_MSECS / TFTP_TIMER_MSECS)) { + if ((tftp_state.last_data != NULL) && (tftp_state.retries < TFTP_MAX_RETRIES)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tftp: timeout, retrying\n")); + resend_data(); + tftp_state.retries++; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TFTP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tftp: timeout\n")); + close_handle(); + } + } +} + +/** @ingroup tftp + * Initialize TFTP server. + * @param ctx TFTP callback struct + */ +err_t tftp_init(const struct tftp_context *ctx) +{ + err_t ret; + + /* LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); is checked by udp_new() */ + struct udp_pcb *pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + ret = udp_bind(pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, TFTP_PORT); + + if (ret != ERR_OK) { + udp_remove(pcb); + return ret; + } + + tftp_state.handle = NULL; + tftp_state.port = 0; + tftp_state.ctx = ctx; + tftp_state.timer = 0; + tftp_state.last_data = NULL; + tftp_state.upcb = pcb; + + udp_recv(pcb, recv, NULL); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** @ingroup tftp + * Deinitialize ("turn off") TFTP server. + */ +void tftp_cleanup(void) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("Cleanup called on non-initialized TFTP", tftp_state.upcb != NULL); + udp_remove(tftp_state.upcb); + close_handle(); + memset(&tftp_state, 0, sizeof(tftp_state)); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/altcp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/altcp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/altcp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/altcp.c index 4d3b7797..fb7ab5b4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/altcp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/altcp.c @@ -1,673 +1,673 @@ -/** - * @file - * @defgroup altcp Application layered TCP Functions - * @ingroup altcp_api - * - * This file contains the common functions for altcp to work. - * For more details see @ref altcp_api. - */ - -/** - * @defgroup altcp_api Application layered TCP Introduction - * @ingroup callbackstyle_api - * - * Overview - * -------- - * altcp (application layered TCP connection API; to be used from TCPIP thread) - * is an abstraction layer that prevents applications linking hard against the - * @ref tcp.h functions while providing the same functionality. It is used to - * e.g. add SSL/TLS (see LWIP_ALTCP_TLS) or proxy-connect support to an application - * written for the tcp callback API without that application knowing the - * protocol details. - * - * * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing - * direct linking (much like virtual functions). - * * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols - * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). - * * This is achieved by simply including "lwip/altcp.h" instead of "lwip/tcp.h", - * replacing "struct tcp_pcb" with "struct altcp_pcb" and prefixing all functions - * with "altcp_" instead of "tcp_". - * - * With altcp support disabled (LWIP_ALTCP==0), applications written against the - * altcp API can still be compiled but are directly linked against the tcp.h - * callback API and then cannot use layered protocols. To minimize code changes - * in this case, the use of altcp_allocators is strongly suggested. - * - * Usage - * ----- - * To make use of this API from an existing tcp raw API application: - * * Include "lwip/altcp.h" instead of "lwip/tcp.h" - * * Replace "struct tcp_pcb" with "struct altcp_pcb" - * * Prefix all called tcp API functions with "altcp_" instead of "tcp_" to link - * against the altcp functions - * * @ref altcp_new (and @ref altcp_new_ip_type/@ref altcp_new_ip6) take - * an @ref altcp_allocator_t as an argument, whereas the original tcp API - * functions take no arguments. - * * An @ref altcp_allocator_t allocator is an object that holds a pointer to an - * allocator object and a corresponding state (e.g. for TLS, the corresponding - * state may hold certificates or keys). This way, the application does not - * even need to know if it uses TLS or pure TCP, this is handled at runtime - * by passing a specific allocator. - * * An application can alternatively bind hard to the altcp_tls API by calling - * @ref altcp_tls_new or @ref altcp_tls_wrap. - * * The TLS layer is not directly implemented by lwIP, but a port to mbedTLS is - * provided. - * * Another altcp layer is proxy-connect to use TLS behind a HTTP proxy (see - * @ref altcp_proxyconnect.h) - * - * altcp_allocator_t - * ----------------- - * An altcp allocator is created by the application by combining an allocator - * callback function and a corresponding state, e.g.:\code{.c} - * static const unsigned char cert[] = {0x2D, ... (see mbedTLS doc for how to create this)}; - * struct altcp_tls_config * conf = altcp_tls_create_config_client(cert, sizeof(cert)); - * altcp_allocator_t tls_allocator = { - * altcp_tls_alloc, conf - * }; - * \endcode - * - * - * struct altcp_tls_config - * ----------------------- - * The struct altcp_tls_config holds state that is needed to create new TLS client - * or server connections (e.g. certificates and private keys). - * - * It is not defined by lwIP itself but by the TLS port (e.g. altcp_tls to mbedTLS - * adaption). However, the parameters used to create it are defined in @ref - * altcp_tls.h (see @ref altcp_tls_create_config_server_privkey_cert for servers - * and @ref altcp_tls_create_config_client/@ref altcp_tls_create_config_client_2wayauth - * for clients). - * - * For mbedTLS, ensure that certificates can be parsed by 'mbedtls_x509_crt_parse()' and - * private keys can be parsed by 'mbedtls_pk_parse_key()'. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" - -#include - -extern const struct altcp_functions altcp_tcp_functions; - -/** - * For altcp layer implementations only: allocate a new struct altcp_pcb from the pool - * and zero the memory - */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_alloc(void) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *ret = (struct altcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_ALTCP_PCB); - - if (ret != NULL) { - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(struct altcp_pcb)); - } - - return ret; -} - -/** - * For altcp layer implementations only: return a struct altcp_pcb to the pool - */ -void altcp_free(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn) { - if (conn->fns && conn->fns->dealloc) { - conn->fns->dealloc(conn); - } - - memp_free(MEMP_ALTCP_PCB, conn); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * altcp_new_ip6: @ref altcp_new for IPv6 - */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_new_ip6(altcp_allocator_t *allocator) -{ - return altcp_new_ip_type(allocator, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * altcp_new: @ref altcp_new for IPv4 - */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_new(altcp_allocator_t *allocator) -{ - return altcp_new_ip_type(allocator, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * altcp_new_ip_type: called by applications to allocate a new pcb with the help of an - * allocator function. - * - * @param allocator allocator function and argument - * @param ip_type IP version of the pcb (@ref lwip_ip_addr_type) - * @return a new altcp_pcb or NULL on error - */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_new_ip_type(altcp_allocator_t *allocator, u8_t ip_type) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn; - - if (allocator == NULL) { - /* no allocator given, create a simple TCP connection */ - return altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); - } - - if (allocator->alloc == NULL) { - /* illegal allocator */ - return NULL; - } - - conn = allocator->alloc(allocator->arg, ip_type); - - if (conn == NULL) { - /* allocation failed */ - return NULL; - } - - return conn; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_arg() - */ -void altcp_arg(struct altcp_pcb *conn, void *arg) -{ - if (conn) { - conn->arg = arg; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_accept() - */ -void altcp_accept(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_accept_fn accept) -{ - if (conn != NULL) { - conn->accept = accept; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_recv() - */ -void altcp_recv(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_recv_fn recv) -{ - if (conn) { - conn->recv = recv; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_sent() - */ -void altcp_sent(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_sent_fn sent) -{ - if (conn) { - conn->sent = sent; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_poll() - */ -void altcp_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_poll_fn poll, u8_t interval) -{ - if (conn) { - conn->poll = poll; - conn->pollinterval = interval; - - if (conn->fns && conn->fns->set_poll) { - conn->fns->set_poll(conn, interval); - } - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_err() - */ -void altcp_err(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_err_fn err) -{ - if (conn) { - conn->err = err; - } -} - -/* Generic functions calling the "virtual" ones */ - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_recved() - */ -void altcp_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->recved) { - conn->fns->recved(conn, len); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_bind() - */ -err_t altcp_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->bind) { - return conn->fns->bind(conn, ipaddr, port); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_connect() - */ -err_t altcp_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->connect) { - return conn->fns->connect(conn, ipaddr, port, connected); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err() - */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->listen) { - return conn->fns->listen(conn, backlog, err); - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_abort() - */ -void altcp_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->abort) { - conn->fns->abort(conn); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_close() - */ -err_t altcp_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->close) { - return conn->fns->close(conn); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_shutdown() - */ -err_t altcp_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->shutdown) { - return conn->fns->shutdown(conn, shut_rx, shut_tx); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_write() - */ -err_t altcp_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->write) { - return conn->fns->write(conn, dataptr, len, apiflags); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_output() - */ -err_t altcp_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->output) { - return conn->fns->output(conn); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_mss() - */ -u16_t altcp_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->mss) { - return conn->fns->mss(conn); - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_sndbuf() - */ -u16_t altcp_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->sndbuf) { - return conn->fns->sndbuf(conn); - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_sndqueuelen() - */ -u16_t altcp_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->sndqueuelen) { - return conn->fns->sndqueuelen(conn); - } - - return 0; -} - -void altcp_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->nagle_disable) { - conn->fns->nagle_disable(conn); - } -} - -void altcp_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->nagle_enable) { - conn->fns->nagle_enable(conn); - } -} - -int altcp_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->nagle_disabled) { - return conn->fns->nagle_disabled(conn); - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * @ingroup altcp - * @see tcp_setprio() - */ -void altcp_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->setprio) { - conn->fns->setprio(conn, prio); - } -} - -err_t altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->addrinfo) { - return conn->fns->addrinfo(conn, local, addr, port); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -ip_addr_t *altcp_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->getip) { - return conn->fns->getip(conn, local); - } - - return NULL; -} - -u16_t altcp_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->getport) { - return conn->fns->getport(conn, local); - } - - return 0; -} - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -enum tcp_state altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->dbg_get_tcp_state) { - return conn->fns->dbg_get_tcp_state(conn); - } - - return CLOSED; -} -#endif - -/* Default implementations for the "virtual" functions */ - -void altcp_default_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - altcp_poll(conn->inner_conn, conn->poll, interval); - } -} - -void altcp_default_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - altcp_recved(conn->inner_conn, len); - } -} - -err_t altcp_default_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_bind(conn->inner_conn, ipaddr, port); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -err_t altcp_default_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx) -{ - if (conn) { - if (shut_rx && shut_tx && conn->fns && conn->fns->close) { - /* default shutdown for both sides is close */ - return conn->fns->close(conn); - } - - if (conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_shutdown(conn->inner_conn, shut_rx, shut_tx); - } - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -err_t altcp_default_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_write(conn->inner_conn, dataptr, len, apiflags); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -err_t altcp_default_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_output(conn->inner_conn); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -u16_t altcp_default_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_mss(conn->inner_conn); - } - - return 0; -} - -u16_t altcp_default_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_sndbuf(conn->inner_conn); - } - - return 0; -} - -u16_t altcp_default_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_sndqueuelen(conn->inner_conn); - } - - return 0; -} - -void altcp_default_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - altcp_nagle_disable(conn->inner_conn); - } -} - -void altcp_default_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - altcp_nagle_enable(conn->inner_conn); - } -} - -int altcp_default_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_nagle_disabled(conn->inner_conn); - } - - return 0; -} - -void altcp_default_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - altcp_setprio(conn->inner_conn, prio); - } -} - -void altcp_default_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); - /* nothing to do */ -} - -err_t altcp_default_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(conn->inner_conn, local, addr, port); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -ip_addr_t *altcp_default_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_get_ip(conn->inner_conn, local); - } - - return NULL; -} - -u16_t altcp_default_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_get_port(conn->inner_conn, local); - } - - return 0; -} - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -enum tcp_state altcp_default_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { - return altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(conn->inner_conn); - } - - return CLOSED; -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +/** + * @file + * @defgroup altcp Application layered TCP Functions + * @ingroup altcp_api + * + * This file contains the common functions for altcp to work. + * For more details see @ref altcp_api. + */ + +/** + * @defgroup altcp_api Application layered TCP Introduction + * @ingroup callbackstyle_api + * + * Overview + * -------- + * altcp (application layered TCP connection API; to be used from TCPIP thread) + * is an abstraction layer that prevents applications linking hard against the + * @ref tcp.h functions while providing the same functionality. It is used to + * e.g. add SSL/TLS (see LWIP_ALTCP_TLS) or proxy-connect support to an application + * written for the tcp callback API without that application knowing the + * protocol details. + * + * * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing + * direct linking (much like virtual functions). + * * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols + * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). + * * This is achieved by simply including "lwip/altcp.h" instead of "lwip/tcp.h", + * replacing "struct tcp_pcb" with "struct altcp_pcb" and prefixing all functions + * with "altcp_" instead of "tcp_". + * + * With altcp support disabled (LWIP_ALTCP==0), applications written against the + * altcp API can still be compiled but are directly linked against the tcp.h + * callback API and then cannot use layered protocols. To minimize code changes + * in this case, the use of altcp_allocators is strongly suggested. + * + * Usage + * ----- + * To make use of this API from an existing tcp raw API application: + * * Include "lwip/altcp.h" instead of "lwip/tcp.h" + * * Replace "struct tcp_pcb" with "struct altcp_pcb" + * * Prefix all called tcp API functions with "altcp_" instead of "tcp_" to link + * against the altcp functions + * * @ref altcp_new (and @ref altcp_new_ip_type/@ref altcp_new_ip6) take + * an @ref altcp_allocator_t as an argument, whereas the original tcp API + * functions take no arguments. + * * An @ref altcp_allocator_t allocator is an object that holds a pointer to an + * allocator object and a corresponding state (e.g. for TLS, the corresponding + * state may hold certificates or keys). This way, the application does not + * even need to know if it uses TLS or pure TCP, this is handled at runtime + * by passing a specific allocator. + * * An application can alternatively bind hard to the altcp_tls API by calling + * @ref altcp_tls_new or @ref altcp_tls_wrap. + * * The TLS layer is not directly implemented by lwIP, but a port to mbedTLS is + * provided. + * * Another altcp layer is proxy-connect to use TLS behind a HTTP proxy (see + * @ref altcp_proxyconnect.h) + * + * altcp_allocator_t + * ----------------- + * An altcp allocator is created by the application by combining an allocator + * callback function and a corresponding state, e.g.:\code{.c} + * static const unsigned char cert[] = {0x2D, ... (see mbedTLS doc for how to create this)}; + * struct altcp_tls_config * conf = altcp_tls_create_config_client(cert, sizeof(cert)); + * altcp_allocator_t tls_allocator = { + * altcp_tls_alloc, conf + * }; + * \endcode + * + * + * struct altcp_tls_config + * ----------------------- + * The struct altcp_tls_config holds state that is needed to create new TLS client + * or server connections (e.g. certificates and private keys). + * + * It is not defined by lwIP itself but by the TLS port (e.g. altcp_tls to mbedTLS + * adaption). However, the parameters used to create it are defined in @ref + * altcp_tls.h (see @ref altcp_tls_create_config_server_privkey_cert for servers + * and @ref altcp_tls_create_config_client/@ref altcp_tls_create_config_client_2wayauth + * for clients). + * + * For mbedTLS, ensure that certificates can be parsed by 'mbedtls_x509_crt_parse()' and + * private keys can be parsed by 'mbedtls_pk_parse_key()'. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" + +#include + +extern const struct altcp_functions altcp_tcp_functions; + +/** + * For altcp layer implementations only: allocate a new struct altcp_pcb from the pool + * and zero the memory + */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_alloc(void) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *ret = (struct altcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_ALTCP_PCB); + + if (ret != NULL) { + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(struct altcp_pcb)); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * For altcp layer implementations only: return a struct altcp_pcb to the pool + */ +void altcp_free(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn) { + if (conn->fns && conn->fns->dealloc) { + conn->fns->dealloc(conn); + } + + memp_free(MEMP_ALTCP_PCB, conn); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * altcp_new_ip6: @ref altcp_new for IPv6 + */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_new_ip6(altcp_allocator_t *allocator) +{ + return altcp_new_ip_type(allocator, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * altcp_new: @ref altcp_new for IPv4 + */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_new(altcp_allocator_t *allocator) +{ + return altcp_new_ip_type(allocator, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * altcp_new_ip_type: called by applications to allocate a new pcb with the help of an + * allocator function. + * + * @param allocator allocator function and argument + * @param ip_type IP version of the pcb (@ref lwip_ip_addr_type) + * @return a new altcp_pcb or NULL on error + */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_new_ip_type(altcp_allocator_t *allocator, u8_t ip_type) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn; + + if (allocator == NULL) { + /* no allocator given, create a simple TCP connection */ + return altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); + } + + if (allocator->alloc == NULL) { + /* illegal allocator */ + return NULL; + } + + conn = allocator->alloc(allocator->arg, ip_type); + + if (conn == NULL) { + /* allocation failed */ + return NULL; + } + + return conn; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_arg() + */ +void altcp_arg(struct altcp_pcb *conn, void *arg) +{ + if (conn) { + conn->arg = arg; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_accept() + */ +void altcp_accept(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_accept_fn accept) +{ + if (conn != NULL) { + conn->accept = accept; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_recv() + */ +void altcp_recv(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_recv_fn recv) +{ + if (conn) { + conn->recv = recv; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_sent() + */ +void altcp_sent(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_sent_fn sent) +{ + if (conn) { + conn->sent = sent; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_poll() + */ +void altcp_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_poll_fn poll, u8_t interval) +{ + if (conn) { + conn->poll = poll; + conn->pollinterval = interval; + + if (conn->fns && conn->fns->set_poll) { + conn->fns->set_poll(conn, interval); + } + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_err() + */ +void altcp_err(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_err_fn err) +{ + if (conn) { + conn->err = err; + } +} + +/* Generic functions calling the "virtual" ones */ + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_recved() + */ +void altcp_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->recved) { + conn->fns->recved(conn, len); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_bind() + */ +err_t altcp_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->bind) { + return conn->fns->bind(conn, ipaddr, port); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_connect() + */ +err_t altcp_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->connect) { + return conn->fns->connect(conn, ipaddr, port, connected); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err() + */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->listen) { + return conn->fns->listen(conn, backlog, err); + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_abort() + */ +void altcp_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->abort) { + conn->fns->abort(conn); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_close() + */ +err_t altcp_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->close) { + return conn->fns->close(conn); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_shutdown() + */ +err_t altcp_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->shutdown) { + return conn->fns->shutdown(conn, shut_rx, shut_tx); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_write() + */ +err_t altcp_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->write) { + return conn->fns->write(conn, dataptr, len, apiflags); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_output() + */ +err_t altcp_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->output) { + return conn->fns->output(conn); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_mss() + */ +u16_t altcp_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->mss) { + return conn->fns->mss(conn); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_sndbuf() + */ +u16_t altcp_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->sndbuf) { + return conn->fns->sndbuf(conn); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_sndqueuelen() + */ +u16_t altcp_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->sndqueuelen) { + return conn->fns->sndqueuelen(conn); + } + + return 0; +} + +void altcp_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->nagle_disable) { + conn->fns->nagle_disable(conn); + } +} + +void altcp_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->nagle_enable) { + conn->fns->nagle_enable(conn); + } +} + +int altcp_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->nagle_disabled) { + return conn->fns->nagle_disabled(conn); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * @ingroup altcp + * @see tcp_setprio() + */ +void altcp_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->setprio) { + conn->fns->setprio(conn, prio); + } +} + +err_t altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->addrinfo) { + return conn->fns->addrinfo(conn, local, addr, port); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +ip_addr_t *altcp_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->getip) { + return conn->fns->getip(conn, local); + } + + return NULL; +} + +u16_t altcp_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->getport) { + return conn->fns->getport(conn, local); + } + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +enum tcp_state altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->fns && conn->fns->dbg_get_tcp_state) { + return conn->fns->dbg_get_tcp_state(conn); + } + + return CLOSED; +} +#endif + +/* Default implementations for the "virtual" functions */ + +void altcp_default_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + altcp_poll(conn->inner_conn, conn->poll, interval); + } +} + +void altcp_default_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + altcp_recved(conn->inner_conn, len); + } +} + +err_t altcp_default_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_bind(conn->inner_conn, ipaddr, port); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +err_t altcp_default_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx) +{ + if (conn) { + if (shut_rx && shut_tx && conn->fns && conn->fns->close) { + /* default shutdown for both sides is close */ + return conn->fns->close(conn); + } + + if (conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_shutdown(conn->inner_conn, shut_rx, shut_tx); + } + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +err_t altcp_default_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_write(conn->inner_conn, dataptr, len, apiflags); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +err_t altcp_default_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_output(conn->inner_conn); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +u16_t altcp_default_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_mss(conn->inner_conn); + } + + return 0; +} + +u16_t altcp_default_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_sndbuf(conn->inner_conn); + } + + return 0; +} + +u16_t altcp_default_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_sndqueuelen(conn->inner_conn); + } + + return 0; +} + +void altcp_default_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + altcp_nagle_disable(conn->inner_conn); + } +} + +void altcp_default_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + altcp_nagle_enable(conn->inner_conn); + } +} + +int altcp_default_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_nagle_disabled(conn->inner_conn); + } + + return 0; +} + +void altcp_default_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + altcp_setprio(conn->inner_conn, prio); + } +} + +void altcp_default_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); + /* nothing to do */ +} + +err_t altcp_default_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(conn->inner_conn, local, addr, port); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +ip_addr_t *altcp_default_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_get_ip(conn->inner_conn, local); + } + + return NULL; +} + +u16_t altcp_default_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_get_port(conn->inner_conn, local); + } + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +enum tcp_state altcp_default_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->inner_conn) { + return altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(conn->inner_conn); + } + + return CLOSED; +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/altcp_alloc.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/altcp_alloc.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/altcp_alloc.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/altcp_alloc.c index d56818a0..aca961fe 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/altcp_alloc.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/altcp_alloc.c @@ -1,91 +1,91 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n - * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing - * direct linking (much like virtual functions). - * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols - * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). - * - * This file contains allocation implementation that combine several layers. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" -#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS - -/** This standard allocator function creates an altcp pcb for - * TLS over TCP */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_tls_new(struct altcp_tls_config *config, u8_t ip_type) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, *ret; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ip_type); - - inner_conn = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); - - if (inner_conn == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - ret = altcp_tls_wrap(config, inner_conn); - - if (ret == NULL) { - altcp_close(inner_conn); - } - - return ret; -} - -/** This standard allocator function creates an altcp pcb for - * TLS over TCP */ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_tls_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type) -{ - return altcp_tls_new((struct altcp_tls_config *)arg, ip_type); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n + * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing + * direct linking (much like virtual functions). + * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols + * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). + * + * This file contains allocation implementation that combine several layers. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tls.h" +#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS + +/** This standard allocator function creates an altcp pcb for + * TLS over TCP */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_tls_new(struct altcp_tls_config *config, u8_t ip_type) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn, *ret; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ip_type); + + inner_conn = altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); + + if (inner_conn == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + ret = altcp_tls_wrap(config, inner_conn); + + if (ret == NULL) { + altcp_close(inner_conn); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** This standard allocator function creates an altcp pcb for + * TLS over TCP */ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_tls_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type) +{ + return altcp_tls_new((struct altcp_tls_config *)arg, ip_type); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/altcp_tcp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/altcp_tcp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/altcp_tcp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/altcp_tcp.c index bb34d4fe..b20c7512 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/altcp_tcp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/altcp_tcp.c @@ -1,575 +1,575 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n - * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing - * direct linking (much like virtual functions). - * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols - * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). - * - * This file contains the base implementation calling into tcp. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" - -#include - -#define ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn) \ - do { \ - LWIP_ASSERT("conn->inner_conn == NULL", (conn)->inner_conn == NULL); \ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ \ - } while (0) -#define ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb) \ - do { \ - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", (conn)->state == tpcb); \ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ \ - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); \ - } while (0) - -/* Variable prototype, the actual declaration is at the end of this file - since it contains pointers to static functions declared here */ -extern const struct altcp_functions altcp_tcp_functions; - -static void altcp_tcp_setup(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb); - -/* callback functions for TCP */ -static err_t altcp_tcp_accept(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *new_tpcb, err_t err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *listen_conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (listen_conn && listen_conn->accept) { - /* create a new altcp_conn to pass to the next 'accept' callback */ - struct altcp_pcb *new_conn = altcp_alloc(); - - if (new_conn == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - altcp_tcp_setup(new_conn, new_tpcb); - return listen_conn->accept(listen_conn->arg, new_conn, err); - } - - return ERR_ARG; -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_connected(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, err_t err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (conn) { - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb); - - if (conn->connected) { - return conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, err); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (conn) { - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb); - - if (conn->recv) { - return conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, p, err); - } - } - - if (p != NULL) { - /* prevent memory leaks */ - pbuf_free(p); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_sent(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, u16_t len) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (conn) { - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb); - - if (conn->sent) { - return conn->sent(conn->arg, conn, len); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (conn) { - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb); - - if (conn->poll) { - return conn->poll(conn->arg, conn); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void altcp_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; - - if (conn) { - conn->state = NULL; /* already freed */ - - if (conn->err) { - conn->err(conn->arg, err); - } - - altcp_free(conn); - } -} - -/* setup functions */ - -static void altcp_tcp_remove_callbacks(struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) -{ - tcp_arg(tpcb, NULL); - tcp_recv(tpcb, NULL); - tcp_sent(tpcb, NULL); - tcp_err(tpcb, NULL); - tcp_poll(tpcb, NULL, tpcb->pollinterval); -} - -static void altcp_tcp_setup_callbacks(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) -{ - tcp_arg(tpcb, conn); - tcp_recv(tpcb, altcp_tcp_recv); - tcp_sent(tpcb, altcp_tcp_sent); - tcp_err(tpcb, altcp_tcp_err); - /* tcp_poll is set when interval is set by application */ - /* listen is set totally different :-) */ -} - -static void altcp_tcp_setup(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) -{ - altcp_tcp_setup_callbacks(conn, tpcb); - conn->state = tpcb; - conn->fns = &altcp_tcp_functions; -} - -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(u8_t ip_type) -{ - /* Allocate the tcp pcb first to invoke the priority handling code - if we're out of pcbs */ - struct tcp_pcb *tpcb = tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); - - if (tpcb != NULL) { - struct altcp_pcb *ret = altcp_alloc(); - - if (ret != NULL) { - altcp_tcp_setup(ret, tpcb); - return ret; - } else { - /* altcp_pcb allocation failed -> free the tcp_pcb too */ - tcp_close(tpcb); - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** altcp_tcp allocator function fitting to @ref altcp_allocator_t / @ref altcp_new. -* -* arg pointer is not used for TCP. -*/ -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_tcp_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - return altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); -} - -struct altcp_pcb * -altcp_tcp_wrap(struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) -{ - if (tpcb != NULL) { - struct altcp_pcb *ret = altcp_alloc(); - - if (ret != NULL) { - altcp_tcp_setup(ret, tpcb); - return ret; - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -/* "virtual" functions calling into tcp */ -static void altcp_tcp_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval) -{ - if (conn != NULL) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - tcp_poll(pcb, altcp_tcp_poll, interval); - } -} - -static void altcp_tcp_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) -{ - if (conn != NULL) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - tcp_recved(pcb, len); - } -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - return tcp_bind(pcb, ipaddr, port); -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - conn->connected = connected; - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - return tcp_connect(pcb, ipaddr, port, altcp_tcp_connected); -} - -static struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tcp_listen(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct tcp_pcb *lpcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - lpcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(pcb, backlog, err); - - if (lpcb != NULL) { - conn->state = lpcb; - tcp_accept(lpcb, altcp_tcp_accept); - return conn; - } - - return NULL; -} - -static void altcp_tcp_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn != NULL) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - - if (pcb) { - tcp_abort(pcb); - } - } -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - - if (pcb) { - err_t err; - tcp_poll_fn oldpoll = pcb->poll; - altcp_tcp_remove_callbacks(pcb); - err = tcp_close(pcb); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* not closed, set up all callbacks again */ - altcp_tcp_setup_callbacks(conn, pcb); - /* poll callback is not included in the above */ - tcp_poll(pcb, oldpoll, pcb->pollinterval); - return err; - } - - conn->state = NULL; /* unsafe to reference pcb after tcp_close(). */ - } - - altcp_free(conn); - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - return tcp_shutdown(pcb, shut_rx, shut_tx); -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - return tcp_write(pcb, dataptr, len, apiflags); -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - return tcp_output(pcb); -} - -static u16_t altcp_tcp_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - return tcp_mss(pcb); -} - -static u16_t altcp_tcp_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - return tcp_sndbuf(pcb); -} - -static u16_t altcp_tcp_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - if (conn == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - return tcp_sndqueuelen(pcb); -} - -static void altcp_tcp_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->state) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - tcp_nagle_disable(pcb); - } -} - -static void altcp_tcp_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->state) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - tcp_nagle_enable(pcb); - } -} - -static int altcp_tcp_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn && conn->state) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - return tcp_nagle_disabled(pcb); - } - - return 0; -} - -static void altcp_tcp_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio) -{ - if (conn != NULL) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - tcp_setprio(pcb, prio); - } -} - -static void altcp_tcp_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - /* no private state to clean up */ -} - -static err_t altcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port) -{ - if (conn) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - return tcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(pcb, local, addr, port); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -static ip_addr_t *altcp_tcp_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) -{ - if (conn) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - - if (pcb) { - if (local) { - return &pcb->local_ip; - } else { - return &pcb->remote_ip; - } - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -static u16_t altcp_tcp_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) -{ - if (conn) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - - if (pcb) { - if (local) { - return pcb->local_port; - } else { - return pcb->remote_port; - } - } - } - - return 0; -} - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -static enum tcp_state altcp_tcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn) -{ - if (conn) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; - ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); - - if (pcb) { - return pcb->state; - } - } - - return CLOSED; -} -#endif -const struct altcp_functions altcp_tcp_functions = { - altcp_tcp_set_poll, - altcp_tcp_recved, - altcp_tcp_bind, - altcp_tcp_connect, - altcp_tcp_listen, - altcp_tcp_abort, - altcp_tcp_close, - altcp_tcp_shutdown, - altcp_tcp_write, - altcp_tcp_output, - altcp_tcp_mss, - altcp_tcp_sndbuf, - altcp_tcp_sndqueuelen, - altcp_tcp_nagle_disable, - altcp_tcp_nagle_enable, - altcp_tcp_nagle_disabled, - altcp_tcp_setprio, - altcp_tcp_dealloc, - altcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo, - altcp_tcp_get_ip, - altcp_tcp_get_port -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - , - altcp_tcp_dbg_get_tcp_state -#endif -}; - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n + * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing + * direct linking (much like virtual functions). + * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols + * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). + * + * This file contains the base implementation calling into tcp. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/altcp_tcp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" + +#include + +#define ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn) \ + do { \ + LWIP_ASSERT("conn->inner_conn == NULL", (conn)->inner_conn == NULL); \ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ \ + } while (0) +#define ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb) \ + do { \ + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb mismatch", (conn)->state == tpcb); \ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(tpcb); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ \ + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); \ + } while (0) + +/* Variable prototype, the actual declaration is at the end of this file + since it contains pointers to static functions declared here */ +extern const struct altcp_functions altcp_tcp_functions; + +static void altcp_tcp_setup(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb); + +/* callback functions for TCP */ +static err_t altcp_tcp_accept(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *new_tpcb, err_t err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *listen_conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (listen_conn && listen_conn->accept) { + /* create a new altcp_conn to pass to the next 'accept' callback */ + struct altcp_pcb *new_conn = altcp_alloc(); + + if (new_conn == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + altcp_tcp_setup(new_conn, new_tpcb); + return listen_conn->accept(listen_conn->arg, new_conn, err); + } + + return ERR_ARG; +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_connected(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, err_t err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (conn) { + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb); + + if (conn->connected) { + return conn->connected(conn->arg, conn, err); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_recv(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (conn) { + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb); + + if (conn->recv) { + return conn->recv(conn->arg, conn, p, err); + } + } + + if (p != NULL) { + /* prevent memory leaks */ + pbuf_free(p); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_sent(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, u16_t len) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (conn) { + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb); + + if (conn->sent) { + return conn->sent(conn->arg, conn, len); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_poll(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (conn) { + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN_PCB(conn, tpcb); + + if (conn->poll) { + return conn->poll(conn->arg, conn); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void altcp_tcp_err(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + struct altcp_pcb *conn = (struct altcp_pcb *)arg; + + if (conn) { + conn->state = NULL; /* already freed */ + + if (conn->err) { + conn->err(conn->arg, err); + } + + altcp_free(conn); + } +} + +/* setup functions */ + +static void altcp_tcp_remove_callbacks(struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) +{ + tcp_arg(tpcb, NULL); + tcp_recv(tpcb, NULL); + tcp_sent(tpcb, NULL); + tcp_err(tpcb, NULL); + tcp_poll(tpcb, NULL, tpcb->pollinterval); +} + +static void altcp_tcp_setup_callbacks(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) +{ + tcp_arg(tpcb, conn); + tcp_recv(tpcb, altcp_tcp_recv); + tcp_sent(tpcb, altcp_tcp_sent); + tcp_err(tpcb, altcp_tcp_err); + /* tcp_poll is set when interval is set by application */ + /* listen is set totally different :-) */ +} + +static void altcp_tcp_setup(struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) +{ + altcp_tcp_setup_callbacks(conn, tpcb); + conn->state = tpcb; + conn->fns = &altcp_tcp_functions; +} + +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(u8_t ip_type) +{ + /* Allocate the tcp pcb first to invoke the priority handling code + if we're out of pcbs */ + struct tcp_pcb *tpcb = tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); + + if (tpcb != NULL) { + struct altcp_pcb *ret = altcp_alloc(); + + if (ret != NULL) { + altcp_tcp_setup(ret, tpcb); + return ret; + } else { + /* altcp_pcb allocation failed -> free the tcp_pcb too */ + tcp_close(tpcb); + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** altcp_tcp allocator function fitting to @ref altcp_allocator_t / @ref altcp_new. +* +* arg pointer is not used for TCP. +*/ +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_tcp_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + return altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type); +} + +struct altcp_pcb * +altcp_tcp_wrap(struct tcp_pcb *tpcb) +{ + if (tpcb != NULL) { + struct altcp_pcb *ret = altcp_alloc(); + + if (ret != NULL) { + altcp_tcp_setup(ret, tpcb); + return ret; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* "virtual" functions calling into tcp */ +static void altcp_tcp_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval) +{ + if (conn != NULL) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + tcp_poll(pcb, altcp_tcp_poll, interval); + } +} + +static void altcp_tcp_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len) +{ + if (conn != NULL) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + tcp_recved(pcb, len); + } +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + return tcp_bind(pcb, ipaddr, port); +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + conn->connected = connected; + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + return tcp_connect(pcb, ipaddr, port, altcp_tcp_connected); +} + +static struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tcp_listen(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct tcp_pcb *lpcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + lpcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(pcb, backlog, err); + + if (lpcb != NULL) { + conn->state = lpcb; + tcp_accept(lpcb, altcp_tcp_accept); + return conn; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static void altcp_tcp_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn != NULL) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + + if (pcb) { + tcp_abort(pcb); + } + } +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + + if (pcb) { + err_t err; + tcp_poll_fn oldpoll = pcb->poll; + altcp_tcp_remove_callbacks(pcb); + err = tcp_close(pcb); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* not closed, set up all callbacks again */ + altcp_tcp_setup_callbacks(conn, pcb); + /* poll callback is not included in the above */ + tcp_poll(pcb, oldpoll, pcb->pollinterval); + return err; + } + + conn->state = NULL; /* unsafe to reference pcb after tcp_close(). */ + } + + altcp_free(conn); + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + return tcp_shutdown(pcb, shut_rx, shut_tx); +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + return tcp_write(pcb, dataptr, len, apiflags); +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + return tcp_output(pcb); +} + +static u16_t altcp_tcp_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + return tcp_mss(pcb); +} + +static u16_t altcp_tcp_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + return tcp_sndbuf(pcb); +} + +static u16_t altcp_tcp_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + if (conn == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + return tcp_sndqueuelen(pcb); +} + +static void altcp_tcp_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->state) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + tcp_nagle_disable(pcb); + } +} + +static void altcp_tcp_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->state) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + tcp_nagle_enable(pcb); + } +} + +static int altcp_tcp_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn && conn->state) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + return tcp_nagle_disabled(pcb); + } + + return 0; +} + +static void altcp_tcp_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio) +{ + if (conn != NULL) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + tcp_setprio(pcb, prio); + } +} + +static void altcp_tcp_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(conn); + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + /* no private state to clean up */ +} + +static err_t altcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port) +{ + if (conn) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + return tcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(pcb, local, addr, port); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +static ip_addr_t *altcp_tcp_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) +{ + if (conn) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + + if (pcb) { + if (local) { + return &pcb->local_ip; + } else { + return &pcb->remote_ip; + } + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +static u16_t altcp_tcp_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local) +{ + if (conn) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + + if (pcb) { + if (local) { + return pcb->local_port; + } else { + return pcb->remote_port; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +static enum tcp_state altcp_tcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn) +{ + if (conn) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)conn->state; + ALTCP_TCP_ASSERT_CONN(conn); + + if (pcb) { + return pcb->state; + } + } + + return CLOSED; +} +#endif +const struct altcp_functions altcp_tcp_functions = { + altcp_tcp_set_poll, + altcp_tcp_recved, + altcp_tcp_bind, + altcp_tcp_connect, + altcp_tcp_listen, + altcp_tcp_abort, + altcp_tcp_close, + altcp_tcp_shutdown, + altcp_tcp_write, + altcp_tcp_output, + altcp_tcp_mss, + altcp_tcp_sndbuf, + altcp_tcp_sndqueuelen, + altcp_tcp_nagle_disable, + altcp_tcp_nagle_enable, + altcp_tcp_nagle_disabled, + altcp_tcp_setprio, + altcp_tcp_dealloc, + altcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo, + altcp_tcp_get_ip, + altcp_tcp_get_port +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + , + altcp_tcp_dbg_get_tcp_state +#endif +}; + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/def.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/def.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/def.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/def.c index fb86a909..3a5b1b68 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/def.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/def.c @@ -1,252 +1,252 @@ -/** - * @file - * Common functions used throughout the stack. - * - * These are reference implementations of the byte swapping functions. - * Again with the aim of being simple, correct and fully portable. - * Byte swapping is the second thing you would want to optimize. You will - * need to port it to your architecture and in your cc.h: - * - * \#define lwip_htons(x) your_htons - * \#define lwip_htonl(x) your_htonl - * - * Note lwip_ntohs() and lwip_ntohl() are merely references to the htonx counterparts. - * - * If you \#define them to htons() and htonl(), you should - * \#define LWIP_DONT_PROVIDE_BYTEORDER_FUNCTIONS to prevent lwIP from - * defining htonx/ntohx compatibility macros. - - * @defgroup sys_nonstandard Non-standard functions - * @ingroup sys_layer - * lwIP provides default implementations for non-standard functions. - * These can be mapped to OS functions to reduce code footprint if desired. - * All defines related to this section must not be placed in lwipopts.h, - * but in arch/cc.h! - * These options cannot be \#defined in lwipopts.h since they are not options - * of lwIP itself, but options of the lwIP port to your system. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" - -#include - -#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN - -#if !defined(lwip_htons) -/** - * Convert an u16_t from host- to network byte order. - * - * @param n u16_t in host byte order - * @return n in network byte order - */ -u16_t lwip_htons(u16_t n) -{ - return PP_HTONS(n); -} -#endif /* lwip_htons */ - -#if !defined(lwip_htonl) -/** - * Convert an u32_t from host- to network byte order. - * - * @param n u32_t in host byte order - * @return n in network byte order - */ -u32_t lwip_htonl(u32_t n) -{ - return PP_HTONL(n); -} -#endif /* lwip_htonl */ - -#endif /* BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN */ - -#ifndef lwip_strnstr -/** - * @ingroup sys_nonstandard - * lwIP default implementation for strnstr() non-standard function. - * This can be \#defined to strnstr() depending on your platform port. - */ -char *lwip_strnstr(const char *buffer, const char *token, size_t n) -{ - const char *p; - size_t tokenlen = strlen(token); - - if (tokenlen == 0) { - return LWIP_CONST_CAST(char *, buffer); - } - - for (p = buffer; *p && (p + tokenlen <= buffer + n); p++) { - if ((*p == *token) && (strncmp(p, token, tokenlen) == 0)) { - return LWIP_CONST_CAST(char *, p); - } - } - - return NULL; -} -#endif - -#ifndef lwip_stricmp -/** - * @ingroup sys_nonstandard - * lwIP default implementation for stricmp() non-standard function. - * This can be \#defined to stricmp() depending on your platform port. - */ -int lwip_stricmp(const char *str1, const char *str2) -{ - char c1, c2; - - do { - c1 = *str1++; - c2 = *str2++; - - if (c1 != c2) { - char c1_upc = c1 | 0x20; - - if ((c1_upc >= 'a') && (c1_upc <= 'z')) { - /* characters are not equal an one is in the alphabet range: - downcase both chars and check again */ - char c2_upc = c2 | 0x20; - - if (c1_upc != c2_upc) { - /* still not equal */ - /* don't care for < or > */ - return 1; - } - } else { - /* characters are not equal but none is in the alphabet range */ - return 1; - } - } - } while (c1 != 0); - - return 0; -} -#endif - -#ifndef lwip_strnicmp -/** - * @ingroup sys_nonstandard - * lwIP default implementation for strnicmp() non-standard function. - * This can be \#defined to strnicmp() depending on your platform port. - */ -int lwip_strnicmp(const char *str1, const char *str2, size_t len) -{ - char c1, c2; - - do { - c1 = *str1++; - c2 = *str2++; - - if (c1 != c2) { - char c1_upc = c1 | 0x20; - - if ((c1_upc >= 'a') && (c1_upc <= 'z')) { - /* characters are not equal an one is in the alphabet range: - downcase both chars and check again */ - char c2_upc = c2 | 0x20; - - if (c1_upc != c2_upc) { - /* still not equal */ - /* don't care for < or > */ - return 1; - } - } else { - /* characters are not equal but none is in the alphabet range */ - return 1; - } - } - - len--; - } while ((len != 0) && (c1 != 0)); - - return 0; -} -#endif - -#ifndef lwip_itoa -/** - * @ingroup sys_nonstandard - * lwIP default implementation for itoa() non-standard function. - * This can be \#defined to itoa() or snprintf(result, bufsize, "%d", number) depending on your platform port. - */ -void lwip_itoa(char *result, size_t bufsize, int number) -{ - char *res = result; - char *tmp = result + bufsize - 1; - int n = (number >= 0) ? number : -number; - - /* handle invalid bufsize */ - if (bufsize < 2) { - if (bufsize == 1) { - *result = 0; - } - - return; - } - - /* First, add sign */ - if (number < 0) { - *res++ = '-'; - } - - /* Then create the string from the end and stop if buffer full, - and ensure output string is zero terminated */ - *tmp = 0; - - while ((n != 0) && (tmp > res)) { - char val = (char)('0' + (n % 10)); - tmp--; - *tmp = val; - n = n / 10; - } - - if (n) { - /* buffer is too small */ - *result = 0; - return; - } - - if (*tmp == 0) { - /* Nothing added? */ - *res++ = '0'; - *res++ = 0; - return; - } - - /* move from temporary buffer to output buffer (sign is not moved) */ - memmove(res, tmp, (size_t)((result + bufsize) - tmp)); -} -#endif +/** + * @file + * Common functions used throughout the stack. + * + * These are reference implementations of the byte swapping functions. + * Again with the aim of being simple, correct and fully portable. + * Byte swapping is the second thing you would want to optimize. You will + * need to port it to your architecture and in your cc.h: + * + * \#define lwip_htons(x) your_htons + * \#define lwip_htonl(x) your_htonl + * + * Note lwip_ntohs() and lwip_ntohl() are merely references to the htonx counterparts. + * + * If you \#define them to htons() and htonl(), you should + * \#define LWIP_DONT_PROVIDE_BYTEORDER_FUNCTIONS to prevent lwIP from + * defining htonx/ntohx compatibility macros. + + * @defgroup sys_nonstandard Non-standard functions + * @ingroup sys_layer + * lwIP provides default implementations for non-standard functions. + * These can be mapped to OS functions to reduce code footprint if desired. + * All defines related to this section must not be placed in lwipopts.h, + * but in arch/cc.h! + * These options cannot be \#defined in lwipopts.h since they are not options + * of lwIP itself, but options of the lwIP port to your system. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" + +#include + +#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN + +#if !defined(lwip_htons) +/** + * Convert an u16_t from host- to network byte order. + * + * @param n u16_t in host byte order + * @return n in network byte order + */ +u16_t lwip_htons(u16_t n) +{ + return PP_HTONS(n); +} +#endif /* lwip_htons */ + +#if !defined(lwip_htonl) +/** + * Convert an u32_t from host- to network byte order. + * + * @param n u32_t in host byte order + * @return n in network byte order + */ +u32_t lwip_htonl(u32_t n) +{ + return PP_HTONL(n); +} +#endif /* lwip_htonl */ + +#endif /* BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN */ + +#ifndef lwip_strnstr +/** + * @ingroup sys_nonstandard + * lwIP default implementation for strnstr() non-standard function. + * This can be \#defined to strnstr() depending on your platform port. + */ +char *lwip_strnstr(const char *buffer, const char *token, size_t n) +{ + const char *p; + size_t tokenlen = strlen(token); + + if (tokenlen == 0) { + return LWIP_CONST_CAST(char *, buffer); + } + + for (p = buffer; *p && (p + tokenlen <= buffer + n); p++) { + if ((*p == *token) && (strncmp(p, token, tokenlen) == 0)) { + return LWIP_CONST_CAST(char *, p); + } + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif + +#ifndef lwip_stricmp +/** + * @ingroup sys_nonstandard + * lwIP default implementation for stricmp() non-standard function. + * This can be \#defined to stricmp() depending on your platform port. + */ +int lwip_stricmp(const char *str1, const char *str2) +{ + char c1, c2; + + do { + c1 = *str1++; + c2 = *str2++; + + if (c1 != c2) { + char c1_upc = c1 | 0x20; + + if ((c1_upc >= 'a') && (c1_upc <= 'z')) { + /* characters are not equal an one is in the alphabet range: + downcase both chars and check again */ + char c2_upc = c2 | 0x20; + + if (c1_upc != c2_upc) { + /* still not equal */ + /* don't care for < or > */ + return 1; + } + } else { + /* characters are not equal but none is in the alphabet range */ + return 1; + } + } + } while (c1 != 0); + + return 0; +} +#endif + +#ifndef lwip_strnicmp +/** + * @ingroup sys_nonstandard + * lwIP default implementation for strnicmp() non-standard function. + * This can be \#defined to strnicmp() depending on your platform port. + */ +int lwip_strnicmp(const char *str1, const char *str2, size_t len) +{ + char c1, c2; + + do { + c1 = *str1++; + c2 = *str2++; + + if (c1 != c2) { + char c1_upc = c1 | 0x20; + + if ((c1_upc >= 'a') && (c1_upc <= 'z')) { + /* characters are not equal an one is in the alphabet range: + downcase both chars and check again */ + char c2_upc = c2 | 0x20; + + if (c1_upc != c2_upc) { + /* still not equal */ + /* don't care for < or > */ + return 1; + } + } else { + /* characters are not equal but none is in the alphabet range */ + return 1; + } + } + + len--; + } while ((len != 0) && (c1 != 0)); + + return 0; +} +#endif + +#ifndef lwip_itoa +/** + * @ingroup sys_nonstandard + * lwIP default implementation for itoa() non-standard function. + * This can be \#defined to itoa() or snprintf(result, bufsize, "%d", number) depending on your platform port. + */ +void lwip_itoa(char *result, size_t bufsize, int number) +{ + char *res = result; + char *tmp = result + bufsize - 1; + int n = (number >= 0) ? number : -number; + + /* handle invalid bufsize */ + if (bufsize < 2) { + if (bufsize == 1) { + *result = 0; + } + + return; + } + + /* First, add sign */ + if (number < 0) { + *res++ = '-'; + } + + /* Then create the string from the end and stop if buffer full, + and ensure output string is zero terminated */ + *tmp = 0; + + while ((n != 0) && (tmp > res)) { + char val = (char)('0' + (n % 10)); + tmp--; + *tmp = val; + n = n / 10; + } + + if (n) { + /* buffer is too small */ + *result = 0; + return; + } + + if (*tmp == 0) { + /* Nothing added? */ + *res++ = '0'; + *res++ = 0; + return; + } + + /* move from temporary buffer to output buffer (sign is not moved) */ + memmove(res, tmp, (size_t)((result + bufsize) - tmp)); +} +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/dns.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/dns.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/dns.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/dns.c index c545974f..065669f7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/dns.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/dns.c @@ -1,1750 +1,1750 @@ -/** - * @file - * DNS - host name to IP address resolver. - * - * @defgroup dns DNS - * @ingroup callbackstyle_api - * - * Implements a DNS host name to IP address resolver. - * - * The lwIP DNS resolver functions are used to lookup a host name and - * map it to a numerical IP address. It maintains a list of resolved - * hostnames that can be queried with the dns_lookup() function. - * New hostnames can be resolved using the dns_query() function. - * - * The lwIP version of the resolver also adds a non-blocking version of - * gethostbyname() that will work with a raw API application. This function - * checks for an IP address string first and converts it if it is valid. - * gethostbyname() then does a dns_lookup() to see if the name is - * already in the table. If so, the IP is returned. If not, a query is - * issued and the function returns with a ERR_INPROGRESS status. The app - * using the dns client must then go into a waiting state. - * - * Once a hostname has been resolved (or found to be non-existent), - * the resolver code calls a specified callback function (which - * must be implemented by the module that uses the resolver). - * - * Multicast DNS queries are supported for names ending on ".local". - * However, only "One-Shot Multicast DNS Queries" are supported (RFC 6762 - * chapter 5.1), this is not a fully compliant implementation of continuous - * mDNS querying! - * - * All functions must be called from TCPIP thread. - * - * @see DNS_MAX_SERVERS - * @see LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS - * @see @ref netconn_common for thread-safe access. - */ - -/* - * Port to lwIP from uIP - * by Jim Pettinato April 2007 - * - * security fixes and more by Simon Goldschmidt - * - * uIP version Copyright (c) 2002-2003, Adam Dunkels. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote - * products derived from this software without specific prior - * written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS - * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE - * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, - * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * RFC 1035 - Domain names - implementation and specification - * RFC 2181 - Clarifications to the DNS Specification - *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/** @todo: define good default values (rfc compliance) */ -/** @todo: improve answer parsing, more checkings... */ -/** @todo: check RFC1035 - 7.3. Processing responses */ -/** @todo: one-shot mDNS: dual-stack fallback to another IP version */ - -/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Includes - *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_DNS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "lwip/prot/dns.h" - -#include - -/** Random generator function to create random TXIDs and source ports for queries */ -#ifndef DNS_RAND_TXID -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_XID) != 0) -#define DNS_RAND_TXID LWIP_RAND -#else -static u16_t dns_txid; -#define DNS_RAND_TXID() (++dns_txid) -#endif -#endif - -/** Limits the source port to be >= 1024 by default */ -#ifndef DNS_PORT_ALLOWED -#define DNS_PORT_ALLOWED(port) ((port) >= 1024) -#endif - -/** DNS resource record max. TTL (one week as default) */ -#ifndef DNS_MAX_TTL -#define DNS_MAX_TTL 604800 -#elif DNS_MAX_TTL > 0x7FFFFFFF -#error DNS_MAX_TTL must be a positive 32-bit value -#endif - -#if DNS_TABLE_SIZE > 255 -#error DNS_TABLE_SIZE must fit into an u8_t -#endif -#if DNS_MAX_SERVERS > 255 -#error DNS_MAX_SERVERS must fit into an u8_t -#endif - -/* The number of parallel requests (i.e. calls to dns_gethostbyname - * that cannot be answered from the DNS table. - * This is set to the table size by default. - */ -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) -#ifndef DNS_MAX_REQUESTS -#define DNS_MAX_REQUESTS DNS_TABLE_SIZE -#else -#if DNS_MAX_REQUESTS > 255 -#error DNS_MAX_REQUESTS must fit into an u8_t -#endif -#endif -#else -/* In this configuration, both arrays have to have the same size and are used - * like one entry (used/free) */ -#define DNS_MAX_REQUESTS DNS_TABLE_SIZE -#endif - -/* The number of UDP source ports used in parallel */ -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) -#ifndef DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS -#define DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS DNS_MAX_REQUESTS -#else -#if DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS > 255 -#error DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS must fit into an u8_t -#endif -#endif -#else -#ifdef DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS -#undef DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS -#endif -#define DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS 1 -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t) (((t) == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4) || ((t) == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6)) -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(t, ip) (IP_IS_V6_VAL(ip) ? LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t) : (!LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t))) -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(x) , x -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG_OR_ZERO(x) x -#define LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(x, y) \ - do { \ - x = y; \ - } while (0) -#else -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t) 1 -#else -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t) 0 -#endif -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(t, ip) 1 -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(x) -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG_OR_ZERO(x) 0 -#define LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(x, y) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES -#define LWIP_DNS_ISMDNS_ARG(x) , x -#else -#define LWIP_DNS_ISMDNS_ARG(x) -#endif - -/** DNS query message structure. - No packing needed: only used locally on the stack. */ -struct dns_query { - /* DNS query record starts with either a domain name or a pointer - to a name already present somewhere in the packet. */ - u16_t type; - u16_t cls; -}; -#define SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY 4 - -/** DNS answer message structure. - No packing needed: only used locally on the stack. */ -struct dns_answer { - /* DNS answer record starts with either a domain name or a pointer - to a name already present somewhere in the packet. */ - u16_t type; - u16_t cls; - u32_t ttl; - u16_t len; -}; -#define SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER 10 -/* maximum allowed size for the struct due to non-packed */ -#define SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER_ASSERT 12 - -/* DNS table entry states */ -typedef enum { - DNS_STATE_UNUSED = 0, - DNS_STATE_NEW = 1, - DNS_STATE_ASKING = 2, - DNS_STATE_DONE = 3 -} dns_state_enum_t; - -/** DNS table entry */ -struct dns_table_entry { - u32_t ttl; - ip_addr_t ipaddr; - u16_t txid; - u8_t state; - u8_t server_idx; - u8_t tmr; - u8_t retries; - u8_t seqno; -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) - u8_t pcb_idx; -#endif - char name[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH]; -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - u8_t reqaddrtype; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES - u8_t is_mdns; -#endif -}; - -/** DNS request table entry: used when dns_gehostbyname cannot answer the - * request from the DNS table */ -struct dns_req_entry { - /* pointer to callback on DNS query done */ - dns_found_callback found; - /* argument passed to the callback function */ - void *arg; -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) - u8_t dns_table_idx; -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - u8_t reqaddrtype; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -}; - -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST - -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC -/** Local host-list. For hostnames in this list, no - * external name resolution is performed */ -static struct local_hostlist_entry *local_hostlist_dynamic; -#else /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ - -/** Defining this allows the local_hostlist_static to be placed in a different - * linker section (e.g. FLASH) */ -#ifndef DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_PRE -#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_PRE static -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_PRE */ -/** Defining this allows the local_hostlist_static to be placed in a different - * linker section (e.g. FLASH) */ -#ifndef DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_POST -#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_POST -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_POST */ -DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_PRE struct local_hostlist_entry local_hostlist_static[] DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_POST = DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT; - -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ - -static void dns_init_local(void); -static err_t dns_lookup_local(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(u8_t dns_addrtype)); -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ - -/* forward declarations */ -static void dns_recv(void *s, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); -static void dns_check_entries(void); -static void dns_call_found(u8_t idx, ip_addr_t *addr); - -/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Globals - *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/* DNS variables */ -static struct udp_pcb *dns_pcbs[DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS]; -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) -static u8_t dns_last_pcb_idx; -#endif -static u8_t dns_seqno; -static struct dns_table_entry dns_table[DNS_TABLE_SIZE]; -static struct dns_req_entry dns_requests[DNS_MAX_REQUESTS]; -static ip_addr_t dns_servers[DNS_MAX_SERVERS]; - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -const ip_addr_t dns_mquery_v4group = DNS_MQUERY_IPV4_GROUP_INIT; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 -const ip_addr_t dns_mquery_v6group = DNS_MQUERY_IPV6_GROUP_INIT; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** - * Initialize the resolver: set up the UDP pcb and configure the default server - * (if DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS is set). - */ -void dns_init(void) -{ -#ifdef DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS - /* initialize default DNS server address */ - ip_addr_t dnsserver; - DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS(&dnsserver); - dns_setserver(0, &dnsserver); -#endif /* DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY", - sizeof(struct dns_query) == SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY); - LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER", - sizeof(struct dns_answer) <= SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER_ASSERT); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_init: initializing\n")); - - /* if dns client not yet initialized... */ -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) == 0) - - if (dns_pcbs[0] == NULL) { - dns_pcbs[0] = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - LWIP_ASSERT("dns_pcbs[0] != NULL", dns_pcbs[0] != NULL); - - /* initialize DNS table not needed (initialized to zero since it is a - * global variable) */ - LWIP_ASSERT("For implicit initialization to work, DNS_STATE_UNUSED needs to be 0", - DNS_STATE_UNUSED == 0); - - /* initialize DNS client */ - udp_bind(dns_pcbs[0], IP_ANY_TYPE, 0); - udp_recv(dns_pcbs[0], dns_recv, NULL); - } - -#endif - -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST - dns_init_local(); -#endif -} - -/** - * @ingroup dns - * Initialize one of the DNS servers. - * - * @param numdns the index of the DNS server to set must be < DNS_MAX_SERVERS - * @param dnsserver IP address of the DNS server to set - */ -void dns_setserver(u8_t numdns, const ip_addr_t *dnsserver) -{ - if (numdns < DNS_MAX_SERVERS) { - if (dnsserver != NULL) { - dns_servers[numdns] = (*dnsserver); - } else { - dns_servers[numdns] = *IP_ADDR_ANY; - } - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup dns - * Obtain one of the currently configured DNS server. - * - * @param numdns the index of the DNS server - * @return IP address of the indexed DNS server or "ip_addr_any" if the DNS - * server has not been configured. - */ -const ip_addr_t *dns_getserver(u8_t numdns) -{ - if (numdns < DNS_MAX_SERVERS) { - return &dns_servers[numdns]; - } else { - return IP_ADDR_ANY; - } -} - -/** - * The DNS resolver client timer - handle retries and timeouts and should - * be called every DNS_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds (every second by default). - */ -void dns_tmr(void) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_tmr: dns_check_entries\n")); - dns_check_entries(); -} - -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST -static void dns_init_local(void) -{ -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC && defined(DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT) - size_t i; - struct local_hostlist_entry *entry; - /* Dynamic: copy entries from DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT to list */ - struct local_hostlist_entry local_hostlist_init[] = DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT; - size_t namelen; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(local_hostlist_init); i++) { - struct local_hostlist_entry *init_entry = &local_hostlist_init[i]; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid host name (NULL)", init_entry->name != NULL); - namelen = strlen(init_entry->name); - LWIP_ASSERT("namelen <= DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN", namelen <= DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN); - entry = (struct local_hostlist_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_LOCALHOSTLIST); - LWIP_ASSERT("mem-error in dns_init_local", entry != NULL); - - if (entry != NULL) { - char *entry_name = (char *)entry + sizeof(struct local_hostlist_entry); - MEMCPY(entry_name, init_entry->name, namelen); - entry_name[namelen] = 0; - entry->name = entry_name; - entry->addr = init_entry->addr; - entry->next = local_hostlist_dynamic; - local_hostlist_dynamic = entry; - } - } - -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC && defined(DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT) */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup dns - * Iterate the local host-list for a hostname. - * - * @param iterator_fn a function that is called for every entry in the local host-list - * @param iterator_arg 3rd argument passed to iterator_fn - * @return the number of entries in the local host-list - */ -size_t dns_local_iterate(dns_found_callback iterator_fn, void *iterator_arg) -{ - size_t i; -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC - struct local_hostlist_entry *entry = local_hostlist_dynamic; - i = 0; - - while (entry != NULL) { - if (iterator_fn != NULL) { - iterator_fn(entry->name, &entry->addr, iterator_arg); - } - - i++; - entry = entry->next; - } - -#else /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(local_hostlist_static); i++) { - if (iterator_fn != NULL) { - iterator_fn(local_hostlist_static[i].name, &local_hostlist_static[i].addr, iterator_arg); - } - } - -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ - return i; -} - -/** - * @ingroup dns - * Scans the local host-list for a hostname. - * - * @param hostname Hostname to look for in the local host-list - * @param addr the first IP address for the hostname in the local host-list or - * IPADDR_NONE if not found. - * @param dns_addrtype - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6: try to resolve IPv4 (ATTENTION: no fallback here!) - * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4: try to resolve IPv6 (ATTENTION: no fallback here!) - * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4: try to resolve IPv4 only - * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6: try to resolve IPv6 only - * @return ERR_OK if found, ERR_ARG if not found - */ -err_t dns_local_lookup(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dns_addrtype); - return dns_lookup_local(hostname, addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(dns_addrtype)); -} - -/* Internal implementation for dns_local_lookup and dns_lookup */ -static err_t dns_lookup_local(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(u8_t dns_addrtype)) -{ -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC - struct local_hostlist_entry *entry = local_hostlist_dynamic; - - while (entry != NULL) { - if ((lwip_stricmp(entry->name, hostname) == 0) && - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(dns_addrtype, entry->addr)) { - if (addr) { - ip_addr_copy(*addr, entry->addr); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - entry = entry->next; - } - -#else /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ - size_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(local_hostlist_static); i++) { - if ((lwip_stricmp(local_hostlist_static[i].name, hostname) == 0) && - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(dns_addrtype, local_hostlist_static[i].addr)) { - if (addr) { - ip_addr_copy(*addr, local_hostlist_static[i].addr); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - } - -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ - return ERR_ARG; -} - -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC -/** - * @ingroup dns - * Remove all entries from the local host-list for a specific hostname - * and/or IP address - * - * @param hostname hostname for which entries shall be removed from the local - * host-list - * @param addr address for which entries shall be removed from the local host-list - * @return the number of removed entries - */ -int dns_local_removehost(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *addr) -{ - int removed = 0; - struct local_hostlist_entry *entry = local_hostlist_dynamic; - struct local_hostlist_entry *last_entry = NULL; - - while (entry != NULL) { - if (((hostname == NULL) || !lwip_stricmp(entry->name, hostname)) && - ((addr == NULL) || ip_addr_cmp(&entry->addr, addr))) { - struct local_hostlist_entry *free_entry; - - if (last_entry != NULL) { - last_entry->next = entry->next; - } else { - local_hostlist_dynamic = entry->next; - } - - free_entry = entry; - entry = entry->next; - memp_free(MEMP_LOCALHOSTLIST, free_entry); - removed++; - } else { - last_entry = entry; - entry = entry->next; - } - } - - return removed; -} - -/** - * @ingroup dns - * Add a hostname/IP address pair to the local host-list. - * Duplicates are not checked. - * - * @param hostname hostname of the new entry - * @param addr IP address of the new entry - * @return ERR_OK if succeeded or ERR_MEM on memory error - */ -err_t dns_local_addhost(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *addr) -{ - struct local_hostlist_entry *entry; - size_t namelen; - char *entry_name; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid host name (NULL)", hostname != NULL); - namelen = strlen(hostname); - LWIP_ASSERT("namelen <= DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN", namelen <= DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN); - entry = (struct local_hostlist_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_LOCALHOSTLIST); - - if (entry == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - entry_name = (char *)entry + sizeof(struct local_hostlist_entry); - MEMCPY(entry_name, hostname, namelen); - entry_name[namelen] = 0; - entry->name = entry_name; - ip_addr_copy(entry->addr, *addr); - entry->next = local_hostlist_dynamic; - local_hostlist_dynamic = entry; - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC*/ -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ - -/** - * @ingroup dns - * Look up a hostname in the array of known hostnames. - * - * @note This function only looks in the internal array of known - * hostnames, it does not send out a query for the hostname if none - * was found. The function dns_enqueue() can be used to send a query - * for a hostname. - * - * @param name the hostname to look up - * @param addr the hostname's IP address, as u32_t (instead of ip_addr_t to - * better check for failure: != IPADDR_NONE) or IPADDR_NONE if the hostname - * was not found in the cached dns_table. - * @return ERR_OK if found, ERR_ARG if not found - */ -static err_t dns_lookup(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(u8_t dns_addrtype)) -{ - u8_t i; -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST - - if (dns_lookup_local(name, addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(dns_addrtype)) == ERR_OK) { - return ERR_OK; - } - -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ -#ifdef DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN - - if (DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN(name, addr, LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG_OR_ZERO(dns_addrtype)) == ERR_OK) { - return ERR_OK; - } - -#endif /* DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN */ - - /* Walk through name list, return entry if found. If not, return NULL. */ - for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { - if ((dns_table[i].state == DNS_STATE_DONE) && - (lwip_strnicmp(name, dns_table[i].name, sizeof(dns_table[i].name)) == 0) && - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(dns_addrtype, dns_table[i].ipaddr)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_lookup: \"%s\": found = ", name)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(DNS_DEBUG, dns_table[i].ipaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("\n")); - - if (addr) { - ip_addr_copy(*addr, dns_table[i].ipaddr); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - return ERR_ARG; -} - -/** - * Compare the "dotted" name "query" with the encoded name "response" - * to make sure an answer from the DNS server matches the current dns_table - * entry (otherwise, answers might arrive late for hostname not on the list - * any more). - * - * For now, this function compares case-insensitive to cope with all kinds of - * servers. This also means that "dns 0x20 bit encoding" must be checked - * externally, if we want to implement it. - * Currently, the request is sent exactly as passed in by he user request. - * - * @param query hostname (not encoded) from the dns_table - * @param p pbuf containing the encoded hostname in the DNS response - * @param start_offset offset into p where the name starts - * @return 0xFFFF: names differ, other: names equal -> offset behind name - */ -static u16_t dns_compare_name(const char *query, struct pbuf *p, u16_t start_offset) -{ - int n; - u16_t response_offset = start_offset; - - do { - n = pbuf_try_get_at(p, response_offset); - - if ((n < 0) || (response_offset == 0xFFFF)) { - /* error or overflow */ - return 0xFFFF; - } - - response_offset++; - - /** @see RFC 1035 - 4.1.4. Message compression */ - if ((n & 0xc0) == 0xc0) { - /* Compressed name: cannot be equal since we don't send them */ - return 0xFFFF; - } else { - /* Not compressed name */ - while (n > 0) { - int c = pbuf_try_get_at(p, response_offset); - - if (c < 0) { - return 0xFFFF; - } - - if (lwip_tolower((*query)) != lwip_tolower((u8_t)c)) { - return 0xFFFF; - } - - if (response_offset == 0xFFFF) { - /* would overflow */ - return 0xFFFF; - } - - response_offset++; - ++query; - --n; - } - - ++query; - } - - n = pbuf_try_get_at(p, response_offset); - - if (n < 0) { - return 0xFFFF; - } - } while (n != 0); - - if (response_offset == 0xFFFF) { - /* would overflow */ - return 0xFFFF; - } - - return (u16_t)(response_offset + 1); -} - -/** - * Walk through a compact encoded DNS name and return the end of the name. - * - * @param p pbuf containing the name - * @param query_idx start index into p pointing to encoded DNS name in the DNS server response - * @return index to end of the name - */ -static u16_t dns_skip_name(struct pbuf *p, u16_t query_idx) -{ - int n; - u16_t offset = query_idx; - - do { - n = pbuf_try_get_at(p, offset++); - - if ((n < 0) || (offset == 0)) { - return 0xFFFF; - } - - /** @see RFC 1035 - 4.1.4. Message compression */ - if ((n & 0xc0) == 0xc0) { - /* Compressed name: since we only want to skip it (not check it), stop here */ - break; - } else { - /* Not compressed name */ - if (offset + n >= p->tot_len) { - return 0xFFFF; - } - - offset = (u16_t)(offset + n); - } - - n = pbuf_try_get_at(p, offset); - - if (n < 0) { - return 0xFFFF; - } - } while (n != 0); - - if (offset == 0xFFFF) { - return 0xFFFF; - } - - return (u16_t)(offset + 1); -} - -/** - * Send a DNS query packet. - * - * @param idx the DNS table entry index for which to send a request - * @return ERR_OK if packet is sent; an err_t indicating the problem otherwise - */ -static err_t dns_send(u8_t idx) -{ - err_t err; - struct dns_hdr hdr; - struct dns_query qry; - struct pbuf *p; - u16_t query_idx, copy_len; - const char *hostname, *hostname_part; - u8_t n; - u8_t pcb_idx; - struct dns_table_entry *entry = &dns_table[idx]; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_send: dns_servers[%" U16_F "] \"%s\": request\n", - (u16_t)(entry->server_idx), entry->name)); - LWIP_ASSERT("dns server out of array", entry->server_idx < DNS_MAX_SERVERS); - - if (ip_addr_isany_val(dns_servers[entry->server_idx]) -#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES - && !entry->is_mdns -#endif - ) { - /* DNS server not valid anymore, e.g. PPP netif has been shut down */ - /* call specified callback function if provided */ - dns_call_found(idx, NULL); - /* flush this entry */ - entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* if here, we have either a new query or a retry on a previous query to process */ - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, (u16_t)(SIZEOF_DNS_HDR + strlen(entry->name) + 2 + SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY), PBUF_RAM); - - if (p != NULL) { - const ip_addr_t *dst; - u16_t dst_port; - /* fill dns header */ - memset(&hdr, 0, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR); - hdr.id = lwip_htons(entry->txid); - hdr.flags1 = DNS_FLAG1_RD; - hdr.numquestions = PP_HTONS(1); - pbuf_take(p, &hdr, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR); - hostname = entry->name; - --hostname; - - /* convert hostname into suitable query format. */ - query_idx = SIZEOF_DNS_HDR; - - do { - ++hostname; - hostname_part = hostname; - - for (n = 0; *hostname != '.' && *hostname != 0; ++hostname) { - ++n; - } - - copy_len = (u16_t)(hostname - hostname_part); - - if (query_idx + n + 1 > 0xFFFF) { - /* u16_t overflow */ - goto overflow_return; - } - - pbuf_put_at(p, query_idx, n); - pbuf_take_at(p, hostname_part, copy_len, (u16_t)(query_idx + 1)); - query_idx = (u16_t)(query_idx + n + 1); - } while (*hostname != 0); - - pbuf_put_at(p, query_idx, 0); - query_idx++; - - /* fill dns query */ - if (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype)) { - qry.type = PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA); - } else { - qry.type = PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_A); - } - - qry.cls = PP_HTONS(DNS_RRCLASS_IN); - pbuf_take_at(p, &qry, SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY, query_idx); - -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) - pcb_idx = entry->pcb_idx; -#else - pcb_idx = 0; -#endif - /* send dns packet */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("sending DNS request ID %d for name \"%s\" to server %d\r\n", - entry->txid, entry->name, entry->server_idx)); -#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES - - if (entry->is_mdns) { - dst_port = DNS_MQUERY_PORT; -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype)) { - dst = &dns_mquery_v6group; - } -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - else -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV4 - { - dst = &dns_mquery_v4group; - } - -#endif - } else -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES */ - { - dst_port = DNS_SERVER_PORT; - dst = &dns_servers[entry->server_idx]; - } - - err = udp_sendto(dns_pcbs[pcb_idx], p, dst, dst_port); - - /* free pbuf */ - pbuf_free(p); - } else { - err = ERR_MEM; - } - - return err; -overflow_return: - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_VAL; -} - -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) -static struct udp_pcb *dns_alloc_random_port(void) -{ - err_t err; - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - - pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - /* out of memory, have to reuse an existing pcb */ - return NULL; - } - - do { - u16_t port = (u16_t)DNS_RAND_TXID(); - - if (DNS_PORT_ALLOWED(port)) { - err = udp_bind(pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, port); - } else { - /* this port is not allowed, try again */ - err = ERR_USE; - } - } while (err == ERR_USE); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - udp_remove(pcb); - return NULL; - } - - udp_recv(pcb, dns_recv, NULL); - return pcb; -} - -/** - * dns_alloc_pcb() - allocates a new pcb (or reuses an existing one) to be used - * for sending a request - * - * @return an index into dns_pcbs - */ -static u8_t dns_alloc_pcb(void) -{ - u8_t i; - u8_t idx; - - for (i = 0; i < DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; i++) { - if (dns_pcbs[i] == NULL) { - break; - } - } - - if (i < DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS) { - dns_pcbs[i] = dns_alloc_random_port(); - - if (dns_pcbs[i] != NULL) { - /* succeeded */ - dns_last_pcb_idx = i; - return i; - } - } - - /* if we come here, creating a new UDP pcb failed, so we have to use - an already existing one (so overflow is no issue) */ - for (i = 0, idx = (u8_t)(dns_last_pcb_idx + 1); i < DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; i++, idx++) { - if (idx >= DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS) { - idx = 0; - } - - if (dns_pcbs[idx] != NULL) { - dns_last_pcb_idx = idx; - return idx; - } - } - - return DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; -} -#endif /* ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) */ - -/** - * dns_call_found() - call the found callback and check if there are duplicate - * entries for the given hostname. If there are any, their found callback will - * be called and they will be removed. - * - * @param idx dns table index of the entry that is resolved or removed - * @param addr IP address for the hostname (or NULL on error or memory shortage) - */ -static void dns_call_found(u8_t idx, ip_addr_t *addr) -{ -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & (LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING | LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT)) != 0) - u8_t i; -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (addr != NULL) { - /* check that address type matches the request and adapt the table entry */ - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(*addr)) { - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid response", LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(dns_table[idx].reqaddrtype)); - dns_table[idx].reqaddrtype = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6; - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid response", !LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(dns_table[idx].reqaddrtype)); - dns_table[idx].reqaddrtype = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) - - for (i = 0; i < DNS_MAX_REQUESTS; i++) { - if (dns_requests[i].found && (dns_requests[i].dns_table_idx == idx)) { - (*dns_requests[i].found)(dns_table[idx].name, addr, dns_requests[i].arg); - /* flush this entry */ - dns_requests[i].found = NULL; - } - } - -#else - - if (dns_requests[idx].found) { - (*dns_requests[idx].found)(dns_table[idx].name, addr, dns_requests[idx].arg); - } - - dns_requests[idx].found = NULL; -#endif -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) - - /* close the pcb used unless other request are using it */ - for (i = 0; i < DNS_MAX_REQUESTS; i++) { - if (i == idx) { - continue; /* only check other requests */ - } - - if (dns_table[i].state == DNS_STATE_ASKING) { - if (dns_table[i].pcb_idx == dns_table[idx].pcb_idx) { - /* another request is still using the same pcb */ - dns_table[idx].pcb_idx = DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; - break; - } - } - } - - if (dns_table[idx].pcb_idx < DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS) { - /* if we come here, the pcb is not used any more and can be removed */ - udp_remove(dns_pcbs[dns_table[idx].pcb_idx]); - dns_pcbs[dns_table[idx].pcb_idx] = NULL; - dns_table[idx].pcb_idx = DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; - } - -#endif -} - -/* Create a query transmission ID that is unique for all outstanding queries */ -static u16_t dns_create_txid(void) -{ - u16_t txid; - u8_t i; - -again: - txid = (u16_t)DNS_RAND_TXID(); - - /* check whether the ID is unique */ - for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { - if ((dns_table[i].state == DNS_STATE_ASKING) && - (dns_table[i].txid == txid)) { - /* ID already used by another pending query */ - goto again; - } - } - - return txid; -} - -/** - * Check whether there are other backup DNS servers available to try - */ -static u8_t dns_backupserver_available(struct dns_table_entry *pentry) -{ - u8_t ret = 0; - - if (pentry) { - if ((pentry->server_idx + 1 < DNS_MAX_SERVERS) && !ip_addr_isany_val(dns_servers[pentry->server_idx + 1])) { - ret = 1; - } - } - - return ret; -} - -/** - * dns_check_entry() - see if entry has not yet been queried and, if so, sends out a query. - * Check an entry in the dns_table: - * - send out query for new entries - * - retry old pending entries on timeout (also with different servers) - * - remove completed entries from the table if their TTL has expired - * - * @param i index of the dns_table entry to check - */ -static void dns_check_entry(u8_t i) -{ - err_t err; - struct dns_table_entry *entry = &dns_table[i]; - - LWIP_ASSERT("array index out of bounds", i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE); - - switch (entry->state) { - case DNS_STATE_NEW: - /* initialize new entry */ - entry->txid = dns_create_txid(); - entry->state = DNS_STATE_ASKING; - entry->server_idx = 0; - entry->tmr = 1; - entry->retries = 0; - - /* send DNS packet for this entry */ - err = dns_send(i); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("dns_send returned error: %s\n", lwip_strerr(err))); - } - - break; - - case DNS_STATE_ASKING: - if (--entry->tmr == 0) { - if (++entry->retries == DNS_MAX_RETRIES) { - if (dns_backupserver_available(entry) -#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES - && !entry->is_mdns -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES */ - ) { - /* change of server */ - entry->server_idx++; - entry->tmr = 1; - entry->retries = 0; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_check_entry: \"%s\": timeout\n", entry->name)); - /* call specified callback function if provided */ - dns_call_found(i, NULL); - /* flush this entry */ - entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; - break; - } - } else { - /* wait longer for the next retry */ - entry->tmr = entry->retries; - } - - /* send DNS packet for this entry */ - err = dns_send(i); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("dns_send returned error: %s\n", lwip_strerr(err))); - } - } - - break; - - case DNS_STATE_DONE: - - /* if the time to live is nul */ - if ((entry->ttl == 0) || (--entry->ttl == 0)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_check_entry: \"%s\": flush\n", entry->name)); - /* flush this entry, there cannot be any related pending entries in this state */ - entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; - } - - break; - - case DNS_STATE_UNUSED: - /* nothing to do */ - break; - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("unknown dns_table entry state:", 0); - break; - } -} - -/** - * Call dns_check_entry for each entry in dns_table - check all entries. - */ -static void dns_check_entries(void) -{ - u8_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { - dns_check_entry(i); - } -} - -/** - * Save TTL and call dns_call_found for correct response. - */ -static void dns_correct_response(u8_t idx, u32_t ttl) -{ - struct dns_table_entry *entry = &dns_table[idx]; - - entry->state = DNS_STATE_DONE; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": response = ", entry->name)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(DNS_DEBUG, entry->ipaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("\n")); - - /* read the answer resource record's TTL, and maximize it if needed */ - entry->ttl = ttl; - - if (entry->ttl > DNS_MAX_TTL) { - entry->ttl = DNS_MAX_TTL; - } - - dns_call_found(idx, &entry->ipaddr); - - if (entry->ttl == 0) { - /* RFC 883, page 29: "Zero values are - interpreted to mean that the RR can only be used for the - transaction in progress, and should not be cached." - -> flush this entry now */ - /* entry reused during callback? */ - if (entry->state == DNS_STATE_DONE) { - entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; - } - } -} - -/** - * Receive input function for DNS response packets arriving for the dns UDP pcb. - */ -static void dns_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - u8_t i; - u16_t txid; - u16_t res_idx; - struct dns_hdr hdr; - struct dns_answer ans; - struct dns_query qry; - u16_t nquestions, nanswers; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); - - /* is the dns message big enough ? */ - if (p->tot_len < (SIZEOF_DNS_HDR + SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: pbuf too small\n")); - /* free pbuf and return */ - goto ignore_packet; - } - - /* copy dns payload inside static buffer for processing */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &hdr, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR, 0) == SIZEOF_DNS_HDR) { - /* Match the ID in the DNS header with the name table. */ - txid = lwip_htons(hdr.id); - - for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { - struct dns_table_entry *entry = &dns_table[i]; - - if ((entry->state == DNS_STATE_ASKING) && - (entry->txid == txid)) { - /* We only care about the question(s) and the answers. The authrr - and the extrarr are simply discarded. */ - nquestions = lwip_htons(hdr.numquestions); - nanswers = lwip_htons(hdr.numanswers); - - /* Check for correct response. */ - if ((hdr.flags1 & DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE) == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": not a response\n", entry->name)); - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - - if (nquestions != 1) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": response not match to query\n", entry->name)); - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - -#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES - - if (!entry->is_mdns) -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES */ - { - /* Check whether response comes from the same network address to which the - question was sent. (RFC 5452) */ - if (!ip_addr_cmp(addr, &dns_servers[entry->server_idx])) { - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - } - - /* Check if the name in the "question" part match with the name in the entry and - skip it if equal. */ - res_idx = dns_compare_name(entry->name, p, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR); - - if (res_idx == 0xFFFF) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": response not match to query\n", entry->name)); - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - - /* check if "question" part matches the request */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &qry, SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY, res_idx) != SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY) { - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - - if ((qry.cls != PP_HTONS(DNS_RRCLASS_IN)) || - (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype) && (qry.type != PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA))) || - (!LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype) && (qry.type != PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_A)))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": response not match to query\n", entry->name)); - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - - /* skip the rest of the "question" part */ - if (res_idx + SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY > 0xFFFF) { - goto ignore_packet; - } - - res_idx = (u16_t)(res_idx + SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY); - - /* Check for error. If so, call callback to inform. */ - if (hdr.flags2 & DNS_FLAG2_ERR_MASK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": error in flags\n", entry->name)); - - /* if there is another backup DNS server to try - * then don't stop the DNS request - */ - if (dns_backupserver_available(entry)) { - /* avoid retrying the same server */ - entry->retries = DNS_MAX_RETRIES - 1; - entry->tmr = 1; - - /* contact next available server for this entry */ - dns_check_entry(i); - - goto ignore_packet; - } - } else { - while ((nanswers > 0) && (res_idx < p->tot_len)) { - /* skip answer resource record's host name */ - res_idx = dns_skip_name(p, res_idx); - - if (res_idx == 0xFFFF) { - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - - /* Check for IP address type and Internet class. Others are discarded. */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &ans, SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER, res_idx) != SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER) { - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - - if (res_idx + SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER > 0xFFFF) { - goto ignore_packet; - } - - res_idx = (u16_t)(res_idx + SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER); - - if (ans.cls == PP_HTONS(DNS_RRCLASS_IN)) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if ((ans.type == PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_A)) && (ans.len == PP_HTONS(sizeof(ip4_addr_t)))) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (!LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype)) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - { - ip4_addr_t ip4addr; - - /* read the IP address after answer resource record's header */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &ip4addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t), res_idx) != sizeof(ip4_addr_t)) { - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dns_table[i].ipaddr, ip4addr); - pbuf_free(p); - /* handle correct response */ - dns_correct_response(i, lwip_ntohl(ans.ttl)); - return; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if ((ans.type == PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA)) && (ans.len == PP_HTONS(sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t)))) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype)) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - { - ip6_addr_p_t ip6addr; - - /* read the IP address after answer resource record's header */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &ip6addr, sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t), res_idx) != sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t)) { - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - - /* @todo: scope ip6addr? Might be required for link-local addresses at least? */ - ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(dns_table[i].ipaddr, ip6addr); - pbuf_free(p); - /* handle correct response */ - dns_correct_response(i, lwip_ntohl(ans.ttl)); - return; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - } - - /* skip this answer */ - if ((int)(res_idx + lwip_htons(ans.len)) > 0xFFFF) { - goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ - } - - res_idx = (u16_t)(res_idx + lwip_htons(ans.len)); - --nanswers; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if ((entry->reqaddrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6) || - (entry->reqaddrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4)) { - if (entry->reqaddrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6) { - /* IPv4 failed, try IPv6 */ - dns_table[i].reqaddrtype = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6; - } else { - /* IPv6 failed, try IPv4 */ - dns_table[i].reqaddrtype = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4; - } - - pbuf_free(p); - dns_table[i].state = DNS_STATE_NEW; - dns_check_entry(i); - return; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": error in response\n", entry->name)); - } - - /* call callback to indicate error, clean up memory and return */ - pbuf_free(p); - dns_call_found(i, NULL); - dns_table[i].state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; - return; - } - } - } - -ignore_packet: - /* deallocate memory and return */ - pbuf_free(p); - return; -} - -/** - * Queues a new hostname to resolve and sends out a DNS query for that hostname - * - * @param name the hostname that is to be queried - * @param hostnamelen length of the hostname - * @param found a callback function to be called on success, failure or timeout - * @param callback_arg argument to pass to the callback function - * @return err_t return code. - */ -static err_t dns_enqueue(const char *name, size_t hostnamelen, dns_found_callback found, - void *callback_arg LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(u8_t dns_addrtype) LWIP_DNS_ISMDNS_ARG(u8_t is_mdns)) -{ - u8_t i; - u8_t lseq, lseqi; - struct dns_table_entry *entry = NULL; - size_t namelen; - struct dns_req_entry *req; - -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) - u8_t r; - - /* check for duplicate entries */ - for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { - if ((dns_table[i].state == DNS_STATE_ASKING) && - (lwip_strnicmp(name, dns_table[i].name, sizeof(dns_table[i].name)) == 0)) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (dns_table[i].reqaddrtype != dns_addrtype) { - /* requested address types don't match - this can lead to 2 concurrent requests, but mixing the address types - for the same host should not be that common */ - continue; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - /* this is a duplicate entry, find a free request entry */ - for (r = 0; r < DNS_MAX_REQUESTS; r++) { - if (dns_requests[r].found == 0) { - dns_requests[r].found = found; - dns_requests[r].arg = callback_arg; - dns_requests[r].dns_table_idx = i; - LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(dns_requests[r].reqaddrtype, dns_addrtype); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": duplicate request\n", name)); - return ERR_INPROGRESS; - } - } - } - } - - /* no duplicate entries found */ -#endif - - /* search an unused entry, or the oldest one */ - lseq = 0; - lseqi = DNS_TABLE_SIZE; - - for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { - entry = &dns_table[i]; - - /* is it an unused entry ? */ - if (entry->state == DNS_STATE_UNUSED) { - break; - } - - /* check if this is the oldest completed entry */ - if (entry->state == DNS_STATE_DONE) { - u8_t age = (u8_t)(dns_seqno - entry->seqno); - - if (age > lseq) { - lseq = age; - lseqi = i; - } - } - } - - /* if we don't have found an unused entry, use the oldest completed one */ - if (i == DNS_TABLE_SIZE) { - if ((lseqi >= DNS_TABLE_SIZE) || (dns_table[lseqi].state != DNS_STATE_DONE)) { - /* no entry can be used now, table is full */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": DNS entries table is full\n", name)); - return ERR_MEM; - } else { - /* use the oldest completed one */ - i = lseqi; - entry = &dns_table[i]; - } - } - -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) - /* find a free request entry */ - req = NULL; - - for (r = 0; r < DNS_MAX_REQUESTS; r++) { - if (dns_requests[r].found == NULL) { - req = &dns_requests[r]; - break; - } - } - - if (req == NULL) { - /* no request entry can be used now, table is full */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": DNS request entries table is full\n", name)); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - req->dns_table_idx = i; -#else - /* in this configuration, the entry index is the same as the request index */ - req = &dns_requests[i]; -#endif - - /* use this entry */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": use DNS entry %" U16_F "\n", name, (u16_t)(i))); - - /* fill the entry */ - entry->state = DNS_STATE_NEW; - entry->seqno = dns_seqno; - LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(entry->reqaddrtype, dns_addrtype); - LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(req->reqaddrtype, dns_addrtype); - req->found = found; - req->arg = callback_arg; - namelen = LWIP_MIN(hostnamelen, DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH - 1); - MEMCPY(entry->name, name, namelen); - entry->name[namelen] = 0; - -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) - entry->pcb_idx = dns_alloc_pcb(); - - if (entry->pcb_idx >= DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS) { - /* failed to get a UDP pcb */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": failed to allocate a pcb\n", name)); - entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; - req->found = NULL; - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": use DNS pcb %" U16_F "\n", name, (u16_t)(entry->pcb_idx))); -#endif - -#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES - entry->is_mdns = is_mdns; -#endif - - dns_seqno++; - - /* force to send query without waiting timer */ - dns_check_entry(i); - - /* dns query is enqueued */ - return ERR_INPROGRESS; -} - -/** - * @ingroup dns - * Resolve a hostname (string) into an IP address. - * NON-BLOCKING callback version for use with raw API!!! - * - * Returns immediately with one of err_t return codes: - * - ERR_OK if hostname is a valid IP address string or the host - * name is already in the local names table. - * - ERR_INPROGRESS enqueue a request to be sent to the DNS server - * for resolution if no errors are present. - * - ERR_ARG: dns client not initialized or invalid hostname - * - * @param hostname the hostname that is to be queried - * @param addr pointer to a ip_addr_t where to store the address if it is already - * cached in the dns_table (only valid if ERR_OK is returned!) - * @param found a callback function to be called on success, failure or timeout (only if - * ERR_INPROGRESS is returned!) - * @param callback_arg argument to pass to the callback function - * @return a err_t return code. - */ -err_t dns_gethostbyname(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, dns_found_callback found, - void *callback_arg) -{ - return dns_gethostbyname_addrtype(hostname, addr, found, callback_arg, LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT); -} - -/** - * @ingroup dns - * Like dns_gethostbyname, but returned address type can be controlled: - * @param hostname the hostname that is to be queried - * @param addr pointer to a ip_addr_t where to store the address if it is already - * cached in the dns_table (only valid if ERR_OK is returned!) - * @param found a callback function to be called on success, failure or timeout (only if - * ERR_INPROGRESS is returned!) - * @param callback_arg argument to pass to the callback function - * @param dns_addrtype - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6: try to resolve IPv4 first, try IPv6 if IPv4 fails only - * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4: try to resolve IPv6 first, try IPv4 if IPv6 fails only - * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4: try to resolve IPv4 only - * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6: try to resolve IPv6 only - */ -err_t dns_gethostbyname_addrtype(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, dns_found_callback found, - void *callback_arg, u8_t dns_addrtype) -{ - size_t hostnamelen; -#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES - u8_t is_mdns; -#endif - - /* not initialized or no valid server yet, or invalid addr pointer - * or invalid hostname or invalid hostname length */ - if ((addr == NULL) || - (!hostname) || (!hostname[0])) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - -#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) == 0) - - if (dns_pcbs[0] == NULL) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - -#endif - hostnamelen = strlen(hostname); - - if (hostnamelen >= DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_gethostbyname: name too long to resolve")); - return ERR_ARG; - } - -#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - - if (strcmp(hostname, "localhost") == 0) { - ip_addr_set_loopback(LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(dns_addrtype), addr); - return ERR_OK; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - - /* host name already in octet notation? set ip addr and return ERR_OK */ - if (ipaddr_aton(hostname, addr)) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if ((IP_IS_V6(addr) && (dns_addrtype != LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4)) || - (IP_IS_V4(addr) && (dns_addrtype != LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6))) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - { - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* already have this address cached? */ - if (dns_lookup(hostname, addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(dns_addrtype)) == ERR_OK) { - return ERR_OK; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if ((dns_addrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6) || (dns_addrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4)) { - /* fallback to 2nd IP type and try again to lookup */ - u8_t fallback; - - if (dns_addrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6) { - fallback = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6; - } else { - fallback = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4; - } - - if (dns_lookup(hostname, addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(fallback)) == ERR_OK) { - return ERR_OK; - } - } - -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dns_addrtype); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES - - if (strstr(hostname, ".local") == &hostname[hostnamelen] - 6) { - is_mdns = 1; - } else { - is_mdns = 0; - } - - if (!is_mdns) -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES */ - { - /* prevent calling found callback if no server is set, return error instead */ - if (ip_addr_isany_val(dns_servers[0])) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - - /* queue query with specified callback */ - return dns_enqueue(hostname, hostnamelen, found, callback_arg LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(dns_addrtype) LWIP_DNS_ISMDNS_ARG(is_mdns)); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +/** + * @file + * DNS - host name to IP address resolver. + * + * @defgroup dns DNS + * @ingroup callbackstyle_api + * + * Implements a DNS host name to IP address resolver. + * + * The lwIP DNS resolver functions are used to lookup a host name and + * map it to a numerical IP address. It maintains a list of resolved + * hostnames that can be queried with the dns_lookup() function. + * New hostnames can be resolved using the dns_query() function. + * + * The lwIP version of the resolver also adds a non-blocking version of + * gethostbyname() that will work with a raw API application. This function + * checks for an IP address string first and converts it if it is valid. + * gethostbyname() then does a dns_lookup() to see if the name is + * already in the table. If so, the IP is returned. If not, a query is + * issued and the function returns with a ERR_INPROGRESS status. The app + * using the dns client must then go into a waiting state. + * + * Once a hostname has been resolved (or found to be non-existent), + * the resolver code calls a specified callback function (which + * must be implemented by the module that uses the resolver). + * + * Multicast DNS queries are supported for names ending on ".local". + * However, only "One-Shot Multicast DNS Queries" are supported (RFC 6762 + * chapter 5.1), this is not a fully compliant implementation of continuous + * mDNS querying! + * + * All functions must be called from TCPIP thread. + * + * @see DNS_MAX_SERVERS + * @see LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS + * @see @ref netconn_common for thread-safe access. + */ + +/* + * Port to lwIP from uIP + * by Jim Pettinato April 2007 + * + * security fixes and more by Simon Goldschmidt + * + * uIP version Copyright (c) 2002-2003, Adam Dunkels. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software without specific prior + * written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE + * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * RFC 1035 - Domain names - implementation and specification + * RFC 2181 - Clarifications to the DNS Specification + *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +/** @todo: define good default values (rfc compliance) */ +/** @todo: improve answer parsing, more checkings... */ +/** @todo: check RFC1035 - 7.3. Processing responses */ +/** @todo: one-shot mDNS: dual-stack fallback to another IP version */ + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Includes + *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_DNS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "lwip/prot/dns.h" + +#include + +/** Random generator function to create random TXIDs and source ports for queries */ +#ifndef DNS_RAND_TXID +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_XID) != 0) +#define DNS_RAND_TXID LWIP_RAND +#else +static u16_t dns_txid; +#define DNS_RAND_TXID() (++dns_txid) +#endif +#endif + +/** Limits the source port to be >= 1024 by default */ +#ifndef DNS_PORT_ALLOWED +#define DNS_PORT_ALLOWED(port) ((port) >= 1024) +#endif + +/** DNS resource record max. TTL (one week as default) */ +#ifndef DNS_MAX_TTL +#define DNS_MAX_TTL 604800 +#elif DNS_MAX_TTL > 0x7FFFFFFF +#error DNS_MAX_TTL must be a positive 32-bit value +#endif + +#if DNS_TABLE_SIZE > 255 +#error DNS_TABLE_SIZE must fit into an u8_t +#endif +#if DNS_MAX_SERVERS > 255 +#error DNS_MAX_SERVERS must fit into an u8_t +#endif + +/* The number of parallel requests (i.e. calls to dns_gethostbyname + * that cannot be answered from the DNS table. + * This is set to the table size by default. + */ +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) +#ifndef DNS_MAX_REQUESTS +#define DNS_MAX_REQUESTS DNS_TABLE_SIZE +#else +#if DNS_MAX_REQUESTS > 255 +#error DNS_MAX_REQUESTS must fit into an u8_t +#endif +#endif +#else +/* In this configuration, both arrays have to have the same size and are used + * like one entry (used/free) */ +#define DNS_MAX_REQUESTS DNS_TABLE_SIZE +#endif + +/* The number of UDP source ports used in parallel */ +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) +#ifndef DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS +#define DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS DNS_MAX_REQUESTS +#else +#if DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS > 255 +#error DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS must fit into an u8_t +#endif +#endif +#else +#ifdef DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS +#undef DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS +#endif +#define DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS 1 +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t) (((t) == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4) || ((t) == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6)) +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(t, ip) (IP_IS_V6_VAL(ip) ? LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t) : (!LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t))) +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(x) , x +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG_OR_ZERO(x) x +#define LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(x, y) \ + do { \ + x = y; \ + } while (0) +#else +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t) 1 +#else +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(t) 0 +#endif +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(t, ip) 1 +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(x) +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG_OR_ZERO(x) 0 +#define LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(x, y) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES +#define LWIP_DNS_ISMDNS_ARG(x) , x +#else +#define LWIP_DNS_ISMDNS_ARG(x) +#endif + +/** DNS query message structure. + No packing needed: only used locally on the stack. */ +struct dns_query { + /* DNS query record starts with either a domain name or a pointer + to a name already present somewhere in the packet. */ + u16_t type; + u16_t cls; +}; +#define SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY 4 + +/** DNS answer message structure. + No packing needed: only used locally on the stack. */ +struct dns_answer { + /* DNS answer record starts with either a domain name or a pointer + to a name already present somewhere in the packet. */ + u16_t type; + u16_t cls; + u32_t ttl; + u16_t len; +}; +#define SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER 10 +/* maximum allowed size for the struct due to non-packed */ +#define SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER_ASSERT 12 + +/* DNS table entry states */ +typedef enum { + DNS_STATE_UNUSED = 0, + DNS_STATE_NEW = 1, + DNS_STATE_ASKING = 2, + DNS_STATE_DONE = 3 +} dns_state_enum_t; + +/** DNS table entry */ +struct dns_table_entry { + u32_t ttl; + ip_addr_t ipaddr; + u16_t txid; + u8_t state; + u8_t server_idx; + u8_t tmr; + u8_t retries; + u8_t seqno; +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) + u8_t pcb_idx; +#endif + char name[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH]; +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + u8_t reqaddrtype; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES + u8_t is_mdns; +#endif +}; + +/** DNS request table entry: used when dns_gehostbyname cannot answer the + * request from the DNS table */ +struct dns_req_entry { + /* pointer to callback on DNS query done */ + dns_found_callback found; + /* argument passed to the callback function */ + void *arg; +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) + u8_t dns_table_idx; +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + u8_t reqaddrtype; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +}; + +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST + +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC +/** Local host-list. For hostnames in this list, no + * external name resolution is performed */ +static struct local_hostlist_entry *local_hostlist_dynamic; +#else /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ + +/** Defining this allows the local_hostlist_static to be placed in a different + * linker section (e.g. FLASH) */ +#ifndef DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_PRE +#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_PRE static +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_PRE */ +/** Defining this allows the local_hostlist_static to be placed in a different + * linker section (e.g. FLASH) */ +#ifndef DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_POST +#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_POST +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_POST */ +DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_PRE struct local_hostlist_entry local_hostlist_static[] DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_STORAGE_POST = DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT; + +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ + +static void dns_init_local(void); +static err_t dns_lookup_local(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(u8_t dns_addrtype)); +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ + +/* forward declarations */ +static void dns_recv(void *s, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); +static void dns_check_entries(void); +static void dns_call_found(u8_t idx, ip_addr_t *addr); + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Globals + *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +/* DNS variables */ +static struct udp_pcb *dns_pcbs[DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS]; +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) +static u8_t dns_last_pcb_idx; +#endif +static u8_t dns_seqno; +static struct dns_table_entry dns_table[DNS_TABLE_SIZE]; +static struct dns_req_entry dns_requests[DNS_MAX_REQUESTS]; +static ip_addr_t dns_servers[DNS_MAX_SERVERS]; + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +const ip_addr_t dns_mquery_v4group = DNS_MQUERY_IPV4_GROUP_INIT; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 +const ip_addr_t dns_mquery_v6group = DNS_MQUERY_IPV6_GROUP_INIT; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** + * Initialize the resolver: set up the UDP pcb and configure the default server + * (if DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS is set). + */ +void dns_init(void) +{ +#ifdef DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS + /* initialize default DNS server address */ + ip_addr_t dnsserver; + DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS(&dnsserver); + dns_setserver(0, &dnsserver); +#endif /* DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY", + sizeof(struct dns_query) == SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY); + LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER", + sizeof(struct dns_answer) <= SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER_ASSERT); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_init: initializing\n")); + + /* if dns client not yet initialized... */ +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) == 0) + + if (dns_pcbs[0] == NULL) { + dns_pcbs[0] = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + LWIP_ASSERT("dns_pcbs[0] != NULL", dns_pcbs[0] != NULL); + + /* initialize DNS table not needed (initialized to zero since it is a + * global variable) */ + LWIP_ASSERT("For implicit initialization to work, DNS_STATE_UNUSED needs to be 0", + DNS_STATE_UNUSED == 0); + + /* initialize DNS client */ + udp_bind(dns_pcbs[0], IP_ANY_TYPE, 0); + udp_recv(dns_pcbs[0], dns_recv, NULL); + } + +#endif + +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST + dns_init_local(); +#endif +} + +/** + * @ingroup dns + * Initialize one of the DNS servers. + * + * @param numdns the index of the DNS server to set must be < DNS_MAX_SERVERS + * @param dnsserver IP address of the DNS server to set + */ +void dns_setserver(u8_t numdns, const ip_addr_t *dnsserver) +{ + if (numdns < DNS_MAX_SERVERS) { + if (dnsserver != NULL) { + dns_servers[numdns] = (*dnsserver); + } else { + dns_servers[numdns] = *IP_ADDR_ANY; + } + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup dns + * Obtain one of the currently configured DNS server. + * + * @param numdns the index of the DNS server + * @return IP address of the indexed DNS server or "ip_addr_any" if the DNS + * server has not been configured. + */ +const ip_addr_t *dns_getserver(u8_t numdns) +{ + if (numdns < DNS_MAX_SERVERS) { + return &dns_servers[numdns]; + } else { + return IP_ADDR_ANY; + } +} + +/** + * The DNS resolver client timer - handle retries and timeouts and should + * be called every DNS_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds (every second by default). + */ +void dns_tmr(void) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_tmr: dns_check_entries\n")); + dns_check_entries(); +} + +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST +static void dns_init_local(void) +{ +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC && defined(DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT) + size_t i; + struct local_hostlist_entry *entry; + /* Dynamic: copy entries from DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT to list */ + struct local_hostlist_entry local_hostlist_init[] = DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT; + size_t namelen; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(local_hostlist_init); i++) { + struct local_hostlist_entry *init_entry = &local_hostlist_init[i]; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid host name (NULL)", init_entry->name != NULL); + namelen = strlen(init_entry->name); + LWIP_ASSERT("namelen <= DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN", namelen <= DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN); + entry = (struct local_hostlist_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_LOCALHOSTLIST); + LWIP_ASSERT("mem-error in dns_init_local", entry != NULL); + + if (entry != NULL) { + char *entry_name = (char *)entry + sizeof(struct local_hostlist_entry); + MEMCPY(entry_name, init_entry->name, namelen); + entry_name[namelen] = 0; + entry->name = entry_name; + entry->addr = init_entry->addr; + entry->next = local_hostlist_dynamic; + local_hostlist_dynamic = entry; + } + } + +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC && defined(DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT) */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup dns + * Iterate the local host-list for a hostname. + * + * @param iterator_fn a function that is called for every entry in the local host-list + * @param iterator_arg 3rd argument passed to iterator_fn + * @return the number of entries in the local host-list + */ +size_t dns_local_iterate(dns_found_callback iterator_fn, void *iterator_arg) +{ + size_t i; +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC + struct local_hostlist_entry *entry = local_hostlist_dynamic; + i = 0; + + while (entry != NULL) { + if (iterator_fn != NULL) { + iterator_fn(entry->name, &entry->addr, iterator_arg); + } + + i++; + entry = entry->next; + } + +#else /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(local_hostlist_static); i++) { + if (iterator_fn != NULL) { + iterator_fn(local_hostlist_static[i].name, &local_hostlist_static[i].addr, iterator_arg); + } + } + +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ + return i; +} + +/** + * @ingroup dns + * Scans the local host-list for a hostname. + * + * @param hostname Hostname to look for in the local host-list + * @param addr the first IP address for the hostname in the local host-list or + * IPADDR_NONE if not found. + * @param dns_addrtype - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6: try to resolve IPv4 (ATTENTION: no fallback here!) + * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4: try to resolve IPv6 (ATTENTION: no fallback here!) + * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4: try to resolve IPv4 only + * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6: try to resolve IPv6 only + * @return ERR_OK if found, ERR_ARG if not found + */ +err_t dns_local_lookup(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dns_addrtype); + return dns_lookup_local(hostname, addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(dns_addrtype)); +} + +/* Internal implementation for dns_local_lookup and dns_lookup */ +static err_t dns_lookup_local(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(u8_t dns_addrtype)) +{ +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC + struct local_hostlist_entry *entry = local_hostlist_dynamic; + + while (entry != NULL) { + if ((lwip_stricmp(entry->name, hostname) == 0) && + LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(dns_addrtype, entry->addr)) { + if (addr) { + ip_addr_copy(*addr, entry->addr); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + entry = entry->next; + } + +#else /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(local_hostlist_static); i++) { + if ((lwip_stricmp(local_hostlist_static[i].name, hostname) == 0) && + LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(dns_addrtype, local_hostlist_static[i].addr)) { + if (addr) { + ip_addr_copy(*addr, local_hostlist_static[i].addr); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + } + +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ + return ERR_ARG; +} + +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC +/** + * @ingroup dns + * Remove all entries from the local host-list for a specific hostname + * and/or IP address + * + * @param hostname hostname for which entries shall be removed from the local + * host-list + * @param addr address for which entries shall be removed from the local host-list + * @return the number of removed entries + */ +int dns_local_removehost(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *addr) +{ + int removed = 0; + struct local_hostlist_entry *entry = local_hostlist_dynamic; + struct local_hostlist_entry *last_entry = NULL; + + while (entry != NULL) { + if (((hostname == NULL) || !lwip_stricmp(entry->name, hostname)) && + ((addr == NULL) || ip_addr_cmp(&entry->addr, addr))) { + struct local_hostlist_entry *free_entry; + + if (last_entry != NULL) { + last_entry->next = entry->next; + } else { + local_hostlist_dynamic = entry->next; + } + + free_entry = entry; + entry = entry->next; + memp_free(MEMP_LOCALHOSTLIST, free_entry); + removed++; + } else { + last_entry = entry; + entry = entry->next; + } + } + + return removed; +} + +/** + * @ingroup dns + * Add a hostname/IP address pair to the local host-list. + * Duplicates are not checked. + * + * @param hostname hostname of the new entry + * @param addr IP address of the new entry + * @return ERR_OK if succeeded or ERR_MEM on memory error + */ +err_t dns_local_addhost(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *addr) +{ + struct local_hostlist_entry *entry; + size_t namelen; + char *entry_name; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid host name (NULL)", hostname != NULL); + namelen = strlen(hostname); + LWIP_ASSERT("namelen <= DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN", namelen <= DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN); + entry = (struct local_hostlist_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_LOCALHOSTLIST); + + if (entry == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + entry_name = (char *)entry + sizeof(struct local_hostlist_entry); + MEMCPY(entry_name, hostname, namelen); + entry_name[namelen] = 0; + entry->name = entry_name; + ip_addr_copy(entry->addr, *addr); + entry->next = local_hostlist_dynamic; + local_hostlist_dynamic = entry; + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC*/ +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ + +/** + * @ingroup dns + * Look up a hostname in the array of known hostnames. + * + * @note This function only looks in the internal array of known + * hostnames, it does not send out a query for the hostname if none + * was found. The function dns_enqueue() can be used to send a query + * for a hostname. + * + * @param name the hostname to look up + * @param addr the hostname's IP address, as u32_t (instead of ip_addr_t to + * better check for failure: != IPADDR_NONE) or IPADDR_NONE if the hostname + * was not found in the cached dns_table. + * @return ERR_OK if found, ERR_ARG if not found + */ +static err_t dns_lookup(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(u8_t dns_addrtype)) +{ + u8_t i; +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST + + if (dns_lookup_local(name, addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(dns_addrtype)) == ERR_OK) { + return ERR_OK; + } + +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ +#ifdef DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN + + if (DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN(name, addr, LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG_OR_ZERO(dns_addrtype)) == ERR_OK) { + return ERR_OK; + } + +#endif /* DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN */ + + /* Walk through name list, return entry if found. If not, return NULL. */ + for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { + if ((dns_table[i].state == DNS_STATE_DONE) && + (lwip_strnicmp(name, dns_table[i].name, sizeof(dns_table[i].name)) == 0) && + LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_MATCH_IP(dns_addrtype, dns_table[i].ipaddr)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_lookup: \"%s\": found = ", name)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(DNS_DEBUG, dns_table[i].ipaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("\n")); + + if (addr) { + ip_addr_copy(*addr, dns_table[i].ipaddr); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + return ERR_ARG; +} + +/** + * Compare the "dotted" name "query" with the encoded name "response" + * to make sure an answer from the DNS server matches the current dns_table + * entry (otherwise, answers might arrive late for hostname not on the list + * any more). + * + * For now, this function compares case-insensitive to cope with all kinds of + * servers. This also means that "dns 0x20 bit encoding" must be checked + * externally, if we want to implement it. + * Currently, the request is sent exactly as passed in by he user request. + * + * @param query hostname (not encoded) from the dns_table + * @param p pbuf containing the encoded hostname in the DNS response + * @param start_offset offset into p where the name starts + * @return 0xFFFF: names differ, other: names equal -> offset behind name + */ +static u16_t dns_compare_name(const char *query, struct pbuf *p, u16_t start_offset) +{ + int n; + u16_t response_offset = start_offset; + + do { + n = pbuf_try_get_at(p, response_offset); + + if ((n < 0) || (response_offset == 0xFFFF)) { + /* error or overflow */ + return 0xFFFF; + } + + response_offset++; + + /** @see RFC 1035 - 4.1.4. Message compression */ + if ((n & 0xc0) == 0xc0) { + /* Compressed name: cannot be equal since we don't send them */ + return 0xFFFF; + } else { + /* Not compressed name */ + while (n > 0) { + int c = pbuf_try_get_at(p, response_offset); + + if (c < 0) { + return 0xFFFF; + } + + if (lwip_tolower((*query)) != lwip_tolower((u8_t)c)) { + return 0xFFFF; + } + + if (response_offset == 0xFFFF) { + /* would overflow */ + return 0xFFFF; + } + + response_offset++; + ++query; + --n; + } + + ++query; + } + + n = pbuf_try_get_at(p, response_offset); + + if (n < 0) { + return 0xFFFF; + } + } while (n != 0); + + if (response_offset == 0xFFFF) { + /* would overflow */ + return 0xFFFF; + } + + return (u16_t)(response_offset + 1); +} + +/** + * Walk through a compact encoded DNS name and return the end of the name. + * + * @param p pbuf containing the name + * @param query_idx start index into p pointing to encoded DNS name in the DNS server response + * @return index to end of the name + */ +static u16_t dns_skip_name(struct pbuf *p, u16_t query_idx) +{ + int n; + u16_t offset = query_idx; + + do { + n = pbuf_try_get_at(p, offset++); + + if ((n < 0) || (offset == 0)) { + return 0xFFFF; + } + + /** @see RFC 1035 - 4.1.4. Message compression */ + if ((n & 0xc0) == 0xc0) { + /* Compressed name: since we only want to skip it (not check it), stop here */ + break; + } else { + /* Not compressed name */ + if (offset + n >= p->tot_len) { + return 0xFFFF; + } + + offset = (u16_t)(offset + n); + } + + n = pbuf_try_get_at(p, offset); + + if (n < 0) { + return 0xFFFF; + } + } while (n != 0); + + if (offset == 0xFFFF) { + return 0xFFFF; + } + + return (u16_t)(offset + 1); +} + +/** + * Send a DNS query packet. + * + * @param idx the DNS table entry index for which to send a request + * @return ERR_OK if packet is sent; an err_t indicating the problem otherwise + */ +static err_t dns_send(u8_t idx) +{ + err_t err; + struct dns_hdr hdr; + struct dns_query qry; + struct pbuf *p; + u16_t query_idx, copy_len; + const char *hostname, *hostname_part; + u8_t n; + u8_t pcb_idx; + struct dns_table_entry *entry = &dns_table[idx]; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_send: dns_servers[%" U16_F "] \"%s\": request\n", + (u16_t)(entry->server_idx), entry->name)); + LWIP_ASSERT("dns server out of array", entry->server_idx < DNS_MAX_SERVERS); + + if (ip_addr_isany_val(dns_servers[entry->server_idx]) +#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES + && !entry->is_mdns +#endif + ) { + /* DNS server not valid anymore, e.g. PPP netif has been shut down */ + /* call specified callback function if provided */ + dns_call_found(idx, NULL); + /* flush this entry */ + entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* if here, we have either a new query or a retry on a previous query to process */ + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, (u16_t)(SIZEOF_DNS_HDR + strlen(entry->name) + 2 + SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY), PBUF_RAM); + + if (p != NULL) { + const ip_addr_t *dst; + u16_t dst_port; + /* fill dns header */ + memset(&hdr, 0, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR); + hdr.id = lwip_htons(entry->txid); + hdr.flags1 = DNS_FLAG1_RD; + hdr.numquestions = PP_HTONS(1); + pbuf_take(p, &hdr, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR); + hostname = entry->name; + --hostname; + + /* convert hostname into suitable query format. */ + query_idx = SIZEOF_DNS_HDR; + + do { + ++hostname; + hostname_part = hostname; + + for (n = 0; *hostname != '.' && *hostname != 0; ++hostname) { + ++n; + } + + copy_len = (u16_t)(hostname - hostname_part); + + if (query_idx + n + 1 > 0xFFFF) { + /* u16_t overflow */ + goto overflow_return; + } + + pbuf_put_at(p, query_idx, n); + pbuf_take_at(p, hostname_part, copy_len, (u16_t)(query_idx + 1)); + query_idx = (u16_t)(query_idx + n + 1); + } while (*hostname != 0); + + pbuf_put_at(p, query_idx, 0); + query_idx++; + + /* fill dns query */ + if (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype)) { + qry.type = PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA); + } else { + qry.type = PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_A); + } + + qry.cls = PP_HTONS(DNS_RRCLASS_IN); + pbuf_take_at(p, &qry, SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY, query_idx); + +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) + pcb_idx = entry->pcb_idx; +#else + pcb_idx = 0; +#endif + /* send dns packet */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("sending DNS request ID %d for name \"%s\" to server %d\r\n", + entry->txid, entry->name, entry->server_idx)); +#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES + + if (entry->is_mdns) { + dst_port = DNS_MQUERY_PORT; +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype)) { + dst = &dns_mquery_v6group; + } +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + else +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV4 + { + dst = &dns_mquery_v4group; + } + +#endif + } else +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES */ + { + dst_port = DNS_SERVER_PORT; + dst = &dns_servers[entry->server_idx]; + } + + err = udp_sendto(dns_pcbs[pcb_idx], p, dst, dst_port); + + /* free pbuf */ + pbuf_free(p); + } else { + err = ERR_MEM; + } + + return err; +overflow_return: + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_VAL; +} + +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) +static struct udp_pcb *dns_alloc_random_port(void) +{ + err_t err; + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + + pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + /* out of memory, have to reuse an existing pcb */ + return NULL; + } + + do { + u16_t port = (u16_t)DNS_RAND_TXID(); + + if (DNS_PORT_ALLOWED(port)) { + err = udp_bind(pcb, IP_ANY_TYPE, port); + } else { + /* this port is not allowed, try again */ + err = ERR_USE; + } + } while (err == ERR_USE); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + udp_remove(pcb); + return NULL; + } + + udp_recv(pcb, dns_recv, NULL); + return pcb; +} + +/** + * dns_alloc_pcb() - allocates a new pcb (or reuses an existing one) to be used + * for sending a request + * + * @return an index into dns_pcbs + */ +static u8_t dns_alloc_pcb(void) +{ + u8_t i; + u8_t idx; + + for (i = 0; i < DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; i++) { + if (dns_pcbs[i] == NULL) { + break; + } + } + + if (i < DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS) { + dns_pcbs[i] = dns_alloc_random_port(); + + if (dns_pcbs[i] != NULL) { + /* succeeded */ + dns_last_pcb_idx = i; + return i; + } + } + + /* if we come here, creating a new UDP pcb failed, so we have to use + an already existing one (so overflow is no issue) */ + for (i = 0, idx = (u8_t)(dns_last_pcb_idx + 1); i < DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; i++, idx++) { + if (idx >= DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS) { + idx = 0; + } + + if (dns_pcbs[idx] != NULL) { + dns_last_pcb_idx = idx; + return idx; + } + } + + return DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; +} +#endif /* ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) */ + +/** + * dns_call_found() - call the found callback and check if there are duplicate + * entries for the given hostname. If there are any, their found callback will + * be called and they will be removed. + * + * @param idx dns table index of the entry that is resolved or removed + * @param addr IP address for the hostname (or NULL on error or memory shortage) + */ +static void dns_call_found(u8_t idx, ip_addr_t *addr) +{ +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & (LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING | LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT)) != 0) + u8_t i; +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (addr != NULL) { + /* check that address type matches the request and adapt the table entry */ + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(*addr)) { + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid response", LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(dns_table[idx].reqaddrtype)); + dns_table[idx].reqaddrtype = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6; + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid response", !LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(dns_table[idx].reqaddrtype)); + dns_table[idx].reqaddrtype = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) + + for (i = 0; i < DNS_MAX_REQUESTS; i++) { + if (dns_requests[i].found && (dns_requests[i].dns_table_idx == idx)) { + (*dns_requests[i].found)(dns_table[idx].name, addr, dns_requests[i].arg); + /* flush this entry */ + dns_requests[i].found = NULL; + } + } + +#else + + if (dns_requests[idx].found) { + (*dns_requests[idx].found)(dns_table[idx].name, addr, dns_requests[idx].arg); + } + + dns_requests[idx].found = NULL; +#endif +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) + + /* close the pcb used unless other request are using it */ + for (i = 0; i < DNS_MAX_REQUESTS; i++) { + if (i == idx) { + continue; /* only check other requests */ + } + + if (dns_table[i].state == DNS_STATE_ASKING) { + if (dns_table[i].pcb_idx == dns_table[idx].pcb_idx) { + /* another request is still using the same pcb */ + dns_table[idx].pcb_idx = DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; + break; + } + } + } + + if (dns_table[idx].pcb_idx < DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS) { + /* if we come here, the pcb is not used any more and can be removed */ + udp_remove(dns_pcbs[dns_table[idx].pcb_idx]); + dns_pcbs[dns_table[idx].pcb_idx] = NULL; + dns_table[idx].pcb_idx = DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS; + } + +#endif +} + +/* Create a query transmission ID that is unique for all outstanding queries */ +static u16_t dns_create_txid(void) +{ + u16_t txid; + u8_t i; + +again: + txid = (u16_t)DNS_RAND_TXID(); + + /* check whether the ID is unique */ + for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { + if ((dns_table[i].state == DNS_STATE_ASKING) && + (dns_table[i].txid == txid)) { + /* ID already used by another pending query */ + goto again; + } + } + + return txid; +} + +/** + * Check whether there are other backup DNS servers available to try + */ +static u8_t dns_backupserver_available(struct dns_table_entry *pentry) +{ + u8_t ret = 0; + + if (pentry) { + if ((pentry->server_idx + 1 < DNS_MAX_SERVERS) && !ip_addr_isany_val(dns_servers[pentry->server_idx + 1])) { + ret = 1; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * dns_check_entry() - see if entry has not yet been queried and, if so, sends out a query. + * Check an entry in the dns_table: + * - send out query for new entries + * - retry old pending entries on timeout (also with different servers) + * - remove completed entries from the table if their TTL has expired + * + * @param i index of the dns_table entry to check + */ +static void dns_check_entry(u8_t i) +{ + err_t err; + struct dns_table_entry *entry = &dns_table[i]; + + LWIP_ASSERT("array index out of bounds", i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE); + + switch (entry->state) { + case DNS_STATE_NEW: + /* initialize new entry */ + entry->txid = dns_create_txid(); + entry->state = DNS_STATE_ASKING; + entry->server_idx = 0; + entry->tmr = 1; + entry->retries = 0; + + /* send DNS packet for this entry */ + err = dns_send(i); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("dns_send returned error: %s\n", lwip_strerr(err))); + } + + break; + + case DNS_STATE_ASKING: + if (--entry->tmr == 0) { + if (++entry->retries == DNS_MAX_RETRIES) { + if (dns_backupserver_available(entry) +#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES + && !entry->is_mdns +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES */ + ) { + /* change of server */ + entry->server_idx++; + entry->tmr = 1; + entry->retries = 0; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_check_entry: \"%s\": timeout\n", entry->name)); + /* call specified callback function if provided */ + dns_call_found(i, NULL); + /* flush this entry */ + entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; + break; + } + } else { + /* wait longer for the next retry */ + entry->tmr = entry->retries; + } + + /* send DNS packet for this entry */ + err = dns_send(i); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("dns_send returned error: %s\n", lwip_strerr(err))); + } + } + + break; + + case DNS_STATE_DONE: + + /* if the time to live is nul */ + if ((entry->ttl == 0) || (--entry->ttl == 0)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_check_entry: \"%s\": flush\n", entry->name)); + /* flush this entry, there cannot be any related pending entries in this state */ + entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; + } + + break; + + case DNS_STATE_UNUSED: + /* nothing to do */ + break; + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("unknown dns_table entry state:", 0); + break; + } +} + +/** + * Call dns_check_entry for each entry in dns_table - check all entries. + */ +static void dns_check_entries(void) +{ + u8_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { + dns_check_entry(i); + } +} + +/** + * Save TTL and call dns_call_found for correct response. + */ +static void dns_correct_response(u8_t idx, u32_t ttl) +{ + struct dns_table_entry *entry = &dns_table[idx]; + + entry->state = DNS_STATE_DONE; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": response = ", entry->name)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(DNS_DEBUG, entry->ipaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("\n")); + + /* read the answer resource record's TTL, and maximize it if needed */ + entry->ttl = ttl; + + if (entry->ttl > DNS_MAX_TTL) { + entry->ttl = DNS_MAX_TTL; + } + + dns_call_found(idx, &entry->ipaddr); + + if (entry->ttl == 0) { + /* RFC 883, page 29: "Zero values are + interpreted to mean that the RR can only be used for the + transaction in progress, and should not be cached." + -> flush this entry now */ + /* entry reused during callback? */ + if (entry->state == DNS_STATE_DONE) { + entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; + } + } +} + +/** + * Receive input function for DNS response packets arriving for the dns UDP pcb. + */ +static void dns_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + u8_t i; + u16_t txid; + u16_t res_idx; + struct dns_hdr hdr; + struct dns_answer ans; + struct dns_query qry; + u16_t nquestions, nanswers; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); + + /* is the dns message big enough ? */ + if (p->tot_len < (SIZEOF_DNS_HDR + SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: pbuf too small\n")); + /* free pbuf and return */ + goto ignore_packet; + } + + /* copy dns payload inside static buffer for processing */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &hdr, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR, 0) == SIZEOF_DNS_HDR) { + /* Match the ID in the DNS header with the name table. */ + txid = lwip_htons(hdr.id); + + for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { + struct dns_table_entry *entry = &dns_table[i]; + + if ((entry->state == DNS_STATE_ASKING) && + (entry->txid == txid)) { + /* We only care about the question(s) and the answers. The authrr + and the extrarr are simply discarded. */ + nquestions = lwip_htons(hdr.numquestions); + nanswers = lwip_htons(hdr.numanswers); + + /* Check for correct response. */ + if ((hdr.flags1 & DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE) == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": not a response\n", entry->name)); + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + + if (nquestions != 1) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": response not match to query\n", entry->name)); + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + +#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES + + if (!entry->is_mdns) +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES */ + { + /* Check whether response comes from the same network address to which the + question was sent. (RFC 5452) */ + if (!ip_addr_cmp(addr, &dns_servers[entry->server_idx])) { + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + } + + /* Check if the name in the "question" part match with the name in the entry and + skip it if equal. */ + res_idx = dns_compare_name(entry->name, p, SIZEOF_DNS_HDR); + + if (res_idx == 0xFFFF) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": response not match to query\n", entry->name)); + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + + /* check if "question" part matches the request */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &qry, SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY, res_idx) != SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY) { + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + + if ((qry.cls != PP_HTONS(DNS_RRCLASS_IN)) || + (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype) && (qry.type != PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA))) || + (!LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype) && (qry.type != PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_A)))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": response not match to query\n", entry->name)); + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + + /* skip the rest of the "question" part */ + if (res_idx + SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY > 0xFFFF) { + goto ignore_packet; + } + + res_idx = (u16_t)(res_idx + SIZEOF_DNS_QUERY); + + /* Check for error. If so, call callback to inform. */ + if (hdr.flags2 & DNS_FLAG2_ERR_MASK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": error in flags\n", entry->name)); + + /* if there is another backup DNS server to try + * then don't stop the DNS request + */ + if (dns_backupserver_available(entry)) { + /* avoid retrying the same server */ + entry->retries = DNS_MAX_RETRIES - 1; + entry->tmr = 1; + + /* contact next available server for this entry */ + dns_check_entry(i); + + goto ignore_packet; + } + } else { + while ((nanswers > 0) && (res_idx < p->tot_len)) { + /* skip answer resource record's host name */ + res_idx = dns_skip_name(p, res_idx); + + if (res_idx == 0xFFFF) { + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + + /* Check for IP address type and Internet class. Others are discarded. */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &ans, SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER, res_idx) != SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER) { + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + + if (res_idx + SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER > 0xFFFF) { + goto ignore_packet; + } + + res_idx = (u16_t)(res_idx + SIZEOF_DNS_ANSWER); + + if (ans.cls == PP_HTONS(DNS_RRCLASS_IN)) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if ((ans.type == PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_A)) && (ans.len == PP_HTONS(sizeof(ip4_addr_t)))) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (!LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype)) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + { + ip4_addr_t ip4addr; + + /* read the IP address after answer resource record's header */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &ip4addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t), res_idx) != sizeof(ip4_addr_t)) { + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dns_table[i].ipaddr, ip4addr); + pbuf_free(p); + /* handle correct response */ + dns_correct_response(i, lwip_ntohl(ans.ttl)); + return; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if ((ans.type == PP_HTONS(DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA)) && (ans.len == PP_HTONS(sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t)))) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(entry->reqaddrtype)) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + { + ip6_addr_p_t ip6addr; + + /* read the IP address after answer resource record's header */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &ip6addr, sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t), res_idx) != sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t)) { + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + + /* @todo: scope ip6addr? Might be required for link-local addresses at least? */ + ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(dns_table[i].ipaddr, ip6addr); + pbuf_free(p); + /* handle correct response */ + dns_correct_response(i, lwip_ntohl(ans.ttl)); + return; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + } + + /* skip this answer */ + if ((int)(res_idx + lwip_htons(ans.len)) > 0xFFFF) { + goto ignore_packet; /* ignore this packet */ + } + + res_idx = (u16_t)(res_idx + lwip_htons(ans.len)); + --nanswers; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if ((entry->reqaddrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6) || + (entry->reqaddrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4)) { + if (entry->reqaddrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6) { + /* IPv4 failed, try IPv6 */ + dns_table[i].reqaddrtype = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6; + } else { + /* IPv6 failed, try IPv4 */ + dns_table[i].reqaddrtype = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4; + } + + pbuf_free(p); + dns_table[i].state = DNS_STATE_NEW; + dns_check_entry(i); + return; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_recv: \"%s\": error in response\n", entry->name)); + } + + /* call callback to indicate error, clean up memory and return */ + pbuf_free(p); + dns_call_found(i, NULL); + dns_table[i].state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; + return; + } + } + } + +ignore_packet: + /* deallocate memory and return */ + pbuf_free(p); + return; +} + +/** + * Queues a new hostname to resolve and sends out a DNS query for that hostname + * + * @param name the hostname that is to be queried + * @param hostnamelen length of the hostname + * @param found a callback function to be called on success, failure or timeout + * @param callback_arg argument to pass to the callback function + * @return err_t return code. + */ +static err_t dns_enqueue(const char *name, size_t hostnamelen, dns_found_callback found, + void *callback_arg LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(u8_t dns_addrtype) LWIP_DNS_ISMDNS_ARG(u8_t is_mdns)) +{ + u8_t i; + u8_t lseq, lseqi; + struct dns_table_entry *entry = NULL; + size_t namelen; + struct dns_req_entry *req; + +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) + u8_t r; + + /* check for duplicate entries */ + for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { + if ((dns_table[i].state == DNS_STATE_ASKING) && + (lwip_strnicmp(name, dns_table[i].name, sizeof(dns_table[i].name)) == 0)) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (dns_table[i].reqaddrtype != dns_addrtype) { + /* requested address types don't match + this can lead to 2 concurrent requests, but mixing the address types + for the same host should not be that common */ + continue; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + /* this is a duplicate entry, find a free request entry */ + for (r = 0; r < DNS_MAX_REQUESTS; r++) { + if (dns_requests[r].found == 0) { + dns_requests[r].found = found; + dns_requests[r].arg = callback_arg; + dns_requests[r].dns_table_idx = i; + LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(dns_requests[r].reqaddrtype, dns_addrtype); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": duplicate request\n", name)); + return ERR_INPROGRESS; + } + } + } + } + + /* no duplicate entries found */ +#endif + + /* search an unused entry, or the oldest one */ + lseq = 0; + lseqi = DNS_TABLE_SIZE; + + for (i = 0; i < DNS_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { + entry = &dns_table[i]; + + /* is it an unused entry ? */ + if (entry->state == DNS_STATE_UNUSED) { + break; + } + + /* check if this is the oldest completed entry */ + if (entry->state == DNS_STATE_DONE) { + u8_t age = (u8_t)(dns_seqno - entry->seqno); + + if (age > lseq) { + lseq = age; + lseqi = i; + } + } + } + + /* if we don't have found an unused entry, use the oldest completed one */ + if (i == DNS_TABLE_SIZE) { + if ((lseqi >= DNS_TABLE_SIZE) || (dns_table[lseqi].state != DNS_STATE_DONE)) { + /* no entry can be used now, table is full */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": DNS entries table is full\n", name)); + return ERR_MEM; + } else { + /* use the oldest completed one */ + i = lseqi; + entry = &dns_table[i]; + } + } + +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING) != 0) + /* find a free request entry */ + req = NULL; + + for (r = 0; r < DNS_MAX_REQUESTS; r++) { + if (dns_requests[r].found == NULL) { + req = &dns_requests[r]; + break; + } + } + + if (req == NULL) { + /* no request entry can be used now, table is full */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": DNS request entries table is full\n", name)); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + req->dns_table_idx = i; +#else + /* in this configuration, the entry index is the same as the request index */ + req = &dns_requests[i]; +#endif + + /* use this entry */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": use DNS entry %" U16_F "\n", name, (u16_t)(i))); + + /* fill the entry */ + entry->state = DNS_STATE_NEW; + entry->seqno = dns_seqno; + LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(entry->reqaddrtype, dns_addrtype); + LWIP_DNS_SET_ADDRTYPE(req->reqaddrtype, dns_addrtype); + req->found = found; + req->arg = callback_arg; + namelen = LWIP_MIN(hostnamelen, DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH - 1); + MEMCPY(entry->name, name, namelen); + entry->name[namelen] = 0; + +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0) + entry->pcb_idx = dns_alloc_pcb(); + + if (entry->pcb_idx >= DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS) { + /* failed to get a UDP pcb */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": failed to allocate a pcb\n", name)); + entry->state = DNS_STATE_UNUSED; + req->found = NULL; + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_enqueue: \"%s\": use DNS pcb %" U16_F "\n", name, (u16_t)(entry->pcb_idx))); +#endif + +#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES + entry->is_mdns = is_mdns; +#endif + + dns_seqno++; + + /* force to send query without waiting timer */ + dns_check_entry(i); + + /* dns query is enqueued */ + return ERR_INPROGRESS; +} + +/** + * @ingroup dns + * Resolve a hostname (string) into an IP address. + * NON-BLOCKING callback version for use with raw API!!! + * + * Returns immediately with one of err_t return codes: + * - ERR_OK if hostname is a valid IP address string or the host + * name is already in the local names table. + * - ERR_INPROGRESS enqueue a request to be sent to the DNS server + * for resolution if no errors are present. + * - ERR_ARG: dns client not initialized or invalid hostname + * + * @param hostname the hostname that is to be queried + * @param addr pointer to a ip_addr_t where to store the address if it is already + * cached in the dns_table (only valid if ERR_OK is returned!) + * @param found a callback function to be called on success, failure or timeout (only if + * ERR_INPROGRESS is returned!) + * @param callback_arg argument to pass to the callback function + * @return a err_t return code. + */ +err_t dns_gethostbyname(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, dns_found_callback found, + void *callback_arg) +{ + return dns_gethostbyname_addrtype(hostname, addr, found, callback_arg, LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT); +} + +/** + * @ingroup dns + * Like dns_gethostbyname, but returned address type can be controlled: + * @param hostname the hostname that is to be queried + * @param addr pointer to a ip_addr_t where to store the address if it is already + * cached in the dns_table (only valid if ERR_OK is returned!) + * @param found a callback function to be called on success, failure or timeout (only if + * ERR_INPROGRESS is returned!) + * @param callback_arg argument to pass to the callback function + * @param dns_addrtype - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6: try to resolve IPv4 first, try IPv6 if IPv4 fails only + * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4: try to resolve IPv6 first, try IPv4 if IPv6 fails only + * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4: try to resolve IPv4 only + * - LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6: try to resolve IPv6 only + */ +err_t dns_gethostbyname_addrtype(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, dns_found_callback found, + void *callback_arg, u8_t dns_addrtype) +{ + size_t hostnamelen; +#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES + u8_t is_mdns; +#endif + + /* not initialized or no valid server yet, or invalid addr pointer + * or invalid hostname or invalid hostname length */ + if ((addr == NULL) || + (!hostname) || (!hostname[0])) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + +#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) == 0) + + if (dns_pcbs[0] == NULL) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + +#endif + hostnamelen = strlen(hostname); + + if (hostnamelen >= DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DNS_DEBUG, ("dns_gethostbyname: name too long to resolve")); + return ERR_ARG; + } + +#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + + if (strcmp(hostname, "localhost") == 0) { + ip_addr_set_loopback(LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IS_IPV6(dns_addrtype), addr); + return ERR_OK; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + + /* host name already in octet notation? set ip addr and return ERR_OK */ + if (ipaddr_aton(hostname, addr)) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if ((IP_IS_V6(addr) && (dns_addrtype != LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4)) || + (IP_IS_V4(addr) && (dns_addrtype != LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6))) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + { + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* already have this address cached? */ + if (dns_lookup(hostname, addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(dns_addrtype)) == ERR_OK) { + return ERR_OK; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if ((dns_addrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6) || (dns_addrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4)) { + /* fallback to 2nd IP type and try again to lookup */ + u8_t fallback; + + if (dns_addrtype == LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6) { + fallback = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6; + } else { + fallback = LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4; + } + + if (dns_lookup(hostname, addr LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(fallback)) == ERR_OK) { + return ERR_OK; + } + } + +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dns_addrtype); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES + + if (strstr(hostname, ".local") == &hostname[hostnamelen] - 6) { + is_mdns = 1; + } else { + is_mdns = 0; + } + + if (!is_mdns) +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES */ + { + /* prevent calling found callback if no server is set, return error instead */ + if (ip_addr_isany_val(dns_servers[0])) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + + /* queue query with specified callback */ + return dns_enqueue(hostname, hostnamelen, found, callback_arg LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_ARG(dns_addrtype) LWIP_DNS_ISMDNS_ARG(is_mdns)); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/inet_chksum.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/inet_chksum.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/inet_chksum.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/inet_chksum.c index 8a276880..ecde53b3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/inet_chksum.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/inet_chksum.c @@ -1,618 +1,618 @@ -/** - * @file - * Internet checksum functions.\n - * - * These are some reference implementations of the checksum algorithm, with the - * aim of being simple, correct and fully portable. Checksumming is the - * first thing you would want to optimize for your platform. If you create - * your own version, link it in and in your cc.h put: - * - * \#define LWIP_CHKSUM your_checksum_routine - * - * Or you can select from the implementations below by defining - * LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM to 1, 2 or 3. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#include - -#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM -#define LWIP_CHKSUM lwip_standard_chksum -#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM -#define LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM 2 -#endif -u16_t lwip_standard_chksum(const void *dataptr, int len); -#endif -/* If none set: */ -#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM -#define LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM 0 -#endif - -#if (LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM == 1) /* Version #1 */ -/** - * lwip checksum - * - * @param dataptr points to start of data to be summed at any boundary - * @param len length of data to be summed - * @return host order (!) lwip checksum (non-inverted Internet sum) - * - * @note accumulator size limits summable length to 64k - * @note host endianess is irrelevant (p3 RFC1071) - */ -u16_t lwip_standard_chksum(const void *dataptr, int len) -{ - u32_t acc; - u16_t src; - const u8_t *octetptr; - - acc = 0; - /* dataptr may be at odd or even addresses */ - octetptr = (const u8_t *)dataptr; - - while (len > 1) { - /* declare first octet as most significant - thus assume network order, ignoring host order */ - src = (*octetptr) << 8; - octetptr++; - /* declare second octet as least significant */ - src |= (*octetptr); - octetptr++; - acc += src; - len -= 2; - } - - if (len > 0) { - /* accumulate remaining octet */ - src = (*octetptr) << 8; - acc += src; - } - - /* add deferred carry bits */ - acc = (acc >> 16) + (acc & 0x0000ffffUL); - - if ((acc & 0xffff0000UL) != 0) { - acc = (acc >> 16) + (acc & 0x0000ffffUL); - } - - /* This maybe a little confusing: reorder sum using lwip_htons() - instead of lwip_ntohs() since it has a little less call overhead. - The caller must invert bits for Internet sum ! */ - return lwip_htons((u16_t)acc); -} -#endif - -#if (LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM == 2) /* Alternative version #2 */ -/* - * Curt McDowell - * Broadcom Corp. - * csm@broadcom.com - * - * IP checksum two bytes at a time with support for - * unaligned buffer. - * Works for len up to and including 0x20000. - * by Curt McDowell, Broadcom Corp. 12/08/2005 - * - * @param dataptr points to start of data to be summed at any boundary - * @param len length of data to be summed - * @return host order (!) lwip checksum (non-inverted Internet sum) - */ -u16_t lwip_standard_chksum(const void *dataptr, int len) -{ - const u8_t *pb = (const u8_t *)dataptr; - const u16_t *ps; - u16_t t = 0; - u32_t sum = 0; - int odd = ((mem_ptr_t)pb & 1); - - /* Get aligned to u16_t */ - if (odd && len > 0) { - ((u8_t *)&t)[1] = *pb++; - len--; - } - - /* Add the bulk of the data */ - ps = (const u16_t *)(const void *)pb; - - while (len > 1) { - sum += *ps++; - len -= 2; - } - - /* Consume left-over byte, if any */ - if (len > 0) { - ((u8_t *)&t)[0] = *(const u8_t *)ps; - } - - /* Add end bytes */ - sum += t; - - /* Fold 32-bit sum to 16 bits - calling this twice is probably faster than if statements... */ - sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); - sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); - - /* Swap if alignment was odd */ - if (odd) { - sum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(sum); - } - - return (u16_t)sum; -} -#endif - -#if (LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM == 3) /* Alternative version #3 */ -/** - * An optimized checksum routine. Basically, it uses loop-unrolling on - * the checksum loop, treating the head and tail bytes specially, whereas - * the inner loop acts on 8 bytes at a time. - * - * @arg start of buffer to be checksummed. May be an odd byte address. - * @len number of bytes in the buffer to be checksummed. - * @return host order (!) lwip checksum (non-inverted Internet sum) - * - * by Curt McDowell, Broadcom Corp. December 8th, 2005 - */ -u16_t lwip_standard_chksum(const void *dataptr, int len) -{ - const u8_t *pb = (const u8_t *)dataptr; - const u16_t *ps; - u16_t t = 0; - const u32_t *pl; - u32_t sum = 0, tmp; - /* starts at odd byte address? */ - int odd = ((mem_ptr_t)pb & 1); - - if (odd && len > 0) { - ((u8_t *)&t)[1] = *pb++; - len--; - } - - ps = (const u16_t *)(const void *)pb; - - if (((mem_ptr_t)ps & 3) && len > 1) { - sum += *ps++; - len -= 2; - } - - pl = (const u32_t *)(const void *)ps; - - while (len > 7) { - tmp = sum + *pl++; /* ping */ - - if (tmp < sum) { - tmp++; /* add back carry */ - } - - sum = tmp + *pl++; /* pong */ - - if (sum < tmp) { - sum++; /* add back carry */ - } - - len -= 8; - } - - /* make room in upper bits */ - sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); - - ps = (const u16_t *)pl; - - /* 16-bit aligned word remaining? */ - while (len > 1) { - sum += *ps++; - len -= 2; - } - - /* dangling tail byte remaining? */ - if (len > 0) /* include odd byte */ - { - ((u8_t *)&t)[0] = *(const u8_t *)ps; - } - - sum += t; /* add end bytes */ - - /* Fold 32-bit sum to 16 bits - calling this twice is probably faster than if statements... */ - sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); - sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); - - if (odd) { - sum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(sum); - } - - return (u16_t)sum; -} -#endif - -/** Parts of the pseudo checksum which are common to IPv4 and IPv6 */ -static u16_t inet_cksum_pseudo_base(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, u32_t acc) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - int swapped = 0; - - /* iterate through all pbuf in chain */ - for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): checksumming pbuf %p (has next %p) \n", - (void *)q, (void *)q->next)); - acc += LWIP_CHKSUM(q->payload, q->len); - /*LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): unwrapped lwip_chksum()=%"X32_F" \n", acc));*/ - /* just executing this next line is probably faster that the if statement needed - to check whether we really need to execute it, and does no harm */ - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - - if (q->len % 2 != 0) { - swapped = !swapped; - acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); - } - - /*LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): wrapped lwip_chksum()=%"X32_F" \n", acc));*/ - } - - if (swapped) { - acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); - } - - acc += (u32_t)lwip_htons((u16_t)proto); - acc += (u32_t)lwip_htons(proto_len); - - /* Fold 32-bit sum to 16 bits - calling this twice is probably faster than if statements... */ - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): pbuf chain lwip_chksum()=%" X32_F "\n", acc)); - return (u16_t) ~(acc & 0xffffUL); -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/* inet_chksum_pseudo: - * - * Calculates the IPv4 pseudo Internet checksum used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. - * IP addresses are expected to be in network byte order. - * - * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) - * @param src source ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param dst destination ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto ip protocol (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto_len length of the ip data part (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header - */ -u16_t inet_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest) -{ - u32_t acc; - u32_t addr; - - addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(src); - acc = (addr & 0xffffUL); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); - addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(dest); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); - /* fold down to 16 bits */ - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - - return inet_cksum_pseudo_base(p, proto, proto_len, acc); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** - * Calculates the checksum with IPv6 pseudo header used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. - * IPv6 addresses are expected to be in network byte order. - * - * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) - * @param proto ipv6 protocol/next header (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto_len length of the ipv6 payload (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param src source ipv6 address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param dest destination ipv6 address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header - */ -u16_t ip6_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest) -{ - u32_t acc = 0; - u32_t addr; - u8_t addr_part; - - for (addr_part = 0; addr_part < 4; addr_part++) { - addr = src->addr[addr_part]; - acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); - addr = dest->addr[addr_part]; - acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); - } - - /* fold down to 16 bits */ - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - - return inet_cksum_pseudo_base(p, proto, proto_len, acc); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/* ip_chksum_pseudo: - * - * Calculates the IPv4 or IPv6 pseudo Internet checksum used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. - * IP addresses are expected to be in network byte order. - * - * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) - * @param src source ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param dst destination ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto ip protocol (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto_len length of the ip data part (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header - */ -u16_t ip_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dest) -{ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (IP_IS_V6(dest)) { - return ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, proto, proto_len, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest)); - } -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - { - return inet_chksum_pseudo(p, proto, proto_len, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest)); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -} - -/** Parts of the pseudo checksum which are common to IPv4 and IPv6 */ -static u16_t inet_cksum_pseudo_partial_base(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - u16_t chksum_len, u32_t acc) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - int swapped = 0; - u16_t chklen; - - /* iterate through all pbuf in chain */ - for (q = p; (q != NULL) && (chksum_len > 0); q = q->next) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): checksumming pbuf %p (has next %p) \n", - (void *)q, (void *)q->next)); - chklen = q->len; - - if (chklen > chksum_len) { - chklen = chksum_len; - } - - acc += LWIP_CHKSUM(q->payload, chklen); - chksum_len = (u16_t)(chksum_len - chklen); - LWIP_ASSERT("delete me", chksum_len < 0x7fff); - /*LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): unwrapped lwip_chksum()=%"X32_F" \n", acc));*/ - /* fold the upper bit down */ - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - - if (q->len % 2 != 0) { - swapped = !swapped; - acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); - } - - /*LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): wrapped lwip_chksum()=%"X32_F" \n", acc));*/ - } - - if (swapped) { - acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); - } - - acc += (u32_t)lwip_htons((u16_t)proto); - acc += (u32_t)lwip_htons(proto_len); - - /* Fold 32-bit sum to 16 bits - calling this twice is probably faster than if statements... */ - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): pbuf chain lwip_chksum()=%" X32_F "\n", acc)); - return (u16_t) ~(acc & 0xffffUL); -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/* inet_chksum_pseudo_partial: - * - * Calculates the IPv4 pseudo Internet checksum used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. - * IP addresses are expected to be in network byte order. - * - * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) - * @param src source ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param dst destination ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto ip protocol (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto_len length of the ip data part (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header - */ -u16_t inet_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - u16_t chksum_len, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest) -{ - u32_t acc; - u32_t addr; - - addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(src); - acc = (addr & 0xffffUL); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); - addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(dest); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); - /* fold down to 16 bits */ - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - - return inet_cksum_pseudo_partial_base(p, proto, proto_len, chksum_len, acc); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** - * Calculates the checksum with IPv6 pseudo header used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. - * IPv6 addresses are expected to be in network byte order. Will only compute for a - * portion of the payload. - * - * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) - * @param proto ipv6 protocol/next header (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto_len length of the ipv6 payload (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param chksum_len number of payload bytes used to compute chksum - * @param src source ipv6 address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param dest destination ipv6 address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header - */ -u16_t ip6_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - u16_t chksum_len, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest) -{ - u32_t acc = 0; - u32_t addr; - u8_t addr_part; - - for (addr_part = 0; addr_part < 4; addr_part++) { - addr = src->addr[addr_part]; - acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); - addr = dest->addr[addr_part]; - acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); - acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); - } - - /* fold down to 16 bits */ - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - - return inet_cksum_pseudo_partial_base(p, proto, proto_len, chksum_len, acc); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/* ip_chksum_pseudo_partial: - * - * Calculates the IPv4 or IPv6 pseudo Internet checksum used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. - * - * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) - * @param src source ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param dst destination ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto ip protocol (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @param proto_len length of the ip data part (used for checksum of pseudo header) - * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header - */ -u16_t ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - u16_t chksum_len, const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dest) -{ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (IP_IS_V6(dest)) { - return ip6_chksum_pseudo_partial(p, proto, proto_len, chksum_len, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest)); - } -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - { - return inet_chksum_pseudo_partial(p, proto, proto_len, chksum_len, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest)); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -} - -/* inet_chksum: - * - * Calculates the Internet checksum over a portion of memory. Used primarily for IP - * and ICMP. - * - * @param dataptr start of the buffer to calculate the checksum (no alignment needed) - * @param len length of the buffer to calculate the checksum - * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header - */ - -u16_t inet_chksum(const void *dataptr, u16_t len) -{ - return (u16_t) ~(unsigned int)LWIP_CHKSUM(dataptr, len); -} - -/** - * Calculate a checksum over a chain of pbufs (without pseudo-header, much like - * inet_chksum only pbufs are used). - * - * @param p pbuf chain over that the checksum should be calculated - * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header - */ -u16_t inet_chksum_pbuf(struct pbuf *p) -{ - u32_t acc; - struct pbuf *q; - int swapped = 0; - - acc = 0; - - for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - acc += LWIP_CHKSUM(q->payload, q->len); - acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); - - if (q->len % 2 != 0) { - swapped = !swapped; - acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); - } - } - - if (swapped) { - acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); - } - - return (u16_t) ~(acc & 0xffffUL); -} - -/* These are some implementations for LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY, which copies data - * like MEMCPY but generates a checksum at the same time. Since this is a - * performance-sensitive function, you might want to create your own version - * in assembly targeted at your hardware by defining it in lwipopts.h: - * #define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst, src, len) your_chksum_copy(dst, src, len) - */ - -#if (LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM == 1) /* Version #1 */ -/** Safe but slow: first call MEMCPY, then call LWIP_CHKSUM. - * For architectures with big caches, data might still be in cache when - * generating the checksum after copying. - */ -u16_t lwip_chksum_copy(void *dst, const void *src, u16_t len) -{ - MEMCPY(dst, src, len); - return LWIP_CHKSUM(dst, len); -} -#endif /* (LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM == 1) */ +/** + * @file + * Internet checksum functions.\n + * + * These are some reference implementations of the checksum algorithm, with the + * aim of being simple, correct and fully portable. Checksumming is the + * first thing you would want to optimize for your platform. If you create + * your own version, link it in and in your cc.h put: + * + * \#define LWIP_CHKSUM your_checksum_routine + * + * Or you can select from the implementations below by defining + * LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM to 1, 2 or 3. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#include + +#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM +#define LWIP_CHKSUM lwip_standard_chksum +#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM +#define LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM 2 +#endif +u16_t lwip_standard_chksum(const void *dataptr, int len); +#endif +/* If none set: */ +#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM +#define LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM 0 +#endif + +#if (LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM == 1) /* Version #1 */ +/** + * lwip checksum + * + * @param dataptr points to start of data to be summed at any boundary + * @param len length of data to be summed + * @return host order (!) lwip checksum (non-inverted Internet sum) + * + * @note accumulator size limits summable length to 64k + * @note host endianess is irrelevant (p3 RFC1071) + */ +u16_t lwip_standard_chksum(const void *dataptr, int len) +{ + u32_t acc; + u16_t src; + const u8_t *octetptr; + + acc = 0; + /* dataptr may be at odd or even addresses */ + octetptr = (const u8_t *)dataptr; + + while (len > 1) { + /* declare first octet as most significant + thus assume network order, ignoring host order */ + src = (*octetptr) << 8; + octetptr++; + /* declare second octet as least significant */ + src |= (*octetptr); + octetptr++; + acc += src; + len -= 2; + } + + if (len > 0) { + /* accumulate remaining octet */ + src = (*octetptr) << 8; + acc += src; + } + + /* add deferred carry bits */ + acc = (acc >> 16) + (acc & 0x0000ffffUL); + + if ((acc & 0xffff0000UL) != 0) { + acc = (acc >> 16) + (acc & 0x0000ffffUL); + } + + /* This maybe a little confusing: reorder sum using lwip_htons() + instead of lwip_ntohs() since it has a little less call overhead. + The caller must invert bits for Internet sum ! */ + return lwip_htons((u16_t)acc); +} +#endif + +#if (LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM == 2) /* Alternative version #2 */ +/* + * Curt McDowell + * Broadcom Corp. + * csm@broadcom.com + * + * IP checksum two bytes at a time with support for + * unaligned buffer. + * Works for len up to and including 0x20000. + * by Curt McDowell, Broadcom Corp. 12/08/2005 + * + * @param dataptr points to start of data to be summed at any boundary + * @param len length of data to be summed + * @return host order (!) lwip checksum (non-inverted Internet sum) + */ +u16_t lwip_standard_chksum(const void *dataptr, int len) +{ + const u8_t *pb = (const u8_t *)dataptr; + const u16_t *ps; + u16_t t = 0; + u32_t sum = 0; + int odd = ((mem_ptr_t)pb & 1); + + /* Get aligned to u16_t */ + if (odd && len > 0) { + ((u8_t *)&t)[1] = *pb++; + len--; + } + + /* Add the bulk of the data */ + ps = (const u16_t *)(const void *)pb; + + while (len > 1) { + sum += *ps++; + len -= 2; + } + + /* Consume left-over byte, if any */ + if (len > 0) { + ((u8_t *)&t)[0] = *(const u8_t *)ps; + } + + /* Add end bytes */ + sum += t; + + /* Fold 32-bit sum to 16 bits + calling this twice is probably faster than if statements... */ + sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); + sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); + + /* Swap if alignment was odd */ + if (odd) { + sum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(sum); + } + + return (u16_t)sum; +} +#endif + +#if (LWIP_CHKSUM_ALGORITHM == 3) /* Alternative version #3 */ +/** + * An optimized checksum routine. Basically, it uses loop-unrolling on + * the checksum loop, treating the head and tail bytes specially, whereas + * the inner loop acts on 8 bytes at a time. + * + * @arg start of buffer to be checksummed. May be an odd byte address. + * @len number of bytes in the buffer to be checksummed. + * @return host order (!) lwip checksum (non-inverted Internet sum) + * + * by Curt McDowell, Broadcom Corp. December 8th, 2005 + */ +u16_t lwip_standard_chksum(const void *dataptr, int len) +{ + const u8_t *pb = (const u8_t *)dataptr; + const u16_t *ps; + u16_t t = 0; + const u32_t *pl; + u32_t sum = 0, tmp; + /* starts at odd byte address? */ + int odd = ((mem_ptr_t)pb & 1); + + if (odd && len > 0) { + ((u8_t *)&t)[1] = *pb++; + len--; + } + + ps = (const u16_t *)(const void *)pb; + + if (((mem_ptr_t)ps & 3) && len > 1) { + sum += *ps++; + len -= 2; + } + + pl = (const u32_t *)(const void *)ps; + + while (len > 7) { + tmp = sum + *pl++; /* ping */ + + if (tmp < sum) { + tmp++; /* add back carry */ + } + + sum = tmp + *pl++; /* pong */ + + if (sum < tmp) { + sum++; /* add back carry */ + } + + len -= 8; + } + + /* make room in upper bits */ + sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); + + ps = (const u16_t *)pl; + + /* 16-bit aligned word remaining? */ + while (len > 1) { + sum += *ps++; + len -= 2; + } + + /* dangling tail byte remaining? */ + if (len > 0) /* include odd byte */ + { + ((u8_t *)&t)[0] = *(const u8_t *)ps; + } + + sum += t; /* add end bytes */ + + /* Fold 32-bit sum to 16 bits + calling this twice is probably faster than if statements... */ + sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); + sum = FOLD_U32T(sum); + + if (odd) { + sum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(sum); + } + + return (u16_t)sum; +} +#endif + +/** Parts of the pseudo checksum which are common to IPv4 and IPv6 */ +static u16_t inet_cksum_pseudo_base(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, u32_t acc) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + int swapped = 0; + + /* iterate through all pbuf in chain */ + for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): checksumming pbuf %p (has next %p) \n", + (void *)q, (void *)q->next)); + acc += LWIP_CHKSUM(q->payload, q->len); + /*LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): unwrapped lwip_chksum()=%"X32_F" \n", acc));*/ + /* just executing this next line is probably faster that the if statement needed + to check whether we really need to execute it, and does no harm */ + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + + if (q->len % 2 != 0) { + swapped = !swapped; + acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); + } + + /*LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): wrapped lwip_chksum()=%"X32_F" \n", acc));*/ + } + + if (swapped) { + acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); + } + + acc += (u32_t)lwip_htons((u16_t)proto); + acc += (u32_t)lwip_htons(proto_len); + + /* Fold 32-bit sum to 16 bits + calling this twice is probably faster than if statements... */ + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): pbuf chain lwip_chksum()=%" X32_F "\n", acc)); + return (u16_t) ~(acc & 0xffffUL); +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/* inet_chksum_pseudo: + * + * Calculates the IPv4 pseudo Internet checksum used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. + * IP addresses are expected to be in network byte order. + * + * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) + * @param src source ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param dst destination ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto ip protocol (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto_len length of the ip data part (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header + */ +u16_t inet_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest) +{ + u32_t acc; + u32_t addr; + + addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(src); + acc = (addr & 0xffffUL); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); + addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(dest); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); + /* fold down to 16 bits */ + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + + return inet_cksum_pseudo_base(p, proto, proto_len, acc); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** + * Calculates the checksum with IPv6 pseudo header used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. + * IPv6 addresses are expected to be in network byte order. + * + * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) + * @param proto ipv6 protocol/next header (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto_len length of the ipv6 payload (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param src source ipv6 address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param dest destination ipv6 address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header + */ +u16_t ip6_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest) +{ + u32_t acc = 0; + u32_t addr; + u8_t addr_part; + + for (addr_part = 0; addr_part < 4; addr_part++) { + addr = src->addr[addr_part]; + acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); + addr = dest->addr[addr_part]; + acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); + } + + /* fold down to 16 bits */ + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + + return inet_cksum_pseudo_base(p, proto, proto_len, acc); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/* ip_chksum_pseudo: + * + * Calculates the IPv4 or IPv6 pseudo Internet checksum used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. + * IP addresses are expected to be in network byte order. + * + * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) + * @param src source ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param dst destination ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto ip protocol (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto_len length of the ip data part (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header + */ +u16_t ip_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dest) +{ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (IP_IS_V6(dest)) { + return ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, proto, proto_len, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest)); + } +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + { + return inet_chksum_pseudo(p, proto, proto_len, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest)); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +} + +/** Parts of the pseudo checksum which are common to IPv4 and IPv6 */ +static u16_t inet_cksum_pseudo_partial_base(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + u16_t chksum_len, u32_t acc) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + int swapped = 0; + u16_t chklen; + + /* iterate through all pbuf in chain */ + for (q = p; (q != NULL) && (chksum_len > 0); q = q->next) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): checksumming pbuf %p (has next %p) \n", + (void *)q, (void *)q->next)); + chklen = q->len; + + if (chklen > chksum_len) { + chklen = chksum_len; + } + + acc += LWIP_CHKSUM(q->payload, chklen); + chksum_len = (u16_t)(chksum_len - chklen); + LWIP_ASSERT("delete me", chksum_len < 0x7fff); + /*LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): unwrapped lwip_chksum()=%"X32_F" \n", acc));*/ + /* fold the upper bit down */ + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + + if (q->len % 2 != 0) { + swapped = !swapped; + acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); + } + + /*LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): wrapped lwip_chksum()=%"X32_F" \n", acc));*/ + } + + if (swapped) { + acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); + } + + acc += (u32_t)lwip_htons((u16_t)proto); + acc += (u32_t)lwip_htons(proto_len); + + /* Fold 32-bit sum to 16 bits + calling this twice is probably faster than if statements... */ + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + LWIP_DEBUGF(INET_DEBUG, ("inet_chksum_pseudo(): pbuf chain lwip_chksum()=%" X32_F "\n", acc)); + return (u16_t) ~(acc & 0xffffUL); +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/* inet_chksum_pseudo_partial: + * + * Calculates the IPv4 pseudo Internet checksum used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. + * IP addresses are expected to be in network byte order. + * + * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) + * @param src source ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param dst destination ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto ip protocol (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto_len length of the ip data part (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header + */ +u16_t inet_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + u16_t chksum_len, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest) +{ + u32_t acc; + u32_t addr; + + addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(src); + acc = (addr & 0xffffUL); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); + addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(dest); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); + /* fold down to 16 bits */ + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + + return inet_cksum_pseudo_partial_base(p, proto, proto_len, chksum_len, acc); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** + * Calculates the checksum with IPv6 pseudo header used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. + * IPv6 addresses are expected to be in network byte order. Will only compute for a + * portion of the payload. + * + * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) + * @param proto ipv6 protocol/next header (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto_len length of the ipv6 payload (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param chksum_len number of payload bytes used to compute chksum + * @param src source ipv6 address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param dest destination ipv6 address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header + */ +u16_t ip6_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + u16_t chksum_len, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest) +{ + u32_t acc = 0; + u32_t addr; + u8_t addr_part; + + for (addr_part = 0; addr_part < 4; addr_part++) { + addr = src->addr[addr_part]; + acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); + addr = dest->addr[addr_part]; + acc = (u32_t)(acc + (addr & 0xffffUL)); + acc = (u32_t)(acc + ((addr >> 16) & 0xffffUL)); + } + + /* fold down to 16 bits */ + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + + return inet_cksum_pseudo_partial_base(p, proto, proto_len, chksum_len, acc); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/* ip_chksum_pseudo_partial: + * + * Calculates the IPv4 or IPv6 pseudo Internet checksum used by TCP and UDP for a pbuf chain. + * + * @param p chain of pbufs over that a checksum should be calculated (ip data part) + * @param src source ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param dst destination ip address (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto ip protocol (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @param proto_len length of the ip data part (used for checksum of pseudo header) + * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header + */ +u16_t ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + u16_t chksum_len, const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dest) +{ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (IP_IS_V6(dest)) { + return ip6_chksum_pseudo_partial(p, proto, proto_len, chksum_len, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest)); + } +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + { + return inet_chksum_pseudo_partial(p, proto, proto_len, chksum_len, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest)); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +} + +/* inet_chksum: + * + * Calculates the Internet checksum over a portion of memory. Used primarily for IP + * and ICMP. + * + * @param dataptr start of the buffer to calculate the checksum (no alignment needed) + * @param len length of the buffer to calculate the checksum + * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header + */ + +u16_t inet_chksum(const void *dataptr, u16_t len) +{ + return (u16_t) ~(unsigned int)LWIP_CHKSUM(dataptr, len); +} + +/** + * Calculate a checksum over a chain of pbufs (without pseudo-header, much like + * inet_chksum only pbufs are used). + * + * @param p pbuf chain over that the checksum should be calculated + * @return checksum (as u16_t) to be saved directly in the protocol header + */ +u16_t inet_chksum_pbuf(struct pbuf *p) +{ + u32_t acc; + struct pbuf *q; + int swapped = 0; + + acc = 0; + + for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + acc += LWIP_CHKSUM(q->payload, q->len); + acc = FOLD_U32T(acc); + + if (q->len % 2 != 0) { + swapped = !swapped; + acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); + } + } + + if (swapped) { + acc = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(acc); + } + + return (u16_t) ~(acc & 0xffffUL); +} + +/* These are some implementations for LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY, which copies data + * like MEMCPY but generates a checksum at the same time. Since this is a + * performance-sensitive function, you might want to create your own version + * in assembly targeted at your hardware by defining it in lwipopts.h: + * #define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst, src, len) your_chksum_copy(dst, src, len) + */ + +#if (LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM == 1) /* Version #1 */ +/** Safe but slow: first call MEMCPY, then call LWIP_CHKSUM. + * For architectures with big caches, data might still be in cache when + * generating the checksum after copying. + */ +u16_t lwip_chksum_copy(void *dst, const void *src, u16_t len) +{ + MEMCPY(dst, src, len); + return LWIP_CHKSUM(dst, len); +} +#endif /* (LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM == 1) */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/init.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/init.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/init.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/init.c index 2549f8e7..ff4d5c68 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/init.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/init.c @@ -1,386 +1,386 @@ -/** - * @file - * Modules initialization - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/init.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/raw.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -#include "lwip/api.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#ifndef LWIP_SKIP_PACKING_CHECK - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct packed_struct_test { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t dummy1); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t dummy2); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#define PACKED_STRUCT_TEST_EXPECTED_SIZE 5 - -#endif - -/* Compile-time sanity checks for configuration errors. - * These can be done independently of LWIP_DEBUG, without penalty. - */ -#ifndef BYTE_ORDER -#error "BYTE_ORDER is not defined, you have to define it in your cc.h" -#endif -#if (!IP_SOF_BROADCAST && IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV) -#error "If you want to use broadcast filter per pcb on recv operations, you have to define IP_SOF_BROADCAST=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (!LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE) -#error "If you want to use UDP Lite, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (!LWIP_UDP && LWIP_DHCP) -#error "If you want to use DHCP, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (!LWIP_UDP && !LWIP_RAW && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS) -#error "If you want to use LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 and/or LWIP_RAW=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (!LWIP_UDP && LWIP_DNS) -#error "If you want to use DNS, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC /* MEMP_NUM_* checks are disabled when not using the pool allocator */ -#if (LWIP_ARP && ARP_QUEUEING && (MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE <= 0)) -#error "If you want to use ARP Queueing, you have to define MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE>=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_RAW && (MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB <= 0)) -#error "If you want to use RAW, you have to define MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB>=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_UDP && (MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB <= 0)) -#error "If you want to use UDP, you have to define MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB>=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && (MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB <= 0)) -#error "If you want to use TCP, you have to define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB>=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_IGMP && (MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP <= 1)) -#error "If you want to use IGMP, you have to define MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP>1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_IGMP && !LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS) -#error "If you want to use IGMP, you have to define LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS==1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_IGMP && !LWIP_IPV4) -#error "IGMP needs LWIP_IPV4 enabled in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if ((LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET) && (MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API <= 0)) -#error "If you want to use Sequential API, you have to define MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API>=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -/* There must be sufficient timeouts, taking into account requirements of the subsystems. */ -#if LWIP_TIMERS && (MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT < LWIP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT_INTERNAL) -#error "MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT is too low to accomodate all required timeouts" -#endif -#if (IP_REASSEMBLY && (MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS)) -#error "MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS doesn't make sense since each struct ip_reassdata must hold 2 pbufs at least!" -#endif -#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE -#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_WND > 0xffffffff)) -#error "If you want to use TCP, TCP_WND must fit in an u32_t, so, you have to reduce it in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_RCV_SCALE > 14)) -#error "The maximum valid window scale value is 14!" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_WND > (0xFFFFU << TCP_RCV_SCALE))) -#error "TCP_WND is bigger than the configured LWIP_WND_SCALE allows!" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && ((TCP_WND >> TCP_RCV_SCALE) == 0)) -#error "TCP_WND is too small for the configured LWIP_WND_SCALE (results in zero window)!" -#endif -#else /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ -#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_WND > 0xffff)) -#error "If you want to use TCP, TCP_WND must fit in an u16_t, so, you have to reduce it in your lwipopts.h (or enable window scaling)" -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ -#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_SND_QUEUELEN > 0xffff)) -#error "If you want to use TCP, TCP_SND_QUEUELEN must fit in an u16_t, so, you have to reduce it in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_SND_QUEUELEN < 2)) -#error "TCP_SND_QUEUELEN must be at least 2 for no-copy TCP writes to work" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && ((TCP_MAXRTX > 12) || (TCP_SYNMAXRTX > 12))) -#error "If you want to use TCP, TCP_MAXRTX and TCP_SYNMAXRTX must less or equal to 12 (due to tcp_backoff table), so, you have to reduce them in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG && ((TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG < 0) || (TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG > 0xff))) -#error "If you want to use TCP backlog, TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG must fit into an u8_t" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT && !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ) -#error "To use LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT, TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ needs to be enabled" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT && (LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM < 1)) -#error "LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM must be greater than 0" -#endif -#if (LWIP_NETIF_API && (NO_SYS == 1)) -#error "If you want to use NETIF API, you have to define NO_SYS=0 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if ((LWIP_SOCKET || LWIP_NETCONN) && (NO_SYS == 1)) -#error "If you want to use Sequential API, you have to define NO_SYS=0 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_PPP_API && (NO_SYS == 1)) -#error "If you want to use PPP API, you have to define NO_SYS=0 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_PPP_API && (PPP_SUPPORT == 0)) -#error "If you want to use PPP API, you have to enable PPP_SUPPORT in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (((!LWIP_DHCP) || (!LWIP_AUTOIP)) && LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP) -#error "If you want to use DHCP/AUTOIP cooperation mode, you have to define LWIP_DHCP=1 and LWIP_AUTOIP=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (((!LWIP_DHCP) || (!LWIP_ARP)) && DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK) -#error "If you want to use DHCP ARP checking, you have to define LWIP_DHCP=1 and LWIP_ARP=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (!LWIP_ARP && LWIP_AUTOIP) -#error "If you want to use AUTOIP, you have to define LWIP_ARP=1 in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_TCP && ((LWIP_EVENT_API && LWIP_CALLBACK_API) || (!LWIP_EVENT_API && !LWIP_CALLBACK_API))) -#error "One and exactly one of LWIP_EVENT_API and LWIP_CALLBACK_API has to be enabled in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_EVENT_API) -#error "The application layered tcp API does not work with LWIP_EVENT_API" -#endif -#if (MEM_LIBC_MALLOC && MEM_USE_POOLS) -#error "MEM_LIBC_MALLOC and MEM_USE_POOLS may not both be simultaneously enabled in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (MEM_USE_POOLS && !MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS) -#error "MEM_USE_POOLS requires custom pools (MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS) to be enabled in your lwipopts.h" -#endif -#if (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE <= MEM_ALIGNMENT) -#error "PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE must be greater than MEM_ALIGNMENT or the offset may take the full first pbuf" -#endif -#if (DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST && !DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC && !(defined(DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT))) -#error "you have to define define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT {{'host1', 0x123}, {'host2', 0x234}} to initialize DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST" -#endif -#if PPP_SUPPORT && !PPPOS_SUPPORT && !PPPOE_SUPPORT && !PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT -#error "PPP_SUPPORT needs at least one of PPPOS_SUPPORT, PPPOE_SUPPORT or PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT turned on" -#endif -#if PPP_SUPPORT && !PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && !PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -#error "PPP_SUPPORT needs PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT and/or PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT turned on" -#endif -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && !LWIP_IPV4 -#error "PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT needs LWIP_IPV4 turned on" -#endif -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT && !LWIP_IPV6 -#error "PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT needs LWIP_IPV6 turned on" -#endif -#if !LWIP_ETHERNET && (LWIP_ARP || PPPOE_SUPPORT) -#error "LWIP_ETHERNET needs to be turned on for LWIP_ARP or PPPOE_SUPPORT" -#endif -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT && !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -#error "When using LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT, LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING must be enabled, too" -#endif -#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF && !TCP_OVERSIZE -#error "LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF needs TCP_OVERSIZE enabled to create single-pbuf TCP packets" -#endif -#if LWIP_NETCONN && LWIP_TCP -#if NETCONN_COPY != TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY -#error "NETCONN_COPY != TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY" -#endif -#if NETCONN_MORE != TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE -#error "NETCONN_MORE != TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE" -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN && LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_SOCKET -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ - -/* Compile-time checks for deprecated options. - */ -#ifdef MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG -#error "MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." -#endif -#ifdef TCP_REXMIT_DEBUG -#error "TCP_REXMIT_DEBUG option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." -#endif -#ifdef RAW_STATS -#error "RAW_STATS option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." -#endif -#ifdef ETHARP_QUEUE_FIRST -#error "ETHARP_QUEUE_FIRST option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." -#endif -#ifdef ETHARP_ALWAYS_INSERT -#error "ETHARP_ALWAYS_INSERT option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." -#endif -#if !NO_SYS && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING && LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX && !defined(LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX_ALLOWED) -#error "LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX cannot prevent priority inversion. It is recommended to implement priority-aware mutexes. (Define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX_ALLOWED to disable this error.)" -#endif - -#ifndef LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS -#define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS 0 -#endif -#ifndef LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS -#define LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS 0 -#endif - -/* MEMP sanity checks */ -#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC -#if !LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS -#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET -#if !MEMP_NUM_NETCONN && LWIP_SOCKET -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: MEMP_NUM_NETCONN cannot be 0 when using sockets!" -#endif -#else /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ -#if MEMP_NUM_NETCONN > (MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB + MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN + MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB + MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB) -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: MEMP_NUM_NETCONN should be less than the sum of MEMP_NUM_{TCP,RAW,UDP}_PCB+MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ -#endif /* !LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS */ -#if MEM_USE_POOLS -#error "MEMP_MEM_MALLOC and MEM_USE_POOLS cannot be enabled at the same time" -#endif -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE -#error "LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE doesn't make sense with MEMP_MEM_MALLOC" -#endif -#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ - -/* TCP sanity checks */ -#if !LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS -#if LWIP_TCP -#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC && (MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG < TCP_SND_QUEUELEN) -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG should be at least as big as TCP_SND_QUEUELEN. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." -#endif -#if TCP_SND_BUF < (2 * TCP_MSS) -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SND_BUF must be at least as much as (2 * TCP_MSS) for things to work smoothly. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." -#endif -#if TCP_SND_QUEUELEN < (2 * (TCP_SND_BUF / TCP_MSS)) -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SND_QUEUELEN must be at least as much as (2 * TCP_SND_BUF/TCP_MSS) for things to work. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." -#endif -#if TCP_SNDLOWAT >= TCP_SND_BUF -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SNDLOWAT must be less than TCP_SND_BUF. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." -#endif -#if TCP_SNDLOWAT >= (0xFFFF - (4 * TCP_MSS)) -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SNDLOWAT must at least be 4*MSS below u16_t overflow!" -#endif -#if TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT >= TCP_SND_QUEUELEN -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT must be less than TCP_SND_QUEUELEN. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." -#endif -#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC && PBUF_POOL_SIZE && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE <= (PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE does not provide enough space for protocol headers. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." -#endif -#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC && PBUF_POOL_SIZE && (TCP_WND > (PBUF_POOL_SIZE * (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - (PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)))) -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_WND is larger than space provided by PBUF_POOL_SIZE * (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - protocol headers). If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." -#endif -#if TCP_WND < TCP_MSS -#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_WND is smaller than MSS. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#endif /* !LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS */ - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_nosys - * Initialize all modules. - * Use this in NO_SYS mode. Use tcpip_init() otherwise. - */ -void lwip_init(void) -{ -#ifndef LWIP_SKIP_CONST_CHECK - int a = 0; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(a); - LWIP_ASSERT("LWIP_CONST_CAST not implemented correctly. Check your lwIP port.", LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &a) == &a); -#endif -#ifndef LWIP_SKIP_PACKING_CHECK - LWIP_ASSERT("Struct packing not implemented correctly. Check your lwIP port.", sizeof(struct packed_struct_test) == PACKED_STRUCT_TEST_EXPECTED_SIZE); -#endif - - /* Modules initialization */ - stats_init(); - // printf("stats_init\r\n"); -#if !NO_SYS - sys_init(); - // printf("sys_init\r\n"); -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - mem_init(); - memp_init(); - // printf("mem_init\r\n"); - pbuf_init(); - // printf("pbuf_init\r\n"); - netif_init(); - // printf("netif_init\r\n"); -#if LWIP_IPV4 - ip_init(); -#if LWIP_ARP - etharp_init(); -#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_RAW - raw_init(); -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ -#if LWIP_UDP - udp_init(); - // printf("udp_init\r\n"); -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - tcp_init(); - // printf("tcp_init\r\n"); -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_IGMP - igmp_init(); -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ -#if LWIP_DNS - dns_init(); -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if PPP_SUPPORT - ppp_init(); -#endif - -#if LWIP_TIMERS - sys_timeouts_init(); - // printf("sys time_init\r\n"); -#endif /* LWIP_TIMERS */ -} +/** + * @file + * Modules initialization + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/init.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/sockets.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/raw.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +#include "lwip/api.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#ifndef LWIP_SKIP_PACKING_CHECK + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct packed_struct_test { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t dummy1); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t dummy2); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#define PACKED_STRUCT_TEST_EXPECTED_SIZE 5 + +#endif + +/* Compile-time sanity checks for configuration errors. + * These can be done independently of LWIP_DEBUG, without penalty. + */ +#ifndef BYTE_ORDER +#error "BYTE_ORDER is not defined, you have to define it in your cc.h" +#endif +#if (!IP_SOF_BROADCAST && IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV) +#error "If you want to use broadcast filter per pcb on recv operations, you have to define IP_SOF_BROADCAST=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (!LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE) +#error "If you want to use UDP Lite, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (!LWIP_UDP && LWIP_DHCP) +#error "If you want to use DHCP, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (!LWIP_UDP && !LWIP_RAW && LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS) +#error "If you want to use LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 and/or LWIP_RAW=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (!LWIP_UDP && LWIP_DNS) +#error "If you want to use DNS, you have to define LWIP_UDP=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC /* MEMP_NUM_* checks are disabled when not using the pool allocator */ +#if (LWIP_ARP && ARP_QUEUEING && (MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE <= 0)) +#error "If you want to use ARP Queueing, you have to define MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE>=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_RAW && (MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB <= 0)) +#error "If you want to use RAW, you have to define MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB>=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_UDP && (MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB <= 0)) +#error "If you want to use UDP, you have to define MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB>=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && (MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB <= 0)) +#error "If you want to use TCP, you have to define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB>=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_IGMP && (MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP <= 1)) +#error "If you want to use IGMP, you have to define MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP>1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_IGMP && !LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS) +#error "If you want to use IGMP, you have to define LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS==1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_IGMP && !LWIP_IPV4) +#error "IGMP needs LWIP_IPV4 enabled in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if ((LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET) && (MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API <= 0)) +#error "If you want to use Sequential API, you have to define MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API>=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +/* There must be sufficient timeouts, taking into account requirements of the subsystems. */ +#if LWIP_TIMERS && (MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT < LWIP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT_INTERNAL) +#error "MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT is too low to accomodate all required timeouts" +#endif +#if (IP_REASSEMBLY && (MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS)) +#error "MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS doesn't make sense since each struct ip_reassdata must hold 2 pbufs at least!" +#endif +#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE +#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_WND > 0xffffffff)) +#error "If you want to use TCP, TCP_WND must fit in an u32_t, so, you have to reduce it in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_RCV_SCALE > 14)) +#error "The maximum valid window scale value is 14!" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_WND > (0xFFFFU << TCP_RCV_SCALE))) +#error "TCP_WND is bigger than the configured LWIP_WND_SCALE allows!" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && ((TCP_WND >> TCP_RCV_SCALE) == 0)) +#error "TCP_WND is too small for the configured LWIP_WND_SCALE (results in zero window)!" +#endif +#else /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ +#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_WND > 0xffff)) +#error "If you want to use TCP, TCP_WND must fit in an u16_t, so, you have to reduce it in your lwipopts.h (or enable window scaling)" +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ +#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_SND_QUEUELEN > 0xffff)) +#error "If you want to use TCP, TCP_SND_QUEUELEN must fit in an u16_t, so, you have to reduce it in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && (TCP_SND_QUEUELEN < 2)) +#error "TCP_SND_QUEUELEN must be at least 2 for no-copy TCP writes to work" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && ((TCP_MAXRTX > 12) || (TCP_SYNMAXRTX > 12))) +#error "If you want to use TCP, TCP_MAXRTX and TCP_SYNMAXRTX must less or equal to 12 (due to tcp_backoff table), so, you have to reduce them in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG && ((TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG < 0) || (TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG > 0xff))) +#error "If you want to use TCP backlog, TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG must fit into an u8_t" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT && !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ) +#error "To use LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT, TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ needs to be enabled" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT && (LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM < 1)) +#error "LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM must be greater than 0" +#endif +#if (LWIP_NETIF_API && (NO_SYS == 1)) +#error "If you want to use NETIF API, you have to define NO_SYS=0 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if ((LWIP_SOCKET || LWIP_NETCONN) && (NO_SYS == 1)) +#error "If you want to use Sequential API, you have to define NO_SYS=0 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_PPP_API && (NO_SYS == 1)) +#error "If you want to use PPP API, you have to define NO_SYS=0 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_PPP_API && (PPP_SUPPORT == 0)) +#error "If you want to use PPP API, you have to enable PPP_SUPPORT in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (((!LWIP_DHCP) || (!LWIP_AUTOIP)) && LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP) +#error "If you want to use DHCP/AUTOIP cooperation mode, you have to define LWIP_DHCP=1 and LWIP_AUTOIP=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (((!LWIP_DHCP) || (!LWIP_ARP)) && DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK) +#error "If you want to use DHCP ARP checking, you have to define LWIP_DHCP=1 and LWIP_ARP=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (!LWIP_ARP && LWIP_AUTOIP) +#error "If you want to use AUTOIP, you have to define LWIP_ARP=1 in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_TCP && ((LWIP_EVENT_API && LWIP_CALLBACK_API) || (!LWIP_EVENT_API && !LWIP_CALLBACK_API))) +#error "One and exactly one of LWIP_EVENT_API and LWIP_CALLBACK_API has to be enabled in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_EVENT_API) +#error "The application layered tcp API does not work with LWIP_EVENT_API" +#endif +#if (MEM_LIBC_MALLOC && MEM_USE_POOLS) +#error "MEM_LIBC_MALLOC and MEM_USE_POOLS may not both be simultaneously enabled in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (MEM_USE_POOLS && !MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS) +#error "MEM_USE_POOLS requires custom pools (MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS) to be enabled in your lwipopts.h" +#endif +#if (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE <= MEM_ALIGNMENT) +#error "PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE must be greater than MEM_ALIGNMENT or the offset may take the full first pbuf" +#endif +#if (DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST && !DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC && !(defined(DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT))) +#error "you have to define define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT {{'host1', 0x123}, {'host2', 0x234}} to initialize DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST" +#endif +#if PPP_SUPPORT && !PPPOS_SUPPORT && !PPPOE_SUPPORT && !PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT +#error "PPP_SUPPORT needs at least one of PPPOS_SUPPORT, PPPOE_SUPPORT or PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT turned on" +#endif +#if PPP_SUPPORT && !PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && !PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +#error "PPP_SUPPORT needs PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT and/or PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT turned on" +#endif +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && !LWIP_IPV4 +#error "PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT needs LWIP_IPV4 turned on" +#endif +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT && !LWIP_IPV6 +#error "PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT needs LWIP_IPV6 turned on" +#endif +#if !LWIP_ETHERNET && (LWIP_ARP || PPPOE_SUPPORT) +#error "LWIP_ETHERNET needs to be turned on for LWIP_ARP or PPPOE_SUPPORT" +#endif +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT && !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +#error "When using LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT, LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING must be enabled, too" +#endif +#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF && !TCP_OVERSIZE +#error "LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF needs TCP_OVERSIZE enabled to create single-pbuf TCP packets" +#endif +#if LWIP_NETCONN && LWIP_TCP +#if NETCONN_COPY != TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY +#error "NETCONN_COPY != TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY" +#endif +#if NETCONN_MORE != TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE +#error "NETCONN_MORE != TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE" +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN && LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_SOCKET +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ + +/* Compile-time checks for deprecated options. + */ +#ifdef MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG +#error "MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." +#endif +#ifdef TCP_REXMIT_DEBUG +#error "TCP_REXMIT_DEBUG option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." +#endif +#ifdef RAW_STATS +#error "RAW_STATS option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." +#endif +#ifdef ETHARP_QUEUE_FIRST +#error "ETHARP_QUEUE_FIRST option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." +#endif +#ifdef ETHARP_ALWAYS_INSERT +#error "ETHARP_ALWAYS_INSERT option is deprecated. Remove it from your lwipopts.h." +#endif +#if !NO_SYS && LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING && LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX && !defined(LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX_ALLOWED) +#error "LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX cannot prevent priority inversion. It is recommended to implement priority-aware mutexes. (Define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX_ALLOWED to disable this error.)" +#endif + +#ifndef LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS +#define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS 0 +#endif +#ifndef LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS +#define LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS 0 +#endif + +/* MEMP sanity checks */ +#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC +#if !LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS +#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET +#if !MEMP_NUM_NETCONN && LWIP_SOCKET +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: MEMP_NUM_NETCONN cannot be 0 when using sockets!" +#endif +#else /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ +#if MEMP_NUM_NETCONN > (MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB + MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN + MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB + MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB) +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: MEMP_NUM_NETCONN should be less than the sum of MEMP_NUM_{TCP,RAW,UDP}_PCB+MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ +#endif /* !LWIP_DISABLE_MEMP_SANITY_CHECKS */ +#if MEM_USE_POOLS +#error "MEMP_MEM_MALLOC and MEM_USE_POOLS cannot be enabled at the same time" +#endif +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE +#error "LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE doesn't make sense with MEMP_MEM_MALLOC" +#endif +#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ + +/* TCP sanity checks */ +#if !LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS +#if LWIP_TCP +#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC && (MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG < TCP_SND_QUEUELEN) +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG should be at least as big as TCP_SND_QUEUELEN. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." +#endif +#if TCP_SND_BUF < (2 * TCP_MSS) +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SND_BUF must be at least as much as (2 * TCP_MSS) for things to work smoothly. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." +#endif +#if TCP_SND_QUEUELEN < (2 * (TCP_SND_BUF / TCP_MSS)) +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SND_QUEUELEN must be at least as much as (2 * TCP_SND_BUF/TCP_MSS) for things to work. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." +#endif +#if TCP_SNDLOWAT >= TCP_SND_BUF +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SNDLOWAT must be less than TCP_SND_BUF. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." +#endif +#if TCP_SNDLOWAT >= (0xFFFF - (4 * TCP_MSS)) +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SNDLOWAT must at least be 4*MSS below u16_t overflow!" +#endif +#if TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT >= TCP_SND_QUEUELEN +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT must be less than TCP_SND_QUEUELEN. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." +#endif +#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC && PBUF_POOL_SIZE && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE <= (PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE does not provide enough space for protocol headers. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." +#endif +#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC && PBUF_POOL_SIZE && (TCP_WND > (PBUF_POOL_SIZE * (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - (PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)))) +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_WND is larger than space provided by PBUF_POOL_SIZE * (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - protocol headers). If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." +#endif +#if TCP_WND < TCP_MSS +#error "lwip_sanity_check: WARNING: TCP_WND is smaller than MSS. If you know what you are doing, define LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS to 1 to disable this error." +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#endif /* !LWIP_DISABLE_TCP_SANITY_CHECKS */ + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_nosys + * Initialize all modules. + * Use this in NO_SYS mode. Use tcpip_init() otherwise. + */ +void lwip_init(void) +{ +#ifndef LWIP_SKIP_CONST_CHECK + int a = 0; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(a); + LWIP_ASSERT("LWIP_CONST_CAST not implemented correctly. Check your lwIP port.", LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &a) == &a); +#endif +#ifndef LWIP_SKIP_PACKING_CHECK + LWIP_ASSERT("Struct packing not implemented correctly. Check your lwIP port.", sizeof(struct packed_struct_test) == PACKED_STRUCT_TEST_EXPECTED_SIZE); +#endif + + /* Modules initialization */ + stats_init(); + // printf("stats_init\r\n"); +#if !NO_SYS + sys_init(); + // printf("sys_init\r\n"); +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + mem_init(); + memp_init(); + // printf("mem_init\r\n"); + pbuf_init(); + // printf("pbuf_init\r\n"); + netif_init(); + // printf("netif_init\r\n"); +#if LWIP_IPV4 + ip_init(); +#if LWIP_ARP + etharp_init(); +#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_RAW + raw_init(); +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +#if LWIP_UDP + udp_init(); + // printf("udp_init\r\n"); +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + tcp_init(); + // printf("tcp_init\r\n"); +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_IGMP + igmp_init(); +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ +#if LWIP_DNS + dns_init(); +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if PPP_SUPPORT + ppp_init(); +#endif + +#if LWIP_TIMERS + sys_timeouts_init(); + // printf("sys time_init\r\n"); +#endif /* LWIP_TIMERS */ +} diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ip.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ip.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ip.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ip.c index 63ad3a7e..d22231b1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ip.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ip.c @@ -1,174 +1,174 @@ -/** - * @file - * Common IPv4 and IPv6 code - * - * @defgroup ip IP - * @ingroup callbackstyle_api - * - * @defgroup ip4 IPv4 - * @ingroup ip - * - * @defgroup ip6 IPv6 - * @ingroup ip - * - * @defgroup ipaddr IP address handling - * @ingroup infrastructure - * - * @defgroup ip4addr IPv4 only - * @ingroup ipaddr - * - * @defgroup ip6addr IPv6 only - * @ingroup ipaddr - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 - -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" - -/** Global data for both IPv4 and IPv6 */ -struct ip_globals ip_data; - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - -const ip_addr_t ip_addr_any_type = IPADDR_ANY_TYPE_INIT; - -/** - * @ingroup ipaddr - * Convert numeric IP address (both versions) into ASCII representation. - * returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! - * - * @param addr ip address in network order to convert - * @return pointer to a global static (!) buffer that holds the ASCII - * representation of addr - */ -char *ipaddr_ntoa(const ip_addr_t *addr) -{ - if (addr == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - if (IP_IS_V6(addr)) { - return ip6addr_ntoa(ip_2_ip6(addr)); - } else { - return ip4addr_ntoa(ip_2_ip4(addr)); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup ipaddr - * Same as ipaddr_ntoa, but reentrant since a user-supplied buffer is used. - * - * @param addr ip address in network order to convert - * @param buf target buffer where the string is stored - * @param buflen length of buf - * @return either pointer to buf which now holds the ASCII - * representation of addr or NULL if buf was too small - */ -char *ipaddr_ntoa_r(const ip_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen) -{ - if (addr == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - if (IP_IS_V6(addr)) { - return ip6addr_ntoa_r(ip_2_ip6(addr), buf, buflen); - } else { - return ip4addr_ntoa_r(ip_2_ip4(addr), buf, buflen); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup ipaddr - * Convert IP address string (both versions) to numeric. - * The version is auto-detected from the string. - * - * @param cp IP address string to convert - * @param addr conversion result is stored here - * @return 1 on success, 0 on error - */ -int ipaddr_aton(const char *cp, ip_addr_t *addr) -{ - if (cp != NULL) { - const char *c; - - for (c = cp; *c != 0; c++) { - if (*c == ':') { - /* contains a colon: IPv6 address */ - if (addr) { - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); - } - - return ip6addr_aton(cp, ip_2_ip6(addr)); - } else if (*c == '.') { - /* contains a dot: IPv4 address */ - break; - } - } - - /* call ip4addr_aton as fallback or if IPv4 was found */ - if (addr) { - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - } - - return ip4addr_aton(cp, ip_2_ip4(addr)); - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_nosys - * If both IP versions are enabled, this function can dispatch packets to the correct one. - * Don't call directly, pass to netif_add() and call netif->input(). - */ -err_t ip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - if (p != NULL) { - if (IP_HDR_GET_VERSION(p->payload) == 6) { - return ip6_input(p, inp); - } - - return ip4_input(p, inp); - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * Common IPv4 and IPv6 code + * + * @defgroup ip IP + * @ingroup callbackstyle_api + * + * @defgroup ip4 IPv4 + * @ingroup ip + * + * @defgroup ip6 IPv6 + * @ingroup ip + * + * @defgroup ipaddr IP address handling + * @ingroup infrastructure + * + * @defgroup ip4addr IPv4 only + * @ingroup ipaddr + * + * @defgroup ip6addr IPv6 only + * @ingroup ipaddr + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 + +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" + +/** Global data for both IPv4 and IPv6 */ +struct ip_globals ip_data; + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + +const ip_addr_t ip_addr_any_type = IPADDR_ANY_TYPE_INIT; + +/** + * @ingroup ipaddr + * Convert numeric IP address (both versions) into ASCII representation. + * returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! + * + * @param addr ip address in network order to convert + * @return pointer to a global static (!) buffer that holds the ASCII + * representation of addr + */ +char *ipaddr_ntoa(const ip_addr_t *addr) +{ + if (addr == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + if (IP_IS_V6(addr)) { + return ip6addr_ntoa(ip_2_ip6(addr)); + } else { + return ip4addr_ntoa(ip_2_ip4(addr)); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup ipaddr + * Same as ipaddr_ntoa, but reentrant since a user-supplied buffer is used. + * + * @param addr ip address in network order to convert + * @param buf target buffer where the string is stored + * @param buflen length of buf + * @return either pointer to buf which now holds the ASCII + * representation of addr or NULL if buf was too small + */ +char *ipaddr_ntoa_r(const ip_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen) +{ + if (addr == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + if (IP_IS_V6(addr)) { + return ip6addr_ntoa_r(ip_2_ip6(addr), buf, buflen); + } else { + return ip4addr_ntoa_r(ip_2_ip4(addr), buf, buflen); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup ipaddr + * Convert IP address string (both versions) to numeric. + * The version is auto-detected from the string. + * + * @param cp IP address string to convert + * @param addr conversion result is stored here + * @return 1 on success, 0 on error + */ +int ipaddr_aton(const char *cp, ip_addr_t *addr) +{ + if (cp != NULL) { + const char *c; + + for (c = cp; *c != 0; c++) { + if (*c == ':') { + /* contains a colon: IPv6 address */ + if (addr) { + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); + } + + return ip6addr_aton(cp, ip_2_ip6(addr)); + } else if (*c == '.') { + /* contains a dot: IPv4 address */ + break; + } + } + + /* call ip4addr_aton as fallback or if IPv4 was found */ + if (addr) { + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + } + + return ip4addr_aton(cp, ip_2_ip4(addr)); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_nosys + * If both IP versions are enabled, this function can dispatch packets to the correct one. + * Don't call directly, pass to netif_add() and call netif->input(). + */ +err_t ip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + if (p != NULL) { + if (IP_HDR_GET_VERSION(p->payload) == 6) { + return ip6_input(p, inp); + } + + return ip4_input(p, inp); + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/autoip.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/autoip.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/autoip.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/autoip.c index 315c8116..81fa4847 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/autoip.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/autoip.c @@ -1,527 +1,527 @@ -/** - * @file - * AutoIP Automatic LinkLocal IP Configuration - * - * This is a AutoIP implementation for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. It aims to conform - * with RFC 3927. - * - * @defgroup autoip AUTOIP - * @ingroup ip4 - * AUTOIP related functions - * USAGE: - * - * define @ref LWIP_AUTOIP 1 in your lwipopts.h - * Options: - * AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL msecs, - * I recommend a value of 100. The value must divide 1000 with a remainder almost 0. - * Possible values are 1000, 500, 333, 250, 200, 166, 142, 125, 111, 100 .... - * - * Without DHCP: - * - Call autoip_start() after netif_add(). - * - * With DHCP: - * - define @ref LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP 1 in your lwipopts.h. - * - Configure your DHCP Client. - * - * @see netifapi_autoip - */ - -/* - * - * Copyright (c) 2007 Dominik Spies - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dominik Spies - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_AUTOIP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/mem.h" -/* #include "lwip/udp.h" */ -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/autoip.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/prot/autoip.h" - -#include - -/** Pseudo random macro based on netif informations. - * You could use "rand()" from the C Library if you define LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND in lwipopts.h */ -#ifndef LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND -#define LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND(netif) ((((u32_t)((netif->hwaddr[5]) & 0xff) << 24) | \ - ((u32_t)((netif->hwaddr[3]) & 0xff) << 16) | \ - ((u32_t)((netif->hwaddr[2]) & 0xff) << 8) | \ - ((u32_t)((netif->hwaddr[4]) & 0xff))) + \ - (netif_autoip_data(netif) ? netif_autoip_data(netif)->tried_llipaddr : 0)) -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND */ - -/** - * Macro that generates the initial IP address to be tried by AUTOIP. - * If you want to override this, define it to something else in lwipopts.h. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR -#define LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR(netif) \ - lwip_htonl(AUTOIP_RANGE_START + ((u32_t)(((u8_t)(netif->hwaddr[4])) | \ - ((u32_t)((u8_t)(netif->hwaddr[5]))) << 8))) -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR */ - -/* static functions */ -static err_t autoip_arp_announce(struct netif *netif); -static void autoip_start_probing(struct netif *netif); - -/** - * @ingroup autoip - * Set a statically allocated struct autoip to work with. - * Using this prevents autoip_start to allocate it using mem_malloc. - * - * @param netif the netif for which to set the struct autoip - * @param autoip (uninitialised) autoip struct allocated by the application - */ -void autoip_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct autoip *autoip) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("autoip != NULL", autoip != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif already has a struct autoip set", - netif_autoip_data(netif) == NULL); - - /* clear data structure */ - memset(autoip, 0, sizeof(struct autoip)); - /* autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_OFF; */ - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_AUTOIP, autoip); -} - -/** Restart AutoIP client and check the next address (conflict detected) - * - * @param netif The netif under AutoIP control - */ -static void autoip_restart(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - autoip->tried_llipaddr++; - autoip_start(netif); -} - -/** - * Handle a IP address conflict after an ARP conflict detection - */ -static void autoip_handle_arp_conflict(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - - /* RFC3927, 2.5 "Conflict Detection and Defense" allows two options where - a) means retreat on the first conflict and - b) allows to keep an already configured address when having only one - conflict in 10 seconds - We use option b) since it helps to improve the chance that one of the two - conflicting hosts may be able to retain its address. */ - - if (autoip->lastconflict > 0) { - /* retreat, there was a conflicting ARP in the last DEFEND_INTERVAL seconds */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - ("autoip_handle_arp_conflict(): we are defending, but in DEFEND_INTERVAL, retreating\n")); - - /* Active TCP sessions are aborted when removing the ip addresss */ - autoip_restart(netif); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - ("autoip_handle_arp_conflict(): we are defend, send ARP Announce\n")); - autoip_arp_announce(netif); - autoip->lastconflict = DEFEND_INTERVAL * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; - } -} - -/** - * Create an IP-Address out of range 169.254.1.0 to 169.254.254.255 - * - * @param netif network interface on which create the IP-Address - * @param ipaddr ip address to initialize - */ -static void autoip_create_addr(struct netif *netif, ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - - /* Here we create an IP-Address out of range 169.254.1.0 to 169.254.254.255 - * compliant to RFC 3927 Section 2.1 - * We have 254 * 256 possibilities */ - - u32_t addr = lwip_ntohl(LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR(netif)); - addr += autoip->tried_llipaddr; - addr = AUTOIP_NET | (addr & 0xffff); - /* Now, 169.254.0.0 <= addr <= 169.254.255.255 */ - - if (addr < AUTOIP_RANGE_START) { - addr += AUTOIP_RANGE_END - AUTOIP_RANGE_START + 1; - } - - if (addr > AUTOIP_RANGE_END) { - addr -= AUTOIP_RANGE_END - AUTOIP_RANGE_START + 1; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("AUTOIP address not in range", (addr >= AUTOIP_RANGE_START) && - (addr <= AUTOIP_RANGE_END)); - ip4_addr_set_u32(ipaddr, lwip_htonl(addr)); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - ("autoip_create_addr(): tried_llipaddr=%" U16_F ", %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - (u16_t)(autoip->tried_llipaddr), ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr), - ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr))); -} - -/** - * Sends an ARP probe from a network interface - * - * @param netif network interface used to send the probe - */ -static err_t autoip_arp_probe(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - /* this works because netif->ip_addr is ANY */ - return etharp_request(netif, &autoip->llipaddr); -} - -/** - * Sends an ARP announce from a network interface - * - * @param netif network interface used to send the announce - */ -static err_t autoip_arp_announce(struct netif *netif) -{ - return etharp_gratuitous(netif); -} - -/** - * Configure interface for use with current LL IP-Address - * - * @param netif network interface to configure with current LL IP-Address - */ -static err_t autoip_bind(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - ip4_addr_t sn_mask, gw_addr; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("autoip_bind(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F " %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num, - ip4_addr1_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(&autoip->llipaddr), - ip4_addr3_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(&autoip->llipaddr))); - - IP4_ADDR(&sn_mask, 255, 255, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw_addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); - - netif_set_addr(netif, &autoip->llipaddr, &sn_mask, &gw_addr); - /* interface is used by routing now that an address is set */ - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup autoip - * Start AutoIP client - * - * @param netif network interface on which start the AutoIP client - */ -err_t autoip_start(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - err_t result = ERR_OK; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ERROR("netif is not up, old style port?", netif_is_up(netif), return ERR_ARG;); - - /* Set IP-Address, Netmask and Gateway to 0 to make sure that - * ARP Packets are formed correctly - */ - netif_set_addr(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - ("autoip_start(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], - netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - - if (autoip == NULL) { - /* no AutoIP client attached yet? */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("autoip_start(): starting new AUTOIP client\n")); - autoip = (struct autoip *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct autoip)); - - if (autoip == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("autoip_start(): could not allocate autoip\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* store this AutoIP client in the netif */ - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_AUTOIP, autoip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("autoip_start(): allocated autoip")); - } else { - autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_OFF; - autoip->ttw = 0; - autoip->sent_num = 0; - ip4_addr_set_zero(&autoip->llipaddr); - autoip->lastconflict = 0; - } - - autoip_create_addr(netif, &(autoip->llipaddr)); - autoip_start_probing(netif); - - return result; -} - -static void autoip_start_probing(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - - autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_PROBING; - autoip->sent_num = 0; - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - ("autoip_start_probing(): changing state to PROBING: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(&autoip->llipaddr), - ip4_addr3_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(&autoip->llipaddr))); - - /* time to wait to first probe, this is randomly - * chosen out of 0 to PROBE_WAIT seconds. - * compliant to RFC 3927 Section 2.2.1 - */ - autoip->ttw = (u16_t)(LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND(netif) % (PROBE_WAIT * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND)); - - /* - * if we tried more then MAX_CONFLICTS we must limit our rate for - * acquiring and probing address - * compliant to RFC 3927 Section 2.2.1 - */ - if (autoip->tried_llipaddr > MAX_CONFLICTS) { - autoip->ttw = RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; - } -} - -/** - * Handle a possible change in the network configuration. - * - * If there is an AutoIP address configured, take the interface down - * and begin probing with the same address. - */ -void autoip_network_changed(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - - if (autoip && (autoip->state != AUTOIP_STATE_OFF)) { - autoip_start_probing(netif); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup autoip - * Stop AutoIP client - * - * @param netif network interface on which stop the AutoIP client - */ -err_t autoip_stop(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (autoip != NULL) { - autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_OFF; - - if (ip4_addr_islinklocal(netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - netif_set_addr(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Has to be called in loop every AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds - */ -void autoip_tmr(void) -{ - struct netif *netif; - /* loop through netif's */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - - /* only act on AutoIP configured interfaces */ - if (autoip != NULL) { - if (autoip->lastconflict > 0) { - autoip->lastconflict--; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("autoip_tmr() AutoIP-State: %" U16_F ", ttw=%" U16_F "\n", - (u16_t)(autoip->state), autoip->ttw)); - - if (autoip->ttw > 0) { - autoip->ttw--; - } - - switch (autoip->state) { - case AUTOIP_STATE_PROBING: - if (autoip->ttw == 0) { - if (autoip->sent_num >= PROBE_NUM) { - /* Switch to ANNOUNCING: now we can bind to an IP address and use it */ - autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_ANNOUNCING; - autoip_bind(netif); - /* autoip_bind() calls netif_set_addr(): this triggers a gratuitous ARP - which counts as an announcement */ - autoip->sent_num = 1; - autoip->ttw = ANNOUNCE_WAIT * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - ("autoip_tmr(): changing state to ANNOUNCING: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(&autoip->llipaddr), - ip4_addr3_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(&autoip->llipaddr))); - } else { - autoip_arp_probe(netif); - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("autoip_tmr() PROBING Sent Probe\n")); - autoip->sent_num++; - - if (autoip->sent_num == PROBE_NUM) { - /* calculate time to wait to for announce */ - autoip->ttw = ANNOUNCE_WAIT * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; - } else { - /* calculate time to wait to next probe */ - autoip->ttw = (u16_t)((LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND(netif) % - ((PROBE_MAX - PROBE_MIN) * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND)) + - PROBE_MIN * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND); - } - } - } - - break; - - case AUTOIP_STATE_ANNOUNCING: - if (autoip->ttw == 0) { - autoip_arp_announce(netif); - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("autoip_tmr() ANNOUNCING Sent Announce\n")); - autoip->ttw = ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; - autoip->sent_num++; - - if (autoip->sent_num >= ANNOUNCE_NUM) { - autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_BOUND; - autoip->sent_num = 0; - autoip->ttw = 0; - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - ("autoip_tmr(): changing state to BOUND: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(&autoip->llipaddr), - ip4_addr3_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(&autoip->llipaddr))); - } - } - - break; - - default: - /* nothing to do in other states */ - break; - } - } - } -} - -/** - * Handles every incoming ARP Packet, called by etharp_input(). - * - * @param netif network interface to use for autoip processing - * @param hdr Incoming ARP packet - */ -void autoip_arp_reply(struct netif *netif, struct etharp_hdr *hdr) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("autoip_arp_reply()\n")); - - if ((autoip != NULL) && (autoip->state != AUTOIP_STATE_OFF)) { - /* when ip.src == llipaddr && hw.src != netif->hwaddr - * - * when probing ip.dst == llipaddr && hw.src != netif->hwaddr - * we have a conflict and must solve it - */ - ip4_addr_t sipaddr, dipaddr; - struct eth_addr netifaddr; - SMEMCPY(netifaddr.addr, netif->hwaddr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); - - /* Copy struct ip4_addr_wordaligned to aligned ip4_addr, to support compilers without - * structure packing (not using structure copy which breaks strict-aliasing rules). - */ - IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(&sipaddr, &hdr->sipaddr); - IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(&dipaddr, &hdr->dipaddr); - - if (autoip->state == AUTOIP_STATE_PROBING) { - /* RFC 3927 Section 2.2.1: - * from beginning to after ANNOUNCE_WAIT - * seconds we have a conflict if - * ip.src == llipaddr OR - * ip.dst == llipaddr && hw.src != own hwaddr - */ - if ((ip4_addr_cmp(&sipaddr, &autoip->llipaddr)) || - (ip4_addr_isany_val(sipaddr) && - ip4_addr_cmp(&dipaddr, &autoip->llipaddr) && - !eth_addr_cmp(&netifaddr, &hdr->shwaddr))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("autoip_arp_reply(): Probe Conflict detected\n")); - autoip_restart(netif); - } - } else { - /* RFC 3927 Section 2.5: - * in any state we have a conflict if - * ip.src == llipaddr && hw.src != own hwaddr - */ - if (ip4_addr_cmp(&sipaddr, &autoip->llipaddr) && - !eth_addr_cmp(&netifaddr, &hdr->shwaddr)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("autoip_arp_reply(): Conflicting ARP-Packet detected\n")); - autoip_handle_arp_conflict(netif); - } - } - } -} - -/** check if AutoIP supplied netif->ip_addr - * - * @param netif the netif to check - * @return 1 if AutoIP supplied netif->ip_addr (state BOUND or ANNOUNCING), - * 0 otherwise - */ -u8_t autoip_supplied_address(const struct netif *netif) -{ - if ((netif != NULL) && (netif_autoip_data(netif) != NULL)) { - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - return (autoip->state == AUTOIP_STATE_BOUND) || (autoip->state == AUTOIP_STATE_ANNOUNCING); - } - - return 0; -} - -u8_t autoip_accept_packet(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *addr) -{ - struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); - return (autoip != NULL) && ip4_addr_cmp(addr, &(autoip->llipaddr)); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_AUTOIP */ +/** + * @file + * AutoIP Automatic LinkLocal IP Configuration + * + * This is a AutoIP implementation for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. It aims to conform + * with RFC 3927. + * + * @defgroup autoip AUTOIP + * @ingroup ip4 + * AUTOIP related functions + * USAGE: + * + * define @ref LWIP_AUTOIP 1 in your lwipopts.h + * Options: + * AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL msecs, + * I recommend a value of 100. The value must divide 1000 with a remainder almost 0. + * Possible values are 1000, 500, 333, 250, 200, 166, 142, 125, 111, 100 .... + * + * Without DHCP: + * - Call autoip_start() after netif_add(). + * + * With DHCP: + * - define @ref LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP 1 in your lwipopts.h. + * - Configure your DHCP Client. + * + * @see netifapi_autoip + */ + +/* + * + * Copyright (c) 2007 Dominik Spies + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dominik Spies + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_AUTOIP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/mem.h" +/* #include "lwip/udp.h" */ +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/autoip.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/prot/autoip.h" + +#include + +/** Pseudo random macro based on netif informations. + * You could use "rand()" from the C Library if you define LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND in lwipopts.h */ +#ifndef LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND +#define LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND(netif) ((((u32_t)((netif->hwaddr[5]) & 0xff) << 24) | \ + ((u32_t)((netif->hwaddr[3]) & 0xff) << 16) | \ + ((u32_t)((netif->hwaddr[2]) & 0xff) << 8) | \ + ((u32_t)((netif->hwaddr[4]) & 0xff))) + \ + (netif_autoip_data(netif) ? netif_autoip_data(netif)->tried_llipaddr : 0)) +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND */ + +/** + * Macro that generates the initial IP address to be tried by AUTOIP. + * If you want to override this, define it to something else in lwipopts.h. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR +#define LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR(netif) \ + lwip_htonl(AUTOIP_RANGE_START + ((u32_t)(((u8_t)(netif->hwaddr[4])) | \ + ((u32_t)((u8_t)(netif->hwaddr[5]))) << 8))) +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR */ + +/* static functions */ +static err_t autoip_arp_announce(struct netif *netif); +static void autoip_start_probing(struct netif *netif); + +/** + * @ingroup autoip + * Set a statically allocated struct autoip to work with. + * Using this prevents autoip_start to allocate it using mem_malloc. + * + * @param netif the netif for which to set the struct autoip + * @param autoip (uninitialised) autoip struct allocated by the application + */ +void autoip_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct autoip *autoip) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("autoip != NULL", autoip != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif already has a struct autoip set", + netif_autoip_data(netif) == NULL); + + /* clear data structure */ + memset(autoip, 0, sizeof(struct autoip)); + /* autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_OFF; */ + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_AUTOIP, autoip); +} + +/** Restart AutoIP client and check the next address (conflict detected) + * + * @param netif The netif under AutoIP control + */ +static void autoip_restart(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + autoip->tried_llipaddr++; + autoip_start(netif); +} + +/** + * Handle a IP address conflict after an ARP conflict detection + */ +static void autoip_handle_arp_conflict(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + + /* RFC3927, 2.5 "Conflict Detection and Defense" allows two options where + a) means retreat on the first conflict and + b) allows to keep an already configured address when having only one + conflict in 10 seconds + We use option b) since it helps to improve the chance that one of the two + conflicting hosts may be able to retain its address. */ + + if (autoip->lastconflict > 0) { + /* retreat, there was a conflicting ARP in the last DEFEND_INTERVAL seconds */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + ("autoip_handle_arp_conflict(): we are defending, but in DEFEND_INTERVAL, retreating\n")); + + /* Active TCP sessions are aborted when removing the ip addresss */ + autoip_restart(netif); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + ("autoip_handle_arp_conflict(): we are defend, send ARP Announce\n")); + autoip_arp_announce(netif); + autoip->lastconflict = DEFEND_INTERVAL * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; + } +} + +/** + * Create an IP-Address out of range 169.254.1.0 to 169.254.254.255 + * + * @param netif network interface on which create the IP-Address + * @param ipaddr ip address to initialize + */ +static void autoip_create_addr(struct netif *netif, ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + + /* Here we create an IP-Address out of range 169.254.1.0 to 169.254.254.255 + * compliant to RFC 3927 Section 2.1 + * We have 254 * 256 possibilities */ + + u32_t addr = lwip_ntohl(LWIP_AUTOIP_CREATE_SEED_ADDR(netif)); + addr += autoip->tried_llipaddr; + addr = AUTOIP_NET | (addr & 0xffff); + /* Now, 169.254.0.0 <= addr <= 169.254.255.255 */ + + if (addr < AUTOIP_RANGE_START) { + addr += AUTOIP_RANGE_END - AUTOIP_RANGE_START + 1; + } + + if (addr > AUTOIP_RANGE_END) { + addr -= AUTOIP_RANGE_END - AUTOIP_RANGE_START + 1; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("AUTOIP address not in range", (addr >= AUTOIP_RANGE_START) && + (addr <= AUTOIP_RANGE_END)); + ip4_addr_set_u32(ipaddr, lwip_htonl(addr)); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + ("autoip_create_addr(): tried_llipaddr=%" U16_F ", %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + (u16_t)(autoip->tried_llipaddr), ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr), + ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr))); +} + +/** + * Sends an ARP probe from a network interface + * + * @param netif network interface used to send the probe + */ +static err_t autoip_arp_probe(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + /* this works because netif->ip_addr is ANY */ + return etharp_request(netif, &autoip->llipaddr); +} + +/** + * Sends an ARP announce from a network interface + * + * @param netif network interface used to send the announce + */ +static err_t autoip_arp_announce(struct netif *netif) +{ + return etharp_gratuitous(netif); +} + +/** + * Configure interface for use with current LL IP-Address + * + * @param netif network interface to configure with current LL IP-Address + */ +static err_t autoip_bind(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + ip4_addr_t sn_mask, gw_addr; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("autoip_bind(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F " %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num, + ip4_addr1_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(&autoip->llipaddr), + ip4_addr3_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(&autoip->llipaddr))); + + IP4_ADDR(&sn_mask, 255, 255, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw_addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + netif_set_addr(netif, &autoip->llipaddr, &sn_mask, &gw_addr); + /* interface is used by routing now that an address is set */ + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup autoip + * Start AutoIP client + * + * @param netif network interface on which start the AutoIP client + */ +err_t autoip_start(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + err_t result = ERR_OK; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ERROR("netif is not up, old style port?", netif_is_up(netif), return ERR_ARG;); + + /* Set IP-Address, Netmask and Gateway to 0 to make sure that + * ARP Packets are formed correctly + */ + netif_set_addr(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + ("autoip_start(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], + netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + + if (autoip == NULL) { + /* no AutoIP client attached yet? */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("autoip_start(): starting new AUTOIP client\n")); + autoip = (struct autoip *)mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct autoip)); + + if (autoip == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("autoip_start(): could not allocate autoip\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* store this AutoIP client in the netif */ + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_AUTOIP, autoip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("autoip_start(): allocated autoip")); + } else { + autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_OFF; + autoip->ttw = 0; + autoip->sent_num = 0; + ip4_addr_set_zero(&autoip->llipaddr); + autoip->lastconflict = 0; + } + + autoip_create_addr(netif, &(autoip->llipaddr)); + autoip_start_probing(netif); + + return result; +} + +static void autoip_start_probing(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + + autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_PROBING; + autoip->sent_num = 0; + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + ("autoip_start_probing(): changing state to PROBING: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(&autoip->llipaddr), + ip4_addr3_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(&autoip->llipaddr))); + + /* time to wait to first probe, this is randomly + * chosen out of 0 to PROBE_WAIT seconds. + * compliant to RFC 3927 Section 2.2.1 + */ + autoip->ttw = (u16_t)(LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND(netif) % (PROBE_WAIT * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND)); + + /* + * if we tried more then MAX_CONFLICTS we must limit our rate for + * acquiring and probing address + * compliant to RFC 3927 Section 2.2.1 + */ + if (autoip->tried_llipaddr > MAX_CONFLICTS) { + autoip->ttw = RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; + } +} + +/** + * Handle a possible change in the network configuration. + * + * If there is an AutoIP address configured, take the interface down + * and begin probing with the same address. + */ +void autoip_network_changed(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + + if (autoip && (autoip->state != AUTOIP_STATE_OFF)) { + autoip_start_probing(netif); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup autoip + * Stop AutoIP client + * + * @param netif network interface on which stop the AutoIP client + */ +err_t autoip_stop(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (autoip != NULL) { + autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_OFF; + + if (ip4_addr_islinklocal(netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + netif_set_addr(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Has to be called in loop every AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds + */ +void autoip_tmr(void) +{ + struct netif *netif; + /* loop through netif's */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + + /* only act on AutoIP configured interfaces */ + if (autoip != NULL) { + if (autoip->lastconflict > 0) { + autoip->lastconflict--; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("autoip_tmr() AutoIP-State: %" U16_F ", ttw=%" U16_F "\n", + (u16_t)(autoip->state), autoip->ttw)); + + if (autoip->ttw > 0) { + autoip->ttw--; + } + + switch (autoip->state) { + case AUTOIP_STATE_PROBING: + if (autoip->ttw == 0) { + if (autoip->sent_num >= PROBE_NUM) { + /* Switch to ANNOUNCING: now we can bind to an IP address and use it */ + autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_ANNOUNCING; + autoip_bind(netif); + /* autoip_bind() calls netif_set_addr(): this triggers a gratuitous ARP + which counts as an announcement */ + autoip->sent_num = 1; + autoip->ttw = ANNOUNCE_WAIT * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + ("autoip_tmr(): changing state to ANNOUNCING: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(&autoip->llipaddr), + ip4_addr3_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(&autoip->llipaddr))); + } else { + autoip_arp_probe(netif); + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("autoip_tmr() PROBING Sent Probe\n")); + autoip->sent_num++; + + if (autoip->sent_num == PROBE_NUM) { + /* calculate time to wait to for announce */ + autoip->ttw = ANNOUNCE_WAIT * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; + } else { + /* calculate time to wait to next probe */ + autoip->ttw = (u16_t)((LWIP_AUTOIP_RAND(netif) % + ((PROBE_MAX - PROBE_MIN) * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND)) + + PROBE_MIN * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND); + } + } + } + + break; + + case AUTOIP_STATE_ANNOUNCING: + if (autoip->ttw == 0) { + autoip_arp_announce(netif); + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("autoip_tmr() ANNOUNCING Sent Announce\n")); + autoip->ttw = ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL * AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND; + autoip->sent_num++; + + if (autoip->sent_num >= ANNOUNCE_NUM) { + autoip->state = AUTOIP_STATE_BOUND; + autoip->sent_num = 0; + autoip->ttw = 0; + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + ("autoip_tmr(): changing state to BOUND: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(&autoip->llipaddr), + ip4_addr3_16(&autoip->llipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(&autoip->llipaddr))); + } + } + + break; + + default: + /* nothing to do in other states */ + break; + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Handles every incoming ARP Packet, called by etharp_input(). + * + * @param netif network interface to use for autoip processing + * @param hdr Incoming ARP packet + */ +void autoip_arp_reply(struct netif *netif, struct etharp_hdr *hdr) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("autoip_arp_reply()\n")); + + if ((autoip != NULL) && (autoip->state != AUTOIP_STATE_OFF)) { + /* when ip.src == llipaddr && hw.src != netif->hwaddr + * + * when probing ip.dst == llipaddr && hw.src != netif->hwaddr + * we have a conflict and must solve it + */ + ip4_addr_t sipaddr, dipaddr; + struct eth_addr netifaddr; + SMEMCPY(netifaddr.addr, netif->hwaddr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); + + /* Copy struct ip4_addr_wordaligned to aligned ip4_addr, to support compilers without + * structure packing (not using structure copy which breaks strict-aliasing rules). + */ + IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(&sipaddr, &hdr->sipaddr); + IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(&dipaddr, &hdr->dipaddr); + + if (autoip->state == AUTOIP_STATE_PROBING) { + /* RFC 3927 Section 2.2.1: + * from beginning to after ANNOUNCE_WAIT + * seconds we have a conflict if + * ip.src == llipaddr OR + * ip.dst == llipaddr && hw.src != own hwaddr + */ + if ((ip4_addr_cmp(&sipaddr, &autoip->llipaddr)) || + (ip4_addr_isany_val(sipaddr) && + ip4_addr_cmp(&dipaddr, &autoip->llipaddr) && + !eth_addr_cmp(&netifaddr, &hdr->shwaddr))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("autoip_arp_reply(): Probe Conflict detected\n")); + autoip_restart(netif); + } + } else { + /* RFC 3927 Section 2.5: + * in any state we have a conflict if + * ip.src == llipaddr && hw.src != own hwaddr + */ + if (ip4_addr_cmp(&sipaddr, &autoip->llipaddr) && + !eth_addr_cmp(&netifaddr, &hdr->shwaddr)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(AUTOIP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("autoip_arp_reply(): Conflicting ARP-Packet detected\n")); + autoip_handle_arp_conflict(netif); + } + } + } +} + +/** check if AutoIP supplied netif->ip_addr + * + * @param netif the netif to check + * @return 1 if AutoIP supplied netif->ip_addr (state BOUND or ANNOUNCING), + * 0 otherwise + */ +u8_t autoip_supplied_address(const struct netif *netif) +{ + if ((netif != NULL) && (netif_autoip_data(netif) != NULL)) { + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + return (autoip->state == AUTOIP_STATE_BOUND) || (autoip->state == AUTOIP_STATE_ANNOUNCING); + } + + return 0; +} + +u8_t autoip_accept_packet(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *addr) +{ + struct autoip *autoip = netif_autoip_data(netif); + return (autoip != NULL) && ip4_addr_cmp(addr, &(autoip->llipaddr)); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_AUTOIP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c index 840ad69f..49cac882 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/dhcp.c @@ -1,2105 +1,2105 @@ -/** - * @file - * Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol client - * - * @defgroup dhcp4 DHCPv4 - * @ingroup ip4 - * DHCP (IPv4) related functions - * This is a DHCP client for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. It aims to conform - * with RFC 2131 and RFC 2132. - * - * @todo: - * - Support for interfaces other than Ethernet (SLIP, PPP, ...) - * - * Options: - * @ref DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS (recommended 60 which is a minute) - * @ref DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS (recommended 500 which equals TCP coarse timer) - * - * dhcp_start() starts a DHCP client instance which - * configures the interface by obtaining an IP address lease and maintaining it. - * - * Use dhcp_release() to end the lease and use dhcp_stop() - * to remove the DHCP client. - * - * @see LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS - * @see LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION - * - * @see netifapi_dhcp4 - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Leon Woestenberg - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * The Swedish Institute of Computer Science and Adam Dunkels - * are specifically granted permission to redistribute this - * source code. - * - * Author: Leon Woestenberg - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_DHCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp.h" -#include "lwip/autoip.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/prot/dhcp.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif -#ifndef LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS -#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr) -#endif -#ifndef LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION -#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, option, len, pbuf, offset) \ - do { \ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg); \ - } while (0) -#endif - -/** DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID: if this is set to 1, the xid is created using - * LWIP_RAND() (this overrides DHCP_GLOBAL_XID) - */ -#ifndef DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID -#define DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID 1 -#endif - -/** Default for DHCP_GLOBAL_XID is 0xABCD0000 - * This can be changed by defining DHCP_GLOBAL_XID and DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER, e.g. - * \#define DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER "stdlib.h" - * \#define DHCP_GLOBAL_XID rand() - */ -#ifdef DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER -#include DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER /* include optional starting XID generation prototypes */ -#endif - -/** DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE is set to the MTU - * MTU is checked to be big enough in dhcp_start */ -#define DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif) (netif->mtu) -#define DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN_MIN_REQUIRED 576 -/** Minimum length for reply before packet is parsed */ -#define DHCP_MIN_REPLY_LEN 44 - -#define REBOOT_TRIES 2 - -#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS -#if DNS_MAX_SERVERS > LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS -#define LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS -#else -#define LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS DNS_MAX_SERVERS -#endif -#else -#define LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS 0 -#endif - -/** Option handling: options are parsed in dhcp_parse_reply - * and saved in an array where other functions can load them from. - * This might be moved into the struct dhcp (not necessarily since - * lwIP is single-threaded and the array is only used while in recv - * callback). */ -enum dhcp_option_idx { - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD = 0, - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE, - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID, - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_LEASE_TIME, - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T1, - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T2, - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SUBNET_MASK, - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_ROUTER, -#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER, - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER_LAST = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER + LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS - 1, -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ -#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER, - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER_LAST = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER + LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS - 1, -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ - DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MAX -}; - -/** Holds the decoded option values, only valid while in dhcp_recv. - @todo: move this into struct dhcp? */ -u32_t dhcp_rx_options_val[DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MAX]; -/** Holds a flag which option was received and is contained in dhcp_rx_options_val, - only valid while in dhcp_recv. - @todo: move this into struct dhcp? */ -u8_t dhcp_rx_options_given[DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MAX]; - -static u8_t dhcp_discover_request_options[] = { - DHCP_OPTION_SUBNET_MASK, - DHCP_OPTION_ROUTER, - DHCP_OPTION_BROADCAST -#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS - , - DHCP_OPTION_DNS_SERVER -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ -#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV - , - DHCP_OPTION_NTP -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ -}; - -#ifdef DHCP_GLOBAL_XID -static u32_t xid; -static u8_t xid_initialised; -#endif /* DHCP_GLOBAL_XID */ - -#define dhcp_option_given(dhcp, idx) (dhcp_rx_options_given[idx] != 0) -#define dhcp_got_option(dhcp, idx) (dhcp_rx_options_given[idx] = 1) -#define dhcp_clear_option(dhcp, idx) (dhcp_rx_options_given[idx] = 0) -#define dhcp_clear_all_options(dhcp) (memset(dhcp_rx_options_given, 0, sizeof(dhcp_rx_options_given))) -#define dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, idx) (dhcp_rx_options_val[idx]) -#define dhcp_set_option_value(dhcp, idx, val) (dhcp_rx_options_val[idx] = (val)) - -static struct udp_pcb *dhcp_pcb; -static u8_t dhcp_pcb_refcount; - -/* DHCP client state machine functions */ -static err_t dhcp_discover(struct netif *netif); -static err_t dhcp_select(struct netif *netif); -static void dhcp_bind(struct netif *netif); -#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK -static err_t dhcp_decline(struct netif *netif); -#endif /* DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK */ -static err_t dhcp_rebind(struct netif *netif); -static err_t dhcp_reboot(struct netif *netif); -static void dhcp_set_state(struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t new_state); - -/* receive, unfold, parse and free incoming messages */ -static void dhcp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); - -/* set the DHCP timers */ -static void dhcp_timeout(struct netif *netif); -static void dhcp_t1_timeout(struct netif *netif); -static void dhcp_t2_timeout(struct netif *netif); - -/* build outgoing messages */ -/* create a DHCP message, fill in common headers */ -static struct pbuf *dhcp_create_msg(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t message_type, u16_t *options_out_len); -/* add a DHCP option (type, then length in bytes) */ -static u16_t dhcp_option(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u8_t option_type, u8_t option_len); -/* add option values */ -static u16_t dhcp_option_byte(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u8_t value); -static u16_t dhcp_option_short(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u16_t value); -static u16_t dhcp_option_long(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u32_t value); -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME -static u16_t dhcp_option_hostname(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, struct netif *netif); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ -/* always add the DHCP options trailer to end and pad */ -static void dhcp_option_trailer(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, struct pbuf *p_out); - -/** Ensure DHCP PCB is allocated and bound */ -static err_t dhcp_inc_pcb_refcount(void) -{ - if (dhcp_pcb_refcount == 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_inc_pcb_refcount(): memory leak", dhcp_pcb == NULL); - - /* allocate UDP PCB */ - dhcp_pcb = udp_new(); - - if (dhcp_pcb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - ip_set_option(dhcp_pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); - - /* set up local and remote port for the pcb -> listen on all interfaces on all src/dest IPs */ - udp_bind(dhcp_pcb, IP4_ADDR_ANY, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_CLIENT); - udp_connect(dhcp_pcb, IP4_ADDR_ANY, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER); - udp_recv(dhcp_pcb, dhcp_recv, NULL); - } - - dhcp_pcb_refcount++; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Free DHCP PCB if the last netif stops using it */ -static void dhcp_dec_pcb_refcount(void) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_pcb_refcount(): refcount error", (dhcp_pcb_refcount > 0)); - dhcp_pcb_refcount--; - - if (dhcp_pcb_refcount == 0) { - udp_remove(dhcp_pcb); - dhcp_pcb = NULL; - } -} - -/** - * Back-off the DHCP client (because of a received NAK response). - * - * Back-off the DHCP client because of a received NAK. Receiving a - * NAK means the client asked for something non-sensible, for - * example when it tries to renew a lease obtained on another network. - * - * We clear any existing set IP address and restart DHCP negotiation - * afresh (as per RFC2131 3.2.3). - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - */ -static void dhcp_handle_nak(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_handle_nak(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", - (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - /* Change to a defined state - set this before assigning the address - to ensure the callback can use dhcp_supplied_address() */ - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF); - /* remove IP address from interface (must no longer be used, as per RFC2131) */ - netif_set_addr(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); - /* We can immediately restart discovery */ - dhcp_discover(netif); -} - -#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK -/** - * Checks if the offered IP address is already in use. - * - * It does so by sending an ARP request for the offered address and - * entering CHECKING state. If no ARP reply is received within a small - * interval, the address is assumed to be free for use by us. - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - */ -static void dhcp_check(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - err_t result; - u16_t msecs; - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_check(netif=%p) %c%c\n", (void *)netif, (s16_t)netif->name[0], - (s16_t)netif->name[1])); - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_CHECKING); - /* create an ARP query for the offered IP address, expecting that no host - responds, as the IP address should not be in use. */ - result = etharp_query(netif, &dhcp->offered_ip_addr, NULL); - - if (result != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("dhcp_check: could not perform ARP query\n")); - } - - if (dhcp->tries < 255) { - dhcp->tries++; - } - - msecs = 500; - dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_check(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); -} -#endif /* DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK */ - -/** - * Remember the configuration offered by a DHCP server. - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - */ -static void dhcp_handle_offer(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp_msg *msg_in) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_handle_offer(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", - (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - - /* obtain the server address */ - if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID)) { - dhcp->request_timeout = 0; /* stop timer */ - - ip_addr_set_ip4_u32(&dhcp->server_ip_addr, lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_handle_offer(): server 0x%08" X32_F "\n", - ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(&dhcp->server_ip_addr)))); - /* remember offered address */ - ip4_addr_copy(dhcp->offered_ip_addr, msg_in->yiaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_handle_offer(): offer for 0x%08" X32_F "\n", - ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr))); - - dhcp_select(netif); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("dhcp_handle_offer(netif=%p) did not get server ID!\n", (void *)netif)); - } -} - -/** - * Select a DHCP server offer out of all offers. - * - * Simply select the first offer received. - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - * @return lwIP specific error (see error.h) - */ -static err_t dhcp_select(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp; - err_t result; - u16_t msecs; - u8_t i; - struct pbuf *p_out; - u16_t options_out_len; - - LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_select: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_select: dhcp != NULL", (dhcp != NULL), return ERR_VAL;); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_select(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING); - - /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ - p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); - - if (p_out != NULL) { - struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); - - /* MUST request the offered IP address */ - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP, 4); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr))); - - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID, 4); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(&dhcp->server_ip_addr)))); - - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { - options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME - options_out_len = dhcp_option_hostname(options_out_len, msg_out->options, netif); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ - - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING, msg_out, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); - dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); - - /* send broadcast to any DHCP server */ - result = udp_sendto_if_src(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY); - pbuf_free(p_out); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_select: REQUESTING\n")); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("dhcp_select: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); - result = ERR_MEM; - } - - if (dhcp->tries < 255) { - dhcp->tries++; - } - - msecs = (u16_t)((dhcp->tries < 6 ? 1 << dhcp->tries : 60) * 1000); - dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_select(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); - return result; -} - -/** - * The DHCP timer that checks for lease renewal/rebind timeouts. - * Must be called once a minute (see @ref DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS). - */ -void dhcp_coarse_tmr(void) -{ - struct netif *netif; - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_coarse_tmr()\n")); - /* iterate through all network interfaces */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - /* only act on DHCP configured interfaces */ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - - if ((dhcp != NULL) && (dhcp->state != DHCP_STATE_OFF)) { - /* compare lease time to expire timeout */ - if (dhcp->t0_timeout && (++dhcp->lease_used == dhcp->t0_timeout)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_coarse_tmr(): t0 timeout\n")); - /* this clients' lease time has expired */ - dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); - dhcp_start(netif); - /* timer is active (non zero), and triggers (zeroes) now? */ - } else if (dhcp->t2_rebind_time && (dhcp->t2_rebind_time-- == 1)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_coarse_tmr(): t2 timeout\n")); - /* this clients' rebind timeout triggered */ - dhcp_t2_timeout(netif); - /* timer is active (non zero), and triggers (zeroes) now */ - } else if (dhcp->t1_renew_time && (dhcp->t1_renew_time-- == 1)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_coarse_tmr(): t1 timeout\n")); - /* this clients' renewal timeout triggered */ - dhcp_t1_timeout(netif); - } - } - } -} - -/** - * DHCP transaction timeout handling (this function must be called every 500ms, - * see @ref DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS). - * - * A DHCP server is expected to respond within a short period of time. - * This timer checks whether an outstanding DHCP request is timed out. - */ -void dhcp_fine_tmr(void) -{ - struct netif *netif; - /* loop through netif's */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - - /* only act on DHCP configured interfaces */ - if (dhcp != NULL) { - /* timer is active (non zero), and is about to trigger now */ - if (dhcp->request_timeout > 1) { - dhcp->request_timeout--; - } else if (dhcp->request_timeout == 1) { - dhcp->request_timeout--; - /* { dhcp->request_timeout == 0 } */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_fine_tmr(): request timeout\n")); - /* this client's request timeout triggered */ - dhcp_timeout(netif); - } - } - } -} - -/** - * A DHCP negotiation transaction, or ARP request, has timed out. - * - * The timer that was started with the DHCP or ARP request has - * timed out, indicating no response was received in time. - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - */ -static void dhcp_timeout(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_timeout()\n")); - - /* back-off period has passed, or server selection timed out */ - if ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_SELECTING)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_timeout(): restarting discovery\n")); - dhcp_discover(netif); - /* receiving the requested lease timed out */ - } else if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_timeout(): REQUESTING, DHCP request timed out\n")); - - if (dhcp->tries <= 5) { - dhcp_select(netif); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_timeout(): REQUESTING, releasing, restarting\n")); - dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); - dhcp_start(netif); - } - -#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK - /* received no ARP reply for the offered address (which is good) */ - } else if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_CHECKING) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_timeout(): CHECKING, ARP request timed out\n")); - - if (dhcp->tries <= 1) { - dhcp_check(netif); - /* no ARP replies on the offered address, - looks like the IP address is indeed free */ - } else { - /* bind the interface to the offered address */ - dhcp_bind(netif); - } - -#endif /* DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK */ - } else if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING) { - if (dhcp->tries < REBOOT_TRIES) { - dhcp_reboot(netif); - } else { - dhcp_discover(netif); - } - } -} - -/** - * The renewal period has timed out. - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - */ -static void dhcp_t1_timeout(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_t1_timeout()\n")); - - if ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_BOUND) || - (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING)) { - /* just retry to renew - note that the rebind timer (t2) will - * eventually time-out if renew tries fail. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - ("dhcp_t1_timeout(): must renew\n")); - /* This slightly different to RFC2131: DHCPREQUEST will be sent from state - DHCP_STATE_RENEWING, not DHCP_STATE_BOUND */ - dhcp_renew(netif); - - /* Calculate next timeout */ - if (((dhcp->t2_timeout - dhcp->lease_used) / 2) >= ((60 + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS)) { - dhcp->t1_renew_time = (u16_t)((dhcp->t2_timeout - dhcp->lease_used) / 2); - } - } -} - -/** - * The rebind period has timed out. - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - */ -static void dhcp_t2_timeout(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_t2_timeout()\n")); - - if ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_BOUND) || - (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING)) { - /* just retry to rebind */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - ("dhcp_t2_timeout(): must rebind\n")); - /* This slightly different to RFC2131: DHCPREQUEST will be sent from state - DHCP_STATE_REBINDING, not DHCP_STATE_BOUND */ - dhcp_rebind(netif); - - /* Calculate next timeout */ - if (((dhcp->t0_timeout - dhcp->lease_used) / 2) >= ((60 + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS)) { - dhcp->t2_rebind_time = (u16_t)((dhcp->t0_timeout - dhcp->lease_used) / 2); - } - } -} - -/** - * Handle a DHCP ACK packet - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - */ -static void dhcp_handle_ack(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp_msg *msg_in) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - -#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS || LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV - u8_t n; -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS || LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ -#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV - ip4_addr_t ntp_server_addrs[LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS]; -#endif - - /* clear options we might not get from the ACK */ - ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_sn_mask); - ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_gw_addr); -#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE - ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_si_addr); -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ - - /* lease time given? */ - if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_LEASE_TIME)) { - /* remember offered lease time */ - dhcp->offered_t0_lease = dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_LEASE_TIME); - } - - /* renewal period given? */ - if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T1)) { - /* remember given renewal period */ - dhcp->offered_t1_renew = dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T1); - } else { - /* calculate safe periods for renewal */ - dhcp->offered_t1_renew = dhcp->offered_t0_lease / 2; - } - - /* renewal period given? */ - if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T2)) { - /* remember given rebind period */ - dhcp->offered_t2_rebind = dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T2); - } else { - /* calculate safe periods for rebinding (offered_t0_lease * 0.875 -> 87.5%)*/ - dhcp->offered_t2_rebind = (dhcp->offered_t0_lease * 7U) / 8U; - } - - /* (y)our internet address */ - ip4_addr_copy(dhcp->offered_ip_addr, msg_in->yiaddr); - -#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE - /* copy boot server address, - boot file name copied in dhcp_parse_reply if not overloaded */ - ip4_addr_copy(dhcp->offered_si_addr, msg_in->siaddr); -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ - - /* subnet mask given? */ - if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SUBNET_MASK)) { - /* remember given subnet mask */ - ip4_addr_set_u32(&dhcp->offered_sn_mask, lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SUBNET_MASK))); - dhcp->subnet_mask_given = 1; - } else { - dhcp->subnet_mask_given = 0; - } - - /* gateway router */ - if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_ROUTER)) { - ip4_addr_set_u32(&dhcp->offered_gw_addr, lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_ROUTER))); - } - -#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV - - /* NTP servers */ - for (n = 0; (n < LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS) && dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER + n); n++) { - ip4_addr_set_u32(&ntp_server_addrs[n], lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER + n))); - } - - dhcp_set_ntp_servers(n, ntp_server_addrs); -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ - -#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS - - /* DNS servers */ - for (n = 0; (n < LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS) && dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER + n); n++) { - ip_addr_t dns_addr; - ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(dns_addr, lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER + n))); - dns_setserver(n, &dns_addr); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp4 - * Set a statically allocated struct dhcp to work with. - * Using this prevents dhcp_start to allocate it using mem_malloc. - * - * @param netif the netif for which to set the struct dhcp - * @param dhcp (uninitialised) dhcp struct allocated by the application - */ -void dhcp_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp != NULL", dhcp != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif already has a struct dhcp set", netif_dhcp_data(netif) == NULL); - - /* clear data structure */ - memset(dhcp, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp)); - /* dhcp_set_state(&dhcp, DHCP_STATE_OFF); */ - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, dhcp); -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp4 - * Removes a struct dhcp from a netif. - * - * ATTENTION: Only use this when not using dhcp_set_struct() to allocate the - * struct dhcp since the memory is passed back to the heap. - * - * @param netif the netif from which to remove the struct dhcp - */ -void dhcp_cleanup(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - - if (netif_dhcp_data(netif) != NULL) { - mem_free(netif_dhcp_data(netif)); - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, NULL); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp4 - * Start DHCP negotiation for a network interface. - * - * If no DHCP client instance was attached to this interface, - * a new client is created first. If a DHCP client instance - * was already present, it restarts negotiation. - * - * @param netif The lwIP network interface - * @return lwIP error code - * - ERR_OK - No error - * - ERR_MEM - Out of memory - */ -err_t dhcp_start(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp; - err_t result; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ERROR("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("netif is not up, old style port?", netif_is_up(netif), return ERR_ARG;); - dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_start(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - - /* check MTU of the netif */ - if (netif->mtu < DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN_MIN_REQUIRED) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): Cannot use this netif with DHCP: MTU is too small\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* no DHCP client attached yet? */ - if (dhcp == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): mallocing new DHCP client\n")); - dhcp = (struct dhcp *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct dhcp)); - - if (dhcp == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): could not allocate dhcp\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* store this dhcp client in the netif */ - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, dhcp); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): allocated dhcp")); - /* already has DHCP client attached */ - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_start(): restarting DHCP configuration\n")); - - if (dhcp->pcb_allocated != 0) { - dhcp_dec_pcb_refcount(); /* free DHCP PCB if not needed any more */ - } - - /* dhcp is cleared below, no need to reset flag*/ - } - - /* clear data structure */ - memset(dhcp, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp)); - /* dhcp_set_state(&dhcp, DHCP_STATE_OFF); */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): starting DHCP configuration\n")); - - if (dhcp_inc_pcb_refcount() != ERR_OK) /* ensure DHCP PCB is allocated */ - { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - dhcp->pcb_allocated = 1; - - if (!netif_is_link_up(netif)) { - /* set state INIT and wait for dhcp_network_changed() to call dhcp_discover() */ - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_INIT); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* (re)start the DHCP negotiation */ - result = dhcp_discover(netif); - - if (result != ERR_OK) { - /* free resources allocated above */ - dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - return result; -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp4 - * Inform a DHCP server of our manual configuration. - * - * This informs DHCP servers of our fixed IP address configuration - * by sending an INFORM message. It does not involve DHCP address - * configuration, it is just here to be nice to the network. - * - * @param netif The lwIP network interface - */ -void dhcp_inform(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp dhcp; - struct pbuf *p_out; - u16_t options_out_len; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ERROR("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return;); - - if (dhcp_inc_pcb_refcount() != ERR_OK) /* ensure DHCP PCB is allocated */ - { - return; - } - - memset(&dhcp, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp)); - dhcp_set_state(&dhcp, DHCP_STATE_INFORMING); - - /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ - p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, &dhcp, DHCP_INFORM, &options_out_len); - - if (p_out != NULL) { - struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); - - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, &dhcp, DHCP_STATE_INFORMING, msg_out, DHCP_INFORM, &options_out_len); - dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_inform: INFORMING\n")); - - udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); - - pbuf_free(p_out); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_inform: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); - } - - dhcp_dec_pcb_refcount(); /* delete DHCP PCB if not needed any more */ -} - -/** Handle a possible change in the network configuration. - * - * This enters the REBOOTING state to verify that the currently bound - * address is still valid. - */ -void dhcp_network_changed(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - - if (!dhcp) { - return; - } - - switch (dhcp->state) { - case DHCP_STATE_REBINDING: - case DHCP_STATE_RENEWING: - case DHCP_STATE_BOUND: - case DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING: - dhcp->tries = 0; - dhcp_reboot(netif); - break; - - case DHCP_STATE_OFF: - /* stay off */ - break; - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid dhcp->state", dhcp->state <= DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF); - /* INIT/REQUESTING/CHECKING/BACKING_OFF restart with new 'rid' because the - state changes, SELECTING: continue with current 'rid' as we stay in the - same state */ -#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP - - if (dhcp->autoip_coop_state == DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON) { - autoip_stop(netif); - dhcp->autoip_coop_state = DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP */ - /* ensure we start with short timeouts, even if already discovering */ - dhcp->tries = 0; - dhcp_discover(netif); - break; - } -} - -#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK -/** - * Match an ARP reply with the offered IP address: - * check whether the offered IP address is not in use using ARP - * - * @param netif the network interface on which the reply was received - * @param addr The IP address we received a reply from - */ -void dhcp_arp_reply(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *addr) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp; - - LWIP_ERROR("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return;); - dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_arp_reply()\n")); - - /* is a DHCP client doing an ARP check? */ - if ((dhcp != NULL) && (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_CHECKING)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_arp_reply(): CHECKING, arp reply for 0x%08" X32_F "\n", - ip4_addr_get_u32(addr))); - - /* did a host respond with the address we - were offered by the DHCP server? */ - if (ip4_addr_cmp(addr, &dhcp->offered_ip_addr)) { - /* we will not accept the offered address */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("dhcp_arp_reply(): arp reply matched with offered address, declining\n")); - dhcp_decline(netif); - } - } -} - -/** - * Decline an offered lease. - * - * Tell the DHCP server we do not accept the offered address. - * One reason to decline the lease is when we find out the address - * is already in use by another host (through ARP). - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - */ -static err_t dhcp_decline(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - err_t result; - u16_t msecs; - struct pbuf *p_out; - u16_t options_out_len; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_decline()\n")); - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF); - /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ - p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_DECLINE, &options_out_len); - - if (p_out != NULL) { - struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP, 4); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr))); - - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF, msg_out, DHCP_DECLINE, &options_out_len); - dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); - - /* per section 4.4.4, broadcast DECLINE messages */ - result = udp_sendto_if_src(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY); - pbuf_free(p_out); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_decline: BACKING OFF\n")); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("dhcp_decline: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); - result = ERR_MEM; - } - - if (dhcp->tries < 255) { - dhcp->tries++; - } - - msecs = 10 * 1000; - dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_decline(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); - return result; -} -#endif /* DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK */ - -/** - * Start the DHCP process, discover a DHCP server. - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - */ -static err_t dhcp_discover(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - err_t result = ERR_OK; - u16_t msecs; - u8_t i; - struct pbuf *p_out; - u16_t options_out_len; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_discover()\n")); - - ip4_addr_set_any(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr); - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_SELECTING); - /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ - p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_DISCOVER, &options_out_len); - - if (p_out != NULL) { - struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_discover: making request\n")); - - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); - - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { - options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); - } - - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_SELECTING, msg_out, DHCP_DISCOVER, &options_out_len); - dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_discover: sendto(DISCOVER, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER)\n")); - udp_sendto_if_src(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_discover: deleting()ing\n")); - pbuf_free(p_out); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_discover: SELECTING\n")); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_discover: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); - } - - if (dhcp->tries < 255) { - dhcp->tries++; - } - -#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP - - if (dhcp->tries >= LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_TRIES && dhcp->autoip_coop_state == DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF) { - dhcp->autoip_coop_state = DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON; - autoip_start(netif); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP */ - msecs = (u16_t)((dhcp->tries < 6 ? 1 << dhcp->tries : 60) * 1000); - dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_discover(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); - return result; -} - -/** - * Bind the interface to the offered IP address. - * - * @param netif network interface to bind to the offered address - */ -static void dhcp_bind(struct netif *netif) -{ - u32_t timeout; - struct dhcp *dhcp; - ip4_addr_t sn_mask, gw_addr; - LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_bind: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return;); - dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_bind: dhcp != NULL", (dhcp != NULL), return;); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_bind(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - - /* reset time used of lease */ - dhcp->lease_used = 0; - - if (dhcp->offered_t0_lease != 0xffffffffUL) { - /* set renewal period timer */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_bind(): t0 renewal timer %" U32_F " secs\n", dhcp->offered_t0_lease)); - timeout = (dhcp->offered_t0_lease + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS; - - if (timeout > 0xffff) { - timeout = 0xffff; - } - - dhcp->t0_timeout = (u16_t)timeout; - - if (dhcp->t0_timeout == 0) { - dhcp->t0_timeout = 1; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_bind(): set request timeout %" U32_F " msecs\n", dhcp->offered_t0_lease * 1000)); - } - - /* temporary DHCP lease? */ - if (dhcp->offered_t1_renew != 0xffffffffUL) { - /* set renewal period timer */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_bind(): t1 renewal timer %" U32_F " secs\n", dhcp->offered_t1_renew)); - timeout = (dhcp->offered_t1_renew + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS; - - if (timeout > 0xffff) { - timeout = 0xffff; - } - - dhcp->t1_timeout = (u16_t)timeout; - - if (dhcp->t1_timeout == 0) { - dhcp->t1_timeout = 1; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_bind(): set request timeout %" U32_F " msecs\n", dhcp->offered_t1_renew * 1000)); - dhcp->t1_renew_time = dhcp->t1_timeout; - } - - /* set renewal period timer */ - if (dhcp->offered_t2_rebind != 0xffffffffUL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_bind(): t2 rebind timer %" U32_F " secs\n", dhcp->offered_t2_rebind)); - timeout = (dhcp->offered_t2_rebind + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS; - - if (timeout > 0xffff) { - timeout = 0xffff; - } - - dhcp->t2_timeout = (u16_t)timeout; - - if (dhcp->t2_timeout == 0) { - dhcp->t2_timeout = 1; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_bind(): set request timeout %" U32_F " msecs\n", dhcp->offered_t2_rebind * 1000)); - dhcp->t2_rebind_time = dhcp->t2_timeout; - } - - /* If we have sub 1 minute lease, t2 and t1 will kick in at the same time. */ - if ((dhcp->t1_timeout >= dhcp->t2_timeout) && (dhcp->t2_timeout > 0)) { - dhcp->t1_timeout = 0; - } - - if (dhcp->subnet_mask_given) { - /* copy offered network mask */ - ip4_addr_copy(sn_mask, dhcp->offered_sn_mask); - } else { - /* subnet mask not given, choose a safe subnet mask given the network class */ - u8_t first_octet = ip4_addr1(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr); - - if (first_octet <= 127) { - ip4_addr_set_u32(&sn_mask, PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL)); - } else if (first_octet >= 192) { - ip4_addr_set_u32(&sn_mask, PP_HTONL(0xffffff00UL)); - } else { - ip4_addr_set_u32(&sn_mask, PP_HTONL(0xffff0000UL)); - } - } - - ip4_addr_copy(gw_addr, dhcp->offered_gw_addr); - - /* gateway address not given? */ - if (ip4_addr_isany_val(gw_addr)) { - /* copy network address */ - ip4_addr_get_network(&gw_addr, &dhcp->offered_ip_addr, &sn_mask); - /* use first host address on network as gateway */ - ip4_addr_set_u32(&gw_addr, ip4_addr_get_u32(&gw_addr) | PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL)); - } - -#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP - - if (dhcp->autoip_coop_state == DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON) { - autoip_stop(netif); - dhcp->autoip_coop_state = DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_bind(): IP: 0x%08" X32_F " SN: 0x%08" X32_F " GW: 0x%08" X32_F "\n", - ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr), ip4_addr_get_u32(&sn_mask), ip4_addr_get_u32(&gw_addr))); - /* netif is now bound to DHCP leased address - set this before assigning the address - to ensure the callback can use dhcp_supplied_address() */ - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_BOUND); - - netif_set_addr(netif, &dhcp->offered_ip_addr, &sn_mask, &gw_addr); - /* interface is used by routing now that an address is set */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp4 - * Renew an existing DHCP lease at the involved DHCP server. - * - * @param netif network interface which must renew its lease - */ -err_t dhcp_renew(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - err_t result; - u16_t msecs; - u8_t i; - struct pbuf *p_out; - u16_t options_out_len; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_renew()\n")); - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_RENEWING); - - /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ - p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); - - if (p_out != NULL) { - struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); - - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { - options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME - options_out_len = dhcp_option_hostname(options_out_len, msg_out->options, netif); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ - - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_RENEWING, msg_out, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); - dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); - - result = udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, &dhcp->server_ip_addr, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); - pbuf_free(p_out); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_renew: RENEWING\n")); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_renew: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); - result = ERR_MEM; - } - - if (dhcp->tries < 255) { - dhcp->tries++; - } - - /* back-off on retries, but to a maximum of 20 seconds */ - msecs = (u16_t)(dhcp->tries < 10 ? dhcp->tries * 2000 : 20 * 1000); - dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_renew(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); - return result; -} - -/** - * Rebind with a DHCP server for an existing DHCP lease. - * - * @param netif network interface which must rebind with a DHCP server - */ -static err_t dhcp_rebind(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - err_t result; - u16_t msecs; - u8_t i; - struct pbuf *p_out; - u16_t options_out_len; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_rebind()\n")); - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REBINDING); - - /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ - p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); - - if (p_out != NULL) { - struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); - - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { - options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME - options_out_len = dhcp_option_hostname(options_out_len, msg_out->options, netif); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ - - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REBINDING, msg_out, DHCP_DISCOVER, &options_out_len); - dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); - - /* broadcast to server */ - result = udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); - pbuf_free(p_out); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_rebind: REBINDING\n")); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_rebind: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); - result = ERR_MEM; - } - - if (dhcp->tries < 255) { - dhcp->tries++; - } - - msecs = (u16_t)(dhcp->tries < 10 ? dhcp->tries * 1000 : 10 * 1000); - dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_rebind(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); - return result; -} - -/** - * Enter REBOOTING state to verify an existing lease - * - * @param netif network interface which must reboot - */ -static err_t dhcp_reboot(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - err_t result; - u16_t msecs; - u8_t i; - struct pbuf *p_out; - u16_t options_out_len; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_reboot()\n")); - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING); - - /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ - p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); - - if (p_out != NULL) { - struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN_MIN_REQUIRED); - - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP, 4); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr))); - - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { - options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME - options_out_len = dhcp_option_hostname(options_out_len, msg_out->options, netif); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ - - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING, msg_out, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); - dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); - - /* broadcast to server */ - result = udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); - pbuf_free(p_out); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_reboot: REBOOTING\n")); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_reboot: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); - result = ERR_MEM; - } - - if (dhcp->tries < 255) { - dhcp->tries++; - } - - msecs = (u16_t)(dhcp->tries < 10 ? dhcp->tries * 1000 : 10 * 1000); - dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_reboot(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); - return result; -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp4 - * Release a DHCP lease and stop DHCP statemachine (and AUTOIP if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP). - * - * @param netif network interface - */ -void dhcp_release_and_stop(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - ip_addr_t server_ip_addr; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_release_and_stop()\n")); - - if (dhcp == NULL) { - return; - } - - /* already off? -> nothing to do */ - if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_OFF) { - return; - } - - ip_addr_copy(server_ip_addr, dhcp->server_ip_addr); - - /* clean old DHCP offer */ - ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(&dhcp->server_ip_addr); - ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr); - ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_sn_mask); - ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_gw_addr); -#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE - ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_si_addr); -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ - dhcp->offered_t0_lease = dhcp->offered_t1_renew = dhcp->offered_t2_rebind = 0; - dhcp->t1_renew_time = dhcp->t2_rebind_time = dhcp->lease_used = dhcp->t0_timeout = 0; - - /* send release message when current IP was assigned via DHCP */ - if (dhcp_supplied_address(netif)) { - /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ - struct pbuf *p_out; - u16_t options_out_len; - p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_RELEASE, &options_out_len); - - if (p_out != NULL) { - struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID, 4); - options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(&server_ip_addr)))); - - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, dhcp->state, msg_out, DHCP_RELEASE, &options_out_len); - dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); - - udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, &server_ip_addr, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); - pbuf_free(p_out); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_release: RELEASED, DHCP_STATE_OFF\n")); - } else { - /* sending release failed, but that's not a problem since the correct behaviour of dhcp does not rely on release */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_release: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); - } - } - - /* remove IP address from interface (prevents routing from selecting this interface) */ - netif_set_addr(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); - -#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP - - if (dhcp->autoip_coop_state == DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON) { - autoip_stop(netif); - dhcp->autoip_coop_state = DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP */ - - dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_OFF); - - if (dhcp->pcb_allocated != 0) { - dhcp_dec_pcb_refcount(); /* free DHCP PCB if not needed any more */ - dhcp->pcb_allocated = 0; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp4 - * This function calls dhcp_release_and_stop() internally. - * @deprecated Use dhcp_release_and_stop() instead. - */ -err_t dhcp_release(struct netif *netif) -{ - dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp4 - * This function calls dhcp_release_and_stop() internally. - * @deprecated Use dhcp_release_and_stop() instead. - */ -void dhcp_stop(struct netif *netif) -{ - dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); -} - -/* - * Set the DHCP state of a DHCP client. - * - * If the state changed, reset the number of tries. - */ -static void dhcp_set_state(struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t new_state) -{ - if (new_state != dhcp->state) { - dhcp->state = new_state; - dhcp->tries = 0; - dhcp->request_timeout = 0; - } -} - -/* - * Concatenate an option type and length field to the outgoing - * DHCP message. - * - */ -static u16_t dhcp_option(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u8_t option_type, u8_t option_len) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_option: options_out_len + 2 + option_len <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN", options_out_len + 2U + option_len <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); - options[options_out_len++] = option_type; - options[options_out_len++] = option_len; - return options_out_len; -} -/* - * Concatenate a single byte to the outgoing DHCP message. - * - */ -static u16_t dhcp_option_byte(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u8_t value) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_option_byte: options_out_len < DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN", options_out_len < DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); - options[options_out_len++] = value; - return options_out_len; -} - -static u16_t dhcp_option_short(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u16_t value) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_option_short: options_out_len + 2 <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN", options_out_len + 2U <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); - options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0xff00U) >> 8); - options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)(value & 0x00ffU); - return options_out_len; -} - -static u16_t dhcp_option_long(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u32_t value) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_option_long: options_out_len + 4 <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN", options_out_len + 4U <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); - options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0xff000000UL) >> 24); - options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0x00ff0000UL) >> 16); - options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0x0000ff00UL) >> 8); - options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0x000000ffUL)); - return options_out_len; -} - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME -static u16_t dhcp_option_hostname(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, struct netif *netif) -{ - if (netif->hostname != NULL) { - size_t namelen = strlen(netif->hostname); - - if (namelen > 0) { - size_t len; - const char *p = netif->hostname; - /* Shrink len to available bytes (need 2 bytes for OPTION_HOSTNAME - and 1 byte for trailer) */ - size_t available = DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN - options_out_len - 3; - LWIP_ASSERT("DHCP: hostname is too long!", namelen <= available); - len = LWIP_MIN(namelen, available); - LWIP_ASSERT("DHCP: hostname is too long!", len <= 0xFF); - options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, options, DHCP_OPTION_HOSTNAME, (u8_t)len); - - while (len--) { - options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, options, *p++); - } - } - } - - return options_out_len; -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ - -/** - * Extract the DHCP message and the DHCP options. - * - * Extract the DHCP message and the DHCP options, each into a contiguous - * piece of memory. As a DHCP message is variable sized by its options, - * and also allows overriding some fields for options, the easy approach - * is to first unfold the options into a contiguous piece of memory, and - * use that further on. - * - */ -static err_t dhcp_parse_reply(struct pbuf *p, struct dhcp *dhcp) -{ - u8_t *options; - u16_t offset; - u16_t offset_max; - u16_t options_idx; - u16_t options_idx_max; - struct pbuf *q; - int parse_file_as_options = 0; - int parse_sname_as_options = 0; - struct dhcp_msg *msg_in; -#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE - int file_overloaded = 0; -#endif - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp); - - /* clear received options */ - dhcp_clear_all_options(dhcp); - - /* check that beginning of dhcp_msg (up to and including chaddr) is in first pbuf */ - if (p->len < DHCP_SNAME_OFS) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - msg_in = (struct dhcp_msg *)p->payload; -#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE - /* clear boot file name */ - dhcp->boot_file_name[0] = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ - - /* parse options */ - - /* start with options field */ - options_idx = DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS; - /* parse options to the end of the received packet */ - options_idx_max = p->tot_len; -again: - q = p; - - while ((q != NULL) && (options_idx >= q->len)) { - options_idx = (u16_t)(options_idx - q->len); - options_idx_max = (u16_t)(options_idx_max - q->len); - q = q->next; - } - - if (q == NULL) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - offset = options_idx; - offset_max = options_idx_max; - options = (u8_t *)q->payload; - - /* at least 1 byte to read and no end marker, then at least 3 bytes to read? */ - while ((q != NULL) && (offset < offset_max) && (options[offset] != DHCP_OPTION_END)) { - u8_t op = options[offset]; - u8_t len; - u8_t decode_len = 0; - int decode_idx = -1; - u16_t val_offset = (u16_t)(offset + 2); - - if (val_offset < offset) { - /* overflow */ - return ERR_BUF; - } - - /* len byte might be in the next pbuf */ - if ((offset + 1) < q->len) { - len = options[offset + 1]; - } else { - len = (q->next != NULL ? ((u8_t *)q->next->payload)[0] : 0); - } - - /* LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG, ("msg_offset=%"U16_F", q->len=%"U16_F, msg_offset, q->len)); */ - decode_len = len; - - switch (op) { - /* case(DHCP_OPTION_END): handled above */ - case (DHCP_OPTION_PAD): - /* special option: no len encoded */ - decode_len = len = 0; - /* will be increased below */ - break; - - case (DHCP_OPTION_SUBNET_MASK): - LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SUBNET_MASK; - break; - - case (DHCP_OPTION_ROUTER): - decode_len = 4; /* only copy the first given router */ - LWIP_ERROR("len >= decode_len", len >= decode_len, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_ROUTER; - break; -#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS - - case (DHCP_OPTION_DNS_SERVER): - /* special case: there might be more than one server */ - LWIP_ERROR("len %% 4 == 0", len % 4 == 0, return ERR_VAL;); - /* limit number of DNS servers */ - decode_len = LWIP_MIN(len, 4 * DNS_MAX_SERVERS); - LWIP_ERROR("len >= decode_len", len >= decode_len, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER; - break; -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ - - case (DHCP_OPTION_LEASE_TIME): - LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_LEASE_TIME; - break; -#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV - - case (DHCP_OPTION_NTP): - /* special case: there might be more than one server */ - LWIP_ERROR("len %% 4 == 0", len % 4 == 0, return ERR_VAL;); - /* limit number of NTP servers */ - decode_len = LWIP_MIN(len, 4 * LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS); - LWIP_ERROR("len >= decode_len", len >= decode_len, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER; - break; -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV*/ - - case (DHCP_OPTION_OVERLOAD): - LWIP_ERROR("len == 1", len == 1, return ERR_VAL;); - /* decode overload only in options, not in file/sname: invalid packet */ - LWIP_ERROR("overload in file/sname", options_idx == DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD; - break; - - case (DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE): - LWIP_ERROR("len == 1", len == 1, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE; - break; - - case (DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID): - LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID; - break; - - case (DHCP_OPTION_T1): - LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T1; - break; - - case (DHCP_OPTION_T2): - LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); - decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T2; - break; - - default: - decode_len = 0; - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG, ("skipping option %" U16_F " in options\n", (u16_t)op)); - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION(ip_current_netif(), dhcp, dhcp->state, msg_in, - dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE) ? (u8_t)dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE) : 0, - op, len, q, val_offset); - break; - } - - if (op == DHCP_OPTION_PAD) { - offset++; - } else { - if (offset + len + 2 > 0xFFFF) { - /* overflow */ - return ERR_BUF; - } - - offset = (u16_t)(offset + len + 2); - - if (decode_len > 0) { - u32_t value = 0; - u16_t copy_len; - decode_next: - LWIP_ASSERT("check decode_idx", decode_idx >= 0 && decode_idx < DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MAX); - - if (!dhcp_option_given(dhcp, decode_idx)) { - copy_len = LWIP_MIN(decode_len, 4); - - if (pbuf_copy_partial(q, &value, copy_len, val_offset) != copy_len) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - if (decode_len > 4) { - /* decode more than one u32_t */ - u16_t next_val_offset; - LWIP_ERROR("decode_len %% 4 == 0", decode_len % 4 == 0, return ERR_VAL;); - dhcp_got_option(dhcp, decode_idx); - dhcp_set_option_value(dhcp, decode_idx, lwip_htonl(value)); - decode_len = (u8_t)(decode_len - 4); - next_val_offset = (u16_t)(val_offset + 4); - - if (next_val_offset < val_offset) { - /* overflow */ - return ERR_BUF; - } - - val_offset = next_val_offset; - decode_idx++; - goto decode_next; - } else if (decode_len == 4) { - value = lwip_ntohl(value); - } else { - LWIP_ERROR("invalid decode_len", decode_len == 1, return ERR_VAL;); - value = ((u8_t *)&value)[0]; - } - - dhcp_got_option(dhcp, decode_idx); - dhcp_set_option_value(dhcp, decode_idx, value); - } - } - } - - if (offset >= q->len) { - offset = (u16_t)(offset - q->len); - offset_max = (u16_t)(offset_max - q->len); - - if (offset < offset_max) { - q = q->next; - LWIP_ERROR("next pbuf was null", q != NULL, return ERR_VAL;); - options = (u8_t *)q->payload; - } else { - /* We've run out of bytes, probably no end marker. Don't proceed. */ - return ERR_BUF; - } - } - } - - /* is this an overloaded message? */ - if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD)) { - u32_t overload = dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD); - dhcp_clear_option(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD); - - if (overload == DHCP_OVERLOAD_FILE) { - parse_file_as_options = 1; - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("overloaded file field\n")); - } else if (overload == DHCP_OVERLOAD_SNAME) { - parse_sname_as_options = 1; - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("overloaded sname field\n")); - } else if (overload == DHCP_OVERLOAD_SNAME_FILE) { - parse_sname_as_options = 1; - parse_file_as_options = 1; - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("overloaded sname and file field\n")); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("invalid overload option: %d\n", (int)overload)); - } - } - - if (parse_file_as_options) { - /* if both are overloaded, parse file first and then sname (RFC 2131 ch. 4.1) */ - parse_file_as_options = 0; - options_idx = DHCP_FILE_OFS; - options_idx_max = DHCP_FILE_OFS + DHCP_FILE_LEN; -#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE - file_overloaded = 1; -#endif - goto again; - } else if (parse_sname_as_options) { - parse_sname_as_options = 0; - options_idx = DHCP_SNAME_OFS; - options_idx_max = DHCP_SNAME_OFS + DHCP_SNAME_LEN; - goto again; - } - -#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE - - if (!file_overloaded) { - /* only do this for ACK messages */ - if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE) && - (dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE) == DHCP_ACK)) - - /* copy bootp file name, don't care for sname (server hostname) */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, dhcp->boot_file_name, DHCP_FILE_LEN - 1, DHCP_FILE_OFS) != (DHCP_FILE_LEN - 1)) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - - /* make sure the string is really NULL-terminated */ - dhcp->boot_file_name[DHCP_FILE_LEN - 1] = 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * If an incoming DHCP message is in response to us, then trigger the state machine - */ -static void dhcp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - struct netif *netif = ip_current_input_netif(); - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - struct dhcp_msg *reply_msg = (struct dhcp_msg *)p->payload; - u8_t msg_type; - u8_t i; - struct dhcp_msg *msg_in; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - /* Caught DHCP message from netif that does not have DHCP enabled? -> not interested */ - if ((dhcp == NULL) || (dhcp->pcb_allocated == 0)) { - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid server address type", IP_IS_V4(addr)); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_recv(pbuf = %p) from DHCP server %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F " port %" U16_F "\n", (void *)p, - ip4_addr1_16(ip_2_ip4(addr)), ip4_addr2_16(ip_2_ip4(addr)), ip4_addr3_16(ip_2_ip4(addr)), ip4_addr4_16(ip_2_ip4(addr)), port)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf->len = %" U16_F "\n", p->len)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf->tot_len = %" U16_F "\n", p->tot_len)); - /* prevent warnings about unused arguments */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); - - if (p->len < DHCP_MIN_REPLY_LEN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("DHCP reply message or pbuf too short\n")); - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - if (reply_msg->op != DHCP_BOOTREPLY) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("not a DHCP reply message, but type %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)reply_msg->op)); - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - /* iterate through hardware address and match against DHCP message */ - for (i = 0; i < netif->hwaddr_len && i < LWIP_MIN(DHCP_CHADDR_LEN, NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN); i++) { - if (netif->hwaddr[i] != reply_msg->chaddr[i]) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("netif->hwaddr[%" U16_F "]==%02" X16_F " != reply_msg->chaddr[%" U16_F "]==%02" X16_F "\n", - (u16_t)i, (u16_t)netif->hwaddr[i], (u16_t)i, (u16_t)reply_msg->chaddr[i])); - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - } - - /* match transaction ID against what we expected */ - if (lwip_ntohl(reply_msg->xid) != dhcp->xid) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("transaction id mismatch reply_msg->xid(%" X32_F ")!=dhcp->xid(%" X32_F ")\n", lwip_ntohl(reply_msg->xid), dhcp->xid)); - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - /* option fields could be unfold? */ - if (dhcp_parse_reply(p, dhcp) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("problem unfolding DHCP message - too short on memory?\n")); - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("searching DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE\n")); - - /* obtain pointer to DHCP message type */ - if (!dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE option not found\n")); - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - msg_in = (struct dhcp_msg *)p->payload; - /* read DHCP message type */ - msg_type = (u8_t)dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE); - - /* message type is DHCP ACK? */ - if (msg_type == DHCP_ACK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("DHCP_ACK received\n")); - - /* in requesting state? */ - if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) { - dhcp_handle_ack(netif, msg_in); -#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK - - if ((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP) != 0) { - /* check if the acknowledged lease address is already in use */ - dhcp_check(netif); - } else { - /* bind interface to the acknowledged lease address */ - dhcp_bind(netif); - } - -#else - /* bind interface to the acknowledged lease address */ - dhcp_bind(netif); -#endif - } - /* already bound to the given lease address? */ - else if ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING) || - (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING)) { - dhcp_handle_ack(netif, msg_in); - dhcp_bind(netif); - } - } - /* received a DHCP_NAK in appropriate state? */ - else if ((msg_type == DHCP_NAK) && - ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) || - (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("DHCP_NAK received\n")); - dhcp_handle_nak(netif); - } - /* received a DHCP_OFFER in DHCP_STATE_SELECTING state? */ - else if ((msg_type == DHCP_OFFER) && (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_SELECTING)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("DHCP_OFFER received in DHCP_STATE_SELECTING state\n")); - /* remember offered lease */ - dhcp_handle_offer(netif, msg_in); - } - -free_pbuf_and_return: - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/** - * Create a DHCP request, fill in common headers - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCP control - * @param dhcp dhcp control struct - * @param message_type message type of the request - */ -static struct pbuf *dhcp_create_msg(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t message_type, u16_t *options_out_len) -{ - u16_t i; - struct pbuf *p_out; - struct dhcp_msg *msg_out; - u16_t options_out_len_loc; - -#ifndef DHCP_GLOBAL_XID - /** default global transaction identifier starting value (easy to match - * with a packet analyser). We simply increment for each new request. - * Predefine DHCP_GLOBAL_XID to a better value or a function call to generate one - * at runtime, any supporting function prototypes can be defined in DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER */ -#if DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) - static u32_t xid; -#else /* DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) */ - static u32_t xid = 0xABCD0000; -#endif /* DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) */ -#else - - if (!xid_initialised) { - xid = DHCP_GLOBAL_XID; - xid_initialised = !xid_initialised; - } - -#endif - LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_create_msg: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return NULL;); - LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_create_msg: dhcp != NULL", (dhcp != NULL), return NULL;); - p_out = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct dhcp_msg), PBUF_RAM); - - if (p_out == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("dhcp_create_msg(): could not allocate pbuf\n")); - return NULL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_create_msg: check that first pbuf can hold struct dhcp_msg", - (p_out->len >= sizeof(struct dhcp_msg))); - - /* DHCP_REQUEST should reuse 'xid' from DHCPOFFER */ - if ((message_type != DHCP_REQUEST) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING)) { - /* reuse transaction identifier in retransmissions */ - if (dhcp->tries == 0) { -#if DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) - xid = LWIP_RAND(); -#else /* DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) */ - xid++; -#endif /* DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) */ - } - - dhcp->xid = xid; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("transaction id xid(%" X32_F ")\n", xid)); - - msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; - memset(msg_out, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp_msg)); - - msg_out->op = DHCP_BOOTREQUEST; - /* @todo: make link layer independent */ - msg_out->htype = LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET; - msg_out->hlen = netif->hwaddr_len; - msg_out->xid = lwip_htonl(dhcp->xid); - - /* we don't need the broadcast flag since we can receive unicast traffic - before being fully configured! */ - /* set ciaddr to netif->ip_addr based on message_type and state */ - if ((message_type == DHCP_INFORM) || (message_type == DHCP_DECLINE) || (message_type == DHCP_RELEASE) || - ((message_type == DHCP_REQUEST) && /* DHCP_STATE_BOUND not used for sending! */ - ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING) || dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING))) { - ip4_addr_copy(msg_out->ciaddr, *netif_ip4_addr(netif)); - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_MIN(DHCP_CHADDR_LEN, NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN); i++) { - /* copy netif hardware address (padded with zeroes through memset already) */ - msg_out->chaddr[i] = netif->hwaddr[i]; - } - - msg_out->cookie = PP_HTONL(DHCP_MAGIC_COOKIE); - /* Add option MESSAGE_TYPE */ - options_out_len_loc = dhcp_option(0, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE, DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE_LEN); - options_out_len_loc = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len_loc, msg_out->options, message_type); - - if (options_out_len) { - *options_out_len = options_out_len_loc; - } - - return p_out; -} - -/** - * Add a DHCP message trailer - * - * Adds the END option to the DHCP message, and if - * necessary, up to three padding bytes. - */ -static void dhcp_option_trailer(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, struct pbuf *p_out) -{ - options[options_out_len++] = DHCP_OPTION_END; - - /* packet is too small, or not 4 byte aligned? */ - while (((options_out_len < DHCP_MIN_OPTIONS_LEN) || (options_out_len & 3)) && - (options_out_len < DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN)) { - /* add a fill/padding byte */ - options[options_out_len++] = 0; - } - - /* shrink the pbuf to the actual content length */ - pbuf_realloc(p_out, (u16_t)(sizeof(struct dhcp_msg) - DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN + options_out_len)); -} - -/** check if DHCP supplied netif->ip_addr - * - * @param netif the netif to check - * @return 1 if DHCP supplied netif->ip_addr (states BOUND or RENEWING), - * 0 otherwise - */ -u8_t dhcp_supplied_address(const struct netif *netif) -{ - if ((netif != NULL) && (netif_dhcp_data(netif) != NULL)) { - struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); - return (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_BOUND) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING) || - (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING); - } - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_DHCP */ +/** + * @file + * Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol client + * + * @defgroup dhcp4 DHCPv4 + * @ingroup ip4 + * DHCP (IPv4) related functions + * This is a DHCP client for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. It aims to conform + * with RFC 2131 and RFC 2132. + * + * @todo: + * - Support for interfaces other than Ethernet (SLIP, PPP, ...) + * + * Options: + * @ref DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS (recommended 60 which is a minute) + * @ref DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS (recommended 500 which equals TCP coarse timer) + * + * dhcp_start() starts a DHCP client instance which + * configures the interface by obtaining an IP address lease and maintaining it. + * + * Use dhcp_release() to end the lease and use dhcp_stop() + * to remove the DHCP client. + * + * @see LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS + * @see LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION + * + * @see netifapi_dhcp4 + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Leon Woestenberg + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * The Swedish Institute of Computer Science and Adam Dunkels + * are specifically granted permission to redistribute this + * source code. + * + * Author: Leon Woestenberg + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_DHCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp.h" +#include "lwip/autoip.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/prot/dhcp.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS +#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr) +#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION +#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, option, len, pbuf, offset) \ + do { \ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg); \ + } while (0) +#endif + +/** DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID: if this is set to 1, the xid is created using + * LWIP_RAND() (this overrides DHCP_GLOBAL_XID) + */ +#ifndef DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID +#define DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID 1 +#endif + +/** Default for DHCP_GLOBAL_XID is 0xABCD0000 + * This can be changed by defining DHCP_GLOBAL_XID and DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER, e.g. + * \#define DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER "stdlib.h" + * \#define DHCP_GLOBAL_XID rand() + */ +#ifdef DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER +#include DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER /* include optional starting XID generation prototypes */ +#endif + +/** DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE is set to the MTU + * MTU is checked to be big enough in dhcp_start */ +#define DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif) (netif->mtu) +#define DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN_MIN_REQUIRED 576 +/** Minimum length for reply before packet is parsed */ +#define DHCP_MIN_REPLY_LEN 44 + +#define REBOOT_TRIES 2 + +#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS +#if DNS_MAX_SERVERS > LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS +#define LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS +#else +#define LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS DNS_MAX_SERVERS +#endif +#else +#define LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS 0 +#endif + +/** Option handling: options are parsed in dhcp_parse_reply + * and saved in an array where other functions can load them from. + * This might be moved into the struct dhcp (not necessarily since + * lwIP is single-threaded and the array is only used while in recv + * callback). */ +enum dhcp_option_idx { + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD = 0, + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE, + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID, + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_LEASE_TIME, + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T1, + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T2, + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SUBNET_MASK, + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_ROUTER, +#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER, + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER_LAST = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER + LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS - 1, +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ +#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER, + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER_LAST = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER + LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS - 1, +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ + DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MAX +}; + +/** Holds the decoded option values, only valid while in dhcp_recv. + @todo: move this into struct dhcp? */ +u32_t dhcp_rx_options_val[DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MAX]; +/** Holds a flag which option was received and is contained in dhcp_rx_options_val, + only valid while in dhcp_recv. + @todo: move this into struct dhcp? */ +u8_t dhcp_rx_options_given[DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MAX]; + +static u8_t dhcp_discover_request_options[] = { + DHCP_OPTION_SUBNET_MASK, + DHCP_OPTION_ROUTER, + DHCP_OPTION_BROADCAST +#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS + , + DHCP_OPTION_DNS_SERVER +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ +#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV + , + DHCP_OPTION_NTP +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ +}; + +#ifdef DHCP_GLOBAL_XID +static u32_t xid; +static u8_t xid_initialised; +#endif /* DHCP_GLOBAL_XID */ + +#define dhcp_option_given(dhcp, idx) (dhcp_rx_options_given[idx] != 0) +#define dhcp_got_option(dhcp, idx) (dhcp_rx_options_given[idx] = 1) +#define dhcp_clear_option(dhcp, idx) (dhcp_rx_options_given[idx] = 0) +#define dhcp_clear_all_options(dhcp) (memset(dhcp_rx_options_given, 0, sizeof(dhcp_rx_options_given))) +#define dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, idx) (dhcp_rx_options_val[idx]) +#define dhcp_set_option_value(dhcp, idx, val) (dhcp_rx_options_val[idx] = (val)) + +static struct udp_pcb *dhcp_pcb; +static u8_t dhcp_pcb_refcount; + +/* DHCP client state machine functions */ +static err_t dhcp_discover(struct netif *netif); +static err_t dhcp_select(struct netif *netif); +static void dhcp_bind(struct netif *netif); +#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK +static err_t dhcp_decline(struct netif *netif); +#endif /* DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK */ +static err_t dhcp_rebind(struct netif *netif); +static err_t dhcp_reboot(struct netif *netif); +static void dhcp_set_state(struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t new_state); + +/* receive, unfold, parse and free incoming messages */ +static void dhcp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); + +/* set the DHCP timers */ +static void dhcp_timeout(struct netif *netif); +static void dhcp_t1_timeout(struct netif *netif); +static void dhcp_t2_timeout(struct netif *netif); + +/* build outgoing messages */ +/* create a DHCP message, fill in common headers */ +static struct pbuf *dhcp_create_msg(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t message_type, u16_t *options_out_len); +/* add a DHCP option (type, then length in bytes) */ +static u16_t dhcp_option(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u8_t option_type, u8_t option_len); +/* add option values */ +static u16_t dhcp_option_byte(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u8_t value); +static u16_t dhcp_option_short(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u16_t value); +static u16_t dhcp_option_long(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u32_t value); +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME +static u16_t dhcp_option_hostname(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, struct netif *netif); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ +/* always add the DHCP options trailer to end and pad */ +static void dhcp_option_trailer(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, struct pbuf *p_out); + +/** Ensure DHCP PCB is allocated and bound */ +static err_t dhcp_inc_pcb_refcount(void) +{ + if (dhcp_pcb_refcount == 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_inc_pcb_refcount(): memory leak", dhcp_pcb == NULL); + + /* allocate UDP PCB */ + dhcp_pcb = udp_new(); + + if (dhcp_pcb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + ip_set_option(dhcp_pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); + + /* set up local and remote port for the pcb -> listen on all interfaces on all src/dest IPs */ + udp_bind(dhcp_pcb, IP4_ADDR_ANY, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_CLIENT); + udp_connect(dhcp_pcb, IP4_ADDR_ANY, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER); + udp_recv(dhcp_pcb, dhcp_recv, NULL); + } + + dhcp_pcb_refcount++; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Free DHCP PCB if the last netif stops using it */ +static void dhcp_dec_pcb_refcount(void) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_pcb_refcount(): refcount error", (dhcp_pcb_refcount > 0)); + dhcp_pcb_refcount--; + + if (dhcp_pcb_refcount == 0) { + udp_remove(dhcp_pcb); + dhcp_pcb = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * Back-off the DHCP client (because of a received NAK response). + * + * Back-off the DHCP client because of a received NAK. Receiving a + * NAK means the client asked for something non-sensible, for + * example when it tries to renew a lease obtained on another network. + * + * We clear any existing set IP address and restart DHCP negotiation + * afresh (as per RFC2131 3.2.3). + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + */ +static void dhcp_handle_nak(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_handle_nak(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", + (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + /* Change to a defined state - set this before assigning the address + to ensure the callback can use dhcp_supplied_address() */ + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF); + /* remove IP address from interface (must no longer be used, as per RFC2131) */ + netif_set_addr(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); + /* We can immediately restart discovery */ + dhcp_discover(netif); +} + +#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK +/** + * Checks if the offered IP address is already in use. + * + * It does so by sending an ARP request for the offered address and + * entering CHECKING state. If no ARP reply is received within a small + * interval, the address is assumed to be free for use by us. + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + */ +static void dhcp_check(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + err_t result; + u16_t msecs; + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_check(netif=%p) %c%c\n", (void *)netif, (s16_t)netif->name[0], + (s16_t)netif->name[1])); + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_CHECKING); + /* create an ARP query for the offered IP address, expecting that no host + responds, as the IP address should not be in use. */ + result = etharp_query(netif, &dhcp->offered_ip_addr, NULL); + + if (result != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("dhcp_check: could not perform ARP query\n")); + } + + if (dhcp->tries < 255) { + dhcp->tries++; + } + + msecs = 500; + dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_check(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); +} +#endif /* DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK */ + +/** + * Remember the configuration offered by a DHCP server. + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + */ +static void dhcp_handle_offer(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp_msg *msg_in) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_handle_offer(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", + (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + + /* obtain the server address */ + if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID)) { + dhcp->request_timeout = 0; /* stop timer */ + + ip_addr_set_ip4_u32(&dhcp->server_ip_addr, lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_handle_offer(): server 0x%08" X32_F "\n", + ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(&dhcp->server_ip_addr)))); + /* remember offered address */ + ip4_addr_copy(dhcp->offered_ip_addr, msg_in->yiaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_handle_offer(): offer for 0x%08" X32_F "\n", + ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr))); + + dhcp_select(netif); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("dhcp_handle_offer(netif=%p) did not get server ID!\n", (void *)netif)); + } +} + +/** + * Select a DHCP server offer out of all offers. + * + * Simply select the first offer received. + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + * @return lwIP specific error (see error.h) + */ +static err_t dhcp_select(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp; + err_t result; + u16_t msecs; + u8_t i; + struct pbuf *p_out; + u16_t options_out_len; + + LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_select: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_select: dhcp != NULL", (dhcp != NULL), return ERR_VAL;); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_select(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING); + + /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ + p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); + + if (p_out != NULL) { + struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); + + /* MUST request the offered IP address */ + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP, 4); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr))); + + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID, 4); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(&dhcp->server_ip_addr)))); + + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { + options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME + options_out_len = dhcp_option_hostname(options_out_len, msg_out->options, netif); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ + + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING, msg_out, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); + dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); + + /* send broadcast to any DHCP server */ + result = udp_sendto_if_src(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY); + pbuf_free(p_out); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_select: REQUESTING\n")); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("dhcp_select: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); + result = ERR_MEM; + } + + if (dhcp->tries < 255) { + dhcp->tries++; + } + + msecs = (u16_t)((dhcp->tries < 6 ? 1 << dhcp->tries : 60) * 1000); + dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_select(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); + return result; +} + +/** + * The DHCP timer that checks for lease renewal/rebind timeouts. + * Must be called once a minute (see @ref DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS). + */ +void dhcp_coarse_tmr(void) +{ + struct netif *netif; + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_coarse_tmr()\n")); + /* iterate through all network interfaces */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + /* only act on DHCP configured interfaces */ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + + if ((dhcp != NULL) && (dhcp->state != DHCP_STATE_OFF)) { + /* compare lease time to expire timeout */ + if (dhcp->t0_timeout && (++dhcp->lease_used == dhcp->t0_timeout)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_coarse_tmr(): t0 timeout\n")); + /* this clients' lease time has expired */ + dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); + dhcp_start(netif); + /* timer is active (non zero), and triggers (zeroes) now? */ + } else if (dhcp->t2_rebind_time && (dhcp->t2_rebind_time-- == 1)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_coarse_tmr(): t2 timeout\n")); + /* this clients' rebind timeout triggered */ + dhcp_t2_timeout(netif); + /* timer is active (non zero), and triggers (zeroes) now */ + } else if (dhcp->t1_renew_time && (dhcp->t1_renew_time-- == 1)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_coarse_tmr(): t1 timeout\n")); + /* this clients' renewal timeout triggered */ + dhcp_t1_timeout(netif); + } + } + } +} + +/** + * DHCP transaction timeout handling (this function must be called every 500ms, + * see @ref DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS). + * + * A DHCP server is expected to respond within a short period of time. + * This timer checks whether an outstanding DHCP request is timed out. + */ +void dhcp_fine_tmr(void) +{ + struct netif *netif; + /* loop through netif's */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + + /* only act on DHCP configured interfaces */ + if (dhcp != NULL) { + /* timer is active (non zero), and is about to trigger now */ + if (dhcp->request_timeout > 1) { + dhcp->request_timeout--; + } else if (dhcp->request_timeout == 1) { + dhcp->request_timeout--; + /* { dhcp->request_timeout == 0 } */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_fine_tmr(): request timeout\n")); + /* this client's request timeout triggered */ + dhcp_timeout(netif); + } + } + } +} + +/** + * A DHCP negotiation transaction, or ARP request, has timed out. + * + * The timer that was started with the DHCP or ARP request has + * timed out, indicating no response was received in time. + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + */ +static void dhcp_timeout(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_timeout()\n")); + + /* back-off period has passed, or server selection timed out */ + if ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_SELECTING)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_timeout(): restarting discovery\n")); + dhcp_discover(netif); + /* receiving the requested lease timed out */ + } else if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_timeout(): REQUESTING, DHCP request timed out\n")); + + if (dhcp->tries <= 5) { + dhcp_select(netif); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_timeout(): REQUESTING, releasing, restarting\n")); + dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); + dhcp_start(netif); + } + +#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK + /* received no ARP reply for the offered address (which is good) */ + } else if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_CHECKING) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_timeout(): CHECKING, ARP request timed out\n")); + + if (dhcp->tries <= 1) { + dhcp_check(netif); + /* no ARP replies on the offered address, + looks like the IP address is indeed free */ + } else { + /* bind the interface to the offered address */ + dhcp_bind(netif); + } + +#endif /* DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK */ + } else if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING) { + if (dhcp->tries < REBOOT_TRIES) { + dhcp_reboot(netif); + } else { + dhcp_discover(netif); + } + } +} + +/** + * The renewal period has timed out. + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + */ +static void dhcp_t1_timeout(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_t1_timeout()\n")); + + if ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_BOUND) || + (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING)) { + /* just retry to renew - note that the rebind timer (t2) will + * eventually time-out if renew tries fail. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + ("dhcp_t1_timeout(): must renew\n")); + /* This slightly different to RFC2131: DHCPREQUEST will be sent from state + DHCP_STATE_RENEWING, not DHCP_STATE_BOUND */ + dhcp_renew(netif); + + /* Calculate next timeout */ + if (((dhcp->t2_timeout - dhcp->lease_used) / 2) >= ((60 + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS)) { + dhcp->t1_renew_time = (u16_t)((dhcp->t2_timeout - dhcp->lease_used) / 2); + } + } +} + +/** + * The rebind period has timed out. + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + */ +static void dhcp_t2_timeout(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_t2_timeout()\n")); + + if ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_BOUND) || + (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING)) { + /* just retry to rebind */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + ("dhcp_t2_timeout(): must rebind\n")); + /* This slightly different to RFC2131: DHCPREQUEST will be sent from state + DHCP_STATE_REBINDING, not DHCP_STATE_BOUND */ + dhcp_rebind(netif); + + /* Calculate next timeout */ + if (((dhcp->t0_timeout - dhcp->lease_used) / 2) >= ((60 + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS)) { + dhcp->t2_rebind_time = (u16_t)((dhcp->t0_timeout - dhcp->lease_used) / 2); + } + } +} + +/** + * Handle a DHCP ACK packet + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + */ +static void dhcp_handle_ack(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp_msg *msg_in) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + +#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS || LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV + u8_t n; +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS || LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ +#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV + ip4_addr_t ntp_server_addrs[LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS]; +#endif + + /* clear options we might not get from the ACK */ + ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_sn_mask); + ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_gw_addr); +#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE + ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_si_addr); +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ + + /* lease time given? */ + if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_LEASE_TIME)) { + /* remember offered lease time */ + dhcp->offered_t0_lease = dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_LEASE_TIME); + } + + /* renewal period given? */ + if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T1)) { + /* remember given renewal period */ + dhcp->offered_t1_renew = dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T1); + } else { + /* calculate safe periods for renewal */ + dhcp->offered_t1_renew = dhcp->offered_t0_lease / 2; + } + + /* renewal period given? */ + if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T2)) { + /* remember given rebind period */ + dhcp->offered_t2_rebind = dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T2); + } else { + /* calculate safe periods for rebinding (offered_t0_lease * 0.875 -> 87.5%)*/ + dhcp->offered_t2_rebind = (dhcp->offered_t0_lease * 7U) / 8U; + } + + /* (y)our internet address */ + ip4_addr_copy(dhcp->offered_ip_addr, msg_in->yiaddr); + +#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE + /* copy boot server address, + boot file name copied in dhcp_parse_reply if not overloaded */ + ip4_addr_copy(dhcp->offered_si_addr, msg_in->siaddr); +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ + + /* subnet mask given? */ + if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SUBNET_MASK)) { + /* remember given subnet mask */ + ip4_addr_set_u32(&dhcp->offered_sn_mask, lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SUBNET_MASK))); + dhcp->subnet_mask_given = 1; + } else { + dhcp->subnet_mask_given = 0; + } + + /* gateway router */ + if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_ROUTER)) { + ip4_addr_set_u32(&dhcp->offered_gw_addr, lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_ROUTER))); + } + +#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV + + /* NTP servers */ + for (n = 0; (n < LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS) && dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER + n); n++) { + ip4_addr_set_u32(&ntp_server_addrs[n], lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER + n))); + } + + dhcp_set_ntp_servers(n, ntp_server_addrs); +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ + +#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS + + /* DNS servers */ + for (n = 0; (n < LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS) && dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER + n); n++) { + ip_addr_t dns_addr; + ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(dns_addr, lwip_htonl(dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER + n))); + dns_setserver(n, &dns_addr); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp4 + * Set a statically allocated struct dhcp to work with. + * Using this prevents dhcp_start to allocate it using mem_malloc. + * + * @param netif the netif for which to set the struct dhcp + * @param dhcp (uninitialised) dhcp struct allocated by the application + */ +void dhcp_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp != NULL", dhcp != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif already has a struct dhcp set", netif_dhcp_data(netif) == NULL); + + /* clear data structure */ + memset(dhcp, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp)); + /* dhcp_set_state(&dhcp, DHCP_STATE_OFF); */ + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, dhcp); +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp4 + * Removes a struct dhcp from a netif. + * + * ATTENTION: Only use this when not using dhcp_set_struct() to allocate the + * struct dhcp since the memory is passed back to the heap. + * + * @param netif the netif from which to remove the struct dhcp + */ +void dhcp_cleanup(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + + if (netif_dhcp_data(netif) != NULL) { + mem_free(netif_dhcp_data(netif)); + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, NULL); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp4 + * Start DHCP negotiation for a network interface. + * + * If no DHCP client instance was attached to this interface, + * a new client is created first. If a DHCP client instance + * was already present, it restarts negotiation. + * + * @param netif The lwIP network interface + * @return lwIP error code + * - ERR_OK - No error + * - ERR_MEM - Out of memory + */ +err_t dhcp_start(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp; + err_t result; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ERROR("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("netif is not up, old style port?", netif_is_up(netif), return ERR_ARG;); + dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_start(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + + /* check MTU of the netif */ + if (netif->mtu < DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN_MIN_REQUIRED) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): Cannot use this netif with DHCP: MTU is too small\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* no DHCP client attached yet? */ + if (dhcp == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): mallocing new DHCP client\n")); + dhcp = (struct dhcp *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct dhcp)); + + if (dhcp == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): could not allocate dhcp\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* store this dhcp client in the netif */ + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, dhcp); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): allocated dhcp")); + /* already has DHCP client attached */ + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_start(): restarting DHCP configuration\n")); + + if (dhcp->pcb_allocated != 0) { + dhcp_dec_pcb_refcount(); /* free DHCP PCB if not needed any more */ + } + + /* dhcp is cleared below, no need to reset flag*/ + } + + /* clear data structure */ + memset(dhcp, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp)); + /* dhcp_set_state(&dhcp, DHCP_STATE_OFF); */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_start(): starting DHCP configuration\n")); + + if (dhcp_inc_pcb_refcount() != ERR_OK) /* ensure DHCP PCB is allocated */ + { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + dhcp->pcb_allocated = 1; + + if (!netif_is_link_up(netif)) { + /* set state INIT and wait for dhcp_network_changed() to call dhcp_discover() */ + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_INIT); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* (re)start the DHCP negotiation */ + result = dhcp_discover(netif); + + if (result != ERR_OK) { + /* free resources allocated above */ + dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + return result; +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp4 + * Inform a DHCP server of our manual configuration. + * + * This informs DHCP servers of our fixed IP address configuration + * by sending an INFORM message. It does not involve DHCP address + * configuration, it is just here to be nice to the network. + * + * @param netif The lwIP network interface + */ +void dhcp_inform(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp dhcp; + struct pbuf *p_out; + u16_t options_out_len; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ERROR("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return;); + + if (dhcp_inc_pcb_refcount() != ERR_OK) /* ensure DHCP PCB is allocated */ + { + return; + } + + memset(&dhcp, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp)); + dhcp_set_state(&dhcp, DHCP_STATE_INFORMING); + + /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ + p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, &dhcp, DHCP_INFORM, &options_out_len); + + if (p_out != NULL) { + struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); + + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, &dhcp, DHCP_STATE_INFORMING, msg_out, DHCP_INFORM, &options_out_len); + dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_inform: INFORMING\n")); + + udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); + + pbuf_free(p_out); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_inform: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); + } + + dhcp_dec_pcb_refcount(); /* delete DHCP PCB if not needed any more */ +} + +/** Handle a possible change in the network configuration. + * + * This enters the REBOOTING state to verify that the currently bound + * address is still valid. + */ +void dhcp_network_changed(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + + if (!dhcp) { + return; + } + + switch (dhcp->state) { + case DHCP_STATE_REBINDING: + case DHCP_STATE_RENEWING: + case DHCP_STATE_BOUND: + case DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING: + dhcp->tries = 0; + dhcp_reboot(netif); + break; + + case DHCP_STATE_OFF: + /* stay off */ + break; + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid dhcp->state", dhcp->state <= DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF); + /* INIT/REQUESTING/CHECKING/BACKING_OFF restart with new 'rid' because the + state changes, SELECTING: continue with current 'rid' as we stay in the + same state */ +#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP + + if (dhcp->autoip_coop_state == DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON) { + autoip_stop(netif); + dhcp->autoip_coop_state = DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP */ + /* ensure we start with short timeouts, even if already discovering */ + dhcp->tries = 0; + dhcp_discover(netif); + break; + } +} + +#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK +/** + * Match an ARP reply with the offered IP address: + * check whether the offered IP address is not in use using ARP + * + * @param netif the network interface on which the reply was received + * @param addr The IP address we received a reply from + */ +void dhcp_arp_reply(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *addr) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp; + + LWIP_ERROR("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return;); + dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_arp_reply()\n")); + + /* is a DHCP client doing an ARP check? */ + if ((dhcp != NULL) && (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_CHECKING)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_arp_reply(): CHECKING, arp reply for 0x%08" X32_F "\n", + ip4_addr_get_u32(addr))); + + /* did a host respond with the address we + were offered by the DHCP server? */ + if (ip4_addr_cmp(addr, &dhcp->offered_ip_addr)) { + /* we will not accept the offered address */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("dhcp_arp_reply(): arp reply matched with offered address, declining\n")); + dhcp_decline(netif); + } + } +} + +/** + * Decline an offered lease. + * + * Tell the DHCP server we do not accept the offered address. + * One reason to decline the lease is when we find out the address + * is already in use by another host (through ARP). + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + */ +static err_t dhcp_decline(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + err_t result; + u16_t msecs; + struct pbuf *p_out; + u16_t options_out_len; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_decline()\n")); + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF); + /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ + p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_DECLINE, &options_out_len); + + if (p_out != NULL) { + struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP, 4); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr))); + + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF, msg_out, DHCP_DECLINE, &options_out_len); + dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); + + /* per section 4.4.4, broadcast DECLINE messages */ + result = udp_sendto_if_src(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY); + pbuf_free(p_out); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_decline: BACKING OFF\n")); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("dhcp_decline: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); + result = ERR_MEM; + } + + if (dhcp->tries < 255) { + dhcp->tries++; + } + + msecs = 10 * 1000; + dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_decline(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); + return result; +} +#endif /* DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK */ + +/** + * Start the DHCP process, discover a DHCP server. + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + */ +static err_t dhcp_discover(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + err_t result = ERR_OK; + u16_t msecs; + u8_t i; + struct pbuf *p_out; + u16_t options_out_len; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_discover()\n")); + + ip4_addr_set_any(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr); + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_SELECTING); + /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ + p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_DISCOVER, &options_out_len); + + if (p_out != NULL) { + struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_discover: making request\n")); + + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); + + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { + options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); + } + + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_SELECTING, msg_out, DHCP_DISCOVER, &options_out_len); + dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_discover: sendto(DISCOVER, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER)\n")); + udp_sendto_if_src(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_discover: deleting()ing\n")); + pbuf_free(p_out); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_discover: SELECTING\n")); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_discover: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); + } + + if (dhcp->tries < 255) { + dhcp->tries++; + } + +#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP + + if (dhcp->tries >= LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_TRIES && dhcp->autoip_coop_state == DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF) { + dhcp->autoip_coop_state = DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON; + autoip_start(netif); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP */ + msecs = (u16_t)((dhcp->tries < 6 ? 1 << dhcp->tries : 60) * 1000); + dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_discover(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); + return result; +} + +/** + * Bind the interface to the offered IP address. + * + * @param netif network interface to bind to the offered address + */ +static void dhcp_bind(struct netif *netif) +{ + u32_t timeout; + struct dhcp *dhcp; + ip4_addr_t sn_mask, gw_addr; + LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_bind: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return;); + dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_bind: dhcp != NULL", (dhcp != NULL), return;); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_bind(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + + /* reset time used of lease */ + dhcp->lease_used = 0; + + if (dhcp->offered_t0_lease != 0xffffffffUL) { + /* set renewal period timer */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_bind(): t0 renewal timer %" U32_F " secs\n", dhcp->offered_t0_lease)); + timeout = (dhcp->offered_t0_lease + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS; + + if (timeout > 0xffff) { + timeout = 0xffff; + } + + dhcp->t0_timeout = (u16_t)timeout; + + if (dhcp->t0_timeout == 0) { + dhcp->t0_timeout = 1; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_bind(): set request timeout %" U32_F " msecs\n", dhcp->offered_t0_lease * 1000)); + } + + /* temporary DHCP lease? */ + if (dhcp->offered_t1_renew != 0xffffffffUL) { + /* set renewal period timer */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_bind(): t1 renewal timer %" U32_F " secs\n", dhcp->offered_t1_renew)); + timeout = (dhcp->offered_t1_renew + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS; + + if (timeout > 0xffff) { + timeout = 0xffff; + } + + dhcp->t1_timeout = (u16_t)timeout; + + if (dhcp->t1_timeout == 0) { + dhcp->t1_timeout = 1; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_bind(): set request timeout %" U32_F " msecs\n", dhcp->offered_t1_renew * 1000)); + dhcp->t1_renew_time = dhcp->t1_timeout; + } + + /* set renewal period timer */ + if (dhcp->offered_t2_rebind != 0xffffffffUL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_bind(): t2 rebind timer %" U32_F " secs\n", dhcp->offered_t2_rebind)); + timeout = (dhcp->offered_t2_rebind + DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS / 2) / DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS; + + if (timeout > 0xffff) { + timeout = 0xffff; + } + + dhcp->t2_timeout = (u16_t)timeout; + + if (dhcp->t2_timeout == 0) { + dhcp->t2_timeout = 1; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_bind(): set request timeout %" U32_F " msecs\n", dhcp->offered_t2_rebind * 1000)); + dhcp->t2_rebind_time = dhcp->t2_timeout; + } + + /* If we have sub 1 minute lease, t2 and t1 will kick in at the same time. */ + if ((dhcp->t1_timeout >= dhcp->t2_timeout) && (dhcp->t2_timeout > 0)) { + dhcp->t1_timeout = 0; + } + + if (dhcp->subnet_mask_given) { + /* copy offered network mask */ + ip4_addr_copy(sn_mask, dhcp->offered_sn_mask); + } else { + /* subnet mask not given, choose a safe subnet mask given the network class */ + u8_t first_octet = ip4_addr1(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr); + + if (first_octet <= 127) { + ip4_addr_set_u32(&sn_mask, PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL)); + } else if (first_octet >= 192) { + ip4_addr_set_u32(&sn_mask, PP_HTONL(0xffffff00UL)); + } else { + ip4_addr_set_u32(&sn_mask, PP_HTONL(0xffff0000UL)); + } + } + + ip4_addr_copy(gw_addr, dhcp->offered_gw_addr); + + /* gateway address not given? */ + if (ip4_addr_isany_val(gw_addr)) { + /* copy network address */ + ip4_addr_get_network(&gw_addr, &dhcp->offered_ip_addr, &sn_mask); + /* use first host address on network as gateway */ + ip4_addr_set_u32(&gw_addr, ip4_addr_get_u32(&gw_addr) | PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL)); + } + +#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP + + if (dhcp->autoip_coop_state == DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON) { + autoip_stop(netif); + dhcp->autoip_coop_state = DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_bind(): IP: 0x%08" X32_F " SN: 0x%08" X32_F " GW: 0x%08" X32_F "\n", + ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr), ip4_addr_get_u32(&sn_mask), ip4_addr_get_u32(&gw_addr))); + /* netif is now bound to DHCP leased address - set this before assigning the address + to ensure the callback can use dhcp_supplied_address() */ + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_BOUND); + + netif_set_addr(netif, &dhcp->offered_ip_addr, &sn_mask, &gw_addr); + /* interface is used by routing now that an address is set */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp4 + * Renew an existing DHCP lease at the involved DHCP server. + * + * @param netif network interface which must renew its lease + */ +err_t dhcp_renew(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + err_t result; + u16_t msecs; + u8_t i; + struct pbuf *p_out; + u16_t options_out_len; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_renew()\n")); + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_RENEWING); + + /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ + p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); + + if (p_out != NULL) { + struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); + + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { + options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME + options_out_len = dhcp_option_hostname(options_out_len, msg_out->options, netif); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ + + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_RENEWING, msg_out, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); + dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); + + result = udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, &dhcp->server_ip_addr, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); + pbuf_free(p_out); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_renew: RENEWING\n")); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_renew: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); + result = ERR_MEM; + } + + if (dhcp->tries < 255) { + dhcp->tries++; + } + + /* back-off on retries, but to a maximum of 20 seconds */ + msecs = (u16_t)(dhcp->tries < 10 ? dhcp->tries * 2000 : 20 * 1000); + dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_renew(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); + return result; +} + +/** + * Rebind with a DHCP server for an existing DHCP lease. + * + * @param netif network interface which must rebind with a DHCP server + */ +static err_t dhcp_rebind(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + err_t result; + u16_t msecs; + u8_t i; + struct pbuf *p_out; + u16_t options_out_len; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_rebind()\n")); + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REBINDING); + + /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ + p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); + + if (p_out != NULL) { + struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN(netif)); + + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { + options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME + options_out_len = dhcp_option_hostname(options_out_len, msg_out->options, netif); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ + + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REBINDING, msg_out, DHCP_DISCOVER, &options_out_len); + dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); + + /* broadcast to server */ + result = udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); + pbuf_free(p_out); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_rebind: REBINDING\n")); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_rebind: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); + result = ERR_MEM; + } + + if (dhcp->tries < 255) { + dhcp->tries++; + } + + msecs = (u16_t)(dhcp->tries < 10 ? dhcp->tries * 1000 : 10 * 1000); + dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_rebind(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); + return result; +} + +/** + * Enter REBOOTING state to verify an existing lease + * + * @param netif network interface which must reboot + */ +static err_t dhcp_reboot(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + err_t result; + u16_t msecs; + u8_t i; + struct pbuf *p_out; + u16_t options_out_len; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_reboot()\n")); + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING); + + /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ + p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); + + if (p_out != NULL) { + struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE, DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_short(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_MAX_MSG_LEN_MIN_REQUIRED); + + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP, 4); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr))); + + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options)); + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(dhcp_discover_request_options); i++) { + options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, msg_out->options, dhcp_discover_request_options[i]); + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME + options_out_len = dhcp_option_hostname(options_out_len, msg_out->options, netif); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ + + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING, msg_out, DHCP_REQUEST, &options_out_len); + dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); + + /* broadcast to server */ + result = udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, IP_ADDR_BROADCAST, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); + pbuf_free(p_out); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_reboot: REBOOTING\n")); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_reboot: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); + result = ERR_MEM; + } + + if (dhcp->tries < 255) { + dhcp->tries++; + } + + msecs = (u16_t)(dhcp->tries < 10 ? dhcp->tries * 1000 : 10 * 1000); + dhcp->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_reboot(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); + return result; +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp4 + * Release a DHCP lease and stop DHCP statemachine (and AUTOIP if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP). + * + * @param netif network interface + */ +void dhcp_release_and_stop(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + ip_addr_t server_ip_addr; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_release_and_stop()\n")); + + if (dhcp == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* already off? -> nothing to do */ + if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_OFF) { + return; + } + + ip_addr_copy(server_ip_addr, dhcp->server_ip_addr); + + /* clean old DHCP offer */ + ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(&dhcp->server_ip_addr); + ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_ip_addr); + ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_sn_mask); + ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_gw_addr); +#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE + ip4_addr_set_zero(&dhcp->offered_si_addr); +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ + dhcp->offered_t0_lease = dhcp->offered_t1_renew = dhcp->offered_t2_rebind = 0; + dhcp->t1_renew_time = dhcp->t2_rebind_time = dhcp->lease_used = dhcp->t0_timeout = 0; + + /* send release message when current IP was assigned via DHCP */ + if (dhcp_supplied_address(netif)) { + /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ + struct pbuf *p_out; + u16_t options_out_len; + p_out = dhcp_create_msg(netif, dhcp, DHCP_RELEASE, &options_out_len); + + if (p_out != NULL) { + struct dhcp_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID, 4); + options_out_len = dhcp_option_long(options_out_len, msg_out->options, lwip_ntohl(ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(&server_ip_addr)))); + + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, dhcp->state, msg_out, DHCP_RELEASE, &options_out_len); + dhcp_option_trailer(options_out_len, msg_out->options, p_out); + + udp_sendto_if(dhcp_pcb, p_out, &server_ip_addr, LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER, netif); + pbuf_free(p_out); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp_release: RELEASED, DHCP_STATE_OFF\n")); + } else { + /* sending release failed, but that's not a problem since the correct behaviour of dhcp does not rely on release */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp_release: could not allocate DHCP request\n")); + } + } + + /* remove IP address from interface (prevents routing from selecting this interface) */ + netif_set_addr(netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); + +#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP + + if (dhcp->autoip_coop_state == DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON) { + autoip_stop(netif); + dhcp->autoip_coop_state = DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP */ + + dhcp_set_state(dhcp, DHCP_STATE_OFF); + + if (dhcp->pcb_allocated != 0) { + dhcp_dec_pcb_refcount(); /* free DHCP PCB if not needed any more */ + dhcp->pcb_allocated = 0; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp4 + * This function calls dhcp_release_and_stop() internally. + * @deprecated Use dhcp_release_and_stop() instead. + */ +err_t dhcp_release(struct netif *netif) +{ + dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp4 + * This function calls dhcp_release_and_stop() internally. + * @deprecated Use dhcp_release_and_stop() instead. + */ +void dhcp_stop(struct netif *netif) +{ + dhcp_release_and_stop(netif); +} + +/* + * Set the DHCP state of a DHCP client. + * + * If the state changed, reset the number of tries. + */ +static void dhcp_set_state(struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t new_state) +{ + if (new_state != dhcp->state) { + dhcp->state = new_state; + dhcp->tries = 0; + dhcp->request_timeout = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Concatenate an option type and length field to the outgoing + * DHCP message. + * + */ +static u16_t dhcp_option(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u8_t option_type, u8_t option_len) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_option: options_out_len + 2 + option_len <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN", options_out_len + 2U + option_len <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); + options[options_out_len++] = option_type; + options[options_out_len++] = option_len; + return options_out_len; +} +/* + * Concatenate a single byte to the outgoing DHCP message. + * + */ +static u16_t dhcp_option_byte(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u8_t value) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_option_byte: options_out_len < DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN", options_out_len < DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); + options[options_out_len++] = value; + return options_out_len; +} + +static u16_t dhcp_option_short(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u16_t value) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_option_short: options_out_len + 2 <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN", options_out_len + 2U <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); + options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0xff00U) >> 8); + options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)(value & 0x00ffU); + return options_out_len; +} + +static u16_t dhcp_option_long(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u32_t value) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_option_long: options_out_len + 4 <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN", options_out_len + 4U <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); + options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0xff000000UL) >> 24); + options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0x00ff0000UL) >> 16); + options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0x0000ff00UL) >> 8); + options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0x000000ffUL)); + return options_out_len; +} + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME +static u16_t dhcp_option_hostname(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, struct netif *netif) +{ + if (netif->hostname != NULL) { + size_t namelen = strlen(netif->hostname); + + if (namelen > 0) { + size_t len; + const char *p = netif->hostname; + /* Shrink len to available bytes (need 2 bytes for OPTION_HOSTNAME + and 1 byte for trailer) */ + size_t available = DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN - options_out_len - 3; + LWIP_ASSERT("DHCP: hostname is too long!", namelen <= available); + len = LWIP_MIN(namelen, available); + LWIP_ASSERT("DHCP: hostname is too long!", len <= 0xFF); + options_out_len = dhcp_option(options_out_len, options, DHCP_OPTION_HOSTNAME, (u8_t)len); + + while (len--) { + options_out_len = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len, options, *p++); + } + } + } + + return options_out_len; +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ + +/** + * Extract the DHCP message and the DHCP options. + * + * Extract the DHCP message and the DHCP options, each into a contiguous + * piece of memory. As a DHCP message is variable sized by its options, + * and also allows overriding some fields for options, the easy approach + * is to first unfold the options into a contiguous piece of memory, and + * use that further on. + * + */ +static err_t dhcp_parse_reply(struct pbuf *p, struct dhcp *dhcp) +{ + u8_t *options; + u16_t offset; + u16_t offset_max; + u16_t options_idx; + u16_t options_idx_max; + struct pbuf *q; + int parse_file_as_options = 0; + int parse_sname_as_options = 0; + struct dhcp_msg *msg_in; +#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE + int file_overloaded = 0; +#endif + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp); + + /* clear received options */ + dhcp_clear_all_options(dhcp); + + /* check that beginning of dhcp_msg (up to and including chaddr) is in first pbuf */ + if (p->len < DHCP_SNAME_OFS) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + msg_in = (struct dhcp_msg *)p->payload; +#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE + /* clear boot file name */ + dhcp->boot_file_name[0] = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ + + /* parse options */ + + /* start with options field */ + options_idx = DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS; + /* parse options to the end of the received packet */ + options_idx_max = p->tot_len; +again: + q = p; + + while ((q != NULL) && (options_idx >= q->len)) { + options_idx = (u16_t)(options_idx - q->len); + options_idx_max = (u16_t)(options_idx_max - q->len); + q = q->next; + } + + if (q == NULL) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + offset = options_idx; + offset_max = options_idx_max; + options = (u8_t *)q->payload; + + /* at least 1 byte to read and no end marker, then at least 3 bytes to read? */ + while ((q != NULL) && (offset < offset_max) && (options[offset] != DHCP_OPTION_END)) { + u8_t op = options[offset]; + u8_t len; + u8_t decode_len = 0; + int decode_idx = -1; + u16_t val_offset = (u16_t)(offset + 2); + + if (val_offset < offset) { + /* overflow */ + return ERR_BUF; + } + + /* len byte might be in the next pbuf */ + if ((offset + 1) < q->len) { + len = options[offset + 1]; + } else { + len = (q->next != NULL ? ((u8_t *)q->next->payload)[0] : 0); + } + + /* LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG, ("msg_offset=%"U16_F", q->len=%"U16_F, msg_offset, q->len)); */ + decode_len = len; + + switch (op) { + /* case(DHCP_OPTION_END): handled above */ + case (DHCP_OPTION_PAD): + /* special option: no len encoded */ + decode_len = len = 0; + /* will be increased below */ + break; + + case (DHCP_OPTION_SUBNET_MASK): + LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SUBNET_MASK; + break; + + case (DHCP_OPTION_ROUTER): + decode_len = 4; /* only copy the first given router */ + LWIP_ERROR("len >= decode_len", len >= decode_len, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_ROUTER; + break; +#if LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS + + case (DHCP_OPTION_DNS_SERVER): + /* special case: there might be more than one server */ + LWIP_ERROR("len %% 4 == 0", len % 4 == 0, return ERR_VAL;); + /* limit number of DNS servers */ + decode_len = LWIP_MIN(len, 4 * DNS_MAX_SERVERS); + LWIP_ERROR("len >= decode_len", len >= decode_len, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER; + break; +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ + + case (DHCP_OPTION_LEASE_TIME): + LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_LEASE_TIME; + break; +#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV + + case (DHCP_OPTION_NTP): + /* special case: there might be more than one server */ + LWIP_ERROR("len %% 4 == 0", len % 4 == 0, return ERR_VAL;); + /* limit number of NTP servers */ + decode_len = LWIP_MIN(len, 4 * LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS); + LWIP_ERROR("len >= decode_len", len >= decode_len, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER; + break; +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV*/ + + case (DHCP_OPTION_OVERLOAD): + LWIP_ERROR("len == 1", len == 1, return ERR_VAL;); + /* decode overload only in options, not in file/sname: invalid packet */ + LWIP_ERROR("overload in file/sname", options_idx == DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD; + break; + + case (DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE): + LWIP_ERROR("len == 1", len == 1, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE; + break; + + case (DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID): + LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID; + break; + + case (DHCP_OPTION_T1): + LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T1; + break; + + case (DHCP_OPTION_T2): + LWIP_ERROR("len == 4", len == 4, return ERR_VAL;); + decode_idx = DHCP_OPTION_IDX_T2; + break; + + default: + decode_len = 0; + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG, ("skipping option %" U16_F " in options\n", (u16_t)op)); + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION(ip_current_netif(), dhcp, dhcp->state, msg_in, + dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE) ? (u8_t)dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE) : 0, + op, len, q, val_offset); + break; + } + + if (op == DHCP_OPTION_PAD) { + offset++; + } else { + if (offset + len + 2 > 0xFFFF) { + /* overflow */ + return ERR_BUF; + } + + offset = (u16_t)(offset + len + 2); + + if (decode_len > 0) { + u32_t value = 0; + u16_t copy_len; + decode_next: + LWIP_ASSERT("check decode_idx", decode_idx >= 0 && decode_idx < DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MAX); + + if (!dhcp_option_given(dhcp, decode_idx)) { + copy_len = LWIP_MIN(decode_len, 4); + + if (pbuf_copy_partial(q, &value, copy_len, val_offset) != copy_len) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + if (decode_len > 4) { + /* decode more than one u32_t */ + u16_t next_val_offset; + LWIP_ERROR("decode_len %% 4 == 0", decode_len % 4 == 0, return ERR_VAL;); + dhcp_got_option(dhcp, decode_idx); + dhcp_set_option_value(dhcp, decode_idx, lwip_htonl(value)); + decode_len = (u8_t)(decode_len - 4); + next_val_offset = (u16_t)(val_offset + 4); + + if (next_val_offset < val_offset) { + /* overflow */ + return ERR_BUF; + } + + val_offset = next_val_offset; + decode_idx++; + goto decode_next; + } else if (decode_len == 4) { + value = lwip_ntohl(value); + } else { + LWIP_ERROR("invalid decode_len", decode_len == 1, return ERR_VAL;); + value = ((u8_t *)&value)[0]; + } + + dhcp_got_option(dhcp, decode_idx); + dhcp_set_option_value(dhcp, decode_idx, value); + } + } + } + + if (offset >= q->len) { + offset = (u16_t)(offset - q->len); + offset_max = (u16_t)(offset_max - q->len); + + if (offset < offset_max) { + q = q->next; + LWIP_ERROR("next pbuf was null", q != NULL, return ERR_VAL;); + options = (u8_t *)q->payload; + } else { + /* We've run out of bytes, probably no end marker. Don't proceed. */ + return ERR_BUF; + } + } + } + + /* is this an overloaded message? */ + if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD)) { + u32_t overload = dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD); + dhcp_clear_option(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_OVERLOAD); + + if (overload == DHCP_OVERLOAD_FILE) { + parse_file_as_options = 1; + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("overloaded file field\n")); + } else if (overload == DHCP_OVERLOAD_SNAME) { + parse_sname_as_options = 1; + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("overloaded sname field\n")); + } else if (overload == DHCP_OVERLOAD_SNAME_FILE) { + parse_sname_as_options = 1; + parse_file_as_options = 1; + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("overloaded sname and file field\n")); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("invalid overload option: %d\n", (int)overload)); + } + } + + if (parse_file_as_options) { + /* if both are overloaded, parse file first and then sname (RFC 2131 ch. 4.1) */ + parse_file_as_options = 0; + options_idx = DHCP_FILE_OFS; + options_idx_max = DHCP_FILE_OFS + DHCP_FILE_LEN; +#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE + file_overloaded = 1; +#endif + goto again; + } else if (parse_sname_as_options) { + parse_sname_as_options = 0; + options_idx = DHCP_SNAME_OFS; + options_idx_max = DHCP_SNAME_OFS + DHCP_SNAME_LEN; + goto again; + } + +#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE + + if (!file_overloaded) { + /* only do this for ACK messages */ + if (dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE) && + (dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE) == DHCP_ACK)) + + /* copy bootp file name, don't care for sname (server hostname) */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, dhcp->boot_file_name, DHCP_FILE_LEN - 1, DHCP_FILE_OFS) != (DHCP_FILE_LEN - 1)) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + + /* make sure the string is really NULL-terminated */ + dhcp->boot_file_name[DHCP_FILE_LEN - 1] = 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * If an incoming DHCP message is in response to us, then trigger the state machine + */ +static void dhcp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + struct netif *netif = ip_current_input_netif(); + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + struct dhcp_msg *reply_msg = (struct dhcp_msg *)p->payload; + u8_t msg_type; + u8_t i; + struct dhcp_msg *msg_in; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + /* Caught DHCP message from netif that does not have DHCP enabled? -> not interested */ + if ((dhcp == NULL) || (dhcp->pcb_allocated == 0)) { + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid server address type", IP_IS_V4(addr)); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_recv(pbuf = %p) from DHCP server %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F " port %" U16_F "\n", (void *)p, + ip4_addr1_16(ip_2_ip4(addr)), ip4_addr2_16(ip_2_ip4(addr)), ip4_addr3_16(ip_2_ip4(addr)), ip4_addr4_16(ip_2_ip4(addr)), port)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf->len = %" U16_F "\n", p->len)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf->tot_len = %" U16_F "\n", p->tot_len)); + /* prevent warnings about unused arguments */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); + + if (p->len < DHCP_MIN_REPLY_LEN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("DHCP reply message or pbuf too short\n")); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + if (reply_msg->op != DHCP_BOOTREPLY) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("not a DHCP reply message, but type %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)reply_msg->op)); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + /* iterate through hardware address and match against DHCP message */ + for (i = 0; i < netif->hwaddr_len && i < LWIP_MIN(DHCP_CHADDR_LEN, NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN); i++) { + if (netif->hwaddr[i] != reply_msg->chaddr[i]) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("netif->hwaddr[%" U16_F "]==%02" X16_F " != reply_msg->chaddr[%" U16_F "]==%02" X16_F "\n", + (u16_t)i, (u16_t)netif->hwaddr[i], (u16_t)i, (u16_t)reply_msg->chaddr[i])); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + } + + /* match transaction ID against what we expected */ + if (lwip_ntohl(reply_msg->xid) != dhcp->xid) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("transaction id mismatch reply_msg->xid(%" X32_F ")!=dhcp->xid(%" X32_F ")\n", lwip_ntohl(reply_msg->xid), dhcp->xid)); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + /* option fields could be unfold? */ + if (dhcp_parse_reply(p, dhcp) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("problem unfolding DHCP message - too short on memory?\n")); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("searching DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE\n")); + + /* obtain pointer to DHCP message type */ + if (!dhcp_option_given(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE option not found\n")); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + msg_in = (struct dhcp_msg *)p->payload; + /* read DHCP message type */ + msg_type = (u8_t)dhcp_get_option_value(dhcp, DHCP_OPTION_IDX_MSG_TYPE); + + /* message type is DHCP ACK? */ + if (msg_type == DHCP_ACK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("DHCP_ACK received\n")); + + /* in requesting state? */ + if (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) { + dhcp_handle_ack(netif, msg_in); +#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK + + if ((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP) != 0) { + /* check if the acknowledged lease address is already in use */ + dhcp_check(netif); + } else { + /* bind interface to the acknowledged lease address */ + dhcp_bind(netif); + } + +#else + /* bind interface to the acknowledged lease address */ + dhcp_bind(netif); +#endif + } + /* already bound to the given lease address? */ + else if ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING) || + (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING)) { + dhcp_handle_ack(netif, msg_in); + dhcp_bind(netif); + } + } + /* received a DHCP_NAK in appropriate state? */ + else if ((msg_type == DHCP_NAK) && + ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING) || + (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("DHCP_NAK received\n")); + dhcp_handle_nak(netif); + } + /* received a DHCP_OFFER in DHCP_STATE_SELECTING state? */ + else if ((msg_type == DHCP_OFFER) && (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_SELECTING)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("DHCP_OFFER received in DHCP_STATE_SELECTING state\n")); + /* remember offered lease */ + dhcp_handle_offer(netif, msg_in); + } + +free_pbuf_and_return: + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/** + * Create a DHCP request, fill in common headers + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCP control + * @param dhcp dhcp control struct + * @param message_type message type of the request + */ +static struct pbuf *dhcp_create_msg(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t message_type, u16_t *options_out_len) +{ + u16_t i; + struct pbuf *p_out; + struct dhcp_msg *msg_out; + u16_t options_out_len_loc; + +#ifndef DHCP_GLOBAL_XID + /** default global transaction identifier starting value (easy to match + * with a packet analyser). We simply increment for each new request. + * Predefine DHCP_GLOBAL_XID to a better value or a function call to generate one + * at runtime, any supporting function prototypes can be defined in DHCP_GLOBAL_XID_HEADER */ +#if DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) + static u32_t xid; +#else /* DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) */ + static u32_t xid = 0xABCD0000; +#endif /* DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) */ +#else + + if (!xid_initialised) { + xid = DHCP_GLOBAL_XID; + xid_initialised = !xid_initialised; + } + +#endif + LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_create_msg: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return NULL;); + LWIP_ERROR("dhcp_create_msg: dhcp != NULL", (dhcp != NULL), return NULL;); + p_out = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct dhcp_msg), PBUF_RAM); + + if (p_out == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("dhcp_create_msg(): could not allocate pbuf\n")); + return NULL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp_create_msg: check that first pbuf can hold struct dhcp_msg", + (p_out->len >= sizeof(struct dhcp_msg))); + + /* DHCP_REQUEST should reuse 'xid' from DHCPOFFER */ + if ((message_type != DHCP_REQUEST) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING)) { + /* reuse transaction identifier in retransmissions */ + if (dhcp->tries == 0) { +#if DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) + xid = LWIP_RAND(); +#else /* DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) */ + xid++; +#endif /* DHCP_CREATE_RAND_XID && defined(LWIP_RAND) */ + } + + dhcp->xid = xid; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("transaction id xid(%" X32_F ")\n", xid)); + + msg_out = (struct dhcp_msg *)p_out->payload; + memset(msg_out, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp_msg)); + + msg_out->op = DHCP_BOOTREQUEST; + /* @todo: make link layer independent */ + msg_out->htype = LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET; + msg_out->hlen = netif->hwaddr_len; + msg_out->xid = lwip_htonl(dhcp->xid); + + /* we don't need the broadcast flag since we can receive unicast traffic + before being fully configured! */ + /* set ciaddr to netif->ip_addr based on message_type and state */ + if ((message_type == DHCP_INFORM) || (message_type == DHCP_DECLINE) || (message_type == DHCP_RELEASE) || + ((message_type == DHCP_REQUEST) && /* DHCP_STATE_BOUND not used for sending! */ + ((dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING) || dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING))) { + ip4_addr_copy(msg_out->ciaddr, *netif_ip4_addr(netif)); + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_MIN(DHCP_CHADDR_LEN, NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN); i++) { + /* copy netif hardware address (padded with zeroes through memset already) */ + msg_out->chaddr[i] = netif->hwaddr[i]; + } + + msg_out->cookie = PP_HTONL(DHCP_MAGIC_COOKIE); + /* Add option MESSAGE_TYPE */ + options_out_len_loc = dhcp_option(0, msg_out->options, DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE, DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE_LEN); + options_out_len_loc = dhcp_option_byte(options_out_len_loc, msg_out->options, message_type); + + if (options_out_len) { + *options_out_len = options_out_len_loc; + } + + return p_out; +} + +/** + * Add a DHCP message trailer + * + * Adds the END option to the DHCP message, and if + * necessary, up to three padding bytes. + */ +static void dhcp_option_trailer(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, struct pbuf *p_out) +{ + options[options_out_len++] = DHCP_OPTION_END; + + /* packet is too small, or not 4 byte aligned? */ + while (((options_out_len < DHCP_MIN_OPTIONS_LEN) || (options_out_len & 3)) && + (options_out_len < DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN)) { + /* add a fill/padding byte */ + options[options_out_len++] = 0; + } + + /* shrink the pbuf to the actual content length */ + pbuf_realloc(p_out, (u16_t)(sizeof(struct dhcp_msg) - DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN + options_out_len)); +} + +/** check if DHCP supplied netif->ip_addr + * + * @param netif the netif to check + * @return 1 if DHCP supplied netif->ip_addr (states BOUND or RENEWING), + * 0 otherwise + */ +u8_t dhcp_supplied_address(const struct netif *netif) +{ + if ((netif != NULL) && (netif_dhcp_data(netif) != NULL)) { + struct dhcp *dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(netif); + return (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_BOUND) || (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_RENEWING) || + (dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REBINDING); + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_DHCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/etharp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/etharp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/etharp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/etharp.c index 2152b039..4710a9e7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/etharp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/etharp.c @@ -1,1258 +1,1258 @@ -/** - * @file - * Address Resolution Protocol module for IP over Ethernet - * - * Functionally, ARP is divided into two parts. The first maps an IP address - * to a physical address when sending a packet, and the second part answers - * requests from other machines for our physical address. - * - * This implementation complies with RFC 826 (Ethernet ARP). It supports - * Gratuitious ARP from RFC3220 (IP Mobility Support for IPv4) section 4.6 - * if an interface calls etharp_gratuitous(our_netif) upon address change. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Leon Woestenberg - * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp.h" -#include "lwip/autoip.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" -#include "netif/ethernet.h" - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -/** Re-request a used ARP entry 1 minute before it would expire to prevent - * breaking a steadily used connection because the ARP entry timed out. */ -#define ARP_AGE_REREQUEST_USED_UNICAST (ARP_MAXAGE - 30) -#define ARP_AGE_REREQUEST_USED_BROADCAST (ARP_MAXAGE - 15) - -/** the time an ARP entry stays pending after first request, - * for ARP_TMR_INTERVAL = 1000, this is - * 10 seconds. - * - * @internal Keep this number at least 2, otherwise it might - * run out instantly if the timeout occurs directly after a request. - */ -#define ARP_MAXPENDING 5 - -/** ARP states */ -enum etharp_state { - ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY = 0, - ETHARP_STATE_PENDING, - ETHARP_STATE_STABLE, - ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_1, - ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_2 -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES - , - ETHARP_STATE_STATIC -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ -}; - -struct etharp_entry { -#if ARP_QUEUEING - /** Pointer to queue of pending outgoing packets on this ARP entry. */ - struct etharp_q_entry *q; -#else /* ARP_QUEUEING */ - /** Pointer to a single pending outgoing packet on this ARP entry. */ - struct pbuf *q; -#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ - ip4_addr_t ipaddr; - struct netif *netif; - struct eth_addr ethaddr; - u16_t ctime; - u8_t state; -}; - -static struct etharp_entry arp_table[ARP_TABLE_SIZE]; - -#if !LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT -static netif_addr_idx_t etharp_cached_entry; -#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ - -/** Try hard to create a new entry - we want the IP address to appear in - the cache (even if this means removing an active entry or so). */ -#define ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD 1 -#define ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY 2 -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES -#define ETHARP_FLAG_STATIC_ENTRY 4 -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT -#define ETHARP_SET_ADDRHINT(netif, addrhint) \ - do { \ - if (((netif) != NULL) && ((netif)->hints != NULL)) { \ - (netif)->hints->addr_hint = (addrhint); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ -#define ETHARP_SET_ADDRHINT(netif, addrhint) (etharp_cached_entry = (addrhint)) -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ - -/* Check for maximum ARP_TABLE_SIZE */ -#if (ARP_TABLE_SIZE > NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX) -#error "ARP_TABLE_SIZE must fit in an s16_t, you have to reduce it in your lwipopts.h" -#endif - -static err_t etharp_request_dst(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const struct eth_addr *hw_dst_addr); -static err_t etharp_raw(struct netif *netif, - const struct eth_addr *ethsrc_addr, const struct eth_addr *ethdst_addr, - const struct eth_addr *hwsrc_addr, const ip4_addr_t *ipsrc_addr, - const struct eth_addr *hwdst_addr, const ip4_addr_t *ipdst_addr, - const u16_t opcode); - -#if ARP_QUEUEING -/** - * Free a complete queue of etharp entries - * - * @param q a qeueue of etharp_q_entry's to free - */ -static void free_etharp_q(struct etharp_q_entry *q) -{ - struct etharp_q_entry *r; - LWIP_ASSERT("q != NULL", q != NULL); - - while (q) { - r = q; - q = q->next; - LWIP_ASSERT("r->p != NULL", (r->p != NULL)); - pbuf_free(r->p); - memp_free(MEMP_ARP_QUEUE, r); - } -} -#else /* ARP_QUEUEING */ - -/** Compatibility define: free the queued pbuf */ -#define free_etharp_q(q) pbuf_free(q) - -#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ - -/** Clean up ARP table entries */ -static void etharp_free_entry(int i) -{ - /* remove from SNMP ARP index tree */ - mib2_remove_arp_entry(arp_table[i].netif, &arp_table[i].ipaddr); - - /* and empty packet queue */ - if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { - /* remove all queued packets */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG, ("etharp_free_entry: freeing entry %" U16_F ", packet queue %p.\n", (u16_t)i, (void *)(arp_table[i].q))); - free_etharp_q(arp_table[i].q); - arp_table[i].q = NULL; - } - - /* recycle entry for re-use */ - arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY; -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - /* for debugging, clean out the complete entry */ - arp_table[i].ctime = 0; - arp_table[i].netif = NULL; - ip4_addr_set_zero(&arp_table[i].ipaddr); - arp_table[i].ethaddr = ethzero; -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ -} - -/** - * Clears expired entries in the ARP table. - * - * This function should be called every ARP_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds (1 second), - * in order to expire entries in the ARP table. - */ -void etharp_tmr(void) -{ - int i; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG, ("etharp_timer\n")); - - /* remove expired entries from the ARP table */ - for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { - u8_t state = arp_table[i].state; - - if (state != ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES - && (state != ETHARP_STATE_STATIC) -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - ) { - arp_table[i].ctime++; - - if ((arp_table[i].ctime >= ARP_MAXAGE) || - ((arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) && - (arp_table[i].ctime >= ARP_MAXPENDING))) { - /* pending or stable entry has become old! */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG, ("etharp_timer: expired %s entry %d.\n", - arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE ? "stable" : "pending", i)); - /* clean up entries that have just been expired */ - etharp_free_entry(i); - } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_1) { - /* Don't send more than one request every 2 seconds. */ - arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_2; - } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_2) { - /* Reset state to stable, so that the next transmitted packet will - re-send an ARP request. */ - arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE; - } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) { - /* still pending, resend an ARP query */ - etharp_request(arp_table[i].netif, &arp_table[i].ipaddr); - } - } - } -} - -/** - * Search the ARP table for a matching or new entry. - * - * If an IP address is given, return a pending or stable ARP entry that matches - * the address. If no match is found, create a new entry with this address set, - * but in state ETHARP_EMPTY. The caller must check and possibly change the - * state of the returned entry. - * - * If ipaddr is NULL, return a initialized new entry in state ETHARP_EMPTY. - * - * In all cases, attempt to create new entries from an empty entry. If no - * empty entries are available and ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD flag is set, recycle - * old entries. Heuristic choose the least important entry for recycling. - * - * @param ipaddr IP address to find in ARP cache, or to add if not found. - * @param flags See @ref etharp_state - * @param netif netif related to this address (used for NETIF_HWADDRHINT) - * - * @return The ARP entry index that matched or is created, ERR_MEM if no - * entry is found or could be recycled. - */ -static s16_t etharp_find_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, u8_t flags, struct netif *netif) -{ - s16_t old_pending = ARP_TABLE_SIZE, old_stable = ARP_TABLE_SIZE; - s16_t empty = ARP_TABLE_SIZE; - s16_t i = 0; - /* oldest entry with packets on queue */ - s16_t old_queue = ARP_TABLE_SIZE; - /* its age */ - u16_t age_queue = 0, age_pending = 0, age_stable = 0; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - - /** - * a) do a search through the cache, remember candidates - * b) select candidate entry - * c) create new entry - */ - - /* a) in a single search sweep, do all of this - * 1) remember the first empty entry (if any) - * 2) remember the oldest stable entry (if any) - * 3) remember the oldest pending entry without queued packets (if any) - * 4) remember the oldest pending entry with queued packets (if any) - * 5) search for a matching IP entry, either pending or stable - * until 5 matches, or all entries are searched for. - */ - - for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { - u8_t state = arp_table[i].state; - - /* no empty entry found yet and now we do find one? */ - if ((empty == ARP_TABLE_SIZE) && (state == ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG, ("etharp_find_entry: found empty entry %d\n", (int)i)); - /* remember first empty entry */ - empty = i; - } else if (state != ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY) { - LWIP_ASSERT("state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING || state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE", - state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING || state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE); - - /* if given, does IP address match IP address in ARP entry? */ - if (ipaddr && ip4_addr_cmp(ipaddr, &arp_table[i].ipaddr) -#if ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF - && ((netif == NULL) || (netif == arp_table[i].netif)) -#endif /* ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF */ - ) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: found matching entry %d\n", (int)i)); - /* found exact IP address match, simply bail out */ - return i; - } - - /* pending entry? */ - if (state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) { - /* pending with queued packets? */ - if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { - if (arp_table[i].ctime >= age_queue) { - old_queue = i; - age_queue = arp_table[i].ctime; - } - } else - /* pending without queued packets? */ - { - if (arp_table[i].ctime >= age_pending) { - old_pending = i; - age_pending = arp_table[i].ctime; - } - } - - /* stable entry? */ - } else if (state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) { -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES - - /* don't record old_stable for static entries since they never expire */ - if (state < ETHARP_STATE_STATIC) -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - { - /* remember entry with oldest stable entry in oldest, its age in maxtime */ - if (arp_table[i].ctime >= age_stable) { - old_stable = i; - age_stable = arp_table[i].ctime; - } - } - } - } - } - - /* { we have no match } => try to create a new entry */ - - /* don't create new entry, only search? */ - if (((flags & ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY) != 0) || - /* or no empty entry found and not allowed to recycle? */ - ((empty == ARP_TABLE_SIZE) && ((flags & ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD) == 0))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: no empty entry found and not allowed to recycle\n")); - return (s16_t)ERR_MEM; - } - - /* b) choose the least destructive entry to recycle: - * 1) empty entry - * 2) oldest stable entry - * 3) oldest pending entry without queued packets - * 4) oldest pending entry with queued packets - * - * { ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD is set at this point } - */ - - /* 1) empty entry available? */ - if (empty < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { - i = empty; - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: selecting empty entry %d\n", (int)i)); - } else { - /* 2) found recyclable stable entry? */ - if (old_stable < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { - /* recycle oldest stable*/ - i = old_stable; - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: selecting oldest stable entry %d\n", (int)i)); - /* no queued packets should exist on stable entries */ - LWIP_ASSERT("arp_table[i].q == NULL", arp_table[i].q == NULL); - /* 3) found recyclable pending entry without queued packets? */ - } else if (old_pending < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { - /* recycle oldest pending */ - i = old_pending; - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: selecting oldest pending entry %d (without queue)\n", (int)i)); - /* 4) found recyclable pending entry with queued packets? */ - } else if (old_queue < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { - /* recycle oldest pending (queued packets are free in etharp_free_entry) */ - i = old_queue; - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: selecting oldest pending entry %d, freeing packet queue %p\n", (int)i, (void *)(arp_table[i].q))); - /* no empty or recyclable entries found */ - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: no empty or recyclable entries found\n")); - return (s16_t)ERR_MEM; - } - - /* { empty or recyclable entry found } */ - LWIP_ASSERT("i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE", i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE); - etharp_free_entry(i); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE", i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE); - LWIP_ASSERT("arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY", - arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY); - - /* IP address given? */ - if (ipaddr != NULL) { - /* set IP address */ - ip4_addr_copy(arp_table[i].ipaddr, *ipaddr); - } - - arp_table[i].ctime = 0; -#if ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF - arp_table[i].netif = netif; -#endif /* ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF */ - return (s16_t)i; -} - -/** - * Update (or insert) a IP/MAC address pair in the ARP cache. - * - * If a pending entry is resolved, any queued packets will be sent - * at this point. - * - * @param netif netif related to this entry (used for NETIF_ADDRHINT) - * @param ipaddr IP address of the inserted ARP entry. - * @param ethaddr Ethernet address of the inserted ARP entry. - * @param flags See @ref etharp_state - * - * @return - * - ERR_OK Successfully updated ARP cache. - * - ERR_MEM If we could not add a new ARP entry when ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD was set. - * - ERR_ARG Non-unicast address given, those will not appear in ARP cache. - * - * @see pbuf_free() - */ -static err_t etharp_update_arp_entry(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr, u8_t flags) -{ - s16_t i; - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->hwaddr_len == ETH_HWADDR_LEN", netif->hwaddr_len == ETH_HWADDR_LEN); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_update_arp_entry: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F " - %02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr), - (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[0], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[1], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[2], - (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[3], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[4], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[5])); - - /* non-unicast address? */ - if (ip4_addr_isany(ipaddr) || - ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ipaddr, netif) || - ip4_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_update_arp_entry: will not add non-unicast IP address to ARP cache\n")); - return ERR_ARG; - } - - /* find or create ARP entry */ - i = etharp_find_entry(ipaddr, flags, netif); - - /* bail out if no entry could be found */ - if (i < 0) { - return (err_t)i; - } - -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES - - if (flags & ETHARP_FLAG_STATIC_ENTRY) { - /* record static type */ - arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_STATIC; - } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_STATIC) { - /* found entry is a static type, don't overwrite it */ - return ERR_VAL; - } else -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - { - /* mark it stable */ - arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE; - } - - /* record network interface */ - arp_table[i].netif = netif; - /* insert in SNMP ARP index tree */ - mib2_add_arp_entry(netif, &arp_table[i].ipaddr); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_update_arp_entry: updating stable entry %" S16_F "\n", i)); - /* update address */ - SMEMCPY(&arp_table[i].ethaddr, ethaddr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); - /* reset time stamp */ - arp_table[i].ctime = 0; - /* this is where we will send out queued packets! */ -#if ARP_QUEUEING - - while (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { - struct pbuf *p; - /* remember remainder of queue */ - struct etharp_q_entry *q = arp_table[i].q; - /* pop first item off the queue */ - arp_table[i].q = q->next; - /* get the packet pointer */ - p = q->p; - /* now queue entry can be freed */ - memp_free(MEMP_ARP_QUEUE, q); -#else /* ARP_QUEUEING */ - - if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { - struct pbuf *p = arp_table[i].q; - arp_table[i].q = NULL; -#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ - /* send the queued IP packet */ - ethernet_output(netif, p, (struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), ethaddr, ETHTYPE_IP); - /* free the queued IP packet */ - pbuf_free(p); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES -/** Add a new static entry to the ARP table. If an entry exists for the - * specified IP address, this entry is overwritten. - * If packets are queued for the specified IP address, they are sent out. - * - * @param ipaddr IP address for the new static entry - * @param ethaddr ethernet address for the new static entry - * @return See return values of etharp_add_static_entry - */ -err_t etharp_add_static_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr) -{ - struct netif *netif; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_add_static_entry: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F " - %02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr), - (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[0], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[1], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[2], - (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[3], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[4], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[5])); - - netif = ip4_route(ipaddr); - - if (netif == NULL) { - return ERR_RTE; - } - - return etharp_update_arp_entry(netif, ipaddr, ethaddr, ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD | ETHARP_FLAG_STATIC_ENTRY); -} - -/** Remove a static entry from the ARP table previously added with a call to - * etharp_add_static_entry. - * - * @param ipaddr IP address of the static entry to remove - * @return ERR_OK: entry removed - * ERR_MEM: entry wasn't found - * ERR_ARG: entry wasn't a static entry but a dynamic one - */ -err_t etharp_remove_static_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - s16_t i; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_remove_static_entry: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr))); - - /* find or create ARP entry */ - i = etharp_find_entry(ipaddr, ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY, NULL); - - /* bail out if no entry could be found */ - if (i < 0) { - return (err_t)i; - } - - if (arp_table[i].state != ETHARP_STATE_STATIC) { - /* entry wasn't a static entry, cannot remove it */ - return ERR_ARG; - } - - /* entry found, free it */ - etharp_free_entry(i); - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - -/** - * Remove all ARP table entries of the specified netif. - * - * @param netif points to a network interface - */ -void etharp_cleanup_netif(struct netif *netif) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { - u8_t state = arp_table[i].state; - - if ((state != ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY) && (arp_table[i].netif == netif)) { - etharp_free_entry(i); - } - } -} - -/** - * Finds (stable) ethernet/IP address pair from ARP table - * using interface and IP address index. - * @note the addresses in the ARP table are in network order! - * - * @param netif points to interface index - * @param ipaddr points to the (network order) IP address index - * @param eth_ret points to return pointer - * @param ip_ret points to return pointer - * @return table index if found, -1 otherwise - */ -ssize_t etharp_find_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, - struct eth_addr **eth_ret, const ip4_addr_t **ip_ret) -{ - s16_t i; - - LWIP_ASSERT("eth_ret != NULL && ip_ret != NULL", - eth_ret != NULL && ip_ret != NULL); - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - - i = etharp_find_entry(ipaddr, ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY, netif); - - if ((i >= 0) && (arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE)) { - *eth_ret = &arp_table[i].ethaddr; - *ip_ret = &arp_table[i].ipaddr; - return i; - } - - return -1; -} - -/** - * Possibility to iterate over stable ARP table entries - * - * @param i entry number, 0 to ARP_TABLE_SIZE - * @param ipaddr return value: IP address - * @param netif return value: points to interface - * @param eth_ret return value: ETH address - * @return 1 on valid index, 0 otherwise - */ -int etharp_get_entry(size_t i, ip4_addr_t **ipaddr, struct netif **netif, struct eth_addr **eth_ret) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("ipaddr != NULL", ipaddr != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("eth_ret != NULL", eth_ret != NULL); - - if ((i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) && (arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE)) { - *ipaddr = &arp_table[i].ipaddr; - *netif = arp_table[i].netif; - *eth_ret = &arp_table[i].ethaddr; - return 1; - } else { - return 0; - } -} - -/** - * Responds to ARP requests to us. Upon ARP replies to us, add entry to cache - * send out queued IP packets. Updates cache with snooped address pairs. - * - * Should be called for incoming ARP packets. The pbuf in the argument - * is freed by this function. - * - * @param p The ARP packet that arrived on netif. Is freed by this function. - * @param netif The lwIP network interface on which the ARP packet pbuf arrived. - * - * @see pbuf_free() - */ -void etharp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) -{ - struct etharp_hdr *hdr; - /* these are aligned properly, whereas the ARP header fields might not be */ - ip4_addr_t sipaddr, dipaddr; - u8_t for_us; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return;); - - hdr = (struct etharp_hdr *)p->payload; - - /* RFC 826 "Packet Reception": */ - if ((hdr->hwtype != PP_HTONS(LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET)) || - (hdr->hwlen != ETH_HWADDR_LEN) || - (hdr->protolen != sizeof(ip4_addr_t)) || - (hdr->proto != PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_IP))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("etharp_input: packet dropped, wrong hw type, hwlen, proto, protolen or ethernet type (%" U16_F "/%" U16_F "/%" U16_F "/%" U16_F ")\n", - hdr->hwtype, (u16_t)hdr->hwlen, hdr->proto, (u16_t)hdr->protolen)); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.proterr); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.recv); - -#if LWIP_AUTOIP - /* We have to check if a host already has configured our random - * created link local address and continuously check if there is - * a host with this IP-address so we can detect collisions */ - autoip_arp_reply(netif, hdr); -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ - - /* Copy struct ip4_addr_wordaligned to aligned ip4_addr, to support compilers without - * structure packing (not using structure copy which breaks strict-aliasing rules). */ - IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(&sipaddr, &hdr->sipaddr); - IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(&dipaddr, &hdr->dipaddr); - - /* this interface is not configured? */ - if (ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - for_us = 0; - } else { - /* ARP packet directed to us? */ - for_us = (u8_t)ip4_addr_cmp(&dipaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif)); - } - - /* ARP message directed to us? - -> add IP address in ARP cache; assume requester wants to talk to us, - can result in directly sending the queued packets for this host. - ARP message not directed to us? - -> update the source IP address in the cache, if present */ - etharp_update_arp_entry(netif, &sipaddr, &(hdr->shwaddr), - for_us ? ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD : ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY); - - /* now act on the message itself */ - switch (hdr->opcode) { - /* ARP request? */ - case PP_HTONS(ARP_REQUEST): - /* ARP request. If it asked for our address, we send out a - * reply. In any case, we time-stamp any existing ARP entry, - * and possibly send out an IP packet that was queued on it. */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: incoming ARP request\n")); - - /* ARP request for our address? */ - if (for_us) { - /* send ARP response */ - etharp_raw(netif, - (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr, &hdr->shwaddr, - (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif), - &hdr->shwaddr, &sipaddr, - ARP_REPLY); - /* we are not configured? */ - } else if (ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - /* { for_us == 0 and netif->ip_addr.addr == 0 } */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: we are unconfigured, ARP request ignored.\n")); - /* request was not directed to us */ - } else { - /* { for_us == 0 and netif->ip_addr.addr != 0 } */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: ARP request was not for us.\n")); - } - - break; - - case PP_HTONS(ARP_REPLY): - /* ARP reply. We already updated the ARP cache earlier. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: incoming ARP reply\n")); -#if (LWIP_DHCP && DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK) - /* DHCP wants to know about ARP replies from any host with an - * IP address also offered to us by the DHCP server. We do not - * want to take a duplicate IP address on a single network. - * @todo How should we handle redundant (fail-over) interfaces? */ - dhcp_arp_reply(netif, &sipaddr); -#endif /* (LWIP_DHCP && DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK) */ - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: ARP unknown opcode type %" S16_F "\n", lwip_htons(hdr->opcode))); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.err); - break; - } - - /* free ARP packet */ - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/** Just a small helper function that sends a pbuf to an ethernet address - * in the arp_table specified by the index 'arp_idx'. - */ -static err_t etharp_output_to_arp_index(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, netif_addr_idx_t arp_idx) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("arp_table[arp_idx].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE", - arp_table[arp_idx].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE); - - /* if arp table entry is about to expire: re-request it, - but only if its state is ETHARP_STATE_STABLE to prevent flooding the - network with ARP requests if this address is used frequently. */ - if (arp_table[arp_idx].state == ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) { - if (arp_table[arp_idx].ctime >= ARP_AGE_REREQUEST_USED_BROADCAST) { - /* issue a standard request using broadcast */ - if (etharp_request(netif, &arp_table[arp_idx].ipaddr) == ERR_OK) { - arp_table[arp_idx].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_1; - } - } else if (arp_table[arp_idx].ctime >= ARP_AGE_REREQUEST_USED_UNICAST) { - /* issue a unicast request (for 15 seconds) to prevent unnecessary broadcast */ - if (etharp_request_dst(netif, &arp_table[arp_idx].ipaddr, &arp_table[arp_idx].ethaddr) == ERR_OK) { - arp_table[arp_idx].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_1; - } - } - } - - return ethernet_output(netif, q, (struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), &arp_table[arp_idx].ethaddr, ETHTYPE_IP); -} - -/** - * Resolve and fill-in Ethernet address header for outgoing IP packet. - * - * For IP multicast and broadcast, corresponding Ethernet addresses - * are selected and the packet is transmitted on the link. - * - * For unicast addresses, the packet is submitted to etharp_query(). In - * case the IP address is outside the local network, the IP address of - * the gateway is used. - * - * @param netif The lwIP network interface which the IP packet will be sent on. - * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. - * @param ipaddr The IP address of the packet destination. - * - * @return - * - ERR_RTE No route to destination (no gateway to external networks), - * or the return type of either etharp_query() or ethernet_output(). - */ -err_t etharp_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - const struct eth_addr *dest; - struct eth_addr mcastaddr; - const ip4_addr_t *dst_addr = ipaddr; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q != NULL", q != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("ipaddr != NULL", ipaddr != NULL); - - /* Determine on destination hardware address. Broadcasts and multicasts - * are special, other IP addresses are looked up in the ARP table. */ - - /* broadcast destination IP address? */ - if (ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ipaddr, netif)) { - /* broadcast on Ethernet also */ - dest = (const struct eth_addr *)ðbroadcast; - /* multicast destination IP address? */ - } else if (ip4_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr)) { - /* Hash IP multicast address to MAC address.*/ - mcastaddr.addr[0] = LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_0; - mcastaddr.addr[1] = LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_1; - mcastaddr.addr[2] = LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_2; - mcastaddr.addr[3] = ip4_addr2(ipaddr) & 0x7f; - mcastaddr.addr[4] = ip4_addr3(ipaddr); - mcastaddr.addr[5] = ip4_addr4(ipaddr); - /* destination Ethernet address is multicast */ - dest = &mcastaddr; - /* unicast destination IP address? */ - } else { - netif_addr_idx_t i; - - /* outside local network? if so, this can neither be a global broadcast nor - a subnet broadcast. */ - if (!ip4_addr_netcmp(ipaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)) && - !ip4_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr)) { -#if LWIP_AUTOIP - struct ip_hdr *iphdr = LWIP_ALIGNMENT_CAST(struct ip_hdr *, q->payload); - - /* According to RFC 3297, chapter 2.6.2 (Forwarding Rules), a packet with - a link-local source address must always be "directly to its destination - on the same physical link. The host MUST NOT send the packet to any - router for forwarding". */ - if (!ip4_addr_islinklocal(&iphdr->src)) -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ - { -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW - /* For advanced routing, a single default gateway might not be enough, so get - the IP address of the gateway to handle the current destination address. */ - dst_addr = LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW(netif, ipaddr); - - if (dst_addr == NULL) -#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW */ - { - /* interface has default gateway? */ - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_gw(netif))) { - /* send to hardware address of default gateway IP address */ - dst_addr = netif_ip4_gw(netif); - /* no default gateway available */ - } else { - /* no route to destination error (default gateway missing) */ - return ERR_RTE; - } - } - } - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT - - if (netif->hints != NULL) { - /* per-pcb cached entry was given */ - netif_addr_idx_t etharp_cached_entry = netif->hints->addr_hint; - - if (etharp_cached_entry < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ - - if ((arp_table[etharp_cached_entry].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) && -#if ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF - (arp_table[etharp_cached_entry].netif == netif) && -#endif - (ip4_addr_cmp(dst_addr, &arp_table[etharp_cached_entry].ipaddr))) { - /* the per-pcb-cached entry is stable and the right one! */ - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.cachehit); - return etharp_output_to_arp_index(netif, q, etharp_cached_entry); - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ - - /* find stable entry: do this here since this is a critical path for - throughput and etharp_find_entry() is kind of slow */ - for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { - if ((arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) && -#if ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF - (arp_table[i].netif == netif) && -#endif - (ip4_addr_cmp(dst_addr, &arp_table[i].ipaddr))) { - /* found an existing, stable entry */ - ETHARP_SET_ADDRHINT(netif, i); - return etharp_output_to_arp_index(netif, q, i); - } - } - - /* no stable entry found, use the (slower) query function: - queue on destination Ethernet address belonging to ipaddr */ - return etharp_query(netif, dst_addr, q); - } - - /* continuation for multicast/broadcast destinations */ - /* obtain source Ethernet address of the given interface */ - /* send packet directly on the link */ - return ethernet_output(netif, q, (struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), dest, ETHTYPE_IP); -} - -/** - * Send an ARP request for the given IP address and/or queue a packet. - * - * If the IP address was not yet in the cache, a pending ARP cache entry - * is added and an ARP request is sent for the given address. The packet - * is queued on this entry. - * - * If the IP address was already pending in the cache, a new ARP request - * is sent for the given address. The packet is queued on this entry. - * - * If the IP address was already stable in the cache, and a packet is - * given, it is directly sent and no ARP request is sent out. - * - * If the IP address was already stable in the cache, and no packet is - * given, an ARP request is sent out. - * - * @param netif The lwIP network interface on which ipaddr - * must be queried for. - * @param ipaddr The IP address to be resolved. - * @param q If non-NULL, a pbuf that must be delivered to the IP address. - * q is not freed by this function. - * - * @note q must only be ONE packet, not a packet queue! - * - * @return - * - ERR_BUF Could not make room for Ethernet header. - * - ERR_MEM Hardware address unknown, and no more ARP entries available - * to query for address or queue the packet. - * - ERR_MEM Could not queue packet due to memory shortage. - * - ERR_RTE No route to destination (no gateway to external networks). - * - ERR_ARG Non-unicast address given, those will not appear in ARP cache. - * - */ -err_t etharp_query(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct pbuf *q) -{ - struct eth_addr *srcaddr = (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr; - err_t result = ERR_MEM; - int is_new_entry = 0; - s16_t i_err; - netif_addr_idx_t i; - - /* non-unicast address? */ - if (ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ipaddr, netif) || - ip4_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) || - ip4_addr_isany(ipaddr)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: will not add non-unicast IP address to ARP cache\n")); - return ERR_ARG; - } - - /* find entry in ARP cache, ask to create entry if queueing packet */ - i_err = etharp_find_entry(ipaddr, ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD, netif); - - /* could not find or create entry? */ - if (i_err < 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: could not create ARP entry\n")); - - if (q) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: packet dropped\n")); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.memerr); - } - - return (err_t)i_err; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("type overflow", (size_t)i_err < NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX); - i = (netif_addr_idx_t)i_err; - - /* mark a fresh entry as pending (we just sent a request) */ - if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY) { - is_new_entry = 1; - arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_PENDING; - /* record network interface for re-sending arp request in etharp_tmr */ - arp_table[i].netif = netif; - } - - /* { i is either a STABLE or (new or existing) PENDING entry } */ - LWIP_ASSERT("arp_table[i].state == PENDING or STABLE", - ((arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) || - (arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE))); - - /* do we have a new entry? or an implicit query request? */ - if (is_new_entry || (q == NULL)) { - /* try to resolve it; send out ARP request */ - result = etharp_request(netif, ipaddr); - - if (result != ERR_OK) { - /* ARP request couldn't be sent */ - /* We don't re-send arp request in etharp_tmr, but we still queue packets, - since this failure could be temporary, and the next packet calling - etharp_query again could lead to sending the queued packets. */ - } - - if (q == NULL) { - return result; - } - } - - /* packet given? */ - LWIP_ASSERT("q != NULL", q != NULL); - - /* stable entry? */ - if (arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) { - /* we have a valid IP->Ethernet address mapping */ - ETHARP_SET_ADDRHINT(netif, i); - /* send the packet */ - result = ethernet_output(netif, q, srcaddr, &(arp_table[i].ethaddr), ETHTYPE_IP); - /* pending entry? (either just created or already pending */ - } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) { - /* entry is still pending, queue the given packet 'q' */ - struct pbuf *p; - int copy_needed = 0; - /* IF q includes a pbuf that must be copied, copy the whole chain into a - * new PBUF_RAM. See the definition of PBUF_NEEDS_COPY for details. */ - p = q; - - while (p) { - LWIP_ASSERT("no packet queues allowed!", (p->len != p->tot_len) || (p->next == 0)); - - if (PBUF_NEEDS_COPY(p)) { - copy_needed = 1; - break; - } - - p = p->next; - } - - if (copy_needed) { - /* copy the whole packet into new pbufs */ - p = pbuf_clone(PBUF_LINK, PBUF_RAM, q); - } else { - /* referencing the old pbuf is enough */ - p = q; - pbuf_ref(p); - } - - /* packet could be taken over? */ - if (p != NULL) { - /* queue packet ... */ -#if ARP_QUEUEING - struct etharp_q_entry *new_entry; - /* allocate a new arp queue entry */ - new_entry = (struct etharp_q_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_ARP_QUEUE); - - if (new_entry != NULL) { - unsigned int qlen = 0; - new_entry->next = 0; - new_entry->p = p; - - if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { - /* queue was already existent, append the new entry to the end */ - struct etharp_q_entry *r; - r = arp_table[i].q; - qlen++; - - while (r->next != NULL) { - r = r->next; - qlen++; - } - - r->next = new_entry; - } else { - /* queue did not exist, first item in queue */ - arp_table[i].q = new_entry; - } - -#if ARP_QUEUE_LEN - - if (qlen >= ARP_QUEUE_LEN) { - struct etharp_q_entry *old; - old = arp_table[i].q; - arp_table[i].q = arp_table[i].q->next; - pbuf_free(old->p); - memp_free(MEMP_ARP_QUEUE, old); - } - -#endif - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: queued packet %p on ARP entry %" U16_F "\n", (void *)q, i)); - result = ERR_OK; - } else { - /* the pool MEMP_ARP_QUEUE is empty */ - pbuf_free(p); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: could not queue a copy of PBUF_REF packet %p (out of memory)\n", (void *)q)); - result = ERR_MEM; - } - -#else /* ARP_QUEUEING */ - - /* always queue one packet per ARP request only, freeing a previously queued packet */ - if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: dropped previously queued packet %p for ARP entry %" U16_F "\n", (void *)q, (u16_t)i)); - pbuf_free(arp_table[i].q); - } - - arp_table[i].q = p; - result = ERR_OK; - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: queued packet %p on ARP entry %" U16_F "\n", (void *)q, (u16_t)i)); -#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ - } else { - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.memerr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: could not queue a copy of PBUF_REF packet %p (out of memory)\n", (void *)q)); - result = ERR_MEM; - } - } - - return result; -} - -/** - * Send a raw ARP packet (opcode and all addresses can be modified) - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface on which to send the ARP packet - * @param ethsrc_addr the source MAC address for the ethernet header - * @param ethdst_addr the destination MAC address for the ethernet header - * @param hwsrc_addr the source MAC address for the ARP protocol header - * @param ipsrc_addr the source IP address for the ARP protocol header - * @param hwdst_addr the destination MAC address for the ARP protocol header - * @param ipdst_addr the destination IP address for the ARP protocol header - * @param opcode the type of the ARP packet - * @return ERR_OK if the ARP packet has been sent - * ERR_MEM if the ARP packet couldn't be allocated - * any other err_t on failure - */ -static err_t etharp_raw(struct netif *netif, const struct eth_addr *ethsrc_addr, - const struct eth_addr *ethdst_addr, - const struct eth_addr *hwsrc_addr, const ip4_addr_t *ipsrc_addr, - const struct eth_addr *hwdst_addr, const ip4_addr_t *ipdst_addr, - const u16_t opcode) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - err_t result = ERR_OK; - struct etharp_hdr *hdr; - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - - /* allocate a pbuf for the outgoing ARP request packet */ - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, SIZEOF_ETHARP_HDR, PBUF_RAM); - - /* could allocate a pbuf for an ARP request? */ - if (p == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("etharp_raw: could not allocate pbuf for ARP request.\n")); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.memerr); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct etharp_hdr", - (p->len >= SIZEOF_ETHARP_HDR)); - - hdr = (struct etharp_hdr *)p->payload; - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_raw: sending raw ARP packet.\n")); - hdr->opcode = lwip_htons(opcode); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->hwaddr_len must be the same as ETH_HWADDR_LEN for etharp!", - (netif->hwaddr_len == ETH_HWADDR_LEN)); - - /* Write the ARP MAC-Addresses */ - SMEMCPY(&hdr->shwaddr, hwsrc_addr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); - SMEMCPY(&hdr->dhwaddr, hwdst_addr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); - /* Copy struct ip4_addr_wordaligned to aligned ip4_addr, to support compilers without - * structure packing. */ - IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_FROM_IP4_ADDR_T(&hdr->sipaddr, ipsrc_addr); - IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_FROM_IP4_ADDR_T(&hdr->dipaddr, ipdst_addr); - - hdr->hwtype = PP_HTONS(LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET); - hdr->proto = PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_IP); - /* set hwlen and protolen */ - hdr->hwlen = ETH_HWADDR_LEN; - hdr->protolen = sizeof(ip4_addr_t); - - /* send ARP query */ -#if LWIP_AUTOIP - - /* If we are using Link-Local, all ARP packets that contain a Link-Local - * 'sender IP address' MUST be sent using link-layer broadcast instead of - * link-layer unicast. (See RFC3927 Section 2.5, last paragraph) */ - if (ip4_addr_islinklocal(ipsrc_addr)) { - ethernet_output(netif, p, ethsrc_addr, ðbroadcast, ETHTYPE_ARP); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ - { - ethernet_output(netif, p, ethsrc_addr, ethdst_addr, ETHTYPE_ARP); - } - - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.xmit); - /* free ARP query packet */ - pbuf_free(p); - p = NULL; - /* could not allocate pbuf for ARP request */ - - return result; -} - -/** - * Send an ARP request packet asking for ipaddr to a specific eth address. - * Used to send unicast request to refresh the ARP table just before an entry - * times out - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface on which to send the request - * @param ipaddr the IP address for which to ask - * @param hw_dst_addr the ethernet address to send this packet to - * @return ERR_OK if the request has been sent - * ERR_MEM if the ARP packet couldn't be allocated - * any other err_t on failure - */ -static err_t etharp_request_dst(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const struct eth_addr *hw_dst_addr) -{ - return etharp_raw(netif, (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr, hw_dst_addr, - (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif), ðzero, - ipaddr, ARP_REQUEST); -} - -/** - * Send an ARP request packet asking for ipaddr. - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface on which to send the request - * @param ipaddr the IP address for which to ask - * @return ERR_OK if the request has been sent - * ERR_MEM if the ARP packet couldn't be allocated - * any other err_t on failure - */ -err_t etharp_request(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_request: sending ARP request.\n")); - return etharp_request_dst(netif, ipaddr, ðbroadcast); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ +/** + * @file + * Address Resolution Protocol module for IP over Ethernet + * + * Functionally, ARP is divided into two parts. The first maps an IP address + * to a physical address when sending a packet, and the second part answers + * requests from other machines for our physical address. + * + * This implementation complies with RFC 826 (Ethernet ARP). It supports + * Gratuitious ARP from RFC3220 (IP Mobility Support for IPv4) section 4.6 + * if an interface calls etharp_gratuitous(our_netif) upon address change. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Leon Woestenberg + * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp.h" +#include "lwip/autoip.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" +#include "netif/ethernet.h" + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +/** Re-request a used ARP entry 1 minute before it would expire to prevent + * breaking a steadily used connection because the ARP entry timed out. */ +#define ARP_AGE_REREQUEST_USED_UNICAST (ARP_MAXAGE - 30) +#define ARP_AGE_REREQUEST_USED_BROADCAST (ARP_MAXAGE - 15) + +/** the time an ARP entry stays pending after first request, + * for ARP_TMR_INTERVAL = 1000, this is + * 10 seconds. + * + * @internal Keep this number at least 2, otherwise it might + * run out instantly if the timeout occurs directly after a request. + */ +#define ARP_MAXPENDING 5 + +/** ARP states */ +enum etharp_state { + ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY = 0, + ETHARP_STATE_PENDING, + ETHARP_STATE_STABLE, + ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_1, + ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_2 +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES + , + ETHARP_STATE_STATIC +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ +}; + +struct etharp_entry { +#if ARP_QUEUEING + /** Pointer to queue of pending outgoing packets on this ARP entry. */ + struct etharp_q_entry *q; +#else /* ARP_QUEUEING */ + /** Pointer to a single pending outgoing packet on this ARP entry. */ + struct pbuf *q; +#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ + ip4_addr_t ipaddr; + struct netif *netif; + struct eth_addr ethaddr; + u16_t ctime; + u8_t state; +}; + +static struct etharp_entry arp_table[ARP_TABLE_SIZE]; + +#if !LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT +static netif_addr_idx_t etharp_cached_entry; +#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ + +/** Try hard to create a new entry - we want the IP address to appear in + the cache (even if this means removing an active entry or so). */ +#define ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD 1 +#define ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY 2 +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES +#define ETHARP_FLAG_STATIC_ENTRY 4 +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT +#define ETHARP_SET_ADDRHINT(netif, addrhint) \ + do { \ + if (((netif) != NULL) && ((netif)->hints != NULL)) { \ + (netif)->hints->addr_hint = (addrhint); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ +#define ETHARP_SET_ADDRHINT(netif, addrhint) (etharp_cached_entry = (addrhint)) +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ + +/* Check for maximum ARP_TABLE_SIZE */ +#if (ARP_TABLE_SIZE > NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX) +#error "ARP_TABLE_SIZE must fit in an s16_t, you have to reduce it in your lwipopts.h" +#endif + +static err_t etharp_request_dst(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const struct eth_addr *hw_dst_addr); +static err_t etharp_raw(struct netif *netif, + const struct eth_addr *ethsrc_addr, const struct eth_addr *ethdst_addr, + const struct eth_addr *hwsrc_addr, const ip4_addr_t *ipsrc_addr, + const struct eth_addr *hwdst_addr, const ip4_addr_t *ipdst_addr, + const u16_t opcode); + +#if ARP_QUEUEING +/** + * Free a complete queue of etharp entries + * + * @param q a qeueue of etharp_q_entry's to free + */ +static void free_etharp_q(struct etharp_q_entry *q) +{ + struct etharp_q_entry *r; + LWIP_ASSERT("q != NULL", q != NULL); + + while (q) { + r = q; + q = q->next; + LWIP_ASSERT("r->p != NULL", (r->p != NULL)); + pbuf_free(r->p); + memp_free(MEMP_ARP_QUEUE, r); + } +} +#else /* ARP_QUEUEING */ + +/** Compatibility define: free the queued pbuf */ +#define free_etharp_q(q) pbuf_free(q) + +#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ + +/** Clean up ARP table entries */ +static void etharp_free_entry(int i) +{ + /* remove from SNMP ARP index tree */ + mib2_remove_arp_entry(arp_table[i].netif, &arp_table[i].ipaddr); + + /* and empty packet queue */ + if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { + /* remove all queued packets */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG, ("etharp_free_entry: freeing entry %" U16_F ", packet queue %p.\n", (u16_t)i, (void *)(arp_table[i].q))); + free_etharp_q(arp_table[i].q); + arp_table[i].q = NULL; + } + + /* recycle entry for re-use */ + arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY; +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + /* for debugging, clean out the complete entry */ + arp_table[i].ctime = 0; + arp_table[i].netif = NULL; + ip4_addr_set_zero(&arp_table[i].ipaddr); + arp_table[i].ethaddr = ethzero; +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ +} + +/** + * Clears expired entries in the ARP table. + * + * This function should be called every ARP_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds (1 second), + * in order to expire entries in the ARP table. + */ +void etharp_tmr(void) +{ + int i; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG, ("etharp_timer\n")); + + /* remove expired entries from the ARP table */ + for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { + u8_t state = arp_table[i].state; + + if (state != ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES + && (state != ETHARP_STATE_STATIC) +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + ) { + arp_table[i].ctime++; + + if ((arp_table[i].ctime >= ARP_MAXAGE) || + ((arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) && + (arp_table[i].ctime >= ARP_MAXPENDING))) { + /* pending or stable entry has become old! */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG, ("etharp_timer: expired %s entry %d.\n", + arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE ? "stable" : "pending", i)); + /* clean up entries that have just been expired */ + etharp_free_entry(i); + } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_1) { + /* Don't send more than one request every 2 seconds. */ + arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_2; + } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_2) { + /* Reset state to stable, so that the next transmitted packet will + re-send an ARP request. */ + arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE; + } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) { + /* still pending, resend an ARP query */ + etharp_request(arp_table[i].netif, &arp_table[i].ipaddr); + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Search the ARP table for a matching or new entry. + * + * If an IP address is given, return a pending or stable ARP entry that matches + * the address. If no match is found, create a new entry with this address set, + * but in state ETHARP_EMPTY. The caller must check and possibly change the + * state of the returned entry. + * + * If ipaddr is NULL, return a initialized new entry in state ETHARP_EMPTY. + * + * In all cases, attempt to create new entries from an empty entry. If no + * empty entries are available and ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD flag is set, recycle + * old entries. Heuristic choose the least important entry for recycling. + * + * @param ipaddr IP address to find in ARP cache, or to add if not found. + * @param flags See @ref etharp_state + * @param netif netif related to this address (used for NETIF_HWADDRHINT) + * + * @return The ARP entry index that matched or is created, ERR_MEM if no + * entry is found or could be recycled. + */ +static s16_t etharp_find_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, u8_t flags, struct netif *netif) +{ + s16_t old_pending = ARP_TABLE_SIZE, old_stable = ARP_TABLE_SIZE; + s16_t empty = ARP_TABLE_SIZE; + s16_t i = 0; + /* oldest entry with packets on queue */ + s16_t old_queue = ARP_TABLE_SIZE; + /* its age */ + u16_t age_queue = 0, age_pending = 0, age_stable = 0; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + + /** + * a) do a search through the cache, remember candidates + * b) select candidate entry + * c) create new entry + */ + + /* a) in a single search sweep, do all of this + * 1) remember the first empty entry (if any) + * 2) remember the oldest stable entry (if any) + * 3) remember the oldest pending entry without queued packets (if any) + * 4) remember the oldest pending entry with queued packets (if any) + * 5) search for a matching IP entry, either pending or stable + * until 5 matches, or all entries are searched for. + */ + + for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { + u8_t state = arp_table[i].state; + + /* no empty entry found yet and now we do find one? */ + if ((empty == ARP_TABLE_SIZE) && (state == ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG, ("etharp_find_entry: found empty entry %d\n", (int)i)); + /* remember first empty entry */ + empty = i; + } else if (state != ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY) { + LWIP_ASSERT("state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING || state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE", + state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING || state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE); + + /* if given, does IP address match IP address in ARP entry? */ + if (ipaddr && ip4_addr_cmp(ipaddr, &arp_table[i].ipaddr) +#if ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF + && ((netif == NULL) || (netif == arp_table[i].netif)) +#endif /* ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF */ + ) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: found matching entry %d\n", (int)i)); + /* found exact IP address match, simply bail out */ + return i; + } + + /* pending entry? */ + if (state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) { + /* pending with queued packets? */ + if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { + if (arp_table[i].ctime >= age_queue) { + old_queue = i; + age_queue = arp_table[i].ctime; + } + } else + /* pending without queued packets? */ + { + if (arp_table[i].ctime >= age_pending) { + old_pending = i; + age_pending = arp_table[i].ctime; + } + } + + /* stable entry? */ + } else if (state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) { +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES + + /* don't record old_stable for static entries since they never expire */ + if (state < ETHARP_STATE_STATIC) +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + { + /* remember entry with oldest stable entry in oldest, its age in maxtime */ + if (arp_table[i].ctime >= age_stable) { + old_stable = i; + age_stable = arp_table[i].ctime; + } + } + } + } + } + + /* { we have no match } => try to create a new entry */ + + /* don't create new entry, only search? */ + if (((flags & ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY) != 0) || + /* or no empty entry found and not allowed to recycle? */ + ((empty == ARP_TABLE_SIZE) && ((flags & ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD) == 0))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: no empty entry found and not allowed to recycle\n")); + return (s16_t)ERR_MEM; + } + + /* b) choose the least destructive entry to recycle: + * 1) empty entry + * 2) oldest stable entry + * 3) oldest pending entry without queued packets + * 4) oldest pending entry with queued packets + * + * { ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD is set at this point } + */ + + /* 1) empty entry available? */ + if (empty < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { + i = empty; + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: selecting empty entry %d\n", (int)i)); + } else { + /* 2) found recyclable stable entry? */ + if (old_stable < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { + /* recycle oldest stable*/ + i = old_stable; + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: selecting oldest stable entry %d\n", (int)i)); + /* no queued packets should exist on stable entries */ + LWIP_ASSERT("arp_table[i].q == NULL", arp_table[i].q == NULL); + /* 3) found recyclable pending entry without queued packets? */ + } else if (old_pending < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { + /* recycle oldest pending */ + i = old_pending; + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: selecting oldest pending entry %d (without queue)\n", (int)i)); + /* 4) found recyclable pending entry with queued packets? */ + } else if (old_queue < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { + /* recycle oldest pending (queued packets are free in etharp_free_entry) */ + i = old_queue; + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: selecting oldest pending entry %d, freeing packet queue %p\n", (int)i, (void *)(arp_table[i].q))); + /* no empty or recyclable entries found */ + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_find_entry: no empty or recyclable entries found\n")); + return (s16_t)ERR_MEM; + } + + /* { empty or recyclable entry found } */ + LWIP_ASSERT("i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE", i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE); + etharp_free_entry(i); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE", i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE); + LWIP_ASSERT("arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY", + arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY); + + /* IP address given? */ + if (ipaddr != NULL) { + /* set IP address */ + ip4_addr_copy(arp_table[i].ipaddr, *ipaddr); + } + + arp_table[i].ctime = 0; +#if ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF + arp_table[i].netif = netif; +#endif /* ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF */ + return (s16_t)i; +} + +/** + * Update (or insert) a IP/MAC address pair in the ARP cache. + * + * If a pending entry is resolved, any queued packets will be sent + * at this point. + * + * @param netif netif related to this entry (used for NETIF_ADDRHINT) + * @param ipaddr IP address of the inserted ARP entry. + * @param ethaddr Ethernet address of the inserted ARP entry. + * @param flags See @ref etharp_state + * + * @return + * - ERR_OK Successfully updated ARP cache. + * - ERR_MEM If we could not add a new ARP entry when ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD was set. + * - ERR_ARG Non-unicast address given, those will not appear in ARP cache. + * + * @see pbuf_free() + */ +static err_t etharp_update_arp_entry(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr, u8_t flags) +{ + s16_t i; + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->hwaddr_len == ETH_HWADDR_LEN", netif->hwaddr_len == ETH_HWADDR_LEN); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_update_arp_entry: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F " - %02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr), + (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[0], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[1], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[2], + (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[3], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[4], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[5])); + + /* non-unicast address? */ + if (ip4_addr_isany(ipaddr) || + ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ipaddr, netif) || + ip4_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_update_arp_entry: will not add non-unicast IP address to ARP cache\n")); + return ERR_ARG; + } + + /* find or create ARP entry */ + i = etharp_find_entry(ipaddr, flags, netif); + + /* bail out if no entry could be found */ + if (i < 0) { + return (err_t)i; + } + +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES + + if (flags & ETHARP_FLAG_STATIC_ENTRY) { + /* record static type */ + arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_STATIC; + } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_STATIC) { + /* found entry is a static type, don't overwrite it */ + return ERR_VAL; + } else +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + { + /* mark it stable */ + arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE; + } + + /* record network interface */ + arp_table[i].netif = netif; + /* insert in SNMP ARP index tree */ + mib2_add_arp_entry(netif, &arp_table[i].ipaddr); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_update_arp_entry: updating stable entry %" S16_F "\n", i)); + /* update address */ + SMEMCPY(&arp_table[i].ethaddr, ethaddr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); + /* reset time stamp */ + arp_table[i].ctime = 0; + /* this is where we will send out queued packets! */ +#if ARP_QUEUEING + + while (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { + struct pbuf *p; + /* remember remainder of queue */ + struct etharp_q_entry *q = arp_table[i].q; + /* pop first item off the queue */ + arp_table[i].q = q->next; + /* get the packet pointer */ + p = q->p; + /* now queue entry can be freed */ + memp_free(MEMP_ARP_QUEUE, q); +#else /* ARP_QUEUEING */ + + if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { + struct pbuf *p = arp_table[i].q; + arp_table[i].q = NULL; +#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ + /* send the queued IP packet */ + ethernet_output(netif, p, (struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), ethaddr, ETHTYPE_IP); + /* free the queued IP packet */ + pbuf_free(p); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES +/** Add a new static entry to the ARP table. If an entry exists for the + * specified IP address, this entry is overwritten. + * If packets are queued for the specified IP address, they are sent out. + * + * @param ipaddr IP address for the new static entry + * @param ethaddr ethernet address for the new static entry + * @return See return values of etharp_add_static_entry + */ +err_t etharp_add_static_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr) +{ + struct netif *netif; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_add_static_entry: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F " - %02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr), + (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[0], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[1], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[2], + (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[3], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[4], (u16_t)ethaddr->addr[5])); + + netif = ip4_route(ipaddr); + + if (netif == NULL) { + return ERR_RTE; + } + + return etharp_update_arp_entry(netif, ipaddr, ethaddr, ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD | ETHARP_FLAG_STATIC_ENTRY); +} + +/** Remove a static entry from the ARP table previously added with a call to + * etharp_add_static_entry. + * + * @param ipaddr IP address of the static entry to remove + * @return ERR_OK: entry removed + * ERR_MEM: entry wasn't found + * ERR_ARG: entry wasn't a static entry but a dynamic one + */ +err_t etharp_remove_static_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + s16_t i; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_remove_static_entry: %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr), ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr))); + + /* find or create ARP entry */ + i = etharp_find_entry(ipaddr, ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY, NULL); + + /* bail out if no entry could be found */ + if (i < 0) { + return (err_t)i; + } + + if (arp_table[i].state != ETHARP_STATE_STATIC) { + /* entry wasn't a static entry, cannot remove it */ + return ERR_ARG; + } + + /* entry found, free it */ + etharp_free_entry(i); + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + +/** + * Remove all ARP table entries of the specified netif. + * + * @param netif points to a network interface + */ +void etharp_cleanup_netif(struct netif *netif) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; ++i) { + u8_t state = arp_table[i].state; + + if ((state != ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY) && (arp_table[i].netif == netif)) { + etharp_free_entry(i); + } + } +} + +/** + * Finds (stable) ethernet/IP address pair from ARP table + * using interface and IP address index. + * @note the addresses in the ARP table are in network order! + * + * @param netif points to interface index + * @param ipaddr points to the (network order) IP address index + * @param eth_ret points to return pointer + * @param ip_ret points to return pointer + * @return table index if found, -1 otherwise + */ +ssize_t etharp_find_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, + struct eth_addr **eth_ret, const ip4_addr_t **ip_ret) +{ + s16_t i; + + LWIP_ASSERT("eth_ret != NULL && ip_ret != NULL", + eth_ret != NULL && ip_ret != NULL); + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + + i = etharp_find_entry(ipaddr, ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY, netif); + + if ((i >= 0) && (arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE)) { + *eth_ret = &arp_table[i].ethaddr; + *ip_ret = &arp_table[i].ipaddr; + return i; + } + + return -1; +} + +/** + * Possibility to iterate over stable ARP table entries + * + * @param i entry number, 0 to ARP_TABLE_SIZE + * @param ipaddr return value: IP address + * @param netif return value: points to interface + * @param eth_ret return value: ETH address + * @return 1 on valid index, 0 otherwise + */ +int etharp_get_entry(size_t i, ip4_addr_t **ipaddr, struct netif **netif, struct eth_addr **eth_ret) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("ipaddr != NULL", ipaddr != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("eth_ret != NULL", eth_ret != NULL); + + if ((i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) && (arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE)) { + *ipaddr = &arp_table[i].ipaddr; + *netif = arp_table[i].netif; + *eth_ret = &arp_table[i].ethaddr; + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Responds to ARP requests to us. Upon ARP replies to us, add entry to cache + * send out queued IP packets. Updates cache with snooped address pairs. + * + * Should be called for incoming ARP packets. The pbuf in the argument + * is freed by this function. + * + * @param p The ARP packet that arrived on netif. Is freed by this function. + * @param netif The lwIP network interface on which the ARP packet pbuf arrived. + * + * @see pbuf_free() + */ +void etharp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) +{ + struct etharp_hdr *hdr; + /* these are aligned properly, whereas the ARP header fields might not be */ + ip4_addr_t sipaddr, dipaddr; + u8_t for_us; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return;); + + hdr = (struct etharp_hdr *)p->payload; + + /* RFC 826 "Packet Reception": */ + if ((hdr->hwtype != PP_HTONS(LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET)) || + (hdr->hwlen != ETH_HWADDR_LEN) || + (hdr->protolen != sizeof(ip4_addr_t)) || + (hdr->proto != PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_IP))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("etharp_input: packet dropped, wrong hw type, hwlen, proto, protolen or ethernet type (%" U16_F "/%" U16_F "/%" U16_F "/%" U16_F ")\n", + hdr->hwtype, (u16_t)hdr->hwlen, hdr->proto, (u16_t)hdr->protolen)); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.proterr); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.recv); + +#if LWIP_AUTOIP + /* We have to check if a host already has configured our random + * created link local address and continuously check if there is + * a host with this IP-address so we can detect collisions */ + autoip_arp_reply(netif, hdr); +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ + + /* Copy struct ip4_addr_wordaligned to aligned ip4_addr, to support compilers without + * structure packing (not using structure copy which breaks strict-aliasing rules). */ + IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(&sipaddr, &hdr->sipaddr); + IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(&dipaddr, &hdr->dipaddr); + + /* this interface is not configured? */ + if (ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + for_us = 0; + } else { + /* ARP packet directed to us? */ + for_us = (u8_t)ip4_addr_cmp(&dipaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif)); + } + + /* ARP message directed to us? + -> add IP address in ARP cache; assume requester wants to talk to us, + can result in directly sending the queued packets for this host. + ARP message not directed to us? + -> update the source IP address in the cache, if present */ + etharp_update_arp_entry(netif, &sipaddr, &(hdr->shwaddr), + for_us ? ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD : ETHARP_FLAG_FIND_ONLY); + + /* now act on the message itself */ + switch (hdr->opcode) { + /* ARP request? */ + case PP_HTONS(ARP_REQUEST): + /* ARP request. If it asked for our address, we send out a + * reply. In any case, we time-stamp any existing ARP entry, + * and possibly send out an IP packet that was queued on it. */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: incoming ARP request\n")); + + /* ARP request for our address? */ + if (for_us) { + /* send ARP response */ + etharp_raw(netif, + (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr, &hdr->shwaddr, + (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif), + &hdr->shwaddr, &sipaddr, + ARP_REPLY); + /* we are not configured? */ + } else if (ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + /* { for_us == 0 and netif->ip_addr.addr == 0 } */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: we are unconfigured, ARP request ignored.\n")); + /* request was not directed to us */ + } else { + /* { for_us == 0 and netif->ip_addr.addr != 0 } */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: ARP request was not for us.\n")); + } + + break; + + case PP_HTONS(ARP_REPLY): + /* ARP reply. We already updated the ARP cache earlier. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: incoming ARP reply\n")); +#if (LWIP_DHCP && DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK) + /* DHCP wants to know about ARP replies from any host with an + * IP address also offered to us by the DHCP server. We do not + * want to take a duplicate IP address on a single network. + * @todo How should we handle redundant (fail-over) interfaces? */ + dhcp_arp_reply(netif, &sipaddr); +#endif /* (LWIP_DHCP && DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK) */ + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_input: ARP unknown opcode type %" S16_F "\n", lwip_htons(hdr->opcode))); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.err); + break; + } + + /* free ARP packet */ + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/** Just a small helper function that sends a pbuf to an ethernet address + * in the arp_table specified by the index 'arp_idx'. + */ +static err_t etharp_output_to_arp_index(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, netif_addr_idx_t arp_idx) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("arp_table[arp_idx].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE", + arp_table[arp_idx].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE); + + /* if arp table entry is about to expire: re-request it, + but only if its state is ETHARP_STATE_STABLE to prevent flooding the + network with ARP requests if this address is used frequently. */ + if (arp_table[arp_idx].state == ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) { + if (arp_table[arp_idx].ctime >= ARP_AGE_REREQUEST_USED_BROADCAST) { + /* issue a standard request using broadcast */ + if (etharp_request(netif, &arp_table[arp_idx].ipaddr) == ERR_OK) { + arp_table[arp_idx].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_1; + } + } else if (arp_table[arp_idx].ctime >= ARP_AGE_REREQUEST_USED_UNICAST) { + /* issue a unicast request (for 15 seconds) to prevent unnecessary broadcast */ + if (etharp_request_dst(netif, &arp_table[arp_idx].ipaddr, &arp_table[arp_idx].ethaddr) == ERR_OK) { + arp_table[arp_idx].state = ETHARP_STATE_STABLE_REREQUESTING_1; + } + } + } + + return ethernet_output(netif, q, (struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), &arp_table[arp_idx].ethaddr, ETHTYPE_IP); +} + +/** + * Resolve and fill-in Ethernet address header for outgoing IP packet. + * + * For IP multicast and broadcast, corresponding Ethernet addresses + * are selected and the packet is transmitted on the link. + * + * For unicast addresses, the packet is submitted to etharp_query(). In + * case the IP address is outside the local network, the IP address of + * the gateway is used. + * + * @param netif The lwIP network interface which the IP packet will be sent on. + * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. + * @param ipaddr The IP address of the packet destination. + * + * @return + * - ERR_RTE No route to destination (no gateway to external networks), + * or the return type of either etharp_query() or ethernet_output(). + */ +err_t etharp_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + const struct eth_addr *dest; + struct eth_addr mcastaddr; + const ip4_addr_t *dst_addr = ipaddr; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q != NULL", q != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("ipaddr != NULL", ipaddr != NULL); + + /* Determine on destination hardware address. Broadcasts and multicasts + * are special, other IP addresses are looked up in the ARP table. */ + + /* broadcast destination IP address? */ + if (ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ipaddr, netif)) { + /* broadcast on Ethernet also */ + dest = (const struct eth_addr *)ðbroadcast; + /* multicast destination IP address? */ + } else if (ip4_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr)) { + /* Hash IP multicast address to MAC address.*/ + mcastaddr.addr[0] = LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_0; + mcastaddr.addr[1] = LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_1; + mcastaddr.addr[2] = LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_2; + mcastaddr.addr[3] = ip4_addr2(ipaddr) & 0x7f; + mcastaddr.addr[4] = ip4_addr3(ipaddr); + mcastaddr.addr[5] = ip4_addr4(ipaddr); + /* destination Ethernet address is multicast */ + dest = &mcastaddr; + /* unicast destination IP address? */ + } else { + netif_addr_idx_t i; + + /* outside local network? if so, this can neither be a global broadcast nor + a subnet broadcast. */ + if (!ip4_addr_netcmp(ipaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)) && + !ip4_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr)) { +#if LWIP_AUTOIP + struct ip_hdr *iphdr = LWIP_ALIGNMENT_CAST(struct ip_hdr *, q->payload); + + /* According to RFC 3297, chapter 2.6.2 (Forwarding Rules), a packet with + a link-local source address must always be "directly to its destination + on the same physical link. The host MUST NOT send the packet to any + router for forwarding". */ + if (!ip4_addr_islinklocal(&iphdr->src)) +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ + { +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW + /* For advanced routing, a single default gateway might not be enough, so get + the IP address of the gateway to handle the current destination address. */ + dst_addr = LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW(netif, ipaddr); + + if (dst_addr == NULL) +#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW */ + { + /* interface has default gateway? */ + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_gw(netif))) { + /* send to hardware address of default gateway IP address */ + dst_addr = netif_ip4_gw(netif); + /* no default gateway available */ + } else { + /* no route to destination error (default gateway missing) */ + return ERR_RTE; + } + } + } + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT + + if (netif->hints != NULL) { + /* per-pcb cached entry was given */ + netif_addr_idx_t etharp_cached_entry = netif->hints->addr_hint; + + if (etharp_cached_entry < ARP_TABLE_SIZE) { +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ + + if ((arp_table[etharp_cached_entry].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) && +#if ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF + (arp_table[etharp_cached_entry].netif == netif) && +#endif + (ip4_addr_cmp(dst_addr, &arp_table[etharp_cached_entry].ipaddr))) { + /* the per-pcb-cached entry is stable and the right one! */ + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.cachehit); + return etharp_output_to_arp_index(netif, q, etharp_cached_entry); + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ + + /* find stable entry: do this here since this is a critical path for + throughput and etharp_find_entry() is kind of slow */ + for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { + if ((arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) && +#if ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF + (arp_table[i].netif == netif) && +#endif + (ip4_addr_cmp(dst_addr, &arp_table[i].ipaddr))) { + /* found an existing, stable entry */ + ETHARP_SET_ADDRHINT(netif, i); + return etharp_output_to_arp_index(netif, q, i); + } + } + + /* no stable entry found, use the (slower) query function: + queue on destination Ethernet address belonging to ipaddr */ + return etharp_query(netif, dst_addr, q); + } + + /* continuation for multicast/broadcast destinations */ + /* obtain source Ethernet address of the given interface */ + /* send packet directly on the link */ + return ethernet_output(netif, q, (struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), dest, ETHTYPE_IP); +} + +/** + * Send an ARP request for the given IP address and/or queue a packet. + * + * If the IP address was not yet in the cache, a pending ARP cache entry + * is added and an ARP request is sent for the given address. The packet + * is queued on this entry. + * + * If the IP address was already pending in the cache, a new ARP request + * is sent for the given address. The packet is queued on this entry. + * + * If the IP address was already stable in the cache, and a packet is + * given, it is directly sent and no ARP request is sent out. + * + * If the IP address was already stable in the cache, and no packet is + * given, an ARP request is sent out. + * + * @param netif The lwIP network interface on which ipaddr + * must be queried for. + * @param ipaddr The IP address to be resolved. + * @param q If non-NULL, a pbuf that must be delivered to the IP address. + * q is not freed by this function. + * + * @note q must only be ONE packet, not a packet queue! + * + * @return + * - ERR_BUF Could not make room for Ethernet header. + * - ERR_MEM Hardware address unknown, and no more ARP entries available + * to query for address or queue the packet. + * - ERR_MEM Could not queue packet due to memory shortage. + * - ERR_RTE No route to destination (no gateway to external networks). + * - ERR_ARG Non-unicast address given, those will not appear in ARP cache. + * + */ +err_t etharp_query(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct pbuf *q) +{ + struct eth_addr *srcaddr = (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr; + err_t result = ERR_MEM; + int is_new_entry = 0; + s16_t i_err; + netif_addr_idx_t i; + + /* non-unicast address? */ + if (ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ipaddr, netif) || + ip4_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) || + ip4_addr_isany(ipaddr)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: will not add non-unicast IP address to ARP cache\n")); + return ERR_ARG; + } + + /* find entry in ARP cache, ask to create entry if queueing packet */ + i_err = etharp_find_entry(ipaddr, ETHARP_FLAG_TRY_HARD, netif); + + /* could not find or create entry? */ + if (i_err < 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: could not create ARP entry\n")); + + if (q) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: packet dropped\n")); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.memerr); + } + + return (err_t)i_err; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("type overflow", (size_t)i_err < NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX); + i = (netif_addr_idx_t)i_err; + + /* mark a fresh entry as pending (we just sent a request) */ + if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_EMPTY) { + is_new_entry = 1; + arp_table[i].state = ETHARP_STATE_PENDING; + /* record network interface for re-sending arp request in etharp_tmr */ + arp_table[i].netif = netif; + } + + /* { i is either a STABLE or (new or existing) PENDING entry } */ + LWIP_ASSERT("arp_table[i].state == PENDING or STABLE", + ((arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) || + (arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE))); + + /* do we have a new entry? or an implicit query request? */ + if (is_new_entry || (q == NULL)) { + /* try to resolve it; send out ARP request */ + result = etharp_request(netif, ipaddr); + + if (result != ERR_OK) { + /* ARP request couldn't be sent */ + /* We don't re-send arp request in etharp_tmr, but we still queue packets, + since this failure could be temporary, and the next packet calling + etharp_query again could lead to sending the queued packets. */ + } + + if (q == NULL) { + return result; + } + } + + /* packet given? */ + LWIP_ASSERT("q != NULL", q != NULL); + + /* stable entry? */ + if (arp_table[i].state >= ETHARP_STATE_STABLE) { + /* we have a valid IP->Ethernet address mapping */ + ETHARP_SET_ADDRHINT(netif, i); + /* send the packet */ + result = ethernet_output(netif, q, srcaddr, &(arp_table[i].ethaddr), ETHTYPE_IP); + /* pending entry? (either just created or already pending */ + } else if (arp_table[i].state == ETHARP_STATE_PENDING) { + /* entry is still pending, queue the given packet 'q' */ + struct pbuf *p; + int copy_needed = 0; + /* IF q includes a pbuf that must be copied, copy the whole chain into a + * new PBUF_RAM. See the definition of PBUF_NEEDS_COPY for details. */ + p = q; + + while (p) { + LWIP_ASSERT("no packet queues allowed!", (p->len != p->tot_len) || (p->next == 0)); + + if (PBUF_NEEDS_COPY(p)) { + copy_needed = 1; + break; + } + + p = p->next; + } + + if (copy_needed) { + /* copy the whole packet into new pbufs */ + p = pbuf_clone(PBUF_LINK, PBUF_RAM, q); + } else { + /* referencing the old pbuf is enough */ + p = q; + pbuf_ref(p); + } + + /* packet could be taken over? */ + if (p != NULL) { + /* queue packet ... */ +#if ARP_QUEUEING + struct etharp_q_entry *new_entry; + /* allocate a new arp queue entry */ + new_entry = (struct etharp_q_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_ARP_QUEUE); + + if (new_entry != NULL) { + unsigned int qlen = 0; + new_entry->next = 0; + new_entry->p = p; + + if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { + /* queue was already existent, append the new entry to the end */ + struct etharp_q_entry *r; + r = arp_table[i].q; + qlen++; + + while (r->next != NULL) { + r = r->next; + qlen++; + } + + r->next = new_entry; + } else { + /* queue did not exist, first item in queue */ + arp_table[i].q = new_entry; + } + +#if ARP_QUEUE_LEN + + if (qlen >= ARP_QUEUE_LEN) { + struct etharp_q_entry *old; + old = arp_table[i].q; + arp_table[i].q = arp_table[i].q->next; + pbuf_free(old->p); + memp_free(MEMP_ARP_QUEUE, old); + } + +#endif + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: queued packet %p on ARP entry %" U16_F "\n", (void *)q, i)); + result = ERR_OK; + } else { + /* the pool MEMP_ARP_QUEUE is empty */ + pbuf_free(p); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: could not queue a copy of PBUF_REF packet %p (out of memory)\n", (void *)q)); + result = ERR_MEM; + } + +#else /* ARP_QUEUEING */ + + /* always queue one packet per ARP request only, freeing a previously queued packet */ + if (arp_table[i].q != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: dropped previously queued packet %p for ARP entry %" U16_F "\n", (void *)q, (u16_t)i)); + pbuf_free(arp_table[i].q); + } + + arp_table[i].q = p; + result = ERR_OK; + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: queued packet %p on ARP entry %" U16_F "\n", (void *)q, (u16_t)i)); +#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ + } else { + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.memerr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_query: could not queue a copy of PBUF_REF packet %p (out of memory)\n", (void *)q)); + result = ERR_MEM; + } + } + + return result; +} + +/** + * Send a raw ARP packet (opcode and all addresses can be modified) + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface on which to send the ARP packet + * @param ethsrc_addr the source MAC address for the ethernet header + * @param ethdst_addr the destination MAC address for the ethernet header + * @param hwsrc_addr the source MAC address for the ARP protocol header + * @param ipsrc_addr the source IP address for the ARP protocol header + * @param hwdst_addr the destination MAC address for the ARP protocol header + * @param ipdst_addr the destination IP address for the ARP protocol header + * @param opcode the type of the ARP packet + * @return ERR_OK if the ARP packet has been sent + * ERR_MEM if the ARP packet couldn't be allocated + * any other err_t on failure + */ +static err_t etharp_raw(struct netif *netif, const struct eth_addr *ethsrc_addr, + const struct eth_addr *ethdst_addr, + const struct eth_addr *hwsrc_addr, const ip4_addr_t *ipsrc_addr, + const struct eth_addr *hwdst_addr, const ip4_addr_t *ipdst_addr, + const u16_t opcode) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + err_t result = ERR_OK; + struct etharp_hdr *hdr; + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + + /* allocate a pbuf for the outgoing ARP request packet */ + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, SIZEOF_ETHARP_HDR, PBUF_RAM); + + /* could allocate a pbuf for an ARP request? */ + if (p == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("etharp_raw: could not allocate pbuf for ARP request.\n")); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.memerr); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct etharp_hdr", + (p->len >= SIZEOF_ETHARP_HDR)); + + hdr = (struct etharp_hdr *)p->payload; + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_raw: sending raw ARP packet.\n")); + hdr->opcode = lwip_htons(opcode); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->hwaddr_len must be the same as ETH_HWADDR_LEN for etharp!", + (netif->hwaddr_len == ETH_HWADDR_LEN)); + + /* Write the ARP MAC-Addresses */ + SMEMCPY(&hdr->shwaddr, hwsrc_addr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); + SMEMCPY(&hdr->dhwaddr, hwdst_addr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); + /* Copy struct ip4_addr_wordaligned to aligned ip4_addr, to support compilers without + * structure packing. */ + IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_FROM_IP4_ADDR_T(&hdr->sipaddr, ipsrc_addr); + IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_FROM_IP4_ADDR_T(&hdr->dipaddr, ipdst_addr); + + hdr->hwtype = PP_HTONS(LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET); + hdr->proto = PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_IP); + /* set hwlen and protolen */ + hdr->hwlen = ETH_HWADDR_LEN; + hdr->protolen = sizeof(ip4_addr_t); + + /* send ARP query */ +#if LWIP_AUTOIP + + /* If we are using Link-Local, all ARP packets that contain a Link-Local + * 'sender IP address' MUST be sent using link-layer broadcast instead of + * link-layer unicast. (See RFC3927 Section 2.5, last paragraph) */ + if (ip4_addr_islinklocal(ipsrc_addr)) { + ethernet_output(netif, p, ethsrc_addr, ðbroadcast, ETHTYPE_ARP); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ + { + ethernet_output(netif, p, ethsrc_addr, ethdst_addr, ETHTYPE_ARP); + } + + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.xmit); + /* free ARP query packet */ + pbuf_free(p); + p = NULL; + /* could not allocate pbuf for ARP request */ + + return result; +} + +/** + * Send an ARP request packet asking for ipaddr to a specific eth address. + * Used to send unicast request to refresh the ARP table just before an entry + * times out + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface on which to send the request + * @param ipaddr the IP address for which to ask + * @param hw_dst_addr the ethernet address to send this packet to + * @return ERR_OK if the request has been sent + * ERR_MEM if the ARP packet couldn't be allocated + * any other err_t on failure + */ +static err_t etharp_request_dst(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const struct eth_addr *hw_dst_addr) +{ + return etharp_raw(netif, (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr, hw_dst_addr, + (struct eth_addr *)netif->hwaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif), ðzero, + ipaddr, ARP_REQUEST); +} + +/** + * Send an ARP request packet asking for ipaddr. + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface on which to send the request + * @param ipaddr the IP address for which to ask + * @return ERR_OK if the request has been sent + * ERR_MEM if the ARP packet couldn't be allocated + * any other err_t on failure + */ +err_t etharp_request(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("etharp_request: sending ARP request.\n")); + return etharp_request_dst(netif, ipaddr, ðbroadcast); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/icmp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/icmp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/icmp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/icmp.c index 193a3f53..a48bead0 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -1,435 +1,435 @@ -/** - * @file - * ICMP - Internet Control Message Protocol - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -/* Some ICMP messages should be passed to the transport protocols. This - is not implemented. */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/icmp.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -/** Small optimization: set to 0 if incoming PBUF_POOL pbuf always can be - * used to modify and send a response packet (and to 1 if this is not the case, - * e.g. when link header is stripped off when receiving) */ -#ifndef LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN -#define LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN 1 -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN */ - -/* The amount of data from the original packet to return in a dest-unreachable */ -#define ICMP_DEST_UNREACH_DATASIZE 8 - -static void icmp_send_response(struct pbuf *p, u8_t type, u8_t code); - -/** - * Processes ICMP input packets, called from ip_input(). - * - * Currently only processes icmp echo requests and sends - * out the echo response. - * - * @param p the icmp echo request packet, p->payload pointing to the icmp header - * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received - */ -void icmp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - u8_t type; -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - u8_t code; -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ - struct icmp_echo_hdr *iecho; - const struct ip_hdr *iphdr_in; - u16_t hlen; - const ip4_addr_t *src; - - ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.recv); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinmsgs); - - iphdr_in = ip4_current_header(); - hlen = IPH_HL_BYTES(iphdr_in); - - if (hlen < IP_HLEN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: short IP header (%" S16_F " bytes) received\n", hlen)); - goto lenerr; - } - - if (p->len < sizeof(u16_t) * 2) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: short ICMP (%" U16_F " bytes) received\n", p->tot_len)); - goto lenerr; - } - - type = *((u8_t *)p->payload); -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - code = *(((u8_t *)p->payload) + 1); - /* if debug is enabled but debug statement below is somehow disabled: */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(code); -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ - - switch (type) { - case ICMP_ER: - /* This is OK, echo reply might have been parsed by a raw PCB - (as obviously, an echo request has been sent, too). */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinechoreps); - break; - - case ICMP_ECHO: - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinechos); - src = ip4_current_dest_addr(); - - /* multicast destination address? */ - if (ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip4_current_dest_addr())) { -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_PING - /* For multicast, use address of receiving interface as source address */ - src = netif_ip4_addr(inp); -#else /* LWIP_MULTICAST_PING */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: Not echoing to multicast pings\n")); - goto icmperr; -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_PING */ - } - - /* broadcast destination address? */ - if (ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_dest_addr(), ip_current_netif())) { -#if LWIP_BROADCAST_PING - /* For broadcast, use address of receiving interface as source address */ - src = netif_ip4_addr(inp); -#else /* LWIP_BROADCAST_PING */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: Not echoing to broadcast pings\n")); - goto icmperr; -#endif /* LWIP_BROADCAST_PING */ - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: ping\n")); - - if (p->tot_len < sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: bad ICMP echo received\n")); - goto lenerr; - } - -#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP) - { - if (inet_chksum_pbuf(p) != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: checksum failed for received ICMP echo\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.chkerr); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinerrors); - return; - } - } -#endif -#if LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN - - if (pbuf_add_header(p, hlen + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN)) { - /* p is not big enough to contain link headers - * allocate a new one and copy p into it - */ - struct pbuf *r; - u16_t alloc_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len + hlen); - - if (alloc_len < p->tot_len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: allocating new pbuf failed (tot_len overflow)\n")); - goto icmperr; - } - - /* allocate new packet buffer with space for link headers */ - r = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, alloc_len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (r == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: allocating new pbuf failed\n")); - goto icmperr; - } - - if (r->len < hlen + sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("first pbuf cannot hold the ICMP header")); - pbuf_free(r); - goto icmperr; - } - - /* copy the ip header */ - MEMCPY(r->payload, iphdr_in, hlen); - - /* switch r->payload back to icmp header (cannot fail) */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(r, hlen)) { - LWIP_ASSERT("icmp_input: moving r->payload to icmp header failed\n", 0); - pbuf_free(r); - goto icmperr; - } - - /* copy the rest of the packet without ip header */ - if (pbuf_copy(r, p) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("icmp_input: copying to new pbuf failed")); - pbuf_free(r); - goto icmperr; - } - - /* free the original p */ - pbuf_free(p); - /* we now have an identical copy of p that has room for link headers */ - p = r; - } else { - /* restore p->payload to point to icmp header (cannot fail) */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN)) { - LWIP_ASSERT("icmp_input: restoring original p->payload failed\n", 0); - goto icmperr; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN */ - /* At this point, all checks are OK. */ - /* We generate an answer by switching the dest and src ip addresses, - * setting the icmp type to ECHO_RESPONSE and updating the checksum. */ - iecho = (struct icmp_echo_hdr *)p->payload; - - if (pbuf_add_header(p, hlen)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("Can't move over header in packet")); - } else { - err_t ret; - struct ip_hdr *iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->src, *src); - ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->dest, *ip4_current_src_addr()); - ICMPH_TYPE_SET(iecho, ICMP_ER); -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP) - { - /* adjust the checksum */ - if (iecho->chksum > PP_HTONS(0xffffU - (ICMP_ECHO << 8))) { - iecho->chksum = (u16_t)(iecho->chksum + PP_HTONS((u16_t)(ICMP_ECHO << 8)) + 1); - } else { - iecho->chksum = (u16_t)(iecho->chksum + PP_HTONS(ICMP_ECHO << 8)); - } - } -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF - else - { - iecho->chksum = 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ -#else /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP */ - iecho->chksum = 0; -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP */ - - /* Set the correct TTL and recalculate the header checksum. */ - IPH_TTL_SET(iphdr, ICMP_TTL); - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) - { - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, hlen)); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP */ - - ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.xmit); - /* increase number of messages attempted to send */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpoutmsgs); - /* increase number of echo replies attempted to send */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpoutechoreps); - - /* send an ICMP packet */ - ret = ip4_output_if(p, src, LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, - ICMP_TTL, 0, IP_PROTO_ICMP, inp); - - if (ret != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: ip_output_if returned an error: %s\n", lwip_strerr(ret))); - } - } - - break; - - default: - if (type == ICMP_DUR) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpindestunreachs); - } else if (type == ICMP_TE) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpintimeexcds); - } else if (type == ICMP_PP) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinparmprobs); - } else if (type == ICMP_SQ) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinsrcquenchs); - } else if (type == ICMP_RD) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinredirects); - } else if (type == ICMP_TS) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpintimestamps); - } else if (type == ICMP_TSR) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpintimestampreps); - } else if (type == ICMP_AM) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinaddrmasks); - } else if (type == ICMP_AMR) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinaddrmaskreps); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: ICMP type %" S16_F " code %" S16_F " not supported.\n", - (s16_t)type, (s16_t)code)); - ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.proterr); - ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.drop); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return; -lenerr: - pbuf_free(p); - ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.lenerr); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinerrors); - return; -#if LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN || !LWIP_MULTICAST_PING || !LWIP_BROADCAST_PING -icmperr: - pbuf_free(p); - ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.err); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinerrors); - return; -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN || !LWIP_MULTICAST_PING || !LWIP_BROADCAST_PING */ -} - -/** - * Send an icmp 'destination unreachable' packet, called from ip_input() if - * the transport layer protocol is unknown and from udp_input() if the local - * port is not bound. - * - * @param p the input packet for which the 'unreachable' should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IP header - * @param t type of the 'unreachable' packet - */ -void icmp_dest_unreach(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp_dur_type t) -{ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpoutdestunreachs); - icmp_send_response(p, ICMP_DUR, t); -} - -#if IP_FORWARD || IP_REASSEMBLY -/** - * Send a 'time exceeded' packet, called from ip_forward() if TTL is 0. - * - * @param p the input packet for which the 'time exceeded' should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IP header - * @param t type of the 'time exceeded' packet - */ -void icmp_time_exceeded(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp_te_type t) -{ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpouttimeexcds); - icmp_send_response(p, ICMP_TE, t); -} - -#endif /* IP_FORWARD || IP_REASSEMBLY */ - -/** - * Send an icmp packet in response to an incoming packet. - * - * @param p the input packet for which the 'unreachable' should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IP header - * @param type Type of the ICMP header - * @param code Code of the ICMP header - */ -static void icmp_send_response(struct pbuf *p, u8_t type, u8_t code) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - struct ip_hdr *iphdr; - /* we can use the echo header here */ - struct icmp_echo_hdr *icmphdr; - ip4_addr_t iphdr_src; - struct netif *netif; - - /* increase number of messages attempted to send */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpoutmsgs); - - /* ICMP header + IP header + 8 bytes of data */ - q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr) + IP_HLEN + ICMP_DEST_UNREACH_DATASIZE, - PBUF_RAM); - - if (q == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_time_exceeded: failed to allocate pbuf for ICMP packet.\n")); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpouterrors); - return; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold icmp message", - (q->len >= (sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr) + IP_HLEN + ICMP_DEST_UNREACH_DATASIZE))); - - iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_time_exceeded from ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print_val(ICMP_DEBUG, iphdr->src); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, (" to ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print_val(ICMP_DEBUG, iphdr->dest); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("\n")); - - icmphdr = (struct icmp_echo_hdr *)q->payload; - icmphdr->type = type; - icmphdr->code = code; - icmphdr->id = 0; - icmphdr->seqno = 0; - - /* copy fields from original packet */ - SMEMCPY((u8_t *)q->payload + sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr), (u8_t *)p->payload, - IP_HLEN + ICMP_DEST_UNREACH_DATASIZE); - - ip4_addr_copy(iphdr_src, iphdr->src); -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC - { - ip4_addr_t iphdr_dst; - ip4_addr_copy(iphdr_dst, iphdr->dest); - netif = ip4_route_src(&iphdr_dst, &iphdr_src); - } -#else - netif = ip4_route(&iphdr_src); -#endif - - if (netif != NULL) { - /* calculate checksum */ - icmphdr->chksum = 0; -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP) - { - icmphdr->chksum = inet_chksum(icmphdr, q->len); - } -#endif - ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.xmit); - ip4_output_if(q, NULL, &iphdr_src, ICMP_TTL, 0, IP_PROTO_ICMP, netif); - } - - pbuf_free(q); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP */ +/** + * @file + * ICMP - Internet Control Message Protocol + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +/* Some ICMP messages should be passed to the transport protocols. This + is not implemented. */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/icmp.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +/** Small optimization: set to 0 if incoming PBUF_POOL pbuf always can be + * used to modify and send a response packet (and to 1 if this is not the case, + * e.g. when link header is stripped off when receiving) */ +#ifndef LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN +#define LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN 1 +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN */ + +/* The amount of data from the original packet to return in a dest-unreachable */ +#define ICMP_DEST_UNREACH_DATASIZE 8 + +static void icmp_send_response(struct pbuf *p, u8_t type, u8_t code); + +/** + * Processes ICMP input packets, called from ip_input(). + * + * Currently only processes icmp echo requests and sends + * out the echo response. + * + * @param p the icmp echo request packet, p->payload pointing to the icmp header + * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received + */ +void icmp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + u8_t type; +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + u8_t code; +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ + struct icmp_echo_hdr *iecho; + const struct ip_hdr *iphdr_in; + u16_t hlen; + const ip4_addr_t *src; + + ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.recv); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinmsgs); + + iphdr_in = ip4_current_header(); + hlen = IPH_HL_BYTES(iphdr_in); + + if (hlen < IP_HLEN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: short IP header (%" S16_F " bytes) received\n", hlen)); + goto lenerr; + } + + if (p->len < sizeof(u16_t) * 2) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: short ICMP (%" U16_F " bytes) received\n", p->tot_len)); + goto lenerr; + } + + type = *((u8_t *)p->payload); +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + code = *(((u8_t *)p->payload) + 1); + /* if debug is enabled but debug statement below is somehow disabled: */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(code); +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ + + switch (type) { + case ICMP_ER: + /* This is OK, echo reply might have been parsed by a raw PCB + (as obviously, an echo request has been sent, too). */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinechoreps); + break; + + case ICMP_ECHO: + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinechos); + src = ip4_current_dest_addr(); + + /* multicast destination address? */ + if (ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip4_current_dest_addr())) { +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_PING + /* For multicast, use address of receiving interface as source address */ + src = netif_ip4_addr(inp); +#else /* LWIP_MULTICAST_PING */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: Not echoing to multicast pings\n")); + goto icmperr; +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_PING */ + } + + /* broadcast destination address? */ + if (ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_dest_addr(), ip_current_netif())) { +#if LWIP_BROADCAST_PING + /* For broadcast, use address of receiving interface as source address */ + src = netif_ip4_addr(inp); +#else /* LWIP_BROADCAST_PING */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: Not echoing to broadcast pings\n")); + goto icmperr; +#endif /* LWIP_BROADCAST_PING */ + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: ping\n")); + + if (p->tot_len < sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: bad ICMP echo received\n")); + goto lenerr; + } + +#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP) + { + if (inet_chksum_pbuf(p) != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: checksum failed for received ICMP echo\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.chkerr); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinerrors); + return; + } + } +#endif +#if LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN + + if (pbuf_add_header(p, hlen + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN)) { + /* p is not big enough to contain link headers + * allocate a new one and copy p into it + */ + struct pbuf *r; + u16_t alloc_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len + hlen); + + if (alloc_len < p->tot_len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: allocating new pbuf failed (tot_len overflow)\n")); + goto icmperr; + } + + /* allocate new packet buffer with space for link headers */ + r = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, alloc_len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (r == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: allocating new pbuf failed\n")); + goto icmperr; + } + + if (r->len < hlen + sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("first pbuf cannot hold the ICMP header")); + pbuf_free(r); + goto icmperr; + } + + /* copy the ip header */ + MEMCPY(r->payload, iphdr_in, hlen); + + /* switch r->payload back to icmp header (cannot fail) */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(r, hlen)) { + LWIP_ASSERT("icmp_input: moving r->payload to icmp header failed\n", 0); + pbuf_free(r); + goto icmperr; + } + + /* copy the rest of the packet without ip header */ + if (pbuf_copy(r, p) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("icmp_input: copying to new pbuf failed")); + pbuf_free(r); + goto icmperr; + } + + /* free the original p */ + pbuf_free(p); + /* we now have an identical copy of p that has room for link headers */ + p = r; + } else { + /* restore p->payload to point to icmp header (cannot fail) */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN)) { + LWIP_ASSERT("icmp_input: restoring original p->payload failed\n", 0); + goto icmperr; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN */ + /* At this point, all checks are OK. */ + /* We generate an answer by switching the dest and src ip addresses, + * setting the icmp type to ECHO_RESPONSE and updating the checksum. */ + iecho = (struct icmp_echo_hdr *)p->payload; + + if (pbuf_add_header(p, hlen)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("Can't move over header in packet")); + } else { + err_t ret; + struct ip_hdr *iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->src, *src); + ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->dest, *ip4_current_src_addr()); + ICMPH_TYPE_SET(iecho, ICMP_ER); +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP) + { + /* adjust the checksum */ + if (iecho->chksum > PP_HTONS(0xffffU - (ICMP_ECHO << 8))) { + iecho->chksum = (u16_t)(iecho->chksum + PP_HTONS((u16_t)(ICMP_ECHO << 8)) + 1); + } else { + iecho->chksum = (u16_t)(iecho->chksum + PP_HTONS(ICMP_ECHO << 8)); + } + } +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF + else + { + iecho->chksum = 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ +#else /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP */ + iecho->chksum = 0; +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP */ + + /* Set the correct TTL and recalculate the header checksum. */ + IPH_TTL_SET(iphdr, ICMP_TTL); + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) + { + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, hlen)); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP */ + + ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.xmit); + /* increase number of messages attempted to send */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpoutmsgs); + /* increase number of echo replies attempted to send */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpoutechoreps); + + /* send an ICMP packet */ + ret = ip4_output_if(p, src, LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, + ICMP_TTL, 0, IP_PROTO_ICMP, inp); + + if (ret != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: ip_output_if returned an error: %s\n", lwip_strerr(ret))); + } + } + + break; + + default: + if (type == ICMP_DUR) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpindestunreachs); + } else if (type == ICMP_TE) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpintimeexcds); + } else if (type == ICMP_PP) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinparmprobs); + } else if (type == ICMP_SQ) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinsrcquenchs); + } else if (type == ICMP_RD) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinredirects); + } else if (type == ICMP_TS) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpintimestamps); + } else if (type == ICMP_TSR) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpintimestampreps); + } else if (type == ICMP_AM) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinaddrmasks); + } else if (type == ICMP_AMR) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinaddrmaskreps); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_input: ICMP type %" S16_F " code %" S16_F " not supported.\n", + (s16_t)type, (s16_t)code)); + ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.proterr); + ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.drop); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return; +lenerr: + pbuf_free(p); + ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.lenerr); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinerrors); + return; +#if LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN || !LWIP_MULTICAST_PING || !LWIP_BROADCAST_PING +icmperr: + pbuf_free(p); + ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.err); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpinerrors); + return; +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP_ECHO_CHECK_INPUT_PBUF_LEN || !LWIP_MULTICAST_PING || !LWIP_BROADCAST_PING */ +} + +/** + * Send an icmp 'destination unreachable' packet, called from ip_input() if + * the transport layer protocol is unknown and from udp_input() if the local + * port is not bound. + * + * @param p the input packet for which the 'unreachable' should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IP header + * @param t type of the 'unreachable' packet + */ +void icmp_dest_unreach(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp_dur_type t) +{ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpoutdestunreachs); + icmp_send_response(p, ICMP_DUR, t); +} + +#if IP_FORWARD || IP_REASSEMBLY +/** + * Send a 'time exceeded' packet, called from ip_forward() if TTL is 0. + * + * @param p the input packet for which the 'time exceeded' should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IP header + * @param t type of the 'time exceeded' packet + */ +void icmp_time_exceeded(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp_te_type t) +{ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpouttimeexcds); + icmp_send_response(p, ICMP_TE, t); +} + +#endif /* IP_FORWARD || IP_REASSEMBLY */ + +/** + * Send an icmp packet in response to an incoming packet. + * + * @param p the input packet for which the 'unreachable' should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IP header + * @param type Type of the ICMP header + * @param code Code of the ICMP header + */ +static void icmp_send_response(struct pbuf *p, u8_t type, u8_t code) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + struct ip_hdr *iphdr; + /* we can use the echo header here */ + struct icmp_echo_hdr *icmphdr; + ip4_addr_t iphdr_src; + struct netif *netif; + + /* increase number of messages attempted to send */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpoutmsgs); + + /* ICMP header + IP header + 8 bytes of data */ + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr) + IP_HLEN + ICMP_DEST_UNREACH_DATASIZE, + PBUF_RAM); + + if (q == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_time_exceeded: failed to allocate pbuf for ICMP packet.\n")); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.icmpouterrors); + return; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold icmp message", + (q->len >= (sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr) + IP_HLEN + ICMP_DEST_UNREACH_DATASIZE))); + + iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_time_exceeded from ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print_val(ICMP_DEBUG, iphdr->src); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, (" to ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print_val(ICMP_DEBUG, iphdr->dest); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("\n")); + + icmphdr = (struct icmp_echo_hdr *)q->payload; + icmphdr->type = type; + icmphdr->code = code; + icmphdr->id = 0; + icmphdr->seqno = 0; + + /* copy fields from original packet */ + SMEMCPY((u8_t *)q->payload + sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr), (u8_t *)p->payload, + IP_HLEN + ICMP_DEST_UNREACH_DATASIZE); + + ip4_addr_copy(iphdr_src, iphdr->src); +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC + { + ip4_addr_t iphdr_dst; + ip4_addr_copy(iphdr_dst, iphdr->dest); + netif = ip4_route_src(&iphdr_dst, &iphdr_src); + } +#else + netif = ip4_route(&iphdr_src); +#endif + + if (netif != NULL) { + /* calculate checksum */ + icmphdr->chksum = 0; +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP) + { + icmphdr->chksum = inet_chksum(icmphdr, q->len); + } +#endif + ICMP_STATS_INC(icmp.xmit); + ip4_output_if(q, NULL, &iphdr_src, ICMP_TTL, 0, IP_PROTO_ICMP, netif); + } + + pbuf_free(q); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/igmp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/igmp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/igmp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/igmp.c index 36bc50c9..9d255169 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -1,805 +1,805 @@ -/** - * @file - * IGMP - Internet Group Management Protocol - * - * @defgroup igmp IGMP - * @ingroup ip4 - * To be called from TCPIP thread - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2002 CITEL Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. Neither the name of CITEL Technologies Ltd nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY CITEL TECHNOLOGIES AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' - * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CITEL TECHNOLOGIES OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is a contribution to the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * The Swedish Institute of Computer Science and Adam Dunkels - * are specifically granted permission to redistribute this - * source code. -*/ - -/*------------------------------------------------------------- -Note 1) -Although the rfc requires V1 AND V2 capability -we will only support v2 since now V1 is very old (August 1989) -V1 can be added if required - -a debug print and statistic have been implemented to -show this up. -------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------- -Note 2) -A query for a specific group address (as opposed to ALLHOSTS) -has now been implemented as I am unsure if it is required - -a debug print and statistic have been implemented to -show this up. -------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------- -Note 3) -The router alert rfc 2113 is implemented in outgoing packets -but not checked rigorously incoming -------------------------------------------------------------- -Steve Reynolds -------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * RFC 988 - Host extensions for IP multicasting - V0 - * RFC 1054 - Host extensions for IP multicasting - - * RFC 1112 - Host extensions for IP multicasting - V1 - * RFC 2236 - Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 2 - V2 <- this code is based on this RFC (it's the "de facto" standard) - * RFC 3376 - Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3 - V3 - * RFC 4604 - Using Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3... - V3+ - * RFC 2113 - IP Router Alert Option - - *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - * Includes - *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -#include "lwip/debug.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/prot/igmp.h" - -#include - -static struct igmp_group *igmp_lookup_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip4_addr_t *addr); -static err_t igmp_remove_group(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group); -static void igmp_timeout(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group); -static void igmp_start_timer(struct igmp_group *group, u8_t max_time); -static void igmp_delaying_member(struct igmp_group *group, u8_t maxresp); -static err_t igmp_ip_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, struct netif *netif); -static void igmp_send(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group, u8_t type); - -static ip4_addr_t allsystems; -static ip4_addr_t allrouters; - -/** - * Initialize the IGMP module - */ -void igmp_init(void) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_init: initializing\n")); - - IP4_ADDR(&allsystems, 224, 0, 0, 1); - IP4_ADDR(&allrouters, 224, 0, 0, 2); -} - -/** - * Start IGMP processing on interface - * - * @param netif network interface on which start IGMP processing - */ -err_t igmp_start(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct igmp_group *group; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_start: starting IGMP processing on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); - - group = igmp_lookup_group(netif, &allsystems); - - if (group != NULL) { - group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; - group->use++; - - /* Allow the igmp messages at the MAC level */ - if (netif->igmp_mac_filter != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_start: igmp_mac_filter(ADD ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, allsystems); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (") on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); - netif->igmp_mac_filter(netif, &allsystems, NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - return ERR_MEM; -} - -/** - * Stop IGMP processing on interface - * - * @param netif network interface on which stop IGMP processing - */ -err_t igmp_stop(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct igmp_group *group = netif_igmp_data(netif); - - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_IGMP, NULL); - - while (group != NULL) { - struct igmp_group *next = group->next; /* avoid use-after-free below */ - - /* disable the group at the MAC level */ - if (netif->igmp_mac_filter != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_stop: igmp_mac_filter(DEL ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, group->group_address); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (") on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); - netif->igmp_mac_filter(netif, &(group->group_address), NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER); - } - - /* free group */ - memp_free(MEMP_IGMP_GROUP, group); - - /* move to "next" */ - group = next; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Report IGMP memberships for this interface - * - * @param netif network interface on which report IGMP memberships - */ -void igmp_report_groups(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct igmp_group *group = netif_igmp_data(netif); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_report_groups: sending IGMP reports on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); - - /* Skip the first group in the list, it is always the allsystems group added in igmp_start() */ - if (group != NULL) { - group = group->next; - } - - while (group != NULL) { - igmp_delaying_member(group, IGMP_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR); - group = group->next; - } -} - -/** - * Search for a group in the netif's igmp group list - * - * @param ifp the network interface for which to look - * @param addr the group ip address to search for - * @return a struct igmp_group* if the group has been found, - * NULL if the group wasn't found. - */ -struct igmp_group * -igmp_lookfor_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip4_addr_t *addr) -{ - struct igmp_group *group = netif_igmp_data(ifp); - - while (group != NULL) { - if (ip4_addr_cmp(&(group->group_address), addr)) { - return group; - } - - group = group->next; - } - - /* to be clearer, we return NULL here instead of - * 'group' (which is also NULL at this point). - */ - return NULL; -} - -/** - * Search for a specific igmp group and create a new one if not found- - * - * @param ifp the network interface for which to look - * @param addr the group ip address to search - * @return a struct igmp_group*, - * NULL on memory error. - */ -static struct igmp_group *igmp_lookup_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip4_addr_t *addr) -{ - struct igmp_group *group; - struct igmp_group *list_head = netif_igmp_data(ifp); - - /* Search if the group already exists */ - group = igmp_lookfor_group(ifp, addr); - - if (group != NULL) { - /* Group already exists. */ - return group; - } - - /* Group doesn't exist yet, create a new one */ - group = (struct igmp_group *)memp_malloc(MEMP_IGMP_GROUP); - - if (group != NULL) { - ip4_addr_set(&(group->group_address), addr); - group->timer = 0; /* Not running */ - group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_NON_MEMBER; - group->last_reporter_flag = 0; - group->use = 0; - - /* Ensure allsystems group is always first in list */ - if (list_head == NULL) { - /* this is the first entry in linked list */ - LWIP_ASSERT("igmp_lookup_group: first group must be allsystems", - (ip4_addr_cmp(addr, &allsystems) != 0)); - group->next = NULL; - netif_set_client_data(ifp, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_IGMP, group); - } else { - /* append _after_ first entry */ - LWIP_ASSERT("igmp_lookup_group: all except first group must not be allsystems", - (ip4_addr_cmp(addr, &allsystems) == 0)); - group->next = list_head->next; - list_head->next = group; - } - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_lookup_group: %sallocated a new group with address ", (group ? "" : "impossible to "))); - ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, addr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" on if %p\n", (void *)ifp)); - - return group; -} - -/** - * Remove a group from netif's igmp group list, but don't free it yet - * - * @param group the group to remove from the netif's igmp group list - * @return ERR_OK if group was removed from the list, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t igmp_remove_group(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group) -{ - err_t err = ERR_OK; - struct igmp_group *tmp_group; - - /* Skip the first group in the list, it is always the allsystems group added in igmp_start() */ - for (tmp_group = netif_igmp_data(netif); tmp_group != NULL; tmp_group = tmp_group->next) { - if (tmp_group->next == group) { - tmp_group->next = group->next; - break; - } - } - - /* Group not found in netif's igmp group list */ - if (tmp_group == NULL) { - err = ERR_ARG; - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * Called from ip_input() if a new IGMP packet is received. - * - * @param p received igmp packet, p->payload pointing to the igmp header - * @param inp network interface on which the packet was received - * @param dest destination ip address of the igmp packet - */ -void igmp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp, const ip4_addr_t *dest) -{ - struct igmp_msg *igmp; - struct igmp_group *group; - struct igmp_group *groupref; - - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.recv); - - /* Note that the length CAN be greater than 8 but only 8 are used - All are included in the checksum */ - if (p->len < IGMP_MINLEN) { - pbuf_free(p); - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.lenerr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: length error\n")); - return; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: message from ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, ip4_current_header()->src); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" to address ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, ip4_current_header()->dest); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" on if %p\n", (void *)inp)); - - /* Now calculate and check the checksum */ - igmp = (struct igmp_msg *)p->payload; - - if (inet_chksum(igmp, p->len)) { - pbuf_free(p); - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.chkerr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: checksum error\n")); - return; - } - - /* Packet is ok so find an existing group */ - group = igmp_lookfor_group(inp, dest); /* use the destination IP address of incoming packet */ - - /* If group can be found or create... */ - if (!group) { - pbuf_free(p); - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.drop); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: IGMP frame not for us\n")); - return; - } - - /* NOW ACT ON THE INCOMING MESSAGE TYPE... */ - switch (igmp->igmp_msgtype) { - case IGMP_MEMB_QUERY: - - /* IGMP_MEMB_QUERY to the "all systems" address ? */ - if ((ip4_addr_cmp(dest, &allsystems)) && ip4_addr_isany(&igmp->igmp_group_address)) { - /* THIS IS THE GENERAL QUERY */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: General IGMP_MEMB_QUERY on \"ALL SYSTEMS\" address (224.0.0.1) [igmp_maxresp=%i]\n", (int)(igmp->igmp_maxresp))); - - if (igmp->igmp_maxresp == 0) { - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.rx_v1); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: got an all hosts query with time== 0 - this is V1 and not implemented - treat as v2\n")); - igmp->igmp_maxresp = IGMP_V1_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR; - } else { - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.rx_general); - } - - groupref = netif_igmp_data(inp); - - /* Do not send messages on the all systems group address! */ - /* Skip the first group in the list, it is always the allsystems group added in igmp_start() */ - if (groupref != NULL) { - groupref = groupref->next; - } - - while (groupref) { - igmp_delaying_member(groupref, igmp->igmp_maxresp); - groupref = groupref->next; - } - } else { - /* IGMP_MEMB_QUERY to a specific group ? */ - if (!ip4_addr_isany(&igmp->igmp_group_address)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: IGMP_MEMB_QUERY to a specific group ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, igmp->igmp_group_address); - - if (ip4_addr_cmp(dest, &allsystems)) { - ip4_addr_t groupaddr; - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" using \"ALL SYSTEMS\" address (224.0.0.1) [igmp_maxresp=%i]\n", (int)(igmp->igmp_maxresp))); - /* we first need to re-look for the group since we used dest last time */ - ip4_addr_copy(groupaddr, igmp->igmp_group_address); - group = igmp_lookfor_group(inp, &groupaddr); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" with the group address as destination [igmp_maxresp=%i]\n", (int)(igmp->igmp_maxresp))); - } - - if (group != NULL) { - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.rx_group); - igmp_delaying_member(group, igmp->igmp_maxresp); - } else { - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.drop); - } - } else { - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.proterr); - } - } - - break; - - case IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT: - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT\n")); - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.rx_report); - - if (group->group_state == IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) { - /* This is on a specific group we have already looked up */ - group->timer = 0; /* stopped */ - group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; - group->last_reporter_flag = 0; - } - - break; - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: unexpected msg %d in state %d on group %p on if %p\n", - igmp->igmp_msgtype, group->group_state, (void *)&group, (void *)inp)); - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.proterr); - break; - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return; -} - -/** - * @ingroup igmp - * Join a group on one network interface. - * - * @param ifaddr ip address of the network interface which should join a new group - * @param groupaddr the ip address of the group which to join - * @return ERR_OK if group was joined on the netif(s), an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t igmp_joingroup(const ip4_addr_t *ifaddr, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr) -{ - err_t err = ERR_VAL; /* no matching interface */ - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* make sure it is multicast address */ - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup: attempt to join non-multicast address", ip4_addr_ismulticast(groupaddr), return ERR_VAL;); - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup: attempt to join allsystems address", (!ip4_addr_cmp(groupaddr, &allsystems)), return ERR_VAL;); - - /* loop through netif's */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - /* Should we join this interface ? */ - if ((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) && ((ip4_addr_isany(ifaddr) || ip4_addr_cmp(netif_ip4_addr(netif), ifaddr)))) { - err = igmp_joingroup_netif(netif, groupaddr); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* Return an error even if some network interfaces are joined */ - /** @todo undo any other netif already joined */ - return err; - } - } - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup igmp - * Join a group on one network interface. - * - * @param netif the network interface which should join a new group - * @param groupaddr the ip address of the group which to join - * @return ERR_OK if group was joined on the netif, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t igmp_joingroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr) -{ - struct igmp_group *group; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* make sure it is multicast address */ - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup_netif: attempt to join non-multicast address", ip4_addr_ismulticast(groupaddr), return ERR_VAL;); - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup_netif: attempt to join allsystems address", (!ip4_addr_cmp(groupaddr, &allsystems)), return ERR_VAL;); - - /* make sure it is an igmp-enabled netif */ - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup_netif: attempt to join on non-IGMP netif", netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP, return ERR_VAL;); - - /* find group or create a new one if not found */ - group = igmp_lookup_group(netif, groupaddr); - - if (group != NULL) { - /* This should create a new group, check the state to make sure */ - if (group->group_state != IGMP_GROUP_NON_MEMBER) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_joingroup_netif: join to group not in state IGMP_GROUP_NON_MEMBER\n")); - } else { - /* OK - it was new group */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_joingroup_netif: join to new group: ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, groupaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("\n")); - - /* If first use of the group, allow the group at the MAC level */ - if ((group->use == 0) && (netif->igmp_mac_filter != NULL)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_joingroup_netif: igmp_mac_filter(ADD ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, groupaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (") on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); - netif->igmp_mac_filter(netif, groupaddr, NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER); - } - - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.tx_join); - igmp_send(netif, group, IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT); - - igmp_start_timer(group, IGMP_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR); - - /* Need to work out where this timer comes from */ - group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER; - } - - /* Increment group use */ - group->use++; - /* Join on this interface */ - return ERR_OK; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_joingroup_netif: Not enough memory to join to group\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup igmp - * Leave a group on one network interface. - * - * @param ifaddr ip address of the network interface which should leave a group - * @param groupaddr the ip address of the group which to leave - * @return ERR_OK if group was left on the netif(s), an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t igmp_leavegroup(const ip4_addr_t *ifaddr, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr) -{ - err_t err = ERR_VAL; /* no matching interface */ - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* make sure it is multicast address */ - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup: attempt to leave non-multicast address", ip4_addr_ismulticast(groupaddr), return ERR_VAL;); - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup: attempt to leave allsystems address", (!ip4_addr_cmp(groupaddr, &allsystems)), return ERR_VAL;); - - /* loop through netif's */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - /* Should we leave this interface ? */ - if ((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) && ((ip4_addr_isany(ifaddr) || ip4_addr_cmp(netif_ip4_addr(netif), ifaddr)))) { - err_t res = igmp_leavegroup_netif(netif, groupaddr); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* Store this result if we have not yet gotten a success */ - err = res; - } - } - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup igmp - * Leave a group on one network interface. - * - * @param netif the network interface which should leave a group - * @param groupaddr the ip address of the group which to leave - * @return ERR_OK if group was left on the netif, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t igmp_leavegroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr) -{ - struct igmp_group *group; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* make sure it is multicast address */ - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup_netif: attempt to leave non-multicast address", ip4_addr_ismulticast(groupaddr), return ERR_VAL;); - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup_netif: attempt to leave allsystems address", (!ip4_addr_cmp(groupaddr, &allsystems)), return ERR_VAL;); - - /* make sure it is an igmp-enabled netif */ - LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup_netif: attempt to leave on non-IGMP netif", netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP, return ERR_VAL;); - - /* find group */ - group = igmp_lookfor_group(netif, groupaddr); - - if (group != NULL) { - /* Only send a leave if the flag is set according to the state diagram */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_leavegroup_netif: Leaving group: ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, groupaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("\n")); - - /* If there is no other use of the group */ - if (group->use <= 1) { - /* Remove the group from the list */ - igmp_remove_group(netif, group); - - /* If we are the last reporter for this group */ - if (group->last_reporter_flag) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_leavegroup_netif: sending leaving group\n")); - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.tx_leave); - igmp_send(netif, group, IGMP_LEAVE_GROUP); - } - - /* Disable the group at the MAC level */ - if (netif->igmp_mac_filter != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_leavegroup_netif: igmp_mac_filter(DEL ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, groupaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (") on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); - netif->igmp_mac_filter(netif, groupaddr, NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER); - } - - /* Free group struct */ - memp_free(MEMP_IGMP_GROUP, group); - } else { - /* Decrement group use */ - group->use--; - } - - return ERR_OK; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_leavegroup_netif: not member of group\n")); - return ERR_VAL; - } -} - -/** - * The igmp timer function (both for NO_SYS=1 and =0) - * Should be called every IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds (100 ms is default). - */ -void igmp_tmr(void) -{ - struct netif *netif; - - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - struct igmp_group *group = netif_igmp_data(netif); - - while (group != NULL) { - if (group->timer > 0) { - group->timer--; - - if (group->timer == 0) { - igmp_timeout(netif, group); - } - } - - group = group->next; - } - } -} - -/** - * Called if a timeout for one group is reached. - * Sends a report for this group. - * - * @param group an igmp_group for which a timeout is reached - */ -static void igmp_timeout(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group) -{ - /* If the state is IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER then we send a report for this group - (unless it is the allsystems group) */ - if ((group->group_state == IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) && - (!(ip4_addr_cmp(&(group->group_address), &allsystems)))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_timeout: report membership for group with address ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, group->group_address); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); - - group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; - - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.tx_report); - igmp_send(netif, group, IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT); - } -} - -/** - * Start a timer for an igmp group - * - * @param group the igmp_group for which to start a timer - * @param max_time the time in multiples of IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL (decrease with - * every call to igmp_tmr()) - */ -static void igmp_start_timer(struct igmp_group *group, u8_t max_time) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_RAND - group->timer = (u16_t)(max_time > 2 ? (LWIP_RAND() % max_time) : 1); -#else /* LWIP_RAND */ - /* ATTENTION: use this only if absolutely necessary! */ - group->timer = max_time / 2; -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ - - if (group->timer == 0) { - group->timer = 1; - } -} - -/** - * Delaying membership report for a group if necessary - * - * @param group the igmp_group for which "delaying" membership report - * @param maxresp query delay - */ -static void igmp_delaying_member(struct igmp_group *group, u8_t maxresp) -{ - if ((group->group_state == IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER) || - ((group->group_state == IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) && - ((group->timer == 0) || (maxresp < group->timer)))) { - igmp_start_timer(group, maxresp); - group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER; - } -} - -/** - * Sends an IP packet on a network interface. This function constructs the IP header - * and calculates the IP header checksum. If the source IP address is NULL, - * the IP address of the outgoing network interface is filled in as source address. - * - * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next - protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an - IP header and p->payload points to that IP header) - * @param src the source IP address to send from (if src == IP4_ADDR_ANY, the - * IP address of the netif used to send is used as source address) - * @param dest the destination IP address to send the packet to - * @param netif the netif on which to send this packet - * @return ERR_OK if the packet was sent OK - * ERR_BUF if p doesn't have enough space for IP/LINK headers - * returns errors returned by netif->output - */ -static err_t igmp_ip_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, struct netif *netif) -{ - /* This is the "router alert" option */ - u16_t ra[2]; - ra[0] = PP_HTONS(ROUTER_ALERT); - ra[1] = 0x0000; /* Router shall examine packet */ - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.xmit); - return ip4_output_if_opt(p, src, dest, IGMP_TTL, 0, IP_PROTO_IGMP, netif, ra, ROUTER_ALERTLEN); -} - -/** - * Send an igmp packet to a specific group. - * - * @param group the group to which to send the packet - * @param type the type of igmp packet to send - */ -static void igmp_send(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group, u8_t type) -{ - struct pbuf *p = NULL; - struct igmp_msg *igmp = NULL; - ip4_addr_t src = *IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - ip4_addr_t *dest = NULL; - - /* IP header + "router alert" option + IGMP header */ - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, IGMP_MINLEN, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p) { - igmp = (struct igmp_msg *)p->payload; - LWIP_ASSERT("igmp_send: check that first pbuf can hold struct igmp_msg", - (p->len >= sizeof(struct igmp_msg))); - ip4_addr_copy(src, *netif_ip4_addr(netif)); - - if (type == IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT) { - dest = &(group->group_address); - ip4_addr_copy(igmp->igmp_group_address, group->group_address); - group->last_reporter_flag = 1; /* Remember we were the last to report */ - } else { - if (type == IGMP_LEAVE_GROUP) { - dest = &allrouters; - ip4_addr_copy(igmp->igmp_group_address, group->group_address); - } - } - - if ((type == IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT) || (type == IGMP_LEAVE_GROUP)) { - igmp->igmp_msgtype = type; - igmp->igmp_maxresp = 0; - igmp->igmp_checksum = 0; - igmp->igmp_checksum = inet_chksum(igmp, IGMP_MINLEN); - - igmp_ip_output_if(p, &src, dest, netif); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_send: not enough memory for igmp_send\n")); - IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.memerr); - } -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP */ +/** + * @file + * IGMP - Internet Group Management Protocol + * + * @defgroup igmp IGMP + * @ingroup ip4 + * To be called from TCPIP thread + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 CITEL Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of CITEL Technologies Ltd nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY CITEL TECHNOLOGIES AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' + * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CITEL TECHNOLOGIES OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is a contribution to the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * The Swedish Institute of Computer Science and Adam Dunkels + * are specifically granted permission to redistribute this + * source code. +*/ + +/*------------------------------------------------------------- +Note 1) +Although the rfc requires V1 AND V2 capability +we will only support v2 since now V1 is very old (August 1989) +V1 can be added if required + +a debug print and statistic have been implemented to +show this up. +------------------------------------------------------------- +------------------------------------------------------------- +Note 2) +A query for a specific group address (as opposed to ALLHOSTS) +has now been implemented as I am unsure if it is required + +a debug print and statistic have been implemented to +show this up. +------------------------------------------------------------- +------------------------------------------------------------- +Note 3) +The router alert rfc 2113 is implemented in outgoing packets +but not checked rigorously incoming +------------------------------------------------------------- +Steve Reynolds +------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * RFC 988 - Host extensions for IP multicasting - V0 + * RFC 1054 - Host extensions for IP multicasting - + * RFC 1112 - Host extensions for IP multicasting - V1 + * RFC 2236 - Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 2 - V2 <- this code is based on this RFC (it's the "de facto" standard) + * RFC 3376 - Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3 - V3 + * RFC 4604 - Using Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3... - V3+ + * RFC 2113 - IP Router Alert Option - + *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Includes + *----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +#include "lwip/debug.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/prot/igmp.h" + +#include + +static struct igmp_group *igmp_lookup_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip4_addr_t *addr); +static err_t igmp_remove_group(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group); +static void igmp_timeout(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group); +static void igmp_start_timer(struct igmp_group *group, u8_t max_time); +static void igmp_delaying_member(struct igmp_group *group, u8_t maxresp); +static err_t igmp_ip_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, struct netif *netif); +static void igmp_send(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group, u8_t type); + +static ip4_addr_t allsystems; +static ip4_addr_t allrouters; + +/** + * Initialize the IGMP module + */ +void igmp_init(void) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_init: initializing\n")); + + IP4_ADDR(&allsystems, 224, 0, 0, 1); + IP4_ADDR(&allrouters, 224, 0, 0, 2); +} + +/** + * Start IGMP processing on interface + * + * @param netif network interface on which start IGMP processing + */ +err_t igmp_start(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct igmp_group *group; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_start: starting IGMP processing on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); + + group = igmp_lookup_group(netif, &allsystems); + + if (group != NULL) { + group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; + group->use++; + + /* Allow the igmp messages at the MAC level */ + if (netif->igmp_mac_filter != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_start: igmp_mac_filter(ADD ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, allsystems); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (") on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); + netif->igmp_mac_filter(netif, &allsystems, NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + return ERR_MEM; +} + +/** + * Stop IGMP processing on interface + * + * @param netif network interface on which stop IGMP processing + */ +err_t igmp_stop(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct igmp_group *group = netif_igmp_data(netif); + + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_IGMP, NULL); + + while (group != NULL) { + struct igmp_group *next = group->next; /* avoid use-after-free below */ + + /* disable the group at the MAC level */ + if (netif->igmp_mac_filter != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_stop: igmp_mac_filter(DEL ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, group->group_address); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (") on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); + netif->igmp_mac_filter(netif, &(group->group_address), NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER); + } + + /* free group */ + memp_free(MEMP_IGMP_GROUP, group); + + /* move to "next" */ + group = next; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Report IGMP memberships for this interface + * + * @param netif network interface on which report IGMP memberships + */ +void igmp_report_groups(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct igmp_group *group = netif_igmp_data(netif); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_report_groups: sending IGMP reports on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); + + /* Skip the first group in the list, it is always the allsystems group added in igmp_start() */ + if (group != NULL) { + group = group->next; + } + + while (group != NULL) { + igmp_delaying_member(group, IGMP_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR); + group = group->next; + } +} + +/** + * Search for a group in the netif's igmp group list + * + * @param ifp the network interface for which to look + * @param addr the group ip address to search for + * @return a struct igmp_group* if the group has been found, + * NULL if the group wasn't found. + */ +struct igmp_group * +igmp_lookfor_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip4_addr_t *addr) +{ + struct igmp_group *group = netif_igmp_data(ifp); + + while (group != NULL) { + if (ip4_addr_cmp(&(group->group_address), addr)) { + return group; + } + + group = group->next; + } + + /* to be clearer, we return NULL here instead of + * 'group' (which is also NULL at this point). + */ + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Search for a specific igmp group and create a new one if not found- + * + * @param ifp the network interface for which to look + * @param addr the group ip address to search + * @return a struct igmp_group*, + * NULL on memory error. + */ +static struct igmp_group *igmp_lookup_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip4_addr_t *addr) +{ + struct igmp_group *group; + struct igmp_group *list_head = netif_igmp_data(ifp); + + /* Search if the group already exists */ + group = igmp_lookfor_group(ifp, addr); + + if (group != NULL) { + /* Group already exists. */ + return group; + } + + /* Group doesn't exist yet, create a new one */ + group = (struct igmp_group *)memp_malloc(MEMP_IGMP_GROUP); + + if (group != NULL) { + ip4_addr_set(&(group->group_address), addr); + group->timer = 0; /* Not running */ + group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_NON_MEMBER; + group->last_reporter_flag = 0; + group->use = 0; + + /* Ensure allsystems group is always first in list */ + if (list_head == NULL) { + /* this is the first entry in linked list */ + LWIP_ASSERT("igmp_lookup_group: first group must be allsystems", + (ip4_addr_cmp(addr, &allsystems) != 0)); + group->next = NULL; + netif_set_client_data(ifp, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_IGMP, group); + } else { + /* append _after_ first entry */ + LWIP_ASSERT("igmp_lookup_group: all except first group must not be allsystems", + (ip4_addr_cmp(addr, &allsystems) == 0)); + group->next = list_head->next; + list_head->next = group; + } + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_lookup_group: %sallocated a new group with address ", (group ? "" : "impossible to "))); + ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, addr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" on if %p\n", (void *)ifp)); + + return group; +} + +/** + * Remove a group from netif's igmp group list, but don't free it yet + * + * @param group the group to remove from the netif's igmp group list + * @return ERR_OK if group was removed from the list, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t igmp_remove_group(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group) +{ + err_t err = ERR_OK; + struct igmp_group *tmp_group; + + /* Skip the first group in the list, it is always the allsystems group added in igmp_start() */ + for (tmp_group = netif_igmp_data(netif); tmp_group != NULL; tmp_group = tmp_group->next) { + if (tmp_group->next == group) { + tmp_group->next = group->next; + break; + } + } + + /* Group not found in netif's igmp group list */ + if (tmp_group == NULL) { + err = ERR_ARG; + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * Called from ip_input() if a new IGMP packet is received. + * + * @param p received igmp packet, p->payload pointing to the igmp header + * @param inp network interface on which the packet was received + * @param dest destination ip address of the igmp packet + */ +void igmp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp, const ip4_addr_t *dest) +{ + struct igmp_msg *igmp; + struct igmp_group *group; + struct igmp_group *groupref; + + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.recv); + + /* Note that the length CAN be greater than 8 but only 8 are used - All are included in the checksum */ + if (p->len < IGMP_MINLEN) { + pbuf_free(p); + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.lenerr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: length error\n")); + return; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: message from ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, ip4_current_header()->src); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" to address ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, ip4_current_header()->dest); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" on if %p\n", (void *)inp)); + + /* Now calculate and check the checksum */ + igmp = (struct igmp_msg *)p->payload; + + if (inet_chksum(igmp, p->len)) { + pbuf_free(p); + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.chkerr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: checksum error\n")); + return; + } + + /* Packet is ok so find an existing group */ + group = igmp_lookfor_group(inp, dest); /* use the destination IP address of incoming packet */ + + /* If group can be found or create... */ + if (!group) { + pbuf_free(p); + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.drop); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: IGMP frame not for us\n")); + return; + } + + /* NOW ACT ON THE INCOMING MESSAGE TYPE... */ + switch (igmp->igmp_msgtype) { + case IGMP_MEMB_QUERY: + + /* IGMP_MEMB_QUERY to the "all systems" address ? */ + if ((ip4_addr_cmp(dest, &allsystems)) && ip4_addr_isany(&igmp->igmp_group_address)) { + /* THIS IS THE GENERAL QUERY */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: General IGMP_MEMB_QUERY on \"ALL SYSTEMS\" address (224.0.0.1) [igmp_maxresp=%i]\n", (int)(igmp->igmp_maxresp))); + + if (igmp->igmp_maxresp == 0) { + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.rx_v1); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: got an all hosts query with time== 0 - this is V1 and not implemented - treat as v2\n")); + igmp->igmp_maxresp = IGMP_V1_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR; + } else { + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.rx_general); + } + + groupref = netif_igmp_data(inp); + + /* Do not send messages on the all systems group address! */ + /* Skip the first group in the list, it is always the allsystems group added in igmp_start() */ + if (groupref != NULL) { + groupref = groupref->next; + } + + while (groupref) { + igmp_delaying_member(groupref, igmp->igmp_maxresp); + groupref = groupref->next; + } + } else { + /* IGMP_MEMB_QUERY to a specific group ? */ + if (!ip4_addr_isany(&igmp->igmp_group_address)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: IGMP_MEMB_QUERY to a specific group ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, igmp->igmp_group_address); + + if (ip4_addr_cmp(dest, &allsystems)) { + ip4_addr_t groupaddr; + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" using \"ALL SYSTEMS\" address (224.0.0.1) [igmp_maxresp=%i]\n", (int)(igmp->igmp_maxresp))); + /* we first need to re-look for the group since we used dest last time */ + ip4_addr_copy(groupaddr, igmp->igmp_group_address); + group = igmp_lookfor_group(inp, &groupaddr); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" with the group address as destination [igmp_maxresp=%i]\n", (int)(igmp->igmp_maxresp))); + } + + if (group != NULL) { + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.rx_group); + igmp_delaying_member(group, igmp->igmp_maxresp); + } else { + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.drop); + } + } else { + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.proterr); + } + } + + break; + + case IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT: + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT\n")); + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.rx_report); + + if (group->group_state == IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) { + /* This is on a specific group we have already looked up */ + group->timer = 0; /* stopped */ + group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; + group->last_reporter_flag = 0; + } + + break; + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_input: unexpected msg %d in state %d on group %p on if %p\n", + igmp->igmp_msgtype, group->group_state, (void *)&group, (void *)inp)); + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.proterr); + break; + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return; +} + +/** + * @ingroup igmp + * Join a group on one network interface. + * + * @param ifaddr ip address of the network interface which should join a new group + * @param groupaddr the ip address of the group which to join + * @return ERR_OK if group was joined on the netif(s), an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t igmp_joingroup(const ip4_addr_t *ifaddr, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr) +{ + err_t err = ERR_VAL; /* no matching interface */ + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* make sure it is multicast address */ + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup: attempt to join non-multicast address", ip4_addr_ismulticast(groupaddr), return ERR_VAL;); + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup: attempt to join allsystems address", (!ip4_addr_cmp(groupaddr, &allsystems)), return ERR_VAL;); + + /* loop through netif's */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + /* Should we join this interface ? */ + if ((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) && ((ip4_addr_isany(ifaddr) || ip4_addr_cmp(netif_ip4_addr(netif), ifaddr)))) { + err = igmp_joingroup_netif(netif, groupaddr); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* Return an error even if some network interfaces are joined */ + /** @todo undo any other netif already joined */ + return err; + } + } + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup igmp + * Join a group on one network interface. + * + * @param netif the network interface which should join a new group + * @param groupaddr the ip address of the group which to join + * @return ERR_OK if group was joined on the netif, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t igmp_joingroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr) +{ + struct igmp_group *group; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* make sure it is multicast address */ + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup_netif: attempt to join non-multicast address", ip4_addr_ismulticast(groupaddr), return ERR_VAL;); + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup_netif: attempt to join allsystems address", (!ip4_addr_cmp(groupaddr, &allsystems)), return ERR_VAL;); + + /* make sure it is an igmp-enabled netif */ + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_joingroup_netif: attempt to join on non-IGMP netif", netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP, return ERR_VAL;); + + /* find group or create a new one if not found */ + group = igmp_lookup_group(netif, groupaddr); + + if (group != NULL) { + /* This should create a new group, check the state to make sure */ + if (group->group_state != IGMP_GROUP_NON_MEMBER) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_joingroup_netif: join to group not in state IGMP_GROUP_NON_MEMBER\n")); + } else { + /* OK - it was new group */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_joingroup_netif: join to new group: ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, groupaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("\n")); + + /* If first use of the group, allow the group at the MAC level */ + if ((group->use == 0) && (netif->igmp_mac_filter != NULL)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_joingroup_netif: igmp_mac_filter(ADD ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, groupaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (") on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); + netif->igmp_mac_filter(netif, groupaddr, NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER); + } + + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.tx_join); + igmp_send(netif, group, IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT); + + igmp_start_timer(group, IGMP_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR); + + /* Need to work out where this timer comes from */ + group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER; + } + + /* Increment group use */ + group->use++; + /* Join on this interface */ + return ERR_OK; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_joingroup_netif: Not enough memory to join to group\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup igmp + * Leave a group on one network interface. + * + * @param ifaddr ip address of the network interface which should leave a group + * @param groupaddr the ip address of the group which to leave + * @return ERR_OK if group was left on the netif(s), an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t igmp_leavegroup(const ip4_addr_t *ifaddr, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr) +{ + err_t err = ERR_VAL; /* no matching interface */ + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* make sure it is multicast address */ + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup: attempt to leave non-multicast address", ip4_addr_ismulticast(groupaddr), return ERR_VAL;); + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup: attempt to leave allsystems address", (!ip4_addr_cmp(groupaddr, &allsystems)), return ERR_VAL;); + + /* loop through netif's */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + /* Should we leave this interface ? */ + if ((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) && ((ip4_addr_isany(ifaddr) || ip4_addr_cmp(netif_ip4_addr(netif), ifaddr)))) { + err_t res = igmp_leavegroup_netif(netif, groupaddr); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* Store this result if we have not yet gotten a success */ + err = res; + } + } + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup igmp + * Leave a group on one network interface. + * + * @param netif the network interface which should leave a group + * @param groupaddr the ip address of the group which to leave + * @return ERR_OK if group was left on the netif, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t igmp_leavegroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr) +{ + struct igmp_group *group; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* make sure it is multicast address */ + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup_netif: attempt to leave non-multicast address", ip4_addr_ismulticast(groupaddr), return ERR_VAL;); + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup_netif: attempt to leave allsystems address", (!ip4_addr_cmp(groupaddr, &allsystems)), return ERR_VAL;); + + /* make sure it is an igmp-enabled netif */ + LWIP_ERROR("igmp_leavegroup_netif: attempt to leave on non-IGMP netif", netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP, return ERR_VAL;); + + /* find group */ + group = igmp_lookfor_group(netif, groupaddr); + + if (group != NULL) { + /* Only send a leave if the flag is set according to the state diagram */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_leavegroup_netif: Leaving group: ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, groupaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("\n")); + + /* If there is no other use of the group */ + if (group->use <= 1) { + /* Remove the group from the list */ + igmp_remove_group(netif, group); + + /* If we are the last reporter for this group */ + if (group->last_reporter_flag) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_leavegroup_netif: sending leaving group\n")); + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.tx_leave); + igmp_send(netif, group, IGMP_LEAVE_GROUP); + } + + /* Disable the group at the MAC level */ + if (netif->igmp_mac_filter != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_leavegroup_netif: igmp_mac_filter(DEL ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print(IGMP_DEBUG, groupaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (") on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); + netif->igmp_mac_filter(netif, groupaddr, NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER); + } + + /* Free group struct */ + memp_free(MEMP_IGMP_GROUP, group); + } else { + /* Decrement group use */ + group->use--; + } + + return ERR_OK; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_leavegroup_netif: not member of group\n")); + return ERR_VAL; + } +} + +/** + * The igmp timer function (both for NO_SYS=1 and =0) + * Should be called every IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds (100 ms is default). + */ +void igmp_tmr(void) +{ + struct netif *netif; + + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + struct igmp_group *group = netif_igmp_data(netif); + + while (group != NULL) { + if (group->timer > 0) { + group->timer--; + + if (group->timer == 0) { + igmp_timeout(netif, group); + } + } + + group = group->next; + } + } +} + +/** + * Called if a timeout for one group is reached. + * Sends a report for this group. + * + * @param group an igmp_group for which a timeout is reached + */ +static void igmp_timeout(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group) +{ + /* If the state is IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER then we send a report for this group + (unless it is the allsystems group) */ + if ((group->group_state == IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) && + (!(ip4_addr_cmp(&(group->group_address), &allsystems)))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_timeout: report membership for group with address ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print_val(IGMP_DEBUG, group->group_address); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, (" on if %p\n", (void *)netif)); + + group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; + + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.tx_report); + igmp_send(netif, group, IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT); + } +} + +/** + * Start a timer for an igmp group + * + * @param group the igmp_group for which to start a timer + * @param max_time the time in multiples of IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL (decrease with + * every call to igmp_tmr()) + */ +static void igmp_start_timer(struct igmp_group *group, u8_t max_time) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_RAND + group->timer = (u16_t)(max_time > 2 ? (LWIP_RAND() % max_time) : 1); +#else /* LWIP_RAND */ + /* ATTENTION: use this only if absolutely necessary! */ + group->timer = max_time / 2; +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ + + if (group->timer == 0) { + group->timer = 1; + } +} + +/** + * Delaying membership report for a group if necessary + * + * @param group the igmp_group for which "delaying" membership report + * @param maxresp query delay + */ +static void igmp_delaying_member(struct igmp_group *group, u8_t maxresp) +{ + if ((group->group_state == IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER) || + ((group->group_state == IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) && + ((group->timer == 0) || (maxresp < group->timer)))) { + igmp_start_timer(group, maxresp); + group->group_state = IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER; + } +} + +/** + * Sends an IP packet on a network interface. This function constructs the IP header + * and calculates the IP header checksum. If the source IP address is NULL, + * the IP address of the outgoing network interface is filled in as source address. + * + * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next + protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an + IP header and p->payload points to that IP header) + * @param src the source IP address to send from (if src == IP4_ADDR_ANY, the + * IP address of the netif used to send is used as source address) + * @param dest the destination IP address to send the packet to + * @param netif the netif on which to send this packet + * @return ERR_OK if the packet was sent OK + * ERR_BUF if p doesn't have enough space for IP/LINK headers + * returns errors returned by netif->output + */ +static err_t igmp_ip_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, struct netif *netif) +{ + /* This is the "router alert" option */ + u16_t ra[2]; + ra[0] = PP_HTONS(ROUTER_ALERT); + ra[1] = 0x0000; /* Router shall examine packet */ + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.xmit); + return ip4_output_if_opt(p, src, dest, IGMP_TTL, 0, IP_PROTO_IGMP, netif, ra, ROUTER_ALERTLEN); +} + +/** + * Send an igmp packet to a specific group. + * + * @param group the group to which to send the packet + * @param type the type of igmp packet to send + */ +static void igmp_send(struct netif *netif, struct igmp_group *group, u8_t type) +{ + struct pbuf *p = NULL; + struct igmp_msg *igmp = NULL; + ip4_addr_t src = *IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + ip4_addr_t *dest = NULL; + + /* IP header + "router alert" option + IGMP header */ + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, IGMP_MINLEN, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p) { + igmp = (struct igmp_msg *)p->payload; + LWIP_ASSERT("igmp_send: check that first pbuf can hold struct igmp_msg", + (p->len >= sizeof(struct igmp_msg))); + ip4_addr_copy(src, *netif_ip4_addr(netif)); + + if (type == IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT) { + dest = &(group->group_address); + ip4_addr_copy(igmp->igmp_group_address, group->group_address); + group->last_reporter_flag = 1; /* Remember we were the last to report */ + } else { + if (type == IGMP_LEAVE_GROUP) { + dest = &allrouters; + ip4_addr_copy(igmp->igmp_group_address, group->group_address); + } + } + + if ((type == IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT) || (type == IGMP_LEAVE_GROUP)) { + igmp->igmp_msgtype = type; + igmp->igmp_maxresp = 0; + igmp->igmp_checksum = 0; + igmp->igmp_checksum = inet_chksum(igmp, IGMP_MINLEN); + + igmp_ip_output_if(p, &src, dest, netif); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IGMP_DEBUG, ("igmp_send: not enough memory for igmp_send\n")); + IGMP_STATS_INC(igmp.memerr); + } +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4.c index 14ae2d60..7c3df818 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4.c @@ -1,1213 +1,1213 @@ -/** - * @file - * This is the IPv4 layer implementation for incoming and outgoing IP traffic. - * - * @see ip_frag.c - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/ip4_frag.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/icmp.h" -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/raw_priv.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/autoip.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -/** Set this to 0 in the rare case of wanting to call an extra function to - * generate the IP checksum (in contrast to calculating it on-the-fly). */ -#ifndef LWIP_INLINE_IP_CHKSUM -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF -#define LWIP_INLINE_IP_CHKSUM 0 -#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ -#define LWIP_INLINE_IP_CHKSUM 1 -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ -#endif - -#if LWIP_INLINE_IP_CHKSUM && CHECKSUM_GEN_IP -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE 1 -#else -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE 0 -#endif - -#if LWIP_DHCP || defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) -#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING 1 - -/** Some defines for DHCP to let link-layer-addressed packets through while the - * netif is down. - * To use this in your own application/protocol, define LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(port) - * to return 1 if the port is accepted and 0 if the port is not accepted. - */ -#if LWIP_DHCP && defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) -/* accept DHCP client port and custom port */ -#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSED_PORT(port) (((port) == PP_NTOHS(LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_CLIENT)) || (LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(port))) -#elif defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) /* LWIP_DHCP && defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) */ -/* accept custom port only */ -#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSED_PORT(port) (LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(port)) -#else /* LWIP_DHCP && defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) */ -/* accept DHCP client port only */ -#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSED_PORT(port) ((port) == PP_NTOHS(LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_CLIENT)) -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP && defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) */ - -#else /* LWIP_DHCP */ -#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING 0 -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ - -/** The IP header ID of the next outgoing IP packet */ -static u16_t ip_id; - -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS -/** The default netif used for multicast */ -static struct netif *ip4_default_multicast_netif; - -/** - * @ingroup ip4 - * Set a default netif for IPv4 multicast. */ -void ip4_set_default_multicast_netif(struct netif *default_multicast_netif) -{ - ip4_default_multicast_netif = default_multicast_netif; -} -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC -/** - * Source based IPv4 routing must be fully implemented in - * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(). This function only provides the parameters. - */ -struct netif * -ip4_route_src(const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest) -{ - if (src != NULL) { - /* when src==NULL, the hook is called from ip4_route(dest) */ - struct netif *netif = LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(src, dest); - - if (netif != NULL) { - return netif; - } - } - - return ip4_route(dest); -} -#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC */ - -/** - * Finds the appropriate network interface for a given IP address. It - * searches the list of network interfaces linearly. A match is found - * if the masked IP address of the network interface equals the masked - * IP address given to the function. - * - * @param dest the destination IP address for which to find the route - * @return the netif on which to send to reach dest - */ -struct netif * -ip4_route(const ip4_addr_t *dest) -{ -#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - - /* Use administratively selected interface for multicast by default */ - if (ip4_addr_ismulticast(dest) && ip4_default_multicast_netif) { - return ip4_default_multicast_netif; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - - /* bug #54569: in case LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF=1 and LWIP_DEBUGF() disabled, the following loop is optimized away */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dest); - - /* iterate through netifs */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - /* is the netif up, does it have a link and a valid address? */ - if (netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif) && !ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - /* network mask matches? */ - if (ip4_addr_netcmp(dest, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif))) { - /* return netif on which to forward IP packet */ - return netif; - } - - /* gateway matches on a non broadcast interface? (i.e. peer in a point to point interface) */ - if (((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST) == 0) && ip4_addr_cmp(dest, netif_ip4_gw(netif))) { - /* return netif on which to forward IP packet */ - return netif; - } - } - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - - /* loopif is disabled, looopback traffic is passed through any netif */ - if (ip4_addr_isloopback(dest)) { - /* don't check for link on loopback traffic */ - if (netif_default != NULL && netif_is_up(netif_default)) { - return netif_default; - } - - /* default netif is not up, just use any netif for loopback traffic */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (netif_is_up(netif)) { - return netif; - } - } - return NULL; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC - netif = LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(NULL, dest); - - if (netif != NULL) { - return netif; - } - -#elif defined(LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE) - netif = LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE(dest); - - if (netif != NULL) { - return netif; - } - -#endif -#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ - - if ((netif_default == NULL) || !netif_is_up(netif_default) || !netif_is_link_up(netif_default) || - ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif_default)) || ip4_addr_isloopback(dest)) { - /* No matching netif found and default netif is not usable. - If this is not good enough for you, use LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE() */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_route: No route to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(dest), ip4_addr2_16(dest), ip4_addr3_16(dest), ip4_addr4_16(dest))); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.rterr); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutnoroutes); - return NULL; - } - - return netif_default; -} - -#if IP_FORWARD -/** - * Determine whether an IP address is in a reserved set of addresses - * that may not be forwarded, or whether datagrams to that destination - * may be forwarded. - * @param p the packet to forward - * @return 1: can forward 0: discard - */ -static int ip4_canforward(struct pbuf *p) -{ - u32_t addr = lwip_htonl(ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr())); - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD - int ret = LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD(p, addr); - - if (ret >= 0) { - return ret; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD */ - - if (p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_LLBCAST) { - /* don't route link-layer broadcasts */ - return 0; - } - - if ((p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_LLMCAST) || IP_MULTICAST(addr)) { - /* don't route link-layer multicasts (use LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD instead) */ - return 0; - } - - if (IP_EXPERIMENTAL(addr)) { - return 0; - } - - if (IP_CLASSA(addr)) { - u32_t net = addr & IP_CLASSA_NET; - - if ((net == 0) || (net == ((u32_t)IP_LOOPBACKNET << IP_CLASSA_NSHIFT))) { - /* don't route loopback packets */ - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -/** - * Forwards an IP packet. It finds an appropriate route for the - * packet, decrements the TTL value of the packet, adjusts the - * checksum and outputs the packet on the appropriate interface. - * - * @param p the packet to forward (p->payload points to IP header) - * @param iphdr the IP header of the input packet - * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received - */ -static void ip4_forward(struct pbuf *p, struct ip_hdr *iphdr, struct netif *inp) -{ - struct netif *netif; - - PERF_START; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); - - if (!ip4_canforward(p)) { - goto return_noroute; - } - - /* RFC3927 2.7: do not forward link-local addresses */ - if (ip4_addr_islinklocal(ip4_current_dest_addr())) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_forward: not forwarding LLA %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr2_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), - ip4_addr3_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr4_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()))); - goto return_noroute; - } - - /* Find network interface where to forward this IP packet to. */ - netif = ip4_route_src(ip4_current_src_addr(), ip4_current_dest_addr()); - - if (netif == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_forward: no forwarding route for %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F " found\n", - ip4_addr1_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr2_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), - ip4_addr3_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr4_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()))); - /* @todo: send ICMP_DUR_NET? */ - goto return_noroute; - } - -#if !IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF - - /* Do not forward packets onto the same network interface on which - * they arrived. */ - if (netif == inp) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_forward: not bouncing packets back on incoming interface.\n")); - goto return_noroute; - } - -#endif /* IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF */ - - /* decrement TTL */ - IPH_TTL_SET(iphdr, IPH_TTL(iphdr) - 1); - - /* send ICMP if TTL == 0 */ - if (IPH_TTL(iphdr) == 0) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinhdrerrors); -#if LWIP_ICMP - - /* Don't send ICMP messages in response to ICMP messages */ - if (IPH_PROTO(iphdr) != IP_PROTO_ICMP) { - icmp_time_exceeded(p, ICMP_TE_TTL); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ - return; - } - - /* Incrementally update the IP checksum. */ - if (IPH_CHKSUM(iphdr) >= PP_HTONS(0xffffU - 0x100)) { - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, (u16_t)(IPH_CHKSUM(iphdr) + PP_HTONS(0x100) + 1)); - } else { - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, (u16_t)(IPH_CHKSUM(iphdr) + PP_HTONS(0x100))); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_forward: forwarding packet to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr2_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), - ip4_addr3_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr4_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()))); - - IP_STATS_INC(ip.fw); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipforwdatagrams); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.xmit); - - PERF_STOP("ip4_forward"); - - /* don't fragment if interface has mtu set to 0 [loopif] */ - if (netif->mtu && (p->tot_len > netif->mtu)) { - if ((IPH_OFFSET(iphdr) & PP_NTOHS(IP_DF)) == 0) { -#if IP_FRAG - ip4_frag(p, netif, ip4_current_dest_addr()); -#else /* IP_FRAG */ - /* @todo: send ICMP Destination Unreachable code 13 "Communication administratively prohibited"? */ -#endif /* IP_FRAG */ - } else { -#if LWIP_ICMP - /* send ICMP Destination Unreachable code 4: "Fragmentation Needed and DF Set" */ - icmp_dest_unreach(p, ICMP_DUR_FRAG); -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ - } - - return; - } - - /* transmit pbuf on chosen interface */ - netif->output(netif, p, ip4_current_dest_addr()); - return; -return_noroute: - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutnoroutes); -} -#endif /* IP_FORWARD */ - -/** Return true if the current input packet should be accepted on this netif */ -static int ip4_input_accept(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip_input: iphdr->dest 0x%" X32_F " netif->ip_addr 0x%" X32_F " (0x%" X32_F ", 0x%" X32_F ", 0x%" X32_F ")\n", - ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_addr(netif)), - ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr()) & ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), - ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_addr(netif)) & ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), - ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr()) & ~ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)))); - - /* interface is up and configured? */ - if ((netif_is_up(netif)) && (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif)))) { - /* unicast to this interface address? */ - if (ip4_addr_cmp(ip4_current_dest_addr(), netif_ip4_addr(netif)) || - /* or broadcast on this interface network address? */ - ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_dest_addr(), netif) -#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - || (ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr()) == PP_HTONL(IPADDR_LOOPBACK)) -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - ) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_input: packet accepted on interface %c%c\n", - netif->name[0], netif->name[1])); - /* accept on this netif */ - return 1; - } - -#if LWIP_AUTOIP - - /* connections to link-local addresses must persist after changing - the netif's address (RFC3927 ch. 1.9) */ - if (autoip_accept_packet(netif, ip4_current_dest_addr())) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_input: LLA packet accepted on interface %c%c\n", - netif->name[0], netif->name[1])); - /* accept on this netif */ - return 1; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * This function is called by the network interface device driver when - * an IP packet is received. The function does the basic checks of the - * IP header such as packet size being at least larger than the header - * size etc. If the packet was not destined for us, the packet is - * forwarded (using ip_forward). The IP checksum is always checked. - * - * Finally, the packet is sent to the upper layer protocol input function. - * - * @param p the received IP packet (p->payload points to IP header) - * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received - * @return ERR_OK if the packet was processed (could return ERR_* if it wasn't - * processed, but currently always returns ERR_OK) - */ -err_t ip4_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - const struct ip_hdr *iphdr; - struct netif *netif; - u16_t iphdr_hlen; - u16_t iphdr_len; -#if IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING || LWIP_IGMP - int check_ip_src = 1; -#endif /* IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING || LWIP_IGMP */ -#if LWIP_RAW - raw_input_state_t raw_status; -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - IP_STATS_INC(ip.recv); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinreceives); - - /* identify the IP header */ - iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - - if (IPH_V(iphdr) != 4) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("IP packet dropped due to bad version number %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)IPH_V(iphdr))); - ip4_debug_print(p); - pbuf_free(p); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinhdrerrors); - return ERR_OK; - } - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_INPUT - - if (LWIP_HOOK_IP4_INPUT(p, inp)) { - /* the packet has been eaten */ - return ERR_OK; - } - -#endif - - /* obtain IP header length in bytes */ - iphdr_hlen = IPH_HL_BYTES(iphdr); - /* obtain ip length in bytes */ - iphdr_len = lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(iphdr)); - - /* Trim pbuf. This is especially required for packets < 60 bytes. */ - if (iphdr_len < p->tot_len) { - pbuf_realloc(p, iphdr_len); - } - - /* header length exceeds first pbuf length, or ip length exceeds total pbuf length? */ - if ((iphdr_hlen > p->len) || (iphdr_len > p->tot_len) || (iphdr_hlen < IP_HLEN)) { - if (iphdr_hlen < IP_HLEN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("ip4_input: short IP header (%" U16_F " bytes) received, IP packet dropped\n", iphdr_hlen)); - } - - if (iphdr_hlen > p->len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("IP header (len %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IP packet dropped.\n", - iphdr_hlen, p->len)); - } - - if (iphdr_len > p->tot_len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("IP (len %" U16_F ") is longer than pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IP packet dropped.\n", - iphdr_len, p->tot_len)); - } - - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - pbuf_free(p); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.lenerr); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindiscards); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* verify checksum */ -#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP) - { - if (inet_chksum(iphdr, iphdr_hlen) != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("Checksum (0x%" X16_F ") failed, IP packet dropped.\n", inet_chksum(iphdr, iphdr_hlen))); - ip4_debug_print(p); - pbuf_free(p); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.chkerr); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinhdrerrors); - return ERR_OK; - } - } -#endif - - /* copy IP addresses to aligned ip_addr_t */ - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(ip_data.current_iphdr_dest, iphdr->dest); - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(ip_data.current_iphdr_src, iphdr->src); - - /* match packet against an interface, i.e. is this packet for us? */ - if (ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip4_current_dest_addr())) { -#if LWIP_IGMP - - if ((inp->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) && (igmp_lookfor_group(inp, ip4_current_dest_addr()))) { - /* IGMP snooping switches need 0.0.0.0 to be allowed as source address (RFC 4541) */ - ip4_addr_t allsystems; - IP4_ADDR(&allsystems, 224, 0, 0, 1); - - if (ip4_addr_cmp(ip4_current_dest_addr(), &allsystems) && - ip4_addr_isany(ip4_current_src_addr())) { - check_ip_src = 0; - } - - netif = inp; - } else { - netif = NULL; - } - -#else /* LWIP_IGMP */ - - if ((netif_is_up(inp)) && (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(inp)))) { - netif = inp; - } else { - netif = NULL; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - } else { - /* start trying with inp. if that's not acceptable, start walking the - list of configured netifs. */ - if (ip4_input_accept(inp)) { - netif = inp; - } else { - netif = NULL; -#if !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - - /* Packets sent to the loopback address must not be accepted on an - * interface that does not have the loopback address assigned to it, - * unless a non-loopback interface is used for loopback traffic. */ - if (!ip4_addr_isloopback(ip4_current_dest_addr())) -#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - { -#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (netif == inp) { - /* we checked that before already */ - continue; - } - - if (ip4_input_accept(netif)) { - break; - } - } -#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ - } - } - } - -#if IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING - - /* Pass DHCP messages regardless of destination address. DHCP traffic is addressed - * using link layer addressing (such as Ethernet MAC) so we must not filter on IP. - * According to RFC 1542 section 3.1.1, referred by RFC 2131). - * - * If you want to accept private broadcast communication while a netif is down, - * define LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(dst_port), e.g.: - * - * #define LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(dst_port) ((dst_port) == PP_NTOHS(12345)) - */ - if (netif == NULL) { - /* remote port is DHCP server? */ - if (IPH_PROTO(iphdr) == IP_PROTO_UDP) { - const struct udp_hdr *udphdr = (const struct udp_hdr *)((const u8_t *)iphdr + iphdr_hlen); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ip4_input: UDP packet to DHCP client port %" U16_F "\n", - lwip_ntohs(udphdr->dest))); - - if (IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSED_PORT(udphdr->dest)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ip4_input: DHCP packet accepted.\n")); - netif = inp; - check_ip_src = 0; - } - } - } - -#endif /* IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING */ - - /* broadcast or multicast packet source address? Compliant with RFC 1122: 3.2.1.3 */ -#if LWIP_IGMP || IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING - - if (check_ip_src -#if IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING - /* DHCP servers need 0.0.0.0 to be allowed as source address (RFC 1.1.2.2: 3.2.1.3/a) */ - && !ip4_addr_isany_val(*ip4_current_src_addr()) -#endif /* IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING */ - ) -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING */ - { - if ((ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_src_addr(), inp)) || - (ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip4_current_src_addr()))) { - /* packet source is not valid */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("ip4_input: packet source is not valid.\n")); - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - pbuf_free(p); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinaddrerrors); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindiscards); - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* packet not for us? */ - if (netif == NULL) { - /* packet not for us, route or discard */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ip4_input: packet not for us.\n")); -#if IP_FORWARD - - /* non-broadcast packet? */ - if (!ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_dest_addr(), inp)) { - /* try to forward IP packet on (other) interfaces */ - ip4_forward(p, (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload, inp); - } else -#endif /* IP_FORWARD */ - { - IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinaddrerrors); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindiscards); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* packet consists of multiple fragments? */ - if ((IPH_OFFSET(iphdr) & PP_HTONS(IP_OFFMASK | IP_MF)) != 0) { -#if IP_REASSEMBLY /* packet fragment reassembly code present? */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("IP packet is a fragment (id=0x%04" X16_F " tot_len=%" U16_F " len=%" U16_F " MF=%" U16_F " offset=%" U16_F "), calling ip4_reass()\n", - lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(iphdr)), p->tot_len, lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(iphdr)), (u16_t) !!(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr) & PP_HTONS(IP_MF)), (u16_t)((lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) & IP_OFFMASK) * 8))); - /* reassemble the packet*/ - p = ip4_reass(p); - - /* packet not fully reassembled yet? */ - if (p == NULL) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - iphdr = (const struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; -#else /* IP_REASSEMBLY == 0, no packet fragment reassembly code present */ - pbuf_free(p); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("IP packet dropped since it was fragmented (0x%" X16_F ") (while IP_REASSEMBLY == 0).\n", - lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)))); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.opterr); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); - /* unsupported protocol feature */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinunknownprotos); - return ERR_OK; -#endif /* IP_REASSEMBLY */ - } - -#if IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED == 0 /* no support for IP options in the IP header? */ - -#if LWIP_IGMP - - /* there is an extra "router alert" option in IGMP messages which we allow for but do not police */ - if ((iphdr_hlen > IP_HLEN) && (IPH_PROTO(iphdr) != IP_PROTO_IGMP)) { -#else - - if (iphdr_hlen > IP_HLEN) { -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("IP packet dropped since there were IP options (while IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED == 0).\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.opterr); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); - /* unsupported protocol feature */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinunknownprotos); - return ERR_OK; - } - -#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED == 0 */ - - /* send to upper layers */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_input: \n")); - ip4_debug_print(p); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_input: p->len %" U16_F " p->tot_len %" U16_F "\n", p->len, p->tot_len)); - - ip_data.current_netif = netif; - ip_data.current_input_netif = inp; - ip_data.current_ip4_header = iphdr; - ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = IPH_HL_BYTES(iphdr); - -#if LWIP_RAW - /* raw input did not eat the packet? */ - raw_status = raw_input(p, inp); - - if (raw_status != RAW_INPUT_EATEN) -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ - { - pbuf_remove_header(p, iphdr_hlen); /* Move to payload, no check necessary. */ - - switch (IPH_PROTO(iphdr)) { -#if LWIP_UDP - - case IP_PROTO_UDP: -#if LWIP_UDPLITE - case IP_PROTO_UDPLITE: -#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindelivers); - udp_input(p, inp); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - case IP_PROTO_TCP: - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindelivers); - tcp_input(p, inp); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_ICMP - - case IP_PROTO_ICMP: - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindelivers); - icmp_input(p, inp); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ -#if LWIP_IGMP - - case IP_PROTO_IGMP: - igmp_input(p, inp, ip4_current_dest_addr()); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - - default: -#if LWIP_RAW - if (raw_status == RAW_INPUT_DELIVERED) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindelivers); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ - { -#if LWIP_ICMP - - /* send ICMP destination protocol unreachable unless is was a broadcast */ - if (!ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_dest_addr(), netif) && - !ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip4_current_dest_addr())) { - pbuf_header_force(p, (s16_t)iphdr_hlen); /* Move to ip header, no check necessary. */ - icmp_dest_unreach(p, ICMP_DUR_PROTO); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("Unsupported transport protocol %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)IPH_PROTO(iphdr))); - - IP_STATS_INC(ip.proterr); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinunknownprotos); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - break; - } - } - - /* @todo: this is not really necessary... */ - ip_data.current_netif = NULL; - ip_data.current_input_netif = NULL; - ip_data.current_ip4_header = NULL; - ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = 0; - ip4_addr_set_any(ip4_current_src_addr()); - ip4_addr_set_any(ip4_current_dest_addr()); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Sends an IP packet on a network interface. This function constructs - * the IP header and calculates the IP header checksum. If the source - * IP address is NULL, the IP address of the outgoing network - * interface is filled in as source address. - * If the destination IP address is LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p is assumed to already - * include an IP header and p->payload points to it instead of the data. - * - * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next - protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an - IP header and p->payload points to that IP header) - * @param src the source IP address to send from (if src == IP4_ADDR_ANY, the - * IP address of the netif used to send is used as source address) - * @param dest the destination IP address to send the packet to - * @param ttl the TTL value to be set in the IP header - * @param tos the TOS value to be set in the IP header - * @param proto the PROTOCOL to be set in the IP header - * @param netif the netif on which to send this packet - * @return ERR_OK if the packet was sent OK - * ERR_BUF if p doesn't have enough space for IP/LINK headers - * returns errors returned by netif->output - * - * @note ip_id: RFC791 "some host may be able to simply use - * unique identifiers independent of destination" - */ -err_t ip4_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, - u8_t proto, struct netif *netif) -{ -#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND - return ip4_output_if_opt(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif, NULL, 0); -} - -/** - * Same as ip_output_if() but with the possibility to include IP options: - * - * @ param ip_options pointer to the IP options, copied into the IP header - * @ param optlen length of ip_options - */ -err_t ip4_output_if_opt(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif, void *ip_options, - u16_t optlen) -{ -#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ - const ip4_addr_t *src_used = src; - - if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { - if (ip4_addr_isany(src)) { - src_used = netif_ip4_addr(netif); - } - } - -#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND - return ip4_output_if_opt_src(p, src_used, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif, - ip_options, optlen); -#else /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ - return ip4_output_if_src(p, src_used, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif); -#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ -} - -/** - * Same as ip_output_if() but 'src' address is not replaced by netif address - * when it is 'any'. - */ -err_t ip4_output_if_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, - u8_t proto, struct netif *netif) -{ -#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND - return ip4_output_if_opt_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif, NULL, 0); -} - -/** - * Same as ip_output_if_opt() but 'src' address is not replaced by netif address - * when it is 'any'. - */ -err_t ip4_output_if_opt_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif, void *ip_options, - u16_t optlen) -{ -#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ - struct ip_hdr *iphdr; - ip4_addr_t dest_addr; -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE - u32_t chk_sum = 0; -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); - - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutrequests); - - /* Should the IP header be generated or is it already included in p? */ - if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { - u16_t ip_hlen = IP_HLEN; -#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND - u16_t optlen_aligned = 0; - - if (optlen != 0) { -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE - int i; -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - - if (optlen > (IP_HLEN_MAX - IP_HLEN)) { - /* optlen too long */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_output_if_opt: optlen too long\n")); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutdiscards); - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* round up to a multiple of 4 */ - optlen_aligned = (u16_t)((optlen + 3) & ~3); - ip_hlen = (u16_t)(ip_hlen + optlen_aligned); - - /* First write in the IP options */ - if (pbuf_add_header(p, optlen_aligned)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_output_if_opt: not enough room for IP options in pbuf\n")); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutdiscards); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - MEMCPY(p->payload, ip_options, optlen); - - if (optlen < optlen_aligned) { - /* zero the remaining bytes */ - memset(((char *)p->payload) + optlen, 0, (size_t)(optlen_aligned - optlen)); - } - -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE - - for (i = 0; i < optlen_aligned / 2; i++) { - chk_sum += ((u16_t *)p->payload)[i]; - } - -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - } - -#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ - - /* generate IP header */ - if (pbuf_add_header(p, IP_HLEN)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_output: not enough room for IP header in pbuf\n")); - - IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutdiscards); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct ip_hdr", - (p->len >= sizeof(struct ip_hdr))); - - IPH_TTL_SET(iphdr, ttl); - IPH_PROTO_SET(iphdr, proto); -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE - chk_sum += PP_NTOHS(proto | (ttl << 8)); -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - - /* dest cannot be NULL here */ - ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->dest, *dest); -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE - chk_sum += ip4_addr_get_u32(&iphdr->dest) & 0xFFFF; - chk_sum += ip4_addr_get_u32(&iphdr->dest) >> 16; -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - - IPH_VHL_SET(iphdr, 4, ip_hlen / 4); - IPH_TOS_SET(iphdr, tos); -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE - chk_sum += PP_NTOHS(tos | (iphdr->_v_hl << 8)); -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - IPH_LEN_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(p->tot_len)); -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE - chk_sum += iphdr->_len; -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - IPH_OFFSET_SET(iphdr, 0); - IPH_ID_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(ip_id)); -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE - chk_sum += iphdr->_id; -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - ++ip_id; - - if (src == NULL) { - ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->src, *IP4_ADDR_ANY4); - } else { - /* src cannot be NULL here */ - ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->src, *src); - } - -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE - chk_sum += ip4_addr_get_u32(&iphdr->src) & 0xFFFF; - chk_sum += ip4_addr_get_u32(&iphdr->src) >> 16; - chk_sum = (chk_sum >> 16) + (chk_sum & 0xFFFF); - chk_sum = (chk_sum >> 16) + chk_sum; - chk_sum = ~chk_sum; - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) - { - iphdr->_chksum = (u16_t)chk_sum; /* network order */ - } -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF - else - { - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF*/ -#else /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) - { - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, ip_hlen)); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP */ -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ - } else { - /* IP header already included in p */ - if (p->len < IP_HLEN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_output: LWIP_IP_HDRINCL but pbuf is too short\n")); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutdiscards); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - ip4_addr_copy(dest_addr, iphdr->dest); - dest = &dest_addr; - } - - IP_STATS_INC(ip.xmit); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_output_if: %c%c%" U16_F "\n", netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - ip4_debug_print(p); - -#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK - - if (ip4_addr_cmp(dest, netif_ip4_addr(netif)) -#if !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - || ip4_addr_isloopback(dest) -#endif /* !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - ) { - /* Packet to self, enqueue it for loopback */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("netif_loop_output()")); - return netif_loop_output(netif, p); - } - -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - - if ((p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP) != 0) { - netif_loop_output(netif, p); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ -#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ -#if IP_FRAG - - /* don't fragment if interface has mtu set to 0 [loopif] */ - if (netif->mtu && (p->tot_len > netif->mtu)) { - return ip4_frag(p, netif, dest); - } - -#endif /* IP_FRAG */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_output_if: call netif->output()\n")); - return netif->output(netif, p, dest); -} - -/** - * Simple interface to ip_output_if. It finds the outgoing network - * interface and calls upon ip_output_if to do the actual work. - * - * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next - protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an - IP header and p->payload points to that IP header) - * @param src the source IP address to send from (if src == IP4_ADDR_ANY, the - * IP address of the netif used to send is used as source address) - * @param dest the destination IP address to send the packet to - * @param ttl the TTL value to be set in the IP header - * @param tos the TOS value to be set in the IP header - * @param proto the PROTOCOL to be set in the IP header - * - * @return ERR_RTE if no route is found - * see ip_output_if() for more return values - */ -err_t ip4_output(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto) -{ - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); - - if ((netif = ip4_route_src(src, dest)) == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_output: No route to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(dest), ip4_addr2_16(dest), ip4_addr3_16(dest), ip4_addr4_16(dest))); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.rterr); - return ERR_RTE; - } - - return ip4_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif); -} - -#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS -/** Like ip_output, but takes and addr_hint pointer that is passed on to netif->addr_hint - * before calling ip_output_if. - * - * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next - protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an - IP header and p->payload points to that IP header) - * @param src the source IP address to send from (if src == IP4_ADDR_ANY, the - * IP address of the netif used to send is used as source address) - * @param dest the destination IP address to send the packet to - * @param ttl the TTL value to be set in the IP header - * @param tos the TOS value to be set in the IP header - * @param proto the PROTOCOL to be set in the IP header - * @param netif_hint netif output hint pointer set to netif->hint before - * calling ip_output_if() - * - * @return ERR_RTE if no route is found - * see ip_output_if() for more return values - */ -err_t ip4_output_hinted(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif_hint *netif_hint) -{ - struct netif *netif; - err_t err; - - LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); - - if ((netif = ip4_route_src(src, dest)) == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_output: No route to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - ip4_addr1_16(dest), ip4_addr2_16(dest), ip4_addr3_16(dest), ip4_addr4_16(dest))); - IP_STATS_INC(ip.rterr); - return ERR_RTE; - } - - NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, netif_hint); - err = ip4_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif); - NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); - - return err; -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS*/ - -#if IP_DEBUG -/* Print an IP header by using LWIP_DEBUGF - * @param p an IP packet, p->payload pointing to the IP header - */ -void ip4_debug_print(struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct ip_hdr *iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("IP header:\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("|%2" S16_F " |%2" S16_F " | 0x%02" X16_F " | %5" U16_F " | (v, hl, tos, len)\n", - (u16_t)IPH_V(iphdr), - (u16_t)IPH_HL(iphdr), - (u16_t)IPH_TOS(iphdr), - lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(iphdr)))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " |%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "| %4" U16_F " | (id, flags, offset)\n", - lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(iphdr)), - (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) >> 15 & 1), - (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) >> 14 & 1), - (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) >> 13 & 1), - (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) & IP_OFFMASK))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("| %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | 0x%04" X16_F " | (ttl, proto, chksum)\n", - (u16_t)IPH_TTL(iphdr), - (u16_t)IPH_PROTO(iphdr), - lwip_ntohs(IPH_CHKSUM(iphdr)))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("| %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | (src)\n", - ip4_addr1_16_val(iphdr->src), - ip4_addr2_16_val(iphdr->src), - ip4_addr3_16_val(iphdr->src), - ip4_addr4_16_val(iphdr->src))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("| %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | (dest)\n", - ip4_addr1_16_val(iphdr->dest), - ip4_addr2_16_val(iphdr->dest), - ip4_addr3_16_val(iphdr->dest), - ip4_addr4_16_val(iphdr->dest))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); -} -#endif /* IP_DEBUG */ - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +/** + * @file + * This is the IPv4 layer implementation for incoming and outgoing IP traffic. + * + * @see ip_frag.c + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/ip4_frag.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/icmp.h" +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/raw_priv.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/autoip.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +/** Set this to 0 in the rare case of wanting to call an extra function to + * generate the IP checksum (in contrast to calculating it on-the-fly). */ +#ifndef LWIP_INLINE_IP_CHKSUM +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF +#define LWIP_INLINE_IP_CHKSUM 0 +#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ +#define LWIP_INLINE_IP_CHKSUM 1 +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ +#endif + +#if LWIP_INLINE_IP_CHKSUM && CHECKSUM_GEN_IP +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE 1 +#else +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE 0 +#endif + +#if LWIP_DHCP || defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) +#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING 1 + +/** Some defines for DHCP to let link-layer-addressed packets through while the + * netif is down. + * To use this in your own application/protocol, define LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(port) + * to return 1 if the port is accepted and 0 if the port is not accepted. + */ +#if LWIP_DHCP && defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) +/* accept DHCP client port and custom port */ +#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSED_PORT(port) (((port) == PP_NTOHS(LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_CLIENT)) || (LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(port))) +#elif defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) /* LWIP_DHCP && defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) */ +/* accept custom port only */ +#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSED_PORT(port) (LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(port)) +#else /* LWIP_DHCP && defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) */ +/* accept DHCP client port only */ +#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSED_PORT(port) ((port) == PP_NTOHS(LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_CLIENT)) +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP && defined(LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT) */ + +#else /* LWIP_DHCP */ +#define IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING 0 +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ + +/** The IP header ID of the next outgoing IP packet */ +static u16_t ip_id; + +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS +/** The default netif used for multicast */ +static struct netif *ip4_default_multicast_netif; + +/** + * @ingroup ip4 + * Set a default netif for IPv4 multicast. */ +void ip4_set_default_multicast_netif(struct netif *default_multicast_netif) +{ + ip4_default_multicast_netif = default_multicast_netif; +} +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC +/** + * Source based IPv4 routing must be fully implemented in + * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(). This function only provides the parameters. + */ +struct netif * +ip4_route_src(const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest) +{ + if (src != NULL) { + /* when src==NULL, the hook is called from ip4_route(dest) */ + struct netif *netif = LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(src, dest); + + if (netif != NULL) { + return netif; + } + } + + return ip4_route(dest); +} +#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC */ + +/** + * Finds the appropriate network interface for a given IP address. It + * searches the list of network interfaces linearly. A match is found + * if the masked IP address of the network interface equals the masked + * IP address given to the function. + * + * @param dest the destination IP address for which to find the route + * @return the netif on which to send to reach dest + */ +struct netif * +ip4_route(const ip4_addr_t *dest) +{ +#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + + /* Use administratively selected interface for multicast by default */ + if (ip4_addr_ismulticast(dest) && ip4_default_multicast_netif) { + return ip4_default_multicast_netif; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + + /* bug #54569: in case LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF=1 and LWIP_DEBUGF() disabled, the following loop is optimized away */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dest); + + /* iterate through netifs */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + /* is the netif up, does it have a link and a valid address? */ + if (netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif) && !ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + /* network mask matches? */ + if (ip4_addr_netcmp(dest, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif))) { + /* return netif on which to forward IP packet */ + return netif; + } + + /* gateway matches on a non broadcast interface? (i.e. peer in a point to point interface) */ + if (((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST) == 0) && ip4_addr_cmp(dest, netif_ip4_gw(netif))) { + /* return netif on which to forward IP packet */ + return netif; + } + } + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + + /* loopif is disabled, looopback traffic is passed through any netif */ + if (ip4_addr_isloopback(dest)) { + /* don't check for link on loopback traffic */ + if (netif_default != NULL && netif_is_up(netif_default)) { + return netif_default; + } + + /* default netif is not up, just use any netif for loopback traffic */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (netif_is_up(netif)) { + return netif; + } + } + return NULL; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC + netif = LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(NULL, dest); + + if (netif != NULL) { + return netif; + } + +#elif defined(LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE) + netif = LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE(dest); + + if (netif != NULL) { + return netif; + } + +#endif +#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ + + if ((netif_default == NULL) || !netif_is_up(netif_default) || !netif_is_link_up(netif_default) || + ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif_default)) || ip4_addr_isloopback(dest)) { + /* No matching netif found and default netif is not usable. + If this is not good enough for you, use LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE() */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_route: No route to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(dest), ip4_addr2_16(dest), ip4_addr3_16(dest), ip4_addr4_16(dest))); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.rterr); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutnoroutes); + return NULL; + } + + return netif_default; +} + +#if IP_FORWARD +/** + * Determine whether an IP address is in a reserved set of addresses + * that may not be forwarded, or whether datagrams to that destination + * may be forwarded. + * @param p the packet to forward + * @return 1: can forward 0: discard + */ +static int ip4_canforward(struct pbuf *p) +{ + u32_t addr = lwip_htonl(ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr())); + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD + int ret = LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD(p, addr); + + if (ret >= 0) { + return ret; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD */ + + if (p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_LLBCAST) { + /* don't route link-layer broadcasts */ + return 0; + } + + if ((p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_LLMCAST) || IP_MULTICAST(addr)) { + /* don't route link-layer multicasts (use LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD instead) */ + return 0; + } + + if (IP_EXPERIMENTAL(addr)) { + return 0; + } + + if (IP_CLASSA(addr)) { + u32_t net = addr & IP_CLASSA_NET; + + if ((net == 0) || (net == ((u32_t)IP_LOOPBACKNET << IP_CLASSA_NSHIFT))) { + /* don't route loopback packets */ + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Forwards an IP packet. It finds an appropriate route for the + * packet, decrements the TTL value of the packet, adjusts the + * checksum and outputs the packet on the appropriate interface. + * + * @param p the packet to forward (p->payload points to IP header) + * @param iphdr the IP header of the input packet + * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received + */ +static void ip4_forward(struct pbuf *p, struct ip_hdr *iphdr, struct netif *inp) +{ + struct netif *netif; + + PERF_START; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); + + if (!ip4_canforward(p)) { + goto return_noroute; + } + + /* RFC3927 2.7: do not forward link-local addresses */ + if (ip4_addr_islinklocal(ip4_current_dest_addr())) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_forward: not forwarding LLA %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr2_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), + ip4_addr3_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr4_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()))); + goto return_noroute; + } + + /* Find network interface where to forward this IP packet to. */ + netif = ip4_route_src(ip4_current_src_addr(), ip4_current_dest_addr()); + + if (netif == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_forward: no forwarding route for %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F " found\n", + ip4_addr1_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr2_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), + ip4_addr3_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr4_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()))); + /* @todo: send ICMP_DUR_NET? */ + goto return_noroute; + } + +#if !IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF + + /* Do not forward packets onto the same network interface on which + * they arrived. */ + if (netif == inp) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_forward: not bouncing packets back on incoming interface.\n")); + goto return_noroute; + } + +#endif /* IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF */ + + /* decrement TTL */ + IPH_TTL_SET(iphdr, IPH_TTL(iphdr) - 1); + + /* send ICMP if TTL == 0 */ + if (IPH_TTL(iphdr) == 0) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinhdrerrors); +#if LWIP_ICMP + + /* Don't send ICMP messages in response to ICMP messages */ + if (IPH_PROTO(iphdr) != IP_PROTO_ICMP) { + icmp_time_exceeded(p, ICMP_TE_TTL); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ + return; + } + + /* Incrementally update the IP checksum. */ + if (IPH_CHKSUM(iphdr) >= PP_HTONS(0xffffU - 0x100)) { + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, (u16_t)(IPH_CHKSUM(iphdr) + PP_HTONS(0x100) + 1)); + } else { + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, (u16_t)(IPH_CHKSUM(iphdr) + PP_HTONS(0x100))); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_forward: forwarding packet to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr2_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), + ip4_addr3_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr4_16(ip4_current_dest_addr()))); + + IP_STATS_INC(ip.fw); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipforwdatagrams); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.xmit); + + PERF_STOP("ip4_forward"); + + /* don't fragment if interface has mtu set to 0 [loopif] */ + if (netif->mtu && (p->tot_len > netif->mtu)) { + if ((IPH_OFFSET(iphdr) & PP_NTOHS(IP_DF)) == 0) { +#if IP_FRAG + ip4_frag(p, netif, ip4_current_dest_addr()); +#else /* IP_FRAG */ + /* @todo: send ICMP Destination Unreachable code 13 "Communication administratively prohibited"? */ +#endif /* IP_FRAG */ + } else { +#if LWIP_ICMP + /* send ICMP Destination Unreachable code 4: "Fragmentation Needed and DF Set" */ + icmp_dest_unreach(p, ICMP_DUR_FRAG); +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ + } + + return; + } + + /* transmit pbuf on chosen interface */ + netif->output(netif, p, ip4_current_dest_addr()); + return; +return_noroute: + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutnoroutes); +} +#endif /* IP_FORWARD */ + +/** Return true if the current input packet should be accepted on this netif */ +static int ip4_input_accept(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip_input: iphdr->dest 0x%" X32_F " netif->ip_addr 0x%" X32_F " (0x%" X32_F ", 0x%" X32_F ", 0x%" X32_F ")\n", + ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr()), ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_addr(netif)), + ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr()) & ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), + ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_addr(netif)) & ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), + ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr()) & ~ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)))); + + /* interface is up and configured? */ + if ((netif_is_up(netif)) && (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif)))) { + /* unicast to this interface address? */ + if (ip4_addr_cmp(ip4_current_dest_addr(), netif_ip4_addr(netif)) || + /* or broadcast on this interface network address? */ + ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_dest_addr(), netif) +#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + || (ip4_addr_get_u32(ip4_current_dest_addr()) == PP_HTONL(IPADDR_LOOPBACK)) +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + ) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_input: packet accepted on interface %c%c\n", + netif->name[0], netif->name[1])); + /* accept on this netif */ + return 1; + } + +#if LWIP_AUTOIP + + /* connections to link-local addresses must persist after changing + the netif's address (RFC3927 ch. 1.9) */ + if (autoip_accept_packet(netif, ip4_current_dest_addr())) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_input: LLA packet accepted on interface %c%c\n", + netif->name[0], netif->name[1])); + /* accept on this netif */ + return 1; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * This function is called by the network interface device driver when + * an IP packet is received. The function does the basic checks of the + * IP header such as packet size being at least larger than the header + * size etc. If the packet was not destined for us, the packet is + * forwarded (using ip_forward). The IP checksum is always checked. + * + * Finally, the packet is sent to the upper layer protocol input function. + * + * @param p the received IP packet (p->payload points to IP header) + * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received + * @return ERR_OK if the packet was processed (could return ERR_* if it wasn't + * processed, but currently always returns ERR_OK) + */ +err_t ip4_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + const struct ip_hdr *iphdr; + struct netif *netif; + u16_t iphdr_hlen; + u16_t iphdr_len; +#if IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING || LWIP_IGMP + int check_ip_src = 1; +#endif /* IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING || LWIP_IGMP */ +#if LWIP_RAW + raw_input_state_t raw_status; +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + IP_STATS_INC(ip.recv); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinreceives); + + /* identify the IP header */ + iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + + if (IPH_V(iphdr) != 4) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("IP packet dropped due to bad version number %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)IPH_V(iphdr))); + ip4_debug_print(p); + pbuf_free(p); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinhdrerrors); + return ERR_OK; + } + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_INPUT + + if (LWIP_HOOK_IP4_INPUT(p, inp)) { + /* the packet has been eaten */ + return ERR_OK; + } + +#endif + + /* obtain IP header length in bytes */ + iphdr_hlen = IPH_HL_BYTES(iphdr); + /* obtain ip length in bytes */ + iphdr_len = lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(iphdr)); + + /* Trim pbuf. This is especially required for packets < 60 bytes. */ + if (iphdr_len < p->tot_len) { + pbuf_realloc(p, iphdr_len); + } + + /* header length exceeds first pbuf length, or ip length exceeds total pbuf length? */ + if ((iphdr_hlen > p->len) || (iphdr_len > p->tot_len) || (iphdr_hlen < IP_HLEN)) { + if (iphdr_hlen < IP_HLEN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("ip4_input: short IP header (%" U16_F " bytes) received, IP packet dropped\n", iphdr_hlen)); + } + + if (iphdr_hlen > p->len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("IP header (len %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IP packet dropped.\n", + iphdr_hlen, p->len)); + } + + if (iphdr_len > p->tot_len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("IP (len %" U16_F ") is longer than pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IP packet dropped.\n", + iphdr_len, p->tot_len)); + } + + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + pbuf_free(p); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.lenerr); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindiscards); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* verify checksum */ +#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP) + { + if (inet_chksum(iphdr, iphdr_hlen) != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("Checksum (0x%" X16_F ") failed, IP packet dropped.\n", inet_chksum(iphdr, iphdr_hlen))); + ip4_debug_print(p); + pbuf_free(p); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.chkerr); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinhdrerrors); + return ERR_OK; + } + } +#endif + + /* copy IP addresses to aligned ip_addr_t */ + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(ip_data.current_iphdr_dest, iphdr->dest); + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(ip_data.current_iphdr_src, iphdr->src); + + /* match packet against an interface, i.e. is this packet for us? */ + if (ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip4_current_dest_addr())) { +#if LWIP_IGMP + + if ((inp->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) && (igmp_lookfor_group(inp, ip4_current_dest_addr()))) { + /* IGMP snooping switches need 0.0.0.0 to be allowed as source address (RFC 4541) */ + ip4_addr_t allsystems; + IP4_ADDR(&allsystems, 224, 0, 0, 1); + + if (ip4_addr_cmp(ip4_current_dest_addr(), &allsystems) && + ip4_addr_isany(ip4_current_src_addr())) { + check_ip_src = 0; + } + + netif = inp; + } else { + netif = NULL; + } + +#else /* LWIP_IGMP */ + + if ((netif_is_up(inp)) && (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(inp)))) { + netif = inp; + } else { + netif = NULL; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + } else { + /* start trying with inp. if that's not acceptable, start walking the + list of configured netifs. */ + if (ip4_input_accept(inp)) { + netif = inp; + } else { + netif = NULL; +#if !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + + /* Packets sent to the loopback address must not be accepted on an + * interface that does not have the loopback address assigned to it, + * unless a non-loopback interface is used for loopback traffic. */ + if (!ip4_addr_isloopback(ip4_current_dest_addr())) +#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + { +#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (netif == inp) { + /* we checked that before already */ + continue; + } + + if (ip4_input_accept(netif)) { + break; + } + } +#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ + } + } + } + +#if IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING + + /* Pass DHCP messages regardless of destination address. DHCP traffic is addressed + * using link layer addressing (such as Ethernet MAC) so we must not filter on IP. + * According to RFC 1542 section 3.1.1, referred by RFC 2131). + * + * If you want to accept private broadcast communication while a netif is down, + * define LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(dst_port), e.g.: + * + * #define LWIP_IP_ACCEPT_UDP_PORT(dst_port) ((dst_port) == PP_NTOHS(12345)) + */ + if (netif == NULL) { + /* remote port is DHCP server? */ + if (IPH_PROTO(iphdr) == IP_PROTO_UDP) { + const struct udp_hdr *udphdr = (const struct udp_hdr *)((const u8_t *)iphdr + iphdr_hlen); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ip4_input: UDP packet to DHCP client port %" U16_F "\n", + lwip_ntohs(udphdr->dest))); + + if (IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSED_PORT(udphdr->dest)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ip4_input: DHCP packet accepted.\n")); + netif = inp; + check_ip_src = 0; + } + } + } + +#endif /* IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING */ + + /* broadcast or multicast packet source address? Compliant with RFC 1122: 3.2.1.3 */ +#if LWIP_IGMP || IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING + + if (check_ip_src +#if IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING + /* DHCP servers need 0.0.0.0 to be allowed as source address (RFC 1.1.2.2: 3.2.1.3/a) */ + && !ip4_addr_isany_val(*ip4_current_src_addr()) +#endif /* IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING */ + ) +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING */ + { + if ((ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_src_addr(), inp)) || + (ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip4_current_src_addr()))) { + /* packet source is not valid */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("ip4_input: packet source is not valid.\n")); + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + pbuf_free(p); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinaddrerrors); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindiscards); + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* packet not for us? */ + if (netif == NULL) { + /* packet not for us, route or discard */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ip4_input: packet not for us.\n")); +#if IP_FORWARD + + /* non-broadcast packet? */ + if (!ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_dest_addr(), inp)) { + /* try to forward IP packet on (other) interfaces */ + ip4_forward(p, (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload, inp); + } else +#endif /* IP_FORWARD */ + { + IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinaddrerrors); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindiscards); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* packet consists of multiple fragments? */ + if ((IPH_OFFSET(iphdr) & PP_HTONS(IP_OFFMASK | IP_MF)) != 0) { +#if IP_REASSEMBLY /* packet fragment reassembly code present? */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("IP packet is a fragment (id=0x%04" X16_F " tot_len=%" U16_F " len=%" U16_F " MF=%" U16_F " offset=%" U16_F "), calling ip4_reass()\n", + lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(iphdr)), p->tot_len, lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(iphdr)), (u16_t) !!(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr) & PP_HTONS(IP_MF)), (u16_t)((lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) & IP_OFFMASK) * 8))); + /* reassemble the packet*/ + p = ip4_reass(p); + + /* packet not fully reassembled yet? */ + if (p == NULL) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + iphdr = (const struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; +#else /* IP_REASSEMBLY == 0, no packet fragment reassembly code present */ + pbuf_free(p); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("IP packet dropped since it was fragmented (0x%" X16_F ") (while IP_REASSEMBLY == 0).\n", + lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)))); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.opterr); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); + /* unsupported protocol feature */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinunknownprotos); + return ERR_OK; +#endif /* IP_REASSEMBLY */ + } + +#if IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED == 0 /* no support for IP options in the IP header? */ + +#if LWIP_IGMP + + /* there is an extra "router alert" option in IGMP messages which we allow for but do not police */ + if ((iphdr_hlen > IP_HLEN) && (IPH_PROTO(iphdr) != IP_PROTO_IGMP)) { +#else + + if (iphdr_hlen > IP_HLEN) { +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("IP packet dropped since there were IP options (while IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED == 0).\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.opterr); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); + /* unsupported protocol feature */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinunknownprotos); + return ERR_OK; + } + +#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED == 0 */ + + /* send to upper layers */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_input: \n")); + ip4_debug_print(p); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_input: p->len %" U16_F " p->tot_len %" U16_F "\n", p->len, p->tot_len)); + + ip_data.current_netif = netif; + ip_data.current_input_netif = inp; + ip_data.current_ip4_header = iphdr; + ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = IPH_HL_BYTES(iphdr); + +#if LWIP_RAW + /* raw input did not eat the packet? */ + raw_status = raw_input(p, inp); + + if (raw_status != RAW_INPUT_EATEN) +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ + { + pbuf_remove_header(p, iphdr_hlen); /* Move to payload, no check necessary. */ + + switch (IPH_PROTO(iphdr)) { +#if LWIP_UDP + + case IP_PROTO_UDP: +#if LWIP_UDPLITE + case IP_PROTO_UDPLITE: +#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindelivers); + udp_input(p, inp); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + case IP_PROTO_TCP: + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindelivers); + tcp_input(p, inp); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_ICMP + + case IP_PROTO_ICMP: + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindelivers); + icmp_input(p, inp); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ +#if LWIP_IGMP + + case IP_PROTO_IGMP: + igmp_input(p, inp, ip4_current_dest_addr()); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + + default: +#if LWIP_RAW + if (raw_status == RAW_INPUT_DELIVERED) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipindelivers); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ + { +#if LWIP_ICMP + + /* send ICMP destination protocol unreachable unless is was a broadcast */ + if (!ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip4_current_dest_addr(), netif) && + !ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip4_current_dest_addr())) { + pbuf_header_force(p, (s16_t)iphdr_hlen); /* Move to ip header, no check necessary. */ + icmp_dest_unreach(p, ICMP_DUR_PROTO); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("Unsupported transport protocol %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)IPH_PROTO(iphdr))); + + IP_STATS_INC(ip.proterr); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipinunknownprotos); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + break; + } + } + + /* @todo: this is not really necessary... */ + ip_data.current_netif = NULL; + ip_data.current_input_netif = NULL; + ip_data.current_ip4_header = NULL; + ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = 0; + ip4_addr_set_any(ip4_current_src_addr()); + ip4_addr_set_any(ip4_current_dest_addr()); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Sends an IP packet on a network interface. This function constructs + * the IP header and calculates the IP header checksum. If the source + * IP address is NULL, the IP address of the outgoing network + * interface is filled in as source address. + * If the destination IP address is LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p is assumed to already + * include an IP header and p->payload points to it instead of the data. + * + * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next + protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an + IP header and p->payload points to that IP header) + * @param src the source IP address to send from (if src == IP4_ADDR_ANY, the + * IP address of the netif used to send is used as source address) + * @param dest the destination IP address to send the packet to + * @param ttl the TTL value to be set in the IP header + * @param tos the TOS value to be set in the IP header + * @param proto the PROTOCOL to be set in the IP header + * @param netif the netif on which to send this packet + * @return ERR_OK if the packet was sent OK + * ERR_BUF if p doesn't have enough space for IP/LINK headers + * returns errors returned by netif->output + * + * @note ip_id: RFC791 "some host may be able to simply use + * unique identifiers independent of destination" + */ +err_t ip4_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, + u8_t proto, struct netif *netif) +{ +#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND + return ip4_output_if_opt(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif, NULL, 0); +} + +/** + * Same as ip_output_if() but with the possibility to include IP options: + * + * @ param ip_options pointer to the IP options, copied into the IP header + * @ param optlen length of ip_options + */ +err_t ip4_output_if_opt(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif, void *ip_options, + u16_t optlen) +{ +#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ + const ip4_addr_t *src_used = src; + + if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { + if (ip4_addr_isany(src)) { + src_used = netif_ip4_addr(netif); + } + } + +#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND + return ip4_output_if_opt_src(p, src_used, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif, + ip_options, optlen); +#else /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ + return ip4_output_if_src(p, src_used, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif); +#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ +} + +/** + * Same as ip_output_if() but 'src' address is not replaced by netif address + * when it is 'any'. + */ +err_t ip4_output_if_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, + u8_t proto, struct netif *netif) +{ +#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND + return ip4_output_if_opt_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif, NULL, 0); +} + +/** + * Same as ip_output_if_opt() but 'src' address is not replaced by netif address + * when it is 'any'. + */ +err_t ip4_output_if_opt_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif, void *ip_options, + u16_t optlen) +{ +#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ + struct ip_hdr *iphdr; + ip4_addr_t dest_addr; +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE + u32_t chk_sum = 0; +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); + + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutrequests); + + /* Should the IP header be generated or is it already included in p? */ + if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { + u16_t ip_hlen = IP_HLEN; +#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND + u16_t optlen_aligned = 0; + + if (optlen != 0) { +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE + int i; +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + + if (optlen > (IP_HLEN_MAX - IP_HLEN)) { + /* optlen too long */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_output_if_opt: optlen too long\n")); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutdiscards); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* round up to a multiple of 4 */ + optlen_aligned = (u16_t)((optlen + 3) & ~3); + ip_hlen = (u16_t)(ip_hlen + optlen_aligned); + + /* First write in the IP options */ + if (pbuf_add_header(p, optlen_aligned)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_output_if_opt: not enough room for IP options in pbuf\n")); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutdiscards); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + MEMCPY(p->payload, ip_options, optlen); + + if (optlen < optlen_aligned) { + /* zero the remaining bytes */ + memset(((char *)p->payload) + optlen, 0, (size_t)(optlen_aligned - optlen)); + } + +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE + + for (i = 0; i < optlen_aligned / 2; i++) { + chk_sum += ((u16_t *)p->payload)[i]; + } + +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + } + +#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ + + /* generate IP header */ + if (pbuf_add_header(p, IP_HLEN)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_output: not enough room for IP header in pbuf\n")); + + IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutdiscards); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct ip_hdr", + (p->len >= sizeof(struct ip_hdr))); + + IPH_TTL_SET(iphdr, ttl); + IPH_PROTO_SET(iphdr, proto); +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE + chk_sum += PP_NTOHS(proto | (ttl << 8)); +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + + /* dest cannot be NULL here */ + ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->dest, *dest); +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE + chk_sum += ip4_addr_get_u32(&iphdr->dest) & 0xFFFF; + chk_sum += ip4_addr_get_u32(&iphdr->dest) >> 16; +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + + IPH_VHL_SET(iphdr, 4, ip_hlen / 4); + IPH_TOS_SET(iphdr, tos); +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE + chk_sum += PP_NTOHS(tos | (iphdr->_v_hl << 8)); +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + IPH_LEN_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(p->tot_len)); +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE + chk_sum += iphdr->_len; +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + IPH_OFFSET_SET(iphdr, 0); + IPH_ID_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(ip_id)); +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE + chk_sum += iphdr->_id; +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + ++ip_id; + + if (src == NULL) { + ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->src, *IP4_ADDR_ANY4); + } else { + /* src cannot be NULL here */ + ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->src, *src); + } + +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE + chk_sum += ip4_addr_get_u32(&iphdr->src) & 0xFFFF; + chk_sum += ip4_addr_get_u32(&iphdr->src) >> 16; + chk_sum = (chk_sum >> 16) + (chk_sum & 0xFFFF); + chk_sum = (chk_sum >> 16) + chk_sum; + chk_sum = ~chk_sum; + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) + { + iphdr->_chksum = (u16_t)chk_sum; /* network order */ + } +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF + else + { + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF*/ +#else /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) + { + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, ip_hlen)); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP */ +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP_INLINE */ + } else { + /* IP header already included in p */ + if (p->len < IP_HLEN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip4_output: LWIP_IP_HDRINCL but pbuf is too short\n")); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.err); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipoutdiscards); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + ip4_addr_copy(dest_addr, iphdr->dest); + dest = &dest_addr; + } + + IP_STATS_INC(ip.xmit); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_output_if: %c%c%" U16_F "\n", netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + ip4_debug_print(p); + +#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK + + if (ip4_addr_cmp(dest, netif_ip4_addr(netif)) +#if !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + || ip4_addr_isloopback(dest) +#endif /* !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + ) { + /* Packet to self, enqueue it for loopback */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("netif_loop_output()")); + return netif_loop_output(netif, p); + } + +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + + if ((p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP) != 0) { + netif_loop_output(netif, p); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ +#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ +#if IP_FRAG + + /* don't fragment if interface has mtu set to 0 [loopif] */ + if (netif->mtu && (p->tot_len > netif->mtu)) { + return ip4_frag(p, netif, dest); + } + +#endif /* IP_FRAG */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_output_if: call netif->output()\n")); + return netif->output(netif, p, dest); +} + +/** + * Simple interface to ip_output_if. It finds the outgoing network + * interface and calls upon ip_output_if to do the actual work. + * + * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next + protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an + IP header and p->payload points to that IP header) + * @param src the source IP address to send from (if src == IP4_ADDR_ANY, the + * IP address of the netif used to send is used as source address) + * @param dest the destination IP address to send the packet to + * @param ttl the TTL value to be set in the IP header + * @param tos the TOS value to be set in the IP header + * @param proto the PROTOCOL to be set in the IP header + * + * @return ERR_RTE if no route is found + * see ip_output_if() for more return values + */ +err_t ip4_output(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto) +{ + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); + + if ((netif = ip4_route_src(src, dest)) == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_output: No route to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(dest), ip4_addr2_16(dest), ip4_addr3_16(dest), ip4_addr4_16(dest))); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.rterr); + return ERR_RTE; + } + + return ip4_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif); +} + +#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS +/** Like ip_output, but takes and addr_hint pointer that is passed on to netif->addr_hint + * before calling ip_output_if. + * + * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next + protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an + IP header and p->payload points to that IP header) + * @param src the source IP address to send from (if src == IP4_ADDR_ANY, the + * IP address of the netif used to send is used as source address) + * @param dest the destination IP address to send the packet to + * @param ttl the TTL value to be set in the IP header + * @param tos the TOS value to be set in the IP header + * @param proto the PROTOCOL to be set in the IP header + * @param netif_hint netif output hint pointer set to netif->hint before + * calling ip_output_if() + * + * @return ERR_RTE if no route is found + * see ip_output_if() for more return values + */ +err_t ip4_output_hinted(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif_hint *netif_hint) +{ + struct netif *netif; + err_t err; + + LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); + + if ((netif = ip4_route_src(src, dest)) == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("ip4_output: No route to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + ip4_addr1_16(dest), ip4_addr2_16(dest), ip4_addr3_16(dest), ip4_addr4_16(dest))); + IP_STATS_INC(ip.rterr); + return ERR_RTE; + } + + NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, netif_hint); + err = ip4_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif); + NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); + + return err; +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS*/ + +#if IP_DEBUG +/* Print an IP header by using LWIP_DEBUGF + * @param p an IP packet, p->payload pointing to the IP header + */ +void ip4_debug_print(struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct ip_hdr *iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("IP header:\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("|%2" S16_F " |%2" S16_F " | 0x%02" X16_F " | %5" U16_F " | (v, hl, tos, len)\n", + (u16_t)IPH_V(iphdr), + (u16_t)IPH_HL(iphdr), + (u16_t)IPH_TOS(iphdr), + lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(iphdr)))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " |%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "| %4" U16_F " | (id, flags, offset)\n", + lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(iphdr)), + (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) >> 15 & 1), + (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) >> 14 & 1), + (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) >> 13 & 1), + (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)) & IP_OFFMASK))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("| %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | 0x%04" X16_F " | (ttl, proto, chksum)\n", + (u16_t)IPH_TTL(iphdr), + (u16_t)IPH_PROTO(iphdr), + lwip_ntohs(IPH_CHKSUM(iphdr)))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("| %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | (src)\n", + ip4_addr1_16_val(iphdr->src), + ip4_addr2_16_val(iphdr->src), + ip4_addr3_16_val(iphdr->src), + ip4_addr4_16_val(iphdr->src))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("| %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | (dest)\n", + ip4_addr1_16_val(iphdr->dest), + ip4_addr2_16_val(iphdr->dest), + ip4_addr3_16_val(iphdr->dest), + ip4_addr4_16_val(iphdr->dest))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); +} +#endif /* IP_DEBUG */ + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c index 5729085a..5728edc6 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_addr.c @@ -1,342 +1,342 @@ -/** - * @file - * This is the IPv4 address tools implementation. - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -/* used by IP4_ADDR_ANY and IP_ADDR_BROADCAST in ip_addr.h */ -const ip_addr_t ip_addr_any = IPADDR4_INIT(IPADDR_ANY); -const ip_addr_t ip_addr_broadcast = IPADDR4_INIT(IPADDR_BROADCAST); - -/** - * Determine if an address is a broadcast address on a network interface - * - * @param addr address to be checked - * @param netif the network interface against which the address is checked - * @return returns non-zero if the address is a broadcast address - */ -u8_t ip4_addr_isbroadcast_u32(u32_t addr, const struct netif *netif) -{ - ip4_addr_t ipaddr; - ip4_addr_set_u32(&ipaddr, addr); - - /* all ones (broadcast) or all zeroes (old skool broadcast) */ - if ((~addr == IPADDR_ANY) || - (addr == IPADDR_ANY)) { - return 1; - /* no broadcast support on this network interface? */ - } else if ((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST) == 0) { - /* the given address cannot be a broadcast address - * nor can we check against any broadcast addresses */ - return 0; - /* address matches network interface address exactly? => no broadcast */ - } else if (addr == ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - return 0; - /* on the same (sub) network... */ - } else if (ip4_addr_netcmp(&ipaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)) - /* ...and host identifier bits are all ones? =>... */ - && ((addr & ~ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif))) == - (IPADDR_BROADCAST & ~ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif))))) { - /* => network broadcast address */ - return 1; - } else { - return 0; - } -} - -/** Checks if a netmask is valid (starting with ones, then only zeros) - * - * @param netmask the IPv4 netmask to check (in network byte order!) - * @return 1 if the netmask is valid, 0 if it is not - */ -u8_t ip4_addr_netmask_valid(u32_t netmask) -{ - u32_t mask; - u32_t nm_hostorder = lwip_htonl(netmask); - - /* first, check for the first zero */ - for (mask = 1UL << 31; mask != 0; mask >>= 1) { - if ((nm_hostorder & mask) == 0) { - break; - } - } - - /* then check that there is no one */ - for (; mask != 0; mask >>= 1) { - if ((nm_hostorder & mask) != 0) { - /* there is a one after the first zero -> invalid */ - return 0; - } - } - - /* no one after the first zero -> valid */ - return 1; -} - -/** - * Ascii internet address interpretation routine. - * The value returned is in network order. - * - * @param cp IP address in ascii representation (e.g. "127.0.0.1") - * @return ip address in network order - */ -u32_t ipaddr_addr(const char *cp) -{ - ip4_addr_t val; - - if (ip4addr_aton(cp, &val)) { - return ip4_addr_get_u32(&val); - } - - return (IPADDR_NONE); -} - -/** - * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation - * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address. - * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not. - * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which - * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address. - * - * @param cp IP address in ascii representation (e.g. "127.0.0.1") - * @param addr pointer to which to save the ip address in network order - * @return 1 if cp could be converted to addr, 0 on failure - */ -int ip4addr_aton(const char *cp, ip4_addr_t *addr) -{ - u32_t val; - u8_t base; - char c; - u32_t parts[4]; - u32_t *pp = parts; - - c = *cp; - - for (;;) { - /* - * Collect number up to ``.''. - * Values are specified as for C: - * 0x=hex, 0=octal, 1-9=decimal. - */ - if (!lwip_isdigit(c)) { - return 0; - } - - val = 0; - base = 10; - - if (c == '0') { - c = *++cp; - - if (c == 'x' || c == 'X') { - base = 16; - c = *++cp; - } else { - base = 8; - } - } - - for (;;) { - if (lwip_isdigit(c)) { - val = (val * base) + (u32_t)(c - '0'); - c = *++cp; - } else if (base == 16 && lwip_isxdigit(c)) { - val = (val << 4) | (u32_t)(c + 10 - (lwip_islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A')); - c = *++cp; - } else { - break; - } - } - - if (c == '.') { - /* - * Internet format: - * a.b.c.d - * a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits) - * a.b (with b treated as 24 bits) - */ - if (pp >= parts + 3) { - return 0; - } - - *pp++ = val; - c = *++cp; - } else { - break; - } - } - - /* - * Check for trailing characters. - */ - if (c != '\0' && !lwip_isspace(c)) { - return 0; - } - - /* - * Concoct the address according to - * the number of parts specified. - */ - switch (pp - parts + 1) { - case 0: - return 0; /* initial nondigit */ - - case 1: /* a -- 32 bits */ - break; - - case 2: /* a.b -- 8.24 bits */ - if (val > 0xffffffUL) { - return 0; - } - - if (parts[0] > 0xff) { - return 0; - } - - val |= parts[0] << 24; - break; - - case 3: /* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */ - if (val > 0xffff) { - return 0; - } - - if ((parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff)) { - return 0; - } - - val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16); - break; - - case 4: /* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */ - if (val > 0xff) { - return 0; - } - - if ((parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff)) { - return 0; - } - - val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8); - break; - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("unhandled", 0); - break; - } - - if (addr) { - ip4_addr_set_u32(addr, lwip_htonl(val)); - } - - return 1; -} - -/** - * Convert numeric IP address into decimal dotted ASCII representation. - * returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! - * - * @param addr ip address in network order to convert - * @return pointer to a global static (!) buffer that holds the ASCII - * representation of addr - */ -char *ip4addr_ntoa(const ip4_addr_t *addr) -{ - static char str[IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX]; - return ip4addr_ntoa_r(addr, str, IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX); -} - -/** - * Same as ip4addr_ntoa, but reentrant since a user-supplied buffer is used. - * - * @param addr ip address in network order to convert - * @param buf target buffer where the string is stored - * @param buflen length of buf - * @return either pointer to buf which now holds the ASCII - * representation of addr or NULL if buf was too small - */ -char *ip4addr_ntoa_r(const ip4_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen) -{ - u32_t s_addr; - char inv[3]; - char *rp; - u8_t *ap; - u8_t rem; - u8_t n; - u8_t i; - int len = 0; - - s_addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(addr); - - rp = buf; - ap = (u8_t *)&s_addr; - - for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) { - i = 0; - - do { - rem = *ap % (u8_t)10; - *ap /= (u8_t)10; - inv[i++] = (char)('0' + rem); - } while (*ap); - - while (i--) { - if (len++ >= buflen) { - return NULL; - } - - *rp++ = inv[i]; - } - - if (len++ >= buflen) { - return NULL; - } - - *rp++ = '.'; - ap++; - } - - *--rp = 0; - return buf; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +/** + * @file + * This is the IPv4 address tools implementation. + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +/* used by IP4_ADDR_ANY and IP_ADDR_BROADCAST in ip_addr.h */ +const ip_addr_t ip_addr_any = IPADDR4_INIT(IPADDR_ANY); +const ip_addr_t ip_addr_broadcast = IPADDR4_INIT(IPADDR_BROADCAST); + +/** + * Determine if an address is a broadcast address on a network interface + * + * @param addr address to be checked + * @param netif the network interface against which the address is checked + * @return returns non-zero if the address is a broadcast address + */ +u8_t ip4_addr_isbroadcast_u32(u32_t addr, const struct netif *netif) +{ + ip4_addr_t ipaddr; + ip4_addr_set_u32(&ipaddr, addr); + + /* all ones (broadcast) or all zeroes (old skool broadcast) */ + if ((~addr == IPADDR_ANY) || + (addr == IPADDR_ANY)) { + return 1; + /* no broadcast support on this network interface? */ + } else if ((netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST) == 0) { + /* the given address cannot be a broadcast address + * nor can we check against any broadcast addresses */ + return 0; + /* address matches network interface address exactly? => no broadcast */ + } else if (addr == ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + return 0; + /* on the same (sub) network... */ + } else if (ip4_addr_netcmp(&ipaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif), netif_ip4_netmask(netif)) + /* ...and host identifier bits are all ones? =>... */ + && ((addr & ~ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif))) == + (IPADDR_BROADCAST & ~ip4_addr_get_u32(netif_ip4_netmask(netif))))) { + /* => network broadcast address */ + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +/** Checks if a netmask is valid (starting with ones, then only zeros) + * + * @param netmask the IPv4 netmask to check (in network byte order!) + * @return 1 if the netmask is valid, 0 if it is not + */ +u8_t ip4_addr_netmask_valid(u32_t netmask) +{ + u32_t mask; + u32_t nm_hostorder = lwip_htonl(netmask); + + /* first, check for the first zero */ + for (mask = 1UL << 31; mask != 0; mask >>= 1) { + if ((nm_hostorder & mask) == 0) { + break; + } + } + + /* then check that there is no one */ + for (; mask != 0; mask >>= 1) { + if ((nm_hostorder & mask) != 0) { + /* there is a one after the first zero -> invalid */ + return 0; + } + } + + /* no one after the first zero -> valid */ + return 1; +} + +/** + * Ascii internet address interpretation routine. + * The value returned is in network order. + * + * @param cp IP address in ascii representation (e.g. "127.0.0.1") + * @return ip address in network order + */ +u32_t ipaddr_addr(const char *cp) +{ + ip4_addr_t val; + + if (ip4addr_aton(cp, &val)) { + return ip4_addr_get_u32(&val); + } + + return (IPADDR_NONE); +} + +/** + * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation + * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address. + * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not. + * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which + * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address. + * + * @param cp IP address in ascii representation (e.g. "127.0.0.1") + * @param addr pointer to which to save the ip address in network order + * @return 1 if cp could be converted to addr, 0 on failure + */ +int ip4addr_aton(const char *cp, ip4_addr_t *addr) +{ + u32_t val; + u8_t base; + char c; + u32_t parts[4]; + u32_t *pp = parts; + + c = *cp; + + for (;;) { + /* + * Collect number up to ``.''. + * Values are specified as for C: + * 0x=hex, 0=octal, 1-9=decimal. + */ + if (!lwip_isdigit(c)) { + return 0; + } + + val = 0; + base = 10; + + if (c == '0') { + c = *++cp; + + if (c == 'x' || c == 'X') { + base = 16; + c = *++cp; + } else { + base = 8; + } + } + + for (;;) { + if (lwip_isdigit(c)) { + val = (val * base) + (u32_t)(c - '0'); + c = *++cp; + } else if (base == 16 && lwip_isxdigit(c)) { + val = (val << 4) | (u32_t)(c + 10 - (lwip_islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A')); + c = *++cp; + } else { + break; + } + } + + if (c == '.') { + /* + * Internet format: + * a.b.c.d + * a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits) + * a.b (with b treated as 24 bits) + */ + if (pp >= parts + 3) { + return 0; + } + + *pp++ = val; + c = *++cp; + } else { + break; + } + } + + /* + * Check for trailing characters. + */ + if (c != '\0' && !lwip_isspace(c)) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * Concoct the address according to + * the number of parts specified. + */ + switch (pp - parts + 1) { + case 0: + return 0; /* initial nondigit */ + + case 1: /* a -- 32 bits */ + break; + + case 2: /* a.b -- 8.24 bits */ + if (val > 0xffffffUL) { + return 0; + } + + if (parts[0] > 0xff) { + return 0; + } + + val |= parts[0] << 24; + break; + + case 3: /* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */ + if (val > 0xffff) { + return 0; + } + + if ((parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff)) { + return 0; + } + + val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16); + break; + + case 4: /* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */ + if (val > 0xff) { + return 0; + } + + if ((parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff)) { + return 0; + } + + val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8); + break; + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("unhandled", 0); + break; + } + + if (addr) { + ip4_addr_set_u32(addr, lwip_htonl(val)); + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Convert numeric IP address into decimal dotted ASCII representation. + * returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! + * + * @param addr ip address in network order to convert + * @return pointer to a global static (!) buffer that holds the ASCII + * representation of addr + */ +char *ip4addr_ntoa(const ip4_addr_t *addr) +{ + static char str[IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX]; + return ip4addr_ntoa_r(addr, str, IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX); +} + +/** + * Same as ip4addr_ntoa, but reentrant since a user-supplied buffer is used. + * + * @param addr ip address in network order to convert + * @param buf target buffer where the string is stored + * @param buflen length of buf + * @return either pointer to buf which now holds the ASCII + * representation of addr or NULL if buf was too small + */ +char *ip4addr_ntoa_r(const ip4_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen) +{ + u32_t s_addr; + char inv[3]; + char *rp; + u8_t *ap; + u8_t rem; + u8_t n; + u8_t i; + int len = 0; + + s_addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(addr); + + rp = buf; + ap = (u8_t *)&s_addr; + + for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) { + i = 0; + + do { + rem = *ap % (u8_t)10; + *ap /= (u8_t)10; + inv[i++] = (char)('0' + rem); + } while (*ap); + + while (i--) { + if (len++ >= buflen) { + return NULL; + } + + *rp++ = inv[i]; + } + + if (len++ >= buflen) { + return NULL; + } + + *rp++ = '.'; + ap++; + } + + *--rp = 0; + return buf; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c index 5d4877b8..8249d562 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv4/ip4_frag.c @@ -1,957 +1,957 @@ -/** - * @file - * This is the IPv4 packet segmentation and reassembly implementation. - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Jani Monoses - * Simon Goldschmidt - * original reassembly code by Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -#include "lwip/ip4_frag.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/icmp.h" - -#include - -#if IP_REASSEMBLY -/** - * The IP reassembly code currently has the following limitations: - * - IP header options are not supported - * - fragments must not overlap (e.g. due to different routes), - * currently, overlapping or duplicate fragments are thrown away - * if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP=1 (the default)! - * - * @todo: work with IP header options - */ - -/** Setting this to 0, you can turn off checking the fragments for overlapping - * regions. The code gets a little smaller. Only use this if you know that - * overlapping won't occur on your network! */ -#ifndef IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP -#define IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP 1 -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - -/** Set to 0 to prevent freeing the oldest datagram when the reassembly buffer is - * full (IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS pbufs are enqueued). The code gets a little smaller. - * Datagrams will be freed by timeout only. Especially useful when MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA - * is set to 1, so one datagram can be reassembled at a time, only. */ -#ifndef IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST -#define IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST 1 -#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ - -#define IP_REASS_FLAG_LASTFRAG 0x01 - -#define IP_REASS_VALIDATE_TELEGRAM_FINISHED 1 -#define IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_QUEUED 0 -#define IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED -1 - -/** This is a helper struct which holds the starting - * offset and the ending offset of this fragment to - * easily chain the fragments. - * It has the same packing requirements as the IP header, since it replaces - * the IP header in memory in incoming fragments (after copying it) to keep - * track of the various fragments. (-> If the IP header doesn't need packing, - * this struct doesn't need packing, too.) - */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip_reass_helper { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(struct pbuf *next_pbuf); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t start); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t end); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#define IP_ADDRESSES_AND_ID_MATCH(iphdrA, iphdrB) \ - (ip4_addr_cmp(&(iphdrA)->src, &(iphdrB)->src) && \ - ip4_addr_cmp(&(iphdrA)->dest, &(iphdrB)->dest) && \ - IPH_ID(iphdrA) == IPH_ID(iphdrB)) ? \ - 1 : \ - 0 - -/* global variables */ -static struct ip_reassdata *reassdatagrams; -static u16_t ip_reass_pbufcount; - -/* function prototypes */ -static void ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct ip_reassdata *prev); -static int ip_reass_free_complete_datagram(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct ip_reassdata *prev); - -/** - * Reassembly timer base function - * for both NO_SYS == 0 and 1 (!). - * - * Should be called every 1000 msec (defined by IP_TMR_INTERVAL). - */ -void ip_reass_tmr(void) -{ - struct ip_reassdata *r, *prev = NULL; - - r = reassdatagrams; - - while (r != NULL) { - /* Decrement the timer. Once it reaches 0, - * clean up the incomplete fragment assembly */ - if (r->timer > 0) { - r->timer--; - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip_reass_tmr: timer dec %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)r->timer)); - prev = r; - r = r->next; - } else { - /* reassembly timed out */ - struct ip_reassdata *tmp; - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip_reass_tmr: timer timed out\n")); - tmp = r; - /* get the next pointer before freeing */ - r = r->next; - /* free the helper struct and all enqueued pbufs */ - ip_reass_free_complete_datagram(tmp, prev); - } - } -} - -/** - * Free a datagram (struct ip_reassdata) and all its pbufs. - * Updates the total count of enqueued pbufs (ip_reass_pbufcount), - * SNMP counters and sends an ICMP time exceeded packet. - * - * @param ipr datagram to free - * @param prev the previous datagram in the linked list - * @return the number of pbufs freed - */ -static int ip_reass_free_complete_datagram(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct ip_reassdata *prev) -{ - u16_t pbufs_freed = 0; - u16_t clen; - struct pbuf *p; - struct ip_reass_helper *iprh; - - LWIP_ASSERT("prev != ipr", prev != ipr); - - if (prev != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("prev->next == ipr", prev->next == ipr); - } - - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipreasmfails); -#if LWIP_ICMP - iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload; - - if (iprh->start == 0) { - /* The first fragment was received, send ICMP time exceeded. */ - /* First, de-queue the first pbuf from r->p. */ - p = ipr->p; - ipr->p = iprh->next_pbuf; - /* Then, copy the original header into it. */ - SMEMCPY(p->payload, &ipr->iphdr, IP_HLEN); - icmp_time_exceeded(p, ICMP_TE_FRAG); - clen = pbuf_clen(p); - LWIP_ASSERT("pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff", pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff); - pbufs_freed = (u16_t)(pbufs_freed + clen); - pbuf_free(p); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ - - /* First, free all received pbufs. The individual pbufs need to be released - separately as they have not yet been chained */ - p = ipr->p; - - while (p != NULL) { - struct pbuf *pcur; - iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)p->payload; - pcur = p; - /* get the next pointer before freeing */ - p = iprh->next_pbuf; - clen = pbuf_clen(pcur); - LWIP_ASSERT("pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff", pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff); - pbufs_freed = (u16_t)(pbufs_freed + clen); - pbuf_free(pcur); - } - - /* Then, unchain the struct ip_reassdata from the list and free it. */ - ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(ipr, prev); - LWIP_ASSERT("ip_reass_pbufcount >= pbufs_freed", ip_reass_pbufcount >= pbufs_freed); - ip_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip_reass_pbufcount - pbufs_freed); - - return pbufs_freed; -} - -#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST -/** - * Free the oldest datagram to make room for enqueueing new fragments. - * The datagram 'fraghdr' belongs to is not freed! - * - * @param fraghdr IP header of the current fragment - * @param pbufs_needed number of pbufs needed to enqueue - * (used for freeing other datagrams if not enough space) - * @return the number of pbufs freed - */ -static int ip_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(struct ip_hdr *fraghdr, int pbufs_needed) -{ - /* @todo Can't we simply remove the last datagram in the - * linked list behind reassdatagrams? - */ - struct ip_reassdata *r, *oldest, *prev, *oldest_prev; - int pbufs_freed = 0, pbufs_freed_current; - int other_datagrams; - - /* Free datagrams until being allowed to enqueue 'pbufs_needed' pbufs, - * but don't free the datagram that 'fraghdr' belongs to! */ - do { - oldest = NULL; - prev = NULL; - oldest_prev = NULL; - other_datagrams = 0; - r = reassdatagrams; - - while (r != NULL) { - if (!IP_ADDRESSES_AND_ID_MATCH(&r->iphdr, fraghdr)) { - /* Not the same datagram as fraghdr */ - other_datagrams++; - - if (oldest == NULL) { - oldest = r; - oldest_prev = prev; - } else if (r->timer <= oldest->timer) { - /* older than the previous oldest */ - oldest = r; - oldest_prev = prev; - } - } - - if (r->next != NULL) { - prev = r; - } - - r = r->next; - } - - if (oldest != NULL) { - pbufs_freed_current = ip_reass_free_complete_datagram(oldest, oldest_prev); - pbufs_freed += pbufs_freed_current; - } - } while ((pbufs_freed < pbufs_needed) && (other_datagrams > 1)); - - return pbufs_freed; -} -#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ - -/** - * Enqueues a new fragment into the fragment queue - * @param fraghdr points to the new fragments IP hdr - * @param clen number of pbufs needed to enqueue (used for freeing other datagrams if not enough space) - * @return A pointer to the queue location into which the fragment was enqueued - */ -static struct ip_reassdata *ip_reass_enqueue_new_datagram(struct ip_hdr *fraghdr, int clen) -{ - struct ip_reassdata *ipr; -#if !IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(clen); -#endif - - /* No matching previous fragment found, allocate a new reassdata struct */ - ipr = (struct ip_reassdata *)memp_malloc(MEMP_REASSDATA); - - if (ipr == NULL) { -#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST - - if (ip_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(fraghdr, clen) >= clen) { - ipr = (struct ip_reassdata *)memp_malloc(MEMP_REASSDATA); - } - - if (ipr == NULL) -#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ - { - IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.memerr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("Failed to alloc reassdata struct\n")); - return NULL; - } - } - - memset(ipr, 0, sizeof(struct ip_reassdata)); - ipr->timer = IP_REASS_MAXAGE; - - /* enqueue the new structure to the front of the list */ - ipr->next = reassdatagrams; - reassdatagrams = ipr; - /* copy the ip header for later tests and input */ - /* @todo: no ip options supported? */ - SMEMCPY(&(ipr->iphdr), fraghdr, IP_HLEN); - return ipr; -} - -/** - * Dequeues a datagram from the datagram queue. Doesn't deallocate the pbufs. - * @param ipr points to the queue entry to dequeue - */ -static void ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct ip_reassdata *prev) -{ - /* dequeue the reass struct */ - if (reassdatagrams == ipr) { - /* it was the first in the list */ - reassdatagrams = ipr->next; - } else { - /* it wasn't the first, so it must have a valid 'prev' */ - LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check linked list", prev != NULL); - prev->next = ipr->next; - } - - /* now we can free the ip_reassdata struct */ - memp_free(MEMP_REASSDATA, ipr); -} - -/** - * Chain a new pbuf into the pbuf list that composes the datagram. The pbuf list - * will grow over time as new pbufs are rx. - * Also checks that the datagram passes basic continuity checks (if the last - * fragment was received at least once). - * @param ipr points to the reassembly state - * @param new_p points to the pbuf for the current fragment - * @param is_last is 1 if this pbuf has MF==0 (ipr->flags not updated yet) - * @return see IP_REASS_VALIDATE_* defines - */ -static int ip_reass_chain_frag_into_datagram_and_validate(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct pbuf *new_p, int is_last) -{ - struct ip_reass_helper *iprh, *iprh_tmp, *iprh_prev = NULL; - struct pbuf *q; - u16_t offset, len; - u8_t hlen; - struct ip_hdr *fraghdr; - int valid = 1; - - /* Extract length and fragment offset from current fragment */ - fraghdr = (struct ip_hdr *)new_p->payload; - len = lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(fraghdr)); - hlen = IPH_HL_BYTES(fraghdr); - - if (hlen > len) { - /* invalid datagram */ - return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; - } - - len = (u16_t)(len - hlen); - offset = IPH_OFFSET_BYTES(fraghdr); - - /* overwrite the fragment's ip header from the pbuf with our helper struct, - * and setup the embedded helper structure. */ - /* make sure the struct ip_reass_helper fits into the IP header */ - LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct ip_reass_helper) <= IP_HLEN", - sizeof(struct ip_reass_helper) <= IP_HLEN); - iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)new_p->payload; - iprh->next_pbuf = NULL; - iprh->start = offset; - iprh->end = (u16_t)(offset + len); - - if (iprh->end < offset) { - /* u16_t overflow, cannot handle this */ - return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; - } - - /* Iterate through until we either get to the end of the list (append), - * or we find one with a larger offset (insert). */ - for (q = ipr->p; q != NULL;) { - iprh_tmp = (struct ip_reass_helper *)q->payload; - - if (iprh->start < iprh_tmp->start) { - /* the new pbuf should be inserted before this */ - iprh->next_pbuf = q; - - if (iprh_prev != NULL) { - /* not the fragment with the lowest offset */ -#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP - if ((iprh->start < iprh_prev->end) || (iprh->end > iprh_tmp->start)) { - /* fragment overlaps with previous or following, throw away */ - return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; - } - -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - iprh_prev->next_pbuf = new_p; - - if (iprh_prev->end != iprh->start) { - /* There is a fragment missing between the current - * and the previous fragment */ - valid = 0; - } - } else { -#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP - - if (iprh->end > iprh_tmp->start) { - /* fragment overlaps with following, throw away */ - return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; - } - -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - /* fragment with the lowest offset */ - ipr->p = new_p; - } - - break; - } else if (iprh->start == iprh_tmp->start) { - /* received the same datagram twice: no need to keep the datagram */ - return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; -#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP - } else if (iprh->start < iprh_tmp->end) { - /* overlap: no need to keep the new datagram */ - return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - } else { - /* Check if the fragments received so far have no holes. */ - if (iprh_prev != NULL) { - if (iprh_prev->end != iprh_tmp->start) { - /* There is a fragment missing between the current - * and the previous fragment */ - valid = 0; - } - } - } - - q = iprh_tmp->next_pbuf; - iprh_prev = iprh_tmp; - } - - /* If q is NULL, then we made it to the end of the list. Determine what to do now */ - if (q == NULL) { - if (iprh_prev != NULL) { - /* this is (for now), the fragment with the highest offset: - * chain it to the last fragment */ -#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP - LWIP_ASSERT("check fragments don't overlap", iprh_prev->end <= iprh->start); -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - iprh_prev->next_pbuf = new_p; - - if (iprh_prev->end != iprh->start) { - valid = 0; - } - } else { -#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP - LWIP_ASSERT("no previous fragment, this must be the first fragment!", - ipr->p == NULL); -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - /* this is the first fragment we ever received for this ip datagram */ - ipr->p = new_p; - } - } - - /* At this point, the validation part begins: */ - /* If we already received the last fragment */ - if (is_last || ((ipr->flags & IP_REASS_FLAG_LASTFRAG) != 0)) { - /* and had no holes so far */ - if (valid) { - /* then check if the rest of the fragments is here */ - /* Check if the queue starts with the first datagram */ - if ((ipr->p == NULL) || (((struct ip_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload)->start != 0)) { - valid = 0; - } else { - /* and check that there are no holes after this datagram */ - iprh_prev = iprh; - q = iprh->next_pbuf; - - while (q != NULL) { - iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)q->payload; - - if (iprh_prev->end != iprh->start) { - valid = 0; - break; - } - - iprh_prev = iprh; - q = iprh->next_pbuf; - } - - /* if still valid, all fragments are received - * (because to the MF==0 already arrived */ - if (valid) { - LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check", ipr->p != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check", - ((struct ip_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload) != iprh); - LWIP_ASSERT("validate_datagram:next_pbuf!=NULL", - iprh->next_pbuf == NULL); - } - } - } - - /* If valid is 0 here, there are some fragments missing in the middle - * (since MF == 0 has already arrived). Such datagrams simply time out if - * no more fragments are received... */ - return valid ? IP_REASS_VALIDATE_TELEGRAM_FINISHED : IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_QUEUED; - } - - /* If we come here, not all fragments were received, yet! */ - return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_QUEUED; /* not yet valid! */ -} - -/** - * Reassembles incoming IP fragments into an IP datagram. - * - * @param p points to a pbuf chain of the fragment - * @return NULL if reassembly is incomplete, ? otherwise - */ -struct pbuf * -ip4_reass(struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct pbuf *r; - struct ip_hdr *fraghdr; - struct ip_reassdata *ipr; - struct ip_reass_helper *iprh; - u16_t offset, len, clen; - u8_t hlen; - int valid; - int is_last; - - IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.recv); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipreasmreqds); - - fraghdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - - if (IPH_HL_BYTES(fraghdr) != IP_HLEN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip4_reass: IP options currently not supported!\n")); - IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.err); - goto nullreturn; - } - - offset = IPH_OFFSET_BYTES(fraghdr); - len = lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(fraghdr)); - hlen = IPH_HL_BYTES(fraghdr); - - if (hlen > len) { - /* invalid datagram */ - goto nullreturn; - } - - len = (u16_t)(len - hlen); - - /* Check if we are allowed to enqueue more datagrams. */ - clen = pbuf_clen(p); - - if ((ip_reass_pbufcount + clen) > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) { -#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST - - if (!ip_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(fraghdr, clen) || - ((ip_reass_pbufcount + clen) > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS)) -#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ - { - /* No datagram could be freed and still too many pbufs enqueued */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip4_reass: Overflow condition: pbufct=%d, clen=%d, MAX=%d\n", - ip_reass_pbufcount, clen, IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS)); - IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.memerr); - /* @todo: send ICMP time exceeded here? */ - /* drop this pbuf */ - goto nullreturn; - } - } - - /* Look for the datagram the fragment belongs to in the current datagram queue, - * remembering the previous in the queue for later dequeueing. */ - for (ipr = reassdatagrams; ipr != NULL; ipr = ipr->next) { - /* Check if the incoming fragment matches the one currently present - in the reassembly buffer. If so, we proceed with copying the - fragment into the buffer. */ - if (IP_ADDRESSES_AND_ID_MATCH(&ipr->iphdr, fraghdr)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip4_reass: matching previous fragment ID=%" X16_F "\n", - lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(fraghdr)))); - IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.cachehit); - break; - } - } - - if (ipr == NULL) { - /* Enqueue a new datagram into the datagram queue */ - ipr = ip_reass_enqueue_new_datagram(fraghdr, clen); - - /* Bail if unable to enqueue */ - if (ipr == NULL) { - goto nullreturn; - } - } else { - if (((lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(fraghdr)) & IP_OFFMASK) == 0) && - ((lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(&ipr->iphdr)) & IP_OFFMASK) != 0)) { - /* ipr->iphdr is not the header from the first fragment, but fraghdr is - * -> copy fraghdr into ipr->iphdr since we want to have the header - * of the first fragment (for ICMP time exceeded and later, for copying - * all options, if supported)*/ - SMEMCPY(&ipr->iphdr, fraghdr, IP_HLEN); - } - } - - /* At this point, we have either created a new entry or pointing - * to an existing one */ - - /* check for 'no more fragments', and update queue entry*/ - is_last = (IPH_OFFSET(fraghdr) & PP_NTOHS(IP_MF)) == 0; - - if (is_last) { - u16_t datagram_len = (u16_t)(offset + len); - - if ((datagram_len < offset) || (datagram_len > (0xFFFF - IP_HLEN))) { - /* u16_t overflow, cannot handle this */ - goto nullreturn_ipr; - } - } - - /* find the right place to insert this pbuf */ - /* @todo: trim pbufs if fragments are overlapping */ - valid = ip_reass_chain_frag_into_datagram_and_validate(ipr, p, is_last); - - if (valid == IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED) { - goto nullreturn_ipr; - } - - /* if we come here, the pbuf has been enqueued */ - - /* Track the current number of pbufs current 'in-flight', in order to limit - the number of fragments that may be enqueued at any one time - (overflow checked by testing against IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) */ - ip_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip_reass_pbufcount + clen); - - if (is_last) { - u16_t datagram_len = (u16_t)(offset + len); - ipr->datagram_len = datagram_len; - ipr->flags |= IP_REASS_FLAG_LASTFRAG; - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, - ("ip4_reass: last fragment seen, total len %" S16_F "\n", - ipr->datagram_len)); - } - - if (valid == IP_REASS_VALIDATE_TELEGRAM_FINISHED) { - struct ip_reassdata *ipr_prev; - /* the totally last fragment (flag more fragments = 0) was received at least - * once AND all fragments are received */ - u16_t datagram_len = (u16_t)(ipr->datagram_len + IP_HLEN); - - /* save the second pbuf before copying the header over the pointer */ - r = ((struct ip_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload)->next_pbuf; - - /* copy the original ip header back to the first pbuf */ - fraghdr = (struct ip_hdr *)(ipr->p->payload); - SMEMCPY(fraghdr, &ipr->iphdr, IP_HLEN); - IPH_LEN_SET(fraghdr, lwip_htons(datagram_len)); - IPH_OFFSET_SET(fraghdr, 0); - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(fraghdr, 0); - /* @todo: do we need to set/calculate the correct checksum? */ -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(ip_current_input_netif(), NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) - { - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(fraghdr, inet_chksum(fraghdr, IP_HLEN)); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP */ - - p = ipr->p; - - /* chain together the pbufs contained within the reass_data list. */ - while (r != NULL) { - iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)r->payload; - - /* hide the ip header for every succeeding fragment */ - pbuf_remove_header(r, IP_HLEN); - pbuf_cat(p, r); - r = iprh->next_pbuf; - } - - /* find the previous entry in the linked list */ - if (ipr == reassdatagrams) { - ipr_prev = NULL; - } else { - for (ipr_prev = reassdatagrams; ipr_prev != NULL; ipr_prev = ipr_prev->next) { - if (ipr_prev->next == ipr) { - break; - } - } - } - - /* release the sources allocate for the fragment queue entry */ - ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(ipr, ipr_prev); - - /* and adjust the number of pbufs currently queued for reassembly. */ - clen = pbuf_clen(p); - LWIP_ASSERT("ip_reass_pbufcount >= clen", ip_reass_pbufcount >= clen); - ip_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip_reass_pbufcount - clen); - - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipreasmoks); - - /* Return the pbuf chain */ - return p; - } - - /* the datagram is not (yet?) reassembled completely */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip_reass_pbufcount: %d out\n", ip_reass_pbufcount)); - return NULL; - -nullreturn_ipr: - LWIP_ASSERT("ipr != NULL", ipr != NULL); - - if (ipr->p == NULL) { - /* dropped pbuf after creating a new datagram entry: remove the entry, too */ - LWIP_ASSERT("not firstalthough just enqueued", ipr == reassdatagrams); - ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(ipr, NULL); - } - -nullreturn: - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip4_reass: nullreturn\n")); - IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.drop); - pbuf_free(p); - return NULL; -} -#endif /* IP_REASSEMBLY */ - -#if IP_FRAG -#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF -/** Allocate a new struct pbuf_custom_ref */ -static struct pbuf_custom_ref *ip_frag_alloc_pbuf_custom_ref(void) -{ - return (struct pbuf_custom_ref *)memp_malloc(MEMP_FRAG_PBUF); -} - -/** Free a struct pbuf_custom_ref */ -static void ip_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(struct pbuf_custom_ref *p) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - memp_free(MEMP_FRAG_PBUF, p); -} - -/** Free-callback function to free a 'struct pbuf_custom_ref', called by - * pbuf_free. */ -static void ipfrag_free_pbuf_custom(struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct pbuf_custom_ref *pcr = (struct pbuf_custom_ref *)p; - LWIP_ASSERT("pcr != NULL", pcr != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("pcr == p", (void *)pcr == (void *)p); - - if (pcr->original != NULL) { - pbuf_free(pcr->original); - } - - ip_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(pcr); -} -#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - -/** - * Fragment an IP datagram if too large for the netif. - * - * Chop the datagram in MTU sized chunks and send them in order - * by pointing PBUF_REFs into p. - * - * @param p ip packet to send - * @param netif the netif on which to send - * @param dest destination ip address to which to send - * - * @return ERR_OK if sent successfully, err_t otherwise - */ -err_t ip4_frag(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *dest) -{ - struct pbuf *rambuf; -#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - struct pbuf *newpbuf; - u16_t newpbuflen = 0; - u16_t left_to_copy; -#endif - struct ip_hdr *original_iphdr; - struct ip_hdr *iphdr; - const u16_t nfb = (u16_t)((netif->mtu - IP_HLEN) / 8); - u16_t left, fragsize; - u16_t ofo; - int last; - u16_t poff = IP_HLEN; - u16_t tmp; - int mf_set; - - original_iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - iphdr = original_iphdr; - - if (IPH_HL_BYTES(iphdr) != IP_HLEN) { - /* ip4_frag() does not support IP options */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - LWIP_ERROR("ip4_frag(): pbuf too short", p->len >= IP_HLEN, return ERR_VAL); - - /* Save original offset */ - tmp = lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)); - ofo = tmp & IP_OFFMASK; - /* already fragmented? if so, the last fragment we create must have MF, too */ - mf_set = tmp & IP_MF; - - left = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - IP_HLEN); - - while (left) { - /* Fill this fragment */ - fragsize = LWIP_MIN(left, (u16_t)(nfb * 8)); - -#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - rambuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, fragsize, PBUF_RAM); - - if (rambuf == NULL) { - goto memerr; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece!", - (rambuf->len == rambuf->tot_len) && (rambuf->next == NULL)); - poff += pbuf_copy_partial(p, rambuf->payload, fragsize, poff); - - /* make room for the IP header */ - if (pbuf_add_header(rambuf, IP_HLEN)) { - pbuf_free(rambuf); - goto memerr; - } - - /* fill in the IP header */ - SMEMCPY(rambuf->payload, original_iphdr, IP_HLEN); - iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)rambuf->payload; -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - /* When not using a static buffer, create a chain of pbufs. - * The first will be a PBUF_RAM holding the link and IP header. - * The rest will be PBUF_REFs mirroring the pbuf chain to be fragged, - * but limited to the size of an mtu. - */ - rambuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, IP_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); - - if (rambuf == NULL) { - goto memerr; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece!", - (rambuf->len >= (IP_HLEN))); - SMEMCPY(rambuf->payload, original_iphdr, IP_HLEN); - iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)rambuf->payload; - - left_to_copy = fragsize; - - while (left_to_copy) { - struct pbuf_custom_ref *pcr; - u16_t plen = (u16_t)(p->len - poff); - LWIP_ASSERT("p->len >= poff", p->len >= poff); - newpbuflen = LWIP_MIN(left_to_copy, plen); - - /* Is this pbuf already empty? */ - if (!newpbuflen) { - poff = 0; - p = p->next; - continue; - } - - pcr = ip_frag_alloc_pbuf_custom_ref(); - - if (pcr == NULL) { - pbuf_free(rambuf); - goto memerr; - } - - /* Mirror this pbuf, although we might not need all of it. */ - newpbuf = pbuf_alloced_custom(PBUF_RAW, newpbuflen, PBUF_REF, &pcr->pc, - (u8_t *)p->payload + poff, newpbuflen); - - if (newpbuf == NULL) { - ip_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(pcr); - pbuf_free(rambuf); - goto memerr; - } - - pbuf_ref(p); - pcr->original = p; - pcr->pc.custom_free_function = ipfrag_free_pbuf_custom; - - /* Add it to end of rambuf's chain, but using pbuf_cat, not pbuf_chain - * so that it is removed when pbuf_dechain is later called on rambuf. - */ - pbuf_cat(rambuf, newpbuf); - left_to_copy = (u16_t)(left_to_copy - newpbuflen); - - if (left_to_copy) { - poff = 0; - p = p->next; - } - } - - poff = (u16_t)(poff + newpbuflen); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - - /* Correct header */ - last = (left <= netif->mtu - IP_HLEN); - - /* Set new offset and MF flag */ - tmp = (IP_OFFMASK & (ofo)); - - if (!last || mf_set) { - /* the last fragment has MF set if the input frame had it */ - tmp = tmp | IP_MF; - } - - IPH_OFFSET_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(tmp)); - IPH_LEN_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons((u16_t)(fragsize + IP_HLEN))); - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) - { - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, IP_HLEN)); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP */ - - /* No need for separate header pbuf - we allowed room for it in rambuf - * when allocated. - */ - netif->output(netif, rambuf, dest); - IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.xmit); - - /* Unfortunately we can't reuse rambuf - the hardware may still be - * using the buffer. Instead we free it (and the ensuing chain) and - * recreate it next time round the loop. If we're lucky the hardware - * will have already sent the packet, the free will really free, and - * there will be zero memory penalty. - */ - - pbuf_free(rambuf); - left = (u16_t)(left - fragsize); - ofo = (u16_t)(ofo + nfb); - } - - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipfragoks); - return ERR_OK; -memerr: - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipfragfails); - return ERR_MEM; -} -#endif /* IP_FRAG */ - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +/** + * @file + * This is the IPv4 packet segmentation and reassembly implementation. + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Jani Monoses + * Simon Goldschmidt + * original reassembly code by Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +#include "lwip/ip4_frag.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/icmp.h" + +#include + +#if IP_REASSEMBLY +/** + * The IP reassembly code currently has the following limitations: + * - IP header options are not supported + * - fragments must not overlap (e.g. due to different routes), + * currently, overlapping or duplicate fragments are thrown away + * if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP=1 (the default)! + * + * @todo: work with IP header options + */ + +/** Setting this to 0, you can turn off checking the fragments for overlapping + * regions. The code gets a little smaller. Only use this if you know that + * overlapping won't occur on your network! */ +#ifndef IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP +#define IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP 1 +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + +/** Set to 0 to prevent freeing the oldest datagram when the reassembly buffer is + * full (IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS pbufs are enqueued). The code gets a little smaller. + * Datagrams will be freed by timeout only. Especially useful when MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA + * is set to 1, so one datagram can be reassembled at a time, only. */ +#ifndef IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST +#define IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST 1 +#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ + +#define IP_REASS_FLAG_LASTFRAG 0x01 + +#define IP_REASS_VALIDATE_TELEGRAM_FINISHED 1 +#define IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_QUEUED 0 +#define IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED -1 + +/** This is a helper struct which holds the starting + * offset and the ending offset of this fragment to + * easily chain the fragments. + * It has the same packing requirements as the IP header, since it replaces + * the IP header in memory in incoming fragments (after copying it) to keep + * track of the various fragments. (-> If the IP header doesn't need packing, + * this struct doesn't need packing, too.) + */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip_reass_helper { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(struct pbuf *next_pbuf); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t start); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t end); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#define IP_ADDRESSES_AND_ID_MATCH(iphdrA, iphdrB) \ + (ip4_addr_cmp(&(iphdrA)->src, &(iphdrB)->src) && \ + ip4_addr_cmp(&(iphdrA)->dest, &(iphdrB)->dest) && \ + IPH_ID(iphdrA) == IPH_ID(iphdrB)) ? \ + 1 : \ + 0 + +/* global variables */ +static struct ip_reassdata *reassdatagrams; +static u16_t ip_reass_pbufcount; + +/* function prototypes */ +static void ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct ip_reassdata *prev); +static int ip_reass_free_complete_datagram(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct ip_reassdata *prev); + +/** + * Reassembly timer base function + * for both NO_SYS == 0 and 1 (!). + * + * Should be called every 1000 msec (defined by IP_TMR_INTERVAL). + */ +void ip_reass_tmr(void) +{ + struct ip_reassdata *r, *prev = NULL; + + r = reassdatagrams; + + while (r != NULL) { + /* Decrement the timer. Once it reaches 0, + * clean up the incomplete fragment assembly */ + if (r->timer > 0) { + r->timer--; + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip_reass_tmr: timer dec %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)r->timer)); + prev = r; + r = r->next; + } else { + /* reassembly timed out */ + struct ip_reassdata *tmp; + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip_reass_tmr: timer timed out\n")); + tmp = r; + /* get the next pointer before freeing */ + r = r->next; + /* free the helper struct and all enqueued pbufs */ + ip_reass_free_complete_datagram(tmp, prev); + } + } +} + +/** + * Free a datagram (struct ip_reassdata) and all its pbufs. + * Updates the total count of enqueued pbufs (ip_reass_pbufcount), + * SNMP counters and sends an ICMP time exceeded packet. + * + * @param ipr datagram to free + * @param prev the previous datagram in the linked list + * @return the number of pbufs freed + */ +static int ip_reass_free_complete_datagram(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct ip_reassdata *prev) +{ + u16_t pbufs_freed = 0; + u16_t clen; + struct pbuf *p; + struct ip_reass_helper *iprh; + + LWIP_ASSERT("prev != ipr", prev != ipr); + + if (prev != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("prev->next == ipr", prev->next == ipr); + } + + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipreasmfails); +#if LWIP_ICMP + iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload; + + if (iprh->start == 0) { + /* The first fragment was received, send ICMP time exceeded. */ + /* First, de-queue the first pbuf from r->p. */ + p = ipr->p; + ipr->p = iprh->next_pbuf; + /* Then, copy the original header into it. */ + SMEMCPY(p->payload, &ipr->iphdr, IP_HLEN); + icmp_time_exceeded(p, ICMP_TE_FRAG); + clen = pbuf_clen(p); + LWIP_ASSERT("pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff", pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff); + pbufs_freed = (u16_t)(pbufs_freed + clen); + pbuf_free(p); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ + + /* First, free all received pbufs. The individual pbufs need to be released + separately as they have not yet been chained */ + p = ipr->p; + + while (p != NULL) { + struct pbuf *pcur; + iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)p->payload; + pcur = p; + /* get the next pointer before freeing */ + p = iprh->next_pbuf; + clen = pbuf_clen(pcur); + LWIP_ASSERT("pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff", pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff); + pbufs_freed = (u16_t)(pbufs_freed + clen); + pbuf_free(pcur); + } + + /* Then, unchain the struct ip_reassdata from the list and free it. */ + ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(ipr, prev); + LWIP_ASSERT("ip_reass_pbufcount >= pbufs_freed", ip_reass_pbufcount >= pbufs_freed); + ip_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip_reass_pbufcount - pbufs_freed); + + return pbufs_freed; +} + +#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST +/** + * Free the oldest datagram to make room for enqueueing new fragments. + * The datagram 'fraghdr' belongs to is not freed! + * + * @param fraghdr IP header of the current fragment + * @param pbufs_needed number of pbufs needed to enqueue + * (used for freeing other datagrams if not enough space) + * @return the number of pbufs freed + */ +static int ip_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(struct ip_hdr *fraghdr, int pbufs_needed) +{ + /* @todo Can't we simply remove the last datagram in the + * linked list behind reassdatagrams? + */ + struct ip_reassdata *r, *oldest, *prev, *oldest_prev; + int pbufs_freed = 0, pbufs_freed_current; + int other_datagrams; + + /* Free datagrams until being allowed to enqueue 'pbufs_needed' pbufs, + * but don't free the datagram that 'fraghdr' belongs to! */ + do { + oldest = NULL; + prev = NULL; + oldest_prev = NULL; + other_datagrams = 0; + r = reassdatagrams; + + while (r != NULL) { + if (!IP_ADDRESSES_AND_ID_MATCH(&r->iphdr, fraghdr)) { + /* Not the same datagram as fraghdr */ + other_datagrams++; + + if (oldest == NULL) { + oldest = r; + oldest_prev = prev; + } else if (r->timer <= oldest->timer) { + /* older than the previous oldest */ + oldest = r; + oldest_prev = prev; + } + } + + if (r->next != NULL) { + prev = r; + } + + r = r->next; + } + + if (oldest != NULL) { + pbufs_freed_current = ip_reass_free_complete_datagram(oldest, oldest_prev); + pbufs_freed += pbufs_freed_current; + } + } while ((pbufs_freed < pbufs_needed) && (other_datagrams > 1)); + + return pbufs_freed; +} +#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ + +/** + * Enqueues a new fragment into the fragment queue + * @param fraghdr points to the new fragments IP hdr + * @param clen number of pbufs needed to enqueue (used for freeing other datagrams if not enough space) + * @return A pointer to the queue location into which the fragment was enqueued + */ +static struct ip_reassdata *ip_reass_enqueue_new_datagram(struct ip_hdr *fraghdr, int clen) +{ + struct ip_reassdata *ipr; +#if !IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(clen); +#endif + + /* No matching previous fragment found, allocate a new reassdata struct */ + ipr = (struct ip_reassdata *)memp_malloc(MEMP_REASSDATA); + + if (ipr == NULL) { +#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST + + if (ip_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(fraghdr, clen) >= clen) { + ipr = (struct ip_reassdata *)memp_malloc(MEMP_REASSDATA); + } + + if (ipr == NULL) +#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ + { + IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.memerr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("Failed to alloc reassdata struct\n")); + return NULL; + } + } + + memset(ipr, 0, sizeof(struct ip_reassdata)); + ipr->timer = IP_REASS_MAXAGE; + + /* enqueue the new structure to the front of the list */ + ipr->next = reassdatagrams; + reassdatagrams = ipr; + /* copy the ip header for later tests and input */ + /* @todo: no ip options supported? */ + SMEMCPY(&(ipr->iphdr), fraghdr, IP_HLEN); + return ipr; +} + +/** + * Dequeues a datagram from the datagram queue. Doesn't deallocate the pbufs. + * @param ipr points to the queue entry to dequeue + */ +static void ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct ip_reassdata *prev) +{ + /* dequeue the reass struct */ + if (reassdatagrams == ipr) { + /* it was the first in the list */ + reassdatagrams = ipr->next; + } else { + /* it wasn't the first, so it must have a valid 'prev' */ + LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check linked list", prev != NULL); + prev->next = ipr->next; + } + + /* now we can free the ip_reassdata struct */ + memp_free(MEMP_REASSDATA, ipr); +} + +/** + * Chain a new pbuf into the pbuf list that composes the datagram. The pbuf list + * will grow over time as new pbufs are rx. + * Also checks that the datagram passes basic continuity checks (if the last + * fragment was received at least once). + * @param ipr points to the reassembly state + * @param new_p points to the pbuf for the current fragment + * @param is_last is 1 if this pbuf has MF==0 (ipr->flags not updated yet) + * @return see IP_REASS_VALIDATE_* defines + */ +static int ip_reass_chain_frag_into_datagram_and_validate(struct ip_reassdata *ipr, struct pbuf *new_p, int is_last) +{ + struct ip_reass_helper *iprh, *iprh_tmp, *iprh_prev = NULL; + struct pbuf *q; + u16_t offset, len; + u8_t hlen; + struct ip_hdr *fraghdr; + int valid = 1; + + /* Extract length and fragment offset from current fragment */ + fraghdr = (struct ip_hdr *)new_p->payload; + len = lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(fraghdr)); + hlen = IPH_HL_BYTES(fraghdr); + + if (hlen > len) { + /* invalid datagram */ + return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; + } + + len = (u16_t)(len - hlen); + offset = IPH_OFFSET_BYTES(fraghdr); + + /* overwrite the fragment's ip header from the pbuf with our helper struct, + * and setup the embedded helper structure. */ + /* make sure the struct ip_reass_helper fits into the IP header */ + LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct ip_reass_helper) <= IP_HLEN", + sizeof(struct ip_reass_helper) <= IP_HLEN); + iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)new_p->payload; + iprh->next_pbuf = NULL; + iprh->start = offset; + iprh->end = (u16_t)(offset + len); + + if (iprh->end < offset) { + /* u16_t overflow, cannot handle this */ + return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; + } + + /* Iterate through until we either get to the end of the list (append), + * or we find one with a larger offset (insert). */ + for (q = ipr->p; q != NULL;) { + iprh_tmp = (struct ip_reass_helper *)q->payload; + + if (iprh->start < iprh_tmp->start) { + /* the new pbuf should be inserted before this */ + iprh->next_pbuf = q; + + if (iprh_prev != NULL) { + /* not the fragment with the lowest offset */ +#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP + if ((iprh->start < iprh_prev->end) || (iprh->end > iprh_tmp->start)) { + /* fragment overlaps with previous or following, throw away */ + return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; + } + +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + iprh_prev->next_pbuf = new_p; + + if (iprh_prev->end != iprh->start) { + /* There is a fragment missing between the current + * and the previous fragment */ + valid = 0; + } + } else { +#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP + + if (iprh->end > iprh_tmp->start) { + /* fragment overlaps with following, throw away */ + return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; + } + +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + /* fragment with the lowest offset */ + ipr->p = new_p; + } + + break; + } else if (iprh->start == iprh_tmp->start) { + /* received the same datagram twice: no need to keep the datagram */ + return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; +#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP + } else if (iprh->start < iprh_tmp->end) { + /* overlap: no need to keep the new datagram */ + return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED; +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + } else { + /* Check if the fragments received so far have no holes. */ + if (iprh_prev != NULL) { + if (iprh_prev->end != iprh_tmp->start) { + /* There is a fragment missing between the current + * and the previous fragment */ + valid = 0; + } + } + } + + q = iprh_tmp->next_pbuf; + iprh_prev = iprh_tmp; + } + + /* If q is NULL, then we made it to the end of the list. Determine what to do now */ + if (q == NULL) { + if (iprh_prev != NULL) { + /* this is (for now), the fragment with the highest offset: + * chain it to the last fragment */ +#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP + LWIP_ASSERT("check fragments don't overlap", iprh_prev->end <= iprh->start); +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + iprh_prev->next_pbuf = new_p; + + if (iprh_prev->end != iprh->start) { + valid = 0; + } + } else { +#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP + LWIP_ASSERT("no previous fragment, this must be the first fragment!", + ipr->p == NULL); +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + /* this is the first fragment we ever received for this ip datagram */ + ipr->p = new_p; + } + } + + /* At this point, the validation part begins: */ + /* If we already received the last fragment */ + if (is_last || ((ipr->flags & IP_REASS_FLAG_LASTFRAG) != 0)) { + /* and had no holes so far */ + if (valid) { + /* then check if the rest of the fragments is here */ + /* Check if the queue starts with the first datagram */ + if ((ipr->p == NULL) || (((struct ip_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload)->start != 0)) { + valid = 0; + } else { + /* and check that there are no holes after this datagram */ + iprh_prev = iprh; + q = iprh->next_pbuf; + + while (q != NULL) { + iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)q->payload; + + if (iprh_prev->end != iprh->start) { + valid = 0; + break; + } + + iprh_prev = iprh; + q = iprh->next_pbuf; + } + + /* if still valid, all fragments are received + * (because to the MF==0 already arrived */ + if (valid) { + LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check", ipr->p != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check", + ((struct ip_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload) != iprh); + LWIP_ASSERT("validate_datagram:next_pbuf!=NULL", + iprh->next_pbuf == NULL); + } + } + } + + /* If valid is 0 here, there are some fragments missing in the middle + * (since MF == 0 has already arrived). Such datagrams simply time out if + * no more fragments are received... */ + return valid ? IP_REASS_VALIDATE_TELEGRAM_FINISHED : IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_QUEUED; + } + + /* If we come here, not all fragments were received, yet! */ + return IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_QUEUED; /* not yet valid! */ +} + +/** + * Reassembles incoming IP fragments into an IP datagram. + * + * @param p points to a pbuf chain of the fragment + * @return NULL if reassembly is incomplete, ? otherwise + */ +struct pbuf * +ip4_reass(struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct pbuf *r; + struct ip_hdr *fraghdr; + struct ip_reassdata *ipr; + struct ip_reass_helper *iprh; + u16_t offset, len, clen; + u8_t hlen; + int valid; + int is_last; + + IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.recv); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipreasmreqds); + + fraghdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + + if (IPH_HL_BYTES(fraghdr) != IP_HLEN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip4_reass: IP options currently not supported!\n")); + IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.err); + goto nullreturn; + } + + offset = IPH_OFFSET_BYTES(fraghdr); + len = lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(fraghdr)); + hlen = IPH_HL_BYTES(fraghdr); + + if (hlen > len) { + /* invalid datagram */ + goto nullreturn; + } + + len = (u16_t)(len - hlen); + + /* Check if we are allowed to enqueue more datagrams. */ + clen = pbuf_clen(p); + + if ((ip_reass_pbufcount + clen) > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) { +#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST + + if (!ip_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(fraghdr, clen) || + ((ip_reass_pbufcount + clen) > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS)) +#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ + { + /* No datagram could be freed and still too many pbufs enqueued */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip4_reass: Overflow condition: pbufct=%d, clen=%d, MAX=%d\n", + ip_reass_pbufcount, clen, IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS)); + IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.memerr); + /* @todo: send ICMP time exceeded here? */ + /* drop this pbuf */ + goto nullreturn; + } + } + + /* Look for the datagram the fragment belongs to in the current datagram queue, + * remembering the previous in the queue for later dequeueing. */ + for (ipr = reassdatagrams; ipr != NULL; ipr = ipr->next) { + /* Check if the incoming fragment matches the one currently present + in the reassembly buffer. If so, we proceed with copying the + fragment into the buffer. */ + if (IP_ADDRESSES_AND_ID_MATCH(&ipr->iphdr, fraghdr)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip4_reass: matching previous fragment ID=%" X16_F "\n", + lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(fraghdr)))); + IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.cachehit); + break; + } + } + + if (ipr == NULL) { + /* Enqueue a new datagram into the datagram queue */ + ipr = ip_reass_enqueue_new_datagram(fraghdr, clen); + + /* Bail if unable to enqueue */ + if (ipr == NULL) { + goto nullreturn; + } + } else { + if (((lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(fraghdr)) & IP_OFFMASK) == 0) && + ((lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(&ipr->iphdr)) & IP_OFFMASK) != 0)) { + /* ipr->iphdr is not the header from the first fragment, but fraghdr is + * -> copy fraghdr into ipr->iphdr since we want to have the header + * of the first fragment (for ICMP time exceeded and later, for copying + * all options, if supported)*/ + SMEMCPY(&ipr->iphdr, fraghdr, IP_HLEN); + } + } + + /* At this point, we have either created a new entry or pointing + * to an existing one */ + + /* check for 'no more fragments', and update queue entry*/ + is_last = (IPH_OFFSET(fraghdr) & PP_NTOHS(IP_MF)) == 0; + + if (is_last) { + u16_t datagram_len = (u16_t)(offset + len); + + if ((datagram_len < offset) || (datagram_len > (0xFFFF - IP_HLEN))) { + /* u16_t overflow, cannot handle this */ + goto nullreturn_ipr; + } + } + + /* find the right place to insert this pbuf */ + /* @todo: trim pbufs if fragments are overlapping */ + valid = ip_reass_chain_frag_into_datagram_and_validate(ipr, p, is_last); + + if (valid == IP_REASS_VALIDATE_PBUF_DROPPED) { + goto nullreturn_ipr; + } + + /* if we come here, the pbuf has been enqueued */ + + /* Track the current number of pbufs current 'in-flight', in order to limit + the number of fragments that may be enqueued at any one time + (overflow checked by testing against IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) */ + ip_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip_reass_pbufcount + clen); + + if (is_last) { + u16_t datagram_len = (u16_t)(offset + len); + ipr->datagram_len = datagram_len; + ipr->flags |= IP_REASS_FLAG_LASTFRAG; + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, + ("ip4_reass: last fragment seen, total len %" S16_F "\n", + ipr->datagram_len)); + } + + if (valid == IP_REASS_VALIDATE_TELEGRAM_FINISHED) { + struct ip_reassdata *ipr_prev; + /* the totally last fragment (flag more fragments = 0) was received at least + * once AND all fragments are received */ + u16_t datagram_len = (u16_t)(ipr->datagram_len + IP_HLEN); + + /* save the second pbuf before copying the header over the pointer */ + r = ((struct ip_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload)->next_pbuf; + + /* copy the original ip header back to the first pbuf */ + fraghdr = (struct ip_hdr *)(ipr->p->payload); + SMEMCPY(fraghdr, &ipr->iphdr, IP_HLEN); + IPH_LEN_SET(fraghdr, lwip_htons(datagram_len)); + IPH_OFFSET_SET(fraghdr, 0); + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(fraghdr, 0); + /* @todo: do we need to set/calculate the correct checksum? */ +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(ip_current_input_netif(), NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) + { + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(fraghdr, inet_chksum(fraghdr, IP_HLEN)); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP */ + + p = ipr->p; + + /* chain together the pbufs contained within the reass_data list. */ + while (r != NULL) { + iprh = (struct ip_reass_helper *)r->payload; + + /* hide the ip header for every succeeding fragment */ + pbuf_remove_header(r, IP_HLEN); + pbuf_cat(p, r); + r = iprh->next_pbuf; + } + + /* find the previous entry in the linked list */ + if (ipr == reassdatagrams) { + ipr_prev = NULL; + } else { + for (ipr_prev = reassdatagrams; ipr_prev != NULL; ipr_prev = ipr_prev->next) { + if (ipr_prev->next == ipr) { + break; + } + } + } + + /* release the sources allocate for the fragment queue entry */ + ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(ipr, ipr_prev); + + /* and adjust the number of pbufs currently queued for reassembly. */ + clen = pbuf_clen(p); + LWIP_ASSERT("ip_reass_pbufcount >= clen", ip_reass_pbufcount >= clen); + ip_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip_reass_pbufcount - clen); + + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipreasmoks); + + /* Return the pbuf chain */ + return p; + } + + /* the datagram is not (yet?) reassembled completely */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip_reass_pbufcount: %d out\n", ip_reass_pbufcount)); + return NULL; + +nullreturn_ipr: + LWIP_ASSERT("ipr != NULL", ipr != NULL); + + if (ipr->p == NULL) { + /* dropped pbuf after creating a new datagram entry: remove the entry, too */ + LWIP_ASSERT("not firstalthough just enqueued", ipr == reassdatagrams); + ip_reass_dequeue_datagram(ipr, NULL); + } + +nullreturn: + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP_REASS_DEBUG, ("ip4_reass: nullreturn\n")); + IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.drop); + pbuf_free(p); + return NULL; +} +#endif /* IP_REASSEMBLY */ + +#if IP_FRAG +#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF +/** Allocate a new struct pbuf_custom_ref */ +static struct pbuf_custom_ref *ip_frag_alloc_pbuf_custom_ref(void) +{ + return (struct pbuf_custom_ref *)memp_malloc(MEMP_FRAG_PBUF); +} + +/** Free a struct pbuf_custom_ref */ +static void ip_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(struct pbuf_custom_ref *p) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + memp_free(MEMP_FRAG_PBUF, p); +} + +/** Free-callback function to free a 'struct pbuf_custom_ref', called by + * pbuf_free. */ +static void ipfrag_free_pbuf_custom(struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct pbuf_custom_ref *pcr = (struct pbuf_custom_ref *)p; + LWIP_ASSERT("pcr != NULL", pcr != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("pcr == p", (void *)pcr == (void *)p); + + if (pcr->original != NULL) { + pbuf_free(pcr->original); + } + + ip_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(pcr); +} +#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + +/** + * Fragment an IP datagram if too large for the netif. + * + * Chop the datagram in MTU sized chunks and send them in order + * by pointing PBUF_REFs into p. + * + * @param p ip packet to send + * @param netif the netif on which to send + * @param dest destination ip address to which to send + * + * @return ERR_OK if sent successfully, err_t otherwise + */ +err_t ip4_frag(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *dest) +{ + struct pbuf *rambuf; +#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + struct pbuf *newpbuf; + u16_t newpbuflen = 0; + u16_t left_to_copy; +#endif + struct ip_hdr *original_iphdr; + struct ip_hdr *iphdr; + const u16_t nfb = (u16_t)((netif->mtu - IP_HLEN) / 8); + u16_t left, fragsize; + u16_t ofo; + int last; + u16_t poff = IP_HLEN; + u16_t tmp; + int mf_set; + + original_iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + iphdr = original_iphdr; + + if (IPH_HL_BYTES(iphdr) != IP_HLEN) { + /* ip4_frag() does not support IP options */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + LWIP_ERROR("ip4_frag(): pbuf too short", p->len >= IP_HLEN, return ERR_VAL); + + /* Save original offset */ + tmp = lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(iphdr)); + ofo = tmp & IP_OFFMASK; + /* already fragmented? if so, the last fragment we create must have MF, too */ + mf_set = tmp & IP_MF; + + left = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - IP_HLEN); + + while (left) { + /* Fill this fragment */ + fragsize = LWIP_MIN(left, (u16_t)(nfb * 8)); + +#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + rambuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, fragsize, PBUF_RAM); + + if (rambuf == NULL) { + goto memerr; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece!", + (rambuf->len == rambuf->tot_len) && (rambuf->next == NULL)); + poff += pbuf_copy_partial(p, rambuf->payload, fragsize, poff); + + /* make room for the IP header */ + if (pbuf_add_header(rambuf, IP_HLEN)) { + pbuf_free(rambuf); + goto memerr; + } + + /* fill in the IP header */ + SMEMCPY(rambuf->payload, original_iphdr, IP_HLEN); + iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)rambuf->payload; +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + /* When not using a static buffer, create a chain of pbufs. + * The first will be a PBUF_RAM holding the link and IP header. + * The rest will be PBUF_REFs mirroring the pbuf chain to be fragged, + * but limited to the size of an mtu. + */ + rambuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, IP_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); + + if (rambuf == NULL) { + goto memerr; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece!", + (rambuf->len >= (IP_HLEN))); + SMEMCPY(rambuf->payload, original_iphdr, IP_HLEN); + iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)rambuf->payload; + + left_to_copy = fragsize; + + while (left_to_copy) { + struct pbuf_custom_ref *pcr; + u16_t plen = (u16_t)(p->len - poff); + LWIP_ASSERT("p->len >= poff", p->len >= poff); + newpbuflen = LWIP_MIN(left_to_copy, plen); + + /* Is this pbuf already empty? */ + if (!newpbuflen) { + poff = 0; + p = p->next; + continue; + } + + pcr = ip_frag_alloc_pbuf_custom_ref(); + + if (pcr == NULL) { + pbuf_free(rambuf); + goto memerr; + } + + /* Mirror this pbuf, although we might not need all of it. */ + newpbuf = pbuf_alloced_custom(PBUF_RAW, newpbuflen, PBUF_REF, &pcr->pc, + (u8_t *)p->payload + poff, newpbuflen); + + if (newpbuf == NULL) { + ip_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(pcr); + pbuf_free(rambuf); + goto memerr; + } + + pbuf_ref(p); + pcr->original = p; + pcr->pc.custom_free_function = ipfrag_free_pbuf_custom; + + /* Add it to end of rambuf's chain, but using pbuf_cat, not pbuf_chain + * so that it is removed when pbuf_dechain is later called on rambuf. + */ + pbuf_cat(rambuf, newpbuf); + left_to_copy = (u16_t)(left_to_copy - newpbuflen); + + if (left_to_copy) { + poff = 0; + p = p->next; + } + } + + poff = (u16_t)(poff + newpbuflen); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + + /* Correct header */ + last = (left <= netif->mtu - IP_HLEN); + + /* Set new offset and MF flag */ + tmp = (IP_OFFMASK & (ofo)); + + if (!last || mf_set) { + /* the last fragment has MF set if the input frame had it */ + tmp = tmp | IP_MF; + } + + IPH_OFFSET_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(tmp)); + IPH_LEN_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons((u16_t)(fragsize + IP_HLEN))); + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_IP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP) + { + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, IP_HLEN)); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_IP */ + + /* No need for separate header pbuf - we allowed room for it in rambuf + * when allocated. + */ + netif->output(netif, rambuf, dest); + IPFRAG_STATS_INC(ip_frag.xmit); + + /* Unfortunately we can't reuse rambuf - the hardware may still be + * using the buffer. Instead we free it (and the ensuing chain) and + * recreate it next time round the loop. If we're lucky the hardware + * will have already sent the packet, the free will really free, and + * there will be zero memory penalty. + */ + + pbuf_free(rambuf); + left = (u16_t)(left - fragsize); + ofo = (u16_t)(ofo + nfb); + } + + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipfragoks); + return ERR_OK; +memerr: + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.ipfragfails); + return ERR_MEM; +} +#endif /* IP_FRAG */ + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c index 2d4131c6..db604b2a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/dhcp6.c @@ -1,845 +1,845 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * @defgroup dhcp6 DHCPv6 - * @ingroup ip6 - * DHCPv6 client: IPv6 address autoconfiguration as per - * RFC 3315 (stateful DHCPv6) and - * RFC 3736 (stateless DHCPv6). - * - * For now, only stateless DHCPv6 is implemented! - * - * TODO: - * - enable/disable API to not always start when RA is received - * - stateful DHCPv6 (for now, only stateless DHCPv6 for DNS and NTP servers works) - * - create Client Identifier? - * - only start requests if a valid local address is available on the netif - * - only start information requests if required (not for every RA) - * - * dhcp6_enable_stateful() enables stateful DHCPv6 for a netif (stateless disabled)\n - * dhcp6_enable_stateless() enables stateless DHCPv6 for a netif (stateful disabled)\n - * dhcp6_disable() disable DHCPv6 for a netif - * - * When enabled, requests are only issued after receipt of RA with the - * corresponding bits set. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" -#include "lwip/prot/dhcp6.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif -#ifndef LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS -#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp6, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr, max_len) -#endif -#ifndef LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_PARSE_OPTION -#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_PARSE_OPTION(netif, dhcp6, state, msg, msg_type, option, len, pbuf, offset) \ - do { \ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg); \ - } while (0) -#endif - -#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS -#if DNS_MAX_SERVERS > LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS -#define LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS -#else -#define LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS DNS_MAX_SERVERS -#endif -#else -#define LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS 0 -#endif - -/** Option handling: options are parsed in dhcp6_parse_reply - * and saved in an array where other functions can load them from. - * This might be moved into the struct dhcp6 (not necessarily since - * lwIP is single-threaded and the array is only used while in recv - * callback). */ -enum dhcp6_option_idx { - DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_CLI_ID = 0, - DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID, -#if LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS - DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER, - DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DOMAIN_LIST, -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ -#if LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV - DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER, -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ - DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_MAX -}; - -struct dhcp6_option_info { - u8_t option_given; - u16_t val_start; - u16_t val_length; -}; - -/** Holds the decoded option info, only valid while in dhcp6_recv. */ -struct dhcp6_option_info dhcp6_rx_options[DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_MAX]; - -#define dhcp6_option_given(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].option_given != 0) -#define dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].option_given = 1) -#define dhcp6_clear_option(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].option_given = 0) -#define dhcp6_clear_all_options(dhcp6) (memset(dhcp6_rx_options, 0, sizeof(dhcp6_rx_options))) -#define dhcp6_get_option_start(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].val_start) -#define dhcp6_get_option_length(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].val_length) -#define dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, idx, start, len) \ - do { \ - dhcp6_rx_options[idx].val_start = (start); \ - dhcp6_rx_options[idx].val_length = (len); \ - } while (0) - -const ip_addr_t dhcp6_All_DHCP6_Relay_Agents_and_Servers = IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xFF020000, 0, 0, 0x00010002); -const ip_addr_t dhcp6_All_DHCP6_Servers = IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xFF020000, 0, 0, 0x00010003); - -static struct udp_pcb *dhcp6_pcb; -static u8_t dhcp6_pcb_refcount; - -/* receive, unfold, parse and free incoming messages */ -static void dhcp6_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); - -/** Ensure DHCP PCB is allocated and bound */ -static err_t dhcp6_inc_pcb_refcount(void) -{ - if (dhcp6_pcb_refcount == 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6_inc_pcb_refcount(): memory leak", dhcp6_pcb == NULL); - - /* allocate UDP PCB */ - dhcp6_pcb = udp_new_ip6(); - - if (dhcp6_pcb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - ip_set_option(dhcp6_pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); - - /* set up local and remote port for the pcb -> listen on all interfaces on all src/dest IPs */ - udp_bind(dhcp6_pcb, IP6_ADDR_ANY, DHCP6_CLIENT_PORT); - udp_recv(dhcp6_pcb, dhcp6_recv, NULL); - } - - dhcp6_pcb_refcount++; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Free DHCP PCB if the last netif stops using it */ -static void dhcp6_dec_pcb_refcount(void) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6_pcb_refcount(): refcount error", (dhcp6_pcb_refcount > 0)); - dhcp6_pcb_refcount--; - - if (dhcp6_pcb_refcount == 0) { - udp_remove(dhcp6_pcb); - dhcp6_pcb = NULL; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp6 - * Set a statically allocated struct dhcp6 to work with. - * Using this prevents dhcp6_start to allocate it using mem_malloc. - * - * @param netif the netif for which to set the struct dhcp - * @param dhcp6 (uninitialised) dhcp6 struct allocated by the application - */ -void dhcp6_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6 != NULL", dhcp6 != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif already has a struct dhcp6 set", netif_dhcp6_data(netif) == NULL); - - /* clear data structure */ - memset(dhcp6, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp6)); - /* dhcp6_set_state(&dhcp, DHCP6_STATE_OFF); */ - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, dhcp6); -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp6 - * Removes a struct dhcp6 from a netif. - * - * ATTENTION: Only use this when not using dhcp6_set_struct() to allocate the - * struct dhcp6 since the memory is passed back to the heap. - * - * @param netif the netif from which to remove the struct dhcp - */ -void dhcp6_cleanup(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - - if (netif_dhcp6_data(netif) != NULL) { - mem_free(netif_dhcp6_data(netif)); - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, NULL); - } -} - -static struct dhcp6 *dhcp6_get_struct(struct netif *netif, const char *dbg_requester) -{ - struct dhcp6 *dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); - - if (dhcp6 == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("%s: mallocing new DHCPv6 client\n", dbg_requester)); - dhcp6 = (struct dhcp6 *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct dhcp6)); - - if (dhcp6 == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("%s: could not allocate dhcp6\n", dbg_requester)); - return NULL; - } - - /* clear data structure, this implies DHCP6_STATE_OFF */ - memset(dhcp6, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp6)); - /* store this dhcp6 client in the netif */ - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, dhcp6); - } else { - /* already has DHCP6 client attached */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("%s: using existing DHCPv6 client\n", dbg_requester)); - } - - if (!dhcp6->pcb_allocated) { - if (dhcp6_inc_pcb_refcount() != ERR_OK) /* ensure DHCP6 PCB is allocated */ - { - mem_free(dhcp6); - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, NULL); - return NULL; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("%s: allocated dhcp6", dbg_requester)); - dhcp6->pcb_allocated = 1; - } - - return dhcp6; -} - -/* - * Set the DHCPv6 state - * If the state changed, reset the number of tries. - */ -static void dhcp6_set_state(struct dhcp6 *dhcp6, u8_t new_state, const char *dbg_caller) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("DHCPv6 state: %d -> %d (%s)\n", - dhcp6->state, new_state, dbg_caller)); - - if (new_state != dhcp6->state) { - dhcp6->state = new_state; - dhcp6->tries = 0; - dhcp6->request_timeout = 0; - } -} - -static int dhcp6_stateless_enabled(struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) -{ - if ((dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE) || - (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG)) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} - -/*static int -dhcp6_stateful_enabled(struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) -{ - if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_OFF) { - return 0; - } - if (dhcp6_stateless_enabled(dhcp6)) { - return 0; - } - return 1; -}*/ - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp6 - * Enable stateful DHCPv6 on this netif - * Requests are sent on receipt of an RA message with the - * ND6_RA_FLAG_MANAGED_ADDR_CONFIG flag set. - * - * A struct dhcp6 will be allocated for this netif if not - * set via @ref dhcp6_set_struct before. - * - * @todo: stateful DHCPv6 not supported, yet - */ -err_t dhcp6_enable_stateful(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("stateful dhcp6 not implemented yet")); - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp6 - * Enable stateless DHCPv6 on this netif - * Requests are sent on receipt of an RA message with the - * ND6_RA_FLAG_OTHER_CONFIG flag set. - * - * A struct dhcp6 will be allocated for this netif if not - * set via @ref dhcp6_set_struct before. - */ -err_t dhcp6_enable_stateless(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp6 *dhcp6; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_enable_stateless(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - - dhcp6 = dhcp6_get_struct(netif, "dhcp6_enable_stateless()"); - - if (dhcp6 == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (dhcp6_stateless_enabled(dhcp6)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_enable_stateless(): stateless DHCPv6 already enabled")); - return ERR_OK; - } else if (dhcp6->state != DHCP6_STATE_OFF) { - /* stateful running */ - /* @todo: stop stateful once it is implemented */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_enable_stateless(): switching from stateful to stateless DHCPv6")); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_enable_stateless(): stateless DHCPv6 enabled\n")); - dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE, "dhcp6_enable_stateless"); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup dhcp6 - * Disable stateful or stateless DHCPv6 on this netif - * Requests are sent on receipt of an RA message with the - * ND6_RA_FLAG_OTHER_CONFIG flag set. - */ -void dhcp6_disable(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct dhcp6 *dhcp6; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_disable(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - - dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); - - if (dhcp6 != NULL) { - if (dhcp6->state != DHCP6_STATE_OFF) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_disable(): DHCPv6 disabled (old state: %s)\n", - (dhcp6_stateless_enabled(dhcp6) ? "stateless" : "stateful"))); - dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_OFF, "dhcp6_disable"); - - if (dhcp6->pcb_allocated != 0) { - dhcp6_dec_pcb_refcount(); /* free DHCPv6 PCB if not needed any more */ - dhcp6->pcb_allocated = 0; - } - } - } -} - -/** - * Create a DHCPv6 request, fill in common headers - * - * @param netif the netif under DHCPv6 control - * @param dhcp6 dhcp6 control struct - * @param message_type message type of the request - * @param opt_len_alloc option length to allocate - * @param options_out_len option length on exit - * @return a pbuf for the message - */ -static struct pbuf *dhcp6_create_msg(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6, u8_t message_type, - u16_t opt_len_alloc, u16_t *options_out_len) -{ - struct pbuf *p_out; - struct dhcp6_msg *msg_out; - - LWIP_ERROR("dhcp6_create_msg: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return NULL;); - LWIP_ERROR("dhcp6_create_msg: dhcp6 != NULL", (dhcp6 != NULL), return NULL;); - p_out = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + opt_len_alloc, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p_out == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("dhcp6_create_msg(): could not allocate pbuf\n")); - return NULL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6_create_msg: check that first pbuf can hold struct dhcp6_msg", - (p_out->len >= sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + opt_len_alloc)); - - /* @todo: limit new xid for certain message types? */ - /* reuse transaction identifier in retransmissions */ - if (dhcp6->tries == 0) { - dhcp6->xid = LWIP_RAND() & 0xFFFFFF; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("transaction id xid(%" X32_F ")\n", dhcp6->xid)); - - msg_out = (struct dhcp6_msg *)p_out->payload; - memset(msg_out, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + opt_len_alloc); - - msg_out->msgtype = message_type; - msg_out->transaction_id[0] = (u8_t)(dhcp6->xid >> 16); - msg_out->transaction_id[1] = (u8_t)(dhcp6->xid >> 8); - msg_out->transaction_id[2] = (u8_t)dhcp6->xid; - *options_out_len = 0; - return p_out; -} - -static u16_t dhcp6_option_short(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u16_t value) -{ - options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0xff00U) >> 8); - options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)(value & 0x00ffU); - return options_out_len; -} - -static u16_t dhcp6_option_optionrequest(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, const u16_t *req_options, - u16_t num_req_options, u16_t max_len) -{ - size_t i; - u16_t ret; - - LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6_option_optionrequest: options_out_len + sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + addlen <= max_len", - sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + options_out_len + 4U + (2U * num_req_options) <= max_len); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(max_len); - - ret = dhcp6_option_short(options_out_len, options, DHCP6_OPTION_ORO); - ret = dhcp6_option_short(ret, options, 2 * num_req_options); - - for (i = 0; i < num_req_options; i++) { - ret = dhcp6_option_short(ret, options, req_options[i]); - } - - return ret; -} - -/* All options are added, shrink the pbuf to the required size */ -static void dhcp6_msg_finalize(u16_t options_out_len, struct pbuf *p_out) -{ - /* shrink the pbuf to the actual content length */ - pbuf_realloc(p_out, (u16_t)(sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + options_out_len)); -} - -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS -static void dhcp6_information_request(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) -{ - const u16_t requested_options[] = { DHCP6_OPTION_DNS_SERVERS, DHCP6_OPTION_DOMAIN_LIST, DHCP6_OPTION_SNTP_SERVERS }; - u16_t msecs; - struct pbuf *p_out; - u16_t options_out_len; - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_information_request()\n")); - /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ - p_out = dhcp6_create_msg(netif, dhcp6, DHCP6_INFOREQUEST, 4 + sizeof(requested_options), &options_out_len); - - if (p_out != NULL) { - err_t err; - struct dhcp6_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp6_msg *)p_out->payload; - u8_t *options = (u8_t *)(msg_out + 1); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_information_request: making request\n")); - - options_out_len = dhcp6_option_optionrequest(options_out_len, options, requested_options, - LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(requested_options), p_out->len); - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG, msg_out, - DHCP6_INFOREQUEST, options_out_len, p_out->len); - dhcp6_msg_finalize(options_out_len, p_out); - - err = udp_sendto_if(dhcp6_pcb, p_out, &dhcp6_All_DHCP6_Relay_Agents_and_Servers, DHCP6_SERVER_PORT, netif); - pbuf_free(p_out); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_information_request: INFOREQUESTING -> %d\n", (int)err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp6_information_request: could not allocate DHCP6 request\n")); - } - - dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG, "dhcp6_information_request"); - - if (dhcp6->tries < 255) { - dhcp6->tries++; - } - - msecs = (u16_t)((dhcp6->tries < 6 ? 1 << dhcp6->tries : 60) * 1000); - dhcp6->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_information_request(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); -} - -static err_t dhcp6_request_config(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) -{ - /* stateless mode enabled and no request running? */ - if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE) { - /* send Information-request and wait for answer; setup receive timeout */ - dhcp6_information_request(netif, dhcp6); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void dhcp6_abort_config_request(struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) -{ - if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG) { - /* abort running request */ - dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE, "dhcp6_abort_config_request"); - } -} - -/* Handle a REPLY to INFOREQUEST - * This parses DNS and NTP server addresses from the reply. - */ -static void dhcp6_handle_config_reply(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p_msg_in) -{ - struct dhcp6 *dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp6); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p_msg_in); - -#if LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS - - if (dhcp6_option_given(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER)) { - ip_addr_t dns_addr; - ip6_addr_t *dns_addr6; - u16_t op_start = dhcp6_get_option_start(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER); - u16_t op_len = dhcp6_get_option_length(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER); - u16_t idx; - u8_t n; - - memset(&dns_addr, 0, sizeof(dns_addr)); - dns_addr6 = ip_2_ip6(&dns_addr); - - for (n = 0, idx = op_start; (idx < op_start + op_len) && (n < LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS); - n++, idx += sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed)) { - u16_t copied = pbuf_copy_partial(p_msg_in, dns_addr6, sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed), idx); - - if (copied != sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed)) { - /* pbuf length mismatch */ - return; - } - - ip6_addr_assign_zone(dns_addr6, IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); - /* @todo: do we need a different offset than DHCP(v4)? */ - dns_setserver(n, &dns_addr); - } - } - - /* @ todo: parse and set Domain Search List */ -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ - -#if LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV - - if (dhcp6_option_given(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER)) { - ip_addr_t ntp_server_addrs[LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS]; - u16_t op_start = dhcp6_get_option_start(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER); - u16_t op_len = dhcp6_get_option_length(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER); - u16_t idx; - u8_t n; - - for (n = 0, idx = op_start; (idx < op_start + op_len) && (n < LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS); - n++, idx += sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed)) { - u16_t copied; - ip6_addr_t *ntp_addr6 = ip_2_ip6(&ntp_server_addrs[n]); - ip_addr_set_zero_ip6(&ntp_server_addrs[n]); - copied = pbuf_copy_partial(p_msg_in, ntp_addr6, sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed), idx); - - if (copied != sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed)) { - /* pbuf length mismatch */ - return; - } - - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ntp_addr6, IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); - } - - dhcp6_set_ntp_servers(n, ntp_server_addrs); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV */ -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS */ - -/** This function is called from nd6 module when an RA messsage is received - * It triggers DHCPv6 requests (if enabled). - */ -void dhcp6_nd6_ra_trigger(struct netif *netif, u8_t managed_addr_config, u8_t other_config) -{ - struct dhcp6 *dhcp6; - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(managed_addr_config); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(other_config); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp6); - -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS - - if (dhcp6 != NULL) { - if (dhcp6_stateless_enabled(dhcp6)) { - if (other_config) { - dhcp6_request_config(netif, dhcp6); - } else { - dhcp6_abort_config_request(dhcp6); - } - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS */ -} - -/** - * Parse the DHCPv6 message and extract the DHCPv6 options. - * - * Extract the DHCPv6 options (offset + length) so that we can later easily - * check for them or extract the contents. - */ -static err_t dhcp6_parse_reply(struct pbuf *p, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) -{ - u16_t offset; - u16_t offset_max; - u16_t options_idx; - struct dhcp6_msg *msg_in; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp6); - - /* clear received options */ - dhcp6_clear_all_options(dhcp6); - msg_in = (struct dhcp6_msg *)p->payload; - - /* parse options */ - - options_idx = sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg); - /* parse options to the end of the received packet */ - offset_max = p->tot_len; - - offset = options_idx; - - /* at least 4 byte to read? */ - while ((offset + 4 <= offset_max)) { - u8_t op_len_buf[4]; - u8_t *op_len; - u16_t op; - u16_t len; - u16_t val_offset = (u16_t)(offset + 4); - - if (val_offset < offset) { - /* overflow */ - return ERR_BUF; - } - - /* copy option + length, might be split accross pbufs */ - op_len = (u8_t *)pbuf_get_contiguous(p, op_len_buf, 4, 4, offset); - - if (op_len == NULL) { - /* failed to get option and length */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - op = (op_len[0] << 8) | op_len[1]; - len = (op_len[2] << 8) | op_len[3]; - offset = val_offset + len; - - if (offset < val_offset) { - /* overflow */ - return ERR_BUF; - } - - switch (op) { - case (DHCP6_OPTION_CLIENTID): - dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_CLI_ID); - dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_CLI_ID, val_offset, len); - break; - - case (DHCP6_OPTION_SERVERID): - dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID); - dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID, val_offset, len); - break; -#if LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS - - case (DHCP6_OPTION_DNS_SERVERS): - dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER); - dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER, val_offset, len); - break; - - case (DHCP6_OPTION_DOMAIN_LIST): - dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DOMAIN_LIST); - dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DOMAIN_LIST, val_offset, len); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ -#if LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV - - case (DHCP6_OPTION_SNTP_SERVERS): - dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER); - dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER, val_offset, len); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV*/ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG, ("skipping option %" U16_F " in options\n", op)); - LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_PARSE_OPTION(ip_current_netif(), dhcp6, dhcp6->state, msg_in, - msg_in->msgtype, op, len, q, val_offset); - break; - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void dhcp6_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - struct netif *netif = ip_current_input_netif(); - struct dhcp6 *dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); - struct dhcp6_msg *reply_msg = (struct dhcp6_msg *)p->payload; - u8_t msg_type; - u32_t xid; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - /* Caught DHCPv6 message from netif that does not have DHCPv6 enabled? -> not interested */ - if ((dhcp6 == NULL) || (dhcp6->pcb_allocated == 0)) { - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - LWIP_ERROR("invalid server address type", IP_IS_V6(addr), goto free_pbuf_and_return;); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_recv(pbuf = %p) from DHCPv6 server %s port %" U16_F "\n", (void *)p, - ipaddr_ntoa(addr), port)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf->len = %" U16_F "\n", p->len)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf->tot_len = %" U16_F "\n", p->tot_len)); - /* prevent warnings about unused arguments */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); - - if (p->len < sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("DHCPv6 reply message or pbuf too short\n")); - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - /* match transaction ID against what we expected */ - xid = reply_msg->transaction_id[0] << 16; - xid |= reply_msg->transaction_id[1] << 8; - xid |= reply_msg->transaction_id[2]; - - if (xid != dhcp6->xid) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("transaction id mismatch reply_msg->xid(%" X32_F ")!= dhcp6->xid(%" X32_F ")\n", xid, dhcp6->xid)); - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - /* option fields could be unfold? */ - if (dhcp6_parse_reply(p, dhcp6) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("problem unfolding DHCPv6 message - too short on memory?\n")); - goto free_pbuf_and_return; - } - - /* read DHCP message type */ - msg_type = reply_msg->msgtype; - - /* message type is DHCP6 REPLY? */ - if (msg_type == DHCP6_REPLY) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("DHCP6_REPLY received\n")); -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS - - /* in info-requesting state? */ - if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG) { - dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE, "dhcp6_recv"); - dhcp6_handle_config_reply(netif, p); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS */ - { - /* @todo: handle reply in other states? */ - } - } else { - /* @todo: handle other message types */ - } - -free_pbuf_and_return: - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/** - * A DHCPv6 request has timed out. - * - * The timer that was started with the DHCPv6 request has - * timed out, indicating no response was received in time. - */ -static void dhcp6_timeout(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_timeout()\n")); - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp6); - -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS - - /* back-off period has passed, or server selection timed out */ - if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_timeout(): retrying information request\n")); - dhcp6_information_request(netif, dhcp6); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS */ -} - -/** - * DHCPv6 timeout handling (this function must be called every 500ms, - * see @ref DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS). - * - * A DHCPv6 server is expected to respond within a short period of time. - * This timer checks whether an outstanding DHCPv6 request is timed out. - */ -void dhcp6_tmr(void) -{ - struct netif *netif; - /* loop through netif's */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - struct dhcp6 *dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); - - /* only act on DHCPv6 configured interfaces */ - if (dhcp6 != NULL) { - /* timer is active (non zero), and is about to trigger now */ - if (dhcp6->request_timeout > 1) { - dhcp6->request_timeout--; - } else if (dhcp6->request_timeout == 1) { - dhcp6->request_timeout--; - /* { dhcp6->request_timeout == 0 } */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_tmr(): request timeout\n")); - /* this client's request timeout triggered */ - dhcp6_timeout(netif, dhcp6); - } - } - } -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 */ +/** + * @file + * + * @defgroup dhcp6 DHCPv6 + * @ingroup ip6 + * DHCPv6 client: IPv6 address autoconfiguration as per + * RFC 3315 (stateful DHCPv6) and + * RFC 3736 (stateless DHCPv6). + * + * For now, only stateless DHCPv6 is implemented! + * + * TODO: + * - enable/disable API to not always start when RA is received + * - stateful DHCPv6 (for now, only stateless DHCPv6 for DNS and NTP servers works) + * - create Client Identifier? + * - only start requests if a valid local address is available on the netif + * - only start information requests if required (not for every RA) + * + * dhcp6_enable_stateful() enables stateful DHCPv6 for a netif (stateless disabled)\n + * dhcp6_enable_stateless() enables stateless DHCPv6 for a netif (stateful disabled)\n + * dhcp6_disable() disable DHCPv6 for a netif + * + * When enabled, requests are only issued after receipt of RA with the + * corresponding bits set. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" +#include "lwip/prot/dhcp6.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS +#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp6, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr, max_len) +#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_PARSE_OPTION +#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_PARSE_OPTION(netif, dhcp6, state, msg, msg_type, option, len, pbuf, offset) \ + do { \ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(msg); \ + } while (0) +#endif + +#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS +#if DNS_MAX_SERVERS > LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS +#define LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS +#else +#define LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS DNS_MAX_SERVERS +#endif +#else +#define LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS 0 +#endif + +/** Option handling: options are parsed in dhcp6_parse_reply + * and saved in an array where other functions can load them from. + * This might be moved into the struct dhcp6 (not necessarily since + * lwIP is single-threaded and the array is only used while in recv + * callback). */ +enum dhcp6_option_idx { + DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_CLI_ID = 0, + DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID, +#if LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS + DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER, + DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DOMAIN_LIST, +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ +#if LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV + DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER, +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ + DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_MAX +}; + +struct dhcp6_option_info { + u8_t option_given; + u16_t val_start; + u16_t val_length; +}; + +/** Holds the decoded option info, only valid while in dhcp6_recv. */ +struct dhcp6_option_info dhcp6_rx_options[DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_MAX]; + +#define dhcp6_option_given(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].option_given != 0) +#define dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].option_given = 1) +#define dhcp6_clear_option(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].option_given = 0) +#define dhcp6_clear_all_options(dhcp6) (memset(dhcp6_rx_options, 0, sizeof(dhcp6_rx_options))) +#define dhcp6_get_option_start(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].val_start) +#define dhcp6_get_option_length(dhcp6, idx) (dhcp6_rx_options[idx].val_length) +#define dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, idx, start, len) \ + do { \ + dhcp6_rx_options[idx].val_start = (start); \ + dhcp6_rx_options[idx].val_length = (len); \ + } while (0) + +const ip_addr_t dhcp6_All_DHCP6_Relay_Agents_and_Servers = IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xFF020000, 0, 0, 0x00010002); +const ip_addr_t dhcp6_All_DHCP6_Servers = IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xFF020000, 0, 0, 0x00010003); + +static struct udp_pcb *dhcp6_pcb; +static u8_t dhcp6_pcb_refcount; + +/* receive, unfold, parse and free incoming messages */ +static void dhcp6_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); + +/** Ensure DHCP PCB is allocated and bound */ +static err_t dhcp6_inc_pcb_refcount(void) +{ + if (dhcp6_pcb_refcount == 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6_inc_pcb_refcount(): memory leak", dhcp6_pcb == NULL); + + /* allocate UDP PCB */ + dhcp6_pcb = udp_new_ip6(); + + if (dhcp6_pcb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + ip_set_option(dhcp6_pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); + + /* set up local and remote port for the pcb -> listen on all interfaces on all src/dest IPs */ + udp_bind(dhcp6_pcb, IP6_ADDR_ANY, DHCP6_CLIENT_PORT); + udp_recv(dhcp6_pcb, dhcp6_recv, NULL); + } + + dhcp6_pcb_refcount++; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Free DHCP PCB if the last netif stops using it */ +static void dhcp6_dec_pcb_refcount(void) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6_pcb_refcount(): refcount error", (dhcp6_pcb_refcount > 0)); + dhcp6_pcb_refcount--; + + if (dhcp6_pcb_refcount == 0) { + udp_remove(dhcp6_pcb); + dhcp6_pcb = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp6 + * Set a statically allocated struct dhcp6 to work with. + * Using this prevents dhcp6_start to allocate it using mem_malloc. + * + * @param netif the netif for which to set the struct dhcp + * @param dhcp6 (uninitialised) dhcp6 struct allocated by the application + */ +void dhcp6_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6 != NULL", dhcp6 != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif already has a struct dhcp6 set", netif_dhcp6_data(netif) == NULL); + + /* clear data structure */ + memset(dhcp6, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp6)); + /* dhcp6_set_state(&dhcp, DHCP6_STATE_OFF); */ + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, dhcp6); +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp6 + * Removes a struct dhcp6 from a netif. + * + * ATTENTION: Only use this when not using dhcp6_set_struct() to allocate the + * struct dhcp6 since the memory is passed back to the heap. + * + * @param netif the netif from which to remove the struct dhcp + */ +void dhcp6_cleanup(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + + if (netif_dhcp6_data(netif) != NULL) { + mem_free(netif_dhcp6_data(netif)); + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, NULL); + } +} + +static struct dhcp6 *dhcp6_get_struct(struct netif *netif, const char *dbg_requester) +{ + struct dhcp6 *dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); + + if (dhcp6 == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("%s: mallocing new DHCPv6 client\n", dbg_requester)); + dhcp6 = (struct dhcp6 *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct dhcp6)); + + if (dhcp6 == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("%s: could not allocate dhcp6\n", dbg_requester)); + return NULL; + } + + /* clear data structure, this implies DHCP6_STATE_OFF */ + memset(dhcp6, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp6)); + /* store this dhcp6 client in the netif */ + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, dhcp6); + } else { + /* already has DHCP6 client attached */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("%s: using existing DHCPv6 client\n", dbg_requester)); + } + + if (!dhcp6->pcb_allocated) { + if (dhcp6_inc_pcb_refcount() != ERR_OK) /* ensure DHCP6 PCB is allocated */ + { + mem_free(dhcp6); + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, NULL); + return NULL; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("%s: allocated dhcp6", dbg_requester)); + dhcp6->pcb_allocated = 1; + } + + return dhcp6; +} + +/* + * Set the DHCPv6 state + * If the state changed, reset the number of tries. + */ +static void dhcp6_set_state(struct dhcp6 *dhcp6, u8_t new_state, const char *dbg_caller) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("DHCPv6 state: %d -> %d (%s)\n", + dhcp6->state, new_state, dbg_caller)); + + if (new_state != dhcp6->state) { + dhcp6->state = new_state; + dhcp6->tries = 0; + dhcp6->request_timeout = 0; + } +} + +static int dhcp6_stateless_enabled(struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) +{ + if ((dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE) || + (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG)) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/*static int +dhcp6_stateful_enabled(struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) +{ + if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_OFF) { + return 0; + } + if (dhcp6_stateless_enabled(dhcp6)) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +}*/ + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp6 + * Enable stateful DHCPv6 on this netif + * Requests are sent on receipt of an RA message with the + * ND6_RA_FLAG_MANAGED_ADDR_CONFIG flag set. + * + * A struct dhcp6 will be allocated for this netif if not + * set via @ref dhcp6_set_struct before. + * + * @todo: stateful DHCPv6 not supported, yet + */ +err_t dhcp6_enable_stateful(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("stateful dhcp6 not implemented yet")); + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp6 + * Enable stateless DHCPv6 on this netif + * Requests are sent on receipt of an RA message with the + * ND6_RA_FLAG_OTHER_CONFIG flag set. + * + * A struct dhcp6 will be allocated for this netif if not + * set via @ref dhcp6_set_struct before. + */ +err_t dhcp6_enable_stateless(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp6 *dhcp6; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_enable_stateless(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + + dhcp6 = dhcp6_get_struct(netif, "dhcp6_enable_stateless()"); + + if (dhcp6 == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (dhcp6_stateless_enabled(dhcp6)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_enable_stateless(): stateless DHCPv6 already enabled")); + return ERR_OK; + } else if (dhcp6->state != DHCP6_STATE_OFF) { + /* stateful running */ + /* @todo: stop stateful once it is implemented */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_enable_stateless(): switching from stateful to stateless DHCPv6")); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_enable_stateless(): stateless DHCPv6 enabled\n")); + dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE, "dhcp6_enable_stateless"); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup dhcp6 + * Disable stateful or stateless DHCPv6 on this netif + * Requests are sent on receipt of an RA message with the + * ND6_RA_FLAG_OTHER_CONFIG flag set. + */ +void dhcp6_disable(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp6 *dhcp6; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_disable(netif=%p) %c%c%" U16_F "\n", (void *)netif, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + + dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); + + if (dhcp6 != NULL) { + if (dhcp6->state != DHCP6_STATE_OFF) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_disable(): DHCPv6 disabled (old state: %s)\n", + (dhcp6_stateless_enabled(dhcp6) ? "stateless" : "stateful"))); + dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_OFF, "dhcp6_disable"); + + if (dhcp6->pcb_allocated != 0) { + dhcp6_dec_pcb_refcount(); /* free DHCPv6 PCB if not needed any more */ + dhcp6->pcb_allocated = 0; + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Create a DHCPv6 request, fill in common headers + * + * @param netif the netif under DHCPv6 control + * @param dhcp6 dhcp6 control struct + * @param message_type message type of the request + * @param opt_len_alloc option length to allocate + * @param options_out_len option length on exit + * @return a pbuf for the message + */ +static struct pbuf *dhcp6_create_msg(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6, u8_t message_type, + u16_t opt_len_alloc, u16_t *options_out_len) +{ + struct pbuf *p_out; + struct dhcp6_msg *msg_out; + + LWIP_ERROR("dhcp6_create_msg: netif != NULL", (netif != NULL), return NULL;); + LWIP_ERROR("dhcp6_create_msg: dhcp6 != NULL", (dhcp6 != NULL), return NULL;); + p_out = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + opt_len_alloc, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p_out == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("dhcp6_create_msg(): could not allocate pbuf\n")); + return NULL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6_create_msg: check that first pbuf can hold struct dhcp6_msg", + (p_out->len >= sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + opt_len_alloc)); + + /* @todo: limit new xid for certain message types? */ + /* reuse transaction identifier in retransmissions */ + if (dhcp6->tries == 0) { + dhcp6->xid = LWIP_RAND() & 0xFFFFFF; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("transaction id xid(%" X32_F ")\n", dhcp6->xid)); + + msg_out = (struct dhcp6_msg *)p_out->payload; + memset(msg_out, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + opt_len_alloc); + + msg_out->msgtype = message_type; + msg_out->transaction_id[0] = (u8_t)(dhcp6->xid >> 16); + msg_out->transaction_id[1] = (u8_t)(dhcp6->xid >> 8); + msg_out->transaction_id[2] = (u8_t)dhcp6->xid; + *options_out_len = 0; + return p_out; +} + +static u16_t dhcp6_option_short(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, u16_t value) +{ + options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)((value & 0xff00U) >> 8); + options[options_out_len++] = (u8_t)(value & 0x00ffU); + return options_out_len; +} + +static u16_t dhcp6_option_optionrequest(u16_t options_out_len, u8_t *options, const u16_t *req_options, + u16_t num_req_options, u16_t max_len) +{ + size_t i; + u16_t ret; + + LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp6_option_optionrequest: options_out_len + sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + addlen <= max_len", + sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + options_out_len + 4U + (2U * num_req_options) <= max_len); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(max_len); + + ret = dhcp6_option_short(options_out_len, options, DHCP6_OPTION_ORO); + ret = dhcp6_option_short(ret, options, 2 * num_req_options); + + for (i = 0; i < num_req_options; i++) { + ret = dhcp6_option_short(ret, options, req_options[i]); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* All options are added, shrink the pbuf to the required size */ +static void dhcp6_msg_finalize(u16_t options_out_len, struct pbuf *p_out) +{ + /* shrink the pbuf to the actual content length */ + pbuf_realloc(p_out, (u16_t)(sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + options_out_len)); +} + +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS +static void dhcp6_information_request(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) +{ + const u16_t requested_options[] = { DHCP6_OPTION_DNS_SERVERS, DHCP6_OPTION_DOMAIN_LIST, DHCP6_OPTION_SNTP_SERVERS }; + u16_t msecs; + struct pbuf *p_out; + u16_t options_out_len; + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_information_request()\n")); + /* create and initialize the DHCP message header */ + p_out = dhcp6_create_msg(netif, dhcp6, DHCP6_INFOREQUEST, 4 + sizeof(requested_options), &options_out_len); + + if (p_out != NULL) { + err_t err; + struct dhcp6_msg *msg_out = (struct dhcp6_msg *)p_out->payload; + u8_t *options = (u8_t *)(msg_out + 1); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_information_request: making request\n")); + + options_out_len = dhcp6_option_optionrequest(options_out_len, options, requested_options, + LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(requested_options), p_out->len); + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG, msg_out, + DHCP6_INFOREQUEST, options_out_len, p_out->len); + dhcp6_msg_finalize(options_out_len, p_out); + + err = udp_sendto_if(dhcp6_pcb, p_out, &dhcp6_All_DHCP6_Relay_Agents_and_Servers, DHCP6_SERVER_PORT, netif); + pbuf_free(p_out); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_information_request: INFOREQUESTING -> %d\n", (int)err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("dhcp6_information_request: could not allocate DHCP6 request\n")); + } + + dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG, "dhcp6_information_request"); + + if (dhcp6->tries < 255) { + dhcp6->tries++; + } + + msecs = (u16_t)((dhcp6->tries < 6 ? 1 << dhcp6->tries : 60) * 1000); + dhcp6->request_timeout = (u16_t)((msecs + DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS - 1) / DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_information_request(): set request timeout %" U16_F " msecs\n", msecs)); +} + +static err_t dhcp6_request_config(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) +{ + /* stateless mode enabled and no request running? */ + if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE) { + /* send Information-request and wait for answer; setup receive timeout */ + dhcp6_information_request(netif, dhcp6); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void dhcp6_abort_config_request(struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) +{ + if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG) { + /* abort running request */ + dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE, "dhcp6_abort_config_request"); + } +} + +/* Handle a REPLY to INFOREQUEST + * This parses DNS and NTP server addresses from the reply. + */ +static void dhcp6_handle_config_reply(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p_msg_in) +{ + struct dhcp6 *dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp6); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p_msg_in); + +#if LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS + + if (dhcp6_option_given(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER)) { + ip_addr_t dns_addr; + ip6_addr_t *dns_addr6; + u16_t op_start = dhcp6_get_option_start(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER); + u16_t op_len = dhcp6_get_option_length(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER); + u16_t idx; + u8_t n; + + memset(&dns_addr, 0, sizeof(dns_addr)); + dns_addr6 = ip_2_ip6(&dns_addr); + + for (n = 0, idx = op_start; (idx < op_start + op_len) && (n < LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS); + n++, idx += sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed)) { + u16_t copied = pbuf_copy_partial(p_msg_in, dns_addr6, sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed), idx); + + if (copied != sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed)) { + /* pbuf length mismatch */ + return; + } + + ip6_addr_assign_zone(dns_addr6, IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); + /* @todo: do we need a different offset than DHCP(v4)? */ + dns_setserver(n, &dns_addr); + } + } + + /* @ todo: parse and set Domain Search List */ +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ + +#if LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV + + if (dhcp6_option_given(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER)) { + ip_addr_t ntp_server_addrs[LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS]; + u16_t op_start = dhcp6_get_option_start(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER); + u16_t op_len = dhcp6_get_option_length(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER); + u16_t idx; + u8_t n; + + for (n = 0, idx = op_start; (idx < op_start + op_len) && (n < LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS); + n++, idx += sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed)) { + u16_t copied; + ip6_addr_t *ntp_addr6 = ip_2_ip6(&ntp_server_addrs[n]); + ip_addr_set_zero_ip6(&ntp_server_addrs[n]); + copied = pbuf_copy_partial(p_msg_in, ntp_addr6, sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed), idx); + + if (copied != sizeof(struct ip6_addr_packed)) { + /* pbuf length mismatch */ + return; + } + + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ntp_addr6, IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); + } + + dhcp6_set_ntp_servers(n, ntp_server_addrs); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV */ +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS */ + +/** This function is called from nd6 module when an RA messsage is received + * It triggers DHCPv6 requests (if enabled). + */ +void dhcp6_nd6_ra_trigger(struct netif *netif, u8_t managed_addr_config, u8_t other_config) +{ + struct dhcp6 *dhcp6; + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(managed_addr_config); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(other_config); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp6); + +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS + + if (dhcp6 != NULL) { + if (dhcp6_stateless_enabled(dhcp6)) { + if (other_config) { + dhcp6_request_config(netif, dhcp6); + } else { + dhcp6_abort_config_request(dhcp6); + } + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS */ +} + +/** + * Parse the DHCPv6 message and extract the DHCPv6 options. + * + * Extract the DHCPv6 options (offset + length) so that we can later easily + * check for them or extract the contents. + */ +static err_t dhcp6_parse_reply(struct pbuf *p, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) +{ + u16_t offset; + u16_t offset_max; + u16_t options_idx; + struct dhcp6_msg *msg_in; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp6); + + /* clear received options */ + dhcp6_clear_all_options(dhcp6); + msg_in = (struct dhcp6_msg *)p->payload; + + /* parse options */ + + options_idx = sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg); + /* parse options to the end of the received packet */ + offset_max = p->tot_len; + + offset = options_idx; + + /* at least 4 byte to read? */ + while ((offset + 4 <= offset_max)) { + u8_t op_len_buf[4]; + u8_t *op_len; + u16_t op; + u16_t len; + u16_t val_offset = (u16_t)(offset + 4); + + if (val_offset < offset) { + /* overflow */ + return ERR_BUF; + } + + /* copy option + length, might be split accross pbufs */ + op_len = (u8_t *)pbuf_get_contiguous(p, op_len_buf, 4, 4, offset); + + if (op_len == NULL) { + /* failed to get option and length */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + op = (op_len[0] << 8) | op_len[1]; + len = (op_len[2] << 8) | op_len[3]; + offset = val_offset + len; + + if (offset < val_offset) { + /* overflow */ + return ERR_BUF; + } + + switch (op) { + case (DHCP6_OPTION_CLIENTID): + dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_CLI_ID); + dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_CLI_ID, val_offset, len); + break; + + case (DHCP6_OPTION_SERVERID): + dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID); + dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_SERVER_ID, val_offset, len); + break; +#if LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS + + case (DHCP6_OPTION_DNS_SERVERS): + dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER); + dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DNS_SERVER, val_offset, len); + break; + + case (DHCP6_OPTION_DOMAIN_LIST): + dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DOMAIN_LIST); + dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_DOMAIN_LIST, val_offset, len); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_PROVIDE_DNS_SERVERS */ +#if LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV + + case (DHCP6_OPTION_SNTP_SERVERS): + dhcp6_got_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER); + dhcp6_set_option(dhcp6, DHCP6_OPTION_IDX_NTP_SERVER, val_offset, len); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV*/ + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG, ("skipping option %" U16_F " in options\n", op)); + LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_PARSE_OPTION(ip_current_netif(), dhcp6, dhcp6->state, msg_in, + msg_in->msgtype, op, len, q, val_offset); + break; + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void dhcp6_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + struct netif *netif = ip_current_input_netif(); + struct dhcp6 *dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); + struct dhcp6_msg *reply_msg = (struct dhcp6_msg *)p->payload; + u8_t msg_type; + u32_t xid; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + /* Caught DHCPv6 message from netif that does not have DHCPv6 enabled? -> not interested */ + if ((dhcp6 == NULL) || (dhcp6->pcb_allocated == 0)) { + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + LWIP_ERROR("invalid server address type", IP_IS_V6(addr), goto free_pbuf_and_return;); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_recv(pbuf = %p) from DHCPv6 server %s port %" U16_F "\n", (void *)p, + ipaddr_ntoa(addr), port)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf->len = %" U16_F "\n", p->len)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf->tot_len = %" U16_F "\n", p->tot_len)); + /* prevent warnings about unused arguments */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); + + if (p->len < sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("DHCPv6 reply message or pbuf too short\n")); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + /* match transaction ID against what we expected */ + xid = reply_msg->transaction_id[0] << 16; + xid |= reply_msg->transaction_id[1] << 8; + xid |= reply_msg->transaction_id[2]; + + if (xid != dhcp6->xid) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("transaction id mismatch reply_msg->xid(%" X32_F ")!= dhcp6->xid(%" X32_F ")\n", xid, dhcp6->xid)); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + /* option fields could be unfold? */ + if (dhcp6_parse_reply(p, dhcp6) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("problem unfolding DHCPv6 message - too short on memory?\n")); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + /* read DHCP message type */ + msg_type = reply_msg->msgtype; + + /* message type is DHCP6 REPLY? */ + if (msg_type == DHCP6_REPLY) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("DHCP6_REPLY received\n")); +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS + + /* in info-requesting state? */ + if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG) { + dhcp6_set_state(dhcp6, DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE, "dhcp6_recv"); + dhcp6_handle_config_reply(netif, p); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS */ + { + /* @todo: handle reply in other states? */ + } + } else { + /* @todo: handle other message types */ + } + +free_pbuf_and_return: + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/** + * A DHCPv6 request has timed out. + * + * The timer that was started with the DHCPv6 request has + * timed out, indicating no response was received in time. + */ +static void dhcp6_timeout(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_timeout()\n")); + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dhcp6); + +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS + + /* back-off period has passed, or server selection timed out */ + if (dhcp6->state == DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp6_timeout(): retrying information request\n")); + dhcp6_information_request(netif, dhcp6); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS */ +} + +/** + * DHCPv6 timeout handling (this function must be called every 500ms, + * see @ref DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS). + * + * A DHCPv6 server is expected to respond within a short period of time. + * This timer checks whether an outstanding DHCPv6 request is timed out. + */ +void dhcp6_tmr(void) +{ + struct netif *netif; + /* loop through netif's */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + struct dhcp6 *dhcp6 = netif_dhcp6_data(netif); + + /* only act on DHCPv6 configured interfaces */ + if (dhcp6 != NULL) { + /* timer is active (non zero), and is about to trigger now */ + if (dhcp6->request_timeout > 1) { + dhcp6->request_timeout--; + } else if (dhcp6->request_timeout == 1) { + dhcp6->request_timeout--; + /* { dhcp6->request_timeout == 0 } */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("dhcp6_tmr(): request timeout\n")); + /* this client's request timeout triggered */ + dhcp6_timeout(netif, dhcp6); + } + } + } +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ethip6.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ethip6.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ethip6.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ethip6.c index 5e5f2afe..915535ca 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ethip6.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ethip6.c @@ -1,123 +1,123 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * Ethernet output for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ETHERNET - -#include "lwip/ethip6.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/icmp6.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" -#include "netif/ethernet.h" - -#include - -/** - * Resolve and fill-in Ethernet address header for outgoing IPv6 packet. - * - * For IPv6 multicast, corresponding Ethernet addresses - * are selected and the packet is transmitted on the link. - * - * For unicast addresses, ask the ND6 module what to do. It will either let us - * send the the packet right away, or queue the packet for later itself, unless - * an error occurs. - * - * @todo anycast addresses - * - * @param netif The lwIP network interface which the IP packet will be sent on. - * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. - * @param ip6addr The IP address of the packet destination. - * - * @return - * - ERR_OK or the return value of @ref nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue. - */ -err_t ethip6_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - struct eth_addr dest; - const u8_t *hwaddr; - err_t result; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* The destination IP address must be properly zoned from here on down. */ - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(ip6addr, netif); - - /* multicast destination IP address? */ - if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6addr)) { - /* Hash IP multicast address to MAC address.*/ - dest.addr[0] = 0x33; - dest.addr[1] = 0x33; - dest.addr[2] = ((const u8_t *)(&(ip6addr->addr[3])))[0]; - dest.addr[3] = ((const u8_t *)(&(ip6addr->addr[3])))[1]; - dest.addr[4] = ((const u8_t *)(&(ip6addr->addr[3])))[2]; - dest.addr[5] = ((const u8_t *)(&(ip6addr->addr[3])))[3]; - - /* Send out. */ - return ethernet_output(netif, q, (const struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), &dest, ETHTYPE_IPV6); - } - - /* We have a unicast destination IP address */ - /* @todo anycast? */ - - /* Ask ND6 what to do with the packet. */ - result = nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue(netif, q, ip6addr, &hwaddr); - - if (result != ERR_OK) { - return result; - } - - /* If no hardware address is returned, nd6 has queued the packet for later. */ - if (hwaddr == NULL) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Send out the packet using the returned hardware address. */ - SMEMCPY(dest.addr, hwaddr, 6); - return ethernet_output(netif, q, (const struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), &dest, ETHTYPE_IPV6); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ETHERNET */ +/** + * @file + * + * Ethernet output for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ETHERNET + +#include "lwip/ethip6.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/icmp6.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" +#include "netif/ethernet.h" + +#include + +/** + * Resolve and fill-in Ethernet address header for outgoing IPv6 packet. + * + * For IPv6 multicast, corresponding Ethernet addresses + * are selected and the packet is transmitted on the link. + * + * For unicast addresses, ask the ND6 module what to do. It will either let us + * send the the packet right away, or queue the packet for later itself, unless + * an error occurs. + * + * @todo anycast addresses + * + * @param netif The lwIP network interface which the IP packet will be sent on. + * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. + * @param ip6addr The IP address of the packet destination. + * + * @return + * - ERR_OK or the return value of @ref nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue. + */ +err_t ethip6_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + struct eth_addr dest; + const u8_t *hwaddr; + err_t result; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* The destination IP address must be properly zoned from here on down. */ + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(ip6addr, netif); + + /* multicast destination IP address? */ + if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6addr)) { + /* Hash IP multicast address to MAC address.*/ + dest.addr[0] = 0x33; + dest.addr[1] = 0x33; + dest.addr[2] = ((const u8_t *)(&(ip6addr->addr[3])))[0]; + dest.addr[3] = ((const u8_t *)(&(ip6addr->addr[3])))[1]; + dest.addr[4] = ((const u8_t *)(&(ip6addr->addr[3])))[2]; + dest.addr[5] = ((const u8_t *)(&(ip6addr->addr[3])))[3]; + + /* Send out. */ + return ethernet_output(netif, q, (const struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), &dest, ETHTYPE_IPV6); + } + + /* We have a unicast destination IP address */ + /* @todo anycast? */ + + /* Ask ND6 what to do with the packet. */ + result = nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue(netif, q, ip6addr, &hwaddr); + + if (result != ERR_OK) { + return result; + } + + /* If no hardware address is returned, nd6 has queued the packet for later. */ + if (hwaddr == NULL) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Send out the packet using the returned hardware address. */ + SMEMCPY(dest.addr, hwaddr, 6); + return ethernet_output(netif, q, (const struct eth_addr *)(netif->hwaddr), &dest, ETHTYPE_IPV6); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ETHERNET */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/icmp6.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/icmp6.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/icmp6.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/icmp6.c index 869682fa..07ae9fd1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/icmp6.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/icmp6.c @@ -1,431 +1,431 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * IPv6 version of ICMP, as per RFC 4443. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ICMP6 && LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/icmp6.h" -#include "lwip/prot/icmp6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE == 0 -#undef LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE -#define LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE 8 -#endif - -/* Forward declarations */ -static void icmp6_send_response(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, u8_t type); -static void icmp6_send_response_with_addrs(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, - u8_t type, const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr); -static void icmp6_send_response_with_addrs_and_netif(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, - u8_t type, const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr, struct netif *netif); - -/** - * Process an input ICMPv6 message. Called by ip6_input. - * - * Will generate a reply for echo requests. Other messages are forwarded - * to nd6_input, or mld6_input. - * - * @param p the mld packet, p->payload pointing to the icmpv6 header - * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received - */ -void icmp6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - struct icmp6_hdr *icmp6hdr; - struct pbuf *r; - const ip6_addr_t *reply_src; - - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.recv); - - /* Check that ICMPv6 header fits in payload */ - if (p->len < sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr)) { - /* drop short packets */ - pbuf_free(p); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.lenerr); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.drop); - return; - } - - icmp6hdr = (struct icmp6_hdr *)p->payload; - -#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6) - { - if (ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->tot_len, ip6_current_src_addr(), - ip6_current_dest_addr()) != 0) { - /* Checksum failed */ - pbuf_free(p); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.chkerr); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.drop); - return; - } - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 */ - - switch (icmp6hdr->type) { - case ICMP6_TYPE_NA: /* Neighbor advertisement */ - case ICMP6_TYPE_NS: /* Neighbor solicitation */ - case ICMP6_TYPE_RA: /* Router advertisement */ - case ICMP6_TYPE_RD: /* Redirect */ - case ICMP6_TYPE_PTB: /* Packet too big */ - nd6_input(p, inp); - return; - - case ICMP6_TYPE_RS: -#if LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD - /* @todo implement router functionality */ -#endif - break; -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD - - case ICMP6_TYPE_MLQ: - case ICMP6_TYPE_MLR: - case ICMP6_TYPE_MLD: - mld6_input(p, inp); - return; -#endif - - case ICMP6_TYPE_EREQ: -#if !LWIP_MULTICAST_PING - - /* multicast destination address? */ - if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - /* drop */ - pbuf_free(p); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.drop); - return; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_PING */ - - /* Allocate reply. */ - r = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (r == NULL) { - /* drop */ - pbuf_free(p); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.memerr); - return; - } - - /* Copy echo request. */ - if (pbuf_copy(r, p) != ERR_OK) { - /* drop */ - pbuf_free(p); - pbuf_free(r); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.err); - return; - } - - /* Determine reply source IPv6 address. */ -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_PING - - if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - reply_src = ip_2_ip6(ip6_select_source_address(inp, ip6_current_src_addr())); - - if (reply_src == NULL) { - /* drop */ - pbuf_free(p); - pbuf_free(r); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.rterr); - return; - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_PING */ - { - reply_src = ip6_current_dest_addr(); - } - - /* Set fields in reply. */ - ((struct icmp6_echo_hdr *)(r->payload))->type = ICMP6_TYPE_EREP; - ((struct icmp6_echo_hdr *)(r->payload))->chksum = 0; -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) - { - ((struct icmp6_echo_hdr *)(r->payload))->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(r, - IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, r->tot_len, reply_src, ip6_current_src_addr()); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ - - /* Send reply. */ - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.xmit); - ip6_output_if(r, reply_src, ip6_current_src_addr(), - LWIP_ICMP6_HL, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, inp); - pbuf_free(r); - - break; - - default: - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.proterr); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.drop); - break; - } - - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/** - * Send an icmpv6 'destination unreachable' packet. - * - * This function must be used only in direct response to a packet that is being - * received right now. Otherwise, address zones would be lost. - * - * @param p the input packet for which the 'unreachable' should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header - * @param c ICMPv6 code for the unreachable type - */ -void icmp6_dest_unreach(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_dur_code c) -{ - icmp6_send_response(p, c, 0, ICMP6_TYPE_DUR); -} - -/** - * Send an icmpv6 'packet too big' packet. - * - * This function must be used only in direct response to a packet that is being - * received right now. Otherwise, address zones would be lost. - * - * @param p the input packet for which the 'packet too big' should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header - * @param mtu the maximum mtu that we can accept - */ -void icmp6_packet_too_big(struct pbuf *p, u32_t mtu) -{ - icmp6_send_response(p, 0, mtu, ICMP6_TYPE_PTB); -} - -/** - * Send an icmpv6 'time exceeded' packet. - * - * This function must be used only in direct response to a packet that is being - * received right now. Otherwise, address zones would be lost. - * - * @param p the input packet for which the 'time exceeded' should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header - * @param c ICMPv6 code for the time exceeded type - */ -void icmp6_time_exceeded(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_te_code c) -{ - icmp6_send_response(p, c, 0, ICMP6_TYPE_TE); -} - -/** - * Send an icmpv6 'time exceeded' packet, with explicit source and destination - * addresses. - * - * This function may be used to send a response sometime after receiving the - * packet for which this response is meant. The provided source and destination - * addresses are used primarily to retain their zone information. - * - * @param p the input packet for which the 'time exceeded' should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header - * @param c ICMPv6 code for the time exceeded type - * @param src_addr source address of the original packet, with zone information - * @param dest_addr destination address of the original packet, with zone - * information - */ -void icmp6_time_exceeded_with_addrs(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_te_code c, - const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr) -{ - icmp6_send_response_with_addrs(p, c, 0, ICMP6_TYPE_TE, src_addr, dest_addr); -} - -/** - * Send an icmpv6 'parameter problem' packet. - * - * This function must be used only in direct response to a packet that is being - * received right now. Otherwise, address zones would be lost and the calculated - * offset would be wrong (calculated against ip6_current_header()). - * - * @param p the input packet for which the 'param problem' should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IP header - * @param c ICMPv6 code for the param problem type - * @param pointer the pointer to the byte where the parameter is found - */ -void icmp6_param_problem(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_pp_code c, const void *pointer) -{ - u32_t pointer_u32 = (u32_t)((const u8_t *)pointer - (const u8_t *)ip6_current_header()); - icmp6_send_response(p, c, pointer_u32, ICMP6_TYPE_PP); -} - -/** - * Send an ICMPv6 packet in response to an incoming packet. - * The packet is sent *to* ip_current_src_addr() on ip_current_netif(). - * - * @param p the input packet for which the response should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header - * @param code Code of the ICMPv6 header - * @param data Additional 32-bit parameter in the ICMPv6 header - * @param type Type of the ICMPv6 header - */ -static void icmp6_send_response(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, u8_t type) -{ - const struct ip6_addr *reply_src, *reply_dest; - struct netif *netif = ip_current_netif(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("icmpv6 packet not a direct response", netif != NULL); - reply_dest = ip6_current_src_addr(); - - /* Select an address to use as source. */ - reply_src = ip_2_ip6(ip6_select_source_address(netif, reply_dest)); - - if (reply_src == NULL) { - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.rterr); - return; - } - - icmp6_send_response_with_addrs_and_netif(p, code, data, type, reply_src, reply_dest, netif); -} - -/** - * Send an ICMPv6 packet in response to an incoming packet. - * - * Call this function if the packet is NOT sent as a direct response to an - * incoming packet, but rather sometime later (e.g. for a fragment reassembly - * timeout). The caller must provide the zoned source and destination addresses - * from the original packet with the src_addr and dest_addr parameters. The - * reason for this approach is that while the addresses themselves are part of - * the original packet, their zone information is not, thus possibly resulting - * in a link-local response being sent over the wrong link. - * - * @param p the input packet for which the response should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header - * @param code Code of the ICMPv6 header - * @param data Additional 32-bit parameter in the ICMPv6 header - * @param type Type of the ICMPv6 header - * @param src_addr original source address - * @param dest_addr original destination address - */ -static void icmp6_send_response_with_addrs(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, u8_t type, - const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr) -{ - const struct ip6_addr *reply_src, *reply_dest; - struct netif *netif; - - /* Get the destination address and netif for this ICMP message. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("must provide both source and destination", src_addr != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("must provide both source and destination", dest_addr != NULL); - - /* Special case, as ip6_current_xxx is either NULL, or points - to a different packet than the one that expired. */ - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(src_addr); - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(dest_addr); - /* Swap source and destination for the reply. */ - reply_dest = src_addr; - reply_src = dest_addr; - netif = ip6_route(reply_src, reply_dest); - - if (netif == NULL) { - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.rterr); - return; - } - - icmp6_send_response_with_addrs_and_netif(p, code, data, type, reply_src, - reply_dest, netif); -} - -/** - * Send an ICMPv6 packet (with srd/dst address and netif given). - * - * @param p the input packet for which the response should be sent, - * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header - * @param code Code of the ICMPv6 header - * @param data Additional 32-bit parameter in the ICMPv6 header - * @param type Type of the ICMPv6 header - * @param reply_src source address of the packet to send - * @param reply_dest destination address of the packet to send - * @param netif netif to send the packet - */ -static void icmp6_send_response_with_addrs_and_netif(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, u8_t type, - const ip6_addr_t *reply_src, const ip6_addr_t *reply_dest, struct netif *netif) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - struct icmp6_hdr *icmp6hdr; - - /* ICMPv6 header + IPv6 header + data */ - q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr) + IP6_HLEN + LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE, - PBUF_RAM); - - if (q == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_time_exceeded: failed to allocate pbuf for ICMPv6 packet.\n")); - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.memerr); - return; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold icmp 6message", - (q->len >= (sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr) + IP6_HLEN + LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE))); - - icmp6hdr = (struct icmp6_hdr *)q->payload; - icmp6hdr->type = type; - icmp6hdr->code = code; - icmp6hdr->data = lwip_htonl(data); - - /* copy fields from original packet */ - SMEMCPY((u8_t *)q->payload + sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr), (u8_t *)p->payload, - IP6_HLEN + LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE); - - /* calculate checksum */ - icmp6hdr->chksum = 0; -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) - { - icmp6hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(q, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, q->tot_len, - reply_src, reply_dest); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ - - ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.xmit); - ip6_output_if(q, reply_src, reply_dest, LWIP_ICMP6_HL, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, netif); - pbuf_free(q); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * + * IPv6 version of ICMP, as per RFC 4443. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ICMP6 && LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/icmp6.h" +#include "lwip/prot/icmp6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE == 0 +#undef LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE +#define LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE 8 +#endif + +/* Forward declarations */ +static void icmp6_send_response(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, u8_t type); +static void icmp6_send_response_with_addrs(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, + u8_t type, const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr); +static void icmp6_send_response_with_addrs_and_netif(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, + u8_t type, const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr, struct netif *netif); + +/** + * Process an input ICMPv6 message. Called by ip6_input. + * + * Will generate a reply for echo requests. Other messages are forwarded + * to nd6_input, or mld6_input. + * + * @param p the mld packet, p->payload pointing to the icmpv6 header + * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received + */ +void icmp6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + struct icmp6_hdr *icmp6hdr; + struct pbuf *r; + const ip6_addr_t *reply_src; + + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.recv); + + /* Check that ICMPv6 header fits in payload */ + if (p->len < sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr)) { + /* drop short packets */ + pbuf_free(p); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.lenerr); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.drop); + return; + } + + icmp6hdr = (struct icmp6_hdr *)p->payload; + +#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6) + { + if (ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->tot_len, ip6_current_src_addr(), + ip6_current_dest_addr()) != 0) { + /* Checksum failed */ + pbuf_free(p); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.chkerr); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.drop); + return; + } + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 */ + + switch (icmp6hdr->type) { + case ICMP6_TYPE_NA: /* Neighbor advertisement */ + case ICMP6_TYPE_NS: /* Neighbor solicitation */ + case ICMP6_TYPE_RA: /* Router advertisement */ + case ICMP6_TYPE_RD: /* Redirect */ + case ICMP6_TYPE_PTB: /* Packet too big */ + nd6_input(p, inp); + return; + + case ICMP6_TYPE_RS: +#if LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD + /* @todo implement router functionality */ +#endif + break; +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD + + case ICMP6_TYPE_MLQ: + case ICMP6_TYPE_MLR: + case ICMP6_TYPE_MLD: + mld6_input(p, inp); + return; +#endif + + case ICMP6_TYPE_EREQ: +#if !LWIP_MULTICAST_PING + + /* multicast destination address? */ + if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + /* drop */ + pbuf_free(p); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.drop); + return; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_PING */ + + /* Allocate reply. */ + r = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (r == NULL) { + /* drop */ + pbuf_free(p); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.memerr); + return; + } + + /* Copy echo request. */ + if (pbuf_copy(r, p) != ERR_OK) { + /* drop */ + pbuf_free(p); + pbuf_free(r); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.err); + return; + } + + /* Determine reply source IPv6 address. */ +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_PING + + if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + reply_src = ip_2_ip6(ip6_select_source_address(inp, ip6_current_src_addr())); + + if (reply_src == NULL) { + /* drop */ + pbuf_free(p); + pbuf_free(r); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.rterr); + return; + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_PING */ + { + reply_src = ip6_current_dest_addr(); + } + + /* Set fields in reply. */ + ((struct icmp6_echo_hdr *)(r->payload))->type = ICMP6_TYPE_EREP; + ((struct icmp6_echo_hdr *)(r->payload))->chksum = 0; +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) + { + ((struct icmp6_echo_hdr *)(r->payload))->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(r, + IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, r->tot_len, reply_src, ip6_current_src_addr()); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ + + /* Send reply. */ + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.xmit); + ip6_output_if(r, reply_src, ip6_current_src_addr(), + LWIP_ICMP6_HL, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, inp); + pbuf_free(r); + + break; + + default: + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.proterr); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.drop); + break; + } + + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/** + * Send an icmpv6 'destination unreachable' packet. + * + * This function must be used only in direct response to a packet that is being + * received right now. Otherwise, address zones would be lost. + * + * @param p the input packet for which the 'unreachable' should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header + * @param c ICMPv6 code for the unreachable type + */ +void icmp6_dest_unreach(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_dur_code c) +{ + icmp6_send_response(p, c, 0, ICMP6_TYPE_DUR); +} + +/** + * Send an icmpv6 'packet too big' packet. + * + * This function must be used only in direct response to a packet that is being + * received right now. Otherwise, address zones would be lost. + * + * @param p the input packet for which the 'packet too big' should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header + * @param mtu the maximum mtu that we can accept + */ +void icmp6_packet_too_big(struct pbuf *p, u32_t mtu) +{ + icmp6_send_response(p, 0, mtu, ICMP6_TYPE_PTB); +} + +/** + * Send an icmpv6 'time exceeded' packet. + * + * This function must be used only in direct response to a packet that is being + * received right now. Otherwise, address zones would be lost. + * + * @param p the input packet for which the 'time exceeded' should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header + * @param c ICMPv6 code for the time exceeded type + */ +void icmp6_time_exceeded(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_te_code c) +{ + icmp6_send_response(p, c, 0, ICMP6_TYPE_TE); +} + +/** + * Send an icmpv6 'time exceeded' packet, with explicit source and destination + * addresses. + * + * This function may be used to send a response sometime after receiving the + * packet for which this response is meant. The provided source and destination + * addresses are used primarily to retain their zone information. + * + * @param p the input packet for which the 'time exceeded' should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header + * @param c ICMPv6 code for the time exceeded type + * @param src_addr source address of the original packet, with zone information + * @param dest_addr destination address of the original packet, with zone + * information + */ +void icmp6_time_exceeded_with_addrs(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_te_code c, + const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr) +{ + icmp6_send_response_with_addrs(p, c, 0, ICMP6_TYPE_TE, src_addr, dest_addr); +} + +/** + * Send an icmpv6 'parameter problem' packet. + * + * This function must be used only in direct response to a packet that is being + * received right now. Otherwise, address zones would be lost and the calculated + * offset would be wrong (calculated against ip6_current_header()). + * + * @param p the input packet for which the 'param problem' should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IP header + * @param c ICMPv6 code for the param problem type + * @param pointer the pointer to the byte where the parameter is found + */ +void icmp6_param_problem(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_pp_code c, const void *pointer) +{ + u32_t pointer_u32 = (u32_t)((const u8_t *)pointer - (const u8_t *)ip6_current_header()); + icmp6_send_response(p, c, pointer_u32, ICMP6_TYPE_PP); +} + +/** + * Send an ICMPv6 packet in response to an incoming packet. + * The packet is sent *to* ip_current_src_addr() on ip_current_netif(). + * + * @param p the input packet for which the response should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header + * @param code Code of the ICMPv6 header + * @param data Additional 32-bit parameter in the ICMPv6 header + * @param type Type of the ICMPv6 header + */ +static void icmp6_send_response(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, u8_t type) +{ + const struct ip6_addr *reply_src, *reply_dest; + struct netif *netif = ip_current_netif(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("icmpv6 packet not a direct response", netif != NULL); + reply_dest = ip6_current_src_addr(); + + /* Select an address to use as source. */ + reply_src = ip_2_ip6(ip6_select_source_address(netif, reply_dest)); + + if (reply_src == NULL) { + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.rterr); + return; + } + + icmp6_send_response_with_addrs_and_netif(p, code, data, type, reply_src, reply_dest, netif); +} + +/** + * Send an ICMPv6 packet in response to an incoming packet. + * + * Call this function if the packet is NOT sent as a direct response to an + * incoming packet, but rather sometime later (e.g. for a fragment reassembly + * timeout). The caller must provide the zoned source and destination addresses + * from the original packet with the src_addr and dest_addr parameters. The + * reason for this approach is that while the addresses themselves are part of + * the original packet, their zone information is not, thus possibly resulting + * in a link-local response being sent over the wrong link. + * + * @param p the input packet for which the response should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header + * @param code Code of the ICMPv6 header + * @param data Additional 32-bit parameter in the ICMPv6 header + * @param type Type of the ICMPv6 header + * @param src_addr original source address + * @param dest_addr original destination address + */ +static void icmp6_send_response_with_addrs(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, u8_t type, + const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr) +{ + const struct ip6_addr *reply_src, *reply_dest; + struct netif *netif; + + /* Get the destination address and netif for this ICMP message. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("must provide both source and destination", src_addr != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("must provide both source and destination", dest_addr != NULL); + + /* Special case, as ip6_current_xxx is either NULL, or points + to a different packet than the one that expired. */ + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(src_addr); + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(dest_addr); + /* Swap source and destination for the reply. */ + reply_dest = src_addr; + reply_src = dest_addr; + netif = ip6_route(reply_src, reply_dest); + + if (netif == NULL) { + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.rterr); + return; + } + + icmp6_send_response_with_addrs_and_netif(p, code, data, type, reply_src, + reply_dest, netif); +} + +/** + * Send an ICMPv6 packet (with srd/dst address and netif given). + * + * @param p the input packet for which the response should be sent, + * p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header + * @param code Code of the ICMPv6 header + * @param data Additional 32-bit parameter in the ICMPv6 header + * @param type Type of the ICMPv6 header + * @param reply_src source address of the packet to send + * @param reply_dest destination address of the packet to send + * @param netif netif to send the packet + */ +static void icmp6_send_response_with_addrs_and_netif(struct pbuf *p, u8_t code, u32_t data, u8_t type, + const ip6_addr_t *reply_src, const ip6_addr_t *reply_dest, struct netif *netif) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + struct icmp6_hdr *icmp6hdr; + + /* ICMPv6 header + IPv6 header + data */ + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr) + IP6_HLEN + LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE, + PBUF_RAM); + + if (q == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ICMP_DEBUG, ("icmp_time_exceeded: failed to allocate pbuf for ICMPv6 packet.\n")); + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.memerr); + return; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold icmp 6message", + (q->len >= (sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr) + IP6_HLEN + LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE))); + + icmp6hdr = (struct icmp6_hdr *)q->payload; + icmp6hdr->type = type; + icmp6hdr->code = code; + icmp6hdr->data = lwip_htonl(data); + + /* copy fields from original packet */ + SMEMCPY((u8_t *)q->payload + sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr), (u8_t *)p->payload, + IP6_HLEN + LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE); + + /* calculate checksum */ + icmp6hdr->chksum = 0; +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) + { + icmp6hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(q, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, q->tot_len, + reply_src, reply_dest); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ + + ICMP6_STATS_INC(icmp6.xmit); + ip6_output_if(q, reply_src, reply_dest, LWIP_ICMP6_HL, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, netif); + pbuf_free(q); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 && LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/inet6.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/inet6.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/inet6.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/inet6.c index 9c6662d3..2d2d1064 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/inet6.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/inet6.c @@ -1,53 +1,53 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * INET v6 addresses. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/inet.h" - -/** This variable is initialized by the system to contain the wildcard IPv6 address. - */ -const struct in6_addr in6addr_any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT; - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * + * INET v6 addresses. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/inet.h" + +/** This variable is initialized by the system to contain the wildcard IPv6 address. + */ +const struct in6_addr in6addr_any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT; + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6.c index 04987c4b..42318824 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6.c @@ -1,1582 +1,1582 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * IPv6 layer. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_frag.h" -#include "lwip/icmp6.h" -#include "lwip/priv/raw_priv.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -#include "lwip/debug.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -/** - * Finds the appropriate network interface for a given IPv6 address. It tries to select - * a netif following a sequence of heuristics: - * 1) if there is only 1 netif, return it - * 2) if the destination is a zoned address, match its zone to a netif - * 3) if the either the source or destination address is a scoped address, - * match the source address's zone (if set) or address (if not) to a netif - * 4) tries to match the destination subnet to a configured address - * 5) tries to find a router-announced route - * 6) tries to match the (unscoped) source address to the netif - * 7) returns the default netif, if configured - * - * Note that each of the two given addresses may or may not be properly zoned. - * - * @param src the source IPv6 address, if known - * @param dest the destination IPv6 address for which to find the route - * @return the netif on which to send to reach dest - */ -struct netif * -ip6_route(const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest) -{ -#if LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(src); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dest); -#else /* LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ - struct netif *netif; - s8_t i; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* If single netif configuration, fast return. */ - if ((netif_list != NULL) && (netif_list->next == NULL)) { - if (!netif_is_up(netif_list) || !netif_is_link_up(netif_list) || - (ip6_addr_has_zone(dest) && !ip6_addr_test_zone(dest, netif_list))) { - return NULL; - } - - return netif_list; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - /* Special processing for zoned destination addresses. This includes link- - * local unicast addresses and interface/link-local multicast addresses. Use - * the zone to find a matching netif. If the address is not zoned, then there - * is technically no "wrong" netif to choose, and we leave routing to other - * rules; in most cases this should be the scoped-source rule below. */ - if (ip6_addr_has_zone(dest)) { - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(dest); - /* Find a netif based on the zone. For custom mappings, one zone may map - * to multiple netifs, so find one that can actually send a packet. */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (ip6_addr_test_zone(dest, netif) && - netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif)) { - return netif; - } - } - /* No matching netif found. Do no try to route to a different netif, - * as that would be a zone violation, resulting in any packets sent to - * that netif being dropped on output. */ - return NULL; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - /* Special processing for scoped source and destination addresses. If we get - * here, the destination address does not have a zone, so either way we need - * to look at the source address, which may or may not have a zone. If it - * does, the zone is restrictive: there is (typically) only one matching - * netif for it, and we should avoid routing to any other netif as that would - * result in guaranteed zone violations. For scoped source addresses that do - * not have a zone, use (only) a netif that has that source address locally - * assigned. This case also applies to the loopback source address, which has - * an implied link-local scope. If only the destination address is scoped - * (but, again, not zoned), we still want to use only the source address to - * determine its zone because that's most likely what the user/application - * wants, regardless of whether the source address is scoped. Finally, some - * of this story also applies if scoping is disabled altogether. */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - if (ip6_addr_has_scope(dest, IP6_UNKNOWN) || - ip6_addr_has_scope(src, IP6_UNICAST) || -#else /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(dest) || ip6_addr_ismulticast_iflocal(dest) || - ip6_addr_ismulticast_linklocal(dest) || ip6_addr_islinklocal(src) || -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - ip6_addr_isloopback(src)) { -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - if (ip6_addr_has_zone(src)) { - /* Find a netif matching the source zone (relatively cheap). */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif) && - ip6_addr_test_zone(src, netif)) { - return netif; - } - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - { - /* Find a netif matching the source address (relatively expensive). */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (!netif_is_up(netif) || !netif_is_link_up(netif)) { - continue; - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && - ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(src, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { - return netif; - } - } - } - } - - /* Again, do not use any other netif in this case, as that could result in - * zone boundary violations. */ - return NULL; - } - - /* We come here only if neither source nor destination is scoped. */ - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(src); - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE - netif = LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE(src, dest); - - if (netif != NULL) { - return netif; - } -#endif - - /* See if the destination subnet matches a configured address. In accordance - * with RFC 5942, dynamically configured addresses do not have an implied - * local subnet, and thus should be considered /128 assignments. However, as - * such, the destination address may still match a local address, and so we - * still need to check for exact matches here. By (lwIP) policy, statically - * configured addresses do always have an implied local /64 subnet. */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (!netif_is_up(netif) || !netif_is_link_up(netif)) { - continue; - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && - ip6_addr_netcmp(dest, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i)) && - (netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) || - ip6_addr_nethostcmp(dest, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i)))) { - return netif; - } - } - } - - /* Get the netif for a suitable router-announced route. */ - netif = nd6_find_route(dest); - - if (netif != NULL) { - return netif; - } - - /* Try with the netif that matches the source address. Given the earlier rule - * for scoped source addresses, this applies to unscoped addresses only. */ - if (!ip6_addr_isany(src)) { - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (!netif_is_up(netif) || !netif_is_link_up(netif)) { - continue; - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && - ip6_addr_cmp(src, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { - return netif; - } - } - } - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - - /* loopif is disabled, loopback traffic is passed through any netif */ - if (ip6_addr_isloopback(dest)) { - /* don't check for link on loopback traffic */ - if (netif_default != NULL && netif_is_up(netif_default)) { - return netif_default; - } - - /* default netif is not up, just use any netif for loopback traffic */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (netif_is_up(netif)) { - return netif; - } - } - return NULL; - } -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ -#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ - - /* no matching netif found, use default netif, if up */ - if ((netif_default == NULL) || !netif_is_up(netif_default) || !netif_is_link_up(netif_default)) { - return NULL; - } - return netif_default; -} - -/** - * @ingroup ip6 - * Select the best IPv6 source address for a given destination IPv6 address. - * - * This implementation follows RFC 6724 Sec. 5 to the following extent: - * - Rules 1, 2, 3: fully implemented - * - Rules 4, 5, 5.5: not applicable - * - Rule 6: not implemented - * - Rule 7: not applicable - * - Rule 8: limited to "prefer /64 subnet match over non-match" - * - * For Rule 2, we deliberately deviate from RFC 6724 Sec. 3.1 by considering - * ULAs to be of smaller scope than global addresses, to avoid that a preferred - * ULA is picked over a deprecated global address when given a global address - * as destination, as that would likely result in broken two-way communication. - * - * As long as temporary addresses are not supported (as used in Rule 7), a - * proper implementation of Rule 8 would obviate the need to implement Rule 6. - * - * @param netif the netif on which to send a packet - * @param dest the destination we are trying to reach (possibly not properly - * zoned) - * @return the most suitable source address to use, or NULL if no suitable - * source address is found - */ -const ip_addr_t *ip6_select_source_address(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest) -{ - const ip_addr_t *best_addr; - const ip6_addr_t *cand_addr; - s8_t dest_scope, cand_scope; - s8_t best_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVED; - u8_t i, cand_pref, cand_bits; - u8_t best_pref = 0; - u8_t best_bits = 0; - - /* Start by determining the scope of the given destination address. These - * tests are hopefully (roughly) in order of likeliness to match. */ - if (ip6_addr_isglobal(dest)) { - dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_GLOBAL; - } else if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(dest) || ip6_addr_isloopback(dest)) { - dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_LINK_LOCAL; - } else if (ip6_addr_isuniquelocal(dest)) { - dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_ORGANIZATION_LOCAL; - } else if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(dest)) { - dest_scope = ip6_addr_multicast_scope(dest); - } else if (ip6_addr_issitelocal(dest)) { - dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_SITE_LOCAL; - } else { - /* no match, consider scope global */ - dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_GLOBAL; - } - - best_addr = NULL; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - /* Consider only valid (= preferred and deprecated) addresses. */ - if (!ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { - continue; - } - - /* Determine the scope of this candidate address. Same ordering idea. */ - cand_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, i); - - if (ip6_addr_isglobal(cand_addr)) { - cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_GLOBAL; - } else if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(cand_addr)) { - cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_LINK_LOCAL; - } else if (ip6_addr_isuniquelocal(cand_addr)) { - cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_ORGANIZATION_LOCAL; - } else if (ip6_addr_issitelocal(cand_addr)) { - cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_SITE_LOCAL; - } else { - /* no match, treat as low-priority global scope */ - cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVEDF; - } - - cand_pref = ip6_addr_ispreferred(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)); - /* @todo compute the actual common bits, for longest matching prefix. */ - /* We cannot count on the destination address having a proper zone - * assignment, so do not compare zones in this case. */ - cand_bits = ip6_addr_netcmp_zoneless(cand_addr, dest); /* just 1 or 0 for now */ - - if (cand_bits && ip6_addr_nethostcmp(cand_addr, dest)) { - return netif_ip_addr6(netif, i); /* Rule 1 */ - } - - if ((best_addr == NULL) || /* no alternative yet */ - ((cand_scope < best_scope) && (cand_scope >= dest_scope)) || - ((cand_scope > best_scope) && (best_scope < dest_scope)) || /* Rule 2 */ - ((cand_scope == best_scope) && ((cand_pref > best_pref) || /* Rule 3 */ - ((cand_pref == best_pref) && (cand_bits > best_bits))))) /* Rule 8 */ - { - /* We found a new "winning" candidate. */ - best_addr = netif_ip_addr6(netif, i); - best_scope = cand_scope; - best_pref = cand_pref; - best_bits = cand_bits; - } - } - - return best_addr; /* may be NULL */ -} - -#if LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD -/** - * Forwards an IPv6 packet. It finds an appropriate route for the - * packet, decrements the HL value of the packet, and outputs - * the packet on the appropriate interface. - * - * @param p the packet to forward (p->payload points to IP header) - * @param iphdr the IPv6 header of the input packet - * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received - */ -static void ip6_forward(struct pbuf *p, struct ip6_hdr *iphdr, struct netif *inp) -{ - struct netif *netif; - - /* do not forward link-local or loopback addresses */ - if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_dest_addr()) || - ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: not forwarding link-local address.\n")); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - return; - } - - /* Find network interface where to forward this IP packet to. */ - netif = ip6_route(IP6_ADDR_ANY6, ip6_current_dest_addr()); - - if (netif == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: no route for %" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F "\n", - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(ip6_current_dest_addr()))); -#if LWIP_ICMP6 - - /* Don't send ICMP messages in response to ICMP messages */ - if (IP6H_NEXTH(iphdr) != IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) { - icmp6_dest_unreach(p, ICMP6_DUR_NO_ROUTE); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 */ - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - return; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - /* Do not forward packets with a zoned (e.g., link-local) source address - * outside of their zone. We determined the zone a bit earlier, so we know - * that the address is properly zoned here, so we can safely use has_zone. - * Also skip packets with a loopback source address (link-local implied). */ - if ((ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6_current_src_addr()) && - !ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6_current_src_addr(), netif)) || - ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6_current_src_addr())) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: not forwarding packet beyond its source address zone.\n")); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - return; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - /* Do not forward packets onto the same network interface on which - * they arrived. */ - if (netif == inp) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: not bouncing packets back on incoming interface.\n")); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - return; - } - - /* decrement HL */ - IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(iphdr, IP6H_HOPLIM(iphdr) - 1); - - /* send ICMP6 if HL == 0 */ - if (IP6H_HOPLIM(iphdr) == 0) { -#if LWIP_ICMP6 - - /* Don't send ICMP messages in response to ICMP messages */ - if (IP6H_NEXTH(iphdr) != IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) { - icmp6_time_exceeded(p, ICMP6_TE_HL); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 */ - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - return; - } - - if (netif->mtu && (p->tot_len > netif->mtu)) { -#if LWIP_ICMP6 - - /* Don't send ICMP messages in response to ICMP messages */ - if (IP6H_NEXTH(iphdr) != IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) { - icmp6_packet_too_big(p, netif->mtu); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 */ - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - return; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: forwarding packet to %" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F "\n", - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(ip6_current_dest_addr()), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(ip6_current_dest_addr()))); - - /* transmit pbuf on chosen interface */ - netif->output_ip6(netif, p, ip6_current_dest_addr()); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.fw); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.xmit); - return; -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD */ - -/** Return true if the current input packet should be accepted on this netif */ -static int ip6_input_accept(struct netif *netif) -{ - /* interface is up? */ - if (netif_is_up(netif)) { - u8_t i; - - /* unicast to this interface address? address configured? */ - /* If custom scopes are used, the destination zone will be tested as - * part of the local-address comparison, but we need to test the source - * scope as well (e.g., is this interface on the same link?). */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && - ip6_addr_cmp(ip6_current_dest_addr(), netif_ip6_addr(netif, i)) -#if IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES - && (!ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6_current_src_addr()) || - ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6_current_src_addr(), netif)) -#endif /* IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES */ - ) { - /* accept on this netif */ - return 1; - } - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * This function is called by the network interface device driver when - * an IPv6 packet is received. The function does the basic checks of the - * IP header such as packet size being at least larger than the header - * size etc. If the packet was not destined for us, the packet is - * forwarded (using ip6_forward). - * - * Finally, the packet is sent to the upper layer protocol input function. - * - * @param p the received IPv6 packet (p->payload points to IPv6 header) - * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received - * @return ERR_OK if the packet was processed (could return ERR_* if it wasn't - * processed, but currently always returns ERR_OK) - */ -err_t ip6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; - struct netif *netif; - const u8_t *nexth; - u16_t hlen, hlen_tot; /* the current header length */ -#if 0 /*IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING*/ - @todo - int check_ip_src = 1; -#endif /* IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING */ -#if LWIP_RAW - raw_input_state_t raw_status; -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.recv); - - /* identify the IP header */ - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; - - if (IP6H_V(ip6hdr) != 6) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("IPv6 packet dropped due to bad version number %" U32_F "\n", - IP6H_V(ip6hdr))); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.err); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - return ERR_OK; - } - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP6_INPUT - - if (LWIP_HOOK_IP6_INPUT(p, inp)) { - /* the packet has been eaten */ - return ERR_OK; - } - -#endif - - /* header length exceeds first pbuf length, or ip length exceeds total pbuf length? */ - if ((IP6_HLEN > p->len) || (IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr) > (p->tot_len - IP6_HLEN))) { - if (IP6_HLEN > p->len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("IPv6 header (len %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IP packet dropped.\n", - (u16_t)IP6_HLEN, p->len)); - } - - if ((IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr) + IP6_HLEN) > p->tot_len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("IPv6 (plen %" U16_F ") is longer than pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IP packet dropped.\n", - (u16_t)(IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr) + IP6_HLEN), p->tot_len)); - } - - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.lenerr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Trim pbuf. This should have been done at the netif layer, - * but we'll do it anyway just to be sure that its done. */ - pbuf_realloc(p, (u16_t)(IP6_HLEN + IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr))); - - /* copy IP addresses to aligned ip6_addr_t */ - ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(ip_data.current_iphdr_dest, ip6hdr->dest); - ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(ip_data.current_iphdr_src, ip6hdr->src); - - /* Don't accept virtual IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses. - * Don't accept multicast source addresses. */ - if (ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest)) || - ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src)) || - ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src))) { - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.err); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Set the appropriate zone identifier on the addresses. */ - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest), IP6_UNKNOWN, inp); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src), IP6_UNICAST, inp); - - /* current header pointer. */ - ip_data.current_ip6_header = ip6hdr; - - /* In netif, used in case we need to send ICMPv6 packets back. */ - ip_data.current_netif = inp; - ip_data.current_input_netif = inp; - - /* match packet against an interface, i.e. is this packet for us? */ - if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - /* Always joined to multicast if-local and link-local all-nodes group. */ - if (ip6_addr_isallnodes_iflocal(ip6_current_dest_addr()) || - ip6_addr_isallnodes_linklocal(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - netif = inp; - } -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD - else if (mld6_lookfor_group(inp, ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - netif = inp; - } -#else /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - else if (ip6_addr_issolicitednode(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - u8_t i; - /* Filter solicited node packets when MLD is not enabled - * (for Neighbor discovery). */ - netif = NULL; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && - ip6_addr_cmp_solicitednode(ip6_current_dest_addr(), netif_ip6_addr(inp, i))) { - netif = inp; - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: solicited node packet accepted on interface %c%c\n", - netif->name[0], netif->name[1])); - break; - } - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - else { - netif = NULL; - } - } else { - /* start trying with inp. if that's not acceptable, start walking the - list of configured netifs. */ - if (ip6_input_accept(inp)) { - netif = inp; - } else { - netif = NULL; -#if !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES - - /* Shortcut: stop looking for other interfaces if either the source or - * the destination has a scope constrained to this interface. Custom - * scopes may break the 1:1 link/interface mapping, however. */ - if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_dest_addr()) || - ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_src_addr())) { - goto netif_found; - } - -#endif /* !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES */ -#if !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - - /* The loopback address is to be considered link-local. Packets to it - * should be dropped on other interfaces, as per RFC 4291 Sec. 2.5.3. - * Its implied scope means packets *from* the loopback address should - * not be accepted on other interfaces, either. These requirements - * cannot be implemented in the case that loopback traffic is sent - * across a non-loopback interface, however. */ - if (ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6_current_dest_addr()) || - ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6_current_src_addr())) { - goto netif_found; - } - -#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ -#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (netif == inp) { - /* we checked that before already */ - continue; - } - - if (ip6_input_accept(netif)) { - break; - } - } -#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ - } - - netif_found: - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet accepted on interface %c%c\n", - netif ? netif->name[0] : 'X', netif ? netif->name[1] : 'X')); - } - - /* "::" packet source address? (used in duplicate address detection) */ - if (ip6_addr_isany(ip6_current_src_addr()) && - (!ip6_addr_issolicitednode(ip6_current_dest_addr()))) { - /* packet source is not valid */ - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with src ANY_ADDRESS dropped\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - - /* packet not for us? */ - if (netif == NULL) { - /* packet not for us, route or discard */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ip6_input: packet not for us.\n")); -#if LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD - - /* non-multicast packet? */ - if (!ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - /* try to forward IP packet on (other) interfaces */ - ip6_forward(p, ip6hdr, inp); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD */ - pbuf_free(p); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - - /* current netif pointer. */ - ip_data.current_netif = netif; - - /* Save next header type. */ - nexth = &IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr); - - /* Init header length. */ - hlen = hlen_tot = IP6_HLEN; - - /* Move to payload. */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, IP6_HLEN); - - /* Process known option extension headers, if present. */ - while (*nexth != IP6_NEXTH_NONE) { - switch (*nexth) { - case IP6_NEXTH_HOPBYHOP: { - s32_t opt_offset; - struct ip6_hbh_hdr *hbh_hdr; - struct ip6_opt_hdr *opt_hdr; - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Hop-by-Hop options header\n")); - - /* Get and check the header length, while staying in packet bounds. */ - hbh_hdr = (struct ip6_hbh_hdr *)p->payload; - - /* Get next header type. */ - nexth = &IP6_HBH_NEXTH(hbh_hdr); - - /* Get the header length. */ - hlen = (u16_t)(8 * (1 + hbh_hdr->_hlen)); - - if ((p->len < 8) || (hlen > p->len)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("IPv6 options header (hlen %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IPv6 packet dropped.\n", - hlen, p->len)); - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.lenerr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - - hlen_tot = (u16_t)(hlen_tot + hlen); - - /* The extended option header starts right after Hop-by-Hop header. */ - opt_offset = IP6_HBH_HLEN; - - while (opt_offset < hlen) { - s32_t opt_dlen = 0; - - opt_hdr = (struct ip6_opt_hdr *)((u8_t *)hbh_hdr + opt_offset); - - switch (IP6_OPT_TYPE(opt_hdr)) { - /* @todo: process IPV6 Hop-by-Hop option data */ - case IP6_PAD1_OPTION: - /* PAD1 option doesn't have length and value field */ - opt_dlen = -1; - break; - - case IP6_PADN_OPTION: - opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - break; - - case IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_OPTION: - opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - break; - - case IP6_JUMBO_OPTION: - opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - break; - - default: - - /* Check 2 MSB of Hop-by-Hop header type. */ - switch (IP6_OPT_TYPE_ACTION(opt_hdr)) { - case 1: - /* Discard the packet. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid Hop-by-Hop option type dropped.\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - - case 2: - /* Send ICMP Parameter Problem */ - icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_OPTION, opt_hdr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid Hop-by-Hop option type dropped.\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - - case 3: - - /* Send ICMP Parameter Problem if destination address is not a multicast address */ - if (!ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_OPTION, opt_hdr); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid Hop-by-Hop option type dropped.\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - - default: - /* Skip over this option. */ - opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - break; - } - - break; - } - - /* Adjust the offset to move to the next extended option header */ - opt_offset = opt_offset + IP6_OPT_HLEN + opt_dlen; - } - - pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen); - break; - } - - case IP6_NEXTH_DESTOPTS: { - s32_t opt_offset; - struct ip6_dest_hdr *dest_hdr; - struct ip6_opt_hdr *opt_hdr; - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Destination options header\n")); - - dest_hdr = (struct ip6_dest_hdr *)p->payload; - - /* Get next header type. */ - nexth = &IP6_DEST_NEXTH(dest_hdr); - - /* Get the header length. */ - hlen = 8 * (1 + dest_hdr->_hlen); - - if ((p->len < 8) || (hlen > p->len)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("IPv6 options header (hlen %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IPv6 packet dropped.\n", - hlen, p->len)); - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.lenerr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - - hlen_tot = (u16_t)(hlen_tot + hlen); - - /* The extended option header starts right after Destination header. */ - opt_offset = IP6_DEST_HLEN; - - while (opt_offset < hlen) { - s32_t opt_dlen = 0; - - opt_hdr = (struct ip6_opt_hdr *)((u8_t *)dest_hdr + opt_offset); - - switch (IP6_OPT_TYPE(opt_hdr)) { - /* @todo: process IPV6 Destination option data */ - case IP6_PAD1_OPTION: - /* PAD1 option deosn't have length and value field */ - opt_dlen = -1; - break; - - case IP6_PADN_OPTION: - opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - break; - - case IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_OPTION: - opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - break; - - case IP6_JUMBO_OPTION: - opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - break; - - case IP6_HOME_ADDRESS_OPTION: - opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - break; - - default: - - /* Check 2 MSB of Destination header type. */ - switch (IP6_OPT_TYPE_ACTION(opt_hdr)) { - case 1: - /* Discard the packet. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid destination option type dropped.\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - - case 2: - /* Send ICMP Parameter Problem */ - icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_OPTION, opt_hdr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid destination option type dropped.\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - - case 3: - - /* Send ICMP Parameter Problem if destination address is not a multicast address */ - if (!ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_OPTION, opt_hdr); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid destination option type dropped.\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - - default: - /* Skip over this option. */ - opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - break; - } - - break; - } - - /* Adjust the offset to move to the next extended option header */ - opt_offset = opt_offset + IP6_OPT_HLEN + opt_dlen; - } - - pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen); - break; - } - - case IP6_NEXTH_ROUTING: { - struct ip6_rout_hdr *rout_hdr; - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Routing header\n")); - - rout_hdr = (struct ip6_rout_hdr *)p->payload; - - /* Get next header type. */ - nexth = &IP6_ROUT_NEXTH(rout_hdr); - - /* Get the header length. */ - hlen = 8 * (1 + rout_hdr->_hlen); - - if ((p->len < 8) || (hlen > p->len)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("IPv6 options header (hlen %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IPv6 packet dropped.\n", - hlen, p->len)); - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.lenerr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - - /* Skip over this header. */ - hlen_tot = (u16_t)(hlen_tot + hlen); - - /* if segment left value is 0 in routing header, ignore the option */ - if (IP6_ROUT_SEG_LEFT(rout_hdr)) { - /* The length field of routing option header must be even */ - if (rout_hdr->_hlen & 0x1) { - /* Discard and send parameter field error */ - icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_FIELD, &rout_hdr->_hlen); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid routing type dropped\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - - switch (IP6_ROUT_TYPE(rout_hdr)) { - /* TODO: process routing by the type */ - case IP6_ROUT_TYPE2: - break; - - case IP6_ROUT_RPL: - break; - - default: - /* Discard unrecognized routing type and send parameter field error */ - icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_FIELD, &IP6_ROUT_TYPE(rout_hdr)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid routing type dropped\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - } - - pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen); - break; - } - - case IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT: { - struct ip6_frag_hdr *frag_hdr; - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Fragment header\n")); - - frag_hdr = (struct ip6_frag_hdr *)p->payload; - - /* Get next header type. */ - nexth = &IP6_FRAG_NEXTH(frag_hdr); - - /* Fragment Header length. */ - hlen = 8; - - /* Make sure this header fits in current pbuf. */ - if (hlen > p->len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("IPv6 options header (hlen %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IPv6 packet dropped.\n", - hlen, p->len)); - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.lenerr); - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - - hlen_tot = (u16_t)(hlen_tot + hlen); - - /* check payload length is multiple of 8 octets when mbit is set */ - if (IP6_FRAG_MBIT(frag_hdr) && (IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr) & 0x7)) { - /* ipv6 payload length is not multiple of 8 octets */ - icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_FIELD, LWIP_PACKED_CAST(const void *, &ip6hdr->_plen)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid payload length dropped\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - - /* Offset == 0 and more_fragments == 0? */ - if ((frag_hdr->_fragment_offset & - PP_HTONS(IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK | IP6_FRAG_MORE_FLAG)) == 0) { - /* This is a 1-fragment packet. Skip this header and continue. */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen); - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV6_REASS - /* reassemble the packet */ - ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = hlen_tot; - p = ip6_reass(p); - - /* packet not fully reassembled yet? */ - if (p == NULL) { - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - - /* Returned p point to IPv6 header. - * Update all our variables and pointers and continue. */ - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; - nexth = &IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr); - hlen = hlen_tot = IP6_HLEN; - pbuf_remove_header(p, IP6_HLEN); - -#else /* LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ - /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Fragment header dropped (with LWIP_IPV6_REASS==0)\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.opterr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ - } - - break; - } - - default: - goto options_done; - } - - if (*nexth == IP6_NEXTH_HOPBYHOP) { - /* Hop-by-Hop header comes only as a first option */ - icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_HEADER, nexth); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Hop-by-Hop options header dropped (only valid as a first option)\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - goto ip6_input_cleanup; - } - } - -options_done: - - /* send to upper layers */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: \n")); - ip6_debug_print(p); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: p->len %" U16_F " p->tot_len %" U16_F "\n", p->len, p->tot_len)); - - ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = hlen_tot; - -#if LWIP_RAW - /* p points to IPv6 header again for raw_input. */ - pbuf_add_header_force(p, hlen_tot); - /* raw input did not eat the packet? */ - raw_status = raw_input(p, inp); - - if (raw_status != RAW_INPUT_EATEN) { - /* Point to payload. */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen_tot); -#else /* LWIP_RAW */ - { -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ - - switch (*nexth) { - case IP6_NEXTH_NONE: - pbuf_free(p); - break; -#if LWIP_UDP - - case IP6_NEXTH_UDP: -#if LWIP_UDPLITE - case IP6_NEXTH_UDPLITE: -#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ - udp_input(p, inp); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_TCP - - case IP6_NEXTH_TCP: - tcp_input(p, inp); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_ICMP6 - - case IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6: - icmp6_input(p, inp); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ - - default: -#if LWIP_RAW - if (raw_status == RAW_INPUT_DELIVERED) { - /* @todo: ipv6 mib in-delivers? */ - } else -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ - { -#if LWIP_ICMP6 - /* p points to IPv6 header again for raw_input. */ - pbuf_add_header_force(p, hlen_tot); - - /* send ICMP parameter problem unless it was a multicast or ICMPv6 */ - if ((!ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) && - (IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr) != IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6)) { - icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_HEADER, nexth); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip6_input: Unsupported transport protocol %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr))); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.proterr); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - break; - } - } - -ip6_input_cleanup: - ip_data.current_netif = NULL; - ip_data.current_input_netif = NULL; - ip_data.current_ip6_header = NULL; - ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = 0; - ip6_addr_set_zero(ip6_current_src_addr()); - ip6_addr_set_zero(ip6_current_dest_addr()); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Sends an IPv6 packet on a network interface. This function constructs - * the IPv6 header. If the source IPv6 address is NULL, the IPv6 "ANY" address is - * used as source (usually during network startup). If the source IPv6 address it - * IP6_ADDR_ANY, the most appropriate IPv6 address of the outgoing network - * interface is filled in as source address. If the destination IPv6 address is - * LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p is assumed to already include an IPv6 header and - * p->payload points to it instead of the data. - * - * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next - protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an - IPv6 header and p->payload points to that IPv6 header) - * @param src the source IPv6 address to send from (if src == IP6_ADDR_ANY, an - * IP address of the netif is selected and used as source address. - * if src == NULL, IP6_ADDR_ANY is used as source) (src is possibly not - * properly zoned) - * @param dest the destination IPv6 address to send the packet to (possibly not - * properly zoned) - * @param hl the Hop Limit value to be set in the IPv6 header - * @param tc the Traffic Class value to be set in the IPv6 header - * @param nexth the Next Header to be set in the IPv6 header - * @param netif the netif on which to send this packet - * @return ERR_OK if the packet was sent OK - * ERR_BUF if p doesn't have enough space for IPv6/LINK headers - * returns errors returned by netif->output_ip6 - */ -err_t ip6_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, - u8_t hl, u8_t tc, - u8_t nexth, struct netif *netif) -{ - const ip6_addr_t *src_used = src; - - if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { - if (src != NULL && ip6_addr_isany(src)) { - src_used = ip_2_ip6(ip6_select_source_address(netif, dest)); - - if ((src_used == NULL) || ip6_addr_isany(src_used)) { - /* No appropriate source address was found for this packet. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip6_output: No suitable source address for packet.\n")); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); - return ERR_RTE; - } - } - } - - return ip6_output_if_src(p, src_used, dest, hl, tc, nexth, netif); -} - -/** - * Same as ip6_output_if() but 'src' address is not replaced by netif address - * when it is 'any'. - */ -err_t ip6_output_if_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, - u8_t hl, u8_t tc, - u8_t nexth, struct netif *netif) -{ - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; - ip6_addr_t dest_addr; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); - - /* Should the IPv6 header be generated or is it already included in p? */ - if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - /* If the destination address is scoped but lacks a zone, add a zone now, - * based on the outgoing interface. The lower layers (e.g., nd6) absolutely - * require addresses to be properly zoned for correctness. In some cases, - * earlier attempts will have been made to add a zone to the destination, - * but this function is the only one that is called in all (other) cases, - * so we must do this here. */ - if (ip6_addr_lacks_zone(dest, IP6_UNKNOWN)) { - ip6_addr_copy(dest_addr, *dest); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&dest_addr, IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); - dest = &dest_addr; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - /* generate IPv6 header */ - if (pbuf_add_header(p, IP6_HLEN)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip6_output: not enough room for IPv6 header in pbuf\n")); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.err); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; - LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct ip6_hdr", - (p->len >= sizeof(struct ip6_hdr))); - - IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, hl); - IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, nexth); - - /* dest cannot be NULL here */ - ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(ip6hdr->dest, *dest); - - IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, tc, 0); - IP6H_PLEN_SET(ip6hdr, (u16_t)(p->tot_len - IP6_HLEN)); - - if (src == NULL) { - src = IP6_ADDR_ANY6; - } - - /* src cannot be NULL here */ - ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(ip6hdr->src, *src); - - } else { - /* IP header already included in p */ - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest_addr, ip6hdr->dest); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&dest_addr, IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); - dest = &dest_addr; - } - - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.xmit); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_output_if: %c%c%" U16_F "\n", netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); - ip6_debug_print(p); - -#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK - { - int i; -#if !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - - if (ip6_addr_isloopback(dest)) { - return netif_loop_output(netif, p); - } - -#endif /* !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && - ip6_addr_cmp(dest, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { - /* Packet to self, enqueue it for loopback */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("netif_loop_output()\n")); - return netif_loop_output(netif, p); - } - } - } -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - - if ((p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP) != 0) { - netif_loop_output(netif, p); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ -#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_FRAG - - /* don't fragment if interface has mtu set to 0 [loopif] */ - if (netif_mtu6(netif) && (p->tot_len > nd6_get_destination_mtu(dest, netif))) { - return ip6_frag(p, netif, dest); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_FRAG */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("netif->output_ip6()\n")); - return netif->output_ip6(netif, p, dest); -} - -/** - * Simple interface to ip6_output_if. It finds the outgoing network - * interface and calls upon ip6_output_if to do the actual work. - * - * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next - protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an - IPv6 header and p->payload points to that IPv6 header) - * @param src the source IPv6 address to send from (if src == IP6_ADDR_ANY, an - * IP address of the netif is selected and used as source address. - * if src == NULL, IP6_ADDR_ANY is used as source) - * @param dest the destination IPv6 address to send the packet to - * @param hl the Hop Limit value to be set in the IPv6 header - * @param tc the Traffic Class value to be set in the IPv6 header - * @param nexth the Next Header to be set in the IPv6 header - * - * @return ERR_RTE if no route is found - * see ip_output_if() for more return values - */ -err_t ip6_output(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, - u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth) -{ - struct netif *netif; - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; - ip6_addr_t src_addr, dest_addr; - - LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); - - if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { - netif = ip6_route(src, dest); - } else { - /* IP header included in p, read addresses. */ - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(src_addr, ip6hdr->src); - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest_addr, ip6hdr->dest); - netif = ip6_route(&src_addr, &dest_addr); - } - - if (netif == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_output: no route for %" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F "\n", - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(dest))); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); - return ERR_RTE; - } - - return ip6_output_if(p, src, dest, hl, tc, nexth, netif); -} - -#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS -/** Like ip6_output, but takes and addr_hint pointer that is passed on to netif->addr_hint - * before calling ip6_output_if. - * - * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next - protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an - IPv6 header and p->payload points to that IPv6 header) - * @param src the source IPv6 address to send from (if src == IP6_ADDR_ANY, an - * IP address of the netif is selected and used as source address. - * if src == NULL, IP6_ADDR_ANY is used as source) - * @param dest the destination IPv6 address to send the packet to - * @param hl the Hop Limit value to be set in the IPv6 header - * @param tc the Traffic Class value to be set in the IPv6 header - * @param nexth the Next Header to be set in the IPv6 header - * @param netif_hint netif output hint pointer set to netif->hint before - * calling ip_output_if() - * - * @return ERR_RTE if no route is found - * see ip_output_if() for more return values - */ -err_t ip6_output_hinted(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, - u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth, struct netif_hint *netif_hint) -{ - struct netif *netif; - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; - ip6_addr_t src_addr, dest_addr; - err_t err; - - LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); - - if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { - netif = ip6_route(src, dest); - } else { - /* IP header included in p, read addresses. */ - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(src_addr, ip6hdr->src); - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest_addr, ip6hdr->dest); - netif = ip6_route(&src_addr, &dest_addr); - } - - if (netif == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_output: no route for %" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F "\n", - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(dest), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(dest))); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); - return ERR_RTE; - } - - NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, netif_hint); - err = ip6_output_if(p, src, dest, hl, tc, nexth, netif); - NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); - - return err; -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS*/ - -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD -/** - * Add a hop-by-hop options header with a router alert option and padding. - * - * Used by MLD when sending a Multicast listener report/done message. - * - * @param p the packet to which we will prepend the options header - * @param nexth the next header protocol number (e.g. IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) - * @param value the value of the router alert option data (e.g. IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_VALUE_MLD) - * @return ERR_OK if hop-by-hop header was added, ERR_* otherwise - */ -err_t ip6_options_add_hbh_ra(struct pbuf *p, u8_t nexth, u8_t value) -{ - u8_t *opt_data; - u32_t offset = 0; - struct ip6_hbh_hdr *hbh_hdr; - struct ip6_opt_hdr *opt_hdr; - - /* fixed 4 bytes for router alert option and 2 bytes padding */ - const u8_t hlen = (sizeof(struct ip6_opt_hdr) * 2) + IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_DLEN; - - /* Move pointer to make room for hop-by-hop options header. */ - if (pbuf_add_header(p, sizeof(struct ip6_hbh_hdr) + hlen)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_options: no space for options header\n")); - IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.err); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - /* Set fields of Hop-by-Hop header */ - hbh_hdr = (struct ip6_hbh_hdr *)p->payload; - IP6_HBH_NEXTH(hbh_hdr) = nexth; - hbh_hdr->_hlen = 0; - offset = IP6_HBH_HLEN; - - /* Set router alert options to Hop-by-Hop extended option header */ - opt_hdr = (struct ip6_opt_hdr *)((u8_t *)hbh_hdr + offset); - IP6_OPT_TYPE(opt_hdr) = IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_OPTION; - IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr) = IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_DLEN; - offset += IP6_OPT_HLEN; - - /* Set router alert option data */ - opt_data = (u8_t *)hbh_hdr + offset; - opt_data[0] = value; - opt_data[1] = 0; - offset += IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); - - /* add 2 bytes padding to make 8 bytes Hop-by-Hop header length */ - opt_hdr = (struct ip6_opt_hdr *)((u8_t *)hbh_hdr + offset); - IP6_OPT_TYPE(opt_hdr) = IP6_PADN_OPTION; - IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr) = 0; - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - -#if IP6_DEBUG -/* Print an IPv6 header by using LWIP_DEBUGF - * @param p an IPv6 packet, p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header - */ -void ip6_debug_print(struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("IPv6 header:\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %2" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %7" U32_F " | (ver, class, flow)\n", - IP6H_V(ip6hdr), - IP6H_TC(ip6hdr), - IP6H_FL(ip6hdr))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | (plen, nexth, hopl)\n", - IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr), - IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr), - IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | (src)\n", - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(&(ip6hdr->src)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(&(ip6hdr->src)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(&(ip6hdr->src)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(&(ip6hdr->src)))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " |\n", - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(&(ip6hdr->src)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(&(ip6hdr->src)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(&(ip6hdr->src)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(&(ip6hdr->src)))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | (dest)\n", - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(&(ip6hdr->dest)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(&(ip6hdr->dest)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(&(ip6hdr->dest)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(&(ip6hdr->dest)))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " |\n", - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(&(ip6hdr->dest)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(&(ip6hdr->dest)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(&(ip6hdr->dest)), - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(&(ip6hdr->dest)))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); -} -#endif /* IP6_DEBUG */ - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * + * IPv6 layer. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_frag.h" +#include "lwip/icmp6.h" +#include "lwip/priv/raw_priv.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +#include "lwip/debug.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +/** + * Finds the appropriate network interface for a given IPv6 address. It tries to select + * a netif following a sequence of heuristics: + * 1) if there is only 1 netif, return it + * 2) if the destination is a zoned address, match its zone to a netif + * 3) if the either the source or destination address is a scoped address, + * match the source address's zone (if set) or address (if not) to a netif + * 4) tries to match the destination subnet to a configured address + * 5) tries to find a router-announced route + * 6) tries to match the (unscoped) source address to the netif + * 7) returns the default netif, if configured + * + * Note that each of the two given addresses may or may not be properly zoned. + * + * @param src the source IPv6 address, if known + * @param dest the destination IPv6 address for which to find the route + * @return the netif on which to send to reach dest + */ +struct netif * +ip6_route(const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest) +{ +#if LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(src); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dest); +#else /* LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ + struct netif *netif; + s8_t i; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* If single netif configuration, fast return. */ + if ((netif_list != NULL) && (netif_list->next == NULL)) { + if (!netif_is_up(netif_list) || !netif_is_link_up(netif_list) || + (ip6_addr_has_zone(dest) && !ip6_addr_test_zone(dest, netif_list))) { + return NULL; + } + + return netif_list; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + /* Special processing for zoned destination addresses. This includes link- + * local unicast addresses and interface/link-local multicast addresses. Use + * the zone to find a matching netif. If the address is not zoned, then there + * is technically no "wrong" netif to choose, and we leave routing to other + * rules; in most cases this should be the scoped-source rule below. */ + if (ip6_addr_has_zone(dest)) { + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(dest); + /* Find a netif based on the zone. For custom mappings, one zone may map + * to multiple netifs, so find one that can actually send a packet. */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (ip6_addr_test_zone(dest, netif) && + netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif)) { + return netif; + } + } + /* No matching netif found. Do no try to route to a different netif, + * as that would be a zone violation, resulting in any packets sent to + * that netif being dropped on output. */ + return NULL; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + /* Special processing for scoped source and destination addresses. If we get + * here, the destination address does not have a zone, so either way we need + * to look at the source address, which may or may not have a zone. If it + * does, the zone is restrictive: there is (typically) only one matching + * netif for it, and we should avoid routing to any other netif as that would + * result in guaranteed zone violations. For scoped source addresses that do + * not have a zone, use (only) a netif that has that source address locally + * assigned. This case also applies to the loopback source address, which has + * an implied link-local scope. If only the destination address is scoped + * (but, again, not zoned), we still want to use only the source address to + * determine its zone because that's most likely what the user/application + * wants, regardless of whether the source address is scoped. Finally, some + * of this story also applies if scoping is disabled altogether. */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + if (ip6_addr_has_scope(dest, IP6_UNKNOWN) || + ip6_addr_has_scope(src, IP6_UNICAST) || +#else /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(dest) || ip6_addr_ismulticast_iflocal(dest) || + ip6_addr_ismulticast_linklocal(dest) || ip6_addr_islinklocal(src) || +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + ip6_addr_isloopback(src)) { +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + if (ip6_addr_has_zone(src)) { + /* Find a netif matching the source zone (relatively cheap). */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif) && + ip6_addr_test_zone(src, netif)) { + return netif; + } + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + { + /* Find a netif matching the source address (relatively expensive). */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (!netif_is_up(netif) || !netif_is_link_up(netif)) { + continue; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && + ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(src, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { + return netif; + } + } + } + } + + /* Again, do not use any other netif in this case, as that could result in + * zone boundary violations. */ + return NULL; + } + + /* We come here only if neither source nor destination is scoped. */ + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(src); + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE + netif = LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE(src, dest); + + if (netif != NULL) { + return netif; + } +#endif + + /* See if the destination subnet matches a configured address. In accordance + * with RFC 5942, dynamically configured addresses do not have an implied + * local subnet, and thus should be considered /128 assignments. However, as + * such, the destination address may still match a local address, and so we + * still need to check for exact matches here. By (lwIP) policy, statically + * configured addresses do always have an implied local /64 subnet. */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (!netif_is_up(netif) || !netif_is_link_up(netif)) { + continue; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && + ip6_addr_netcmp(dest, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i)) && + (netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) || + ip6_addr_nethostcmp(dest, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i)))) { + return netif; + } + } + } + + /* Get the netif for a suitable router-announced route. */ + netif = nd6_find_route(dest); + + if (netif != NULL) { + return netif; + } + + /* Try with the netif that matches the source address. Given the earlier rule + * for scoped source addresses, this applies to unscoped addresses only. */ + if (!ip6_addr_isany(src)) { + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (!netif_is_up(netif) || !netif_is_link_up(netif)) { + continue; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && + ip6_addr_cmp(src, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { + return netif; + } + } + } + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + + /* loopif is disabled, loopback traffic is passed through any netif */ + if (ip6_addr_isloopback(dest)) { + /* don't check for link on loopback traffic */ + if (netif_default != NULL && netif_is_up(netif_default)) { + return netif_default; + } + + /* default netif is not up, just use any netif for loopback traffic */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (netif_is_up(netif)) { + return netif; + } + } + return NULL; + } +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ +#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ + + /* no matching netif found, use default netif, if up */ + if ((netif_default == NULL) || !netif_is_up(netif_default) || !netif_is_link_up(netif_default)) { + return NULL; + } + return netif_default; +} + +/** + * @ingroup ip6 + * Select the best IPv6 source address for a given destination IPv6 address. + * + * This implementation follows RFC 6724 Sec. 5 to the following extent: + * - Rules 1, 2, 3: fully implemented + * - Rules 4, 5, 5.5: not applicable + * - Rule 6: not implemented + * - Rule 7: not applicable + * - Rule 8: limited to "prefer /64 subnet match over non-match" + * + * For Rule 2, we deliberately deviate from RFC 6724 Sec. 3.1 by considering + * ULAs to be of smaller scope than global addresses, to avoid that a preferred + * ULA is picked over a deprecated global address when given a global address + * as destination, as that would likely result in broken two-way communication. + * + * As long as temporary addresses are not supported (as used in Rule 7), a + * proper implementation of Rule 8 would obviate the need to implement Rule 6. + * + * @param netif the netif on which to send a packet + * @param dest the destination we are trying to reach (possibly not properly + * zoned) + * @return the most suitable source address to use, or NULL if no suitable + * source address is found + */ +const ip_addr_t *ip6_select_source_address(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest) +{ + const ip_addr_t *best_addr; + const ip6_addr_t *cand_addr; + s8_t dest_scope, cand_scope; + s8_t best_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVED; + u8_t i, cand_pref, cand_bits; + u8_t best_pref = 0; + u8_t best_bits = 0; + + /* Start by determining the scope of the given destination address. These + * tests are hopefully (roughly) in order of likeliness to match. */ + if (ip6_addr_isglobal(dest)) { + dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_GLOBAL; + } else if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(dest) || ip6_addr_isloopback(dest)) { + dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_LINK_LOCAL; + } else if (ip6_addr_isuniquelocal(dest)) { + dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_ORGANIZATION_LOCAL; + } else if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(dest)) { + dest_scope = ip6_addr_multicast_scope(dest); + } else if (ip6_addr_issitelocal(dest)) { + dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_SITE_LOCAL; + } else { + /* no match, consider scope global */ + dest_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_GLOBAL; + } + + best_addr = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + /* Consider only valid (= preferred and deprecated) addresses. */ + if (!ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { + continue; + } + + /* Determine the scope of this candidate address. Same ordering idea. */ + cand_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, i); + + if (ip6_addr_isglobal(cand_addr)) { + cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_GLOBAL; + } else if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(cand_addr)) { + cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_LINK_LOCAL; + } else if (ip6_addr_isuniquelocal(cand_addr)) { + cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_ORGANIZATION_LOCAL; + } else if (ip6_addr_issitelocal(cand_addr)) { + cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_SITE_LOCAL; + } else { + /* no match, treat as low-priority global scope */ + cand_scope = IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVEDF; + } + + cand_pref = ip6_addr_ispreferred(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)); + /* @todo compute the actual common bits, for longest matching prefix. */ + /* We cannot count on the destination address having a proper zone + * assignment, so do not compare zones in this case. */ + cand_bits = ip6_addr_netcmp_zoneless(cand_addr, dest); /* just 1 or 0 for now */ + + if (cand_bits && ip6_addr_nethostcmp(cand_addr, dest)) { + return netif_ip_addr6(netif, i); /* Rule 1 */ + } + + if ((best_addr == NULL) || /* no alternative yet */ + ((cand_scope < best_scope) && (cand_scope >= dest_scope)) || + ((cand_scope > best_scope) && (best_scope < dest_scope)) || /* Rule 2 */ + ((cand_scope == best_scope) && ((cand_pref > best_pref) || /* Rule 3 */ + ((cand_pref == best_pref) && (cand_bits > best_bits))))) /* Rule 8 */ + { + /* We found a new "winning" candidate. */ + best_addr = netif_ip_addr6(netif, i); + best_scope = cand_scope; + best_pref = cand_pref; + best_bits = cand_bits; + } + } + + return best_addr; /* may be NULL */ +} + +#if LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD +/** + * Forwards an IPv6 packet. It finds an appropriate route for the + * packet, decrements the HL value of the packet, and outputs + * the packet on the appropriate interface. + * + * @param p the packet to forward (p->payload points to IP header) + * @param iphdr the IPv6 header of the input packet + * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received + */ +static void ip6_forward(struct pbuf *p, struct ip6_hdr *iphdr, struct netif *inp) +{ + struct netif *netif; + + /* do not forward link-local or loopback addresses */ + if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_dest_addr()) || + ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: not forwarding link-local address.\n")); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + return; + } + + /* Find network interface where to forward this IP packet to. */ + netif = ip6_route(IP6_ADDR_ANY6, ip6_current_dest_addr()); + + if (netif == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: no route for %" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F "\n", + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(ip6_current_dest_addr()))); +#if LWIP_ICMP6 + + /* Don't send ICMP messages in response to ICMP messages */ + if (IP6H_NEXTH(iphdr) != IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) { + icmp6_dest_unreach(p, ICMP6_DUR_NO_ROUTE); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 */ + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + return; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + /* Do not forward packets with a zoned (e.g., link-local) source address + * outside of their zone. We determined the zone a bit earlier, so we know + * that the address is properly zoned here, so we can safely use has_zone. + * Also skip packets with a loopback source address (link-local implied). */ + if ((ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6_current_src_addr()) && + !ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6_current_src_addr(), netif)) || + ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6_current_src_addr())) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: not forwarding packet beyond its source address zone.\n")); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + return; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + /* Do not forward packets onto the same network interface on which + * they arrived. */ + if (netif == inp) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: not bouncing packets back on incoming interface.\n")); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + return; + } + + /* decrement HL */ + IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(iphdr, IP6H_HOPLIM(iphdr) - 1); + + /* send ICMP6 if HL == 0 */ + if (IP6H_HOPLIM(iphdr) == 0) { +#if LWIP_ICMP6 + + /* Don't send ICMP messages in response to ICMP messages */ + if (IP6H_NEXTH(iphdr) != IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) { + icmp6_time_exceeded(p, ICMP6_TE_HL); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 */ + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + return; + } + + if (netif->mtu && (p->tot_len > netif->mtu)) { +#if LWIP_ICMP6 + + /* Don't send ICMP messages in response to ICMP messages */ + if (IP6H_NEXTH(iphdr) != IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) { + icmp6_packet_too_big(p, netif->mtu); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 */ + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + return; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_forward: forwarding packet to %" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F "\n", + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(ip6_current_dest_addr()), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(ip6_current_dest_addr()))); + + /* transmit pbuf on chosen interface */ + netif->output_ip6(netif, p, ip6_current_dest_addr()); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.fw); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.xmit); + return; +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD */ + +/** Return true if the current input packet should be accepted on this netif */ +static int ip6_input_accept(struct netif *netif) +{ + /* interface is up? */ + if (netif_is_up(netif)) { + u8_t i; + + /* unicast to this interface address? address configured? */ + /* If custom scopes are used, the destination zone will be tested as + * part of the local-address comparison, but we need to test the source + * scope as well (e.g., is this interface on the same link?). */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && + ip6_addr_cmp(ip6_current_dest_addr(), netif_ip6_addr(netif, i)) +#if IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES + && (!ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6_current_src_addr()) || + ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6_current_src_addr(), netif)) +#endif /* IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES */ + ) { + /* accept on this netif */ + return 1; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * This function is called by the network interface device driver when + * an IPv6 packet is received. The function does the basic checks of the + * IP header such as packet size being at least larger than the header + * size etc. If the packet was not destined for us, the packet is + * forwarded (using ip6_forward). + * + * Finally, the packet is sent to the upper layer protocol input function. + * + * @param p the received IPv6 packet (p->payload points to IPv6 header) + * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received + * @return ERR_OK if the packet was processed (could return ERR_* if it wasn't + * processed, but currently always returns ERR_OK) + */ +err_t ip6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; + struct netif *netif; + const u8_t *nexth; + u16_t hlen, hlen_tot; /* the current header length */ +#if 0 /*IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING*/ + @todo + int check_ip_src = 1; +#endif /* IP_ACCEPT_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESSING */ +#if LWIP_RAW + raw_input_state_t raw_status; +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.recv); + + /* identify the IP header */ + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; + + if (IP6H_V(ip6hdr) != 6) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("IPv6 packet dropped due to bad version number %" U32_F "\n", + IP6H_V(ip6hdr))); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.err); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + return ERR_OK; + } + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP6_INPUT + + if (LWIP_HOOK_IP6_INPUT(p, inp)) { + /* the packet has been eaten */ + return ERR_OK; + } + +#endif + + /* header length exceeds first pbuf length, or ip length exceeds total pbuf length? */ + if ((IP6_HLEN > p->len) || (IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr) > (p->tot_len - IP6_HLEN))) { + if (IP6_HLEN > p->len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("IPv6 header (len %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IP packet dropped.\n", + (u16_t)IP6_HLEN, p->len)); + } + + if ((IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr) + IP6_HLEN) > p->tot_len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("IPv6 (plen %" U16_F ") is longer than pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IP packet dropped.\n", + (u16_t)(IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr) + IP6_HLEN), p->tot_len)); + } + + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.lenerr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Trim pbuf. This should have been done at the netif layer, + * but we'll do it anyway just to be sure that its done. */ + pbuf_realloc(p, (u16_t)(IP6_HLEN + IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr))); + + /* copy IP addresses to aligned ip6_addr_t */ + ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(ip_data.current_iphdr_dest, ip6hdr->dest); + ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(ip_data.current_iphdr_src, ip6hdr->src); + + /* Don't accept virtual IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses. + * Don't accept multicast source addresses. */ + if (ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest)) || + ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src)) || + ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src))) { + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.err); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Set the appropriate zone identifier on the addresses. */ + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest), IP6_UNKNOWN, inp); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src), IP6_UNICAST, inp); + + /* current header pointer. */ + ip_data.current_ip6_header = ip6hdr; + + /* In netif, used in case we need to send ICMPv6 packets back. */ + ip_data.current_netif = inp; + ip_data.current_input_netif = inp; + + /* match packet against an interface, i.e. is this packet for us? */ + if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + /* Always joined to multicast if-local and link-local all-nodes group. */ + if (ip6_addr_isallnodes_iflocal(ip6_current_dest_addr()) || + ip6_addr_isallnodes_linklocal(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + netif = inp; + } +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD + else if (mld6_lookfor_group(inp, ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + netif = inp; + } +#else /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + else if (ip6_addr_issolicitednode(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + u8_t i; + /* Filter solicited node packets when MLD is not enabled + * (for Neighbor discovery). */ + netif = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && + ip6_addr_cmp_solicitednode(ip6_current_dest_addr(), netif_ip6_addr(inp, i))) { + netif = inp; + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: solicited node packet accepted on interface %c%c\n", + netif->name[0], netif->name[1])); + break; + } + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + else { + netif = NULL; + } + } else { + /* start trying with inp. if that's not acceptable, start walking the + list of configured netifs. */ + if (ip6_input_accept(inp)) { + netif = inp; + } else { + netif = NULL; +#if !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES + + /* Shortcut: stop looking for other interfaces if either the source or + * the destination has a scope constrained to this interface. Custom + * scopes may break the 1:1 link/interface mapping, however. */ + if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_dest_addr()) || + ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_src_addr())) { + goto netif_found; + } + +#endif /* !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES */ +#if !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + + /* The loopback address is to be considered link-local. Packets to it + * should be dropped on other interfaces, as per RFC 4291 Sec. 2.5.3. + * Its implied scope means packets *from* the loopback address should + * not be accepted on other interfaces, either. These requirements + * cannot be implemented in the case that loopback traffic is sent + * across a non-loopback interface, however. */ + if (ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6_current_dest_addr()) || + ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6_current_src_addr())) { + goto netif_found; + } + +#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ +#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (netif == inp) { + /* we checked that before already */ + continue; + } + + if (ip6_input_accept(netif)) { + break; + } + } +#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ + } + + netif_found: + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet accepted on interface %c%c\n", + netif ? netif->name[0] : 'X', netif ? netif->name[1] : 'X')); + } + + /* "::" packet source address? (used in duplicate address detection) */ + if (ip6_addr_isany(ip6_current_src_addr()) && + (!ip6_addr_issolicitednode(ip6_current_dest_addr()))) { + /* packet source is not valid */ + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with src ANY_ADDRESS dropped\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + + /* packet not for us? */ + if (netif == NULL) { + /* packet not for us, route or discard */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ip6_input: packet not for us.\n")); +#if LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD + + /* non-multicast packet? */ + if (!ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + /* try to forward IP packet on (other) interfaces */ + ip6_forward(p, ip6hdr, inp); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD */ + pbuf_free(p); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + + /* current netif pointer. */ + ip_data.current_netif = netif; + + /* Save next header type. */ + nexth = &IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr); + + /* Init header length. */ + hlen = hlen_tot = IP6_HLEN; + + /* Move to payload. */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, IP6_HLEN); + + /* Process known option extension headers, if present. */ + while (*nexth != IP6_NEXTH_NONE) { + switch (*nexth) { + case IP6_NEXTH_HOPBYHOP: { + s32_t opt_offset; + struct ip6_hbh_hdr *hbh_hdr; + struct ip6_opt_hdr *opt_hdr; + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Hop-by-Hop options header\n")); + + /* Get and check the header length, while staying in packet bounds. */ + hbh_hdr = (struct ip6_hbh_hdr *)p->payload; + + /* Get next header type. */ + nexth = &IP6_HBH_NEXTH(hbh_hdr); + + /* Get the header length. */ + hlen = (u16_t)(8 * (1 + hbh_hdr->_hlen)); + + if ((p->len < 8) || (hlen > p->len)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("IPv6 options header (hlen %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IPv6 packet dropped.\n", + hlen, p->len)); + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.lenerr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + + hlen_tot = (u16_t)(hlen_tot + hlen); + + /* The extended option header starts right after Hop-by-Hop header. */ + opt_offset = IP6_HBH_HLEN; + + while (opt_offset < hlen) { + s32_t opt_dlen = 0; + + opt_hdr = (struct ip6_opt_hdr *)((u8_t *)hbh_hdr + opt_offset); + + switch (IP6_OPT_TYPE(opt_hdr)) { + /* @todo: process IPV6 Hop-by-Hop option data */ + case IP6_PAD1_OPTION: + /* PAD1 option doesn't have length and value field */ + opt_dlen = -1; + break; + + case IP6_PADN_OPTION: + opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + break; + + case IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_OPTION: + opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + break; + + case IP6_JUMBO_OPTION: + opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + break; + + default: + + /* Check 2 MSB of Hop-by-Hop header type. */ + switch (IP6_OPT_TYPE_ACTION(opt_hdr)) { + case 1: + /* Discard the packet. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid Hop-by-Hop option type dropped.\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + + case 2: + /* Send ICMP Parameter Problem */ + icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_OPTION, opt_hdr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid Hop-by-Hop option type dropped.\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + + case 3: + + /* Send ICMP Parameter Problem if destination address is not a multicast address */ + if (!ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_OPTION, opt_hdr); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid Hop-by-Hop option type dropped.\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + + default: + /* Skip over this option. */ + opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + break; + } + + break; + } + + /* Adjust the offset to move to the next extended option header */ + opt_offset = opt_offset + IP6_OPT_HLEN + opt_dlen; + } + + pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen); + break; + } + + case IP6_NEXTH_DESTOPTS: { + s32_t opt_offset; + struct ip6_dest_hdr *dest_hdr; + struct ip6_opt_hdr *opt_hdr; + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Destination options header\n")); + + dest_hdr = (struct ip6_dest_hdr *)p->payload; + + /* Get next header type. */ + nexth = &IP6_DEST_NEXTH(dest_hdr); + + /* Get the header length. */ + hlen = 8 * (1 + dest_hdr->_hlen); + + if ((p->len < 8) || (hlen > p->len)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("IPv6 options header (hlen %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IPv6 packet dropped.\n", + hlen, p->len)); + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.lenerr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + + hlen_tot = (u16_t)(hlen_tot + hlen); + + /* The extended option header starts right after Destination header. */ + opt_offset = IP6_DEST_HLEN; + + while (opt_offset < hlen) { + s32_t opt_dlen = 0; + + opt_hdr = (struct ip6_opt_hdr *)((u8_t *)dest_hdr + opt_offset); + + switch (IP6_OPT_TYPE(opt_hdr)) { + /* @todo: process IPV6 Destination option data */ + case IP6_PAD1_OPTION: + /* PAD1 option deosn't have length and value field */ + opt_dlen = -1; + break; + + case IP6_PADN_OPTION: + opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + break; + + case IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_OPTION: + opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + break; + + case IP6_JUMBO_OPTION: + opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + break; + + case IP6_HOME_ADDRESS_OPTION: + opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + break; + + default: + + /* Check 2 MSB of Destination header type. */ + switch (IP6_OPT_TYPE_ACTION(opt_hdr)) { + case 1: + /* Discard the packet. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid destination option type dropped.\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + + case 2: + /* Send ICMP Parameter Problem */ + icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_OPTION, opt_hdr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid destination option type dropped.\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + + case 3: + + /* Send ICMP Parameter Problem if destination address is not a multicast address */ + if (!ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_OPTION, opt_hdr); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid destination option type dropped.\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + + default: + /* Skip over this option. */ + opt_dlen = IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + break; + } + + break; + } + + /* Adjust the offset to move to the next extended option header */ + opt_offset = opt_offset + IP6_OPT_HLEN + opt_dlen; + } + + pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen); + break; + } + + case IP6_NEXTH_ROUTING: { + struct ip6_rout_hdr *rout_hdr; + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Routing header\n")); + + rout_hdr = (struct ip6_rout_hdr *)p->payload; + + /* Get next header type. */ + nexth = &IP6_ROUT_NEXTH(rout_hdr); + + /* Get the header length. */ + hlen = 8 * (1 + rout_hdr->_hlen); + + if ((p->len < 8) || (hlen > p->len)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("IPv6 options header (hlen %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IPv6 packet dropped.\n", + hlen, p->len)); + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.lenerr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + + /* Skip over this header. */ + hlen_tot = (u16_t)(hlen_tot + hlen); + + /* if segment left value is 0 in routing header, ignore the option */ + if (IP6_ROUT_SEG_LEFT(rout_hdr)) { + /* The length field of routing option header must be even */ + if (rout_hdr->_hlen & 0x1) { + /* Discard and send parameter field error */ + icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_FIELD, &rout_hdr->_hlen); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid routing type dropped\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + + switch (IP6_ROUT_TYPE(rout_hdr)) { + /* TODO: process routing by the type */ + case IP6_ROUT_TYPE2: + break; + + case IP6_ROUT_RPL: + break; + + default: + /* Discard unrecognized routing type and send parameter field error */ + icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_FIELD, &IP6_ROUT_TYPE(rout_hdr)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid routing type dropped\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + } + + pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen); + break; + } + + case IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT: { + struct ip6_frag_hdr *frag_hdr; + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Fragment header\n")); + + frag_hdr = (struct ip6_frag_hdr *)p->payload; + + /* Get next header type. */ + nexth = &IP6_FRAG_NEXTH(frag_hdr); + + /* Fragment Header length. */ + hlen = 8; + + /* Make sure this header fits in current pbuf. */ + if (hlen > p->len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("IPv6 options header (hlen %" U16_F ") does not fit in first pbuf (len %" U16_F "), IPv6 packet dropped.\n", + hlen, p->len)); + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.lenerr); + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + + hlen_tot = (u16_t)(hlen_tot + hlen); + + /* check payload length is multiple of 8 octets when mbit is set */ + if (IP6_FRAG_MBIT(frag_hdr) && (IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr) & 0x7)) { + /* ipv6 payload length is not multiple of 8 octets */ + icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_FIELD, LWIP_PACKED_CAST(const void *, &ip6hdr->_plen)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with invalid payload length dropped\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + + /* Offset == 0 and more_fragments == 0? */ + if ((frag_hdr->_fragment_offset & + PP_HTONS(IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK | IP6_FRAG_MORE_FLAG)) == 0) { + /* This is a 1-fragment packet. Skip this header and continue. */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen); + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV6_REASS + /* reassemble the packet */ + ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = hlen_tot; + p = ip6_reass(p); + + /* packet not fully reassembled yet? */ + if (p == NULL) { + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + + /* Returned p point to IPv6 header. + * Update all our variables and pointers and continue. */ + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; + nexth = &IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr); + hlen = hlen_tot = IP6_HLEN; + pbuf_remove_header(p, IP6_HLEN); + +#else /* LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ + /* free (drop) packet pbufs */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Fragment header dropped (with LWIP_IPV6_REASS==0)\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.opterr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ + } + + break; + } + + default: + goto options_done; + } + + if (*nexth == IP6_NEXTH_HOPBYHOP) { + /* Hop-by-Hop header comes only as a first option */ + icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_HEADER, nexth); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: packet with Hop-by-Hop options header dropped (only valid as a first option)\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + goto ip6_input_cleanup; + } + } + +options_done: + + /* send to upper layers */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: \n")); + ip6_debug_print(p); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_input: p->len %" U16_F " p->tot_len %" U16_F "\n", p->len, p->tot_len)); + + ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = hlen_tot; + +#if LWIP_RAW + /* p points to IPv6 header again for raw_input. */ + pbuf_add_header_force(p, hlen_tot); + /* raw input did not eat the packet? */ + raw_status = raw_input(p, inp); + + if (raw_status != RAW_INPUT_EATEN) { + /* Point to payload. */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen_tot); +#else /* LWIP_RAW */ + { +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ + + switch (*nexth) { + case IP6_NEXTH_NONE: + pbuf_free(p); + break; +#if LWIP_UDP + + case IP6_NEXTH_UDP: +#if LWIP_UDPLITE + case IP6_NEXTH_UDPLITE: +#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ + udp_input(p, inp); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_TCP + + case IP6_NEXTH_TCP: + tcp_input(p, inp); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_ICMP6 + + case IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6: + icmp6_input(p, inp); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ + + default: +#if LWIP_RAW + if (raw_status == RAW_INPUT_DELIVERED) { + /* @todo: ipv6 mib in-delivers? */ + } else +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ + { +#if LWIP_ICMP6 + /* p points to IPv6 header again for raw_input. */ + pbuf_add_header_force(p, hlen_tot); + + /* send ICMP parameter problem unless it was a multicast or ICMPv6 */ + if ((!ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) && + (IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr) != IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6)) { + icmp6_param_problem(p, ICMP6_PP_HEADER, nexth); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip6_input: Unsupported transport protocol %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr))); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.proterr); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.drop); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + break; + } + } + +ip6_input_cleanup: + ip_data.current_netif = NULL; + ip_data.current_input_netif = NULL; + ip_data.current_ip6_header = NULL; + ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len = 0; + ip6_addr_set_zero(ip6_current_src_addr()); + ip6_addr_set_zero(ip6_current_dest_addr()); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Sends an IPv6 packet on a network interface. This function constructs + * the IPv6 header. If the source IPv6 address is NULL, the IPv6 "ANY" address is + * used as source (usually during network startup). If the source IPv6 address it + * IP6_ADDR_ANY, the most appropriate IPv6 address of the outgoing network + * interface is filled in as source address. If the destination IPv6 address is + * LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p is assumed to already include an IPv6 header and + * p->payload points to it instead of the data. + * + * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next + protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an + IPv6 header and p->payload points to that IPv6 header) + * @param src the source IPv6 address to send from (if src == IP6_ADDR_ANY, an + * IP address of the netif is selected and used as source address. + * if src == NULL, IP6_ADDR_ANY is used as source) (src is possibly not + * properly zoned) + * @param dest the destination IPv6 address to send the packet to (possibly not + * properly zoned) + * @param hl the Hop Limit value to be set in the IPv6 header + * @param tc the Traffic Class value to be set in the IPv6 header + * @param nexth the Next Header to be set in the IPv6 header + * @param netif the netif on which to send this packet + * @return ERR_OK if the packet was sent OK + * ERR_BUF if p doesn't have enough space for IPv6/LINK headers + * returns errors returned by netif->output_ip6 + */ +err_t ip6_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, + u8_t hl, u8_t tc, + u8_t nexth, struct netif *netif) +{ + const ip6_addr_t *src_used = src; + + if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { + if (src != NULL && ip6_addr_isany(src)) { + src_used = ip_2_ip6(ip6_select_source_address(netif, dest)); + + if ((src_used == NULL) || ip6_addr_isany(src_used)) { + /* No appropriate source address was found for this packet. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip6_output: No suitable source address for packet.\n")); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); + return ERR_RTE; + } + } + } + + return ip6_output_if_src(p, src_used, dest, hl, tc, nexth, netif); +} + +/** + * Same as ip6_output_if() but 'src' address is not replaced by netif address + * when it is 'any'. + */ +err_t ip6_output_if_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, + u8_t hl, u8_t tc, + u8_t nexth, struct netif *netif) +{ + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; + ip6_addr_t dest_addr; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); + + /* Should the IPv6 header be generated or is it already included in p? */ + if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + /* If the destination address is scoped but lacks a zone, add a zone now, + * based on the outgoing interface. The lower layers (e.g., nd6) absolutely + * require addresses to be properly zoned for correctness. In some cases, + * earlier attempts will have been made to add a zone to the destination, + * but this function is the only one that is called in all (other) cases, + * so we must do this here. */ + if (ip6_addr_lacks_zone(dest, IP6_UNKNOWN)) { + ip6_addr_copy(dest_addr, *dest); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&dest_addr, IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); + dest = &dest_addr; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + /* generate IPv6 header */ + if (pbuf_add_header(p, IP6_HLEN)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("ip6_output: not enough room for IPv6 header in pbuf\n")); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.err); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; + LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct ip6_hdr", + (p->len >= sizeof(struct ip6_hdr))); + + IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, hl); + IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, nexth); + + /* dest cannot be NULL here */ + ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(ip6hdr->dest, *dest); + + IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, tc, 0); + IP6H_PLEN_SET(ip6hdr, (u16_t)(p->tot_len - IP6_HLEN)); + + if (src == NULL) { + src = IP6_ADDR_ANY6; + } + + /* src cannot be NULL here */ + ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(ip6hdr->src, *src); + + } else { + /* IP header already included in p */ + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest_addr, ip6hdr->dest); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&dest_addr, IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); + dest = &dest_addr; + } + + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.xmit); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_output_if: %c%c%" U16_F "\n", netif->name[0], netif->name[1], (u16_t)netif->num)); + ip6_debug_print(p); + +#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK + { + int i; +#if !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + + if (ip6_addr_isloopback(dest)) { + return netif_loop_output(netif, p); + } + +#endif /* !LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && + ip6_addr_cmp(dest, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { + /* Packet to self, enqueue it for loopback */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("netif_loop_output()\n")); + return netif_loop_output(netif, p); + } + } + } +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + + if ((p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP) != 0) { + netif_loop_output(netif, p); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ +#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_FRAG + + /* don't fragment if interface has mtu set to 0 [loopif] */ + if (netif_mtu6(netif) && (p->tot_len > nd6_get_destination_mtu(dest, netif))) { + return ip6_frag(p, netif, dest); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_FRAG */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("netif->output_ip6()\n")); + return netif->output_ip6(netif, p, dest); +} + +/** + * Simple interface to ip6_output_if. It finds the outgoing network + * interface and calls upon ip6_output_if to do the actual work. + * + * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next + protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an + IPv6 header and p->payload points to that IPv6 header) + * @param src the source IPv6 address to send from (if src == IP6_ADDR_ANY, an + * IP address of the netif is selected and used as source address. + * if src == NULL, IP6_ADDR_ANY is used as source) + * @param dest the destination IPv6 address to send the packet to + * @param hl the Hop Limit value to be set in the IPv6 header + * @param tc the Traffic Class value to be set in the IPv6 header + * @param nexth the Next Header to be set in the IPv6 header + * + * @return ERR_RTE if no route is found + * see ip_output_if() for more return values + */ +err_t ip6_output(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, + u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth) +{ + struct netif *netif; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; + ip6_addr_t src_addr, dest_addr; + + LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); + + if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { + netif = ip6_route(src, dest); + } else { + /* IP header included in p, read addresses. */ + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(src_addr, ip6hdr->src); + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest_addr, ip6hdr->dest); + netif = ip6_route(&src_addr, &dest_addr); + } + + if (netif == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_output: no route for %" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F "\n", + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(dest))); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); + return ERR_RTE; + } + + return ip6_output_if(p, src, dest, hl, tc, nexth, netif); +} + +#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS +/** Like ip6_output, but takes and addr_hint pointer that is passed on to netif->addr_hint + * before calling ip6_output_if. + * + * @param p the packet to send (p->payload points to the data, e.g. next + protocol header; if dest == LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, p already includes an + IPv6 header and p->payload points to that IPv6 header) + * @param src the source IPv6 address to send from (if src == IP6_ADDR_ANY, an + * IP address of the netif is selected and used as source address. + * if src == NULL, IP6_ADDR_ANY is used as source) + * @param dest the destination IPv6 address to send the packet to + * @param hl the Hop Limit value to be set in the IPv6 header + * @param tc the Traffic Class value to be set in the IPv6 header + * @param nexth the Next Header to be set in the IPv6 header + * @param netif_hint netif output hint pointer set to netif->hint before + * calling ip_output_if() + * + * @return ERR_RTE if no route is found + * see ip_output_if() for more return values + */ +err_t ip6_output_hinted(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, + u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth, struct netif_hint *netif_hint) +{ + struct netif *netif; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; + ip6_addr_t src_addr, dest_addr; + err_t err; + + LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p); + + if (dest != LWIP_IP_HDRINCL) { + netif = ip6_route(src, dest); + } else { + /* IP header included in p, read addresses. */ + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(src_addr, ip6hdr->src); + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest_addr, ip6hdr->dest); + netif = ip6_route(&src_addr, &dest_addr); + } + + if (netif == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_output: no route for %" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F "\n", + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(dest), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(dest))); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.rterr); + return ERR_RTE; + } + + NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, netif_hint); + err = ip6_output_if(p, src, dest, hl, tc, nexth, netif); + NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); + + return err; +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS*/ + +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD +/** + * Add a hop-by-hop options header with a router alert option and padding. + * + * Used by MLD when sending a Multicast listener report/done message. + * + * @param p the packet to which we will prepend the options header + * @param nexth the next header protocol number (e.g. IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) + * @param value the value of the router alert option data (e.g. IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_VALUE_MLD) + * @return ERR_OK if hop-by-hop header was added, ERR_* otherwise + */ +err_t ip6_options_add_hbh_ra(struct pbuf *p, u8_t nexth, u8_t value) +{ + u8_t *opt_data; + u32_t offset = 0; + struct ip6_hbh_hdr *hbh_hdr; + struct ip6_opt_hdr *opt_hdr; + + /* fixed 4 bytes for router alert option and 2 bytes padding */ + const u8_t hlen = (sizeof(struct ip6_opt_hdr) * 2) + IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_DLEN; + + /* Move pointer to make room for hop-by-hop options header. */ + if (pbuf_add_header(p, sizeof(struct ip6_hbh_hdr) + hlen)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("ip6_options: no space for options header\n")); + IP6_STATS_INC(ip6.err); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + /* Set fields of Hop-by-Hop header */ + hbh_hdr = (struct ip6_hbh_hdr *)p->payload; + IP6_HBH_NEXTH(hbh_hdr) = nexth; + hbh_hdr->_hlen = 0; + offset = IP6_HBH_HLEN; + + /* Set router alert options to Hop-by-Hop extended option header */ + opt_hdr = (struct ip6_opt_hdr *)((u8_t *)hbh_hdr + offset); + IP6_OPT_TYPE(opt_hdr) = IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_OPTION; + IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr) = IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_DLEN; + offset += IP6_OPT_HLEN; + + /* Set router alert option data */ + opt_data = (u8_t *)hbh_hdr + offset; + opt_data[0] = value; + opt_data[1] = 0; + offset += IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr); + + /* add 2 bytes padding to make 8 bytes Hop-by-Hop header length */ + opt_hdr = (struct ip6_opt_hdr *)((u8_t *)hbh_hdr + offset); + IP6_OPT_TYPE(opt_hdr) = IP6_PADN_OPTION; + IP6_OPT_DLEN(opt_hdr) = 0; + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + +#if IP6_DEBUG +/* Print an IPv6 header by using LWIP_DEBUGF + * @param p an IPv6 packet, p->payload pointing to the IPv6 header + */ +void ip6_debug_print(struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("IPv6 header:\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %2" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %7" U32_F " | (ver, class, flow)\n", + IP6H_V(ip6hdr), + IP6H_TC(ip6hdr), + IP6H_FL(ip6hdr))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | %3" U16_F " | (plen, nexth, hopl)\n", + IP6H_PLEN(ip6hdr), + IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr), + IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | (src)\n", + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(&(ip6hdr->src)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(&(ip6hdr->src)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(&(ip6hdr->src)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(&(ip6hdr->src)))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " |\n", + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(&(ip6hdr->src)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(&(ip6hdr->src)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(&(ip6hdr->src)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(&(ip6hdr->src)))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | (dest)\n", + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(&(ip6hdr->dest)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(&(ip6hdr->dest)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(&(ip6hdr->dest)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(&(ip6hdr->dest)))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("| %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " | %4" X32_F " |\n", + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(&(ip6hdr->dest)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(&(ip6hdr->dest)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(&(ip6hdr->dest)), + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(&(ip6hdr->dest)))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(IP6_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); +} +#endif /* IP6_DEBUG */ + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c index 78ce06f3..6d84084e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_addr.c @@ -1,375 +1,375 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * IPv6 addresses. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * Functions for handling IPv6 addresses. - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" /* for ip6addr_aton to handle IPv4-mapped addresses */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/* used by IP6_ADDR_ANY(6) in ip6_addr.h */ -const ip_addr_t ip6_addr_any = IPADDR6_INIT(0ul, 0ul, 0ul, 0ul); - -#define lwip_xchar(i) ((char)((i) < 10 ? '0' + (i) : 'A' + (i)-10)) - -/** - * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation - * of an IPv6 address and convert to a binary address. - * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not. - * - * @param cp IPv6 address in ascii representation (e.g. "FF01::1") - * @param addr pointer to which to save the ip address in network order - * @return 1 if cp could be converted to addr, 0 on failure - */ -int ip6addr_aton(const char *cp, ip6_addr_t *addr) -{ - u32_t addr_index, zero_blocks, current_block_index, current_block_value; - const char *s; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - int check_ipv4_mapped = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - /* Count the number of colons, to count the number of blocks in a "::" sequence - zero_blocks may be 1 even if there are no :: sequences */ - zero_blocks = 8; - - for (s = cp; *s != 0; s++) { - if (*s == ':') { - zero_blocks--; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - } else if (*s == '.') { - if ((zero_blocks == 5) || (zero_blocks == 2)) { - check_ipv4_mapped = 1; - /* last block could be the start of an IPv4 address */ - zero_blocks--; - } else { - /* invalid format */ - return 0; - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - } else if (!lwip_isxdigit(*s)) { - break; - } - } - - /* parse each block */ - addr_index = 0; - current_block_index = 0; - current_block_value = 0; - - for (s = cp; *s != 0; s++) { - if (*s == ':') { - if (addr) { - if (current_block_index & 0x1) { - addr->addr[addr_index++] |= current_block_value; - } else { - addr->addr[addr_index] = current_block_value << 16; - } - } - - current_block_index++; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (check_ipv4_mapped) { - if (current_block_index == 6) { - ip4_addr_t ip4; - int ret = ip4addr_aton(s + 1, &ip4); - - if (ret) { - if (addr) { - addr->addr[3] = lwip_htonl(ip4.addr); - current_block_index++; - goto fix_byte_order_and_return; - } - - return 1; - } - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - current_block_value = 0; - - if (current_block_index > 7) { - /* address too long! */ - return 0; - } - - if (s[1] == ':') { - if (s[2] == ':') { - /* invalid format: three successive colons */ - return 0; - } - - s++; - - /* "::" found, set zeros */ - while (zero_blocks > 0) { - zero_blocks--; - - if (current_block_index & 0x1) { - addr_index++; - } else { - if (addr) { - addr->addr[addr_index] = 0; - } - } - - current_block_index++; - - if (current_block_index > 7) { - /* address too long! */ - return 0; - } - } - } - } else if (lwip_isxdigit(*s)) { - /* add current digit */ - current_block_value = (current_block_value << 4) + - (lwip_isdigit(*s) ? (u32_t)(*s - '0') : - (u32_t)(10 + (lwip_islower(*s) ? *s - 'a' : *s - 'A'))); - } else { - /* unexpected digit, space? CRLF? */ - break; - } - } - - if (addr) { - if (current_block_index & 0x1) { - addr->addr[addr_index++] |= current_block_value; - } else { - addr->addr[addr_index] = current_block_value << 16; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - fix_byte_order_and_return: -#endif - - /* convert to network byte order. */ - for (addr_index = 0; addr_index < 4; addr_index++) { - addr->addr[addr_index] = lwip_htonl(addr->addr[addr_index]); - } - - ip6_addr_clear_zone(addr); - } - - if (current_block_index != 7) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -/** - * Convert numeric IPv6 address into ASCII representation. - * returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! - * - * @param addr ip6 address in network order to convert - * @return pointer to a global static (!) buffer that holds the ASCII - * representation of addr - */ -char *ip6addr_ntoa(const ip6_addr_t *addr) -{ - static char str[40]; - return ip6addr_ntoa_r(addr, str, 40); -} - -/** - * Same as ipaddr_ntoa, but reentrant since a user-supplied buffer is used. - * - * @param addr ip6 address in network order to convert - * @param buf target buffer where the string is stored - * @param buflen length of buf - * @return either pointer to buf which now holds the ASCII - * representation of addr or NULL if buf was too small - */ -char *ip6addr_ntoa_r(const ip6_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen) -{ - u32_t current_block_index, current_block_value, next_block_value; - s32_t i; - u8_t zero_flag, empty_block_flag; - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(addr)) { - /* This is an IPv4 mapped address */ - ip4_addr_t addr4; - char *ret; -#define IP4MAPPED_HEADER "::FFFF:" - char *buf_ip4 = buf + sizeof(IP4MAPPED_HEADER) - 1; - int buflen_ip4 = buflen - sizeof(IP4MAPPED_HEADER) + 1; - - if (buflen < (int)sizeof(IP4MAPPED_HEADER)) { - return NULL; - } - - memcpy(buf, IP4MAPPED_HEADER, sizeof(IP4MAPPED_HEADER)); - addr4.addr = addr->addr[3]; - ret = ip4addr_ntoa_r(&addr4, buf_ip4, buflen_ip4); - - if (ret != buf_ip4) { - return NULL; - } - - return buf; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - i = 0; - empty_block_flag = 0; /* used to indicate a zero chain for "::' */ - - for (current_block_index = 0; current_block_index < 8; current_block_index++) { - /* get the current 16-bit block */ - current_block_value = lwip_htonl(addr->addr[current_block_index >> 1]); - - if ((current_block_index & 0x1) == 0) { - current_block_value = current_block_value >> 16; - } - - current_block_value &= 0xffff; - - /* Check for empty block. */ - if (current_block_value == 0) { - if (current_block_index == 7 && empty_block_flag == 1) { - /* special case, we must render a ':' for the last block. */ - buf[i++] = ':'; - - if (i >= buflen) { - return NULL; - } - - break; - } - - if (empty_block_flag == 0) { - /* generate empty block "::", but only if more than one contiguous zero block, - * according to current formatting suggestions RFC 5952. */ - next_block_value = lwip_htonl(addr->addr[(current_block_index + 1) >> 1]); - - if ((current_block_index & 0x1) == 0x01) { - next_block_value = next_block_value >> 16; - } - - next_block_value &= 0xffff; - - if (next_block_value == 0) { - empty_block_flag = 1; - buf[i++] = ':'; - - if (i >= buflen) { - return NULL; - } - - continue; /* move on to next block. */ - } - } else if (empty_block_flag == 1) { - /* move on to next block. */ - continue; - } - } else if (empty_block_flag == 1) { - /* Set this flag value so we don't produce multiple empty blocks. */ - empty_block_flag = 2; - } - - if (current_block_index > 0) { - buf[i++] = ':'; - - if (i >= buflen) { - return NULL; - } - } - - if ((current_block_value & 0xf000) == 0) { - zero_flag = 1; - } else { - buf[i++] = lwip_xchar(((current_block_value & 0xf000) >> 12)); - zero_flag = 0; - - if (i >= buflen) { - return NULL; - } - } - - if (((current_block_value & 0xf00) == 0) && (zero_flag)) { - /* do nothing */ - } else { - buf[i++] = lwip_xchar(((current_block_value & 0xf00) >> 8)); - zero_flag = 0; - - if (i >= buflen) { - return NULL; - } - } - - if (((current_block_value & 0xf0) == 0) && (zero_flag)) { - /* do nothing */ - } else { - buf[i++] = lwip_xchar(((current_block_value & 0xf0) >> 4)); - zero_flag = 0; - - if (i >= buflen) { - return NULL; - } - } - - buf[i++] = lwip_xchar((current_block_value & 0xf)); - - if (i >= buflen) { - return NULL; - } - } - - buf[i] = 0; - - return buf; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * + * IPv6 addresses. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * Functions for handling IPv6 addresses. + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" /* for ip6addr_aton to handle IPv4-mapped addresses */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/* used by IP6_ADDR_ANY(6) in ip6_addr.h */ +const ip_addr_t ip6_addr_any = IPADDR6_INIT(0ul, 0ul, 0ul, 0ul); + +#define lwip_xchar(i) ((char)((i) < 10 ? '0' + (i) : 'A' + (i)-10)) + +/** + * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation + * of an IPv6 address and convert to a binary address. + * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not. + * + * @param cp IPv6 address in ascii representation (e.g. "FF01::1") + * @param addr pointer to which to save the ip address in network order + * @return 1 if cp could be converted to addr, 0 on failure + */ +int ip6addr_aton(const char *cp, ip6_addr_t *addr) +{ + u32_t addr_index, zero_blocks, current_block_index, current_block_value; + const char *s; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + int check_ipv4_mapped = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + /* Count the number of colons, to count the number of blocks in a "::" sequence + zero_blocks may be 1 even if there are no :: sequences */ + zero_blocks = 8; + + for (s = cp; *s != 0; s++) { + if (*s == ':') { + zero_blocks--; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + } else if (*s == '.') { + if ((zero_blocks == 5) || (zero_blocks == 2)) { + check_ipv4_mapped = 1; + /* last block could be the start of an IPv4 address */ + zero_blocks--; + } else { + /* invalid format */ + return 0; + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + } else if (!lwip_isxdigit(*s)) { + break; + } + } + + /* parse each block */ + addr_index = 0; + current_block_index = 0; + current_block_value = 0; + + for (s = cp; *s != 0; s++) { + if (*s == ':') { + if (addr) { + if (current_block_index & 0x1) { + addr->addr[addr_index++] |= current_block_value; + } else { + addr->addr[addr_index] = current_block_value << 16; + } + } + + current_block_index++; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (check_ipv4_mapped) { + if (current_block_index == 6) { + ip4_addr_t ip4; + int ret = ip4addr_aton(s + 1, &ip4); + + if (ret) { + if (addr) { + addr->addr[3] = lwip_htonl(ip4.addr); + current_block_index++; + goto fix_byte_order_and_return; + } + + return 1; + } + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + current_block_value = 0; + + if (current_block_index > 7) { + /* address too long! */ + return 0; + } + + if (s[1] == ':') { + if (s[2] == ':') { + /* invalid format: three successive colons */ + return 0; + } + + s++; + + /* "::" found, set zeros */ + while (zero_blocks > 0) { + zero_blocks--; + + if (current_block_index & 0x1) { + addr_index++; + } else { + if (addr) { + addr->addr[addr_index] = 0; + } + } + + current_block_index++; + + if (current_block_index > 7) { + /* address too long! */ + return 0; + } + } + } + } else if (lwip_isxdigit(*s)) { + /* add current digit */ + current_block_value = (current_block_value << 4) + + (lwip_isdigit(*s) ? (u32_t)(*s - '0') : + (u32_t)(10 + (lwip_islower(*s) ? *s - 'a' : *s - 'A'))); + } else { + /* unexpected digit, space? CRLF? */ + break; + } + } + + if (addr) { + if (current_block_index & 0x1) { + addr->addr[addr_index++] |= current_block_value; + } else { + addr->addr[addr_index] = current_block_value << 16; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + fix_byte_order_and_return: +#endif + + /* convert to network byte order. */ + for (addr_index = 0; addr_index < 4; addr_index++) { + addr->addr[addr_index] = lwip_htonl(addr->addr[addr_index]); + } + + ip6_addr_clear_zone(addr); + } + + if (current_block_index != 7) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Convert numeric IPv6 address into ASCII representation. + * returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! + * + * @param addr ip6 address in network order to convert + * @return pointer to a global static (!) buffer that holds the ASCII + * representation of addr + */ +char *ip6addr_ntoa(const ip6_addr_t *addr) +{ + static char str[40]; + return ip6addr_ntoa_r(addr, str, 40); +} + +/** + * Same as ipaddr_ntoa, but reentrant since a user-supplied buffer is used. + * + * @param addr ip6 address in network order to convert + * @param buf target buffer where the string is stored + * @param buflen length of buf + * @return either pointer to buf which now holds the ASCII + * representation of addr or NULL if buf was too small + */ +char *ip6addr_ntoa_r(const ip6_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen) +{ + u32_t current_block_index, current_block_value, next_block_value; + s32_t i; + u8_t zero_flag, empty_block_flag; + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(addr)) { + /* This is an IPv4 mapped address */ + ip4_addr_t addr4; + char *ret; +#define IP4MAPPED_HEADER "::FFFF:" + char *buf_ip4 = buf + sizeof(IP4MAPPED_HEADER) - 1; + int buflen_ip4 = buflen - sizeof(IP4MAPPED_HEADER) + 1; + + if (buflen < (int)sizeof(IP4MAPPED_HEADER)) { + return NULL; + } + + memcpy(buf, IP4MAPPED_HEADER, sizeof(IP4MAPPED_HEADER)); + addr4.addr = addr->addr[3]; + ret = ip4addr_ntoa_r(&addr4, buf_ip4, buflen_ip4); + + if (ret != buf_ip4) { + return NULL; + } + + return buf; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + i = 0; + empty_block_flag = 0; /* used to indicate a zero chain for "::' */ + + for (current_block_index = 0; current_block_index < 8; current_block_index++) { + /* get the current 16-bit block */ + current_block_value = lwip_htonl(addr->addr[current_block_index >> 1]); + + if ((current_block_index & 0x1) == 0) { + current_block_value = current_block_value >> 16; + } + + current_block_value &= 0xffff; + + /* Check for empty block. */ + if (current_block_value == 0) { + if (current_block_index == 7 && empty_block_flag == 1) { + /* special case, we must render a ':' for the last block. */ + buf[i++] = ':'; + + if (i >= buflen) { + return NULL; + } + + break; + } + + if (empty_block_flag == 0) { + /* generate empty block "::", but only if more than one contiguous zero block, + * according to current formatting suggestions RFC 5952. */ + next_block_value = lwip_htonl(addr->addr[(current_block_index + 1) >> 1]); + + if ((current_block_index & 0x1) == 0x01) { + next_block_value = next_block_value >> 16; + } + + next_block_value &= 0xffff; + + if (next_block_value == 0) { + empty_block_flag = 1; + buf[i++] = ':'; + + if (i >= buflen) { + return NULL; + } + + continue; /* move on to next block. */ + } + } else if (empty_block_flag == 1) { + /* move on to next block. */ + continue; + } + } else if (empty_block_flag == 1) { + /* Set this flag value so we don't produce multiple empty blocks. */ + empty_block_flag = 2; + } + + if (current_block_index > 0) { + buf[i++] = ':'; + + if (i >= buflen) { + return NULL; + } + } + + if ((current_block_value & 0xf000) == 0) { + zero_flag = 1; + } else { + buf[i++] = lwip_xchar(((current_block_value & 0xf000) >> 12)); + zero_flag = 0; + + if (i >= buflen) { + return NULL; + } + } + + if (((current_block_value & 0xf00) == 0) && (zero_flag)) { + /* do nothing */ + } else { + buf[i++] = lwip_xchar(((current_block_value & 0xf00) >> 8)); + zero_flag = 0; + + if (i >= buflen) { + return NULL; + } + } + + if (((current_block_value & 0xf0) == 0) && (zero_flag)) { + /* do nothing */ + } else { + buf[i++] = lwip_xchar(((current_block_value & 0xf0) >> 4)); + zero_flag = 0; + + if (i >= buflen) { + return NULL; + } + } + + buf[i++] = lwip_xchar((current_block_value & 0xf)); + + if (i >= buflen) { + return NULL; + } + } + + buf[i] = 0; + + return buf; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c index 8542c6c1..4d98a156 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/ip6_frag.c @@ -1,916 +1,916 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * IPv6 fragmentation and reassembly. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_frag.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/icmp6.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/** Setting this to 0, you can turn off checking the fragments for overlapping - * regions. The code gets a little smaller. Only use this if you know that - * overlapping won't occur on your network! */ -#ifndef IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP -#define IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP 1 -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - -/** Set to 0 to prevent freeing the oldest datagram when the reassembly buffer is - * full (IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS pbufs are enqueued). The code gets a little smaller. - * Datagrams will be freed by timeout only. Especially useful when MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA - * is set to 1, so one datagram can be reassembled at a time, only. */ -#ifndef IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST -#define IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST 1 -#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ - -#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER -/* The number of bytes we need to "borrow" from (i.e., overwrite in) the header - * that precedes the fragment header for reassembly pruposes. */ -#define IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM ((s16_t)(sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) - IP6_FRAG_HLEN)) -#endif - -#define IP_REASS_FLAG_LASTFRAG 0x01 - -/** This is a helper struct which holds the starting - * offset and the ending offset of this fragment to - * easily chain the fragments. - * It has the same packing requirements as the IPv6 header, since it replaces - * the Fragment Header in memory in incoming fragments to keep - * track of the various fragments. - */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip6_reass_helper { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(struct pbuf *next_pbuf); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t start); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t end); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/* static variables */ -static struct ip6_reassdata *reassdatagrams; -static u16_t ip6_reass_pbufcount; - -/* Forward declarations. */ -static void ip6_reass_free_complete_datagram(struct ip6_reassdata *ipr); -#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST -static void ip6_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(struct ip6_reassdata *ipr, int pbufs_needed); -#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ - -void ip6_reass_tmr(void) -{ - struct ip6_reassdata *r, *tmp; - -#if !IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER - LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) <= IP6_FRAG_HLEN, set IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER to 1", - sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) <= IP6_FRAG_HLEN); -#endif /* !IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ - - r = reassdatagrams; - - while (r != NULL) { - /* Decrement the timer. Once it reaches 0, - * clean up the incomplete fragment assembly */ - if (r->timer > 0) { - r->timer--; - r = r->next; - } else { - /* reassembly timed out */ - tmp = r; - /* get the next pointer before freeing */ - r = r->next; - /* free the helper struct and all enqueued pbufs */ - ip6_reass_free_complete_datagram(tmp); - } - } -} - -/** - * Free a datagram (struct ip6_reassdata) and all its pbufs. - * Updates the total count of enqueued pbufs (ip6_reass_pbufcount), - * sends an ICMP time exceeded packet. - * - * @param ipr datagram to free - */ -static void ip6_reass_free_complete_datagram(struct ip6_reassdata *ipr) -{ - struct ip6_reassdata *prev; - u16_t pbufs_freed = 0; - u16_t clen; - struct pbuf *p; - struct ip6_reass_helper *iprh; - -#if LWIP_ICMP6 - iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload; - - if (iprh->start == 0) { - /* The first fragment was received, send ICMP time exceeded. */ - /* First, de-queue the first pbuf from r->p. */ - p = ipr->p; - ipr->p = iprh->next_pbuf; - /* Restore the part that we've overwritten with our helper structure, or we - * might send garbage (and disclose a pointer) in the ICMPv6 reply. */ - MEMCPY(p->payload, ipr->orig_hdr, sizeof(iprh)); - - /* Then, move back to the original ipv6 header (we are now pointing to Fragment header). - This cannot fail since we already checked when receiving this fragment. */ - if (pbuf_header_force(p, (s16_t)((u8_t *)p->payload - (u8_t *)ipr->iphdr))) { - LWIP_ASSERT("ip6_reass_free: moving p->payload to ip6 header failed\n", 0); - } else { - /* Reconstruct the zoned source and destination addresses, so that we do - * not end up sending the ICMP response over the wrong link. */ - ip6_addr_t src_addr, dest_addr; - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(src_addr, IPV6_FRAG_SRC(ipr)); - ip6_addr_set_zone(&src_addr, ipr->src_zone); - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest_addr, IPV6_FRAG_DEST(ipr)); - ip6_addr_set_zone(&dest_addr, ipr->dest_zone); - /* Send the actual ICMP response. */ - icmp6_time_exceeded_with_addrs(p, ICMP6_TE_FRAG, &src_addr, &dest_addr); - } - - clen = pbuf_clen(p); - LWIP_ASSERT("pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff", pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff); - pbufs_freed = (u16_t)(pbufs_freed + clen); - pbuf_free(p); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 */ - - /* First, free all received pbufs. The individual pbufs need to be released - separately as they have not yet been chained */ - p = ipr->p; - - while (p != NULL) { - struct pbuf *pcur; - iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)p->payload; - pcur = p; - /* get the next pointer before freeing */ - p = iprh->next_pbuf; - clen = pbuf_clen(pcur); - LWIP_ASSERT("pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff", pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff); - pbufs_freed = (u16_t)(pbufs_freed + clen); - pbuf_free(pcur); - } - - /* Then, unchain the struct ip6_reassdata from the list and free it. */ - if (ipr == reassdatagrams) { - reassdatagrams = ipr->next; - } else { - prev = reassdatagrams; - - while (prev != NULL) { - if (prev->next == ipr) { - break; - } - - prev = prev->next; - } - - if (prev != NULL) { - prev->next = ipr->next; - } - } - - memp_free(MEMP_IP6_REASSDATA, ipr); - - /* Finally, update number of pbufs in reassembly queue */ - LWIP_ASSERT("ip_reass_pbufcount >= clen", ip6_reass_pbufcount >= pbufs_freed); - ip6_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip6_reass_pbufcount - pbufs_freed); -} - -#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST -/** - * Free the oldest datagram to make room for enqueueing new fragments. - * The datagram ipr is not freed! - * - * @param ipr ip6_reassdata for the current fragment - * @param pbufs_needed number of pbufs needed to enqueue - * (used for freeing other datagrams if not enough space) - */ -static void ip6_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(struct ip6_reassdata *ipr, int pbufs_needed) -{ - struct ip6_reassdata *r, *oldest; - - /* Free datagrams until being allowed to enqueue 'pbufs_needed' pbufs, - * but don't free the current datagram! */ - do { - r = oldest = reassdatagrams; - - while (r != NULL) { - if (r != ipr) { - if (r->timer <= oldest->timer) { - /* older than the previous oldest */ - oldest = r; - } - } - - r = r->next; - } - - if (oldest == ipr) { - /* nothing to free, ipr is the only element on the list */ - return; - } - - if (oldest != NULL) { - ip6_reass_free_complete_datagram(oldest); - } - } while (((ip6_reass_pbufcount + pbufs_needed) > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) && (reassdatagrams != NULL)); -} -#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ - -/** - * Reassembles incoming IPv6 fragments into an IPv6 datagram. - * - * @param p points to the IPv6 Fragment Header - * @return NULL if reassembly is incomplete, pbuf pointing to - * IPv6 Header if reassembly is complete - */ -struct pbuf * -ip6_reass(struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct ip6_reassdata *ipr, *ipr_prev; - struct ip6_reass_helper *iprh, *iprh_tmp, *iprh_prev = NULL; - struct ip6_frag_hdr *frag_hdr; - u16_t offset, len, start, end; - ptrdiff_t hdrdiff; - u16_t clen; - u8_t valid = 1; - struct pbuf *q, *next_pbuf; - - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.recv); - - /* ip6_frag_hdr must be in the first pbuf, not chained. Checked by caller. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("IPv6 fragment header does not fit in first pbuf", - p->len >= sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr)); - - frag_hdr = (struct ip6_frag_hdr *)p->payload; - - clen = pbuf_clen(p); - - offset = lwip_ntohs(frag_hdr->_fragment_offset); - - /* Calculate fragment length from IPv6 payload length. - * Adjust for headers before Fragment Header. - * And finally adjust by Fragment Header length. */ - len = lwip_ntohs(ip6_current_header()->_plen); - hdrdiff = (u8_t *)p->payload - (const u8_t *)ip6_current_header(); - LWIP_ASSERT("not a valid pbuf (ip6_input check missing?)", hdrdiff <= 0xFFFF); - LWIP_ASSERT("not a valid pbuf (ip6_input check missing?)", hdrdiff >= IP6_HLEN); - hdrdiff -= IP6_HLEN; - hdrdiff += IP6_FRAG_HLEN; - - if (hdrdiff > len) { - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); - goto nullreturn; - } - - len = (u16_t)(len - hdrdiff); - start = (offset & IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK); - - if (start > (0xFFFF - len)) { - /* u16_t overflow, cannot handle this */ - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); - goto nullreturn; - } - - /* Look for the datagram the fragment belongs to in the current datagram queue, - * remembering the previous in the queue for later dequeueing. */ - for (ipr = reassdatagrams, ipr_prev = NULL; ipr != NULL; ipr = ipr->next) { - /* Check if the incoming fragment matches the one currently present - in the reassembly buffer. If so, we proceed with copying the - fragment into the buffer. */ - if ((frag_hdr->_identification == ipr->identification) && - ip6_addr_cmp_packed(ip6_current_src_addr(), &(IPV6_FRAG_SRC(ipr)), ipr->src_zone) && - ip6_addr_cmp_packed(ip6_current_dest_addr(), &(IPV6_FRAG_DEST(ipr)), ipr->dest_zone)) { - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.cachehit); - break; - } - - ipr_prev = ipr; - } - - if (ipr == NULL) { - /* Enqueue a new datagram into the datagram queue */ - ipr = (struct ip6_reassdata *)memp_malloc(MEMP_IP6_REASSDATA); - - if (ipr == NULL) { -#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST - /* Make room and try again. */ - ip6_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(ipr, clen); - ipr = (struct ip6_reassdata *)memp_malloc(MEMP_IP6_REASSDATA); - - if (ipr != NULL) { - /* re-search ipr_prev since it might have been removed */ - for (ipr_prev = reassdatagrams; ipr_prev != NULL; ipr_prev = ipr_prev->next) { - if (ipr_prev->next == ipr) { - break; - } - } - } else -#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ - { - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); - goto nullreturn; - } - } - - memset(ipr, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_reassdata)); - ipr->timer = IPV6_REASS_MAXAGE; - - /* enqueue the new structure to the front of the list */ - ipr->next = reassdatagrams; - reassdatagrams = ipr; - - /* Use the current IPv6 header for src/dest address reference. - * Eventually, we will replace it when we get the first fragment - * (it might be this one, in any case, it is done later). */ - /* need to use the none-const pointer here: */ - ipr->iphdr = ip_data.current_ip6_header; -#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER - MEMCPY(&ipr->src, &ip6_current_header()->src, sizeof(ipr->src)); - MEMCPY(&ipr->dest, &ip6_current_header()->dest, sizeof(ipr->dest)); -#endif /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - /* Also store the address zone information. - * @todo It is possible that due to netif destruction and recreation, the - * stored zones end up resolving to a different interface. In that case, we - * risk sending a "time exceeded" ICMP response over the wrong link. - * Ideally, netif destruction would clean up matching pending reassembly - * structures, but custom zone mappings would make that non-trivial. */ - ipr->src_zone = ip6_addr_zone(ip6_current_src_addr()); - ipr->dest_zone = ip6_addr_zone(ip6_current_dest_addr()); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - /* copy the fragmented packet id. */ - ipr->identification = frag_hdr->_identification; - - /* copy the nexth field */ - ipr->nexth = frag_hdr->_nexth; - } - - /* Check if we are allowed to enqueue more datagrams. */ - if ((ip6_reass_pbufcount + clen) > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) { -#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST - ip6_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(ipr, clen); - - if ((ip6_reass_pbufcount + clen) <= IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) { - /* re-search ipr_prev since it might have been removed */ - for (ipr_prev = reassdatagrams; ipr_prev != NULL; ipr_prev = ipr_prev->next) { - if (ipr_prev->next == ipr) { - break; - } - } - } else -#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ - { - /* @todo: send ICMPv6 time exceeded here? */ - /* drop this pbuf */ - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); - goto nullreturn; - } - } - - /* Overwrite Fragment Header with our own helper struct. */ -#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER - - if (IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM > 0) { - /* Make room for struct ip6_reass_helper (only required if sizeof(void*) > 4). - This cannot fail since we already checked when receiving this fragment. */ - u8_t hdrerr = pbuf_header_force(p, IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hdrerr); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_ASSERT("no room for struct ip6_reass_helper", hdrerr == 0); - } - -#else /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ - LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) <= IP6_FRAG_HLEN, set IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER to 1", - sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) <= IP6_FRAG_HLEN); -#endif /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ - - /* Prepare the pointer to the helper structure, and its initial values. - * Do not yet write to the structure itself, as we still have to make a - * backup of the original data, and we should not do that until we know for - * sure that we are going to add this packet to the list. */ - iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)p->payload; - next_pbuf = NULL; - end = (u16_t)(start + len); - - /* find the right place to insert this pbuf */ - /* Iterate through until we either get to the end of the list (append), - * or we find on with a larger offset (insert). */ - for (q = ipr->p; q != NULL;) { - iprh_tmp = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)q->payload; - - if (start < iprh_tmp->start) { -#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP - - if (end > iprh_tmp->start) { - /* fragment overlaps with following, throw away */ - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); - goto nullreturn; - } - - if (iprh_prev != NULL) { - if (start < iprh_prev->end) { - /* fragment overlaps with previous, throw away */ - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); - goto nullreturn; - } - } - -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - /* the new pbuf should be inserted before this */ - next_pbuf = q; - - if (iprh_prev != NULL) { - /* not the fragment with the lowest offset */ - iprh_prev->next_pbuf = p; - } else { - /* fragment with the lowest offset */ - ipr->p = p; - } - - break; - } else if (start == iprh_tmp->start) { - /* received the same datagram twice: no need to keep the datagram */ - goto nullreturn; -#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP - } else if (start < iprh_tmp->end) { - /* overlap: no need to keep the new datagram */ - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); - goto nullreturn; -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - } else { - /* Check if the fragments received so far have no gaps. */ - if (iprh_prev != NULL) { - if (iprh_prev->end != iprh_tmp->start) { - /* There is a fragment missing between the current - * and the previous fragment */ - valid = 0; - } - } - } - - q = iprh_tmp->next_pbuf; - iprh_prev = iprh_tmp; - } - - /* If q is NULL, then we made it to the end of the list. Determine what to do now */ - if (q == NULL) { - if (iprh_prev != NULL) { - /* this is (for now), the fragment with the highest offset: - * chain it to the last fragment */ -#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP - LWIP_ASSERT("check fragments don't overlap", iprh_prev->end <= start); -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - iprh_prev->next_pbuf = p; - - if (iprh_prev->end != start) { - valid = 0; - } - } else { -#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP - LWIP_ASSERT("no previous fragment, this must be the first fragment!", - ipr->p == NULL); -#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ - /* this is the first fragment we ever received for this ip datagram */ - ipr->p = p; - } - } - - /* Track the current number of pbufs current 'in-flight', in order to limit - the number of fragments that may be enqueued at any one time */ - ip6_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip6_reass_pbufcount + clen); - - /* Remember IPv6 header if this is the first fragment. */ - if (start == 0) { - /* need to use the none-const pointer here: */ - ipr->iphdr = ip_data.current_ip6_header; - /* Make a backup of the part of the packet data that we are about to - * overwrite, so that we can restore the original later. */ - MEMCPY(ipr->orig_hdr, p->payload, sizeof(*iprh)); - /* For IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER there is no need to copy src/dst again, as they - * will be the same as they were. With LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES, the same applies - * to the source/destination zones. */ - } - - /* Only after the backup do we get to fill in the actual helper structure. */ - iprh->next_pbuf = next_pbuf; - iprh->start = start; - iprh->end = end; - - /* If this is the last fragment, calculate total packet length. */ - if ((offset & IP6_FRAG_MORE_FLAG) == 0) { - ipr->datagram_len = iprh->end; - } - - /* Additional validity tests: we have received first and last fragment. */ - iprh_tmp = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload; - - if (iprh_tmp->start != 0) { - valid = 0; - } - - if (ipr->datagram_len == 0) { - valid = 0; - } - - /* Final validity test: no gaps between current and last fragment. */ - iprh_prev = iprh; - q = iprh->next_pbuf; - - while ((q != NULL) && valid) { - iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)q->payload; - - if (iprh_prev->end != iprh->start) { - valid = 0; - break; - } - - iprh_prev = iprh; - q = iprh->next_pbuf; - } - - if (valid) { - /* All fragments have been received */ - struct ip6_hdr *iphdr_ptr; - - /* chain together the pbufs contained within the ip6_reassdata list. */ - iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload; - - while (iprh != NULL) { - next_pbuf = iprh->next_pbuf; - - if (next_pbuf != NULL) { - /* Save next helper struct (will be hidden in next step). */ - iprh_tmp = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)next_pbuf->payload; - - /* hide the fragment header for every succeeding fragment */ - pbuf_remove_header(next_pbuf, IP6_FRAG_HLEN); -#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER - - if (IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM > 0) { - /* hide the extra bytes borrowed from ip6_hdr for struct ip6_reass_helper */ - u8_t hdrerr = pbuf_remove_header(next_pbuf, IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hdrerr); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_ASSERT("no room for struct ip6_reass_helper", hdrerr == 0); - } - -#endif - pbuf_cat(ipr->p, next_pbuf); - } else { - iprh_tmp = NULL; - } - - iprh = iprh_tmp; - } - - /* Get the first pbuf. */ - p = ipr->p; - -#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER - - if (IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM > 0) { - u8_t hdrerr; - /* Restore (only) the bytes that we overwrote beyond the fragment header. - * Those bytes may belong to either the IPv6 header or an extension - * header placed before the fragment header. */ - MEMCPY(p->payload, ipr->orig_hdr, IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM); - /* get back room for struct ip6_reass_helper (only required if sizeof(void*) > 4) */ - hdrerr = pbuf_remove_header(p, IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hdrerr); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_ASSERT("no room for struct ip6_reass_helper", hdrerr == 0); - } - -#endif - - /* We need to get rid of the fragment header itself, which is somewhere in - * the middle of the packet (but still in the first pbuf of the chain). - * Getting rid of the header is required by RFC 2460 Sec. 4.5 and necessary - * in order to be able to reassemble packets that are close to full size - * (i.e., around 65535 bytes). We simply move up all the headers before the - * fragment header, including the IPv6 header, and adjust the payload start - * accordingly. This works because all these headers are in the first pbuf - * of the chain, and because the caller adjusts all its pointers on - * successful reassembly. */ - MEMMOVE((u8_t *)ipr->iphdr + sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr), ipr->iphdr, - (size_t)((u8_t *)p->payload - (u8_t *)ipr->iphdr)); - - /* This is where the IPv6 header is now. */ - iphdr_ptr = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u8_t *)ipr->iphdr + - sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr)); - - /* Adjust datagram length by adding header lengths. */ - ipr->datagram_len = (u16_t)(ipr->datagram_len + ((u8_t *)p->payload - (u8_t *)iphdr_ptr) - IP6_HLEN); - - /* Set payload length in ip header. */ - iphdr_ptr->_plen = lwip_htons(ipr->datagram_len); - - /* With the fragment header gone, we now need to adjust the next-header - * field of whatever header was originally before it. Since the packet made - * it through the original header processing routines at least up to the - * fragment header, we do not need any further sanity checks here. */ - if (IP6H_NEXTH(iphdr_ptr) == IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT) { - iphdr_ptr->_nexth = ipr->nexth; - } else { - u8_t *ptr = (u8_t *)iphdr_ptr + IP6_HLEN; - - while (*ptr != IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT) { - ptr += 8 * (1 + ptr[1]); - } - - *ptr = ipr->nexth; - } - - /* release the resources allocated for the fragment queue entry */ - if (reassdatagrams == ipr) { - /* it was the first in the list */ - reassdatagrams = ipr->next; - } else { - /* it wasn't the first, so it must have a valid 'prev' */ - LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check linked list", ipr_prev != NULL); - ipr_prev->next = ipr->next; - } - - memp_free(MEMP_IP6_REASSDATA, ipr); - - /* adjust the number of pbufs currently queued for reassembly. */ - clen = pbuf_clen(p); - LWIP_ASSERT("ip6_reass_pbufcount >= clen", ip6_reass_pbufcount >= clen); - ip6_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip6_reass_pbufcount - clen); - - /* Move pbuf back to IPv6 header. This should never fail. */ - if (pbuf_header_force(p, (s16_t)((u8_t *)p->payload - (u8_t *)iphdr_ptr))) { - LWIP_ASSERT("ip6_reass: moving p->payload to ip6 header failed\n", 0); - pbuf_free(p); - return NULL; - } - - /* Return the pbuf chain */ - return p; - } - - /* the datagram is not (yet?) reassembled completely */ - return NULL; - -nullreturn: - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.drop); - pbuf_free(p); - return NULL; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG - -#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF -/** Allocate a new struct pbuf_custom_ref */ -static struct pbuf_custom_ref *ip6_frag_alloc_pbuf_custom_ref(void) -{ - return (struct pbuf_custom_ref *)memp_malloc(MEMP_FRAG_PBUF); -} - -/** Free a struct pbuf_custom_ref */ -static void ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(struct pbuf_custom_ref *p) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - memp_free(MEMP_FRAG_PBUF, p); -} - -/** Free-callback function to free a 'struct pbuf_custom_ref', called by - * pbuf_free. */ -static void ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom(struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct pbuf_custom_ref *pcr = (struct pbuf_custom_ref *)p; - LWIP_ASSERT("pcr != NULL", pcr != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("pcr == p", (void *)pcr == (void *)p); - - if (pcr->original != NULL) { - pbuf_free(pcr->original); - } - - ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(pcr); -} -#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - -/** - * Fragment an IPv6 datagram if too large for the netif or path MTU. - * - * Chop the datagram in MTU sized chunks and send them in order - * by pointing PBUF_REFs into p - * - * @param p ipv6 packet to send - * @param netif the netif on which to send - * @param dest destination ipv6 address to which to send - * - * @return ERR_OK if sent successfully, err_t otherwise - */ -err_t ip6_frag(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest) -{ - struct ip6_hdr *original_ip6hdr; - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; - struct ip6_frag_hdr *frag_hdr; - struct pbuf *rambuf; -#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - struct pbuf *newpbuf; - u16_t newpbuflen = 0; - u16_t left_to_copy; -#endif - static u32_t identification; - u16_t left, cop; - const u16_t mtu = nd6_get_destination_mtu(dest, netif); - const u16_t nfb = (u16_t)((mtu - (IP6_HLEN + IP6_FRAG_HLEN)) & IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK); - u16_t fragment_offset = 0; - u16_t last; - u16_t poff = IP6_HLEN; - - identification++; - - original_ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; - - /* @todo we assume there are no options in the unfragmentable part (IPv6 header). */ - LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len >= IP6_HLEN", p->tot_len >= IP6_HLEN); - left = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - IP6_HLEN); - - while (left) { - last = (left <= nfb); - - /* Fill this fragment */ - cop = last ? left : nfb; - -#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - rambuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, cop + IP6_FRAG_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); - - if (rambuf == NULL) { - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece!", - (rambuf->len == rambuf->tot_len) && (rambuf->next == NULL)); - poff += pbuf_copy_partial(p, (u8_t *)rambuf->payload + IP6_FRAG_HLEN, cop, poff); - - /* make room for the IP header */ - if (pbuf_add_header(rambuf, IP6_HLEN)) { - pbuf_free(rambuf); - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* fill in the IP header */ - SMEMCPY(rambuf->payload, original_ip6hdr, IP6_HLEN); - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)rambuf->payload; - frag_hdr = (struct ip6_frag_hdr *)((u8_t *)rambuf->payload + IP6_HLEN); -#else - /* When not using a static buffer, create a chain of pbufs. - * The first will be a PBUF_RAM holding the link, IPv6, and Fragment header. - * The rest will be PBUF_REFs mirroring the pbuf chain to be fragged, - * but limited to the size of an mtu. - */ - rambuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, IP6_HLEN + IP6_FRAG_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); - - if (rambuf == NULL) { - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece!", - (p->len >= (IP6_HLEN))); - SMEMCPY(rambuf->payload, original_ip6hdr, IP6_HLEN); - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)rambuf->payload; - frag_hdr = (struct ip6_frag_hdr *)((u8_t *)rambuf->payload + IP6_HLEN); - - /* Can just adjust p directly for needed offset. */ - p->payload = (u8_t *)p->payload + poff; - p->len = (u16_t)(p->len - poff); - p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - poff); - - left_to_copy = cop; - - while (left_to_copy) { - struct pbuf_custom_ref *pcr; - newpbuflen = (left_to_copy < p->len) ? left_to_copy : p->len; - - /* Is this pbuf already empty? */ - if (!newpbuflen) { - p = p->next; - continue; - } - - pcr = ip6_frag_alloc_pbuf_custom_ref(); - - if (pcr == NULL) { - pbuf_free(rambuf); - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Mirror this pbuf, although we might not need all of it. */ - newpbuf = pbuf_alloced_custom(PBUF_RAW, newpbuflen, PBUF_REF, &pcr->pc, p->payload, newpbuflen); - - if (newpbuf == NULL) { - ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(pcr); - pbuf_free(rambuf); - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - pbuf_ref(p); - pcr->original = p; - pcr->pc.custom_free_function = ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom; - - /* Add it to end of rambuf's chain, but using pbuf_cat, not pbuf_chain - * so that it is removed when pbuf_dechain is later called on rambuf. - */ - pbuf_cat(rambuf, newpbuf); - left_to_copy = (u16_t)(left_to_copy - newpbuflen); - - if (left_to_copy) { - p = p->next; - } - } - - poff = newpbuflen; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - - /* Set headers */ - frag_hdr->_nexth = original_ip6hdr->_nexth; - frag_hdr->reserved = 0; - frag_hdr->_fragment_offset = lwip_htons((u16_t)((fragment_offset & IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK) | (last ? 0 : IP6_FRAG_MORE_FLAG))); - frag_hdr->_identification = lwip_htonl(identification); - - IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT); - IP6H_PLEN_SET(ip6hdr, (u16_t)(cop + IP6_FRAG_HLEN)); - - /* No need for separate header pbuf - we allowed room for it in rambuf - * when allocated. - */ - IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.xmit); - netif->output_ip6(netif, rambuf, dest); - - /* Unfortunately we can't reuse rambuf - the hardware may still be - * using the buffer. Instead we free it (and the ensuing chain) and - * recreate it next time round the loop. If we're lucky the hardware - * will have already sent the packet, the free will really free, and - * there will be zero memory penalty. - */ - - pbuf_free(rambuf); - left = (u16_t)(left - cop); - fragment_offset = (u16_t)(fragment_offset + cop); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG */ +/** + * @file + * + * IPv6 fragmentation and reassembly. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_frag.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/icmp6.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/** Setting this to 0, you can turn off checking the fragments for overlapping + * regions. The code gets a little smaller. Only use this if you know that + * overlapping won't occur on your network! */ +#ifndef IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP +#define IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP 1 +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + +/** Set to 0 to prevent freeing the oldest datagram when the reassembly buffer is + * full (IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS pbufs are enqueued). The code gets a little smaller. + * Datagrams will be freed by timeout only. Especially useful when MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA + * is set to 1, so one datagram can be reassembled at a time, only. */ +#ifndef IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST +#define IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST 1 +#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ + +#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER +/* The number of bytes we need to "borrow" from (i.e., overwrite in) the header + * that precedes the fragment header for reassembly pruposes. */ +#define IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM ((s16_t)(sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) - IP6_FRAG_HLEN)) +#endif + +#define IP_REASS_FLAG_LASTFRAG 0x01 + +/** This is a helper struct which holds the starting + * offset and the ending offset of this fragment to + * easily chain the fragments. + * It has the same packing requirements as the IPv6 header, since it replaces + * the Fragment Header in memory in incoming fragments to keep + * track of the various fragments. + */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip6_reass_helper { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(struct pbuf *next_pbuf); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t start); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t end); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/* static variables */ +static struct ip6_reassdata *reassdatagrams; +static u16_t ip6_reass_pbufcount; + +/* Forward declarations. */ +static void ip6_reass_free_complete_datagram(struct ip6_reassdata *ipr); +#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST +static void ip6_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(struct ip6_reassdata *ipr, int pbufs_needed); +#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ + +void ip6_reass_tmr(void) +{ + struct ip6_reassdata *r, *tmp; + +#if !IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER + LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) <= IP6_FRAG_HLEN, set IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER to 1", + sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) <= IP6_FRAG_HLEN); +#endif /* !IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ + + r = reassdatagrams; + + while (r != NULL) { + /* Decrement the timer. Once it reaches 0, + * clean up the incomplete fragment assembly */ + if (r->timer > 0) { + r->timer--; + r = r->next; + } else { + /* reassembly timed out */ + tmp = r; + /* get the next pointer before freeing */ + r = r->next; + /* free the helper struct and all enqueued pbufs */ + ip6_reass_free_complete_datagram(tmp); + } + } +} + +/** + * Free a datagram (struct ip6_reassdata) and all its pbufs. + * Updates the total count of enqueued pbufs (ip6_reass_pbufcount), + * sends an ICMP time exceeded packet. + * + * @param ipr datagram to free + */ +static void ip6_reass_free_complete_datagram(struct ip6_reassdata *ipr) +{ + struct ip6_reassdata *prev; + u16_t pbufs_freed = 0; + u16_t clen; + struct pbuf *p; + struct ip6_reass_helper *iprh; + +#if LWIP_ICMP6 + iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload; + + if (iprh->start == 0) { + /* The first fragment was received, send ICMP time exceeded. */ + /* First, de-queue the first pbuf from r->p. */ + p = ipr->p; + ipr->p = iprh->next_pbuf; + /* Restore the part that we've overwritten with our helper structure, or we + * might send garbage (and disclose a pointer) in the ICMPv6 reply. */ + MEMCPY(p->payload, ipr->orig_hdr, sizeof(iprh)); + + /* Then, move back to the original ipv6 header (we are now pointing to Fragment header). + This cannot fail since we already checked when receiving this fragment. */ + if (pbuf_header_force(p, (s16_t)((u8_t *)p->payload - (u8_t *)ipr->iphdr))) { + LWIP_ASSERT("ip6_reass_free: moving p->payload to ip6 header failed\n", 0); + } else { + /* Reconstruct the zoned source and destination addresses, so that we do + * not end up sending the ICMP response over the wrong link. */ + ip6_addr_t src_addr, dest_addr; + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(src_addr, IPV6_FRAG_SRC(ipr)); + ip6_addr_set_zone(&src_addr, ipr->src_zone); + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest_addr, IPV6_FRAG_DEST(ipr)); + ip6_addr_set_zone(&dest_addr, ipr->dest_zone); + /* Send the actual ICMP response. */ + icmp6_time_exceeded_with_addrs(p, ICMP6_TE_FRAG, &src_addr, &dest_addr); + } + + clen = pbuf_clen(p); + LWIP_ASSERT("pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff", pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff); + pbufs_freed = (u16_t)(pbufs_freed + clen); + pbuf_free(p); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 */ + + /* First, free all received pbufs. The individual pbufs need to be released + separately as they have not yet been chained */ + p = ipr->p; + + while (p != NULL) { + struct pbuf *pcur; + iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)p->payload; + pcur = p; + /* get the next pointer before freeing */ + p = iprh->next_pbuf; + clen = pbuf_clen(pcur); + LWIP_ASSERT("pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff", pbufs_freed + clen <= 0xffff); + pbufs_freed = (u16_t)(pbufs_freed + clen); + pbuf_free(pcur); + } + + /* Then, unchain the struct ip6_reassdata from the list and free it. */ + if (ipr == reassdatagrams) { + reassdatagrams = ipr->next; + } else { + prev = reassdatagrams; + + while (prev != NULL) { + if (prev->next == ipr) { + break; + } + + prev = prev->next; + } + + if (prev != NULL) { + prev->next = ipr->next; + } + } + + memp_free(MEMP_IP6_REASSDATA, ipr); + + /* Finally, update number of pbufs in reassembly queue */ + LWIP_ASSERT("ip_reass_pbufcount >= clen", ip6_reass_pbufcount >= pbufs_freed); + ip6_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip6_reass_pbufcount - pbufs_freed); +} + +#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST +/** + * Free the oldest datagram to make room for enqueueing new fragments. + * The datagram ipr is not freed! + * + * @param ipr ip6_reassdata for the current fragment + * @param pbufs_needed number of pbufs needed to enqueue + * (used for freeing other datagrams if not enough space) + */ +static void ip6_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(struct ip6_reassdata *ipr, int pbufs_needed) +{ + struct ip6_reassdata *r, *oldest; + + /* Free datagrams until being allowed to enqueue 'pbufs_needed' pbufs, + * but don't free the current datagram! */ + do { + r = oldest = reassdatagrams; + + while (r != NULL) { + if (r != ipr) { + if (r->timer <= oldest->timer) { + /* older than the previous oldest */ + oldest = r; + } + } + + r = r->next; + } + + if (oldest == ipr) { + /* nothing to free, ipr is the only element on the list */ + return; + } + + if (oldest != NULL) { + ip6_reass_free_complete_datagram(oldest); + } + } while (((ip6_reass_pbufcount + pbufs_needed) > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) && (reassdatagrams != NULL)); +} +#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ + +/** + * Reassembles incoming IPv6 fragments into an IPv6 datagram. + * + * @param p points to the IPv6 Fragment Header + * @return NULL if reassembly is incomplete, pbuf pointing to + * IPv6 Header if reassembly is complete + */ +struct pbuf * +ip6_reass(struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct ip6_reassdata *ipr, *ipr_prev; + struct ip6_reass_helper *iprh, *iprh_tmp, *iprh_prev = NULL; + struct ip6_frag_hdr *frag_hdr; + u16_t offset, len, start, end; + ptrdiff_t hdrdiff; + u16_t clen; + u8_t valid = 1; + struct pbuf *q, *next_pbuf; + + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.recv); + + /* ip6_frag_hdr must be in the first pbuf, not chained. Checked by caller. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("IPv6 fragment header does not fit in first pbuf", + p->len >= sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr)); + + frag_hdr = (struct ip6_frag_hdr *)p->payload; + + clen = pbuf_clen(p); + + offset = lwip_ntohs(frag_hdr->_fragment_offset); + + /* Calculate fragment length from IPv6 payload length. + * Adjust for headers before Fragment Header. + * And finally adjust by Fragment Header length. */ + len = lwip_ntohs(ip6_current_header()->_plen); + hdrdiff = (u8_t *)p->payload - (const u8_t *)ip6_current_header(); + LWIP_ASSERT("not a valid pbuf (ip6_input check missing?)", hdrdiff <= 0xFFFF); + LWIP_ASSERT("not a valid pbuf (ip6_input check missing?)", hdrdiff >= IP6_HLEN); + hdrdiff -= IP6_HLEN; + hdrdiff += IP6_FRAG_HLEN; + + if (hdrdiff > len) { + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); + goto nullreturn; + } + + len = (u16_t)(len - hdrdiff); + start = (offset & IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK); + + if (start > (0xFFFF - len)) { + /* u16_t overflow, cannot handle this */ + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); + goto nullreturn; + } + + /* Look for the datagram the fragment belongs to in the current datagram queue, + * remembering the previous in the queue for later dequeueing. */ + for (ipr = reassdatagrams, ipr_prev = NULL; ipr != NULL; ipr = ipr->next) { + /* Check if the incoming fragment matches the one currently present + in the reassembly buffer. If so, we proceed with copying the + fragment into the buffer. */ + if ((frag_hdr->_identification == ipr->identification) && + ip6_addr_cmp_packed(ip6_current_src_addr(), &(IPV6_FRAG_SRC(ipr)), ipr->src_zone) && + ip6_addr_cmp_packed(ip6_current_dest_addr(), &(IPV6_FRAG_DEST(ipr)), ipr->dest_zone)) { + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.cachehit); + break; + } + + ipr_prev = ipr; + } + + if (ipr == NULL) { + /* Enqueue a new datagram into the datagram queue */ + ipr = (struct ip6_reassdata *)memp_malloc(MEMP_IP6_REASSDATA); + + if (ipr == NULL) { +#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST + /* Make room and try again. */ + ip6_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(ipr, clen); + ipr = (struct ip6_reassdata *)memp_malloc(MEMP_IP6_REASSDATA); + + if (ipr != NULL) { + /* re-search ipr_prev since it might have been removed */ + for (ipr_prev = reassdatagrams; ipr_prev != NULL; ipr_prev = ipr_prev->next) { + if (ipr_prev->next == ipr) { + break; + } + } + } else +#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ + { + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); + goto nullreturn; + } + } + + memset(ipr, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_reassdata)); + ipr->timer = IPV6_REASS_MAXAGE; + + /* enqueue the new structure to the front of the list */ + ipr->next = reassdatagrams; + reassdatagrams = ipr; + + /* Use the current IPv6 header for src/dest address reference. + * Eventually, we will replace it when we get the first fragment + * (it might be this one, in any case, it is done later). */ + /* need to use the none-const pointer here: */ + ipr->iphdr = ip_data.current_ip6_header; +#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER + MEMCPY(&ipr->src, &ip6_current_header()->src, sizeof(ipr->src)); + MEMCPY(&ipr->dest, &ip6_current_header()->dest, sizeof(ipr->dest)); +#endif /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + /* Also store the address zone information. + * @todo It is possible that due to netif destruction and recreation, the + * stored zones end up resolving to a different interface. In that case, we + * risk sending a "time exceeded" ICMP response over the wrong link. + * Ideally, netif destruction would clean up matching pending reassembly + * structures, but custom zone mappings would make that non-trivial. */ + ipr->src_zone = ip6_addr_zone(ip6_current_src_addr()); + ipr->dest_zone = ip6_addr_zone(ip6_current_dest_addr()); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + /* copy the fragmented packet id. */ + ipr->identification = frag_hdr->_identification; + + /* copy the nexth field */ + ipr->nexth = frag_hdr->_nexth; + } + + /* Check if we are allowed to enqueue more datagrams. */ + if ((ip6_reass_pbufcount + clen) > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) { +#if IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST + ip6_reass_remove_oldest_datagram(ipr, clen); + + if ((ip6_reass_pbufcount + clen) <= IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS) { + /* re-search ipr_prev since it might have been removed */ + for (ipr_prev = reassdatagrams; ipr_prev != NULL; ipr_prev = ipr_prev->next) { + if (ipr_prev->next == ipr) { + break; + } + } + } else +#endif /* IP_REASS_FREE_OLDEST */ + { + /* @todo: send ICMPv6 time exceeded here? */ + /* drop this pbuf */ + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); + goto nullreturn; + } + } + + /* Overwrite Fragment Header with our own helper struct. */ +#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER + + if (IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM > 0) { + /* Make room for struct ip6_reass_helper (only required if sizeof(void*) > 4). + This cannot fail since we already checked when receiving this fragment. */ + u8_t hdrerr = pbuf_header_force(p, IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hdrerr); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_ASSERT("no room for struct ip6_reass_helper", hdrerr == 0); + } + +#else /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ + LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) <= IP6_FRAG_HLEN, set IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER to 1", + sizeof(struct ip6_reass_helper) <= IP6_FRAG_HLEN); +#endif /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ + + /* Prepare the pointer to the helper structure, and its initial values. + * Do not yet write to the structure itself, as we still have to make a + * backup of the original data, and we should not do that until we know for + * sure that we are going to add this packet to the list. */ + iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)p->payload; + next_pbuf = NULL; + end = (u16_t)(start + len); + + /* find the right place to insert this pbuf */ + /* Iterate through until we either get to the end of the list (append), + * or we find on with a larger offset (insert). */ + for (q = ipr->p; q != NULL;) { + iprh_tmp = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)q->payload; + + if (start < iprh_tmp->start) { +#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP + + if (end > iprh_tmp->start) { + /* fragment overlaps with following, throw away */ + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); + goto nullreturn; + } + + if (iprh_prev != NULL) { + if (start < iprh_prev->end) { + /* fragment overlaps with previous, throw away */ + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); + goto nullreturn; + } + } + +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + /* the new pbuf should be inserted before this */ + next_pbuf = q; + + if (iprh_prev != NULL) { + /* not the fragment with the lowest offset */ + iprh_prev->next_pbuf = p; + } else { + /* fragment with the lowest offset */ + ipr->p = p; + } + + break; + } else if (start == iprh_tmp->start) { + /* received the same datagram twice: no need to keep the datagram */ + goto nullreturn; +#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP + } else if (start < iprh_tmp->end) { + /* overlap: no need to keep the new datagram */ + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.proterr); + goto nullreturn; +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + } else { + /* Check if the fragments received so far have no gaps. */ + if (iprh_prev != NULL) { + if (iprh_prev->end != iprh_tmp->start) { + /* There is a fragment missing between the current + * and the previous fragment */ + valid = 0; + } + } + } + + q = iprh_tmp->next_pbuf; + iprh_prev = iprh_tmp; + } + + /* If q is NULL, then we made it to the end of the list. Determine what to do now */ + if (q == NULL) { + if (iprh_prev != NULL) { + /* this is (for now), the fragment with the highest offset: + * chain it to the last fragment */ +#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP + LWIP_ASSERT("check fragments don't overlap", iprh_prev->end <= start); +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + iprh_prev->next_pbuf = p; + + if (iprh_prev->end != start) { + valid = 0; + } + } else { +#if IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP + LWIP_ASSERT("no previous fragment, this must be the first fragment!", + ipr->p == NULL); +#endif /* IP_REASS_CHECK_OVERLAP */ + /* this is the first fragment we ever received for this ip datagram */ + ipr->p = p; + } + } + + /* Track the current number of pbufs current 'in-flight', in order to limit + the number of fragments that may be enqueued at any one time */ + ip6_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip6_reass_pbufcount + clen); + + /* Remember IPv6 header if this is the first fragment. */ + if (start == 0) { + /* need to use the none-const pointer here: */ + ipr->iphdr = ip_data.current_ip6_header; + /* Make a backup of the part of the packet data that we are about to + * overwrite, so that we can restore the original later. */ + MEMCPY(ipr->orig_hdr, p->payload, sizeof(*iprh)); + /* For IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER there is no need to copy src/dst again, as they + * will be the same as they were. With LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES, the same applies + * to the source/destination zones. */ + } + + /* Only after the backup do we get to fill in the actual helper structure. */ + iprh->next_pbuf = next_pbuf; + iprh->start = start; + iprh->end = end; + + /* If this is the last fragment, calculate total packet length. */ + if ((offset & IP6_FRAG_MORE_FLAG) == 0) { + ipr->datagram_len = iprh->end; + } + + /* Additional validity tests: we have received first and last fragment. */ + iprh_tmp = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload; + + if (iprh_tmp->start != 0) { + valid = 0; + } + + if (ipr->datagram_len == 0) { + valid = 0; + } + + /* Final validity test: no gaps between current and last fragment. */ + iprh_prev = iprh; + q = iprh->next_pbuf; + + while ((q != NULL) && valid) { + iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)q->payload; + + if (iprh_prev->end != iprh->start) { + valid = 0; + break; + } + + iprh_prev = iprh; + q = iprh->next_pbuf; + } + + if (valid) { + /* All fragments have been received */ + struct ip6_hdr *iphdr_ptr; + + /* chain together the pbufs contained within the ip6_reassdata list. */ + iprh = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)ipr->p->payload; + + while (iprh != NULL) { + next_pbuf = iprh->next_pbuf; + + if (next_pbuf != NULL) { + /* Save next helper struct (will be hidden in next step). */ + iprh_tmp = (struct ip6_reass_helper *)next_pbuf->payload; + + /* hide the fragment header for every succeeding fragment */ + pbuf_remove_header(next_pbuf, IP6_FRAG_HLEN); +#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER + + if (IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM > 0) { + /* hide the extra bytes borrowed from ip6_hdr for struct ip6_reass_helper */ + u8_t hdrerr = pbuf_remove_header(next_pbuf, IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hdrerr); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_ASSERT("no room for struct ip6_reass_helper", hdrerr == 0); + } + +#endif + pbuf_cat(ipr->p, next_pbuf); + } else { + iprh_tmp = NULL; + } + + iprh = iprh_tmp; + } + + /* Get the first pbuf. */ + p = ipr->p; + +#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER + + if (IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM > 0) { + u8_t hdrerr; + /* Restore (only) the bytes that we overwrote beyond the fragment header. + * Those bytes may belong to either the IPv6 header or an extension + * header placed before the fragment header. */ + MEMCPY(p->payload, ipr->orig_hdr, IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM); + /* get back room for struct ip6_reass_helper (only required if sizeof(void*) > 4) */ + hdrerr = pbuf_remove_header(p, IPV6_FRAG_REQROOM); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(hdrerr); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_ASSERT("no room for struct ip6_reass_helper", hdrerr == 0); + } + +#endif + + /* We need to get rid of the fragment header itself, which is somewhere in + * the middle of the packet (but still in the first pbuf of the chain). + * Getting rid of the header is required by RFC 2460 Sec. 4.5 and necessary + * in order to be able to reassemble packets that are close to full size + * (i.e., around 65535 bytes). We simply move up all the headers before the + * fragment header, including the IPv6 header, and adjust the payload start + * accordingly. This works because all these headers are in the first pbuf + * of the chain, and because the caller adjusts all its pointers on + * successful reassembly. */ + MEMMOVE((u8_t *)ipr->iphdr + sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr), ipr->iphdr, + (size_t)((u8_t *)p->payload - (u8_t *)ipr->iphdr)); + + /* This is where the IPv6 header is now. */ + iphdr_ptr = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u8_t *)ipr->iphdr + + sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr)); + + /* Adjust datagram length by adding header lengths. */ + ipr->datagram_len = (u16_t)(ipr->datagram_len + ((u8_t *)p->payload - (u8_t *)iphdr_ptr) - IP6_HLEN); + + /* Set payload length in ip header. */ + iphdr_ptr->_plen = lwip_htons(ipr->datagram_len); + + /* With the fragment header gone, we now need to adjust the next-header + * field of whatever header was originally before it. Since the packet made + * it through the original header processing routines at least up to the + * fragment header, we do not need any further sanity checks here. */ + if (IP6H_NEXTH(iphdr_ptr) == IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT) { + iphdr_ptr->_nexth = ipr->nexth; + } else { + u8_t *ptr = (u8_t *)iphdr_ptr + IP6_HLEN; + + while (*ptr != IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT) { + ptr += 8 * (1 + ptr[1]); + } + + *ptr = ipr->nexth; + } + + /* release the resources allocated for the fragment queue entry */ + if (reassdatagrams == ipr) { + /* it was the first in the list */ + reassdatagrams = ipr->next; + } else { + /* it wasn't the first, so it must have a valid 'prev' */ + LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check linked list", ipr_prev != NULL); + ipr_prev->next = ipr->next; + } + + memp_free(MEMP_IP6_REASSDATA, ipr); + + /* adjust the number of pbufs currently queued for reassembly. */ + clen = pbuf_clen(p); + LWIP_ASSERT("ip6_reass_pbufcount >= clen", ip6_reass_pbufcount >= clen); + ip6_reass_pbufcount = (u16_t)(ip6_reass_pbufcount - clen); + + /* Move pbuf back to IPv6 header. This should never fail. */ + if (pbuf_header_force(p, (s16_t)((u8_t *)p->payload - (u8_t *)iphdr_ptr))) { + LWIP_ASSERT("ip6_reass: moving p->payload to ip6 header failed\n", 0); + pbuf_free(p); + return NULL; + } + + /* Return the pbuf chain */ + return p; + } + + /* the datagram is not (yet?) reassembled completely */ + return NULL; + +nullreturn: + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.drop); + pbuf_free(p); + return NULL; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG + +#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF +/** Allocate a new struct pbuf_custom_ref */ +static struct pbuf_custom_ref *ip6_frag_alloc_pbuf_custom_ref(void) +{ + return (struct pbuf_custom_ref *)memp_malloc(MEMP_FRAG_PBUF); +} + +/** Free a struct pbuf_custom_ref */ +static void ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(struct pbuf_custom_ref *p) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + memp_free(MEMP_FRAG_PBUF, p); +} + +/** Free-callback function to free a 'struct pbuf_custom_ref', called by + * pbuf_free. */ +static void ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom(struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct pbuf_custom_ref *pcr = (struct pbuf_custom_ref *)p; + LWIP_ASSERT("pcr != NULL", pcr != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("pcr == p", (void *)pcr == (void *)p); + + if (pcr->original != NULL) { + pbuf_free(pcr->original); + } + + ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(pcr); +} +#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + +/** + * Fragment an IPv6 datagram if too large for the netif or path MTU. + * + * Chop the datagram in MTU sized chunks and send them in order + * by pointing PBUF_REFs into p + * + * @param p ipv6 packet to send + * @param netif the netif on which to send + * @param dest destination ipv6 address to which to send + * + * @return ERR_OK if sent successfully, err_t otherwise + */ +err_t ip6_frag(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest) +{ + struct ip6_hdr *original_ip6hdr; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; + struct ip6_frag_hdr *frag_hdr; + struct pbuf *rambuf; +#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + struct pbuf *newpbuf; + u16_t newpbuflen = 0; + u16_t left_to_copy; +#endif + static u32_t identification; + u16_t left, cop; + const u16_t mtu = nd6_get_destination_mtu(dest, netif); + const u16_t nfb = (u16_t)((mtu - (IP6_HLEN + IP6_FRAG_HLEN)) & IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK); + u16_t fragment_offset = 0; + u16_t last; + u16_t poff = IP6_HLEN; + + identification++; + + original_ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; + + /* @todo we assume there are no options in the unfragmentable part (IPv6 header). */ + LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len >= IP6_HLEN", p->tot_len >= IP6_HLEN); + left = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - IP6_HLEN); + + while (left) { + last = (left <= nfb); + + /* Fill this fragment */ + cop = last ? left : nfb; + +#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + rambuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, cop + IP6_FRAG_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); + + if (rambuf == NULL) { + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece!", + (rambuf->len == rambuf->tot_len) && (rambuf->next == NULL)); + poff += pbuf_copy_partial(p, (u8_t *)rambuf->payload + IP6_FRAG_HLEN, cop, poff); + + /* make room for the IP header */ + if (pbuf_add_header(rambuf, IP6_HLEN)) { + pbuf_free(rambuf); + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* fill in the IP header */ + SMEMCPY(rambuf->payload, original_ip6hdr, IP6_HLEN); + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)rambuf->payload; + frag_hdr = (struct ip6_frag_hdr *)((u8_t *)rambuf->payload + IP6_HLEN); +#else + /* When not using a static buffer, create a chain of pbufs. + * The first will be a PBUF_RAM holding the link, IPv6, and Fragment header. + * The rest will be PBUF_REFs mirroring the pbuf chain to be fragged, + * but limited to the size of an mtu. + */ + rambuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, IP6_HLEN + IP6_FRAG_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); + + if (rambuf == NULL) { + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece!", + (p->len >= (IP6_HLEN))); + SMEMCPY(rambuf->payload, original_ip6hdr, IP6_HLEN); + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)rambuf->payload; + frag_hdr = (struct ip6_frag_hdr *)((u8_t *)rambuf->payload + IP6_HLEN); + + /* Can just adjust p directly for needed offset. */ + p->payload = (u8_t *)p->payload + poff; + p->len = (u16_t)(p->len - poff); + p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - poff); + + left_to_copy = cop; + + while (left_to_copy) { + struct pbuf_custom_ref *pcr; + newpbuflen = (left_to_copy < p->len) ? left_to_copy : p->len; + + /* Is this pbuf already empty? */ + if (!newpbuflen) { + p = p->next; + continue; + } + + pcr = ip6_frag_alloc_pbuf_custom_ref(); + + if (pcr == NULL) { + pbuf_free(rambuf); + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Mirror this pbuf, although we might not need all of it. */ + newpbuf = pbuf_alloced_custom(PBUF_RAW, newpbuflen, PBUF_REF, &pcr->pc, p->payload, newpbuflen); + + if (newpbuf == NULL) { + ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom_ref(pcr); + pbuf_free(rambuf); + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.memerr); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + pbuf_ref(p); + pcr->original = p; + pcr->pc.custom_free_function = ip6_frag_free_pbuf_custom; + + /* Add it to end of rambuf's chain, but using pbuf_cat, not pbuf_chain + * so that it is removed when pbuf_dechain is later called on rambuf. + */ + pbuf_cat(rambuf, newpbuf); + left_to_copy = (u16_t)(left_to_copy - newpbuflen); + + if (left_to_copy) { + p = p->next; + } + } + + poff = newpbuflen; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + + /* Set headers */ + frag_hdr->_nexth = original_ip6hdr->_nexth; + frag_hdr->reserved = 0; + frag_hdr->_fragment_offset = lwip_htons((u16_t)((fragment_offset & IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK) | (last ? 0 : IP6_FRAG_MORE_FLAG))); + frag_hdr->_identification = lwip_htonl(identification); + + IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT); + IP6H_PLEN_SET(ip6hdr, (u16_t)(cop + IP6_FRAG_HLEN)); + + /* No need for separate header pbuf - we allowed room for it in rambuf + * when allocated. + */ + IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(ip6_frag.xmit); + netif->output_ip6(netif, rambuf, dest); + + /* Unfortunately we can't reuse rambuf - the hardware may still be + * using the buffer. Instead we free it (and the ensuing chain) and + * recreate it next time round the loop. If we're lucky the hardware + * will have already sent the packet, the free will really free, and + * there will be zero memory penalty. + */ + + pbuf_free(rambuf); + left = (u16_t)(left - cop); + fragment_offset = (u16_t)(fragment_offset + cop); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/mld6.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/mld6.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/mld6.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/mld6.c index 3159c5e0..296e1305 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/mld6.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/mld6.c @@ -1,639 +1,639 @@ -/** - * @file - * Multicast listener discovery - * - * @defgroup mld6 MLD6 - * @ingroup ip6 - * Multicast listener discovery for IPv6. Aims to be compliant with RFC 2710. - * No support for MLDv2.\n - * Note: The allnodes (ff01::1, ff02::1) group is assumed be received by your - * netif since it must always be received for correct IPv6 operation (e.g. SLAAC). - * Ensure the netif filters are configured accordingly!\n - * The netif flags also need NETIF_FLAG_MLD6 flag set to enable MLD6 on a - * netif ("netif->flags |= NETIF_FLAG_MLD6;").\n - * To be called from TCPIP thread. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -/* Based on igmp.c implementation of igmp v2 protocol */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -#include "lwip/prot/mld6.h" -#include "lwip/icmp6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#include - -/* - * MLD constants - */ -#define MLD6_HL 1 -#define MLD6_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR_MS (500) - -#define MLD6_GROUP_NON_MEMBER 0 -#define MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER 1 -#define MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER 2 - -/* Forward declarations. */ -static struct mld_group *mld6_new_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip6_addr_t *addr); -static err_t mld6_remove_group(struct netif *netif, struct mld_group *group); -static void mld6_delayed_report(struct mld_group *group, u16_t maxresp); -static void mld6_send(struct netif *netif, struct mld_group *group, u8_t type); - -/** - * Stop MLD processing on interface - * - * @param netif network interface on which stop MLD processing - */ -err_t mld6_stop(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct mld_group *group = netif_mld6_data(netif); - - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6, NULL); - - while (group != NULL) { - struct mld_group *next = group->next; /* avoid use-after-free below */ - - /* disable the group at the MAC level */ - if (netif->mld_mac_filter != NULL) { - netif->mld_mac_filter(netif, &(group->group_address), NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER); - } - - /* free group */ - memp_free(MEMP_MLD6_GROUP, group); - - /* move to "next" */ - group = next; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Report MLD memberships for this interface - * - * @param netif network interface on which report MLD memberships - */ -void mld6_report_groups(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct mld_group *group = netif_mld6_data(netif); - - while (group != NULL) { - mld6_delayed_report(group, MLD6_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR_MS); - group = group->next; - } -} - -/** - * Search for a group that is joined on a netif - * - * @param ifp the network interface for which to look - * @param addr the group ipv6 address to search for - * @return a struct mld_group* if the group has been found, - * NULL if the group wasn't found. - */ -struct mld_group * -mld6_lookfor_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip6_addr_t *addr) -{ - struct mld_group *group = netif_mld6_data(ifp); - - while (group != NULL) { - if (ip6_addr_cmp(&(group->group_address), addr)) { - return group; - } - - group = group->next; - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** - * create a new group - * - * @param ifp the network interface for which to create - * @param addr the new group ipv6 - * @return a struct mld_group*, - * NULL on memory error. - */ -static struct mld_group *mld6_new_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip6_addr_t *addr) -{ - struct mld_group *group; - - group = (struct mld_group *)memp_malloc(MEMP_MLD6_GROUP); - - if (group != NULL) { - ip6_addr_set(&(group->group_address), addr); - group->timer = 0; /* Not running */ - group->group_state = MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; - group->last_reporter_flag = 0; - group->use = 0; - group->next = netif_mld6_data(ifp); - - netif_set_client_data(ifp, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6, group); - } - - return group; -} - -/** - * Remove a group from the mld_group_list, but do not free it yet - * - * @param group the group to remove - * @return ERR_OK if group was removed from the list, an err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t mld6_remove_group(struct netif *netif, struct mld_group *group) -{ - err_t err = ERR_OK; - - /* Is it the first group? */ - if (netif_mld6_data(netif) == group) { - netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6, group->next); - } else { - /* look for group further down the list */ - struct mld_group *tmpGroup; - - for (tmpGroup = netif_mld6_data(netif); tmpGroup != NULL; tmpGroup = tmpGroup->next) { - if (tmpGroup->next == group) { - tmpGroup->next = group->next; - break; - } - } - - /* Group not find group */ - if (tmpGroup == NULL) { - err = ERR_ARG; - } - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * Process an input MLD message. Called by icmp6_input. - * - * @param p the mld packet, p->payload pointing to the icmpv6 header - * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received - */ -void mld6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - struct mld_header *mld_hdr; - struct mld_group *group; - - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.recv); - - /* Check that mld header fits in packet. */ - if (p->len < sizeof(struct mld_header)) { - /* @todo debug message */ - pbuf_free(p); - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.lenerr); - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.drop); - return; - } - - mld_hdr = (struct mld_header *)p->payload; - - switch (mld_hdr->type) { - case ICMP6_TYPE_MLQ: /* Multicast listener query. */ - - /* Is it a general query? */ - if (ip6_addr_isallnodes_linklocal(ip6_current_dest_addr()) && - ip6_addr_isany(&(mld_hdr->multicast_address))) { - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.rx_general); - /* Report all groups, except all nodes group, and if-local groups. */ - group = netif_mld6_data(inp); - - while (group != NULL) { - if ((!(ip6_addr_ismulticast_iflocal(&(group->group_address)))) && - (!(ip6_addr_isallnodes_linklocal(&(group->group_address))))) { - mld6_delayed_report(group, mld_hdr->max_resp_delay); - } - - group = group->next; - } - } else { - /* Have we joined this group? - * We use IP6 destination address to have a memory aligned copy. - * mld_hdr->multicast_address should be the same. */ - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.rx_group); - group = mld6_lookfor_group(inp, ip6_current_dest_addr()); - - if (group != NULL) { - /* Schedule a report. */ - mld6_delayed_report(group, mld_hdr->max_resp_delay); - } - } - - break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_MLQ */ - - case ICMP6_TYPE_MLR: /* Multicast listener report. */ - /* Have we joined this group? - * We use IP6 destination address to have a memory aligned copy. - * mld_hdr->multicast_address should be the same. */ - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.rx_report); - group = mld6_lookfor_group(inp, ip6_current_dest_addr()); - - if (group != NULL) { - /* If we are waiting to report, cancel it. */ - if (group->group_state == MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) { - group->timer = 0; /* stopped */ - group->group_state = MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; - group->last_reporter_flag = 0; - } - } - - break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_MLR */ - - case ICMP6_TYPE_MLD: /* Multicast listener done. */ - /* Do nothing, router will query us. */ - break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_MLD */ - - default: - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.proterr); - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.drop); - break; - } - - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/** - * @ingroup mld6 - * Join a group on one or all network interfaces. - * - * If the group is to be joined on all interfaces, the given group address must - * not have a zone set (i.e., it must have its zone index set to IP6_NO_ZONE). - * If the group is to be joined on one particular interface, the given group - * address may or may not have a zone set. - * - * @param srcaddr ipv6 address (zoned) of the network interface which should - * join a new group. If IP6_ADDR_ANY6, join on all netifs - * @param groupaddr the ipv6 address of the group to join (possibly but not - * necessarily zoned) - * @return ERR_OK if group was joined on the netif(s), an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mld6_joingroup(const ip6_addr_t *srcaddr, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr) -{ - err_t err = ERR_VAL; /* no matching interface */ - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* loop through netif's */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - /* Should we join this interface ? */ - if (ip6_addr_isany(srcaddr) || - netif_get_ip6_addr_match(netif, srcaddr) >= 0) { - err = mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, groupaddr); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - } - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mld6 - * Join a group on a network interface. - * - * @param netif the network interface which should join a new group. - * @param groupaddr the ipv6 address of the group to join (possibly but not - * necessarily zoned) - * @return ERR_OK if group was joined on the netif, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mld6_joingroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr) -{ - struct mld_group *group; -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - ip6_addr_t ip6addr; - - /* If the address has a particular scope but no zone set, use the netif to - * set one now. Within the mld6 module, all addresses are properly zoned. */ - if (ip6_addr_lacks_zone(groupaddr, IP6_MULTICAST)) { - ip6_addr_set(&ip6addr, groupaddr); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&ip6addr, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); - groupaddr = &ip6addr; - } - - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(groupaddr, netif); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* find group or create a new one if not found */ - group = mld6_lookfor_group(netif, groupaddr); - - if (group == NULL) { - /* Joining a new group. Create a new group entry. */ - group = mld6_new_group(netif, groupaddr); - - if (group == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Activate this address on the MAC layer. */ - if (netif->mld_mac_filter != NULL) { - netif->mld_mac_filter(netif, groupaddr, NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER); - } - - /* Report our membership. */ - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.tx_report); - mld6_send(netif, group, ICMP6_TYPE_MLR); - mld6_delayed_report(group, MLD6_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR_MS); - } - - /* Increment group use */ - group->use++; - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mld6 - * Leave a group on a network interface. - * - * Zoning of address follows the same rules as @ref mld6_joingroup. - * - * @param srcaddr ipv6 address (zoned) of the network interface which should - * leave the group. If IP6_ADDR_ANY6, leave on all netifs - * @param groupaddr the ipv6 address of the group to leave (possibly, but not - * necessarily zoned) - * @return ERR_OK if group was left on the netif(s), an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mld6_leavegroup(const ip6_addr_t *srcaddr, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr) -{ - err_t err = ERR_VAL; /* no matching interface */ - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* loop through netif's */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - /* Should we leave this interface ? */ - if (ip6_addr_isany(srcaddr) || - netif_get_ip6_addr_match(netif, srcaddr) >= 0) { - err_t res = mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, groupaddr); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* Store this result if we have not yet gotten a success */ - err = res; - } - } - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup mld6 - * Leave a group on a network interface. - * - * @param netif the network interface which should leave the group. - * @param groupaddr the ipv6 address of the group to leave (possibly, but not - * necessarily zoned) - * @return ERR_OK if group was left on the netif, an err_t otherwise - */ -err_t mld6_leavegroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr) -{ - struct mld_group *group; -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - ip6_addr_t ip6addr; - - if (ip6_addr_lacks_zone(groupaddr, IP6_MULTICAST)) { - ip6_addr_set(&ip6addr, groupaddr); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&ip6addr, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); - groupaddr = &ip6addr; - } - - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(groupaddr, netif); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* find group */ - group = mld6_lookfor_group(netif, groupaddr); - - if (group != NULL) { - /* Leave if there is no other use of the group */ - if (group->use <= 1) { - /* Remove the group from the list */ - mld6_remove_group(netif, group); - - /* If we are the last reporter for this group */ - if (group->last_reporter_flag) { - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.tx_leave); - mld6_send(netif, group, ICMP6_TYPE_MLD); - } - - /* Disable the group at the MAC level */ - if (netif->mld_mac_filter != NULL) { - netif->mld_mac_filter(netif, groupaddr, NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER); - } - - /* free group struct */ - memp_free(MEMP_MLD6_GROUP, group); - } else { - /* Decrement group use */ - group->use--; - } - - /* Left group */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Group not found */ - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** - * Periodic timer for mld processing. Must be called every - * MLD6_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds (100). - * - * When a delaying member expires, a membership report is sent. - */ -void mld6_tmr(void) -{ - struct netif *netif; - - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - struct mld_group *group = netif_mld6_data(netif); - - while (group != NULL) { - if (group->timer > 0) { - group->timer--; - - if (group->timer == 0) { - /* If the state is MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER then we send a report for this group */ - if (group->group_state == MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) { - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.tx_report); - mld6_send(netif, group, ICMP6_TYPE_MLR); - group->group_state = MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; - } - } - } - - group = group->next; - } - } -} - -/** - * Schedule a delayed membership report for a group - * - * @param group the mld_group for which "delaying" membership report - * should be sent - * @param maxresp_in the max resp delay provided in the query - */ -static void mld6_delayed_report(struct mld_group *group, u16_t maxresp_in) -{ - /* Convert maxresp from milliseconds to tmr ticks */ - u16_t maxresp = maxresp_in / MLD6_TMR_INTERVAL; - - if (maxresp == 0) { - maxresp = 1; - } - -#ifdef LWIP_RAND - /* Randomize maxresp. (if LWIP_RAND is supported) */ - maxresp = (u16_t)(LWIP_RAND() % maxresp); - - if (maxresp == 0) { - maxresp = 1; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ - - /* Apply timer value if no report has been scheduled already. */ - if ((group->group_state == MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER) || - ((group->group_state == MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) && - ((group->timer == 0) || (maxresp < group->timer)))) { - group->timer = maxresp; - group->group_state = MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER; - } -} - -/** - * Send a MLD message (report or done). - * - * An IPv6 hop-by-hop options header with a router alert option - * is prepended. - * - * @param group the group to report or quit - * @param type ICMP6_TYPE_MLR (report) or ICMP6_TYPE_MLD (done) - */ -static void mld6_send(struct netif *netif, struct mld_group *group, u8_t type) -{ - struct mld_header *mld_hdr; - struct pbuf *p; - const ip6_addr_t *src_addr; - - /* Allocate a packet. Size is MLD header + IPv6 Hop-by-hop options header. */ - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct mld_header) + MLD6_HBH_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.memerr); - return; - } - - /* Move to make room for Hop-by-hop options header. */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(p, MLD6_HBH_HLEN)) { - pbuf_free(p); - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.lenerr); - return; - } - - /* Select our source address. */ - if (!ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0))) { - /* This is a special case, when we are performing duplicate address detection. - * We must join the multicast group, but we don't have a valid address yet. */ - src_addr = IP6_ADDR_ANY6; - } else { - /* Use link-local address as source address. */ - src_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0); - } - - /* MLD message header pointer. */ - mld_hdr = (struct mld_header *)p->payload; - - /* Set fields. */ - mld_hdr->type = type; - mld_hdr->code = 0; - mld_hdr->chksum = 0; - mld_hdr->max_resp_delay = 0; - mld_hdr->reserved = 0; - ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(mld_hdr->multicast_address, group->group_address); - -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) - { - mld_hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->len, - src_addr, &(group->group_address)); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ - - /* Add hop-by-hop headers options: router alert with MLD value. */ - ip6_options_add_hbh_ra(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_VALUE_MLD); - - if (type == ICMP6_TYPE_MLR) { - /* Remember we were the last to report */ - group->last_reporter_flag = 1; - } - - /* Send the packet out. */ - MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.xmit); - ip6_output_if(p, (ip6_addr_isany(src_addr)) ? NULL : src_addr, &(group->group_address), - MLD6_HL, 0, IP6_NEXTH_HOPBYHOP, netif); - pbuf_free(p); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * Multicast listener discovery + * + * @defgroup mld6 MLD6 + * @ingroup ip6 + * Multicast listener discovery for IPv6. Aims to be compliant with RFC 2710. + * No support for MLDv2.\n + * Note: The allnodes (ff01::1, ff02::1) group is assumed be received by your + * netif since it must always be received for correct IPv6 operation (e.g. SLAAC). + * Ensure the netif filters are configured accordingly!\n + * The netif flags also need NETIF_FLAG_MLD6 flag set to enable MLD6 on a + * netif ("netif->flags |= NETIF_FLAG_MLD6;").\n + * To be called from TCPIP thread. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +/* Based on igmp.c implementation of igmp v2 protocol */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +#include "lwip/prot/mld6.h" +#include "lwip/icmp6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#include + +/* + * MLD constants + */ +#define MLD6_HL 1 +#define MLD6_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR_MS (500) + +#define MLD6_GROUP_NON_MEMBER 0 +#define MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER 1 +#define MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER 2 + +/* Forward declarations. */ +static struct mld_group *mld6_new_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip6_addr_t *addr); +static err_t mld6_remove_group(struct netif *netif, struct mld_group *group); +static void mld6_delayed_report(struct mld_group *group, u16_t maxresp); +static void mld6_send(struct netif *netif, struct mld_group *group, u8_t type); + +/** + * Stop MLD processing on interface + * + * @param netif network interface on which stop MLD processing + */ +err_t mld6_stop(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct mld_group *group = netif_mld6_data(netif); + + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6, NULL); + + while (group != NULL) { + struct mld_group *next = group->next; /* avoid use-after-free below */ + + /* disable the group at the MAC level */ + if (netif->mld_mac_filter != NULL) { + netif->mld_mac_filter(netif, &(group->group_address), NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER); + } + + /* free group */ + memp_free(MEMP_MLD6_GROUP, group); + + /* move to "next" */ + group = next; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Report MLD memberships for this interface + * + * @param netif network interface on which report MLD memberships + */ +void mld6_report_groups(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct mld_group *group = netif_mld6_data(netif); + + while (group != NULL) { + mld6_delayed_report(group, MLD6_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR_MS); + group = group->next; + } +} + +/** + * Search for a group that is joined on a netif + * + * @param ifp the network interface for which to look + * @param addr the group ipv6 address to search for + * @return a struct mld_group* if the group has been found, + * NULL if the group wasn't found. + */ +struct mld_group * +mld6_lookfor_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip6_addr_t *addr) +{ + struct mld_group *group = netif_mld6_data(ifp); + + while (group != NULL) { + if (ip6_addr_cmp(&(group->group_address), addr)) { + return group; + } + + group = group->next; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * create a new group + * + * @param ifp the network interface for which to create + * @param addr the new group ipv6 + * @return a struct mld_group*, + * NULL on memory error. + */ +static struct mld_group *mld6_new_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip6_addr_t *addr) +{ + struct mld_group *group; + + group = (struct mld_group *)memp_malloc(MEMP_MLD6_GROUP); + + if (group != NULL) { + ip6_addr_set(&(group->group_address), addr); + group->timer = 0; /* Not running */ + group->group_state = MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; + group->last_reporter_flag = 0; + group->use = 0; + group->next = netif_mld6_data(ifp); + + netif_set_client_data(ifp, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6, group); + } + + return group; +} + +/** + * Remove a group from the mld_group_list, but do not free it yet + * + * @param group the group to remove + * @return ERR_OK if group was removed from the list, an err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t mld6_remove_group(struct netif *netif, struct mld_group *group) +{ + err_t err = ERR_OK; + + /* Is it the first group? */ + if (netif_mld6_data(netif) == group) { + netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6, group->next); + } else { + /* look for group further down the list */ + struct mld_group *tmpGroup; + + for (tmpGroup = netif_mld6_data(netif); tmpGroup != NULL; tmpGroup = tmpGroup->next) { + if (tmpGroup->next == group) { + tmpGroup->next = group->next; + break; + } + } + + /* Group not find group */ + if (tmpGroup == NULL) { + err = ERR_ARG; + } + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * Process an input MLD message. Called by icmp6_input. + * + * @param p the mld packet, p->payload pointing to the icmpv6 header + * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received + */ +void mld6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + struct mld_header *mld_hdr; + struct mld_group *group; + + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.recv); + + /* Check that mld header fits in packet. */ + if (p->len < sizeof(struct mld_header)) { + /* @todo debug message */ + pbuf_free(p); + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.lenerr); + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.drop); + return; + } + + mld_hdr = (struct mld_header *)p->payload; + + switch (mld_hdr->type) { + case ICMP6_TYPE_MLQ: /* Multicast listener query. */ + + /* Is it a general query? */ + if (ip6_addr_isallnodes_linklocal(ip6_current_dest_addr()) && + ip6_addr_isany(&(mld_hdr->multicast_address))) { + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.rx_general); + /* Report all groups, except all nodes group, and if-local groups. */ + group = netif_mld6_data(inp); + + while (group != NULL) { + if ((!(ip6_addr_ismulticast_iflocal(&(group->group_address)))) && + (!(ip6_addr_isallnodes_linklocal(&(group->group_address))))) { + mld6_delayed_report(group, mld_hdr->max_resp_delay); + } + + group = group->next; + } + } else { + /* Have we joined this group? + * We use IP6 destination address to have a memory aligned copy. + * mld_hdr->multicast_address should be the same. */ + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.rx_group); + group = mld6_lookfor_group(inp, ip6_current_dest_addr()); + + if (group != NULL) { + /* Schedule a report. */ + mld6_delayed_report(group, mld_hdr->max_resp_delay); + } + } + + break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_MLQ */ + + case ICMP6_TYPE_MLR: /* Multicast listener report. */ + /* Have we joined this group? + * We use IP6 destination address to have a memory aligned copy. + * mld_hdr->multicast_address should be the same. */ + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.rx_report); + group = mld6_lookfor_group(inp, ip6_current_dest_addr()); + + if (group != NULL) { + /* If we are waiting to report, cancel it. */ + if (group->group_state == MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) { + group->timer = 0; /* stopped */ + group->group_state = MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; + group->last_reporter_flag = 0; + } + } + + break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_MLR */ + + case ICMP6_TYPE_MLD: /* Multicast listener done. */ + /* Do nothing, router will query us. */ + break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_MLD */ + + default: + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.proterr); + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.drop); + break; + } + + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/** + * @ingroup mld6 + * Join a group on one or all network interfaces. + * + * If the group is to be joined on all interfaces, the given group address must + * not have a zone set (i.e., it must have its zone index set to IP6_NO_ZONE). + * If the group is to be joined on one particular interface, the given group + * address may or may not have a zone set. + * + * @param srcaddr ipv6 address (zoned) of the network interface which should + * join a new group. If IP6_ADDR_ANY6, join on all netifs + * @param groupaddr the ipv6 address of the group to join (possibly but not + * necessarily zoned) + * @return ERR_OK if group was joined on the netif(s), an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mld6_joingroup(const ip6_addr_t *srcaddr, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr) +{ + err_t err = ERR_VAL; /* no matching interface */ + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* loop through netif's */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + /* Should we join this interface ? */ + if (ip6_addr_isany(srcaddr) || + netif_get_ip6_addr_match(netif, srcaddr) >= 0) { + err = mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, groupaddr); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + } + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mld6 + * Join a group on a network interface. + * + * @param netif the network interface which should join a new group. + * @param groupaddr the ipv6 address of the group to join (possibly but not + * necessarily zoned) + * @return ERR_OK if group was joined on the netif, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mld6_joingroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr) +{ + struct mld_group *group; +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + ip6_addr_t ip6addr; + + /* If the address has a particular scope but no zone set, use the netif to + * set one now. Within the mld6 module, all addresses are properly zoned. */ + if (ip6_addr_lacks_zone(groupaddr, IP6_MULTICAST)) { + ip6_addr_set(&ip6addr, groupaddr); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&ip6addr, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); + groupaddr = &ip6addr; + } + + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(groupaddr, netif); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* find group or create a new one if not found */ + group = mld6_lookfor_group(netif, groupaddr); + + if (group == NULL) { + /* Joining a new group. Create a new group entry. */ + group = mld6_new_group(netif, groupaddr); + + if (group == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Activate this address on the MAC layer. */ + if (netif->mld_mac_filter != NULL) { + netif->mld_mac_filter(netif, groupaddr, NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER); + } + + /* Report our membership. */ + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.tx_report); + mld6_send(netif, group, ICMP6_TYPE_MLR); + mld6_delayed_report(group, MLD6_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR_MS); + } + + /* Increment group use */ + group->use++; + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mld6 + * Leave a group on a network interface. + * + * Zoning of address follows the same rules as @ref mld6_joingroup. + * + * @param srcaddr ipv6 address (zoned) of the network interface which should + * leave the group. If IP6_ADDR_ANY6, leave on all netifs + * @param groupaddr the ipv6 address of the group to leave (possibly, but not + * necessarily zoned) + * @return ERR_OK if group was left on the netif(s), an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mld6_leavegroup(const ip6_addr_t *srcaddr, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr) +{ + err_t err = ERR_VAL; /* no matching interface */ + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* loop through netif's */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + /* Should we leave this interface ? */ + if (ip6_addr_isany(srcaddr) || + netif_get_ip6_addr_match(netif, srcaddr) >= 0) { + err_t res = mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, groupaddr); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* Store this result if we have not yet gotten a success */ + err = res; + } + } + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup mld6 + * Leave a group on a network interface. + * + * @param netif the network interface which should leave the group. + * @param groupaddr the ipv6 address of the group to leave (possibly, but not + * necessarily zoned) + * @return ERR_OK if group was left on the netif, an err_t otherwise + */ +err_t mld6_leavegroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr) +{ + struct mld_group *group; +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + ip6_addr_t ip6addr; + + if (ip6_addr_lacks_zone(groupaddr, IP6_MULTICAST)) { + ip6_addr_set(&ip6addr, groupaddr); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&ip6addr, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); + groupaddr = &ip6addr; + } + + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(groupaddr, netif); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* find group */ + group = mld6_lookfor_group(netif, groupaddr); + + if (group != NULL) { + /* Leave if there is no other use of the group */ + if (group->use <= 1) { + /* Remove the group from the list */ + mld6_remove_group(netif, group); + + /* If we are the last reporter for this group */ + if (group->last_reporter_flag) { + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.tx_leave); + mld6_send(netif, group, ICMP6_TYPE_MLD); + } + + /* Disable the group at the MAC level */ + if (netif->mld_mac_filter != NULL) { + netif->mld_mac_filter(netif, groupaddr, NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER); + } + + /* free group struct */ + memp_free(MEMP_MLD6_GROUP, group); + } else { + /* Decrement group use */ + group->use--; + } + + /* Left group */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Group not found */ + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** + * Periodic timer for mld processing. Must be called every + * MLD6_TMR_INTERVAL milliseconds (100). + * + * When a delaying member expires, a membership report is sent. + */ +void mld6_tmr(void) +{ + struct netif *netif; + + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + struct mld_group *group = netif_mld6_data(netif); + + while (group != NULL) { + if (group->timer > 0) { + group->timer--; + + if (group->timer == 0) { + /* If the state is MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER then we send a report for this group */ + if (group->group_state == MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) { + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.tx_report); + mld6_send(netif, group, ICMP6_TYPE_MLR); + group->group_state = MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER; + } + } + } + + group = group->next; + } + } +} + +/** + * Schedule a delayed membership report for a group + * + * @param group the mld_group for which "delaying" membership report + * should be sent + * @param maxresp_in the max resp delay provided in the query + */ +static void mld6_delayed_report(struct mld_group *group, u16_t maxresp_in) +{ + /* Convert maxresp from milliseconds to tmr ticks */ + u16_t maxresp = maxresp_in / MLD6_TMR_INTERVAL; + + if (maxresp == 0) { + maxresp = 1; + } + +#ifdef LWIP_RAND + /* Randomize maxresp. (if LWIP_RAND is supported) */ + maxresp = (u16_t)(LWIP_RAND() % maxresp); + + if (maxresp == 0) { + maxresp = 1; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ + + /* Apply timer value if no report has been scheduled already. */ + if ((group->group_state == MLD6_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER) || + ((group->group_state == MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER) && + ((group->timer == 0) || (maxresp < group->timer)))) { + group->timer = maxresp; + group->group_state = MLD6_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER; + } +} + +/** + * Send a MLD message (report or done). + * + * An IPv6 hop-by-hop options header with a router alert option + * is prepended. + * + * @param group the group to report or quit + * @param type ICMP6_TYPE_MLR (report) or ICMP6_TYPE_MLD (done) + */ +static void mld6_send(struct netif *netif, struct mld_group *group, u8_t type) +{ + struct mld_header *mld_hdr; + struct pbuf *p; + const ip6_addr_t *src_addr; + + /* Allocate a packet. Size is MLD header + IPv6 Hop-by-hop options header. */ + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct mld_header) + MLD6_HBH_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.memerr); + return; + } + + /* Move to make room for Hop-by-hop options header. */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(p, MLD6_HBH_HLEN)) { + pbuf_free(p); + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.lenerr); + return; + } + + /* Select our source address. */ + if (!ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0))) { + /* This is a special case, when we are performing duplicate address detection. + * We must join the multicast group, but we don't have a valid address yet. */ + src_addr = IP6_ADDR_ANY6; + } else { + /* Use link-local address as source address. */ + src_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0); + } + + /* MLD message header pointer. */ + mld_hdr = (struct mld_header *)p->payload; + + /* Set fields. */ + mld_hdr->type = type; + mld_hdr->code = 0; + mld_hdr->chksum = 0; + mld_hdr->max_resp_delay = 0; + mld_hdr->reserved = 0; + ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(mld_hdr->multicast_address, group->group_address); + +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) + { + mld_hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->len, + src_addr, &(group->group_address)); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ + + /* Add hop-by-hop headers options: router alert with MLD value. */ + ip6_options_add_hbh_ra(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_VALUE_MLD); + + if (type == ICMP6_TYPE_MLR) { + /* Remember we were the last to report */ + group->last_reporter_flag = 1; + } + + /* Send the packet out. */ + MLD6_STATS_INC(mld6.xmit); + ip6_output_if(p, (ip6_addr_isany(src_addr)) ? NULL : src_addr, &(group->group_address), + MLD6_HL, 0, IP6_NEXTH_HOPBYHOP, netif); + pbuf_free(p); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/nd6.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/nd6.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/nd6.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/nd6.c index e2b86a02..b56c9a31 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/ipv6/nd6.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/ipv6/nd6.c @@ -1,2569 +1,2569 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * Neighbor discovery and stateless address autoconfiguration for IPv6. - * Aims to be compliant with RFC 4861 (Neighbor discovery) and RFC 4862 - * (Address autoconfiguration). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h" -#include "lwip/prot/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/prot/icmp6.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/icmp6.h" -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS > IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK -#error LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS > IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK -#endif - -/* Router tables. */ -struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry neighbor_cache[LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS]; -struct nd6_destination_cache_entry destination_cache[LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS]; -struct nd6_prefix_list_entry prefix_list[LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES]; -struct nd6_router_list_entry default_router_list[LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS]; - -/* Default values, can be updated by a RA message. */ -u32_t reachable_time = LWIP_ND6_REACHABLE_TIME; -u32_t retrans_timer = LWIP_ND6_RETRANS_TIMER; /* @todo implement this value in timer */ - -/* Index for cache entries. */ -static u8_t nd6_cached_neighbor_index; -static netif_addr_idx_t nd6_cached_destination_index; - -/* Multicast address holder. */ -static ip6_addr_t multicast_address; - -static u8_t nd6_tmr_rs_reduction; - -/* Static buffer to parse RA packet options */ -union ra_options { - struct lladdr_option lladdr; - struct mtu_option mtu; - struct prefix_option prefix; -#if LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS - struct rdnss_option rdnss; -#endif -}; -static union ra_options nd6_ra_buffer; - -/* Forward declarations. */ -static s8_t nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); -static s8_t nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(void); -static void nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(s8_t i); -static s16_t nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); -static s16_t nd6_new_destination_cache_entry(void); -static int nd6_is_prefix_in_netif(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif); -static s8_t nd6_select_router(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif); -static s8_t nd6_get_router(const ip6_addr_t *router_addr, struct netif *netif); -static s8_t nd6_new_router(const ip6_addr_t *router_addr, struct netif *netif); -static s8_t nd6_get_onlink_prefix(const ip6_addr_t *prefix, struct netif *netif); -static s8_t nd6_new_onlink_prefix(const ip6_addr_t *prefix, struct netif *netif); -static s8_t nd6_get_next_hop_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif); -static err_t nd6_queue_packet(s8_t neighbor_index, struct pbuf *q); - -#define ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST 0x01 -#define ND6_SEND_FLAG_ALLNODES_DEST 0x02 -#define ND6_SEND_FLAG_ANY_SRC 0x04 -static void nd6_send_ns(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *target_addr, u8_t flags); -static void nd6_send_na(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *target_addr, u8_t flags); -static void nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry *entry, u8_t flags); -#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT -static err_t nd6_send_rs(struct netif *netif); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ - -#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING -static void nd6_free_q(struct nd6_q_entry *q); -#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ -#define nd6_free_q(q) pbuf_free(q) -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ -static void nd6_send_q(s8_t i); - -/** - * A local address has been determined to be a duplicate. Take the appropriate - * action(s) on the address and the interface as a whole. - * - * @param netif the netif that owns the address - * @param addr_idx the index of the address detected to be a duplicate - */ -static void nd6_duplicate_addr_detected(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx) -{ - /* Mark the address as duplicate, but leave its lifetimes alone. If this was - * a manually assigned address, it will remain in existence as duplicate, and - * as such be unusable for any practical purposes until manual intervention. - * If this was an autogenerated address, the address will follow normal - * expiration rules, and thus disappear once its valid lifetime expires. */ - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, addr_idx, IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED); - -#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG - - /* If the affected address was the link-local address that we use to generate - * all other addresses, then we should not continue to use those derived - * addresses either, so mark them as duplicate as well. For autoconfig-only - * setups, this will make the interface effectively unusable, approaching the - * intention of RFC 4862 Sec. 5.4.5. @todo implement the full requirements */ - if (addr_idx == 0) { - s8_t i; - - for (i = 1; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && - !netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i)) { - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED); - } - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ -} - -#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG -/** - * We received a router advertisement that contains a prefix with the - * autoconfiguration flag set. Add or update an associated autogenerated - * address. - * - * @param netif the netif on which the router advertisement arrived - * @param prefix_opt a pointer to the prefix option data - * @param prefix_addr an aligned copy of the prefix address - */ -static void nd6_process_autoconfig_prefix(struct netif *netif, - struct prefix_option *prefix_opt, const ip6_addr_t *prefix_addr) -{ - ip6_addr_t ip6addr; - u32_t valid_life, pref_life; - u8_t addr_state; - s8_t i, free_idx; - - /* The caller already checks RFC 4862 Sec. 5.5.3 points (a) and (b). We do - * the rest, starting with checks for (c) and (d) here. */ - valid_life = lwip_htonl(prefix_opt->valid_lifetime); - pref_life = lwip_htonl(prefix_opt->preferred_lifetime); - - if (pref_life > valid_life || prefix_opt->prefix_length != 64) { - return; /* silently ignore this prefix for autoconfiguration purposes */ - } - - /* If an autogenerated address already exists for this prefix, update its - * lifetimes. An address is considered autogenerated if 1) it is not static - * (i.e., manually assigned), and 2) there is an advertised autoconfiguration - * prefix for it (the one we are processing here). This does not necessarily - * exclude the possibility that the address was actually assigned by, say, - * DHCPv6. If that distinction becomes important in the future, more state - * must be kept. As explained elsewhere we also update lifetimes of tentative - * and duplicate addresses. Skip address slot 0 (the link-local address). */ - for (i = 1; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - addr_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i); - - if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(addr_state) && !netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) && - ip6_addr_netcmp(prefix_addr, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { - /* Update the valid lifetime, as per RFC 4862 Sec. 5.5.3 point (e). - * The valid lifetime will never drop to zero as a result of this. */ - u32_t remaining_life = netif_ip6_addr_valid_life(netif, i); - - if (valid_life > ND6_2HRS || valid_life > remaining_life) { - netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, valid_life); - } else if (remaining_life > ND6_2HRS) { - netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, ND6_2HRS); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("bad valid lifetime", !netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i)); - - /* Update the preferred lifetime. No bounds checks are needed here. In - * rare cases the advertisement may un-deprecate the address, though. - * Deprecation is left to the timer code where it is handled anyway. */ - if (pref_life > 0 && addr_state == IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED) { - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED); - } - - netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, pref_life); - return; /* there should be at most one matching address */ - } - } - - /* No autogenerated address exists for this prefix yet. See if we can add a - * new one. However, if IPv6 autoconfiguration is administratively disabled, - * do not generate new addresses, but do keep updating lifetimes for existing - * addresses. Also, when adding new addresses, we must protect explicitly - * against a valid lifetime of zero, because again, we use that as a special - * value. The generated address would otherwise expire immediately anyway. - * Finally, the original link-local address must be usable at all. We start - * creating addresses even if the link-local address is still in tentative - * state though, and deal with the fallout of that upon DAD collision. */ - addr_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0); - - if (!netif->ip6_autoconfig_enabled || valid_life == IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC || - ip6_addr_isinvalid(addr_state) || ip6_addr_isduplicated(addr_state)) { - return; - } - - /* Construct the new address that we intend to use, and then see if that - * address really does not exist. It might have been added manually, after - * all. As a side effect, find a free slot. Note that we cannot use - * netif_add_ip6_address() here, as it would return ERR_OK if the address - * already did exist, resulting in that address being given lifetimes. */ - IP6_ADDR(&ip6addr, prefix_addr->addr[0], prefix_addr->addr[1], - netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0)->addr[2], netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0)->addr[3]); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&ip6addr, IP6_UNICAST, netif); - - free_idx = 0; - - for (i = 1; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { - if (ip6_addr_cmp(&ip6addr, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { - return; /* formed address already exists */ - } - } else if (free_idx == 0) { - free_idx = i; - } - } - - if (free_idx == 0) { - return; /* no address slots available, try again on next advertisement */ - } - - /* Assign the new address to the interface. */ - ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(netif->ip6_addr[free_idx], ip6addr); - netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, free_idx, valid_life); - netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, free_idx, pref_life); - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, free_idx, IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ - -/** - * Process an incoming neighbor discovery message - * - * @param p the nd packet, p->payload pointing to the icmpv6 header - * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received - */ -void nd6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - u8_t msg_type; - s8_t i; - s16_t dest_idx; - - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.recv); - - msg_type = *((u8_t *)p->payload); - - switch (msg_type) { - case ICMP6_TYPE_NA: /* Neighbor Advertisement. */ - { - struct na_header *na_hdr; - struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; - ip6_addr_t target_address; - - /* Check that na header fits in packet. */ - if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header))) { - /* @todo debug message */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - na_hdr = (struct na_header *)p->payload; - - /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the target address. */ - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(target_address, na_hdr->target_address); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&target_address, IP6_UNICAST, inp); - - /* Check a subset of the other RFC 4861 Sec. 7.1.2 requirements. */ - if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6_current_header()) != ND6_HOPLIM || na_hdr->code != 0 || - ip6_addr_ismulticast(&target_address)) { - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - /* @todo RFC MUST: if IP destination is multicast, Solicited flag is zero */ - /* @todo RFC MUST: all included options have a length greater than zero */ - - /* Unsolicited NA?*/ - if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { - /* This is an unsolicited NA. - * link-layer changed? - * part of DAD mechanism? */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS - /* If the target address matches this netif, it is a DAD response. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && - !ip6_addr_isduplicated(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && - ip6_addr_cmp(&target_address, netif_ip6_addr(inp, i))) { - /* We are using a duplicate address. */ - nd6_duplicate_addr_detected(inp, i); - - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS */ - - /* Check that link-layer address option also fits in packet. */ - if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header) + 2)) { - /* @todo debug message */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct na_header)); - - if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header) + (lladdr_opt->length << 3))) { - /* @todo debug message */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - /* This is an unsolicited NA, most likely there was a LLADDR change. */ - i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&target_address); - - if (i >= 0) { - if (na_hdr->flags & ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE) { - MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); - } - } - } else { - /* This is a solicited NA. - * neighbor address resolution response? - * neighbor unreachability detection response? */ - - /* Find the cache entry corresponding to this na. */ - i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&target_address); - - if (i < 0) { - /* We no longer care about this target address. drop it. */ - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - /* Update cache entry. */ - if ((na_hdr->flags & ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE) || - (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE)) { - /* Check that link-layer address option also fits in packet. */ - if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header) + 2)) { - /* @todo debug message */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct na_header)); - - if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header) + (lladdr_opt->length << 3))) { - /* @todo debug message */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); - } - - neighbor_cache[i].netif = inp; - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_REACHABLE; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time = reachable_time; - - /* Send queued packets, if any. */ - if (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { - nd6_send_q(i); - } - } - - break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_NA */ - } - - case ICMP6_TYPE_NS: /* Neighbor solicitation. */ - { - struct ns_header *ns_hdr; - struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; - ip6_addr_t target_address; - u8_t accepted; - - /* Check that ns header fits in packet. */ - if (p->len < sizeof(struct ns_header)) { - /* @todo debug message */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - ns_hdr = (struct ns_header *)p->payload; - - /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the target address. */ - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(target_address, ns_hdr->target_address); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&target_address, IP6_UNICAST, inp); - - /* Check a subset of the other RFC 4861 Sec. 7.1.1 requirements. */ - if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6_current_header()) != ND6_HOPLIM || ns_hdr->code != 0 || - ip6_addr_ismulticast(&target_address)) { - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - /* @todo RFC MUST: all included options have a length greater than zero */ - /* @todo RFC MUST: if IP source is 'any', destination is solicited-node multicast address */ - /* @todo RFC MUST: if IP source is 'any', there is no source LL address option */ - - /* Check if there is a link-layer address provided. Only point to it if in this buffer. */ - if (p->len >= (sizeof(struct ns_header) + 2)) { - lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct ns_header)); - - if (p->len < (sizeof(struct ns_header) + (lladdr_opt->length << 3))) { - lladdr_opt = NULL; - } - } else { - lladdr_opt = NULL; - } - - /* Check if the target address is configured on the receiving netif. */ - accepted = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; ++i) { - if ((ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) || - (ip6_addr_istentative(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && - ip6_addr_isany(ip6_current_src_addr()))) && - ip6_addr_cmp(&target_address, netif_ip6_addr(inp, i))) { - accepted = 1; - break; - } - } - - /* NS not for us? */ - if (!accepted) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - /* Check for ANY address in src (DAD algorithm). */ - if (ip6_addr_isany(ip6_current_src_addr())) { - /* Sender is validating this address. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; ++i) { - if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && - ip6_addr_cmp(&target_address, netif_ip6_addr(inp, i))) { - /* Send a NA back so that the sender does not use this address. */ - nd6_send_na(inp, netif_ip6_addr(inp, i), ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE | ND6_SEND_FLAG_ALLNODES_DEST); - - if (ip6_addr_istentative(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i))) { - /* We shouldn't use this address either. */ - nd6_duplicate_addr_detected(inp, i); - } - } - } - } else { - /* Sender is trying to resolve our address. */ - /* Verify that they included their own link-layer address. */ - if (lladdr_opt == NULL) { - /* Not a valid message. */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(ip6_current_src_addr()); - - if (i >= 0) { - /* We already have a record for the solicitor. */ - if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE) { - neighbor_cache[i].netif = inp; - MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); - - /* Delay probe in case we get confirmation of reachability from upper layer (TCP). */ - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; - } - } else { - /* Add their IPv6 address and link-layer address to neighbor cache. - * We will need it at least to send a unicast NA message, but most - * likely we will also be communicating with this node soon. */ - i = nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(); - - if (i < 0) { - /* We couldn't assign a cache entry for this neighbor. - * we won't be able to reply. drop it. */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); - return; - } - - neighbor_cache[i].netif = inp; - MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); - ip6_addr_set(&(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address), ip6_current_src_addr()); - - /* Receiving a message does not prove reachability: only in one direction. - * Delay probe in case we get confirmation of reachability from upper layer (TCP). */ - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; - } - - /* Send back a NA for us. Allocate the reply pbuf. */ - nd6_send_na(inp, &target_address, ND6_FLAG_SOLICITED | ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE); - } - - break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_NS */ - } - - case ICMP6_TYPE_RA: /* Router Advertisement. */ - { - struct ra_header *ra_hdr; - u8_t *buffer; /* Used to copy options. */ - u16_t offset; -#if LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS - /* There can be multiple RDNSS options per RA */ - u8_t rdnss_server_idx = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS */ - - /* Check that RA header fits in packet. */ - if (p->len < sizeof(struct ra_header)) { - /* @todo debug message */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - ra_hdr = (struct ra_header *)p->payload; - - /* Check a subset of the other RFC 4861 Sec. 6.1.2 requirements. */ - if (!ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_src_addr()) || - IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6_current_header()) != ND6_HOPLIM || ra_hdr->code != 0) { - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - /* @todo RFC MUST: all included options have a length greater than zero */ - - /* If we are sending RS messages, stop. */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT - - /* ensure at least one solicitation is sent (see RFC 4861, ch. 6.3.7) */ - if ((inp->rs_count < LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT) || - (nd6_send_rs(inp) == ERR_OK)) { - inp->rs_count = 0; - } else { - inp->rs_count = 1; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ - - /* Get the matching default router entry. */ - i = nd6_get_router(ip6_current_src_addr(), inp); - - if (i < 0) { - /* Create a new router entry. */ - i = nd6_new_router(ip6_current_src_addr(), inp); - } - - if (i < 0) { - /* Could not create a new router entry. */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); - return; - } - - /* Re-set invalidation timer. */ - default_router_list[i].invalidation_timer = lwip_htons(ra_hdr->router_lifetime); - - /* Re-set default timer values. */ -#if LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES - - if (ra_hdr->retrans_timer > 0) { - retrans_timer = lwip_htonl(ra_hdr->retrans_timer); - } - - if (ra_hdr->reachable_time > 0) { - reachable_time = lwip_htonl(ra_hdr->reachable_time); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ - - /* @todo set default hop limit... */ - /* ra_hdr->current_hop_limit;*/ - - /* Update flags in local entry (incl. preference). */ - default_router_list[i].flags = ra_hdr->flags; - -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 - /* Trigger DHCPv6 if enabled */ - dhcp6_nd6_ra_trigger(inp, ra_hdr->flags & ND6_RA_FLAG_MANAGED_ADDR_CONFIG, - ra_hdr->flags & ND6_RA_FLAG_OTHER_CONFIG); -#endif - - /* Offset to options. */ - offset = sizeof(struct ra_header); - - /* Process each option. */ - while ((p->tot_len - offset) >= 2) { - u8_t option_type; - u16_t option_len; - int option_len8 = pbuf_try_get_at(p, offset + 1); - - if (option_len8 <= 0) { - /* read beyond end or zero length */ - goto lenerr_drop_free_return; - } - - option_len = ((u8_t)option_len8) << 3; - - if (option_len > p->tot_len - offset) { - /* short packet (option does not fit in) */ - goto lenerr_drop_free_return; - } - - if (p->len == p->tot_len) { - /* no need to copy from contiguous pbuf */ - buffer = &((u8_t *)p->payload)[offset]; - } else { - /* check if this option fits into our buffer */ - if (option_len > sizeof(nd6_ra_buffer)) { - option_type = pbuf_get_at(p, offset); - - /* invalid option length */ - if (option_type != ND6_OPTION_TYPE_RDNSS) { - goto lenerr_drop_free_return; - } - - /* we allow RDNSS option to be longer - we'll just drop some servers */ - option_len = sizeof(nd6_ra_buffer); - } - - buffer = (u8_t *)&nd6_ra_buffer; - option_len = pbuf_copy_partial(p, &nd6_ra_buffer, option_len, offset); - } - - option_type = buffer[0]; - - switch (option_type) { - case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_SOURCE_LLADDR: { - struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; - - if (option_len < sizeof(struct lladdr_option)) { - goto lenerr_drop_free_return; - } - - lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)buffer; - - if ((default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) && - (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->state == ND6_INCOMPLETE)) { - SMEMCPY(default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); - default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->state = ND6_REACHABLE; - default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->counter.reachable_time = reachable_time; - } - - break; - } - - case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_MTU: { - struct mtu_option *mtu_opt; - u32_t mtu32; - - if (option_len < sizeof(struct mtu_option)) { - goto lenerr_drop_free_return; - } - - mtu_opt = (struct mtu_option *)buffer; - mtu32 = lwip_htonl(mtu_opt->mtu); - - if ((mtu32 >= 1280) && (mtu32 <= 0xffff)) { -#if LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES - - if (inp->mtu) { - /* don't set the mtu for IPv6 higher than the netif driver supports */ - inp->mtu6 = LWIP_MIN(inp->mtu, (u16_t)mtu32); - } else { - inp->mtu6 = (u16_t)mtu32; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ - } - - break; - } - - case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_PREFIX_INFO: { - struct prefix_option *prefix_opt; - ip6_addr_t prefix_addr; - - if (option_len < sizeof(struct prefix_option)) { - goto lenerr_drop_free_return; - } - - prefix_opt = (struct prefix_option *)buffer; - - /* Get a memory-aligned copy of the prefix. */ - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(prefix_addr, prefix_opt->prefix); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&prefix_addr, IP6_UNICAST, inp); - - if (!ip6_addr_islinklocal(&prefix_addr)) { - if ((prefix_opt->flags & ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_ON_LINK) && - (prefix_opt->prefix_length == 64)) { - /* Add to on-link prefix list. */ - u32_t valid_life; - s8_t prefix; - - valid_life = lwip_htonl(prefix_opt->valid_lifetime); - - /* find cache entry for this prefix. */ - prefix = nd6_get_onlink_prefix(&prefix_addr, inp); - - if (prefix < 0 && valid_life > 0) { - /* Create a new cache entry. */ - prefix = nd6_new_onlink_prefix(&prefix_addr, inp); - } - - if (prefix >= 0) { - prefix_list[prefix].invalidation_timer = valid_life; - } - } - -#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG - - if (prefix_opt->flags & ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_AUTONOMOUS) { - /* Perform processing for autoconfiguration. */ - nd6_process_autoconfig_prefix(inp, prefix_opt, &prefix_addr); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ - } - - break; - } - - case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_ROUTE_INFO: - /* @todo implement preferred routes. - struct route_option * route_opt; - route_opt = (struct route_option *)buffer;*/ - - break; -#if LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS - - case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_RDNSS: { - u8_t num, n; - u16_t copy_offset = offset + SIZEOF_RDNSS_OPTION_BASE; - struct rdnss_option *rdnss_opt; - - if (option_len < SIZEOF_RDNSS_OPTION_BASE) { - goto lenerr_drop_free_return; - } - - rdnss_opt = (struct rdnss_option *)buffer; - num = (rdnss_opt->length - 1) / 2; - - for (n = 0; (rdnss_server_idx < DNS_MAX_SERVERS) && (n < num); n++) { - ip_addr_t rdnss_address; - - /* Copy directly from pbuf to get an aligned, zoned copy of the prefix. */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &rdnss_address, sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t), copy_offset) == sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t)) { - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(rdnss_address, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&rdnss_address), IP6_UNKNOWN, inp); - - if (htonl(rdnss_opt->lifetime) > 0) { - /* TODO implement Lifetime > 0 */ - dns_setserver(rdnss_server_idx++, &rdnss_address); - } else { - /* TODO implement DNS removal in dns.c */ - u8_t s; - - for (s = 0; s < DNS_MAX_SERVERS; s++) { - const ip_addr_t *addr = dns_getserver(s); - - if (ip_addr_cmp(addr, &rdnss_address)) { - dns_setserver(s, NULL); - } - } - } - } - } - - break; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS */ - - default: - /* Unrecognized option, abort. */ - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); - break; - } - - /* option length is checked earlier to be non-zero to make sure loop ends */ - offset += 8 * (u8_t)option_len8; - } - - break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_RA */ - } - - case ICMP6_TYPE_RD: /* Redirect */ - { - struct redirect_header *redir_hdr; - struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; - ip6_addr_t destination_address, target_address; - - /* Check that Redir header fits in packet. */ - if (p->len < sizeof(struct redirect_header)) { - /* @todo debug message */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - redir_hdr = (struct redirect_header *)p->payload; - - /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the destination address. */ - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(destination_address, redir_hdr->destination_address); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&destination_address, IP6_UNICAST, inp); - - /* Check a subset of the other RFC 4861 Sec. 8.1 requirements. */ - if (!ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_src_addr()) || - IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6_current_header()) != ND6_HOPLIM || - redir_hdr->code != 0 || ip6_addr_ismulticast(&destination_address)) { - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - /* @todo RFC MUST: IP source address equals first-hop router for destination_address */ - /* @todo RFC MUST: ICMP target address is either link-local address or same as destination_address */ - /* @todo RFC MUST: all included options have a length greater than zero */ - - if (p->len >= (sizeof(struct redirect_header) + 2)) { - lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct redirect_header)); - - if (p->len < (sizeof(struct redirect_header) + (lladdr_opt->length << 3))) { - lladdr_opt = NULL; - } - } else { - lladdr_opt = NULL; - } - - /* Find dest address in cache */ - dest_idx = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(&destination_address); - - if (dest_idx < 0) { - /* Destination not in cache, drop packet. */ - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the target address. */ - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(target_address, redir_hdr->target_address); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&target_address, IP6_UNICAST, inp); - - /* Set the new target address. */ - ip6_addr_copy(destination_cache[dest_idx].next_hop_addr, target_address); - - /* If Link-layer address of other router is given, try to add to neighbor cache. */ - if (lladdr_opt != NULL) { - if (lladdr_opt->type == ND6_OPTION_TYPE_TARGET_LLADDR) { - i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&target_address); - - if (i < 0) { - i = nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(); - - if (i >= 0) { - neighbor_cache[i].netif = inp; - MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); - ip6_addr_copy(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address, target_address); - - /* Receiving a message does not prove reachability: only in one direction. - * Delay probe in case we get confirmation of reachability from upper layer (TCP). */ - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; - } - } - - if (i >= 0) { - if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE) { - MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); - /* Receiving a message does not prove reachability: only in one direction. - * Delay probe in case we get confirmation of reachability from upper layer (TCP). */ - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; - } - } - } - } - - break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_RD */ - } - - case ICMP6_TYPE_PTB: /* Packet too big */ - { - struct icmp6_hdr *icmp6hdr; /* Packet too big message */ - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; /* IPv6 header of the packet which caused the error */ - u32_t pmtu; - ip6_addr_t destination_address; - - /* Check that ICMPv6 header + IPv6 header fit in payload */ - if (p->len < (sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr) + IP6_HLEN)) { - /* drop short packets */ - pbuf_free(p); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - return; - } - - icmp6hdr = (struct icmp6_hdr *)p->payload; - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr)); - - /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the destination address. */ - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(destination_address, ip6hdr->dest); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&destination_address, IP6_UNKNOWN, inp); - - /* Look for entry in destination cache. */ - dest_idx = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(&destination_address); - - if (dest_idx < 0) { - /* Destination not in cache, drop packet. */ - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - /* Change the Path MTU. */ - pmtu = lwip_htonl(icmp6hdr->data); - destination_cache[dest_idx].pmtu = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(pmtu, 0xFFFF); - - break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_PTB */ - } - - default: - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - break; /* default */ - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return; -lenerr_drop_free_return: - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/** - * Periodic timer for Neighbor discovery functions: - * - * - Update neighbor reachability states - * - Update destination cache entries age - * - Update invalidation timers of default routers and on-link prefixes - * - Update lifetimes of our addresses - * - Perform duplicate address detection (DAD) for our addresses - * - Send router solicitations - */ -void nd6_tmr(void) -{ - s8_t i; - struct netif *netif; - - /* Process neighbor entries. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - switch (neighbor_cache[i].state) { - case ND6_INCOMPLETE: - if ((neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent >= LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT) && - (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { - /* Retries exceeded. */ - nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); - } else { - /* Send a NS for this entry. */ - neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent++; - nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(&neighbor_cache[i], ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST); - } - - break; - - case ND6_REACHABLE: - - /* Send queued packets, if any are left. Should have been sent already. */ - if (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { - nd6_send_q(i); - } - - if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL) { - /* Change to stale state. */ - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_STALE; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.stale_time = 0; - } else { - neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; - } - - break; - - case ND6_STALE: - neighbor_cache[i].counter.stale_time++; - break; - - case ND6_DELAY: - if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time <= 1) { - /* Change to PROBE state. */ - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_PROBE; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent = 0; - } else { - neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time--; - } - - break; - - case ND6_PROBE: - if ((neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent >= LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT) && - (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { - /* Retries exceeded. */ - nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); - } else { - /* Send a NS for this entry. */ - neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent++; - nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(&neighbor_cache[i], 0); - } - - break; - - case ND6_NO_ENTRY: - default: - /* Do nothing. */ - break; - } - } - - /* Process destination entries. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { - destination_cache[i].age++; - } - - /* Process router entries. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; i++) { - if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) { - /* Active entry. */ - if (default_router_list[i].invalidation_timer <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000) { - /* No more than 1 second remaining. Clear this entry. Also clear any of - * its destination cache entries, as per RFC 4861 Sec. 5.3 and 6.3.5. */ - s8_t j; - - for (j = 0; j < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; j++) { - if (ip6_addr_cmp(&destination_cache[j].next_hop_addr, - &default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->next_hop_address)) { - ip6_addr_set_any(&destination_cache[j].destination_addr); - } - } - - default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->isrouter = 0; - default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry = NULL; - default_router_list[i].invalidation_timer = 0; - default_router_list[i].flags = 0; - } else { - default_router_list[i].invalidation_timer -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000; - } - } - } - - /* Process prefix entries. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; i++) { - if (prefix_list[i].netif != NULL) { - if (prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000) { - /* Entry timed out, remove it */ - prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer = 0; - prefix_list[i].netif = NULL; - } else { - prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000; - } - } - } - - /* Process our own addresses, updating address lifetimes and/or DAD state. */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; ++i) { - u8_t addr_state; -#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES - /* Step 1: update address lifetimes (valid and preferred). */ - addr_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i); - - /* RFC 4862 is not entirely clear as to whether address lifetimes affect - * tentative addresses, and is even less clear as to what should happen - * with duplicate addresses. We choose to track and update lifetimes for - * both those types, although for different reasons: - * - for tentative addresses, the line of thought of Sec. 5.7 combined - * with the potentially long period that an address may be in tentative - * state (due to the interface being down) suggests that lifetimes - * should be independent of external factors which would include DAD; - * - for duplicate addresses, retiring them early could result in a new - * but unwanted attempt at marking them as valid, while retiring them - * late/never could clog up address slots on the netif. - * As a result, we may end up expiring addresses of either type here. - */ - if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(addr_state) && - !netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i)) { - u32_t life = netif_ip6_addr_valid_life(netif, i); - - if (life <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000) { - /* The address has expired. */ - netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, 0); - netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, 0); - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_INVALID); - } else { - if (!ip6_addr_life_isinfinite(life)) { - life -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000; - LWIP_ASSERT("bad valid lifetime", life != IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC); - netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, life); - } - - /* The address is still here. Update the preferred lifetime too. */ - life = netif_ip6_addr_pref_life(netif, i); - - if (life <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000) { - /* This case must also trigger if 'life' was already zero, so as to - * deal correctly with advertised preferred-lifetime reductions. */ - netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, 0); - - if (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED) { - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED); - } - } else if (!ip6_addr_life_isinfinite(life)) { - life -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000; - netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, life); - } - } - } - - /* The address state may now have changed, so reobtain it next. */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ - /* Step 2: update DAD state. */ - addr_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i); - - if (ip6_addr_istentative(addr_state)) { - if ((addr_state & IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK) >= LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS) { - /* No NA received in response. Mark address as valid. For dynamic - * addresses with an expired preferred lifetime, the state is set to - * deprecated right away. That should almost never happen, though. */ - addr_state = IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED; -#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES - - if (!netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) && - netif_ip6_addr_pref_life(netif, i) == 0) { - addr_state = IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, addr_state); - } else if (netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif)) { - /* tentative: set next state by increasing by one */ - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, addr_state + 1); - /* Send a NS for this address. Use the unspecified address as source - * address in all cases (RFC 4862 Sec. 5.4.2), not in the least - * because as it is, we only consider multicast replies for DAD. */ - nd6_send_ns(netif, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i), - ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST | ND6_SEND_FLAG_ANY_SRC); - } - } - } - } - -#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT - - /* Send router solicitation messages, if necessary. */ - if (!nd6_tmr_rs_reduction) { - nd6_tmr_rs_reduction = (ND6_RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL) - 1; - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if ((netif->rs_count > 0) && netif_is_up(netif) && - netif_is_link_up(netif) && - !ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0)) && - !ip6_addr_isduplicated(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0))) { - if (nd6_send_rs(netif) == ERR_OK) { - netif->rs_count--; - } - } - } - } else { - nd6_tmr_rs_reduction--; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ -} - -/** Send a neighbor solicitation message for a specific neighbor cache entry - * - * @param entry the neightbor cache entry for wich to send the message - * @param flags one of ND6_SEND_FLAG_* - */ -static void nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry *entry, u8_t flags) -{ - nd6_send_ns(entry->netif, &entry->next_hop_address, flags); -} - -/** - * Send a neighbor solicitation message - * - * @param netif the netif on which to send the message - * @param target_addr the IPv6 target address for the ND message - * @param flags one of ND6_SEND_FLAG_* - */ -static void nd6_send_ns(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *target_addr, u8_t flags) -{ - struct ns_header *ns_hdr; - struct pbuf *p; - const ip6_addr_t *src_addr; - u16_t lladdr_opt_len; - - LWIP_ASSERT("target address is required", target_addr != NULL); - - if (!(flags & ND6_SEND_FLAG_ANY_SRC) && - ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0))) { - /* Use link-local address as source address. */ - src_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0); - /* calculate option length (in 8-byte-blocks) */ - lladdr_opt_len = ((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) + 7) >> 3; - } else { - src_addr = IP6_ADDR_ANY6; - /* Option "MUST NOT be included when the source IP address is the unspecified address." */ - lladdr_opt_len = 0; - } - - /* Allocate a packet. */ - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct ns_header) + (lladdr_opt_len << 3), PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); - return; - } - - /* Set fields. */ - ns_hdr = (struct ns_header *)p->payload; - - ns_hdr->type = ICMP6_TYPE_NS; - ns_hdr->code = 0; - ns_hdr->chksum = 0; - ns_hdr->reserved = 0; - ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(ns_hdr->target_address, *target_addr); - - if (lladdr_opt_len != 0) { - struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct ns_header)); - lladdr_opt->type = ND6_OPTION_TYPE_SOURCE_LLADDR; - lladdr_opt->length = (u8_t)lladdr_opt_len; - SMEMCPY(lladdr_opt->addr, netif->hwaddr, netif->hwaddr_len); - } - - /* Generate the solicited node address for the target address. */ - if (flags & ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST) { - ip6_addr_set_solicitednode(&multicast_address, target_addr->addr[3]); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); - target_addr = &multicast_address; - } - -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) - { - ns_hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->len, src_addr, - target_addr); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ - - /* Send the packet out. */ - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.xmit); - ip6_output_if(p, (src_addr == IP6_ADDR_ANY6) ? NULL : src_addr, target_addr, - ND6_HOPLIM, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, netif); - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/** - * Send a neighbor advertisement message - * - * @param netif the netif on which to send the message - * @param target_addr the IPv6 target address for the ND message - * @param flags one of ND6_SEND_FLAG_* - */ -static void nd6_send_na(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *target_addr, u8_t flags) -{ - struct na_header *na_hdr; - struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; - struct pbuf *p; - const ip6_addr_t *src_addr; - const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr; - u16_t lladdr_opt_len; - - LWIP_ASSERT("target address is required", target_addr != NULL); - - /* Use link-local address as source address. */ - /* src_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0); */ - /* Use target address as source address. */ - src_addr = target_addr; - - /* Allocate a packet. */ - lladdr_opt_len = ((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) >> 3) + (((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) & 0x07) ? 1 : 0); - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct na_header) + (lladdr_opt_len << 3), PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); - return; - } - - /* Set fields. */ - na_hdr = (struct na_header *)p->payload; - lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct na_header)); - - na_hdr->type = ICMP6_TYPE_NA; - na_hdr->code = 0; - na_hdr->chksum = 0; - na_hdr->flags = flags & 0xf0; - na_hdr->reserved[0] = 0; - na_hdr->reserved[1] = 0; - na_hdr->reserved[2] = 0; - ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(na_hdr->target_address, *target_addr); - - lladdr_opt->type = ND6_OPTION_TYPE_TARGET_LLADDR; - lladdr_opt->length = (u8_t)lladdr_opt_len; - SMEMCPY(lladdr_opt->addr, netif->hwaddr, netif->hwaddr_len); - - /* Generate the solicited node address for the target address. */ - if (flags & ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST) { - ip6_addr_set_solicitednode(&multicast_address, target_addr->addr[3]); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); - dest_addr = &multicast_address; - } else if (flags & ND6_SEND_FLAG_ALLNODES_DEST) { - ip6_addr_set_allnodes_linklocal(&multicast_address); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); - dest_addr = &multicast_address; - } else { - dest_addr = ip6_current_src_addr(); - } - -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) - { - na_hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->len, src_addr, - dest_addr); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ - - /* Send the packet out. */ - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.xmit); - ip6_output_if(p, src_addr, dest_addr, - ND6_HOPLIM, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, netif); - pbuf_free(p); -} - -#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT -/** - * Send a router solicitation message - * - * @param netif the netif on which to send the message - */ -static err_t nd6_send_rs(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct rs_header *rs_hdr; - struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; - struct pbuf *p; - const ip6_addr_t *src_addr; - err_t err; - u16_t lladdr_opt_len = 0; - - /* Link-local source address, or unspecified address? */ - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0))) { - src_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0); - } else { - src_addr = IP6_ADDR_ANY6; - } - - /* Generate the all routers target address. */ - ip6_addr_set_allrouters_linklocal(&multicast_address); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); - - /* Allocate a packet. */ - if (src_addr != IP6_ADDR_ANY6) { - lladdr_opt_len = ((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) >> 3) + (((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) & 0x07) ? 1 : 0); - } - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct rs_header) + (lladdr_opt_len << 3), PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - /* Set fields. */ - rs_hdr = (struct rs_header *)p->payload; - - rs_hdr->type = ICMP6_TYPE_RS; - rs_hdr->code = 0; - rs_hdr->chksum = 0; - rs_hdr->reserved = 0; - - if (src_addr != IP6_ADDR_ANY6) { - /* Include our hw address. */ - lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct rs_header)); - lladdr_opt->type = ND6_OPTION_TYPE_SOURCE_LLADDR; - lladdr_opt->length = (u8_t)lladdr_opt_len; - SMEMCPY(lladdr_opt->addr, netif->hwaddr, netif->hwaddr_len); - } - -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) - { - rs_hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->len, src_addr, - &multicast_address); - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ - - /* Send the packet out. */ - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.xmit); - - err = ip6_output_if(p, (src_addr == IP6_ADDR_ANY6) ? NULL : src_addr, &multicast_address, - ND6_HOPLIM, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, netif); - pbuf_free(p); - - return err; -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ - -/** - * Search for a neighbor cache entry - * - * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address of the neighbor - * @return The neighbor cache entry index that matched, -1 if no - * entry is found - */ -static s8_t nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - s8_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_cmp(ip6addr, &(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address))) { - return i; - } - } - - return -1; -} - -/** - * Create a new neighbor cache entry. - * - * If no unused entry is found, will try to recycle an old entry - * according to ad-hoc "age" heuristic. - * - * @return The neighbor cache entry index that was created, -1 if no - * entry could be created - */ -static s8_t nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(void) -{ - s8_t i; - s8_t j; - u32_t time; - - /* First, try to find an empty entry. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_NO_ENTRY) { - return i; - } - } - - /* We need to recycle an entry. in general, do not recycle if it is a router. */ - - /* Next, try to find a Stale entry. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_STALE) && - (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { - nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); - return i; - } - } - - /* Next, try to find a Probe entry. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_PROBE) && - (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { - nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); - return i; - } - } - - /* Next, try to find a Delayed entry. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_DELAY) && - (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { - nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); - return i; - } - } - - /* Next, try to find the oldest reachable entry. */ - time = 0xfffffffful; - j = -1; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_REACHABLE) && - (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { - if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time < time) { - j = i; - time = neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time; - } - } - } - - if (j >= 0) { - nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(j); - return j; - } - - /* Next, find oldest incomplete entry without queued packets. */ - time = 0; - j = -1; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - if ( - (neighbor_cache[i].q == NULL) && - (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE) && - (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { - if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent >= time) { - j = i; - time = neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent; - } - } - } - - if (j >= 0) { - nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(j); - return j; - } - - /* Next, find oldest incomplete entry with queued packets. */ - time = 0; - j = -1; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE) && - (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { - if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent >= time) { - j = i; - time = neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent; - } - } - } - - if (j >= 0) { - nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(j); - return j; - } - - /* No more entries to try. */ - return -1; -} - -/** - * Will free any resources associated with a neighbor cache - * entry, and will mark it as unused. - * - * @param i the neighbor cache entry index to free - */ -static void nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(s8_t i) -{ - if ((i < 0) || (i >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS)) { - return; - } - - if (neighbor_cache[i].isrouter) { - /* isrouter needs to be cleared before deleting a neighbor cache entry */ - return; - } - - /* Free any queued packets. */ - if (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { - nd6_free_q(neighbor_cache[i].q); - neighbor_cache[i].q = NULL; - } - - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_NO_ENTRY; - neighbor_cache[i].isrouter = 0; - neighbor_cache[i].netif = NULL; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time = 0; - ip6_addr_set_zero(&(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address)); -} - -/** - * Search for a destination cache entry - * - * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address of the destination - * @return The destination cache entry index that matched, -1 if no - * entry is found - */ -static s16_t nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - s16_t i; - - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(ip6addr); - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_cmp(ip6addr, &(destination_cache[i].destination_addr))) { - return i; - } - } - - return -1; -} - -/** - * Create a new destination cache entry. If no unused entry is found, - * will recycle oldest entry. - * - * @return The destination cache entry index that was created, -1 if no - * entry was created - */ -static s16_t nd6_new_destination_cache_entry(void) -{ - s16_t i, j; - u32_t age; - - /* Find an empty entry. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isany(&(destination_cache[i].destination_addr))) { - return i; - } - } - - /* Find oldest entry. */ - age = 0; - j = LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS - 1; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { - if (destination_cache[i].age > age) { - j = i; - } - } - - return j; -} - -/** - * Clear the destination cache. - * - * This operation may be necessary for consistency in the light of changing - * local addresses and/or use of the gateway hook. - */ -void nd6_clear_destination_cache(void) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { - ip6_addr_set_any(&destination_cache[i].destination_addr); - } -} - -/** - * Determine whether an address matches an on-link prefix or the subnet of a - * statically assigned address. - * - * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address to match - * @return 1 if the address is on-link, 0 otherwise - */ -static int nd6_is_prefix_in_netif(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif) -{ - s8_t i; - - /* Check to see if the address matches an on-link prefix. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; i++) { - if ((prefix_list[i].netif == netif) && - (prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer > 0) && - ip6_addr_netcmp(ip6addr, &(prefix_list[i].prefix))) { - return 1; - } - } - - /* Check to see if address prefix matches a manually configured (= static) - * address. Static addresses have an implied /64 subnet assignment. Dynamic - * addresses (from autoconfiguration) have no implied subnet assignment, and - * are thus effectively /128 assignments. See RFC 5942 for more on this. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && - netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) && - ip6_addr_netcmp(ip6addr, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Select a default router for a destination. - * - * This function is used both for routing and for finding a next-hop target for - * a packet. In the former case, the given netif is NULL, and the returned - * router entry must be for a netif suitable for sending packets (up, link up). - * In the latter case, the given netif is not NULL and restricts router choice. - * - * @param ip6addr the destination address - * @param netif the netif for the outgoing packet, if known - * @return the default router entry index, or -1 if no suitable - * router is found - */ -static s8_t nd6_select_router(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif) -{ - struct netif *router_netif; - s8_t i, j, valid_router; - static s8_t last_router; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ip6addr); /* @todo match preferred routes!! (must implement ND6_OPTION_TYPE_ROUTE_INFO) */ - - /* @todo: implement default router preference */ - - /* Look for valid routers. A reachable router is preferred. */ - valid_router = -1; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; i++) { - /* Is the router netif both set and apppropriate? */ - if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) { - router_netif = default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->netif; - - if ((router_netif != NULL) && (netif != NULL ? netif == router_netif : - (netif_is_up(router_netif) && netif_is_link_up(router_netif)))) { - /* Is the router valid, i.e., reachable or probably reachable as per - * RFC 4861 Sec. 6.3.6? Note that we will never return a router that - * has no neighbor cache entry, due to the netif association tests. */ - if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->state != ND6_INCOMPLETE) { - /* Is the router known to be reachable? */ - if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->state == ND6_REACHABLE) { - return i; /* valid and reachable - done! */ - } else if (valid_router < 0) { - valid_router = i; /* valid but not known to be reachable */ - } - } - } - } - } - - if (valid_router >= 0) { - return valid_router; - } - - /* Look for any router for which we have any information at all. */ - /* last_router is used for round-robin selection of incomplete routers, as - * recommended in RFC 4861 Sec. 6.3.6 point (2). Advance only when picking a - * route, to select the same router as next-hop target in the common case. */ - if ((netif == NULL) && (++last_router >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS)) { - last_router = 0; - } - - i = last_router; - - for (j = 0; j < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; j++) { - if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) { - router_netif = default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->netif; - - if ((router_netif != NULL) && (netif != NULL ? netif == router_netif : - (netif_is_up(router_netif) && netif_is_link_up(router_netif)))) { - return i; - } - } - - if (++i >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS) { - i = 0; - } - } - - /* no suitable router found. */ - return -1; -} - -/** - * Find a router-announced route to the given destination. This route may be - * based on an on-link prefix or a default router. - * - * If a suitable route is found, the returned netif is guaranteed to be in a - * suitable state (up, link up) to be used for packet transmission. - * - * @param ip6addr the destination IPv6 address - * @return the netif to use for the destination, or NULL if none found - */ -struct netif * -nd6_find_route(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - struct netif *netif; - s8_t i; - - /* @todo decide if it makes sense to check the destination cache first */ - - /* Check if there is a matching on-link prefix. There may be multiple - * matches. Pick the first one that is associated with a suitable netif. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; ++i) { - netif = prefix_list[i].netif; - - if ((netif != NULL) && ip6_addr_netcmp(&prefix_list[i].prefix, ip6addr) && - netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif)) { - return netif; - } - } - - /* No on-link prefix match. Find a router that can forward the packet. */ - i = nd6_select_router(ip6addr, NULL); - - if (i >= 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("selected router must have a neighbor entry", - default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL); - return default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->netif; - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** - * Find an entry for a default router. - * - * @param router_addr the IPv6 address of the router - * @param netif the netif on which the router is found, if known - * @return the index of the router entry, or -1 if not found - */ -static s8_t nd6_get_router(const ip6_addr_t *router_addr, struct netif *netif) -{ - s8_t i; - - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(router_addr, netif); - - /* Look for router. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; i++) { - if ((default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) && - ((netif != NULL) ? netif == default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->netif : 1) && - ip6_addr_cmp(router_addr, &(default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->next_hop_address))) { - return i; - } - } - - /* router not found. */ - return -1; -} - -/** - * Create a new entry for a default router. - * - * @param router_addr the IPv6 address of the router - * @param netif the netif on which the router is connected, if known - * @return the index on the router table, or -1 if could not be created - */ -static s8_t nd6_new_router(const ip6_addr_t *router_addr, struct netif *netif) -{ - s8_t router_index; - s8_t free_router_index; - s8_t neighbor_index; - - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(router_addr, netif); - - /* Do we have a neighbor entry for this router? */ - neighbor_index = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(router_addr); - - if (neighbor_index < 0) { - /* Create a neighbor entry for this router. */ - neighbor_index = nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(); - - if (neighbor_index < 0) { - /* Could not create neighbor entry for this router. */ - return -1; - } - - ip6_addr_set(&(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].next_hop_address), router_addr); - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].netif = netif; - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = NULL; - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].state = ND6_INCOMPLETE; - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].counter.probes_sent = 1; - nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(&neighbor_cache[neighbor_index], ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST); - } - - /* Mark neighbor as router. */ - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].isrouter = 1; - - /* Look for empty entry. */ - free_router_index = LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; - - for (router_index = LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS - 1; router_index >= 0; router_index--) { - /* check if router already exists (this is a special case for 2 netifs on the same subnet - - e.g. wifi and cable) */ - if (default_router_list[router_index].neighbor_entry == &(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index])) { - return router_index; - } - - if (default_router_list[router_index].neighbor_entry == NULL) { - /* remember lowest free index to create a new entry */ - free_router_index = router_index; - } - } - - if (free_router_index < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS) { - default_router_list[free_router_index].neighbor_entry = &(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index]); - return free_router_index; - } - - /* Could not create a router entry. */ - - /* Mark neighbor entry as not-router. Entry might be useful as neighbor still. */ - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].isrouter = 0; - - /* router not found. */ - return -1; -} - -/** - * Find the cached entry for an on-link prefix. - * - * @param prefix the IPv6 prefix that is on-link - * @param netif the netif on which the prefix is on-link - * @return the index on the prefix table, or -1 if not found - */ -static s8_t nd6_get_onlink_prefix(const ip6_addr_t *prefix, struct netif *netif) -{ - s8_t i; - - /* Look for prefix in list. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; ++i) { - if ((ip6_addr_netcmp(&(prefix_list[i].prefix), prefix)) && - (prefix_list[i].netif == netif)) { - return i; - } - } - - /* Entry not available. */ - return -1; -} - -/** - * Creates a new entry for an on-link prefix. - * - * @param prefix the IPv6 prefix that is on-link - * @param netif the netif on which the prefix is on-link - * @return the index on the prefix table, or -1 if not created - */ -static s8_t nd6_new_onlink_prefix(const ip6_addr_t *prefix, struct netif *netif) -{ - s8_t i; - - /* Create new entry. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; ++i) { - if ((prefix_list[i].netif == NULL) || - (prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer == 0)) { - /* Found empty prefix entry. */ - prefix_list[i].netif = netif; - ip6_addr_set(&(prefix_list[i].prefix), prefix); - return i; - } - } - - /* Entry not available. */ - return -1; -} - -/** - * Determine the next hop for a destination. Will determine if the - * destination is on-link, else a suitable on-link router is selected. - * - * The last entry index is cached for fast entry search. - * - * @param ip6addr the destination address - * @param netif the netif on which the packet will be sent - * @return the neighbor cache entry for the next hop, ERR_RTE if no - * suitable next hop was found, ERR_MEM if no cache entry - * could be created - */ -static s8_t nd6_get_next_hop_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW - const ip6_addr_t *next_hop_addr; -#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW */ - s8_t i; - s16_t dst_idx; - - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(ip6addr, netif); - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT - - if (netif->hints != NULL) { - /* per-pcb cached entry was given */ - netif_addr_idx_t addr_hint = netif->hints->addr_hint; - - if (addr_hint < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS) { - nd6_cached_destination_index = addr_hint; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ - - /* Look for ip6addr in destination cache. */ - if (ip6_addr_cmp(ip6addr, &(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr))) { - /* the cached entry index is the right one! */ - /* do nothing. */ - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.cachehit); - } else { - /* Search destination cache. */ - dst_idx = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(ip6addr); - - if (dst_idx >= 0) { - /* found destination entry. make it our new cached index. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("type overflow", (size_t)dst_idx < NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX); - nd6_cached_destination_index = (netif_addr_idx_t)dst_idx; - } else { - /* Not found. Create a new destination entry. */ - dst_idx = nd6_new_destination_cache_entry(); - - if (dst_idx >= 0) { - /* got new destination entry. make it our new cached index. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("type overflow", (size_t)dst_idx < NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX); - nd6_cached_destination_index = (netif_addr_idx_t)dst_idx; - } else { - /* Could not create a destination cache entry. */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Copy dest address to destination cache. */ - ip6_addr_set(&(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr), ip6addr); - - /* Now find the next hop. is it a neighbor? */ - if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6addr) || - nd6_is_prefix_in_netif(ip6addr, netif)) { - /* Destination in local link. */ - destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].pmtu = netif_mtu6(netif); - ip6_addr_copy(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr, destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr); -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW - } else if ((next_hop_addr = LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW(netif, ip6addr)) != NULL) { - /* Next hop for destination provided by hook function. */ - destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].pmtu = netif->mtu; - ip6_addr_set(&destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr, next_hop_addr); -#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW */ - } else { - /* We need to select a router. */ - i = nd6_select_router(ip6addr, netif); - - if (i < 0) { - /* No router found. */ - ip6_addr_set_any(&(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr)); - return ERR_RTE; - } - - destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].pmtu = netif_mtu6(netif); /* Start with netif mtu, correct through ICMPv6 if necessary */ - ip6_addr_copy(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr, default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->next_hop_address); - } - } - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT - - if (netif->hints != NULL) { - /* per-pcb cached entry was given */ - netif->hints->addr_hint = nd6_cached_destination_index; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ - - /* Look in neighbor cache for the next-hop address. */ - if (ip6_addr_cmp(&(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr), - &(neighbor_cache[nd6_cached_neighbor_index].next_hop_address))) { - /* Cache hit. */ - /* Do nothing. */ - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.cachehit); - } else { - i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr)); - - if (i >= 0) { - /* Found a matching record, make it new cached entry. */ - nd6_cached_neighbor_index = i; - } else { - /* Neighbor not in cache. Make a new entry. */ - i = nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(); - - if (i >= 0) { - /* got new neighbor entry. make it our new cached index. */ - nd6_cached_neighbor_index = i; - } else { - /* Could not create a neighbor cache entry. */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Initialize fields. */ - ip6_addr_copy(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address, - destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr); - neighbor_cache[i].isrouter = 0; - neighbor_cache[i].netif = netif; - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_INCOMPLETE; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent = 1; - nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(&neighbor_cache[i], ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST); - } - } - - /* Reset this destination's age. */ - destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].age = 0; - - return nd6_cached_neighbor_index; -} - -/** - * Queue a packet for a neighbor. - * - * @param neighbor_index the index in the neighbor cache table - * @param q packet to be queued - * @return ERR_OK if succeeded, ERR_MEM if out of memory - */ -static err_t nd6_queue_packet(s8_t neighbor_index, struct pbuf *q) -{ - err_t result = ERR_MEM; - struct pbuf *p; - int copy_needed = 0; -#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING - struct nd6_q_entry *new_entry, *r; -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - - if ((neighbor_index < 0) || (neighbor_index >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS)) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - /* IF q includes a pbuf that must be copied, we have to copy the whole chain - * into a new PBUF_RAM. See the definition of PBUF_NEEDS_COPY for details. */ - p = q; - - while (p) { - if (PBUF_NEEDS_COPY(p)) { - copy_needed = 1; - break; - } - - p = p->next; - } - - if (copy_needed) { - /* copy the whole packet into new pbufs */ - p = pbuf_clone(PBUF_LINK, PBUF_RAM, q); - - while ((p == NULL) && (neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q != NULL)) { - /* Free oldest packet (as per RFC recommendation) */ -#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING - r = neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q; - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = r->next; - r->next = NULL; - nd6_free_q(r); -#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - pbuf_free(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q); - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = NULL; -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - p = pbuf_clone(PBUF_LINK, PBUF_RAM, q); - } - } else { - /* referencing the old pbuf is enough */ - p = q; - pbuf_ref(p); - } - - /* packet was copied/ref'd? */ - if (p != NULL) { - /* queue packet ... */ -#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING - /* allocate a new nd6 queue entry */ - new_entry = (struct nd6_q_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_ND6_QUEUE); - - if ((new_entry == NULL) && (neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q != NULL)) { - /* Free oldest packet (as per RFC recommendation) */ - r = neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q; - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = r->next; - r->next = NULL; - nd6_free_q(r); - new_entry = (struct nd6_q_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_ND6_QUEUE); - } - - if (new_entry != NULL) { - new_entry->next = NULL; - new_entry->p = p; - - if (neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q != NULL) { - /* queue was already existent, append the new entry to the end */ - r = neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q; - - while (r->next != NULL) { - r = r->next; - } - - r->next = new_entry; - } else { - /* queue did not exist, first item in queue */ - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = new_entry; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ipv6: queued packet %p on neighbor entry %" S16_F "\n", (void *)p, (s16_t)neighbor_index)); - result = ERR_OK; - } else { - /* the pool MEMP_ND6_QUEUE is empty */ - pbuf_free(p); - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ipv6: could not queue a copy of packet %p (out of memory)\n", (void *)p)); - /* { result == ERR_MEM } through initialization */ - } - -#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - - /* Queue a single packet. If an older packet is already queued, free it as per RFC. */ - if (neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q != NULL) { - pbuf_free(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q); - } - - neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = p; - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ipv6: queued packet %p on neighbor entry %" S16_F "\n", (void *)p, (s16_t)neighbor_index)); - result = ERR_OK; -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ipv6: could not queue a copy of packet %p (out of memory)\n", (void *)q)); - /* { result == ERR_MEM } through initialization */ - } - - return result; -} - -#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING -/** - * Free a complete queue of nd6 q entries - * - * @param q a queue of nd6_q_entry to free - */ -static void nd6_free_q(struct nd6_q_entry *q) -{ - struct nd6_q_entry *r; - LWIP_ASSERT("q != NULL", q != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->p != NULL", q->p != NULL); - - while (q) { - r = q; - q = q->next; - LWIP_ASSERT("r->p != NULL", (r->p != NULL)); - pbuf_free(r->p); - memp_free(MEMP_ND6_QUEUE, r); - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - -/** - * Send queued packets for a neighbor - * - * @param i the neighbor to send packets to - */ -static void nd6_send_q(s8_t i) -{ - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; - ip6_addr_t dest; -#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING - struct nd6_q_entry *q; -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - - if ((i < 0) || (i >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS)) { - return; - } - -#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING - - while (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { - /* remember first in queue */ - q = neighbor_cache[i].q; - /* pop first item off the queue */ - neighbor_cache[i].q = q->next; - /* Get ipv6 header. */ - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)(q->p->payload); - /* Create an aligned copy. */ - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest, ip6hdr->dest); - /* Restore the zone, if applicable. */ - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&dest, IP6_UNKNOWN, neighbor_cache[i].netif); - /* send the queued IPv6 packet */ - (neighbor_cache[i].netif)->output_ip6(neighbor_cache[i].netif, q->p, &dest); - /* free the queued IP packet */ - pbuf_free(q->p); - /* now queue entry can be freed */ - memp_free(MEMP_ND6_QUEUE, q); - } - -#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - - if (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { - /* Get ipv6 header. */ - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)(neighbor_cache[i].q->payload); - /* Create an aligned copy. */ - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest, ip6hdr->dest); - /* Restore the zone, if applicable. */ - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&dest, IP6_UNKNOWN, neighbor_cache[i].netif); - /* send the queued IPv6 packet */ - (neighbor_cache[i].netif)->output_ip6(neighbor_cache[i].netif, neighbor_cache[i].q, &dest); - /* free the queued IP packet */ - pbuf_free(neighbor_cache[i].q); - neighbor_cache[i].q = NULL; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ -} - -/** - * A packet is to be transmitted to a specific IPv6 destination on a specific - * interface. Check if we can find the hardware address of the next hop to use - * for the packet. If so, give the hardware address to the caller, which should - * use it to send the packet right away. Otherwise, enqueue the packet for - * later transmission while looking up the hardware address, if possible. - * - * As such, this function returns one of three different possible results: - * - * - ERR_OK with a non-NULL 'hwaddrp': the caller should send the packet now. - * - ERR_OK with a NULL 'hwaddrp': the packet has been enqueued for later. - * - not ERR_OK: something went wrong; forward the error upward in the stack. - * - * @param netif The lwIP network interface on which the IP packet will be sent. - * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. - * @param ip6addr The destination IPv6 address of the packet. - * @param hwaddrp On success, filled with a pointer to a HW address or NULL (meaning - * the packet has been queued). - * @return - * - ERR_OK on success, ERR_RTE if no route was found for the packet, - * or ERR_MEM if low memory conditions prohibit sending the packet at all. - */ -err_t nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, const u8_t **hwaddrp) -{ - s8_t i; - - /* Get next hop record. */ - i = nd6_get_next_hop_entry(ip6addr, netif); - - if (i < 0) { - /* failed to get a next hop neighbor record. */ - return i; - } - - /* Now that we have a destination record, send or queue the packet. */ - if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_STALE) { - /* Switch to delay state. */ - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; - } - - /* @todo should we send or queue if PROBE? send for now, to let unicast NS pass. */ - if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_REACHABLE) || - (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_DELAY) || - (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_PROBE)) { - /* Tell the caller to send out the packet now. */ - *hwaddrp = neighbor_cache[i].lladdr; - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* We should queue packet on this interface. */ - *hwaddrp = NULL; - return nd6_queue_packet(i, q); -} - -/** - * Get the Path MTU for a destination. - * - * @param ip6addr the destination address - * @param netif the netif on which the packet will be sent - * @return the Path MTU, if known, or the netif default MTU - */ -u16_t nd6_get_destination_mtu(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif) -{ - s16_t i; - - i = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(ip6addr); - - if (i >= 0) { - if (destination_cache[i].pmtu > 0) { - return destination_cache[i].pmtu; - } - } - - if (netif != NULL) { - return netif_mtu6(netif); - } - - return 1280; /* Minimum MTU */ -} - -#if LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS -/** - * Provide the Neighbor discovery process with a hint that a - * destination is reachable. Called by tcp_receive when ACKs are - * received or sent (as per RFC). This is useful to avoid sending - * NS messages every 30 seconds. - * - * @param ip6addr the destination address which is know to be reachable - * by an upper layer protocol (TCP) - */ -void nd6_reachability_hint(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - s8_t i; - s16_t dst_idx; - - /* Find destination in cache. */ - if (ip6_addr_cmp(ip6addr, &(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr))) { - dst_idx = nd6_cached_destination_index; - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.cachehit); - } else { - dst_idx = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(ip6addr); - } - - if (dst_idx < 0) { - return; - } - - /* Find next hop neighbor in cache. */ - if (ip6_addr_cmp(&(destination_cache[dst_idx].next_hop_addr), &(neighbor_cache[nd6_cached_neighbor_index].next_hop_address))) { - i = nd6_cached_neighbor_index; - ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.cachehit); - } else { - i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&(destination_cache[dst_idx].next_hop_addr)); - } - - if (i < 0) { - return; - } - - /* For safety: don't set as reachable if we don't have a LL address yet. Misuse protection. */ - if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE || neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_NO_ENTRY) { - return; - } - - /* Set reachability state. */ - neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_REACHABLE; - neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time = reachable_time; -} -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS */ - -/** - * Remove all prefix, neighbor_cache and router entries of the specified netif. - * - * @param netif points to a network interface - */ -void nd6_cleanup_netif(struct netif *netif) -{ - u8_t i; - s8_t router_index; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; i++) { - if (prefix_list[i].netif == netif) { - prefix_list[i].netif = NULL; - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { - if (neighbor_cache[i].netif == netif) { - for (router_index = 0; router_index < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; router_index++) { - if (default_router_list[router_index].neighbor_entry == &neighbor_cache[i]) { - default_router_list[router_index].neighbor_entry = NULL; - default_router_list[router_index].flags = 0; - } - } - - neighbor_cache[i].isrouter = 0; - nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); - } - } - - /* Clear the destination cache, since many entries may now have become - * invalid for one of several reasons. As destination cache entries have no - * netif association, use a sledgehammer approach (this can be improved). */ - nd6_clear_destination_cache(); -} - -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD -/** - * The state of a local IPv6 address entry is about to change. If needed, join - * or leave the solicited-node multicast group for the address. - * - * @param netif The netif that owns the address. - * @param addr_idx The index of the address. - * @param new_state The new (IP6_ADDR_) state for the address. - */ -void nd6_adjust_mld_membership(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u8_t new_state) -{ - u8_t old_state, old_member, new_member; - - old_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx); - - /* Determine whether we were, and should be, a member of the solicited-node - * multicast group for this address. For tentative addresses, the group is - * not joined until the address enters the TENTATIVE_1 (or VALID) state. */ - old_member = (old_state != IP6_ADDR_INVALID && old_state != IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED && old_state != IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); - new_member = (new_state != IP6_ADDR_INVALID && new_state != IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED && new_state != IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); - - if (old_member != new_member) { - ip6_addr_set_solicitednode(&multicast_address, netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx)->addr[3]); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); - - if (new_member) { - mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, &multicast_address); - } else { - mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, &multicast_address); - } - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - -/** Netif was added, set up, or reconnected (link up) */ -void nd6_restart_netif(struct netif *netif) -{ -#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT - /* Send Router Solicitation messages (see RFC 4861, ch. 6.3.7). */ - netif->rs_count = LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * + * Neighbor discovery and stateless address autoconfiguration for IPv6. + * Aims to be compliant with RFC 4861 (Neighbor discovery) and RFC 4862 + * (Address autoconfiguration). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h" +#include "lwip/prot/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/prot/icmp6.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/icmp6.h" +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS > IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK +#error LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS > IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK +#endif + +/* Router tables. */ +struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry neighbor_cache[LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS]; +struct nd6_destination_cache_entry destination_cache[LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS]; +struct nd6_prefix_list_entry prefix_list[LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES]; +struct nd6_router_list_entry default_router_list[LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS]; + +/* Default values, can be updated by a RA message. */ +u32_t reachable_time = LWIP_ND6_REACHABLE_TIME; +u32_t retrans_timer = LWIP_ND6_RETRANS_TIMER; /* @todo implement this value in timer */ + +/* Index for cache entries. */ +static u8_t nd6_cached_neighbor_index; +static netif_addr_idx_t nd6_cached_destination_index; + +/* Multicast address holder. */ +static ip6_addr_t multicast_address; + +static u8_t nd6_tmr_rs_reduction; + +/* Static buffer to parse RA packet options */ +union ra_options { + struct lladdr_option lladdr; + struct mtu_option mtu; + struct prefix_option prefix; +#if LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS + struct rdnss_option rdnss; +#endif +}; +static union ra_options nd6_ra_buffer; + +/* Forward declarations. */ +static s8_t nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); +static s8_t nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(void); +static void nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(s8_t i); +static s16_t nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); +static s16_t nd6_new_destination_cache_entry(void); +static int nd6_is_prefix_in_netif(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif); +static s8_t nd6_select_router(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif); +static s8_t nd6_get_router(const ip6_addr_t *router_addr, struct netif *netif); +static s8_t nd6_new_router(const ip6_addr_t *router_addr, struct netif *netif); +static s8_t nd6_get_onlink_prefix(const ip6_addr_t *prefix, struct netif *netif); +static s8_t nd6_new_onlink_prefix(const ip6_addr_t *prefix, struct netif *netif); +static s8_t nd6_get_next_hop_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif); +static err_t nd6_queue_packet(s8_t neighbor_index, struct pbuf *q); + +#define ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST 0x01 +#define ND6_SEND_FLAG_ALLNODES_DEST 0x02 +#define ND6_SEND_FLAG_ANY_SRC 0x04 +static void nd6_send_ns(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *target_addr, u8_t flags); +static void nd6_send_na(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *target_addr, u8_t flags); +static void nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry *entry, u8_t flags); +#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT +static err_t nd6_send_rs(struct netif *netif); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ + +#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING +static void nd6_free_q(struct nd6_q_entry *q); +#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ +#define nd6_free_q(q) pbuf_free(q) +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ +static void nd6_send_q(s8_t i); + +/** + * A local address has been determined to be a duplicate. Take the appropriate + * action(s) on the address and the interface as a whole. + * + * @param netif the netif that owns the address + * @param addr_idx the index of the address detected to be a duplicate + */ +static void nd6_duplicate_addr_detected(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx) +{ + /* Mark the address as duplicate, but leave its lifetimes alone. If this was + * a manually assigned address, it will remain in existence as duplicate, and + * as such be unusable for any practical purposes until manual intervention. + * If this was an autogenerated address, the address will follow normal + * expiration rules, and thus disappear once its valid lifetime expires. */ + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, addr_idx, IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED); + +#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG + + /* If the affected address was the link-local address that we use to generate + * all other addresses, then we should not continue to use those derived + * addresses either, so mark them as duplicate as well. For autoconfig-only + * setups, this will make the interface effectively unusable, approaching the + * intention of RFC 4862 Sec. 5.4.5. @todo implement the full requirements */ + if (addr_idx == 0) { + s8_t i; + + for (i = 1; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && + !netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i)) { + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED); + } + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ +} + +#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG +/** + * We received a router advertisement that contains a prefix with the + * autoconfiguration flag set. Add or update an associated autogenerated + * address. + * + * @param netif the netif on which the router advertisement arrived + * @param prefix_opt a pointer to the prefix option data + * @param prefix_addr an aligned copy of the prefix address + */ +static void nd6_process_autoconfig_prefix(struct netif *netif, + struct prefix_option *prefix_opt, const ip6_addr_t *prefix_addr) +{ + ip6_addr_t ip6addr; + u32_t valid_life, pref_life; + u8_t addr_state; + s8_t i, free_idx; + + /* The caller already checks RFC 4862 Sec. 5.5.3 points (a) and (b). We do + * the rest, starting with checks for (c) and (d) here. */ + valid_life = lwip_htonl(prefix_opt->valid_lifetime); + pref_life = lwip_htonl(prefix_opt->preferred_lifetime); + + if (pref_life > valid_life || prefix_opt->prefix_length != 64) { + return; /* silently ignore this prefix for autoconfiguration purposes */ + } + + /* If an autogenerated address already exists for this prefix, update its + * lifetimes. An address is considered autogenerated if 1) it is not static + * (i.e., manually assigned), and 2) there is an advertised autoconfiguration + * prefix for it (the one we are processing here). This does not necessarily + * exclude the possibility that the address was actually assigned by, say, + * DHCPv6. If that distinction becomes important in the future, more state + * must be kept. As explained elsewhere we also update lifetimes of tentative + * and duplicate addresses. Skip address slot 0 (the link-local address). */ + for (i = 1; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + addr_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i); + + if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(addr_state) && !netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) && + ip6_addr_netcmp(prefix_addr, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { + /* Update the valid lifetime, as per RFC 4862 Sec. 5.5.3 point (e). + * The valid lifetime will never drop to zero as a result of this. */ + u32_t remaining_life = netif_ip6_addr_valid_life(netif, i); + + if (valid_life > ND6_2HRS || valid_life > remaining_life) { + netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, valid_life); + } else if (remaining_life > ND6_2HRS) { + netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, ND6_2HRS); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("bad valid lifetime", !netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i)); + + /* Update the preferred lifetime. No bounds checks are needed here. In + * rare cases the advertisement may un-deprecate the address, though. + * Deprecation is left to the timer code where it is handled anyway. */ + if (pref_life > 0 && addr_state == IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED) { + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED); + } + + netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, pref_life); + return; /* there should be at most one matching address */ + } + } + + /* No autogenerated address exists for this prefix yet. See if we can add a + * new one. However, if IPv6 autoconfiguration is administratively disabled, + * do not generate new addresses, but do keep updating lifetimes for existing + * addresses. Also, when adding new addresses, we must protect explicitly + * against a valid lifetime of zero, because again, we use that as a special + * value. The generated address would otherwise expire immediately anyway. + * Finally, the original link-local address must be usable at all. We start + * creating addresses even if the link-local address is still in tentative + * state though, and deal with the fallout of that upon DAD collision. */ + addr_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0); + + if (!netif->ip6_autoconfig_enabled || valid_life == IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC || + ip6_addr_isinvalid(addr_state) || ip6_addr_isduplicated(addr_state)) { + return; + } + + /* Construct the new address that we intend to use, and then see if that + * address really does not exist. It might have been added manually, after + * all. As a side effect, find a free slot. Note that we cannot use + * netif_add_ip6_address() here, as it would return ERR_OK if the address + * already did exist, resulting in that address being given lifetimes. */ + IP6_ADDR(&ip6addr, prefix_addr->addr[0], prefix_addr->addr[1], + netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0)->addr[2], netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0)->addr[3]); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&ip6addr, IP6_UNICAST, netif); + + free_idx = 0; + + for (i = 1; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { + if (ip6_addr_cmp(&ip6addr, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { + return; /* formed address already exists */ + } + } else if (free_idx == 0) { + free_idx = i; + } + } + + if (free_idx == 0) { + return; /* no address slots available, try again on next advertisement */ + } + + /* Assign the new address to the interface. */ + ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(netif->ip6_addr[free_idx], ip6addr); + netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, free_idx, valid_life); + netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, free_idx, pref_life); + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, free_idx, IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ + +/** + * Process an incoming neighbor discovery message + * + * @param p the nd packet, p->payload pointing to the icmpv6 header + * @param inp the netif on which this packet was received + */ +void nd6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + u8_t msg_type; + s8_t i; + s16_t dest_idx; + + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.recv); + + msg_type = *((u8_t *)p->payload); + + switch (msg_type) { + case ICMP6_TYPE_NA: /* Neighbor Advertisement. */ + { + struct na_header *na_hdr; + struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; + ip6_addr_t target_address; + + /* Check that na header fits in packet. */ + if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header))) { + /* @todo debug message */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + na_hdr = (struct na_header *)p->payload; + + /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the target address. */ + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(target_address, na_hdr->target_address); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&target_address, IP6_UNICAST, inp); + + /* Check a subset of the other RFC 4861 Sec. 7.1.2 requirements. */ + if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6_current_header()) != ND6_HOPLIM || na_hdr->code != 0 || + ip6_addr_ismulticast(&target_address)) { + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + /* @todo RFC MUST: if IP destination is multicast, Solicited flag is zero */ + /* @todo RFC MUST: all included options have a length greater than zero */ + + /* Unsolicited NA?*/ + if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6_current_dest_addr())) { + /* This is an unsolicited NA. + * link-layer changed? + * part of DAD mechanism? */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS + /* If the target address matches this netif, it is a DAD response. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && + !ip6_addr_isduplicated(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && + ip6_addr_cmp(&target_address, netif_ip6_addr(inp, i))) { + /* We are using a duplicate address. */ + nd6_duplicate_addr_detected(inp, i); + + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS */ + + /* Check that link-layer address option also fits in packet. */ + if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header) + 2)) { + /* @todo debug message */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct na_header)); + + if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header) + (lladdr_opt->length << 3))) { + /* @todo debug message */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + /* This is an unsolicited NA, most likely there was a LLADDR change. */ + i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&target_address); + + if (i >= 0) { + if (na_hdr->flags & ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE) { + MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); + } + } + } else { + /* This is a solicited NA. + * neighbor address resolution response? + * neighbor unreachability detection response? */ + + /* Find the cache entry corresponding to this na. */ + i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&target_address); + + if (i < 0) { + /* We no longer care about this target address. drop it. */ + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + /* Update cache entry. */ + if ((na_hdr->flags & ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE) || + (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE)) { + /* Check that link-layer address option also fits in packet. */ + if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header) + 2)) { + /* @todo debug message */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct na_header)); + + if (p->len < (sizeof(struct na_header) + (lladdr_opt->length << 3))) { + /* @todo debug message */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); + } + + neighbor_cache[i].netif = inp; + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_REACHABLE; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time = reachable_time; + + /* Send queued packets, if any. */ + if (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { + nd6_send_q(i); + } + } + + break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_NA */ + } + + case ICMP6_TYPE_NS: /* Neighbor solicitation. */ + { + struct ns_header *ns_hdr; + struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; + ip6_addr_t target_address; + u8_t accepted; + + /* Check that ns header fits in packet. */ + if (p->len < sizeof(struct ns_header)) { + /* @todo debug message */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + ns_hdr = (struct ns_header *)p->payload; + + /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the target address. */ + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(target_address, ns_hdr->target_address); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&target_address, IP6_UNICAST, inp); + + /* Check a subset of the other RFC 4861 Sec. 7.1.1 requirements. */ + if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6_current_header()) != ND6_HOPLIM || ns_hdr->code != 0 || + ip6_addr_ismulticast(&target_address)) { + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + /* @todo RFC MUST: all included options have a length greater than zero */ + /* @todo RFC MUST: if IP source is 'any', destination is solicited-node multicast address */ + /* @todo RFC MUST: if IP source is 'any', there is no source LL address option */ + + /* Check if there is a link-layer address provided. Only point to it if in this buffer. */ + if (p->len >= (sizeof(struct ns_header) + 2)) { + lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct ns_header)); + + if (p->len < (sizeof(struct ns_header) + (lladdr_opt->length << 3))) { + lladdr_opt = NULL; + } + } else { + lladdr_opt = NULL; + } + + /* Check if the target address is configured on the receiving netif. */ + accepted = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; ++i) { + if ((ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) || + (ip6_addr_istentative(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && + ip6_addr_isany(ip6_current_src_addr()))) && + ip6_addr_cmp(&target_address, netif_ip6_addr(inp, i))) { + accepted = 1; + break; + } + } + + /* NS not for us? */ + if (!accepted) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + /* Check for ANY address in src (DAD algorithm). */ + if (ip6_addr_isany(ip6_current_src_addr())) { + /* Sender is validating this address. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; ++i) { + if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i)) && + ip6_addr_cmp(&target_address, netif_ip6_addr(inp, i))) { + /* Send a NA back so that the sender does not use this address. */ + nd6_send_na(inp, netif_ip6_addr(inp, i), ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE | ND6_SEND_FLAG_ALLNODES_DEST); + + if (ip6_addr_istentative(netif_ip6_addr_state(inp, i))) { + /* We shouldn't use this address either. */ + nd6_duplicate_addr_detected(inp, i); + } + } + } + } else { + /* Sender is trying to resolve our address. */ + /* Verify that they included their own link-layer address. */ + if (lladdr_opt == NULL) { + /* Not a valid message. */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(ip6_current_src_addr()); + + if (i >= 0) { + /* We already have a record for the solicitor. */ + if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE) { + neighbor_cache[i].netif = inp; + MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); + + /* Delay probe in case we get confirmation of reachability from upper layer (TCP). */ + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; + } + } else { + /* Add their IPv6 address and link-layer address to neighbor cache. + * We will need it at least to send a unicast NA message, but most + * likely we will also be communicating with this node soon. */ + i = nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(); + + if (i < 0) { + /* We couldn't assign a cache entry for this neighbor. + * we won't be able to reply. drop it. */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); + return; + } + + neighbor_cache[i].netif = inp; + MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); + ip6_addr_set(&(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address), ip6_current_src_addr()); + + /* Receiving a message does not prove reachability: only in one direction. + * Delay probe in case we get confirmation of reachability from upper layer (TCP). */ + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; + } + + /* Send back a NA for us. Allocate the reply pbuf. */ + nd6_send_na(inp, &target_address, ND6_FLAG_SOLICITED | ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE); + } + + break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_NS */ + } + + case ICMP6_TYPE_RA: /* Router Advertisement. */ + { + struct ra_header *ra_hdr; + u8_t *buffer; /* Used to copy options. */ + u16_t offset; +#if LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS + /* There can be multiple RDNSS options per RA */ + u8_t rdnss_server_idx = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS */ + + /* Check that RA header fits in packet. */ + if (p->len < sizeof(struct ra_header)) { + /* @todo debug message */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + ra_hdr = (struct ra_header *)p->payload; + + /* Check a subset of the other RFC 4861 Sec. 6.1.2 requirements. */ + if (!ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_src_addr()) || + IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6_current_header()) != ND6_HOPLIM || ra_hdr->code != 0) { + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + /* @todo RFC MUST: all included options have a length greater than zero */ + + /* If we are sending RS messages, stop. */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT + + /* ensure at least one solicitation is sent (see RFC 4861, ch. 6.3.7) */ + if ((inp->rs_count < LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT) || + (nd6_send_rs(inp) == ERR_OK)) { + inp->rs_count = 0; + } else { + inp->rs_count = 1; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ + + /* Get the matching default router entry. */ + i = nd6_get_router(ip6_current_src_addr(), inp); + + if (i < 0) { + /* Create a new router entry. */ + i = nd6_new_router(ip6_current_src_addr(), inp); + } + + if (i < 0) { + /* Could not create a new router entry. */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); + return; + } + + /* Re-set invalidation timer. */ + default_router_list[i].invalidation_timer = lwip_htons(ra_hdr->router_lifetime); + + /* Re-set default timer values. */ +#if LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES + + if (ra_hdr->retrans_timer > 0) { + retrans_timer = lwip_htonl(ra_hdr->retrans_timer); + } + + if (ra_hdr->reachable_time > 0) { + reachable_time = lwip_htonl(ra_hdr->reachable_time); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ + + /* @todo set default hop limit... */ + /* ra_hdr->current_hop_limit;*/ + + /* Update flags in local entry (incl. preference). */ + default_router_list[i].flags = ra_hdr->flags; + +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 + /* Trigger DHCPv6 if enabled */ + dhcp6_nd6_ra_trigger(inp, ra_hdr->flags & ND6_RA_FLAG_MANAGED_ADDR_CONFIG, + ra_hdr->flags & ND6_RA_FLAG_OTHER_CONFIG); +#endif + + /* Offset to options. */ + offset = sizeof(struct ra_header); + + /* Process each option. */ + while ((p->tot_len - offset) >= 2) { + u8_t option_type; + u16_t option_len; + int option_len8 = pbuf_try_get_at(p, offset + 1); + + if (option_len8 <= 0) { + /* read beyond end or zero length */ + goto lenerr_drop_free_return; + } + + option_len = ((u8_t)option_len8) << 3; + + if (option_len > p->tot_len - offset) { + /* short packet (option does not fit in) */ + goto lenerr_drop_free_return; + } + + if (p->len == p->tot_len) { + /* no need to copy from contiguous pbuf */ + buffer = &((u8_t *)p->payload)[offset]; + } else { + /* check if this option fits into our buffer */ + if (option_len > sizeof(nd6_ra_buffer)) { + option_type = pbuf_get_at(p, offset); + + /* invalid option length */ + if (option_type != ND6_OPTION_TYPE_RDNSS) { + goto lenerr_drop_free_return; + } + + /* we allow RDNSS option to be longer - we'll just drop some servers */ + option_len = sizeof(nd6_ra_buffer); + } + + buffer = (u8_t *)&nd6_ra_buffer; + option_len = pbuf_copy_partial(p, &nd6_ra_buffer, option_len, offset); + } + + option_type = buffer[0]; + + switch (option_type) { + case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_SOURCE_LLADDR: { + struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; + + if (option_len < sizeof(struct lladdr_option)) { + goto lenerr_drop_free_return; + } + + lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)buffer; + + if ((default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) && + (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->state == ND6_INCOMPLETE)) { + SMEMCPY(default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); + default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->state = ND6_REACHABLE; + default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->counter.reachable_time = reachable_time; + } + + break; + } + + case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_MTU: { + struct mtu_option *mtu_opt; + u32_t mtu32; + + if (option_len < sizeof(struct mtu_option)) { + goto lenerr_drop_free_return; + } + + mtu_opt = (struct mtu_option *)buffer; + mtu32 = lwip_htonl(mtu_opt->mtu); + + if ((mtu32 >= 1280) && (mtu32 <= 0xffff)) { +#if LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES + + if (inp->mtu) { + /* don't set the mtu for IPv6 higher than the netif driver supports */ + inp->mtu6 = LWIP_MIN(inp->mtu, (u16_t)mtu32); + } else { + inp->mtu6 = (u16_t)mtu32; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ + } + + break; + } + + case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_PREFIX_INFO: { + struct prefix_option *prefix_opt; + ip6_addr_t prefix_addr; + + if (option_len < sizeof(struct prefix_option)) { + goto lenerr_drop_free_return; + } + + prefix_opt = (struct prefix_option *)buffer; + + /* Get a memory-aligned copy of the prefix. */ + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(prefix_addr, prefix_opt->prefix); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&prefix_addr, IP6_UNICAST, inp); + + if (!ip6_addr_islinklocal(&prefix_addr)) { + if ((prefix_opt->flags & ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_ON_LINK) && + (prefix_opt->prefix_length == 64)) { + /* Add to on-link prefix list. */ + u32_t valid_life; + s8_t prefix; + + valid_life = lwip_htonl(prefix_opt->valid_lifetime); + + /* find cache entry for this prefix. */ + prefix = nd6_get_onlink_prefix(&prefix_addr, inp); + + if (prefix < 0 && valid_life > 0) { + /* Create a new cache entry. */ + prefix = nd6_new_onlink_prefix(&prefix_addr, inp); + } + + if (prefix >= 0) { + prefix_list[prefix].invalidation_timer = valid_life; + } + } + +#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG + + if (prefix_opt->flags & ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_AUTONOMOUS) { + /* Perform processing for autoconfiguration. */ + nd6_process_autoconfig_prefix(inp, prefix_opt, &prefix_addr); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ + } + + break; + } + + case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_ROUTE_INFO: + /* @todo implement preferred routes. + struct route_option * route_opt; + route_opt = (struct route_option *)buffer;*/ + + break; +#if LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS + + case ND6_OPTION_TYPE_RDNSS: { + u8_t num, n; + u16_t copy_offset = offset + SIZEOF_RDNSS_OPTION_BASE; + struct rdnss_option *rdnss_opt; + + if (option_len < SIZEOF_RDNSS_OPTION_BASE) { + goto lenerr_drop_free_return; + } + + rdnss_opt = (struct rdnss_option *)buffer; + num = (rdnss_opt->length - 1) / 2; + + for (n = 0; (rdnss_server_idx < DNS_MAX_SERVERS) && (n < num); n++) { + ip_addr_t rdnss_address; + + /* Copy directly from pbuf to get an aligned, zoned copy of the prefix. */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(p, &rdnss_address, sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t), copy_offset) == sizeof(ip6_addr_p_t)) { + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(rdnss_address, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&rdnss_address), IP6_UNKNOWN, inp); + + if (htonl(rdnss_opt->lifetime) > 0) { + /* TODO implement Lifetime > 0 */ + dns_setserver(rdnss_server_idx++, &rdnss_address); + } else { + /* TODO implement DNS removal in dns.c */ + u8_t s; + + for (s = 0; s < DNS_MAX_SERVERS; s++) { + const ip_addr_t *addr = dns_getserver(s); + + if (ip_addr_cmp(addr, &rdnss_address)) { + dns_setserver(s, NULL); + } + } + } + } + } + + break; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS */ + + default: + /* Unrecognized option, abort. */ + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); + break; + } + + /* option length is checked earlier to be non-zero to make sure loop ends */ + offset += 8 * (u8_t)option_len8; + } + + break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_RA */ + } + + case ICMP6_TYPE_RD: /* Redirect */ + { + struct redirect_header *redir_hdr; + struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; + ip6_addr_t destination_address, target_address; + + /* Check that Redir header fits in packet. */ + if (p->len < sizeof(struct redirect_header)) { + /* @todo debug message */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + redir_hdr = (struct redirect_header *)p->payload; + + /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the destination address. */ + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(destination_address, redir_hdr->destination_address); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&destination_address, IP6_UNICAST, inp); + + /* Check a subset of the other RFC 4861 Sec. 8.1 requirements. */ + if (!ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6_current_src_addr()) || + IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6_current_header()) != ND6_HOPLIM || + redir_hdr->code != 0 || ip6_addr_ismulticast(&destination_address)) { + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + /* @todo RFC MUST: IP source address equals first-hop router for destination_address */ + /* @todo RFC MUST: ICMP target address is either link-local address or same as destination_address */ + /* @todo RFC MUST: all included options have a length greater than zero */ + + if (p->len >= (sizeof(struct redirect_header) + 2)) { + lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct redirect_header)); + + if (p->len < (sizeof(struct redirect_header) + (lladdr_opt->length << 3))) { + lladdr_opt = NULL; + } + } else { + lladdr_opt = NULL; + } + + /* Find dest address in cache */ + dest_idx = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(&destination_address); + + if (dest_idx < 0) { + /* Destination not in cache, drop packet. */ + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the target address. */ + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(target_address, redir_hdr->target_address); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&target_address, IP6_UNICAST, inp); + + /* Set the new target address. */ + ip6_addr_copy(destination_cache[dest_idx].next_hop_addr, target_address); + + /* If Link-layer address of other router is given, try to add to neighbor cache. */ + if (lladdr_opt != NULL) { + if (lladdr_opt->type == ND6_OPTION_TYPE_TARGET_LLADDR) { + i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&target_address); + + if (i < 0) { + i = nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(); + + if (i >= 0) { + neighbor_cache[i].netif = inp; + MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); + ip6_addr_copy(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address, target_address); + + /* Receiving a message does not prove reachability: only in one direction. + * Delay probe in case we get confirmation of reachability from upper layer (TCP). */ + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; + } + } + + if (i >= 0) { + if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE) { + MEMCPY(neighbor_cache[i].lladdr, lladdr_opt->addr, inp->hwaddr_len); + /* Receiving a message does not prove reachability: only in one direction. + * Delay probe in case we get confirmation of reachability from upper layer (TCP). */ + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; + } + } + } + } + + break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_RD */ + } + + case ICMP6_TYPE_PTB: /* Packet too big */ + { + struct icmp6_hdr *icmp6hdr; /* Packet too big message */ + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; /* IPv6 header of the packet which caused the error */ + u32_t pmtu; + ip6_addr_t destination_address; + + /* Check that ICMPv6 header + IPv6 header fit in payload */ + if (p->len < (sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr) + IP6_HLEN)) { + /* drop short packets */ + pbuf_free(p); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + return; + } + + icmp6hdr = (struct icmp6_hdr *)p->payload; + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct icmp6_hdr)); + + /* Create an aligned, zoned copy of the destination address. */ + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(destination_address, ip6hdr->dest); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&destination_address, IP6_UNKNOWN, inp); + + /* Look for entry in destination cache. */ + dest_idx = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(&destination_address); + + if (dest_idx < 0) { + /* Destination not in cache, drop packet. */ + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + /* Change the Path MTU. */ + pmtu = lwip_htonl(icmp6hdr->data); + destination_cache[dest_idx].pmtu = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(pmtu, 0xFFFF); + + break; /* ICMP6_TYPE_PTB */ + } + + default: + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.proterr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + break; /* default */ + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return; +lenerr_drop_free_return: + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.lenerr); + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.drop); + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/** + * Periodic timer for Neighbor discovery functions: + * + * - Update neighbor reachability states + * - Update destination cache entries age + * - Update invalidation timers of default routers and on-link prefixes + * - Update lifetimes of our addresses + * - Perform duplicate address detection (DAD) for our addresses + * - Send router solicitations + */ +void nd6_tmr(void) +{ + s8_t i; + struct netif *netif; + + /* Process neighbor entries. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + switch (neighbor_cache[i].state) { + case ND6_INCOMPLETE: + if ((neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent >= LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT) && + (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { + /* Retries exceeded. */ + nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); + } else { + /* Send a NS for this entry. */ + neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent++; + nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(&neighbor_cache[i], ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST); + } + + break; + + case ND6_REACHABLE: + + /* Send queued packets, if any are left. Should have been sent already. */ + if (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { + nd6_send_q(i); + } + + if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL) { + /* Change to stale state. */ + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_STALE; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.stale_time = 0; + } else { + neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; + } + + break; + + case ND6_STALE: + neighbor_cache[i].counter.stale_time++; + break; + + case ND6_DELAY: + if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time <= 1) { + /* Change to PROBE state. */ + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_PROBE; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent = 0; + } else { + neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time--; + } + + break; + + case ND6_PROBE: + if ((neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent >= LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT) && + (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { + /* Retries exceeded. */ + nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); + } else { + /* Send a NS for this entry. */ + neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent++; + nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(&neighbor_cache[i], 0); + } + + break; + + case ND6_NO_ENTRY: + default: + /* Do nothing. */ + break; + } + } + + /* Process destination entries. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { + destination_cache[i].age++; + } + + /* Process router entries. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; i++) { + if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) { + /* Active entry. */ + if (default_router_list[i].invalidation_timer <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000) { + /* No more than 1 second remaining. Clear this entry. Also clear any of + * its destination cache entries, as per RFC 4861 Sec. 5.3 and 6.3.5. */ + s8_t j; + + for (j = 0; j < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; j++) { + if (ip6_addr_cmp(&destination_cache[j].next_hop_addr, + &default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->next_hop_address)) { + ip6_addr_set_any(&destination_cache[j].destination_addr); + } + } + + default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->isrouter = 0; + default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry = NULL; + default_router_list[i].invalidation_timer = 0; + default_router_list[i].flags = 0; + } else { + default_router_list[i].invalidation_timer -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000; + } + } + } + + /* Process prefix entries. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; i++) { + if (prefix_list[i].netif != NULL) { + if (prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000) { + /* Entry timed out, remove it */ + prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer = 0; + prefix_list[i].netif = NULL; + } else { + prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000; + } + } + } + + /* Process our own addresses, updating address lifetimes and/or DAD state. */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; ++i) { + u8_t addr_state; +#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES + /* Step 1: update address lifetimes (valid and preferred). */ + addr_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i); + + /* RFC 4862 is not entirely clear as to whether address lifetimes affect + * tentative addresses, and is even less clear as to what should happen + * with duplicate addresses. We choose to track and update lifetimes for + * both those types, although for different reasons: + * - for tentative addresses, the line of thought of Sec. 5.7 combined + * with the potentially long period that an address may be in tentative + * state (due to the interface being down) suggests that lifetimes + * should be independent of external factors which would include DAD; + * - for duplicate addresses, retiring them early could result in a new + * but unwanted attempt at marking them as valid, while retiring them + * late/never could clog up address slots on the netif. + * As a result, we may end up expiring addresses of either type here. + */ + if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(addr_state) && + !netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i)) { + u32_t life = netif_ip6_addr_valid_life(netif, i); + + if (life <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000) { + /* The address has expired. */ + netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, 0); + netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, 0); + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_INVALID); + } else { + if (!ip6_addr_life_isinfinite(life)) { + life -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000; + LWIP_ASSERT("bad valid lifetime", life != IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC); + netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, life); + } + + /* The address is still here. Update the preferred lifetime too. */ + life = netif_ip6_addr_pref_life(netif, i); + + if (life <= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000) { + /* This case must also trigger if 'life' was already zero, so as to + * deal correctly with advertised preferred-lifetime reductions. */ + netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, 0); + + if (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED) { + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED); + } + } else if (!ip6_addr_life_isinfinite(life)) { + life -= ND6_TMR_INTERVAL / 1000; + netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, life); + } + } + } + + /* The address state may now have changed, so reobtain it next. */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ + /* Step 2: update DAD state. */ + addr_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i); + + if (ip6_addr_istentative(addr_state)) { + if ((addr_state & IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK) >= LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS) { + /* No NA received in response. Mark address as valid. For dynamic + * addresses with an expired preferred lifetime, the state is set to + * deprecated right away. That should almost never happen, though. */ + addr_state = IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED; +#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES + + if (!netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) && + netif_ip6_addr_pref_life(netif, i) == 0) { + addr_state = IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, addr_state); + } else if (netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif)) { + /* tentative: set next state by increasing by one */ + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, addr_state + 1); + /* Send a NS for this address. Use the unspecified address as source + * address in all cases (RFC 4862 Sec. 5.4.2), not in the least + * because as it is, we only consider multicast replies for DAD. */ + nd6_send_ns(netif, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i), + ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST | ND6_SEND_FLAG_ANY_SRC); + } + } + } + } + +#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT + + /* Send router solicitation messages, if necessary. */ + if (!nd6_tmr_rs_reduction) { + nd6_tmr_rs_reduction = (ND6_RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL) - 1; + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if ((netif->rs_count > 0) && netif_is_up(netif) && + netif_is_link_up(netif) && + !ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0)) && + !ip6_addr_isduplicated(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0))) { + if (nd6_send_rs(netif) == ERR_OK) { + netif->rs_count--; + } + } + } + } else { + nd6_tmr_rs_reduction--; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ +} + +/** Send a neighbor solicitation message for a specific neighbor cache entry + * + * @param entry the neightbor cache entry for wich to send the message + * @param flags one of ND6_SEND_FLAG_* + */ +static void nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry *entry, u8_t flags) +{ + nd6_send_ns(entry->netif, &entry->next_hop_address, flags); +} + +/** + * Send a neighbor solicitation message + * + * @param netif the netif on which to send the message + * @param target_addr the IPv6 target address for the ND message + * @param flags one of ND6_SEND_FLAG_* + */ +static void nd6_send_ns(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *target_addr, u8_t flags) +{ + struct ns_header *ns_hdr; + struct pbuf *p; + const ip6_addr_t *src_addr; + u16_t lladdr_opt_len; + + LWIP_ASSERT("target address is required", target_addr != NULL); + + if (!(flags & ND6_SEND_FLAG_ANY_SRC) && + ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0))) { + /* Use link-local address as source address. */ + src_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0); + /* calculate option length (in 8-byte-blocks) */ + lladdr_opt_len = ((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) + 7) >> 3; + } else { + src_addr = IP6_ADDR_ANY6; + /* Option "MUST NOT be included when the source IP address is the unspecified address." */ + lladdr_opt_len = 0; + } + + /* Allocate a packet. */ + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct ns_header) + (lladdr_opt_len << 3), PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); + return; + } + + /* Set fields. */ + ns_hdr = (struct ns_header *)p->payload; + + ns_hdr->type = ICMP6_TYPE_NS; + ns_hdr->code = 0; + ns_hdr->chksum = 0; + ns_hdr->reserved = 0; + ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(ns_hdr->target_address, *target_addr); + + if (lladdr_opt_len != 0) { + struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct ns_header)); + lladdr_opt->type = ND6_OPTION_TYPE_SOURCE_LLADDR; + lladdr_opt->length = (u8_t)lladdr_opt_len; + SMEMCPY(lladdr_opt->addr, netif->hwaddr, netif->hwaddr_len); + } + + /* Generate the solicited node address for the target address. */ + if (flags & ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST) { + ip6_addr_set_solicitednode(&multicast_address, target_addr->addr[3]); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); + target_addr = &multicast_address; + } + +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) + { + ns_hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->len, src_addr, + target_addr); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ + + /* Send the packet out. */ + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.xmit); + ip6_output_if(p, (src_addr == IP6_ADDR_ANY6) ? NULL : src_addr, target_addr, + ND6_HOPLIM, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, netif); + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/** + * Send a neighbor advertisement message + * + * @param netif the netif on which to send the message + * @param target_addr the IPv6 target address for the ND message + * @param flags one of ND6_SEND_FLAG_* + */ +static void nd6_send_na(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *target_addr, u8_t flags) +{ + struct na_header *na_hdr; + struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; + struct pbuf *p; + const ip6_addr_t *src_addr; + const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr; + u16_t lladdr_opt_len; + + LWIP_ASSERT("target address is required", target_addr != NULL); + + /* Use link-local address as source address. */ + /* src_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0); */ + /* Use target address as source address. */ + src_addr = target_addr; + + /* Allocate a packet. */ + lladdr_opt_len = ((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) >> 3) + (((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) & 0x07) ? 1 : 0); + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct na_header) + (lladdr_opt_len << 3), PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); + return; + } + + /* Set fields. */ + na_hdr = (struct na_header *)p->payload; + lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct na_header)); + + na_hdr->type = ICMP6_TYPE_NA; + na_hdr->code = 0; + na_hdr->chksum = 0; + na_hdr->flags = flags & 0xf0; + na_hdr->reserved[0] = 0; + na_hdr->reserved[1] = 0; + na_hdr->reserved[2] = 0; + ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(na_hdr->target_address, *target_addr); + + lladdr_opt->type = ND6_OPTION_TYPE_TARGET_LLADDR; + lladdr_opt->length = (u8_t)lladdr_opt_len; + SMEMCPY(lladdr_opt->addr, netif->hwaddr, netif->hwaddr_len); + + /* Generate the solicited node address for the target address. */ + if (flags & ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST) { + ip6_addr_set_solicitednode(&multicast_address, target_addr->addr[3]); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); + dest_addr = &multicast_address; + } else if (flags & ND6_SEND_FLAG_ALLNODES_DEST) { + ip6_addr_set_allnodes_linklocal(&multicast_address); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); + dest_addr = &multicast_address; + } else { + dest_addr = ip6_current_src_addr(); + } + +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) + { + na_hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->len, src_addr, + dest_addr); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ + + /* Send the packet out. */ + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.xmit); + ip6_output_if(p, src_addr, dest_addr, + ND6_HOPLIM, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, netif); + pbuf_free(p); +} + +#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT +/** + * Send a router solicitation message + * + * @param netif the netif on which to send the message + */ +static err_t nd6_send_rs(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct rs_header *rs_hdr; + struct lladdr_option *lladdr_opt; + struct pbuf *p; + const ip6_addr_t *src_addr; + err_t err; + u16_t lladdr_opt_len = 0; + + /* Link-local source address, or unspecified address? */ + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, 0))) { + src_addr = netif_ip6_addr(netif, 0); + } else { + src_addr = IP6_ADDR_ANY6; + } + + /* Generate the all routers target address. */ + ip6_addr_set_allrouters_linklocal(&multicast_address); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); + + /* Allocate a packet. */ + if (src_addr != IP6_ADDR_ANY6) { + lladdr_opt_len = ((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) >> 3) + (((netif->hwaddr_len + 2) & 0x07) ? 1 : 0); + } + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, sizeof(struct rs_header) + (lladdr_opt_len << 3), PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.memerr); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + /* Set fields. */ + rs_hdr = (struct rs_header *)p->payload; + + rs_hdr->type = ICMP6_TYPE_RS; + rs_hdr->code = 0; + rs_hdr->chksum = 0; + rs_hdr->reserved = 0; + + if (src_addr != IP6_ADDR_ANY6) { + /* Include our hw address. */ + lladdr_opt = (struct lladdr_option *)((u8_t *)p->payload + sizeof(struct rs_header)); + lladdr_opt->type = ND6_OPTION_TYPE_SOURCE_LLADDR; + lladdr_opt->length = (u8_t)lladdr_opt_len; + SMEMCPY(lladdr_opt->addr, netif->hwaddr, netif->hwaddr_len); + } + +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6) + { + rs_hdr->chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, p->len, src_addr, + &multicast_address); + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 */ + + /* Send the packet out. */ + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.xmit); + + err = ip6_output_if(p, (src_addr == IP6_ADDR_ANY6) ? NULL : src_addr, &multicast_address, + ND6_HOPLIM, 0, IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6, netif); + pbuf_free(p); + + return err; +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ + +/** + * Search for a neighbor cache entry + * + * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address of the neighbor + * @return The neighbor cache entry index that matched, -1 if no + * entry is found + */ +static s8_t nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + s8_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_cmp(ip6addr, &(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address))) { + return i; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +/** + * Create a new neighbor cache entry. + * + * If no unused entry is found, will try to recycle an old entry + * according to ad-hoc "age" heuristic. + * + * @return The neighbor cache entry index that was created, -1 if no + * entry could be created + */ +static s8_t nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(void) +{ + s8_t i; + s8_t j; + u32_t time; + + /* First, try to find an empty entry. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_NO_ENTRY) { + return i; + } + } + + /* We need to recycle an entry. in general, do not recycle if it is a router. */ + + /* Next, try to find a Stale entry. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_STALE) && + (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { + nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); + return i; + } + } + + /* Next, try to find a Probe entry. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_PROBE) && + (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { + nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); + return i; + } + } + + /* Next, try to find a Delayed entry. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_DELAY) && + (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { + nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); + return i; + } + } + + /* Next, try to find the oldest reachable entry. */ + time = 0xfffffffful; + j = -1; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_REACHABLE) && + (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { + if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time < time) { + j = i; + time = neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time; + } + } + } + + if (j >= 0) { + nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(j); + return j; + } + + /* Next, find oldest incomplete entry without queued packets. */ + time = 0; + j = -1; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + if ( + (neighbor_cache[i].q == NULL) && + (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE) && + (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { + if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent >= time) { + j = i; + time = neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent; + } + } + } + + if (j >= 0) { + nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(j); + return j; + } + + /* Next, find oldest incomplete entry with queued packets. */ + time = 0; + j = -1; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE) && + (!neighbor_cache[i].isrouter)) { + if (neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent >= time) { + j = i; + time = neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent; + } + } + } + + if (j >= 0) { + nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(j); + return j; + } + + /* No more entries to try. */ + return -1; +} + +/** + * Will free any resources associated with a neighbor cache + * entry, and will mark it as unused. + * + * @param i the neighbor cache entry index to free + */ +static void nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(s8_t i) +{ + if ((i < 0) || (i >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS)) { + return; + } + + if (neighbor_cache[i].isrouter) { + /* isrouter needs to be cleared before deleting a neighbor cache entry */ + return; + } + + /* Free any queued packets. */ + if (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { + nd6_free_q(neighbor_cache[i].q); + neighbor_cache[i].q = NULL; + } + + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_NO_ENTRY; + neighbor_cache[i].isrouter = 0; + neighbor_cache[i].netif = NULL; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time = 0; + ip6_addr_set_zero(&(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address)); +} + +/** + * Search for a destination cache entry + * + * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address of the destination + * @return The destination cache entry index that matched, -1 if no + * entry is found + */ +static s16_t nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + s16_t i; + + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(ip6addr); + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_cmp(ip6addr, &(destination_cache[i].destination_addr))) { + return i; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +/** + * Create a new destination cache entry. If no unused entry is found, + * will recycle oldest entry. + * + * @return The destination cache entry index that was created, -1 if no + * entry was created + */ +static s16_t nd6_new_destination_cache_entry(void) +{ + s16_t i, j; + u32_t age; + + /* Find an empty entry. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isany(&(destination_cache[i].destination_addr))) { + return i; + } + } + + /* Find oldest entry. */ + age = 0; + j = LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS - 1; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { + if (destination_cache[i].age > age) { + j = i; + } + } + + return j; +} + +/** + * Clear the destination cache. + * + * This operation may be necessary for consistency in the light of changing + * local addresses and/or use of the gateway hook. + */ +void nd6_clear_destination_cache(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS; i++) { + ip6_addr_set_any(&destination_cache[i].destination_addr); + } +} + +/** + * Determine whether an address matches an on-link prefix or the subnet of a + * statically assigned address. + * + * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address to match + * @return 1 if the address is on-link, 0 otherwise + */ +static int nd6_is_prefix_in_netif(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif) +{ + s8_t i; + + /* Check to see if the address matches an on-link prefix. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; i++) { + if ((prefix_list[i].netif == netif) && + (prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer > 0) && + ip6_addr_netcmp(ip6addr, &(prefix_list[i].prefix))) { + return 1; + } + } + + /* Check to see if address prefix matches a manually configured (= static) + * address. Static addresses have an implied /64 subnet assignment. Dynamic + * addresses (from autoconfiguration) have no implied subnet assignment, and + * are thus effectively /128 assignments. See RFC 5942 for more on this. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && + netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) && + ip6_addr_netcmp(ip6addr, netif_ip6_addr(netif, i))) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Select a default router for a destination. + * + * This function is used both for routing and for finding a next-hop target for + * a packet. In the former case, the given netif is NULL, and the returned + * router entry must be for a netif suitable for sending packets (up, link up). + * In the latter case, the given netif is not NULL and restricts router choice. + * + * @param ip6addr the destination address + * @param netif the netif for the outgoing packet, if known + * @return the default router entry index, or -1 if no suitable + * router is found + */ +static s8_t nd6_select_router(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif) +{ + struct netif *router_netif; + s8_t i, j, valid_router; + static s8_t last_router; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ip6addr); /* @todo match preferred routes!! (must implement ND6_OPTION_TYPE_ROUTE_INFO) */ + + /* @todo: implement default router preference */ + + /* Look for valid routers. A reachable router is preferred. */ + valid_router = -1; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; i++) { + /* Is the router netif both set and apppropriate? */ + if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) { + router_netif = default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->netif; + + if ((router_netif != NULL) && (netif != NULL ? netif == router_netif : + (netif_is_up(router_netif) && netif_is_link_up(router_netif)))) { + /* Is the router valid, i.e., reachable or probably reachable as per + * RFC 4861 Sec. 6.3.6? Note that we will never return a router that + * has no neighbor cache entry, due to the netif association tests. */ + if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->state != ND6_INCOMPLETE) { + /* Is the router known to be reachable? */ + if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->state == ND6_REACHABLE) { + return i; /* valid and reachable - done! */ + } else if (valid_router < 0) { + valid_router = i; /* valid but not known to be reachable */ + } + } + } + } + } + + if (valid_router >= 0) { + return valid_router; + } + + /* Look for any router for which we have any information at all. */ + /* last_router is used for round-robin selection of incomplete routers, as + * recommended in RFC 4861 Sec. 6.3.6 point (2). Advance only when picking a + * route, to select the same router as next-hop target in the common case. */ + if ((netif == NULL) && (++last_router >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS)) { + last_router = 0; + } + + i = last_router; + + for (j = 0; j < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; j++) { + if (default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) { + router_netif = default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->netif; + + if ((router_netif != NULL) && (netif != NULL ? netif == router_netif : + (netif_is_up(router_netif) && netif_is_link_up(router_netif)))) { + return i; + } + } + + if (++i >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS) { + i = 0; + } + } + + /* no suitable router found. */ + return -1; +} + +/** + * Find a router-announced route to the given destination. This route may be + * based on an on-link prefix or a default router. + * + * If a suitable route is found, the returned netif is guaranteed to be in a + * suitable state (up, link up) to be used for packet transmission. + * + * @param ip6addr the destination IPv6 address + * @return the netif to use for the destination, or NULL if none found + */ +struct netif * +nd6_find_route(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + struct netif *netif; + s8_t i; + + /* @todo decide if it makes sense to check the destination cache first */ + + /* Check if there is a matching on-link prefix. There may be multiple + * matches. Pick the first one that is associated with a suitable netif. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; ++i) { + netif = prefix_list[i].netif; + + if ((netif != NULL) && ip6_addr_netcmp(&prefix_list[i].prefix, ip6addr) && + netif_is_up(netif) && netif_is_link_up(netif)) { + return netif; + } + } + + /* No on-link prefix match. Find a router that can forward the packet. */ + i = nd6_select_router(ip6addr, NULL); + + if (i >= 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("selected router must have a neighbor entry", + default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL); + return default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->netif; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Find an entry for a default router. + * + * @param router_addr the IPv6 address of the router + * @param netif the netif on which the router is found, if known + * @return the index of the router entry, or -1 if not found + */ +static s8_t nd6_get_router(const ip6_addr_t *router_addr, struct netif *netif) +{ + s8_t i; + + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(router_addr, netif); + + /* Look for router. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; i++) { + if ((default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry != NULL) && + ((netif != NULL) ? netif == default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->netif : 1) && + ip6_addr_cmp(router_addr, &(default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->next_hop_address))) { + return i; + } + } + + /* router not found. */ + return -1; +} + +/** + * Create a new entry for a default router. + * + * @param router_addr the IPv6 address of the router + * @param netif the netif on which the router is connected, if known + * @return the index on the router table, or -1 if could not be created + */ +static s8_t nd6_new_router(const ip6_addr_t *router_addr, struct netif *netif) +{ + s8_t router_index; + s8_t free_router_index; + s8_t neighbor_index; + + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(router_addr, netif); + + /* Do we have a neighbor entry for this router? */ + neighbor_index = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(router_addr); + + if (neighbor_index < 0) { + /* Create a neighbor entry for this router. */ + neighbor_index = nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(); + + if (neighbor_index < 0) { + /* Could not create neighbor entry for this router. */ + return -1; + } + + ip6_addr_set(&(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].next_hop_address), router_addr); + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].netif = netif; + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = NULL; + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].state = ND6_INCOMPLETE; + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].counter.probes_sent = 1; + nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(&neighbor_cache[neighbor_index], ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST); + } + + /* Mark neighbor as router. */ + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].isrouter = 1; + + /* Look for empty entry. */ + free_router_index = LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; + + for (router_index = LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS - 1; router_index >= 0; router_index--) { + /* check if router already exists (this is a special case for 2 netifs on the same subnet + - e.g. wifi and cable) */ + if (default_router_list[router_index].neighbor_entry == &(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index])) { + return router_index; + } + + if (default_router_list[router_index].neighbor_entry == NULL) { + /* remember lowest free index to create a new entry */ + free_router_index = router_index; + } + } + + if (free_router_index < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS) { + default_router_list[free_router_index].neighbor_entry = &(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index]); + return free_router_index; + } + + /* Could not create a router entry. */ + + /* Mark neighbor entry as not-router. Entry might be useful as neighbor still. */ + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].isrouter = 0; + + /* router not found. */ + return -1; +} + +/** + * Find the cached entry for an on-link prefix. + * + * @param prefix the IPv6 prefix that is on-link + * @param netif the netif on which the prefix is on-link + * @return the index on the prefix table, or -1 if not found + */ +static s8_t nd6_get_onlink_prefix(const ip6_addr_t *prefix, struct netif *netif) +{ + s8_t i; + + /* Look for prefix in list. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; ++i) { + if ((ip6_addr_netcmp(&(prefix_list[i].prefix), prefix)) && + (prefix_list[i].netif == netif)) { + return i; + } + } + + /* Entry not available. */ + return -1; +} + +/** + * Creates a new entry for an on-link prefix. + * + * @param prefix the IPv6 prefix that is on-link + * @param netif the netif on which the prefix is on-link + * @return the index on the prefix table, or -1 if not created + */ +static s8_t nd6_new_onlink_prefix(const ip6_addr_t *prefix, struct netif *netif) +{ + s8_t i; + + /* Create new entry. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; ++i) { + if ((prefix_list[i].netif == NULL) || + (prefix_list[i].invalidation_timer == 0)) { + /* Found empty prefix entry. */ + prefix_list[i].netif = netif; + ip6_addr_set(&(prefix_list[i].prefix), prefix); + return i; + } + } + + /* Entry not available. */ + return -1; +} + +/** + * Determine the next hop for a destination. Will determine if the + * destination is on-link, else a suitable on-link router is selected. + * + * The last entry index is cached for fast entry search. + * + * @param ip6addr the destination address + * @param netif the netif on which the packet will be sent + * @return the neighbor cache entry for the next hop, ERR_RTE if no + * suitable next hop was found, ERR_MEM if no cache entry + * could be created + */ +static s8_t nd6_get_next_hop_entry(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW + const ip6_addr_t *next_hop_addr; +#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW */ + s8_t i; + s16_t dst_idx; + + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(ip6addr, netif); + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT + + if (netif->hints != NULL) { + /* per-pcb cached entry was given */ + netif_addr_idx_t addr_hint = netif->hints->addr_hint; + + if (addr_hint < LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS) { + nd6_cached_destination_index = addr_hint; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ + + /* Look for ip6addr in destination cache. */ + if (ip6_addr_cmp(ip6addr, &(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr))) { + /* the cached entry index is the right one! */ + /* do nothing. */ + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.cachehit); + } else { + /* Search destination cache. */ + dst_idx = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(ip6addr); + + if (dst_idx >= 0) { + /* found destination entry. make it our new cached index. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("type overflow", (size_t)dst_idx < NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX); + nd6_cached_destination_index = (netif_addr_idx_t)dst_idx; + } else { + /* Not found. Create a new destination entry. */ + dst_idx = nd6_new_destination_cache_entry(); + + if (dst_idx >= 0) { + /* got new destination entry. make it our new cached index. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("type overflow", (size_t)dst_idx < NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX); + nd6_cached_destination_index = (netif_addr_idx_t)dst_idx; + } else { + /* Could not create a destination cache entry. */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Copy dest address to destination cache. */ + ip6_addr_set(&(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr), ip6addr); + + /* Now find the next hop. is it a neighbor? */ + if (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6addr) || + nd6_is_prefix_in_netif(ip6addr, netif)) { + /* Destination in local link. */ + destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].pmtu = netif_mtu6(netif); + ip6_addr_copy(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr, destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr); +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW + } else if ((next_hop_addr = LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW(netif, ip6addr)) != NULL) { + /* Next hop for destination provided by hook function. */ + destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].pmtu = netif->mtu; + ip6_addr_set(&destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr, next_hop_addr); +#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW */ + } else { + /* We need to select a router. */ + i = nd6_select_router(ip6addr, netif); + + if (i < 0) { + /* No router found. */ + ip6_addr_set_any(&(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr)); + return ERR_RTE; + } + + destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].pmtu = netif_mtu6(netif); /* Start with netif mtu, correct through ICMPv6 if necessary */ + ip6_addr_copy(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr, default_router_list[i].neighbor_entry->next_hop_address); + } + } + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT + + if (netif->hints != NULL) { + /* per-pcb cached entry was given */ + netif->hints->addr_hint = nd6_cached_destination_index; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ + + /* Look in neighbor cache for the next-hop address. */ + if (ip6_addr_cmp(&(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr), + &(neighbor_cache[nd6_cached_neighbor_index].next_hop_address))) { + /* Cache hit. */ + /* Do nothing. */ + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.cachehit); + } else { + i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr)); + + if (i >= 0) { + /* Found a matching record, make it new cached entry. */ + nd6_cached_neighbor_index = i; + } else { + /* Neighbor not in cache. Make a new entry. */ + i = nd6_new_neighbor_cache_entry(); + + if (i >= 0) { + /* got new neighbor entry. make it our new cached index. */ + nd6_cached_neighbor_index = i; + } else { + /* Could not create a neighbor cache entry. */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Initialize fields. */ + ip6_addr_copy(neighbor_cache[i].next_hop_address, + destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].next_hop_addr); + neighbor_cache[i].isrouter = 0; + neighbor_cache[i].netif = netif; + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_INCOMPLETE; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.probes_sent = 1; + nd6_send_neighbor_cache_probe(&neighbor_cache[i], ND6_SEND_FLAG_MULTICAST_DEST); + } + } + + /* Reset this destination's age. */ + destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].age = 0; + + return nd6_cached_neighbor_index; +} + +/** + * Queue a packet for a neighbor. + * + * @param neighbor_index the index in the neighbor cache table + * @param q packet to be queued + * @return ERR_OK if succeeded, ERR_MEM if out of memory + */ +static err_t nd6_queue_packet(s8_t neighbor_index, struct pbuf *q) +{ + err_t result = ERR_MEM; + struct pbuf *p; + int copy_needed = 0; +#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING + struct nd6_q_entry *new_entry, *r; +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + + if ((neighbor_index < 0) || (neighbor_index >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS)) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + /* IF q includes a pbuf that must be copied, we have to copy the whole chain + * into a new PBUF_RAM. See the definition of PBUF_NEEDS_COPY for details. */ + p = q; + + while (p) { + if (PBUF_NEEDS_COPY(p)) { + copy_needed = 1; + break; + } + + p = p->next; + } + + if (copy_needed) { + /* copy the whole packet into new pbufs */ + p = pbuf_clone(PBUF_LINK, PBUF_RAM, q); + + while ((p == NULL) && (neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q != NULL)) { + /* Free oldest packet (as per RFC recommendation) */ +#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING + r = neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q; + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = r->next; + r->next = NULL; + nd6_free_q(r); +#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + pbuf_free(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q); + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = NULL; +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + p = pbuf_clone(PBUF_LINK, PBUF_RAM, q); + } + } else { + /* referencing the old pbuf is enough */ + p = q; + pbuf_ref(p); + } + + /* packet was copied/ref'd? */ + if (p != NULL) { + /* queue packet ... */ +#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING + /* allocate a new nd6 queue entry */ + new_entry = (struct nd6_q_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_ND6_QUEUE); + + if ((new_entry == NULL) && (neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q != NULL)) { + /* Free oldest packet (as per RFC recommendation) */ + r = neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q; + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = r->next; + r->next = NULL; + nd6_free_q(r); + new_entry = (struct nd6_q_entry *)memp_malloc(MEMP_ND6_QUEUE); + } + + if (new_entry != NULL) { + new_entry->next = NULL; + new_entry->p = p; + + if (neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q != NULL) { + /* queue was already existent, append the new entry to the end */ + r = neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q; + + while (r->next != NULL) { + r = r->next; + } + + r->next = new_entry; + } else { + /* queue did not exist, first item in queue */ + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = new_entry; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ipv6: queued packet %p on neighbor entry %" S16_F "\n", (void *)p, (s16_t)neighbor_index)); + result = ERR_OK; + } else { + /* the pool MEMP_ND6_QUEUE is empty */ + pbuf_free(p); + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ipv6: could not queue a copy of packet %p (out of memory)\n", (void *)p)); + /* { result == ERR_MEM } through initialization */ + } + +#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + + /* Queue a single packet. If an older packet is already queued, free it as per RFC. */ + if (neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q != NULL) { + pbuf_free(neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q); + } + + neighbor_cache[neighbor_index].q = p; + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ipv6: queued packet %p on neighbor entry %" S16_F "\n", (void *)p, (s16_t)neighbor_index)); + result = ERR_OK; +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("ipv6: could not queue a copy of packet %p (out of memory)\n", (void *)q)); + /* { result == ERR_MEM } through initialization */ + } + + return result; +} + +#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING +/** + * Free a complete queue of nd6 q entries + * + * @param q a queue of nd6_q_entry to free + */ +static void nd6_free_q(struct nd6_q_entry *q) +{ + struct nd6_q_entry *r; + LWIP_ASSERT("q != NULL", q != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->p != NULL", q->p != NULL); + + while (q) { + r = q; + q = q->next; + LWIP_ASSERT("r->p != NULL", (r->p != NULL)); + pbuf_free(r->p); + memp_free(MEMP_ND6_QUEUE, r); + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + +/** + * Send queued packets for a neighbor + * + * @param i the neighbor to send packets to + */ +static void nd6_send_q(s8_t i) +{ + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; + ip6_addr_t dest; +#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING + struct nd6_q_entry *q; +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + + if ((i < 0) || (i >= LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS)) { + return; + } + +#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING + + while (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { + /* remember first in queue */ + q = neighbor_cache[i].q; + /* pop first item off the queue */ + neighbor_cache[i].q = q->next; + /* Get ipv6 header. */ + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)(q->p->payload); + /* Create an aligned copy. */ + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest, ip6hdr->dest); + /* Restore the zone, if applicable. */ + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&dest, IP6_UNKNOWN, neighbor_cache[i].netif); + /* send the queued IPv6 packet */ + (neighbor_cache[i].netif)->output_ip6(neighbor_cache[i].netif, q->p, &dest); + /* free the queued IP packet */ + pbuf_free(q->p); + /* now queue entry can be freed */ + memp_free(MEMP_ND6_QUEUE, q); + } + +#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + + if (neighbor_cache[i].q != NULL) { + /* Get ipv6 header. */ + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)(neighbor_cache[i].q->payload); + /* Create an aligned copy. */ + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest, ip6hdr->dest); + /* Restore the zone, if applicable. */ + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&dest, IP6_UNKNOWN, neighbor_cache[i].netif); + /* send the queued IPv6 packet */ + (neighbor_cache[i].netif)->output_ip6(neighbor_cache[i].netif, neighbor_cache[i].q, &dest); + /* free the queued IP packet */ + pbuf_free(neighbor_cache[i].q); + neighbor_cache[i].q = NULL; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ +} + +/** + * A packet is to be transmitted to a specific IPv6 destination on a specific + * interface. Check if we can find the hardware address of the next hop to use + * for the packet. If so, give the hardware address to the caller, which should + * use it to send the packet right away. Otherwise, enqueue the packet for + * later transmission while looking up the hardware address, if possible. + * + * As such, this function returns one of three different possible results: + * + * - ERR_OK with a non-NULL 'hwaddrp': the caller should send the packet now. + * - ERR_OK with a NULL 'hwaddrp': the packet has been enqueued for later. + * - not ERR_OK: something went wrong; forward the error upward in the stack. + * + * @param netif The lwIP network interface on which the IP packet will be sent. + * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. + * @param ip6addr The destination IPv6 address of the packet. + * @param hwaddrp On success, filled with a pointer to a HW address or NULL (meaning + * the packet has been queued). + * @return + * - ERR_OK on success, ERR_RTE if no route was found for the packet, + * or ERR_MEM if low memory conditions prohibit sending the packet at all. + */ +err_t nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, const u8_t **hwaddrp) +{ + s8_t i; + + /* Get next hop record. */ + i = nd6_get_next_hop_entry(ip6addr, netif); + + if (i < 0) { + /* failed to get a next hop neighbor record. */ + return i; + } + + /* Now that we have a destination record, send or queue the packet. */ + if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_STALE) { + /* Switch to delay state. */ + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_DELAY; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.delay_time = LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME / ND6_TMR_INTERVAL; + } + + /* @todo should we send or queue if PROBE? send for now, to let unicast NS pass. */ + if ((neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_REACHABLE) || + (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_DELAY) || + (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_PROBE)) { + /* Tell the caller to send out the packet now. */ + *hwaddrp = neighbor_cache[i].lladdr; + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* We should queue packet on this interface. */ + *hwaddrp = NULL; + return nd6_queue_packet(i, q); +} + +/** + * Get the Path MTU for a destination. + * + * @param ip6addr the destination address + * @param netif the netif on which the packet will be sent + * @return the Path MTU, if known, or the netif default MTU + */ +u16_t nd6_get_destination_mtu(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif) +{ + s16_t i; + + i = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(ip6addr); + + if (i >= 0) { + if (destination_cache[i].pmtu > 0) { + return destination_cache[i].pmtu; + } + } + + if (netif != NULL) { + return netif_mtu6(netif); + } + + return 1280; /* Minimum MTU */ +} + +#if LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS +/** + * Provide the Neighbor discovery process with a hint that a + * destination is reachable. Called by tcp_receive when ACKs are + * received or sent (as per RFC). This is useful to avoid sending + * NS messages every 30 seconds. + * + * @param ip6addr the destination address which is know to be reachable + * by an upper layer protocol (TCP) + */ +void nd6_reachability_hint(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + s8_t i; + s16_t dst_idx; + + /* Find destination in cache. */ + if (ip6_addr_cmp(ip6addr, &(destination_cache[nd6_cached_destination_index].destination_addr))) { + dst_idx = nd6_cached_destination_index; + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.cachehit); + } else { + dst_idx = nd6_find_destination_cache_entry(ip6addr); + } + + if (dst_idx < 0) { + return; + } + + /* Find next hop neighbor in cache. */ + if (ip6_addr_cmp(&(destination_cache[dst_idx].next_hop_addr), &(neighbor_cache[nd6_cached_neighbor_index].next_hop_address))) { + i = nd6_cached_neighbor_index; + ND6_STATS_INC(nd6.cachehit); + } else { + i = nd6_find_neighbor_cache_entry(&(destination_cache[dst_idx].next_hop_addr)); + } + + if (i < 0) { + return; + } + + /* For safety: don't set as reachable if we don't have a LL address yet. Misuse protection. */ + if (neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_INCOMPLETE || neighbor_cache[i].state == ND6_NO_ENTRY) { + return; + } + + /* Set reachability state. */ + neighbor_cache[i].state = ND6_REACHABLE; + neighbor_cache[i].counter.reachable_time = reachable_time; +} +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS */ + +/** + * Remove all prefix, neighbor_cache and router entries of the specified netif. + * + * @param netif points to a network interface + */ +void nd6_cleanup_netif(struct netif *netif) +{ + u8_t i; + s8_t router_index; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES; i++) { + if (prefix_list[i].netif == netif) { + prefix_list[i].netif = NULL; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS; i++) { + if (neighbor_cache[i].netif == netif) { + for (router_index = 0; router_index < LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS; router_index++) { + if (default_router_list[router_index].neighbor_entry == &neighbor_cache[i]) { + default_router_list[router_index].neighbor_entry = NULL; + default_router_list[router_index].flags = 0; + } + } + + neighbor_cache[i].isrouter = 0; + nd6_free_neighbor_cache_entry(i); + } + } + + /* Clear the destination cache, since many entries may now have become + * invalid for one of several reasons. As destination cache entries have no + * netif association, use a sledgehammer approach (this can be improved). */ + nd6_clear_destination_cache(); +} + +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD +/** + * The state of a local IPv6 address entry is about to change. If needed, join + * or leave the solicited-node multicast group for the address. + * + * @param netif The netif that owns the address. + * @param addr_idx The index of the address. + * @param new_state The new (IP6_ADDR_) state for the address. + */ +void nd6_adjust_mld_membership(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u8_t new_state) +{ + u8_t old_state, old_member, new_member; + + old_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx); + + /* Determine whether we were, and should be, a member of the solicited-node + * multicast group for this address. For tentative addresses, the group is + * not joined until the address enters the TENTATIVE_1 (or VALID) state. */ + old_member = (old_state != IP6_ADDR_INVALID && old_state != IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED && old_state != IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); + new_member = (new_state != IP6_ADDR_INVALID && new_state != IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED && new_state != IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); + + if (old_member != new_member) { + ip6_addr_set_solicitednode(&multicast_address, netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx)->addr[3]); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&multicast_address, IP6_MULTICAST, netif); + + if (new_member) { + mld6_joingroup_netif(netif, &multicast_address); + } else { + mld6_leavegroup_netif(netif, &multicast_address); + } + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + +/** Netif was added, set up, or reconnected (link up) */ +void nd6_restart_netif(struct netif *netif) +{ +#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT + /* Send Router Solicitation messages (see RFC 4861, ch. 6.3.7). */ + netif->rs_count = LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/mem.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/mem.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/mem.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/mem.c index a1885a7e..aa96dd32 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/mem.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/mem.c @@ -1,1053 +1,1053 @@ -/** - * @file - * Dynamic memory manager - * - * This is a lightweight replacement for the standard C library malloc(). - * - * If you want to use the standard C library malloc() instead, define - * MEM_LIBC_MALLOC to 1 in your lwipopts.h - * - * To let mem_malloc() use pools (prevents fragmentation and is much faster than - * a heap but might waste some memory), define MEM_USE_POOLS to 1, define - * MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS to 1 and create a file "lwippools.h" that includes a list - * of pools like this (more pools can be added between _START and _END): - * - * Define three pools with sizes 256, 512, and 1512 bytes - * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START - * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(20, 256) - * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(10, 512) - * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(5, 1512) - * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#include - -#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC -#include /* for malloc()/free() */ -#endif - -/* This is overridable for tests only... */ -#ifndef LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE -#define LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE(msg) LWIP_ASSERT(msg, 0) -#endif - -#define MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(x) SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(MEM_STATS_INC(x)) -#define MEM_STATS_INC_USED_LOCKED(x, y) SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(MEM_STATS_INC_USED(x, y)) -#define MEM_STATS_DEC_USED_LOCKED(x, y) SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(x, y)) - -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK -#define MEM_SANITY_OFFSET MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED -#define MEM_SANITY_OVERHEAD (MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED) -#else -#define MEM_SANITY_OFFSET 0 -#define MEM_SANITY_OVERHEAD 0 -#endif - -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -/** - * Check if a mep element was victim of an overflow or underflow - * (e.g. the restricted area after/before it has been altered) - * - * @param p the mem element to check - * @param size allocated size of the element - * @param descr1 description of the element source shown on error - * @param descr2 description of the element source shown on error - */ -void mem_overflow_check_raw(void *p, size_t size, const char *descr1, const char *descr2) -{ -#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED || MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED - u16_t k; - u8_t *m; - -#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 - m = (u8_t *)p + size; - - for (k = 0; k < MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED; k++) { - if (m[k] != 0xcd) { - char errstr[128]; - snprintf(errstr, sizeof(errstr), "detected mem overflow in %s%s", descr1, descr2); - LWIP_ASSERT(errstr, 0); - } - } - -#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 */ - -#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 - m = (u8_t *)p - MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED; - - for (k = 0; k < MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED; k++) { - if (m[k] != 0xcd) { - char errstr[128]; - snprintf(errstr, sizeof(errstr), "detected mem underflow in %s%s", descr1, descr2); - LWIP_ASSERT(errstr, 0); - } - } - -#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 */ -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(desc); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(descr); -#endif -} - -/** - * Initialize the restricted area of a mem element. - */ -void mem_overflow_init_raw(void *p, size_t size) -{ -#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 || MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 - u8_t *m; -#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 - m = (u8_t *)p - MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED; - memset(m, 0xcd, MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED); -#endif -#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 - m = (u8_t *)p + size; - memset(m, 0xcd, MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED); -#endif -#else /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 || MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(desc); -#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 || MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 */ -} -#endif /* MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - -#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC || MEM_USE_POOLS - -/** mem_init is not used when using pools instead of a heap or using - * C library malloc(). - */ -void mem_init(void) -{ -} - -/** mem_trim is not used when using pools instead of a heap or using - * C library malloc(): we can't free part of a pool element and the stack - * support mem_trim() to return a different pointer - */ -void *mem_trim(void *mem, mem_size_t size) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(size); - return mem; -} -#endif /* MEM_LIBC_MALLOC || MEM_USE_POOLS */ - -#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC -/* lwIP heap implemented using C library malloc() */ - -/* in case C library malloc() needs extra protection, - * allow these defines to be overridden. - */ -#ifndef mem_clib_free -#define mem_clib_free free -#endif -#ifndef mem_clib_malloc -#define mem_clib_malloc malloc -#endif -#ifndef mem_clib_calloc -#define mem_clib_calloc calloc -#endif - -#if LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS -#define MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(mem_size_t)) -#else -#define MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE 0 -#endif - -/** - * Allocate a block of memory with a minimum of 'size' bytes. - * - * @param size is the minimum size of the requested block in bytes. - * @return pointer to allocated memory or NULL if no free memory was found. - * - * Note that the returned value must always be aligned (as defined by MEM_ALIGNMENT). - */ -void *mem_malloc(mem_size_t size) -{ - void *ret = mem_clib_malloc(size + MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE); - - if (ret == NULL) { - MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(err); - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("malloc() must return aligned memory", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(ret) == ret); -#if LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS - *(mem_size_t *)ret = size; - ret = (u8_t *)ret + MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE; - MEM_STATS_INC_USED_LOCKED(used, size); -#endif - } - - return ret; -} - -/** Put memory back on the heap - * - * @param rmem is the pointer as returned by a previous call to mem_malloc() - */ -void mem_free(void *rmem) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("rmem != NULL", (rmem != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("rmem == MEM_ALIGN(rmem)", (rmem == LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(rmem))); -#if LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS - rmem = (u8_t *)rmem - MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE; - MEM_STATS_DEC_USED_LOCKED(used, *(mem_size_t *)rmem); -#endif - mem_clib_free(rmem); -} - -#elif MEM_USE_POOLS - -/* lwIP heap implemented with different sized pools */ - -/** - * Allocate memory: determine the smallest pool that is big enough - * to contain an element of 'size' and get an element from that pool. - * - * @param size the size in bytes of the memory needed - * @return a pointer to the allocated memory or NULL if the pool is empty - */ -void *mem_malloc(mem_size_t size) -{ - void *ret; - struct memp_malloc_helper *element = NULL; - memp_t poolnr; - mem_size_t required_size = size + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp_malloc_helper)); - - for (poolnr = MEMP_POOL_FIRST; poolnr <= MEMP_POOL_LAST; poolnr = (memp_t)(poolnr + 1)) { - /* is this pool big enough to hold an element of the required size - plus a struct memp_malloc_helper that saves the pool this element came from? */ - if (required_size <= memp_pools[poolnr]->size) { - element = (struct memp_malloc_helper *)memp_malloc(poolnr); - - if (element == NULL) { - /* No need to DEBUGF or ASSERT: This error is already taken care of in memp.c */ -#if MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL - /** Try a bigger pool if this one is empty! */ - if (poolnr < MEMP_POOL_LAST) { - continue; - } - -#endif /* MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL */ - MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(err); - return NULL; - } - - break; - } - } - - if (poolnr > MEMP_POOL_LAST) { - LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc(): no pool is that big!", 0); - MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(err); - return NULL; - } - - /* save the pool number this element came from */ - element->poolnr = poolnr; - /* and return a pointer to the memory directly after the struct memp_malloc_helper */ - ret = (u8_t *)element + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp_malloc_helper)); - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || (LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS) - /* truncating to u16_t is safe because struct memp_desc::size is u16_t */ - element->size = (u16_t)size; - MEM_STATS_INC_USED_LOCKED(used, element->size); -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || (LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS) */ -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - /* initialize unused memory (diff between requested size and selected pool's size) */ - memset((u8_t *)ret + size, 0xcd, memp_pools[poolnr]->size - size); -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - return ret; -} - -/** - * Free memory previously allocated by mem_malloc. Loads the pool number - * and calls memp_free with that pool number to put the element back into - * its pool - * - * @param rmem the memory element to free - */ -void mem_free(void *rmem) -{ - struct memp_malloc_helper *hmem; - - LWIP_ASSERT("rmem != NULL", (rmem != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("rmem == MEM_ALIGN(rmem)", (rmem == LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(rmem))); - - /* get the original struct memp_malloc_helper */ - /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ - hmem = (struct memp_malloc_helper *)(void *)((u8_t *)rmem - LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp_malloc_helper))); - - LWIP_ASSERT("hmem != NULL", (hmem != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("hmem == MEM_ALIGN(hmem)", (hmem == LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(hmem))); - LWIP_ASSERT("hmem->poolnr < MEMP_MAX", (hmem->poolnr < MEMP_MAX)); - - MEM_STATS_DEC_USED_LOCKED(used, hmem->size); -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - { - u16_t i; - LWIP_ASSERT("MEM_USE_POOLS: invalid chunk size", - hmem->size <= memp_pools[hmem->poolnr]->size); - - /* check that unused memory remained untouched (diff between requested size and selected pool's size) */ - for (i = hmem->size; i < memp_pools[hmem->poolnr]->size; i++) { - u8_t data = *((u8_t *)rmem + i); - LWIP_ASSERT("MEM_USE_POOLS: mem overflow detected", data == 0xcd); - } - } -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - - /* and put it in the pool we saved earlier */ - memp_free(hmem->poolnr, hmem); -} - -#else /* MEM_USE_POOLS */ -/* lwIP replacement for your libc malloc() */ - -/** - * The heap is made up as a list of structs of this type. - * This does not have to be aligned since for getting its size, - * we only use the macro SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM, which automatically aligns. - */ -struct mem { - /** index (-> ram[next]) of the next struct */ - mem_size_t next; - /** index (-> ram[prev]) of the previous struct */ - mem_size_t prev; - /** 1: this area is used; 0: this area is unused */ - u8_t used; -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK - /** this keeps track of the user allocation size for guard checks */ - mem_size_t user_size; -#endif -}; - -/** All allocated blocks will be MIN_SIZE bytes big, at least! - * MIN_SIZE can be overridden to suit your needs. Smaller values save space, - * larger values could prevent too small blocks to fragment the RAM too much. */ -#ifndef MIN_SIZE -#define MIN_SIZE 12 -#endif /* MIN_SIZE */ -/* some alignment macros: we define them here for better source code layout */ -#define MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(MIN_SIZE) -#define SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct mem)) -#define MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(MEM_SIZE) - -/** If you want to relocate the heap to external memory, simply define - * LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER as a void-pointer to that location. - * If so, make sure the memory at that location is big enough (see below on - * how that space is calculated). */ -#ifndef LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER -/** the heap. we need one struct mem at the end and some room for alignment */ -LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(ram_heap, MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED + (2U * SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM)); -#define LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER ram_heap -#endif /* LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER */ - -/** pointer to the heap (ram_heap): for alignment, ram is now a pointer instead of an array */ -static u8_t *ram; -/** the last entry, always unused! */ -static struct mem *ram_end; - -/** concurrent access protection */ -#if !NO_SYS -static sys_mutex_t mem_mutex; -#endif - -#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT - -static volatile u8_t mem_free_count; - -/* Allow mem_free from other (e.g. interrupt) context */ -#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_DECL_PROTECT() SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev_free) -#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_PROTECT() SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev_free) -#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT() SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev_free) -#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_DECL_PROTECT() SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev_alloc) -#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT() SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev_alloc) -#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT() SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev_alloc) -#define LWIP_MEM_LFREE_VOLATILE volatile - -#else /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - -/* Protect the heap only by using a mutex */ -#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_DECL_PROTECT() -#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_PROTECT() sys_mutex_lock(&mem_mutex) -#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT() sys_mutex_unlock(&mem_mutex) -/* mem_malloc is protected using mutex AND LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT */ -#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_DECL_PROTECT() -#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT() -#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT() -#define LWIP_MEM_LFREE_VOLATILE - -#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - -/** pointer to the lowest free block, this is used for faster search */ -static struct mem *LWIP_MEM_LFREE_VOLATILE lfree; - -#if MEM_SANITY_CHECK -static void mem_sanity(void); -#define MEM_SANITY() mem_sanity() -#else -#define MEM_SANITY() -#endif - -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK -static void mem_overflow_init_element(struct mem *mem, mem_size_t user_size) -{ - void *p = (u8_t *)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET; - mem->user_size = user_size; - mem_overflow_init_raw(p, user_size); -} - -static void mem_overflow_check_element(struct mem *mem) -{ - void *p = (u8_t *)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET; - mem_overflow_check_raw(p, mem->user_size, "heap", ""); -} -#else /* MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ -#define mem_overflow_init_element(mem, size) -#define mem_overflow_check_element(mem) -#endif /* MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - -static struct mem *ptr_to_mem(mem_size_t ptr) -{ - return (struct mem *)(void *)&ram[ptr]; -} - -static mem_size_t mem_to_ptr(void *mem) -{ - return (mem_size_t)((u8_t *)mem - ram); -} - -/** - * "Plug holes" by combining adjacent empty struct mems. - * After this function is through, there should not exist - * one empty struct mem pointing to another empty struct mem. - * - * @param mem this points to a struct mem which just has been freed - * @internal this function is only called by mem_free() and mem_trim() - * - * This assumes access to the heap is protected by the calling function - * already. - */ -static void plug_holes(struct mem *mem) -{ - struct mem *nmem; - struct mem *pmem; - - LWIP_ASSERT("plug_holes: mem >= ram", (u8_t *)mem >= ram); - LWIP_ASSERT("plug_holes: mem < ram_end", (u8_t *)mem < (u8_t *)ram_end); - LWIP_ASSERT("plug_holes: mem->used == 0", mem->used == 0); - - /* plug hole forward */ - LWIP_ASSERT("plug_holes: mem->next <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED", mem->next <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - - nmem = ptr_to_mem(mem->next); - - if (mem != nmem && nmem->used == 0 && (u8_t *)nmem != (u8_t *)ram_end) { - /* if mem->next is unused and not end of ram, combine mem and mem->next */ - if (lfree == nmem) { - lfree = mem; - } - - mem->next = nmem->next; - - if (nmem->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { - ptr_to_mem(nmem->next)->prev = mem_to_ptr(mem); - } - } - - /* plug hole backward */ - pmem = ptr_to_mem(mem->prev); - - if (pmem != mem && pmem->used == 0) { - /* if mem->prev is unused, combine mem and mem->prev */ - if (lfree == mem) { - lfree = pmem; - } - - pmem->next = mem->next; - - if (mem->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { - ptr_to_mem(mem->next)->prev = mem_to_ptr(pmem); - } - } -} - -/** - * Zero the heap and initialize start, end and lowest-free - */ -void mem_init(void) -{ - struct mem *mem; - - LWIP_ASSERT("Sanity check alignment", - (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM & (MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1)) == 0); - - /* align the heap */ - ram = (u8_t *)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER); - /* initialize the start of the heap */ - mem = (struct mem *)(void *)ram; - mem->next = MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED; - mem->prev = 0; - mem->used = 0; - /* initialize the end of the heap */ - ram_end = ptr_to_mem(MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - ram_end->used = 1; - ram_end->next = MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED; - ram_end->prev = MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED; - MEM_SANITY(); - - /* initialize the lowest-free pointer to the start of the heap */ - lfree = (struct mem *)(void *)ram; - - MEM_STATS_AVAIL(avail, MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - - if (sys_mutex_new(&mem_mutex) != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_ASSERT("failed to create mem_mutex", 0); - } -} - -/* Check if a struct mem is correctly linked. - * If not, double-free is a possible reason. - */ -static int mem_link_valid(struct mem *mem) -{ - struct mem *nmem, *pmem; - mem_size_t rmem_idx; - rmem_idx = mem_to_ptr(mem); - nmem = ptr_to_mem(mem->next); - pmem = ptr_to_mem(mem->prev); - - if ((mem->next > MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) || (mem->prev > MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) || - ((mem->prev != rmem_idx) && (pmem->next != rmem_idx)) || - ((nmem != ram_end) && (nmem->prev != rmem_idx))) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -#if MEM_SANITY_CHECK -static void mem_sanity(void) -{ - struct mem *mem; - u8_t last_used; - - /* begin with first element here */ - mem = (struct mem *)ram; - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element used valid", (mem->used == 0) || (mem->used == 1)); - last_used = mem->used; - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element prev ptr valid", mem->prev == 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr valid", mem->next <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr aligned", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(ptr_to_mem(mem->next) == ptr_to_mem(mem->next))); - - /* check all elements before the end of the heap */ - for (mem = ptr_to_mem(mem->next); - ((u8_t *)mem > ram) && (mem < ram_end); - mem = ptr_to_mem(mem->next)) { - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element aligned", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(mem) == mem); - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element prev ptr valid", mem->prev <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr valid", mem->next <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element prev ptr aligned", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(ptr_to_mem(mem->prev) == ptr_to_mem(mem->prev))); - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr aligned", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(ptr_to_mem(mem->next) == ptr_to_mem(mem->next))); - - if (last_used == 0) { - /* 2 unused elements in a row? */ - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element unused?", mem->used == 1); - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element unused member", (mem->used == 0) || (mem->used == 1)); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element link valid", mem_link_valid(mem)); - - /* used/unused altering */ - last_used = mem->used; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("heap end ptr sanity", mem == ptr_to_mem(MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED)); - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element used valid", mem->used == 1); - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element prev ptr valid", mem->prev == MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr valid", mem->next == MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); -} -#endif /* MEM_SANITY_CHECK */ - -/** - * Put a struct mem back on the heap - * - * @param rmem is the data portion of a struct mem as returned by a previous - * call to mem_malloc() - */ -void mem_free(void *rmem) -{ - struct mem *mem; - LWIP_MEM_FREE_DECL_PROTECT(); - - if (rmem == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("mem_free(p == NULL) was called.\n")); - return; - } - - if ((((mem_ptr_t)rmem) & (MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1)) != 0) { - LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE("mem_free: sanity check alignment"); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_free: sanity check alignment\n")); - /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ - MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); - return; - } - - /* Get the corresponding struct mem: */ - /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ - mem = (struct mem *)(void *)((u8_t *)rmem - (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET)); - - if ((u8_t *)mem < ram || (u8_t *)rmem + MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED > (u8_t *)ram_end) { - LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE("mem_free: illegal memory"); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_free: illegal memory\n")); - /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ - MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); - return; - } - -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK - mem_overflow_check_element(mem); -#endif - /* protect the heap from concurrent access */ - LWIP_MEM_FREE_PROTECT(); - - /* mem has to be in a used state */ - if (!mem->used) { - LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE("mem_free: illegal memory: double free"); - LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT(); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_free: illegal memory: double free?\n")); - /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ - MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); - return; - } - - if (!mem_link_valid(mem)) { - LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE("mem_free: illegal memory: non-linked: double free"); - LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT(); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_free: illegal memory: non-linked: double free?\n")); - /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ - MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); - return; - } - - /* mem is now unused. */ - mem->used = 0; - - if (mem < lfree) { - /* the newly freed struct is now the lowest */ - lfree = mem; - } - - MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(used, mem->next - (mem_size_t)(((u8_t *)mem - ram))); - - /* finally, see if prev or next are free also */ - plug_holes(mem); - MEM_SANITY(); -#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT - mem_free_count = 1; -#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT(); -} - -/** - * Shrink memory returned by mem_malloc(). - * - * @param rmem pointer to memory allocated by mem_malloc the is to be shrinked - * @param new_size required size after shrinking (needs to be smaller than or - * equal to the previous size) - * @return for compatibility reasons: is always == rmem, at the moment - * or NULL if newsize is > old size, in which case rmem is NOT touched - * or freed! - */ -void *mem_trim(void *rmem, mem_size_t new_size) -{ - mem_size_t size, newsize; - mem_size_t ptr, ptr2; - struct mem *mem, *mem2; - /* use the FREE_PROTECT here: it protects with sem OR SYS_ARCH_PROTECT */ - LWIP_MEM_FREE_DECL_PROTECT(); - - /* Expand the size of the allocated memory region so that we can - adjust for alignment. */ - newsize = (mem_size_t)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(new_size); - - if (newsize < MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED) { - /* every data block must be at least MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED long */ - newsize = MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED; - } - -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK - newsize += MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED; -#endif - - if ((newsize > MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) || (newsize < new_size)) { - return NULL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("mem_trim: legal memory", (u8_t *)rmem >= (u8_t *)ram && - (u8_t *)rmem < (u8_t *)ram_end); - - if ((u8_t *)rmem < (u8_t *)ram || (u8_t *)rmem >= (u8_t *)ram_end) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_trim: illegal memory\n")); - /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ - MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); - return rmem; - } - - /* Get the corresponding struct mem ... */ - /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ - mem = (struct mem *)(void *)((u8_t *)rmem - (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET)); -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK - mem_overflow_check_element(mem); -#endif - /* ... and its offset pointer */ - ptr = mem_to_ptr(mem); - - size = (mem_size_t)((mem_size_t)(mem->next - ptr) - (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OVERHEAD)); - LWIP_ASSERT("mem_trim can only shrink memory", newsize <= size); - - if (newsize > size) { - /* not supported */ - return NULL; - } - - if (newsize == size) { - /* No change in size, simply return */ - return rmem; - } - - /* protect the heap from concurrent access */ - LWIP_MEM_FREE_PROTECT(); - - mem2 = ptr_to_mem(mem->next); - - if (mem2->used == 0) { - /* The next struct is unused, we can simply move it at little */ - mem_size_t next; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid next ptr", mem->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - /* remember the old next pointer */ - next = mem2->next; - /* create new struct mem which is moved directly after the shrinked mem */ - ptr2 = (mem_size_t)(ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + newsize); - - if (lfree == mem2) { - lfree = ptr_to_mem(ptr2); - } - - mem2 = ptr_to_mem(ptr2); - mem2->used = 0; - /* restore the next pointer */ - mem2->next = next; - /* link it back to mem */ - mem2->prev = ptr; - /* link mem to it */ - mem->next = ptr2; - - /* last thing to restore linked list: as we have moved mem2, - * let 'mem2->next->prev' point to mem2 again. but only if mem2->next is not - * the end of the heap */ - if (mem2->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { - ptr_to_mem(mem2->next)->prev = ptr2; - } - - MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(used, (size - newsize)); - /* no need to plug holes, we've already done that */ - } else if (newsize + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED <= size) { - /* Next struct is used but there's room for another struct mem with - * at least MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED of data. - * Old size ('size') must be big enough to contain at least 'newsize' plus a struct mem - * ('SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM') with some data ('MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED'). - * @todo we could leave out MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED. We would create an empty - * region that couldn't hold data, but when mem->next gets freed, - * the 2 regions would be combined, resulting in more free memory */ - ptr2 = (mem_size_t)(ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + newsize); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid next ptr", mem->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - mem2 = ptr_to_mem(ptr2); - - if (mem2 < lfree) { - lfree = mem2; - } - - mem2->used = 0; - mem2->next = mem->next; - mem2->prev = ptr; - mem->next = ptr2; - - if (mem2->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { - ptr_to_mem(mem2->next)->prev = ptr2; - } - - MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(used, (size - newsize)); - /* the original mem->next is used, so no need to plug holes! */ - } - - /* else { - next struct mem is used but size between mem and mem2 is not big enough - to create another struct mem - -> don't do anyhting. - -> the remaining space stays unused since it is too small - } */ -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK - mem_overflow_init_element(mem, new_size); -#endif - MEM_SANITY(); -#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT - mem_free_count = 1; -#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT(); - return rmem; -} - -/** - * Allocate a block of memory with a minimum of 'size' bytes. - * - * @param size_in is the minimum size of the requested block in bytes. - * @return pointer to allocated memory or NULL if no free memory was found. - * - * Note that the returned value will always be aligned (as defined by MEM_ALIGNMENT). - */ -void *mem_malloc(mem_size_t size_in) -{ - mem_size_t ptr, ptr2, size; - struct mem *mem, *mem2; -#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT - u8_t local_mem_free_count = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_DECL_PROTECT(); - - if (size_in == 0) { - return NULL; - } - - /* Expand the size of the allocated memory region so that we can - adjust for alignment. */ - size = (mem_size_t)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(size_in); - - if (size < MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED) { - /* every data block must be at least MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED long */ - size = MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED; - } - -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK - size += MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED; -#endif - - if ((size > MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) || (size < size_in)) { - return NULL; - } - - /* protect the heap from concurrent access */ - sys_mutex_lock(&mem_mutex); - LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT(); -#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT - - /* run as long as a mem_free disturbed mem_malloc or mem_trim */ - do { - local_mem_free_count = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - - /* Scan through the heap searching for a free block that is big enough, - * beginning with the lowest free block. - */ - for (ptr = mem_to_ptr(lfree); ptr < MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED - size; - ptr = ptr_to_mem(ptr)->next) { - mem = ptr_to_mem(ptr); -#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT - mem_free_count = 0; - LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT(); - /* allow mem_free or mem_trim to run */ - LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT(); - - if (mem_free_count != 0) { - /* If mem_free or mem_trim have run, we have to restart since they - could have altered our current struct mem. */ - local_mem_free_count = 1; - break; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - - if ((!mem->used) && - (mem->next - (ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM)) >= size) { - /* mem is not used and at least perfect fit is possible: - * mem->next - (ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM) gives us the 'user data size' of mem */ - - if (mem->next - (ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM) >= (size + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED)) { - /* (in addition to the above, we test if another struct mem (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM) containing - * at least MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED of data also fits in the 'user data space' of 'mem') - * -> split large block, create empty remainder, - * remainder must be large enough to contain MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED data: if - * mem->next - (ptr + (2*SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM)) == size, - * struct mem would fit in but no data between mem2 and mem2->next - * @todo we could leave out MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED. We would create an empty - * region that couldn't hold data, but when mem->next gets freed, - * the 2 regions would be combined, resulting in more free memory - */ - ptr2 = (mem_size_t)(ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + size); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid next ptr", ptr2 != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); - /* create mem2 struct */ - mem2 = ptr_to_mem(ptr2); - mem2->used = 0; - mem2->next = mem->next; - mem2->prev = ptr; - /* and insert it between mem and mem->next */ - mem->next = ptr2; - mem->used = 1; - - if (mem2->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { - ptr_to_mem(mem2->next)->prev = ptr2; - } - - MEM_STATS_INC_USED(used, (size + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM)); - } else { - /* (a mem2 struct does no fit into the user data space of mem and mem->next will always - * be used at this point: if not we have 2 unused structs in a row, plug_holes should have - * take care of this). - * -> near fit or exact fit: do not split, no mem2 creation - * also can't move mem->next directly behind mem, since mem->next - * will always be used at this point! - */ - mem->used = 1; - MEM_STATS_INC_USED(used, mem->next - mem_to_ptr(mem)); - } - -#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT - mem_malloc_adjust_lfree: -#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - - if (mem == lfree) { - struct mem *cur = lfree; - - /* Find next free block after mem and update lowest free pointer */ - while (cur->used && cur != ram_end) { -#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT - mem_free_count = 0; - LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT(); - /* prevent high interrupt latency... */ - LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT(); - - if (mem_free_count != 0) { - /* If mem_free or mem_trim have run, we have to restart since they - could have altered our current struct mem or lfree. */ - goto mem_malloc_adjust_lfree; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - cur = ptr_to_mem(cur->next); - } - - lfree = cur; - LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc: !lfree->used", ((lfree == ram_end) || (!lfree->used))); - } - - LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT(); - sys_mutex_unlock(&mem_mutex); - LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc: allocated memory not above ram_end.", - (mem_ptr_t)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + size <= (mem_ptr_t)ram_end); - LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc: allocated memory properly aligned.", - ((mem_ptr_t)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM) % MEM_ALIGNMENT == 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc: sanity check alignment", - (((mem_ptr_t)mem) & (MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1)) == 0); - -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK - mem_overflow_init_element(mem, size_in); -#endif - MEM_SANITY(); - return (u8_t *)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET; - } - } - -#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT - /* if we got interrupted by a mem_free, try again */ - } while (local_mem_free_count != 0); - -#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ - MEM_STATS_INC(err); - LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT(); - sys_mutex_unlock(&mem_mutex); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("mem_malloc: could not allocate %" S16_F " bytes\n", (s16_t)size)); - return NULL; -} - -#endif /* MEM_USE_POOLS */ - -#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC && (!LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS) -void *mem_calloc(mem_size_t count, mem_size_t size) -{ - return mem_clib_calloc(count, size); -} - -#else /* MEM_LIBC_MALLOC && (!LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS) */ -/** - * Contiguously allocates enough space for count objects that are size bytes - * of memory each and returns a pointer to the allocated memory. - * - * The allocated memory is filled with bytes of value zero. - * - * @param count number of objects to allocate - * @param size size of the objects to allocate - * @return pointer to allocated memory / NULL pointer if there is an error - */ -void *mem_calloc(mem_size_t count, mem_size_t size) -{ - void *p; - size_t alloc_size = (size_t)count * (size_t)size; - - if ((size_t)(mem_size_t)alloc_size != alloc_size) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("mem_calloc: could not allocate %" SZT_F " bytes\n", alloc_size)); - return NULL; - } - - /* allocate 'count' objects of size 'size' */ - p = mem_malloc((mem_size_t)alloc_size); - - if (p) { - /* zero the memory */ - memset(p, 0, alloc_size); - } - - return p; -} -#endif /* MEM_LIBC_MALLOC && (!LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS) */ +/** + * @file + * Dynamic memory manager + * + * This is a lightweight replacement for the standard C library malloc(). + * + * If you want to use the standard C library malloc() instead, define + * MEM_LIBC_MALLOC to 1 in your lwipopts.h + * + * To let mem_malloc() use pools (prevents fragmentation and is much faster than + * a heap but might waste some memory), define MEM_USE_POOLS to 1, define + * MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS to 1 and create a file "lwippools.h" that includes a list + * of pools like this (more pools can be added between _START and _END): + * + * Define three pools with sizes 256, 512, and 1512 bytes + * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START + * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(20, 256) + * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(10, 512) + * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(5, 1512) + * LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#include + +#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC +#include /* for malloc()/free() */ +#endif + +/* This is overridable for tests only... */ +#ifndef LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE +#define LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE(msg) LWIP_ASSERT(msg, 0) +#endif + +#define MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(x) SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(MEM_STATS_INC(x)) +#define MEM_STATS_INC_USED_LOCKED(x, y) SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(MEM_STATS_INC_USED(x, y)) +#define MEM_STATS_DEC_USED_LOCKED(x, y) SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(x, y)) + +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK +#define MEM_SANITY_OFFSET MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED +#define MEM_SANITY_OVERHEAD (MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED) +#else +#define MEM_SANITY_OFFSET 0 +#define MEM_SANITY_OVERHEAD 0 +#endif + +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +/** + * Check if a mep element was victim of an overflow or underflow + * (e.g. the restricted area after/before it has been altered) + * + * @param p the mem element to check + * @param size allocated size of the element + * @param descr1 description of the element source shown on error + * @param descr2 description of the element source shown on error + */ +void mem_overflow_check_raw(void *p, size_t size, const char *descr1, const char *descr2) +{ +#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED || MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED + u16_t k; + u8_t *m; + +#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 + m = (u8_t *)p + size; + + for (k = 0; k < MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED; k++) { + if (m[k] != 0xcd) { + char errstr[128]; + snprintf(errstr, sizeof(errstr), "detected mem overflow in %s%s", descr1, descr2); + LWIP_ASSERT(errstr, 0); + } + } + +#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 */ + +#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 + m = (u8_t *)p - MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED; + + for (k = 0; k < MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED; k++) { + if (m[k] != 0xcd) { + char errstr[128]; + snprintf(errstr, sizeof(errstr), "detected mem underflow in %s%s", descr1, descr2); + LWIP_ASSERT(errstr, 0); + } + } + +#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 */ +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(desc); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(descr); +#endif +} + +/** + * Initialize the restricted area of a mem element. + */ +void mem_overflow_init_raw(void *p, size_t size) +{ +#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 || MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 + u8_t *m; +#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 + m = (u8_t *)p - MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED; + memset(m, 0xcd, MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED); +#endif +#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 + m = (u8_t *)p + size; + memset(m, 0xcd, MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED); +#endif +#else /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 || MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(desc); +#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED > 0 || MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED > 0 */ +} +#endif /* MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + +#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC || MEM_USE_POOLS + +/** mem_init is not used when using pools instead of a heap or using + * C library malloc(). + */ +void mem_init(void) +{ +} + +/** mem_trim is not used when using pools instead of a heap or using + * C library malloc(): we can't free part of a pool element and the stack + * support mem_trim() to return a different pointer + */ +void *mem_trim(void *mem, mem_size_t size) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(size); + return mem; +} +#endif /* MEM_LIBC_MALLOC || MEM_USE_POOLS */ + +#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC +/* lwIP heap implemented using C library malloc() */ + +/* in case C library malloc() needs extra protection, + * allow these defines to be overridden. + */ +#ifndef mem_clib_free +#define mem_clib_free free +#endif +#ifndef mem_clib_malloc +#define mem_clib_malloc malloc +#endif +#ifndef mem_clib_calloc +#define mem_clib_calloc calloc +#endif + +#if LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS +#define MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(mem_size_t)) +#else +#define MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE 0 +#endif + +/** + * Allocate a block of memory with a minimum of 'size' bytes. + * + * @param size is the minimum size of the requested block in bytes. + * @return pointer to allocated memory or NULL if no free memory was found. + * + * Note that the returned value must always be aligned (as defined by MEM_ALIGNMENT). + */ +void *mem_malloc(mem_size_t size) +{ + void *ret = mem_clib_malloc(size + MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE); + + if (ret == NULL) { + MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(err); + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("malloc() must return aligned memory", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(ret) == ret); +#if LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS + *(mem_size_t *)ret = size; + ret = (u8_t *)ret + MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE; + MEM_STATS_INC_USED_LOCKED(used, size); +#endif + } + + return ret; +} + +/** Put memory back on the heap + * + * @param rmem is the pointer as returned by a previous call to mem_malloc() + */ +void mem_free(void *rmem) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("rmem != NULL", (rmem != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("rmem == MEM_ALIGN(rmem)", (rmem == LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(rmem))); +#if LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS + rmem = (u8_t *)rmem - MEM_LIBC_STATSHELPER_SIZE; + MEM_STATS_DEC_USED_LOCKED(used, *(mem_size_t *)rmem); +#endif + mem_clib_free(rmem); +} + +#elif MEM_USE_POOLS + +/* lwIP heap implemented with different sized pools */ + +/** + * Allocate memory: determine the smallest pool that is big enough + * to contain an element of 'size' and get an element from that pool. + * + * @param size the size in bytes of the memory needed + * @return a pointer to the allocated memory or NULL if the pool is empty + */ +void *mem_malloc(mem_size_t size) +{ + void *ret; + struct memp_malloc_helper *element = NULL; + memp_t poolnr; + mem_size_t required_size = size + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp_malloc_helper)); + + for (poolnr = MEMP_POOL_FIRST; poolnr <= MEMP_POOL_LAST; poolnr = (memp_t)(poolnr + 1)) { + /* is this pool big enough to hold an element of the required size + plus a struct memp_malloc_helper that saves the pool this element came from? */ + if (required_size <= memp_pools[poolnr]->size) { + element = (struct memp_malloc_helper *)memp_malloc(poolnr); + + if (element == NULL) { + /* No need to DEBUGF or ASSERT: This error is already taken care of in memp.c */ +#if MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL + /** Try a bigger pool if this one is empty! */ + if (poolnr < MEMP_POOL_LAST) { + continue; + } + +#endif /* MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL */ + MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(err); + return NULL; + } + + break; + } + } + + if (poolnr > MEMP_POOL_LAST) { + LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc(): no pool is that big!", 0); + MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(err); + return NULL; + } + + /* save the pool number this element came from */ + element->poolnr = poolnr; + /* and return a pointer to the memory directly after the struct memp_malloc_helper */ + ret = (u8_t *)element + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp_malloc_helper)); + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || (LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS) + /* truncating to u16_t is safe because struct memp_desc::size is u16_t */ + element->size = (u16_t)size; + MEM_STATS_INC_USED_LOCKED(used, element->size); +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || (LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS) */ +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + /* initialize unused memory (diff between requested size and selected pool's size) */ + memset((u8_t *)ret + size, 0xcd, memp_pools[poolnr]->size - size); +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + return ret; +} + +/** + * Free memory previously allocated by mem_malloc. Loads the pool number + * and calls memp_free with that pool number to put the element back into + * its pool + * + * @param rmem the memory element to free + */ +void mem_free(void *rmem) +{ + struct memp_malloc_helper *hmem; + + LWIP_ASSERT("rmem != NULL", (rmem != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("rmem == MEM_ALIGN(rmem)", (rmem == LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(rmem))); + + /* get the original struct memp_malloc_helper */ + /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ + hmem = (struct memp_malloc_helper *)(void *)((u8_t *)rmem - LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp_malloc_helper))); + + LWIP_ASSERT("hmem != NULL", (hmem != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("hmem == MEM_ALIGN(hmem)", (hmem == LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(hmem))); + LWIP_ASSERT("hmem->poolnr < MEMP_MAX", (hmem->poolnr < MEMP_MAX)); + + MEM_STATS_DEC_USED_LOCKED(used, hmem->size); +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + { + u16_t i; + LWIP_ASSERT("MEM_USE_POOLS: invalid chunk size", + hmem->size <= memp_pools[hmem->poolnr]->size); + + /* check that unused memory remained untouched (diff between requested size and selected pool's size) */ + for (i = hmem->size; i < memp_pools[hmem->poolnr]->size; i++) { + u8_t data = *((u8_t *)rmem + i); + LWIP_ASSERT("MEM_USE_POOLS: mem overflow detected", data == 0xcd); + } + } +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + + /* and put it in the pool we saved earlier */ + memp_free(hmem->poolnr, hmem); +} + +#else /* MEM_USE_POOLS */ +/* lwIP replacement for your libc malloc() */ + +/** + * The heap is made up as a list of structs of this type. + * This does not have to be aligned since for getting its size, + * we only use the macro SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM, which automatically aligns. + */ +struct mem { + /** index (-> ram[next]) of the next struct */ + mem_size_t next; + /** index (-> ram[prev]) of the previous struct */ + mem_size_t prev; + /** 1: this area is used; 0: this area is unused */ + u8_t used; +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK + /** this keeps track of the user allocation size for guard checks */ + mem_size_t user_size; +#endif +}; + +/** All allocated blocks will be MIN_SIZE bytes big, at least! + * MIN_SIZE can be overridden to suit your needs. Smaller values save space, + * larger values could prevent too small blocks to fragment the RAM too much. */ +#ifndef MIN_SIZE +#define MIN_SIZE 12 +#endif /* MIN_SIZE */ +/* some alignment macros: we define them here for better source code layout */ +#define MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(MIN_SIZE) +#define SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct mem)) +#define MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(MEM_SIZE) + +/** If you want to relocate the heap to external memory, simply define + * LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER as a void-pointer to that location. + * If so, make sure the memory at that location is big enough (see below on + * how that space is calculated). */ +#ifndef LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER +/** the heap. we need one struct mem at the end and some room for alignment */ +LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(ram_heap, MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED + (2U * SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM)); +#define LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER ram_heap +#endif /* LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER */ + +/** pointer to the heap (ram_heap): for alignment, ram is now a pointer instead of an array */ +static u8_t *ram; +/** the last entry, always unused! */ +static struct mem *ram_end; + +/** concurrent access protection */ +#if !NO_SYS +static sys_mutex_t mem_mutex; +#endif + +#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT + +static volatile u8_t mem_free_count; + +/* Allow mem_free from other (e.g. interrupt) context */ +#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_DECL_PROTECT() SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev_free) +#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_PROTECT() SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev_free) +#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT() SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev_free) +#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_DECL_PROTECT() SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev_alloc) +#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT() SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev_alloc) +#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT() SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev_alloc) +#define LWIP_MEM_LFREE_VOLATILE volatile + +#else /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + +/* Protect the heap only by using a mutex */ +#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_DECL_PROTECT() +#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_PROTECT() sys_mutex_lock(&mem_mutex) +#define LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT() sys_mutex_unlock(&mem_mutex) +/* mem_malloc is protected using mutex AND LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT */ +#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_DECL_PROTECT() +#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT() +#define LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT() +#define LWIP_MEM_LFREE_VOLATILE + +#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + +/** pointer to the lowest free block, this is used for faster search */ +static struct mem *LWIP_MEM_LFREE_VOLATILE lfree; + +#if MEM_SANITY_CHECK +static void mem_sanity(void); +#define MEM_SANITY() mem_sanity() +#else +#define MEM_SANITY() +#endif + +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK +static void mem_overflow_init_element(struct mem *mem, mem_size_t user_size) +{ + void *p = (u8_t *)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET; + mem->user_size = user_size; + mem_overflow_init_raw(p, user_size); +} + +static void mem_overflow_check_element(struct mem *mem) +{ + void *p = (u8_t *)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET; + mem_overflow_check_raw(p, mem->user_size, "heap", ""); +} +#else /* MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ +#define mem_overflow_init_element(mem, size) +#define mem_overflow_check_element(mem) +#endif /* MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + +static struct mem *ptr_to_mem(mem_size_t ptr) +{ + return (struct mem *)(void *)&ram[ptr]; +} + +static mem_size_t mem_to_ptr(void *mem) +{ + return (mem_size_t)((u8_t *)mem - ram); +} + +/** + * "Plug holes" by combining adjacent empty struct mems. + * After this function is through, there should not exist + * one empty struct mem pointing to another empty struct mem. + * + * @param mem this points to a struct mem which just has been freed + * @internal this function is only called by mem_free() and mem_trim() + * + * This assumes access to the heap is protected by the calling function + * already. + */ +static void plug_holes(struct mem *mem) +{ + struct mem *nmem; + struct mem *pmem; + + LWIP_ASSERT("plug_holes: mem >= ram", (u8_t *)mem >= ram); + LWIP_ASSERT("plug_holes: mem < ram_end", (u8_t *)mem < (u8_t *)ram_end); + LWIP_ASSERT("plug_holes: mem->used == 0", mem->used == 0); + + /* plug hole forward */ + LWIP_ASSERT("plug_holes: mem->next <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED", mem->next <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + + nmem = ptr_to_mem(mem->next); + + if (mem != nmem && nmem->used == 0 && (u8_t *)nmem != (u8_t *)ram_end) { + /* if mem->next is unused and not end of ram, combine mem and mem->next */ + if (lfree == nmem) { + lfree = mem; + } + + mem->next = nmem->next; + + if (nmem->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { + ptr_to_mem(nmem->next)->prev = mem_to_ptr(mem); + } + } + + /* plug hole backward */ + pmem = ptr_to_mem(mem->prev); + + if (pmem != mem && pmem->used == 0) { + /* if mem->prev is unused, combine mem and mem->prev */ + if (lfree == mem) { + lfree = pmem; + } + + pmem->next = mem->next; + + if (mem->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { + ptr_to_mem(mem->next)->prev = mem_to_ptr(pmem); + } + } +} + +/** + * Zero the heap and initialize start, end and lowest-free + */ +void mem_init(void) +{ + struct mem *mem; + + LWIP_ASSERT("Sanity check alignment", + (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM & (MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1)) == 0); + + /* align the heap */ + ram = (u8_t *)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(LWIP_RAM_HEAP_POINTER); + /* initialize the start of the heap */ + mem = (struct mem *)(void *)ram; + mem->next = MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED; + mem->prev = 0; + mem->used = 0; + /* initialize the end of the heap */ + ram_end = ptr_to_mem(MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + ram_end->used = 1; + ram_end->next = MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED; + ram_end->prev = MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED; + MEM_SANITY(); + + /* initialize the lowest-free pointer to the start of the heap */ + lfree = (struct mem *)(void *)ram; + + MEM_STATS_AVAIL(avail, MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + + if (sys_mutex_new(&mem_mutex) != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_ASSERT("failed to create mem_mutex", 0); + } +} + +/* Check if a struct mem is correctly linked. + * If not, double-free is a possible reason. + */ +static int mem_link_valid(struct mem *mem) +{ + struct mem *nmem, *pmem; + mem_size_t rmem_idx; + rmem_idx = mem_to_ptr(mem); + nmem = ptr_to_mem(mem->next); + pmem = ptr_to_mem(mem->prev); + + if ((mem->next > MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) || (mem->prev > MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) || + ((mem->prev != rmem_idx) && (pmem->next != rmem_idx)) || + ((nmem != ram_end) && (nmem->prev != rmem_idx))) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +#if MEM_SANITY_CHECK +static void mem_sanity(void) +{ + struct mem *mem; + u8_t last_used; + + /* begin with first element here */ + mem = (struct mem *)ram; + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element used valid", (mem->used == 0) || (mem->used == 1)); + last_used = mem->used; + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element prev ptr valid", mem->prev == 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr valid", mem->next <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr aligned", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(ptr_to_mem(mem->next) == ptr_to_mem(mem->next))); + + /* check all elements before the end of the heap */ + for (mem = ptr_to_mem(mem->next); + ((u8_t *)mem > ram) && (mem < ram_end); + mem = ptr_to_mem(mem->next)) { + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element aligned", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(mem) == mem); + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element prev ptr valid", mem->prev <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr valid", mem->next <= MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element prev ptr aligned", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(ptr_to_mem(mem->prev) == ptr_to_mem(mem->prev))); + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr aligned", LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(ptr_to_mem(mem->next) == ptr_to_mem(mem->next))); + + if (last_used == 0) { + /* 2 unused elements in a row? */ + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element unused?", mem->used == 1); + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element unused member", (mem->used == 0) || (mem->used == 1)); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element link valid", mem_link_valid(mem)); + + /* used/unused altering */ + last_used = mem->used; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("heap end ptr sanity", mem == ptr_to_mem(MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED)); + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element used valid", mem->used == 1); + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element prev ptr valid", mem->prev == MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + LWIP_ASSERT("heap element next ptr valid", mem->next == MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); +} +#endif /* MEM_SANITY_CHECK */ + +/** + * Put a struct mem back on the heap + * + * @param rmem is the data portion of a struct mem as returned by a previous + * call to mem_malloc() + */ +void mem_free(void *rmem) +{ + struct mem *mem; + LWIP_MEM_FREE_DECL_PROTECT(); + + if (rmem == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("mem_free(p == NULL) was called.\n")); + return; + } + + if ((((mem_ptr_t)rmem) & (MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1)) != 0) { + LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE("mem_free: sanity check alignment"); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_free: sanity check alignment\n")); + /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ + MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); + return; + } + + /* Get the corresponding struct mem: */ + /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ + mem = (struct mem *)(void *)((u8_t *)rmem - (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET)); + + if ((u8_t *)mem < ram || (u8_t *)rmem + MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED > (u8_t *)ram_end) { + LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE("mem_free: illegal memory"); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_free: illegal memory\n")); + /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ + MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); + return; + } + +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK + mem_overflow_check_element(mem); +#endif + /* protect the heap from concurrent access */ + LWIP_MEM_FREE_PROTECT(); + + /* mem has to be in a used state */ + if (!mem->used) { + LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE("mem_free: illegal memory: double free"); + LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT(); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_free: illegal memory: double free?\n")); + /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ + MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); + return; + } + + if (!mem_link_valid(mem)) { + LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE("mem_free: illegal memory: non-linked: double free"); + LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT(); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_free: illegal memory: non-linked: double free?\n")); + /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ + MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); + return; + } + + /* mem is now unused. */ + mem->used = 0; + + if (mem < lfree) { + /* the newly freed struct is now the lowest */ + lfree = mem; + } + + MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(used, mem->next - (mem_size_t)(((u8_t *)mem - ram))); + + /* finally, see if prev or next are free also */ + plug_holes(mem); + MEM_SANITY(); +#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT + mem_free_count = 1; +#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT(); +} + +/** + * Shrink memory returned by mem_malloc(). + * + * @param rmem pointer to memory allocated by mem_malloc the is to be shrinked + * @param new_size required size after shrinking (needs to be smaller than or + * equal to the previous size) + * @return for compatibility reasons: is always == rmem, at the moment + * or NULL if newsize is > old size, in which case rmem is NOT touched + * or freed! + */ +void *mem_trim(void *rmem, mem_size_t new_size) +{ + mem_size_t size, newsize; + mem_size_t ptr, ptr2; + struct mem *mem, *mem2; + /* use the FREE_PROTECT here: it protects with sem OR SYS_ARCH_PROTECT */ + LWIP_MEM_FREE_DECL_PROTECT(); + + /* Expand the size of the allocated memory region so that we can + adjust for alignment. */ + newsize = (mem_size_t)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(new_size); + + if (newsize < MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED) { + /* every data block must be at least MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED long */ + newsize = MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED; + } + +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK + newsize += MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED; +#endif + + if ((newsize > MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) || (newsize < new_size)) { + return NULL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("mem_trim: legal memory", (u8_t *)rmem >= (u8_t *)ram && + (u8_t *)rmem < (u8_t *)ram_end); + + if ((u8_t *)rmem < (u8_t *)ram || (u8_t *)rmem >= (u8_t *)ram_end) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("mem_trim: illegal memory\n")); + /* protect mem stats from concurrent access */ + MEM_STATS_INC_LOCKED(illegal); + return rmem; + } + + /* Get the corresponding struct mem ... */ + /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ + mem = (struct mem *)(void *)((u8_t *)rmem - (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET)); +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK + mem_overflow_check_element(mem); +#endif + /* ... and its offset pointer */ + ptr = mem_to_ptr(mem); + + size = (mem_size_t)((mem_size_t)(mem->next - ptr) - (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OVERHEAD)); + LWIP_ASSERT("mem_trim can only shrink memory", newsize <= size); + + if (newsize > size) { + /* not supported */ + return NULL; + } + + if (newsize == size) { + /* No change in size, simply return */ + return rmem; + } + + /* protect the heap from concurrent access */ + LWIP_MEM_FREE_PROTECT(); + + mem2 = ptr_to_mem(mem->next); + + if (mem2->used == 0) { + /* The next struct is unused, we can simply move it at little */ + mem_size_t next; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid next ptr", mem->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + /* remember the old next pointer */ + next = mem2->next; + /* create new struct mem which is moved directly after the shrinked mem */ + ptr2 = (mem_size_t)(ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + newsize); + + if (lfree == mem2) { + lfree = ptr_to_mem(ptr2); + } + + mem2 = ptr_to_mem(ptr2); + mem2->used = 0; + /* restore the next pointer */ + mem2->next = next; + /* link it back to mem */ + mem2->prev = ptr; + /* link mem to it */ + mem->next = ptr2; + + /* last thing to restore linked list: as we have moved mem2, + * let 'mem2->next->prev' point to mem2 again. but only if mem2->next is not + * the end of the heap */ + if (mem2->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { + ptr_to_mem(mem2->next)->prev = ptr2; + } + + MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(used, (size - newsize)); + /* no need to plug holes, we've already done that */ + } else if (newsize + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED <= size) { + /* Next struct is used but there's room for another struct mem with + * at least MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED of data. + * Old size ('size') must be big enough to contain at least 'newsize' plus a struct mem + * ('SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM') with some data ('MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED'). + * @todo we could leave out MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED. We would create an empty + * region that couldn't hold data, but when mem->next gets freed, + * the 2 regions would be combined, resulting in more free memory */ + ptr2 = (mem_size_t)(ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + newsize); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid next ptr", mem->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + mem2 = ptr_to_mem(ptr2); + + if (mem2 < lfree) { + lfree = mem2; + } + + mem2->used = 0; + mem2->next = mem->next; + mem2->prev = ptr; + mem->next = ptr2; + + if (mem2->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { + ptr_to_mem(mem2->next)->prev = ptr2; + } + + MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(used, (size - newsize)); + /* the original mem->next is used, so no need to plug holes! */ + } + + /* else { + next struct mem is used but size between mem and mem2 is not big enough + to create another struct mem + -> don't do anyhting. + -> the remaining space stays unused since it is too small + } */ +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK + mem_overflow_init_element(mem, new_size); +#endif + MEM_SANITY(); +#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT + mem_free_count = 1; +#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + LWIP_MEM_FREE_UNPROTECT(); + return rmem; +} + +/** + * Allocate a block of memory with a minimum of 'size' bytes. + * + * @param size_in is the minimum size of the requested block in bytes. + * @return pointer to allocated memory or NULL if no free memory was found. + * + * Note that the returned value will always be aligned (as defined by MEM_ALIGNMENT). + */ +void *mem_malloc(mem_size_t size_in) +{ + mem_size_t ptr, ptr2, size; + struct mem *mem, *mem2; +#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT + u8_t local_mem_free_count = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_DECL_PROTECT(); + + if (size_in == 0) { + return NULL; + } + + /* Expand the size of the allocated memory region so that we can + adjust for alignment. */ + size = (mem_size_t)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(size_in); + + if (size < MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED) { + /* every data block must be at least MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED long */ + size = MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED; + } + +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK + size += MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED; +#endif + + if ((size > MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) || (size < size_in)) { + return NULL; + } + + /* protect the heap from concurrent access */ + sys_mutex_lock(&mem_mutex); + LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT(); +#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT + + /* run as long as a mem_free disturbed mem_malloc or mem_trim */ + do { + local_mem_free_count = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + + /* Scan through the heap searching for a free block that is big enough, + * beginning with the lowest free block. + */ + for (ptr = mem_to_ptr(lfree); ptr < MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED - size; + ptr = ptr_to_mem(ptr)->next) { + mem = ptr_to_mem(ptr); +#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT + mem_free_count = 0; + LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT(); + /* allow mem_free or mem_trim to run */ + LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT(); + + if (mem_free_count != 0) { + /* If mem_free or mem_trim have run, we have to restart since they + could have altered our current struct mem. */ + local_mem_free_count = 1; + break; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + + if ((!mem->used) && + (mem->next - (ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM)) >= size) { + /* mem is not used and at least perfect fit is possible: + * mem->next - (ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM) gives us the 'user data size' of mem */ + + if (mem->next - (ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM) >= (size + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED)) { + /* (in addition to the above, we test if another struct mem (SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM) containing + * at least MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED of data also fits in the 'user data space' of 'mem') + * -> split large block, create empty remainder, + * remainder must be large enough to contain MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED data: if + * mem->next - (ptr + (2*SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM)) == size, + * struct mem would fit in but no data between mem2 and mem2->next + * @todo we could leave out MIN_SIZE_ALIGNED. We would create an empty + * region that couldn't hold data, but when mem->next gets freed, + * the 2 regions would be combined, resulting in more free memory + */ + ptr2 = (mem_size_t)(ptr + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + size); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid next ptr", ptr2 != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED); + /* create mem2 struct */ + mem2 = ptr_to_mem(ptr2); + mem2->used = 0; + mem2->next = mem->next; + mem2->prev = ptr; + /* and insert it between mem and mem->next */ + mem->next = ptr2; + mem->used = 1; + + if (mem2->next != MEM_SIZE_ALIGNED) { + ptr_to_mem(mem2->next)->prev = ptr2; + } + + MEM_STATS_INC_USED(used, (size + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM)); + } else { + /* (a mem2 struct does no fit into the user data space of mem and mem->next will always + * be used at this point: if not we have 2 unused structs in a row, plug_holes should have + * take care of this). + * -> near fit or exact fit: do not split, no mem2 creation + * also can't move mem->next directly behind mem, since mem->next + * will always be used at this point! + */ + mem->used = 1; + MEM_STATS_INC_USED(used, mem->next - mem_to_ptr(mem)); + } + +#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT + mem_malloc_adjust_lfree: +#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + + if (mem == lfree) { + struct mem *cur = lfree; + + /* Find next free block after mem and update lowest free pointer */ + while (cur->used && cur != ram_end) { +#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT + mem_free_count = 0; + LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT(); + /* prevent high interrupt latency... */ + LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_PROTECT(); + + if (mem_free_count != 0) { + /* If mem_free or mem_trim have run, we have to restart since they + could have altered our current struct mem or lfree. */ + goto mem_malloc_adjust_lfree; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + cur = ptr_to_mem(cur->next); + } + + lfree = cur; + LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc: !lfree->used", ((lfree == ram_end) || (!lfree->used))); + } + + LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT(); + sys_mutex_unlock(&mem_mutex); + LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc: allocated memory not above ram_end.", + (mem_ptr_t)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + size <= (mem_ptr_t)ram_end); + LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc: allocated memory properly aligned.", + ((mem_ptr_t)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM) % MEM_ALIGNMENT == 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("mem_malloc: sanity check alignment", + (((mem_ptr_t)mem) & (MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1)) == 0); + +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK + mem_overflow_init_element(mem, size_in); +#endif + MEM_SANITY(); + return (u8_t *)mem + SIZEOF_STRUCT_MEM + MEM_SANITY_OFFSET; + } + } + +#if LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT + /* if we got interrupted by a mem_free, try again */ + } while (local_mem_free_count != 0); + +#endif /* LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT */ + MEM_STATS_INC(err); + LWIP_MEM_ALLOC_UNPROTECT(); + sys_mutex_unlock(&mem_mutex); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("mem_malloc: could not allocate %" S16_F " bytes\n", (s16_t)size)); + return NULL; +} + +#endif /* MEM_USE_POOLS */ + +#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC && (!LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS) +void *mem_calloc(mem_size_t count, mem_size_t size) +{ + return mem_clib_calloc(count, size); +} + +#else /* MEM_LIBC_MALLOC && (!LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS) */ +/** + * Contiguously allocates enough space for count objects that are size bytes + * of memory each and returns a pointer to the allocated memory. + * + * The allocated memory is filled with bytes of value zero. + * + * @param count number of objects to allocate + * @param size size of the objects to allocate + * @return pointer to allocated memory / NULL pointer if there is an error + */ +void *mem_calloc(mem_size_t count, mem_size_t size) +{ + void *p; + size_t alloc_size = (size_t)count * (size_t)size; + + if ((size_t)(mem_size_t)alloc_size != alloc_size) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(MEM_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("mem_calloc: could not allocate %" SZT_F " bytes\n", alloc_size)); + return NULL; + } + + /* allocate 'count' objects of size 'size' */ + p = mem_malloc((mem_size_t)alloc_size); + + if (p) { + /* zero the memory */ + memset(p, 0, alloc_size); + } + + return p; +} +#endif /* MEM_LIBC_MALLOC && (!LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS) */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/memp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/memp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/memp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/memp.c index c0d149a8..fd4481ef 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/memp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/memp.c @@ -1,449 +1,449 @@ -/** - * @file - * Dynamic pool memory manager - * - * lwIP has dedicated pools for many structures (netconn, protocol control blocks, - * packet buffers, ...). All these pools are managed here. - * - * @defgroup mempool Memory pools - * @ingroup infrastructure - * Custom memory pools - - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#include - -/* Make sure we include everything we need for size calculation required by memp_std.h */ -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/raw.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/ip4_frag.h" -#include "lwip/netbuf.h" -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" -#include "lwip/priv/api_msg.h" -#include "lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -/* needed by default MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT */ -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#include "lwip/netdb.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_frag.h" -#include "lwip/mld6.h" - -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(name, num, size, desc) -#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" - -const struct memp_desc *const memp_pools[MEMP_MAX] = { -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) &memp_##name, -#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" -}; - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC && MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 -#undef MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -/* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 does not work with MEMP_MEM_MALLOC, use 1 instead */ -#define MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK 1 -#endif - -#if MEMP_SANITY_CHECK && !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC -/** - * Check that memp-lists don't form a circle, using "Floyd's cycle-finding algorithm". - */ -static int memp_sanity(const struct memp_desc *desc) -{ - struct memp *t, *h; - - t = *desc->tab; - - if (t != NULL) { - for (h = t->next; (t != NULL) && (h != NULL); t = t->next, - h = ((h->next != NULL) ? h->next->next : NULL)) { - if (t == h) { - return 0; - } - } - } - - return 1; -} -#endif /* MEMP_SANITY_CHECK && !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -/** - * Check if a memp element was victim of an overflow or underflow - * (e.g. the restricted area after/before it has been altered) - * - * @param p the memp element to check - * @param desc the pool p comes from - */ -static void memp_overflow_check_element(struct memp *p, const struct memp_desc *desc) -{ - mem_overflow_check_raw((u8_t *)p + MEMP_SIZE, desc->size, "pool ", desc->desc); -} - -/** - * Initialize the restricted area of on memp element. - */ -static void memp_overflow_init_element(struct memp *p, const struct memp_desc *desc) -{ - mem_overflow_init_raw((u8_t *)p + MEMP_SIZE, desc->size); -} - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 -/** - * Do an overflow check for all elements in every pool. - * - * @see memp_overflow_check_element for a description of the check - */ -static void memp_overflow_check_all(void) -{ - u16_t i, j; - struct memp *p; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); - - for (i = 0; i < MEMP_MAX; ++i) { - p = (struct memp *)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(memp_pools[i]->base); - - for (j = 0; j < memp_pools[i]->num; ++j) { - memp_overflow_check_element(p, memp_pools[i]); - p = LWIP_ALIGNMENT_CAST(struct memp *, ((u8_t *)p + MEMP_SIZE + memp_pools[i]->size + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED)); - } - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); -} -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 */ -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - -/** - * Initialize custom memory pool. - * Related functions: memp_malloc_pool, memp_free_pool - * - * @param desc pool to initialize - */ -void memp_init_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc) -{ -#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(desc); -#else - int i; - struct memp *memp; - - *desc->tab = NULL; - memp = (struct memp *)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(desc->base); -#if MEMP_MEM_INIT - /* force memset on pool memory */ - memset(memp, 0, (size_t)desc->num * (MEMP_SIZE + desc->size -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED -#endif - )); -#endif - - /* create a linked list of memp elements */ - for (i = 0; i < desc->num; ++i) { - memp->next = *desc->tab; - *desc->tab = memp; -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - memp_overflow_init_element(memp, desc); -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ - memp = (struct memp *)(void *)((u8_t *)memp + MEMP_SIZE + desc->size -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED -#endif - ); - } - -#if MEMP_STATS - desc->stats->avail = desc->num; -#endif /* MEMP_STATS */ -#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ - -#if MEMP_STATS && (defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY) - desc->stats->name = desc->desc; -#endif /* MEMP_STATS && (defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY) */ -} - -/** - * Initializes lwIP built-in pools. - * Related functions: memp_malloc, memp_free - * - * Carves out memp_memory into linked lists for each pool-type. - */ -void memp_init(void) -{ - u16_t i; - - /* for every pool: */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(memp_pools); i++) { - memp_init_pool(memp_pools[i]); - -#if LWIP_STATS && MEMP_STATS - lwip_stats.memp[i] = memp_pools[i]->stats; -#endif - } - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 - /* check everything a first time to see if it worked */ - memp_overflow_check_all(); -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 */ -} - -static void * -#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -do_memp_malloc_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc) -#else -do_memp_malloc_pool_fn(const struct memp_desc *desc, const char *file, const int line) -#endif -{ - struct memp *memp; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); - -#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC - memp = (struct memp *)mem_malloc(MEMP_SIZE + MEMP_ALIGN_SIZE(desc->size)); - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); -#else /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); - - memp = *desc->tab; -#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ - - if (memp != NULL) { -#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 1 - memp_overflow_check_element(memp, desc); -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - - *desc->tab = memp->next; -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - memp->next = NULL; -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ -#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - memp->file = file; - memp->line = line; -#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC - memp_overflow_init_element(memp, desc); -#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - LWIP_ASSERT("memp_malloc: memp properly aligned", - ((mem_ptr_t)memp % MEM_ALIGNMENT) == 0); -#if MEMP_STATS - desc->stats->used++; - - if (desc->stats->used > desc->stats->max) { - desc->stats->max = desc->stats->used; - } - -#endif - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); - /* cast through u8_t* to get rid of alignment warnings */ - return ((u8_t *)memp + MEMP_SIZE); - } else { -#if MEMP_STATS - desc->stats->err++; -#endif - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); - LWIP_DEBUGF(MEMP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("memp_malloc: out of memory in pool %s\n", desc->desc)); - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** - * Get an element from a custom pool. - * - * @param desc the pool to get an element from - * - * @return a pointer to the allocated memory or a NULL pointer on error - */ -void * -#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -memp_malloc_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc) -#else -memp_malloc_pool_fn(const struct memp_desc *desc, const char *file, const int line) -#endif -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pool desc", desc != NULL); - - if (desc == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - -#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - return do_memp_malloc_pool(desc); -#else - return do_memp_malloc_pool_fn(desc, file, line); -#endif -} - -/** - * Get an element from a specific pool. - * - * @param type the pool to get an element from - * - * @return a pointer to the allocated memory or a NULL pointer on error - */ -void * -#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -memp_malloc(memp_t type) -#else -memp_malloc_fn(memp_t type, const char *file, const int line) -#endif -{ - void *memp; - LWIP_ERROR("memp_malloc: type < MEMP_MAX", (type < MEMP_MAX), return NULL;); - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 - memp_overflow_check_all(); -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 */ - -#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - memp = do_memp_malloc_pool(memp_pools[type]); -#else - memp = do_memp_malloc_pool_fn(memp_pools[type], file, line); -#endif - - return memp; -} - -static void do_memp_free_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc, void *mem) -{ - struct memp *memp; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); - - LWIP_ASSERT("memp_free: mem properly aligned", - ((mem_ptr_t)mem % MEM_ALIGNMENT) == 0); - - /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ - memp = (struct memp *)(void *)((u8_t *)mem - MEMP_SIZE); - - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 1 - memp_overflow_check_element(memp, desc); -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - -#if MEMP_STATS - desc->stats->used--; -#endif - -#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(desc); - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); - mem_free(memp); -#else /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ - memp->next = *desc->tab; - *desc->tab = memp; - -#if MEMP_SANITY_CHECK - LWIP_ASSERT("memp sanity", memp_sanity(desc)); -#endif /* MEMP_SANITY_CHECK */ - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); -#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ -} - -/** - * Put a custom pool element back into its pool. - * - * @param desc the pool where to put mem - * @param mem the memp element to free - */ -void memp_free_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc, void *mem) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pool desc", desc != NULL); - - if ((desc == NULL) || (mem == NULL)) { - return; - } - - do_memp_free_pool(desc, mem); -} - -/** - * Put an element back into its pool. - * - * @param type the pool where to put mem - * @param mem the memp element to free - */ -void memp_free(memp_t type, void *mem) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE - struct memp *old_first; -#endif - - LWIP_ERROR("memp_free: type < MEMP_MAX", (type < MEMP_MAX), return;); - - if (mem == NULL) { - return; - } - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 - memp_overflow_check_all(); -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 */ - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE - old_first = *memp_pools[type]->tab; -#endif - - do_memp_free_pool(memp_pools[type], mem); - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE - - if (old_first == NULL) { - LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE(type); - } - -#endif -} +/** + * @file + * Dynamic pool memory manager + * + * lwIP has dedicated pools for many structures (netconn, protocol control blocks, + * packet buffers, ...). All these pools are managed here. + * + * @defgroup mempool Memory pools + * @ingroup infrastructure + * Custom memory pools + + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#include + +/* Make sure we include everything we need for size calculation required by memp_std.h */ +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/raw.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/ip4_frag.h" +#include "lwip/netbuf.h" +#include "lwip/api.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" +#include "lwip/priv/api_msg.h" +#include "lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +/* needed by default MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT */ +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#include "lwip/netdb.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_frag.h" +#include "lwip/mld6.h" + +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(name, num, size, desc) +#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" + +const struct memp_desc *const memp_pools[MEMP_MAX] = { +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) &memp_##name, +#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" +}; + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC && MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 +#undef MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +/* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 does not work with MEMP_MEM_MALLOC, use 1 instead */ +#define MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK 1 +#endif + +#if MEMP_SANITY_CHECK && !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC +/** + * Check that memp-lists don't form a circle, using "Floyd's cycle-finding algorithm". + */ +static int memp_sanity(const struct memp_desc *desc) +{ + struct memp *t, *h; + + t = *desc->tab; + + if (t != NULL) { + for (h = t->next; (t != NULL) && (h != NULL); t = t->next, + h = ((h->next != NULL) ? h->next->next : NULL)) { + if (t == h) { + return 0; + } + } + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* MEMP_SANITY_CHECK && !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +/** + * Check if a memp element was victim of an overflow or underflow + * (e.g. the restricted area after/before it has been altered) + * + * @param p the memp element to check + * @param desc the pool p comes from + */ +static void memp_overflow_check_element(struct memp *p, const struct memp_desc *desc) +{ + mem_overflow_check_raw((u8_t *)p + MEMP_SIZE, desc->size, "pool ", desc->desc); +} + +/** + * Initialize the restricted area of on memp element. + */ +static void memp_overflow_init_element(struct memp *p, const struct memp_desc *desc) +{ + mem_overflow_init_raw((u8_t *)p + MEMP_SIZE, desc->size); +} + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 +/** + * Do an overflow check for all elements in every pool. + * + * @see memp_overflow_check_element for a description of the check + */ +static void memp_overflow_check_all(void) +{ + u16_t i, j; + struct memp *p; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); + + for (i = 0; i < MEMP_MAX; ++i) { + p = (struct memp *)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(memp_pools[i]->base); + + for (j = 0; j < memp_pools[i]->num; ++j) { + memp_overflow_check_element(p, memp_pools[i]); + p = LWIP_ALIGNMENT_CAST(struct memp *, ((u8_t *)p + MEMP_SIZE + memp_pools[i]->size + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED)); + } + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); +} +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 */ +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + +/** + * Initialize custom memory pool. + * Related functions: memp_malloc_pool, memp_free_pool + * + * @param desc pool to initialize + */ +void memp_init_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc) +{ +#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(desc); +#else + int i; + struct memp *memp; + + *desc->tab = NULL; + memp = (struct memp *)LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(desc->base); +#if MEMP_MEM_INIT + /* force memset on pool memory */ + memset(memp, 0, (size_t)desc->num * (MEMP_SIZE + desc->size +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED +#endif + )); +#endif + + /* create a linked list of memp elements */ + for (i = 0; i < desc->num; ++i) { + memp->next = *desc->tab; + *desc->tab = memp; +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + memp_overflow_init_element(memp, desc); +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ + memp = (struct memp *)(void *)((u8_t *)memp + MEMP_SIZE + desc->size +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED +#endif + ); + } + +#if MEMP_STATS + desc->stats->avail = desc->num; +#endif /* MEMP_STATS */ +#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ + +#if MEMP_STATS && (defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY) + desc->stats->name = desc->desc; +#endif /* MEMP_STATS && (defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY) */ +} + +/** + * Initializes lwIP built-in pools. + * Related functions: memp_malloc, memp_free + * + * Carves out memp_memory into linked lists for each pool-type. + */ +void memp_init(void) +{ + u16_t i; + + /* for every pool: */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(memp_pools); i++) { + memp_init_pool(memp_pools[i]); + +#if LWIP_STATS && MEMP_STATS + lwip_stats.memp[i] = memp_pools[i]->stats; +#endif + } + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 + /* check everything a first time to see if it worked */ + memp_overflow_check_all(); +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 */ +} + +static void * +#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +do_memp_malloc_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc) +#else +do_memp_malloc_pool_fn(const struct memp_desc *desc, const char *file, const int line) +#endif +{ + struct memp *memp; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); + +#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC + memp = (struct memp *)mem_malloc(MEMP_SIZE + MEMP_ALIGN_SIZE(desc->size)); + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); +#else /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); + + memp = *desc->tab; +#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ + + if (memp != NULL) { +#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 1 + memp_overflow_check_element(memp, desc); +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + + *desc->tab = memp->next; +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + memp->next = NULL; +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ +#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + memp->file = file; + memp->line = line; +#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC + memp_overflow_init_element(memp, desc); +#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + LWIP_ASSERT("memp_malloc: memp properly aligned", + ((mem_ptr_t)memp % MEM_ALIGNMENT) == 0); +#if MEMP_STATS + desc->stats->used++; + + if (desc->stats->used > desc->stats->max) { + desc->stats->max = desc->stats->used; + } + +#endif + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); + /* cast through u8_t* to get rid of alignment warnings */ + return ((u8_t *)memp + MEMP_SIZE); + } else { +#if MEMP_STATS + desc->stats->err++; +#endif + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); + LWIP_DEBUGF(MEMP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("memp_malloc: out of memory in pool %s\n", desc->desc)); + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Get an element from a custom pool. + * + * @param desc the pool to get an element from + * + * @return a pointer to the allocated memory or a NULL pointer on error + */ +void * +#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +memp_malloc_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc) +#else +memp_malloc_pool_fn(const struct memp_desc *desc, const char *file, const int line) +#endif +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pool desc", desc != NULL); + + if (desc == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + +#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + return do_memp_malloc_pool(desc); +#else + return do_memp_malloc_pool_fn(desc, file, line); +#endif +} + +/** + * Get an element from a specific pool. + * + * @param type the pool to get an element from + * + * @return a pointer to the allocated memory or a NULL pointer on error + */ +void * +#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +memp_malloc(memp_t type) +#else +memp_malloc_fn(memp_t type, const char *file, const int line) +#endif +{ + void *memp; + LWIP_ERROR("memp_malloc: type < MEMP_MAX", (type < MEMP_MAX), return NULL;); + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 + memp_overflow_check_all(); +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 */ + +#if !MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + memp = do_memp_malloc_pool(memp_pools[type]); +#else + memp = do_memp_malloc_pool_fn(memp_pools[type], file, line); +#endif + + return memp; +} + +static void do_memp_free_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc, void *mem) +{ + struct memp *memp; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); + + LWIP_ASSERT("memp_free: mem properly aligned", + ((mem_ptr_t)mem % MEM_ALIGNMENT) == 0); + + /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ + memp = (struct memp *)(void *)((u8_t *)mem - MEMP_SIZE); + + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 1 + memp_overflow_check_element(memp, desc); +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + +#if MEMP_STATS + desc->stats->used--; +#endif + +#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(desc); + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); + mem_free(memp); +#else /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ + memp->next = *desc->tab; + *desc->tab = memp; + +#if MEMP_SANITY_CHECK + LWIP_ASSERT("memp sanity", memp_sanity(desc)); +#endif /* MEMP_SANITY_CHECK */ + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); +#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ +} + +/** + * Put a custom pool element back into its pool. + * + * @param desc the pool where to put mem + * @param mem the memp element to free + */ +void memp_free_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc, void *mem) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pool desc", desc != NULL); + + if ((desc == NULL) || (mem == NULL)) { + return; + } + + do_memp_free_pool(desc, mem); +} + +/** + * Put an element back into its pool. + * + * @param type the pool where to put mem + * @param mem the memp element to free + */ +void memp_free(memp_t type, void *mem) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE + struct memp *old_first; +#endif + + LWIP_ERROR("memp_free: type < MEMP_MAX", (type < MEMP_MAX), return;); + + if (mem == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 + memp_overflow_check_all(); +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 */ + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE + old_first = *memp_pools[type]->tab; +#endif + + do_memp_free_pool(memp_pools[type], mem); + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE + + if (old_first == NULL) { + LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE(type); + } + +#endif +} diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/netif.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/netif.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/netif.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/netif.c index c7cfdd3c..fa211708 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/netif.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/netif.c @@ -1,1853 +1,1853 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP network interface abstraction - * - * @defgroup netif Network interface (NETIF) - * @ingroup callbackstyle_api - * - * @defgroup netif_ip4 IPv4 address handling - * @ingroup netif - * - * @defgroup netif_ip6 IPv6 address handling - * @ingroup netif - * - * @defgroup netif_cd Client data handling - * Store data (void*) on a netif for application usage. - * @see @ref LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA - * @ingroup netif - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include /* memset */ -#include /* atoi */ - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/raw_priv.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK -#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ -#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ - -#include "netif/ethernet.h" - -#if LWIP_AUTOIP -#include "lwip/autoip.h" -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ -#if LWIP_DHCP -#include "lwip/dhcp.h" -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 -#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#endif - -#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK -#define NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(n) \ - do { \ - if (n->status_callback) { \ - (n->status_callback)(n); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#else -#define NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(n) -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ - -#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK -#define NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK(n) \ - do { \ - if (n->link_callback) { \ - (n->link_callback)(n); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#else -#define NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK(n) -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ - -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK -static netif_ext_callback_t *ext_callback; -#endif - -#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF -struct netif *netif_list; -#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ -struct netif *netif_default; - -#define netif_index_to_num(index) ((index)-1) -static u8_t netif_num; - -#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 0 -static u8_t netif_client_id; -#endif - -#define NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4 0x01 -#define NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6 0x02 -static void netif_issue_reports(struct netif *netif, u8_t report_type); - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -static err_t netif_null_output_ip6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 -static err_t netif_null_output_ip4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF -#if LWIP_IPV4 -static err_t netif_loop_output_ipv4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *addr); -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 -static err_t netif_loop_output_ipv6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *addr); -#endif - -static struct netif loop_netif; - -/** - * Initialize a lwip network interface structure for a loopback interface - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this loopif - * @return ERR_OK if the loopif is initialized - * ERR_MEM if private data couldn't be allocated - */ -static err_t netif_loopif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_loopif_init: invalid netif", netif != NULL); - - /* initialize the snmp variables and counters inside the struct netif - * ifSpeed: no assumption can be made! - */ - MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_softwareLoopback, 0); - - netif->name[0] = 'l'; - netif->name[1] = 'o'; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - netif->output = netif_loop_output_ipv4; -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - netif->output_ip6 = netif_loop_output_ipv6; -#endif -#if LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTICAST - netif_set_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_IGMP); -#endif - NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_DISABLE_ALL); - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - -void netif_init(void) -{ -#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF -#if LWIP_IPV4 -#define LOOPIF_ADDRINIT &loop_ipaddr, &loop_netmask, &loop_gw, - ip4_addr_t loop_ipaddr, loop_netmask, loop_gw; - IP4_ADDR(&loop_gw, 127, 0, 0, 1); - IP4_ADDR(&loop_ipaddr, 127, 0, 0, 1); - IP4_ADDR(&loop_netmask, 255, 0, 0, 0); -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#define LOOPIF_ADDRINIT -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if NO_SYS - netif_add(&loop_netif, LOOPIF_ADDRINIT NULL, netif_loopif_init, ip_input); -#else /* NO_SYS */ - netif_add(&loop_netif, LOOPIF_ADDRINIT NULL, netif_loopif_init, tcpip_input); -#endif /* NO_SYS */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - IP_ADDR6_HOST(loop_netif.ip6_addr, 0, 0, 0, 0x00000001UL); - loop_netif.ip6_addr_state[0] = IP6_ADDR_VALID; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - - netif_set_link_up(&loop_netif); - netif_set_up(&loop_netif); - -#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_nosys - * Forwards a received packet for input processing with - * ethernet_input() or ip_input() depending on netif flags. - * Don't call directly, pass to netif_add() and call - * netif->input(). - * Only works if the netif driver correctly sets - * NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP and/or NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET flag! - */ -err_t netif_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_input: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_input: invalid netif", inp != NULL); - -#if LWIP_ETHERNET - - if (inp->flags & (NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET)) { - return ethernet_input(p, inp); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_ETHERNET */ - return ip_input(p, inp); -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Add a network interface to the list of lwIP netifs. - * - * Same as @ref netif_add but without IPv4 addresses - */ -struct netif * -netif_add_noaddr(struct netif *netif, void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input) -{ - return netif_add(netif, -#if LWIP_IPV4 - NULL, NULL, NULL, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ - state, init, input); -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Add a network interface to the list of lwIP netifs. - * - * @param netif a pre-allocated netif structure - * @param ipaddr IP address for the new netif - * @param netmask network mask for the new netif - * @param gw default gateway IP address for the new netif - * @param state opaque data passed to the new netif - * @param init callback function that initializes the interface - * @param input callback function that is called to pass - * ingress packets up in the protocol layer stack.\n - * It is recommended to use a function that passes the input directly - * to the stack (netif_input(), NO_SYS=1 mode) or via sending a - * message to TCPIP thread (tcpip_input(), NO_SYS=0 mode).\n - * These functions use netif flags NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP and NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET - * to decide whether to forward to ethernet_input() or ip_input(). - * In other words, the functions only work when the netif - * driver is implemented correctly!\n - * Most members of struct netif should be be initialized by the - * netif init function = netif driver (init parameter of this function).\n - * IPv6: Don't forget to call netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address() after - * setting the MAC address in struct netif.hwaddr - * (IPv6 requires a link-local address). - * - * @return netif, or NULL if failed. - */ -struct netif * -netif_add(struct netif *netif, -#if LWIP_IPV4 - const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input) -{ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - s8_t i; -#endif - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - -#if LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF - - if (netif_default != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("single netif already set", 0); - return NULL; - } - -#endif - - LWIP_ERROR("netif_add: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return NULL); - LWIP_ERROR("netif_add: No init function given", init != NULL, return NULL); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (ipaddr == NULL) { - ipaddr = ip_2_ip4(IP4_ADDR_ANY); - } - - if (netmask == NULL) { - netmask = ip_2_ip4(IP4_ADDR_ANY); - } - - if (gw == NULL) { - gw = ip_2_ip4(IP4_ADDR_ANY); - } - - /* reset new interface configuration state */ - ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(&netif->ip_addr); - ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(&netif->netmask); - ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(&netif->gw); - netif->output = netif_null_output_ip4; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - ip_addr_set_zero_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[i]); - netif->ip6_addr_state[i] = IP6_ADDR_INVALID; -#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES - netif->ip6_addr_valid_life[i] = IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC; - netif->ip6_addr_pref_life[i] = IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ - } - - netif->output_ip6 = netif_null_output_ip6; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLE_ALL); - netif->mtu = 0; - netif->flags = 0; -#ifdef netif_get_client_data - memset(netif->client_data, 0, sizeof(netif->client_data)); -#endif /* LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG - /* IPv6 address autoconfiguration not enabled by default */ - netif->ip6_autoconfig_enabled = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ - nd6_restart_netif(netif); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK - netif->status_callback = NULL; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK - netif->link_callback = NULL; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ -#if LWIP_IGMP - netif->igmp_mac_filter = NULL; -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD - netif->mld_mac_filter = NULL; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ -#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK - netif->loop_first = NULL; - netif->loop_last = NULL; -#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ - - /* remember netif specific state information data */ - netif->state = state; - netif->num = netif_num; - netif->input = input; - - NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); -#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK && LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS - netif->loop_cnt_current = 0; -#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK && LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - netif_set_addr(netif, ipaddr, netmask, gw); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - /* call user specified initialization function for netif */ - if (init(netif) != ERR_OK) { - return NULL; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES - /* Initialize the MTU for IPv6 to the one set by the netif driver. - This can be updated later by RA. */ - netif->mtu6 = netif->mtu; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ - -#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF - /* Assign a unique netif number in the range [0..254], so that (num+1) can - serve as an interface index that fits in a u8_t. - We assume that the new netif has not yet been added to the list here. - This algorithm is O(n^2), but that should be OK for lwIP. - */ - { - struct netif *netif2; - int num_netifs; - - do { - if (netif->num == 255) { - netif->num = 0; - } - - num_netifs = 0; - - for (netif2 = netif_list; netif2 != NULL; netif2 = netif2->next) { - LWIP_ASSERT("netif already added", netif2 != netif); - num_netifs++; - LWIP_ASSERT("too many netifs, max. supported number is 255", num_netifs <= 255); - - if (netif2->num == netif->num) { - netif->num++; - break; - } - } - } while (netif2 != NULL); - } - - if (netif->num == 254) { - netif_num = 0; - } else { - netif_num = (u8_t)(netif->num + 1); - } - - /* add this netif to the list */ - netif->next = netif_list; - netif_list = netif; -#endif /* "LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ - mib2_netif_added(netif); - -#if LWIP_IGMP - - /* start IGMP processing */ - if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) { - igmp_start(netif); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif: added interface %c%c IP", - netif->name[0], netif->name[1])); -#if LWIP_IPV4 - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, (" addr ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print(NETIF_DEBUG, ipaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, (" netmask ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print(NETIF_DEBUG, netmask); - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, (" gw ")); - ip4_addr_debug_print(NETIF_DEBUG, gw); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("\n")); - - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_NETIF_ADDED, NULL); - - return netif; -} - -static void netif_do_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr) -{ -#if LWIP_TCP - tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed(old_addr, new_addr); -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_UDP - udp_netif_ip_addr_changed(old_addr, new_addr); -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ -#if LWIP_RAW - raw_netif_ip_addr_changed(old_addr, new_addr); -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -static int netif_do_set_ipaddr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, ip_addr_t *old_addr) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pointer", ipaddr != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pointer", old_addr != NULL); - - /* address is actually being changed? */ - if (ip4_addr_cmp(ipaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif)) == 0) { - ip_addr_t new_addr; - *ip_2_ip4(&new_addr) = *ipaddr; - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(new_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - - ip_addr_copy(*old_addr, *netif_ip_addr4(netif)); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif_set_ipaddr: netif address being changed\n")); - netif_do_ip_addr_changed(old_addr, &new_addr); - - mib2_remove_ip4(netif); - mib2_remove_route_ip4(0, netif); - /* set new IP address to netif */ - ip4_addr_set(ip_2_ip4(&netif->ip_addr), ipaddr); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(netif->ip_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - mib2_add_ip4(netif); - mib2_add_route_ip4(0, netif); - - netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4); - - NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); - return 1; /* address changed */ - } - - return 0; /* address unchanged */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif_ip4 - * Change the IP address of a network interface - * - * @param netif the network interface to change - * @param ipaddr the new IP address - * - * @note call netif_set_addr() if you also want to change netmask and - * default gateway - */ -void netif_set_ipaddr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - ip_addr_t old_addr; - - LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_ipaddr: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ - if (ipaddr == NULL) { - ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netif_do_set_ipaddr(netif, ipaddr, &old_addr)) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - netif_ext_callback_args_t args; - args.ipv4_changed.old_address = &old_addr; - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED, &args); -#endif - } -} - -static int netif_do_set_netmask(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, ip_addr_t *old_nm) -{ - /* address is actually being changed? */ - if (ip4_addr_cmp(netmask, netif_ip4_netmask(netif)) == 0) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pointer", old_nm != NULL); - ip_addr_copy(*old_nm, *netif_ip_netmask4(netif)); -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(old_nm); -#endif - mib2_remove_route_ip4(0, netif); - /* set new netmask to netif */ - ip4_addr_set(ip_2_ip4(&netif->netmask), netmask); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(netif->netmask, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - mib2_add_route_ip4(0, netif); - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif: netmask of interface %c%c set to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - netif->name[0], netif->name[1], - ip4_addr1_16(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), - ip4_addr2_16(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), - ip4_addr3_16(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), - ip4_addr4_16(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)))); - return 1; /* netmask changed */ - } - - return 0; /* netmask unchanged */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif_ip4 - * Change the netmask of a network interface - * - * @param netif the network interface to change - * @param netmask the new netmask - * - * @note call netif_set_addr() if you also want to change ip address and - * default gateway - */ -void netif_set_netmask(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *netmask) -{ -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - ip_addr_t old_nm_val; - ip_addr_t *old_nm = &old_nm_val; -#else - ip_addr_t *old_nm = NULL; -#endif - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_netmask: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ - if (netmask == NULL) { - netmask = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - if (netif_do_set_netmask(netif, netmask, old_nm)) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - netif_ext_callback_args_t args; - args.ipv4_changed.old_netmask = old_nm; - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED, &args); -#endif - } -} - -static int netif_do_set_gw(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *gw, ip_addr_t *old_gw) -{ - /* address is actually being changed? */ - if (ip4_addr_cmp(gw, netif_ip4_gw(netif)) == 0) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pointer", old_gw != NULL); - ip_addr_copy(*old_gw, *netif_ip_gw4(netif)); -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(old_gw); -#endif - - ip4_addr_set(ip_2_ip4(&netif->gw), gw); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(netif->gw, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif: GW address of interface %c%c set to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", - netif->name[0], netif->name[1], - ip4_addr1_16(netif_ip4_gw(netif)), - ip4_addr2_16(netif_ip4_gw(netif)), - ip4_addr3_16(netif_ip4_gw(netif)), - ip4_addr4_16(netif_ip4_gw(netif)))); - return 1; /* gateway changed */ - } - - return 0; /* gateway unchanged */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif_ip4 - * Change the default gateway for a network interface - * - * @param netif the network interface to change - * @param gw the new default gateway - * - * @note call netif_set_addr() if you also want to change ip address and netmask - */ -void netif_set_gw(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *gw) -{ -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - ip_addr_t old_gw_val; - ip_addr_t *old_gw = &old_gw_val; -#else - ip_addr_t *old_gw = NULL; -#endif - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_gw: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ - if (gw == NULL) { - gw = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - if (netif_do_set_gw(netif, gw, old_gw)) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - netif_ext_callback_args_t args; - args.ipv4_changed.old_gw = old_gw; - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED, &args); -#endif - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif_ip4 - * Change IP address configuration for a network interface (including netmask - * and default gateway). - * - * @param netif the network interface to change - * @param ipaddr the new IP address - * @param netmask the new netmask - * @param gw the new default gateway - */ -void netif_set_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, - const ip4_addr_t *gw) -{ -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - netif_nsc_reason_t change_reason = LWIP_NSC_NONE; - netif_ext_callback_args_t cb_args; - ip_addr_t old_nm_val; - ip_addr_t old_gw_val; - ip_addr_t *old_nm = &old_nm_val; - ip_addr_t *old_gw = &old_gw_val; -#else - ip_addr_t *old_nm = NULL; - ip_addr_t *old_gw = NULL; -#endif - ip_addr_t old_addr; - int remove; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ - if (ipaddr == NULL) { - ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - if (netmask == NULL) { - netmask = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - if (gw == NULL) { - gw = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; - } - - remove = ip4_addr_isany(ipaddr); - - if (remove) { - /* when removing an address, we have to remove it *before* changing netmask/gw - to ensure that tcp RST segment can be sent correctly */ - if (netif_do_set_ipaddr(netif, ipaddr, &old_addr)) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED; - cb_args.ipv4_changed.old_address = &old_addr; -#endif - } - } - - if (netif_do_set_netmask(netif, netmask, old_nm)) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED; - cb_args.ipv4_changed.old_netmask = old_nm; -#endif - } - - if (netif_do_set_gw(netif, gw, old_gw)) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED; - cb_args.ipv4_changed.old_gw = old_gw; -#endif - } - - if (!remove) { - /* set ipaddr last to ensure netmask/gw have been set when status callback is called */ - if (netif_do_set_ipaddr(netif, ipaddr, &old_addr)) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED; - cb_args.ipv4_changed.old_address = &old_addr; -#endif - } - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - - if (change_reason != LWIP_NSC_NONE) { - change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED; - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, change_reason, &cb_args); - } - -#endif -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Remove a network interface from the list of lwIP netifs. - * - * @param netif the network interface to remove - */ -void netif_remove(struct netif *netif) -{ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - int i; -#endif - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netif == NULL) { - return; - } - - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_NETIF_REMOVED, NULL); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - netif_do_ip_addr_changed(netif_ip_addr4(netif), NULL); - } - -#if LWIP_IGMP - - /* stop IGMP processing */ - if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) { - igmp_stop(netif); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { - netif_do_ip_addr_changed(netif_ip_addr6(netif, i), NULL); - } - } - -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD - /* stop MLD processing */ - mld6_stop(netif); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - - if (netif_is_up(netif)) { - /* set netif down before removing (call callback function) */ - netif_set_down(netif); - } - - mib2_remove_ip4(netif); - - /* this netif is default? */ - if (netif_default == netif) { - /* reset default netif */ - netif_set_default(NULL); - } - -#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF - - /* is it the first netif? */ - if (netif_list == netif) { - netif_list = netif->next; - } else { - /* look for netif further down the list */ - struct netif *tmp_netif; - NETIF_FOREACH(tmp_netif) - { - if (tmp_netif->next == netif) { - tmp_netif->next = netif->next; - break; - } - } - - if (tmp_netif == NULL) { - return; /* netif is not on the list */ - } - } - -#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ - mib2_netif_removed(netif); -#if LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK - - if (netif->remove_callback) { - netif->remove_callback(netif); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif_remove: removed netif\n")); -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Set a network interface as the default network interface - * (used to output all packets for which no specific route is found) - * - * @param netif the default network interface - */ -void netif_set_default(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netif == NULL) { - /* remove default route */ - mib2_remove_route_ip4(1, netif); - } else { - /* install default route */ - mib2_add_route_ip4(1, netif); - } - - netif_default = netif; - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif: setting default interface %c%c\n", - netif ? netif->name[0] : '\'', netif ? netif->name[1] : '\'')); -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Bring an interface up, available for processing - * traffic. - */ -void netif_set_up(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_up: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); - - if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_UP)) { - netif_set_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_UP); - - MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(&netif->ts); - - NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); - -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - { - netif_ext_callback_args_t args; - args.status_changed.state = 1; - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED, &args); - } -#endif - - netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4 | NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6); -#if LWIP_IPV6 - nd6_restart_netif(netif); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - } -} - -/** Send ARP/IGMP/MLD/RS events, e.g. on link-up/netif-up or addr-change - */ -static void netif_issue_reports(struct netif *netif, u8_t report_type) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_issue_reports: invalid netif", netif != NULL); - - /* Only send reports when both link and admin states are up */ - if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP) || - !(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_UP)) { - return; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if ((report_type & NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4) && - !ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { -#if LWIP_ARP - - /* For Ethernet network interfaces, we would like to send a "gratuitous ARP" */ - if (netif->flags & (NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP)) { - etharp_gratuitous(netif); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ - -#if LWIP_IGMP - - /* resend IGMP memberships */ - if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) { - igmp_report_groups(netif); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (report_type & NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6) { -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD - /* send mld memberships */ - mld6_report_groups(netif); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Bring an interface down, disabling any traffic processing. - */ -void netif_set_down(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_down: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); - - if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_UP) { -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - { - netif_ext_callback_args_t args; - args.status_changed.state = 0; - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED, &args); - } -#endif - - netif_clear_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_UP); - MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(&netif->ts); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP - - if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP) { - etharp_cleanup_netif(netif); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - nd6_cleanup_netif(netif); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - - NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); - } -} - -#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Set callback to be called when interface is brought up/down or address is changed while up - */ -void netif_set_status_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn status_callback) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netif) { - netif->status_callback = status_callback; - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ - -#if LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Set callback to be called when the interface has been removed - */ -void netif_set_remove_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn remove_callback) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netif) { - netif->remove_callback = remove_callback; - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK */ - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Called by a driver when its link goes up - */ -void netif_set_link_up(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_link_up: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); - - if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP)) { - netif_set_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP); - -#if LWIP_DHCP - dhcp_network_changed(netif); -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ - -#if LWIP_AUTOIP - autoip_network_changed(netif); -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ - - netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4 | NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6); -#if LWIP_IPV6 - nd6_restart_netif(netif); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - - NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK(netif); -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - { - netif_ext_callback_args_t args; - args.link_changed.state = 1; - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED, &args); - } -#endif - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Called by a driver when its link goes down - */ -void netif_set_link_down(struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_link_down: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); - - if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP) { - netif_clear_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP); - NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK(netif); -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - { - netif_ext_callback_args_t args; - args.link_changed.state = 0; - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED, &args); - } -#endif - } -} - -#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Set callback to be called when link is brought up/down - */ -void netif_set_link_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn link_callback) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netif) { - netif->link_callback = link_callback; - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ - -#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Send an IP packet to be received on the same netif (loopif-like). - * The pbuf is simply copied and handed back to netif->input. - * In multithreaded mode, this is done directly since netif->input must put - * the packet on a queue. - * In callback mode, the packet is put on an internal queue and is fed to - * netif->input by netif_poll(). - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface structure - * @param p the (IP) packet to 'send' - * @return ERR_OK if the packet has been sent - * ERR_MEM if the pbuf used to copy the packet couldn't be allocated - */ -err_t netif_loop_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct pbuf *r; - err_t err; - struct pbuf *last; -#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS - u16_t clen = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ - /* If we have a loopif, SNMP counters are adjusted for it, - * if not they are adjusted for 'netif'. */ -#if MIB2_STATS -#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - struct netif *stats_if = &loop_netif; -#else /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - struct netif *stats_if = netif; -#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING - u8_t schedule_poll = 0; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_loop_output: invalid netif", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_loop_output: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); - - /* Allocate a new pbuf */ - r = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (r == NULL) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifoutdiscards); - return ERR_MEM; - } - -#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS - clen = pbuf_clen(r); - - /* check for overflow or too many pbuf on queue */ - if (((netif->loop_cnt_current + clen) < netif->loop_cnt_current) || - ((netif->loop_cnt_current + clen) > LWIP_MIN(LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS, 0xFFFF))) { - pbuf_free(r); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifoutdiscards); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - netif->loop_cnt_current = (u16_t)(netif->loop_cnt_current + clen); -#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ - - /* Copy the whole pbuf queue p into the single pbuf r */ - if ((err = pbuf_copy(r, p)) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(r); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifoutdiscards); - return err; - } - - /* Put the packet on a linked list which gets emptied through calling - netif_poll(). */ - - /* let last point to the last pbuf in chain r */ - for (last = r; last->next != NULL; last = last->next) { - /* nothing to do here, just get to the last pbuf */ - } - - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - - if (netif->loop_first != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("if first != NULL, last must also be != NULL", netif->loop_last != NULL); - netif->loop_last->next = r; - netif->loop_last = last; - } else { - netif->loop_first = r; - netif->loop_last = last; -#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING - /* No existing packets queued, schedule poll */ - schedule_poll = 1; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - - LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(stats_if, ifoutoctets, p->tot_len); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifoutucastpkts); - -#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING - - /* For multithreading environment, schedule a call to netif_poll */ - if (schedule_poll) { - tcpip_try_callback((tcpip_callback_fn)netif_poll, netif); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF -#if LWIP_IPV4 -static err_t netif_loop_output_ipv4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *addr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); - return netif_loop_output(netif, p); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -static err_t netif_loop_output_ipv6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *addr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); - return netif_loop_output(netif, p); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - -/** - * Call netif_poll() in the main loop of your application. This is to prevent - * reentering non-reentrant functions like tcp_input(). Packets passed to - * netif_loop_output() are put on a list that is passed to netif->input() by - * netif_poll(). - */ -void netif_poll(struct netif *netif) -{ - /* If we have a loopif, SNMP counters are adjusted for it, - * if not they are adjusted for 'netif'. */ -#if MIB2_STATS -#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - struct netif *stats_if = &loop_netif; -#else /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ - struct netif *stats_if = netif; -#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_poll: invalid netif", netif != NULL); - - /* Get a packet from the list. With SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT=1, this is protected */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - - while (netif->loop_first != NULL) { - struct pbuf *in, *in_end; -#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS - u8_t clen = 1; -#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ - - in = in_end = netif->loop_first; - - while (in_end->len != in_end->tot_len) { - LWIP_ASSERT("bogus pbuf: len != tot_len but next == NULL!", in_end->next != NULL); - in_end = in_end->next; -#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS - clen++; -#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ - } - -#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS - /* adjust the number of pbufs on queue */ - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->loop_cnt_current underflow", - ((netif->loop_cnt_current - clen) < netif->loop_cnt_current)); - netif->loop_cnt_current = (u16_t)(netif->loop_cnt_current - clen); -#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ - - /* 'in_end' now points to the last pbuf from 'in' */ - if (in_end == netif->loop_last) { - /* this was the last pbuf in the list */ - netif->loop_first = netif->loop_last = NULL; - } else { - /* pop the pbuf off the list */ - netif->loop_first = in_end->next; - LWIP_ASSERT("should not be null since first != last!", netif->loop_first != NULL); - } - - /* De-queue the pbuf from its successors on the 'loop_' list. */ - in_end->next = NULL; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); - - in->if_idx = netif_get_index(netif); - - LINK_STATS_INC(link.recv); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(stats_if, ifinoctets, in->tot_len); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifinucastpkts); - - /* loopback packets are always IP packets! */ - if (ip_input(in, netif) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(in); - } - - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); -} - -#if !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING -/** - * Calls netif_poll() for every netif on the netif_list. - */ -void netif_poll_all(void) -{ - struct netif *netif; - /* loop through netifs */ - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - netif_poll(netif); - } -} -#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ -#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ - -#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 0 -/** - * @ingroup netif_cd - * Allocate an index to store data in client_data member of struct netif. - * Returned value is an index in mentioned array. - * @see LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA - */ -u8_t netif_alloc_client_data_id(void) -{ - u8_t result = netif_client_id; - netif_client_id++; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - -#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 256 -#error LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA must be <= 256 -#endif - LWIP_ASSERT("Increase LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA in lwipopts.h", result < LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA); - return (u8_t)(result + LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MAX); -} -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** - * @ingroup netif_ip6 - * Change an IPv6 address of a network interface - * - * @param netif the network interface to change - * @param addr_idx index of the IPv6 address - * @param addr6 the new IPv6 address - * - * @note call netif_ip6_addr_set_state() to set the address valid/temptative - */ -void netif_ip6_addr_set(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, const ip6_addr_t *addr6) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_ip6_addr_set: invalid netif", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_ip6_addr_set: invalid addr6", addr6 != NULL); - - netif_ip6_addr_set_parts(netif, addr_idx, addr6->addr[0], addr6->addr[1], - addr6->addr[2], addr6->addr[3]); -} - -/* - * Change an IPv6 address of a network interface (internal version taking 4 * u32_t) - * - * @param netif the network interface to change - * @param addr_idx index of the IPv6 address - * @param i0 word0 of the new IPv6 address - * @param i1 word1 of the new IPv6 address - * @param i2 word2 of the new IPv6 address - * @param i3 word3 of the new IPv6 address - */ -void netif_ip6_addr_set_parts(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u32_t i0, u32_t i1, u32_t i2, u32_t i3) -{ - ip_addr_t old_addr; - ip_addr_t new_ipaddr; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid index", addr_idx < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES); - - ip6_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip6(&old_addr), *netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx)); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(old_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); - - /* address is actually being changed? */ - if ((ip_2_ip6(&old_addr)->addr[0] != i0) || (ip_2_ip6(&old_addr)->addr[1] != i1) || - (ip_2_ip6(&old_addr)->addr[2] != i2) || (ip_2_ip6(&old_addr)->addr[3] != i3)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif_ip6_addr_set: netif address being changed\n")); - - IP_ADDR6(&new_ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&new_ipaddr), IP6_UNICAST, netif); - - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx))) { - netif_do_ip_addr_changed(netif_ip_addr6(netif, addr_idx), &new_ipaddr); - } - - /* @todo: remove/readd mib2 ip6 entries? */ - - ip_addr_copy(netif->ip6_addr[addr_idx], new_ipaddr); - - if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx))) { - netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6); - NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - { - netif_ext_callback_args_t args; - args.ipv6_set.addr_index = addr_idx; - args.ipv6_set.old_address = &old_addr; - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV6_SET, &args); - } -#endif - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif: IPv6 address %d of interface %c%c set to %s/0x%" X8_F "\n", - addr_idx, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], ip6addr_ntoa(netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx)), - netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx))); -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif_ip6 - * Change the state of an IPv6 address of a network interface - * (INVALID, TEMPTATIVE, PREFERRED, DEPRECATED, where TEMPTATIVE - * includes the number of checks done, see ip6_addr.h) - * - * @param netif the network interface to change - * @param addr_idx index of the IPv6 address - * @param state the new IPv6 address state - */ -void netif_ip6_addr_set_state(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u8_t state) -{ - u8_t old_state; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid index", addr_idx < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES); - - old_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx); - - /* state is actually being changed? */ - if (old_state != state) { - u8_t old_valid = old_state & IP6_ADDR_VALID; - u8_t new_valid = state & IP6_ADDR_VALID; - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif_ip6_addr_set_state: netif address state being changed\n")); - -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD - - /* Reevaluate solicited-node multicast group membership. */ - if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_MLD6) { - nd6_adjust_mld_membership(netif, addr_idx, state); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - - if (old_valid && !new_valid) { - /* address about to be removed by setting invalid */ - netif_do_ip_addr_changed(netif_ip_addr6(netif, addr_idx), NULL); - /* @todo: remove mib2 ip6 entries? */ - } - - netif->ip6_addr_state[addr_idx] = state; - - if (!old_valid && new_valid) { - /* address added by setting valid */ - /* This is a good moment to check that the address is properly zoned. */ - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx), netif); - /* @todo: add mib2 ip6 entries? */ - netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6); - } - - if ((old_state & ~IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK) != - (state & ~IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK)) { - /* address state has changed -> call the callback function */ - NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK - { - netif_ext_callback_args_t args; - args.ipv6_addr_state_changed.addr_index = addr_idx; - args.ipv6_addr_state_changed.old_state = old_state; - args.ipv6_addr_state_changed.address = netif_ip_addr6(netif, addr_idx); - netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV6_ADDR_STATE_CHANGED, &args); - } -#endif - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif: IPv6 address %d of interface %c%c set to %s/0x%" X8_F "\n", - addr_idx, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], ip6addr_ntoa(netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx)), - netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx))); -} - -/** - * Checks if a specific local address is present on the netif and returns its - * index. Depending on its state, it may or may not be assigned to the - * interface (as per RFC terminology). - * - * The given address may or may not be zoned (i.e., have a zone index other - * than IP6_NO_ZONE). If the address is zoned, it must have the correct zone - * for the given netif, or no match will be found. - * - * @param netif the netif to check - * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address to find - * @return >= 0: address found, this is its index - * -1: address not found on this netif - */ -s8_t netif_get_ip6_addr_match(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - s8_t i; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_get_ip6_addr_match: invalid netif", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_get_ip6_addr_match: invalid ip6addr", ip6addr != NULL); - -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - if (ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) && !ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6addr, netif)) { - return -1; /* wrong zone, no match */ - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && - ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(netif_ip6_addr(netif, i), ip6addr)) { - return i; - } - } - - return -1; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif_ip6 - * Create a link-local IPv6 address on a netif (stored in slot 0) - * - * @param netif the netif to create the address on - * @param from_mac_48bit if != 0, assume hwadr is a 48-bit MAC address (std conversion) - * if == 0, use hwaddr directly as interface ID - */ -void netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(struct netif *netif, u8_t from_mac_48bit) -{ - u8_t i, addr_index; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address: invalid netif", netif != NULL); - - /* Link-local prefix. */ - ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000ul); - ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[1] = 0; - - /* Generate interface ID. */ - if (from_mac_48bit) { - /* Assume hwaddr is a 48-bit IEEE 802 MAC. Convert to EUI-64 address. Complement Group bit. */ - ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[2] = lwip_htonl((((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[0] ^ 0x02)) << 24) | - ((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[1]) << 16) | - ((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[2]) << 8) | - (0xff)); - ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[3] = lwip_htonl((u32_t)(0xfeul << 24) | - ((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[3]) << 16) | - ((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[4]) << 8) | - (netif->hwaddr[5])); - } else { - /* Use hwaddr directly as interface ID. */ - ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[2] = 0; - ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[3] = 0; - - addr_index = 3; - - for (i = 0; (i < 8) && (i < netif->hwaddr_len); i++) { - if (i == 4) { - addr_index--; - } - - ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[addr_index] |= lwip_htonl(((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[netif->hwaddr_len - i - 1])) << (8 * (i & 0x03))); - } - } - - /* Set a link-local zone. Even though the zone is implied by the owning - * netif, setting the zone anyway has two important conceptual advantages: - * 1) it avoids the need for a ton of exceptions in internal code, allowing - * e.g. ip6_addr_cmp() to be used on local addresses; - * 2) the properly zoned address is visible externally, e.g. when any outside - * code enumerates available addresses or uses one to bind a socket. - * Any external code unaware of address scoping is likely to just ignore the - * zone field, so this should not create any compatibility problems. */ - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0]), IP6_UNICAST, netif); - - /* Set address state. */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS - /* Will perform duplicate address detection (DAD). */ - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); -#else - /* Consider address valid. */ - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif_ip6 - * This function allows for the easy addition of a new IPv6 address to an interface. - * It takes care of finding an empty slot and then sets the address tentative - * (to make sure that all the subsequent processing happens). - * - * @param netif netif to add the address on - * @param ip6addr address to add - * @param chosen_idx if != NULL, the chosen IPv6 address index will be stored here - */ -err_t netif_add_ip6_address(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, s8_t *chosen_idx) -{ - s8_t i; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_add_ip6_address: invalid netif", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif_add_ip6_address: invalid ip6addr", ip6addr != NULL); - - i = netif_get_ip6_addr_match(netif, ip6addr); - - if (i >= 0) { - /* Address already added */ - if (chosen_idx != NULL) { - *chosen_idx = i; - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Find a free slot. The first one is reserved for link-local addresses. */ - for (i = ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6addr) ? 0 : 1; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { - ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(netif->ip6_addr[i], *ip6addr); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[i]), IP6_UNICAST, netif); - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); - - if (chosen_idx != NULL) { - *chosen_idx = i; - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - if (chosen_idx != NULL) { - *chosen_idx = -1; - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** Dummy IPv6 output function for netifs not supporting IPv6 - */ -static err_t netif_null_output_ip6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - - return ERR_IF; -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/** Dummy IPv4 output function for netifs not supporting IPv4 - */ -static err_t netif_null_output_ip4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - - return ERR_IF; -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/** -* @ingroup netif -* Return the interface index for the netif with name -* or NETIF_NO_INDEX if not found/on error -* -* @param name the name of the netif -*/ -u8_t netif_name_to_index(const char *name) -{ - struct netif *netif = netif_find(name); - - if (netif != NULL) { - return netif_get_index(netif); - } - - /* No name found, return invalid index */ - return NETIF_NO_INDEX; -} - -/** -* @ingroup netif -* Return the interface name for the netif matching index -* or NULL if not found/on error -* -* @param idx the interface index of the netif -* @param name char buffer of at least NETIF_NAMESIZE bytes -*/ -char *netif_index_to_name(u8_t idx, char *name) -{ - struct netif *netif = netif_get_by_index(idx); - - if (netif != NULL) { - name[0] = netif->name[0]; - name[1] = netif->name[1]; - lwip_itoa(&name[2], NETIF_NAMESIZE - 2, netif_index_to_num(idx)); - return name; - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** -* @ingroup netif -* Return the interface for the netif index -* -* @param idx index of netif to find -*/ -struct netif * -netif_get_by_index(u8_t idx) -{ - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (idx == netif_get_index(netif)) { - return netif; /* found! */ - } - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Find a network interface by searching for its name - * - * @param name the name of the netif (like netif->name) plus concatenated number - * in ascii representation (e.g. 'en0') - */ -struct netif * -netif_find(const char *name) -{ - struct netif *netif; - u8_t num; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (name == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - num = (u8_t)atoi(&name[2]); - - NETIF_FOREACH(netif) - { - if (num == netif->num && - name[0] == netif->name[0] && - name[1] == netif->name[1]) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif_find: found %c%c\n", name[0], name[1])); - return netif; - } - } - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif_find: didn't find %c%c\n", name[0], name[1])); - return NULL; -} - -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Add extended netif events listener - * @param callback pointer to listener structure - * @param fn callback function - */ -void netif_add_ext_callback(netif_ext_callback_t *callback, netif_ext_callback_fn fn) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("callback must be != NULL", callback != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("fn must be != NULL", fn != NULL); - - callback->callback_fn = fn; - callback->next = ext_callback; - ext_callback = callback; -} - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Remove extended netif events listener - * @param callback pointer to listener structure - */ -void netif_remove_ext_callback(netif_ext_callback_t *callback) -{ - netif_ext_callback_t *last, *iter; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("callback must be != NULL", callback != NULL); - - if (ext_callback == NULL) { - return; - } - - if (callback == ext_callback) { - ext_callback = ext_callback->next; - } else { - last = ext_callback; - - for (iter = ext_callback->next; iter != NULL; last = iter, iter = iter->next) { - if (iter == callback) { - LWIP_ASSERT("last != NULL", last != NULL); - last->next = callback->next; - callback->next = NULL; - return; - } - } - } -} - -/** - * Invoke extended netif status event - * @param netif netif that is affected by change - * @param reason change reason - * @param args depends on reason, see reason description - */ -void netif_invoke_ext_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args) -{ - netif_ext_callback_t *callback = ext_callback; - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif must be != NULL", netif != NULL); - - while (callback != NULL) { - callback->callback_fn(netif, reason, args); - callback = callback->next; - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP network interface abstraction + * + * @defgroup netif Network interface (NETIF) + * @ingroup callbackstyle_api + * + * @defgroup netif_ip4 IPv4 address handling + * @ingroup netif + * + * @defgroup netif_ip6 IPv6 address handling + * @ingroup netif + * + * @defgroup netif_cd Client data handling + * Store data (void*) on a netif for application usage. + * @see @ref LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA + * @ingroup netif + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include /* memset */ +#include /* atoi */ + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/raw_priv.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK +#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ +#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ + +#include "netif/ethernet.h" + +#if LWIP_AUTOIP +#include "lwip/autoip.h" +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ +#if LWIP_DHCP +#include "lwip/dhcp.h" +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 +#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#endif + +#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK +#define NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(n) \ + do { \ + if (n->status_callback) { \ + (n->status_callback)(n); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else +#define NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(n) +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ + +#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK +#define NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK(n) \ + do { \ + if (n->link_callback) { \ + (n->link_callback)(n); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else +#define NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK(n) +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ + +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK +static netif_ext_callback_t *ext_callback; +#endif + +#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF +struct netif *netif_list; +#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ +struct netif *netif_default; + +#define netif_index_to_num(index) ((index)-1) +static u8_t netif_num; + +#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 0 +static u8_t netif_client_id; +#endif + +#define NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4 0x01 +#define NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6 0x02 +static void netif_issue_reports(struct netif *netif, u8_t report_type); + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +static err_t netif_null_output_ip6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 +static err_t netif_null_output_ip4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF +#if LWIP_IPV4 +static err_t netif_loop_output_ipv4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *addr); +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 +static err_t netif_loop_output_ipv6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *addr); +#endif + +static struct netif loop_netif; + +/** + * Initialize a lwip network interface structure for a loopback interface + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this loopif + * @return ERR_OK if the loopif is initialized + * ERR_MEM if private data couldn't be allocated + */ +static err_t netif_loopif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_loopif_init: invalid netif", netif != NULL); + + /* initialize the snmp variables and counters inside the struct netif + * ifSpeed: no assumption can be made! + */ + MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_softwareLoopback, 0); + + netif->name[0] = 'l'; + netif->name[1] = 'o'; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + netif->output = netif_loop_output_ipv4; +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + netif->output_ip6 = netif_loop_output_ipv6; +#endif +#if LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTICAST + netif_set_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_IGMP); +#endif + NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_DISABLE_ALL); + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + +void netif_init(void) +{ +#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF +#if LWIP_IPV4 +#define LOOPIF_ADDRINIT &loop_ipaddr, &loop_netmask, &loop_gw, + ip4_addr_t loop_ipaddr, loop_netmask, loop_gw; + IP4_ADDR(&loop_gw, 127, 0, 0, 1); + IP4_ADDR(&loop_ipaddr, 127, 0, 0, 1); + IP4_ADDR(&loop_netmask, 255, 0, 0, 0); +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#define LOOPIF_ADDRINIT +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if NO_SYS + netif_add(&loop_netif, LOOPIF_ADDRINIT NULL, netif_loopif_init, ip_input); +#else /* NO_SYS */ + netif_add(&loop_netif, LOOPIF_ADDRINIT NULL, netif_loopif_init, tcpip_input); +#endif /* NO_SYS */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + IP_ADDR6_HOST(loop_netif.ip6_addr, 0, 0, 0, 0x00000001UL); + loop_netif.ip6_addr_state[0] = IP6_ADDR_VALID; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + + netif_set_link_up(&loop_netif); + netif_set_up(&loop_netif); + +#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_nosys + * Forwards a received packet for input processing with + * ethernet_input() or ip_input() depending on netif flags. + * Don't call directly, pass to netif_add() and call + * netif->input(). + * Only works if the netif driver correctly sets + * NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP and/or NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET flag! + */ +err_t netif_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_input: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_input: invalid netif", inp != NULL); + +#if LWIP_ETHERNET + + if (inp->flags & (NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET)) { + return ethernet_input(p, inp); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_ETHERNET */ + return ip_input(p, inp); +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Add a network interface to the list of lwIP netifs. + * + * Same as @ref netif_add but without IPv4 addresses + */ +struct netif * +netif_add_noaddr(struct netif *netif, void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input) +{ + return netif_add(netif, +#if LWIP_IPV4 + NULL, NULL, NULL, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ + state, init, input); +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Add a network interface to the list of lwIP netifs. + * + * @param netif a pre-allocated netif structure + * @param ipaddr IP address for the new netif + * @param netmask network mask for the new netif + * @param gw default gateway IP address for the new netif + * @param state opaque data passed to the new netif + * @param init callback function that initializes the interface + * @param input callback function that is called to pass + * ingress packets up in the protocol layer stack.\n + * It is recommended to use a function that passes the input directly + * to the stack (netif_input(), NO_SYS=1 mode) or via sending a + * message to TCPIP thread (tcpip_input(), NO_SYS=0 mode).\n + * These functions use netif flags NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP and NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET + * to decide whether to forward to ethernet_input() or ip_input(). + * In other words, the functions only work when the netif + * driver is implemented correctly!\n + * Most members of struct netif should be be initialized by the + * netif init function = netif driver (init parameter of this function).\n + * IPv6: Don't forget to call netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address() after + * setting the MAC address in struct netif.hwaddr + * (IPv6 requires a link-local address). + * + * @return netif, or NULL if failed. + */ +struct netif * +netif_add(struct netif *netif, +#if LWIP_IPV4 + const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input) +{ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + s8_t i; +#endif + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + +#if LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF + + if (netif_default != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("single netif already set", 0); + return NULL; + } + +#endif + + LWIP_ERROR("netif_add: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return NULL); + LWIP_ERROR("netif_add: No init function given", init != NULL, return NULL); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (ipaddr == NULL) { + ipaddr = ip_2_ip4(IP4_ADDR_ANY); + } + + if (netmask == NULL) { + netmask = ip_2_ip4(IP4_ADDR_ANY); + } + + if (gw == NULL) { + gw = ip_2_ip4(IP4_ADDR_ANY); + } + + /* reset new interface configuration state */ + ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(&netif->ip_addr); + ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(&netif->netmask); + ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(&netif->gw); + netif->output = netif_null_output_ip4; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + ip_addr_set_zero_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[i]); + netif->ip6_addr_state[i] = IP6_ADDR_INVALID; +#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES + netif->ip6_addr_valid_life[i] = IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC; + netif->ip6_addr_pref_life[i] = IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ + } + + netif->output_ip6 = netif_null_output_ip6; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLE_ALL); + netif->mtu = 0; + netif->flags = 0; +#ifdef netif_get_client_data + memset(netif->client_data, 0, sizeof(netif->client_data)); +#endif /* LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG + /* IPv6 address autoconfiguration not enabled by default */ + netif->ip6_autoconfig_enabled = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ + nd6_restart_netif(netif); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK + netif->status_callback = NULL; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK + netif->link_callback = NULL; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ +#if LWIP_IGMP + netif->igmp_mac_filter = NULL; +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD + netif->mld_mac_filter = NULL; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ +#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK + netif->loop_first = NULL; + netif->loop_last = NULL; +#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ + + /* remember netif specific state information data */ + netif->state = state; + netif->num = netif_num; + netif->input = input; + + NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); +#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK && LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS + netif->loop_cnt_current = 0; +#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK && LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + netif_set_addr(netif, ipaddr, netmask, gw); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + /* call user specified initialization function for netif */ + if (init(netif) != ERR_OK) { + return NULL; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES + /* Initialize the MTU for IPv6 to the one set by the netif driver. + This can be updated later by RA. */ + netif->mtu6 = netif->mtu; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ + +#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF + /* Assign a unique netif number in the range [0..254], so that (num+1) can + serve as an interface index that fits in a u8_t. + We assume that the new netif has not yet been added to the list here. + This algorithm is O(n^2), but that should be OK for lwIP. + */ + { + struct netif *netif2; + int num_netifs; + + do { + if (netif->num == 255) { + netif->num = 0; + } + + num_netifs = 0; + + for (netif2 = netif_list; netif2 != NULL; netif2 = netif2->next) { + LWIP_ASSERT("netif already added", netif2 != netif); + num_netifs++; + LWIP_ASSERT("too many netifs, max. supported number is 255", num_netifs <= 255); + + if (netif2->num == netif->num) { + netif->num++; + break; + } + } + } while (netif2 != NULL); + } + + if (netif->num == 254) { + netif_num = 0; + } else { + netif_num = (u8_t)(netif->num + 1); + } + + /* add this netif to the list */ + netif->next = netif_list; + netif_list = netif; +#endif /* "LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ + mib2_netif_added(netif); + +#if LWIP_IGMP + + /* start IGMP processing */ + if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) { + igmp_start(netif); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif: added interface %c%c IP", + netif->name[0], netif->name[1])); +#if LWIP_IPV4 + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, (" addr ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print(NETIF_DEBUG, ipaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, (" netmask ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print(NETIF_DEBUG, netmask); + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, (" gw ")); + ip4_addr_debug_print(NETIF_DEBUG, gw); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("\n")); + + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_NETIF_ADDED, NULL); + + return netif; +} + +static void netif_do_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr) +{ +#if LWIP_TCP + tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed(old_addr, new_addr); +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_UDP + udp_netif_ip_addr_changed(old_addr, new_addr); +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +#if LWIP_RAW + raw_netif_ip_addr_changed(old_addr, new_addr); +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +static int netif_do_set_ipaddr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, ip_addr_t *old_addr) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pointer", ipaddr != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pointer", old_addr != NULL); + + /* address is actually being changed? */ + if (ip4_addr_cmp(ipaddr, netif_ip4_addr(netif)) == 0) { + ip_addr_t new_addr; + *ip_2_ip4(&new_addr) = *ipaddr; + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(new_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + + ip_addr_copy(*old_addr, *netif_ip_addr4(netif)); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif_set_ipaddr: netif address being changed\n")); + netif_do_ip_addr_changed(old_addr, &new_addr); + + mib2_remove_ip4(netif); + mib2_remove_route_ip4(0, netif); + /* set new IP address to netif */ + ip4_addr_set(ip_2_ip4(&netif->ip_addr), ipaddr); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(netif->ip_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + mib2_add_ip4(netif); + mib2_add_route_ip4(0, netif); + + netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4); + + NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); + return 1; /* address changed */ + } + + return 0; /* address unchanged */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif_ip4 + * Change the IP address of a network interface + * + * @param netif the network interface to change + * @param ipaddr the new IP address + * + * @note call netif_set_addr() if you also want to change netmask and + * default gateway + */ +void netif_set_ipaddr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + ip_addr_t old_addr; + + LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_ipaddr: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ + if (ipaddr == NULL) { + ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netif_do_set_ipaddr(netif, ipaddr, &old_addr)) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + netif_ext_callback_args_t args; + args.ipv4_changed.old_address = &old_addr; + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED, &args); +#endif + } +} + +static int netif_do_set_netmask(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, ip_addr_t *old_nm) +{ + /* address is actually being changed? */ + if (ip4_addr_cmp(netmask, netif_ip4_netmask(netif)) == 0) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pointer", old_nm != NULL); + ip_addr_copy(*old_nm, *netif_ip_netmask4(netif)); +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(old_nm); +#endif + mib2_remove_route_ip4(0, netif); + /* set new netmask to netif */ + ip4_addr_set(ip_2_ip4(&netif->netmask), netmask); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(netif->netmask, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + mib2_add_route_ip4(0, netif); + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif: netmask of interface %c%c set to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + netif->name[0], netif->name[1], + ip4_addr1_16(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), + ip4_addr2_16(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), + ip4_addr3_16(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)), + ip4_addr4_16(netif_ip4_netmask(netif)))); + return 1; /* netmask changed */ + } + + return 0; /* netmask unchanged */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif_ip4 + * Change the netmask of a network interface + * + * @param netif the network interface to change + * @param netmask the new netmask + * + * @note call netif_set_addr() if you also want to change ip address and + * default gateway + */ +void netif_set_netmask(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *netmask) +{ +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + ip_addr_t old_nm_val; + ip_addr_t *old_nm = &old_nm_val; +#else + ip_addr_t *old_nm = NULL; +#endif + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_netmask: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ + if (netmask == NULL) { + netmask = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + if (netif_do_set_netmask(netif, netmask, old_nm)) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + netif_ext_callback_args_t args; + args.ipv4_changed.old_netmask = old_nm; + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED, &args); +#endif + } +} + +static int netif_do_set_gw(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *gw, ip_addr_t *old_gw) +{ + /* address is actually being changed? */ + if (ip4_addr_cmp(gw, netif_ip4_gw(netif)) == 0) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pointer", old_gw != NULL); + ip_addr_copy(*old_gw, *netif_ip_gw4(netif)); +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(old_gw); +#endif + + ip4_addr_set(ip_2_ip4(&netif->gw), gw); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(netif->gw, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif: GW address of interface %c%c set to %" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F "\n", + netif->name[0], netif->name[1], + ip4_addr1_16(netif_ip4_gw(netif)), + ip4_addr2_16(netif_ip4_gw(netif)), + ip4_addr3_16(netif_ip4_gw(netif)), + ip4_addr4_16(netif_ip4_gw(netif)))); + return 1; /* gateway changed */ + } + + return 0; /* gateway unchanged */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif_ip4 + * Change the default gateway for a network interface + * + * @param netif the network interface to change + * @param gw the new default gateway + * + * @note call netif_set_addr() if you also want to change ip address and netmask + */ +void netif_set_gw(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *gw) +{ +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + ip_addr_t old_gw_val; + ip_addr_t *old_gw = &old_gw_val; +#else + ip_addr_t *old_gw = NULL; +#endif + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_gw: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ + if (gw == NULL) { + gw = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + if (netif_do_set_gw(netif, gw, old_gw)) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + netif_ext_callback_args_t args; + args.ipv4_changed.old_gw = old_gw; + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED, &args); +#endif + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif_ip4 + * Change IP address configuration for a network interface (including netmask + * and default gateway). + * + * @param netif the network interface to change + * @param ipaddr the new IP address + * @param netmask the new netmask + * @param gw the new default gateway + */ +void netif_set_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, + const ip4_addr_t *gw) +{ +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + netif_nsc_reason_t change_reason = LWIP_NSC_NONE; + netif_ext_callback_args_t cb_args; + ip_addr_t old_nm_val; + ip_addr_t old_gw_val; + ip_addr_t *old_nm = &old_nm_val; + ip_addr_t *old_gw = &old_gw_val; +#else + ip_addr_t *old_nm = NULL; + ip_addr_t *old_gw = NULL; +#endif + ip_addr_t old_addr; + int remove; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ + if (ipaddr == NULL) { + ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + if (netmask == NULL) { + netmask = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + if (gw == NULL) { + gw = IP4_ADDR_ANY4; + } + + remove = ip4_addr_isany(ipaddr); + + if (remove) { + /* when removing an address, we have to remove it *before* changing netmask/gw + to ensure that tcp RST segment can be sent correctly */ + if (netif_do_set_ipaddr(netif, ipaddr, &old_addr)) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED; + cb_args.ipv4_changed.old_address = &old_addr; +#endif + } + } + + if (netif_do_set_netmask(netif, netmask, old_nm)) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED; + cb_args.ipv4_changed.old_netmask = old_nm; +#endif + } + + if (netif_do_set_gw(netif, gw, old_gw)) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED; + cb_args.ipv4_changed.old_gw = old_gw; +#endif + } + + if (!remove) { + /* set ipaddr last to ensure netmask/gw have been set when status callback is called */ + if (netif_do_set_ipaddr(netif, ipaddr, &old_addr)) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED; + cb_args.ipv4_changed.old_address = &old_addr; +#endif + } + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + + if (change_reason != LWIP_NSC_NONE) { + change_reason |= LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED; + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, change_reason, &cb_args); + } + +#endif +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Remove a network interface from the list of lwIP netifs. + * + * @param netif the network interface to remove + */ +void netif_remove(struct netif *netif) +{ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + int i; +#endif + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netif == NULL) { + return; + } + + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_NETIF_REMOVED, NULL); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + netif_do_ip_addr_changed(netif_ip_addr4(netif), NULL); + } + +#if LWIP_IGMP + + /* stop IGMP processing */ + if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) { + igmp_stop(netif); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { + netif_do_ip_addr_changed(netif_ip_addr6(netif, i), NULL); + } + } + +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD + /* stop MLD processing */ + mld6_stop(netif); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + + if (netif_is_up(netif)) { + /* set netif down before removing (call callback function) */ + netif_set_down(netif); + } + + mib2_remove_ip4(netif); + + /* this netif is default? */ + if (netif_default == netif) { + /* reset default netif */ + netif_set_default(NULL); + } + +#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF + + /* is it the first netif? */ + if (netif_list == netif) { + netif_list = netif->next; + } else { + /* look for netif further down the list */ + struct netif *tmp_netif; + NETIF_FOREACH(tmp_netif) + { + if (tmp_netif->next == netif) { + tmp_netif->next = netif->next; + break; + } + } + + if (tmp_netif == NULL) { + return; /* netif is not on the list */ + } + } + +#endif /* !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ + mib2_netif_removed(netif); +#if LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK + + if (netif->remove_callback) { + netif->remove_callback(netif); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif_remove: removed netif\n")); +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Set a network interface as the default network interface + * (used to output all packets for which no specific route is found) + * + * @param netif the default network interface + */ +void netif_set_default(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netif == NULL) { + /* remove default route */ + mib2_remove_route_ip4(1, netif); + } else { + /* install default route */ + mib2_add_route_ip4(1, netif); + } + + netif_default = netif; + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif: setting default interface %c%c\n", + netif ? netif->name[0] : '\'', netif ? netif->name[1] : '\'')); +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Bring an interface up, available for processing + * traffic. + */ +void netif_set_up(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_up: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); + + if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_UP)) { + netif_set_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_UP); + + MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(&netif->ts); + + NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); + +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + { + netif_ext_callback_args_t args; + args.status_changed.state = 1; + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED, &args); + } +#endif + + netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4 | NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6); +#if LWIP_IPV6 + nd6_restart_netif(netif); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + } +} + +/** Send ARP/IGMP/MLD/RS events, e.g. on link-up/netif-up or addr-change + */ +static void netif_issue_reports(struct netif *netif, u8_t report_type) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_issue_reports: invalid netif", netif != NULL); + + /* Only send reports when both link and admin states are up */ + if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP) || + !(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_UP)) { + return; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if ((report_type & NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4) && + !ip4_addr_isany_val(*netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { +#if LWIP_ARP + + /* For Ethernet network interfaces, we would like to send a "gratuitous ARP" */ + if (netif->flags & (NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP)) { + etharp_gratuitous(netif); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ + +#if LWIP_IGMP + + /* resend IGMP memberships */ + if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_IGMP) { + igmp_report_groups(netif); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (report_type & NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6) { +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD + /* send mld memberships */ + mld6_report_groups(netif); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Bring an interface down, disabling any traffic processing. + */ +void netif_set_down(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_down: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); + + if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_UP) { +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + { + netif_ext_callback_args_t args; + args.status_changed.state = 0; + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED, &args); + } +#endif + + netif_clear_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_UP); + MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(&netif->ts); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP + + if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP) { + etharp_cleanup_netif(netif); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + nd6_cleanup_netif(netif); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + + NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); + } +} + +#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Set callback to be called when interface is brought up/down or address is changed while up + */ +void netif_set_status_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn status_callback) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netif) { + netif->status_callback = status_callback; + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ + +#if LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Set callback to be called when the interface has been removed + */ +void netif_set_remove_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn remove_callback) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netif) { + netif->remove_callback = remove_callback; + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK */ + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Called by a driver when its link goes up + */ +void netif_set_link_up(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_link_up: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); + + if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP)) { + netif_set_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP); + +#if LWIP_DHCP + dhcp_network_changed(netif); +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ + +#if LWIP_AUTOIP + autoip_network_changed(netif); +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ + + netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV4 | NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6); +#if LWIP_IPV6 + nd6_restart_netif(netif); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + + NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK(netif); +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + { + netif_ext_callback_args_t args; + args.link_changed.state = 1; + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED, &args); + } +#endif + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Called by a driver when its link goes down + */ +void netif_set_link_down(struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("netif_set_link_down: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ); + + if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP) { + netif_clear_flags(netif, NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP); + NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK(netif); +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + { + netif_ext_callback_args_t args; + args.link_changed.state = 0; + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED, &args); + } +#endif + } +} + +#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Set callback to be called when link is brought up/down + */ +void netif_set_link_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn link_callback) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netif) { + netif->link_callback = link_callback; + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ + +#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Send an IP packet to be received on the same netif (loopif-like). + * The pbuf is simply copied and handed back to netif->input. + * In multithreaded mode, this is done directly since netif->input must put + * the packet on a queue. + * In callback mode, the packet is put on an internal queue and is fed to + * netif->input by netif_poll(). + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface structure + * @param p the (IP) packet to 'send' + * @return ERR_OK if the packet has been sent + * ERR_MEM if the pbuf used to copy the packet couldn't be allocated + */ +err_t netif_loop_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct pbuf *r; + err_t err; + struct pbuf *last; +#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS + u16_t clen = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ + /* If we have a loopif, SNMP counters are adjusted for it, + * if not they are adjusted for 'netif'. */ +#if MIB2_STATS +#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + struct netif *stats_if = &loop_netif; +#else /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + struct netif *stats_if = netif; +#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING + u8_t schedule_poll = 0; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_loop_output: invalid netif", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_loop_output: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); + + /* Allocate a new pbuf */ + r = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (r == NULL) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifoutdiscards); + return ERR_MEM; + } + +#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS + clen = pbuf_clen(r); + + /* check for overflow or too many pbuf on queue */ + if (((netif->loop_cnt_current + clen) < netif->loop_cnt_current) || + ((netif->loop_cnt_current + clen) > LWIP_MIN(LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS, 0xFFFF))) { + pbuf_free(r); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifoutdiscards); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + netif->loop_cnt_current = (u16_t)(netif->loop_cnt_current + clen); +#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ + + /* Copy the whole pbuf queue p into the single pbuf r */ + if ((err = pbuf_copy(r, p)) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(r); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifoutdiscards); + return err; + } + + /* Put the packet on a linked list which gets emptied through calling + netif_poll(). */ + + /* let last point to the last pbuf in chain r */ + for (last = r; last->next != NULL; last = last->next) { + /* nothing to do here, just get to the last pbuf */ + } + + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + + if (netif->loop_first != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("if first != NULL, last must also be != NULL", netif->loop_last != NULL); + netif->loop_last->next = r; + netif->loop_last = last; + } else { + netif->loop_first = r; + netif->loop_last = last; +#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING + /* No existing packets queued, schedule poll */ + schedule_poll = 1; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + + LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(stats_if, ifoutoctets, p->tot_len); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifoutucastpkts); + +#if LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING + + /* For multithreading environment, schedule a call to netif_poll */ + if (schedule_poll) { + tcpip_try_callback((tcpip_callback_fn)netif_poll, netif); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF +#if LWIP_IPV4 +static err_t netif_loop_output_ipv4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *addr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + return netif_loop_output(netif, p); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +static err_t netif_loop_output_ipv6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *addr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + return netif_loop_output(netif, p); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + +/** + * Call netif_poll() in the main loop of your application. This is to prevent + * reentering non-reentrant functions like tcp_input(). Packets passed to + * netif_loop_output() are put on a list that is passed to netif->input() by + * netif_poll(). + */ +void netif_poll(struct netif *netif) +{ + /* If we have a loopif, SNMP counters are adjusted for it, + * if not they are adjusted for 'netif'. */ +#if MIB2_STATS +#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + struct netif *stats_if = &loop_netif; +#else /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ + struct netif *stats_if = netif; +#endif /* LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF */ +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_poll: invalid netif", netif != NULL); + + /* Get a packet from the list. With SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT=1, this is protected */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + + while (netif->loop_first != NULL) { + struct pbuf *in, *in_end; +#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS + u8_t clen = 1; +#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ + + in = in_end = netif->loop_first; + + while (in_end->len != in_end->tot_len) { + LWIP_ASSERT("bogus pbuf: len != tot_len but next == NULL!", in_end->next != NULL); + in_end = in_end->next; +#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS + clen++; +#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ + } + +#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS + /* adjust the number of pbufs on queue */ + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->loop_cnt_current underflow", + ((netif->loop_cnt_current - clen) < netif->loop_cnt_current)); + netif->loop_cnt_current = (u16_t)(netif->loop_cnt_current - clen); +#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ + + /* 'in_end' now points to the last pbuf from 'in' */ + if (in_end == netif->loop_last) { + /* this was the last pbuf in the list */ + netif->loop_first = netif->loop_last = NULL; + } else { + /* pop the pbuf off the list */ + netif->loop_first = in_end->next; + LWIP_ASSERT("should not be null since first != last!", netif->loop_first != NULL); + } + + /* De-queue the pbuf from its successors on the 'loop_' list. */ + in_end->next = NULL; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); + + in->if_idx = netif_get_index(netif); + + LINK_STATS_INC(link.recv); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(stats_if, ifinoctets, in->tot_len); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(stats_if, ifinucastpkts); + + /* loopback packets are always IP packets! */ + if (ip_input(in, netif) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(in); + } + + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev); + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev); +} + +#if !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING +/** + * Calls netif_poll() for every netif on the netif_list. + */ +void netif_poll_all(void) +{ + struct netif *netif; + /* loop through netifs */ + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + netif_poll(netif); + } +} +#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ +#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ + +#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 0 +/** + * @ingroup netif_cd + * Allocate an index to store data in client_data member of struct netif. + * Returned value is an index in mentioned array. + * @see LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA + */ +u8_t netif_alloc_client_data_id(void) +{ + u8_t result = netif_client_id; + netif_client_id++; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + +#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 256 +#error LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA must be <= 256 +#endif + LWIP_ASSERT("Increase LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA in lwipopts.h", result < LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA); + return (u8_t)(result + LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MAX); +} +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** + * @ingroup netif_ip6 + * Change an IPv6 address of a network interface + * + * @param netif the network interface to change + * @param addr_idx index of the IPv6 address + * @param addr6 the new IPv6 address + * + * @note call netif_ip6_addr_set_state() to set the address valid/temptative + */ +void netif_ip6_addr_set(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, const ip6_addr_t *addr6) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_ip6_addr_set: invalid netif", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_ip6_addr_set: invalid addr6", addr6 != NULL); + + netif_ip6_addr_set_parts(netif, addr_idx, addr6->addr[0], addr6->addr[1], + addr6->addr[2], addr6->addr[3]); +} + +/* + * Change an IPv6 address of a network interface (internal version taking 4 * u32_t) + * + * @param netif the network interface to change + * @param addr_idx index of the IPv6 address + * @param i0 word0 of the new IPv6 address + * @param i1 word1 of the new IPv6 address + * @param i2 word2 of the new IPv6 address + * @param i3 word3 of the new IPv6 address + */ +void netif_ip6_addr_set_parts(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u32_t i0, u32_t i1, u32_t i2, u32_t i3) +{ + ip_addr_t old_addr; + ip_addr_t new_ipaddr; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid index", addr_idx < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES); + + ip6_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip6(&old_addr), *netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx)); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(old_addr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); + + /* address is actually being changed? */ + if ((ip_2_ip6(&old_addr)->addr[0] != i0) || (ip_2_ip6(&old_addr)->addr[1] != i1) || + (ip_2_ip6(&old_addr)->addr[2] != i2) || (ip_2_ip6(&old_addr)->addr[3] != i3)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif_ip6_addr_set: netif address being changed\n")); + + IP_ADDR6(&new_ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&new_ipaddr), IP6_UNICAST, netif); + + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx))) { + netif_do_ip_addr_changed(netif_ip_addr6(netif, addr_idx), &new_ipaddr); + } + + /* @todo: remove/readd mib2 ip6 entries? */ + + ip_addr_copy(netif->ip6_addr[addr_idx], new_ipaddr); + + if (ip6_addr_isvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx))) { + netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6); + NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + { + netif_ext_callback_args_t args; + args.ipv6_set.addr_index = addr_idx; + args.ipv6_set.old_address = &old_addr; + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV6_SET, &args); + } +#endif + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif: IPv6 address %d of interface %c%c set to %s/0x%" X8_F "\n", + addr_idx, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], ip6addr_ntoa(netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx)), + netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx))); +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif_ip6 + * Change the state of an IPv6 address of a network interface + * (INVALID, TEMPTATIVE, PREFERRED, DEPRECATED, where TEMPTATIVE + * includes the number of checks done, see ip6_addr.h) + * + * @param netif the network interface to change + * @param addr_idx index of the IPv6 address + * @param state the new IPv6 address state + */ +void netif_ip6_addr_set_state(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u8_t state) +{ + u8_t old_state; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid index", addr_idx < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES); + + old_state = netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx); + + /* state is actually being changed? */ + if (old_state != state) { + u8_t old_valid = old_state & IP6_ADDR_VALID; + u8_t new_valid = state & IP6_ADDR_VALID; + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif_ip6_addr_set_state: netif address state being changed\n")); + +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD + + /* Reevaluate solicited-node multicast group membership. */ + if (netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_MLD6) { + nd6_adjust_mld_membership(netif, addr_idx, state); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + + if (old_valid && !new_valid) { + /* address about to be removed by setting invalid */ + netif_do_ip_addr_changed(netif_ip_addr6(netif, addr_idx), NULL); + /* @todo: remove mib2 ip6 entries? */ + } + + netif->ip6_addr_state[addr_idx] = state; + + if (!old_valid && new_valid) { + /* address added by setting valid */ + /* This is a good moment to check that the address is properly zoned. */ + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx), netif); + /* @todo: add mib2 ip6 entries? */ + netif_issue_reports(netif, NETIF_REPORT_TYPE_IPV6); + } + + if ((old_state & ~IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK) != + (state & ~IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK)) { + /* address state has changed -> call the callback function */ + NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK(netif); + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK + { + netif_ext_callback_args_t args; + args.ipv6_addr_state_changed.addr_index = addr_idx; + args.ipv6_addr_state_changed.old_state = old_state; + args.ipv6_addr_state_changed.address = netif_ip_addr6(netif, addr_idx); + netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, LWIP_NSC_IPV6_ADDR_STATE_CHANGED, &args); + } +#endif + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif: IPv6 address %d of interface %c%c set to %s/0x%" X8_F "\n", + addr_idx, netif->name[0], netif->name[1], ip6addr_ntoa(netif_ip6_addr(netif, addr_idx)), + netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, addr_idx))); +} + +/** + * Checks if a specific local address is present on the netif and returns its + * index. Depending on its state, it may or may not be assigned to the + * interface (as per RFC terminology). + * + * The given address may or may not be zoned (i.e., have a zone index other + * than IP6_NO_ZONE). If the address is zoned, it must have the correct zone + * for the given netif, or no match will be found. + * + * @param netif the netif to check + * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address to find + * @return >= 0: address found, this is its index + * -1: address not found on this netif + */ +s8_t netif_get_ip6_addr_match(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + s8_t i; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_get_ip6_addr_match: invalid netif", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_get_ip6_addr_match: invalid ip6addr", ip6addr != NULL); + +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + if (ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) && !ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6addr, netif)) { + return -1; /* wrong zone, no match */ + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (!ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i)) && + ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(netif_ip6_addr(netif, i), ip6addr)) { + return i; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif_ip6 + * Create a link-local IPv6 address on a netif (stored in slot 0) + * + * @param netif the netif to create the address on + * @param from_mac_48bit if != 0, assume hwadr is a 48-bit MAC address (std conversion) + * if == 0, use hwaddr directly as interface ID + */ +void netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(struct netif *netif, u8_t from_mac_48bit) +{ + u8_t i, addr_index; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address: invalid netif", netif != NULL); + + /* Link-local prefix. */ + ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000ul); + ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[1] = 0; + + /* Generate interface ID. */ + if (from_mac_48bit) { + /* Assume hwaddr is a 48-bit IEEE 802 MAC. Convert to EUI-64 address. Complement Group bit. */ + ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[2] = lwip_htonl((((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[0] ^ 0x02)) << 24) | + ((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[1]) << 16) | + ((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[2]) << 8) | + (0xff)); + ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[3] = lwip_htonl((u32_t)(0xfeul << 24) | + ((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[3]) << 16) | + ((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[4]) << 8) | + (netif->hwaddr[5])); + } else { + /* Use hwaddr directly as interface ID. */ + ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[2] = 0; + ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[3] = 0; + + addr_index = 3; + + for (i = 0; (i < 8) && (i < netif->hwaddr_len); i++) { + if (i == 4) { + addr_index--; + } + + ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0])->addr[addr_index] |= lwip_htonl(((u32_t)(netif->hwaddr[netif->hwaddr_len - i - 1])) << (8 * (i & 0x03))); + } + } + + /* Set a link-local zone. Even though the zone is implied by the owning + * netif, setting the zone anyway has two important conceptual advantages: + * 1) it avoids the need for a ton of exceptions in internal code, allowing + * e.g. ip6_addr_cmp() to be used on local addresses; + * 2) the properly zoned address is visible externally, e.g. when any outside + * code enumerates available addresses or uses one to bind a socket. + * Any external code unaware of address scoping is likely to just ignore the + * zone field, so this should not create any compatibility problems. */ + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[0]), IP6_UNICAST, netif); + + /* Set address state. */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS + /* Will perform duplicate address detection (DAD). */ + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); +#else + /* Consider address valid. */ + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif_ip6 + * This function allows for the easy addition of a new IPv6 address to an interface. + * It takes care of finding an empty slot and then sets the address tentative + * (to make sure that all the subsequent processing happens). + * + * @param netif netif to add the address on + * @param ip6addr address to add + * @param chosen_idx if != NULL, the chosen IPv6 address index will be stored here + */ +err_t netif_add_ip6_address(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, s8_t *chosen_idx) +{ + s8_t i; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_add_ip6_address: invalid netif", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif_add_ip6_address: invalid ip6addr", ip6addr != NULL); + + i = netif_get_ip6_addr_match(netif, ip6addr); + + if (i >= 0) { + /* Address already added */ + if (chosen_idx != NULL) { + *chosen_idx = i; + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Find a free slot. The first one is reserved for link-local addresses. */ + for (i = ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6addr) ? 0 : 1; i < LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_isinvalid(netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i))) { + ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(netif->ip6_addr[i], *ip6addr); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&netif->ip6_addr[i]), IP6_UNICAST, netif); + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(netif, i, IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE); + + if (chosen_idx != NULL) { + *chosen_idx = i; + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + if (chosen_idx != NULL) { + *chosen_idx = -1; + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** Dummy IPv6 output function for netifs not supporting IPv6 + */ +static err_t netif_null_output_ip6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + + return ERR_IF; +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/** Dummy IPv4 output function for netifs not supporting IPv4 + */ +static err_t netif_null_output_ip4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + + return ERR_IF; +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/** +* @ingroup netif +* Return the interface index for the netif with name +* or NETIF_NO_INDEX if not found/on error +* +* @param name the name of the netif +*/ +u8_t netif_name_to_index(const char *name) +{ + struct netif *netif = netif_find(name); + + if (netif != NULL) { + return netif_get_index(netif); + } + + /* No name found, return invalid index */ + return NETIF_NO_INDEX; +} + +/** +* @ingroup netif +* Return the interface name for the netif matching index +* or NULL if not found/on error +* +* @param idx the interface index of the netif +* @param name char buffer of at least NETIF_NAMESIZE bytes +*/ +char *netif_index_to_name(u8_t idx, char *name) +{ + struct netif *netif = netif_get_by_index(idx); + + if (netif != NULL) { + name[0] = netif->name[0]; + name[1] = netif->name[1]; + lwip_itoa(&name[2], NETIF_NAMESIZE - 2, netif_index_to_num(idx)); + return name; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** +* @ingroup netif +* Return the interface for the netif index +* +* @param idx index of netif to find +*/ +struct netif * +netif_get_by_index(u8_t idx) +{ + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (idx == netif_get_index(netif)) { + return netif; /* found! */ + } + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Find a network interface by searching for its name + * + * @param name the name of the netif (like netif->name) plus concatenated number + * in ascii representation (e.g. 'en0') + */ +struct netif * +netif_find(const char *name) +{ + struct netif *netif; + u8_t num; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (name == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + num = (u8_t)atoi(&name[2]); + + NETIF_FOREACH(netif) + { + if (num == netif->num && + name[0] == netif->name[0] && + name[1] == netif->name[1]) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif_find: found %c%c\n", name[0], name[1])); + return netif; + } + } + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("netif_find: didn't find %c%c\n", name[0], name[1])); + return NULL; +} + +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Add extended netif events listener + * @param callback pointer to listener structure + * @param fn callback function + */ +void netif_add_ext_callback(netif_ext_callback_t *callback, netif_ext_callback_fn fn) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("callback must be != NULL", callback != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("fn must be != NULL", fn != NULL); + + callback->callback_fn = fn; + callback->next = ext_callback; + ext_callback = callback; +} + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Remove extended netif events listener + * @param callback pointer to listener structure + */ +void netif_remove_ext_callback(netif_ext_callback_t *callback) +{ + netif_ext_callback_t *last, *iter; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("callback must be != NULL", callback != NULL); + + if (ext_callback == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (callback == ext_callback) { + ext_callback = ext_callback->next; + } else { + last = ext_callback; + + for (iter = ext_callback->next; iter != NULL; last = iter, iter = iter->next) { + if (iter == callback) { + LWIP_ASSERT("last != NULL", last != NULL); + last->next = callback->next; + callback->next = NULL; + return; + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Invoke extended netif status event + * @param netif netif that is affected by change + * @param reason change reason + * @param args depends on reason, see reason description + */ +void netif_invoke_ext_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args) +{ + netif_ext_callback_t *callback = ext_callback; + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif must be != NULL", netif != NULL); + + while (callback != NULL) { + callback->callback_fn(netif, reason, args); + callback = callback->next; + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/pbuf.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/pbuf.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/pbuf.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/pbuf.c index ceb37949..a59c38d7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/pbuf.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/pbuf.c @@ -1,1570 +1,1570 @@ -/** - * @file - * Packet buffer management - */ - -/** - * @defgroup pbuf Packet buffers (PBUF) - * @ingroup infrastructure - * - * Packets are built from the pbuf data structure. It supports dynamic - * memory allocation for packet contents or can reference externally - * managed packet contents both in RAM and ROM. Quick allocation for - * incoming packets is provided through pools with fixed sized pbufs. - * - * A packet may span over multiple pbufs, chained as a singly linked - * list. This is called a "pbuf chain". - * - * Multiple packets may be queued, also using this singly linked list. - * This is called a "packet queue". - * - * So, a packet queue consists of one or more pbuf chains, each of - * which consist of one or more pbufs. CURRENTLY, PACKET QUEUES ARE - * NOT SUPPORTED!!! Use helper structs to queue multiple packets. - * - * The differences between a pbuf chain and a packet queue are very - * precise but subtle. - * - * The last pbuf of a packet has a ->tot_len field that equals the - * ->len field. It can be found by traversing the list. If the last - * pbuf of a packet has a ->next field other than NULL, more packets - * are on the queue. - * - * Therefore, looping through a pbuf of a single packet, has an - * loop end condition (tot_len == p->len), NOT (next == NULL). - * - * Example of custom pbuf usage: @ref zerocopyrx - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#if LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#endif -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#endif - -#include - -#define SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct pbuf)) -/* Since the pool is created in memp, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE will be automatically - aligned there. Therefore, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE_ALIGNED can be used here. */ -#define PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE) - -static const struct pbuf *pbuf_skip_const(const struct pbuf *in, u16_t in_offset, u16_t *out_offset); - -#if !LWIP_TCP || !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || !PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ -#define PBUF_POOL_IS_EMPTY() -#else /* !LWIP_TCP || !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || !PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ */ - -#if !NO_SYS -#ifndef PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#define PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL() \ - do { \ - if (tcpip_try_callback(pbuf_free_ooseq_callback, NULL) != ERR_OK) { \ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ - pbuf_free_ooseq_pending = 0; \ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#endif /* PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL */ -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - -volatile u8_t pbuf_free_ooseq_pending; -#define PBUF_POOL_IS_EMPTY() pbuf_pool_is_empty() - -/** - * Attempt to reclaim some memory from queued out-of-sequence TCP segments - * if we run out of pool pbufs. It's better to give priority to new packets - * if we're running out. - * - * This must be done in the correct thread context therefore this function - * can only be used with NO_SYS=0 and through tcpip_callback. - */ -#if !NO_SYS -static -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - void - pbuf_free_ooseq(void) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - SYS_ARCH_SET(pbuf_free_ooseq_pending, 0); - - for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; NULL != pcb; pcb = pcb->next) { - if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { - /** Free the ooseq pbufs of one PCB only */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_free_ooseq: freeing out-of-sequence pbufs\n")); - tcp_free_ooseq(pcb); - return; - } - } -} - -#if !NO_SYS -/** - * Just a callback function for tcpip_callback() that calls pbuf_free_ooseq(). - */ -static void pbuf_free_ooseq_callback(void *arg) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - pbuf_free_ooseq(); -} -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - -/** Queue a call to pbuf_free_ooseq if not already queued. */ -static void pbuf_pool_is_empty(void) -{ -#ifndef PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL - SYS_ARCH_SET(pbuf_free_ooseq_pending, 1); -#else /* PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL */ - u8_t queued; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); - queued = pbuf_free_ooseq_pending; - pbuf_free_ooseq_pending = 1; - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); - - if (!queued) { - /* queue a call to pbuf_free_ooseq if not already queued */ - PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL(); - } - -#endif /* PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL */ -} -#endif /* !LWIP_TCP || !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || !PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ */ - -/* Initialize members of struct pbuf after allocation */ -static void pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(struct pbuf *p, void *payload, u16_t tot_len, u16_t len, pbuf_type type, u8_t flags) -{ - p->next = NULL; - p->payload = payload; - p->tot_len = tot_len; - p->len = len; - p->type_internal = (u8_t)type; - p->flags = flags; - p->ref = 1; - p->if_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Allocates a pbuf of the given type (possibly a chain for PBUF_POOL type). - * - * The actual memory allocated for the pbuf is determined by the - * layer at which the pbuf is allocated and the requested size - * (from the size parameter). - * - * @param layer header size - * @param length size of the pbuf's payload - * @param type this parameter decides how and where the pbuf - * should be allocated as follows: - * - * - PBUF_RAM: buffer memory for pbuf is allocated as one large - * chunk. This includes protocol headers as well. - * - PBUF_ROM: no buffer memory is allocated for the pbuf, even for - * protocol headers. Additional headers must be prepended - * by allocating another pbuf and chain in to the front of - * the ROM pbuf. It is assumed that the memory used is really - * similar to ROM in that it is immutable and will not be - * changed. Memory which is dynamic should generally not - * be attached to PBUF_ROM pbufs. Use PBUF_REF instead. - * - PBUF_REF: no buffer memory is allocated for the pbuf, even for - * protocol headers. It is assumed that the pbuf is only - * being used in a single thread. If the pbuf gets queued, - * then pbuf_take should be called to copy the buffer. - * - PBUF_POOL: the pbuf is allocated as a pbuf chain, with pbufs from - * the pbuf pool that is allocated during pbuf_init(). - * - * @return the allocated pbuf. If multiple pbufs where allocated, this - * is the first pbuf of a pbuf chain. - */ -struct pbuf * -pbuf_alloc(pbuf_layer layer, u16_t length, pbuf_type type) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u16_t offset = (u16_t)layer; - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_alloc(length=%" U16_F ")\n", length)); - - switch (type) { - case PBUF_REF: /* fall through */ - case PBUF_ROM: - p = pbuf_alloc_reference(NULL, length, type); - break; - - case PBUF_POOL: { - struct pbuf *q, *last; - u16_t rem_len; /* remaining length */ - p = NULL; - last = NULL; - rem_len = length; - - do { - u16_t qlen; - q = (struct pbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_PBUF_POOL); - - if (q == NULL) { - PBUF_POOL_IS_EMPTY(); - - /* free chain so far allocated */ - if (p) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - /* bail out unsuccessfully */ - return NULL; - } - - qlen = LWIP_MIN(rem_len, (u16_t)(PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE_ALIGNED - LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset))); - pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(q, LWIP_MEM_ALIGN((void *)((u8_t *)q + SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF + offset)), - rem_len, qlen, type, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_alloc: pbuf q->payload properly aligned", - ((mem_ptr_t)q->payload % MEM_ALIGNMENT) == 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE must be bigger than MEM_ALIGNMENT", - (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE_ALIGNED - LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset)) > 0); - - if (p == NULL) { - /* allocated head of pbuf chain (into p) */ - p = q; - } else { - /* make previous pbuf point to this pbuf */ - last->next = q; - } - - last = q; - rem_len = (u16_t)(rem_len - qlen); - offset = 0; - } while (rem_len > 0); - - break; - } - - case PBUF_RAM: { - u16_t payload_len = (u16_t)(LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset) + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(length)); - mem_size_t alloc_len = (mem_size_t)(LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF) + payload_len); - - /* bug #50040: Check for integer overflow when calculating alloc_len */ - if ((payload_len < LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(length)) || - (alloc_len < LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(length))) { - return NULL; - } - - /* If pbuf is to be allocated in RAM, allocate memory for it. */ - p = (struct pbuf *)mem_malloc(alloc_len); - - if (p == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(p, LWIP_MEM_ALIGN((void *)((u8_t *)p + SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF + offset)), - length, length, type, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_alloc: pbuf->payload properly aligned", - ((mem_ptr_t)p->payload % MEM_ALIGNMENT) == 0); - break; - } - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_alloc: erroneous type", 0); - return NULL; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_alloc(length=%" U16_F ") == %p\n", length, (void *)p)); - return p; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Allocates a pbuf for referenced data. - * Referenced data can be volatile (PBUF_REF) or long-lived (PBUF_ROM). - * - * The actual memory allocated for the pbuf is determined by the - * layer at which the pbuf is allocated and the requested size - * (from the size parameter). - * - * @param payload referenced payload - * @param length size of the pbuf's payload - * @param type this parameter decides how and where the pbuf - * should be allocated as follows: - * - * - PBUF_ROM: It is assumed that the memory used is really - * similar to ROM in that it is immutable and will not be - * changed. Memory which is dynamic should generally not - * be attached to PBUF_ROM pbufs. Use PBUF_REF instead. - * - PBUF_REF: It is assumed that the pbuf is only - * being used in a single thread. If the pbuf gets queued, - * then pbuf_take should be called to copy the buffer. - * - * @return the allocated pbuf. - */ -struct pbuf * -pbuf_alloc_reference(void *payload, u16_t length, pbuf_type type) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pbuf_type", (type == PBUF_REF) || (type == PBUF_ROM)); - /* only allocate memory for the pbuf structure */ - p = (struct pbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_PBUF); - - if (p == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("pbuf_alloc_reference: Could not allocate MEMP_PBUF for PBUF_%s.\n", - (type == PBUF_ROM) ? "ROM" : "REF")); - return NULL; - } - - pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(p, payload, length, length, type, 0); - return p; -} - -#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Initialize a custom pbuf (already allocated). - * Example of custom pbuf usage: @ref zerocopyrx - * - * @param l header size - * @param length size of the pbuf's payload - * @param type type of the pbuf (only used to treat the pbuf accordingly, as - * this function allocates no memory) - * @param p pointer to the custom pbuf to initialize (already allocated) - * @param payload_mem pointer to the buffer that is used for payload and headers, - * must be at least big enough to hold 'length' plus the header size, - * may be NULL if set later. - * ATTENTION: The caller is responsible for correct alignment of this buffer!! - * @param payload_mem_len the size of the 'payload_mem' buffer, must be at least - * big enough to hold 'length' plus the header size - */ -struct pbuf * -pbuf_alloced_custom(pbuf_layer l, u16_t length, pbuf_type type, struct pbuf_custom *p, - void *payload_mem, u16_t payload_mem_len) -{ - u16_t offset = (u16_t)l; - void *payload; - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_alloced_custom(length=%" U16_F ")\n", length)); - - if (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset) + length > payload_mem_len) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("pbuf_alloced_custom(length=%" U16_F ") buffer too short\n", length)); - return NULL; - } - - if (payload_mem != NULL) { - payload = (u8_t *)payload_mem + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset); - } else { - payload = NULL; - } - - pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(&p->pbuf, payload, length, length, type, PBUF_FLAG_IS_CUSTOM); - return &p->pbuf; -} -#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Shrink a pbuf chain to a desired length. - * - * @param p pbuf to shrink. - * @param new_len desired new length of pbuf chain - * - * Depending on the desired length, the first few pbufs in a chain might - * be skipped and left unchanged. The new last pbuf in the chain will be - * resized, and any remaining pbufs will be freed. - * - * @note If the pbuf is ROM/REF, only the ->tot_len and ->len fields are adjusted. - * @note May not be called on a packet queue. - * - * @note Despite its name, pbuf_realloc cannot grow the size of a pbuf (chain). - */ -void pbuf_realloc(struct pbuf *p, u16_t new_len) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - u16_t rem_len; /* remaining length */ - u16_t shrink; - - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_realloc: p != NULL", p != NULL); - - /* desired length larger than current length? */ - if (new_len >= p->tot_len) { - /* enlarging not yet supported */ - return; - } - - /* the pbuf chain grows by (new_len - p->tot_len) bytes - * (which may be negative in case of shrinking) */ - shrink = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - new_len); - - /* first, step over any pbufs that should remain in the chain */ - rem_len = new_len; - q = p; - - /* should this pbuf be kept? */ - while (rem_len > q->len) { - /* decrease remaining length by pbuf length */ - rem_len = (u16_t)(rem_len - q->len); - /* decrease total length indicator */ - q->tot_len = (u16_t)(q->tot_len - shrink); - /* proceed to next pbuf in chain */ - q = q->next; - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_realloc: q != NULL", q != NULL); - } - - /* we have now reached the new last pbuf (in q) */ - /* rem_len == desired length for pbuf q */ - - /* shrink allocated memory for PBUF_RAM */ - /* (other types merely adjust their length fields */ - if (pbuf_match_allocsrc(q, PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_HEAP) && (rem_len != q->len) -#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF - && ((q->flags & PBUF_FLAG_IS_CUSTOM) == 0) -#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ - ) { - /* reallocate and adjust the length of the pbuf that will be split */ - q = (struct pbuf *)mem_trim(q, (mem_size_t)(((u8_t *)q->payload - (u8_t *)q) + rem_len)); - LWIP_ASSERT("mem_trim returned q == NULL", q != NULL); - } - - /* adjust length fields for new last pbuf */ - q->len = rem_len; - q->tot_len = q->len; - - /* any remaining pbufs in chain? */ - if (q->next != NULL) { - /* free remaining pbufs in chain */ - pbuf_free(q->next); - } - - /* q is last packet in chain */ - q->next = NULL; -} - -/** - * Adjusts the payload pointer to reveal headers in the payload. - * @see pbuf_add_header. - * - * @param p pbuf to change the header size. - * @param header_size_increment Number of bytes to increment header size. - * @param force Allow 'header_size_increment > 0' for PBUF_REF/PBUF_ROM types - * - * @return non-zero on failure, zero on success. - * - */ -static u8_t pbuf_add_header_impl(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment, u8_t force) -{ - u16_t type_internal; - void *payload; - u16_t increment_magnitude; - - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - - if ((p == NULL) || (header_size_increment > 0xFFFF)) { - return 1; - } - - if (header_size_increment == 0) { - return 0; - } - - increment_magnitude = (u16_t)header_size_increment; - - /* Do not allow tot_len to wrap as a result. */ - if ((u16_t)(increment_magnitude + p->tot_len) < increment_magnitude) { - return 1; - } - - type_internal = p->type_internal; - - /* pbuf types containing payloads? */ - if (type_internal & PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS) { - /* set new payload pointer */ - payload = (u8_t *)p->payload - header_size_increment; - - /* boundary check fails? */ - if ((u8_t *)payload < (u8_t *)p + SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("pbuf_add_header: failed as %p < %p (not enough space for new header size)\n", - (void *)payload, (void *)((u8_t *)p + SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF))); - /* bail out unsuccessfully */ - return 1; - } - - /* pbuf types referring to external payloads? */ - } else { - /* hide a header in the payload? */ - if (force) { - payload = (u8_t *)p->payload - header_size_increment; - } else { - /* cannot expand payload to front (yet!) - * bail out unsuccessfully */ - return 1; - } - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_add_header: old %p new %p (%" U16_F ")\n", - (void *)p->payload, (void *)payload, increment_magnitude)); - - /* modify pbuf fields */ - p->payload = payload; - p->len = (u16_t)(p->len + increment_magnitude); - p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len + increment_magnitude); - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Adjusts the payload pointer to reveal headers in the payload. - * - * Adjusts the ->payload pointer so that space for a header - * appears in the pbuf payload. - * - * The ->payload, ->tot_len and ->len fields are adjusted. - * - * @param p pbuf to change the header size. - * @param header_size_increment Number of bytes to increment header size which - * increases the size of the pbuf. New space is on the front. - * If header_size_increment is 0, this function does nothing and returns successful. - * - * PBUF_ROM and PBUF_REF type buffers cannot have their sizes increased, so - * the call will fail. A check is made that the increase in header size does - * not move the payload pointer in front of the start of the buffer. - * - * @return non-zero on failure, zero on success. - * - */ -u8_t pbuf_add_header(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment) -{ - return pbuf_add_header_impl(p, header_size_increment, 0); -} - -/** - * Same as @ref pbuf_add_header but does not check if 'header_size > 0' is allowed. - * This is used internally only, to allow PBUF_REF for RX. - */ -u8_t pbuf_add_header_force(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment) -{ - return pbuf_add_header_impl(p, header_size_increment, 1); -} - -/** - * Adjusts the payload pointer to hide headers in the payload. - * - * Adjusts the ->payload pointer so that space for a header - * disappears in the pbuf payload. - * - * The ->payload, ->tot_len and ->len fields are adjusted. - * - * @param p pbuf to change the header size. - * @param header_size_decrement Number of bytes to decrement header size which - * decreases the size of the pbuf. - * If header_size_decrement is 0, this function does nothing and returns successful. - * @return non-zero on failure, zero on success. - * - */ -u8_t pbuf_remove_header(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_decrement) -{ - void *payload; - u16_t increment_magnitude; - - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - - if ((p == NULL) || (header_size_decrement > 0xFFFF)) { - return 1; - } - - if (header_size_decrement == 0) { - return 0; - } - - increment_magnitude = (u16_t)header_size_decrement; - /* Check that we aren't going to move off the end of the pbuf */ - LWIP_ERROR("increment_magnitude <= p->len", (increment_magnitude <= p->len), return 1;); - - /* remember current payload pointer */ - payload = p->payload; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(payload); /* only used in LWIP_DEBUGF below */ - - /* increase payload pointer (guarded by length check above) */ - p->payload = (u8_t *)p->payload + header_size_decrement; - /* modify pbuf length fields */ - p->len = (u16_t)(p->len - increment_magnitude); - p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - increment_magnitude); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_remove_header: old %p new %p (%" U16_F ")\n", - (void *)payload, (void *)p->payload, increment_magnitude)); - - return 0; -} - -static u8_t pbuf_header_impl(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size_increment, u8_t force) -{ - if (header_size_increment < 0) { - return pbuf_remove_header(p, (size_t)-header_size_increment); - } else { - return pbuf_add_header_impl(p, (size_t)header_size_increment, force); - } -} - -/** - * Adjusts the payload pointer to hide or reveal headers in the payload. - * - * Adjusts the ->payload pointer so that space for a header - * (dis)appears in the pbuf payload. - * - * The ->payload, ->tot_len and ->len fields are adjusted. - * - * @param p pbuf to change the header size. - * @param header_size_increment Number of bytes to increment header size which - * increases the size of the pbuf. New space is on the front. - * (Using a negative value decreases the header size.) - * If header_size_increment is 0, this function does nothing and returns successful. - * - * PBUF_ROM and PBUF_REF type buffers cannot have their sizes increased, so - * the call will fail. A check is made that the increase in header size does - * not move the payload pointer in front of the start of the buffer. - * @return non-zero on failure, zero on success. - * - */ -u8_t pbuf_header(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size_increment) -{ - return pbuf_header_impl(p, header_size_increment, 0); -} - -/** - * Same as pbuf_header but does not check if 'header_size > 0' is allowed. - * This is used internally only, to allow PBUF_REF for RX. - */ -u8_t pbuf_header_force(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size_increment) -{ - return pbuf_header_impl(p, header_size_increment, 1); -} - -/** Similar to pbuf_header(-size) but de-refs header pbufs for (size >= p->len) - * - * @param q pbufs to operate on - * @param size The number of bytes to remove from the beginning of the pbuf list. - * While size >= p->len, pbufs are freed. - * ATTENTION: this is the opposite direction as @ref pbuf_header, but - * takes an u16_t not s16_t! - * @return the new head pbuf - */ -struct pbuf * -pbuf_free_header(struct pbuf *q, u16_t size) -{ - struct pbuf *p = q; - u16_t free_left = size; - - while (free_left && p) { - if (free_left >= p->len) { - struct pbuf *f = p; - free_left = (u16_t)(free_left - p->len); - p = p->next; - f->next = 0; - pbuf_free(f); - } else { - pbuf_remove_header(p, free_left); - free_left = 0; - } - } - - return p; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Dereference a pbuf chain or queue and deallocate any no-longer-used - * pbufs at the head of this chain or queue. - * - * Decrements the pbuf reference count. If it reaches zero, the pbuf is - * deallocated. - * - * For a pbuf chain, this is repeated for each pbuf in the chain, - * up to the first pbuf which has a non-zero reference count after - * decrementing. So, when all reference counts are one, the whole - * chain is free'd. - * - * @param p The pbuf (chain) to be dereferenced. - * - * @return the number of pbufs that were de-allocated - * from the head of the chain. - * - * @note MUST NOT be called on a packet queue (Not verified to work yet). - * @note the reference counter of a pbuf equals the number of pointers - * that refer to the pbuf (or into the pbuf). - * - * @internal examples: - * - * Assuming existing chains a->b->c with the following reference - * counts, calling pbuf_free(a) results in: - * - * 1->2->3 becomes ...1->3 - * 3->3->3 becomes 2->3->3 - * 1->1->2 becomes ......1 - * 2->1->1 becomes 1->1->1 - * 1->1->1 becomes ....... - * - */ -u8_t pbuf_free(struct pbuf *p) -{ - u8_t alloc_src; - struct pbuf *q; - u8_t count; - - if (p == NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - /* if assertions are disabled, proceed with debug output */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("pbuf_free(p == NULL) was called.\n")); - return 0; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_free(%p)\n", (void *)p)); - - PERF_START; - - count = 0; - - /* de-allocate all consecutive pbufs from the head of the chain that - * obtain a zero reference count after decrementing*/ - while (p != NULL) { - LWIP_PBUF_REF_T ref; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); - /* Since decrementing ref cannot be guaranteed to be a single machine operation - * we must protect it. We put the new ref into a local variable to prevent - * further protection. */ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); - /* all pbufs in a chain are referenced at least once */ - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_free: p->ref > 0", p->ref > 0); - /* decrease reference count (number of pointers to pbuf) */ - ref = --(p->ref); - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); - - /* this pbuf is no longer referenced to? */ - if (ref == 0) { - /* remember next pbuf in chain for next iteration */ - q = p->next; - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_free: deallocating %p\n", (void *)p)); - alloc_src = pbuf_get_allocsrc(p); -#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF - - /* is this a custom pbuf? */ - if ((p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_IS_CUSTOM) != 0) { - struct pbuf_custom *pc = (struct pbuf_custom *)p; - LWIP_ASSERT("pc->custom_free_function != NULL", pc->custom_free_function != NULL); - pc->custom_free_function(p); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ - { - /* is this a pbuf from the pool? */ - if (alloc_src == PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF_POOL) { - memp_free(MEMP_PBUF_POOL, p); - /* is this a ROM or RAM referencing pbuf? */ - } else if (alloc_src == PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF) { - memp_free(MEMP_PBUF, p); - /* type == PBUF_RAM */ - } else if (alloc_src == PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_HEAP) { - mem_free(p); - } else { - /* @todo: support freeing other types */ - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pbuf type", 0); - } - } - - count++; - /* proceed to next pbuf */ - p = q; - /* p->ref > 0, this pbuf is still referenced to */ - /* (and so the remaining pbufs in chain as well) */ - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_free: %p has ref %" U16_F ", ending here.\n", (void *)p, (u16_t)ref)); - /* stop walking through the chain */ - p = NULL; - } - } - - PERF_STOP("pbuf_free"); - /* return number of de-allocated pbufs */ - return count; -} - -/** - * Count number of pbufs in a chain - * - * @param p first pbuf of chain - * @return the number of pbufs in a chain - */ -u16_t pbuf_clen(const struct pbuf *p) -{ - u16_t len; - - len = 0; - - while (p != NULL) { - ++len; - p = p->next; - } - - return len; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Increment the reference count of the pbuf. - * - * @param p pbuf to increase reference counter of - * - */ -void pbuf_ref(struct pbuf *p) -{ - /* pbuf given? */ - if (p != NULL) { - SYS_ARCH_SET(p->ref, (LWIP_PBUF_REF_T)(p->ref + 1)); - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf ref overflow", p->ref > 0); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Concatenate two pbufs (each may be a pbuf chain) and take over - * the caller's reference of the tail pbuf. - * - * @note The caller MAY NOT reference the tail pbuf afterwards. - * Use pbuf_chain() for that purpose. - * - * This function explicitly does not check for tot_len overflow to prevent - * failing to queue too long pbufs. This can produce invalid pbufs, so - * handle with care! - * - * @see pbuf_chain() - */ -void pbuf_cat(struct pbuf *h, struct pbuf *t) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - - LWIP_ERROR("(h != NULL) && (t != NULL) (programmer violates API)", - ((h != NULL) && (t != NULL)), return;); - - /* proceed to last pbuf of chain */ - for (p = h; p->next != NULL; p = p->next) { - /* add total length of second chain to all totals of first chain */ - p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len + t->tot_len); - } - - /* { p is last pbuf of first h chain, p->next == NULL } */ - LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len == p->len (of last pbuf in chain)", p->tot_len == p->len); - LWIP_ASSERT("p->next == NULL", p->next == NULL); - /* add total length of second chain to last pbuf total of first chain */ - p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len + t->tot_len); - /* chain last pbuf of head (p) with first of tail (t) */ - p->next = t; - /* p->next now references t, but the caller will drop its reference to t, - * so netto there is no change to the reference count of t. - */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Chain two pbufs (or pbuf chains) together. - * - * The caller MUST call pbuf_free(t) once it has stopped - * using it. Use pbuf_cat() instead if you no longer use t. - * - * @param h head pbuf (chain) - * @param t tail pbuf (chain) - * @note The pbufs MUST belong to the same packet. - * @note MAY NOT be called on a packet queue. - * - * The ->tot_len fields of all pbufs of the head chain are adjusted. - * The ->next field of the last pbuf of the head chain is adjusted. - * The ->ref field of the first pbuf of the tail chain is adjusted. - * - */ -void pbuf_chain(struct pbuf *h, struct pbuf *t) -{ - pbuf_cat(h, t); - /* t is now referenced by h */ - pbuf_ref(t); - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_chain: %p references %p\n", (void *)h, (void *)t)); -} - -/** - * Dechains the first pbuf from its succeeding pbufs in the chain. - * - * Makes p->tot_len field equal to p->len. - * @param p pbuf to dechain - * @return remainder of the pbuf chain, or NULL if it was de-allocated. - * @note May not be called on a packet queue. - */ -struct pbuf * -pbuf_dechain(struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - u8_t tail_gone = 1; - /* tail */ - q = p->next; - - /* pbuf has successor in chain? */ - if (q != NULL) { - /* assert tot_len invariant: (p->tot_len == p->len + (p->next? p->next->tot_len: 0) */ - LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len == p->len + q->tot_len", q->tot_len == p->tot_len - p->len); - /* enforce invariant if assertion is disabled */ - q->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - p->len); - /* decouple pbuf from remainder */ - p->next = NULL; - /* total length of pbuf p is its own length only */ - p->tot_len = p->len; - /* q is no longer referenced by p, free it */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_dechain: unreferencing %p\n", (void *)q)); - tail_gone = pbuf_free(q); - - if (tail_gone > 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("pbuf_dechain: deallocated %p (as it is no longer referenced)\n", (void *)q)); - } - - /* return remaining tail or NULL if deallocated */ - } - - /* assert tot_len invariant: (p->tot_len == p->len + (p->next? p->next->tot_len: 0) */ - LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len == p->len", p->tot_len == p->len); - return ((tail_gone > 0) ? NULL : q); -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Create PBUF_RAM copies of pbufs. - * - * Used to queue packets on behalf of the lwIP stack, such as - * ARP based queueing. - * - * @note You MUST explicitly use p = pbuf_take(p); - * - * @note Only one packet is copied, no packet queue! - * - * @param p_to pbuf destination of the copy - * @param p_from pbuf source of the copy - * - * @return ERR_OK if pbuf was copied - * ERR_ARG if one of the pbufs is NULL or p_to is not big - * enough to hold p_from - */ -err_t pbuf_copy(struct pbuf *p_to, const struct pbuf *p_from) -{ - size_t offset_to = 0, offset_from = 0, len; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_copy(%p, %p)\n", - (const void *)p_to, (const void *)p_from)); - - /* is the target big enough to hold the source? */ - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy: target not big enough to hold source", ((p_to != NULL) && (p_from != NULL) && (p_to->tot_len >= p_from->tot_len)), return ERR_ARG;); - - /* iterate through pbuf chain */ - do { - /* copy one part of the original chain */ - if ((p_to->len - offset_to) >= (p_from->len - offset_from)) { - /* complete current p_from fits into current p_to */ - len = p_from->len - offset_from; - } else { - /* current p_from does not fit into current p_to */ - len = p_to->len - offset_to; - } - - MEMCPY((u8_t *)p_to->payload + offset_to, (u8_t *)p_from->payload + offset_from, len); - offset_to += len; - offset_from += len; - LWIP_ASSERT("offset_to <= p_to->len", offset_to <= p_to->len); - LWIP_ASSERT("offset_from <= p_from->len", offset_from <= p_from->len); - - if (offset_from >= p_from->len) { - /* on to next p_from (if any) */ - offset_from = 0; - p_from = p_from->next; - } - - if (offset_to == p_to->len) { - /* on to next p_to (if any) */ - offset_to = 0; - p_to = p_to->next; - LWIP_ERROR("p_to != NULL", (p_to != NULL) || (p_from == NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - } - - if ((p_from != NULL) && (p_from->len == p_from->tot_len)) { - /* don't copy more than one packet! */ - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy() does not allow packet queues!", - (p_from->next == NULL), return ERR_VAL;); - } - - if ((p_to != NULL) && (p_to->len == p_to->tot_len)) { - /* don't copy more than one packet! */ - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy() does not allow packet queues!", - (p_to->next == NULL), return ERR_VAL;); - } - } while (p_from); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_copy: end of chain reached.\n")); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Copy (part of) the contents of a packet buffer - * to an application supplied buffer. - * - * @param buf the pbuf from which to copy data - * @param dataptr the application supplied buffer - * @param len length of data to copy (dataptr must be big enough). No more - * than buf->tot_len will be copied, irrespective of len - * @param offset offset into the packet buffer from where to begin copying len bytes - * @return the number of bytes copied, or 0 on failure - */ -u16_t pbuf_copy_partial(const struct pbuf *buf, void *dataptr, u16_t len, u16_t offset) -{ - const struct pbuf *p; - u16_t left = 0; - u16_t buf_copy_len; - u16_t copied_total = 0; - - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy_partial: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return 0;); - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy_partial: invalid dataptr", (dataptr != NULL), return 0;); - - /* Note some systems use byte copy if dataptr or one of the pbuf payload pointers are unaligned. */ - for (p = buf; len != 0 && p != NULL; p = p->next) { - if ((offset != 0) && (offset >= p->len)) { - /* don't copy from this buffer -> on to the next */ - offset = (u16_t)(offset - p->len); - } else { - /* copy from this buffer. maybe only partially. */ - buf_copy_len = (u16_t)(p->len - offset); - - if (buf_copy_len > len) { - buf_copy_len = len; - } - - /* copy the necessary parts of the buffer */ - MEMCPY(&((char *)dataptr)[left], &((char *)p->payload)[offset], buf_copy_len); - copied_total = (u16_t)(copied_total + buf_copy_len); - left = (u16_t)(left + buf_copy_len); - len = (u16_t)(len - buf_copy_len); - offset = 0; - } - } - - return copied_total; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Get part of a pbuf's payload as contiguous memory. The returned memory is - * either a pointer into the pbuf's payload or, if split over multiple pbufs, - * a copy into the user-supplied buffer. - * - * @param p the pbuf from which to copy data - * @param buffer the application supplied buffer - * @param bufsize size of the application supplied buffer - * @param len length of data to copy (dataptr must be big enough). No more - * than buf->tot_len will be copied, irrespective of len - * @param offset offset into the packet buffer from where to begin copying len bytes - * @return the number of bytes copied, or 0 on failure - */ -void *pbuf_get_contiguous(const struct pbuf *p, void *buffer, size_t bufsize, u16_t len, u16_t offset) -{ - const struct pbuf *q; - u16_t out_offset; - - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_get_contiguous: invalid buf", (p != NULL), return NULL;); - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_get_contiguous: invalid dataptr", (buffer != NULL), return NULL;); - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_get_contiguous: invalid dataptr", (bufsize >= len), return NULL;); - - q = pbuf_skip_const(p, offset, &out_offset); - - if (q != NULL) { - if (q->len >= (out_offset + len)) { - /* all data in this pbuf, return zero-copy */ - return (u8_t *)q->payload + out_offset; - } - - /* need to copy */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(q, buffer, len, out_offset) != len) { - /* copying failed: pbuf is too short */ - return NULL; - } - - return buffer; - } - - /* pbuf is too short (offset does not fit in) */ - return NULL; -} - -#if LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE -/** - * This method modifies a 'pbuf chain', so that its total length is - * smaller than 64K. The remainder of the original pbuf chain is stored - * in *rest. - * This function never creates new pbufs, but splits an existing chain - * in two parts. The tot_len of the modified packet queue will likely be - * smaller than 64K. - * 'packet queues' are not supported by this function. - * - * @param p the pbuf queue to be split - * @param rest pointer to store the remainder (after the first 64K) - */ -void pbuf_split_64k(struct pbuf *p, struct pbuf **rest) -{ - *rest = NULL; - - if ((p != NULL) && (p->next != NULL)) { - u16_t tot_len_front = p->len; - struct pbuf *i = p; - struct pbuf *r = p->next; - - /* continue until the total length (summed up as u16_t) overflows */ - while ((r != NULL) && ((u16_t)(tot_len_front + r->len) >= tot_len_front)) { - tot_len_front = (u16_t)(tot_len_front + r->len); - i = r; - r = r->next; - } - - /* i now points to last packet of the first segment. Set next - pointer to NULL */ - i->next = NULL; - - if (r != NULL) { - /* Update the tot_len field in the first part */ - for (i = p; i != NULL; i = i->next) { - i->tot_len = (u16_t)(i->tot_len - r->tot_len); - LWIP_ASSERT("tot_len/len mismatch in last pbuf", - (i->next != NULL) || (i->tot_len == i->len)); - } - - if (p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN) { - r->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN; - } - - /* tot_len field in rest does not need modifications */ - /* reference counters do not need modifications */ - *rest = r; - } - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - -/* Actual implementation of pbuf_skip() but returning const pointer... */ -static const struct pbuf *pbuf_skip_const(const struct pbuf *in, u16_t in_offset, u16_t *out_offset) -{ - u16_t offset_left = in_offset; - const struct pbuf *q = in; - - /* get the correct pbuf */ - while ((q != NULL) && (q->len <= offset_left)) { - offset_left = (u16_t)(offset_left - q->len); - q = q->next; - } - - if (out_offset != NULL) { - *out_offset = offset_left; - } - - return q; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Skip a number of bytes at the start of a pbuf - * - * @param in input pbuf - * @param in_offset offset to skip - * @param out_offset resulting offset in the returned pbuf - * @return the pbuf in the queue where the offset is - */ -struct pbuf * -pbuf_skip(struct pbuf *in, u16_t in_offset, u16_t *out_offset) -{ - const struct pbuf *out = pbuf_skip_const(in, in_offset, out_offset); - return LWIP_CONST_CAST(struct pbuf *, out); -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Copy application supplied data into a pbuf. - * This function can only be used to copy the equivalent of buf->tot_len data. - * - * @param buf pbuf to fill with data - * @param dataptr application supplied data buffer - * @param len length of the application supplied data buffer - * - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_MEM if the pbuf is not big enough - */ -err_t pbuf_take(struct pbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t len) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - size_t buf_copy_len; - size_t total_copy_len = len; - size_t copied_total = 0; - - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_take: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_take: invalid dataptr", (dataptr != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); - LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_take: buf not large enough", (buf->tot_len >= len), return ERR_MEM;); - - if ((buf == NULL) || (dataptr == NULL) || (buf->tot_len < len)) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - /* Note some systems use byte copy if dataptr or one of the pbuf payload pointers are unaligned. */ - for (p = buf; total_copy_len != 0; p = p->next) { - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_take: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); - buf_copy_len = total_copy_len; - - if (buf_copy_len > p->len) { - /* this pbuf cannot hold all remaining data */ - buf_copy_len = p->len; - } - - /* copy the necessary parts of the buffer */ - MEMCPY(p->payload, &((const char *)dataptr)[copied_total], buf_copy_len); - total_copy_len -= buf_copy_len; - copied_total += buf_copy_len; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("did not copy all data", total_copy_len == 0 && copied_total == len); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Same as pbuf_take() but puts data at an offset - * - * @param buf pbuf to fill with data - * @param dataptr application supplied data buffer - * @param len length of the application supplied data buffer - * @param offset offset in pbuf where to copy dataptr to - * - * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_MEM if the pbuf is not big enough - */ -err_t pbuf_take_at(struct pbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u16_t offset) -{ - u16_t target_offset; - struct pbuf *q = pbuf_skip(buf, offset, &target_offset); - - /* return requested data if pbuf is OK */ - if ((q != NULL) && (q->tot_len >= target_offset + len)) { - u16_t remaining_len = len; - const u8_t *src_ptr = (const u8_t *)dataptr; - /* copy the part that goes into the first pbuf */ - u16_t first_copy_len; - LWIP_ASSERT("check pbuf_skip result", target_offset < q->len); - first_copy_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(q->len - target_offset, len); - MEMCPY(((u8_t *)q->payload) + target_offset, dataptr, first_copy_len); - remaining_len = (u16_t)(remaining_len - first_copy_len); - src_ptr += first_copy_len; - - if (remaining_len > 0) { - return pbuf_take(q->next, src_ptr, remaining_len); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - return ERR_MEM; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Creates a single pbuf out of a queue of pbufs. - * - * @remark: Either the source pbuf 'p' is freed by this function or the original - * pbuf 'p' is returned, therefore the caller has to check the result! - * - * @param p the source pbuf - * @param layer pbuf_layer of the new pbuf - * - * @return a new, single pbuf (p->next is NULL) - * or the old pbuf if allocation fails - */ -struct pbuf * -pbuf_coalesce(struct pbuf *p, pbuf_layer layer) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - - if (p->next == NULL) { - return p; - } - - q = pbuf_clone(layer, PBUF_RAM, p); - - if (q == NULL) { - /* @todo: what do we do now? */ - return p; - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return q; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Allocates a new pbuf of same length (via pbuf_alloc()) and copies the source - * pbuf into this new pbuf (using pbuf_copy()). - * - * @param layer pbuf_layer of the new pbuf - * @param type this parameter decides how and where the pbuf should be allocated - * (@see pbuf_alloc()) - * @param p the source pbuf - * - * @return a new pbuf or NULL if allocation fails - */ -struct pbuf * -pbuf_clone(pbuf_layer layer, pbuf_type type, struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - err_t err; - q = pbuf_alloc(layer, p->tot_len, type); - - if (q == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - err = pbuf_copy(q, p); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_copy failed", err == ERR_OK); - return q; -} - -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY -/** - * Copies data into a single pbuf (*not* into a pbuf queue!) and updates - * the checksum while copying - * - * @param p the pbuf to copy data into - * @param start_offset offset of p->payload where to copy the data to - * @param dataptr data to copy into the pbuf - * @param len length of data to copy into the pbuf - * @param chksum pointer to the checksum which is updated - * @return ERR_OK if successful, another error if the data does not fit - * within the (first) pbuf (no pbuf queues!) - */ -err_t pbuf_fill_chksum(struct pbuf *p, u16_t start_offset, const void *dataptr, - u16_t len, u16_t *chksum) -{ - u32_t acc; - u16_t copy_chksum; - char *dst_ptr; - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("dataptr != NULL", dataptr != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("chksum != NULL", chksum != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("len != 0", len != 0); - - if ((start_offset >= p->len) || (start_offset + len > p->len)) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - dst_ptr = ((char *)p->payload) + start_offset; - copy_chksum = LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst_ptr, dataptr, len); - - if ((start_offset & 1) != 0) { - copy_chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(copy_chksum); - } - - acc = *chksum; - acc += copy_chksum; - *chksum = FOLD_U32T(acc); - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Get one byte from the specified position in a pbuf - * WARNING: returns zero for offset >= p->tot_len - * - * @param p pbuf to parse - * @param offset offset into p of the byte to return - * @return byte at an offset into p OR ZERO IF 'offset' >= p->tot_len - */ -u8_t pbuf_get_at(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset) -{ - int ret = pbuf_try_get_at(p, offset); - - if (ret >= 0) { - return (u8_t)ret; - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Get one byte from the specified position in a pbuf - * - * @param p pbuf to parse - * @param offset offset into p of the byte to return - * @return byte at an offset into p [0..0xFF] OR negative if 'offset' >= p->tot_len - */ -int pbuf_try_get_at(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset) -{ - u16_t q_idx; - const struct pbuf *q = pbuf_skip_const(p, offset, &q_idx); - - /* return requested data if pbuf is OK */ - if ((q != NULL) && (q->len > q_idx)) { - return ((u8_t *)q->payload)[q_idx]; - } - - return -1; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Put one byte to the specified position in a pbuf - * WARNING: silently ignores offset >= p->tot_len - * - * @param p pbuf to fill - * @param offset offset into p of the byte to write - * @param data byte to write at an offset into p - */ -void pbuf_put_at(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u8_t data) -{ - u16_t q_idx; - struct pbuf *q = pbuf_skip(p, offset, &q_idx); - - /* write requested data if pbuf is OK */ - if ((q != NULL) && (q->len > q_idx)) { - ((u8_t *)q->payload)[q_idx] = data; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Compare pbuf contents at specified offset with memory s2, both of length n - * - * @param p pbuf to compare - * @param offset offset into p at which to start comparing - * @param s2 buffer to compare - * @param n length of buffer to compare - * @return zero if equal, nonzero otherwise - * (0xffff if p is too short, diffoffset+1 otherwise) - */ -u16_t pbuf_memcmp(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, const void *s2, u16_t n) -{ - u16_t start = offset; - const struct pbuf *q = p; - u16_t i; - - /* pbuf long enough to perform check? */ - if (p->tot_len < (offset + n)) { - return 0xffff; - } - - /* get the correct pbuf from chain. We know it succeeds because of p->tot_len check above. */ - while ((q != NULL) && (q->len <= start)) { - start = (u16_t)(start - q->len); - q = q->next; - } - - /* return requested data if pbuf is OK */ - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - /* We know pbuf_get_at() succeeds because of p->tot_len check above. */ - u8_t a = pbuf_get_at(q, (u16_t)(start + i)); - u8_t b = ((const u8_t *)s2)[i]; - - if (a != b) { - return (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(i + 1, 0xFFFF); - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Find occurrence of mem (with length mem_len) in pbuf p, starting at offset - * start_offset. - * - * @param p pbuf to search, maximum length is 0xFFFE since 0xFFFF is used as - * return value 'not found' - * @param mem search for the contents of this buffer - * @param mem_len length of 'mem' - * @param start_offset offset into p at which to start searching - * @return 0xFFFF if substr was not found in p or the index where it was found - */ -u16_t pbuf_memfind(const struct pbuf *p, const void *mem, u16_t mem_len, u16_t start_offset) -{ - u16_t i; - u16_t max_cmp_start = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - mem_len); - - if (p->tot_len >= mem_len + start_offset) { - for (i = start_offset; i <= max_cmp_start; i++) { - u16_t plus = pbuf_memcmp(p, i, mem, mem_len); - - if (plus == 0) { - return i; - } - } - } - - return 0xFFFF; -} - -/** - * Find occurrence of substr with length substr_len in pbuf p, start at offset - * start_offset - * WARNING: in contrast to strstr(), this one does not stop at the first \0 in - * the pbuf/source string! - * - * @param p pbuf to search, maximum length is 0xFFFE since 0xFFFF is used as - * return value 'not found' - * @param substr string to search for in p, maximum length is 0xFFFE - * @return 0xFFFF if substr was not found in p or the index where it was found - */ -u16_t pbuf_strstr(const struct pbuf *p, const char *substr) -{ - size_t substr_len; - - if ((substr == NULL) || (substr[0] == 0) || (p->tot_len == 0xFFFF)) { - return 0xFFFF; - } - - substr_len = strlen(substr); - - if (substr_len >= 0xFFFF) { - return 0xFFFF; - } - - return pbuf_memfind(p, substr, (u16_t)substr_len, 0); -} +/** + * @file + * Packet buffer management + */ + +/** + * @defgroup pbuf Packet buffers (PBUF) + * @ingroup infrastructure + * + * Packets are built from the pbuf data structure. It supports dynamic + * memory allocation for packet contents or can reference externally + * managed packet contents both in RAM and ROM. Quick allocation for + * incoming packets is provided through pools with fixed sized pbufs. + * + * A packet may span over multiple pbufs, chained as a singly linked + * list. This is called a "pbuf chain". + * + * Multiple packets may be queued, also using this singly linked list. + * This is called a "packet queue". + * + * So, a packet queue consists of one or more pbuf chains, each of + * which consist of one or more pbufs. CURRENTLY, PACKET QUEUES ARE + * NOT SUPPORTED!!! Use helper structs to queue multiple packets. + * + * The differences between a pbuf chain and a packet queue are very + * precise but subtle. + * + * The last pbuf of a packet has a ->tot_len field that equals the + * ->len field. It can be found by traversing the list. If the last + * pbuf of a packet has a ->next field other than NULL, more packets + * are on the queue. + * + * Therefore, looping through a pbuf of a single packet, has an + * loop end condition (tot_len == p->len), NOT (next == NULL). + * + * Example of custom pbuf usage: @ref zerocopyrx + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#if LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#endif +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#endif + +#include + +#define SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct pbuf)) +/* Since the pool is created in memp, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE will be automatically + aligned there. Therefore, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE_ALIGNED can be used here. */ +#define PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE) + +static const struct pbuf *pbuf_skip_const(const struct pbuf *in, u16_t in_offset, u16_t *out_offset); + +#if !LWIP_TCP || !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || !PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ +#define PBUF_POOL_IS_EMPTY() +#else /* !LWIP_TCP || !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || !PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ */ + +#if !NO_SYS +#ifndef PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#define PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL() \ + do { \ + if (tcpip_try_callback(pbuf_free_ooseq_callback, NULL) != ERR_OK) { \ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ + pbuf_free_ooseq_pending = 0; \ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#endif /* PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL */ +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + +volatile u8_t pbuf_free_ooseq_pending; +#define PBUF_POOL_IS_EMPTY() pbuf_pool_is_empty() + +/** + * Attempt to reclaim some memory from queued out-of-sequence TCP segments + * if we run out of pool pbufs. It's better to give priority to new packets + * if we're running out. + * + * This must be done in the correct thread context therefore this function + * can only be used with NO_SYS=0 and through tcpip_callback. + */ +#if !NO_SYS +static +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + void + pbuf_free_ooseq(void) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + SYS_ARCH_SET(pbuf_free_ooseq_pending, 0); + + for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; NULL != pcb; pcb = pcb->next) { + if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { + /** Free the ooseq pbufs of one PCB only */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_free_ooseq: freeing out-of-sequence pbufs\n")); + tcp_free_ooseq(pcb); + return; + } + } +} + +#if !NO_SYS +/** + * Just a callback function for tcpip_callback() that calls pbuf_free_ooseq(). + */ +static void pbuf_free_ooseq_callback(void *arg) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + pbuf_free_ooseq(); +} +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + +/** Queue a call to pbuf_free_ooseq if not already queued. */ +static void pbuf_pool_is_empty(void) +{ +#ifndef PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL + SYS_ARCH_SET(pbuf_free_ooseq_pending, 1); +#else /* PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL */ + u8_t queued; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); + queued = pbuf_free_ooseq_pending; + pbuf_free_ooseq_pending = 1; + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); + + if (!queued) { + /* queue a call to pbuf_free_ooseq if not already queued */ + PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL(); + } + +#endif /* PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ_QUEUE_CALL */ +} +#endif /* !LWIP_TCP || !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || !PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ */ + +/* Initialize members of struct pbuf after allocation */ +static void pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(struct pbuf *p, void *payload, u16_t tot_len, u16_t len, pbuf_type type, u8_t flags) +{ + p->next = NULL; + p->payload = payload; + p->tot_len = tot_len; + p->len = len; + p->type_internal = (u8_t)type; + p->flags = flags; + p->ref = 1; + p->if_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Allocates a pbuf of the given type (possibly a chain for PBUF_POOL type). + * + * The actual memory allocated for the pbuf is determined by the + * layer at which the pbuf is allocated and the requested size + * (from the size parameter). + * + * @param layer header size + * @param length size of the pbuf's payload + * @param type this parameter decides how and where the pbuf + * should be allocated as follows: + * + * - PBUF_RAM: buffer memory for pbuf is allocated as one large + * chunk. This includes protocol headers as well. + * - PBUF_ROM: no buffer memory is allocated for the pbuf, even for + * protocol headers. Additional headers must be prepended + * by allocating another pbuf and chain in to the front of + * the ROM pbuf. It is assumed that the memory used is really + * similar to ROM in that it is immutable and will not be + * changed. Memory which is dynamic should generally not + * be attached to PBUF_ROM pbufs. Use PBUF_REF instead. + * - PBUF_REF: no buffer memory is allocated for the pbuf, even for + * protocol headers. It is assumed that the pbuf is only + * being used in a single thread. If the pbuf gets queued, + * then pbuf_take should be called to copy the buffer. + * - PBUF_POOL: the pbuf is allocated as a pbuf chain, with pbufs from + * the pbuf pool that is allocated during pbuf_init(). + * + * @return the allocated pbuf. If multiple pbufs where allocated, this + * is the first pbuf of a pbuf chain. + */ +struct pbuf * +pbuf_alloc(pbuf_layer layer, u16_t length, pbuf_type type) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u16_t offset = (u16_t)layer; + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_alloc(length=%" U16_F ")\n", length)); + + switch (type) { + case PBUF_REF: /* fall through */ + case PBUF_ROM: + p = pbuf_alloc_reference(NULL, length, type); + break; + + case PBUF_POOL: { + struct pbuf *q, *last; + u16_t rem_len; /* remaining length */ + p = NULL; + last = NULL; + rem_len = length; + + do { + u16_t qlen; + q = (struct pbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_PBUF_POOL); + + if (q == NULL) { + PBUF_POOL_IS_EMPTY(); + + /* free chain so far allocated */ + if (p) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + /* bail out unsuccessfully */ + return NULL; + } + + qlen = LWIP_MIN(rem_len, (u16_t)(PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE_ALIGNED - LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset))); + pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(q, LWIP_MEM_ALIGN((void *)((u8_t *)q + SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF + offset)), + rem_len, qlen, type, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_alloc: pbuf q->payload properly aligned", + ((mem_ptr_t)q->payload % MEM_ALIGNMENT) == 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE must be bigger than MEM_ALIGNMENT", + (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE_ALIGNED - LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset)) > 0); + + if (p == NULL) { + /* allocated head of pbuf chain (into p) */ + p = q; + } else { + /* make previous pbuf point to this pbuf */ + last->next = q; + } + + last = q; + rem_len = (u16_t)(rem_len - qlen); + offset = 0; + } while (rem_len > 0); + + break; + } + + case PBUF_RAM: { + u16_t payload_len = (u16_t)(LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset) + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(length)); + mem_size_t alloc_len = (mem_size_t)(LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF) + payload_len); + + /* bug #50040: Check for integer overflow when calculating alloc_len */ + if ((payload_len < LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(length)) || + (alloc_len < LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(length))) { + return NULL; + } + + /* If pbuf is to be allocated in RAM, allocate memory for it. */ + p = (struct pbuf *)mem_malloc(alloc_len); + + if (p == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(p, LWIP_MEM_ALIGN((void *)((u8_t *)p + SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF + offset)), + length, length, type, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_alloc: pbuf->payload properly aligned", + ((mem_ptr_t)p->payload % MEM_ALIGNMENT) == 0); + break; + } + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_alloc: erroneous type", 0); + return NULL; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_alloc(length=%" U16_F ") == %p\n", length, (void *)p)); + return p; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Allocates a pbuf for referenced data. + * Referenced data can be volatile (PBUF_REF) or long-lived (PBUF_ROM). + * + * The actual memory allocated for the pbuf is determined by the + * layer at which the pbuf is allocated and the requested size + * (from the size parameter). + * + * @param payload referenced payload + * @param length size of the pbuf's payload + * @param type this parameter decides how and where the pbuf + * should be allocated as follows: + * + * - PBUF_ROM: It is assumed that the memory used is really + * similar to ROM in that it is immutable and will not be + * changed. Memory which is dynamic should generally not + * be attached to PBUF_ROM pbufs. Use PBUF_REF instead. + * - PBUF_REF: It is assumed that the pbuf is only + * being used in a single thread. If the pbuf gets queued, + * then pbuf_take should be called to copy the buffer. + * + * @return the allocated pbuf. + */ +struct pbuf * +pbuf_alloc_reference(void *payload, u16_t length, pbuf_type type) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pbuf_type", (type == PBUF_REF) || (type == PBUF_ROM)); + /* only allocate memory for the pbuf structure */ + p = (struct pbuf *)memp_malloc(MEMP_PBUF); + + if (p == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("pbuf_alloc_reference: Could not allocate MEMP_PBUF for PBUF_%s.\n", + (type == PBUF_ROM) ? "ROM" : "REF")); + return NULL; + } + + pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(p, payload, length, length, type, 0); + return p; +} + +#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Initialize a custom pbuf (already allocated). + * Example of custom pbuf usage: @ref zerocopyrx + * + * @param l header size + * @param length size of the pbuf's payload + * @param type type of the pbuf (only used to treat the pbuf accordingly, as + * this function allocates no memory) + * @param p pointer to the custom pbuf to initialize (already allocated) + * @param payload_mem pointer to the buffer that is used for payload and headers, + * must be at least big enough to hold 'length' plus the header size, + * may be NULL if set later. + * ATTENTION: The caller is responsible for correct alignment of this buffer!! + * @param payload_mem_len the size of the 'payload_mem' buffer, must be at least + * big enough to hold 'length' plus the header size + */ +struct pbuf * +pbuf_alloced_custom(pbuf_layer l, u16_t length, pbuf_type type, struct pbuf_custom *p, + void *payload_mem, u16_t payload_mem_len) +{ + u16_t offset = (u16_t)l; + void *payload; + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_alloced_custom(length=%" U16_F ")\n", length)); + + if (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset) + length > payload_mem_len) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("pbuf_alloced_custom(length=%" U16_F ") buffer too short\n", length)); + return NULL; + } + + if (payload_mem != NULL) { + payload = (u8_t *)payload_mem + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(offset); + } else { + payload = NULL; + } + + pbuf_init_alloced_pbuf(&p->pbuf, payload, length, length, type, PBUF_FLAG_IS_CUSTOM); + return &p->pbuf; +} +#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Shrink a pbuf chain to a desired length. + * + * @param p pbuf to shrink. + * @param new_len desired new length of pbuf chain + * + * Depending on the desired length, the first few pbufs in a chain might + * be skipped and left unchanged. The new last pbuf in the chain will be + * resized, and any remaining pbufs will be freed. + * + * @note If the pbuf is ROM/REF, only the ->tot_len and ->len fields are adjusted. + * @note May not be called on a packet queue. + * + * @note Despite its name, pbuf_realloc cannot grow the size of a pbuf (chain). + */ +void pbuf_realloc(struct pbuf *p, u16_t new_len) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + u16_t rem_len; /* remaining length */ + u16_t shrink; + + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_realloc: p != NULL", p != NULL); + + /* desired length larger than current length? */ + if (new_len >= p->tot_len) { + /* enlarging not yet supported */ + return; + } + + /* the pbuf chain grows by (new_len - p->tot_len) bytes + * (which may be negative in case of shrinking) */ + shrink = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - new_len); + + /* first, step over any pbufs that should remain in the chain */ + rem_len = new_len; + q = p; + + /* should this pbuf be kept? */ + while (rem_len > q->len) { + /* decrease remaining length by pbuf length */ + rem_len = (u16_t)(rem_len - q->len); + /* decrease total length indicator */ + q->tot_len = (u16_t)(q->tot_len - shrink); + /* proceed to next pbuf in chain */ + q = q->next; + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_realloc: q != NULL", q != NULL); + } + + /* we have now reached the new last pbuf (in q) */ + /* rem_len == desired length for pbuf q */ + + /* shrink allocated memory for PBUF_RAM */ + /* (other types merely adjust their length fields */ + if (pbuf_match_allocsrc(q, PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_HEAP) && (rem_len != q->len) +#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF + && ((q->flags & PBUF_FLAG_IS_CUSTOM) == 0) +#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ + ) { + /* reallocate and adjust the length of the pbuf that will be split */ + q = (struct pbuf *)mem_trim(q, (mem_size_t)(((u8_t *)q->payload - (u8_t *)q) + rem_len)); + LWIP_ASSERT("mem_trim returned q == NULL", q != NULL); + } + + /* adjust length fields for new last pbuf */ + q->len = rem_len; + q->tot_len = q->len; + + /* any remaining pbufs in chain? */ + if (q->next != NULL) { + /* free remaining pbufs in chain */ + pbuf_free(q->next); + } + + /* q is last packet in chain */ + q->next = NULL; +} + +/** + * Adjusts the payload pointer to reveal headers in the payload. + * @see pbuf_add_header. + * + * @param p pbuf to change the header size. + * @param header_size_increment Number of bytes to increment header size. + * @param force Allow 'header_size_increment > 0' for PBUF_REF/PBUF_ROM types + * + * @return non-zero on failure, zero on success. + * + */ +static u8_t pbuf_add_header_impl(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment, u8_t force) +{ + u16_t type_internal; + void *payload; + u16_t increment_magnitude; + + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + + if ((p == NULL) || (header_size_increment > 0xFFFF)) { + return 1; + } + + if (header_size_increment == 0) { + return 0; + } + + increment_magnitude = (u16_t)header_size_increment; + + /* Do not allow tot_len to wrap as a result. */ + if ((u16_t)(increment_magnitude + p->tot_len) < increment_magnitude) { + return 1; + } + + type_internal = p->type_internal; + + /* pbuf types containing payloads? */ + if (type_internal & PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS) { + /* set new payload pointer */ + payload = (u8_t *)p->payload - header_size_increment; + + /* boundary check fails? */ + if ((u8_t *)payload < (u8_t *)p + SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("pbuf_add_header: failed as %p < %p (not enough space for new header size)\n", + (void *)payload, (void *)((u8_t *)p + SIZEOF_STRUCT_PBUF))); + /* bail out unsuccessfully */ + return 1; + } + + /* pbuf types referring to external payloads? */ + } else { + /* hide a header in the payload? */ + if (force) { + payload = (u8_t *)p->payload - header_size_increment; + } else { + /* cannot expand payload to front (yet!) + * bail out unsuccessfully */ + return 1; + } + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_add_header: old %p new %p (%" U16_F ")\n", + (void *)p->payload, (void *)payload, increment_magnitude)); + + /* modify pbuf fields */ + p->payload = payload; + p->len = (u16_t)(p->len + increment_magnitude); + p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len + increment_magnitude); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Adjusts the payload pointer to reveal headers in the payload. + * + * Adjusts the ->payload pointer so that space for a header + * appears in the pbuf payload. + * + * The ->payload, ->tot_len and ->len fields are adjusted. + * + * @param p pbuf to change the header size. + * @param header_size_increment Number of bytes to increment header size which + * increases the size of the pbuf. New space is on the front. + * If header_size_increment is 0, this function does nothing and returns successful. + * + * PBUF_ROM and PBUF_REF type buffers cannot have their sizes increased, so + * the call will fail. A check is made that the increase in header size does + * not move the payload pointer in front of the start of the buffer. + * + * @return non-zero on failure, zero on success. + * + */ +u8_t pbuf_add_header(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment) +{ + return pbuf_add_header_impl(p, header_size_increment, 0); +} + +/** + * Same as @ref pbuf_add_header but does not check if 'header_size > 0' is allowed. + * This is used internally only, to allow PBUF_REF for RX. + */ +u8_t pbuf_add_header_force(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment) +{ + return pbuf_add_header_impl(p, header_size_increment, 1); +} + +/** + * Adjusts the payload pointer to hide headers in the payload. + * + * Adjusts the ->payload pointer so that space for a header + * disappears in the pbuf payload. + * + * The ->payload, ->tot_len and ->len fields are adjusted. + * + * @param p pbuf to change the header size. + * @param header_size_decrement Number of bytes to decrement header size which + * decreases the size of the pbuf. + * If header_size_decrement is 0, this function does nothing and returns successful. + * @return non-zero on failure, zero on success. + * + */ +u8_t pbuf_remove_header(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_decrement) +{ + void *payload; + u16_t increment_magnitude; + + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + + if ((p == NULL) || (header_size_decrement > 0xFFFF)) { + return 1; + } + + if (header_size_decrement == 0) { + return 0; + } + + increment_magnitude = (u16_t)header_size_decrement; + /* Check that we aren't going to move off the end of the pbuf */ + LWIP_ERROR("increment_magnitude <= p->len", (increment_magnitude <= p->len), return 1;); + + /* remember current payload pointer */ + payload = p->payload; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(payload); /* only used in LWIP_DEBUGF below */ + + /* increase payload pointer (guarded by length check above) */ + p->payload = (u8_t *)p->payload + header_size_decrement; + /* modify pbuf length fields */ + p->len = (u16_t)(p->len - increment_magnitude); + p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - increment_magnitude); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_remove_header: old %p new %p (%" U16_F ")\n", + (void *)payload, (void *)p->payload, increment_magnitude)); + + return 0; +} + +static u8_t pbuf_header_impl(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size_increment, u8_t force) +{ + if (header_size_increment < 0) { + return pbuf_remove_header(p, (size_t)-header_size_increment); + } else { + return pbuf_add_header_impl(p, (size_t)header_size_increment, force); + } +} + +/** + * Adjusts the payload pointer to hide or reveal headers in the payload. + * + * Adjusts the ->payload pointer so that space for a header + * (dis)appears in the pbuf payload. + * + * The ->payload, ->tot_len and ->len fields are adjusted. + * + * @param p pbuf to change the header size. + * @param header_size_increment Number of bytes to increment header size which + * increases the size of the pbuf. New space is on the front. + * (Using a negative value decreases the header size.) + * If header_size_increment is 0, this function does nothing and returns successful. + * + * PBUF_ROM and PBUF_REF type buffers cannot have their sizes increased, so + * the call will fail. A check is made that the increase in header size does + * not move the payload pointer in front of the start of the buffer. + * @return non-zero on failure, zero on success. + * + */ +u8_t pbuf_header(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size_increment) +{ + return pbuf_header_impl(p, header_size_increment, 0); +} + +/** + * Same as pbuf_header but does not check if 'header_size > 0' is allowed. + * This is used internally only, to allow PBUF_REF for RX. + */ +u8_t pbuf_header_force(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size_increment) +{ + return pbuf_header_impl(p, header_size_increment, 1); +} + +/** Similar to pbuf_header(-size) but de-refs header pbufs for (size >= p->len) + * + * @param q pbufs to operate on + * @param size The number of bytes to remove from the beginning of the pbuf list. + * While size >= p->len, pbufs are freed. + * ATTENTION: this is the opposite direction as @ref pbuf_header, but + * takes an u16_t not s16_t! + * @return the new head pbuf + */ +struct pbuf * +pbuf_free_header(struct pbuf *q, u16_t size) +{ + struct pbuf *p = q; + u16_t free_left = size; + + while (free_left && p) { + if (free_left >= p->len) { + struct pbuf *f = p; + free_left = (u16_t)(free_left - p->len); + p = p->next; + f->next = 0; + pbuf_free(f); + } else { + pbuf_remove_header(p, free_left); + free_left = 0; + } + } + + return p; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Dereference a pbuf chain or queue and deallocate any no-longer-used + * pbufs at the head of this chain or queue. + * + * Decrements the pbuf reference count. If it reaches zero, the pbuf is + * deallocated. + * + * For a pbuf chain, this is repeated for each pbuf in the chain, + * up to the first pbuf which has a non-zero reference count after + * decrementing. So, when all reference counts are one, the whole + * chain is free'd. + * + * @param p The pbuf (chain) to be dereferenced. + * + * @return the number of pbufs that were de-allocated + * from the head of the chain. + * + * @note MUST NOT be called on a packet queue (Not verified to work yet). + * @note the reference counter of a pbuf equals the number of pointers + * that refer to the pbuf (or into the pbuf). + * + * @internal examples: + * + * Assuming existing chains a->b->c with the following reference + * counts, calling pbuf_free(a) results in: + * + * 1->2->3 becomes ...1->3 + * 3->3->3 becomes 2->3->3 + * 1->1->2 becomes ......1 + * 2->1->1 becomes 1->1->1 + * 1->1->1 becomes ....... + * + */ +u8_t pbuf_free(struct pbuf *p) +{ + u8_t alloc_src; + struct pbuf *q; + u8_t count; + + if (p == NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + /* if assertions are disabled, proceed with debug output */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("pbuf_free(p == NULL) was called.\n")); + return 0; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_free(%p)\n", (void *)p)); + + PERF_START; + + count = 0; + + /* de-allocate all consecutive pbufs from the head of the chain that + * obtain a zero reference count after decrementing*/ + while (p != NULL) { + LWIP_PBUF_REF_T ref; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); + /* Since decrementing ref cannot be guaranteed to be a single machine operation + * we must protect it. We put the new ref into a local variable to prevent + * further protection. */ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); + /* all pbufs in a chain are referenced at least once */ + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_free: p->ref > 0", p->ref > 0); + /* decrease reference count (number of pointers to pbuf) */ + ref = --(p->ref); + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); + + /* this pbuf is no longer referenced to? */ + if (ref == 0) { + /* remember next pbuf in chain for next iteration */ + q = p->next; + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_free: deallocating %p\n", (void *)p)); + alloc_src = pbuf_get_allocsrc(p); +#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF + + /* is this a custom pbuf? */ + if ((p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_IS_CUSTOM) != 0) { + struct pbuf_custom *pc = (struct pbuf_custom *)p; + LWIP_ASSERT("pc->custom_free_function != NULL", pc->custom_free_function != NULL); + pc->custom_free_function(p); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ + { + /* is this a pbuf from the pool? */ + if (alloc_src == PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF_POOL) { + memp_free(MEMP_PBUF_POOL, p); + /* is this a ROM or RAM referencing pbuf? */ + } else if (alloc_src == PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF) { + memp_free(MEMP_PBUF, p); + /* type == PBUF_RAM */ + } else if (alloc_src == PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_HEAP) { + mem_free(p); + } else { + /* @todo: support freeing other types */ + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pbuf type", 0); + } + } + + count++; + /* proceed to next pbuf */ + p = q; + /* p->ref > 0, this pbuf is still referenced to */ + /* (and so the remaining pbufs in chain as well) */ + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_free: %p has ref %" U16_F ", ending here.\n", (void *)p, (u16_t)ref)); + /* stop walking through the chain */ + p = NULL; + } + } + + PERF_STOP("pbuf_free"); + /* return number of de-allocated pbufs */ + return count; +} + +/** + * Count number of pbufs in a chain + * + * @param p first pbuf of chain + * @return the number of pbufs in a chain + */ +u16_t pbuf_clen(const struct pbuf *p) +{ + u16_t len; + + len = 0; + + while (p != NULL) { + ++len; + p = p->next; + } + + return len; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Increment the reference count of the pbuf. + * + * @param p pbuf to increase reference counter of + * + */ +void pbuf_ref(struct pbuf *p) +{ + /* pbuf given? */ + if (p != NULL) { + SYS_ARCH_SET(p->ref, (LWIP_PBUF_REF_T)(p->ref + 1)); + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf ref overflow", p->ref > 0); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Concatenate two pbufs (each may be a pbuf chain) and take over + * the caller's reference of the tail pbuf. + * + * @note The caller MAY NOT reference the tail pbuf afterwards. + * Use pbuf_chain() for that purpose. + * + * This function explicitly does not check for tot_len overflow to prevent + * failing to queue too long pbufs. This can produce invalid pbufs, so + * handle with care! + * + * @see pbuf_chain() + */ +void pbuf_cat(struct pbuf *h, struct pbuf *t) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + + LWIP_ERROR("(h != NULL) && (t != NULL) (programmer violates API)", + ((h != NULL) && (t != NULL)), return;); + + /* proceed to last pbuf of chain */ + for (p = h; p->next != NULL; p = p->next) { + /* add total length of second chain to all totals of first chain */ + p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len + t->tot_len); + } + + /* { p is last pbuf of first h chain, p->next == NULL } */ + LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len == p->len (of last pbuf in chain)", p->tot_len == p->len); + LWIP_ASSERT("p->next == NULL", p->next == NULL); + /* add total length of second chain to last pbuf total of first chain */ + p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len + t->tot_len); + /* chain last pbuf of head (p) with first of tail (t) */ + p->next = t; + /* p->next now references t, but the caller will drop its reference to t, + * so netto there is no change to the reference count of t. + */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Chain two pbufs (or pbuf chains) together. + * + * The caller MUST call pbuf_free(t) once it has stopped + * using it. Use pbuf_cat() instead if you no longer use t. + * + * @param h head pbuf (chain) + * @param t tail pbuf (chain) + * @note The pbufs MUST belong to the same packet. + * @note MAY NOT be called on a packet queue. + * + * The ->tot_len fields of all pbufs of the head chain are adjusted. + * The ->next field of the last pbuf of the head chain is adjusted. + * The ->ref field of the first pbuf of the tail chain is adjusted. + * + */ +void pbuf_chain(struct pbuf *h, struct pbuf *t) +{ + pbuf_cat(h, t); + /* t is now referenced by h */ + pbuf_ref(t); + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_chain: %p references %p\n", (void *)h, (void *)t)); +} + +/** + * Dechains the first pbuf from its succeeding pbufs in the chain. + * + * Makes p->tot_len field equal to p->len. + * @param p pbuf to dechain + * @return remainder of the pbuf chain, or NULL if it was de-allocated. + * @note May not be called on a packet queue. + */ +struct pbuf * +pbuf_dechain(struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + u8_t tail_gone = 1; + /* tail */ + q = p->next; + + /* pbuf has successor in chain? */ + if (q != NULL) { + /* assert tot_len invariant: (p->tot_len == p->len + (p->next? p->next->tot_len: 0) */ + LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len == p->len + q->tot_len", q->tot_len == p->tot_len - p->len); + /* enforce invariant if assertion is disabled */ + q->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - p->len); + /* decouple pbuf from remainder */ + p->next = NULL; + /* total length of pbuf p is its own length only */ + p->tot_len = p->len; + /* q is no longer referenced by p, free it */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_dechain: unreferencing %p\n", (void *)q)); + tail_gone = pbuf_free(q); + + if (tail_gone > 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("pbuf_dechain: deallocated %p (as it is no longer referenced)\n", (void *)q)); + } + + /* return remaining tail or NULL if deallocated */ + } + + /* assert tot_len invariant: (p->tot_len == p->len + (p->next? p->next->tot_len: 0) */ + LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len == p->len", p->tot_len == p->len); + return ((tail_gone > 0) ? NULL : q); +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Create PBUF_RAM copies of pbufs. + * + * Used to queue packets on behalf of the lwIP stack, such as + * ARP based queueing. + * + * @note You MUST explicitly use p = pbuf_take(p); + * + * @note Only one packet is copied, no packet queue! + * + * @param p_to pbuf destination of the copy + * @param p_from pbuf source of the copy + * + * @return ERR_OK if pbuf was copied + * ERR_ARG if one of the pbufs is NULL or p_to is not big + * enough to hold p_from + */ +err_t pbuf_copy(struct pbuf *p_to, const struct pbuf *p_from) +{ + size_t offset_to = 0, offset_from = 0, len; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_copy(%p, %p)\n", + (const void *)p_to, (const void *)p_from)); + + /* is the target big enough to hold the source? */ + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy: target not big enough to hold source", ((p_to != NULL) && (p_from != NULL) && (p_to->tot_len >= p_from->tot_len)), return ERR_ARG;); + + /* iterate through pbuf chain */ + do { + /* copy one part of the original chain */ + if ((p_to->len - offset_to) >= (p_from->len - offset_from)) { + /* complete current p_from fits into current p_to */ + len = p_from->len - offset_from; + } else { + /* current p_from does not fit into current p_to */ + len = p_to->len - offset_to; + } + + MEMCPY((u8_t *)p_to->payload + offset_to, (u8_t *)p_from->payload + offset_from, len); + offset_to += len; + offset_from += len; + LWIP_ASSERT("offset_to <= p_to->len", offset_to <= p_to->len); + LWIP_ASSERT("offset_from <= p_from->len", offset_from <= p_from->len); + + if (offset_from >= p_from->len) { + /* on to next p_from (if any) */ + offset_from = 0; + p_from = p_from->next; + } + + if (offset_to == p_to->len) { + /* on to next p_to (if any) */ + offset_to = 0; + p_to = p_to->next; + LWIP_ERROR("p_to != NULL", (p_to != NULL) || (p_from == NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + } + + if ((p_from != NULL) && (p_from->len == p_from->tot_len)) { + /* don't copy more than one packet! */ + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy() does not allow packet queues!", + (p_from->next == NULL), return ERR_VAL;); + } + + if ((p_to != NULL) && (p_to->len == p_to->tot_len)) { + /* don't copy more than one packet! */ + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy() does not allow packet queues!", + (p_to->next == NULL), return ERR_VAL;); + } + } while (p_from); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(PBUF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("pbuf_copy: end of chain reached.\n")); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Copy (part of) the contents of a packet buffer + * to an application supplied buffer. + * + * @param buf the pbuf from which to copy data + * @param dataptr the application supplied buffer + * @param len length of data to copy (dataptr must be big enough). No more + * than buf->tot_len will be copied, irrespective of len + * @param offset offset into the packet buffer from where to begin copying len bytes + * @return the number of bytes copied, or 0 on failure + */ +u16_t pbuf_copy_partial(const struct pbuf *buf, void *dataptr, u16_t len, u16_t offset) +{ + const struct pbuf *p; + u16_t left = 0; + u16_t buf_copy_len; + u16_t copied_total = 0; + + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy_partial: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return 0;); + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_copy_partial: invalid dataptr", (dataptr != NULL), return 0;); + + /* Note some systems use byte copy if dataptr or one of the pbuf payload pointers are unaligned. */ + for (p = buf; len != 0 && p != NULL; p = p->next) { + if ((offset != 0) && (offset >= p->len)) { + /* don't copy from this buffer -> on to the next */ + offset = (u16_t)(offset - p->len); + } else { + /* copy from this buffer. maybe only partially. */ + buf_copy_len = (u16_t)(p->len - offset); + + if (buf_copy_len > len) { + buf_copy_len = len; + } + + /* copy the necessary parts of the buffer */ + MEMCPY(&((char *)dataptr)[left], &((char *)p->payload)[offset], buf_copy_len); + copied_total = (u16_t)(copied_total + buf_copy_len); + left = (u16_t)(left + buf_copy_len); + len = (u16_t)(len - buf_copy_len); + offset = 0; + } + } + + return copied_total; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Get part of a pbuf's payload as contiguous memory. The returned memory is + * either a pointer into the pbuf's payload or, if split over multiple pbufs, + * a copy into the user-supplied buffer. + * + * @param p the pbuf from which to copy data + * @param buffer the application supplied buffer + * @param bufsize size of the application supplied buffer + * @param len length of data to copy (dataptr must be big enough). No more + * than buf->tot_len will be copied, irrespective of len + * @param offset offset into the packet buffer from where to begin copying len bytes + * @return the number of bytes copied, or 0 on failure + */ +void *pbuf_get_contiguous(const struct pbuf *p, void *buffer, size_t bufsize, u16_t len, u16_t offset) +{ + const struct pbuf *q; + u16_t out_offset; + + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_get_contiguous: invalid buf", (p != NULL), return NULL;); + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_get_contiguous: invalid dataptr", (buffer != NULL), return NULL;); + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_get_contiguous: invalid dataptr", (bufsize >= len), return NULL;); + + q = pbuf_skip_const(p, offset, &out_offset); + + if (q != NULL) { + if (q->len >= (out_offset + len)) { + /* all data in this pbuf, return zero-copy */ + return (u8_t *)q->payload + out_offset; + } + + /* need to copy */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(q, buffer, len, out_offset) != len) { + /* copying failed: pbuf is too short */ + return NULL; + } + + return buffer; + } + + /* pbuf is too short (offset does not fit in) */ + return NULL; +} + +#if LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE +/** + * This method modifies a 'pbuf chain', so that its total length is + * smaller than 64K. The remainder of the original pbuf chain is stored + * in *rest. + * This function never creates new pbufs, but splits an existing chain + * in two parts. The tot_len of the modified packet queue will likely be + * smaller than 64K. + * 'packet queues' are not supported by this function. + * + * @param p the pbuf queue to be split + * @param rest pointer to store the remainder (after the first 64K) + */ +void pbuf_split_64k(struct pbuf *p, struct pbuf **rest) +{ + *rest = NULL; + + if ((p != NULL) && (p->next != NULL)) { + u16_t tot_len_front = p->len; + struct pbuf *i = p; + struct pbuf *r = p->next; + + /* continue until the total length (summed up as u16_t) overflows */ + while ((r != NULL) && ((u16_t)(tot_len_front + r->len) >= tot_len_front)) { + tot_len_front = (u16_t)(tot_len_front + r->len); + i = r; + r = r->next; + } + + /* i now points to last packet of the first segment. Set next + pointer to NULL */ + i->next = NULL; + + if (r != NULL) { + /* Update the tot_len field in the first part */ + for (i = p; i != NULL; i = i->next) { + i->tot_len = (u16_t)(i->tot_len - r->tot_len); + LWIP_ASSERT("tot_len/len mismatch in last pbuf", + (i->next != NULL) || (i->tot_len == i->len)); + } + + if (p->flags & PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN) { + r->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN; + } + + /* tot_len field in rest does not need modifications */ + /* reference counters do not need modifications */ + *rest = r; + } + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + +/* Actual implementation of pbuf_skip() but returning const pointer... */ +static const struct pbuf *pbuf_skip_const(const struct pbuf *in, u16_t in_offset, u16_t *out_offset) +{ + u16_t offset_left = in_offset; + const struct pbuf *q = in; + + /* get the correct pbuf */ + while ((q != NULL) && (q->len <= offset_left)) { + offset_left = (u16_t)(offset_left - q->len); + q = q->next; + } + + if (out_offset != NULL) { + *out_offset = offset_left; + } + + return q; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Skip a number of bytes at the start of a pbuf + * + * @param in input pbuf + * @param in_offset offset to skip + * @param out_offset resulting offset in the returned pbuf + * @return the pbuf in the queue where the offset is + */ +struct pbuf * +pbuf_skip(struct pbuf *in, u16_t in_offset, u16_t *out_offset) +{ + const struct pbuf *out = pbuf_skip_const(in, in_offset, out_offset); + return LWIP_CONST_CAST(struct pbuf *, out); +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Copy application supplied data into a pbuf. + * This function can only be used to copy the equivalent of buf->tot_len data. + * + * @param buf pbuf to fill with data + * @param dataptr application supplied data buffer + * @param len length of the application supplied data buffer + * + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_MEM if the pbuf is not big enough + */ +err_t pbuf_take(struct pbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t len) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + size_t buf_copy_len; + size_t total_copy_len = len; + size_t copied_total = 0; + + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_take: invalid buf", (buf != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_take: invalid dataptr", (dataptr != NULL), return ERR_ARG;); + LWIP_ERROR("pbuf_take: buf not large enough", (buf->tot_len >= len), return ERR_MEM;); + + if ((buf == NULL) || (dataptr == NULL) || (buf->tot_len < len)) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + /* Note some systems use byte copy if dataptr or one of the pbuf payload pointers are unaligned. */ + for (p = buf; total_copy_len != 0; p = p->next) { + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_take: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); + buf_copy_len = total_copy_len; + + if (buf_copy_len > p->len) { + /* this pbuf cannot hold all remaining data */ + buf_copy_len = p->len; + } + + /* copy the necessary parts of the buffer */ + MEMCPY(p->payload, &((const char *)dataptr)[copied_total], buf_copy_len); + total_copy_len -= buf_copy_len; + copied_total += buf_copy_len; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("did not copy all data", total_copy_len == 0 && copied_total == len); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Same as pbuf_take() but puts data at an offset + * + * @param buf pbuf to fill with data + * @param dataptr application supplied data buffer + * @param len length of the application supplied data buffer + * @param offset offset in pbuf where to copy dataptr to + * + * @return ERR_OK if successful, ERR_MEM if the pbuf is not big enough + */ +err_t pbuf_take_at(struct pbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u16_t offset) +{ + u16_t target_offset; + struct pbuf *q = pbuf_skip(buf, offset, &target_offset); + + /* return requested data if pbuf is OK */ + if ((q != NULL) && (q->tot_len >= target_offset + len)) { + u16_t remaining_len = len; + const u8_t *src_ptr = (const u8_t *)dataptr; + /* copy the part that goes into the first pbuf */ + u16_t first_copy_len; + LWIP_ASSERT("check pbuf_skip result", target_offset < q->len); + first_copy_len = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(q->len - target_offset, len); + MEMCPY(((u8_t *)q->payload) + target_offset, dataptr, first_copy_len); + remaining_len = (u16_t)(remaining_len - first_copy_len); + src_ptr += first_copy_len; + + if (remaining_len > 0) { + return pbuf_take(q->next, src_ptr, remaining_len); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + return ERR_MEM; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Creates a single pbuf out of a queue of pbufs. + * + * @remark: Either the source pbuf 'p' is freed by this function or the original + * pbuf 'p' is returned, therefore the caller has to check the result! + * + * @param p the source pbuf + * @param layer pbuf_layer of the new pbuf + * + * @return a new, single pbuf (p->next is NULL) + * or the old pbuf if allocation fails + */ +struct pbuf * +pbuf_coalesce(struct pbuf *p, pbuf_layer layer) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + + if (p->next == NULL) { + return p; + } + + q = pbuf_clone(layer, PBUF_RAM, p); + + if (q == NULL) { + /* @todo: what do we do now? */ + return p; + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return q; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Allocates a new pbuf of same length (via pbuf_alloc()) and copies the source + * pbuf into this new pbuf (using pbuf_copy()). + * + * @param layer pbuf_layer of the new pbuf + * @param type this parameter decides how and where the pbuf should be allocated + * (@see pbuf_alloc()) + * @param p the source pbuf + * + * @return a new pbuf or NULL if allocation fails + */ +struct pbuf * +pbuf_clone(pbuf_layer layer, pbuf_type type, struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + err_t err; + q = pbuf_alloc(layer, p->tot_len, type); + + if (q == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + err = pbuf_copy(q, p); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* in case of LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_copy failed", err == ERR_OK); + return q; +} + +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY +/** + * Copies data into a single pbuf (*not* into a pbuf queue!) and updates + * the checksum while copying + * + * @param p the pbuf to copy data into + * @param start_offset offset of p->payload where to copy the data to + * @param dataptr data to copy into the pbuf + * @param len length of data to copy into the pbuf + * @param chksum pointer to the checksum which is updated + * @return ERR_OK if successful, another error if the data does not fit + * within the (first) pbuf (no pbuf queues!) + */ +err_t pbuf_fill_chksum(struct pbuf *p, u16_t start_offset, const void *dataptr, + u16_t len, u16_t *chksum) +{ + u32_t acc; + u16_t copy_chksum; + char *dst_ptr; + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", p != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("dataptr != NULL", dataptr != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("chksum != NULL", chksum != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("len != 0", len != 0); + + if ((start_offset >= p->len) || (start_offset + len > p->len)) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + dst_ptr = ((char *)p->payload) + start_offset; + copy_chksum = LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst_ptr, dataptr, len); + + if ((start_offset & 1) != 0) { + copy_chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(copy_chksum); + } + + acc = *chksum; + acc += copy_chksum; + *chksum = FOLD_U32T(acc); + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Get one byte from the specified position in a pbuf + * WARNING: returns zero for offset >= p->tot_len + * + * @param p pbuf to parse + * @param offset offset into p of the byte to return + * @return byte at an offset into p OR ZERO IF 'offset' >= p->tot_len + */ +u8_t pbuf_get_at(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset) +{ + int ret = pbuf_try_get_at(p, offset); + + if (ret >= 0) { + return (u8_t)ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Get one byte from the specified position in a pbuf + * + * @param p pbuf to parse + * @param offset offset into p of the byte to return + * @return byte at an offset into p [0..0xFF] OR negative if 'offset' >= p->tot_len + */ +int pbuf_try_get_at(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset) +{ + u16_t q_idx; + const struct pbuf *q = pbuf_skip_const(p, offset, &q_idx); + + /* return requested data if pbuf is OK */ + if ((q != NULL) && (q->len > q_idx)) { + return ((u8_t *)q->payload)[q_idx]; + } + + return -1; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Put one byte to the specified position in a pbuf + * WARNING: silently ignores offset >= p->tot_len + * + * @param p pbuf to fill + * @param offset offset into p of the byte to write + * @param data byte to write at an offset into p + */ +void pbuf_put_at(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u8_t data) +{ + u16_t q_idx; + struct pbuf *q = pbuf_skip(p, offset, &q_idx); + + /* write requested data if pbuf is OK */ + if ((q != NULL) && (q->len > q_idx)) { + ((u8_t *)q->payload)[q_idx] = data; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Compare pbuf contents at specified offset with memory s2, both of length n + * + * @param p pbuf to compare + * @param offset offset into p at which to start comparing + * @param s2 buffer to compare + * @param n length of buffer to compare + * @return zero if equal, nonzero otherwise + * (0xffff if p is too short, diffoffset+1 otherwise) + */ +u16_t pbuf_memcmp(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, const void *s2, u16_t n) +{ + u16_t start = offset; + const struct pbuf *q = p; + u16_t i; + + /* pbuf long enough to perform check? */ + if (p->tot_len < (offset + n)) { + return 0xffff; + } + + /* get the correct pbuf from chain. We know it succeeds because of p->tot_len check above. */ + while ((q != NULL) && (q->len <= start)) { + start = (u16_t)(start - q->len); + q = q->next; + } + + /* return requested data if pbuf is OK */ + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + /* We know pbuf_get_at() succeeds because of p->tot_len check above. */ + u8_t a = pbuf_get_at(q, (u16_t)(start + i)); + u8_t b = ((const u8_t *)s2)[i]; + + if (a != b) { + return (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(i + 1, 0xFFFF); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Find occurrence of mem (with length mem_len) in pbuf p, starting at offset + * start_offset. + * + * @param p pbuf to search, maximum length is 0xFFFE since 0xFFFF is used as + * return value 'not found' + * @param mem search for the contents of this buffer + * @param mem_len length of 'mem' + * @param start_offset offset into p at which to start searching + * @return 0xFFFF if substr was not found in p or the index where it was found + */ +u16_t pbuf_memfind(const struct pbuf *p, const void *mem, u16_t mem_len, u16_t start_offset) +{ + u16_t i; + u16_t max_cmp_start = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - mem_len); + + if (p->tot_len >= mem_len + start_offset) { + for (i = start_offset; i <= max_cmp_start; i++) { + u16_t plus = pbuf_memcmp(p, i, mem, mem_len); + + if (plus == 0) { + return i; + } + } + } + + return 0xFFFF; +} + +/** + * Find occurrence of substr with length substr_len in pbuf p, start at offset + * start_offset + * WARNING: in contrast to strstr(), this one does not stop at the first \0 in + * the pbuf/source string! + * + * @param p pbuf to search, maximum length is 0xFFFE since 0xFFFF is used as + * return value 'not found' + * @param substr string to search for in p, maximum length is 0xFFFE + * @return 0xFFFF if substr was not found in p or the index where it was found + */ +u16_t pbuf_strstr(const struct pbuf *p, const char *substr) +{ + size_t substr_len; + + if ((substr == NULL) || (substr[0] == 0) || (p->tot_len == 0xFFFF)) { + return 0xFFFF; + } + + substr_len = strlen(substr); + + if (substr_len >= 0xFFFF) { + return 0xFFFF; + } + + return pbuf_memfind(p, substr, (u16_t)substr_len, 0); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/raw.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/raw.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/raw.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/raw.c index e04d3d3a..86c3fe39 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/raw.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/raw.c @@ -1,711 +1,711 @@ -/** - * @file - * Implementation of raw protocol PCBs for low-level handling of - * different types of protocols besides (or overriding) those - * already available in lwIP.\n - * See also @ref raw_raw - * - * @defgroup raw_raw RAW - * @ingroup callbackstyle_api - * Implementation of raw protocol PCBs for low-level handling of - * different types of protocols besides (or overriding) those - * already available in lwIP.\n - * @see @ref api - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_RAW /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/raw.h" -#include "lwip/priv/raw_priv.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" - -#include - -/** The list of RAW PCBs */ -static struct raw_pcb *raw_pcbs; - -static u8_t raw_input_local_match(struct raw_pcb *pcb, u8_t broadcast) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(broadcast); /* in IPv6 only case */ - - /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ - if ((pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && - (pcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { - return 0; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - /* Dual-stack: PCBs listening to any IP type also listen to any IP address */ - if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { -#if IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV - - if ((broadcast != 0) && !ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST)) { - return 0; - } - -#endif /* IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV */ - return 1; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - - /* Only need to check PCB if incoming IP version matches PCB IP version */ - if (IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ip_current_dest_addr())) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /* Special case: IPv4 broadcast: receive all broadcasts - * Note: broadcast variable can only be 1 if it is an IPv4 broadcast */ - if (broadcast != 0) { -#if IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV - - if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST)) -#endif /* IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV */ - { - if (ip4_addr_isany(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip))) { - return 1; - } - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - /* Handle IPv4 and IPv6: catch all or exact match */ - if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip) || - ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Determine if in incoming IP packet is covered by a RAW PCB - * and if so, pass it to a user-provided receive callback function. - * - * Given an incoming IP datagram (as a chain of pbufs) this function - * finds a corresponding RAW PCB and calls the corresponding receive - * callback function. - * - * @param p pbuf to be demultiplexed to a RAW PCB. - * @param inp network interface on which the datagram was received. - * @return - 1 if the packet has been eaten by a RAW PCB receive - * callback function. The caller MAY NOT not reference the - * packet any longer, and MAY NOT call pbuf_free(). - * @return - 0 if packet is not eaten (pbuf is still referenced by the - * caller). - * - */ -raw_input_state_t raw_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - struct raw_pcb *pcb, *prev; - s16_t proto; - raw_input_state_t ret = RAW_INPUT_NONE; - u8_t broadcast = ip_addr_isbroadcast(ip_current_dest_addr(), ip_current_netif()); - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (IP_HDR_GET_VERSION(p->payload) == 6) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - { - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; - proto = IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr); - } -#if LWIP_IPV4 - else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - { - proto = IPH_PROTO((struct ip_hdr *)p->payload); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - prev = NULL; - pcb = raw_pcbs; - - /* loop through all raw pcbs until the packet is eaten by one */ - /* this allows multiple pcbs to match against the packet by design */ - while (pcb != NULL) { - if ((pcb->protocol == proto) && raw_input_local_match(pcb, broadcast) && - (((pcb->flags & RAW_FLAGS_CONNECTED) == 0) || - ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->remote_ip, ip_current_src_addr()))) { - /* receive callback function available? */ - if (pcb->recv != NULL) { - u8_t eaten; -#ifndef LWIP_NOASSERT - void *old_payload = p->payload; -#endif - ret = RAW_INPUT_DELIVERED; - /* the receive callback function did not eat the packet? */ - eaten = pcb->recv(pcb->recv_arg, pcb, p, ip_current_src_addr()); - - if (eaten != 0) { - /* receive function ate the packet */ - p = NULL; - - if (prev != NULL) { - /* move the pcb to the front of raw_pcbs so that is - found faster next time */ - prev->next = pcb->next; - pcb->next = raw_pcbs; - raw_pcbs = pcb; - } - - return RAW_INPUT_EATEN; - } else { - /* sanity-check that the receive callback did not alter the pbuf */ - LWIP_ASSERT("raw pcb recv callback altered pbuf payload pointer without eating packet", - p->payload == old_payload); - } - } - - /* no receive callback function was set for this raw PCB */ - } - - /* drop the packet */ - prev = pcb; - pcb = pcb->next; - } - - return ret; -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Bind a RAW PCB. - * - * @param pcb RAW PCB to be bound with a local address ipaddr. - * @param ipaddr local IP address to bind with. Use IP4_ADDR_ANY to - * bind to all local interfaces. - * - * @return lwIP error code. - * - ERR_OK. Successful. No error occurred. - * - ERR_USE. The specified IP address is already bound to by - * another RAW PCB. - * - * @see raw_disconnect() - */ -err_t raw_bind(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if ((pcb == NULL) || (ipaddr == NULL)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - ip_addr_set_ipaddr(&pcb->local_ip, ipaddr); -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now. - * This is legacy support: scope-aware callers should always provide properly - * zoned source addresses. */ - if (IP_IS_V6(&pcb->local_ip) && - ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { - ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip), ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Bind an RAW PCB to a specific netif. - * After calling this function, all packets received via this PCB - * are guaranteed to have come in via the specified netif, and all - * outgoing packets will go out via the specified netif. - * - * @param pcb RAW PCB to be bound with netif. - * @param netif netif to bind to. Can be NULL. - * - * @see raw_disconnect() - */ -void raw_bind_netif(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netif != NULL) { - pcb->netif_idx = netif_get_index(netif); - } else { - pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Connect an RAW PCB. This function is required by upper layers - * of lwip. Using the raw api you could use raw_sendto() instead - * - * This will associate the RAW PCB with the remote address. - * - * @param pcb RAW PCB to be connected with remote address ipaddr and port. - * @param ipaddr remote IP address to connect with. - * - * @return lwIP error code - * - * @see raw_disconnect() and raw_sendto() - */ -err_t raw_connect(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if ((pcb == NULL) || (ipaddr == NULL)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - ip_addr_set_ipaddr(&pcb->remote_ip, ipaddr); -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now, - * using the bound address to make a more informed decision when possible. */ - if (IP_IS_V6(&pcb->remote_ip) && - ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { - ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - raw_set_flags(pcb, RAW_FLAGS_CONNECTED); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Disconnect a RAW PCB. - * - * @param pcb the raw pcb to disconnect. - */ -void raw_disconnect(struct raw_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - /* reset remote address association */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { - ip_addr_copy(pcb->remote_ip, *IP_ANY_TYPE); - } else { -#endif - ip_addr_set_any(IP_IS_V6_VAL(pcb->remote_ip), &pcb->remote_ip); -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - } - -#endif - pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; - /* mark PCB as unconnected */ - raw_clear_flags(pcb, RAW_FLAGS_CONNECTED); -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Set the callback function for received packets that match the - * raw PCB's protocol and binding. - * - * The callback function MUST either - * - eat the packet by calling pbuf_free() and returning non-zero. The - * packet will not be passed to other raw PCBs or other protocol layers. - * - not free the packet, and return zero. The packet will be matched - * against further PCBs and/or forwarded to another protocol layers. - */ -void raw_recv(struct raw_pcb *pcb, raw_recv_fn recv, void *recv_arg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - /* remember recv() callback and user data */ - pcb->recv = recv; - pcb->recv_arg = recv_arg; -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Send the raw IP packet to the given address. An IP header will be prepended - * to the packet, unless the RAW_FLAGS_HDRINCL flag is set on the PCB. In that - * case, the packet must include an IP header, which will then be sent as is. - * - * @param pcb the raw pcb which to send - * @param p the IP payload to send - * @param ipaddr the destination address of the IP packet - * - */ -err_t raw_sendto(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - struct netif *netif; - const ip_addr_t *src_ip; - - if ((pcb == NULL) || (ipaddr == NULL) || !IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, ipaddr)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("raw_sendto\n")); - - if (pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { - netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->netif_idx); - } else { -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - netif = NULL; - - if (ip_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr)) { - /* For multicast-destined packets, use the user-provided interface index to - * determine the outgoing interface, if an interface index is set and a - * matching netif can be found. Otherwise, fall back to regular routing. */ - netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->mcast_ifindex); - } - - if (netif == NULL) -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - { - netif = ip_route(&pcb->local_ip, ipaddr); - } - } - - if (netif == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("raw_sendto: No route to ")); - ip_addr_debug_print(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ipaddr); - return ERR_RTE; - } - - if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip) || ip_addr_ismulticast(&pcb->local_ip)) { - /* use outgoing network interface IP address as source address */ - src_ip = ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, ipaddr); -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (src_ip == NULL) { - return ERR_RTE; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - } else { - /* use RAW PCB local IP address as source address */ - src_ip = &pcb->local_ip; - } - - return raw_sendto_if_src(pcb, p, ipaddr, netif, src_ip); -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Send the raw IP packet to the given address, using a particular outgoing - * netif and source IP address. An IP header will be prepended to the packet, - * unless the RAW_FLAGS_HDRINCL flag is set on the PCB. In that case, the - * packet must include an IP header, which will then be sent as is. - * - * @param pcb RAW PCB used to send the data - * @param p chain of pbufs to be sent - * @param dst_ip destination IP address - * @param netif the netif used for sending - * @param src_ip source IP address - */ -err_t raw_sendto_if_src(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, - struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *src_ip) -{ - err_t err; - struct pbuf *q; /* q will be sent down the stack */ - u16_t header_size; - u8_t ttl; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if ((pcb == NULL) || (dst_ip == NULL) || (netif == NULL) || (src_ip == NULL) || - !IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, src_ip) || !IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, dst_ip)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - header_size = ( -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - IP_IS_V6(dst_ip) ? IP6_HLEN : IP_HLEN); -#elif LWIP_IPV4 - IP_HLEN); -#else - IP6_HLEN); -#endif - - /* Handle the HDRINCL option as an exception: none of the code below applies - * to this case, and sending the packet needs to be done differently too. */ - if (pcb->flags & RAW_FLAGS_HDRINCL) { - /* A full header *must* be present in the first pbuf of the chain, as the - * output routines may access its fields directly. */ - if (p->len < header_size) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* @todo multicast loop support, if at all desired for this scenario.. */ - NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, &pcb->netif_hints); - err = ip_output_if_hdrincl(p, src_ip, dst_ip, netif); - NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); - return err; - } - - /* packet too large to add an IP header without causing an overflow? */ - if ((u16_t)(p->tot_len + header_size) < p->tot_len) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* not enough space to add an IP header to first pbuf in given p chain? */ - if (pbuf_add_header(p, header_size)) { - /* allocate header in new pbuf */ - q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, 0, PBUF_RAM); - - /* new header pbuf could not be allocated? */ - if (q == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("raw_sendto: could not allocate header\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (p->tot_len != 0) { - /* chain header q in front of given pbuf p */ - pbuf_chain(q, p); - } - - /* { first pbuf q points to header pbuf } */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG, ("raw_sendto: added header pbuf %p before given pbuf %p\n", (void *)q, (void *)p)); - } else { - /* first pbuf q equals given pbuf */ - q = p; - - if (pbuf_remove_header(q, header_size)) { - LWIP_ASSERT("Can't restore header we just removed!", 0); - return ERR_MEM; - } - } - -#if IP_SOF_BROADCAST - - if (IP_IS_V4(dst_ip)) { - /* broadcast filter? */ - if (!ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST) && ip_addr_isbroadcast(dst_ip, netif)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("raw_sendto: SOF_BROADCAST not enabled on pcb %p\n", (void *)pcb)); - - /* free any temporary header pbuf allocated by pbuf_header() */ - if (q != p) { - pbuf_free(q); - } - - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - -#endif /* IP_SOF_BROADCAST */ - - /* Multicast Loop? */ -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - - if (((pcb->flags & RAW_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP) != 0) && ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip)) { - q->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - /* If requested, based on the IPV6_CHECKSUM socket option per RFC3542, - compute the checksum and update the checksum in the payload. */ - if (IP_IS_V6(dst_ip) && pcb->chksum_reqd) { - u16_t chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, pcb->protocol, p->tot_len, ip_2_ip6(src_ip), ip_2_ip6(dst_ip)); - LWIP_ASSERT("Checksum must fit into first pbuf", p->len >= (pcb->chksum_offset + 2)); - SMEMCPY(((u8_t *)p->payload) + pcb->chksum_offset, &chksum, sizeof(u16_t)); - } - -#endif - - /* Determine TTL to use */ -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - ttl = (ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip) ? raw_get_multicast_ttl(pcb) : pcb->ttl); -#else /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - ttl = pcb->ttl; -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - - NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, &pcb->netif_hints); - err = ip_output_if(q, src_ip, dst_ip, ttl, pcb->tos, pcb->protocol, netif); - NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); - - /* did we chain a header earlier? */ - if (q != p) { - /* free the header */ - pbuf_free(q); - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Send the raw IP packet to the address given by raw_connect() - * - * @param pcb the raw pcb which to send - * @param p the IP payload to send - * - */ -err_t raw_send(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p) -{ - return raw_sendto(pcb, p, &pcb->remote_ip); -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Remove an RAW PCB. - * - * @param pcb RAW PCB to be removed. The PCB is removed from the list of - * RAW PCB's and the data structure is freed from memory. - * - * @see raw_new() - */ -void raw_remove(struct raw_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct raw_pcb *pcb2; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* pcb to be removed is first in list? */ - if (raw_pcbs == pcb) { - /* make list start at 2nd pcb */ - raw_pcbs = raw_pcbs->next; - /* pcb not 1st in list */ - } else { - for (pcb2 = raw_pcbs; pcb2 != NULL; pcb2 = pcb2->next) { - /* find pcb in raw_pcbs list */ - if (pcb2->next != NULL && pcb2->next == pcb) { - /* remove pcb from list */ - pcb2->next = pcb->next; - break; - } - } - } - - memp_free(MEMP_RAW_PCB, pcb); -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Create a RAW PCB. - * - * @return The RAW PCB which was created. NULL if the PCB data structure - * could not be allocated. - * - * @param proto the protocol number of the IPs payload (e.g. IP_PROTO_ICMP) - * - * @see raw_remove() - */ -struct raw_pcb * -raw_new(u8_t proto) -{ - struct raw_pcb *pcb; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("raw_new\n")); - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - pcb = (struct raw_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_RAW_PCB); - - /* could allocate RAW PCB? */ - if (pcb != NULL) { - /* initialize PCB to all zeroes */ - memset(pcb, 0, sizeof(struct raw_pcb)); - pcb->protocol = proto; - pcb->ttl = RAW_TTL; -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - raw_set_multicast_ttl(pcb, RAW_TTL); -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - pcb->next = raw_pcbs; - raw_pcbs = pcb; - } - - return pcb; -} - -/** - * @ingroup raw_raw - * Create a RAW PCB for specific IP type. - * - * @return The RAW PCB which was created. NULL if the PCB data structure - * could not be allocated. - * - * @param type IP address type, see @ref lwip_ip_addr_type definitions. - * If you want to listen to IPv4 and IPv6 (dual-stack) packets, - * supply @ref IPADDR_TYPE_ANY as argument and bind to @ref IP_ANY_TYPE. - * @param proto the protocol number (next header) of the IPv6 packet payload - * (e.g. IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) - * - * @see raw_remove() - */ -struct raw_pcb * -raw_new_ip_type(u8_t type, u8_t proto) -{ - struct raw_pcb *pcb; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - pcb = raw_new(proto); -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (pcb != NULL) { - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip, type); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip, type); - } - -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - return pcb; -} - -/** This function is called from netif.c when address is changed - * - * @param old_addr IP address of the netif before change - * @param new_addr IP address of the netif after change - */ -void raw_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr) -{ - struct raw_pcb *rpcb; - - if (!ip_addr_isany(old_addr) && !ip_addr_isany(new_addr)) { - for (rpcb = raw_pcbs; rpcb != NULL; rpcb = rpcb->next) { - /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ - if (ip_addr_cmp(&rpcb->local_ip, old_addr)) { - /* The PCB is bound to the old ipaddr and - * is set to bound to the new one instead */ - ip_addr_copy(rpcb->local_ip, *new_addr); - } - } - } -} - -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ +/** + * @file + * Implementation of raw protocol PCBs for low-level handling of + * different types of protocols besides (or overriding) those + * already available in lwIP.\n + * See also @ref raw_raw + * + * @defgroup raw_raw RAW + * @ingroup callbackstyle_api + * Implementation of raw protocol PCBs for low-level handling of + * different types of protocols besides (or overriding) those + * already available in lwIP.\n + * @see @ref api + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_RAW /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/raw.h" +#include "lwip/priv/raw_priv.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" + +#include + +/** The list of RAW PCBs */ +static struct raw_pcb *raw_pcbs; + +static u8_t raw_input_local_match(struct raw_pcb *pcb, u8_t broadcast) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(broadcast); /* in IPv6 only case */ + + /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ + if ((pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && + (pcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { + return 0; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + /* Dual-stack: PCBs listening to any IP type also listen to any IP address */ + if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { +#if IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV + + if ((broadcast != 0) && !ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST)) { + return 0; + } + +#endif /* IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV */ + return 1; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + + /* Only need to check PCB if incoming IP version matches PCB IP version */ + if (IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ip_current_dest_addr())) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /* Special case: IPv4 broadcast: receive all broadcasts + * Note: broadcast variable can only be 1 if it is an IPv4 broadcast */ + if (broadcast != 0) { +#if IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV + + if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST)) +#endif /* IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV */ + { + if (ip4_addr_isany(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip))) { + return 1; + } + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + /* Handle IPv4 and IPv6: catch all or exact match */ + if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip) || + ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Determine if in incoming IP packet is covered by a RAW PCB + * and if so, pass it to a user-provided receive callback function. + * + * Given an incoming IP datagram (as a chain of pbufs) this function + * finds a corresponding RAW PCB and calls the corresponding receive + * callback function. + * + * @param p pbuf to be demultiplexed to a RAW PCB. + * @param inp network interface on which the datagram was received. + * @return - 1 if the packet has been eaten by a RAW PCB receive + * callback function. The caller MAY NOT not reference the + * packet any longer, and MAY NOT call pbuf_free(). + * @return - 0 if packet is not eaten (pbuf is still referenced by the + * caller). + * + */ +raw_input_state_t raw_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + struct raw_pcb *pcb, *prev; + s16_t proto; + raw_input_state_t ret = RAW_INPUT_NONE; + u8_t broadcast = ip_addr_isbroadcast(ip_current_dest_addr(), ip_current_netif()); + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (IP_HDR_GET_VERSION(p->payload) == 6) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + { + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)p->payload; + proto = IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr); + } +#if LWIP_IPV4 + else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + { + proto = IPH_PROTO((struct ip_hdr *)p->payload); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + prev = NULL; + pcb = raw_pcbs; + + /* loop through all raw pcbs until the packet is eaten by one */ + /* this allows multiple pcbs to match against the packet by design */ + while (pcb != NULL) { + if ((pcb->protocol == proto) && raw_input_local_match(pcb, broadcast) && + (((pcb->flags & RAW_FLAGS_CONNECTED) == 0) || + ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->remote_ip, ip_current_src_addr()))) { + /* receive callback function available? */ + if (pcb->recv != NULL) { + u8_t eaten; +#ifndef LWIP_NOASSERT + void *old_payload = p->payload; +#endif + ret = RAW_INPUT_DELIVERED; + /* the receive callback function did not eat the packet? */ + eaten = pcb->recv(pcb->recv_arg, pcb, p, ip_current_src_addr()); + + if (eaten != 0) { + /* receive function ate the packet */ + p = NULL; + + if (prev != NULL) { + /* move the pcb to the front of raw_pcbs so that is + found faster next time */ + prev->next = pcb->next; + pcb->next = raw_pcbs; + raw_pcbs = pcb; + } + + return RAW_INPUT_EATEN; + } else { + /* sanity-check that the receive callback did not alter the pbuf */ + LWIP_ASSERT("raw pcb recv callback altered pbuf payload pointer without eating packet", + p->payload == old_payload); + } + } + + /* no receive callback function was set for this raw PCB */ + } + + /* drop the packet */ + prev = pcb; + pcb = pcb->next; + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Bind a RAW PCB. + * + * @param pcb RAW PCB to be bound with a local address ipaddr. + * @param ipaddr local IP address to bind with. Use IP4_ADDR_ANY to + * bind to all local interfaces. + * + * @return lwIP error code. + * - ERR_OK. Successful. No error occurred. + * - ERR_USE. The specified IP address is already bound to by + * another RAW PCB. + * + * @see raw_disconnect() + */ +err_t raw_bind(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if ((pcb == NULL) || (ipaddr == NULL)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + ip_addr_set_ipaddr(&pcb->local_ip, ipaddr); +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now. + * This is legacy support: scope-aware callers should always provide properly + * zoned source addresses. */ + if (IP_IS_V6(&pcb->local_ip) && + ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { + ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip), ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Bind an RAW PCB to a specific netif. + * After calling this function, all packets received via this PCB + * are guaranteed to have come in via the specified netif, and all + * outgoing packets will go out via the specified netif. + * + * @param pcb RAW PCB to be bound with netif. + * @param netif netif to bind to. Can be NULL. + * + * @see raw_disconnect() + */ +void raw_bind_netif(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netif != NULL) { + pcb->netif_idx = netif_get_index(netif); + } else { + pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Connect an RAW PCB. This function is required by upper layers + * of lwip. Using the raw api you could use raw_sendto() instead + * + * This will associate the RAW PCB with the remote address. + * + * @param pcb RAW PCB to be connected with remote address ipaddr and port. + * @param ipaddr remote IP address to connect with. + * + * @return lwIP error code + * + * @see raw_disconnect() and raw_sendto() + */ +err_t raw_connect(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if ((pcb == NULL) || (ipaddr == NULL)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + ip_addr_set_ipaddr(&pcb->remote_ip, ipaddr); +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now, + * using the bound address to make a more informed decision when possible. */ + if (IP_IS_V6(&pcb->remote_ip) && + ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { + ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + raw_set_flags(pcb, RAW_FLAGS_CONNECTED); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Disconnect a RAW PCB. + * + * @param pcb the raw pcb to disconnect. + */ +void raw_disconnect(struct raw_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + /* reset remote address association */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { + ip_addr_copy(pcb->remote_ip, *IP_ANY_TYPE); + } else { +#endif + ip_addr_set_any(IP_IS_V6_VAL(pcb->remote_ip), &pcb->remote_ip); +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + } + +#endif + pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; + /* mark PCB as unconnected */ + raw_clear_flags(pcb, RAW_FLAGS_CONNECTED); +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Set the callback function for received packets that match the + * raw PCB's protocol and binding. + * + * The callback function MUST either + * - eat the packet by calling pbuf_free() and returning non-zero. The + * packet will not be passed to other raw PCBs or other protocol layers. + * - not free the packet, and return zero. The packet will be matched + * against further PCBs and/or forwarded to another protocol layers. + */ +void raw_recv(struct raw_pcb *pcb, raw_recv_fn recv, void *recv_arg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + /* remember recv() callback and user data */ + pcb->recv = recv; + pcb->recv_arg = recv_arg; +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Send the raw IP packet to the given address. An IP header will be prepended + * to the packet, unless the RAW_FLAGS_HDRINCL flag is set on the PCB. In that + * case, the packet must include an IP header, which will then be sent as is. + * + * @param pcb the raw pcb which to send + * @param p the IP payload to send + * @param ipaddr the destination address of the IP packet + * + */ +err_t raw_sendto(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + struct netif *netif; + const ip_addr_t *src_ip; + + if ((pcb == NULL) || (ipaddr == NULL) || !IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, ipaddr)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("raw_sendto\n")); + + if (pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { + netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->netif_idx); + } else { +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + netif = NULL; + + if (ip_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr)) { + /* For multicast-destined packets, use the user-provided interface index to + * determine the outgoing interface, if an interface index is set and a + * matching netif can be found. Otherwise, fall back to regular routing. */ + netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->mcast_ifindex); + } + + if (netif == NULL) +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + { + netif = ip_route(&pcb->local_ip, ipaddr); + } + } + + if (netif == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("raw_sendto: No route to ")); + ip_addr_debug_print(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ipaddr); + return ERR_RTE; + } + + if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip) || ip_addr_ismulticast(&pcb->local_ip)) { + /* use outgoing network interface IP address as source address */ + src_ip = ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, ipaddr); +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (src_ip == NULL) { + return ERR_RTE; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + } else { + /* use RAW PCB local IP address as source address */ + src_ip = &pcb->local_ip; + } + + return raw_sendto_if_src(pcb, p, ipaddr, netif, src_ip); +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Send the raw IP packet to the given address, using a particular outgoing + * netif and source IP address. An IP header will be prepended to the packet, + * unless the RAW_FLAGS_HDRINCL flag is set on the PCB. In that case, the + * packet must include an IP header, which will then be sent as is. + * + * @param pcb RAW PCB used to send the data + * @param p chain of pbufs to be sent + * @param dst_ip destination IP address + * @param netif the netif used for sending + * @param src_ip source IP address + */ +err_t raw_sendto_if_src(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, + struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *src_ip) +{ + err_t err; + struct pbuf *q; /* q will be sent down the stack */ + u16_t header_size; + u8_t ttl; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if ((pcb == NULL) || (dst_ip == NULL) || (netif == NULL) || (src_ip == NULL) || + !IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, src_ip) || !IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, dst_ip)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + header_size = ( +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + IP_IS_V6(dst_ip) ? IP6_HLEN : IP_HLEN); +#elif LWIP_IPV4 + IP_HLEN); +#else + IP6_HLEN); +#endif + + /* Handle the HDRINCL option as an exception: none of the code below applies + * to this case, and sending the packet needs to be done differently too. */ + if (pcb->flags & RAW_FLAGS_HDRINCL) { + /* A full header *must* be present in the first pbuf of the chain, as the + * output routines may access its fields directly. */ + if (p->len < header_size) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* @todo multicast loop support, if at all desired for this scenario.. */ + NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, &pcb->netif_hints); + err = ip_output_if_hdrincl(p, src_ip, dst_ip, netif); + NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); + return err; + } + + /* packet too large to add an IP header without causing an overflow? */ + if ((u16_t)(p->tot_len + header_size) < p->tot_len) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* not enough space to add an IP header to first pbuf in given p chain? */ + if (pbuf_add_header(p, header_size)) { + /* allocate header in new pbuf */ + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, 0, PBUF_RAM); + + /* new header pbuf could not be allocated? */ + if (q == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("raw_sendto: could not allocate header\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (p->tot_len != 0) { + /* chain header q in front of given pbuf p */ + pbuf_chain(q, p); + } + + /* { first pbuf q points to header pbuf } */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG, ("raw_sendto: added header pbuf %p before given pbuf %p\n", (void *)q, (void *)p)); + } else { + /* first pbuf q equals given pbuf */ + q = p; + + if (pbuf_remove_header(q, header_size)) { + LWIP_ASSERT("Can't restore header we just removed!", 0); + return ERR_MEM; + } + } + +#if IP_SOF_BROADCAST + + if (IP_IS_V4(dst_ip)) { + /* broadcast filter? */ + if (!ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST) && ip_addr_isbroadcast(dst_ip, netif)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("raw_sendto: SOF_BROADCAST not enabled on pcb %p\n", (void *)pcb)); + + /* free any temporary header pbuf allocated by pbuf_header() */ + if (q != p) { + pbuf_free(q); + } + + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + +#endif /* IP_SOF_BROADCAST */ + + /* Multicast Loop? */ +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + + if (((pcb->flags & RAW_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP) != 0) && ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip)) { + q->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + /* If requested, based on the IPV6_CHECKSUM socket option per RFC3542, + compute the checksum and update the checksum in the payload. */ + if (IP_IS_V6(dst_ip) && pcb->chksum_reqd) { + u16_t chksum = ip6_chksum_pseudo(p, pcb->protocol, p->tot_len, ip_2_ip6(src_ip), ip_2_ip6(dst_ip)); + LWIP_ASSERT("Checksum must fit into first pbuf", p->len >= (pcb->chksum_offset + 2)); + SMEMCPY(((u8_t *)p->payload) + pcb->chksum_offset, &chksum, sizeof(u16_t)); + } + +#endif + + /* Determine TTL to use */ +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + ttl = (ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip) ? raw_get_multicast_ttl(pcb) : pcb->ttl); +#else /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + ttl = pcb->ttl; +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + + NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, &pcb->netif_hints); + err = ip_output_if(q, src_ip, dst_ip, ttl, pcb->tos, pcb->protocol, netif); + NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); + + /* did we chain a header earlier? */ + if (q != p) { + /* free the header */ + pbuf_free(q); + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Send the raw IP packet to the address given by raw_connect() + * + * @param pcb the raw pcb which to send + * @param p the IP payload to send + * + */ +err_t raw_send(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p) +{ + return raw_sendto(pcb, p, &pcb->remote_ip); +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Remove an RAW PCB. + * + * @param pcb RAW PCB to be removed. The PCB is removed from the list of + * RAW PCB's and the data structure is freed from memory. + * + * @see raw_new() + */ +void raw_remove(struct raw_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct raw_pcb *pcb2; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* pcb to be removed is first in list? */ + if (raw_pcbs == pcb) { + /* make list start at 2nd pcb */ + raw_pcbs = raw_pcbs->next; + /* pcb not 1st in list */ + } else { + for (pcb2 = raw_pcbs; pcb2 != NULL; pcb2 = pcb2->next) { + /* find pcb in raw_pcbs list */ + if (pcb2->next != NULL && pcb2->next == pcb) { + /* remove pcb from list */ + pcb2->next = pcb->next; + break; + } + } + } + + memp_free(MEMP_RAW_PCB, pcb); +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Create a RAW PCB. + * + * @return The RAW PCB which was created. NULL if the PCB data structure + * could not be allocated. + * + * @param proto the protocol number of the IPs payload (e.g. IP_PROTO_ICMP) + * + * @see raw_remove() + */ +struct raw_pcb * +raw_new(u8_t proto) +{ + struct raw_pcb *pcb; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(RAW_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("raw_new\n")); + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + pcb = (struct raw_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_RAW_PCB); + + /* could allocate RAW PCB? */ + if (pcb != NULL) { + /* initialize PCB to all zeroes */ + memset(pcb, 0, sizeof(struct raw_pcb)); + pcb->protocol = proto; + pcb->ttl = RAW_TTL; +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + raw_set_multicast_ttl(pcb, RAW_TTL); +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + pcb->next = raw_pcbs; + raw_pcbs = pcb; + } + + return pcb; +} + +/** + * @ingroup raw_raw + * Create a RAW PCB for specific IP type. + * + * @return The RAW PCB which was created. NULL if the PCB data structure + * could not be allocated. + * + * @param type IP address type, see @ref lwip_ip_addr_type definitions. + * If you want to listen to IPv4 and IPv6 (dual-stack) packets, + * supply @ref IPADDR_TYPE_ANY as argument and bind to @ref IP_ANY_TYPE. + * @param proto the protocol number (next header) of the IPv6 packet payload + * (e.g. IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6) + * + * @see raw_remove() + */ +struct raw_pcb * +raw_new_ip_type(u8_t type, u8_t proto) +{ + struct raw_pcb *pcb; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + pcb = raw_new(proto); +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (pcb != NULL) { + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip, type); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip, type); + } + +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + return pcb; +} + +/** This function is called from netif.c when address is changed + * + * @param old_addr IP address of the netif before change + * @param new_addr IP address of the netif after change + */ +void raw_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr) +{ + struct raw_pcb *rpcb; + + if (!ip_addr_isany(old_addr) && !ip_addr_isany(new_addr)) { + for (rpcb = raw_pcbs; rpcb != NULL; rpcb = rpcb->next) { + /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ + if (ip_addr_cmp(&rpcb->local_ip, old_addr)) { + /* The PCB is bound to the old ipaddr and + * is set to bound to the new one instead */ + ip_addr_copy(rpcb->local_ip, *new_addr); + } + } + } +} + +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/stats.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/stats.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/stats.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/stats.c index d6e73301..5e8a21e9 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/stats.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/stats.c @@ -1,163 +1,163 @@ -/** - * @file - * Statistics module - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_STATS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/debug.h" - -#include - -struct stats_ lwip_stats; - -void stats_init(void) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -#if MEM_STATS - lwip_stats.mem.name = "MEM"; -#endif /* MEM_STATS */ -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ -} - -#if LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY -void stats_display_proto(struct stats_proto *proto, const char *name) -{ - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("\n%s\n\t", name)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("xmit: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->xmit)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("recv: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->recv)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("fw: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->fw)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("drop: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->drop)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("chkerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->chkerr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("lenerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->lenerr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("memerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->memerr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rterr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->rterr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("proterr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->proterr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("opterr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->opterr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->err)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("cachehit: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n", proto->cachehit)); -} - -#if IGMP_STATS || MLD6_STATS -void stats_display_igmp(struct stats_igmp *igmp, const char *name) -{ - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("\n%s\n\t", name)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("xmit: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->xmit)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("recv: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->recv)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("drop: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->drop)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("chkerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->chkerr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("lenerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->lenerr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("memerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->memerr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("proterr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->proterr)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rx_v1: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->rx_v1)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rx_group: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->rx_group)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rx_general: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->rx_general)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rx_report: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->rx_report)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("tx_join: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->tx_join)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("tx_leave: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->tx_leave)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("tx_report: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n", igmp->tx_report)); -} -#endif /* IGMP_STATS || MLD6_STATS */ - -#if MEM_STATS || MEMP_STATS -void stats_display_mem(struct stats_mem *mem, const char *name) -{ - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("\nMEM %s\n\t", name)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("avail: %" MEM_SIZE_F "\n\t", mem->avail)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("used: %" MEM_SIZE_F "\n\t", mem->used)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("max: %" MEM_SIZE_F "\n\t", mem->max)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n", mem->err)); -} - -#if MEMP_STATS -void stats_display_memp(struct stats_mem *mem, int idx) -{ - if (idx < MEMP_MAX) { - stats_display_mem(mem, mem->name); - } -} -#endif /* MEMP_STATS */ -#endif /* MEM_STATS || MEMP_STATS */ - -#if SYS_STATS -void stats_display_sys(struct stats_sys *sys) -{ - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("\nSYS\n\t")); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("sem.used: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->sem.used)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("sem.max: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->sem.max)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("sem.err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->sem.err)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mutex.used: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mutex.used)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mutex.max: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mutex.max)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mutex.err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mutex.err)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mbox.used: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mbox.used)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mbox.max: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mbox.max)); - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mbox.err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n", sys->mbox.err)); -} -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - -void stats_display(void) -{ - s16_t i; - - LINK_STATS_DISPLAY(); - ETHARP_STATS_DISPLAY(); - IPFRAG_STATS_DISPLAY(); - IP6_FRAG_STATS_DISPLAY(); - IP_STATS_DISPLAY(); - ND6_STATS_DISPLAY(); - IP6_STATS_DISPLAY(); - IGMP_STATS_DISPLAY(); - MLD6_STATS_DISPLAY(); - ICMP_STATS_DISPLAY(); - ICMP6_STATS_DISPLAY(); - UDP_STATS_DISPLAY(); - TCP_STATS_DISPLAY(); - MEM_STATS_DISPLAY(); - - for (i = 0; i < MEMP_MAX; i++) { - MEMP_STATS_DISPLAY(i); - } - - SYS_STATS_DISPLAY(); -} -#endif /* LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ - -#endif /* LWIP_STATS */ +/** + * @file + * Statistics module + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_STATS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/debug.h" + +#include + +struct stats_ lwip_stats; + +void stats_init(void) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +#if MEM_STATS + lwip_stats.mem.name = "MEM"; +#endif /* MEM_STATS */ +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ +} + +#if LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY +void stats_display_proto(struct stats_proto *proto, const char *name) +{ + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("\n%s\n\t", name)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("xmit: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->xmit)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("recv: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->recv)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("fw: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->fw)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("drop: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->drop)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("chkerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->chkerr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("lenerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->lenerr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("memerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->memerr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rterr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->rterr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("proterr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->proterr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("opterr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->opterr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", proto->err)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("cachehit: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n", proto->cachehit)); +} + +#if IGMP_STATS || MLD6_STATS +void stats_display_igmp(struct stats_igmp *igmp, const char *name) +{ + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("\n%s\n\t", name)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("xmit: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->xmit)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("recv: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->recv)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("drop: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->drop)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("chkerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->chkerr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("lenerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->lenerr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("memerr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->memerr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("proterr: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->proterr)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rx_v1: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->rx_v1)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rx_group: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->rx_group)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rx_general: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->rx_general)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("rx_report: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->rx_report)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("tx_join: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->tx_join)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("tx_leave: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", igmp->tx_leave)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("tx_report: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n", igmp->tx_report)); +} +#endif /* IGMP_STATS || MLD6_STATS */ + +#if MEM_STATS || MEMP_STATS +void stats_display_mem(struct stats_mem *mem, const char *name) +{ + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("\nMEM %s\n\t", name)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("avail: %" MEM_SIZE_F "\n\t", mem->avail)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("used: %" MEM_SIZE_F "\n\t", mem->used)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("max: %" MEM_SIZE_F "\n\t", mem->max)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n", mem->err)); +} + +#if MEMP_STATS +void stats_display_memp(struct stats_mem *mem, int idx) +{ + if (idx < MEMP_MAX) { + stats_display_mem(mem, mem->name); + } +} +#endif /* MEMP_STATS */ +#endif /* MEM_STATS || MEMP_STATS */ + +#if SYS_STATS +void stats_display_sys(struct stats_sys *sys) +{ + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("\nSYS\n\t")); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("sem.used: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->sem.used)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("sem.max: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->sem.max)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("sem.err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->sem.err)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mutex.used: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mutex.used)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mutex.max: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mutex.max)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mutex.err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mutex.err)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mbox.used: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mbox.used)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mbox.max: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n\t", sys->mbox.max)); + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(("mbox.err: %" STAT_COUNTER_F "\n", sys->mbox.err)); +} +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + +void stats_display(void) +{ + s16_t i; + + LINK_STATS_DISPLAY(); + ETHARP_STATS_DISPLAY(); + IPFRAG_STATS_DISPLAY(); + IP6_FRAG_STATS_DISPLAY(); + IP_STATS_DISPLAY(); + ND6_STATS_DISPLAY(); + IP6_STATS_DISPLAY(); + IGMP_STATS_DISPLAY(); + MLD6_STATS_DISPLAY(); + ICMP_STATS_DISPLAY(); + ICMP6_STATS_DISPLAY(); + UDP_STATS_DISPLAY(); + TCP_STATS_DISPLAY(); + MEM_STATS_DISPLAY(); + + for (i = 0; i < MEMP_MAX; i++) { + MEMP_STATS_DISPLAY(i); + } + + SYS_STATS_DISPLAY(); +} +#endif /* LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ + +#endif /* LWIP_STATS */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/sys.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/sys.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/sys.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/sys.c index 2830dfe5..23791349 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/sys.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/sys.c @@ -1,148 +1,148 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP Operating System abstraction - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -/** - * @defgroup sys_layer Porting (system abstraction layer) - * @ingroup lwip - * - * @defgroup sys_os OS abstraction layer - * @ingroup sys_layer - * No need to implement functions in this section in NO_SYS mode. - * The OS-specific code should be implemented in arch/sys_arch.h - * and sys_arch.c of your port. - * - * The operating system emulation layer provides a common interface - * between the lwIP code and the underlying operating system kernel. The - * general idea is that porting lwIP to new architectures requires only - * small changes to a few header files and a new sys_arch - * implementation. It is also possible to do a sys_arch implementation - * that does not rely on any underlying operating system. - * - * The sys_arch provides semaphores, mailboxes and mutexes to lwIP. For the full - * lwIP functionality, multiple threads support can be implemented in the - * sys_arch, but this is not required for the basic lwIP - * functionality. Timer scheduling is implemented in lwIP, but can be implemented - * by the sys_arch port (LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM==1). - * - * In addition to the source file providing the functionality of sys_arch, - * the OS emulation layer must provide several header files defining - * macros used throughout lwip. The files required and the macros they - * must define are listed below the sys_arch description. - * - * Since lwIP 1.4.0, semaphore, mutexes and mailbox functions are prototyped in a way that - * allows both using pointers or actual OS structures to be used. This way, memory - * required for such types can be either allocated in place (globally or on the - * stack) or on the heap (allocated internally in the "*_new()" functions). - * - * Note: - * ----- - * Be careful with using mem_malloc() in sys_arch. When malloc() refers to - * mem_malloc() you can run into a circular function call problem. In mem.c - * mem_init() tries to allocate a semaphore using mem_malloc, which of course - * can't be performed when sys_arch uses mem_malloc. - * - * @defgroup sys_sem Semaphores - * @ingroup sys_os - * Semaphores can be either counting or binary - lwIP works with both - * kinds. - * Semaphores are represented by the type "sys_sem_t" which is typedef'd - * in the sys_arch.h file. Mailboxes are equivalently represented by the - * type "sys_mbox_t". Mutexes are represented by the type "sys_mutex_t". - * lwIP does not place any restrictions on how these types are represented - * internally. - * - * @defgroup sys_mutex Mutexes - * @ingroup sys_os - * Mutexes are recommended to correctly handle priority inversion, - * especially if you use LWIP_CORE_LOCKING . - * - * @defgroup sys_mbox Mailboxes - * @ingroup sys_os - * Mailboxes should be implemented as a queue which allows multiple messages - * to be posted (implementing as a rendez-vous point where only one message can be - * posted at a time can have a highly negative impact on performance). A message - * in a mailbox is just a pointer, nothing more. - * - * @defgroup sys_time Time - * @ingroup sys_layer - * - * @defgroup sys_prot Critical sections - * @ingroup sys_layer - * Used to protect short regions of code against concurrent access. - * - Your system is a bare-metal system (probably with an RTOS) - * and interrupts are under your control: - * Implement this as LockInterrupts() / UnlockInterrupts() - * - Your system uses an RTOS with deferred interrupt handling from a - * worker thread: Implement as a global mutex or lock/unlock scheduler - * - Your system uses a high-level OS with e.g. POSIX signals: - * Implement as a global mutex - * - * @defgroup sys_misc Misc - * @ingroup sys_os - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/sys.h" - -/* Most of the functions defined in sys.h must be implemented in the - * architecture-dependent file sys_arch.c */ - -#if !NO_SYS - -#ifndef sys_msleep -/** - * Sleep for some ms. Timeouts are NOT processed while sleeping. - * - * @param ms number of milliseconds to sleep - */ -void sys_msleep(u32_t ms) -{ - if (ms > 0) { - sys_sem_t delaysem; - err_t err = sys_sem_new(&delaysem, 0); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - sys_arch_sem_wait(&delaysem, ms); - sys_sem_free(&delaysem); - } - } -} -#endif /* sys_msleep */ - -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP Operating System abstraction + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +/** + * @defgroup sys_layer Porting (system abstraction layer) + * @ingroup lwip + * + * @defgroup sys_os OS abstraction layer + * @ingroup sys_layer + * No need to implement functions in this section in NO_SYS mode. + * The OS-specific code should be implemented in arch/sys_arch.h + * and sys_arch.c of your port. + * + * The operating system emulation layer provides a common interface + * between the lwIP code and the underlying operating system kernel. The + * general idea is that porting lwIP to new architectures requires only + * small changes to a few header files and a new sys_arch + * implementation. It is also possible to do a sys_arch implementation + * that does not rely on any underlying operating system. + * + * The sys_arch provides semaphores, mailboxes and mutexes to lwIP. For the full + * lwIP functionality, multiple threads support can be implemented in the + * sys_arch, but this is not required for the basic lwIP + * functionality. Timer scheduling is implemented in lwIP, but can be implemented + * by the sys_arch port (LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM==1). + * + * In addition to the source file providing the functionality of sys_arch, + * the OS emulation layer must provide several header files defining + * macros used throughout lwip. The files required and the macros they + * must define are listed below the sys_arch description. + * + * Since lwIP 1.4.0, semaphore, mutexes and mailbox functions are prototyped in a way that + * allows both using pointers or actual OS structures to be used. This way, memory + * required for such types can be either allocated in place (globally or on the + * stack) or on the heap (allocated internally in the "*_new()" functions). + * + * Note: + * ----- + * Be careful with using mem_malloc() in sys_arch. When malloc() refers to + * mem_malloc() you can run into a circular function call problem. In mem.c + * mem_init() tries to allocate a semaphore using mem_malloc, which of course + * can't be performed when sys_arch uses mem_malloc. + * + * @defgroup sys_sem Semaphores + * @ingroup sys_os + * Semaphores can be either counting or binary - lwIP works with both + * kinds. + * Semaphores are represented by the type "sys_sem_t" which is typedef'd + * in the sys_arch.h file. Mailboxes are equivalently represented by the + * type "sys_mbox_t". Mutexes are represented by the type "sys_mutex_t". + * lwIP does not place any restrictions on how these types are represented + * internally. + * + * @defgroup sys_mutex Mutexes + * @ingroup sys_os + * Mutexes are recommended to correctly handle priority inversion, + * especially if you use LWIP_CORE_LOCKING . + * + * @defgroup sys_mbox Mailboxes + * @ingroup sys_os + * Mailboxes should be implemented as a queue which allows multiple messages + * to be posted (implementing as a rendez-vous point where only one message can be + * posted at a time can have a highly negative impact on performance). A message + * in a mailbox is just a pointer, nothing more. + * + * @defgroup sys_time Time + * @ingroup sys_layer + * + * @defgroup sys_prot Critical sections + * @ingroup sys_layer + * Used to protect short regions of code against concurrent access. + * - Your system is a bare-metal system (probably with an RTOS) + * and interrupts are under your control: + * Implement this as LockInterrupts() / UnlockInterrupts() + * - Your system uses an RTOS with deferred interrupt handling from a + * worker thread: Implement as a global mutex or lock/unlock scheduler + * - Your system uses a high-level OS with e.g. POSIX signals: + * Implement as a global mutex + * + * @defgroup sys_misc Misc + * @ingroup sys_os + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/sys.h" + +/* Most of the functions defined in sys.h must be implemented in the + * architecture-dependent file sys_arch.c */ + +#if !NO_SYS + +#ifndef sys_msleep +/** + * Sleep for some ms. Timeouts are NOT processed while sleeping. + * + * @param ms number of milliseconds to sleep + */ +void sys_msleep(u32_t ms) +{ + if (ms > 0) { + sys_sem_t delaysem; + err_t err = sys_sem_new(&delaysem, 0); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + sys_arch_sem_wait(&delaysem, ms); + sys_sem_free(&delaysem); + } + } +} +#endif /* sys_msleep */ + +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/tcp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/tcp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/tcp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/tcp.c index 9442acf1..3d3d4e8f 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/tcp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/tcp.c @@ -1,2797 +1,2797 @@ -/** - * @file - * Transmission Control Protocol for IP - * See also @ref tcp_raw - * - * @defgroup tcp_raw TCP - * @ingroup callbackstyle_api - * Transmission Control Protocol for IP\n - * @see @ref api - * - * Common functions for the TCP implementation, such as functions - * for manipulating the data structures and the TCP timer functions. TCP functions - * related to input and output is found in tcp_in.c and tcp_out.c respectively.\n - * - * TCP connection setup - * -------------------- - * The functions used for setting up connections is similar to that of - * the sequential API and of the BSD socket API. A new TCP connection - * identifier (i.e., a protocol control block - PCB) is created with the - * tcp_new() function. This PCB can then be either set to listen for new - * incoming connections or be explicitly connected to another host. - * - tcp_new() - * - tcp_bind() - * - tcp_listen() and tcp_listen_with_backlog() - * - tcp_accept() - * - tcp_connect() - * - * Sending TCP data - * ---------------- - * TCP data is sent by enqueueing the data with a call to tcp_write() and - * triggering to send by calling tcp_output(). When the data is successfully - * transmitted to the remote host, the application will be notified with a - * call to a specified callback function. - * - tcp_write() - * - tcp_output() - * - tcp_sent() - * - * Receiving TCP data - * ------------------ - * TCP data reception is callback based - an application specified - * callback function is called when new data arrives. When the - * application has taken the data, it has to call the tcp_recved() - * function to indicate that TCP can advertise increase the receive - * window. - * - tcp_recv() - * - tcp_recved() - * - * Application polling - * ------------------- - * When a connection is idle (i.e., no data is either transmitted or - * received), lwIP will repeatedly poll the application by calling a - * specified callback function. This can be used either as a watchdog - * timer for killing connections that have stayed idle for too long, or - * as a method of waiting for memory to become available. For instance, - * if a call to tcp_write() has failed because memory wasn't available, - * the application may use the polling functionality to call tcp_write() - * again when the connection has been idle for a while. - * - tcp_poll() - * - * Closing and aborting connections - * -------------------------------- - * - tcp_close() - * - tcp_abort() - * - tcp_err() - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/debug.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -#ifndef TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START -/* From http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers: - "The Dynamic and/or Private Ports are those from 49152 through 65535" */ -#define TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START 0xc000 -#define TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END 0xffff -#define TCP_ENSURE_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE(port) ((u16_t)(((port) & (u16_t)~TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START) + TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START)) -#endif - -#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE -#define TCP_KEEP_DUR(pcb) ((pcb)->keep_cnt * (pcb)->keep_intvl) -#define TCP_KEEP_INTVL(pcb) ((pcb)->keep_intvl) -#else /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ -#define TCP_KEEP_DUR(pcb) TCP_MAXIDLE -#define TCP_KEEP_INTVL(pcb) TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ - -/* As initial send MSS, we use TCP_MSS but limit it to 536. */ -#if TCP_MSS > 536 -#define INITIAL_MSS 536 -#else -#define INITIAL_MSS TCP_MSS -#endif - -static const char *const tcp_state_str[] = { - "CLOSED", - "LISTEN", - "SYN_SENT", - "SYN_RCVD", - "ESTABLISHED", - "FIN_WAIT_1", - "FIN_WAIT_2", - "CLOSE_WAIT", - "CLOSING", - "LAST_ACK", - "TIME_WAIT" -}; - -/* last local TCP port */ -static u16_t tcp_port = TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START; - -/* Incremented every coarse grained timer shot (typically every 500 ms). */ -u32_t tcp_ticks; -static const u8_t tcp_backoff[13] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7 }; -/* Times per slowtmr hits */ -static const u8_t tcp_persist_backoff[7] = { 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96, 120 }; - -/* The TCP PCB lists. */ - -/** List of all TCP PCBs bound but not yet (connected || listening) */ -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_bound_pcbs; -/** List of all TCP PCBs in LISTEN state */ -union tcp_listen_pcbs_t tcp_listen_pcbs; -/** List of all TCP PCBs that are in a state in which - * they accept or send data. */ -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_active_pcbs; -/** List of all TCP PCBs in TIME-WAIT state */ -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tw_pcbs; - -/** An array with all (non-temporary) PCB lists, mainly used for smaller code size */ -struct tcp_pcb **const tcp_pcb_lists[] = { &tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs, &tcp_bound_pcbs, - &tcp_active_pcbs, &tcp_tw_pcbs }; - -u8_t tcp_active_pcbs_changed; - -/** Timer counter to handle calling slow-timer from tcp_tmr() */ -static u8_t tcp_timer; -static u8_t tcp_timer_ctr; -static u16_t tcp_new_port(void); - -static err_t tcp_close_shutdown_fin(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS -static void tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_destroyed(struct tcp_pcb_ext_args *ext_args); -#endif - -/** - * Initialize this module. - */ -void tcp_init(void) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_RAND - tcp_port = TCP_ENSURE_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE(LWIP_RAND()); -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ -} - -/** Free a tcp pcb */ -void tcp_free(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_free: LISTEN", pcb->state != LISTEN); -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS - tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_destroyed(pcb->ext_args); -#endif - memp_free(MEMP_TCP_PCB, pcb); -} - -/** Free a tcp listen pcb */ -static void tcp_free_listen(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_free_listen: !LISTEN", pcb->state != LISTEN); -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS - tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_destroyed(pcb->ext_args); -#endif - memp_free(MEMP_TCP_PCB_LISTEN, pcb); -} - -/** - * Called periodically to dispatch TCP timers. - */ -void tcp_tmr(void) -{ - /* Call tcp_fasttmr() every 250 ms */ - tcp_fasttmr(); - - if (++tcp_timer & 1) { - /* Call tcp_slowtmr() every 500 ms, i.e., every other timer - tcp_tmr() is called. */ - tcp_slowtmr(); - } -} - -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG -/** Called when a listen pcb is closed. Iterates one pcb list and removes the - * closed listener pcb from pcb->listener if matching. - */ -static void tcp_remove_listener(struct tcp_pcb *list, struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_remove_listener: invalid listener", lpcb != NULL); - - for (pcb = list; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - if (pcb->listener == lpcb) { - pcb->listener = NULL; - } - } -} -#endif - -/** Called when a listen pcb is closed. Iterates all pcb lists and removes the - * closed listener pcb from pcb->listener if matching. - */ -static void tcp_listen_closed(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - size_t i; - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->state == LISTEN", pcb->state == LISTEN); - - for (i = 1; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_lists); i++) { - tcp_remove_listener(*tcp_pcb_lists[i], (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)pcb); - } - -#endif - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); -} - -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG -/** @ingroup tcp_raw - * Delay accepting a connection in respect to the listen backlog: - * the number of outstanding connections is increased until - * tcp_backlog_accepted() is called. - * - * ATTENTION: the caller is responsible for calling tcp_backlog_accepted() - * or else the backlog feature will get out of sync! - * - * @param pcb the connection pcb which is not fully accepted yet - */ -void tcp_backlog_delayed(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if ((pcb->flags & TF_BACKLOGPEND) == 0) { - if (pcb->listener != NULL) { - pcb->listener->accepts_pending++; - LWIP_ASSERT("accepts_pending != 0", pcb->listener->accepts_pending != 0); - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_BACKLOGPEND); - } - } -} - -/** @ingroup tcp_raw - * A delayed-accept a connection is accepted (or closed/aborted): decreases - * the number of outstanding connections after calling tcp_backlog_delayed(). - * - * ATTENTION: the caller is responsible for calling tcp_backlog_accepted() - * or else the backlog feature will get out of sync! - * - * @param pcb the connection pcb which is now fully accepted (or closed/aborted) - */ -void tcp_backlog_accepted(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if ((pcb->flags & TF_BACKLOGPEND) != 0) { - if (pcb->listener != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("accepts_pending != 0", pcb->listener->accepts_pending != 0); - pcb->listener->accepts_pending--; - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_BACKLOGPEND); - } - } -} -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - -/** - * Closes the TX side of a connection held by the PCB. - * For tcp_close(), a RST is sent if the application didn't receive all data - * (tcp_recved() not called for all data passed to recv callback). - * - * Listening pcbs are freed and may not be referenced any more. - * Connection pcbs are freed if not yet connected and may not be referenced - * any more. If a connection is established (at least SYN received or in - * a closing state), the connection is closed, and put in a closing state. - * The pcb is then automatically freed in tcp_slowtmr(). It is therefore - * unsafe to reference it. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to close - * @return ERR_OK if connection has been closed - * another err_t if closing failed and pcb is not freed - */ -static err_t tcp_close_shutdown(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t rst_on_unacked_data) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_close_shutdown: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - if (rst_on_unacked_data && ((pcb->state == ESTABLISHED) || (pcb->state == CLOSE_WAIT))) { - if ((pcb->refused_data != NULL) || (pcb->rcv_wnd != TCP_WND_MAX(pcb))) { - /* Not all data received by application, send RST to tell the remote - side about this. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED", pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED); - - /* don't call tcp_abort here: we must not deallocate the pcb since - that might not be expected when calling tcp_close */ - tcp_rst(pcb, pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, - pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port); - - tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); - TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(pcb); - - /* Deallocate the pcb since we already sent a RST for it */ - if (tcp_input_pcb == pcb) { - /* prevent using a deallocated pcb: free it from tcp_input later */ - tcp_trigger_input_pcb_close(); - } else { - tcp_free(pcb); - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* - states which free the pcb are handled here, - - states which send FIN and change state are handled in tcp_close_shutdown_fin() */ - switch (pcb->state) { - case CLOSED: - - /* Closing a pcb in the CLOSED state might seem erroneous, - * however, it is in this state once allocated and as yet unused - * and the user needs some way to free it should the need arise. - * Calling tcp_close() with a pcb that has already been closed, (i.e. twice) - * or for a pcb that has been used and then entered the CLOSED state - * is erroneous, but this should never happen as the pcb has in those cases - * been freed, and so any remaining handles are bogus. */ - if (pcb->local_port != 0) { - TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); - } - - tcp_free(pcb); - break; - - case LISTEN: - tcp_listen_closed(pcb); - tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs, pcb); - tcp_free_listen(pcb); - break; - - case SYN_SENT: - TCP_PCB_REMOVE_ACTIVE(pcb); - tcp_free(pcb); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpattemptfails); - break; - - default: - return tcp_close_shutdown_fin(pcb); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t tcp_close_shutdown_fin(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - err_t err; - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); - - switch (pcb->state) { - case SYN_RCVD: - err = tcp_send_fin(pcb); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpattemptfails); - pcb->state = FIN_WAIT_1; - } - - break; - - case ESTABLISHED: - err = tcp_send_fin(pcb); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpestabresets); - pcb->state = FIN_WAIT_1; - } - - break; - - case CLOSE_WAIT: - err = tcp_send_fin(pcb); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpestabresets); - pcb->state = LAST_ACK; - } - - break; - - default: - /* Has already been closed, do nothing. */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - /* To ensure all data has been sent when tcp_close returns, we have - to make sure tcp_output doesn't fail. - Since we don't really have to ensure all data has been sent when tcp_close - returns (unsent data is sent from tcp timer functions, also), we don't care - for the return value of tcp_output for now. */ - tcp_output(pcb); - } else if (err == ERR_MEM) { - /* Mark this pcb for closing. Closing is retried from tcp_tmr. */ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_CLOSEPEND); - /* We have to return ERR_OK from here to indicate to the callers that this - pcb should not be used any more as it will be freed soon via tcp_tmr. - This is OK here since sending FIN does not guarantee a time frime for - actually freeing the pcb, either (it is left in closure states for - remote ACK or timeout) */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Closes the connection held by the PCB. - * - * Listening pcbs are freed and may not be referenced any more. - * Connection pcbs are freed if not yet connected and may not be referenced - * any more. If a connection is established (at least SYN received or in - * a closing state), the connection is closed, and put in a closing state. - * The pcb is then automatically freed in tcp_slowtmr(). It is therefore - * unsafe to reference it (unless an error is returned). - * - * The function may return ERR_MEM if no memory - * was available for closing the connection. If so, the application - * should wait and try again either by using the acknowledgment - * callback or the polling functionality. If the close succeeds, the - * function returns ERR_OK. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to close - * @return ERR_OK if connection has been closed - * another err_t if closing failed and pcb is not freed - */ -err_t tcp_close(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_close: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_close: closing in ")); - - tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); - - if (pcb->state != LISTEN) { - /* Set a flag not to receive any more data... */ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_RXCLOSED); - } - - /* ... and close */ - return tcp_close_shutdown(pcb, 1); -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Causes all or part of a full-duplex connection of this PCB to be shut down. - * This doesn't deallocate the PCB unless shutting down both sides! - * Shutting down both sides is the same as calling tcp_close, so if it succeds - * (i.e. returns ER_OK), the PCB must not be referenced any more! - * - * @param pcb PCB to shutdown - * @param shut_rx shut down receive side if this is != 0 - * @param shut_tx shut down send side if this is != 0 - * @return ERR_OK if shutdown succeeded (or the PCB has already been shut down) - * another err_t on error. - */ -err_t tcp_shutdown(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int shut_rx, int shut_tx) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_shutdown: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { - return ERR_CONN; - } - - if (shut_rx) { - /* shut down the receive side: set a flag not to receive any more data... */ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_RXCLOSED); - - if (shut_tx) { - /* shutting down the tx AND rx side is the same as closing for the raw API */ - return tcp_close_shutdown(pcb, 1); - } - - /* ... and free buffered data */ - if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { - pbuf_free(pcb->refused_data); - pcb->refused_data = NULL; - } - } - - if (shut_tx) { - /* This can't happen twice since if it succeeds, the pcb's state is changed. - Only close in these states as the others directly deallocate the PCB */ - switch (pcb->state) { - case SYN_RCVD: - case ESTABLISHED: - case CLOSE_WAIT: - return tcp_close_shutdown(pcb, (u8_t)shut_rx); - - default: - /* Not (yet?) connected, cannot shutdown the TX side as that would bring us - into CLOSED state, where the PCB is deallocated. */ - return ERR_CONN; - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Abandons a connection and optionally sends a RST to the remote - * host. Deletes the local protocol control block. This is done when - * a connection is killed because of shortage of memory. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to abort - * @param reset boolean to indicate whether a reset should be sent - */ -void tcp_abandon(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int reset) -{ - u32_t seqno, ackno; -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - tcp_err_fn errf; -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - void *errf_arg; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_abandon: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); - - /* pcb->state LISTEN not allowed here */ - LWIP_ASSERT("don't call tcp_abort/tcp_abandon for listen-pcbs", - pcb->state != LISTEN); - - /* Figure out on which TCP PCB list we are, and remove us. If we - are in an active state, call the receive function associated with - the PCB with a NULL argument, and send an RST to the remote end. */ - if (pcb->state == TIME_WAIT) { - tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); - tcp_free(pcb); - } else { - int send_rst = 0; - u16_t local_port = 0; - enum tcp_state last_state; - seqno = pcb->snd_nxt; - ackno = pcb->rcv_nxt; -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - errf = pcb->errf; -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - errf_arg = pcb->callback_arg; - - if (pcb->state == CLOSED) { - if (pcb->local_port != 0) { - /* bound, not yet opened */ - TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); - } - } else { - send_rst = reset; - local_port = pcb->local_port; - TCP_PCB_REMOVE_ACTIVE(pcb); - } - - if (pcb->unacked != NULL) { - tcp_segs_free(pcb->unacked); - } - - if (pcb->unsent != NULL) { - tcp_segs_free(pcb->unsent); - } - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ - - if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { - tcp_segs_free(pcb->ooseq); - } - -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb); - - if (send_rst) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RST_DEBUG, ("tcp_abandon: sending RST\n")); - tcp_rst(pcb, seqno, ackno, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, local_port, pcb->remote_port); - } - - last_state = pcb->state; - tcp_free(pcb); - TCP_EVENT_ERR(last_state, errf, errf_arg, ERR_ABRT); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Aborts the connection by sending a RST (reset) segment to the remote - * host. The pcb is deallocated. This function never fails. - * - * ATTENTION: When calling this from one of the TCP callbacks, make - * sure you always return ERR_ABRT (and never return ERR_ABRT otherwise - * or you will risk accessing deallocated memory or memory leaks! - * - * @param pcb the tcp pcb to abort - */ -void tcp_abort(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - tcp_abandon(pcb, 1); -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Binds the connection to a local port number and IP address. If the - * IP address is not given (i.e., ipaddr == IP_ANY_TYPE), the connection is - * bound to all local IP addresses. - * If another connection is bound to the same port, the function will - * return ERR_USE, otherwise ERR_OK is returned. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to bind (no check is done whether this pcb is - * already bound!) - * @param ipaddr the local ip address to bind to (use IPx_ADDR_ANY to bind - * to any local address - * @param port the local port to bind to - * @return ERR_USE if the port is already in use - * ERR_VAL if bind failed because the PCB is not in a valid state - * ERR_OK if bound - */ -err_t tcp_bind(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) -{ - int i; - int max_pcb_list = NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS; - struct tcp_pcb *cpcb; -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - ip_addr_t zoned_ipaddr; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ - if (ipaddr == NULL) { - ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; - } - -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_bind: invalid ipaddr", ipaddr != NULL, return ERR_ARG); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_bind: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_bind: can only bind in state CLOSED", pcb->state == CLOSED, return ERR_VAL); - -#if SO_REUSE - - /* Unless the REUSEADDR flag is set, - we have to check the pcbs in TIME-WAIT state, also. - We do not dump TIME_WAIT pcb's; they can still be matched by incoming - packets using both local and remote IP addresses and ports to distinguish. - */ - if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) { - max_pcb_list = NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS_NO_TIME_WAIT; - } - -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now. - * This is legacy support: scope-aware callers should always provide properly - * zoned source addresses. Do the zone selection before the address-in-use - * check below; as such we have to make a temporary copy of the address. */ - if (IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) && ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), IP6_UNICAST)) { - ip_addr_copy(zoned_ipaddr, *ipaddr); - ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&zoned_ipaddr), ip_2_ip6(&zoned_ipaddr)); - ipaddr = &zoned_ipaddr; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - if (port == 0) { - port = tcp_new_port(); - - if (port == 0) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - } else { - /* Check if the address already is in use (on all lists) */ - for (i = 0; i < max_pcb_list; i++) { - for (cpcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; cpcb != NULL; cpcb = cpcb->next) { - if (cpcb->local_port == port) { -#if SO_REUSE - - /* Omit checking for the same port if both pcbs have REUSEADDR set. - For SO_REUSEADDR, the duplicate-check for a 5-tuple is done in - tcp_connect. */ - if (!ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR) || - !ip_get_option(cpcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - { - /* @todo: check accept_any_ip_version */ - if ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) == IP_IS_V6_VAL(cpcb->local_ip)) && - (ip_addr_isany(&cpcb->local_ip) || - ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) || - ip_addr_cmp(&cpcb->local_ip, ipaddr))) { - return ERR_USE; - } - } - } - } - } - } - - if (!ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - || (IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr) != IP_GET_TYPE(&pcb->local_ip)) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - ) { - ip_addr_set(&pcb->local_ip, ipaddr); - } - - pcb->local_port = port; - TCP_REG(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_bind: bind to port %" U16_F "\n", port)); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Binds the connection to a netif and IP address. - * After calling this function, all packets received via this PCB - * are guaranteed to have come in via the specified netif, and all - * outgoing packets will go out via the specified netif. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to bind. - * @param netif the netif to bind to. Can be NULL. - */ -void tcp_bind_netif(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netif != NULL) { - pcb->netif_idx = netif_get_index(netif); - } else { - pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; - } -} - -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API -/** - * Default accept callback if no accept callback is specified by the user. - */ -static err_t tcp_accept_null(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_accept_null: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - tcp_abort(pcb); - - return ERR_ABRT; -} -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Set the state of the connection to be LISTEN, which means that it - * is able to accept incoming connections. The protocol control block - * is reallocated in order to consume less memory. Setting the - * connection to LISTEN is an irreversible process. - * When an incoming connection is accepted, the function specified with - * the tcp_accept() function will be called. The pcb has to be bound - * to a local port with the tcp_bind() function. - * - * The tcp_listen() function returns a new connection identifier, and - * the one passed as an argument to the function will be - * deallocated. The reason for this behavior is that less memory is - * needed for a connection that is listening, so tcp_listen() will - * reclaim the memory needed for the original connection and allocate a - * new smaller memory block for the listening connection. - * - * tcp_listen() may return NULL if no memory was available for the - * listening connection. If so, the memory associated with the pcb - * passed as an argument to tcp_listen() will not be deallocated. - * - * The backlog limits the number of outstanding connections - * in the listen queue to the value specified by the backlog argument. - * To use it, your need to set TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG=1 in your lwipopts.h. - * - * @param pcb the original tcp_pcb - * @param backlog the incoming connections queue limit - * @return tcp_pcb used for listening, consumes less memory. - * - * @note The original tcp_pcb is freed. This function therefore has to be - * called like this: - * tpcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog(tpcb, backlog); - */ -struct tcp_pcb * -tcp_listen_with_backlog(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t backlog) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - return tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(pcb, backlog, NULL); -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Set the state of the connection to be LISTEN, which means that it - * is able to accept incoming connections. The protocol control block - * is reallocated in order to consume less memory. Setting the - * connection to LISTEN is an irreversible process. - * - * @param pcb the original tcp_pcb - * @param backlog the incoming connections queue limit - * @param err when NULL is returned, this contains the error reason - * @return tcp_pcb used for listening, consumes less memory. - * - * @note The original tcp_pcb is freed. This function therefore has to be - * called like this: - * tpcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(tpcb, backlog, &err); - */ -struct tcp_pcb * -tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) -{ - struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb = NULL; - err_t res; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(backlog); - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, res = ERR_ARG; goto done); - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err: pcb already connected", pcb->state == CLOSED, res = ERR_CLSD; goto done); - - /* already listening? */ - if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { - lpcb = (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)pcb; - res = ERR_ALREADY; - goto done; - } - -#if SO_REUSE - - if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) { - /* Since SOF_REUSEADDR allows reusing a local address before the pcb's usage - is declared (listen-/connection-pcb), we have to make sure now that - this port is only used once for every local IP. */ - for (lpcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; lpcb != NULL; lpcb = lpcb->next) { - if ((lpcb->local_port == pcb->local_port) && - ip_addr_cmp(&lpcb->local_ip, &pcb->local_ip)) { - /* this address/port is already used */ - lpcb = NULL; - res = ERR_USE; - goto done; - } - } - } - -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - lpcb = (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB_LISTEN); - - if (lpcb == NULL) { - res = ERR_MEM; - goto done; - } - - lpcb->callback_arg = pcb->callback_arg; - lpcb->local_port = pcb->local_port; - lpcb->state = LISTEN; - lpcb->prio = pcb->prio; - lpcb->so_options = pcb->so_options; - lpcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; - lpcb->ttl = pcb->ttl; - lpcb->tos = pcb->tos; -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(lpcb->remote_ip, pcb->local_ip.type); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - ip_addr_copy(lpcb->local_ip, pcb->local_ip); - - if (pcb->local_port != 0) { - TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); - } - -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS - /* copy over ext_args to listening pcb */ - memcpy(&lpcb->ext_args, &pcb->ext_args, sizeof(pcb->ext_args)); -#endif - tcp_free(pcb); -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - lpcb->accept = tcp_accept_null; -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - lpcb->accepts_pending = 0; - tcp_backlog_set(lpcb, backlog); -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - TCP_REG(&tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs, (struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb); - res = ERR_OK; -done: - - if (err != NULL) { - *err = res; - } - - return (struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb; -} - -/** - * Update the state that tracks the available window space to advertise. - * - * Returns how much extra window would be advertised if we sent an - * update now. - */ -u32_t tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - u32_t new_right_edge; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - new_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd; - - if (TCP_SEQ_GEQ(new_right_edge, pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge + LWIP_MIN((TCP_WND / 2), pcb->mss))) { - /* we can advertise more window */ - pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = pcb->rcv_wnd; - return new_right_edge - pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge; - } else { - if (TCP_SEQ_GT(pcb->rcv_nxt, pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge)) { - /* Can happen due to other end sending out of advertised window, - * but within actual available (but not yet advertised) window */ - pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = 0; - } else { - /* keep the right edge of window constant */ - u32_t new_rcv_ann_wnd = pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge - pcb->rcv_nxt; -#if !LWIP_WND_SCALE - LWIP_ASSERT("new_rcv_ann_wnd <= 0xffff", new_rcv_ann_wnd <= 0xffff); -#endif - pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = (tcpwnd_size_t)new_rcv_ann_wnd; - } - - return 0; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * This function should be called by the application when it has - * processed the data. The purpose is to advertise a larger window - * when the data has been processed. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which data is read - * @param len the amount of bytes that have been read by the application - */ -void tcp_recved(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) -{ - u32_t wnd_inflation; - tcpwnd_size_t rcv_wnd; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_recved: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); - - /* pcb->state LISTEN not allowed here */ - LWIP_ASSERT("don't call tcp_recved for listen-pcbs", - pcb->state != LISTEN); - - rcv_wnd = (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->rcv_wnd + len); - - if ((rcv_wnd > TCP_WND_MAX(pcb)) || (rcv_wnd < pcb->rcv_wnd)) { - /* window got too big or tcpwnd_size_t overflow */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_recved: window got too big or tcpwnd_size_t overflow\n")); - pcb->rcv_wnd = TCP_WND_MAX(pcb); - } else { - pcb->rcv_wnd = rcv_wnd; - } - - wnd_inflation = tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(pcb); - - /* If the change in the right edge of window is significant (default - * watermark is TCP_WND/4), then send an explicit update now. - * Otherwise wait for a packet to be sent in the normal course of - * events (or more window to be available later) */ - if (wnd_inflation >= TCP_WND_UPDATE_THRESHOLD) { - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - tcp_output(pcb); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_recved: received %" U16_F " bytes, wnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F " (%" TCPWNDSIZE_F ").\n", - len, pcb->rcv_wnd, (u16_t)(TCP_WND_MAX(pcb) - pcb->rcv_wnd))); -} - -/** - * Allocate a new local TCP port. - * - * @return a new (free) local TCP port number - */ -static u16_t tcp_new_port(void) -{ - u8_t i; - u16_t n = 0; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - -again: - tcp_port++; - - if (tcp_port == TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END) { - tcp_port = TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START; - } - - /* Check all PCB lists. */ - for (i = 0; i < NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS; i++) { - for (pcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - if (pcb->local_port == tcp_port) { - n++; - - if (n > (TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END - TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START)) { - return 0; - } - - goto again; - } - } - } - - return tcp_port; -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Connects to another host. The function given as the "connected" - * argument will be called when the connection has been established. - * Sets up the pcb to connect to the remote host and sends the - * initial SYN segment which opens the connection. - * - * The tcp_connect() function returns immediately; it does not wait for - * the connection to be properly setup. Instead, it will call the - * function specified as the fourth argument (the "connected" argument) - * when the connection is established. If the connection could not be - * properly established, either because the other host refused the - * connection or because the other host didn't answer, the "err" - * callback function of this pcb (registered with tcp_err, see below) - * will be called. - * - * The tcp_connect() function can return ERR_MEM if no memory is - * available for enqueueing the SYN segment. If the SYN indeed was - * enqueued successfully, the tcp_connect() function returns ERR_OK. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb used to establish the connection - * @param ipaddr the remote ip address to connect to - * @param port the remote tcp port to connect to - * @param connected callback function to call when connected (on error, - the err calback will be called) - * @return ERR_VAL if invalid arguments are given - * ERR_OK if connect request has been sent - * other err_t values if connect request couldn't be sent - */ -err_t tcp_connect(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, - tcp_connected_fn connected) -{ - struct netif *netif = NULL; - err_t ret; - u32_t iss; - u16_t old_local_port; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_connect: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_connect: invalid ipaddr", ipaddr != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_connect: can only connect from state CLOSED", pcb->state == CLOSED, return ERR_ISCONN); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_connect to port %" U16_F "\n", port)); - ip_addr_set(&pcb->remote_ip, ipaddr); - pcb->remote_port = port; - - if (pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { - netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->netif_idx); - } else { - /* check if we have a route to the remote host */ - netif = ip_route(&pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); - } - - if (netif == NULL) { - /* Don't even try to send a SYN packet if we have no route since that will fail. */ - return ERR_RTE; - } - - /* check if local IP has been assigned to pcb, if not, get one */ - if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip)) { - const ip_addr_t *local_ip = ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, ipaddr); - - if (local_ip == NULL) { - return ERR_RTE; - } - - ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); - } - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now. - * Given that we already have the target netif, this is easy and cheap. */ - if (IP_IS_V6(&pcb->remote_ip) && - ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), IP6_UNICAST)) { - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), IP6_UNICAST, netif); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - old_local_port = pcb->local_port; - - if (pcb->local_port == 0) { - pcb->local_port = tcp_new_port(); - - if (pcb->local_port == 0) { - return ERR_BUF; - } - } else { -#if SO_REUSE - - if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) { - /* Since SOF_REUSEADDR allows reusing a local address, we have to make sure - now that the 5-tuple is unique. */ - struct tcp_pcb *cpcb; - int i; - - /* Don't check listen- and bound-PCBs, check active- and TIME-WAIT PCBs. */ - for (i = 2; i < NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS; i++) { - for (cpcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; cpcb != NULL; cpcb = cpcb->next) { - if ((cpcb->local_port == pcb->local_port) && - (cpcb->remote_port == port) && - ip_addr_cmp(&cpcb->local_ip, &pcb->local_ip) && - ip_addr_cmp(&cpcb->remote_ip, ipaddr)) { - /* linux returns EISCONN here, but ERR_USE should be OK for us */ - return ERR_USE; - } - } - } - } - -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - } - - iss = tcp_next_iss(pcb); - pcb->rcv_nxt = 0; - pcb->snd_nxt = iss; - pcb->lastack = iss - 1; - pcb->snd_wl2 = iss - 1; - pcb->snd_lbb = iss - 1; - /* Start with a window that does not need scaling. When window scaling is - enabled and used, the window is enlarged when both sides agree on scaling. */ - pcb->rcv_wnd = pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = TCPWND_MIN16(TCP_WND); - pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt; - pcb->snd_wnd = TCP_WND; - /* As initial send MSS, we use TCP_MSS but limit it to 536. - The send MSS is updated when an MSS option is received. */ - pcb->mss = INITIAL_MSS; -#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS - pcb->mss = tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(pcb->mss, netif, &pcb->remote_ip); -#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ - pcb->cwnd = 1; -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - pcb->connected = connected; -#else /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(connected); -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - - /* Send a SYN together with the MSS option. */ - ret = tcp_enqueue_flags(pcb, TCP_SYN); - - if (ret == ERR_OK) { - /* SYN segment was enqueued, changed the pcbs state now */ - pcb->state = SYN_SENT; - - if (old_local_port != 0) { - TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); - } - - TCP_REG_ACTIVE(pcb); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpactiveopens); - - tcp_output(pcb); - } - - return ret; -} - -/** - * Called every 500 ms and implements the retransmission timer and the timer that - * removes PCBs that have been in TIME-WAIT for enough time. It also increments - * various timers such as the inactivity timer in each PCB. - * - * Automatically called from tcp_tmr(). - */ -void tcp_slowtmr(void) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *prev; - tcpwnd_size_t eff_wnd; - u8_t pcb_remove; /* flag if a PCB should be removed */ - u8_t pcb_reset; /* flag if a RST should be sent when removing */ - err_t err; - - err = ERR_OK; - - ++tcp_ticks; - ++tcp_timer_ctr; - -tcp_slowtmr_start: - /* Steps through all of the active PCBs. */ - prev = NULL; - pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; - - if (pcb == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: no active pcbs\n")); - } - - while (pcb != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: processing active pcb\n")); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: active pcb->state != CLOSED\n", pcb->state != CLOSED); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: active pcb->state != LISTEN\n", pcb->state != LISTEN); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: active pcb->state != TIME-WAIT\n", pcb->state != TIME_WAIT); - - if (pcb->last_timer == tcp_timer_ctr) { - /* skip this pcb, we have already processed it */ - prev = pcb; - pcb = pcb->next; - continue; - } - - pcb->last_timer = tcp_timer_ctr; - - pcb_remove = 0; - pcb_reset = 0; - - if (pcb->state == SYN_SENT && pcb->nrtx >= TCP_SYNMAXRTX) { - ++pcb_remove; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: max SYN retries reached\n")); - } else if (pcb->nrtx >= TCP_MAXRTX) { - ++pcb_remove; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: max DATA retries reached\n")); - } else { - if (pcb->persist_backoff > 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtimr: persist ticking with in-flight data", pcb->unacked == NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtimr: persist ticking with empty send buffer", pcb->unsent != NULL); - - if (pcb->persist_probe >= TCP_MAXRTX) { - ++pcb_remove; /* max probes reached */ - } else { - u8_t backoff_cnt = tcp_persist_backoff[pcb->persist_backoff - 1]; - - if (pcb->persist_cnt < backoff_cnt) { - pcb->persist_cnt++; - } - - if (pcb->persist_cnt >= backoff_cnt) { - int next_slot = 1; /* increment timer to next slot */ - - /* If snd_wnd is zero, send 1 byte probes */ - if (pcb->snd_wnd == 0) { - if (tcp_zero_window_probe(pcb) != ERR_OK) { - next_slot = 0; /* try probe again with current slot */ - } - - /* snd_wnd not fully closed, split unsent head and fill window */ - } else { - if (tcp_split_unsent_seg(pcb, (u16_t)pcb->snd_wnd) == ERR_OK) { - if (tcp_output(pcb) == ERR_OK) { - /* sending will cancel persist timer, else retry with current slot */ - next_slot = 0; - } - } - } - - if (next_slot) { - pcb->persist_cnt = 0; - - if (pcb->persist_backoff < sizeof(tcp_persist_backoff)) { - pcb->persist_backoff++; - } - } - } - } - } else { - /* Increase the retransmission timer if it is running */ - if ((pcb->rtime >= 0) && (pcb->rtime < 0x7FFF)) { - ++pcb->rtime; - } - - if (pcb->rtime >= pcb->rto) { - /* Time for a retransmission. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: rtime %" S16_F - " pcb->rto %" S16_F "\n", - pcb->rtime, pcb->rto)); - - /* If prepare phase fails but we have unsent data but no unacked data, - still execute the backoff calculations below, as this means we somehow - failed to send segment. */ - if ((tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare(pcb) == ERR_OK) || ((pcb->unacked == NULL) && (pcb->unsent != NULL))) { - /* Double retransmission time-out unless we are trying to - * connect to somebody (i.e., we are in SYN_SENT). */ - if (pcb->state != SYN_SENT) { - u8_t backoff_idx = LWIP_MIN(pcb->nrtx, sizeof(tcp_backoff) - 1); - int calc_rto = ((pcb->sa >> 3) + pcb->sv) << tcp_backoff[backoff_idx]; - pcb->rto = (s16_t)LWIP_MIN(calc_rto, 0x7FFF); - } - - /* Reset the retransmission timer. */ - pcb->rtime = 0; - - /* Reduce congestion window and ssthresh. */ - eff_wnd = LWIP_MIN(pcb->cwnd, pcb->snd_wnd); - pcb->ssthresh = eff_wnd >> 1; - - if (pcb->ssthresh < (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->mss << 1)) { - pcb->ssthresh = (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->mss << 1); - } - - pcb->cwnd = pcb->mss; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F - " ssthresh %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", - pcb->cwnd, pcb->ssthresh)); - pcb->bytes_acked = 0; - - /* The following needs to be called AFTER cwnd is set to one - mss - STJ */ - tcp_rexmit_rto_commit(pcb); - } - } - } - } - - /* Check if this PCB has stayed too long in FIN-WAIT-2 */ - if (pcb->state == FIN_WAIT_2) { - /* If this PCB is in FIN_WAIT_2 because of SHUT_WR don't let it time out. */ - if (pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED) { - /* PCB was fully closed (either through close() or SHUT_RDWR): - normal FIN-WAIT timeout handling. */ - if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > - TCP_FIN_WAIT_TIMEOUT / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { - ++pcb_remove; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: removing pcb stuck in FIN-WAIT-2\n")); - } - } - } - - /* Check if KEEPALIVE should be sent */ - if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_KEEPALIVE) && - ((pcb->state == ESTABLISHED) || - (pcb->state == CLOSE_WAIT))) { - if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > - (pcb->keep_idle + TCP_KEEP_DUR(pcb)) / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: KEEPALIVE timeout. Aborting connection to ")); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(TCP_DEBUG, pcb->remote_ip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("\n")); - - ++pcb_remove; - ++pcb_reset; - } else if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > - (pcb->keep_idle + pcb->keep_cnt_sent * TCP_KEEP_INTVL(pcb)) / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { - err = tcp_keepalive(pcb); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - pcb->keep_cnt_sent++; - } - } - } - - /* If this PCB has queued out of sequence data, but has been - inactive for too long, will drop the data (it will eventually - be retransmitted). */ -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ - - if (pcb->ooseq != NULL && - (tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr >= (u32_t)pcb->rto * TCP_OOSEQ_TIMEOUT)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: dropping OOSEQ queued data\n")); - tcp_free_ooseq(pcb); - } - -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - - /* Check if this PCB has stayed too long in SYN-RCVD */ - if (pcb->state == SYN_RCVD) { - if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > - TCP_SYN_RCVD_TIMEOUT / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { - ++pcb_remove; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: removing pcb stuck in SYN-RCVD\n")); - } - } - - /* Check if this PCB has stayed too long in LAST-ACK */ - if (pcb->state == LAST_ACK) { - if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > 2 * TCP_MSL / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { - ++pcb_remove; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: removing pcb stuck in LAST-ACK\n")); - } - } - - /* If the PCB should be removed, do it. */ - if (pcb_remove) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb2; -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - tcp_err_fn err_fn = pcb->errf; -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - void *err_arg; - enum tcp_state last_state; - tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); - - /* Remove PCB from tcp_active_pcbs list. */ - if (prev != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: middle tcp != tcp_active_pcbs", pcb != tcp_active_pcbs); - prev->next = pcb->next; - } else { - /* This PCB was the first. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: first pcb == tcp_active_pcbs", tcp_active_pcbs == pcb); - tcp_active_pcbs = pcb->next; - } - - if (pcb_reset) { - tcp_rst(pcb, pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, - pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port); - } - - err_arg = pcb->callback_arg; - last_state = pcb->state; - pcb2 = pcb; - pcb = pcb->next; - tcp_free(pcb2); - - tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 0; - TCP_EVENT_ERR(last_state, err_fn, err_arg, ERR_ABRT); - - if (tcp_active_pcbs_changed) { - goto tcp_slowtmr_start; - } - } else { - /* get the 'next' element now and work with 'prev' below (in case of abort) */ - prev = pcb; - pcb = pcb->next; - - /* We check if we should poll the connection. */ - ++prev->polltmr; - - if (prev->polltmr >= prev->pollinterval) { - prev->polltmr = 0; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: polling application\n")); - tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 0; - TCP_EVENT_POLL(prev, err); - - if (tcp_active_pcbs_changed) { - goto tcp_slowtmr_start; - } - - /* if err == ERR_ABRT, 'prev' is already deallocated */ - if (err == ERR_OK) { - tcp_output(prev); - } - } - } - } - - /* Steps through all of the TIME-WAIT PCBs. */ - prev = NULL; - pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: TIME-WAIT pcb->state == TIME-WAIT", pcb->state == TIME_WAIT); - pcb_remove = 0; - - /* Check if this PCB has stayed long enough in TIME-WAIT */ - if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > 2 * TCP_MSL / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { - ++pcb_remove; - } - - /* If the PCB should be removed, do it. */ - if (pcb_remove) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb2; - tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); - - /* Remove PCB from tcp_tw_pcbs list. */ - if (prev != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: middle tcp != tcp_tw_pcbs", pcb != tcp_tw_pcbs); - prev->next = pcb->next; - } else { - /* This PCB was the first. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: first pcb == tcp_tw_pcbs", tcp_tw_pcbs == pcb); - tcp_tw_pcbs = pcb->next; - } - - pcb2 = pcb; - pcb = pcb->next; - tcp_free(pcb2); - } else { - prev = pcb; - pcb = pcb->next; - } - } -} - -/** - * Is called every TCP_FAST_INTERVAL (250 ms) and process data previously - * "refused" by upper layer (application) and sends delayed ACKs or pending FINs. - * - * Automatically called from tcp_tmr(). - */ -void tcp_fasttmr(void) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - ++tcp_timer_ctr; - -tcp_fasttmr_start: - pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - if (pcb->last_timer != tcp_timer_ctr) { - struct tcp_pcb *next; - pcb->last_timer = tcp_timer_ctr; - - /* send delayed ACKs */ - if (pcb->flags & TF_ACK_DELAY) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_fasttmr: delayed ACK\n")); - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - tcp_output(pcb); - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); - } - - /* send pending FIN */ - if (pcb->flags & TF_CLOSEPEND) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_fasttmr: pending FIN\n")); - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_CLOSEPEND); - tcp_close_shutdown_fin(pcb); - } - - next = pcb->next; - - /* If there is data which was previously "refused" by upper layer */ - if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { - tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 0; - tcp_process_refused_data(pcb); - - if (tcp_active_pcbs_changed) { - /* application callback has changed the pcb list: restart the loop */ - goto tcp_fasttmr_start; - } - } - - pcb = next; - } else { - pcb = pcb->next; - } - } -} - -/** Call tcp_output for all active pcbs that have TF_NAGLEMEMERR set */ -void tcp_txnow(void) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - if (pcb->flags & TF_NAGLEMEMERR) { - tcp_output(pcb); - } - } -} - -/** Pass pcb->refused_data to the recv callback */ -err_t tcp_process_refused_data(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - struct pbuf *rest; -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_process_refused_data: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - - while (pcb->refused_data != NULL) -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - { - err_t err; - u8_t refused_flags = pcb->refused_data->flags; - /* set pcb->refused_data to NULL in case the callback frees it and then - closes the pcb */ - struct pbuf *refused_data = pcb->refused_data; -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - pbuf_split_64k(refused_data, &rest); - pcb->refused_data = rest; -#else /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - pcb->refused_data = NULL; -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - /* Notify again application with data previously received. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: notify kept packet\n")); - TCP_EVENT_RECV(pcb, refused_data, ERR_OK, err); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - /* did refused_data include a FIN? */ - if ((refused_flags & PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN) -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - && (rest == NULL) -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - ) { - /* correct rcv_wnd as the application won't call tcp_recved() - for the FIN's seqno */ - if (pcb->rcv_wnd != TCP_WND_MAX(pcb)) { - pcb->rcv_wnd++; - } - - TCP_EVENT_CLOSED(pcb, err); - - if (err == ERR_ABRT) { - return ERR_ABRT; - } - } - } else if (err == ERR_ABRT) { - /* if err == ERR_ABRT, 'pcb' is already deallocated */ - /* Drop incoming packets because pcb is "full" (only if the incoming - segment contains data). */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: drop incoming packets, because pcb is \"full\"\n")); - return ERR_ABRT; - } else { - /* data is still refused, pbuf is still valid (go on for ACK-only packets) */ -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - if (rest != NULL) { - pbuf_cat(refused_data, rest); - } - -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - pcb->refused_data = refused_data; - return ERR_INPROGRESS; - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Deallocates a list of TCP segments (tcp_seg structures). - * - * @param seg tcp_seg list of TCP segments to free - */ -void tcp_segs_free(struct tcp_seg *seg) -{ - while (seg != NULL) { - struct tcp_seg *next = seg->next; - tcp_seg_free(seg); - seg = next; - } -} - -/** - * Frees a TCP segment (tcp_seg structure). - * - * @param seg single tcp_seg to free - */ -void tcp_seg_free(struct tcp_seg *seg) -{ - if (seg != NULL) { - if (seg->p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(seg->p); -#if TCP_DEBUG - seg->p = NULL; -#endif /* TCP_DEBUG */ - } - - memp_free(MEMP_TCP_SEG, seg); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp - * Sets the priority of a connection. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to manipulate - * @param prio new priority - */ -void tcp_setprio(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t prio) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_setprio: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); - - pcb->prio = prio; -} - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ -/** - * Returns a copy of the given TCP segment. - * The pbuf and data are not copied, only the pointers - * - * @param seg the old tcp_seg - * @return a copy of seg - */ -struct tcp_seg * -tcp_seg_copy(struct tcp_seg *seg) -{ - struct tcp_seg *cseg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_seg_copy: invalid seg", seg != NULL); - - cseg = (struct tcp_seg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_SEG); - - if (cseg == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - SMEMCPY((u8_t *)cseg, (const u8_t *)seg, sizeof(struct tcp_seg)); - pbuf_ref(cseg->p); - return cseg; -} -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API -/** - * Default receive callback that is called if the user didn't register - * a recv callback for the pcb. - */ -err_t tcp_recv_null(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_recv_null: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - if (p != NULL) { - tcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); - pbuf_free(p); - } else if (err == ERR_OK) { - return tcp_close(pcb); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - -/** - * Kills the oldest active connection that has a lower priority than 'prio'. - * - * @param prio minimum priority - */ -static void tcp_kill_prio(u8_t prio) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *inactive; - u32_t inactivity; - u8_t mprio; - - mprio = LWIP_MIN(TCP_PRIO_MAX, prio); - - /* We want to kill connections with a lower prio, so bail out if - * supplied prio is 0 - there can never be a lower prio - */ - if (mprio == 0) { - return; - } - - /* We only want kill connections with a lower prio, so decrement prio by one - * and start searching for oldest connection with same or lower priority than mprio. - * We want to find the connections with the lowest possible prio, and among - * these the one with the longest inactivity time. - */ - mprio--; - - inactivity = 0; - inactive = NULL; - - for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - /* lower prio is always a kill candidate */ - if ((pcb->prio < mprio) || - /* longer inactivity is also a kill candidate */ - ((pcb->prio == mprio) && ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) >= inactivity))) { - inactivity = tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr; - inactive = pcb; - mprio = pcb->prio; - } - } - - if (inactive != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_kill_prio: killing oldest PCB %p (%" S32_F ")\n", - (void *)inactive, inactivity)); - tcp_abort(inactive); - } -} - -/** - * Kills the oldest connection that is in specific state. - * Called from tcp_alloc() for LAST_ACK and CLOSING if no more connections are available. - */ -static void tcp_kill_state(enum tcp_state state) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *inactive; - u32_t inactivity; - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid state", (state == CLOSING) || (state == LAST_ACK)); - - inactivity = 0; - inactive = NULL; - - /* Go through the list of active pcbs and get the oldest pcb that is in state - CLOSING/LAST_ACK. */ - for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - if (pcb->state == state) { - if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) >= inactivity) { - inactivity = tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr; - inactive = pcb; - } - } - } - - if (inactive != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_kill_closing: killing oldest %s PCB %p (%" S32_F ")\n", - tcp_state_str[state], (void *)inactive, inactivity)); - /* Don't send a RST, since no data is lost. */ - tcp_abandon(inactive, 0); - } -} - -/** - * Kills the oldest connection that is in TIME_WAIT state. - * Called from tcp_alloc() if no more connections are available. - */ -static void tcp_kill_timewait(void) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *inactive; - u32_t inactivity; - - inactivity = 0; - inactive = NULL; - - /* Go through the list of TIME_WAIT pcbs and get the oldest pcb. */ - for (pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) >= inactivity) { - inactivity = tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr; - inactive = pcb; - } - } - - if (inactive != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_kill_timewait: killing oldest TIME-WAIT PCB %p (%" S32_F ")\n", - (void *)inactive, inactivity)); - tcp_abort(inactive); - } -} - -/* Called when allocating a pcb fails. - * In this case, we want to handle all pcbs that want to close first: if we can - * now send the FIN (which failed before), the pcb might be in a state that is - * OK for us to now free it. - */ -static void tcp_handle_closepend(void) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - struct tcp_pcb *next = pcb->next; - - /* send pending FIN */ - if (pcb->flags & TF_CLOSEPEND) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_handle_closepend: pending FIN\n")); - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_CLOSEPEND); - tcp_close_shutdown_fin(pcb); - } - - pcb = next; - } -} - -/** - * Allocate a new tcp_pcb structure. - * - * @param prio priority for the new pcb - * @return a new tcp_pcb that initially is in state CLOSED - */ -struct tcp_pcb * -tcp_alloc(u8_t prio) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - /* Try to send FIN for all pcbs stuck in TF_CLOSEPEND first */ - tcp_handle_closepend(); - - /* Try killing oldest connection in TIME-WAIT. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_alloc: killing off oldest TIME-WAIT connection\n")); - tcp_kill_timewait(); - /* Try to allocate a tcp_pcb again. */ - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - /* Try killing oldest connection in LAST-ACK (these wouldn't go to TIME-WAIT). */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_alloc: killing off oldest LAST-ACK connection\n")); - tcp_kill_state(LAST_ACK); - /* Try to allocate a tcp_pcb again. */ - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - /* Try killing oldest connection in CLOSING. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_alloc: killing off oldest CLOSING connection\n")); - tcp_kill_state(CLOSING); - /* Try to allocate a tcp_pcb again. */ - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - /* Try killing oldest active connection with lower priority than the new one. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_alloc: killing oldest connection with prio lower than %d\n", prio)); - tcp_kill_prio(prio); - /* Try to allocate a tcp_pcb again. */ - pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - /* adjust err stats: memp_malloc failed multiple times before */ - MEMP_STATS_DEC(err, MEMP_TCP_PCB); - } - } - - if (pcb != NULL) { - /* adjust err stats: memp_malloc failed multiple times before */ - MEMP_STATS_DEC(err, MEMP_TCP_PCB); - } - } - - if (pcb != NULL) { - /* adjust err stats: memp_malloc failed multiple times before */ - MEMP_STATS_DEC(err, MEMP_TCP_PCB); - } - } - - if (pcb != NULL) { - /* adjust err stats: memp_malloc failed above */ - MEMP_STATS_DEC(err, MEMP_TCP_PCB); - } - } - - if (pcb != NULL) { - /* zero out the whole pcb, so there is no need to initialize members to zero */ - memset(pcb, 0, sizeof(struct tcp_pcb)); - pcb->prio = prio; - pcb->snd_buf = TCP_SND_BUF; - /* Start with a window that does not need scaling. When window scaling is - enabled and used, the window is enlarged when both sides agree on scaling. */ - pcb->rcv_wnd = pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = TCPWND_MIN16(TCP_WND); - pcb->ttl = TCP_TTL; - /* As initial send MSS, we use TCP_MSS but limit it to 536. - The send MSS is updated when an MSS option is received. */ - pcb->mss = INITIAL_MSS; - pcb->rto = 3000 / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL; - pcb->sv = 3000 / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL; - pcb->rtime = -1; - pcb->cwnd = 1; - pcb->tmr = tcp_ticks; - pcb->last_timer = tcp_timer_ctr; - - /* RFC 5681 recommends setting ssthresh abritrarily high and gives an example - of using the largest advertised receive window. We've seen complications with - receiving TCPs that use window scaling and/or window auto-tuning where the - initial advertised window is very small and then grows rapidly once the - connection is established. To avoid these complications, we set ssthresh to the - largest effective cwnd (amount of in-flight data) that the sender can have. */ - pcb->ssthresh = TCP_SND_BUF; - -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - pcb->recv = tcp_recv_null; -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - - /* Init KEEPALIVE timer */ - pcb->keep_idle = TCP_KEEPIDLE_DEFAULT; - -#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE - pcb->keep_intvl = TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT; - pcb->keep_cnt = TCP_KEEPCNT_DEFAULT; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ - } - - return pcb; -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Creates a new TCP protocol control block but doesn't place it on - * any of the TCP PCB lists. - * The pcb is not put on any list until binding using tcp_bind(). - * If memory is not available for creating the new pcb, NULL is returned. - * - * @internal: Maybe there should be a idle TCP PCB list where these - * PCBs are put on. Port reservation using tcp_bind() is implemented but - * allocated pcbs that are not bound can't be killed automatically if wanting - * to allocate a pcb with higher prio (@see tcp_kill_prio()) - * - * @return a new tcp_pcb that initially is in state CLOSED - */ -struct tcp_pcb * -tcp_new(void) -{ - return tcp_alloc(TCP_PRIO_NORMAL); -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Creates a new TCP protocol control block but doesn't - * place it on any of the TCP PCB lists. - * The pcb is not put on any list until binding using tcp_bind(). - * - * @param type IP address type, see @ref lwip_ip_addr_type definitions. - * If you want to listen to IPv4 and IPv6 (dual-stack) connections, - * supply @ref IPADDR_TYPE_ANY as argument and bind to @ref IP_ANY_TYPE. - * @return a new tcp_pcb that initially is in state CLOSED - */ -struct tcp_pcb * -tcp_new_ip_type(u8_t type) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - pcb = tcp_alloc(TCP_PRIO_NORMAL); -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (pcb != NULL) { - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip, type); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip, type); - } - -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - return pcb; -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Specifies the program specific state that should be passed to all - * other callback functions. The "pcb" argument is the current TCP - * connection control block, and the "arg" argument is the argument - * that will be passed to the callbacks. - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the callback argument - * @param arg void pointer argument to pass to callback functions - */ -void tcp_arg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *arg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* This function is allowed to be called for both listen pcbs and - connection pcbs. */ - if (pcb != NULL) { - pcb->callback_arg = arg; - } -} -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Sets the callback function that will be called when new data - * arrives. The callback function will be passed a NULL pbuf to - * indicate that the remote host has closed the connection. If the - * callback function returns ERR_OK or ERR_ABRT it must have - * freed the pbuf, otherwise it must not have freed it. - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the recv callback - * @param recv callback function to call for this pcb when data is received - */ -void tcp_recv(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_recv_fn recv) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket state for recv callback", pcb->state != LISTEN); - pcb->recv = recv; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Specifies the callback function that should be called when data has - * successfully been received (i.e., acknowledged) by the remote - * host. The len argument passed to the callback function gives the - * amount bytes that was acknowledged by the last acknowledgment. - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the sent callback - * @param sent callback function to call for this pcb when data is successfully sent - */ -void tcp_sent(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_sent_fn sent) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket state for sent callback", pcb->state != LISTEN); - pcb->sent = sent; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Used to specify the function that should be called when a fatal error - * has occurred on the connection. - * - * If a connection is aborted because of an error, the application is - * alerted of this event by the err callback. Errors that might abort a - * connection are when there is a shortage of memory. The callback - * function to be called is set using the tcp_err() function. - * - * @note The corresponding pcb is already freed when this callback is called! - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the err callback - * @param err callback function to call for this pcb when a fatal error - * has occurred on the connection - */ -void tcp_err(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_err_fn err) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket state for err callback", pcb->state != LISTEN); - pcb->errf = err; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Used for specifying the function that should be called when a - * LISTENing connection has been connected to another host. - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the accept callback - * @param accept callback function to call for this pcb when LISTENing - * connection has been connected to another host - */ -void tcp_accept(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_accept_fn accept) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if ((pcb != NULL) && (pcb->state == LISTEN)) { - struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb = (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)pcb; - lpcb->accept = accept; - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Specifies the polling interval and the callback function that should - * be called to poll the application. The interval is specified in - * number of TCP coarse grained timer shots, which typically occurs - * twice a second. An interval of 10 means that the application would - * be polled every 5 seconds. - * - * When a connection is idle (i.e., no data is either transmitted or - * received), lwIP will repeatedly poll the application by calling a - * specified callback function. This can be used either as a watchdog - * timer for killing connections that have stayed idle for too long, or - * as a method of waiting for memory to become available. For instance, - * if a call to tcp_write() has failed because memory wasn't available, - * the application may use the polling functionality to call tcp_write() - * again when the connection has been idle for a while. - */ -void tcp_poll(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_poll_fn poll, u8_t interval) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_poll: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket state for poll", pcb->state != LISTEN); - -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - pcb->poll = poll; -#else /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(poll); -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - pcb->pollinterval = interval; -} - -/** - * Purges a TCP PCB. Removes any buffered data and frees the buffer memory - * (pcb->ooseq, pcb->unsent and pcb->unacked are freed). - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb to purge. The pcb itself is not deallocated! - */ -void tcp_pcb_purge(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_pcb_purge: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); - - if (pcb->state != CLOSED && - pcb->state != TIME_WAIT && - pcb->state != LISTEN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge\n")); - - tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb); - - if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge: data left on ->refused_data\n")); - pbuf_free(pcb->refused_data); - pcb->refused_data = NULL; - } - - if (pcb->unsent != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge: not all data sent\n")); - } - - if (pcb->unacked != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge: data left on ->unacked\n")); - } - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ - - if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge: data left on ->ooseq\n")); - tcp_free_ooseq(pcb); - } - -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - - /* Stop the retransmission timer as it will expect data on unacked - queue if it fires */ - pcb->rtime = -1; - - tcp_segs_free(pcb->unsent); - tcp_segs_free(pcb->unacked); - pcb->unacked = pcb->unsent = NULL; -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - } -} - -/** - * Purges the PCB and removes it from a PCB list. Any delayed ACKs are sent first. - * - * @param pcblist PCB list to purge. - * @param pcb tcp_pcb to purge. The pcb itself is NOT deallocated! - */ -void tcp_pcb_remove(struct tcp_pcb **pcblist, struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcb_remove: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcb_remove: invalid pcblist", pcblist != NULL); - - TCP_RMV(pcblist, pcb); - - tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); - - /* if there is an outstanding delayed ACKs, send it */ - if ((pcb->state != TIME_WAIT) && - (pcb->state != LISTEN) && - (pcb->flags & TF_ACK_DELAY)) { - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - tcp_output(pcb); - } - - if (pcb->state != LISTEN) { - LWIP_ASSERT("unsent segments leaking", pcb->unsent == NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("unacked segments leaking", pcb->unacked == NULL); -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ - LWIP_ASSERT("ooseq segments leaking", pcb->ooseq == NULL); -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - } - - pcb->state = CLOSED; - /* reset the local port to prevent the pcb from being 'bound' */ - pcb->local_port = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcb_remove: tcp_pcbs_sane()", tcp_pcbs_sane()); -} - -/** - * Calculates a new initial sequence number for new connections. - * - * @return u32_t pseudo random sequence number - */ -u32_t tcp_next_iss(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_next_iss: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - return LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN(&pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port, &pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port); -#else /* LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN */ - static u32_t iss = 6510; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_next_iss: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - iss += tcp_ticks; /* XXX */ - return iss; -#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN */ -} - -#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS -/** - * Calculates the effective send mss that can be used for a specific IP address - * by calculating the minimum of TCP_MSS and the mtu (if set) of the target - * netif (if not NULL). - */ -u16_t tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(u16_t sendmss, struct netif *outif, const ip_addr_t *dest) -{ - u16_t mss_s; - u16_t mtu; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dest); /* in case IPv6 is disabled */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_eff_send_mss_netif: invalid dst_ip", dest != NULL); - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (IP_IS_V6(dest)) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - { - /* First look in destination cache, to see if there is a Path MTU. */ - mtu = nd6_get_destination_mtu(ip_2_ip6(dest), outif); - } -#if LWIP_IPV4 - else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - { - if (outif == NULL) { - return sendmss; - } - - mtu = outif->mtu; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - if (mtu != 0) { - u16_t offset; -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (IP_IS_V6(dest)) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - { - offset = IP6_HLEN + TCP_HLEN; - } -#if LWIP_IPV4 - else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - { - offset = IP_HLEN + TCP_HLEN; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - mss_s = (mtu > offset) ? (u16_t)(mtu - offset) : 0; - /* RFC 1122, chap 4.2.2.6: - * Eff.snd.MSS = min(SendMSS+20, MMS_S) - TCPhdrsize - IPoptionsize - * We correct for TCP options in tcp_write(), and don't support IP options. - */ - sendmss = LWIP_MIN(sendmss, mss_s); - } - - return sendmss; -} -#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ - -/** Helper function for tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed() that iterates a pcb list */ -static void tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed_pcblist(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, struct tcp_pcb *pcb_list) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - pcb = pcb_list; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed_pcblist: invalid old_addr", old_addr != NULL); - - while (pcb != NULL) { - /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ - if (ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, old_addr) -#if LWIP_AUTOIP - /* connections to link-local addresses must persist (RFC3927 ch. 1.9) */ - && (!IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip) || !ip4_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip))) -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ - ) { - /* this connection must be aborted */ - struct tcp_pcb *next = pcb->next; - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif_set_ipaddr: aborting TCP pcb %p\n", (void *)pcb)); - tcp_abort(pcb); - pcb = next; - } else { - pcb = pcb->next; - } - } -} - -/** This function is called from netif.c when address is changed or netif is removed - * - * @param old_addr IP address of the netif before change - * @param new_addr IP address of the netif after change or NULL if netif has been removed - */ -void tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr) -{ - struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb; - - if (!ip_addr_isany(old_addr)) { - tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed_pcblist(old_addr, tcp_active_pcbs); - tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed_pcblist(old_addr, tcp_bound_pcbs); - - if (!ip_addr_isany(new_addr)) { - /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ - for (lpcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; lpcb != NULL; lpcb = lpcb->next) { - /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ - if (ip_addr_cmp(&lpcb->local_ip, old_addr)) { - /* The PCB is listening to the old ipaddr and - * is set to listen to the new one instead */ - ip_addr_copy(lpcb->local_ip, *new_addr); - } - } - } - } -} - -const char *tcp_debug_state_str(enum tcp_state s) -{ - return tcp_state_str[s]; -} - -err_t tcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port) -{ - if (pcb) { - if (local) { - if (addr) { - *addr = pcb->local_ip; - } - - if (port) { - *port = pcb->local_port; - } - } else { - if (addr) { - *addr = pcb->remote_ip; - } - - if (port) { - *port = pcb->remote_port; - } - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - - return ERR_VAL; -} - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ -/* Free all ooseq pbufs (and possibly reset SACK state) */ -void tcp_free_ooseq(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - if (pcb->ooseq) { - tcp_segs_free(pcb->ooseq); - pcb->ooseq = NULL; -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - memset(pcb->rcv_sacks, 0, sizeof(pcb->rcv_sacks)); -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - } -} -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - -#if TCP_DEBUG || TCP_INPUT_DEBUG || TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG -/** - * Print a tcp header for debugging purposes. - * - * @param tcphdr pointer to a struct tcp_hdr - */ -void tcp_debug_print(struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP header:\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " | %5" U16_F " | (src port, dest port)\n", - lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->src), lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->dest))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| %010" U32_F " | (seq no)\n", - lwip_ntohl(tcphdr->seqno))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| %010" U32_F " | (ack no)\n", - lwip_ntohl(tcphdr->ackno))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| %2" U16_F " | |%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "| %5" U16_F " | (hdrlen, flags (", - TCPH_HDRLEN(tcphdr), - (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 5 & 1), - (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 4 & 1), - (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 3 & 1), - (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 2 & 1), - (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 1 & 1), - (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) & 1), - lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->wnd))); - tcp_debug_print_flags(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("), win)\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| 0x%04" X16_F " | %5" U16_F " | (chksum, urgp)\n", - lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->chksum), lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->urgp))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); -} - -/** - * Print a tcp state for debugging purposes. - * - * @param s enum tcp_state to print - */ -void tcp_debug_print_state(enum tcp_state s) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("State: %s\n", tcp_state_str[s])); -} - -/** - * Print tcp flags for debugging purposes. - * - * @param flags tcp flags, all active flags are printed - */ -void tcp_debug_print_flags(u8_t flags) -{ - if (flags & TCP_FIN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("FIN ")); - } - - if (flags & TCP_SYN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("SYN ")); - } - - if (flags & TCP_RST) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("RST ")); - } - - if (flags & TCP_PSH) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("PSH ")); - } - - if (flags & TCP_ACK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("ACK ")); - } - - if (flags & TCP_URG) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("URG ")); - } - - if (flags & TCP_ECE) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("ECE ")); - } - - if (flags & TCP_CWR) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("CWR ")); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("\n")); -} - -/** - * Print all tcp_pcbs in every list for debugging purposes. - */ -void tcp_debug_print_pcbs(void) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcbl; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Active PCB states:\n")); - - for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Local port %" U16_F ", foreign port %" U16_F " snd_nxt %" U32_F " rcv_nxt %" U32_F " ", - pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port, - pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt)); - tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Listen PCB states:\n")); - - for (pcbl = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; pcbl != NULL; pcbl = pcbl->next) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Local port %" U16_F " ", pcbl->local_port)); - tcp_debug_print_state(pcbl->state); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TIME-WAIT PCB states:\n")); - - for (pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Local port %" U16_F ", foreign port %" U16_F " snd_nxt %" U32_F " rcv_nxt %" U32_F " ", - pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port, - pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt)); - tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); - } -} - -/** - * Check state consistency of the tcp_pcb lists. - */ -s16_t tcp_pcbs_sane(void) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - - for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcbs_sane: active pcb->state != CLOSED", pcb->state != CLOSED); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcbs_sane: active pcb->state != LISTEN", pcb->state != LISTEN); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcbs_sane: active pcb->state != TIME-WAIT", pcb->state != TIME_WAIT); - } - - for (pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcbs_sane: tw pcb->state == TIME-WAIT", pcb->state == TIME_WAIT); - } - - return 1; -} -#endif /* TCP_DEBUG */ - -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS -/** - * @defgroup tcp_raw_extargs ext arguments - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Additional data storage per tcp pcb\n - * @see @ref tcp_raw - * - * When LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS is > 0, every tcp pcb (including listen pcb) - * includes a number of additional argument entries in an array. - * - * To support memory management, in addition to a 'void *', callbacks can be - * provided to manage transition from listening pcbs to connections and to - * deallocate memory when a pcb is deallocated (see struct @ref tcp_ext_arg_callbacks). - * - * After allocating this index, use @ref tcp_ext_arg_set and @ref tcp_ext_arg_get - * to store and load arguments from this index for a given pcb. - */ - -static u8_t tcp_ext_arg_id; - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw_extargs - * Allocate an index to store data in ext_args member of struct tcp_pcb. - * Returned value is an index in mentioned array. - * The index is *global* over all pcbs! - * - * When @ref LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS is > 0, every tcp pcb (including listen pcb) - * includes a number of additional argument entries in an array. - * - * To support memory management, in addition to a 'void *', callbacks can be - * provided to manage transition from listening pcbs to connections and to - * deallocate memory when a pcb is deallocated (see struct @ref tcp_ext_arg_callbacks). - * - * After allocating this index, use @ref tcp_ext_arg_set and @ref tcp_ext_arg_get - * to store and load arguments from this index for a given pcb. - * - * @return a unique index into struct tcp_pcb.ext_args - */ -u8_t tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id(void) -{ - u8_t result = tcp_ext_arg_id; - tcp_ext_arg_id++; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS >= 255 -#error LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS -#endif - LWIP_ASSERT("Increase LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS in lwipopts.h", result < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS); - return result; -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw_extargs - * Set callbacks for a given index of ext_args on the specified pcb. - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb for which to set the callback - * @param id ext_args index to set (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) - * @param callbacks callback table (const since it is referenced, not copied!) - */ -void tcp_ext_arg_set_callbacks(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id, const struct tcp_ext_arg_callbacks *const callbacks) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS", id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS); - LWIP_ASSERT("callbacks != NULL", callbacks != NULL); - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - pcb->ext_args[id].callbacks = callbacks; -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw_extargs - * Set data for a given index of ext_args on the specified pcb. - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb for which to set the data - * @param id ext_args index to set (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) - * @param arg data pointer to set - */ -void tcp_ext_arg_set(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id, void *arg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS", id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS); - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - pcb->ext_args[id].data = arg; -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw_extargs - * Set data for a given index of ext_args on the specified pcb. - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb for which to set the data - * @param id ext_args index to set (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) - * @return data pointer at the given index - */ -void *tcp_ext_arg_get(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS", id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS); - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - return pcb->ext_args[id].data; -} - -/** This function calls the "destroy" callback for all ext_args once a pcb is - * freed. - */ -static void tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_destroyed(struct tcp_pcb_ext_args *ext_args) -{ - int i; - LWIP_ASSERT("ext_args != NULL", ext_args != NULL); - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS; i++) { - if (ext_args[i].callbacks != NULL) { - if (ext_args[i].callbacks->destroy != NULL) { - ext_args[i].callbacks->destroy((u8_t)i, ext_args[i].data); - } - } - } -} - -/** This function calls the "passive_open" callback for all ext_args if a connection - * is in the process of being accepted. This is called just after the SYN is - * received and before a SYN/ACK is sent, to allow to modify the very first - * segment sent even on passive open. Naturally, the "accepted" callback of the - * pcb has not been called yet! - */ -err_t tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_passive_open(struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb, struct tcp_pcb *cpcb) -{ - int i; - LWIP_ASSERT("lpcb != NULL", lpcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("cpcb != NULL", cpcb != NULL); - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS; i++) { - if (lpcb->ext_args[i].callbacks != NULL) { - if (lpcb->ext_args[i].callbacks->passive_open != NULL) { - err_t err = lpcb->ext_args[i].callbacks->passive_open((u8_t)i, lpcb, cpcb); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - } - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +/** + * @file + * Transmission Control Protocol for IP + * See also @ref tcp_raw + * + * @defgroup tcp_raw TCP + * @ingroup callbackstyle_api + * Transmission Control Protocol for IP\n + * @see @ref api + * + * Common functions for the TCP implementation, such as functions + * for manipulating the data structures and the TCP timer functions. TCP functions + * related to input and output is found in tcp_in.c and tcp_out.c respectively.\n + * + * TCP connection setup + * -------------------- + * The functions used for setting up connections is similar to that of + * the sequential API and of the BSD socket API. A new TCP connection + * identifier (i.e., a protocol control block - PCB) is created with the + * tcp_new() function. This PCB can then be either set to listen for new + * incoming connections or be explicitly connected to another host. + * - tcp_new() + * - tcp_bind() + * - tcp_listen() and tcp_listen_with_backlog() + * - tcp_accept() + * - tcp_connect() + * + * Sending TCP data + * ---------------- + * TCP data is sent by enqueueing the data with a call to tcp_write() and + * triggering to send by calling tcp_output(). When the data is successfully + * transmitted to the remote host, the application will be notified with a + * call to a specified callback function. + * - tcp_write() + * - tcp_output() + * - tcp_sent() + * + * Receiving TCP data + * ------------------ + * TCP data reception is callback based - an application specified + * callback function is called when new data arrives. When the + * application has taken the data, it has to call the tcp_recved() + * function to indicate that TCP can advertise increase the receive + * window. + * - tcp_recv() + * - tcp_recved() + * + * Application polling + * ------------------- + * When a connection is idle (i.e., no data is either transmitted or + * received), lwIP will repeatedly poll the application by calling a + * specified callback function. This can be used either as a watchdog + * timer for killing connections that have stayed idle for too long, or + * as a method of waiting for memory to become available. For instance, + * if a call to tcp_write() has failed because memory wasn't available, + * the application may use the polling functionality to call tcp_write() + * again when the connection has been idle for a while. + * - tcp_poll() + * + * Closing and aborting connections + * -------------------------------- + * - tcp_close() + * - tcp_abort() + * - tcp_err() + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/debug.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +#ifndef TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START +/* From http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers: + "The Dynamic and/or Private Ports are those from 49152 through 65535" */ +#define TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START 0xc000 +#define TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END 0xffff +#define TCP_ENSURE_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE(port) ((u16_t)(((port) & (u16_t)~TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START) + TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START)) +#endif + +#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE +#define TCP_KEEP_DUR(pcb) ((pcb)->keep_cnt * (pcb)->keep_intvl) +#define TCP_KEEP_INTVL(pcb) ((pcb)->keep_intvl) +#else /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ +#define TCP_KEEP_DUR(pcb) TCP_MAXIDLE +#define TCP_KEEP_INTVL(pcb) TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ + +/* As initial send MSS, we use TCP_MSS but limit it to 536. */ +#if TCP_MSS > 536 +#define INITIAL_MSS 536 +#else +#define INITIAL_MSS TCP_MSS +#endif + +static const char *const tcp_state_str[] = { + "CLOSED", + "LISTEN", + "SYN_SENT", + "SYN_RCVD", + "ESTABLISHED", + "FIN_WAIT_1", + "FIN_WAIT_2", + "CLOSE_WAIT", + "CLOSING", + "LAST_ACK", + "TIME_WAIT" +}; + +/* last local TCP port */ +static u16_t tcp_port = TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START; + +/* Incremented every coarse grained timer shot (typically every 500 ms). */ +u32_t tcp_ticks; +static const u8_t tcp_backoff[13] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7 }; +/* Times per slowtmr hits */ +static const u8_t tcp_persist_backoff[7] = { 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96, 120 }; + +/* The TCP PCB lists. */ + +/** List of all TCP PCBs bound but not yet (connected || listening) */ +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_bound_pcbs; +/** List of all TCP PCBs in LISTEN state */ +union tcp_listen_pcbs_t tcp_listen_pcbs; +/** List of all TCP PCBs that are in a state in which + * they accept or send data. */ +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_active_pcbs; +/** List of all TCP PCBs in TIME-WAIT state */ +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tw_pcbs; + +/** An array with all (non-temporary) PCB lists, mainly used for smaller code size */ +struct tcp_pcb **const tcp_pcb_lists[] = { &tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs, &tcp_bound_pcbs, + &tcp_active_pcbs, &tcp_tw_pcbs }; + +u8_t tcp_active_pcbs_changed; + +/** Timer counter to handle calling slow-timer from tcp_tmr() */ +static u8_t tcp_timer; +static u8_t tcp_timer_ctr; +static u16_t tcp_new_port(void); + +static err_t tcp_close_shutdown_fin(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS +static void tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_destroyed(struct tcp_pcb_ext_args *ext_args); +#endif + +/** + * Initialize this module. + */ +void tcp_init(void) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_RAND + tcp_port = TCP_ENSURE_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE(LWIP_RAND()); +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ +} + +/** Free a tcp pcb */ +void tcp_free(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_free: LISTEN", pcb->state != LISTEN); +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS + tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_destroyed(pcb->ext_args); +#endif + memp_free(MEMP_TCP_PCB, pcb); +} + +/** Free a tcp listen pcb */ +static void tcp_free_listen(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_free_listen: !LISTEN", pcb->state != LISTEN); +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS + tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_destroyed(pcb->ext_args); +#endif + memp_free(MEMP_TCP_PCB_LISTEN, pcb); +} + +/** + * Called periodically to dispatch TCP timers. + */ +void tcp_tmr(void) +{ + /* Call tcp_fasttmr() every 250 ms */ + tcp_fasttmr(); + + if (++tcp_timer & 1) { + /* Call tcp_slowtmr() every 500 ms, i.e., every other timer + tcp_tmr() is called. */ + tcp_slowtmr(); + } +} + +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG +/** Called when a listen pcb is closed. Iterates one pcb list and removes the + * closed listener pcb from pcb->listener if matching. + */ +static void tcp_remove_listener(struct tcp_pcb *list, struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_remove_listener: invalid listener", lpcb != NULL); + + for (pcb = list; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + if (pcb->listener == lpcb) { + pcb->listener = NULL; + } + } +} +#endif + +/** Called when a listen pcb is closed. Iterates all pcb lists and removes the + * closed listener pcb from pcb->listener if matching. + */ +static void tcp_listen_closed(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + size_t i; + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->state == LISTEN", pcb->state == LISTEN); + + for (i = 1; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tcp_pcb_lists); i++) { + tcp_remove_listener(*tcp_pcb_lists[i], (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)pcb); + } + +#endif + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); +} + +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG +/** @ingroup tcp_raw + * Delay accepting a connection in respect to the listen backlog: + * the number of outstanding connections is increased until + * tcp_backlog_accepted() is called. + * + * ATTENTION: the caller is responsible for calling tcp_backlog_accepted() + * or else the backlog feature will get out of sync! + * + * @param pcb the connection pcb which is not fully accepted yet + */ +void tcp_backlog_delayed(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if ((pcb->flags & TF_BACKLOGPEND) == 0) { + if (pcb->listener != NULL) { + pcb->listener->accepts_pending++; + LWIP_ASSERT("accepts_pending != 0", pcb->listener->accepts_pending != 0); + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_BACKLOGPEND); + } + } +} + +/** @ingroup tcp_raw + * A delayed-accept a connection is accepted (or closed/aborted): decreases + * the number of outstanding connections after calling tcp_backlog_delayed(). + * + * ATTENTION: the caller is responsible for calling tcp_backlog_accepted() + * or else the backlog feature will get out of sync! + * + * @param pcb the connection pcb which is now fully accepted (or closed/aborted) + */ +void tcp_backlog_accepted(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if ((pcb->flags & TF_BACKLOGPEND) != 0) { + if (pcb->listener != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("accepts_pending != 0", pcb->listener->accepts_pending != 0); + pcb->listener->accepts_pending--; + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_BACKLOGPEND); + } + } +} +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + +/** + * Closes the TX side of a connection held by the PCB. + * For tcp_close(), a RST is sent if the application didn't receive all data + * (tcp_recved() not called for all data passed to recv callback). + * + * Listening pcbs are freed and may not be referenced any more. + * Connection pcbs are freed if not yet connected and may not be referenced + * any more. If a connection is established (at least SYN received or in + * a closing state), the connection is closed, and put in a closing state. + * The pcb is then automatically freed in tcp_slowtmr(). It is therefore + * unsafe to reference it. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to close + * @return ERR_OK if connection has been closed + * another err_t if closing failed and pcb is not freed + */ +static err_t tcp_close_shutdown(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t rst_on_unacked_data) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_close_shutdown: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + if (rst_on_unacked_data && ((pcb->state == ESTABLISHED) || (pcb->state == CLOSE_WAIT))) { + if ((pcb->refused_data != NULL) || (pcb->rcv_wnd != TCP_WND_MAX(pcb))) { + /* Not all data received by application, send RST to tell the remote + side about this. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED", pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED); + + /* don't call tcp_abort here: we must not deallocate the pcb since + that might not be expected when calling tcp_close */ + tcp_rst(pcb, pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, + pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port); + + tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); + TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(pcb); + + /* Deallocate the pcb since we already sent a RST for it */ + if (tcp_input_pcb == pcb) { + /* prevent using a deallocated pcb: free it from tcp_input later */ + tcp_trigger_input_pcb_close(); + } else { + tcp_free(pcb); + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* - states which free the pcb are handled here, + - states which send FIN and change state are handled in tcp_close_shutdown_fin() */ + switch (pcb->state) { + case CLOSED: + + /* Closing a pcb in the CLOSED state might seem erroneous, + * however, it is in this state once allocated and as yet unused + * and the user needs some way to free it should the need arise. + * Calling tcp_close() with a pcb that has already been closed, (i.e. twice) + * or for a pcb that has been used and then entered the CLOSED state + * is erroneous, but this should never happen as the pcb has in those cases + * been freed, and so any remaining handles are bogus. */ + if (pcb->local_port != 0) { + TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); + } + + tcp_free(pcb); + break; + + case LISTEN: + tcp_listen_closed(pcb); + tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs, pcb); + tcp_free_listen(pcb); + break; + + case SYN_SENT: + TCP_PCB_REMOVE_ACTIVE(pcb); + tcp_free(pcb); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpattemptfails); + break; + + default: + return tcp_close_shutdown_fin(pcb); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t tcp_close_shutdown_fin(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + err_t err; + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); + + switch (pcb->state) { + case SYN_RCVD: + err = tcp_send_fin(pcb); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpattemptfails); + pcb->state = FIN_WAIT_1; + } + + break; + + case ESTABLISHED: + err = tcp_send_fin(pcb); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpestabresets); + pcb->state = FIN_WAIT_1; + } + + break; + + case CLOSE_WAIT: + err = tcp_send_fin(pcb); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpestabresets); + pcb->state = LAST_ACK; + } + + break; + + default: + /* Has already been closed, do nothing. */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + /* To ensure all data has been sent when tcp_close returns, we have + to make sure tcp_output doesn't fail. + Since we don't really have to ensure all data has been sent when tcp_close + returns (unsent data is sent from tcp timer functions, also), we don't care + for the return value of tcp_output for now. */ + tcp_output(pcb); + } else if (err == ERR_MEM) { + /* Mark this pcb for closing. Closing is retried from tcp_tmr. */ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_CLOSEPEND); + /* We have to return ERR_OK from here to indicate to the callers that this + pcb should not be used any more as it will be freed soon via tcp_tmr. + This is OK here since sending FIN does not guarantee a time frime for + actually freeing the pcb, either (it is left in closure states for + remote ACK or timeout) */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Closes the connection held by the PCB. + * + * Listening pcbs are freed and may not be referenced any more. + * Connection pcbs are freed if not yet connected and may not be referenced + * any more. If a connection is established (at least SYN received or in + * a closing state), the connection is closed, and put in a closing state. + * The pcb is then automatically freed in tcp_slowtmr(). It is therefore + * unsafe to reference it (unless an error is returned). + * + * The function may return ERR_MEM if no memory + * was available for closing the connection. If so, the application + * should wait and try again either by using the acknowledgment + * callback or the polling functionality. If the close succeeds, the + * function returns ERR_OK. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to close + * @return ERR_OK if connection has been closed + * another err_t if closing failed and pcb is not freed + */ +err_t tcp_close(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_close: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_close: closing in ")); + + tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); + + if (pcb->state != LISTEN) { + /* Set a flag not to receive any more data... */ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_RXCLOSED); + } + + /* ... and close */ + return tcp_close_shutdown(pcb, 1); +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Causes all or part of a full-duplex connection of this PCB to be shut down. + * This doesn't deallocate the PCB unless shutting down both sides! + * Shutting down both sides is the same as calling tcp_close, so if it succeds + * (i.e. returns ER_OK), the PCB must not be referenced any more! + * + * @param pcb PCB to shutdown + * @param shut_rx shut down receive side if this is != 0 + * @param shut_tx shut down send side if this is != 0 + * @return ERR_OK if shutdown succeeded (or the PCB has already been shut down) + * another err_t on error. + */ +err_t tcp_shutdown(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int shut_rx, int shut_tx) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_shutdown: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { + return ERR_CONN; + } + + if (shut_rx) { + /* shut down the receive side: set a flag not to receive any more data... */ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_RXCLOSED); + + if (shut_tx) { + /* shutting down the tx AND rx side is the same as closing for the raw API */ + return tcp_close_shutdown(pcb, 1); + } + + /* ... and free buffered data */ + if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { + pbuf_free(pcb->refused_data); + pcb->refused_data = NULL; + } + } + + if (shut_tx) { + /* This can't happen twice since if it succeeds, the pcb's state is changed. + Only close in these states as the others directly deallocate the PCB */ + switch (pcb->state) { + case SYN_RCVD: + case ESTABLISHED: + case CLOSE_WAIT: + return tcp_close_shutdown(pcb, (u8_t)shut_rx); + + default: + /* Not (yet?) connected, cannot shutdown the TX side as that would bring us + into CLOSED state, where the PCB is deallocated. */ + return ERR_CONN; + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Abandons a connection and optionally sends a RST to the remote + * host. Deletes the local protocol control block. This is done when + * a connection is killed because of shortage of memory. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to abort + * @param reset boolean to indicate whether a reset should be sent + */ +void tcp_abandon(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int reset) +{ + u32_t seqno, ackno; +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + tcp_err_fn errf; +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + void *errf_arg; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_abandon: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); + + /* pcb->state LISTEN not allowed here */ + LWIP_ASSERT("don't call tcp_abort/tcp_abandon for listen-pcbs", + pcb->state != LISTEN); + + /* Figure out on which TCP PCB list we are, and remove us. If we + are in an active state, call the receive function associated with + the PCB with a NULL argument, and send an RST to the remote end. */ + if (pcb->state == TIME_WAIT) { + tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); + tcp_free(pcb); + } else { + int send_rst = 0; + u16_t local_port = 0; + enum tcp_state last_state; + seqno = pcb->snd_nxt; + ackno = pcb->rcv_nxt; +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + errf = pcb->errf; +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + errf_arg = pcb->callback_arg; + + if (pcb->state == CLOSED) { + if (pcb->local_port != 0) { + /* bound, not yet opened */ + TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); + } + } else { + send_rst = reset; + local_port = pcb->local_port; + TCP_PCB_REMOVE_ACTIVE(pcb); + } + + if (pcb->unacked != NULL) { + tcp_segs_free(pcb->unacked); + } + + if (pcb->unsent != NULL) { + tcp_segs_free(pcb->unsent); + } + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ + + if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { + tcp_segs_free(pcb->ooseq); + } + +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb); + + if (send_rst) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RST_DEBUG, ("tcp_abandon: sending RST\n")); + tcp_rst(pcb, seqno, ackno, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, local_port, pcb->remote_port); + } + + last_state = pcb->state; + tcp_free(pcb); + TCP_EVENT_ERR(last_state, errf, errf_arg, ERR_ABRT); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Aborts the connection by sending a RST (reset) segment to the remote + * host. The pcb is deallocated. This function never fails. + * + * ATTENTION: When calling this from one of the TCP callbacks, make + * sure you always return ERR_ABRT (and never return ERR_ABRT otherwise + * or you will risk accessing deallocated memory or memory leaks! + * + * @param pcb the tcp pcb to abort + */ +void tcp_abort(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + tcp_abandon(pcb, 1); +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Binds the connection to a local port number and IP address. If the + * IP address is not given (i.e., ipaddr == IP_ANY_TYPE), the connection is + * bound to all local IP addresses. + * If another connection is bound to the same port, the function will + * return ERR_USE, otherwise ERR_OK is returned. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to bind (no check is done whether this pcb is + * already bound!) + * @param ipaddr the local ip address to bind to (use IPx_ADDR_ANY to bind + * to any local address + * @param port the local port to bind to + * @return ERR_USE if the port is already in use + * ERR_VAL if bind failed because the PCB is not in a valid state + * ERR_OK if bound + */ +err_t tcp_bind(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) +{ + int i; + int max_pcb_list = NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS; + struct tcp_pcb *cpcb; +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + ip_addr_t zoned_ipaddr; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ + if (ipaddr == NULL) { + ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; + } + +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_bind: invalid ipaddr", ipaddr != NULL, return ERR_ARG); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_bind: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_bind: can only bind in state CLOSED", pcb->state == CLOSED, return ERR_VAL); + +#if SO_REUSE + + /* Unless the REUSEADDR flag is set, + we have to check the pcbs in TIME-WAIT state, also. + We do not dump TIME_WAIT pcb's; they can still be matched by incoming + packets using both local and remote IP addresses and ports to distinguish. + */ + if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) { + max_pcb_list = NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS_NO_TIME_WAIT; + } + +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now. + * This is legacy support: scope-aware callers should always provide properly + * zoned source addresses. Do the zone selection before the address-in-use + * check below; as such we have to make a temporary copy of the address. */ + if (IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) && ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), IP6_UNICAST)) { + ip_addr_copy(zoned_ipaddr, *ipaddr); + ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&zoned_ipaddr), ip_2_ip6(&zoned_ipaddr)); + ipaddr = &zoned_ipaddr; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + if (port == 0) { + port = tcp_new_port(); + + if (port == 0) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + } else { + /* Check if the address already is in use (on all lists) */ + for (i = 0; i < max_pcb_list; i++) { + for (cpcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; cpcb != NULL; cpcb = cpcb->next) { + if (cpcb->local_port == port) { +#if SO_REUSE + + /* Omit checking for the same port if both pcbs have REUSEADDR set. + For SO_REUSEADDR, the duplicate-check for a 5-tuple is done in + tcp_connect. */ + if (!ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR) || + !ip_get_option(cpcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + { + /* @todo: check accept_any_ip_version */ + if ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) == IP_IS_V6_VAL(cpcb->local_ip)) && + (ip_addr_isany(&cpcb->local_ip) || + ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) || + ip_addr_cmp(&cpcb->local_ip, ipaddr))) { + return ERR_USE; + } + } + } + } + } + } + + if (!ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + || (IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr) != IP_GET_TYPE(&pcb->local_ip)) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + ) { + ip_addr_set(&pcb->local_ip, ipaddr); + } + + pcb->local_port = port; + TCP_REG(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_bind: bind to port %" U16_F "\n", port)); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Binds the connection to a netif and IP address. + * After calling this function, all packets received via this PCB + * are guaranteed to have come in via the specified netif, and all + * outgoing packets will go out via the specified netif. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to bind. + * @param netif the netif to bind to. Can be NULL. + */ +void tcp_bind_netif(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netif != NULL) { + pcb->netif_idx = netif_get_index(netif); + } else { + pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; + } +} + +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API +/** + * Default accept callback if no accept callback is specified by the user. + */ +static err_t tcp_accept_null(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, err_t err) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_accept_null: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + tcp_abort(pcb); + + return ERR_ABRT; +} +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Set the state of the connection to be LISTEN, which means that it + * is able to accept incoming connections. The protocol control block + * is reallocated in order to consume less memory. Setting the + * connection to LISTEN is an irreversible process. + * When an incoming connection is accepted, the function specified with + * the tcp_accept() function will be called. The pcb has to be bound + * to a local port with the tcp_bind() function. + * + * The tcp_listen() function returns a new connection identifier, and + * the one passed as an argument to the function will be + * deallocated. The reason for this behavior is that less memory is + * needed for a connection that is listening, so tcp_listen() will + * reclaim the memory needed for the original connection and allocate a + * new smaller memory block for the listening connection. + * + * tcp_listen() may return NULL if no memory was available for the + * listening connection. If so, the memory associated with the pcb + * passed as an argument to tcp_listen() will not be deallocated. + * + * The backlog limits the number of outstanding connections + * in the listen queue to the value specified by the backlog argument. + * To use it, your need to set TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG=1 in your lwipopts.h. + * + * @param pcb the original tcp_pcb + * @param backlog the incoming connections queue limit + * @return tcp_pcb used for listening, consumes less memory. + * + * @note The original tcp_pcb is freed. This function therefore has to be + * called like this: + * tpcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog(tpcb, backlog); + */ +struct tcp_pcb * +tcp_listen_with_backlog(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t backlog) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + return tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(pcb, backlog, NULL); +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Set the state of the connection to be LISTEN, which means that it + * is able to accept incoming connections. The protocol control block + * is reallocated in order to consume less memory. Setting the + * connection to LISTEN is an irreversible process. + * + * @param pcb the original tcp_pcb + * @param backlog the incoming connections queue limit + * @param err when NULL is returned, this contains the error reason + * @return tcp_pcb used for listening, consumes less memory. + * + * @note The original tcp_pcb is freed. This function therefore has to be + * called like this: + * tpcb = tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(tpcb, backlog, &err); + */ +struct tcp_pcb * +tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t backlog, err_t *err) +{ + struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb = NULL; + err_t res; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(backlog); + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, res = ERR_ARG; goto done); + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err: pcb already connected", pcb->state == CLOSED, res = ERR_CLSD; goto done); + + /* already listening? */ + if (pcb->state == LISTEN) { + lpcb = (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)pcb; + res = ERR_ALREADY; + goto done; + } + +#if SO_REUSE + + if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) { + /* Since SOF_REUSEADDR allows reusing a local address before the pcb's usage + is declared (listen-/connection-pcb), we have to make sure now that + this port is only used once for every local IP. */ + for (lpcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; lpcb != NULL; lpcb = lpcb->next) { + if ((lpcb->local_port == pcb->local_port) && + ip_addr_cmp(&lpcb->local_ip, &pcb->local_ip)) { + /* this address/port is already used */ + lpcb = NULL; + res = ERR_USE; + goto done; + } + } + } + +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + lpcb = (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB_LISTEN); + + if (lpcb == NULL) { + res = ERR_MEM; + goto done; + } + + lpcb->callback_arg = pcb->callback_arg; + lpcb->local_port = pcb->local_port; + lpcb->state = LISTEN; + lpcb->prio = pcb->prio; + lpcb->so_options = pcb->so_options; + lpcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; + lpcb->ttl = pcb->ttl; + lpcb->tos = pcb->tos; +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(lpcb->remote_ip, pcb->local_ip.type); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + ip_addr_copy(lpcb->local_ip, pcb->local_ip); + + if (pcb->local_port != 0) { + TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); + } + +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS + /* copy over ext_args to listening pcb */ + memcpy(&lpcb->ext_args, &pcb->ext_args, sizeof(pcb->ext_args)); +#endif + tcp_free(pcb); +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + lpcb->accept = tcp_accept_null; +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + lpcb->accepts_pending = 0; + tcp_backlog_set(lpcb, backlog); +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + TCP_REG(&tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs, (struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb); + res = ERR_OK; +done: + + if (err != NULL) { + *err = res; + } + + return (struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb; +} + +/** + * Update the state that tracks the available window space to advertise. + * + * Returns how much extra window would be advertised if we sent an + * update now. + */ +u32_t tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + u32_t new_right_edge; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + new_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd; + + if (TCP_SEQ_GEQ(new_right_edge, pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge + LWIP_MIN((TCP_WND / 2), pcb->mss))) { + /* we can advertise more window */ + pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = pcb->rcv_wnd; + return new_right_edge - pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge; + } else { + if (TCP_SEQ_GT(pcb->rcv_nxt, pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge)) { + /* Can happen due to other end sending out of advertised window, + * but within actual available (but not yet advertised) window */ + pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = 0; + } else { + /* keep the right edge of window constant */ + u32_t new_rcv_ann_wnd = pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge - pcb->rcv_nxt; +#if !LWIP_WND_SCALE + LWIP_ASSERT("new_rcv_ann_wnd <= 0xffff", new_rcv_ann_wnd <= 0xffff); +#endif + pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = (tcpwnd_size_t)new_rcv_ann_wnd; + } + + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * This function should be called by the application when it has + * processed the data. The purpose is to advertise a larger window + * when the data has been processed. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which data is read + * @param len the amount of bytes that have been read by the application + */ +void tcp_recved(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) +{ + u32_t wnd_inflation; + tcpwnd_size_t rcv_wnd; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_recved: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); + + /* pcb->state LISTEN not allowed here */ + LWIP_ASSERT("don't call tcp_recved for listen-pcbs", + pcb->state != LISTEN); + + rcv_wnd = (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->rcv_wnd + len); + + if ((rcv_wnd > TCP_WND_MAX(pcb)) || (rcv_wnd < pcb->rcv_wnd)) { + /* window got too big or tcpwnd_size_t overflow */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_recved: window got too big or tcpwnd_size_t overflow\n")); + pcb->rcv_wnd = TCP_WND_MAX(pcb); + } else { + pcb->rcv_wnd = rcv_wnd; + } + + wnd_inflation = tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(pcb); + + /* If the change in the right edge of window is significant (default + * watermark is TCP_WND/4), then send an explicit update now. + * Otherwise wait for a packet to be sent in the normal course of + * events (or more window to be available later) */ + if (wnd_inflation >= TCP_WND_UPDATE_THRESHOLD) { + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + tcp_output(pcb); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_recved: received %" U16_F " bytes, wnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F " (%" TCPWNDSIZE_F ").\n", + len, pcb->rcv_wnd, (u16_t)(TCP_WND_MAX(pcb) - pcb->rcv_wnd))); +} + +/** + * Allocate a new local TCP port. + * + * @return a new (free) local TCP port number + */ +static u16_t tcp_new_port(void) +{ + u8_t i; + u16_t n = 0; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + +again: + tcp_port++; + + if (tcp_port == TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END) { + tcp_port = TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START; + } + + /* Check all PCB lists. */ + for (i = 0; i < NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS; i++) { + for (pcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + if (pcb->local_port == tcp_port) { + n++; + + if (n > (TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END - TCP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START)) { + return 0; + } + + goto again; + } + } + } + + return tcp_port; +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Connects to another host. The function given as the "connected" + * argument will be called when the connection has been established. + * Sets up the pcb to connect to the remote host and sends the + * initial SYN segment which opens the connection. + * + * The tcp_connect() function returns immediately; it does not wait for + * the connection to be properly setup. Instead, it will call the + * function specified as the fourth argument (the "connected" argument) + * when the connection is established. If the connection could not be + * properly established, either because the other host refused the + * connection or because the other host didn't answer, the "err" + * callback function of this pcb (registered with tcp_err, see below) + * will be called. + * + * The tcp_connect() function can return ERR_MEM if no memory is + * available for enqueueing the SYN segment. If the SYN indeed was + * enqueued successfully, the tcp_connect() function returns ERR_OK. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb used to establish the connection + * @param ipaddr the remote ip address to connect to + * @param port the remote tcp port to connect to + * @param connected callback function to call when connected (on error, + the err calback will be called) + * @return ERR_VAL if invalid arguments are given + * ERR_OK if connect request has been sent + * other err_t values if connect request couldn't be sent + */ +err_t tcp_connect(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, + tcp_connected_fn connected) +{ + struct netif *netif = NULL; + err_t ret; + u32_t iss; + u16_t old_local_port; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_connect: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_connect: invalid ipaddr", ipaddr != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_connect: can only connect from state CLOSED", pcb->state == CLOSED, return ERR_ISCONN); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_connect to port %" U16_F "\n", port)); + ip_addr_set(&pcb->remote_ip, ipaddr); + pcb->remote_port = port; + + if (pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { + netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->netif_idx); + } else { + /* check if we have a route to the remote host */ + netif = ip_route(&pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); + } + + if (netif == NULL) { + /* Don't even try to send a SYN packet if we have no route since that will fail. */ + return ERR_RTE; + } + + /* check if local IP has been assigned to pcb, if not, get one */ + if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip)) { + const ip_addr_t *local_ip = ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, ipaddr); + + if (local_ip == NULL) { + return ERR_RTE; + } + + ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); + } + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now. + * Given that we already have the target netif, this is easy and cheap. */ + if (IP_IS_V6(&pcb->remote_ip) && + ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), IP6_UNICAST)) { + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), IP6_UNICAST, netif); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + old_local_port = pcb->local_port; + + if (pcb->local_port == 0) { + pcb->local_port = tcp_new_port(); + + if (pcb->local_port == 0) { + return ERR_BUF; + } + } else { +#if SO_REUSE + + if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) { + /* Since SOF_REUSEADDR allows reusing a local address, we have to make sure + now that the 5-tuple is unique. */ + struct tcp_pcb *cpcb; + int i; + + /* Don't check listen- and bound-PCBs, check active- and TIME-WAIT PCBs. */ + for (i = 2; i < NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS; i++) { + for (cpcb = *tcp_pcb_lists[i]; cpcb != NULL; cpcb = cpcb->next) { + if ((cpcb->local_port == pcb->local_port) && + (cpcb->remote_port == port) && + ip_addr_cmp(&cpcb->local_ip, &pcb->local_ip) && + ip_addr_cmp(&cpcb->remote_ip, ipaddr)) { + /* linux returns EISCONN here, but ERR_USE should be OK for us */ + return ERR_USE; + } + } + } + } + +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + } + + iss = tcp_next_iss(pcb); + pcb->rcv_nxt = 0; + pcb->snd_nxt = iss; + pcb->lastack = iss - 1; + pcb->snd_wl2 = iss - 1; + pcb->snd_lbb = iss - 1; + /* Start with a window that does not need scaling. When window scaling is + enabled and used, the window is enlarged when both sides agree on scaling. */ + pcb->rcv_wnd = pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = TCPWND_MIN16(TCP_WND); + pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt; + pcb->snd_wnd = TCP_WND; + /* As initial send MSS, we use TCP_MSS but limit it to 536. + The send MSS is updated when an MSS option is received. */ + pcb->mss = INITIAL_MSS; +#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS + pcb->mss = tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(pcb->mss, netif, &pcb->remote_ip); +#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ + pcb->cwnd = 1; +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + pcb->connected = connected; +#else /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(connected); +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + + /* Send a SYN together with the MSS option. */ + ret = tcp_enqueue_flags(pcb, TCP_SYN); + + if (ret == ERR_OK) { + /* SYN segment was enqueued, changed the pcbs state now */ + pcb->state = SYN_SENT; + + if (old_local_port != 0) { + TCP_RMV(&tcp_bound_pcbs, pcb); + } + + TCP_REG_ACTIVE(pcb); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpactiveopens); + + tcp_output(pcb); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * Called every 500 ms and implements the retransmission timer and the timer that + * removes PCBs that have been in TIME-WAIT for enough time. It also increments + * various timers such as the inactivity timer in each PCB. + * + * Automatically called from tcp_tmr(). + */ +void tcp_slowtmr(void) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *prev; + tcpwnd_size_t eff_wnd; + u8_t pcb_remove; /* flag if a PCB should be removed */ + u8_t pcb_reset; /* flag if a RST should be sent when removing */ + err_t err; + + err = ERR_OK; + + ++tcp_ticks; + ++tcp_timer_ctr; + +tcp_slowtmr_start: + /* Steps through all of the active PCBs. */ + prev = NULL; + pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; + + if (pcb == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: no active pcbs\n")); + } + + while (pcb != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: processing active pcb\n")); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: active pcb->state != CLOSED\n", pcb->state != CLOSED); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: active pcb->state != LISTEN\n", pcb->state != LISTEN); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: active pcb->state != TIME-WAIT\n", pcb->state != TIME_WAIT); + + if (pcb->last_timer == tcp_timer_ctr) { + /* skip this pcb, we have already processed it */ + prev = pcb; + pcb = pcb->next; + continue; + } + + pcb->last_timer = tcp_timer_ctr; + + pcb_remove = 0; + pcb_reset = 0; + + if (pcb->state == SYN_SENT && pcb->nrtx >= TCP_SYNMAXRTX) { + ++pcb_remove; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: max SYN retries reached\n")); + } else if (pcb->nrtx >= TCP_MAXRTX) { + ++pcb_remove; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: max DATA retries reached\n")); + } else { + if (pcb->persist_backoff > 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtimr: persist ticking with in-flight data", pcb->unacked == NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtimr: persist ticking with empty send buffer", pcb->unsent != NULL); + + if (pcb->persist_probe >= TCP_MAXRTX) { + ++pcb_remove; /* max probes reached */ + } else { + u8_t backoff_cnt = tcp_persist_backoff[pcb->persist_backoff - 1]; + + if (pcb->persist_cnt < backoff_cnt) { + pcb->persist_cnt++; + } + + if (pcb->persist_cnt >= backoff_cnt) { + int next_slot = 1; /* increment timer to next slot */ + + /* If snd_wnd is zero, send 1 byte probes */ + if (pcb->snd_wnd == 0) { + if (tcp_zero_window_probe(pcb) != ERR_OK) { + next_slot = 0; /* try probe again with current slot */ + } + + /* snd_wnd not fully closed, split unsent head and fill window */ + } else { + if (tcp_split_unsent_seg(pcb, (u16_t)pcb->snd_wnd) == ERR_OK) { + if (tcp_output(pcb) == ERR_OK) { + /* sending will cancel persist timer, else retry with current slot */ + next_slot = 0; + } + } + } + + if (next_slot) { + pcb->persist_cnt = 0; + + if (pcb->persist_backoff < sizeof(tcp_persist_backoff)) { + pcb->persist_backoff++; + } + } + } + } + } else { + /* Increase the retransmission timer if it is running */ + if ((pcb->rtime >= 0) && (pcb->rtime < 0x7FFF)) { + ++pcb->rtime; + } + + if (pcb->rtime >= pcb->rto) { + /* Time for a retransmission. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: rtime %" S16_F + " pcb->rto %" S16_F "\n", + pcb->rtime, pcb->rto)); + + /* If prepare phase fails but we have unsent data but no unacked data, + still execute the backoff calculations below, as this means we somehow + failed to send segment. */ + if ((tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare(pcb) == ERR_OK) || ((pcb->unacked == NULL) && (pcb->unsent != NULL))) { + /* Double retransmission time-out unless we are trying to + * connect to somebody (i.e., we are in SYN_SENT). */ + if (pcb->state != SYN_SENT) { + u8_t backoff_idx = LWIP_MIN(pcb->nrtx, sizeof(tcp_backoff) - 1); + int calc_rto = ((pcb->sa >> 3) + pcb->sv) << tcp_backoff[backoff_idx]; + pcb->rto = (s16_t)LWIP_MIN(calc_rto, 0x7FFF); + } + + /* Reset the retransmission timer. */ + pcb->rtime = 0; + + /* Reduce congestion window and ssthresh. */ + eff_wnd = LWIP_MIN(pcb->cwnd, pcb->snd_wnd); + pcb->ssthresh = eff_wnd >> 1; + + if (pcb->ssthresh < (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->mss << 1)) { + pcb->ssthresh = (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->mss << 1); + } + + pcb->cwnd = pcb->mss; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F + " ssthresh %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", + pcb->cwnd, pcb->ssthresh)); + pcb->bytes_acked = 0; + + /* The following needs to be called AFTER cwnd is set to one + mss - STJ */ + tcp_rexmit_rto_commit(pcb); + } + } + } + } + + /* Check if this PCB has stayed too long in FIN-WAIT-2 */ + if (pcb->state == FIN_WAIT_2) { + /* If this PCB is in FIN_WAIT_2 because of SHUT_WR don't let it time out. */ + if (pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED) { + /* PCB was fully closed (either through close() or SHUT_RDWR): + normal FIN-WAIT timeout handling. */ + if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > + TCP_FIN_WAIT_TIMEOUT / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { + ++pcb_remove; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: removing pcb stuck in FIN-WAIT-2\n")); + } + } + } + + /* Check if KEEPALIVE should be sent */ + if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_KEEPALIVE) && + ((pcb->state == ESTABLISHED) || + (pcb->state == CLOSE_WAIT))) { + if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > + (pcb->keep_idle + TCP_KEEP_DUR(pcb)) / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: KEEPALIVE timeout. Aborting connection to ")); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(TCP_DEBUG, pcb->remote_ip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("\n")); + + ++pcb_remove; + ++pcb_reset; + } else if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > + (pcb->keep_idle + pcb->keep_cnt_sent * TCP_KEEP_INTVL(pcb)) / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { + err = tcp_keepalive(pcb); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + pcb->keep_cnt_sent++; + } + } + } + + /* If this PCB has queued out of sequence data, but has been + inactive for too long, will drop the data (it will eventually + be retransmitted). */ +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ + + if (pcb->ooseq != NULL && + (tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr >= (u32_t)pcb->rto * TCP_OOSEQ_TIMEOUT)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: dropping OOSEQ queued data\n")); + tcp_free_ooseq(pcb); + } + +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + + /* Check if this PCB has stayed too long in SYN-RCVD */ + if (pcb->state == SYN_RCVD) { + if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > + TCP_SYN_RCVD_TIMEOUT / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { + ++pcb_remove; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: removing pcb stuck in SYN-RCVD\n")); + } + } + + /* Check if this PCB has stayed too long in LAST-ACK */ + if (pcb->state == LAST_ACK) { + if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > 2 * TCP_MSL / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { + ++pcb_remove; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: removing pcb stuck in LAST-ACK\n")); + } + } + + /* If the PCB should be removed, do it. */ + if (pcb_remove) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb2; +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + tcp_err_fn err_fn = pcb->errf; +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + void *err_arg; + enum tcp_state last_state; + tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); + + /* Remove PCB from tcp_active_pcbs list. */ + if (prev != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: middle tcp != tcp_active_pcbs", pcb != tcp_active_pcbs); + prev->next = pcb->next; + } else { + /* This PCB was the first. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: first pcb == tcp_active_pcbs", tcp_active_pcbs == pcb); + tcp_active_pcbs = pcb->next; + } + + if (pcb_reset) { + tcp_rst(pcb, pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, + pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port); + } + + err_arg = pcb->callback_arg; + last_state = pcb->state; + pcb2 = pcb; + pcb = pcb->next; + tcp_free(pcb2); + + tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 0; + TCP_EVENT_ERR(last_state, err_fn, err_arg, ERR_ABRT); + + if (tcp_active_pcbs_changed) { + goto tcp_slowtmr_start; + } + } else { + /* get the 'next' element now and work with 'prev' below (in case of abort) */ + prev = pcb; + pcb = pcb->next; + + /* We check if we should poll the connection. */ + ++prev->polltmr; + + if (prev->polltmr >= prev->pollinterval) { + prev->polltmr = 0; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_slowtmr: polling application\n")); + tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 0; + TCP_EVENT_POLL(prev, err); + + if (tcp_active_pcbs_changed) { + goto tcp_slowtmr_start; + } + + /* if err == ERR_ABRT, 'prev' is already deallocated */ + if (err == ERR_OK) { + tcp_output(prev); + } + } + } + } + + /* Steps through all of the TIME-WAIT PCBs. */ + prev = NULL; + pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: TIME-WAIT pcb->state == TIME-WAIT", pcb->state == TIME_WAIT); + pcb_remove = 0; + + /* Check if this PCB has stayed long enough in TIME-WAIT */ + if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) > 2 * TCP_MSL / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) { + ++pcb_remove; + } + + /* If the PCB should be removed, do it. */ + if (pcb_remove) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb2; + tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); + + /* Remove PCB from tcp_tw_pcbs list. */ + if (prev != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: middle tcp != tcp_tw_pcbs", pcb != tcp_tw_pcbs); + prev->next = pcb->next; + } else { + /* This PCB was the first. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_slowtmr: first pcb == tcp_tw_pcbs", tcp_tw_pcbs == pcb); + tcp_tw_pcbs = pcb->next; + } + + pcb2 = pcb; + pcb = pcb->next; + tcp_free(pcb2); + } else { + prev = pcb; + pcb = pcb->next; + } + } +} + +/** + * Is called every TCP_FAST_INTERVAL (250 ms) and process data previously + * "refused" by upper layer (application) and sends delayed ACKs or pending FINs. + * + * Automatically called from tcp_tmr(). + */ +void tcp_fasttmr(void) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + ++tcp_timer_ctr; + +tcp_fasttmr_start: + pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + if (pcb->last_timer != tcp_timer_ctr) { + struct tcp_pcb *next; + pcb->last_timer = tcp_timer_ctr; + + /* send delayed ACKs */ + if (pcb->flags & TF_ACK_DELAY) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_fasttmr: delayed ACK\n")); + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + tcp_output(pcb); + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); + } + + /* send pending FIN */ + if (pcb->flags & TF_CLOSEPEND) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_fasttmr: pending FIN\n")); + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_CLOSEPEND); + tcp_close_shutdown_fin(pcb); + } + + next = pcb->next; + + /* If there is data which was previously "refused" by upper layer */ + if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { + tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 0; + tcp_process_refused_data(pcb); + + if (tcp_active_pcbs_changed) { + /* application callback has changed the pcb list: restart the loop */ + goto tcp_fasttmr_start; + } + } + + pcb = next; + } else { + pcb = pcb->next; + } + } +} + +/** Call tcp_output for all active pcbs that have TF_NAGLEMEMERR set */ +void tcp_txnow(void) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + if (pcb->flags & TF_NAGLEMEMERR) { + tcp_output(pcb); + } + } +} + +/** Pass pcb->refused_data to the recv callback */ +err_t tcp_process_refused_data(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + struct pbuf *rest; +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_process_refused_data: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + + while (pcb->refused_data != NULL) +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + { + err_t err; + u8_t refused_flags = pcb->refused_data->flags; + /* set pcb->refused_data to NULL in case the callback frees it and then + closes the pcb */ + struct pbuf *refused_data = pcb->refused_data; +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + pbuf_split_64k(refused_data, &rest); + pcb->refused_data = rest; +#else /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + pcb->refused_data = NULL; +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + /* Notify again application with data previously received. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: notify kept packet\n")); + TCP_EVENT_RECV(pcb, refused_data, ERR_OK, err); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + /* did refused_data include a FIN? */ + if ((refused_flags & PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN) +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + && (rest == NULL) +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + ) { + /* correct rcv_wnd as the application won't call tcp_recved() + for the FIN's seqno */ + if (pcb->rcv_wnd != TCP_WND_MAX(pcb)) { + pcb->rcv_wnd++; + } + + TCP_EVENT_CLOSED(pcb, err); + + if (err == ERR_ABRT) { + return ERR_ABRT; + } + } + } else if (err == ERR_ABRT) { + /* if err == ERR_ABRT, 'pcb' is already deallocated */ + /* Drop incoming packets because pcb is "full" (only if the incoming + segment contains data). */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: drop incoming packets, because pcb is \"full\"\n")); + return ERR_ABRT; + } else { + /* data is still refused, pbuf is still valid (go on for ACK-only packets) */ +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + if (rest != NULL) { + pbuf_cat(refused_data, rest); + } + +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + pcb->refused_data = refused_data; + return ERR_INPROGRESS; + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Deallocates a list of TCP segments (tcp_seg structures). + * + * @param seg tcp_seg list of TCP segments to free + */ +void tcp_segs_free(struct tcp_seg *seg) +{ + while (seg != NULL) { + struct tcp_seg *next = seg->next; + tcp_seg_free(seg); + seg = next; + } +} + +/** + * Frees a TCP segment (tcp_seg structure). + * + * @param seg single tcp_seg to free + */ +void tcp_seg_free(struct tcp_seg *seg) +{ + if (seg != NULL) { + if (seg->p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(seg->p); +#if TCP_DEBUG + seg->p = NULL; +#endif /* TCP_DEBUG */ + } + + memp_free(MEMP_TCP_SEG, seg); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp + * Sets the priority of a connection. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to manipulate + * @param prio new priority + */ +void tcp_setprio(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t prio) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_setprio: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); + + pcb->prio = prio; +} + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ +/** + * Returns a copy of the given TCP segment. + * The pbuf and data are not copied, only the pointers + * + * @param seg the old tcp_seg + * @return a copy of seg + */ +struct tcp_seg * +tcp_seg_copy(struct tcp_seg *seg) +{ + struct tcp_seg *cseg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_seg_copy: invalid seg", seg != NULL); + + cseg = (struct tcp_seg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_SEG); + + if (cseg == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + SMEMCPY((u8_t *)cseg, (const u8_t *)seg, sizeof(struct tcp_seg)); + pbuf_ref(cseg->p); + return cseg; +} +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API +/** + * Default receive callback that is called if the user didn't register + * a recv callback for the pcb. + */ +err_t tcp_recv_null(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_recv_null: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + if (p != NULL) { + tcp_recved(pcb, p->tot_len); + pbuf_free(p); + } else if (err == ERR_OK) { + return tcp_close(pcb); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + +/** + * Kills the oldest active connection that has a lower priority than 'prio'. + * + * @param prio minimum priority + */ +static void tcp_kill_prio(u8_t prio) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *inactive; + u32_t inactivity; + u8_t mprio; + + mprio = LWIP_MIN(TCP_PRIO_MAX, prio); + + /* We want to kill connections with a lower prio, so bail out if + * supplied prio is 0 - there can never be a lower prio + */ + if (mprio == 0) { + return; + } + + /* We only want kill connections with a lower prio, so decrement prio by one + * and start searching for oldest connection with same or lower priority than mprio. + * We want to find the connections with the lowest possible prio, and among + * these the one with the longest inactivity time. + */ + mprio--; + + inactivity = 0; + inactive = NULL; + + for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + /* lower prio is always a kill candidate */ + if ((pcb->prio < mprio) || + /* longer inactivity is also a kill candidate */ + ((pcb->prio == mprio) && ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) >= inactivity))) { + inactivity = tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr; + inactive = pcb; + mprio = pcb->prio; + } + } + + if (inactive != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_kill_prio: killing oldest PCB %p (%" S32_F ")\n", + (void *)inactive, inactivity)); + tcp_abort(inactive); + } +} + +/** + * Kills the oldest connection that is in specific state. + * Called from tcp_alloc() for LAST_ACK and CLOSING if no more connections are available. + */ +static void tcp_kill_state(enum tcp_state state) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *inactive; + u32_t inactivity; + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid state", (state == CLOSING) || (state == LAST_ACK)); + + inactivity = 0; + inactive = NULL; + + /* Go through the list of active pcbs and get the oldest pcb that is in state + CLOSING/LAST_ACK. */ + for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + if (pcb->state == state) { + if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) >= inactivity) { + inactivity = tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr; + inactive = pcb; + } + } + } + + if (inactive != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_kill_closing: killing oldest %s PCB %p (%" S32_F ")\n", + tcp_state_str[state], (void *)inactive, inactivity)); + /* Don't send a RST, since no data is lost. */ + tcp_abandon(inactive, 0); + } +} + +/** + * Kills the oldest connection that is in TIME_WAIT state. + * Called from tcp_alloc() if no more connections are available. + */ +static void tcp_kill_timewait(void) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *inactive; + u32_t inactivity; + + inactivity = 0; + inactive = NULL; + + /* Go through the list of TIME_WAIT pcbs and get the oldest pcb. */ + for (pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + if ((u32_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr) >= inactivity) { + inactivity = tcp_ticks - pcb->tmr; + inactive = pcb; + } + } + + if (inactive != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_kill_timewait: killing oldest TIME-WAIT PCB %p (%" S32_F ")\n", + (void *)inactive, inactivity)); + tcp_abort(inactive); + } +} + +/* Called when allocating a pcb fails. + * In this case, we want to handle all pcbs that want to close first: if we can + * now send the FIN (which failed before), the pcb might be in a state that is + * OK for us to now free it. + */ +static void tcp_handle_closepend(void) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + struct tcp_pcb *next = pcb->next; + + /* send pending FIN */ + if (pcb->flags & TF_CLOSEPEND) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_handle_closepend: pending FIN\n")); + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_CLOSEPEND); + tcp_close_shutdown_fin(pcb); + } + + pcb = next; + } +} + +/** + * Allocate a new tcp_pcb structure. + * + * @param prio priority for the new pcb + * @return a new tcp_pcb that initially is in state CLOSED + */ +struct tcp_pcb * +tcp_alloc(u8_t prio) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + /* Try to send FIN for all pcbs stuck in TF_CLOSEPEND first */ + tcp_handle_closepend(); + + /* Try killing oldest connection in TIME-WAIT. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_alloc: killing off oldest TIME-WAIT connection\n")); + tcp_kill_timewait(); + /* Try to allocate a tcp_pcb again. */ + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + /* Try killing oldest connection in LAST-ACK (these wouldn't go to TIME-WAIT). */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_alloc: killing off oldest LAST-ACK connection\n")); + tcp_kill_state(LAST_ACK); + /* Try to allocate a tcp_pcb again. */ + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + /* Try killing oldest connection in CLOSING. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_alloc: killing off oldest CLOSING connection\n")); + tcp_kill_state(CLOSING); + /* Try to allocate a tcp_pcb again. */ + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + /* Try killing oldest active connection with lower priority than the new one. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_alloc: killing oldest connection with prio lower than %d\n", prio)); + tcp_kill_prio(prio); + /* Try to allocate a tcp_pcb again. */ + pcb = (struct tcp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_PCB); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + /* adjust err stats: memp_malloc failed multiple times before */ + MEMP_STATS_DEC(err, MEMP_TCP_PCB); + } + } + + if (pcb != NULL) { + /* adjust err stats: memp_malloc failed multiple times before */ + MEMP_STATS_DEC(err, MEMP_TCP_PCB); + } + } + + if (pcb != NULL) { + /* adjust err stats: memp_malloc failed multiple times before */ + MEMP_STATS_DEC(err, MEMP_TCP_PCB); + } + } + + if (pcb != NULL) { + /* adjust err stats: memp_malloc failed above */ + MEMP_STATS_DEC(err, MEMP_TCP_PCB); + } + } + + if (pcb != NULL) { + /* zero out the whole pcb, so there is no need to initialize members to zero */ + memset(pcb, 0, sizeof(struct tcp_pcb)); + pcb->prio = prio; + pcb->snd_buf = TCP_SND_BUF; + /* Start with a window that does not need scaling. When window scaling is + enabled and used, the window is enlarged when both sides agree on scaling. */ + pcb->rcv_wnd = pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = TCPWND_MIN16(TCP_WND); + pcb->ttl = TCP_TTL; + /* As initial send MSS, we use TCP_MSS but limit it to 536. + The send MSS is updated when an MSS option is received. */ + pcb->mss = INITIAL_MSS; + pcb->rto = 3000 / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL; + pcb->sv = 3000 / TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL; + pcb->rtime = -1; + pcb->cwnd = 1; + pcb->tmr = tcp_ticks; + pcb->last_timer = tcp_timer_ctr; + + /* RFC 5681 recommends setting ssthresh abritrarily high and gives an example + of using the largest advertised receive window. We've seen complications with + receiving TCPs that use window scaling and/or window auto-tuning where the + initial advertised window is very small and then grows rapidly once the + connection is established. To avoid these complications, we set ssthresh to the + largest effective cwnd (amount of in-flight data) that the sender can have. */ + pcb->ssthresh = TCP_SND_BUF; + +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + pcb->recv = tcp_recv_null; +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + + /* Init KEEPALIVE timer */ + pcb->keep_idle = TCP_KEEPIDLE_DEFAULT; + +#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE + pcb->keep_intvl = TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT; + pcb->keep_cnt = TCP_KEEPCNT_DEFAULT; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ + } + + return pcb; +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Creates a new TCP protocol control block but doesn't place it on + * any of the TCP PCB lists. + * The pcb is not put on any list until binding using tcp_bind(). + * If memory is not available for creating the new pcb, NULL is returned. + * + * @internal: Maybe there should be a idle TCP PCB list where these + * PCBs are put on. Port reservation using tcp_bind() is implemented but + * allocated pcbs that are not bound can't be killed automatically if wanting + * to allocate a pcb with higher prio (@see tcp_kill_prio()) + * + * @return a new tcp_pcb that initially is in state CLOSED + */ +struct tcp_pcb * +tcp_new(void) +{ + return tcp_alloc(TCP_PRIO_NORMAL); +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Creates a new TCP protocol control block but doesn't + * place it on any of the TCP PCB lists. + * The pcb is not put on any list until binding using tcp_bind(). + * + * @param type IP address type, see @ref lwip_ip_addr_type definitions. + * If you want to listen to IPv4 and IPv6 (dual-stack) connections, + * supply @ref IPADDR_TYPE_ANY as argument and bind to @ref IP_ANY_TYPE. + * @return a new tcp_pcb that initially is in state CLOSED + */ +struct tcp_pcb * +tcp_new_ip_type(u8_t type) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + pcb = tcp_alloc(TCP_PRIO_NORMAL); +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (pcb != NULL) { + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip, type); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip, type); + } + +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + return pcb; +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Specifies the program specific state that should be passed to all + * other callback functions. The "pcb" argument is the current TCP + * connection control block, and the "arg" argument is the argument + * that will be passed to the callbacks. + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the callback argument + * @param arg void pointer argument to pass to callback functions + */ +void tcp_arg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *arg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* This function is allowed to be called for both listen pcbs and + connection pcbs. */ + if (pcb != NULL) { + pcb->callback_arg = arg; + } +} +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Sets the callback function that will be called when new data + * arrives. The callback function will be passed a NULL pbuf to + * indicate that the remote host has closed the connection. If the + * callback function returns ERR_OK or ERR_ABRT it must have + * freed the pbuf, otherwise it must not have freed it. + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the recv callback + * @param recv callback function to call for this pcb when data is received + */ +void tcp_recv(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_recv_fn recv) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket state for recv callback", pcb->state != LISTEN); + pcb->recv = recv; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Specifies the callback function that should be called when data has + * successfully been received (i.e., acknowledged) by the remote + * host. The len argument passed to the callback function gives the + * amount bytes that was acknowledged by the last acknowledgment. + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the sent callback + * @param sent callback function to call for this pcb when data is successfully sent + */ +void tcp_sent(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_sent_fn sent) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket state for sent callback", pcb->state != LISTEN); + pcb->sent = sent; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Used to specify the function that should be called when a fatal error + * has occurred on the connection. + * + * If a connection is aborted because of an error, the application is + * alerted of this event by the err callback. Errors that might abort a + * connection are when there is a shortage of memory. The callback + * function to be called is set using the tcp_err() function. + * + * @note The corresponding pcb is already freed when this callback is called! + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the err callback + * @param err callback function to call for this pcb when a fatal error + * has occurred on the connection + */ +void tcp_err(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_err_fn err) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket state for err callback", pcb->state != LISTEN); + pcb->errf = err; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Used for specifying the function that should be called when a + * LISTENing connection has been connected to another host. + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb to set the accept callback + * @param accept callback function to call for this pcb when LISTENing + * connection has been connected to another host + */ +void tcp_accept(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_accept_fn accept) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if ((pcb != NULL) && (pcb->state == LISTEN)) { + struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb = (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)pcb; + lpcb->accept = accept; + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Specifies the polling interval and the callback function that should + * be called to poll the application. The interval is specified in + * number of TCP coarse grained timer shots, which typically occurs + * twice a second. An interval of 10 means that the application would + * be polled every 5 seconds. + * + * When a connection is idle (i.e., no data is either transmitted or + * received), lwIP will repeatedly poll the application by calling a + * specified callback function. This can be used either as a watchdog + * timer for killing connections that have stayed idle for too long, or + * as a method of waiting for memory to become available. For instance, + * if a call to tcp_write() has failed because memory wasn't available, + * the application may use the polling functionality to call tcp_write() + * again when the connection has been idle for a while. + */ +void tcp_poll(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_poll_fn poll, u8_t interval) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_poll: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid socket state for poll", pcb->state != LISTEN); + +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + pcb->poll = poll; +#else /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(poll); +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + pcb->pollinterval = interval; +} + +/** + * Purges a TCP PCB. Removes any buffered data and frees the buffer memory + * (pcb->ooseq, pcb->unsent and pcb->unacked are freed). + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb to purge. The pcb itself is not deallocated! + */ +void tcp_pcb_purge(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_pcb_purge: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); + + if (pcb->state != CLOSED && + pcb->state != TIME_WAIT && + pcb->state != LISTEN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge\n")); + + tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb); + + if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge: data left on ->refused_data\n")); + pbuf_free(pcb->refused_data); + pcb->refused_data = NULL; + } + + if (pcb->unsent != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge: not all data sent\n")); + } + + if (pcb->unacked != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge: data left on ->unacked\n")); + } + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ + + if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_pcb_purge: data left on ->ooseq\n")); + tcp_free_ooseq(pcb); + } + +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + + /* Stop the retransmission timer as it will expect data on unacked + queue if it fires */ + pcb->rtime = -1; + + tcp_segs_free(pcb->unsent); + tcp_segs_free(pcb->unacked); + pcb->unacked = pcb->unsent = NULL; +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + } +} + +/** + * Purges the PCB and removes it from a PCB list. Any delayed ACKs are sent first. + * + * @param pcblist PCB list to purge. + * @param pcb tcp_pcb to purge. The pcb itself is NOT deallocated! + */ +void tcp_pcb_remove(struct tcp_pcb **pcblist, struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcb_remove: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcb_remove: invalid pcblist", pcblist != NULL); + + TCP_RMV(pcblist, pcb); + + tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); + + /* if there is an outstanding delayed ACKs, send it */ + if ((pcb->state != TIME_WAIT) && + (pcb->state != LISTEN) && + (pcb->flags & TF_ACK_DELAY)) { + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + tcp_output(pcb); + } + + if (pcb->state != LISTEN) { + LWIP_ASSERT("unsent segments leaking", pcb->unsent == NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("unacked segments leaking", pcb->unacked == NULL); +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ + LWIP_ASSERT("ooseq segments leaking", pcb->ooseq == NULL); +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + } + + pcb->state = CLOSED; + /* reset the local port to prevent the pcb from being 'bound' */ + pcb->local_port = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcb_remove: tcp_pcbs_sane()", tcp_pcbs_sane()); +} + +/** + * Calculates a new initial sequence number for new connections. + * + * @return u32_t pseudo random sequence number + */ +u32_t tcp_next_iss(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_next_iss: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + return LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN(&pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port, &pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port); +#else /* LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN */ + static u32_t iss = 6510; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_next_iss: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + iss += tcp_ticks; /* XXX */ + return iss; +#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN */ +} + +#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS +/** + * Calculates the effective send mss that can be used for a specific IP address + * by calculating the minimum of TCP_MSS and the mtu (if set) of the target + * netif (if not NULL). + */ +u16_t tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(u16_t sendmss, struct netif *outif, const ip_addr_t *dest) +{ + u16_t mss_s; + u16_t mtu; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dest); /* in case IPv6 is disabled */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_eff_send_mss_netif: invalid dst_ip", dest != NULL); + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (IP_IS_V6(dest)) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + { + /* First look in destination cache, to see if there is a Path MTU. */ + mtu = nd6_get_destination_mtu(ip_2_ip6(dest), outif); + } +#if LWIP_IPV4 + else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + { + if (outif == NULL) { + return sendmss; + } + + mtu = outif->mtu; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + if (mtu != 0) { + u16_t offset; +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (IP_IS_V6(dest)) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + { + offset = IP6_HLEN + TCP_HLEN; + } +#if LWIP_IPV4 + else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + { + offset = IP_HLEN + TCP_HLEN; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + mss_s = (mtu > offset) ? (u16_t)(mtu - offset) : 0; + /* RFC 1122, chap 4.2.2.6: + * Eff.snd.MSS = min(SendMSS+20, MMS_S) - TCPhdrsize - IPoptionsize + * We correct for TCP options in tcp_write(), and don't support IP options. + */ + sendmss = LWIP_MIN(sendmss, mss_s); + } + + return sendmss; +} +#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ + +/** Helper function for tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed() that iterates a pcb list */ +static void tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed_pcblist(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, struct tcp_pcb *pcb_list) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + pcb = pcb_list; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed_pcblist: invalid old_addr", old_addr != NULL); + + while (pcb != NULL) { + /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ + if (ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, old_addr) +#if LWIP_AUTOIP + /* connections to link-local addresses must persist (RFC3927 ch. 1.9) */ + && (!IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip) || !ip4_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip))) +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ + ) { + /* this connection must be aborted */ + struct tcp_pcb *next = pcb->next; + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("netif_set_ipaddr: aborting TCP pcb %p\n", (void *)pcb)); + tcp_abort(pcb); + pcb = next; + } else { + pcb = pcb->next; + } + } +} + +/** This function is called from netif.c when address is changed or netif is removed + * + * @param old_addr IP address of the netif before change + * @param new_addr IP address of the netif after change or NULL if netif has been removed + */ +void tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr) +{ + struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb; + + if (!ip_addr_isany(old_addr)) { + tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed_pcblist(old_addr, tcp_active_pcbs); + tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed_pcblist(old_addr, tcp_bound_pcbs); + + if (!ip_addr_isany(new_addr)) { + /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ + for (lpcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; lpcb != NULL; lpcb = lpcb->next) { + /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ + if (ip_addr_cmp(&lpcb->local_ip, old_addr)) { + /* The PCB is listening to the old ipaddr and + * is set to listen to the new one instead */ + ip_addr_copy(lpcb->local_ip, *new_addr); + } + } + } + } +} + +const char *tcp_debug_state_str(enum tcp_state s) +{ + return tcp_state_str[s]; +} + +err_t tcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port) +{ + if (pcb) { + if (local) { + if (addr) { + *addr = pcb->local_ip; + } + + if (port) { + *port = pcb->local_port; + } + } else { + if (addr) { + *addr = pcb->remote_ip; + } + + if (port) { + *port = pcb->remote_port; + } + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + + return ERR_VAL; +} + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ +/* Free all ooseq pbufs (and possibly reset SACK state) */ +void tcp_free_ooseq(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + if (pcb->ooseq) { + tcp_segs_free(pcb->ooseq); + pcb->ooseq = NULL; +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + memset(pcb->rcv_sacks, 0, sizeof(pcb->rcv_sacks)); +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + } +} +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + +#if TCP_DEBUG || TCP_INPUT_DEBUG || TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG +/** + * Print a tcp header for debugging purposes. + * + * @param tcphdr pointer to a struct tcp_hdr + */ +void tcp_debug_print(struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP header:\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " | %5" U16_F " | (src port, dest port)\n", + lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->src), lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->dest))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| %010" U32_F " | (seq no)\n", + lwip_ntohl(tcphdr->seqno))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| %010" U32_F " | (ack no)\n", + lwip_ntohl(tcphdr->ackno))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| %2" U16_F " | |%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "%" U16_F "| %5" U16_F " | (hdrlen, flags (", + TCPH_HDRLEN(tcphdr), + (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 5 & 1), + (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 4 & 1), + (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 3 & 1), + (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 2 & 1), + (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) >> 1 & 1), + (u16_t)(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) & 1), + lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->wnd))); + tcp_debug_print_flags(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("), win)\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("| 0x%04" X16_F " | %5" U16_F " | (chksum, urgp)\n", + lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->chksum), lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->urgp))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); +} + +/** + * Print a tcp state for debugging purposes. + * + * @param s enum tcp_state to print + */ +void tcp_debug_print_state(enum tcp_state s) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("State: %s\n", tcp_state_str[s])); +} + +/** + * Print tcp flags for debugging purposes. + * + * @param flags tcp flags, all active flags are printed + */ +void tcp_debug_print_flags(u8_t flags) +{ + if (flags & TCP_FIN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("FIN ")); + } + + if (flags & TCP_SYN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("SYN ")); + } + + if (flags & TCP_RST) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("RST ")); + } + + if (flags & TCP_PSH) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("PSH ")); + } + + if (flags & TCP_ACK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("ACK ")); + } + + if (flags & TCP_URG) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("URG ")); + } + + if (flags & TCP_ECE) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("ECE ")); + } + + if (flags & TCP_CWR) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("CWR ")); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("\n")); +} + +/** + * Print all tcp_pcbs in every list for debugging purposes. + */ +void tcp_debug_print_pcbs(void) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcbl; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Active PCB states:\n")); + + for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Local port %" U16_F ", foreign port %" U16_F " snd_nxt %" U32_F " rcv_nxt %" U32_F " ", + pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port, + pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt)); + tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Listen PCB states:\n")); + + for (pcbl = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; pcbl != NULL; pcbl = pcbl->next) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Local port %" U16_F " ", pcbl->local_port)); + tcp_debug_print_state(pcbl->state); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TIME-WAIT PCB states:\n")); + + for (pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("Local port %" U16_F ", foreign port %" U16_F " snd_nxt %" U32_F " rcv_nxt %" U32_F " ", + pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port, + pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt)); + tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); + } +} + +/** + * Check state consistency of the tcp_pcb lists. + */ +s16_t tcp_pcbs_sane(void) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + + for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcbs_sane: active pcb->state != CLOSED", pcb->state != CLOSED); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcbs_sane: active pcb->state != LISTEN", pcb->state != LISTEN); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcbs_sane: active pcb->state != TIME-WAIT", pcb->state != TIME_WAIT); + } + + for (pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pcbs_sane: tw pcb->state == TIME-WAIT", pcb->state == TIME_WAIT); + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* TCP_DEBUG */ + +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS +/** + * @defgroup tcp_raw_extargs ext arguments + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Additional data storage per tcp pcb\n + * @see @ref tcp_raw + * + * When LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS is > 0, every tcp pcb (including listen pcb) + * includes a number of additional argument entries in an array. + * + * To support memory management, in addition to a 'void *', callbacks can be + * provided to manage transition from listening pcbs to connections and to + * deallocate memory when a pcb is deallocated (see struct @ref tcp_ext_arg_callbacks). + * + * After allocating this index, use @ref tcp_ext_arg_set and @ref tcp_ext_arg_get + * to store and load arguments from this index for a given pcb. + */ + +static u8_t tcp_ext_arg_id; + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw_extargs + * Allocate an index to store data in ext_args member of struct tcp_pcb. + * Returned value is an index in mentioned array. + * The index is *global* over all pcbs! + * + * When @ref LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS is > 0, every tcp pcb (including listen pcb) + * includes a number of additional argument entries in an array. + * + * To support memory management, in addition to a 'void *', callbacks can be + * provided to manage transition from listening pcbs to connections and to + * deallocate memory when a pcb is deallocated (see struct @ref tcp_ext_arg_callbacks). + * + * After allocating this index, use @ref tcp_ext_arg_set and @ref tcp_ext_arg_get + * to store and load arguments from this index for a given pcb. + * + * @return a unique index into struct tcp_pcb.ext_args + */ +u8_t tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id(void) +{ + u8_t result = tcp_ext_arg_id; + tcp_ext_arg_id++; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS >= 255 +#error LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS +#endif + LWIP_ASSERT("Increase LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS in lwipopts.h", result < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS); + return result; +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw_extargs + * Set callbacks for a given index of ext_args on the specified pcb. + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb for which to set the callback + * @param id ext_args index to set (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) + * @param callbacks callback table (const since it is referenced, not copied!) + */ +void tcp_ext_arg_set_callbacks(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id, const struct tcp_ext_arg_callbacks *const callbacks) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS", id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS); + LWIP_ASSERT("callbacks != NULL", callbacks != NULL); + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + pcb->ext_args[id].callbacks = callbacks; +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw_extargs + * Set data for a given index of ext_args on the specified pcb. + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb for which to set the data + * @param id ext_args index to set (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) + * @param arg data pointer to set + */ +void tcp_ext_arg_set(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id, void *arg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS", id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS); + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + pcb->ext_args[id].data = arg; +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw_extargs + * Set data for a given index of ext_args on the specified pcb. + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb for which to set the data + * @param id ext_args index to set (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) + * @return data pointer at the given index + */ +void *tcp_ext_arg_get(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS", id < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS); + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + return pcb->ext_args[id].data; +} + +/** This function calls the "destroy" callback for all ext_args once a pcb is + * freed. + */ +static void tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_destroyed(struct tcp_pcb_ext_args *ext_args) +{ + int i; + LWIP_ASSERT("ext_args != NULL", ext_args != NULL); + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS; i++) { + if (ext_args[i].callbacks != NULL) { + if (ext_args[i].callbacks->destroy != NULL) { + ext_args[i].callbacks->destroy((u8_t)i, ext_args[i].data); + } + } + } +} + +/** This function calls the "passive_open" callback for all ext_args if a connection + * is in the process of being accepted. This is called just after the SYN is + * received and before a SYN/ACK is sent, to allow to modify the very first + * segment sent even on passive open. Naturally, the "accepted" callback of the + * pcb has not been called yet! + */ +err_t tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_passive_open(struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb, struct tcp_pcb *cpcb) +{ + int i; + LWIP_ASSERT("lpcb != NULL", lpcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("cpcb != NULL", cpcb != NULL); + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS; i++) { + if (lpcb->ext_args[i].callbacks != NULL) { + if (lpcb->ext_args[i].callbacks->passive_open != NULL) { + err_t err = lpcb->ext_args[i].callbacks->passive_open((u8_t)i, lpcb, cpcb); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + } + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/tcp_in.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/tcp_in.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/tcp_in.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/tcp_in.c index 42883e5d..70ed7a98 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/tcp_in.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/tcp_in.c @@ -1,2373 +1,2373 @@ -/** - * @file - * Transmission Control Protocol, incoming traffic - * - * The input processing functions of the TCP layer. - * - * These functions are generally called in the order (ip_input() ->) - * tcp_input() -> * tcp_process() -> tcp_receive() (-> application). - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#if LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS */ - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -/** Initial CWND calculation as defined RFC 2581 */ -#define LWIP_TCP_CALC_INITIAL_CWND(mss) ((tcpwnd_size_t)LWIP_MIN((4U * (mss)), LWIP_MAX((2U * (mss)), 4380U))) - -/* These variables are global to all functions involved in the input - processing of TCP segments. They are set by the tcp_input() - function. */ -static struct tcp_seg inseg; -static struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; -static u16_t tcphdr_optlen; -static u16_t tcphdr_opt1len; -static u8_t *tcphdr_opt2; -static u16_t tcp_optidx; -static u32_t seqno, ackno; -static tcpwnd_size_t recv_acked; -static u16_t tcplen; -static u8_t flags; - -static u8_t recv_flags; -static struct pbuf *recv_data; - -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_input_pcb; - -/* Forward declarations. */ -static err_t tcp_process(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -static void tcp_receive(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -static void tcp_parseopt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); - -static void tcp_listen_input(struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcb); -static void tcp_timewait_input(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); - -static int tcp_input_delayed_close(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT -static void tcp_add_sack(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t left, u32_t right); -static void tcp_remove_sacks_lt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seq); -#if defined(TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT) || defined(TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT) -static void tcp_remove_sacks_gt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seq); -#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT || TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT */ -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - -/** - * The initial input processing of TCP. It verifies the TCP header, demultiplexes - * the segment between the PCBs and passes it on to tcp_process(), which implements - * the TCP finite state machine. This function is called by the IP layer (in - * ip_input()). - * - * @param p received TCP segment to process (p->payload pointing to the TCP header) - * @param inp network interface on which this segment was received - */ -void tcp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *prev; - struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb; -#if SO_REUSE - struct tcp_pcb *lpcb_prev = NULL; - struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb_any = NULL; -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - u8_t hdrlen_bytes; - err_t err; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); - - PERF_START; - - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.recv); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpinsegs); - - tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; - -#if TCP_INPUT_DEBUG - tcp_debug_print(tcphdr); -#endif - - /* Check that TCP header fits in payload */ - if (p->len < TCP_HLEN) { - /* drop short packets */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: short packet (%" U16_F " bytes) discarded\n", p->tot_len)); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.lenerr); - goto dropped; - } - - /* Don't even process incoming broadcasts/multicasts. */ - if (ip_addr_isbroadcast(ip_current_dest_addr(), ip_current_netif()) || - ip_addr_ismulticast(ip_current_dest_addr())) { - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.proterr); - goto dropped; - } - -#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP) - { - /* Verify TCP checksum. */ - u16_t chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(p, IP_PROTO_TCP, p->tot_len, - ip_current_src_addr(), ip_current_dest_addr()); - - if (chksum != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: packet discarded due to failing checksum 0x%04" X16_F "\n", - chksum)); - tcp_debug_print(tcphdr); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.chkerr); - goto dropped; - } - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP */ - - /* sanity-check header length */ - hdrlen_bytes = TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES(tcphdr); - - if ((hdrlen_bytes < TCP_HLEN) || (hdrlen_bytes > p->tot_len)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: invalid header length (%" U16_F ")\n", (u16_t)hdrlen_bytes)); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.lenerr); - goto dropped; - } - - /* Move the payload pointer in the pbuf so that it points to the - TCP data instead of the TCP header. */ - tcphdr_optlen = (u16_t)(hdrlen_bytes - TCP_HLEN); - tcphdr_opt2 = NULL; - - if (p->len >= hdrlen_bytes) { - /* all options are in the first pbuf */ - tcphdr_opt1len = tcphdr_optlen; - pbuf_remove_header(p, hdrlen_bytes); /* cannot fail */ - } else { - u16_t opt2len; - /* TCP header fits into first pbuf, options don't - data is in the next pbuf */ - /* there must be a next pbuf, due to hdrlen_bytes sanity check above */ - LWIP_ASSERT("p->next != NULL", p->next != NULL); - - /* advance over the TCP header (cannot fail) */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, TCP_HLEN); - - /* determine how long the first and second parts of the options are */ - tcphdr_opt1len = p->len; - opt2len = (u16_t)(tcphdr_optlen - tcphdr_opt1len); - - /* options continue in the next pbuf: set p to zero length and hide the - options in the next pbuf (adjusting p->tot_len) */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, tcphdr_opt1len); - - /* check that the options fit in the second pbuf */ - if (opt2len > p->next->len) { - /* drop short packets */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: options overflow second pbuf (%" U16_F " bytes)\n", p->next->len)); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.lenerr); - goto dropped; - } - - /* remember the pointer to the second part of the options */ - tcphdr_opt2 = (u8_t *)p->next->payload; - - /* advance p->next to point after the options, and manually - adjust p->tot_len to keep it consistent with the changed p->next */ - pbuf_remove_header(p->next, opt2len); - p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - opt2len); - - LWIP_ASSERT("p->len == 0", p->len == 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len == p->next->tot_len", p->tot_len == p->next->tot_len); - } - - /* Convert fields in TCP header to host byte order. */ - tcphdr->src = lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->src); - tcphdr->dest = lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->dest); - seqno = tcphdr->seqno = lwip_ntohl(tcphdr->seqno); - ackno = tcphdr->ackno = lwip_ntohl(tcphdr->ackno); - tcphdr->wnd = lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->wnd); - - flags = TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr); - tcplen = p->tot_len; - - if (flags & (TCP_FIN | TCP_SYN)) { - tcplen++; - - if (tcplen < p->tot_len) { - /* u16_t overflow, cannot handle this */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: length u16_t overflow, cannot handle this\n")); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.lenerr); - goto dropped; - } - } - - /* Demultiplex an incoming segment. First, we check if it is destined - for an active connection. */ - prev = NULL; - - for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: active pcb->state != CLOSED", pcb->state != CLOSED); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: active pcb->state != TIME-WAIT", pcb->state != TIME_WAIT); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: active pcb->state != LISTEN", pcb->state != LISTEN); - - /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ - if ((pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && - (pcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { - prev = pcb; - continue; - } - - if (pcb->remote_port == tcphdr->src && - pcb->local_port == tcphdr->dest && - ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->remote_ip, ip_current_src_addr()) && - ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { - /* Move this PCB to the front of the list so that subsequent - lookups will be faster (we exploit locality in TCP segment - arrivals). */ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: pcb->next != pcb (before cache)", pcb->next != pcb); - - if (prev != NULL) { - prev->next = pcb->next; - pcb->next = tcp_active_pcbs; - tcp_active_pcbs = pcb; - } else { - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.cachehit); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: pcb->next != pcb (after cache)", pcb->next != pcb); - break; - } - - prev = pcb; - } - - if (pcb == NULL) { - /* If it did not go to an active connection, we check the connections - in the TIME-WAIT state. */ - for (pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: TIME-WAIT pcb->state == TIME-WAIT", pcb->state == TIME_WAIT); - - /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ - if ((pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && - (pcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { - continue; - } - - if (pcb->remote_port == tcphdr->src && - pcb->local_port == tcphdr->dest && - ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->remote_ip, ip_current_src_addr()) && - ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { - /* We don't really care enough to move this PCB to the front - of the list since we are not very likely to receive that - many segments for connections in TIME-WAIT. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: packed for TIME_WAITing connection.\n")); -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB - - if (LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB(pcb, tcphdr, tcphdr_optlen, tcphdr_opt1len, - tcphdr_opt2, p) == ERR_OK) -#endif - { - tcp_timewait_input(pcb); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - } - - /* Finally, if we still did not get a match, we check all PCBs that - are LISTENing for incoming connections. */ - prev = NULL; - - for (lpcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; lpcb != NULL; lpcb = lpcb->next) { - /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ - if ((lpcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && - (lpcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { - prev = (struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb; - continue; - } - - if (lpcb->local_port == tcphdr->dest) { - if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(lpcb->local_ip)) { - /* found an ANY TYPE (IPv4/IPv6) match */ -#if SO_REUSE - lpcb_any = lpcb; - lpcb_prev = prev; -#else /* SO_REUSE */ - break; -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - } else if (IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(lpcb, ip_current_dest_addr())) { - if (ip_addr_cmp(&lpcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { - /* found an exact match */ - break; - } else if (ip_addr_isany(&lpcb->local_ip)) { - /* found an ANY-match */ -#if SO_REUSE - lpcb_any = lpcb; - lpcb_prev = prev; -#else /* SO_REUSE */ - break; -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - } - } - } - - prev = (struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb; - } - -#if SO_REUSE - - /* first try specific local IP */ - if (lpcb == NULL) { - /* only pass to ANY if no specific local IP has been found */ - lpcb = lpcb_any; - prev = lpcb_prev; - } - -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - - if (lpcb != NULL) { - /* Move this PCB to the front of the list so that subsequent - lookups will be faster (we exploit locality in TCP segment - arrivals). */ - if (prev != NULL) { - ((struct tcp_pcb_listen *)prev)->next = lpcb->next; - /* our successor is the remainder of the listening list */ - lpcb->next = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; - /* put this listening pcb at the head of the listening list */ - tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs = lpcb; - } else { - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.cachehit); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: packed for LISTENing connection.\n")); -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB - - if (LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB((struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb, tcphdr, tcphdr_optlen, - tcphdr_opt1len, tcphdr_opt2, p) == ERR_OK) -#endif - { - tcp_listen_input(lpcb); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - } - -#if TCP_INPUT_DEBUG - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- tcp_input: flags ")); - tcp_debug_print_flags(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\n")); -#endif /* TCP_INPUT_DEBUG */ - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB - - if ((pcb != NULL) && LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB(pcb, tcphdr, tcphdr_optlen, - tcphdr_opt1len, tcphdr_opt2, p) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - -#endif - - if (pcb != NULL) { - /* The incoming segment belongs to a connection. */ -#if TCP_INPUT_DEBUG - tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); -#endif /* TCP_INPUT_DEBUG */ - - /* Set up a tcp_seg structure. */ - inseg.next = NULL; - inseg.len = p->tot_len; - inseg.p = p; - inseg.tcphdr = tcphdr; - - recv_data = NULL; - recv_flags = 0; - recv_acked = 0; - - if (flags & TCP_PSH) { - p->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_PUSH; - } - - /* If there is data which was previously "refused" by upper layer */ - if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { - if ((tcp_process_refused_data(pcb) == ERR_ABRT) || - ((pcb->refused_data != NULL) && (tcplen > 0))) { - /* pcb has been aborted or refused data is still refused and the new - segment contains data */ - if (pcb->rcv_ann_wnd == 0) { - /* this is a zero-window probe, we respond to it with current RCV.NXT - and drop the data segment */ - tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); - } - - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpinerrs); - goto aborted; - } - } - - tcp_input_pcb = pcb; - err = tcp_process(pcb); - - /* A return value of ERR_ABRT means that tcp_abort() was called - and that the pcb has been freed. If so, we don't do anything. */ - if (err != ERR_ABRT) { - if (recv_flags & TF_RESET) { - /* TF_RESET means that the connection was reset by the other - end. We then call the error callback to inform the - application that the connection is dead before we - deallocate the PCB. */ - TCP_EVENT_ERR(pcb->state, pcb->errf, pcb->callback_arg, ERR_RST); - tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_active_pcbs, pcb); - tcp_free(pcb); - } else { - err = ERR_OK; - - /* If the application has registered a "sent" function to be - called when new send buffer space is available, we call it - now. */ - if (recv_acked > 0) { - u16_t acked16; -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE - /* recv_acked is u32_t but the sent callback only takes a u16_t, - so we might have to call it multiple times. */ - u32_t acked = recv_acked; - - while (acked > 0) { - acked16 = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(acked, 0xffffu); - acked -= acked16; -#else - { - acked16 = recv_acked; -#endif - TCP_EVENT_SENT(pcb, (u16_t)acked16, err); - - if (err == ERR_ABRT) { - goto aborted; - } - } - recv_acked = 0; - } - - if (tcp_input_delayed_close(pcb)) { - goto aborted; - } - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - - while (recv_data != NULL) { - struct pbuf *rest = NULL; - pbuf_split_64k(recv_data, &rest); -#else /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - - if (recv_data != NULL) { -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->refused_data == NULL", pcb->refused_data == NULL); - - if (pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED) { - /* received data although already closed -> abort (send RST) to - notify the remote host that not all data has been processed */ - pbuf_free(recv_data); -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - - if (rest != NULL) { - pbuf_free(rest); - } - -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - tcp_abort(pcb); - goto aborted; - } - - /* Notify application that data has been received. */ - TCP_EVENT_RECV(pcb, recv_data, ERR_OK, err); - - if (err == ERR_ABRT) { -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - - if (rest != NULL) { - pbuf_free(rest); - } - -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - goto aborted; - } - - /* If the upper layer can't receive this data, store it */ - if (err != ERR_OK) { -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - - if (rest != NULL) { - pbuf_cat(recv_data, rest); - } - -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - pcb->refused_data = recv_data; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: keep incoming packet, because pcb is \"full\"\n")); -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE - break; - } else { - /* Upper layer received the data, go on with the rest if > 64K */ - recv_data = rest; -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - } - } - - /* If a FIN segment was received, we call the callback - function with a NULL buffer to indicate EOF. */ - if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) { - if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { - /* Delay this if we have refused data. */ - pcb->refused_data->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN; - } else { - /* correct rcv_wnd as the application won't call tcp_recved() - for the FIN's seqno */ - if (pcb->rcv_wnd != TCP_WND_MAX(pcb)) { - pcb->rcv_wnd++; - } - - TCP_EVENT_CLOSED(pcb, err); - - if (err == ERR_ABRT) { - goto aborted; - } - } - } - - tcp_input_pcb = NULL; - - if (tcp_input_delayed_close(pcb)) { - goto aborted; - } - - /* Try to send something out. */ - tcp_output(pcb); -#if TCP_INPUT_DEBUG -#if TCP_DEBUG - tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); -#endif /* TCP_DEBUG */ -#endif /* TCP_INPUT_DEBUG */ - } - } - - /* Jump target if pcb has been aborted in a callback (by calling tcp_abort()). - Below this line, 'pcb' may not be dereferenced! */ - aborted: - tcp_input_pcb = NULL; - recv_data = NULL; - - /* give up our reference to inseg.p */ - if (inseg.p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(inseg.p); - inseg.p = NULL; - } - } else { - /* If no matching PCB was found, send a TCP RST (reset) to the - sender. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RST_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: no PCB match found, resetting.\n")); - - if (!(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) & TCP_RST)) { - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.proterr); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.drop); - tcp_rst(NULL, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), - ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: tcp_pcbs_sane()", tcp_pcbs_sane()); - PERF_STOP("tcp_input"); - return; -dropped: - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpinerrs); - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/** Called from tcp_input to check for TF_CLOSED flag. This results in closing - * and deallocating a pcb at the correct place to ensure noone references it - * any more. - * @returns 1 if the pcb has been closed and deallocated, 0 otherwise - */ -static int tcp_input_delayed_close(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input_delayed_close: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - if (recv_flags & TF_CLOSED) { - /* The connection has been closed and we will deallocate the - PCB. */ - if (!(pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED)) { - /* Connection closed although the application has only shut down the - tx side: call the PCB's err callback and indicate the closure to - ensure the application doesn't continue using the PCB. */ - TCP_EVENT_ERR(pcb->state, pcb->errf, pcb->callback_arg, ERR_CLSD); - } - - tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_active_pcbs, pcb); - tcp_free(pcb); - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Called by tcp_input() when a segment arrives for a listening - * connection (from tcp_input()). - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb_listen for which a segment arrived - * - * @note the segment which arrived is saved in global variables, therefore only the pcb - * involved is passed as a parameter to this function - */ -static void tcp_listen_input(struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcb) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *npcb; - u32_t iss; - err_t rc; - - if (flags & TCP_RST) { - /* An incoming RST should be ignored. Return. */ - return; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_listen_input: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - /* In the LISTEN state, we check for incoming SYN segments, - creates a new PCB, and responds with a SYN|ACK. */ - if (flags & TCP_ACK) { - /* For incoming segments with the ACK flag set, respond with a - RST. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RST_DEBUG, ("tcp_listen_input: ACK in LISTEN, sending reset\n")); - tcp_rst((const struct tcp_pcb *)pcb, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), - ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); - } else if (flags & TCP_SYN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection request %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", tcphdr->src, tcphdr->dest)); -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - - if (pcb->accepts_pending >= pcb->backlog) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_listen_input: listen backlog exceeded for port %" U16_F "\n", tcphdr->dest)); - return; - } - -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - npcb = tcp_alloc(pcb->prio); - - /* If a new PCB could not be created (probably due to lack of memory), - we don't do anything, but rely on the sender will retransmit the - SYN at a time when we have more memory available. */ - if (npcb == NULL) { - err_t err; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_listen_input: could not allocate PCB\n")); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); - TCP_EVENT_ACCEPT(pcb, NULL, pcb->callback_arg, ERR_MEM, err); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* err not useful here */ - return; - } - -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - pcb->accepts_pending++; - tcp_set_flags(npcb, TF_BACKLOGPEND); -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - /* Set up the new PCB. */ - ip_addr_copy(npcb->local_ip, *ip_current_dest_addr()); - ip_addr_copy(npcb->remote_ip, *ip_current_src_addr()); - npcb->local_port = pcb->local_port; - npcb->remote_port = tcphdr->src; - npcb->state = SYN_RCVD; - npcb->rcv_nxt = seqno + 1; - npcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = npcb->rcv_nxt; - iss = tcp_next_iss(npcb); - npcb->snd_wl2 = iss; - npcb->snd_nxt = iss; - npcb->lastack = iss; - npcb->snd_lbb = iss; - npcb->snd_wl1 = seqno - 1; /* initialise to seqno-1 to force window update */ - npcb->callback_arg = pcb->callback_arg; -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - npcb->listener = pcb; -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - /* inherit socket options */ - npcb->so_options = pcb->so_options & SOF_INHERITED; - npcb->netif_idx = pcb->netif_idx; - /* Register the new PCB so that we can begin receiving segments - for it. */ - TCP_REG_ACTIVE(npcb); - - /* Parse any options in the SYN. */ - tcp_parseopt(npcb); - npcb->snd_wnd = tcphdr->wnd; - npcb->snd_wnd_max = npcb->snd_wnd; - -#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS - npcb->mss = tcp_eff_send_mss(npcb->mss, &npcb->local_ip, &npcb->remote_ip); -#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ - - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcppassiveopens); - -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS - - if (tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_passive_open(pcb, npcb) != ERR_OK) { - tcp_abandon(npcb, 0); - return; - } - -#endif - - /* Send a SYN|ACK together with the MSS option. */ - rc = tcp_enqueue_flags(npcb, TCP_SYN | TCP_ACK); - - if (rc != ERR_OK) { - tcp_abandon(npcb, 0); - return; - } - - tcp_output(npcb); - } - - return; -} - -/** - * Called by tcp_input() when a segment arrives for a connection in - * TIME_WAIT. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which a segment arrived - * - * @note the segment which arrived is saved in global variables, therefore only the pcb - * involved is passed as a parameter to this function - */ -static void tcp_timewait_input(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - /* RFC 1337: in TIME_WAIT, ignore RST and ACK FINs + any 'acceptable' segments */ - /* RFC 793 3.9 Event Processing - Segment Arrives: - * - first check sequence number - we skip that one in TIME_WAIT (always - * acceptable since we only send ACKs) - * - second check the RST bit (... return) */ - if (flags & TCP_RST) { - return; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_timewait_input: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - /* - fourth, check the SYN bit, */ - if (flags & TCP_SYN) { - /* If an incoming segment is not acceptable, an acknowledgment - should be sent in reply */ - if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)) { - /* If the SYN is in the window it is an error, send a reset */ - tcp_rst(pcb, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), - ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); - return; - } - } else if (flags & TCP_FIN) { - /* - eighth, check the FIN bit: Remain in the TIME-WAIT state. - Restart the 2 MSL time-wait timeout.*/ - pcb->tmr = tcp_ticks; - } - - if ((tcplen > 0)) { - /* Acknowledge data, FIN or out-of-window SYN */ - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - tcp_output(pcb); - } - - return; -} - -/** - * Implements the TCP state machine. Called by tcp_input. In some - * states tcp_receive() is called to receive data. The tcp_seg - * argument will be freed by the caller (tcp_input()) unless the - * recv_data pointer in the pcb is set. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which a segment arrived - * - * @note the segment which arrived is saved in global variables, therefore only the pcb - * involved is passed as a parameter to this function - */ -static err_t tcp_process(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct tcp_seg *rseg; - u8_t acceptable = 0; - err_t err; - - err = ERR_OK; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_process: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - /* Process incoming RST segments. */ - if (flags & TCP_RST) { - /* First, determine if the reset is acceptable. */ - if (pcb->state == SYN_SENT) { - /* "In the SYN-SENT state (a RST received in response to an initial SYN), - the RST is acceptable if the ACK field acknowledges the SYN." */ - if (ackno == pcb->snd_nxt) { - acceptable = 1; - } - } else { - /* "In all states except SYN-SENT, all reset (RST) segments are validated - by checking their SEQ-fields." */ - if (seqno == pcb->rcv_nxt) { - acceptable = 1; - } else if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt, - pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)) { - /* If the sequence number is inside the window, we send a challenge ACK - and wait for a re-send with matching sequence number. - This follows RFC 5961 section 3.2 and addresses CVE-2004-0230 - (RST spoofing attack), which is present in RFC 793 RST handling. */ - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - } - } - - if (acceptable) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_process: Connection RESET\n")); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: pcb->state != CLOSED", pcb->state != CLOSED); - recv_flags |= TF_RESET; - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY); - return ERR_RST; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_process: unacceptable reset seqno %" U32_F " rcv_nxt %" U32_F "\n", - seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_process: unacceptable reset seqno %" U32_F " rcv_nxt %" U32_F "\n", - seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt)); - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - if ((flags & TCP_SYN) && (pcb->state != SYN_SENT && pcb->state != SYN_RCVD)) { - /* Cope with new connection attempt after remote end crashed */ - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - return ERR_OK; - } - - if ((pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED) == 0) { - /* Update the PCB (in)activity timer unless rx is closed (see tcp_shutdown) */ - pcb->tmr = tcp_ticks; - } - - pcb->keep_cnt_sent = 0; - pcb->persist_probe = 0; - - tcp_parseopt(pcb); - - /* Do different things depending on the TCP state. */ - switch (pcb->state) { - case SYN_SENT: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("SYN-SENT: ackno %" U32_F " pcb->snd_nxt %" U32_F " unacked %" U32_F "\n", ackno, - pcb->snd_nxt, lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno))); - - /* received SYN ACK with expected sequence number? */ - if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && (flags & TCP_SYN) && (ackno == pcb->lastack + 1)) { - pcb->rcv_nxt = seqno + 1; - pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt; - pcb->lastack = ackno; - pcb->snd_wnd = tcphdr->wnd; - pcb->snd_wnd_max = pcb->snd_wnd; - pcb->snd_wl1 = seqno - 1; /* initialise to seqno - 1 to force window update */ - pcb->state = ESTABLISHED; - -#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS - pcb->mss = tcp_eff_send_mss(pcb->mss, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); -#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ - - pcb->cwnd = LWIP_TCP_CALC_INITIAL_CWND(pcb->mss); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_process (SENT): cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F - " ssthresh %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", - pcb->cwnd, pcb->ssthresh)); - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->snd_queuelen > 0", (pcb->snd_queuelen > 0)); - --pcb->snd_queuelen; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_process: SYN-SENT --queuelen %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", (tcpwnd_size_t)pcb->snd_queuelen)); - rseg = pcb->unacked; - - if (rseg == NULL) { - /* might happen if tcp_output fails in tcp_rexmit_rto() - in which case the segment is on the unsent list */ - rseg = pcb->unsent; - LWIP_ASSERT("no segment to free", rseg != NULL); - pcb->unsent = rseg->next; - } else { - pcb->unacked = rseg->next; - } - - tcp_seg_free(rseg); - - /* If there's nothing left to acknowledge, stop the retransmit - timer, otherwise reset it to start again */ - if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { - pcb->rtime = -1; - } else { - pcb->rtime = 0; - pcb->nrtx = 0; - } - - /* Call the user specified function to call when successfully - * connected. */ - TCP_EVENT_CONNECTED(pcb, ERR_OK, err); - - if (err == ERR_ABRT) { - return ERR_ABRT; - } - - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - } - /* received ACK? possibly a half-open connection */ - else if (flags & TCP_ACK) { - /* send a RST to bring the other side in a non-synchronized state. */ - tcp_rst(pcb, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), - ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); - - /* Resend SYN immediately (don't wait for rto timeout) to establish - connection faster, but do not send more SYNs than we otherwise would - have, or we might get caught in a loop on loopback interfaces. */ - if (pcb->nrtx < TCP_SYNMAXRTX) { - pcb->rtime = 0; - tcp_rexmit_rto(pcb); - } - } - - break; - - case SYN_RCVD: - if (flags & TCP_ACK) { - /* expected ACK number? */ - if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(ackno, pcb->lastack + 1, pcb->snd_nxt)) { - pcb->state = ESTABLISHED; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection established %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - - if (pcb->listener == NULL) { - /* listen pcb might be closed by now */ - err = ERR_VAL; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - { -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->listener->accept != NULL", pcb->listener->accept != NULL); -#endif - tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb); - /* Call the accept function. */ - TCP_EVENT_ACCEPT(pcb->listener, pcb, pcb->callback_arg, ERR_OK, err); - } - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* If the accept function returns with an error, we abort - * the connection. */ - /* Already aborted? */ - if (err != ERR_ABRT) { - tcp_abort(pcb); - } - - return ERR_ABRT; - } - - /* If there was any data contained within this ACK, - * we'd better pass it on to the application as well. */ - tcp_receive(pcb); - - /* Prevent ACK for SYN to generate a sent event */ - if (recv_acked != 0) { - recv_acked--; - } - - pcb->cwnd = LWIP_TCP_CALC_INITIAL_CWND(pcb->mss); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_process (SYN_RCVD): cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F - " ssthresh %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", - pcb->cwnd, pcb->ssthresh)); - - if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) { - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - pcb->state = CLOSE_WAIT; - } - } else { - /* incorrect ACK number, send RST */ - tcp_rst(pcb, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), - ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); - } - } else if ((flags & TCP_SYN) && (seqno == pcb->rcv_nxt - 1)) { - /* Looks like another copy of the SYN - retransmit our SYN-ACK */ - tcp_rexmit(pcb); - } - - break; - - case CLOSE_WAIT: - - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case ESTABLISHED: - tcp_receive(pcb); - - if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) /* passive close */ - { - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - pcb->state = CLOSE_WAIT; - } - - break; - - case FIN_WAIT_1: - tcp_receive(pcb); - - if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) { - if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && (ackno == pcb->snd_nxt) && - pcb->unsent == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, - ("TCP connection closed: FIN_WAIT_1 %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); - TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(pcb); - pcb->state = TIME_WAIT; - TCP_REG(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); - } else { - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - pcb->state = CLOSING; - } - } else if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && (ackno == pcb->snd_nxt) && - pcb->unsent == NULL) { - pcb->state = FIN_WAIT_2; - } - - break; - - case FIN_WAIT_2: - tcp_receive(pcb); - - if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection closed: FIN_WAIT_2 %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); - TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(pcb); - pcb->state = TIME_WAIT; - TCP_REG(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); - } - - break; - - case CLOSING: - tcp_receive(pcb); - - if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && ackno == pcb->snd_nxt && pcb->unsent == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection closed: CLOSING %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); - tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); - TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(pcb); - pcb->state = TIME_WAIT; - TCP_REG(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); - } - - break; - - case LAST_ACK: - tcp_receive(pcb); - - if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && ackno == pcb->snd_nxt && pcb->unsent == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection closed: LAST_ACK %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); - /* bugfix #21699: don't set pcb->state to CLOSED here or we risk leaking segments */ - recv_flags |= TF_CLOSED; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ -/** - * Insert segment into the list (segments covered with new one will be deleted) - * - * Called from tcp_receive() - */ -static void tcp_oos_insert_segment(struct tcp_seg *cseg, struct tcp_seg *next) -{ - struct tcp_seg *old_seg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_oos_insert_segment: invalid cseg", cseg != NULL); - - if (TCPH_FLAGS(cseg->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { - /* received segment overlaps all following segments */ - tcp_segs_free(next); - next = NULL; - } else { - /* delete some following segments - oos queue may have segments with FIN flag */ - while (next && - TCP_SEQ_GEQ((seqno + cseg->len), - (next->tcphdr->seqno + next->len))) { - /* cseg with FIN already processed */ - if (TCPH_FLAGS(next->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { - TCPH_SET_FLAG(cseg->tcphdr, TCP_FIN); - } - - old_seg = next; - next = next->next; - tcp_seg_free(old_seg); - } - - if (next && - TCP_SEQ_GT(seqno + cseg->len, next->tcphdr->seqno)) { - /* We need to trim the incoming segment. */ - cseg->len = (u16_t)(next->tcphdr->seqno - seqno); - pbuf_realloc(cseg->p, cseg->len); - } - } - - cseg->next = next; -} -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - -/** Remove segments from a list if the incoming ACK acknowledges them */ -static struct tcp_seg *tcp_free_acked_segments(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct tcp_seg *seg_list, const char *dbg_list_name, - struct tcp_seg *dbg_other_seg_list) -{ - struct tcp_seg *next; - u16_t clen; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_list_name); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_other_seg_list); - - while (seg_list != NULL && - TCP_SEQ_LEQ(lwip_ntohl(seg_list->tcphdr->seqno) + - TCP_TCPLEN(seg_list), - ackno)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: removing %" U32_F ":%" U32_F " from pcb->%s\n", - lwip_ntohl(seg_list->tcphdr->seqno), - lwip_ntohl(seg_list->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg_list), - dbg_list_name)); - - next = seg_list; - seg_list = seg_list->next; - - clen = pbuf_clen(next->p); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: queuelen %" TCPWNDSIZE_F " ... ", - (tcpwnd_size_t)pcb->snd_queuelen)); - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->snd_queuelen >= pbuf_clen(next->p)", (pcb->snd_queuelen >= clen)); - - pcb->snd_queuelen = (u16_t)(pcb->snd_queuelen - clen); - recv_acked = (tcpwnd_size_t)(recv_acked + next->len); - tcp_seg_free(next); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("%" TCPWNDSIZE_F " (after freeing %s)\n", - (tcpwnd_size_t)pcb->snd_queuelen, - dbg_list_name)); - - if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: valid queue length", - seg_list != NULL || dbg_other_seg_list != NULL); - } - } - - return seg_list; -} - -/** - * Called by tcp_process. Checks if the given segment is an ACK for outstanding - * data, and if so frees the memory of the buffered data. Next, it places the - * segment on any of the receive queues (pcb->recved or pcb->ooseq). If the segment - * is buffered, the pbuf is referenced by pbuf_ref so that it will not be freed until - * it has been removed from the buffer. - * - * If the incoming segment constitutes an ACK for a segment that was used for RTT - * estimation, the RTT is estimated here as well. - * - * Called from tcp_process(). - */ -static void tcp_receive(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - s16_t m; - u32_t right_wnd_edge; - int found_dupack = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: wrong state", pcb->state >= ESTABLISHED); - - if (flags & TCP_ACK) { - right_wnd_edge = pcb->snd_wnd + pcb->snd_wl2; - - /* Update window. */ - if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->snd_wl1, seqno) || - (pcb->snd_wl1 == seqno && TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->snd_wl2, ackno)) || - (pcb->snd_wl2 == ackno && (u32_t)SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, tcphdr->wnd) > pcb->snd_wnd)) { - pcb->snd_wnd = SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, tcphdr->wnd); - - /* keep track of the biggest window announced by the remote host to calculate - the maximum segment size */ - if (pcb->snd_wnd_max < pcb->snd_wnd) { - pcb->snd_wnd_max = pcb->snd_wnd; - } - - pcb->snd_wl1 = seqno; - pcb->snd_wl2 = ackno; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_WND_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: window update %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", pcb->snd_wnd)); -#if TCP_WND_DEBUG - } else { - if (pcb->snd_wnd != (tcpwnd_size_t)SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, tcphdr->wnd)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_WND_DEBUG, - ("tcp_receive: no window update lastack %" U32_F " ackno %" U32_F " wl1 %" U32_F " seqno %" U32_F " wl2 %" U32_F "\n", - pcb->lastack, ackno, pcb->snd_wl1, seqno, pcb->snd_wl2)); - } - -#endif /* TCP_WND_DEBUG */ - } - - /* (From Stevens TCP/IP Illustrated Vol II, p970.) Its only a - * duplicate ack if: - * 1) It doesn't ACK new data - * 2) length of received packet is zero (i.e. no payload) - * 3) the advertised window hasn't changed - * 4) There is outstanding unacknowledged data (retransmission timer running) - * 5) The ACK is == biggest ACK sequence number so far seen (snd_una) - * - * If it passes all five, should process as a dupack: - * a) dupacks < 3: do nothing - * b) dupacks == 3: fast retransmit - * c) dupacks > 3: increase cwnd - * - * If it only passes 1-3, should reset dupack counter (and add to - * stats, which we don't do in lwIP) - * - * If it only passes 1, should reset dupack counter - * - */ - - /* Clause 1 */ - if (TCP_SEQ_LEQ(ackno, pcb->lastack)) { - /* Clause 2 */ - if (tcplen == 0) { - /* Clause 3 */ - if (pcb->snd_wl2 + pcb->snd_wnd == right_wnd_edge) { - /* Clause 4 */ - if (pcb->rtime >= 0) { - /* Clause 5 */ - if (pcb->lastack == ackno) { - found_dupack = 1; - - if ((u8_t)(pcb->dupacks + 1) > pcb->dupacks) { - ++pcb->dupacks; - } - - if (pcb->dupacks > 3) { - /* Inflate the congestion window */ - TCP_WND_INC(pcb->cwnd, pcb->mss); - } - - if (pcb->dupacks >= 3) { - /* Do fast retransmit (checked via TF_INFR, not via dupacks count) */ - tcp_rexmit_fast(pcb); - } - } - } - } - } - - /* If Clause (1) or more is true, but not a duplicate ack, reset - * count of consecutive duplicate acks */ - if (!found_dupack) { - pcb->dupacks = 0; - } - } else if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(ackno, pcb->lastack + 1, pcb->snd_nxt)) { - /* We come here when the ACK acknowledges new data. */ - tcpwnd_size_t acked; - - /* Reset the "IN Fast Retransmit" flag, since we are no longer - in fast retransmit. Also reset the congestion window to the - slow start threshold. */ - if (pcb->flags & TF_INFR) { - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_INFR); - pcb->cwnd = pcb->ssthresh; - pcb->bytes_acked = 0; - } - - /* Reset the number of retransmissions. */ - pcb->nrtx = 0; - - /* Reset the retransmission time-out. */ - pcb->rto = (s16_t)((pcb->sa >> 3) + pcb->sv); - - /* Record how much data this ACK acks */ - acked = (tcpwnd_size_t)(ackno - pcb->lastack); - - /* Reset the fast retransmit variables. */ - pcb->dupacks = 0; - pcb->lastack = ackno; - - /* Update the congestion control variables (cwnd and - ssthresh). */ - if (pcb->state >= ESTABLISHED) { - if (pcb->cwnd < pcb->ssthresh) { - tcpwnd_size_t increase; - /* limit to 1 SMSS segment during period following RTO */ - u8_t num_seg = (pcb->flags & TF_RTO) ? 1 : 2; - /* RFC 3465, section 2.2 Slow Start */ - increase = LWIP_MIN(acked, (tcpwnd_size_t)(num_seg * pcb->mss)); - TCP_WND_INC(pcb->cwnd, increase); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: slow start cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", pcb->cwnd)); - } else { - /* RFC 3465, section 2.1 Congestion Avoidance */ - TCP_WND_INC(pcb->bytes_acked, acked); - - if (pcb->bytes_acked >= pcb->cwnd) { - pcb->bytes_acked = (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->bytes_acked - pcb->cwnd); - TCP_WND_INC(pcb->cwnd, pcb->mss); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: congestion avoidance cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", pcb->cwnd)); - } - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: ACK for %" U32_F ", unacked->seqno %" U32_F ":%" U32_F "\n", - ackno, - pcb->unacked != NULL ? - lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno) : - 0, - pcb->unacked != NULL ? - lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(pcb->unacked) : - 0)); - - /* Remove segment from the unacknowledged list if the incoming - ACK acknowledges them. */ - pcb->unacked = tcp_free_acked_segments(pcb, pcb->unacked, "unacked", pcb->unsent); - /* We go through the ->unsent list to see if any of the segments - on the list are acknowledged by the ACK. This may seem - strange since an "unsent" segment shouldn't be acked. The - rationale is that lwIP puts all outstanding segments on the - ->unsent list after a retransmission, so these segments may - in fact have been sent once. */ - pcb->unsent = tcp_free_acked_segments(pcb, pcb->unsent, "unsent", pcb->unacked); - - /* If there's nothing left to acknowledge, stop the retransmit - timer, otherwise reset it to start again */ - if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { - pcb->rtime = -1; - } else { - pcb->rtime = 0; - } - - pcb->polltmr = 0; - -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - - if (pcb->unsent == NULL) { - pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; - } - -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS - - if (ip_current_is_v6()) { - /* Inform neighbor reachability of forward progress. */ - nd6_reachability_hint(ip6_current_src_addr()); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS*/ - - pcb->snd_buf = (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->snd_buf + recv_acked); - - /* check if this ACK ends our retransmission of in-flight data */ - if (pcb->flags & TF_RTO) { - /* RTO is done if - 1) both queues are empty or - 2) unacked is empty and unsent head contains data not part of RTO or - 3) unacked head contains data not part of RTO */ - if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { - if ((pcb->unsent == NULL) || - (TCP_SEQ_LEQ(pcb->rto_end, lwip_ntohl(pcb->unsent->tcphdr->seqno)))) { - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_RTO); - } - } else if (TCP_SEQ_LEQ(pcb->rto_end, lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno))) { - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_RTO); - } - } - - /* End of ACK for new data processing. */ - } else { - /* Out of sequence ACK, didn't really ack anything */ - tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: pcb->rttest %" U32_F " rtseq %" U32_F " ackno %" U32_F "\n", - pcb->rttest, pcb->rtseq, ackno)); - - /* RTT estimation calculations. This is done by checking if the - incoming segment acknowledges the segment we use to take a - round-trip time measurement. */ - if (pcb->rttest && TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->rtseq, ackno)) { - /* diff between this shouldn't exceed 32K since this are tcp timer ticks - and a round-trip shouldn't be that long... */ - m = (s16_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->rttest); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: experienced rtt %" U16_F " ticks (%" U16_F " msec).\n", - m, (u16_t)(m * TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL))); - - /* This is taken directly from VJs original code in his paper */ - m = (s16_t)(m - (pcb->sa >> 3)); - pcb->sa = (s16_t)(pcb->sa + m); - - if (m < 0) { - m = (s16_t)-m; - } - - m = (s16_t)(m - (pcb->sv >> 2)); - pcb->sv = (s16_t)(pcb->sv + m); - pcb->rto = (s16_t)((pcb->sa >> 3) + pcb->sv); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: RTO %" U16_F " (%" U16_F " milliseconds)\n", - pcb->rto, (u16_t)(pcb->rto * TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL))); - - pcb->rttest = 0; - } - } - - /* If the incoming segment contains data, we must process it - further unless the pcb already received a FIN. - (RFC 793, chapter 3.9, "SEGMENT ARRIVES" in states CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, - LAST-ACK and TIME-WAIT: "Ignore the segment text.") */ - if ((tcplen > 0) && (pcb->state < CLOSE_WAIT)) { - /* This code basically does three things: - - +) If the incoming segment contains data that is the next - in-sequence data, this data is passed to the application. This - might involve trimming the first edge of the data. The rcv_nxt - variable and the advertised window are adjusted. - - +) If the incoming segment has data that is above the next - sequence number expected (->rcv_nxt), the segment is placed on - the ->ooseq queue. This is done by finding the appropriate - place in the ->ooseq queue (which is ordered by sequence - number) and trim the segment in both ends if needed. An - immediate ACK is sent to indicate that we received an - out-of-sequence segment. - - +) Finally, we check if the first segment on the ->ooseq queue - now is in sequence (i.e., if rcv_nxt >= ooseq->seqno). If - rcv_nxt > ooseq->seqno, we must trim the first edge of the - segment on ->ooseq before we adjust rcv_nxt. The data in the - segments that are now on sequence are chained onto the - incoming segment so that we only need to call the application - once. - */ - - /* First, we check if we must trim the first edge. We have to do - this if the sequence number of the incoming segment is less - than rcv_nxt, and the sequence number plus the length of the - segment is larger than rcv_nxt. */ - /* if (TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt)) { - if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->rcv_nxt, seqno + tcplen)) {*/ - if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(pcb->rcv_nxt, seqno + 1, seqno + tcplen - 1)) { - /* Trimming the first edge is done by pushing the payload - pointer in the pbuf downwards. This is somewhat tricky since - we do not want to discard the full contents of the pbuf up to - the new starting point of the data since we have to keep the - TCP header which is present in the first pbuf in the chain. - - What is done is really quite a nasty hack: the first pbuf in - the pbuf chain is pointed to by inseg.p. Since we need to be - able to deallocate the whole pbuf, we cannot change this - inseg.p pointer to point to any of the later pbufs in the - chain. Instead, we point the ->payload pointer in the first - pbuf to data in one of the later pbufs. We also set the - inseg.data pointer to point to the right place. This way, the - ->p pointer will still point to the first pbuf, but the - ->p->payload pointer will point to data in another pbuf. - - After we are done with adjusting the pbuf pointers we must - adjust the ->data pointer in the seg and the segment - length.*/ - - struct pbuf *p = inseg.p; - u32_t off32 = pcb->rcv_nxt - seqno; - u16_t new_tot_len, off; - LWIP_ASSERT("inseg.p != NULL", inseg.p); - LWIP_ASSERT("insane offset!", (off32 < 0xffff)); - off = (u16_t)off32; - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf too short!", (((s32_t)inseg.p->tot_len) >= off)); - inseg.len -= off; - new_tot_len = (u16_t)(inseg.p->tot_len - off); - - while (p->len < off) { - off -= p->len; - /* all pbufs up to and including this one have len==0, so tot_len is equal */ - p->tot_len = new_tot_len; - p->len = 0; - p = p->next; - } - - /* cannot fail... */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, off); - inseg.tcphdr->seqno = seqno = pcb->rcv_nxt; - } else { - if (TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt)) { - /* the whole segment is < rcv_nxt */ - /* must be a duplicate of a packet that has already been correctly handled */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: duplicate seqno %" U32_F "\n", seqno)); - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - } - } - - /* The sequence number must be within the window (above rcv_nxt - and below rcv_nxt + rcv_wnd) in order to be further - processed. */ - if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt, - pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd - 1)) { - if (pcb->rcv_nxt == seqno) { - /* The incoming segment is the next in sequence. We check if - we have to trim the end of the segment and update rcv_nxt - and pass the data to the application. */ - tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(&inseg); - - if (tcplen > pcb->rcv_wnd) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, - ("tcp_receive: other end overran receive window" - "seqno %" U32_F " len %" U16_F " right edge %" U32_F "\n", - seqno, tcplen, pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)); - - if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { - /* Must remove the FIN from the header as we're trimming - * that byte of sequence-space from the packet */ - TCPH_FLAGS_SET(inseg.tcphdr, TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & ~(unsigned int)TCP_FIN); - } - - /* Adjust length of segment to fit in the window. */ - TCPWND_CHECK16(pcb->rcv_wnd); - inseg.len = (u16_t)pcb->rcv_wnd; - - if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_SYN) { - inseg.len -= 1; - } - - pbuf_realloc(inseg.p, inseg.len); - tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(&inseg); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: segment not trimmed correctly to rcv_wnd\n", - (seqno + tcplen) == (pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)); - } - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ - - /* Received in-sequence data, adjust ooseq data if: - - FIN has been received or - - inseq overlaps with ooseq */ - if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { - if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, - ("tcp_receive: received in-order FIN, binning ooseq queue\n")); - - /* Received in-order FIN means anything that was received - * out of order must now have been received in-order, so - * bin the ooseq queue */ - while (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { - struct tcp_seg *old_ooseq = pcb->ooseq; - pcb->ooseq = pcb->ooseq->next; - tcp_seg_free(old_ooseq); - } - } else { - struct tcp_seg *next = pcb->ooseq; - - /* Remove all segments on ooseq that are covered by inseg already. - * FIN is copied from ooseq to inseg if present. */ - while (next && - TCP_SEQ_GEQ(seqno + tcplen, - next->tcphdr->seqno + next->len)) { - struct tcp_seg *tmp; - - /* inseg cannot have FIN here (already processed above) */ - if ((TCPH_FLAGS(next->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) != 0 && - (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_SYN) == 0) { - TCPH_SET_FLAG(inseg.tcphdr, TCP_FIN); - tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(&inseg); - } - - tmp = next; - next = next->next; - tcp_seg_free(tmp); - } - - /* Now trim right side of inseg if it overlaps with the first - * segment on ooseq */ - if (next && - TCP_SEQ_GT(seqno + tcplen, - next->tcphdr->seqno)) { - /* inseg cannot have FIN here (already processed above) */ - inseg.len = (u16_t)(next->tcphdr->seqno - seqno); - - if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_SYN) { - inseg.len -= 1; - } - - pbuf_realloc(inseg.p, inseg.len); - tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(&inseg); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: segment not trimmed correctly to ooseq queue\n", - (seqno + tcplen) == next->tcphdr->seqno); - } - - pcb->ooseq = next; - } - } - -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - - pcb->rcv_nxt = seqno + tcplen; - - /* Update the receiver's (our) window. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: tcplen > rcv_wnd\n", pcb->rcv_wnd >= tcplen); - pcb->rcv_wnd -= tcplen; - - tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(pcb); - - /* If there is data in the segment, we make preparations to - pass this up to the application. The ->recv_data variable - is used for holding the pbuf that goes to the - application. The code for reassembling out-of-sequence data - chains its data on this pbuf as well. - - If the segment was a FIN, we set the TF_GOT_FIN flag that will - be used to indicate to the application that the remote side has - closed its end of the connection. */ - if (inseg.p->tot_len > 0) { - recv_data = inseg.p; - /* Since this pbuf now is the responsibility of the - application, we delete our reference to it so that we won't - (mistakingly) deallocate it. */ - inseg.p = NULL; - } - - if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: received FIN.\n")); - recv_flags |= TF_GOT_FIN; - } - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ - - /* We now check if we have segments on the ->ooseq queue that - are now in sequence. */ - while (pcb->ooseq != NULL && - pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno == pcb->rcv_nxt) { - struct tcp_seg *cseg = pcb->ooseq; - seqno = pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno; - - pcb->rcv_nxt += TCP_TCPLEN(cseg); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: ooseq tcplen > rcv_wnd\n", - pcb->rcv_wnd >= TCP_TCPLEN(cseg)); - pcb->rcv_wnd -= TCP_TCPLEN(cseg); - - tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(pcb); - - if (cseg->p->tot_len > 0) { - /* Chain this pbuf onto the pbuf that we will pass to - the application. */ - /* With window scaling, this can overflow recv_data->tot_len, but - that's not a problem since we explicitly fix that before passing - recv_data to the application. */ - if (recv_data) { - pbuf_cat(recv_data, cseg->p); - } else { - recv_data = cseg->p; - } - - cseg->p = NULL; - } - - if (TCPH_FLAGS(cseg->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: dequeued FIN.\n")); - recv_flags |= TF_GOT_FIN; - - if (pcb->state == ESTABLISHED) /* force passive close or we can move to active close */ - { - pcb->state = CLOSE_WAIT; - } - } - - pcb->ooseq = cseg->next; - tcp_seg_free(cseg); - } - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { - if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { - /* Some segments may have been removed from ooseq, let's remove all SACKs that - describe anything before the new beginning of that list. */ - tcp_remove_sacks_lt(pcb, pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno); - } else if (LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, 0)) { - /* ooseq has been cleared. Nothing to SACK */ - memset(pcb->rcv_sacks, 0, sizeof(pcb->rcv_sacks)); - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - - /* Acknowledge the segment(s). */ - tcp_ack(pcb); - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - if (LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, 0)) { - /* Normally the ACK for the data received could be piggy-backed on a data packet, - but lwIP currently does not support including SACKs in data packets. So we force - it to respond with an empty ACK packet (only if there is at least one SACK to be sent). - NOTE: tcp_send_empty_ack() on success clears the ACK flags (set by tcp_ack()) */ - tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS - - if (ip_current_is_v6()) { - /* Inform neighbor reachability of forward progress. */ - nd6_reachability_hint(ip6_current_src_addr()); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS*/ - - } else { - /* We get here if the incoming segment is out-of-sequence. */ - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ - /* We queue the segment on the ->ooseq queue. */ - if (pcb->ooseq == NULL) { - pcb->ooseq = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { - /* All the SACKs should be invalid, so we can simply store the most recent one: */ - pcb->rcv_sacks[0].left = seqno; - pcb->rcv_sacks[0].right = seqno + inseg.len; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - } else { - /* If the queue is not empty, we walk through the queue and - try to find a place where the sequence number of the - incoming segment is between the sequence numbers of the - previous and the next segment on the ->ooseq queue. That is - the place where we put the incoming segment. If needed, we - trim the second edges of the previous and the incoming - segment so that it will fit into the sequence. - - If the incoming segment has the same sequence number as a - segment on the ->ooseq queue, we discard the segment that - contains less data. */ - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - /* This is the left edge of the lowest possible SACK range. - It may start before the newly received segment (possibly adjusted below). */ - u32_t sackbeg = TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno) ? seqno : pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - struct tcp_seg *next, *prev = NULL; - - for (next = pcb->ooseq; next != NULL; next = next->next) { - if (seqno == next->tcphdr->seqno) { - /* The sequence number of the incoming segment is the - same as the sequence number of the segment on - ->ooseq. We check the lengths to see which one to - discard. */ - if (inseg.len > next->len) { - /* The incoming segment is larger than the old - segment. We replace some segments with the new - one. */ - struct tcp_seg *cseg = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); - - if (cseg != NULL) { - if (prev != NULL) { - prev->next = cseg; - } else { - pcb->ooseq = cseg; - } - - tcp_oos_insert_segment(cseg, next); - } - - break; - } else { - /* Either the lengths are the same or the incoming - segment was smaller than the old one; in either - case, we ditch the incoming segment. */ - break; - } - } else { - if (prev == NULL) { - if (TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, next->tcphdr->seqno)) { - /* The sequence number of the incoming segment is lower - than the sequence number of the first segment on the - queue. We put the incoming segment first on the - queue. */ - struct tcp_seg *cseg = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); - - if (cseg != NULL) { - pcb->ooseq = cseg; - tcp_oos_insert_segment(cseg, next); - } - - break; - } - } else { - /*if (TCP_SEQ_LT(prev->tcphdr->seqno, seqno) && - TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, next->tcphdr->seqno)) {*/ - if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, prev->tcphdr->seqno + 1, next->tcphdr->seqno - 1)) { - /* The sequence number of the incoming segment is in - between the sequence numbers of the previous and - the next segment on ->ooseq. We trim trim the previous - segment, delete next segments that included in received segment - and trim received, if needed. */ - struct tcp_seg *cseg = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); - - if (cseg != NULL) { - if (TCP_SEQ_GT(prev->tcphdr->seqno + prev->len, seqno)) { - /* We need to trim the prev segment. */ - prev->len = (u16_t)(seqno - prev->tcphdr->seqno); - pbuf_realloc(prev->p, prev->len); - } - - prev->next = cseg; - tcp_oos_insert_segment(cseg, next); - } - - break; - } - } - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - /* The new segment goes after the 'next' one. If there is a "hole" in sequence numbers - between 'prev' and the beginning of 'next', we want to move sackbeg. */ - if (prev != NULL && prev->tcphdr->seqno + prev->len != next->tcphdr->seqno) { - sackbeg = next->tcphdr->seqno; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - - /* We don't use 'prev' below, so let's set it to current 'next'. - This way even if we break the loop below, 'prev' will be pointing - at the segment right in front of the newly added one. */ - prev = next; - - /* If the "next" segment is the last segment on the - ooseq queue, we add the incoming segment to the end - of the list. */ - if (next->next == NULL && - TCP_SEQ_GT(seqno, next->tcphdr->seqno)) { - if (TCPH_FLAGS(next->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { - /* segment "next" already contains all data */ - break; - } - - next->next = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); - - if (next->next != NULL) { - if (TCP_SEQ_GT(next->tcphdr->seqno + next->len, seqno)) { - /* We need to trim the last segment. */ - next->len = (u16_t)(seqno - next->tcphdr->seqno); - pbuf_realloc(next->p, next->len); - } - - /* check if the remote side overruns our receive window */ - if (TCP_SEQ_GT((u32_t)tcplen + seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt + (u32_t)pcb->rcv_wnd)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, - ("tcp_receive: other end overran receive window" - "seqno %" U32_F " len %" U16_F " right edge %" U32_F "\n", - seqno, tcplen, pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)); - - if (TCPH_FLAGS(next->next->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { - /* Must remove the FIN from the header as we're trimming - * that byte of sequence-space from the packet */ - TCPH_FLAGS_SET(next->next->tcphdr, TCPH_FLAGS(next->next->tcphdr) & ~TCP_FIN); - } - - /* Adjust length of segment to fit in the window. */ - next->next->len = (u16_t)(pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd - seqno); - pbuf_realloc(next->next->p, next->next->len); - tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(next->next); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: segment not trimmed correctly to rcv_wnd\n", - (seqno + tcplen) == (pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)); - } - } - - break; - } - } - } - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { - if (prev == NULL) { - /* The new segment is at the beginning. sackbeg should already be set properly. - We need to find the right edge. */ - next = pcb->ooseq; - } else if (prev->next != NULL) { - /* The new segment was added after 'prev'. If there is a "hole" between 'prev' and 'prev->next', - we need to move sackbeg. After that we should find the right edge. */ - next = prev->next; - - if (prev->tcphdr->seqno + prev->len != next->tcphdr->seqno) { - sackbeg = next->tcphdr->seqno; - } - } else { - next = NULL; - } - - if (next != NULL) { - u32_t sackend = next->tcphdr->seqno; - - for (; (next != NULL) && (sackend == next->tcphdr->seqno); next = next->next) { - sackend += next->len; - } - - tcp_add_sack(pcb, sackbeg, sackend); - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - } - -#if defined(TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT) || defined(TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT) - { - /* Check that the data on ooseq doesn't exceed one of the limits - and throw away everything above that limit. */ -#ifdef TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT - const u32_t ooseq_max_blen = TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT(pcb); - u32_t ooseq_blen = 0; -#endif -#ifdef TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT - const u16_t ooseq_max_qlen = TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT(pcb); - u16_t ooseq_qlen = 0; -#endif - struct tcp_seg *next, *prev = NULL; - - for (next = pcb->ooseq; next != NULL; prev = next, next = next->next) { - struct pbuf *p = next->p; - int stop_here = 0; -#ifdef TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT - ooseq_blen += p->tot_len; - - if (ooseq_blen > ooseq_max_blen) { - stop_here = 1; - } - -#endif -#ifdef TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT - ooseq_qlen += pbuf_clen(p); - - if (ooseq_qlen > ooseq_max_qlen) { - stop_here = 1; - } - -#endif - - if (stop_here) { -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { - /* Let's remove all SACKs from next's seqno up. */ - tcp_remove_sacks_gt(pcb, next->tcphdr->seqno); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - /* too much ooseq data, dump this and everything after it */ - tcp_segs_free(next); - - if (prev == NULL) { - /* first ooseq segment is too much, dump the whole queue */ - pcb->ooseq = NULL; - } else { - /* just dump 'next' and everything after it */ - prev->next = NULL; - } - - break; - } - } - } -#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT || TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT */ -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - - /* We send the ACK packet after we've (potentially) dealt with SACKs, - so they can be included in the acknowledgment. */ - tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); - } - } else { - /* The incoming segment is not within the window. */ - tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); - } - } else { - /* Segments with length 0 is taken care of here. Segments that - fall out of the window are ACKed. */ - if (!TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd - 1)) { - tcp_ack_now(pcb); - } - } -} - -static u8_t tcp_get_next_optbyte(void) -{ - u16_t optidx = tcp_optidx++; - - if ((tcphdr_opt2 == NULL) || (optidx < tcphdr_opt1len)) { - u8_t *opts = (u8_t *)tcphdr + TCP_HLEN; - return opts[optidx]; - } else { - u8_t idx = (u8_t)(optidx - tcphdr_opt1len); - return tcphdr_opt2[idx]; - } -} - -/** - * Parses the options contained in the incoming segment. - * - * Called from tcp_listen_input() and tcp_process(). - * Currently, only the MSS option is supported! - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which a segment arrived - */ -static void tcp_parseopt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - u8_t data; - u16_t mss; -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - u32_t tsval; -#endif - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_parseopt: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - /* Parse the TCP MSS option, if present. */ - if (tcphdr_optlen != 0) { - for (tcp_optidx = 0; tcp_optidx < tcphdr_optlen;) { - u8_t opt = tcp_get_next_optbyte(); - - switch (opt) { - case LWIP_TCP_OPT_EOL: - /* End of options. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: EOL\n")); - return; - - case LWIP_TCP_OPT_NOP: - /* NOP option. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: NOP\n")); - break; - - case LWIP_TCP_OPT_MSS: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: MSS\n")); - - if (tcp_get_next_optbyte() != LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_MSS || (tcp_optidx - 2 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_MSS) > tcphdr_optlen) { - /* Bad length */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); - return; - } - - /* An MSS option with the right option length. */ - mss = (u16_t)(tcp_get_next_optbyte() << 8); - mss |= tcp_get_next_optbyte(); - /* Limit the mss to the configured TCP_MSS and prevent division by zero */ - pcb->mss = ((mss > TCP_MSS) || (mss == 0)) ? TCP_MSS : mss; - break; -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE - - case LWIP_TCP_OPT_WS: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: WND_SCALE\n")); - - if (tcp_get_next_optbyte() != LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS || (tcp_optidx - 2 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS) > tcphdr_optlen) { - /* Bad length */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); - return; - } - - /* An WND_SCALE option with the right option length. */ - data = tcp_get_next_optbyte(); - - /* If syn was received with wnd scale option, - activate wnd scale opt, but only if this is not a retransmission */ - if ((flags & TCP_SYN) && !(pcb->flags & TF_WND_SCALE)) { - pcb->snd_scale = data; - - if (pcb->snd_scale > 14U) { - pcb->snd_scale = 14U; - } - - pcb->rcv_scale = TCP_RCV_SCALE; - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_WND_SCALE); - /* window scaling is enabled, we can use the full receive window */ - LWIP_ASSERT("window not at default value", pcb->rcv_wnd == TCPWND_MIN16(TCP_WND)); - LWIP_ASSERT("window not at default value", pcb->rcv_ann_wnd == TCPWND_MIN16(TCP_WND)); - pcb->rcv_wnd = pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = TCP_WND; - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - - case LWIP_TCP_OPT_TS: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: TS\n")); - - if (tcp_get_next_optbyte() != LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS || (tcp_optidx - 2 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS) > tcphdr_optlen) { - /* Bad length */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); - return; - } - - /* TCP timestamp option with valid length */ - tsval = tcp_get_next_optbyte(); - tsval |= (tcp_get_next_optbyte() << 8); - tsval |= (tcp_get_next_optbyte() << 16); - tsval |= (tcp_get_next_optbyte() << 24); - - if (flags & TCP_SYN) { - pcb->ts_recent = lwip_ntohl(tsval); - /* Enable sending timestamps in every segment now that we know - the remote host supports it. */ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_TIMESTAMP); - } else if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(pcb->ts_lastacksent, seqno, seqno + tcplen)) { - pcb->ts_recent = lwip_ntohl(tsval); - } - - /* Advance to next option (6 bytes already read) */ - tcp_optidx += LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS - 6; - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - case LWIP_TCP_OPT_SACK_PERM: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: SACK_PERM\n")); - - if (tcp_get_next_optbyte() != LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM || (tcp_optidx - 2 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM) > tcphdr_optlen) { - /* Bad length */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); - return; - } - - /* TCP SACK_PERM option with valid length */ - if (flags & TCP_SYN) { - /* We only set it if we receive it in a SYN (or SYN+ACK) packet */ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_SACK); - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - - default: - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: other\n")); - data = tcp_get_next_optbyte(); - - if (data < 2) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); - /* If the length field is zero, the options are malformed - and we don't process them further. */ - return; - } - - /* All other options have a length field, so that we easily - can skip past them. */ - tcp_optidx += data - 2; - } - } - } -} - -void tcp_trigger_input_pcb_close(void) -{ - recv_flags |= TF_CLOSED; -} - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT -/** - * Called by tcp_receive() to add new SACK entry. - * - * The new SACK entry will be placed at the beginning of rcv_sacks[], as the newest one. - * Existing SACK entries will be "pushed back", to preserve their order. - * This is the behavior described in RFC 2018, section 4. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which a segment arrived - * @param left the left side of the SACK (the first sequence number) - * @param right the right side of the SACK (the first sequence number past this SACK) - */ -static void tcp_add_sack(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t left, u32_t right) -{ - u8_t i; - u8_t unused_idx; - - if ((pcb->flags & TF_SACK) == 0 || !TCP_SEQ_LT(left, right)) { - return; - } - - /* First, let's remove all SACKs that are no longer needed (because they overlap with the newest one), - while moving all other SACKs forward. - We run this loop for all entries, until we find the first invalid one. - There is no point checking after that. */ - for (i = unused_idx = 0; (i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM) && LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, i); ++i) { - /* We only want to use SACK at [i] if it doesn't overlap with left:right range. - It does not overlap if its right side is before the newly added SACK, - or if its left side is after the newly added SACK. - NOTE: The equality should not really happen, but it doesn't hurt. */ - if (TCP_SEQ_LEQ(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right, left) || TCP_SEQ_LEQ(right, pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left)) { - if (unused_idx != i) { - /* We don't need to copy if it's already in the right spot */ - pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx] = pcb->rcv_sacks[i]; - } - - ++unused_idx; - } - } - - /* Now 'unused_idx' is the index of the first invalid SACK entry, - anywhere between 0 (no valid entries) and LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM (all entries are valid). - We want to clear this and all following SACKs. - However, we will be adding another one in the front (and shifting everything else back). - So let's just iterate from the back, and set each entry to the one to the left if it's valid, - or to 0 if it is not. */ - for (i = LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM - 1; i > 0; --i) { - /* [i] is the index we are setting, and the value should be at index [i-1], - or 0 if that index is unused (>= unused_idx). */ - if (i - 1 >= unused_idx) { - /* [i-1] is unused. Let's clear [i]. */ - pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left = pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right = 0; - } else { - pcb->rcv_sacks[i] = pcb->rcv_sacks[i - 1]; - } - } - - /* And now we can store the newest SACK */ - pcb->rcv_sacks[0].left = left; - pcb->rcv_sacks[0].right = right; -} - -/** - * Called to remove a range of SACKs. - * - * SACK entries will be removed or adjusted to not acknowledge any sequence - * numbers that are less than 'seq' passed. It not only invalidates entries, - * but also moves all entries that are still valid to the beginning. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to modify - * @param seq the lowest sequence number to keep in SACK entries - */ -static void tcp_remove_sacks_lt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seq) -{ - u8_t i; - u8_t unused_idx; - - /* We run this loop for all entries, until we find the first invalid one. - There is no point checking after that. */ - for (i = unused_idx = 0; (i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM) && LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, i); ++i) { - /* We only want to use SACK at index [i] if its right side is > 'seq'. */ - if (TCP_SEQ_GT(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right, seq)) { - if (unused_idx != i) { - /* We only copy it if it's not in the right spot already. */ - pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx] = pcb->rcv_sacks[i]; - } - - /* NOTE: It is possible that its left side is < 'seq', in which case we should adjust it. */ - if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx].left, seq)) { - pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx].left = seq; - } - - ++unused_idx; - } - } - - /* We also need to invalidate everything from 'unused_idx' till the end */ - for (i = unused_idx; i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM; ++i) { - pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left = pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right = 0; - } -} - -#if defined(TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT) || defined(TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT) -/** - * Called to remove a range of SACKs. - * - * SACK entries will be removed or adjusted to not acknowledge any sequence - * numbers that are greater than (or equal to) 'seq' passed. It not only invalidates entries, - * but also moves all entries that are still valid to the beginning. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to modify - * @param seq the highest sequence number to keep in SACK entries - */ -static void tcp_remove_sacks_gt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seq) -{ - u8_t i; - u8_t unused_idx; - - /* We run this loop for all entries, until we find the first invalid one. - There is no point checking after that. */ - for (i = unused_idx = 0; (i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM) && LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, i); ++i) { - /* We only want to use SACK at index [i] if its left side is < 'seq'. */ - if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left, seq)) { - if (unused_idx != i) { - /* We only copy it if it's not in the right spot already. */ - pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx] = pcb->rcv_sacks[i]; - } - - /* NOTE: It is possible that its right side is > 'seq', in which case we should adjust it. */ - if (TCP_SEQ_GT(pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx].right, seq)) { - pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx].right = seq; - } - - ++unused_idx; - } - } - - /* We also need to invalidate everything from 'unused_idx' till the end */ - for (i = unused_idx; i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM; ++i) { - pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left = pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right = 0; - } -} -#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT || TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT */ - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +/** + * @file + * Transmission Control Protocol, incoming traffic + * + * The input processing functions of the TCP layer. + * + * These functions are generally called in the order (ip_input() ->) + * tcp_input() -> * tcp_process() -> tcp_receive() (-> application). + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#if LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS */ + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +/** Initial CWND calculation as defined RFC 2581 */ +#define LWIP_TCP_CALC_INITIAL_CWND(mss) ((tcpwnd_size_t)LWIP_MIN((4U * (mss)), LWIP_MAX((2U * (mss)), 4380U))) + +/* These variables are global to all functions involved in the input + processing of TCP segments. They are set by the tcp_input() + function. */ +static struct tcp_seg inseg; +static struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; +static u16_t tcphdr_optlen; +static u16_t tcphdr_opt1len; +static u8_t *tcphdr_opt2; +static u16_t tcp_optidx; +static u32_t seqno, ackno; +static tcpwnd_size_t recv_acked; +static u16_t tcplen; +static u8_t flags; + +static u8_t recv_flags; +static struct pbuf *recv_data; + +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_input_pcb; + +/* Forward declarations. */ +static err_t tcp_process(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +static void tcp_receive(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +static void tcp_parseopt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); + +static void tcp_listen_input(struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcb); +static void tcp_timewait_input(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); + +static int tcp_input_delayed_close(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT +static void tcp_add_sack(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t left, u32_t right); +static void tcp_remove_sacks_lt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seq); +#if defined(TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT) || defined(TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT) +static void tcp_remove_sacks_gt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seq); +#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT || TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT */ +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + +/** + * The initial input processing of TCP. It verifies the TCP header, demultiplexes + * the segment between the PCBs and passes it on to tcp_process(), which implements + * the TCP finite state machine. This function is called by the IP layer (in + * ip_input()). + * + * @param p received TCP segment to process (p->payload pointing to the TCP header) + * @param inp network interface on which this segment was received + */ +void tcp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *prev; + struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb; +#if SO_REUSE + struct tcp_pcb *lpcb_prev = NULL; + struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb_any = NULL; +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + u8_t hdrlen_bytes; + err_t err; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); + + PERF_START; + + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.recv); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpinsegs); + + tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; + +#if TCP_INPUT_DEBUG + tcp_debug_print(tcphdr); +#endif + + /* Check that TCP header fits in payload */ + if (p->len < TCP_HLEN) { + /* drop short packets */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: short packet (%" U16_F " bytes) discarded\n", p->tot_len)); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.lenerr); + goto dropped; + } + + /* Don't even process incoming broadcasts/multicasts. */ + if (ip_addr_isbroadcast(ip_current_dest_addr(), ip_current_netif()) || + ip_addr_ismulticast(ip_current_dest_addr())) { + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.proterr); + goto dropped; + } + +#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP) + { + /* Verify TCP checksum. */ + u16_t chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(p, IP_PROTO_TCP, p->tot_len, + ip_current_src_addr(), ip_current_dest_addr()); + + if (chksum != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: packet discarded due to failing checksum 0x%04" X16_F "\n", + chksum)); + tcp_debug_print(tcphdr); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.chkerr); + goto dropped; + } + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP */ + + /* sanity-check header length */ + hdrlen_bytes = TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES(tcphdr); + + if ((hdrlen_bytes < TCP_HLEN) || (hdrlen_bytes > p->tot_len)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: invalid header length (%" U16_F ")\n", (u16_t)hdrlen_bytes)); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.lenerr); + goto dropped; + } + + /* Move the payload pointer in the pbuf so that it points to the + TCP data instead of the TCP header. */ + tcphdr_optlen = (u16_t)(hdrlen_bytes - TCP_HLEN); + tcphdr_opt2 = NULL; + + if (p->len >= hdrlen_bytes) { + /* all options are in the first pbuf */ + tcphdr_opt1len = tcphdr_optlen; + pbuf_remove_header(p, hdrlen_bytes); /* cannot fail */ + } else { + u16_t opt2len; + /* TCP header fits into first pbuf, options don't - data is in the next pbuf */ + /* there must be a next pbuf, due to hdrlen_bytes sanity check above */ + LWIP_ASSERT("p->next != NULL", p->next != NULL); + + /* advance over the TCP header (cannot fail) */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, TCP_HLEN); + + /* determine how long the first and second parts of the options are */ + tcphdr_opt1len = p->len; + opt2len = (u16_t)(tcphdr_optlen - tcphdr_opt1len); + + /* options continue in the next pbuf: set p to zero length and hide the + options in the next pbuf (adjusting p->tot_len) */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, tcphdr_opt1len); + + /* check that the options fit in the second pbuf */ + if (opt2len > p->next->len) { + /* drop short packets */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: options overflow second pbuf (%" U16_F " bytes)\n", p->next->len)); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.lenerr); + goto dropped; + } + + /* remember the pointer to the second part of the options */ + tcphdr_opt2 = (u8_t *)p->next->payload; + + /* advance p->next to point after the options, and manually + adjust p->tot_len to keep it consistent with the changed p->next */ + pbuf_remove_header(p->next, opt2len); + p->tot_len = (u16_t)(p->tot_len - opt2len); + + LWIP_ASSERT("p->len == 0", p->len == 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len == p->next->tot_len", p->tot_len == p->next->tot_len); + } + + /* Convert fields in TCP header to host byte order. */ + tcphdr->src = lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->src); + tcphdr->dest = lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->dest); + seqno = tcphdr->seqno = lwip_ntohl(tcphdr->seqno); + ackno = tcphdr->ackno = lwip_ntohl(tcphdr->ackno); + tcphdr->wnd = lwip_ntohs(tcphdr->wnd); + + flags = TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr); + tcplen = p->tot_len; + + if (flags & (TCP_FIN | TCP_SYN)) { + tcplen++; + + if (tcplen < p->tot_len) { + /* u16_t overflow, cannot handle this */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: length u16_t overflow, cannot handle this\n")); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.lenerr); + goto dropped; + } + } + + /* Demultiplex an incoming segment. First, we check if it is destined + for an active connection. */ + prev = NULL; + + for (pcb = tcp_active_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: active pcb->state != CLOSED", pcb->state != CLOSED); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: active pcb->state != TIME-WAIT", pcb->state != TIME_WAIT); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: active pcb->state != LISTEN", pcb->state != LISTEN); + + /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ + if ((pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && + (pcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { + prev = pcb; + continue; + } + + if (pcb->remote_port == tcphdr->src && + pcb->local_port == tcphdr->dest && + ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->remote_ip, ip_current_src_addr()) && + ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { + /* Move this PCB to the front of the list so that subsequent + lookups will be faster (we exploit locality in TCP segment + arrivals). */ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: pcb->next != pcb (before cache)", pcb->next != pcb); + + if (prev != NULL) { + prev->next = pcb->next; + pcb->next = tcp_active_pcbs; + tcp_active_pcbs = pcb; + } else { + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.cachehit); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: pcb->next != pcb (after cache)", pcb->next != pcb); + break; + } + + prev = pcb; + } + + if (pcb == NULL) { + /* If it did not go to an active connection, we check the connections + in the TIME-WAIT state. */ + for (pcb = tcp_tw_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: TIME-WAIT pcb->state == TIME-WAIT", pcb->state == TIME_WAIT); + + /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ + if ((pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && + (pcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { + continue; + } + + if (pcb->remote_port == tcphdr->src && + pcb->local_port == tcphdr->dest && + ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->remote_ip, ip_current_src_addr()) && + ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { + /* We don't really care enough to move this PCB to the front + of the list since we are not very likely to receive that + many segments for connections in TIME-WAIT. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: packed for TIME_WAITing connection.\n")); +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB + + if (LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB(pcb, tcphdr, tcphdr_optlen, tcphdr_opt1len, + tcphdr_opt2, p) == ERR_OK) +#endif + { + tcp_timewait_input(pcb); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + } + + /* Finally, if we still did not get a match, we check all PCBs that + are LISTENing for incoming connections. */ + prev = NULL; + + for (lpcb = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; lpcb != NULL; lpcb = lpcb->next) { + /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ + if ((lpcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && + (lpcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { + prev = (struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb; + continue; + } + + if (lpcb->local_port == tcphdr->dest) { + if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(lpcb->local_ip)) { + /* found an ANY TYPE (IPv4/IPv6) match */ +#if SO_REUSE + lpcb_any = lpcb; + lpcb_prev = prev; +#else /* SO_REUSE */ + break; +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + } else if (IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(lpcb, ip_current_dest_addr())) { + if (ip_addr_cmp(&lpcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { + /* found an exact match */ + break; + } else if (ip_addr_isany(&lpcb->local_ip)) { + /* found an ANY-match */ +#if SO_REUSE + lpcb_any = lpcb; + lpcb_prev = prev; +#else /* SO_REUSE */ + break; +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + } + } + } + + prev = (struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb; + } + +#if SO_REUSE + + /* first try specific local IP */ + if (lpcb == NULL) { + /* only pass to ANY if no specific local IP has been found */ + lpcb = lpcb_any; + prev = lpcb_prev; + } + +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + + if (lpcb != NULL) { + /* Move this PCB to the front of the list so that subsequent + lookups will be faster (we exploit locality in TCP segment + arrivals). */ + if (prev != NULL) { + ((struct tcp_pcb_listen *)prev)->next = lpcb->next; + /* our successor is the remainder of the listening list */ + lpcb->next = tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs; + /* put this listening pcb at the head of the listening list */ + tcp_listen_pcbs.listen_pcbs = lpcb; + } else { + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.cachehit); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: packed for LISTENing connection.\n")); +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB + + if (LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB((struct tcp_pcb *)lpcb, tcphdr, tcphdr_optlen, + tcphdr_opt1len, tcphdr_opt2, p) == ERR_OK) +#endif + { + tcp_listen_input(lpcb); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + } + +#if TCP_INPUT_DEBUG + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- tcp_input: flags ")); + tcp_debug_print_flags(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\n")); +#endif /* TCP_INPUT_DEBUG */ + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB + + if ((pcb != NULL) && LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB(pcb, tcphdr, tcphdr_optlen, + tcphdr_opt1len, tcphdr_opt2, p) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + +#endif + + if (pcb != NULL) { + /* The incoming segment belongs to a connection. */ +#if TCP_INPUT_DEBUG + tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); +#endif /* TCP_INPUT_DEBUG */ + + /* Set up a tcp_seg structure. */ + inseg.next = NULL; + inseg.len = p->tot_len; + inseg.p = p; + inseg.tcphdr = tcphdr; + + recv_data = NULL; + recv_flags = 0; + recv_acked = 0; + + if (flags & TCP_PSH) { + p->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_PUSH; + } + + /* If there is data which was previously "refused" by upper layer */ + if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { + if ((tcp_process_refused_data(pcb) == ERR_ABRT) || + ((pcb->refused_data != NULL) && (tcplen > 0))) { + /* pcb has been aborted or refused data is still refused and the new + segment contains data */ + if (pcb->rcv_ann_wnd == 0) { + /* this is a zero-window probe, we respond to it with current RCV.NXT + and drop the data segment */ + tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); + } + + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpinerrs); + goto aborted; + } + } + + tcp_input_pcb = pcb; + err = tcp_process(pcb); + + /* A return value of ERR_ABRT means that tcp_abort() was called + and that the pcb has been freed. If so, we don't do anything. */ + if (err != ERR_ABRT) { + if (recv_flags & TF_RESET) { + /* TF_RESET means that the connection was reset by the other + end. We then call the error callback to inform the + application that the connection is dead before we + deallocate the PCB. */ + TCP_EVENT_ERR(pcb->state, pcb->errf, pcb->callback_arg, ERR_RST); + tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_active_pcbs, pcb); + tcp_free(pcb); + } else { + err = ERR_OK; + + /* If the application has registered a "sent" function to be + called when new send buffer space is available, we call it + now. */ + if (recv_acked > 0) { + u16_t acked16; +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE + /* recv_acked is u32_t but the sent callback only takes a u16_t, + so we might have to call it multiple times. */ + u32_t acked = recv_acked; + + while (acked > 0) { + acked16 = (u16_t)LWIP_MIN(acked, 0xffffu); + acked -= acked16; +#else + { + acked16 = recv_acked; +#endif + TCP_EVENT_SENT(pcb, (u16_t)acked16, err); + + if (err == ERR_ABRT) { + goto aborted; + } + } + recv_acked = 0; + } + + if (tcp_input_delayed_close(pcb)) { + goto aborted; + } + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + + while (recv_data != NULL) { + struct pbuf *rest = NULL; + pbuf_split_64k(recv_data, &rest); +#else /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + + if (recv_data != NULL) { +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->refused_data == NULL", pcb->refused_data == NULL); + + if (pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED) { + /* received data although already closed -> abort (send RST) to + notify the remote host that not all data has been processed */ + pbuf_free(recv_data); +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + + if (rest != NULL) { + pbuf_free(rest); + } + +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + tcp_abort(pcb); + goto aborted; + } + + /* Notify application that data has been received. */ + TCP_EVENT_RECV(pcb, recv_data, ERR_OK, err); + + if (err == ERR_ABRT) { +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + + if (rest != NULL) { + pbuf_free(rest); + } + +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + goto aborted; + } + + /* If the upper layer can't receive this data, store it */ + if (err != ERR_OK) { +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + + if (rest != NULL) { + pbuf_cat(recv_data, rest); + } + +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + pcb->refused_data = recv_data; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: keep incoming packet, because pcb is \"full\"\n")); +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE + break; + } else { + /* Upper layer received the data, go on with the rest if > 64K */ + recv_data = rest; +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + } + } + + /* If a FIN segment was received, we call the callback + function with a NULL buffer to indicate EOF. */ + if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) { + if (pcb->refused_data != NULL) { + /* Delay this if we have refused data. */ + pcb->refused_data->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN; + } else { + /* correct rcv_wnd as the application won't call tcp_recved() + for the FIN's seqno */ + if (pcb->rcv_wnd != TCP_WND_MAX(pcb)) { + pcb->rcv_wnd++; + } + + TCP_EVENT_CLOSED(pcb, err); + + if (err == ERR_ABRT) { + goto aborted; + } + } + } + + tcp_input_pcb = NULL; + + if (tcp_input_delayed_close(pcb)) { + goto aborted; + } + + /* Try to send something out. */ + tcp_output(pcb); +#if TCP_INPUT_DEBUG +#if TCP_DEBUG + tcp_debug_print_state(pcb->state); +#endif /* TCP_DEBUG */ +#endif /* TCP_INPUT_DEBUG */ + } + } + + /* Jump target if pcb has been aborted in a callback (by calling tcp_abort()). + Below this line, 'pcb' may not be dereferenced! */ + aborted: + tcp_input_pcb = NULL; + recv_data = NULL; + + /* give up our reference to inseg.p */ + if (inseg.p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(inseg.p); + inseg.p = NULL; + } + } else { + /* If no matching PCB was found, send a TCP RST (reset) to the + sender. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RST_DEBUG, ("tcp_input: no PCB match found, resetting.\n")); + + if (!(TCPH_FLAGS(tcphdr) & TCP_RST)) { + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.proterr); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.drop); + tcp_rst(NULL, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), + ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: tcp_pcbs_sane()", tcp_pcbs_sane()); + PERF_STOP("tcp_input"); + return; +dropped: + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpinerrs); + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/** Called from tcp_input to check for TF_CLOSED flag. This results in closing + * and deallocating a pcb at the correct place to ensure noone references it + * any more. + * @returns 1 if the pcb has been closed and deallocated, 0 otherwise + */ +static int tcp_input_delayed_close(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input_delayed_close: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + if (recv_flags & TF_CLOSED) { + /* The connection has been closed and we will deallocate the + PCB. */ + if (!(pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED)) { + /* Connection closed although the application has only shut down the + tx side: call the PCB's err callback and indicate the closure to + ensure the application doesn't continue using the PCB. */ + TCP_EVENT_ERR(pcb->state, pcb->errf, pcb->callback_arg, ERR_CLSD); + } + + tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_active_pcbs, pcb); + tcp_free(pcb); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Called by tcp_input() when a segment arrives for a listening + * connection (from tcp_input()). + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb_listen for which a segment arrived + * + * @note the segment which arrived is saved in global variables, therefore only the pcb + * involved is passed as a parameter to this function + */ +static void tcp_listen_input(struct tcp_pcb_listen *pcb) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *npcb; + u32_t iss; + err_t rc; + + if (flags & TCP_RST) { + /* An incoming RST should be ignored. Return. */ + return; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_listen_input: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + /* In the LISTEN state, we check for incoming SYN segments, + creates a new PCB, and responds with a SYN|ACK. */ + if (flags & TCP_ACK) { + /* For incoming segments with the ACK flag set, respond with a + RST. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RST_DEBUG, ("tcp_listen_input: ACK in LISTEN, sending reset\n")); + tcp_rst((const struct tcp_pcb *)pcb, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), + ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); + } else if (flags & TCP_SYN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection request %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", tcphdr->src, tcphdr->dest)); +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + + if (pcb->accepts_pending >= pcb->backlog) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_listen_input: listen backlog exceeded for port %" U16_F "\n", tcphdr->dest)); + return; + } + +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + npcb = tcp_alloc(pcb->prio); + + /* If a new PCB could not be created (probably due to lack of memory), + we don't do anything, but rely on the sender will retransmit the + SYN at a time when we have more memory available. */ + if (npcb == NULL) { + err_t err; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_listen_input: could not allocate PCB\n")); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); + TCP_EVENT_ACCEPT(pcb, NULL, pcb->callback_arg, ERR_MEM, err); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* err not useful here */ + return; + } + +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + pcb->accepts_pending++; + tcp_set_flags(npcb, TF_BACKLOGPEND); +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + /* Set up the new PCB. */ + ip_addr_copy(npcb->local_ip, *ip_current_dest_addr()); + ip_addr_copy(npcb->remote_ip, *ip_current_src_addr()); + npcb->local_port = pcb->local_port; + npcb->remote_port = tcphdr->src; + npcb->state = SYN_RCVD; + npcb->rcv_nxt = seqno + 1; + npcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = npcb->rcv_nxt; + iss = tcp_next_iss(npcb); + npcb->snd_wl2 = iss; + npcb->snd_nxt = iss; + npcb->lastack = iss; + npcb->snd_lbb = iss; + npcb->snd_wl1 = seqno - 1; /* initialise to seqno-1 to force window update */ + npcb->callback_arg = pcb->callback_arg; +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + npcb->listener = pcb; +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + /* inherit socket options */ + npcb->so_options = pcb->so_options & SOF_INHERITED; + npcb->netif_idx = pcb->netif_idx; + /* Register the new PCB so that we can begin receiving segments + for it. */ + TCP_REG_ACTIVE(npcb); + + /* Parse any options in the SYN. */ + tcp_parseopt(npcb); + npcb->snd_wnd = tcphdr->wnd; + npcb->snd_wnd_max = npcb->snd_wnd; + +#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS + npcb->mss = tcp_eff_send_mss(npcb->mss, &npcb->local_ip, &npcb->remote_ip); +#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ + + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcppassiveopens); + +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS + + if (tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_passive_open(pcb, npcb) != ERR_OK) { + tcp_abandon(npcb, 0); + return; + } + +#endif + + /* Send a SYN|ACK together with the MSS option. */ + rc = tcp_enqueue_flags(npcb, TCP_SYN | TCP_ACK); + + if (rc != ERR_OK) { + tcp_abandon(npcb, 0); + return; + } + + tcp_output(npcb); + } + + return; +} + +/** + * Called by tcp_input() when a segment arrives for a connection in + * TIME_WAIT. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which a segment arrived + * + * @note the segment which arrived is saved in global variables, therefore only the pcb + * involved is passed as a parameter to this function + */ +static void tcp_timewait_input(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + /* RFC 1337: in TIME_WAIT, ignore RST and ACK FINs + any 'acceptable' segments */ + /* RFC 793 3.9 Event Processing - Segment Arrives: + * - first check sequence number - we skip that one in TIME_WAIT (always + * acceptable since we only send ACKs) + * - second check the RST bit (... return) */ + if (flags & TCP_RST) { + return; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_timewait_input: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + /* - fourth, check the SYN bit, */ + if (flags & TCP_SYN) { + /* If an incoming segment is not acceptable, an acknowledgment + should be sent in reply */ + if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)) { + /* If the SYN is in the window it is an error, send a reset */ + tcp_rst(pcb, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), + ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); + return; + } + } else if (flags & TCP_FIN) { + /* - eighth, check the FIN bit: Remain in the TIME-WAIT state. + Restart the 2 MSL time-wait timeout.*/ + pcb->tmr = tcp_ticks; + } + + if ((tcplen > 0)) { + /* Acknowledge data, FIN or out-of-window SYN */ + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + tcp_output(pcb); + } + + return; +} + +/** + * Implements the TCP state machine. Called by tcp_input. In some + * states tcp_receive() is called to receive data. The tcp_seg + * argument will be freed by the caller (tcp_input()) unless the + * recv_data pointer in the pcb is set. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which a segment arrived + * + * @note the segment which arrived is saved in global variables, therefore only the pcb + * involved is passed as a parameter to this function + */ +static err_t tcp_process(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct tcp_seg *rseg; + u8_t acceptable = 0; + err_t err; + + err = ERR_OK; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_process: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + /* Process incoming RST segments. */ + if (flags & TCP_RST) { + /* First, determine if the reset is acceptable. */ + if (pcb->state == SYN_SENT) { + /* "In the SYN-SENT state (a RST received in response to an initial SYN), + the RST is acceptable if the ACK field acknowledges the SYN." */ + if (ackno == pcb->snd_nxt) { + acceptable = 1; + } + } else { + /* "In all states except SYN-SENT, all reset (RST) segments are validated + by checking their SEQ-fields." */ + if (seqno == pcb->rcv_nxt) { + acceptable = 1; + } else if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt, + pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)) { + /* If the sequence number is inside the window, we send a challenge ACK + and wait for a re-send with matching sequence number. + This follows RFC 5961 section 3.2 and addresses CVE-2004-0230 + (RST spoofing attack), which is present in RFC 793 RST handling. */ + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + } + } + + if (acceptable) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_process: Connection RESET\n")); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_input: pcb->state != CLOSED", pcb->state != CLOSED); + recv_flags |= TF_RESET; + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY); + return ERR_RST; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_process: unacceptable reset seqno %" U32_F " rcv_nxt %" U32_F "\n", + seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_process: unacceptable reset seqno %" U32_F " rcv_nxt %" U32_F "\n", + seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt)); + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + if ((flags & TCP_SYN) && (pcb->state != SYN_SENT && pcb->state != SYN_RCVD)) { + /* Cope with new connection attempt after remote end crashed */ + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + return ERR_OK; + } + + if ((pcb->flags & TF_RXCLOSED) == 0) { + /* Update the PCB (in)activity timer unless rx is closed (see tcp_shutdown) */ + pcb->tmr = tcp_ticks; + } + + pcb->keep_cnt_sent = 0; + pcb->persist_probe = 0; + + tcp_parseopt(pcb); + + /* Do different things depending on the TCP state. */ + switch (pcb->state) { + case SYN_SENT: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("SYN-SENT: ackno %" U32_F " pcb->snd_nxt %" U32_F " unacked %" U32_F "\n", ackno, + pcb->snd_nxt, lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno))); + + /* received SYN ACK with expected sequence number? */ + if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && (flags & TCP_SYN) && (ackno == pcb->lastack + 1)) { + pcb->rcv_nxt = seqno + 1; + pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt; + pcb->lastack = ackno; + pcb->snd_wnd = tcphdr->wnd; + pcb->snd_wnd_max = pcb->snd_wnd; + pcb->snd_wl1 = seqno - 1; /* initialise to seqno - 1 to force window update */ + pcb->state = ESTABLISHED; + +#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS + pcb->mss = tcp_eff_send_mss(pcb->mss, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); +#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ + + pcb->cwnd = LWIP_TCP_CALC_INITIAL_CWND(pcb->mss); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_process (SENT): cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F + " ssthresh %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", + pcb->cwnd, pcb->ssthresh)); + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->snd_queuelen > 0", (pcb->snd_queuelen > 0)); + --pcb->snd_queuelen; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_process: SYN-SENT --queuelen %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", (tcpwnd_size_t)pcb->snd_queuelen)); + rseg = pcb->unacked; + + if (rseg == NULL) { + /* might happen if tcp_output fails in tcp_rexmit_rto() + in which case the segment is on the unsent list */ + rseg = pcb->unsent; + LWIP_ASSERT("no segment to free", rseg != NULL); + pcb->unsent = rseg->next; + } else { + pcb->unacked = rseg->next; + } + + tcp_seg_free(rseg); + + /* If there's nothing left to acknowledge, stop the retransmit + timer, otherwise reset it to start again */ + if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { + pcb->rtime = -1; + } else { + pcb->rtime = 0; + pcb->nrtx = 0; + } + + /* Call the user specified function to call when successfully + * connected. */ + TCP_EVENT_CONNECTED(pcb, ERR_OK, err); + + if (err == ERR_ABRT) { + return ERR_ABRT; + } + + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + } + /* received ACK? possibly a half-open connection */ + else if (flags & TCP_ACK) { + /* send a RST to bring the other side in a non-synchronized state. */ + tcp_rst(pcb, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), + ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); + + /* Resend SYN immediately (don't wait for rto timeout) to establish + connection faster, but do not send more SYNs than we otherwise would + have, or we might get caught in a loop on loopback interfaces. */ + if (pcb->nrtx < TCP_SYNMAXRTX) { + pcb->rtime = 0; + tcp_rexmit_rto(pcb); + } + } + + break; + + case SYN_RCVD: + if (flags & TCP_ACK) { + /* expected ACK number? */ + if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(ackno, pcb->lastack + 1, pcb->snd_nxt)) { + pcb->state = ESTABLISHED; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection established %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + + if (pcb->listener == NULL) { + /* listen pcb might be closed by now */ + err = ERR_VAL; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + { +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->listener->accept != NULL", pcb->listener->accept != NULL); +#endif + tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb); + /* Call the accept function. */ + TCP_EVENT_ACCEPT(pcb->listener, pcb, pcb->callback_arg, ERR_OK, err); + } + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* If the accept function returns with an error, we abort + * the connection. */ + /* Already aborted? */ + if (err != ERR_ABRT) { + tcp_abort(pcb); + } + + return ERR_ABRT; + } + + /* If there was any data contained within this ACK, + * we'd better pass it on to the application as well. */ + tcp_receive(pcb); + + /* Prevent ACK for SYN to generate a sent event */ + if (recv_acked != 0) { + recv_acked--; + } + + pcb->cwnd = LWIP_TCP_CALC_INITIAL_CWND(pcb->mss); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_process (SYN_RCVD): cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F + " ssthresh %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", + pcb->cwnd, pcb->ssthresh)); + + if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) { + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + pcb->state = CLOSE_WAIT; + } + } else { + /* incorrect ACK number, send RST */ + tcp_rst(pcb, ackno, seqno + tcplen, ip_current_dest_addr(), + ip_current_src_addr(), tcphdr->dest, tcphdr->src); + } + } else if ((flags & TCP_SYN) && (seqno == pcb->rcv_nxt - 1)) { + /* Looks like another copy of the SYN - retransmit our SYN-ACK */ + tcp_rexmit(pcb); + } + + break; + + case CLOSE_WAIT: + + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case ESTABLISHED: + tcp_receive(pcb); + + if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) /* passive close */ + { + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + pcb->state = CLOSE_WAIT; + } + + break; + + case FIN_WAIT_1: + tcp_receive(pcb); + + if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) { + if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && (ackno == pcb->snd_nxt) && + pcb->unsent == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, + ("TCP connection closed: FIN_WAIT_1 %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); + TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(pcb); + pcb->state = TIME_WAIT; + TCP_REG(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); + } else { + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + pcb->state = CLOSING; + } + } else if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && (ackno == pcb->snd_nxt) && + pcb->unsent == NULL) { + pcb->state = FIN_WAIT_2; + } + + break; + + case FIN_WAIT_2: + tcp_receive(pcb); + + if (recv_flags & TF_GOT_FIN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection closed: FIN_WAIT_2 %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); + TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(pcb); + pcb->state = TIME_WAIT; + TCP_REG(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); + } + + break; + + case CLOSING: + tcp_receive(pcb); + + if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && ackno == pcb->snd_nxt && pcb->unsent == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection closed: CLOSING %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); + tcp_pcb_purge(pcb); + TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(pcb); + pcb->state = TIME_WAIT; + TCP_REG(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); + } + + break; + + case LAST_ACK: + tcp_receive(pcb); + + if ((flags & TCP_ACK) && ackno == pcb->snd_nxt && pcb->unsent == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP connection closed: LAST_ACK %" U16_F " -> %" U16_F ".\n", inseg.tcphdr->src, inseg.tcphdr->dest)); + /* bugfix #21699: don't set pcb->state to CLOSED here or we risk leaking segments */ + recv_flags |= TF_CLOSED; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ +/** + * Insert segment into the list (segments covered with new one will be deleted) + * + * Called from tcp_receive() + */ +static void tcp_oos_insert_segment(struct tcp_seg *cseg, struct tcp_seg *next) +{ + struct tcp_seg *old_seg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_oos_insert_segment: invalid cseg", cseg != NULL); + + if (TCPH_FLAGS(cseg->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { + /* received segment overlaps all following segments */ + tcp_segs_free(next); + next = NULL; + } else { + /* delete some following segments + oos queue may have segments with FIN flag */ + while (next && + TCP_SEQ_GEQ((seqno + cseg->len), + (next->tcphdr->seqno + next->len))) { + /* cseg with FIN already processed */ + if (TCPH_FLAGS(next->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { + TCPH_SET_FLAG(cseg->tcphdr, TCP_FIN); + } + + old_seg = next; + next = next->next; + tcp_seg_free(old_seg); + } + + if (next && + TCP_SEQ_GT(seqno + cseg->len, next->tcphdr->seqno)) { + /* We need to trim the incoming segment. */ + cseg->len = (u16_t)(next->tcphdr->seqno - seqno); + pbuf_realloc(cseg->p, cseg->len); + } + } + + cseg->next = next; +} +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + +/** Remove segments from a list if the incoming ACK acknowledges them */ +static struct tcp_seg *tcp_free_acked_segments(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct tcp_seg *seg_list, const char *dbg_list_name, + struct tcp_seg *dbg_other_seg_list) +{ + struct tcp_seg *next; + u16_t clen; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_list_name); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(dbg_other_seg_list); + + while (seg_list != NULL && + TCP_SEQ_LEQ(lwip_ntohl(seg_list->tcphdr->seqno) + + TCP_TCPLEN(seg_list), + ackno)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: removing %" U32_F ":%" U32_F " from pcb->%s\n", + lwip_ntohl(seg_list->tcphdr->seqno), + lwip_ntohl(seg_list->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg_list), + dbg_list_name)); + + next = seg_list; + seg_list = seg_list->next; + + clen = pbuf_clen(next->p); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: queuelen %" TCPWNDSIZE_F " ... ", + (tcpwnd_size_t)pcb->snd_queuelen)); + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->snd_queuelen >= pbuf_clen(next->p)", (pcb->snd_queuelen >= clen)); + + pcb->snd_queuelen = (u16_t)(pcb->snd_queuelen - clen); + recv_acked = (tcpwnd_size_t)(recv_acked + next->len); + tcp_seg_free(next); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("%" TCPWNDSIZE_F " (after freeing %s)\n", + (tcpwnd_size_t)pcb->snd_queuelen, + dbg_list_name)); + + if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: valid queue length", + seg_list != NULL || dbg_other_seg_list != NULL); + } + } + + return seg_list; +} + +/** + * Called by tcp_process. Checks if the given segment is an ACK for outstanding + * data, and if so frees the memory of the buffered data. Next, it places the + * segment on any of the receive queues (pcb->recved or pcb->ooseq). If the segment + * is buffered, the pbuf is referenced by pbuf_ref so that it will not be freed until + * it has been removed from the buffer. + * + * If the incoming segment constitutes an ACK for a segment that was used for RTT + * estimation, the RTT is estimated here as well. + * + * Called from tcp_process(). + */ +static void tcp_receive(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + s16_t m; + u32_t right_wnd_edge; + int found_dupack = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: wrong state", pcb->state >= ESTABLISHED); + + if (flags & TCP_ACK) { + right_wnd_edge = pcb->snd_wnd + pcb->snd_wl2; + + /* Update window. */ + if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->snd_wl1, seqno) || + (pcb->snd_wl1 == seqno && TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->snd_wl2, ackno)) || + (pcb->snd_wl2 == ackno && (u32_t)SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, tcphdr->wnd) > pcb->snd_wnd)) { + pcb->snd_wnd = SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, tcphdr->wnd); + + /* keep track of the biggest window announced by the remote host to calculate + the maximum segment size */ + if (pcb->snd_wnd_max < pcb->snd_wnd) { + pcb->snd_wnd_max = pcb->snd_wnd; + } + + pcb->snd_wl1 = seqno; + pcb->snd_wl2 = ackno; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_WND_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: window update %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", pcb->snd_wnd)); +#if TCP_WND_DEBUG + } else { + if (pcb->snd_wnd != (tcpwnd_size_t)SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, tcphdr->wnd)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_WND_DEBUG, + ("tcp_receive: no window update lastack %" U32_F " ackno %" U32_F " wl1 %" U32_F " seqno %" U32_F " wl2 %" U32_F "\n", + pcb->lastack, ackno, pcb->snd_wl1, seqno, pcb->snd_wl2)); + } + +#endif /* TCP_WND_DEBUG */ + } + + /* (From Stevens TCP/IP Illustrated Vol II, p970.) Its only a + * duplicate ack if: + * 1) It doesn't ACK new data + * 2) length of received packet is zero (i.e. no payload) + * 3) the advertised window hasn't changed + * 4) There is outstanding unacknowledged data (retransmission timer running) + * 5) The ACK is == biggest ACK sequence number so far seen (snd_una) + * + * If it passes all five, should process as a dupack: + * a) dupacks < 3: do nothing + * b) dupacks == 3: fast retransmit + * c) dupacks > 3: increase cwnd + * + * If it only passes 1-3, should reset dupack counter (and add to + * stats, which we don't do in lwIP) + * + * If it only passes 1, should reset dupack counter + * + */ + + /* Clause 1 */ + if (TCP_SEQ_LEQ(ackno, pcb->lastack)) { + /* Clause 2 */ + if (tcplen == 0) { + /* Clause 3 */ + if (pcb->snd_wl2 + pcb->snd_wnd == right_wnd_edge) { + /* Clause 4 */ + if (pcb->rtime >= 0) { + /* Clause 5 */ + if (pcb->lastack == ackno) { + found_dupack = 1; + + if ((u8_t)(pcb->dupacks + 1) > pcb->dupacks) { + ++pcb->dupacks; + } + + if (pcb->dupacks > 3) { + /* Inflate the congestion window */ + TCP_WND_INC(pcb->cwnd, pcb->mss); + } + + if (pcb->dupacks >= 3) { + /* Do fast retransmit (checked via TF_INFR, not via dupacks count) */ + tcp_rexmit_fast(pcb); + } + } + } + } + } + + /* If Clause (1) or more is true, but not a duplicate ack, reset + * count of consecutive duplicate acks */ + if (!found_dupack) { + pcb->dupacks = 0; + } + } else if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(ackno, pcb->lastack + 1, pcb->snd_nxt)) { + /* We come here when the ACK acknowledges new data. */ + tcpwnd_size_t acked; + + /* Reset the "IN Fast Retransmit" flag, since we are no longer + in fast retransmit. Also reset the congestion window to the + slow start threshold. */ + if (pcb->flags & TF_INFR) { + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_INFR); + pcb->cwnd = pcb->ssthresh; + pcb->bytes_acked = 0; + } + + /* Reset the number of retransmissions. */ + pcb->nrtx = 0; + + /* Reset the retransmission time-out. */ + pcb->rto = (s16_t)((pcb->sa >> 3) + pcb->sv); + + /* Record how much data this ACK acks */ + acked = (tcpwnd_size_t)(ackno - pcb->lastack); + + /* Reset the fast retransmit variables. */ + pcb->dupacks = 0; + pcb->lastack = ackno; + + /* Update the congestion control variables (cwnd and + ssthresh). */ + if (pcb->state >= ESTABLISHED) { + if (pcb->cwnd < pcb->ssthresh) { + tcpwnd_size_t increase; + /* limit to 1 SMSS segment during period following RTO */ + u8_t num_seg = (pcb->flags & TF_RTO) ? 1 : 2; + /* RFC 3465, section 2.2 Slow Start */ + increase = LWIP_MIN(acked, (tcpwnd_size_t)(num_seg * pcb->mss)); + TCP_WND_INC(pcb->cwnd, increase); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: slow start cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", pcb->cwnd)); + } else { + /* RFC 3465, section 2.1 Congestion Avoidance */ + TCP_WND_INC(pcb->bytes_acked, acked); + + if (pcb->bytes_acked >= pcb->cwnd) { + pcb->bytes_acked = (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->bytes_acked - pcb->cwnd); + TCP_WND_INC(pcb->cwnd, pcb->mss); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: congestion avoidance cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", pcb->cwnd)); + } + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: ACK for %" U32_F ", unacked->seqno %" U32_F ":%" U32_F "\n", + ackno, + pcb->unacked != NULL ? + lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno) : + 0, + pcb->unacked != NULL ? + lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(pcb->unacked) : + 0)); + + /* Remove segment from the unacknowledged list if the incoming + ACK acknowledges them. */ + pcb->unacked = tcp_free_acked_segments(pcb, pcb->unacked, "unacked", pcb->unsent); + /* We go through the ->unsent list to see if any of the segments + on the list are acknowledged by the ACK. This may seem + strange since an "unsent" segment shouldn't be acked. The + rationale is that lwIP puts all outstanding segments on the + ->unsent list after a retransmission, so these segments may + in fact have been sent once. */ + pcb->unsent = tcp_free_acked_segments(pcb, pcb->unsent, "unsent", pcb->unacked); + + /* If there's nothing left to acknowledge, stop the retransmit + timer, otherwise reset it to start again */ + if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { + pcb->rtime = -1; + } else { + pcb->rtime = 0; + } + + pcb->polltmr = 0; + +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + + if (pcb->unsent == NULL) { + pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; + } + +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS + + if (ip_current_is_v6()) { + /* Inform neighbor reachability of forward progress. */ + nd6_reachability_hint(ip6_current_src_addr()); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS*/ + + pcb->snd_buf = (tcpwnd_size_t)(pcb->snd_buf + recv_acked); + + /* check if this ACK ends our retransmission of in-flight data */ + if (pcb->flags & TF_RTO) { + /* RTO is done if + 1) both queues are empty or + 2) unacked is empty and unsent head contains data not part of RTO or + 3) unacked head contains data not part of RTO */ + if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { + if ((pcb->unsent == NULL) || + (TCP_SEQ_LEQ(pcb->rto_end, lwip_ntohl(pcb->unsent->tcphdr->seqno)))) { + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_RTO); + } + } else if (TCP_SEQ_LEQ(pcb->rto_end, lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno))) { + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_RTO); + } + } + + /* End of ACK for new data processing. */ + } else { + /* Out of sequence ACK, didn't really ack anything */ + tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: pcb->rttest %" U32_F " rtseq %" U32_F " ackno %" U32_F "\n", + pcb->rttest, pcb->rtseq, ackno)); + + /* RTT estimation calculations. This is done by checking if the + incoming segment acknowledges the segment we use to take a + round-trip time measurement. */ + if (pcb->rttest && TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->rtseq, ackno)) { + /* diff between this shouldn't exceed 32K since this are tcp timer ticks + and a round-trip shouldn't be that long... */ + m = (s16_t)(tcp_ticks - pcb->rttest); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: experienced rtt %" U16_F " ticks (%" U16_F " msec).\n", + m, (u16_t)(m * TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL))); + + /* This is taken directly from VJs original code in his paper */ + m = (s16_t)(m - (pcb->sa >> 3)); + pcb->sa = (s16_t)(pcb->sa + m); + + if (m < 0) { + m = (s16_t)-m; + } + + m = (s16_t)(m - (pcb->sv >> 2)); + pcb->sv = (s16_t)(pcb->sv + m); + pcb->rto = (s16_t)((pcb->sa >> 3) + pcb->sv); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: RTO %" U16_F " (%" U16_F " milliseconds)\n", + pcb->rto, (u16_t)(pcb->rto * TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL))); + + pcb->rttest = 0; + } + } + + /* If the incoming segment contains data, we must process it + further unless the pcb already received a FIN. + (RFC 793, chapter 3.9, "SEGMENT ARRIVES" in states CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, + LAST-ACK and TIME-WAIT: "Ignore the segment text.") */ + if ((tcplen > 0) && (pcb->state < CLOSE_WAIT)) { + /* This code basically does three things: + + +) If the incoming segment contains data that is the next + in-sequence data, this data is passed to the application. This + might involve trimming the first edge of the data. The rcv_nxt + variable and the advertised window are adjusted. + + +) If the incoming segment has data that is above the next + sequence number expected (->rcv_nxt), the segment is placed on + the ->ooseq queue. This is done by finding the appropriate + place in the ->ooseq queue (which is ordered by sequence + number) and trim the segment in both ends if needed. An + immediate ACK is sent to indicate that we received an + out-of-sequence segment. + + +) Finally, we check if the first segment on the ->ooseq queue + now is in sequence (i.e., if rcv_nxt >= ooseq->seqno). If + rcv_nxt > ooseq->seqno, we must trim the first edge of the + segment on ->ooseq before we adjust rcv_nxt. The data in the + segments that are now on sequence are chained onto the + incoming segment so that we only need to call the application + once. + */ + + /* First, we check if we must trim the first edge. We have to do + this if the sequence number of the incoming segment is less + than rcv_nxt, and the sequence number plus the length of the + segment is larger than rcv_nxt. */ + /* if (TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt)) { + if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->rcv_nxt, seqno + tcplen)) {*/ + if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(pcb->rcv_nxt, seqno + 1, seqno + tcplen - 1)) { + /* Trimming the first edge is done by pushing the payload + pointer in the pbuf downwards. This is somewhat tricky since + we do not want to discard the full contents of the pbuf up to + the new starting point of the data since we have to keep the + TCP header which is present in the first pbuf in the chain. + + What is done is really quite a nasty hack: the first pbuf in + the pbuf chain is pointed to by inseg.p. Since we need to be + able to deallocate the whole pbuf, we cannot change this + inseg.p pointer to point to any of the later pbufs in the + chain. Instead, we point the ->payload pointer in the first + pbuf to data in one of the later pbufs. We also set the + inseg.data pointer to point to the right place. This way, the + ->p pointer will still point to the first pbuf, but the + ->p->payload pointer will point to data in another pbuf. + + After we are done with adjusting the pbuf pointers we must + adjust the ->data pointer in the seg and the segment + length.*/ + + struct pbuf *p = inseg.p; + u32_t off32 = pcb->rcv_nxt - seqno; + u16_t new_tot_len, off; + LWIP_ASSERT("inseg.p != NULL", inseg.p); + LWIP_ASSERT("insane offset!", (off32 < 0xffff)); + off = (u16_t)off32; + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf too short!", (((s32_t)inseg.p->tot_len) >= off)); + inseg.len -= off; + new_tot_len = (u16_t)(inseg.p->tot_len - off); + + while (p->len < off) { + off -= p->len; + /* all pbufs up to and including this one have len==0, so tot_len is equal */ + p->tot_len = new_tot_len; + p->len = 0; + p = p->next; + } + + /* cannot fail... */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, off); + inseg.tcphdr->seqno = seqno = pcb->rcv_nxt; + } else { + if (TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt)) { + /* the whole segment is < rcv_nxt */ + /* must be a duplicate of a packet that has already been correctly handled */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: duplicate seqno %" U32_F "\n", seqno)); + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + } + } + + /* The sequence number must be within the window (above rcv_nxt + and below rcv_nxt + rcv_wnd) in order to be further + processed. */ + if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt, + pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd - 1)) { + if (pcb->rcv_nxt == seqno) { + /* The incoming segment is the next in sequence. We check if + we have to trim the end of the segment and update rcv_nxt + and pass the data to the application. */ + tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(&inseg); + + if (tcplen > pcb->rcv_wnd) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, + ("tcp_receive: other end overran receive window" + "seqno %" U32_F " len %" U16_F " right edge %" U32_F "\n", + seqno, tcplen, pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)); + + if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { + /* Must remove the FIN from the header as we're trimming + * that byte of sequence-space from the packet */ + TCPH_FLAGS_SET(inseg.tcphdr, TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & ~(unsigned int)TCP_FIN); + } + + /* Adjust length of segment to fit in the window. */ + TCPWND_CHECK16(pcb->rcv_wnd); + inseg.len = (u16_t)pcb->rcv_wnd; + + if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_SYN) { + inseg.len -= 1; + } + + pbuf_realloc(inseg.p, inseg.len); + tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(&inseg); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: segment not trimmed correctly to rcv_wnd\n", + (seqno + tcplen) == (pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)); + } + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ + + /* Received in-sequence data, adjust ooseq data if: + - FIN has been received or + - inseq overlaps with ooseq */ + if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { + if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, + ("tcp_receive: received in-order FIN, binning ooseq queue\n")); + + /* Received in-order FIN means anything that was received + * out of order must now have been received in-order, so + * bin the ooseq queue */ + while (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { + struct tcp_seg *old_ooseq = pcb->ooseq; + pcb->ooseq = pcb->ooseq->next; + tcp_seg_free(old_ooseq); + } + } else { + struct tcp_seg *next = pcb->ooseq; + + /* Remove all segments on ooseq that are covered by inseg already. + * FIN is copied from ooseq to inseg if present. */ + while (next && + TCP_SEQ_GEQ(seqno + tcplen, + next->tcphdr->seqno + next->len)) { + struct tcp_seg *tmp; + + /* inseg cannot have FIN here (already processed above) */ + if ((TCPH_FLAGS(next->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) != 0 && + (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_SYN) == 0) { + TCPH_SET_FLAG(inseg.tcphdr, TCP_FIN); + tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(&inseg); + } + + tmp = next; + next = next->next; + tcp_seg_free(tmp); + } + + /* Now trim right side of inseg if it overlaps with the first + * segment on ooseq */ + if (next && + TCP_SEQ_GT(seqno + tcplen, + next->tcphdr->seqno)) { + /* inseg cannot have FIN here (already processed above) */ + inseg.len = (u16_t)(next->tcphdr->seqno - seqno); + + if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_SYN) { + inseg.len -= 1; + } + + pbuf_realloc(inseg.p, inseg.len); + tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(&inseg); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: segment not trimmed correctly to ooseq queue\n", + (seqno + tcplen) == next->tcphdr->seqno); + } + + pcb->ooseq = next; + } + } + +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + + pcb->rcv_nxt = seqno + tcplen; + + /* Update the receiver's (our) window. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: tcplen > rcv_wnd\n", pcb->rcv_wnd >= tcplen); + pcb->rcv_wnd -= tcplen; + + tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(pcb); + + /* If there is data in the segment, we make preparations to + pass this up to the application. The ->recv_data variable + is used for holding the pbuf that goes to the + application. The code for reassembling out-of-sequence data + chains its data on this pbuf as well. + + If the segment was a FIN, we set the TF_GOT_FIN flag that will + be used to indicate to the application that the remote side has + closed its end of the connection. */ + if (inseg.p->tot_len > 0) { + recv_data = inseg.p; + /* Since this pbuf now is the responsibility of the + application, we delete our reference to it so that we won't + (mistakingly) deallocate it. */ + inseg.p = NULL; + } + + if (TCPH_FLAGS(inseg.tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: received FIN.\n")); + recv_flags |= TF_GOT_FIN; + } + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ + + /* We now check if we have segments on the ->ooseq queue that + are now in sequence. */ + while (pcb->ooseq != NULL && + pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno == pcb->rcv_nxt) { + struct tcp_seg *cseg = pcb->ooseq; + seqno = pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno; + + pcb->rcv_nxt += TCP_TCPLEN(cseg); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: ooseq tcplen > rcv_wnd\n", + pcb->rcv_wnd >= TCP_TCPLEN(cseg)); + pcb->rcv_wnd -= TCP_TCPLEN(cseg); + + tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(pcb); + + if (cseg->p->tot_len > 0) { + /* Chain this pbuf onto the pbuf that we will pass to + the application. */ + /* With window scaling, this can overflow recv_data->tot_len, but + that's not a problem since we explicitly fix that before passing + recv_data to the application. */ + if (recv_data) { + pbuf_cat(recv_data, cseg->p); + } else { + recv_data = cseg->p; + } + + cseg->p = NULL; + } + + if (TCPH_FLAGS(cseg->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_receive: dequeued FIN.\n")); + recv_flags |= TF_GOT_FIN; + + if (pcb->state == ESTABLISHED) /* force passive close or we can move to active close */ + { + pcb->state = CLOSE_WAIT; + } + } + + pcb->ooseq = cseg->next; + tcp_seg_free(cseg); + } + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { + if (pcb->ooseq != NULL) { + /* Some segments may have been removed from ooseq, let's remove all SACKs that + describe anything before the new beginning of that list. */ + tcp_remove_sacks_lt(pcb, pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno); + } else if (LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, 0)) { + /* ooseq has been cleared. Nothing to SACK */ + memset(pcb->rcv_sacks, 0, sizeof(pcb->rcv_sacks)); + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + + /* Acknowledge the segment(s). */ + tcp_ack(pcb); + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + if (LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, 0)) { + /* Normally the ACK for the data received could be piggy-backed on a data packet, + but lwIP currently does not support including SACKs in data packets. So we force + it to respond with an empty ACK packet (only if there is at least one SACK to be sent). + NOTE: tcp_send_empty_ack() on success clears the ACK flags (set by tcp_ack()) */ + tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS + + if (ip_current_is_v6()) { + /* Inform neighbor reachability of forward progress. */ + nd6_reachability_hint(ip6_current_src_addr()); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS*/ + + } else { + /* We get here if the incoming segment is out-of-sequence. */ + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ + /* We queue the segment on the ->ooseq queue. */ + if (pcb->ooseq == NULL) { + pcb->ooseq = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { + /* All the SACKs should be invalid, so we can simply store the most recent one: */ + pcb->rcv_sacks[0].left = seqno; + pcb->rcv_sacks[0].right = seqno + inseg.len; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + } else { + /* If the queue is not empty, we walk through the queue and + try to find a place where the sequence number of the + incoming segment is between the sequence numbers of the + previous and the next segment on the ->ooseq queue. That is + the place where we put the incoming segment. If needed, we + trim the second edges of the previous and the incoming + segment so that it will fit into the sequence. + + If the incoming segment has the same sequence number as a + segment on the ->ooseq queue, we discard the segment that + contains less data. */ + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + /* This is the left edge of the lowest possible SACK range. + It may start before the newly received segment (possibly adjusted below). */ + u32_t sackbeg = TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno) ? seqno : pcb->ooseq->tcphdr->seqno; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + struct tcp_seg *next, *prev = NULL; + + for (next = pcb->ooseq; next != NULL; next = next->next) { + if (seqno == next->tcphdr->seqno) { + /* The sequence number of the incoming segment is the + same as the sequence number of the segment on + ->ooseq. We check the lengths to see which one to + discard. */ + if (inseg.len > next->len) { + /* The incoming segment is larger than the old + segment. We replace some segments with the new + one. */ + struct tcp_seg *cseg = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); + + if (cseg != NULL) { + if (prev != NULL) { + prev->next = cseg; + } else { + pcb->ooseq = cseg; + } + + tcp_oos_insert_segment(cseg, next); + } + + break; + } else { + /* Either the lengths are the same or the incoming + segment was smaller than the old one; in either + case, we ditch the incoming segment. */ + break; + } + } else { + if (prev == NULL) { + if (TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, next->tcphdr->seqno)) { + /* The sequence number of the incoming segment is lower + than the sequence number of the first segment on the + queue. We put the incoming segment first on the + queue. */ + struct tcp_seg *cseg = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); + + if (cseg != NULL) { + pcb->ooseq = cseg; + tcp_oos_insert_segment(cseg, next); + } + + break; + } + } else { + /*if (TCP_SEQ_LT(prev->tcphdr->seqno, seqno) && + TCP_SEQ_LT(seqno, next->tcphdr->seqno)) {*/ + if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, prev->tcphdr->seqno + 1, next->tcphdr->seqno - 1)) { + /* The sequence number of the incoming segment is in + between the sequence numbers of the previous and + the next segment on ->ooseq. We trim trim the previous + segment, delete next segments that included in received segment + and trim received, if needed. */ + struct tcp_seg *cseg = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); + + if (cseg != NULL) { + if (TCP_SEQ_GT(prev->tcphdr->seqno + prev->len, seqno)) { + /* We need to trim the prev segment. */ + prev->len = (u16_t)(seqno - prev->tcphdr->seqno); + pbuf_realloc(prev->p, prev->len); + } + + prev->next = cseg; + tcp_oos_insert_segment(cseg, next); + } + + break; + } + } + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + /* The new segment goes after the 'next' one. If there is a "hole" in sequence numbers + between 'prev' and the beginning of 'next', we want to move sackbeg. */ + if (prev != NULL && prev->tcphdr->seqno + prev->len != next->tcphdr->seqno) { + sackbeg = next->tcphdr->seqno; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + + /* We don't use 'prev' below, so let's set it to current 'next'. + This way even if we break the loop below, 'prev' will be pointing + at the segment right in front of the newly added one. */ + prev = next; + + /* If the "next" segment is the last segment on the + ooseq queue, we add the incoming segment to the end + of the list. */ + if (next->next == NULL && + TCP_SEQ_GT(seqno, next->tcphdr->seqno)) { + if (TCPH_FLAGS(next->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { + /* segment "next" already contains all data */ + break; + } + + next->next = tcp_seg_copy(&inseg); + + if (next->next != NULL) { + if (TCP_SEQ_GT(next->tcphdr->seqno + next->len, seqno)) { + /* We need to trim the last segment. */ + next->len = (u16_t)(seqno - next->tcphdr->seqno); + pbuf_realloc(next->p, next->len); + } + + /* check if the remote side overruns our receive window */ + if (TCP_SEQ_GT((u32_t)tcplen + seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt + (u32_t)pcb->rcv_wnd)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, + ("tcp_receive: other end overran receive window" + "seqno %" U32_F " len %" U16_F " right edge %" U32_F "\n", + seqno, tcplen, pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)); + + if (TCPH_FLAGS(next->next->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) { + /* Must remove the FIN from the header as we're trimming + * that byte of sequence-space from the packet */ + TCPH_FLAGS_SET(next->next->tcphdr, TCPH_FLAGS(next->next->tcphdr) & ~TCP_FIN); + } + + /* Adjust length of segment to fit in the window. */ + next->next->len = (u16_t)(pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd - seqno); + pbuf_realloc(next->next->p, next->next->len); + tcplen = TCP_TCPLEN(next->next); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_receive: segment not trimmed correctly to rcv_wnd\n", + (seqno + tcplen) == (pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)); + } + } + + break; + } + } + } + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { + if (prev == NULL) { + /* The new segment is at the beginning. sackbeg should already be set properly. + We need to find the right edge. */ + next = pcb->ooseq; + } else if (prev->next != NULL) { + /* The new segment was added after 'prev'. If there is a "hole" between 'prev' and 'prev->next', + we need to move sackbeg. After that we should find the right edge. */ + next = prev->next; + + if (prev->tcphdr->seqno + prev->len != next->tcphdr->seqno) { + sackbeg = next->tcphdr->seqno; + } + } else { + next = NULL; + } + + if (next != NULL) { + u32_t sackend = next->tcphdr->seqno; + + for (; (next != NULL) && (sackend == next->tcphdr->seqno); next = next->next) { + sackend += next->len; + } + + tcp_add_sack(pcb, sackbeg, sackend); + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + } + +#if defined(TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT) || defined(TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT) + { + /* Check that the data on ooseq doesn't exceed one of the limits + and throw away everything above that limit. */ +#ifdef TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT + const u32_t ooseq_max_blen = TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT(pcb); + u32_t ooseq_blen = 0; +#endif +#ifdef TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT + const u16_t ooseq_max_qlen = TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT(pcb); + u16_t ooseq_qlen = 0; +#endif + struct tcp_seg *next, *prev = NULL; + + for (next = pcb->ooseq; next != NULL; prev = next, next = next->next) { + struct pbuf *p = next->p; + int stop_here = 0; +#ifdef TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT + ooseq_blen += p->tot_len; + + if (ooseq_blen > ooseq_max_blen) { + stop_here = 1; + } + +#endif +#ifdef TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT + ooseq_qlen += pbuf_clen(p); + + if (ooseq_qlen > ooseq_max_qlen) { + stop_here = 1; + } + +#endif + + if (stop_here) { +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { + /* Let's remove all SACKs from next's seqno up. */ + tcp_remove_sacks_gt(pcb, next->tcphdr->seqno); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + /* too much ooseq data, dump this and everything after it */ + tcp_segs_free(next); + + if (prev == NULL) { + /* first ooseq segment is too much, dump the whole queue */ + pcb->ooseq = NULL; + } else { + /* just dump 'next' and everything after it */ + prev->next = NULL; + } + + break; + } + } + } +#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT || TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT */ +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + + /* We send the ACK packet after we've (potentially) dealt with SACKs, + so they can be included in the acknowledgment. */ + tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); + } + } else { + /* The incoming segment is not within the window. */ + tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); + } + } else { + /* Segments with length 0 is taken care of here. Segments that + fall out of the window are ACKed. */ + if (!TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd - 1)) { + tcp_ack_now(pcb); + } + } +} + +static u8_t tcp_get_next_optbyte(void) +{ + u16_t optidx = tcp_optidx++; + + if ((tcphdr_opt2 == NULL) || (optidx < tcphdr_opt1len)) { + u8_t *opts = (u8_t *)tcphdr + TCP_HLEN; + return opts[optidx]; + } else { + u8_t idx = (u8_t)(optidx - tcphdr_opt1len); + return tcphdr_opt2[idx]; + } +} + +/** + * Parses the options contained in the incoming segment. + * + * Called from tcp_listen_input() and tcp_process(). + * Currently, only the MSS option is supported! + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which a segment arrived + */ +static void tcp_parseopt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + u8_t data; + u16_t mss; +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + u32_t tsval; +#endif + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_parseopt: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + /* Parse the TCP MSS option, if present. */ + if (tcphdr_optlen != 0) { + for (tcp_optidx = 0; tcp_optidx < tcphdr_optlen;) { + u8_t opt = tcp_get_next_optbyte(); + + switch (opt) { + case LWIP_TCP_OPT_EOL: + /* End of options. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: EOL\n")); + return; + + case LWIP_TCP_OPT_NOP: + /* NOP option. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: NOP\n")); + break; + + case LWIP_TCP_OPT_MSS: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: MSS\n")); + + if (tcp_get_next_optbyte() != LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_MSS || (tcp_optidx - 2 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_MSS) > tcphdr_optlen) { + /* Bad length */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); + return; + } + + /* An MSS option with the right option length. */ + mss = (u16_t)(tcp_get_next_optbyte() << 8); + mss |= tcp_get_next_optbyte(); + /* Limit the mss to the configured TCP_MSS and prevent division by zero */ + pcb->mss = ((mss > TCP_MSS) || (mss == 0)) ? TCP_MSS : mss; + break; +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE + + case LWIP_TCP_OPT_WS: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: WND_SCALE\n")); + + if (tcp_get_next_optbyte() != LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS || (tcp_optidx - 2 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS) > tcphdr_optlen) { + /* Bad length */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); + return; + } + + /* An WND_SCALE option with the right option length. */ + data = tcp_get_next_optbyte(); + + /* If syn was received with wnd scale option, + activate wnd scale opt, but only if this is not a retransmission */ + if ((flags & TCP_SYN) && !(pcb->flags & TF_WND_SCALE)) { + pcb->snd_scale = data; + + if (pcb->snd_scale > 14U) { + pcb->snd_scale = 14U; + } + + pcb->rcv_scale = TCP_RCV_SCALE; + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_WND_SCALE); + /* window scaling is enabled, we can use the full receive window */ + LWIP_ASSERT("window not at default value", pcb->rcv_wnd == TCPWND_MIN16(TCP_WND)); + LWIP_ASSERT("window not at default value", pcb->rcv_ann_wnd == TCPWND_MIN16(TCP_WND)); + pcb->rcv_wnd = pcb->rcv_ann_wnd = TCP_WND; + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + + case LWIP_TCP_OPT_TS: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: TS\n")); + + if (tcp_get_next_optbyte() != LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS || (tcp_optidx - 2 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS) > tcphdr_optlen) { + /* Bad length */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); + return; + } + + /* TCP timestamp option with valid length */ + tsval = tcp_get_next_optbyte(); + tsval |= (tcp_get_next_optbyte() << 8); + tsval |= (tcp_get_next_optbyte() << 16); + tsval |= (tcp_get_next_optbyte() << 24); + + if (flags & TCP_SYN) { + pcb->ts_recent = lwip_ntohl(tsval); + /* Enable sending timestamps in every segment now that we know + the remote host supports it. */ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_TIMESTAMP); + } else if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(pcb->ts_lastacksent, seqno, seqno + tcplen)) { + pcb->ts_recent = lwip_ntohl(tsval); + } + + /* Advance to next option (6 bytes already read) */ + tcp_optidx += LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS - 6; + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + case LWIP_TCP_OPT_SACK_PERM: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: SACK_PERM\n")); + + if (tcp_get_next_optbyte() != LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM || (tcp_optidx - 2 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM) > tcphdr_optlen) { + /* Bad length */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); + return; + } + + /* TCP SACK_PERM option with valid length */ + if (flags & TCP_SYN) { + /* We only set it if we receive it in a SYN (or SYN+ACK) packet */ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_SACK); + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + + default: + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: other\n")); + data = tcp_get_next_optbyte(); + + if (data < 2) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_INPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_parseopt: bad length\n")); + /* If the length field is zero, the options are malformed + and we don't process them further. */ + return; + } + + /* All other options have a length field, so that we easily + can skip past them. */ + tcp_optidx += data - 2; + } + } + } +} + +void tcp_trigger_input_pcb_close(void) +{ + recv_flags |= TF_CLOSED; +} + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT +/** + * Called by tcp_receive() to add new SACK entry. + * + * The new SACK entry will be placed at the beginning of rcv_sacks[], as the newest one. + * Existing SACK entries will be "pushed back", to preserve their order. + * This is the behavior described in RFC 2018, section 4. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which a segment arrived + * @param left the left side of the SACK (the first sequence number) + * @param right the right side of the SACK (the first sequence number past this SACK) + */ +static void tcp_add_sack(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t left, u32_t right) +{ + u8_t i; + u8_t unused_idx; + + if ((pcb->flags & TF_SACK) == 0 || !TCP_SEQ_LT(left, right)) { + return; + } + + /* First, let's remove all SACKs that are no longer needed (because they overlap with the newest one), + while moving all other SACKs forward. + We run this loop for all entries, until we find the first invalid one. + There is no point checking after that. */ + for (i = unused_idx = 0; (i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM) && LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, i); ++i) { + /* We only want to use SACK at [i] if it doesn't overlap with left:right range. + It does not overlap if its right side is before the newly added SACK, + or if its left side is after the newly added SACK. + NOTE: The equality should not really happen, but it doesn't hurt. */ + if (TCP_SEQ_LEQ(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right, left) || TCP_SEQ_LEQ(right, pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left)) { + if (unused_idx != i) { + /* We don't need to copy if it's already in the right spot */ + pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx] = pcb->rcv_sacks[i]; + } + + ++unused_idx; + } + } + + /* Now 'unused_idx' is the index of the first invalid SACK entry, + anywhere between 0 (no valid entries) and LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM (all entries are valid). + We want to clear this and all following SACKs. + However, we will be adding another one in the front (and shifting everything else back). + So let's just iterate from the back, and set each entry to the one to the left if it's valid, + or to 0 if it is not. */ + for (i = LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM - 1; i > 0; --i) { + /* [i] is the index we are setting, and the value should be at index [i-1], + or 0 if that index is unused (>= unused_idx). */ + if (i - 1 >= unused_idx) { + /* [i-1] is unused. Let's clear [i]. */ + pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left = pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right = 0; + } else { + pcb->rcv_sacks[i] = pcb->rcv_sacks[i - 1]; + } + } + + /* And now we can store the newest SACK */ + pcb->rcv_sacks[0].left = left; + pcb->rcv_sacks[0].right = right; +} + +/** + * Called to remove a range of SACKs. + * + * SACK entries will be removed or adjusted to not acknowledge any sequence + * numbers that are less than 'seq' passed. It not only invalidates entries, + * but also moves all entries that are still valid to the beginning. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to modify + * @param seq the lowest sequence number to keep in SACK entries + */ +static void tcp_remove_sacks_lt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seq) +{ + u8_t i; + u8_t unused_idx; + + /* We run this loop for all entries, until we find the first invalid one. + There is no point checking after that. */ + for (i = unused_idx = 0; (i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM) && LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, i); ++i) { + /* We only want to use SACK at index [i] if its right side is > 'seq'. */ + if (TCP_SEQ_GT(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right, seq)) { + if (unused_idx != i) { + /* We only copy it if it's not in the right spot already. */ + pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx] = pcb->rcv_sacks[i]; + } + + /* NOTE: It is possible that its left side is < 'seq', in which case we should adjust it. */ + if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx].left, seq)) { + pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx].left = seq; + } + + ++unused_idx; + } + } + + /* We also need to invalidate everything from 'unused_idx' till the end */ + for (i = unused_idx; i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM; ++i) { + pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left = pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right = 0; + } +} + +#if defined(TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT) || defined(TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT) +/** + * Called to remove a range of SACKs. + * + * SACK entries will be removed or adjusted to not acknowledge any sequence + * numbers that are greater than (or equal to) 'seq' passed. It not only invalidates entries, + * but also moves all entries that are still valid to the beginning. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb to modify + * @param seq the highest sequence number to keep in SACK entries + */ +static void tcp_remove_sacks_gt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seq) +{ + u8_t i; + u8_t unused_idx; + + /* We run this loop for all entries, until we find the first invalid one. + There is no point checking after that. */ + for (i = unused_idx = 0; (i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM) && LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, i); ++i) { + /* We only want to use SACK at index [i] if its left side is < 'seq'. */ + if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left, seq)) { + if (unused_idx != i) { + /* We only copy it if it's not in the right spot already. */ + pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx] = pcb->rcv_sacks[i]; + } + + /* NOTE: It is possible that its right side is > 'seq', in which case we should adjust it. */ + if (TCP_SEQ_GT(pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx].right, seq)) { + pcb->rcv_sacks[unused_idx].right = seq; + } + + ++unused_idx; + } + } + + /* We also need to invalidate everything from 'unused_idx' till the end */ + for (i = unused_idx; i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM; ++i) { + pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left = pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right = 0; + } +} +#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT || TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT */ + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/tcp_out.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/tcp_out.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/tcp_out.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/tcp_out.c index ade8e2ba..0d3a271a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/tcp_out.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/tcp_out.c @@ -1,2325 +1,2325 @@ -/** - * @file - * Transmission Control Protocol, outgoing traffic - * - * The output functions of TCP. - * - * There are two distinct ways for TCP segments to get sent: - * - queued data: these are segments transferring data or segments containing - * SYN or FIN (which both count as one sequence number). They are created as - * struct @ref pbuf together with a struct tcp_seg and enqueue to the - * unsent list of the pcb. They are sent by tcp_output: - * - @ref tcp_write : creates data segments - * - @ref tcp_split_unsent_seg : splits a data segment - * - @ref tcp_enqueue_flags : creates SYN-only or FIN-only segments - * - @ref tcp_output / tcp_output_segment : finalize the tcp header - * (e.g. sequence numbers, options, checksum) and output to IP - * - the various tcp_rexmit functions shuffle around segments between the - * unsent an unacked lists to retransmit them - * - tcp_create_segment and tcp_pbuf_prealloc allocate pbuf and - * segment for these functions - * - direct send: these segments don't contain data but control the connection - * behaviour. They are created as pbuf only and sent directly without - * enqueueing them: - * - @ref tcp_send_empty_ack sends an ACK-only segment - * - @ref tcp_rst sends a RST segment - * - @ref tcp_keepalive sends a keepalive segment - * - @ref tcp_zero_window_probe sends a window probe segment - * - tcp_output_alloc_header allocates a header-only pbuf for these functions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#endif - -#include - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -/* Allow to add custom TCP header options by defining this hook */ -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(flags, pcb) LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH(pcb, LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(flags)) -#else -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(flags, pcb) LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(flags) -#endif - -/* Define some copy-macros for checksum-on-copy so that the code looks - nicer by preventing too many ifdef's. */ -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY -#define TCP_DATA_COPY(dst, src, len, seg) \ - do { \ - tcp_seg_add_chksum(LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst, src, len), \ - len, &seg->chksum, &seg->chksum_swapped); \ - seg->flags |= TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; \ - } while (0) -#define TCP_DATA_COPY2(dst, src, len, chksum, chksum_swapped) \ - tcp_seg_add_chksum(LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst, src, len), len, chksum, chksum_swapped); -#else /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY*/ -#define TCP_DATA_COPY(dst, src, len, seg) MEMCPY(dst, src, len) -#define TCP_DATA_COPY2(dst, src, len, chksum, chksum_swapped) MEMCPY(dst, src, len) -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY*/ - -/** Define this to 1 for an extra check that the output checksum is valid - * (usefule when the checksum is generated by the application, not the stack) */ -#ifndef TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK -#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK 0 -#endif -/* Allow to override the failure of sanity check from warning to e.g. hard failure */ -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK -#ifndef TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL -#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL(msg) LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, msg) -#endif -#endif - -#if TCP_OVERSIZE -/** The size of segment pbufs created when TCP_OVERSIZE is enabled */ -#ifndef TCP_OVERSIZE_CALC_LENGTH -#define TCP_OVERSIZE_CALC_LENGTH(length) ((length) + TCP_OVERSIZE) -#endif -#endif - -/* Forward declarations.*/ -static err_t tcp_output_segment(struct tcp_seg *seg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct netif *netif); - -/* tcp_route: common code that returns a fixed bound netif or calls ip_route */ -static struct netif *tcp_route(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dst) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(src); /* in case IPv4-only and source-based routing is disabled */ - - if ((pcb != NULL) && (pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX)) { - return netif_get_by_index(pcb->netif_idx); - } else { - return ip_route(src, dst); - } -} - -/** - * Create a TCP segment with prefilled header. - * - * Called by @ref tcp_write, @ref tcp_enqueue_flags and @ref tcp_split_unsent_seg - * - * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection. - * @param p pbuf that is used to hold the TCP header. - * @param hdrflags TCP flags for header. - * @param seqno TCP sequence number of this packet - * @param optflags options to include in TCP header - * @return a new tcp_seg pointing to p, or NULL. - * The TCP header is filled in except ackno and wnd. - * p is freed on failure. - */ -static struct tcp_seg *tcp_create_segment(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, u8_t hdrflags, u32_t seqno, u8_t optflags) -{ - struct tcp_seg *seg; - u8_t optlen; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_create_segment: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_create_segment: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); - - optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(optflags, pcb); - - if ((seg = (struct tcp_seg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_SEG)) == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_create_segment: no memory.\n")); - pbuf_free(p); - return NULL; - } - - seg->flags = optflags; - seg->next = NULL; - seg->p = p; - LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len >= optlen", p->tot_len >= optlen); - seg->len = p->tot_len - optlen; -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - seg->oversize_left = 0; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - seg->chksum = 0; - seg->chksum_swapped = 0; - /* check optflags */ - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid optflags passed: TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED", - (optflags & TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED) == 0); -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - /* build TCP header */ - if (pbuf_add_header(p, TCP_HLEN)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_create_segment: no room for TCP header in pbuf.\n")); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.err); - tcp_seg_free(seg); - return NULL; - } - - seg->tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)seg->p->payload; - seg->tcphdr->src = lwip_htons(pcb->local_port); - seg->tcphdr->dest = lwip_htons(pcb->remote_port); - seg->tcphdr->seqno = lwip_htonl(seqno); - /* ackno is set in tcp_output */ - TCPH_HDRLEN_FLAGS_SET(seg->tcphdr, (5 + optlen / 4), hdrflags); - /* wnd and chksum are set in tcp_output */ - seg->tcphdr->urgp = 0; - return seg; -} - -/** - * Allocate a PBUF_RAM pbuf, perhaps with extra space at the end. - * - * This function is like pbuf_alloc(layer, length, PBUF_RAM) except - * there may be extra bytes available at the end. - * - * Called by @ref tcp_write - * - * @param layer flag to define header size. - * @param length size of the pbuf's payload. - * @param max_length maximum usable size of payload+oversize. - * @param oversize pointer to a u16_t that will receive the number of usable tail bytes. - * @param pcb The TCP connection that will enqueue the pbuf. - * @param apiflags API flags given to tcp_write. - * @param first_seg true when this pbuf will be used in the first enqueued segment. - */ -#if TCP_OVERSIZE -static struct pbuf *tcp_pbuf_prealloc(pbuf_layer layer, u16_t length, u16_t max_length, - u16_t *oversize, const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t apiflags, - u8_t first_seg) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u16_t alloc = length; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pbuf_prealloc: invalid oversize", oversize != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pbuf_prealloc: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - -#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(max_length); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(apiflags); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(first_seg); - alloc = max_length; -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - - if (length < max_length) { - /* Should we allocate an oversized pbuf, or just the minimum - * length required? If tcp_write is going to be called again - * before this segment is transmitted, we want the oversized - * buffer. If the segment will be transmitted immediately, we can - * save memory by allocating only length. We use a simple - * heuristic based on the following information: - * - * Did the user set TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE? - * - * Will the Nagle algorithm defer transmission of this segment? - */ - if ((apiflags & TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE) || - (!(pcb->flags & TF_NODELAY) && - (!first_seg || - pcb->unsent != NULL || - pcb->unacked != NULL))) { - alloc = LWIP_MIN(max_length, LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(TCP_OVERSIZE_CALC_LENGTH(length))); - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - p = pbuf_alloc(layer, alloc, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("need unchained pbuf", p->next == NULL); - *oversize = p->len - length; - /* trim p->len to the currently used size */ - p->len = p->tot_len = length; - return p; -} -#else /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ -#define tcp_pbuf_prealloc(layer, length, mx, os, pcb, api, fst) pbuf_alloc((layer), (length), PBUF_RAM) -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY -/** Add a checksum of newly added data to the segment. - * - * Called by tcp_write and tcp_split_unsent_seg. - */ -static void tcp_seg_add_chksum(u16_t chksum, u16_t len, u16_t *seg_chksum, - u8_t *seg_chksum_swapped) -{ - u32_t helper; - /* add chksum to old chksum and fold to u16_t */ - helper = chksum + *seg_chksum; - chksum = FOLD_U32T(helper); - - if ((len & 1) != 0) { - *seg_chksum_swapped = 1 - *seg_chksum_swapped; - chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(chksum); - } - - *seg_chksum = chksum; -} -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - -/** Checks if tcp_write is allowed or not (checks state, snd_buf and snd_queuelen). - * - * @param pcb the tcp pcb to check for - * @param len length of data to send (checked agains snd_buf) - * @return ERR_OK if tcp_write is allowed to proceed, another err_t otherwise - */ -static err_t tcp_write_checks(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write_checks: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - /* connection is in invalid state for data transmission? */ - if ((pcb->state != ESTABLISHED) && - (pcb->state != CLOSE_WAIT) && - (pcb->state != SYN_SENT) && - (pcb->state != SYN_RCVD)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("tcp_write() called in invalid state\n")); - return ERR_CONN; - } else if (len == 0) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* fail on too much data */ - if (len > pcb->snd_buf) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("tcp_write: too much data (len=%" U16_F " > snd_buf=%" TCPWNDSIZE_F ")\n", - len, pcb->snd_buf)); - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_write: queuelen: %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", (tcpwnd_size_t)pcb->snd_queuelen)); - - /* If total number of pbufs on the unsent/unacked queues exceeds the - * configured maximum, return an error */ - /* check for configured max queuelen and possible overflow */ - if (pcb->snd_queuelen >= LWIP_MIN(TCP_SND_QUEUELEN, (TCP_SNDQUEUELEN_OVERFLOW + 1))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("tcp_write: too long queue %" U16_F " (max %" U16_F ")\n", - pcb->snd_queuelen, (u16_t)TCP_SND_QUEUELEN)); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: pbufs on queue => at least one queue non-empty", - pcb->unacked != NULL || pcb->unsent != NULL); - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: no pbufs on queue => both queues empty", - pcb->unacked == NULL && pcb->unsent == NULL); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Write data for sending (but does not send it immediately). - * - * It waits in the expectation of more data being sent soon (as - * it can send them more efficiently by combining them together). - * To prompt the system to send data now, call tcp_output() after - * calling tcp_write(). - * - * This function enqueues the data pointed to by the argument dataptr. The length of - * the data is passed as the len parameter. The apiflags can be one or more of: - * - TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY: indicates whether the new memory should be allocated - * for the data to be copied into. If this flag is not given, no new memory - * should be allocated and the data should only be referenced by pointer. This - * also means that the memory behind dataptr must not change until the data is - * ACKed by the remote host - * - TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE: indicates that more data follows. If this is omitted, - * the PSH flag is set in the last segment created by this call to tcp_write. - * If this flag is given, the PSH flag is not set. - * - * The tcp_write() function will fail and return ERR_MEM if the length - * of the data exceeds the current send buffer size or if the length of - * the queue of outgoing segment is larger than the upper limit defined - * in lwipopts.h. The number of bytes available in the output queue can - * be retrieved with the tcp_sndbuf() function. - * - * The proper way to use this function is to call the function with at - * most tcp_sndbuf() bytes of data. If the function returns ERR_MEM, - * the application should wait until some of the currently enqueued - * data has been successfully received by the other host and try again. - * - * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection to enqueue data for. - * @param arg Pointer to the data to be enqueued for sending. - * @param len Data length in bytes - * @param apiflags combination of following flags : - * - TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY (0x01) data will be copied into memory belonging to the stack - * - TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE (0x02) for TCP connection, PSH flag will not be set on last segment sent, - * @return ERR_OK if enqueued, another err_t on error - */ -err_t tcp_write(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const void *arg, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) -{ - struct pbuf *concat_p = NULL; - struct tcp_seg *last_unsent = NULL, *seg = NULL, *prev_seg = NULL, *queue = NULL; - u16_t pos = 0; /* position in 'arg' data */ - u16_t queuelen; - u8_t optlen; - u8_t optflags = 0; -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - u16_t oversize = 0; - u16_t oversize_used = 0; -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - u16_t oversize_add = 0; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK*/ -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - u16_t extendlen = 0; -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - u16_t concat_chksum = 0; - u8_t concat_chksum_swapped = 0; - u16_t concat_chksummed = 0; -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - err_t err; - u16_t mss_local; - - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_write: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - /* don't allocate segments bigger than half the maximum window we ever received */ - mss_local = LWIP_MIN(pcb->mss, TCPWND_MIN16(pcb->snd_wnd_max / 2)); - mss_local = mss_local ? mss_local : pcb->mss; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - -#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - /* Always copy to try to create single pbufs for TX */ - apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_write(pcb=%p, data=%p, len=%" U16_F ", apiflags=%" U16_F ")\n", - (void *)pcb, arg, len, (u16_t)apiflags)); - LWIP_ERROR("tcp_write: arg == NULL (programmer violates API)", - arg != NULL, return ERR_ARG;); - - err = tcp_write_checks(pcb, len); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - queuelen = pcb->snd_queuelen; - -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - - if ((pcb->flags & TF_TIMESTAMP)) { - /* Make sure the timestamp option is only included in data segments if we - agreed about it with the remote host. */ - optflags = TF_SEG_OPTS_TS; - optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(TF_SEG_OPTS_TS, pcb); - /* ensure that segments can hold at least one data byte... */ - mss_local = LWIP_MAX(mss_local, LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS + 1); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ - { - optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(0, pcb); - } - - /* - * TCP segmentation is done in three phases with increasing complexity: - * - * 1. Copy data directly into an oversized pbuf. - * 2. Chain a new pbuf to the end of pcb->unsent. - * 3. Create new segments. - * - * We may run out of memory at any point. In that case we must - * return ERR_MEM and not change anything in pcb. Therefore, all - * changes are recorded in local variables and committed at the end - * of the function. Some pcb fields are maintained in local copies: - * - * queuelen = pcb->snd_queuelen - * oversize = pcb->unsent_oversize - * - * These variables are set consistently by the phases: - * - * seg points to the last segment tampered with. - * - * pos records progress as data is segmented. - */ - - /* Find the tail of the unsent queue. */ - if (pcb->unsent != NULL) { - u16_t space; - u16_t unsent_optlen; - - /* @todo: this could be sped up by keeping last_unsent in the pcb */ - for (last_unsent = pcb->unsent; last_unsent->next != NULL; - last_unsent = last_unsent->next) - ; - - /* Usable space at the end of the last unsent segment */ - unsent_optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(last_unsent->flags, pcb); - LWIP_ASSERT("mss_local is too small", mss_local >= last_unsent->len + unsent_optlen); - space = mss_local - (last_unsent->len + unsent_optlen); - - /* - * Phase 1: Copy data directly into an oversized pbuf. - * - * The number of bytes copied is recorded in the oversize_used - * variable. The actual copying is done at the bottom of the - * function. - */ -#if TCP_OVERSIZE -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - /* check that pcb->unsent_oversize matches last_unsent->oversize_left */ - LWIP_ASSERT("unsent_oversize mismatch (pcb vs. last_unsent)", - pcb->unsent_oversize == last_unsent->oversize_left); -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ - oversize = pcb->unsent_oversize; - - if (oversize > 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("inconsistent oversize vs. space", oversize <= space); - seg = last_unsent; - oversize_used = LWIP_MIN(space, LWIP_MIN(oversize, len)); - pos += oversize_used; - oversize -= oversize_used; - space -= oversize_used; - } - - /* now we are either finished or oversize is zero */ - LWIP_ASSERT("inconsistent oversize vs. len", (oversize == 0) || (pos == len)); -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - -#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF - - /* - * Phase 2: Chain a new pbuf to the end of pcb->unsent. - * - * As an exception when NOT copying the data, if the given data buffer - * directly follows the last unsent data buffer in memory, extend the last - * ROM pbuf reference to the buffer, thus saving a ROM pbuf allocation. - * - * We don't extend segments containing SYN/FIN flags or options - * (len==0). The new pbuf is kept in concat_p and pbuf_cat'ed at - * the end. - * - * This phase is skipped for LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF as we could only execute - * it after rexmit puts a segment from unacked to unsent and at this point, - * oversize info is lost. - */ - if ((pos < len) && (space > 0) && (last_unsent->len > 0)) { - u16_t seglen = LWIP_MIN(space, len - pos); - seg = last_unsent; - - /* Create a pbuf with a copy or reference to seglen bytes. We - * can use PBUF_RAW here since the data appears in the middle of - * a segment. A header will never be prepended. */ - if (apiflags & TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY) { - /* Data is copied */ - if ((concat_p = tcp_pbuf_prealloc(PBUF_RAW, seglen, space, &oversize, pcb, apiflags, 1)) == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("tcp_write : could not allocate memory for pbuf copy size %" U16_F "\n", - seglen)); - goto memerr; - } - -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - oversize_add = oversize; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ - TCP_DATA_COPY2(concat_p->payload, (const u8_t *)arg + pos, seglen, &concat_chksum, &concat_chksum_swapped); -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - concat_chksummed += seglen; -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - queuelen += pbuf_clen(concat_p); - } else { - /* Data is not copied */ - /* If the last unsent pbuf is of type PBUF_ROM, try to extend it. */ - struct pbuf *p; - - for (p = last_unsent->p; p->next != NULL; p = p->next) - ; - - if (((p->type_internal & (PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS | PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_DATA_VOLATILE)) == 0) && - (const u8_t *)p->payload + p->len == (const u8_t *)arg) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: ROM pbufs cannot be oversized", pos == 0); - extendlen = seglen; - } else { - if ((concat_p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, seglen, PBUF_ROM)) == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("tcp_write: could not allocate memory for zero-copy pbuf\n")); - goto memerr; - } - - /* reference the non-volatile payload data */ - ((struct pbuf_rom *)concat_p)->payload = (const u8_t *)arg + pos; - queuelen += pbuf_clen(concat_p); - } - -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - /* calculate the checksum of nocopy-data */ - tcp_seg_add_chksum(~inet_chksum((const u8_t *)arg + pos, seglen), seglen, - &concat_chksum, &concat_chksum_swapped); - concat_chksummed += seglen; -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - } - - pos += seglen; - } - -#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - } else { -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - LWIP_ASSERT("unsent_oversize mismatch (pcb->unsent is NULL)", - pcb->unsent_oversize == 0); -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - } - - /* - * Phase 3: Create new segments. - * - * The new segments are chained together in the local 'queue' - * variable, ready to be appended to pcb->unsent. - */ - while (pos < len) { - struct pbuf *p; - u16_t left = len - pos; - u16_t max_len = mss_local - optlen; - u16_t seglen = LWIP_MIN(left, max_len); -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - u16_t chksum = 0; - u8_t chksum_swapped = 0; -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - if (apiflags & TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY) { - /* If copy is set, memory should be allocated and data copied - * into pbuf */ - if ((p = tcp_pbuf_prealloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, seglen + optlen, mss_local, &oversize, pcb, apiflags, queue == NULL)) == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_write : could not allocate memory for pbuf copy size %" U16_F "\n", seglen)); - goto memerr; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: check that first pbuf can hold the complete seglen", - (p->len >= seglen)); - TCP_DATA_COPY2((char *)p->payload + optlen, (const u8_t *)arg + pos, seglen, &chksum, &chksum_swapped); - } else { - /* Copy is not set: First allocate a pbuf for holding the data. - * Since the referenced data is available at least until it is - * sent out on the link (as it has to be ACKed by the remote - * party) we can safely use PBUF_ROM instead of PBUF_REF here. - */ - struct pbuf *p2; -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - LWIP_ASSERT("oversize == 0", oversize == 0); -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - - if ((p2 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, seglen, PBUF_ROM)) == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_write: could not allocate memory for zero-copy pbuf\n")); - goto memerr; - } - -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - /* calculate the checksum of nocopy-data */ - chksum = ~inet_chksum((const u8_t *)arg + pos, seglen); - - if (seglen & 1) { - chksum_swapped = 1; - chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(chksum); - } - -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - /* reference the non-volatile payload data */ - ((struct pbuf_rom *)p2)->payload = (const u8_t *)arg + pos; - - /* Second, allocate a pbuf for the headers. */ - if ((p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, optlen, PBUF_RAM)) == NULL) { - /* If allocation fails, we have to deallocate the data pbuf as - * well. */ - pbuf_free(p2); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_write: could not allocate memory for header pbuf\n")); - goto memerr; - } - - /* Concatenate the headers and data pbufs together. */ - pbuf_cat(p /*header*/, p2 /*data*/); - } - - queuelen += pbuf_clen(p); - - /* Now that there are more segments queued, we check again if the - * length of the queue exceeds the configured maximum or - * overflows. */ - if (queuelen > LWIP_MIN(TCP_SND_QUEUELEN, TCP_SNDQUEUELEN_OVERFLOW)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_write: queue too long %" U16_F " (%d)\n", - queuelen, (int)TCP_SND_QUEUELEN)); - pbuf_free(p); - goto memerr; - } - - if ((seg = tcp_create_segment(pcb, p, 0, pcb->snd_lbb + pos, optflags)) == NULL) { - goto memerr; - } - -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - seg->oversize_left = oversize; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - seg->chksum = chksum; - seg->chksum_swapped = chksum_swapped; - seg->flags |= TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - /* first segment of to-be-queued data? */ - if (queue == NULL) { - queue = seg; - } else { - /* Attach the segment to the end of the queued segments */ - LWIP_ASSERT("prev_seg != NULL", prev_seg != NULL); - prev_seg->next = seg; - } - - /* remember last segment of to-be-queued data for next iteration */ - prev_seg = seg; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("tcp_write: queueing %" U32_F ":%" U32_F "\n", - lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), - lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg))); - - pos += seglen; - } - - /* - * All three segmentation phases were successful. We can commit the - * transaction. - */ -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - - if ((last_unsent != NULL) && (oversize_add != 0)) { - last_unsent->oversize_left += oversize_add; - } - -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ - - /* - * Phase 1: If data has been added to the preallocated tail of - * last_unsent, we update the length fields of the pbuf chain. - */ -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - - if (oversize_used > 0) { - struct pbuf *p; - - /* Bump tot_len of whole chain, len of tail */ - for (p = last_unsent->p; p; p = p->next) { - p->tot_len += oversize_used; - - if (p->next == NULL) { - TCP_DATA_COPY((char *)p->payload + p->len, arg, oversize_used, last_unsent); - p->len += oversize_used; - } - } - - last_unsent->len += oversize_used; -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - LWIP_ASSERT("last_unsent->oversize_left >= oversize_used", - last_unsent->oversize_left >= oversize_used); - last_unsent->oversize_left -= oversize_used; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ - } - - pcb->unsent_oversize = oversize; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - - /* - * Phase 2: concat_p can be concatenated onto last_unsent->p, unless we - * determined that the last ROM pbuf can be extended to include the new data. - */ - if (concat_p != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: cannot concatenate when pcb->unsent is empty", - (last_unsent != NULL)); - pbuf_cat(last_unsent->p, concat_p); - last_unsent->len += concat_p->tot_len; - } else if (extendlen > 0) { - struct pbuf *p; - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: extension of reference requires reference", - last_unsent != NULL && last_unsent->p != NULL); - - for (p = last_unsent->p; p->next != NULL; p = p->next) { - p->tot_len += extendlen; - } - - p->tot_len += extendlen; - p->len += extendlen; - last_unsent->len += extendlen; - } - -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - - if (concat_chksummed) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: concat checksum needs concatenated data", - concat_p != NULL || extendlen > 0); - - /*if concat checksumm swapped - swap it back */ - if (concat_chksum_swapped) { - concat_chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(concat_chksum); - } - - tcp_seg_add_chksum(concat_chksum, concat_chksummed, &last_unsent->chksum, - &last_unsent->chksum_swapped); - last_unsent->flags |= TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; - } - -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - /* - * Phase 3: Append queue to pcb->unsent. Queue may be NULL, but that - * is harmless - */ - if (last_unsent == NULL) { - pcb->unsent = queue; - } else { - last_unsent->next = queue; - } - - /* - * Finally update the pcb state. - */ - pcb->snd_lbb += len; - pcb->snd_buf -= len; - pcb->snd_queuelen = queuelen; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_write: %" S16_F " (after enqueued)\n", - pcb->snd_queuelen)); - - if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: valid queue length", - pcb->unacked != NULL || pcb->unsent != NULL); - } - - /* Set the PSH flag in the last segment that we enqueued. */ - if (seg != NULL && seg->tcphdr != NULL && ((apiflags & TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE) == 0)) { - TCPH_SET_FLAG(seg->tcphdr, TCP_PSH); - } - - return ERR_OK; -memerr: - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); - - if (concat_p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(concat_p); - } - - if (queue != NULL) { - tcp_segs_free(queue); - } - - if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: valid queue length", pcb->unacked != NULL || - pcb->unsent != NULL); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tcp_write: %" S16_F " (with mem err)\n", pcb->snd_queuelen)); - return ERR_MEM; -} - -/** - * Split segment on the head of the unsent queue. If return is not - * ERR_OK, existing head remains intact - * - * The split is accomplished by creating a new TCP segment and pbuf - * which holds the remainder payload after the split. The original - * pbuf is trimmed to new length. This allows splitting of read-only - * pbufs - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to split the unsent head - * @param split the amount of payload to remain in the head - */ -err_t tcp_split_unsent_seg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t split) -{ - struct tcp_seg *seg = NULL, *useg = NULL; - struct pbuf *p = NULL; - u8_t optlen; - u8_t optflags; - u8_t split_flags; - u8_t remainder_flags; - u16_t remainder; - u16_t offset; -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - u16_t chksum = 0; - u8_t chksum_swapped = 0; - struct pbuf *q; -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_split_unsent_seg: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - useg = pcb->unsent; - - if (useg == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (split == 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("Can't split segment into length 0", 0); - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (useg->len <= split) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("split <= mss", split <= pcb->mss); - LWIP_ASSERT("useg->len > 0", useg->len > 0); - - /* We should check that we don't exceed TCP_SND_QUEUELEN but we need - * to split this packet so we may actually exceed the max value by - * one! - */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_enqueue: split_unsent_seg: %u\n", (unsigned int)pcb->snd_queuelen)); - - optflags = useg->flags; -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - /* Remove since checksum is not stored until after tcp_create_segment() */ - optflags &= ~TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(optflags); - remainder = useg->len - split; - - /* Create new pbuf for the remainder of the split */ - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, remainder + optlen, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("tcp_split_unsent_seg: could not allocate memory for pbuf remainder %u\n", remainder)); - goto memerr; - } - - /* Offset into the original pbuf is past TCP/IP headers, options, and split amount */ - offset = useg->p->tot_len - useg->len + split; - - /* Copy remainder into new pbuf, headers and options will not be filled out */ - if (pbuf_copy_partial(useg->p, (u8_t *)p->payload + optlen, remainder, offset) != remainder) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("tcp_split_unsent_seg: could not copy pbuf remainder %u\n", remainder)); - goto memerr; - } - -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - /* calculate the checksum on remainder data */ - tcp_seg_add_chksum(~inet_chksum((const u8_t *)p->payload + optlen, remainder), remainder, - &chksum, &chksum_swapped); -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - /* Options are created when calling tcp_output() */ - - /* Migrate flags from original segment */ - split_flags = TCPH_FLAGS(useg->tcphdr); - remainder_flags = 0; /* ACK added in tcp_output() */ - - if (split_flags & TCP_PSH) { - split_flags &= ~TCP_PSH; - remainder_flags |= TCP_PSH; - } - - if (split_flags & TCP_FIN) { - split_flags &= ~TCP_FIN; - remainder_flags |= TCP_FIN; - } - - /* SYN should be left on split, RST should not be present with data */ - - seg = tcp_create_segment(pcb, p, remainder_flags, lwip_ntohl(useg->tcphdr->seqno) + split, optflags); - - if (seg == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("tcp_split_unsent_seg: could not create new TCP segment\n")); - goto memerr; - } - -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - seg->chksum = chksum; - seg->chksum_swapped = chksum_swapped; - seg->flags |= TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - /* Remove this segment from the queue since trimming it may free pbufs */ - pcb->snd_queuelen -= pbuf_clen(useg->p); - - /* Trim the original pbuf into our split size. At this point our remainder segment must be setup - successfully because we are modifying the original segment */ - pbuf_realloc(useg->p, useg->p->tot_len - remainder); - useg->len -= remainder; - TCPH_SET_FLAG(useg->tcphdr, split_flags); -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - /* By trimming, realloc may have actually shrunk the pbuf, so clear oversize_left */ - useg->oversize_left = 0; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ - - /* Add back to the queue with new trimmed pbuf */ - pcb->snd_queuelen += pbuf_clen(useg->p); - -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - /* The checksum on the split segment is now incorrect. We need to re-run it over the split */ - useg->chksum = 0; - useg->chksum_swapped = 0; - q = useg->p; - offset = q->tot_len - useg->len; /* Offset due to exposed headers */ - - /* Advance to the pbuf where the offset ends */ - while (q != NULL && offset > q->len) { - offset -= q->len; - q = q->next; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("Found start of payload pbuf", q != NULL); - - /* Checksum the first payload pbuf accounting for offset, then other pbufs are all payload */ - for (; q != NULL; offset = 0, q = q->next) { - tcp_seg_add_chksum(~inet_chksum((const u8_t *)q->payload + offset, q->len - offset), q->len - offset, - &useg->chksum, &useg->chksum_swapped); - } - -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - /* Update number of segments on the queues. Note that length now may - * exceed TCP_SND_QUEUELEN! We don't have to touch pcb->snd_buf - * because the total amount of data is constant when packet is split */ - pcb->snd_queuelen += pbuf_clen(seg->p); - - /* Finally insert remainder into queue after split (which stays head) */ - seg->next = useg->next; - useg->next = seg; - -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - - /* If remainder is last segment on the unsent, ensure we clear the oversize amount - * because the remainder is always sized to the exact remaining amount */ - if (seg->next == NULL) { - pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; - } - -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - - return ERR_OK; -memerr: - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); - - LWIP_ASSERT("seg == NULL", seg == NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - return ERR_MEM; -} - -/** - * Called by tcp_close() to send a segment including FIN flag but not data. - * This FIN may be added to an existing segment or a new, otherwise empty - * segment is enqueued. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb over which to send a segment - * @return ERR_OK if sent, another err_t otherwise - */ -err_t tcp_send_fin(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_send_fin: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - /* first, try to add the fin to the last unsent segment */ - if (pcb->unsent != NULL) { - struct tcp_seg *last_unsent; - - for (last_unsent = pcb->unsent; last_unsent->next != NULL; - last_unsent = last_unsent->next) - ; - - if ((TCPH_FLAGS(last_unsent->tcphdr) & (TCP_SYN | TCP_FIN | TCP_RST)) == 0) { - /* no SYN/FIN/RST flag in the header, we can add the FIN flag */ - TCPH_SET_FLAG(last_unsent->tcphdr, TCP_FIN); - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_FIN); - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* no data, no length, flags, copy=1, no optdata */ - return tcp_enqueue_flags(pcb, TCP_FIN); -} - -/** - * Enqueue SYN or FIN for transmission. - * - * Called by @ref tcp_connect, tcp_listen_input, and @ref tcp_close - * (via @ref tcp_send_fin) - * - * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection. - * @param flags TCP header flags to set in the outgoing segment. - */ -err_t tcp_enqueue_flags(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t flags) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - struct tcp_seg *seg; - u8_t optflags = 0; - u8_t optlen = 0; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_enqueue_flags: queuelen: %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)pcb->snd_queuelen)); - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: need either TCP_SYN or TCP_FIN in flags (programmer violates API)", - (flags & (TCP_SYN | TCP_FIN)) != 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - /* No need to check pcb->snd_queuelen if only SYN or FIN are allowed! */ - - /* Get options for this segment. This is a special case since this is the - only place where a SYN can be sent. */ - if (flags & TCP_SYN) { - optflags = TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS; -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE - - if ((pcb->state != SYN_RCVD) || (pcb->flags & TF_WND_SCALE)) { - /* In a (sent in state SYN_RCVD), the window scale option may only - be sent if we received a window scale option from the remote host. */ - optflags |= TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - if ((pcb->state != SYN_RCVD) || (pcb->flags & TF_SACK)) { - /* In a (sent in state SYN_RCVD), the SACK_PERM option may only - be sent if we received a SACK_PERM option from the remote host. */ - optflags |= TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - } - -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - - if ((pcb->flags & TF_TIMESTAMP) || ((flags & TCP_SYN) && (pcb->state != SYN_RCVD))) { - /* Make sure the timestamp option is only included in data segments if we - agreed about it with the remote host (and in active open SYN segments). */ - optflags |= TF_SEG_OPTS_TS; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ - optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(optflags, pcb); - - /* Allocate pbuf with room for TCP header + options */ - if ((p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, optlen, PBUF_RAM)) == NULL) { - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: check that first pbuf can hold optlen", - (p->len >= optlen)); - - /* Allocate memory for tcp_seg, and fill in fields. */ - if ((seg = tcp_create_segment(pcb, p, flags, pcb->snd_lbb, optflags)) == NULL) { - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("seg->tcphdr not aligned", ((mem_ptr_t)seg->tcphdr % LWIP_MIN(MEM_ALIGNMENT, 4)) == 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: invalid segment length", seg->len == 0); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("tcp_enqueue_flags: queueing %" U32_F ":%" U32_F " (0x%" X16_F ")\n", - lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), - lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg), - (u16_t)flags)); - - /* Now append seg to pcb->unsent queue */ - if (pcb->unsent == NULL) { - pcb->unsent = seg; - } else { - struct tcp_seg *useg; - - for (useg = pcb->unsent; useg->next != NULL; useg = useg->next) - ; - - useg->next = seg; - } - -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - /* The new unsent tail has no space */ - pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - - /* SYN and FIN bump the sequence number */ - if ((flags & TCP_SYN) || (flags & TCP_FIN)) { - pcb->snd_lbb++; - /* optlen does not influence snd_buf */ - } - - if (flags & TCP_FIN) { - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_FIN); - } - - /* update number of segments on the queues */ - pcb->snd_queuelen += pbuf_clen(seg->p); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_enqueue_flags: %" S16_F " (after enqueued)\n", pcb->snd_queuelen)); - - if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: invalid queue length", - pcb->unacked != NULL || pcb->unsent != NULL); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS -/* Build a timestamp option (12 bytes long) at the specified options pointer) - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb - * @param opts option pointer where to store the timestamp option - */ -static void tcp_build_timestamp_option(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t *opts) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_build_timestamp_option: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - /* Pad with two NOP options to make everything nicely aligned */ - opts[0] = PP_HTONL(0x0101080A); - opts[1] = lwip_htonl(sys_now()); - opts[2] = lwip_htonl(pcb->ts_recent); -} -#endif - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT -/** - * Calculates the number of SACK entries that should be generated. - * It takes into account whether TF_SACK flag is set, - * the number of SACK entries in tcp_pcb that are valid, - * as well as the available options size. - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb - * @param optlen the length of other TCP options (in bytes) - * @return the number of SACK ranges that can be used - */ -static u8_t tcp_get_num_sacks(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t optlen) -{ - u8_t num_sacks = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_get_num_sacks: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { - u8_t i; - - /* The first SACK takes up 12 bytes (it includes SACK header and two NOP options), - each additional one - 8 bytes. */ - optlen += 12; - - /* Max options size = 40, number of SACK array entries = LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM */ - for (i = 0; (i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM) && (optlen <= TCP_MAX_OPTION_BYTES) && - LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, i); - ++i) { - ++num_sacks; - optlen += 8; - } - } - - return num_sacks; -} - -/** Build a SACK option (12 or more bytes long) at the specified options pointer) - * - * @param pcb tcp_pcb - * @param opts option pointer where to store the SACK option - * @param num_sacks the number of SACKs to store - */ -static void tcp_build_sack_option(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t *opts, u8_t num_sacks) -{ - u8_t i; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_build_sack_option: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_build_sack_option: invalid opts", opts != NULL); - - /* Pad with two NOP options to make everything nicely aligned. - We add the length (of just the SACK option, not the NOPs in front of it), - which is 2B of header, plus 8B for each SACK. */ - *(opts++) = PP_HTONL(0x01010500 + 2 + num_sacks * 8); - - for (i = 0; i < num_sacks; ++i) { - *(opts++) = lwip_htonl(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left); - *(opts++) = lwip_htonl(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right); - } -} - -#endif - -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE -/** Build a window scale option (3 bytes long) at the specified options pointer) - * - * @param opts option pointer where to store the window scale option - */ -static void tcp_build_wnd_scale_option(u32_t *opts) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_build_wnd_scale_option: invalid opts", opts != NULL); - - /* Pad with one NOP option to make everything nicely aligned */ - opts[0] = PP_HTONL(0x01030300 | TCP_RCV_SCALE); -} -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup tcp_raw - * Find out what we can send and send it - * - * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection to send data - * @return ERR_OK if data has been sent or nothing to send - * another err_t on error - */ -err_t tcp_output(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct tcp_seg *seg, *useg; - u32_t wnd, snd_nxt; - err_t err; - struct netif *netif; -#if TCP_CWND_DEBUG - s16_t i = 0; -#endif /* TCP_CWND_DEBUG */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - /* pcb->state LISTEN not allowed here */ - LWIP_ASSERT("don't call tcp_output for listen-pcbs", - pcb->state != LISTEN); - - /* First, check if we are invoked by the TCP input processing - code. If so, we do not output anything. Instead, we rely on the - input processing code to call us when input processing is done - with. */ - if (tcp_input_pcb == pcb) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - wnd = LWIP_MIN(pcb->snd_wnd, pcb->cwnd); - - seg = pcb->unsent; - - if (seg == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_output: nothing to send (%p)\n", - (void *)pcb->unsent)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_output: snd_wnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F - ", cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", wnd %" U32_F - ", seg == NULL, ack %" U32_F "\n", - pcb->snd_wnd, pcb->cwnd, wnd, pcb->lastack)); - - /* If the TF_ACK_NOW flag is set and the ->unsent queue is empty, construct - * an empty ACK segment and send it. */ - if (pcb->flags & TF_ACK_NOW) { - return tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); - } - - /* nothing to send: shortcut out of here */ - goto output_done; - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, - ("tcp_output: snd_wnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", wnd %" U32_F - ", effwnd %" U32_F ", seq %" U32_F ", ack %" U32_F "\n", - pcb->snd_wnd, pcb->cwnd, wnd, - lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) - pcb->lastack + seg->len, - lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), pcb->lastack)); - } - - netif = tcp_route(pcb, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); - - if (netif == NULL) { - return ERR_RTE; - } - - /* If we don't have a local IP address, we get one from netif */ - if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip)) { - const ip_addr_t *local_ip = ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, &pcb->remote_ip); - - if (local_ip == NULL) { - return ERR_RTE; - } - - ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); - } - - /* Handle the current segment not fitting within the window */ - if (lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) - pcb->lastack + seg->len > wnd) { - /* We need to start the persistent timer when the next unsent segment does not fit - * within the remaining (could be 0) send window and RTO timer is not running (we - * have no in-flight data). If window is still too small after persist timer fires, - * then we split the segment. We don't consider the congestion window since a cwnd - * smaller than 1 SMSS implies in-flight data - */ - if (wnd == pcb->snd_wnd && pcb->unacked == NULL && pcb->persist_backoff == 0) { - pcb->persist_cnt = 0; - pcb->persist_backoff = 1; - pcb->persist_probe = 0; - } - - /* We need an ACK, but can't send data now, so send an empty ACK */ - if (pcb->flags & TF_ACK_NOW) { - return tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); - } - - goto output_done; - } - - /* Stop persist timer, above conditions are not active */ - pcb->persist_backoff = 0; - - /* useg should point to last segment on unacked queue */ - useg = pcb->unacked; - - if (useg != NULL) { - for (; useg->next != NULL; useg = useg->next) - ; - } - - /* data available and window allows it to be sent? */ - while (seg != NULL && - lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) - pcb->lastack + seg->len <= wnd) { - LWIP_ASSERT("RST not expected here!", - (TCPH_FLAGS(seg->tcphdr) & TCP_RST) == 0); - - /* Stop sending if the nagle algorithm would prevent it - * Don't stop: - * - if tcp_write had a memory error before (prevent delayed ACK timeout) or - * - if FIN was already enqueued for this PCB (SYN is always alone in a segment - - * either seg->next != NULL or pcb->unacked == NULL; - * RST is no sent using tcp_write/tcp_output. - */ - if ((tcp_do_output_nagle(pcb) == 0) && - ((pcb->flags & (TF_NAGLEMEMERR | TF_FIN)) == 0)) { - break; - } - -#if TCP_CWND_DEBUG - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_output: snd_wnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", wnd %" U32_F ", effwnd %" U32_F ", seq %" U32_F ", ack %" U32_F ", i %" S16_F "\n", - pcb->snd_wnd, pcb->cwnd, wnd, - lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + seg->len - - pcb->lastack, - lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), pcb->lastack, i)); - ++i; -#endif /* TCP_CWND_DEBUG */ - - if (pcb->state != SYN_SENT) { - TCPH_SET_FLAG(seg->tcphdr, TCP_ACK); - } - - err = tcp_output_segment(seg, pcb, netif); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* segment could not be sent, for whatever reason */ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); - return err; - } - -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - seg->oversize_left = 0; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ - pcb->unsent = seg->next; - - if (pcb->state != SYN_SENT) { - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); - } - - snd_nxt = lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg); - - if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->snd_nxt, snd_nxt)) { - pcb->snd_nxt = snd_nxt; - } - - /* put segment on unacknowledged list if length > 0 */ - if (TCP_TCPLEN(seg) > 0) { - seg->next = NULL; - - /* unacked list is empty? */ - if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { - pcb->unacked = seg; - useg = seg; - /* unacked list is not empty? */ - } else { - /* In the case of fast retransmit, the packet should not go to the tail - * of the unacked queue, but rather somewhere before it. We need to check for - * this case. -STJ Jul 27, 2004 */ - if (TCP_SEQ_LT(lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), lwip_ntohl(useg->tcphdr->seqno))) { - /* add segment to before tail of unacked list, keeping the list sorted */ - struct tcp_seg **cur_seg = &(pcb->unacked); - - while (*cur_seg && - TCP_SEQ_LT(lwip_ntohl((*cur_seg)->tcphdr->seqno), lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno))) { - cur_seg = &((*cur_seg)->next); - } - - seg->next = (*cur_seg); - (*cur_seg) = seg; - } else { - /* add segment to tail of unacked list */ - useg->next = seg; - useg = useg->next; - } - } - - /* do not queue empty segments on the unacked list */ - } else { - tcp_seg_free(seg); - } - - seg = pcb->unsent; - } - -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - - if (pcb->unsent == NULL) { - /* last unsent has been removed, reset unsent_oversize */ - pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; - } - -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - -output_done: - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Check if a segment's pbufs are used by someone else than TCP. - * This can happen on retransmission if the pbuf of this segment is still - * referenced by the netif driver due to deferred transmission. - * This is the case (only!) if someone down the TX call path called - * pbuf_ref() on one of the pbufs! - * - * @arg seg the tcp segment to check - * @return 1 if ref != 1, 0 if ref == 1 - */ -static int tcp_output_segment_busy(const struct tcp_seg *seg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_segment_busy: invalid seg", seg != NULL); - - /* We only need to check the first pbuf here: - If a pbuf is queued for transmission, a driver calls pbuf_ref(), - which only changes the ref count of the first pbuf */ - if (seg->p->ref != 1) { - /* other reference found */ - return 1; - } - - /* no other references found */ - return 0; -} - -/** - * Called by tcp_output() to actually send a TCP segment over IP. - * - * @param seg the tcp_seg to send - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for the TCP connection used to send the segment - * @param netif the netif used to send the segment - */ -static err_t tcp_output_segment(struct tcp_seg *seg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct netif *netif) -{ - err_t err; - u16_t len; - u32_t *opts; -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - int seg_chksum_was_swapped = 0; -#endif - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_segment: invalid seg", seg != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_segment: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_segment: invalid netif", netif != NULL); - - if (tcp_output_segment_busy(seg)) { - /* This should not happen: rexmit functions should have checked this. - However, since this function modifies p->len, we must not continue in this case. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_output_segment: segment busy\n")); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* The TCP header has already been constructed, but the ackno and - wnd fields remain. */ - seg->tcphdr->ackno = lwip_htonl(pcb->rcv_nxt); - - /* advertise our receive window size in this TCP segment */ -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE - - if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE) { - /* The Window field in a SYN segment itself (the only type where we send - the window scale option) is never scaled. */ - seg->tcphdr->wnd = lwip_htons(TCPWND_MIN16(pcb->rcv_ann_wnd)); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - { - seg->tcphdr->wnd = lwip_htons(TCPWND_MIN16(RCV_WND_SCALE(pcb, pcb->rcv_ann_wnd))); - } - - pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_ann_wnd; - - /* Add any requested options. NB MSS option is only set on SYN - packets, so ignore it here */ - /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ - opts = (u32_t *)(void *)(seg->tcphdr + 1); - - if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS) { - u16_t mss; -#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS - mss = tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(TCP_MSS, netif, &pcb->remote_ip); -#else /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ - mss = TCP_MSS; -#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ - *opts = TCP_BUILD_MSS_OPTION(mss); - opts += 1; - } - -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - pcb->ts_lastacksent = pcb->rcv_nxt; - - if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_TS) { - tcp_build_timestamp_option(pcb, opts); - opts += 3; - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE - - if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE) { - tcp_build_wnd_scale_option(opts); - opts += 1; - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM) { - /* Pad with two NOP options to make everything nicely aligned - * NOTE: When we send both timestamp and SACK_PERM options, - * we could use the first two NOPs before the timestamp to store SACK_PERM option, - * but that would complicate the code. - */ - *(opts++) = PP_HTONL(0x01010402); - } - -#endif - - /* Set retransmission timer running if it is not currently enabled - This must be set before checking the route. */ - if (pcb->rtime < 0) { - pcb->rtime = 0; - } - - if (pcb->rttest == 0) { - pcb->rttest = tcp_ticks; - pcb->rtseq = lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_output_segment: rtseq %" U32_F "\n", pcb->rtseq)); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_output_segment: %" U32_F ":%" U32_F "\n", - lwip_htonl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), lwip_htonl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + seg->len)); - - len = (u16_t)((u8_t *)seg->tcphdr - (u8_t *)seg->p->payload); - - if (len == 0) { - /** Exclude retransmitted segments from this count. */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpoutsegs); - } - - seg->p->len -= len; - seg->p->tot_len -= len; - - seg->p->payload = seg->tcphdr; - - seg->tcphdr->chksum = 0; - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS - opts = LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS(seg->p, seg->tcphdr, pcb, opts); -#endif - LWIP_ASSERT("options not filled", (u8_t *)opts == ((u8_t *)(seg->tcphdr + 1)) + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(seg->flags, pcb)); - -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP) - { -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - u32_t acc; -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK - u16_t chksum_slow = ip_chksum_pseudo(seg->p, IP_PROTO_TCP, - seg->p->tot_len, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK */ - - if ((seg->flags & TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED) == 0) { - LWIP_ASSERT("data included but not checksummed", - seg->p->tot_len == TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES(seg->tcphdr)); - } - - /* rebuild TCP header checksum (TCP header changes for retransmissions!) */ - acc = ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(seg->p, IP_PROTO_TCP, - seg->p->tot_len, TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES(seg->tcphdr), &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); - - /* add payload checksum */ - if (seg->chksum_swapped) { - seg_chksum_was_swapped = 1; - seg->chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(seg->chksum); - seg->chksum_swapped = 0; - } - - acc = (u16_t)~acc + seg->chksum; - seg->tcphdr->chksum = (u16_t)~FOLD_U32T(acc); -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK - - if (chksum_slow != seg->tcphdr->chksum) { - TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL( - ("tcp_output_segment: calculated checksum is %" X16_F " instead of %" X16_F "\n", - seg->tcphdr->chksum, chksum_slow)); - seg->tcphdr->chksum = chksum_slow; - } - -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK */ -#else /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - seg->tcphdr->chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(seg->p, IP_PROTO_TCP, - seg->p->tot_len, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP */ - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.xmit); - - NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, &(pcb->netif_hints)); - err = ip_output_if(seg->p, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, pcb->ttl, - pcb->tos, IP_PROTO_TCP, netif); - NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); - -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - - if (seg_chksum_was_swapped) { - /* if data is added to this segment later, chksum needs to be swapped, - so restore this now */ - seg->chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(seg->chksum); - seg->chksum_swapped = 1; - } - -#endif - - return err; -} - -/** - * Requeue all unacked segments for retransmission - * - * Called by tcp_slowtmr() for slow retransmission. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to re-enqueue all unacked segments - */ -err_t tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct tcp_seg *seg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* Move all unacked segments to the head of the unsent queue. - However, give up if any of the unsent pbufs are still referenced by the - netif driver due to deferred transmission. No point loading the link further - if it is struggling to flush its buffered writes. */ - for (seg = pcb->unacked; seg->next != NULL; seg = seg->next) { - if (tcp_output_segment_busy(seg)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_rexmit_rto: segment busy\n")); - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - - if (tcp_output_segment_busy(seg)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_rexmit_rto: segment busy\n")); - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* concatenate unsent queue after unacked queue */ - seg->next = pcb->unsent; -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - - /* if last unsent changed, we need to update unsent_oversize */ - if (pcb->unsent == NULL) { - pcb->unsent_oversize = seg->oversize_left; - } - -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ - /* unsent queue is the concatenated queue (of unacked, unsent) */ - pcb->unsent = pcb->unacked; - /* unacked queue is now empty */ - pcb->unacked = NULL; - - /* Mark RTO in-progress */ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_RTO); - /* Record the next byte following retransmit */ - pcb->rto_end = lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg); - /* Don't take any RTT measurements after retransmitting. */ - pcb->rttest = 0; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Requeue all unacked segments for retransmission - * - * Called by tcp_slowtmr() for slow retransmission. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to re-enqueue all unacked segments - */ -void tcp_rexmit_rto_commit(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit_rto_commit: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - /* increment number of retransmissions */ - if (pcb->nrtx < 0xFF) { - ++pcb->nrtx; - } - - /* Do the actual retransmission */ - tcp_output(pcb); -} - -/** - * Requeue all unacked segments for retransmission - * - * Called by tcp_process() only, tcp_slowtmr() needs to do some things between - * "prepare" and "commit". - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to re-enqueue all unacked segments - */ -void tcp_rexmit_rto(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit_rto: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - if (tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare(pcb) == ERR_OK) { - tcp_rexmit_rto_commit(pcb); - } -} - -/** - * Requeue the first unacked segment for retransmission - * - * Called by tcp_receive() for fast retransmit. - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to retransmit the first unacked segment - */ -err_t tcp_rexmit(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct tcp_seg *seg; - struct tcp_seg **cur_seg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - seg = pcb->unacked; - - /* Give up if the segment is still referenced by the netif driver - due to deferred transmission. */ - if (tcp_output_segment_busy(seg)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_rexmit busy\n")); - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* Move the first unacked segment to the unsent queue */ - /* Keep the unsent queue sorted. */ - pcb->unacked = seg->next; - - cur_seg = &(pcb->unsent); - - while (*cur_seg && - TCP_SEQ_LT(lwip_ntohl((*cur_seg)->tcphdr->seqno), lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno))) { - cur_seg = &((*cur_seg)->next); - } - - seg->next = *cur_seg; - *cur_seg = seg; -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - - if (seg->next == NULL) { - /* the retransmitted segment is last in unsent, so reset unsent_oversize */ - pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; - } - -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - - if (pcb->nrtx < 0xFF) { - ++pcb->nrtx; - } - - /* Don't take any rtt measurements after retransmitting. */ - pcb->rttest = 0; - - /* Do the actual retransmission. */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpretranssegs); - /* No need to call tcp_output: we are always called from tcp_input() - and thus tcp_output directly returns. */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Handle retransmission after three dupacks received - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to retransmit the first unacked segment - */ -void tcp_rexmit_fast(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit_fast: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - if (pcb->unacked != NULL && !(pcb->flags & TF_INFR)) { - /* This is fast retransmit. Retransmit the first unacked segment. */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_FR_DEBUG, - ("tcp_receive: dupacks %" U16_F " (%" U32_F - "), fast retransmit %" U32_F "\n", - (u16_t)pcb->dupacks, pcb->lastack, - lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno))); - - if (tcp_rexmit(pcb) == ERR_OK) { - /* Set ssthresh to half of the minimum of the current - * cwnd and the advertised window */ - pcb->ssthresh = LWIP_MIN(pcb->cwnd, pcb->snd_wnd) / 2; - - /* The minimum value for ssthresh should be 2 MSS */ - if (pcb->ssthresh < (2U * pcb->mss)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_FR_DEBUG, - ("tcp_receive: The minimum value for ssthresh %" TCPWNDSIZE_F - " should be min 2 mss %" U16_F "...\n", - pcb->ssthresh, (u16_t)(2 * pcb->mss))); - pcb->ssthresh = 2 * pcb->mss; - } - - pcb->cwnd = pcb->ssthresh + 3 * pcb->mss; - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_INFR); - - /* Reset the retransmission timer to prevent immediate rto retransmissions */ - pcb->rtime = 0; - } - } -} - -static struct pbuf *tcp_output_alloc_header_common(u32_t ackno, u16_t optlen, u16_t datalen, - u32_t seqno_be /* already in network byte order */, - u16_t src_port, u16_t dst_port, u8_t flags, u16_t wnd) -{ - struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; - struct pbuf *p; - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, TCP_HLEN + optlen + datalen, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p != NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct tcp_hdr", - (p->len >= TCP_HLEN + optlen)); - tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; - tcphdr->src = lwip_htons(src_port); - tcphdr->dest = lwip_htons(dst_port); - tcphdr->seqno = seqno_be; - tcphdr->ackno = lwip_htonl(ackno); - TCPH_HDRLEN_FLAGS_SET(tcphdr, (5 + optlen / 4), flags); - tcphdr->wnd = lwip_htons(wnd); - tcphdr->chksum = 0; - tcphdr->urgp = 0; - } - - return p; -} - -/** Allocate a pbuf and create a tcphdr at p->payload, used for output - * functions other than the default tcp_output -> tcp_output_segment - * (e.g. tcp_send_empty_ack, etc.) - * - * @param pcb tcp pcb for which to send a packet (used to initialize tcp_hdr) - * @param optlen length of header-options - * @param datalen length of tcp data to reserve in pbuf - * @param seqno_be seqno in network byte order (big-endian) - * @return pbuf with p->payload being the tcp_hdr - */ -static struct pbuf *tcp_output_alloc_header(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t optlen, u16_t datalen, - u32_t seqno_be /* already in network byte order */) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_alloc_header: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - p = tcp_output_alloc_header_common(pcb->rcv_nxt, optlen, datalen, - seqno_be, pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port, TCP_ACK, - TCPWND_MIN16(RCV_WND_SCALE(pcb, pcb->rcv_ann_wnd))); - - if (p != NULL) { - /* If we're sending a packet, update the announced right window edge */ - pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_ann_wnd; - } - - return p; -} - -/* Fill in options for control segments */ -static void tcp_output_fill_options(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, u8_t optflags, u8_t num_sacks) -{ - struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; - u32_t *opts; - u16_t sacks_len = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_fill_options: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); - - tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; - opts = (u32_t *)(void *)(tcphdr + 1); - - /* NB. MSS and window scale options are only sent on SYNs, so ignore them here */ - -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - - if (optflags & TF_SEG_OPTS_TS) { - tcp_build_timestamp_option(pcb, opts); - opts += 3; - } - -#endif - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - if (pcb && (num_sacks > 0)) { - tcp_build_sack_option(pcb, opts, num_sacks); - /* 1 word for SACKs header (including 2xNOP), and 2 words for each SACK */ - sacks_len = 1 + num_sacks * 2; - opts += sacks_len; - } - -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(num_sacks); -#endif - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS - opts = LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS(p, tcphdr, pcb, opts); -#endif - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(sacks_len); - LWIP_ASSERT("options not filled", (u8_t *)opts == ((u8_t *)(tcphdr + 1)) + sacks_len * 4 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(optflags, pcb)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(optflags); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(opts); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ -} - -/** Output a control segment pbuf to IP. - * - * Called from tcp_rst, tcp_send_empty_ack, tcp_keepalive and tcp_zero_window_probe, - * this function combines selecting a netif for transmission, generating the tcp - * header checksum and calling ip_output_if while handling netif hints and stats. - */ -static err_t tcp_output_control_segment(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dst) -{ - err_t err; - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_control_segment: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); - - netif = tcp_route(pcb, src, dst); - - if (netif == NULL) { - err = ERR_RTE; - } else { - u8_t ttl, tos; -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP) - { - struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; - tcphdr->chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(p, IP_PROTO_TCP, p->tot_len, - src, dst); - } -#endif - - if (pcb != NULL) { - NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, LWIP_CONST_CAST(struct netif_hint *, &(pcb->netif_hints))); - ttl = pcb->ttl; - tos = pcb->tos; - } else { - /* Send output with hardcoded TTL/HL since we have no access to the pcb */ - ttl = TCP_TTL; - tos = 0; - } - - TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.xmit); - err = ip_output_if(p, src, dst, ttl, tos, IP_PROTO_TCP, netif); - NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return err; -} - -/** - * Send a TCP RESET packet (empty segment with RST flag set) either to - * abort a connection or to show that there is no matching local connection - * for a received segment. - * - * Called by tcp_abort() (to abort a local connection), tcp_input() (if no - * matching local pcb was found), tcp_listen_input() (if incoming segment - * has ACK flag set) and tcp_process() (received segment in the wrong state) - * - * Since a RST segment is in most cases not sent for an active connection, - * tcp_rst() has a number of arguments that are taken from a tcp_pcb for - * most other segment output functions. - * - * @param pcb TCP pcb (may be NULL if no pcb is available) - * @param seqno the sequence number to use for the outgoing segment - * @param ackno the acknowledge number to use for the outgoing segment - * @param local_ip the local IP address to send the segment from - * @param remote_ip the remote IP address to send the segment to - * @param local_port the local TCP port to send the segment from - * @param remote_port the remote TCP port to send the segment to - */ -void tcp_rst(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, - const ip_addr_t *local_ip, const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, - u16_t local_port, u16_t remote_port) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u16_t wnd; - u8_t optlen; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rst: invalid local_ip", local_ip != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rst: invalid remote_ip", remote_ip != NULL); - - optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(0, pcb); - -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE - wnd = PP_HTONS(((TCP_WND >> TCP_RCV_SCALE) & 0xFFFF)); -#else - wnd = PP_HTONS(TCP_WND); -#endif - - p = tcp_output_alloc_header_common(ackno, optlen, 0, lwip_htonl(seqno), local_port, - remote_port, TCP_RST | TCP_ACK, wnd); - - if (p == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_rst: could not allocate memory for pbuf\n")); - return; - } - - tcp_output_fill_options(pcb, p, 0, optlen); - - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpoutrsts); - - tcp_output_control_segment(pcb, p, local_ip, remote_ip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RST_DEBUG, ("tcp_rst: seqno %" U32_F " ackno %" U32_F ".\n", seqno, ackno)); -} - -/** - * Send an ACK without data. - * - * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection to send the ACK - */ -err_t tcp_send_empty_ack(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - err_t err; - struct pbuf *p; - u8_t optlen, optflags = 0; - u8_t num_sacks = 0; - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_send_empty_ack: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - - if (pcb->flags & TF_TIMESTAMP) { - optflags = TF_SEG_OPTS_TS; - } - -#endif - optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(optflags, pcb); - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - - /* For now, SACKs are only sent with empty ACKs */ - if ((num_sacks = tcp_get_num_sacks(pcb, optlen)) > 0) { - optlen += 4 + num_sacks * 8; /* 4 bytes for header (including 2*NOP), plus 8B for each SACK */ - } - -#endif - - p = tcp_output_alloc_header(pcb, optlen, 0, lwip_htonl(pcb->snd_nxt)); - - if (p == NULL) { - /* let tcp_fasttmr retry sending this ACK */ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_output: (ACK) could not allocate pbuf\n")); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - tcp_output_fill_options(pcb, p, optflags, num_sacks); - -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - pcb->ts_lastacksent = pcb->rcv_nxt; -#endif - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, - ("tcp_output: sending ACK for %" U32_F "\n", pcb->rcv_nxt)); - err = tcp_output_control_segment(pcb, p, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - /* let tcp_fasttmr retry sending this ACK */ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); - } else { - /* remove ACK flags from the PCB, as we sent an empty ACK now */ - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); - } - - return err; -} - -/** - * Send keepalive packets to keep a connection active although - * no data is sent over it. - * - * Called by tcp_slowtmr() - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to send a keepalive packet - */ -err_t tcp_keepalive(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - err_t err; - struct pbuf *p; - u8_t optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(0, pcb); - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_keepalive: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_keepalive: sending KEEPALIVE probe to ")); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(TCP_DEBUG, pcb->remote_ip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("\n")); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_keepalive: tcp_ticks %" U32_F " pcb->tmr %" U32_F " pcb->keep_cnt_sent %" U16_F "\n", - tcp_ticks, pcb->tmr, (u16_t)pcb->keep_cnt_sent)); - - p = tcp_output_alloc_header(pcb, optlen, 0, lwip_htonl(pcb->snd_nxt - 1)); - - if (p == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, - ("tcp_keepalive: could not allocate memory for pbuf\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - tcp_output_fill_options(pcb, p, 0, optlen); - err = tcp_output_control_segment(pcb, p, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_keepalive: seqno %" U32_F " ackno %" U32_F " err %d.\n", - pcb->snd_nxt - 1, pcb->rcv_nxt, (int)err)); - return err; -} - -/** - * Send persist timer zero-window probes to keep a connection active - * when a window update is lost. - * - * Called by tcp_slowtmr() - * - * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to send a zero-window probe packet - */ -err_t tcp_zero_window_probe(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - err_t err; - struct pbuf *p; - struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; - struct tcp_seg *seg; - u16_t len; - u8_t is_fin; - u32_t snd_nxt; - u8_t optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(0, pcb); - - LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_zero_window_probe: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_zero_window_probe: sending ZERO WINDOW probe to ")); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(TCP_DEBUG, pcb->remote_ip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("\n")); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, - ("tcp_zero_window_probe: tcp_ticks %" U32_F - " pcb->tmr %" U32_F " pcb->keep_cnt_sent %" U16_F "\n", - tcp_ticks, pcb->tmr, (u16_t)pcb->keep_cnt_sent)); - - /* Only consider unsent, persist timer should be off when there is data in-flight */ - seg = pcb->unsent; - - if (seg == NULL) { - /* Not expected, persist timer should be off when the send buffer is empty */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* increment probe count. NOTE: we record probe even if it fails - to actually transmit due to an error. This ensures memory exhaustion/ - routing problem doesn't leave a zero-window pcb as an indefinite zombie. - RTO mechanism has similar behavior, see pcb->nrtx */ - if (pcb->persist_probe < 0xFF) { - ++pcb->persist_probe; - } - - is_fin = ((TCPH_FLAGS(seg->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) != 0) && (seg->len == 0); - /* we want to send one seqno: either FIN or data (no options) */ - len = is_fin ? 0 : 1; - - p = tcp_output_alloc_header(pcb, optlen, len, seg->tcphdr->seqno); - - if (p == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_zero_window_probe: no memory for pbuf\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; - - if (is_fin) { - /* FIN segment, no data */ - TCPH_FLAGS_SET(tcphdr, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); - } else { - /* Data segment, copy in one byte from the head of the unacked queue */ - char *d = ((char *)p->payload + TCP_HLEN); - /* Depending on whether the segment has already been sent (unacked) or not - (unsent), seg->p->payload points to the IP header or TCP header. - Ensure we copy the first TCP data byte: */ - pbuf_copy_partial(seg->p, d, 1, seg->p->tot_len - seg->len); - } - - /* The byte may be acknowledged without the window being opened. */ - snd_nxt = lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + 1; - - if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->snd_nxt, snd_nxt)) { - pcb->snd_nxt = snd_nxt; - } - - tcp_output_fill_options(pcb, p, 0, optlen); - - err = tcp_output_control_segment(pcb, p, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_zero_window_probe: seqno %" U32_F - " ackno %" U32_F " err %d.\n", - pcb->snd_nxt - 1, pcb->rcv_nxt, (int)err)); - return err; -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +/** + * @file + * Transmission Control Protocol, outgoing traffic + * + * The output functions of TCP. + * + * There are two distinct ways for TCP segments to get sent: + * - queued data: these are segments transferring data or segments containing + * SYN or FIN (which both count as one sequence number). They are created as + * struct @ref pbuf together with a struct tcp_seg and enqueue to the + * unsent list of the pcb. They are sent by tcp_output: + * - @ref tcp_write : creates data segments + * - @ref tcp_split_unsent_seg : splits a data segment + * - @ref tcp_enqueue_flags : creates SYN-only or FIN-only segments + * - @ref tcp_output / tcp_output_segment : finalize the tcp header + * (e.g. sequence numbers, options, checksum) and output to IP + * - the various tcp_rexmit functions shuffle around segments between the + * unsent an unacked lists to retransmit them + * - tcp_create_segment and tcp_pbuf_prealloc allocate pbuf and + * segment for these functions + * - direct send: these segments don't contain data but control the connection + * behaviour. They are created as pbuf only and sent directly without + * enqueueing them: + * - @ref tcp_send_empty_ack sends an ACK-only segment + * - @ref tcp_rst sends a RST segment + * - @ref tcp_keepalive sends a keepalive segment + * - @ref tcp_zero_window_probe sends a window probe segment + * - tcp_output_alloc_header allocates a header-only pbuf for these functions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +/* Allow to add custom TCP header options by defining this hook */ +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(flags, pcb) LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH(pcb, LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(flags)) +#else +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(flags, pcb) LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(flags) +#endif + +/* Define some copy-macros for checksum-on-copy so that the code looks + nicer by preventing too many ifdef's. */ +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY +#define TCP_DATA_COPY(dst, src, len, seg) \ + do { \ + tcp_seg_add_chksum(LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst, src, len), \ + len, &seg->chksum, &seg->chksum_swapped); \ + seg->flags |= TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; \ + } while (0) +#define TCP_DATA_COPY2(dst, src, len, chksum, chksum_swapped) \ + tcp_seg_add_chksum(LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst, src, len), len, chksum, chksum_swapped); +#else /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY*/ +#define TCP_DATA_COPY(dst, src, len, seg) MEMCPY(dst, src, len) +#define TCP_DATA_COPY2(dst, src, len, chksum, chksum_swapped) MEMCPY(dst, src, len) +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY*/ + +/** Define this to 1 for an extra check that the output checksum is valid + * (usefule when the checksum is generated by the application, not the stack) */ +#ifndef TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK +#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK 0 +#endif +/* Allow to override the failure of sanity check from warning to e.g. hard failure */ +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK +#ifndef TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL +#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL(msg) LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, msg) +#endif +#endif + +#if TCP_OVERSIZE +/** The size of segment pbufs created when TCP_OVERSIZE is enabled */ +#ifndef TCP_OVERSIZE_CALC_LENGTH +#define TCP_OVERSIZE_CALC_LENGTH(length) ((length) + TCP_OVERSIZE) +#endif +#endif + +/* Forward declarations.*/ +static err_t tcp_output_segment(struct tcp_seg *seg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct netif *netif); + +/* tcp_route: common code that returns a fixed bound netif or calls ip_route */ +static struct netif *tcp_route(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dst) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(src); /* in case IPv4-only and source-based routing is disabled */ + + if ((pcb != NULL) && (pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX)) { + return netif_get_by_index(pcb->netif_idx); + } else { + return ip_route(src, dst); + } +} + +/** + * Create a TCP segment with prefilled header. + * + * Called by @ref tcp_write, @ref tcp_enqueue_flags and @ref tcp_split_unsent_seg + * + * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection. + * @param p pbuf that is used to hold the TCP header. + * @param hdrflags TCP flags for header. + * @param seqno TCP sequence number of this packet + * @param optflags options to include in TCP header + * @return a new tcp_seg pointing to p, or NULL. + * The TCP header is filled in except ackno and wnd. + * p is freed on failure. + */ +static struct tcp_seg *tcp_create_segment(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, u8_t hdrflags, u32_t seqno, u8_t optflags) +{ + struct tcp_seg *seg; + u8_t optlen; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_create_segment: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_create_segment: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); + + optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(optflags, pcb); + + if ((seg = (struct tcp_seg *)memp_malloc(MEMP_TCP_SEG)) == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_create_segment: no memory.\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + return NULL; + } + + seg->flags = optflags; + seg->next = NULL; + seg->p = p; + LWIP_ASSERT("p->tot_len >= optlen", p->tot_len >= optlen); + seg->len = p->tot_len - optlen; +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + seg->oversize_left = 0; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + seg->chksum = 0; + seg->chksum_swapped = 0; + /* check optflags */ + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid optflags passed: TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED", + (optflags & TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED) == 0); +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + /* build TCP header */ + if (pbuf_add_header(p, TCP_HLEN)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_create_segment: no room for TCP header in pbuf.\n")); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.err); + tcp_seg_free(seg); + return NULL; + } + + seg->tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)seg->p->payload; + seg->tcphdr->src = lwip_htons(pcb->local_port); + seg->tcphdr->dest = lwip_htons(pcb->remote_port); + seg->tcphdr->seqno = lwip_htonl(seqno); + /* ackno is set in tcp_output */ + TCPH_HDRLEN_FLAGS_SET(seg->tcphdr, (5 + optlen / 4), hdrflags); + /* wnd and chksum are set in tcp_output */ + seg->tcphdr->urgp = 0; + return seg; +} + +/** + * Allocate a PBUF_RAM pbuf, perhaps with extra space at the end. + * + * This function is like pbuf_alloc(layer, length, PBUF_RAM) except + * there may be extra bytes available at the end. + * + * Called by @ref tcp_write + * + * @param layer flag to define header size. + * @param length size of the pbuf's payload. + * @param max_length maximum usable size of payload+oversize. + * @param oversize pointer to a u16_t that will receive the number of usable tail bytes. + * @param pcb The TCP connection that will enqueue the pbuf. + * @param apiflags API flags given to tcp_write. + * @param first_seg true when this pbuf will be used in the first enqueued segment. + */ +#if TCP_OVERSIZE +static struct pbuf *tcp_pbuf_prealloc(pbuf_layer layer, u16_t length, u16_t max_length, + u16_t *oversize, const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t apiflags, + u8_t first_seg) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u16_t alloc = length; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pbuf_prealloc: invalid oversize", oversize != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_pbuf_prealloc: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + +#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(max_length); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(apiflags); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(first_seg); + alloc = max_length; +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + + if (length < max_length) { + /* Should we allocate an oversized pbuf, or just the minimum + * length required? If tcp_write is going to be called again + * before this segment is transmitted, we want the oversized + * buffer. If the segment will be transmitted immediately, we can + * save memory by allocating only length. We use a simple + * heuristic based on the following information: + * + * Did the user set TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE? + * + * Will the Nagle algorithm defer transmission of this segment? + */ + if ((apiflags & TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE) || + (!(pcb->flags & TF_NODELAY) && + (!first_seg || + pcb->unsent != NULL || + pcb->unacked != NULL))) { + alloc = LWIP_MIN(max_length, LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(TCP_OVERSIZE_CALC_LENGTH(length))); + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + p = pbuf_alloc(layer, alloc, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("need unchained pbuf", p->next == NULL); + *oversize = p->len - length; + /* trim p->len to the currently used size */ + p->len = p->tot_len = length; + return p; +} +#else /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ +#define tcp_pbuf_prealloc(layer, length, mx, os, pcb, api, fst) pbuf_alloc((layer), (length), PBUF_RAM) +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY +/** Add a checksum of newly added data to the segment. + * + * Called by tcp_write and tcp_split_unsent_seg. + */ +static void tcp_seg_add_chksum(u16_t chksum, u16_t len, u16_t *seg_chksum, + u8_t *seg_chksum_swapped) +{ + u32_t helper; + /* add chksum to old chksum and fold to u16_t */ + helper = chksum + *seg_chksum; + chksum = FOLD_U32T(helper); + + if ((len & 1) != 0) { + *seg_chksum_swapped = 1 - *seg_chksum_swapped; + chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(chksum); + } + + *seg_chksum = chksum; +} +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + +/** Checks if tcp_write is allowed or not (checks state, snd_buf and snd_queuelen). + * + * @param pcb the tcp pcb to check for + * @param len length of data to send (checked agains snd_buf) + * @return ERR_OK if tcp_write is allowed to proceed, another err_t otherwise + */ +static err_t tcp_write_checks(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write_checks: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + /* connection is in invalid state for data transmission? */ + if ((pcb->state != ESTABLISHED) && + (pcb->state != CLOSE_WAIT) && + (pcb->state != SYN_SENT) && + (pcb->state != SYN_RCVD)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("tcp_write() called in invalid state\n")); + return ERR_CONN; + } else if (len == 0) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* fail on too much data */ + if (len > pcb->snd_buf) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("tcp_write: too much data (len=%" U16_F " > snd_buf=%" TCPWNDSIZE_F ")\n", + len, pcb->snd_buf)); + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_write: queuelen: %" TCPWNDSIZE_F "\n", (tcpwnd_size_t)pcb->snd_queuelen)); + + /* If total number of pbufs on the unsent/unacked queues exceeds the + * configured maximum, return an error */ + /* check for configured max queuelen and possible overflow */ + if (pcb->snd_queuelen >= LWIP_MIN(TCP_SND_QUEUELEN, (TCP_SNDQUEUELEN_OVERFLOW + 1))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE, ("tcp_write: too long queue %" U16_F " (max %" U16_F ")\n", + pcb->snd_queuelen, (u16_t)TCP_SND_QUEUELEN)); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: pbufs on queue => at least one queue non-empty", + pcb->unacked != NULL || pcb->unsent != NULL); + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: no pbufs on queue => both queues empty", + pcb->unacked == NULL && pcb->unsent == NULL); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Write data for sending (but does not send it immediately). + * + * It waits in the expectation of more data being sent soon (as + * it can send them more efficiently by combining them together). + * To prompt the system to send data now, call tcp_output() after + * calling tcp_write(). + * + * This function enqueues the data pointed to by the argument dataptr. The length of + * the data is passed as the len parameter. The apiflags can be one or more of: + * - TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY: indicates whether the new memory should be allocated + * for the data to be copied into. If this flag is not given, no new memory + * should be allocated and the data should only be referenced by pointer. This + * also means that the memory behind dataptr must not change until the data is + * ACKed by the remote host + * - TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE: indicates that more data follows. If this is omitted, + * the PSH flag is set in the last segment created by this call to tcp_write. + * If this flag is given, the PSH flag is not set. + * + * The tcp_write() function will fail and return ERR_MEM if the length + * of the data exceeds the current send buffer size or if the length of + * the queue of outgoing segment is larger than the upper limit defined + * in lwipopts.h. The number of bytes available in the output queue can + * be retrieved with the tcp_sndbuf() function. + * + * The proper way to use this function is to call the function with at + * most tcp_sndbuf() bytes of data. If the function returns ERR_MEM, + * the application should wait until some of the currently enqueued + * data has been successfully received by the other host and try again. + * + * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection to enqueue data for. + * @param arg Pointer to the data to be enqueued for sending. + * @param len Data length in bytes + * @param apiflags combination of following flags : + * - TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY (0x01) data will be copied into memory belonging to the stack + * - TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE (0x02) for TCP connection, PSH flag will not be set on last segment sent, + * @return ERR_OK if enqueued, another err_t on error + */ +err_t tcp_write(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const void *arg, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags) +{ + struct pbuf *concat_p = NULL; + struct tcp_seg *last_unsent = NULL, *seg = NULL, *prev_seg = NULL, *queue = NULL; + u16_t pos = 0; /* position in 'arg' data */ + u16_t queuelen; + u8_t optlen; + u8_t optflags = 0; +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + u16_t oversize = 0; + u16_t oversize_used = 0; +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + u16_t oversize_add = 0; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK*/ +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + u16_t extendlen = 0; +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + u16_t concat_chksum = 0; + u8_t concat_chksum_swapped = 0; + u16_t concat_chksummed = 0; +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + err_t err; + u16_t mss_local; + + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_write: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + /* don't allocate segments bigger than half the maximum window we ever received */ + mss_local = LWIP_MIN(pcb->mss, TCPWND_MIN16(pcb->snd_wnd_max / 2)); + mss_local = mss_local ? mss_local : pcb->mss; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + +#if LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + /* Always copy to try to create single pbufs for TX */ + apiflags |= TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_write(pcb=%p, data=%p, len=%" U16_F ", apiflags=%" U16_F ")\n", + (void *)pcb, arg, len, (u16_t)apiflags)); + LWIP_ERROR("tcp_write: arg == NULL (programmer violates API)", + arg != NULL, return ERR_ARG;); + + err = tcp_write_checks(pcb, len); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + queuelen = pcb->snd_queuelen; + +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + + if ((pcb->flags & TF_TIMESTAMP)) { + /* Make sure the timestamp option is only included in data segments if we + agreed about it with the remote host. */ + optflags = TF_SEG_OPTS_TS; + optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(TF_SEG_OPTS_TS, pcb); + /* ensure that segments can hold at least one data byte... */ + mss_local = LWIP_MAX(mss_local, LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS + 1); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ + { + optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(0, pcb); + } + + /* + * TCP segmentation is done in three phases with increasing complexity: + * + * 1. Copy data directly into an oversized pbuf. + * 2. Chain a new pbuf to the end of pcb->unsent. + * 3. Create new segments. + * + * We may run out of memory at any point. In that case we must + * return ERR_MEM and not change anything in pcb. Therefore, all + * changes are recorded in local variables and committed at the end + * of the function. Some pcb fields are maintained in local copies: + * + * queuelen = pcb->snd_queuelen + * oversize = pcb->unsent_oversize + * + * These variables are set consistently by the phases: + * + * seg points to the last segment tampered with. + * + * pos records progress as data is segmented. + */ + + /* Find the tail of the unsent queue. */ + if (pcb->unsent != NULL) { + u16_t space; + u16_t unsent_optlen; + + /* @todo: this could be sped up by keeping last_unsent in the pcb */ + for (last_unsent = pcb->unsent; last_unsent->next != NULL; + last_unsent = last_unsent->next) + ; + + /* Usable space at the end of the last unsent segment */ + unsent_optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(last_unsent->flags, pcb); + LWIP_ASSERT("mss_local is too small", mss_local >= last_unsent->len + unsent_optlen); + space = mss_local - (last_unsent->len + unsent_optlen); + + /* + * Phase 1: Copy data directly into an oversized pbuf. + * + * The number of bytes copied is recorded in the oversize_used + * variable. The actual copying is done at the bottom of the + * function. + */ +#if TCP_OVERSIZE +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + /* check that pcb->unsent_oversize matches last_unsent->oversize_left */ + LWIP_ASSERT("unsent_oversize mismatch (pcb vs. last_unsent)", + pcb->unsent_oversize == last_unsent->oversize_left); +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ + oversize = pcb->unsent_oversize; + + if (oversize > 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("inconsistent oversize vs. space", oversize <= space); + seg = last_unsent; + oversize_used = LWIP_MIN(space, LWIP_MIN(oversize, len)); + pos += oversize_used; + oversize -= oversize_used; + space -= oversize_used; + } + + /* now we are either finished or oversize is zero */ + LWIP_ASSERT("inconsistent oversize vs. len", (oversize == 0) || (pos == len)); +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + +#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF + + /* + * Phase 2: Chain a new pbuf to the end of pcb->unsent. + * + * As an exception when NOT copying the data, if the given data buffer + * directly follows the last unsent data buffer in memory, extend the last + * ROM pbuf reference to the buffer, thus saving a ROM pbuf allocation. + * + * We don't extend segments containing SYN/FIN flags or options + * (len==0). The new pbuf is kept in concat_p and pbuf_cat'ed at + * the end. + * + * This phase is skipped for LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF as we could only execute + * it after rexmit puts a segment from unacked to unsent and at this point, + * oversize info is lost. + */ + if ((pos < len) && (space > 0) && (last_unsent->len > 0)) { + u16_t seglen = LWIP_MIN(space, len - pos); + seg = last_unsent; + + /* Create a pbuf with a copy or reference to seglen bytes. We + * can use PBUF_RAW here since the data appears in the middle of + * a segment. A header will never be prepended. */ + if (apiflags & TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY) { + /* Data is copied */ + if ((concat_p = tcp_pbuf_prealloc(PBUF_RAW, seglen, space, &oversize, pcb, apiflags, 1)) == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("tcp_write : could not allocate memory for pbuf copy size %" U16_F "\n", + seglen)); + goto memerr; + } + +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + oversize_add = oversize; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ + TCP_DATA_COPY2(concat_p->payload, (const u8_t *)arg + pos, seglen, &concat_chksum, &concat_chksum_swapped); +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + concat_chksummed += seglen; +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + queuelen += pbuf_clen(concat_p); + } else { + /* Data is not copied */ + /* If the last unsent pbuf is of type PBUF_ROM, try to extend it. */ + struct pbuf *p; + + for (p = last_unsent->p; p->next != NULL; p = p->next) + ; + + if (((p->type_internal & (PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS | PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_DATA_VOLATILE)) == 0) && + (const u8_t *)p->payload + p->len == (const u8_t *)arg) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: ROM pbufs cannot be oversized", pos == 0); + extendlen = seglen; + } else { + if ((concat_p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, seglen, PBUF_ROM)) == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("tcp_write: could not allocate memory for zero-copy pbuf\n")); + goto memerr; + } + + /* reference the non-volatile payload data */ + ((struct pbuf_rom *)concat_p)->payload = (const u8_t *)arg + pos; + queuelen += pbuf_clen(concat_p); + } + +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + /* calculate the checksum of nocopy-data */ + tcp_seg_add_chksum(~inet_chksum((const u8_t *)arg + pos, seglen), seglen, + &concat_chksum, &concat_chksum_swapped); + concat_chksummed += seglen; +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + } + + pos += seglen; + } + +#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + } else { +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + LWIP_ASSERT("unsent_oversize mismatch (pcb->unsent is NULL)", + pcb->unsent_oversize == 0); +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + } + + /* + * Phase 3: Create new segments. + * + * The new segments are chained together in the local 'queue' + * variable, ready to be appended to pcb->unsent. + */ + while (pos < len) { + struct pbuf *p; + u16_t left = len - pos; + u16_t max_len = mss_local - optlen; + u16_t seglen = LWIP_MIN(left, max_len); +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + u16_t chksum = 0; + u8_t chksum_swapped = 0; +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + if (apiflags & TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY) { + /* If copy is set, memory should be allocated and data copied + * into pbuf */ + if ((p = tcp_pbuf_prealloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, seglen + optlen, mss_local, &oversize, pcb, apiflags, queue == NULL)) == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_write : could not allocate memory for pbuf copy size %" U16_F "\n", seglen)); + goto memerr; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: check that first pbuf can hold the complete seglen", + (p->len >= seglen)); + TCP_DATA_COPY2((char *)p->payload + optlen, (const u8_t *)arg + pos, seglen, &chksum, &chksum_swapped); + } else { + /* Copy is not set: First allocate a pbuf for holding the data. + * Since the referenced data is available at least until it is + * sent out on the link (as it has to be ACKed by the remote + * party) we can safely use PBUF_ROM instead of PBUF_REF here. + */ + struct pbuf *p2; +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + LWIP_ASSERT("oversize == 0", oversize == 0); +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + + if ((p2 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, seglen, PBUF_ROM)) == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_write: could not allocate memory for zero-copy pbuf\n")); + goto memerr; + } + +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + /* calculate the checksum of nocopy-data */ + chksum = ~inet_chksum((const u8_t *)arg + pos, seglen); + + if (seglen & 1) { + chksum_swapped = 1; + chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(chksum); + } + +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + /* reference the non-volatile payload data */ + ((struct pbuf_rom *)p2)->payload = (const u8_t *)arg + pos; + + /* Second, allocate a pbuf for the headers. */ + if ((p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, optlen, PBUF_RAM)) == NULL) { + /* If allocation fails, we have to deallocate the data pbuf as + * well. */ + pbuf_free(p2); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_write: could not allocate memory for header pbuf\n")); + goto memerr; + } + + /* Concatenate the headers and data pbufs together. */ + pbuf_cat(p /*header*/, p2 /*data*/); + } + + queuelen += pbuf_clen(p); + + /* Now that there are more segments queued, we check again if the + * length of the queue exceeds the configured maximum or + * overflows. */ + if (queuelen > LWIP_MIN(TCP_SND_QUEUELEN, TCP_SNDQUEUELEN_OVERFLOW)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_write: queue too long %" U16_F " (%d)\n", + queuelen, (int)TCP_SND_QUEUELEN)); + pbuf_free(p); + goto memerr; + } + + if ((seg = tcp_create_segment(pcb, p, 0, pcb->snd_lbb + pos, optflags)) == NULL) { + goto memerr; + } + +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + seg->oversize_left = oversize; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + seg->chksum = chksum; + seg->chksum_swapped = chksum_swapped; + seg->flags |= TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + /* first segment of to-be-queued data? */ + if (queue == NULL) { + queue = seg; + } else { + /* Attach the segment to the end of the queued segments */ + LWIP_ASSERT("prev_seg != NULL", prev_seg != NULL); + prev_seg->next = seg; + } + + /* remember last segment of to-be-queued data for next iteration */ + prev_seg = seg; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("tcp_write: queueing %" U32_F ":%" U32_F "\n", + lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), + lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg))); + + pos += seglen; + } + + /* + * All three segmentation phases were successful. We can commit the + * transaction. + */ +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + + if ((last_unsent != NULL) && (oversize_add != 0)) { + last_unsent->oversize_left += oversize_add; + } + +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ + + /* + * Phase 1: If data has been added to the preallocated tail of + * last_unsent, we update the length fields of the pbuf chain. + */ +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + + if (oversize_used > 0) { + struct pbuf *p; + + /* Bump tot_len of whole chain, len of tail */ + for (p = last_unsent->p; p; p = p->next) { + p->tot_len += oversize_used; + + if (p->next == NULL) { + TCP_DATA_COPY((char *)p->payload + p->len, arg, oversize_used, last_unsent); + p->len += oversize_used; + } + } + + last_unsent->len += oversize_used; +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + LWIP_ASSERT("last_unsent->oversize_left >= oversize_used", + last_unsent->oversize_left >= oversize_used); + last_unsent->oversize_left -= oversize_used; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ + } + + pcb->unsent_oversize = oversize; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + + /* + * Phase 2: concat_p can be concatenated onto last_unsent->p, unless we + * determined that the last ROM pbuf can be extended to include the new data. + */ + if (concat_p != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: cannot concatenate when pcb->unsent is empty", + (last_unsent != NULL)); + pbuf_cat(last_unsent->p, concat_p); + last_unsent->len += concat_p->tot_len; + } else if (extendlen > 0) { + struct pbuf *p; + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: extension of reference requires reference", + last_unsent != NULL && last_unsent->p != NULL); + + for (p = last_unsent->p; p->next != NULL; p = p->next) { + p->tot_len += extendlen; + } + + p->tot_len += extendlen; + p->len += extendlen; + last_unsent->len += extendlen; + } + +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + + if (concat_chksummed) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: concat checksum needs concatenated data", + concat_p != NULL || extendlen > 0); + + /*if concat checksumm swapped - swap it back */ + if (concat_chksum_swapped) { + concat_chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(concat_chksum); + } + + tcp_seg_add_chksum(concat_chksum, concat_chksummed, &last_unsent->chksum, + &last_unsent->chksum_swapped); + last_unsent->flags |= TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; + } + +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + /* + * Phase 3: Append queue to pcb->unsent. Queue may be NULL, but that + * is harmless + */ + if (last_unsent == NULL) { + pcb->unsent = queue; + } else { + last_unsent->next = queue; + } + + /* + * Finally update the pcb state. + */ + pcb->snd_lbb += len; + pcb->snd_buf -= len; + pcb->snd_queuelen = queuelen; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_write: %" S16_F " (after enqueued)\n", + pcb->snd_queuelen)); + + if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: valid queue length", + pcb->unacked != NULL || pcb->unsent != NULL); + } + + /* Set the PSH flag in the last segment that we enqueued. */ + if (seg != NULL && seg->tcphdr != NULL && ((apiflags & TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE) == 0)) { + TCPH_SET_FLAG(seg->tcphdr, TCP_PSH); + } + + return ERR_OK; +memerr: + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); + + if (concat_p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(concat_p); + } + + if (queue != NULL) { + tcp_segs_free(queue); + } + + if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_write: valid queue length", pcb->unacked != NULL || + pcb->unsent != NULL); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("tcp_write: %" S16_F " (with mem err)\n", pcb->snd_queuelen)); + return ERR_MEM; +} + +/** + * Split segment on the head of the unsent queue. If return is not + * ERR_OK, existing head remains intact + * + * The split is accomplished by creating a new TCP segment and pbuf + * which holds the remainder payload after the split. The original + * pbuf is trimmed to new length. This allows splitting of read-only + * pbufs + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to split the unsent head + * @param split the amount of payload to remain in the head + */ +err_t tcp_split_unsent_seg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t split) +{ + struct tcp_seg *seg = NULL, *useg = NULL; + struct pbuf *p = NULL; + u8_t optlen; + u8_t optflags; + u8_t split_flags; + u8_t remainder_flags; + u16_t remainder; + u16_t offset; +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + u16_t chksum = 0; + u8_t chksum_swapped = 0; + struct pbuf *q; +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_split_unsent_seg: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + useg = pcb->unsent; + + if (useg == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (split == 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("Can't split segment into length 0", 0); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (useg->len <= split) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("split <= mss", split <= pcb->mss); + LWIP_ASSERT("useg->len > 0", useg->len > 0); + + /* We should check that we don't exceed TCP_SND_QUEUELEN but we need + * to split this packet so we may actually exceed the max value by + * one! + */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_enqueue: split_unsent_seg: %u\n", (unsigned int)pcb->snd_queuelen)); + + optflags = useg->flags; +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + /* Remove since checksum is not stored until after tcp_create_segment() */ + optflags &= ~TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(optflags); + remainder = useg->len - split; + + /* Create new pbuf for the remainder of the split */ + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, remainder + optlen, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("tcp_split_unsent_seg: could not allocate memory for pbuf remainder %u\n", remainder)); + goto memerr; + } + + /* Offset into the original pbuf is past TCP/IP headers, options, and split amount */ + offset = useg->p->tot_len - useg->len + split; + + /* Copy remainder into new pbuf, headers and options will not be filled out */ + if (pbuf_copy_partial(useg->p, (u8_t *)p->payload + optlen, remainder, offset) != remainder) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("tcp_split_unsent_seg: could not copy pbuf remainder %u\n", remainder)); + goto memerr; + } + +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + /* calculate the checksum on remainder data */ + tcp_seg_add_chksum(~inet_chksum((const u8_t *)p->payload + optlen, remainder), remainder, + &chksum, &chksum_swapped); +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + /* Options are created when calling tcp_output() */ + + /* Migrate flags from original segment */ + split_flags = TCPH_FLAGS(useg->tcphdr); + remainder_flags = 0; /* ACK added in tcp_output() */ + + if (split_flags & TCP_PSH) { + split_flags &= ~TCP_PSH; + remainder_flags |= TCP_PSH; + } + + if (split_flags & TCP_FIN) { + split_flags &= ~TCP_FIN; + remainder_flags |= TCP_FIN; + } + + /* SYN should be left on split, RST should not be present with data */ + + seg = tcp_create_segment(pcb, p, remainder_flags, lwip_ntohl(useg->tcphdr->seqno) + split, optflags); + + if (seg == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("tcp_split_unsent_seg: could not create new TCP segment\n")); + goto memerr; + } + +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + seg->chksum = chksum; + seg->chksum_swapped = chksum_swapped; + seg->flags |= TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED; +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + /* Remove this segment from the queue since trimming it may free pbufs */ + pcb->snd_queuelen -= pbuf_clen(useg->p); + + /* Trim the original pbuf into our split size. At this point our remainder segment must be setup + successfully because we are modifying the original segment */ + pbuf_realloc(useg->p, useg->p->tot_len - remainder); + useg->len -= remainder; + TCPH_SET_FLAG(useg->tcphdr, split_flags); +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + /* By trimming, realloc may have actually shrunk the pbuf, so clear oversize_left */ + useg->oversize_left = 0; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ + + /* Add back to the queue with new trimmed pbuf */ + pcb->snd_queuelen += pbuf_clen(useg->p); + +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + /* The checksum on the split segment is now incorrect. We need to re-run it over the split */ + useg->chksum = 0; + useg->chksum_swapped = 0; + q = useg->p; + offset = q->tot_len - useg->len; /* Offset due to exposed headers */ + + /* Advance to the pbuf where the offset ends */ + while (q != NULL && offset > q->len) { + offset -= q->len; + q = q->next; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("Found start of payload pbuf", q != NULL); + + /* Checksum the first payload pbuf accounting for offset, then other pbufs are all payload */ + for (; q != NULL; offset = 0, q = q->next) { + tcp_seg_add_chksum(~inet_chksum((const u8_t *)q->payload + offset, q->len - offset), q->len - offset, + &useg->chksum, &useg->chksum_swapped); + } + +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + /* Update number of segments on the queues. Note that length now may + * exceed TCP_SND_QUEUELEN! We don't have to touch pcb->snd_buf + * because the total amount of data is constant when packet is split */ + pcb->snd_queuelen += pbuf_clen(seg->p); + + /* Finally insert remainder into queue after split (which stays head) */ + seg->next = useg->next; + useg->next = seg; + +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + + /* If remainder is last segment on the unsent, ensure we clear the oversize amount + * because the remainder is always sized to the exact remaining amount */ + if (seg->next == NULL) { + pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; + } + +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + + return ERR_OK; +memerr: + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); + + LWIP_ASSERT("seg == NULL", seg == NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + return ERR_MEM; +} + +/** + * Called by tcp_close() to send a segment including FIN flag but not data. + * This FIN may be added to an existing segment or a new, otherwise empty + * segment is enqueued. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb over which to send a segment + * @return ERR_OK if sent, another err_t otherwise + */ +err_t tcp_send_fin(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_send_fin: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + /* first, try to add the fin to the last unsent segment */ + if (pcb->unsent != NULL) { + struct tcp_seg *last_unsent; + + for (last_unsent = pcb->unsent; last_unsent->next != NULL; + last_unsent = last_unsent->next) + ; + + if ((TCPH_FLAGS(last_unsent->tcphdr) & (TCP_SYN | TCP_FIN | TCP_RST)) == 0) { + /* no SYN/FIN/RST flag in the header, we can add the FIN flag */ + TCPH_SET_FLAG(last_unsent->tcphdr, TCP_FIN); + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_FIN); + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* no data, no length, flags, copy=1, no optdata */ + return tcp_enqueue_flags(pcb, TCP_FIN); +} + +/** + * Enqueue SYN or FIN for transmission. + * + * Called by @ref tcp_connect, tcp_listen_input, and @ref tcp_close + * (via @ref tcp_send_fin) + * + * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection. + * @param flags TCP header flags to set in the outgoing segment. + */ +err_t tcp_enqueue_flags(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t flags) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + struct tcp_seg *seg; + u8_t optflags = 0; + u8_t optlen = 0; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_enqueue_flags: queuelen: %" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)pcb->snd_queuelen)); + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: need either TCP_SYN or TCP_FIN in flags (programmer violates API)", + (flags & (TCP_SYN | TCP_FIN)) != 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + /* No need to check pcb->snd_queuelen if only SYN or FIN are allowed! */ + + /* Get options for this segment. This is a special case since this is the + only place where a SYN can be sent. */ + if (flags & TCP_SYN) { + optflags = TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS; +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE + + if ((pcb->state != SYN_RCVD) || (pcb->flags & TF_WND_SCALE)) { + /* In a (sent in state SYN_RCVD), the window scale option may only + be sent if we received a window scale option from the remote host. */ + optflags |= TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + if ((pcb->state != SYN_RCVD) || (pcb->flags & TF_SACK)) { + /* In a (sent in state SYN_RCVD), the SACK_PERM option may only + be sent if we received a SACK_PERM option from the remote host. */ + optflags |= TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + } + +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + + if ((pcb->flags & TF_TIMESTAMP) || ((flags & TCP_SYN) && (pcb->state != SYN_RCVD))) { + /* Make sure the timestamp option is only included in data segments if we + agreed about it with the remote host (and in active open SYN segments). */ + optflags |= TF_SEG_OPTS_TS; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ + optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(optflags, pcb); + + /* Allocate pbuf with room for TCP header + options */ + if ((p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, optlen, PBUF_RAM)) == NULL) { + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: check that first pbuf can hold optlen", + (p->len >= optlen)); + + /* Allocate memory for tcp_seg, and fill in fields. */ + if ((seg = tcp_create_segment(pcb, p, flags, pcb->snd_lbb, optflags)) == NULL) { + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.memerr); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("seg->tcphdr not aligned", ((mem_ptr_t)seg->tcphdr % LWIP_MIN(MEM_ALIGNMENT, 4)) == 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: invalid segment length", seg->len == 0); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("tcp_enqueue_flags: queueing %" U32_F ":%" U32_F " (0x%" X16_F ")\n", + lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), + lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg), + (u16_t)flags)); + + /* Now append seg to pcb->unsent queue */ + if (pcb->unsent == NULL) { + pcb->unsent = seg; + } else { + struct tcp_seg *useg; + + for (useg = pcb->unsent; useg->next != NULL; useg = useg->next) + ; + + useg->next = seg; + } + +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + /* The new unsent tail has no space */ + pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + + /* SYN and FIN bump the sequence number */ + if ((flags & TCP_SYN) || (flags & TCP_FIN)) { + pcb->snd_lbb++; + /* optlen does not influence snd_buf */ + } + + if (flags & TCP_FIN) { + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_FIN); + } + + /* update number of segments on the queues */ + pcb->snd_queuelen += pbuf_clen(seg->p); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_QLEN_DEBUG, ("tcp_enqueue_flags: %" S16_F " (after enqueued)\n", pcb->snd_queuelen)); + + if (pcb->snd_queuelen != 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_enqueue_flags: invalid queue length", + pcb->unacked != NULL || pcb->unsent != NULL); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS +/* Build a timestamp option (12 bytes long) at the specified options pointer) + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb + * @param opts option pointer where to store the timestamp option + */ +static void tcp_build_timestamp_option(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t *opts) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_build_timestamp_option: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + /* Pad with two NOP options to make everything nicely aligned */ + opts[0] = PP_HTONL(0x0101080A); + opts[1] = lwip_htonl(sys_now()); + opts[2] = lwip_htonl(pcb->ts_recent); +} +#endif + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT +/** + * Calculates the number of SACK entries that should be generated. + * It takes into account whether TF_SACK flag is set, + * the number of SACK entries in tcp_pcb that are valid, + * as well as the available options size. + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb + * @param optlen the length of other TCP options (in bytes) + * @return the number of SACK ranges that can be used + */ +static u8_t tcp_get_num_sacks(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t optlen) +{ + u8_t num_sacks = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_get_num_sacks: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + if (pcb->flags & TF_SACK) { + u8_t i; + + /* The first SACK takes up 12 bytes (it includes SACK header and two NOP options), + each additional one - 8 bytes. */ + optlen += 12; + + /* Max options size = 40, number of SACK array entries = LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM */ + for (i = 0; (i < LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM) && (optlen <= TCP_MAX_OPTION_BYTES) && + LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, i); + ++i) { + ++num_sacks; + optlen += 8; + } + } + + return num_sacks; +} + +/** Build a SACK option (12 or more bytes long) at the specified options pointer) + * + * @param pcb tcp_pcb + * @param opts option pointer where to store the SACK option + * @param num_sacks the number of SACKs to store + */ +static void tcp_build_sack_option(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t *opts, u8_t num_sacks) +{ + u8_t i; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_build_sack_option: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_build_sack_option: invalid opts", opts != NULL); + + /* Pad with two NOP options to make everything nicely aligned. + We add the length (of just the SACK option, not the NOPs in front of it), + which is 2B of header, plus 8B for each SACK. */ + *(opts++) = PP_HTONL(0x01010500 + 2 + num_sacks * 8); + + for (i = 0; i < num_sacks; ++i) { + *(opts++) = lwip_htonl(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].left); + *(opts++) = lwip_htonl(pcb->rcv_sacks[i].right); + } +} + +#endif + +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE +/** Build a window scale option (3 bytes long) at the specified options pointer) + * + * @param opts option pointer where to store the window scale option + */ +static void tcp_build_wnd_scale_option(u32_t *opts) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_build_wnd_scale_option: invalid opts", opts != NULL); + + /* Pad with one NOP option to make everything nicely aligned */ + opts[0] = PP_HTONL(0x01030300 | TCP_RCV_SCALE); +} +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup tcp_raw + * Find out what we can send and send it + * + * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection to send data + * @return ERR_OK if data has been sent or nothing to send + * another err_t on error + */ +err_t tcp_output(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct tcp_seg *seg, *useg; + u32_t wnd, snd_nxt; + err_t err; + struct netif *netif; +#if TCP_CWND_DEBUG + s16_t i = 0; +#endif /* TCP_CWND_DEBUG */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + /* pcb->state LISTEN not allowed here */ + LWIP_ASSERT("don't call tcp_output for listen-pcbs", + pcb->state != LISTEN); + + /* First, check if we are invoked by the TCP input processing + code. If so, we do not output anything. Instead, we rely on the + input processing code to call us when input processing is done + with. */ + if (tcp_input_pcb == pcb) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + wnd = LWIP_MIN(pcb->snd_wnd, pcb->cwnd); + + seg = pcb->unsent; + + if (seg == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_output: nothing to send (%p)\n", + (void *)pcb->unsent)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_output: snd_wnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F + ", cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", wnd %" U32_F + ", seg == NULL, ack %" U32_F "\n", + pcb->snd_wnd, pcb->cwnd, wnd, pcb->lastack)); + + /* If the TF_ACK_NOW flag is set and the ->unsent queue is empty, construct + * an empty ACK segment and send it. */ + if (pcb->flags & TF_ACK_NOW) { + return tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); + } + + /* nothing to send: shortcut out of here */ + goto output_done; + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, + ("tcp_output: snd_wnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", wnd %" U32_F + ", effwnd %" U32_F ", seq %" U32_F ", ack %" U32_F "\n", + pcb->snd_wnd, pcb->cwnd, wnd, + lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) - pcb->lastack + seg->len, + lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), pcb->lastack)); + } + + netif = tcp_route(pcb, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); + + if (netif == NULL) { + return ERR_RTE; + } + + /* If we don't have a local IP address, we get one from netif */ + if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip)) { + const ip_addr_t *local_ip = ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, &pcb->remote_ip); + + if (local_ip == NULL) { + return ERR_RTE; + } + + ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); + } + + /* Handle the current segment not fitting within the window */ + if (lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) - pcb->lastack + seg->len > wnd) { + /* We need to start the persistent timer when the next unsent segment does not fit + * within the remaining (could be 0) send window and RTO timer is not running (we + * have no in-flight data). If window is still too small after persist timer fires, + * then we split the segment. We don't consider the congestion window since a cwnd + * smaller than 1 SMSS implies in-flight data + */ + if (wnd == pcb->snd_wnd && pcb->unacked == NULL && pcb->persist_backoff == 0) { + pcb->persist_cnt = 0; + pcb->persist_backoff = 1; + pcb->persist_probe = 0; + } + + /* We need an ACK, but can't send data now, so send an empty ACK */ + if (pcb->flags & TF_ACK_NOW) { + return tcp_send_empty_ack(pcb); + } + + goto output_done; + } + + /* Stop persist timer, above conditions are not active */ + pcb->persist_backoff = 0; + + /* useg should point to last segment on unacked queue */ + useg = pcb->unacked; + + if (useg != NULL) { + for (; useg->next != NULL; useg = useg->next) + ; + } + + /* data available and window allows it to be sent? */ + while (seg != NULL && + lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) - pcb->lastack + seg->len <= wnd) { + LWIP_ASSERT("RST not expected here!", + (TCPH_FLAGS(seg->tcphdr) & TCP_RST) == 0); + + /* Stop sending if the nagle algorithm would prevent it + * Don't stop: + * - if tcp_write had a memory error before (prevent delayed ACK timeout) or + * - if FIN was already enqueued for this PCB (SYN is always alone in a segment - + * either seg->next != NULL or pcb->unacked == NULL; + * RST is no sent using tcp_write/tcp_output. + */ + if ((tcp_do_output_nagle(pcb) == 0) && + ((pcb->flags & (TF_NAGLEMEMERR | TF_FIN)) == 0)) { + break; + } + +#if TCP_CWND_DEBUG + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_CWND_DEBUG, ("tcp_output: snd_wnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", cwnd %" TCPWNDSIZE_F ", wnd %" U32_F ", effwnd %" U32_F ", seq %" U32_F ", ack %" U32_F ", i %" S16_F "\n", + pcb->snd_wnd, pcb->cwnd, wnd, + lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + seg->len - + pcb->lastack, + lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), pcb->lastack, i)); + ++i; +#endif /* TCP_CWND_DEBUG */ + + if (pcb->state != SYN_SENT) { + TCPH_SET_FLAG(seg->tcphdr, TCP_ACK); + } + + err = tcp_output_segment(seg, pcb, netif); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* segment could not be sent, for whatever reason */ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); + return err; + } + +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + seg->oversize_left = 0; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ + pcb->unsent = seg->next; + + if (pcb->state != SYN_SENT) { + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); + } + + snd_nxt = lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg); + + if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->snd_nxt, snd_nxt)) { + pcb->snd_nxt = snd_nxt; + } + + /* put segment on unacknowledged list if length > 0 */ + if (TCP_TCPLEN(seg) > 0) { + seg->next = NULL; + + /* unacked list is empty? */ + if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { + pcb->unacked = seg; + useg = seg; + /* unacked list is not empty? */ + } else { + /* In the case of fast retransmit, the packet should not go to the tail + * of the unacked queue, but rather somewhere before it. We need to check for + * this case. -STJ Jul 27, 2004 */ + if (TCP_SEQ_LT(lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), lwip_ntohl(useg->tcphdr->seqno))) { + /* add segment to before tail of unacked list, keeping the list sorted */ + struct tcp_seg **cur_seg = &(pcb->unacked); + + while (*cur_seg && + TCP_SEQ_LT(lwip_ntohl((*cur_seg)->tcphdr->seqno), lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno))) { + cur_seg = &((*cur_seg)->next); + } + + seg->next = (*cur_seg); + (*cur_seg) = seg; + } else { + /* add segment to tail of unacked list */ + useg->next = seg; + useg = useg->next; + } + } + + /* do not queue empty segments on the unacked list */ + } else { + tcp_seg_free(seg); + } + + seg = pcb->unsent; + } + +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + + if (pcb->unsent == NULL) { + /* last unsent has been removed, reset unsent_oversize */ + pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; + } + +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + +output_done: + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_NAGLEMEMERR); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Check if a segment's pbufs are used by someone else than TCP. + * This can happen on retransmission if the pbuf of this segment is still + * referenced by the netif driver due to deferred transmission. + * This is the case (only!) if someone down the TX call path called + * pbuf_ref() on one of the pbufs! + * + * @arg seg the tcp segment to check + * @return 1 if ref != 1, 0 if ref == 1 + */ +static int tcp_output_segment_busy(const struct tcp_seg *seg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_segment_busy: invalid seg", seg != NULL); + + /* We only need to check the first pbuf here: + If a pbuf is queued for transmission, a driver calls pbuf_ref(), + which only changes the ref count of the first pbuf */ + if (seg->p->ref != 1) { + /* other reference found */ + return 1; + } + + /* no other references found */ + return 0; +} + +/** + * Called by tcp_output() to actually send a TCP segment over IP. + * + * @param seg the tcp_seg to send + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for the TCP connection used to send the segment + * @param netif the netif used to send the segment + */ +static err_t tcp_output_segment(struct tcp_seg *seg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct netif *netif) +{ + err_t err; + u16_t len; + u32_t *opts; +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + int seg_chksum_was_swapped = 0; +#endif + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_segment: invalid seg", seg != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_segment: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_segment: invalid netif", netif != NULL); + + if (tcp_output_segment_busy(seg)) { + /* This should not happen: rexmit functions should have checked this. + However, since this function modifies p->len, we must not continue in this case. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("tcp_output_segment: segment busy\n")); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* The TCP header has already been constructed, but the ackno and + wnd fields remain. */ + seg->tcphdr->ackno = lwip_htonl(pcb->rcv_nxt); + + /* advertise our receive window size in this TCP segment */ +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE + + if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE) { + /* The Window field in a SYN segment itself (the only type where we send + the window scale option) is never scaled. */ + seg->tcphdr->wnd = lwip_htons(TCPWND_MIN16(pcb->rcv_ann_wnd)); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + { + seg->tcphdr->wnd = lwip_htons(TCPWND_MIN16(RCV_WND_SCALE(pcb, pcb->rcv_ann_wnd))); + } + + pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_ann_wnd; + + /* Add any requested options. NB MSS option is only set on SYN + packets, so ignore it here */ + /* cast through void* to get rid of alignment warnings */ + opts = (u32_t *)(void *)(seg->tcphdr + 1); + + if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS) { + u16_t mss; +#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS + mss = tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(TCP_MSS, netif, &pcb->remote_ip); +#else /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ + mss = TCP_MSS; +#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ + *opts = TCP_BUILD_MSS_OPTION(mss); + opts += 1; + } + +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + pcb->ts_lastacksent = pcb->rcv_nxt; + + if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_TS) { + tcp_build_timestamp_option(pcb, opts); + opts += 3; + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE + + if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE) { + tcp_build_wnd_scale_option(opts); + opts += 1; + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + if (seg->flags & TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM) { + /* Pad with two NOP options to make everything nicely aligned + * NOTE: When we send both timestamp and SACK_PERM options, + * we could use the first two NOPs before the timestamp to store SACK_PERM option, + * but that would complicate the code. + */ + *(opts++) = PP_HTONL(0x01010402); + } + +#endif + + /* Set retransmission timer running if it is not currently enabled + This must be set before checking the route. */ + if (pcb->rtime < 0) { + pcb->rtime = 0; + } + + if (pcb->rttest == 0) { + pcb->rttest = tcp_ticks; + pcb->rtseq = lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_output_segment: rtseq %" U32_F "\n", pcb->rtseq)); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_output_segment: %" U32_F ":%" U32_F "\n", + lwip_htonl(seg->tcphdr->seqno), lwip_htonl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + seg->len)); + + len = (u16_t)((u8_t *)seg->tcphdr - (u8_t *)seg->p->payload); + + if (len == 0) { + /** Exclude retransmitted segments from this count. */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpoutsegs); + } + + seg->p->len -= len; + seg->p->tot_len -= len; + + seg->p->payload = seg->tcphdr; + + seg->tcphdr->chksum = 0; + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS + opts = LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS(seg->p, seg->tcphdr, pcb, opts); +#endif + LWIP_ASSERT("options not filled", (u8_t *)opts == ((u8_t *)(seg->tcphdr + 1)) + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(seg->flags, pcb)); + +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP) + { +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + u32_t acc; +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK + u16_t chksum_slow = ip_chksum_pseudo(seg->p, IP_PROTO_TCP, + seg->p->tot_len, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK */ + + if ((seg->flags & TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED) == 0) { + LWIP_ASSERT("data included but not checksummed", + seg->p->tot_len == TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES(seg->tcphdr)); + } + + /* rebuild TCP header checksum (TCP header changes for retransmissions!) */ + acc = ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(seg->p, IP_PROTO_TCP, + seg->p->tot_len, TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES(seg->tcphdr), &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); + + /* add payload checksum */ + if (seg->chksum_swapped) { + seg_chksum_was_swapped = 1; + seg->chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(seg->chksum); + seg->chksum_swapped = 0; + } + + acc = (u16_t)~acc + seg->chksum; + seg->tcphdr->chksum = (u16_t)~FOLD_U32T(acc); +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK + + if (chksum_slow != seg->tcphdr->chksum) { + TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL( + ("tcp_output_segment: calculated checksum is %" X16_F " instead of %" X16_F "\n", + seg->tcphdr->chksum, chksum_slow)); + seg->tcphdr->chksum = chksum_slow; + } + +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK */ +#else /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + seg->tcphdr->chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(seg->p, IP_PROTO_TCP, + seg->p->tot_len, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP */ + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.xmit); + + NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, &(pcb->netif_hints)); + err = ip_output_if(seg->p, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, pcb->ttl, + pcb->tos, IP_PROTO_TCP, netif); + NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); + +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + + if (seg_chksum_was_swapped) { + /* if data is added to this segment later, chksum needs to be swapped, + so restore this now */ + seg->chksum = SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(seg->chksum); + seg->chksum_swapped = 1; + } + +#endif + + return err; +} + +/** + * Requeue all unacked segments for retransmission + * + * Called by tcp_slowtmr() for slow retransmission. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to re-enqueue all unacked segments + */ +err_t tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct tcp_seg *seg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* Move all unacked segments to the head of the unsent queue. + However, give up if any of the unsent pbufs are still referenced by the + netif driver due to deferred transmission. No point loading the link further + if it is struggling to flush its buffered writes. */ + for (seg = pcb->unacked; seg->next != NULL; seg = seg->next) { + if (tcp_output_segment_busy(seg)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_rexmit_rto: segment busy\n")); + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + + if (tcp_output_segment_busy(seg)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_rexmit_rto: segment busy\n")); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* concatenate unsent queue after unacked queue */ + seg->next = pcb->unsent; +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + + /* if last unsent changed, we need to update unsent_oversize */ + if (pcb->unsent == NULL) { + pcb->unsent_oversize = seg->oversize_left; + } + +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ + /* unsent queue is the concatenated queue (of unacked, unsent) */ + pcb->unsent = pcb->unacked; + /* unacked queue is now empty */ + pcb->unacked = NULL; + + /* Mark RTO in-progress */ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_RTO); + /* Record the next byte following retransmit */ + pcb->rto_end = lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + TCP_TCPLEN(seg); + /* Don't take any RTT measurements after retransmitting. */ + pcb->rttest = 0; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Requeue all unacked segments for retransmission + * + * Called by tcp_slowtmr() for slow retransmission. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to re-enqueue all unacked segments + */ +void tcp_rexmit_rto_commit(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit_rto_commit: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + /* increment number of retransmissions */ + if (pcb->nrtx < 0xFF) { + ++pcb->nrtx; + } + + /* Do the actual retransmission */ + tcp_output(pcb); +} + +/** + * Requeue all unacked segments for retransmission + * + * Called by tcp_process() only, tcp_slowtmr() needs to do some things between + * "prepare" and "commit". + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to re-enqueue all unacked segments + */ +void tcp_rexmit_rto(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit_rto: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + if (tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare(pcb) == ERR_OK) { + tcp_rexmit_rto_commit(pcb); + } +} + +/** + * Requeue the first unacked segment for retransmission + * + * Called by tcp_receive() for fast retransmit. + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to retransmit the first unacked segment + */ +err_t tcp_rexmit(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct tcp_seg *seg; + struct tcp_seg **cur_seg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + if (pcb->unacked == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + seg = pcb->unacked; + + /* Give up if the segment is still referenced by the netif driver + due to deferred transmission. */ + if (tcp_output_segment_busy(seg)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RTO_DEBUG, ("tcp_rexmit busy\n")); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* Move the first unacked segment to the unsent queue */ + /* Keep the unsent queue sorted. */ + pcb->unacked = seg->next; + + cur_seg = &(pcb->unsent); + + while (*cur_seg && + TCP_SEQ_LT(lwip_ntohl((*cur_seg)->tcphdr->seqno), lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno))) { + cur_seg = &((*cur_seg)->next); + } + + seg->next = *cur_seg; + *cur_seg = seg; +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + + if (seg->next == NULL) { + /* the retransmitted segment is last in unsent, so reset unsent_oversize */ + pcb->unsent_oversize = 0; + } + +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + + if (pcb->nrtx < 0xFF) { + ++pcb->nrtx; + } + + /* Don't take any rtt measurements after retransmitting. */ + pcb->rttest = 0; + + /* Do the actual retransmission. */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpretranssegs); + /* No need to call tcp_output: we are always called from tcp_input() + and thus tcp_output directly returns. */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Handle retransmission after three dupacks received + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to retransmit the first unacked segment + */ +void tcp_rexmit_fast(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rexmit_fast: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + if (pcb->unacked != NULL && !(pcb->flags & TF_INFR)) { + /* This is fast retransmit. Retransmit the first unacked segment. */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_FR_DEBUG, + ("tcp_receive: dupacks %" U16_F " (%" U32_F + "), fast retransmit %" U32_F "\n", + (u16_t)pcb->dupacks, pcb->lastack, + lwip_ntohl(pcb->unacked->tcphdr->seqno))); + + if (tcp_rexmit(pcb) == ERR_OK) { + /* Set ssthresh to half of the minimum of the current + * cwnd and the advertised window */ + pcb->ssthresh = LWIP_MIN(pcb->cwnd, pcb->snd_wnd) / 2; + + /* The minimum value for ssthresh should be 2 MSS */ + if (pcb->ssthresh < (2U * pcb->mss)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_FR_DEBUG, + ("tcp_receive: The minimum value for ssthresh %" TCPWNDSIZE_F + " should be min 2 mss %" U16_F "...\n", + pcb->ssthresh, (u16_t)(2 * pcb->mss))); + pcb->ssthresh = 2 * pcb->mss; + } + + pcb->cwnd = pcb->ssthresh + 3 * pcb->mss; + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_INFR); + + /* Reset the retransmission timer to prevent immediate rto retransmissions */ + pcb->rtime = 0; + } + } +} + +static struct pbuf *tcp_output_alloc_header_common(u32_t ackno, u16_t optlen, u16_t datalen, + u32_t seqno_be /* already in network byte order */, + u16_t src_port, u16_t dst_port, u8_t flags, u16_t wnd) +{ + struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; + struct pbuf *p; + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, TCP_HLEN + optlen + datalen, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p != NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct tcp_hdr", + (p->len >= TCP_HLEN + optlen)); + tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; + tcphdr->src = lwip_htons(src_port); + tcphdr->dest = lwip_htons(dst_port); + tcphdr->seqno = seqno_be; + tcphdr->ackno = lwip_htonl(ackno); + TCPH_HDRLEN_FLAGS_SET(tcphdr, (5 + optlen / 4), flags); + tcphdr->wnd = lwip_htons(wnd); + tcphdr->chksum = 0; + tcphdr->urgp = 0; + } + + return p; +} + +/** Allocate a pbuf and create a tcphdr at p->payload, used for output + * functions other than the default tcp_output -> tcp_output_segment + * (e.g. tcp_send_empty_ack, etc.) + * + * @param pcb tcp pcb for which to send a packet (used to initialize tcp_hdr) + * @param optlen length of header-options + * @param datalen length of tcp data to reserve in pbuf + * @param seqno_be seqno in network byte order (big-endian) + * @return pbuf with p->payload being the tcp_hdr + */ +static struct pbuf *tcp_output_alloc_header(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t optlen, u16_t datalen, + u32_t seqno_be /* already in network byte order */) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_alloc_header: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + p = tcp_output_alloc_header_common(pcb->rcv_nxt, optlen, datalen, + seqno_be, pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port, TCP_ACK, + TCPWND_MIN16(RCV_WND_SCALE(pcb, pcb->rcv_ann_wnd))); + + if (p != NULL) { + /* If we're sending a packet, update the announced right window edge */ + pcb->rcv_ann_right_edge = pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_ann_wnd; + } + + return p; +} + +/* Fill in options for control segments */ +static void tcp_output_fill_options(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, u8_t optflags, u8_t num_sacks) +{ + struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; + u32_t *opts; + u16_t sacks_len = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_fill_options: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); + + tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; + opts = (u32_t *)(void *)(tcphdr + 1); + + /* NB. MSS and window scale options are only sent on SYNs, so ignore them here */ + +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + + if (optflags & TF_SEG_OPTS_TS) { + tcp_build_timestamp_option(pcb, opts); + opts += 3; + } + +#endif + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + if (pcb && (num_sacks > 0)) { + tcp_build_sack_option(pcb, opts, num_sacks); + /* 1 word for SACKs header (including 2xNOP), and 2 words for each SACK */ + sacks_len = 1 + num_sacks * 2; + opts += sacks_len; + } + +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(num_sacks); +#endif + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS + opts = LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS(p, tcphdr, pcb, opts); +#endif + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(sacks_len); + LWIP_ASSERT("options not filled", (u8_t *)opts == ((u8_t *)(tcphdr + 1)) + sacks_len * 4 + LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(optflags, pcb)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(optflags); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(opts); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ +} + +/** Output a control segment pbuf to IP. + * + * Called from tcp_rst, tcp_send_empty_ack, tcp_keepalive and tcp_zero_window_probe, + * this function combines selecting a netif for transmission, generating the tcp + * header checksum and calling ip_output_if while handling netif hints and stats. + */ +static err_t tcp_output_control_segment(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dst) +{ + err_t err; + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_output_control_segment: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); + + netif = tcp_route(pcb, src, dst); + + if (netif == NULL) { + err = ERR_RTE; + } else { + u8_t ttl, tos; +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP) + { + struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; + tcphdr->chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(p, IP_PROTO_TCP, p->tot_len, + src, dst); + } +#endif + + if (pcb != NULL) { + NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, LWIP_CONST_CAST(struct netif_hint *, &(pcb->netif_hints))); + ttl = pcb->ttl; + tos = pcb->tos; + } else { + /* Send output with hardcoded TTL/HL since we have no access to the pcb */ + ttl = TCP_TTL; + tos = 0; + } + + TCP_STATS_INC(tcp.xmit); + err = ip_output_if(p, src, dst, ttl, tos, IP_PROTO_TCP, netif); + NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return err; +} + +/** + * Send a TCP RESET packet (empty segment with RST flag set) either to + * abort a connection or to show that there is no matching local connection + * for a received segment. + * + * Called by tcp_abort() (to abort a local connection), tcp_input() (if no + * matching local pcb was found), tcp_listen_input() (if incoming segment + * has ACK flag set) and tcp_process() (received segment in the wrong state) + * + * Since a RST segment is in most cases not sent for an active connection, + * tcp_rst() has a number of arguments that are taken from a tcp_pcb for + * most other segment output functions. + * + * @param pcb TCP pcb (may be NULL if no pcb is available) + * @param seqno the sequence number to use for the outgoing segment + * @param ackno the acknowledge number to use for the outgoing segment + * @param local_ip the local IP address to send the segment from + * @param remote_ip the remote IP address to send the segment to + * @param local_port the local TCP port to send the segment from + * @param remote_port the remote TCP port to send the segment to + */ +void tcp_rst(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, + const ip_addr_t *local_ip, const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, + u16_t local_port, u16_t remote_port) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u16_t wnd; + u8_t optlen; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rst: invalid local_ip", local_ip != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_rst: invalid remote_ip", remote_ip != NULL); + + optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(0, pcb); + +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE + wnd = PP_HTONS(((TCP_WND >> TCP_RCV_SCALE) & 0xFFFF)); +#else + wnd = PP_HTONS(TCP_WND); +#endif + + p = tcp_output_alloc_header_common(ackno, optlen, 0, lwip_htonl(seqno), local_port, + remote_port, TCP_RST | TCP_ACK, wnd); + + if (p == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_rst: could not allocate memory for pbuf\n")); + return; + } + + tcp_output_fill_options(pcb, p, 0, optlen); + + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.tcpoutrsts); + + tcp_output_control_segment(pcb, p, local_ip, remote_ip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_RST_DEBUG, ("tcp_rst: seqno %" U32_F " ackno %" U32_F ".\n", seqno, ackno)); +} + +/** + * Send an ACK without data. + * + * @param pcb Protocol control block for the TCP connection to send the ACK + */ +err_t tcp_send_empty_ack(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + err_t err; + struct pbuf *p; + u8_t optlen, optflags = 0; + u8_t num_sacks = 0; + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_send_empty_ack: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + + if (pcb->flags & TF_TIMESTAMP) { + optflags = TF_SEG_OPTS_TS; + } + +#endif + optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(optflags, pcb); + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + + /* For now, SACKs are only sent with empty ACKs */ + if ((num_sacks = tcp_get_num_sacks(pcb, optlen)) > 0) { + optlen += 4 + num_sacks * 8; /* 4 bytes for header (including 2*NOP), plus 8B for each SACK */ + } + +#endif + + p = tcp_output_alloc_header(pcb, optlen, 0, lwip_htonl(pcb->snd_nxt)); + + if (p == NULL) { + /* let tcp_fasttmr retry sending this ACK */ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, ("tcp_output: (ACK) could not allocate pbuf\n")); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + tcp_output_fill_options(pcb, p, optflags, num_sacks); + +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + pcb->ts_lastacksent = pcb->rcv_nxt; +#endif + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG, + ("tcp_output: sending ACK for %" U32_F "\n", pcb->rcv_nxt)); + err = tcp_output_control_segment(pcb, p, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + /* let tcp_fasttmr retry sending this ACK */ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); + } else { + /* remove ACK flags from the PCB, as we sent an empty ACK now */ + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY | TF_ACK_NOW); + } + + return err; +} + +/** + * Send keepalive packets to keep a connection active although + * no data is sent over it. + * + * Called by tcp_slowtmr() + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to send a keepalive packet + */ +err_t tcp_keepalive(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + err_t err; + struct pbuf *p; + u8_t optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(0, pcb); + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_keepalive: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_keepalive: sending KEEPALIVE probe to ")); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(TCP_DEBUG, pcb->remote_ip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("\n")); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_keepalive: tcp_ticks %" U32_F " pcb->tmr %" U32_F " pcb->keep_cnt_sent %" U16_F "\n", + tcp_ticks, pcb->tmr, (u16_t)pcb->keep_cnt_sent)); + + p = tcp_output_alloc_header(pcb, optlen, 0, lwip_htonl(pcb->snd_nxt - 1)); + + if (p == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, + ("tcp_keepalive: could not allocate memory for pbuf\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + tcp_output_fill_options(pcb, p, 0, optlen); + err = tcp_output_control_segment(pcb, p, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_keepalive: seqno %" U32_F " ackno %" U32_F " err %d.\n", + pcb->snd_nxt - 1, pcb->rcv_nxt, (int)err)); + return err; +} + +/** + * Send persist timer zero-window probes to keep a connection active + * when a window update is lost. + * + * Called by tcp_slowtmr() + * + * @param pcb the tcp_pcb for which to send a zero-window probe packet + */ +err_t tcp_zero_window_probe(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + err_t err; + struct pbuf *p; + struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; + struct tcp_seg *seg; + u16_t len; + u8_t is_fin; + u32_t snd_nxt; + u8_t optlen = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH_SEGMENT(0, pcb); + + LWIP_ASSERT("tcp_zero_window_probe: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_zero_window_probe: sending ZERO WINDOW probe to ")); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(TCP_DEBUG, pcb->remote_ip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("\n")); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, + ("tcp_zero_window_probe: tcp_ticks %" U32_F + " pcb->tmr %" U32_F " pcb->keep_cnt_sent %" U16_F "\n", + tcp_ticks, pcb->tmr, (u16_t)pcb->keep_cnt_sent)); + + /* Only consider unsent, persist timer should be off when there is data in-flight */ + seg = pcb->unsent; + + if (seg == NULL) { + /* Not expected, persist timer should be off when the send buffer is empty */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* increment probe count. NOTE: we record probe even if it fails + to actually transmit due to an error. This ensures memory exhaustion/ + routing problem doesn't leave a zero-window pcb as an indefinite zombie. + RTO mechanism has similar behavior, see pcb->nrtx */ + if (pcb->persist_probe < 0xFF) { + ++pcb->persist_probe; + } + + is_fin = ((TCPH_FLAGS(seg->tcphdr) & TCP_FIN) != 0) && (seg->len == 0); + /* we want to send one seqno: either FIN or data (no options) */ + len = is_fin ? 0 : 1; + + p = tcp_output_alloc_header(pcb, optlen, len, seg->tcphdr->seqno); + + if (p == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_zero_window_probe: no memory for pbuf\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; + + if (is_fin) { + /* FIN segment, no data */ + TCPH_FLAGS_SET(tcphdr, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); + } else { + /* Data segment, copy in one byte from the head of the unacked queue */ + char *d = ((char *)p->payload + TCP_HLEN); + /* Depending on whether the segment has already been sent (unacked) or not + (unsent), seg->p->payload points to the IP header or TCP header. + Ensure we copy the first TCP data byte: */ + pbuf_copy_partial(seg->p, d, 1, seg->p->tot_len - seg->len); + } + + /* The byte may be acknowledged without the window being opened. */ + snd_nxt = lwip_ntohl(seg->tcphdr->seqno) + 1; + + if (TCP_SEQ_LT(pcb->snd_nxt, snd_nxt)) { + pcb->snd_nxt = snd_nxt; + } + + tcp_output_fill_options(pcb, p, 0, optlen); + + err = tcp_output_control_segment(pcb, p, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("tcp_zero_window_probe: seqno %" U32_F + " ackno %" U32_F " err %d.\n", + pcb->snd_nxt - 1, pcb->rcv_nxt, (int)err)); + return err; +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/timeouts.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/timeouts.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/core/timeouts.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/timeouts.c index d0bdae33..08ca564b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/timeouts.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/timeouts.c @@ -1,456 +1,456 @@ -/** - * @file - * Stack-internal timers implementation. - * This file includes timer callbacks for stack-internal timers as well as - * functions to set up or stop timers and check for expired timers. - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" - -#include "lwip/ip4_frag.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp.h" -#include "lwip/autoip.h" -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_frag.h" -#include "lwip/mld6.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" - -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES -#define HANDLER(x) x, #x -#else /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ -#define HANDLER(x) x -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ - -#define LWIP_MAX_TIMEOUT 0x7fffffff - -/* Check if timer's expiry time is greater than time and care about u32_t wraparounds */ -#define TIME_LESS_THAN(t, compare_to) ((((u32_t)((t) - (compare_to))) > LWIP_MAX_TIMEOUT) ? 1 : 0) - -/** This array contains all stack-internal cyclic timers. To get the number of - * timers, use LWIP_ARRAYSIZE() */ -const struct lwip_cyclic_timer lwip_cyclic_timers[] = { -#if LWIP_TCP - /* The TCP timer is a special case: it does not have to run always and - is triggered to start from TCP using tcp_timer_needed() */ - { TCP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(tcp_tmr) }, -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 -#if IP_REASSEMBLY - { IP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(ip_reass_tmr) }, -#endif /* IP_REASSEMBLY */ -#if LWIP_ARP - { ARP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(etharp_tmr) }, -#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ -#if LWIP_DHCP - { DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_MSECS, HANDLER(dhcp_coarse_tmr) }, - { DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS, HANDLER(dhcp_fine_tmr) }, -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ -#if LWIP_AUTOIP - { AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(autoip_tmr) }, -#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ -#if LWIP_IGMP - { IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(igmp_tmr) }, -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_DNS - { DNS_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(dns_tmr) }, -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - { ND6_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(nd6_tmr) }, -#if LWIP_IPV6_REASS - { IP6_REASS_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(ip6_reass_tmr) }, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD - { MLD6_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(mld6_tmr) }, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 - { DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS, HANDLER(dhcp6_tmr) }, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -}; -const int lwip_num_cyclic_timers = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(lwip_cyclic_timers); - -#if LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM - -/** The one and only timeout list */ -static struct sys_timeo *next_timeout; - -static u32_t current_timeout_due_time; - -#if LWIP_TESTMODE -struct sys_timeo ** -sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(void) -{ - return &next_timeout; -} -#endif - -#if LWIP_TCP -/** global variable that shows if the tcp timer is currently scheduled or not */ -static int tcpip_tcp_timer_active; - -/** - * Timer callback function that calls tcp_tmr() and reschedules itself. - * - * @param arg unused argument - */ -static void tcpip_tcp_timer(void *arg) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - /* call TCP timer handler */ - tcp_tmr(); - - /* timer still needed? */ - if (tcp_active_pcbs || tcp_tw_pcbs) { - /* restart timer */ - sys_timeout(TCP_TMR_INTERVAL, tcpip_tcp_timer, NULL); - } else { - /* disable timer */ - tcpip_tcp_timer_active = 0; - } -} - -/** - * Called from TCP_REG when registering a new PCB: - * the reason is to have the TCP timer only running when - * there are active (or time-wait) PCBs. - */ -void tcp_timer_needed(void) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* timer is off but needed again? */ - if (!tcpip_tcp_timer_active && (tcp_active_pcbs || tcp_tw_pcbs)) { - /* enable and start timer */ - tcpip_tcp_timer_active = 1; - sys_timeout(TCP_TMR_INTERVAL, tcpip_tcp_timer, NULL); - } -} -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -static void -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES -sys_timeout_abs(u32_t abs_time, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg, const char *handler_name) -#else /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ -sys_timeout_abs(u32_t abs_time, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg) -#endif -{ - struct sys_timeo *timeout, *t; - - timeout = (struct sys_timeo *)memp_malloc(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT); - - if (timeout == NULL) { - LWIP_ASSERT("sys_timeout: timeout != NULL, pool MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT is empty", timeout != NULL); - return; - } - - timeout->next = NULL; - timeout->h = handler; - timeout->arg = arg; - timeout->time = abs_time; - -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES - timeout->handler_name = handler_name; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TIMERS_DEBUG, ("sys_timeout: %p abs_time=%" U32_F " handler=%s arg=%p\n", - (void *)timeout, abs_time, handler_name, (void *)arg)); -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ - - if (next_timeout == NULL) { - next_timeout = timeout; - return; - } - - if (TIME_LESS_THAN(timeout->time, next_timeout->time)) { - timeout->next = next_timeout; - next_timeout = timeout; - } else { - for (t = next_timeout; t != NULL; t = t->next) { - if ((t->next == NULL) || TIME_LESS_THAN(timeout->time, t->next->time)) { - timeout->next = t->next; - t->next = timeout; - break; - } - } - } -} - -/** - * Timer callback function that calls cyclic->handler() and reschedules itself. - * - * @param arg unused argument - */ -#if !LWIP_TESTMODE -static -#endif - void - lwip_cyclic_timer(void *arg) -{ - u32_t now; - u32_t next_timeout_time; - const struct lwip_cyclic_timer *cyclic = (const struct lwip_cyclic_timer *)arg; - -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES - LWIP_DEBUGF(TIMERS_DEBUG, ("tcpip: %s()\n", cyclic->handler_name)); -#endif - cyclic->handler(); - - now = sys_now(); - next_timeout_time = (u32_t)(current_timeout_due_time + cyclic->interval_ms); /* overflow handled by TIME_LESS_THAN macro */ - - if (TIME_LESS_THAN(next_timeout_time, now)) { - /* timer would immediately expire again -> "overload" -> restart without any correction */ -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES - sys_timeout_abs((u32_t)(now + cyclic->interval_ms), lwip_cyclic_timer, arg, cyclic->handler_name); -#else - sys_timeout_abs((u32_t)(now + cyclic->interval_ms), lwip_cyclic_timer, arg); -#endif - - } else { - /* correct cyclic interval with handler execution delay and sys_check_timeouts jitter */ -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES - sys_timeout_abs(next_timeout_time, lwip_cyclic_timer, arg, cyclic->handler_name); -#else - sys_timeout_abs(next_timeout_time, lwip_cyclic_timer, arg); -#endif - } -} - -/** Initialize this module */ -void sys_timeouts_init(void) -{ - size_t i; - - /* tcp_tmr() at index 0 is started on demand */ - for (i = (LWIP_TCP ? 1 : 0); i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(lwip_cyclic_timers); i++) { - /* we have to cast via size_t to get rid of const warning - (this is OK as cyclic_timer() casts back to const* */ - sys_timeout(lwip_cyclic_timers[i].interval_ms, lwip_cyclic_timer, LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &lwip_cyclic_timers[i])); - } -} - -/** - * Create a one-shot timer (aka timeout). Timeouts are processed in the - * following cases: - * - while waiting for a message using sys_timeouts_mbox_fetch() - * - by calling sys_check_timeouts() (NO_SYS==1 only) - * - * @param msecs time in milliseconds after that the timer should expire - * @param handler callback function to call when msecs have elapsed - * @param arg argument to pass to the callback function - */ -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES -void sys_timeout_debug(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg, const char *handler_name) -#else /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ -void sys_timeout(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg) -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ -{ - u32_t next_timeout_time; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("Timeout time too long, max is LWIP_UINT32_MAX/4 msecs", msecs <= (LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 4)); - - next_timeout_time = (u32_t)(sys_now() + msecs); /* overflow handled by TIME_LESS_THAN macro */ - -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES - sys_timeout_abs(next_timeout_time, handler, arg, handler_name); -#else - sys_timeout_abs(next_timeout_time, handler, arg); -#endif -} - -/** - * Go through timeout list (for this task only) and remove the first matching - * entry (subsequent entries remain untouched), even though the timeout has not - * triggered yet. - * - * @param handler callback function that would be called by the timeout - * @param arg callback argument that would be passed to handler -*/ -void sys_untimeout(sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg) -{ - struct sys_timeo *prev_t, *t; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (next_timeout == NULL) { - return; - } - - for (t = next_timeout, prev_t = NULL; t != NULL; prev_t = t, t = t->next) { - if ((t->h == handler) && (t->arg == arg)) { - /* We have a match */ - /* Unlink from previous in list */ - if (prev_t == NULL) { - next_timeout = t->next; - } else { - prev_t->next = t->next; - } - - memp_free(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT, t); - return; - } - } - - return; -} - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_nosys - * Handle timeouts for NO_SYS==1 (i.e. without using - * tcpip_thread/sys_timeouts_mbox_fetch(). Uses sys_now() to call timeout - * handler functions when timeouts expire. - * - * Must be called periodically from your main loop. - */ -void sys_check_timeouts(void) -{ - u32_t now; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - /* Process only timers expired at the start of the function. */ - now = sys_now(); - - do { - struct sys_timeo *tmptimeout; - sys_timeout_handler handler; - void *arg; - - PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ(); - - tmptimeout = next_timeout; - - if (tmptimeout == NULL) { - return; - } - - if (TIME_LESS_THAN(now, tmptimeout->time)) { - return; - } - - /* Timeout has expired */ - next_timeout = tmptimeout->next; - handler = tmptimeout->h; - arg = tmptimeout->arg; - current_timeout_due_time = tmptimeout->time; -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES - - if (handler != NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TIMERS_DEBUG, ("sct calling h=%s t=%" U32_F " arg=%p\n", - tmptimeout->handler_name, sys_now() - tmptimeout->time, arg)); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ - memp_free(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT, tmptimeout); - - if (handler != NULL) { - handler(arg); - } - - LWIP_TCPIP_THREAD_ALIVE(); - - /* Repeat until all expired timers have been called */ - } while (1); -} - -/** Rebase the timeout times to the current time. - * This is necessary if sys_check_timeouts() hasn't been called for a long - * time (e.g. while saving energy) to prevent all timer functions of that - * period being called. - */ -void sys_restart_timeouts(void) -{ - u32_t now; - u32_t base; - struct sys_timeo *t; - - if (next_timeout == NULL) { - return; - } - - now = sys_now(); - base = next_timeout->time; - - for (t = next_timeout; t != NULL; t = t->next) { - t->time = (t->time - base) + now; - } -} - -/** Return the time left before the next timeout is due. If no timeouts are - * enqueued, returns 0xffffffff - */ -u32_t sys_timeouts_sleeptime(void) -{ - u32_t now; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (next_timeout == NULL) { - return SYS_TIMEOUTS_SLEEPTIME_INFINITE; - } - - now = sys_now(); - - if (TIME_LESS_THAN(next_timeout->time, now)) { - return 0; - } else { - u32_t ret = (u32_t)(next_timeout->time - now); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid sleeptime", ret <= LWIP_MAX_TIMEOUT); - return ret; - } -} - -#else /* LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM */ -/* Satisfy the TCP code which calls this function */ -void tcp_timer_needed(void) -{ -} -#endif /* LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM */ +/** + * @file + * Stack-internal timers implementation. + * This file includes timer callbacks for stack-internal timers as well as + * functions to set up or stop timers and check for expired timers. + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" + +#include "lwip/ip4_frag.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp.h" +#include "lwip/autoip.h" +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_frag.h" +#include "lwip/mld6.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp6.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" + +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES +#define HANDLER(x) x, #x +#else /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ +#define HANDLER(x) x +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ + +#define LWIP_MAX_TIMEOUT 0x7fffffff + +/* Check if timer's expiry time is greater than time and care about u32_t wraparounds */ +#define TIME_LESS_THAN(t, compare_to) ((((u32_t)((t) - (compare_to))) > LWIP_MAX_TIMEOUT) ? 1 : 0) + +/** This array contains all stack-internal cyclic timers. To get the number of + * timers, use LWIP_ARRAYSIZE() */ +const struct lwip_cyclic_timer lwip_cyclic_timers[] = { +#if LWIP_TCP + /* The TCP timer is a special case: it does not have to run always and + is triggered to start from TCP using tcp_timer_needed() */ + { TCP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(tcp_tmr) }, +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 +#if IP_REASSEMBLY + { IP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(ip_reass_tmr) }, +#endif /* IP_REASSEMBLY */ +#if LWIP_ARP + { ARP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(etharp_tmr) }, +#endif /* LWIP_ARP */ +#if LWIP_DHCP + { DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_MSECS, HANDLER(dhcp_coarse_tmr) }, + { DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS, HANDLER(dhcp_fine_tmr) }, +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ +#if LWIP_AUTOIP + { AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(autoip_tmr) }, +#endif /* LWIP_AUTOIP */ +#if LWIP_IGMP + { IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(igmp_tmr) }, +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_DNS + { DNS_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(dns_tmr) }, +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + { ND6_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(nd6_tmr) }, +#if LWIP_IPV6_REASS + { IP6_REASS_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(ip6_reass_tmr) }, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD + { MLD6_TMR_INTERVAL, HANDLER(mld6_tmr) }, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 + { DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS, HANDLER(dhcp6_tmr) }, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +}; +const int lwip_num_cyclic_timers = LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(lwip_cyclic_timers); + +#if LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM + +/** The one and only timeout list */ +static struct sys_timeo *next_timeout; + +static u32_t current_timeout_due_time; + +#if LWIP_TESTMODE +struct sys_timeo ** +sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(void) +{ + return &next_timeout; +} +#endif + +#if LWIP_TCP +/** global variable that shows if the tcp timer is currently scheduled or not */ +static int tcpip_tcp_timer_active; + +/** + * Timer callback function that calls tcp_tmr() and reschedules itself. + * + * @param arg unused argument + */ +static void tcpip_tcp_timer(void *arg) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + /* call TCP timer handler */ + tcp_tmr(); + + /* timer still needed? */ + if (tcp_active_pcbs || tcp_tw_pcbs) { + /* restart timer */ + sys_timeout(TCP_TMR_INTERVAL, tcpip_tcp_timer, NULL); + } else { + /* disable timer */ + tcpip_tcp_timer_active = 0; + } +} + +/** + * Called from TCP_REG when registering a new PCB: + * the reason is to have the TCP timer only running when + * there are active (or time-wait) PCBs. + */ +void tcp_timer_needed(void) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* timer is off but needed again? */ + if (!tcpip_tcp_timer_active && (tcp_active_pcbs || tcp_tw_pcbs)) { + /* enable and start timer */ + tcpip_tcp_timer_active = 1; + sys_timeout(TCP_TMR_INTERVAL, tcpip_tcp_timer, NULL); + } +} +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +static void +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES +sys_timeout_abs(u32_t abs_time, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg, const char *handler_name) +#else /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ +sys_timeout_abs(u32_t abs_time, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg) +#endif +{ + struct sys_timeo *timeout, *t; + + timeout = (struct sys_timeo *)memp_malloc(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT); + + if (timeout == NULL) { + LWIP_ASSERT("sys_timeout: timeout != NULL, pool MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT is empty", timeout != NULL); + return; + } + + timeout->next = NULL; + timeout->h = handler; + timeout->arg = arg; + timeout->time = abs_time; + +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES + timeout->handler_name = handler_name; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TIMERS_DEBUG, ("sys_timeout: %p abs_time=%" U32_F " handler=%s arg=%p\n", + (void *)timeout, abs_time, handler_name, (void *)arg)); +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ + + if (next_timeout == NULL) { + next_timeout = timeout; + return; + } + + if (TIME_LESS_THAN(timeout->time, next_timeout->time)) { + timeout->next = next_timeout; + next_timeout = timeout; + } else { + for (t = next_timeout; t != NULL; t = t->next) { + if ((t->next == NULL) || TIME_LESS_THAN(timeout->time, t->next->time)) { + timeout->next = t->next; + t->next = timeout; + break; + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Timer callback function that calls cyclic->handler() and reschedules itself. + * + * @param arg unused argument + */ +#if !LWIP_TESTMODE +static +#endif + void + lwip_cyclic_timer(void *arg) +{ + u32_t now; + u32_t next_timeout_time; + const struct lwip_cyclic_timer *cyclic = (const struct lwip_cyclic_timer *)arg; + +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES + LWIP_DEBUGF(TIMERS_DEBUG, ("tcpip: %s()\n", cyclic->handler_name)); +#endif + cyclic->handler(); + + now = sys_now(); + next_timeout_time = (u32_t)(current_timeout_due_time + cyclic->interval_ms); /* overflow handled by TIME_LESS_THAN macro */ + + if (TIME_LESS_THAN(next_timeout_time, now)) { + /* timer would immediately expire again -> "overload" -> restart without any correction */ +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES + sys_timeout_abs((u32_t)(now + cyclic->interval_ms), lwip_cyclic_timer, arg, cyclic->handler_name); +#else + sys_timeout_abs((u32_t)(now + cyclic->interval_ms), lwip_cyclic_timer, arg); +#endif + + } else { + /* correct cyclic interval with handler execution delay and sys_check_timeouts jitter */ +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES + sys_timeout_abs(next_timeout_time, lwip_cyclic_timer, arg, cyclic->handler_name); +#else + sys_timeout_abs(next_timeout_time, lwip_cyclic_timer, arg); +#endif + } +} + +/** Initialize this module */ +void sys_timeouts_init(void) +{ + size_t i; + + /* tcp_tmr() at index 0 is started on demand */ + for (i = (LWIP_TCP ? 1 : 0); i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(lwip_cyclic_timers); i++) { + /* we have to cast via size_t to get rid of const warning + (this is OK as cyclic_timer() casts back to const* */ + sys_timeout(lwip_cyclic_timers[i].interval_ms, lwip_cyclic_timer, LWIP_CONST_CAST(void *, &lwip_cyclic_timers[i])); + } +} + +/** + * Create a one-shot timer (aka timeout). Timeouts are processed in the + * following cases: + * - while waiting for a message using sys_timeouts_mbox_fetch() + * - by calling sys_check_timeouts() (NO_SYS==1 only) + * + * @param msecs time in milliseconds after that the timer should expire + * @param handler callback function to call when msecs have elapsed + * @param arg argument to pass to the callback function + */ +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES +void sys_timeout_debug(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg, const char *handler_name) +#else /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ +void sys_timeout(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg) +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ +{ + u32_t next_timeout_time; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("Timeout time too long, max is LWIP_UINT32_MAX/4 msecs", msecs <= (LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 4)); + + next_timeout_time = (u32_t)(sys_now() + msecs); /* overflow handled by TIME_LESS_THAN macro */ + +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES + sys_timeout_abs(next_timeout_time, handler, arg, handler_name); +#else + sys_timeout_abs(next_timeout_time, handler, arg); +#endif +} + +/** + * Go through timeout list (for this task only) and remove the first matching + * entry (subsequent entries remain untouched), even though the timeout has not + * triggered yet. + * + * @param handler callback function that would be called by the timeout + * @param arg callback argument that would be passed to handler +*/ +void sys_untimeout(sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg) +{ + struct sys_timeo *prev_t, *t; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (next_timeout == NULL) { + return; + } + + for (t = next_timeout, prev_t = NULL; t != NULL; prev_t = t, t = t->next) { + if ((t->h == handler) && (t->arg == arg)) { + /* We have a match */ + /* Unlink from previous in list */ + if (prev_t == NULL) { + next_timeout = t->next; + } else { + prev_t->next = t->next; + } + + memp_free(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT, t); + return; + } + } + + return; +} + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_nosys + * Handle timeouts for NO_SYS==1 (i.e. without using + * tcpip_thread/sys_timeouts_mbox_fetch(). Uses sys_now() to call timeout + * handler functions when timeouts expire. + * + * Must be called periodically from your main loop. + */ +void sys_check_timeouts(void) +{ + u32_t now; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + /* Process only timers expired at the start of the function. */ + now = sys_now(); + + do { + struct sys_timeo *tmptimeout; + sys_timeout_handler handler; + void *arg; + + PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ(); + + tmptimeout = next_timeout; + + if (tmptimeout == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (TIME_LESS_THAN(now, tmptimeout->time)) { + return; + } + + /* Timeout has expired */ + next_timeout = tmptimeout->next; + handler = tmptimeout->h; + arg = tmptimeout->arg; + current_timeout_due_time = tmptimeout->time; +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES + + if (handler != NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TIMERS_DEBUG, ("sct calling h=%s t=%" U32_F " arg=%p\n", + tmptimeout->handler_name, sys_now() - tmptimeout->time, arg)); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ + memp_free(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT, tmptimeout); + + if (handler != NULL) { + handler(arg); + } + + LWIP_TCPIP_THREAD_ALIVE(); + + /* Repeat until all expired timers have been called */ + } while (1); +} + +/** Rebase the timeout times to the current time. + * This is necessary if sys_check_timeouts() hasn't been called for a long + * time (e.g. while saving energy) to prevent all timer functions of that + * period being called. + */ +void sys_restart_timeouts(void) +{ + u32_t now; + u32_t base; + struct sys_timeo *t; + + if (next_timeout == NULL) { + return; + } + + now = sys_now(); + base = next_timeout->time; + + for (t = next_timeout; t != NULL; t = t->next) { + t->time = (t->time - base) + now; + } +} + +/** Return the time left before the next timeout is due. If no timeouts are + * enqueued, returns 0xffffffff + */ +u32_t sys_timeouts_sleeptime(void) +{ + u32_t now; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (next_timeout == NULL) { + return SYS_TIMEOUTS_SLEEPTIME_INFINITE; + } + + now = sys_now(); + + if (TIME_LESS_THAN(next_timeout->time, now)) { + return 0; + } else { + u32_t ret = (u32_t)(next_timeout->time - now); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid sleeptime", ret <= LWIP_MAX_TIMEOUT); + return ret; + } +} + +#else /* LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM */ +/* Satisfy the TCP code which calls this function */ +void tcp_timer_needed(void) +{ +} +#endif /* LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/core/udp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/udp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/core/udp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/udp.c index b5fe9c89..31262f8d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/core/udp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/core/udp.c @@ -1,1377 +1,1377 @@ -/** - * @file - * User Datagram Protocol module\n - * The code for the User Datagram Protocol UDP & UDPLite (RFC 3828).\n - * See also @ref udp_raw - * - * @defgroup udp_raw UDP - * @ingroup callbackstyle_api - * User Datagram Protocol module\n - * @see @ref api - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -/* @todo Check the use of '(struct udp_pcb).chksum_len_rx'! - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_UDP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/icmp.h" -#include "lwip/icmp6.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp.h" - -#include - -#ifndef UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START -/* From http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers: - "The Dynamic and/or Private Ports are those from 49152 through 65535" */ -#define UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START 0xc000 -#define UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END 0xffff -#define UDP_ENSURE_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE(port) ((u16_t)(((port) & (u16_t)~UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START) + UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START)) -#endif - -/* last local UDP port */ -static u16_t udp_port = UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START; - -/* The list of UDP PCBs */ -/* exported in udp.h (was static) */ -struct udp_pcb *udp_pcbs; - -/** - * Initialize this module. - */ -void udp_init(void) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_RAND - udp_port = UDP_ENSURE_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE(LWIP_RAND()); -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ -} - -/** - * Allocate a new local UDP port. - * - * @return a new (free) local UDP port number - */ -static u16_t udp_new_port(void) -{ - u16_t n = 0; - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - -again: - - if (udp_port++ == UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END) { - udp_port = UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START; - } - - /* Check all PCBs. */ - for (pcb = udp_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - if (pcb->local_port == udp_port) { - if (++n > (UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END - UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START)) { - return 0; - } - - goto again; - } - } - - return udp_port; -} - -/** Common code to see if the current input packet matches the pcb - * (current input packet is accessed via ip(4/6)_current_* macros) - * - * @param pcb pcb to check - * @param inp network interface on which the datagram was received (only used for IPv4) - * @param broadcast 1 if his is an IPv4 broadcast (global or subnet-only), 0 otherwise (only used for IPv4) - * @return 1 on match, 0 otherwise - */ -static u8_t udp_input_local_match(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct netif *inp, u8_t broadcast) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); /* in IPv6 only case */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(broadcast); /* in IPv6 only case */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("udp_input_local_match: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("udp_input_local_match: invalid netif", inp != NULL); - - /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ - if ((pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && - (pcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { - return 0; - } - - /* Dual-stack: PCBs listening to any IP type also listen to any IP address */ - if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 && IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV - - if ((broadcast != 0) && !ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST)) { - return 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV */ - return 1; - } - - /* Only need to check PCB if incoming IP version matches PCB IP version */ - if (IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ip_current_dest_addr())) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /* Special case: IPv4 broadcast: all or broadcasts in my subnet - * Note: broadcast variable can only be 1 if it is an IPv4 broadcast */ - if (broadcast != 0) { -#if IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV - - if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST)) -#endif /* IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV */ - { - if (ip4_addr_isany(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)) || - ((ip4_current_dest_addr()->addr == IPADDR_BROADCAST)) || - ip4_addr_netcmp(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), ip4_current_dest_addr(), netif_ip4_netmask(inp))) { - return 1; - } - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - /* Handle IPv4 and IPv6: all or exact match */ - if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip) || ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Process an incoming UDP datagram. - * - * Given an incoming UDP datagram (as a chain of pbufs) this function - * finds a corresponding UDP PCB and hands over the pbuf to the pcbs - * recv function. If no pcb is found or the datagram is incorrect, the - * pbuf is freed. - * - * @param p pbuf to be demultiplexed to a UDP PCB (p->payload pointing to the UDP header) - * @param inp network interface on which the datagram was received. - * - */ -void udp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - struct udp_hdr *udphdr; - struct udp_pcb *pcb, *prev; - struct udp_pcb *uncon_pcb; - u16_t src, dest; - u8_t broadcast; - u8_t for_us = 0; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ASSERT("udp_input: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("udp_input: invalid netif", inp != NULL); - - PERF_START; - - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.recv); - - /* Check minimum length (UDP header) */ - if (p->len < UDP_HLEN) { - /* drop short packets */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, - ("udp_input: short UDP datagram (%" U16_F " bytes) discarded\n", p->tot_len)); - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.lenerr); - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpinerrors); - pbuf_free(p); - goto end; - } - - udphdr = (struct udp_hdr *)p->payload; - - /* is broadcast packet ? */ - broadcast = ip_addr_isbroadcast(ip_current_dest_addr(), ip_current_netif()); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_input: received datagram of length %" U16_F "\n", p->tot_len)); - - /* convert src and dest ports to host byte order */ - src = lwip_ntohs(udphdr->src); - dest = lwip_ntohs(udphdr->dest); - - udp_debug_print(udphdr); - - /* print the UDP source and destination */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp (")); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG, *ip_current_dest_addr()); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, (", %" U16_F ") <-- (", lwip_ntohs(udphdr->dest))); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG, *ip_current_src_addr()); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, (", %" U16_F ")\n", lwip_ntohs(udphdr->src))); - - pcb = NULL; - prev = NULL; - uncon_pcb = NULL; - - /* Iterate through the UDP pcb list for a matching pcb. - * 'Perfect match' pcbs (connected to the remote port & ip address) are - * preferred. If no perfect match is found, the first unconnected pcb that - * matches the local port and ip address gets the datagram. */ - for (pcb = udp_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { - /* print the PCB local and remote address */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("pcb (")); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG, pcb->local_ip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, (", %" U16_F ") <-- (", pcb->local_port)); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG, pcb->remote_ip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, (", %" U16_F ")\n", pcb->remote_port)); - - /* compare PCB local addr+port to UDP destination addr+port */ - if ((pcb->local_port == dest) && - (udp_input_local_match(pcb, inp, broadcast) != 0)) { - if ((pcb->flags & UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED) == 0) { - if (uncon_pcb == NULL) { - /* the first unconnected matching PCB */ - uncon_pcb = pcb; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - } else if (broadcast && ip4_current_dest_addr()->addr == IPADDR_BROADCAST) { - /* global broadcast address (only valid for IPv4; match was checked before) */ - if (!IP_IS_V4_VAL(uncon_pcb->local_ip) || !ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(&uncon_pcb->local_ip), netif_ip4_addr(inp))) { - /* uncon_pcb does not match the input netif, check this pcb */ - if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip) && ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), netif_ip4_addr(inp))) { - /* better match */ - uncon_pcb = pcb; - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - } -#if SO_REUSE - else if (!ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip)) { - /* prefer specific IPs over catch-all */ - uncon_pcb = pcb; - } - -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - } - - /* compare PCB remote addr+port to UDP source addr+port */ - if ((pcb->remote_port == src) && - (ip_addr_isany_val(pcb->remote_ip) || - ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->remote_ip, ip_current_src_addr()))) { - /* the first fully matching PCB */ - if (prev != NULL) { - /* move the pcb to the front of udp_pcbs so that is - found faster next time */ - prev->next = pcb->next; - pcb->next = udp_pcbs; - udp_pcbs = pcb; - } else { - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.cachehit); - } - - break; - } - } - - prev = pcb; - } - - /* no fully matching pcb found? then look for an unconnected pcb */ - if (pcb == NULL) { - pcb = uncon_pcb; - } - - /* Check checksum if this is a match or if it was directed at us. */ - if (pcb != NULL) { - for_us = 1; - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (ip_current_is_v6()) { - for_us = netif_get_ip6_addr_match(inp, ip6_current_dest_addr()) >= 0; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (!ip_current_is_v6()) { - for_us = ip4_addr_cmp(netif_ip4_addr(inp), ip4_current_dest_addr()); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - } - - if (for_us) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_input: calculating checksum\n")); -#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP) - { -#if LWIP_UDPLITE - - if (ip_current_header_proto() == IP_PROTO_UDPLITE) { - /* Do the UDP Lite checksum */ - u16_t chklen = lwip_ntohs(udphdr->len); - - if (chklen < sizeof(struct udp_hdr)) { - if (chklen == 0) { - /* For UDP-Lite, checksum length of 0 means checksum - over the complete packet (See RFC 3828 chap. 3.1) */ - chklen = p->tot_len; - } else { - /* At least the UDP-Lite header must be covered by the - checksum! (Again, see RFC 3828 chap. 3.1) */ - goto chkerr; - } - } - - if (ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(p, IP_PROTO_UDPLITE, - p->tot_len, chklen, - ip_current_src_addr(), ip_current_dest_addr()) != 0) { - goto chkerr; - } - } else -#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ - { - if (udphdr->chksum != 0) { - if (ip_chksum_pseudo(p, IP_PROTO_UDP, p->tot_len, - ip_current_src_addr(), - ip_current_dest_addr()) != 0) { - goto chkerr; - } - } - } - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP */ - - if (pbuf_remove_header(p, UDP_HLEN)) { - /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpinerrors); - pbuf_free(p); - goto end; - } - - if (pcb != NULL) { - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpindatagrams); -#if SO_REUSE && SO_REUSE_RXTOALL - - if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR) && - (broadcast || ip_addr_ismulticast(ip_current_dest_addr()))) { - /* pass broadcast- or multicast packets to all multicast pcbs - if SOF_REUSEADDR is set on the first match */ - struct udp_pcb *mpcb; - - for (mpcb = udp_pcbs; mpcb != NULL; mpcb = mpcb->next) { - if (mpcb != pcb) { - /* compare PCB local addr+port to UDP destination addr+port */ - if ((mpcb->local_port == dest) && - (udp_input_local_match(mpcb, inp, broadcast) != 0)) { - /* pass a copy of the packet to all local matches */ - if (mpcb->recv != NULL) { - struct pbuf *q; - q = pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_POOL, p); - - if (q != NULL) { - mpcb->recv(mpcb->recv_arg, mpcb, q, ip_current_src_addr(), src); - } - } - } - } - } - } - -#endif /* SO_REUSE && SO_REUSE_RXTOALL */ - - /* callback */ - if (pcb->recv != NULL) { - /* now the recv function is responsible for freeing p */ - pcb->recv(pcb->recv_arg, pcb, p, ip_current_src_addr(), src); - } else { - /* no recv function registered? then we have to free the pbuf! */ - pbuf_free(p); - goto end; - } - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_input: not for us.\n")); - -#if LWIP_ICMP || LWIP_ICMP6 - - /* No match was found, send ICMP destination port unreachable unless - destination address was broadcast/multicast. */ - if (!broadcast && !ip_addr_ismulticast(ip_current_dest_addr())) { - /* move payload pointer back to ip header */ - pbuf_header_force(p, (s16_t)(ip_current_header_tot_len() + UDP_HLEN)); - icmp_port_unreach(ip_current_is_v6(), p); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP || LWIP_ICMP6 */ - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.proterr); - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpnoports); - pbuf_free(p); - } - } else { - pbuf_free(p); - } - -end: - PERF_STOP("udp_input"); - return; -#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP -chkerr: - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("udp_input: UDP (or UDP Lite) datagram discarded due to failing checksum\n")); - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.chkerr); - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.drop); - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpinerrors); - pbuf_free(p); - PERF_STOP("udp_input"); -#endif /* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Sends the pbuf p using UDP. The pbuf is not deallocated. - * - * - * @param pcb UDP PCB used to send the data. - * @param p chain of pbuf's to be sent. - * - * The datagram will be sent to the current remote_ip & remote_port - * stored in pcb. If the pcb is not bound to a port, it will - * automatically be bound to a random port. - * - * @return lwIP error code. - * - ERR_OK. Successful. No error occurred. - * - ERR_MEM. Out of memory. - * - ERR_RTE. Could not find route to destination address. - * - ERR_VAL. No PCB or PCB is dual-stack - * - More errors could be returned by lower protocol layers. - * - * @see udp_disconnect() udp_sendto() - */ -err_t udp_send(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("udp_send: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_send: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* send to the packet using remote ip and port stored in the pcb */ - return udp_sendto(pcb, p, &pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port); -} - -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP -/** @ingroup udp_raw - * Same as udp_send() but with checksum - */ -err_t udp_send_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum) -{ - LWIP_ERROR("udp_send_chksum: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_send_chksum: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* send to the packet using remote ip and port stored in the pcb */ - return udp_sendto_chksum(pcb, p, &pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port, - have_chksum, chksum); -} -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Send data to a specified address using UDP. - * - * @param pcb UDP PCB used to send the data. - * @param p chain of pbuf's to be sent. - * @param dst_ip Destination IP address. - * @param dst_port Destination UDP port. - * - * dst_ip & dst_port are expected to be in the same byte order as in the pcb. - * - * If the PCB already has a remote address association, it will - * be restored after the data is sent. - * - * @return lwIP error code (@see udp_send for possible error codes) - * - * @see udp_disconnect() udp_send() - */ -err_t udp_sendto(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port) -{ -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP - return udp_sendto_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, 0, 0); -} - -/** @ingroup udp_raw - * Same as udp_sendto(), but with checksum */ -err_t udp_sendto_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, - u16_t dst_port, u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum) -{ -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ - struct netif *netif; - - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto: invalid dst_ip", dst_ip != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - if (!IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, dst_ip)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_send\n")); - - if (pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { - netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->netif_idx); - } else { -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - netif = NULL; - - if (ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip)) { - /* For IPv6, the interface to use for packets with a multicast destination - * is specified using an interface index. The same approach may be used for - * IPv4 as well, in which case it overrides the IPv4 multicast override - * address below. Here we have to look up the netif by going through the - * list, but by doing so we skip a route lookup. If the interface index has - * gone stale, we fall through and do the regular route lookup after all. */ - if (pcb->mcast_ifindex != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { - netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->mcast_ifindex); - } -#if LWIP_IPV4 - else -#if LWIP_IPV6 - if (IP_IS_V4(dst_ip)) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - { - /* IPv4 does not use source-based routing by default, so we use an - administratively selected interface for multicast by default. - However, this can be overridden by setting an interface address - in pcb->mcast_ip4 that is used for routing. If this routing lookup - fails, we try regular routing as though no override was set. */ - if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(pcb->mcast_ip4) && - !ip4_addr_cmp(&pcb->mcast_ip4, IP4_ADDR_BROADCAST)) { - netif = ip4_route_src(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), &pcb->mcast_ip4); - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - } - - if (netif == NULL) -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - { - /* find the outgoing network interface for this packet */ - netif = ip_route(&pcb->local_ip, dst_ip); - } - } - - /* no outgoing network interface could be found? */ - if (netif == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("udp_send: No route to ")); - ip_addr_debug_print(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, dst_ip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("\n")); - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.rterr); - return ERR_RTE; - } - -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP - return udp_sendto_if_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, have_chksum, chksum); -#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ - return udp_sendto_if(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif); -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Send data to a specified address using UDP. - * The netif used for sending can be specified. - * - * This function exists mainly for DHCP, to be able to send UDP packets - * on a netif that is still down. - * - * @param pcb UDP PCB used to send the data. - * @param p chain of pbuf's to be sent. - * @param dst_ip Destination IP address. - * @param dst_port Destination UDP port. - * @param netif the netif used for sending. - * - * dst_ip & dst_port are expected to be in the same byte order as in the pcb. - * - * @return lwIP error code (@see udp_send for possible error codes) - * - * @see udp_disconnect() udp_send() - */ -err_t udp_sendto_if(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif) -{ -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP - return udp_sendto_if_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, 0, 0); -} - -/** Same as udp_sendto_if(), but with checksum */ -err_t udp_sendto_if_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, - u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif, u8_t have_chksum, - u16_t chksum) -{ -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ - const ip_addr_t *src_ip; - - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if: invalid dst_ip", dst_ip != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - if (!IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, dst_ip)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* PCB local address is IP_ANY_ADDR or multicast? */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (IP_IS_V6(dst_ip)) { - if (ip6_addr_isany(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)) || - ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip))) { - src_ip = ip6_select_source_address(netif, ip_2_ip6(dst_ip)); - - if (src_ip == NULL) { - /* No suitable source address was found. */ - return ERR_RTE; - } - } else { - /* use UDP PCB local IPv6 address as source address, if still valid. */ - if (netif_get_ip6_addr_match(netif, ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)) < 0) { - /* Address isn't valid anymore. */ - return ERR_RTE; - } - - src_ip = &pcb->local_ip; - } - } -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - if (ip4_addr_isany(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)) || - ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip))) { - /* if the local_ip is any or multicast - * use the outgoing network interface IP address as source address */ - src_ip = netif_ip_addr4(netif); - } else { - /* check if UDP PCB local IP address is correct - * this could be an old address if netif->ip_addr has changed */ - if (!ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(&(pcb->local_ip)), netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { - /* local_ip doesn't match, drop the packet */ - return ERR_RTE; - } - - /* use UDP PCB local IP address as source address */ - src_ip = &pcb->local_ip; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP - return udp_sendto_if_src_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, have_chksum, chksum, src_ip); -#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ - return udp_sendto_if_src(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, src_ip); -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ -} - -/** @ingroup udp_raw - * Same as @ref udp_sendto_if, but with source address */ -err_t udp_sendto_if_src(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *src_ip) -{ -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP - return udp_sendto_if_src_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, 0, 0, src_ip); -} - -/** Same as udp_sendto_if_src(), but with checksum */ -err_t udp_sendto_if_src_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, - u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif, u8_t have_chksum, - u16_t chksum, const ip_addr_t *src_ip) -{ -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ - struct udp_hdr *udphdr; - err_t err; - struct pbuf *q; /* q will be sent down the stack */ - u8_t ip_proto; - u8_t ttl; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid dst_ip", dst_ip != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid src_ip", src_ip != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - if (!IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, src_ip) || - !IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, dst_ip)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && IP_SOF_BROADCAST - - /* broadcast filter? */ - if (!ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST) && -#if LWIP_IPV6 - IP_IS_V4(dst_ip) && -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - ip_addr_isbroadcast(dst_ip, netif)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("udp_sendto_if: SOF_BROADCAST not enabled on pcb %p\n", (void *)pcb)); - return ERR_VAL; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && IP_SOF_BROADCAST */ - - /* if the PCB is not yet bound to a port, bind it here */ - if (pcb->local_port == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_send: not yet bound to a port, binding now\n")); - err = udp_bind(pcb, &pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("udp_send: forced port bind failed\n")); - return err; - } - } - - /* packet too large to add a UDP header without causing an overflow? */ - if ((u16_t)(p->tot_len + UDP_HLEN) < p->tot_len) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* not enough space to add an UDP header to first pbuf in given p chain? */ - if (pbuf_add_header(p, UDP_HLEN)) { - /* allocate header in a separate new pbuf */ - q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, UDP_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); - - /* new header pbuf could not be allocated? */ - if (q == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("udp_send: could not allocate header\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (p->tot_len != 0) { - /* chain header q in front of given pbuf p (only if p contains data) */ - pbuf_chain(q, p); - } - - /* first pbuf q points to header pbuf */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, - ("udp_send: added header pbuf %p before given pbuf %p\n", (void *)q, (void *)p)); - } else { - /* adding space for header within p succeeded */ - /* first pbuf q equals given pbuf */ - q = p; - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: added header in given pbuf %p\n", (void *)p)); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct udp_hdr", - (q->len >= sizeof(struct udp_hdr))); - /* q now represents the packet to be sent */ - udphdr = (struct udp_hdr *)q->payload; - udphdr->src = lwip_htons(pcb->local_port); - udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(dst_port); - /* in UDP, 0 checksum means 'no checksum' */ - udphdr->chksum = 0x0000; - - /* Multicast Loop? */ -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - - if (((pcb->flags & UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP) != 0) && ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip)) { - q->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: sending datagram of length %" U16_F "\n", q->tot_len)); - -#if LWIP_UDPLITE - - /* UDP Lite protocol? */ - if (pcb->flags & UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE) { - u16_t chklen, chklen_hdr; - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: UDP LITE packet length %" U16_F "\n", q->tot_len)); - /* set UDP message length in UDP header */ - chklen_hdr = chklen = pcb->chksum_len_tx; - - if ((chklen < sizeof(struct udp_hdr)) || (chklen > q->tot_len)) { - if (chklen != 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: UDP LITE pcb->chksum_len is illegal: %" U16_F "\n", chklen)); - } - - /* For UDP-Lite, checksum length of 0 means checksum - over the complete packet. (See RFC 3828 chap. 3.1) - At least the UDP-Lite header must be covered by the - checksum, therefore, if chksum_len has an illegal - value, we generate the checksum over the complete - packet to be safe. */ - chklen_hdr = 0; - chklen = q->tot_len; - } - - udphdr->len = lwip_htons(chklen_hdr); - /* calculate checksum */ -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP) - { -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - - if (have_chksum) { - chklen = UDP_HLEN; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - udphdr->chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(q, IP_PROTO_UDPLITE, - q->tot_len, chklen, src_ip, dst_ip); -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - - if (have_chksum) { - u32_t acc; - acc = udphdr->chksum + (u16_t) ~(chksum); - udphdr->chksum = FOLD_U32T(acc); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - - /* chksum zero must become 0xffff, as zero means 'no checksum' */ - if (udphdr->chksum == 0x0000) { - udphdr->chksum = 0xffff; - } - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ - - ip_proto = IP_PROTO_UDPLITE; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ - { - /* UDP */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: UDP packet length %" U16_F "\n", q->tot_len)); - udphdr->len = lwip_htons(q->tot_len); - /* calculate checksum */ -#if CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP - IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP) - { - /* Checksum is mandatory over IPv6. */ - if (IP_IS_V6(dst_ip) || (pcb->flags & UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM) == 0) { - u16_t udpchksum; -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - - if (have_chksum) { - u32_t acc; - udpchksum = ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(q, IP_PROTO_UDP, - q->tot_len, UDP_HLEN, src_ip, dst_ip); - acc = udpchksum + (u16_t) ~(chksum); - udpchksum = FOLD_U32T(acc); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - { - udpchksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(q, IP_PROTO_UDP, q->tot_len, - src_ip, dst_ip); - } - - /* chksum zero must become 0xffff, as zero means 'no checksum' */ - if (udpchksum == 0x0000) { - udpchksum = 0xffff; - } - - udphdr->chksum = udpchksum; - } - } -#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ - ip_proto = IP_PROTO_UDP; - } - - /* Determine TTL to use */ -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - ttl = (ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip) ? udp_get_multicast_ttl(pcb) : pcb->ttl); -#else /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - ttl = pcb->ttl; -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: UDP checksum 0x%04" X16_F "\n", udphdr->chksum)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: ip_output_if (,,,,0x%02" X16_F ",)\n", (u16_t)ip_proto)); - /* output to IP */ - NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, &(pcb->netif_hints)); - err = ip_output_if_src(q, src_ip, dst_ip, ttl, pcb->tos, ip_proto, netif); - NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); - - /* @todo: must this be increased even if error occurred? */ - MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpoutdatagrams); - - /* did we chain a separate header pbuf earlier? */ - if (q != p) { - /* free the header pbuf */ - pbuf_free(q); - q = NULL; - /* p is still referenced by the caller, and will live on */ - } - - UDP_STATS_INC(udp.xmit); - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Bind an UDP PCB. - * - * @param pcb UDP PCB to be bound with a local address ipaddr and port. - * @param ipaddr local IP address to bind with. Use IP_ANY_TYPE to - * bind to all local interfaces. - * @param port local UDP port to bind with. Use 0 to automatically bind - * to a random port between UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START and - * UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END. - * - * ipaddr & port are expected to be in the same byte order as in the pcb. - * - * @return lwIP error code. - * - ERR_OK. Successful. No error occurred. - * - ERR_USE. The specified ipaddr and port are already bound to by - * another UDP PCB. - * - * @see udp_disconnect() - */ -err_t udp_bind(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) -{ - struct udp_pcb *ipcb; - u8_t rebind; -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - ip_addr_t zoned_ipaddr; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ - if (ipaddr == NULL) { - ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; - } - -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - LWIP_ERROR("udp_bind: invalid ipaddr", ipaddr != NULL, return ERR_ARG); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - LWIP_ERROR("udp_bind: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_bind(ipaddr = ")); - ip_addr_debug_print(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ipaddr); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, (", port = %" U16_F ")\n", port)); - - rebind = 0; - - /* Check for double bind and rebind of the same pcb */ - for (ipcb = udp_pcbs; ipcb != NULL; ipcb = ipcb->next) { - /* is this UDP PCB already on active list? */ - if (pcb == ipcb) { - rebind = 1; - break; - } - } - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now. - * This is legacy support: scope-aware callers should always provide properly - * zoned source addresses. Do the zone selection before the address-in-use - * check below; as such we have to make a temporary copy of the address. */ - if (IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) && ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { - ip_addr_copy(zoned_ipaddr, *ipaddr); - ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&zoned_ipaddr), ip_2_ip6(&zoned_ipaddr)); - ipaddr = &zoned_ipaddr; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - /* no port specified? */ - if (port == 0) { - port = udp_new_port(); - - if (port == 0) { - /* no more ports available in local range */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_bind: out of free UDP ports\n")); - return ERR_USE; - } - } else { - for (ipcb = udp_pcbs; ipcb != NULL; ipcb = ipcb->next) { - if (pcb != ipcb) { - /* By default, we don't allow to bind to a port that any other udp - PCB is already bound to, unless *all* PCBs with that port have tha - REUSEADDR flag set. */ -#if SO_REUSE - if (!ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR) || - !ip_get_option(ipcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) -#endif /* SO_REUSE */ - { - /* port matches that of PCB in list and REUSEADDR not set -> reject */ - if ((ipcb->local_port == port) && - /* IP address matches or any IP used? */ - (ip_addr_cmp(&ipcb->local_ip, ipaddr) || ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) || - ip_addr_isany(&ipcb->local_ip))) { - /* other PCB already binds to this local IP and port */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, - ("udp_bind: local port %" U16_F " already bound by another pcb\n", port)); - return ERR_USE; - } - } - } - } - } - - ip_addr_set_ipaddr(&pcb->local_ip, ipaddr); - - pcb->local_port = port; - mib2_udp_bind(pcb); - - /* pcb not active yet? */ - if (rebind == 0) { - /* place the PCB on the active list if not already there */ - pcb->next = udp_pcbs; - udp_pcbs = pcb; - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("udp_bind: bound to ")); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, pcb->local_ip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, (", port %" U16_F ")\n", pcb->local_port)); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Bind an UDP PCB to a specific netif. - * After calling this function, all packets received via this PCB - * are guaranteed to have come in via the specified netif, and all - * outgoing packets will go out via the specified netif. - * - * @param pcb UDP PCB to be bound. - * @param netif netif to bind udp pcb to. Can be NULL. - * - * @see udp_disconnect() - */ -void udp_bind_netif(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (netif != NULL) { - pcb->netif_idx = netif_get_index(netif); - } else { - pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Sets the remote end of the pcb. This function does not generate any - * network traffic, but only sets the remote address of the pcb. - * - * @param pcb UDP PCB to be connected with remote address ipaddr and port. - * @param ipaddr remote IP address to connect with. - * @param port remote UDP port to connect with. - * - * @return lwIP error code - * - * ipaddr & port are expected to be in the same byte order as in the pcb. - * - * The udp pcb is bound to a random local port if not already bound. - * - * @see udp_disconnect() - */ -err_t udp_connect(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) -{ - struct udp_pcb *ipcb; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("udp_connect: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - LWIP_ERROR("udp_connect: invalid ipaddr", ipaddr != NULL, return ERR_ARG); - - if (pcb->local_port == 0) { - err_t err = udp_bind(pcb, &pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - } - - ip_addr_set_ipaddr(&pcb->remote_ip, ipaddr); -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - - /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now, - * using the bound address to make a more informed decision when possible. */ - if (IP_IS_V6(&pcb->remote_ip) && - ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { - ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - - pcb->remote_port = port; - pcb->flags |= UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED; - - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("udp_connect: connected to ")); - ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, - pcb->remote_ip); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, (", port %" U16_F ")\n", pcb->remote_port)); - - /* Insert UDP PCB into the list of active UDP PCBs. */ - for (ipcb = udp_pcbs; ipcb != NULL; ipcb = ipcb->next) { - if (pcb == ipcb) { - /* already on the list, just return */ - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* PCB not yet on the list, add PCB now */ - pcb->next = udp_pcbs; - udp_pcbs = pcb; - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Remove the remote end of the pcb. This function does not generate - * any network traffic, but only removes the remote address of the pcb. - * - * @param pcb the udp pcb to disconnect. - */ -void udp_disconnect(struct udp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("udp_disconnect: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); - - /* reset remote address association */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { - ip_addr_copy(pcb->remote_ip, *IP_ANY_TYPE); - } else { -#endif - ip_addr_set_any(IP_IS_V6_VAL(pcb->remote_ip), &pcb->remote_ip); -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - } - -#endif - pcb->remote_port = 0; - pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; - /* mark PCB as unconnected */ - udp_clear_flags(pcb, UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED); -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Set a receive callback for a UDP PCB. - * This callback will be called when receiving a datagram for the pcb. - * - * @param pcb the pcb for which to set the recv callback - * @param recv function pointer of the callback function - * @param recv_arg additional argument to pass to the callback function - */ -void udp_recv(struct udp_pcb *pcb, udp_recv_fn recv, void *recv_arg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("udp_recv: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); - - /* remember recv() callback and user data */ - pcb->recv = recv; - pcb->recv_arg = recv_arg; -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Removes and deallocates the pcb. - * - * @param pcb UDP PCB to be removed. The PCB is removed from the list of - * UDP PCB's and the data structure is freed from memory. - * - * @see udp_new() - */ -void udp_remove(struct udp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct udp_pcb *pcb2; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - LWIP_ERROR("udp_remove: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); - - mib2_udp_unbind(pcb); - - /* pcb to be removed is first in list? */ - if (udp_pcbs == pcb) { - /* make list start at 2nd pcb */ - udp_pcbs = udp_pcbs->next; - /* pcb not 1st in list */ - } else { - for (pcb2 = udp_pcbs; pcb2 != NULL; pcb2 = pcb2->next) { - /* find pcb in udp_pcbs list */ - if (pcb2->next != NULL && pcb2->next == pcb) { - /* remove pcb from list */ - pcb2->next = pcb->next; - break; - } - } - } - - memp_free(MEMP_UDP_PCB, pcb); -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Creates a new UDP pcb which can be used for UDP communication. The - * pcb is not active until it has either been bound to a local address - * or connected to a remote address. - * - * @return The UDP PCB which was created. NULL if the PCB data structure - * could not be allocated. - * - * @see udp_remove() - */ -struct udp_pcb * -udp_new(void) -{ - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - pcb = (struct udp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_UDP_PCB); - - /* could allocate UDP PCB? */ - if (pcb != NULL) { - /* UDP Lite: by initializing to all zeroes, chksum_len is set to 0 - * which means checksum is generated over the whole datagram per default - * (recommended as default by RFC 3828). */ - /* initialize PCB to all zeroes */ - memset(pcb, 0, sizeof(struct udp_pcb)); - pcb->ttl = UDP_TTL; -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - udp_set_multicast_ttl(pcb, UDP_TTL); -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - } - - return pcb; -} - -/** - * @ingroup udp_raw - * Create a UDP PCB for specific IP type. - * The pcb is not active until it has either been bound to a local address - * or connected to a remote address. - * - * @param type IP address type, see @ref lwip_ip_addr_type definitions. - * If you want to listen to IPv4 and IPv6 (dual-stack) packets, - * supply @ref IPADDR_TYPE_ANY as argument and bind to @ref IP_ANY_TYPE. - * @return The UDP PCB which was created. NULL if the PCB data structure - * could not be allocated. - * - * @see udp_remove() - */ -struct udp_pcb * -udp_new_ip_type(u8_t type) -{ - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - pcb = udp_new(); -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - - if (pcb != NULL) { - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip, type); - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip, type); - } - -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - return pcb; -} - -/** This function is called from netif.c when address is changed - * - * @param old_addr IP address of the netif before change - * @param new_addr IP address of the netif after change - */ -void udp_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr) -{ - struct udp_pcb *upcb; - - if (!ip_addr_isany(old_addr) && !ip_addr_isany(new_addr)) { - for (upcb = udp_pcbs; upcb != NULL; upcb = upcb->next) { - /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ - if (ip_addr_cmp(&upcb->local_ip, old_addr)) { - /* The PCB is bound to the old ipaddr and - * is set to bound to the new one instead */ - ip_addr_copy(upcb->local_ip, *new_addr); - } - } - } -} - -#if UDP_DEBUG -/** - * Print UDP header information for debug purposes. - * - * @param udphdr pointer to the udp header in memory. - */ -void udp_debug_print(struct udp_hdr *udphdr) -{ - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("UDP header:\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " | %5" U16_F " | (src port, dest port)\n", - lwip_ntohs(udphdr->src), lwip_ntohs(udphdr->dest))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " | 0x%04" X16_F " | (len, chksum)\n", - lwip_ntohs(udphdr->len), lwip_ntohs(udphdr->chksum))); - LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); -} -#endif /* UDP_DEBUG */ - -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ +/** + * @file + * User Datagram Protocol module\n + * The code for the User Datagram Protocol UDP & UDPLite (RFC 3828).\n + * See also @ref udp_raw + * + * @defgroup udp_raw UDP + * @ingroup callbackstyle_api + * User Datagram Protocol module\n + * @see @ref api + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +/* @todo Check the use of '(struct udp_pcb).chksum_len_rx'! + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_UDP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/icmp.h" +#include "lwip/icmp6.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp.h" + +#include + +#ifndef UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START +/* From http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers: + "The Dynamic and/or Private Ports are those from 49152 through 65535" */ +#define UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START 0xc000 +#define UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END 0xffff +#define UDP_ENSURE_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE(port) ((u16_t)(((port) & (u16_t)~UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START) + UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START)) +#endif + +/* last local UDP port */ +static u16_t udp_port = UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START; + +/* The list of UDP PCBs */ +/* exported in udp.h (was static) */ +struct udp_pcb *udp_pcbs; + +/** + * Initialize this module. + */ +void udp_init(void) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_RAND + udp_port = UDP_ENSURE_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE(LWIP_RAND()); +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ +} + +/** + * Allocate a new local UDP port. + * + * @return a new (free) local UDP port number + */ +static u16_t udp_new_port(void) +{ + u16_t n = 0; + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + +again: + + if (udp_port++ == UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END) { + udp_port = UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START; + } + + /* Check all PCBs. */ + for (pcb = udp_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + if (pcb->local_port == udp_port) { + if (++n > (UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END - UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START)) { + return 0; + } + + goto again; + } + } + + return udp_port; +} + +/** Common code to see if the current input packet matches the pcb + * (current input packet is accessed via ip(4/6)_current_* macros) + * + * @param pcb pcb to check + * @param inp network interface on which the datagram was received (only used for IPv4) + * @param broadcast 1 if his is an IPv4 broadcast (global or subnet-only), 0 otherwise (only used for IPv4) + * @return 1 on match, 0 otherwise + */ +static u8_t udp_input_local_match(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct netif *inp, u8_t broadcast) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); /* in IPv6 only case */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(broadcast); /* in IPv6 only case */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("udp_input_local_match: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("udp_input_local_match: invalid netif", inp != NULL); + + /* check if PCB is bound to specific netif */ + if ((pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) && + (pcb->netif_idx != netif_get_index(ip_data.current_input_netif))) { + return 0; + } + + /* Dual-stack: PCBs listening to any IP type also listen to any IP address */ + if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 && IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV + + if ((broadcast != 0) && !ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST)) { + return 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV */ + return 1; + } + + /* Only need to check PCB if incoming IP version matches PCB IP version */ + if (IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ip_current_dest_addr())) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /* Special case: IPv4 broadcast: all or broadcasts in my subnet + * Note: broadcast variable can only be 1 if it is an IPv4 broadcast */ + if (broadcast != 0) { +#if IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV + + if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST)) +#endif /* IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV */ + { + if (ip4_addr_isany(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)) || + ((ip4_current_dest_addr()->addr == IPADDR_BROADCAST)) || + ip4_addr_netcmp(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), ip4_current_dest_addr(), netif_ip4_netmask(inp))) { + return 1; + } + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + /* Handle IPv4 and IPv6: all or exact match */ + if (ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip) || ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->local_ip, ip_current_dest_addr())) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Process an incoming UDP datagram. + * + * Given an incoming UDP datagram (as a chain of pbufs) this function + * finds a corresponding UDP PCB and hands over the pbuf to the pcbs + * recv function. If no pcb is found or the datagram is incorrect, the + * pbuf is freed. + * + * @param p pbuf to be demultiplexed to a UDP PCB (p->payload pointing to the UDP header) + * @param inp network interface on which the datagram was received. + * + */ +void udp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + struct udp_hdr *udphdr; + struct udp_pcb *pcb, *prev; + struct udp_pcb *uncon_pcb; + u16_t src, dest; + u8_t broadcast; + u8_t for_us = 0; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(inp); + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ASSERT("udp_input: invalid pbuf", p != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("udp_input: invalid netif", inp != NULL); + + PERF_START; + + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.recv); + + /* Check minimum length (UDP header) */ + if (p->len < UDP_HLEN) { + /* drop short packets */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, + ("udp_input: short UDP datagram (%" U16_F " bytes) discarded\n", p->tot_len)); + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.lenerr); + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpinerrors); + pbuf_free(p); + goto end; + } + + udphdr = (struct udp_hdr *)p->payload; + + /* is broadcast packet ? */ + broadcast = ip_addr_isbroadcast(ip_current_dest_addr(), ip_current_netif()); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_input: received datagram of length %" U16_F "\n", p->tot_len)); + + /* convert src and dest ports to host byte order */ + src = lwip_ntohs(udphdr->src); + dest = lwip_ntohs(udphdr->dest); + + udp_debug_print(udphdr); + + /* print the UDP source and destination */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp (")); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG, *ip_current_dest_addr()); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, (", %" U16_F ") <-- (", lwip_ntohs(udphdr->dest))); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG, *ip_current_src_addr()); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, (", %" U16_F ")\n", lwip_ntohs(udphdr->src))); + + pcb = NULL; + prev = NULL; + uncon_pcb = NULL; + + /* Iterate through the UDP pcb list for a matching pcb. + * 'Perfect match' pcbs (connected to the remote port & ip address) are + * preferred. If no perfect match is found, the first unconnected pcb that + * matches the local port and ip address gets the datagram. */ + for (pcb = udp_pcbs; pcb != NULL; pcb = pcb->next) { + /* print the PCB local and remote address */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("pcb (")); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG, pcb->local_ip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, (", %" U16_F ") <-- (", pcb->local_port)); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG, pcb->remote_ip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, (", %" U16_F ")\n", pcb->remote_port)); + + /* compare PCB local addr+port to UDP destination addr+port */ + if ((pcb->local_port == dest) && + (udp_input_local_match(pcb, inp, broadcast) != 0)) { + if ((pcb->flags & UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED) == 0) { + if (uncon_pcb == NULL) { + /* the first unconnected matching PCB */ + uncon_pcb = pcb; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + } else if (broadcast && ip4_current_dest_addr()->addr == IPADDR_BROADCAST) { + /* global broadcast address (only valid for IPv4; match was checked before) */ + if (!IP_IS_V4_VAL(uncon_pcb->local_ip) || !ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(&uncon_pcb->local_ip), netif_ip4_addr(inp))) { + /* uncon_pcb does not match the input netif, check this pcb */ + if (IP_IS_V4_VAL(pcb->local_ip) && ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), netif_ip4_addr(inp))) { + /* better match */ + uncon_pcb = pcb; + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + } +#if SO_REUSE + else if (!ip_addr_isany(&pcb->local_ip)) { + /* prefer specific IPs over catch-all */ + uncon_pcb = pcb; + } + +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + } + + /* compare PCB remote addr+port to UDP source addr+port */ + if ((pcb->remote_port == src) && + (ip_addr_isany_val(pcb->remote_ip) || + ip_addr_cmp(&pcb->remote_ip, ip_current_src_addr()))) { + /* the first fully matching PCB */ + if (prev != NULL) { + /* move the pcb to the front of udp_pcbs so that is + found faster next time */ + prev->next = pcb->next; + pcb->next = udp_pcbs; + udp_pcbs = pcb; + } else { + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.cachehit); + } + + break; + } + } + + prev = pcb; + } + + /* no fully matching pcb found? then look for an unconnected pcb */ + if (pcb == NULL) { + pcb = uncon_pcb; + } + + /* Check checksum if this is a match or if it was directed at us. */ + if (pcb != NULL) { + for_us = 1; + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (ip_current_is_v6()) { + for_us = netif_get_ip6_addr_match(inp, ip6_current_dest_addr()) >= 0; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (!ip_current_is_v6()) { + for_us = ip4_addr_cmp(netif_ip4_addr(inp), ip4_current_dest_addr()); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + } + + if (for_us) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_input: calculating checksum\n")); +#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(inp, NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP) + { +#if LWIP_UDPLITE + + if (ip_current_header_proto() == IP_PROTO_UDPLITE) { + /* Do the UDP Lite checksum */ + u16_t chklen = lwip_ntohs(udphdr->len); + + if (chklen < sizeof(struct udp_hdr)) { + if (chklen == 0) { + /* For UDP-Lite, checksum length of 0 means checksum + over the complete packet (See RFC 3828 chap. 3.1) */ + chklen = p->tot_len; + } else { + /* At least the UDP-Lite header must be covered by the + checksum! (Again, see RFC 3828 chap. 3.1) */ + goto chkerr; + } + } + + if (ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(p, IP_PROTO_UDPLITE, + p->tot_len, chklen, + ip_current_src_addr(), ip_current_dest_addr()) != 0) { + goto chkerr; + } + } else +#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ + { + if (udphdr->chksum != 0) { + if (ip_chksum_pseudo(p, IP_PROTO_UDP, p->tot_len, + ip_current_src_addr(), + ip_current_dest_addr()) != 0) { + goto chkerr; + } + } + } + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP */ + + if (pbuf_remove_header(p, UDP_HLEN)) { + /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpinerrors); + pbuf_free(p); + goto end; + } + + if (pcb != NULL) { + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpindatagrams); +#if SO_REUSE && SO_REUSE_RXTOALL + + if (ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR) && + (broadcast || ip_addr_ismulticast(ip_current_dest_addr()))) { + /* pass broadcast- or multicast packets to all multicast pcbs + if SOF_REUSEADDR is set on the first match */ + struct udp_pcb *mpcb; + + for (mpcb = udp_pcbs; mpcb != NULL; mpcb = mpcb->next) { + if (mpcb != pcb) { + /* compare PCB local addr+port to UDP destination addr+port */ + if ((mpcb->local_port == dest) && + (udp_input_local_match(mpcb, inp, broadcast) != 0)) { + /* pass a copy of the packet to all local matches */ + if (mpcb->recv != NULL) { + struct pbuf *q; + q = pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_POOL, p); + + if (q != NULL) { + mpcb->recv(mpcb->recv_arg, mpcb, q, ip_current_src_addr(), src); + } + } + } + } + } + } + +#endif /* SO_REUSE && SO_REUSE_RXTOALL */ + + /* callback */ + if (pcb->recv != NULL) { + /* now the recv function is responsible for freeing p */ + pcb->recv(pcb->recv_arg, pcb, p, ip_current_src_addr(), src); + } else { + /* no recv function registered? then we have to free the pbuf! */ + pbuf_free(p); + goto end; + } + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_input: not for us.\n")); + +#if LWIP_ICMP || LWIP_ICMP6 + + /* No match was found, send ICMP destination port unreachable unless + destination address was broadcast/multicast. */ + if (!broadcast && !ip_addr_ismulticast(ip_current_dest_addr())) { + /* move payload pointer back to ip header */ + pbuf_header_force(p, (s16_t)(ip_current_header_tot_len() + UDP_HLEN)); + icmp_port_unreach(ip_current_is_v6(), p); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP || LWIP_ICMP6 */ + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.proterr); + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpnoports); + pbuf_free(p); + } + } else { + pbuf_free(p); + } + +end: + PERF_STOP("udp_input"); + return; +#if CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP +chkerr: + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("udp_input: UDP (or UDP Lite) datagram discarded due to failing checksum\n")); + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.chkerr); + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.drop); + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpinerrors); + pbuf_free(p); + PERF_STOP("udp_input"); +#endif /* CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Sends the pbuf p using UDP. The pbuf is not deallocated. + * + * + * @param pcb UDP PCB used to send the data. + * @param p chain of pbuf's to be sent. + * + * The datagram will be sent to the current remote_ip & remote_port + * stored in pcb. If the pcb is not bound to a port, it will + * automatically be bound to a random port. + * + * @return lwIP error code. + * - ERR_OK. Successful. No error occurred. + * - ERR_MEM. Out of memory. + * - ERR_RTE. Could not find route to destination address. + * - ERR_VAL. No PCB or PCB is dual-stack + * - More errors could be returned by lower protocol layers. + * + * @see udp_disconnect() udp_sendto() + */ +err_t udp_send(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("udp_send: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_send: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* send to the packet using remote ip and port stored in the pcb */ + return udp_sendto(pcb, p, &pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port); +} + +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP +/** @ingroup udp_raw + * Same as udp_send() but with checksum + */ +err_t udp_send_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum) +{ + LWIP_ERROR("udp_send_chksum: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_send_chksum: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* send to the packet using remote ip and port stored in the pcb */ + return udp_sendto_chksum(pcb, p, &pcb->remote_ip, pcb->remote_port, + have_chksum, chksum); +} +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Send data to a specified address using UDP. + * + * @param pcb UDP PCB used to send the data. + * @param p chain of pbuf's to be sent. + * @param dst_ip Destination IP address. + * @param dst_port Destination UDP port. + * + * dst_ip & dst_port are expected to be in the same byte order as in the pcb. + * + * If the PCB already has a remote address association, it will + * be restored after the data is sent. + * + * @return lwIP error code (@see udp_send for possible error codes) + * + * @see udp_disconnect() udp_send() + */ +err_t udp_sendto(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port) +{ +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP + return udp_sendto_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, 0, 0); +} + +/** @ingroup udp_raw + * Same as udp_sendto(), but with checksum */ +err_t udp_sendto_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, + u16_t dst_port, u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum) +{ +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ + struct netif *netif; + + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto: invalid dst_ip", dst_ip != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + if (!IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, dst_ip)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_send\n")); + + if (pcb->netif_idx != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { + netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->netif_idx); + } else { +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + netif = NULL; + + if (ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip)) { + /* For IPv6, the interface to use for packets with a multicast destination + * is specified using an interface index. The same approach may be used for + * IPv4 as well, in which case it overrides the IPv4 multicast override + * address below. Here we have to look up the netif by going through the + * list, but by doing so we skip a route lookup. If the interface index has + * gone stale, we fall through and do the regular route lookup after all. */ + if (pcb->mcast_ifindex != NETIF_NO_INDEX) { + netif = netif_get_by_index(pcb->mcast_ifindex); + } +#if LWIP_IPV4 + else +#if LWIP_IPV6 + if (IP_IS_V4(dst_ip)) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + { + /* IPv4 does not use source-based routing by default, so we use an + administratively selected interface for multicast by default. + However, this can be overridden by setting an interface address + in pcb->mcast_ip4 that is used for routing. If this routing lookup + fails, we try regular routing as though no override was set. */ + if (!ip4_addr_isany_val(pcb->mcast_ip4) && + !ip4_addr_cmp(&pcb->mcast_ip4, IP4_ADDR_BROADCAST)) { + netif = ip4_route_src(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip), &pcb->mcast_ip4); + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + } + + if (netif == NULL) +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + { + /* find the outgoing network interface for this packet */ + netif = ip_route(&pcb->local_ip, dst_ip); + } + } + + /* no outgoing network interface could be found? */ + if (netif == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("udp_send: No route to ")); + ip_addr_debug_print(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, dst_ip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("\n")); + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.rterr); + return ERR_RTE; + } + +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP + return udp_sendto_if_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, have_chksum, chksum); +#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ + return udp_sendto_if(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif); +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Send data to a specified address using UDP. + * The netif used for sending can be specified. + * + * This function exists mainly for DHCP, to be able to send UDP packets + * on a netif that is still down. + * + * @param pcb UDP PCB used to send the data. + * @param p chain of pbuf's to be sent. + * @param dst_ip Destination IP address. + * @param dst_port Destination UDP port. + * @param netif the netif used for sending. + * + * dst_ip & dst_port are expected to be in the same byte order as in the pcb. + * + * @return lwIP error code (@see udp_send for possible error codes) + * + * @see udp_disconnect() udp_send() + */ +err_t udp_sendto_if(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif) +{ +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP + return udp_sendto_if_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, 0, 0); +} + +/** Same as udp_sendto_if(), but with checksum */ +err_t udp_sendto_if_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, + u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif, u8_t have_chksum, + u16_t chksum) +{ +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ + const ip_addr_t *src_ip; + + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if: invalid dst_ip", dst_ip != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + if (!IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, dst_ip)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* PCB local address is IP_ANY_ADDR or multicast? */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (IP_IS_V6(dst_ip)) { + if (ip6_addr_isany(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)) || + ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip))) { + src_ip = ip6_select_source_address(netif, ip_2_ip6(dst_ip)); + + if (src_ip == NULL) { + /* No suitable source address was found. */ + return ERR_RTE; + } + } else { + /* use UDP PCB local IPv6 address as source address, if still valid. */ + if (netif_get_ip6_addr_match(netif, ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)) < 0) { + /* Address isn't valid anymore. */ + return ERR_RTE; + } + + src_ip = &pcb->local_ip; + } + } +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + if (ip4_addr_isany(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip)) || + ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip4(&pcb->local_ip))) { + /* if the local_ip is any or multicast + * use the outgoing network interface IP address as source address */ + src_ip = netif_ip_addr4(netif); + } else { + /* check if UDP PCB local IP address is correct + * this could be an old address if netif->ip_addr has changed */ + if (!ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(&(pcb->local_ip)), netif_ip4_addr(netif))) { + /* local_ip doesn't match, drop the packet */ + return ERR_RTE; + } + + /* use UDP PCB local IP address as source address */ + src_ip = &pcb->local_ip; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP + return udp_sendto_if_src_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, have_chksum, chksum, src_ip); +#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ + return udp_sendto_if_src(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, src_ip); +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ +} + +/** @ingroup udp_raw + * Same as @ref udp_sendto_if, but with source address */ +err_t udp_sendto_if_src(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *src_ip) +{ +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP + return udp_sendto_if_src_chksum(pcb, p, dst_ip, dst_port, netif, 0, 0, src_ip); +} + +/** Same as udp_sendto_if_src(), but with checksum */ +err_t udp_sendto_if_src_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, + u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif, u8_t have_chksum, + u16_t chksum, const ip_addr_t *src_ip) +{ +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ + struct udp_hdr *udphdr; + err_t err; + struct pbuf *q; /* q will be sent down the stack */ + u8_t ip_proto; + u8_t ttl; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid pbuf", p != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid dst_ip", dst_ip != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid src_ip", src_ip != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_sendto_if_src: invalid netif", netif != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + if (!IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, src_ip) || + !IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, dst_ip)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && IP_SOF_BROADCAST + + /* broadcast filter? */ + if (!ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_BROADCAST) && +#if LWIP_IPV6 + IP_IS_V4(dst_ip) && +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + ip_addr_isbroadcast(dst_ip, netif)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("udp_sendto_if: SOF_BROADCAST not enabled on pcb %p\n", (void *)pcb)); + return ERR_VAL; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && IP_SOF_BROADCAST */ + + /* if the PCB is not yet bound to a port, bind it here */ + if (pcb->local_port == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_send: not yet bound to a port, binding now\n")); + err = udp_bind(pcb, &pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("udp_send: forced port bind failed\n")); + return err; + } + } + + /* packet too large to add a UDP header without causing an overflow? */ + if ((u16_t)(p->tot_len + UDP_HLEN) < p->tot_len) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* not enough space to add an UDP header to first pbuf in given p chain? */ + if (pbuf_add_header(p, UDP_HLEN)) { + /* allocate header in a separate new pbuf */ + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, UDP_HLEN, PBUF_RAM); + + /* new header pbuf could not be allocated? */ + if (q == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, ("udp_send: could not allocate header\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (p->tot_len != 0) { + /* chain header q in front of given pbuf p (only if p contains data) */ + pbuf_chain(q, p); + } + + /* first pbuf q points to header pbuf */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, + ("udp_send: added header pbuf %p before given pbuf %p\n", (void *)q, (void *)p)); + } else { + /* adding space for header within p succeeded */ + /* first pbuf q equals given pbuf */ + q = p; + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: added header in given pbuf %p\n", (void *)p)); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("check that first pbuf can hold struct udp_hdr", + (q->len >= sizeof(struct udp_hdr))); + /* q now represents the packet to be sent */ + udphdr = (struct udp_hdr *)q->payload; + udphdr->src = lwip_htons(pcb->local_port); + udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(dst_port); + /* in UDP, 0 checksum means 'no checksum' */ + udphdr->chksum = 0x0000; + + /* Multicast Loop? */ +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + + if (((pcb->flags & UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP) != 0) && ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip)) { + q->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: sending datagram of length %" U16_F "\n", q->tot_len)); + +#if LWIP_UDPLITE + + /* UDP Lite protocol? */ + if (pcb->flags & UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE) { + u16_t chklen, chklen_hdr; + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: UDP LITE packet length %" U16_F "\n", q->tot_len)); + /* set UDP message length in UDP header */ + chklen_hdr = chklen = pcb->chksum_len_tx; + + if ((chklen < sizeof(struct udp_hdr)) || (chklen > q->tot_len)) { + if (chklen != 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: UDP LITE pcb->chksum_len is illegal: %" U16_F "\n", chklen)); + } + + /* For UDP-Lite, checksum length of 0 means checksum + over the complete packet. (See RFC 3828 chap. 3.1) + At least the UDP-Lite header must be covered by the + checksum, therefore, if chksum_len has an illegal + value, we generate the checksum over the complete + packet to be safe. */ + chklen_hdr = 0; + chklen = q->tot_len; + } + + udphdr->len = lwip_htons(chklen_hdr); + /* calculate checksum */ +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP) + { +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + + if (have_chksum) { + chklen = UDP_HLEN; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + udphdr->chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(q, IP_PROTO_UDPLITE, + q->tot_len, chklen, src_ip, dst_ip); +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + + if (have_chksum) { + u32_t acc; + acc = udphdr->chksum + (u16_t) ~(chksum); + udphdr->chksum = FOLD_U32T(acc); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + + /* chksum zero must become 0xffff, as zero means 'no checksum' */ + if (udphdr->chksum == 0x0000) { + udphdr->chksum = 0xffff; + } + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ + + ip_proto = IP_PROTO_UDPLITE; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ + { + /* UDP */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: UDP packet length %" U16_F "\n", q->tot_len)); + udphdr->len = lwip_htons(q->tot_len); + /* calculate checksum */ +#if CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP + IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP) + { + /* Checksum is mandatory over IPv6. */ + if (IP_IS_V6(dst_ip) || (pcb->flags & UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM) == 0) { + u16_t udpchksum; +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + + if (have_chksum) { + u32_t acc; + udpchksum = ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(q, IP_PROTO_UDP, + q->tot_len, UDP_HLEN, src_ip, dst_ip); + acc = udpchksum + (u16_t) ~(chksum); + udpchksum = FOLD_U32T(acc); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + { + udpchksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(q, IP_PROTO_UDP, q->tot_len, + src_ip, dst_ip); + } + + /* chksum zero must become 0xffff, as zero means 'no checksum' */ + if (udpchksum == 0x0000) { + udpchksum = 0xffff; + } + + udphdr->chksum = udpchksum; + } + } +#endif /* CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ + ip_proto = IP_PROTO_UDP; + } + + /* Determine TTL to use */ +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + ttl = (ip_addr_ismulticast(dst_ip) ? udp_get_multicast_ttl(pcb) : pcb->ttl); +#else /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + ttl = pcb->ttl; +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: UDP checksum 0x%04" X16_F "\n", udphdr->chksum)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_send: ip_output_if (,,,,0x%02" X16_F ",)\n", (u16_t)ip_proto)); + /* output to IP */ + NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, &(pcb->netif_hints)); + err = ip_output_if_src(q, src_ip, dst_ip, ttl, pcb->tos, ip_proto, netif); + NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif); + + /* @todo: must this be increased even if error occurred? */ + MIB2_STATS_INC(mib2.udpoutdatagrams); + + /* did we chain a separate header pbuf earlier? */ + if (q != p) { + /* free the header pbuf */ + pbuf_free(q); + q = NULL; + /* p is still referenced by the caller, and will live on */ + } + + UDP_STATS_INC(udp.xmit); + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Bind an UDP PCB. + * + * @param pcb UDP PCB to be bound with a local address ipaddr and port. + * @param ipaddr local IP address to bind with. Use IP_ANY_TYPE to + * bind to all local interfaces. + * @param port local UDP port to bind with. Use 0 to automatically bind + * to a random port between UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_START and + * UDP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE_END. + * + * ipaddr & port are expected to be in the same byte order as in the pcb. + * + * @return lwIP error code. + * - ERR_OK. Successful. No error occurred. + * - ERR_USE. The specified ipaddr and port are already bound to by + * another UDP PCB. + * + * @see udp_disconnect() + */ +err_t udp_bind(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) +{ + struct udp_pcb *ipcb; + u8_t rebind; +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + ip_addr_t zoned_ipaddr; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + /* Don't propagate NULL pointer (IPv4 ANY) to subsequent functions */ + if (ipaddr == NULL) { + ipaddr = IP4_ADDR_ANY; + } + +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + LWIP_ERROR("udp_bind: invalid ipaddr", ipaddr != NULL, return ERR_ARG); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + LWIP_ERROR("udp_bind: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("udp_bind(ipaddr = ")); + ip_addr_debug_print(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ipaddr); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, (", port = %" U16_F ")\n", port)); + + rebind = 0; + + /* Check for double bind and rebind of the same pcb */ + for (ipcb = udp_pcbs; ipcb != NULL; ipcb = ipcb->next) { + /* is this UDP PCB already on active list? */ + if (pcb == ipcb) { + rebind = 1; + break; + } + } + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now. + * This is legacy support: scope-aware callers should always provide properly + * zoned source addresses. Do the zone selection before the address-in-use + * check below; as such we have to make a temporary copy of the address. */ + if (IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) && ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { + ip_addr_copy(zoned_ipaddr, *ipaddr); + ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&zoned_ipaddr), ip_2_ip6(&zoned_ipaddr)); + ipaddr = &zoned_ipaddr; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + /* no port specified? */ + if (port == 0) { + port = udp_new_port(); + + if (port == 0) { + /* no more ports available in local range */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("udp_bind: out of free UDP ports\n")); + return ERR_USE; + } + } else { + for (ipcb = udp_pcbs; ipcb != NULL; ipcb = ipcb->next) { + if (pcb != ipcb) { + /* By default, we don't allow to bind to a port that any other udp + PCB is already bound to, unless *all* PCBs with that port have tha + REUSEADDR flag set. */ +#if SO_REUSE + if (!ip_get_option(pcb, SOF_REUSEADDR) || + !ip_get_option(ipcb, SOF_REUSEADDR)) +#endif /* SO_REUSE */ + { + /* port matches that of PCB in list and REUSEADDR not set -> reject */ + if ((ipcb->local_port == port) && + /* IP address matches or any IP used? */ + (ip_addr_cmp(&ipcb->local_ip, ipaddr) || ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) || + ip_addr_isany(&ipcb->local_ip))) { + /* other PCB already binds to this local IP and port */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, + ("udp_bind: local port %" U16_F " already bound by another pcb\n", port)); + return ERR_USE; + } + } + } + } + } + + ip_addr_set_ipaddr(&pcb->local_ip, ipaddr); + + pcb->local_port = port; + mib2_udp_bind(pcb); + + /* pcb not active yet? */ + if (rebind == 0) { + /* place the PCB on the active list if not already there */ + pcb->next = udp_pcbs; + udp_pcbs = pcb; + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("udp_bind: bound to ")); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, pcb->local_ip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, (", port %" U16_F ")\n", pcb->local_port)); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Bind an UDP PCB to a specific netif. + * After calling this function, all packets received via this PCB + * are guaranteed to have come in via the specified netif, and all + * outgoing packets will go out via the specified netif. + * + * @param pcb UDP PCB to be bound. + * @param netif netif to bind udp pcb to. Can be NULL. + * + * @see udp_disconnect() + */ +void udp_bind_netif(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (netif != NULL) { + pcb->netif_idx = netif_get_index(netif); + } else { + pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Sets the remote end of the pcb. This function does not generate any + * network traffic, but only sets the remote address of the pcb. + * + * @param pcb UDP PCB to be connected with remote address ipaddr and port. + * @param ipaddr remote IP address to connect with. + * @param port remote UDP port to connect with. + * + * @return lwIP error code + * + * ipaddr & port are expected to be in the same byte order as in the pcb. + * + * The udp pcb is bound to a random local port if not already bound. + * + * @see udp_disconnect() + */ +err_t udp_connect(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port) +{ + struct udp_pcb *ipcb; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("udp_connect: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + LWIP_ERROR("udp_connect: invalid ipaddr", ipaddr != NULL, return ERR_ARG); + + if (pcb->local_port == 0) { + err_t err = udp_bind(pcb, &pcb->local_ip, pcb->local_port); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + } + + ip_addr_set_ipaddr(&pcb->remote_ip, ipaddr); +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + + /* If the given IP address should have a zone but doesn't, assign one now, + * using the bound address to make a more informed decision when possible. */ + if (IP_IS_V6(&pcb->remote_ip) && + ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), IP6_UNKNOWN)) { + ip6_addr_select_zone(ip_2_ip6(&pcb->remote_ip), ip_2_ip6(&pcb->local_ip)); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + + pcb->remote_port = port; + pcb->flags |= UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("udp_connect: connected to ")); + ip_addr_debug_print_val(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, + pcb->remote_ip); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_STATE, (", port %" U16_F ")\n", pcb->remote_port)); + + /* Insert UDP PCB into the list of active UDP PCBs. */ + for (ipcb = udp_pcbs; ipcb != NULL; ipcb = ipcb->next) { + if (pcb == ipcb) { + /* already on the list, just return */ + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* PCB not yet on the list, add PCB now */ + pcb->next = udp_pcbs; + udp_pcbs = pcb; + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Remove the remote end of the pcb. This function does not generate + * any network traffic, but only removes the remote address of the pcb. + * + * @param pcb the udp pcb to disconnect. + */ +void udp_disconnect(struct udp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("udp_disconnect: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); + + /* reset remote address association */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip)) { + ip_addr_copy(pcb->remote_ip, *IP_ANY_TYPE); + } else { +#endif + ip_addr_set_any(IP_IS_V6_VAL(pcb->remote_ip), &pcb->remote_ip); +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + } + +#endif + pcb->remote_port = 0; + pcb->netif_idx = NETIF_NO_INDEX; + /* mark PCB as unconnected */ + udp_clear_flags(pcb, UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED); +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Set a receive callback for a UDP PCB. + * This callback will be called when receiving a datagram for the pcb. + * + * @param pcb the pcb for which to set the recv callback + * @param recv function pointer of the callback function + * @param recv_arg additional argument to pass to the callback function + */ +void udp_recv(struct udp_pcb *pcb, udp_recv_fn recv, void *recv_arg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("udp_recv: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); + + /* remember recv() callback and user data */ + pcb->recv = recv; + pcb->recv_arg = recv_arg; +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Removes and deallocates the pcb. + * + * @param pcb UDP PCB to be removed. The PCB is removed from the list of + * UDP PCB's and the data structure is freed from memory. + * + * @see udp_new() + */ +void udp_remove(struct udp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct udp_pcb *pcb2; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + LWIP_ERROR("udp_remove: invalid pcb", pcb != NULL, return ); + + mib2_udp_unbind(pcb); + + /* pcb to be removed is first in list? */ + if (udp_pcbs == pcb) { + /* make list start at 2nd pcb */ + udp_pcbs = udp_pcbs->next; + /* pcb not 1st in list */ + } else { + for (pcb2 = udp_pcbs; pcb2 != NULL; pcb2 = pcb2->next) { + /* find pcb in udp_pcbs list */ + if (pcb2->next != NULL && pcb2->next == pcb) { + /* remove pcb from list */ + pcb2->next = pcb->next; + break; + } + } + } + + memp_free(MEMP_UDP_PCB, pcb); +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Creates a new UDP pcb which can be used for UDP communication. The + * pcb is not active until it has either been bound to a local address + * or connected to a remote address. + * + * @return The UDP PCB which was created. NULL if the PCB data structure + * could not be allocated. + * + * @see udp_remove() + */ +struct udp_pcb * +udp_new(void) +{ + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + pcb = (struct udp_pcb *)memp_malloc(MEMP_UDP_PCB); + + /* could allocate UDP PCB? */ + if (pcb != NULL) { + /* UDP Lite: by initializing to all zeroes, chksum_len is set to 0 + * which means checksum is generated over the whole datagram per default + * (recommended as default by RFC 3828). */ + /* initialize PCB to all zeroes */ + memset(pcb, 0, sizeof(struct udp_pcb)); + pcb->ttl = UDP_TTL; +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + udp_set_multicast_ttl(pcb, UDP_TTL); +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + } + + return pcb; +} + +/** + * @ingroup udp_raw + * Create a UDP PCB for specific IP type. + * The pcb is not active until it has either been bound to a local address + * or connected to a remote address. + * + * @param type IP address type, see @ref lwip_ip_addr_type definitions. + * If you want to listen to IPv4 and IPv6 (dual-stack) packets, + * supply @ref IPADDR_TYPE_ANY as argument and bind to @ref IP_ANY_TYPE. + * @return The UDP PCB which was created. NULL if the PCB data structure + * could not be allocated. + * + * @see udp_remove() + */ +struct udp_pcb * +udp_new_ip_type(u8_t type) +{ + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + pcb = udp_new(); +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + + if (pcb != NULL) { + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip, type); + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(pcb->remote_ip, type); + } + +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(type); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + return pcb; +} + +/** This function is called from netif.c when address is changed + * + * @param old_addr IP address of the netif before change + * @param new_addr IP address of the netif after change + */ +void udp_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr) +{ + struct udp_pcb *upcb; + + if (!ip_addr_isany(old_addr) && !ip_addr_isany(new_addr)) { + for (upcb = udp_pcbs; upcb != NULL; upcb = upcb->next) { + /* PCB bound to current local interface address? */ + if (ip_addr_cmp(&upcb->local_ip, old_addr)) { + /* The PCB is bound to the old ipaddr and + * is set to bound to the new one instead */ + ip_addr_copy(upcb->local_ip, *new_addr); + } + } + } +} + +#if UDP_DEBUG +/** + * Print UDP header information for debug purposes. + * + * @param udphdr pointer to the udp header in memory. + */ +void udp_debug_print(struct udp_hdr *udphdr) +{ + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("UDP header:\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " | %5" U16_F " | (src port, dest port)\n", + lwip_ntohs(udphdr->src), lwip_ntohs(udphdr->dest))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("| %5" U16_F " | 0x%04" X16_F " | (len, chksum)\n", + lwip_ntohs(udphdr->len), lwip_ntohs(udphdr->chksum))); + LWIP_DEBUGF(UDP_DEBUG, ("+-------------------------------+\n")); +} +#endif /* UDP_DEBUG */ + +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/arpa/inet.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/arpa/inet.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/arpa/inet.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/arpa/inet.h index 68267e51..0ed9baf3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/arpa/inet.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/arpa/inet.h @@ -1,33 +1,33 @@ -/** - * @file - * This file is a posix wrapper for lwip/sockets.h. - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "lwip/sockets.h" +/** + * @file + * This file is a posix wrapper for lwip/sockets.h. + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "lwip/sockets.h" diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/net/if.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/net/if.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/net/if.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/net/if.h index 40368c6f..8b8e4819 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/net/if.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/net/if.h @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ -/** - * @file - * This file is a posix wrapper for lwip/if_api.h. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Joel Cunningham, Garmin International, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "lwip/if_api.h" +/** + * @file + * This file is a posix wrapper for lwip/if_api.h. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Joel Cunningham, Garmin International, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "lwip/if_api.h" diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/netdb.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/netdb.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/netdb.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/netdb.h index 29abbafe..12d4c7f5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/netdb.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/netdb.h @@ -1,33 +1,33 @@ -/** - * @file - * This file is a posix wrapper for lwip/netdb.h. - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "lwip/netdb.h" +/** + * @file + * This file is a posix wrapper for lwip/netdb.h. + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "lwip/netdb.h" diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/sys/socket.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/sys/socket.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/sys/socket.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/sys/socket.h index 68267e51..0ed9baf3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/sys/socket.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/posix/sys/socket.h @@ -1,33 +1,33 @@ -/** - * @file - * This file is a posix wrapper for lwip/sockets.h. - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "lwip/sockets.h" +/** + * @file + * This file is a posix wrapper for lwip/sockets.h. + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "lwip/sockets.h" diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/stdc/errno.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/stdc/errno.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/compat/stdc/errno.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/stdc/errno.h index a3bbfd26..98a9aec9 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/compat/stdc/errno.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/compat/stdc/errno.h @@ -1,33 +1,33 @@ -/** - * @file - * This file is a posix/stdc wrapper for lwip/errno.h. - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "lwip/errno.h" +/** + * @file + * This file is a posix/stdc wrapper for lwip/errno.h. + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "lwip/errno.h" diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp.h index 2bed682f..c841429c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp.h @@ -1,201 +1,201 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n - * - * This file contains the generic API. - * For more details see @ref altcp_api. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/tcpbase.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct altcp_pcb; -struct altcp_functions; - -typedef err_t (*altcp_accept_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *new_conn, err_t err); -typedef err_t (*altcp_connected_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *conn, err_t err); -typedef err_t (*altcp_recv_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); -typedef err_t (*altcp_sent_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len); -typedef err_t (*altcp_poll_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *conn); -typedef void (*altcp_err_fn)(void *arg, err_t err); - -typedef struct altcp_pcb *(*altcp_new_fn)(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); - -struct altcp_pcb { - const struct altcp_functions *fns; - struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn; - void *arg; - void *state; - /* application callbacks */ - altcp_accept_fn accept; - altcp_connected_fn connected; - altcp_recv_fn recv; - altcp_sent_fn sent; - altcp_poll_fn poll; - altcp_err_fn err; - u8_t pollinterval; -}; - -/** @ingroup altcp */ -typedef struct altcp_allocator_s { - /** Allocator function */ - altcp_new_fn alloc; - /** Argument to allocator function */ - void *arg; -} altcp_allocator_t; - -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_new(altcp_allocator_t *allocator); -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_new_ip6(altcp_allocator_t *allocator); -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_new_ip_type(altcp_allocator_t *allocator, u8_t ip_type); - -void altcp_arg(struct altcp_pcb *conn, void *arg); -void altcp_accept(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_accept_fn accept); -void altcp_recv(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_recv_fn recv); -void altcp_sent(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_sent_fn sent); -void altcp_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_poll_fn poll, u8_t interval); -void altcp_err(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_err_fn err); - -void altcp_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len); -err_t altcp_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port); -err_t altcp_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected); - -/* return conn for source code compatibility to tcp callback API only */ -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err); -#define altcp_listen_with_backlog(conn, backlog) altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(conn, backlog, NULL) -/** @ingroup altcp */ -#define altcp_listen(conn) altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(conn, TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG, NULL) - -void altcp_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -err_t altcp_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -err_t altcp_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx); - -err_t altcp_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags); -err_t altcp_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn); - -u16_t altcp_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -u16_t altcp_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -u16_t altcp_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -void altcp_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -void altcp_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -int altcp_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn); - -void altcp_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio); - -err_t altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port); -ip_addr_t *altcp_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); -u16_t altcp_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -enum tcp_state altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#else /* LWIP_ALTCP */ - -/* ALTCP disabled, define everything to link against tcp callback API (e.g. to get a small non-ssl httpd) */ - -#include "lwip/tcp.h" - -#define altcp_accept_fn tcp_accept_fn -#define altcp_connected_fn tcp_connected_fn -#define altcp_recv_fn tcp_recv_fn -#define altcp_sent_fn tcp_sent_fn -#define altcp_poll_fn tcp_poll_fn -#define altcp_err_fn tcp_err_fn - -#define altcp_pcb tcp_pcb -#define altcp_tcp_new_ip_type tcp_new_ip_type -#define altcp_tcp_new tcp_new -#define altcp_tcp_new_ip6 tcp_new_ip6 - -#define altcp_new(allocator) tcp_new() -#define altcp_new_ip6(allocator) tcp_new_ip6() -#define altcp_new_ip_type(allocator, ip_type) tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type) - -#define altcp_arg tcp_arg -#define altcp_accept tcp_accept -#define altcp_recv tcp_recv -#define altcp_sent tcp_sent -#define altcp_poll tcp_poll -#define altcp_err tcp_err - -#define altcp_recved tcp_recved -#define altcp_bind tcp_bind -#define altcp_connect tcp_connect - -#define altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err -#define altcp_listen_with_backlog tcp_listen_with_backlog -#define altcp_listen tcp_listen - -#define altcp_abort tcp_abort -#define altcp_close tcp_close -#define altcp_shutdown tcp_shutdown - -#define altcp_write tcp_write -#define altcp_output tcp_output - -#define altcp_mss tcp_mss -#define altcp_sndbuf tcp_sndbuf -#define altcp_sndqueuelen tcp_sndqueuelen -#define altcp_nagle_disable tcp_nagle_disable -#define altcp_nagle_enable tcp_nagle_enable -#define altcp_nagle_disabled tcp_nagle_disabled -#define altcp_setprio tcp_setprio - -#define altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo -#define altcp_get_ip(pcb, local) ((local) ? (&(pcb)->local_ip) : (&(pcb)->remote_ip)) - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -#define altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state tcp_dbg_get_tcp_state -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_H */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n + * + * This file contains the generic API. + * For more details see @ref altcp_api. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/tcpbase.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct altcp_pcb; +struct altcp_functions; + +typedef err_t (*altcp_accept_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *new_conn, err_t err); +typedef err_t (*altcp_connected_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *conn, err_t err); +typedef err_t (*altcp_recv_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *conn, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); +typedef err_t (*altcp_sent_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len); +typedef err_t (*altcp_poll_fn)(void *arg, struct altcp_pcb *conn); +typedef void (*altcp_err_fn)(void *arg, err_t err); + +typedef struct altcp_pcb *(*altcp_new_fn)(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); + +struct altcp_pcb { + const struct altcp_functions *fns; + struct altcp_pcb *inner_conn; + void *arg; + void *state; + /* application callbacks */ + altcp_accept_fn accept; + altcp_connected_fn connected; + altcp_recv_fn recv; + altcp_sent_fn sent; + altcp_poll_fn poll; + altcp_err_fn err; + u8_t pollinterval; +}; + +/** @ingroup altcp */ +typedef struct altcp_allocator_s { + /** Allocator function */ + altcp_new_fn alloc; + /** Argument to allocator function */ + void *arg; +} altcp_allocator_t; + +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_new(altcp_allocator_t *allocator); +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_new_ip6(altcp_allocator_t *allocator); +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_new_ip_type(altcp_allocator_t *allocator, u8_t ip_type); + +void altcp_arg(struct altcp_pcb *conn, void *arg); +void altcp_accept(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_accept_fn accept); +void altcp_recv(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_recv_fn recv); +void altcp_sent(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_sent_fn sent); +void altcp_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_poll_fn poll, u8_t interval); +void altcp_err(struct altcp_pcb *conn, altcp_err_fn err); + +void altcp_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len); +err_t altcp_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port); +err_t altcp_connect(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected); + +/* return conn for source code compatibility to tcp callback API only */ +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err); +#define altcp_listen_with_backlog(conn, backlog) altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(conn, backlog, NULL) +/** @ingroup altcp */ +#define altcp_listen(conn) altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(conn, TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG, NULL) + +void altcp_abort(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +err_t altcp_close(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +err_t altcp_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx); + +err_t altcp_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags); +err_t altcp_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn); + +u16_t altcp_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +u16_t altcp_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +u16_t altcp_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +void altcp_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +void altcp_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +int altcp_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn); + +void altcp_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio); + +err_t altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port); +ip_addr_t *altcp_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); +u16_t altcp_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +enum tcp_state altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#else /* LWIP_ALTCP */ + +/* ALTCP disabled, define everything to link against tcp callback API (e.g. to get a small non-ssl httpd) */ + +#include "lwip/tcp.h" + +#define altcp_accept_fn tcp_accept_fn +#define altcp_connected_fn tcp_connected_fn +#define altcp_recv_fn tcp_recv_fn +#define altcp_sent_fn tcp_sent_fn +#define altcp_poll_fn tcp_poll_fn +#define altcp_err_fn tcp_err_fn + +#define altcp_pcb tcp_pcb +#define altcp_tcp_new_ip_type tcp_new_ip_type +#define altcp_tcp_new tcp_new +#define altcp_tcp_new_ip6 tcp_new_ip6 + +#define altcp_new(allocator) tcp_new() +#define altcp_new_ip6(allocator) tcp_new_ip6() +#define altcp_new_ip_type(allocator, ip_type) tcp_new_ip_type(ip_type) + +#define altcp_arg tcp_arg +#define altcp_accept tcp_accept +#define altcp_recv tcp_recv +#define altcp_sent tcp_sent +#define altcp_poll tcp_poll +#define altcp_err tcp_err + +#define altcp_recved tcp_recved +#define altcp_bind tcp_bind +#define altcp_connect tcp_connect + +#define altcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err +#define altcp_listen_with_backlog tcp_listen_with_backlog +#define altcp_listen tcp_listen + +#define altcp_abort tcp_abort +#define altcp_close tcp_close +#define altcp_shutdown tcp_shutdown + +#define altcp_write tcp_write +#define altcp_output tcp_output + +#define altcp_mss tcp_mss +#define altcp_sndbuf tcp_sndbuf +#define altcp_sndqueuelen tcp_sndqueuelen +#define altcp_nagle_disable tcp_nagle_disable +#define altcp_nagle_enable tcp_nagle_enable +#define altcp_nagle_disabled tcp_nagle_disabled +#define altcp_setprio tcp_setprio + +#define altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo +#define altcp_get_ip(pcb, local) ((local) ? (&(pcb)->local_ip) : (&(pcb)->remote_ip)) + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +#define altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state tcp_dbg_get_tcp_state +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tcp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tcp.h index cb255471..4fa2e24a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tcp.h @@ -1,72 +1,72 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n - * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing - * direct linking (much like virtual functions). - * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols - * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). - * - * This file contains the base implementation calling into tcp. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TCP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TCP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(u8_t ip_type); - -#define altcp_tcp_new() altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V4) -#define altcp_tcp_new_ip6() altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V6) - -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tcp_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); - -struct tcp_pcb; -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tcp_wrap(struct tcp_pcb *tpcb); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TCP_H */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n + * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing + * direct linking (much like virtual functions). + * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols + * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). + * + * This file contains the base implementation calling into tcp. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TCP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TCP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(u8_t ip_type); + +#define altcp_tcp_new() altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V4) +#define altcp_tcp_new_ip6() altcp_tcp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V6) + +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tcp_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); + +struct tcp_pcb; +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tcp_wrap(struct tcp_pcb *tpcb); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TCP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tls.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tls.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tls.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tls.h index 0999c7e2..5d49e8a4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tls.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/altcp_tls.h @@ -1,117 +1,117 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) - * - * @defgroup altcp_tls TLS layer - * @ingroup altcp - * This file contains function prototypes for a TLS layer. - * A port to ARM mbedtls is provided in the apps/ tree - * (LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS option). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** @ingroup altcp_tls - * ALTCP_TLS configuration handle, content depends on port (e.g. mbedtls) - */ -struct altcp_tls_config; - -/** @ingroup altcp_tls - * Create an ALTCP_TLS server configuration handle - */ -struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config_server_privkey_cert(const u8_t *privkey, size_t privkey_len, - const u8_t *privkey_pass, size_t privkey_pass_len, - const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len); - -/** @ingroup altcp_tls - * Create an ALTCP_TLS client configuration handle - */ -struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config_client(const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len); - -/** @ingroup altcp_tls - * Create an ALTCP_TLS client configuration handle with two-way server/client authentication - */ -struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config_client_2wayauth(const u8_t *ca, size_t ca_len, const u8_t *privkey, size_t privkey_len, - const u8_t *privkey_pass, size_t privkey_pass_len, - const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len); - -/** @ingroup altcp_tls - * Free an ALTCP_TLS configuration handle - */ -void altcp_tls_free_config(struct altcp_tls_config *conf); - -/** @ingroup altcp_tls - * Create new ALTCP_TLS layer wrapping an existing pcb as inner connection (e.g. TLS over TCP) - */ -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tls_wrap(struct altcp_tls_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb); - -/** @ingroup altcp_tls - * Create new ALTCP_TLS pcb and its inner tcp pcb - */ -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tls_new(struct altcp_tls_config *config, u8_t ip_type); - -/** @ingroup altcp_tls - * Create new ALTCP_TLS layer pcb and its inner tcp pcb. - * Same as @ref altcp_tls_new but this allocator function fits to - * @ref altcp_allocator_t / @ref altcp_new.\n - 'arg' must contain a struct altcp_tls_config *. - */ -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tls_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); - -/** @ingroup altcp_tls - * Return pointer to internal TLS context so application can tweak it. - * Real type depends on port (e.g. mbedtls) - */ -void *altcp_tls_context(struct altcp_pcb *conn); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_H */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) + * + * @defgroup altcp_tls TLS layer + * @ingroup altcp + * This file contains function prototypes for a TLS layer. + * A port to ARM mbedtls is provided in the apps/ tree + * (LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS option). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** @ingroup altcp_tls + * ALTCP_TLS configuration handle, content depends on port (e.g. mbedtls) + */ +struct altcp_tls_config; + +/** @ingroup altcp_tls + * Create an ALTCP_TLS server configuration handle + */ +struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config_server_privkey_cert(const u8_t *privkey, size_t privkey_len, + const u8_t *privkey_pass, size_t privkey_pass_len, + const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len); + +/** @ingroup altcp_tls + * Create an ALTCP_TLS client configuration handle + */ +struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config_client(const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len); + +/** @ingroup altcp_tls + * Create an ALTCP_TLS client configuration handle with two-way server/client authentication + */ +struct altcp_tls_config *altcp_tls_create_config_client_2wayauth(const u8_t *ca, size_t ca_len, const u8_t *privkey, size_t privkey_len, + const u8_t *privkey_pass, size_t privkey_pass_len, + const u8_t *cert, size_t cert_len); + +/** @ingroup altcp_tls + * Free an ALTCP_TLS configuration handle + */ +void altcp_tls_free_config(struct altcp_tls_config *conf); + +/** @ingroup altcp_tls + * Create new ALTCP_TLS layer wrapping an existing pcb as inner connection (e.g. TLS over TCP) + */ +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tls_wrap(struct altcp_tls_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb); + +/** @ingroup altcp_tls + * Create new ALTCP_TLS pcb and its inner tcp pcb + */ +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tls_new(struct altcp_tls_config *config, u8_t ip_type); + +/** @ingroup altcp_tls + * Create new ALTCP_TLS layer pcb and its inner tcp pcb. + * Same as @ref altcp_tls_new but this allocator function fits to + * @ref altcp_allocator_t / @ref altcp_new.\n + 'arg' must contain a struct altcp_tls_config *. + */ +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_tls_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); + +/** @ingroup altcp_tls + * Return pointer to internal TLS context so application can tweak it. + * Real type depends on port (e.g. mbedtls) + */ +void *altcp_tls_context(struct altcp_pcb *conn); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/api.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/api.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/api.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/api.h index 5e1d8719..899cf4c5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/api.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/api.h @@ -1,447 +1,447 @@ -/** - * @file - * netconn API (to be used from non-TCPIP threads) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_API_H -#define LWIP_HDR_API_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ -/* Note: Netconn API is always available when sockets are enabled - - * sockets are implemented on top of them */ - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/netbuf.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* Throughout this file, IP addresses and port numbers are expected to be in - * the same byte order as in the corresponding pcb. - */ - -/* Flags for netconn_write (u8_t) */ -#define NETCONN_NOFLAG 0x00 -#define NETCONN_NOCOPY 0x00 /* Only for source code compatibility */ -#define NETCONN_COPY 0x01 -#define NETCONN_MORE 0x02 -#define NETCONN_DONTBLOCK 0x04 -#define NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD 0x08 /* prevent netconn_recv_data_tcp() from updating the tcp window - must be done manually via netconn_tcp_recvd() */ -#define NETCONN_NOFIN 0x10 /* upper layer already received data, leave FIN in queue until called again */ - -/* Flags for struct netconn.flags (u8_t) */ -/** This netconn had an error, don't block on recvmbox/acceptmbox any more */ -#define NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED 0x01 -/** Should this netconn avoid blocking? */ -#define NETCONN_FLAG_NON_BLOCKING 0x02 -/** Was the last connect action a non-blocking one? */ -#define NETCONN_FLAG_IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT 0x04 -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -/** The mbox of this netconn is being deallocated, don't use it anymore */ -#define NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID 0x08 -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ -/** If a nonblocking write has been rejected before, poll_tcp needs to - check if the netconn is writable again */ -#define NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE 0x10 -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** If this flag is set then only IPv6 communication is allowed on the - netconn. As per RFC#3493 this features defaults to OFF allowing - dual-stack usage by default. */ -#define NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY 0x20 -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO -/** Received packet info will be recorded for this netconn */ -#define NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO 0x40 -#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ -/** A FIN has been received but not passed to the application yet */ -#define NETCONN_FIN_RX_PENDING 0x80 - -/* Helpers to process several netconn_types by the same code */ -#define NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(t) ((t)&0xF0) -#define NETCONNTYPE_DATAGRAM(t) ((t)&0xE0) -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#define NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 0x08 -#define NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(t) (((t)&NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6) != 0) -#define NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(t) (((t)&0xF3) == NETCONN_UDPLITE) -#define NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPNOCHKSUM(t) (((t)&0xF3) == NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM) -#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#define NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(t) (0) -#define NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(t) ((t) == NETCONN_UDPLITE) -#define NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPNOCHKSUM(t) ((t) == NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** @ingroup netconn_common - * Protocol family and type of the netconn - */ -enum netconn_type { - NETCONN_INVALID = 0, - /** TCP IPv4 */ - NETCONN_TCP = 0x10, -#if LWIP_IPV6 - /** TCP IPv6 */ - NETCONN_TCP_IPV6 = NETCONN_TCP | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x18 */, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - /** UDP IPv4 */ - NETCONN_UDP = 0x20, - /** UDP IPv4 lite */ - NETCONN_UDPLITE = 0x21, - /** UDP IPv4 no checksum */ - NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM = 0x22, - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - /** UDP IPv6 (dual-stack by default, unless you call @ref netconn_set_ipv6only) */ - NETCONN_UDP_IPV6 = NETCONN_UDP | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x28 */, - /** UDP IPv6 lite (dual-stack by default, unless you call @ref netconn_set_ipv6only) */ - NETCONN_UDPLITE_IPV6 = NETCONN_UDPLITE | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x29 */, - /** UDP IPv6 no checksum (dual-stack by default, unless you call @ref netconn_set_ipv6only) */ - NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM_IPV6 = NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x2a */, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - - /** Raw connection IPv4 */ - NETCONN_RAW = 0x40 -#if LWIP_IPV6 - /** Raw connection IPv6 (dual-stack by default, unless you call @ref netconn_set_ipv6only) */ - , - NETCONN_RAW_IPV6 = NETCONN_RAW | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x48 */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -}; - -/** Current state of the netconn. Non-TCP netconns are always - * in state NETCONN_NONE! */ -enum netconn_state { - NETCONN_NONE, - NETCONN_WRITE, - NETCONN_LISTEN, - NETCONN_CONNECT, - NETCONN_CLOSE -}; - -/** Used to inform the callback function about changes - * - * Event explanation: - * - * In the netconn implementation, there are three ways to block a client: - * - * - accept mbox (sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &accept_ptr, 0); in netconn_accept()) - * - receive mbox (sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->recvmbox, &buf, 0); in netconn_recv_data()) - * - send queue is full (sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); in lwip_netconn_do_write()) - * - * The events have to be seen as events signaling the state of these mboxes/semaphores. For non-blocking - * connections, you need to know in advance whether a call to a netconn function call would block or not, - * and these events tell you about that. - * - * RCVPLUS events say: Safe to perform a potentially blocking call call once more. - * They are counted in sockets - three RCVPLUS events for accept mbox means you are safe - * to call netconn_accept 3 times without being blocked. - * Same thing for receive mbox. - * - * RCVMINUS events say: Your call to to a possibly blocking function is "acknowledged". - * Socket implementation decrements the counter. - * - * For TX, there is no need to count, its merely a flag. SENDPLUS means you may send something. - * SENDPLUS occurs when enough data was delivered to peer so netconn_send() can be called again. - * A SENDMINUS event occurs when the next call to a netconn_send() would be blocking. - */ -enum netconn_evt { - NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, - NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS, - NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, - NETCONN_EVT_SENDMINUS, - NETCONN_EVT_ERROR -}; - -#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) -/** Used for netconn_join_leave_group() */ -enum netconn_igmp { - NETCONN_JOIN, - NETCONN_LEAVE -}; -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ - -#if LWIP_DNS -/* Used for netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(), these should match the DNS_ADDRTYPE defines in dns.h */ -#define NETCONN_DNS_DEFAULT NETCONN_DNS_IPV4_IPV6 -#define NETCONN_DNS_IPV4 0 -#define NETCONN_DNS_IPV6 1 -#define NETCONN_DNS_IPV4_IPV6 2 /* try to resolve IPv4 first, try IPv6 if IPv4 fails only */ -#define NETCONN_DNS_IPV6_IPV4 3 /* try to resolve IPv6 first, try IPv4 if IPv6 fails only */ -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -/* forward-declare some structs to avoid to include their headers */ -struct ip_pcb; -struct tcp_pcb; -struct udp_pcb; -struct raw_pcb; -struct netconn; -struct api_msg; - -/** A callback prototype to inform about events for a netconn */ -typedef void (*netconn_callback)(struct netconn *, enum netconn_evt, u16_t len); - -/** A netconn descriptor */ -struct netconn { - /** type of the netconn (TCP, UDP or RAW) */ - enum netconn_type type; - /** current state of the netconn */ - enum netconn_state state; - /** the lwIP internal protocol control block */ - union { - struct ip_pcb *ip; - struct tcp_pcb *tcp; - struct udp_pcb *udp; - struct raw_pcb *raw; - } pcb; - /** the last asynchronous unreported error this netconn had */ - err_t pending_err; -#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - /** sem that is used to synchronously execute functions in the core context */ - sys_sem_t op_completed; -#endif - /** mbox where received packets are stored until they are fetched - by the netconn application thread (can grow quite big) */ - sys_mbox_t recvmbox; -#if LWIP_TCP - /** mbox where new connections are stored until processed - by the application thread */ - sys_mbox_t acceptmbox; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - /** number of threads waiting on an mbox. This is required to unblock - all threads when closing while threads are waiting. */ - int mbox_threads_waiting; -#endif - /** only used for socket layer */ -#if LWIP_SOCKET - int socket; -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO - /** timeout to wait for sending data (which means enqueueing data for sending - in internal buffers) in milliseconds */ - s32_t send_timeout; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO - /** timeout in milliseconds to wait for new data to be received - (or connections to arrive for listening netconns) */ - u32_t recv_timeout; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF - /** maximum amount of bytes queued in recvmbox - not used for TCP: adjust TCP_WND instead! */ - int recv_bufsize; - /** number of bytes currently in recvmbox to be received, - tested against recv_bufsize to limit bytes on recvmbox - for UDP and RAW, used for FIONREAD */ - int recv_avail; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ -#if LWIP_SO_LINGER - /** values <0 mean linger is disabled, values > 0 are seconds to linger */ - s16_t linger; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - /** flags holding more netconn-internal state, see NETCONN_FLAG_* defines */ - u8_t flags; -#if LWIP_TCP - /** TCP: when data passed to netconn_write doesn't fit into the send buffer, - this temporarily stores the message. - Also used during connect and close. */ - struct api_msg *current_msg; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - /** A callback function that is informed about events for this netconn */ - netconn_callback callback; -}; - -/** This vector type is passed to @ref netconn_write_vectors_partly to send - * multiple buffers at once. - * ATTENTION: This type has to directly map struct iovec since one is casted - * into the other! - */ -struct netvector { - /** pointer to the application buffer that contains the data to send */ - const void *ptr; - /** size of the application data to send */ - size_t len; -}; - -/** Register an Network connection event */ -#define API_EVENT(c, e, l) \ - if (c->callback) { \ - (*c->callback)(c, e, l); \ - } - -/* Network connection functions: */ - -/** @ingroup netconn_common - * Create new netconn connection - * @param t @ref netconn_type */ -#define netconn_new(t) netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(t, 0, NULL) -#define netconn_new_with_callback(t, c) netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(t, 0, c) -struct netconn *netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(enum netconn_type t, u8_t proto, - netconn_callback callback); -err_t netconn_prepare_delete(struct netconn *conn); -err_t netconn_delete(struct netconn *conn); -/** Get the type of a netconn (as enum netconn_type). */ -#define netconn_type(conn) (conn->type) - -err_t netconn_getaddr(struct netconn *conn, ip_addr_t *addr, - u16_t *port, u8_t local); -/** @ingroup netconn_common */ -#define netconn_peer(c, i, p) netconn_getaddr(c, i, p, 0) -/** @ingroup netconn_common */ -#define netconn_addr(c, i, p) netconn_getaddr(c, i, p, 1) - -err_t netconn_bind(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); -err_t netconn_bind_if(struct netconn *conn, u8_t if_idx); -err_t netconn_connect(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); -err_t netconn_disconnect(struct netconn *conn); -err_t netconn_listen_with_backlog(struct netconn *conn, u8_t backlog); -/** @ingroup netconn_tcp */ -#define netconn_listen(conn) netconn_listen_with_backlog(conn, TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG) -err_t netconn_accept(struct netconn *conn, struct netconn **new_conn); -err_t netconn_recv(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf); -err_t netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf); -err_t netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf_flags(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags); -err_t netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf); -err_t netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf_flags(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags); -err_t netconn_tcp_recvd(struct netconn *conn, size_t len); -err_t netconn_sendto(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf *buf, - const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); -err_t netconn_send(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf *buf); -err_t netconn_write_partly(struct netconn *conn, const void *dataptr, size_t size, - u8_t apiflags, size_t *bytes_written); -err_t netconn_write_vectors_partly(struct netconn *conn, struct netvector *vectors, u16_t vectorcnt, - u8_t apiflags, size_t *bytes_written); -/** @ingroup netconn_tcp */ -#define netconn_write(conn, dataptr, size, apiflags) \ - netconn_write_partly(conn, dataptr, size, apiflags, NULL) -err_t netconn_close(struct netconn *conn); -err_t netconn_shutdown(struct netconn *conn, u8_t shut_rx, u8_t shut_tx); - -#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) -err_t netconn_join_leave_group(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *multiaddr, - const ip_addr_t *netif_addr, enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave); -err_t netconn_join_leave_group_netif(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *multiaddr, - u8_t if_idx, enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave); -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ -#if LWIP_DNS -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -err_t netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype); -#define netconn_gethostbyname(name, addr) netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(name, addr, NETCONN_DNS_DEFAULT) -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -err_t netconn_gethostbyname(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr); -#define netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(name, addr, dns_addrtype) netconn_gethostbyname(name, addr) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -err_t netconn_err(struct netconn *conn); -#define netconn_recv_bufsize(conn) ((conn)->recv_bufsize) - -#define netconn_set_flags(conn, set_flags) \ - do { \ - (conn)->flags = (u8_t)((conn)->flags | (set_flags)); \ - } while (0) -#define netconn_clear_flags(conn, clr_flags) \ - do { \ - (conn)->flags = (u8_t)((conn)->flags & (u8_t)(~(clr_flags)&0xff)); \ - } while (0) -#define netconn_is_flag_set(conn, flag) (((conn)->flags & (flag)) != 0) - -/** Set the blocking status of netconn calls (@todo: write/send is missing) */ -#define netconn_set_nonblocking(conn, val) \ - do { \ - if (val) { \ - netconn_set_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_NON_BLOCKING); \ - } else { \ - netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_NON_BLOCKING); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** Get the blocking status of netconn calls (@todo: write/send is missing) */ -#define netconn_is_nonblocking(conn) (((conn)->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_NON_BLOCKING) != 0) - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** @ingroup netconn_common - * TCP: Set the IPv6 ONLY status of netconn calls (see NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY) - */ -#define netconn_set_ipv6only(conn, val) \ - do { \ - if (val) { \ - netconn_set_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY); \ - } else { \ - netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup netconn_common - * TCP: Get the IPv6 ONLY status of netconn calls (see NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY) - */ -#define netconn_get_ipv6only(conn) (((conn)->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY) != 0) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO -/** Set the send timeout in milliseconds */ -#define netconn_set_sendtimeout(conn, timeout) ((conn)->send_timeout = (timeout)) -/** Get the send timeout in milliseconds */ -#define netconn_get_sendtimeout(conn) ((conn)->send_timeout) -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO -/** Set the receive timeout in milliseconds */ -#define netconn_set_recvtimeout(conn, timeout) ((conn)->recv_timeout = (timeout)) -/** Get the receive timeout in milliseconds */ -#define netconn_get_recvtimeout(conn) ((conn)->recv_timeout) -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ -#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF -/** Set the receive buffer in bytes */ -#define netconn_set_recvbufsize(conn, recvbufsize) ((conn)->recv_bufsize = (recvbufsize)) -/** Get the receive buffer in bytes */ -#define netconn_get_recvbufsize(conn) ((conn)->recv_bufsize) -#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF*/ - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD -void netconn_thread_init(void); -void netconn_thread_cleanup(void); -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ -#define netconn_thread_init() -#define netconn_thread_cleanup() -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_API_H */ +/** + * @file + * netconn API (to be used from non-TCPIP threads) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_API_H +#define LWIP_HDR_API_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ +/* Note: Netconn API is always available when sockets are enabled - + * sockets are implemented on top of them */ + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/netbuf.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Throughout this file, IP addresses and port numbers are expected to be in + * the same byte order as in the corresponding pcb. + */ + +/* Flags for netconn_write (u8_t) */ +#define NETCONN_NOFLAG 0x00 +#define NETCONN_NOCOPY 0x00 /* Only for source code compatibility */ +#define NETCONN_COPY 0x01 +#define NETCONN_MORE 0x02 +#define NETCONN_DONTBLOCK 0x04 +#define NETCONN_NOAUTORCVD 0x08 /* prevent netconn_recv_data_tcp() from updating the tcp window - must be done manually via netconn_tcp_recvd() */ +#define NETCONN_NOFIN 0x10 /* upper layer already received data, leave FIN in queue until called again */ + +/* Flags for struct netconn.flags (u8_t) */ +/** This netconn had an error, don't block on recvmbox/acceptmbox any more */ +#define NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXCLOSED 0x01 +/** Should this netconn avoid blocking? */ +#define NETCONN_FLAG_NON_BLOCKING 0x02 +/** Was the last connect action a non-blocking one? */ +#define NETCONN_FLAG_IN_NONBLOCKING_CONNECT 0x04 +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +/** The mbox of this netconn is being deallocated, don't use it anymore */ +#define NETCONN_FLAG_MBOXINVALID 0x08 +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX */ +/** If a nonblocking write has been rejected before, poll_tcp needs to + check if the netconn is writable again */ +#define NETCONN_FLAG_CHECK_WRITESPACE 0x10 +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** If this flag is set then only IPv6 communication is allowed on the + netconn. As per RFC#3493 this features defaults to OFF allowing + dual-stack usage by default. */ +#define NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY 0x20 +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO +/** Received packet info will be recorded for this netconn */ +#define NETCONN_FLAG_PKTINFO 0x40 +#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ +/** A FIN has been received but not passed to the application yet */ +#define NETCONN_FIN_RX_PENDING 0x80 + +/* Helpers to process several netconn_types by the same code */ +#define NETCONNTYPE_GROUP(t) ((t)&0xF0) +#define NETCONNTYPE_DATAGRAM(t) ((t)&0xE0) +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#define NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 0x08 +#define NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(t) (((t)&NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6) != 0) +#define NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(t) (((t)&0xF3) == NETCONN_UDPLITE) +#define NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPNOCHKSUM(t) (((t)&0xF3) == NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM) +#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#define NETCONNTYPE_ISIPV6(t) (0) +#define NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPLITE(t) ((t) == NETCONN_UDPLITE) +#define NETCONNTYPE_ISUDPNOCHKSUM(t) ((t) == NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** @ingroup netconn_common + * Protocol family and type of the netconn + */ +enum netconn_type { + NETCONN_INVALID = 0, + /** TCP IPv4 */ + NETCONN_TCP = 0x10, +#if LWIP_IPV6 + /** TCP IPv6 */ + NETCONN_TCP_IPV6 = NETCONN_TCP | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x18 */, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + /** UDP IPv4 */ + NETCONN_UDP = 0x20, + /** UDP IPv4 lite */ + NETCONN_UDPLITE = 0x21, + /** UDP IPv4 no checksum */ + NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM = 0x22, + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + /** UDP IPv6 (dual-stack by default, unless you call @ref netconn_set_ipv6only) */ + NETCONN_UDP_IPV6 = NETCONN_UDP | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x28 */, + /** UDP IPv6 lite (dual-stack by default, unless you call @ref netconn_set_ipv6only) */ + NETCONN_UDPLITE_IPV6 = NETCONN_UDPLITE | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x29 */, + /** UDP IPv6 no checksum (dual-stack by default, unless you call @ref netconn_set_ipv6only) */ + NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM_IPV6 = NETCONN_UDPNOCHKSUM | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x2a */, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + + /** Raw connection IPv4 */ + NETCONN_RAW = 0x40 +#if LWIP_IPV6 + /** Raw connection IPv6 (dual-stack by default, unless you call @ref netconn_set_ipv6only) */ + , + NETCONN_RAW_IPV6 = NETCONN_RAW | NETCONN_TYPE_IPV6 /* 0x48 */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +}; + +/** Current state of the netconn. Non-TCP netconns are always + * in state NETCONN_NONE! */ +enum netconn_state { + NETCONN_NONE, + NETCONN_WRITE, + NETCONN_LISTEN, + NETCONN_CONNECT, + NETCONN_CLOSE +}; + +/** Used to inform the callback function about changes + * + * Event explanation: + * + * In the netconn implementation, there are three ways to block a client: + * + * - accept mbox (sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->acceptmbox, &accept_ptr, 0); in netconn_accept()) + * - receive mbox (sys_arch_mbox_fetch(&conn->recvmbox, &buf, 0); in netconn_recv_data()) + * - send queue is full (sys_arch_sem_wait(LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg), 0); in lwip_netconn_do_write()) + * + * The events have to be seen as events signaling the state of these mboxes/semaphores. For non-blocking + * connections, you need to know in advance whether a call to a netconn function call would block or not, + * and these events tell you about that. + * + * RCVPLUS events say: Safe to perform a potentially blocking call call once more. + * They are counted in sockets - three RCVPLUS events for accept mbox means you are safe + * to call netconn_accept 3 times without being blocked. + * Same thing for receive mbox. + * + * RCVMINUS events say: Your call to to a possibly blocking function is "acknowledged". + * Socket implementation decrements the counter. + * + * For TX, there is no need to count, its merely a flag. SENDPLUS means you may send something. + * SENDPLUS occurs when enough data was delivered to peer so netconn_send() can be called again. + * A SENDMINUS event occurs when the next call to a netconn_send() would be blocking. + */ +enum netconn_evt { + NETCONN_EVT_RCVPLUS, + NETCONN_EVT_RCVMINUS, + NETCONN_EVT_SENDPLUS, + NETCONN_EVT_SENDMINUS, + NETCONN_EVT_ERROR +}; + +#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) +/** Used for netconn_join_leave_group() */ +enum netconn_igmp { + NETCONN_JOIN, + NETCONN_LEAVE +}; +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ + +#if LWIP_DNS +/* Used for netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(), these should match the DNS_ADDRTYPE defines in dns.h */ +#define NETCONN_DNS_DEFAULT NETCONN_DNS_IPV4_IPV6 +#define NETCONN_DNS_IPV4 0 +#define NETCONN_DNS_IPV6 1 +#define NETCONN_DNS_IPV4_IPV6 2 /* try to resolve IPv4 first, try IPv6 if IPv4 fails only */ +#define NETCONN_DNS_IPV6_IPV4 3 /* try to resolve IPv6 first, try IPv4 if IPv6 fails only */ +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +/* forward-declare some structs to avoid to include their headers */ +struct ip_pcb; +struct tcp_pcb; +struct udp_pcb; +struct raw_pcb; +struct netconn; +struct api_msg; + +/** A callback prototype to inform about events for a netconn */ +typedef void (*netconn_callback)(struct netconn *, enum netconn_evt, u16_t len); + +/** A netconn descriptor */ +struct netconn { + /** type of the netconn (TCP, UDP or RAW) */ + enum netconn_type type; + /** current state of the netconn */ + enum netconn_state state; + /** the lwIP internal protocol control block */ + union { + struct ip_pcb *ip; + struct tcp_pcb *tcp; + struct udp_pcb *udp; + struct raw_pcb *raw; + } pcb; + /** the last asynchronous unreported error this netconn had */ + err_t pending_err; +#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + /** sem that is used to synchronously execute functions in the core context */ + sys_sem_t op_completed; +#endif + /** mbox where received packets are stored until they are fetched + by the netconn application thread (can grow quite big) */ + sys_mbox_t recvmbox; +#if LWIP_TCP + /** mbox where new connections are stored until processed + by the application thread */ + sys_mbox_t acceptmbox; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + /** number of threads waiting on an mbox. This is required to unblock + all threads when closing while threads are waiting. */ + int mbox_threads_waiting; +#endif + /** only used for socket layer */ +#if LWIP_SOCKET + int socket; +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO + /** timeout to wait for sending data (which means enqueueing data for sending + in internal buffers) in milliseconds */ + s32_t send_timeout; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO + /** timeout in milliseconds to wait for new data to be received + (or connections to arrive for listening netconns) */ + u32_t recv_timeout; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF + /** maximum amount of bytes queued in recvmbox + not used for TCP: adjust TCP_WND instead! */ + int recv_bufsize; + /** number of bytes currently in recvmbox to be received, + tested against recv_bufsize to limit bytes on recvmbox + for UDP and RAW, used for FIONREAD */ + int recv_avail; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF */ +#if LWIP_SO_LINGER + /** values <0 mean linger is disabled, values > 0 are seconds to linger */ + s16_t linger; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + /** flags holding more netconn-internal state, see NETCONN_FLAG_* defines */ + u8_t flags; +#if LWIP_TCP + /** TCP: when data passed to netconn_write doesn't fit into the send buffer, + this temporarily stores the message. + Also used during connect and close. */ + struct api_msg *current_msg; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + /** A callback function that is informed about events for this netconn */ + netconn_callback callback; +}; + +/** This vector type is passed to @ref netconn_write_vectors_partly to send + * multiple buffers at once. + * ATTENTION: This type has to directly map struct iovec since one is casted + * into the other! + */ +struct netvector { + /** pointer to the application buffer that contains the data to send */ + const void *ptr; + /** size of the application data to send */ + size_t len; +}; + +/** Register an Network connection event */ +#define API_EVENT(c, e, l) \ + if (c->callback) { \ + (*c->callback)(c, e, l); \ + } + +/* Network connection functions: */ + +/** @ingroup netconn_common + * Create new netconn connection + * @param t @ref netconn_type */ +#define netconn_new(t) netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(t, 0, NULL) +#define netconn_new_with_callback(t, c) netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(t, 0, c) +struct netconn *netconn_new_with_proto_and_callback(enum netconn_type t, u8_t proto, + netconn_callback callback); +err_t netconn_prepare_delete(struct netconn *conn); +err_t netconn_delete(struct netconn *conn); +/** Get the type of a netconn (as enum netconn_type). */ +#define netconn_type(conn) (conn->type) + +err_t netconn_getaddr(struct netconn *conn, ip_addr_t *addr, + u16_t *port, u8_t local); +/** @ingroup netconn_common */ +#define netconn_peer(c, i, p) netconn_getaddr(c, i, p, 0) +/** @ingroup netconn_common */ +#define netconn_addr(c, i, p) netconn_getaddr(c, i, p, 1) + +err_t netconn_bind(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); +err_t netconn_bind_if(struct netconn *conn, u8_t if_idx); +err_t netconn_connect(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); +err_t netconn_disconnect(struct netconn *conn); +err_t netconn_listen_with_backlog(struct netconn *conn, u8_t backlog); +/** @ingroup netconn_tcp */ +#define netconn_listen(conn) netconn_listen_with_backlog(conn, TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG) +err_t netconn_accept(struct netconn *conn, struct netconn **new_conn); +err_t netconn_recv(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf); +err_t netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf); +err_t netconn_recv_udp_raw_netbuf_flags(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags); +err_t netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf); +err_t netconn_recv_tcp_pbuf_flags(struct netconn *conn, struct pbuf **new_buf, u8_t apiflags); +err_t netconn_tcp_recvd(struct netconn *conn, size_t len); +err_t netconn_sendto(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf *buf, + const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); +err_t netconn_send(struct netconn *conn, struct netbuf *buf); +err_t netconn_write_partly(struct netconn *conn, const void *dataptr, size_t size, + u8_t apiflags, size_t *bytes_written); +err_t netconn_write_vectors_partly(struct netconn *conn, struct netvector *vectors, u16_t vectorcnt, + u8_t apiflags, size_t *bytes_written); +/** @ingroup netconn_tcp */ +#define netconn_write(conn, dataptr, size, apiflags) \ + netconn_write_partly(conn, dataptr, size, apiflags, NULL) +err_t netconn_close(struct netconn *conn); +err_t netconn_shutdown(struct netconn *conn, u8_t shut_rx, u8_t shut_tx); + +#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) +err_t netconn_join_leave_group(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *multiaddr, + const ip_addr_t *netif_addr, enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave); +err_t netconn_join_leave_group_netif(struct netconn *conn, const ip_addr_t *multiaddr, + u8_t if_idx, enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave); +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ +#if LWIP_DNS +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +err_t netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype); +#define netconn_gethostbyname(name, addr) netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(name, addr, NETCONN_DNS_DEFAULT) +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +err_t netconn_gethostbyname(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr); +#define netconn_gethostbyname_addrtype(name, addr, dns_addrtype) netconn_gethostbyname(name, addr) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +err_t netconn_err(struct netconn *conn); +#define netconn_recv_bufsize(conn) ((conn)->recv_bufsize) + +#define netconn_set_flags(conn, set_flags) \ + do { \ + (conn)->flags = (u8_t)((conn)->flags | (set_flags)); \ + } while (0) +#define netconn_clear_flags(conn, clr_flags) \ + do { \ + (conn)->flags = (u8_t)((conn)->flags & (u8_t)(~(clr_flags)&0xff)); \ + } while (0) +#define netconn_is_flag_set(conn, flag) (((conn)->flags & (flag)) != 0) + +/** Set the blocking status of netconn calls (@todo: write/send is missing) */ +#define netconn_set_nonblocking(conn, val) \ + do { \ + if (val) { \ + netconn_set_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_NON_BLOCKING); \ + } else { \ + netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_NON_BLOCKING); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** Get the blocking status of netconn calls (@todo: write/send is missing) */ +#define netconn_is_nonblocking(conn) (((conn)->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_NON_BLOCKING) != 0) + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** @ingroup netconn_common + * TCP: Set the IPv6 ONLY status of netconn calls (see NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY) + */ +#define netconn_set_ipv6only(conn, val) \ + do { \ + if (val) { \ + netconn_set_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY); \ + } else { \ + netconn_clear_flags(conn, NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup netconn_common + * TCP: Get the IPv6 ONLY status of netconn calls (see NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY) + */ +#define netconn_get_ipv6only(conn) (((conn)->flags & NETCONN_FLAG_IPV6_V6ONLY) != 0) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO +/** Set the send timeout in milliseconds */ +#define netconn_set_sendtimeout(conn, timeout) ((conn)->send_timeout = (timeout)) +/** Get the send timeout in milliseconds */ +#define netconn_get_sendtimeout(conn) ((conn)->send_timeout) +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO +/** Set the receive timeout in milliseconds */ +#define netconn_set_recvtimeout(conn, timeout) ((conn)->recv_timeout = (timeout)) +/** Get the receive timeout in milliseconds */ +#define netconn_get_recvtimeout(conn) ((conn)->recv_timeout) +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO */ +#if LWIP_SO_RCVBUF +/** Set the receive buffer in bytes */ +#define netconn_set_recvbufsize(conn, recvbufsize) ((conn)->recv_bufsize = (recvbufsize)) +/** Get the receive buffer in bytes */ +#define netconn_get_recvbufsize(conn) ((conn)->recv_bufsize) +#endif /* LWIP_SO_RCVBUF*/ + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD +void netconn_thread_init(void); +void netconn_thread_cleanup(void); +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ +#define netconn_thread_init() +#define netconn_thread_cleanup() +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_API_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/FILES b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/FILES similarity index 98% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/FILES rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/FILES index c983076c..adfc0f33 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/FILES +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/FILES @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -This directory contains application headers. -Every application shall provide one api file APP.h and optionally one options file APP_opts.h +This directory contains application headers. +Every application shall provide one api file APP.h and optionally one options file APP_opts.h diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_proxyconnect.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_proxyconnect.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_proxyconnect.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_proxyconnect.h index ce192878..d7452d1b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_proxyconnect.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_proxyconnect.h @@ -1,78 +1,78 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP connection API that executes a proxy-connect. - * - * This file provides a starting layer that executes a proxy-connect e.g. to - * set up TLS connections through a http proxy. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct altcp_proxyconnect_config { - ip_addr_t proxy_addr; - u16_t proxy_port; -}; - -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_new(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb); -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_new_tcp(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, u8_t ip_type); - -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); - -#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS -struct altcp_proxyconnect_tls_config { - struct altcp_proxyconnect_config proxy; - struct altcp_tls_config *tls_config; -}; - -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_tls_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_H */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP connection API that executes a proxy-connect. + * + * This file provides a starting layer that executes a proxy-connect e.g. to + * set up TLS connections through a http proxy. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct altcp_proxyconnect_config { + ip_addr_t proxy_addr; + u16_t proxy_port; +}; + +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_new(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, struct altcp_pcb *inner_pcb); +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_new_tcp(struct altcp_proxyconnect_config *config, u8_t ip_type); + +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); + +#if LWIP_ALTCP_TLS +struct altcp_proxyconnect_tls_config { + struct altcp_proxyconnect_config proxy; + struct altcp_tls_config *tls_config; +}; + +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_proxyconnect_tls_alloc(void *arg, u8_t ip_type); +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP_TLS */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_ALTCP_PROXYCONNECT_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h index 0a28ba41..bb4a3f74 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/altcp_tls_mbedtls_opts.h @@ -1,67 +1,67 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) - * - * This file contains options for an mbedtls port of the TLS layer. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/** LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS==1: use mbedTLS for TLS support for altcp API - * mbedtls include directory must be reachable via include search path - */ -#ifndef LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS -#define LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS 0 -#endif - -/** Configure debug level of this file */ -#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** Set a session timeout in seconds for the basic session cache - * ATTENTION: Using a session cache can lower security by reusing keys! - */ -#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_SESSION_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS -#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_SESSION_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS 0 -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_OPTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP/TLS connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread) + * + * This file contains options for an mbedtls port of the TLS layer. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/** LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS==1: use mbedTLS for TLS support for altcp API + * mbedtls include directory must be reachable via include search path + */ +#ifndef LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS +#define LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS 0 +#endif + +/** Configure debug level of this file */ +#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** Set a session timeout in seconds for the basic session cache + * ATTENTION: Using a session cache can lower security by reusing keys! + */ +#ifndef ALTCP_MBEDTLS_SESSION_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS +#define ALTCP_MBEDTLS_SESSION_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS 0 +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_TLS_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/fs.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/fs.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/fs.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/fs.h index 6ed2ea9b..5128356b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/fs.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/fs.h @@ -1,126 +1,126 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_FS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_FS_H - -#include "httpd_opts.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define FS_READ_EOF -1 -#define FS_READ_DELAYED -2 - -#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM -struct fsdata_chksum { - u32_t offset; - u16_t chksum; - u16_t len; -}; -#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */ - -#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED 0x01 -#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT 0x02 -#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_HTTPVER_1_1 0x04 -#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI 0x08 - -/** Define FS_FILE_EXTENSION_T_DEFINED if you have typedef'ed to your private - * pointer type (defaults to 'void' so the default usage is 'void*') - */ -#ifndef FS_FILE_EXTENSION_T_DEFINED -typedef void fs_file_extension; -#endif - -struct fs_file { - const char *data; - int len; - int index; - /* pextension is free for implementations to hold private (extensional) - arbitrary data, e.g. holding some file state or file system handle */ - fs_file_extension *pextension; -#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM - const struct fsdata_chksum *chksum; - u16_t chksum_count; -#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */ - u8_t flags; -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES - u8_t is_custom_file; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE - void *state; -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ -}; - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ -typedef void (*fs_wait_cb)(void *arg); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ - -err_t fs_open(struct fs_file *file, const char *name); -void fs_close(struct fs_file *file); -#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ -int fs_read_async(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg); -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ -int fs_read(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ -int fs_is_file_ready(struct fs_file *file, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ -int fs_bytes_left(struct fs_file *file); - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE -/** This user-defined function is called when a file is opened. */ -void *fs_state_init(struct fs_file *file, const char *name); -/** This user-defined function is called when a file is closed. */ -void fs_state_free(struct fs_file *file, void *state); -#endif /* #if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ - -struct fsdata_file { - const struct fsdata_file *next; - const unsigned char *name; - const unsigned char *data; - int len; - u8_t flags; -#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM - u16_t chksum_count; - const struct fsdata_chksum *chksum; -#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */ -}; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_FS_H */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_FS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_FS_H + +#include "httpd_opts.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define FS_READ_EOF -1 +#define FS_READ_DELAYED -2 + +#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM +struct fsdata_chksum { + u32_t offset; + u16_t chksum; + u16_t len; +}; +#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */ + +#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_INCLUDED 0x01 +#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_PERSISTENT 0x02 +#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_HEADER_HTTPVER_1_1 0x04 +#define FS_FILE_FLAGS_SSI 0x08 + +/** Define FS_FILE_EXTENSION_T_DEFINED if you have typedef'ed to your private + * pointer type (defaults to 'void' so the default usage is 'void*') + */ +#ifndef FS_FILE_EXTENSION_T_DEFINED +typedef void fs_file_extension; +#endif + +struct fs_file { + const char *data; + int len; + int index; + /* pextension is free for implementations to hold private (extensional) + arbitrary data, e.g. holding some file state or file system handle */ + fs_file_extension *pextension; +#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM + const struct fsdata_chksum *chksum; + u16_t chksum_count; +#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */ + u8_t flags; +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES + u8_t is_custom_file; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE + void *state; +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ +}; + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ +typedef void (*fs_wait_cb)(void *arg); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ + +err_t fs_open(struct fs_file *file, const char *name); +void fs_close(struct fs_file *file); +#if LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ +int fs_read_async(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg); +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ +int fs_read(struct fs_file *file, char *buffer, int count); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ */ +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ +int fs_is_file_ready(struct fs_file *file, fs_wait_cb callback_fn, void *callback_arg); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ */ +int fs_bytes_left(struct fs_file *file); + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE +/** This user-defined function is called when a file is opened. */ +void *fs_state_init(struct fs_file *file, const char *name); +/** This user-defined function is called when a file is closed. */ +void fs_state_free(struct fs_file *file, void *state); +#endif /* #if LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ + +struct fsdata_file { + const struct fsdata_file *next; + const unsigned char *name; + const unsigned char *data; + int len; + u8_t flags; +#if HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM + u16_t chksum_count; + const struct fsdata_chksum *chksum; +#endif /* HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM */ +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_FS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/http_client.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/http_client.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/http_client.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/http_client.h index 7528e9fb..3b862d13 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/http_client.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/http_client.h @@ -1,160 +1,160 @@ -/** - * @file - * HTTP client - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTP_CLIENT_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTP_CLIENT_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" - -#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup httpc - * HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO: define this to 1 to have functions dowloading directly - * to disk via fopen/fwrite. - * These functions are example implementations of the interface only. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO -#define LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO 0 -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup httpc - * The default TCP port used for HTTP - */ -#define HTTP_DEFAULT_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTP - -/** - * @ingroup httpc - * HTTP client result codes - */ -typedef enum ehttpc_result { - /** File successfully received */ - HTTPC_RESULT_OK = 0, - /** Unknown error */ - HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_UNKNOWN = 1, - /** Connection to server failed */ - HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT = 2, - /** Failed to resolve server hostname */ - HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME = 3, - /** Connection unexpectedly closed by remote server */ - HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED = 4, - /** Connection timed out (server didn't respond in time) */ - HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT = 5, - /** Server responded with an error code */ - HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_SVR_RESP = 6, - /** Local memory error */ - HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_MEM = 7, - /** Local abort */ - HTTPC_RESULT_LOCAL_ABORT = 8, - /** Content length mismatch */ - HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CONTENT_LEN = 9 -} httpc_result_t; - -typedef struct _httpc_state httpc_state_t; - -/** - * @ingroup httpc - * Prototype of a http client callback function - * - * @param arg argument specified when initiating the request - * @param httpc_result result of the http transfer (see enum httpc_result_t) - * @param rx_content_len number of bytes received (without headers) - * @param srv_res this contains the http status code received (if any) - * @param err an error returned by internal lwip functions, can help to specify - * the source of the error but must not necessarily be != ERR_OK - */ -typedef void (*httpc_result_fn)(void *arg, httpc_result_t httpc_result, u32_t rx_content_len, u32_t srv_res, err_t err); - -/** - * @ingroup httpc - * Prototype of http client callback: called when the headers are received - * - * @param connection http client connection - * @param arg argument specified when initiating the request - * @param hdr header pbuf(s) (may contain data also) - * @param hdr_len length of the heders in 'hdr' - * @param content_len content length as received in the headers (-1 if not received) - * @return if != ERR_OK is returned, the connection is aborted - */ -typedef err_t (*httpc_headers_done_fn)(httpc_state_t *connection, void *arg, struct pbuf *hdr, u16_t hdr_len, u32_t content_len); - -typedef struct _httpc_connection { - ip_addr_t proxy_addr; - u16_t proxy_port; - u8_t use_proxy; - /* @todo: add username:pass? */ - -#if LWIP_ALTCP - altcp_allocator_t *altcp_allocator; -#endif - - /* this callback is called when the transfer is finished (or aborted) */ - httpc_result_fn result_fn; - /* this callback is called after receiving the http headers - It can abort the connection by returning != ERR_OK */ - httpc_headers_done_fn headers_done_fn; -} httpc_connection_t; - -err_t httpc_get_file(const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, - altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, httpc_state_t **connection); -err_t httpc_get_file_dns(const char *server_name, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, - altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, httpc_state_t **connection); - -#if LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO -err_t httpc_get_file_to_disk(const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, - void *callback_arg, const char *local_file_name, httpc_state_t **connection); -err_t httpc_get_file_dns_to_disk(const char *server_name, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, - void *callback_arg, const char *local_file_name, httpc_state_t **connection); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTP_CLIENT_H */ +/** + * @file + * HTTP client + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTP_CLIENT_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTP_CLIENT_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" + +#if LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup httpc + * HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO: define this to 1 to have functions dowloading directly + * to disk via fopen/fwrite. + * These functions are example implementations of the interface only. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO +#define LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO 0 +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup httpc + * The default TCP port used for HTTP + */ +#define HTTP_DEFAULT_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTP + +/** + * @ingroup httpc + * HTTP client result codes + */ +typedef enum ehttpc_result { + /** File successfully received */ + HTTPC_RESULT_OK = 0, + /** Unknown error */ + HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_UNKNOWN = 1, + /** Connection to server failed */ + HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT = 2, + /** Failed to resolve server hostname */ + HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME = 3, + /** Connection unexpectedly closed by remote server */ + HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED = 4, + /** Connection timed out (server didn't respond in time) */ + HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT = 5, + /** Server responded with an error code */ + HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_SVR_RESP = 6, + /** Local memory error */ + HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_MEM = 7, + /** Local abort */ + HTTPC_RESULT_LOCAL_ABORT = 8, + /** Content length mismatch */ + HTTPC_RESULT_ERR_CONTENT_LEN = 9 +} httpc_result_t; + +typedef struct _httpc_state httpc_state_t; + +/** + * @ingroup httpc + * Prototype of a http client callback function + * + * @param arg argument specified when initiating the request + * @param httpc_result result of the http transfer (see enum httpc_result_t) + * @param rx_content_len number of bytes received (without headers) + * @param srv_res this contains the http status code received (if any) + * @param err an error returned by internal lwip functions, can help to specify + * the source of the error but must not necessarily be != ERR_OK + */ +typedef void (*httpc_result_fn)(void *arg, httpc_result_t httpc_result, u32_t rx_content_len, u32_t srv_res, err_t err); + +/** + * @ingroup httpc + * Prototype of http client callback: called when the headers are received + * + * @param connection http client connection + * @param arg argument specified when initiating the request + * @param hdr header pbuf(s) (may contain data also) + * @param hdr_len length of the heders in 'hdr' + * @param content_len content length as received in the headers (-1 if not received) + * @return if != ERR_OK is returned, the connection is aborted + */ +typedef err_t (*httpc_headers_done_fn)(httpc_state_t *connection, void *arg, struct pbuf *hdr, u16_t hdr_len, u32_t content_len); + +typedef struct _httpc_connection { + ip_addr_t proxy_addr; + u16_t proxy_port; + u8_t use_proxy; + /* @todo: add username:pass? */ + +#if LWIP_ALTCP + altcp_allocator_t *altcp_allocator; +#endif + + /* this callback is called when the transfer is finished (or aborted) */ + httpc_result_fn result_fn; + /* this callback is called after receiving the http headers + It can abort the connection by returning != ERR_OK */ + httpc_headers_done_fn headers_done_fn; +} httpc_connection_t; + +err_t httpc_get_file(const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, + altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, httpc_state_t **connection); +err_t httpc_get_file_dns(const char *server_name, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, + altcp_recv_fn recv_fn, void *callback_arg, httpc_state_t **connection); + +#if LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO +err_t httpc_get_file_to_disk(const ip_addr_t *server_addr, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, + void *callback_arg, const char *local_file_name, httpc_state_t **connection); +err_t httpc_get_file_dns_to_disk(const char *server_name, u16_t port, const char *uri, const httpc_connection_t *settings, + void *callback_arg, const char *local_file_name, httpc_state_t **connection); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPC_HAVE_FILE_IO */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTP_CLIENT_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd.h index 0d3b76c3..7ac77da0 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd.h @@ -1,258 +1,258 @@ -/** - * @file - * HTTP server - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - * This version of the file has been modified by Texas Instruments to offer - * simple server-side-include (SSI) and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) - * capability. - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_H - -#include "httpd_opts.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI - -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Function pointer for a CGI script handler. - * - * This function is called each time the HTTPD server is asked for a file - * whose name was previously registered as a CGI function using a call to - * http_set_cgi_handlers. The iIndex parameter provides the index of the - * CGI within the cgis array passed to http_set_cgi_handlers. Parameters - * pcParam and pcValue provide access to the parameters provided along with - * the URI. iNumParams provides a count of the entries in the pcParam and - * pcValue arrays. Each entry in the pcParam array contains the name of a - * parameter with the corresponding entry in the pcValue array containing the - * value for that parameter. Note that pcParam may contain multiple elements - * with the same name if, for example, a multi-selection list control is used - * in the form generating the data. - * - * The function should return a pointer to a character string which is the - * path and filename of the response that is to be sent to the connected - * browser, for example "/thanks.htm" or "/response/error.ssi". - * - * The maximum number of parameters that will be passed to this function via - * iNumParams is defined by LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS. Any parameters in - * the incoming HTTP request above this number will be discarded. - * - * Requests intended for use by this CGI mechanism must be sent using the GET - * method (which encodes all parameters within the URI rather than in a block - * later in the request). Attempts to use the POST method will result in the - * request being ignored. - * - */ -typedef const char *(*tCGIHandler)(int iIndex, int iNumParams, char *pcParam[], - char *pcValue[]); - -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Structure defining the base filename (URL) of a CGI and the associated - * function which is to be called when that URL is requested. - */ -typedef struct -{ - const char *pcCGIName; - tCGIHandler pfnCGIHandler; -} tCGI; - -void http_set_cgi_handlers(const tCGI *pCGIs, int iNumHandlers); - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI -/* we have to prototype this struct here to make it available for the handler */ -struct fs_file; - -/** Define this generic CGI handler in your application. - * It is called once for every URI with parameters. - * The parameters can be stored to the object passed as connection_state, which - * is allocated to file->state via fs_state_init() from fs_open() or fs_open_custom(). - * Content creation via SSI or complete dynamic files can retrieve the CGI params from there. - */ -extern void httpd_cgi_handler(struct fs_file *file, const char *uri, int iNumParams, - char **pcParam, char **pcValue -#if defined(LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE) && LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE - , - void *connection_state -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ -); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI - -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Function pointer for the SSI tag handler callback. - * - * This function will be called each time the HTTPD server detects a tag of the - * form in files with extensions mentioned in the g_pcSSIExtensions - * array (currently .shtml, .shtm, .ssi, .xml, .json) where "name" appears as - * one of the tags supplied to http_set_ssi_handler in the tags array. The - * returned insert string, which will be appended after the the string - * "" in file sent back to the client, should be written to pointer - * pcInsert. iInsertLen contains the size of the buffer pointed to by - * pcInsert. The iIndex parameter provides the zero-based index of the tag as - * found in the tags array and identifies the tag that is to be processed. - * - * The handler returns the number of characters written to pcInsert excluding - * any terminating NULL or HTTPD_SSI_TAG_UNKNOWN when tag is not recognized. - * - * Note that the behavior of this SSI mechanism is somewhat different from the - * "normal" SSI processing as found in, for example, the Apache web server. In - * this case, the inserted text is appended following the SSI tag rather than - * replacing the tag entirely. This allows for an implementation that does not - * require significant additional buffering of output data yet which will still - * offer usable SSI functionality. One downside to this approach is when - * attempting to use SSI within JavaScript. The SSI tag is structured to - * resemble an HTML comment but this syntax does not constitute a comment - * within JavaScript and, hence, leaving the tag in place will result in - * problems in these cases. In order to avoid these problems, define - * LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG as zero in your lwip options file, or use JavaScript - * style block comments in the form / * # name * / (without the spaces). - */ -typedef u16_t (*tSSIHandler)( -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW - const char *ssi_tag_name, -#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - int iIndex, -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ - char *pcInsert, int iInsertLen -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART - , - u16_t current_tag_part, u16_t *next_tag_part -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ -#if defined(LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE) && LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE - , - void *connection_state -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ -); - -/** Set the SSI handler function - * (if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW==1, only the first argument is used) - */ -void http_set_ssi_handler(tSSIHandler pfnSSIHandler, - const char **ppcTags, int iNumTags); - -/** For LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW==1, return this to indicate the tag is unknown. - * In this case, the webserver writes a warning into the page. - * You can also just return 0 to write nothing for unknown tags. - */ -#define HTTPD_SSI_TAG_UNKNOWN 0xFFFF - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST - -/* These functions must be implemented by the application */ - -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Called when a POST request has been received. The application can decide - * whether to accept it or not. - * - * @param connection Unique connection identifier, valid until httpd_post_end - * is called. - * @param uri The HTTP header URI receiving the POST request. - * @param http_request The raw HTTP request (the first packet, normally). - * @param http_request_len Size of 'http_request'. - * @param content_len Content-Length from HTTP header. - * @param response_uri Filename of response file, to be filled when denying the - * request - * @param response_uri_len Size of the 'response_uri' buffer. - * @param post_auto_wnd Set this to 0 to let the callback code handle window - * updates by calling 'httpd_post_data_recved' (to throttle rx speed) - * default is 1 (httpd handles window updates automatically) - * @return ERR_OK: Accept the POST request, data may be passed in - * another err_t: Deny the POST request, send back 'bad request'. - */ -err_t httpd_post_begin(void *connection, const char *uri, const char *http_request, - u16_t http_request_len, int content_len, char *response_uri, - u16_t response_uri_len, u8_t *post_auto_wnd); - -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Called for each pbuf of data that has been received for a POST. - * ATTENTION: The application is responsible for freeing the pbufs passed in! - * - * @param connection Unique connection identifier. - * @param p Received data. - * @return ERR_OK: Data accepted. - * another err_t: Data denied, http_post_get_response_uri will be called. - */ -err_t httpd_post_receive_data(void *connection, struct pbuf *p); - -/** - * @ingroup httpd - * Called when all data is received or when the connection is closed. - * The application must return the filename/URI of a file to send in response - * to this POST request. If the response_uri buffer is untouched, a 404 - * response is returned. - * - * @param connection Unique connection identifier. - * @param response_uri Filename of response file, to be filled when denying the request - * @param response_uri_len Size of the 'response_uri' buffer. - */ -void httpd_post_finished(void *connection, char *response_uri, u16_t response_uri_len); - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND -void httpd_post_data_recved(void *connection, u16_t recved_len); -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ - -void httpd_init(void); - -#if HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS -struct altcp_tls_config; -void httpd_inits(struct altcp_tls_config *conf); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_H */ +/** + * @file + * HTTP server + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + * This version of the file has been modified by Texas Instruments to offer + * simple server-side-include (SSI) and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) + * capability. + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_H + +#include "httpd_opts.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI + +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Function pointer for a CGI script handler. + * + * This function is called each time the HTTPD server is asked for a file + * whose name was previously registered as a CGI function using a call to + * http_set_cgi_handlers. The iIndex parameter provides the index of the + * CGI within the cgis array passed to http_set_cgi_handlers. Parameters + * pcParam and pcValue provide access to the parameters provided along with + * the URI. iNumParams provides a count of the entries in the pcParam and + * pcValue arrays. Each entry in the pcParam array contains the name of a + * parameter with the corresponding entry in the pcValue array containing the + * value for that parameter. Note that pcParam may contain multiple elements + * with the same name if, for example, a multi-selection list control is used + * in the form generating the data. + * + * The function should return a pointer to a character string which is the + * path and filename of the response that is to be sent to the connected + * browser, for example "/thanks.htm" or "/response/error.ssi". + * + * The maximum number of parameters that will be passed to this function via + * iNumParams is defined by LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS. Any parameters in + * the incoming HTTP request above this number will be discarded. + * + * Requests intended for use by this CGI mechanism must be sent using the GET + * method (which encodes all parameters within the URI rather than in a block + * later in the request). Attempts to use the POST method will result in the + * request being ignored. + * + */ +typedef const char *(*tCGIHandler)(int iIndex, int iNumParams, char *pcParam[], + char *pcValue[]); + +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Structure defining the base filename (URL) of a CGI and the associated + * function which is to be called when that URL is requested. + */ +typedef struct +{ + const char *pcCGIName; + tCGIHandler pfnCGIHandler; +} tCGI; + +void http_set_cgi_handlers(const tCGI *pCGIs, int iNumHandlers); + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI +/* we have to prototype this struct here to make it available for the handler */ +struct fs_file; + +/** Define this generic CGI handler in your application. + * It is called once for every URI with parameters. + * The parameters can be stored to the object passed as connection_state, which + * is allocated to file->state via fs_state_init() from fs_open() or fs_open_custom(). + * Content creation via SSI or complete dynamic files can retrieve the CGI params from there. + */ +extern void httpd_cgi_handler(struct fs_file *file, const char *uri, int iNumParams, + char **pcParam, char **pcValue +#if defined(LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE) && LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE + , + void *connection_state +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ +); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI + +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Function pointer for the SSI tag handler callback. + * + * This function will be called each time the HTTPD server detects a tag of the + * form in files with extensions mentioned in the g_pcSSIExtensions + * array (currently .shtml, .shtm, .ssi, .xml, .json) where "name" appears as + * one of the tags supplied to http_set_ssi_handler in the tags array. The + * returned insert string, which will be appended after the the string + * "" in file sent back to the client, should be written to pointer + * pcInsert. iInsertLen contains the size of the buffer pointed to by + * pcInsert. The iIndex parameter provides the zero-based index of the tag as + * found in the tags array and identifies the tag that is to be processed. + * + * The handler returns the number of characters written to pcInsert excluding + * any terminating NULL or HTTPD_SSI_TAG_UNKNOWN when tag is not recognized. + * + * Note that the behavior of this SSI mechanism is somewhat different from the + * "normal" SSI processing as found in, for example, the Apache web server. In + * this case, the inserted text is appended following the SSI tag rather than + * replacing the tag entirely. This allows for an implementation that does not + * require significant additional buffering of output data yet which will still + * offer usable SSI functionality. One downside to this approach is when + * attempting to use SSI within JavaScript. The SSI tag is structured to + * resemble an HTML comment but this syntax does not constitute a comment + * within JavaScript and, hence, leaving the tag in place will result in + * problems in these cases. In order to avoid these problems, define + * LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG as zero in your lwip options file, or use JavaScript + * style block comments in the form / * # name * / (without the spaces). + */ +typedef u16_t (*tSSIHandler)( +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW + const char *ssi_tag_name, +#else /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + int iIndex, +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW */ + char *pcInsert, int iInsertLen +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART + , + u16_t current_tag_part, u16_t *next_tag_part +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART */ +#if defined(LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE) && LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE + , + void *connection_state +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE */ +); + +/** Set the SSI handler function + * (if LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW==1, only the first argument is used) + */ +void http_set_ssi_handler(tSSIHandler pfnSSIHandler, + const char **ppcTags, int iNumTags); + +/** For LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW==1, return this to indicate the tag is unknown. + * In this case, the webserver writes a warning into the page. + * You can also just return 0 to write nothing for unknown tags. + */ +#define HTTPD_SSI_TAG_UNKNOWN 0xFFFF + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SSI */ + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST + +/* These functions must be implemented by the application */ + +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Called when a POST request has been received. The application can decide + * whether to accept it or not. + * + * @param connection Unique connection identifier, valid until httpd_post_end + * is called. + * @param uri The HTTP header URI receiving the POST request. + * @param http_request The raw HTTP request (the first packet, normally). + * @param http_request_len Size of 'http_request'. + * @param content_len Content-Length from HTTP header. + * @param response_uri Filename of response file, to be filled when denying the + * request + * @param response_uri_len Size of the 'response_uri' buffer. + * @param post_auto_wnd Set this to 0 to let the callback code handle window + * updates by calling 'httpd_post_data_recved' (to throttle rx speed) + * default is 1 (httpd handles window updates automatically) + * @return ERR_OK: Accept the POST request, data may be passed in + * another err_t: Deny the POST request, send back 'bad request'. + */ +err_t httpd_post_begin(void *connection, const char *uri, const char *http_request, + u16_t http_request_len, int content_len, char *response_uri, + u16_t response_uri_len, u8_t *post_auto_wnd); + +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Called for each pbuf of data that has been received for a POST. + * ATTENTION: The application is responsible for freeing the pbufs passed in! + * + * @param connection Unique connection identifier. + * @param p Received data. + * @return ERR_OK: Data accepted. + * another err_t: Data denied, http_post_get_response_uri will be called. + */ +err_t httpd_post_receive_data(void *connection, struct pbuf *p); + +/** + * @ingroup httpd + * Called when all data is received or when the connection is closed. + * The application must return the filename/URI of a file to send in response + * to this POST request. If the response_uri buffer is untouched, a 404 + * response is returned. + * + * @param connection Unique connection identifier. + * @param response_uri Filename of response file, to be filled when denying the request + * @param response_uri_len Size of the 'response_uri' buffer. + */ +void httpd_post_finished(void *connection, char *response_uri, u16_t response_uri_len); + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND +void httpd_post_data_recved(void *connection, u16_t recved_len); +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST */ + +void httpd_init(void); + +#if HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS +struct altcp_tls_config; +void httpd_inits(struct altcp_tls_config *conf); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h index ca825445..a8ac4331 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/httpd_opts.h @@ -1,396 +1,396 @@ -/** - * @file - * HTTP server options list - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - * This version of the file has been modified by Texas Instruments to offer - * simple server-side-include (SSI) and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) - * capability. - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -/** - * @defgroup httpd_opts Options - * @ingroup httpd - * @{ - */ - -/** Set this to 1 to support CGI (old style). - * - * This old style CGI support works by registering an array of URLs and - * associated CGI handler functions (@ref http_set_cgi_handlers). - * This list is scanned just before fs_open is called from request handling. - * The handler can return a new URL that is used internally by the httpd to - * load the returned page (passed to fs_open). - * - * Use this CGI type e.g. to execute specific actions and return a page that - * does not depend on the CGI parameters. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_CGI 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to support CGI (new style). - * - * This new style CGI support works by calling a global function - * (@ref tCGIHandler) for all URLs that are found. fs_open is called first - * and the URL can not be written by the CGI handler. Instead, this handler gets - * passed the http file state, an object where it can store information derived - * from the CGI URL or parameters. This file state is later passed to SSI, so - * the SSI code can return data depending on CGI input. - * - * Use this CGI handler if you want CGI information passed on to SSI. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to support SSI (Server-Side-Includes) - * - * In contrast to other http servers, this only calls a preregistered callback - * function (@see http_set_ssi_handler) for each tag (in the format of - * ) encountered in SSI-enabled pages. - * SSI-enabled pages must have one of the predefined SSI-enabled file extensions. - * All files with one of these extensions are parsed when sent. - * - * A downside of the current SSI implementation is that persistent connections - * don't work, as the file length is not known in advance (and httpd currently - * relies on the Content-Length header for persistent connections). - * - * To save memory, the maximum tag length is limited (@see LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN). - * To save memory, the maximum insertion string length is limited (@see - * LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN). If this is not enought, @ref LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART - * can be used. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to implement an SSI tag handler callback that gets a const char* - * to the tag (instead of an index into a pre-registered array of known tags) - * If this is 0, the SSI handler callback function is only called pre-registered tags. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 0 to prevent parsing the file extension at runtime to decide - * if a file should be scanned for SSI tags or not. - * Default is 1 (file extensions are checked using the g_pcSSIExtensions array) - * Set to 2 to override this runtime test function. - * - * This is enabled by default, but if you only use a newer version of makefsdata - * supporting the "-ssi" option, this info is already present in - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION 1 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to support HTTP POST */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST 0 -#endif - -/* The maximum number of parameters that the CGI handler can be sent. */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS 16 -#endif - -/** LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART==1: SSI handler function is called with 2 more - * arguments indicating a counter for insert string that are too long to be - * inserted at once: the SSI handler function must then set 'next_tag_part' - * which will be passed back to it in the next call. */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART 0 -#endif - -/* The maximum length of the string comprising the SSI tag name - * ATTENTION: tags longer than this are ignored, not truncated! - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN 8 -#endif - -/* The maximum length of string that can be returned to replace any given tag - * If this buffer is not long enough, use LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN 192 -#endif - -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND 0 -#endif - -/** This string is passed in the HTTP header as "Server: " */ -#if !defined HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT "lwIP/" LWIP_VERSION_STRING " (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip)" -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 if you want to include code that creates HTTP headers - * at runtime. Default is off: HTTP headers are then created statically - * by the makefsdata tool. Static headers mean smaller code size, but - * the (readonly) fsdata will grow a bit as every file includes the HTTP - * header. */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS 0 -#endif - -#if !defined HTTPD_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to use a memp pool for allocating - * struct http_state instead of the heap. - * If enabled, you'll need to define MEMP_NUM_PARALLEL_HTTPD_CONNS - * (and MEMP_NUM_PARALLEL_HTTPD_SSI_CONNS for SSI) to set the size of - * the pool(s). - */ -#if !defined HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL 0 -#endif - -/** The server port for HTTPD to use */ -#if !defined HTTPD_SERVER_PORT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_SERVER_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTP -#endif - -/** The https server port for HTTPD to use */ -#if !defined HTTPD_SERVER_PORT_HTTPS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_SERVER_PORT_HTTPS LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTPS -#endif - -/** Enable https support? */ -#if !defined HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS 0 -#endif - -/** Maximum retries before the connection is aborted/closed. - * - number of times pcb->poll is called -> default is 4*500ms = 2s; - * - reset when pcb->sent is called - */ -#if !defined HTTPD_MAX_RETRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_MAX_RETRIES 4 -#endif - -/** The poll delay is X*500ms */ -#if !defined HTTPD_POLL_INTERVAL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_POLL_INTERVAL 4 -#endif - -/** Priority for tcp pcbs created by HTTPD (very low by default). - * Lower priorities get killed first when running out of memory. - */ -#if !defined HTTPD_TCP_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_TCP_PRIO TCP_PRIO_MIN -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to enable timing each file sent */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING 0 -#endif -/** Set this to 1 to enable timing each file sent */ -#if !defined HTTPD_DEBUG_TIMING || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_DEBUG_TIMING LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** Set this to one to show error pages when parsing a request fails instead - of simply closing the connection. */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 0 to drop support for HTTP/0.9 clients (to save some bytes) */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 1 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to enable HTTP/1.1 persistent connections. - * ATTENTION: If the generated file system includes HTTP headers, these must - * include the "Connection: keep-alive" header (pass argument "-11" to makefsdata). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to support HTTP request coming in in multiple packets/pbufs */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST 1 -#endif - -#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST -/** Number of rx pbufs to enqueue to parse an incoming request (up to the first - newline) */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_QUEUELEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_QUEUELEN 5 -#endif - -/** Number of (TCP payload-) bytes (in pbufs) to enqueue to parse and incoming - request (up to the first double-newline) */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_BUFSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_BUFSIZE LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH -#endif - -/** Defines the maximum length of a HTTP request line (up to the first CRLF, - copied from pbuf into this a global buffer when pbuf- or packet-queues - are received - otherwise the input pbuf is used directly) */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH LWIP_MIN(1023, (LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_QUEUELEN * PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE)) -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ - -/** This is the size of a static buffer used when URIs end with '/'. - * In this buffer, the directory requested is concatenated with all the - * configured default file names. - * Set to 0 to disable checking default filenames on non-root directories. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN 63 -#endif - -/** Maximum length of the filename to send as response to a POST request, - * filled in by the application when a POST is finished. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MAX_RESPONSE_URI_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MAX_RESPONSE_URI_LEN 63 -#endif - -/** Set this to 0 to not send the SSI tag (default is on, so the tag will - * be sent in the HTML page */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG 1 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to call tcp_abort when tcp_close fails with memory error. - * This can be used to prevent consuming all memory in situations where the - * HTTP server has low priority compared to other communication. */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_ABORT_ON_CLOSE_MEM_ERROR || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_ABORT_ON_CLOSE_MEM_ERROR 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to kill the oldest connection when running out of - * memory for 'struct http_state' or 'struct http_ssi_state'. - * ATTENTION: This puts all connections on a linked list, so may be kind of slow. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to send URIs without extension without headers - * (who uses this at all??) */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_OMIT_HEADER_FOR_EXTENSIONLESS_URI || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_OMIT_HEADER_FOR_EXTENSIONLESS_URI 0 -#endif - -/** Default: Tags are sent from struct http_state and are therefore volatile */ -#if !defined HTTP_IS_TAG_VOLATILE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTP_IS_TAG_VOLATILE(ptr) TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY -#endif - -/* By default, the httpd is limited to send 2*pcb->mss to keep resource usage low - when http is not an important protocol in the device. */ -#if !defined HTTPD_LIMIT_SENDING_TO_2MSS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_LIMIT_SENDING_TO_2MSS 1 -#endif - -/* Define this to a function that returns the maximum amount of data to enqueue. - The function have this signature: u16_t fn(struct altcp_pcb* pcb); - The best place to define this is the hooks file (@see LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME) */ -#if !defined HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#if HTTPD_LIMIT_SENDING_TO_2MSS -#define HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN(pcb) ((u16_t)(2 * altcp_mss(pcb))) -#endif -#endif - -/*------------------- FS OPTIONS -------------------*/ - -/** Set this to 1 and provide the functions: - * - "int fs_open_custom(struct fs_file *file, const char *name)" - * Called first for every opened file to allow opening files - * that are not included in fsdata(_custom).c - * - "void fs_close_custom(struct fs_file *file)" - * Called to free resources allocated by fs_open_custom(). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to support fs_read() to dynamically read file data. - * Without this (default=off), only one-block files are supported, - * and the contents must be ready after fs_open(). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to include an application state argument per file - * that is opened. This allows to keep a state per connection/file. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE 0 -#endif - -/** HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM==1: include precompiled checksums for - * predefined (MSS-sized) chunks of the files to prevent having to calculate - * the checksums at runtime. */ -#if !defined HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM 0 -#endif - -/** LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ==1: support asynchronous read operations - * (fs_read_async returns FS_READ_DELAYED and calls a callback when finished). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ 0 -#endif - -/** Filename (including path) to use as FS data file */ -#if !defined HTTPD_FSDATA_FILE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -/* HTTPD_USE_CUSTOM_FSDATA: Compatibility with deprecated lwIP option */ -#if defined(HTTPD_USE_CUSTOM_FSDATA) && (HTTPD_USE_CUSTOM_FSDATA != 0) -#define HTTPD_FSDATA_FILE "fsdata_custom.c" -#else -#define HTTPD_FSDATA_FILE "fsdata.c" -#endif -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_OPTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * HTTP server options list + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + * This version of the file has been modified by Texas Instruments to offer + * simple server-side-include (SSI) and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) + * capability. + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +/** + * @defgroup httpd_opts Options + * @ingroup httpd + * @{ + */ + +/** Set this to 1 to support CGI (old style). + * + * This old style CGI support works by registering an array of URLs and + * associated CGI handler functions (@ref http_set_cgi_handlers). + * This list is scanned just before fs_open is called from request handling. + * The handler can return a new URL that is used internally by the httpd to + * load the returned page (passed to fs_open). + * + * Use this CGI type e.g. to execute specific actions and return a page that + * does not depend on the CGI parameters. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_CGI || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_CGI 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to support CGI (new style). + * + * This new style CGI support works by calling a global function + * (@ref tCGIHandler) for all URLs that are found. fs_open is called first + * and the URL can not be written by the CGI handler. Instead, this handler gets + * passed the http file state, an object where it can store information derived + * from the CGI URL or parameters. This file state is later passed to SSI, so + * the SSI code can return data depending on CGI input. + * + * Use this CGI handler if you want CGI information passed on to SSI. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_CGI_SSI 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to support SSI (Server-Side-Includes) + * + * In contrast to other http servers, this only calls a preregistered callback + * function (@see http_set_ssi_handler) for each tag (in the format of + * ) encountered in SSI-enabled pages. + * SSI-enabled pages must have one of the predefined SSI-enabled file extensions. + * All files with one of these extensions are parsed when sent. + * + * A downside of the current SSI implementation is that persistent connections + * don't work, as the file length is not known in advance (and httpd currently + * relies on the Content-Length header for persistent connections). + * + * To save memory, the maximum tag length is limited (@see LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN). + * To save memory, the maximum insertion string length is limited (@see + * LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN). If this is not enought, @ref LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART + * can be used. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to implement an SSI tag handler callback that gets a const char* + * to the tag (instead of an index into a pre-registered array of known tags) + * If this is 0, the SSI handler callback function is only called pre-registered tags. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_RAW 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 0 to prevent parsing the file extension at runtime to decide + * if a file should be scanned for SSI tags or not. + * Default is 1 (file extensions are checked using the g_pcSSIExtensions array) + * Set to 2 to override this runtime test function. + * + * This is enabled by default, but if you only use a newer version of makefsdata + * supporting the "-ssi" option, this info is already present in + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_BY_FILE_EXTENSION 1 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to support HTTP POST */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_POST 0 +#endif + +/* The maximum number of parameters that the CGI handler can be sent. */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_CGI_PARAMETERS 16 +#endif + +/** LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART==1: SSI handler function is called with 2 more + * arguments indicating a counter for insert string that are too long to be + * inserted at once: the SSI handler function must then set 'next_tag_part' + * which will be passed back to it in the next call. */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART 0 +#endif + +/* The maximum length of the string comprising the SSI tag name + * ATTENTION: tags longer than this are ignored, not truncated! + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_NAME_LEN 8 +#endif + +/* The maximum length of string that can be returned to replace any given tag + * If this buffer is not long enough, use LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_MULTIPART. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_TAG_INSERT_LEN 192 +#endif + +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MANUAL_WND 0 +#endif + +/** This string is passed in the HTTP header as "Server: " */ +#if !defined HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_SERVER_AGENT "lwIP/" LWIP_VERSION_STRING " (http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip)" +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 if you want to include code that creates HTTP headers + * at runtime. Default is off: HTTP headers are then created statically + * by the makefsdata tool. Static headers mean smaller code size, but + * the (readonly) fsdata will grow a bit as every file includes the HTTP + * header. */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_HEADERS 0 +#endif + +#if !defined HTTPD_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to use a memp pool for allocating + * struct http_state instead of the heap. + * If enabled, you'll need to define MEMP_NUM_PARALLEL_HTTPD_CONNS + * (and MEMP_NUM_PARALLEL_HTTPD_SSI_CONNS for SSI) to set the size of + * the pool(s). + */ +#if !defined HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_USE_MEM_POOL 0 +#endif + +/** The server port for HTTPD to use */ +#if !defined HTTPD_SERVER_PORT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_SERVER_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTP +#endif + +/** The https server port for HTTPD to use */ +#if !defined HTTPD_SERVER_PORT_HTTPS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_SERVER_PORT_HTTPS LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTPS +#endif + +/** Enable https support? */ +#if !defined HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_ENABLE_HTTPS 0 +#endif + +/** Maximum retries before the connection is aborted/closed. + * - number of times pcb->poll is called -> default is 4*500ms = 2s; + * - reset when pcb->sent is called + */ +#if !defined HTTPD_MAX_RETRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_MAX_RETRIES 4 +#endif + +/** The poll delay is X*500ms */ +#if !defined HTTPD_POLL_INTERVAL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_POLL_INTERVAL 4 +#endif + +/** Priority for tcp pcbs created by HTTPD (very low by default). + * Lower priorities get killed first when running out of memory. + */ +#if !defined HTTPD_TCP_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_TCP_PRIO TCP_PRIO_MIN +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to enable timing each file sent */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_TIMING 0 +#endif +/** Set this to 1 to enable timing each file sent */ +#if !defined HTTPD_DEBUG_TIMING || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_DEBUG_TIMING LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** Set this to one to show error pages when parsing a request fails instead + of simply closing the connection. */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_EXTSTATUS 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 0 to drop support for HTTP/0.9 clients (to save some bytes) */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_V09 1 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to enable HTTP/1.1 persistent connections. + * ATTENTION: If the generated file system includes HTTP headers, these must + * include the "Connection: keep-alive" header (pass argument "-11" to makefsdata). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_11_KEEPALIVE 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to support HTTP request coming in in multiple packets/pbufs */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST 1 +#endif + +#if LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST +/** Number of rx pbufs to enqueue to parse an incoming request (up to the first + newline) */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_QUEUELEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_QUEUELEN 5 +#endif + +/** Number of (TCP payload-) bytes (in pbufs) to enqueue to parse and incoming + request (up to the first double-newline) */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_BUFSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_BUFSIZE LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH +#endif + +/** Defines the maximum length of a HTTP request line (up to the first CRLF, + copied from pbuf into this a global buffer when pbuf- or packet-queues + are received - otherwise the input pbuf is used directly) */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQ_LENGTH LWIP_MIN(1023, (LWIP_HTTPD_REQ_QUEUELEN * PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE)) +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_HTTPD_SUPPORT_REQUESTLIST */ + +/** This is the size of a static buffer used when URIs end with '/'. + * In this buffer, the directory requested is concatenated with all the + * configured default file names. + * Set to 0 to disable checking default filenames on non-root directories. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_MAX_REQUEST_URI_LEN 63 +#endif + +/** Maximum length of the filename to send as response to a POST request, + * filled in by the application when a POST is finished. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MAX_RESPONSE_URI_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_POST_MAX_RESPONSE_URI_LEN 63 +#endif + +/** Set this to 0 to not send the SSI tag (default is on, so the tag will + * be sent in the HTML page */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_SSI_INCLUDE_TAG 1 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to call tcp_abort when tcp_close fails with memory error. + * This can be used to prevent consuming all memory in situations where the + * HTTP server has low priority compared to other communication. */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_ABORT_ON_CLOSE_MEM_ERROR || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_ABORT_ON_CLOSE_MEM_ERROR 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to kill the oldest connection when running out of + * memory for 'struct http_state' or 'struct http_ssi_state'. + * ATTENTION: This puts all connections on a linked list, so may be kind of slow. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_KILL_OLD_ON_CONNECTIONS_EXCEEDED 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to send URIs without extension without headers + * (who uses this at all??) */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_OMIT_HEADER_FOR_EXTENSIONLESS_URI || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_OMIT_HEADER_FOR_EXTENSIONLESS_URI 0 +#endif + +/** Default: Tags are sent from struct http_state and are therefore volatile */ +#if !defined HTTP_IS_TAG_VOLATILE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTP_IS_TAG_VOLATILE(ptr) TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY +#endif + +/* By default, the httpd is limited to send 2*pcb->mss to keep resource usage low + when http is not an important protocol in the device. */ +#if !defined HTTPD_LIMIT_SENDING_TO_2MSS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_LIMIT_SENDING_TO_2MSS 1 +#endif + +/* Define this to a function that returns the maximum amount of data to enqueue. + The function have this signature: u16_t fn(struct altcp_pcb* pcb); + The best place to define this is the hooks file (@see LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME) */ +#if !defined HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#if HTTPD_LIMIT_SENDING_TO_2MSS +#define HTTPD_MAX_WRITE_LEN(pcb) ((u16_t)(2 * altcp_mss(pcb))) +#endif +#endif + +/*------------------- FS OPTIONS -------------------*/ + +/** Set this to 1 and provide the functions: + * - "int fs_open_custom(struct fs_file *file, const char *name)" + * Called first for every opened file to allow opening files + * that are not included in fsdata(_custom).c + * - "void fs_close_custom(struct fs_file *file)" + * Called to free resources allocated by fs_open_custom(). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_CUSTOM_FILES 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to support fs_read() to dynamically read file data. + * Without this (default=off), only one-block files are supported, + * and the contents must be ready after fs_open(). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_DYNAMIC_FILE_READ 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to include an application state argument per file + * that is opened. This allows to keep a state per connection/file. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_FILE_STATE 0 +#endif + +/** HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM==1: include precompiled checksums for + * predefined (MSS-sized) chunks of the files to prevent having to calculate + * the checksums at runtime. */ +#if !defined HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define HTTPD_PRECALCULATED_CHECKSUM 0 +#endif + +/** LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ==1: support asynchronous read operations + * (fs_read_async returns FS_READ_DELAYED and calls a callback when finished). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HTTPD_FS_ASYNC_READ 0 +#endif + +/** Filename (including path) to use as FS data file */ +#if !defined HTTPD_FSDATA_FILE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +/* HTTPD_USE_CUSTOM_FSDATA: Compatibility with deprecated lwIP option */ +#if defined(HTTPD_USE_CUSTOM_FSDATA) && (HTTPD_USE_CUSTOM_FSDATA != 0) +#define HTTPD_FSDATA_FILE "fsdata_custom.c" +#else +#define HTTPD_FSDATA_FILE "fsdata.c" +#endif +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_HTTPD_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/lwiperf.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/lwiperf.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/lwiperf.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/lwiperf.h index f3cdcece..dbb6250f 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/lwiperf.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/lwiperf.h @@ -1,97 +1,97 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP iPerf server implementation - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2014 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_LWIPERF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_LWIPERF_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT 5001 - -/** lwIPerf test results */ -enum lwiperf_report_type { - /** The server side test is done */ - LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_SERVER, - /** The client side test is done */ - LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_CLIENT, - /** Local error lead to test abort */ - LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL, - /** Data check error lead to test abort */ - LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_DATAERROR, - /** Transmit error lead to test abort */ - LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_TXERROR, - /** Remote side aborted the test */ - LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_REMOTE -}; - -/** Control */ -enum lwiperf_client_type { - /** Unidirectional tx only test */ - LWIPERF_CLIENT, - /** Do a bidirectional test simultaneously */ - LWIPERF_DUAL, - /** Do a bidirectional test individually */ - LWIPERF_TRADEOFF -}; - -/** Prototype of a report function that is called when a session is finished. - This report function can show the test results. - @param report_type contains the test result */ -typedef void (*lwiperf_report_fn)(void *arg, enum lwiperf_report_type report_type, - const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, u16_t remote_port, - u32_t bytes_transferred, u32_t ms_duration, u32_t bandwidth_kbitpsec); - -void *lwiperf_start_tcp_server(const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, - lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg); -void *lwiperf_start_tcp_server_default(lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg); -void *lwiperf_start_tcp_client(const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, u16_t remote_port, - enum lwiperf_client_type type, - lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg); -void *lwiperf_start_tcp_client_default(const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, - lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg); - -void lwiperf_abort(void *lwiperf_session); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_LWIPERF_H */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP iPerf server implementation + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_LWIPERF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_LWIPERF_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define LWIPERF_TCP_PORT_DEFAULT 5001 + +/** lwIPerf test results */ +enum lwiperf_report_type { + /** The server side test is done */ + LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_SERVER, + /** The client side test is done */ + LWIPERF_TCP_DONE_CLIENT, + /** Local error lead to test abort */ + LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL, + /** Data check error lead to test abort */ + LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_DATAERROR, + /** Transmit error lead to test abort */ + LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_LOCAL_TXERROR, + /** Remote side aborted the test */ + LWIPERF_TCP_ABORTED_REMOTE +}; + +/** Control */ +enum lwiperf_client_type { + /** Unidirectional tx only test */ + LWIPERF_CLIENT, + /** Do a bidirectional test simultaneously */ + LWIPERF_DUAL, + /** Do a bidirectional test individually */ + LWIPERF_TRADEOFF +}; + +/** Prototype of a report function that is called when a session is finished. + This report function can show the test results. + @param report_type contains the test result */ +typedef void (*lwiperf_report_fn)(void *arg, enum lwiperf_report_type report_type, + const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, u16_t remote_port, + u32_t bytes_transferred, u32_t ms_duration, u32_t bandwidth_kbitpsec); + +void *lwiperf_start_tcp_server(const ip_addr_t *local_addr, u16_t local_port, + lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg); +void *lwiperf_start_tcp_server_default(lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg); +void *lwiperf_start_tcp_client(const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, u16_t remote_port, + enum lwiperf_client_type type, + lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg); +void *lwiperf_start_tcp_client_default(const ip_addr_t *remote_addr, + lwiperf_report_fn report_fn, void *report_arg); + +void lwiperf_abort(void *lwiperf_session); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_LWIPERF_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns.h index 5dfbb4bf..2365426e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns.h @@ -1,105 +1,105 @@ -/** - * @file - * MDNS responder - */ - -/* -* Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB -* All rights reserved. -* -* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -* -* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products -* derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED -* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT -* SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, -* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT -* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS -* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN -* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING -* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY -* OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -* This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. -* -* Author: Erik Ekman -* -*/ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_H - -#include "lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER - -enum mdns_sd_proto { - DNSSD_PROTO_UDP = 0, - DNSSD_PROTO_TCP = 1 -}; - -#define MDNS_PROBING_CONFLICT 0 -#define MDNS_PROBING_SUCCESSFUL 1 - -#define MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN 63 - -struct mdns_host; -struct mdns_service; - -/** Callback function to add text to a reply, called when generating the reply */ -typedef void (*service_get_txt_fn_t)(struct mdns_service *service, void *txt_userdata); - -/** Callback function to let application know the result of probing network for name - * uniqueness, called with result MDNS_PROBING_SUCCESSFUL if no other node claimed - * use for the name for the netif or a service and is safe to use, or MDNS_PROBING_CONFLICT - * if another node is already using it and mdns is disabled on this interface */ -typedef void (*mdns_name_result_cb_t)(struct netif *netif, u8_t result); - -void mdns_resp_init(void); - -void mdns_resp_register_name_result_cb(mdns_name_result_cb_t cb); - -err_t mdns_resp_add_netif(struct netif *netif, const char *hostname, u32_t dns_ttl); -err_t mdns_resp_remove_netif(struct netif *netif); -err_t mdns_resp_rename_netif(struct netif *netif, const char *hostname); - -s8_t mdns_resp_add_service(struct netif *netif, const char *name, const char *service, enum mdns_sd_proto proto, u16_t port, u32_t dns_ttl, service_get_txt_fn_t txt_fn, void *txt_userdata); -err_t mdns_resp_del_service(struct netif *netif, s8_t slot); -err_t mdns_resp_rename_service(struct netif *netif, s8_t slot, const char *name); - -err_t mdns_resp_add_service_txtitem(struct mdns_service *service, const char *txt, u8_t txt_len); - -void mdns_resp_restart(struct netif *netif); -void mdns_resp_announce(struct netif *netif); - -/** - * @ingroup mdns - * Announce IP settings have changed on netif. - * Call this in your callback registered by netif_set_status_callback(). - * No need to call this function when LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK==1, - * this handled automatically for you. - * @param netif The network interface where settings have changed. - */ -#define mdns_resp_netif_settings_changed(netif) mdns_resp_announce(netif) - -#endif /* LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_H */ +/** + * @file + * MDNS responder + */ + +/* +* Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB +* All rights reserved. +* +* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, +* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +* +* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, +* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation +* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +* derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT +* SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, +* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT +* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING +* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY +* OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +* This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. +* +* Author: Erik Ekman +* +*/ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_H + +#include "lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER + +enum mdns_sd_proto { + DNSSD_PROTO_UDP = 0, + DNSSD_PROTO_TCP = 1 +}; + +#define MDNS_PROBING_CONFLICT 0 +#define MDNS_PROBING_SUCCESSFUL 1 + +#define MDNS_LABEL_MAXLEN 63 + +struct mdns_host; +struct mdns_service; + +/** Callback function to add text to a reply, called when generating the reply */ +typedef void (*service_get_txt_fn_t)(struct mdns_service *service, void *txt_userdata); + +/** Callback function to let application know the result of probing network for name + * uniqueness, called with result MDNS_PROBING_SUCCESSFUL if no other node claimed + * use for the name for the netif or a service and is safe to use, or MDNS_PROBING_CONFLICT + * if another node is already using it and mdns is disabled on this interface */ +typedef void (*mdns_name_result_cb_t)(struct netif *netif, u8_t result); + +void mdns_resp_init(void); + +void mdns_resp_register_name_result_cb(mdns_name_result_cb_t cb); + +err_t mdns_resp_add_netif(struct netif *netif, const char *hostname, u32_t dns_ttl); +err_t mdns_resp_remove_netif(struct netif *netif); +err_t mdns_resp_rename_netif(struct netif *netif, const char *hostname); + +s8_t mdns_resp_add_service(struct netif *netif, const char *name, const char *service, enum mdns_sd_proto proto, u16_t port, u32_t dns_ttl, service_get_txt_fn_t txt_fn, void *txt_userdata); +err_t mdns_resp_del_service(struct netif *netif, s8_t slot); +err_t mdns_resp_rename_service(struct netif *netif, s8_t slot, const char *name); + +err_t mdns_resp_add_service_txtitem(struct mdns_service *service, const char *txt, u8_t txt_len); + +void mdns_resp_restart(struct netif *netif); +void mdns_resp_announce(struct netif *netif); + +/** + * @ingroup mdns + * Announce IP settings have changed on netif. + * Call this in your callback registered by netif_set_status_callback(). + * No need to call this function when LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK==1, + * this handled automatically for you. + * @param netif The network interface where settings have changed. + */ +#define mdns_resp_netif_settings_changed(netif) mdns_resp_announce(netif) + +#endif /* LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h index 9bded4c8..2ebe98f3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h @@ -1,80 +1,80 @@ -/** - * @file - * MDNS responder - */ - -/* -* Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB -* All rights reserved. -* -* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -* -* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products -* derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED -* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT -* SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, -* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT -* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS -* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN -* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING -* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY -* OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -* This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. -* -* Author: Erik Ekman -* -*/ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -/** - * @defgroup mdns_opts Options - * @ingroup mdns - * @{ - */ - -/** - * LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER==1: Turn on multicast DNS module. UDP must be available for MDNS - * transport. IGMP is needed for IPv4 multicast. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER -#define LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER 0 -#endif /* LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER */ - -/** The maximum number of services per netif */ -#ifndef MDNS_MAX_SERVICES -#define MDNS_MAX_SERVICES 1 -#endif - -/** MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK==1: register an ext_callback on the netif - * to automatically restart probing/announcing on status or address change. - */ -#ifndef MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK -#define MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK -#endif - -/** - * MDNS_DEBUG: Enable debugging for multicast DNS. - */ -#ifndef MDNS_DEBUG -#define MDNS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_OPTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * MDNS responder + */ + +/* +* Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB +* All rights reserved. +* +* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, +* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +* +* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, +* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation +* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +* derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT +* SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, +* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT +* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING +* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY +* OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +* This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. +* +* Author: Erik Ekman +* +*/ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +/** + * @defgroup mdns_opts Options + * @ingroup mdns + * @{ + */ + +/** + * LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER==1: Turn on multicast DNS module. UDP must be available for MDNS + * transport. IGMP is needed for IPv4 multicast. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER +#define LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER 0 +#endif /* LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER */ + +/** The maximum number of services per netif */ +#ifndef MDNS_MAX_SERVICES +#define MDNS_MAX_SERVICES 1 +#endif + +/** MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK==1: register an ext_callback on the netif + * to automatically restart probing/announcing on status or address change. + */ +#ifndef MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK +#define MDNS_RESP_USENETIF_EXTCALLBACK LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK +#endif + +/** + * MDNS_DEBUG: Enable debugging for multicast DNS. + */ +#ifndef MDNS_DEBUG +#define MDNS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MDNS_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h index 62481b72..1f0a04bd 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h @@ -1,74 +1,74 @@ -/** - * @file - * MDNS responder private definitions - */ - -/* -* Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB -* All rights reserved. -* -* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -* -* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products -* derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED -* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT -* SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, -* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT -* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS -* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN -* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING -* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY -* OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -* This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. -* -* Author: Erik Ekman -* -*/ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MDNS_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_MDNS_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER - -/* Domain struct and methods - visible for unit tests */ - -#define MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN 256 -#define MDNS_READNAME_ERROR 0xFFFF - -struct mdns_domain { - /* Encoded domain name */ - u8_t name[MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN]; - /* Total length of domain name, including zero */ - u16_t length; - /* Set if compression of this domain is not allowed */ - u8_t skip_compression; -}; - -err_t mdns_domain_add_label(struct mdns_domain *domain, const char *label, u8_t len); -u16_t mdns_readname(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, struct mdns_domain *domain); -int mdns_domain_eq(struct mdns_domain *a, struct mdns_domain *b); -u16_t mdns_compress_domain(struct pbuf *pbuf, u16_t *offset, struct mdns_domain *domain); - -#endif /* LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MDNS_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * MDNS responder private definitions + */ + +/* +* Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB +* All rights reserved. +* +* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, +* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +* +* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, +* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation +* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +* derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT +* SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, +* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT +* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING +* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY +* OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +* This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. +* +* Author: Erik Ekman +* +*/ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MDNS_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_MDNS_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/apps/mdns_opts.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER + +/* Domain struct and methods - visible for unit tests */ + +#define MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN 256 +#define MDNS_READNAME_ERROR 0xFFFF + +struct mdns_domain { + /* Encoded domain name */ + u8_t name[MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN]; + /* Total length of domain name, including zero */ + u16_t length; + /* Set if compression of this domain is not allowed */ + u8_t skip_compression; +}; + +err_t mdns_domain_add_label(struct mdns_domain *domain, const char *label, u8_t len); +u16_t mdns_readname(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, struct mdns_domain *domain); +int mdns_domain_eq(struct mdns_domain *a, struct mdns_domain *b); +u16_t mdns_compress_domain(struct pbuf *pbuf, u16_t *offset, struct mdns_domain *domain); + +#endif /* LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MDNS_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt.h index cf1bfa30..45d6f1bb 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt.h @@ -1,200 +1,200 @@ -/** - * @file - * MQTT client - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2016 Erik Andersson - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Erik Andersson - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_CLIENT_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_CLIENT_H - -#include "lwip/apps/mqtt_opts.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -typedef struct mqtt_client_s mqtt_client_t; - -#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS -struct altcp_tls_config; -#endif - -/** @ingroup mqtt - * Default MQTT port (non-TLS) */ -#define MQTT_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_MQTT -/** @ingroup mqtt - * Default MQTT TLS port */ -#define MQTT_TLS_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_SECURE_MQTT - -/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* Connection with server */ - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Client information and connection parameters */ -struct mqtt_connect_client_info_t { - /** Client identifier, must be set by caller */ - const char *client_id; - /** User name, set to NULL if not used */ - const char *client_user; - /** Password, set to NULL if not used */ - const char *client_pass; - /** keep alive time in seconds, 0 to disable keep alive functionality*/ - u16_t keep_alive; - /** will topic, set to NULL if will is not to be used, - will_msg, will_qos and will retain are then ignored */ - const char *will_topic; - /** will_msg, see will_topic */ - const char *will_msg; - /** will_qos, see will_topic */ - u8_t will_qos; - /** will_retain, see will_topic */ - u8_t will_retain; -#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS - /** TLS configuration for secure connections */ - struct altcp_tls_config *tls_config; -#endif -}; - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Connection status codes */ -typedef enum { - /** Accepted */ - MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED = 0, - /** Refused protocol version */ - MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1, - /** Refused identifier */ - MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_IDENTIFIER = 2, - /** Refused server */ - MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_SERVER = 3, - /** Refused user credentials */ - MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_USERNAME_PASS = 4, - /** Refused not authorized */ - MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_NOT_AUTHORIZED_ = 5, - /** Disconnected */ - MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED = 256, - /** Timeout */ - MQTT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT = 257 -} mqtt_connection_status_t; - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Function prototype for mqtt connection status callback. Called when - * client has connected to the server after initiating a mqtt connection attempt by - * calling mqtt_client_connect() or when connection is closed by server or an error - * - * @param client MQTT client itself - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function - * @param status Connect result code or disconnection notification @see mqtt_connection_status_t - * - */ -typedef void (*mqtt_connection_cb_t)(mqtt_client_t *client, void *arg, mqtt_connection_status_t status); - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Data callback flags */ -enum { - /** Flag set when last fragment of data arrives in data callback */ - MQTT_DATA_FLAG_LAST = 1 -}; - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Function prototype for MQTT incoming publish data callback function. Called when data - * arrives to a subscribed topic @see mqtt_subscribe - * - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function - * @param data User data, pointed object, data may not be referenced after callback return, - NULL is passed when all publish data are delivered - * @param len Length of publish data fragment - * @param flags MQTT_DATA_FLAG_LAST set when this call contains the last part of data from publish message - * - */ -typedef void (*mqtt_incoming_data_cb_t)(void *arg, const u8_t *data, u16_t len, u8_t flags); - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Function prototype for MQTT incoming publish function. Called when an incoming publish - * arrives to a subscribed topic @see mqtt_subscribe - * - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function - * @param topic Zero terminated Topic text string, topic may not be referenced after callback return - * @param tot_len Total length of publish data, if set to 0 (no publish payload) data callback will not be invoked - */ -typedef void (*mqtt_incoming_publish_cb_t)(void *arg, const char *topic, u32_t tot_len); - -/** - * @ingroup mqtt - * Function prototype for mqtt request callback. Called when a subscribe, unsubscribe - * or publish request has completed - * @param arg Pointer to user data supplied when invoking request - * @param err ERR_OK on success - * ERR_TIMEOUT if no response was received within timeout, - * ERR_ABRT if (un)subscribe was denied - */ -typedef void (*mqtt_request_cb_t)(void *arg, err_t err); - -err_t mqtt_client_connect(mqtt_client_t *client, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, mqtt_connection_cb_t cb, void *arg, - const struct mqtt_connect_client_info_t *client_info); - -void mqtt_disconnect(mqtt_client_t *client); - -mqtt_client_t *mqtt_client_new(void); -void mqtt_client_free(mqtt_client_t *client); - -u8_t mqtt_client_is_connected(mqtt_client_t *client); - -void mqtt_set_inpub_callback(mqtt_client_t *client, mqtt_incoming_publish_cb_t, - mqtt_incoming_data_cb_t data_cb, void *arg); - -err_t mqtt_sub_unsub(mqtt_client_t *client, const char *topic, u8_t qos, mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg, u8_t sub); - -/** @ingroup mqtt - *Subscribe to topic */ -#define mqtt_subscribe(client, topic, qos, cb, arg) mqtt_sub_unsub(client, topic, qos, cb, arg, 1) -/** @ingroup mqtt - * Unsubscribe to topic */ -#define mqtt_unsubscribe(client, topic, cb, arg) mqtt_sub_unsub(client, topic, 0, cb, arg, 0) - -err_t mqtt_publish(mqtt_client_t *client, const char *topic, const void *payload, u16_t payload_length, u8_t qos, u8_t retain, - mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_CLIENT_H */ +/** + * @file + * MQTT client + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Erik Andersson + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Erik Andersson + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_CLIENT_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_CLIENT_H + +#include "lwip/apps/mqtt_opts.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef struct mqtt_client_s mqtt_client_t; + +#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS +struct altcp_tls_config; +#endif + +/** @ingroup mqtt + * Default MQTT port (non-TLS) */ +#define MQTT_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_MQTT +/** @ingroup mqtt + * Default MQTT TLS port */ +#define MQTT_TLS_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_SECURE_MQTT + +/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* Connection with server */ + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Client information and connection parameters */ +struct mqtt_connect_client_info_t { + /** Client identifier, must be set by caller */ + const char *client_id; + /** User name, set to NULL if not used */ + const char *client_user; + /** Password, set to NULL if not used */ + const char *client_pass; + /** keep alive time in seconds, 0 to disable keep alive functionality*/ + u16_t keep_alive; + /** will topic, set to NULL if will is not to be used, + will_msg, will_qos and will retain are then ignored */ + const char *will_topic; + /** will_msg, see will_topic */ + const char *will_msg; + /** will_qos, see will_topic */ + u8_t will_qos; + /** will_retain, see will_topic */ + u8_t will_retain; +#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS + /** TLS configuration for secure connections */ + struct altcp_tls_config *tls_config; +#endif +}; + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Connection status codes */ +typedef enum { + /** Accepted */ + MQTT_CONNECT_ACCEPTED = 0, + /** Refused protocol version */ + MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1, + /** Refused identifier */ + MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_IDENTIFIER = 2, + /** Refused server */ + MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_SERVER = 3, + /** Refused user credentials */ + MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_USERNAME_PASS = 4, + /** Refused not authorized */ + MQTT_CONNECT_REFUSED_NOT_AUTHORIZED_ = 5, + /** Disconnected */ + MQTT_CONNECT_DISCONNECTED = 256, + /** Timeout */ + MQTT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT = 257 +} mqtt_connection_status_t; + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Function prototype for mqtt connection status callback. Called when + * client has connected to the server after initiating a mqtt connection attempt by + * calling mqtt_client_connect() or when connection is closed by server or an error + * + * @param client MQTT client itself + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function + * @param status Connect result code or disconnection notification @see mqtt_connection_status_t + * + */ +typedef void (*mqtt_connection_cb_t)(mqtt_client_t *client, void *arg, mqtt_connection_status_t status); + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Data callback flags */ +enum { + /** Flag set when last fragment of data arrives in data callback */ + MQTT_DATA_FLAG_LAST = 1 +}; + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Function prototype for MQTT incoming publish data callback function. Called when data + * arrives to a subscribed topic @see mqtt_subscribe + * + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function + * @param data User data, pointed object, data may not be referenced after callback return, + NULL is passed when all publish data are delivered + * @param len Length of publish data fragment + * @param flags MQTT_DATA_FLAG_LAST set when this call contains the last part of data from publish message + * + */ +typedef void (*mqtt_incoming_data_cb_t)(void *arg, const u8_t *data, u16_t len, u8_t flags); + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Function prototype for MQTT incoming publish function. Called when an incoming publish + * arrives to a subscribed topic @see mqtt_subscribe + * + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function + * @param topic Zero terminated Topic text string, topic may not be referenced after callback return + * @param tot_len Total length of publish data, if set to 0 (no publish payload) data callback will not be invoked + */ +typedef void (*mqtt_incoming_publish_cb_t)(void *arg, const char *topic, u32_t tot_len); + +/** + * @ingroup mqtt + * Function prototype for mqtt request callback. Called when a subscribe, unsubscribe + * or publish request has completed + * @param arg Pointer to user data supplied when invoking request + * @param err ERR_OK on success + * ERR_TIMEOUT if no response was received within timeout, + * ERR_ABRT if (un)subscribe was denied + */ +typedef void (*mqtt_request_cb_t)(void *arg, err_t err); + +err_t mqtt_client_connect(mqtt_client_t *client, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, mqtt_connection_cb_t cb, void *arg, + const struct mqtt_connect_client_info_t *client_info); + +void mqtt_disconnect(mqtt_client_t *client); + +mqtt_client_t *mqtt_client_new(void); +void mqtt_client_free(mqtt_client_t *client); + +u8_t mqtt_client_is_connected(mqtt_client_t *client); + +void mqtt_set_inpub_callback(mqtt_client_t *client, mqtt_incoming_publish_cb_t, + mqtt_incoming_data_cb_t data_cb, void *arg); + +err_t mqtt_sub_unsub(mqtt_client_t *client, const char *topic, u8_t qos, mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg, u8_t sub); + +/** @ingroup mqtt + *Subscribe to topic */ +#define mqtt_subscribe(client, topic, qos, cb, arg) mqtt_sub_unsub(client, topic, qos, cb, arg, 1) +/** @ingroup mqtt + * Unsubscribe to topic */ +#define mqtt_unsubscribe(client, topic, cb, arg) mqtt_sub_unsub(client, topic, 0, cb, arg, 0) + +err_t mqtt_publish(mqtt_client_t *client, const char *topic, const void *payload, u16_t payload_length, u8_t qos, u8_t retain, + mqtt_request_cb_t cb, void *arg); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_CLIENT_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_opts.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_opts.h index e0561301..4226d21e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_opts.h @@ -1,103 +1,103 @@ -/** - * @file - * MQTT client options - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2016 Erik Andersson - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Erik Andersson - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @defgroup mqtt_opts Options - * @ingroup mqtt - * @{ - */ - -/** - * Output ring-buffer size, must be able to fit largest outgoing publish message topic+payloads - */ -#ifndef MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE -#define MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE 256 -#endif - -/** - * Number of bytes in receive buffer, must be at least the size of the longest incoming topic + 8 - * If one wants to avoid fragmented incoming publish, set length to max incoming topic length + max payload length + 8 - */ -#ifndef MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN -#define MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN 128 -#endif - -/** - * Maximum number of pending subscribe, unsubscribe and publish requests to server . - */ -#ifndef MQTT_REQ_MAX_IN_FLIGHT -#define MQTT_REQ_MAX_IN_FLIGHT 4 -#endif - -/** - * Seconds between each cyclic timer call. - */ -#ifndef MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL -#define MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL 5 -#endif - -/** - * Publish, subscribe and unsubscribe request timeout in seconds. - */ -#ifndef MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT -#define MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT 30 -#endif - -/** - * Seconds for MQTT connect response timeout after sending connect request - */ -#ifndef MQTT_CONNECT_TIMOUT -#define MQTT_CONNECT_TIMOUT 100 -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_OPTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * MQTT client options + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Erik Andersson + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Erik Andersson + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @defgroup mqtt_opts Options + * @ingroup mqtt + * @{ + */ + +/** + * Output ring-buffer size, must be able to fit largest outgoing publish message topic+payloads + */ +#ifndef MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE +#define MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE 256 +#endif + +/** + * Number of bytes in receive buffer, must be at least the size of the longest incoming topic + 8 + * If one wants to avoid fragmented incoming publish, set length to max incoming topic length + max payload length + 8 + */ +#ifndef MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN +#define MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN 128 +#endif + +/** + * Maximum number of pending subscribe, unsubscribe and publish requests to server . + */ +#ifndef MQTT_REQ_MAX_IN_FLIGHT +#define MQTT_REQ_MAX_IN_FLIGHT 4 +#endif + +/** + * Seconds between each cyclic timer call. + */ +#ifndef MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL +#define MQTT_CYCLIC_TIMER_INTERVAL 5 +#endif + +/** + * Publish, subscribe and unsubscribe request timeout in seconds. + */ +#ifndef MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT +#define MQTT_REQ_TIMEOUT 30 +#endif + +/** + * Seconds for MQTT connect response timeout after sending connect request + */ +#ifndef MQTT_CONNECT_TIMOUT +#define MQTT_CONNECT_TIMOUT 100 +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h index 64ad7fb0..7c65924c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h @@ -1,102 +1,102 @@ -/** - * @file - * MQTT client (private interface) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2016 Erik Andersson - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Erik Andersson - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/apps/mqtt.h" -#include "lwip/altcp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** Pending request item, binds application callback to pending server requests */ -struct mqtt_request_t { - /** Next item in list, NULL means this is the last in chain, - next pointing at itself means request is unallocated */ - struct mqtt_request_t *next; - /** Callback to upper layer */ - mqtt_request_cb_t cb; - void *arg; - /** MQTT packet identifier */ - u16_t pkt_id; - /** Expire time relative to element before this */ - u16_t timeout_diff; -}; - -/** Ring buffer */ -struct mqtt_ringbuf_t { - u16_t put; - u16_t get; - u8_t buf[MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE]; -}; - -/** MQTT client */ -struct mqtt_client_s { - /** Timers and timeouts */ - u16_t cyclic_tick; - u16_t keep_alive; - u16_t server_watchdog; - /** Packet identifier generator*/ - u16_t pkt_id_seq; - /** Packet identifier of pending incoming publish */ - u16_t inpub_pkt_id; - /** Connection state */ - u8_t conn_state; - struct altcp_pcb *conn; - /** Connection callback */ - void *connect_arg; - mqtt_connection_cb_t connect_cb; - /** Pending requests to server */ - struct mqtt_request_t *pend_req_queue; - struct mqtt_request_t req_list[MQTT_REQ_MAX_IN_FLIGHT]; - void *inpub_arg; - /** Incoming data callback */ - mqtt_incoming_data_cb_t data_cb; - mqtt_incoming_publish_cb_t pub_cb; - /** Input */ - u32_t msg_idx; - u8_t rx_buffer[MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN]; - /** Output ring-buffer */ - struct mqtt_ringbuf_t output; -}; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * MQTT client (private interface) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Erik Andersson + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Erik Andersson + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/apps/mqtt.h" +#include "lwip/altcp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Pending request item, binds application callback to pending server requests */ +struct mqtt_request_t { + /** Next item in list, NULL means this is the last in chain, + next pointing at itself means request is unallocated */ + struct mqtt_request_t *next; + /** Callback to upper layer */ + mqtt_request_cb_t cb; + void *arg; + /** MQTT packet identifier */ + u16_t pkt_id; + /** Expire time relative to element before this */ + u16_t timeout_diff; +}; + +/** Ring buffer */ +struct mqtt_ringbuf_t { + u16_t put; + u16_t get; + u8_t buf[MQTT_OUTPUT_RINGBUF_SIZE]; +}; + +/** MQTT client */ +struct mqtt_client_s { + /** Timers and timeouts */ + u16_t cyclic_tick; + u16_t keep_alive; + u16_t server_watchdog; + /** Packet identifier generator*/ + u16_t pkt_id_seq; + /** Packet identifier of pending incoming publish */ + u16_t inpub_pkt_id; + /** Connection state */ + u8_t conn_state; + struct altcp_pcb *conn; + /** Connection callback */ + void *connect_arg; + mqtt_connection_cb_t connect_cb; + /** Pending requests to server */ + struct mqtt_request_t *pend_req_queue; + struct mqtt_request_t req_list[MQTT_REQ_MAX_IN_FLIGHT]; + void *inpub_arg; + /** Incoming data callback */ + mqtt_incoming_data_cb_t data_cb; + mqtt_incoming_publish_cb_t pub_cb; + /** Input */ + u32_t msg_idx; + u8_t rx_buffer[MQTT_VAR_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN]; + /** Output ring-buffer */ + struct mqtt_ringbuf_t output; +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_MQTT_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns.h index 69e50236..25bb9f60 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns.h @@ -1,51 +1,51 @@ -/** - * @file - * NETBIOS name service responder - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_H - -#include "lwip/apps/netbiosns_opts.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -void netbiosns_init(void); -#ifndef NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME -void netbiosns_set_name(const char *hostname); -#endif -void netbiosns_stop(void); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_H */ +/** + * @file + * NETBIOS name service responder + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_H + +#include "lwip/apps/netbiosns_opts.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +void netbiosns_init(void); +#ifndef NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME +void netbiosns_set_name(const char *hostname); +#endif +void netbiosns_stop(void); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns_opts.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns_opts.h index a4d8615b..fc6611ca 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/netbiosns_opts.h @@ -1,66 +1,66 @@ -/** - * @file - * NETBIOS name service responder options - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -/** - * @defgroup netbiosns_opts Options - * @ingroup netbiosns - * @{ - */ - -/** NetBIOS name of lwip device - * This must be uppercase until NETBIOS_STRCMP() is defined to a string - * comparision function that is case insensitive. - * If you want to use the netif's hostname, use this (with LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME): - * (ip_current_netif() != NULL ? ip_current_netif()->hostname != NULL ? ip_current_netif()->hostname : "" : "") - * - * If this is not defined, netbiosns_set_name() can be called at runtime to change the name. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME "NETBIOSLWIPDEV" -#endif - -/** Respond to NetBIOS name queries - * Default is disabled - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETBIOS_RESPOND_NAME_QUERY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETBIOS_RESPOND_NAME_QUERY 0 -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_OPTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * NETBIOS name service responder options + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +/** + * @defgroup netbiosns_opts Options + * @ingroup netbiosns + * @{ + */ + +/** NetBIOS name of lwip device + * This must be uppercase until NETBIOS_STRCMP() is defined to a string + * comparision function that is case insensitive. + * If you want to use the netif's hostname, use this (with LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME): + * (ip_current_netif() != NULL ? ip_current_netif()->hostname != NULL ? ip_current_netif()->hostname : "" : "") + * + * If this is not defined, netbiosns_set_name() can be called at runtime to change the name. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define NETBIOS_LWIP_NAME "NETBIOSLWIPDEV" +#endif + +/** Respond to NetBIOS name queries + * Default is disabled + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETBIOS_RESPOND_NAME_QUERY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETBIOS_RESPOND_NAME_QUERY 0 +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_NETBIOS_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp.h index d58d29b0..43f2273e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp.h @@ -1,126 +1,126 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#include "lwip/apps/smtp_opts.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -/** The default TCP port used for SMTP */ -#define SMTP_DEFAULT_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_SMTP -/** The default TCP port used for SMTPS */ -#define SMTPS_DEFAULT_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_SMTPS - -/** Email successfully sent */ -#define SMTP_RESULT_OK 0 -/** Unknown error */ -#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_UNKNOWN 1 -/** Connection to server failed */ -#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT 2 -/** Failed to resolve server hostname */ -#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME 3 -/** Connection unexpectedly closed by remote server */ -#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED 4 -/** Connection timed out (server didn't respond in time) */ -#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT 5 -/** Server responded with an unknown response code */ -#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_SVR_RESP 6 -/** Out of resources locally */ -#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_MEM 7 - -/** Prototype of an smtp callback function - * - * @param arg argument specified when initiating the email - * @param smtp_result result of the mail transfer (see defines SMTP_RESULT_*) - * @param srv_err if aborted by the server, this contains the error code received - * @param err an error returned by internal lwip functions, can help to specify - * the source of the error but must not necessarily be != ERR_OK - */ -typedef void (*smtp_result_fn)(void *arg, u8_t smtp_result, u16_t srv_err, err_t err); - -/** This structure is used as argument for smtp_send_mail_int(), - * which in turn can be used with tcpip_callback() to send mail - * from interrupt context, e.g. like this: - * struct smtp_send_request *req; (to be filled) - * tcpip_try_callback(smtp_send_mail_int, (void*)req); - * - * For member description, see parameter description of smtp_send_mail(). - * When using with tcpip_callback, this structure has to stay allocated - * (e.g. using mem_malloc/mem_free) until its 'callback_fn' is called. - */ -struct smtp_send_request { - const char *from; - const char *to; - const char *subject; - const char *body; - smtp_result_fn callback_fn; - void *callback_arg; - /** If this is != 0, data is *not* copied into an extra buffer - * but used from the pointers supplied in this struct. - * This means less memory usage, but data must stay untouched until - * the callback function is called. */ - u8_t static_data; -}; - -#if SMTP_BODYDH - -#ifndef SMTP_BODYDH_BUFFER_SIZE -#define SMTP_BODYDH_BUFFER_SIZE 256 -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH_BUFFER_SIZE */ - -struct smtp_bodydh { - u16_t state; - u16_t length; /* Length of content in buffer */ - char buffer[SMTP_BODYDH_BUFFER_SIZE]; /* buffer for generated content */ -#ifdef SMTP_BODYDH_USER_SIZE - u8_t user[SMTP_BODYDH_USER_SIZE]; -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH_USER_SIZE */ -}; - -enum bdh_retvals_e { - BDH_DONE = 0, - BDH_WORKING -}; - -/** Prototype of an smtp body callback function - * It receives a struct smtp_bodydh, and a buffer to write data, - * must return BDH_WORKING to be called again and BDH_DONE when - * it has finished processing. This one tries to fill one TCP buffer with - * data, your function will be repeatedly called until that happens; so if you - * know you'll be taking too long to serve your request, pause once in a while - * by writing length=0 to avoid hogging system resources - * - * @param arg argument specified when initiating the email - * @param smtp_bodydh state handling + buffer structure - */ -typedef int (*smtp_bodycback_fn)(void *arg, struct smtp_bodydh *bodydh); - -err_t smtp_send_mail_bodycback(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, - smtp_bodycback_fn bodycback_fn, smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg); - -#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ - -err_t smtp_set_server_addr(const char *server); -void smtp_set_server_port(u16_t port); -#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS -struct altcp_tls_config; -void smtp_set_tls_config(struct altcp_tls_config *tls_config); -#endif -err_t smtp_set_auth(const char *username, const char *pass); -err_t smtp_send_mail(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, const char *body, - smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg); -err_t smtp_send_mail_static(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, const char *body, - smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg); -void smtp_send_mail_int(void *arg); -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -const char *smtp_result_str(u8_t smtp_result); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_H */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "lwip/apps/smtp_opts.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +/** The default TCP port used for SMTP */ +#define SMTP_DEFAULT_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_SMTP +/** The default TCP port used for SMTPS */ +#define SMTPS_DEFAULT_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_SMTPS + +/** Email successfully sent */ +#define SMTP_RESULT_OK 0 +/** Unknown error */ +#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_UNKNOWN 1 +/** Connection to server failed */ +#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CONNECT 2 +/** Failed to resolve server hostname */ +#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_HOSTNAME 3 +/** Connection unexpectedly closed by remote server */ +#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_CLOSED 4 +/** Connection timed out (server didn't respond in time) */ +#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_TIMEOUT 5 +/** Server responded with an unknown response code */ +#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_SVR_RESP 6 +/** Out of resources locally */ +#define SMTP_RESULT_ERR_MEM 7 + +/** Prototype of an smtp callback function + * + * @param arg argument specified when initiating the email + * @param smtp_result result of the mail transfer (see defines SMTP_RESULT_*) + * @param srv_err if aborted by the server, this contains the error code received + * @param err an error returned by internal lwip functions, can help to specify + * the source of the error but must not necessarily be != ERR_OK + */ +typedef void (*smtp_result_fn)(void *arg, u8_t smtp_result, u16_t srv_err, err_t err); + +/** This structure is used as argument for smtp_send_mail_int(), + * which in turn can be used with tcpip_callback() to send mail + * from interrupt context, e.g. like this: + * struct smtp_send_request *req; (to be filled) + * tcpip_try_callback(smtp_send_mail_int, (void*)req); + * + * For member description, see parameter description of smtp_send_mail(). + * When using with tcpip_callback, this structure has to stay allocated + * (e.g. using mem_malloc/mem_free) until its 'callback_fn' is called. + */ +struct smtp_send_request { + const char *from; + const char *to; + const char *subject; + const char *body; + smtp_result_fn callback_fn; + void *callback_arg; + /** If this is != 0, data is *not* copied into an extra buffer + * but used from the pointers supplied in this struct. + * This means less memory usage, but data must stay untouched until + * the callback function is called. */ + u8_t static_data; +}; + +#if SMTP_BODYDH + +#ifndef SMTP_BODYDH_BUFFER_SIZE +#define SMTP_BODYDH_BUFFER_SIZE 256 +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH_BUFFER_SIZE */ + +struct smtp_bodydh { + u16_t state; + u16_t length; /* Length of content in buffer */ + char buffer[SMTP_BODYDH_BUFFER_SIZE]; /* buffer for generated content */ +#ifdef SMTP_BODYDH_USER_SIZE + u8_t user[SMTP_BODYDH_USER_SIZE]; +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH_USER_SIZE */ +}; + +enum bdh_retvals_e { + BDH_DONE = 0, + BDH_WORKING +}; + +/** Prototype of an smtp body callback function + * It receives a struct smtp_bodydh, and a buffer to write data, + * must return BDH_WORKING to be called again and BDH_DONE when + * it has finished processing. This one tries to fill one TCP buffer with + * data, your function will be repeatedly called until that happens; so if you + * know you'll be taking too long to serve your request, pause once in a while + * by writing length=0 to avoid hogging system resources + * + * @param arg argument specified when initiating the email + * @param smtp_bodydh state handling + buffer structure + */ +typedef int (*smtp_bodycback_fn)(void *arg, struct smtp_bodydh *bodydh); + +err_t smtp_send_mail_bodycback(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, + smtp_bodycback_fn bodycback_fn, smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg); + +#endif /* SMTP_BODYDH */ + +err_t smtp_set_server_addr(const char *server); +void smtp_set_server_port(u16_t port); +#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_ALTCP_TLS +struct altcp_tls_config; +void smtp_set_tls_config(struct altcp_tls_config *tls_config); +#endif +err_t smtp_set_auth(const char *username, const char *pass); +err_t smtp_send_mail(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, const char *body, + smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg); +err_t smtp_send_mail_static(const char *from, const char *to, const char *subject, const char *body, + smtp_result_fn callback_fn, void *callback_arg); +void smtp_send_mail_int(void *arg); +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +const char *smtp_result_str(u8_t smtp_result); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp_opts.h similarity index 95% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp_opts.h index acce9062..d955004d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/smtp_opts.h @@ -1,80 +1,80 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @defgroup smtp_opts Options - * @ingroup smtp - * - * @{ - */ - -/** Set this to 1 to enable data handler callback on BODY */ -#ifndef SMTP_BODYDH -#define SMTP_BODYDH 0 -#endif - -/** SMTP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for SNTP. */ -#ifndef SMTP_DEBUG -#define SMTP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** Maximum length reserved for server name including terminating 0 byte */ -#ifndef SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN -#define SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN 256 -#endif - -/** Maximum length reserved for username */ -#ifndef SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN -#define SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN 32 -#endif - -/** Maximum length reserved for password */ -#ifndef SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN -#define SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN 32 -#endif - -/** Set this to 0 if you know the authentication data will not change - * during the smtp session, which saves some heap space. */ -#ifndef SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA -#define SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA 1 -#endif - -/** Set this to 0 to save some code space if you know for sure that all data - * passed to this module conforms to the requirements in the SMTP RFC. - * WARNING: use this with care! - */ -#ifndef SMTP_CHECK_DATA -#define SMTP_CHECK_DATA 1 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to enable AUTH PLAIN support */ -#ifndef SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN -#define SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN 1 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to enable AUTH LOGIN support */ -#ifndef SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN -#define SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN 1 -#endif - -/* Memory allocation/deallocation can be overridden... */ -#ifndef SMTP_STATE_MALLOC -#define SMTP_STATE_MALLOC(size) mem_malloc(size) -#define SMTP_STATE_FREE(ptr) mem_free(ptr) -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* SMTP_OPTS_H */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SMTP_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @defgroup smtp_opts Options + * @ingroup smtp + * + * @{ + */ + +/** Set this to 1 to enable data handler callback on BODY */ +#ifndef SMTP_BODYDH +#define SMTP_BODYDH 0 +#endif + +/** SMTP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for SNTP. */ +#ifndef SMTP_DEBUG +#define SMTP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** Maximum length reserved for server name including terminating 0 byte */ +#ifndef SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN +#define SMTP_MAX_SERVERNAME_LEN 256 +#endif + +/** Maximum length reserved for username */ +#ifndef SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN +#define SMTP_MAX_USERNAME_LEN 32 +#endif + +/** Maximum length reserved for password */ +#ifndef SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN +#define SMTP_MAX_PASS_LEN 32 +#endif + +/** Set this to 0 if you know the authentication data will not change + * during the smtp session, which saves some heap space. */ +#ifndef SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA +#define SMTP_COPY_AUTHDATA 1 +#endif + +/** Set this to 0 to save some code space if you know for sure that all data + * passed to this module conforms to the requirements in the SMTP RFC. + * WARNING: use this with care! + */ +#ifndef SMTP_CHECK_DATA +#define SMTP_CHECK_DATA 1 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to enable AUTH PLAIN support */ +#ifndef SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN +#define SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_PLAIN 1 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to enable AUTH LOGIN support */ +#ifndef SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN +#define SMTP_SUPPORT_AUTH_LOGIN 1 +#endif + +/* Memory allocation/deallocation can be overridden... */ +#ifndef SMTP_STATE_MALLOC +#define SMTP_STATE_MALLOC(size) mem_malloc(size) +#define SMTP_STATE_FREE(ptr) mem_free(ptr) +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SMTP_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp.h index b0469bb7..0f0967ca 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp.h @@ -1,134 +1,134 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP server main API - start and basic configuration - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Leon Woestenberg - * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Leon Woestenberg - * Martin Hentschel - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" - -/** SNMP variable binding descriptor (publically needed for traps) */ -struct snmp_varbind { - /** pointer to next varbind, NULL for last in list */ - struct snmp_varbind *next; - /** pointer to previous varbind, NULL for first in list */ - struct snmp_varbind *prev; - - /** object identifier */ - struct snmp_obj_id oid; - - /** value ASN1 type */ - u8_t type; - /** object value length */ - u16_t value_len; - /** object value */ - void *value; -}; - -/** - * @ingroup snmp_core - * Agent setup, start listening to port 161. - */ -void snmp_init(void); -void snmp_set_mibs(const struct snmp_mib **mibs, u8_t num_mibs); - -void snmp_set_device_enterprise_oid(const struct snmp_obj_id *device_enterprise_oid); -const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_get_device_enterprise_oid(void); - -void snmp_trap_dst_enable(u8_t dst_idx, u8_t enable); -void snmp_trap_dst_ip_set(u8_t dst_idx, const ip_addr_t *dst); - -/** Generic trap: cold start */ -#define SNMP_GENTRAP_COLDSTART 0 -/** Generic trap: warm start */ -#define SNMP_GENTRAP_WARMSTART 1 -/** Generic trap: link down */ -#define SNMP_GENTRAP_LINKDOWN 2 -/** Generic trap: link up */ -#define SNMP_GENTRAP_LINKUP 3 -/** Generic trap: authentication failure */ -#define SNMP_GENTRAP_AUTH_FAILURE 4 -/** Generic trap: EGP neighbor lost */ -#define SNMP_GENTRAP_EGP_NEIGHBOR_LOSS 5 -/** Generic trap: enterprise specific */ -#define SNMP_GENTRAP_ENTERPRISE_SPECIFIC 6 - -err_t snmp_send_trap_generic(s32_t generic_trap); -err_t snmp_send_trap_specific(s32_t specific_trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds); -err_t snmp_send_trap(const struct snmp_obj_id *oid, s32_t generic_trap, s32_t specific_trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds); - -#define SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED 0 -#define SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED 1 -void snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled(u8_t enable); -u8_t snmp_get_auth_traps_enabled(void); - -u8_t snmp_v1_enabled(void); -u8_t snmp_v2c_enabled(void); -u8_t snmp_v3_enabled(void); -void snmp_v1_enable(u8_t enable); -void snmp_v2c_enable(u8_t enable); -void snmp_v3_enable(u8_t enable); - -const char *snmp_get_community(void); -const char *snmp_get_community_write(void); -const char *snmp_get_community_trap(void); -void snmp_set_community(const char *const community); -void snmp_set_community_write(const char *const community); -void snmp_set_community_trap(const char *const community); - -void snmp_coldstart_trap(void); -void snmp_authfail_trap(void); - -typedef void (*snmp_write_callback_fct)(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, void *callback_arg); -void snmp_set_write_callback(snmp_write_callback_fct write_callback, void *callback_arg); - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP server main API - start and basic configuration + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Leon Woestenberg + * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Leon Woestenberg + * Martin Hentschel + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" + +/** SNMP variable binding descriptor (publically needed for traps) */ +struct snmp_varbind { + /** pointer to next varbind, NULL for last in list */ + struct snmp_varbind *next; + /** pointer to previous varbind, NULL for first in list */ + struct snmp_varbind *prev; + + /** object identifier */ + struct snmp_obj_id oid; + + /** value ASN1 type */ + u8_t type; + /** object value length */ + u16_t value_len; + /** object value */ + void *value; +}; + +/** + * @ingroup snmp_core + * Agent setup, start listening to port 161. + */ +void snmp_init(void); +void snmp_set_mibs(const struct snmp_mib **mibs, u8_t num_mibs); + +void snmp_set_device_enterprise_oid(const struct snmp_obj_id *device_enterprise_oid); +const struct snmp_obj_id *snmp_get_device_enterprise_oid(void); + +void snmp_trap_dst_enable(u8_t dst_idx, u8_t enable); +void snmp_trap_dst_ip_set(u8_t dst_idx, const ip_addr_t *dst); + +/** Generic trap: cold start */ +#define SNMP_GENTRAP_COLDSTART 0 +/** Generic trap: warm start */ +#define SNMP_GENTRAP_WARMSTART 1 +/** Generic trap: link down */ +#define SNMP_GENTRAP_LINKDOWN 2 +/** Generic trap: link up */ +#define SNMP_GENTRAP_LINKUP 3 +/** Generic trap: authentication failure */ +#define SNMP_GENTRAP_AUTH_FAILURE 4 +/** Generic trap: EGP neighbor lost */ +#define SNMP_GENTRAP_EGP_NEIGHBOR_LOSS 5 +/** Generic trap: enterprise specific */ +#define SNMP_GENTRAP_ENTERPRISE_SPECIFIC 6 + +err_t snmp_send_trap_generic(s32_t generic_trap); +err_t snmp_send_trap_specific(s32_t specific_trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds); +err_t snmp_send_trap(const struct snmp_obj_id *oid, s32_t generic_trap, s32_t specific_trap, struct snmp_varbind *varbinds); + +#define SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_DISABLED 0 +#define SNMP_AUTH_TRAPS_ENABLED 1 +void snmp_set_auth_traps_enabled(u8_t enable); +u8_t snmp_get_auth_traps_enabled(void); + +u8_t snmp_v1_enabled(void); +u8_t snmp_v2c_enabled(void); +u8_t snmp_v3_enabled(void); +void snmp_v1_enable(u8_t enable); +void snmp_v2c_enable(u8_t enable); +void snmp_v3_enable(u8_t enable); + +const char *snmp_get_community(void); +const char *snmp_get_community_write(void); +const char *snmp_get_community_trap(void); +void snmp_set_community(const char *const community); +void snmp_set_community_write(const char *const community); +void snmp_set_community_trap(const char *const community); + +void snmp_coldstart_trap(void); +void snmp_authfail_trap(void); + +typedef void (*snmp_write_callback_fct)(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, void *callback_arg); +void snmp_set_write_callback(snmp_write_callback_fct write_callback, void *callback_arg); + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_core.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_core.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_core.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_core.h index cc29e4fd..c792e200 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_core.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_core.h @@ -1,371 +1,371 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP core API for implementing MIBs - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Christiaan Simons - * Martin Hentschel - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* basic ASN1 defines */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL 0x00 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION 0x40 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT 0x80 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_PRIVATE 0xC0 - -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE 0x00 -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED 0x20 - -/* universal tags (from ASN.1 spec.) */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_END_OF_CONTENT 0 -#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_INTEGER 2 -#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_OCTET_STRING 4 -#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_NULL 5 -#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_OBJECT_ID 6 -#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_SEQUENCE_OF 16 - -/* application specific (SNMP) tags (from SNMPv2-SMI) */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_IPADDR 0 /* [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_COUNTER 1 /* [APPLICATION 1] IMPLICIT INTEGER (0..4294967295) => u32_t */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_GAUGE 2 /* [APPLICATION 2] IMPLICIT INTEGER (0..4294967295) => u32_t */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_TIMETICKS 3 /* [APPLICATION 3] IMPLICIT INTEGER (0..4294967295) => u32_t */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_OPAQUE 4 /* [APPLICATION 4] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_COUNTER64 6 /* [APPLICATION 6] IMPLICIT INTEGER (0..18446744073709551615) */ - -/* context specific (SNMP) tags (from RFC 1905) */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_NO_SUCH_INSTANCE 1 - -/* full ASN1 type defines */ -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_END_OF_CONTENT (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_END_OF_CONTENT) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_INTEGER) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_OCTET_STRING) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_NULL) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_OBJECT_ID) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_SEQUENCE_OF) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_IPADDR) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDRESS SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_COUNTER) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER32 SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_GAUGE) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE32 SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_UNSIGNED32 SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_TIMETICKS) -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OPAQUE (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_OPAQUE) -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64 (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_COUNTER64) -#endif - -#define SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET 0xF0 -#define SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_MASK 0x0F - -/** error codes predefined by SNMP prot. */ -typedef enum { - SNMP_ERR_NOERROR = 0, - /* - outdated v1 error codes. do not use anmore! - #define SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME 2 use SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE instead - #define SNMP_ERR_BADVALUE 3 use SNMP_ERR_WRONGTYPE,SNMP_ERR_WRONGLENGTH,SNMP_ERR_WRONGENCODING or SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE instead - #define SNMP_ERR_READONLY 4 use SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE instead - */ - SNMP_ERR_GENERROR = 5, - SNMP_ERR_NOACCESS = 6, - SNMP_ERR_WRONGTYPE = 7, - SNMP_ERR_WRONGLENGTH = 8, - SNMP_ERR_WRONGENCODING = 9, - SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE = 10, - SNMP_ERR_NOCREATION = 11, - SNMP_ERR_INCONSISTENTVALUE = 12, - SNMP_ERR_RESOURCEUNAVAILABLE = 13, - SNMP_ERR_COMMITFAILED = 14, - SNMP_ERR_UNDOFAILED = 15, - SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE = 17, - SNMP_ERR_INCONSISTENTNAME = 18, - - SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE = SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET + SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_NO_SUCH_INSTANCE -} snmp_err_t; - -/** internal object identifier representation */ -struct snmp_obj_id { - u8_t len; - u32_t id[SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN]; -}; - -struct snmp_obj_id_const_ref { - u8_t len; - const u32_t *id; -}; - -extern const struct snmp_obj_id_const_ref snmp_zero_dot_zero; /* administrative identifier from SNMPv2-SMI */ - -/** SNMP variant value, used as reference in struct snmp_node_instance and table implementation */ -union snmp_variant_value { - void *ptr; - const void *const_ptr; - u32_t u32; - s32_t s32; -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 - u64_t u64; -#endif -}; - -/** -SNMP MIB node types - tree node is the only node the stack can process in order to walk the tree, - all other nodes are assumed to be leaf nodes. - This cannot be an enum because users may want to define their own node types. -*/ -#define SNMP_NODE_TREE 0x00 -/* predefined leaf node types */ -#define SNMP_NODE_SCALAR 0x01 -#define SNMP_NODE_SCALAR_ARRAY 0x02 -#define SNMP_NODE_TABLE 0x03 -#define SNMP_NODE_THREADSYNC 0x04 - -/** node "base class" layout, the mandatory fields for a node */ -struct snmp_node { - /** one out of SNMP_NODE_TREE or any leaf node type (like SNMP_NODE_SCALAR) */ - u8_t node_type; - /** the number assigned to this node which used as part of the full OID */ - u32_t oid; -}; - -/** SNMP node instance access types */ -typedef enum { - SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ = 1, - SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE = 2, - SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ, - SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE = (SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ | SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE), - SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_WRITE_ONLY = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE, - SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_NOT_ACCESSIBLE = 0 -} snmp_access_t; - -struct snmp_node_instance; - -typedef s16_t (*node_instance_get_value_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *, void *); -typedef snmp_err_t (*node_instance_set_test_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *, u16_t, void *); -typedef snmp_err_t (*node_instance_set_value_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *, u16_t, void *); -typedef void (*node_instance_release_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *); - -#define SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA 0x4000 /* do not use 0x8000 because return value of node_instance_get_value_method is signed16 and 0x8000 would be the signed bit */ - -/** SNMP node instance */ -struct snmp_node_instance { - /** prefilled with the node, get_instance() is called on; may be changed by user to any value to pass an arbitrary node between calls to get_instance() and get_value/test_value/set_value */ - const struct snmp_node *node; - /** prefilled with the instance id requested; for get_instance() this is the exact oid requested; for get_next_instance() this is the relative starting point, stack expects relative oid of next node here */ - struct snmp_obj_id instance_oid; - - /** ASN type for this object (see snmp_asn1.h for definitions) */ - u8_t asn1_type; - /** one out of instance access types defined above (SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY,...) */ - snmp_access_t access; - - /** returns object value for the given object identifier. Return values <0 to indicate an error */ - node_instance_get_value_method get_value; - /** tests length and/or range BEFORE setting */ - node_instance_set_test_method set_test; - /** sets object value, only called when set_test() was successful */ - node_instance_set_value_method set_value; - /** called in any case when the instance is not required anymore by stack (useful for freeing memory allocated in get_instance/get_next_instance methods) */ - node_instance_release_method release_instance; - - /** reference to pass arbitrary value between calls to get_instance() and get_value/test_value/set_value */ - union snmp_variant_value reference; - /** see reference (if reference is a pointer, the length of underlying data may be stored here or anything else) */ - u32_t reference_len; -}; - -/** SNMP tree node */ -struct snmp_tree_node { - /** inherited "base class" members */ - struct snmp_node node; - u16_t subnode_count; - const struct snmp_node *const *subnodes; -}; - -#define SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(oid, subnodes) \ - { \ - { SNMP_NODE_TREE, (oid) }, \ - (u16_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(subnodes), (subnodes) \ - } - -#define SNMP_CREATE_EMPTY_TREE_NODE(oid) \ - { \ - { SNMP_NODE_TREE, (oid) }, \ - 0, NULL \ - } - -/** SNMP leaf node */ -struct snmp_leaf_node { - /** inherited "base class" members */ - struct snmp_node node; - snmp_err_t (*get_instance)(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); - snmp_err_t (*get_next_instance)(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); -}; - -/** represents a single mib with its base oid and root node */ -struct snmp_mib { - const u32_t *base_oid; - u8_t base_oid_len; - const struct snmp_node *root_node; -}; - -#define SNMP_MIB_CREATE(oid_list, root_node) \ - { \ - (oid_list), (u8_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid_list), root_node \ - } - -/** OID range structure */ -struct snmp_oid_range { - u32_t min; - u32_t max; -}; - -/** checks if incoming OID length and values are in allowed ranges */ -u8_t snmp_oid_in_range(const u32_t *oid_in, u8_t oid_len, const struct snmp_oid_range *oid_ranges, u8_t oid_ranges_len); - -typedef enum { - SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS, - SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_NO_MATCH, - SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_BUF_TO_SMALL -} snmp_next_oid_status_t; - -/** state for next_oid_init / next_oid_check functions */ -struct snmp_next_oid_state { - const u32_t *start_oid; - u8_t start_oid_len; - - u32_t *next_oid; - u8_t next_oid_len; - u8_t next_oid_max_len; - - snmp_next_oid_status_t status; - void *reference; -}; - -void snmp_next_oid_init(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, - const u32_t *start_oid, u8_t start_oid_len, - u32_t *next_oid_buf, u8_t next_oid_max_len); -u8_t snmp_next_oid_precheck(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len); -u8_t snmp_next_oid_check(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, void *reference); - -void snmp_oid_assign(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len); -void snmp_oid_combine(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len); -void snmp_oid_prefix(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len); -void snmp_oid_append(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len); -u8_t snmp_oid_equal(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len); -s8_t snmp_oid_compare(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip4(const u32_t *oid, ip4_addr_t *ip); -void snmp_ip4_to_oid(const ip4_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 -u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip6(const u32_t *oid, ip6_addr_t *ip); -void snmp_ip6_to_oid(const ip6_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 -u8_t snmp_ip_to_oid(const ip_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid); -u8_t snmp_ip_port_to_oid(const ip_addr_t *ip, u16_t port, u32_t *oid); - -u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, ip_addr_t *ip); -u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip_port(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, ip_addr_t *ip, u16_t *port); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 */ - -struct netif; -u8_t netif_to_num(const struct netif *netif); - -snmp_err_t snmp_set_test_ok(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value); /* generic function which can be used if test is always successful */ - -err_t snmp_decode_bits(const u8_t *buf, u32_t buf_len, u32_t *bit_value); -err_t snmp_decode_truthvalue(const s32_t *asn1_value, u8_t *bool_value); -u8_t snmp_encode_bits(u8_t *buf, u32_t buf_len, u32_t bit_value, u8_t bit_count); -u8_t snmp_encode_truthvalue(s32_t *asn1_value, u32_t bool_value); - -struct snmp_statistics { - u32_t inpkts; - u32_t outpkts; - u32_t inbadversions; - u32_t inbadcommunitynames; - u32_t inbadcommunityuses; - u32_t inasnparseerrs; - u32_t intoobigs; - u32_t innosuchnames; - u32_t inbadvalues; - u32_t inreadonlys; - u32_t ingenerrs; - u32_t intotalreqvars; - u32_t intotalsetvars; - u32_t ingetrequests; - u32_t ingetnexts; - u32_t insetrequests; - u32_t ingetresponses; - u32_t intraps; - u32_t outtoobigs; - u32_t outnosuchnames; - u32_t outbadvalues; - u32_t outgenerrs; - u32_t outgetrequests; - u32_t outgetnexts; - u32_t outsetrequests; - u32_t outgetresponses; - u32_t outtraps; -#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 - u32_t unsupportedseclevels; - u32_t notintimewindows; - u32_t unknownusernames; - u32_t unknownengineids; - u32_t wrongdigests; - u32_t decryptionerrors; -#endif -}; - -extern struct snmp_statistics snmp_stats; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP core API for implementing MIBs + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Christiaan Simons + * Martin Hentschel + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* basic ASN1 defines */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL 0x00 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION 0x40 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT 0x80 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_PRIVATE 0xC0 + +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE 0x00 +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED 0x20 + +/* universal tags (from ASN.1 spec.) */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_END_OF_CONTENT 0 +#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_INTEGER 2 +#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_OCTET_STRING 4 +#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_NULL 5 +#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_OBJECT_ID 6 +#define SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_SEQUENCE_OF 16 + +/* application specific (SNMP) tags (from SNMPv2-SMI) */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_IPADDR 0 /* [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_COUNTER 1 /* [APPLICATION 1] IMPLICIT INTEGER (0..4294967295) => u32_t */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_GAUGE 2 /* [APPLICATION 2] IMPLICIT INTEGER (0..4294967295) => u32_t */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_TIMETICKS 3 /* [APPLICATION 3] IMPLICIT INTEGER (0..4294967295) => u32_t */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_OPAQUE 4 /* [APPLICATION 4] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_COUNTER64 6 /* [APPLICATION 6] IMPLICIT INTEGER (0..18446744073709551615) */ + +/* context specific (SNMP) tags (from RFC 1905) */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_NO_SUCH_INSTANCE 1 + +/* full ASN1 type defines */ +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_END_OF_CONTENT (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_END_OF_CONTENT) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_INTEGER) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_OCTET_STRING) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_NULL (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_NULL) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_OBJECT_ID) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_CONSTRUCTED | SNMP_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_SEQUENCE_OF) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_IPADDR) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDRESS SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_IPADDR +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_COUNTER) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER32 SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_GAUGE) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE32 SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_UNSIGNED32 SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_GAUGE +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_TIMETICKS (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_TIMETICKS) +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_OPAQUE (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_OPAQUE) +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +#define SNMP_ASN1_TYPE_COUNTER64 (SNMP_ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION | SNMP_ASN1_CONTENTTYPE_PRIMITIVE | SNMP_ASN1_APPLICATION_COUNTER64) +#endif + +#define SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET 0xF0 +#define SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_MASK 0x0F + +/** error codes predefined by SNMP prot. */ +typedef enum { + SNMP_ERR_NOERROR = 0, + /* + outdated v1 error codes. do not use anmore! + #define SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHNAME 2 use SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE instead + #define SNMP_ERR_BADVALUE 3 use SNMP_ERR_WRONGTYPE,SNMP_ERR_WRONGLENGTH,SNMP_ERR_WRONGENCODING or SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE instead + #define SNMP_ERR_READONLY 4 use SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE instead + */ + SNMP_ERR_GENERROR = 5, + SNMP_ERR_NOACCESS = 6, + SNMP_ERR_WRONGTYPE = 7, + SNMP_ERR_WRONGLENGTH = 8, + SNMP_ERR_WRONGENCODING = 9, + SNMP_ERR_WRONGVALUE = 10, + SNMP_ERR_NOCREATION = 11, + SNMP_ERR_INCONSISTENTVALUE = 12, + SNMP_ERR_RESOURCEUNAVAILABLE = 13, + SNMP_ERR_COMMITFAILED = 14, + SNMP_ERR_UNDOFAILED = 15, + SNMP_ERR_NOTWRITABLE = 17, + SNMP_ERR_INCONSISTENTNAME = 18, + + SNMP_ERR_NOSUCHINSTANCE = SNMP_VARBIND_EXCEPTION_OFFSET + SNMP_ASN1_CONTEXT_VARBIND_NO_SUCH_INSTANCE +} snmp_err_t; + +/** internal object identifier representation */ +struct snmp_obj_id { + u8_t len; + u32_t id[SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN]; +}; + +struct snmp_obj_id_const_ref { + u8_t len; + const u32_t *id; +}; + +extern const struct snmp_obj_id_const_ref snmp_zero_dot_zero; /* administrative identifier from SNMPv2-SMI */ + +/** SNMP variant value, used as reference in struct snmp_node_instance and table implementation */ +union snmp_variant_value { + void *ptr; + const void *const_ptr; + u32_t u32; + s32_t s32; +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 + u64_t u64; +#endif +}; + +/** +SNMP MIB node types + tree node is the only node the stack can process in order to walk the tree, + all other nodes are assumed to be leaf nodes. + This cannot be an enum because users may want to define their own node types. +*/ +#define SNMP_NODE_TREE 0x00 +/* predefined leaf node types */ +#define SNMP_NODE_SCALAR 0x01 +#define SNMP_NODE_SCALAR_ARRAY 0x02 +#define SNMP_NODE_TABLE 0x03 +#define SNMP_NODE_THREADSYNC 0x04 + +/** node "base class" layout, the mandatory fields for a node */ +struct snmp_node { + /** one out of SNMP_NODE_TREE or any leaf node type (like SNMP_NODE_SCALAR) */ + u8_t node_type; + /** the number assigned to this node which used as part of the full OID */ + u32_t oid; +}; + +/** SNMP node instance access types */ +typedef enum { + SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ = 1, + SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE = 2, + SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ, + SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_WRITE = (SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_READ | SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE), + SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_WRITE_ONLY = SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_ACCESS_WRITE, + SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_NOT_ACCESSIBLE = 0 +} snmp_access_t; + +struct snmp_node_instance; + +typedef s16_t (*node_instance_get_value_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *, void *); +typedef snmp_err_t (*node_instance_set_test_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *, u16_t, void *); +typedef snmp_err_t (*node_instance_set_value_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *, u16_t, void *); +typedef void (*node_instance_release_method)(struct snmp_node_instance *); + +#define SNMP_GET_VALUE_RAW_DATA 0x4000 /* do not use 0x8000 because return value of node_instance_get_value_method is signed16 and 0x8000 would be the signed bit */ + +/** SNMP node instance */ +struct snmp_node_instance { + /** prefilled with the node, get_instance() is called on; may be changed by user to any value to pass an arbitrary node between calls to get_instance() and get_value/test_value/set_value */ + const struct snmp_node *node; + /** prefilled with the instance id requested; for get_instance() this is the exact oid requested; for get_next_instance() this is the relative starting point, stack expects relative oid of next node here */ + struct snmp_obj_id instance_oid; + + /** ASN type for this object (see snmp_asn1.h for definitions) */ + u8_t asn1_type; + /** one out of instance access types defined above (SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY,...) */ + snmp_access_t access; + + /** returns object value for the given object identifier. Return values <0 to indicate an error */ + node_instance_get_value_method get_value; + /** tests length and/or range BEFORE setting */ + node_instance_set_test_method set_test; + /** sets object value, only called when set_test() was successful */ + node_instance_set_value_method set_value; + /** called in any case when the instance is not required anymore by stack (useful for freeing memory allocated in get_instance/get_next_instance methods) */ + node_instance_release_method release_instance; + + /** reference to pass arbitrary value between calls to get_instance() and get_value/test_value/set_value */ + union snmp_variant_value reference; + /** see reference (if reference is a pointer, the length of underlying data may be stored here or anything else) */ + u32_t reference_len; +}; + +/** SNMP tree node */ +struct snmp_tree_node { + /** inherited "base class" members */ + struct snmp_node node; + u16_t subnode_count; + const struct snmp_node *const *subnodes; +}; + +#define SNMP_CREATE_TREE_NODE(oid, subnodes) \ + { \ + { SNMP_NODE_TREE, (oid) }, \ + (u16_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(subnodes), (subnodes) \ + } + +#define SNMP_CREATE_EMPTY_TREE_NODE(oid) \ + { \ + { SNMP_NODE_TREE, (oid) }, \ + 0, NULL \ + } + +/** SNMP leaf node */ +struct snmp_leaf_node { + /** inherited "base class" members */ + struct snmp_node node; + snmp_err_t (*get_instance)(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); + snmp_err_t (*get_next_instance)(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); +}; + +/** represents a single mib with its base oid and root node */ +struct snmp_mib { + const u32_t *base_oid; + u8_t base_oid_len; + const struct snmp_node *root_node; +}; + +#define SNMP_MIB_CREATE(oid_list, root_node) \ + { \ + (oid_list), (u8_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(oid_list), root_node \ + } + +/** OID range structure */ +struct snmp_oid_range { + u32_t min; + u32_t max; +}; + +/** checks if incoming OID length and values are in allowed ranges */ +u8_t snmp_oid_in_range(const u32_t *oid_in, u8_t oid_len, const struct snmp_oid_range *oid_ranges, u8_t oid_ranges_len); + +typedef enum { + SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_SUCCESS, + SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_NO_MATCH, + SNMP_NEXT_OID_STATUS_BUF_TO_SMALL +} snmp_next_oid_status_t; + +/** state for next_oid_init / next_oid_check functions */ +struct snmp_next_oid_state { + const u32_t *start_oid; + u8_t start_oid_len; + + u32_t *next_oid; + u8_t next_oid_len; + u8_t next_oid_max_len; + + snmp_next_oid_status_t status; + void *reference; +}; + +void snmp_next_oid_init(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, + const u32_t *start_oid, u8_t start_oid_len, + u32_t *next_oid_buf, u8_t next_oid_max_len); +u8_t snmp_next_oid_precheck(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len); +u8_t snmp_next_oid_check(struct snmp_next_oid_state *state, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, void *reference); + +void snmp_oid_assign(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len); +void snmp_oid_combine(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len); +void snmp_oid_prefix(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len); +void snmp_oid_append(struct snmp_obj_id *target, const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len); +u8_t snmp_oid_equal(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len); +s8_t snmp_oid_compare(const u32_t *oid1, u8_t oid1_len, const u32_t *oid2, u8_t oid2_len); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip4(const u32_t *oid, ip4_addr_t *ip); +void snmp_ip4_to_oid(const ip4_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 +u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip6(const u32_t *oid, ip6_addr_t *ip); +void snmp_ip6_to_oid(const ip6_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 +u8_t snmp_ip_to_oid(const ip_addr_t *ip, u32_t *oid); +u8_t snmp_ip_port_to_oid(const ip_addr_t *ip, u16_t port, u32_t *oid); + +u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, ip_addr_t *ip); +u8_t snmp_oid_to_ip_port(const u32_t *oid, u8_t oid_len, ip_addr_t *ip, u16_t *port); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 || LWIP_IPV6 */ + +struct netif; +u8_t netif_to_num(const struct netif *netif); + +snmp_err_t snmp_set_test_ok(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, u16_t value_len, void *value); /* generic function which can be used if test is always successful */ + +err_t snmp_decode_bits(const u8_t *buf, u32_t buf_len, u32_t *bit_value); +err_t snmp_decode_truthvalue(const s32_t *asn1_value, u8_t *bool_value); +u8_t snmp_encode_bits(u8_t *buf, u32_t buf_len, u32_t bit_value, u8_t bit_count); +u8_t snmp_encode_truthvalue(s32_t *asn1_value, u32_t bool_value); + +struct snmp_statistics { + u32_t inpkts; + u32_t outpkts; + u32_t inbadversions; + u32_t inbadcommunitynames; + u32_t inbadcommunityuses; + u32_t inasnparseerrs; + u32_t intoobigs; + u32_t innosuchnames; + u32_t inbadvalues; + u32_t inreadonlys; + u32_t ingenerrs; + u32_t intotalreqvars; + u32_t intotalsetvars; + u32_t ingetrequests; + u32_t ingetnexts; + u32_t insetrequests; + u32_t ingetresponses; + u32_t intraps; + u32_t outtoobigs; + u32_t outnosuchnames; + u32_t outbadvalues; + u32_t outgenerrs; + u32_t outgetrequests; + u32_t outgetnexts; + u32_t outsetrequests; + u32_t outgetresponses; + u32_t outtraps; +#if LWIP_SNMP_V3 + u32_t unsupportedseclevels; + u32_t notintimewindows; + u32_t unknownusernames; + u32_t unknownengineids; + u32_t wrongdigests; + u32_t decryptionerrors; +#endif +}; + +extern struct snmp_statistics snmp_stats; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_CORE_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h index 1a8eae24..74964c86 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_mib2.h @@ -1,78 +1,78 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP MIB2 API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MIB2_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MIB2_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ -#if SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" - -extern const struct snmp_mib mib2; - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h" -void snmp_mib2_lwip_synchronizer(snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn, void *arg); -extern struct snmp_threadsync_instance snmp_mib2_lwip_locks; -#endif - -#ifndef SNMP_SYSSERVICES -#define SNMP_SYSSERVICES ((1 << 6) | (1 << 3) | ((IP_FORWARD) << 2)) -#endif - -void snmp_mib2_set_sysdescr(const u8_t *str, const u16_t *len); /* read-only be defintion */ -void snmp_mib2_set_syscontact(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize); -void snmp_mib2_set_syscontact_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen); -void snmp_mib2_set_sysname(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize); -void snmp_mib2_set_sysname_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen); -void snmp_mib2_set_syslocation(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize); -void snmp_mib2_set_syslocation_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen); - -#endif /* SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MIB2_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP MIB2 API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MIB2_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MIB2_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ +#if SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" + +extern const struct snmp_mib mib2; + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h" +void snmp_mib2_lwip_synchronizer(snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn, void *arg); +extern struct snmp_threadsync_instance snmp_mib2_lwip_locks; +#endif + +#ifndef SNMP_SYSSERVICES +#define SNMP_SYSSERVICES ((1 << 6) | (1 << 3) | ((IP_FORWARD) << 2)) +#endif + +void snmp_mib2_set_sysdescr(const u8_t *str, const u16_t *len); /* read-only be defintion */ +void snmp_mib2_set_syscontact(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize); +void snmp_mib2_set_syscontact_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen); +void snmp_mib2_set_sysname(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize); +void snmp_mib2_set_sysname_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen); +void snmp_mib2_set_syslocation(u8_t *ocstr, u16_t *ocstrlen, u16_t bufsize); +void snmp_mib2_set_syslocation_readonly(const u8_t *ocstr, const u16_t *ocstrlen); + +#endif /* SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 */ +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_MIB2_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h index a6744337..5c76f9e3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h @@ -1,300 +1,300 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP server options list - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Dirk Ziegelmeier - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SNMP_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_SNMP_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -/** - * @defgroup snmp_opts Options - * @ingroup snmp - * @{ - */ - -/** - * LWIP_SNMP==1: This enables the lwIP SNMP agent. UDP must be available - * for SNMP transport. - * If you want to use your own SNMP agent, leave this disabled. - * To integrate MIB2 of an external agent, you need to enable - * LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS and MIB2_STATS. This will give you the callbacks - * and statistics counters you need to get MIB2 working. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SNMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SNMP 0 -#endif - -/** - * SNMP_USE_NETCONN: Use netconn API instead of raw API. - * Makes SNMP agent run in a worker thread, so blocking operations - * can be done in MIB calls. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_USE_NETCONN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_USE_NETCONN 0 -#endif - -/** - * SNMP_USE_RAW: Use raw API. - * SNMP agent does not run in a worker thread, so blocking operations - * should not be done in MIB calls. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_USE_RAW || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_USE_RAW 1 -#endif - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN && SNMP_USE_RAW -#error SNMP stack can use only one of the APIs {raw, netconn} -#endif - -#if LWIP_SNMP && !SNMP_USE_NETCONN && !SNMP_USE_RAW -#error SNMP stack needs a receive API and UDP {raw, netconn} -#endif - -#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN -/** - * SNMP_STACK_SIZE: Stack size of SNMP netconn worker thread - */ -#if !defined SNMP_STACK_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_STACK_SIZE DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE -#endif - -/** - * SNMP_THREAD_PRIO: SNMP netconn worker thread priority - */ -#if !defined SNMP_THREAD_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_THREAD_PRIO DEFAULT_THREAD_PRIO -#endif -#endif /* SNMP_USE_NETCONN */ - -/** - * SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS: Number of trap destinations. At least one trap - * destination is required - */ -#if !defined SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS 1 -#endif - -/** - * Only allow SNMP write actions that are 'safe' (e.g. disabling netifs is not - * a safe action and disabled when SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS = 1). - * Unsafe requests are disabled by default! - */ -#if !defined SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS 1 -#endif - -/** - * The maximum length of strings used. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_MAX_OCTET_STRING_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_MAX_OCTET_STRING_LEN 127 -#endif - -/** - * The maximum number of Sub ID's inside an object identifier. - * Indirectly this also limits the maximum depth of SNMP tree. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN 50 -#endif - -#if !defined SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -/** - * The minimum size of a value. - */ -#define SNMP_MIN_VALUE_SIZE (2 * sizeof(u32_t *)) /* size required to store the basic types (8 bytes for counter64) */ -/** - * The maximum size of a value. - */ -#define SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE LWIP_MAX(LWIP_MAX((SNMP_MAX_OCTET_STRING_LEN), sizeof(u32_t) * (SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN)), SNMP_MIN_VALUE_SIZE) -#endif - -/** - * The snmp read-access community. Used for write-access and traps, too - * unless SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE or SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP are enabled, respectively. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_COMMUNITY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_COMMUNITY "public" -#endif - -/** - * The snmp write-access community. - * Set this community to "" in order to disallow any write access. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE "private" -#endif - -/** - * The snmp community used for sending traps. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP "public" -#endif - -/** - * The maximum length of community string. - * If community names shall be adjusted at runtime via snmp_set_community() calls, - * enter here the possible maximum length (+1 for terminating null character). - */ -#if !defined SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN LWIP_MAX(LWIP_MAX(sizeof(SNMP_COMMUNITY), sizeof(SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE)), sizeof(SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP)) -#endif - -/** - * The OID identifiying the device. This may be the enterprise OID itself or any OID located below it in tree. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_LWIP_ENTERPRISE_OID 26381 -/** - * IANA assigned enterprise ID for lwIP is 26381 - * @see http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers - * - * @note this enterprise ID is assigned to the lwIP project, - * all object identifiers living under this ID are assigned - * by the lwIP maintainers! - * @note don't change this define, use snmp_set_device_enterprise_oid() - * - * If you need to create your own private MIB you'll need - * to apply for your own enterprise ID with IANA: - * http://www.iana.org/numbers.html - */ -#define SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID \ - { \ - 1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, SNMP_LWIP_ENTERPRISE_OID \ - } -/** - * Length of SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID - */ -#define SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID_LEN 7 -#endif - -/** - * SNMP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for SNMP messages. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * SNMP_MIB_DEBUG: Enable debugging for SNMP MIBs. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_MIB_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_MIB_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * Indicates if the MIB2 implementation of LWIP SNMP stack is used. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 LWIP_SNMP -#endif - -/** - * Value return for sysDesc field of MIB2. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSDESC || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSDESC "lwIP" -#endif - -/** - * Value return for sysName field of MIB2. - * To make sysName field settable, call snmp_mib2_set_sysname() to provide the necessary buffers. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSNAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSNAME "FQDN-unk" -#endif - -/** - * Value return for sysContact field of MIB2. - * To make sysContact field settable, call snmp_mib2_set_syscontact() to provide the necessary buffers. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSCONTACT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSCONTACT "" -#endif - -/** - * Value return for sysLocation field of MIB2. - * To make sysLocation field settable, call snmp_mib2_set_syslocation() to provide the necessary buffers. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSLOCATION || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSLOCATION "" -#endif - -/** - * This value is used to limit the repetitions processed in GetBulk requests (value == 0 means no limitation). - * This may be useful to limit the load for a single request. - * According to SNMP RFC 1905 it is allowed to not return all requested variables from a GetBulk request if system load would be too high. - * so the effect is that the client will do more requests to gather all data. - * For the stack this could be useful in case that SNMP processing is done in TCP/IP thread. In this situation a request with many - * repetitions could block the thread for a longer time. Setting limit here will keep the stack more responsive. - */ -#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_GETBULK_MAX_REPETITIONS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNMP_LWIP_GETBULK_MAX_REPETITIONS 0 -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------ - ---------- SNMPv3 options ---------- - ------------------------------------ -*/ - -/** - * LWIP_SNMP_V3==1: This enables EXPERIMENTAL SNMPv3 support. LWIP_SNMP must - * also be enabled. - * THIS IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND SHOULD NOT BE ENABLED IN PRODUCTS. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_SNMP_V3 -#define LWIP_SNMP_V3 0 -#endif - -#ifndef LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS -#define LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS LWIP_SNMP_V3 -#endif - -#ifndef LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO -#define LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS -#endif - -#ifndef LWIP_SNMP_CONFIGURE_VERSIONS -#define LWIP_SNMP_CONFIGURE_VERSIONS 0 -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SNMP_OPTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP server options list + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Dirk Ziegelmeier + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SNMP_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_SNMP_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +/** + * @defgroup snmp_opts Options + * @ingroup snmp + * @{ + */ + +/** + * LWIP_SNMP==1: This enables the lwIP SNMP agent. UDP must be available + * for SNMP transport. + * If you want to use your own SNMP agent, leave this disabled. + * To integrate MIB2 of an external agent, you need to enable + * LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS and MIB2_STATS. This will give you the callbacks + * and statistics counters you need to get MIB2 working. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SNMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SNMP 0 +#endif + +/** + * SNMP_USE_NETCONN: Use netconn API instead of raw API. + * Makes SNMP agent run in a worker thread, so blocking operations + * can be done in MIB calls. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_USE_NETCONN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_USE_NETCONN 0 +#endif + +/** + * SNMP_USE_RAW: Use raw API. + * SNMP agent does not run in a worker thread, so blocking operations + * should not be done in MIB calls. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_USE_RAW || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_USE_RAW 1 +#endif + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN && SNMP_USE_RAW +#error SNMP stack can use only one of the APIs {raw, netconn} +#endif + +#if LWIP_SNMP && !SNMP_USE_NETCONN && !SNMP_USE_RAW +#error SNMP stack needs a receive API and UDP {raw, netconn} +#endif + +#if SNMP_USE_NETCONN +/** + * SNMP_STACK_SIZE: Stack size of SNMP netconn worker thread + */ +#if !defined SNMP_STACK_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_STACK_SIZE DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE +#endif + +/** + * SNMP_THREAD_PRIO: SNMP netconn worker thread priority + */ +#if !defined SNMP_THREAD_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_THREAD_PRIO DEFAULT_THREAD_PRIO +#endif +#endif /* SNMP_USE_NETCONN */ + +/** + * SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS: Number of trap destinations. At least one trap + * destination is required + */ +#if !defined SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_TRAP_DESTINATIONS 1 +#endif + +/** + * Only allow SNMP write actions that are 'safe' (e.g. disabling netifs is not + * a safe action and disabled when SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS = 1). + * Unsafe requests are disabled by default! + */ +#if !defined SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_SAFE_REQUESTS 1 +#endif + +/** + * The maximum length of strings used. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_MAX_OCTET_STRING_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_MAX_OCTET_STRING_LEN 127 +#endif + +/** + * The maximum number of Sub ID's inside an object identifier. + * Indirectly this also limits the maximum depth of SNMP tree. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN 50 +#endif + +#if !defined SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +/** + * The minimum size of a value. + */ +#define SNMP_MIN_VALUE_SIZE (2 * sizeof(u32_t *)) /* size required to store the basic types (8 bytes for counter64) */ +/** + * The maximum size of a value. + */ +#define SNMP_MAX_VALUE_SIZE LWIP_MAX(LWIP_MAX((SNMP_MAX_OCTET_STRING_LEN), sizeof(u32_t) * (SNMP_MAX_OBJ_ID_LEN)), SNMP_MIN_VALUE_SIZE) +#endif + +/** + * The snmp read-access community. Used for write-access and traps, too + * unless SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE or SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP are enabled, respectively. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_COMMUNITY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_COMMUNITY "public" +#endif + +/** + * The snmp write-access community. + * Set this community to "" in order to disallow any write access. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE "private" +#endif + +/** + * The snmp community used for sending traps. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP "public" +#endif + +/** + * The maximum length of community string. + * If community names shall be adjusted at runtime via snmp_set_community() calls, + * enter here the possible maximum length (+1 for terminating null character). + */ +#if !defined SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_MAX_COMMUNITY_STR_LEN LWIP_MAX(LWIP_MAX(sizeof(SNMP_COMMUNITY), sizeof(SNMP_COMMUNITY_WRITE)), sizeof(SNMP_COMMUNITY_TRAP)) +#endif + +/** + * The OID identifiying the device. This may be the enterprise OID itself or any OID located below it in tree. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_LWIP_ENTERPRISE_OID 26381 +/** + * IANA assigned enterprise ID for lwIP is 26381 + * @see http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers + * + * @note this enterprise ID is assigned to the lwIP project, + * all object identifiers living under this ID are assigned + * by the lwIP maintainers! + * @note don't change this define, use snmp_set_device_enterprise_oid() + * + * If you need to create your own private MIB you'll need + * to apply for your own enterprise ID with IANA: + * http://www.iana.org/numbers.html + */ +#define SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID \ + { \ + 1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, SNMP_LWIP_ENTERPRISE_OID \ + } +/** + * Length of SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID + */ +#define SNMP_DEVICE_ENTERPRISE_OID_LEN 7 +#endif + +/** + * SNMP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for SNMP messages. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * SNMP_MIB_DEBUG: Enable debugging for SNMP MIBs. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_MIB_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_MIB_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * Indicates if the MIB2 implementation of LWIP SNMP stack is used. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2 LWIP_SNMP +#endif + +/** + * Value return for sysDesc field of MIB2. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSDESC || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSDESC "lwIP" +#endif + +/** + * Value return for sysName field of MIB2. + * To make sysName field settable, call snmp_mib2_set_sysname() to provide the necessary buffers. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSNAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSNAME "FQDN-unk" +#endif + +/** + * Value return for sysContact field of MIB2. + * To make sysContact field settable, call snmp_mib2_set_syscontact() to provide the necessary buffers. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSCONTACT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSCONTACT "" +#endif + +/** + * Value return for sysLocation field of MIB2. + * To make sysLocation field settable, call snmp_mib2_set_syslocation() to provide the necessary buffers. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSLOCATION || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_LWIP_MIB2_SYSLOCATION "" +#endif + +/** + * This value is used to limit the repetitions processed in GetBulk requests (value == 0 means no limitation). + * This may be useful to limit the load for a single request. + * According to SNMP RFC 1905 it is allowed to not return all requested variables from a GetBulk request if system load would be too high. + * so the effect is that the client will do more requests to gather all data. + * For the stack this could be useful in case that SNMP processing is done in TCP/IP thread. In this situation a request with many + * repetitions could block the thread for a longer time. Setting limit here will keep the stack more responsive. + */ +#if !defined SNMP_LWIP_GETBULK_MAX_REPETITIONS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNMP_LWIP_GETBULK_MAX_REPETITIONS 0 +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------ + ---------- SNMPv3 options ---------- + ------------------------------------ +*/ + +/** + * LWIP_SNMP_V3==1: This enables EXPERIMENTAL SNMPv3 support. LWIP_SNMP must + * also be enabled. + * THIS IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND SHOULD NOT BE ENABLED IN PRODUCTS. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_SNMP_V3 +#define LWIP_SNMP_V3 0 +#endif + +#ifndef LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS +#define LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS LWIP_SNMP_V3 +#endif + +#ifndef LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO +#define LWIP_SNMP_V3_CRYPTO LWIP_SNMP_V3_MBEDTLS +#endif + +#ifndef LWIP_SNMP_CONFIGURE_VERSIONS +#define LWIP_SNMP_CONFIGURE_VERSIONS 0 +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SNMP_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h index a391bb2c..885b7127 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_scalar.h @@ -1,113 +1,113 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP server MIB API to implement scalar nodes - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Martin Hentschel - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_SCALAR_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_SCALAR_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/** basic scalar node */ -struct snmp_scalar_node { - /** inherited "base class" members */ - struct snmp_leaf_node node; - u8_t asn1_type; - snmp_access_t access; - node_instance_get_value_method get_value; - node_instance_set_test_method set_test; - node_instance_set_value_method set_value; -}; - -snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); -snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); - -#define SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE(oid, access, asn1_type, get_value_method, set_test_method, set_value_method) \ - { \ - { { SNMP_NODE_SCALAR, (oid) }, \ - snmp_scalar_get_instance, \ - snmp_scalar_get_next_instance }, \ - (asn1_type), (access), (get_value_method), (set_test_method), (set_value_method) \ - } - -#define SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(oid, asn1_type, get_value_method) SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE(oid, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY, asn1_type, get_value_method, NULL, NULL) - -/** scalar array node - a tree node which contains scalars only as children */ -struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def { - u32_t oid; - u8_t asn1_type; - snmp_access_t access; -}; - -typedef s16_t (*snmp_scalar_array_get_value_method)(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *, void *); -typedef snmp_err_t (*snmp_scalar_array_set_test_method)(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *, u16_t, void *); -typedef snmp_err_t (*snmp_scalar_array_set_value_method)(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *, u16_t, void *); - -/** basic scalar array node */ -struct snmp_scalar_array_node { - /** inherited "base class" members */ - struct snmp_leaf_node node; - u16_t array_node_count; - const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_nodes; - snmp_scalar_array_get_value_method get_value; - snmp_scalar_array_set_test_method set_test; - snmp_scalar_array_set_value_method set_value; -}; - -snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); -snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); - -#define SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(oid, array_nodes, get_value_method, set_test_method, set_value_method) \ - { \ - { { SNMP_NODE_SCALAR_ARRAY, (oid) }, \ - snmp_scalar_array_get_instance, \ - snmp_scalar_array_get_next_instance }, \ - (u16_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(array_nodes), (array_nodes), (get_value_method), (set_test_method), (set_value_method) \ - } - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_SCALAR_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP server MIB API to implement scalar nodes + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Martin Hentschel + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_SCALAR_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_SCALAR_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/** basic scalar node */ +struct snmp_scalar_node { + /** inherited "base class" members */ + struct snmp_leaf_node node; + u8_t asn1_type; + snmp_access_t access; + node_instance_get_value_method get_value; + node_instance_set_test_method set_test; + node_instance_set_value_method set_value; +}; + +snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); +snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); + +#define SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE(oid, access, asn1_type, get_value_method, set_test_method, set_value_method) \ + { \ + { { SNMP_NODE_SCALAR, (oid) }, \ + snmp_scalar_get_instance, \ + snmp_scalar_get_next_instance }, \ + (asn1_type), (access), (get_value_method), (set_test_method), (set_value_method) \ + } + +#define SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE_READONLY(oid, asn1_type, get_value_method) SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_NODE(oid, SNMP_NODE_INSTANCE_READ_ONLY, asn1_type, get_value_method, NULL, NULL) + +/** scalar array node - a tree node which contains scalars only as children */ +struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def { + u32_t oid; + u8_t asn1_type; + snmp_access_t access; +}; + +typedef s16_t (*snmp_scalar_array_get_value_method)(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *, void *); +typedef snmp_err_t (*snmp_scalar_array_set_test_method)(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *, u16_t, void *); +typedef snmp_err_t (*snmp_scalar_array_set_value_method)(const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *, u16_t, void *); + +/** basic scalar array node */ +struct snmp_scalar_array_node { + /** inherited "base class" members */ + struct snmp_leaf_node node; + u16_t array_node_count; + const struct snmp_scalar_array_node_def *array_nodes; + snmp_scalar_array_get_value_method get_value; + snmp_scalar_array_set_test_method set_test; + snmp_scalar_array_set_value_method set_value; +}; + +snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); +snmp_err_t snmp_scalar_array_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); + +#define SNMP_SCALAR_CREATE_ARRAY_NODE(oid, array_nodes, get_value_method, set_test_method, set_value_method) \ + { \ + { { SNMP_NODE_SCALAR_ARRAY, (oid) }, \ + snmp_scalar_array_get_instance, \ + snmp_scalar_array_get_next_instance }, \ + (u16_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(array_nodes), (array_nodes), (get_value_method), (set_test_method), (set_value_method) \ + } + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_SCALAR_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h similarity index 95% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h index 9f4b41c2..47409cc2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_framework.h @@ -1,32 +1,32 @@ -/* -Generated by LwipMibCompiler -*/ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_FRAMEWORK_MIB_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_FRAMEWORK_MIB_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" -#if LWIP_SNMP - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif /* __cplusplus */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" - -extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmNoAuthProtocol; -extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol; -extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol; - -extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmNoPrivProtocol; -extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmDESPrivProtocol; -extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmAESPrivProtocol; - -extern const struct snmp_mib snmpframeworkmib; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif /* __cplusplus */ - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_FRAMEWORK_MIB_H */ +/* +Generated by LwipMibCompiler +*/ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_FRAMEWORK_MIB_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_FRAMEWORK_MIB_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" +#if LWIP_SNMP + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif /* __cplusplus */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" + +extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmNoAuthProtocol; +extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol; +extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol; + +extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmNoPrivProtocol; +extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmDESPrivProtocol; +extern const struct snmp_obj_id usmAESPrivProtocol; + +extern const struct snmp_mib snmpframeworkmib; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif /* __cplusplus */ + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_FRAMEWORK_MIB_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h similarity index 94% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h index ae09baa5..88cfcd8e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_snmpv2_usm.h @@ -1,24 +1,24 @@ -/* -Generated by LwipMibCompiler -*/ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_USER_BASED_SM_MIB_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_USER_BASED_SM_MIB_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" -#if LWIP_SNMP - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif /* __cplusplus */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" - -extern const struct snmp_mib snmpusmmib; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif /* __cplusplus */ - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_USER_BASED_SM_MIB_H */ +/* +Generated by LwipMibCompiler +*/ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_USER_BASED_SM_MIB_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_USER_BASED_SM_MIB_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" +#if LWIP_SNMP + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif /* __cplusplus */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" + +extern const struct snmp_mib snmpusmmib; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif /* __cplusplus */ + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_USER_BASED_SM_MIB_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_table.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_table.h similarity index 98% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_table.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_table.h index aceabb4b..7e6433cf 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_table.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_table.h @@ -1,133 +1,133 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP server MIB API to implement table nodes - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Martin Hentschel - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_TABLE_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_TABLE_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/** default (customizable) read/write table */ -struct snmp_table_col_def { - u32_t index; - u8_t asn1_type; - snmp_access_t access; -}; - -/** table node */ -struct snmp_table_node { - /** inherited "base class" members */ - struct snmp_leaf_node node; - u16_t column_count; - const struct snmp_table_col_def *columns; - snmp_err_t (*get_cell_instance)(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance); - snmp_err_t (*get_next_cell_instance)(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance); - /** returns object value for the given object identifier */ - node_instance_get_value_method get_value; - /** tests length and/or range BEFORE setting */ - node_instance_set_test_method set_test; - /** sets object value, only called when set_test() was successful */ - node_instance_set_value_method set_value; -}; - -snmp_err_t snmp_table_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); -snmp_err_t snmp_table_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); - -#define SNMP_TABLE_CREATE(oid, columns, get_cell_instance_method, get_next_cell_instance_method, get_value_method, set_test_method, set_value_method) \ - { \ - { { SNMP_NODE_TABLE, (oid) }, \ - snmp_table_get_instance, \ - snmp_table_get_next_instance }, \ - (u16_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(columns), (columns), \ - (get_cell_instance_method), (get_next_cell_instance_method), \ - (get_value_method), (set_test_method), (set_value_method) \ - } - -#define SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(oid) ((oid)[1]) /* first array value is (fixed) row entry (fixed to 1) and 2nd value is column, follow3ed by instance */ - -/** simple read-only table */ -typedef enum { - SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32, - SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32, - SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR, - SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_CONST_PTR -} snmp_table_column_data_type_t; - -struct snmp_table_simple_col_def { - u32_t index; - u8_t asn1_type; - snmp_table_column_data_type_t data_type; /* depending of what union member is used to store the value*/ -}; - -/** simple read-only table node */ -struct snmp_table_simple_node { - /* inherited "base class" members */ - struct snmp_leaf_node node; - u16_t column_count; - const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def *columns; - snmp_err_t (*get_cell_value)(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len); - snmp_err_t (*get_next_cell_instance_and_value)(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len); -}; - -snmp_err_t snmp_table_simple_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); -snmp_err_t snmp_table_simple_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); - -#define SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(oid, columns, get_cell_value_method, get_next_cell_instance_and_value_method) \ - { \ - { { SNMP_NODE_TABLE, (oid) }, \ - snmp_table_simple_get_instance, \ - snmp_table_simple_get_next_instance }, \ - (u16_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(columns), (columns), (get_cell_value_method), (get_next_cell_instance_and_value_method) \ - } - -s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_s32ref(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value); -s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_u32ref(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value); -s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_refconstptr(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value); - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_TABLE_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP server MIB API to implement table nodes + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Martin Hentschel + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_TABLE_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_TABLE_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/** default (customizable) read/write table */ +struct snmp_table_col_def { + u32_t index; + u8_t asn1_type; + snmp_access_t access; +}; + +/** table node */ +struct snmp_table_node { + /** inherited "base class" members */ + struct snmp_leaf_node node; + u16_t column_count; + const struct snmp_table_col_def *columns; + snmp_err_t (*get_cell_instance)(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance); + snmp_err_t (*get_next_cell_instance)(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, struct snmp_node_instance *cell_instance); + /** returns object value for the given object identifier */ + node_instance_get_value_method get_value; + /** tests length and/or range BEFORE setting */ + node_instance_set_test_method set_test; + /** sets object value, only called when set_test() was successful */ + node_instance_set_value_method set_value; +}; + +snmp_err_t snmp_table_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); +snmp_err_t snmp_table_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); + +#define SNMP_TABLE_CREATE(oid, columns, get_cell_instance_method, get_next_cell_instance_method, get_value_method, set_test_method, set_value_method) \ + { \ + { { SNMP_NODE_TABLE, (oid) }, \ + snmp_table_get_instance, \ + snmp_table_get_next_instance }, \ + (u16_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(columns), (columns), \ + (get_cell_instance_method), (get_next_cell_instance_method), \ + (get_value_method), (set_test_method), (set_value_method) \ + } + +#define SNMP_TABLE_GET_COLUMN_FROM_OID(oid) ((oid)[1]) /* first array value is (fixed) row entry (fixed to 1) and 2nd value is column, follow3ed by instance */ + +/** simple read-only table */ +typedef enum { + SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_U32, + SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_S32, + SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_PTR, + SNMP_VARIANT_VALUE_TYPE_CONST_PTR +} snmp_table_column_data_type_t; + +struct snmp_table_simple_col_def { + u32_t index; + u8_t asn1_type; + snmp_table_column_data_type_t data_type; /* depending of what union member is used to store the value*/ +}; + +/** simple read-only table node */ +struct snmp_table_simple_node { + /* inherited "base class" members */ + struct snmp_leaf_node node; + u16_t column_count; + const struct snmp_table_simple_col_def *columns; + snmp_err_t (*get_cell_value)(const u32_t *column, const u32_t *row_oid, u8_t row_oid_len, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len); + snmp_err_t (*get_next_cell_instance_and_value)(const u32_t *column, struct snmp_obj_id *row_oid, union snmp_variant_value *value, u32_t *value_len); +}; + +snmp_err_t snmp_table_simple_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); +snmp_err_t snmp_table_simple_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); + +#define SNMP_TABLE_CREATE_SIMPLE(oid, columns, get_cell_value_method, get_next_cell_instance_and_value_method) \ + { \ + { { SNMP_NODE_TABLE, (oid) }, \ + snmp_table_simple_get_instance, \ + snmp_table_simple_get_next_instance }, \ + (u16_t)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(columns), (columns), (get_cell_value_method), (get_next_cell_instance_and_value_method) \ + } + +s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_s32ref(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value); +s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_u32ref(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value); +s16_t snmp_table_extract_value_from_refconstptr(struct snmp_node_instance *instance, void *value); + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_TABLE_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h index 351cbfa2..de6b7af5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmp_threadsync.h @@ -1,112 +1,112 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP server MIB API to implement thread synchronization - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_THREADSYNC_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_THREADSYNC_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" - -typedef void (*snmp_threadsync_called_fn)(void *arg); -typedef void (*snmp_threadsync_synchronizer_fn)(snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn, void *arg); - -/** Thread sync runtime data. For internal usage only. */ -struct threadsync_data { - union { - snmp_err_t err; - s16_t s16; - } retval; - union { - const u32_t *root_oid; - void *value; - } arg1; - union { - u8_t root_oid_len; - u16_t len; - } arg2; - const struct snmp_threadsync_node *threadsync_node; - struct snmp_node_instance proxy_instance; -}; - -/** Thread sync instance. Needed EXCATLY once for every thread to be synced into. */ -struct snmp_threadsync_instance { - sys_sem_t sem; - sys_mutex_t sem_usage_mutex; - snmp_threadsync_synchronizer_fn sync_fn; - struct threadsync_data data; -}; - -/** SNMP thread sync proxy leaf node */ -struct snmp_threadsync_node { - /* inherited "base class" members */ - struct snmp_leaf_node node; - - const struct snmp_leaf_node *target; - struct snmp_threadsync_instance *instance; -}; - -snmp_err_t snmp_threadsync_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); -snmp_err_t snmp_threadsync_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); - -/** Create thread sync proxy node */ -#define SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, target_leaf_node, threadsync_instance) \ - { \ - { { SNMP_NODE_THREADSYNC, (oid) }, \ - snmp_threadsync_get_instance, \ - snmp_threadsync_get_next_instance }, \ - (target_leaf_node), \ - (threadsync_instance) \ - } - -/** Create thread sync instance data */ -void snmp_threadsync_init(struct snmp_threadsync_instance *instance, snmp_threadsync_synchronizer_fn sync_fn); - -#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_THREADSYNC_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP server MIB API to implement thread synchronization + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_THREADSYNC_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_THREADSYNC_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_SNMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_core.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" + +typedef void (*snmp_threadsync_called_fn)(void *arg); +typedef void (*snmp_threadsync_synchronizer_fn)(snmp_threadsync_called_fn fn, void *arg); + +/** Thread sync runtime data. For internal usage only. */ +struct threadsync_data { + union { + snmp_err_t err; + s16_t s16; + } retval; + union { + const u32_t *root_oid; + void *value; + } arg1; + union { + u8_t root_oid_len; + u16_t len; + } arg2; + const struct snmp_threadsync_node *threadsync_node; + struct snmp_node_instance proxy_instance; +}; + +/** Thread sync instance. Needed EXCATLY once for every thread to be synced into. */ +struct snmp_threadsync_instance { + sys_sem_t sem; + sys_mutex_t sem_usage_mutex; + snmp_threadsync_synchronizer_fn sync_fn; + struct threadsync_data data; +}; + +/** SNMP thread sync proxy leaf node */ +struct snmp_threadsync_node { + /* inherited "base class" members */ + struct snmp_leaf_node node; + + const struct snmp_leaf_node *target; + struct snmp_threadsync_instance *instance; +}; + +snmp_err_t snmp_threadsync_get_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); +snmp_err_t snmp_threadsync_get_next_instance(const u32_t *root_oid, u8_t root_oid_len, struct snmp_node_instance *instance); + +/** Create thread sync proxy node */ +#define SNMP_CREATE_THREAD_SYNC_NODE(oid, target_leaf_node, threadsync_instance) \ + { \ + { { SNMP_NODE_THREADSYNC, (oid) }, \ + snmp_threadsync_get_instance, \ + snmp_threadsync_get_next_instance }, \ + (target_leaf_node), \ + (threadsync_instance) \ + } + +/** Create thread sync instance data */ +void snmp_threadsync_init(struct snmp_threadsync_instance *instance, snmp_threadsync_synchronizer_fn sync_fn); + +#endif /* LWIP_SNMP */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_THREADSYNC_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmpv3.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmpv3.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmpv3.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmpv3.h index fafed077..3fe05af8 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmpv3.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/snmpv3.h @@ -1,111 +1,111 @@ -/** - * @file - * Additional SNMPv3 functionality RFC3414 and RFC3826. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Elias Oenal - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_H - -#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 - -typedef enum { - SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_INVAL = 0, - SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_MD5 = 1, - SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_SHA = 2 -} snmpv3_auth_algo_t; - -typedef enum { - SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_INVAL = 0, - SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_DES = 1, - SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_AES = 2 -} snmpv3_priv_algo_t; - -typedef enum { - SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_OTHER = 1, - SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_VOLATILE = 2, - SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_NONVOLATILE = 3, - SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_PERMANENT = 4, - SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_READONLY = 5 -} snmpv3_user_storagetype_t; - -/* - * The following callback functions must be implemented by the application. - * There is a dummy implementation in snmpv3_dummy.c. - */ - -void snmpv3_get_engine_id(const char **id, u8_t *len); -err_t snmpv3_set_engine_id(const char *id, u8_t len); - -u32_t snmpv3_get_engine_boots(void); -void snmpv3_set_engine_boots(u32_t boots); - -u32_t snmpv3_get_engine_time(void); -void snmpv3_reset_engine_time(void); - -err_t snmpv3_get_user(const char *username, snmpv3_auth_algo_t *auth_algo, u8_t *auth_key, snmpv3_priv_algo_t *priv_algo, u8_t *priv_key); -u8_t snmpv3_get_amount_of_users(void); -err_t snmpv3_get_user_storagetype(const char *username, snmpv3_user_storagetype_t *storagetype); -err_t snmpv3_get_username(char *username, u8_t index); - -/* The following functions are provided by the SNMPv3 agent */ - -void snmpv3_engine_id_changed(void); -s32_t snmpv3_get_engine_time_internal(void); - -void snmpv3_password_to_key_md5( - const u8_t *password, /* IN */ - size_t passwordlen, /* IN */ - const u8_t *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */ - u8_t engineLength, /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */ - u8_t *key); /* OUT - pointer to caller 16-octet buffer */ - -void snmpv3_password_to_key_sha( - const u8_t *password, /* IN */ - size_t passwordlen, /* IN */ - const u8_t *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */ - u8_t engineLength, /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */ - u8_t *key); /* OUT - pointer to caller 20-octet buffer */ - -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_H */ +/** + * @file + * Additional SNMPv3 functionality RFC3414 and RFC3826. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Elias Oenal. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Elias Oenal + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_H + +#include "lwip/apps/snmp_opts.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_SNMP && LWIP_SNMP_V3 + +typedef enum { + SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_INVAL = 0, + SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_MD5 = 1, + SNMP_V3_AUTH_ALGO_SHA = 2 +} snmpv3_auth_algo_t; + +typedef enum { + SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_INVAL = 0, + SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_DES = 1, + SNMP_V3_PRIV_ALGO_AES = 2 +} snmpv3_priv_algo_t; + +typedef enum { + SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_OTHER = 1, + SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_VOLATILE = 2, + SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_NONVOLATILE = 3, + SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_PERMANENT = 4, + SNMP_V3_USER_STORAGETYPE_READONLY = 5 +} snmpv3_user_storagetype_t; + +/* + * The following callback functions must be implemented by the application. + * There is a dummy implementation in snmpv3_dummy.c. + */ + +void snmpv3_get_engine_id(const char **id, u8_t *len); +err_t snmpv3_set_engine_id(const char *id, u8_t len); + +u32_t snmpv3_get_engine_boots(void); +void snmpv3_set_engine_boots(u32_t boots); + +u32_t snmpv3_get_engine_time(void); +void snmpv3_reset_engine_time(void); + +err_t snmpv3_get_user(const char *username, snmpv3_auth_algo_t *auth_algo, u8_t *auth_key, snmpv3_priv_algo_t *priv_algo, u8_t *priv_key); +u8_t snmpv3_get_amount_of_users(void); +err_t snmpv3_get_user_storagetype(const char *username, snmpv3_user_storagetype_t *storagetype); +err_t snmpv3_get_username(char *username, u8_t index); + +/* The following functions are provided by the SNMPv3 agent */ + +void snmpv3_engine_id_changed(void); +s32_t snmpv3_get_engine_time_internal(void); + +void snmpv3_password_to_key_md5( + const u8_t *password, /* IN */ + size_t passwordlen, /* IN */ + const u8_t *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */ + u8_t engineLength, /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */ + u8_t *key); /* OUT - pointer to caller 16-octet buffer */ + +void snmpv3_password_to_key_sha( + const u8_t *password, /* IN */ + size_t passwordlen, /* IN */ + const u8_t *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */ + u8_t engineLength, /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */ + u8_t *key); /* OUT - pointer to caller 20-octet buffer */ + +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNMP_V3_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp.h index ac3ea30c..f785c3ea 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp.h @@ -1,80 +1,80 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNTP client API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2007-2009 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_H - -#include "lwip/apps/sntp_opts.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* SNTP operating modes: default is to poll using unicast. - The mode has to be set before calling sntp_init(). */ -#define SNTP_OPMODE_POLL 0 -#define SNTP_OPMODE_LISTENONLY 1 -void sntp_setoperatingmode(u8_t operating_mode); -u8_t sntp_getoperatingmode(void); - -void sntp_init(void); -void sntp_stop(void); -u8_t sntp_enabled(void); - -void sntp_setserver(u8_t idx, const ip_addr_t *addr); -const ip_addr_t *sntp_getserver(u8_t idx); - -#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY -u8_t sntp_getreachability(u8_t idx); -#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ - -#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS -void sntp_setservername(u8_t idx, const char *server); -const char *sntp_getservername(u8_t idx); -#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ - -#if SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP -void sntp_servermode_dhcp(int set_servers_from_dhcp); -#else /* SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ -#define sntp_servermode_dhcp(x) -#endif /* SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNTP client API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2007-2009 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_H + +#include "lwip/apps/sntp_opts.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* SNTP operating modes: default is to poll using unicast. + The mode has to be set before calling sntp_init(). */ +#define SNTP_OPMODE_POLL 0 +#define SNTP_OPMODE_LISTENONLY 1 +void sntp_setoperatingmode(u8_t operating_mode); +u8_t sntp_getoperatingmode(void); + +void sntp_init(void); +void sntp_stop(void); +u8_t sntp_enabled(void); + +void sntp_setserver(u8_t idx, const ip_addr_t *addr); +const ip_addr_t *sntp_getserver(u8_t idx); + +#if SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY +u8_t sntp_getreachability(u8_t idx); +#endif /* SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY */ + +#if SNTP_SERVER_DNS +void sntp_setservername(u8_t idx, const char *server); +const char *sntp_getservername(u8_t idx); +#endif /* SNTP_SERVER_DNS */ + +#if SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP +void sntp_servermode_dhcp(int set_servers_from_dhcp); +#else /* SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ +#define sntp_servermode_dhcp(x) +#endif /* SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp_opts.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp_opts.h index a65c6211..1ef8af55 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/sntp_opts.h @@ -1,213 +1,213 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNTP client options list - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2007-2009 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -/** - * @defgroup sntp_opts Options - * @ingroup sntp - * @{ - */ - -/** SNTP macro to change system time in seconds - * Define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_US(sec, us) to set the time in microseconds - * instead of this one if you need the additional precision. Alternatively, - * define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(sec, frac) in order to work with native - * NTP timestamps instead. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME(sec) LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(sec) -#endif - -/** The maximum number of SNTP servers that can be set */ -#if !defined SNTP_MAX_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_MAX_SERVERS LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to implement the callback function called by dhcp when - * NTP servers are received. */ -#if !defined SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to support DNS names (or IP address strings) to set sntp servers - * One server address/name can be defined as default if SNTP_SERVER_DNS == 1: - * \#define SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS "pool.ntp.org" - */ -#if !defined SNTP_SERVER_DNS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_SERVER_DNS 0 -#endif - -/** - * SNTP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for SNTP. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** SNTP server port */ -#if !defined SNTP_PORT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNTP -#endif - -/** Sanity check: - * Define this to - * - 0 to turn off sanity checks (default; smaller code) - * - >= 1 to check address and port of the response packet to ensure the - * response comes from the server we sent the request to. - * - >= 2 to check returned Originate Timestamp against Transmit Timestamp - * sent to the server (to ensure response to older request). - * - >= 3 @todo: discard reply if any of the VN, Stratum, or Transmit Timestamp - * fields is 0 or the Mode field is not 4 (unicast) or 5 (broadcast). - * - >= 4 @todo: to check that the Root Delay and Root Dispersion fields are each - * greater than or equal to 0 and less than infinity, where infinity is - * currently a cozy number like one second. This check avoids using a - * server whose synchronization source has expired for a very long time. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE 0 -#endif - -/** Enable round-trip delay compensation. - * Compensate for the round-trip delay by calculating the clock offset from - * the originate, receive, transmit and destination timestamps, as per RFC. - * - * The calculation requires compiler support for 64-bit integers. Also, either - * SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_US or SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP has to be implemented - * for setting the system clock with sub-second precision. Likewise, either - * SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME or SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP needs to be implemented - * with sub-second precision. - * - * Although not strictly required, it makes sense to combine this option with - * SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 for sanity-checking of the received timestamps. - * Also, in order for the round-trip calculation to work, the difference - * between the local clock and the NTP server clock must not be larger than - * about 34 years. If that limit is exceeded, the implementation will fall back - * to setting the clock without compensation. In order to ensure that the local - * clock is always within the permitted range for compensation, even at first - * try, it may be necessary to store at least the current year in non-volatile - * memory. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP 0 -#endif - -/** According to the RFC, this shall be a random delay - * between 1 and 5 minutes (in milliseconds) to prevent load peaks. - * This can be defined to a random generation function, - * which must return the delay in milliseconds as u32_t. - * Turned off by default. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#ifdef LWIP_RAND -#define SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY 1 -#else -#define SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY 0 -#endif -#endif - -/** If you want the startup delay to be a function, define this - * to a function (including the brackets) and define SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY to 1. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY_FUNC || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY_FUNC (LWIP_RAND() % 5000) -#endif - -/** SNTP receive timeout - in milliseconds - * Also used as retry timeout - this shouldn't be too low. - * Default is 15 seconds. Must not be beolw 15 seconds by specification (i.e. 15000) - */ -#if !defined SNTP_RECV_TIMEOUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_RECV_TIMEOUT 15000 -#endif - -/** SNTP update delay - in milliseconds - * Default is 1 hour. Must not be beolw 60 seconds by specification (i.e. 60000) - */ -#if !defined SNTP_UPDATE_DELAY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_UPDATE_DELAY 3600000 -#endif - -/** SNTP macro to get system time, used with SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 - * to send in request and compare in response. Also used for round-trip - * delay compensation if SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP != 0. - * Alternatively, define SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(sec, frac) in order to - * work with native NTP timestamps instead. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME(sec, us) \ - do { \ - (sec) = 0; \ - (us) = 0; \ - } while (0) -#endif - -/** Default retry timeout (in milliseconds) if the response - * received is invalid. - * This is doubled with each retry until SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_MAX is reached. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT SNTP_RECV_TIMEOUT -#endif - -/** Maximum retry timeout (in milliseconds). */ -#if !defined SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_MAX || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_MAX (SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT * 10) -#endif - -/** Increase retry timeout with every retry sent - * Default is on to conform to RFC. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP 1 -#endif - -/** Keep a reachability shift register per server - * Default is on to conform to RFC. - */ -#if !defined SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY 1 -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_OPTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNTP client options list + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2007-2009 Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Frédéric Bernon, Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +/** + * @defgroup sntp_opts Options + * @ingroup sntp + * @{ + */ + +/** SNTP macro to change system time in seconds + * Define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_US(sec, us) to set the time in microseconds + * instead of this one if you need the additional precision. Alternatively, + * define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(sec, frac) in order to work with native + * NTP timestamps instead. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME(sec) LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(sec) +#endif + +/** The maximum number of SNTP servers that can be set */ +#if !defined SNTP_MAX_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_MAX_SERVERS LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to implement the callback function called by dhcp when + * NTP servers are received. */ +#if !defined SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_GET_SERVERS_FROM_DHCP LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to support DNS names (or IP address strings) to set sntp servers + * One server address/name can be defined as default if SNTP_SERVER_DNS == 1: + * \#define SNTP_SERVER_ADDRESS "pool.ntp.org" + */ +#if !defined SNTP_SERVER_DNS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_SERVER_DNS 0 +#endif + +/** + * SNTP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for SNTP. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** SNTP server port */ +#if !defined SNTP_PORT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNTP +#endif + +/** Sanity check: + * Define this to + * - 0 to turn off sanity checks (default; smaller code) + * - >= 1 to check address and port of the response packet to ensure the + * response comes from the server we sent the request to. + * - >= 2 to check returned Originate Timestamp against Transmit Timestamp + * sent to the server (to ensure response to older request). + * - >= 3 @todo: discard reply if any of the VN, Stratum, or Transmit Timestamp + * fields is 0 or the Mode field is not 4 (unicast) or 5 (broadcast). + * - >= 4 @todo: to check that the Root Delay and Root Dispersion fields are each + * greater than or equal to 0 and less than infinity, where infinity is + * currently a cozy number like one second. This check avoids using a + * server whose synchronization source has expired for a very long time. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE 0 +#endif + +/** Enable round-trip delay compensation. + * Compensate for the round-trip delay by calculating the clock offset from + * the originate, receive, transmit and destination timestamps, as per RFC. + * + * The calculation requires compiler support for 64-bit integers. Also, either + * SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_US or SNTP_SET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP has to be implemented + * for setting the system clock with sub-second precision. Likewise, either + * SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME or SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP needs to be implemented + * with sub-second precision. + * + * Although not strictly required, it makes sense to combine this option with + * SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 for sanity-checking of the received timestamps. + * Also, in order for the round-trip calculation to work, the difference + * between the local clock and the NTP server clock must not be larger than + * about 34 years. If that limit is exceeded, the implementation will fall back + * to setting the clock without compensation. In order to ensure that the local + * clock is always within the permitted range for compensation, even at first + * try, it may be necessary to store at least the current year in non-volatile + * memory. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP 0 +#endif + +/** According to the RFC, this shall be a random delay + * between 1 and 5 minutes (in milliseconds) to prevent load peaks. + * This can be defined to a random generation function, + * which must return the delay in milliseconds as u32_t. + * Turned off by default. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#ifdef LWIP_RAND +#define SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY 1 +#else +#define SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY 0 +#endif +#endif + +/** If you want the startup delay to be a function, define this + * to a function (including the brackets) and define SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY to 1. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY_FUNC || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_STARTUP_DELAY_FUNC (LWIP_RAND() % 5000) +#endif + +/** SNTP receive timeout - in milliseconds + * Also used as retry timeout - this shouldn't be too low. + * Default is 15 seconds. Must not be beolw 15 seconds by specification (i.e. 15000) + */ +#if !defined SNTP_RECV_TIMEOUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_RECV_TIMEOUT 15000 +#endif + +/** SNTP update delay - in milliseconds + * Default is 1 hour. Must not be beolw 60 seconds by specification (i.e. 60000) + */ +#if !defined SNTP_UPDATE_DELAY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_UPDATE_DELAY 3600000 +#endif + +/** SNTP macro to get system time, used with SNTP_CHECK_RESPONSE >= 2 + * to send in request and compare in response. Also used for round-trip + * delay compensation if SNTP_COMP_ROUNDTRIP != 0. + * Alternatively, define SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME_NTP(sec, frac) in order to + * work with native NTP timestamps instead. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_GET_SYSTEM_TIME(sec, us) \ + do { \ + (sec) = 0; \ + (us) = 0; \ + } while (0) +#endif + +/** Default retry timeout (in milliseconds) if the response + * received is invalid. + * This is doubled with each retry until SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_MAX is reached. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT SNTP_RECV_TIMEOUT +#endif + +/** Maximum retry timeout (in milliseconds). */ +#if !defined SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_MAX || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_MAX (SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT * 10) +#endif + +/** Increase retry timeout with every retry sent + * Default is on to conform to RFC. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_RETRY_TIMEOUT_EXP 1 +#endif + +/** Keep a reachability shift register per server + * Default is on to conform to RFC. + */ +#if !defined SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SNTP_MONITOR_SERVER_REACHABILITY 1 +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_SNTP_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_opts.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_opts.h index 3f381ac4..c87ce084 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_opts.h @@ -1,106 +1,106 @@ -/** - * - * @file tftp_opts.h - * - * @author Logan Gunthorpe - * - * @brief Trivial File Transfer Protocol (RFC 1350) implementation options - * - * Copyright (c) Deltatee Enterprises Ltd. 2013 - * All rights reserved. - * - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification,are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO - * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Logan Gunthorpe - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -/** - * @defgroup tftp_opts Options - * @ingroup tftp - * @{ - */ - -/** - * Enable TFTP debug messages - */ -#if !defined TFTP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TFTP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TFTP server port - */ -#if !defined TFTP_PORT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TFTP_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_TFTP -#endif - -/** - * TFTP timeout - */ -#if !defined TFTP_TIMEOUT_MSECS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TFTP_TIMEOUT_MSECS 10000 -#endif - -/** - * Max. number of retries when a file is read from server - */ -#if !defined TFTP_MAX_RETRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TFTP_MAX_RETRIES 5 -#endif - -/** - * TFTP timer cyclic interval - */ -#if !defined TFTP_TIMER_MSECS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TFTP_TIMER_MSECS (TFTP_TIMEOUT_MSECS / 10) -#endif - -/** - * Max. length of TFTP filename - */ -#if !defined TFTP_MAX_FILENAME_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TFTP_MAX_FILENAME_LEN 20 -#endif - -/** - * Max. length of TFTP mode - */ -#if !defined TFTP_MAX_MODE_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TFTP_MAX_MODE_LEN 7 -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_OPTS_H */ +/** + * + * @file tftp_opts.h + * + * @author Logan Gunthorpe + * + * @brief Trivial File Transfer Protocol (RFC 1350) implementation options + * + * Copyright (c) Deltatee Enterprises Ltd. 2013 + * All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification,are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO + * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Logan Gunthorpe + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +/** + * @defgroup tftp_opts Options + * @ingroup tftp + * @{ + */ + +/** + * Enable TFTP debug messages + */ +#if !defined TFTP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TFTP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TFTP server port + */ +#if !defined TFTP_PORT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TFTP_PORT LWIP_IANA_PORT_TFTP +#endif + +/** + * TFTP timeout + */ +#if !defined TFTP_TIMEOUT_MSECS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TFTP_TIMEOUT_MSECS 10000 +#endif + +/** + * Max. number of retries when a file is read from server + */ +#if !defined TFTP_MAX_RETRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TFTP_MAX_RETRIES 5 +#endif + +/** + * TFTP timer cyclic interval + */ +#if !defined TFTP_TIMER_MSECS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TFTP_TIMER_MSECS (TFTP_TIMEOUT_MSECS / 10) +#endif + +/** + * Max. length of TFTP filename + */ +#if !defined TFTP_MAX_FILENAME_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TFTP_MAX_FILENAME_LEN 20 +#endif + +/** + * Max. length of TFTP mode + */ +#if !defined TFTP_MAX_MODE_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TFTP_MAX_MODE_LEN 7 +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_server.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_server.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_server.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_server.h index a1c91c53..f17a5a8d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_server.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/apps/tftp_server.h @@ -1,95 +1,95 @@ -/** - * - * @file tftp_server.h - * - * @author Logan Gunthorpe - * - * @brief Trivial File Transfer Protocol (RFC 1350) - * - * Copyright (c) Deltatee Enterprises Ltd. 2013 - * All rights reserved. - * - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification,are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO - * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Logan Gunthorpe - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_SERVER_H -#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_SERVER_H - -#include "lwip/apps/tftp_opts.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** @ingroup tftp - * TFTP context containing callback functions for TFTP transfers - */ -struct tftp_context { - /** - * Open file for read/write. - * @param fname Filename - * @param mode Mode string from TFTP RFC 1350 (netascii, octet, mail) - * @param write Flag indicating read (0) or write (!= 0) access - * @returns File handle supplied to other functions - */ - void *(*open)(const char *fname, const char *mode, u8_t write); - /** - * Close file handle - * @param handle File handle returned by open() - */ - void (*close)(void *handle); - /** - * Read from file - * @param handle File handle returned by open() - * @param buf Target buffer to copy read data to - * @param bytes Number of bytes to copy to buf - * @returns >= 0: Success; < 0: Error - */ - int (*read)(void *handle, void *buf, int bytes); - /** - * Write to file - * @param handle File handle returned by open() - * @param pbuf PBUF adjusted such that payload pointer points - * to the beginning of write data. In other words, - * TFTP headers are stripped off. - * @returns >= 0: Success; < 0: Error - */ - int (*write)(void *handle, struct pbuf *p); -}; - -err_t tftp_init(const struct tftp_context *ctx); -void tftp_cleanup(void); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_SERVER_H */ +/** + * + * @file tftp_server.h + * + * @author Logan Gunthorpe + * + * @brief Trivial File Transfer Protocol (RFC 1350) + * + * Copyright (c) Deltatee Enterprises Ltd. 2013 + * All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification,are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO + * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Logan Gunthorpe + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_SERVER_H +#define LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_SERVER_H + +#include "lwip/apps/tftp_opts.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** @ingroup tftp + * TFTP context containing callback functions for TFTP transfers + */ +struct tftp_context { + /** + * Open file for read/write. + * @param fname Filename + * @param mode Mode string from TFTP RFC 1350 (netascii, octet, mail) + * @param write Flag indicating read (0) or write (!= 0) access + * @returns File handle supplied to other functions + */ + void *(*open)(const char *fname, const char *mode, u8_t write); + /** + * Close file handle + * @param handle File handle returned by open() + */ + void (*close)(void *handle); + /** + * Read from file + * @param handle File handle returned by open() + * @param buf Target buffer to copy read data to + * @param bytes Number of bytes to copy to buf + * @returns >= 0: Success; < 0: Error + */ + int (*read)(void *handle, void *buf, int bytes); + /** + * Write to file + * @param handle File handle returned by open() + * @param pbuf PBUF adjusted such that payload pointer points + * to the beginning of write data. In other words, + * TFTP headers are stripped off. + * @returns >= 0: Success; < 0: Error + */ + int (*write)(void *handle, struct pbuf *p); +}; + +err_t tftp_init(const struct tftp_context *ctx); +void tftp_cleanup(void); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_APPS_TFTP_SERVER_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/arch.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/arch.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/arch.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/arch.h index 2c366dc4..edc77218 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/arch.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/arch.h @@ -1,401 +1,401 @@ -/** - * @file - * Support for different processor and compiler architectures - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ARCH_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ARCH_H - -#ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN -#define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234 -#endif - -#ifndef BIG_ENDIAN -#define BIG_ENDIAN 4321 -#endif - -#include "arch/cc.h" - -/** - * @defgroup compiler_abstraction Compiler/platform abstraction - * @ingroup sys_layer - * All defines related to this section must not be placed in lwipopts.h, - * but in arch/cc.h! - * If the compiler does not provide memset() this file must include a - * definition of it, or include a file which defines it. - * These options cannot be \#defined in lwipopts.h since they are not options - * of lwIP itself, but options of the lwIP port to your system. - * @{ - */ - -/** Define the byte order of the system. - * Needed for conversion of network data to host byte order. - * Allowed values: LITTLE_ENDIAN and BIG_ENDIAN - */ -#ifndef BYTE_ORDER -#define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN -#endif - -/** Define random number generator function of your system */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_RAND() ((u32_t)rand()) -#endif - -/** Platform specific diagnostic output.\n - * Note the default implementation pulls in printf, which may - * in turn pull in a lot of standard libary code. In resource-constrained - * systems, this should be defined to something less resource-consuming. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG -#define LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(x) \ - do { \ - printf x; \ - } while (0) -#include -#include -#endif - -/** Platform specific assertion handling.\n - * Note the default implementation pulls in printf, fflush and abort, which may - * in turn pull in a lot of standard libary code. In resource-constrained - * systems, this should be defined to something less resource-consuming. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT -#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT(x) \ - do { \ - printf("Assertion \"%s\" failed at line %d in %s\n", \ - x, __LINE__, __FILE__); \ - fflush(NULL); \ - abort(); \ - } while (0) -#include -#include -#endif - -/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if you do not want to - * include stddef.h header to get size_t. You need to typedef size_t - * by yourself in this case. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_NO_STDDEF_H -#define LWIP_NO_STDDEF_H 0 -#endif - -#if !LWIP_NO_STDDEF_H -#include /* for size_t */ -#endif - -/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if your compiler does not provide - * the stdint.h header. You need to typedef the generic types listed in - * lwip/arch.h yourself in this case (u8_t, u16_t...). - */ -#ifndef LWIP_NO_STDINT_H -#define LWIP_NO_STDINT_H 0 -#endif - -/* Define generic types used in lwIP */ -#if !LWIP_NO_STDINT_H -#include -/* stdint.h is C99 which should also provide support for 64-bit integers */ -#if !defined(LWIP_HAVE_INT64) && defined(UINT64_MAX) -#define LWIP_HAVE_INT64 1 -#endif -typedef uint8_t u8_t; -typedef int8_t s8_t; -typedef uint16_t u16_t; -typedef int16_t s16_t; -typedef uint32_t u32_t; -typedef int32_t s32_t; -#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 -typedef uint64_t u64_t; -typedef int64_t s64_t; -#endif -typedef uintptr_t mem_ptr_t; -#endif - -/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if your compiler does not provide - * the inttypes.h header. You need to define the format strings listed in - * lwip/arch.h yourself in this case (X8_F, U16_F...). - */ -#ifndef LWIP_NO_INTTYPES_H -#define LWIP_NO_INTTYPES_H 0 -#endif - -/* Define (sn)printf formatters for these lwIP types */ -#if !LWIP_NO_INTTYPES_H -#include -#ifndef X8_F -#define X8_F "02" PRIx8 -#endif -#ifndef U16_F -#define U16_F PRIu16 -#endif -#ifndef S16_F -#define S16_F PRId16 -#endif -#ifndef X16_F -#define X16_F PRIx16 -#endif -#ifndef U32_F -#define U32_F PRIu32 -#endif -#ifndef S32_F -#define S32_F PRId32 -#endif -#ifndef X32_F -#define X32_F PRIx32 -#endif -#ifndef SZT_F -#define SZT_F PRIuPTR -#endif -#endif - -/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if your compiler does not provide - * the limits.h header. You need to define the type limits yourself in this case - * (e.g. INT_MAX, SSIZE_MAX). - */ -#ifndef LWIP_NO_LIMITS_H -#define LWIP_NO_LIMITS_H 0 -#endif - -/* Include limits.h? */ -#if !LWIP_NO_LIMITS_H -#include -#endif - -/* Do we need to define ssize_t? This is a compatibility hack: - * Unfortunately, this type seems to be unavailable on some systems (even if - * sys/types or unistd.h are available). - * Being like that, we define it to 'int' if SSIZE_MAX is not defined. - */ -#ifdef SSIZE_MAX -/* If SSIZE_MAX is defined, unistd.h should provide the type as well */ -#ifndef LWIP_NO_UNISTD_H -#define LWIP_NO_UNISTD_H 0 -#endif -#if !LWIP_NO_UNISTD_H -#include -#endif -#else /* SSIZE_MAX */ -typedef int ssize_t; -#define SSIZE_MAX INT_MAX -#endif /* SSIZE_MAX */ - -/* some maximum values needed in lwip code */ -#define LWIP_UINT32_MAX 0xffffffff - -/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if your compiler does not provide - * the ctype.h header. If ctype.h is available, a few character functions - * are mapped to the appropriate functions (lwip_islower, lwip_isdigit...), if - * not, a private implementation is provided. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_NO_CTYPE_H -#define LWIP_NO_CTYPE_H 0 -#endif - -#if LWIP_NO_CTYPE_H -#define lwip_in_range(c, lo, up) ((u8_t)(c) >= (lo) && (u8_t)(c) <= (up)) -#define lwip_isdigit(c) lwip_in_range((c), '0', '9') -#define lwip_isxdigit(c) (lwip_isdigit(c) || lwip_in_range((c), 'a', 'f') || lwip_in_range((c), 'A', 'F')) -#define lwip_islower(c) lwip_in_range((c), 'a', 'z') -#define lwip_isspace(c) ((c) == ' ' || (c) == '\f' || (c) == '\n' || (c) == '\r' || (c) == '\t' || (c) == '\v') -#define lwip_isupper(c) lwip_in_range((c), 'A', 'Z') -#define lwip_tolower(c) (lwip_isupper(c) ? (c) - 'A' + 'a' : c) -#define lwip_toupper(c) (lwip_islower(c) ? (c) - 'a' + 'A' : c) -#else -#include -#define lwip_isdigit(c) isdigit((unsigned char)(c)) -#define lwip_isxdigit(c) isxdigit((unsigned char)(c)) -#define lwip_islower(c) islower((unsigned char)(c)) -#define lwip_isspace(c) isspace((unsigned char)(c)) -#define lwip_isupper(c) isupper((unsigned char)(c)) -#define lwip_tolower(c) tolower((unsigned char)(c)) -#define lwip_toupper(c) toupper((unsigned char)(c)) -#endif - -/** C++ const_cast(val) equivalent to remove constness from a value (GCC -Wcast-qual) */ -#ifndef LWIP_CONST_CAST -#define LWIP_CONST_CAST(target_type, val) ((target_type)((ptrdiff_t)val)) -#endif - -/** Get rid of alignment cast warnings (GCC -Wcast-align) */ -#ifndef LWIP_ALIGNMENT_CAST -#define LWIP_ALIGNMENT_CAST(target_type, val) LWIP_CONST_CAST(target_type, val) -#endif - -/** Get rid of warnings related to pointer-to-numeric and vice-versa casts, - * e.g. "conversion from 'u8_t' to 'void *' of greater size" - */ -#ifndef LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST -#define LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(target_type, val) LWIP_CONST_CAST(target_type, val) -#endif - -/** Avoid warnings/errors related to implicitly casting away packed attributes by doing a explicit cast */ -#ifndef LWIP_PACKED_CAST -#define LWIP_PACKED_CAST(target_type, val) LWIP_CONST_CAST(target_type, val) -#endif - -/** Allocates a memory buffer of specified size that is of sufficient size to align - * its start address using LWIP_MEM_ALIGN. - * You can declare your own version here e.g. to enforce alignment without adding - * trailing padding bytes (see LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER) or your own section placement - * requirements.\n - * e.g. if you use gcc and need 32 bit alignment:\n - * \#define LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(variable_name, size) u8_t variable_name[size] \_\_attribute\_\_((aligned(4)))\n - * or more portable:\n - * \#define LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(variable_name, size) u32_t variable_name[(size + sizeof(u32_t) - 1) / sizeof(u32_t)] - */ -#ifndef LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED -#define LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(variable_name, size) u8_t variable_name[LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER(size)] -#endif - -/** Calculate memory size for an aligned buffer - returns the next highest - * multiple of MEM_ALIGNMENT (e.g. LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(3) and - * LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(4) will both yield 4 for MEM_ALIGNMENT == 4). - */ -#ifndef LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE -#define LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(size) (((size) + MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1U) & ~(MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1U)) -#endif - -/** Calculate safe memory size for an aligned buffer when using an unaligned - * type as storage. This includes a safety-margin on (MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1) at the - * start (e.g. if buffer is u8_t[] and actual data will be u32_t*) - */ -#ifndef LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER -#define LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER(size) (((size) + MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1U)) -#endif - -/** Align a memory pointer to the alignment defined by MEM_ALIGNMENT - * so that ADDR % MEM_ALIGNMENT == 0 - */ -#ifndef LWIP_MEM_ALIGN -#define LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(addr) ((void *)(((mem_ptr_t)(addr) + MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1) & ~(mem_ptr_t)(MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1))) -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** Packed structs support. - * Placed BEFORE declaration of a packed struct.\n - * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n - * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. - */ -#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN */ - -/** Packed structs support. - * Placed AFTER declaration of a packed struct.\n - * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n - * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. - */ -#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_END -#define PACK_STRUCT_END -#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_END */ - -/** Packed structs support. - * Placed between end of declaration of a packed struct and trailing semicolon.\n - * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n - * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. - */ -#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT __attribute__((packed)) -#else -#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT -#endif -#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT */ - -/** Packed structs support. - * Wraps u32_t and u16_t members.\n - * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n - * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. - */ -#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_FIELD -#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x -#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_FIELD */ - -/** Packed structs support. - * Wraps u8_t members, where some compilers warn that packing is not necessary.\n - * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n - * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. - */ -#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8 -#define PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(x) PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) -#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8 */ - -/** Packed structs support. - * Wraps members that are packed structs themselves, where some compilers warn that packing is not necessary.\n - * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n - * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. - */ -#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S -#define PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(x) PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) -#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S */ - -/** PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES==1: Packed structs support using \#include files before and after struct to be packed.\n - * The file included BEFORE the struct is "arch/bpstruct.h".\n - * The file included AFTER the struct is "arch/epstruct.h".\n - * This can be used to implement struct packing on MS Visual C compilers, see - * the Win32 port in the lwIP contrib repository for reference. - * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n - * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#endif - -/** Eliminates compiler warning about unused arguments (GCC -Wextra -Wunused). */ -#ifndef LWIP_UNUSED_ARG -#define LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(x) (void)x -#endif /* LWIP_UNUSED_ARG */ - -/** LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO==1: Let lwIP provide ERRNO values and the 'errno' variable. - * If this is disabled, cc.h must either define 'errno', include , - * define LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE to get included or - * define LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE to or equivalent. - */ -#if defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ARCH_H */ +/** + * @file + * Support for different processor and compiler architectures + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ARCH_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ARCH_H + +#ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN +#define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234 +#endif + +#ifndef BIG_ENDIAN +#define BIG_ENDIAN 4321 +#endif + +#include "arch/cc.h" + +/** + * @defgroup compiler_abstraction Compiler/platform abstraction + * @ingroup sys_layer + * All defines related to this section must not be placed in lwipopts.h, + * but in arch/cc.h! + * If the compiler does not provide memset() this file must include a + * definition of it, or include a file which defines it. + * These options cannot be \#defined in lwipopts.h since they are not options + * of lwIP itself, but options of the lwIP port to your system. + * @{ + */ + +/** Define the byte order of the system. + * Needed for conversion of network data to host byte order. + * Allowed values: LITTLE_ENDIAN and BIG_ENDIAN + */ +#ifndef BYTE_ORDER +#define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN +#endif + +/** Define random number generator function of your system */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_RAND() ((u32_t)rand()) +#endif + +/** Platform specific diagnostic output.\n + * Note the default implementation pulls in printf, which may + * in turn pull in a lot of standard libary code. In resource-constrained + * systems, this should be defined to something less resource-consuming. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG +#define LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(x) \ + do { \ + printf x; \ + } while (0) +#include +#include +#endif + +/** Platform specific assertion handling.\n + * Note the default implementation pulls in printf, fflush and abort, which may + * in turn pull in a lot of standard libary code. In resource-constrained + * systems, this should be defined to something less resource-consuming. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT +#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT(x) \ + do { \ + printf("Assertion \"%s\" failed at line %d in %s\n", \ + x, __LINE__, __FILE__); \ + fflush(NULL); \ + abort(); \ + } while (0) +#include +#include +#endif + +/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if you do not want to + * include stddef.h header to get size_t. You need to typedef size_t + * by yourself in this case. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_NO_STDDEF_H +#define LWIP_NO_STDDEF_H 0 +#endif + +#if !LWIP_NO_STDDEF_H +#include /* for size_t */ +#endif + +/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if your compiler does not provide + * the stdint.h header. You need to typedef the generic types listed in + * lwip/arch.h yourself in this case (u8_t, u16_t...). + */ +#ifndef LWIP_NO_STDINT_H +#define LWIP_NO_STDINT_H 0 +#endif + +/* Define generic types used in lwIP */ +#if !LWIP_NO_STDINT_H +#include +/* stdint.h is C99 which should also provide support for 64-bit integers */ +#if !defined(LWIP_HAVE_INT64) && defined(UINT64_MAX) +#define LWIP_HAVE_INT64 1 +#endif +typedef uint8_t u8_t; +typedef int8_t s8_t; +typedef uint16_t u16_t; +typedef int16_t s16_t; +typedef uint32_t u32_t; +typedef int32_t s32_t; +#if LWIP_HAVE_INT64 +typedef uint64_t u64_t; +typedef int64_t s64_t; +#endif +typedef uintptr_t mem_ptr_t; +#endif + +/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if your compiler does not provide + * the inttypes.h header. You need to define the format strings listed in + * lwip/arch.h yourself in this case (X8_F, U16_F...). + */ +#ifndef LWIP_NO_INTTYPES_H +#define LWIP_NO_INTTYPES_H 0 +#endif + +/* Define (sn)printf formatters for these lwIP types */ +#if !LWIP_NO_INTTYPES_H +#include +#ifndef X8_F +#define X8_F "02" PRIx8 +#endif +#ifndef U16_F +#define U16_F PRIu16 +#endif +#ifndef S16_F +#define S16_F PRId16 +#endif +#ifndef X16_F +#define X16_F PRIx16 +#endif +#ifndef U32_F +#define U32_F PRIu32 +#endif +#ifndef S32_F +#define S32_F PRId32 +#endif +#ifndef X32_F +#define X32_F PRIx32 +#endif +#ifndef SZT_F +#define SZT_F PRIuPTR +#endif +#endif + +/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if your compiler does not provide + * the limits.h header. You need to define the type limits yourself in this case + * (e.g. INT_MAX, SSIZE_MAX). + */ +#ifndef LWIP_NO_LIMITS_H +#define LWIP_NO_LIMITS_H 0 +#endif + +/* Include limits.h? */ +#if !LWIP_NO_LIMITS_H +#include +#endif + +/* Do we need to define ssize_t? This is a compatibility hack: + * Unfortunately, this type seems to be unavailable on some systems (even if + * sys/types or unistd.h are available). + * Being like that, we define it to 'int' if SSIZE_MAX is not defined. + */ +#ifdef SSIZE_MAX +/* If SSIZE_MAX is defined, unistd.h should provide the type as well */ +#ifndef LWIP_NO_UNISTD_H +#define LWIP_NO_UNISTD_H 0 +#endif +#if !LWIP_NO_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#else /* SSIZE_MAX */ +typedef int ssize_t; +#define SSIZE_MAX INT_MAX +#endif /* SSIZE_MAX */ + +/* some maximum values needed in lwip code */ +#define LWIP_UINT32_MAX 0xffffffff + +/** Define this to 1 in arch/cc.h of your port if your compiler does not provide + * the ctype.h header. If ctype.h is available, a few character functions + * are mapped to the appropriate functions (lwip_islower, lwip_isdigit...), if + * not, a private implementation is provided. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_NO_CTYPE_H +#define LWIP_NO_CTYPE_H 0 +#endif + +#if LWIP_NO_CTYPE_H +#define lwip_in_range(c, lo, up) ((u8_t)(c) >= (lo) && (u8_t)(c) <= (up)) +#define lwip_isdigit(c) lwip_in_range((c), '0', '9') +#define lwip_isxdigit(c) (lwip_isdigit(c) || lwip_in_range((c), 'a', 'f') || lwip_in_range((c), 'A', 'F')) +#define lwip_islower(c) lwip_in_range((c), 'a', 'z') +#define lwip_isspace(c) ((c) == ' ' || (c) == '\f' || (c) == '\n' || (c) == '\r' || (c) == '\t' || (c) == '\v') +#define lwip_isupper(c) lwip_in_range((c), 'A', 'Z') +#define lwip_tolower(c) (lwip_isupper(c) ? (c) - 'A' + 'a' : c) +#define lwip_toupper(c) (lwip_islower(c) ? (c) - 'a' + 'A' : c) +#else +#include +#define lwip_isdigit(c) isdigit((unsigned char)(c)) +#define lwip_isxdigit(c) isxdigit((unsigned char)(c)) +#define lwip_islower(c) islower((unsigned char)(c)) +#define lwip_isspace(c) isspace((unsigned char)(c)) +#define lwip_isupper(c) isupper((unsigned char)(c)) +#define lwip_tolower(c) tolower((unsigned char)(c)) +#define lwip_toupper(c) toupper((unsigned char)(c)) +#endif + +/** C++ const_cast(val) equivalent to remove constness from a value (GCC -Wcast-qual) */ +#ifndef LWIP_CONST_CAST +#define LWIP_CONST_CAST(target_type, val) ((target_type)((ptrdiff_t)val)) +#endif + +/** Get rid of alignment cast warnings (GCC -Wcast-align) */ +#ifndef LWIP_ALIGNMENT_CAST +#define LWIP_ALIGNMENT_CAST(target_type, val) LWIP_CONST_CAST(target_type, val) +#endif + +/** Get rid of warnings related to pointer-to-numeric and vice-versa casts, + * e.g. "conversion from 'u8_t' to 'void *' of greater size" + */ +#ifndef LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST +#define LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(target_type, val) LWIP_CONST_CAST(target_type, val) +#endif + +/** Avoid warnings/errors related to implicitly casting away packed attributes by doing a explicit cast */ +#ifndef LWIP_PACKED_CAST +#define LWIP_PACKED_CAST(target_type, val) LWIP_CONST_CAST(target_type, val) +#endif + +/** Allocates a memory buffer of specified size that is of sufficient size to align + * its start address using LWIP_MEM_ALIGN. + * You can declare your own version here e.g. to enforce alignment without adding + * trailing padding bytes (see LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER) or your own section placement + * requirements.\n + * e.g. if you use gcc and need 32 bit alignment:\n + * \#define LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(variable_name, size) u8_t variable_name[size] \_\_attribute\_\_((aligned(4)))\n + * or more portable:\n + * \#define LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(variable_name, size) u32_t variable_name[(size + sizeof(u32_t) - 1) / sizeof(u32_t)] + */ +#ifndef LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED +#define LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(variable_name, size) u8_t variable_name[LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER(size)] +#endif + +/** Calculate memory size for an aligned buffer - returns the next highest + * multiple of MEM_ALIGNMENT (e.g. LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(3) and + * LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(4) will both yield 4 for MEM_ALIGNMENT == 4). + */ +#ifndef LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE +#define LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(size) (((size) + MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1U) & ~(MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1U)) +#endif + +/** Calculate safe memory size for an aligned buffer when using an unaligned + * type as storage. This includes a safety-margin on (MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1) at the + * start (e.g. if buffer is u8_t[] and actual data will be u32_t*) + */ +#ifndef LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER +#define LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_BUFFER(size) (((size) + MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1U)) +#endif + +/** Align a memory pointer to the alignment defined by MEM_ALIGNMENT + * so that ADDR % MEM_ALIGNMENT == 0 + */ +#ifndef LWIP_MEM_ALIGN +#define LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(addr) ((void *)(((mem_ptr_t)(addr) + MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1) & ~(mem_ptr_t)(MEM_ALIGNMENT - 1))) +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Packed structs support. + * Placed BEFORE declaration of a packed struct.\n + * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n + * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. + */ +#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN */ + +/** Packed structs support. + * Placed AFTER declaration of a packed struct.\n + * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n + * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. + */ +#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_END +#define PACK_STRUCT_END +#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_END */ + +/** Packed structs support. + * Placed between end of declaration of a packed struct and trailing semicolon.\n + * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n + * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. + */ +#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT +#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) +#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT __attribute__((packed)) +#else +#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT +#endif +#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT */ + +/** Packed structs support. + * Wraps u32_t and u16_t members.\n + * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n + * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. + */ +#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_FIELD +#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x +#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_FIELD */ + +/** Packed structs support. + * Wraps u8_t members, where some compilers warn that packing is not necessary.\n + * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n + * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. + */ +#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8 +#define PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(x) PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) +#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8 */ + +/** Packed structs support. + * Wraps members that are packed structs themselves, where some compilers warn that packing is not necessary.\n + * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n + * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. + */ +#ifndef PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S +#define PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(x) PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) +#endif /* PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S */ + +/** PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES==1: Packed structs support using \#include files before and after struct to be packed.\n + * The file included BEFORE the struct is "arch/bpstruct.h".\n + * The file included AFTER the struct is "arch/epstruct.h".\n + * This can be used to implement struct packing on MS Visual C compilers, see + * the Win32 port in the lwIP contrib repository for reference. + * For examples of packed struct declarations, see include/lwip/prot/ subfolder.\n + * A port to GCC/clang is included in lwIP, if you use these compilers there is nothing to do here. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#endif + +/** Eliminates compiler warning about unused arguments (GCC -Wextra -Wunused). */ +#ifndef LWIP_UNUSED_ARG +#define LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(x) (void)x +#endif /* LWIP_UNUSED_ARG */ + +/** LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO==1: Let lwIP provide ERRNO values and the 'errno' variable. + * If this is disabled, cc.h must either define 'errno', include , + * define LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE to get included or + * define LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE to or equivalent. + */ +#if defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ARCH_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/autoip.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/autoip.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/autoip.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/autoip.h index 8ab83968..00456f97 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/autoip.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/autoip.h @@ -1,100 +1,100 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * AutoIP Automatic LinkLocal IP Configuration - */ - -/* - * - * Copyright (c) 2007 Dominik Spies - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dominik Spies - * - * This is a AutoIP implementation for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. It aims to conform - * with RFC 3927. - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_AUTOIP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_AUTOIP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_AUTOIP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/netif.h" -/* #include "lwip/udp.h" */ -#include "lwip/etharp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** AutoIP Timing */ -#define AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL 100 -#define AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND (1000 / AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL) - -/** AutoIP state information per netif */ -struct autoip { - /** the currently selected, probed, announced or used LL IP-Address */ - ip4_addr_t llipaddr; - /** current AutoIP state machine state */ - u8_t state; - /** sent number of probes or announces, dependent on state */ - u8_t sent_num; - /** ticks to wait, tick is AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL long */ - u16_t ttw; - /** ticks until a conflict can be solved by defending */ - u8_t lastconflict; - /** total number of probed/used Link Local IP-Addresses */ - u8_t tried_llipaddr; -}; - -void autoip_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct autoip *autoip); -/** Remove a struct autoip previously set to the netif using autoip_set_struct() */ -#define autoip_remove_struct(netif) \ - do { \ - (netif)->autoip = NULL; \ - } while (0) -err_t autoip_start(struct netif *netif); -err_t autoip_stop(struct netif *netif); -void autoip_arp_reply(struct netif *netif, struct etharp_hdr *hdr); -void autoip_tmr(void); -void autoip_network_changed(struct netif *netif); -u8_t autoip_supplied_address(const struct netif *netif); - -/* for lwIP internal use by ip4.c */ -u8_t autoip_accept_packet(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *addr); - -#define netif_autoip_data(netif) ((struct autoip *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_AUTOIP)) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_AUTOIP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_AUTOIP_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * AutoIP Automatic LinkLocal IP Configuration + */ + +/* + * + * Copyright (c) 2007 Dominik Spies + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dominik Spies + * + * This is a AutoIP implementation for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. It aims to conform + * with RFC 3927. + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_AUTOIP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_AUTOIP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_AUTOIP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/netif.h" +/* #include "lwip/udp.h" */ +#include "lwip/etharp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** AutoIP Timing */ +#define AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL 100 +#define AUTOIP_TICKS_PER_SECOND (1000 / AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL) + +/** AutoIP state information per netif */ +struct autoip { + /** the currently selected, probed, announced or used LL IP-Address */ + ip4_addr_t llipaddr; + /** current AutoIP state machine state */ + u8_t state; + /** sent number of probes or announces, dependent on state */ + u8_t sent_num; + /** ticks to wait, tick is AUTOIP_TMR_INTERVAL long */ + u16_t ttw; + /** ticks until a conflict can be solved by defending */ + u8_t lastconflict; + /** total number of probed/used Link Local IP-Addresses */ + u8_t tried_llipaddr; +}; + +void autoip_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct autoip *autoip); +/** Remove a struct autoip previously set to the netif using autoip_set_struct() */ +#define autoip_remove_struct(netif) \ + do { \ + (netif)->autoip = NULL; \ + } while (0) +err_t autoip_start(struct netif *netif); +err_t autoip_stop(struct netif *netif); +void autoip_arp_reply(struct netif *netif, struct etharp_hdr *hdr); +void autoip_tmr(void); +void autoip_network_changed(struct netif *netif); +u8_t autoip_supplied_address(const struct netif *netif); + +/* for lwIP internal use by ip4.c */ +u8_t autoip_accept_packet(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *addr); + +#define netif_autoip_data(netif) ((struct autoip *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_AUTOIP)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_AUTOIP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_AUTOIP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/debug.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/debug.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/debug.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/debug.h index 70c8df2f..d3fa06a5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/debug.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/debug.h @@ -1,172 +1,172 @@ -/** - * @file - * Debug messages infrastructure - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_DEBUG_H -#define LWIP_HDR_DEBUG_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -/** - * @defgroup debugging_levels LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL and LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON values - * @ingroup lwip_opts_debugmsg - * @{ - */ - -/** @name Debug level (LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL) - * @{ - */ -/** Debug level: ALL messages*/ -#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_ALL 0x00 -/** Debug level: Warnings. bad checksums, dropped packets, ... */ -#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING 0x01 -/** Debug level: Serious. memory allocation failures, ... */ -#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS 0x02 -/** Debug level: Severe */ -#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE 0x03 -/** - * @} - */ - -#define LWIP_DBG_MASK_LEVEL 0x03 -/* compatibility define only */ -#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_OFF LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_ALL - -/** @name Enable/disable debug messages completely (LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON) - * @{ - */ -/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF to enable that debug message */ -#define LWIP_DBG_ON 0x80U -/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF to disable that debug message */ -#define LWIP_DBG_OFF 0x00U -/** - * @} - */ - -/** @name Debug message types (LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON) - * @{ - */ -/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF indicating a tracing message (to follow program flow) */ -#define LWIP_DBG_TRACE 0x40U -/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF indicating a state debug message (to follow module states) */ -#define LWIP_DBG_STATE 0x20U -/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF indicating newly added code, not thoroughly tested yet */ -#define LWIP_DBG_FRESH 0x10U -/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF to halt after printing this debug message */ -#define LWIP_DBG_HALT 0x08U -/** - * @} - */ - -/** - * @} - */ - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_assertions Assertion handling - * @ingroup lwip_opts_debug - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_NOASSERT: Disable LWIP_ASSERT checks: - * To disable assertions define LWIP_NOASSERT in arch/cc.h. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NOASSERT -#undef LWIP_NOASSERT -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_NOASSERT -#define LWIP_ASSERT(message, assertion) \ - do { \ - if (!(assertion)) { \ - LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT(message); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#else /* LWIP_NOASSERT */ -#define LWIP_ASSERT(message, assertion) -#endif /* LWIP_NOASSERT */ - -#ifndef LWIP_ERROR -#ifndef LWIP_NOASSERT -#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ERROR(message) LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT(message) -#elif defined LWIP_DEBUG -#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ERROR(message) LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG((message)) -#else -#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ERROR(message) -#endif - -/* if "expression" isn't true, then print "message" and execute "handler" expression */ -#define LWIP_ERROR(message, expression, handler) \ - do { \ - if (!(expression)) { \ - LWIP_PLATFORM_ERROR(message); \ - handler; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#endif /* LWIP_ERROR */ - -/** Enable debug message printing, but only if debug message type is enabled - * AND is of correct type AND is at least LWIP_DBG_LEVEL. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DEBUG -#undef LWIP_DEBUG -#endif - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -#define LWIP_DEBUGF(debug, message) \ - do { \ - if ( \ - ((debug)&LWIP_DBG_ON) && \ - ((debug)&LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON) && \ - ((s16_t)((debug)&LWIP_DBG_MASK_LEVEL) >= LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL)) { \ - LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(message); \ - if ((debug)&LWIP_DBG_HALT) { \ - while (1) \ - ; \ - } \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#else /* LWIP_DEBUG */ -#define LWIP_DEBUGF(debug, message) -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_DEBUG_H */ +/** + * @file + * Debug messages infrastructure + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_DEBUG_H +#define LWIP_HDR_DEBUG_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +/** + * @defgroup debugging_levels LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL and LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON values + * @ingroup lwip_opts_debugmsg + * @{ + */ + +/** @name Debug level (LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL) + * @{ + */ +/** Debug level: ALL messages*/ +#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_ALL 0x00 +/** Debug level: Warnings. bad checksums, dropped packets, ... */ +#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING 0x01 +/** Debug level: Serious. memory allocation failures, ... */ +#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS 0x02 +/** Debug level: Severe */ +#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE 0x03 +/** + * @} + */ + +#define LWIP_DBG_MASK_LEVEL 0x03 +/* compatibility define only */ +#define LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_OFF LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_ALL + +/** @name Enable/disable debug messages completely (LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON) + * @{ + */ +/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF to enable that debug message */ +#define LWIP_DBG_ON 0x80U +/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF to disable that debug message */ +#define LWIP_DBG_OFF 0x00U +/** + * @} + */ + +/** @name Debug message types (LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON) + * @{ + */ +/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF indicating a tracing message (to follow program flow) */ +#define LWIP_DBG_TRACE 0x40U +/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF indicating a state debug message (to follow module states) */ +#define LWIP_DBG_STATE 0x20U +/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF indicating newly added code, not thoroughly tested yet */ +#define LWIP_DBG_FRESH 0x10U +/** flag for LWIP_DEBUGF to halt after printing this debug message */ +#define LWIP_DBG_HALT 0x08U +/** + * @} + */ + +/** + * @} + */ + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_assertions Assertion handling + * @ingroup lwip_opts_debug + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_NOASSERT: Disable LWIP_ASSERT checks: + * To disable assertions define LWIP_NOASSERT in arch/cc.h. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NOASSERT +#undef LWIP_NOASSERT +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_NOASSERT +#define LWIP_ASSERT(message, assertion) \ + do { \ + if (!(assertion)) { \ + LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT(message); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else /* LWIP_NOASSERT */ +#define LWIP_ASSERT(message, assertion) +#endif /* LWIP_NOASSERT */ + +#ifndef LWIP_ERROR +#ifndef LWIP_NOASSERT +#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ERROR(message) LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT(message) +#elif defined LWIP_DEBUG +#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ERROR(message) LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG((message)) +#else +#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ERROR(message) +#endif + +/* if "expression" isn't true, then print "message" and execute "handler" expression */ +#define LWIP_ERROR(message, expression, handler) \ + do { \ + if (!(expression)) { \ + LWIP_PLATFORM_ERROR(message); \ + handler; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#endif /* LWIP_ERROR */ + +/** Enable debug message printing, but only if debug message type is enabled + * AND is of correct type AND is at least LWIP_DBG_LEVEL. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DEBUG +#undef LWIP_DEBUG +#endif + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +#define LWIP_DEBUGF(debug, message) \ + do { \ + if ( \ + ((debug)&LWIP_DBG_ON) && \ + ((debug)&LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON) && \ + ((s16_t)((debug)&LWIP_DBG_MASK_LEVEL) >= LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL)) { \ + LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(message); \ + if ((debug)&LWIP_DBG_HALT) { \ + while (1) \ + ; \ + } \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#else /* LWIP_DEBUG */ +#define LWIP_DEBUGF(debug, message) +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_DEBUG_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/def.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/def.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/def.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/def.h index 9bb3cce6..b135d3a5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/def.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/def.h @@ -1,152 +1,152 @@ -/** - * @file - * various utility macros - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -/** - * @defgroup perf Performance measurement - * @ingroup sys_layer - * All defines related to this section must not be placed in lwipopts.h, - * but in arch/perf.h! - * Measurement calls made throughout lwip, these can be defined to nothing. - * - PERF_START: start measuring something. - * - PERF_STOP(x): stop measuring something, and record the result. - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_DEF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_DEF_H - -/* arch.h might define NULL already */ -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#if LWIP_PERF -#include "arch/perf.h" -#else /* LWIP_PERF */ -#define PERF_START /* null definition */ -#define PERF_STOP(x) /* null definition */ -#endif /* LWIP_PERF */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define LWIP_MAX(x, y) (((x) > (y)) ? (x) : (y)) -#define LWIP_MIN(x, y) (((x) < (y)) ? (x) : (y)) - -/* Get the number of entries in an array ('x' must NOT be a pointer!) */ -#define LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0])) - -/** Create u32_t value from bytes */ -#define LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d) (((u32_t)((a)&0xff) << 24) | \ - ((u32_t)((b)&0xff) << 16) | \ - ((u32_t)((c)&0xff) << 8) | \ - (u32_t)((d)&0xff)) - -#ifndef NULL -#ifdef __cplusplus -#define NULL 0 -#else -#define NULL ((void *)0) -#endif -#endif - -#if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN -#define lwip_htons(x) ((u16_t)(x)) -#define lwip_ntohs(x) ((u16_t)(x)) -#define lwip_htonl(x) ((u32_t)(x)) -#define lwip_ntohl(x) ((u32_t)(x)) -#define PP_HTONS(x) ((u16_t)(x)) -#define PP_NTOHS(x) ((u16_t)(x)) -#define PP_HTONL(x) ((u32_t)(x)) -#define PP_NTOHL(x) ((u32_t)(x)) -#else /* BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN */ -#ifndef lwip_htons -u16_t lwip_htons(u16_t x); -#endif -#define lwip_ntohs(x) lwip_htons(x) - -#ifndef lwip_htonl -u32_t lwip_htonl(u32_t x); -#endif -#define lwip_ntohl(x) lwip_htonl(x) - -/* These macros should be calculated by the preprocessor and are used - with compile-time constants only (so that there is no little-endian - overhead at runtime). */ -#define PP_HTONS(x) ((u16_t)((((x) & (u16_t)0x00ffU) << 8) | (((x) & (u16_t)0xff00U) >> 8))) -#define PP_NTOHS(x) PP_HTONS(x) -#define PP_HTONL(x) ((((x) & (u32_t)0x000000ffUL) << 24) | \ - (((x) & (u32_t)0x0000ff00UL) << 8) | \ - (((x) & (u32_t)0x00ff0000UL) >> 8) | \ - (((x) & (u32_t)0xff000000UL) >> 24)) -#define PP_NTOHL(x) PP_HTONL(x) -#endif /* BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN */ - -/* Provide usual function names as macros for users, but this can be turned off */ -#ifndef LWIP_DONT_PROVIDE_BYTEORDER_FUNCTIONS -#define htons(x) lwip_htons(x) -#define ntohs(x) lwip_ntohs(x) -#define htonl(x) lwip_htonl(x) -#define ntohl(x) lwip_ntohl(x) -#endif - -/* Functions that are not available as standard implementations. - * In cc.h, you can #define these to implementations available on - * your platform to save some code bytes if you use these functions - * in your application, too. - */ - -#ifndef lwip_itoa -/* This can be #defined to itoa() or snprintf(result, bufsize, "%d", number) depending on your platform */ -void lwip_itoa(char *result, size_t bufsize, int number); -#endif -#ifndef lwip_strnicmp -/* This can be #defined to strnicmp() or strncasecmp() depending on your platform */ -int lwip_strnicmp(const char *str1, const char *str2, size_t len); -#endif -#ifndef lwip_stricmp -/* This can be #defined to stricmp() or strcasecmp() depending on your platform */ -int lwip_stricmp(const char *str1, const char *str2); -#endif -#ifndef lwip_strnstr -/* This can be #defined to strnstr() depending on your platform */ -char *lwip_strnstr(const char *buffer, const char *token, size_t n); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_DEF_H */ +/** + * @file + * various utility macros + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +/** + * @defgroup perf Performance measurement + * @ingroup sys_layer + * All defines related to this section must not be placed in lwipopts.h, + * but in arch/perf.h! + * Measurement calls made throughout lwip, these can be defined to nothing. + * - PERF_START: start measuring something. + * - PERF_STOP(x): stop measuring something, and record the result. + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_DEF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_DEF_H + +/* arch.h might define NULL already */ +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#if LWIP_PERF +#include "arch/perf.h" +#else /* LWIP_PERF */ +#define PERF_START /* null definition */ +#define PERF_STOP(x) /* null definition */ +#endif /* LWIP_PERF */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define LWIP_MAX(x, y) (((x) > (y)) ? (x) : (y)) +#define LWIP_MIN(x, y) (((x) < (y)) ? (x) : (y)) + +/* Get the number of entries in an array ('x' must NOT be a pointer!) */ +#define LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0])) + +/** Create u32_t value from bytes */ +#define LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d) (((u32_t)((a)&0xff) << 24) | \ + ((u32_t)((b)&0xff) << 16) | \ + ((u32_t)((c)&0xff) << 8) | \ + (u32_t)((d)&0xff)) + +#ifndef NULL +#ifdef __cplusplus +#define NULL 0 +#else +#define NULL ((void *)0) +#endif +#endif + +#if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN +#define lwip_htons(x) ((u16_t)(x)) +#define lwip_ntohs(x) ((u16_t)(x)) +#define lwip_htonl(x) ((u32_t)(x)) +#define lwip_ntohl(x) ((u32_t)(x)) +#define PP_HTONS(x) ((u16_t)(x)) +#define PP_NTOHS(x) ((u16_t)(x)) +#define PP_HTONL(x) ((u32_t)(x)) +#define PP_NTOHL(x) ((u32_t)(x)) +#else /* BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN */ +#ifndef lwip_htons +u16_t lwip_htons(u16_t x); +#endif +#define lwip_ntohs(x) lwip_htons(x) + +#ifndef lwip_htonl +u32_t lwip_htonl(u32_t x); +#endif +#define lwip_ntohl(x) lwip_htonl(x) + +/* These macros should be calculated by the preprocessor and are used + with compile-time constants only (so that there is no little-endian + overhead at runtime). */ +#define PP_HTONS(x) ((u16_t)((((x) & (u16_t)0x00ffU) << 8) | (((x) & (u16_t)0xff00U) >> 8))) +#define PP_NTOHS(x) PP_HTONS(x) +#define PP_HTONL(x) ((((x) & (u32_t)0x000000ffUL) << 24) | \ + (((x) & (u32_t)0x0000ff00UL) << 8) | \ + (((x) & (u32_t)0x00ff0000UL) >> 8) | \ + (((x) & (u32_t)0xff000000UL) >> 24)) +#define PP_NTOHL(x) PP_HTONL(x) +#endif /* BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN */ + +/* Provide usual function names as macros for users, but this can be turned off */ +#ifndef LWIP_DONT_PROVIDE_BYTEORDER_FUNCTIONS +#define htons(x) lwip_htons(x) +#define ntohs(x) lwip_ntohs(x) +#define htonl(x) lwip_htonl(x) +#define ntohl(x) lwip_ntohl(x) +#endif + +/* Functions that are not available as standard implementations. + * In cc.h, you can #define these to implementations available on + * your platform to save some code bytes if you use these functions + * in your application, too. + */ + +#ifndef lwip_itoa +/* This can be #defined to itoa() or snprintf(result, bufsize, "%d", number) depending on your platform */ +void lwip_itoa(char *result, size_t bufsize, int number); +#endif +#ifndef lwip_strnicmp +/* This can be #defined to strnicmp() or strncasecmp() depending on your platform */ +int lwip_strnicmp(const char *str1, const char *str2, size_t len); +#endif +#ifndef lwip_stricmp +/* This can be #defined to stricmp() or strcasecmp() depending on your platform */ +int lwip_stricmp(const char *str1, const char *str2); +#endif +#ifndef lwip_strnstr +/* This can be #defined to strnstr() depending on your platform */ +char *lwip_strnstr(const char *buffer, const char *token, size_t n); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_DEF_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp.h index 50358bd2..06339ca3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp.h @@ -1,137 +1,137 @@ -/** - * @file - * DHCP client API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Leon Woestenberg - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Leon Woestenberg - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_DHCP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_DHCP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_DHCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** period (in seconds) of the application calling dhcp_coarse_tmr() */ -#define DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS 60 -/** period (in milliseconds) of the application calling dhcp_coarse_tmr() */ -#define DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_MSECS (DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS * 1000UL) -/** period (in milliseconds) of the application calling dhcp_fine_tmr() */ -#define DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS 500 - -#define DHCP_BOOT_FILE_LEN 128U - -/* AutoIP cooperation flags (struct dhcp.autoip_coop_state) */ -typedef enum { - DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF = 0, - DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON = 1 -} dhcp_autoip_coop_state_enum_t; - -struct dhcp { - /** transaction identifier of last sent request */ - u32_t xid; - /** track PCB allocation state */ - u8_t pcb_allocated; - /** current DHCP state machine state */ - u8_t state; - /** retries of current request */ - u8_t tries; -#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP - u8_t autoip_coop_state; -#endif - u8_t subnet_mask_given; - - u16_t request_timeout; /* #ticks with period DHCP_FINE_TIMER_SECS for request timeout */ - u16_t t1_timeout; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS for renewal time */ - u16_t t2_timeout; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS for rebind time */ - u16_t t1_renew_time; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS until next renew try */ - u16_t t2_rebind_time; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS until next rebind try */ - u16_t lease_used; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS since last received DHCP ack */ - u16_t t0_timeout; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS for lease time */ - ip_addr_t server_ip_addr; /* dhcp server address that offered this lease (ip_addr_t because passed to UDP) */ - ip4_addr_t offered_ip_addr; - ip4_addr_t offered_sn_mask; - ip4_addr_t offered_gw_addr; - - u32_t offered_t0_lease; /* lease period (in seconds) */ - u32_t offered_t1_renew; /* recommended renew time (usually 50% of lease period) */ - u32_t offered_t2_rebind; /* recommended rebind time (usually 87.5 of lease period) */ -#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE - ip4_addr_t offered_si_addr; - char boot_file_name[DHCP_BOOT_FILE_LEN]; -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTPFILE */ -}; - -void dhcp_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp); -/** Remove a struct dhcp previously set to the netif using dhcp_set_struct() */ -#define dhcp_remove_struct(netif) netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, NULL) -void dhcp_cleanup(struct netif *netif); -err_t dhcp_start(struct netif *netif); -err_t dhcp_renew(struct netif *netif); -err_t dhcp_release(struct netif *netif); -void dhcp_stop(struct netif *netif); -void dhcp_release_and_stop(struct netif *netif); -void dhcp_inform(struct netif *netif); -void dhcp_network_changed(struct netif *netif); -#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK -void dhcp_arp_reply(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *addr); -#endif -u8_t dhcp_supplied_address(const struct netif *netif); -/* to be called every minute */ -void dhcp_coarse_tmr(void); -/* to be called every half second */ -void dhcp_fine_tmr(void); - -#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV -/** This function must exist, in other to add offered NTP servers to - * the NTP (or SNTP) engine. - * See LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS */ -extern void dhcp_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num_ntp_servers, const ip4_addr_t *ntp_server_addrs); -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ - -#define netif_dhcp_data(netif) ((struct dhcp *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP)) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ - -#endif /*LWIP_HDR_DHCP_H*/ +/** + * @file + * DHCP client API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Leon Woestenberg + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Leon Woestenberg + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_DHCP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_DHCP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_DHCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** period (in seconds) of the application calling dhcp_coarse_tmr() */ +#define DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS 60 +/** period (in milliseconds) of the application calling dhcp_coarse_tmr() */ +#define DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_MSECS (DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS * 1000UL) +/** period (in milliseconds) of the application calling dhcp_fine_tmr() */ +#define DHCP_FINE_TIMER_MSECS 500 + +#define DHCP_BOOT_FILE_LEN 128U + +/* AutoIP cooperation flags (struct dhcp.autoip_coop_state) */ +typedef enum { + DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_OFF = 0, + DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_STATE_ON = 1 +} dhcp_autoip_coop_state_enum_t; + +struct dhcp { + /** transaction identifier of last sent request */ + u32_t xid; + /** track PCB allocation state */ + u8_t pcb_allocated; + /** current DHCP state machine state */ + u8_t state; + /** retries of current request */ + u8_t tries; +#if LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP + u8_t autoip_coop_state; +#endif + u8_t subnet_mask_given; + + u16_t request_timeout; /* #ticks with period DHCP_FINE_TIMER_SECS for request timeout */ + u16_t t1_timeout; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS for renewal time */ + u16_t t2_timeout; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS for rebind time */ + u16_t t1_renew_time; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS until next renew try */ + u16_t t2_rebind_time; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS until next rebind try */ + u16_t lease_used; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS since last received DHCP ack */ + u16_t t0_timeout; /* #ticks with period DHCP_COARSE_TIMER_SECS for lease time */ + ip_addr_t server_ip_addr; /* dhcp server address that offered this lease (ip_addr_t because passed to UDP) */ + ip4_addr_t offered_ip_addr; + ip4_addr_t offered_sn_mask; + ip4_addr_t offered_gw_addr; + + u32_t offered_t0_lease; /* lease period (in seconds) */ + u32_t offered_t1_renew; /* recommended renew time (usually 50% of lease period) */ + u32_t offered_t2_rebind; /* recommended rebind time (usually 87.5 of lease period) */ +#if LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE + ip4_addr_t offered_si_addr; + char boot_file_name[DHCP_BOOT_FILE_LEN]; +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_BOOTPFILE */ +}; + +void dhcp_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp); +/** Remove a struct dhcp previously set to the netif using dhcp_set_struct() */ +#define dhcp_remove_struct(netif) netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, NULL) +void dhcp_cleanup(struct netif *netif); +err_t dhcp_start(struct netif *netif); +err_t dhcp_renew(struct netif *netif); +err_t dhcp_release(struct netif *netif); +void dhcp_stop(struct netif *netif); +void dhcp_release_and_stop(struct netif *netif); +void dhcp_inform(struct netif *netif); +void dhcp_network_changed(struct netif *netif); +#if DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK +void dhcp_arp_reply(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *addr); +#endif +u8_t dhcp_supplied_address(const struct netif *netif); +/* to be called every minute */ +void dhcp_coarse_tmr(void); +/* to be called every half second */ +void dhcp_fine_tmr(void); + +#if LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV +/** This function must exist, in other to add offered NTP servers to + * the NTP (or SNTP) engine. + * See LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS */ +extern void dhcp_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num_ntp_servers, const ip4_addr_t *ntp_server_addrs); +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV */ + +#define netif_dhcp_data(netif) ((struct dhcp *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP */ + +#endif /*LWIP_HDR_DHCP_H*/ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp6.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp6.h index bb5ab86d..245a840b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/dhcp6.h @@ -1,103 +1,103 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * DHCPv6 client: IPv6 address autoconfiguration as per - * RFC 3315 (stateful DHCPv6) and - * RFC 3736 (stateless DHCPv6). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_DHCP6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_DHCP6_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** period (in milliseconds) of the application calling dhcp6_tmr() */ -#define DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS 500 - -struct dhcp6 { - /** transaction identifier of last sent request */ - u32_t xid; - /** track PCB allocation state */ - u8_t pcb_allocated; - /** current DHCPv6 state machine state */ - u8_t state; - /** retries of current request */ - u8_t tries; - /** if request config is triggered while another action is active, this keeps track of it */ - u8_t request_config_pending; - /** #ticks with period DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS for request timeout */ - u16_t request_timeout; -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL - /* @todo: add more members here to keep track of stateful DHCPv6 data, like lease times */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL */ -}; - -void dhcp6_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6); -/** Remove a struct dhcp6 previously set to the netif using dhcp6_set_struct() */ -#define dhcp6_remove_struct(netif) netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, NULL) -void dhcp6_cleanup(struct netif *netif); - -err_t dhcp6_enable_stateful(struct netif *netif); -err_t dhcp6_enable_stateless(struct netif *netif); -void dhcp6_disable(struct netif *netif); - -void dhcp6_tmr(void); - -void dhcp6_nd6_ra_trigger(struct netif *netif, u8_t managed_addr_config, u8_t other_config); - -#if LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV -/** This function must exist, in other to add offered NTP servers to - * the NTP (or SNTP) engine. - * See LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS */ -extern void dhcp6_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num_ntp_servers, const ip_addr_t *ntp_server_addrs); -#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV */ - -#define netif_dhcp6_data(netif) ((struct dhcp6 *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6)) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_DHCP6_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * DHCPv6 client: IPv6 address autoconfiguration as per + * RFC 3315 (stateful DHCPv6) and + * RFC 3736 (stateless DHCPv6). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_DHCP6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_DHCP6_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** period (in milliseconds) of the application calling dhcp6_tmr() */ +#define DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS 500 + +struct dhcp6 { + /** transaction identifier of last sent request */ + u32_t xid; + /** track PCB allocation state */ + u8_t pcb_allocated; + /** current DHCPv6 state machine state */ + u8_t state; + /** retries of current request */ + u8_t tries; + /** if request config is triggered while another action is active, this keeps track of it */ + u8_t request_config_pending; + /** #ticks with period DHCP6_TIMER_MSECS for request timeout */ + u16_t request_timeout; +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL + /* @todo: add more members here to keep track of stateful DHCPv6 data, like lease times */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL */ +}; + +void dhcp6_set_struct(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp6); +/** Remove a struct dhcp6 previously set to the netif using dhcp6_set_struct() */ +#define dhcp6_remove_struct(netif) netif_set_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, NULL) +void dhcp6_cleanup(struct netif *netif); + +err_t dhcp6_enable_stateful(struct netif *netif); +err_t dhcp6_enable_stateless(struct netif *netif); +void dhcp6_disable(struct netif *netif); + +void dhcp6_tmr(void); + +void dhcp6_nd6_ra_trigger(struct netif *netif, u8_t managed_addr_config, u8_t other_config); + +#if LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV +/** This function must exist, in other to add offered NTP servers to + * the NTP (or SNTP) engine. + * See LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS */ +extern void dhcp6_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num_ntp_servers, const ip_addr_t *ntp_server_addrs); +#endif /* LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV */ + +#define netif_dhcp6_data(netif) ((struct dhcp6 *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_DHCP6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/dns.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/dns.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/dns.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/dns.h index 5fc2da87..1e421f7e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/dns.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/dns.h @@ -1,133 +1,133 @@ -/** - * @file - * DNS API - */ - -/** - * lwip DNS resolver header file. - - * Author: Jim Pettinato - * April 2007 - - * ported from uIP resolv.c Copyright (c) 2002-2003, Adam Dunkels. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote - * products derived from this software without specific prior - * written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS - * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE - * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, - * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_DNS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_DNS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_DNS - -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** DNS timer period */ -#define DNS_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 - -/* DNS resolve types: */ -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4 0 -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6 1 -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6 2 /* try to resolve IPv4 first, try IPv6 if IPv4 fails only */ -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4 3 /* try to resolve IPv6 first, try IPv4 if IPv6 fails only */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -#ifndef LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6 -#endif -#elif LWIP_IPV4 -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4 -#else -#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6 -#endif - -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST -/** struct used for local host-list */ -struct local_hostlist_entry { - /** static hostname */ - const char *name; - /** static host address in network byteorder */ - ip_addr_t addr; - struct local_hostlist_entry *next; -}; -#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_ELEM(name, addr_init) \ - { \ - name, addr_init, NULL \ - } -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC -#ifndef DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN -#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH -#endif -#define LOCALHOSTLIST_ELEM_SIZE ((sizeof(struct local_hostlist_entry) + DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN + 1)) -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -extern const ip_addr_t dns_mquery_v4group; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 -extern const ip_addr_t dns_mquery_v6group; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** Callback which is invoked when a hostname is found. - * A function of this type must be implemented by the application using the DNS resolver. - * @param name pointer to the name that was looked up. - * @param ipaddr pointer to an ip_addr_t containing the IP address of the hostname, - * or NULL if the name could not be found (or on any other error). - * @param callback_arg a user-specified callback argument passed to dns_gethostbyname -*/ -typedef void (*dns_found_callback)(const char *name, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *callback_arg); - -void dns_init(void); -void dns_tmr(void); -void dns_setserver(u8_t numdns, const ip_addr_t *dnsserver); -const ip_addr_t *dns_getserver(u8_t numdns); -err_t dns_gethostbyname(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, - dns_found_callback found, void *callback_arg); -err_t dns_gethostbyname_addrtype(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, - dns_found_callback found, void *callback_arg, - u8_t dns_addrtype); - -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST -size_t dns_local_iterate(dns_found_callback iterator_fn, void *iterator_arg); -err_t dns_local_lookup(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype); -#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC -int dns_local_removehost(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *addr); -err_t dns_local_addhost(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *addr); -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_DNS_H */ +/** + * @file + * DNS API + */ + +/** + * lwip DNS resolver header file. + + * Author: Jim Pettinato + * April 2007 + + * ported from uIP resolv.c Copyright (c) 2002-2003, Adam Dunkels. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software without specific prior + * written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE + * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_DNS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_DNS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_DNS + +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** DNS timer period */ +#define DNS_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 + +/* DNS resolve types: */ +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4 0 +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6 1 +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6 2 /* try to resolve IPv4 first, try IPv6 if IPv4 fails only */ +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6_IPV4 3 /* try to resolve IPv6 first, try IPv4 if IPv6 fails only */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +#ifndef LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4_IPV6 +#endif +#elif LWIP_IPV4 +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV4 +#else +#define LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_DEFAULT LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_IPV6 +#endif + +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST +/** struct used for local host-list */ +struct local_hostlist_entry { + /** static hostname */ + const char *name; + /** static host address in network byteorder */ + ip_addr_t addr; + struct local_hostlist_entry *next; +}; +#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_ELEM(name, addr_init) \ + { \ + name, addr_init, NULL \ + } +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC +#ifndef DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN +#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH +#endif +#define LOCALHOSTLIST_ELEM_SIZE ((sizeof(struct local_hostlist_entry) + DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_MAX_NAMELEN + 1)) +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +extern const ip_addr_t dns_mquery_v4group; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 +extern const ip_addr_t dns_mquery_v6group; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** Callback which is invoked when a hostname is found. + * A function of this type must be implemented by the application using the DNS resolver. + * @param name pointer to the name that was looked up. + * @param ipaddr pointer to an ip_addr_t containing the IP address of the hostname, + * or NULL if the name could not be found (or on any other error). + * @param callback_arg a user-specified callback argument passed to dns_gethostbyname +*/ +typedef void (*dns_found_callback)(const char *name, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, void *callback_arg); + +void dns_init(void); +void dns_tmr(void); +void dns_setserver(u8_t numdns, const ip_addr_t *dnsserver); +const ip_addr_t *dns_getserver(u8_t numdns); +err_t dns_gethostbyname(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, + dns_found_callback found, void *callback_arg); +err_t dns_gethostbyname_addrtype(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, + dns_found_callback found, void *callback_arg, + u8_t dns_addrtype); + +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST +size_t dns_local_iterate(dns_found_callback iterator_fn, void *iterator_arg); +err_t dns_local_lookup(const char *hostname, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype); +#if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC +int dns_local_removehost(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *addr); +err_t dns_local_addhost(const char *hostname, const ip_addr_t *addr); +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_DNS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/err.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/err.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/err.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/err.h index 47c82c86..6c87414b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/err.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/err.h @@ -1,117 +1,117 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP Error codes - */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ERR_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ERR_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/arch.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @defgroup infrastructure_errors Error codes - * @ingroup infrastructure - * @{ - */ - -/** Definitions for error constants. */ -typedef enum { - /** No error, everything OK. */ - ERR_OK = 0, - /** Out of memory error. */ - ERR_MEM = -1, - /** Buffer error. */ - ERR_BUF = -2, - /** Timeout. */ - ERR_TIMEOUT = -3, - /** Routing problem. */ - ERR_RTE = -4, - /** Operation in progress */ - ERR_INPROGRESS = -5, - /** Illegal value. */ - ERR_VAL = -6, - /** Operation would block. */ - ERR_WOULDBLOCK = -7, - /** Address in use. */ - ERR_USE = -8, - /** Already connecting. */ - ERR_ALREADY = -9, - /** Conn already established.*/ - ERR_ISCONN = -10, - /** Not connected. */ - ERR_CONN = -11, - /** Low-level netif error */ - ERR_IF = -12, - - /** Connection aborted. */ - ERR_ABRT = -13, - /** Connection reset. */ - ERR_RST = -14, - /** Connection closed. */ - ERR_CLSD = -15, - /** Illegal argument. */ - ERR_ARG = -16 -} err_enum_t; - -/** Define LWIP_ERR_T in cc.h if you want to use - * a different type for your platform (must be signed). */ -#ifdef LWIP_ERR_T -typedef LWIP_ERR_T err_t; -#else /* LWIP_ERR_T */ -typedef s8_t err_t; -#endif /* LWIP_ERR_T*/ - -/** - * @} - */ - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -extern const char *lwip_strerr(err_t err); -#else -#define lwip_strerr(x) "" -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ - -#if !NO_SYS -int err_to_errno(err_t err); -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ERR_H */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP Error codes + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ERR_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ERR_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/arch.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @defgroup infrastructure_errors Error codes + * @ingroup infrastructure + * @{ + */ + +/** Definitions for error constants. */ +typedef enum { + /** No error, everything OK. */ + ERR_OK = 0, + /** Out of memory error. */ + ERR_MEM = -1, + /** Buffer error. */ + ERR_BUF = -2, + /** Timeout. */ + ERR_TIMEOUT = -3, + /** Routing problem. */ + ERR_RTE = -4, + /** Operation in progress */ + ERR_INPROGRESS = -5, + /** Illegal value. */ + ERR_VAL = -6, + /** Operation would block. */ + ERR_WOULDBLOCK = -7, + /** Address in use. */ + ERR_USE = -8, + /** Already connecting. */ + ERR_ALREADY = -9, + /** Conn already established.*/ + ERR_ISCONN = -10, + /** Not connected. */ + ERR_CONN = -11, + /** Low-level netif error */ + ERR_IF = -12, + + /** Connection aborted. */ + ERR_ABRT = -13, + /** Connection reset. */ + ERR_RST = -14, + /** Connection closed. */ + ERR_CLSD = -15, + /** Illegal argument. */ + ERR_ARG = -16 +} err_enum_t; + +/** Define LWIP_ERR_T in cc.h if you want to use + * a different type for your platform (must be signed). */ +#ifdef LWIP_ERR_T +typedef LWIP_ERR_T err_t; +#else /* LWIP_ERR_T */ +typedef s8_t err_t; +#endif /* LWIP_ERR_T*/ + +/** + * @} + */ + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +extern const char *lwip_strerr(err_t err); +#else +#define lwip_strerr(x) "" +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ + +#if !NO_SYS +int err_to_errno(err_t err); +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ERR_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/errno.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/errno.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/errno.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/errno.h index 3cc62687..69b25f16 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/errno.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/errno.h @@ -1,198 +1,200 @@ -/** - * @file - * Posix Errno defines - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ERRNO_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ERRNO_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#ifdef LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO - -#define EPERM 1 /* Operation not permitted */ -#define ENOENT 2 /* No such file or directory */ -#define ESRCH 3 /* No such process */ -#define EINTR 4 /* Interrupted system call */ -#define EIO 5 /* I/O error */ -#define ENXIO 6 /* No such device or address */ -#define E2BIG 7 /* Arg list too long */ -#define ENOEXEC 8 /* Exec format error */ -#define EBADF 9 /* Bad file number */ -#define ECHILD 10 /* No child processes */ -#define EAGAIN 11 /* Try again */ -#define ENOMEM 12 /* Out of memory */ -#define EACCES 13 /* Permission denied */ -#define EFAULT 14 /* Bad address */ -#define ENOTBLK 15 /* Block device required */ -#define EBUSY 16 /* Device or resource busy */ -#define EEXIST 17 /* File exists */ -#define EXDEV 18 /* Cross-device link */ -#define ENODEV 19 /* No such device */ -#define ENOTDIR 20 /* Not a directory */ -#define EISDIR 21 /* Is a directory */ -#define EINVAL 22 /* Invalid argument */ -#define ENFILE 23 /* File table overflow */ -#define EMFILE 24 /* Too many open files */ -#define ENOTTY 25 /* Not a typewriter */ -#define ETXTBSY 26 /* Text file busy */ -#define EFBIG 27 /* File too large */ -#define ENOSPC 28 /* No space left on device */ -#define ESPIPE 29 /* Illegal seek */ -#define EROFS 30 /* Read-only file system */ -#define EMLINK 31 /* Too many links */ -#define EPIPE 32 /* Broken pipe */ -#define EDOM 33 /* Math argument out of domain of func */ -#define ERANGE 34 /* Math result not representable */ -#define EDEADLK 35 /* Resource deadlock would occur */ -#define ENAMETOOLONG 36 /* File name too long */ -#define ENOLCK 37 /* No record locks available */ -#define ENOSYS 38 /* Function not implemented */ -#define ENOTEMPTY 39 /* Directory not empty */ -#define ELOOP 40 /* Too many symbolic links encountered */ -#define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN /* Operation would block */ -#define ENOMSG 42 /* No message of desired type */ -#define EIDRM 43 /* Identifier removed */ -#define ECHRNG 44 /* Channel number out of range */ -#define EL2NSYNC 45 /* Level 2 not synchronized */ -#define EL3HLT 46 /* Level 3 halted */ -#define EL3RST 47 /* Level 3 reset */ -#define ELNRNG 48 /* Link number out of range */ -#define EUNATCH 49 /* Protocol driver not attached */ -#define ENOCSI 50 /* No CSI structure available */ -#define EL2HLT 51 /* Level 2 halted */ -#define EBADE 52 /* Invalid exchange */ -#define EBADR 53 /* Invalid request descriptor */ -#define EXFULL 54 /* Exchange full */ -#define ENOANO 55 /* No anode */ -#define EBADRQC 56 /* Invalid request code */ -#define EBADSLT 57 /* Invalid slot */ - -#define EDEADLOCK EDEADLK - -#define EBFONT 59 /* Bad font file format */ -#define ENOSTR 60 /* Device not a stream */ -#define ENODATA 61 /* No data available */ -#define ETIME 62 /* Timer expired */ -#define ENOSR 63 /* Out of streams resources */ -#define ENONET 64 /* Machine is not on the network */ -#define ENOPKG 65 /* Package not installed */ -#define EREMOTE 66 /* Object is remote */ -#define ENOLINK 67 /* Link has been severed */ -#define EADV 68 /* Advertise error */ -#define ESRMNT 69 /* Srmount error */ -#define ECOMM 70 /* Communication error on send */ -#define EPROTO 71 /* Protocol error */ -#define EMULTIHOP 72 /* Multihop attempted */ -#define EDOTDOT 73 /* RFS specific error */ -#define EBADMSG 74 /* Not a data message */ -#define EOVERFLOW 75 /* Value too large for defined data type */ -#define ENOTUNIQ 76 /* Name not unique on network */ -#define EBADFD 77 /* File descriptor in bad state */ -#define EREMCHG 78 /* Remote address changed */ -#define ELIBACC 79 /* Can not access a needed shared library */ -#define ELIBBAD 80 /* Accessing a corrupted shared library */ -#define ELIBSCN 81 /* .lib section in a.out corrupted */ -#define ELIBMAX 82 /* Attempting to link in too many shared libraries */ -#define ELIBEXEC 83 /* Cannot exec a shared library directly */ -#define EILSEQ 84 /* Illegal byte sequence */ -#define ERESTART 85 /* Interrupted system call should be restarted */ -#define ESTRPIPE 86 /* Streams pipe error */ -#define EUSERS 87 /* Too many users */ -#define ENOTSOCK 88 /* Socket operation on non-socket */ -#define EDESTADDRREQ 89 /* Destination address required */ -#define EMSGSIZE 90 /* Message too long */ -#define EPROTOTYPE 91 /* Protocol wrong type for socket */ -#define ENOPROTOOPT 92 /* Protocol not available */ -#define EPROTONOSUPPORT 93 /* Protocol not supported */ -#define ESOCKTNOSUPPORT 94 /* Socket type not supported */ -#define EOPNOTSUPP 95 /* Operation not supported on transport endpoint */ -#define EPFNOSUPPORT 96 /* Protocol family not supported */ -#define EAFNOSUPPORT 97 /* Address family not supported by protocol */ -#define EADDRINUSE 98 /* Address already in use */ -#define EADDRNOTAVAIL 99 /* Cannot assign requested address */ -#define ENETDOWN 100 /* Network is down */ -#define ENETUNREACH 101 /* Network is unreachable */ -#define ENETRESET 102 /* Network dropped connection because of reset */ -#define ECONNABORTED 103 /* Software caused connection abort */ -#define ECONNRESET 104 /* Connection reset by peer */ -#define ENOBUFS 105 /* No buffer space available */ -#define EISCONN 106 /* Transport endpoint is already connected */ -#define ENOTCONN 107 /* Transport endpoint is not connected */ -#define ESHUTDOWN 108 /* Cannot send after transport endpoint shutdown */ -#define ETOOMANYREFS 109 /* Too many references: cannot splice */ -#define ETIMEDOUT 110 /* Connection timed out */ -#define ECONNREFUSED 111 /* Connection refused */ -#define EHOSTDOWN 112 /* Host is down */ -#define EHOSTUNREACH 113 /* No route to host */ -#define EALREADY 114 /* Operation already in progress */ -#define EINPROGRESS 115 /* Operation now in progress */ -#define ESTALE 116 /* Stale NFS file handle */ -#define EUCLEAN 117 /* Structure needs cleaning */ -#define ENOTNAM 118 /* Not a XENIX named type file */ -#define ENAVAIL 119 /* No XENIX semaphores available */ -#define EISNAM 120 /* Is a named type file */ -#define EREMOTEIO 121 /* Remote I/O error */ -#define EDQUOT 122 /* Quota exceeded */ - -#define ENOMEDIUM 123 /* No medium found */ -#define EMEDIUMTYPE 124 /* Wrong medium type */ - -#ifndef errno -extern int errno; -#endif - -#else /* LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO */ - -/* Define LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE if you want to include here */ -#ifdef LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE -#include -#else /* LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE */ -/* Define LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE to an equivalent of to include the error defines here */ -#ifdef LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE -#include LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE -#endif /* LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE */ -#endif /* LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE */ - -#endif /* LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ERRNO_H */ +/** + * @file + * Posix Errno defines + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ERRNO_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ERRNO_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#ifdef LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO + +#define EPERM 1 /* Operation not permitted */ +#define ENOENT 2 /* No such file or directory */ +#define ESRCH 3 /* No such process */ +#define EINTR 4 /* Interrupted system call */ +#define EIO 5 /* I/O error */ +#define ENXIO 6 /* No such device or address */ +#define E2BIG 7 /* Arg list too long */ +#define ENOEXEC 8 /* Exec format error */ +#define EBADF 9 /* Bad file number */ +#define ECHILD 10 /* No child processes */ +#define EAGAIN 11 /* Try again */ +#define ENOMEM 12 /* Out of memory */ +#define EACCES 13 /* Permission denied */ +#define EFAULT 14 /* Bad address */ +#define ENOTBLK 15 /* Block device required */ +#define EBUSY 16 /* Device or resource busy */ +#define EEXIST 17 /* File exists */ +#define EXDEV 18 /* Cross-device link */ +#define ENODEV 19 /* No such device */ +#define ENOTDIR 20 /* Not a directory */ +#define EISDIR 21 /* Is a directory */ +#define EINVAL 22 /* Invalid argument */ +#define ENFILE 23 /* File table overflow */ +#define EMFILE 24 /* Too many open files */ +#define ENOTTY 25 /* Not a typewriter */ +#define ETXTBSY 26 /* Text file busy */ +#define EFBIG 27 /* File too large */ +#define ENOSPC 28 /* No space left on device */ +#define ESPIPE 29 /* Illegal seek */ +#define EROFS 30 /* Read-only file system */ +#define EMLINK 31 /* Too many links */ +#define EPIPE 32 /* Broken pipe */ +#define EDOM 33 /* Math argument out of domain of func */ +#define ERANGE 34 /* Math result not representable */ +#define EDEADLK 35 /* Resource deadlock would occur */ +#define ENAMETOOLONG 36 /* File name too long */ +#define ENOLCK 37 /* No record locks available */ +#define ENOSYS 38 /* Function not implemented */ +#define ENOTEMPTY 39 /* Directory not empty */ +#define ELOOP 40 /* Too many symbolic links encountered */ +#define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN /* Operation would block */ +#define ENOMSG 42 /* No message of desired type */ +#define EIDRM 43 /* Identifier removed */ +#define ECHRNG 44 /* Channel number out of range */ +#define EL2NSYNC 45 /* Level 2 not synchronized */ +#define EL3HLT 46 /* Level 3 halted */ +#define EL3RST 47 /* Level 3 reset */ +#define ELNRNG 48 /* Link number out of range */ +#define EUNATCH 49 /* Protocol driver not attached */ +#define ENOCSI 50 /* No CSI structure available */ +#define EL2HLT 51 /* Level 2 halted */ +#define EBADE 52 /* Invalid exchange */ +#define EBADR 53 /* Invalid request descriptor */ +#define EXFULL 54 /* Exchange full */ +#define ENOANO 55 /* No anode */ +#define EBADRQC 56 /* Invalid request code */ +#define EBADSLT 57 /* Invalid slot */ + +#define EDEADLOCK EDEADLK + +#define EBFONT 59 /* Bad font file format */ +#define ENOSTR 60 /* Device not a stream */ +#define ENODATA 61 /* No data available */ +#define ETIME 62 /* Timer expired */ +#define ENOSR 63 /* Out of streams resources */ +#define ENONET 64 /* Machine is not on the network */ +#define ENOPKG 65 /* Package not installed */ +#define EREMOTE 66 /* Object is remote */ +#define ENOLINK 67 /* Link has been severed */ +#define EADV 68 /* Advertise error */ +#define ESRMNT 69 /* Srmount error */ +#define ECOMM 70 /* Communication error on send */ +#define EPROTO 71 /* Protocol error */ +#define EMULTIHOP 72 /* Multihop attempted */ +#define EDOTDOT 73 /* RFS specific error */ +#define EBADMSG 74 /* Not a data message */ +#define EOVERFLOW 75 /* Value too large for defined data type */ +#define ENOTUNIQ 76 /* Name not unique on network */ +#define EBADFD 77 /* File descriptor in bad state */ +#define EREMCHG 78 /* Remote address changed */ +#define ELIBACC 79 /* Can not access a needed shared library */ +#define ELIBBAD 80 /* Accessing a corrupted shared library */ +#define ELIBSCN 81 /* .lib section in a.out corrupted */ +#define ELIBMAX 82 /* Attempting to link in too many shared libraries */ +#define ELIBEXEC 83 /* Cannot exec a shared library directly */ +#define EILSEQ 84 /* Illegal byte sequence */ +#define ERESTART 85 /* Interrupted system call should be restarted */ +#define ESTRPIPE 86 /* Streams pipe error */ +#define EUSERS 87 /* Too many users */ +#define ENOTSOCK 88 /* Socket operation on non-socket */ +#define EDESTADDRREQ 89 /* Destination address required */ +#define EMSGSIZE 90 /* Message too long */ +#define EPROTOTYPE 91 /* Protocol wrong type for socket */ +#define ENOPROTOOPT 92 /* Protocol not available */ +#define EPROTONOSUPPORT 93 /* Protocol not supported */ +#define ESOCKTNOSUPPORT 94 /* Socket type not supported */ +#define EOPNOTSUPP 95 /* Operation not supported on transport endpoint */ +#define EPFNOSUPPORT 96 /* Protocol family not supported */ +#define EAFNOSUPPORT 97 /* Address family not supported by protocol */ +#define EADDRINUSE 98 /* Address already in use */ +#define EADDRNOTAVAIL 99 /* Cannot assign requested address */ +#define ENETDOWN 100 /* Network is down */ +#define ENETUNREACH 101 /* Network is unreachable */ +#define ENETRESET 102 /* Network dropped connection because of reset */ +#define ECONNABORTED 103 /* Software caused connection abort */ +#define ECONNRESET 104 /* Connection reset by peer */ +#define ENOBUFS 105 /* No buffer space available */ +#define EISCONN 106 /* Transport endpoint is already connected */ +#define ENOTCONN 107 /* Transport endpoint is not connected */ +#define ESHUTDOWN 108 /* Cannot send after transport endpoint shutdown */ +#define ETOOMANYREFS 109 /* Too many references: cannot splice */ +#define ETIMEDOUT 110 /* Connection timed out */ +#define ECONNREFUSED 111 /* Connection refused */ +#define EHOSTDOWN 112 /* Host is down */ +#define EHOSTUNREACH 113 /* No route to host */ +#define EALREADY 114 /* Operation already in progress */ +#define EINPROGRESS 115 /* Operation now in progress */ +#define ESTALE 116 /* Stale NFS file handle */ +#define EUCLEAN 117 /* Structure needs cleaning */ +#define ENOTNAM 118 /* Not a XENIX named type file */ +#define ENAVAIL 119 /* No XENIX semaphores available */ +#define EISNAM 120 /* Is a named type file */ +#define EREMOTEIO 121 /* Remote I/O error */ +#define EDQUOT 122 /* Quota exceeded */ + +#define ENOMEDIUM 123 /* No medium found */ +#define EMEDIUMTYPE 124 /* Wrong medium type */ + +#define ECANCELED 125 /* Operation canceled */ + +#ifndef errno +extern int errno; +#endif + +#else /* LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO */ + +/* Define LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE if you want to include here */ +#ifdef LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE +#include +#else /* LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE */ +/* Define LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE to an equivalent of to include the error defines here */ +#ifdef LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE +#include LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE +#endif /* LWIP_ERRNO_INCLUDE */ +#endif /* LWIP_ERRNO_STDINCLUDE */ + +#endif /* LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ERRNO_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/etharp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/etharp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/etharp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/etharp.h index 7990428f..8b95b534 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/etharp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/etharp.h @@ -1,105 +1,105 @@ -/** - * @file - * Ethernet output function - handles OUTGOING ethernet level traffic, implements - * ARP resolving. - * To be used in most low-level netif implementations - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Leon Woestenberg - * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHARP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHARP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/ip4.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/prot/etharp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** 1 seconds period */ -#define ARP_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 - -#if ARP_QUEUEING -/** struct for queueing outgoing packets for unknown address - * defined here to be accessed by memp.h - */ -struct etharp_q_entry { - struct etharp_q_entry *next; - struct pbuf *p; -}; -#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ - -#define etharp_init() /* Compatibility define, no init needed. */ -void etharp_tmr(void); -ssize_t etharp_find_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, - struct eth_addr **eth_ret, const ip4_addr_t **ip_ret); -int etharp_get_entry(size_t i, ip4_addr_t **ipaddr, struct netif **netif, struct eth_addr **eth_ret); -err_t etharp_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); -err_t etharp_query(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct pbuf *q); -err_t etharp_request(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); -/** For Ethernet network interfaces, we might want to send "gratuitous ARP"; - * this is an ARP packet sent by a node in order to spontaneously cause other - * nodes to update an entry in their ARP cache. - * From RFC 3220 "IP Mobility Support for IPv4" section 4.6. */ -#define etharp_gratuitous(netif) etharp_request((netif), netif_ip4_addr(netif)) -void etharp_cleanup_netif(struct netif *netif); - -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES -err_t etharp_add_static_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr); -err_t etharp_remove_static_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - -void etharp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ -#endif /* LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHARP_H */ +/** + * @file + * Ethernet output function - handles OUTGOING ethernet level traffic, implements + * ARP resolving. + * To be used in most low-level netif implementations + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Leon Woestenberg + * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHARP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHARP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/ip4.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/prot/etharp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** 1 seconds period */ +#define ARP_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 + +#if ARP_QUEUEING +/** struct for queueing outgoing packets for unknown address + * defined here to be accessed by memp.h + */ +struct etharp_q_entry { + struct etharp_q_entry *next; + struct pbuf *p; +}; +#endif /* ARP_QUEUEING */ + +#define etharp_init() /* Compatibility define, no init needed. */ +void etharp_tmr(void); +ssize_t etharp_find_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, + struct eth_addr **eth_ret, const ip4_addr_t **ip_ret); +int etharp_get_entry(size_t i, ip4_addr_t **ipaddr, struct netif **netif, struct eth_addr **eth_ret); +err_t etharp_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); +err_t etharp_query(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct pbuf *q); +err_t etharp_request(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); +/** For Ethernet network interfaces, we might want to send "gratuitous ARP"; + * this is an ARP packet sent by a node in order to spontaneously cause other + * nodes to update an entry in their ARP cache. + * From RFC 3220 "IP Mobility Support for IPv4" section 4.6. */ +#define etharp_gratuitous(netif) etharp_request((netif), netif_ip4_addr(netif)) +void etharp_cleanup_netif(struct netif *netif); + +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES +err_t etharp_add_static_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr); +err_t etharp_remove_static_entry(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + +void etharp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ +#endif /* LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHARP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ethip6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ethip6.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ethip6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ethip6.h index 3b50040f..3dd6a7f5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ethip6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ethip6.h @@ -1,66 +1,66 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * Ethernet output for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ETHIP6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ETHIP6_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ETHERNET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -err_t ethip6_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ETHERNET */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ETHIP6_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * Ethernet output for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ETHIP6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ETHIP6_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ETHERNET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +err_t ethip6_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ETHERNET */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ETHIP6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp.h index ed3fa5bc..e8a513b4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp.h @@ -1,120 +1,120 @@ -/** - * @file - * ICMP API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ICMP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ICMP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/prot/icmp.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6 -#include "lwip/icmp6.h" -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** ICMP destination unreachable codes */ -enum icmp_dur_type { - /** net unreachable */ - ICMP_DUR_NET = 0, - /** host unreachable */ - ICMP_DUR_HOST = 1, - /** protocol unreachable */ - ICMP_DUR_PROTO = 2, - /** port unreachable */ - ICMP_DUR_PORT = 3, - /** fragmentation needed and DF set */ - ICMP_DUR_FRAG = 4, - /** source route failed */ - ICMP_DUR_SR = 5 -}; - -/** ICMP time exceeded codes */ -enum icmp_te_type { - /** time to live exceeded in transit */ - ICMP_TE_TTL = 0, - /** fragment reassembly time exceeded */ - ICMP_TE_FRAG = 1 -}; - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -void icmp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -void icmp_dest_unreach(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp_dur_type t); -void icmp_time_exceeded(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp_te_type t); - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -#if LWIP_ICMP && LWIP_ICMP6 -#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) ((isipv6) ? \ - icmp6_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP6_DUR_PORT) : \ - icmp_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP_DUR_PORT)) -#elif LWIP_ICMP -#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) \ - do { \ - if (!(isipv6)) { \ - icmp_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP_DUR_PORT); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#elif LWIP_ICMP6 -#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) \ - do { \ - if (isipv6) { \ - icmp6_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP6_DUR_PORT); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#else -#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) -#endif -#elif LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6 -#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) icmp6_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP6_DUR_PORT) -#elif LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP -#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) icmp_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP_DUR_PORT) -#else /* (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6) || (LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP) */ -#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) -#endif /* (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6) || (LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP) LWIP_IPV4*/ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ICMP_H */ +/** + * @file + * ICMP API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ICMP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ICMP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/prot/icmp.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6 +#include "lwip/icmp6.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** ICMP destination unreachable codes */ +enum icmp_dur_type { + /** net unreachable */ + ICMP_DUR_NET = 0, + /** host unreachable */ + ICMP_DUR_HOST = 1, + /** protocol unreachable */ + ICMP_DUR_PROTO = 2, + /** port unreachable */ + ICMP_DUR_PORT = 3, + /** fragmentation needed and DF set */ + ICMP_DUR_FRAG = 4, + /** source route failed */ + ICMP_DUR_SR = 5 +}; + +/** ICMP time exceeded codes */ +enum icmp_te_type { + /** time to live exceeded in transit */ + ICMP_TE_TTL = 0, + /** fragment reassembly time exceeded */ + ICMP_TE_FRAG = 1 +}; + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +void icmp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +void icmp_dest_unreach(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp_dur_type t); +void icmp_time_exceeded(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp_te_type t); + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +#if LWIP_ICMP && LWIP_ICMP6 +#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) ((isipv6) ? \ + icmp6_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP6_DUR_PORT) : \ + icmp_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP_DUR_PORT)) +#elif LWIP_ICMP +#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) \ + do { \ + if (!(isipv6)) { \ + icmp_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP_DUR_PORT); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#elif LWIP_ICMP6 +#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) \ + do { \ + if (isipv6) { \ + icmp6_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP6_DUR_PORT); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else +#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) +#endif +#elif LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6 +#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) icmp6_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP6_DUR_PORT) +#elif LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP +#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) icmp_dest_unreach(pbuf, ICMP_DUR_PORT) +#else /* (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6) || (LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP) */ +#define icmp_port_unreach(isipv6, pbuf) +#endif /* (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6) || (LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ICMP) LWIP_IPV4*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ICMP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp6.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp6.h index bc5bf4bb..dcf5db1b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/icmp6.h @@ -1,70 +1,70 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * IPv6 version of ICMP, as per RFC 4443. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ICMP6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ICMP6_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/prot/icmp6.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_ICMP6 && LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -void icmp6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -void icmp6_dest_unreach(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_dur_code c); -void icmp6_packet_too_big(struct pbuf *p, u32_t mtu); -void icmp6_time_exceeded(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_te_code c); -void icmp6_time_exceeded_with_addrs(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_te_code c, - const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr); -void icmp6_param_problem(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_pp_code c, const void *pointer); - -#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ICMP6_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * IPv6 version of ICMP, as per RFC 4443. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ICMP6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ICMP6_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/prot/icmp6.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_ICMP6 && LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +void icmp6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +void icmp6_dest_unreach(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_dur_code c); +void icmp6_packet_too_big(struct pbuf *p, u32_t mtu); +void icmp6_time_exceeded(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_te_code c); +void icmp6_time_exceeded_with_addrs(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_te_code c, + const ip6_addr_t *src_addr, const ip6_addr_t *dest_addr); +void icmp6_param_problem(struct pbuf *p, enum icmp6_pp_code c, const void *pointer); + +#endif /* LWIP_ICMP6 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ICMP6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/if_api.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/if_api.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/if_api.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/if_api.h index 01ba7df7..8851a528 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/if_api.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/if_api.h @@ -1,68 +1,68 @@ -/** - * @file - * Interface Identification APIs from: - * RFC 3493: Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6 - * Section 4: Interface Identification - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Joel Cunningham, Garmin International, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Joel Cunningham - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IF_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define IF_NAMESIZE NETIF_NAMESIZE - -char *lwip_if_indextoname(unsigned int ifindex, char *ifname); -unsigned int lwip_if_nametoindex(const char *ifname); - -#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS -#define if_indextoname(ifindex, ifname) lwip_if_indextoname(ifindex, ifname) -#define if_nametoindex(ifname) lwip_if_nametoindex(ifname) -#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IF_H */ +/** + * @file + * Interface Identification APIs from: + * RFC 3493: Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6 + * Section 4: Interface Identification + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Joel Cunningham, Garmin International, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Joel Cunningham + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IF_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define IF_NAMESIZE NETIF_NAMESIZE + +char *lwip_if_indextoname(unsigned int ifindex, char *ifname); +unsigned int lwip_if_nametoindex(const char *ifname); + +#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS +#define if_indextoname(ifindex, ifname) lwip_if_indextoname(ifindex, ifname) +#define if_nametoindex(ifname) lwip_if_nametoindex(ifname) +#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IF_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/igmp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/igmp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/igmp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/igmp.h index 7123c499..414e2b96 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/igmp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/igmp.h @@ -1,115 +1,115 @@ -/** - * @file - * IGMP API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2002 CITEL Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. Neither the name of CITEL Technologies Ltd nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY CITEL TECHNOLOGIES AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' - * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CITEL TECHNOLOGIES OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is a contribution to the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * The Swedish Institute of Computer Science and Adam Dunkels - * are specifically granted permission to redistribute this - * source code. -*/ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IGMP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IGMP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* IGMP timer */ -#define IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL 100 /* Milliseconds */ -#define IGMP_V1_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR (1000 / IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL) -#define IGMP_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR (500 / IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL) - -/* Compatibility defines (don't use for new code) */ -#define IGMP_DEL_MAC_FILTER NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER -#define IGMP_ADD_MAC_FILTER NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER - -/** - * igmp group structure - there is - * a list of groups for each interface - * these should really be linked from the interface, but - * if we keep them separate we will not affect the lwip original code - * too much - * - * There will be a group for the all systems group address but this - * will not run the state machine as it is used to kick off reports - * from all the other groups - */ -struct igmp_group { - /** next link */ - struct igmp_group *next; - /** multicast address */ - ip4_addr_t group_address; - /** signifies we were the last person to report */ - u8_t last_reporter_flag; - /** current state of the group */ - u8_t group_state; - /** timer for reporting, negative is OFF */ - u16_t timer; - /** counter of simultaneous uses */ - u8_t use; -}; - -/* Prototypes */ -void igmp_init(void); -err_t igmp_start(struct netif *netif); -err_t igmp_stop(struct netif *netif); -void igmp_report_groups(struct netif *netif); -struct igmp_group *igmp_lookfor_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip4_addr_t *addr); -void igmp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp, const ip4_addr_t *dest); -err_t igmp_joingroup(const ip4_addr_t *ifaddr, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr); -err_t igmp_joingroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr); -err_t igmp_leavegroup(const ip4_addr_t *ifaddr, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr); -err_t igmp_leavegroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr); -void igmp_tmr(void); - -/** @ingroup igmp - * Get list head of IGMP groups for netif. - * Note: The allsystems group IP is contained in the list as first entry. - * @see @ref netif_set_igmp_mac_filter() - */ -#define netif_igmp_data(netif) ((struct igmp_group *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_IGMP)) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IGMP_H */ +/** + * @file + * IGMP API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 CITEL Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of CITEL Technologies Ltd nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY CITEL TECHNOLOGIES AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' + * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CITEL TECHNOLOGIES OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is a contribution to the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * The Swedish Institute of Computer Science and Adam Dunkels + * are specifically granted permission to redistribute this + * source code. +*/ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IGMP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IGMP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* IGMP timer */ +#define IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL 100 /* Milliseconds */ +#define IGMP_V1_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR (1000 / IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL) +#define IGMP_JOIN_DELAYING_MEMBER_TMR (500 / IGMP_TMR_INTERVAL) + +/* Compatibility defines (don't use for new code) */ +#define IGMP_DEL_MAC_FILTER NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER +#define IGMP_ADD_MAC_FILTER NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER + +/** + * igmp group structure - there is + * a list of groups for each interface + * these should really be linked from the interface, but + * if we keep them separate we will not affect the lwip original code + * too much + * + * There will be a group for the all systems group address but this + * will not run the state machine as it is used to kick off reports + * from all the other groups + */ +struct igmp_group { + /** next link */ + struct igmp_group *next; + /** multicast address */ + ip4_addr_t group_address; + /** signifies we were the last person to report */ + u8_t last_reporter_flag; + /** current state of the group */ + u8_t group_state; + /** timer for reporting, negative is OFF */ + u16_t timer; + /** counter of simultaneous uses */ + u8_t use; +}; + +/* Prototypes */ +void igmp_init(void); +err_t igmp_start(struct netif *netif); +err_t igmp_stop(struct netif *netif); +void igmp_report_groups(struct netif *netif); +struct igmp_group *igmp_lookfor_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip4_addr_t *addr); +void igmp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp, const ip4_addr_t *dest); +err_t igmp_joingroup(const ip4_addr_t *ifaddr, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr); +err_t igmp_joingroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr); +err_t igmp_leavegroup(const ip4_addr_t *ifaddr, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr); +err_t igmp_leavegroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *groupaddr); +void igmp_tmr(void); + +/** @ingroup igmp + * Get list head of IGMP groups for netif. + * Note: The allsystems group IP is contained in the list as first entry. + * @see @ref netif_set_igmp_mac_filter() + */ +#define netif_igmp_data(netif) ((struct igmp_group *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_IGMP)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IGMP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet.h index fa04c17f..c1a2be28 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet.h @@ -1,187 +1,187 @@ -/** - * @file - * This file (together with sockets.h) aims to provide structs and functions from - * - arpa/inet.h - * - netinet/in.h - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_INET_H -#define LWIP_HDR_INET_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* If your port already typedef's in_addr_t, define IN_ADDR_T_DEFINED - to prevent this code from redefining it. */ -#if !defined(in_addr_t) && !defined(IN_ADDR_T_DEFINED) -typedef u32_t in_addr_t; -#endif - -struct in_addr { - in_addr_t s_addr; -}; - -struct in6_addr { - union { - u32_t u32_addr[4]; - u8_t u8_addr[16]; - } un; -#define s6_addr un.u8_addr -}; - -/** 255.255.255.255 */ -#define INADDR_NONE IPADDR_NONE -/** 127.0.0.1 */ -#define INADDR_LOOPBACK IPADDR_LOOPBACK -/** 0.0.0.0 */ -#define INADDR_ANY IPADDR_ANY -/** 255.255.255.255 */ -#define INADDR_BROADCAST IPADDR_BROADCAST - -/** This macro can be used to initialize a variable of type struct in6_addr - to the IPv6 wildcard address. */ -#define IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT \ - { \ - { \ - { \ - 0, 0, 0, 0 \ - } \ - } \ - } -/** This macro can be used to initialize a variable of type struct in6_addr - to the IPv6 loopback address. */ -#define IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT \ - { \ - { \ - { \ - 0, 0, 0, PP_HTONL(1) \ - } \ - } \ - } -/** This variable is initialized by the system to contain the wildcard IPv6 address. */ -extern const struct in6_addr in6addr_any; - -/* Definitions of the bits in an (IPv4) Internet address integer. - - On subnets, host and network parts are found according to - the subnet mask, not these masks. */ -#define IN_CLASSA(a) IP_CLASSA(a) -#define IN_CLASSA_NET IP_CLASSA_NET -#define IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT IP_CLASSA_NSHIFT -#define IN_CLASSA_HOST IP_CLASSA_HOST -#define IN_CLASSA_MAX IP_CLASSA_MAX - -#define IN_CLASSB(b) IP_CLASSB(b) -#define IN_CLASSB_NET IP_CLASSB_NET -#define IN_CLASSB_NSHIFT IP_CLASSB_NSHIFT -#define IN_CLASSB_HOST IP_CLASSB_HOST -#define IN_CLASSB_MAX IP_CLASSB_MAX - -#define IN_CLASSC(c) IP_CLASSC(c) -#define IN_CLASSC_NET IP_CLASSC_NET -#define IN_CLASSC_NSHIFT IP_CLASSC_NSHIFT -#define IN_CLASSC_HOST IP_CLASSC_HOST -#define IN_CLASSC_MAX IP_CLASSC_MAX - -#define IN_CLASSD(d) IP_CLASSD(d) -#define IN_CLASSD_NET IP_CLASSD_NET /* These ones aren't really */ -#define IN_CLASSD_NSHIFT IP_CLASSD_NSHIFT /* net and host fields, but */ -#define IN_CLASSD_HOST IP_CLASSD_HOST /* routing needn't know. */ -#define IN_CLASSD_MAX IP_CLASSD_MAX - -#define IN_MULTICAST(a) IP_MULTICAST(a) - -#define IN_EXPERIMENTAL(a) IP_EXPERIMENTAL(a) -#define IN_BADCLASS(a) IP_BADCLASS(a) - -#define IN_LOOPBACKNET IP_LOOPBACKNET - -#ifndef INET_ADDRSTRLEN -#define INET_ADDRSTRLEN IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN -#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN IP6ADDR_STRLEN_MAX -#endif -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -#define inet_addr_from_ip4addr(target_inaddr, source_ipaddr) ((target_inaddr)->s_addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(source_ipaddr)) -#define inet_addr_to_ip4addr(target_ipaddr, source_inaddr) (ip4_addr_set_u32(target_ipaddr, (source_inaddr)->s_addr)) - -/* directly map this to the lwip internal functions */ -#define inet_addr(cp) ipaddr_addr(cp) -#define inet_aton(cp, addr) ip4addr_aton(cp, (ip4_addr_t *)addr) -#define inet_ntoa(addr) ip4addr_ntoa((const ip4_addr_t *)&(addr)) -#define inet_ntoa_r(addr, buf, buflen) ip4addr_ntoa_r((const ip4_addr_t *)&(addr), buf, buflen) - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#define inet6_addr_from_ip6addr(target_in6addr, source_ip6addr) \ - { \ - (target_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[0] = (source_ip6addr)->addr[0]; \ - (target_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[1] = (source_ip6addr)->addr[1]; \ - (target_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[2] = (source_ip6addr)->addr[2]; \ - (target_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[3] = (source_ip6addr)->addr[3]; \ - } -#define inet6_addr_to_ip6addr(target_ip6addr, source_in6addr) \ - { \ - (target_ip6addr)->addr[0] = (source_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[0]; \ - (target_ip6addr)->addr[1] = (source_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[1]; \ - (target_ip6addr)->addr[2] = (source_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[2]; \ - (target_ip6addr)->addr[3] = (source_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[3]; \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(target_ip6addr); \ - } - -/* directly map this to the lwip internal functions */ -#define inet6_aton(cp, addr) ip6addr_aton(cp, (ip6_addr_t *)addr) -#define inet6_ntoa(addr) ip6addr_ntoa((const ip6_addr_t *)&(addr)) -#define inet6_ntoa_r(addr, buf, buflen) ip6addr_ntoa_r((const ip6_addr_t *)&(addr), buf, buflen) - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_INET_H */ +/** + * @file + * This file (together with sockets.h) aims to provide structs and functions from + * - arpa/inet.h + * - netinet/in.h + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_INET_H +#define LWIP_HDR_INET_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* If your port already typedef's in_addr_t, define IN_ADDR_T_DEFINED + to prevent this code from redefining it. */ +#if !defined(in_addr_t) && !defined(IN_ADDR_T_DEFINED) +typedef u32_t in_addr_t; +#endif + +struct in_addr { + in_addr_t s_addr; +}; + +struct in6_addr { + union { + u32_t u32_addr[4]; + u8_t u8_addr[16]; + } un; +#define s6_addr un.u8_addr +}; + +/** 255.255.255.255 */ +#define INADDR_NONE IPADDR_NONE +/** 127.0.0.1 */ +#define INADDR_LOOPBACK IPADDR_LOOPBACK +/** 0.0.0.0 */ +#define INADDR_ANY IPADDR_ANY +/** 255.255.255.255 */ +#define INADDR_BROADCAST IPADDR_BROADCAST + +/** This macro can be used to initialize a variable of type struct in6_addr + to the IPv6 wildcard address. */ +#define IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT \ + { \ + { \ + { \ + 0, 0, 0, 0 \ + } \ + } \ + } +/** This macro can be used to initialize a variable of type struct in6_addr + to the IPv6 loopback address. */ +#define IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT \ + { \ + { \ + { \ + 0, 0, 0, PP_HTONL(1) \ + } \ + } \ + } +/** This variable is initialized by the system to contain the wildcard IPv6 address. */ +extern const struct in6_addr in6addr_any; + +/* Definitions of the bits in an (IPv4) Internet address integer. + + On subnets, host and network parts are found according to + the subnet mask, not these masks. */ +#define IN_CLASSA(a) IP_CLASSA(a) +#define IN_CLASSA_NET IP_CLASSA_NET +#define IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT IP_CLASSA_NSHIFT +#define IN_CLASSA_HOST IP_CLASSA_HOST +#define IN_CLASSA_MAX IP_CLASSA_MAX + +#define IN_CLASSB(b) IP_CLASSB(b) +#define IN_CLASSB_NET IP_CLASSB_NET +#define IN_CLASSB_NSHIFT IP_CLASSB_NSHIFT +#define IN_CLASSB_HOST IP_CLASSB_HOST +#define IN_CLASSB_MAX IP_CLASSB_MAX + +#define IN_CLASSC(c) IP_CLASSC(c) +#define IN_CLASSC_NET IP_CLASSC_NET +#define IN_CLASSC_NSHIFT IP_CLASSC_NSHIFT +#define IN_CLASSC_HOST IP_CLASSC_HOST +#define IN_CLASSC_MAX IP_CLASSC_MAX + +#define IN_CLASSD(d) IP_CLASSD(d) +#define IN_CLASSD_NET IP_CLASSD_NET /* These ones aren't really */ +#define IN_CLASSD_NSHIFT IP_CLASSD_NSHIFT /* net and host fields, but */ +#define IN_CLASSD_HOST IP_CLASSD_HOST /* routing needn't know. */ +#define IN_CLASSD_MAX IP_CLASSD_MAX + +#define IN_MULTICAST(a) IP_MULTICAST(a) + +#define IN_EXPERIMENTAL(a) IP_EXPERIMENTAL(a) +#define IN_BADCLASS(a) IP_BADCLASS(a) + +#define IN_LOOPBACKNET IP_LOOPBACKNET + +#ifndef INET_ADDRSTRLEN +#define INET_ADDRSTRLEN IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN +#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN IP6ADDR_STRLEN_MAX +#endif +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +#define inet_addr_from_ip4addr(target_inaddr, source_ipaddr) ((target_inaddr)->s_addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(source_ipaddr)) +#define inet_addr_to_ip4addr(target_ipaddr, source_inaddr) (ip4_addr_set_u32(target_ipaddr, (source_inaddr)->s_addr)) + +/* directly map this to the lwip internal functions */ +#define inet_addr(cp) ipaddr_addr(cp) +#define inet_aton(cp, addr) ip4addr_aton(cp, (ip4_addr_t *)addr) +#define inet_ntoa(addr) ip4addr_ntoa((const ip4_addr_t *)&(addr)) +#define inet_ntoa_r(addr, buf, buflen) ip4addr_ntoa_r((const ip4_addr_t *)&(addr), buf, buflen) + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#define inet6_addr_from_ip6addr(target_in6addr, source_ip6addr) \ + { \ + (target_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[0] = (source_ip6addr)->addr[0]; \ + (target_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[1] = (source_ip6addr)->addr[1]; \ + (target_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[2] = (source_ip6addr)->addr[2]; \ + (target_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[3] = (source_ip6addr)->addr[3]; \ + } +#define inet6_addr_to_ip6addr(target_ip6addr, source_in6addr) \ + { \ + (target_ip6addr)->addr[0] = (source_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[0]; \ + (target_ip6addr)->addr[1] = (source_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[1]; \ + (target_ip6addr)->addr[2] = (source_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[2]; \ + (target_ip6addr)->addr[3] = (source_in6addr)->un.u32_addr[3]; \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(target_ip6addr); \ + } + +/* directly map this to the lwip internal functions */ +#define inet6_aton(cp, addr) ip6addr_aton(cp, (ip6_addr_t *)addr) +#define inet6_ntoa(addr) ip6addr_ntoa((const ip6_addr_t *)&(addr)) +#define inet6_ntoa_r(addr, buf, buflen) ip6addr_ntoa_r((const ip6_addr_t *)&(addr), buf, buflen) + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_INET_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet_chksum.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet_chksum.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet_chksum.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet_chksum.h index e70559fd..5b43249a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet_chksum.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/inet_chksum.h @@ -1,103 +1,103 @@ -/** - * @file - * IP checksum calculation functions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_INET_CHKSUM_H -#define LWIP_HDR_INET_CHKSUM_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -/** Swap the bytes in an u16_t: much like lwip_htons() for little-endian */ -#ifndef SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD -#define SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(w) (((w)&0xff) << 8) | (((w)&0xff00) >> 8) -#endif /* SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD */ - -/** Split an u32_t in two u16_ts and add them up */ -#ifndef FOLD_U32T -#define FOLD_U32T(u) ((u32_t)(((u) >> 16) + ((u)&0x0000ffffUL))) -#endif - -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY -/** Function-like macro: same as MEMCPY but returns the checksum of copied data - as u16_t */ -#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY -#define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst, src, len) lwip_chksum_copy(dst, src, len) -#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM -#define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM 1 -#endif /* LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM */ -#else /* LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY */ -#define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM 0 -#endif /* LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY */ -#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ -#define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM 0 -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -u16_t inet_chksum(const void *dataptr, u16_t len); -u16_t inet_chksum_pbuf(struct pbuf *p); -#if LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM -u16_t lwip_chksum_copy(void *dst, const void *src, u16_t len); -#endif /* LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -u16_t inet_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest); -u16_t inet_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, - u16_t proto_len, u16_t chksum_len, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -u16_t ip6_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest); -u16_t ip6_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - u16_t chksum_len, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -u16_t ip_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dest); -u16_t ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, - u16_t chksum_len, const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dest); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_INET_H */ +/** + * @file + * IP checksum calculation functions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_INET_CHKSUM_H +#define LWIP_HDR_INET_CHKSUM_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +/** Swap the bytes in an u16_t: much like lwip_htons() for little-endian */ +#ifndef SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD +#define SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD(w) (((w)&0xff) << 8) | (((w)&0xff00) >> 8) +#endif /* SWAP_BYTES_IN_WORD */ + +/** Split an u32_t in two u16_ts and add them up */ +#ifndef FOLD_U32T +#define FOLD_U32T(u) ((u32_t)(((u) >> 16) + ((u)&0x0000ffffUL))) +#endif + +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY +/** Function-like macro: same as MEMCPY but returns the checksum of copied data + as u16_t */ +#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY +#define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY(dst, src, len) lwip_chksum_copy(dst, src, len) +#ifndef LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM +#define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM 1 +#endif /* LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM */ +#else /* LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY */ +#define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM 0 +#endif /* LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY */ +#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ +#define LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM 0 +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +u16_t inet_chksum(const void *dataptr, u16_t len); +u16_t inet_chksum_pbuf(struct pbuf *p); +#if LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM +u16_t lwip_chksum_copy(void *dst, const void *src, u16_t len); +#endif /* LWIP_CHKSUM_COPY_ALGORITHM */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +u16_t inet_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest); +u16_t inet_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, + u16_t proto_len, u16_t chksum_len, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +u16_t ip6_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest); +u16_t ip6_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + u16_t chksum_len, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +u16_t ip_chksum_pseudo(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dest); +u16_t ip_chksum_pseudo_partial(struct pbuf *p, u8_t proto, u16_t proto_len, + u16_t chksum_len, const ip_addr_t *src, const ip_addr_t *dest); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_INET_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h index 685bf703..6ab5c2ff 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h @@ -1,102 +1,102 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP initialization API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_INIT_H -#define LWIP_HDR_INIT_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_version Version - * @ingroup lwip - * @{ - */ - -/** X.x.x: Major version of the stack */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -/** x.X.x: Minor version of the stack */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_MINOR 1 -/** x.x.X: Revision of the stack */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_REVISION 2 -/** For release candidates, this is set to 1..254 - * For official releases, this is set to 255 (LWIP_RC_RELEASE) - * For development versions (Git), this is set to 0 (LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT) */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_RC LWIP_RC_RELEASE - -/** LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_RELEASE for official releases */ -#define LWIP_RC_RELEASE 255 -/** LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT for Git versions */ -#define LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT 0 - -#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_RELEASE (LWIP_VERSION_RC == LWIP_RC_RELEASE) -#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_DEVELOPMENT (LWIP_VERSION_RC == LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT) -#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_RC ((LWIP_VERSION_RC != LWIP_RC_RELEASE) && (LWIP_VERSION_RC != LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT)) - -/* Some helper defines to get a version string */ -#define LWIP_VERSTR2(x) #x -#define LWIP_VERSTR(x) LWIP_VERSTR2(x) -#if LWIP_VERSION_IS_RELEASE -#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "" -#elif LWIP_VERSION_IS_DEVELOPMENT -#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "d" -#else -#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "rc" LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_RC) -#endif - -/** Provides the version of the stack */ -#define LWIP_VERSION ((LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR) << 24 | (LWIP_VERSION_MINOR) << 16 | \ - (LWIP_VERSION_REVISION) << 8 | (LWIP_VERSION_RC)) -/** Provides the version of the stack as string */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING \ - LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR) \ - "." LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_MINOR) "." LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_REVISION) LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX - -/** - * @} - */ - -/* Modules initialization */ -void lwip_init(void); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_INIT_H */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP initialization API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_INIT_H +#define LWIP_HDR_INIT_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_version Version + * @ingroup lwip + * @{ + */ + +/** X.x.x: Major version of the stack */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR 2 +/** x.X.x: Minor version of the stack */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_MINOR 1 +/** x.x.X: Revision of the stack */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_REVISION 2 +/** For release candidates, this is set to 1..254 + * For official releases, this is set to 255 (LWIP_RC_RELEASE) + * For development versions (Git), this is set to 0 (LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT) */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_RC LWIP_RC_RELEASE + +/** LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_RELEASE for official releases */ +#define LWIP_RC_RELEASE 255 +/** LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT for Git versions */ +#define LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT 0 + +#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_RELEASE (LWIP_VERSION_RC == LWIP_RC_RELEASE) +#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_DEVELOPMENT (LWIP_VERSION_RC == LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT) +#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_RC ((LWIP_VERSION_RC != LWIP_RC_RELEASE) && (LWIP_VERSION_RC != LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT)) + +/* Some helper defines to get a version string */ +#define LWIP_VERSTR2(x) #x +#define LWIP_VERSTR(x) LWIP_VERSTR2(x) +#if LWIP_VERSION_IS_RELEASE +#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "" +#elif LWIP_VERSION_IS_DEVELOPMENT +#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "d" +#else +#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "rc" LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_RC) +#endif + +/** Provides the version of the stack */ +#define LWIP_VERSION ((LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR) << 24 | (LWIP_VERSION_MINOR) << 16 | \ + (LWIP_VERSION_REVISION) << 8 | (LWIP_VERSION_RC)) +/** Provides the version of the stack as string */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING \ + LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR) \ + "." LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_MINOR) "." LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_REVISION) LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX + +/** + * @} + */ + +/* Modules initialization */ +void lwip_init(void); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_INIT_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h.cmake.in b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h.cmake.in similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h.cmake.in rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h.cmake.in index d7c017ea..9b609b74 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h.cmake.in +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/init.h.cmake.in @@ -1,100 +1,100 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP initialization API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_INIT_H -#define LWIP_HDR_INIT_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_version Version - * @ingroup lwip - * @{ - */ - -/** X.x.x: Major version of the stack */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR ${LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR} -/** x.X.x: Minor version of the stack */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_MINOR ${LWIP_VERSION_MINOR} -/** x.x.X: Revision of the stack */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_REVISION ${LWIP_VERSION_REVISION} -/** For release candidates, this is set to 1..254 - * For official releases, this is set to 255 (LWIP_RC_RELEASE) - * For development versions (Git), this is set to 0 (LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT) */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_RC ${LWIP_VERSION_RC} - -/** LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_RELEASE for official releases */ -#define LWIP_RC_RELEASE 255 -/** LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT for Git versions */ -#define LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT 0 - -#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_RELEASE (LWIP_VERSION_RC == LWIP_RC_RELEASE) -#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_DEVELOPMENT (LWIP_VERSION_RC == LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT) -#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_RC ((LWIP_VERSION_RC != LWIP_RC_RELEASE) && (LWIP_VERSION_RC != LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT)) - -/* Some helper defines to get a version string */ -#define LWIP_VERSTR2(x) #x -#define LWIP_VERSTR(x) LWIP_VERSTR2(x) -#if LWIP_VERSION_IS_RELEASE -#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "" -#elif LWIP_VERSION_IS_DEVELOPMENT -#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "d" -#else -#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "rc" LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_RC) -#endif - -/** Provides the version of the stack */ -#define LWIP_VERSION ((LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR) << 24 | (LWIP_VERSION_MINOR) << 16 | \ - (LWIP_VERSION_REVISION) << 8 | (LWIP_VERSION_RC)) -/** Provides the version of the stack as string */ -#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR) "." LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_MINOR) "." LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_REVISION) LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX - -/** - * @} - */ - -/* Modules initialization */ -void lwip_init(void); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_INIT_H */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP initialization API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_INIT_H +#define LWIP_HDR_INIT_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_version Version + * @ingroup lwip + * @{ + */ + +/** X.x.x: Major version of the stack */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR ${LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR} +/** x.X.x: Minor version of the stack */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_MINOR ${LWIP_VERSION_MINOR} +/** x.x.X: Revision of the stack */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_REVISION ${LWIP_VERSION_REVISION} +/** For release candidates, this is set to 1..254 + * For official releases, this is set to 255 (LWIP_RC_RELEASE) + * For development versions (Git), this is set to 0 (LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT) */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_RC ${LWIP_VERSION_RC} + +/** LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_RELEASE for official releases */ +#define LWIP_RC_RELEASE 255 +/** LWIP_VERSION_RC is set to LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT for Git versions */ +#define LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT 0 + +#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_RELEASE (LWIP_VERSION_RC == LWIP_RC_RELEASE) +#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_DEVELOPMENT (LWIP_VERSION_RC == LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT) +#define LWIP_VERSION_IS_RC ((LWIP_VERSION_RC != LWIP_RC_RELEASE) && (LWIP_VERSION_RC != LWIP_RC_DEVELOPMENT)) + +/* Some helper defines to get a version string */ +#define LWIP_VERSTR2(x) #x +#define LWIP_VERSTR(x) LWIP_VERSTR2(x) +#if LWIP_VERSION_IS_RELEASE +#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "" +#elif LWIP_VERSION_IS_DEVELOPMENT +#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "d" +#else +#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX "rc" LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_RC) +#endif + +/** Provides the version of the stack */ +#define LWIP_VERSION ((LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR) << 24 | (LWIP_VERSION_MINOR) << 16 | \ + (LWIP_VERSION_REVISION) << 8 | (LWIP_VERSION_RC)) +/** Provides the version of the stack as string */ +#define LWIP_VERSION_STRING LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR) "." LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_MINOR) "." LWIP_VERSTR(LWIP_VERSION_REVISION) LWIP_VERSION_STRING_SUFFIX + +/** + * @} + */ + +/* Modules initialization */ +void lwip_init(void); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_INIT_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip.h index 2fc09361..1ed9835b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip.h @@ -1,330 +1,330 @@ -/** - * @file - * IP API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/ip4.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* This is passed as the destination address to ip_output_if (not - to ip_output), meaning that an IP header already is constructed - in the pbuf. This is used when TCP retransmits. */ -#define LWIP_IP_HDRINCL NULL - -/** pbufs passed to IP must have a ref-count of 1 as their payload pointer - gets altered as the packet is passed down the stack */ -#ifndef LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX -#define LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p) LWIP_ASSERT("p->ref == 1", (p)->ref == 1) -#endif - -#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS -#define IP_PCB_NETIFHINT \ - ; \ - struct netif_hint netif_hints -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ -#define IP_PCB_NETIFHINT -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ - -/** This is the common part of all PCB types. It needs to be at the - beginning of a PCB type definition. It is located here so that - changes to this common part are made in one location instead of - having to change all PCB structs. */ -#define IP_PCB \ - /* ip addresses in network byte order */ \ - ip_addr_t local_ip; \ - ip_addr_t remote_ip; \ - /* Bound netif index */ \ - u8_t netif_idx; \ - /* Socket options */ \ - u8_t so_options; \ - /* Type Of Service */ \ - u8_t tos; \ - /* Time To Live */ \ - u8_t ttl /* link layer address resolution hint */ \ - IP_PCB_NETIFHINT - -struct ip_pcb { - /* Common members of all PCB types */ - IP_PCB; -}; - -/* - * Option flags per-socket. These are the same like SO_XXX in sockets.h - */ -#define SOF_REUSEADDR 0x04U /* allow local address reuse */ -#define SOF_KEEPALIVE 0x08U /* keep connections alive */ -#define SOF_BROADCAST 0x20U /* permit to send and to receive broadcast messages (see IP_SOF_BROADCAST option) */ - -/* These flags are inherited (e.g. from a listen-pcb to a connection-pcb): */ -#define SOF_INHERITED (SOF_REUSEADDR | SOF_KEEPALIVE) - -/** Global variables of this module, kept in a struct for efficient access using base+index. */ -struct ip_globals { - /** The interface that accepted the packet for the current callback invocation. */ - struct netif *current_netif; - /** The interface that received the packet for the current callback invocation. */ - struct netif *current_input_netif; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - /** Header of the input packet currently being processed. */ - const struct ip_hdr *current_ip4_header; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - /** Header of the input IPv6 packet currently being processed. */ - struct ip6_hdr *current_ip6_header; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - /** Total header length of current_ip4/6_header (i.e. after this, the UDP/TCP header starts) */ - u16_t current_ip_header_tot_len; - /** Source IP address of current_header */ - ip_addr_t current_iphdr_src; - /** Destination IP address of current_header */ - ip_addr_t current_iphdr_dest; -}; -extern struct ip_globals ip_data; - -/** Get the interface that accepted the current packet. - * This may or may not be the receiving netif, depending on your netif/network setup. - * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, - * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ -#define ip_current_netif() (ip_data.current_netif) -/** Get the interface that received the current packet. - * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, - * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ -#define ip_current_input_netif() (ip_data.current_input_netif) -/** Total header length of ip(6)_current_header() (i.e. after this, the UDP/TCP header starts) */ -#define ip_current_header_tot_len() (ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len) -/** Source IP address of current_header */ -#define ip_current_src_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_src) -/** Destination IP address of current_header */ -#define ip_current_dest_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest) - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -/** Get the IPv4 header of the current packet. - * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, - * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ -#define ip4_current_header() ip_data.current_ip4_header -/** Get the IPv6 header of the current packet. - * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, - * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ -#define ip6_current_header() ((const struct ip6_hdr *)(ip_data.current_ip6_header)) -/** Returns TRUE if the current IP input packet is IPv6, FALSE if it is IPv4 */ -#define ip_current_is_v6() (ip6_current_header() != NULL) -/** Source IPv6 address of current_header */ -#define ip6_current_src_addr() (ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src)) -/** Destination IPv6 address of current_header */ -#define ip6_current_dest_addr() (ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest)) -/** Get the transport layer protocol */ -#define ip_current_header_proto() (ip_current_is_v6() ? \ - IP6H_NEXTH(ip6_current_header()) : \ - IPH_PROTO(ip4_current_header())) -/** Get the transport layer header */ -#define ip_next_header_ptr() ((const void *)((ip_current_is_v6() ? \ - (const u8_t *)ip6_current_header() : \ - (const u8_t *)ip4_current_header()) + \ - ip_current_header_tot_len())) - -/** Source IP4 address of current_header */ -#define ip4_current_src_addr() (ip_2_ip4(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src)) -/** Destination IP4 address of current_header */ -#define ip4_current_dest_addr() (ip_2_ip4(&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest)) - -#elif LWIP_IPV4 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** Get the IPv4 header of the current packet. - * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, - * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ -#define ip4_current_header() ip_data.current_ip4_header -/** Always returns FALSE when only supporting IPv4 only */ -#define ip_current_is_v6() 0 -/** Get the transport layer protocol */ -#define ip_current_header_proto() IPH_PROTO(ip4_current_header()) -/** Get the transport layer header */ -#define ip_next_header_ptr() ((const void *)((const u8_t *)ip4_current_header() + ip_current_header_tot_len())) -/** Source IP4 address of current_header */ -#define ip4_current_src_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_src) -/** Destination IP4 address of current_header */ -#define ip4_current_dest_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest) - -#elif LWIP_IPV6 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** Get the IPv6 header of the current packet. - * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, - * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ -#define ip6_current_header() ((const struct ip6_hdr *)(ip_data.current_ip6_header)) -/** Always returns TRUE when only supporting IPv6 only */ -#define ip_current_is_v6() 1 -/** Get the transport layer protocol */ -#define ip_current_header_proto() IP6H_NEXTH(ip6_current_header()) -/** Get the transport layer header */ -#define ip_next_header_ptr() ((const void *)(((const u8_t *)ip6_current_header()) + ip_current_header_tot_len())) -/** Source IP6 address of current_header */ -#define ip6_current_src_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_src) -/** Destination IP6 address of current_header */ -#define ip6_current_dest_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest) - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** Union source address of current_header */ -#define ip_current_src_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_src) -/** Union destination address of current_header */ -#define ip_current_dest_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest) - -/** Gets an IP pcb option (SOF_* flags) */ -#define ip_get_option(pcb, opt) ((pcb)->so_options & (opt)) -/** Sets an IP pcb option (SOF_* flags) */ -#define ip_set_option(pcb, opt) ((pcb)->so_options = (u8_t)((pcb)->so_options | (opt))) -/** Resets an IP pcb option (SOF_* flags) */ -#define ip_reset_option(pcb, opt) ((pcb)->so_options = (u8_t)((pcb)->so_options & ~(opt))) - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -/** - * @ingroup ip - * Output IP packet, netif is selected by source address - */ -#define ip_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) \ - (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ - ip6_output(p, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest), ttl, tos, proto) : \ - ip4_output(p, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest), ttl, tos, proto)) -/** - * @ingroup ip - * Output IP packet to specified interface - */ -#define ip_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ - (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ - ip6_output_if(p, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif) : \ - ip4_output_if(p, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif)) -/** - * @ingroup ip - * Output IP packet to interface specifying source address - */ -#define ip_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ - (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ - ip6_output_if_src(p, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif) : \ - ip4_output_if_src(p, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif)) -/** Output IP packet that already includes an IP header. */ -#define ip_output_if_hdrincl(p, src, dest, netif) \ - (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ - ip6_output_if(p, ip_2_ip6(src), LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, 0, 0, 0, netif) : \ - ip4_output_if(p, ip_2_ip4(src), LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, 0, 0, 0, netif)) -/** Output IP packet with netif_hint */ -#define ip_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) \ - (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ - ip6_output_hinted(p, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) : \ - ip4_output_hinted(p, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint)) -/** - * @ingroup ip - * Get netif for address combination. See \ref ip6_route and \ref ip4_route - */ -#define ip_route(src, dest) \ - (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ - ip6_route(ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest)) : \ - ip4_route_src(ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest))) -/** - * @ingroup ip - * Get netif for IP. - */ -#define ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ - ip6_netif_get_local_ip(netif, ip_2_ip6(dest)) : \ - ip4_netif_get_local_ip(netif)) -#define ip_debug_print(is_ipv6, p) ((is_ipv6) ? ip6_debug_print(p) : ip4_debug_print(p)) - -err_t ip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); - -#elif LWIP_IPV4 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#define ip_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) \ - ip4_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) -#define ip_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ - ip4_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) -#define ip_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ - ip4_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) -#define ip_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) \ - ip4_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) -#define ip_output_if_hdrincl(p, src, dest, netif) \ - ip4_output_if(p, src, LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, 0, 0, 0, netif) -#define ip_route(src, dest) \ - ip4_route_src(src, dest) -#define ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) \ - ip4_netif_get_local_ip(netif) -#define ip_debug_print(is_ipv6, p) ip4_debug_print(p) - -#define ip_input ip4_input - -#elif LWIP_IPV6 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#define ip_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) \ - ip6_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) -#define ip_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ - ip6_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) -#define ip_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ - ip6_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) -#define ip_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) \ - ip6_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) -#define ip_output_if_hdrincl(p, src, dest, netif) \ - ip6_output_if(p, src, LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, 0, 0, 0, netif) -#define ip_route(src, dest) \ - ip6_route(src, dest) -#define ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) \ - ip6_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) -#define ip_debug_print(is_ipv6, p) ip6_debug_print(p) - -#define ip_input ip6_input - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#define ip_route_get_local_ip(src, dest, netif, ipaddr) \ - do { \ - (netif) = ip_route(src, dest); \ - (ipaddr) = ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest); \ - } while (0) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP_H */ +/** + * @file + * IP API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/ip4.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* This is passed as the destination address to ip_output_if (not + to ip_output), meaning that an IP header already is constructed + in the pbuf. This is used when TCP retransmits. */ +#define LWIP_IP_HDRINCL NULL + +/** pbufs passed to IP must have a ref-count of 1 as their payload pointer + gets altered as the packet is passed down the stack */ +#ifndef LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX +#define LWIP_IP_CHECK_PBUF_REF_COUNT_FOR_TX(p) LWIP_ASSERT("p->ref == 1", (p)->ref == 1) +#endif + +#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS +#define IP_PCB_NETIFHINT \ + ; \ + struct netif_hint netif_hints +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ +#define IP_PCB_NETIFHINT +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ + +/** This is the common part of all PCB types. It needs to be at the + beginning of a PCB type definition. It is located here so that + changes to this common part are made in one location instead of + having to change all PCB structs. */ +#define IP_PCB \ + /* ip addresses in network byte order */ \ + ip_addr_t local_ip; \ + ip_addr_t remote_ip; \ + /* Bound netif index */ \ + u8_t netif_idx; \ + /* Socket options */ \ + u8_t so_options; \ + /* Type Of Service */ \ + u8_t tos; \ + /* Time To Live */ \ + u8_t ttl /* link layer address resolution hint */ \ + IP_PCB_NETIFHINT + +struct ip_pcb { + /* Common members of all PCB types */ + IP_PCB; +}; + +/* + * Option flags per-socket. These are the same like SO_XXX in sockets.h + */ +#define SOF_REUSEADDR 0x04U /* allow local address reuse */ +#define SOF_KEEPALIVE 0x08U /* keep connections alive */ +#define SOF_BROADCAST 0x20U /* permit to send and to receive broadcast messages (see IP_SOF_BROADCAST option) */ + +/* These flags are inherited (e.g. from a listen-pcb to a connection-pcb): */ +#define SOF_INHERITED (SOF_REUSEADDR | SOF_KEEPALIVE) + +/** Global variables of this module, kept in a struct for efficient access using base+index. */ +struct ip_globals { + /** The interface that accepted the packet for the current callback invocation. */ + struct netif *current_netif; + /** The interface that received the packet for the current callback invocation. */ + struct netif *current_input_netif; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + /** Header of the input packet currently being processed. */ + const struct ip_hdr *current_ip4_header; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + /** Header of the input IPv6 packet currently being processed. */ + struct ip6_hdr *current_ip6_header; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + /** Total header length of current_ip4/6_header (i.e. after this, the UDP/TCP header starts) */ + u16_t current_ip_header_tot_len; + /** Source IP address of current_header */ + ip_addr_t current_iphdr_src; + /** Destination IP address of current_header */ + ip_addr_t current_iphdr_dest; +}; +extern struct ip_globals ip_data; + +/** Get the interface that accepted the current packet. + * This may or may not be the receiving netif, depending on your netif/network setup. + * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, + * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ +#define ip_current_netif() (ip_data.current_netif) +/** Get the interface that received the current packet. + * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, + * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ +#define ip_current_input_netif() (ip_data.current_input_netif) +/** Total header length of ip(6)_current_header() (i.e. after this, the UDP/TCP header starts) */ +#define ip_current_header_tot_len() (ip_data.current_ip_header_tot_len) +/** Source IP address of current_header */ +#define ip_current_src_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_src) +/** Destination IP address of current_header */ +#define ip_current_dest_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest) + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +/** Get the IPv4 header of the current packet. + * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, + * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ +#define ip4_current_header() ip_data.current_ip4_header +/** Get the IPv6 header of the current packet. + * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, + * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ +#define ip6_current_header() ((const struct ip6_hdr *)(ip_data.current_ip6_header)) +/** Returns TRUE if the current IP input packet is IPv6, FALSE if it is IPv4 */ +#define ip_current_is_v6() (ip6_current_header() != NULL) +/** Source IPv6 address of current_header */ +#define ip6_current_src_addr() (ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src)) +/** Destination IPv6 address of current_header */ +#define ip6_current_dest_addr() (ip_2_ip6(&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest)) +/** Get the transport layer protocol */ +#define ip_current_header_proto() (ip_current_is_v6() ? \ + IP6H_NEXTH(ip6_current_header()) : \ + IPH_PROTO(ip4_current_header())) +/** Get the transport layer header */ +#define ip_next_header_ptr() ((const void *)((ip_current_is_v6() ? \ + (const u8_t *)ip6_current_header() : \ + (const u8_t *)ip4_current_header()) + \ + ip_current_header_tot_len())) + +/** Source IP4 address of current_header */ +#define ip4_current_src_addr() (ip_2_ip4(&ip_data.current_iphdr_src)) +/** Destination IP4 address of current_header */ +#define ip4_current_dest_addr() (ip_2_ip4(&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest)) + +#elif LWIP_IPV4 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** Get the IPv4 header of the current packet. + * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, + * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ +#define ip4_current_header() ip_data.current_ip4_header +/** Always returns FALSE when only supporting IPv4 only */ +#define ip_current_is_v6() 0 +/** Get the transport layer protocol */ +#define ip_current_header_proto() IPH_PROTO(ip4_current_header()) +/** Get the transport layer header */ +#define ip_next_header_ptr() ((const void *)((const u8_t *)ip4_current_header() + ip_current_header_tot_len())) +/** Source IP4 address of current_header */ +#define ip4_current_src_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_src) +/** Destination IP4 address of current_header */ +#define ip4_current_dest_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest) + +#elif LWIP_IPV6 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** Get the IPv6 header of the current packet. + * This function must only be called from a receive callback (udp_recv, + * raw_recv, tcp_accept). It will return NULL otherwise. */ +#define ip6_current_header() ((const struct ip6_hdr *)(ip_data.current_ip6_header)) +/** Always returns TRUE when only supporting IPv6 only */ +#define ip_current_is_v6() 1 +/** Get the transport layer protocol */ +#define ip_current_header_proto() IP6H_NEXTH(ip6_current_header()) +/** Get the transport layer header */ +#define ip_next_header_ptr() ((const void *)(((const u8_t *)ip6_current_header()) + ip_current_header_tot_len())) +/** Source IP6 address of current_header */ +#define ip6_current_src_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_src) +/** Destination IP6 address of current_header */ +#define ip6_current_dest_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest) + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** Union source address of current_header */ +#define ip_current_src_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_src) +/** Union destination address of current_header */ +#define ip_current_dest_addr() (&ip_data.current_iphdr_dest) + +/** Gets an IP pcb option (SOF_* flags) */ +#define ip_get_option(pcb, opt) ((pcb)->so_options & (opt)) +/** Sets an IP pcb option (SOF_* flags) */ +#define ip_set_option(pcb, opt) ((pcb)->so_options = (u8_t)((pcb)->so_options | (opt))) +/** Resets an IP pcb option (SOF_* flags) */ +#define ip_reset_option(pcb, opt) ((pcb)->so_options = (u8_t)((pcb)->so_options & ~(opt))) + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +/** + * @ingroup ip + * Output IP packet, netif is selected by source address + */ +#define ip_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) \ + (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ + ip6_output(p, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest), ttl, tos, proto) : \ + ip4_output(p, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest), ttl, tos, proto)) +/** + * @ingroup ip + * Output IP packet to specified interface + */ +#define ip_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ + (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ + ip6_output_if(p, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif) : \ + ip4_output_if(p, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif)) +/** + * @ingroup ip + * Output IP packet to interface specifying source address + */ +#define ip_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ + (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ + ip6_output_if_src(p, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif) : \ + ip4_output_if_src(p, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif)) +/** Output IP packet that already includes an IP header. */ +#define ip_output_if_hdrincl(p, src, dest, netif) \ + (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ + ip6_output_if(p, ip_2_ip6(src), LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, 0, 0, 0, netif) : \ + ip4_output_if(p, ip_2_ip4(src), LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, 0, 0, 0, netif)) +/** Output IP packet with netif_hint */ +#define ip_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) \ + (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ + ip6_output_hinted(p, ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) : \ + ip4_output_hinted(p, ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest), ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint)) +/** + * @ingroup ip + * Get netif for address combination. See \ref ip6_route and \ref ip4_route + */ +#define ip_route(src, dest) \ + (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ + ip6_route(ip_2_ip6(src), ip_2_ip6(dest)) : \ + ip4_route_src(ip_2_ip4(src), ip_2_ip4(dest))) +/** + * @ingroup ip + * Get netif for IP. + */ +#define ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) (IP_IS_V6(dest) ? \ + ip6_netif_get_local_ip(netif, ip_2_ip6(dest)) : \ + ip4_netif_get_local_ip(netif)) +#define ip_debug_print(is_ipv6, p) ((is_ipv6) ? ip6_debug_print(p) : ip4_debug_print(p)) + +err_t ip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); + +#elif LWIP_IPV4 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#define ip_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) \ + ip4_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) +#define ip_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ + ip4_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) +#define ip_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ + ip4_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) +#define ip_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) \ + ip4_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) +#define ip_output_if_hdrincl(p, src, dest, netif) \ + ip4_output_if(p, src, LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, 0, 0, 0, netif) +#define ip_route(src, dest) \ + ip4_route_src(src, dest) +#define ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) \ + ip4_netif_get_local_ip(netif) +#define ip_debug_print(is_ipv6, p) ip4_debug_print(p) + +#define ip_input ip4_input + +#elif LWIP_IPV6 /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#define ip_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) \ + ip6_output(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto) +#define ip_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ + ip6_output_if(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) +#define ip_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) \ + ip6_output_if_src(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif) +#define ip_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) \ + ip6_output_hinted(p, src, dest, ttl, tos, proto, netif_hint) +#define ip_output_if_hdrincl(p, src, dest, netif) \ + ip6_output_if(p, src, LWIP_IP_HDRINCL, 0, 0, 0, netif) +#define ip_route(src, dest) \ + ip6_route(src, dest) +#define ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) \ + ip6_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) +#define ip_debug_print(is_ipv6, p) ip6_debug_print(p) + +#define ip_input ip6_input + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#define ip_route_get_local_ip(src, dest, netif, ipaddr) \ + do { \ + (netif) = ip_route(src, dest); \ + (ipaddr) = ip_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest); \ + } while (0) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4.h index 16bee640..0a73d354 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4.h @@ -1,109 +1,109 @@ -/** - * @file - * IPv4 API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP4_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP4_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip4.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC -#define LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING 1 -#else -#define LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING 0 -#endif - -/** Currently, the function ip_output_if_opt() is only used with IGMP */ -#define IP_OPTIONS_SEND (LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP) - -#define ip_init() /* Compatibility define, no init needed. */ -struct netif *ip4_route(const ip4_addr_t *dest); -#if LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING -struct netif *ip4_route_src(const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest); -#else /* LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING */ -#define ip4_route_src(src, dest) ip4_route(dest) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING */ -err_t ip4_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -err_t ip4_output(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto); -err_t ip4_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif); -err_t ip4_output_if_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif); -#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS -err_t ip4_output_hinted(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif_hint *netif_hint); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ -#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND -err_t ip4_output_if_opt(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif, void *ip_options, - u16_t optlen); -err_t ip4_output_if_opt_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, - u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif, void *ip_options, - u16_t optlen); -#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ - -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS -void ip4_set_default_multicast_netif(struct netif *default_multicast_netif); -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - -#define ip4_netif_get_local_ip(netif) (((netif) != NULL) ? netif_ip_addr4(netif) : NULL) - -#if IP_DEBUG -void ip4_debug_print(struct pbuf *p); -#else -#define ip4_debug_print(p) -#endif /* IP_DEBUG */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP_H */ +/** + * @file + * IPv4 API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP4_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP4_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip4.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC +#define LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING 1 +#else +#define LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING 0 +#endif + +/** Currently, the function ip_output_if_opt() is only used with IGMP */ +#define IP_OPTIONS_SEND (LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP) + +#define ip_init() /* Compatibility define, no init needed. */ +struct netif *ip4_route(const ip4_addr_t *dest); +#if LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING +struct netif *ip4_route_src(const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest); +#else /* LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING */ +#define ip4_route_src(src, dest) ip4_route(dest) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4_SRC_ROUTING */ +err_t ip4_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +err_t ip4_output(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto); +err_t ip4_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif); +err_t ip4_output_if_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif); +#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS +err_t ip4_output_hinted(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif_hint *netif_hint); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ +#if IP_OPTIONS_SEND +err_t ip4_output_if_opt(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif, void *ip_options, + u16_t optlen); +err_t ip4_output_if_opt_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest, + u8_t ttl, u8_t tos, u8_t proto, struct netif *netif, void *ip_options, + u16_t optlen); +#endif /* IP_OPTIONS_SEND */ + +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS +void ip4_set_default_multicast_netif(struct netif *default_multicast_netif); +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + +#define ip4_netif_get_local_ip(netif) (((netif) != NULL) ? netif_ip_addr4(netif) : NULL) + +#if IP_DEBUG +void ip4_debug_print(struct pbuf *p); +#else +#define ip4_debug_print(p) +#endif /* IP_DEBUG */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_addr.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_addr.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_addr.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_addr.h index 0e19669b..63acaa5c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_addr.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_addr.h @@ -1,219 +1,219 @@ -/** - * @file - * IPv4 address API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP4_ADDR_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP4_ADDR_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** This is the aligned version of ip4_addr_t, - used as local variable, on the stack, etc. */ -struct ip4_addr { - u32_t addr; -}; - -/** ip4_addr_t uses a struct for convenience only, so that the same defines can - * operate both on ip4_addr_t as well as on ip4_addr_p_t. */ -typedef struct ip4_addr ip4_addr_t; - -/* Forward declaration to not include netif.h */ -struct netif; - -/** 255.255.255.255 */ -#define IPADDR_NONE ((u32_t)0xffffffffUL) -/** 127.0.0.1 */ -#define IPADDR_LOOPBACK ((u32_t)0x7f000001UL) -/** 0.0.0.0 */ -#define IPADDR_ANY ((u32_t)0x00000000UL) -/** 255.255.255.255 */ -#define IPADDR_BROADCAST ((u32_t)0xffffffffUL) - -/* Definitions of the bits in an Internet address integer. - - On subnets, host and network parts are found according to - the subnet mask, not these masks. */ -#define IP_CLASSA(a) ((((u32_t)(a)) & 0x80000000UL) == 0) -#define IP_CLASSA_NET 0xff000000 -#define IP_CLASSA_NSHIFT 24 -#define IP_CLASSA_HOST (0xffffffff & ~IP_CLASSA_NET) -#define IP_CLASSA_MAX 128 - -#define IP_CLASSB(a) ((((u32_t)(a)) & 0xc0000000UL) == 0x80000000UL) -#define IP_CLASSB_NET 0xffff0000 -#define IP_CLASSB_NSHIFT 16 -#define IP_CLASSB_HOST (0xffffffff & ~IP_CLASSB_NET) -#define IP_CLASSB_MAX 65536 - -#define IP_CLASSC(a) ((((u32_t)(a)) & 0xe0000000UL) == 0xc0000000UL) -#define IP_CLASSC_NET 0xffffff00 -#define IP_CLASSC_NSHIFT 8 -#define IP_CLASSC_HOST (0xffffffff & ~IP_CLASSC_NET) - -#define IP_CLASSD(a) (((u32_t)(a)&0xf0000000UL) == 0xe0000000UL) -#define IP_CLASSD_NET 0xf0000000 /* These ones aren't really */ -#define IP_CLASSD_NSHIFT 28 /* net and host fields, but */ -#define IP_CLASSD_HOST 0x0fffffff /* routing needn't know. */ -#define IP_MULTICAST(a) IP_CLASSD(a) - -#define IP_EXPERIMENTAL(a) (((u32_t)(a)&0xf0000000UL) == 0xf0000000UL) -#define IP_BADCLASS(a) (((u32_t)(a)&0xf0000000UL) == 0xf0000000UL) - -#define IP_LOOPBACKNET 127 /* official! */ - -/** Set an IP address given by the four byte-parts */ -#define IP4_ADDR(ipaddr, a, b, c, d) (ipaddr)->addr = PP_HTONL(LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d)) - -/** Copy IP address - faster than ip4_addr_set: no NULL check */ -#define ip4_addr_copy(dest, src) ((dest).addr = (src).addr) -/** Safely copy one IP address to another (src may be NULL) */ -#define ip4_addr_set(dest, src) ((dest)->addr = \ - ((src) == NULL ? 0 : \ - (src)->addr)) -/** Set complete address to zero */ -#define ip4_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) ((ipaddr)->addr = 0) -/** Set address to IPADDR_ANY (no need for lwip_htonl()) */ -#define ip4_addr_set_any(ipaddr) ((ipaddr)->addr = IPADDR_ANY) -/** Set address to loopback address */ -#define ip4_addr_set_loopback(ipaddr) ((ipaddr)->addr = PP_HTONL(IPADDR_LOOPBACK)) -/** Check if an address is in the loopback region */ -#define ip4_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) (((ipaddr)->addr & PP_HTONL(IP_CLASSA_NET)) == PP_HTONL(((u32_t)IP_LOOPBACKNET) << 24)) -/** Safely copy one IP address to another and change byte order - * from host- to network-order. */ -#define ip4_addr_set_hton(dest, src) ((dest)->addr = \ - ((src) == NULL ? 0 : \ - lwip_htonl((src)->addr))) -/** IPv4 only: set the IP address given as an u32_t */ -#define ip4_addr_set_u32(dest_ipaddr, src_u32) ((dest_ipaddr)->addr = (src_u32)) -/** IPv4 only: get the IP address as an u32_t */ -#define ip4_addr_get_u32(src_ipaddr) ((src_ipaddr)->addr) - -/** Get the network address by combining host address with netmask */ -#define ip4_addr_get_network(target, host, netmask) \ - do { \ - ((target)->addr = ((host)->addr) & ((netmask)->addr)); \ - } while (0) - -/** - * Determine if two address are on the same network. - * - * @arg addr1 IP address 1 - * @arg addr2 IP address 2 - * @arg mask network identifier mask - * @return !0 if the network identifiers of both address match - */ -#define ip4_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) (((addr1)->addr & \ - (mask)->addr) == \ - ((addr2)->addr & \ - (mask)->addr)) -#define ip4_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) ((addr1)->addr == (addr2)->addr) - -#define ip4_addr_isany_val(addr1) ((addr1).addr == IPADDR_ANY) -#define ip4_addr_isany(addr1) ((addr1) == NULL || ip4_addr_isany_val(*(addr1))) - -#define ip4_addr_isbroadcast(addr1, netif) ip4_addr_isbroadcast_u32((addr1)->addr, netif) -u8_t ip4_addr_isbroadcast_u32(u32_t addr, const struct netif *netif); - -#define ip_addr_netmask_valid(netmask) ip4_addr_netmask_valid((netmask)->addr) -u8_t ip4_addr_netmask_valid(u32_t netmask); - -#define ip4_addr_ismulticast(addr1) (((addr1)->addr & PP_HTONL(0xf0000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xe0000000UL)) - -#define ip4_addr_islinklocal(addr1) (((addr1)->addr & PP_HTONL(0xffff0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xa9fe0000UL)) - -#define ip4_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, a, b, c, d) \ - LWIP_DEBUGF(debug, ("%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F, a, b, c, d)) -#define ip4_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) \ - ip4_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr) : 0)) -#define ip4_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) \ - ip4_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, \ - ip4_addr1_16_val(ipaddr), \ - ip4_addr2_16_val(ipaddr), \ - ip4_addr3_16_val(ipaddr), \ - ip4_addr4_16_val(ipaddr)) - -/* Get one byte from the 4-byte address */ -#define ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, idx) (((const u8_t *)(&(ipaddr)->addr))[idx]) -#define ip4_addr1(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, 0) -#define ip4_addr2(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, 1) -#define ip4_addr3(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, 2) -#define ip4_addr4(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, 3) -/* Get one byte from the 4-byte address, but argument is 'ip4_addr_t', - * not a pointer */ -#define ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, idx) ((u8_t)(((ipaddr).addr >> (idx * 8)) & 0xff)) -#define ip4_addr1_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, 0) -#define ip4_addr2_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, 1) -#define ip4_addr3_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, 2) -#define ip4_addr4_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, 3) -/* These are cast to u16_t, with the intent that they are often arguments - * to printf using the U16_F format from cc.h. */ -#define ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr1(ipaddr)) -#define ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr2(ipaddr)) -#define ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr3(ipaddr)) -#define ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr4(ipaddr)) -#define ip4_addr1_16_val(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr1_val(ipaddr)) -#define ip4_addr2_16_val(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr2_val(ipaddr)) -#define ip4_addr3_16_val(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr3_val(ipaddr)) -#define ip4_addr4_16_val(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr4_val(ipaddr)) - -#define IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX 16 - -/** For backwards compatibility */ -#define ip_ntoa(ipaddr) ipaddr_ntoa(ipaddr) - -u32_t ipaddr_addr(const char *cp); -int ip4addr_aton(const char *cp, ip4_addr_t *addr); -/** returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! */ -char *ip4addr_ntoa(const ip4_addr_t *addr); -char *ip4addr_ntoa_r(const ip4_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP_ADDR_H */ +/** + * @file + * IPv4 address API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP4_ADDR_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP4_ADDR_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** This is the aligned version of ip4_addr_t, + used as local variable, on the stack, etc. */ +struct ip4_addr { + u32_t addr; +}; + +/** ip4_addr_t uses a struct for convenience only, so that the same defines can + * operate both on ip4_addr_t as well as on ip4_addr_p_t. */ +typedef struct ip4_addr ip4_addr_t; + +/* Forward declaration to not include netif.h */ +struct netif; + +/** 255.255.255.255 */ +#define IPADDR_NONE ((u32_t)0xffffffffUL) +/** 127.0.0.1 */ +#define IPADDR_LOOPBACK ((u32_t)0x7f000001UL) +/** 0.0.0.0 */ +#define IPADDR_ANY ((u32_t)0x00000000UL) +/** 255.255.255.255 */ +#define IPADDR_BROADCAST ((u32_t)0xffffffffUL) + +/* Definitions of the bits in an Internet address integer. + + On subnets, host and network parts are found according to + the subnet mask, not these masks. */ +#define IP_CLASSA(a) ((((u32_t)(a)) & 0x80000000UL) == 0) +#define IP_CLASSA_NET 0xff000000 +#define IP_CLASSA_NSHIFT 24 +#define IP_CLASSA_HOST (0xffffffff & ~IP_CLASSA_NET) +#define IP_CLASSA_MAX 128 + +#define IP_CLASSB(a) ((((u32_t)(a)) & 0xc0000000UL) == 0x80000000UL) +#define IP_CLASSB_NET 0xffff0000 +#define IP_CLASSB_NSHIFT 16 +#define IP_CLASSB_HOST (0xffffffff & ~IP_CLASSB_NET) +#define IP_CLASSB_MAX 65536 + +#define IP_CLASSC(a) ((((u32_t)(a)) & 0xe0000000UL) == 0xc0000000UL) +#define IP_CLASSC_NET 0xffffff00 +#define IP_CLASSC_NSHIFT 8 +#define IP_CLASSC_HOST (0xffffffff & ~IP_CLASSC_NET) + +#define IP_CLASSD(a) (((u32_t)(a)&0xf0000000UL) == 0xe0000000UL) +#define IP_CLASSD_NET 0xf0000000 /* These ones aren't really */ +#define IP_CLASSD_NSHIFT 28 /* net and host fields, but */ +#define IP_CLASSD_HOST 0x0fffffff /* routing needn't know. */ +#define IP_MULTICAST(a) IP_CLASSD(a) + +#define IP_EXPERIMENTAL(a) (((u32_t)(a)&0xf0000000UL) == 0xf0000000UL) +#define IP_BADCLASS(a) (((u32_t)(a)&0xf0000000UL) == 0xf0000000UL) + +#define IP_LOOPBACKNET 127 /* official! */ + +/** Set an IP address given by the four byte-parts */ +#define IP4_ADDR(ipaddr, a, b, c, d) (ipaddr)->addr = PP_HTONL(LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d)) + +/** Copy IP address - faster than ip4_addr_set: no NULL check */ +#define ip4_addr_copy(dest, src) ((dest).addr = (src).addr) +/** Safely copy one IP address to another (src may be NULL) */ +#define ip4_addr_set(dest, src) ((dest)->addr = \ + ((src) == NULL ? 0 : \ + (src)->addr)) +/** Set complete address to zero */ +#define ip4_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) ((ipaddr)->addr = 0) +/** Set address to IPADDR_ANY (no need for lwip_htonl()) */ +#define ip4_addr_set_any(ipaddr) ((ipaddr)->addr = IPADDR_ANY) +/** Set address to loopback address */ +#define ip4_addr_set_loopback(ipaddr) ((ipaddr)->addr = PP_HTONL(IPADDR_LOOPBACK)) +/** Check if an address is in the loopback region */ +#define ip4_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) (((ipaddr)->addr & PP_HTONL(IP_CLASSA_NET)) == PP_HTONL(((u32_t)IP_LOOPBACKNET) << 24)) +/** Safely copy one IP address to another and change byte order + * from host- to network-order. */ +#define ip4_addr_set_hton(dest, src) ((dest)->addr = \ + ((src) == NULL ? 0 : \ + lwip_htonl((src)->addr))) +/** IPv4 only: set the IP address given as an u32_t */ +#define ip4_addr_set_u32(dest_ipaddr, src_u32) ((dest_ipaddr)->addr = (src_u32)) +/** IPv4 only: get the IP address as an u32_t */ +#define ip4_addr_get_u32(src_ipaddr) ((src_ipaddr)->addr) + +/** Get the network address by combining host address with netmask */ +#define ip4_addr_get_network(target, host, netmask) \ + do { \ + ((target)->addr = ((host)->addr) & ((netmask)->addr)); \ + } while (0) + +/** + * Determine if two address are on the same network. + * + * @arg addr1 IP address 1 + * @arg addr2 IP address 2 + * @arg mask network identifier mask + * @return !0 if the network identifiers of both address match + */ +#define ip4_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) (((addr1)->addr & \ + (mask)->addr) == \ + ((addr2)->addr & \ + (mask)->addr)) +#define ip4_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) ((addr1)->addr == (addr2)->addr) + +#define ip4_addr_isany_val(addr1) ((addr1).addr == IPADDR_ANY) +#define ip4_addr_isany(addr1) ((addr1) == NULL || ip4_addr_isany_val(*(addr1))) + +#define ip4_addr_isbroadcast(addr1, netif) ip4_addr_isbroadcast_u32((addr1)->addr, netif) +u8_t ip4_addr_isbroadcast_u32(u32_t addr, const struct netif *netif); + +#define ip_addr_netmask_valid(netmask) ip4_addr_netmask_valid((netmask)->addr) +u8_t ip4_addr_netmask_valid(u32_t netmask); + +#define ip4_addr_ismulticast(addr1) (((addr1)->addr & PP_HTONL(0xf0000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xe0000000UL)) + +#define ip4_addr_islinklocal(addr1) (((addr1)->addr & PP_HTONL(0xffff0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xa9fe0000UL)) + +#define ip4_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, a, b, c, d) \ + LWIP_DEBUGF(debug, ("%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F ".%" U16_F, a, b, c, d)) +#define ip4_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) \ + ip4_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr) : 0)) +#define ip4_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) \ + ip4_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, \ + ip4_addr1_16_val(ipaddr), \ + ip4_addr2_16_val(ipaddr), \ + ip4_addr3_16_val(ipaddr), \ + ip4_addr4_16_val(ipaddr)) + +/* Get one byte from the 4-byte address */ +#define ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, idx) (((const u8_t *)(&(ipaddr)->addr))[idx]) +#define ip4_addr1(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, 0) +#define ip4_addr2(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, 1) +#define ip4_addr3(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, 2) +#define ip4_addr4(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte(ipaddr, 3) +/* Get one byte from the 4-byte address, but argument is 'ip4_addr_t', + * not a pointer */ +#define ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, idx) ((u8_t)(((ipaddr).addr >> (idx * 8)) & 0xff)) +#define ip4_addr1_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, 0) +#define ip4_addr2_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, 1) +#define ip4_addr3_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, 2) +#define ip4_addr4_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_byte_val(ipaddr, 3) +/* These are cast to u16_t, with the intent that they are often arguments + * to printf using the U16_F format from cc.h. */ +#define ip4_addr1_16(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr1(ipaddr)) +#define ip4_addr2_16(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr2(ipaddr)) +#define ip4_addr3_16(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr3(ipaddr)) +#define ip4_addr4_16(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr4(ipaddr)) +#define ip4_addr1_16_val(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr1_val(ipaddr)) +#define ip4_addr2_16_val(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr2_val(ipaddr)) +#define ip4_addr3_16_val(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr3_val(ipaddr)) +#define ip4_addr4_16_val(ipaddr) ((u16_t)ip4_addr4_val(ipaddr)) + +#define IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX 16 + +/** For backwards compatibility */ +#define ip_ntoa(ipaddr) ipaddr_ntoa(ipaddr) + +u32_t ipaddr_addr(const char *cp); +int ip4addr_aton(const char *cp, ip4_addr_t *addr); +/** returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! */ +char *ip4addr_ntoa(const ip4_addr_t *addr); +char *ip4addr_ntoa_r(const ip4_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP_ADDR_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_frag.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_frag.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_frag.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_frag.h index e9f744f3..22588321 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_frag.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip4_frag.h @@ -1,100 +1,100 @@ -/** - * @file - * IP fragmentation/reassembly - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Jani Monoses - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP4_FRAG_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP4_FRAG_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if IP_REASSEMBLY -/* The IP reassembly timer interval in milliseconds. */ -#define IP_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 - -/** IP reassembly helper struct. - * This is exported because memp needs to know the size. - */ -struct ip_reassdata { - struct ip_reassdata *next; - struct pbuf *p; - struct ip_hdr iphdr; - u16_t datagram_len; - u8_t flags; - u8_t timer; -}; - -void ip_reass_init(void); -void ip_reass_tmr(void); -struct pbuf *ip4_reass(struct pbuf *p); -#endif /* IP_REASSEMBLY */ - -#if IP_FRAG -#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF -#ifndef LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED -#define LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED -/** A custom pbuf that holds a reference to another pbuf, which is freed - * when this custom pbuf is freed. This is used to create a custom PBUF_REF - * that points into the original pbuf. */ -struct pbuf_custom_ref { - /** 'base class' */ - struct pbuf_custom pc; - /** pointer to the original pbuf that is referenced */ - struct pbuf *original; -}; -#endif /* LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED */ -#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - -err_t ip4_frag(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *dest); -#endif /* IP_FRAG */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP4_FRAG_H */ +/** + * @file + * IP fragmentation/reassembly + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Jani Monoses + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP4_FRAG_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP4_FRAG_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if IP_REASSEMBLY +/* The IP reassembly timer interval in milliseconds. */ +#define IP_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 + +/** IP reassembly helper struct. + * This is exported because memp needs to know the size. + */ +struct ip_reassdata { + struct ip_reassdata *next; + struct pbuf *p; + struct ip_hdr iphdr; + u16_t datagram_len; + u8_t flags; + u8_t timer; +}; + +void ip_reass_init(void); +void ip_reass_tmr(void); +struct pbuf *ip4_reass(struct pbuf *p); +#endif /* IP_REASSEMBLY */ + +#if IP_FRAG +#if !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF +#ifndef LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED +#define LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED +/** A custom pbuf that holds a reference to another pbuf, which is freed + * when this custom pbuf is freed. This is used to create a custom PBUF_REF + * that points into the original pbuf. */ +struct pbuf_custom_ref { + /** 'base class' */ + struct pbuf_custom pc; + /** pointer to the original pbuf that is referenced */ + struct pbuf *original; +}; +#endif /* LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED */ +#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + +err_t ip4_frag(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *dest); +#endif /* IP_FRAG */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP4_FRAG_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6.h index 99bc06ae..9c0ab559 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6.h @@ -1,93 +1,93 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * IPv6 layer. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct netif *ip6_route(const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest); -const ip_addr_t *ip6_select_source_address(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest); -err_t ip6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -err_t ip6_output(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, - u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth); -err_t ip6_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, - u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth, struct netif *netif); -err_t ip6_output_if_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, - u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth, struct netif *netif); -#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS -err_t ip6_output_hinted(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, - u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth, struct netif_hint *netif_hint); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD -err_t ip6_options_add_hbh_ra(struct pbuf *p, u8_t nexth, u8_t value); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - -#define ip6_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) (((netif) != NULL) ? \ - ip6_select_source_address(netif, dest) : \ - NULL) - -#if IP6_DEBUG -void ip6_debug_print(struct pbuf *p); -#else -#define ip6_debug_print(p) -#endif /* IP6_DEBUG */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * IPv6 layer. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct netif *ip6_route(const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest); +const ip_addr_t *ip6_select_source_address(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest); +err_t ip6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +err_t ip6_output(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, + u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth); +err_t ip6_output_if(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, + u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth, struct netif *netif); +err_t ip6_output_if_src(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, + u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth, struct netif *netif); +#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS +err_t ip6_output_hinted(struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *src, const ip6_addr_t *dest, + u8_t hl, u8_t tc, u8_t nexth, struct netif_hint *netif_hint); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD +err_t ip6_options_add_hbh_ra(struct pbuf *p, u8_t nexth, u8_t value); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + +#define ip6_netif_get_local_ip(netif, dest) (((netif) != NULL) ? \ + ip6_select_source_address(netif, dest) : \ + NULL) + +#if IP6_DEBUG +void ip6_debug_print(struct pbuf *p); +#else +#define ip6_debug_print(p) +#endif /* IP6_DEBUG */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_addr.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_addr.h similarity index 98% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_addr.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_addr.h index c261b670..13acc74b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_addr.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_addr.h @@ -1,380 +1,380 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * IPv6 addresses. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * Structs and macros for handling IPv6 addresses. - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_ADDR_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_ADDR_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "def.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/ip6_zone.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** This is the aligned version of ip6_addr_t, - used as local variable, on the stack, etc. */ -struct ip6_addr { - u32_t addr[4]; -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - u8_t zone; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ -}; - -/** IPv6 address */ -typedef struct ip6_addr ip6_addr_t; - -/** Set an IPv6 partial address given by byte-parts */ -#define IP6_ADDR_PART(ip6addr, index, a, b, c, d) \ - (ip6addr)->addr[index] = PP_HTONL(LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d)) - -/** Set a full IPv6 address by passing the 4 u32_t indices in network byte order - (use PP_HTONL() for constants) */ -#define IP6_ADDR(ip6addr, idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3) \ - do { \ - (ip6addr)->addr[0] = idx0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[1] = idx1; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[2] = idx2; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[3] = idx3; \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ - } while (0) - -/** Access address in 16-bit block */ -#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[0]) >> 16) & 0xffff)) -/** Access address in 16-bit block */ -#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[0])) & 0xffff)) -/** Access address in 16-bit block */ -#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[1]) >> 16) & 0xffff)) -/** Access address in 16-bit block */ -#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[1])) & 0xffff)) -/** Access address in 16-bit block */ -#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[2]) >> 16) & 0xffff)) -/** Access address in 16-bit block */ -#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[2])) & 0xffff)) -/** Access address in 16-bit block */ -#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[3]) >> 16) & 0xffff)) -/** Access address in 16-bit block */ -#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[3])) & 0xffff)) - -/** Copy IPv6 address - faster than ip6_addr_set: no NULL check */ -#define ip6_addr_copy(dest, src) \ - do { \ - (dest).addr[0] = (src).addr[0]; \ - (dest).addr[1] = (src).addr[1]; \ - (dest).addr[2] = (src).addr[2]; \ - (dest).addr[3] = (src).addr[3]; \ - ip6_addr_copy_zone((dest), (src)); \ - } while (0) -/** Safely copy one IPv6 address to another (src may be NULL) */ -#define ip6_addr_set(dest, src) \ - do { \ - (dest)->addr[0] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : (src)->addr[0]; \ - (dest)->addr[1] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : (src)->addr[1]; \ - (dest)->addr[2] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : (src)->addr[2]; \ - (dest)->addr[3] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : (src)->addr[3]; \ - ip6_addr_set_zone((dest), (src) == NULL ? IP6_NO_ZONE : ip6_addr_zone(src)); \ - } while (0) - -/** Copy packed IPv6 address to unpacked IPv6 address; zone is not set */ -#define ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest, src) \ - do { \ - (dest).addr[0] = (src).addr[0]; \ - (dest).addr[1] = (src).addr[1]; \ - (dest).addr[2] = (src).addr[2]; \ - (dest).addr[3] = (src).addr[3]; \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(&dest); \ - } while (0) - -/** Copy unpacked IPv6 address to packed IPv6 address; zone is lost */ -#define ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(dest, src) \ - do { \ - (dest).addr[0] = (src).addr[0]; \ - (dest).addr[1] = (src).addr[1]; \ - (dest).addr[2] = (src).addr[2]; \ - (dest).addr[3] = (src).addr[3]; \ - } while (0) - -/** Set complete address to zero */ -#define ip6_addr_set_zero(ip6addr) \ - do { \ - (ip6addr)->addr[0] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[2] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[3] = 0; \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ - } while (0) - -/** Set address to ipv6 'any' (no need for lwip_htonl()) */ -#define ip6_addr_set_any(ip6addr) ip6_addr_set_zero(ip6addr) -/** Set address to ipv6 loopback address */ -#define ip6_addr_set_loopback(ip6addr) \ - do { \ - (ip6addr)->addr[0] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[2] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[3] = PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL); \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ - } while (0) -/** Safely copy one IPv6 address to another and change byte order - * from host- to network-order. */ -#define ip6_addr_set_hton(dest, src) \ - do { \ - (dest)->addr[0] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : lwip_htonl((src)->addr[0]); \ - (dest)->addr[1] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : lwip_htonl((src)->addr[1]); \ - (dest)->addr[2] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : lwip_htonl((src)->addr[2]); \ - (dest)->addr[3] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : lwip_htonl((src)->addr[3]); \ - ip6_addr_set_zone((dest), (src) == NULL ? IP6_NO_ZONE : ip6_addr_zone(src)); \ - } while (0) - -/** Compare IPv6 networks, ignoring zone information. To be used sparingly! */ -#define ip6_addr_netcmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) (((addr1)->addr[0] == (addr2)->addr[0]) && \ - ((addr1)->addr[1] == (addr2)->addr[1])) - -/** - * Determine if two IPv6 address are on the same network. - * - * @param addr1 IPv6 address 1 - * @param addr2 IPv6 address 2 - * @return 1 if the network identifiers of both address match, 0 if not - */ -#define ip6_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2) (ip6_addr_netcmp_zoneless((addr1), (addr2)) && \ - ip6_addr_cmp_zone((addr1), (addr2))) - -/* Exact-host comparison *after* ip6_addr_netcmp() succeeded, for efficiency. */ -#define ip6_addr_nethostcmp(addr1, addr2) (((addr1)->addr[2] == (addr2)->addr[2]) && \ - ((addr1)->addr[3] == (addr2)->addr[3])) - -/** Compare IPv6 addresses, ignoring zone information. To be used sparingly! */ -#define ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) (((addr1)->addr[0] == (addr2)->addr[0]) && \ - ((addr1)->addr[1] == (addr2)->addr[1]) && \ - ((addr1)->addr[2] == (addr2)->addr[2]) && \ - ((addr1)->addr[3] == (addr2)->addr[3])) -/** - * Determine if two IPv6 addresses are the same. In particular, the address - * part of both must be the same, and the zone must be compatible. - * - * @param addr1 IPv6 address 1 - * @param addr2 IPv6 address 2 - * @return 1 if the addresses are considered equal, 0 if not - */ -#define ip6_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) (ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless((addr1), (addr2)) && \ - ip6_addr_cmp_zone((addr1), (addr2))) - -/** Compare IPv6 address to packed address and zone */ -#define ip6_addr_cmp_packed(ip6addr, paddr, zone_idx) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == (paddr)->addr[0]) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == (paddr)->addr[1]) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == (paddr)->addr[2]) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == (paddr)->addr[3]) && \ - ip6_addr_equals_zone((ip6addr), (zone_idx))) - -#define ip6_get_subnet_id(ip6addr) (lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[2]) & 0x0000ffffUL) - -#define ip6_addr_isany_val(ip6addr) (((ip6addr).addr[0] == 0) && \ - ((ip6addr).addr[1] == 0) && \ - ((ip6addr).addr[2] == 0) && \ - ((ip6addr).addr[3] == 0)) -#define ip6_addr_isany(ip6addr) (((ip6addr) == NULL) || ip6_addr_isany_val(*(ip6addr))) - -#define ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == 0UL) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0UL) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == 0UL) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL))) - -#define ip6_addr_isglobal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xe0000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0x20000000UL)) - -#define ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xffc00000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL)) - -#define ip6_addr_issitelocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xffc00000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xfec00000UL)) - -#define ip6_addr_isuniquelocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xfe000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xfc000000UL)) - -#define ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == 0) && ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0) && (((ip6addr)->addr[2]) == PP_HTONL(0x0000FFFFUL))) - -#define ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL)) -#define ip6_addr_multicast_transient_flag(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0x00100000UL)) -#define ip6_addr_multicast_prefix_flag(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0x00200000UL)) -#define ip6_addr_multicast_rendezvous_flag(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0x00400000UL)) -#define ip6_addr_multicast_scope(ip6addr) ((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[0]) >> 16) & 0xf) -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVED 0x0 -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVED0 0x0 -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_INTERFACE_LOCAL 0x1 -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_LINK_LOCAL 0x2 -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVED3 0x3 -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_ADMIN_LOCAL 0x4 -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_SITE_LOCAL 0x5 -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_ORGANIZATION_LOCAL 0x8 -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_GLOBAL 0xe -#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVEDF 0xf -#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_iflocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff010000UL)) -#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_linklocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) -#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_adminlocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff040000UL)) -#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_sitelocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff050000UL)) -#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_orglocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff080000UL)) -#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_global(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff0e0000UL)) - -/* Scoping note: while interface-local and link-local multicast addresses do - * have a scope (i.e., they are meaningful only in the context of a particular - * interface), the following functions are not assigning or comparing zone - * indices. The reason for this is backward compatibility. Any call site that - * produces a non-global multicast address must assign a multicast address as - * appropriate itself. */ - -#define ip6_addr_isallnodes_iflocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff010000UL)) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0UL) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == 0UL) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL))) - -#define ip6_addr_isallnodes_linklocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0UL) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == 0UL) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL))) -#define ip6_addr_set_allnodes_linklocal(ip6addr) \ - do { \ - (ip6addr)->addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL); \ - (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[2] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[3] = PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL); \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ - } while (0) - -#define ip6_addr_isallrouters_linklocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0UL) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == 0UL) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == PP_HTONL(0x00000002UL))) -#define ip6_addr_set_allrouters_linklocal(ip6addr) \ - do { \ - (ip6addr)->addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL); \ - (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[2] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[3] = PP_HTONL(0x00000002UL); \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ - } while (0) - -#define ip6_addr_issolicitednode(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL)) && \ - (((ip6addr)->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL))) - -#define ip6_addr_set_solicitednode(ip6addr, if_id) \ - do { \ - (ip6addr)->addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL); \ - (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL); \ - (ip6addr)->addr[3] = (PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL) | (if_id)); \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ - } while (0) - -#define ip6_addr_cmp_solicitednode(ip6addr, sn_addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL)) && \ - ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == (PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL) | (sn_addr)->addr[3]))) - -/* IPv6 address states. */ -#define IP6_ADDR_INVALID 0x00 -#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE 0x08 -#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_1 0x09 /* 1 probe sent */ -#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_2 0x0a /* 2 probes sent */ -#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_3 0x0b /* 3 probes sent */ -#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_4 0x0c /* 4 probes sent */ -#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_5 0x0d /* 5 probes sent */ -#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_6 0x0e /* 6 probes sent */ -#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_7 0x0f /* 7 probes sent */ -#define IP6_ADDR_VALID 0x10 /* This bit marks an address as valid (preferred or deprecated) */ -#define IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED 0x30 -#define IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED 0x10 /* Same as VALID (valid but not preferred) */ -#define IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED 0x40 /* Failed DAD test, not valid */ - -#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK 0x07 /* 1-7 probes sent */ - -#define ip6_addr_isinvalid(addr_state) (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_INVALID) -#define ip6_addr_istentative(addr_state) (addr_state & IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE) -#define ip6_addr_isvalid(addr_state) (addr_state & IP6_ADDR_VALID) /* Include valid, preferred, and deprecated. */ -#define ip6_addr_ispreferred(addr_state) (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED) -#define ip6_addr_isdeprecated(addr_state) (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED) -#define ip6_addr_isduplicated(addr_state) (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED) - -#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES -#define IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC (0) -#define IP6_ADDR_LIFE_INFINITE (0xffffffffUL) -#define ip6_addr_life_isstatic(addr_life) ((addr_life) == IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC) -#define ip6_addr_life_isinfinite(addr_life) ((addr_life) == IP6_ADDR_LIFE_INFINITE) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ - -#define ip6_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \ - LWIP_DEBUGF(debug, ("%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F, \ - a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h)) -#define ip6_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) \ - ip6_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(ipaddr) : 0), \ - (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(ipaddr) : 0)) -#define ip6_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) \ - ip6_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, \ - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(&(ipaddr)), \ - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(&(ipaddr)), \ - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(&(ipaddr)), \ - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(&(ipaddr)), \ - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(&(ipaddr)), \ - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(&(ipaddr)), \ - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(&(ipaddr)), \ - IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(&(ipaddr))) - -#define IP6ADDR_STRLEN_MAX 46 - -int ip6addr_aton(const char *cp, ip6_addr_t *addr); -/** returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! */ -char *ip6addr_ntoa(const ip6_addr_t *addr); -char *ip6addr_ntoa_r(const ip6_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_ADDR_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * IPv6 addresses. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * Structs and macros for handling IPv6 addresses. + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_ADDR_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_ADDR_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "def.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/ip6_zone.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** This is the aligned version of ip6_addr_t, + used as local variable, on the stack, etc. */ +struct ip6_addr { + u32_t addr[4]; +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + u8_t zone; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ +}; + +/** IPv6 address */ +typedef struct ip6_addr ip6_addr_t; + +/** Set an IPv6 partial address given by byte-parts */ +#define IP6_ADDR_PART(ip6addr, index, a, b, c, d) \ + (ip6addr)->addr[index] = PP_HTONL(LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d)) + +/** Set a full IPv6 address by passing the 4 u32_t indices in network byte order + (use PP_HTONL() for constants) */ +#define IP6_ADDR(ip6addr, idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3) \ + do { \ + (ip6addr)->addr[0] = idx0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[1] = idx1; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[2] = idx2; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[3] = idx3; \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ + } while (0) + +/** Access address in 16-bit block */ +#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[0]) >> 16) & 0xffff)) +/** Access address in 16-bit block */ +#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[0])) & 0xffff)) +/** Access address in 16-bit block */ +#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[1]) >> 16) & 0xffff)) +/** Access address in 16-bit block */ +#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[1])) & 0xffff)) +/** Access address in 16-bit block */ +#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[2]) >> 16) & 0xffff)) +/** Access address in 16-bit block */ +#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[2])) & 0xffff)) +/** Access address in 16-bit block */ +#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[3]) >> 16) & 0xffff)) +/** Access address in 16-bit block */ +#define IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(ip6addr) ((u16_t)((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[3])) & 0xffff)) + +/** Copy IPv6 address - faster than ip6_addr_set: no NULL check */ +#define ip6_addr_copy(dest, src) \ + do { \ + (dest).addr[0] = (src).addr[0]; \ + (dest).addr[1] = (src).addr[1]; \ + (dest).addr[2] = (src).addr[2]; \ + (dest).addr[3] = (src).addr[3]; \ + ip6_addr_copy_zone((dest), (src)); \ + } while (0) +/** Safely copy one IPv6 address to another (src may be NULL) */ +#define ip6_addr_set(dest, src) \ + do { \ + (dest)->addr[0] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : (src)->addr[0]; \ + (dest)->addr[1] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : (src)->addr[1]; \ + (dest)->addr[2] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : (src)->addr[2]; \ + (dest)->addr[3] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : (src)->addr[3]; \ + ip6_addr_set_zone((dest), (src) == NULL ? IP6_NO_ZONE : ip6_addr_zone(src)); \ + } while (0) + +/** Copy packed IPv6 address to unpacked IPv6 address; zone is not set */ +#define ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest, src) \ + do { \ + (dest).addr[0] = (src).addr[0]; \ + (dest).addr[1] = (src).addr[1]; \ + (dest).addr[2] = (src).addr[2]; \ + (dest).addr[3] = (src).addr[3]; \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(&dest); \ + } while (0) + +/** Copy unpacked IPv6 address to packed IPv6 address; zone is lost */ +#define ip6_addr_copy_to_packed(dest, src) \ + do { \ + (dest).addr[0] = (src).addr[0]; \ + (dest).addr[1] = (src).addr[1]; \ + (dest).addr[2] = (src).addr[2]; \ + (dest).addr[3] = (src).addr[3]; \ + } while (0) + +/** Set complete address to zero */ +#define ip6_addr_set_zero(ip6addr) \ + do { \ + (ip6addr)->addr[0] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[2] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[3] = 0; \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ + } while (0) + +/** Set address to ipv6 'any' (no need for lwip_htonl()) */ +#define ip6_addr_set_any(ip6addr) ip6_addr_set_zero(ip6addr) +/** Set address to ipv6 loopback address */ +#define ip6_addr_set_loopback(ip6addr) \ + do { \ + (ip6addr)->addr[0] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[2] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[3] = PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL); \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ + } while (0) +/** Safely copy one IPv6 address to another and change byte order + * from host- to network-order. */ +#define ip6_addr_set_hton(dest, src) \ + do { \ + (dest)->addr[0] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : lwip_htonl((src)->addr[0]); \ + (dest)->addr[1] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : lwip_htonl((src)->addr[1]); \ + (dest)->addr[2] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : lwip_htonl((src)->addr[2]); \ + (dest)->addr[3] = (src) == NULL ? 0 : lwip_htonl((src)->addr[3]); \ + ip6_addr_set_zone((dest), (src) == NULL ? IP6_NO_ZONE : ip6_addr_zone(src)); \ + } while (0) + +/** Compare IPv6 networks, ignoring zone information. To be used sparingly! */ +#define ip6_addr_netcmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) (((addr1)->addr[0] == (addr2)->addr[0]) && \ + ((addr1)->addr[1] == (addr2)->addr[1])) + +/** + * Determine if two IPv6 address are on the same network. + * + * @param addr1 IPv6 address 1 + * @param addr2 IPv6 address 2 + * @return 1 if the network identifiers of both address match, 0 if not + */ +#define ip6_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2) (ip6_addr_netcmp_zoneless((addr1), (addr2)) && \ + ip6_addr_cmp_zone((addr1), (addr2))) + +/* Exact-host comparison *after* ip6_addr_netcmp() succeeded, for efficiency. */ +#define ip6_addr_nethostcmp(addr1, addr2) (((addr1)->addr[2] == (addr2)->addr[2]) && \ + ((addr1)->addr[3] == (addr2)->addr[3])) + +/** Compare IPv6 addresses, ignoring zone information. To be used sparingly! */ +#define ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) (((addr1)->addr[0] == (addr2)->addr[0]) && \ + ((addr1)->addr[1] == (addr2)->addr[1]) && \ + ((addr1)->addr[2] == (addr2)->addr[2]) && \ + ((addr1)->addr[3] == (addr2)->addr[3])) +/** + * Determine if two IPv6 addresses are the same. In particular, the address + * part of both must be the same, and the zone must be compatible. + * + * @param addr1 IPv6 address 1 + * @param addr2 IPv6 address 2 + * @return 1 if the addresses are considered equal, 0 if not + */ +#define ip6_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) (ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless((addr1), (addr2)) && \ + ip6_addr_cmp_zone((addr1), (addr2))) + +/** Compare IPv6 address to packed address and zone */ +#define ip6_addr_cmp_packed(ip6addr, paddr, zone_idx) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == (paddr)->addr[0]) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == (paddr)->addr[1]) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == (paddr)->addr[2]) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == (paddr)->addr[3]) && \ + ip6_addr_equals_zone((ip6addr), (zone_idx))) + +#define ip6_get_subnet_id(ip6addr) (lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[2]) & 0x0000ffffUL) + +#define ip6_addr_isany_val(ip6addr) (((ip6addr).addr[0] == 0) && \ + ((ip6addr).addr[1] == 0) && \ + ((ip6addr).addr[2] == 0) && \ + ((ip6addr).addr[3] == 0)) +#define ip6_addr_isany(ip6addr) (((ip6addr) == NULL) || ip6_addr_isany_val(*(ip6addr))) + +#define ip6_addr_isloopback(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == 0UL) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0UL) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == 0UL) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL))) + +#define ip6_addr_isglobal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xe0000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0x20000000UL)) + +#define ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xffc00000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL)) + +#define ip6_addr_issitelocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xffc00000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xfec00000UL)) + +#define ip6_addr_isuniquelocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xfe000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xfc000000UL)) + +#define ip6_addr_isipv4mappedipv6(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == 0) && ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0) && (((ip6addr)->addr[2]) == PP_HTONL(0x0000FFFFUL))) + +#define ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL)) +#define ip6_addr_multicast_transient_flag(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0x00100000UL)) +#define ip6_addr_multicast_prefix_flag(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0x00200000UL)) +#define ip6_addr_multicast_rendezvous_flag(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0x00400000UL)) +#define ip6_addr_multicast_scope(ip6addr) ((lwip_htonl((ip6addr)->addr[0]) >> 16) & 0xf) +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVED 0x0 +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVED0 0x0 +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_INTERFACE_LOCAL 0x1 +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_LINK_LOCAL 0x2 +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVED3 0x3 +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_ADMIN_LOCAL 0x4 +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_SITE_LOCAL 0x5 +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_ORGANIZATION_LOCAL 0x8 +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_GLOBAL 0xe +#define IP6_MULTICAST_SCOPE_RESERVEDF 0xf +#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_iflocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff010000UL)) +#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_linklocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) +#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_adminlocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff040000UL)) +#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_sitelocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff050000UL)) +#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_orglocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff080000UL)) +#define ip6_addr_ismulticast_global(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff8f0000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff0e0000UL)) + +/* Scoping note: while interface-local and link-local multicast addresses do + * have a scope (i.e., they are meaningful only in the context of a particular + * interface), the following functions are not assigning or comparing zone + * indices. The reason for this is backward compatibility. Any call site that + * produces a non-global multicast address must assign a multicast address as + * appropriate itself. */ + +#define ip6_addr_isallnodes_iflocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff010000UL)) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0UL) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == 0UL) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL))) + +#define ip6_addr_isallnodes_linklocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0UL) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == 0UL) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL))) +#define ip6_addr_set_allnodes_linklocal(ip6addr) \ + do { \ + (ip6addr)->addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL); \ + (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[2] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[3] = PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL); \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ + } while (0) + +#define ip6_addr_isallrouters_linklocal(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0UL) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == 0UL) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == PP_HTONL(0x00000002UL))) +#define ip6_addr_set_allrouters_linklocal(ip6addr) \ + do { \ + (ip6addr)->addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL); \ + (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[2] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[3] = PP_HTONL(0x00000002UL); \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ + } while (0) + +#define ip6_addr_issolicitednode(ip6addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL)) && \ + (((ip6addr)->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL)) == PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL))) + +#define ip6_addr_set_solicitednode(ip6addr, if_id) \ + do { \ + (ip6addr)->addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL); \ + (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL); \ + (ip6addr)->addr[3] = (PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL) | (if_id)); \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ + } while (0) + +#define ip6_addr_cmp_solicitednode(ip6addr, sn_addr) (((ip6addr)->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL)) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[1] == 0) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[2] == PP_HTONL(0x00000001UL)) && \ + ((ip6addr)->addr[3] == (PP_HTONL(0xff000000UL) | (sn_addr)->addr[3]))) + +/* IPv6 address states. */ +#define IP6_ADDR_INVALID 0x00 +#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE 0x08 +#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_1 0x09 /* 1 probe sent */ +#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_2 0x0a /* 2 probes sent */ +#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_3 0x0b /* 3 probes sent */ +#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_4 0x0c /* 4 probes sent */ +#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_5 0x0d /* 5 probes sent */ +#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_6 0x0e /* 6 probes sent */ +#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_7 0x0f /* 7 probes sent */ +#define IP6_ADDR_VALID 0x10 /* This bit marks an address as valid (preferred or deprecated) */ +#define IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED 0x30 +#define IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED 0x10 /* Same as VALID (valid but not preferred) */ +#define IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED 0x40 /* Failed DAD test, not valid */ + +#define IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE_COUNT_MASK 0x07 /* 1-7 probes sent */ + +#define ip6_addr_isinvalid(addr_state) (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_INVALID) +#define ip6_addr_istentative(addr_state) (addr_state & IP6_ADDR_TENTATIVE) +#define ip6_addr_isvalid(addr_state) (addr_state & IP6_ADDR_VALID) /* Include valid, preferred, and deprecated. */ +#define ip6_addr_ispreferred(addr_state) (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED) +#define ip6_addr_isdeprecated(addr_state) (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_DEPRECATED) +#define ip6_addr_isduplicated(addr_state) (addr_state == IP6_ADDR_DUPLICATED) + +#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES +#define IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC (0) +#define IP6_ADDR_LIFE_INFINITE (0xffffffffUL) +#define ip6_addr_life_isstatic(addr_life) ((addr_life) == IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC) +#define ip6_addr_life_isinfinite(addr_life) ((addr_life) == IP6_ADDR_LIFE_INFINITE) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ + +#define ip6_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \ + LWIP_DEBUGF(debug, ("%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F ":%" X16_F, \ + a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h)) +#define ip6_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) \ + ip6_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(ipaddr) : 0), \ + (u16_t)((ipaddr) != NULL ? IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(ipaddr) : 0)) +#define ip6_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) \ + ip6_addr_debug_print_parts(debug, \ + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK1(&(ipaddr)), \ + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK2(&(ipaddr)), \ + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK3(&(ipaddr)), \ + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK4(&(ipaddr)), \ + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK5(&(ipaddr)), \ + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK6(&(ipaddr)), \ + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK7(&(ipaddr)), \ + IP6_ADDR_BLOCK8(&(ipaddr))) + +#define IP6ADDR_STRLEN_MAX 46 + +int ip6addr_aton(const char *cp, ip6_addr_t *addr); +/** returns ptr to static buffer; not reentrant! */ +char *ip6addr_ntoa(const ip6_addr_t *addr); +char *ip6addr_ntoa_r(const ip6_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_ADDR_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_frag.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_frag.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_frag.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_frag.h index f728d817..a4c1990d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_frag.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_frag.h @@ -1,142 +1,142 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * IPv6 fragmentation and reassembly. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_FRAG_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_FRAG_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/** The IPv6 reassembly timer interval in milliseconds. */ -#define IP6_REASS_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 - -/** IP6_FRAG_COPYHEADER==1: for platforms where sizeof(void*) > 4, "struct - * ip6_reass_helper" is too large to be stored in the IPv6 fragment header, and - * will bleed into the header before it, which may be the IPv6 header or an - * extension header. This means that for each first fragment packet, we need to - * 1) make a copy of some IPv6 header fields (src+dest) that we need later on, - * just in case we do overwrite part of the IPv6 header, and 2) make a copy of - * the header data that we overwrote, so that we can restore it before either - * completing reassembly or sending an ICMPv6 reply. The last part is true even - * if this setting is disabled, but if it is enabled, we need to save a bit - * more data (up to the size of a pointer) because we overwrite more. */ -#ifndef IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER -#define IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER 0 -#endif - -/* With IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER==1, a helper structure may (or, depending on the - * presence of extensions, may not) overwrite part of the IP header. Therefore, - * we copy the fields that we need from the IP header for as long as the helper - * structure may still be in place. This is easier than temporarily restoring - * those fields in the IP header each time we need to perform checks on them. */ -#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER -#define IPV6_FRAG_SRC(ipr) ((ipr)->src) -#define IPV6_FRAG_DEST(ipr) ((ipr)->dest) -#else /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ -#define IPV6_FRAG_SRC(ipr) ((ipr)->iphdr->src) -#define IPV6_FRAG_DEST(ipr) ((ipr)->iphdr->dest) -#endif /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ - -/** IPv6 reassembly helper struct. - * This is exported because memp needs to know the size. - */ -struct ip6_reassdata { - struct ip6_reassdata *next; - struct pbuf *p; - struct ip6_hdr *iphdr; /* pointer to the first (original) IPv6 header */ -#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER - ip6_addr_p_t src; /* copy of the source address in the IP header */ - ip6_addr_p_t dest; /* copy of the destination address in the IP header */ - /* This buffer (for the part of the original header that we overwrite) will - * be slightly oversized, but we cannot compute the exact size from here. */ - u8_t orig_hdr[sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr) + sizeof(void *)]; -#else /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ - /* In this case we still need the buffer, for sending ICMPv6 replies. */ - u8_t orig_hdr[sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr)]; -#endif /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ - u32_t identification; - u16_t datagram_len; - u8_t nexth; - u8_t timer; -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - u8_t src_zone; /* zone of original packet's source address */ - u8_t dest_zone; /* zone of original packet's destination address */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ -}; - -#define ip6_reass_init() /* Compatibility define */ -void ip6_reass_tmr(void); -struct pbuf *ip6_reass(struct pbuf *p); - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED -#define LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED -/** A custom pbuf that holds a reference to another pbuf, which is freed - * when this custom pbuf is freed. This is used to create a custom PBUF_REF - * that points into the original pbuf. */ -struct pbuf_custom_ref { - /** 'base class' */ - struct pbuf_custom pc; - /** pointer to the original pbuf that is referenced */ - struct pbuf *original; -}; -#endif /* LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED */ - -err_t ip6_frag(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest); - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_FRAG_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * IPv6 fragmentation and reassembly. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_FRAG_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_FRAG_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/** The IPv6 reassembly timer interval in milliseconds. */ +#define IP6_REASS_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 + +/** IP6_FRAG_COPYHEADER==1: for platforms where sizeof(void*) > 4, "struct + * ip6_reass_helper" is too large to be stored in the IPv6 fragment header, and + * will bleed into the header before it, which may be the IPv6 header or an + * extension header. This means that for each first fragment packet, we need to + * 1) make a copy of some IPv6 header fields (src+dest) that we need later on, + * just in case we do overwrite part of the IPv6 header, and 2) make a copy of + * the header data that we overwrote, so that we can restore it before either + * completing reassembly or sending an ICMPv6 reply. The last part is true even + * if this setting is disabled, but if it is enabled, we need to save a bit + * more data (up to the size of a pointer) because we overwrite more. */ +#ifndef IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER +#define IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER 0 +#endif + +/* With IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER==1, a helper structure may (or, depending on the + * presence of extensions, may not) overwrite part of the IP header. Therefore, + * we copy the fields that we need from the IP header for as long as the helper + * structure may still be in place. This is easier than temporarily restoring + * those fields in the IP header each time we need to perform checks on them. */ +#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER +#define IPV6_FRAG_SRC(ipr) ((ipr)->src) +#define IPV6_FRAG_DEST(ipr) ((ipr)->dest) +#else /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ +#define IPV6_FRAG_SRC(ipr) ((ipr)->iphdr->src) +#define IPV6_FRAG_DEST(ipr) ((ipr)->iphdr->dest) +#endif /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ + +/** IPv6 reassembly helper struct. + * This is exported because memp needs to know the size. + */ +struct ip6_reassdata { + struct ip6_reassdata *next; + struct pbuf *p; + struct ip6_hdr *iphdr; /* pointer to the first (original) IPv6 header */ +#if IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER + ip6_addr_p_t src; /* copy of the source address in the IP header */ + ip6_addr_p_t dest; /* copy of the destination address in the IP header */ + /* This buffer (for the part of the original header that we overwrite) will + * be slightly oversized, but we cannot compute the exact size from here. */ + u8_t orig_hdr[sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr) + sizeof(void *)]; +#else /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ + /* In this case we still need the buffer, for sending ICMPv6 replies. */ + u8_t orig_hdr[sizeof(struct ip6_frag_hdr)]; +#endif /* IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER */ + u32_t identification; + u16_t datagram_len; + u8_t nexth; + u8_t timer; +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + u8_t src_zone; /* zone of original packet's source address */ + u8_t dest_zone; /* zone of original packet's destination address */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ +}; + +#define ip6_reass_init() /* Compatibility define */ +void ip6_reass_tmr(void); +struct pbuf *ip6_reass(struct pbuf *p); + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED +#define LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED +/** A custom pbuf that holds a reference to another pbuf, which is freed + * when this custom pbuf is freed. This is used to create a custom PBUF_REF + * that points into the original pbuf. */ +struct pbuf_custom_ref { + /** 'base class' */ + struct pbuf_custom pc; + /** pointer to the original pbuf that is referenced */ + struct pbuf *original; +}; +#endif /* LWIP_PBUF_CUSTOM_REF_DEFINED */ + +err_t ip6_frag(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest); + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_FRAG_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_zone.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_zone.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_zone.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_zone.h index 4506a3bf..c8445f8d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_zone.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip6_zone.h @@ -1,306 +1,306 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * IPv6 address scopes, zones, and scoping policy. - * - * This header provides the means to implement support for IPv6 address scopes, - * as per RFC 4007. An address scope can be either global or more constrained. - * In lwIP, we say that an address "has a scope" or "is scoped" when its scope - * is constrained, in which case the address is meaningful only in a specific - * "zone." For unicast addresses, only link-local addresses have a scope; in - * that case, the scope is the link. For multicast addresses, there are various - * scopes defined by RFC 4007 and others. For any constrained scope, a system - * must establish a (potentially one-to-many) mapping between zones and local - * interfaces. For example, a link-local address is valid on only one link (its - * zone). That link may be attached to one or more local interfaces. The - * decisions on which scopes are constrained and the mapping between zones and - * interfaces is together what we refer to as the "scoping policy" - more on - * this in a bit. - * - * In lwIP, each IPv6 address has an associated zone index. This zone index may - * be set to "no zone" (IP6_NO_ZONE, 0) or an actual zone. We say that an - * address "has a zone" or "is zoned" when its zone index is *not* set to "no - * zone." In lwIP, in principle, each address should be "properly zoned," which - * means that if the address has a zone if and only if has a scope. As such, it - * is a rule that an unscoped (e.g., global) address must never have a zone. - * Even though one could argue that there is always one zone even for global - * scopes, this rule exists for implementation simplicity. Violation of the - * rule will trigger assertions or otherwise result in undesired behavior. - * - * Backward compatibility prevents us from requiring that applications always - * provide properly zoned addresses. We do enforce the rule that the in the - * lwIP link layer (everything below netif->output_ip6() and in particular ND6) - * *all* addresses are properly zoned. Thus, on the output paths down the - * stack, various places deal with the case of addresses that lack a zone. - * Some of them are best-effort for efficiency (e.g. the PCB bind and connect - * API calls' attempts to add missing zones); ultimately the IPv6 output - * handler (@ref ip6_output_if_src) will set a zone if necessary. - * - * Aside from dealing with scoped addresses lacking a zone, a proper IPv6 - * implementation must also ensure that a packet with a scoped source and/or - * destination address does not leave its zone. This is currently implemented - * in the input and forward functions. However, for output, these checks are - * deliberately omitted in order to keep the implementation lightweight. The - * routing algorithm in @ref ip6_route will take decisions such that it will - * not cause zone violations unless the application sets bad addresses, though. - * - * In terms of scoping policy, lwIP implements the default policy from RFC 4007 - * using macros in this file. This policy considers link-local unicast - * addresses and (only) interface-local and link-local multicast addresses as - * having a scope. For all these addresses, the zone is equal to the interface. - * As shown below in this file, it is possible to implement a custom policy. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 The MINIX 3 Project. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: David van Moolenbroek - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_ZONE_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_ZONE_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @defgroup ip6_zones IPv6 Zones - * @ingroup ip6 - * @{ - */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/** Identifier for "no zone". */ -#define IP6_NO_ZONE 0 - -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - -/** Zone initializer for static IPv6 address initialization, including comma. */ -#define IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT , IP6_NO_ZONE - -/** Return the zone index of the given IPv6 address; possibly "no zone". */ -#define ip6_addr_zone(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->zone) - -/** Does the given IPv6 address have a zone set? (0/1) */ -#define ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) (ip6_addr_zone(ip6addr) != IP6_NO_ZONE) - -/** Set the zone field of an IPv6 address to a particular value. */ -#define ip6_addr_set_zone(ip6addr, zone_idx) ((ip6addr)->zone = (zone_idx)) - -/** Clear the zone field of an IPv6 address, setting it to "no zone". */ -#define ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->zone = IP6_NO_ZONE) - -/** Copy the zone field from the second IPv6 address to the first one. */ -#define ip6_addr_copy_zone(ip6addr1, ip6addr2) ((ip6addr1).zone = (ip6addr2).zone) - -/** Is the zone field of the given IPv6 address equal to the given zone index? (0/1) */ -#define ip6_addr_equals_zone(ip6addr, zone_idx) ((ip6addr)->zone == (zone_idx)) - -/** Are the zone fields of the given IPv6 addresses equal? (0/1) - * This macro must only be used on IPv6 addresses of the same scope. */ -#define ip6_addr_cmp_zone(ip6addr1, ip6addr2) ((ip6addr1)->zone == (ip6addr2)->zone) - -/** Symbolic constants for the 'type' parameters in some of the macros. - * These exist for efficiency only, allowing the macros to avoid certain tests - * when the address is known not to be of a certain type. Dead code elimination - * will do the rest. IP6_MULTICAST is supported but currently not optimized. - * @see ip6_addr_has_scope, ip6_addr_assign_zone, ip6_addr_lacks_zone. - */ -enum lwip_ipv6_scope_type { - /** Unknown */ - IP6_UNKNOWN = 0, - /** Unicast */ - IP6_UNICAST = 1, - /** Multicast */ - IP6_MULTICAST = 2 -}; - -/** IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES: together, the following three macro definitions, - * @ref ip6_addr_has_scope, @ref ip6_addr_assign_zone, and - * @ref ip6_addr_test_zone, completely define the lwIP scoping policy. - * The definitions below implement the default policy from RFC 4007 Sec. 6. - * Should an implementation desire to implement a different policy, it can - * define IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES to 1 and supply its own definitions for the three - * macros instead. - */ -#ifndef IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES -#define IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES 0 -#endif /* !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES */ - -#if !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES - -/** - * Determine whether an IPv6 address has a constrained scope, and as such is - * meaningful only if accompanied by a zone index to identify the scope's zone. - * The given address type may be used to eliminate at compile time certain - * checks that will evaluate to false at run time anyway. - * - * This default implementation follows the default model of RFC 4007, where - * only interface-local and link-local scopes are defined. - * - * Even though the unicast loopback address does have an implied link-local - * scope, in this implementation it does not have an explicitly assigned zone - * index. As such it should not be tested for in this macro. - * - * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address (const); only its address part is examined. - * @param type address type; see @ref lwip_ipv6_scope_type. - * @return 1 if the address has a constrained scope, 0 if it does not. - */ -#define ip6_addr_has_scope(ip6addr, type) \ - (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6addr) || (((type) != IP6_UNICAST) && \ - (ip6_addr_ismulticast_iflocal(ip6addr) || \ - ip6_addr_ismulticast_linklocal(ip6addr)))) - -/** - * Assign a zone index to an IPv6 address, based on a network interface. If the - * given address has a scope, the assigned zone index is that scope's zone of - * the given netif; otherwise, the assigned zone index is "no zone". - * - * This default implementation follows the default model of RFC 4007, where - * only interface-local and link-local scopes are defined, and the zone index - * of both of those scopes always equals the index of the network interface. - * As such, this default implementation need not distinguish between different - * constrained scopes when assigning the zone. - * - * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address; its address part is examined, and its zone - * index is assigned. - * @param type address type; see @ref lwip_ipv6_scope_type. - * @param netif the network interface (const). - */ -#define ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip6addr, type, netif) \ - (ip6_addr_set_zone((ip6addr), \ - ip6_addr_has_scope((ip6addr), (type)) ? netif_get_index(netif) : 0)) - -/** - * Test whether an IPv6 address is "zone-compatible" with a network interface. - * That is, test whether the network interface is part of the zone associated - * with the address. For efficiency, this macro is only ever called if the - * given address is either scoped or zoned, and thus, it need not test this. - * If an address is scoped but not zoned, or zoned and not scoped, it is - * considered not zone-compatible with any netif. - * - * This default implementation follows the default model of RFC 4007, where - * only interface-local and link-local scopes are defined, and the zone index - * of both of those scopes always equals the index of the network interface. - * As such, there is always only one matching netif for a specific zone index, - * but all call sites of this macro currently support multiple matching netifs - * as well (at no additional expense in the common case). - * - * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address (const). - * @param netif the network interface (const). - * @return 1 if the address is scope-compatible with the netif, 0 if not. - */ -#define ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6addr, netif) \ - (ip6_addr_equals_zone((ip6addr), netif_get_index(netif))) - -#endif /* !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES */ - -/** Does the given IPv6 address have a scope, and as such should also have a - * zone to be meaningful, but does not actually have a zone? (0/1) */ -#define ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip6addr, type) \ - (!ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) && ip6_addr_has_scope((ip6addr), (type))) - -/** - * Try to select a zone for a scoped address that does not yet have a zone. - * Called from PCB bind and connect routines, for two reasons: 1) to save on - * this (relatively expensive) selection for every individual packet route - * operation and 2) to allow the application to obtain the selected zone from - * the PCB as is customary for e.g. getsockname/getpeername BSD socket calls. - * - * Ideally, callers would always supply a properly zoned address, in which case - * this function would not be needed. It exists both for compatibility with the - * BSD socket API (which accepts zoneless destination addresses) and for - * backward compatibility with pre-scoping lwIP code. - * - * It may be impossible to select a zone, e.g. if there are no netifs. In that - * case, the address's zone field will be left as is. - * - * @param dest the IPv6 address for which to select and set a zone. - * @param src source IPv6 address (const); may be equal to dest. - */ -#define ip6_addr_select_zone(dest, src) \ - do { \ - struct netif *selected_netif; \ - selected_netif = ip6_route((src), (dest)); \ - if (selected_netif != NULL) { \ - ip6_addr_assign_zone((dest), IP6_UNKNOWN, selected_netif); \ - } \ - } while (0) - -/** - * @} - */ - -#else /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - -#define IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT -#define ip6_addr_zone(ip6addr) (IP6_NO_ZONE) -#define ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) (0) -#define ip6_addr_set_zone(ip6addr, zone_idx) -#define ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr) -#define ip6_addr_copy_zone(ip6addr1, ip6addr2) -#define ip6_addr_equals_zone(ip6addr, zone_idx) (1) -#define ip6_addr_cmp_zone(ip6addr1, ip6addr2) (1) -#define IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES 0 -#define ip6_addr_has_scope(ip6addr, type) (0) -#define ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip6addr, type, netif) -#define ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6addr, netif) (1) -#define ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip6addr, type) (0) -#define ip6_addr_select_zone(ip6addr, src) - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG - -/** Verify that the given IPv6 address is properly zoned. */ -#define IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(ip6addr) LWIP_ASSERT("IPv6 zone check failed", \ - ip6_addr_has_scope(ip6addr, IP6_UNKNOWN) == ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr)) - -/** Verify that the given IPv6 address is properly zoned for the given netif. */ -#define IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(ip6addr, netif) LWIP_ASSERT("IPv6 netif zone check failed", \ - ip6_addr_has_scope(ip6addr, IP6_UNKNOWN) ? \ - (ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) && \ - (((netif) == NULL) || ip6_addr_test_zone((ip6addr), (netif)))) : \ - !ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr)) - -#else /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG */ - -#define IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(ip6addr) -#define IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(ip6addr, netif) - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG */ - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_ZONE_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * IPv6 address scopes, zones, and scoping policy. + * + * This header provides the means to implement support for IPv6 address scopes, + * as per RFC 4007. An address scope can be either global or more constrained. + * In lwIP, we say that an address "has a scope" or "is scoped" when its scope + * is constrained, in which case the address is meaningful only in a specific + * "zone." For unicast addresses, only link-local addresses have a scope; in + * that case, the scope is the link. For multicast addresses, there are various + * scopes defined by RFC 4007 and others. For any constrained scope, a system + * must establish a (potentially one-to-many) mapping between zones and local + * interfaces. For example, a link-local address is valid on only one link (its + * zone). That link may be attached to one or more local interfaces. The + * decisions on which scopes are constrained and the mapping between zones and + * interfaces is together what we refer to as the "scoping policy" - more on + * this in a bit. + * + * In lwIP, each IPv6 address has an associated zone index. This zone index may + * be set to "no zone" (IP6_NO_ZONE, 0) or an actual zone. We say that an + * address "has a zone" or "is zoned" when its zone index is *not* set to "no + * zone." In lwIP, in principle, each address should be "properly zoned," which + * means that if the address has a zone if and only if has a scope. As such, it + * is a rule that an unscoped (e.g., global) address must never have a zone. + * Even though one could argue that there is always one zone even for global + * scopes, this rule exists for implementation simplicity. Violation of the + * rule will trigger assertions or otherwise result in undesired behavior. + * + * Backward compatibility prevents us from requiring that applications always + * provide properly zoned addresses. We do enforce the rule that the in the + * lwIP link layer (everything below netif->output_ip6() and in particular ND6) + * *all* addresses are properly zoned. Thus, on the output paths down the + * stack, various places deal with the case of addresses that lack a zone. + * Some of them are best-effort for efficiency (e.g. the PCB bind and connect + * API calls' attempts to add missing zones); ultimately the IPv6 output + * handler (@ref ip6_output_if_src) will set a zone if necessary. + * + * Aside from dealing with scoped addresses lacking a zone, a proper IPv6 + * implementation must also ensure that a packet with a scoped source and/or + * destination address does not leave its zone. This is currently implemented + * in the input and forward functions. However, for output, these checks are + * deliberately omitted in order to keep the implementation lightweight. The + * routing algorithm in @ref ip6_route will take decisions such that it will + * not cause zone violations unless the application sets bad addresses, though. + * + * In terms of scoping policy, lwIP implements the default policy from RFC 4007 + * using macros in this file. This policy considers link-local unicast + * addresses and (only) interface-local and link-local multicast addresses as + * having a scope. For all these addresses, the zone is equal to the interface. + * As shown below in this file, it is possible to implement a custom policy. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 The MINIX 3 Project. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: David van Moolenbroek + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP6_ZONE_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP6_ZONE_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @defgroup ip6_zones IPv6 Zones + * @ingroup ip6 + * @{ + */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/** Identifier for "no zone". */ +#define IP6_NO_ZONE 0 + +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + +/** Zone initializer for static IPv6 address initialization, including comma. */ +#define IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT , IP6_NO_ZONE + +/** Return the zone index of the given IPv6 address; possibly "no zone". */ +#define ip6_addr_zone(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->zone) + +/** Does the given IPv6 address have a zone set? (0/1) */ +#define ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) (ip6_addr_zone(ip6addr) != IP6_NO_ZONE) + +/** Set the zone field of an IPv6 address to a particular value. */ +#define ip6_addr_set_zone(ip6addr, zone_idx) ((ip6addr)->zone = (zone_idx)) + +/** Clear the zone field of an IPv6 address, setting it to "no zone". */ +#define ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr) ((ip6addr)->zone = IP6_NO_ZONE) + +/** Copy the zone field from the second IPv6 address to the first one. */ +#define ip6_addr_copy_zone(ip6addr1, ip6addr2) ((ip6addr1).zone = (ip6addr2).zone) + +/** Is the zone field of the given IPv6 address equal to the given zone index? (0/1) */ +#define ip6_addr_equals_zone(ip6addr, zone_idx) ((ip6addr)->zone == (zone_idx)) + +/** Are the zone fields of the given IPv6 addresses equal? (0/1) + * This macro must only be used on IPv6 addresses of the same scope. */ +#define ip6_addr_cmp_zone(ip6addr1, ip6addr2) ((ip6addr1)->zone == (ip6addr2)->zone) + +/** Symbolic constants for the 'type' parameters in some of the macros. + * These exist for efficiency only, allowing the macros to avoid certain tests + * when the address is known not to be of a certain type. Dead code elimination + * will do the rest. IP6_MULTICAST is supported but currently not optimized. + * @see ip6_addr_has_scope, ip6_addr_assign_zone, ip6_addr_lacks_zone. + */ +enum lwip_ipv6_scope_type { + /** Unknown */ + IP6_UNKNOWN = 0, + /** Unicast */ + IP6_UNICAST = 1, + /** Multicast */ + IP6_MULTICAST = 2 +}; + +/** IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES: together, the following three macro definitions, + * @ref ip6_addr_has_scope, @ref ip6_addr_assign_zone, and + * @ref ip6_addr_test_zone, completely define the lwIP scoping policy. + * The definitions below implement the default policy from RFC 4007 Sec. 6. + * Should an implementation desire to implement a different policy, it can + * define IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES to 1 and supply its own definitions for the three + * macros instead. + */ +#ifndef IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES +#define IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES 0 +#endif /* !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES */ + +#if !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES + +/** + * Determine whether an IPv6 address has a constrained scope, and as such is + * meaningful only if accompanied by a zone index to identify the scope's zone. + * The given address type may be used to eliminate at compile time certain + * checks that will evaluate to false at run time anyway. + * + * This default implementation follows the default model of RFC 4007, where + * only interface-local and link-local scopes are defined. + * + * Even though the unicast loopback address does have an implied link-local + * scope, in this implementation it does not have an explicitly assigned zone + * index. As such it should not be tested for in this macro. + * + * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address (const); only its address part is examined. + * @param type address type; see @ref lwip_ipv6_scope_type. + * @return 1 if the address has a constrained scope, 0 if it does not. + */ +#define ip6_addr_has_scope(ip6addr, type) \ + (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip6addr) || (((type) != IP6_UNICAST) && \ + (ip6_addr_ismulticast_iflocal(ip6addr) || \ + ip6_addr_ismulticast_linklocal(ip6addr)))) + +/** + * Assign a zone index to an IPv6 address, based on a network interface. If the + * given address has a scope, the assigned zone index is that scope's zone of + * the given netif; otherwise, the assigned zone index is "no zone". + * + * This default implementation follows the default model of RFC 4007, where + * only interface-local and link-local scopes are defined, and the zone index + * of both of those scopes always equals the index of the network interface. + * As such, this default implementation need not distinguish between different + * constrained scopes when assigning the zone. + * + * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address; its address part is examined, and its zone + * index is assigned. + * @param type address type; see @ref lwip_ipv6_scope_type. + * @param netif the network interface (const). + */ +#define ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip6addr, type, netif) \ + (ip6_addr_set_zone((ip6addr), \ + ip6_addr_has_scope((ip6addr), (type)) ? netif_get_index(netif) : 0)) + +/** + * Test whether an IPv6 address is "zone-compatible" with a network interface. + * That is, test whether the network interface is part of the zone associated + * with the address. For efficiency, this macro is only ever called if the + * given address is either scoped or zoned, and thus, it need not test this. + * If an address is scoped but not zoned, or zoned and not scoped, it is + * considered not zone-compatible with any netif. + * + * This default implementation follows the default model of RFC 4007, where + * only interface-local and link-local scopes are defined, and the zone index + * of both of those scopes always equals the index of the network interface. + * As such, there is always only one matching netif for a specific zone index, + * but all call sites of this macro currently support multiple matching netifs + * as well (at no additional expense in the common case). + * + * @param ip6addr the IPv6 address (const). + * @param netif the network interface (const). + * @return 1 if the address is scope-compatible with the netif, 0 if not. + */ +#define ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6addr, netif) \ + (ip6_addr_equals_zone((ip6addr), netif_get_index(netif))) + +#endif /* !IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES */ + +/** Does the given IPv6 address have a scope, and as such should also have a + * zone to be meaningful, but does not actually have a zone? (0/1) */ +#define ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip6addr, type) \ + (!ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) && ip6_addr_has_scope((ip6addr), (type))) + +/** + * Try to select a zone for a scoped address that does not yet have a zone. + * Called from PCB bind and connect routines, for two reasons: 1) to save on + * this (relatively expensive) selection for every individual packet route + * operation and 2) to allow the application to obtain the selected zone from + * the PCB as is customary for e.g. getsockname/getpeername BSD socket calls. + * + * Ideally, callers would always supply a properly zoned address, in which case + * this function would not be needed. It exists both for compatibility with the + * BSD socket API (which accepts zoneless destination addresses) and for + * backward compatibility with pre-scoping lwIP code. + * + * It may be impossible to select a zone, e.g. if there are no netifs. In that + * case, the address's zone field will be left as is. + * + * @param dest the IPv6 address for which to select and set a zone. + * @param src source IPv6 address (const); may be equal to dest. + */ +#define ip6_addr_select_zone(dest, src) \ + do { \ + struct netif *selected_netif; \ + selected_netif = ip6_route((src), (dest)); \ + if (selected_netif != NULL) { \ + ip6_addr_assign_zone((dest), IP6_UNKNOWN, selected_netif); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/** + * @} + */ + +#else /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + +#define IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT +#define ip6_addr_zone(ip6addr) (IP6_NO_ZONE) +#define ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) (0) +#define ip6_addr_set_zone(ip6addr, zone_idx) +#define ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr) +#define ip6_addr_copy_zone(ip6addr1, ip6addr2) +#define ip6_addr_equals_zone(ip6addr, zone_idx) (1) +#define ip6_addr_cmp_zone(ip6addr1, ip6addr2) (1) +#define IPV6_CUSTOM_SCOPES 0 +#define ip6_addr_has_scope(ip6addr, type) (0) +#define ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip6addr, type, netif) +#define ip6_addr_test_zone(ip6addr, netif) (1) +#define ip6_addr_lacks_zone(ip6addr, type) (0) +#define ip6_addr_select_zone(ip6addr, src) + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG + +/** Verify that the given IPv6 address is properly zoned. */ +#define IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(ip6addr) LWIP_ASSERT("IPv6 zone check failed", \ + ip6_addr_has_scope(ip6addr, IP6_UNKNOWN) == ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr)) + +/** Verify that the given IPv6 address is properly zoned for the given netif. */ +#define IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(ip6addr, netif) LWIP_ASSERT("IPv6 netif zone check failed", \ + ip6_addr_has_scope(ip6addr, IP6_UNKNOWN) ? \ + (ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr) && \ + (((netif) == NULL) || ip6_addr_test_zone((ip6addr), (netif)))) : \ + !ip6_addr_has_zone(ip6addr)) + +#else /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG */ + +#define IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(ip6addr) +#define IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK_NETIF(ip6addr, netif) + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES && LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG */ + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP6_ZONE_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip_addr.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip_addr.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip_addr.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip_addr.h index 5680525c..afc52843 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip_addr.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/ip_addr.h @@ -1,573 +1,573 @@ -/** - * @file - * IP address API (common IPv4 and IPv6) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP_ADDR_H -#define LWIP_HDR_IP_ADDR_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" - -#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** @ingroup ipaddr - * IP address types for use in ip_addr_t.type member. - * @see tcp_new_ip_type(), udp_new_ip_type(), raw_new_ip_type(). - */ -enum lwip_ip_addr_type { - /** IPv4 */ - IPADDR_TYPE_V4 = 0U, - /** IPv6 */ - IPADDR_TYPE_V6 = 6U, - /** IPv4+IPv6 ("dual-stack") */ - IPADDR_TYPE_ANY = 46U -}; - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -/** - * @ingroup ipaddr - * A union struct for both IP version's addresses. - * ATTENTION: watch out for its size when adding IPv6 address scope! - */ -typedef struct ip_addr { - union { - ip6_addr_t ip6; - ip4_addr_t ip4; - } u_addr; - /** @ref lwip_ip_addr_type */ - u8_t type; -} ip_addr_t; - -extern const ip_addr_t ip_addr_any_type; - -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define IPADDR4_INIT(u32val) \ - { \ - { { { u32val, 0ul, 0ul, 0ul } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT } }, IPADDR_TYPE_V4 \ - } -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(a, b, c, d) IPADDR4_INIT(PP_HTONL(LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d))) - -/** @ingroup ip6addr */ -#define IPADDR6_INIT(a, b, c, d) \ - { \ - { { { a, b, c, d } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT } }, IPADDR_TYPE_V6 \ - } -/** @ingroup ip6addr */ -#define IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(a, b, c, d) \ - { \ - { { { PP_HTONL(a), PP_HTONL(b), PP_HTONL(c), PP_HTONL(d) } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT } }, IPADDR_TYPE_V6 \ - } - -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&ipaddr) == IPADDR_TYPE_ANY) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define IPADDR_ANY_TYPE_INIT \ - { \ - { { { 0ul, 0ul, 0ul, 0ul } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT } }, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY \ - } - -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define IP_IS_V4_VAL(ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&ipaddr) == IPADDR_TYPE_V4) -/** @ingroup ip6addr */ -#define IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&ipaddr) == IPADDR_TYPE_V6) -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define IP_IS_V4(ipaddr) (((ipaddr) == NULL) || IP_IS_V4_VAL(*(ipaddr))) -/** @ingroup ip6addr */ -#define IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) (((ipaddr) != NULL) && IP_IS_V6_VAL(*(ipaddr))) - -#define IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, iptype) \ - do { \ - (ipaddr).type = (iptype); \ - } while (0) -#define IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, iptype) \ - do { \ - if ((ipaddr) != NULL) { \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*(ipaddr), iptype); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr) ((ipaddr)->type) - -#define IP_ADDR_RAW_SIZE(ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&ipaddr) == IPADDR_TYPE_V4 ? sizeof(ip4_addr_t) : sizeof(ip6_addr_t)) - -#define IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&pcb->local_ip) == IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr)) -#define IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, ipaddr) (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip) || IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ipaddr)) - -/** @ingroup ip6addr - * Convert generic ip address to specific protocol version - */ -#define ip_2_ip6(ipaddr) (&((ipaddr)->u_addr.ip6)) -/** @ingroup ip4addr - * Convert generic ip address to specific protocol version - */ -#define ip_2_ip4(ipaddr) (&((ipaddr)->u_addr.ip4)) - -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define IP_ADDR4(ipaddr, a, b, c, d) \ - do { \ - IP4_ADDR(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), a, b, c, d); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*(ipaddr), IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip6addr */ -#define IP_ADDR6(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) \ - do { \ - IP6_ADDR(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), i0, i1, i2, i3); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*(ipaddr), IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip6addr */ -#define IP_ADDR6_HOST(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) IP_ADDR6(ipaddr, PP_HTONL(i0), PP_HTONL(i1), PP_HTONL(i2), PP_HTONL(i3)) - -#define ip_clear_no4(ipaddr) \ - do { \ - ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)->addr[1] = \ - ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)->addr[2] = \ - ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)->addr[3] = 0; \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ - } while (0) - -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_copy(dest, src) \ - do { \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(dest, IP_GET_TYPE(&src)); \ - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(src)) { \ - ip6_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip6(&(dest)), *ip_2_ip6(&(src))); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip4(&(dest)), *ip_2_ip4(&(src))); \ - ip_clear_no4(&dest); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip6addr */ -#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(dest, src) \ - do { \ - ip6_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip6(&(dest)), src); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip6addr */ -#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(dest, src) \ - do { \ - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(*ip_2_ip6(&(dest)), src); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dest, src) \ - do { \ - ip4_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip4(&(dest)), src); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - ip_clear_no4(&dest); \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define ip_addr_set_ip4_u32(ipaddr, val) \ - do { \ - if (ipaddr) { \ - ip4_addr_set_u32(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), val); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - ip_clear_no4(ipaddr); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(ipaddr, val) \ - do { \ - ip4_addr_set_u32(ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr)), val); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - ip_clear_no4(&ipaddr); \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define ip_addr_get_ip4_u32(ipaddr) (((ipaddr) && IP_IS_V4(ipaddr)) ? \ - ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)) : \ - 0) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_set(dest, src) \ - do { \ - IP_SET_TYPE(dest, IP_GET_TYPE(src)); \ - if (IP_IS_V6(src)) { \ - ip6_addr_set(ip_2_ip6(dest), ip_2_ip6(src)); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_set(ip_2_ip4(dest), ip_2_ip4(src)); \ - ip_clear_no4(dest); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_set_ipaddr(dest, src) ip_addr_set(dest, src) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) \ - do { \ - ip6_addr_set_zero(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, 0); \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip5addr */ -#define ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(ipaddr) \ - do { \ - ip6_addr_set_zero(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ip6addr */ -#define ip_addr_set_zero_ip6(ipaddr) \ - do { \ - ip6_addr_set_zero(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_set_any(is_ipv6, ipaddr) \ - do { \ - if (is_ipv6) { \ - ip6_addr_set_any(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_set_any(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - ip_clear_no4(ipaddr); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_set_any_val(is_ipv6, ipaddr) \ - do { \ - if (is_ipv6) { \ - ip6_addr_set_any(ip_2_ip6(&(ipaddr))); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_set_any(ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr))); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - ip_clear_no4(&ipaddr); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_set_loopback(is_ipv6, ipaddr) \ - do { \ - if (is_ipv6) { \ - ip6_addr_set_loopback(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_set_loopback(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - ip_clear_no4(ipaddr); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_set_loopback_val(is_ipv6, ipaddr) \ - do { \ - if (is_ipv6) { \ - ip6_addr_set_loopback(ip_2_ip6(&(ipaddr))); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_set_loopback(ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr))); \ - IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - ip_clear_no4(&ipaddr); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_set_hton(dest, src) \ - do { \ - if (IP_IS_V6(src)) { \ - ip6_addr_set_hton(ip_2_ip6(dest), ip_2_ip6(src)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_set_hton(ip_2_ip4(dest), ip_2_ip4(src)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - ip_clear_no4(ipaddr); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_get_network(target, host, netmask) \ - do { \ - if (IP_IS_V6(host)) { \ - ip4_addr_set_zero(ip_2_ip4(target)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(target, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_get_network(ip_2_ip4(target), ip_2_ip4(host), ip_2_ip4(netmask)); \ - IP_SET_TYPE(target, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) ((IP_IS_V6(addr1) && IP_IS_V6(addr2)) ? \ - 0 : \ - ip4_addr_netcmp(ip_2_ip4(addr1), ip_2_ip4(addr2), mask)) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) ((IP_GET_TYPE(addr1) != IP_GET_TYPE(addr2)) ? 0 : (IP_IS_V6_VAL(*(addr1)) ? ip6_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip6(addr1), ip_2_ip6(addr2)) : ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(addr1), ip_2_ip4(addr2)))) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_cmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) ((IP_GET_TYPE(addr1) != IP_GET_TYPE(addr2)) ? 0 : (IP_IS_V6_VAL(*(addr1)) ? ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(ip_2_ip6(addr1), ip_2_ip6(addr2)) : ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(addr1), ip_2_ip4(addr2)))) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) (((ipaddr) == NULL) ? 1 : ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? ip6_addr_isany(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)) : ip4_addr_isany(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)))) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) ((IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr)) ? \ - ip6_addr_isany_val(*ip_2_ip6(&(ipaddr))) : \ - ip4_addr_isany_val(*ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr)))) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_isbroadcast(ipaddr, netif) ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? \ - 0 : \ - ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), netif)) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? \ - ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)) : \ - ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr))) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? \ - ip6_addr_isloopback(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)) : \ - ip4_addr_isloopback(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr))) -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? \ - ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)) : \ - ip4_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr))) -#define ip_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) \ - do { \ - if (IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) { \ - ip6_addr_debug_print(debug, ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_debug_print(debug, ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define ip_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) \ - do { \ - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr)) { \ - ip6_addr_debug_print_val(debug, *ip_2_ip6(&(ipaddr))); \ - } else { \ - ip4_addr_debug_print_val(debug, *ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr))); \ - } \ - } while (0) -char *ipaddr_ntoa(const ip_addr_t *addr); -char *ipaddr_ntoa_r(const ip_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen); -int ipaddr_aton(const char *cp, ip_addr_t *addr); - -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define IPADDR_STRLEN_MAX IP6ADDR_STRLEN_MAX - -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define ip4_2_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip6addr, ip4addr) \ - do { \ - (ip6addr)->addr[3] = (ip4addr)->addr; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x0000FFFFUL); \ - (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ - (ip6addr)->addr[0] = 0; \ - ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ - } while (0); - -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip4addr, ip6addr) \ - (ip4addr)->addr = (ip6addr)->addr[3]; - -#define IP46_ADDR_ANY(type) (((type) == IPADDR_TYPE_V6) ? IP6_ADDR_ANY : IP4_ADDR_ANY) - -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#define IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(addr, pcb) 1 -#define IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ipaddr) 1 - -#define ip_addr_set_any_val(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip_addr_set_any(is_ipv6, &(ipaddr)) -#define ip_addr_set_loopback_val(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip_addr_set_loopback(is_ipv6, &(ipaddr)) - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -typedef ip4_addr_t ip_addr_t; -#define IPADDR4_INIT(u32val) \ - { \ - u32val \ - } -#define IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(a, b, c, d) IPADDR4_INIT(PP_HTONL(LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d))) -#define IP_IS_V4_VAL(ipaddr) 1 -#define IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr) 0 -#define IP_IS_V4(ipaddr) 1 -#define IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) 0 -#define IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr) 0 -#define IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, iptype) -#define IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, iptype) -#define IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr) IPADDR_TYPE_V4 -#define IP_ADDR_RAW_SIZE(ipaddr) sizeof(ip4_addr_t) -#define ip_2_ip4(ipaddr) (ipaddr) -#define IP_ADDR4(ipaddr, a, b, c, d) IP4_ADDR(ipaddr, a, b, c, d) - -#define ip_addr_copy(dest, src) ip4_addr_copy(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dest, src) ip4_addr_copy(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_set_ip4_u32(ipaddr, val) ip4_addr_set_u32(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), val) -#define ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(ipaddr, val) ip_addr_set_ip4_u32(&(ipaddr), val) -#define ip_addr_get_ip4_u32(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)) -#define ip_addr_set(dest, src) ip4_addr_set(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_set_ipaddr(dest, src) ip4_addr_set(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) ip4_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(ipaddr) ip4_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_set_any(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip4_addr_set_any(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_set_loopback(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip4_addr_set_loopback(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_set_hton(dest, src) ip4_addr_set_hton(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_get_network(target, host, mask) ip4_addr_get_network(target, host, mask) -#define ip_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) ip4_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) -#define ip_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) ip4_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) -#define ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) ip4_addr_isany(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) ip4_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) ip4_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_isbroadcast(addr, netif) ip4_addr_isbroadcast(addr, netif) -#define ip_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) ip4_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) ip4_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) ip4_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) -#define ipaddr_ntoa(ipaddr) ip4addr_ntoa(ipaddr) -#define ipaddr_ntoa_r(ipaddr, buf, buflen) ip4addr_ntoa_r(ipaddr, buf, buflen) -#define ipaddr_aton(cp, addr) ip4addr_aton(cp, addr) - -#define IPADDR_STRLEN_MAX IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX - -#define IP46_ADDR_ANY(type) (IP4_ADDR_ANY) - -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -typedef ip6_addr_t ip_addr_t; -#define IPADDR6_INIT(a, b, c, d) \ - { \ - { a, b, c, d } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT \ - } -#define IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(a, b, c, d) \ - { \ - { PP_HTONL(a), PP_HTONL(b), PP_HTONL(c), PP_HTONL(d) } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT \ - } -#define IP_IS_V4_VAL(ipaddr) 0 -#define IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr) 1 -#define IP_IS_V4(ipaddr) 0 -#define IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) 1 -#define IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr) 0 -#define IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, iptype) -#define IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, iptype) -#define IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr) IPADDR_TYPE_V6 -#define IP_ADDR_RAW_SIZE(ipaddr) sizeof(ip6_addr_t) -#define ip_2_ip6(ipaddr) (ipaddr) -#define IP_ADDR6(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) IP6_ADDR(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) -#define IP_ADDR6_HOST(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) IP_ADDR6(ipaddr, PP_HTONL(i0), PP_HTONL(i1), PP_HTONL(i2), PP_HTONL(i3)) - -#define ip_addr_copy(dest, src) ip6_addr_copy(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(dest, src) ip6_addr_copy(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(dest, src) ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_set(dest, src) ip6_addr_set(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_set_ipaddr(dest, src) ip6_addr_set(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) ip6_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_set_zero_ip6(ipaddr) ip6_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_set_any(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip6_addr_set_any(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_set_loopback(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip6_addr_set_loopback(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_set_hton(dest, src) ip6_addr_set_hton(dest, src) -#define ip_addr_get_network(target, host, mask) ip6_addr_set_zero(target) -#define ip_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) 0 -#define ip_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) ip6_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) -#define ip_addr_cmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) -#define ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) ip6_addr_isany(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) ip6_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) ip6_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) ip6_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_isbroadcast(addr, netif) 0 -#define ip_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) ip6_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) ip6_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) -#define ip_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) ip6_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) -#define ipaddr_ntoa(ipaddr) ip6addr_ntoa(ipaddr) -#define ipaddr_ntoa_r(ipaddr, buf, buflen) ip6addr_ntoa_r(ipaddr, buf, buflen) -#define ipaddr_aton(cp, addr) ip6addr_aton(cp, addr) - -#define IPADDR_STRLEN_MAX IP6ADDR_STRLEN_MAX - -#define IP46_ADDR_ANY(type) (IP6_ADDR_ANY) - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - -extern const ip_addr_t ip_addr_any; -extern const ip_addr_t ip_addr_broadcast; - -/** - * @ingroup ip4addr - * Can be used as a fixed/const ip_addr_t - * for the IP wildcard. - * Defined to @ref IP4_ADDR_ANY when IPv4 is enabled. - * Defined to @ref IP6_ADDR_ANY in IPv6 only systems. - * Use this if you can handle IPv4 _AND_ IPv6 addresses. - * Use @ref IP4_ADDR_ANY or @ref IP6_ADDR_ANY when the IP - * type matters. - */ -#define IP_ADDR_ANY IP4_ADDR_ANY -/** - * @ingroup ip4addr - * Can be used as a fixed/const ip_addr_t - * for the IPv4 wildcard and the broadcast address - */ -#define IP4_ADDR_ANY (&ip_addr_any) -/** - * @ingroup ip4addr - * Can be used as a fixed/const ip4_addr_t - * for the wildcard and the broadcast address - */ -#define IP4_ADDR_ANY4 (ip_2_ip4(&ip_addr_any)) - -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define IP_ADDR_BROADCAST (&ip_addr_broadcast) -/** @ingroup ip4addr */ -#define IP4_ADDR_BROADCAST (ip_2_ip4(&ip_addr_broadcast)) - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - -extern const ip_addr_t ip6_addr_any; - -/** - * @ingroup ip6addr - * IP6_ADDR_ANY can be used as a fixed ip_addr_t - * for the IPv6 wildcard address - */ -#define IP6_ADDR_ANY (&ip6_addr_any) -/** - * @ingroup ip6addr - * IP6_ADDR_ANY6 can be used as a fixed ip6_addr_t - * for the IPv6 wildcard address - */ -#define IP6_ADDR_ANY6 (ip_2_ip6(&ip6_addr_any)) - -#if !LWIP_IPV4 -/** IPv6-only configurations */ -#define IP_ADDR_ANY IP6_ADDR_ANY -#endif /* !LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 -/** @ingroup ipaddr */ -#define IP_ANY_TYPE (&ip_addr_any_type) -#else -#define IP_ANY_TYPE IP_ADDR_ANY -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP_ADDR_H */ +/** + * @file + * IP address API (common IPv4 and IPv6) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_IP_ADDR_H +#define LWIP_HDR_IP_ADDR_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" + +#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** @ingroup ipaddr + * IP address types for use in ip_addr_t.type member. + * @see tcp_new_ip_type(), udp_new_ip_type(), raw_new_ip_type(). + */ +enum lwip_ip_addr_type { + /** IPv4 */ + IPADDR_TYPE_V4 = 0U, + /** IPv6 */ + IPADDR_TYPE_V6 = 6U, + /** IPv4+IPv6 ("dual-stack") */ + IPADDR_TYPE_ANY = 46U +}; + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +/** + * @ingroup ipaddr + * A union struct for both IP version's addresses. + * ATTENTION: watch out for its size when adding IPv6 address scope! + */ +typedef struct ip_addr { + union { + ip6_addr_t ip6; + ip4_addr_t ip4; + } u_addr; + /** @ref lwip_ip_addr_type */ + u8_t type; +} ip_addr_t; + +extern const ip_addr_t ip_addr_any_type; + +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define IPADDR4_INIT(u32val) \ + { \ + { { { u32val, 0ul, 0ul, 0ul } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT } }, IPADDR_TYPE_V4 \ + } +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(a, b, c, d) IPADDR4_INIT(PP_HTONL(LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d))) + +/** @ingroup ip6addr */ +#define IPADDR6_INIT(a, b, c, d) \ + { \ + { { { a, b, c, d } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT } }, IPADDR_TYPE_V6 \ + } +/** @ingroup ip6addr */ +#define IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(a, b, c, d) \ + { \ + { { { PP_HTONL(a), PP_HTONL(b), PP_HTONL(c), PP_HTONL(d) } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT } }, IPADDR_TYPE_V6 \ + } + +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&ipaddr) == IPADDR_TYPE_ANY) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define IPADDR_ANY_TYPE_INIT \ + { \ + { { { 0ul, 0ul, 0ul, 0ul } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT } }, IPADDR_TYPE_ANY \ + } + +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define IP_IS_V4_VAL(ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&ipaddr) == IPADDR_TYPE_V4) +/** @ingroup ip6addr */ +#define IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&ipaddr) == IPADDR_TYPE_V6) +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define IP_IS_V4(ipaddr) (((ipaddr) == NULL) || IP_IS_V4_VAL(*(ipaddr))) +/** @ingroup ip6addr */ +#define IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) (((ipaddr) != NULL) && IP_IS_V6_VAL(*(ipaddr))) + +#define IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, iptype) \ + do { \ + (ipaddr).type = (iptype); \ + } while (0) +#define IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, iptype) \ + do { \ + if ((ipaddr) != NULL) { \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*(ipaddr), iptype); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr) ((ipaddr)->type) + +#define IP_ADDR_RAW_SIZE(ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&ipaddr) == IPADDR_TYPE_V4 ? sizeof(ip4_addr_t) : sizeof(ip6_addr_t)) + +#define IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ipaddr) (IP_GET_TYPE(&pcb->local_ip) == IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr)) +#define IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(pcb, ipaddr) (IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(pcb->local_ip) || IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ipaddr)) + +/** @ingroup ip6addr + * Convert generic ip address to specific protocol version + */ +#define ip_2_ip6(ipaddr) (&((ipaddr)->u_addr.ip6)) +/** @ingroup ip4addr + * Convert generic ip address to specific protocol version + */ +#define ip_2_ip4(ipaddr) (&((ipaddr)->u_addr.ip4)) + +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define IP_ADDR4(ipaddr, a, b, c, d) \ + do { \ + IP4_ADDR(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), a, b, c, d); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*(ipaddr), IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip6addr */ +#define IP_ADDR6(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) \ + do { \ + IP6_ADDR(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr), i0, i1, i2, i3); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(*(ipaddr), IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip6addr */ +#define IP_ADDR6_HOST(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) IP_ADDR6(ipaddr, PP_HTONL(i0), PP_HTONL(i1), PP_HTONL(i2), PP_HTONL(i3)) + +#define ip_clear_no4(ipaddr) \ + do { \ + ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)->addr[1] = \ + ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)->addr[2] = \ + ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)->addr[3] = 0; \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ + } while (0) + +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_copy(dest, src) \ + do { \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(dest, IP_GET_TYPE(&src)); \ + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(src)) { \ + ip6_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip6(&(dest)), *ip_2_ip6(&(src))); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip4(&(dest)), *ip_2_ip4(&(src))); \ + ip_clear_no4(&dest); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip6addr */ +#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(dest, src) \ + do { \ + ip6_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip6(&(dest)), src); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip6addr */ +#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(dest, src) \ + do { \ + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(*ip_2_ip6(&(dest)), src); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dest, src) \ + do { \ + ip4_addr_copy(*ip_2_ip4(&(dest)), src); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + ip_clear_no4(&dest); \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define ip_addr_set_ip4_u32(ipaddr, val) \ + do { \ + if (ipaddr) { \ + ip4_addr_set_u32(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), val); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + ip_clear_no4(ipaddr); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(ipaddr, val) \ + do { \ + ip4_addr_set_u32(ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr)), val); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + ip_clear_no4(&ipaddr); \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define ip_addr_get_ip4_u32(ipaddr) (((ipaddr) && IP_IS_V4(ipaddr)) ? \ + ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)) : \ + 0) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_set(dest, src) \ + do { \ + IP_SET_TYPE(dest, IP_GET_TYPE(src)); \ + if (IP_IS_V6(src)) { \ + ip6_addr_set(ip_2_ip6(dest), ip_2_ip6(src)); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_set(ip_2_ip4(dest), ip_2_ip4(src)); \ + ip_clear_no4(dest); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_set_ipaddr(dest, src) ip_addr_set(dest, src) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) \ + do { \ + ip6_addr_set_zero(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, 0); \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip5addr */ +#define ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(ipaddr) \ + do { \ + ip6_addr_set_zero(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ip6addr */ +#define ip_addr_set_zero_ip6(ipaddr) \ + do { \ + ip6_addr_set_zero(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_set_any(is_ipv6, ipaddr) \ + do { \ + if (is_ipv6) { \ + ip6_addr_set_any(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_set_any(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + ip_clear_no4(ipaddr); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_set_any_val(is_ipv6, ipaddr) \ + do { \ + if (is_ipv6) { \ + ip6_addr_set_any(ip_2_ip6(&(ipaddr))); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_set_any(ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr))); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + ip_clear_no4(&ipaddr); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_set_loopback(is_ipv6, ipaddr) \ + do { \ + if (is_ipv6) { \ + ip6_addr_set_loopback(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_set_loopback(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + ip_clear_no4(ipaddr); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_set_loopback_val(is_ipv6, ipaddr) \ + do { \ + if (is_ipv6) { \ + ip6_addr_set_loopback(ip_2_ip6(&(ipaddr))); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_set_loopback(ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr))); \ + IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + ip_clear_no4(&ipaddr); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_set_hton(dest, src) \ + do { \ + if (IP_IS_V6(src)) { \ + ip6_addr_set_hton(ip_2_ip6(dest), ip_2_ip6(src)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_set_hton(ip_2_ip4(dest), ip_2_ip4(src)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(dest, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + ip_clear_no4(ipaddr); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_get_network(target, host, netmask) \ + do { \ + if (IP_IS_V6(host)) { \ + ip4_addr_set_zero(ip_2_ip4(target)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(target, IPADDR_TYPE_V6); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_get_network(ip_2_ip4(target), ip_2_ip4(host), ip_2_ip4(netmask)); \ + IP_SET_TYPE(target, IPADDR_TYPE_V4); \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) ((IP_IS_V6(addr1) && IP_IS_V6(addr2)) ? \ + 0 : \ + ip4_addr_netcmp(ip_2_ip4(addr1), ip_2_ip4(addr2), mask)) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) ((IP_GET_TYPE(addr1) != IP_GET_TYPE(addr2)) ? 0 : (IP_IS_V6_VAL(*(addr1)) ? ip6_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip6(addr1), ip_2_ip6(addr2)) : ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(addr1), ip_2_ip4(addr2)))) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_cmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) ((IP_GET_TYPE(addr1) != IP_GET_TYPE(addr2)) ? 0 : (IP_IS_V6_VAL(*(addr1)) ? ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(ip_2_ip6(addr1), ip_2_ip6(addr2)) : ip4_addr_cmp(ip_2_ip4(addr1), ip_2_ip4(addr2)))) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) (((ipaddr) == NULL) ? 1 : ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? ip6_addr_isany(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)) : ip4_addr_isany(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)))) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) ((IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr)) ? \ + ip6_addr_isany_val(*ip_2_ip6(&(ipaddr))) : \ + ip4_addr_isany_val(*ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr)))) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_isbroadcast(ipaddr, netif) ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? \ + 0 : \ + ip4_addr_isbroadcast(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), netif)) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? \ + ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)) : \ + ip4_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr))) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? \ + ip6_addr_isloopback(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)) : \ + ip4_addr_isloopback(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr))) +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) ((IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) ? \ + ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)) : \ + ip4_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr))) +#define ip_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) \ + do { \ + if (IP_IS_V6(ipaddr)) { \ + ip6_addr_debug_print(debug, ip_2_ip6(ipaddr)); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_debug_print(debug, ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define ip_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) \ + do { \ + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr)) { \ + ip6_addr_debug_print_val(debug, *ip_2_ip6(&(ipaddr))); \ + } else { \ + ip4_addr_debug_print_val(debug, *ip_2_ip4(&(ipaddr))); \ + } \ + } while (0) +char *ipaddr_ntoa(const ip_addr_t *addr); +char *ipaddr_ntoa_r(const ip_addr_t *addr, char *buf, int buflen); +int ipaddr_aton(const char *cp, ip_addr_t *addr); + +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define IPADDR_STRLEN_MAX IP6ADDR_STRLEN_MAX + +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define ip4_2_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip6addr, ip4addr) \ + do { \ + (ip6addr)->addr[3] = (ip4addr)->addr; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x0000FFFFUL); \ + (ip6addr)->addr[1] = 0; \ + (ip6addr)->addr[0] = 0; \ + ip6_addr_clear_zone(ip6addr); \ + } while (0); + +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define unmap_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(ip4addr, ip6addr) \ + (ip4addr)->addr = (ip6addr)->addr[3]; + +#define IP46_ADDR_ANY(type) (((type) == IPADDR_TYPE_V6) ? IP6_ADDR_ANY : IP4_ADDR_ANY) + +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#define IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH(addr, pcb) 1 +#define IP_ADDR_PCB_VERSION_MATCH_EXACT(pcb, ipaddr) 1 + +#define ip_addr_set_any_val(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip_addr_set_any(is_ipv6, &(ipaddr)) +#define ip_addr_set_loopback_val(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip_addr_set_loopback(is_ipv6, &(ipaddr)) + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +typedef ip4_addr_t ip_addr_t; +#define IPADDR4_INIT(u32val) \ + { \ + u32val \ + } +#define IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(a, b, c, d) IPADDR4_INIT(PP_HTONL(LWIP_MAKEU32(a, b, c, d))) +#define IP_IS_V4_VAL(ipaddr) 1 +#define IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr) 0 +#define IP_IS_V4(ipaddr) 1 +#define IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) 0 +#define IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr) 0 +#define IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, iptype) +#define IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, iptype) +#define IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr) IPADDR_TYPE_V4 +#define IP_ADDR_RAW_SIZE(ipaddr) sizeof(ip4_addr_t) +#define ip_2_ip4(ipaddr) (ipaddr) +#define IP_ADDR4(ipaddr, a, b, c, d) IP4_ADDR(ipaddr, a, b, c, d) + +#define ip_addr_copy(dest, src) ip4_addr_copy(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dest, src) ip4_addr_copy(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_set_ip4_u32(ipaddr, val) ip4_addr_set_u32(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr), val) +#define ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(ipaddr, val) ip_addr_set_ip4_u32(&(ipaddr), val) +#define ip_addr_get_ip4_u32(ipaddr) ip4_addr_get_u32(ip_2_ip4(ipaddr)) +#define ip_addr_set(dest, src) ip4_addr_set(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_set_ipaddr(dest, src) ip4_addr_set(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) ip4_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_set_zero_ip4(ipaddr) ip4_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_set_any(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip4_addr_set_any(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_set_loopback(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip4_addr_set_loopback(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_set_hton(dest, src) ip4_addr_set_hton(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_get_network(target, host, mask) ip4_addr_get_network(target, host, mask) +#define ip_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) ip4_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) +#define ip_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) ip4_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) +#define ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) ip4_addr_isany(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) ip4_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) ip4_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) ip4_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_isbroadcast(addr, netif) ip4_addr_isbroadcast(addr, netif) +#define ip_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) ip4_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) ip4_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) ip4_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) +#define ipaddr_ntoa(ipaddr) ip4addr_ntoa(ipaddr) +#define ipaddr_ntoa_r(ipaddr, buf, buflen) ip4addr_ntoa_r(ipaddr, buf, buflen) +#define ipaddr_aton(cp, addr) ip4addr_aton(cp, addr) + +#define IPADDR_STRLEN_MAX IP4ADDR_STRLEN_MAX + +#define IP46_ADDR_ANY(type) (IP4_ADDR_ANY) + +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +typedef ip6_addr_t ip_addr_t; +#define IPADDR6_INIT(a, b, c, d) \ + { \ + { a, b, c, d } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT \ + } +#define IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(a, b, c, d) \ + { \ + { PP_HTONL(a), PP_HTONL(b), PP_HTONL(c), PP_HTONL(d) } IPADDR6_ZONE_INIT \ + } +#define IP_IS_V4_VAL(ipaddr) 0 +#define IP_IS_V6_VAL(ipaddr) 1 +#define IP_IS_V4(ipaddr) 0 +#define IP_IS_V6(ipaddr) 1 +#define IP_IS_ANY_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr) 0 +#define IP_SET_TYPE_VAL(ipaddr, iptype) +#define IP_SET_TYPE(ipaddr, iptype) +#define IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr) IPADDR_TYPE_V6 +#define IP_ADDR_RAW_SIZE(ipaddr) sizeof(ip6_addr_t) +#define ip_2_ip6(ipaddr) (ipaddr) +#define IP_ADDR6(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) IP6_ADDR(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) +#define IP_ADDR6_HOST(ipaddr, i0, i1, i2, i3) IP_ADDR6(ipaddr, PP_HTONL(i0), PP_HTONL(i1), PP_HTONL(i2), PP_HTONL(i3)) + +#define ip_addr_copy(dest, src) ip6_addr_copy(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip6(dest, src) ip6_addr_copy(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(dest, src) ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_set(dest, src) ip6_addr_set(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_set_ipaddr(dest, src) ip6_addr_set(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) ip6_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_set_zero_ip6(ipaddr) ip6_addr_set_zero(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_set_any(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip6_addr_set_any(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_set_loopback(is_ipv6, ipaddr) ip6_addr_set_loopback(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_set_hton(dest, src) ip6_addr_set_hton(dest, src) +#define ip_addr_get_network(target, host, mask) ip6_addr_set_zero(target) +#define ip_addr_netcmp(addr1, addr2, mask) 0 +#define ip_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) ip6_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) +#define ip_addr_cmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) ip6_addr_cmp_zoneless(addr1, addr2) +#define ip_addr_isany(ipaddr) ip6_addr_isany(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) ip6_addr_isany_val(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) ip6_addr_isloopback(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) ip6_addr_islinklocal(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_isbroadcast(addr, netif) 0 +#define ip_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) ip6_addr_ismulticast(ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) ip6_addr_debug_print(debug, ipaddr) +#define ip_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) ip6_addr_debug_print_val(debug, ipaddr) +#define ipaddr_ntoa(ipaddr) ip6addr_ntoa(ipaddr) +#define ipaddr_ntoa_r(ipaddr, buf, buflen) ip6addr_ntoa_r(ipaddr, buf, buflen) +#define ipaddr_aton(cp, addr) ip6addr_aton(cp, addr) + +#define IPADDR_STRLEN_MAX IP6ADDR_STRLEN_MAX + +#define IP46_ADDR_ANY(type) (IP6_ADDR_ANY) + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + +extern const ip_addr_t ip_addr_any; +extern const ip_addr_t ip_addr_broadcast; + +/** + * @ingroup ip4addr + * Can be used as a fixed/const ip_addr_t + * for the IP wildcard. + * Defined to @ref IP4_ADDR_ANY when IPv4 is enabled. + * Defined to @ref IP6_ADDR_ANY in IPv6 only systems. + * Use this if you can handle IPv4 _AND_ IPv6 addresses. + * Use @ref IP4_ADDR_ANY or @ref IP6_ADDR_ANY when the IP + * type matters. + */ +#define IP_ADDR_ANY IP4_ADDR_ANY +/** + * @ingroup ip4addr + * Can be used as a fixed/const ip_addr_t + * for the IPv4 wildcard and the broadcast address + */ +#define IP4_ADDR_ANY (&ip_addr_any) +/** + * @ingroup ip4addr + * Can be used as a fixed/const ip4_addr_t + * for the wildcard and the broadcast address + */ +#define IP4_ADDR_ANY4 (ip_2_ip4(&ip_addr_any)) + +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define IP_ADDR_BROADCAST (&ip_addr_broadcast) +/** @ingroup ip4addr */ +#define IP4_ADDR_BROADCAST (ip_2_ip4(&ip_addr_broadcast)) + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + +extern const ip_addr_t ip6_addr_any; + +/** + * @ingroup ip6addr + * IP6_ADDR_ANY can be used as a fixed ip_addr_t + * for the IPv6 wildcard address + */ +#define IP6_ADDR_ANY (&ip6_addr_any) +/** + * @ingroup ip6addr + * IP6_ADDR_ANY6 can be used as a fixed ip6_addr_t + * for the IPv6 wildcard address + */ +#define IP6_ADDR_ANY6 (ip_2_ip6(&ip6_addr_any)) + +#if !LWIP_IPV4 +/** IPv6-only configurations */ +#define IP_ADDR_ANY IP6_ADDR_ANY +#endif /* !LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 +/** @ingroup ipaddr */ +#define IP_ANY_TYPE (&ip_addr_any_type) +#else +#define IP_ANY_TYPE IP_ADDR_ANY +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_IP_ADDR_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/mem.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/mem.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/mem.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/mem.h index 85b9acc0..0136fae5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/mem.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/mem.h @@ -1,82 +1,82 @@ -/** - * @file - * Heap API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MEM_H -#define LWIP_HDR_MEM_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC - -#include "lwip/arch.h" - -typedef size_t mem_size_t; -#define MEM_SIZE_F SZT_F - -#elif MEM_USE_POOLS - -typedef u16_t mem_size_t; -#define MEM_SIZE_F U16_F - -#else - -/* MEM_SIZE would have to be aligned, but using 64000 here instead of - * 65535 leaves some room for alignment... - */ -#if MEM_SIZE > 64000L -typedef u32_t mem_size_t; -#define MEM_SIZE_F U32_F -#else -typedef u16_t mem_size_t; -#define MEM_SIZE_F U16_F -#endif /* MEM_SIZE > 64000 */ -#endif - -void mem_init(void); -void *mem_trim(void *mem, mem_size_t size); -void *mem_malloc(mem_size_t size); -void *mem_calloc(mem_size_t count, mem_size_t size); -void mem_free(void *mem); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MEM_H */ +/** + * @file + * Heap API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MEM_H +#define LWIP_HDR_MEM_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if MEM_LIBC_MALLOC + +#include "lwip/arch.h" + +typedef size_t mem_size_t; +#define MEM_SIZE_F SZT_F + +#elif MEM_USE_POOLS + +typedef u16_t mem_size_t; +#define MEM_SIZE_F U16_F + +#else + +/* MEM_SIZE would have to be aligned, but using 64000 here instead of + * 65535 leaves some room for alignment... + */ +#if MEM_SIZE > 64000L +typedef u32_t mem_size_t; +#define MEM_SIZE_F U32_F +#else +typedef u16_t mem_size_t; +#define MEM_SIZE_F U16_F +#endif /* MEM_SIZE > 64000 */ +#endif + +void mem_init(void); +void *mem_trim(void *mem, mem_size_t size); +void *mem_malloc(mem_size_t size); +void *mem_calloc(mem_size_t count, mem_size_t size); +void mem_free(void *mem); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MEM_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/memp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/memp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/memp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/memp.h index bbcc831f..18437b4f 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/memp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/memp.h @@ -1,154 +1,154 @@ -/** - * @file - * Memory pool API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MEMP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_MEMP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* run once with empty definition to handle all custom includes in lwippools.h */ -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) -#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" - -/** Create the list of all memory pools managed by memp. MEMP_MAX represents a NULL pool at the end */ -typedef enum { -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) MEMP_##name, -#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" - MEMP_MAX -} memp_t; - -#include "lwip/priv/memp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -extern const struct memp_desc *const memp_pools[MEMP_MAX]; - -/** - * @ingroup mempool - * Declare prototype for private memory pool if it is used in multiple files - */ -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(name) extern const struct memp_desc memp_##name - -#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC - -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(name, num, size, desc) \ - LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_INSTANCE(memp_stats_##name) \ - const struct memp_desc memp_##name = { \ - DECLARE_LWIP_MEMPOOL_DESC(desc) \ - LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_REFERENCE(memp_stats_##name) \ - LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(size) \ - }; - -#else /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ - -/** - * @ingroup mempool - * Declare a private memory pool - * Private mempools example: - * .h: only when pool is used in multiple .c files: LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(my_private_pool); - * .c: - * - in global variables section: LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(my_private_pool, 10, sizeof(foo), "Some description") - * - call ONCE before using pool (e.g. in some init() function): LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(my_private_pool); - * - allocate: void* my_new_mem = LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(my_private_pool); - * - free: LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(my_private_pool, my_new_mem); - * - * To relocate a pool, declare it as extern in cc.h. Example for GCC: - * extern u8_t \_\_attribute\_\_((section(".onchip_mem"))) memp_memory_my_private_pool_base[]; - */ -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(name, num, size, desc) \ - LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(memp_memory_##name##_base, ((num) * (MEMP_SIZE + MEMP_ALIGN_SIZE(size)))); \ - \ - LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_INSTANCE(memp_stats_##name) \ - \ - static struct memp *memp_tab_##name; \ - \ - const struct memp_desc memp_##name = { \ - DECLARE_LWIP_MEMPOOL_DESC(desc) \ - LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_REFERENCE(memp_stats_##name) \ - LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(size), \ - (num), \ - memp_memory_##name##_base, \ - &memp_tab_##name \ - }; - -#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ - -/** - * @ingroup mempool - * Initialize a private memory pool - */ -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(name) memp_init_pool(&memp_##name) -/** - * @ingroup mempool - * Allocate from a private memory pool - */ -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(name) memp_malloc_pool(&memp_##name) -/** - * @ingroup mempool - * Free element from a private memory pool - */ -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(name, x) memp_free_pool(&memp_##name, (x)) - -#if MEM_USE_POOLS -/** This structure is used to save the pool one element came from. - * This has to be defined here as it is required for pool size calculation. */ -struct memp_malloc_helper { - memp_t poolnr; -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || (LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS) - u16_t size; -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || (LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS) */ -}; -#endif /* MEM_USE_POOLS */ - -void memp_init(void); - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -void *memp_malloc_fn(memp_t type, const char *file, const int line); -#define memp_malloc(t) memp_malloc_fn((t), __FILE__, __LINE__) -#else -void *memp_malloc(memp_t type); -#endif -void memp_free(memp_t type, void *mem); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MEMP_H */ +/** + * @file + * Memory pool API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MEMP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_MEMP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* run once with empty definition to handle all custom includes in lwippools.h */ +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) +#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" + +/** Create the list of all memory pools managed by memp. MEMP_MAX represents a NULL pool at the end */ +typedef enum { +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) MEMP_##name, +#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" + MEMP_MAX +} memp_t; + +#include "lwip/priv/memp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +extern const struct memp_desc *const memp_pools[MEMP_MAX]; + +/** + * @ingroup mempool + * Declare prototype for private memory pool if it is used in multiple files + */ +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(name) extern const struct memp_desc memp_##name + +#if MEMP_MEM_MALLOC + +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(name, num, size, desc) \ + LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_INSTANCE(memp_stats_##name) \ + const struct memp_desc memp_##name = { \ + DECLARE_LWIP_MEMPOOL_DESC(desc) \ + LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_REFERENCE(memp_stats_##name) \ + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(size) \ + }; + +#else /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ + +/** + * @ingroup mempool + * Declare a private memory pool + * Private mempools example: + * .h: only when pool is used in multiple .c files: LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(my_private_pool); + * .c: + * - in global variables section: LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(my_private_pool, 10, sizeof(foo), "Some description") + * - call ONCE before using pool (e.g. in some init() function): LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(my_private_pool); + * - allocate: void* my_new_mem = LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(my_private_pool); + * - free: LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(my_private_pool, my_new_mem); + * + * To relocate a pool, declare it as extern in cc.h. Example for GCC: + * extern u8_t \_\_attribute\_\_((section(".onchip_mem"))) memp_memory_my_private_pool_base[]; + */ +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(name, num, size, desc) \ + LWIP_DECLARE_MEMORY_ALIGNED(memp_memory_##name##_base, ((num) * (MEMP_SIZE + MEMP_ALIGN_SIZE(size)))); \ + \ + LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_INSTANCE(memp_stats_##name) \ + \ + static struct memp *memp_tab_##name; \ + \ + const struct memp_desc memp_##name = { \ + DECLARE_LWIP_MEMPOOL_DESC(desc) \ + LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_REFERENCE(memp_stats_##name) \ + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(size), \ + (num), \ + memp_memory_##name##_base, \ + &memp_tab_##name \ + }; + +#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ + +/** + * @ingroup mempool + * Initialize a private memory pool + */ +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(name) memp_init_pool(&memp_##name) +/** + * @ingroup mempool + * Allocate from a private memory pool + */ +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(name) memp_malloc_pool(&memp_##name) +/** + * @ingroup mempool + * Free element from a private memory pool + */ +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(name, x) memp_free_pool(&memp_##name, (x)) + +#if MEM_USE_POOLS +/** This structure is used to save the pool one element came from. + * This has to be defined here as it is required for pool size calculation. */ +struct memp_malloc_helper { + memp_t poolnr; +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || (LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS) + u16_t size; +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || (LWIP_STATS && MEM_STATS) */ +}; +#endif /* MEM_USE_POOLS */ + +void memp_init(void); + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +void *memp_malloc_fn(memp_t type, const char *file, const int line); +#define memp_malloc(t) memp_malloc_fn((t), __FILE__, __LINE__) +#else +void *memp_malloc(memp_t type); +#endif +void memp_free(memp_t type, void *mem); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MEMP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/mld6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/mld6.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/mld6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/mld6.h index 0dae4aeb..85ffa9f0 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/mld6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/mld6.h @@ -1,99 +1,99 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * Multicast listener discovery for IPv6. Aims to be compliant with RFC 2710. - * No support for MLDv2. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MLD6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_MLD6_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD && LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** MLD group */ -struct mld_group { - /** next link */ - struct mld_group *next; - /** multicast address */ - ip6_addr_t group_address; - /** signifies we were the last person to report */ - u8_t last_reporter_flag; - /** current state of the group */ - u8_t group_state; - /** timer for reporting */ - u16_t timer; - /** counter of simultaneous uses */ - u8_t use; -}; - -#define MLD6_TMR_INTERVAL 100 /* Milliseconds */ - -err_t mld6_stop(struct netif *netif); -void mld6_report_groups(struct netif *netif); -void mld6_tmr(void); -struct mld_group *mld6_lookfor_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip6_addr_t *addr); -void mld6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -err_t mld6_joingroup(const ip6_addr_t *srcaddr, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr); -err_t mld6_joingroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr); -err_t mld6_leavegroup(const ip6_addr_t *srcaddr, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr); -err_t mld6_leavegroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr); - -/** @ingroup mld6 - * Get list head of MLD6 groups for netif. - * Note: The allnodes group IP is NOT in the list, since it must always - * be received for correct IPv6 operation. - * @see @ref netif_set_mld_mac_filter() - */ -#define netif_mld6_data(netif) ((struct mld_group *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6)) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD && LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MLD6_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * Multicast listener discovery for IPv6. Aims to be compliant with RFC 2710. + * No support for MLDv2. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MLD6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_MLD6_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD && LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** MLD group */ +struct mld_group { + /** next link */ + struct mld_group *next; + /** multicast address */ + ip6_addr_t group_address; + /** signifies we were the last person to report */ + u8_t last_reporter_flag; + /** current state of the group */ + u8_t group_state; + /** timer for reporting */ + u16_t timer; + /** counter of simultaneous uses */ + u8_t use; +}; + +#define MLD6_TMR_INTERVAL 100 /* Milliseconds */ + +err_t mld6_stop(struct netif *netif); +void mld6_report_groups(struct netif *netif); +void mld6_tmr(void); +struct mld_group *mld6_lookfor_group(struct netif *ifp, const ip6_addr_t *addr); +void mld6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +err_t mld6_joingroup(const ip6_addr_t *srcaddr, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr); +err_t mld6_joingroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr); +err_t mld6_leavegroup(const ip6_addr_t *srcaddr, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr); +err_t mld6_leavegroup_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *groupaddr); + +/** @ingroup mld6 + * Get list head of MLD6 groups for netif. + * Note: The allnodes group IP is NOT in the list, since it must always + * be received for correct IPv6 operation. + * @see @ref netif_set_mld_mac_filter() + */ +#define netif_mld6_data(netif) ((struct mld_group *)netif_get_client_data(netif, LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD && LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MLD6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/nd6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/nd6.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/nd6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/nd6.h index 961fc469..a931ee62 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/nd6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/nd6.h @@ -1,90 +1,90 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * Neighbor discovery and stateless address autoconfiguration for IPv6. - * Aims to be compliant with RFC 4861 (Neighbor discovery) and RFC 4862 - * (Address autoconfiguration). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ND6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ND6_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** 1 second period */ -#define ND6_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 - -/** Router solicitations are sent in 4 second intervals (see RFC 4861, ch. 6.3.7) */ -#ifndef ND6_RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL -#define ND6_RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL 4000 -#endif - -struct pbuf; -struct netif; - -void nd6_tmr(void); -void nd6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -void nd6_clear_destination_cache(void); -struct netif *nd6_find_route(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); -err_t nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, const u8_t **hwaddrp); -u16_t nd6_get_destination_mtu(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif); -#if LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS -void nd6_reachability_hint(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS */ -void nd6_cleanup_netif(struct netif *netif); -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD -void nd6_adjust_mld_membership(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u8_t new_state); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ -void nd6_restart_netif(struct netif *netif); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ND6_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * Neighbor discovery and stateless address autoconfiguration for IPv6. + * Aims to be compliant with RFC 4861 (Neighbor discovery) and RFC 4862 + * (Address autoconfiguration). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ND6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ND6_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** 1 second period */ +#define ND6_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 + +/** Router solicitations are sent in 4 second intervals (see RFC 4861, ch. 6.3.7) */ +#ifndef ND6_RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL +#define ND6_RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL 4000 +#endif + +struct pbuf; +struct netif; + +void nd6_tmr(void); +void nd6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +void nd6_clear_destination_cache(void); +struct netif *nd6_find_route(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); +err_t nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, const u8_t **hwaddrp); +u16_t nd6_get_destination_mtu(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, struct netif *netif); +#if LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS +void nd6_reachability_hint(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS */ +void nd6_cleanup_netif(struct netif *netif); +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD +void nd6_adjust_mld_membership(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u8_t new_state); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ +void nd6_restart_netif(struct netif *netif); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ND6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netbuf.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netbuf.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netbuf.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netbuf.h index 372d435e..360becca 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netbuf.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netbuf.h @@ -1,118 +1,118 @@ -/** - * @file - * netbuf API (for netconn API) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETBUF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETBUF_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ -/* Note: Netconn API is always available when sockets are enabled - - * sockets are implemented on top of them */ - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** This netbuf has dest-addr/port set */ -#define NETBUF_FLAG_DESTADDR 0x01 -/** This netbuf includes a checksum */ -#define NETBUF_FLAG_CHKSUM 0x02 - -/** "Network buffer" - contains data and addressing info */ -struct netbuf { - struct pbuf *p, *ptr; - ip_addr_t addr; - u16_t port; -#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO || LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - u8_t flags; - u16_t toport_chksum; -#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO - ip_addr_t toaddr; -#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ -#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO || LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ -}; - -/* Network buffer functions: */ -struct netbuf *netbuf_new(void); -void netbuf_delete(struct netbuf *buf); -void *netbuf_alloc(struct netbuf *buf, u16_t size); -void netbuf_free(struct netbuf *buf); -err_t netbuf_ref(struct netbuf *buf, - const void *dataptr, u16_t size); -void netbuf_chain(struct netbuf *head, struct netbuf *tail); - -err_t netbuf_data(struct netbuf *buf, - void **dataptr, u16_t *len); -s8_t netbuf_next(struct netbuf *buf); -void netbuf_first(struct netbuf *buf); - -#define netbuf_copy_partial(buf, dataptr, len, offset) \ - pbuf_copy_partial((buf)->p, (dataptr), (len), (offset)) -#define netbuf_copy(buf, dataptr, len) netbuf_copy_partial(buf, dataptr, len, 0) -#define netbuf_take(buf, dataptr, len) pbuf_take((buf)->p, dataptr, len) -#define netbuf_len(buf) ((buf)->p->tot_len) -#define netbuf_fromaddr(buf) (&((buf)->addr)) -#define netbuf_set_fromaddr(buf, fromaddr) ip_addr_set(&((buf)->addr), fromaddr) -#define netbuf_fromport(buf) ((buf)->port) -#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO -#define netbuf_destaddr(buf) (&((buf)->toaddr)) -#define netbuf_set_destaddr(buf, destaddr) ip_addr_set(&((buf)->toaddr), destaddr) -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY -#define netbuf_destport(buf) (((buf)->flags & NETBUF_FLAG_DESTADDR) ? (buf)->toport_chksum : 0) -#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ -#define netbuf_destport(buf) ((buf)->toport_chksum) -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ -#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY -#define netbuf_set_chksum(buf, chksum) \ - do { \ - (buf)->flags = NETBUF_FLAG_CHKSUM; \ - (buf)->toport_chksum = chksum; \ - } while (0) -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETBUF_H */ +/** + * @file + * netbuf API (for netconn API) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETBUF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETBUF_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ +/* Note: Netconn API is always available when sockets are enabled - + * sockets are implemented on top of them */ + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** This netbuf has dest-addr/port set */ +#define NETBUF_FLAG_DESTADDR 0x01 +/** This netbuf includes a checksum */ +#define NETBUF_FLAG_CHKSUM 0x02 + +/** "Network buffer" - contains data and addressing info */ +struct netbuf { + struct pbuf *p, *ptr; + ip_addr_t addr; + u16_t port; +#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO || LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + u8_t flags; + u16_t toport_chksum; +#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO + ip_addr_t toaddr; +#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ +#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO || LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ +}; + +/* Network buffer functions: */ +struct netbuf *netbuf_new(void); +void netbuf_delete(struct netbuf *buf); +void *netbuf_alloc(struct netbuf *buf, u16_t size); +void netbuf_free(struct netbuf *buf); +err_t netbuf_ref(struct netbuf *buf, + const void *dataptr, u16_t size); +void netbuf_chain(struct netbuf *head, struct netbuf *tail); + +err_t netbuf_data(struct netbuf *buf, + void **dataptr, u16_t *len); +s8_t netbuf_next(struct netbuf *buf); +void netbuf_first(struct netbuf *buf); + +#define netbuf_copy_partial(buf, dataptr, len, offset) \ + pbuf_copy_partial((buf)->p, (dataptr), (len), (offset)) +#define netbuf_copy(buf, dataptr, len) netbuf_copy_partial(buf, dataptr, len, 0) +#define netbuf_take(buf, dataptr, len) pbuf_take((buf)->p, dataptr, len) +#define netbuf_len(buf) ((buf)->p->tot_len) +#define netbuf_fromaddr(buf) (&((buf)->addr)) +#define netbuf_set_fromaddr(buf, fromaddr) ip_addr_set(&((buf)->addr), fromaddr) +#define netbuf_fromport(buf) ((buf)->port) +#if LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO +#define netbuf_destaddr(buf) (&((buf)->toaddr)) +#define netbuf_set_destaddr(buf, destaddr) ip_addr_set(&((buf)->toaddr), destaddr) +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY +#define netbuf_destport(buf) (((buf)->flags & NETBUF_FLAG_DESTADDR) ? (buf)->toport_chksum : 0) +#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ +#define netbuf_destport(buf) ((buf)->toport_chksum) +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ +#endif /* LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO */ +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY +#define netbuf_set_chksum(buf, chksum) \ + do { \ + (buf)->flags = NETBUF_FLAG_CHKSUM; \ + (buf)->toport_chksum = chksum; \ + } while (0) +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETBUF_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netdb.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netdb.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netdb.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netdb.h index b6f8117b..e139c7d7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netdb.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netdb.h @@ -1,150 +1,150 @@ -/** - * @file - * NETDB API (sockets) - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETDB_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETDB_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/inet.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* some rarely used options */ -#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO -#define LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO 1 -#endif - -#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_ERRORS -#define LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_ERRORS 1 -#endif - -#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_FLAGS -#define LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_FLAGS 1 -#endif - -#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_STRUCTS -#define LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_STRUCTS 1 -#endif - -#if LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_ERRORS -/** Errors used by the DNS API functions, h_errno can be one of them */ -#define EAI_NONAME 200 -#define EAI_SERVICE 201 -#define EAI_FAIL 202 -#define EAI_MEMORY 203 -#define EAI_FAMILY 204 - -#define HOST_NOT_FOUND 210 -#define NO_DATA 211 -#define NO_RECOVERY 212 -#define TRY_AGAIN 213 -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_ERRORS */ - -#if LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_FLAGS -/* input flags for struct addrinfo */ -#define AI_PASSIVE 0x01 -#define AI_CANONNAME 0x02 -#define AI_NUMERICHOST 0x04 -#define AI_NUMERICSERV 0x08 -#define AI_V4MAPPED 0x10 -#define AI_ALL 0x20 -#define AI_ADDRCONFIG 0x40 -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_FLAGS */ - -#if LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_STRUCTS -struct hostent { - char *h_name; /* Official name of the host. */ - char **h_aliases; /* A pointer to an array of pointers to alternative host names, - terminated by a null pointer. */ - int h_addrtype; /* Address type. */ - int h_length; /* The length, in bytes, of the address. */ - char **h_addr_list; /* A pointer to an array of pointers to network addresses (in - network byte order) for the host, terminated by a null pointer. */ -#define h_addr h_addr_list[0] /* for backward compatibility */ -}; - -struct addrinfo { - int ai_flags; /* Input flags. */ - int ai_family; /* Address family of socket. */ - int ai_socktype; /* Socket type. */ - int ai_protocol; /* Protocol of socket. */ - socklen_t ai_addrlen; /* Length of socket address. */ - struct sockaddr *ai_addr; /* Socket address of socket. */ - char *ai_canonname; /* Canonical name of service location. */ - struct addrinfo *ai_next; /* Pointer to next in list. */ -}; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_STRUCTS */ - -#define NETDB_ELEM_SIZE (sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) + DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 1) - -#if LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO -/* application accessible error code set by the DNS API functions */ -extern int h_errno; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO*/ - -struct hostent *lwip_gethostbyname(const char *name); -int lwip_gethostbyname_r(const char *name, struct hostent *ret, char *buf, - size_t buflen, struct hostent **result, int *h_errnop); -void lwip_freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai); -int lwip_getaddrinfo(const char *nodename, - const char *servname, - const struct addrinfo *hints, - struct addrinfo **res); - -#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS -/** @ingroup netdbapi */ -#define gethostbyname(name) lwip_gethostbyname(name) -/** @ingroup netdbapi */ -#define gethostbyname_r(name, ret, buf, buflen, result, h_errnop) \ - lwip_gethostbyname_r(name, ret, buf, buflen, result, h_errnop) -/** @ingroup netdbapi */ -#define freeaddrinfo(addrinfo) lwip_freeaddrinfo(addrinfo) -/** @ingroup netdbapi */ -#define getaddrinfo(nodname, servname, hints, res) \ - lwip_getaddrinfo(nodname, servname, hints, res) -#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETDB_H */ +/** + * @file + * NETDB API (sockets) + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETDB_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETDB_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/inet.h" +#include "lwip/sockets.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* some rarely used options */ +#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO +#define LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO 1 +#endif + +#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_ERRORS +#define LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_ERRORS 1 +#endif + +#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_FLAGS +#define LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_FLAGS 1 +#endif + +#ifndef LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_STRUCTS +#define LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_STRUCTS 1 +#endif + +#if LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_ERRORS +/** Errors used by the DNS API functions, h_errno can be one of them */ +#define EAI_NONAME 200 +#define EAI_SERVICE 201 +#define EAI_FAIL 202 +#define EAI_MEMORY 203 +#define EAI_FAMILY 204 + +#define HOST_NOT_FOUND 210 +#define NO_DATA 211 +#define NO_RECOVERY 212 +#define TRY_AGAIN 213 +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_ERRORS */ + +#if LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_FLAGS +/* input flags for struct addrinfo */ +#define AI_PASSIVE 0x01 +#define AI_CANONNAME 0x02 +#define AI_NUMERICHOST 0x04 +#define AI_NUMERICSERV 0x08 +#define AI_V4MAPPED 0x10 +#define AI_ALL 0x20 +#define AI_ADDRCONFIG 0x40 +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DEFINE_FLAGS */ + +#if LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_STRUCTS +struct hostent { + char *h_name; /* Official name of the host. */ + char **h_aliases; /* A pointer to an array of pointers to alternative host names, + terminated by a null pointer. */ + int h_addrtype; /* Address type. */ + int h_length; /* The length, in bytes, of the address. */ + char **h_addr_list; /* A pointer to an array of pointers to network addresses (in + network byte order) for the host, terminated by a null pointer. */ +#define h_addr h_addr_list[0] /* for backward compatibility */ +}; + +struct addrinfo { + int ai_flags; /* Input flags. */ + int ai_family; /* Address family of socket. */ + int ai_socktype; /* Socket type. */ + int ai_protocol; /* Protocol of socket. */ + socklen_t ai_addrlen; /* Length of socket address. */ + struct sockaddr *ai_addr; /* Socket address of socket. */ + char *ai_canonname; /* Canonical name of service location. */ + struct addrinfo *ai_next; /* Pointer to next in list. */ +}; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_STRUCTS */ + +#define NETDB_ELEM_SIZE (sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) + DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 1) + +#if LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO +/* application accessible error code set by the DNS API functions */ +extern int h_errno; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS_API_DECLARE_H_ERRNO*/ + +struct hostent *lwip_gethostbyname(const char *name); +int lwip_gethostbyname_r(const char *name, struct hostent *ret, char *buf, + size_t buflen, struct hostent **result, int *h_errnop); +void lwip_freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai); +int lwip_getaddrinfo(const char *nodename, + const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + struct addrinfo **res); + +#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS +/** @ingroup netdbapi */ +#define gethostbyname(name) lwip_gethostbyname(name) +/** @ingroup netdbapi */ +#define gethostbyname_r(name, ret, buf, buflen, result, h_errnop) \ + lwip_gethostbyname_r(name, ret, buf, buflen, result, h_errnop) +/** @ingroup netdbapi */ +#define freeaddrinfo(addrinfo) lwip_freeaddrinfo(addrinfo) +/** @ingroup netdbapi */ +#define getaddrinfo(nodname, servname, hints, res) \ + lwip_getaddrinfo(nodname, servname, hints, res) +#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETDB_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netif.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netif.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netif.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netif.h index 2d0a3848..6986a550 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netif.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netif.h @@ -1,702 +1,702 @@ -/** - * @file - * netif API (to be used from TCPIP thread) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#define ENABLE_LOOPBACK (LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF) - -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* Throughout this file, IP addresses are expected to be in - * the same byte order as in IP_PCB. */ - -/** Must be the maximum of all used hardware address lengths - across all types of interfaces in use. - This does not have to be changed, normally. */ -#ifndef NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN -#define NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN 6U -#endif - -/** The size of a fully constructed netif name which the - * netif can be identified by in APIs. Composed of - * 2 chars, 3 (max) digits, and 1 \0 - */ -#define NETIF_NAMESIZE 6 - -/** - * @defgroup netif_flags Flags - * @ingroup netif - * @{ - */ - -/** Whether the network interface is 'up'. This is - * a software flag used to control whether this network - * interface is enabled and processes traffic. - * It must be set by the startup code before this netif can be used - * (also for dhcp/autoip). - */ -#define NETIF_FLAG_UP 0x01U -/** If set, the netif has broadcast capability. - * Set by the netif driver in its init function. */ -#define NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST 0x02U -/** If set, the interface has an active link - * (set by the network interface driver). - * Either set by the netif driver in its init function (if the link - * is up at that time) or at a later point once the link comes up - * (if link detection is supported by the hardware). */ -#define NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP 0x04U -/** If set, the netif is an ethernet device using ARP. - * Set by the netif driver in its init function. - * Used to check input packet types and use of DHCP. */ -#define NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP 0x08U -/** If set, the netif is an ethernet device. It might not use - * ARP or TCP/IP if it is used for PPPoE only. - */ -#define NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET 0x10U -/** If set, the netif has IGMP capability. - * Set by the netif driver in its init function. */ -#define NETIF_FLAG_IGMP 0x20U -/** If set, the netif has MLD6 capability. - * Set by the netif driver in its init function. */ -#define NETIF_FLAG_MLD6 0x40U - -/** - * @} - */ - -enum lwip_internal_netif_client_data_index { -#if LWIP_IPV4 -#if LWIP_DHCP - LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, -#endif -#if LWIP_AUTOIP - LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_AUTOIP, -#endif -#if LWIP_IGMP - LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_IGMP, -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 - LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD - LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6, -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MAX -}; - -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 0x0001 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 0x0002 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 0x0004 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 0x0008 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 0x0010 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 0x0100 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 0x0200 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 0x0400 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP 0x0800 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 0x1000 -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLE_ALL 0xFFFF -#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_DISABLE_ALL 0x0000 -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ - -struct netif; - -/** MAC Filter Actions, these are passed to a netif's igmp_mac_filter or - * mld_mac_filter callback function. */ -enum netif_mac_filter_action { - /** Delete a filter entry */ - NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER = 0, - /** Add a filter entry */ - NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER = 1 -}; - -/** Function prototype for netif init functions. Set up flags and output/linkoutput - * callback functions in this function. - * - * @param netif The netif to initialize - */ -typedef err_t (*netif_init_fn)(struct netif *netif); -/** Function prototype for netif->input functions. This function is saved as 'input' - * callback function in the netif struct. Call it when a packet has been received. - * - * @param p The received packet, copied into a pbuf - * @param inp The netif which received the packet - * @return ERR_OK if the packet was handled - * != ERR_OK is the packet was NOT handled, in this case, the caller has - * to free the pbuf - */ -typedef err_t (*netif_input_fn)(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/** Function prototype for netif->output functions. Called by lwIP when a packet - * shall be sent. For ethernet netif, set this to 'etharp_output' and set - * 'linkoutput'. - * - * @param netif The netif which shall send a packet - * @param p The packet to send (p->payload points to IP header) - * @param ipaddr The IP address to which the packet shall be sent - */ -typedef err_t (*netif_output_fn)(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, - const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** Function prototype for netif->output_ip6 functions. Called by lwIP when a packet - * shall be sent. For ethernet netif, set this to 'ethip6_output' and set - * 'linkoutput'. - * - * @param netif The netif which shall send a packet - * @param p The packet to send (p->payload points to IP header) - * @param ipaddr The IPv6 address to which the packet shall be sent - */ -typedef err_t (*netif_output_ip6_fn)(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, - const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** Function prototype for netif->linkoutput functions. Only used for ethernet - * netifs. This function is called by ARP when a packet shall be sent. - * - * @param netif The netif which shall send a packet - * @param p The packet to send (raw ethernet packet) - */ -typedef err_t (*netif_linkoutput_fn)(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); -/** Function prototype for netif status- or link-callback functions. */ -typedef void (*netif_status_callback_fn)(struct netif *netif); -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP -/** Function prototype for netif igmp_mac_filter functions */ -typedef err_t (*netif_igmp_mac_filter_fn)(struct netif *netif, - const ip4_addr_t *group, enum netif_mac_filter_action action); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD -/** Function prototype for netif mld_mac_filter functions */ -typedef err_t (*netif_mld_mac_filter_fn)(struct netif *netif, - const ip6_addr_t *group, enum netif_mac_filter_action action); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - -#if LWIP_DHCP || LWIP_AUTOIP || LWIP_IGMP || LWIP_IPV6_MLD || LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 || (LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 0) -#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 0 -u8_t netif_alloc_client_data_id(void); -#endif -/** @ingroup netif_cd - * Set client data. Obtain ID from netif_alloc_client_data_id(). - */ -#define netif_set_client_data(netif, id, data) netif_get_client_data(netif, id) = (data) -/** @ingroup netif_cd - * Get client data. Obtain ID from netif_alloc_client_data_id(). - */ -#define netif_get_client_data(netif, id) (netif)->client_data[(id)] -#endif - -#if (LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP && (ARP_TABLE_SIZE > 0x7f)) || (LWIP_IPV6 && (LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS > 0x7f)) -typedef u16_t netif_addr_idx_t; -#define NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX 0x7FFF -#else -typedef u8_t netif_addr_idx_t; -#define NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX 0x7F -#endif - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT -#define LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS 1 -struct netif_hint { - netif_addr_idx_t addr_hint; -}; -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ -#define LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS 0 -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ - -/** Generic data structure used for all lwIP network interfaces. - * The following fields should be filled in by the initialization - * function for the device driver: hwaddr_len, hwaddr[], mtu, flags */ -struct netif { -#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF - /** pointer to next in linked list */ - struct netif *next; -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - /** IP address configuration in network byte order */ - ip_addr_t ip_addr; - ip_addr_t netmask; - ip_addr_t gw; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - /** Array of IPv6 addresses for this netif. */ - ip_addr_t ip6_addr[LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES]; - /** The state of each IPv6 address (Tentative, Preferred, etc). - * @see ip6_addr.h */ - u8_t ip6_addr_state[LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES]; -#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES - /** Remaining valid and preferred lifetime of each IPv6 address, in seconds. - * For valid lifetimes, the special value of IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC (0) - * indicates the address is static and has no lifetimes. */ - u32_t ip6_addr_valid_life[LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES]; - u32_t ip6_addr_pref_life[LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES]; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - /** This function is called by the network device driver - * to pass a packet up the TCP/IP stack. */ - netif_input_fn input; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - /** This function is called by the IP module when it wants - * to send a packet on the interface. This function typically - * first resolves the hardware address, then sends the packet. - * For ethernet physical layer, this is usually etharp_output() */ - netif_output_fn output; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - /** This function is called by ethernet_output() when it wants - * to send a packet on the interface. This function outputs - * the pbuf as-is on the link medium. */ - netif_linkoutput_fn linkoutput; -#if LWIP_IPV6 - /** This function is called by the IPv6 module when it wants - * to send a packet on the interface. This function typically - * first resolves the hardware address, then sends the packet. - * For ethernet physical layer, this is usually ethip6_output() */ - netif_output_ip6_fn output_ip6; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK - /** This function is called when the netif state is set to up or down - */ - netif_status_callback_fn status_callback; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK - /** This function is called when the netif link is set to up or down - */ - netif_status_callback_fn link_callback; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK - /** This function is called when the netif has been removed */ - netif_status_callback_fn remove_callback; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK */ - /** This field can be set by the device driver and could point - * to state information for the device. */ - void *state; -#ifdef netif_get_client_data - void *client_data[LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MAX + LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA]; -#endif -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME - /* the hostname for this netif, NULL is a valid value */ - const char *hostname; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF - u16_t chksum_flags; -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF*/ - /** maximum transfer unit (in bytes) */ - u16_t mtu; -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES - /** maximum transfer unit (in bytes), updated by RA */ - u16_t mtu6; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ - /** link level hardware address of this interface */ - u8_t hwaddr[NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN]; - /** number of bytes used in hwaddr */ - u8_t hwaddr_len; - /** flags (@see @ref netif_flags) */ - u8_t flags; - /** descriptive abbreviation */ - char name[2]; - /** number of this interface. Used for @ref if_api and @ref netifapi_netif, - * as well as for IPv6 zones */ - u8_t num; -#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG - /** is this netif enabled for IPv6 autoconfiguration */ - u8_t ip6_autoconfig_enabled; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ -#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT - /** Number of Router Solicitation messages that remain to be sent. */ - u8_t rs_count; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ -#if MIB2_STATS - /** link type (from "snmp_ifType" enum from snmp_mib2.h) */ - u8_t link_type; - /** (estimate) link speed */ - u32_t link_speed; - /** timestamp at last change made (up/down) */ - u32_t ts; - /** counters */ - struct stats_mib2_netif_ctrs mib2_counters; -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP - /** This function could be called to add or delete an entry in the multicast - filter table of the ethernet MAC.*/ - netif_igmp_mac_filter_fn igmp_mac_filter; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD - /** This function could be called to add or delete an entry in the IPv6 multicast - filter table of the ethernet MAC. */ - netif_mld_mac_filter_fn mld_mac_filter; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS - struct netif_hint *hints; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ -#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK - /* List of packets to be queued for ourselves. */ - struct pbuf *loop_first; - struct pbuf *loop_last; -#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS - u16_t loop_cnt_current; -#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ -#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ -}; - -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF -#define NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL(netif, chksumflags) \ - do { \ - (netif)->chksum_flags = chksumflags; \ - } while (0) -#define IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, chksumflag) if (((netif) == NULL) || (((netif)->chksum_flags & (chksumflag)) != 0)) -#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ -#define NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL(netif, chksumflags) -#define IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, chksumflag) -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ - -#if LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF -#define NETIF_FOREACH(netif) if (((netif) = netif_default) != NULL) -#else /* LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ -/** The list of network interfaces. */ -extern struct netif *netif_list; -#define NETIF_FOREACH(netif) for ((netif) = netif_list; (netif) != NULL; (netif) = (netif)->next) -#endif /* LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ -/** The default network interface. */ -extern struct netif *netif_default; - -void netif_init(void); - -struct netif *netif_add_noaddr(struct netif *netif, void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -struct netif *netif_add(struct netif *netif, - const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw, - void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input); -void netif_set_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, - const ip4_addr_t *gw); -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -struct netif *netif_add(struct netif *netif, void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -void netif_remove(struct netif *netif); - -/* Returns a network interface given its name. The name is of the form - "et0", where the first two letters are the "name" field in the - netif structure, and the digit is in the num field in the same - structure. */ -struct netif *netif_find(const char *name); - -void netif_set_default(struct netif *netif); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -void netif_set_ipaddr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); -void netif_set_netmask(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *netmask); -void netif_set_gw(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *gw); -/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ -#define netif_ip4_addr(netif) ((const ip4_addr_t *)ip_2_ip4(&((netif)->ip_addr))) -/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ -#define netif_ip4_netmask(netif) ((const ip4_addr_t *)ip_2_ip4(&((netif)->netmask))) -/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ -#define netif_ip4_gw(netif) ((const ip4_addr_t *)ip_2_ip4(&((netif)->gw))) -/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ -#define netif_ip_addr4(netif) ((const ip_addr_t *)&((netif)->ip_addr)) -/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ -#define netif_ip_netmask4(netif) ((const ip_addr_t *)&((netif)->netmask)) -/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ -#define netif_ip_gw4(netif) ((const ip_addr_t *)&((netif)->gw)) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#define netif_set_flags(netif, set_flags) \ - do { \ - (netif)->flags = (u8_t)((netif)->flags | (set_flags)); \ - } while (0) -#define netif_clear_flags(netif, clr_flags) \ - do { \ - (netif)->flags = (u8_t)((netif)->flags & (u8_t)(~(clr_flags)&0xff)); \ - } while (0) -#define netif_is_flag_set(nefif, flag) (((netif)->flags & (flag)) != 0) - -void netif_set_up(struct netif *netif); -void netif_set_down(struct netif *netif); -/** @ingroup netif - * Ask if an interface is up - */ -#define netif_is_up(netif) (((netif)->flags & NETIF_FLAG_UP) ? (u8_t)1 : (u8_t)0) - -#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK -void netif_set_status_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn status_callback); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK -void netif_set_remove_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn remove_callback); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK */ - -void netif_set_link_up(struct netif *netif); -void netif_set_link_down(struct netif *netif); -/** Ask if a link is up */ -#define netif_is_link_up(netif) (((netif)->flags & NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP) ? (u8_t)1 : (u8_t)0) - -#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK -void netif_set_link_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn link_callback); -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME -/** @ingroup netif */ -#define netif_set_hostname(netif, name) \ - do { \ - if ((netif) != NULL) { \ - (netif)->hostname = name; \ - } \ - } while (0) -/** @ingroup netif */ -#define netif_get_hostname(netif) (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->hostname) : NULL) -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ - -#if LWIP_IGMP -/** @ingroup netif */ -#define netif_set_igmp_mac_filter(netif, function) \ - do { \ - if ((netif) != NULL) { \ - (netif)->igmp_mac_filter = function; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define netif_get_igmp_mac_filter(netif) (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->igmp_mac_filter) : NULL) -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD -/** @ingroup netif */ -#define netif_set_mld_mac_filter(netif, function) \ - do { \ - if ((netif) != NULL) { \ - (netif)->mld_mac_filter = function; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define netif_get_mld_mac_filter(netif) (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->mld_mac_filter) : NULL) -#define netif_mld_mac_filter(netif, addr, action) \ - do { \ - if ((netif) && (netif)->mld_mac_filter) { \ - (netif)->mld_mac_filter((netif), (addr), (action)); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - -#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK -err_t netif_loop_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); -void netif_poll(struct netif *netif); -#if !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING -void netif_poll_all(void); -#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ -#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ - -err_t netif_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** @ingroup netif_ip6 */ -#define netif_ip_addr6(netif, i) ((const ip_addr_t *)(&((netif)->ip6_addr[i]))) -/** @ingroup netif_ip6 */ -#define netif_ip6_addr(netif, i) ((const ip6_addr_t *)ip_2_ip6(&((netif)->ip6_addr[i]))) -void netif_ip6_addr_set(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, const ip6_addr_t *addr6); -void netif_ip6_addr_set_parts(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u32_t i0, u32_t i1, u32_t i2, u32_t i3); -#define netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i) ((netif)->ip6_addr_state[i]) -void netif_ip6_addr_set_state(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u8_t state); -s8_t netif_get_ip6_addr_match(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); -void netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(struct netif *netif, u8_t from_mac_48bit); -err_t netif_add_ip6_address(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, s8_t *chosen_idx); -#define netif_set_ip6_autoconfig_enabled(netif, action) \ - do { \ - if (netif) { \ - (netif)->ip6_autoconfig_enabled = (action); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES -#define netif_ip6_addr_valid_life(netif, i) \ - (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->ip6_addr_valid_life[i]) : IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC) -#define netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, secs) \ - do { \ - if (netif != NULL) { \ - (netif)->ip6_addr_valid_life[i] = (secs); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define netif_ip6_addr_pref_life(netif, i) \ - (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->ip6_addr_pref_life[i]) : IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC) -#define netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, secs) \ - do { \ - if (netif != NULL) { \ - (netif)->ip6_addr_pref_life[i] = (secs); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) \ - (netif_ip6_addr_valid_life((netif), (i)) == IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC) -#else /* !LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ -#define netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) (1) /* all addresses are static */ -#endif /* !LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ -#if LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES -#define netif_mtu6(netif) ((netif)->mtu6) -#else /* LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ -#define netif_mtu6(netif) ((netif)->mtu) -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS -#define NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, netifhint) (netif)->hints = (netifhint) -#define NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif) (netif)->hints = NULL -#else /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ -#define NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, netifhint) -#define NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif) -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ - -u8_t netif_name_to_index(const char *name); -char *netif_index_to_name(u8_t idx, char *name); -struct netif *netif_get_by_index(u8_t idx); - -/* Interface indexes always start at 1 per RFC 3493, section 4, num starts at 0 (internal index is 0..254)*/ -#define netif_get_index(netif) ((u8_t)((netif)->num + 1)) -#define NETIF_NO_INDEX (0) - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Extended netif status callback (NSC) reasons flags. - * May be extended in the future! - */ -typedef u16_t netif_nsc_reason_t; - -/* used for initialization only */ -#define LWIP_NSC_NONE 0x0000 -/** netif was added. arg: NULL. Called AFTER netif was added. */ -#define LWIP_NSC_NETIF_ADDED 0x0001 -/** netif was removed. arg: NULL. Called BEFORE netif is removed. */ -#define LWIP_NSC_NETIF_REMOVED 0x0002 -/** link changed */ -#define LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED 0x0004 -/** netif administrative status changed.\n - * up is called AFTER netif is set up.\n - * down is called BEFORE the netif is actually set down. */ -#define LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED 0x0008 -/** IPv4 address has changed */ -#define LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED 0x0010 -/** IPv4 gateway has changed */ -#define LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED 0x0020 -/** IPv4 netmask has changed */ -#define LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED 0x0040 -/** called AFTER IPv4 address/gateway/netmask changes have been applied */ -#define LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED 0x0080 -/** IPv6 address was added */ -#define LWIP_NSC_IPV6_SET 0x0100 -/** IPv6 address state has changed */ -#define LWIP_NSC_IPV6_ADDR_STATE_CHANGED 0x0200 - -/** @ingroup netif - * Argument supplied to netif_ext_callback_fn. - */ -typedef union { - /** Args to LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED callback */ - struct link_changed_s { - /** 1: up; 0: down */ - u8_t state; - } link_changed; - /** Args to LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED callback */ - struct status_changed_s { - /** 1: up; 0: down */ - u8_t state; - } status_changed; - /** Args to LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED|LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED|LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED|LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED callback */ - struct ipv4_changed_s { - /** Old IPv4 address */ - const ip_addr_t *old_address; - const ip_addr_t *old_netmask; - const ip_addr_t *old_gw; - } ipv4_changed; - /** Args to LWIP_NSC_IPV6_SET callback */ - struct ipv6_set_s { - /** Index of changed IPv6 address */ - s8_t addr_index; - /** Old IPv6 address */ - const ip_addr_t *old_address; - } ipv6_set; - /** Args to LWIP_NSC_IPV6_ADDR_STATE_CHANGED callback */ - struct ipv6_addr_state_changed_s { - /** Index of affected IPv6 address */ - s8_t addr_index; - /** Old IPv6 address state */ - u8_t old_state; - /** Affected IPv6 address */ - const ip_addr_t *address; - } ipv6_addr_state_changed; -} netif_ext_callback_args_t; - -/** - * @ingroup netif - * Function used for extended netif status callbacks - * Note: When parsing reason argument, keep in mind that more reasons may be added in the future! - * @param netif netif that is affected by change - * @param reason change reason - * @param args depends on reason, see reason description - */ -typedef void (*netif_ext_callback_fn)(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args); - -#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK -struct netif_ext_callback; -typedef struct netif_ext_callback { - netif_ext_callback_fn callback_fn; - struct netif_ext_callback *next; -} netif_ext_callback_t; - -#define NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(name) static netif_ext_callback_t name; -void netif_add_ext_callback(netif_ext_callback_t *callback, netif_ext_callback_fn fn); -void netif_remove_ext_callback(netif_ext_callback_t *callback); -void netif_invoke_ext_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args); -#else -#define NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(name) -#define netif_add_ext_callback(callback, fn) -#define netif_remove_ext_callback(callback) -#define netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, reason, args) -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_H */ +/** + * @file + * netif API (to be used from TCPIP thread) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#define ENABLE_LOOPBACK (LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF) + +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Throughout this file, IP addresses are expected to be in + * the same byte order as in IP_PCB. */ + +/** Must be the maximum of all used hardware address lengths + across all types of interfaces in use. + This does not have to be changed, normally. */ +#ifndef NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN +#define NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN 6U +#endif + +/** The size of a fully constructed netif name which the + * netif can be identified by in APIs. Composed of + * 2 chars, 3 (max) digits, and 1 \0 + */ +#define NETIF_NAMESIZE 6 + +/** + * @defgroup netif_flags Flags + * @ingroup netif + * @{ + */ + +/** Whether the network interface is 'up'. This is + * a software flag used to control whether this network + * interface is enabled and processes traffic. + * It must be set by the startup code before this netif can be used + * (also for dhcp/autoip). + */ +#define NETIF_FLAG_UP 0x01U +/** If set, the netif has broadcast capability. + * Set by the netif driver in its init function. */ +#define NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST 0x02U +/** If set, the interface has an active link + * (set by the network interface driver). + * Either set by the netif driver in its init function (if the link + * is up at that time) or at a later point once the link comes up + * (if link detection is supported by the hardware). */ +#define NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP 0x04U +/** If set, the netif is an ethernet device using ARP. + * Set by the netif driver in its init function. + * Used to check input packet types and use of DHCP. */ +#define NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP 0x08U +/** If set, the netif is an ethernet device. It might not use + * ARP or TCP/IP if it is used for PPPoE only. + */ +#define NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET 0x10U +/** If set, the netif has IGMP capability. + * Set by the netif driver in its init function. */ +#define NETIF_FLAG_IGMP 0x20U +/** If set, the netif has MLD6 capability. + * Set by the netif driver in its init function. */ +#define NETIF_FLAG_MLD6 0x40U + +/** + * @} + */ + +enum lwip_internal_netif_client_data_index { +#if LWIP_IPV4 +#if LWIP_DHCP + LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP, +#endif +#if LWIP_AUTOIP + LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_AUTOIP, +#endif +#if LWIP_IGMP + LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_IGMP, +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#if LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 + LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_DHCP6, +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD + LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MLD6, +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MAX +}; + +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 0x0001 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 0x0002 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 0x0004 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 0x0008 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 0x0010 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 0x0100 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 0x0200 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 0x0400 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP 0x0800 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 0x1000 +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLE_ALL 0xFFFF +#define NETIF_CHECKSUM_DISABLE_ALL 0x0000 +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ + +struct netif; + +/** MAC Filter Actions, these are passed to a netif's igmp_mac_filter or + * mld_mac_filter callback function. */ +enum netif_mac_filter_action { + /** Delete a filter entry */ + NETIF_DEL_MAC_FILTER = 0, + /** Add a filter entry */ + NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER = 1 +}; + +/** Function prototype for netif init functions. Set up flags and output/linkoutput + * callback functions in this function. + * + * @param netif The netif to initialize + */ +typedef err_t (*netif_init_fn)(struct netif *netif); +/** Function prototype for netif->input functions. This function is saved as 'input' + * callback function in the netif struct. Call it when a packet has been received. + * + * @param p The received packet, copied into a pbuf + * @param inp The netif which received the packet + * @return ERR_OK if the packet was handled + * != ERR_OK is the packet was NOT handled, in this case, the caller has + * to free the pbuf + */ +typedef err_t (*netif_input_fn)(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/** Function prototype for netif->output functions. Called by lwIP when a packet + * shall be sent. For ethernet netif, set this to 'etharp_output' and set + * 'linkoutput'. + * + * @param netif The netif which shall send a packet + * @param p The packet to send (p->payload points to IP header) + * @param ipaddr The IP address to which the packet shall be sent + */ +typedef err_t (*netif_output_fn)(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, + const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** Function prototype for netif->output_ip6 functions. Called by lwIP when a packet + * shall be sent. For ethernet netif, set this to 'ethip6_output' and set + * 'linkoutput'. + * + * @param netif The netif which shall send a packet + * @param p The packet to send (p->payload points to IP header) + * @param ipaddr The IPv6 address to which the packet shall be sent + */ +typedef err_t (*netif_output_ip6_fn)(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, + const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** Function prototype for netif->linkoutput functions. Only used for ethernet + * netifs. This function is called by ARP when a packet shall be sent. + * + * @param netif The netif which shall send a packet + * @param p The packet to send (raw ethernet packet) + */ +typedef err_t (*netif_linkoutput_fn)(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); +/** Function prototype for netif status- or link-callback functions. */ +typedef void (*netif_status_callback_fn)(struct netif *netif); +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP +/** Function prototype for netif igmp_mac_filter functions */ +typedef err_t (*netif_igmp_mac_filter_fn)(struct netif *netif, + const ip4_addr_t *group, enum netif_mac_filter_action action); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD +/** Function prototype for netif mld_mac_filter functions */ +typedef err_t (*netif_mld_mac_filter_fn)(struct netif *netif, + const ip6_addr_t *group, enum netif_mac_filter_action action); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + +#if LWIP_DHCP || LWIP_AUTOIP || LWIP_IGMP || LWIP_IPV6_MLD || LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 || (LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 0) +#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA > 0 +u8_t netif_alloc_client_data_id(void); +#endif +/** @ingroup netif_cd + * Set client data. Obtain ID from netif_alloc_client_data_id(). + */ +#define netif_set_client_data(netif, id, data) netif_get_client_data(netif, id) = (data) +/** @ingroup netif_cd + * Get client data. Obtain ID from netif_alloc_client_data_id(). + */ +#define netif_get_client_data(netif, id) (netif)->client_data[(id)] +#endif + +#if (LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP && (ARP_TABLE_SIZE > 0x7f)) || (LWIP_IPV6 && (LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS > 0x7f)) +typedef u16_t netif_addr_idx_t; +#define NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX 0x7FFF +#else +typedef u8_t netif_addr_idx_t; +#define NETIF_ADDR_IDX_MAX 0x7F +#endif + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT +#define LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS 1 +struct netif_hint { + netif_addr_idx_t addr_hint; +}; +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ +#define LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS 0 +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT */ + +/** Generic data structure used for all lwIP network interfaces. + * The following fields should be filled in by the initialization + * function for the device driver: hwaddr_len, hwaddr[], mtu, flags */ +struct netif { +#if !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF + /** pointer to next in linked list */ + struct netif *next; +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + /** IP address configuration in network byte order */ + ip_addr_t ip_addr; + ip_addr_t netmask; + ip_addr_t gw; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + /** Array of IPv6 addresses for this netif. */ + ip_addr_t ip6_addr[LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES]; + /** The state of each IPv6 address (Tentative, Preferred, etc). + * @see ip6_addr.h */ + u8_t ip6_addr_state[LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES]; +#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES + /** Remaining valid and preferred lifetime of each IPv6 address, in seconds. + * For valid lifetimes, the special value of IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC (0) + * indicates the address is static and has no lifetimes. */ + u32_t ip6_addr_valid_life[LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES]; + u32_t ip6_addr_pref_life[LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES]; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + /** This function is called by the network device driver + * to pass a packet up the TCP/IP stack. */ + netif_input_fn input; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + /** This function is called by the IP module when it wants + * to send a packet on the interface. This function typically + * first resolves the hardware address, then sends the packet. + * For ethernet physical layer, this is usually etharp_output() */ + netif_output_fn output; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + /** This function is called by ethernet_output() when it wants + * to send a packet on the interface. This function outputs + * the pbuf as-is on the link medium. */ + netif_linkoutput_fn linkoutput; +#if LWIP_IPV6 + /** This function is called by the IPv6 module when it wants + * to send a packet on the interface. This function typically + * first resolves the hardware address, then sends the packet. + * For ethernet physical layer, this is usually ethip6_output() */ + netif_output_ip6_fn output_ip6; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK + /** This function is called when the netif state is set to up or down + */ + netif_status_callback_fn status_callback; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK + /** This function is called when the netif link is set to up or down + */ + netif_status_callback_fn link_callback; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK + /** This function is called when the netif has been removed */ + netif_status_callback_fn remove_callback; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK */ + /** This field can be set by the device driver and could point + * to state information for the device. */ + void *state; +#ifdef netif_get_client_data + void *client_data[LWIP_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA_INDEX_MAX + LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA]; +#endif +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME + /* the hostname for this netif, NULL is a valid value */ + const char *hostname; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF + u16_t chksum_flags; +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF*/ + /** maximum transfer unit (in bytes) */ + u16_t mtu; +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES + /** maximum transfer unit (in bytes), updated by RA */ + u16_t mtu6; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ + /** link level hardware address of this interface */ + u8_t hwaddr[NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN]; + /** number of bytes used in hwaddr */ + u8_t hwaddr_len; + /** flags (@see @ref netif_flags) */ + u8_t flags; + /** descriptive abbreviation */ + char name[2]; + /** number of this interface. Used for @ref if_api and @ref netifapi_netif, + * as well as for IPv6 zones */ + u8_t num; +#if LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG + /** is this netif enabled for IPv6 autoconfiguration */ + u8_t ip6_autoconfig_enabled; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG */ +#if LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT + /** Number of Router Solicitation messages that remain to be sent. */ + u8_t rs_count; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT */ +#if MIB2_STATS + /** link type (from "snmp_ifType" enum from snmp_mib2.h) */ + u8_t link_type; + /** (estimate) link speed */ + u32_t link_speed; + /** timestamp at last change made (up/down) */ + u32_t ts; + /** counters */ + struct stats_mib2_netif_ctrs mib2_counters; +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP + /** This function could be called to add or delete an entry in the multicast + filter table of the ethernet MAC.*/ + netif_igmp_mac_filter_fn igmp_mac_filter; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IGMP */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD + /** This function could be called to add or delete an entry in the IPv6 multicast + filter table of the ethernet MAC. */ + netif_mld_mac_filter_fn mld_mac_filter; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS + struct netif_hint *hints; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ +#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK + /* List of packets to be queued for ourselves. */ + struct pbuf *loop_first; + struct pbuf *loop_last; +#if LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS + u16_t loop_cnt_current; +#endif /* LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS */ +#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ +}; + +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF +#define NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL(netif, chksumflags) \ + do { \ + (netif)->chksum_flags = chksumflags; \ + } while (0) +#define IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, chksumflag) if (((netif) == NULL) || (((netif)->chksum_flags & (chksumflag)) != 0)) +#else /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ +#define NETIF_SET_CHECKSUM_CTRL(netif, chksumflags) +#define IF__NETIF_CHECKSUM_ENABLED(netif, chksumflag) +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF */ + +#if LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF +#define NETIF_FOREACH(netif) if (((netif) = netif_default) != NULL) +#else /* LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ +/** The list of network interfaces. */ +extern struct netif *netif_list; +#define NETIF_FOREACH(netif) for ((netif) = netif_list; (netif) != NULL; (netif) = (netif)->next) +#endif /* LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF */ +/** The default network interface. */ +extern struct netif *netif_default; + +void netif_init(void); + +struct netif *netif_add_noaddr(struct netif *netif, void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +struct netif *netif_add(struct netif *netif, + const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw, + void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input); +void netif_set_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, + const ip4_addr_t *gw); +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +struct netif *netif_add(struct netif *netif, void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +void netif_remove(struct netif *netif); + +/* Returns a network interface given its name. The name is of the form + "et0", where the first two letters are the "name" field in the + netif structure, and the digit is in the num field in the same + structure. */ +struct netif *netif_find(const char *name); + +void netif_set_default(struct netif *netif); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +void netif_set_ipaddr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); +void netif_set_netmask(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *netmask); +void netif_set_gw(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *gw); +/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ +#define netif_ip4_addr(netif) ((const ip4_addr_t *)ip_2_ip4(&((netif)->ip_addr))) +/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ +#define netif_ip4_netmask(netif) ((const ip4_addr_t *)ip_2_ip4(&((netif)->netmask))) +/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ +#define netif_ip4_gw(netif) ((const ip4_addr_t *)ip_2_ip4(&((netif)->gw))) +/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ +#define netif_ip_addr4(netif) ((const ip_addr_t *)&((netif)->ip_addr)) +/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ +#define netif_ip_netmask4(netif) ((const ip_addr_t *)&((netif)->netmask)) +/** @ingroup netif_ip4 */ +#define netif_ip_gw4(netif) ((const ip_addr_t *)&((netif)->gw)) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#define netif_set_flags(netif, set_flags) \ + do { \ + (netif)->flags = (u8_t)((netif)->flags | (set_flags)); \ + } while (0) +#define netif_clear_flags(netif, clr_flags) \ + do { \ + (netif)->flags = (u8_t)((netif)->flags & (u8_t)(~(clr_flags)&0xff)); \ + } while (0) +#define netif_is_flag_set(nefif, flag) (((netif)->flags & (flag)) != 0) + +void netif_set_up(struct netif *netif); +void netif_set_down(struct netif *netif); +/** @ingroup netif + * Ask if an interface is up + */ +#define netif_is_up(netif) (((netif)->flags & NETIF_FLAG_UP) ? (u8_t)1 : (u8_t)0) + +#if LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK +void netif_set_status_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn status_callback); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK +void netif_set_remove_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn remove_callback); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK */ + +void netif_set_link_up(struct netif *netif); +void netif_set_link_down(struct netif *netif); +/** Ask if a link is up */ +#define netif_is_link_up(netif) (((netif)->flags & NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP) ? (u8_t)1 : (u8_t)0) + +#if LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK +void netif_set_link_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_status_callback_fn link_callback); +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK */ + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME +/** @ingroup netif */ +#define netif_set_hostname(netif, name) \ + do { \ + if ((netif) != NULL) { \ + (netif)->hostname = name; \ + } \ + } while (0) +/** @ingroup netif */ +#define netif_get_hostname(netif) (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->hostname) : NULL) +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ + +#if LWIP_IGMP +/** @ingroup netif */ +#define netif_set_igmp_mac_filter(netif, function) \ + do { \ + if ((netif) != NULL) { \ + (netif)->igmp_mac_filter = function; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define netif_get_igmp_mac_filter(netif) (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->igmp_mac_filter) : NULL) +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD +/** @ingroup netif */ +#define netif_set_mld_mac_filter(netif, function) \ + do { \ + if ((netif) != NULL) { \ + (netif)->mld_mac_filter = function; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define netif_get_mld_mac_filter(netif) (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->mld_mac_filter) : NULL) +#define netif_mld_mac_filter(netif, addr, action) \ + do { \ + if ((netif) && (netif)->mld_mac_filter) { \ + (netif)->mld_mac_filter((netif), (addr), (action)); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + +#if ENABLE_LOOPBACK +err_t netif_loop_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); +void netif_poll(struct netif *netif); +#if !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING +void netif_poll_all(void); +#endif /* !LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING */ +#endif /* ENABLE_LOOPBACK */ + +err_t netif_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** @ingroup netif_ip6 */ +#define netif_ip_addr6(netif, i) ((const ip_addr_t *)(&((netif)->ip6_addr[i]))) +/** @ingroup netif_ip6 */ +#define netif_ip6_addr(netif, i) ((const ip6_addr_t *)ip_2_ip6(&((netif)->ip6_addr[i]))) +void netif_ip6_addr_set(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, const ip6_addr_t *addr6); +void netif_ip6_addr_set_parts(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u32_t i0, u32_t i1, u32_t i2, u32_t i3); +#define netif_ip6_addr_state(netif, i) ((netif)->ip6_addr_state[i]) +void netif_ip6_addr_set_state(struct netif *netif, s8_t addr_idx, u8_t state); +s8_t netif_get_ip6_addr_match(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); +void netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(struct netif *netif, u8_t from_mac_48bit); +err_t netif_add_ip6_address(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, s8_t *chosen_idx); +#define netif_set_ip6_autoconfig_enabled(netif, action) \ + do { \ + if (netif) { \ + (netif)->ip6_autoconfig_enabled = (action); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#if LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES +#define netif_ip6_addr_valid_life(netif, i) \ + (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->ip6_addr_valid_life[i]) : IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC) +#define netif_ip6_addr_set_valid_life(netif, i, secs) \ + do { \ + if (netif != NULL) { \ + (netif)->ip6_addr_valid_life[i] = (secs); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define netif_ip6_addr_pref_life(netif, i) \ + (((netif) != NULL) ? ((netif)->ip6_addr_pref_life[i]) : IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC) +#define netif_ip6_addr_set_pref_life(netif, i, secs) \ + do { \ + if (netif != NULL) { \ + (netif)->ip6_addr_pref_life[i] = (secs); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) \ + (netif_ip6_addr_valid_life((netif), (i)) == IP6_ADDR_LIFE_STATIC) +#else /* !LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ +#define netif_ip6_addr_isstatic(netif, i) (1) /* all addresses are static */ +#endif /* !LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES */ +#if LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES +#define netif_mtu6(netif) ((netif)->mtu6) +#else /* LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ +#define netif_mtu6(netif) ((netif)->mtu) +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS +#define NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, netifhint) (netif)->hints = (netifhint) +#define NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif) (netif)->hints = NULL +#else /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ +#define NETIF_SET_HINTS(netif, netifhint) +#define NETIF_RESET_HINTS(netif) +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_USE_HINTS */ + +u8_t netif_name_to_index(const char *name); +char *netif_index_to_name(u8_t idx, char *name); +struct netif *netif_get_by_index(u8_t idx); + +/* Interface indexes always start at 1 per RFC 3493, section 4, num starts at 0 (internal index is 0..254)*/ +#define netif_get_index(netif) ((u8_t)((netif)->num + 1)) +#define NETIF_NO_INDEX (0) + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Extended netif status callback (NSC) reasons flags. + * May be extended in the future! + */ +typedef u16_t netif_nsc_reason_t; + +/* used for initialization only */ +#define LWIP_NSC_NONE 0x0000 +/** netif was added. arg: NULL. Called AFTER netif was added. */ +#define LWIP_NSC_NETIF_ADDED 0x0001 +/** netif was removed. arg: NULL. Called BEFORE netif is removed. */ +#define LWIP_NSC_NETIF_REMOVED 0x0002 +/** link changed */ +#define LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED 0x0004 +/** netif administrative status changed.\n + * up is called AFTER netif is set up.\n + * down is called BEFORE the netif is actually set down. */ +#define LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED 0x0008 +/** IPv4 address has changed */ +#define LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED 0x0010 +/** IPv4 gateway has changed */ +#define LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED 0x0020 +/** IPv4 netmask has changed */ +#define LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED 0x0040 +/** called AFTER IPv4 address/gateway/netmask changes have been applied */ +#define LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED 0x0080 +/** IPv6 address was added */ +#define LWIP_NSC_IPV6_SET 0x0100 +/** IPv6 address state has changed */ +#define LWIP_NSC_IPV6_ADDR_STATE_CHANGED 0x0200 + +/** @ingroup netif + * Argument supplied to netif_ext_callback_fn. + */ +typedef union { + /** Args to LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED callback */ + struct link_changed_s { + /** 1: up; 0: down */ + u8_t state; + } link_changed; + /** Args to LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED callback */ + struct status_changed_s { + /** 1: up; 0: down */ + u8_t state; + } status_changed; + /** Args to LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED|LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED|LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED|LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED callback */ + struct ipv4_changed_s { + /** Old IPv4 address */ + const ip_addr_t *old_address; + const ip_addr_t *old_netmask; + const ip_addr_t *old_gw; + } ipv4_changed; + /** Args to LWIP_NSC_IPV6_SET callback */ + struct ipv6_set_s { + /** Index of changed IPv6 address */ + s8_t addr_index; + /** Old IPv6 address */ + const ip_addr_t *old_address; + } ipv6_set; + /** Args to LWIP_NSC_IPV6_ADDR_STATE_CHANGED callback */ + struct ipv6_addr_state_changed_s { + /** Index of affected IPv6 address */ + s8_t addr_index; + /** Old IPv6 address state */ + u8_t old_state; + /** Affected IPv6 address */ + const ip_addr_t *address; + } ipv6_addr_state_changed; +} netif_ext_callback_args_t; + +/** + * @ingroup netif + * Function used for extended netif status callbacks + * Note: When parsing reason argument, keep in mind that more reasons may be added in the future! + * @param netif netif that is affected by change + * @param reason change reason + * @param args depends on reason, see reason description + */ +typedef void (*netif_ext_callback_fn)(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args); + +#if LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK +struct netif_ext_callback; +typedef struct netif_ext_callback { + netif_ext_callback_fn callback_fn; + struct netif_ext_callback *next; +} netif_ext_callback_t; + +#define NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(name) static netif_ext_callback_t name; +void netif_add_ext_callback(netif_ext_callback_t *callback, netif_ext_callback_fn fn); +void netif_remove_ext_callback(netif_ext_callback_t *callback); +void netif_invoke_ext_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args); +#else +#define NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(name) +#define netif_add_ext_callback(callback, fn) +#define netif_remove_ext_callback(callback) +#define netif_invoke_ext_callback(netif, reason, args) +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netifapi.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netifapi.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netifapi.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netifapi.h index 79910ecc..3839cf05 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/netifapi.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/netifapi.h @@ -1,161 +1,161 @@ -/** - * @file - * netif API (to be used from non-TCPIP threads) - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIFAPI_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETIFAPI_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_NETIF_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp.h" -#include "lwip/autoip.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" -#include "lwip/priv/api_msg.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* API for application */ -#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 -/* Used for netfiapi_arp_* APIs */ -enum netifapi_arp_entry { - NETIFAPI_ARP_PERM /* Permanent entry */ - /* Other entry types can be added here */ -}; - -/** @ingroup netifapi_arp */ -err_t netifapi_arp_add(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr, enum netifapi_arp_entry type); -/** @ingroup netifapi_arp */ -err_t netifapi_arp_remove(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, enum netifapi_arp_entry type); -#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ - -err_t netifapi_netif_add(struct netif *netif, -#if LWIP_IPV4 - const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -err_t netifapi_netif_set_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, - const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ - -err_t netifapi_netif_common(struct netif *netif, netifapi_void_fn voidfunc, - netifapi_errt_fn errtfunc); - -/** @ingroup netifapi_netif */ -err_t netifapi_netif_name_to_index(const char *name, u8_t *index); -/** @ingroup netifapi_netif */ -err_t netifapi_netif_index_to_name(u8_t index, char *name); - -/** @ingroup netifapi_netif - * @see netif_remove() - */ -#define netifapi_netif_remove(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_remove, NULL) -/** @ingroup netifapi_netif - * @see netif_set_up() - */ -#define netifapi_netif_set_up(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_up, NULL) -/** @ingroup netifapi_netif - * @see netif_set_down() - */ -#define netifapi_netif_set_down(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_down, NULL) -/** @ingroup netifapi_netif - * @see netif_set_default() - */ -#define netifapi_netif_set_default(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_default, NULL) -/** @ingroup netifapi_netif - * @see netif_set_link_up() - */ -#define netifapi_netif_set_link_up(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_link_up, NULL) -/** @ingroup netifapi_netif - * @see netif_set_link_down() - */ -#define netifapi_netif_set_link_down(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_link_down, NULL) - -/** - * @defgroup netifapi_dhcp4 DHCPv4 - * @ingroup netifapi - * To be called from non-TCPIP threads - */ -/** @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 - * @see dhcp_start() - */ -#define netifapi_dhcp_start(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, dhcp_start) -/** - * @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 - * @deprecated Use netifapi_dhcp_release_and_stop() instead. - */ -#define netifapi_dhcp_stop(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, dhcp_stop, NULL) -/** @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 - * @see dhcp_inform() - */ -#define netifapi_dhcp_inform(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, dhcp_inform, NULL) -/** @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 - * @see dhcp_renew() - */ -#define netifapi_dhcp_renew(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, dhcp_renew) -/** - * @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 - * @deprecated Use netifapi_dhcp_release_and_stop() instead. - */ -#define netifapi_dhcp_release(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, dhcp_release) -/** @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 - * @see dhcp_release_and_stop() - */ -#define netifapi_dhcp_release_and_stop(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, dhcp_release_and_stop, NULL) - -/** - * @defgroup netifapi_autoip AUTOIP - * @ingroup netifapi - * To be called from non-TCPIP threads - */ -/** @ingroup netifapi_autoip - * @see autoip_start() - */ -#define netifapi_autoip_start(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, autoip_start) -/** @ingroup netifapi_autoip - * @see autoip_stop() - */ -#define netifapi_autoip_stop(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, autoip_stop) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIFAPI_H */ +/** + * @file + * netif API (to be used from non-TCPIP threads) + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIFAPI_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETIFAPI_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_NETIF_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp.h" +#include "lwip/autoip.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" +#include "lwip/priv/api_msg.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* API for application */ +#if LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 +/* Used for netfiapi_arp_* APIs */ +enum netifapi_arp_entry { + NETIFAPI_ARP_PERM /* Permanent entry */ + /* Other entry types can be added here */ +}; + +/** @ingroup netifapi_arp */ +err_t netifapi_arp_add(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, struct eth_addr *ethaddr, enum netifapi_arp_entry type); +/** @ingroup netifapi_arp */ +err_t netifapi_arp_remove(const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, enum netifapi_arp_entry type); +#endif /* LWIP_ARP && LWIP_IPV4 */ + +err_t netifapi_netif_add(struct netif *netif, +#if LWIP_IPV4 + const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + void *state, netif_init_fn init, netif_input_fn input); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +err_t netifapi_netif_set_addr(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr, + const ip4_addr_t *netmask, const ip4_addr_t *gw); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4*/ + +err_t netifapi_netif_common(struct netif *netif, netifapi_void_fn voidfunc, + netifapi_errt_fn errtfunc); + +/** @ingroup netifapi_netif */ +err_t netifapi_netif_name_to_index(const char *name, u8_t *index); +/** @ingroup netifapi_netif */ +err_t netifapi_netif_index_to_name(u8_t index, char *name); + +/** @ingroup netifapi_netif + * @see netif_remove() + */ +#define netifapi_netif_remove(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_remove, NULL) +/** @ingroup netifapi_netif + * @see netif_set_up() + */ +#define netifapi_netif_set_up(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_up, NULL) +/** @ingroup netifapi_netif + * @see netif_set_down() + */ +#define netifapi_netif_set_down(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_down, NULL) +/** @ingroup netifapi_netif + * @see netif_set_default() + */ +#define netifapi_netif_set_default(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_default, NULL) +/** @ingroup netifapi_netif + * @see netif_set_link_up() + */ +#define netifapi_netif_set_link_up(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_link_up, NULL) +/** @ingroup netifapi_netif + * @see netif_set_link_down() + */ +#define netifapi_netif_set_link_down(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, netif_set_link_down, NULL) + +/** + * @defgroup netifapi_dhcp4 DHCPv4 + * @ingroup netifapi + * To be called from non-TCPIP threads + */ +/** @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 + * @see dhcp_start() + */ +#define netifapi_dhcp_start(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, dhcp_start) +/** + * @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 + * @deprecated Use netifapi_dhcp_release_and_stop() instead. + */ +#define netifapi_dhcp_stop(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, dhcp_stop, NULL) +/** @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 + * @see dhcp_inform() + */ +#define netifapi_dhcp_inform(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, dhcp_inform, NULL) +/** @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 + * @see dhcp_renew() + */ +#define netifapi_dhcp_renew(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, dhcp_renew) +/** + * @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 + * @deprecated Use netifapi_dhcp_release_and_stop() instead. + */ +#define netifapi_dhcp_release(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, dhcp_release) +/** @ingroup netifapi_dhcp4 + * @see dhcp_release_and_stop() + */ +#define netifapi_dhcp_release_and_stop(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, dhcp_release_and_stop, NULL) + +/** + * @defgroup netifapi_autoip AUTOIP + * @ingroup netifapi + * To be called from non-TCPIP threads + */ +/** @ingroup netifapi_autoip + * @see autoip_start() + */ +#define netifapi_autoip_start(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, autoip_start) +/** @ingroup netifapi_autoip + * @see autoip_stop() + */ +#define netifapi_autoip_stop(n) netifapi_netif_common(n, NULL, autoip_stop) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIFAPI_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/opt.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/opt.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/opt.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/opt.h index ea81df65..251ded23 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/opt.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/opt.h @@ -1,3518 +1,3518 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * lwIP Options Configuration - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -/* - * NOTE: || defined __DOXYGEN__ is a workaround for doxygen bug - - * without this, doxygen does not see the actual #define - */ - -#if !defined LWIP_HDR_OPT_H -#define LWIP_HDR_OPT_H - -/* - * Include user defined options first. Anything not defined in these files - * will be set to standard values. Override anything you don't like! - */ -#include "lwipopts.h" -#include "lwip/debug.h" - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts Options (lwipopts.h) - * @ingroup lwip - * - * @defgroup lwip_opts_debug Debugging - * @ingroup lwip_opts - * - * @defgroup lwip_opts_infrastructure Infrastructure - * @ingroup lwip_opts - * - * @defgroup lwip_opts_callback Callback-style APIs - * @ingroup lwip_opts - * - * @defgroup lwip_opts_threadsafe_apis Thread-safe APIs - * @ingroup lwip_opts - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------ - -------------- NO SYS -------------- - ------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_nosys NO_SYS - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * NO_SYS==1: Use lwIP without OS-awareness (no thread, semaphores, mutexes or - * mboxes). This means threaded APIs cannot be used (socket, netconn, - * i.e. everything in the 'api' folder), only the callback-style raw API is - * available (and you have to watch out for yourself that you don't access - * lwIP functions/structures from more than one context at a time!) - */ -#if !defined NO_SYS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define NO_SYS 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_timers Timers - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_TIMERS==0: Drop support for sys_timeout and lwip-internal cyclic timers. - * (the array of lwip-internal cyclic timers is still provided) - * (check NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS for compatibility to old versions) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TIMERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#ifdef NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS -#define LWIP_TIMERS (!NO_SYS || (NO_SYS && !NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS)) -#else -#define LWIP_TIMERS 1 -#endif -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM==1: Provide your own timer implementation. - * Function prototypes in timeouts.h and the array of lwip-internal cyclic timers - * are still included, but the implementation is not. The following functions - * will be required: sys_timeouts_init(), sys_timeout(), sys_untimeout(), - * sys_timeouts_mbox_fetch() - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_memcpy memcpy - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * MEMCPY: override this if you have a faster implementation at hand than the - * one included in your C library - */ -#if !defined MEMCPY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMCPY(dst, src, len) memcpy(dst, src, len) -#endif - -/** - * SMEMCPY: override this with care! Some compilers (e.g. gcc) can inline a - * call to memcpy() if the length is known at compile time and is small. - */ -#if !defined SMEMCPY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SMEMCPY(dst, src, len) memcpy(dst, src, len) -#endif - -/** - * MEMMOVE: override this if you have a faster implementation at hand than the - * one included in your C library. lwIP currently uses MEMMOVE only when IPv6 - * fragmentation support is enabled. - */ -#if !defined MEMMOVE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMMOVE(dst, src, len) memmove(dst, src, len) -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------ - ----------- Core locking ----------- - ------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_lock Core locking and MPU - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE: enables special memory management mechanism - * which makes lwip able to work on MPU (Memory Protection Unit) system - * by not passing stack-pointers to other threads - * (this decreases performance as memory is allocated from pools instead - * of keeping it on the stack) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - * Creates a global mutex that is held during TCPIP thread operations. - * Can be locked by client code to perform lwIP operations without changing - * into TCPIP thread using callbacks. See LOCK_TCPIP_CORE() and - * UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(). - * Your system should provide mutexes supporting priority inversion to use this. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT: when LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING is enabled, - * this lets tcpip_input() grab the mutex for input packets as well, - * instead of allocating a message and passing it to tcpip_thread. - * - * ATTENTION: this does not work when tcpip_input() is called from - * interrupt context! - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT 0 -#endif - -/** - * SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT==1: enable inter-task protection (and task-vs-interrupt - * protection) for certain critical regions during buffer allocation, deallocation - * and memory allocation and deallocation. - * ATTENTION: This is required when using lwIP from more than one context! If - * you disable this, you must be sure what you are doing! - */ -#if !defined SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT 1 -#endif - -/** - * Macro/function to check whether lwIP's threading/locking - * requirements are satisfied during current function call. - * This macro usually calls a function that is implemented in the OS-dependent - * sys layer and performs the following checks: - * - Not in ISR (this should be checked for NO_SYS==1, too!) - * - If @ref LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING = 1: TCPIP core lock is held - * - If @ref LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING = 0: function is called from TCPIP thread - * @see @ref multithreading - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED() -#endif - -/** - * Called as first thing in the lwIP TCPIP thread. Can be used in conjunction - * with @ref LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED to check core locking. - * @see @ref multithreading - */ -#if !defined LWIP_MARK_TCPIP_THREAD || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_MARK_TCPIP_THREAD() -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------ - ---------- Memory options ---------- - ------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_mem Heap and memory pools - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * MEM_LIBC_MALLOC==1: Use malloc/free/realloc provided by your C-library - * instead of the lwip internal allocator. Can save code size if you - * already use it. - */ -#if !defined MEM_LIBC_MALLOC || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEM_LIBC_MALLOC 0 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_MEM_MALLOC==1: Use mem_malloc/mem_free instead of the lwip pool allocator. - * Especially useful with MEM_LIBC_MALLOC but handle with care regarding execution - * speed (heap alloc can be much slower than pool alloc) and usage from interrupts - * (especially if your netif driver allocates PBUF_POOL pbufs for received frames - * from interrupt)! - * ATTENTION: Currently, this uses the heap for ALL pools (also for private pools, - * not only for internal pools defined in memp_std.h)! - */ -#if !defined MEMP_MEM_MALLOC || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_MEM_MALLOC 0 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_MEM_INIT==1: Force use of memset to initialize pool memory. - * Useful if pool are moved in uninitialized section of memory. This will ensure - * default values in pcbs struct are well initialized in all conditions. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_MEM_INIT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_MEM_INIT 0 -#endif - -/** - * MEM_ALIGNMENT: should be set to the alignment of the CPU - * 4 byte alignment -> \#define MEM_ALIGNMENT 4 - * 2 byte alignment -> \#define MEM_ALIGNMENT 2 - */ -#if !defined MEM_ALIGNMENT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEM_ALIGNMENT 1 -#endif - -/** - * MEM_SIZE: the size of the heap memory. If the application will send - * a lot of data that needs to be copied, this should be set high. - */ -#if !defined MEM_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEM_SIZE 1600 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK: memp overflow protection reserves a configurable - * amount of bytes before and after each memp element in every pool and fills - * it with a prominent default value. - * MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 0 no checking - * MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 1 checks each element when it is freed - * MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 checks each element in every pool every time - * memp_malloc() or memp_free() is called (useful but slow!) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK 0 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_SANITY_CHECK==1: run a sanity check after each memp_free() to make - * sure that there are no cycles in the linked lists. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_SANITY_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_SANITY_CHECK 0 -#endif - -/** - * MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK: mem overflow protection reserves a configurable - * amount of bytes before and after each heap allocation chunk and fills - * it with a prominent default value. - * MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 0 no checking - * MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 1 checks each element when it is freed - * MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 checks all heap elements every time - * mem_malloc() or mem_free() is called (useful but slow!) - */ -#if !defined MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK 0 -#endif - -/** - * MEM_SANITY_CHECK==1: run a sanity check after each mem_free() to make - * sure that the linked list of heap elements is not corrupted. - */ -#if !defined MEM_SANITY_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEM_SANITY_CHECK 0 -#endif - -/** - * MEM_USE_POOLS==1: Use an alternative to malloc() by allocating from a set - * of memory pools of various sizes. When mem_malloc is called, an element of - * the smallest pool that can provide the length needed is returned. - * To use this, MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS also has to be enabled. - */ -#if !defined MEM_USE_POOLS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEM_USE_POOLS 0 -#endif - -/** - * MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL==1: if one malloc-pool is empty, try the next - * bigger pool - WARNING: THIS MIGHT WASTE MEMORY but it can make a system more - * reliable. */ -#if !defined MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL 0 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS==1: whether to include a user file lwippools.h - * that defines additional pools beyond the "standard" ones required - * by lwIP. If you set this to 1, you must have lwippools.h in your - * include path somewhere. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS 0 -#endif - -/** - * Set this to 1 if you want to free PBUF_RAM pbufs (or call mem_free()) from - * interrupt context (or another context that doesn't allow waiting for a - * semaphore). - * If set to 1, mem_malloc will be protected by a semaphore and SYS_ARCH_PROTECT, - * while mem_free will only use SYS_ARCH_PROTECT. mem_malloc SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECTs - * with each loop so that mem_free can run. - * - * ATTENTION: As you can see from the above description, this leads to dis-/ - * enabling interrupts often, which can be slow! Also, on low memory, mem_malloc - * can need longer. - * - * If you don't want that, at least for NO_SYS=0, you can still use the following - * functions to enqueue a deallocation call which then runs in the tcpip_thread - * context: - * - pbuf_free_callback(p); - * - mem_free_callback(m); - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------------------ - ---------- Internal Memory Pool Sizes ---------- - ------------------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_memp Internal memory pools - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * MEMP_NUM_PBUF: the number of memp struct pbufs (used for PBUF_ROM and PBUF_REF). - * If the application sends a lot of data out of ROM (or other static memory), - * this should be set high. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_PBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_PBUF 16 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB: Number of raw connection PCBs - * (requires the LWIP_RAW option) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB 4 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB: the number of UDP protocol control blocks. One - * per active UDP "connection". - * (requires the LWIP_UDP option) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB 4 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB: the number of simultaneously active TCP connections. - * (requires the LWIP_TCP option) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB 5 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN: the number of listening TCP connections. - * (requires the LWIP_TCP option) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN 8 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG: the number of simultaneously queued TCP segments. - * (requires the LWIP_TCP option) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG 16 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_ALTCP_PCB: the number of simultaneously active altcp layer pcbs. - * (requires the LWIP_ALTCP option) - * Connections with multiple layers require more than one altcp_pcb (e.g. TLS - * over TCP requires 2 altcp_pcbs, one for TLS and one for TCP). - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_ALTCP_PCB || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_ALTCP_PCB MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA: the number of IP packets simultaneously queued for - * reassembly (whole packets, not fragments!) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA 5 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_FRAG_PBUF: the number of IP fragments simultaneously sent - * (fragments, not whole packets!). - * This is only used with LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF==0 and only has to be > 1 - * with DMA-enabled MACs where the packet is not yet sent when netif->output - * returns. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_FRAG_PBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_FRAG_PBUF 15 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE: the number of simultaneously queued outgoing - * packets (pbufs) that are waiting for an ARP request (to resolve - * their destination address) to finish. - * (requires the ARP_QUEUEING option) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE 30 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP: The number of multicast groups whose network interfaces - * can be members at the same time (one per netif - allsystems group -, plus one - * per netif membership). - * (requires the LWIP_IGMP option) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP 8 -#endif - -/** - * The number of sys timeouts used by the core stack (not apps) - * The default number of timeouts is calculated here for all enabled modules. - */ -#define LWIP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT_INTERNAL (LWIP_TCP + IP_REASSEMBLY + LWIP_ARP + (2 * LWIP_DHCP) + LWIP_AUTOIP + LWIP_IGMP + LWIP_DNS + PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS + (LWIP_IPV6 * (1 + LWIP_IPV6_REASS + LWIP_IPV6_MLD))) - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT: the number of simultaneously active timeouts. - * The default number of timeouts is calculated here for all enabled modules. - * The formula expects settings to be either '0' or '1'. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT LWIP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT_INTERNAL -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_NETBUF: the number of struct netbufs. - * (only needed if you use the sequential API, like api_lib.c) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_NETBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_NETBUF 2 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_NETCONN: the number of struct netconns. - * (only needed if you use the sequential API, like api_lib.c) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_NETCONN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_NETCONN 4 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_SELECT_CB: the number of struct lwip_select_cb. - * (Only needed if you have LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE==1 and use the socket API. - * In that case, you need one per thread calling lwip_select.) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_SELECT_CB || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_SELECT_CB 4 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API: the number of struct tcpip_msg, which are used - * for callback/timeout API communication. - * (only needed if you use tcpip.c) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API 8 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT: the number of struct tcpip_msg, which are used - * for incoming packets. - * (only needed if you use tcpip.c) - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT 8 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_NETDB: the number of concurrently running lwip_addrinfo() calls - * (before freeing the corresponding memory using lwip_freeaddrinfo()). - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_NETDB || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_NETDB 1 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST: the number of host entries in the local host list - * if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC==1. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST 1 -#endif - -/** - * PBUF_POOL_SIZE: the number of buffers in the pbuf pool. - */ -#if !defined PBUF_POOL_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define PBUF_POOL_SIZE 16 -#endif - -/** MEMP_NUM_API_MSG: the number of concurrently active calls to various - * socket, netconn, and tcpip functions - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_API_MSG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_API_MSG MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API -#endif - -/** MEMP_NUM_DNS_API_MSG: the number of concurrently active calls to netconn_gethostbyname - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_DNS_API_MSG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_DNS_API_MSG MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API -#endif - -/** MEMP_NUM_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA: the number of concurrently active calls - * to getsockopt/setsockopt - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API -#endif - -/** MEMP_NUM_NETIFAPI_MSG: the number of concurrently active calls to the - * netifapi functions - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_NETIFAPI_MSG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_NETIFAPI_MSG MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - --------------------------------- - ---------- ARP options ---------- - --------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_arp ARP - * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_ARP==1: Enable ARP functionality. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ARP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ARP 1 -#endif - -/** - * ARP_TABLE_SIZE: Number of active MAC-IP address pairs cached. - */ -#if !defined ARP_TABLE_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ARP_TABLE_SIZE 10 -#endif - -/** the time an ARP entry stays valid after its last update, - * for ARP_TMR_INTERVAL = 1000, this is - * (60 * 5) seconds = 5 minutes. - */ -#if !defined ARP_MAXAGE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ARP_MAXAGE 300 -#endif - -/** - * ARP_QUEUEING==1: Multiple outgoing packets are queued during hardware address - * resolution. By default, only the most recent packet is queued per IP address. - * This is sufficient for most protocols and mainly reduces TCP connection - * startup time. Set this to 1 if you know your application sends more than one - * packet in a row to an IP address that is not in the ARP cache. - */ -#if !defined ARP_QUEUEING || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ARP_QUEUEING 0 -#endif - -/** The maximum number of packets which may be queued for each - * unresolved address by other network layers. Defaults to 3, 0 means disabled. - * Old packets are dropped, new packets are queued. - */ -#if !defined ARP_QUEUE_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ARP_QUEUE_LEN 3 -#endif - -/** - * ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN==1: support receiving and sending ethernet packets with - * VLAN header. See the description of LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK and - * LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET hooks to check/set VLAN headers. - * Additionally, you can define ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK to an u16_t VLAN ID to check. - * If ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK is defined, only VLAN-traffic for this VLAN is accepted. - * If ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK is not defined, all traffic is accepted. - * Alternatively, define a function/define ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN(eth_hdr, vlan) - * that returns 1 to accept a packet or 0 to drop a packet. - */ -#if !defined ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN 0 -#endif - -/** LWIP_ETHERNET==1: enable ethernet support even though ARP might be disabled - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ETHERNET || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ETHERNET LWIP_ARP -#endif - -/** ETH_PAD_SIZE: number of bytes added before the ethernet header to ensure - * alignment of payload after that header. Since the header is 14 bytes long, - * without this padding e.g. addresses in the IP header will not be aligned - * on a 32-bit boundary, so setting this to 2 can speed up 32-bit-platforms. - */ -#if !defined ETH_PAD_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ETH_PAD_SIZE 0 -#endif - -/** ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES==1: enable code to support static ARP table - * entries (using etharp_add_static_entry/etharp_remove_static_entry). - */ -#if !defined ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES 0 -#endif - -/** ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF==1: Match netif for ARP table entries. - * If disabled, duplicate IP address on multiple netifs are not supported - * (but this should only occur for AutoIP). - */ -#if !defined ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - -------------------------------- - ---------- IP options ---------- - -------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_ipv4 IPv4 - * @ingroup lwip_opts - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_IPV4==1: Enable IPv4 - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV4 || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV4 1 -#endif - -/** - * IP_FORWARD==1: Enables the ability to forward IP packets across network - * interfaces. If you are going to run lwIP on a device with only one network - * interface, define this to 0. - */ -#if !defined IP_FORWARD || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_FORWARD 0 -#endif - -/** - * IP_REASSEMBLY==1: Reassemble incoming fragmented IP packets. Note that - * this option does not affect outgoing packet sizes, which can be controlled - * via IP_FRAG. - */ -#if !defined IP_REASSEMBLY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_REASSEMBLY 1 -#endif - -/** - * IP_FRAG==1: Fragment outgoing IP packets if their size exceeds MTU. Note - * that this option does not affect incoming packet sizes, which can be - * controlled via IP_REASSEMBLY. - */ -#if !defined IP_FRAG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_FRAG 1 -#endif - -#if !LWIP_IPV4 -/* disable IPv4 extensions when IPv4 is disabled */ -#undef IP_FORWARD -#define IP_FORWARD 0 -#undef IP_REASSEMBLY -#define IP_REASSEMBLY 0 -#undef IP_FRAG -#define IP_FRAG 0 -#endif /* !LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/** - * IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED: Defines the behavior for IP options. - * IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED==0: All packets with IP options are dropped. - * IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED==1: IP options are allowed (but not parsed). - */ -#if !defined IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED 1 -#endif - -/** - * IP_REASS_MAXAGE: Maximum time (in multiples of IP_TMR_INTERVAL - so seconds, normally) - * a fragmented IP packet waits for all fragments to arrive. If not all fragments arrived - * in this time, the whole packet is discarded. - */ -#if !defined IP_REASS_MAXAGE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_REASS_MAXAGE 15 -#endif - -/** - * IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS: Total maximum amount of pbufs waiting to be reassembled. - * Since the received pbufs are enqueued, be sure to configure - * PBUF_POOL_SIZE > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS so that the stack is still able to receive - * packets even if the maximum amount of fragments is enqueued for reassembly! - * When IPv4 *and* IPv6 are enabled, this even changes to - * (PBUF_POOL_SIZE > 2 * IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS)! - */ -#if !defined IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS 10 -#endif - -/** - * IP_DEFAULT_TTL: Default value for Time-To-Live used by transport layers. - */ -#if !defined IP_DEFAULT_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_DEFAULT_TTL 255 -#endif - -/** - * IP_SOF_BROADCAST=1: Use the SOF_BROADCAST field to enable broadcast - * filter per pcb on udp and raw send operations. To enable broadcast filter - * on recv operations, you also have to set IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV=1. - */ -#if !defined IP_SOF_BROADCAST || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_SOF_BROADCAST 0 -#endif - -/** - * IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV (requires IP_SOF_BROADCAST=1) enable the broadcast - * filter on recv operations. - */ -#if !defined IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV 0 -#endif - -/** - * IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF==1: allow ip_forward() to send packets back - * out on the netif where it was received. This should only be used for - * wireless networks. - * ATTENTION: When this is 1, make sure your netif driver correctly marks incoming - * link-layer-broadcast/multicast packets as such using the corresponding pbuf flags! - */ -#if !defined IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ---------------------------------- - ---------- ICMP options ---------- - ---------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_icmp ICMP - * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_ICMP==1: Enable ICMP module inside the IP stack. - * Be careful, disable that make your product non-compliant to RFC1122 - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ICMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ICMP 1 -#endif - -/** - * ICMP_TTL: Default value for Time-To-Live used by ICMP packets. - */ -#if !defined ICMP_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ICMP_TTL IP_DEFAULT_TTL -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_BROADCAST_PING==1: respond to broadcast pings (default is unicast only) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_BROADCAST_PING || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_BROADCAST_PING 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_MULTICAST_PING==1: respond to multicast pings (default is unicast only) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_MULTICAST_PING || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_MULTICAST_PING 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - --------------------------------- - ---------- RAW options ---------- - --------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_raw RAW - * @ingroup lwip_opts_callback - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_RAW==1: Enable application layer to hook into the IP layer itself. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_RAW || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_RAW 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_RAW==1: Enable application layer to hook into the IP layer itself. - */ -#if !defined RAW_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define RAW_TTL IP_DEFAULT_TTL -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ---------------------------------- - ---------- DHCP options ---------- - ---------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_dhcp DHCP - * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_DHCP==1: Enable DHCP module. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP 0 -#endif -#if !LWIP_IPV4 -/* disable DHCP when IPv4 is disabled */ -#undef LWIP_DHCP -#define LWIP_DHCP 0 -#endif /* !LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/** - * DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK==1: Do an ARP check on the offered address. - */ -#if !defined DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK (LWIP_DHCP && LWIP_ARP) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE==1: Store offered_si_addr and boot_file_name. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_DHCP_GETS_NTP==1: Request NTP servers with discover/select. For each - * response packet, an callback is called, which has to be provided by the port: - * void dhcp_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num_ntp_servers, ip_addr_t* ntp_server_addrs); -*/ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV 0 -#endif - -/** - * The maximum of NTP servers requested - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS > 0: Request DNS servers with discover/select. - * DNS servers received in the response are passed to DNS via @ref dns_setserver() - * (up to the maximum limit defined here). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS DNS_MAX_SERVERS -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------ - ---------- AUTOIP options ---------- - ------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_autoip AUTOIP - * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_AUTOIP==1: Enable AUTOIP module. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_AUTOIP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_AUTOIP 0 -#endif -#if !LWIP_IPV4 -/* disable AUTOIP when IPv4 is disabled */ -#undef LWIP_AUTOIP -#define LWIP_AUTOIP 0 -#endif /* !LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/** - * LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP==1: Allow DHCP and AUTOIP to be both enabled on - * the same interface at the same time. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_TRIES: Set to the number of DHCP DISCOVER probes - * that should be sent before falling back on AUTOIP (the DHCP client keeps - * running in this case). This can be set as low as 1 to get an AutoIP address - * very quickly, but you should be prepared to handle a changing IP address - * when DHCP overrides AutoIP. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_TRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_TRIES 9 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ---------------------------------- - ----- SNMP MIB2 support ----- - ---------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_mib2 SNMP MIB2 callbacks - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS==1: Turn on SNMP MIB2 callbacks. - * Turn this on to get callbacks needed to implement MIB2. - * Usually MIB2_STATS should be enabled, too. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ---------------------------------- - -------- Multicast options ------- - ---------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_multicast Multicast - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS==1: Enable multicast TX support like the socket options - * IP_MULTICAST_TTL/IP_MULTICAST_IF/IP_MULTICAST_LOOP, as well as (currently only) - * core support for the corresponding IPv6 options. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS ((LWIP_IGMP || LWIP_IPV6_MLD) && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW)) -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ---------------------------------- - ---------- IGMP options ---------- - ---------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_igmp IGMP - * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_IGMP==1: Turn on IGMP module. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IGMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IGMP 0 -#endif -#if !LWIP_IPV4 -#undef LWIP_IGMP -#define LWIP_IGMP 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ---------------------------------- - ---------- DNS options ----------- - ---------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_dns DNS - * @ingroup lwip_opts_callback - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_DNS==1: Turn on DNS module. UDP must be available for DNS - * transport. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DNS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DNS 0 -#endif - -/** DNS maximum number of entries to maintain locally. */ -#if !defined DNS_TABLE_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DNS_TABLE_SIZE 4 -#endif - -/** DNS maximum host name length supported in the name table. */ -#if !defined DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH 256 -#endif - -/** The maximum of DNS servers - * The first server can be initialized automatically by defining - * DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS(ipaddr), where 'ipaddr' is an 'ip_addr_t*' - */ -#if !defined DNS_MAX_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DNS_MAX_SERVERS 2 -#endif - -/** DNS maximum number of retries when asking for a name, before "timeout". */ -#if !defined DNS_MAX_RETRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DNS_MAX_RETRIES 4 -#endif - -/** DNS do a name checking between the query and the response. */ -#if !defined DNS_DOES_NAME_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DNS_DOES_NAME_CHECK 1 -#endif - -/** LWIP_DNS_SECURE: controls the security level of the DNS implementation - * Use all DNS security features by default. - * This is overridable but should only be needed by very small targets - * or when using against non standard DNS servers. */ -#if !defined LWIP_DNS_SECURE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DNS_SECURE (LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_XID | LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING | LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) -#endif - -/* A list of DNS security features follows */ -#define LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_XID 1 -#define LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING 2 -#define LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT 4 - -/** DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST: Implements a local host-to-address list. If enabled, you have to define an initializer: - * \#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT {DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_ELEM("host_ip4", IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(1,2,3,4)), \ - * DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_ELEM("host_ip6", IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(123, 234, 345, 456)} - * - * Instead, you can also use an external function: - * \#define DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN(x) extern err_t my_lookup_function(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype) - * that looks up the IP address and returns ERR_OK if found (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_xxx is passed in dns_addrtype). - */ -#if !defined DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST 0 -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ - -/** If this is turned on, the local host-list can be dynamically changed - * at runtime. */ -#if !defined DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC 0 -#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ - -/** Set this to 1 to enable querying ".local" names via mDNS - * using a One-Shot Multicast DNS Query */ -#if !defined LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - --------------------------------- - ---------- UDP options ---------- - --------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_udp UDP - * @ingroup lwip_opts_callback - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_UDP==1: Turn on UDP. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_UDP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_UDP 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_UDPLITE==1: Turn on UDP-Lite. (Requires LWIP_UDP) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_UDPLITE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_UDPLITE 0 -#endif - -/** - * UDP_TTL: Default Time-To-Live value. - */ -#if !defined UDP_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define UDP_TTL IP_DEFAULT_TTL -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO==1: append destination addr and port to every netbuf. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - --------------------------------- - ---------- TCP options ---------- - --------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_tcp TCP - * @ingroup lwip_opts_callback - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_TCP==1: Turn on TCP. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCP 1 -#endif - -/** - * TCP_TTL: Default Time-To-Live value. - */ -#if !defined TCP_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_TTL IP_DEFAULT_TTL -#endif - -/** - * TCP_WND: The size of a TCP window. This must be at least - * (2 * TCP_MSS) for things to work well. - * ATTENTION: when using TCP_RCV_SCALE, TCP_WND is the total size - * with scaling applied. Maximum window value in the TCP header - * will be TCP_WND >> TCP_RCV_SCALE - */ -#if !defined TCP_WND || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_WND (4 * TCP_MSS) -#endif - -/** - * TCP_MAXRTX: Maximum number of retransmissions of data segments. - */ -#if !defined TCP_MAXRTX || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_MAXRTX 12 -#endif - -/** - * TCP_SYNMAXRTX: Maximum number of retransmissions of SYN segments. - */ -#if !defined TCP_SYNMAXRTX || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_SYNMAXRTX 6 -#endif - -/** - * TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1: TCP will queue segments that arrive out of order. - * Define to 0 if your device is low on memory. - */ -#if !defined TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ LWIP_TCP -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT==1: TCP will support sending selective acknowledgements (SACKs). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM: The maximum number of SACK values to include in TCP segments. - * Must be at least 1, but is only used if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT is enabled. - * NOTE: Even though we never send more than 3 or 4 SACK ranges in a single segment - * (depending on other options), setting this option to values greater than 4 is not pointless. - * This is basically the max number of SACK ranges we want to keep track of. - * As new data is delivered, some of the SACK ranges may be removed or merged. - * In that case some of those older SACK ranges may be used again. - * The amount of memory used to store SACK ranges is LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM * 8 bytes for each TCP PCB. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM 4 -#endif - -/** - * TCP_MSS: TCP Maximum segment size. (default is 536, a conservative default, - * you might want to increase this.) - * For the receive side, this MSS is advertised to the remote side - * when opening a connection. For the transmit size, this MSS sets - * an upper limit on the MSS advertised by the remote host. - */ -#if !defined TCP_MSS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_MSS 536 -#endif - -/** - * TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS: "The maximum size of a segment that TCP really - * sends, the 'effective send MSS,' MUST be the smaller of the send MSS (which - * reflects the available reassembly buffer size at the remote host) and the - * largest size permitted by the IP layer" (RFC 1122) - * Setting this to 1 enables code that checks TCP_MSS against the MTU of the - * netif used for a connection and limits the MSS if it would be too big otherwise. - */ -#if !defined TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS 1 -#endif - -/** - * TCP_SND_BUF: TCP sender buffer space (bytes). - * To achieve good performance, this should be at least 2 * TCP_MSS. - */ -#if !defined TCP_SND_BUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_SND_BUF (2 * TCP_MSS) -#endif - -/** - * TCP_SND_QUEUELEN: TCP sender buffer space (pbufs). This must be at least - * as much as (2 * TCP_SND_BUF/TCP_MSS) for things to work. - */ -#if !defined TCP_SND_QUEUELEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_SND_QUEUELEN ((4 * (TCP_SND_BUF) + (TCP_MSS - 1)) / (TCP_MSS)) -#endif - -/** - * TCP_SNDLOWAT: TCP writable space (bytes). This must be less than - * TCP_SND_BUF. It is the amount of space which must be available in the - * TCP snd_buf for select to return writable (combined with TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT). - */ -#if !defined TCP_SNDLOWAT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_SNDLOWAT LWIP_MIN(LWIP_MAX(((TCP_SND_BUF) / 2), (2 * TCP_MSS) + 1), (TCP_SND_BUF)-1) -#endif - -/** - * TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT: TCP writable bufs (pbuf count). This must be less - * than TCP_SND_QUEUELEN. If the number of pbufs queued on a pcb drops below - * this number, select returns writable (combined with TCP_SNDLOWAT). - */ -#if !defined TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT LWIP_MAX(((TCP_SND_QUEUELEN) / 2), 5) -#endif - -/** - * TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES: The default maximum number of bytes queued on ooseq per - * pcb if TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT is not defined. Default is 0 (no limit). - * Only valid for TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1. - */ -#if !defined TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES 0 -#endif - -/** - * TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT(pcb): Return the maximum number of bytes to be queued - * on ooseq per pcb, given the pcb. Only valid for TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1 && - * TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES==1. - * Use this to override TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES to a dynamic value per pcb. - */ -#if !defined TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT -#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES -#define TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT(pcb) TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES -#elif defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT(pcb) -#endif -#endif - -/** - * TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS: The default maximum number of pbufs queued on ooseq per - * pcb if TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT is not defined. Default is 0 (no limit). - * Only valid for TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1. - */ -#if !defined TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS 0 -#endif - -/** - * TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT(pcb): Return the maximum number of pbufs to be queued - * on ooseq per pcb, given the pcb. Only valid for TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1 && - * TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS==1. - * Use this to override TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS to a dynamic value per pcb. - */ -#if !defined TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT -#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS -#define TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT(pcb) TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS -#elif defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT(pcb) -#endif -#endif - -/** - * TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG: Enable the backlog option for tcp listen pcb. - */ -#if !defined TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG 0 -#endif - -/** - * The maximum allowed backlog for TCP listen netconns. - * This backlog is used unless another is explicitly specified. - * 0xff is the maximum (u8_t). - */ -#if !defined TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG 0xff -#endif - -/** - * TCP_OVERSIZE: The maximum number of bytes that tcp_write may - * allocate ahead of time in an attempt to create shorter pbuf chains - * for transmission. The meaningful range is 0 to TCP_MSS. Some - * suggested values are: - * - * 0: Disable oversized allocation. Each tcp_write() allocates a new - pbuf (old behaviour). - * 1: Allocate size-aligned pbufs with minimal excess. Use this if your - * scatter-gather DMA requires aligned fragments. - * 128: Limit the pbuf/memory overhead to 20%. - * TCP_MSS: Try to create unfragmented TCP packets. - * TCP_MSS/4: Try to create 4 fragments or less per TCP packet. - */ -#if !defined TCP_OVERSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_OVERSIZE TCP_MSS -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS==1: support the TCP timestamp option. - * The timestamp option is currently only used to help remote hosts, it is not - * really used locally. Therefore, it is only enabled when a TS option is - * received in the initial SYN packet from a remote host. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS 0 -#endif - -/** - * TCP_WND_UPDATE_THRESHOLD: difference in window to trigger an - * explicit window update - */ -#if !defined TCP_WND_UPDATE_THRESHOLD || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_WND_UPDATE_THRESHOLD LWIP_MIN((TCP_WND / 4), (TCP_MSS * 4)) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_EVENT_API and LWIP_CALLBACK_API: Only one of these should be set to 1. - * LWIP_EVENT_API==1: The user defines lwip_tcp_event() to receive all - * events (accept, sent, etc) that happen in the system. - * LWIP_CALLBACK_API==1: The PCB callback function is called directly - * for the event. This is the default. - */ -#if !defined(LWIP_EVENT_API) && !defined(LWIP_CALLBACK_API) || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_EVENT_API 0 -#define LWIP_CALLBACK_API 1 -#else -#ifndef LWIP_EVENT_API -#define LWIP_EVENT_API 0 -#endif -#ifndef LWIP_CALLBACK_API -#define LWIP_CALLBACK_API 0 -#endif -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_WND_SCALE and TCP_RCV_SCALE: - * Set LWIP_WND_SCALE to 1 to enable window scaling. - * Set TCP_RCV_SCALE to the desired scaling factor (shift count in the - * range of [0..14]). - * When LWIP_WND_SCALE is enabled but TCP_RCV_SCALE is 0, we can use a large - * send window while having a small receive window only. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_WND_SCALE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_WND_SCALE 0 -#define TCP_RCV_SCALE 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS: - * When this is > 0, every tcp pcb (including listen pcb) includes a number of - * additional argument entries in an array (see tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS 0 -#endif - -/** LWIP_ALTCP==1: enable the altcp API. - * altcp is an abstraction layer that prevents applications linking against the - * tcp.h functions but provides the same functionality. It is used to e.g. add - * SSL/TLS or proxy-connect support to an application written for the tcp callback - * API without that application knowing the protocol details. - * - * With LWIP_ALTCP==0, applications written against the altcp API can still be - * compiled but are directly linked against the tcp.h callback API and then - * cannot use layered protocols. - * - * See @ref altcp_api - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ALTCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ALTCP 0 -#endif - -/** LWIP_ALTCP_TLS==1: enable TLS support for altcp API. - * This needs a port of the functions in altcp_tls.h to a TLS library. - * A port to ARM mbedtls is provided with lwIP, see apps/altcp_tls/ directory - * and LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS option. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ALTCP_TLS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ALTCP_TLS 0 -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ---------------------------------- - ---------- Pbuf options ---------- - ---------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_pbuf PBUF - * @ingroup lwip_opts - * @{ - */ -/** - * PBUF_LINK_HLEN: the number of bytes that should be allocated for a - * link level header. The default is 14, the standard value for - * Ethernet. - */ -#if !defined PBUF_LINK_HLEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#if defined LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET && !defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define PBUF_LINK_HLEN (18 + ETH_PAD_SIZE) -#else /* LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET */ -#define PBUF_LINK_HLEN (14 + ETH_PAD_SIZE) -#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET */ -#endif - -/** - * PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN: the number of bytes that should be allocated - * for an additional encapsulation header before ethernet headers (e.g. 802.11) - */ -#if !defined PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN 0 -#endif - -/** - * PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE: the size of each pbuf in the pbuf pool. The default is - * designed to accommodate single full size TCP frame in one pbuf, including - * TCP_MSS, IP header, and link header. - */ -#if !defined PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(TCP_MSS + 40 + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_PBUF_REF_T: Refcount type in pbuf. - * Default width of u8_t can be increased if 255 refs are not enough for you. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_PBUF_REF_T || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_PBUF_REF_T u8_t -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------------------ - ---------- Network Interfaces options ---------- - ------------------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_netif NETIF - * @ingroup lwip_opts - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF==1: use a single netif only. This is the common case for - * small real-life targets. Some code like routing etc. can be left out. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME==1: use DHCP_OPTION_HOSTNAME with netif's hostname - * field. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_API==1: Support netif api (in netifapi.c) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_API || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_API 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK==1: Support a callback function whenever an interface - * changes its up/down status (i.e., due to DHCP IP acquisition) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK==1: Support an extended callback function - * for several netif related event that supports multiple subscribers. - * @see netif_ext_status_callback - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK==1: Support a callback function from an interface - * whenever the link changes (i.e., link down) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK==1: Support a callback function that is called - * when a netif has been removed - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT==1: Cache link-layer-address hints (e.g. table - * indices) in struct netif. TCP and UDP can make use of this to prevent - * scanning the ARP table for every sent packet. While this is faster for big - * ARP tables or many concurrent connections, it might be counterproductive - * if you have a tiny ARP table or if there never are concurrent connections. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF: if this is set to 1, lwIP *tries* to put all data - * to be sent into one single pbuf. This is for compatibility with DMA-enabled - * MACs that do not support scatter-gather. - * Beware that this might involve CPU-memcpy before transmitting that would not - * be needed without this flag! Use this only if you need to! - * - * ATTENTION: a driver should *NOT* rely on getting single pbufs but check TX - * pbufs for being in one piece. If not, @ref pbuf_clone can be used to get - * a single pbuf: - * if (p->next != NULL) { - * struct pbuf *q = pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_RAM, p); - * if (q == NULL) { - * return ERR_MEM; - * } - * p = q; ATTENTION: do NOT free the old 'p' as the ref belongs to the caller! - * } - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF 0 -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ - -/** - * LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA: Number of clients that may store - * data in client_data member array of struct netif (max. 256). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------ - ---------- LOOPIF options ---------- - ------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_loop Loopback interface - * @ingroup lwip_opts_netif - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF==1: Support loop interface (127.0.0.1). - * This is only needed when no real netifs are available. If at least one other - * netif is available, loopback traffic uses this netif. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF (LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTICAST==1: Support multicast/IGMP on loop interface (127.0.0.1). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTICAST || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTICAST 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK==1: Support sending packets with a destination IP - * address equal to the netif IP address, looping them back up the stack. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS: Maximum number of pbufs on queue for loopback - * sending for each netif (0 = disabled) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING: Indicates whether threading is enabled in - * the system, as netifs must change how they behave depending on this setting - * for the LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK option to work. - * Setting this is needed to avoid reentering non-reentrant functions like - * tcp_input(). - * LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING==1: Indicates that the user is using a - * multithreaded environment like tcpip.c. In this case, netif->input() - * is called directly. - * LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING==0: Indicates a polling (or NO_SYS) setup. - * The packets are put on a list and netif_poll() must be called in - * the main application loop. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING (!NO_SYS) -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------ - ---------- Thread options ---------- - ------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_thread Threading - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * TCPIP_THREAD_NAME: The name assigned to the main tcpip thread. - */ -#if !defined TCPIP_THREAD_NAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCPIP_THREAD_NAME "tcpip_thread" -#endif - -/** - * TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE: The stack size used by the main tcpip thread. - * The stack size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to - * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. - */ -#if !defined TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE 0 -#endif - -/** - * TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO: The priority assigned to the main tcpip thread. - * The priority value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to - * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. - */ -#if !defined TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO 1 -#endif - -/** - * TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the tcpip thread messages - * The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to - * sys_mbox_new() when tcpip_init is called. - */ -#if !defined TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE 0 -#endif - -/** - * Define this to something that triggers a watchdog. This is called from - * tcpip_thread after processing a message. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCPIP_THREAD_ALIVE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCPIP_THREAD_ALIVE() -#endif - -/** - * SLIPIF_THREAD_NAME: The name assigned to the slipif_loop thread. - */ -#if !defined SLIPIF_THREAD_NAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SLIPIF_THREAD_NAME "slipif_loop" -#endif - -/** - * SLIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE: The stack size used by the slipif_loop thread. - * The stack size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to - * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. - */ -#if !defined SLIPIF_THREAD_STACKSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SLIPIF_THREAD_STACKSIZE 0 -#endif - -/** - * SLIPIF_THREAD_PRIO: The priority assigned to the slipif_loop thread. - * The priority value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to - * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. - */ -#if !defined SLIPIF_THREAD_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SLIPIF_THREAD_PRIO 1 -#endif - -/** - * DEFAULT_THREAD_NAME: The name assigned to any other lwIP thread. - */ -#if !defined DEFAULT_THREAD_NAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DEFAULT_THREAD_NAME "lwIP" -#endif - -/** - * DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE: The stack size used by any other lwIP thread. - * The stack size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to - * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. - */ -#if !defined DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE 0 -#endif - -/** - * DEFAULT_THREAD_PRIO: The priority assigned to any other lwIP thread. - * The priority value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to - * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. - */ -#if !defined DEFAULT_THREAD_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DEFAULT_THREAD_PRIO 1 -#endif - -/** - * DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the incoming packets on a - * NETCONN_RAW. The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed - * to sys_mbox_new() when the recvmbox is created. - */ -#if !defined DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE 0 -#endif - -/** - * DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the incoming packets on a - * NETCONN_UDP. The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed - * to sys_mbox_new() when the recvmbox is created. - */ -#if !defined DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 0 -#endif - -/** - * DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the incoming packets on a - * NETCONN_TCP. The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed - * to sys_mbox_new() when the recvmbox is created. - */ -#if !defined DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 0 -#endif - -/** - * DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the incoming connections. - * The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to - * sys_mbox_new() when the acceptmbox is created. - */ -#if !defined DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ---------------------------------------------- - ---------- Sequential layer options ---------- - ---------------------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_netconn Netconn - * @ingroup lwip_opts_threadsafe_apis - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_NETCONN==1: Enable Netconn API (require to use api_lib.c) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETCONN || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETCONN 1 -#endif - -/** LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT==1: Enable tcpip_timeout/tcpip_untimeout to create - * timers running in tcpip_thread from another thread. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT 0 -#endif - -/** LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: Use one (thread-local) semaphore per - * thread calling socket/netconn functions instead of allocating one - * semaphore per netconn (and per select etc.) - * ATTENTION: a thread-local semaphore for API calls is needed: - * - LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET() returning a sys_sem_t* - * - LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_ALLOC() creating the semaphore - * - LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_FREE() freeing the semaphore - * The latter 2 can be invoked up by calling netconn_thread_init()/netconn_thread_cleanup(). - * Ports may call these for threads created with sys_thread_new(). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD 0 -#endif - -/** LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX==1: Enable code that allows reading from one thread, - * writing from a 2nd thread and closing from a 3rd thread at the same time. - * ATTENTION: This is currently really alpha! Some requirements: - * - LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1 is required to use one socket/netconn from - * multiple threads at once - * - sys_mbox_free() has to unblock receive tasks waiting on recvmbox/acceptmbox - * and prevent a task pending on this during/after deletion - */ -#if !defined LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ------------------------------------ - ---------- Socket options ---------- - ------------------------------------ -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_socket Sockets - * @ingroup lwip_opts_threadsafe_apis - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_SOCKET==1: Enable Socket API (require to use sockets.c) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SOCKET || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SOCKET 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS==1: Enable BSD-style sockets functions names through defines. - * LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS==2: Same as ==1 but correctly named functions are created. - * While this helps code completion, it might conflict with existing libraries. - * (only used if you use sockets.c) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES==1: Enable POSIX-style sockets functions names. - * Disable this option if you use a POSIX operating system that uses the same - * names (read, write & close). (only used if you use sockets.c) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET==n: Increases the file descriptor number created by LwIP with n. - * This can be useful when there are multiple APIs which create file descriptors. - * When they all start with a different offset and you won't make them overlap you can - * re implement read/write/close/ioctl/fnctl to send the requested action to the right - * library (sharing select will need more work though). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE==1: Enable TCP_KEEPIDLE, TCP_KEEPINTVL and TCP_KEEPCNT - * options processing. Note that TCP_KEEPIDLE and TCP_KEEPINTVL have to be set - * in seconds. (does not require sockets.c, and will affect tcp.c) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO==1: Enable send timeout for sockets/netconns and - * SO_SNDTIMEO processing. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO==1: Enable receive timeout for sockets/netconns and - * SO_RCVTIMEO processing. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD==1: SO_RCVTIMEO/SO_SNDTIMEO take an int - * (milliseconds, much like winsock does) instead of a struct timeval (default). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_SO_RCVBUF==1: Enable SO_RCVBUF processing. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SO_RCVBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SO_RCVBUF 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_SO_LINGER==1: Enable SO_LINGER processing. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SO_LINGER || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SO_LINGER 0 -#endif - -/** - * If LWIP_SO_RCVBUF is used, this is the default value for recv_bufsize. - */ -#if !defined RECV_BUFSIZE_DEFAULT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define RECV_BUFSIZE_DEFAULT INT_MAX -#endif - -/** - * By default, TCP socket/netconn close waits 20 seconds max to send the FIN - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT 20000 -#endif - -/** - * SO_REUSE==1: Enable SO_REUSEADDR option. - */ -#if !defined SO_REUSE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SO_REUSE 0 -#endif - -/** - * SO_REUSE_RXTOALL==1: Pass a copy of incoming broadcast/multicast packets - * to all local matches if SO_REUSEADDR is turned on. - * WARNING: Adds a memcpy for every packet if passing to more than one pcb! - */ -#if !defined SO_REUSE_RXTOALL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SO_REUSE_RXTOALL 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE==0 (default): ioctl/FIONREAD returns the amount of - * pending data in the network buffer. This is the way windows does it. It's - * the default for lwIP since it is smaller. - * LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE==1: ioctl/FIONREAD returns the size of the next - * pending datagram in bytes. This is the way linux does it. This code is only - * here for compatibility. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT==1 (default): enable select() for sockets (uses a netconn - * callback to keep track of events). - * This saves RAM (counters per socket) and code (netconn event callback), which - * should improve performance a bit). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_SOCKET_POLL==1 (default): enable poll() for sockets (including - * struct pollfd, nfds_t, and constants) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_SOCKET_POLL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_SOCKET_POLL 1 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - ---------------------------------------- - ---------- Statistics options ---------- - ---------------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_stats Statistics - * @ingroup lwip_opts_debug - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_STATS==1: Enable statistics collection in lwip_stats. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_STATS 1 -#endif - -#if LWIP_STATS - -/** - * LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY==1: Compile in the statistics output functions. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY 0 -#endif - -/** - * LINK_STATS==1: Enable link stats. - */ -#if !defined LINK_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LINK_STATS 1 -#endif - -/** - * ETHARP_STATS==1: Enable etharp stats. - */ -#if !defined ETHARP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ETHARP_STATS (LWIP_ARP) -#endif - -/** - * IP_STATS==1: Enable IP stats. - */ -#if !defined IP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_STATS 1 -#endif - -/** - * IPFRAG_STATS==1: Enable IP fragmentation stats. Default is - * on if using either frag or reass. - */ -#if !defined IPFRAG_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IPFRAG_STATS (IP_REASSEMBLY || IP_FRAG) -#endif - -/** - * ICMP_STATS==1: Enable ICMP stats. - */ -#if !defined ICMP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ICMP_STATS 1 -#endif - -/** - * IGMP_STATS==1: Enable IGMP stats. - */ -#if !defined IGMP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IGMP_STATS (LWIP_IGMP) -#endif - -/** - * UDP_STATS==1: Enable UDP stats. Default is on if - * UDP enabled, otherwise off. - */ -#if !defined UDP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define UDP_STATS (LWIP_UDP) -#endif - -/** - * TCP_STATS==1: Enable TCP stats. Default is on if TCP - * enabled, otherwise off. - */ -#if !defined TCP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_STATS (LWIP_TCP) -#endif - -/** - * MEM_STATS==1: Enable mem.c stats. - */ -#if !defined MEM_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEM_STATS ((MEM_LIBC_MALLOC == 0) && (MEM_USE_POOLS == 0)) -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_STATS==1: Enable memp.c pool stats. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_STATS (MEMP_MEM_MALLOC == 0) -#endif - -/** - * SYS_STATS==1: Enable system stats (sem and mbox counts, etc). - */ -#if !defined SYS_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SYS_STATS (NO_SYS == 0) -#endif - -/** - * IP6_STATS==1: Enable IPv6 stats. - */ -#if !defined IP6_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP6_STATS (LWIP_IPV6) -#endif - -/** - * ICMP6_STATS==1: Enable ICMP for IPv6 stats. - */ -#if !defined ICMP6_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ICMP6_STATS (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6) -#endif - -/** - * IP6_FRAG_STATS==1: Enable IPv6 fragmentation stats. - */ -#if !defined IP6_FRAG_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP6_FRAG_STATS (LWIP_IPV6 && (LWIP_IPV6_FRAG || LWIP_IPV6_REASS)) -#endif - -/** - * MLD6_STATS==1: Enable MLD for IPv6 stats. - */ -#if !defined MLD6_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MLD6_STATS (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) -#endif - -/** - * ND6_STATS==1: Enable Neighbor discovery for IPv6 stats. - */ -#if !defined ND6_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ND6_STATS (LWIP_IPV6) -#endif - -/** - * MIB2_STATS==1: Stats for SNMP MIB2. - */ -#if !defined MIB2_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MIB2_STATS 0 -#endif - -#else - -#define LINK_STATS 0 -#define ETHARP_STATS 0 -#define IP_STATS 0 -#define IPFRAG_STATS 0 -#define ICMP_STATS 0 -#define IGMP_STATS 0 -#define UDP_STATS 0 -#define TCP_STATS 0 -#define MEM_STATS 0 -#define MEMP_STATS 0 -#define SYS_STATS 0 -#define LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY 0 -#define IP6_STATS 0 -#define ICMP6_STATS 0 -#define IP6_FRAG_STATS 0 -#define MLD6_STATS 0 -#define ND6_STATS 0 -#define MIB2_STATS 0 - -#endif /* LWIP_STATS */ -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - -------------------------------------- - ---------- Checksum options ---------- - -------------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_checksum Checksum - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF==1: Checksum generation/check can be enabled/disabled - * per netif. - * ATTENTION: if enabled, the CHECKSUM_GEN_* and CHECKSUM_CHECK_* defines must be enabled! - */ -#if !defined LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF 0 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_GEN_IP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing IP packets. - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_IP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 1 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing UDP packets. - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 1 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing TCP packets. - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 1 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing ICMP packets. - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 1 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing ICMP6 packets. - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 1 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming IP packets. - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 1 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming UDP packets. - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 1 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming TCP packets. - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 1 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming ICMP packets. - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP 1 -#endif - -/** - * CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6==1: Check checksums in software for incoming ICMPv6 packets - */ -#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY==1: Calculate checksum when copying data from - * application buffers to pbufs. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - --------------------------------------- - ---------- IPv6 options --------------- - --------------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_ipv6 IPv6 - * @ingroup lwip_opts - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_IPV6==1: Enable IPv6 - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6 0 -#endif - -/** - * IPV6_REASS_MAXAGE: Maximum time (in multiples of IP6_REASS_TMR_INTERVAL - so seconds, normally) - * a fragmented IP packet waits for all fragments to arrive. If not all fragments arrived - * in this time, the whole packet is discarded. - */ -#if !defined IPV6_REASS_MAXAGE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IPV6_REASS_MAXAGE 60 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES==1: Enable support for IPv6 address scopes, ensuring that - * e.g. link-local addresses are really treated as link-local. Disable this - * setting only for single-interface configurations. - * All addresses that have a scope according to the default policy (link-local - * unicast addresses, interface-local and link-local multicast addresses) should - * now have a zone set on them before being passed to the core API, although - * lwIP will currently attempt to select a zone on the caller's behalf when - * necessary. Applications that directly assign IPv6 addresses to interfaces - * (which is NOT recommended) must now ensure that link-local addresses carry - * the netif's zone. See the new ip6_zone.h header file for more information and - * relevant macros. For now it is still possible to turn off scopes support - * through the new LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES option. When upgrading an implementation that - * uses the core API directly, it is highly recommended to enable - * LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG at least for a while, to ensure e.g. proper address - * initialization. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES (LWIP_IPV6 && !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG==1: Perform run-time checks to verify that addresses - * are properly zoned (see ip6_zone.h on what that means) where it matters. - * Enabling this setting is highly recommended when upgrading from an existing - * installation that is not yet scope-aware; otherwise it may be too expensive. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES: Number of IPv6 addresses per netif. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES 3 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD==1: Forward IPv6 packets across netifs - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_FRAG==1: Fragment outgoing IPv6 packets that are too big. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_FRAG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_FRAG 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_REASS==1: reassemble incoming IPv6 packets that fragmented - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_REASS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_REASS LWIP_IPV6 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT==1: Send router solicitation messages during - * network startup. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG==1: Enable stateless address autoconfiguration as per RFC 4862. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG LWIP_IPV6 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES==1: Keep valid and preferred lifetimes for each - * IPv6 address. Required for LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG. May still be enabled - * otherwise, in which case the application may assign address lifetimes with - * the appropriate macros. Addresses with no lifetime are assumed to be static. - * If this option is disabled, all addresses are assumed to be static. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS=[0..7]: Number of duplicate address detection attempts. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS 1 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_icmp6 ICMP6 - * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv6 - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_ICMP6==1: Enable ICMPv6 (mandatory per RFC) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ICMP6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ICMP6 LWIP_IPV6 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE: bytes from original packet to send back in - * ICMPv6 error messages. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE 8 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ICMP6_HL: default hop limit for ICMPv6 messages - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ICMP6_HL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ICMP6_HL 255 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_mld6 Multicast listener discovery - * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv6 - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_MLD==1: Enable multicast listener discovery protocol. - * If LWIP_IPV6 is enabled but this setting is disabled, the MAC layer must - * indiscriminately pass all inbound IPv6 multicast traffic to lwIP. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_MLD || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_MLD LWIP_IPV6 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_MLD6_GROUP: Max number of IPv6 multicast groups that can be joined. - * There must be enough groups so that each netif can join the solicited-node - * multicast group for each of its local addresses, plus one for MDNS if - * applicable, plus any number of groups to be joined on UDP sockets. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_MLD6_GROUP || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_MLD6_GROUP 4 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_nd6 Neighbor discovery - * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv6 - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING==1: queue outgoing IPv6 packets while MAC address - * is being resolved. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING LWIP_IPV6 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_ND6_QUEUE: Max number of IPv6 packets to queue during MAC resolution. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_NUM_ND6_QUEUE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_NUM_ND6_QUEUE 20 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS: Number of entries in IPv6 neighbor cache - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS 10 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS: number of entries in IPv6 destination cache - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS 10 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES: number of entries in IPv6 on-link prefixes cache - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES 5 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS: number of entries in IPv6 default router cache - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS 3 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT: max number of multicast solicit messages to send - * (neighbor solicit and router solicit) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT 3 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT: max number of unicast neighbor solicitation messages - * to send during neighbor reachability detection. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT 3 -#endif - -/** - * Unused: See ND RFC (time in milliseconds). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_MAX_ANYCAST_DELAY_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_MAX_ANYCAST_DELAY_TIME 1000 -#endif - -/** - * Unused: See ND RFC - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENT || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENT 3 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_REACHABLE_TIME: default neighbor reachable time (in milliseconds). - * May be updated by router advertisement messages. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_REACHABLE_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_REACHABLE_TIME 30000 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_RETRANS_TIMER: default retransmission timer for solicitation messages - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_RETRANS_TIMER || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_RETRANS_TIMER 1000 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME: Delay before first unicast neighbor solicitation - * message is sent, during neighbor reachability detection. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME 5000 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES==1: Allow Router Advertisement messages to update - * Reachable time and retransmission timers, and netif MTU. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS==1: Allow TCP to provide Neighbor Discovery - * with reachability hints for connected destinations. This helps avoid sending - * unicast neighbor solicitation messages. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS > 0: Use IPv6 Router Advertisement Recursive - * DNS Server Option (as per RFC 6106) to copy a defined maximum number of DNS - * servers to the DNS module. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_dhcpv6 DHCPv6 - * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv6 - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6==1: enable DHCPv6 stateful/stateless address autoconfiguration. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL==1: enable DHCPv6 stateful address autoconfiguration. - * (not supported, yet!) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS==1: enable DHCPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration. - */ -#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_DHCP6_GETS_NTP==1: Request NTP servers via DHCPv6. For each - * response packet, a callback is called, which has to be provided by the port: - * void dhcp6_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num_ntp_servers, ip_addr_t* ntp_server_addrs); -*/ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV 0 -#endif - -/** - * The maximum of NTP servers requested - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS 1 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS > 0: Request DNS servers via DHCPv6. - * DNS servers received in the response are passed to DNS via @ref dns_setserver() - * (up to the maximum limit defined here). - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS DNS_MAX_SERVERS -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - --------------------------------------- - ---------- Hook options --------------- - --------------------------------------- -*/ - -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_hooks Hooks - * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure - * Hooks are undefined by default, define them to a function if you need them. - * @{ - */ - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME: Custom filename to \#include in files that provide hooks. - * Declare your hook function prototypes in there, you may also \#include all headers - * providing data types that are need in this file. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME "path/to/my/lwip_hooks.h" -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN: - * Hook for generation of the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) for a new TCP - * connection. The default lwIP ISN generation algorithm is very basic and may - * allow for TCP spoofing attacks. This hook provides the means to implement - * the standardized ISN generation algorithm from RFC 6528 (see contrib/adons/tcp_isn), - * or any other desired algorithm as a replacement. - * Called from tcp_connect() and tcp_listen_input() when an ISN is needed for - * a new TCP connection, if TCP support (@ref LWIP_TCP) is enabled.\n - * Signature:\code{.c} - * u32_t my_hook_tcp_isn(const ip_addr_t* local_ip, u16_t local_port, const ip_addr_t* remote_ip, u16_t remote_port); - * \endcode - * - it may be necessary to use "struct ip_addr" (ip4_addr, ip6_addr) instead of "ip_addr_t" in function declarations\n - * Arguments: - * - local_ip: pointer to the local IP address of the connection - * - local_port: local port number of the connection (host-byte order) - * - remote_ip: pointer to the remote IP address of the connection - * - remote_port: remote port number of the connection (host-byte order)\n - * Return value: - * - the 32-bit Initial Sequence Number to use for the new TCP connection. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN(local_ip, local_port, remote_ip, remote_port) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB: - * Hook for intercepting incoming packets before they are passed to a pcb. This - * allows updating some state or even dropping a packet. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * err_t my_hook_tcp_inpkt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct tcp_hdr *hdr, u16_t optlen, u16_t opt1len, u8_t *opt2, struct pbuf *p); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - pcb: tcp_pcb selected for input of this packet (ATTENTION: this may be - * struct tcp_pcb_listen if pcb->state == LISTEN) - * - hdr: pointer to tcp header (ATTENTION: tcp options may not be in one piece!) - * - optlen: tcp option length - * - opt1len: tcp option length 1st part - * - opt2: if this is != NULL, tcp options are split among 2 pbufs. In that case, - * options start at right after the tcp header ('(u8_t*)(hdr + 1)') for - * the first 'opt1len' bytes and the rest starts at 'opt2'. opt2len can - * be simply calculated: 'opt2len = optlen - opt1len;' - * - p: input packet, p->payload points to application data (that's why tcp hdr - * and options are passed in seperately) - * Return value: - * - ERR_OK: continue input of this packet as normal - * - != ERR_OK: drop this packet for input (don't continue input processing) - * - * ATTENTION: don't call any tcp api functions that might change tcp state (pcb - * state or any pcb lists) from this callback! - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB(pcb, hdr, optlen, opt1len, opt2, p) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH: - * Hook for increasing the size of the options allocated with a tcp header. - * Together with LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS, this can be used to add custom - * options to outgoing tcp segments. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * u8_t my_hook_tcp_out_tcpopt_length(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t internal_option_length); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - pcb: tcp_pcb that transmits (ATTENTION: this may be NULL or - * struct tcp_pcb_listen if pcb->state == LISTEN) - * - internal_option_length: tcp option length used by the stack internally - * Return value: - * - a number of bytes to allocate for tcp options (internal_option_length <= ret <= 40) - * - * ATTENTION: don't call any tcp api functions that might change tcp state (pcb - * state or any pcb lists) from this callback! - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH(pcb, internal_len) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS: - * Hook for adding custom options to outgoing tcp segments. - * Space for these custom options has to be reserved via LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * u32_t *my_hook_tcp_out_add_tcpopts(struct pbuf *p, struct tcp_hdr *hdr, const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t *opts); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - p: output packet, p->payload pointing to tcp header, data follows - * - hdr: tcp header - * - pcb: tcp_pcb that transmits (ATTENTION: this may be NULL or - * struct tcp_pcb_listen if pcb->state == LISTEN) - * - opts: pointer where to add the custom options (there may already be options - * between the header and these) - * Return value: - * - pointer pointing directly after the inserted options - * - * ATTENTION: don't call any tcp api functions that might change tcp state (pcb - * state or any pcb lists) from this callback! - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS(p, hdr, pcb, opts) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_INPUT(pbuf, input_netif): - * Called from ip_input() (IPv4) - * Signature:\code{.c} - * int my_hook(struct pbuf *pbuf, struct netif *input_netif); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - pbuf: received struct pbuf passed to ip_input() - * - input_netif: struct netif on which the packet has been received - * Return values: - * - 0: Hook has not consumed the packet, packet is processed as normal - * - != 0: Hook has consumed the packet. - * If the hook consumed the packet, 'pbuf' is in the responsibility of the hook - * (i.e. free it when done). - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_INPUT(pbuf, input_netif) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE(dest): - * Called from ip_route() (IPv4) - * Signature:\code{.c} - * struct netif *my_hook(const ip4_addr_t *dest); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - dest: destination IPv4 address - * Returns values: - * - the destination netif - * - NULL if no destination netif is found. In that case, ip_route() continues as normal. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE() -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(src, dest): - * Source-based routing for IPv4 - called from ip_route() (IPv4) - * Signature:\code{.c} - * struct netif *my_hook(const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - src: local/source IPv4 address - * - dest: destination IPv4 address - * Returns values: - * - the destination netif - * - NULL if no destination netif is found. In that case, ip_route() continues as normal. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(src, dest) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD(src, dest): - * Check if an IPv4 can be forwarded - called from: - * ip4_input() -> ip4_forward() -> ip4_canforward() (IPv4) - * - source address is available via ip4_current_src_addr() - * - calling an output function in this context (e.g. multicast router) is allowed - * Signature:\code{.c} - * int my_hook(struct pbuf *p, u32_t dest_addr_hostorder); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - p: packet to forward - * - dest: destination IPv4 address - * Returns values: - * - 1: forward - * - 0: don't forward - * - -1: no decision. In that case, ip4_canforward() continues as normal. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD(src, dest) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW(netif, dest): - * Called from etharp_output() (IPv4) - * Signature:\code{.c} - * const ip4_addr_t *my_hook(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *dest); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - netif: the netif used for sending - * - dest: the destination IPv4 address - * Return values: - * - the IPv4 address of the gateway to handle the specified destination IPv4 address - * - NULL, in which case the netif's default gateway is used - * - * The returned address MUST be directly reachable on the specified netif! - * This function is meant to implement advanced IPv4 routing together with - * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE(). The actual routing/gateway table implementation is - * not part of lwIP but can e.g. be hidden in the netif's state argument. -*/ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW(netif, dest) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_IP6_INPUT(pbuf, input_netif): - * Called from ip6_input() (IPv6) - * Signature:\code{.c} - * int my_hook(struct pbuf *pbuf, struct netif *input_netif); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - pbuf: received struct pbuf passed to ip6_input() - * - input_netif: struct netif on which the packet has been received - * Return values: - * - 0: Hook has not consumed the packet, packet is processed as normal - * - != 0: Hook has consumed the packet. - * If the hook consumed the packet, 'pbuf' is in the responsibility of the hook - * (i.e. free it when done). - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_IP6_INPUT(pbuf, input_netif) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE(src, dest): - * Called from ip_route() (IPv6) - * Signature:\code{.c} - * struct netif *my_hook(const ip6_addr_t *dest, const ip6_addr_t *src); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - src: source IPv6 address - * - dest: destination IPv6 address - * Return values: - * - the destination netif - * - NULL if no destination netif is found. In that case, ip6_route() continues as normal. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE(src, dest) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW(netif, dest): - * Called from nd6_get_next_hop_entry() (IPv6) - * Signature:\code{.c} - * const ip6_addr_t *my_hook(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - netif: the netif used for sending - * - dest: the destination IPv6 address - * Return values: - * - the IPv6 address of the next hop to handle the specified destination IPv6 address - * - NULL, in which case a NDP-discovered router is used instead - * - * The returned address MUST be directly reachable on the specified netif! - * This function is meant to implement advanced IPv6 routing together with - * LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE(). The actual routing/gateway table implementation is - * not part of lwIP but can e.g. be hidden in the netif's state argument. -*/ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW(netif, dest) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK(netif, eth_hdr, vlan_hdr): - * Called from ethernet_input() if VLAN support is enabled - * Signature:\code{.c} - * int my_hook(struct netif *netif, struct eth_hdr *eth_hdr, struct eth_vlan_hdr *vlan_hdr); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - netif: struct netif on which the packet has been received - * - eth_hdr: struct eth_hdr of the packet - * - vlan_hdr: struct eth_vlan_hdr of the packet - * Return values: - * - 0: Packet must be dropped. - * - != 0: Packet must be accepted. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK(netif, eth_hdr, vlan_hdr) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET: - * Hook can be used to set prio_vid field of vlan_hdr. If you need to store data - * on per-netif basis to implement this callback, see @ref netif_cd. - * Called from ethernet_output() if VLAN support (@ref ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN) is enabled.\n - * Signature:\code{.c} - * s32_t my_hook_vlan_set(struct netif* netif, struct pbuf* pbuf, const struct eth_addr* src, const struct eth_addr* dst, u16_t eth_type);\n - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - netif: struct netif that the packet will be sent through - * - p: struct pbuf packet to be sent - * - src: source eth address - * - dst: destination eth address - * - eth_type: ethernet type to packet to be sent\n - * - * - * Return values: - * - <0: Packet shall not contain VLAN header. - * - 0 <= return value <= 0xFFFF: Packet shall contain VLAN header. Return value is prio_vid in host byte order. - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET(netif, p, src, dst, eth_type) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE(memp_t_type): - * Called from memp_free() when a memp pool was empty and an item is now available - * Signature:\code{.c} - * void my_hook(memp_t type); - * \endcode - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE(memp_t_type) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL(pbuf, netif): - * Called from ethernet_input() when an unknown eth type is encountered. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * err_t my_hook(struct pbuf* pbuf, struct netif* netif); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - p: rx packet with unknown eth type - * - netif: netif on which the packet has been received - * Return values: - * - ERR_OK if packet is accepted (hook function now owns the pbuf) - * - any error code otherwise (pbuf is freed) - * - * Payload points to ethernet header! - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL(pbuf, netif) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr): - * Called from various dhcp functions when sending a DHCP message. - * This hook is called just before the DHCP message trailer is added, so the - * options are at the end of a DHCP message. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * void my_hook(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t state, struct dhcp_msg *msg, - * u8_t msg_type, u16_t *options_len_ptr); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - netif: struct netif that the packet will be sent through - * - dhcp: struct dhcp on that netif - * - state: current dhcp state (dhcp_state_enum_t as an u8_t) - * - msg: struct dhcp_msg that will be sent - * - msg_type: dhcp message type to be sent (u8_t) - * - options_len_ptr: pointer to the current length of options in the dhcp_msg "msg" - * (must be increased when options are added!) - * - * Options need to appended like this: - * LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp option overflow", *options_len_ptr + option_len + 2 <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); - * msg->options[(*options_len_ptr)++] = <option_number>; - * msg->options[(*options_len_ptr)++] = <option_len>; - * msg->options[(*options_len_ptr)++] = <option_bytes>; - * [...] - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, option, len, pbuf, option_value_offset): - * Called from dhcp_parse_reply when receiving a DHCP message. - * This hook is called for every option in the received message that is not handled internally. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * void my_hook(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t state, struct dhcp_msg *msg, - * u8_t msg_type, u8_t option, u8_t option_len, struct pbuf *pbuf, u16_t option_value_offset); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - netif: struct netif that the packet will be sent through - * - dhcp: struct dhcp on that netif - * - state: current dhcp state (dhcp_state_enum_t as an u8_t) - * - msg: struct dhcp_msg that was received - * - msg_type: dhcp message type received (u8_t, ATTENTION: only valid after - * the message type option has been parsed!) - * - option: option value (u8_t) - * - len: option data length (u8_t) - * - pbuf: pbuf where option data is contained - * - option_value_offset: offset in pbuf where option data begins - * - * A nice way to get the option contents is pbuf_get_contiguous(): - * u8_t buf[32]; - * u8_t *ptr = (u8_t*)pbuf_get_contiguous(p, buf, sizeof(buf), LWIP_MIN(option_len, sizeof(buf)), offset); - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, option, len, pbuf, offset) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp6, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr, max_len): - * Called from various dhcp6 functions when sending a DHCP6 message. - * This hook is called just before the DHCP6 message is sent, so the - * options are at the end of a DHCP6 message. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * void my_hook(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp, u8_t state, struct dhcp6_msg *msg, - * u8_t msg_type, u16_t *options_len_ptr); - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - netif: struct netif that the packet will be sent through - * - dhcp6: struct dhcp6 on that netif - * - state: current dhcp6 state (dhcp6_state_enum_t as an u8_t) - * - msg: struct dhcp6_msg that will be sent - * - msg_type: dhcp6 message type to be sent (u8_t) - * - options_len_ptr: pointer to the current length of options in the dhcp6_msg "msg" - * (must be increased when options are added!) - * - * Options need to appended like this: - * u8_t *options = (u8_t *)(msg + 1); - * LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp option overflow", sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + *options_len_ptr + newoptlen <= max_len); - * options[(*options_len_ptr)++] = <option_data>; - * [...] - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp6, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr, max_len) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_SETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, err) - * Called from socket API to implement setsockopt() for options not provided by lwIP. - * Core lock is held when this hook is called. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * int my_hook(int s, struct lwip_sock *sock, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen, int *err) - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - s: socket file descriptor - * - sock: internal socket descriptor (see lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h) - * - level: protocol level at which the option resides - * - optname: option to set - * - optval: value to set - * - optlen: size of optval - * - err: output error - * Return values: - * - 0: Hook has not consumed the option, code continues as normal (to internal options) - * - != 0: Hook has consumed the option, 'err' is returned - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_SETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, err) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_GETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, err) - * Called from socket API to implement getsockopt() for options not provided by lwIP. - * Core lock is held when this hook is called. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * int my_hook(int s, struct lwip_sock *sock, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen, int *err) - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - s: socket file descriptor - * - sock: internal socket descriptor (see lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h) - * - level: protocol level at which the option resides - * - optname: option to get - * - optval: value to get - * - optlen: size of optval - * - err: output error - * Return values: - * - 0: Hook has not consumed the option, code continues as normal (to internal options) - * - != 0: Hook has consumed the option, 'err' is returned - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_GETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, err) -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE(name, addr, addrtype, err) - * Called from netconn APIs (not usable with callback apps) allowing an - * external DNS resolver (which uses sequential API) to handle the query. - * Signature:\code{.c} - * int my_hook(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t addrtype, err_t *err) - * \endcode - * Arguments: - * - name: hostname to resolve - * - addr: output host address - * - addrtype: type of address to query - * - err: output error - * Return values: - * - 0: Hook has not consumed hostname query, query continues into DNS module - * - != 0: Hook has consumed the query - * - * err must also be checked to determine if the hook consumed the query, but - * the query failed - */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE(name, addr, addrtype, err) -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/* - --------------------------------------- - ---------- Debugging options ---------- - --------------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_debugmsg Debug messages - * @ingroup lwip_opts_debug - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL: After masking, the value of the debug is - * compared against this value. If it is smaller, then debugging - * messages are written. - * @see debugging_levels - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_ALL -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON: A mask that can be used to globally enable/disable - * debug messages of certain types. - * @see debugging_levels - */ -#if !defined LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON LWIP_DBG_ON -#endif - -/** - * ETHARP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in etharp.c. - */ -#if !defined ETHARP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ETHARP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * NETIF_DEBUG: Enable debugging in netif.c. - */ -#if !defined NETIF_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define NETIF_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * PBUF_DEBUG: Enable debugging in pbuf.c. - */ -#if !defined PBUF_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define PBUF_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * API_LIB_DEBUG: Enable debugging in api_lib.c. - */ -#if !defined API_LIB_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define API_LIB_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * API_MSG_DEBUG: Enable debugging in api_msg.c. - */ -#if !defined API_MSG_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define API_MSG_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * SOCKETS_DEBUG: Enable debugging in sockets.c. - */ -#if !defined SOCKETS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SOCKETS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * ICMP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in icmp.c. - */ -#if !defined ICMP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define ICMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * IGMP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in igmp.c. - */ -#if !defined IGMP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IGMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * INET_DEBUG: Enable debugging in inet.c. - */ -#if !defined INET_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define INET_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * IP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for IP. - */ -#if !defined IP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * IP_REASS_DEBUG: Enable debugging in ip_frag.c for both frag & reass. - */ -#if !defined IP_REASS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP_REASS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * RAW_DEBUG: Enable debugging in raw.c. - */ -#if !defined RAW_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define RAW_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * MEM_DEBUG: Enable debugging in mem.c. - */ -#if !defined MEM_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEM_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in memp.c. - */ -#if !defined MEMP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define MEMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * SYS_DEBUG: Enable debugging in sys.c. - */ -#if !defined SYS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SYS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TIMERS_DEBUG: Enable debugging in timers.c. - */ -#if !defined TIMERS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TIMERS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for TCP. - */ -#if !defined TCP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCP_INPUT_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcp_in.c for incoming debug. - */ -#if !defined TCP_INPUT_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_INPUT_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCP_FR_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcp_in.c for fast retransmit. - */ -#if !defined TCP_FR_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_FR_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCP_RTO_DEBUG: Enable debugging in TCP for retransmit - * timeout. - */ -#if !defined TCP_RTO_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_RTO_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCP_CWND_DEBUG: Enable debugging for TCP congestion window. - */ -#if !defined TCP_CWND_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_CWND_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCP_WND_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcp_in.c for window updating. - */ -#if !defined TCP_WND_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_WND_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcp_out.c output functions. - */ -#if !defined TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCP_RST_DEBUG: Enable debugging for TCP with the RST message. - */ -#if !defined TCP_RST_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_RST_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCP_QLEN_DEBUG: Enable debugging for TCP queue lengths. - */ -#if !defined TCP_QLEN_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCP_QLEN_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * UDP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in UDP. - */ -#if !defined UDP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define UDP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * TCPIP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcpip.c. - */ -#if !defined TCPIP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define TCPIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * SLIP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in slipif.c. - */ -#if !defined SLIP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define SLIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * DHCP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in dhcp.c. - */ -#if !defined DHCP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DHCP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * AUTOIP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in autoip.c. - */ -#if !defined AUTOIP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define AUTOIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * DNS_DEBUG: Enable debugging for DNS. - */ -#if !defined DNS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DNS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * IP6_DEBUG: Enable debugging for IPv6. - */ -#if !defined IP6_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define IP6_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * DHCP6_DEBUG: Enable debugging in dhcp6.c. - */ -#if !defined DHCP6_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define DHCP6_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -/** - * LWIP_TESTMODE: Changes to make unit test possible - */ -#if !defined LWIP_TESTMODE -#define LWIP_TESTMODE 0 -#endif - -/* - -------------------------------------------------- - ---------- Performance tracking options ---------- - -------------------------------------------------- -*/ -/** - * @defgroup lwip_opts_perf Performance - * @ingroup lwip_opts_debug - * @{ - */ -/** - * LWIP_PERF: Enable performance testing for lwIP - * (if enabled, arch/perf.h is included) - */ -#if !defined LWIP_PERF || defined __DOXYGEN__ -#define LWIP_PERF 0 -#endif -/** - * @} - */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_OPT_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * lwIP Options Configuration + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +/* + * NOTE: || defined __DOXYGEN__ is a workaround for doxygen bug - + * without this, doxygen does not see the actual #define + */ + +#if !defined LWIP_HDR_OPT_H +#define LWIP_HDR_OPT_H + +/* + * Include user defined options first. Anything not defined in these files + * will be set to standard values. Override anything you don't like! + */ +#include "lwipopts.h" +#include "lwip/debug.h" + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts Options (lwipopts.h) + * @ingroup lwip + * + * @defgroup lwip_opts_debug Debugging + * @ingroup lwip_opts + * + * @defgroup lwip_opts_infrastructure Infrastructure + * @ingroup lwip_opts + * + * @defgroup lwip_opts_callback Callback-style APIs + * @ingroup lwip_opts + * + * @defgroup lwip_opts_threadsafe_apis Thread-safe APIs + * @ingroup lwip_opts + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------ + -------------- NO SYS -------------- + ------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_nosys NO_SYS + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * NO_SYS==1: Use lwIP without OS-awareness (no thread, semaphores, mutexes or + * mboxes). This means threaded APIs cannot be used (socket, netconn, + * i.e. everything in the 'api' folder), only the callback-style raw API is + * available (and you have to watch out for yourself that you don't access + * lwIP functions/structures from more than one context at a time!) + */ +#if !defined NO_SYS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define NO_SYS 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_timers Timers + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_TIMERS==0: Drop support for sys_timeout and lwip-internal cyclic timers. + * (the array of lwip-internal cyclic timers is still provided) + * (check NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS for compatibility to old versions) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TIMERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#ifdef NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS +#define LWIP_TIMERS (!NO_SYS || (NO_SYS && !NO_SYS_NO_TIMERS)) +#else +#define LWIP_TIMERS 1 +#endif +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM==1: Provide your own timer implementation. + * Function prototypes in timeouts.h and the array of lwip-internal cyclic timers + * are still included, but the implementation is not. The following functions + * will be required: sys_timeouts_init(), sys_timeout(), sys_untimeout(), + * sys_timeouts_mbox_fetch() + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_memcpy memcpy + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * MEMCPY: override this if you have a faster implementation at hand than the + * one included in your C library + */ +#if !defined MEMCPY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMCPY(dst, src, len) memcpy(dst, src, len) +#endif + +/** + * SMEMCPY: override this with care! Some compilers (e.g. gcc) can inline a + * call to memcpy() if the length is known at compile time and is small. + */ +#if !defined SMEMCPY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SMEMCPY(dst, src, len) memcpy(dst, src, len) +#endif + +/** + * MEMMOVE: override this if you have a faster implementation at hand than the + * one included in your C library. lwIP currently uses MEMMOVE only when IPv6 + * fragmentation support is enabled. + */ +#if !defined MEMMOVE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMMOVE(dst, src, len) memmove(dst, src, len) +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------ + ----------- Core locking ----------- + ------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_lock Core locking and MPU + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE: enables special memory management mechanism + * which makes lwip able to work on MPU (Memory Protection Unit) system + * by not passing stack-pointers to other threads + * (this decreases performance as memory is allocated from pools instead + * of keeping it on the stack) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + * Creates a global mutex that is held during TCPIP thread operations. + * Can be locked by client code to perform lwIP operations without changing + * into TCPIP thread using callbacks. See LOCK_TCPIP_CORE() and + * UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE(). + * Your system should provide mutexes supporting priority inversion to use this. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT: when LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING is enabled, + * this lets tcpip_input() grab the mutex for input packets as well, + * instead of allocating a message and passing it to tcpip_thread. + * + * ATTENTION: this does not work when tcpip_input() is called from + * interrupt context! + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT 0 +#endif + +/** + * SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT==1: enable inter-task protection (and task-vs-interrupt + * protection) for certain critical regions during buffer allocation, deallocation + * and memory allocation and deallocation. + * ATTENTION: This is required when using lwIP from more than one context! If + * you disable this, you must be sure what you are doing! + */ +#if !defined SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT 1 +#endif + +/** + * Macro/function to check whether lwIP's threading/locking + * requirements are satisfied during current function call. + * This macro usually calls a function that is implemented in the OS-dependent + * sys layer and performs the following checks: + * - Not in ISR (this should be checked for NO_SYS==1, too!) + * - If @ref LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING = 1: TCPIP core lock is held + * - If @ref LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING = 0: function is called from TCPIP thread + * @see @ref multithreading + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED() +#endif + +/** + * Called as first thing in the lwIP TCPIP thread. Can be used in conjunction + * with @ref LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED to check core locking. + * @see @ref multithreading + */ +#if !defined LWIP_MARK_TCPIP_THREAD || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_MARK_TCPIP_THREAD() +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------ + ---------- Memory options ---------- + ------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_mem Heap and memory pools + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * MEM_LIBC_MALLOC==1: Use malloc/free/realloc provided by your C-library + * instead of the lwip internal allocator. Can save code size if you + * already use it. + */ +#if !defined MEM_LIBC_MALLOC || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEM_LIBC_MALLOC 0 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_MEM_MALLOC==1: Use mem_malloc/mem_free instead of the lwip pool allocator. + * Especially useful with MEM_LIBC_MALLOC but handle with care regarding execution + * speed (heap alloc can be much slower than pool alloc) and usage from interrupts + * (especially if your netif driver allocates PBUF_POOL pbufs for received frames + * from interrupt)! + * ATTENTION: Currently, this uses the heap for ALL pools (also for private pools, + * not only for internal pools defined in memp_std.h)! + */ +#if !defined MEMP_MEM_MALLOC || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_MEM_MALLOC 0 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_MEM_INIT==1: Force use of memset to initialize pool memory. + * Useful if pool are moved in uninitialized section of memory. This will ensure + * default values in pcbs struct are well initialized in all conditions. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_MEM_INIT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_MEM_INIT 0 +#endif + +/** + * MEM_ALIGNMENT: should be set to the alignment of the CPU + * 4 byte alignment -> \#define MEM_ALIGNMENT 4 + * 2 byte alignment -> \#define MEM_ALIGNMENT 2 + */ +#if !defined MEM_ALIGNMENT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEM_ALIGNMENT 1 +#endif + +/** + * MEM_SIZE: the size of the heap memory. If the application will send + * a lot of data that needs to be copied, this should be set high. + */ +#if !defined MEM_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEM_SIZE 1600 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK: memp overflow protection reserves a configurable + * amount of bytes before and after each memp element in every pool and fills + * it with a prominent default value. + * MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 0 no checking + * MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 1 checks each element when it is freed + * MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 checks each element in every pool every time + * memp_malloc() or memp_free() is called (useful but slow!) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK 0 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_SANITY_CHECK==1: run a sanity check after each memp_free() to make + * sure that there are no cycles in the linked lists. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_SANITY_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_SANITY_CHECK 0 +#endif + +/** + * MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK: mem overflow protection reserves a configurable + * amount of bytes before and after each heap allocation chunk and fills + * it with a prominent default value. + * MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 0 no checking + * MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK == 1 checks each element when it is freed + * MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK >= 2 checks all heap elements every time + * mem_malloc() or mem_free() is called (useful but slow!) + */ +#if !defined MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK 0 +#endif + +/** + * MEM_SANITY_CHECK==1: run a sanity check after each mem_free() to make + * sure that the linked list of heap elements is not corrupted. + */ +#if !defined MEM_SANITY_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEM_SANITY_CHECK 0 +#endif + +/** + * MEM_USE_POOLS==1: Use an alternative to malloc() by allocating from a set + * of memory pools of various sizes. When mem_malloc is called, an element of + * the smallest pool that can provide the length needed is returned. + * To use this, MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS also has to be enabled. + */ +#if !defined MEM_USE_POOLS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEM_USE_POOLS 0 +#endif + +/** + * MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL==1: if one malloc-pool is empty, try the next + * bigger pool - WARNING: THIS MIGHT WASTE MEMORY but it can make a system more + * reliable. */ +#if !defined MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEM_USE_POOLS_TRY_BIGGER_POOL 0 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS==1: whether to include a user file lwippools.h + * that defines additional pools beyond the "standard" ones required + * by lwIP. If you set this to 1, you must have lwippools.h in your + * include path somewhere. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS 0 +#endif + +/** + * Set this to 1 if you want to free PBUF_RAM pbufs (or call mem_free()) from + * interrupt context (or another context that doesn't allow waiting for a + * semaphore). + * If set to 1, mem_malloc will be protected by a semaphore and SYS_ARCH_PROTECT, + * while mem_free will only use SYS_ARCH_PROTECT. mem_malloc SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECTs + * with each loop so that mem_free can run. + * + * ATTENTION: As you can see from the above description, this leads to dis-/ + * enabling interrupts often, which can be slow! Also, on low memory, mem_malloc + * can need longer. + * + * If you don't want that, at least for NO_SYS=0, you can still use the following + * functions to enqueue a deallocation call which then runs in the tcpip_thread + * context: + * - pbuf_free_callback(p); + * - mem_free_callback(m); + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ALLOW_MEM_FREE_FROM_OTHER_CONTEXT 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------------------ + ---------- Internal Memory Pool Sizes ---------- + ------------------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_memp Internal memory pools + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * MEMP_NUM_PBUF: the number of memp struct pbufs (used for PBUF_ROM and PBUF_REF). + * If the application sends a lot of data out of ROM (or other static memory), + * this should be set high. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_PBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_PBUF 16 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB: Number of raw connection PCBs + * (requires the LWIP_RAW option) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB 4 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB: the number of UDP protocol control blocks. One + * per active UDP "connection". + * (requires the LWIP_UDP option) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB 4 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB: the number of simultaneously active TCP connections. + * (requires the LWIP_TCP option) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB 5 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN: the number of listening TCP connections. + * (requires the LWIP_TCP option) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN 8 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG: the number of simultaneously queued TCP segments. + * (requires the LWIP_TCP option) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG 16 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_ALTCP_PCB: the number of simultaneously active altcp layer pcbs. + * (requires the LWIP_ALTCP option) + * Connections with multiple layers require more than one altcp_pcb (e.g. TLS + * over TCP requires 2 altcp_pcbs, one for TLS and one for TCP). + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_ALTCP_PCB || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_ALTCP_PCB MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA: the number of IP packets simultaneously queued for + * reassembly (whole packets, not fragments!) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA 5 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_FRAG_PBUF: the number of IP fragments simultaneously sent + * (fragments, not whole packets!). + * This is only used with LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF==0 and only has to be > 1 + * with DMA-enabled MACs where the packet is not yet sent when netif->output + * returns. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_FRAG_PBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_FRAG_PBUF 15 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE: the number of simultaneously queued outgoing + * packets (pbufs) that are waiting for an ARP request (to resolve + * their destination address) to finish. + * (requires the ARP_QUEUEING option) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE 30 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP: The number of multicast groups whose network interfaces + * can be members at the same time (one per netif - allsystems group -, plus one + * per netif membership). + * (requires the LWIP_IGMP option) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP 8 +#endif + +/** + * The number of sys timeouts used by the core stack (not apps) + * The default number of timeouts is calculated here for all enabled modules. + */ +#define LWIP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT_INTERNAL (LWIP_TCP + IP_REASSEMBLY + LWIP_ARP + (2 * LWIP_DHCP) + LWIP_AUTOIP + LWIP_IGMP + LWIP_DNS + PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS + (LWIP_IPV6 * (1 + LWIP_IPV6_REASS + LWIP_IPV6_MLD))) + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT: the number of simultaneously active timeouts. + * The default number of timeouts is calculated here for all enabled modules. + * The formula expects settings to be either '0' or '1'. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT LWIP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT_INTERNAL +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_NETBUF: the number of struct netbufs. + * (only needed if you use the sequential API, like api_lib.c) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_NETBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_NETBUF 2 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_NETCONN: the number of struct netconns. + * (only needed if you use the sequential API, like api_lib.c) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_NETCONN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_NETCONN 4 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_SELECT_CB: the number of struct lwip_select_cb. + * (Only needed if you have LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE==1 and use the socket API. + * In that case, you need one per thread calling lwip_select.) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_SELECT_CB || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_SELECT_CB 4 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API: the number of struct tcpip_msg, which are used + * for callback/timeout API communication. + * (only needed if you use tcpip.c) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API 8 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT: the number of struct tcpip_msg, which are used + * for incoming packets. + * (only needed if you use tcpip.c) + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT 8 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_NETDB: the number of concurrently running lwip_addrinfo() calls + * (before freeing the corresponding memory using lwip_freeaddrinfo()). + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_NETDB || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_NETDB 1 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST: the number of host entries in the local host list + * if DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC==1. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST 1 +#endif + +/** + * PBUF_POOL_SIZE: the number of buffers in the pbuf pool. + */ +#if !defined PBUF_POOL_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define PBUF_POOL_SIZE 16 +#endif + +/** MEMP_NUM_API_MSG: the number of concurrently active calls to various + * socket, netconn, and tcpip functions + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_API_MSG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_API_MSG MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API +#endif + +/** MEMP_NUM_DNS_API_MSG: the number of concurrently active calls to netconn_gethostbyname + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_DNS_API_MSG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_DNS_API_MSG MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API +#endif + +/** MEMP_NUM_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA: the number of concurrently active calls + * to getsockopt/setsockopt + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API +#endif + +/** MEMP_NUM_NETIFAPI_MSG: the number of concurrently active calls to the + * netifapi functions + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_NETIFAPI_MSG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_NETIFAPI_MSG MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + --------------------------------- + ---------- ARP options ---------- + --------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_arp ARP + * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_ARP==1: Enable ARP functionality. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ARP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ARP 1 +#endif + +/** + * ARP_TABLE_SIZE: Number of active MAC-IP address pairs cached. + */ +#if !defined ARP_TABLE_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ARP_TABLE_SIZE 10 +#endif + +/** the time an ARP entry stays valid after its last update, + * for ARP_TMR_INTERVAL = 1000, this is + * (60 * 5) seconds = 5 minutes. + */ +#if !defined ARP_MAXAGE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ARP_MAXAGE 300 +#endif + +/** + * ARP_QUEUEING==1: Multiple outgoing packets are queued during hardware address + * resolution. By default, only the most recent packet is queued per IP address. + * This is sufficient for most protocols and mainly reduces TCP connection + * startup time. Set this to 1 if you know your application sends more than one + * packet in a row to an IP address that is not in the ARP cache. + */ +#if !defined ARP_QUEUEING || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ARP_QUEUEING 0 +#endif + +/** The maximum number of packets which may be queued for each + * unresolved address by other network layers. Defaults to 3, 0 means disabled. + * Old packets are dropped, new packets are queued. + */ +#if !defined ARP_QUEUE_LEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ARP_QUEUE_LEN 3 +#endif + +/** + * ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN==1: support receiving and sending ethernet packets with + * VLAN header. See the description of LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK and + * LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET hooks to check/set VLAN headers. + * Additionally, you can define ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK to an u16_t VLAN ID to check. + * If ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK is defined, only VLAN-traffic for this VLAN is accepted. + * If ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK is not defined, all traffic is accepted. + * Alternatively, define a function/define ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN(eth_hdr, vlan) + * that returns 1 to accept a packet or 0 to drop a packet. + */ +#if !defined ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN 0 +#endif + +/** LWIP_ETHERNET==1: enable ethernet support even though ARP might be disabled + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ETHERNET || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ETHERNET LWIP_ARP +#endif + +/** ETH_PAD_SIZE: number of bytes added before the ethernet header to ensure + * alignment of payload after that header. Since the header is 14 bytes long, + * without this padding e.g. addresses in the IP header will not be aligned + * on a 32-bit boundary, so setting this to 2 can speed up 32-bit-platforms. + */ +#if !defined ETH_PAD_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ETH_PAD_SIZE 0 +#endif + +/** ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES==1: enable code to support static ARP table + * entries (using etharp_add_static_entry/etharp_remove_static_entry). + */ +#if !defined ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES 0 +#endif + +/** ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF==1: Match netif for ARP table entries. + * If disabled, duplicate IP address on multiple netifs are not supported + * (but this should only occur for AutoIP). + */ +#if !defined ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ETHARP_TABLE_MATCH_NETIF !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + -------------------------------- + ---------- IP options ---------- + -------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_ipv4 IPv4 + * @ingroup lwip_opts + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_IPV4==1: Enable IPv4 + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV4 || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV4 1 +#endif + +/** + * IP_FORWARD==1: Enables the ability to forward IP packets across network + * interfaces. If you are going to run lwIP on a device with only one network + * interface, define this to 0. + */ +#if !defined IP_FORWARD || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_FORWARD 0 +#endif + +/** + * IP_REASSEMBLY==1: Reassemble incoming fragmented IP packets. Note that + * this option does not affect outgoing packet sizes, which can be controlled + * via IP_FRAG. + */ +#if !defined IP_REASSEMBLY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_REASSEMBLY 1 +#endif + +/** + * IP_FRAG==1: Fragment outgoing IP packets if their size exceeds MTU. Note + * that this option does not affect incoming packet sizes, which can be + * controlled via IP_REASSEMBLY. + */ +#if !defined IP_FRAG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_FRAG 1 +#endif + +#if !LWIP_IPV4 +/* disable IPv4 extensions when IPv4 is disabled */ +#undef IP_FORWARD +#define IP_FORWARD 0 +#undef IP_REASSEMBLY +#define IP_REASSEMBLY 0 +#undef IP_FRAG +#define IP_FRAG 0 +#endif /* !LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/** + * IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED: Defines the behavior for IP options. + * IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED==0: All packets with IP options are dropped. + * IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED==1: IP options are allowed (but not parsed). + */ +#if !defined IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_OPTIONS_ALLOWED 1 +#endif + +/** + * IP_REASS_MAXAGE: Maximum time (in multiples of IP_TMR_INTERVAL - so seconds, normally) + * a fragmented IP packet waits for all fragments to arrive. If not all fragments arrived + * in this time, the whole packet is discarded. + */ +#if !defined IP_REASS_MAXAGE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_REASS_MAXAGE 15 +#endif + +/** + * IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS: Total maximum amount of pbufs waiting to be reassembled. + * Since the received pbufs are enqueued, be sure to configure + * PBUF_POOL_SIZE > IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS so that the stack is still able to receive + * packets even if the maximum amount of fragments is enqueued for reassembly! + * When IPv4 *and* IPv6 are enabled, this even changes to + * (PBUF_POOL_SIZE > 2 * IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS)! + */ +#if !defined IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_REASS_MAX_PBUFS 10 +#endif + +/** + * IP_DEFAULT_TTL: Default value for Time-To-Live used by transport layers. + */ +#if !defined IP_DEFAULT_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_DEFAULT_TTL 255 +#endif + +/** + * IP_SOF_BROADCAST=1: Use the SOF_BROADCAST field to enable broadcast + * filter per pcb on udp and raw send operations. To enable broadcast filter + * on recv operations, you also have to set IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV=1. + */ +#if !defined IP_SOF_BROADCAST || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_SOF_BROADCAST 0 +#endif + +/** + * IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV (requires IP_SOF_BROADCAST=1) enable the broadcast + * filter on recv operations. + */ +#if !defined IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_SOF_BROADCAST_RECV 0 +#endif + +/** + * IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF==1: allow ip_forward() to send packets back + * out on the netif where it was received. This should only be used for + * wireless networks. + * ATTENTION: When this is 1, make sure your netif driver correctly marks incoming + * link-layer-broadcast/multicast packets as such using the corresponding pbuf flags! + */ +#if !defined IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_FORWARD_ALLOW_TX_ON_RX_NETIF 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ---------------------------------- + ---------- ICMP options ---------- + ---------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_icmp ICMP + * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_ICMP==1: Enable ICMP module inside the IP stack. + * Be careful, disable that make your product non-compliant to RFC1122 + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ICMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ICMP 1 +#endif + +/** + * ICMP_TTL: Default value for Time-To-Live used by ICMP packets. + */ +#if !defined ICMP_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ICMP_TTL IP_DEFAULT_TTL +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_BROADCAST_PING==1: respond to broadcast pings (default is unicast only) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_BROADCAST_PING || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_BROADCAST_PING 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_MULTICAST_PING==1: respond to multicast pings (default is unicast only) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_MULTICAST_PING || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_MULTICAST_PING 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + --------------------------------- + ---------- RAW options ---------- + --------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_raw RAW + * @ingroup lwip_opts_callback + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_RAW==1: Enable application layer to hook into the IP layer itself. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_RAW || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_RAW 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_RAW==1: Enable application layer to hook into the IP layer itself. + */ +#if !defined RAW_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define RAW_TTL IP_DEFAULT_TTL +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ---------------------------------- + ---------- DHCP options ---------- + ---------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_dhcp DHCP + * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_DHCP==1: Enable DHCP module. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP 0 +#endif +#if !LWIP_IPV4 +/* disable DHCP when IPv4 is disabled */ +#undef LWIP_DHCP +#define LWIP_DHCP 0 +#endif /* !LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/** + * DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK==1: Do an ARP check on the offered address. + */ +#if !defined DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DHCP_DOES_ARP_CHECK (LWIP_DHCP && LWIP_ARP) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE==1: Store offered_si_addr and boot_file_name. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP_BOOTP_FILE 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_DHCP_GETS_NTP==1: Request NTP servers with discover/select. For each + * response packet, an callback is called, which has to be provided by the port: + * void dhcp_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num_ntp_servers, ip_addr_t* ntp_server_addrs); +*/ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP_GET_NTP_SRV 0 +#endif + +/** + * The maximum of NTP servers requested + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP_MAX_NTP_SERVERS 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS > 0: Request DNS servers with discover/select. + * DNS servers received in the response are passed to DNS via @ref dns_setserver() + * (up to the maximum limit defined here). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP_MAX_DNS_SERVERS DNS_MAX_SERVERS +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------ + ---------- AUTOIP options ---------- + ------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_autoip AUTOIP + * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_AUTOIP==1: Enable AUTOIP module. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_AUTOIP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_AUTOIP 0 +#endif +#if !LWIP_IPV4 +/* disable AUTOIP when IPv4 is disabled */ +#undef LWIP_AUTOIP +#define LWIP_AUTOIP 0 +#endif /* !LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/** + * LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP==1: Allow DHCP and AUTOIP to be both enabled on + * the same interface at the same time. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_TRIES: Set to the number of DHCP DISCOVER probes + * that should be sent before falling back on AUTOIP (the DHCP client keeps + * running in this case). This can be set as low as 1 to get an AutoIP address + * very quickly, but you should be prepared to handle a changing IP address + * when DHCP overrides AutoIP. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_TRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP_AUTOIP_COOP_TRIES 9 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ---------------------------------- + ----- SNMP MIB2 support ----- + ---------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_mib2 SNMP MIB2 callbacks + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS==1: Turn on SNMP MIB2 callbacks. + * Turn this on to get callbacks needed to implement MIB2. + * Usually MIB2_STATS should be enabled, too. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ---------------------------------- + -------- Multicast options ------- + ---------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_multicast Multicast + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS==1: Enable multicast TX support like the socket options + * IP_MULTICAST_TTL/IP_MULTICAST_IF/IP_MULTICAST_LOOP, as well as (currently only) + * core support for the corresponding IPv6 options. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS ((LWIP_IGMP || LWIP_IPV6_MLD) && (LWIP_UDP || LWIP_RAW)) +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ---------------------------------- + ---------- IGMP options ---------- + ---------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_igmp IGMP + * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv4 + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_IGMP==1: Turn on IGMP module. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IGMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IGMP 0 +#endif +#if !LWIP_IPV4 +#undef LWIP_IGMP +#define LWIP_IGMP 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ---------------------------------- + ---------- DNS options ----------- + ---------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_dns DNS + * @ingroup lwip_opts_callback + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_DNS==1: Turn on DNS module. UDP must be available for DNS + * transport. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DNS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DNS 0 +#endif + +/** DNS maximum number of entries to maintain locally. */ +#if !defined DNS_TABLE_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DNS_TABLE_SIZE 4 +#endif + +/** DNS maximum host name length supported in the name table. */ +#if !defined DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH 256 +#endif + +/** The maximum of DNS servers + * The first server can be initialized automatically by defining + * DNS_SERVER_ADDRESS(ipaddr), where 'ipaddr' is an 'ip_addr_t*' + */ +#if !defined DNS_MAX_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DNS_MAX_SERVERS 2 +#endif + +/** DNS maximum number of retries when asking for a name, before "timeout". */ +#if !defined DNS_MAX_RETRIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DNS_MAX_RETRIES 4 +#endif + +/** DNS do a name checking between the query and the response. */ +#if !defined DNS_DOES_NAME_CHECK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DNS_DOES_NAME_CHECK 1 +#endif + +/** LWIP_DNS_SECURE: controls the security level of the DNS implementation + * Use all DNS security features by default. + * This is overridable but should only be needed by very small targets + * or when using against non standard DNS servers. */ +#if !defined LWIP_DNS_SECURE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DNS_SECURE (LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_XID | LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING | LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) +#endif + +/* A list of DNS security features follows */ +#define LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_XID 1 +#define LWIP_DNS_SECURE_NO_MULTIPLE_OUTSTANDING 2 +#define LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT 4 + +/** DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST: Implements a local host-to-address list. If enabled, you have to define an initializer: + * \#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_INIT {DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_ELEM("host_ip4", IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(1,2,3,4)), \ + * DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_ELEM("host_ip6", IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(123, 234, 345, 456)} + * + * Instead, you can also use an external function: + * \#define DNS_LOOKUP_LOCAL_EXTERN(x) extern err_t my_lookup_function(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t dns_addrtype) + * that looks up the IP address and returns ERR_OK if found (LWIP_DNS_ADDRTYPE_xxx is passed in dns_addrtype). + */ +#if !defined DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST 0 +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST */ + +/** If this is turned on, the local host-list can be dynamically changed + * at runtime. */ +#if !defined DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC 0 +#endif /* DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ + +/** Set this to 1 to enable querying ".local" names via mDNS + * using a One-Shot Multicast DNS Query */ +#if !defined LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DNS_SUPPORT_MDNS_QUERIES 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + --------------------------------- + ---------- UDP options ---------- + --------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_udp UDP + * @ingroup lwip_opts_callback + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_UDP==1: Turn on UDP. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_UDP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_UDP 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_UDPLITE==1: Turn on UDP-Lite. (Requires LWIP_UDP) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_UDPLITE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_UDPLITE 0 +#endif + +/** + * UDP_TTL: Default Time-To-Live value. + */ +#if !defined UDP_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define UDP_TTL IP_DEFAULT_TTL +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO==1: append destination addr and port to every netbuf. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + --------------------------------- + ---------- TCP options ---------- + --------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_tcp TCP + * @ingroup lwip_opts_callback + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_TCP==1: Turn on TCP. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCP 1 +#endif + +/** + * TCP_TTL: Default Time-To-Live value. + */ +#if !defined TCP_TTL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_TTL IP_DEFAULT_TTL +#endif + +/** + * TCP_WND: The size of a TCP window. This must be at least + * (2 * TCP_MSS) for things to work well. + * ATTENTION: when using TCP_RCV_SCALE, TCP_WND is the total size + * with scaling applied. Maximum window value in the TCP header + * will be TCP_WND >> TCP_RCV_SCALE + */ +#if !defined TCP_WND || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_WND (4 * TCP_MSS) +#endif + +/** + * TCP_MAXRTX: Maximum number of retransmissions of data segments. + */ +#if !defined TCP_MAXRTX || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_MAXRTX 12 +#endif + +/** + * TCP_SYNMAXRTX: Maximum number of retransmissions of SYN segments. + */ +#if !defined TCP_SYNMAXRTX || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_SYNMAXRTX 6 +#endif + +/** + * TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1: TCP will queue segments that arrive out of order. + * Define to 0 if your device is low on memory. + */ +#if !defined TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ LWIP_TCP +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT==1: TCP will support sending selective acknowledgements (SACKs). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM: The maximum number of SACK values to include in TCP segments. + * Must be at least 1, but is only used if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT is enabled. + * NOTE: Even though we never send more than 3 or 4 SACK ranges in a single segment + * (depending on other options), setting this option to values greater than 4 is not pointless. + * This is basically the max number of SACK ranges we want to keep track of. + * As new data is delivered, some of the SACK ranges may be removed or merged. + * In that case some of those older SACK ranges may be used again. + * The amount of memory used to store SACK ranges is LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM * 8 bytes for each TCP PCB. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM 4 +#endif + +/** + * TCP_MSS: TCP Maximum segment size. (default is 536, a conservative default, + * you might want to increase this.) + * For the receive side, this MSS is advertised to the remote side + * when opening a connection. For the transmit size, this MSS sets + * an upper limit on the MSS advertised by the remote host. + */ +#if !defined TCP_MSS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_MSS 536 +#endif + +/** + * TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS: "The maximum size of a segment that TCP really + * sends, the 'effective send MSS,' MUST be the smaller of the send MSS (which + * reflects the available reassembly buffer size at the remote host) and the + * largest size permitted by the IP layer" (RFC 1122) + * Setting this to 1 enables code that checks TCP_MSS against the MTU of the + * netif used for a connection and limits the MSS if it would be too big otherwise. + */ +#if !defined TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS 1 +#endif + +/** + * TCP_SND_BUF: TCP sender buffer space (bytes). + * To achieve good performance, this should be at least 2 * TCP_MSS. + */ +#if !defined TCP_SND_BUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_SND_BUF (2 * TCP_MSS) +#endif + +/** + * TCP_SND_QUEUELEN: TCP sender buffer space (pbufs). This must be at least + * as much as (2 * TCP_SND_BUF/TCP_MSS) for things to work. + */ +#if !defined TCP_SND_QUEUELEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_SND_QUEUELEN ((4 * (TCP_SND_BUF) + (TCP_MSS - 1)) / (TCP_MSS)) +#endif + +/** + * TCP_SNDLOWAT: TCP writable space (bytes). This must be less than + * TCP_SND_BUF. It is the amount of space which must be available in the + * TCP snd_buf for select to return writable (combined with TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT). + */ +#if !defined TCP_SNDLOWAT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_SNDLOWAT LWIP_MIN(LWIP_MAX(((TCP_SND_BUF) / 2), (2 * TCP_MSS) + 1), (TCP_SND_BUF)-1) +#endif + +/** + * TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT: TCP writable bufs (pbuf count). This must be less + * than TCP_SND_QUEUELEN. If the number of pbufs queued on a pcb drops below + * this number, select returns writable (combined with TCP_SNDLOWAT). + */ +#if !defined TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_SNDQUEUELOWAT LWIP_MAX(((TCP_SND_QUEUELEN) / 2), 5) +#endif + +/** + * TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES: The default maximum number of bytes queued on ooseq per + * pcb if TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT is not defined. Default is 0 (no limit). + * Only valid for TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1. + */ +#if !defined TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES 0 +#endif + +/** + * TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT(pcb): Return the maximum number of bytes to be queued + * on ooseq per pcb, given the pcb. Only valid for TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1 && + * TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES==1. + * Use this to override TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES to a dynamic value per pcb. + */ +#if !defined TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT +#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES +#define TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT(pcb) TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES +#elif defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT(pcb) +#endif +#endif + +/** + * TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS: The default maximum number of pbufs queued on ooseq per + * pcb if TCP_OOSEQ_BYTES_LIMIT is not defined. Default is 0 (no limit). + * Only valid for TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1. + */ +#if !defined TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS 0 +#endif + +/** + * TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT(pcb): Return the maximum number of pbufs to be queued + * on ooseq per pcb, given the pcb. Only valid for TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ==1 && + * TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS==1. + * Use this to override TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS to a dynamic value per pcb. + */ +#if !defined TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT +#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS +#define TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT(pcb) TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS +#elif defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_OOSEQ_PBUFS_LIMIT(pcb) +#endif +#endif + +/** + * TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG: Enable the backlog option for tcp listen pcb. + */ +#if !defined TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG 0 +#endif + +/** + * The maximum allowed backlog for TCP listen netconns. + * This backlog is used unless another is explicitly specified. + * 0xff is the maximum (u8_t). + */ +#if !defined TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG 0xff +#endif + +/** + * TCP_OVERSIZE: The maximum number of bytes that tcp_write may + * allocate ahead of time in an attempt to create shorter pbuf chains + * for transmission. The meaningful range is 0 to TCP_MSS. Some + * suggested values are: + * + * 0: Disable oversized allocation. Each tcp_write() allocates a new + pbuf (old behaviour). + * 1: Allocate size-aligned pbufs with minimal excess. Use this if your + * scatter-gather DMA requires aligned fragments. + * 128: Limit the pbuf/memory overhead to 20%. + * TCP_MSS: Try to create unfragmented TCP packets. + * TCP_MSS/4: Try to create 4 fragments or less per TCP packet. + */ +#if !defined TCP_OVERSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_OVERSIZE TCP_MSS +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS==1: support the TCP timestamp option. + * The timestamp option is currently only used to help remote hosts, it is not + * really used locally. Therefore, it is only enabled when a TS option is + * received in the initial SYN packet from a remote host. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS 0 +#endif + +/** + * TCP_WND_UPDATE_THRESHOLD: difference in window to trigger an + * explicit window update + */ +#if !defined TCP_WND_UPDATE_THRESHOLD || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_WND_UPDATE_THRESHOLD LWIP_MIN((TCP_WND / 4), (TCP_MSS * 4)) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_EVENT_API and LWIP_CALLBACK_API: Only one of these should be set to 1. + * LWIP_EVENT_API==1: The user defines lwip_tcp_event() to receive all + * events (accept, sent, etc) that happen in the system. + * LWIP_CALLBACK_API==1: The PCB callback function is called directly + * for the event. This is the default. + */ +#if !defined(LWIP_EVENT_API) && !defined(LWIP_CALLBACK_API) || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_EVENT_API 0 +#define LWIP_CALLBACK_API 1 +#else +#ifndef LWIP_EVENT_API +#define LWIP_EVENT_API 0 +#endif +#ifndef LWIP_CALLBACK_API +#define LWIP_CALLBACK_API 0 +#endif +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_WND_SCALE and TCP_RCV_SCALE: + * Set LWIP_WND_SCALE to 1 to enable window scaling. + * Set TCP_RCV_SCALE to the desired scaling factor (shift count in the + * range of [0..14]). + * When LWIP_WND_SCALE is enabled but TCP_RCV_SCALE is 0, we can use a large + * send window while having a small receive window only. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_WND_SCALE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_WND_SCALE 0 +#define TCP_RCV_SCALE 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS: + * When this is > 0, every tcp pcb (including listen pcb) includes a number of + * additional argument entries in an array (see tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS 0 +#endif + +/** LWIP_ALTCP==1: enable the altcp API. + * altcp is an abstraction layer that prevents applications linking against the + * tcp.h functions but provides the same functionality. It is used to e.g. add + * SSL/TLS or proxy-connect support to an application written for the tcp callback + * API without that application knowing the protocol details. + * + * With LWIP_ALTCP==0, applications written against the altcp API can still be + * compiled but are directly linked against the tcp.h callback API and then + * cannot use layered protocols. + * + * See @ref altcp_api + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ALTCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ALTCP 0 +#endif + +/** LWIP_ALTCP_TLS==1: enable TLS support for altcp API. + * This needs a port of the functions in altcp_tls.h to a TLS library. + * A port to ARM mbedtls is provided with lwIP, see apps/altcp_tls/ directory + * and LWIP_ALTCP_TLS_MBEDTLS option. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ALTCP_TLS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ALTCP_TLS 0 +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ---------------------------------- + ---------- Pbuf options ---------- + ---------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_pbuf PBUF + * @ingroup lwip_opts + * @{ + */ +/** + * PBUF_LINK_HLEN: the number of bytes that should be allocated for a + * link level header. The default is 14, the standard value for + * Ethernet. + */ +#if !defined PBUF_LINK_HLEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#if defined LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET && !defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define PBUF_LINK_HLEN (18 + ETH_PAD_SIZE) +#else /* LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET */ +#define PBUF_LINK_HLEN (14 + ETH_PAD_SIZE) +#endif /* LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET */ +#endif + +/** + * PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN: the number of bytes that should be allocated + * for an additional encapsulation header before ethernet headers (e.g. 802.11) + */ +#if !defined PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN 0 +#endif + +/** + * PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE: the size of each pbuf in the pbuf pool. The default is + * designed to accommodate single full size TCP frame in one pbuf, including + * TCP_MSS, IP header, and link header. + */ +#if !defined PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(TCP_MSS + 40 + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_PBUF_REF_T: Refcount type in pbuf. + * Default width of u8_t can be increased if 255 refs are not enough for you. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_PBUF_REF_T || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_PBUF_REF_T u8_t +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------------------ + ---------- Network Interfaces options ---------- + ------------------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_netif NETIF + * @ingroup lwip_opts + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF==1: use a single netif only. This is the common case for + * small real-life targets. Some code like routing etc. can be left out. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME==1: use DHCP_OPTION_HOSTNAME with netif's hostname + * field. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_API==1: Support netif api (in netifapi.c) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_API || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_API 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK==1: Support a callback function whenever an interface + * changes its up/down status (i.e., due to DHCP IP acquisition) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_STATUS_CALLBACK 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK==1: Support an extended callback function + * for several netif related event that supports multiple subscribers. + * @see netif_ext_status_callback + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK==1: Support a callback function from an interface + * whenever the link changes (i.e., link down) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_LINK_CALLBACK 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK==1: Support a callback function that is called + * when a netif has been removed + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_REMOVE_CALLBACK 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT==1: Cache link-layer-address hints (e.g. table + * indices) in struct netif. TCP and UDP can make use of this to prevent + * scanning the ARP table for every sent packet. While this is faster for big + * ARP tables or many concurrent connections, it might be counterproductive + * if you have a tiny ARP table or if there never are concurrent connections. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_HWADDRHINT 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF: if this is set to 1, lwIP *tries* to put all data + * to be sent into one single pbuf. This is for compatibility with DMA-enabled + * MACs that do not support scatter-gather. + * Beware that this might involve CPU-memcpy before transmitting that would not + * be needed without this flag! Use this only if you need to! + * + * ATTENTION: a driver should *NOT* rely on getting single pbufs but check TX + * pbufs for being in one piece. If not, @ref pbuf_clone can be used to get + * a single pbuf: + * if (p->next != NULL) { + * struct pbuf *q = pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_RAM, p); + * if (q == NULL) { + * return ERR_MEM; + * } + * p = q; ATTENTION: do NOT free the old 'p' as the ref belongs to the caller! + * } + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF 0 +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF */ + +/** + * LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA: Number of clients that may store + * data in client_data member array of struct netif (max. 256). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------ + ---------- LOOPIF options ---------- + ------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_loop Loopback interface + * @ingroup lwip_opts_netif + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF==1: Support loop interface (127.0.0.1). + * This is only needed when no real netifs are available. If at least one other + * netif is available, loopback traffic uses this netif. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF (LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK && !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTICAST==1: Support multicast/IGMP on loop interface (127.0.0.1). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTICAST || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_LOOPIF_MULTICAST 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK==1: Support sending packets with a destination IP + * address equal to the netif IP address, looping them back up the stack. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS: Maximum number of pbufs on queue for loopback + * sending for each netif (0 = disabled) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_LOOPBACK_MAX_PBUFS 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING: Indicates whether threading is enabled in + * the system, as netifs must change how they behave depending on this setting + * for the LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK option to work. + * Setting this is needed to avoid reentering non-reentrant functions like + * tcp_input(). + * LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING==1: Indicates that the user is using a + * multithreaded environment like tcpip.c. In this case, netif->input() + * is called directly. + * LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING==0: Indicates a polling (or NO_SYS) setup. + * The packets are put on a list and netif_poll() must be called in + * the main application loop. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETIF_LOOPBACK_MULTITHREADING (!NO_SYS) +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------ + ---------- Thread options ---------- + ------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_thread Threading + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * TCPIP_THREAD_NAME: The name assigned to the main tcpip thread. + */ +#if !defined TCPIP_THREAD_NAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCPIP_THREAD_NAME "tcpip_thread" +#endif + +/** + * TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE: The stack size used by the main tcpip thread. + * The stack size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to + * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. + */ +#if !defined TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCPIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE 0 +#endif + +/** + * TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO: The priority assigned to the main tcpip thread. + * The priority value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to + * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. + */ +#if !defined TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCPIP_THREAD_PRIO 1 +#endif + +/** + * TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the tcpip thread messages + * The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to + * sys_mbox_new() when tcpip_init is called. + */ +#if !defined TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE 0 +#endif + +/** + * Define this to something that triggers a watchdog. This is called from + * tcpip_thread after processing a message. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCPIP_THREAD_ALIVE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCPIP_THREAD_ALIVE() +#endif + +/** + * SLIPIF_THREAD_NAME: The name assigned to the slipif_loop thread. + */ +#if !defined SLIPIF_THREAD_NAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SLIPIF_THREAD_NAME "slipif_loop" +#endif + +/** + * SLIP_THREAD_STACKSIZE: The stack size used by the slipif_loop thread. + * The stack size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to + * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. + */ +#if !defined SLIPIF_THREAD_STACKSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SLIPIF_THREAD_STACKSIZE 0 +#endif + +/** + * SLIPIF_THREAD_PRIO: The priority assigned to the slipif_loop thread. + * The priority value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to + * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. + */ +#if !defined SLIPIF_THREAD_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SLIPIF_THREAD_PRIO 1 +#endif + +/** + * DEFAULT_THREAD_NAME: The name assigned to any other lwIP thread. + */ +#if !defined DEFAULT_THREAD_NAME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DEFAULT_THREAD_NAME "lwIP" +#endif + +/** + * DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE: The stack size used by any other lwIP thread. + * The stack size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to + * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. + */ +#if !defined DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DEFAULT_THREAD_STACKSIZE 0 +#endif + +/** + * DEFAULT_THREAD_PRIO: The priority assigned to any other lwIP thread. + * The priority value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to + * sys_thread_new() when the thread is created. + */ +#if !defined DEFAULT_THREAD_PRIO || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DEFAULT_THREAD_PRIO 1 +#endif + +/** + * DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the incoming packets on a + * NETCONN_RAW. The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed + * to sys_mbox_new() when the recvmbox is created. + */ +#if !defined DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DEFAULT_RAW_RECVMBOX_SIZE 0 +#endif + +/** + * DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the incoming packets on a + * NETCONN_UDP. The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed + * to sys_mbox_new() when the recvmbox is created. + */ +#if !defined DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DEFAULT_UDP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 0 +#endif + +/** + * DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the incoming packets on a + * NETCONN_TCP. The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed + * to sys_mbox_new() when the recvmbox is created. + */ +#if !defined DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DEFAULT_TCP_RECVMBOX_SIZE 0 +#endif + +/** + * DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE: The mailbox size for the incoming connections. + * The queue size value itself is platform-dependent, but is passed to + * sys_mbox_new() when the acceptmbox is created. + */ +#if !defined DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DEFAULT_ACCEPTMBOX_SIZE 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ---------------------------------------------- + ---------- Sequential layer options ---------- + ---------------------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_netconn Netconn + * @ingroup lwip_opts_threadsafe_apis + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_NETCONN==1: Enable Netconn API (require to use api_lib.c) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETCONN || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETCONN 1 +#endif + +/** LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT==1: Enable tcpip_timeout/tcpip_untimeout to create + * timers running in tcpip_thread from another thread. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT 0 +#endif + +/** LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: Use one (thread-local) semaphore per + * thread calling socket/netconn functions instead of allocating one + * semaphore per netconn (and per select etc.) + * ATTENTION: a thread-local semaphore for API calls is needed: + * - LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_GET() returning a sys_sem_t* + * - LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_ALLOC() creating the semaphore + * - LWIP_NETCONN_THREAD_SEM_FREE() freeing the semaphore + * The latter 2 can be invoked up by calling netconn_thread_init()/netconn_thread_cleanup(). + * Ports may call these for threads created with sys_thread_new(). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD 0 +#endif + +/** LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX==1: Enable code that allows reading from one thread, + * writing from a 2nd thread and closing from a 3rd thread at the same time. + * ATTENTION: This is currently really alpha! Some requirements: + * - LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1 is required to use one socket/netconn from + * multiple threads at once + * - sys_mbox_free() has to unblock receive tasks waiting on recvmbox/acceptmbox + * and prevent a task pending on this during/after deletion + */ +#if !defined LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ------------------------------------ + ---------- Socket options ---------- + ------------------------------------ +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_socket Sockets + * @ingroup lwip_opts_threadsafe_apis + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_SOCKET==1: Enable Socket API (require to use sockets.c) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SOCKET || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SOCKET 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS==1: Enable BSD-style sockets functions names through defines. + * LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS==2: Same as ==1 but correctly named functions are created. + * While this helps code completion, it might conflict with existing libraries. + * (only used if you use sockets.c) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES==1: Enable POSIX-style sockets functions names. + * Disable this option if you use a POSIX operating system that uses the same + * names (read, write & close). (only used if you use sockets.c) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET==n: Increases the file descriptor number created by LwIP with n. + * This can be useful when there are multiple APIs which create file descriptors. + * When they all start with a different offset and you won't make them overlap you can + * re implement read/write/close/ioctl/fnctl to send the requested action to the right + * library (sharing select will need more work though). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE==1: Enable TCP_KEEPIDLE, TCP_KEEPINTVL and TCP_KEEPCNT + * options processing. Note that TCP_KEEPIDLE and TCP_KEEPINTVL have to be set + * in seconds. (does not require sockets.c, and will affect tcp.c) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO==1: Enable send timeout for sockets/netconns and + * SO_SNDTIMEO processing. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO==1: Enable receive timeout for sockets/netconns and + * SO_RCVTIMEO processing. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD==1: SO_RCVTIMEO/SO_SNDTIMEO take an int + * (milliseconds, much like winsock does) instead of a struct timeval (default). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_SO_RCVBUF==1: Enable SO_RCVBUF processing. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SO_RCVBUF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SO_RCVBUF 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_SO_LINGER==1: Enable SO_LINGER processing. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SO_LINGER || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SO_LINGER 0 +#endif + +/** + * If LWIP_SO_RCVBUF is used, this is the default value for recv_bufsize. + */ +#if !defined RECV_BUFSIZE_DEFAULT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define RECV_BUFSIZE_DEFAULT INT_MAX +#endif + +/** + * By default, TCP socket/netconn close waits 20 seconds max to send the FIN + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_TCP_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS_DEFAULT 20000 +#endif + +/** + * SO_REUSE==1: Enable SO_REUSEADDR option. + */ +#if !defined SO_REUSE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SO_REUSE 0 +#endif + +/** + * SO_REUSE_RXTOALL==1: Pass a copy of incoming broadcast/multicast packets + * to all local matches if SO_REUSEADDR is turned on. + * WARNING: Adds a memcpy for every packet if passing to more than one pcb! + */ +#if !defined SO_REUSE_RXTOALL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SO_REUSE_RXTOALL 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE==0 (default): ioctl/FIONREAD returns the amount of + * pending data in the network buffer. This is the way windows does it. It's + * the default for lwIP since it is smaller. + * LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE==1: ioctl/FIONREAD returns the size of the next + * pending datagram in bytes. This is the way linux does it. This code is only + * here for compatibility. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_FIONREAD_LINUXMODE 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT==1 (default): enable select() for sockets (uses a netconn + * callback to keep track of events). + * This saves RAM (counters per socket) and code (netconn event callback), which + * should improve performance a bit). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_SOCKET_POLL==1 (default): enable poll() for sockets (including + * struct pollfd, nfds_t, and constants) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_SOCKET_POLL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_SOCKET_POLL 1 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + ---------------------------------------- + ---------- Statistics options ---------- + ---------------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_stats Statistics + * @ingroup lwip_opts_debug + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_STATS==1: Enable statistics collection in lwip_stats. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_STATS 1 +#endif + +#if LWIP_STATS + +/** + * LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY==1: Compile in the statistics output functions. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY 0 +#endif + +/** + * LINK_STATS==1: Enable link stats. + */ +#if !defined LINK_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LINK_STATS 1 +#endif + +/** + * ETHARP_STATS==1: Enable etharp stats. + */ +#if !defined ETHARP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ETHARP_STATS (LWIP_ARP) +#endif + +/** + * IP_STATS==1: Enable IP stats. + */ +#if !defined IP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_STATS 1 +#endif + +/** + * IPFRAG_STATS==1: Enable IP fragmentation stats. Default is + * on if using either frag or reass. + */ +#if !defined IPFRAG_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IPFRAG_STATS (IP_REASSEMBLY || IP_FRAG) +#endif + +/** + * ICMP_STATS==1: Enable ICMP stats. + */ +#if !defined ICMP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ICMP_STATS 1 +#endif + +/** + * IGMP_STATS==1: Enable IGMP stats. + */ +#if !defined IGMP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IGMP_STATS (LWIP_IGMP) +#endif + +/** + * UDP_STATS==1: Enable UDP stats. Default is on if + * UDP enabled, otherwise off. + */ +#if !defined UDP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define UDP_STATS (LWIP_UDP) +#endif + +/** + * TCP_STATS==1: Enable TCP stats. Default is on if TCP + * enabled, otherwise off. + */ +#if !defined TCP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_STATS (LWIP_TCP) +#endif + +/** + * MEM_STATS==1: Enable mem.c stats. + */ +#if !defined MEM_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEM_STATS ((MEM_LIBC_MALLOC == 0) && (MEM_USE_POOLS == 0)) +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_STATS==1: Enable memp.c pool stats. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_STATS (MEMP_MEM_MALLOC == 0) +#endif + +/** + * SYS_STATS==1: Enable system stats (sem and mbox counts, etc). + */ +#if !defined SYS_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SYS_STATS (NO_SYS == 0) +#endif + +/** + * IP6_STATS==1: Enable IPv6 stats. + */ +#if !defined IP6_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP6_STATS (LWIP_IPV6) +#endif + +/** + * ICMP6_STATS==1: Enable ICMP for IPv6 stats. + */ +#if !defined ICMP6_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ICMP6_STATS (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ICMP6) +#endif + +/** + * IP6_FRAG_STATS==1: Enable IPv6 fragmentation stats. + */ +#if !defined IP6_FRAG_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP6_FRAG_STATS (LWIP_IPV6 && (LWIP_IPV6_FRAG || LWIP_IPV6_REASS)) +#endif + +/** + * MLD6_STATS==1: Enable MLD for IPv6 stats. + */ +#if !defined MLD6_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MLD6_STATS (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) +#endif + +/** + * ND6_STATS==1: Enable Neighbor discovery for IPv6 stats. + */ +#if !defined ND6_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ND6_STATS (LWIP_IPV6) +#endif + +/** + * MIB2_STATS==1: Stats for SNMP MIB2. + */ +#if !defined MIB2_STATS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MIB2_STATS 0 +#endif + +#else + +#define LINK_STATS 0 +#define ETHARP_STATS 0 +#define IP_STATS 0 +#define IPFRAG_STATS 0 +#define ICMP_STATS 0 +#define IGMP_STATS 0 +#define UDP_STATS 0 +#define TCP_STATS 0 +#define MEM_STATS 0 +#define MEMP_STATS 0 +#define SYS_STATS 0 +#define LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY 0 +#define IP6_STATS 0 +#define ICMP6_STATS 0 +#define IP6_FRAG_STATS 0 +#define MLD6_STATS 0 +#define ND6_STATS 0 +#define MIB2_STATS 0 + +#endif /* LWIP_STATS */ +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + -------------------------------------- + ---------- Checksum options ---------- + -------------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_checksum Checksum + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF==1: Checksum generation/check can be enabled/disabled + * per netif. + * ATTENTION: if enabled, the CHECKSUM_GEN_* and CHECKSUM_CHECK_* defines must be enabled! + */ +#if !defined LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_CHECKSUM_CTRL_PER_NETIF 0 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_GEN_IP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing IP packets. + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_IP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_IP 1 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing UDP packets. + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP 1 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing TCP packets. + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP 1 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing ICMP packets. + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP 1 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6==1: Generate checksums in software for outgoing ICMP6 packets. + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_GEN_ICMP6 1 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming IP packets. + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 1 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming UDP packets. + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 1 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming TCP packets. + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 1 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP==1: Check checksums in software for incoming ICMP packets. + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP 1 +#endif + +/** + * CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6==1: Check checksums in software for incoming ICMPv6 packets + */ +#if !defined CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY==1: Calculate checksum when copying data from + * application buffers to pbufs. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + --------------------------------------- + ---------- IPv6 options --------------- + --------------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_ipv6 IPv6 + * @ingroup lwip_opts + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_IPV6==1: Enable IPv6 + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6 0 +#endif + +/** + * IPV6_REASS_MAXAGE: Maximum time (in multiples of IP6_REASS_TMR_INTERVAL - so seconds, normally) + * a fragmented IP packet waits for all fragments to arrive. If not all fragments arrived + * in this time, the whole packet is discarded. + */ +#if !defined IPV6_REASS_MAXAGE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IPV6_REASS_MAXAGE 60 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES==1: Enable support for IPv6 address scopes, ensuring that + * e.g. link-local addresses are really treated as link-local. Disable this + * setting only for single-interface configurations. + * All addresses that have a scope according to the default policy (link-local + * unicast addresses, interface-local and link-local multicast addresses) should + * now have a zone set on them before being passed to the core API, although + * lwIP will currently attempt to select a zone on the caller's behalf when + * necessary. Applications that directly assign IPv6 addresses to interfaces + * (which is NOT recommended) must now ensure that link-local addresses carry + * the netif's zone. See the new ip6_zone.h header file for more information and + * relevant macros. For now it is still possible to turn off scopes support + * through the new LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES option. When upgrading an implementation that + * uses the core API directly, it is highly recommended to enable + * LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG at least for a while, to ensure e.g. proper address + * initialization. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES (LWIP_IPV6 && !LWIP_SINGLE_NETIF) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG==1: Perform run-time checks to verify that addresses + * are properly zoned (see ip6_zone.h on what that means) where it matters. + * Enabling this setting is highly recommended when upgrading from an existing + * installation that is not yet scope-aware; otherwise it may be too expensive. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES_DEBUG 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES: Number of IPv6 addresses per netif. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_NUM_ADDRESSES 3 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD==1: Forward IPv6 packets across netifs + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_FRAG==1: Fragment outgoing IPv6 packets that are too big. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_FRAG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_FRAG 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_REASS==1: reassemble incoming IPv6 packets that fragmented + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_REASS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_REASS LWIP_IPV6 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT==1: Send router solicitation messages during + * network startup. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_SEND_ROUTER_SOLICIT 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG==1: Enable stateless address autoconfiguration as per RFC 4862. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG LWIP_IPV6 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES==1: Keep valid and preferred lifetimes for each + * IPv6 address. Required for LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG. May still be enabled + * otherwise, in which case the application may assign address lifetimes with + * the appropriate macros. Addresses with no lifetime are assumed to be static. + * If this option is disabled, all addresses are assumed to be static. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_ADDRESS_LIFETIMES LWIP_IPV6_AUTOCONFIG +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS=[0..7]: Number of duplicate address detection attempts. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS 1 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_icmp6 ICMP6 + * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv6 + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_ICMP6==1: Enable ICMPv6 (mandatory per RFC) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ICMP6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ICMP6 LWIP_IPV6 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE: bytes from original packet to send back in + * ICMPv6 error messages. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ICMP6_DATASIZE 8 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ICMP6_HL: default hop limit for ICMPv6 messages + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ICMP6_HL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ICMP6_HL 255 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_mld6 Multicast listener discovery + * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv6 + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_MLD==1: Enable multicast listener discovery protocol. + * If LWIP_IPV6 is enabled but this setting is disabled, the MAC layer must + * indiscriminately pass all inbound IPv6 multicast traffic to lwIP. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_MLD || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_MLD LWIP_IPV6 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_MLD6_GROUP: Max number of IPv6 multicast groups that can be joined. + * There must be enough groups so that each netif can join the solicited-node + * multicast group for each of its local addresses, plus one for MDNS if + * applicable, plus any number of groups to be joined on UDP sockets. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_MLD6_GROUP || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_MLD6_GROUP 4 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_nd6 Neighbor discovery + * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv6 + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING==1: queue outgoing IPv6 packets while MAC address + * is being resolved. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING LWIP_IPV6 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_ND6_QUEUE: Max number of IPv6 packets to queue during MAC resolution. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_NUM_ND6_QUEUE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_NUM_ND6_QUEUE 20 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS: Number of entries in IPv6 neighbor cache + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_NUM_NEIGHBORS 10 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS: number of entries in IPv6 destination cache + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_NUM_DESTINATIONS 10 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES: number of entries in IPv6 on-link prefixes cache + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_NUM_PREFIXES 5 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS: number of entries in IPv6 default router cache + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_NUM_ROUTERS 3 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT: max number of multicast solicit messages to send + * (neighbor solicit and router solicit) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT 3 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT: max number of unicast neighbor solicitation messages + * to send during neighbor reachability detection. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT 3 +#endif + +/** + * Unused: See ND RFC (time in milliseconds). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_MAX_ANYCAST_DELAY_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_MAX_ANYCAST_DELAY_TIME 1000 +#endif + +/** + * Unused: See ND RFC + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENT || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENT 3 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_REACHABLE_TIME: default neighbor reachable time (in milliseconds). + * May be updated by router advertisement messages. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_REACHABLE_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_REACHABLE_TIME 30000 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_RETRANS_TIMER: default retransmission timer for solicitation messages + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_RETRANS_TIMER || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_RETRANS_TIMER 1000 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME: Delay before first unicast neighbor solicitation + * message is sent, during neighbor reachability detection. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME 5000 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES==1: Allow Router Advertisement messages to update + * Reachable time and retransmission timers, and netif MTU. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_ALLOW_RA_UPDATES 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS==1: Allow TCP to provide Neighbor Discovery + * with reachability hints for connected destinations. This helps avoid sending + * unicast neighbor solicitation messages. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_TCP_REACHABILITY_HINTS 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS > 0: Use IPv6 Router Advertisement Recursive + * DNS Server Option (as per RFC 6106) to copy a defined maximum number of DNS + * servers to the DNS module. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_ND6_RDNSS_MAX_DNS_SERVERS 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_dhcpv6 DHCPv6 + * @ingroup lwip_opts_ipv6 + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6==1: enable DHCPv6 stateful/stateless address autoconfiguration. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL==1: enable DHCPv6 stateful address autoconfiguration. + * (not supported, yet!) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATEFUL 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS==1: enable DHCPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration. + */ +#if !defined LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6_STATELESS LWIP_IPV6_DHCP6 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_DHCP6_GETS_NTP==1: Request NTP servers via DHCPv6. For each + * response packet, a callback is called, which has to be provided by the port: + * void dhcp6_set_ntp_servers(u8_t num_ntp_servers, ip_addr_t* ntp_server_addrs); +*/ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP6_GET_NTP_SRV 0 +#endif + +/** + * The maximum of NTP servers requested + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_NTP_SERVERS 1 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS > 0: Request DNS servers via DHCPv6. + * DNS servers received in the response are passed to DNS via @ref dns_setserver() + * (up to the maximum limit defined here). + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DHCP6_MAX_DNS_SERVERS DNS_MAX_SERVERS +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + --------------------------------------- + ---------- Hook options --------------- + --------------------------------------- +*/ + +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_hooks Hooks + * @ingroup lwip_opts_infrastructure + * Hooks are undefined by default, define them to a function if you need them. + * @{ + */ + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME: Custom filename to \#include in files that provide hooks. + * Declare your hook function prototypes in there, you may also \#include all headers + * providing data types that are need in this file. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME "path/to/my/lwip_hooks.h" +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN: + * Hook for generation of the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) for a new TCP + * connection. The default lwIP ISN generation algorithm is very basic and may + * allow for TCP spoofing attacks. This hook provides the means to implement + * the standardized ISN generation algorithm from RFC 6528 (see contrib/adons/tcp_isn), + * or any other desired algorithm as a replacement. + * Called from tcp_connect() and tcp_listen_input() when an ISN is needed for + * a new TCP connection, if TCP support (@ref LWIP_TCP) is enabled.\n + * Signature:\code{.c} + * u32_t my_hook_tcp_isn(const ip_addr_t* local_ip, u16_t local_port, const ip_addr_t* remote_ip, u16_t remote_port); + * \endcode + * - it may be necessary to use "struct ip_addr" (ip4_addr, ip6_addr) instead of "ip_addr_t" in function declarations\n + * Arguments: + * - local_ip: pointer to the local IP address of the connection + * - local_port: local port number of the connection (host-byte order) + * - remote_ip: pointer to the remote IP address of the connection + * - remote_port: remote port number of the connection (host-byte order)\n + * Return value: + * - the 32-bit Initial Sequence Number to use for the new TCP connection. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_TCP_ISN(local_ip, local_port, remote_ip, remote_port) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB: + * Hook for intercepting incoming packets before they are passed to a pcb. This + * allows updating some state or even dropping a packet. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * err_t my_hook_tcp_inpkt(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct tcp_hdr *hdr, u16_t optlen, u16_t opt1len, u8_t *opt2, struct pbuf *p); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - pcb: tcp_pcb selected for input of this packet (ATTENTION: this may be + * struct tcp_pcb_listen if pcb->state == LISTEN) + * - hdr: pointer to tcp header (ATTENTION: tcp options may not be in one piece!) + * - optlen: tcp option length + * - opt1len: tcp option length 1st part + * - opt2: if this is != NULL, tcp options are split among 2 pbufs. In that case, + * options start at right after the tcp header ('(u8_t*)(hdr + 1)') for + * the first 'opt1len' bytes and the rest starts at 'opt2'. opt2len can + * be simply calculated: 'opt2len = optlen - opt1len;' + * - p: input packet, p->payload points to application data (that's why tcp hdr + * and options are passed in seperately) + * Return value: + * - ERR_OK: continue input of this packet as normal + * - != ERR_OK: drop this packet for input (don't continue input processing) + * + * ATTENTION: don't call any tcp api functions that might change tcp state (pcb + * state or any pcb lists) from this callback! + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_TCP_INPACKET_PCB(pcb, hdr, optlen, opt1len, opt2, p) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH: + * Hook for increasing the size of the options allocated with a tcp header. + * Together with LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS, this can be used to add custom + * options to outgoing tcp segments. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * u8_t my_hook_tcp_out_tcpopt_length(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t internal_option_length); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - pcb: tcp_pcb that transmits (ATTENTION: this may be NULL or + * struct tcp_pcb_listen if pcb->state == LISTEN) + * - internal_option_length: tcp option length used by the stack internally + * Return value: + * - a number of bytes to allocate for tcp options (internal_option_length <= ret <= 40) + * + * ATTENTION: don't call any tcp api functions that might change tcp state (pcb + * state or any pcb lists) from this callback! + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH(pcb, internal_len) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS: + * Hook for adding custom options to outgoing tcp segments. + * Space for these custom options has to be reserved via LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_TCPOPT_LENGTH. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * u32_t *my_hook_tcp_out_add_tcpopts(struct pbuf *p, struct tcp_hdr *hdr, const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t *opts); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - p: output packet, p->payload pointing to tcp header, data follows + * - hdr: tcp header + * - pcb: tcp_pcb that transmits (ATTENTION: this may be NULL or + * struct tcp_pcb_listen if pcb->state == LISTEN) + * - opts: pointer where to add the custom options (there may already be options + * between the header and these) + * Return value: + * - pointer pointing directly after the inserted options + * + * ATTENTION: don't call any tcp api functions that might change tcp state (pcb + * state or any pcb lists) from this callback! + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_TCP_OUT_ADD_TCPOPTS(p, hdr, pcb, opts) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_INPUT(pbuf, input_netif): + * Called from ip_input() (IPv4) + * Signature:\code{.c} + * int my_hook(struct pbuf *pbuf, struct netif *input_netif); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - pbuf: received struct pbuf passed to ip_input() + * - input_netif: struct netif on which the packet has been received + * Return values: + * - 0: Hook has not consumed the packet, packet is processed as normal + * - != 0: Hook has consumed the packet. + * If the hook consumed the packet, 'pbuf' is in the responsibility of the hook + * (i.e. free it when done). + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_INPUT(pbuf, input_netif) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE(dest): + * Called from ip_route() (IPv4) + * Signature:\code{.c} + * struct netif *my_hook(const ip4_addr_t *dest); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - dest: destination IPv4 address + * Returns values: + * - the destination netif + * - NULL if no destination netif is found. In that case, ip_route() continues as normal. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE() +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(src, dest): + * Source-based routing for IPv4 - called from ip_route() (IPv4) + * Signature:\code{.c} + * struct netif *my_hook(const ip4_addr_t *src, const ip4_addr_t *dest); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - src: local/source IPv4 address + * - dest: destination IPv4 address + * Returns values: + * - the destination netif + * - NULL if no destination netif is found. In that case, ip_route() continues as normal. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE_SRC(src, dest) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD(src, dest): + * Check if an IPv4 can be forwarded - called from: + * ip4_input() -> ip4_forward() -> ip4_canforward() (IPv4) + * - source address is available via ip4_current_src_addr() + * - calling an output function in this context (e.g. multicast router) is allowed + * Signature:\code{.c} + * int my_hook(struct pbuf *p, u32_t dest_addr_hostorder); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - p: packet to forward + * - dest: destination IPv4 address + * Returns values: + * - 1: forward + * - 0: don't forward + * - -1: no decision. In that case, ip4_canforward() continues as normal. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_IP4_CANFORWARD(src, dest) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW(netif, dest): + * Called from etharp_output() (IPv4) + * Signature:\code{.c} + * const ip4_addr_t *my_hook(struct netif *netif, const ip4_addr_t *dest); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - netif: the netif used for sending + * - dest: the destination IPv4 address + * Return values: + * - the IPv4 address of the gateway to handle the specified destination IPv4 address + * - NULL, in which case the netif's default gateway is used + * + * The returned address MUST be directly reachable on the specified netif! + * This function is meant to implement advanced IPv4 routing together with + * LWIP_HOOK_IP4_ROUTE(). The actual routing/gateway table implementation is + * not part of lwIP but can e.g. be hidden in the netif's state argument. +*/ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_ETHARP_GET_GW(netif, dest) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_IP6_INPUT(pbuf, input_netif): + * Called from ip6_input() (IPv6) + * Signature:\code{.c} + * int my_hook(struct pbuf *pbuf, struct netif *input_netif); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - pbuf: received struct pbuf passed to ip6_input() + * - input_netif: struct netif on which the packet has been received + * Return values: + * - 0: Hook has not consumed the packet, packet is processed as normal + * - != 0: Hook has consumed the packet. + * If the hook consumed the packet, 'pbuf' is in the responsibility of the hook + * (i.e. free it when done). + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_IP6_INPUT(pbuf, input_netif) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE(src, dest): + * Called from ip_route() (IPv6) + * Signature:\code{.c} + * struct netif *my_hook(const ip6_addr_t *dest, const ip6_addr_t *src); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - src: source IPv6 address + * - dest: destination IPv6 address + * Return values: + * - the destination netif + * - NULL if no destination netif is found. In that case, ip6_route() continues as normal. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE(src, dest) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW(netif, dest): + * Called from nd6_get_next_hop_entry() (IPv6) + * Signature:\code{.c} + * const ip6_addr_t *my_hook(struct netif *netif, const ip6_addr_t *dest); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - netif: the netif used for sending + * - dest: the destination IPv6 address + * Return values: + * - the IPv6 address of the next hop to handle the specified destination IPv6 address + * - NULL, in which case a NDP-discovered router is used instead + * + * The returned address MUST be directly reachable on the specified netif! + * This function is meant to implement advanced IPv6 routing together with + * LWIP_HOOK_IP6_ROUTE(). The actual routing/gateway table implementation is + * not part of lwIP but can e.g. be hidden in the netif's state argument. +*/ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_ND6_GET_GW(netif, dest) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK(netif, eth_hdr, vlan_hdr): + * Called from ethernet_input() if VLAN support is enabled + * Signature:\code{.c} + * int my_hook(struct netif *netif, struct eth_hdr *eth_hdr, struct eth_vlan_hdr *vlan_hdr); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - netif: struct netif on which the packet has been received + * - eth_hdr: struct eth_hdr of the packet + * - vlan_hdr: struct eth_vlan_hdr of the packet + * Return values: + * - 0: Packet must be dropped. + * - != 0: Packet must be accepted. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK(netif, eth_hdr, vlan_hdr) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET: + * Hook can be used to set prio_vid field of vlan_hdr. If you need to store data + * on per-netif basis to implement this callback, see @ref netif_cd. + * Called from ethernet_output() if VLAN support (@ref ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN) is enabled.\n + * Signature:\code{.c} + * s32_t my_hook_vlan_set(struct netif* netif, struct pbuf* pbuf, const struct eth_addr* src, const struct eth_addr* dst, u16_t eth_type);\n + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - netif: struct netif that the packet will be sent through + * - p: struct pbuf packet to be sent + * - src: source eth address + * - dst: destination eth address + * - eth_type: ethernet type to packet to be sent\n + * + * + * Return values: + * - <0: Packet shall not contain VLAN header. + * - 0 <= return value <= 0xFFFF: Packet shall contain VLAN header. Return value is prio_vid in host byte order. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET(netif, p, src, dst, eth_type) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE(memp_t_type): + * Called from memp_free() when a memp pool was empty and an item is now available + * Signature:\code{.c} + * void my_hook(memp_t type); + * \endcode + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_MEMP_AVAILABLE(memp_t_type) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL(pbuf, netif): + * Called from ethernet_input() when an unknown eth type is encountered. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * err_t my_hook(struct pbuf* pbuf, struct netif* netif); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - p: rx packet with unknown eth type + * - netif: netif on which the packet has been received + * Return values: + * - ERR_OK if packet is accepted (hook function now owns the pbuf) + * - any error code otherwise (pbuf is freed) + * + * Payload points to ethernet header! + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL(pbuf, netif) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr): + * Called from various dhcp functions when sending a DHCP message. + * This hook is called just before the DHCP message trailer is added, so the + * options are at the end of a DHCP message. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * void my_hook(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t state, struct dhcp_msg *msg, + * u8_t msg_type, u16_t *options_len_ptr); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - netif: struct netif that the packet will be sent through + * - dhcp: struct dhcp on that netif + * - state: current dhcp state (dhcp_state_enum_t as an u8_t) + * - msg: struct dhcp_msg that will be sent + * - msg_type: dhcp message type to be sent (u8_t) + * - options_len_ptr: pointer to the current length of options in the dhcp_msg "msg" + * (must be increased when options are added!) + * + * Options need to appended like this: + * LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp option overflow", *options_len_ptr + option_len + 2 <= DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN); + * msg->options[(*options_len_ptr)++] = <option_number>; + * msg->options[(*options_len_ptr)++] = <option_len>; + * msg->options[(*options_len_ptr)++] = <option_bytes>; + * [...] + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, option, len, pbuf, option_value_offset): + * Called from dhcp_parse_reply when receiving a DHCP message. + * This hook is called for every option in the received message that is not handled internally. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * void my_hook(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp *dhcp, u8_t state, struct dhcp_msg *msg, + * u8_t msg_type, u8_t option, u8_t option_len, struct pbuf *pbuf, u16_t option_value_offset); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - netif: struct netif that the packet will be sent through + * - dhcp: struct dhcp on that netif + * - state: current dhcp state (dhcp_state_enum_t as an u8_t) + * - msg: struct dhcp_msg that was received + * - msg_type: dhcp message type received (u8_t, ATTENTION: only valid after + * the message type option has been parsed!) + * - option: option value (u8_t) + * - len: option data length (u8_t) + * - pbuf: pbuf where option data is contained + * - option_value_offset: offset in pbuf where option data begins + * + * A nice way to get the option contents is pbuf_get_contiguous(): + * u8_t buf[32]; + * u8_t *ptr = (u8_t*)pbuf_get_contiguous(p, buf, sizeof(buf), LWIP_MIN(option_len, sizeof(buf)), offset); + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP_PARSE_OPTION(netif, dhcp, state, msg, msg_type, option, len, pbuf, offset) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp6, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr, max_len): + * Called from various dhcp6 functions when sending a DHCP6 message. + * This hook is called just before the DHCP6 message is sent, so the + * options are at the end of a DHCP6 message. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * void my_hook(struct netif *netif, struct dhcp6 *dhcp, u8_t state, struct dhcp6_msg *msg, + * u8_t msg_type, u16_t *options_len_ptr); + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - netif: struct netif that the packet will be sent through + * - dhcp6: struct dhcp6 on that netif + * - state: current dhcp6 state (dhcp6_state_enum_t as an u8_t) + * - msg: struct dhcp6_msg that will be sent + * - msg_type: dhcp6 message type to be sent (u8_t) + * - options_len_ptr: pointer to the current length of options in the dhcp6_msg "msg" + * (must be increased when options are added!) + * + * Options need to appended like this: + * u8_t *options = (u8_t *)(msg + 1); + * LWIP_ASSERT("dhcp option overflow", sizeof(struct dhcp6_msg) + *options_len_ptr + newoptlen <= max_len); + * options[(*options_len_ptr)++] = <option_data>; + * [...] + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_DHCP6_APPEND_OPTIONS(netif, dhcp6, state, msg, msg_type, options_len_ptr, max_len) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_SETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, err) + * Called from socket API to implement setsockopt() for options not provided by lwIP. + * Core lock is held when this hook is called. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * int my_hook(int s, struct lwip_sock *sock, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen, int *err) + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - s: socket file descriptor + * - sock: internal socket descriptor (see lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h) + * - level: protocol level at which the option resides + * - optname: option to set + * - optval: value to set + * - optlen: size of optval + * - err: output error + * Return values: + * - 0: Hook has not consumed the option, code continues as normal (to internal options) + * - != 0: Hook has consumed the option, 'err' is returned + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_SETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, err) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_GETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, err) + * Called from socket API to implement getsockopt() for options not provided by lwIP. + * Core lock is held when this hook is called. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * int my_hook(int s, struct lwip_sock *sock, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen, int *err) + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - s: socket file descriptor + * - sock: internal socket descriptor (see lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h) + * - level: protocol level at which the option resides + * - optname: option to get + * - optval: value to get + * - optlen: size of optval + * - err: output error + * Return values: + * - 0: Hook has not consumed the option, code continues as normal (to internal options) + * - != 0: Hook has consumed the option, 'err' is returned + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_SOCKETS_GETSOCKOPT(s, sock, level, optname, optval, optlen, err) +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE(name, addr, addrtype, err) + * Called from netconn APIs (not usable with callback apps) allowing an + * external DNS resolver (which uses sequential API) to handle the query. + * Signature:\code{.c} + * int my_hook(const char *name, ip_addr_t *addr, u8_t addrtype, err_t *err) + * \endcode + * Arguments: + * - name: hostname to resolve + * - addr: output host address + * - addrtype: type of address to query + * - err: output error + * Return values: + * - 0: Hook has not consumed hostname query, query continues into DNS module + * - != 0: Hook has consumed the query + * + * err must also be checked to determine if the hook consumed the query, but + * the query failed + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_HOOK_NETCONN_EXTERNAL_RESOLVE(name, addr, addrtype, err) +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/* + --------------------------------------- + ---------- Debugging options ---------- + --------------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_debugmsg Debug messages + * @ingroup lwip_opts_debug + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL: After masking, the value of the debug is + * compared against this value. If it is smaller, then debugging + * messages are written. + * @see debugging_levels + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DBG_MIN_LEVEL LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_ALL +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON: A mask that can be used to globally enable/disable + * debug messages of certain types. + * @see debugging_levels + */ +#if !defined LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_DBG_TYPES_ON LWIP_DBG_ON +#endif + +/** + * ETHARP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in etharp.c. + */ +#if !defined ETHARP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ETHARP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * NETIF_DEBUG: Enable debugging in netif.c. + */ +#if !defined NETIF_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define NETIF_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * PBUF_DEBUG: Enable debugging in pbuf.c. + */ +#if !defined PBUF_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define PBUF_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * API_LIB_DEBUG: Enable debugging in api_lib.c. + */ +#if !defined API_LIB_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define API_LIB_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * API_MSG_DEBUG: Enable debugging in api_msg.c. + */ +#if !defined API_MSG_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define API_MSG_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * SOCKETS_DEBUG: Enable debugging in sockets.c. + */ +#if !defined SOCKETS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SOCKETS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * ICMP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in icmp.c. + */ +#if !defined ICMP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define ICMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * IGMP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in igmp.c. + */ +#if !defined IGMP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IGMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * INET_DEBUG: Enable debugging in inet.c. + */ +#if !defined INET_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define INET_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * IP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for IP. + */ +#if !defined IP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * IP_REASS_DEBUG: Enable debugging in ip_frag.c for both frag & reass. + */ +#if !defined IP_REASS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP_REASS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * RAW_DEBUG: Enable debugging in raw.c. + */ +#if !defined RAW_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define RAW_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * MEM_DEBUG: Enable debugging in mem.c. + */ +#if !defined MEM_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEM_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in memp.c. + */ +#if !defined MEMP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define MEMP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * SYS_DEBUG: Enable debugging in sys.c. + */ +#if !defined SYS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SYS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TIMERS_DEBUG: Enable debugging in timers.c. + */ +#if !defined TIMERS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TIMERS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for TCP. + */ +#if !defined TCP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCP_INPUT_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcp_in.c for incoming debug. + */ +#if !defined TCP_INPUT_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_INPUT_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCP_FR_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcp_in.c for fast retransmit. + */ +#if !defined TCP_FR_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_FR_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCP_RTO_DEBUG: Enable debugging in TCP for retransmit + * timeout. + */ +#if !defined TCP_RTO_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_RTO_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCP_CWND_DEBUG: Enable debugging for TCP congestion window. + */ +#if !defined TCP_CWND_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_CWND_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCP_WND_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcp_in.c for window updating. + */ +#if !defined TCP_WND_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_WND_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcp_out.c output functions. + */ +#if !defined TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCP_RST_DEBUG: Enable debugging for TCP with the RST message. + */ +#if !defined TCP_RST_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_RST_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCP_QLEN_DEBUG: Enable debugging for TCP queue lengths. + */ +#if !defined TCP_QLEN_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCP_QLEN_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * UDP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in UDP. + */ +#if !defined UDP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define UDP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * TCPIP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in tcpip.c. + */ +#if !defined TCPIP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define TCPIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * SLIP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in slipif.c. + */ +#if !defined SLIP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define SLIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * DHCP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in dhcp.c. + */ +#if !defined DHCP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DHCP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * AUTOIP_DEBUG: Enable debugging in autoip.c. + */ +#if !defined AUTOIP_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define AUTOIP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * DNS_DEBUG: Enable debugging for DNS. + */ +#if !defined DNS_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DNS_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * IP6_DEBUG: Enable debugging for IPv6. + */ +#if !defined IP6_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define IP6_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * DHCP6_DEBUG: Enable debugging in dhcp6.c. + */ +#if !defined DHCP6_DEBUG || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define DHCP6_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +/** + * LWIP_TESTMODE: Changes to make unit test possible + */ +#if !defined LWIP_TESTMODE +#define LWIP_TESTMODE 0 +#endif + +/* + -------------------------------------------------- + ---------- Performance tracking options ---------- + -------------------------------------------------- +*/ +/** + * @defgroup lwip_opts_perf Performance + * @ingroup lwip_opts_debug + * @{ + */ +/** + * LWIP_PERF: Enable performance testing for lwIP + * (if enabled, arch/perf.h is included) + */ +#if !defined LWIP_PERF || defined __DOXYGEN__ +#define LWIP_PERF 0 +#endif +/** + * @} + */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_OPT_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/pbuf.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/pbuf.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/pbuf.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/pbuf.h index cb2e994f..05434d41 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/pbuf.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/pbuf.h @@ -1,323 +1,323 @@ -/** - * @file - * pbuf API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PBUF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PBUF_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF==1: Custom pbufs behave much like their pbuf type - * but they are allocated by external code (initialised by calling - * pbuf_alloced_custom()) and when pbuf_free gives up their last reference, they - * are freed by calling pbuf_custom->custom_free_function(). - * Currently, the pbuf_custom code is only needed for one specific configuration - * of IP_FRAG, unless required by external driver/application code. */ -#ifndef LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF -#define LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF ((IP_FRAG && !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF) || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG)) -#endif - -/** @ingroup pbuf - * PBUF_NEEDS_COPY(p): return a boolean value indicating whether the given - * pbuf needs to be copied in order to be kept around beyond the current call - * stack without risking being corrupted. The default setting provides safety: - * it will make a copy iof any pbuf chain that does not consist entirely of - * PBUF_ROM type pbufs. For setups with zero-copy support, it may be redefined - * to evaluate to true in all cases, for example. However, doing so also has an - * effect on the application side: any buffers that are *not* copied must also - * *not* be reused by the application after passing them to lwIP. For example, - * when setting PBUF_NEEDS_COPY to (0), after using udp_send() with a PBUF_RAM - * pbuf, the application must free the pbuf immediately, rather than reusing it - * for other purposes. For more background information on this, see tasks #6735 - * and #7896, and bugs #11400 and #49914. */ -#ifndef PBUF_NEEDS_COPY -#define PBUF_NEEDS_COPY(p) ((p)->type_internal & PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_DATA_VOLATILE) -#endif /* PBUF_NEEDS_COPY */ - -/* @todo: We need a mechanism to prevent wasting memory in every pbuf - (TCP vs. UDP, IPv4 vs. IPv6: UDP/IPv4 packets may waste up to 28 bytes) */ - -#define PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN 20 -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#define PBUF_IP_HLEN 40 -#else -#define PBUF_IP_HLEN 20 -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Enumeration of pbuf layers - */ -typedef enum { - /** Includes spare room for transport layer header, e.g. UDP header. - * Use this if you intend to pass the pbuf to functions like udp_send(). - */ - PBUF_TRANSPORT = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN, - /** Includes spare room for IP header. - * Use this if you intend to pass the pbuf to functions like raw_send(). - */ - PBUF_IP = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN, - /** Includes spare room for link layer header (ethernet header). - * Use this if you intend to pass the pbuf to functions like ethernet_output(). - * @see PBUF_LINK_HLEN - */ - PBUF_LINK = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN, - /** Includes spare room for additional encapsulation header before ethernet - * headers (e.g. 802.11). - * Use this if you intend to pass the pbuf to functions like netif->linkoutput(). - * @see PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN - */ - PBUF_RAW_TX = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN, - /** Use this for input packets in a netif driver when calling netif->input() - * in the most common case - ethernet-layer netif driver. */ - PBUF_RAW = 0 -} pbuf_layer; - -/* Base flags for pbuf_type definitions: */ - -/** Indicates that the payload directly follows the struct pbuf. - * This makes @ref pbuf_header work in both directions. */ -#define PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS 0x80 -/** Indicates the data stored in this pbuf can change. If this pbuf needs - * to be queued, it must be copied/duplicated. */ -#define PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_DATA_VOLATILE 0x40 -/** 4 bits are reserved for 16 allocation sources (e.g. heap, pool1, pool2, etc) - * Internally, we use: 0=heap, 1=MEMP_PBUF, 2=MEMP_PBUF_POOL -> 13 types free*/ -#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK 0x0F -/** Indicates this pbuf is used for RX (if not set, indicates use for TX). - * This information can be used to keep some spare RX buffers e.g. for - * receiving TCP ACKs to unblock a connection) */ -#define PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_RX 0x0100 -/** Indicates the application needs the pbuf payload to be in one piece */ -#define PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_DATA_CONTIGUOUS 0x0200 - -#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_HEAP 0x00 -#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF 0x01 -#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF_POOL 0x02 -/** First pbuf allocation type for applications */ -#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_APP_MIN 0x03 -/** Last pbuf allocation type for applications */ -#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_APP_MAX PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK - -/** - * @ingroup pbuf - * Enumeration of pbuf types - */ -typedef enum { - /** pbuf data is stored in RAM, used for TX mostly, struct pbuf and its payload - are allocated in one piece of contiguous memory (so the first payload byte - can be calculated from struct pbuf). - pbuf_alloc() allocates PBUF_RAM pbufs as unchained pbufs (although that might - change in future versions). - This should be used for all OUTGOING packets (TX).*/ - PBUF_RAM = (PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_DATA_CONTIGUOUS | PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS | PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_HEAP), - /** pbuf data is stored in ROM, i.e. struct pbuf and its payload are located in - totally different memory areas. Since it points to ROM, payload does not - have to be copied when queued for transmission. */ - PBUF_ROM = PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF, - /** pbuf comes from the pbuf pool. Much like PBUF_ROM but payload might change - so it has to be duplicated when queued before transmitting, depending on - who has a 'ref' to it. */ - PBUF_REF = (PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_DATA_VOLATILE | PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF), - /** pbuf payload refers to RAM. This one comes from a pool and should be used - for RX. Payload can be chained (scatter-gather RX) but like PBUF_RAM, struct - pbuf and its payload are allocated in one piece of contiguous memory (so - the first payload byte can be calculated from struct pbuf). - Don't use this for TX, if the pool becomes empty e.g. because of TCP queuing, - you are unable to receive TCP acks! */ - PBUF_POOL = (PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_RX | PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS | PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF_POOL) -} pbuf_type; - -/** indicates this packet's data should be immediately passed to the application */ -#define PBUF_FLAG_PUSH 0x01U -/** indicates this is a custom pbuf: pbuf_free calls pbuf_custom->custom_free_function() - when the last reference is released (plus custom PBUF_RAM cannot be trimmed) */ -#define PBUF_FLAG_IS_CUSTOM 0x02U -/** indicates this pbuf is UDP multicast to be looped back */ -#define PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP 0x04U -/** indicates this pbuf was received as link-level broadcast */ -#define PBUF_FLAG_LLBCAST 0x08U -/** indicates this pbuf was received as link-level multicast */ -#define PBUF_FLAG_LLMCAST 0x10U -/** indicates this pbuf includes a TCP FIN flag */ -#define PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN 0x20U - -/** Main packet buffer struct */ -struct pbuf { - /** next pbuf in singly linked pbuf chain */ - struct pbuf *next; - - /** pointer to the actual data in the buffer */ - void *payload; - - /** - * total length of this buffer and all next buffers in chain - * belonging to the same packet. - * - * For non-queue packet chains this is the invariant: - * p->tot_len == p->len + (p->next? p->next->tot_len: 0) - */ - u16_t tot_len; - - /** length of this buffer */ - u16_t len; - - /** a bit field indicating pbuf type and allocation sources - (see PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_*, PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_* and PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK) - */ - u8_t type_internal; - - /** misc flags */ - u8_t flags; - - /** - * the reference count always equals the number of pointers - * that refer to this pbuf. This can be pointers from an application, - * the stack itself, or pbuf->next pointers from a chain. - */ - LWIP_PBUF_REF_T ref; - - /** For incoming packets, this contains the input netif's index */ - u8_t if_idx; -}; - -/** Helper struct for const-correctness only. - * The only meaning of this one is to provide a const payload pointer - * for PBUF_ROM type. - */ -struct pbuf_rom { - /** next pbuf in singly linked pbuf chain */ - struct pbuf *next; - - /** pointer to the actual data in the buffer */ - const void *payload; -}; - -#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF -/** Prototype for a function to free a custom pbuf */ -typedef void (*pbuf_free_custom_fn)(struct pbuf *p); - -/** A custom pbuf: like a pbuf, but following a function pointer to free it. */ -struct pbuf_custom { - /** The actual pbuf */ - struct pbuf pbuf; - /** This function is called when pbuf_free deallocates this pbuf(_custom) */ - pbuf_free_custom_fn custom_free_function; -}; -#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ - -/** Define this to 0 to prevent freeing ooseq pbufs when the PBUF_POOL is empty */ -#ifndef PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ -#define PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ 1 -#endif /* PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ */ -#if LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && NO_SYS && PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ -extern volatile u8_t pbuf_free_ooseq_pending; -void pbuf_free_ooseq(void); -/** When not using sys_check_timeouts(), call PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ() - at regular intervals from main level to check if ooseq pbufs need to be - freed! */ -#define PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ() \ - do { \ - if (pbuf_free_ooseq_pending) { \ - /* pbuf_alloc() reported PBUF_POOL to be empty -> try to free some \ - ooseq queued pbufs now */ \ - pbuf_free_ooseq(); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#else /* LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && NO_SYS && PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ */ -/* Otherwise declare an empty PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ */ -#define PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ() -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && NO_SYS && PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ*/ - -/* Initializes the pbuf module. This call is empty for now, but may not be in future. */ -#define pbuf_init() - -struct pbuf *pbuf_alloc(pbuf_layer l, u16_t length, pbuf_type type); -struct pbuf *pbuf_alloc_reference(void *payload, u16_t length, pbuf_type type); -#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF -struct pbuf *pbuf_alloced_custom(pbuf_layer l, u16_t length, pbuf_type type, - struct pbuf_custom *p, void *payload_mem, - u16_t payload_mem_len); -#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ -void pbuf_realloc(struct pbuf *p, u16_t size); -#define pbuf_get_allocsrc(p) ((p)->type_internal & PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK) -#define pbuf_match_allocsrc(p, type) (pbuf_get_allocsrc(p) == ((type)&PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK)) -#define pbuf_match_type(p, type) pbuf_match_allocsrc(p, type) -u8_t pbuf_header(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size); -u8_t pbuf_header_force(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size); -u8_t pbuf_add_header(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment); -u8_t pbuf_add_header_force(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment); -u8_t pbuf_remove_header(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size); -struct pbuf *pbuf_free_header(struct pbuf *q, u16_t size); -void pbuf_ref(struct pbuf *p); -u8_t pbuf_free(struct pbuf *p); -u16_t pbuf_clen(const struct pbuf *p); -void pbuf_cat(struct pbuf *head, struct pbuf *tail); -void pbuf_chain(struct pbuf *head, struct pbuf *tail); -struct pbuf *pbuf_dechain(struct pbuf *p); -err_t pbuf_copy(struct pbuf *p_to, const struct pbuf *p_from); -u16_t pbuf_copy_partial(const struct pbuf *p, void *dataptr, u16_t len, u16_t offset); -void *pbuf_get_contiguous(const struct pbuf *p, void *buffer, size_t bufsize, u16_t len, u16_t offset); -err_t pbuf_take(struct pbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t len); -err_t pbuf_take_at(struct pbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u16_t offset); -struct pbuf *pbuf_skip(struct pbuf *in, u16_t in_offset, u16_t *out_offset); -struct pbuf *pbuf_coalesce(struct pbuf *p, pbuf_layer layer); -struct pbuf *pbuf_clone(pbuf_layer l, pbuf_type type, struct pbuf *p); -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY -err_t pbuf_fill_chksum(struct pbuf *p, u16_t start_offset, const void *dataptr, - u16_t len, u16_t *chksum); -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ -#if LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE -void pbuf_split_64k(struct pbuf *p, struct pbuf **rest); -#endif /* LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - -u8_t pbuf_get_at(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset); -int pbuf_try_get_at(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset); -void pbuf_put_at(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u8_t data); -u16_t pbuf_memcmp(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, const void *s2, u16_t n); -u16_t pbuf_memfind(const struct pbuf *p, const void *mem, u16_t mem_len, u16_t start_offset); -u16_t pbuf_strstr(const struct pbuf *p, const char *substr); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PBUF_H */ +/** + * @file + * pbuf API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PBUF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PBUF_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF==1: Custom pbufs behave much like their pbuf type + * but they are allocated by external code (initialised by calling + * pbuf_alloced_custom()) and when pbuf_free gives up their last reference, they + * are freed by calling pbuf_custom->custom_free_function(). + * Currently, the pbuf_custom code is only needed for one specific configuration + * of IP_FRAG, unless required by external driver/application code. */ +#ifndef LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF +#define LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF ((IP_FRAG && !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF) || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG)) +#endif + +/** @ingroup pbuf + * PBUF_NEEDS_COPY(p): return a boolean value indicating whether the given + * pbuf needs to be copied in order to be kept around beyond the current call + * stack without risking being corrupted. The default setting provides safety: + * it will make a copy iof any pbuf chain that does not consist entirely of + * PBUF_ROM type pbufs. For setups with zero-copy support, it may be redefined + * to evaluate to true in all cases, for example. However, doing so also has an + * effect on the application side: any buffers that are *not* copied must also + * *not* be reused by the application after passing them to lwIP. For example, + * when setting PBUF_NEEDS_COPY to (0), after using udp_send() with a PBUF_RAM + * pbuf, the application must free the pbuf immediately, rather than reusing it + * for other purposes. For more background information on this, see tasks #6735 + * and #7896, and bugs #11400 and #49914. */ +#ifndef PBUF_NEEDS_COPY +#define PBUF_NEEDS_COPY(p) ((p)->type_internal & PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_DATA_VOLATILE) +#endif /* PBUF_NEEDS_COPY */ + +/* @todo: We need a mechanism to prevent wasting memory in every pbuf + (TCP vs. UDP, IPv4 vs. IPv6: UDP/IPv4 packets may waste up to 28 bytes) */ + +#define PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN 20 +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#define PBUF_IP_HLEN 40 +#else +#define PBUF_IP_HLEN 20 +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Enumeration of pbuf layers + */ +typedef enum { + /** Includes spare room for transport layer header, e.g. UDP header. + * Use this if you intend to pass the pbuf to functions like udp_send(). + */ + PBUF_TRANSPORT = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN, + /** Includes spare room for IP header. + * Use this if you intend to pass the pbuf to functions like raw_send(). + */ + PBUF_IP = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN, + /** Includes spare room for link layer header (ethernet header). + * Use this if you intend to pass the pbuf to functions like ethernet_output(). + * @see PBUF_LINK_HLEN + */ + PBUF_LINK = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN, + /** Includes spare room for additional encapsulation header before ethernet + * headers (e.g. 802.11). + * Use this if you intend to pass the pbuf to functions like netif->linkoutput(). + * @see PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + */ + PBUF_RAW_TX = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN, + /** Use this for input packets in a netif driver when calling netif->input() + * in the most common case - ethernet-layer netif driver. */ + PBUF_RAW = 0 +} pbuf_layer; + +/* Base flags for pbuf_type definitions: */ + +/** Indicates that the payload directly follows the struct pbuf. + * This makes @ref pbuf_header work in both directions. */ +#define PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS 0x80 +/** Indicates the data stored in this pbuf can change. If this pbuf needs + * to be queued, it must be copied/duplicated. */ +#define PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_DATA_VOLATILE 0x40 +/** 4 bits are reserved for 16 allocation sources (e.g. heap, pool1, pool2, etc) + * Internally, we use: 0=heap, 1=MEMP_PBUF, 2=MEMP_PBUF_POOL -> 13 types free*/ +#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK 0x0F +/** Indicates this pbuf is used for RX (if not set, indicates use for TX). + * This information can be used to keep some spare RX buffers e.g. for + * receiving TCP ACKs to unblock a connection) */ +#define PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_RX 0x0100 +/** Indicates the application needs the pbuf payload to be in one piece */ +#define PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_DATA_CONTIGUOUS 0x0200 + +#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_HEAP 0x00 +#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF 0x01 +#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF_POOL 0x02 +/** First pbuf allocation type for applications */ +#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_APP_MIN 0x03 +/** Last pbuf allocation type for applications */ +#define PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_APP_MAX PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK + +/** + * @ingroup pbuf + * Enumeration of pbuf types + */ +typedef enum { + /** pbuf data is stored in RAM, used for TX mostly, struct pbuf and its payload + are allocated in one piece of contiguous memory (so the first payload byte + can be calculated from struct pbuf). + pbuf_alloc() allocates PBUF_RAM pbufs as unchained pbufs (although that might + change in future versions). + This should be used for all OUTGOING packets (TX).*/ + PBUF_RAM = (PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_DATA_CONTIGUOUS | PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS | PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_HEAP), + /** pbuf data is stored in ROM, i.e. struct pbuf and its payload are located in + totally different memory areas. Since it points to ROM, payload does not + have to be copied when queued for transmission. */ + PBUF_ROM = PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF, + /** pbuf comes from the pbuf pool. Much like PBUF_ROM but payload might change + so it has to be duplicated when queued before transmitting, depending on + who has a 'ref' to it. */ + PBUF_REF = (PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_DATA_VOLATILE | PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF), + /** pbuf payload refers to RAM. This one comes from a pool and should be used + for RX. Payload can be chained (scatter-gather RX) but like PBUF_RAM, struct + pbuf and its payload are allocated in one piece of contiguous memory (so + the first payload byte can be calculated from struct pbuf). + Don't use this for TX, if the pool becomes empty e.g. because of TCP queuing, + you are unable to receive TCP acks! */ + PBUF_POOL = (PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_RX | PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_STRUCT_DATA_CONTIGUOUS | PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK_STD_MEMP_PBUF_POOL) +} pbuf_type; + +/** indicates this packet's data should be immediately passed to the application */ +#define PBUF_FLAG_PUSH 0x01U +/** indicates this is a custom pbuf: pbuf_free calls pbuf_custom->custom_free_function() + when the last reference is released (plus custom PBUF_RAM cannot be trimmed) */ +#define PBUF_FLAG_IS_CUSTOM 0x02U +/** indicates this pbuf is UDP multicast to be looped back */ +#define PBUF_FLAG_MCASTLOOP 0x04U +/** indicates this pbuf was received as link-level broadcast */ +#define PBUF_FLAG_LLBCAST 0x08U +/** indicates this pbuf was received as link-level multicast */ +#define PBUF_FLAG_LLMCAST 0x10U +/** indicates this pbuf includes a TCP FIN flag */ +#define PBUF_FLAG_TCP_FIN 0x20U + +/** Main packet buffer struct */ +struct pbuf { + /** next pbuf in singly linked pbuf chain */ + struct pbuf *next; + + /** pointer to the actual data in the buffer */ + void *payload; + + /** + * total length of this buffer and all next buffers in chain + * belonging to the same packet. + * + * For non-queue packet chains this is the invariant: + * p->tot_len == p->len + (p->next? p->next->tot_len: 0) + */ + u16_t tot_len; + + /** length of this buffer */ + u16_t len; + + /** a bit field indicating pbuf type and allocation sources + (see PBUF_TYPE_FLAG_*, PBUF_ALLOC_FLAG_* and PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK) + */ + u8_t type_internal; + + /** misc flags */ + u8_t flags; + + /** + * the reference count always equals the number of pointers + * that refer to this pbuf. This can be pointers from an application, + * the stack itself, or pbuf->next pointers from a chain. + */ + LWIP_PBUF_REF_T ref; + + /** For incoming packets, this contains the input netif's index */ + u8_t if_idx; +}; + +/** Helper struct for const-correctness only. + * The only meaning of this one is to provide a const payload pointer + * for PBUF_ROM type. + */ +struct pbuf_rom { + /** next pbuf in singly linked pbuf chain */ + struct pbuf *next; + + /** pointer to the actual data in the buffer */ + const void *payload; +}; + +#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF +/** Prototype for a function to free a custom pbuf */ +typedef void (*pbuf_free_custom_fn)(struct pbuf *p); + +/** A custom pbuf: like a pbuf, but following a function pointer to free it. */ +struct pbuf_custom { + /** The actual pbuf */ + struct pbuf pbuf; + /** This function is called when pbuf_free deallocates this pbuf(_custom) */ + pbuf_free_custom_fn custom_free_function; +}; +#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ + +/** Define this to 0 to prevent freeing ooseq pbufs when the PBUF_POOL is empty */ +#ifndef PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ +#define PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ 1 +#endif /* PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ */ +#if LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && NO_SYS && PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ +extern volatile u8_t pbuf_free_ooseq_pending; +void pbuf_free_ooseq(void); +/** When not using sys_check_timeouts(), call PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ() + at regular intervals from main level to check if ooseq pbufs need to be + freed! */ +#define PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ() \ + do { \ + if (pbuf_free_ooseq_pending) { \ + /* pbuf_alloc() reported PBUF_POOL to be empty -> try to free some \ + ooseq queued pbufs now */ \ + pbuf_free_ooseq(); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else /* LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && NO_SYS && PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ */ +/* Otherwise declare an empty PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ */ +#define PBUF_CHECK_FREE_OOSEQ() +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && NO_SYS && PBUF_POOL_FREE_OOSEQ*/ + +/* Initializes the pbuf module. This call is empty for now, but may not be in future. */ +#define pbuf_init() + +struct pbuf *pbuf_alloc(pbuf_layer l, u16_t length, pbuf_type type); +struct pbuf *pbuf_alloc_reference(void *payload, u16_t length, pbuf_type type); +#if LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF +struct pbuf *pbuf_alloced_custom(pbuf_layer l, u16_t length, pbuf_type type, + struct pbuf_custom *p, void *payload_mem, + u16_t payload_mem_len); +#endif /* LWIP_SUPPORT_CUSTOM_PBUF */ +void pbuf_realloc(struct pbuf *p, u16_t size); +#define pbuf_get_allocsrc(p) ((p)->type_internal & PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK) +#define pbuf_match_allocsrc(p, type) (pbuf_get_allocsrc(p) == ((type)&PBUF_TYPE_ALLOC_SRC_MASK)) +#define pbuf_match_type(p, type) pbuf_match_allocsrc(p, type) +u8_t pbuf_header(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size); +u8_t pbuf_header_force(struct pbuf *p, s16_t header_size); +u8_t pbuf_add_header(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment); +u8_t pbuf_add_header_force(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size_increment); +u8_t pbuf_remove_header(struct pbuf *p, size_t header_size); +struct pbuf *pbuf_free_header(struct pbuf *q, u16_t size); +void pbuf_ref(struct pbuf *p); +u8_t pbuf_free(struct pbuf *p); +u16_t pbuf_clen(const struct pbuf *p); +void pbuf_cat(struct pbuf *head, struct pbuf *tail); +void pbuf_chain(struct pbuf *head, struct pbuf *tail); +struct pbuf *pbuf_dechain(struct pbuf *p); +err_t pbuf_copy(struct pbuf *p_to, const struct pbuf *p_from); +u16_t pbuf_copy_partial(const struct pbuf *p, void *dataptr, u16_t len, u16_t offset); +void *pbuf_get_contiguous(const struct pbuf *p, void *buffer, size_t bufsize, u16_t len, u16_t offset); +err_t pbuf_take(struct pbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t len); +err_t pbuf_take_at(struct pbuf *buf, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u16_t offset); +struct pbuf *pbuf_skip(struct pbuf *in, u16_t in_offset, u16_t *out_offset); +struct pbuf *pbuf_coalesce(struct pbuf *p, pbuf_layer layer); +struct pbuf *pbuf_clone(pbuf_layer l, pbuf_type type, struct pbuf *p); +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY +err_t pbuf_fill_chksum(struct pbuf *p, u16_t start_offset, const void *dataptr, + u16_t len, u16_t *chksum); +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ +#if LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE +void pbuf_split_64k(struct pbuf *p, struct pbuf **rest); +#endif /* LWIP_TCP && TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ && LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + +u8_t pbuf_get_at(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset); +int pbuf_try_get_at(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset); +void pbuf_put_at(struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, u8_t data); +u16_t pbuf_memcmp(const struct pbuf *p, u16_t offset, const void *s2, u16_t n); +u16_t pbuf_memfind(const struct pbuf *p, const void *mem, u16_t mem_len, u16_t start_offset); +u16_t pbuf_strstr(const struct pbuf *p, const char *substr); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PBUF_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h index 50556369..2d1c4af7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/altcp_priv.h @@ -1,146 +1,146 @@ -/** - * @file - * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n - * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing - * direct linking (much like virtual functions). - * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols - * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/altcp.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct altcp_pcb *altcp_alloc(void); -void altcp_free(struct altcp_pcb *conn); - -/* Function prototypes for application layers */ -typedef void (*altcp_set_poll_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval); -typedef void (*altcp_recved_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len); -typedef err_t (*altcp_bind_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port); -typedef err_t (*altcp_connect_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected); - -typedef struct altcp_pcb *(*altcp_listen_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err); - -typedef void (*altcp_abort_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -typedef err_t (*altcp_close_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -typedef err_t (*altcp_shutdown_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx); - -typedef err_t (*altcp_write_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags); -typedef err_t (*altcp_output_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); - -typedef u16_t (*altcp_mss_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -typedef u16_t (*altcp_sndbuf_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -typedef u16_t (*altcp_sndqueuelen_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -typedef void (*altcp_nagle_disable_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -typedef void (*altcp_nagle_enable_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -typedef int (*altcp_nagle_disabled_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); - -typedef void (*altcp_setprio_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio); - -typedef void (*altcp_dealloc_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); - -typedef err_t (*altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port); -typedef ip_addr_t *(*altcp_get_ip_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); -typedef u16_t (*altcp_get_port_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); - -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -typedef enum tcp_state (*altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -#endif - -struct altcp_functions { - altcp_set_poll_fn set_poll; - altcp_recved_fn recved; - altcp_bind_fn bind; - altcp_connect_fn connect; - altcp_listen_fn listen; - altcp_abort_fn abort; - altcp_close_fn close; - altcp_shutdown_fn shutdown; - altcp_write_fn write; - altcp_output_fn output; - altcp_mss_fn mss; - altcp_sndbuf_fn sndbuf; - altcp_sndqueuelen_fn sndqueuelen; - altcp_nagle_disable_fn nagle_disable; - altcp_nagle_enable_fn nagle_enable; - altcp_nagle_disabled_fn nagle_disabled; - altcp_setprio_fn setprio; - altcp_dealloc_fn dealloc; - altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo_fn addrinfo; - altcp_get_ip_fn getip; - altcp_get_port_fn getport; -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG - altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state_fn dbg_get_tcp_state; -#endif -}; - -void altcp_default_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval); -void altcp_default_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len); -err_t altcp_default_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port); -err_t altcp_default_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx); -err_t altcp_default_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags); -err_t altcp_default_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -u16_t altcp_default_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -u16_t altcp_default_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -u16_t altcp_default_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -void altcp_default_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -void altcp_default_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -int altcp_default_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -void altcp_default_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio); -void altcp_default_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -err_t altcp_default_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port); -ip_addr_t *altcp_default_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); -u16_t altcp_default_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -enum tcp_state altcp_default_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * Application layered TCP connection API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n + * This interface mimics the tcp callback API to the application while preventing + * direct linking (much like virtual functions). + * This way, an application can make use of other application layer protocols + * on top of TCP without knowing the details (e.g. TLS, proxy connection). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ALTCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/altcp.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct altcp_pcb *altcp_alloc(void); +void altcp_free(struct altcp_pcb *conn); + +/* Function prototypes for application layers */ +typedef void (*altcp_set_poll_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval); +typedef void (*altcp_recved_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len); +typedef err_t (*altcp_bind_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port); +typedef err_t (*altcp_connect_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, altcp_connected_fn connected); + +typedef struct altcp_pcb *(*altcp_listen_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t backlog, err_t *err); + +typedef void (*altcp_abort_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +typedef err_t (*altcp_close_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +typedef err_t (*altcp_shutdown_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx); + +typedef err_t (*altcp_write_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags); +typedef err_t (*altcp_output_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); + +typedef u16_t (*altcp_mss_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +typedef u16_t (*altcp_sndbuf_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +typedef u16_t (*altcp_sndqueuelen_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +typedef void (*altcp_nagle_disable_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +typedef void (*altcp_nagle_enable_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +typedef int (*altcp_nagle_disabled_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); + +typedef void (*altcp_setprio_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio); + +typedef void (*altcp_dealloc_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); + +typedef err_t (*altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port); +typedef ip_addr_t *(*altcp_get_ip_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); +typedef u16_t (*altcp_get_port_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); + +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +typedef enum tcp_state (*altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state_fn)(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +#endif + +struct altcp_functions { + altcp_set_poll_fn set_poll; + altcp_recved_fn recved; + altcp_bind_fn bind; + altcp_connect_fn connect; + altcp_listen_fn listen; + altcp_abort_fn abort; + altcp_close_fn close; + altcp_shutdown_fn shutdown; + altcp_write_fn write; + altcp_output_fn output; + altcp_mss_fn mss; + altcp_sndbuf_fn sndbuf; + altcp_sndqueuelen_fn sndqueuelen; + altcp_nagle_disable_fn nagle_disable; + altcp_nagle_enable_fn nagle_enable; + altcp_nagle_disabled_fn nagle_disabled; + altcp_setprio_fn setprio; + altcp_dealloc_fn dealloc; + altcp_get_tcp_addrinfo_fn addrinfo; + altcp_get_ip_fn getip; + altcp_get_port_fn getport; +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG + altcp_dbg_get_tcp_state_fn dbg_get_tcp_state; +#endif +}; + +void altcp_default_set_poll(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t interval); +void altcp_default_recved(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u16_t len); +err_t altcp_default_bind(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port); +err_t altcp_default_shutdown(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int shut_rx, int shut_tx); +err_t altcp_default_write(struct altcp_pcb *conn, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, u8_t apiflags); +err_t altcp_default_output(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +u16_t altcp_default_mss(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +u16_t altcp_default_sndbuf(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +u16_t altcp_default_sndqueuelen(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +void altcp_default_nagle_disable(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +void altcp_default_nagle_enable(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +int altcp_default_nagle_disabled(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +void altcp_default_setprio(struct altcp_pcb *conn, u8_t prio); +void altcp_default_dealloc(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +err_t altcp_default_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port); +ip_addr_t *altcp_default_get_ip(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); +u16_t altcp_default_get_port(struct altcp_pcb *conn, int local); +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +enum tcp_state altcp_default_dbg_get_tcp_state(struct altcp_pcb *conn); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ALTCP_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/api_msg.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/api_msg.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/api_msg.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/api_msg.h index 82b625b1..95fb48fd 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/api_msg.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/api_msg.h @@ -1,282 +1,282 @@ -/** - * @file - * netconn API lwIP internal implementations (do not use in application code) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_API_MSG_H -#define LWIP_HDR_API_MSG_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/igmp.h" -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ -/* Note: Netconn API is always available when sockets are enabled - - * sockets are implemented on top of them */ - -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD -#define API_MSG_M_DEF_SEM(m) *m -#else -#define API_MSG_M_DEF_SEM(m) API_MSG_M_DEF(m) -#endif -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ -#define API_MSG_M_DEF_SEM(m) API_MSG_M_DEF(m) -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - -/* For the netconn API, these values are use as a bitmask! */ -#define NETCONN_SHUT_RD 1 -#define NETCONN_SHUT_WR 2 -#define NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR (NETCONN_SHUT_RD | NETCONN_SHUT_WR) - -/* IP addresses and port numbers are expected to be in - * the same byte order as in the corresponding pcb. - */ -/** This struct includes everything that is necessary to execute a function - for a netconn in another thread context (mainly used to process netconns - in the tcpip_thread context to be thread safe). */ -struct api_msg { - /** The netconn which to process - always needed: it includes the semaphore - which is used to block the application thread until the function finished. */ - struct netconn *conn; - /** The return value of the function executed in tcpip_thread. */ - err_t err; - /** Depending on the executed function, one of these union members is used */ - union { - /** used for lwip_netconn_do_send */ - struct netbuf *b; - /** used for lwip_netconn_do_newconn */ - struct - { - u8_t proto; - } n; - /** used for lwip_netconn_do_bind and lwip_netconn_do_connect */ - struct - { - API_MSG_M_DEF_C(ip_addr_t, ipaddr); - u16_t port; - u8_t if_idx; - } bc; - /** used for lwip_netconn_do_getaddr */ - struct - { - ip_addr_t API_MSG_M_DEF(ipaddr); - u16_t API_MSG_M_DEF(port); - u8_t local; - } ad; - /** used for lwip_netconn_do_write */ - struct - { - /** current vector to write */ - const struct netvector *vector; - /** number of unwritten vectors */ - u16_t vector_cnt; - /** offset into current vector */ - size_t vector_off; - /** total length across vectors */ - size_t len; - /** offset into total length/output of bytes written when err == ERR_OK */ - size_t offset; - u8_t apiflags; -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO - u32_t time_started; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ - } w; - /** used for lwip_netconn_do_recv */ - struct - { - size_t len; - } r; -#if LWIP_TCP - /** used for lwip_netconn_do_close (/shutdown) */ - struct - { - u8_t shut; -#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER - u32_t time_started; -#else /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - u8_t polls_left; -#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ - } sd; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ -#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) - /** used for lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group */ - struct - { - API_MSG_M_DEF_C(ip_addr_t, multiaddr); - API_MSG_M_DEF_C(ip_addr_t, netif_addr); - u8_t if_idx; - enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave; - } jl; -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - struct - { - u8_t backlog; - } lb; -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - } msg; -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem; -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ -}; - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD -#define LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg) ((msg)->op_completed_sem) -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ -#define LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg) (&(msg)->conn->op_completed) -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - -#if LWIP_DNS -/** As lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname requires more arguments but doesn't require a netconn, - it has its own struct (to avoid struct api_msg getting bigger than necessary). - lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname must be called using tcpip_callback instead of tcpip_apimsg - (see netconn_gethostbyname). */ -struct dns_api_msg { - /** Hostname to query or dotted IP address string */ -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - char name[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH]; -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - const char *name; -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - /** The resolved address is stored here */ - ip_addr_t API_MSG_M_DEF(addr); -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - /** Type of resolve call */ - u8_t dns_addrtype; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ - /** This semaphore is posted when the name is resolved, the application thread - should wait on it. */ - sys_sem_t API_MSG_M_DEF_SEM(sem); - /** Errors are given back here */ - err_t API_MSG_M_DEF(err); -}; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -int lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(void *msg); -#endif -int lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(void *msg, err_t *err); -void lwip_netconn_do_newconn(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_delconn(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_bind(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_bind_if(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_connect(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_disconnect(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_listen(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_send(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_recv(void *m); -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG -void lwip_netconn_do_accepted(void *m); -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ -void lwip_netconn_do_write(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_getaddr(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_close(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_shutdown(void *m); -#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) -void lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group(void *m); -void lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group_netif(void *m); -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ - -#if LWIP_DNS -void lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname(void *arg); -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -struct netconn *netconn_alloc(enum netconn_type t, netconn_callback callback); -void netconn_free(struct netconn *conn); - -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ - -#if LWIP_NETIF_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/* netifapi related lwIP internal definitions */ - -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE -#define NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(type, m) type m -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ -#define NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(type, m) const type *m -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - -typedef void (*netifapi_void_fn)(struct netif *netif); -typedef err_t (*netifapi_errt_fn)(struct netif *netif); - -struct netifapi_msg { - struct tcpip_api_call_data call; - struct netif *netif; - union { - struct - { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(ip4_addr_t, ipaddr); - NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(ip4_addr_t, netmask); - NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(ip4_addr_t, gw); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - void *state; - netif_init_fn init; - netif_input_fn input; - } add; - struct - { - netifapi_void_fn voidfunc; - netifapi_errt_fn errtfunc; - } common; - struct - { -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - char name[NETIF_NAMESIZE]; -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - char *name; -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - u8_t index; - } ifs; - } msg; -}; - -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_API_MSG_H */ +/** + * @file + * netconn API lwIP internal implementations (do not use in application code) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_API_MSG_H +#define LWIP_HDR_API_MSG_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/igmp.h" +#include "lwip/api.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ +/* Note: Netconn API is always available when sockets are enabled - + * sockets are implemented on top of them */ + +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD +#define API_MSG_M_DEF_SEM(m) *m +#else +#define API_MSG_M_DEF_SEM(m) API_MSG_M_DEF(m) +#endif +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ +#define API_MSG_M_DEF_SEM(m) API_MSG_M_DEF(m) +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + +/* For the netconn API, these values are use as a bitmask! */ +#define NETCONN_SHUT_RD 1 +#define NETCONN_SHUT_WR 2 +#define NETCONN_SHUT_RDWR (NETCONN_SHUT_RD | NETCONN_SHUT_WR) + +/* IP addresses and port numbers are expected to be in + * the same byte order as in the corresponding pcb. + */ +/** This struct includes everything that is necessary to execute a function + for a netconn in another thread context (mainly used to process netconns + in the tcpip_thread context to be thread safe). */ +struct api_msg { + /** The netconn which to process - always needed: it includes the semaphore + which is used to block the application thread until the function finished. */ + struct netconn *conn; + /** The return value of the function executed in tcpip_thread. */ + err_t err; + /** Depending on the executed function, one of these union members is used */ + union { + /** used for lwip_netconn_do_send */ + struct netbuf *b; + /** used for lwip_netconn_do_newconn */ + struct + { + u8_t proto; + } n; + /** used for lwip_netconn_do_bind and lwip_netconn_do_connect */ + struct + { + API_MSG_M_DEF_C(ip_addr_t, ipaddr); + u16_t port; + u8_t if_idx; + } bc; + /** used for lwip_netconn_do_getaddr */ + struct + { + ip_addr_t API_MSG_M_DEF(ipaddr); + u16_t API_MSG_M_DEF(port); + u8_t local; + } ad; + /** used for lwip_netconn_do_write */ + struct + { + /** current vector to write */ + const struct netvector *vector; + /** number of unwritten vectors */ + u16_t vector_cnt; + /** offset into current vector */ + size_t vector_off; + /** total length across vectors */ + size_t len; + /** offset into total length/output of bytes written when err == ERR_OK */ + size_t offset; + u8_t apiflags; +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO + u32_t time_started; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO */ + } w; + /** used for lwip_netconn_do_recv */ + struct + { + size_t len; + } r; +#if LWIP_TCP + /** used for lwip_netconn_do_close (/shutdown) */ + struct + { + u8_t shut; +#if LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER + u32_t time_started; +#else /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + u8_t polls_left; +#endif /* LWIP_SO_SNDTIMEO || LWIP_SO_LINGER */ + } sd; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ +#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) + /** used for lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group */ + struct + { + API_MSG_M_DEF_C(ip_addr_t, multiaddr); + API_MSG_M_DEF_C(ip_addr_t, netif_addr); + u8_t if_idx; + enum netconn_igmp join_or_leave; + } jl; +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + struct + { + u8_t backlog; + } lb; +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + } msg; +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + sys_sem_t *op_completed_sem; +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ +}; + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD +#define LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg) ((msg)->op_completed_sem) +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ +#define LWIP_API_MSG_SEM(msg) (&(msg)->conn->op_completed) +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + +#if LWIP_DNS +/** As lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname requires more arguments but doesn't require a netconn, + it has its own struct (to avoid struct api_msg getting bigger than necessary). + lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname must be called using tcpip_callback instead of tcpip_apimsg + (see netconn_gethostbyname). */ +struct dns_api_msg { + /** Hostname to query or dotted IP address string */ +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + char name[DNS_MAX_NAME_LENGTH]; +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + const char *name; +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + /** The resolved address is stored here */ + ip_addr_t API_MSG_M_DEF(addr); +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + /** Type of resolve call */ + u8_t dns_addrtype; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 */ + /** This semaphore is posted when the name is resolved, the application thread + should wait on it. */ + sys_sem_t API_MSG_M_DEF_SEM(sem); + /** Errors are given back here */ + err_t API_MSG_M_DEF(err); +}; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +int lwip_netconn_is_deallocated_msg(void *msg); +#endif +int lwip_netconn_is_err_msg(void *msg, err_t *err); +void lwip_netconn_do_newconn(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_delconn(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_bind(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_bind_if(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_connect(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_disconnect(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_listen(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_send(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_recv(void *m); +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG +void lwip_netconn_do_accepted(void *m); +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ +void lwip_netconn_do_write(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_getaddr(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_close(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_shutdown(void *m); +#if LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) +void lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group(void *m); +void lwip_netconn_do_join_leave_group_netif(void *m); +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD) */ + +#if LWIP_DNS +void lwip_netconn_do_gethostbyname(void *arg); +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +struct netconn *netconn_alloc(enum netconn_type t, netconn_callback callback); +void netconn_free(struct netconn *conn); + +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ + +#if LWIP_NETIF_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/* netifapi related lwIP internal definitions */ + +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE +#define NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(type, m) type m +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ +#define NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(type, m) const type *m +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + +typedef void (*netifapi_void_fn)(struct netif *netif); +typedef err_t (*netifapi_errt_fn)(struct netif *netif); + +struct netifapi_msg { + struct tcpip_api_call_data call; + struct netif *netif; + union { + struct + { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(ip4_addr_t, ipaddr); + NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(ip4_addr_t, netmask); + NETIFAPI_IPADDR_DEF(ip4_addr_t, gw); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + void *state; + netif_init_fn init; + netif_input_fn input; + } add; + struct + { + netifapi_void_fn voidfunc; + netifapi_errt_fn errtfunc; + } common; + struct + { +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + char name[NETIF_NAMESIZE]; +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + char *name; +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + u8_t index; + } ifs; + } msg; +}; + +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_API */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_API_MSG_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/mem_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/mem_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/mem_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/mem_priv.h index 758331b1..1a21bd1d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/mem_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/mem_priv.h @@ -1,84 +1,84 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP internal memory implementations (do not use in application code) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MEM_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_MEM_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#include "lwip/mem.h" - -#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -/* if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK or MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK is turned on, we reserve some - * bytes at the beginning and at the end of each element, initialize them as - * 0xcd and check them later. - * If MEM(P)_OVERFLOW_CHECK is >= 2, on every call to mem(p)_malloc or mem(p)_free, - * every single element in each pool/heap is checked! - * This is VERY SLOW but also very helpful. - * MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE and MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER can be overridden in - * lwipopts.h to change the amount reserved for checking. */ -#ifndef MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE -#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE 16 -#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE*/ -#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE > 0 -#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE) -#else -#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED 0 -#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE*/ -#ifndef MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER -#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER 16 -#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER*/ -#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER > 0 -#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER) -#else -#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED 0 -#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER*/ - -void mem_overflow_init_raw(void *p, size_t size); -void mem_overflow_check_raw(void *p, size_t size, const char *descr1, const char *descr2); - -#endif /* MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MEMP_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP internal memory implementations (do not use in application code) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MEM_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_MEM_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "lwip/mem.h" + +#if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +/* if MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK or MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK is turned on, we reserve some + * bytes at the beginning and at the end of each element, initialize them as + * 0xcd and check them later. + * If MEM(P)_OVERFLOW_CHECK is >= 2, on every call to mem(p)_malloc or mem(p)_free, + * every single element in each pool/heap is checked! + * This is VERY SLOW but also very helpful. + * MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE and MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER can be overridden in + * lwipopts.h to change the amount reserved for checking. */ +#ifndef MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE +#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE 16 +#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE*/ +#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE > 0 +#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE) +#else +#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED 0 +#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE*/ +#ifndef MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER +#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER 16 +#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER*/ +#if MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER > 0 +#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER) +#else +#define MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED 0 +#endif /* MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER*/ + +void mem_overflow_init_raw(void *p, size_t size); +void mem_overflow_check_raw(void *p, size_t size, const char *descr1, const char *descr2); + +#endif /* MEM_OVERFLOW_CHECK || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MEMP_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_priv.h index b8e06c24..73396b37 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_priv.h @@ -1,160 +1,160 @@ -/** - * @file - * memory pools lwIP internal implementations (do not use in application code) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MEMP_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_MEMP_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/priv/mem_priv.h" - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - -/* MEMP_SIZE: save space for struct memp and for sanity check */ -#define MEMP_SIZE (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp)) + MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED) -#define MEMP_ALIGN_SIZE(x) (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(x) + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED) - -#else /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - -/* No sanity checks - * We don't need to preserve the struct memp while not allocated, so we - * can save a little space and set MEMP_SIZE to 0. - */ -#define MEMP_SIZE 0 -#define MEMP_ALIGN_SIZE(x) (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(x)) - -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - -#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -struct memp { - struct memp *next; -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK - const char *file; - int line; -#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ -}; -#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ - -#if MEM_USE_POOLS && MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS -/* Use a helper type to get the start and end of the user "memory pools" for mem_malloc */ -typedef enum { - /* Get the first (via: - MEMP_POOL_HELPER_START = ((u8_t) 1*MEMP_POOL_A + 0*MEMP_POOL_B + 0*MEMP_POOL_C + 0)*/ - MEMP_POOL_HELPER_FIRST = ((u8_t) -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) -#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START 1 -#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(num, size) *MEMP_POOL_##size + 0 -#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END -#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" - ), - /* Get the last (via: - MEMP_POOL_HELPER_END = ((u8_t) 0 + MEMP_POOL_A*0 + MEMP_POOL_B*0 + MEMP_POOL_C*1) */ - MEMP_POOL_HELPER_LAST = ((u8_t) -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) -#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START -#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(num, size) 0 + MEMP_POOL_##size * -#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END 1 -#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" - ) -} memp_pool_helper_t; - -/* The actual start and stop values are here (cast them over) - We use this helper type and these defines so we can avoid using const memp_t values */ -#define MEMP_POOL_FIRST ((memp_t)MEMP_POOL_HELPER_FIRST) -#define MEMP_POOL_LAST ((memp_t)MEMP_POOL_HELPER_LAST) -#endif /* MEM_USE_POOLS && MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS */ - -/** Memory pool descriptor */ -struct memp_desc { -#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY - /** Textual description */ - const char *desc; -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ -#if MEMP_STATS - /** Statistics */ - struct stats_mem *stats; -#endif - - /** Element size */ - u16_t size; - -#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC - /** Number of elements */ - u16_t num; - - /** Base address */ - u8_t *base; - - /** First free element of each pool. Elements form a linked list. */ - struct memp **tab; -#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ -}; - -#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY -#define DECLARE_LWIP_MEMPOOL_DESC(desc) (desc), -#else -#define DECLARE_LWIP_MEMPOOL_DESC(desc) -#endif - -#if MEMP_STATS -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_INSTANCE(name) static struct stats_mem name; -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_REFERENCE(name) &name, -#else -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_INSTANCE(name) -#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_REFERENCE(name) -#endif - -void memp_init_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc); - -#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK -void *memp_malloc_pool_fn(const struct memp_desc *desc, const char *file, const int line); -#define memp_malloc_pool(d) memp_malloc_pool_fn((d), __FILE__, __LINE__) -#else -void *memp_malloc_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc); -#endif -void memp_free_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc, void *mem); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MEMP_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * memory pools lwIP internal implementations (do not use in application code) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_MEMP_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_MEMP_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/priv/mem_priv.h" + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + +/* MEMP_SIZE: save space for struct memp and for sanity check */ +#define MEMP_SIZE (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp)) + MEM_SANITY_REGION_BEFORE_ALIGNED) +#define MEMP_ALIGN_SIZE(x) (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(x) + MEM_SANITY_REGION_AFTER_ALIGNED) + +#else /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + +/* No sanity checks + * We don't need to preserve the struct memp while not allocated, so we + * can save a little space and set MEMP_SIZE to 0. + */ +#define MEMP_SIZE 0 +#define MEMP_ALIGN_SIZE(x) (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(x)) + +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + +#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +struct memp { + struct memp *next; +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK + const char *file; + int line; +#endif /* MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ +}; +#endif /* !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK */ + +#if MEM_USE_POOLS && MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS +/* Use a helper type to get the start and end of the user "memory pools" for mem_malloc */ +typedef enum { + /* Get the first (via: + MEMP_POOL_HELPER_START = ((u8_t) 1*MEMP_POOL_A + 0*MEMP_POOL_B + 0*MEMP_POOL_C + 0)*/ + MEMP_POOL_HELPER_FIRST = ((u8_t) +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) +#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START 1 +#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(num, size) *MEMP_POOL_##size + 0 +#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END +#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" + ), + /* Get the last (via: + MEMP_POOL_HELPER_END = ((u8_t) 0 + MEMP_POOL_A*0 + MEMP_POOL_B*0 + MEMP_POOL_C*1) */ + MEMP_POOL_HELPER_LAST = ((u8_t) +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, size, desc) +#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START +#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(num, size) 0 + MEMP_POOL_##size * +#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END 1 +#include "lwip/priv/memp_std.h" + ) +} memp_pool_helper_t; + +/* The actual start and stop values are here (cast them over) + We use this helper type and these defines so we can avoid using const memp_t values */ +#define MEMP_POOL_FIRST ((memp_t)MEMP_POOL_HELPER_FIRST) +#define MEMP_POOL_LAST ((memp_t)MEMP_POOL_HELPER_LAST) +#endif /* MEM_USE_POOLS && MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS */ + +/** Memory pool descriptor */ +struct memp_desc { +#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY + /** Textual description */ + const char *desc; +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ +#if MEMP_STATS + /** Statistics */ + struct stats_mem *stats; +#endif + + /** Element size */ + u16_t size; + +#if !MEMP_MEM_MALLOC + /** Number of elements */ + u16_t num; + + /** Base address */ + u8_t *base; + + /** First free element of each pool. Elements form a linked list. */ + struct memp **tab; +#endif /* MEMP_MEM_MALLOC */ +}; + +#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY +#define DECLARE_LWIP_MEMPOOL_DESC(desc) (desc), +#else +#define DECLARE_LWIP_MEMPOOL_DESC(desc) +#endif + +#if MEMP_STATS +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_INSTANCE(name) static struct stats_mem name; +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_REFERENCE(name) &name, +#else +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_INSTANCE(name) +#define LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE_STATS_REFERENCE(name) +#endif + +void memp_init_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc); + +#if MEMP_OVERFLOW_CHECK +void *memp_malloc_pool_fn(const struct memp_desc *desc, const char *file, const int line); +#define memp_malloc_pool(d) memp_malloc_pool_fn((d), __FILE__, __LINE__) +#else +void *memp_malloc_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc); +#endif +void memp_free_pool(const struct memp_desc *desc, void *mem); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_MEMP_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_std.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_std.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_std.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_std.h index 625ca8c5..3ec0001a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_std.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/memp_std.h @@ -1,150 +1,150 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP internal memory pools (do not use in application code) - * This file is deliberately included multiple times: once with empty - * definition of LWIP_MEMPOOL() to handle all includes and multiple times - * to build up various lists of mem pools. - */ - -/* - * SETUP: Make sure we define everything we will need. - * - * We have create three types of pools: - * 1) MEMPOOL - standard pools - * 2) MALLOC_MEMPOOL - to be used by mem_malloc in mem.c - * 3) PBUF_MEMPOOL - a mempool of pbuf's, so include space for the pbuf struct - * - * If the include'r doesn't require any special treatment of each of the types - * above, then will declare #2 & #3 to be just standard mempools. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL -/* This treats "malloc pools" just like any other pool. - The pools are a little bigger to provide 'size' as the amount of user data. */ -#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(num, size) LWIP_MEMPOOL(POOL_##size, num, (size + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp_malloc_helper))), "MALLOC_" #size) -#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START -#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END -#endif /* LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL */ - -#ifndef LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL -/* This treats "pbuf pools" just like any other pool. - * Allocates buffers for a pbuf struct AND a payload size */ -#define LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL(name, num, payload, desc) LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct pbuf)) + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(payload)), desc) -#endif /* LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL */ - -/* - * A list of internal pools used by LWIP. - * - * LWIP_MEMPOOL(pool_name, number_elements, element_size, pool_description) - * creates a pool name MEMP_pool_name. description is used in stats.c - */ -#if LWIP_RAW -LWIP_MEMPOOL(RAW_PCB, MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB, sizeof(struct raw_pcb), "RAW_PCB") -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ - -#if LWIP_UDP -LWIP_MEMPOOL(UDP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB, sizeof(struct udp_pcb), "UDP_PCB") -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - -#if LWIP_TCP -LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB, sizeof(struct tcp_pcb), "TCP_PCB") -LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCP_PCB_LISTEN, MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN, sizeof(struct tcp_pcb_listen), "TCP_PCB_LISTEN") -LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCP_SEG, MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG, sizeof(struct tcp_seg), "TCP_SEG") -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_TCP -LWIP_MEMPOOL(ALTCP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_ALTCP_PCB, sizeof(struct altcp_pcb), "ALTCP_PCB") -#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_TCP */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && IP_REASSEMBLY -LWIP_MEMPOOL(REASSDATA, MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA, sizeof(struct ip_reassdata), "REASSDATA") -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && IP_REASSEMBLY */ -#if (IP_FRAG && !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF) || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG) -LWIP_MEMPOOL(FRAG_PBUF, MEMP_NUM_FRAG_PBUF, sizeof(struct pbuf_custom_ref), "FRAG_PBUF") -#endif /* IP_FRAG && !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG) */ - -#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET -LWIP_MEMPOOL(NETBUF, MEMP_NUM_NETBUF, sizeof(struct netbuf), "NETBUF") -LWIP_MEMPOOL(NETCONN, MEMP_NUM_NETCONN, sizeof(struct netconn), "NETCONN") -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ - -#if NO_SYS == 0 -LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCPIP_MSG_API, MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API, sizeof(struct tcpip_msg), "TCPIP_MSG_API") -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE -LWIP_MEMPOOL(API_MSG, MEMP_NUM_API_MSG, sizeof(struct api_msg), "API_MSG") -#if LWIP_DNS -LWIP_MEMPOOL(DNS_API_MSG, MEMP_NUM_DNS_API_MSG, sizeof(struct dns_api_msg), "DNS_API_MSG") -#endif -#if LWIP_SOCKET && !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -LWIP_MEMPOOL(SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA, MEMP_NUM_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA, sizeof(struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data), "SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA") -#endif -#if LWIP_SOCKET && (LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL) -LWIP_MEMPOOL(SELECT_CB, MEMP_NUM_SELECT_CB, sizeof(struct lwip_select_cb), "SELECT_CB") -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET && (LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL) */ -#if LWIP_NETIF_API -LWIP_MEMPOOL(NETIFAPI_MSG, MEMP_NUM_NETIFAPI_MSG, sizeof(struct netifapi_msg), "NETIFAPI_MSG") -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT -LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, sizeof(struct tcpip_msg), "TCPIP_MSG_INPKT") -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ -#endif /* NO_SYS==0 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP && ARP_QUEUEING -LWIP_MEMPOOL(ARP_QUEUE, MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE, sizeof(struct etharp_q_entry), "ARP_QUEUE") -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP && ARP_QUEUEING */ - -#if LWIP_IGMP -LWIP_MEMPOOL(IGMP_GROUP, MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP, sizeof(struct igmp_group), "IGMP_GROUP") -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - -#if LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM -LWIP_MEMPOOL(SYS_TIMEOUT, MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT, sizeof(struct sys_timeo), "SYS_TIMEOUT") -#endif /* LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM */ - -#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET -LWIP_MEMPOOL(NETDB, MEMP_NUM_NETDB, NETDB_ELEM_SIZE, "NETDB") -#endif /* LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET */ -#if LWIP_DNS && DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST && DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC -LWIP_MEMPOOL(LOCALHOSTLIST, MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST, LOCALHOSTLIST_ELEM_SIZE, "LOCALHOSTLIST") -#endif /* LWIP_DNS && DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST && DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING -LWIP_MEMPOOL(ND6_QUEUE, MEMP_NUM_ND6_QUEUE, sizeof(struct nd6_q_entry), "ND6_QUEUE") -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS -LWIP_MEMPOOL(IP6_REASSDATA, MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA, sizeof(struct ip6_reassdata), "IP6_REASSDATA") -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD -LWIP_MEMPOOL(MLD6_GROUP, MEMP_NUM_MLD6_GROUP, sizeof(struct mld_group), "MLD6_GROUP") -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - -/* - * A list of pools of pbuf's used by LWIP. - * - * LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL(pool_name, number_elements, pbuf_payload_size, pool_description) - * creates a pool name MEMP_pool_name. description is used in stats.c - * This allocates enough space for the pbuf struct and a payload. - * (Example: pbuf_payload_size=0 allocates only size for the struct) - */ -LWIP_MEMPOOL(PBUF, MEMP_NUM_PBUF, sizeof(struct pbuf), "PBUF_REF/ROM") -LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL(PBUF_POOL, PBUF_POOL_SIZE, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE, "PBUF_POOL") - -/* - * Allow for user-defined pools; this must be explicitly set in lwipopts.h - * since the default is to NOT look for lwippools.h - */ -#if MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS -#include "lwippools.h" -#endif /* MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS */ - -/* - * REQUIRED CLEANUP: Clear up so we don't get "multiply defined" error later - * (#undef is ignored for something that is not defined) - */ -#undef LWIP_MEMPOOL -#undef LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL -#undef LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START -#undef LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END -#undef LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL +/** + * @file + * lwIP internal memory pools (do not use in application code) + * This file is deliberately included multiple times: once with empty + * definition of LWIP_MEMPOOL() to handle all includes and multiple times + * to build up various lists of mem pools. + */ + +/* + * SETUP: Make sure we define everything we will need. + * + * We have create three types of pools: + * 1) MEMPOOL - standard pools + * 2) MALLOC_MEMPOOL - to be used by mem_malloc in mem.c + * 3) PBUF_MEMPOOL - a mempool of pbuf's, so include space for the pbuf struct + * + * If the include'r doesn't require any special treatment of each of the types + * above, then will declare #2 & #3 to be just standard mempools. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL +/* This treats "malloc pools" just like any other pool. + The pools are a little bigger to provide 'size' as the amount of user data. */ +#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL(num, size) LWIP_MEMPOOL(POOL_##size, num, (size + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct memp_malloc_helper))), "MALLOC_" #size) +#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START +#define LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END +#endif /* LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL */ + +#ifndef LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL +/* This treats "pbuf pools" just like any other pool. + * Allocates buffers for a pbuf struct AND a payload size */ +#define LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL(name, num, payload, desc) LWIP_MEMPOOL(name, num, (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(sizeof(struct pbuf)) + LWIP_MEM_ALIGN_SIZE(payload)), desc) +#endif /* LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL */ + +/* + * A list of internal pools used by LWIP. + * + * LWIP_MEMPOOL(pool_name, number_elements, element_size, pool_description) + * creates a pool name MEMP_pool_name. description is used in stats.c + */ +#if LWIP_RAW +LWIP_MEMPOOL(RAW_PCB, MEMP_NUM_RAW_PCB, sizeof(struct raw_pcb), "RAW_PCB") +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ + +#if LWIP_UDP +LWIP_MEMPOOL(UDP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_UDP_PCB, sizeof(struct udp_pcb), "UDP_PCB") +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + +#if LWIP_TCP +LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB, sizeof(struct tcp_pcb), "TCP_PCB") +LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCP_PCB_LISTEN, MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTEN, sizeof(struct tcp_pcb_listen), "TCP_PCB_LISTEN") +LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCP_SEG, MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG, sizeof(struct tcp_seg), "TCP_SEG") +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +#if LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_TCP +LWIP_MEMPOOL(ALTCP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_ALTCP_PCB, sizeof(struct altcp_pcb), "ALTCP_PCB") +#endif /* LWIP_ALTCP && LWIP_TCP */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && IP_REASSEMBLY +LWIP_MEMPOOL(REASSDATA, MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA, sizeof(struct ip_reassdata), "REASSDATA") +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && IP_REASSEMBLY */ +#if (IP_FRAG && !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF) || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG) +LWIP_MEMPOOL(FRAG_PBUF, MEMP_NUM_FRAG_PBUF, sizeof(struct pbuf_custom_ref), "FRAG_PBUF") +#endif /* IP_FRAG && !LWIP_NETIF_TX_SINGLE_PBUF || (LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_FRAG) */ + +#if LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET +LWIP_MEMPOOL(NETBUF, MEMP_NUM_NETBUF, sizeof(struct netbuf), "NETBUF") +LWIP_MEMPOOL(NETCONN, MEMP_NUM_NETCONN, sizeof(struct netconn), "NETCONN") +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN || LWIP_SOCKET */ + +#if NO_SYS == 0 +LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCPIP_MSG_API, MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_API, sizeof(struct tcpip_msg), "TCPIP_MSG_API") +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE +LWIP_MEMPOOL(API_MSG, MEMP_NUM_API_MSG, sizeof(struct api_msg), "API_MSG") +#if LWIP_DNS +LWIP_MEMPOOL(DNS_API_MSG, MEMP_NUM_DNS_API_MSG, sizeof(struct dns_api_msg), "DNS_API_MSG") +#endif +#if LWIP_SOCKET && !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +LWIP_MEMPOOL(SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA, MEMP_NUM_SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA, sizeof(struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data), "SOCKET_SETGETSOCKOPT_DATA") +#endif +#if LWIP_SOCKET && (LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL) +LWIP_MEMPOOL(SELECT_CB, MEMP_NUM_SELECT_CB, sizeof(struct lwip_select_cb), "SELECT_CB") +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET && (LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL) */ +#if LWIP_NETIF_API +LWIP_MEMPOOL(NETIFAPI_MSG, MEMP_NUM_NETIFAPI_MSG, sizeof(struct netifapi_msg), "NETIFAPI_MSG") +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT +LWIP_MEMPOOL(TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, MEMP_NUM_TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, sizeof(struct tcpip_msg), "TCPIP_MSG_INPKT") +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ +#endif /* NO_SYS==0 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP && ARP_QUEUEING +LWIP_MEMPOOL(ARP_QUEUE, MEMP_NUM_ARP_QUEUE, sizeof(struct etharp_q_entry), "ARP_QUEUE") +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP && ARP_QUEUEING */ + +#if LWIP_IGMP +LWIP_MEMPOOL(IGMP_GROUP, MEMP_NUM_IGMP_GROUP, sizeof(struct igmp_group), "IGMP_GROUP") +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + +#if LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM +LWIP_MEMPOOL(SYS_TIMEOUT, MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT, sizeof(struct sys_timeo), "SYS_TIMEOUT") +#endif /* LWIP_TIMERS && !LWIP_TIMERS_CUSTOM */ + +#if LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET +LWIP_MEMPOOL(NETDB, MEMP_NUM_NETDB, NETDB_ELEM_SIZE, "NETDB") +#endif /* LWIP_DNS && LWIP_SOCKET */ +#if LWIP_DNS && DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST && DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC +LWIP_MEMPOOL(LOCALHOSTLIST, MEMP_NUM_LOCALHOSTLIST, LOCALHOSTLIST_ELEM_SIZE, "LOCALHOSTLIST") +#endif /* LWIP_DNS && DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST && DNS_LOCAL_HOSTLIST_IS_DYNAMIC */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING +LWIP_MEMPOOL(ND6_QUEUE, MEMP_NUM_ND6_QUEUE, sizeof(struct nd6_q_entry), "ND6_QUEUE") +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS +LWIP_MEMPOOL(IP6_REASSDATA, MEMP_NUM_REASSDATA, sizeof(struct ip6_reassdata), "IP6_REASSDATA") +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_REASS */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD +LWIP_MEMPOOL(MLD6_GROUP, MEMP_NUM_MLD6_GROUP, sizeof(struct mld_group), "MLD6_GROUP") +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + +/* + * A list of pools of pbuf's used by LWIP. + * + * LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL(pool_name, number_elements, pbuf_payload_size, pool_description) + * creates a pool name MEMP_pool_name. description is used in stats.c + * This allocates enough space for the pbuf struct and a payload. + * (Example: pbuf_payload_size=0 allocates only size for the struct) + */ +LWIP_MEMPOOL(PBUF, MEMP_NUM_PBUF, sizeof(struct pbuf), "PBUF_REF/ROM") +LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL(PBUF_POOL, PBUF_POOL_SIZE, PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE, "PBUF_POOL") + +/* + * Allow for user-defined pools; this must be explicitly set in lwipopts.h + * since the default is to NOT look for lwippools.h + */ +#if MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS +#include "lwippools.h" +#endif /* MEMP_USE_CUSTOM_POOLS */ + +/* + * REQUIRED CLEANUP: Clear up so we don't get "multiply defined" error later + * (#undef is ignored for something that is not defined) + */ +#undef LWIP_MEMPOOL +#undef LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL +#undef LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_START +#undef LWIP_MALLOC_MEMPOOL_END +#undef LWIP_PBUF_MEMPOOL diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h index d0b782fc..5102c5ab 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/nd6_priv.h @@ -1,141 +1,141 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * Neighbor discovery and stateless address autoconfiguration for IPv6. - * Aims to be compliant with RFC 4861 (Neighbor discovery) and RFC 4862 - * (Address autoconfiguration). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ND6_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ND6_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING -/** struct for queueing outgoing packets for unknown address - * defined here to be accessed by memp.h - */ -struct nd6_q_entry { - struct nd6_q_entry *next; - struct pbuf *p; -}; -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - -/** Struct for tables. */ -struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry { - ip6_addr_t next_hop_address; - struct netif *netif; - u8_t lladdr[NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN]; - /*u32_t pmtu;*/ -#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING - /** Pointer to queue of pending outgoing packets on this entry. */ - struct nd6_q_entry *q; -#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - /** Pointer to a single pending outgoing packet on this entry. */ - struct pbuf *q; -#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ - u8_t state; - u8_t isrouter; - union { - u32_t reachable_time; /* in seconds */ - u32_t delay_time; /* ticks (ND6_TMR_INTERVAL) */ - u32_t probes_sent; - u32_t stale_time; /* ticks (ND6_TMR_INTERVAL) */ - } counter; -}; - -struct nd6_destination_cache_entry { - ip6_addr_t destination_addr; - ip6_addr_t next_hop_addr; - u16_t pmtu; - u32_t age; -}; - -struct nd6_prefix_list_entry { - ip6_addr_t prefix; - struct netif *netif; - u32_t invalidation_timer; /* in seconds */ -}; - -struct nd6_router_list_entry { - struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry *neighbor_entry; - u32_t invalidation_timer; /* in seconds */ - u8_t flags; -}; - -enum nd6_neighbor_cache_entry_state { - ND6_NO_ENTRY = 0, - ND6_INCOMPLETE, - ND6_REACHABLE, - ND6_STALE, - ND6_DELAY, - ND6_PROBE -}; - -#define ND6_HOPLIM 255 /* maximum hop limit, required in all ND packets */ - -#define ND6_2HRS 7200 /* two hours, expressed in number of seconds */ - -/* Router tables. */ -/* @todo make these static? and entries accessible through API? */ -extern struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry neighbor_cache[]; -extern struct nd6_destination_cache_entry destination_cache[]; -extern struct nd6_prefix_list_entry prefix_list[]; -extern struct nd6_router_list_entry default_router_list[]; - -/* Default values, can be updated by a RA message. */ -extern u32_t reachable_time; -extern u32_t retrans_timer; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ND6_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * Neighbor discovery and stateless address autoconfiguration for IPv6. + * Aims to be compliant with RFC 4861 (Neighbor discovery) and RFC 4862 + * (Address autoconfiguration). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ND6_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ND6_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING +/** struct for queueing outgoing packets for unknown address + * defined here to be accessed by memp.h + */ +struct nd6_q_entry { + struct nd6_q_entry *next; + struct pbuf *p; +}; +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + +/** Struct for tables. */ +struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry { + ip6_addr_t next_hop_address; + struct netif *netif; + u8_t lladdr[NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN]; + /*u32_t pmtu;*/ +#if LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING + /** Pointer to queue of pending outgoing packets on this entry. */ + struct nd6_q_entry *q; +#else /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + /** Pointer to a single pending outgoing packet on this entry. */ + struct pbuf *q; +#endif /* LWIP_ND6_QUEUEING */ + u8_t state; + u8_t isrouter; + union { + u32_t reachable_time; /* in seconds */ + u32_t delay_time; /* ticks (ND6_TMR_INTERVAL) */ + u32_t probes_sent; + u32_t stale_time; /* ticks (ND6_TMR_INTERVAL) */ + } counter; +}; + +struct nd6_destination_cache_entry { + ip6_addr_t destination_addr; + ip6_addr_t next_hop_addr; + u16_t pmtu; + u32_t age; +}; + +struct nd6_prefix_list_entry { + ip6_addr_t prefix; + struct netif *netif; + u32_t invalidation_timer; /* in seconds */ +}; + +struct nd6_router_list_entry { + struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry *neighbor_entry; + u32_t invalidation_timer; /* in seconds */ + u8_t flags; +}; + +enum nd6_neighbor_cache_entry_state { + ND6_NO_ENTRY = 0, + ND6_INCOMPLETE, + ND6_REACHABLE, + ND6_STALE, + ND6_DELAY, + ND6_PROBE +}; + +#define ND6_HOPLIM 255 /* maximum hop limit, required in all ND packets */ + +#define ND6_2HRS 7200 /* two hours, expressed in number of seconds */ + +/* Router tables. */ +/* @todo make these static? and entries accessible through API? */ +extern struct nd6_neighbor_cache_entry neighbor_cache[]; +extern struct nd6_destination_cache_entry destination_cache[]; +extern struct nd6_prefix_list_entry prefix_list[]; +extern struct nd6_router_list_entry default_router_list[]; + +/* Default values, can be updated by a RA message. */ +extern u32_t reachable_time; +extern u32_t retrans_timer; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ND6_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/raw_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/raw_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/raw_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/raw_priv.h index 0f2487d8..a9038db9 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/raw_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/raw_priv.h @@ -1,68 +1,68 @@ -/** - * @file - * raw API internal implementations (do not use in application code) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_RAW_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_RAW_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_RAW /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/raw.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** return codes for raw_input */ -typedef enum raw_input_state { - RAW_INPUT_NONE = 0, /* pbuf did not match any pcbs */ - RAW_INPUT_EATEN, /* pbuf handed off and delivered to pcb */ - RAW_INPUT_DELIVERED /* pbuf only delivered to pcb (pbuf can still be referenced) */ -} raw_input_state_t; - -/* The following functions are the lower layer interface to RAW. */ -raw_input_state_t raw_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); - -void raw_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_RAW_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * raw API internal implementations (do not use in application code) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_RAW_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_RAW_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_RAW /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/raw.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** return codes for raw_input */ +typedef enum raw_input_state { + RAW_INPUT_NONE = 0, /* pbuf did not match any pcbs */ + RAW_INPUT_EATEN, /* pbuf handed off and delivered to pcb */ + RAW_INPUT_DELIVERED /* pbuf only delivered to pcb (pbuf can still be referenced) */ +} raw_input_state_t; + +/* The following functions are the lower layer interface to RAW. */ +raw_input_state_t raw_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); + +void raw_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_RAW_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h index eb1a71be..37e8a760 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h @@ -1,180 +1,180 @@ -/** - * @file - * Sockets API internal implementations (do not use in application code) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Joel Cunningham, Garmin International, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Joel Cunningham - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define NUM_SOCKETS MEMP_NUM_NETCONN - -/** This is overridable for the rare case where more than 255 threads - * select on the same socket... - */ -#ifndef SELWAIT_T -#define SELWAIT_T u8_t -#endif - -union lwip_sock_lastdata { - struct netbuf *netbuf; - struct pbuf *pbuf; -}; - -/** Contains all internal pointers and states used for a socket */ -struct lwip_sock { - /** sockets currently are built on netconns, each socket has one netconn */ - struct netconn *conn; - /** data that was left from the previous read */ - union lwip_sock_lastdata lastdata; -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL - /** number of times data was received, set by event_callback(), - tested by the receive and select functions */ - s16_t rcvevent; - /** number of times data was ACKed (free send buffer), set by event_callback(), - tested by select */ - u16_t sendevent; - /** error happened for this socket, set by event_callback(), tested by select */ - u16_t errevent; - /** counter of how many threads are waiting for this socket using select */ - SELWAIT_T select_waiting; -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - /* counter of how many threads are using a struct lwip_sock (not the 'int') */ - u8_t fd_used; - /* status of pending close/delete actions */ - u8_t fd_free_pending; -#define LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_TCP 1 -#define LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_FREE 2 -#endif -}; - -#ifndef set_errno -#define set_errno(err) \ - do { \ - if (err) { \ - errno = (err); \ - } \ - } while (0) -#endif - -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -/** Maximum optlen used by setsockopt/getsockopt */ -#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_MAXOPTLEN LWIP_MAX(16, sizeof(struct ifreq)) - -/** This struct is used to pass data to the set/getsockopt_internal - * functions running in tcpip_thread context (only a void* is allowed) */ -struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data { - /** socket index for which to change options */ - int s; - /** level of the option to process */ - int level; - /** name of the option to process */ - int optname; - /** set: value to set the option to - * get: value of the option is stored here */ -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - u8_t optval[LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_MAXOPTLEN]; -#else - union { - void *p; - const void *pc; - } optval; -#endif - /** size of *optval */ - socklen_t optlen; - /** if an error occurs, it is temporarily stored here */ - int err; - /** semaphore to wake up the calling task */ - void *completed_sem; -}; -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -struct lwip_sock *lwip_socket_dbg_get_socket(int fd); - -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD -#define SELECT_SEM_T sys_sem_t * -#define SELECT_SEM_PTR(sem) (sem) -#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ -#define SELECT_SEM_T sys_sem_t -#define SELECT_SEM_PTR(sem) (&(sem)) -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - -/** Description for a task waiting in select */ -struct lwip_select_cb { - /** Pointer to the next waiting task */ - struct lwip_select_cb *next; - /** Pointer to the previous waiting task */ - struct lwip_select_cb *prev; -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT - /** readset passed to select */ - fd_set *readset; - /** writeset passed to select */ - fd_set *writeset; - /** unimplemented: exceptset passed to select */ - fd_set *exceptset; -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT */ -#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL - /** fds passed to poll; NULL if select */ - struct pollfd *poll_fds; - /** nfds passed to poll; 0 if select */ - nfds_t poll_nfds; -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ - /** don't signal the same semaphore twice: set to 1 when signalled */ - int sem_signalled; - /** semaphore to wake up a task waiting for select */ - SELECT_SEM_T sem; -}; -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ - -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * Sockets API internal implementations (do not use in application code) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Joel Cunningham, Garmin International, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Joel Cunningham + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/sockets.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define NUM_SOCKETS MEMP_NUM_NETCONN + +/** This is overridable for the rare case where more than 255 threads + * select on the same socket... + */ +#ifndef SELWAIT_T +#define SELWAIT_T u8_t +#endif + +union lwip_sock_lastdata { + struct netbuf *netbuf; + struct pbuf *pbuf; +}; + +/** Contains all internal pointers and states used for a socket */ +struct lwip_sock { + /** sockets currently are built on netconns, each socket has one netconn */ + struct netconn *conn; + /** data that was left from the previous read */ + union lwip_sock_lastdata lastdata; +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL + /** number of times data was received, set by event_callback(), + tested by the receive and select functions */ + s16_t rcvevent; + /** number of times data was ACKed (free send buffer), set by event_callback(), + tested by select */ + u16_t sendevent; + /** error happened for this socket, set by event_callback(), tested by select */ + u16_t errevent; + /** counter of how many threads are waiting for this socket using select */ + SELWAIT_T select_waiting; +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + /* counter of how many threads are using a struct lwip_sock (not the 'int') */ + u8_t fd_used; + /* status of pending close/delete actions */ + u8_t fd_free_pending; +#define LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_TCP 1 +#define LWIP_SOCK_FD_FREE_FREE 2 +#endif +}; + +#ifndef set_errno +#define set_errno(err) \ + do { \ + if (err) { \ + errno = (err); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#endif + +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +/** Maximum optlen used by setsockopt/getsockopt */ +#define LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_MAXOPTLEN LWIP_MAX(16, sizeof(struct ifreq)) + +/** This struct is used to pass data to the set/getsockopt_internal + * functions running in tcpip_thread context (only a void* is allowed) */ +struct lwip_setgetsockopt_data { + /** socket index for which to change options */ + int s; + /** level of the option to process */ + int level; + /** name of the option to process */ + int optname; + /** set: value to set the option to + * get: value of the option is stored here */ +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + u8_t optval[LWIP_SETGETSOCKOPT_MAXOPTLEN]; +#else + union { + void *p; + const void *pc; + } optval; +#endif + /** size of *optval */ + socklen_t optlen; + /** if an error occurs, it is temporarily stored here */ + int err; + /** semaphore to wake up the calling task */ + void *completed_sem; +}; +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +struct lwip_sock *lwip_socket_dbg_get_socket(int fd); + +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD +#define SELECT_SEM_T sys_sem_t * +#define SELECT_SEM_PTR(sem) (sem) +#else /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ +#define SELECT_SEM_T sys_sem_t +#define SELECT_SEM_PTR(sem) (&(sem)) +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + +/** Description for a task waiting in select */ +struct lwip_select_cb { + /** Pointer to the next waiting task */ + struct lwip_select_cb *next; + /** Pointer to the previous waiting task */ + struct lwip_select_cb *prev; +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT + /** readset passed to select */ + fd_set *readset; + /** writeset passed to select */ + fd_set *writeset; + /** unimplemented: exceptset passed to select */ + fd_set *exceptset; +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT */ +#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL + /** fds passed to poll; NULL if select */ + struct pollfd *poll_fds; + /** nfds passed to poll; 0 if select */ + nfds_t poll_nfds; +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ + /** don't signal the same semaphore twice: set to 1 when signalled */ + int sem_signalled; + /** semaphore to wake up a task waiting for select */ + SELECT_SEM_T sem; +}; +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT || LWIP_SOCKET_POLL */ + +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h index d3b690e1..0f62cb0f 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h @@ -1,535 +1,535 @@ -/** - * @file - * TCP internal implementations (do not use in application code) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCP_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TCP_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/icmp.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/prot/tcp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* Functions for interfacing with TCP: */ - -/* Lower layer interface to TCP: */ -void tcp_init(void); /* Initialize this module. */ -void tcp_tmr(void); /* Must be called every - TCP_TMR_INTERVAL - ms. (Typically 250 ms). */ -/* It is also possible to call these two functions at the right - intervals (instead of calling tcp_tmr()). */ -void tcp_slowtmr(void); -void tcp_fasttmr(void); - -/* Call this from a netif driver (watch out for threading issues!) that has - returned a memory error on transmit and now has free buffers to send more. - This iterates all active pcbs that had an error and tries to call - tcp_output, so use this with care as it might slow down the system. */ -void tcp_txnow(void); - -/* Only used by IP to pass a TCP segment to TCP: */ -void tcp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -/* Used within the TCP code only: */ -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_alloc(u8_t prio); -void tcp_free(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -void tcp_abandon(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int reset); -err_t tcp_send_empty_ack(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -err_t tcp_rexmit(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -err_t tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -void tcp_rexmit_rto_commit(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -void tcp_rexmit_rto(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -void tcp_rexmit_fast(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -u32_t tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -err_t tcp_process_refused_data(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); - -/** - * This is the Nagle algorithm: try to combine user data to send as few TCP - * segments as possible. Only send if - * - no previously transmitted data on the connection remains unacknowledged or - * - the TF_NODELAY flag is set (nagle algorithm turned off for this pcb) or - * - the only unsent segment is at least pcb->mss bytes long (or there is more - * than one unsent segment - with lwIP, this can happen although unsent->len < mss) - * - or if we are in fast-retransmit (TF_INFR) - */ -#define tcp_do_output_nagle(tpcb) ((((tpcb)->unacked == NULL) || \ - ((tpcb)->flags & (TF_NODELAY | TF_INFR)) || \ - (((tpcb)->unsent != NULL) && (((tpcb)->unsent->next != NULL) || \ - ((tpcb)->unsent->len >= (tpcb)->mss))) || \ - ((tcp_sndbuf(tpcb) == 0) || (tcp_sndqueuelen(tpcb) >= TCP_SND_QUEUELEN))) ? \ - 1 : \ - 0) -#define tcp_output_nagle(tpcb) (tcp_do_output_nagle(tpcb) ? tcp_output(tpcb) : ERR_OK) - -#define TCP_SEQ_LT(a, b) ((s32_t)((u32_t)(a) - (u32_t)(b)) < 0) -#define TCP_SEQ_LEQ(a, b) ((s32_t)((u32_t)(a) - (u32_t)(b)) <= 0) -#define TCP_SEQ_GT(a, b) ((s32_t)((u32_t)(a) - (u32_t)(b)) > 0) -#define TCP_SEQ_GEQ(a, b) ((s32_t)((u32_t)(a) - (u32_t)(b)) >= 0) -/* is b<=a<=c? */ -#if 0 /* see bug #10548 */ -#define TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(a, b, c) ((c) - (b) >= (a) - (b)) -#endif -#define TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(a, b, c) (TCP_SEQ_GEQ(a, b) && TCP_SEQ_LEQ(a, c)) - -#ifndef TCP_TMR_INTERVAL -#define TCP_TMR_INTERVAL 250 /* The TCP timer interval in milliseconds. */ -#endif /* TCP_TMR_INTERVAL */ - -#ifndef TCP_FAST_INTERVAL -#define TCP_FAST_INTERVAL TCP_TMR_INTERVAL /* the fine grained timeout in milliseconds */ -#endif /* TCP_FAST_INTERVAL */ - -#ifndef TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL -#define TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL (2 * TCP_TMR_INTERVAL) /* the coarse grained timeout in milliseconds */ -#endif /* TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL */ - -#define TCP_FIN_WAIT_TIMEOUT 20000 /* milliseconds */ -#define TCP_SYN_RCVD_TIMEOUT 20000 /* milliseconds */ - -#define TCP_OOSEQ_TIMEOUT 6U /* x RTO */ - -#ifndef TCP_MSL -#define TCP_MSL 60000UL /* The maximum segment lifetime in milliseconds */ -#endif - -/* Keepalive values, compliant with RFC 1122. Don't change this unless you know what you're doing */ -#ifndef TCP_KEEPIDLE_DEFAULT -#define TCP_KEEPIDLE_DEFAULT 7200000UL /* Default KEEPALIVE timer in milliseconds */ -#endif - -#ifndef TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT -#define TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT 75000UL /* Default Time between KEEPALIVE probes in milliseconds */ -#endif - -#ifndef TCP_KEEPCNT_DEFAULT -#define TCP_KEEPCNT_DEFAULT 9U /* Default Counter for KEEPALIVE probes */ -#endif - -#define TCP_MAXIDLE TCP_KEEPCNT_DEFAULT *TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT /* Maximum KEEPALIVE probe time */ - -#define TCP_TCPLEN(seg) ((seg)->len + (((TCPH_FLAGS((seg)->tcphdr) & (TCP_FIN | TCP_SYN)) != 0) ? 1U : 0U)) - -/** Flags used on input processing, not on pcb->flags -*/ -#define TF_RESET (u8_t)0x08U /* Connection was reset. */ -#define TF_CLOSED (u8_t)0x10U /* Connection was successfully closed. */ -#define TF_GOT_FIN (u8_t)0x20U /* Connection was closed by the remote end. */ - -#if LWIP_EVENT_API - -#define TCP_EVENT_ACCEPT(lpcb, pcb, arg, err, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event(arg, (pcb), \ - LWIP_EVENT_ACCEPT, NULL, 0, err) -#define TCP_EVENT_SENT(pcb, space, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), \ - LWIP_EVENT_SENT, NULL, space, ERR_OK) -#define TCP_EVENT_RECV(pcb, p, err, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), \ - LWIP_EVENT_RECV, (p), 0, (err)) -#define TCP_EVENT_CLOSED(pcb, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), \ - LWIP_EVENT_RECV, NULL, 0, ERR_OK) -#define TCP_EVENT_CONNECTED(pcb, err, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), \ - LWIP_EVENT_CONNECTED, NULL, 0, (err)) -#define TCP_EVENT_POLL(pcb, ret) \ - do { \ - if ((pcb)->state != SYN_RCVD) { \ - ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), LWIP_EVENT_POLL, NULL, 0, ERR_OK); \ - } else { \ - ret = ERR_ARG; \ - } \ - } while (0) -/* For event API, last state SYN_RCVD must be excluded here: the application - has not seen this pcb, yet! */ -#define TCP_EVENT_ERR(last_state, errf, arg, err) \ - do { \ - if (last_state != SYN_RCVD) { \ - lwip_tcp_event((arg), NULL, LWIP_EVENT_ERR, NULL, 0, (err)); \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#else /* LWIP_EVENT_API */ - -#define TCP_EVENT_ACCEPT(lpcb, pcb, arg, err, ret) \ - do { \ - if ((lpcb)->accept != NULL) \ - (ret) = (lpcb)->accept((arg), (pcb), (err)); \ - else \ - (ret) = ERR_ARG; \ - } while (0) - -#define TCP_EVENT_SENT(pcb, space, ret) \ - do { \ - if ((pcb)->sent != NULL) \ - (ret) = (pcb)->sent((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), (space)); \ - else \ - (ret) = ERR_OK; \ - } while (0) - -#define TCP_EVENT_RECV(pcb, p, err, ret) \ - do { \ - if ((pcb)->recv != NULL) { \ - (ret) = (pcb)->recv((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), (p), (err)); \ - } else { \ - (ret) = tcp_recv_null(NULL, (pcb), (p), (err)); \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#define TCP_EVENT_CLOSED(pcb, ret) \ - do { \ - if (((pcb)->recv != NULL)) { \ - (ret) = (pcb)->recv((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), NULL, ERR_OK); \ - } else { \ - (ret) = ERR_OK; \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#define TCP_EVENT_CONNECTED(pcb, err, ret) \ - do { \ - if ((pcb)->connected != NULL) \ - (ret) = (pcb)->connected((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), (err)); \ - else \ - (ret) = ERR_OK; \ - } while (0) - -#define TCP_EVENT_POLL(pcb, ret) \ - do { \ - if ((pcb)->poll != NULL) \ - (ret) = (pcb)->poll((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb)); \ - else \ - (ret) = ERR_OK; \ - } while (0) - -#define TCP_EVENT_ERR(last_state, errf, arg, err) \ - do { \ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(last_state); \ - if ((errf) != NULL) \ - (errf)((arg), (err)); \ - } while (0) - -#endif /* LWIP_EVENT_API */ - -/** Enabled extra-check for TCP_OVERSIZE if LWIP_DEBUG is enabled */ -#if TCP_OVERSIZE && defined(LWIP_DEBUG) -#define TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK 1 -#else -#define TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK 0 -#endif - -/** Don't generate checksum on copy if CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP is disabled */ -#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY (LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP) - -/* This structure represents a TCP segment on the unsent, unacked and ooseq queues */ -struct tcp_seg { - struct tcp_seg *next; /* used when putting segments on a queue */ - struct pbuf *p; /* buffer containing data + TCP header */ - u16_t len; /* the TCP length of this segment */ -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - u16_t oversize_left; /* Extra bytes available at the end of the last - pbuf in unsent (used for asserting vs. - tcp_pcb.unsent_oversize only) */ -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ -#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY - u16_t chksum; - u8_t chksum_swapped; -#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ - u8_t flags; -#define TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS (u8_t)0x01U /* Include MSS option (only used in SYN segments) */ -#define TF_SEG_OPTS_TS (u8_t)0x02U /* Include timestamp option. */ -#define TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED (u8_t)0x04U /* ALL data (not the header) is - checksummed into 'chksum' */ -#define TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE (u8_t)0x08U /* Include WND SCALE option (only used in SYN segments) */ -#define TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM (u8_t)0x10U /* Include SACK Permitted option (only used in SYN segments) */ - struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; /* the TCP header */ -}; - -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_EOL 0 -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_NOP 1 -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_MSS 2 -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_WS 3 -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_SACK_PERM 4 -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_TS 8 - -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_MSS 4 -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS 10 -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS_OUT 12 /* aligned for output (includes NOP padding) */ -#else -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS_OUT 0 -#endif -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS 3 -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS_OUT 4 /* aligned for output (includes NOP padding) */ -#else -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS_OUT 0 -#endif - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM 2 -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM_OUT 4 /* aligned for output (includes NOP padding) */ -#else -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM_OUT 0 -#endif - -#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(flags) \ - ((flags)&TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS ? LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_MSS : 0) + \ - ((flags)&TF_SEG_OPTS_TS ? LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS_OUT : 0) + \ - ((flags)&TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE ? LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS_OUT : 0) + \ - ((flags)&TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM ? LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM_OUT : 0) - -/** This returns a TCP header option for MSS in an u32_t */ -#define TCP_BUILD_MSS_OPTION(mss) lwip_htonl(0x02040000 | ((mss)&0xFFFF)) - -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE -#define TCPWNDSIZE_F U32_F -#define TCPWND_MAX 0xFFFFFFFFU -#define TCPWND_CHECK16(x) LWIP_ASSERT("window size > 0xFFFF", (x) <= 0xFFFF) -#define TCPWND_MIN16(x) ((u16_t)LWIP_MIN((x), 0xFFFF)) -#else /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ -#define TCPWNDSIZE_F U16_F -#define TCPWND_MAX 0xFFFFU -#define TCPWND_CHECK16(x) -#define TCPWND_MIN16(x) x -#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ - -/* Global variables: */ -extern struct tcp_pcb *tcp_input_pcb; -extern u32_t tcp_ticks; -extern u8_t tcp_active_pcbs_changed; - -/* The TCP PCB lists. */ -union tcp_listen_pcbs_t /* List of all TCP PCBs in LISTEN state. */ -{ - struct tcp_pcb_listen *listen_pcbs; - struct tcp_pcb *pcbs; -}; -extern struct tcp_pcb *tcp_bound_pcbs; -extern union tcp_listen_pcbs_t tcp_listen_pcbs; -extern struct tcp_pcb *tcp_active_pcbs; /* List of all TCP PCBs that are in a - state in which they accept or send - data. */ -extern struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tw_pcbs; /* List of all TCP PCBs in TIME-WAIT. */ - -#define NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS_NO_TIME_WAIT 3 -#define NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS 4 -extern struct tcp_pcb **const tcp_pcb_lists[NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS]; - -/* Axioms about the above lists: - 1) Every TCP PCB that is not CLOSED is in one of the lists. - 2) A PCB is only in one of the lists. - 3) All PCBs in the tcp_listen_pcbs list is in LISTEN state. - 4) All PCBs in the tcp_tw_pcbs list is in TIME-WAIT state. -*/ -/* Define two macros, TCP_REG and TCP_RMV that registers a TCP PCB - with a PCB list or removes a PCB from a list, respectively. */ -#ifndef TCP_DEBUG_PCB_LISTS -#define TCP_DEBUG_PCB_LISTS 0 -#endif -#if TCP_DEBUG_PCB_LISTS -#define TCP_REG(pcbs, npcb) \ - do { \ - struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tmp_pcb; \ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP_REG %p local port %" U16_F "\n", (void *)(npcb), (npcb)->local_port)); \ - for (tcp_tmp_pcb = *(pcbs); \ - tcp_tmp_pcb != NULL; \ - tcp_tmp_pcb = tcp_tmp_pcb->next) { \ - LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_REG: already registered\n", tcp_tmp_pcb != (npcb)); \ - } \ - LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_REG: pcb->state != CLOSED", ((pcbs) == &tcp_bound_pcbs) || ((npcb)->state != CLOSED)); \ - (npcb)->next = *(pcbs); \ - LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_REG: npcb->next != npcb", (npcb)->next != (npcb)); \ - *(pcbs) = (npcb); \ - LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_REG: tcp_pcbs sane", tcp_pcbs_sane()); \ - tcp_timer_needed(); \ - } while (0) -#define TCP_RMV(pcbs, npcb) \ - do { \ - struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tmp_pcb; \ - LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_RMV: pcbs != NULL", *(pcbs) != NULL); \ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP_RMV: removing %p from %p\n", (void *)(npcb), (void *)(*(pcbs)))); \ - if (*(pcbs) == (npcb)) { \ - *(pcbs) = (*pcbs)->next; \ - } else \ - for (tcp_tmp_pcb = *(pcbs); tcp_tmp_pcb != NULL; tcp_tmp_pcb = tcp_tmp_pcb->next) { \ - if (tcp_tmp_pcb->next == (npcb)) { \ - tcp_tmp_pcb->next = (npcb)->next; \ - break; \ - } \ - } \ - (npcb)->next = NULL; \ - LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_RMV: tcp_pcbs sane", tcp_pcbs_sane()); \ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP_RMV: removed %p from %p\n", (void *)(npcb), (void *)(*(pcbs)))); \ - } while (0) - -#else /* LWIP_DEBUG */ - -#define TCP_REG(pcbs, npcb) \ - do { \ - (npcb)->next = *pcbs; \ - *(pcbs) = (npcb); \ - tcp_timer_needed(); \ - } while (0) - -#define TCP_RMV(pcbs, npcb) \ - do { \ - if (*(pcbs) == (npcb)) { \ - (*(pcbs)) = (*pcbs)->next; \ - } else { \ - struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tmp_pcb; \ - for (tcp_tmp_pcb = *pcbs; \ - tcp_tmp_pcb != NULL; \ - tcp_tmp_pcb = tcp_tmp_pcb->next) { \ - if (tcp_tmp_pcb->next == (npcb)) { \ - tcp_tmp_pcb->next = (npcb)->next; \ - break; \ - } \ - } \ - } \ - (npcb)->next = NULL; \ - } while (0) - -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ - -#define TCP_REG_ACTIVE(npcb) \ - do { \ - TCP_REG(&tcp_active_pcbs, npcb); \ - tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 1; \ - } while (0) - -#define TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(npcb) \ - do { \ - TCP_RMV(&tcp_active_pcbs, npcb); \ - tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 1; \ - } while (0) - -#define TCP_PCB_REMOVE_ACTIVE(pcb) \ - do { \ - tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_active_pcbs, pcb); \ - tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 1; \ - } while (0) - -/* Internal functions: */ -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_pcb_copy(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -void tcp_pcb_purge(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -void tcp_pcb_remove(struct tcp_pcb **pcblist, struct tcp_pcb *pcb); - -void tcp_segs_free(struct tcp_seg *seg); -void tcp_seg_free(struct tcp_seg *seg); -struct tcp_seg *tcp_seg_copy(struct tcp_seg *seg); - -#define tcp_ack(pcb) \ - do { \ - if ((pcb)->flags & TF_ACK_DELAY) { \ - tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY); \ - tcp_ack_now(pcb); \ - } else { \ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY); \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#define tcp_ack_now(pcb) \ - tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_NOW) - -err_t tcp_send_fin(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -err_t tcp_enqueue_flags(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t flags); - -void tcp_rexmit_seg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct tcp_seg *seg); - -void tcp_rst(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, - const ip_addr_t *local_ip, const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, - u16_t local_port, u16_t remote_port); - -u32_t tcp_next_iss(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); - -err_t tcp_keepalive(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -err_t tcp_split_unsent_seg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t split); -err_t tcp_zero_window_probe(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -void tcp_trigger_input_pcb_close(void); - -#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS -u16_t tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(u16_t sendmss, struct netif *outif, - const ip_addr_t *dest); -#define tcp_eff_send_mss(sendmss, src, dest) \ - tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(sendmss, ip_route(src, dest), dest) -#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ - -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API -err_t tcp_recv_null(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - -#if TCP_DEBUG || TCP_INPUT_DEBUG || TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG -void tcp_debug_print(struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr); -void tcp_debug_print_flags(u8_t flags); -void tcp_debug_print_state(enum tcp_state s); -void tcp_debug_print_pcbs(void); -s16_t tcp_pcbs_sane(void); -#else -#define tcp_debug_print(tcphdr) -#define tcp_debug_print_flags(flags) -#define tcp_debug_print_state(s) -#define tcp_debug_print_pcbs() -#define tcp_pcbs_sane() 1 -#endif /* TCP_DEBUG */ - -/** External function (implemented in timers.c), called when TCP detects - * that a timer is needed (i.e. active- or time-wait-pcb found). */ -void tcp_timer_needed(void); - -void tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr); - -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ -void tcp_free_ooseq(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -#endif - -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS -err_t tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_passive_open(struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb, struct tcp_pcb *cpcb); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCP_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * TCP internal implementations (do not use in application code) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCP_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TCP_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/icmp.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/prot/tcp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Functions for interfacing with TCP: */ + +/* Lower layer interface to TCP: */ +void tcp_init(void); /* Initialize this module. */ +void tcp_tmr(void); /* Must be called every + TCP_TMR_INTERVAL + ms. (Typically 250 ms). */ +/* It is also possible to call these two functions at the right + intervals (instead of calling tcp_tmr()). */ +void tcp_slowtmr(void); +void tcp_fasttmr(void); + +/* Call this from a netif driver (watch out for threading issues!) that has + returned a memory error on transmit and now has free buffers to send more. + This iterates all active pcbs that had an error and tries to call + tcp_output, so use this with care as it might slow down the system. */ +void tcp_txnow(void); + +/* Only used by IP to pass a TCP segment to TCP: */ +void tcp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +/* Used within the TCP code only: */ +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_alloc(u8_t prio); +void tcp_free(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +void tcp_abandon(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int reset); +err_t tcp_send_empty_ack(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +err_t tcp_rexmit(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +err_t tcp_rexmit_rto_prepare(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +void tcp_rexmit_rto_commit(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +void tcp_rexmit_rto(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +void tcp_rexmit_fast(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +u32_t tcp_update_rcv_ann_wnd(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +err_t tcp_process_refused_data(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); + +/** + * This is the Nagle algorithm: try to combine user data to send as few TCP + * segments as possible. Only send if + * - no previously transmitted data on the connection remains unacknowledged or + * - the TF_NODELAY flag is set (nagle algorithm turned off for this pcb) or + * - the only unsent segment is at least pcb->mss bytes long (or there is more + * than one unsent segment - with lwIP, this can happen although unsent->len < mss) + * - or if we are in fast-retransmit (TF_INFR) + */ +#define tcp_do_output_nagle(tpcb) ((((tpcb)->unacked == NULL) || \ + ((tpcb)->flags & (TF_NODELAY | TF_INFR)) || \ + (((tpcb)->unsent != NULL) && (((tpcb)->unsent->next != NULL) || \ + ((tpcb)->unsent->len >= (tpcb)->mss))) || \ + ((tcp_sndbuf(tpcb) == 0) || (tcp_sndqueuelen(tpcb) >= TCP_SND_QUEUELEN))) ? \ + 1 : \ + 0) +#define tcp_output_nagle(tpcb) (tcp_do_output_nagle(tpcb) ? tcp_output(tpcb) : ERR_OK) + +#define TCP_SEQ_LT(a, b) ((s32_t)((u32_t)(a) - (u32_t)(b)) < 0) +#define TCP_SEQ_LEQ(a, b) ((s32_t)((u32_t)(a) - (u32_t)(b)) <= 0) +#define TCP_SEQ_GT(a, b) ((s32_t)((u32_t)(a) - (u32_t)(b)) > 0) +#define TCP_SEQ_GEQ(a, b) ((s32_t)((u32_t)(a) - (u32_t)(b)) >= 0) +/* is b<=a<=c? */ +#if 0 /* see bug #10548 */ +#define TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(a, b, c) ((c) - (b) >= (a) - (b)) +#endif +#define TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(a, b, c) (TCP_SEQ_GEQ(a, b) && TCP_SEQ_LEQ(a, c)) + +#ifndef TCP_TMR_INTERVAL +#define TCP_TMR_INTERVAL 250 /* The TCP timer interval in milliseconds. */ +#endif /* TCP_TMR_INTERVAL */ + +#ifndef TCP_FAST_INTERVAL +#define TCP_FAST_INTERVAL TCP_TMR_INTERVAL /* the fine grained timeout in milliseconds */ +#endif /* TCP_FAST_INTERVAL */ + +#ifndef TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL +#define TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL (2 * TCP_TMR_INTERVAL) /* the coarse grained timeout in milliseconds */ +#endif /* TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL */ + +#define TCP_FIN_WAIT_TIMEOUT 20000 /* milliseconds */ +#define TCP_SYN_RCVD_TIMEOUT 20000 /* milliseconds */ + +#define TCP_OOSEQ_TIMEOUT 6U /* x RTO */ + +#ifndef TCP_MSL +#define TCP_MSL 60000UL /* The maximum segment lifetime in milliseconds */ +#endif + +/* Keepalive values, compliant with RFC 1122. Don't change this unless you know what you're doing */ +#ifndef TCP_KEEPIDLE_DEFAULT +#define TCP_KEEPIDLE_DEFAULT 7200000UL /* Default KEEPALIVE timer in milliseconds */ +#endif + +#ifndef TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT +#define TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT 75000UL /* Default Time between KEEPALIVE probes in milliseconds */ +#endif + +#ifndef TCP_KEEPCNT_DEFAULT +#define TCP_KEEPCNT_DEFAULT 9U /* Default Counter for KEEPALIVE probes */ +#endif + +#define TCP_MAXIDLE TCP_KEEPCNT_DEFAULT *TCP_KEEPINTVL_DEFAULT /* Maximum KEEPALIVE probe time */ + +#define TCP_TCPLEN(seg) ((seg)->len + (((TCPH_FLAGS((seg)->tcphdr) & (TCP_FIN | TCP_SYN)) != 0) ? 1U : 0U)) + +/** Flags used on input processing, not on pcb->flags +*/ +#define TF_RESET (u8_t)0x08U /* Connection was reset. */ +#define TF_CLOSED (u8_t)0x10U /* Connection was successfully closed. */ +#define TF_GOT_FIN (u8_t)0x20U /* Connection was closed by the remote end. */ + +#if LWIP_EVENT_API + +#define TCP_EVENT_ACCEPT(lpcb, pcb, arg, err, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event(arg, (pcb), \ + LWIP_EVENT_ACCEPT, NULL, 0, err) +#define TCP_EVENT_SENT(pcb, space, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), \ + LWIP_EVENT_SENT, NULL, space, ERR_OK) +#define TCP_EVENT_RECV(pcb, p, err, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), \ + LWIP_EVENT_RECV, (p), 0, (err)) +#define TCP_EVENT_CLOSED(pcb, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), \ + LWIP_EVENT_RECV, NULL, 0, ERR_OK) +#define TCP_EVENT_CONNECTED(pcb, err, ret) ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), \ + LWIP_EVENT_CONNECTED, NULL, 0, (err)) +#define TCP_EVENT_POLL(pcb, ret) \ + do { \ + if ((pcb)->state != SYN_RCVD) { \ + ret = lwip_tcp_event((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), LWIP_EVENT_POLL, NULL, 0, ERR_OK); \ + } else { \ + ret = ERR_ARG; \ + } \ + } while (0) +/* For event API, last state SYN_RCVD must be excluded here: the application + has not seen this pcb, yet! */ +#define TCP_EVENT_ERR(last_state, errf, arg, err) \ + do { \ + if (last_state != SYN_RCVD) { \ + lwip_tcp_event((arg), NULL, LWIP_EVENT_ERR, NULL, 0, (err)); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#else /* LWIP_EVENT_API */ + +#define TCP_EVENT_ACCEPT(lpcb, pcb, arg, err, ret) \ + do { \ + if ((lpcb)->accept != NULL) \ + (ret) = (lpcb)->accept((arg), (pcb), (err)); \ + else \ + (ret) = ERR_ARG; \ + } while (0) + +#define TCP_EVENT_SENT(pcb, space, ret) \ + do { \ + if ((pcb)->sent != NULL) \ + (ret) = (pcb)->sent((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), (space)); \ + else \ + (ret) = ERR_OK; \ + } while (0) + +#define TCP_EVENT_RECV(pcb, p, err, ret) \ + do { \ + if ((pcb)->recv != NULL) { \ + (ret) = (pcb)->recv((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), (p), (err)); \ + } else { \ + (ret) = tcp_recv_null(NULL, (pcb), (p), (err)); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define TCP_EVENT_CLOSED(pcb, ret) \ + do { \ + if (((pcb)->recv != NULL)) { \ + (ret) = (pcb)->recv((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), NULL, ERR_OK); \ + } else { \ + (ret) = ERR_OK; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define TCP_EVENT_CONNECTED(pcb, err, ret) \ + do { \ + if ((pcb)->connected != NULL) \ + (ret) = (pcb)->connected((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb), (err)); \ + else \ + (ret) = ERR_OK; \ + } while (0) + +#define TCP_EVENT_POLL(pcb, ret) \ + do { \ + if ((pcb)->poll != NULL) \ + (ret) = (pcb)->poll((pcb)->callback_arg, (pcb)); \ + else \ + (ret) = ERR_OK; \ + } while (0) + +#define TCP_EVENT_ERR(last_state, errf, arg, err) \ + do { \ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(last_state); \ + if ((errf) != NULL) \ + (errf)((arg), (err)); \ + } while (0) + +#endif /* LWIP_EVENT_API */ + +/** Enabled extra-check for TCP_OVERSIZE if LWIP_DEBUG is enabled */ +#if TCP_OVERSIZE && defined(LWIP_DEBUG) +#define TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK 1 +#else +#define TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK 0 +#endif + +/** Don't generate checksum on copy if CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP is disabled */ +#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY (LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_TCP) + +/* This structure represents a TCP segment on the unsent, unacked and ooseq queues */ +struct tcp_seg { + struct tcp_seg *next; /* used when putting segments on a queue */ + struct pbuf *p; /* buffer containing data + TCP header */ + u16_t len; /* the TCP length of this segment */ +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + u16_t oversize_left; /* Extra bytes available at the end of the last + pbuf in unsent (used for asserting vs. + tcp_pcb.unsent_oversize only) */ +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ +#if TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY + u16_t chksum; + u8_t chksum_swapped; +#endif /* TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY */ + u8_t flags; +#define TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS (u8_t)0x01U /* Include MSS option (only used in SYN segments) */ +#define TF_SEG_OPTS_TS (u8_t)0x02U /* Include timestamp option. */ +#define TF_SEG_DATA_CHECKSUMMED (u8_t)0x04U /* ALL data (not the header) is + checksummed into 'chksum' */ +#define TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE (u8_t)0x08U /* Include WND SCALE option (only used in SYN segments) */ +#define TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM (u8_t)0x10U /* Include SACK Permitted option (only used in SYN segments) */ + struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; /* the TCP header */ +}; + +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_EOL 0 +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_NOP 1 +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_MSS 2 +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_WS 3 +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_SACK_PERM 4 +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_TS 8 + +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_MSS 4 +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS 10 +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS_OUT 12 /* aligned for output (includes NOP padding) */ +#else +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS_OUT 0 +#endif +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS 3 +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS_OUT 4 /* aligned for output (includes NOP padding) */ +#else +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS_OUT 0 +#endif + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM 2 +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM_OUT 4 /* aligned for output (includes NOP padding) */ +#else +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM_OUT 0 +#endif + +#define LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(flags) \ + ((flags)&TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS ? LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_MSS : 0) + \ + ((flags)&TF_SEG_OPTS_TS ? LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_TS_OUT : 0) + \ + ((flags)&TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE ? LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_WS_OUT : 0) + \ + ((flags)&TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM ? LWIP_TCP_OPT_LEN_SACK_PERM_OUT : 0) + +/** This returns a TCP header option for MSS in an u32_t */ +#define TCP_BUILD_MSS_OPTION(mss) lwip_htonl(0x02040000 | ((mss)&0xFFFF)) + +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE +#define TCPWNDSIZE_F U32_F +#define TCPWND_MAX 0xFFFFFFFFU +#define TCPWND_CHECK16(x) LWIP_ASSERT("window size > 0xFFFF", (x) <= 0xFFFF) +#define TCPWND_MIN16(x) ((u16_t)LWIP_MIN((x), 0xFFFF)) +#else /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ +#define TCPWNDSIZE_F U16_F +#define TCPWND_MAX 0xFFFFU +#define TCPWND_CHECK16(x) +#define TCPWND_MIN16(x) x +#endif /* LWIP_WND_SCALE */ + +/* Global variables: */ +extern struct tcp_pcb *tcp_input_pcb; +extern u32_t tcp_ticks; +extern u8_t tcp_active_pcbs_changed; + +/* The TCP PCB lists. */ +union tcp_listen_pcbs_t /* List of all TCP PCBs in LISTEN state. */ +{ + struct tcp_pcb_listen *listen_pcbs; + struct tcp_pcb *pcbs; +}; +extern struct tcp_pcb *tcp_bound_pcbs; +extern union tcp_listen_pcbs_t tcp_listen_pcbs; +extern struct tcp_pcb *tcp_active_pcbs; /* List of all TCP PCBs that are in a + state in which they accept or send + data. */ +extern struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tw_pcbs; /* List of all TCP PCBs in TIME-WAIT. */ + +#define NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS_NO_TIME_WAIT 3 +#define NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS 4 +extern struct tcp_pcb **const tcp_pcb_lists[NUM_TCP_PCB_LISTS]; + +/* Axioms about the above lists: + 1) Every TCP PCB that is not CLOSED is in one of the lists. + 2) A PCB is only in one of the lists. + 3) All PCBs in the tcp_listen_pcbs list is in LISTEN state. + 4) All PCBs in the tcp_tw_pcbs list is in TIME-WAIT state. +*/ +/* Define two macros, TCP_REG and TCP_RMV that registers a TCP PCB + with a PCB list or removes a PCB from a list, respectively. */ +#ifndef TCP_DEBUG_PCB_LISTS +#define TCP_DEBUG_PCB_LISTS 0 +#endif +#if TCP_DEBUG_PCB_LISTS +#define TCP_REG(pcbs, npcb) \ + do { \ + struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tmp_pcb; \ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP_REG %p local port %" U16_F "\n", (void *)(npcb), (npcb)->local_port)); \ + for (tcp_tmp_pcb = *(pcbs); \ + tcp_tmp_pcb != NULL; \ + tcp_tmp_pcb = tcp_tmp_pcb->next) { \ + LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_REG: already registered\n", tcp_tmp_pcb != (npcb)); \ + } \ + LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_REG: pcb->state != CLOSED", ((pcbs) == &tcp_bound_pcbs) || ((npcb)->state != CLOSED)); \ + (npcb)->next = *(pcbs); \ + LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_REG: npcb->next != npcb", (npcb)->next != (npcb)); \ + *(pcbs) = (npcb); \ + LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_REG: tcp_pcbs sane", tcp_pcbs_sane()); \ + tcp_timer_needed(); \ + } while (0) +#define TCP_RMV(pcbs, npcb) \ + do { \ + struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tmp_pcb; \ + LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_RMV: pcbs != NULL", *(pcbs) != NULL); \ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP_RMV: removing %p from %p\n", (void *)(npcb), (void *)(*(pcbs)))); \ + if (*(pcbs) == (npcb)) { \ + *(pcbs) = (*pcbs)->next; \ + } else \ + for (tcp_tmp_pcb = *(pcbs); tcp_tmp_pcb != NULL; tcp_tmp_pcb = tcp_tmp_pcb->next) { \ + if (tcp_tmp_pcb->next == (npcb)) { \ + tcp_tmp_pcb->next = (npcb)->next; \ + break; \ + } \ + } \ + (npcb)->next = NULL; \ + LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_RMV: tcp_pcbs sane", tcp_pcbs_sane()); \ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TCP_DEBUG, ("TCP_RMV: removed %p from %p\n", (void *)(npcb), (void *)(*(pcbs)))); \ + } while (0) + +#else /* LWIP_DEBUG */ + +#define TCP_REG(pcbs, npcb) \ + do { \ + (npcb)->next = *pcbs; \ + *(pcbs) = (npcb); \ + tcp_timer_needed(); \ + } while (0) + +#define TCP_RMV(pcbs, npcb) \ + do { \ + if (*(pcbs) == (npcb)) { \ + (*(pcbs)) = (*pcbs)->next; \ + } else { \ + struct tcp_pcb *tcp_tmp_pcb; \ + for (tcp_tmp_pcb = *pcbs; \ + tcp_tmp_pcb != NULL; \ + tcp_tmp_pcb = tcp_tmp_pcb->next) { \ + if (tcp_tmp_pcb->next == (npcb)) { \ + tcp_tmp_pcb->next = (npcb)->next; \ + break; \ + } \ + } \ + } \ + (npcb)->next = NULL; \ + } while (0) + +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG */ + +#define TCP_REG_ACTIVE(npcb) \ + do { \ + TCP_REG(&tcp_active_pcbs, npcb); \ + tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 1; \ + } while (0) + +#define TCP_RMV_ACTIVE(npcb) \ + do { \ + TCP_RMV(&tcp_active_pcbs, npcb); \ + tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 1; \ + } while (0) + +#define TCP_PCB_REMOVE_ACTIVE(pcb) \ + do { \ + tcp_pcb_remove(&tcp_active_pcbs, pcb); \ + tcp_active_pcbs_changed = 1; \ + } while (0) + +/* Internal functions: */ +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_pcb_copy(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +void tcp_pcb_purge(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +void tcp_pcb_remove(struct tcp_pcb **pcblist, struct tcp_pcb *pcb); + +void tcp_segs_free(struct tcp_seg *seg); +void tcp_seg_free(struct tcp_seg *seg); +struct tcp_seg *tcp_seg_copy(struct tcp_seg *seg); + +#define tcp_ack(pcb) \ + do { \ + if ((pcb)->flags & TF_ACK_DELAY) { \ + tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY); \ + tcp_ack_now(pcb); \ + } else { \ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_DELAY); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define tcp_ack_now(pcb) \ + tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_ACK_NOW) + +err_t tcp_send_fin(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +err_t tcp_enqueue_flags(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t flags); + +void tcp_rexmit_seg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct tcp_seg *seg); + +void tcp_rst(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, + const ip_addr_t *local_ip, const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, + u16_t local_port, u16_t remote_port); + +u32_t tcp_next_iss(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); + +err_t tcp_keepalive(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +err_t tcp_split_unsent_seg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t split); +err_t tcp_zero_window_probe(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +void tcp_trigger_input_pcb_close(void); + +#if TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS +u16_t tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(u16_t sendmss, struct netif *outif, + const ip_addr_t *dest); +#define tcp_eff_send_mss(sendmss, src, dest) \ + tcp_eff_send_mss_netif(sendmss, ip_route(src, dest), dest) +#endif /* TCP_CALCULATE_EFF_SEND_MSS */ + +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API +err_t tcp_recv_null(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + +#if TCP_DEBUG || TCP_INPUT_DEBUG || TCP_OUTPUT_DEBUG +void tcp_debug_print(struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr); +void tcp_debug_print_flags(u8_t flags); +void tcp_debug_print_state(enum tcp_state s); +void tcp_debug_print_pcbs(void); +s16_t tcp_pcbs_sane(void); +#else +#define tcp_debug_print(tcphdr) +#define tcp_debug_print_flags(flags) +#define tcp_debug_print_state(s) +#define tcp_debug_print_pcbs() +#define tcp_pcbs_sane() 1 +#endif /* TCP_DEBUG */ + +/** External function (implemented in timers.c), called when TCP detects + * that a timer is needed (i.e. active- or time-wait-pcb found). */ +void tcp_timer_needed(void); + +void tcp_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr); + +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ +void tcp_free_ooseq(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +#endif + +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS +err_t tcp_ext_arg_invoke_callbacks_passive_open(struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb, struct tcp_pcb *cpcb); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCP_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h index e9310dc6..779745c2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h @@ -1,176 +1,176 @@ -/** - * @file - * TCPIP API internal implementations (do not use in application code) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_PRIV_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_PRIV_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if !NO_SYS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct pbuf; -struct netif; - -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE -#define API_VAR_REF(name) (*(name)) -#define API_VAR_DECLARE(type, name) type *name -#define API_VAR_ALLOC_EXT(type, pool, name, errorblock) \ - do { \ - name = (type *)memp_malloc(pool); \ - if (name == NULL) { \ - errorblock; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define API_VAR_ALLOC(type, pool, name, errorval) API_VAR_ALLOC_EXT(type, pool, name, return errorval) -#define API_VAR_ALLOC_POOL(type, pool, name, errorval) \ - do { \ - name = (type *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(pool); \ - if (name == NULL) { \ - return errorval; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define API_VAR_FREE(pool, name) memp_free(pool, name) -#define API_VAR_FREE_POOL(pool, name) LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(pool, name) -#define API_EXPR_REF(expr) (&(expr)) -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD -#define API_EXPR_REF_SEM(expr) (expr) -#else -#define API_EXPR_REF_SEM(expr) API_EXPR_REF(expr) -#endif -#define API_EXPR_DEREF(expr) expr -#define API_MSG_M_DEF(m) m -#define API_MSG_M_DEF_C(t, m) t m -#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ -#define API_VAR_REF(name) name -#define API_VAR_DECLARE(type, name) type name -#define API_VAR_ALLOC_EXT(type, pool, name, errorblock) -#define API_VAR_ALLOC(type, pool, name, errorval) -#define API_VAR_ALLOC_POOL(type, pool, name, errorval) -#define API_VAR_FREE(pool, name) -#define API_VAR_FREE_POOL(pool, name) -#define API_EXPR_REF(expr) expr -#define API_EXPR_REF_SEM(expr) API_EXPR_REF(expr) -#define API_EXPR_DEREF(expr) (*(expr)) -#define API_MSG_M_DEF(m) *m -#define API_MSG_M_DEF_C(t, m) const t *m -#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ - -err_t tcpip_send_msg_wait_sem(tcpip_callback_fn fn, void *apimsg, sys_sem_t *sem); - -struct tcpip_api_call_data { -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - err_t err; -#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD - sys_sem_t sem; -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ -#else /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - u8_t dummy; /* avoid empty struct :-( */ -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -}; -typedef err_t (*tcpip_api_call_fn)(struct tcpip_api_call_data *call); -err_t tcpip_api_call(tcpip_api_call_fn fn, struct tcpip_api_call_data *call); - -enum tcpip_msg_type { -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - TCPIP_MSG_API, - TCPIP_MSG_API_CALL, -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT - TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ -#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS - TCPIP_MSG_TIMEOUT, - TCPIP_MSG_UNTIMEOUT, -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ - TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK, - TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK_STATIC -}; - -struct tcpip_msg { - enum tcpip_msg_type type; - union { -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING - struct - { - tcpip_callback_fn function; - void *msg; - } api_msg; - struct - { - tcpip_api_call_fn function; - struct tcpip_api_call_data *arg; - sys_sem_t *sem; - } api_call; -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT - struct - { - struct pbuf *p; - struct netif *netif; - netif_input_fn input_fn; - } inp; -#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ - struct - { - tcpip_callback_fn function; - void *ctx; - } cb; -#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS - struct - { - u32_t msecs; - sys_timeout_handler h; - void *arg; - } tmo; -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ - } msg; -}; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_PRIV_H */ +/** + * @file + * TCPIP API internal implementations (do not use in application code) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_PRIV_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_PRIV_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if !NO_SYS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct pbuf; +struct netif; + +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE +#define API_VAR_REF(name) (*(name)) +#define API_VAR_DECLARE(type, name) type *name +#define API_VAR_ALLOC_EXT(type, pool, name, errorblock) \ + do { \ + name = (type *)memp_malloc(pool); \ + if (name == NULL) { \ + errorblock; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define API_VAR_ALLOC(type, pool, name, errorval) API_VAR_ALLOC_EXT(type, pool, name, return errorval) +#define API_VAR_ALLOC_POOL(type, pool, name, errorval) \ + do { \ + name = (type *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(pool); \ + if (name == NULL) { \ + return errorval; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define API_VAR_FREE(pool, name) memp_free(pool, name) +#define API_VAR_FREE_POOL(pool, name) LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(pool, name) +#define API_EXPR_REF(expr) (&(expr)) +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD +#define API_EXPR_REF_SEM(expr) (expr) +#else +#define API_EXPR_REF_SEM(expr) API_EXPR_REF(expr) +#endif +#define API_EXPR_DEREF(expr) expr +#define API_MSG_M_DEF(m) m +#define API_MSG_M_DEF_C(t, m) t m +#else /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ +#define API_VAR_REF(name) name +#define API_VAR_DECLARE(type, name) type name +#define API_VAR_ALLOC_EXT(type, pool, name, errorblock) +#define API_VAR_ALLOC(type, pool, name, errorval) +#define API_VAR_ALLOC_POOL(type, pool, name, errorval) +#define API_VAR_FREE(pool, name) +#define API_VAR_FREE_POOL(pool, name) +#define API_EXPR_REF(expr) expr +#define API_EXPR_REF_SEM(expr) API_EXPR_REF(expr) +#define API_EXPR_DEREF(expr) (*(expr)) +#define API_MSG_M_DEF(m) *m +#define API_MSG_M_DEF_C(t, m) const t *m +#endif /* LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE */ + +err_t tcpip_send_msg_wait_sem(tcpip_callback_fn fn, void *apimsg, sys_sem_t *sem); + +struct tcpip_api_call_data { +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + err_t err; +#if !LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD + sys_sem_t sem; +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ +#else /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + u8_t dummy; /* avoid empty struct :-( */ +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +}; +typedef err_t (*tcpip_api_call_fn)(struct tcpip_api_call_data *call); +err_t tcpip_api_call(tcpip_api_call_fn fn, struct tcpip_api_call_data *call); + +enum tcpip_msg_type { +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + TCPIP_MSG_API, + TCPIP_MSG_API_CALL, +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT + TCPIP_MSG_INPKT, +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ +#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS + TCPIP_MSG_TIMEOUT, + TCPIP_MSG_UNTIMEOUT, +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ + TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK, + TCPIP_MSG_CALLBACK_STATIC +}; + +struct tcpip_msg { + enum tcpip_msg_type type; + union { +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING + struct + { + tcpip_callback_fn function; + void *msg; + } api_msg; + struct + { + tcpip_api_call_fn function; + struct tcpip_api_call_data *arg; + sys_sem_t *sem; + } api_call; +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +#if !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT + struct + { + struct pbuf *p; + struct netif *netif; + netif_input_fn input_fn; + } inp; +#endif /* !LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING_INPUT */ + struct + { + tcpip_callback_fn function; + void *ctx; + } cb; +#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS + struct + { + u32_t msecs; + sys_timeout_handler h; + void *arg; + } tmo; +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ + } msg; +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_PRIV_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/autoip.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/autoip.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/autoip.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/autoip.h index 5d1440fa..09ecb911 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/autoip.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/autoip.h @@ -1,78 +1,78 @@ -/** - * @file - * AutoIP protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * - * Copyright (c) 2007 Dominik Spies - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Dominik Spies - * - * This is a AutoIP implementation for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. It aims to conform - * with RFC 3927. - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_AUTOIP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_AUTOIP_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* 169.254.0.0 */ -#define AUTOIP_NET 0xA9FE0000 -/* 169.254.1.0 */ -#define AUTOIP_RANGE_START (AUTOIP_NET | 0x0100) -/* 169.254.254.255 */ -#define AUTOIP_RANGE_END (AUTOIP_NET | 0xFEFF) - -/* RFC 3927 Constants */ -#define PROBE_WAIT 1 /* second (initial random delay) */ -#define PROBE_MIN 1 /* second (minimum delay till repeated probe) */ -#define PROBE_MAX 2 /* seconds (maximum delay till repeated probe) */ -#define PROBE_NUM 3 /* (number of probe packets) */ -#define ANNOUNCE_NUM 2 /* (number of announcement packets) */ -#define ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL 2 /* seconds (time between announcement packets) */ -#define ANNOUNCE_WAIT 2 /* seconds (delay before announcing) */ -#define MAX_CONFLICTS 10 /* (max conflicts before rate limiting) */ -#define RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL 60 /* seconds (delay between successive attempts) */ -#define DEFEND_INTERVAL 10 /* seconds (min. wait between defensive ARPs) */ - -/* AutoIP client states */ -typedef enum { - AUTOIP_STATE_OFF = 0, - AUTOIP_STATE_PROBING = 1, - AUTOIP_STATE_ANNOUNCING = 2, - AUTOIP_STATE_BOUND = 3 -} autoip_state_enum_t; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_AUTOIP_H */ +/** + * @file + * AutoIP protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * + * Copyright (c) 2007 Dominik Spies + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Dominik Spies + * + * This is a AutoIP implementation for the lwIP TCP/IP stack. It aims to conform + * with RFC 3927. + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_AUTOIP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_AUTOIP_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* 169.254.0.0 */ +#define AUTOIP_NET 0xA9FE0000 +/* 169.254.1.0 */ +#define AUTOIP_RANGE_START (AUTOIP_NET | 0x0100) +/* 169.254.254.255 */ +#define AUTOIP_RANGE_END (AUTOIP_NET | 0xFEFF) + +/* RFC 3927 Constants */ +#define PROBE_WAIT 1 /* second (initial random delay) */ +#define PROBE_MIN 1 /* second (minimum delay till repeated probe) */ +#define PROBE_MAX 2 /* seconds (maximum delay till repeated probe) */ +#define PROBE_NUM 3 /* (number of probe packets) */ +#define ANNOUNCE_NUM 2 /* (number of announcement packets) */ +#define ANNOUNCE_INTERVAL 2 /* seconds (time between announcement packets) */ +#define ANNOUNCE_WAIT 2 /* seconds (delay before announcing) */ +#define MAX_CONFLICTS 10 /* (max conflicts before rate limiting) */ +#define RATE_LIMIT_INTERVAL 60 /* seconds (delay between successive attempts) */ +#define DEFEND_INTERVAL 10 /* seconds (min. wait between defensive ARPs) */ + +/* AutoIP client states */ +typedef enum { + AUTOIP_STATE_OFF = 0, + AUTOIP_STATE_PROBING = 1, + AUTOIP_STATE_ANNOUNCING = 2, + AUTOIP_STATE_BOUND = 3 +} autoip_state_enum_t; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_AUTOIP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp.h index f89f6226..84693253 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp.h @@ -1,175 +1,175 @@ -/** - * @file - * DHCP protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Leon Woestenberg - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Leon Woestenberg - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip4.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* DHCP message item offsets and length */ -#define DHCP_CHADDR_LEN 16U -#define DHCP_SNAME_OFS 44U -#define DHCP_SNAME_LEN 64U -#define DHCP_FILE_OFS 108U -#define DHCP_FILE_LEN 128U -#define DHCP_MSG_LEN 236U -#define DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS (DHCP_MSG_LEN + 4U) /* 4 byte: cookie */ - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -/** minimum set of fields of any DHCP message */ -struct dhcp_msg { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t op); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t htype); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t hlen); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t hops); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t xid); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t secs); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t flags); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t ciaddr); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t yiaddr); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t siaddr); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t giaddr); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t chaddr[DHCP_CHADDR_LEN]); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t sname[DHCP_SNAME_LEN]); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t file[DHCP_FILE_LEN]); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t cookie); -#define DHCP_MIN_OPTIONS_LEN 68U - /** make sure user does not configure this too small */ -#if ((defined(DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN)) && (DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN < DHCP_MIN_OPTIONS_LEN)) -#undef DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN -#endif - /** allow this to be configured in lwipopts.h, but not too small */ -#if (!defined(DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN)) - /** set this to be sufficient for your options in outgoing DHCP msgs */ -#define DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN DHCP_MIN_OPTIONS_LEN -#endif - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t options[DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN]); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/* DHCP client states */ -typedef enum { - DHCP_STATE_OFF = 0, - DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING = 1, - DHCP_STATE_INIT = 2, - DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING = 3, - DHCP_STATE_REBINDING = 4, - DHCP_STATE_RENEWING = 5, - DHCP_STATE_SELECTING = 6, - DHCP_STATE_INFORMING = 7, - DHCP_STATE_CHECKING = 8, - DHCP_STATE_PERMANENT = 9, /* not yet implemented */ - DHCP_STATE_BOUND = 10, - DHCP_STATE_RELEASING = 11, /* not yet implemented */ - DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF = 12 -} dhcp_state_enum_t; - -/* DHCP op codes */ -#define DHCP_BOOTREQUEST 1 -#define DHCP_BOOTREPLY 2 - -/* DHCP message types */ -#define DHCP_DISCOVER 1 -#define DHCP_OFFER 2 -#define DHCP_REQUEST 3 -#define DHCP_DECLINE 4 -#define DHCP_ACK 5 -#define DHCP_NAK 6 -#define DHCP_RELEASE 7 -#define DHCP_INFORM 8 - -#define DHCP_MAGIC_COOKIE 0x63825363UL - -/* This is a list of options for BOOTP and DHCP, see RFC 2132 for descriptions */ - -/* BootP options */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_PAD 0 -#define DHCP_OPTION_SUBNET_MASK 1 /* RFC 2132 3.3 */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_ROUTER 3 -#define DHCP_OPTION_DNS_SERVER 6 -#define DHCP_OPTION_HOSTNAME 12 -#define DHCP_OPTION_IP_TTL 23 -#define DHCP_OPTION_MTU 26 -#define DHCP_OPTION_BROADCAST 28 -#define DHCP_OPTION_TCP_TTL 37 -#define DHCP_OPTION_NTP 42 -#define DHCP_OPTION_END 255 - -/* DHCP options */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP 50 /* RFC 2132 9.1, requested IP address */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_LEASE_TIME 51 /* RFC 2132 9.2, time in seconds, in 4 bytes */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_OVERLOAD 52 /* RFC2132 9.3, use file and/or sname field for options */ - -#define DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE 53 /* RFC 2132 9.6, important for DHCP */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE_LEN 1 - -#define DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID 54 /* RFC 2132 9.7, server IP address */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST 55 /* RFC 2132 9.8, requested option types */ - -#define DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE 57 /* RFC 2132 9.10, message size accepted >= 576 */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN 2 - -#define DHCP_OPTION_T1 58 /* T1 renewal time */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_T2 59 /* T2 rebinding time */ -#define DHCP_OPTION_US 60 -#define DHCP_OPTION_CLIENT_ID 61 -#define DHCP_OPTION_TFTP_SERVERNAME 66 -#define DHCP_OPTION_BOOTFILE 67 - -/* possible combinations of overloading the file and sname fields with options */ -#define DHCP_OVERLOAD_NONE 0 -#define DHCP_OVERLOAD_FILE 1 -#define DHCP_OVERLOAD_SNAME 2 -#define DHCP_OVERLOAD_SNAME_FILE 3 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP_H */ +/** + * @file + * DHCP protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Leon Woestenberg + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Leon Woestenberg + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip4.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* DHCP message item offsets and length */ +#define DHCP_CHADDR_LEN 16U +#define DHCP_SNAME_OFS 44U +#define DHCP_SNAME_LEN 64U +#define DHCP_FILE_OFS 108U +#define DHCP_FILE_LEN 128U +#define DHCP_MSG_LEN 236U +#define DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS (DHCP_MSG_LEN + 4U) /* 4 byte: cookie */ + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +/** minimum set of fields of any DHCP message */ +struct dhcp_msg { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t op); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t htype); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t hlen); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t hops); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t xid); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t secs); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t flags); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t ciaddr); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t yiaddr); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t siaddr); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t giaddr); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t chaddr[DHCP_CHADDR_LEN]); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t sname[DHCP_SNAME_LEN]); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t file[DHCP_FILE_LEN]); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t cookie); +#define DHCP_MIN_OPTIONS_LEN 68U + /** make sure user does not configure this too small */ +#if ((defined(DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN)) && (DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN < DHCP_MIN_OPTIONS_LEN)) +#undef DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN +#endif + /** allow this to be configured in lwipopts.h, but not too small */ +#if (!defined(DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN)) + /** set this to be sufficient for your options in outgoing DHCP msgs */ +#define DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN DHCP_MIN_OPTIONS_LEN +#endif + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t options[DHCP_OPTIONS_LEN]); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/* DHCP client states */ +typedef enum { + DHCP_STATE_OFF = 0, + DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING = 1, + DHCP_STATE_INIT = 2, + DHCP_STATE_REBOOTING = 3, + DHCP_STATE_REBINDING = 4, + DHCP_STATE_RENEWING = 5, + DHCP_STATE_SELECTING = 6, + DHCP_STATE_INFORMING = 7, + DHCP_STATE_CHECKING = 8, + DHCP_STATE_PERMANENT = 9, /* not yet implemented */ + DHCP_STATE_BOUND = 10, + DHCP_STATE_RELEASING = 11, /* not yet implemented */ + DHCP_STATE_BACKING_OFF = 12 +} dhcp_state_enum_t; + +/* DHCP op codes */ +#define DHCP_BOOTREQUEST 1 +#define DHCP_BOOTREPLY 2 + +/* DHCP message types */ +#define DHCP_DISCOVER 1 +#define DHCP_OFFER 2 +#define DHCP_REQUEST 3 +#define DHCP_DECLINE 4 +#define DHCP_ACK 5 +#define DHCP_NAK 6 +#define DHCP_RELEASE 7 +#define DHCP_INFORM 8 + +#define DHCP_MAGIC_COOKIE 0x63825363UL + +/* This is a list of options for BOOTP and DHCP, see RFC 2132 for descriptions */ + +/* BootP options */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_PAD 0 +#define DHCP_OPTION_SUBNET_MASK 1 /* RFC 2132 3.3 */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_ROUTER 3 +#define DHCP_OPTION_DNS_SERVER 6 +#define DHCP_OPTION_HOSTNAME 12 +#define DHCP_OPTION_IP_TTL 23 +#define DHCP_OPTION_MTU 26 +#define DHCP_OPTION_BROADCAST 28 +#define DHCP_OPTION_TCP_TTL 37 +#define DHCP_OPTION_NTP 42 +#define DHCP_OPTION_END 255 + +/* DHCP options */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP 50 /* RFC 2132 9.1, requested IP address */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_LEASE_TIME 51 /* RFC 2132 9.2, time in seconds, in 4 bytes */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_OVERLOAD 52 /* RFC2132 9.3, use file and/or sname field for options */ + +#define DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE 53 /* RFC 2132 9.6, important for DHCP */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE_LEN 1 + +#define DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID 54 /* RFC 2132 9.7, server IP address */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_PARAMETER_REQUEST_LIST 55 /* RFC 2132 9.8, requested option types */ + +#define DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE 57 /* RFC 2132 9.10, message size accepted >= 576 */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_MAX_MSG_SIZE_LEN 2 + +#define DHCP_OPTION_T1 58 /* T1 renewal time */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_T2 59 /* T2 rebinding time */ +#define DHCP_OPTION_US 60 +#define DHCP_OPTION_CLIENT_ID 61 +#define DHCP_OPTION_TFTP_SERVERNAME 66 +#define DHCP_OPTION_BOOTFILE 67 + +/* possible combinations of overloading the file and sname fields with options */ +#define DHCP_OVERLOAD_NONE 0 +#define DHCP_OVERLOAD_FILE 1 +#define DHCP_OVERLOAD_SNAME 2 +#define DHCP_OVERLOAD_SNAME_FILE 3 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp6.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp6.h index 993e367f..32657be8 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dhcp6.h @@ -1,134 +1,134 @@ -/** - * @file - * DHCPv6 protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP6_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define DHCP6_CLIENT_PORT 546 -#define DHCP6_SERVER_PORT 547 - -/* DHCPv6 message item offsets and length */ -#define DHCP6_TRANSACTION_ID_LEN 3 - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -/** minimum set of fields of any DHCPv6 message */ -struct dhcp6_msg { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t msgtype); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t transaction_id[DHCP6_TRANSACTION_ID_LEN]); - /* options follow */ -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/* DHCP6 client states */ -typedef enum { - DHCP6_STATE_OFF = 0, - DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE = 1, - DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG = 2 -} dhcp6_state_enum_t; - -/* DHCPv6 message types */ -#define DHCP6_SOLICIT 1 -#define DHCP6_ADVERTISE 2 -#define DHCP6_REQUEST 3 -#define DHCP6_CONFIRM 4 -#define DHCP6_RENEW 5 -#define DHCP6_REBIND 6 -#define DHCP6_REPLY 7 -#define DHCP6_RELEASE 8 -#define DHCP6_DECLINE 9 -#define DHCP6_RECONFIGURE 10 -#define DHCP6_INFOREQUEST 11 -#define DHCP6_RELAYFORW 12 -#define DHCP6_RELAYREPL 13 -/* More message types see https://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/dhcpv6-parameters.xhtml */ - -/** DHCPv6 status codes */ -#define DHCP6_STATUS_SUCCESS 0 /* Success. */ -#define DHCP6_STATUS_UNSPECFAIL 1 /* Failure, reason unspecified; this status code is sent by either a client or a server to indicate a failure not explicitly specified in this document. */ -#define DHCP6_STATUS_NOADDRSAVAIL 2 /* Server has no addresses available to assign to the IA(s). */ -#define DHCP6_STATUS_NOBINDING 3 /* Client record (binding) unavailable. */ -#define DHCP6_STATUS_NOTONLINK 4 /* The prefix for the address is not appropriate for the link to which the client is attached. */ -#define DHCP6_STATUS_USEMULTICAST 5 /* Sent by a server to a client to force the client to send messages to the server using the All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers address. */ -/* More status codes see https://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/dhcpv6-parameters.xhtml */ - -/** DHCPv6 DUID types */ -#define DHCP6_DUID_LLT 1 /* LLT: Link-layer Address Plus Time */ -#define DHCP6_DUID_EN 2 /* EN: Enterprise number */ -#define DHCP6_DUID_LL 3 /* LL: Link-layer Address */ -#define DHCP6_DUID_UUID 4 /* UUID (RFC 6355) */ - -/* DHCPv6 options */ -#define DHCP6_OPTION_CLIENTID 1 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_SERVERID 2 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_IA_NA 3 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_IA_TA 4 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_IAADDR 5 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_ORO 6 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_PREFERENCE 7 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_ELAPSED_TIME 8 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_RELAY_MSG 9 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_AUTH 11 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_UNICAST 12 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_STATUS_CODE 13 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_RAPID_COMMIT 14 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_USER_CLASS 15 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_VENDOR_CLASS 16 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_VENDOR_OPTS 17 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_INTERFACE_ID 18 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_RECONF_MSG 19 -#define DHCP6_OPTION_RECONF_ACCEPT 20 -/* More options see https://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/dhcpv6-parameters.xhtml */ -#define DHCP6_OPTION_DNS_SERVERS 23 /* RFC 3646 */ -#define DHCP6_OPTION_DOMAIN_LIST 24 /* RFC 3646 */ -#define DHCP6_OPTION_SNTP_SERVERS 31 /* RFC 4075 */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP6_H */ +/** + * @file + * DHCPv6 protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP6_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define DHCP6_CLIENT_PORT 546 +#define DHCP6_SERVER_PORT 547 + +/* DHCPv6 message item offsets and length */ +#define DHCP6_TRANSACTION_ID_LEN 3 + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +/** minimum set of fields of any DHCPv6 message */ +struct dhcp6_msg { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t msgtype); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t transaction_id[DHCP6_TRANSACTION_ID_LEN]); + /* options follow */ +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/* DHCP6 client states */ +typedef enum { + DHCP6_STATE_OFF = 0, + DHCP6_STATE_STATELESS_IDLE = 1, + DHCP6_STATE_REQUESTING_CONFIG = 2 +} dhcp6_state_enum_t; + +/* DHCPv6 message types */ +#define DHCP6_SOLICIT 1 +#define DHCP6_ADVERTISE 2 +#define DHCP6_REQUEST 3 +#define DHCP6_CONFIRM 4 +#define DHCP6_RENEW 5 +#define DHCP6_REBIND 6 +#define DHCP6_REPLY 7 +#define DHCP6_RELEASE 8 +#define DHCP6_DECLINE 9 +#define DHCP6_RECONFIGURE 10 +#define DHCP6_INFOREQUEST 11 +#define DHCP6_RELAYFORW 12 +#define DHCP6_RELAYREPL 13 +/* More message types see https://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/dhcpv6-parameters.xhtml */ + +/** DHCPv6 status codes */ +#define DHCP6_STATUS_SUCCESS 0 /* Success. */ +#define DHCP6_STATUS_UNSPECFAIL 1 /* Failure, reason unspecified; this status code is sent by either a client or a server to indicate a failure not explicitly specified in this document. */ +#define DHCP6_STATUS_NOADDRSAVAIL 2 /* Server has no addresses available to assign to the IA(s). */ +#define DHCP6_STATUS_NOBINDING 3 /* Client record (binding) unavailable. */ +#define DHCP6_STATUS_NOTONLINK 4 /* The prefix for the address is not appropriate for the link to which the client is attached. */ +#define DHCP6_STATUS_USEMULTICAST 5 /* Sent by a server to a client to force the client to send messages to the server using the All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers address. */ +/* More status codes see https://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/dhcpv6-parameters.xhtml */ + +/** DHCPv6 DUID types */ +#define DHCP6_DUID_LLT 1 /* LLT: Link-layer Address Plus Time */ +#define DHCP6_DUID_EN 2 /* EN: Enterprise number */ +#define DHCP6_DUID_LL 3 /* LL: Link-layer Address */ +#define DHCP6_DUID_UUID 4 /* UUID (RFC 6355) */ + +/* DHCPv6 options */ +#define DHCP6_OPTION_CLIENTID 1 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_SERVERID 2 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_IA_NA 3 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_IA_TA 4 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_IAADDR 5 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_ORO 6 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_PREFERENCE 7 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_ELAPSED_TIME 8 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_RELAY_MSG 9 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_AUTH 11 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_UNICAST 12 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_STATUS_CODE 13 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_RAPID_COMMIT 14 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_USER_CLASS 15 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_VENDOR_CLASS 16 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_VENDOR_OPTS 17 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_INTERFACE_ID 18 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_RECONF_MSG 19 +#define DHCP6_OPTION_RECONF_ACCEPT 20 +/* More options see https://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/dhcpv6-parameters.xhtml */ +#define DHCP6_OPTION_DNS_SERVERS 23 /* RFC 3646 */ +#define DHCP6_OPTION_DOMAIN_LIST 24 /* RFC 3646 */ +#define DHCP6_OPTION_SNTP_SERVERS 31 /* RFC 4075 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_DHCP6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dns.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dns.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dns.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dns.h index bc3b94c8..f4ed295a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dns.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/dns.h @@ -1,139 +1,139 @@ -/** - * @file - * DNS - host name to IP address resolver. - */ - -/* - * Port to lwIP from uIP - * by Jim Pettinato April 2007 - * - * security fixes and more by Simon Goldschmidt - * - * uIP version Copyright (c) 2002-2003, Adam Dunkels. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote - * products derived from this software without specific prior - * written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS - * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE - * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, - * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_DNS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_DNS_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** DNS server port address */ -#ifndef DNS_SERVER_PORT -#define DNS_SERVER_PORT 53 -#endif - -/* DNS field TYPE used for "Resource Records" */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_A 1 /* a host address */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_NS 2 /* an authoritative name server */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_MD 3 /* a mail destination (Obsolete - use MX) */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_MF 4 /* a mail forwarder (Obsolete - use MX) */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_CNAME 5 /* the canonical name for an alias */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_SOA 6 /* marks the start of a zone of authority */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_MB 7 /* a mailbox domain name (EXPERIMENTAL) */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_MG 8 /* a mail group member (EXPERIMENTAL) */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_MR 9 /* a mail rename domain name (EXPERIMENTAL) */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_NULL 10 /* a null RR (EXPERIMENTAL) */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_WKS 11 /* a well known service description */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_PTR 12 /* a domain name pointer */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_HINFO 13 /* host information */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_MINFO 14 /* mailbox or mail list information */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_MX 15 /* mail exchange */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_TXT 16 /* text strings */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA 28 /* IPv6 address */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_SRV 33 /* service location */ -#define DNS_RRTYPE_ANY 255 /* any type */ - -/* DNS field CLASS used for "Resource Records" */ -#define DNS_RRCLASS_IN 1 /* the Internet */ -#define DNS_RRCLASS_CS 2 /* the CSNET class (Obsolete - used only for examples in some obsolete RFCs) */ -#define DNS_RRCLASS_CH 3 /* the CHAOS class */ -#define DNS_RRCLASS_HS 4 /* Hesiod [Dyer 87] */ -#define DNS_RRCLASS_ANY 255 /* any class */ -#define DNS_RRCLASS_FLUSH 0x800 /* Flush bit */ - -/* DNS protocol flags */ -#define DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE 0x80 -#define DNS_FLAG1_OPCODE_STATUS 0x10 -#define DNS_FLAG1_OPCODE_INVERSE 0x08 -#define DNS_FLAG1_OPCODE_STANDARD 0x00 -#define DNS_FLAG1_AUTHORATIVE 0x04 -#define DNS_FLAG1_TRUNC 0x02 -#define DNS_FLAG1_RD 0x01 -#define DNS_FLAG2_RA 0x80 -#define DNS_FLAG2_ERR_MASK 0x0f -#define DNS_FLAG2_ERR_NONE 0x00 -#define DNS_FLAG2_ERR_NAME 0x03 - -#define DNS_HDR_GET_OPCODE(hdr) ((((hdr)->flags1) >> 3) & 0xF) - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -/** DNS message header */ -struct dns_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t id); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags1); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags2); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t numquestions); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t numanswers); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t numauthrr); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t numextrarr); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#define SIZEOF_DNS_HDR 12 - -/* Multicast DNS definitions */ - -/** UDP port for multicast DNS queries */ -#ifndef DNS_MQUERY_PORT -#define DNS_MQUERY_PORT 5353 -#endif - -/* IPv4 group for multicast DNS queries: 224.0.0.251 */ -#ifndef DNS_MQUERY_IPV4_GROUP_INIT -#define DNS_MQUERY_IPV4_GROUP_INIT IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(224, 0, 0, 251) -#endif - -/* IPv6 group for multicast DNS queries: FF02::FB */ -#ifndef DNS_MQUERY_IPV6_GROUP_INIT -#define DNS_MQUERY_IPV6_GROUP_INIT IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xFF020000, 0, 0, 0xFB) -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_DNS_H */ +/** + * @file + * DNS - host name to IP address resolver. + */ + +/* + * Port to lwIP from uIP + * by Jim Pettinato April 2007 + * + * security fixes and more by Simon Goldschmidt + * + * uIP version Copyright (c) 2002-2003, Adam Dunkels. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software without specific prior + * written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE + * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_DNS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_DNS_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** DNS server port address */ +#ifndef DNS_SERVER_PORT +#define DNS_SERVER_PORT 53 +#endif + +/* DNS field TYPE used for "Resource Records" */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_A 1 /* a host address */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_NS 2 /* an authoritative name server */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_MD 3 /* a mail destination (Obsolete - use MX) */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_MF 4 /* a mail forwarder (Obsolete - use MX) */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_CNAME 5 /* the canonical name for an alias */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_SOA 6 /* marks the start of a zone of authority */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_MB 7 /* a mailbox domain name (EXPERIMENTAL) */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_MG 8 /* a mail group member (EXPERIMENTAL) */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_MR 9 /* a mail rename domain name (EXPERIMENTAL) */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_NULL 10 /* a null RR (EXPERIMENTAL) */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_WKS 11 /* a well known service description */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_PTR 12 /* a domain name pointer */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_HINFO 13 /* host information */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_MINFO 14 /* mailbox or mail list information */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_MX 15 /* mail exchange */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_TXT 16 /* text strings */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_AAAA 28 /* IPv6 address */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_SRV 33 /* service location */ +#define DNS_RRTYPE_ANY 255 /* any type */ + +/* DNS field CLASS used for "Resource Records" */ +#define DNS_RRCLASS_IN 1 /* the Internet */ +#define DNS_RRCLASS_CS 2 /* the CSNET class (Obsolete - used only for examples in some obsolete RFCs) */ +#define DNS_RRCLASS_CH 3 /* the CHAOS class */ +#define DNS_RRCLASS_HS 4 /* Hesiod [Dyer 87] */ +#define DNS_RRCLASS_ANY 255 /* any class */ +#define DNS_RRCLASS_FLUSH 0x800 /* Flush bit */ + +/* DNS protocol flags */ +#define DNS_FLAG1_RESPONSE 0x80 +#define DNS_FLAG1_OPCODE_STATUS 0x10 +#define DNS_FLAG1_OPCODE_INVERSE 0x08 +#define DNS_FLAG1_OPCODE_STANDARD 0x00 +#define DNS_FLAG1_AUTHORATIVE 0x04 +#define DNS_FLAG1_TRUNC 0x02 +#define DNS_FLAG1_RD 0x01 +#define DNS_FLAG2_RA 0x80 +#define DNS_FLAG2_ERR_MASK 0x0f +#define DNS_FLAG2_ERR_NONE 0x00 +#define DNS_FLAG2_ERR_NAME 0x03 + +#define DNS_HDR_GET_OPCODE(hdr) ((((hdr)->flags1) >> 3) & 0xF) + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +/** DNS message header */ +struct dns_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t id); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags1); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags2); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t numquestions); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t numanswers); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t numauthrr); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t numextrarr); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#define SIZEOF_DNS_HDR 12 + +/* Multicast DNS definitions */ + +/** UDP port for multicast DNS queries */ +#ifndef DNS_MQUERY_PORT +#define DNS_MQUERY_PORT 5353 +#endif + +/* IPv4 group for multicast DNS queries: 224.0.0.251 */ +#ifndef DNS_MQUERY_IPV4_GROUP_INIT +#define DNS_MQUERY_IPV4_GROUP_INIT IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(224, 0, 0, 251) +#endif + +/* IPv6 group for multicast DNS queries: FF02::FB */ +#ifndef DNS_MQUERY_IPV6_GROUP_INIT +#define DNS_MQUERY_IPV6_GROUP_INIT IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xFF020000, 0, 0, 0xFB) +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_DNS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/etharp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/etharp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/etharp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/etharp.h index eab1b4f3..ec658bbc 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/etharp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/etharp.h @@ -1,114 +1,114 @@ -/** - * @file - * ARP protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHARP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHARP_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#ifndef ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN -#define ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN ETH_HWADDR_LEN -#endif - -/** - * struct ip4_addr_wordaligned is used in the definition of the ARP packet format in - * order to support compilers that don't have structure packing. - */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip4_addr_wordaligned { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t addrw[2]); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** MEMCPY-like copying of IP addresses where addresses are known to be - * 16-bit-aligned if the port is correctly configured (so a port could define - * this to copying 2 u16_t's) - no NULL-pointer-checking needed. */ -#ifndef IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T -#define IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(dest, src) SMEMCPY(dest, src, sizeof(ip4_addr_t)) -#endif - -/** MEMCPY-like copying of IP addresses where addresses are known to be -* 16-bit-aligned if the port is correctly configured (so a port could define -* this to copying 2 u16_t's) - no NULL-pointer-checking needed. */ -#ifndef IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_FROM_IP4_ADDR_T -#define IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_FROM_IP4_ADDR_T(dest, src) SMEMCPY(dest, src, sizeof(ip4_addr_t)) -#endif - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -/** the ARP message, see RFC 826 ("Packet format") */ -struct etharp_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t hwtype); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t proto); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t hwlen); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t protolen); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t opcode); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct eth_addr shwaddr); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct ip4_addr_wordaligned sipaddr); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct eth_addr dhwaddr); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct ip4_addr_wordaligned dipaddr); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#define SIZEOF_ETHARP_HDR 28 - -/* ARP message types (opcodes) */ -enum etharp_opcode { - ARP_REQUEST = 1, - ARP_REPLY = 2 -}; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHARP_H */ +/** + * @file + * ARP protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHARP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHARP_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#ifndef ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN +#define ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN ETH_HWADDR_LEN +#endif + +/** + * struct ip4_addr_wordaligned is used in the definition of the ARP packet format in + * order to support compilers that don't have structure packing. + */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip4_addr_wordaligned { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t addrw[2]); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** MEMCPY-like copying of IP addresses where addresses are known to be + * 16-bit-aligned if the port is correctly configured (so a port could define + * this to copying 2 u16_t's) - no NULL-pointer-checking needed. */ +#ifndef IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T +#define IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_TO_IP4_ADDR_T(dest, src) SMEMCPY(dest, src, sizeof(ip4_addr_t)) +#endif + +/** MEMCPY-like copying of IP addresses where addresses are known to be +* 16-bit-aligned if the port is correctly configured (so a port could define +* this to copying 2 u16_t's) - no NULL-pointer-checking needed. */ +#ifndef IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_FROM_IP4_ADDR_T +#define IPADDR_WORDALIGNED_COPY_FROM_IP4_ADDR_T(dest, src) SMEMCPY(dest, src, sizeof(ip4_addr_t)) +#endif + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +/** the ARP message, see RFC 826 ("Packet format") */ +struct etharp_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t hwtype); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t proto); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t hwlen); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t protolen); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t opcode); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct eth_addr shwaddr); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct ip4_addr_wordaligned sipaddr); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct eth_addr dhwaddr); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct ip4_addr_wordaligned dipaddr); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#define SIZEOF_ETHARP_HDR 28 + +/* ARP message types (opcodes) */ +enum etharp_opcode { + ARP_REQUEST = 1, + ARP_REPLY = 2 +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHARP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ethernet.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ethernet.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ethernet.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ethernet.h index 1433cbf5..8d6bab92 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ethernet.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ethernet.h @@ -1,130 +1,130 @@ -/** - * @file - * Ethernet protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHERNET_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHERNET_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ieee.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#ifndef ETH_HWADDR_LEN -#ifdef ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN -#define ETH_HWADDR_LEN ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN /* compatibility mode */ -#else -#define ETH_HWADDR_LEN 6 -#endif -#endif - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -/** An Ethernet MAC address */ -struct eth_addr { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t addr[ETH_HWADDR_LEN]); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** Initialize a struct eth_addr with its 6 bytes (takes care of correct braces) */ -#define ETH_ADDR(b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) \ - { \ - { \ - b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 \ - } \ - } - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -/** Ethernet header */ -struct eth_hdr { -#if ETH_PAD_SIZE - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t padding[ETH_PAD_SIZE]); -#endif - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct eth_addr dest); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct eth_addr src); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t type); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#define SIZEOF_ETH_HDR (14 + ETH_PAD_SIZE) - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -/** VLAN header inserted between ethernet header and payload - * if 'type' in ethernet header is ETHTYPE_VLAN. - * See IEEE802.Q */ -struct eth_vlan_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t prio_vid); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t tpid); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#define SIZEOF_VLAN_HDR 4 -#define VLAN_ID(vlan_hdr) (lwip_htons((vlan_hdr)->prio_vid) & 0xFFF) - -/** The 24-bit IANA IPv4-multicast OUI is 01-00-5e: */ -#define LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_0 0x01 -#define LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_1 0x00 -#define LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_2 0x5e - -/** IPv6 multicast uses this prefix */ -#define LL_IP6_MULTICAST_ADDR_0 0x33 -#define LL_IP6_MULTICAST_ADDR_1 0x33 - -#define eth_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) (memcmp((addr1)->addr, (addr2)->addr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN) == 0) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHERNET_H */ +/** + * @file + * Ethernet protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHERNET_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHERNET_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ieee.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#ifndef ETH_HWADDR_LEN +#ifdef ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN +#define ETH_HWADDR_LEN ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN /* compatibility mode */ +#else +#define ETH_HWADDR_LEN 6 +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +/** An Ethernet MAC address */ +struct eth_addr { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t addr[ETH_HWADDR_LEN]); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** Initialize a struct eth_addr with its 6 bytes (takes care of correct braces) */ +#define ETH_ADDR(b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) \ + { \ + { \ + b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 \ + } \ + } + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +/** Ethernet header */ +struct eth_hdr { +#if ETH_PAD_SIZE + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t padding[ETH_PAD_SIZE]); +#endif + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct eth_addr dest); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(struct eth_addr src); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t type); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#define SIZEOF_ETH_HDR (14 + ETH_PAD_SIZE) + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +/** VLAN header inserted between ethernet header and payload + * if 'type' in ethernet header is ETHTYPE_VLAN. + * See IEEE802.Q */ +struct eth_vlan_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t prio_vid); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t tpid); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#define SIZEOF_VLAN_HDR 4 +#define VLAN_ID(vlan_hdr) (lwip_htons((vlan_hdr)->prio_vid) & 0xFFF) + +/** The 24-bit IANA IPv4-multicast OUI is 01-00-5e: */ +#define LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_0 0x01 +#define LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_1 0x00 +#define LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_2 0x5e + +/** IPv6 multicast uses this prefix */ +#define LL_IP6_MULTICAST_ADDR_0 0x33 +#define LL_IP6_MULTICAST_ADDR_1 0x33 + +#define eth_addr_cmp(addr1, addr2) (memcmp((addr1)->addr, (addr2)->addr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN) == 0) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ETHERNET_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/iana.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/iana.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/iana.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/iana.h index 97b1a141..8bcfa7cb 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/iana.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/iana.h @@ -1,97 +1,97 @@ -/** - * @file - * IANA assigned numbers (RFC 1700 and successors) - * - * @defgroup iana IANA assigned numbers - * @ingroup infrastructure - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Dirk Ziegelmeier. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IANA_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IANA_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup iana - * Hardware types - */ -enum lwip_iana_hwtype { - /** Ethernet */ - LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET = 1 -}; - -/** - * @ingroup iana - * Port numbers - * https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.txt - */ -enum lwip_iana_port_number { - /** SMTP */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_SMTP = 25, - /** DHCP server */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER = 67, - /** DHCP client */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_CLIENT = 68, - /** TFTP */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_TFTP = 69, - /** HTTP */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTP = 80, - /** SNTP */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNTP = 123, - /** NETBIOS */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_NETBIOS = 137, - /** SNMP */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP = 161, - /** SNMP traps */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP_TRAP = 162, - /** HTTPS */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTPS = 443, - /** SMTPS */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_SMTPS = 465, - /** MQTT */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_MQTT = 1883, - /** MDNS */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS = 5353, - /** Secure MQTT */ - LWIP_IANA_PORT_SECURE_MQTT = 8883 -}; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IANA_H */ +/** + * @file + * IANA assigned numbers (RFC 1700 and successors) + * + * @defgroup iana IANA assigned numbers + * @ingroup infrastructure + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Dirk Ziegelmeier. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IANA_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IANA_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup iana + * Hardware types + */ +enum lwip_iana_hwtype { + /** Ethernet */ + LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET = 1 +}; + +/** + * @ingroup iana + * Port numbers + * https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.txt + */ +enum lwip_iana_port_number { + /** SMTP */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_SMTP = 25, + /** DHCP server */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_SERVER = 67, + /** DHCP client */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_DHCP_CLIENT = 68, + /** TFTP */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_TFTP = 69, + /** HTTP */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTP = 80, + /** SNTP */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNTP = 123, + /** NETBIOS */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_NETBIOS = 137, + /** SNMP */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP = 161, + /** SNMP traps */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_SNMP_TRAP = 162, + /** HTTPS */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_HTTPS = 443, + /** SMTPS */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_SMTPS = 465, + /** MQTT */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_MQTT = 1883, + /** MDNS */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_MDNS = 5353, + /** Secure MQTT */ + LWIP_IANA_PORT_SECURE_MQTT = 8883 +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IANA_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp.h index 727cba4e..6360365c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp.h @@ -1,91 +1,91 @@ -/** - * @file - * ICMP protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define ICMP_ER 0 /* echo reply */ -#define ICMP_DUR 3 /* destination unreachable */ -#define ICMP_SQ 4 /* source quench */ -#define ICMP_RD 5 /* redirect */ -#define ICMP_ECHO 8 /* echo */ -#define ICMP_TE 11 /* time exceeded */ -#define ICMP_PP 12 /* parameter problem */ -#define ICMP_TS 13 /* timestamp */ -#define ICMP_TSR 14 /* timestamp reply */ -#define ICMP_IRQ 15 /* information request */ -#define ICMP_IR 16 /* information reply */ -#define ICMP_AM 17 /* address mask request */ -#define ICMP_AMR 18 /* address mask reply */ - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -/** This is the standard ICMP header only that the u32_t data - * is split to two u16_t like ICMP echo needs it. - * This header is also used for other ICMP types that do not - * use the data part. - */ -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct icmp_echo_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t id); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t seqno); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/* Compatibility defines, old versions used to combine type and code to an u16_t */ -#define ICMPH_TYPE(hdr) ((hdr)->type) -#define ICMPH_CODE(hdr) ((hdr)->code) -#define ICMPH_TYPE_SET(hdr, t) ((hdr)->type = (t)) -#define ICMPH_CODE_SET(hdr, c) ((hdr)->code = (c)) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP_H */ +/** + * @file + * ICMP protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define ICMP_ER 0 /* echo reply */ +#define ICMP_DUR 3 /* destination unreachable */ +#define ICMP_SQ 4 /* source quench */ +#define ICMP_RD 5 /* redirect */ +#define ICMP_ECHO 8 /* echo */ +#define ICMP_TE 11 /* time exceeded */ +#define ICMP_PP 12 /* parameter problem */ +#define ICMP_TS 13 /* timestamp */ +#define ICMP_TSR 14 /* timestamp reply */ +#define ICMP_IRQ 15 /* information request */ +#define ICMP_IR 16 /* information reply */ +#define ICMP_AM 17 /* address mask request */ +#define ICMP_AMR 18 /* address mask reply */ + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +/** This is the standard ICMP header only that the u32_t data + * is split to two u16_t like ICMP echo needs it. + * This header is also used for other ICMP types that do not + * use the data part. + */ +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct icmp_echo_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t id); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t seqno); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/* Compatibility defines, old versions used to combine type and code to an u16_t */ +#define ICMPH_TYPE(hdr) ((hdr)->type) +#define ICMPH_CODE(hdr) ((hdr)->code) +#define ICMPH_TYPE_SET(hdr, t) ((hdr)->type = (t)) +#define ICMPH_CODE_SET(hdr, c) ((hdr)->code = (c)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp6.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp6.h index bc298307..8dc976b6 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/icmp6.h @@ -1,170 +1,170 @@ -/** - * @file - * ICMP6 protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP6_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** ICMP type */ -enum icmp6_type { - /** Destination unreachable */ - ICMP6_TYPE_DUR = 1, - /** Packet too big */ - ICMP6_TYPE_PTB = 2, - /** Time exceeded */ - ICMP6_TYPE_TE = 3, - /** Parameter problem */ - ICMP6_TYPE_PP = 4, - /** Private experimentation */ - ICMP6_TYPE_PE1 = 100, - /** Private experimentation */ - ICMP6_TYPE_PE2 = 101, - /** Reserved for expansion of error messages */ - ICMP6_TYPE_RSV_ERR = 127, - - /** Echo request */ - ICMP6_TYPE_EREQ = 128, - /** Echo reply */ - ICMP6_TYPE_EREP = 129, - /** Multicast listener query */ - ICMP6_TYPE_MLQ = 130, - /** Multicast listener report */ - ICMP6_TYPE_MLR = 131, - /** Multicast listener done */ - ICMP6_TYPE_MLD = 132, - /** Router solicitation */ - ICMP6_TYPE_RS = 133, - /** Router advertisement */ - ICMP6_TYPE_RA = 134, - /** Neighbor solicitation */ - ICMP6_TYPE_NS = 135, - /** Neighbor advertisement */ - ICMP6_TYPE_NA = 136, - /** Redirect */ - ICMP6_TYPE_RD = 137, - /** Multicast router advertisement */ - ICMP6_TYPE_MRA = 151, - /** Multicast router solicitation */ - ICMP6_TYPE_MRS = 152, - /** Multicast router termination */ - ICMP6_TYPE_MRT = 153, - /** Private experimentation */ - ICMP6_TYPE_PE3 = 200, - /** Private experimentation */ - ICMP6_TYPE_PE4 = 201, - /** Reserved for expansion of informational messages */ - ICMP6_TYPE_RSV_INF = 255 -}; - -/** ICMP destination unreachable codes */ -enum icmp6_dur_code { - /** No route to destination */ - ICMP6_DUR_NO_ROUTE = 0, - /** Communication with destination administratively prohibited */ - ICMP6_DUR_PROHIBITED = 1, - /** Beyond scope of source address */ - ICMP6_DUR_SCOPE = 2, - /** Address unreachable */ - ICMP6_DUR_ADDRESS = 3, - /** Port unreachable */ - ICMP6_DUR_PORT = 4, - /** Source address failed ingress/egress policy */ - ICMP6_DUR_POLICY = 5, - /** Reject route to destination */ - ICMP6_DUR_REJECT_ROUTE = 6 -}; - -/** ICMP time exceeded codes */ -enum icmp6_te_code { - /** Hop limit exceeded in transit */ - ICMP6_TE_HL = 0, - /** Fragment reassembly time exceeded */ - ICMP6_TE_FRAG = 1 -}; - -/** ICMP parameter code */ -enum icmp6_pp_code { - /** Erroneous header field encountered */ - ICMP6_PP_FIELD = 0, - /** Unrecognized next header type encountered */ - ICMP6_PP_HEADER = 1, - /** Unrecognized IPv6 option encountered */ - ICMP6_PP_OPTION = 2 -}; - -/** This is the standard ICMP6 header. */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct icmp6_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t data); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** This is the ICMP6 header adapted for echo req/resp. */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct icmp6_echo_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t id); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t seqno); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP6_H */ +/** + * @file + * ICMP6 protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP6_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** ICMP type */ +enum icmp6_type { + /** Destination unreachable */ + ICMP6_TYPE_DUR = 1, + /** Packet too big */ + ICMP6_TYPE_PTB = 2, + /** Time exceeded */ + ICMP6_TYPE_TE = 3, + /** Parameter problem */ + ICMP6_TYPE_PP = 4, + /** Private experimentation */ + ICMP6_TYPE_PE1 = 100, + /** Private experimentation */ + ICMP6_TYPE_PE2 = 101, + /** Reserved for expansion of error messages */ + ICMP6_TYPE_RSV_ERR = 127, + + /** Echo request */ + ICMP6_TYPE_EREQ = 128, + /** Echo reply */ + ICMP6_TYPE_EREP = 129, + /** Multicast listener query */ + ICMP6_TYPE_MLQ = 130, + /** Multicast listener report */ + ICMP6_TYPE_MLR = 131, + /** Multicast listener done */ + ICMP6_TYPE_MLD = 132, + /** Router solicitation */ + ICMP6_TYPE_RS = 133, + /** Router advertisement */ + ICMP6_TYPE_RA = 134, + /** Neighbor solicitation */ + ICMP6_TYPE_NS = 135, + /** Neighbor advertisement */ + ICMP6_TYPE_NA = 136, + /** Redirect */ + ICMP6_TYPE_RD = 137, + /** Multicast router advertisement */ + ICMP6_TYPE_MRA = 151, + /** Multicast router solicitation */ + ICMP6_TYPE_MRS = 152, + /** Multicast router termination */ + ICMP6_TYPE_MRT = 153, + /** Private experimentation */ + ICMP6_TYPE_PE3 = 200, + /** Private experimentation */ + ICMP6_TYPE_PE4 = 201, + /** Reserved for expansion of informational messages */ + ICMP6_TYPE_RSV_INF = 255 +}; + +/** ICMP destination unreachable codes */ +enum icmp6_dur_code { + /** No route to destination */ + ICMP6_DUR_NO_ROUTE = 0, + /** Communication with destination administratively prohibited */ + ICMP6_DUR_PROHIBITED = 1, + /** Beyond scope of source address */ + ICMP6_DUR_SCOPE = 2, + /** Address unreachable */ + ICMP6_DUR_ADDRESS = 3, + /** Port unreachable */ + ICMP6_DUR_PORT = 4, + /** Source address failed ingress/egress policy */ + ICMP6_DUR_POLICY = 5, + /** Reject route to destination */ + ICMP6_DUR_REJECT_ROUTE = 6 +}; + +/** ICMP time exceeded codes */ +enum icmp6_te_code { + /** Hop limit exceeded in transit */ + ICMP6_TE_HL = 0, + /** Fragment reassembly time exceeded */ + ICMP6_TE_FRAG = 1 +}; + +/** ICMP parameter code */ +enum icmp6_pp_code { + /** Erroneous header field encountered */ + ICMP6_PP_FIELD = 0, + /** Unrecognized next header type encountered */ + ICMP6_PP_HEADER = 1, + /** Unrecognized IPv6 option encountered */ + ICMP6_PP_OPTION = 2 +}; + +/** This is the standard ICMP6 header. */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct icmp6_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t data); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** This is the ICMP6 header adapted for echo req/resp. */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct icmp6_echo_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t id); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t seqno); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ICMP6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ieee.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ieee.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ieee.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ieee.h index 2adc95f0..93e40a27 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ieee.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ieee.h @@ -1,91 +1,91 @@ -/** - * @file - * IEEE assigned numbers - * - * @defgroup ieee IEEE assigned numbers - * @ingroup infrastructure - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Dirk Ziegelmeier. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IEEE_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IEEE_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup ieee - * A list of often ethtypes (although lwIP does not use all of them). - */ -enum lwip_ieee_eth_type { - /** Internet protocol v4 */ - ETHTYPE_IP = 0x0800U, - /** Address resolution protocol */ - ETHTYPE_ARP = 0x0806U, - /** Wake on lan */ - ETHTYPE_WOL = 0x0842U, - /** RARP */ - ETHTYPE_RARP = 0x8035U, - /** Virtual local area network */ - ETHTYPE_VLAN = 0x8100U, - /** Internet protocol v6 */ - ETHTYPE_IPV6 = 0x86DDU, - /** PPP Over Ethernet Discovery Stage */ - ETHTYPE_PPPOEDISC = 0x8863U, - /** PPP Over Ethernet Session Stage */ - ETHTYPE_PPPOE = 0x8864U, - /** Jumbo Frames */ - ETHTYPE_JUMBO = 0x8870U, - /** Process field network */ - ETHTYPE_PROFINET = 0x8892U, - /** Ethernet for control automation technology */ - ETHTYPE_ETHERCAT = 0x88A4U, - /** Link layer discovery protocol */ - ETHTYPE_LLDP = 0x88CCU, - /** Serial real-time communication system */ - ETHTYPE_SERCOS = 0x88CDU, - /** Media redundancy protocol */ - ETHTYPE_MRP = 0x88E3U, - /** Precision time protocol */ - ETHTYPE_PTP = 0x88F7U, - /** Q-in-Q, 802.1ad */ - ETHTYPE_QINQ = 0x9100U -}; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IEEE_H */ +/** + * @file + * IEEE assigned numbers + * + * @defgroup ieee IEEE assigned numbers + * @ingroup infrastructure + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Dirk Ziegelmeier. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IEEE_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IEEE_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup ieee + * A list of often ethtypes (although lwIP does not use all of them). + */ +enum lwip_ieee_eth_type { + /** Internet protocol v4 */ + ETHTYPE_IP = 0x0800U, + /** Address resolution protocol */ + ETHTYPE_ARP = 0x0806U, + /** Wake on lan */ + ETHTYPE_WOL = 0x0842U, + /** RARP */ + ETHTYPE_RARP = 0x8035U, + /** Virtual local area network */ + ETHTYPE_VLAN = 0x8100U, + /** Internet protocol v6 */ + ETHTYPE_IPV6 = 0x86DDU, + /** PPP Over Ethernet Discovery Stage */ + ETHTYPE_PPPOEDISC = 0x8863U, + /** PPP Over Ethernet Session Stage */ + ETHTYPE_PPPOE = 0x8864U, + /** Jumbo Frames */ + ETHTYPE_JUMBO = 0x8870U, + /** Process field network */ + ETHTYPE_PROFINET = 0x8892U, + /** Ethernet for control automation technology */ + ETHTYPE_ETHERCAT = 0x88A4U, + /** Link layer discovery protocol */ + ETHTYPE_LLDP = 0x88CCU, + /** Serial real-time communication system */ + ETHTYPE_SERCOS = 0x88CDU, + /** Media redundancy protocol */ + ETHTYPE_MRP = 0x88E3U, + /** Precision time protocol */ + ETHTYPE_PTP = 0x88F7U, + /** Q-in-Q, 802.1ad */ + ETHTYPE_QINQ = 0x9100U +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IEEE_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/igmp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/igmp.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/igmp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/igmp.h index eaff4d6c..43d90289 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/igmp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/igmp.h @@ -1,90 +1,90 @@ -/** - * @file - * IGMP protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IGMP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IGMP_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip4.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * IGMP constants - */ -#define IGMP_TTL 1 -#define IGMP_MINLEN 8 -#define ROUTER_ALERT 0x9404U -#define ROUTER_ALERTLEN 4 - -/* - * IGMP message types, including version number. - */ -#define IGMP_MEMB_QUERY 0x11 /* Membership query */ -#define IGMP_V1_MEMB_REPORT 0x12 /* Ver. 1 membership report */ -#define IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT 0x16 /* Ver. 2 membership report */ -#define IGMP_LEAVE_GROUP 0x17 /* Leave-group message */ - -/* Group membership states */ -#define IGMP_GROUP_NON_MEMBER 0 -#define IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER 1 -#define IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER 2 - -/** - * IGMP packet format. - */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct igmp_msg { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t igmp_msgtype); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t igmp_maxresp); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t igmp_checksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t igmp_group_address); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IGMP_H */ +/** + * @file + * IGMP protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IGMP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IGMP_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip4.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * IGMP constants + */ +#define IGMP_TTL 1 +#define IGMP_MINLEN 8 +#define ROUTER_ALERT 0x9404U +#define ROUTER_ALERTLEN 4 + +/* + * IGMP message types, including version number. + */ +#define IGMP_MEMB_QUERY 0x11 /* Membership query */ +#define IGMP_V1_MEMB_REPORT 0x12 /* Ver. 1 membership report */ +#define IGMP_V2_MEMB_REPORT 0x16 /* Ver. 2 membership report */ +#define IGMP_LEAVE_GROUP 0x17 /* Leave-group message */ + +/* Group membership states */ +#define IGMP_GROUP_NON_MEMBER 0 +#define IGMP_GROUP_DELAYING_MEMBER 1 +#define IGMP_GROUP_IDLE_MEMBER 2 + +/** + * IGMP packet format. + */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct igmp_msg { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t igmp_msgtype); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t igmp_maxresp); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t igmp_checksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t igmp_group_address); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IGMP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip.h index bbd7e200..e5721079 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip.h @@ -1,59 +1,59 @@ -/** - * @file - * IP protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define IP_PROTO_ICMP 1 -#define IP_PROTO_IGMP 2 -#define IP_PROTO_UDP 17 -#define IP_PROTO_UDPLITE 136 -#define IP_PROTO_TCP 6 - -/** This operates on a void* by loading the first byte */ -#define IP_HDR_GET_VERSION(ptr) ((*(u8_t *)(ptr)) >> 4) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP_H */ +/** + * @file + * IP protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define IP_PROTO_ICMP 1 +#define IP_PROTO_IGMP 2 +#define IP_PROTO_UDP 17 +#define IP_PROTO_UDPLITE 136 +#define IP_PROTO_TCP 6 + +/** This operates on a void* by loading the first byte */ +#define IP_HDR_GET_VERSION(ptr) ((*(u8_t *)(ptr)) >> 4) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip4.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip4.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip4.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip4.h index 45d4678f..5ed7d0ac 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip4.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip4.h @@ -1,130 +1,130 @@ -/** - * @file - * IPv4 protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP4_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP4_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** This is the packed version of ip4_addr_t, - used in network headers that are itself packed */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip4_addr_packed { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t addr); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -typedef struct ip4_addr_packed ip4_addr_p_t; - -/* Size of the IPv4 header. Same as 'sizeof(struct ip_hdr)'. */ -#define IP_HLEN 20 -/* Maximum size of the IPv4 header with options. */ -#define IP_HLEN_MAX 60 - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -/* The IPv4 header */ -struct ip_hdr { - /* version / header length */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _v_hl); - /* type of service */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _tos); - /* total length */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _len); - /* identification */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _id); - /* fragment offset field */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _offset); -#define IP_RF 0x8000U /* reserved fragment flag */ -#define IP_DF 0x4000U /* don't fragment flag */ -#define IP_MF 0x2000U /* more fragments flag */ -#define IP_OFFMASK 0x1fffU /* mask for fragmenting bits */ - /* time to live */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _ttl); - /* protocol*/ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _proto); - /* checksum */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _chksum); - /* source and destination IP addresses */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t src); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t dest); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/* Macros to get struct ip_hdr fields: */ -#define IPH_V(hdr) ((hdr)->_v_hl >> 4) -#define IPH_HL(hdr) ((hdr)->_v_hl & 0x0f) -#define IPH_HL_BYTES(hdr) ((u8_t)(IPH_HL(hdr) * 4)) -#define IPH_TOS(hdr) ((hdr)->_tos) -#define IPH_LEN(hdr) ((hdr)->_len) -#define IPH_ID(hdr) ((hdr)->_id) -#define IPH_OFFSET(hdr) ((hdr)->_offset) -#define IPH_OFFSET_BYTES(hdr) ((u16_t)((lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(hdr)) & IP_OFFMASK) * 8U)) -#define IPH_TTL(hdr) ((hdr)->_ttl) -#define IPH_PROTO(hdr) ((hdr)->_proto) -#define IPH_CHKSUM(hdr) ((hdr)->_chksum) - -/* Macros to set struct ip_hdr fields: */ -#define IPH_VHL_SET(hdr, v, hl) (hdr)->_v_hl = (u8_t)((((v) << 4) | (hl))) -#define IPH_TOS_SET(hdr, tos) (hdr)->_tos = (tos) -#define IPH_LEN_SET(hdr, len) (hdr)->_len = (len) -#define IPH_ID_SET(hdr, id) (hdr)->_id = (id) -#define IPH_OFFSET_SET(hdr, off) (hdr)->_offset = (off) -#define IPH_TTL_SET(hdr, ttl) (hdr)->_ttl = (u8_t)(ttl) -#define IPH_PROTO_SET(hdr, proto) (hdr)->_proto = (u8_t)(proto) -#define IPH_CHKSUM_SET(hdr, chksum) (hdr)->_chksum = (chksum) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP4_H */ +/** + * @file + * IPv4 protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP4_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP4_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/ip4_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** This is the packed version of ip4_addr_t, + used in network headers that are itself packed */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip4_addr_packed { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t addr); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +typedef struct ip4_addr_packed ip4_addr_p_t; + +/* Size of the IPv4 header. Same as 'sizeof(struct ip_hdr)'. */ +#define IP_HLEN 20 +/* Maximum size of the IPv4 header with options. */ +#define IP_HLEN_MAX 60 + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +/* The IPv4 header */ +struct ip_hdr { + /* version / header length */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _v_hl); + /* type of service */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _tos); + /* total length */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _len); + /* identification */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _id); + /* fragment offset field */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _offset); +#define IP_RF 0x8000U /* reserved fragment flag */ +#define IP_DF 0x4000U /* don't fragment flag */ +#define IP_MF 0x2000U /* more fragments flag */ +#define IP_OFFMASK 0x1fffU /* mask for fragmenting bits */ + /* time to live */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _ttl); + /* protocol*/ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _proto); + /* checksum */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _chksum); + /* source and destination IP addresses */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t src); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip4_addr_p_t dest); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/* Macros to get struct ip_hdr fields: */ +#define IPH_V(hdr) ((hdr)->_v_hl >> 4) +#define IPH_HL(hdr) ((hdr)->_v_hl & 0x0f) +#define IPH_HL_BYTES(hdr) ((u8_t)(IPH_HL(hdr) * 4)) +#define IPH_TOS(hdr) ((hdr)->_tos) +#define IPH_LEN(hdr) ((hdr)->_len) +#define IPH_ID(hdr) ((hdr)->_id) +#define IPH_OFFSET(hdr) ((hdr)->_offset) +#define IPH_OFFSET_BYTES(hdr) ((u16_t)((lwip_ntohs(IPH_OFFSET(hdr)) & IP_OFFMASK) * 8U)) +#define IPH_TTL(hdr) ((hdr)->_ttl) +#define IPH_PROTO(hdr) ((hdr)->_proto) +#define IPH_CHKSUM(hdr) ((hdr)->_chksum) + +/* Macros to set struct ip_hdr fields: */ +#define IPH_VHL_SET(hdr, v, hl) (hdr)->_v_hl = (u8_t)((((v) << 4) | (hl))) +#define IPH_TOS_SET(hdr, tos) (hdr)->_tos = (tos) +#define IPH_LEN_SET(hdr, len) (hdr)->_len = (len) +#define IPH_ID_SET(hdr, id) (hdr)->_id = (id) +#define IPH_OFFSET_SET(hdr, off) (hdr)->_offset = (off) +#define IPH_TTL_SET(hdr, ttl) (hdr)->_ttl = (u8_t)(ttl) +#define IPH_PROTO_SET(hdr, proto) (hdr)->_proto = (u8_t)(proto) +#define IPH_CHKSUM_SET(hdr, chksum) (hdr)->_chksum = (chksum) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP4_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip6.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip6.h index 819dfe5e..f0a3162e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/ip6.h @@ -1,233 +1,233 @@ -/** - * @file - * IPv6 protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP6_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** This is the packed version of ip6_addr_t, - used in network headers that are itself packed */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip6_addr_packed { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t addr[4]); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -typedef struct ip6_addr_packed ip6_addr_p_t; - -#define IP6_HLEN 40 - -#define IP6_NEXTH_HOPBYHOP 0 -#define IP6_NEXTH_TCP 6 -#define IP6_NEXTH_UDP 17 -#define IP6_NEXTH_ENCAPS 41 -#define IP6_NEXTH_ROUTING 43 -#define IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT 44 -#define IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6 58 -#define IP6_NEXTH_NONE 59 -#define IP6_NEXTH_DESTOPTS 60 -#define IP6_NEXTH_UDPLITE 136 - -/** The IPv6 header. */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip6_hdr { - /** version / traffic class / flow label */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t _v_tc_fl); - /** payload length */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _plen); - /** next header */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); - /** hop limit */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _hoplim); - /** source and destination IP addresses */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t src); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t dest); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#define IP6H_V(hdr) ((lwip_ntohl((hdr)->_v_tc_fl) >> 28) & 0x0f) -#define IP6H_TC(hdr) ((lwip_ntohl((hdr)->_v_tc_fl) >> 20) & 0xff) -#define IP6H_FL(hdr) (lwip_ntohl((hdr)->_v_tc_fl) & 0x000fffff) -#define IP6H_PLEN(hdr) (lwip_ntohs((hdr)->_plen)) -#define IP6H_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) -#define IP6H_NEXTH_P(hdr) ((u8_t *)(hdr) + 6) -#define IP6H_HOPLIM(hdr) ((hdr)->_hoplim) -#define IP6H_VTCFL_SET(hdr, v, tc, fl) (hdr)->_v_tc_fl = (lwip_htonl((((u32_t)(v)) << 28) | (((u32_t)(tc)) << 20) | (fl))) -#define IP6H_PLEN_SET(hdr, plen) (hdr)->_plen = lwip_htons(plen) -#define IP6H_NEXTH_SET(hdr, nexth) (hdr)->_nexth = (nexth) -#define IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(hdr, hl) (hdr)->_hoplim = (u8_t)(hl) - -/* ipv6 extended options header */ -#define IP6_PAD1_OPTION 0 -#define IP6_PADN_OPTION 1 -#define IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_OPTION 5 -#define IP6_JUMBO_OPTION 194 -#define IP6_HOME_ADDRESS_OPTION 201 -#define IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_DLEN 2 -#define IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_VALUE_MLD 0 - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip6_opt_hdr { - /* router alert option type */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _opt_type); - /* router alert option data len */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _opt_dlen); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#define IP6_OPT_HLEN 2 -#define IP6_OPT_TYPE_ACTION(hdr) ((((hdr)->_opt_type) >> 6) & 0x3) -#define IP6_OPT_TYPE_CHANGE(hdr) ((((hdr)->_opt_type) >> 5) & 0x1) -#define IP6_OPT_TYPE(hdr) ((hdr)->_opt_type) -#define IP6_OPT_DLEN(hdr) ((hdr)->_opt_dlen) - -/* Hop-by-Hop header. */ -#define IP6_HBH_HLEN 2 - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip6_hbh_hdr { - /* next header */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); - /* header length in 8-octet units */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _hlen); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#define IP6_HBH_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) - -/* Destination header. */ -#define IP6_DEST_HLEN 2 - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip6_dest_hdr { - /* next header */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); - /* header length in 8-octet units */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _hlen); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#define IP6_DEST_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) - -/* Routing header */ -#define IP6_ROUT_TYPE2 2 -#define IP6_ROUT_RPL 3 - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip6_rout_hdr { - /* next header */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); - /* reserved */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _hlen); - /* fragment offset */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u8_t _routing_type); - /* fragmented packet identification */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u8_t _segments_left); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#define IP6_ROUT_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) -#define IP6_ROUT_TYPE(hdr) ((hdr)->_routing_type) -#define IP6_ROUT_SEG_LEFT(hdr) ((hdr)->_segments_left) - -/* Fragment header. */ -#define IP6_FRAG_HLEN 8 -#define IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK 0xfff8 -#define IP6_FRAG_MORE_FLAG 0x0001 - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ip6_frag_hdr { - /* next header */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); - /* reserved */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t reserved); - /* fragment offset */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _fragment_offset); - /* fragmented packet identification */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t _identification); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#define IP6_FRAG_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) -#define IP6_FRAG_MBIT(hdr) (lwip_ntohs((hdr)->_fragment_offset) & 0x1) -#define IP6_FRAG_ID(hdr) (lwip_ntohl((hdr)->_identification)) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP6_H */ +/** + * @file + * IPv6 protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP6_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** This is the packed version of ip6_addr_t, + used in network headers that are itself packed */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip6_addr_packed { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t addr[4]); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +typedef struct ip6_addr_packed ip6_addr_p_t; + +#define IP6_HLEN 40 + +#define IP6_NEXTH_HOPBYHOP 0 +#define IP6_NEXTH_TCP 6 +#define IP6_NEXTH_UDP 17 +#define IP6_NEXTH_ENCAPS 41 +#define IP6_NEXTH_ROUTING 43 +#define IP6_NEXTH_FRAGMENT 44 +#define IP6_NEXTH_ICMP6 58 +#define IP6_NEXTH_NONE 59 +#define IP6_NEXTH_DESTOPTS 60 +#define IP6_NEXTH_UDPLITE 136 + +/** The IPv6 header. */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip6_hdr { + /** version / traffic class / flow label */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t _v_tc_fl); + /** payload length */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _plen); + /** next header */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); + /** hop limit */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _hoplim); + /** source and destination IP addresses */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t src); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t dest); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#define IP6H_V(hdr) ((lwip_ntohl((hdr)->_v_tc_fl) >> 28) & 0x0f) +#define IP6H_TC(hdr) ((lwip_ntohl((hdr)->_v_tc_fl) >> 20) & 0xff) +#define IP6H_FL(hdr) (lwip_ntohl((hdr)->_v_tc_fl) & 0x000fffff) +#define IP6H_PLEN(hdr) (lwip_ntohs((hdr)->_plen)) +#define IP6H_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) +#define IP6H_NEXTH_P(hdr) ((u8_t *)(hdr) + 6) +#define IP6H_HOPLIM(hdr) ((hdr)->_hoplim) +#define IP6H_VTCFL_SET(hdr, v, tc, fl) (hdr)->_v_tc_fl = (lwip_htonl((((u32_t)(v)) << 28) | (((u32_t)(tc)) << 20) | (fl))) +#define IP6H_PLEN_SET(hdr, plen) (hdr)->_plen = lwip_htons(plen) +#define IP6H_NEXTH_SET(hdr, nexth) (hdr)->_nexth = (nexth) +#define IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(hdr, hl) (hdr)->_hoplim = (u8_t)(hl) + +/* ipv6 extended options header */ +#define IP6_PAD1_OPTION 0 +#define IP6_PADN_OPTION 1 +#define IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_OPTION 5 +#define IP6_JUMBO_OPTION 194 +#define IP6_HOME_ADDRESS_OPTION 201 +#define IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_DLEN 2 +#define IP6_ROUTER_ALERT_VALUE_MLD 0 + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip6_opt_hdr { + /* router alert option type */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _opt_type); + /* router alert option data len */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _opt_dlen); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#define IP6_OPT_HLEN 2 +#define IP6_OPT_TYPE_ACTION(hdr) ((((hdr)->_opt_type) >> 6) & 0x3) +#define IP6_OPT_TYPE_CHANGE(hdr) ((((hdr)->_opt_type) >> 5) & 0x1) +#define IP6_OPT_TYPE(hdr) ((hdr)->_opt_type) +#define IP6_OPT_DLEN(hdr) ((hdr)->_opt_dlen) + +/* Hop-by-Hop header. */ +#define IP6_HBH_HLEN 2 + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip6_hbh_hdr { + /* next header */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); + /* header length in 8-octet units */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _hlen); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#define IP6_HBH_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) + +/* Destination header. */ +#define IP6_DEST_HLEN 2 + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip6_dest_hdr { + /* next header */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); + /* header length in 8-octet units */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _hlen); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#define IP6_DEST_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) + +/* Routing header */ +#define IP6_ROUT_TYPE2 2 +#define IP6_ROUT_RPL 3 + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip6_rout_hdr { + /* next header */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); + /* reserved */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _hlen); + /* fragment offset */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u8_t _routing_type); + /* fragmented packet identification */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u8_t _segments_left); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#define IP6_ROUT_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) +#define IP6_ROUT_TYPE(hdr) ((hdr)->_routing_type) +#define IP6_ROUT_SEG_LEFT(hdr) ((hdr)->_segments_left) + +/* Fragment header. */ +#define IP6_FRAG_HLEN 8 +#define IP6_FRAG_OFFSET_MASK 0xfff8 +#define IP6_FRAG_MORE_FLAG 0x0001 + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ip6_frag_hdr { + /* next header */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t _nexth); + /* reserved */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t reserved); + /* fragment offset */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _fragment_offset); + /* fragmented packet identification */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t _identification); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#define IP6_FRAG_NEXTH(hdr) ((hdr)->_nexth) +#define IP6_FRAG_MBIT(hdr) (lwip_ntohs((hdr)->_fragment_offset) & 0x1) +#define IP6_FRAG_ID(hdr) (lwip_ntohl((hdr)->_identification)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_IP6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/mld6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/mld6.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/mld6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/mld6.h index 7b9c7dac..f9f3ffca 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/mld6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/mld6.h @@ -1,71 +1,71 @@ -/** - * @file - * MLD6 protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_MLD6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_MLD6_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip6.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define MLD6_HBH_HLEN 8 -/** Multicast listener report/query/done message header. */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct mld_header { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t max_resp_delay); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t reserved); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t multicast_address); - /* Options follow. */ -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_MLD6_H */ +/** + * @file + * MLD6 protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_MLD6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_MLD6_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip6.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define MLD6_HBH_HLEN 8 +/** Multicast listener report/query/done message header. */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct mld_header { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t max_resp_delay); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t reserved); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t multicast_address); + /* Options follow. */ +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_MLD6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/nd6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/nd6.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/nd6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/nd6.h index 4b2ca1cf..560af1fc 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/nd6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/nd6.h @@ -1,274 +1,274 @@ -/** - * @file - * ND6 protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ND6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ND6_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip6.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** Neighbor solicitation message header. */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ns_header { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reserved); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t target_address); - /* Options follow. */ -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** Neighbor advertisement message header. */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct na_header { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t reserved[3]); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t target_address); - /* Options follow. */ -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#define ND6_FLAG_ROUTER (0x80) -#define ND6_FLAG_SOLICITED (0x40) -#define ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE (0x20) - -/** Router solicitation message header. */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct rs_header { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reserved); - /* Options follow. */ -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** Router advertisement message header. */ -#define ND6_RA_FLAG_MANAGED_ADDR_CONFIG (0x80) -#define ND6_RA_FLAG_OTHER_CONFIG (0x40) -#define ND6_RA_FLAG_HOME_AGENT (0x20) -#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_MASK (0x18) -#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_HIGH (0x08) -#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_MEDIUM (0x00) -#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_LOW (0x18) -#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_DISABLED (0x10) -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct ra_header { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t current_hop_limit); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t router_lifetime); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reachable_time); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t retrans_timer); - /* Options follow. */ -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** Redirect message header. */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct redirect_header { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reserved); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t target_address); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t destination_address); - /* Options follow. */ -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** Link-layer address option. */ -#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_SOURCE_LLADDR (0x01) -#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_TARGET_LLADDR (0x02) -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct lladdr_option { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t addr[NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN]); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** Prefix information option. */ -#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_PREFIX_INFO (0x03) -#define ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_ON_LINK (0x80) -#define ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_AUTONOMOUS (0x40) -#define ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_ROUTER_ADDRESS (0x20) -#define ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_SITE_PREFIX (0x10) -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct prefix_option { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t prefix_length); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t valid_lifetime); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t preferred_lifetime); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t reserved2[3]); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t site_prefix_length); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t prefix); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** Redirected header option. */ -#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_REDIR_HDR (0x04) -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct redirected_header_option { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t reserved[6]); - /* Portion of redirected packet follows. */ - /* PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t redirected[8]); */ -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** MTU option. */ -#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_MTU (0x05) -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct mtu_option { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t reserved); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t mtu); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** Route information option. */ -#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_ROUTE_INFO (24) -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct route_option { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t prefix_length); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t preference); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t route_lifetime); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t prefix); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/** Recursive DNS Server Option. */ -#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_RDNSS (25) -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct rdnss_option { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t reserved); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t lifetime); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t rdnss_address[1]); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#define SIZEOF_RDNSS_OPTION_BASE 8 /* size without addresses */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ND6_H */ +/** + * @file + * ND6 protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_ND6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_ND6_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip6.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Neighbor solicitation message header. */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ns_header { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reserved); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t target_address); + /* Options follow. */ +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** Neighbor advertisement message header. */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct na_header { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t reserved[3]); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t target_address); + /* Options follow. */ +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#define ND6_FLAG_ROUTER (0x80) +#define ND6_FLAG_SOLICITED (0x40) +#define ND6_FLAG_OVERRIDE (0x20) + +/** Router solicitation message header. */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct rs_header { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reserved); + /* Options follow. */ +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** Router advertisement message header. */ +#define ND6_RA_FLAG_MANAGED_ADDR_CONFIG (0x80) +#define ND6_RA_FLAG_OTHER_CONFIG (0x40) +#define ND6_RA_FLAG_HOME_AGENT (0x20) +#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_MASK (0x18) +#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_HIGH (0x08) +#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_MEDIUM (0x00) +#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_LOW (0x18) +#define ND6_RA_PREFERENCE_DISABLED (0x10) +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct ra_header { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t current_hop_limit); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t router_lifetime); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reachable_time); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t retrans_timer); + /* Options follow. */ +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** Redirect message header. */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct redirect_header { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t reserved); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t target_address); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t destination_address); + /* Options follow. */ +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** Link-layer address option. */ +#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_SOURCE_LLADDR (0x01) +#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_TARGET_LLADDR (0x02) +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct lladdr_option { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t addr[NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN]); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** Prefix information option. */ +#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_PREFIX_INFO (0x03) +#define ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_ON_LINK (0x80) +#define ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_AUTONOMOUS (0x40) +#define ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_ROUTER_ADDRESS (0x20) +#define ND6_PREFIX_FLAG_SITE_PREFIX (0x10) +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct prefix_option { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t prefix_length); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t flags); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t valid_lifetime); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t preferred_lifetime); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t reserved2[3]); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t site_prefix_length); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t prefix); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** Redirected header option. */ +#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_REDIR_HDR (0x04) +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct redirected_header_option { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t reserved[6]); + /* Portion of redirected packet follows. */ + /* PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t redirected[8]); */ +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** MTU option. */ +#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_MTU (0x05) +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct mtu_option { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t reserved); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t mtu); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** Route information option. */ +#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_ROUTE_INFO (24) +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct route_option { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t prefix_length); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t preference); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t route_lifetime); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t prefix); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/** Recursive DNS Server Option. */ +#define ND6_OPTION_TYPE_RDNSS (25) +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct rdnss_option { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t length); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t reserved); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t lifetime); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_S(ip6_addr_p_t rdnss_address[1]); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#define SIZEOF_RDNSS_OPTION_BASE 8 /* size without addresses */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_ND6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/tcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/tcp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/tcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/tcp.h index 96e1938e..7176ee7c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/tcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/tcp.h @@ -1,100 +1,100 @@ -/** - * @file - * TCP protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_TCP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_TCP_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* Length of the TCP header, excluding options. */ -#define TCP_HLEN 20 - -/* Fields are (of course) in network byte order. - * Some fields are converted to host byte order in tcp_input(). - */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct tcp_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t src); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t dest); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t seqno); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t ackno); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _hdrlen_rsvd_flags); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t wnd); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t urgp); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/* TCP header flags bits */ -#define TCP_FIN 0x01U -#define TCP_SYN 0x02U -#define TCP_RST 0x04U -#define TCP_PSH 0x08U -#define TCP_ACK 0x10U -#define TCP_URG 0x20U -#define TCP_ECE 0x40U -#define TCP_CWR 0x80U -/* Valid TCP header flags */ -#define TCP_FLAGS 0x3fU - -#define TCP_MAX_OPTION_BYTES 40 - -#define TCPH_HDRLEN(phdr) ((u16_t)(lwip_ntohs((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags) >> 12)) -#define TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES(phdr) ((u8_t)(TCPH_HDRLEN(phdr) << 2)) -#define TCPH_FLAGS(phdr) ((u8_t)((lwip_ntohs((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags) & TCP_FLAGS))) - -#define TCPH_HDRLEN_SET(phdr, len) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = lwip_htons(((len) << 12) | TCPH_FLAGS(phdr)) -#define TCPH_FLAGS_SET(phdr, flags) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = (((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags & PP_HTONS(~TCP_FLAGS)) | lwip_htons(flags)) -#define TCPH_HDRLEN_FLAGS_SET(phdr, len, flags) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = (u16_t)(lwip_htons((u16_t)((len) << 12) | (flags))) - -#define TCPH_SET_FLAG(phdr, flags) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = ((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags | lwip_htons(flags)) -#define TCPH_UNSET_FLAG(phdr, flags) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = ((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags & ~lwip_htons(flags)) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_TCP_H */ +/** + * @file + * TCP protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_TCP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_TCP_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Length of the TCP header, excluding options. */ +#define TCP_HLEN 20 + +/* Fields are (of course) in network byte order. + * Some fields are converted to host byte order in tcp_input(). + */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct tcp_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t src); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t dest); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t seqno); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t ackno); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t _hdrlen_rsvd_flags); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t wnd); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t urgp); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/* TCP header flags bits */ +#define TCP_FIN 0x01U +#define TCP_SYN 0x02U +#define TCP_RST 0x04U +#define TCP_PSH 0x08U +#define TCP_ACK 0x10U +#define TCP_URG 0x20U +#define TCP_ECE 0x40U +#define TCP_CWR 0x80U +/* Valid TCP header flags */ +#define TCP_FLAGS 0x3fU + +#define TCP_MAX_OPTION_BYTES 40 + +#define TCPH_HDRLEN(phdr) ((u16_t)(lwip_ntohs((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags) >> 12)) +#define TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES(phdr) ((u8_t)(TCPH_HDRLEN(phdr) << 2)) +#define TCPH_FLAGS(phdr) ((u8_t)((lwip_ntohs((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags) & TCP_FLAGS))) + +#define TCPH_HDRLEN_SET(phdr, len) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = lwip_htons(((len) << 12) | TCPH_FLAGS(phdr)) +#define TCPH_FLAGS_SET(phdr, flags) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = (((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags & PP_HTONS(~TCP_FLAGS)) | lwip_htons(flags)) +#define TCPH_HDRLEN_FLAGS_SET(phdr, len, flags) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = (u16_t)(lwip_htons((u16_t)((len) << 12) | (flags))) + +#define TCPH_SET_FLAG(phdr, flags) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = ((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags | lwip_htons(flags)) +#define TCPH_UNSET_FLAG(phdr, flags) (phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags = ((phdr)->_hdrlen_rsvd_flags & ~lwip_htons(flags)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_TCP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/udp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/udp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/udp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/udp.h index 5fb028dc..78b4191c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/udp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/prot/udp.h @@ -1,68 +1,68 @@ -/** - * @file - * UDP protocol definitions - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_UDP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_UDP_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define UDP_HLEN 8 - -/* Fields are (of course) in network byte order. */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct udp_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t src); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t dest); /* src/dest UDP ports */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t len); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_UDP_H */ +/** + * @file + * UDP protocol definitions + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PROT_UDP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PROT_UDP_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define UDP_HLEN 8 + +/* Fields are (of course) in network byte order. */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct udp_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t src); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t dest); /* src/dest UDP ports */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t len); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t chksum); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PROT_UDP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/raw.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/raw.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/raw.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/raw.h index c96ef4a4..021622f1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/raw.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/raw.h @@ -1,149 +1,149 @@ -/** - * @file - * raw API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n - * See also @ref raw_raw - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_RAW_H -#define LWIP_HDR_RAW_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_RAW /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define RAW_FLAGS_CONNECTED 0x01U -#define RAW_FLAGS_HDRINCL 0x02U -#define RAW_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP 0x04U - -struct raw_pcb; - -/** Function prototype for raw pcb receive callback functions. - * @param arg user supplied argument (raw_pcb.recv_arg) - * @param pcb the raw_pcb which received data - * @param p the packet buffer that was received - * @param addr the remote IP address from which the packet was received - * @return 1 if the packet was 'eaten' (aka. deleted), - * 0 if the packet lives on - * If returning 1, the callback is responsible for freeing the pbuf - * if it's not used any more. - */ -typedef u8_t (*raw_recv_fn)(void *arg, struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *addr); - -/** the RAW protocol control block */ -struct raw_pcb { - /* Common members of all PCB types */ - IP_PCB; - - struct raw_pcb *next; - - u8_t protocol; - u8_t flags; - -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS - /** outgoing network interface for multicast packets, by interface index (if nonzero) */ - u8_t mcast_ifindex; - /** TTL for outgoing multicast packets */ - u8_t mcast_ttl; -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - - /** receive callback function */ - raw_recv_fn recv; - /* user-supplied argument for the recv callback */ - void *recv_arg; -#if LWIP_IPV6 - /* fields for handling checksum computations as per RFC3542. */ - u16_t chksum_offset; - u8_t chksum_reqd; -#endif -}; - -/* The following functions is the application layer interface to the - RAW code. */ -struct raw_pcb *raw_new(u8_t proto); -struct raw_pcb *raw_new_ip_type(u8_t type, u8_t proto); -void raw_remove(struct raw_pcb *pcb); -err_t raw_bind(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr); -void raw_bind_netif(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif); -err_t raw_connect(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr); -void raw_disconnect(struct raw_pcb *pcb); - -err_t raw_sendto(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr); -err_t raw_sendto_if_src(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *src_ip); -err_t raw_send(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p); - -void raw_recv(struct raw_pcb *pcb, raw_recv_fn recv, void *recv_arg); - -#define raw_flags(pcb) ((pcb)->flags) -#define raw_setflags(pcb, f) ((pcb)->flags = (f)) - -#define raw_set_flags(pcb, set_flags) \ - do { \ - (pcb)->flags = (u8_t)((pcb)->flags | (set_flags)); \ - } while (0) -#define raw_clear_flags(pcb, clr_flags) \ - do { \ - (pcb)->flags = (u8_t)((pcb)->flags & (u8_t)(~(clr_flags)&0xff)); \ - } while (0) -#define raw_is_flag_set(pcb, flag) (((pcb)->flags & (flag)) != 0) - -#define raw_init() /* Compatibility define, no init needed. */ - -/* for compatibility with older implementation */ -#define raw_new_ip6(proto) raw_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V6, proto) - -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS -#define raw_set_multicast_netif_index(pcb, idx) ((pcb)->mcast_ifindex = (idx)) -#define raw_get_multicast_netif_index(pcb) ((pcb)->mcast_ifindex) -#define raw_set_multicast_ttl(pcb, value) ((pcb)->mcast_ttl = (value)) -#define raw_get_multicast_ttl(pcb) ((pcb)->mcast_ttl) -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_RAW_H */ +/** + * @file + * raw API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n + * See also @ref raw_raw + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_RAW_H +#define LWIP_HDR_RAW_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_RAW /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define RAW_FLAGS_CONNECTED 0x01U +#define RAW_FLAGS_HDRINCL 0x02U +#define RAW_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP 0x04U + +struct raw_pcb; + +/** Function prototype for raw pcb receive callback functions. + * @param arg user supplied argument (raw_pcb.recv_arg) + * @param pcb the raw_pcb which received data + * @param p the packet buffer that was received + * @param addr the remote IP address from which the packet was received + * @return 1 if the packet was 'eaten' (aka. deleted), + * 0 if the packet lives on + * If returning 1, the callback is responsible for freeing the pbuf + * if it's not used any more. + */ +typedef u8_t (*raw_recv_fn)(void *arg, struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *addr); + +/** the RAW protocol control block */ +struct raw_pcb { + /* Common members of all PCB types */ + IP_PCB; + + struct raw_pcb *next; + + u8_t protocol; + u8_t flags; + +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS + /** outgoing network interface for multicast packets, by interface index (if nonzero) */ + u8_t mcast_ifindex; + /** TTL for outgoing multicast packets */ + u8_t mcast_ttl; +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + + /** receive callback function */ + raw_recv_fn recv; + /* user-supplied argument for the recv callback */ + void *recv_arg; +#if LWIP_IPV6 + /* fields for handling checksum computations as per RFC3542. */ + u16_t chksum_offset; + u8_t chksum_reqd; +#endif +}; + +/* The following functions is the application layer interface to the + RAW code. */ +struct raw_pcb *raw_new(u8_t proto); +struct raw_pcb *raw_new_ip_type(u8_t type, u8_t proto); +void raw_remove(struct raw_pcb *pcb); +err_t raw_bind(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr); +void raw_bind_netif(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif); +err_t raw_connect(struct raw_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr); +void raw_disconnect(struct raw_pcb *pcb); + +err_t raw_sendto(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr); +err_t raw_sendto_if_src(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *src_ip); +err_t raw_send(struct raw_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p); + +void raw_recv(struct raw_pcb *pcb, raw_recv_fn recv, void *recv_arg); + +#define raw_flags(pcb) ((pcb)->flags) +#define raw_setflags(pcb, f) ((pcb)->flags = (f)) + +#define raw_set_flags(pcb, set_flags) \ + do { \ + (pcb)->flags = (u8_t)((pcb)->flags | (set_flags)); \ + } while (0) +#define raw_clear_flags(pcb, clr_flags) \ + do { \ + (pcb)->flags = (u8_t)((pcb)->flags & (u8_t)(~(clr_flags)&0xff)); \ + } while (0) +#define raw_is_flag_set(pcb, flag) (((pcb)->flags & (flag)) != 0) + +#define raw_init() /* Compatibility define, no init needed. */ + +/* for compatibility with older implementation */ +#define raw_new_ip6(proto) raw_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V6, proto) + +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS +#define raw_set_multicast_netif_index(pcb, idx) ((pcb)->mcast_ifindex = (idx)) +#define raw_get_multicast_netif_index(pcb) ((pcb)->mcast_ifindex) +#define raw_set_multicast_ttl(pcb, value) ((pcb)->mcast_ttl = (value)) +#define raw_get_multicast_ttl(pcb) ((pcb)->mcast_ttl) +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_RAW */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_RAW_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/sio.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/sio.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/sio.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/sio.h index 6f2de523..9eaa197e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/sio.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/sio.h @@ -1,142 +1,142 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - */ - -/* - * This is the interface to the platform specific serial IO module - * It needs to be implemented by those platforms which need SLIP or PPP - */ - -#ifndef SIO_H -#define SIO_H - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* If you want to define sio_fd_t elsewhere or differently, - define this in your cc.h file. */ -#ifndef __sio_fd_t_defined -typedef void *sio_fd_t; -#endif - -/* The following functions can be defined to something else in your cc.h file - or be implemented in your custom sio.c file. */ - -#ifndef sio_open -/** - * Opens a serial device for communication. - * - * @param devnum device number - * @return handle to serial device if successful, NULL otherwise - */ -sio_fd_t sio_open(u8_t devnum); -#endif - -#ifndef sio_send -/** - * Sends a single character to the serial device. - * - * @param c character to send - * @param fd serial device handle - * - * @note This function will block until the character can be sent. - */ -void sio_send(u8_t c, sio_fd_t fd); -#endif - -#ifndef sio_recv -/** - * Receives a single character from the serial device. - * - * @param fd serial device handle - * - * @note This function will block until a character is received. - */ -u8_t sio_recv(sio_fd_t fd); -#endif - -#ifndef sio_read -/** - * Reads from the serial device. - * - * @param fd serial device handle - * @param data pointer to data buffer for receiving - * @param len maximum length (in bytes) of data to receive - * @return number of bytes actually received - may be 0 if aborted by sio_read_abort - * - * @note This function will block until data can be received. The blocking - * can be cancelled by calling sio_read_abort(). - */ -u32_t sio_read(sio_fd_t fd, u8_t *data, u32_t len); -#endif - -#ifndef sio_tryread -/** - * Tries to read from the serial device. Same as sio_read but returns - * immediately if no data is available and never blocks. - * - * @param fd serial device handle - * @param data pointer to data buffer for receiving - * @param len maximum length (in bytes) of data to receive - * @return number of bytes actually received - */ -u32_t sio_tryread(sio_fd_t fd, u8_t *data, u32_t len); -#endif - -#ifndef sio_write -/** - * Writes to the serial device. - * - * @param fd serial device handle - * @param data pointer to data to send - * @param len length (in bytes) of data to send - * @return number of bytes actually sent - * - * @note This function will block until all data can be sent. - */ -u32_t sio_write(sio_fd_t fd, u8_t *data, u32_t len); -#endif - -#ifndef sio_read_abort -/** - * Aborts a blocking sio_read() call. - * - * @param fd serial device handle - */ -void sio_read_abort(sio_fd_t fd); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* SIO_H */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + */ + +/* + * This is the interface to the platform specific serial IO module + * It needs to be implemented by those platforms which need SLIP or PPP + */ + +#ifndef SIO_H +#define SIO_H + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* If you want to define sio_fd_t elsewhere or differently, + define this in your cc.h file. */ +#ifndef __sio_fd_t_defined +typedef void *sio_fd_t; +#endif + +/* The following functions can be defined to something else in your cc.h file + or be implemented in your custom sio.c file. */ + +#ifndef sio_open +/** + * Opens a serial device for communication. + * + * @param devnum device number + * @return handle to serial device if successful, NULL otherwise + */ +sio_fd_t sio_open(u8_t devnum); +#endif + +#ifndef sio_send +/** + * Sends a single character to the serial device. + * + * @param c character to send + * @param fd serial device handle + * + * @note This function will block until the character can be sent. + */ +void sio_send(u8_t c, sio_fd_t fd); +#endif + +#ifndef sio_recv +/** + * Receives a single character from the serial device. + * + * @param fd serial device handle + * + * @note This function will block until a character is received. + */ +u8_t sio_recv(sio_fd_t fd); +#endif + +#ifndef sio_read +/** + * Reads from the serial device. + * + * @param fd serial device handle + * @param data pointer to data buffer for receiving + * @param len maximum length (in bytes) of data to receive + * @return number of bytes actually received - may be 0 if aborted by sio_read_abort + * + * @note This function will block until data can be received. The blocking + * can be cancelled by calling sio_read_abort(). + */ +u32_t sio_read(sio_fd_t fd, u8_t *data, u32_t len); +#endif + +#ifndef sio_tryread +/** + * Tries to read from the serial device. Same as sio_read but returns + * immediately if no data is available and never blocks. + * + * @param fd serial device handle + * @param data pointer to data buffer for receiving + * @param len maximum length (in bytes) of data to receive + * @return number of bytes actually received + */ +u32_t sio_tryread(sio_fd_t fd, u8_t *data, u32_t len); +#endif + +#ifndef sio_write +/** + * Writes to the serial device. + * + * @param fd serial device handle + * @param data pointer to data to send + * @param len length (in bytes) of data to send + * @return number of bytes actually sent + * + * @note This function will block until all data can be sent. + */ +u32_t sio_write(sio_fd_t fd, u8_t *data, u32_t len); +#endif + +#ifndef sio_read_abort +/** + * Aborts a blocking sio_read() call. + * + * @param fd serial device handle + */ +void sio_read_abort(sio_fd_t fd); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SIO_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/snmp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/snmp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/snmp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/snmp.h index 31f96c8c..169b0e37 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/snmp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/snmp.h @@ -1,221 +1,221 @@ -/** - * @file - * SNMP support API for implementing netifs and statitics for MIB2 - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SNMP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_SNMP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct udp_pcb; -struct netif; - -/** - * @defgroup netif_mib2 MIB2 statistics - * @ingroup netif - */ - -/* MIB2 statistics functions */ -#if MIB2_STATS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ -/** - * @ingroup netif_mib2 - * @see RFC1213, "MIB-II, 6. Definitions" - */ -enum snmp_ifType { - snmp_ifType_other = 1, /* none of the following */ - snmp_ifType_regular1822, - snmp_ifType_hdh1822, - snmp_ifType_ddn_x25, - snmp_ifType_rfc877_x25, - snmp_ifType_ethernet_csmacd, - snmp_ifType_iso88023_csmacd, - snmp_ifType_iso88024_tokenBus, - snmp_ifType_iso88025_tokenRing, - snmp_ifType_iso88026_man, - snmp_ifType_starLan, - snmp_ifType_proteon_10Mbit, - snmp_ifType_proteon_80Mbit, - snmp_ifType_hyperchannel, - snmp_ifType_fddi, - snmp_ifType_lapb, - snmp_ifType_sdlc, - snmp_ifType_ds1, /* T-1 */ - snmp_ifType_e1, /* european equiv. of T-1 */ - snmp_ifType_basicISDN, - snmp_ifType_primaryISDN, /* proprietary serial */ - snmp_ifType_propPointToPointSerial, - snmp_ifType_ppp, - snmp_ifType_softwareLoopback, - snmp_ifType_eon, /* CLNP over IP [11] */ - snmp_ifType_ethernet_3Mbit, - snmp_ifType_nsip, /* XNS over IP */ - snmp_ifType_slip, /* generic SLIP */ - snmp_ifType_ultra, /* ULTRA technologies */ - snmp_ifType_ds3, /* T-3 */ - snmp_ifType_sip, /* SMDS */ - snmp_ifType_frame_relay -}; - -/** This macro has a precision of ~49 days because sys_now returns u32_t. \#define your own if you want ~490 days. */ -#ifndef MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO -#define MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(ptrToVal) (*(ptrToVal) = (sys_now() / 10)) -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup netif_mib2 - * Increment stats member for SNMP MIB2 stats (struct stats_mib2_netif_ctrs) - */ -#define MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(n, x) \ - do { \ - ++(n)->mib2_counters.x; \ - } while (0) -/** - * @ingroup netif_mib2 - * Add value to stats member for SNMP MIB2 stats (struct stats_mib2_netif_ctrs) - */ -#define MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(n, x, val) \ - do { \ - (n)->mib2_counters.x += (val); \ - } while (0) - -/** - * @ingroup netif_mib2 - * Init MIB2 statistic counters in netif - * @param netif Netif to init - * @param type one of enum @ref snmp_ifType - * @param speed your link speed here (units: bits per second) - */ -#define MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, type, speed) \ - do { \ - (netif)->link_type = (type); \ - (netif)->link_speed = (speed); \ - (netif)->ts = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinoctets = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinucastpkts = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinnucastpkts = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifindiscards = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinerrors = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinunknownprotos = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifoutoctets = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifoutucastpkts = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifoutnucastpkts = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifoutdiscards = 0; \ - (netif)->mib2_counters.ifouterrors = 0; \ - } while (0) -#else /* MIB2_STATS */ -#ifndef MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO -#define MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(ptrToVal) -#endif -#define MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, type, speed) -#define MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(n, x) -#define MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(n, x, val) -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - -/* LWIP MIB2 callbacks */ -#if LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ -/* network interface */ -void mib2_netif_added(struct netif *ni); -void mib2_netif_removed(struct netif *ni); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP -/* ARP (for atTable and ipNetToMediaTable) */ -void mib2_add_arp_entry(struct netif *ni, ip4_addr_t *ip); -void mib2_remove_arp_entry(struct netif *ni, ip4_addr_t *ip); -#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ -#define mib2_add_arp_entry(ni, ip) -#define mib2_remove_arp_entry(ni, ip) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ - -/* IP */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 -void mib2_add_ip4(struct netif *ni); -void mib2_remove_ip4(struct netif *ni); -void mib2_add_route_ip4(u8_t dflt, struct netif *ni); -void mib2_remove_route_ip4(u8_t dflt, struct netif *ni); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -/* UDP */ -#if LWIP_UDP -void mib2_udp_bind(struct udp_pcb *pcb); -void mib2_udp_unbind(struct udp_pcb *pcb); -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - -#else /* LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS */ -/* LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS support not available */ -/* define everything to be empty */ - -/* network interface */ -#define mib2_netif_added(ni) -#define mib2_netif_removed(ni) - -/* ARP */ -#define mib2_add_arp_entry(ni, ip) -#define mib2_remove_arp_entry(ni, ip) - -/* IP */ -#define mib2_add_ip4(ni) -#define mib2_remove_ip4(ni) -#define mib2_add_route_ip4(dflt, ni) -#define mib2_remove_route_ip4(dflt, ni) - -/* UDP */ -#define mib2_udp_bind(pcb) -#define mib2_udp_unbind(pcb) -#endif /* LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS */ - -/* for source-code compatibility reasons only, can be removed (not used internally) */ -#define NETIF_INIT_SNMP MIB2_INIT_NETIF -#define snmp_add_ifinoctets(ni, value) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ni, ifinoctets, value) -#define snmp_inc_ifinucastpkts(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifinucastpkts) -#define snmp_inc_ifinnucastpkts(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifinnucastpkts) -#define snmp_inc_ifindiscards(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifindiscards) -#define snmp_inc_ifinerrors(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifinerrors) -#define snmp_inc_ifinunknownprotos(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifinunknownprotos) -#define snmp_add_ifoutoctets(ni, value) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ni, ifoutoctets, value) -#define snmp_inc_ifoutucastpkts(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifoutucastpkts) -#define snmp_inc_ifoutnucastpkts(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifoutnucastpkts) -#define snmp_inc_ifoutdiscards(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifoutdiscards) -#define snmp_inc_ifouterrors(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifouterrors) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SNMP_H */ +/** + * @file + * SNMP support API for implementing netifs and statitics for MIB2 + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Dirk Ziegelmeier + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SNMP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_SNMP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct udp_pcb; +struct netif; + +/** + * @defgroup netif_mib2 MIB2 statistics + * @ingroup netif + */ + +/* MIB2 statistics functions */ +#if MIB2_STATS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ +/** + * @ingroup netif_mib2 + * @see RFC1213, "MIB-II, 6. Definitions" + */ +enum snmp_ifType { + snmp_ifType_other = 1, /* none of the following */ + snmp_ifType_regular1822, + snmp_ifType_hdh1822, + snmp_ifType_ddn_x25, + snmp_ifType_rfc877_x25, + snmp_ifType_ethernet_csmacd, + snmp_ifType_iso88023_csmacd, + snmp_ifType_iso88024_tokenBus, + snmp_ifType_iso88025_tokenRing, + snmp_ifType_iso88026_man, + snmp_ifType_starLan, + snmp_ifType_proteon_10Mbit, + snmp_ifType_proteon_80Mbit, + snmp_ifType_hyperchannel, + snmp_ifType_fddi, + snmp_ifType_lapb, + snmp_ifType_sdlc, + snmp_ifType_ds1, /* T-1 */ + snmp_ifType_e1, /* european equiv. of T-1 */ + snmp_ifType_basicISDN, + snmp_ifType_primaryISDN, /* proprietary serial */ + snmp_ifType_propPointToPointSerial, + snmp_ifType_ppp, + snmp_ifType_softwareLoopback, + snmp_ifType_eon, /* CLNP over IP [11] */ + snmp_ifType_ethernet_3Mbit, + snmp_ifType_nsip, /* XNS over IP */ + snmp_ifType_slip, /* generic SLIP */ + snmp_ifType_ultra, /* ULTRA technologies */ + snmp_ifType_ds3, /* T-3 */ + snmp_ifType_sip, /* SMDS */ + snmp_ifType_frame_relay +}; + +/** This macro has a precision of ~49 days because sys_now returns u32_t. \#define your own if you want ~490 days. */ +#ifndef MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO +#define MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(ptrToVal) (*(ptrToVal) = (sys_now() / 10)) +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup netif_mib2 + * Increment stats member for SNMP MIB2 stats (struct stats_mib2_netif_ctrs) + */ +#define MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(n, x) \ + do { \ + ++(n)->mib2_counters.x; \ + } while (0) +/** + * @ingroup netif_mib2 + * Add value to stats member for SNMP MIB2 stats (struct stats_mib2_netif_ctrs) + */ +#define MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(n, x, val) \ + do { \ + (n)->mib2_counters.x += (val); \ + } while (0) + +/** + * @ingroup netif_mib2 + * Init MIB2 statistic counters in netif + * @param netif Netif to init + * @param type one of enum @ref snmp_ifType + * @param speed your link speed here (units: bits per second) + */ +#define MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, type, speed) \ + do { \ + (netif)->link_type = (type); \ + (netif)->link_speed = (speed); \ + (netif)->ts = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinoctets = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinucastpkts = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinnucastpkts = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifindiscards = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinerrors = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifinunknownprotos = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifoutoctets = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifoutucastpkts = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifoutnucastpkts = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifoutdiscards = 0; \ + (netif)->mib2_counters.ifouterrors = 0; \ + } while (0) +#else /* MIB2_STATS */ +#ifndef MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO +#define MIB2_COPY_SYSUPTIME_TO(ptrToVal) +#endif +#define MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, type, speed) +#define MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(n, x) +#define MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(n, x, val) +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + +/* LWIP MIB2 callbacks */ +#if LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ +/* network interface */ +void mib2_netif_added(struct netif *ni); +void mib2_netif_removed(struct netif *ni); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP +/* ARP (for atTable and ipNetToMediaTable) */ +void mib2_add_arp_entry(struct netif *ni, ip4_addr_t *ip); +void mib2_remove_arp_entry(struct netif *ni, ip4_addr_t *ip); +#else /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ +#define mib2_add_arp_entry(ni, ip) +#define mib2_remove_arp_entry(ni, ip) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ + +/* IP */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 +void mib2_add_ip4(struct netif *ni); +void mib2_remove_ip4(struct netif *ni); +void mib2_add_route_ip4(u8_t dflt, struct netif *ni); +void mib2_remove_route_ip4(u8_t dflt, struct netif *ni); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +/* UDP */ +#if LWIP_UDP +void mib2_udp_bind(struct udp_pcb *pcb); +void mib2_udp_unbind(struct udp_pcb *pcb); +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + +#else /* LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS */ +/* LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS support not available */ +/* define everything to be empty */ + +/* network interface */ +#define mib2_netif_added(ni) +#define mib2_netif_removed(ni) + +/* ARP */ +#define mib2_add_arp_entry(ni, ip) +#define mib2_remove_arp_entry(ni, ip) + +/* IP */ +#define mib2_add_ip4(ni) +#define mib2_remove_ip4(ni) +#define mib2_add_route_ip4(dflt, ni) +#define mib2_remove_route_ip4(dflt, ni) + +/* UDP */ +#define mib2_udp_bind(pcb) +#define mib2_udp_unbind(pcb) +#endif /* LWIP_MIB2_CALLBACKS */ + +/* for source-code compatibility reasons only, can be removed (not used internally) */ +#define NETIF_INIT_SNMP MIB2_INIT_NETIF +#define snmp_add_ifinoctets(ni, value) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ni, ifinoctets, value) +#define snmp_inc_ifinucastpkts(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifinucastpkts) +#define snmp_inc_ifinnucastpkts(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifinnucastpkts) +#define snmp_inc_ifindiscards(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifindiscards) +#define snmp_inc_ifinerrors(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifinerrors) +#define snmp_inc_ifinunknownprotos(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifinunknownprotos) +#define snmp_add_ifoutoctets(ni, value) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ni, ifoutoctets, value) +#define snmp_inc_ifoutucastpkts(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifoutucastpkts) +#define snmp_inc_ifoutnucastpkts(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifoutnucastpkts) +#define snmp_inc_ifoutdiscards(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifoutdiscards) +#define snmp_inc_ifouterrors(ni) MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ni, ifouterrors) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SNMP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/sockets.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/sockets.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/sockets.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/sockets.h index 1c328255..b29bb2c3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/sockets.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/sockets.h @@ -1,683 +1,684 @@ -/** - * @file - * Socket API (to be used from non-TCPIP threads) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/inet.h" -#include "lwip/errno.h" - -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* If your port already typedef's sa_family_t, define SA_FAMILY_T_DEFINED - to prevent this code from redefining it. */ -#if !defined(sa_family_t) && !defined(SA_FAMILY_T_DEFINED) -typedef u8_t sa_family_t; -#endif -/* If your port already typedef's in_port_t, define IN_PORT_T_DEFINED - to prevent this code from redefining it. */ -#if !defined(in_port_t) && !defined(IN_PORT_T_DEFINED) -typedef u16_t in_port_t; -#endif - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/* members are in network byte order */ -struct sockaddr_in { - u8_t sin_len; - sa_family_t sin_family; - in_port_t sin_port; - struct in_addr sin_addr; -#define SIN_ZERO_LEN 8 - char sin_zero[SIN_ZERO_LEN]; -}; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -struct sockaddr_in6 { - u8_t sin6_len; /* length of this structure */ - sa_family_t sin6_family; /* AF_INET6 */ - in_port_t sin6_port; /* Transport layer port # */ - u32_t sin6_flowinfo; /* IPv6 flow information */ - struct in6_addr sin6_addr; /* IPv6 address */ - u32_t sin6_scope_id; /* Set of interfaces for scope */ -}; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -struct sockaddr { - u8_t sa_len; - sa_family_t sa_family; - char sa_data[14]; -}; - -struct sockaddr_storage { - u8_t s2_len; - sa_family_t ss_family; - char s2_data1[2]; - u32_t s2_data2[3]; -#if LWIP_IPV6 - u32_t s2_data3[3]; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -}; - -/* If your port already typedef's socklen_t, define SOCKLEN_T_DEFINED - to prevent this code from redefining it. */ -#if !defined(socklen_t) && !defined(SOCKLEN_T_DEFINED) -typedef u32_t socklen_t; -#endif - -#if !defined IOV_MAX -#define IOV_MAX 0xFFFF -#elif IOV_MAX > 0xFFFF -#error "IOV_MAX larger than supported by LwIP" -#endif /* IOV_MAX */ - -#if !defined(iovec) -struct iovec { - void *iov_base; - size_t iov_len; -}; -#endif - -struct msghdr { - void *msg_name; - socklen_t msg_namelen; - struct iovec *msg_iov; - int msg_iovlen; - void *msg_control; - socklen_t msg_controllen; - int msg_flags; -}; - -/* struct msghdr->msg_flags bit field values */ -#define MSG_TRUNC 0x04 -#define MSG_CTRUNC 0x08 - -/* RFC 3542, Section 20: Ancillary Data */ -struct cmsghdr { - socklen_t cmsg_len; /* number of bytes, including header */ - int cmsg_level; /* originating protocol */ - int cmsg_type; /* protocol-specific type */ -}; -/* Data section follows header and possible padding, typically referred to as - unsigned char cmsg_data[]; */ - -/* cmsg header/data alignment. NOTE: we align to native word size (double word -size on 16-bit arch) so structures are not placed at an unaligned address. -16-bit arch needs double word to ensure 32-bit alignment because socklen_t -could be 32 bits. If we ever have cmsg data with a 64-bit variable, alignment -will need to increase long long */ -#define ALIGN_H(size) (((size) + sizeof(long) - 1U) & ~(sizeof(long) - 1U)) -#define ALIGN_D(size) ALIGN_H(size) - -#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \ - ((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \ - (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \ - (struct cmsghdr *)NULL) - -#define CMSG_NXTHDR(mhdr, cmsg) \ - (((cmsg) == NULL) ? CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) : \ - (((u8_t *)(cmsg) + ALIGN_H((cmsg)->cmsg_len) + ALIGN_D(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) > \ - (u8_t *)((mhdr)->msg_control) + (mhdr)->msg_controllen) ? \ - (struct cmsghdr *)NULL : \ - (struct cmsghdr *)((void *)((u8_t *)(cmsg) + \ - ALIGN_H((cmsg)->cmsg_len))))) - -#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((void *)((u8_t *)(cmsg) + \ - ALIGN_D(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))) - -#define CMSG_SPACE(length) (ALIGN_D(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + \ - ALIGN_H(length)) - -#define CMSG_LEN(length) (ALIGN_D(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + \ - length) - -/* Set socket options argument */ -#define IFNAMSIZ NETIF_NAMESIZE -struct ifreq { - char ifr_name[IFNAMSIZ]; /* Interface name */ -}; - -/* Socket protocol types (TCP/UDP/RAW) */ -#define SOCK_STREAM 1 -#define SOCK_DGRAM 2 -#define SOCK_RAW 3 - -/* - * Option flags per-socket. These must match the SOF_ flags in ip.h (checked in init.c) - */ -#define SO_REUSEADDR 0x0004 /* Allow local address reuse */ -#define SO_KEEPALIVE 0x0008 /* keep connections alive */ -#define SO_BROADCAST 0x0020 /* permit to send and to receive broadcast messages (see IP_SOF_BROADCAST option) */ - -/* - * Additional options, not kept in so_options. - */ -#define SO_DEBUG 0x0001 /* Unimplemented: turn on debugging info recording */ -#define SO_ACCEPTCONN 0x0002 /* socket has had listen() */ -#define SO_DONTROUTE 0x0010 /* Unimplemented: just use interface addresses */ -#define SO_USELOOPBACK 0x0040 /* Unimplemented: bypass hardware when possible */ -#define SO_LINGER 0x0080 /* linger on close if data present */ -#define SO_DONTLINGER ((int)(~SO_LINGER)) -#define SO_OOBINLINE 0x0100 /* Unimplemented: leave received OOB data in line */ -#define SO_REUSEPORT 0x0200 /* Unimplemented: allow local address & port reuse */ -#define SO_SNDBUF 0x1001 /* Unimplemented: send buffer size */ -#define SO_RCVBUF 0x1002 /* receive buffer size */ -#define SO_SNDLOWAT 0x1003 /* Unimplemented: send low-water mark */ -#define SO_RCVLOWAT 0x1004 /* Unimplemented: receive low-water mark */ -#define SO_SNDTIMEO 0x1005 /* send timeout */ -#define SO_RCVTIMEO 0x1006 /* receive timeout */ -#define SO_ERROR 0x1007 /* get error status and clear */ -#define SO_TYPE 0x1008 /* get socket type */ -#define SO_CONTIMEO 0x1009 /* Unimplemented: connect timeout */ -#define SO_NO_CHECK 0x100a /* don't create UDP checksum */ -#define SO_BINDTODEVICE 0x100b /* bind to device */ - -/* - * Structure used for manipulating linger option. - */ -struct linger { - int l_onoff; /* option on/off */ - int l_linger; /* linger time in seconds */ -}; - -/* - * Level number for (get/set)sockopt() to apply to socket itself. - */ -#define SOL_SOCKET 0xfff /* options for socket level */ - -#define AF_UNSPEC 0 -#define AF_INET 2 -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#define AF_INET6 10 -#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#define AF_INET6 AF_UNSPEC -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#define PF_INET AF_INET -#define PF_INET6 AF_INET6 -#define PF_UNSPEC AF_UNSPEC - -#define IPPROTO_IP 0 -#define IPPROTO_ICMP 1 -#define IPPROTO_TCP 6 -#define IPPROTO_UDP 17 -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#define IPPROTO_IPV6 41 -#define IPPROTO_ICMPV6 58 -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#define IPPROTO_UDPLITE 136 -#define IPPROTO_RAW 255 - -/* Flags we can use with send and recv. */ -#define MSG_PEEK 0x01 /* Peeks at an incoming message */ -#define MSG_WAITALL 0x02 /* Unimplemented: Requests that the function block until the full amount of data requested can be returned */ -#define MSG_OOB 0x04 /* Unimplemented: Requests out-of-band data. The significance and semantics of out-of-band data are protocol-specific */ -#define MSG_DONTWAIT 0x08 /* Nonblocking i/o for this operation only */ -#define MSG_MORE 0x10 /* Sender will send more */ -#define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0x20 /* Uninmplemented: Requests not to send the SIGPIPE signal if an attempt to send is made on a stream-oriented socket that is no longer connected. */ - -/* - * Options for level IPPROTO_IP - */ -#define IP_TOS 1 -#define IP_TTL 2 -#define IP_PKTINFO 8 - -#if LWIP_TCP -/* - * Options for level IPPROTO_TCP - */ -#define TCP_NODELAY 0x01 /* don't delay send to coalesce packets */ -#define TCP_KEEPALIVE 0x02 /* send KEEPALIVE probes when idle for pcb->keep_idle milliseconds */ -#define TCP_KEEPIDLE 0x03 /* set pcb->keep_idle - Same as TCP_KEEPALIVE, but use seconds for get/setsockopt */ -#define TCP_KEEPINTVL 0x04 /* set pcb->keep_intvl - Use seconds for get/setsockopt */ -#define TCP_KEEPCNT 0x05 /* set pcb->keep_cnt - Use number of probes sent for get/setsockopt */ -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/* - * Options for level IPPROTO_IPV6 - */ -#define IPV6_CHECKSUM 7 /* RFC3542: calculate and insert the ICMPv6 checksum for raw sockets. */ -#define IPV6_V6ONLY 27 /* RFC3493: boolean control to restrict AF_INET6 sockets to IPv6 communications only. */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#if LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE -/* - * Options for level IPPROTO_UDPLITE - */ -#define UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV 0x01 /* sender checksum coverage */ -#define UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV 0x02 /* minimal receiver checksum coverage */ -#endif /* LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE*/ - -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS -/* - * Options and types for UDP multicast traffic handling - */ -#define IP_MULTICAST_TTL 5 -#define IP_MULTICAST_IF 6 -#define IP_MULTICAST_LOOP 7 -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - -#if LWIP_IGMP -/* - * Options and types related to multicast membership - */ -#define IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP 3 -#define IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP 4 - -typedef struct ip_mreq { - struct in_addr imr_multiaddr; /* IP multicast address of group */ - struct in_addr imr_interface; /* local IP address of interface */ -} ip_mreq; -#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -struct in_pktinfo { - unsigned int ipi_ifindex; /* Interface index */ - struct in_addr ipi_addr; /* Destination (from header) address */ -}; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD -/* - * Options and types related to IPv6 multicast membership - */ -#define IPV6_JOIN_GROUP 12 -#define IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP IPV6_JOIN_GROUP -#define IPV6_LEAVE_GROUP 13 -#define IPV6_DROP_MEMBERSHIP IPV6_LEAVE_GROUP - -typedef struct ipv6_mreq { - struct in6_addr ipv6mr_multiaddr; /* IPv6 multicast addr */ - unsigned int ipv6mr_interface; /* interface index, or 0 */ -} ipv6_mreq; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - -/* - * The Type of Service provides an indication of the abstract - * parameters of the quality of service desired. These parameters are - * to be used to guide the selection of the actual service parameters - * when transmitting a datagram through a particular network. Several - * networks offer service precedence, which somehow treats high - * precedence traffic as more important than other traffic (generally - * by accepting only traffic above a certain precedence at time of high - * load). The major choice is a three way tradeoff between low-delay, - * high-reliability, and high-throughput. - * The use of the Delay, Throughput, and Reliability indications may - * increase the cost (in some sense) of the service. In many networks - * better performance for one of these parameters is coupled with worse - * performance on another. Except for very unusual cases at most two - * of these three indications should be set. - */ -#define IPTOS_TOS_MASK 0x1E -#define IPTOS_TOS(tos) ((tos)&IPTOS_TOS_MASK) -#define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10 -#define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08 -#define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04 -#define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02 -#define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST - -/* - * The Network Control precedence designation is intended to be used - * within a network only. The actual use and control of that - * designation is up to each network. The Internetwork Control - * designation is intended for use by gateway control originators only. - * If the actual use of these precedence designations is of concern to - * a particular network, it is the responsibility of that network to - * control the access to, and use of, those precedence designations. - */ -#define IPTOS_PREC_MASK 0xe0 -#define IPTOS_PREC(tos) ((tos)&IPTOS_PREC_MASK) -#define IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL 0xe0 -#define IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL 0xc0 -#define IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP 0xa0 -#define IPTOS_PREC_FLASHOVERRIDE 0x80 -#define IPTOS_PREC_FLASH 0x60 -#define IPTOS_PREC_IMMEDIATE 0x40 -#define IPTOS_PREC_PRIORITY 0x20 -#define IPTOS_PREC_ROUTINE 0x00 - -/* - * Commands for ioctlsocket(), taken from the BSD file fcntl.h. - * lwip_ioctl only supports FIONREAD and FIONBIO, for now - * - * Ioctl's have the command encoded in the lower word, - * and the size of any in or out parameters in the upper - * word. The high 2 bits of the upper word are used - * to encode the in/out status of the parameter; for now - * we restrict parameters to at most 128 bytes. - */ -#if !defined(FIONREAD) || !defined(FIONBIO) -#define IOCPARM_MASK 0x7fU /* parameters must be < 128 bytes */ -#define IOC_VOID 0x20000000UL /* no parameters */ -#define IOC_OUT 0x40000000UL /* copy out parameters */ -#define IOC_IN 0x80000000UL /* copy in parameters */ -#define IOC_INOUT (IOC_IN | IOC_OUT) -/* 0x20000000 distinguishes new & - old ioctl's */ -#define _IO(x, y) ((long)(IOC_VOID | ((x) << 8) | (y))) - -#define _IOR(x, y, t) ((long)(IOC_OUT | ((sizeof(t) & IOCPARM_MASK) << 16) | ((x) << 8) | (y))) - -#define _IOW(x, y, t) ((long)(IOC_IN | ((sizeof(t) & IOCPARM_MASK) << 16) | ((x) << 8) | (y))) -#endif /* !defined(FIONREAD) || !defined(FIONBIO) */ - -#ifndef FIONREAD -#define FIONREAD _IOR('f', 127, unsigned long) /* get # bytes to read */ -#endif -#ifndef FIONBIO -#define FIONBIO _IOW('f', 126, unsigned long) /* set/clear non-blocking i/o */ -#endif - -/* Socket I/O Controls: unimplemented */ -#ifndef SIOCSHIWAT -#define SIOCSHIWAT _IOW('s', 0, unsigned long) /* set high watermark */ -#define SIOCGHIWAT _IOR('s', 1, unsigned long) /* get high watermark */ -#define SIOCSLOWAT _IOW('s', 2, unsigned long) /* set low watermark */ -#define SIOCGLOWAT _IOR('s', 3, unsigned long) /* get low watermark */ -#define SIOCATMARK _IOR('s', 7, unsigned long) /* at oob mark? */ -#endif - -/* commands for fnctl */ -#ifndef F_GETFL -#define F_GETFL 3 -#endif -#ifndef F_SETFL -#define F_SETFL 4 -#endif - -/* File status flags and file access modes for fnctl, - these are bits in an int. */ -#ifndef O_NONBLOCK -#define O_NONBLOCK 1 /* nonblocking I/O */ -#endif -#ifndef O_NDELAY -#define O_NDELAY O_NONBLOCK /* same as O_NONBLOCK, for compatibility */ -#endif -#ifndef O_RDONLY -#define O_RDONLY 2 -#endif -#ifndef O_WRONLY -#define O_WRONLY 4 -#endif -#ifndef O_RDWR -#define O_RDWR (O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY) -#endif - -#ifndef SHUT_RD -#define SHUT_RD 0 -#define SHUT_WR 1 -#define SHUT_RDWR 2 -#endif - -/* FD_SET used for lwip_select */ -#ifndef FD_SET -#undef FD_SETSIZE -/* Make FD_SETSIZE match NUM_SOCKETS in socket.c */ -#define FD_SETSIZE MEMP_NUM_NETCONN -#define LWIP_SELECT_MAXNFDS (FD_SETSIZE + LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) -#define FDSETSAFESET(n, code) \ - do { \ - if (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET < MEMP_NUM_NETCONN) && (((int)(n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) >= 0)) { \ - code; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define FDSETSAFEGET(n, code) (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET < MEMP_NUM_NETCONN) && (((int)(n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) >= 0) ? \ - (code) : \ - 0) -#define FD_SET(n, p) FDSETSAFESET(n, (p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] = (u8_t)((p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] | (1 << (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) & 7)))) -#define FD_CLR(n, p) FDSETSAFESET(n, (p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] = (u8_t)((p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] & ~(1 << (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) & 7)))) -#define FD_ISSET(n, p) FDSETSAFEGET(n, (p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] & (1 << (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) & 7))) -#define FD_ZERO(p) memset((void *)(p), 0, sizeof(*(p))) - -typedef struct fd_set { - unsigned char fd_bits[(FD_SETSIZE + 7) / 8]; -} fd_set; - -#elif FD_SETSIZE < (LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET + MEMP_NUM_NETCONN) -#error "external FD_SETSIZE too small for number of sockets" -#else -#define LWIP_SELECT_MAXNFDS FD_SETSIZE -#endif /* FD_SET */ - -/* poll-related defines and types */ -/* @todo: find a better way to guard the definition of these defines and types if already defined */ -#if !defined(POLLIN) && !defined(POLLOUT) -#define POLLIN 0x1 -#define POLLOUT 0x2 -#define POLLERR 0x4 -#define POLLNVAL 0x8 -/* Below values are unimplemented */ -#define POLLRDNORM 0x10 -#define POLLRDBAND 0x20 -#define POLLPRI 0x40 -#define POLLWRNORM 0x80 -#define POLLWRBAND 0x100 -#define POLLHUP 0x200 -typedef unsigned int nfds_t; -struct pollfd { - int fd; - short events; - short revents; -}; -#endif - -/** LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE: if you want to use the struct timeval provided - * by your system, set this to 0 and include in cc.h */ -#ifndef LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE -#define LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE 1 -#endif - -#if LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE -struct timeval { - long tv_sec; /* seconds */ - long tv_usec; /* and microseconds */ -}; -#endif /* LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE */ - -#define lwip_socket_init() /* Compatibility define, no init needed. */ -void lwip_socket_thread_init(void); /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: initialize thread-local semaphore */ -void lwip_socket_thread_cleanup(void); /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: destroy thread-local semaphore */ - -#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS == 2 -/* This helps code parsers/code completion by not having the COMPAT functions as defines */ -#define lwip_accept accept -#define lwip_bind bind -#define lwip_shutdown shutdown -#define lwip_getpeername getpeername -#define lwip_getsockname getsockname -#define lwip_setsockopt setsockopt -#define lwip_getsockopt getsockopt -#define lwip_close closesocket -#define lwip_connect connect -#define lwip_listen listen -#define lwip_recv recv -#define lwip_recvmsg recvmsg -#define lwip_recvfrom recvfrom -#define lwip_send send -#define lwip_sendmsg sendmsg -#define lwip_sendto sendto -#define lwip_socket socket -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT -#define lwip_select select -#endif -#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL -#define lwip_poll poll -#endif -#define lwip_ioctl ioctlsocket -#define lwip_inet_ntop inet_ntop -#define lwip_inet_pton inet_pton - -#if LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES -#define lwip_read read -#define lwip_readv readv -#define lwip_write write -#define lwip_writev writev -#undef lwip_close -#define lwip_close close -#define closesocket(s) close(s) -int fcntl(int s, int cmd, ...); -#undef lwip_ioctl -#define lwip_ioctl ioctl -#define ioctlsocket ioctl -#endif /* LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES */ -#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS == 2 */ - -int lwip_accept(int s, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t *addrlen); -int lwip_bind(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen); -int lwip_shutdown(int s, int how); -int lwip_getpeername(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen); -int lwip_getsockname(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen); -int lwip_getsockopt(int s, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen); -int lwip_setsockopt(int s, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen); -int lwip_close(int s); -int lwip_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen); -int lwip_listen(int s, int backlog); -ssize_t lwip_recv(int s, void *mem, size_t len, int flags); -ssize_t lwip_read(int s, void *mem, size_t len); -ssize_t lwip_readv(int s, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt); -ssize_t lwip_recvfrom(int s, void *mem, size_t len, int flags, - struct sockaddr *from, socklen_t *fromlen); -ssize_t lwip_recvmsg(int s, struct msghdr *message, int flags); -ssize_t lwip_send(int s, const void *dataptr, size_t size, int flags); -ssize_t lwip_sendmsg(int s, const struct msghdr *message, int flags); -ssize_t lwip_sendto(int s, const void *dataptr, size_t size, int flags, - const struct sockaddr *to, socklen_t tolen); -int lwip_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol); -ssize_t lwip_write(int s, const void *dataptr, size_t size); -ssize_t lwip_writev(int s, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt); -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT -int lwip_select(int maxfdp1, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, fd_set *exceptset, - struct timeval *timeout); -#endif -#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL -int lwip_poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout); -#endif -int lwip_ioctl(int s, long cmd, void *argp); -int lwip_fcntl(int s, int cmd, int val); -const char *lwip_inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size); -int lwip_inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst); - -#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS -#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS != 2 -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define accept(s, addr, addrlen) lwip_accept(s, addr, addrlen) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define bind(s, name, namelen) lwip_bind(s, name, namelen) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define shutdown(s, how) lwip_shutdown(s, how) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define getpeername(s, name, namelen) lwip_getpeername(s, name, namelen) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define getsockname(s, name, namelen) lwip_getsockname(s, name, namelen) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define setsockopt(s, level, optname, opval, optlen) lwip_setsockopt(s, level, optname, opval, optlen) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define getsockopt(s, level, optname, opval, optlen) lwip_getsockopt(s, level, optname, opval, optlen) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define closesocket(s) lwip_close(s) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define connect(s, name, namelen) lwip_connect(s, name, namelen) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define listen(s, backlog) lwip_listen(s, backlog) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define recv(s, mem, len, flags) lwip_recv(s, mem, len, flags) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define recvmsg(s, message, flags) lwip_recvmsg(s, message, flags) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define recvfrom(s, mem, len, flags, from, fromlen) lwip_recvfrom(s, mem, len, flags, from, fromlen) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define send(s, dataptr, size, flags) lwip_send(s, dataptr, size, flags) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define sendmsg(s, message, flags) lwip_sendmsg(s, message, flags) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define sendto(s, dataptr, size, flags, to, tolen) lwip_sendto(s, dataptr, size, flags, to, tolen) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define socket(domain, type, protocol) lwip_socket(domain, type, protocol) -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define select(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, timeout) lwip_select(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, timeout) -#endif -#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define poll(fds, nfds, timeout) lwip_poll(fds, nfds, timeout) -#endif -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define ioctlsocket(s, cmd, argp) lwip_ioctl(s, cmd, argp) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size) lwip_inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define inet_pton(af, src, dst) lwip_inet_pton(af, src, dst) - -#if LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define read(s, mem, len) lwip_read(s, mem, len) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define readv(s, iov, iovcnt) lwip_readv(s, iov, iovcnt) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define write(s, dataptr, len) lwip_write(s, dataptr, len) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define writev(s, iov, iovcnt) lwip_writev(s, iov, iovcnt) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define close(s) lwip_close(s) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define fcntl(s, cmd, val) lwip_fcntl(s, cmd, val) -/** @ingroup socket */ -#define ioctl(s, cmd, argp) lwip_ioctl(s, cmd, argp) -#endif /* LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES */ -#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS != 2 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_H */ +/** + * @file + * Socket API (to be used from non-TCPIP threads) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_SOCKET /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/inet.h" +#include "lwip/errno.h" + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* If your port already typedef's sa_family_t, define SA_FAMILY_T_DEFINED + to prevent this code from redefining it. */ +#if !defined(sa_family_t) && !defined(SA_FAMILY_T_DEFINED) +typedef u8_t sa_family_t; +#endif +/* If your port already typedef's in_port_t, define IN_PORT_T_DEFINED + to prevent this code from redefining it. */ +#if !defined(in_port_t) && !defined(IN_PORT_T_DEFINED) +typedef u16_t in_port_t; +#endif + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/* members are in network byte order */ +struct sockaddr_in { + u8_t sin_len; + sa_family_t sin_family; + in_port_t sin_port; + struct in_addr sin_addr; +#define SIN_ZERO_LEN 8 + char sin_zero[SIN_ZERO_LEN]; +}; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +struct sockaddr_in6 { + u8_t sin6_len; /* length of this structure */ + sa_family_t sin6_family; /* AF_INET6 */ + in_port_t sin6_port; /* Transport layer port # */ + u32_t sin6_flowinfo; /* IPv6 flow information */ + struct in6_addr sin6_addr; /* IPv6 address */ + u32_t sin6_scope_id; /* Set of interfaces for scope */ +}; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +struct sockaddr { + u8_t sa_len; + sa_family_t sa_family; + char sa_data[14]; +}; + +struct sockaddr_storage { + u8_t s2_len; + sa_family_t ss_family; + char s2_data1[2]; + u32_t s2_data2[3]; +#if LWIP_IPV6 + u32_t s2_data3[3]; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +}; + +/* If your port already typedef's socklen_t, define SOCKLEN_T_DEFINED + to prevent this code from redefining it. */ +#if !defined(socklen_t) && !defined(SOCKLEN_T_DEFINED) +typedef u32_t socklen_t; +#endif + +#if !defined IOV_MAX +#define IOV_MAX 0xFFFF +#elif IOV_MAX > 0xFFFF +#error "IOV_MAX larger than supported by LwIP" +#endif /* IOV_MAX */ + +#if !defined(iovec) +struct iovec { + void *iov_base; + size_t iov_len; +}; +#endif + +struct msghdr { + void *msg_name; + socklen_t msg_namelen; + struct iovec *msg_iov; + int msg_iovlen; + void *msg_control; + socklen_t msg_controllen; + int msg_flags; +}; + +/* struct msghdr->msg_flags bit field values */ +#define MSG_TRUNC 0x04 +#define MSG_CTRUNC 0x08 + +/* RFC 3542, Section 20: Ancillary Data */ +struct cmsghdr { + socklen_t cmsg_len; /* number of bytes, including header */ + int cmsg_level; /* originating protocol */ + int cmsg_type; /* protocol-specific type */ +}; +/* Data section follows header and possible padding, typically referred to as + unsigned char cmsg_data[]; */ + +/* cmsg header/data alignment. NOTE: we align to native word size (double word +size on 16-bit arch) so structures are not placed at an unaligned address. +16-bit arch needs double word to ensure 32-bit alignment because socklen_t +could be 32 bits. If we ever have cmsg data with a 64-bit variable, alignment +will need to increase long long */ +#define ALIGN_H(size) (((size) + sizeof(long) - 1U) & ~(sizeof(long) - 1U)) +#define ALIGN_D(size) ALIGN_H(size) + +#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \ + ((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \ + (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \ + (struct cmsghdr *)NULL) + +#define CMSG_NXTHDR(mhdr, cmsg) \ + (((cmsg) == NULL) ? CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) : \ + (((u8_t *)(cmsg) + ALIGN_H((cmsg)->cmsg_len) + ALIGN_D(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) > \ + (u8_t *)((mhdr)->msg_control) + (mhdr)->msg_controllen) ? \ + (struct cmsghdr *)NULL : \ + (struct cmsghdr *)((void *)((u8_t *)(cmsg) + \ + ALIGN_H((cmsg)->cmsg_len))))) + +#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((void *)((u8_t *)(cmsg) + \ + ALIGN_D(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))) + +#define CMSG_SPACE(length) (ALIGN_D(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + \ + ALIGN_H(length)) + +#define CMSG_LEN(length) (ALIGN_D(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + \ + length) + +/* Set socket options argument */ +#define IFNAMSIZ NETIF_NAMESIZE +struct ifreq { + char ifr_name[IFNAMSIZ]; /* Interface name */ +}; + +/* Socket protocol types (TCP/UDP/RAW) */ +#define SOCK_STREAM 1 +#define SOCK_DGRAM 2 +#define SOCK_RAW 3 + +/* + * Option flags per-socket. These must match the SOF_ flags in ip.h (checked in init.c) + */ +#define SO_REUSEADDR 0x0004 /* Allow local address reuse */ +#define SO_KEEPALIVE 0x0008 /* keep connections alive */ +#define SO_BROADCAST 0x0020 /* permit to send and to receive broadcast messages (see IP_SOF_BROADCAST option) */ + +/* + * Additional options, not kept in so_options. + */ +#define SO_DEBUG 0x0001 /* Unimplemented: turn on debugging info recording */ +#define SO_ACCEPTCONN 0x0002 /* socket has had listen() */ +#define SO_DONTROUTE 0x0010 /* Unimplemented: just use interface addresses */ +#define SO_USELOOPBACK 0x0040 /* Unimplemented: bypass hardware when possible */ +#define SO_LINGER 0x0080 /* linger on close if data present */ +#define SO_DONTLINGER ((int)(~SO_LINGER)) +#define SO_OOBINLINE 0x0100 /* Unimplemented: leave received OOB data in line */ +#define SO_REUSEPORT 0x0200 /* Unimplemented: allow local address & port reuse */ +#define SO_SNDBUF 0x1001 /* Unimplemented: send buffer size */ +#define SO_RCVBUF 0x1002 /* receive buffer size */ +#define SO_SNDLOWAT 0x1003 /* Unimplemented: send low-water mark */ +#define SO_RCVLOWAT 0x1004 /* Unimplemented: receive low-water mark */ +#define SO_SNDTIMEO 0x1005 /* send timeout */ +#define SO_RCVTIMEO 0x1006 /* receive timeout */ +#define SO_ERROR 0x1007 /* get error status and clear */ +#define SO_TYPE 0x1008 /* get socket type */ +#define SO_CONTIMEO 0x1009 /* Unimplemented: connect timeout */ +#define SO_NO_CHECK 0x100a /* don't create UDP checksum */ +#define SO_BINDTODEVICE 0x100b /* bind to device */ +#define SO_CONNINFO 0x100e /* RWNX Specific: Read Only, get pointer on connection info */ + +/* + * Structure used for manipulating linger option. + */ +struct linger { + int l_onoff; /* option on/off */ + int l_linger; /* linger time in seconds */ +}; + +/* + * Level number for (get/set)sockopt() to apply to socket itself. + */ +#define SOL_SOCKET 0xfff /* options for socket level */ + +#define AF_UNSPEC 0 +#define AF_INET 2 +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#define AF_INET6 10 +#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#define AF_INET6 AF_UNSPEC +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#define PF_INET AF_INET +#define PF_INET6 AF_INET6 +#define PF_UNSPEC AF_UNSPEC + +#define IPPROTO_IP 0 +#define IPPROTO_ICMP 1 +#define IPPROTO_TCP 6 +#define IPPROTO_UDP 17 +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#define IPPROTO_IPV6 41 +#define IPPROTO_ICMPV6 58 +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#define IPPROTO_UDPLITE 136 +#define IPPROTO_RAW 255 + +/* Flags we can use with send and recv. */ +#define MSG_PEEK 0x01 /* Peeks at an incoming message */ +#define MSG_WAITALL 0x02 /* Unimplemented: Requests that the function block until the full amount of data requested can be returned */ +#define MSG_OOB 0x04 /* Unimplemented: Requests out-of-band data. The significance and semantics of out-of-band data are protocol-specific */ +#define MSG_DONTWAIT 0x08 /* Nonblocking i/o for this operation only */ +#define MSG_MORE 0x10 /* Sender will send more */ +#define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0x20 /* Uninmplemented: Requests not to send the SIGPIPE signal if an attempt to send is made on a stream-oriented socket that is no longer connected. */ + +/* + * Options for level IPPROTO_IP + */ +#define IP_TOS 1 +#define IP_TTL 2 +#define IP_PKTINFO 8 + +#if LWIP_TCP +/* + * Options for level IPPROTO_TCP + */ +#define TCP_NODELAY 0x01 /* don't delay send to coalesce packets */ +#define TCP_KEEPALIVE 0x02 /* send KEEPALIVE probes when idle for pcb->keep_idle milliseconds */ +#define TCP_KEEPIDLE 0x03 /* set pcb->keep_idle - Same as TCP_KEEPALIVE, but use seconds for get/setsockopt */ +#define TCP_KEEPINTVL 0x04 /* set pcb->keep_intvl - Use seconds for get/setsockopt */ +#define TCP_KEEPCNT 0x05 /* set pcb->keep_cnt - Use number of probes sent for get/setsockopt */ +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/* + * Options for level IPPROTO_IPV6 + */ +#define IPV6_CHECKSUM 7 /* RFC3542: calculate and insert the ICMPv6 checksum for raw sockets. */ +#define IPV6_V6ONLY 27 /* RFC3493: boolean control to restrict AF_INET6 sockets to IPv6 communications only. */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#if LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE +/* + * Options for level IPPROTO_UDPLITE + */ +#define UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV 0x01 /* sender checksum coverage */ +#define UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV 0x02 /* minimal receiver checksum coverage */ +#endif /* LWIP_UDP && LWIP_UDPLITE*/ + +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS +/* + * Options and types for UDP multicast traffic handling + */ +#define IP_MULTICAST_TTL 5 +#define IP_MULTICAST_IF 6 +#define IP_MULTICAST_LOOP 7 +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + +#if LWIP_IGMP +/* + * Options and types related to multicast membership + */ +#define IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP 3 +#define IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP 4 + +typedef struct ip_mreq { + struct in_addr imr_multiaddr; /* IP multicast address of group */ + struct in_addr imr_interface; /* local IP address of interface */ +} ip_mreq; +#endif /* LWIP_IGMP */ + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +struct in_pktinfo { + unsigned int ipi_ifindex; /* Interface index */ + struct in_addr ipi_addr; /* Destination (from header) address */ +}; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6_MLD +/* + * Options and types related to IPv6 multicast membership + */ +#define IPV6_JOIN_GROUP 12 +#define IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP IPV6_JOIN_GROUP +#define IPV6_LEAVE_GROUP 13 +#define IPV6_DROP_MEMBERSHIP IPV6_LEAVE_GROUP + +typedef struct ipv6_mreq { + struct in6_addr ipv6mr_multiaddr; /* IPv6 multicast addr */ + unsigned int ipv6mr_interface; /* interface index, or 0 */ +} ipv6_mreq; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + +/* + * The Type of Service provides an indication of the abstract + * parameters of the quality of service desired. These parameters are + * to be used to guide the selection of the actual service parameters + * when transmitting a datagram through a particular network. Several + * networks offer service precedence, which somehow treats high + * precedence traffic as more important than other traffic (generally + * by accepting only traffic above a certain precedence at time of high + * load). The major choice is a three way tradeoff between low-delay, + * high-reliability, and high-throughput. + * The use of the Delay, Throughput, and Reliability indications may + * increase the cost (in some sense) of the service. In many networks + * better performance for one of these parameters is coupled with worse + * performance on another. Except for very unusual cases at most two + * of these three indications should be set. + */ +#define IPTOS_TOS_MASK 0x1E +#define IPTOS_TOS(tos) ((tos)&IPTOS_TOS_MASK) +#define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10 +#define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08 +#define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04 +#define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02 +#define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST + +/* + * The Network Control precedence designation is intended to be used + * within a network only. The actual use and control of that + * designation is up to each network. The Internetwork Control + * designation is intended for use by gateway control originators only. + * If the actual use of these precedence designations is of concern to + * a particular network, it is the responsibility of that network to + * control the access to, and use of, those precedence designations. + */ +#define IPTOS_PREC_MASK 0xe0 +#define IPTOS_PREC(tos) ((tos)&IPTOS_PREC_MASK) +#define IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL 0xe0 +#define IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL 0xc0 +#define IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP 0xa0 +#define IPTOS_PREC_FLASHOVERRIDE 0x80 +#define IPTOS_PREC_FLASH 0x60 +#define IPTOS_PREC_IMMEDIATE 0x40 +#define IPTOS_PREC_PRIORITY 0x20 +#define IPTOS_PREC_ROUTINE 0x00 + +/* + * Commands for ioctlsocket(), taken from the BSD file fcntl.h. + * lwip_ioctl only supports FIONREAD and FIONBIO, for now + * + * Ioctl's have the command encoded in the lower word, + * and the size of any in or out parameters in the upper + * word. The high 2 bits of the upper word are used + * to encode the in/out status of the parameter; for now + * we restrict parameters to at most 128 bytes. + */ +#if !defined(FIONREAD) || !defined(FIONBIO) +#define IOCPARM_MASK 0x7fU /* parameters must be < 128 bytes */ +#define IOC_VOID 0x20000000UL /* no parameters */ +#define IOC_OUT 0x40000000UL /* copy out parameters */ +#define IOC_IN 0x80000000UL /* copy in parameters */ +#define IOC_INOUT (IOC_IN | IOC_OUT) +/* 0x20000000 distinguishes new & + old ioctl's */ +#define _IO(x, y) ((long)(IOC_VOID | ((x) << 8) | (y))) + +#define _IOR(x, y, t) ((long)(IOC_OUT | ((sizeof(t) & IOCPARM_MASK) << 16) | ((x) << 8) | (y))) + +#define _IOW(x, y, t) ((long)(IOC_IN | ((sizeof(t) & IOCPARM_MASK) << 16) | ((x) << 8) | (y))) +#endif /* !defined(FIONREAD) || !defined(FIONBIO) */ + +#ifndef FIONREAD +#define FIONREAD _IOR('f', 127, unsigned long) /* get # bytes to read */ +#endif +#ifndef FIONBIO +#define FIONBIO _IOW('f', 126, unsigned long) /* set/clear non-blocking i/o */ +#endif + +/* Socket I/O Controls: unimplemented */ +#ifndef SIOCSHIWAT +#define SIOCSHIWAT _IOW('s', 0, unsigned long) /* set high watermark */ +#define SIOCGHIWAT _IOR('s', 1, unsigned long) /* get high watermark */ +#define SIOCSLOWAT _IOW('s', 2, unsigned long) /* set low watermark */ +#define SIOCGLOWAT _IOR('s', 3, unsigned long) /* get low watermark */ +#define SIOCATMARK _IOR('s', 7, unsigned long) /* at oob mark? */ +#endif + +/* commands for fnctl */ +#ifndef F_GETFL +#define F_GETFL 3 +#endif +#ifndef F_SETFL +#define F_SETFL 4 +#endif + +/* File status flags and file access modes for fnctl, + these are bits in an int. */ +#ifndef O_NONBLOCK +#define O_NONBLOCK 1 /* nonblocking I/O */ +#endif +#ifndef O_NDELAY +#define O_NDELAY O_NONBLOCK /* same as O_NONBLOCK, for compatibility */ +#endif +#ifndef O_RDONLY +#define O_RDONLY 2 +#endif +#ifndef O_WRONLY +#define O_WRONLY 4 +#endif +#ifndef O_RDWR +#define O_RDWR (O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY) +#endif + +#ifndef SHUT_RD +#define SHUT_RD 0 +#define SHUT_WR 1 +#define SHUT_RDWR 2 +#endif + +/* FD_SET used for lwip_select */ +#ifndef FD_SET +#undef FD_SETSIZE +/* Make FD_SETSIZE match NUM_SOCKETS in socket.c */ +#define FD_SETSIZE MEMP_NUM_NETCONN +#define LWIP_SELECT_MAXNFDS (FD_SETSIZE + LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) +#define FDSETSAFESET(n, code) \ + do { \ + if (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET < MEMP_NUM_NETCONN) && (((int)(n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) >= 0)) { \ + code; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define FDSETSAFEGET(n, code) (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET < MEMP_NUM_NETCONN) && (((int)(n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) >= 0) ? \ + (code) : \ + 0) +#define FD_SET(n, p) FDSETSAFESET(n, (p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] = (u8_t)((p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] | (1 << (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) & 7)))) +#define FD_CLR(n, p) FDSETSAFESET(n, (p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] = (u8_t)((p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] & ~(1 << (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) & 7)))) +#define FD_ISSET(n, p) FDSETSAFEGET(n, (p)->fd_bits[((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) / 8] & (1 << (((n)-LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET) & 7))) +#define FD_ZERO(p) memset((void *)(p), 0, sizeof(*(p))) + +typedef struct fd_set { + unsigned char fd_bits[(FD_SETSIZE + 7) / 8]; +} fd_set; + +#elif FD_SETSIZE < (LWIP_SOCKET_OFFSET + MEMP_NUM_NETCONN) +#error "external FD_SETSIZE too small for number of sockets" +#else +#define LWIP_SELECT_MAXNFDS FD_SETSIZE +#endif /* FD_SET */ + +/* poll-related defines and types */ +/* @todo: find a better way to guard the definition of these defines and types if already defined */ +#if !defined(POLLIN) && !defined(POLLOUT) +#define POLLIN 0x1 +#define POLLOUT 0x2 +#define POLLERR 0x4 +#define POLLNVAL 0x8 +/* Below values are unimplemented */ +#define POLLRDNORM 0x10 +#define POLLRDBAND 0x20 +#define POLLPRI 0x40 +#define POLLWRNORM 0x80 +#define POLLWRBAND 0x100 +#define POLLHUP 0x200 +typedef unsigned int nfds_t; +struct pollfd { + int fd; + short events; + short revents; +}; +#endif + +/** LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE: if you want to use the struct timeval provided + * by your system, set this to 0 and include in cc.h */ +#ifndef LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE +#define LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE 1 +#endif + +#if LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE +struct timeval { + long tv_sec; /* seconds */ + long tv_usec; /* and microseconds */ +}; +#endif /* LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE */ + +#define lwip_socket_init() /* Compatibility define, no init needed. */ +void lwip_socket_thread_init(void); /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: initialize thread-local semaphore */ +void lwip_socket_thread_cleanup(void); /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1: destroy thread-local semaphore */ + +#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS == 2 +/* This helps code parsers/code completion by not having the COMPAT functions as defines */ +#define lwip_accept accept +#define lwip_bind bind +#define lwip_shutdown shutdown +#define lwip_getpeername getpeername +#define lwip_getsockname getsockname +#define lwip_setsockopt setsockopt +#define lwip_getsockopt getsockopt +#define lwip_close closesocket +#define lwip_connect connect +#define lwip_listen listen +#define lwip_recv recv +#define lwip_recvmsg recvmsg +#define lwip_recvfrom recvfrom +#define lwip_send send +#define lwip_sendmsg sendmsg +#define lwip_sendto sendto +#define lwip_socket socket +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT +#define lwip_select select +#endif +#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL +#define lwip_poll poll +#endif +#define lwip_ioctl ioctlsocket +#define lwip_inet_ntop inet_ntop +#define lwip_inet_pton inet_pton + +#if LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES +#define lwip_read read +#define lwip_readv readv +#define lwip_write write +#define lwip_writev writev +#undef lwip_close +#define lwip_close close +#define closesocket(s) close(s) +int fcntl(int s, int cmd, ...); +#undef lwip_ioctl +#define lwip_ioctl ioctl +#define ioctlsocket ioctl +#endif /* LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES */ +#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS == 2 */ + +int lwip_accept(int s, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t *addrlen); +int lwip_bind(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen); +int lwip_shutdown(int s, int how); +int lwip_getpeername(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen); +int lwip_getsockname(int s, struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t *namelen); +int lwip_getsockopt(int s, int level, int optname, void *optval, socklen_t *optlen); +int lwip_setsockopt(int s, int level, int optname, const void *optval, socklen_t optlen); +int lwip_close(int s); +int lwip_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen); +int lwip_listen(int s, int backlog); +ssize_t lwip_recv(int s, void *mem, size_t len, int flags); +ssize_t lwip_read(int s, void *mem, size_t len); +ssize_t lwip_readv(int s, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt); +ssize_t lwip_recvfrom(int s, void *mem, size_t len, int flags, + struct sockaddr *from, socklen_t *fromlen); +ssize_t lwip_recvmsg(int s, struct msghdr *message, int flags); +ssize_t lwip_send(int s, const void *dataptr, size_t size, int flags); +ssize_t lwip_sendmsg(int s, const struct msghdr *message, int flags); +ssize_t lwip_sendto(int s, const void *dataptr, size_t size, int flags, + const struct sockaddr *to, socklen_t tolen); +int lwip_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol); +ssize_t lwip_write(int s, const void *dataptr, size_t size); +ssize_t lwip_writev(int s, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt); +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT +int lwip_select(int maxfdp1, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, fd_set *exceptset, + struct timeval *timeout); +#endif +#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL +int lwip_poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout); +#endif +int lwip_ioctl(int s, long cmd, void *argp); +int lwip_fcntl(int s, int cmd, int val); +const char *lwip_inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size); +int lwip_inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst); + +#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS +#if LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS != 2 +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define accept(s, addr, addrlen) lwip_accept(s, addr, addrlen) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define bind(s, name, namelen) lwip_bind(s, name, namelen) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define shutdown(s, how) lwip_shutdown(s, how) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define getpeername(s, name, namelen) lwip_getpeername(s, name, namelen) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define getsockname(s, name, namelen) lwip_getsockname(s, name, namelen) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define setsockopt(s, level, optname, opval, optlen) lwip_setsockopt(s, level, optname, opval, optlen) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define getsockopt(s, level, optname, opval, optlen) lwip_getsockopt(s, level, optname, opval, optlen) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define closesocket(s) lwip_close(s) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define connect(s, name, namelen) lwip_connect(s, name, namelen) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define listen(s, backlog) lwip_listen(s, backlog) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define recv(s, mem, len, flags) lwip_recv(s, mem, len, flags) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define recvmsg(s, message, flags) lwip_recvmsg(s, message, flags) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define recvfrom(s, mem, len, flags, from, fromlen) lwip_recvfrom(s, mem, len, flags, from, fromlen) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define send(s, dataptr, size, flags) lwip_send(s, dataptr, size, flags) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define sendmsg(s, message, flags) lwip_sendmsg(s, message, flags) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define sendto(s, dataptr, size, flags, to, tolen) lwip_sendto(s, dataptr, size, flags, to, tolen) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define socket(domain, type, protocol) lwip_socket(domain, type, protocol) +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define select(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, timeout) lwip_select(maxfdp1, readset, writeset, exceptset, timeout) +#endif +#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define poll(fds, nfds, timeout) lwip_poll(fds, nfds, timeout) +#endif +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define ioctlsocket(s, cmd, argp) lwip_ioctl(s, cmd, argp) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size) lwip_inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define inet_pton(af, src, dst) lwip_inet_pton(af, src, dst) + +#if LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define read(s, mem, len) lwip_read(s, mem, len) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define readv(s, iov, iovcnt) lwip_readv(s, iov, iovcnt) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define write(s, dataptr, len) lwip_write(s, dataptr, len) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define writev(s, iov, iovcnt) lwip_writev(s, iov, iovcnt) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define close(s) lwip_close(s) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define fcntl(s, cmd, val) lwip_fcntl(s, cmd, val) +/** @ingroup socket */ +#define ioctl(s, cmd, argp) lwip_ioctl(s, cmd, argp) +#endif /* LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES */ +#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS != 2 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_SOCKETS */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SOCKETS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/stats.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/stats.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/stats.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/stats.h index d9e1a5a9..1d8963c7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/stats.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/stats.h @@ -1,493 +1,493 @@ -/** - * @file - * Statistics API (to be used from TCPIP thread) - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_STATS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_STATS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_STATS - -#ifndef LWIP_STATS_LARGE -#define LWIP_STATS_LARGE 0 -#endif - -#if LWIP_STATS_LARGE -#define STAT_COUNTER u32_t -#define STAT_COUNTER_F U32_F -#else -#define STAT_COUNTER u16_t -#define STAT_COUNTER_F U16_F -#endif - -/** Protocol related stats */ -struct stats_proto { - STAT_COUNTER xmit; /* Transmitted packets. */ - STAT_COUNTER recv; /* Received packets. */ - STAT_COUNTER fw; /* Forwarded packets. */ - STAT_COUNTER drop; /* Dropped packets. */ - STAT_COUNTER chkerr; /* Checksum error. */ - STAT_COUNTER lenerr; /* Invalid length error. */ - STAT_COUNTER memerr; /* Out of memory error. */ - STAT_COUNTER rterr; /* Routing error. */ - STAT_COUNTER proterr; /* Protocol error. */ - STAT_COUNTER opterr; /* Error in options. */ - STAT_COUNTER err; /* Misc error. */ - STAT_COUNTER cachehit; -}; - -/** IGMP stats */ -struct stats_igmp { - STAT_COUNTER xmit; /* Transmitted packets. */ - STAT_COUNTER recv; /* Received packets. */ - STAT_COUNTER drop; /* Dropped packets. */ - STAT_COUNTER chkerr; /* Checksum error. */ - STAT_COUNTER lenerr; /* Invalid length error. */ - STAT_COUNTER memerr; /* Out of memory error. */ - STAT_COUNTER proterr; /* Protocol error. */ - STAT_COUNTER rx_v1; /* Received v1 frames. */ - STAT_COUNTER rx_group; /* Received group-specific queries. */ - STAT_COUNTER rx_general; /* Received general queries. */ - STAT_COUNTER rx_report; /* Received reports. */ - STAT_COUNTER tx_join; /* Sent joins. */ - STAT_COUNTER tx_leave; /* Sent leaves. */ - STAT_COUNTER tx_report; /* Sent reports. */ -}; - -/** Memory stats */ -struct stats_mem { -#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY - const char *name; -#endif /* defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ - STAT_COUNTER err; - mem_size_t avail; - mem_size_t used; - mem_size_t max; - STAT_COUNTER illegal; -}; - -/** System element stats */ -struct stats_syselem { - STAT_COUNTER used; - STAT_COUNTER max; - STAT_COUNTER err; -}; - -/** System stats */ -struct stats_sys { - struct stats_syselem sem; - struct stats_syselem mutex; - struct stats_syselem mbox; -}; - -/** SNMP MIB2 stats */ -struct stats_mib2 { - /* IP */ - u32_t ipinhdrerrors; - u32_t ipinaddrerrors; - u32_t ipinunknownprotos; - u32_t ipindiscards; - u32_t ipindelivers; - u32_t ipoutrequests; - u32_t ipoutdiscards; - u32_t ipoutnoroutes; - u32_t ipreasmoks; - u32_t ipreasmfails; - u32_t ipfragoks; - u32_t ipfragfails; - u32_t ipfragcreates; - u32_t ipreasmreqds; - u32_t ipforwdatagrams; - u32_t ipinreceives; - - /* TCP */ - u32_t tcpactiveopens; - u32_t tcppassiveopens; - u32_t tcpattemptfails; - u32_t tcpestabresets; - u32_t tcpoutsegs; - u32_t tcpretranssegs; - u32_t tcpinsegs; - u32_t tcpinerrs; - u32_t tcpoutrsts; - - /* UDP */ - u32_t udpindatagrams; - u32_t udpnoports; - u32_t udpinerrors; - u32_t udpoutdatagrams; - - /* ICMP */ - u32_t icmpinmsgs; - u32_t icmpinerrors; - u32_t icmpindestunreachs; - u32_t icmpintimeexcds; - u32_t icmpinparmprobs; - u32_t icmpinsrcquenchs; - u32_t icmpinredirects; - u32_t icmpinechos; - u32_t icmpinechoreps; - u32_t icmpintimestamps; - u32_t icmpintimestampreps; - u32_t icmpinaddrmasks; - u32_t icmpinaddrmaskreps; - u32_t icmpoutmsgs; - u32_t icmpouterrors; - u32_t icmpoutdestunreachs; - u32_t icmpouttimeexcds; - u32_t icmpoutechos; /* can be incremented by user application ('ping') */ - u32_t icmpoutechoreps; -}; - -/** - * @ingroup netif_mib2 - * SNMP MIB2 interface stats - */ -struct stats_mib2_netif_ctrs { - /** The total number of octets received on the interface, including framing characters */ - u32_t ifinoctets; - /** The number of packets, delivered by this sub-layer to a higher (sub-)layer, which were - * not addressed to a multicast or broadcast address at this sub-layer */ - u32_t ifinucastpkts; - /** The number of packets, delivered by this sub-layer to a higher (sub-)layer, which were - * addressed to a multicast or broadcast address at this sub-layer */ - u32_t ifinnucastpkts; - /** The number of inbound packets which were chosen to be discarded even though no errors had - * been detected to prevent their being deliverable to a higher-layer protocol. One possible - * reason for discarding such a packet could be to free up buffer space */ - u32_t ifindiscards; - /** For packet-oriented interfaces, the number of inbound packets that contained errors - * preventing them from being deliverable to a higher-layer protocol. For character- - * oriented or fixed-length interfaces, the number of inbound transmission units that - * contained errors preventing them from being deliverable to a higher-layer protocol. */ - u32_t ifinerrors; - /** For packet-oriented interfaces, the number of packets received via the interface which - * were discarded because of an unknown or unsupported protocol. For character-oriented - * or fixed-length interfaces that support protocol multiplexing the number of transmission - * units received via the interface which were discarded because of an unknown or unsupported - * protocol. For any interface that does not support protocol multiplexing, this counter will - * always be 0 */ - u32_t ifinunknownprotos; - /** The total number of octets transmitted out of the interface, including framing characters. */ - u32_t ifoutoctets; - /** The total number of packets that higher-level protocols requested be transmitted, and - * which were not addressed to a multicast or broadcast address at this sub-layer, including - * those that were discarded or not sent. */ - u32_t ifoutucastpkts; - /** The total number of packets that higher-level protocols requested be transmitted, and which - * were addressed to a multicast or broadcast address at this sub-layer, including - * those that were discarded or not sent. */ - u32_t ifoutnucastpkts; - /** The number of outbound packets which were chosen to be discarded even though no errors had - * been detected to prevent their being transmitted. One possible reason for discarding - * such a packet could be to free up buffer space. */ - u32_t ifoutdiscards; - /** For packet-oriented interfaces, the number of outbound packets that could not be transmitted - * because of errors. For character-oriented or fixed-length interfaces, the number of outbound - * transmission units that could not be transmitted because of errors. */ - u32_t ifouterrors; -}; - -/** lwIP stats container */ -struct stats_ { -#if LINK_STATS - /** Link level */ - struct stats_proto link; -#endif -#if ETHARP_STATS - /** ARP */ - struct stats_proto etharp; -#endif -#if IPFRAG_STATS - /** Fragmentation */ - struct stats_proto ip_frag; -#endif -#if IP_STATS - /** IP */ - struct stats_proto ip; -#endif -#if ICMP_STATS - /** ICMP */ - struct stats_proto icmp; -#endif -#if IGMP_STATS - /** IGMP */ - struct stats_igmp igmp; -#endif -#if UDP_STATS - /** UDP */ - struct stats_proto udp; -#endif -#if TCP_STATS - /** TCP */ - struct stats_proto tcp; -#endif -#if MEM_STATS - /** Heap */ - struct stats_mem mem; -#endif -#if MEMP_STATS - /** Internal memory pools */ - struct stats_mem *memp[MEMP_MAX]; -#endif -#if SYS_STATS - /** System */ - struct stats_sys sys; -#endif -#if IP6_STATS - /** IPv6 */ - struct stats_proto ip6; -#endif -#if ICMP6_STATS - /** ICMP6 */ - struct stats_proto icmp6; -#endif -#if IP6_FRAG_STATS - /** IPv6 fragmentation */ - struct stats_proto ip6_frag; -#endif -#if MLD6_STATS - /** Multicast listener discovery */ - struct stats_igmp mld6; -#endif -#if ND6_STATS - /** Neighbor discovery */ - struct stats_proto nd6; -#endif -#if MIB2_STATS - /** SNMP MIB2 */ - struct stats_mib2 mib2; -#endif -}; - -/** Global variable containing lwIP internal statistics. Add this to your debugger's watchlist. */ -extern struct stats_ lwip_stats; - -/** Init statistics */ -void stats_init(void); - -#define STATS_INC(x) ++lwip_stats.x -#define STATS_DEC(x) --lwip_stats.x -#define STATS_INC_USED(x, y, type) \ - do { \ - lwip_stats.x.used = (type)(lwip_stats.x.used + y); \ - if (lwip_stats.x.max < lwip_stats.x.used) { \ - lwip_stats.x.max = lwip_stats.x.used; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define STATS_GET(x) lwip_stats.x -#else /* LWIP_STATS */ -#define stats_init() -#define STATS_INC(x) -#define STATS_DEC(x) -#define STATS_INC_USED(x, y, type) -#endif /* LWIP_STATS */ - -#if TCP_STATS -#define TCP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define TCP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.tcp, "TCP") -#else -#define TCP_STATS_INC(x) -#define TCP_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if UDP_STATS -#define UDP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define UDP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.udp, "UDP") -#else -#define UDP_STATS_INC(x) -#define UDP_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if ICMP_STATS -#define ICMP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define ICMP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.icmp, "ICMP") -#else -#define ICMP_STATS_INC(x) -#define ICMP_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if IGMP_STATS -#define IGMP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define IGMP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_igmp(&lwip_stats.igmp, "IGMP") -#else -#define IGMP_STATS_INC(x) -#define IGMP_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if IP_STATS -#define IP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define IP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.ip, "IP") -#else -#define IP_STATS_INC(x) -#define IP_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if IPFRAG_STATS -#define IPFRAG_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define IPFRAG_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.ip_frag, "IP_FRAG") -#else -#define IPFRAG_STATS_INC(x) -#define IPFRAG_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if ETHARP_STATS -#define ETHARP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define ETHARP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.etharp, "ETHARP") -#else -#define ETHARP_STATS_INC(x) -#define ETHARP_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if LINK_STATS -#define LINK_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define LINK_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.link, "LINK") -#else -#define LINK_STATS_INC(x) -#define LINK_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if MEM_STATS -#define MEM_STATS_AVAIL(x, y) lwip_stats.mem.x = y -#define MEM_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(mem.x) -#define MEM_STATS_INC_USED(x, y) STATS_INC_USED(mem, y, mem_size_t) -#define MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(x, y) lwip_stats.mem.x = (mem_size_t)((lwip_stats.mem.x) - (y)) -#define MEM_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_mem(&lwip_stats.mem, "HEAP") -#else -#define MEM_STATS_AVAIL(x, y) -#define MEM_STATS_INC(x) -#define MEM_STATS_INC_USED(x, y) -#define MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(x, y) -#define MEM_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if MEMP_STATS -#define MEMP_STATS_DEC(x, i) STATS_DEC(memp[i]->x) -#define MEMP_STATS_DISPLAY(i) stats_display_memp(lwip_stats.memp[i], i) -#define MEMP_STATS_GET(x, i) STATS_GET(memp[i]->x) -#else -#define MEMP_STATS_DEC(x, i) -#define MEMP_STATS_DISPLAY(i) -#define MEMP_STATS_GET(x, i) 0 -#endif - -#if SYS_STATS -#define SYS_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(sys.x) -#define SYS_STATS_DEC(x) STATS_DEC(sys.x) -#define SYS_STATS_INC_USED(x) STATS_INC_USED(sys.x, 1, STAT_COUNTER) -#define SYS_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_sys(&lwip_stats.sys) -#else -#define SYS_STATS_INC(x) -#define SYS_STATS_DEC(x) -#define SYS_STATS_INC_USED(x) -#define SYS_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if IP6_STATS -#define IP6_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define IP6_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.ip6, "IPv6") -#else -#define IP6_STATS_INC(x) -#define IP6_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if ICMP6_STATS -#define ICMP6_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define ICMP6_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.icmp6, "ICMPv6") -#else -#define ICMP6_STATS_INC(x) -#define ICMP6_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if IP6_FRAG_STATS -#define IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define IP6_FRAG_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.ip6_frag, "IPv6 FRAG") -#else -#define IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(x) -#define IP6_FRAG_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if MLD6_STATS -#define MLD6_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define MLD6_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_igmp(&lwip_stats.mld6, "MLDv1") -#else -#define MLD6_STATS_INC(x) -#define MLD6_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if ND6_STATS -#define ND6_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#define ND6_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.nd6, "ND") -#else -#define ND6_STATS_INC(x) -#define ND6_STATS_DISPLAY() -#endif - -#if MIB2_STATS -#define MIB2_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) -#else -#define MIB2_STATS_INC(x) -#endif - -/* Display of statistics */ -#if LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY -void stats_display(void); -void stats_display_proto(struct stats_proto *proto, const char *name); -void stats_display_igmp(struct stats_igmp *igmp, const char *name); -void stats_display_mem(struct stats_mem *mem, const char *name); -void stats_display_memp(struct stats_mem *mem, int index); -void stats_display_sys(struct stats_sys *sys); -#else /* LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ -#define stats_display() -#define stats_display_proto(proto, name) -#define stats_display_igmp(igmp, name) -#define stats_display_mem(mem, name) -#define stats_display_memp(mem, index) -#define stats_display_sys(sys) -#endif /* LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_STATS_H */ +/** + * @file + * Statistics API (to be used from TCPIP thread) + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_STATS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_STATS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_STATS + +#ifndef LWIP_STATS_LARGE +#define LWIP_STATS_LARGE 0 +#endif + +#if LWIP_STATS_LARGE +#define STAT_COUNTER u32_t +#define STAT_COUNTER_F U32_F +#else +#define STAT_COUNTER u16_t +#define STAT_COUNTER_F U16_F +#endif + +/** Protocol related stats */ +struct stats_proto { + STAT_COUNTER xmit; /* Transmitted packets. */ + STAT_COUNTER recv; /* Received packets. */ + STAT_COUNTER fw; /* Forwarded packets. */ + STAT_COUNTER drop; /* Dropped packets. */ + STAT_COUNTER chkerr; /* Checksum error. */ + STAT_COUNTER lenerr; /* Invalid length error. */ + STAT_COUNTER memerr; /* Out of memory error. */ + STAT_COUNTER rterr; /* Routing error. */ + STAT_COUNTER proterr; /* Protocol error. */ + STAT_COUNTER opterr; /* Error in options. */ + STAT_COUNTER err; /* Misc error. */ + STAT_COUNTER cachehit; +}; + +/** IGMP stats */ +struct stats_igmp { + STAT_COUNTER xmit; /* Transmitted packets. */ + STAT_COUNTER recv; /* Received packets. */ + STAT_COUNTER drop; /* Dropped packets. */ + STAT_COUNTER chkerr; /* Checksum error. */ + STAT_COUNTER lenerr; /* Invalid length error. */ + STAT_COUNTER memerr; /* Out of memory error. */ + STAT_COUNTER proterr; /* Protocol error. */ + STAT_COUNTER rx_v1; /* Received v1 frames. */ + STAT_COUNTER rx_group; /* Received group-specific queries. */ + STAT_COUNTER rx_general; /* Received general queries. */ + STAT_COUNTER rx_report; /* Received reports. */ + STAT_COUNTER tx_join; /* Sent joins. */ + STAT_COUNTER tx_leave; /* Sent leaves. */ + STAT_COUNTER tx_report; /* Sent reports. */ +}; + +/** Memory stats */ +struct stats_mem { +#if defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY + const char *name; +#endif /* defined(LWIP_DEBUG) || LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ + STAT_COUNTER err; + mem_size_t avail; + mem_size_t used; + mem_size_t max; + STAT_COUNTER illegal; +}; + +/** System element stats */ +struct stats_syselem { + STAT_COUNTER used; + STAT_COUNTER max; + STAT_COUNTER err; +}; + +/** System stats */ +struct stats_sys { + struct stats_syselem sem; + struct stats_syselem mutex; + struct stats_syselem mbox; +}; + +/** SNMP MIB2 stats */ +struct stats_mib2 { + /* IP */ + u32_t ipinhdrerrors; + u32_t ipinaddrerrors; + u32_t ipinunknownprotos; + u32_t ipindiscards; + u32_t ipindelivers; + u32_t ipoutrequests; + u32_t ipoutdiscards; + u32_t ipoutnoroutes; + u32_t ipreasmoks; + u32_t ipreasmfails; + u32_t ipfragoks; + u32_t ipfragfails; + u32_t ipfragcreates; + u32_t ipreasmreqds; + u32_t ipforwdatagrams; + u32_t ipinreceives; + + /* TCP */ + u32_t tcpactiveopens; + u32_t tcppassiveopens; + u32_t tcpattemptfails; + u32_t tcpestabresets; + u32_t tcpoutsegs; + u32_t tcpretranssegs; + u32_t tcpinsegs; + u32_t tcpinerrs; + u32_t tcpoutrsts; + + /* UDP */ + u32_t udpindatagrams; + u32_t udpnoports; + u32_t udpinerrors; + u32_t udpoutdatagrams; + + /* ICMP */ + u32_t icmpinmsgs; + u32_t icmpinerrors; + u32_t icmpindestunreachs; + u32_t icmpintimeexcds; + u32_t icmpinparmprobs; + u32_t icmpinsrcquenchs; + u32_t icmpinredirects; + u32_t icmpinechos; + u32_t icmpinechoreps; + u32_t icmpintimestamps; + u32_t icmpintimestampreps; + u32_t icmpinaddrmasks; + u32_t icmpinaddrmaskreps; + u32_t icmpoutmsgs; + u32_t icmpouterrors; + u32_t icmpoutdestunreachs; + u32_t icmpouttimeexcds; + u32_t icmpoutechos; /* can be incremented by user application ('ping') */ + u32_t icmpoutechoreps; +}; + +/** + * @ingroup netif_mib2 + * SNMP MIB2 interface stats + */ +struct stats_mib2_netif_ctrs { + /** The total number of octets received on the interface, including framing characters */ + u32_t ifinoctets; + /** The number of packets, delivered by this sub-layer to a higher (sub-)layer, which were + * not addressed to a multicast or broadcast address at this sub-layer */ + u32_t ifinucastpkts; + /** The number of packets, delivered by this sub-layer to a higher (sub-)layer, which were + * addressed to a multicast or broadcast address at this sub-layer */ + u32_t ifinnucastpkts; + /** The number of inbound packets which were chosen to be discarded even though no errors had + * been detected to prevent their being deliverable to a higher-layer protocol. One possible + * reason for discarding such a packet could be to free up buffer space */ + u32_t ifindiscards; + /** For packet-oriented interfaces, the number of inbound packets that contained errors + * preventing them from being deliverable to a higher-layer protocol. For character- + * oriented or fixed-length interfaces, the number of inbound transmission units that + * contained errors preventing them from being deliverable to a higher-layer protocol. */ + u32_t ifinerrors; + /** For packet-oriented interfaces, the number of packets received via the interface which + * were discarded because of an unknown or unsupported protocol. For character-oriented + * or fixed-length interfaces that support protocol multiplexing the number of transmission + * units received via the interface which were discarded because of an unknown or unsupported + * protocol. For any interface that does not support protocol multiplexing, this counter will + * always be 0 */ + u32_t ifinunknownprotos; + /** The total number of octets transmitted out of the interface, including framing characters. */ + u32_t ifoutoctets; + /** The total number of packets that higher-level protocols requested be transmitted, and + * which were not addressed to a multicast or broadcast address at this sub-layer, including + * those that were discarded or not sent. */ + u32_t ifoutucastpkts; + /** The total number of packets that higher-level protocols requested be transmitted, and which + * were addressed to a multicast or broadcast address at this sub-layer, including + * those that were discarded or not sent. */ + u32_t ifoutnucastpkts; + /** The number of outbound packets which were chosen to be discarded even though no errors had + * been detected to prevent their being transmitted. One possible reason for discarding + * such a packet could be to free up buffer space. */ + u32_t ifoutdiscards; + /** For packet-oriented interfaces, the number of outbound packets that could not be transmitted + * because of errors. For character-oriented or fixed-length interfaces, the number of outbound + * transmission units that could not be transmitted because of errors. */ + u32_t ifouterrors; +}; + +/** lwIP stats container */ +struct stats_ { +#if LINK_STATS + /** Link level */ + struct stats_proto link; +#endif +#if ETHARP_STATS + /** ARP */ + struct stats_proto etharp; +#endif +#if IPFRAG_STATS + /** Fragmentation */ + struct stats_proto ip_frag; +#endif +#if IP_STATS + /** IP */ + struct stats_proto ip; +#endif +#if ICMP_STATS + /** ICMP */ + struct stats_proto icmp; +#endif +#if IGMP_STATS + /** IGMP */ + struct stats_igmp igmp; +#endif +#if UDP_STATS + /** UDP */ + struct stats_proto udp; +#endif +#if TCP_STATS + /** TCP */ + struct stats_proto tcp; +#endif +#if MEM_STATS + /** Heap */ + struct stats_mem mem; +#endif +#if MEMP_STATS + /** Internal memory pools */ + struct stats_mem *memp[MEMP_MAX]; +#endif +#if SYS_STATS + /** System */ + struct stats_sys sys; +#endif +#if IP6_STATS + /** IPv6 */ + struct stats_proto ip6; +#endif +#if ICMP6_STATS + /** ICMP6 */ + struct stats_proto icmp6; +#endif +#if IP6_FRAG_STATS + /** IPv6 fragmentation */ + struct stats_proto ip6_frag; +#endif +#if MLD6_STATS + /** Multicast listener discovery */ + struct stats_igmp mld6; +#endif +#if ND6_STATS + /** Neighbor discovery */ + struct stats_proto nd6; +#endif +#if MIB2_STATS + /** SNMP MIB2 */ + struct stats_mib2 mib2; +#endif +}; + +/** Global variable containing lwIP internal statistics. Add this to your debugger's watchlist. */ +extern struct stats_ lwip_stats; + +/** Init statistics */ +void stats_init(void); + +#define STATS_INC(x) ++lwip_stats.x +#define STATS_DEC(x) --lwip_stats.x +#define STATS_INC_USED(x, y, type) \ + do { \ + lwip_stats.x.used = (type)(lwip_stats.x.used + y); \ + if (lwip_stats.x.max < lwip_stats.x.used) { \ + lwip_stats.x.max = lwip_stats.x.used; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define STATS_GET(x) lwip_stats.x +#else /* LWIP_STATS */ +#define stats_init() +#define STATS_INC(x) +#define STATS_DEC(x) +#define STATS_INC_USED(x, y, type) +#endif /* LWIP_STATS */ + +#if TCP_STATS +#define TCP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define TCP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.tcp, "TCP") +#else +#define TCP_STATS_INC(x) +#define TCP_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if UDP_STATS +#define UDP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define UDP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.udp, "UDP") +#else +#define UDP_STATS_INC(x) +#define UDP_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if ICMP_STATS +#define ICMP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define ICMP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.icmp, "ICMP") +#else +#define ICMP_STATS_INC(x) +#define ICMP_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if IGMP_STATS +#define IGMP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define IGMP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_igmp(&lwip_stats.igmp, "IGMP") +#else +#define IGMP_STATS_INC(x) +#define IGMP_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if IP_STATS +#define IP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define IP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.ip, "IP") +#else +#define IP_STATS_INC(x) +#define IP_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if IPFRAG_STATS +#define IPFRAG_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define IPFRAG_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.ip_frag, "IP_FRAG") +#else +#define IPFRAG_STATS_INC(x) +#define IPFRAG_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if ETHARP_STATS +#define ETHARP_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define ETHARP_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.etharp, "ETHARP") +#else +#define ETHARP_STATS_INC(x) +#define ETHARP_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if LINK_STATS +#define LINK_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define LINK_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.link, "LINK") +#else +#define LINK_STATS_INC(x) +#define LINK_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if MEM_STATS +#define MEM_STATS_AVAIL(x, y) lwip_stats.mem.x = y +#define MEM_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(mem.x) +#define MEM_STATS_INC_USED(x, y) STATS_INC_USED(mem, y, mem_size_t) +#define MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(x, y) lwip_stats.mem.x = (mem_size_t)((lwip_stats.mem.x) - (y)) +#define MEM_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_mem(&lwip_stats.mem, "HEAP") +#else +#define MEM_STATS_AVAIL(x, y) +#define MEM_STATS_INC(x) +#define MEM_STATS_INC_USED(x, y) +#define MEM_STATS_DEC_USED(x, y) +#define MEM_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if MEMP_STATS +#define MEMP_STATS_DEC(x, i) STATS_DEC(memp[i]->x) +#define MEMP_STATS_DISPLAY(i) stats_display_memp(lwip_stats.memp[i], i) +#define MEMP_STATS_GET(x, i) STATS_GET(memp[i]->x) +#else +#define MEMP_STATS_DEC(x, i) +#define MEMP_STATS_DISPLAY(i) +#define MEMP_STATS_GET(x, i) 0 +#endif + +#if SYS_STATS +#define SYS_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(sys.x) +#define SYS_STATS_DEC(x) STATS_DEC(sys.x) +#define SYS_STATS_INC_USED(x) STATS_INC_USED(sys.x, 1, STAT_COUNTER) +#define SYS_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_sys(&lwip_stats.sys) +#else +#define SYS_STATS_INC(x) +#define SYS_STATS_DEC(x) +#define SYS_STATS_INC_USED(x) +#define SYS_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if IP6_STATS +#define IP6_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define IP6_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.ip6, "IPv6") +#else +#define IP6_STATS_INC(x) +#define IP6_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if ICMP6_STATS +#define ICMP6_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define ICMP6_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.icmp6, "ICMPv6") +#else +#define ICMP6_STATS_INC(x) +#define ICMP6_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if IP6_FRAG_STATS +#define IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define IP6_FRAG_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.ip6_frag, "IPv6 FRAG") +#else +#define IP6_FRAG_STATS_INC(x) +#define IP6_FRAG_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if MLD6_STATS +#define MLD6_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define MLD6_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_igmp(&lwip_stats.mld6, "MLDv1") +#else +#define MLD6_STATS_INC(x) +#define MLD6_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if ND6_STATS +#define ND6_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#define ND6_STATS_DISPLAY() stats_display_proto(&lwip_stats.nd6, "ND") +#else +#define ND6_STATS_INC(x) +#define ND6_STATS_DISPLAY() +#endif + +#if MIB2_STATS +#define MIB2_STATS_INC(x) STATS_INC(x) +#else +#define MIB2_STATS_INC(x) +#endif + +/* Display of statistics */ +#if LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY +void stats_display(void); +void stats_display_proto(struct stats_proto *proto, const char *name); +void stats_display_igmp(struct stats_igmp *igmp, const char *name); +void stats_display_mem(struct stats_mem *mem, const char *name); +void stats_display_memp(struct stats_mem *mem, int index); +void stats_display_sys(struct stats_sys *sys); +#else /* LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ +#define stats_display() +#define stats_display_proto(proto, name) +#define stats_display_igmp(igmp, name) +#define stats_display_mem(mem, name) +#define stats_display_memp(mem, index) +#define stats_display_sys(sys) +#endif /* LWIP_STATS_DISPLAY */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_STATS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/sys.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/sys.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/sys.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/sys.h index d26445b7..0803eaf5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/sys.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/sys.h @@ -1,563 +1,563 @@ -/** - * @file - * OS abstraction layer - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SYS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_SYS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if NO_SYS - -/* For a totally minimal and standalone system, we provide null - definitions of the sys_ functions. */ -typedef u8_t sys_sem_t; -typedef u8_t sys_mutex_t; -typedef u8_t sys_mbox_t; - -#define sys_sem_new(s, c) ERR_OK -#define sys_sem_signal(s) -#define sys_sem_wait(s) -#define sys_arch_sem_wait(s, t) -#define sys_sem_free(s) -#define sys_sem_valid(s) 0 -#define sys_sem_valid_val(s) 0 -#define sys_sem_set_invalid(s) -#define sys_sem_set_invalid_val(s) -#define sys_mutex_new(mu) ERR_OK -#define sys_mutex_lock(mu) -#define sys_mutex_unlock(mu) -#define sys_mutex_free(mu) -#define sys_mutex_valid(mu) 0 -#define sys_mutex_set_invalid(mu) -#define sys_mbox_new(m, s) ERR_OK -#define sys_mbox_fetch(m, d) -#define sys_mbox_tryfetch(m, d) -#define sys_mbox_post(m, d) -#define sys_mbox_trypost(m, d) -#define sys_mbox_free(m) -#define sys_mbox_valid(m) -#define sys_mbox_valid_val(m) -#define sys_mbox_set_invalid(m) -#define sys_mbox_set_invalid_val(m) - -#define sys_thread_new(n, t, a, s, p) - -#define sys_msleep(t) - -#else /* NO_SYS */ - -/** Return code for timeouts from sys_arch_mbox_fetch and sys_arch_sem_wait */ -#define SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT 0xffffffffUL - -/** sys_mbox_tryfetch() returns SYS_MBOX_EMPTY if appropriate. - * For now we use the same magic value, but we allow this to change in future. - */ -#define SYS_MBOX_EMPTY SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "arch/sys_arch.h" - -/** Function prototype for thread functions */ -typedef void (*lwip_thread_fn)(void *arg); - -/* Function prototypes for functions to be implemented by platform ports - (in sys_arch.c) */ - -/* Mutex functions: */ - -/** Define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX if the port has no mutexes and binary semaphores - should be used instead */ -#ifndef LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX -#define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX 0 -#endif - -#if LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX -/* for old ports that don't have mutexes: define them to binary semaphores */ -#define sys_mutex_t sys_sem_t -#define sys_mutex_new(mutex) sys_sem_new(mutex, 1) -#define sys_mutex_lock(mutex) sys_sem_wait(mutex) -#define sys_mutex_unlock(mutex) sys_sem_signal(mutex) -#define sys_mutex_free(mutex) sys_sem_free(mutex) -#define sys_mutex_valid(mutex) sys_sem_valid(mutex) -#define sys_mutex_set_invalid(mutex) sys_sem_set_invalid(mutex) - -#else /* LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX */ - -/** - * @ingroup sys_mutex - * Create a new mutex. - * Note that mutexes are expected to not be taken recursively by the lwIP code, - * so both implementation types (recursive or non-recursive) should work. - * The mutex is allocated to the memory that 'mutex' - * points to (which can be both a pointer or the actual OS structure). - * If the mutex has been created, ERR_OK should be returned. Returning any - * other error will provide a hint what went wrong, but except for assertions, - * no real error handling is implemented. - * - * @param mutex pointer to the mutex to create - * @return ERR_OK if successful, another err_t otherwise - */ -err_t sys_mutex_new(sys_mutex_t *mutex); -/** - * @ingroup sys_mutex - * Blocks the thread until the mutex can be grabbed. - * @param mutex the mutex to lock - */ -void sys_mutex_lock(sys_mutex_t *mutex); -/** - * @ingroup sys_mutex - * Releases the mutex previously locked through 'sys_mutex_lock()'. - * @param mutex the mutex to unlock - */ -void sys_mutex_unlock(sys_mutex_t *mutex); -/** - * @ingroup sys_mutex - * Deallocates a mutex. - * @param mutex the mutex to delete - */ -void sys_mutex_free(sys_mutex_t *mutex); -#ifndef sys_mutex_valid -/** - * @ingroup sys_mutex - * Returns 1 if the mutes is valid, 0 if it is not valid. - * When using pointers, a simple way is to check the pointer for != NULL. - * When directly using OS structures, implementing this may be more complex. - * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. - */ -int sys_mutex_valid(sys_mutex_t *mutex); -#endif -#ifndef sys_mutex_set_invalid -/** - * @ingroup sys_mutex - * Invalidate a mutex so that sys_mutex_valid() returns 0. - * ATTENTION: This does NOT mean that the mutex shall be deallocated: - * sys_mutex_free() is always called before calling this function! - * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. - */ -void sys_mutex_set_invalid(sys_mutex_t *mutex); -#endif -#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX */ - -/* Semaphore functions: */ - -/** - * @ingroup sys_sem - * Create a new semaphore - * Creates a new semaphore. The semaphore is allocated to the memory that 'sem' - * points to (which can be both a pointer or the actual OS structure). - * The "count" argument specifies the initial state of the semaphore (which is - * either 0 or 1). - * If the semaphore has been created, ERR_OK should be returned. Returning any - * other error will provide a hint what went wrong, but except for assertions, - * no real error handling is implemented. - * - * @param sem pointer to the semaphore to create - * @param count initial count of the semaphore - * @return ERR_OK if successful, another err_t otherwise - */ -err_t sys_sem_new(sys_sem_t *sem, u8_t count); -/** - * @ingroup sys_sem - * Signals a semaphore - * @param sem the semaphore to signal - */ -void sys_sem_signal(sys_sem_t *sem); -/** - * @ingroup sys_sem - * Blocks the thread while waiting for the semaphore to be signaled. If the - * "timeout" argument is non-zero, the thread should only be blocked for the - * specified time (measured in milliseconds). If the "timeout" argument is zero, - * the thread should be blocked until the semaphore is signalled. - * - * The return value is SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT if the semaphore wasn't signaled within - * the specified time or any other value if it was signaled (with or without - * waiting). - * Notice that lwIP implements a function with a similar name, - * sys_sem_wait(), that uses the sys_arch_sem_wait() function. - * - * @param sem the semaphore to wait for - * @param timeout timeout in milliseconds to wait (0 = wait forever) - * @return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT on timeout, any other value on success - */ -u32_t sys_arch_sem_wait(sys_sem_t *sem, u32_t timeout); -/** - * @ingroup sys_sem - * Deallocates a semaphore. - * @param sem semaphore to delete - */ -void sys_sem_free(sys_sem_t *sem); -/** Wait for a semaphore - forever/no timeout */ -#define sys_sem_wait(sem) sys_arch_sem_wait(sem, 0) -#ifndef sys_sem_valid -/** - * @ingroup sys_sem - * Returns 1 if the semaphore is valid, 0 if it is not valid. - * When using pointers, a simple way is to check the pointer for != NULL. - * When directly using OS structures, implementing this may be more complex. - * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. - */ -int sys_sem_valid(sys_sem_t *sem); -#endif -#ifndef sys_sem_set_invalid -/** - * @ingroup sys_sem - * Invalidate a semaphore so that sys_sem_valid() returns 0. - * ATTENTION: This does NOT mean that the semaphore shall be deallocated: - * sys_sem_free() is always called before calling this function! - * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. - */ -void sys_sem_set_invalid(sys_sem_t *sem); -#endif -#ifndef sys_sem_valid_val -/** - * Same as sys_sem_valid() but taking a value, not a pointer - */ -#define sys_sem_valid_val(sem) sys_sem_valid(&(sem)) -#endif -#ifndef sys_sem_set_invalid_val -/** - * Same as sys_sem_set_invalid() but taking a value, not a pointer - */ -#define sys_sem_set_invalid_val(sem) sys_sem_set_invalid(&(sem)) -#endif - -#ifndef sys_msleep -/** - * @ingroup sys_misc - * Sleep for specified number of ms - */ -void sys_msleep(u32_t ms); /* only has a (close to) 1 ms resolution. */ -#endif - -/* Mailbox functions. */ - -/** - * @ingroup sys_mbox - * Creates an empty mailbox for maximum "size" elements. Elements stored - * in mailboxes are pointers. You have to define macros "_MBOX_SIZE" - * in your lwipopts.h, or ignore this parameter in your implementation - * and use a default size. - * If the mailbox has been created, ERR_OK should be returned. Returning any - * other error will provide a hint what went wrong, but except for assertions, - * no real error handling is implemented. - * - * @param mbox pointer to the mbox to create - * @param size (minimum) number of messages in this mbox - * @return ERR_OK if successful, another err_t otherwise - */ -err_t sys_mbox_new(sys_mbox_t *mbox, int size); -/** - * @ingroup sys_mbox - * Post a message to an mbox - may not fail - * -> blocks if full, only to be used from tasks NOT from ISR! - * - * @param mbox mbox to posts the message - * @param msg message to post (ATTENTION: can be NULL) - */ -void sys_mbox_post(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg); -/** - * @ingroup sys_mbox - * Try to post a message to an mbox - may fail if full. - * Can be used from ISR (if the sys arch layer allows this). - * Returns ERR_MEM if it is full, else, ERR_OK if the "msg" is posted. - * - * @param mbox mbox to posts the message - * @param msg message to post (ATTENTION: can be NULL) - */ -err_t sys_mbox_trypost(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg); -/** - * @ingroup sys_mbox - * Try to post a message to an mbox - may fail if full. - * To be be used from ISR. - * Returns ERR_MEM if it is full, else, ERR_OK if the "msg" is posted. - * - * @param mbox mbox to posts the message - * @param msg message to post (ATTENTION: can be NULL) - */ -err_t sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg); -/** - * @ingroup sys_mbox - * Blocks the thread until a message arrives in the mailbox, but does - * not block the thread longer than "timeout" milliseconds (similar to - * the sys_arch_sem_wait() function). If "timeout" is 0, the thread should - * be blocked until a message arrives. The "msg" argument is a result - * parameter that is set by the function (i.e., by doing "*msg = - * ptr"). The "msg" parameter maybe NULL to indicate that the message - * should be dropped. - * The return values are the same as for the sys_arch_sem_wait() function: - * SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT if there was a timeout, any other value if a messages - * is received. - * - * Note that a function with a similar name, sys_mbox_fetch(), is - * implemented by lwIP. - * - * @param mbox mbox to get a message from - * @param msg pointer where the message is stored - * @param timeout maximum time (in milliseconds) to wait for a message (0 = wait forever) - * @return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT on timeout, any other value if a message has been received - */ -u32_t sys_arch_mbox_fetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg, u32_t timeout); -/* Allow port to override with a macro, e.g. special timeout for sys_arch_mbox_fetch() */ -#ifndef sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch -/** - * @ingroup sys_mbox - * This is similar to sys_arch_mbox_fetch, however if a message is not - * present in the mailbox, it immediately returns with the code - * SYS_MBOX_EMPTY. On success 0 is returned. - * To allow for efficient implementations, this can be defined as a - * function-like macro in sys_arch.h instead of a normal function. For - * example, a naive implementation could be: - * \#define sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(mbox,msg) sys_arch_mbox_fetch(mbox,msg,1) - * although this would introduce unnecessary delays. - * - * @param mbox mbox to get a message from - * @param msg pointer where the message is stored - * @return 0 (milliseconds) if a message has been received - * or SYS_MBOX_EMPTY if the mailbox is empty - */ -u32_t sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg); -#endif -/** - * For now, we map straight to sys_arch implementation. - */ -#define sys_mbox_tryfetch(mbox, msg) sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(mbox, msg) -/** - * @ingroup sys_mbox - * Deallocates a mailbox. If there are messages still present in the - * mailbox when the mailbox is deallocated, it is an indication of a - * programming error in lwIP and the developer should be notified. - * - * @param mbox mbox to delete - */ -void sys_mbox_free(sys_mbox_t *mbox); -#define sys_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg) sys_arch_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg, 0) -#ifndef sys_mbox_valid -/** - * @ingroup sys_mbox - * Returns 1 if the mailbox is valid, 0 if it is not valid. - * When using pointers, a simple way is to check the pointer for != NULL. - * When directly using OS structures, implementing this may be more complex. - * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. - */ -int sys_mbox_valid(sys_mbox_t *mbox); -#endif -#ifndef sys_mbox_set_invalid -/** - * @ingroup sys_mbox - * Invalidate a mailbox so that sys_mbox_valid() returns 0. - * ATTENTION: This does NOT mean that the mailbox shall be deallocated: - * sys_mbox_free() is always called before calling this function! - * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. - */ -void sys_mbox_set_invalid(sys_mbox_t *mbox); -#endif -#ifndef sys_mbox_valid_val -/** - * Same as sys_mbox_valid() but taking a value, not a pointer - */ -#define sys_mbox_valid_val(mbox) sys_mbox_valid(&(mbox)) -#endif -#ifndef sys_mbox_set_invalid_val -/** - * Same as sys_mbox_set_invalid() but taking a value, not a pointer - */ -#define sys_mbox_set_invalid_val(mbox) sys_mbox_set_invalid(&(mbox)) -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup sys_misc - * The only thread function: - * Starts a new thread named "name" with priority "prio" that will begin its - * execution in the function "thread()". The "arg" argument will be passed as an - * argument to the thread() function. The stack size to used for this thread is - * the "stacksize" parameter. The id of the new thread is returned. Both the id - * and the priority are system dependent. - * ATTENTION: although this function returns a value, it MUST NOT FAIL (ports have to assert this!) - * - * @param name human-readable name for the thread (used for debugging purposes) - * @param thread thread-function - * @param arg parameter passed to 'thread' - * @param stacksize stack size in bytes for the new thread (may be ignored by ports) - * @param prio priority of the new thread (may be ignored by ports) */ -sys_thread_t sys_thread_new(const char *name, lwip_thread_fn thread, void *arg, int stacksize, int prio); - -#endif /* NO_SYS */ - -/** - * @ingroup sys_misc - * sys_init() must be called before anything else. - * Initialize the sys_arch layer. - */ -void sys_init(void); - -#ifndef sys_jiffies -/** - * Ticks/jiffies since power up. - */ -u32_t sys_jiffies(void); -#endif - -/** - * @ingroup sys_time - * Returns the current time in milliseconds, - * may be the same as sys_jiffies or at least based on it. - * Don't care for wraparound, this is only used for time diffs. - * Not implementing this function means you cannot use some modules (e.g. TCP - * timestamps, internal timeouts for NO_SYS==1). - */ -u32_t sys_now(void); - -/* Critical Region Protection */ -/* These functions must be implemented in the sys_arch.c file. - In some implementations they can provide a more light-weight protection - mechanism than using semaphores. Otherwise semaphores can be used for - implementation */ -#ifndef SYS_ARCH_PROTECT -/** SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT - * define SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT in lwipopts.h if you want inter-task protection - * for certain critical regions during buffer allocation, deallocation and memory - * allocation and deallocation. - */ -#if SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT - -/** - * @ingroup sys_prot - * SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT - * declare a protection variable. This macro will default to defining a variable of - * type sys_prot_t. If a particular port needs a different implementation, then - * this macro may be defined in sys_arch.h. - */ -#define SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) sys_prot_t lev -/** - * @ingroup sys_prot - * SYS_ARCH_PROTECT - * Perform a "fast" protect. This could be implemented by - * disabling interrupts for an embedded system or by using a semaphore or - * mutex. The implementation should allow calling SYS_ARCH_PROTECT when - * already protected. The old protection level is returned in the variable - * "lev". This macro will default to calling the sys_arch_protect() function - * which should be implemented in sys_arch.c. If a particular port needs a - * different implementation, then this macro may be defined in sys_arch.h - */ -#define SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) lev = sys_arch_protect() -/** - * @ingroup sys_prot - * SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT - * Perform a "fast" set of the protection level to "lev". This could be - * implemented by setting the interrupt level to "lev" within the MACRO or by - * using a semaphore or mutex. This macro will default to calling the - * sys_arch_unprotect() function which should be implemented in - * sys_arch.c. If a particular port needs a different implementation, then - * this macro may be defined in sys_arch.h - */ -#define SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) sys_arch_unprotect(lev) -sys_prot_t sys_arch_protect(void); -void sys_arch_unprotect(sys_prot_t pval); - -#else - -#define SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) -#define SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) -#define SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) - -#endif /* SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT */ - -#endif /* SYS_ARCH_PROTECT */ - -/* - * Macros to set/get and increase/decrease variables in a thread-safe way. - * Use these for accessing variable that are used from more than one thread. - */ - -#ifndef SYS_ARCH_INC -#define SYS_ARCH_INC(var, val) \ - do { \ - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ - var += val; \ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ - } while (0) -#endif /* SYS_ARCH_INC */ - -#ifndef SYS_ARCH_DEC -#define SYS_ARCH_DEC(var, val) \ - do { \ - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ - var -= val; \ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ - } while (0) -#endif /* SYS_ARCH_DEC */ - -#ifndef SYS_ARCH_GET -#define SYS_ARCH_GET(var, ret) \ - do { \ - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ - ret = var; \ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ - } while (0) -#endif /* SYS_ARCH_GET */ - -#ifndef SYS_ARCH_SET -#define SYS_ARCH_SET(var, val) \ - do { \ - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ - var = val; \ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ - } while (0) -#endif /* SYS_ARCH_SET */ - -#ifndef SYS_ARCH_LOCKED -#define SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(code) \ - do { \ - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ - code; \ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ - } while (0) -#endif /* SYS_ARCH_LOCKED */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SYS_H */ +/** + * @file + * OS abstraction layer + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_SYS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_SYS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if NO_SYS + +/* For a totally minimal and standalone system, we provide null + definitions of the sys_ functions. */ +typedef u8_t sys_sem_t; +typedef u8_t sys_mutex_t; +typedef u8_t sys_mbox_t; + +#define sys_sem_new(s, c) ERR_OK +#define sys_sem_signal(s) +#define sys_sem_wait(s) +#define sys_arch_sem_wait(s, t) +#define sys_sem_free(s) +#define sys_sem_valid(s) 0 +#define sys_sem_valid_val(s) 0 +#define sys_sem_set_invalid(s) +#define sys_sem_set_invalid_val(s) +#define sys_mutex_new(mu) ERR_OK +#define sys_mutex_lock(mu) +#define sys_mutex_unlock(mu) +#define sys_mutex_free(mu) +#define sys_mutex_valid(mu) 0 +#define sys_mutex_set_invalid(mu) +#define sys_mbox_new(m, s) ERR_OK +#define sys_mbox_fetch(m, d) +#define sys_mbox_tryfetch(m, d) +#define sys_mbox_post(m, d) +#define sys_mbox_trypost(m, d) +#define sys_mbox_free(m) +#define sys_mbox_valid(m) +#define sys_mbox_valid_val(m) +#define sys_mbox_set_invalid(m) +#define sys_mbox_set_invalid_val(m) + +#define sys_thread_new(n, t, a, s, p) + +#define sys_msleep(t) + +#else /* NO_SYS */ + +/** Return code for timeouts from sys_arch_mbox_fetch and sys_arch_sem_wait */ +#define SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT 0xffffffffUL + +/** sys_mbox_tryfetch() returns SYS_MBOX_EMPTY if appropriate. + * For now we use the same magic value, but we allow this to change in future. + */ +#define SYS_MBOX_EMPTY SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "arch/sys_arch.h" + +/** Function prototype for thread functions */ +typedef void (*lwip_thread_fn)(void *arg); + +/* Function prototypes for functions to be implemented by platform ports + (in sys_arch.c) */ + +/* Mutex functions: */ + +/** Define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX if the port has no mutexes and binary semaphores + should be used instead */ +#ifndef LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX +#define LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX 0 +#endif + +#if LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX +/* for old ports that don't have mutexes: define them to binary semaphores */ +#define sys_mutex_t sys_sem_t +#define sys_mutex_new(mutex) sys_sem_new(mutex, 1) +#define sys_mutex_lock(mutex) sys_sem_wait(mutex) +#define sys_mutex_unlock(mutex) sys_sem_signal(mutex) +#define sys_mutex_free(mutex) sys_sem_free(mutex) +#define sys_mutex_valid(mutex) sys_sem_valid(mutex) +#define sys_mutex_set_invalid(mutex) sys_sem_set_invalid(mutex) + +#else /* LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX */ + +/** + * @ingroup sys_mutex + * Create a new mutex. + * Note that mutexes are expected to not be taken recursively by the lwIP code, + * so both implementation types (recursive or non-recursive) should work. + * The mutex is allocated to the memory that 'mutex' + * points to (which can be both a pointer or the actual OS structure). + * If the mutex has been created, ERR_OK should be returned. Returning any + * other error will provide a hint what went wrong, but except for assertions, + * no real error handling is implemented. + * + * @param mutex pointer to the mutex to create + * @return ERR_OK if successful, another err_t otherwise + */ +err_t sys_mutex_new(sys_mutex_t *mutex); +/** + * @ingroup sys_mutex + * Blocks the thread until the mutex can be grabbed. + * @param mutex the mutex to lock + */ +void sys_mutex_lock(sys_mutex_t *mutex); +/** + * @ingroup sys_mutex + * Releases the mutex previously locked through 'sys_mutex_lock()'. + * @param mutex the mutex to unlock + */ +void sys_mutex_unlock(sys_mutex_t *mutex); +/** + * @ingroup sys_mutex + * Deallocates a mutex. + * @param mutex the mutex to delete + */ +void sys_mutex_free(sys_mutex_t *mutex); +#ifndef sys_mutex_valid +/** + * @ingroup sys_mutex + * Returns 1 if the mutes is valid, 0 if it is not valid. + * When using pointers, a simple way is to check the pointer for != NULL. + * When directly using OS structures, implementing this may be more complex. + * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. + */ +int sys_mutex_valid(sys_mutex_t *mutex); +#endif +#ifndef sys_mutex_set_invalid +/** + * @ingroup sys_mutex + * Invalidate a mutex so that sys_mutex_valid() returns 0. + * ATTENTION: This does NOT mean that the mutex shall be deallocated: + * sys_mutex_free() is always called before calling this function! + * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. + */ +void sys_mutex_set_invalid(sys_mutex_t *mutex); +#endif +#endif /* LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX */ + +/* Semaphore functions: */ + +/** + * @ingroup sys_sem + * Create a new semaphore + * Creates a new semaphore. The semaphore is allocated to the memory that 'sem' + * points to (which can be both a pointer or the actual OS structure). + * The "count" argument specifies the initial state of the semaphore (which is + * either 0 or 1). + * If the semaphore has been created, ERR_OK should be returned. Returning any + * other error will provide a hint what went wrong, but except for assertions, + * no real error handling is implemented. + * + * @param sem pointer to the semaphore to create + * @param count initial count of the semaphore + * @return ERR_OK if successful, another err_t otherwise + */ +err_t sys_sem_new(sys_sem_t *sem, u8_t count); +/** + * @ingroup sys_sem + * Signals a semaphore + * @param sem the semaphore to signal + */ +void sys_sem_signal(sys_sem_t *sem); +/** + * @ingroup sys_sem + * Blocks the thread while waiting for the semaphore to be signaled. If the + * "timeout" argument is non-zero, the thread should only be blocked for the + * specified time (measured in milliseconds). If the "timeout" argument is zero, + * the thread should be blocked until the semaphore is signalled. + * + * The return value is SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT if the semaphore wasn't signaled within + * the specified time or any other value if it was signaled (with or without + * waiting). + * Notice that lwIP implements a function with a similar name, + * sys_sem_wait(), that uses the sys_arch_sem_wait() function. + * + * @param sem the semaphore to wait for + * @param timeout timeout in milliseconds to wait (0 = wait forever) + * @return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT on timeout, any other value on success + */ +u32_t sys_arch_sem_wait(sys_sem_t *sem, u32_t timeout); +/** + * @ingroup sys_sem + * Deallocates a semaphore. + * @param sem semaphore to delete + */ +void sys_sem_free(sys_sem_t *sem); +/** Wait for a semaphore - forever/no timeout */ +#define sys_sem_wait(sem) sys_arch_sem_wait(sem, 0) +#ifndef sys_sem_valid +/** + * @ingroup sys_sem + * Returns 1 if the semaphore is valid, 0 if it is not valid. + * When using pointers, a simple way is to check the pointer for != NULL. + * When directly using OS structures, implementing this may be more complex. + * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. + */ +int sys_sem_valid(sys_sem_t *sem); +#endif +#ifndef sys_sem_set_invalid +/** + * @ingroup sys_sem + * Invalidate a semaphore so that sys_sem_valid() returns 0. + * ATTENTION: This does NOT mean that the semaphore shall be deallocated: + * sys_sem_free() is always called before calling this function! + * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. + */ +void sys_sem_set_invalid(sys_sem_t *sem); +#endif +#ifndef sys_sem_valid_val +/** + * Same as sys_sem_valid() but taking a value, not a pointer + */ +#define sys_sem_valid_val(sem) sys_sem_valid(&(sem)) +#endif +#ifndef sys_sem_set_invalid_val +/** + * Same as sys_sem_set_invalid() but taking a value, not a pointer + */ +#define sys_sem_set_invalid_val(sem) sys_sem_set_invalid(&(sem)) +#endif + +#ifndef sys_msleep +/** + * @ingroup sys_misc + * Sleep for specified number of ms + */ +void sys_msleep(u32_t ms); /* only has a (close to) 1 ms resolution. */ +#endif + +/* Mailbox functions. */ + +/** + * @ingroup sys_mbox + * Creates an empty mailbox for maximum "size" elements. Elements stored + * in mailboxes are pointers. You have to define macros "_MBOX_SIZE" + * in your lwipopts.h, or ignore this parameter in your implementation + * and use a default size. + * If the mailbox has been created, ERR_OK should be returned. Returning any + * other error will provide a hint what went wrong, but except for assertions, + * no real error handling is implemented. + * + * @param mbox pointer to the mbox to create + * @param size (minimum) number of messages in this mbox + * @return ERR_OK if successful, another err_t otherwise + */ +err_t sys_mbox_new(sys_mbox_t *mbox, int size); +/** + * @ingroup sys_mbox + * Post a message to an mbox - may not fail + * -> blocks if full, only to be used from tasks NOT from ISR! + * + * @param mbox mbox to posts the message + * @param msg message to post (ATTENTION: can be NULL) + */ +void sys_mbox_post(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg); +/** + * @ingroup sys_mbox + * Try to post a message to an mbox - may fail if full. + * Can be used from ISR (if the sys arch layer allows this). + * Returns ERR_MEM if it is full, else, ERR_OK if the "msg" is posted. + * + * @param mbox mbox to posts the message + * @param msg message to post (ATTENTION: can be NULL) + */ +err_t sys_mbox_trypost(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg); +/** + * @ingroup sys_mbox + * Try to post a message to an mbox - may fail if full. + * To be be used from ISR. + * Returns ERR_MEM if it is full, else, ERR_OK if the "msg" is posted. + * + * @param mbox mbox to posts the message + * @param msg message to post (ATTENTION: can be NULL) + */ +err_t sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg); +/** + * @ingroup sys_mbox + * Blocks the thread until a message arrives in the mailbox, but does + * not block the thread longer than "timeout" milliseconds (similar to + * the sys_arch_sem_wait() function). If "timeout" is 0, the thread should + * be blocked until a message arrives. The "msg" argument is a result + * parameter that is set by the function (i.e., by doing "*msg = + * ptr"). The "msg" parameter maybe NULL to indicate that the message + * should be dropped. + * The return values are the same as for the sys_arch_sem_wait() function: + * SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT if there was a timeout, any other value if a messages + * is received. + * + * Note that a function with a similar name, sys_mbox_fetch(), is + * implemented by lwIP. + * + * @param mbox mbox to get a message from + * @param msg pointer where the message is stored + * @param timeout maximum time (in milliseconds) to wait for a message (0 = wait forever) + * @return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT on timeout, any other value if a message has been received + */ +u32_t sys_arch_mbox_fetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg, u32_t timeout); +/* Allow port to override with a macro, e.g. special timeout for sys_arch_mbox_fetch() */ +#ifndef sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch +/** + * @ingroup sys_mbox + * This is similar to sys_arch_mbox_fetch, however if a message is not + * present in the mailbox, it immediately returns with the code + * SYS_MBOX_EMPTY. On success 0 is returned. + * To allow for efficient implementations, this can be defined as a + * function-like macro in sys_arch.h instead of a normal function. For + * example, a naive implementation could be: + * \#define sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(mbox,msg) sys_arch_mbox_fetch(mbox,msg,1) + * although this would introduce unnecessary delays. + * + * @param mbox mbox to get a message from + * @param msg pointer where the message is stored + * @return 0 (milliseconds) if a message has been received + * or SYS_MBOX_EMPTY if the mailbox is empty + */ +u32_t sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg); +#endif +/** + * For now, we map straight to sys_arch implementation. + */ +#define sys_mbox_tryfetch(mbox, msg) sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(mbox, msg) +/** + * @ingroup sys_mbox + * Deallocates a mailbox. If there are messages still present in the + * mailbox when the mailbox is deallocated, it is an indication of a + * programming error in lwIP and the developer should be notified. + * + * @param mbox mbox to delete + */ +void sys_mbox_free(sys_mbox_t *mbox); +#define sys_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg) sys_arch_mbox_fetch(mbox, msg, 0) +#ifndef sys_mbox_valid +/** + * @ingroup sys_mbox + * Returns 1 if the mailbox is valid, 0 if it is not valid. + * When using pointers, a simple way is to check the pointer for != NULL. + * When directly using OS structures, implementing this may be more complex. + * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. + */ +int sys_mbox_valid(sys_mbox_t *mbox); +#endif +#ifndef sys_mbox_set_invalid +/** + * @ingroup sys_mbox + * Invalidate a mailbox so that sys_mbox_valid() returns 0. + * ATTENTION: This does NOT mean that the mailbox shall be deallocated: + * sys_mbox_free() is always called before calling this function! + * This may also be a define, in which case the function is not prototyped. + */ +void sys_mbox_set_invalid(sys_mbox_t *mbox); +#endif +#ifndef sys_mbox_valid_val +/** + * Same as sys_mbox_valid() but taking a value, not a pointer + */ +#define sys_mbox_valid_val(mbox) sys_mbox_valid(&(mbox)) +#endif +#ifndef sys_mbox_set_invalid_val +/** + * Same as sys_mbox_set_invalid() but taking a value, not a pointer + */ +#define sys_mbox_set_invalid_val(mbox) sys_mbox_set_invalid(&(mbox)) +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup sys_misc + * The only thread function: + * Starts a new thread named "name" with priority "prio" that will begin its + * execution in the function "thread()". The "arg" argument will be passed as an + * argument to the thread() function. The stack size to used for this thread is + * the "stacksize" parameter. The id of the new thread is returned. Both the id + * and the priority are system dependent. + * ATTENTION: although this function returns a value, it MUST NOT FAIL (ports have to assert this!) + * + * @param name human-readable name for the thread (used for debugging purposes) + * @param thread thread-function + * @param arg parameter passed to 'thread' + * @param stacksize stack size in bytes for the new thread (may be ignored by ports) + * @param prio priority of the new thread (may be ignored by ports) */ +sys_thread_t sys_thread_new(const char *name, lwip_thread_fn thread, void *arg, int stacksize, int prio); + +#endif /* NO_SYS */ + +/** + * @ingroup sys_misc + * sys_init() must be called before anything else. + * Initialize the sys_arch layer. + */ +void sys_init(void); + +#ifndef sys_jiffies +/** + * Ticks/jiffies since power up. + */ +u32_t sys_jiffies(void); +#endif + +/** + * @ingroup sys_time + * Returns the current time in milliseconds, + * may be the same as sys_jiffies or at least based on it. + * Don't care for wraparound, this is only used for time diffs. + * Not implementing this function means you cannot use some modules (e.g. TCP + * timestamps, internal timeouts for NO_SYS==1). + */ +u32_t sys_now(void); + +/* Critical Region Protection */ +/* These functions must be implemented in the sys_arch.c file. + In some implementations they can provide a more light-weight protection + mechanism than using semaphores. Otherwise semaphores can be used for + implementation */ +#ifndef SYS_ARCH_PROTECT +/** SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT + * define SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT in lwipopts.h if you want inter-task protection + * for certain critical regions during buffer allocation, deallocation and memory + * allocation and deallocation. + */ +#if SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT + +/** + * @ingroup sys_prot + * SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT + * declare a protection variable. This macro will default to defining a variable of + * type sys_prot_t. If a particular port needs a different implementation, then + * this macro may be defined in sys_arch.h. + */ +#define SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) sys_prot_t lev +/** + * @ingroup sys_prot + * SYS_ARCH_PROTECT + * Perform a "fast" protect. This could be implemented by + * disabling interrupts for an embedded system or by using a semaphore or + * mutex. The implementation should allow calling SYS_ARCH_PROTECT when + * already protected. The old protection level is returned in the variable + * "lev". This macro will default to calling the sys_arch_protect() function + * which should be implemented in sys_arch.c. If a particular port needs a + * different implementation, then this macro may be defined in sys_arch.h + */ +#define SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) lev = sys_arch_protect() +/** + * @ingroup sys_prot + * SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT + * Perform a "fast" set of the protection level to "lev". This could be + * implemented by setting the interrupt level to "lev" within the MACRO or by + * using a semaphore or mutex. This macro will default to calling the + * sys_arch_unprotect() function which should be implemented in + * sys_arch.c. If a particular port needs a different implementation, then + * this macro may be defined in sys_arch.h + */ +#define SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) sys_arch_unprotect(lev) +sys_prot_t sys_arch_protect(void); +void sys_arch_unprotect(sys_prot_t pval); + +#else + +#define SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) +#define SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) +#define SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) + +#endif /* SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT */ + +#endif /* SYS_ARCH_PROTECT */ + +/* + * Macros to set/get and increase/decrease variables in a thread-safe way. + * Use these for accessing variable that are used from more than one thread. + */ + +#ifndef SYS_ARCH_INC +#define SYS_ARCH_INC(var, val) \ + do { \ + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ + var += val; \ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* SYS_ARCH_INC */ + +#ifndef SYS_ARCH_DEC +#define SYS_ARCH_DEC(var, val) \ + do { \ + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ + var -= val; \ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* SYS_ARCH_DEC */ + +#ifndef SYS_ARCH_GET +#define SYS_ARCH_GET(var, ret) \ + do { \ + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ + ret = var; \ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* SYS_ARCH_GET */ + +#ifndef SYS_ARCH_SET +#define SYS_ARCH_SET(var, val) \ + do { \ + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ + var = val; \ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* SYS_ARCH_SET */ + +#ifndef SYS_ARCH_LOCKED +#define SYS_ARCH_LOCKED(code) \ + do { \ + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); \ + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); \ + code; \ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* SYS_ARCH_LOCKED */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_SYS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcp.h index 72d55ea0..499b3724 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcp.h @@ -1,510 +1,510 @@ -/** - * @file - * TCP API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n - * See also @ref tcp_raw - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TCP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/tcpbase.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/icmp.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct tcp_pcb; -struct tcp_pcb_listen; - -/** Function prototype for tcp accept callback functions. Called when a new - * connection can be accepted on a listening pcb. - * - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) - * @param newpcb The new connection pcb - * @param err An error code if there has been an error accepting. - * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the - * callback function! - */ -typedef err_t (*tcp_accept_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *newpcb, err_t err); - -/** Function prototype for tcp receive callback functions. Called when data has - * been received. - * - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) - * @param tpcb The connection pcb which received data - * @param p The received data (or NULL when the connection has been closed!) - * @param err An error code if there has been an error receiving - * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the - * callback function! - */ -typedef err_t (*tcp_recv_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, - struct pbuf *p, err_t err); - -/** Function prototype for tcp sent callback functions. Called when sent data has - * been acknowledged by the remote side. Use it to free corresponding resources. - * This also means that the pcb has now space available to send new data. - * - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) - * @param tpcb The connection pcb for which data has been acknowledged - * @param len The amount of bytes acknowledged - * @return ERR_OK: try to send some data by calling tcp_output - * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the - * callback function! - */ -typedef err_t (*tcp_sent_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, - u16_t len); - -/** Function prototype for tcp poll callback functions. Called periodically as - * specified by @see tcp_poll. - * - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) - * @param tpcb tcp pcb - * @return ERR_OK: try to send some data by calling tcp_output - * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the - * callback function! - */ -typedef err_t (*tcp_poll_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb); - -/** Function prototype for tcp error callback functions. Called when the pcb - * receives a RST or is unexpectedly closed for any other reason. - * - * @note The corresponding pcb is already freed when this callback is called! - * - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) - * @param err Error code to indicate why the pcb has been closed - * ERR_ABRT: aborted through tcp_abort or by a TCP timer - * ERR_RST: the connection was reset by the remote host - */ -typedef void (*tcp_err_fn)(void *arg, err_t err); - -/** Function prototype for tcp connected callback functions. Called when a pcb - * is connected to the remote side after initiating a connection attempt by - * calling tcp_connect(). - * - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) - * @param tpcb The connection pcb which is connected - * @param err An unused error code, always ERR_OK currently ;-) @todo! - * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the - * callback function! - * - * @note When a connection attempt fails, the error callback is currently called! - */ -typedef err_t (*tcp_connected_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, err_t err); - -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE -#define RCV_WND_SCALE(pcb, wnd) (((wnd) >> (pcb)->rcv_scale)) -#define SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, wnd) (((wnd) << (pcb)->snd_scale)) -#define TCPWND16(x) ((u16_t)LWIP_MIN((x), 0xFFFF)) -#define TCP_WND_MAX(pcb) ((tcpwnd_size_t)(((pcb)->flags & TF_WND_SCALE) ? TCP_WND : TCPWND16(TCP_WND))) -#else -#define RCV_WND_SCALE(pcb, wnd) (wnd) -#define SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, wnd) (wnd) -#define TCPWND16(x) (x) -#define TCP_WND_MAX(pcb) TCP_WND -#endif -/* Increments a tcpwnd_size_t and holds at max value rather than rollover */ -#define TCP_WND_INC(wnd, inc) \ - do { \ - if ((tcpwnd_size_t)(wnd + inc) >= wnd) { \ - wnd = (tcpwnd_size_t)(wnd + inc); \ - } else { \ - wnd = (tcpwnd_size_t)-1; \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT -/** SACK ranges to include in ACK packets. - * SACK entry is invalid if left==right. */ -struct tcp_sack_range { - /** Left edge of the SACK: the first acknowledged sequence number. */ - u32_t left; - /** Right edge of the SACK: the last acknowledged sequence number +1 (so first NOT acknowledged). */ - u32_t right; -}; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - -/** Function prototype for deallocation of arguments. Called *just before* the - * pcb is freed, so don't expect to be able to do anything with this pcb! - * - * @param id ext arg id (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) - * @param data pointer to the data (set via @ref tcp_ext_arg_set before) - */ -typedef void (*tcp_extarg_callback_pcb_destroyed_fn)(u8_t id, void *data); - -/** Function prototype to transition arguments from a listening pcb to an accepted pcb - * - * @param id ext arg id (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) - * @param lpcb the listening pcb accepting a connection - * @param cpcb the newly allocated connection pcb - * @return ERR_OK if OK, any error if connection should be dropped - */ -typedef err_t (*tcp_extarg_callback_passive_open_fn)(u8_t id, struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb, struct tcp_pcb *cpcb); - -/** A table of callback functions that is invoked for ext arguments */ -struct tcp_ext_arg_callbacks { - /** @ref tcp_extarg_callback_pcb_destroyed_fn */ - tcp_extarg_callback_pcb_destroyed_fn destroy; - /** @ref tcp_extarg_callback_passive_open_fn */ - tcp_extarg_callback_passive_open_fn passive_open; -}; - -#define LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARG_ID_INVALID 0xFF - -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS -/* This is the structure for ext args in tcp pcbs (used as array) */ -struct tcp_pcb_ext_args { - const struct tcp_ext_arg_callbacks *callbacks; - void *data; -}; -/* This is a helper define to prevent zero size arrays if disabled */ -#define TCP_PCB_EXTARGS struct tcp_pcb_ext_args ext_args[LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS]; -#else -#define TCP_PCB_EXTARGS -#endif - -typedef u16_t tcpflags_t; -#define TCP_ALLFLAGS 0xffffU - -/** - * members common to struct tcp_pcb and struct tcp_listen_pcb - */ -#define TCP_PCB_COMMON(type) \ - type *next; /* for the linked list */ \ - void *callback_arg; \ - TCP_PCB_EXTARGS \ - enum tcp_state state; /* TCP state */ \ - u8_t prio; \ - /* ports are in host byte order */ \ - u16_t local_port - -/** the TCP protocol control block for listening pcbs */ -struct tcp_pcb_listen { - /** Common members of all PCB types */ - IP_PCB; - /** Protocol specific PCB members */ - TCP_PCB_COMMON(struct tcp_pcb_listen); - -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - /* Function to call when a listener has been connected. */ - tcp_accept_fn accept; -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - u8_t backlog; - u8_t accepts_pending; -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ -}; - -/** the TCP protocol control block */ -struct tcp_pcb { - /** common PCB members */ - IP_PCB; - /** protocol specific PCB members */ - TCP_PCB_COMMON(struct tcp_pcb); - - /* ports are in host byte order */ - u16_t remote_port; - - tcpflags_t flags; -#define TF_ACK_DELAY 0x01U /* Delayed ACK. */ -#define TF_ACK_NOW 0x02U /* Immediate ACK. */ -#define TF_INFR 0x04U /* In fast recovery. */ -#define TF_CLOSEPEND 0x08U /* If this is set, tcp_close failed to enqueue the FIN (retried in tcp_tmr) */ -#define TF_RXCLOSED 0x10U /* rx closed by tcp_shutdown */ -#define TF_FIN 0x20U /* Connection was closed locally (FIN segment enqueued). */ -#define TF_NODELAY 0x40U /* Disable Nagle algorithm */ -#define TF_NAGLEMEMERR 0x80U /* nagle enabled, memerr, try to output to prevent delayed ACK to happen */ -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE -#define TF_WND_SCALE 0x0100U /* Window Scale option enabled */ -#endif -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG -#define TF_BACKLOGPEND 0x0200U /* If this is set, a connection pcb has increased the backlog on its listener */ -#endif -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS -#define TF_TIMESTAMP 0x0400U /* Timestamp option enabled */ -#endif -#define TF_RTO 0x0800U /* RTO timer has fired, in-flight data moved to unsent and being retransmitted */ -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT -#define TF_SACK 0x1000U /* Selective ACKs enabled */ -#endif - - /* the rest of the fields are in host byte order - as we have to do some math with them */ - - /* Timers */ - u8_t polltmr, pollinterval; - u8_t last_timer; - u32_t tmr; - - /* receiver variables */ - u32_t rcv_nxt; /* next seqno expected */ - tcpwnd_size_t rcv_wnd; /* receiver window available */ - tcpwnd_size_t rcv_ann_wnd; /* receiver window to announce */ - u32_t rcv_ann_right_edge; /* announced right edge of window */ - -#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT - /* SACK ranges to include in ACK packets (entry is invalid if left==right) */ - struct tcp_sack_range rcv_sacks[LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM]; -#define LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, idx) ((pcb)->rcv_sacks[idx].left != (pcb)->rcv_sacks[idx].right) -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ - - /* Retransmission timer. */ - s16_t rtime; - - u16_t mss; /* maximum segment size */ - - /* RTT (round trip time) estimation variables */ - u32_t rttest; /* RTT estimate in 500ms ticks */ - u32_t rtseq; /* sequence number being timed */ - s16_t sa, sv; /* @see "Congestion Avoidance and Control" by Van Jacobson and Karels */ - - s16_t rto; /* retransmission time-out (in ticks of TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) */ - u8_t nrtx; /* number of retransmissions */ - - /* fast retransmit/recovery */ - u8_t dupacks; - u32_t lastack; /* Highest acknowledged seqno. */ - - /* congestion avoidance/control variables */ - tcpwnd_size_t cwnd; - tcpwnd_size_t ssthresh; - - /* first byte following last rto byte */ - u32_t rto_end; - - /* sender variables */ - u32_t snd_nxt; /* next new seqno to be sent */ - u32_t snd_wl1, snd_wl2; /* Sequence and acknowledgement numbers of last - window update. */ - u32_t snd_lbb; /* Sequence number of next byte to be buffered. */ - tcpwnd_size_t snd_wnd; /* sender window */ - tcpwnd_size_t snd_wnd_max; /* the maximum sender window announced by the remote host */ - - tcpwnd_size_t snd_buf; /* Available buffer space for sending (in bytes). */ -#define TCP_SNDQUEUELEN_OVERFLOW (0xffffU - 3) - u16_t snd_queuelen; /* Number of pbufs currently in the send buffer. */ - -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - /* Extra bytes available at the end of the last pbuf in unsent. */ - u16_t unsent_oversize; -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - - tcpwnd_size_t bytes_acked; - - /* These are ordered by sequence number: */ - struct tcp_seg *unsent; /* Unsent (queued) segments. */ - struct tcp_seg *unacked; /* Sent but unacknowledged segments. */ -#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ - struct tcp_seg *ooseq; /* Received out of sequence segments. */ -#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ - - struct pbuf *refused_data; /* Data previously received but not yet taken by upper layer */ - -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG - struct tcp_pcb_listen *listener; -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ - -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API - /* Function to be called when more send buffer space is available. */ - tcp_sent_fn sent; - /* Function to be called when (in-sequence) data has arrived. */ - tcp_recv_fn recv; - /* Function to be called when a connection has been set up. */ - tcp_connected_fn connected; - /* Function which is called periodically. */ - tcp_poll_fn poll; - /* Function to be called whenever a fatal error occurs. */ - tcp_err_fn errf; -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ - -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS - u32_t ts_lastacksent; - u32_t ts_recent; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ - - /* idle time before KEEPALIVE is sent */ - u32_t keep_idle; -#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE - u32_t keep_intvl; - u32_t keep_cnt; -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ - - /* Persist timer counter */ - u8_t persist_cnt; - /* Persist timer back-off */ - u8_t persist_backoff; - /* Number of persist probes */ - u8_t persist_probe; - - /* KEEPALIVE counter */ - u8_t keep_cnt_sent; - -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE - u8_t snd_scale; - u8_t rcv_scale; -#endif -}; - -#if LWIP_EVENT_API - -enum lwip_event { - LWIP_EVENT_ACCEPT, - LWIP_EVENT_SENT, - LWIP_EVENT_RECV, - LWIP_EVENT_CONNECTED, - LWIP_EVENT_POLL, - LWIP_EVENT_ERR -}; - -err_t lwip_tcp_event(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, - enum lwip_event, - struct pbuf *p, - u16_t size, - err_t err); - -#endif /* LWIP_EVENT_API */ - -/* Application program's interface: */ -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_new(void); -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_new_ip_type(u8_t type); - -void tcp_arg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *arg); -#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API -void tcp_recv(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_recv_fn recv); -void tcp_sent(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_sent_fn sent); -void tcp_err(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_err_fn err); -void tcp_accept(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_accept_fn accept); -#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ -void tcp_poll(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_poll_fn poll, u8_t interval); - -#define tcp_set_flags(pcb, set_flags) \ - do { \ - (pcb)->flags = (tcpflags_t)((pcb)->flags | (set_flags)); \ - } while (0) -#define tcp_clear_flags(pcb, clr_flags) \ - do { \ - (pcb)->flags = (tcpflags_t)((pcb)->flags & (tcpflags_t)(~(clr_flags)&TCP_ALLFLAGS)); \ - } while (0) -#define tcp_is_flag_set(pcb, flag) (((pcb)->flags & (flag)) != 0) - -#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS -#define tcp_mss(pcb) (((pcb)->flags & TF_TIMESTAMP) ? ((pcb)->mss - 12) : (pcb)->mss) -#else /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ -/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ -#define tcp_mss(pcb) ((pcb)->mss) -#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ -/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ -#define tcp_sndbuf(pcb) (TCPWND16((pcb)->snd_buf)) -/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ -#define tcp_sndqueuelen(pcb) ((pcb)->snd_queuelen) -/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ -#define tcp_nagle_disable(pcb) tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NODELAY) -/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ -#define tcp_nagle_enable(pcb) tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_NODELAY) -/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ -#define tcp_nagle_disabled(pcb) tcp_is_flag_set(pcb, TF_NODELAY) - -#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG -#define tcp_backlog_set(pcb, new_backlog) \ - do { \ - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->state == LISTEN (called for wrong pcb?)", (pcb)->state == LISTEN); \ - ((struct tcp_pcb_listen *)(pcb))->backlog = ((new_backlog) ? (new_backlog) : 1); \ - } while (0) -void tcp_backlog_delayed(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -void tcp_backlog_accepted(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -#else /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ -#define tcp_backlog_set(pcb, new_backlog) -#define tcp_backlog_delayed(pcb) -#define tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb) -#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ -#define tcp_accepted(pcb) \ - do { \ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); \ - } while (0) /* compatibility define, not needed any more */ - -void tcp_recved(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len); -err_t tcp_bind(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, - u16_t port); -void tcp_bind_netif(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif); -err_t tcp_connect(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, - u16_t port, tcp_connected_fn connected); - -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t backlog, err_t *err); -struct tcp_pcb *tcp_listen_with_backlog(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t backlog); -/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ -#define tcp_listen(pcb) tcp_listen_with_backlog(pcb, TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG) - -void tcp_abort(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -err_t tcp_close(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); -err_t tcp_shutdown(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int shut_rx, int shut_tx); - -err_t tcp_write(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, - u8_t apiflags); - -void tcp_setprio(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t prio); - -err_t tcp_output(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); - -err_t tcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port); - -#define tcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(pcb) ((pcb)->state) - -/* for compatibility with older implementation */ -#define tcp_new_ip6() tcp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V6) - -#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS -u8_t tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id(void); -void tcp_ext_arg_set_callbacks(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id, const struct tcp_ext_arg_callbacks *const callbacks); -void tcp_ext_arg_set(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id, void *arg); -void *tcp_ext_arg_get(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCP_H */ +/** + * @file + * TCP API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n + * See also @ref tcp_raw + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TCP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/tcpbase.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/icmp.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct tcp_pcb; +struct tcp_pcb_listen; + +/** Function prototype for tcp accept callback functions. Called when a new + * connection can be accepted on a listening pcb. + * + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) + * @param newpcb The new connection pcb + * @param err An error code if there has been an error accepting. + * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the + * callback function! + */ +typedef err_t (*tcp_accept_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *newpcb, err_t err); + +/** Function prototype for tcp receive callback functions. Called when data has + * been received. + * + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) + * @param tpcb The connection pcb which received data + * @param p The received data (or NULL when the connection has been closed!) + * @param err An error code if there has been an error receiving + * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the + * callback function! + */ +typedef err_t (*tcp_recv_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, + struct pbuf *p, err_t err); + +/** Function prototype for tcp sent callback functions. Called when sent data has + * been acknowledged by the remote side. Use it to free corresponding resources. + * This also means that the pcb has now space available to send new data. + * + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) + * @param tpcb The connection pcb for which data has been acknowledged + * @param len The amount of bytes acknowledged + * @return ERR_OK: try to send some data by calling tcp_output + * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the + * callback function! + */ +typedef err_t (*tcp_sent_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, + u16_t len); + +/** Function prototype for tcp poll callback functions. Called periodically as + * specified by @see tcp_poll. + * + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) + * @param tpcb tcp pcb + * @return ERR_OK: try to send some data by calling tcp_output + * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the + * callback function! + */ +typedef err_t (*tcp_poll_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb); + +/** Function prototype for tcp error callback functions. Called when the pcb + * receives a RST or is unexpectedly closed for any other reason. + * + * @note The corresponding pcb is already freed when this callback is called! + * + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) + * @param err Error code to indicate why the pcb has been closed + * ERR_ABRT: aborted through tcp_abort or by a TCP timer + * ERR_RST: the connection was reset by the remote host + */ +typedef void (*tcp_err_fn)(void *arg, err_t err); + +/** Function prototype for tcp connected callback functions. Called when a pcb + * is connected to the remote side after initiating a connection attempt by + * calling tcp_connect(). + * + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the callback function (@see tcp_arg()) + * @param tpcb The connection pcb which is connected + * @param err An unused error code, always ERR_OK currently ;-) @todo! + * Only return ERR_ABRT if you have called tcp_abort from within the + * callback function! + * + * @note When a connection attempt fails, the error callback is currently called! + */ +typedef err_t (*tcp_connected_fn)(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *tpcb, err_t err); + +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE +#define RCV_WND_SCALE(pcb, wnd) (((wnd) >> (pcb)->rcv_scale)) +#define SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, wnd) (((wnd) << (pcb)->snd_scale)) +#define TCPWND16(x) ((u16_t)LWIP_MIN((x), 0xFFFF)) +#define TCP_WND_MAX(pcb) ((tcpwnd_size_t)(((pcb)->flags & TF_WND_SCALE) ? TCP_WND : TCPWND16(TCP_WND))) +#else +#define RCV_WND_SCALE(pcb, wnd) (wnd) +#define SND_WND_SCALE(pcb, wnd) (wnd) +#define TCPWND16(x) (x) +#define TCP_WND_MAX(pcb) TCP_WND +#endif +/* Increments a tcpwnd_size_t and holds at max value rather than rollover */ +#define TCP_WND_INC(wnd, inc) \ + do { \ + if ((tcpwnd_size_t)(wnd + inc) >= wnd) { \ + wnd = (tcpwnd_size_t)(wnd + inc); \ + } else { \ + wnd = (tcpwnd_size_t)-1; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT +/** SACK ranges to include in ACK packets. + * SACK entry is invalid if left==right. */ +struct tcp_sack_range { + /** Left edge of the SACK: the first acknowledged sequence number. */ + u32_t left; + /** Right edge of the SACK: the last acknowledged sequence number +1 (so first NOT acknowledged). */ + u32_t right; +}; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + +/** Function prototype for deallocation of arguments. Called *just before* the + * pcb is freed, so don't expect to be able to do anything with this pcb! + * + * @param id ext arg id (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) + * @param data pointer to the data (set via @ref tcp_ext_arg_set before) + */ +typedef void (*tcp_extarg_callback_pcb_destroyed_fn)(u8_t id, void *data); + +/** Function prototype to transition arguments from a listening pcb to an accepted pcb + * + * @param id ext arg id (allocated via @ref tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id) + * @param lpcb the listening pcb accepting a connection + * @param cpcb the newly allocated connection pcb + * @return ERR_OK if OK, any error if connection should be dropped + */ +typedef err_t (*tcp_extarg_callback_passive_open_fn)(u8_t id, struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb, struct tcp_pcb *cpcb); + +/** A table of callback functions that is invoked for ext arguments */ +struct tcp_ext_arg_callbacks { + /** @ref tcp_extarg_callback_pcb_destroyed_fn */ + tcp_extarg_callback_pcb_destroyed_fn destroy; + /** @ref tcp_extarg_callback_passive_open_fn */ + tcp_extarg_callback_passive_open_fn passive_open; +}; + +#define LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARG_ID_INVALID 0xFF + +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS +/* This is the structure for ext args in tcp pcbs (used as array) */ +struct tcp_pcb_ext_args { + const struct tcp_ext_arg_callbacks *callbacks; + void *data; +}; +/* This is a helper define to prevent zero size arrays if disabled */ +#define TCP_PCB_EXTARGS struct tcp_pcb_ext_args ext_args[LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS]; +#else +#define TCP_PCB_EXTARGS +#endif + +typedef u16_t tcpflags_t; +#define TCP_ALLFLAGS 0xffffU + +/** + * members common to struct tcp_pcb and struct tcp_listen_pcb + */ +#define TCP_PCB_COMMON(type) \ + type *next; /* for the linked list */ \ + void *callback_arg; \ + TCP_PCB_EXTARGS \ + enum tcp_state state; /* TCP state */ \ + u8_t prio; \ + /* ports are in host byte order */ \ + u16_t local_port + +/** the TCP protocol control block for listening pcbs */ +struct tcp_pcb_listen { + /** Common members of all PCB types */ + IP_PCB; + /** Protocol specific PCB members */ + TCP_PCB_COMMON(struct tcp_pcb_listen); + +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + /* Function to call when a listener has been connected. */ + tcp_accept_fn accept; +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + u8_t backlog; + u8_t accepts_pending; +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ +}; + +/** the TCP protocol control block */ +struct tcp_pcb { + /** common PCB members */ + IP_PCB; + /** protocol specific PCB members */ + TCP_PCB_COMMON(struct tcp_pcb); + + /* ports are in host byte order */ + u16_t remote_port; + + tcpflags_t flags; +#define TF_ACK_DELAY 0x01U /* Delayed ACK. */ +#define TF_ACK_NOW 0x02U /* Immediate ACK. */ +#define TF_INFR 0x04U /* In fast recovery. */ +#define TF_CLOSEPEND 0x08U /* If this is set, tcp_close failed to enqueue the FIN (retried in tcp_tmr) */ +#define TF_RXCLOSED 0x10U /* rx closed by tcp_shutdown */ +#define TF_FIN 0x20U /* Connection was closed locally (FIN segment enqueued). */ +#define TF_NODELAY 0x40U /* Disable Nagle algorithm */ +#define TF_NAGLEMEMERR 0x80U /* nagle enabled, memerr, try to output to prevent delayed ACK to happen */ +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE +#define TF_WND_SCALE 0x0100U /* Window Scale option enabled */ +#endif +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG +#define TF_BACKLOGPEND 0x0200U /* If this is set, a connection pcb has increased the backlog on its listener */ +#endif +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS +#define TF_TIMESTAMP 0x0400U /* Timestamp option enabled */ +#endif +#define TF_RTO 0x0800U /* RTO timer has fired, in-flight data moved to unsent and being retransmitted */ +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT +#define TF_SACK 0x1000U /* Selective ACKs enabled */ +#endif + + /* the rest of the fields are in host byte order + as we have to do some math with them */ + + /* Timers */ + u8_t polltmr, pollinterval; + u8_t last_timer; + u32_t tmr; + + /* receiver variables */ + u32_t rcv_nxt; /* next seqno expected */ + tcpwnd_size_t rcv_wnd; /* receiver window available */ + tcpwnd_size_t rcv_ann_wnd; /* receiver window to announce */ + u32_t rcv_ann_right_edge; /* announced right edge of window */ + +#if LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT + /* SACK ranges to include in ACK packets (entry is invalid if left==right) */ + struct tcp_sack_range rcv_sacks[LWIP_TCP_MAX_SACK_NUM]; +#define LWIP_TCP_SACK_VALID(pcb, idx) ((pcb)->rcv_sacks[idx].left != (pcb)->rcv_sacks[idx].right) +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_SACK_OUT */ + + /* Retransmission timer. */ + s16_t rtime; + + u16_t mss; /* maximum segment size */ + + /* RTT (round trip time) estimation variables */ + u32_t rttest; /* RTT estimate in 500ms ticks */ + u32_t rtseq; /* sequence number being timed */ + s16_t sa, sv; /* @see "Congestion Avoidance and Control" by Van Jacobson and Karels */ + + s16_t rto; /* retransmission time-out (in ticks of TCP_SLOW_INTERVAL) */ + u8_t nrtx; /* number of retransmissions */ + + /* fast retransmit/recovery */ + u8_t dupacks; + u32_t lastack; /* Highest acknowledged seqno. */ + + /* congestion avoidance/control variables */ + tcpwnd_size_t cwnd; + tcpwnd_size_t ssthresh; + + /* first byte following last rto byte */ + u32_t rto_end; + + /* sender variables */ + u32_t snd_nxt; /* next new seqno to be sent */ + u32_t snd_wl1, snd_wl2; /* Sequence and acknowledgement numbers of last + window update. */ + u32_t snd_lbb; /* Sequence number of next byte to be buffered. */ + tcpwnd_size_t snd_wnd; /* sender window */ + tcpwnd_size_t snd_wnd_max; /* the maximum sender window announced by the remote host */ + + tcpwnd_size_t snd_buf; /* Available buffer space for sending (in bytes). */ +#define TCP_SNDQUEUELEN_OVERFLOW (0xffffU - 3) + u16_t snd_queuelen; /* Number of pbufs currently in the send buffer. */ + +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + /* Extra bytes available at the end of the last pbuf in unsent. */ + u16_t unsent_oversize; +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + + tcpwnd_size_t bytes_acked; + + /* These are ordered by sequence number: */ + struct tcp_seg *unsent; /* Unsent (queued) segments. */ + struct tcp_seg *unacked; /* Sent but unacknowledged segments. */ +#if TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ + struct tcp_seg *ooseq; /* Received out of sequence segments. */ +#endif /* TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ */ + + struct pbuf *refused_data; /* Data previously received but not yet taken by upper layer */ + +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG + struct tcp_pcb_listen *listener; +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API || TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ + +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API + /* Function to be called when more send buffer space is available. */ + tcp_sent_fn sent; + /* Function to be called when (in-sequence) data has arrived. */ + tcp_recv_fn recv; + /* Function to be called when a connection has been set up. */ + tcp_connected_fn connected; + /* Function which is called periodically. */ + tcp_poll_fn poll; + /* Function to be called whenever a fatal error occurs. */ + tcp_err_fn errf; +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ + +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS + u32_t ts_lastacksent; + u32_t ts_recent; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ + + /* idle time before KEEPALIVE is sent */ + u32_t keep_idle; +#if LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE + u32_t keep_intvl; + u32_t keep_cnt; +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_KEEPALIVE */ + + /* Persist timer counter */ + u8_t persist_cnt; + /* Persist timer back-off */ + u8_t persist_backoff; + /* Number of persist probes */ + u8_t persist_probe; + + /* KEEPALIVE counter */ + u8_t keep_cnt_sent; + +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE + u8_t snd_scale; + u8_t rcv_scale; +#endif +}; + +#if LWIP_EVENT_API + +enum lwip_event { + LWIP_EVENT_ACCEPT, + LWIP_EVENT_SENT, + LWIP_EVENT_RECV, + LWIP_EVENT_CONNECTED, + LWIP_EVENT_POLL, + LWIP_EVENT_ERR +}; + +err_t lwip_tcp_event(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, + enum lwip_event, + struct pbuf *p, + u16_t size, + err_t err); + +#endif /* LWIP_EVENT_API */ + +/* Application program's interface: */ +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_new(void); +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_new_ip_type(u8_t type); + +void tcp_arg(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *arg); +#if LWIP_CALLBACK_API +void tcp_recv(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_recv_fn recv); +void tcp_sent(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_sent_fn sent); +void tcp_err(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_err_fn err); +void tcp_accept(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_accept_fn accept); +#endif /* LWIP_CALLBACK_API */ +void tcp_poll(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, tcp_poll_fn poll, u8_t interval); + +#define tcp_set_flags(pcb, set_flags) \ + do { \ + (pcb)->flags = (tcpflags_t)((pcb)->flags | (set_flags)); \ + } while (0) +#define tcp_clear_flags(pcb, clr_flags) \ + do { \ + (pcb)->flags = (tcpflags_t)((pcb)->flags & (tcpflags_t)(~(clr_flags)&TCP_ALLFLAGS)); \ + } while (0) +#define tcp_is_flag_set(pcb, flag) (((pcb)->flags & (flag)) != 0) + +#if LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS +#define tcp_mss(pcb) (((pcb)->flags & TF_TIMESTAMP) ? ((pcb)->mss - 12) : (pcb)->mss) +#else /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ +/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ +#define tcp_mss(pcb) ((pcb)->mss) +#endif /* LWIP_TCP_TIMESTAMPS */ +/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ +#define tcp_sndbuf(pcb) (TCPWND16((pcb)->snd_buf)) +/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ +#define tcp_sndqueuelen(pcb) ((pcb)->snd_queuelen) +/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ +#define tcp_nagle_disable(pcb) tcp_set_flags(pcb, TF_NODELAY) +/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ +#define tcp_nagle_enable(pcb) tcp_clear_flags(pcb, TF_NODELAY) +/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ +#define tcp_nagle_disabled(pcb) tcp_is_flag_set(pcb, TF_NODELAY) + +#if TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG +#define tcp_backlog_set(pcb, new_backlog) \ + do { \ + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->state == LISTEN (called for wrong pcb?)", (pcb)->state == LISTEN); \ + ((struct tcp_pcb_listen *)(pcb))->backlog = ((new_backlog) ? (new_backlog) : 1); \ + } while (0) +void tcp_backlog_delayed(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +void tcp_backlog_accepted(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +#else /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ +#define tcp_backlog_set(pcb, new_backlog) +#define tcp_backlog_delayed(pcb) +#define tcp_backlog_accepted(pcb) +#endif /* TCP_LISTEN_BACKLOG */ +#define tcp_accepted(pcb) \ + do { \ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); \ + } while (0) /* compatibility define, not needed any more */ + +void tcp_recved(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u16_t len); +err_t tcp_bind(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, + u16_t port); +void tcp_bind_netif(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif); +err_t tcp_connect(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, + u16_t port, tcp_connected_fn connected); + +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_listen_with_backlog_and_err(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t backlog, err_t *err); +struct tcp_pcb *tcp_listen_with_backlog(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t backlog); +/** @ingroup tcp_raw */ +#define tcp_listen(pcb) tcp_listen_with_backlog(pcb, TCP_DEFAULT_LISTEN_BACKLOG) + +void tcp_abort(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +err_t tcp_close(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); +err_t tcp_shutdown(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int shut_rx, int shut_tx); + +err_t tcp_write(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, const void *dataptr, u16_t len, + u8_t apiflags); + +void tcp_setprio(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, u8_t prio); + +err_t tcp_output(struct tcp_pcb *pcb); + +err_t tcp_tcp_get_tcp_addrinfo(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int local, ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t *port); + +#define tcp_dbg_get_tcp_state(pcb) ((pcb)->state) + +/* for compatibility with older implementation */ +#define tcp_new_ip6() tcp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V6) + +#if LWIP_TCP_PCB_NUM_EXT_ARGS +u8_t tcp_ext_arg_alloc_id(void); +void tcp_ext_arg_set_callbacks(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id, const struct tcp_ext_arg_callbacks *const callbacks); +void tcp_ext_arg_set(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id, void *arg); +void *tcp_ext_arg_get(const struct tcp_pcb *pcb, uint8_t id); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpbase.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpbase.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpbase.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpbase.h index ca437e39..a524b53a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpbase.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpbase.h @@ -1,87 +1,87 @@ -/** - * @file - * Base TCP API definitions shared by TCP and ALTCP\n - * See also @ref tcp_raw - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCPBASE_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TCPBASE_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_WND_SCALE -typedef u32_t tcpwnd_size_t; -#else -typedef u16_t tcpwnd_size_t; -#endif - -enum tcp_state { - CLOSED = 0, - LISTEN = 1, - SYN_SENT = 2, - SYN_RCVD = 3, - ESTABLISHED = 4, - FIN_WAIT_1 = 5, - FIN_WAIT_2 = 6, - CLOSE_WAIT = 7, - CLOSING = 8, - LAST_ACK = 9, - TIME_WAIT = 10 -}; -/* ATTENTION: this depends on state number ordering! */ -#define TCP_STATE_IS_CLOSING(state) ((state) >= FIN_WAIT_1) - -/* Flags for "apiflags" parameter in tcp_write */ -#define TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY 0x01 -#define TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE 0x02 - -#define TCP_PRIO_MIN 1 -#define TCP_PRIO_NORMAL 64 -#define TCP_PRIO_MAX 127 - -const char *tcp_debug_state_str(enum tcp_state s); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCPBASE_H */ +/** + * @file + * Base TCP API definitions shared by TCP and ALTCP\n + * See also @ref tcp_raw + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCPBASE_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TCPBASE_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_TCP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_WND_SCALE +typedef u32_t tcpwnd_size_t; +#else +typedef u16_t tcpwnd_size_t; +#endif + +enum tcp_state { + CLOSED = 0, + LISTEN = 1, + SYN_SENT = 2, + SYN_RCVD = 3, + ESTABLISHED = 4, + FIN_WAIT_1 = 5, + FIN_WAIT_2 = 6, + CLOSE_WAIT = 7, + CLOSING = 8, + LAST_ACK = 9, + TIME_WAIT = 10 +}; +/* ATTENTION: this depends on state number ordering! */ +#define TCP_STATE_IS_CLOSING(state) ((state) >= FIN_WAIT_1) + +/* Flags for "apiflags" parameter in tcp_write */ +#define TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY 0x01 +#define TCP_WRITE_FLAG_MORE 0x02 + +#define TCP_PRIO_MIN 1 +#define TCP_PRIO_NORMAL 64 +#define TCP_PRIO_MAX 127 + +const char *tcp_debug_state_str(enum tcp_state s); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_TCP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCPBASE_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpip.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpip.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpip.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpip.h index 52dd5fe2..bf8640cb 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpip.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/tcpip.h @@ -1,113 +1,113 @@ -/** - * @file - * Functions to sync with TCPIP thread - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if !NO_SYS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING -/** The global semaphore to lock the stack. */ -extern sys_mutex_t lock_tcpip_core; -#if !defined LOCK_TCPIP_CORE || defined __DOXYGEN__ -/** Lock lwIP core mutex (needs @ref LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING 1) */ -#define LOCK_TCPIP_CORE() sys_mutex_lock(&lock_tcpip_core) -/** Unlock lwIP core mutex (needs @ref LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING 1) */ -#define UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE() sys_mutex_unlock(&lock_tcpip_core) -#endif /* LOCK_TCPIP_CORE */ -#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ -#define LOCK_TCPIP_CORE() -#define UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE() -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ - -struct pbuf; -struct netif; - -/** Function prototype for the init_done function passed to tcpip_init */ -typedef void (*tcpip_init_done_fn)(void *arg); -/** Function prototype for functions passed to tcpip_callback() */ -typedef void (*tcpip_callback_fn)(void *ctx); - -/* Forward declarations */ -struct tcpip_callback_msg; - -void tcpip_init(tcpip_init_done_fn tcpip_init_done, void *arg); - -err_t tcpip_inpkt(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp, netif_input_fn input_fn); -err_t tcpip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); - -err_t tcpip_try_callback(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx); -err_t tcpip_callback(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx); -/** @ingroup lwip_os - * @deprecated use tcpip_try_callback() or tcpip_callback() instead - */ -#define tcpip_callback_with_block(function, ctx, block) ((block != 0) ? tcpip_callback(function, ctx) : tcpip_try_callback(function, ctx)) - -struct tcpip_callback_msg *tcpip_callbackmsg_new(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx); -void tcpip_callbackmsg_delete(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg); -err_t tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg); -err_t tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback_fromisr(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg); - -/* free pbufs or heap memory from another context without blocking */ -err_t pbuf_free_callback(struct pbuf *p); -err_t mem_free_callback(void *m); - -#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS -err_t tcpip_timeout(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler h, void *arg); -err_t tcpip_untimeout(sys_timeout_handler h, void *arg); -#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ - -#ifdef TCPIP_THREAD_TEST -int tcpip_thread_poll_one(void); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_H */ +/** + * @file + * Functions to sync with TCPIP thread + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if !NO_SYS /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING +/** The global semaphore to lock the stack. */ +extern sys_mutex_t lock_tcpip_core; +#if !defined LOCK_TCPIP_CORE || defined __DOXYGEN__ +/** Lock lwIP core mutex (needs @ref LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING 1) */ +#define LOCK_TCPIP_CORE() sys_mutex_lock(&lock_tcpip_core) +/** Unlock lwIP core mutex (needs @ref LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING 1) */ +#define UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE() sys_mutex_unlock(&lock_tcpip_core) +#endif /* LOCK_TCPIP_CORE */ +#else /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ +#define LOCK_TCPIP_CORE() +#define UNLOCK_TCPIP_CORE() +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_CORE_LOCKING */ + +struct pbuf; +struct netif; + +/** Function prototype for the init_done function passed to tcpip_init */ +typedef void (*tcpip_init_done_fn)(void *arg); +/** Function prototype for functions passed to tcpip_callback() */ +typedef void (*tcpip_callback_fn)(void *ctx); + +/* Forward declarations */ +struct tcpip_callback_msg; + +void tcpip_init(tcpip_init_done_fn tcpip_init_done, void *arg); + +err_t tcpip_inpkt(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp, netif_input_fn input_fn); +err_t tcpip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); + +err_t tcpip_try_callback(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx); +err_t tcpip_callback(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx); +/** @ingroup lwip_os + * @deprecated use tcpip_try_callback() or tcpip_callback() instead + */ +#define tcpip_callback_with_block(function, ctx, block) ((block != 0) ? tcpip_callback(function, ctx) : tcpip_try_callback(function, ctx)) + +struct tcpip_callback_msg *tcpip_callbackmsg_new(tcpip_callback_fn function, void *ctx); +void tcpip_callbackmsg_delete(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg); +err_t tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg); +err_t tcpip_callbackmsg_trycallback_fromisr(struct tcpip_callback_msg *msg); + +/* free pbufs or heap memory from another context without blocking */ +err_t pbuf_free_callback(struct pbuf *p); +err_t mem_free_callback(void *m); + +#if LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS +err_t tcpip_timeout(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler h, void *arg); +err_t tcpip_untimeout(sys_timeout_handler h, void *arg); +#endif /* LWIP_TCPIP_TIMEOUT && LWIP_TIMERS */ + +#ifdef TCPIP_THREAD_TEST +int tcpip_thread_poll_one(void); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TCPIP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/timeouts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/timeouts.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/timeouts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/timeouts.h index d9e9a7b2..88034eb3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/timeouts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/timeouts.h @@ -1,128 +1,128 @@ -/** - * @file - * Timer implementations - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TIMEOUTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TIMEOUTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#if !NO_SYS -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#ifndef LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES -#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG -#define LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES SYS_DEBUG -#else /* LWIP_DEBUG */ -#define LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES 0 -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG*/ -#endif - -/** Returned by sys_timeouts_sleeptime() to indicate there is no timer, so we - * can sleep forever. - */ -#define SYS_TIMEOUTS_SLEEPTIME_INFINITE 0xFFFFFFFF - -/** Function prototype for a stack-internal timer function that has to be - * called at a defined interval */ -typedef void (*lwip_cyclic_timer_handler)(void); - -/** This struct contains information about a stack-internal timer function - that has to be called at a defined interval */ -struct lwip_cyclic_timer { - u32_t interval_ms; - lwip_cyclic_timer_handler handler; -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES - const char *handler_name; -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ -}; - -/** This array contains all stack-internal cyclic timers. To get the number of - * timers, use lwip_num_cyclic_timers */ -extern const struct lwip_cyclic_timer lwip_cyclic_timers[]; -/** Array size of lwip_cyclic_timers[] */ -extern const int lwip_num_cyclic_timers; - -#if LWIP_TIMERS - -/** Function prototype for a timeout callback function. Register such a function - * using sys_timeout(). - * - * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the function - set up by sys_timeout() - */ -typedef void (*sys_timeout_handler)(void *arg); - -struct sys_timeo { - struct sys_timeo *next; - u32_t time; - sys_timeout_handler h; - void *arg; -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES - const char *handler_name; -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ -}; - -void sys_timeouts_init(void); - -#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES -void sys_timeout_debug(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg, const char *handler_name); -#define sys_timeout(msecs, handler, arg) sys_timeout_debug(msecs, handler, arg, #handler) -#else /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ -void sys_timeout(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg); -#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ - -void sys_untimeout(sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg); -void sys_restart_timeouts(void); -void sys_check_timeouts(void); -u32_t sys_timeouts_sleeptime(void); - -#if LWIP_TESTMODE -struct sys_timeo **sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(void); -void lwip_cyclic_timer(void *arg); -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_TIMERS */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TIMEOUTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * Timer implementations + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TIMEOUTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TIMEOUTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#if !NO_SYS +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#ifndef LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES +#ifdef LWIP_DEBUG +#define LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES SYS_DEBUG +#else /* LWIP_DEBUG */ +#define LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES 0 +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG*/ +#endif + +/** Returned by sys_timeouts_sleeptime() to indicate there is no timer, so we + * can sleep forever. + */ +#define SYS_TIMEOUTS_SLEEPTIME_INFINITE 0xFFFFFFFF + +/** Function prototype for a stack-internal timer function that has to be + * called at a defined interval */ +typedef void (*lwip_cyclic_timer_handler)(void); + +/** This struct contains information about a stack-internal timer function + that has to be called at a defined interval */ +struct lwip_cyclic_timer { + u32_t interval_ms; + lwip_cyclic_timer_handler handler; +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES + const char *handler_name; +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ +}; + +/** This array contains all stack-internal cyclic timers. To get the number of + * timers, use lwip_num_cyclic_timers */ +extern const struct lwip_cyclic_timer lwip_cyclic_timers[]; +/** Array size of lwip_cyclic_timers[] */ +extern const int lwip_num_cyclic_timers; + +#if LWIP_TIMERS + +/** Function prototype for a timeout callback function. Register such a function + * using sys_timeout(). + * + * @param arg Additional argument to pass to the function - set up by sys_timeout() + */ +typedef void (*sys_timeout_handler)(void *arg); + +struct sys_timeo { + struct sys_timeo *next; + u32_t time; + sys_timeout_handler h; + void *arg; +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES + const char *handler_name; +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ +}; + +void sys_timeouts_init(void); + +#if LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES +void sys_timeout_debug(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg, const char *handler_name); +#define sys_timeout(msecs, handler, arg) sys_timeout_debug(msecs, handler, arg, #handler) +#else /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ +void sys_timeout(u32_t msecs, sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg); +#endif /* LWIP_DEBUG_TIMERNAMES */ + +void sys_untimeout(sys_timeout_handler handler, void *arg); +void sys_restart_timeouts(void); +void sys_check_timeouts(void); +u32_t sys_timeouts_sleeptime(void); + +#if LWIP_TESTMODE +struct sys_timeo **sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(void); +void lwip_cyclic_timer(void *arg); +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_TIMERS */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TIMEOUTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/udp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/udp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/lwip/udp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/udp.h index 3f0709c8..13ea8d19 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/lwip/udp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/lwip/udp.h @@ -1,201 +1,201 @@ -/** - * @file - * UDP API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n - * See also @ref udp_raw - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_UDP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_UDP_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_UDP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/prot/udp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM 0x01U -#define UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE 0x02U -#define UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED 0x04U -#define UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP 0x08U - -struct udp_pcb; - -/** Function prototype for udp pcb receive callback functions - * addr and port are in same byte order as in the pcb - * The callback is responsible for freeing the pbuf - * if it's not used any more. - * - * ATTENTION: Be aware that 'addr' might point into the pbuf 'p' so freeing this pbuf - * can make 'addr' invalid, too. - * - * @param arg user supplied argument (udp_pcb.recv_arg) - * @param pcb the udp_pcb which received data - * @param p the packet buffer that was received - * @param addr the remote IP address from which the packet was received - * @param port the remote port from which the packet was received - */ -typedef void (*udp_recv_fn)(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); - -/** the UDP protocol control block */ -struct udp_pcb { - /** Common members of all PCB types */ - IP_PCB; - - /* Protocol specific PCB members */ - - struct udp_pcb *next; - - u8_t flags; - /** ports are in host byte order */ - u16_t local_port, remote_port; - -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS -#if LWIP_IPV4 - /** outgoing network interface for multicast packets, by IPv4 address (if not 'any') */ - ip4_addr_t mcast_ip4; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - /** outgoing network interface for multicast packets, by interface index (if nonzero) */ - u8_t mcast_ifindex; - /** TTL for outgoing multicast packets */ - u8_t mcast_ttl; -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - -#if LWIP_UDPLITE - /** used for UDP_LITE only */ - u16_t chksum_len_rx, chksum_len_tx; -#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ - - /** receive callback function */ - udp_recv_fn recv; - /** user-supplied argument for the recv callback */ - void *recv_arg; -}; -/* udp_pcbs export for external reference (e.g. SNMP agent) */ -extern struct udp_pcb *udp_pcbs; - -/* The following functions is the application layer interface to the - UDP code. */ -struct udp_pcb *udp_new(void); -struct udp_pcb *udp_new_ip_type(u8_t type); -void udp_remove(struct udp_pcb *pcb); -err_t udp_bind(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, - u16_t port); -void udp_bind_netif(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif); -err_t udp_connect(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, - u16_t port); -void udp_disconnect(struct udp_pcb *pcb); -void udp_recv(struct udp_pcb *pcb, udp_recv_fn recv, - void *recv_arg); -err_t udp_sendto_if(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, - struct netif *netif); -err_t udp_sendto_if_src(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, - struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *src_ip); -err_t udp_sendto(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port); -err_t udp_send(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p); - -#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP -err_t udp_sendto_if_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, - struct netif *netif, u8_t have_chksum, - u16_t chksum); -err_t udp_sendto_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, - u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum); -err_t udp_send_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum); -err_t udp_sendto_if_src_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif, - u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum, const ip_addr_t *src_ip); -#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ - -#define udp_flags(pcb) ((pcb)->flags) -#define udp_setflags(pcb, f) ((pcb)->flags = (f)) - -#define udp_set_flags(pcb, set_flags) \ - do { \ - (pcb)->flags = (u8_t)((pcb)->flags | (set_flags)); \ - } while (0) -#define udp_clear_flags(pcb, clr_flags) \ - do { \ - (pcb)->flags = (u8_t)((pcb)->flags & (u8_t)(~(clr_flags)&0xff)); \ - } while (0) -#define udp_is_flag_set(pcb, flag) (((pcb)->flags & (flag)) != 0) - -/* The following functions are the lower layer interface to UDP. */ -void udp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); - -void udp_init(void); - -/* for compatibility with older implementation */ -#define udp_new_ip6() udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V6) - -#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS -#if LWIP_IPV4 -#define udp_set_multicast_netif_addr(pcb, ip4addr) ip4_addr_copy((pcb)->mcast_ip4, *(ip4addr)) -#define udp_get_multicast_netif_addr(pcb) (&(pcb)->mcast_ip4) -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#define udp_set_multicast_netif_index(pcb, idx) ((pcb)->mcast_ifindex = (idx)) -#define udp_get_multicast_netif_index(pcb) ((pcb)->mcast_ifindex) -#define udp_set_multicast_ttl(pcb, value) ((pcb)->mcast_ttl = (value)) -#define udp_get_multicast_ttl(pcb) ((pcb)->mcast_ttl) -#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ - -#if UDP_DEBUG -void udp_debug_print(struct udp_hdr *udphdr); -#else -#define udp_debug_print(udphdr) -#endif - -void udp_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_UDP_H */ +/** + * @file + * UDP API (to be used from TCPIP thread)\n + * See also @ref udp_raw + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_UDP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_UDP_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_UDP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/prot/udp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define UDP_FLAGS_NOCHKSUM 0x01U +#define UDP_FLAGS_UDPLITE 0x02U +#define UDP_FLAGS_CONNECTED 0x04U +#define UDP_FLAGS_MULTICAST_LOOP 0x08U + +struct udp_pcb; + +/** Function prototype for udp pcb receive callback functions + * addr and port are in same byte order as in the pcb + * The callback is responsible for freeing the pbuf + * if it's not used any more. + * + * ATTENTION: Be aware that 'addr' might point into the pbuf 'p' so freeing this pbuf + * can make 'addr' invalid, too. + * + * @param arg user supplied argument (udp_pcb.recv_arg) + * @param pcb the udp_pcb which received data + * @param p the packet buffer that was received + * @param addr the remote IP address from which the packet was received + * @param port the remote port from which the packet was received + */ +typedef void (*udp_recv_fn)(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); + +/** the UDP protocol control block */ +struct udp_pcb { + /** Common members of all PCB types */ + IP_PCB; + + /* Protocol specific PCB members */ + + struct udp_pcb *next; + + u8_t flags; + /** ports are in host byte order */ + u16_t local_port, remote_port; + +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS +#if LWIP_IPV4 + /** outgoing network interface for multicast packets, by IPv4 address (if not 'any') */ + ip4_addr_t mcast_ip4; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + /** outgoing network interface for multicast packets, by interface index (if nonzero) */ + u8_t mcast_ifindex; + /** TTL for outgoing multicast packets */ + u8_t mcast_ttl; +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + +#if LWIP_UDPLITE + /** used for UDP_LITE only */ + u16_t chksum_len_rx, chksum_len_tx; +#endif /* LWIP_UDPLITE */ + + /** receive callback function */ + udp_recv_fn recv; + /** user-supplied argument for the recv callback */ + void *recv_arg; +}; +/* udp_pcbs export for external reference (e.g. SNMP agent) */ +extern struct udp_pcb *udp_pcbs; + +/* The following functions is the application layer interface to the + UDP code. */ +struct udp_pcb *udp_new(void); +struct udp_pcb *udp_new_ip_type(u8_t type); +void udp_remove(struct udp_pcb *pcb); +err_t udp_bind(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, + u16_t port); +void udp_bind_netif(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const struct netif *netif); +err_t udp_connect(struct udp_pcb *pcb, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, + u16_t port); +void udp_disconnect(struct udp_pcb *pcb); +void udp_recv(struct udp_pcb *pcb, udp_recv_fn recv, + void *recv_arg); +err_t udp_sendto_if(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, + struct netif *netif); +err_t udp_sendto_if_src(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, + struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *src_ip); +err_t udp_sendto(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port); +err_t udp_send(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p); + +#if LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP +err_t udp_sendto_if_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, + struct netif *netif, u8_t have_chksum, + u16_t chksum); +err_t udp_sendto_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, + u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum); +err_t udp_send_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum); +err_t udp_sendto_if_src_chksum(struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *dst_ip, u16_t dst_port, struct netif *netif, + u8_t have_chksum, u16_t chksum, const ip_addr_t *src_ip); +#endif /* LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY && CHECKSUM_GEN_UDP */ + +#define udp_flags(pcb) ((pcb)->flags) +#define udp_setflags(pcb, f) ((pcb)->flags = (f)) + +#define udp_set_flags(pcb, set_flags) \ + do { \ + (pcb)->flags = (u8_t)((pcb)->flags | (set_flags)); \ + } while (0) +#define udp_clear_flags(pcb, clr_flags) \ + do { \ + (pcb)->flags = (u8_t)((pcb)->flags & (u8_t)(~(clr_flags)&0xff)); \ + } while (0) +#define udp_is_flag_set(pcb, flag) (((pcb)->flags & (flag)) != 0) + +/* The following functions are the lower layer interface to UDP. */ +void udp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); + +void udp_init(void); + +/* for compatibility with older implementation */ +#define udp_new_ip6() udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_V6) + +#if LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS +#if LWIP_IPV4 +#define udp_set_multicast_netif_addr(pcb, ip4addr) ip4_addr_copy((pcb)->mcast_ip4, *(ip4addr)) +#define udp_get_multicast_netif_addr(pcb) (&(pcb)->mcast_ip4) +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#define udp_set_multicast_netif_index(pcb, idx) ((pcb)->mcast_ifindex = (idx)) +#define udp_get_multicast_netif_index(pcb) ((pcb)->mcast_ifindex) +#define udp_set_multicast_ttl(pcb, value) ((pcb)->mcast_ttl = (value)) +#define udp_get_multicast_ttl(pcb) ((pcb)->mcast_ttl) +#endif /* LWIP_MULTICAST_TX_OPTIONS */ + +#if UDP_DEBUG +void udp_debug_print(struct udp_hdr *udphdr); +#else +#define udp_debug_print(udphdr) +#endif + +void udp_netif_ip_addr_changed(const ip_addr_t *old_addr, const ip_addr_t *new_addr); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_UDP_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif.h index 1960ccda..56ba565d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif.h @@ -1,133 +1,133 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP netif implementing an IEEE 802.1D MAC Bridge - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_H - -#include "netif/bridgeif_opts.h" - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct netif; - -#if (BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 0) || (BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS >= 64) -#error BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS must be [1..63] -#elif BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 8 -typedef u8_t bridgeif_portmask_t; -#elif BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 16 -typedef u16_t bridgeif_portmask_t; -#elif BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 32 -typedef u32_t bridgeif_portmask_t; -#elif BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 64 -typedef u64_t bridgeif_portmask_t; -#endif - -#define BR_FLOOD ((bridgeif_portmask_t)-1) - -/** @ingroup bridgeif - * Initialisation data for @ref bridgeif_init. - * An instance of this type must be passed as parameter 'state' to @ref netif_add - * when the bridge is added. - */ -typedef struct bridgeif_initdata_s { - /** MAC address of the bridge (cannot use the netif's addresses) */ - struct eth_addr ethaddr; - /** Maximum number of ports in the bridge (ports are stored in an array, this - influences memory allocated for netif->state of the bridge netif). */ - u8_t max_ports; - /** Maximum number of dynamic/learning entries in the bridge's forwarding database. - In the default implementation, this controls memory consumption only. */ - u16_t max_fdb_dynamic_entries; - /** Maximum number of static forwarding entries. Influences memory consumption! */ - u16_t max_fdb_static_entries; -} bridgeif_initdata_t; - -/** @ingroup bridgeif - * Use this for constant initialization of a bridgeif_initdat_t - * (ethaddr must be passed as ETH_ADDR()) - */ -#define BRIDGEIF_INITDATA1(max_ports, max_fdb_dynamic_entries, max_fdb_static_entries, ethaddr) \ - { \ - ethaddr, max_ports, max_fdb_dynamic_entries, max_fdb_static_entries \ - } -/** @ingroup bridgeif - * Use this for constant initialization of a bridgeif_initdat_t - * (each byte of ethaddr must be passed) - */ -#define BRIDGEIF_INITDATA2(max_ports, max_fdb_dynamic_entries, max_fdb_static_entries, e0, e1, e2, e3, e4, e5) \ - { \ - { e0, e1, e2, e3, e4, e5 }, max_ports, max_fdb_dynamic_entries, max_fdb_static_entries \ - } - -err_t bridgeif_init(struct netif *netif); -err_t bridgeif_add_port(struct netif *bridgeif, struct netif *portif); -err_t bridgeif_fdb_add(struct netif *bridgeif, const struct eth_addr *addr, bridgeif_portmask_t ports); -err_t bridgeif_fdb_remove(struct netif *bridgeif, const struct eth_addr *addr); - -/* FDB interface, can be replaced by own implementation */ -void bridgeif_fdb_update_src(void *fdb_ptr, struct eth_addr *src_addr, u8_t port_idx); -bridgeif_portmask_t bridgeif_fdb_get_dst_ports(void *fdb_ptr, struct eth_addr *dst_addr); -void *bridgeif_fdb_init(u16_t max_fdb_entries); - -#if BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT -#ifndef BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT -/* define bridgeif protection to sys_arch_protect... */ -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#define BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) -#define BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) -#define BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) -#define BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev) -#define BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev) -#endif -#else /* BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT */ -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#define BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev) -#define BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev) -#define BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev) -#define BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev) -#define BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev) -#endif /* BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_H */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP netif implementing an IEEE 802.1D MAC Bridge + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_H + +#include "netif/bridgeif_opts.h" + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct netif; + +#if (BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 0) || (BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS >= 64) +#error BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS must be [1..63] +#elif BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 8 +typedef u8_t bridgeif_portmask_t; +#elif BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 16 +typedef u16_t bridgeif_portmask_t; +#elif BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 32 +typedef u32_t bridgeif_portmask_t; +#elif BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS < 64 +typedef u64_t bridgeif_portmask_t; +#endif + +#define BR_FLOOD ((bridgeif_portmask_t)-1) + +/** @ingroup bridgeif + * Initialisation data for @ref bridgeif_init. + * An instance of this type must be passed as parameter 'state' to @ref netif_add + * when the bridge is added. + */ +typedef struct bridgeif_initdata_s { + /** MAC address of the bridge (cannot use the netif's addresses) */ + struct eth_addr ethaddr; + /** Maximum number of ports in the bridge (ports are stored in an array, this + influences memory allocated for netif->state of the bridge netif). */ + u8_t max_ports; + /** Maximum number of dynamic/learning entries in the bridge's forwarding database. + In the default implementation, this controls memory consumption only. */ + u16_t max_fdb_dynamic_entries; + /** Maximum number of static forwarding entries. Influences memory consumption! */ + u16_t max_fdb_static_entries; +} bridgeif_initdata_t; + +/** @ingroup bridgeif + * Use this for constant initialization of a bridgeif_initdat_t + * (ethaddr must be passed as ETH_ADDR()) + */ +#define BRIDGEIF_INITDATA1(max_ports, max_fdb_dynamic_entries, max_fdb_static_entries, ethaddr) \ + { \ + ethaddr, max_ports, max_fdb_dynamic_entries, max_fdb_static_entries \ + } +/** @ingroup bridgeif + * Use this for constant initialization of a bridgeif_initdat_t + * (each byte of ethaddr must be passed) + */ +#define BRIDGEIF_INITDATA2(max_ports, max_fdb_dynamic_entries, max_fdb_static_entries, e0, e1, e2, e3, e4, e5) \ + { \ + { e0, e1, e2, e3, e4, e5 }, max_ports, max_fdb_dynamic_entries, max_fdb_static_entries \ + } + +err_t bridgeif_init(struct netif *netif); +err_t bridgeif_add_port(struct netif *bridgeif, struct netif *portif); +err_t bridgeif_fdb_add(struct netif *bridgeif, const struct eth_addr *addr, bridgeif_portmask_t ports); +err_t bridgeif_fdb_remove(struct netif *bridgeif, const struct eth_addr *addr); + +/* FDB interface, can be replaced by own implementation */ +void bridgeif_fdb_update_src(void *fdb_ptr, struct eth_addr *src_addr, u8_t port_idx); +bridgeif_portmask_t bridgeif_fdb_get_dst_ports(void *fdb_ptr, struct eth_addr *dst_addr); +void *bridgeif_fdb_init(u16_t max_fdb_entries); + +#if BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT +#ifndef BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT +/* define bridgeif protection to sys_arch_protect... */ +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#define BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) +#define BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) +#define BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) +#define BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev) +#define BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev) +#endif +#else /* BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT */ +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#define BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev) +#define BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev) +#define BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev) +#define BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev) +#define BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev) +#endif /* BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif_opts.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif_opts.h index 45f9d5d7..37110c3c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/bridgeif_opts.h @@ -1,90 +1,90 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP netif implementing an IEEE 802.1D MAC Bridge - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -/** - * @defgroup bridgeif_opts Options - * @ingroup bridgeif - * @{ - */ - -/** BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT==1: set port netif's 'input' function - * to call directly into bridgeif code and on top of that, directly call into - * the selected forwarding port's 'linkoutput' function. - * This means that the bridgeif input/output path is protected from concurrent access - * but as well, *all* bridge port netif's drivers must correctly handle concurrent access! - * == 0: get into tcpip_thread for every input packet (no multithreading) - * ATTENTION: as ==0 relies on tcpip.h, the default depends on NO_SYS setting - */ -#ifndef BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT -#define BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT NO_SYS -#endif - -/** BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS: this is used to create a typedef used for forwarding - * bit-fields: the number of bits required is this + 1 (for the internal/cpu port) - * (63 is the maximum, resulting in an u64_t for the bit mask) - * ATTENTION: this controls the maximum number of the implementation only! - * The max. number of ports per bridge must still be passed via netif_add parameter! - */ -#ifndef BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS -#define BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS 7 -#endif - -/** BRIDGEIF_DEBUG: Enable generic debugging in bridgeif.c. */ -#ifndef BRIDGEIF_DEBUG -#define BRIDGEIF_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** BRIDGEIF_DEBUG: Enable FDB debugging in bridgeif.c. */ -#ifndef BRIDGEIF_FDB_DEBUG -#define BRIDGEIF_FDB_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** BRIDGEIF_DEBUG: Enable forwarding debugging in bridgeif.c. */ -#ifndef BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG -#define BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * @} - */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_OPTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP netif implementing an IEEE 802.1D MAC Bridge + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +/** + * @defgroup bridgeif_opts Options + * @ingroup bridgeif + * @{ + */ + +/** BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT==1: set port netif's 'input' function + * to call directly into bridgeif code and on top of that, directly call into + * the selected forwarding port's 'linkoutput' function. + * This means that the bridgeif input/output path is protected from concurrent access + * but as well, *all* bridge port netif's drivers must correctly handle concurrent access! + * == 0: get into tcpip_thread for every input packet (no multithreading) + * ATTENTION: as ==0 relies on tcpip.h, the default depends on NO_SYS setting + */ +#ifndef BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT +#define BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT NO_SYS +#endif + +/** BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS: this is used to create a typedef used for forwarding + * bit-fields: the number of bits required is this + 1 (for the internal/cpu port) + * (63 is the maximum, resulting in an u64_t for the bit mask) + * ATTENTION: this controls the maximum number of the implementation only! + * The max. number of ports per bridge must still be passed via netif_add parameter! + */ +#ifndef BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS +#define BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS 7 +#endif + +/** BRIDGEIF_DEBUG: Enable generic debugging in bridgeif.c. */ +#ifndef BRIDGEIF_DEBUG +#define BRIDGEIF_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** BRIDGEIF_DEBUG: Enable FDB debugging in bridgeif.c. */ +#ifndef BRIDGEIF_FDB_DEBUG +#define BRIDGEIF_FDB_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** BRIDGEIF_DEBUG: Enable forwarding debugging in bridgeif.c. */ +#ifndef BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG +#define BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * @} + */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_BRIDGEIF_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/etharp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/etharp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/etharp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/etharp.h index c00de049..b536fd28 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/etharp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/etharp.h @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ -/* ARP has been moved to core/ipv4, provide this #include for compatibility only */ -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "netif/ethernet.h" +/* ARP has been moved to core/ipv4, provide this #include for compatibility only */ +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "netif/ethernet.h" diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ethernet.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ethernet.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ethernet.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ethernet.h index 88753cd3..f3145287 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ethernet.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ethernet.h @@ -1,77 +1,77 @@ -/** - * @file - * Ethernet input function - handles INCOMING ethernet level traffic - * To be used in most low-level netif implementations - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Leon Woestenberg - * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHERNET_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHERNET_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET - -/** Define this to 1 and define LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF_FN(pbuf, netif, type) - * to a filter function that returns the correct netif when using multiple - * netifs on one hardware interface where the netif's low-level receive - * routine cannot decide for the correct netif (e.g. when mapping multiple - * IP addresses to one hardware interface). - */ -#ifndef LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF -#define LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF 0 -#endif - -err_t ethernet_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif); -err_t ethernet_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const struct eth_addr *src, const struct eth_addr *dst, u16_t eth_type); - -extern const struct eth_addr ethbroadcast, ethzero; - -#endif /* LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHERNET_H */ +/** + * @file + * Ethernet input function - handles INCOMING ethernet level traffic + * To be used in most low-level netif implementations + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Leon Woestenberg + * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHERNET_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHERNET_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET + +/** Define this to 1 and define LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF_FN(pbuf, netif, type) + * to a filter function that returns the correct netif when using multiple + * netifs on one hardware interface where the netif's low-level receive + * routine cannot decide for the correct netif (e.g. when mapping multiple + * IP addresses to one hardware interface). + */ +#ifndef LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF +#define LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF 0 +#endif + +err_t ethernet_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif); +err_t ethernet_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const struct eth_addr *src, const struct eth_addr *dst, u16_t eth_type); + +extern const struct eth_addr ethbroadcast, ethzero; + +#endif /* LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_ETHERNET_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ieee802154.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ieee802154.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ieee802154.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ieee802154.h index 0f23c1be..282399cb 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ieee802154.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ieee802154.h @@ -1,112 +1,112 @@ -/** - * @file - * Definitions for IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frames - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_IEEE802154_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_IEEE802154_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -/** General MAC frame format - * This shows the full featured header, mainly for documentation. - * Some fields are omitted or shortened to achieve frame compression. - */ -struct ieee_802154_hdr { - /** See IEEE_802154_FC_* defines */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t frame_control); - /** Sequence number is omitted if IEEE_802154_FC_SEQNO_SUPPR is set in frame_control */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t sequence_number); - /** Destination PAN ID is omitted if Destination Addressing Mode is 0 */ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t destination_pan_id); - /** Destination Address is omitted if Destination Addressing Mode is 0 */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t destination_address[8]); - /** Source PAN ID is omitted if Source Addressing Mode is 0 - or if IEEE_802154_FC_PANID_COMPR is set in frame control*/ - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t source_pan_id); - /** Source Address is omitted if Source Addressing Mode is 0 */ - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t source_address[8]); - /* The rest is variable */ -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/* Addressing modes (2 bits) */ -#define IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_NO_ADDR 0x00 /* PAN ID and address fields are not present */ -#define IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_RESERVED 0x01 /* Reserved */ -#define IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_SHORT 0x02 /* Address field contains a short address (16 bit) */ -#define IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_EXT 0x03 /* Address field contains an extended address (64 bit) */ - -/* IEEE 802.15.4 Frame Control definitions (2 bytes; see IEEE 802.15.4-2015 ch. 7.2.1) */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_MASK 0x0007 /* bits 0..2: Frame Type */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_BEACON 0x00 -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_DATA 0x01 -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_ACK 0x02 -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_MAC_CMD 0x03 -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_RESERVED 0x04 -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_MULTIPURPOSE 0x05 -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_FRAG 0x06 -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_EXT 0x07 -#define IEEE_802154_FC_SEC_EN 0x0008 /* bit 3: Security Enabled */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_PEND 0x0010 /* bit 4: Frame Pending */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_ACK_REQ 0x0020 /* bit 5: AR (ACK required) */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_PANID_COMPR 0x0040 /* bit 6: PAN ID Compression (src and dst are equal, src PAN ID omitted) */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_RESERVED 0x0080 -#define IEEE_802154_FC_SEQNO_SUPPR 0x0100 /* bit 8: Sequence Number Suppression */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_IE_PRESENT 0x0200 /* bit 9: IE Present */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_MASK 0x0c00 /* bits 10..11: Destination Addressing Mode */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_NO_ADDR (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_NO_ADDR << 10) -#define IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_SHORT (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_SHORT << 10) -#define IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_EXT (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_EXT << 10) -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_VERSION_MASK 0x3000 /* bits 12..13: Frame Version */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_VERSION_GET(x) (((x)&IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_VERSION_MASK) >> 12) -#define IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_MASK 0xc000 /* bits 14..15: Source Addressing Mode */ -#define IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_SHORT (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_SHORT << 14) -#define IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_EXT (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_EXT << 14) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_IEEE802154_H */ +/** + * @file + * Definitions for IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frames + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_IEEE802154_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_IEEE802154_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +/** General MAC frame format + * This shows the full featured header, mainly for documentation. + * Some fields are omitted or shortened to achieve frame compression. + */ +struct ieee_802154_hdr { + /** See IEEE_802154_FC_* defines */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t frame_control); + /** Sequence number is omitted if IEEE_802154_FC_SEQNO_SUPPR is set in frame_control */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t sequence_number); + /** Destination PAN ID is omitted if Destination Addressing Mode is 0 */ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t destination_pan_id); + /** Destination Address is omitted if Destination Addressing Mode is 0 */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t destination_address[8]); + /** Source PAN ID is omitted if Source Addressing Mode is 0 + or if IEEE_802154_FC_PANID_COMPR is set in frame control*/ + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t source_pan_id); + /** Source Address is omitted if Source Addressing Mode is 0 */ + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t source_address[8]); + /* The rest is variable */ +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/* Addressing modes (2 bits) */ +#define IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_NO_ADDR 0x00 /* PAN ID and address fields are not present */ +#define IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_RESERVED 0x01 /* Reserved */ +#define IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_SHORT 0x02 /* Address field contains a short address (16 bit) */ +#define IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_EXT 0x03 /* Address field contains an extended address (64 bit) */ + +/* IEEE 802.15.4 Frame Control definitions (2 bytes; see IEEE 802.15.4-2015 ch. 7.2.1) */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_MASK 0x0007 /* bits 0..2: Frame Type */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_BEACON 0x00 +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_DATA 0x01 +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_ACK 0x02 +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_MAC_CMD 0x03 +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_RESERVED 0x04 +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_MULTIPURPOSE 0x05 +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_FRAG 0x06 +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FT_EXT 0x07 +#define IEEE_802154_FC_SEC_EN 0x0008 /* bit 3: Security Enabled */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_PEND 0x0010 /* bit 4: Frame Pending */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_ACK_REQ 0x0020 /* bit 5: AR (ACK required) */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_PANID_COMPR 0x0040 /* bit 6: PAN ID Compression (src and dst are equal, src PAN ID omitted) */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_RESERVED 0x0080 +#define IEEE_802154_FC_SEQNO_SUPPR 0x0100 /* bit 8: Sequence Number Suppression */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_IE_PRESENT 0x0200 /* bit 9: IE Present */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_MASK 0x0c00 /* bits 10..11: Destination Addressing Mode */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_NO_ADDR (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_NO_ADDR << 10) +#define IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_SHORT (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_SHORT << 10) +#define IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_EXT (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_EXT << 10) +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_VERSION_MASK 0x3000 /* bits 12..13: Frame Version */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_VERSION_GET(x) (((x)&IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_VERSION_MASK) >> 12) +#define IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_MASK 0xc000 /* bits 14..15: Source Addressing Mode */ +#define IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_SHORT (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_SHORT << 14) +#define IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_EXT (IEEE_802154_ADDR_MODE_EXT << 14) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_IEEE802154_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6.h index 20b04d14..3d1a7ed6 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6.h @@ -1,89 +1,89 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * 6LowPAN output for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. Fragments packets to 6LowPAN units. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_H - -#include "netif/lowpan6_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - -#include "netif/lowpan6_common.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** 1 second period for reassembly */ -#define LOWPAN6_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 - -void lowpan6_tmr(void); - -err_t lowpan6_set_context(u8_t idx, const ip6_addr_t *context); -err_t lowpan6_set_short_addr(u8_t addr_high, u8_t addr_low); - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -err_t lowpan4_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -err_t lowpan6_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); -err_t lowpan6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif); -err_t lowpan6_if_init(struct netif *netif); - -/* pan_id in network byte order. */ -err_t lowpan6_set_pan_id(u16_t pan_id); - -u16_t lowpan6_calc_crc(const void *buf, u16_t len); - -#if !NO_SYS -err_t tcpip_6lowpan_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * 6LowPAN output for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. Fragments packets to 6LowPAN units. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_H + +#include "netif/lowpan6_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + +#include "netif/lowpan6_common.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** 1 second period for reassembly */ +#define LOWPAN6_TMR_INTERVAL 1000 + +void lowpan6_tmr(void); + +err_t lowpan6_set_context(u8_t idx, const ip6_addr_t *context); +err_t lowpan6_set_short_addr(u8_t addr_high, u8_t addr_low); + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +err_t lowpan4_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +err_t lowpan6_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); +err_t lowpan6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif); +err_t lowpan6_if_init(struct netif *netif); + +/* pan_id in network byte order. */ +err_t lowpan6_set_pan_id(u16_t pan_id); + +u16_t lowpan6_calc_crc(const void *buf, u16_t len); + +#if !NO_SYS +err_t tcpip_6lowpan_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_ble.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_ble.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_ble.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_ble.h index 1bb9ff38..538a0cff 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_ble.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_ble.h @@ -1,78 +1,78 @@ -/** - * @file - * 6LowPAN over BLE for IPv6 (RFC7668). - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Benjamin Aigner - * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. , Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Benjamin Aigner - * - * Based on the original 6lowpan implementation of lwIP ( @see 6lowpan.c) - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_BLE_H -#define LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_BLE_H - -#include "netif/lowpan6_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "netif/lowpan6_common.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -err_t rfc7668_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); -err_t rfc7668_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif); -err_t rfc7668_set_local_addr_eui64(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *local_addr, size_t local_addr_len); -err_t rfc7668_set_local_addr_mac48(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *local_addr, size_t local_addr_len, int is_public_addr); -err_t rfc7668_set_peer_addr_eui64(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *peer_addr, size_t peer_addr_len); -err_t rfc7668_set_peer_addr_mac48(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *peer_addr, size_t peer_addr_len, int is_public_addr); -err_t rfc7668_set_context(u8_t index, const ip6_addr_t *context); -err_t rfc7668_if_init(struct netif *netif); - -#if !NO_SYS -err_t tcpip_rfc7668_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -#endif - -void ble_addr_to_eui64(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, int public_addr); -void eui64_to_ble_addr(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_BLE_H */ +/** + * @file + * 6LowPAN over BLE for IPv6 (RFC7668). + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Benjamin Aigner + * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. , Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Benjamin Aigner + * + * Based on the original 6lowpan implementation of lwIP ( @see 6lowpan.c) + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_BLE_H +#define LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_BLE_H + +#include "netif/lowpan6_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "netif/lowpan6_common.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +err_t rfc7668_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr); +err_t rfc7668_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif); +err_t rfc7668_set_local_addr_eui64(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *local_addr, size_t local_addr_len); +err_t rfc7668_set_local_addr_mac48(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *local_addr, size_t local_addr_len, int is_public_addr); +err_t rfc7668_set_peer_addr_eui64(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *peer_addr, size_t peer_addr_len); +err_t rfc7668_set_peer_addr_mac48(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *peer_addr, size_t peer_addr_len, int is_public_addr); +err_t rfc7668_set_context(u8_t index, const ip6_addr_t *context); +err_t rfc7668_if_init(struct netif *netif); + +#if !NO_SYS +err_t tcpip_rfc7668_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +#endif + +void ble_addr_to_eui64(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, int public_addr); +void eui64_to_ble_addr(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_BLE_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_common.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_common.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_common.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_common.h index 7972e8a2..4598540c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_common.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_common.h @@ -1,82 +1,82 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * Common 6LowPAN routines for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. Fragments packets to 6LowPAN units. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_COMMON_H -#define LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_COMMON_H - -#include "netif/lowpan6_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if IPv6 is disabled in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** Helper define for a link layer address, which can be encoded as 0, 2 or 8 bytes */ -struct lowpan6_link_addr { - /* encoded length of the address */ - u8_t addr_len; - /* address bytes */ - u8_t addr[8]; -}; - -s8_t lowpan6_get_address_mode(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *mac_addr); - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC -err_t lowpan6_compress_headers(struct netif *netif, u8_t *inbuf, size_t inbuf_size, u8_t *outbuf, size_t outbuf_size, - u8_t *lowpan6_header_len_out, u8_t *hidden_header_len_out, ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, - const struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *dst); -struct pbuf *lowpan6_decompress(struct pbuf *p, u16_t datagram_size, ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, - struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, struct lowpan6_link_addr *dest); -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_COMMON_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * Common 6LowPAN routines for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. Fragments packets to 6LowPAN units. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_COMMON_H +#define LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_COMMON_H + +#include "netif/lowpan6_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* don't build if IPv6 is disabled in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Helper define for a link layer address, which can be encoded as 0, 2 or 8 bytes */ +struct lowpan6_link_addr { + /* encoded length of the address */ + u8_t addr_len; + /* address bytes */ + u8_t addr[8]; +}; + +s8_t lowpan6_get_address_mode(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *mac_addr); + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC +err_t lowpan6_compress_headers(struct netif *netif, u8_t *inbuf, size_t inbuf_size, u8_t *outbuf, size_t outbuf_size, + u8_t *lowpan6_header_len_out, u8_t *hidden_header_len_out, ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, + const struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *dst); +struct pbuf *lowpan6_decompress(struct pbuf *p, u16_t datagram_size, ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, + struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, struct lowpan6_link_addr *dest); +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_opts.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_opts.h index 4e1118bb..df957214 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/lowpan6_opts.h @@ -1,121 +1,121 @@ -/** - * @file - * 6LowPAN options list - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -/** LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS: define the number of compression - * contexts per netif type - */ -#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS -#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS 10 -#endif - -/** LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS: set this to 0 to disable creating - * short addresses for matching addresses (debug only) - */ -#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS -#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS 1 -#endif - -/** LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC: set this to 0 to disable IP header compression as per - * RFC 6282 (which is mandatory for BLE) - */ -#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC -#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC 1 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 if your IEEE 802.15.4 interface can calculate and check the - * CRC in hardware. This means TX packets get 2 zero bytes added on transmission - * which are to be filled with the CRC. - */ -#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_802154_HW_CRC -#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_802154_HW_CRC 0 -#endif - -/** If LWIP_6LOWPAN_802154_HW_CRC==0, this can override the default slow - * implementation of the CRC used for 6LoWPAN over IEEE 802.15.4 (which uses - * a shift register). - */ -#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_CALC_CRC -#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_CALC_CRC(buf, len) lowpan6_calc_crc(buf, len) -#endif - -/** Debug level for 6LoWPAN in general */ -#ifndef LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG -#define LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** Debug level for 6LoWPAN over IEEE 802.15.4 */ -#ifndef LWIP_LOWPAN6_802154_DEBUG -#define LWIP_LOWPAN6_802154_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG: enable compressed IP frame - * output debugging - */ -#ifndef LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG -#define LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG: enable decompression debug output - */ -#ifndef LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG -#define LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG: enable decompressed IP frame - * output debugging */ -#ifndef LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG -#define LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS: - * Currently, the linux kernel driver for 6lowpan sets/clears a bit in - * the address, depending on the BD address (either public or not). - * Might not be RFC7668 conform, so you may select to do that (=1) or - * not (=0) */ -#ifndef LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS -#define LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS 1 -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_OPTS_H */ +/** + * @file + * 6LowPAN options list + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +/** LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS: define the number of compression + * contexts per netif type + */ +#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS +#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS 10 +#endif + +/** LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS: set this to 0 to disable creating + * short addresses for matching addresses (debug only) + */ +#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS +#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS 1 +#endif + +/** LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC: set this to 0 to disable IP header compression as per + * RFC 6282 (which is mandatory for BLE) + */ +#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC +#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC 1 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 if your IEEE 802.15.4 interface can calculate and check the + * CRC in hardware. This means TX packets get 2 zero bytes added on transmission + * which are to be filled with the CRC. + */ +#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_802154_HW_CRC +#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_802154_HW_CRC 0 +#endif + +/** If LWIP_6LOWPAN_802154_HW_CRC==0, this can override the default slow + * implementation of the CRC used for 6LoWPAN over IEEE 802.15.4 (which uses + * a shift register). + */ +#ifndef LWIP_6LOWPAN_CALC_CRC +#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_CALC_CRC(buf, len) lowpan6_calc_crc(buf, len) +#endif + +/** Debug level for 6LoWPAN in general */ +#ifndef LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG +#define LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** Debug level for 6LoWPAN over IEEE 802.15.4 */ +#ifndef LWIP_LOWPAN6_802154_DEBUG +#define LWIP_LOWPAN6_802154_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG: enable compressed IP frame + * output debugging + */ +#ifndef LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG +#define LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG: enable decompression debug output + */ +#ifndef LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG +#define LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG: enable decompressed IP frame + * output debugging */ +#ifndef LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG +#define LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS: + * Currently, the linux kernel driver for 6lowpan sets/clears a bit in + * the address, depending on the BD address (either public or not). + * Might not be RFC7668 conform, so you may select to do that (=1) or + * not (=0) */ +#ifndef LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS +#define LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS 1 +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LOWPAN6_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ccp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ccp.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ccp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ccp.h index a1c35bdd..dd44c7e9 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ccp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ccp.h @@ -1,164 +1,164 @@ -/* - * ccp.h - Definitions for PPP Compression Control Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 1994-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: ccp.h,v 1.12 2004/11/04 10:02:26 paulus Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && CCP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef CCP_H -#define CCP_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * CCP codes. - */ - -#define CCP_CONFREQ 1 -#define CCP_CONFACK 2 -#define CCP_TERMREQ 5 -#define CCP_TERMACK 6 -#define CCP_RESETREQ 14 -#define CCP_RESETACK 15 - -/* - * Max # bytes for a CCP option - */ - -#define CCP_MAX_OPTION_LENGTH 32 - -/* - * Parts of a CCP packet. - */ - -#define CCP_CODE(dp) ((dp)[0]) -#define CCP_ID(dp) ((dp)[1]) -#define CCP_LENGTH(dp) (((dp)[2] << 8) + (dp)[3]) -#define CCP_HDRLEN 4 - -#define CCP_OPT_CODE(dp) ((dp)[0]) -#define CCP_OPT_LENGTH(dp) ((dp)[1]) -#define CCP_OPT_MINLEN 2 - -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT -/* - * Definitions for BSD-Compress. - */ - -#define CI_BSD_COMPRESS 21 /* config. option for BSD-Compress */ -#define CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS 3 /* length of config. option */ - -/* Macros for handling the 3rd byte of the BSD-Compress config option. */ -#define BSD_NBITS(x) ((x)&0x1F) /* number of bits requested */ -#define BSD_VERSION(x) ((x) >> 5) /* version of option format */ -#define BSD_CURRENT_VERSION 1 /* current version number */ -#define BSD_MAKE_OPT(v, n) (((v) << 5) | (n)) - -#define BSD_MIN_BITS 9 /* smallest code size supported */ -#define BSD_MAX_BITS 15 /* largest code size supported */ -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ - -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT -/* - * Definitions for Deflate. - */ - -#define CI_DEFLATE 26 /* config option for Deflate */ -#define CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT 24 /* value used in original draft RFC */ -#define CILEN_DEFLATE 4 /* length of its config option */ - -#define DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE 9 -#define DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE 15 -#define DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL 8 -#define DEFLATE_SIZE(x) (((x) >> 4) + 8) -#define DEFLATE_METHOD(x) ((x)&0x0F) -#define DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(w) ((((w)-8) << 4) + DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL) -#define DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE 0 -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -/* - * Definitions for MPPE. - */ - -#define CI_MPPE 18 /* config option for MPPE */ -#define CILEN_MPPE 6 /* length of config option */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT -/* - * Definitions for other, as yet unsupported, compression methods. - */ - -#define CI_PREDICTOR_1 1 /* config option for Predictor-1 */ -#define CILEN_PREDICTOR_1 2 /* length of its config option */ -#define CI_PREDICTOR_2 2 /* config option for Predictor-2 */ -#define CILEN_PREDICTOR_2 2 /* length of its config option */ -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ - -typedef struct ccp_options { -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - unsigned int deflate : 1; /* do Deflate? */ - unsigned int deflate_correct : 1; /* use correct code for deflate? */ - unsigned int deflate_draft : 1; /* use draft RFC code for deflate? */ -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - unsigned int bsd_compress : 1; /* do BSD Compress? */ -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - unsigned int predictor_1 : 1; /* do Predictor-1? */ - unsigned int predictor_2 : 1; /* do Predictor-2? */ -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - u8_t mppe; /* MPPE bitfield */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - u_short bsd_bits; /* # bits/code for BSD Compress */ -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - u_short deflate_size; /* lg(window size) for Deflate */ -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ - u8_t method; /* code for chosen compression method */ -} ccp_options; - -extern const struct protent ccp_protent; - -void ccp_resetrequest(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* Issue a reset-request. */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* CCP_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CCP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * ccp.h - Definitions for PPP Compression Control Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 1994-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: ccp.h,v 1.12 2004/11/04 10:02:26 paulus Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && CCP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef CCP_H +#define CCP_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * CCP codes. + */ + +#define CCP_CONFREQ 1 +#define CCP_CONFACK 2 +#define CCP_TERMREQ 5 +#define CCP_TERMACK 6 +#define CCP_RESETREQ 14 +#define CCP_RESETACK 15 + +/* + * Max # bytes for a CCP option + */ + +#define CCP_MAX_OPTION_LENGTH 32 + +/* + * Parts of a CCP packet. + */ + +#define CCP_CODE(dp) ((dp)[0]) +#define CCP_ID(dp) ((dp)[1]) +#define CCP_LENGTH(dp) (((dp)[2] << 8) + (dp)[3]) +#define CCP_HDRLEN 4 + +#define CCP_OPT_CODE(dp) ((dp)[0]) +#define CCP_OPT_LENGTH(dp) ((dp)[1]) +#define CCP_OPT_MINLEN 2 + +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT +/* + * Definitions for BSD-Compress. + */ + +#define CI_BSD_COMPRESS 21 /* config. option for BSD-Compress */ +#define CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS 3 /* length of config. option */ + +/* Macros for handling the 3rd byte of the BSD-Compress config option. */ +#define BSD_NBITS(x) ((x)&0x1F) /* number of bits requested */ +#define BSD_VERSION(x) ((x) >> 5) /* version of option format */ +#define BSD_CURRENT_VERSION 1 /* current version number */ +#define BSD_MAKE_OPT(v, n) (((v) << 5) | (n)) + +#define BSD_MIN_BITS 9 /* smallest code size supported */ +#define BSD_MAX_BITS 15 /* largest code size supported */ +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ + +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT +/* + * Definitions for Deflate. + */ + +#define CI_DEFLATE 26 /* config option for Deflate */ +#define CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT 24 /* value used in original draft RFC */ +#define CILEN_DEFLATE 4 /* length of its config option */ + +#define DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE 9 +#define DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE 15 +#define DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL 8 +#define DEFLATE_SIZE(x) (((x) >> 4) + 8) +#define DEFLATE_METHOD(x) ((x)&0x0F) +#define DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(w) ((((w)-8) << 4) + DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL) +#define DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE 0 +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +/* + * Definitions for MPPE. + */ + +#define CI_MPPE 18 /* config option for MPPE */ +#define CILEN_MPPE 6 /* length of config option */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT +/* + * Definitions for other, as yet unsupported, compression methods. + */ + +#define CI_PREDICTOR_1 1 /* config option for Predictor-1 */ +#define CILEN_PREDICTOR_1 2 /* length of its config option */ +#define CI_PREDICTOR_2 2 /* config option for Predictor-2 */ +#define CILEN_PREDICTOR_2 2 /* length of its config option */ +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ + +typedef struct ccp_options { +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + unsigned int deflate : 1; /* do Deflate? */ + unsigned int deflate_correct : 1; /* use correct code for deflate? */ + unsigned int deflate_draft : 1; /* use draft RFC code for deflate? */ +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + unsigned int bsd_compress : 1; /* do BSD Compress? */ +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + unsigned int predictor_1 : 1; /* do Predictor-1? */ + unsigned int predictor_2 : 1; /* do Predictor-2? */ +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + u8_t mppe; /* MPPE bitfield */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + u_short bsd_bits; /* # bits/code for BSD Compress */ +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + u_short deflate_size; /* lg(window size) for Deflate */ +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ + u8_t method; /* code for chosen compression method */ +} ccp_options; + +extern const struct protent ccp_protent; + +void ccp_resetrequest(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* Issue a reset-request. */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* CCP_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CCP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-md5.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-md5.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-md5.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-md5.h index c95d11dd..5be0c84b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-md5.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-md5.h @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ -/* - * chap-md5.h - New CHAP/MD5 implementation. - * - * Copyright (c) 2003 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -extern const struct chap_digest_type md5_digest; - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * chap-md5.h - New CHAP/MD5 implementation. + * + * Copyright (c) 2003 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +extern const struct chap_digest_type md5_digest; + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-new.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-new.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-new.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-new.h index d46ff246..dec5a3c6 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-new.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap-new.h @@ -1,200 +1,200 @@ -/* - * chap-new.c - New CHAP implementation. - * - * Copyright (c) 2003 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef CHAP_H -#define CHAP_H - -#include "ppp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * CHAP packets begin with a standard header with code, id, len (2 bytes). - */ -#define CHAP_HDRLEN 4 - -/* - * Values for the code field. - */ -#define CHAP_CHALLENGE 1 -#define CHAP_RESPONSE 2 -#define CHAP_SUCCESS 3 -#define CHAP_FAILURE 4 - -/* - * CHAP digest codes. - */ -#define CHAP_MD5 5 -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_MICROSOFT 0x80 -#define CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2 0x81 -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * Semi-arbitrary limits on challenge and response fields. - */ -#define MAX_CHALLENGE_LEN 64 -#define MAX_RESPONSE_LEN 64 - -/* - * These limits apply to challenge and response packets we send. - * The +4 is the +1 that we actually need rounded up. - */ -#define CHAL_MAX_PKTLEN (PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN + 4 + MAX_CHALLENGE_LEN + MAXNAMELEN) -#define RESP_MAX_PKTLEN (PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN + 4 + MAX_RESPONSE_LEN + MAXNAMELEN) - -/* bitmask of supported algorithms */ -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#define MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2 0x1 -#define MDTYPE_MICROSOFT 0x2 -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define MDTYPE_MD5 0x4 -#define MDTYPE_NONE 0 - -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -/* Return the digest alg. ID for the most preferred digest type. */ -#define CHAP_DIGEST(mdtype) \ - ((mdtype)&MDTYPE_MD5) ? CHAP_MD5 : \ - ((mdtype)&MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2) ? CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2 : \ - ((mdtype)&MDTYPE_MICROSOFT) ? CHAP_MICROSOFT : \ - 0 -#else /* !MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define CHAP_DIGEST(mdtype) \ - ((mdtype)&MDTYPE_MD5) ? CHAP_MD5 : \ - 0 -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - -/* Return the bit flag (lsb set) for our most preferred digest type. */ -#define CHAP_MDTYPE(mdtype) ((mdtype) ^ ((mdtype)-1)) & (mdtype) - -/* Return the bit flag for a given digest algorithm ID. */ -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_MDTYPE_D(digest) \ - ((digest) == CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2) ? MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2 : \ - ((digest) == CHAP_MICROSOFT) ? MDTYPE_MICROSOFT : \ - ((digest) == CHAP_MD5) ? MDTYPE_MD5 : \ - 0 -#else /* !MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define CHAP_MDTYPE_D(digest) \ - ((digest) == CHAP_MD5) ? MDTYPE_MD5 : \ - 0 -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - -/* Can we do the requested digest? */ -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_CANDIGEST(mdtype, digest) \ - ((digest) == CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2) ? (mdtype)&MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2 : \ - ((digest) == CHAP_MICROSOFT) ? (mdtype)&MDTYPE_MICROSOFT : \ - ((digest) == CHAP_MD5) ? (mdtype)&MDTYPE_MD5 : \ - 0 -#else /* !MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define CHAP_CANDIGEST(mdtype, digest) \ - ((digest) == CHAP_MD5) ? (mdtype)&MDTYPE_MD5 : \ - 0 -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * The code for each digest type has to supply one of these. - */ -struct chap_digest_type { - int code; - -#if PPP_SERVER - /* - * Note: challenge and response arguments below are formatted as - * a length byte followed by the actual challenge/response data. - */ - void (*generate_challenge)(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *challenge); - int (*verify_response)(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, const char *name, - const unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, - const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - void (*make_response)(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *response, int id, const char *our_name, - const unsigned char *challenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *priv); - int (*check_success)(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *pkt, int len, unsigned char *priv); - void (*handle_failure)(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *pkt, int len); -}; - -/* - * Each interface is described by chap structure. - */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -typedef struct chap_client_state { - u8_t flags; - const char *name; - const struct chap_digest_type *digest; - unsigned char priv[64]; /* private area for digest's use */ -} chap_client_state; - -#if PPP_SERVER -typedef struct chap_server_state { - u8_t flags; - u8_t id; - const char *name; - const struct chap_digest_type *digest; - int challenge_xmits; - int challenge_pktlen; - unsigned char challenge[CHAL_MAX_PKTLEN]; -} chap_server_state; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* Hook for a plugin to validate CHAP challenge */ -extern int (*chap_verify_hook)(char *name, char *ourname, int id, - const struct chap_digest_type *digest, - unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* Called by authentication code to start authenticating the peer. */ -extern void chap_auth_peer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *our_name, int digest_code); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* Called by auth. code to start authenticating us to the peer. */ -extern void chap_auth_with_peer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *our_name, int digest_code); - -/* Represents the CHAP protocol to the main pppd code */ -extern const struct protent chap_protent; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* CHAP_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * chap-new.c - New CHAP implementation. + * + * Copyright (c) 2003 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef CHAP_H +#define CHAP_H + +#include "ppp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * CHAP packets begin with a standard header with code, id, len (2 bytes). + */ +#define CHAP_HDRLEN 4 + +/* + * Values for the code field. + */ +#define CHAP_CHALLENGE 1 +#define CHAP_RESPONSE 2 +#define CHAP_SUCCESS 3 +#define CHAP_FAILURE 4 + +/* + * CHAP digest codes. + */ +#define CHAP_MD5 5 +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_MICROSOFT 0x80 +#define CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2 0x81 +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Semi-arbitrary limits on challenge and response fields. + */ +#define MAX_CHALLENGE_LEN 64 +#define MAX_RESPONSE_LEN 64 + +/* + * These limits apply to challenge and response packets we send. + * The +4 is the +1 that we actually need rounded up. + */ +#define CHAL_MAX_PKTLEN (PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN + 4 + MAX_CHALLENGE_LEN + MAXNAMELEN) +#define RESP_MAX_PKTLEN (PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN + 4 + MAX_RESPONSE_LEN + MAXNAMELEN) + +/* bitmask of supported algorithms */ +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#define MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2 0x1 +#define MDTYPE_MICROSOFT 0x2 +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define MDTYPE_MD5 0x4 +#define MDTYPE_NONE 0 + +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +/* Return the digest alg. ID for the most preferred digest type. */ +#define CHAP_DIGEST(mdtype) \ + ((mdtype)&MDTYPE_MD5) ? CHAP_MD5 : \ + ((mdtype)&MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2) ? CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2 : \ + ((mdtype)&MDTYPE_MICROSOFT) ? CHAP_MICROSOFT : \ + 0 +#else /* !MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define CHAP_DIGEST(mdtype) \ + ((mdtype)&MDTYPE_MD5) ? CHAP_MD5 : \ + 0 +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + +/* Return the bit flag (lsb set) for our most preferred digest type. */ +#define CHAP_MDTYPE(mdtype) ((mdtype) ^ ((mdtype)-1)) & (mdtype) + +/* Return the bit flag for a given digest algorithm ID. */ +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_MDTYPE_D(digest) \ + ((digest) == CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2) ? MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2 : \ + ((digest) == CHAP_MICROSOFT) ? MDTYPE_MICROSOFT : \ + ((digest) == CHAP_MD5) ? MDTYPE_MD5 : \ + 0 +#else /* !MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define CHAP_MDTYPE_D(digest) \ + ((digest) == CHAP_MD5) ? MDTYPE_MD5 : \ + 0 +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + +/* Can we do the requested digest? */ +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_CANDIGEST(mdtype, digest) \ + ((digest) == CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2) ? (mdtype)&MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2 : \ + ((digest) == CHAP_MICROSOFT) ? (mdtype)&MDTYPE_MICROSOFT : \ + ((digest) == CHAP_MD5) ? (mdtype)&MDTYPE_MD5 : \ + 0 +#else /* !MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define CHAP_CANDIGEST(mdtype, digest) \ + ((digest) == CHAP_MD5) ? (mdtype)&MDTYPE_MD5 : \ + 0 +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * The code for each digest type has to supply one of these. + */ +struct chap_digest_type { + int code; + +#if PPP_SERVER + /* + * Note: challenge and response arguments below are formatted as + * a length byte followed by the actual challenge/response data. + */ + void (*generate_challenge)(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *challenge); + int (*verify_response)(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, const char *name, + const unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, + const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + void (*make_response)(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *response, int id, const char *our_name, + const unsigned char *challenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *priv); + int (*check_success)(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *pkt, int len, unsigned char *priv); + void (*handle_failure)(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *pkt, int len); +}; + +/* + * Each interface is described by chap structure. + */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +typedef struct chap_client_state { + u8_t flags; + const char *name; + const struct chap_digest_type *digest; + unsigned char priv[64]; /* private area for digest's use */ +} chap_client_state; + +#if PPP_SERVER +typedef struct chap_server_state { + u8_t flags; + u8_t id; + const char *name; + const struct chap_digest_type *digest; + int challenge_xmits; + int challenge_pktlen; + unsigned char challenge[CHAL_MAX_PKTLEN]; +} chap_server_state; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* Hook for a plugin to validate CHAP challenge */ +extern int (*chap_verify_hook)(char *name, char *ourname, int id, + const struct chap_digest_type *digest, + unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* Called by authentication code to start authenticating the peer. */ +extern void chap_auth_peer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *our_name, int digest_code); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* Called by auth. code to start authenticating us to the peer. */ +extern void chap_auth_with_peer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *our_name, int digest_code); + +/* Represents the CHAP protocol to the main pppd code */ +extern const struct protent chap_protent; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* CHAP_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap_ms.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap_ms.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap_ms.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap_ms.h index 2cb44b9d..baaa198b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap_ms.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/chap_ms.h @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ -/* - * chap_ms.h - Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol definitions. - * - * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: chap_ms.h,v 1.13 2004/11/15 22:13:26 paulus Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef CHAPMS_INCLUDE -#define CHAPMS_INCLUDE - -extern const struct chap_digest_type chapms_digest; -extern const struct chap_digest_type chapms2_digest; - -#endif /* CHAPMS_INCLUDE */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * chap_ms.h - Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol definitions. + * + * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: chap_ms.h,v 1.13 2004/11/15 22:13:26 paulus Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef CHAPMS_INCLUDE +#define CHAPMS_INCLUDE + +extern const struct chap_digest_type chapms_digest; +extern const struct chap_digest_type chapms2_digest; + +#endif /* CHAPMS_INCLUDE */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eap.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eap.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eap.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eap.h index 08325994..4469690b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eap.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eap.h @@ -1,168 +1,168 @@ -/* - * eap.h - Extensible Authentication Protocol for PPP (RFC 2284) - * - * Copyright (c) 2001 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Non-exclusive rights to redistribute, modify, translate, and use - * this software in source and binary forms, in whole or in part, is - * hereby granted, provided that the above copyright notice is - * duplicated in any source form, and that neither the name of the - * copyright holder nor the author is used to endorse or promote - * products derived from this software. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - * - * Original version by James Carlson - * - * $Id: eap.h,v 1.2 2003/06/11 23:56:26 paulus Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef PPP_EAP_H -#define PPP_EAP_H - -#include "ppp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * Packet header = Code, id, length. - */ -#define EAP_HEADERLEN 4 - -/* EAP message codes. */ -#define EAP_REQUEST 1 -#define EAP_RESPONSE 2 -#define EAP_SUCCESS 3 -#define EAP_FAILURE 4 - -/* EAP types */ -#define EAPT_IDENTITY 1 -#define EAPT_NOTIFICATION 2 -#define EAPT_NAK 3 /* (response only) */ -#define EAPT_MD5CHAP 4 -#define EAPT_OTP 5 /* One-Time Password; RFC 1938 */ -#define EAPT_TOKEN 6 /* Generic Token Card */ -/* 7 and 8 are unassigned. */ -#define EAPT_RSA 9 /* RSA Public Key Authentication */ -#define EAPT_DSS 10 /* DSS Unilateral */ -#define EAPT_KEA 11 /* KEA */ -#define EAPT_KEA_VALIDATE 12 /* KEA-VALIDATE */ -#define EAPT_TLS 13 /* EAP-TLS */ -#define EAPT_DEFENDER 14 /* Defender Token (AXENT) */ -#define EAPT_W2K 15 /* Windows 2000 EAP */ -#define EAPT_ARCOT 16 /* Arcot Systems */ -#define EAPT_CISCOWIRELESS 17 /* Cisco Wireless */ -#define EAPT_NOKIACARD 18 /* Nokia IP smart card */ -#define EAPT_SRP 19 /* Secure Remote Password */ -/* 20 is deprecated */ - -/* EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtypes */ -#define EAPSRP_CHALLENGE 1 /* Request 1 - Challenge */ -#define EAPSRP_CKEY 1 /* Response 1 - Client Key */ -#define EAPSRP_SKEY 2 /* Request 2 - Server Key */ -#define EAPSRP_CVALIDATOR 2 /* Response 2 - Client Validator */ -#define EAPSRP_SVALIDATOR 3 /* Request 3 - Server Validator */ -#define EAPSRP_ACK 3 /* Response 3 - final ack */ -#define EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE 4 /* Req/resp 4 - Lightweight rechal */ - -#define SRPVAL_EBIT 0x00000001 /* Use shared key for ECP */ - -#define SRP_PSEUDO_ID "pseudo_" -#define SRP_PSEUDO_LEN 7 - -#define MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE 16 -#define EAP_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 17 -#define EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 24 -#define EAP_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 3 /* 2^3-1 = 7, 17+7 = 24 */ - -#define EAP_STATES \ - "Initial", "Pending", "Closed", "Listen", "Identify", \ - "SRP1", "SRP2", "SRP3", "MD5Chall", "Open", "SRP4", "BadAuth" - -#define eap_client_active(pcb) ((pcb)->eap.es_client.ea_state == eapListen) -#if PPP_SERVER -#define eap_server_active(pcb) \ - ((pcb)->eap.es_server.ea_state >= eapIdentify && \ - (pcb)->eap.es_server.ea_state <= eapMD5Chall) -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * Complete EAP state for one PPP session. - */ -enum eap_state_code { - eapInitial = 0, /* No EAP authentication yet requested */ - eapPending, /* Waiting for LCP (no timer) */ - eapClosed, /* Authentication not in use */ - eapListen, /* Client ready (and timer running) */ - eapIdentify, /* EAP Identify sent */ - eapSRP1, /* Sent EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtype 1 */ - eapSRP2, /* Sent EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtype 2 */ - eapSRP3, /* Sent EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtype 3 */ - eapMD5Chall, /* Sent MD5-Challenge */ - eapOpen, /* Completed authentication */ - eapSRP4, /* Sent EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtype 4 */ - eapBadAuth /* Failed authentication */ -}; - -struct eap_auth { - const char *ea_name; /* Our name */ - char ea_peer[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; /* Peer's name */ - void *ea_session; /* Authentication library linkage */ - u_char *ea_skey; /* Shared encryption key */ - u_short ea_namelen; /* Length of our name */ - u_short ea_peerlen; /* Length of peer's name */ - enum eap_state_code ea_state; - u_char ea_id; /* Current id */ - u_char ea_requests; /* Number of Requests sent/received */ - u_char ea_responses; /* Number of Responses */ - u_char ea_type; /* One of EAPT_* */ - u32_t ea_keyflags; /* SRP shared key usage flags */ -}; - -#ifndef EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH -#define EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 24 -#endif -typedef struct eap_state { - struct eap_auth es_client; /* Client (authenticatee) data */ -#if PPP_SERVER - struct eap_auth es_server; /* Server (authenticator) data */ -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - int es_savedtime; /* Saved timeout */ - int es_rechallenge; /* EAP rechallenge interval */ - int es_lwrechallenge; /* SRP lightweight rechallenge inter */ - u8_t es_usepseudo; /* Use SRP Pseudonym if offered one */ - int es_usedpseudo; /* Set if we already sent PN */ - int es_challen; /* Length of challenge string */ - u_char es_challenge[EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH]; -} eap_state; - -/* - * Timeouts. - */ -#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ -#define EAP_DEFTIMEOUT 3 /* Timeout (seconds) for rexmit */ -#define EAP_DEFTRANSMITS 10 /* max # times to transmit */ -#define EAP_DEFREQTIME 20 /* Time to wait for peer request */ -#define EAP_DEFALLOWREQ 20 /* max # times to accept requests */ -#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ - -void eap_authwithpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *localname); -void eap_authpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *localname); - -extern const struct protent eap_protent; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* PPP_EAP_H */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * eap.h - Extensible Authentication Protocol for PPP (RFC 2284) + * + * Copyright (c) 2001 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Non-exclusive rights to redistribute, modify, translate, and use + * this software in source and binary forms, in whole or in part, is + * hereby granted, provided that the above copyright notice is + * duplicated in any source form, and that neither the name of the + * copyright holder nor the author is used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + * + * Original version by James Carlson + * + * $Id: eap.h,v 1.2 2003/06/11 23:56:26 paulus Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef PPP_EAP_H +#define PPP_EAP_H + +#include "ppp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Packet header = Code, id, length. + */ +#define EAP_HEADERLEN 4 + +/* EAP message codes. */ +#define EAP_REQUEST 1 +#define EAP_RESPONSE 2 +#define EAP_SUCCESS 3 +#define EAP_FAILURE 4 + +/* EAP types */ +#define EAPT_IDENTITY 1 +#define EAPT_NOTIFICATION 2 +#define EAPT_NAK 3 /* (response only) */ +#define EAPT_MD5CHAP 4 +#define EAPT_OTP 5 /* One-Time Password; RFC 1938 */ +#define EAPT_TOKEN 6 /* Generic Token Card */ +/* 7 and 8 are unassigned. */ +#define EAPT_RSA 9 /* RSA Public Key Authentication */ +#define EAPT_DSS 10 /* DSS Unilateral */ +#define EAPT_KEA 11 /* KEA */ +#define EAPT_KEA_VALIDATE 12 /* KEA-VALIDATE */ +#define EAPT_TLS 13 /* EAP-TLS */ +#define EAPT_DEFENDER 14 /* Defender Token (AXENT) */ +#define EAPT_W2K 15 /* Windows 2000 EAP */ +#define EAPT_ARCOT 16 /* Arcot Systems */ +#define EAPT_CISCOWIRELESS 17 /* Cisco Wireless */ +#define EAPT_NOKIACARD 18 /* Nokia IP smart card */ +#define EAPT_SRP 19 /* Secure Remote Password */ +/* 20 is deprecated */ + +/* EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtypes */ +#define EAPSRP_CHALLENGE 1 /* Request 1 - Challenge */ +#define EAPSRP_CKEY 1 /* Response 1 - Client Key */ +#define EAPSRP_SKEY 2 /* Request 2 - Server Key */ +#define EAPSRP_CVALIDATOR 2 /* Response 2 - Client Validator */ +#define EAPSRP_SVALIDATOR 3 /* Request 3 - Server Validator */ +#define EAPSRP_ACK 3 /* Response 3 - final ack */ +#define EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE 4 /* Req/resp 4 - Lightweight rechal */ + +#define SRPVAL_EBIT 0x00000001 /* Use shared key for ECP */ + +#define SRP_PSEUDO_ID "pseudo_" +#define SRP_PSEUDO_LEN 7 + +#define MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE 16 +#define EAP_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 17 +#define EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 24 +#define EAP_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 3 /* 2^3-1 = 7, 17+7 = 24 */ + +#define EAP_STATES \ + "Initial", "Pending", "Closed", "Listen", "Identify", \ + "SRP1", "SRP2", "SRP3", "MD5Chall", "Open", "SRP4", "BadAuth" + +#define eap_client_active(pcb) ((pcb)->eap.es_client.ea_state == eapListen) +#if PPP_SERVER +#define eap_server_active(pcb) \ + ((pcb)->eap.es_server.ea_state >= eapIdentify && \ + (pcb)->eap.es_server.ea_state <= eapMD5Chall) +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * Complete EAP state for one PPP session. + */ +enum eap_state_code { + eapInitial = 0, /* No EAP authentication yet requested */ + eapPending, /* Waiting for LCP (no timer) */ + eapClosed, /* Authentication not in use */ + eapListen, /* Client ready (and timer running) */ + eapIdentify, /* EAP Identify sent */ + eapSRP1, /* Sent EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtype 1 */ + eapSRP2, /* Sent EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtype 2 */ + eapSRP3, /* Sent EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtype 3 */ + eapMD5Chall, /* Sent MD5-Challenge */ + eapOpen, /* Completed authentication */ + eapSRP4, /* Sent EAP SRP-SHA1 Subtype 4 */ + eapBadAuth /* Failed authentication */ +}; + +struct eap_auth { + const char *ea_name; /* Our name */ + char ea_peer[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; /* Peer's name */ + void *ea_session; /* Authentication library linkage */ + u_char *ea_skey; /* Shared encryption key */ + u_short ea_namelen; /* Length of our name */ + u_short ea_peerlen; /* Length of peer's name */ + enum eap_state_code ea_state; + u_char ea_id; /* Current id */ + u_char ea_requests; /* Number of Requests sent/received */ + u_char ea_responses; /* Number of Responses */ + u_char ea_type; /* One of EAPT_* */ + u32_t ea_keyflags; /* SRP shared key usage flags */ +}; + +#ifndef EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH +#define EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 24 +#endif +typedef struct eap_state { + struct eap_auth es_client; /* Client (authenticatee) data */ +#if PPP_SERVER + struct eap_auth es_server; /* Server (authenticator) data */ +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + int es_savedtime; /* Saved timeout */ + int es_rechallenge; /* EAP rechallenge interval */ + int es_lwrechallenge; /* SRP lightweight rechallenge inter */ + u8_t es_usepseudo; /* Use SRP Pseudonym if offered one */ + int es_usedpseudo; /* Set if we already sent PN */ + int es_challen; /* Length of challenge string */ + u_char es_challenge[EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH]; +} eap_state; + +/* + * Timeouts. + */ +#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ +#define EAP_DEFTIMEOUT 3 /* Timeout (seconds) for rexmit */ +#define EAP_DEFTRANSMITS 10 /* max # times to transmit */ +#define EAP_DEFREQTIME 20 /* Time to wait for peer request */ +#define EAP_DEFALLOWREQ 20 /* max # times to accept requests */ +#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ + +void eap_authwithpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *localname); +void eap_authpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *localname); + +extern const struct protent eap_protent; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PPP_EAP_H */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ecp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ecp.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ecp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ecp.h index 6a56e3a4..b39a14de 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ecp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ecp.h @@ -1,62 +1,62 @@ -/* - * ecp.h - Definitions for PPP Encryption Control Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: ecp.h,v 1.2 2003/01/10 07:12:36 fcusack Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && ECP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef ECP_H -#define ECP_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -typedef struct ecp_options { - bool required; /* Is ECP required? */ - unsigned enctype; /* Encryption type */ -} ecp_options; - -extern fsm ecp_fsm[]; -extern ecp_options ecp_wantoptions[]; -extern ecp_options ecp_gotoptions[]; -extern ecp_options ecp_allowoptions[]; -extern ecp_options ecp_hisoptions[]; - -extern const struct protent ecp_protent; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* ECP_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && ECP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * ecp.h - Definitions for PPP Encryption Control Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: ecp.h,v 1.2 2003/01/10 07:12:36 fcusack Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && ECP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef ECP_H +#define ECP_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef struct ecp_options { + bool required; /* Is ECP required? */ + unsigned enctype; /* Encryption type */ +} ecp_options; + +extern fsm ecp_fsm[]; +extern ecp_options ecp_wantoptions[]; +extern ecp_options ecp_gotoptions[]; +extern ecp_options ecp_allowoptions[]; +extern ecp_options ecp_hisoptions[]; + +extern const struct protent ecp_protent; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ECP_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && ECP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eui64.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eui64.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eui64.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eui64.h index 4400c8fd..9da8e4e3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eui64.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/eui64.h @@ -1,107 +1,107 @@ -/* - * eui64.h - EUI64 routines for IPv6CP. - * - * Copyright (c) 1999 Tommi Komulainen. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Tommi Komulainen - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: eui64.h,v 1.6 2002/12/04 23:03:32 paulus Exp $ -*/ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef EUI64_H -#define EUI64_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * @todo: - * - * Maybe this should be done by processing struct in6_addr directly... - */ -typedef union { - u8_t e8[8]; - u16_t e16[4]; - u32_t e32[2]; -} eui64_t; - -#define eui64_iszero(e) (((e).e32[0] | (e).e32[1]) == 0) -#define eui64_equals(e, o) (((e).e32[0] == (o).e32[0]) && \ - ((e).e32[1] == (o).e32[1])) -#define eui64_zero(e) (e).e32[0] = (e).e32[1] = 0; - -#define eui64_copy(s, d) memcpy(&(d), &(s), sizeof(eui64_t)) - -#define eui64_magic(e) \ - do { \ - (e).e32[0] = magic(); \ - (e).e32[1] = magic(); \ - (e).e8[0] &= ~2; \ - } while (0) -#define eui64_magic_nz(x) \ - do { \ - eui64_magic(x); \ - } while (eui64_iszero(x)) -#define eui64_magic_ne(x, y) \ - do { \ - eui64_magic(x); \ - } while (eui64_equals(x, y)) - -#define eui64_get(ll, cp) \ - do { \ - eui64_copy((*cp), (ll)); \ - (cp) += sizeof(eui64_t); \ - } while (0) - -#define eui64_put(ll, cp) \ - do { \ - eui64_copy((ll), (*cp)); \ - (cp) += sizeof(eui64_t); \ - } while (0) - -#define eui64_set32(e, l) \ - do { \ - (e).e32[0] = 0; \ - (e).e32[1] = lwip_htonl(l); \ - } while (0) -#define eui64_setlo32(e, l) eui64_set32(e, l) - -char *eui64_ntoa(eui64_t); /* Returns ascii representation of id */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* EUI64_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +/* + * eui64.h - EUI64 routines for IPv6CP. + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Tommi Komulainen. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Tommi Komulainen + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: eui64.h,v 1.6 2002/12/04 23:03:32 paulus Exp $ +*/ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef EUI64_H +#define EUI64_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * @todo: + * + * Maybe this should be done by processing struct in6_addr directly... + */ +typedef union { + u8_t e8[8]; + u16_t e16[4]; + u32_t e32[2]; +} eui64_t; + +#define eui64_iszero(e) (((e).e32[0] | (e).e32[1]) == 0) +#define eui64_equals(e, o) (((e).e32[0] == (o).e32[0]) && \ + ((e).e32[1] == (o).e32[1])) +#define eui64_zero(e) (e).e32[0] = (e).e32[1] = 0; + +#define eui64_copy(s, d) memcpy(&(d), &(s), sizeof(eui64_t)) + +#define eui64_magic(e) \ + do { \ + (e).e32[0] = magic(); \ + (e).e32[1] = magic(); \ + (e).e8[0] &= ~2; \ + } while (0) +#define eui64_magic_nz(x) \ + do { \ + eui64_magic(x); \ + } while (eui64_iszero(x)) +#define eui64_magic_ne(x, y) \ + do { \ + eui64_magic(x); \ + } while (eui64_equals(x, y)) + +#define eui64_get(ll, cp) \ + do { \ + eui64_copy((*cp), (ll)); \ + (cp) += sizeof(eui64_t); \ + } while (0) + +#define eui64_put(ll, cp) \ + do { \ + eui64_copy((ll), (*cp)); \ + (cp) += sizeof(eui64_t); \ + } while (0) + +#define eui64_set32(e, l) \ + do { \ + (e).e32[0] = 0; \ + (e).e32[1] = lwip_htonl(l); \ + } while (0) +#define eui64_setlo32(e, l) eui64_set32(e, l) + +char *eui64_ntoa(eui64_t); /* Returns ascii representation of id */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* EUI64_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/fsm.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/fsm.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/fsm.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/fsm.h index e19fe2bb..d5ae3604 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/fsm.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/fsm.h @@ -1,175 +1,175 @@ -/* - * fsm.h - {Link, IP} Control Protocol Finite State Machine definitions. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: fsm.h,v 1.10 2004/11/13 02:28:15 paulus Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef FSM_H -#define FSM_H - -#include "ppp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * Packet header = Code, id, length. - */ -#define HEADERLEN 4 - -/* - * CP (LCP, IPCP, etc.) codes. - */ -#define CONFREQ 1 /* Configuration Request */ -#define CONFACK 2 /* Configuration Ack */ -#define CONFNAK 3 /* Configuration Nak */ -#define CONFREJ 4 /* Configuration Reject */ -#define TERMREQ 5 /* Termination Request */ -#define TERMACK 6 /* Termination Ack */ -#define CODEREJ 7 /* Code Reject */ - -/* - * Each FSM is described by an fsm structure and fsm callbacks. - */ -typedef struct fsm { - ppp_pcb *pcb; /* PPP Interface */ - const struct fsm_callbacks *callbacks; /* Callback routines */ - const char *term_reason; /* Reason for closing protocol */ - u8_t seen_ack; /* Have received valid Ack/Nak/Rej to Req */ - /* -- This is our only flag, we might use u_int :1 if we have more flags */ - u16_t protocol; /* Data Link Layer Protocol field value */ - u8_t state; /* State */ - u8_t flags; /* Contains option bits */ - u8_t id; /* Current id */ - u8_t reqid; /* Current request id */ - u8_t retransmits; /* Number of retransmissions left */ - u8_t nakloops; /* Number of nak loops since last ack */ - u8_t rnakloops; /* Number of naks received */ - u8_t maxnakloops; /* Maximum number of nak loops tolerated - (necessary because IPCP require a custom large max nak loops value) */ - u8_t term_reason_len; /* Length of term_reason */ -} fsm; - -typedef struct fsm_callbacks { - void(*resetci) /* Reset our Configuration Information */ - (fsm *); - int(*cilen) /* Length of our Configuration Information */ - (fsm *); - void(*addci) /* Add our Configuration Information */ - (fsm *, u_char *, int *); - int(*ackci) /* ACK our Configuration Information */ - (fsm *, u_char *, int); - int(*nakci) /* NAK our Configuration Information */ - (fsm *, u_char *, int, int); - int(*rejci) /* Reject our Configuration Information */ - (fsm *, u_char *, int); - int(*reqci) /* Request peer's Configuration Information */ - (fsm *, u_char *, int *, int); - void(*up) /* Called when fsm reaches PPP_FSM_OPENED state */ - (fsm *); - void(*down) /* Called when fsm leaves PPP_FSM_OPENED state */ - (fsm *); - void(*starting) /* Called when we want the lower layer */ - (fsm *); - void(*finished) /* Called when we don't want the lower layer */ - (fsm *); - void(*protreject) /* Called when Protocol-Reject received */ - (int); - void(*retransmit) /* Retransmission is necessary */ - (fsm *); - int(*extcode) /* Called when unknown code received */ - (fsm *, int, int, u_char *, int); - const char *proto_name; /* String name for protocol (for messages) */ -} fsm_callbacks; - -/* - * Link states. - */ -#define PPP_FSM_INITIAL 0 /* Down, hasn't been opened */ -#define PPP_FSM_STARTING 1 /* Down, been opened */ -#define PPP_FSM_CLOSED 2 /* Up, hasn't been opened */ -#define PPP_FSM_STOPPED 3 /* Open, waiting for down event */ -#define PPP_FSM_CLOSING 4 /* Terminating the connection, not open */ -#define PPP_FSM_STOPPING 5 /* Terminating, but open */ -#define PPP_FSM_REQSENT 6 /* We've sent a Config Request */ -#define PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD 7 /* We've received a Config Ack */ -#define PPP_FSM_ACKSENT 8 /* We've sent a Config Ack */ -#define PPP_FSM_OPENED 9 /* Connection available */ - -/* - * Flags - indicate options controlling FSM operation - */ -#define OPT_PASSIVE 1 /* Don't die if we don't get a response */ -#define OPT_RESTART 2 /* Treat 2nd OPEN as DOWN, UP */ -#define OPT_SILENT 4 /* Wait for peer to speak first */ - -/* - * Timeouts. - */ -#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ -#define DEFTIMEOUT 3 /* Timeout time in seconds */ -#define DEFMAXTERMREQS 2 /* Maximum Terminate-Request transmissions */ -#define DEFMAXCONFREQS 10 /* Maximum Configure-Request transmissions */ -#define DEFMAXNAKLOOPS 5 /* Maximum number of nak loops */ -#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ - -/* - * Prototypes - */ -void fsm_init(fsm *f); -void fsm_lowerup(fsm *f); -void fsm_lowerdown(fsm *f); -void fsm_open(fsm *f); -void fsm_close(fsm *f, const char *reason); -void fsm_input(fsm *f, u_char *inpacket, int l); -void fsm_protreject(fsm *f); -void fsm_sdata(fsm *f, u_char code, u_char id, const u_char *data, int datalen); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* FSM_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * fsm.h - {Link, IP} Control Protocol Finite State Machine definitions. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: fsm.h,v 1.10 2004/11/13 02:28:15 paulus Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef FSM_H +#define FSM_H + +#include "ppp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Packet header = Code, id, length. + */ +#define HEADERLEN 4 + +/* + * CP (LCP, IPCP, etc.) codes. + */ +#define CONFREQ 1 /* Configuration Request */ +#define CONFACK 2 /* Configuration Ack */ +#define CONFNAK 3 /* Configuration Nak */ +#define CONFREJ 4 /* Configuration Reject */ +#define TERMREQ 5 /* Termination Request */ +#define TERMACK 6 /* Termination Ack */ +#define CODEREJ 7 /* Code Reject */ + +/* + * Each FSM is described by an fsm structure and fsm callbacks. + */ +typedef struct fsm { + ppp_pcb *pcb; /* PPP Interface */ + const struct fsm_callbacks *callbacks; /* Callback routines */ + const char *term_reason; /* Reason for closing protocol */ + u8_t seen_ack; /* Have received valid Ack/Nak/Rej to Req */ + /* -- This is our only flag, we might use u_int :1 if we have more flags */ + u16_t protocol; /* Data Link Layer Protocol field value */ + u8_t state; /* State */ + u8_t flags; /* Contains option bits */ + u8_t id; /* Current id */ + u8_t reqid; /* Current request id */ + u8_t retransmits; /* Number of retransmissions left */ + u8_t nakloops; /* Number of nak loops since last ack */ + u8_t rnakloops; /* Number of naks received */ + u8_t maxnakloops; /* Maximum number of nak loops tolerated + (necessary because IPCP require a custom large max nak loops value) */ + u8_t term_reason_len; /* Length of term_reason */ +} fsm; + +typedef struct fsm_callbacks { + void(*resetci) /* Reset our Configuration Information */ + (fsm *); + int(*cilen) /* Length of our Configuration Information */ + (fsm *); + void(*addci) /* Add our Configuration Information */ + (fsm *, u_char *, int *); + int(*ackci) /* ACK our Configuration Information */ + (fsm *, u_char *, int); + int(*nakci) /* NAK our Configuration Information */ + (fsm *, u_char *, int, int); + int(*rejci) /* Reject our Configuration Information */ + (fsm *, u_char *, int); + int(*reqci) /* Request peer's Configuration Information */ + (fsm *, u_char *, int *, int); + void(*up) /* Called when fsm reaches PPP_FSM_OPENED state */ + (fsm *); + void(*down) /* Called when fsm leaves PPP_FSM_OPENED state */ + (fsm *); + void(*starting) /* Called when we want the lower layer */ + (fsm *); + void(*finished) /* Called when we don't want the lower layer */ + (fsm *); + void(*protreject) /* Called when Protocol-Reject received */ + (int); + void(*retransmit) /* Retransmission is necessary */ + (fsm *); + int(*extcode) /* Called when unknown code received */ + (fsm *, int, int, u_char *, int); + const char *proto_name; /* String name for protocol (for messages) */ +} fsm_callbacks; + +/* + * Link states. + */ +#define PPP_FSM_INITIAL 0 /* Down, hasn't been opened */ +#define PPP_FSM_STARTING 1 /* Down, been opened */ +#define PPP_FSM_CLOSED 2 /* Up, hasn't been opened */ +#define PPP_FSM_STOPPED 3 /* Open, waiting for down event */ +#define PPP_FSM_CLOSING 4 /* Terminating the connection, not open */ +#define PPP_FSM_STOPPING 5 /* Terminating, but open */ +#define PPP_FSM_REQSENT 6 /* We've sent a Config Request */ +#define PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD 7 /* We've received a Config Ack */ +#define PPP_FSM_ACKSENT 8 /* We've sent a Config Ack */ +#define PPP_FSM_OPENED 9 /* Connection available */ + +/* + * Flags - indicate options controlling FSM operation + */ +#define OPT_PASSIVE 1 /* Don't die if we don't get a response */ +#define OPT_RESTART 2 /* Treat 2nd OPEN as DOWN, UP */ +#define OPT_SILENT 4 /* Wait for peer to speak first */ + +/* + * Timeouts. + */ +#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ +#define DEFTIMEOUT 3 /* Timeout time in seconds */ +#define DEFMAXTERMREQS 2 /* Maximum Terminate-Request transmissions */ +#define DEFMAXCONFREQS 10 /* Maximum Configure-Request transmissions */ +#define DEFMAXNAKLOOPS 5 /* Maximum number of nak loops */ +#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ + +/* + * Prototypes + */ +void fsm_init(fsm *f); +void fsm_lowerup(fsm *f); +void fsm_lowerdown(fsm *f); +void fsm_open(fsm *f); +void fsm_close(fsm *f, const char *reason); +void fsm_input(fsm *f, u_char *inpacket, int l); +void fsm_protreject(fsm *f); +void fsm_sdata(fsm *f, u_char code, u_char id, const u_char *data, int datalen); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* FSM_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipcp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipcp.h index 2b9dfda9..f8e99249 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipcp.h @@ -1,134 +1,134 @@ -/* - * ipcp.h - IP Control Protocol definitions. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: ipcp.h,v 1.14 2002/12/04 23:03:32 paulus Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef IPCP_H -#define IPCP_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * Options. - */ -#define CI_ADDRS 1 /* IP Addresses */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#define CI_COMPRESSTYPE 2 /* Compression Type */ -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ -#define CI_ADDR 3 - -#if LWIP_DNS -#define CI_MS_DNS1 129 /* Primary DNS value */ -#define CI_MS_DNS2 131 /* Secondary DNS value */ -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ -#define CI_MS_WINS1 130 /* Primary WINS value */ -#define CI_MS_WINS2 132 /* Secondary WINS value */ -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#define MAX_STATES 16 /* from slcompress.h */ - -#define IPCP_VJMODE_OLD 1 /* "old" mode (option # = 0x0037) */ -#define IPCP_VJMODE_RFC1172 2 /* "old-rfc"mode (option # = 0x002d) */ -#define IPCP_VJMODE_RFC1332 3 /* "new-rfc"mode (option # = 0x002d, */ -/* maxslot and slot number compression) */ - -#define IPCP_VJ_COMP 0x002d /* current value for VJ compression option*/ -#define IPCP_VJ_COMP_OLD 0x0037 /* "old" (i.e, broken) value for VJ */ -/* compression option*/ -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -typedef struct ipcp_options { - unsigned int neg_addr : 1; /* Negotiate IP Address? */ - unsigned int old_addrs : 1; /* Use old (IP-Addresses) option? */ - unsigned int req_addr : 1; /* Ask peer to send IP address? */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - unsigned int default_route : 1; /* Assign default route through interface? */ - unsigned int replace_default_route : 1; /* Replace default route through interface? */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - unsigned int proxy_arp : 1; /* Make proxy ARP entry for peer? */ -#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT - unsigned int neg_vj : 1; /* Van Jacobson Compression? */ - unsigned int old_vj : 1; /* use old (short) form of VJ option? */ - unsigned int cflag : 1; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - unsigned int accept_local : 1; /* accept peer's value for ouraddr */ - unsigned int accept_remote : 1; /* accept peer's value for hisaddr */ -#if LWIP_DNS - unsigned int req_dns1 : 1; /* Ask peer to send primary DNS address? */ - unsigned int req_dns2 : 1; /* Ask peer to send secondary DNS address? */ -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - - u32_t ouraddr, hisaddr; /* Addresses in NETWORK BYTE ORDER */ -#if LWIP_DNS - u32_t dnsaddr[2]; /* Primary and secondary MS DNS entries */ -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ - u32_t winsaddr[2]; /* Primary and secondary MS WINS entries */ -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - u16_t vj_protocol; /* protocol value to use in VJ option */ - u8_t maxslotindex; /* values for RFC1332 VJ compression neg. */ -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ -} ipcp_options; - -#if 0 /* UNUSED, already defined by lwIP */ -char *ip_ntoa(u32_t); -#endif /* UNUSED, already defined by lwIP */ - -extern const struct protent ipcp_protent; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* IPCP_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +/* + * ipcp.h - IP Control Protocol definitions. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: ipcp.h,v 1.14 2002/12/04 23:03:32 paulus Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef IPCP_H +#define IPCP_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Options. + */ +#define CI_ADDRS 1 /* IP Addresses */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#define CI_COMPRESSTYPE 2 /* Compression Type */ +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ +#define CI_ADDR 3 + +#if LWIP_DNS +#define CI_MS_DNS1 129 /* Primary DNS value */ +#define CI_MS_DNS2 131 /* Secondary DNS value */ +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ +#define CI_MS_WINS1 130 /* Primary WINS value */ +#define CI_MS_WINS2 132 /* Secondary WINS value */ +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#define MAX_STATES 16 /* from slcompress.h */ + +#define IPCP_VJMODE_OLD 1 /* "old" mode (option # = 0x0037) */ +#define IPCP_VJMODE_RFC1172 2 /* "old-rfc"mode (option # = 0x002d) */ +#define IPCP_VJMODE_RFC1332 3 /* "new-rfc"mode (option # = 0x002d, */ +/* maxslot and slot number compression) */ + +#define IPCP_VJ_COMP 0x002d /* current value for VJ compression option*/ +#define IPCP_VJ_COMP_OLD 0x0037 /* "old" (i.e, broken) value for VJ */ +/* compression option*/ +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +typedef struct ipcp_options { + unsigned int neg_addr : 1; /* Negotiate IP Address? */ + unsigned int old_addrs : 1; /* Use old (IP-Addresses) option? */ + unsigned int req_addr : 1; /* Ask peer to send IP address? */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + unsigned int default_route : 1; /* Assign default route through interface? */ + unsigned int replace_default_route : 1; /* Replace default route through interface? */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + unsigned int proxy_arp : 1; /* Make proxy ARP entry for peer? */ +#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT + unsigned int neg_vj : 1; /* Van Jacobson Compression? */ + unsigned int old_vj : 1; /* use old (short) form of VJ option? */ + unsigned int cflag : 1; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + unsigned int accept_local : 1; /* accept peer's value for ouraddr */ + unsigned int accept_remote : 1; /* accept peer's value for hisaddr */ +#if LWIP_DNS + unsigned int req_dns1 : 1; /* Ask peer to send primary DNS address? */ + unsigned int req_dns2 : 1; /* Ask peer to send secondary DNS address? */ +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + + u32_t ouraddr, hisaddr; /* Addresses in NETWORK BYTE ORDER */ +#if LWIP_DNS + u32_t dnsaddr[2]; /* Primary and secondary MS DNS entries */ +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ + u32_t winsaddr[2]; /* Primary and secondary MS WINS entries */ +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + u16_t vj_protocol; /* protocol value to use in VJ option */ + u8_t maxslotindex; /* values for RFC1332 VJ compression neg. */ +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ +} ipcp_options; + +#if 0 /* UNUSED, already defined by lwIP */ +char *ip_ntoa(u32_t); +#endif /* UNUSED, already defined by lwIP */ + +extern const struct protent ipcp_protent; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* IPCP_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h index ebcf54d8..fc1a9548 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h @@ -1,191 +1,191 @@ -/* - * ipv6cp.h - PPP IPV6 Control Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 1999 Tommi Komulainen. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Tommi Komulainen - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - */ - -/* Original version, based on RFC2023 : - - Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Francis.Dupont@inria.fr, INRIA Rocquencourt, - Alain.Durand@imag.fr, IMAG, - Jean-Luc.Richier@imag.fr, IMAG-LSR. - - Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Francis.Dupont@inria.fr, GIE DYADE, - Alain.Durand@imag.fr, IMAG, - Jean-Luc.Richier@imag.fr, IMAG-LSR. - - Ce travail a été fait au sein du GIE DYADE (Groupement d'Intérêt - Économique ayant pour membres BULL S.A. et l'INRIA). - - Ce logiciel informatique est disponible aux conditions - usuelles dans la recherche, c'est-à-dire qu'il peut - être utilisé, copié, modifié, distribué à l'unique - condition que ce texte soit conservé afin que - l'origine de ce logiciel soit reconnue. - - Le nom de l'Institut National de Recherche en Informatique - et en Automatique (INRIA), de l'IMAG, ou d'une personne morale - ou physique ayant participé à l'élaboration de ce logiciel ne peut - être utilisé sans son accord préalable explicite. - - Ce logiciel est fourni tel quel sans aucune garantie, - support ou responsabilité d'aucune sorte. - Ce logiciel est dérivé de sources d'origine - "University of California at Berkeley" et - "Digital Equipment Corporation" couvertes par des copyrights. - - L'Institut d'Informatique et de Mathématiques Appliquées de Grenoble (IMAG) - est une fédération d'unités mixtes de recherche du CNRS, de l'Institut National - Polytechnique de Grenoble et de l'Université Joseph Fourier regroupant - sept laboratoires dont le laboratoire Logiciels, Systèmes, Réseaux (LSR). - - This work has been done in the context of GIE DYADE (joint R & D venture - between BULL S.A. and INRIA). - - This software is available with usual "research" terms - with the aim of retain credits of the software. - Permission to use, copy, modify and distribute this software for any - purpose and without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, - and the name of INRIA, IMAG, or any contributor not be used in advertising - or publicity pertaining to this material without the prior explicit - permission. The software is provided "as is" without any - warranties, support or liabilities of any kind. - This software is derived from source code from - "University of California at Berkeley" and - "Digital Equipment Corporation" protected by copyrights. - - Grenoble's Institute of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics (IMAG) - is a federation of seven research units funded by the CNRS, National - Polytechnic Institute of Grenoble and University Joseph Fourier. - The research unit in Software, Systems, Networks (LSR) is member of IMAG. -*/ - -/* - * Derived from : - * - * - * ipcp.h - IP Control Protocol definitions. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: ipv6cp.h,v 1.7 2002/12/04 23:03:32 paulus Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef IPV6CP_H -#define IPV6CP_H - -#include "eui64.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * Options. - */ -#define CI_IFACEID 1 /* Interface Identifier */ -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP -#define CI_COMPRESSTYPE 2 /* Compression Type */ -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - -/* No compression types yet defined. - *#define IPV6CP_COMP 0x004f - */ -typedef struct ipv6cp_options { - unsigned int neg_ifaceid : 1; /* Negotiate interface identifier? */ - unsigned int req_ifaceid : 1; /* Ask peer to send interface identifier? */ - unsigned int accept_local : 1; /* accept peer's value for iface id? */ - unsigned int opt_local : 1; /* ourtoken set by option */ - unsigned int opt_remote : 1; /* histoken set by option */ - unsigned int use_ip : 1; /* use IP as interface identifier */ -#if 0 - unsigned int use_persistent : 1; /* use uniquely persistent value for address */ -#endif -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - unsigned int neg_vj : 1; /* Van Jacobson Compression? */ -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - u_short vj_protocol; /* protocol value to use in VJ option */ -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - eui64_t ourid, hisid; /* Interface identifiers */ -} ipv6cp_options; - -extern const struct protent ipv6cp_protent; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* IPV6CP_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +/* + * ipv6cp.h - PPP IPV6 Control Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Tommi Komulainen. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Tommi Komulainen + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + */ + +/* Original version, based on RFC2023 : + + Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Francis.Dupont@inria.fr, INRIA Rocquencourt, + Alain.Durand@imag.fr, IMAG, + Jean-Luc.Richier@imag.fr, IMAG-LSR. + + Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Francis.Dupont@inria.fr, GIE DYADE, + Alain.Durand@imag.fr, IMAG, + Jean-Luc.Richier@imag.fr, IMAG-LSR. + + Ce travail a été fait au sein du GIE DYADE (Groupement d'Intérêt + Économique ayant pour membres BULL S.A. et l'INRIA). + + Ce logiciel informatique est disponible aux conditions + usuelles dans la recherche, c'est-à-dire qu'il peut + être utilisé, copié, modifié, distribué à l'unique + condition que ce texte soit conservé afin que + l'origine de ce logiciel soit reconnue. + + Le nom de l'Institut National de Recherche en Informatique + et en Automatique (INRIA), de l'IMAG, ou d'une personne morale + ou physique ayant participé à l'élaboration de ce logiciel ne peut + être utilisé sans son accord préalable explicite. + + Ce logiciel est fourni tel quel sans aucune garantie, + support ou responsabilité d'aucune sorte. + Ce logiciel est dérivé de sources d'origine + "University of California at Berkeley" et + "Digital Equipment Corporation" couvertes par des copyrights. + + L'Institut d'Informatique et de Mathématiques Appliquées de Grenoble (IMAG) + est une fédération d'unités mixtes de recherche du CNRS, de l'Institut National + Polytechnique de Grenoble et de l'Université Joseph Fourier regroupant + sept laboratoires dont le laboratoire Logiciels, Systèmes, Réseaux (LSR). + + This work has been done in the context of GIE DYADE (joint R & D venture + between BULL S.A. and INRIA). + + This software is available with usual "research" terms + with the aim of retain credits of the software. + Permission to use, copy, modify and distribute this software for any + purpose and without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, + and the name of INRIA, IMAG, or any contributor not be used in advertising + or publicity pertaining to this material without the prior explicit + permission. The software is provided "as is" without any + warranties, support or liabilities of any kind. + This software is derived from source code from + "University of California at Berkeley" and + "Digital Equipment Corporation" protected by copyrights. + + Grenoble's Institute of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics (IMAG) + is a federation of seven research units funded by the CNRS, National + Polytechnic Institute of Grenoble and University Joseph Fourier. + The research unit in Software, Systems, Networks (LSR) is member of IMAG. +*/ + +/* + * Derived from : + * + * + * ipcp.h - IP Control Protocol definitions. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: ipv6cp.h,v 1.7 2002/12/04 23:03:32 paulus Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef IPV6CP_H +#define IPV6CP_H + +#include "eui64.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Options. + */ +#define CI_IFACEID 1 /* Interface Identifier */ +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP +#define CI_COMPRESSTYPE 2 /* Compression Type */ +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + +/* No compression types yet defined. + *#define IPV6CP_COMP 0x004f + */ +typedef struct ipv6cp_options { + unsigned int neg_ifaceid : 1; /* Negotiate interface identifier? */ + unsigned int req_ifaceid : 1; /* Ask peer to send interface identifier? */ + unsigned int accept_local : 1; /* accept peer's value for iface id? */ + unsigned int opt_local : 1; /* ourtoken set by option */ + unsigned int opt_remote : 1; /* histoken set by option */ + unsigned int use_ip : 1; /* use IP as interface identifier */ +#if 0 + unsigned int use_persistent : 1; /* use uniquely persistent value for address */ +#endif +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + unsigned int neg_vj : 1; /* Van Jacobson Compression? */ +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + u_short vj_protocol; /* protocol value to use in VJ option */ +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + eui64_t ourid, hisid; /* Interface identifiers */ +} ipv6cp_options; + +extern const struct protent ipv6cp_protent; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* IPV6CP_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/lcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/lcp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/lcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/lcp.h index 69741b13..39a3cdac 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/lcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/lcp.h @@ -1,179 +1,179 @@ -/* - * lcp.h - Link Control Protocol definitions. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: lcp.h,v 1.20 2004/11/14 22:53:42 carlsonj Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef LCP_H -#define LCP_H - -#include "ppp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * Options. - */ -#define CI_VENDOR 0 /* Vendor Specific */ -#define CI_MRU 1 /* Maximum Receive Unit */ -#define CI_ASYNCMAP 2 /* Async Control Character Map */ -#define CI_AUTHTYPE 3 /* Authentication Type */ -#define CI_QUALITY 4 /* Quality Protocol */ -#define CI_MAGICNUMBER 5 /* Magic Number */ -#define CI_PCOMPRESSION 7 /* Protocol Field Compression */ -#define CI_ACCOMPRESSION 8 /* Address/Control Field Compression */ -#define CI_FCSALTERN 9 /* FCS-Alternatives */ -#define CI_SDP 10 /* Self-Describing-Pad */ -#define CI_NUMBERED 11 /* Numbered-Mode */ -#define CI_CALLBACK 13 /* callback */ -#define CI_MRRU 17 /* max reconstructed receive unit; multilink */ -#define CI_SSNHF 18 /* short sequence numbers for multilink */ -#define CI_EPDISC 19 /* endpoint discriminator */ -#define CI_MPPLUS 22 /* Multi-Link-Plus-Procedure */ -#define CI_LDISC 23 /* Link-Discriminator */ -#define CI_LCPAUTH 24 /* LCP Authentication */ -#define CI_COBS 25 /* Consistent Overhead Byte Stuffing */ -#define CI_PREFELIS 26 /* Prefix Elision */ -#define CI_MPHDRFMT 27 /* MP Header Format */ -#define CI_I18N 28 /* Internationalization */ -#define CI_SDL 29 /* Simple Data Link */ - -/* - * LCP-specific packet types (code numbers). - */ -#define PROTREJ 8 /* Protocol Reject */ -#define ECHOREQ 9 /* Echo Request */ -#define ECHOREP 10 /* Echo Reply */ -#define DISCREQ 11 /* Discard Request */ -#define IDENTIF 12 /* Identification */ -#define TIMEREM 13 /* Time Remaining */ - -/* Value used as data for CI_CALLBACK option */ -#define CBCP_OPT 6 /* Use callback control protocol */ - -#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ -#define DEFMRU 1500 /* Try for this */ -#define MINMRU 128 /* No MRUs below this */ -#define MAXMRU 16384 /* Normally limit MRU to this */ -#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ - -/* An endpoint discriminator, used with multilink. */ -#define MAX_ENDP_LEN 20 /* maximum length of discriminator value */ -struct epdisc { - unsigned char class_; /* -- The word "class" is reserved in C++. */ - unsigned char length; - unsigned char value[MAX_ENDP_LEN]; -}; - -/* - * The state of options is described by an lcp_options structure. - */ -typedef struct lcp_options { - unsigned int passive : 1; /* Don't die if we don't get a response */ - unsigned int silent : 1; /* Wait for the other end to start first */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - unsigned int restart : 1; /* Restart vs. exit after close */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ - unsigned int neg_mru : 1; /* Negotiate the MRU? */ - unsigned int neg_asyncmap : 1; /* Negotiate the async map? */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - unsigned int neg_upap : 1; /* Ask for UPAP authentication? */ -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - unsigned int neg_chap : 1; /* Ask for CHAP authentication? */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - unsigned int neg_eap : 1; /* Ask for EAP authentication? */ -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - unsigned int neg_magicnumber : 1; /* Ask for magic number? */ - unsigned int neg_pcompression : 1; /* HDLC Protocol Field Compression? */ - unsigned int neg_accompression : 1; /* HDLC Address/Control Field Compression? */ -#if LQR_SUPPORT - unsigned int neg_lqr : 1; /* Negotiate use of Link Quality Reports */ -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ - unsigned int neg_cbcp : 1; /* Negotiate use of CBCP */ -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - unsigned int neg_mrru : 1; /* negotiate multilink MRRU */ -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - unsigned int neg_ssnhf : 1; /* negotiate short sequence numbers */ - unsigned int neg_endpoint : 1; /* negotiate endpoint discriminator */ - - u16_t mru; /* Value of MRU */ -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - u16_t mrru; /* Value of MRRU, and multilink enable */ -#endif /* MULTILINK */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - u8_t chap_mdtype; /* which MD types (hashing algorithm) */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ - u32_t asyncmap; /* Value of async map */ - u32_t magicnumber; - u8_t numloops; /* Number of loops during magic number neg. */ -#if LQR_SUPPORT - u32_t lqr_period; /* Reporting period for LQR 1/100ths second */ -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ - struct epdisc endpoint; /* endpoint discriminator */ -} lcp_options; - -void lcp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb); -void lcp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); -void lcp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); -void lcp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); -void lcp_sprotrej(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len); /* send protocol reject */ - -extern const struct protent lcp_protent; - -#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ -/* Default number of times we receive our magic number from the peer - before deciding the link is looped-back. */ -#define DEFLOOPBACKFAIL 10 -#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LCP_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * lcp.h - Link Control Protocol definitions. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: lcp.h,v 1.20 2004/11/14 22:53:42 carlsonj Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef LCP_H +#define LCP_H + +#include "ppp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Options. + */ +#define CI_VENDOR 0 /* Vendor Specific */ +#define CI_MRU 1 /* Maximum Receive Unit */ +#define CI_ASYNCMAP 2 /* Async Control Character Map */ +#define CI_AUTHTYPE 3 /* Authentication Type */ +#define CI_QUALITY 4 /* Quality Protocol */ +#define CI_MAGICNUMBER 5 /* Magic Number */ +#define CI_PCOMPRESSION 7 /* Protocol Field Compression */ +#define CI_ACCOMPRESSION 8 /* Address/Control Field Compression */ +#define CI_FCSALTERN 9 /* FCS-Alternatives */ +#define CI_SDP 10 /* Self-Describing-Pad */ +#define CI_NUMBERED 11 /* Numbered-Mode */ +#define CI_CALLBACK 13 /* callback */ +#define CI_MRRU 17 /* max reconstructed receive unit; multilink */ +#define CI_SSNHF 18 /* short sequence numbers for multilink */ +#define CI_EPDISC 19 /* endpoint discriminator */ +#define CI_MPPLUS 22 /* Multi-Link-Plus-Procedure */ +#define CI_LDISC 23 /* Link-Discriminator */ +#define CI_LCPAUTH 24 /* LCP Authentication */ +#define CI_COBS 25 /* Consistent Overhead Byte Stuffing */ +#define CI_PREFELIS 26 /* Prefix Elision */ +#define CI_MPHDRFMT 27 /* MP Header Format */ +#define CI_I18N 28 /* Internationalization */ +#define CI_SDL 29 /* Simple Data Link */ + +/* + * LCP-specific packet types (code numbers). + */ +#define PROTREJ 8 /* Protocol Reject */ +#define ECHOREQ 9 /* Echo Request */ +#define ECHOREP 10 /* Echo Reply */ +#define DISCREQ 11 /* Discard Request */ +#define IDENTIF 12 /* Identification */ +#define TIMEREM 13 /* Time Remaining */ + +/* Value used as data for CI_CALLBACK option */ +#define CBCP_OPT 6 /* Use callback control protocol */ + +#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ +#define DEFMRU 1500 /* Try for this */ +#define MINMRU 128 /* No MRUs below this */ +#define MAXMRU 16384 /* Normally limit MRU to this */ +#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ + +/* An endpoint discriminator, used with multilink. */ +#define MAX_ENDP_LEN 20 /* maximum length of discriminator value */ +struct epdisc { + unsigned char class_; /* -- The word "class" is reserved in C++. */ + unsigned char length; + unsigned char value[MAX_ENDP_LEN]; +}; + +/* + * The state of options is described by an lcp_options structure. + */ +typedef struct lcp_options { + unsigned int passive : 1; /* Don't die if we don't get a response */ + unsigned int silent : 1; /* Wait for the other end to start first */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + unsigned int restart : 1; /* Restart vs. exit after close */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ + unsigned int neg_mru : 1; /* Negotiate the MRU? */ + unsigned int neg_asyncmap : 1; /* Negotiate the async map? */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + unsigned int neg_upap : 1; /* Ask for UPAP authentication? */ +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + unsigned int neg_chap : 1; /* Ask for CHAP authentication? */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + unsigned int neg_eap : 1; /* Ask for EAP authentication? */ +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + unsigned int neg_magicnumber : 1; /* Ask for magic number? */ + unsigned int neg_pcompression : 1; /* HDLC Protocol Field Compression? */ + unsigned int neg_accompression : 1; /* HDLC Address/Control Field Compression? */ +#if LQR_SUPPORT + unsigned int neg_lqr : 1; /* Negotiate use of Link Quality Reports */ +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ + unsigned int neg_cbcp : 1; /* Negotiate use of CBCP */ +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + unsigned int neg_mrru : 1; /* negotiate multilink MRRU */ +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + unsigned int neg_ssnhf : 1; /* negotiate short sequence numbers */ + unsigned int neg_endpoint : 1; /* negotiate endpoint discriminator */ + + u16_t mru; /* Value of MRU */ +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + u16_t mrru; /* Value of MRRU, and multilink enable */ +#endif /* MULTILINK */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + u8_t chap_mdtype; /* which MD types (hashing algorithm) */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ + u32_t asyncmap; /* Value of async map */ + u32_t magicnumber; + u8_t numloops; /* Number of loops during magic number neg. */ +#if LQR_SUPPORT + u32_t lqr_period; /* Reporting period for LQR 1/100ths second */ +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ + struct epdisc endpoint; /* endpoint discriminator */ +} lcp_options; + +void lcp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb); +void lcp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); +void lcp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); +void lcp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); +void lcp_sprotrej(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len); /* send protocol reject */ + +extern const struct protent lcp_protent; + +#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ +/* Default number of times we receive our magic number from the peer + before deciding the link is looped-back. */ +#define DEFLOOPBACKFAIL 10 +#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LCP_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/magic.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/magic.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/magic.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/magic.h index c754f529..008c59ba 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/magic.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/magic.h @@ -1,130 +1,130 @@ -/* - * magic.h - PPP Magic Number definitions. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: magic.h,v 1.5 2003/06/11 23:56:26 paulus Exp $ - */ -/***************************************************************************** -* randm.h - Random number generator header file. -* -* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. -* Copyright (c) 1998 Global Election Systems Inc. -* -* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, -* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided -* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this -* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any -* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required -* for any of the authorized uses. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR -* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -****************************************************************************** -* REVISION HISTORY -* -* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher -* Ported to lwIP. -* 98-05-29 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. -* Extracted from avos. -*****************************************************************************/ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef MAGIC_H -#define MAGIC_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/*********************** -*** PUBLIC FUNCTIONS *** -***********************/ - -/* - * Initialize the random number generator. - */ -void magic_init(void); - -/* - * Randomize our random seed value. To be called for truely random events - * such as user operations and network traffic. - */ -void magic_randomize(void); - -/* - * Return a new random number. - */ -u32_t magic(void); /* Returns the next magic number */ - -/* - * Fill buffer with random bytes - * - * Use the random pool to generate random data. This degrades to pseudo - * random when used faster than randomness is supplied using magic_churnrand(). - * Thus it's important to make sure that the results of this are not - * published directly because one could predict the next result to at - * least some degree. Also, it's important to get a good seed before - * the first use. - */ -void magic_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, u32_t buf_len); - -/* - * Return a new random number between 0 and (2^pow)-1 included. - */ -u32_t magic_pow(u8_t pow); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* MAGIC_H */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * magic.h - PPP Magic Number definitions. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: magic.h,v 1.5 2003/06/11 23:56:26 paulus Exp $ + */ +/***************************************************************************** +* randm.h - Random number generator header file. +* +* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. +* Copyright (c) 1998 Global Election Systems Inc. +* +* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, +* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided +* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this +* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any +* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required +* for any of the authorized uses. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +****************************************************************************** +* REVISION HISTORY +* +* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher +* Ported to lwIP. +* 98-05-29 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. +* Extracted from avos. +*****************************************************************************/ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef MAGIC_H +#define MAGIC_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/*********************** +*** PUBLIC FUNCTIONS *** +***********************/ + +/* + * Initialize the random number generator. + */ +void magic_init(void); + +/* + * Randomize our random seed value. To be called for truely random events + * such as user operations and network traffic. + */ +void magic_randomize(void); + +/* + * Return a new random number. + */ +u32_t magic(void); /* Returns the next magic number */ + +/* + * Fill buffer with random bytes + * + * Use the random pool to generate random data. This degrades to pseudo + * random when used faster than randomness is supplied using magic_churnrand(). + * Thus it's important to make sure that the results of this are not + * published directly because one could predict the next result to at + * least some degree. Also, it's important to get a good seed before + * the first use. + */ +void magic_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, u32_t buf_len); + +/* + * Return a new random number between 0 and (2^pow)-1 included. + */ +u32_t magic_pow(u8_t pow); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MAGIC_H */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/mppe.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/mppe.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/mppe.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/mppe.h index 8e020e12..41e7f59b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/mppe.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/mppe.h @@ -1,181 +1,181 @@ -/* - * mppe.h - Definitions for MPPE - * - * Copyright (c) 2008 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && MPPE_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef MPPE_H -#define MPPE_H - -#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define MPPE_PAD 4 /* MPPE growth per frame */ -#define MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN 16 /* largest key length (128-bit) */ - -/* option bits for ccp_options.mppe */ -#define MPPE_OPT_40 0x01 /* 40 bit */ -#define MPPE_OPT_128 0x02 /* 128 bit */ -#define MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL 0x04 /* stateful mode */ -/* unsupported opts */ -#define MPPE_OPT_56 0x08 /* 56 bit */ -#define MPPE_OPT_MPPC 0x10 /* MPPC compression */ -#define MPPE_OPT_D 0x20 /* Unknown */ -#define MPPE_OPT_UNSUPPORTED (MPPE_OPT_56 | MPPE_OPT_MPPC | MPPE_OPT_D) -#define MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN 0x40 /* Bits !defined in RFC 3078 were set */ - -/* - * This is not nice ... the alternative is a bitfield struct though. - * And unfortunately, we cannot share the same bits for the option - * names above since C and H are the same bit. We could do a u_int32 - * but then we have to do a lwip_htonl() all the time and/or we still need - * to know which octet is which. - */ -#define MPPE_C_BIT 0x01 /* MPPC */ -#define MPPE_D_BIT 0x10 /* Obsolete, usage unknown */ -#define MPPE_L_BIT 0x20 /* 40-bit */ -#define MPPE_S_BIT 0x40 /* 128-bit */ -#define MPPE_M_BIT 0x80 /* 56-bit, not supported */ -#define MPPE_H_BIT 0x01 /* Stateless (in a different byte) */ - -/* Does not include H bit; used for least significant octet only. */ -#define MPPE_ALL_BITS (MPPE_D_BIT | MPPE_L_BIT | MPPE_S_BIT | MPPE_M_BIT | MPPE_H_BIT) - -/* Build a CI from mppe opts (see RFC 3078) */ -#define MPPE_OPTS_TO_CI(opts, ci) \ - do { \ - u_char *ptr = ci; /* u_char[4] */ \ - \ - /* H bit */ \ - if (opts & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) \ - *ptr++ = 0x0; \ - else \ - *ptr++ = MPPE_H_BIT; \ - *ptr++ = 0; \ - *ptr++ = 0; \ - \ - /* S,L bits */ \ - *ptr = 0; \ - if (opts & MPPE_OPT_128) \ - *ptr |= MPPE_S_BIT; \ - if (opts & MPPE_OPT_40) \ - *ptr |= MPPE_L_BIT; \ - /* M,D,C bits not supported */ \ - } while (/* CONSTCOND */ 0) - -/* The reverse of the above */ -#define MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(ci, opts) \ - do { \ - const u_char *ptr = ci; /* u_char[4] */ \ - \ - opts = 0; \ - \ - /* H bit */ \ - if (!(ptr[0] & MPPE_H_BIT)) \ - opts |= MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL; \ - \ - /* S,L bits */ \ - if (ptr[3] & MPPE_S_BIT) \ - opts |= MPPE_OPT_128; \ - if (ptr[3] & MPPE_L_BIT) \ - opts |= MPPE_OPT_40; \ - \ - /* M,D,C bits */ \ - if (ptr[3] & MPPE_M_BIT) \ - opts |= MPPE_OPT_56; \ - if (ptr[3] & MPPE_D_BIT) \ - opts |= MPPE_OPT_D; \ - if (ptr[3] & MPPE_C_BIT) \ - opts |= MPPE_OPT_MPPC; \ - \ - /* Other bits */ \ - if (ptr[0] & ~MPPE_H_BIT) \ - opts |= MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN; \ - if (ptr[1] || ptr[2]) \ - opts |= MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN; \ - if (ptr[3] & ~MPPE_ALL_BITS) \ - opts |= MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN; \ - } while (/* CONSTCOND */ 0) - -/* Shared MPPE padding between MSCHAP and MPPE */ -#define SHA1_PAD_SIZE 40 - -static const u8_t mppe_sha1_pad1[SHA1_PAD_SIZE] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 -}; -static const u8_t mppe_sha1_pad2[SHA1_PAD_SIZE] = { - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2 -}; - -/* - * State for an MPPE (de)compressor. - */ -typedef struct ppp_mppe_state { - lwip_arc4_context arc4; - u8_t master_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; - u8_t session_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; - u8_t keylen; /* key length in bytes */ - /* NB: 128-bit == 16, 40-bit == 8! - * If we want to support 56-bit, the unit has to change to bits - */ - u8_t bits; /* MPPE control bits */ - u16_t ccount; /* 12-bit coherency count (seqno) */ - u16_t sanity_errors; /* take down LCP if too many */ - unsigned int stateful : 1; /* stateful mode flag */ - unsigned int discard : 1; /* stateful mode packet loss flag */ -} ppp_mppe_state; - -void mppe_set_key(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, u8_t *key); -void mppe_init(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, u8_t options); -void mppe_comp_reset(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state); -err_t mppe_compress(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, struct pbuf **pb, u16_t protocol); -void mppe_decomp_reset(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state); -err_t mppe_decompress(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, struct pbuf **pb); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* MPPE_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MPPE_SUPPORT */ +/* + * mppe.h - Definitions for MPPE + * + * Copyright (c) 2008 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && MPPE_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef MPPE_H +#define MPPE_H + +#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define MPPE_PAD 4 /* MPPE growth per frame */ +#define MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN 16 /* largest key length (128-bit) */ + +/* option bits for ccp_options.mppe */ +#define MPPE_OPT_40 0x01 /* 40 bit */ +#define MPPE_OPT_128 0x02 /* 128 bit */ +#define MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL 0x04 /* stateful mode */ +/* unsupported opts */ +#define MPPE_OPT_56 0x08 /* 56 bit */ +#define MPPE_OPT_MPPC 0x10 /* MPPC compression */ +#define MPPE_OPT_D 0x20 /* Unknown */ +#define MPPE_OPT_UNSUPPORTED (MPPE_OPT_56 | MPPE_OPT_MPPC | MPPE_OPT_D) +#define MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN 0x40 /* Bits !defined in RFC 3078 were set */ + +/* + * This is not nice ... the alternative is a bitfield struct though. + * And unfortunately, we cannot share the same bits for the option + * names above since C and H are the same bit. We could do a u_int32 + * but then we have to do a lwip_htonl() all the time and/or we still need + * to know which octet is which. + */ +#define MPPE_C_BIT 0x01 /* MPPC */ +#define MPPE_D_BIT 0x10 /* Obsolete, usage unknown */ +#define MPPE_L_BIT 0x20 /* 40-bit */ +#define MPPE_S_BIT 0x40 /* 128-bit */ +#define MPPE_M_BIT 0x80 /* 56-bit, not supported */ +#define MPPE_H_BIT 0x01 /* Stateless (in a different byte) */ + +/* Does not include H bit; used for least significant octet only. */ +#define MPPE_ALL_BITS (MPPE_D_BIT | MPPE_L_BIT | MPPE_S_BIT | MPPE_M_BIT | MPPE_H_BIT) + +/* Build a CI from mppe opts (see RFC 3078) */ +#define MPPE_OPTS_TO_CI(opts, ci) \ + do { \ + u_char *ptr = ci; /* u_char[4] */ \ + \ + /* H bit */ \ + if (opts & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) \ + *ptr++ = 0x0; \ + else \ + *ptr++ = MPPE_H_BIT; \ + *ptr++ = 0; \ + *ptr++ = 0; \ + \ + /* S,L bits */ \ + *ptr = 0; \ + if (opts & MPPE_OPT_128) \ + *ptr |= MPPE_S_BIT; \ + if (opts & MPPE_OPT_40) \ + *ptr |= MPPE_L_BIT; \ + /* M,D,C bits not supported */ \ + } while (/* CONSTCOND */ 0) + +/* The reverse of the above */ +#define MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(ci, opts) \ + do { \ + const u_char *ptr = ci; /* u_char[4] */ \ + \ + opts = 0; \ + \ + /* H bit */ \ + if (!(ptr[0] & MPPE_H_BIT)) \ + opts |= MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL; \ + \ + /* S,L bits */ \ + if (ptr[3] & MPPE_S_BIT) \ + opts |= MPPE_OPT_128; \ + if (ptr[3] & MPPE_L_BIT) \ + opts |= MPPE_OPT_40; \ + \ + /* M,D,C bits */ \ + if (ptr[3] & MPPE_M_BIT) \ + opts |= MPPE_OPT_56; \ + if (ptr[3] & MPPE_D_BIT) \ + opts |= MPPE_OPT_D; \ + if (ptr[3] & MPPE_C_BIT) \ + opts |= MPPE_OPT_MPPC; \ + \ + /* Other bits */ \ + if (ptr[0] & ~MPPE_H_BIT) \ + opts |= MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN; \ + if (ptr[1] || ptr[2]) \ + opts |= MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN; \ + if (ptr[3] & ~MPPE_ALL_BITS) \ + opts |= MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN; \ + } while (/* CONSTCOND */ 0) + +/* Shared MPPE padding between MSCHAP and MPPE */ +#define SHA1_PAD_SIZE 40 + +static const u8_t mppe_sha1_pad1[SHA1_PAD_SIZE] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 +}; +static const u8_t mppe_sha1_pad2[SHA1_PAD_SIZE] = { + 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, + 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, + 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, + 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2 +}; + +/* + * State for an MPPE (de)compressor. + */ +typedef struct ppp_mppe_state { + lwip_arc4_context arc4; + u8_t master_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; + u8_t session_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; + u8_t keylen; /* key length in bytes */ + /* NB: 128-bit == 16, 40-bit == 8! + * If we want to support 56-bit, the unit has to change to bits + */ + u8_t bits; /* MPPE control bits */ + u16_t ccount; /* 12-bit coherency count (seqno) */ + u16_t sanity_errors; /* take down LCP if too many */ + unsigned int stateful : 1; /* stateful mode flag */ + unsigned int discard : 1; /* stateful mode packet loss flag */ +} ppp_mppe_state; + +void mppe_set_key(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, u8_t *key); +void mppe_init(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, u8_t options); +void mppe_comp_reset(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state); +err_t mppe_compress(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, struct pbuf **pb, u16_t protocol); +void mppe_decomp_reset(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state); +err_t mppe_decompress(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, struct pbuf **pb); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MPPE_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MPPE_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h index 65c087e3..f27d2cee 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h @@ -1,80 +1,80 @@ -/** - * \file arc4.h - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 - -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4_H -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4_H - -/** - * \brief ARC4 context structure - */ -typedef struct -{ - int x; /*!< permutation index */ - int y; /*!< permutation index */ - unsigned char m[256]; /*!< permutation table */ -} arc4_context; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * \brief ARC4 key schedule - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be initialized - * \param key the secret key - * \param keylen length of the key - */ -void arc4_setup(arc4_context *ctx, unsigned char *key, int keylen); - -/** - * \brief ARC4 cipher function - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context - * \param buf buffer to be processed - * \param buflen amount of data in buf - */ -void arc4_crypt(arc4_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int buflen); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4_H */ - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 */ +/** + * \file arc4.h + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 + +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4_H +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4_H + +/** + * \brief ARC4 context structure + */ +typedef struct +{ + int x; /*!< permutation index */ + int y; /*!< permutation index */ + unsigned char m[256]; /*!< permutation table */ +} arc4_context; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief ARC4 key schedule + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context to be initialized + * \param key the secret key + * \param keylen length of the key + */ +void arc4_setup(arc4_context *ctx, unsigned char *key, int keylen); + +/** + * \brief ARC4 cipher function + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context + * \param buf buffer to be processed + * \param buflen amount of data in buf + */ +void arc4_crypt(arc4_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int buflen); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4_H */ + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h index ed0c7a54..ebc7526a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h @@ -1,91 +1,91 @@ -/** - * \file des.h - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES - -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES_H -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES_H - -#define DES_ENCRYPT 1 -#define DES_DECRYPT 0 - -/** - * \brief DES context structure - */ -typedef struct -{ - int mode; /*!< encrypt/decrypt */ - unsigned long sk[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ -} des_context; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) - * - * \param ctx DES context to be initialized - * \param key 8-byte secret key - */ -void des_setkey_enc(des_context *ctx, unsigned char key[8]); - -/** - * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) - * - * \param ctx DES context to be initialized - * \param key 8-byte secret key - */ -void des_setkey_dec(des_context *ctx, unsigned char key[8]); - -/** - * \brief DES-ECB block encryption/decryption - * - * \param ctx DES context - * \param input 64-bit input block - * \param output 64-bit output block - */ -void des_crypt_ecb(des_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[8], - unsigned char output[8]); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES_H */ - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES */ +/** + * \file des.h + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES + +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES_H +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES_H + +#define DES_ENCRYPT 1 +#define DES_DECRYPT 0 + +/** + * \brief DES context structure + */ +typedef struct +{ + int mode; /*!< encrypt/decrypt */ + unsigned long sk[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ +} des_context; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) + * + * \param ctx DES context to be initialized + * \param key 8-byte secret key + */ +void des_setkey_enc(des_context *ctx, unsigned char key[8]); + +/** + * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) + * + * \param ctx DES context to be initialized + * \param key 8-byte secret key + */ +void des_setkey_dec(des_context *ctx, unsigned char key[8]); + +/** + * \brief DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + * + * \param ctx DES context + * \param input 64-bit input block + * \param output 64-bit output block + */ +void des_crypt_ecb(des_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8]); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES_H */ + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h index bf28f5da..36259faa 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h @@ -1,95 +1,95 @@ -/** - * \file md4.h - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 - -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4_H -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4_H - -/** - * \brief MD4 context structure - */ -typedef struct -{ - unsigned long total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - unsigned long state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ -} md4_context; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * \brief MD4 context setup - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - */ -void md4_starts(md4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process buffer - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - */ -void md4_update(md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD4 final digest - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param output MD4 checksum result - */ -void md4_finish(md4_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD4 checksum result - */ -void md4(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[16]); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4_H */ - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 */ +/** + * \file md4.h + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 + +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4_H +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4_H + +/** + * \brief MD4 context structure + */ +typedef struct +{ + unsigned long total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + unsigned long state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ +} md4_context; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief MD4 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + */ +void md4_starts(md4_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief MD4 process buffer + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + */ +void md4_update(md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen); + +/** + * \brief MD4 final digest + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param output MD4 checksum result + */ +void md4_finish(md4_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]); + +/** + * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD4 checksum result + */ +void md4(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[16]); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4_H */ + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h index e66ebf2c..5a5c5c19 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h @@ -1,95 +1,95 @@ -/** - * \file md5.h - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 - -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5_H -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5_H - -/** - * \brief MD5 context structure - */ -typedef struct -{ - unsigned long total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - unsigned long state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ -} md5_context; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * \brief MD5 context setup - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - */ -void md5_starts(md5_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD5 process buffer - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - */ -void md5_update(md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD5 final digest - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param output MD5 checksum result - */ -void md5_finish(md5_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD5 checksum result - */ -void md5(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[16]); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5_H */ - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 */ +/** + * \file md5.h + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 + +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5_H +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5_H + +/** + * \brief MD5 context structure + */ +typedef struct +{ + unsigned long total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + unsigned long state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ +} md5_context; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief MD5 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + */ +void md5_starts(md5_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief MD5 process buffer + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + */ +void md5_update(md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen); + +/** + * \brief MD5 final digest + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param output MD5 checksum result + */ +void md5_finish(md5_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]); + +/** + * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD5 checksum result + */ +void md5(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[16]); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5_H */ + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h index bceb42e9..906ff0e1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h @@ -1,95 +1,95 @@ -/** - * \file sha1.h - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 - -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1_H -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1_H - -/** - * \brief SHA-1 context structure - */ -typedef struct -{ - unsigned long total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - unsigned long state[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ -} sha1_context; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * \brief SHA-1 context setup - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - */ -void sha1_starts(sha1_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief SHA-1 process buffer - * - * \param ctx SHA-1 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - */ -void sha1_update(sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen); - -/** - * \brief SHA-1 final digest - * - * \param ctx SHA-1 context - * \param output SHA-1 checksum result - */ -void sha1_finish(sha1_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20]); - -/** - * \brief Output = SHA-1( input buffer ) - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output SHA-1 checksum result - */ -void sha1(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[20]); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1_H */ - -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 */ +/** + * \file sha1.h + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 + +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1_H +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1_H + +/** + * \brief SHA-1 context structure + */ +typedef struct +{ + unsigned long total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + unsigned long state[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ +} sha1_context; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief SHA-1 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + */ +void sha1_starts(sha1_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief SHA-1 process buffer + * + * \param ctx SHA-1 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + */ +void sha1_update(sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen); + +/** + * \brief SHA-1 final digest + * + * \param ctx SHA-1 context + * \param output SHA-1 checksum result + */ +void sha1_finish(sha1_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20]); + +/** + * \brief Output = SHA-1( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output SHA-1 checksum result + */ +void sha1(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[20]); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1_H */ + +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp.h index ac5c1fb0..e80613ff 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp.h @@ -1,700 +1,700 @@ -/***************************************************************************** -* ppp.h - Network Point to Point Protocol header file. -* -* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. -* portions Copyright (c) 1997 Global Election Systems Inc. -* -* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, -* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided -* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this -* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any -* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required -* for any of the authorized uses. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR -* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -****************************************************************************** -* REVISION HISTORY -* -* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher -* Ported to lwIP. -* 97-11-05 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. -* Original derived from BSD codes. -*****************************************************************************/ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef PPP_H -#define PPP_H - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* Disable non-working or rarely used PPP feature, so rarely that we don't want to bloat ppp_opts.h with them */ -#ifndef PPP_OPTIONS -#define PPP_OPTIONS 0 -#endif - -#ifndef PPP_NOTIFY -#define PPP_NOTIFY 0 -#endif - -#ifndef PPP_REMOTENAME -#define PPP_REMOTENAME 0 -#endif - -#ifndef PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT -#define PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT 0 -#endif - -#ifndef PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE -#define PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE 0 -#endif - -#ifndef PPP_MAXCONNECT -#define PPP_MAXCONNECT 0 -#endif - -#ifndef PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS -#define PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS 0 -#endif - -#ifndef PPP_PROTOCOLNAME -#define PPP_PROTOCOLNAME 0 -#endif - -#ifndef PPP_STATS_SUPPORT -#define PPP_STATS_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -#ifndef DEFLATE_SUPPORT -#define DEFLATE_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -#ifndef BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT -#define BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -#ifndef PREDICTOR_SUPPORT -#define PREDICTOR_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/************************* -*** PUBLIC DEFINITIONS *** -*************************/ - -/* - * The basic PPP frame. - */ -#define PPP_HDRLEN 4 /* octets for standard ppp header */ -#define PPP_FCSLEN 2 /* octets for FCS */ - -/* - * Values for phase. - */ -#define PPP_PHASE_DEAD 0 -#define PPP_PHASE_MASTER 1 -#define PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF 2 -#define PPP_PHASE_INITIALIZE 3 -#define PPP_PHASE_SERIALCONN 4 -#define PPP_PHASE_DORMANT 5 -#define PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH 6 -#define PPP_PHASE_AUTHENTICATE 7 -#define PPP_PHASE_CALLBACK 8 -#define PPP_PHASE_NETWORK 9 -#define PPP_PHASE_RUNNING 10 -#define PPP_PHASE_TERMINATE 11 -#define PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT 12 - -/* Error codes. */ -#define PPPERR_NONE 0 /* No error. */ -#define PPPERR_PARAM 1 /* Invalid parameter. */ -#define PPPERR_OPEN 2 /* Unable to open PPP session. */ -#define PPPERR_DEVICE 3 /* Invalid I/O device for PPP. */ -#define PPPERR_ALLOC 4 /* Unable to allocate resources. */ -#define PPPERR_USER 5 /* User interrupt. */ -#define PPPERR_CONNECT 6 /* Connection lost. */ -#define PPPERR_AUTHFAIL 7 /* Failed authentication challenge. */ -#define PPPERR_PROTOCOL 8 /* Failed to meet protocol. */ -#define PPPERR_PEERDEAD 9 /* Connection timeout */ -#define PPPERR_IDLETIMEOUT 10 /* Idle Timeout */ -#define PPPERR_CONNECTTIME 11 /* Max connect time reached */ -#define PPPERR_LOOPBACK 12 /* Loopback detected */ - -/* Whether auth support is enabled at all */ -#define PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT (PAP_SUPPORT || CHAP_SUPPORT || EAP_SUPPORT) - -/************************ -*** PUBLIC DATA TYPES *** -************************/ - -/* - * Other headers require ppp_pcb definition for prototypes, but ppp_pcb - * require some structure definition from other headers as well, we are - * fixing the dependency loop here by declaring the ppp_pcb type then - * by including headers containing necessary struct definition for ppp_pcb - */ -typedef struct ppp_pcb_s ppp_pcb; - -/* Type definitions for BSD code. */ -#ifndef __u_char_defined -typedef unsigned long u_long; -typedef unsigned int u_int; -typedef unsigned short u_short; -typedef unsigned char u_char; -#endif - -#include "fsm.h" -#include "lcp.h" -#if CCP_SUPPORT -#include "ccp.h" -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -#include "mppe.h" -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT -#include "ipcp.h" -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -#include "ipv6cp.h" -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT -#include "upap.h" -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#include "chap-new.h" -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT -#include "eap.h" -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#include "vj.h" -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -/* Link status callback function prototype */ -typedef void (*ppp_link_status_cb_fn)(ppp_pcb *pcb, int err_code, void *ctx); - -/* - * PPP configuration. - */ -typedef struct ppp_settings_s { -#if PPP_SERVER && PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT - unsigned int auth_required : 1; /* Peer is required to authenticate */ - unsigned int null_login : 1; /* Username of "" and a password of "" are acceptable */ -#endif /* PPP_SERVER && PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_REMOTENAME - unsigned int explicit_remote : 1; /* remote_name specified with remotename opt */ -#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - unsigned int refuse_pap : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with PAP */ -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - unsigned int refuse_chap : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with CHAP */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - unsigned int refuse_mschap : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with MS-CHAP */ - unsigned int refuse_mschap_v2 : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with MS-CHAPv2 */ -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - unsigned int refuse_eap : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with EAP */ -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if LWIP_DNS - unsigned int usepeerdns : 1; /* Ask peer for DNS adds */ -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - unsigned int persist : 1; /* Persist mode, always try to open the connection */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - unsigned int hide_password : 1; /* Hide password in dumped packets */ -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - unsigned int noremoteip : 1; /* Let him have no IP address */ - unsigned int lax_recv : 1; /* accept control chars in asyncmap */ - unsigned int noendpoint : 1; /* don't send/accept endpoint discriminator */ -#if PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE - unsigned int lcp_echo_adaptive : 1; /* request echo only if the link was idle */ -#endif /* PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - unsigned int require_mppe : 1; /* Require MPPE (Microsoft Point to Point Encryption) */ - unsigned int refuse_mppe_40 : 1; /* Allow MPPE 40-bit mode? */ - unsigned int refuse_mppe_128 : 1; /* Allow MPPE 128-bit mode? */ - unsigned int refuse_mppe_stateful : 1; /* Allow MPPE stateful mode? */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - u16_t listen_time; /* time to listen first (ms), waiting for peer to send LCP packet */ - -#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT - u16_t idle_time_limit; /* Disconnect if idle for this many seconds */ -#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ -#if PPP_MAXCONNECT - u32_t maxconnect; /* Maximum connect time (seconds) */ -#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ - -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT - /* auth data */ - const char *user; /* Username for PAP */ - const char *passwd; /* Password for PAP, secret for CHAP */ -#if PPP_REMOTENAME - char remote_name[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; /* Peer's name for authentication */ -#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ - -#if PAP_SUPPORT - u8_t pap_timeout_time; /* Timeout (seconds) for auth-req retrans. */ - u8_t pap_max_transmits; /* Number of auth-reqs sent */ -#if PPP_SERVER - u8_t pap_req_timeout; /* Time to wait for auth-req from peer */ -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -#endif /* PAP_SUPPPORT */ - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - u8_t chap_timeout_time; /* Timeout (seconds) for retransmitting req */ - u8_t chap_max_transmits; /* max # times to send challenge */ -#if PPP_SERVER - u8_t chap_rechallenge_time; /* Time to wait for auth-req from peer */ -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPPORT */ - -#if EAP_SUPPORT - u8_t eap_req_time; /* Time to wait (for retransmit/fail) */ - u8_t eap_allow_req; /* Max Requests allowed */ -#if PPP_SERVER - u8_t eap_timeout_time; /* Time to wait (for retransmit/fail) */ - u8_t eap_max_transmits; /* Max Requests allowed */ -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - u8_t fsm_timeout_time; /* Timeout time in seconds */ - u8_t fsm_max_conf_req_transmits; /* Maximum Configure-Request transmissions */ - u8_t fsm_max_term_transmits; /* Maximum Terminate-Request transmissions */ - u8_t fsm_max_nak_loops; /* Maximum number of nak loops tolerated */ - - u8_t lcp_loopbackfail; /* Number of times we receive our magic number from the peer - before deciding the link is looped-back. */ - u8_t lcp_echo_interval; /* Interval between LCP echo-requests */ - u8_t lcp_echo_fails; /* Tolerance to unanswered echo-requests */ - -} ppp_settings; - -#if PPP_SERVER -struct ppp_addrs { -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT - ip4_addr_t our_ipaddr, his_ipaddr, netmask; -#if LWIP_DNS - ip4_addr_t dns1, dns2; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT - ip6_addr_t our6_ipaddr, his6_ipaddr; -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ -}; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * PPP interface control block. - */ -struct ppp_pcb_s { - ppp_settings settings; - const struct link_callbacks *link_cb; - void *link_ctx_cb; - void (*link_status_cb)(ppp_pcb *pcb, int err_code, void *ctx); /* Status change callback */ -#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE - void (*notify_phase_cb)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t phase, void *ctx); /* Notify phase callback */ -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ - void *ctx_cb; /* Callbacks optional pointer */ - struct netif *netif; /* PPP interface */ - u8_t phase; /* where the link is at */ - u8_t err_code; /* Code indicating why interface is down. */ - - /* flags */ -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT - unsigned int ask_for_local : 1; /* request our address from peer */ - unsigned int ipcp_is_open : 1; /* haven't called np_finished() */ - unsigned int ipcp_is_up : 1; /* have called ipcp_up() */ - unsigned int if4_up : 1; /* True when the IPv4 interface is up. */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - unsigned int proxy_arp_set : 1; /* Have created proxy arp entry */ -#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT - unsigned int ipv6cp_is_up : 1; /* have called ip6cp_up() */ - unsigned int if6_up : 1; /* True when the IPv6 interface is up. */ -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - unsigned int lcp_echo_timer_running : 1; /* set if a timer is running */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT - unsigned int vj_enabled : 1; /* Flag indicating VJ compression enabled. */ -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ -#if CCP_SUPPORT - unsigned int ccp_all_rejected : 1; /* we rejected all peer's options */ -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - unsigned int mppe_keys_set : 1; /* Have the MPPE keys been set? */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT - /* auth data */ -#if PPP_SERVER && defined(HAVE_MULTILINK) - char peer_authname[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; /* The name by which the peer authenticated itself to us. */ -#endif /* PPP_SERVER && defined(HAVE_MULTILINK) */ - u16_t auth_pending; /* Records which authentication operations haven't completed yet. */ - u16_t auth_done; /* Records which authentication operations have been completed. */ - -#if PAP_SUPPORT - upap_state upap; /* PAP data */ -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - chap_client_state chap_client; /* CHAP client data */ -#if PPP_SERVER - chap_server_state chap_server; /* CHAP server data */ -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if EAP_SUPPORT - eap_state eap; /* EAP data */ -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - fsm lcp_fsm; /* LCP fsm structure */ - lcp_options lcp_wantoptions; /* Options that we want to request */ - lcp_options lcp_gotoptions; /* Options that peer ack'd */ - lcp_options lcp_allowoptions; /* Options we allow peer to request */ - lcp_options lcp_hisoptions; /* Options that we ack'd */ - u16_t peer_mru; /* currently negotiated peer MRU */ - u8_t lcp_echos_pending; /* Number of outstanding echo msgs */ - u8_t lcp_echo_number; /* ID number of next echo frame */ - - u8_t num_np_open; /* Number of network protocols which we have opened. */ - u8_t num_np_up; /* Number of network protocols which have come up. */ - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - struct vjcompress vj_comp; /* Van Jacobson compression header. */ -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#if CCP_SUPPORT - fsm ccp_fsm; /* CCP fsm structure */ - ccp_options ccp_wantoptions; /* what to request the peer to use */ - ccp_options ccp_gotoptions; /* what the peer agreed to do */ - ccp_options ccp_allowoptions; /* what we'll agree to do */ - ccp_options ccp_hisoptions; /* what we agreed to do */ - u8_t ccp_localstate; /* Local state (mainly for handling reset-reqs and reset-acks). */ - u8_t ccp_receive_method; /* Method chosen on receive path */ - u8_t ccp_transmit_method; /* Method chosen on transmit path */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - ppp_mppe_state mppe_comp; /* MPPE "compressor" structure */ - ppp_mppe_state mppe_decomp; /* MPPE "decompressor" structure */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT - fsm ipcp_fsm; /* IPCP fsm structure */ - ipcp_options ipcp_wantoptions; /* Options that we want to request */ - ipcp_options ipcp_gotoptions; /* Options that peer ack'd */ - ipcp_options ipcp_allowoptions; /* Options we allow peer to request */ - ipcp_options ipcp_hisoptions; /* Options that we ack'd */ -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT - fsm ipv6cp_fsm; /* IPV6CP fsm structure */ - ipv6cp_options ipv6cp_wantoptions; /* Options that we want to request */ - ipv6cp_options ipv6cp_gotoptions; /* Options that peer ack'd */ - ipv6cp_options ipv6cp_allowoptions; /* Options we allow peer to request */ - ipv6cp_options ipv6cp_hisoptions; /* Options that we ack'd */ -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ -}; - -/************************ - *** PUBLIC FUNCTIONS *** - ************************/ - -/* - * WARNING: For multi-threads environment, all ppp_set_* functions most - * only be called while the PPP is in the dead phase (i.e. disconnected). - */ - -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT -/* - * Set PPP authentication. - * - * Warning: Using PPPAUTHTYPE_ANY might have security consequences. - * RFC 1994 says: - * - * In practice, within or associated with each PPP server, there is a - * database which associates "user" names with authentication - * information ("secrets"). It is not anticipated that a particular - * named user would be authenticated by multiple methods. This would - * make the user vulnerable to attacks which negotiate the least secure - * method from among a set (such as PAP rather than CHAP). If the same - * secret was used, PAP would reveal the secret to be used later with - * CHAP. - * - * Instead, for each user name there should be an indication of exactly - * one method used to authenticate that user name. If a user needs to - * make use of different authentication methods under different - * circumstances, then distinct user names SHOULD be employed, each of - * which identifies exactly one authentication method. - * - * Default is none auth type, unset (NULL) user and passwd. - */ -#define PPPAUTHTYPE_NONE 0x00 -#define PPPAUTHTYPE_PAP 0x01 -#define PPPAUTHTYPE_CHAP 0x02 -#define PPPAUTHTYPE_MSCHAP 0x04 -#define PPPAUTHTYPE_MSCHAP_V2 0x08 -#define PPPAUTHTYPE_EAP 0x10 -#define PPPAUTHTYPE_ANY 0xff -void ppp_set_auth(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t authtype, const char *user, const char *passwd); - -/* - * If set, peer is required to authenticate. This is mostly necessary for PPP server support. - * - * Default is false. - */ -#define ppp_set_auth_required(ppp, boolval) (ppp->settings.auth_required = boolval) -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT -/* - * Set PPP interface "our" and "his" IPv4 addresses. This is mostly necessary for PPP server - * support but it can also be used on a PPP link where each side choose its own IP address. - * - * Default is unset (0.0.0.0). - */ -#define ppp_set_ipcp_ouraddr(ppp, addr) \ - do { \ - ppp->ipcp_wantoptions.ouraddr = ip4_addr_get_u32(addr); \ - ppp->ask_for_local = ppp->ipcp_wantoptions.ouraddr != 0; \ - } while (0) -#define ppp_set_ipcp_hisaddr(ppp, addr) (ppp->ipcp_wantoptions.hisaddr = ip4_addr_get_u32(addr)) -#if LWIP_DNS -/* - * Set DNS server addresses that are sent if the peer asks for them. This is mostly necessary - * for PPP server support. - * - * Default is unset (0.0.0.0). - */ -#define ppp_set_ipcp_dnsaddr(ppp, index, addr) (ppp->ipcp_allowoptions.dnsaddr[index] = ip4_addr_get_u32(addr)) - -/* - * If set, we ask the peer for up to 2 DNS server addresses. Received DNS server addresses are - * registered using the dns_setserver() function. - * - * Default is false. - */ -#define ppp_set_usepeerdns(ppp, boolval) (ppp->settings.usepeerdns = boolval) -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -/* Disable MPPE (Microsoft Point to Point Encryption). This parameter is exclusive. */ -#define PPP_MPPE_DISABLE 0x00 -/* Require the use of MPPE (Microsoft Point to Point Encryption). */ -#define PPP_MPPE_ENABLE 0x01 -/* Allow MPPE to use stateful mode. Stateless mode is still attempted first. */ -#define PPP_MPPE_ALLOW_STATEFUL 0x02 -/* Refuse the use of MPPE with 40-bit encryption. Conflict with PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_128. */ -#define PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_40 0x04 -/* Refuse the use of MPPE with 128-bit encryption. Conflict with PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_40. */ -#define PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_128 0x08 -/* - * Set MPPE configuration - * - * Default is disabled. - */ -void ppp_set_mppe(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t flags); -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * Wait for up to intval milliseconds for a valid PPP packet from the peer. - * At the end of this time, or when a valid PPP packet is received from the - * peer, we commence negotiation by sending our first LCP packet. - * - * Default is 0. - */ -#define ppp_set_listen_time(ppp, intval) (ppp->settings.listen_time = intval) - -/* - * If set, we will attempt to initiate a connection but if no reply is received from - * the peer, we will then just wait passively for a valid LCP packet from the peer. - * - * Default is false. - */ -#define ppp_set_passive(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.passive = boolval) - -/* - * If set, we will not transmit LCP packets to initiate a connection until a valid - * LCP packet is received from the peer. This is what we usually call the server mode. - * - * Default is false. - */ -#define ppp_set_silent(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.silent = boolval) - -/* - * If set, enable protocol field compression negotiation in both the receive and - * the transmit direction. - * - * Default is true. - */ -#define ppp_set_neg_pcomp(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.neg_pcompression = \ - ppp->lcp_allowoptions.neg_pcompression = boolval) - -/* - * If set, enable Address/Control compression in both the receive and the transmit - * direction. - * - * Default is true. - */ -#define ppp_set_neg_accomp(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.neg_accompression = \ - ppp->lcp_allowoptions.neg_accompression = boolval) - -/* - * If set, enable asyncmap negotiation. Otherwise forcing all control characters to - * be escaped for both the transmit and the receive direction. - * - * Default is true. - */ -#define ppp_set_neg_asyncmap(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.neg_asyncmap = \ - ppp->lcp_allowoptions.neg_asyncmap = boolval) - -/* - * This option sets the Async-Control-Character-Map (ACCM) for this end of the link. - * The ACCM is a set of 32 bits, one for each of the ASCII control characters with - * values from 0 to 31, where a 1 bit indicates that the corresponding control - * character should not be used in PPP packets sent to this system. The map is - * an unsigned 32 bits integer where the least significant bit (00000001) represents - * character 0 and the most significant bit (80000000) represents character 31. - * We will then ask the peer to send these characters as a 2-byte escape sequence. - * - * Default is 0. - */ -#define ppp_set_asyncmap(ppp, intval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.asyncmap = intval) - -/* - * Set a PPP interface as the default network interface - * (used to output all packets for which no specific route is found). - */ -#define ppp_set_default(ppp) netif_set_default(ppp->netif) - -#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE -/* - * Set a PPP notify phase callback. - * - * This can be used for example to set a LED pattern depending on the - * current phase of the PPP session. - */ -typedef void (*ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t phase, void *ctx); -void ppp_set_notify_phase_callback(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb); -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ - -/* - * Initiate a PPP connection. - * - * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. - * - * Holdoff is the time to wait (in seconds) before initiating - * the connection. - * - * If this port connects to a modem, the modem connection must be - * established before calling this. - */ -err_t ppp_connect(ppp_pcb *pcb, u16_t holdoff); - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * Listen for an incoming PPP connection. - * - * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. - * - * If this port connects to a modem, the modem connection must be - * established before calling this. - */ -err_t ppp_listen(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * Initiate the end of a PPP connection. - * Any outstanding packets in the queues are dropped. - * - * Setting nocarrier to 1 close the PPP connection without initiating the - * shutdown procedure. Always using nocarrier = 0 is still recommended, - * this is going to take a little longer time if your link is down, but - * is a safer choice for the PPP state machine. - * - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. - */ -err_t ppp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t nocarrier); - -/* - * Release the control block. - * - * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. - * - * You must use ppp_close() before if you wish to terminate - * an established PPP session. - * - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. - */ -err_t ppp_free(ppp_pcb *pcb); - -/* - * PPP IOCTL commands. - * - * Get the up status - 0 for down, non-zero for up. The argument must - * point to an int. - */ -#define PPPCTLG_UPSTATUS 0 - -/* - * Get the PPP error code. The argument must point to an int. - * Returns a PPPERR_* value. - */ -#define PPPCTLG_ERRCODE 1 - -/* - * Get the fd associated with a PPP over serial - */ -#define PPPCTLG_FD 2 - -/* - * Get and set parameters for the given connection. - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. - */ -err_t ppp_ioctl(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t cmd, void *arg); - -/* Get the PPP netif interface */ -#define ppp_netif(ppp) (ppp->netif) - -/* Set an lwIP-style status-callback for the selected PPP device */ -#define ppp_set_netif_statuscallback(ppp, status_cb) \ - netif_set_status_callback(ppp->netif, status_cb); - -/* Set an lwIP-style link-callback for the selected PPP device */ -#define ppp_set_netif_linkcallback(ppp, link_cb) \ - netif_set_link_callback(ppp->netif, link_cb); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* PPP_H */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/***************************************************************************** +* ppp.h - Network Point to Point Protocol header file. +* +* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. +* portions Copyright (c) 1997 Global Election Systems Inc. +* +* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, +* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided +* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this +* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any +* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required +* for any of the authorized uses. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +****************************************************************************** +* REVISION HISTORY +* +* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher +* Ported to lwIP. +* 97-11-05 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. +* Original derived from BSD codes. +*****************************************************************************/ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef PPP_H +#define PPP_H + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +#include "lwip/ip6_addr.h" +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Disable non-working or rarely used PPP feature, so rarely that we don't want to bloat ppp_opts.h with them */ +#ifndef PPP_OPTIONS +#define PPP_OPTIONS 0 +#endif + +#ifndef PPP_NOTIFY +#define PPP_NOTIFY 0 +#endif + +#ifndef PPP_REMOTENAME +#define PPP_REMOTENAME 0 +#endif + +#ifndef PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT +#define PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT 0 +#endif + +#ifndef PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE +#define PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE 0 +#endif + +#ifndef PPP_MAXCONNECT +#define PPP_MAXCONNECT 0 +#endif + +#ifndef PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS +#define PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS 0 +#endif + +#ifndef PPP_PROTOCOLNAME +#define PPP_PROTOCOLNAME 0 +#endif + +#ifndef PPP_STATS_SUPPORT +#define PPP_STATS_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +#ifndef DEFLATE_SUPPORT +#define DEFLATE_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +#ifndef BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT +#define BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +#ifndef PREDICTOR_SUPPORT +#define PREDICTOR_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/************************* +*** PUBLIC DEFINITIONS *** +*************************/ + +/* + * The basic PPP frame. + */ +#define PPP_HDRLEN 4 /* octets for standard ppp header */ +#define PPP_FCSLEN 2 /* octets for FCS */ + +/* + * Values for phase. + */ +#define PPP_PHASE_DEAD 0 +#define PPP_PHASE_MASTER 1 +#define PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF 2 +#define PPP_PHASE_INITIALIZE 3 +#define PPP_PHASE_SERIALCONN 4 +#define PPP_PHASE_DORMANT 5 +#define PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH 6 +#define PPP_PHASE_AUTHENTICATE 7 +#define PPP_PHASE_CALLBACK 8 +#define PPP_PHASE_NETWORK 9 +#define PPP_PHASE_RUNNING 10 +#define PPP_PHASE_TERMINATE 11 +#define PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT 12 + +/* Error codes. */ +#define PPPERR_NONE 0 /* No error. */ +#define PPPERR_PARAM 1 /* Invalid parameter. */ +#define PPPERR_OPEN 2 /* Unable to open PPP session. */ +#define PPPERR_DEVICE 3 /* Invalid I/O device for PPP. */ +#define PPPERR_ALLOC 4 /* Unable to allocate resources. */ +#define PPPERR_USER 5 /* User interrupt. */ +#define PPPERR_CONNECT 6 /* Connection lost. */ +#define PPPERR_AUTHFAIL 7 /* Failed authentication challenge. */ +#define PPPERR_PROTOCOL 8 /* Failed to meet protocol. */ +#define PPPERR_PEERDEAD 9 /* Connection timeout */ +#define PPPERR_IDLETIMEOUT 10 /* Idle Timeout */ +#define PPPERR_CONNECTTIME 11 /* Max connect time reached */ +#define PPPERR_LOOPBACK 12 /* Loopback detected */ + +/* Whether auth support is enabled at all */ +#define PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT (PAP_SUPPORT || CHAP_SUPPORT || EAP_SUPPORT) + +/************************ +*** PUBLIC DATA TYPES *** +************************/ + +/* + * Other headers require ppp_pcb definition for prototypes, but ppp_pcb + * require some structure definition from other headers as well, we are + * fixing the dependency loop here by declaring the ppp_pcb type then + * by including headers containing necessary struct definition for ppp_pcb + */ +typedef struct ppp_pcb_s ppp_pcb; + +/* Type definitions for BSD code. */ +#ifndef __u_char_defined +typedef unsigned long u_long; +typedef unsigned int u_int; +typedef unsigned short u_short; +typedef unsigned char u_char; +#endif + +#include "fsm.h" +#include "lcp.h" +#if CCP_SUPPORT +#include "ccp.h" +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +#include "mppe.h" +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT +#include "ipcp.h" +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +#include "ipv6cp.h" +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT +#include "upap.h" +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#include "chap-new.h" +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT +#include "eap.h" +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#include "vj.h" +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +/* Link status callback function prototype */ +typedef void (*ppp_link_status_cb_fn)(ppp_pcb *pcb, int err_code, void *ctx); + +/* + * PPP configuration. + */ +typedef struct ppp_settings_s { +#if PPP_SERVER && PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT + unsigned int auth_required : 1; /* Peer is required to authenticate */ + unsigned int null_login : 1; /* Username of "" and a password of "" are acceptable */ +#endif /* PPP_SERVER && PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_REMOTENAME + unsigned int explicit_remote : 1; /* remote_name specified with remotename opt */ +#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + unsigned int refuse_pap : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with PAP */ +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + unsigned int refuse_chap : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with CHAP */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + unsigned int refuse_mschap : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with MS-CHAP */ + unsigned int refuse_mschap_v2 : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with MS-CHAPv2 */ +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + unsigned int refuse_eap : 1; /* Don't proceed auth. with EAP */ +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if LWIP_DNS + unsigned int usepeerdns : 1; /* Ask peer for DNS adds */ +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + unsigned int persist : 1; /* Persist mode, always try to open the connection */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + unsigned int hide_password : 1; /* Hide password in dumped packets */ +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + unsigned int noremoteip : 1; /* Let him have no IP address */ + unsigned int lax_recv : 1; /* accept control chars in asyncmap */ + unsigned int noendpoint : 1; /* don't send/accept endpoint discriminator */ +#if PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE + unsigned int lcp_echo_adaptive : 1; /* request echo only if the link was idle */ +#endif /* PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + unsigned int require_mppe : 1; /* Require MPPE (Microsoft Point to Point Encryption) */ + unsigned int refuse_mppe_40 : 1; /* Allow MPPE 40-bit mode? */ + unsigned int refuse_mppe_128 : 1; /* Allow MPPE 128-bit mode? */ + unsigned int refuse_mppe_stateful : 1; /* Allow MPPE stateful mode? */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + u16_t listen_time; /* time to listen first (ms), waiting for peer to send LCP packet */ + +#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT + u16_t idle_time_limit; /* Disconnect if idle for this many seconds */ +#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ +#if PPP_MAXCONNECT + u32_t maxconnect; /* Maximum connect time (seconds) */ +#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ + +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT + /* auth data */ + const char *user; /* Username for PAP */ + const char *passwd; /* Password for PAP, secret for CHAP */ +#if PPP_REMOTENAME + char remote_name[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; /* Peer's name for authentication */ +#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ + +#if PAP_SUPPORT + u8_t pap_timeout_time; /* Timeout (seconds) for auth-req retrans. */ + u8_t pap_max_transmits; /* Number of auth-reqs sent */ +#if PPP_SERVER + u8_t pap_req_timeout; /* Time to wait for auth-req from peer */ +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +#endif /* PAP_SUPPPORT */ + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + u8_t chap_timeout_time; /* Timeout (seconds) for retransmitting req */ + u8_t chap_max_transmits; /* max # times to send challenge */ +#if PPP_SERVER + u8_t chap_rechallenge_time; /* Time to wait for auth-req from peer */ +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPPORT */ + +#if EAP_SUPPORT + u8_t eap_req_time; /* Time to wait (for retransmit/fail) */ + u8_t eap_allow_req; /* Max Requests allowed */ +#if PPP_SERVER + u8_t eap_timeout_time; /* Time to wait (for retransmit/fail) */ + u8_t eap_max_transmits; /* Max Requests allowed */ +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + u8_t fsm_timeout_time; /* Timeout time in seconds */ + u8_t fsm_max_conf_req_transmits; /* Maximum Configure-Request transmissions */ + u8_t fsm_max_term_transmits; /* Maximum Terminate-Request transmissions */ + u8_t fsm_max_nak_loops; /* Maximum number of nak loops tolerated */ + + u8_t lcp_loopbackfail; /* Number of times we receive our magic number from the peer + before deciding the link is looped-back. */ + u8_t lcp_echo_interval; /* Interval between LCP echo-requests */ + u8_t lcp_echo_fails; /* Tolerance to unanswered echo-requests */ + +} ppp_settings; + +#if PPP_SERVER +struct ppp_addrs { +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + ip4_addr_t our_ipaddr, his_ipaddr, netmask; +#if LWIP_DNS + ip4_addr_t dns1, dns2; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + ip6_addr_t our6_ipaddr, his6_ipaddr; +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +}; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * PPP interface control block. + */ +struct ppp_pcb_s { + ppp_settings settings; + const struct link_callbacks *link_cb; + void *link_ctx_cb; + void (*link_status_cb)(ppp_pcb *pcb, int err_code, void *ctx); /* Status change callback */ +#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE + void (*notify_phase_cb)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t phase, void *ctx); /* Notify phase callback */ +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ + void *ctx_cb; /* Callbacks optional pointer */ + struct netif *netif; /* PPP interface */ + u8_t phase; /* where the link is at */ + u8_t err_code; /* Code indicating why interface is down. */ + + /* flags */ +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + unsigned int ask_for_local : 1; /* request our address from peer */ + unsigned int ipcp_is_open : 1; /* haven't called np_finished() */ + unsigned int ipcp_is_up : 1; /* have called ipcp_up() */ + unsigned int if4_up : 1; /* True when the IPv4 interface is up. */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + unsigned int proxy_arp_set : 1; /* Have created proxy arp entry */ +#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + unsigned int ipv6cp_is_up : 1; /* have called ip6cp_up() */ + unsigned int if6_up : 1; /* True when the IPv6 interface is up. */ +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + unsigned int lcp_echo_timer_running : 1; /* set if a timer is running */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT + unsigned int vj_enabled : 1; /* Flag indicating VJ compression enabled. */ +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ +#if CCP_SUPPORT + unsigned int ccp_all_rejected : 1; /* we rejected all peer's options */ +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + unsigned int mppe_keys_set : 1; /* Have the MPPE keys been set? */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT + /* auth data */ +#if PPP_SERVER && defined(HAVE_MULTILINK) + char peer_authname[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; /* The name by which the peer authenticated itself to us. */ +#endif /* PPP_SERVER && defined(HAVE_MULTILINK) */ + u16_t auth_pending; /* Records which authentication operations haven't completed yet. */ + u16_t auth_done; /* Records which authentication operations have been completed. */ + +#if PAP_SUPPORT + upap_state upap; /* PAP data */ +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + chap_client_state chap_client; /* CHAP client data */ +#if PPP_SERVER + chap_server_state chap_server; /* CHAP server data */ +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if EAP_SUPPORT + eap_state eap; /* EAP data */ +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + fsm lcp_fsm; /* LCP fsm structure */ + lcp_options lcp_wantoptions; /* Options that we want to request */ + lcp_options lcp_gotoptions; /* Options that peer ack'd */ + lcp_options lcp_allowoptions; /* Options we allow peer to request */ + lcp_options lcp_hisoptions; /* Options that we ack'd */ + u16_t peer_mru; /* currently negotiated peer MRU */ + u8_t lcp_echos_pending; /* Number of outstanding echo msgs */ + u8_t lcp_echo_number; /* ID number of next echo frame */ + + u8_t num_np_open; /* Number of network protocols which we have opened. */ + u8_t num_np_up; /* Number of network protocols which have come up. */ + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + struct vjcompress vj_comp; /* Van Jacobson compression header. */ +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#if CCP_SUPPORT + fsm ccp_fsm; /* CCP fsm structure */ + ccp_options ccp_wantoptions; /* what to request the peer to use */ + ccp_options ccp_gotoptions; /* what the peer agreed to do */ + ccp_options ccp_allowoptions; /* what we'll agree to do */ + ccp_options ccp_hisoptions; /* what we agreed to do */ + u8_t ccp_localstate; /* Local state (mainly for handling reset-reqs and reset-acks). */ + u8_t ccp_receive_method; /* Method chosen on receive path */ + u8_t ccp_transmit_method; /* Method chosen on transmit path */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + ppp_mppe_state mppe_comp; /* MPPE "compressor" structure */ + ppp_mppe_state mppe_decomp; /* MPPE "decompressor" structure */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + fsm ipcp_fsm; /* IPCP fsm structure */ + ipcp_options ipcp_wantoptions; /* Options that we want to request */ + ipcp_options ipcp_gotoptions; /* Options that peer ack'd */ + ipcp_options ipcp_allowoptions; /* Options we allow peer to request */ + ipcp_options ipcp_hisoptions; /* Options that we ack'd */ +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + fsm ipv6cp_fsm; /* IPV6CP fsm structure */ + ipv6cp_options ipv6cp_wantoptions; /* Options that we want to request */ + ipv6cp_options ipv6cp_gotoptions; /* Options that peer ack'd */ + ipv6cp_options ipv6cp_allowoptions; /* Options we allow peer to request */ + ipv6cp_options ipv6cp_hisoptions; /* Options that we ack'd */ +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +}; + +/************************ + *** PUBLIC FUNCTIONS *** + ************************/ + +/* + * WARNING: For multi-threads environment, all ppp_set_* functions most + * only be called while the PPP is in the dead phase (i.e. disconnected). + */ + +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT +/* + * Set PPP authentication. + * + * Warning: Using PPPAUTHTYPE_ANY might have security consequences. + * RFC 1994 says: + * + * In practice, within or associated with each PPP server, there is a + * database which associates "user" names with authentication + * information ("secrets"). It is not anticipated that a particular + * named user would be authenticated by multiple methods. This would + * make the user vulnerable to attacks which negotiate the least secure + * method from among a set (such as PAP rather than CHAP). If the same + * secret was used, PAP would reveal the secret to be used later with + * CHAP. + * + * Instead, for each user name there should be an indication of exactly + * one method used to authenticate that user name. If a user needs to + * make use of different authentication methods under different + * circumstances, then distinct user names SHOULD be employed, each of + * which identifies exactly one authentication method. + * + * Default is none auth type, unset (NULL) user and passwd. + */ +#define PPPAUTHTYPE_NONE 0x00 +#define PPPAUTHTYPE_PAP 0x01 +#define PPPAUTHTYPE_CHAP 0x02 +#define PPPAUTHTYPE_MSCHAP 0x04 +#define PPPAUTHTYPE_MSCHAP_V2 0x08 +#define PPPAUTHTYPE_EAP 0x10 +#define PPPAUTHTYPE_ANY 0xff +void ppp_set_auth(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t authtype, const char *user, const char *passwd); + +/* + * If set, peer is required to authenticate. This is mostly necessary for PPP server support. + * + * Default is false. + */ +#define ppp_set_auth_required(ppp, boolval) (ppp->settings.auth_required = boolval) +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT +/* + * Set PPP interface "our" and "his" IPv4 addresses. This is mostly necessary for PPP server + * support but it can also be used on a PPP link where each side choose its own IP address. + * + * Default is unset (0.0.0.0). + */ +#define ppp_set_ipcp_ouraddr(ppp, addr) \ + do { \ + ppp->ipcp_wantoptions.ouraddr = ip4_addr_get_u32(addr); \ + ppp->ask_for_local = ppp->ipcp_wantoptions.ouraddr != 0; \ + } while (0) +#define ppp_set_ipcp_hisaddr(ppp, addr) (ppp->ipcp_wantoptions.hisaddr = ip4_addr_get_u32(addr)) +#if LWIP_DNS +/* + * Set DNS server addresses that are sent if the peer asks for them. This is mostly necessary + * for PPP server support. + * + * Default is unset (0.0.0.0). + */ +#define ppp_set_ipcp_dnsaddr(ppp, index, addr) (ppp->ipcp_allowoptions.dnsaddr[index] = ip4_addr_get_u32(addr)) + +/* + * If set, we ask the peer for up to 2 DNS server addresses. Received DNS server addresses are + * registered using the dns_setserver() function. + * + * Default is false. + */ +#define ppp_set_usepeerdns(ppp, boolval) (ppp->settings.usepeerdns = boolval) +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +/* Disable MPPE (Microsoft Point to Point Encryption). This parameter is exclusive. */ +#define PPP_MPPE_DISABLE 0x00 +/* Require the use of MPPE (Microsoft Point to Point Encryption). */ +#define PPP_MPPE_ENABLE 0x01 +/* Allow MPPE to use stateful mode. Stateless mode is still attempted first. */ +#define PPP_MPPE_ALLOW_STATEFUL 0x02 +/* Refuse the use of MPPE with 40-bit encryption. Conflict with PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_128. */ +#define PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_40 0x04 +/* Refuse the use of MPPE with 128-bit encryption. Conflict with PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_40. */ +#define PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_128 0x08 +/* + * Set MPPE configuration + * + * Default is disabled. + */ +void ppp_set_mppe(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t flags); +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Wait for up to intval milliseconds for a valid PPP packet from the peer. + * At the end of this time, or when a valid PPP packet is received from the + * peer, we commence negotiation by sending our first LCP packet. + * + * Default is 0. + */ +#define ppp_set_listen_time(ppp, intval) (ppp->settings.listen_time = intval) + +/* + * If set, we will attempt to initiate a connection but if no reply is received from + * the peer, we will then just wait passively for a valid LCP packet from the peer. + * + * Default is false. + */ +#define ppp_set_passive(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.passive = boolval) + +/* + * If set, we will not transmit LCP packets to initiate a connection until a valid + * LCP packet is received from the peer. This is what we usually call the server mode. + * + * Default is false. + */ +#define ppp_set_silent(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.silent = boolval) + +/* + * If set, enable protocol field compression negotiation in both the receive and + * the transmit direction. + * + * Default is true. + */ +#define ppp_set_neg_pcomp(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.neg_pcompression = \ + ppp->lcp_allowoptions.neg_pcompression = boolval) + +/* + * If set, enable Address/Control compression in both the receive and the transmit + * direction. + * + * Default is true. + */ +#define ppp_set_neg_accomp(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.neg_accompression = \ + ppp->lcp_allowoptions.neg_accompression = boolval) + +/* + * If set, enable asyncmap negotiation. Otherwise forcing all control characters to + * be escaped for both the transmit and the receive direction. + * + * Default is true. + */ +#define ppp_set_neg_asyncmap(ppp, boolval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.neg_asyncmap = \ + ppp->lcp_allowoptions.neg_asyncmap = boolval) + +/* + * This option sets the Async-Control-Character-Map (ACCM) for this end of the link. + * The ACCM is a set of 32 bits, one for each of the ASCII control characters with + * values from 0 to 31, where a 1 bit indicates that the corresponding control + * character should not be used in PPP packets sent to this system. The map is + * an unsigned 32 bits integer where the least significant bit (00000001) represents + * character 0 and the most significant bit (80000000) represents character 31. + * We will then ask the peer to send these characters as a 2-byte escape sequence. + * + * Default is 0. + */ +#define ppp_set_asyncmap(ppp, intval) (ppp->lcp_wantoptions.asyncmap = intval) + +/* + * Set a PPP interface as the default network interface + * (used to output all packets for which no specific route is found). + */ +#define ppp_set_default(ppp) netif_set_default(ppp->netif) + +#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE +/* + * Set a PPP notify phase callback. + * + * This can be used for example to set a LED pattern depending on the + * current phase of the PPP session. + */ +typedef void (*ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t phase, void *ctx); +void ppp_set_notify_phase_callback(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb); +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ + +/* + * Initiate a PPP connection. + * + * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. + * + * Holdoff is the time to wait (in seconds) before initiating + * the connection. + * + * If this port connects to a modem, the modem connection must be + * established before calling this. + */ +err_t ppp_connect(ppp_pcb *pcb, u16_t holdoff); + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * Listen for an incoming PPP connection. + * + * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. + * + * If this port connects to a modem, the modem connection must be + * established before calling this. + */ +err_t ppp_listen(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * Initiate the end of a PPP connection. + * Any outstanding packets in the queues are dropped. + * + * Setting nocarrier to 1 close the PPP connection without initiating the + * shutdown procedure. Always using nocarrier = 0 is still recommended, + * this is going to take a little longer time if your link is down, but + * is a safer choice for the PPP state machine. + * + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + */ +err_t ppp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t nocarrier); + +/* + * Release the control block. + * + * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. + * + * You must use ppp_close() before if you wish to terminate + * an established PPP session. + * + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + */ +err_t ppp_free(ppp_pcb *pcb); + +/* + * PPP IOCTL commands. + * + * Get the up status - 0 for down, non-zero for up. The argument must + * point to an int. + */ +#define PPPCTLG_UPSTATUS 0 + +/* + * Get the PPP error code. The argument must point to an int. + * Returns a PPPERR_* value. + */ +#define PPPCTLG_ERRCODE 1 + +/* + * Get the fd associated with a PPP over serial + */ +#define PPPCTLG_FD 2 + +/* + * Get and set parameters for the given connection. + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + */ +err_t ppp_ioctl(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t cmd, void *arg); + +/* Get the PPP netif interface */ +#define ppp_netif(ppp) (ppp->netif) + +/* Set an lwIP-style status-callback for the selected PPP device */ +#define ppp_set_netif_statuscallback(ppp, status_cb) \ + netif_set_status_callback(ppp->netif, status_cb); + +/* Set an lwIP-style link-callback for the selected PPP device */ +#define ppp_set_netif_linkcallback(ppp, link_cb) \ + netif_set_link_callback(ppp->netif, link_cb); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PPP_H */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h index e597e779..63f42605 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h @@ -1,737 +1,737 @@ -/***************************************************************************** -* ppp.h - Network Point to Point Protocol header file. -* -* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. -* portions Copyright (c) 1997 Global Election Systems Inc. -* -* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, -* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided -* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this -* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any -* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required -* for any of the authorized uses. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR -* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -****************************************************************************** -* REVISION HISTORY -* -* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher -* Ported to lwIP. -* 97-11-05 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. -* Original derived from BSD codes. -*****************************************************************************/ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PPP_IMPL_H -#define LWIP_HDR_PPP_IMPL_H - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" - -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifdef PPP_INCLUDE_SETTINGS_HEADER -#include "ppp_settings.h" -#endif - -#include /* formats */ -#include -#include -#include /* strtol() */ - -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" - -#include "ppp.h" -#include "pppdebug.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * Memory used for control packets. - * - * PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE is the amount of memory we allocate when we - * cannot figure out how much we are going to use before filling the buffer. - */ -#if PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM -#define PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE PBUF_RAM -#define PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE 512 -#else /* PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM */ -#define PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE PBUF_POOL -#define PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE -#endif /* PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM */ - -/* - * The basic PPP frame. - */ -#define PPP_ADDRESS(p) (((u_char *)(p))[0]) -#define PPP_CONTROL(p) (((u_char *)(p))[1]) -#define PPP_PROTOCOL(p) ((((u_char *)(p))[2] << 8) + ((u_char *)(p))[3]) - -/* - * Significant octet values. - */ -#define PPP_ALLSTATIONS 0xff /* All-Stations broadcast address */ -#define PPP_UI 0x03 /* Unnumbered Information */ -#define PPP_FLAG 0x7e /* Flag Sequence */ -#define PPP_ESCAPE 0x7d /* Asynchronous Control Escape */ -#define PPP_TRANS 0x20 /* Asynchronous transparency modifier */ - -/* - * Protocol field values. - */ -#define PPP_IP 0x21 /* Internet Protocol */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#define PPP_AT 0x29 /* AppleTalk Protocol */ -#define PPP_IPX 0x2b /* IPX protocol */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#define PPP_VJC_COMP 0x2d /* VJ compressed TCP */ -#define PPP_VJC_UNCOMP 0x2f /* VJ uncompressed TCP */ -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -#define PPP_IPV6 0x57 /* Internet Protocol Version 6 */ -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ -#if CCP_SUPPORT -#define PPP_COMP 0xfd /* compressed packet */ -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ -#define PPP_IPCP 0x8021 /* IP Control Protocol */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#define PPP_ATCP 0x8029 /* AppleTalk Control Protocol */ -#define PPP_IPXCP 0x802b /* IPX Control Protocol */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -#define PPP_IPV6CP 0x8057 /* IPv6 Control Protocol */ -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ -#if CCP_SUPPORT -#define PPP_CCP 0x80fd /* Compression Control Protocol */ -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ -#if ECP_SUPPORT -#define PPP_ECP 0x8053 /* Encryption Control Protocol */ -#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ -#define PPP_LCP 0xc021 /* Link Control Protocol */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT -#define PPP_PAP 0xc023 /* Password Authentication Protocol */ -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if LQR_SUPPORT -#define PPP_LQR 0xc025 /* Link Quality Report protocol */ -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#define PPP_CHAP 0xc223 /* Cryptographic Handshake Auth. Protocol */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CBCP_SUPPORT -#define PPP_CBCP 0xc029 /* Callback Control Protocol */ -#endif /* CBCP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT -#define PPP_EAP 0xc227 /* Extensible Authentication Protocol */ -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * The following struct gives the addresses of procedures to call - * for a particular lower link level protocol. - */ -struct link_callbacks { - /* Start a connection (e.g. Initiate discovery phase) */ - void (*connect)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx); -#if PPP_SERVER - /* Listen for an incoming connection (Passive mode) */ - void (*listen)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - /* End a connection (i.e. initiate disconnect phase) */ - void (*disconnect)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx); - /* Free lower protocol control block */ - err_t (*free)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx); - /* Write a pbuf to a ppp link, only used from PPP functions to send PPP packets. */ - err_t (*write)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p); - /* Send a packet from lwIP core (IPv4 or IPv6) */ - err_t (*netif_output)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol); - /* configure the transmit-side characteristics of the PPP interface */ - void (*send_config)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); - /* confire the receive-side characteristics of the PPP interface */ - void (*recv_config)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); -}; - -/* - * What to do with network protocol (NP) packets. - */ -enum NPmode { - NPMODE_PASS, /* pass the packet through */ - NPMODE_DROP, /* silently drop the packet */ - NPMODE_ERROR, /* return an error */ - NPMODE_QUEUE /* save it up for later. */ -}; - -/* - * Statistics. - */ -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT -struct pppstat { - unsigned int ppp_ibytes; /* bytes received */ - unsigned int ppp_ipackets; /* packets received */ - unsigned int ppp_ierrors; /* receive errors */ - unsigned int ppp_obytes; /* bytes sent */ - unsigned int ppp_opackets; /* packets sent */ - unsigned int ppp_oerrors; /* transmit errors */ -}; - -#if VJ_SUPPORT -struct vjstat { - unsigned int vjs_packets; /* outbound packets */ - unsigned int vjs_compressed; /* outbound compressed packets */ - unsigned int vjs_searches; /* searches for connection state */ - unsigned int vjs_misses; /* times couldn't find conn. state */ - unsigned int vjs_uncompressedin; /* inbound uncompressed packets */ - unsigned int vjs_compressedin; /* inbound compressed packets */ - unsigned int vjs_errorin; /* inbound unknown type packets */ - unsigned int vjs_tossed; /* inbound packets tossed because of error */ -}; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -struct ppp_stats { - struct pppstat p; /* basic PPP statistics */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT - struct vjstat vj; /* VJ header compression statistics */ -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ -}; - -#if CCP_SUPPORT -struct compstat { - unsigned int unc_bytes; /* total uncompressed bytes */ - unsigned int unc_packets; /* total uncompressed packets */ - unsigned int comp_bytes; /* compressed bytes */ - unsigned int comp_packets; /* compressed packets */ - unsigned int inc_bytes; /* incompressible bytes */ - unsigned int inc_packets; /* incompressible packets */ - unsigned int ratio; /* recent compression ratio << 8 */ -}; - -struct ppp_comp_stats { - struct compstat c; /* packet compression statistics */ - struct compstat d; /* packet decompression statistics */ -}; -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT -/* - * The following structure records the time in seconds since - * the last NP packet was sent or received. - */ -struct ppp_idle { - time_t xmit_idle; /* time since last NP packet sent */ - time_t recv_idle; /* time since last NP packet received */ -}; -#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ - -/* values for epdisc.class */ -#define EPD_NULL 0 /* null discriminator, no data */ -#define EPD_LOCAL 1 -#define EPD_IP 2 -#define EPD_MAC 3 -#define EPD_MAGIC 4 -#define EPD_PHONENUM 5 - -/* - * Global variables. - */ -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK -extern u8_t multilink; /* enable multilink operation */ -extern u8_t doing_multilink; -extern u8_t multilink_master; -extern u8_t bundle_eof; -extern u8_t bundle_terminating; -#endif - -#ifdef MAXOCTETS -extern unsigned int maxoctets; /* Maximum octetes per session (in bytes) */ -extern int maxoctets_dir; /* Direction : - 0 - in+out (default) - 1 - in - 2 - out - 3 - max(in,out) */ -extern int maxoctets_timeout; /* Timeout for check of octets limit */ -#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_SUM 0 -#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_IN 1 -#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_OUT 2 -#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_MAXOVERAL 3 -/* same as previos, but little different on RADIUS side */ -#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_MAXSESSION 4 -#endif - -/* Data input may be used by CCP and ECP, remove this entry - * from struct protent to save some flash - */ -#define PPP_DATAINPUT 0 - -/* - * The following struct gives the addresses of procedures to call - * for a particular protocol. - */ -struct protent { - u_short protocol; /* PPP protocol number */ - /* Initialization procedure */ - void (*init)(ppp_pcb *pcb); - /* Process a received packet */ - void (*input)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len); - /* Process a received protocol-reject */ - void (*protrej)(ppp_pcb *pcb); - /* Lower layer has come up */ - void (*lowerup)(ppp_pcb *pcb); - /* Lower layer has gone down */ - void (*lowerdown)(ppp_pcb *pcb); - /* Open the protocol */ - void (*open)(ppp_pcb *pcb); - /* Close the protocol */ - void (*close)(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - /* Print a packet in readable form */ - int (*printpkt)(const u_char *pkt, int len, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), - void *arg); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT - /* Process a received data packet */ - void (*datainput)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len); -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - const char *name; /* Text name of protocol */ - const char *data_name; /* Text name of corresponding data protocol */ -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS - option_t *options; /* List of command-line options */ - /* Check requested options, assign defaults */ - void (*check_options)(void); -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - /* Configure interface for demand-dial */ - int (*demand_conf)(int unit); - /* Say whether to bring up link for this pkt */ - int (*active_pkt)(u_char *pkt, int len); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -}; - -/* Table of pointers to supported protocols */ -extern const struct protent *const protocols[]; - -/* Values for auth_pending, auth_done */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT -#define PAP_WITHPEER 0x1 -#define PAP_PEER 0x2 -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_WITHPEER 0x4 -#define CHAP_PEER 0x8 -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT -#define EAP_WITHPEER 0x10 -#define EAP_PEER 0x20 -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - -/* Values for auth_done only */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_MD5_WITHPEER 0x40 -#define CHAP_MD5_PEER 0x80 -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_MS_SHIFT 8 /* LSB position for MS auths */ -#define CHAP_MS_WITHPEER 0x100 -#define CHAP_MS_PEER 0x200 -#define CHAP_MS2_WITHPEER 0x400 -#define CHAP_MS2_PEER 0x800 -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ - -/* Supported CHAP protocols */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED (MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2 | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT | MDTYPE_MD5) -#else /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED (MDTYPE_MD5) -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - -#else /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED (MDTYPE_NONE) -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT -/* - * PPP statistics structure - */ -struct pppd_stats { - unsigned int bytes_in; - unsigned int bytes_out; - unsigned int pkts_in; - unsigned int pkts_out; -}; -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * PPP private functions - */ - -/* - * Functions called from lwIP core. - */ - -/* initialize the PPP subsystem */ -int ppp_init(void); - -/* - * Functions called from PPP link protocols. - */ - -/* Create a new PPP control block */ -ppp_pcb *ppp_new(struct netif *pppif, const struct link_callbacks *callbacks, void *link_ctx_cb, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); - -/* Initiate LCP open request */ -void ppp_start(ppp_pcb *pcb); - -/* Called when link failed to setup */ -void ppp_link_failed(ppp_pcb *pcb); - -/* Called when link is normally down (i.e. it was asked to end) */ -void ppp_link_end(ppp_pcb *pcb); - -/* function called to process input packet */ -void ppp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *pb); - -/* - * Functions called by PPP protocols. - */ - -/* function called by all PPP subsystems to send packets */ -err_t ppp_write(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p); - -/* functions called by auth.c link_terminated() */ -void ppp_link_terminated(ppp_pcb *pcb); - -void new_phase(ppp_pcb *pcb, int p); - -int ppp_send_config(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mtu, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); -int ppp_recv_config(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mru, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); - -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT -int sifaddr(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t our_adr, u32_t his_adr, u32_t netmask); -int cifaddr(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t our_adr, u32_t his_adr); -#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ -int sifproxyarp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t his_adr); -int cifproxyarp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t his_adr); -#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ -#if LWIP_DNS -int sdns(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ns1, u32_t ns2); -int cdns(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ns1, u32_t ns2); -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT -int sifvjcomp(ppp_pcb *pcb, int vjcomp, int cidcomp, int maxcid); -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ -int sifup(ppp_pcb *pcb); -int sifdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); -u32_t get_mask(u32_t addr); -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -int sif6addr(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t our_eui64, eui64_t his_eui64); -int cif6addr(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t our_eui64, eui64_t his_eui64); -int sif6up(ppp_pcb *pcb); -int sif6down(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -int sifnpmode(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto, enum NPmode mode); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORt */ - -void netif_set_mtu(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mtu); -int netif_get_mtu(ppp_pcb *pcb); - -#if CCP_SUPPORT -#if 0 /* unused */ -int ccp_test(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *opt_ptr, int opt_len, int for_transmit); -#endif /* unused */ -void ccp_set(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t isopen, u8_t isup, u8_t receive_method, u8_t transmit_method); -void ccp_reset_comp(ppp_pcb *pcb); -void ccp_reset_decomp(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if 0 /* unused */ -int ccp_fatal_error(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#endif /* unused */ -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT -int get_idle_time(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct ppp_idle *ip); -#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -int get_loop_output(void); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -/* Optional protocol names list, to make our messages a little more informative. */ -#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME -const char *protocol_name(int proto); -#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ - -/* Optional stats support, to get some statistics on the PPP interface */ -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT -void print_link_stats(void); /* Print stats, if available */ -void reset_link_stats(int u); /* Reset (init) stats when link goes up */ -void update_link_stats(int u); /* Get stats at link termination */ -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * Inline versions of get/put char/short/long. - * Pointer is advanced; we assume that both arguments - * are lvalues and will already be in registers. - * cp MUST be u_char *. - */ -#define GETCHAR(c, cp) \ - { \ - (c) = *(cp)++; \ - } -#define PUTCHAR(c, cp) \ - { \ - *(cp)++ = (u_char)(c); \ - } -#define GETSHORT(s, cp) \ - { \ - (s) = *(cp)++ << 8; \ - (s) |= *(cp)++; \ - } -#define PUTSHORT(s, cp) \ - { \ - *(cp)++ = (u_char)((s) >> 8); \ - *(cp)++ = (u_char)(s); \ - } -#define GETLONG(l, cp) \ - { \ - (l) = *(cp)++ << 8; \ - (l) |= *(cp)++; \ - (l) <<= 8; \ - (l) |= *(cp)++; \ - (l) <<= 8; \ - (l) |= *(cp)++; \ - } -#define PUTLONG(l, cp) \ - { \ - *(cp)++ = (u_char)((l) >> 24); \ - *(cp)++ = (u_char)((l) >> 16); \ - *(cp)++ = (u_char)((l) >> 8); \ - *(cp)++ = (u_char)(l); \ - } - -#define INCPTR(n, cp) ((cp) += (n)) -#define DECPTR(n, cp) ((cp) -= (n)) - -/* - * System dependent definitions for user-level 4.3BSD UNIX implementation. - */ -#define TIMEOUT(f, a, t) \ - do { \ - sys_untimeout((f), (a)); \ - sys_timeout((t)*1000, (f), (a)); \ - } while (0) -#define TIMEOUTMS(f, a, t) \ - do { \ - sys_untimeout((f), (a)); \ - sys_timeout((t), (f), (a)); \ - } while (0) -#define UNTIMEOUT(f, a) sys_untimeout((f), (a)) - -#define BZERO(s, n) memset(s, 0, n) -#define BCMP(s1, s2, l) memcmp(s1, s2, l) - -#define PRINTMSG(m, l) \ - { \ - ppp_info("Remote message: %0.*v", l, m); \ - } - -/* - * MAKEHEADER - Add Header fields to a packet. - */ -#define MAKEHEADER(p, t) \ - { \ - PUTCHAR(PPP_ALLSTATIONS, p); \ - PUTCHAR(PPP_UI, p); \ - PUTSHORT(t, p); \ - } - -/* Procedures exported from auth.c */ -void link_required(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* we are starting to use the link */ -void link_terminated(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* we are finished with the link */ -void link_down(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* the LCP layer has left the Opened state */ -void upper_layers_down(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* take all NCPs down */ -void link_established(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* the link is up; authenticate now */ -void start_networks(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* start all the network control protos */ -void continue_networks(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* start network [ip, etc] control protos */ -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT -#if PPP_SERVER -int auth_check_passwd(ppp_pcb *pcb, char *auser, int userlen, char *apasswd, int passwdlen, const char **msg, int *msglen); -/* check the user name and passwd against configuration */ -void auth_peer_fail(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol); -/* peer failed to authenticate itself */ -void auth_peer_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol, int prot_flavor, const char *name, int namelen); -/* peer successfully authenticated itself */ -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -void auth_withpeer_fail(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol); -/* we failed to authenticate ourselves */ -void auth_withpeer_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol, int prot_flavor); -/* we successfully authenticated ourselves */ -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ -void np_up(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto); /* a network protocol has come up */ -void np_down(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto); /* a network protocol has gone down */ -void np_finished(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto); /* a network protocol no longer needs link */ -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT -int get_secret(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *client, const char *server, char *secret, int *secret_len, int am_server); -/* get "secret" for chap */ -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - -/* Procedures exported from ipcp.c */ -/* int parse_dotted_ip (char *, u32_t *); */ - -/* Procedures exported from demand.c */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -void demand_conf(void); /* config interface(s) for demand-dial */ -void demand_block(void); /* set all NPs to queue up packets */ -void demand_unblock(void); /* set all NPs to pass packets */ -void demand_discard(void); /* set all NPs to discard packets */ -void demand_rexmit(int, u32_t); /* retransmit saved frames for an NP*/ -int loop_chars(unsigned char *, int); /* process chars from loopback */ -int loop_frame(unsigned char *, int); /* should we bring link up? */ -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -/* Procedures exported from multilink.c */ -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK -void mp_check_options(void); /* Check multilink-related options */ -int mp_join_bundle(void); /* join our link to an appropriate bundle */ -void mp_exit_bundle(void); /* have disconnected our link from bundle */ -void mp_bundle_terminated(void); -char *epdisc_to_str(struct epdisc *); /* string from endpoint discrim. */ -int str_to_epdisc(struct epdisc *, char *); /* endpt disc. from str */ -#else -#define mp_bundle_terminated() /* nothing */ -#define mp_exit_bundle() /* nothing */ -#define doing_multilink 0 -#define multilink_master 0 -#endif - -/* Procedures exported from utils.c. */ -void ppp_print_string(const u_char *p, int len, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); /* Format a string for output */ -int ppp_slprintf(char *buf, int buflen, const char *fmt, ...); /* sprintf++ */ -int ppp_vslprintf(char *buf, int buflen, const char *fmt, va_list args); /* vsprintf++ */ -size_t ppp_strlcpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t len); /* safe strcpy */ -size_t ppp_strlcat(char *dest, const char *src, size_t len); /* safe strncpy */ -void ppp_dbglog(const char *fmt, ...); /* log a debug message */ -void ppp_info(const char *fmt, ...); /* log an informational message */ -void ppp_notice(const char *fmt, ...); /* log a notice-level message */ -void ppp_warn(const char *fmt, ...); /* log a warning message */ -void ppp_error(const char *fmt, ...); /* log an error message */ -void ppp_fatal(const char *fmt, ...); /* log an error message and die(1) */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -void ppp_dump_packet(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *tag, unsigned char *p, int len); -/* dump packet to debug log if interesting */ -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * Number of necessary timers analysis. - * - * PPP use at least one timer per each of its protocol, but not all protocols are - * active at the same time, thus the number of necessary timeouts is actually - * lower than enabled protocols. Here is the actual necessary timeouts based - * on code analysis. - * - * Note that many features analysed here are not working at all and are only - * there for a comprehensive analysis of necessary timers in order to prevent - * having to redo that each time we add a feature. - * - * Timer list - * - * | holdoff timeout - * | low level protocol timeout (PPPoE or PPPoL2P) - * | LCP delayed UP - * | LCP retransmit (FSM) - * | LCP Echo timer - * .| PAP or CHAP or EAP authentication - * . | ECP retransmit (FSM) - * . | CCP retransmit (FSM) when MPPE is enabled - * . | CCP retransmit (FSM) when MPPE is NOT enabled - * . | IPCP retransmit (FSM) - * . .| IP6CP retransmit (FSM) - * . . | Idle time limit - * . . | Max connect time - * . . | Max octets - * . . | CCP RACK timeout - * . . . - * PPP_PHASE_DEAD - * PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF - * | . . . - * PPP_PHASE_INITIALIZE - * | . . . - * PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH - * | . . . - * |. . . - * | . . - * PPP_PHASE_AUTHENTICATE - * | . . - * || . . - * PPP_PHASE_NETWORK - * | || . . - * | ||| . - * PPP_PHASE_RUNNING - * | .||||| - * | . |||| - * PPP_PHASE_TERMINATE - * | . |||| - * PPP_PHASE_NETWORK - * |. . - * PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH - * PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT - * PPP_PHASE_DEAD - * - * Alright, PPP basic retransmission and LCP Echo consume one timer. - * 1 - * - * If authentication is enabled one timer is necessary during authentication. - * 1 + PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT - * - * If ECP is enabled one timer is necessary before IPCP and/or IP6CP, one more - * is necessary if CCP is enabled (only with MPPE support but we don't care much - * up to this detail level). - * 1 + ECP_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT - * - * If CCP is enabled it might consume a timer during IPCP or IP6CP, thus - * we might use IPCP, IP6CP and CCP timers simultaneously. - * 1 + PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT - * - * When entering running phase, IPCP or IP6CP is still running. If idle time limit - * is enabled one more timer is necessary. Same for max connect time and max - * octets features. Furthermore CCP RACK might be used past this point. - * 1 + PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -1 + PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT + PPP_MAXCONNECT + MAXOCTETS + CCP_SUPPORT - * - * IPv4 or IPv6 must be enabled, therefore we don't need to take care the authentication - * and the CCP + ECP case, thus reducing overall complexity. - * 1 + LWIP_MAX(PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT, PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -1 + PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT + PPP_MAXCONNECT + MAXOCTETS + CCP_SUPPORT) - * - * We don't support PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT + PPP_MAXCONNECT + MAXOCTETS features - * and adding those defines to ppp_opts.h just for having the value always - * defined to 0 isn't worth it. - * 1 + LWIP_MAX(PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT, PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -1 + CCP_SUPPORT) - * - * Thus, the following is enough for now. - * 1 + PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT - */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PPP_IMPL_H */ +/***************************************************************************** +* ppp.h - Network Point to Point Protocol header file. +* +* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. +* portions Copyright (c) 1997 Global Election Systems Inc. +* +* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, +* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided +* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this +* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any +* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required +* for any of the authorized uses. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +****************************************************************************** +* REVISION HISTORY +* +* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher +* Ported to lwIP. +* 97-11-05 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. +* Original derived from BSD codes. +*****************************************************************************/ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_PPP_IMPL_H +#define LWIP_HDR_PPP_IMPL_H + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" + +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifdef PPP_INCLUDE_SETTINGS_HEADER +#include "ppp_settings.h" +#endif + +#include /* formats */ +#include +#include +#include /* strtol() */ + +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" + +#include "ppp.h" +#include "pppdebug.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Memory used for control packets. + * + * PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE is the amount of memory we allocate when we + * cannot figure out how much we are going to use before filling the buffer. + */ +#if PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM +#define PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE PBUF_RAM +#define PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE 512 +#else /* PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM */ +#define PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE PBUF_POOL +#define PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE +#endif /* PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM */ + +/* + * The basic PPP frame. + */ +#define PPP_ADDRESS(p) (((u_char *)(p))[0]) +#define PPP_CONTROL(p) (((u_char *)(p))[1]) +#define PPP_PROTOCOL(p) ((((u_char *)(p))[2] << 8) + ((u_char *)(p))[3]) + +/* + * Significant octet values. + */ +#define PPP_ALLSTATIONS 0xff /* All-Stations broadcast address */ +#define PPP_UI 0x03 /* Unnumbered Information */ +#define PPP_FLAG 0x7e /* Flag Sequence */ +#define PPP_ESCAPE 0x7d /* Asynchronous Control Escape */ +#define PPP_TRANS 0x20 /* Asynchronous transparency modifier */ + +/* + * Protocol field values. + */ +#define PPP_IP 0x21 /* Internet Protocol */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#define PPP_AT 0x29 /* AppleTalk Protocol */ +#define PPP_IPX 0x2b /* IPX protocol */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#define PPP_VJC_COMP 0x2d /* VJ compressed TCP */ +#define PPP_VJC_UNCOMP 0x2f /* VJ uncompressed TCP */ +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +#define PPP_IPV6 0x57 /* Internet Protocol Version 6 */ +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +#if CCP_SUPPORT +#define PPP_COMP 0xfd /* compressed packet */ +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ +#define PPP_IPCP 0x8021 /* IP Control Protocol */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#define PPP_ATCP 0x8029 /* AppleTalk Control Protocol */ +#define PPP_IPXCP 0x802b /* IPX Control Protocol */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +#define PPP_IPV6CP 0x8057 /* IPv6 Control Protocol */ +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +#if CCP_SUPPORT +#define PPP_CCP 0x80fd /* Compression Control Protocol */ +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ +#if ECP_SUPPORT +#define PPP_ECP 0x8053 /* Encryption Control Protocol */ +#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ +#define PPP_LCP 0xc021 /* Link Control Protocol */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT +#define PPP_PAP 0xc023 /* Password Authentication Protocol */ +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if LQR_SUPPORT +#define PPP_LQR 0xc025 /* Link Quality Report protocol */ +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#define PPP_CHAP 0xc223 /* Cryptographic Handshake Auth. Protocol */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CBCP_SUPPORT +#define PPP_CBCP 0xc029 /* Callback Control Protocol */ +#endif /* CBCP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT +#define PPP_EAP 0xc227 /* Extensible Authentication Protocol */ +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * The following struct gives the addresses of procedures to call + * for a particular lower link level protocol. + */ +struct link_callbacks { + /* Start a connection (e.g. Initiate discovery phase) */ + void (*connect)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx); +#if PPP_SERVER + /* Listen for an incoming connection (Passive mode) */ + void (*listen)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + /* End a connection (i.e. initiate disconnect phase) */ + void (*disconnect)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx); + /* Free lower protocol control block */ + err_t (*free)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx); + /* Write a pbuf to a ppp link, only used from PPP functions to send PPP packets. */ + err_t (*write)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p); + /* Send a packet from lwIP core (IPv4 or IPv6) */ + err_t (*netif_output)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol); + /* configure the transmit-side characteristics of the PPP interface */ + void (*send_config)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); + /* confire the receive-side characteristics of the PPP interface */ + void (*recv_config)(ppp_pcb *pcb, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); +}; + +/* + * What to do with network protocol (NP) packets. + */ +enum NPmode { + NPMODE_PASS, /* pass the packet through */ + NPMODE_DROP, /* silently drop the packet */ + NPMODE_ERROR, /* return an error */ + NPMODE_QUEUE /* save it up for later. */ +}; + +/* + * Statistics. + */ +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT +struct pppstat { + unsigned int ppp_ibytes; /* bytes received */ + unsigned int ppp_ipackets; /* packets received */ + unsigned int ppp_ierrors; /* receive errors */ + unsigned int ppp_obytes; /* bytes sent */ + unsigned int ppp_opackets; /* packets sent */ + unsigned int ppp_oerrors; /* transmit errors */ +}; + +#if VJ_SUPPORT +struct vjstat { + unsigned int vjs_packets; /* outbound packets */ + unsigned int vjs_compressed; /* outbound compressed packets */ + unsigned int vjs_searches; /* searches for connection state */ + unsigned int vjs_misses; /* times couldn't find conn. state */ + unsigned int vjs_uncompressedin; /* inbound uncompressed packets */ + unsigned int vjs_compressedin; /* inbound compressed packets */ + unsigned int vjs_errorin; /* inbound unknown type packets */ + unsigned int vjs_tossed; /* inbound packets tossed because of error */ +}; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +struct ppp_stats { + struct pppstat p; /* basic PPP statistics */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT + struct vjstat vj; /* VJ header compression statistics */ +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ +}; + +#if CCP_SUPPORT +struct compstat { + unsigned int unc_bytes; /* total uncompressed bytes */ + unsigned int unc_packets; /* total uncompressed packets */ + unsigned int comp_bytes; /* compressed bytes */ + unsigned int comp_packets; /* compressed packets */ + unsigned int inc_bytes; /* incompressible bytes */ + unsigned int inc_packets; /* incompressible packets */ + unsigned int ratio; /* recent compression ratio << 8 */ +}; + +struct ppp_comp_stats { + struct compstat c; /* packet compression statistics */ + struct compstat d; /* packet decompression statistics */ +}; +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT +/* + * The following structure records the time in seconds since + * the last NP packet was sent or received. + */ +struct ppp_idle { + time_t xmit_idle; /* time since last NP packet sent */ + time_t recv_idle; /* time since last NP packet received */ +}; +#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ + +/* values for epdisc.class */ +#define EPD_NULL 0 /* null discriminator, no data */ +#define EPD_LOCAL 1 +#define EPD_IP 2 +#define EPD_MAC 3 +#define EPD_MAGIC 4 +#define EPD_PHONENUM 5 + +/* + * Global variables. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK +extern u8_t multilink; /* enable multilink operation */ +extern u8_t doing_multilink; +extern u8_t multilink_master; +extern u8_t bundle_eof; +extern u8_t bundle_terminating; +#endif + +#ifdef MAXOCTETS +extern unsigned int maxoctets; /* Maximum octetes per session (in bytes) */ +extern int maxoctets_dir; /* Direction : + 0 - in+out (default) + 1 - in + 2 - out + 3 - max(in,out) */ +extern int maxoctets_timeout; /* Timeout for check of octets limit */ +#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_SUM 0 +#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_IN 1 +#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_OUT 2 +#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_MAXOVERAL 3 +/* same as previos, but little different on RADIUS side */ +#define PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_MAXSESSION 4 +#endif + +/* Data input may be used by CCP and ECP, remove this entry + * from struct protent to save some flash + */ +#define PPP_DATAINPUT 0 + +/* + * The following struct gives the addresses of procedures to call + * for a particular protocol. + */ +struct protent { + u_short protocol; /* PPP protocol number */ + /* Initialization procedure */ + void (*init)(ppp_pcb *pcb); + /* Process a received packet */ + void (*input)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len); + /* Process a received protocol-reject */ + void (*protrej)(ppp_pcb *pcb); + /* Lower layer has come up */ + void (*lowerup)(ppp_pcb *pcb); + /* Lower layer has gone down */ + void (*lowerdown)(ppp_pcb *pcb); + /* Open the protocol */ + void (*open)(ppp_pcb *pcb); + /* Close the protocol */ + void (*close)(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + /* Print a packet in readable form */ + int (*printpkt)(const u_char *pkt, int len, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), + void *arg); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT + /* Process a received data packet */ + void (*datainput)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len); +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + const char *name; /* Text name of protocol */ + const char *data_name; /* Text name of corresponding data protocol */ +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS + option_t *options; /* List of command-line options */ + /* Check requested options, assign defaults */ + void (*check_options)(void); +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + /* Configure interface for demand-dial */ + int (*demand_conf)(int unit); + /* Say whether to bring up link for this pkt */ + int (*active_pkt)(u_char *pkt, int len); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +}; + +/* Table of pointers to supported protocols */ +extern const struct protent *const protocols[]; + +/* Values for auth_pending, auth_done */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT +#define PAP_WITHPEER 0x1 +#define PAP_PEER 0x2 +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_WITHPEER 0x4 +#define CHAP_PEER 0x8 +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT +#define EAP_WITHPEER 0x10 +#define EAP_PEER 0x20 +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + +/* Values for auth_done only */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_MD5_WITHPEER 0x40 +#define CHAP_MD5_PEER 0x80 +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_MS_SHIFT 8 /* LSB position for MS auths */ +#define CHAP_MS_WITHPEER 0x100 +#define CHAP_MS_PEER 0x200 +#define CHAP_MS2_WITHPEER 0x400 +#define CHAP_MS2_PEER 0x800 +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ + +/* Supported CHAP protocols */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED (MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2 | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT | MDTYPE_MD5) +#else /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED (MDTYPE_MD5) +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + +#else /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED (MDTYPE_NONE) +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT +/* + * PPP statistics structure + */ +struct pppd_stats { + unsigned int bytes_in; + unsigned int bytes_out; + unsigned int pkts_in; + unsigned int pkts_out; +}; +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * PPP private functions + */ + +/* + * Functions called from lwIP core. + */ + +/* initialize the PPP subsystem */ +int ppp_init(void); + +/* + * Functions called from PPP link protocols. + */ + +/* Create a new PPP control block */ +ppp_pcb *ppp_new(struct netif *pppif, const struct link_callbacks *callbacks, void *link_ctx_cb, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); + +/* Initiate LCP open request */ +void ppp_start(ppp_pcb *pcb); + +/* Called when link failed to setup */ +void ppp_link_failed(ppp_pcb *pcb); + +/* Called when link is normally down (i.e. it was asked to end) */ +void ppp_link_end(ppp_pcb *pcb); + +/* function called to process input packet */ +void ppp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *pb); + +/* + * Functions called by PPP protocols. + */ + +/* function called by all PPP subsystems to send packets */ +err_t ppp_write(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p); + +/* functions called by auth.c link_terminated() */ +void ppp_link_terminated(ppp_pcb *pcb); + +void new_phase(ppp_pcb *pcb, int p); + +int ppp_send_config(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mtu, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); +int ppp_recv_config(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mru, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); + +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT +int sifaddr(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t our_adr, u32_t his_adr, u32_t netmask); +int cifaddr(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t our_adr, u32_t his_adr); +#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ +int sifproxyarp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t his_adr); +int cifproxyarp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t his_adr); +#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ +#if LWIP_DNS +int sdns(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ns1, u32_t ns2); +int cdns(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ns1, u32_t ns2); +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT +int sifvjcomp(ppp_pcb *pcb, int vjcomp, int cidcomp, int maxcid); +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ +int sifup(ppp_pcb *pcb); +int sifdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); +u32_t get_mask(u32_t addr); +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +int sif6addr(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t our_eui64, eui64_t his_eui64); +int cif6addr(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t our_eui64, eui64_t his_eui64); +int sif6up(ppp_pcb *pcb); +int sif6down(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +int sifnpmode(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto, enum NPmode mode); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORt */ + +void netif_set_mtu(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mtu); +int netif_get_mtu(ppp_pcb *pcb); + +#if CCP_SUPPORT +#if 0 /* unused */ +int ccp_test(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *opt_ptr, int opt_len, int for_transmit); +#endif /* unused */ +void ccp_set(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t isopen, u8_t isup, u8_t receive_method, u8_t transmit_method); +void ccp_reset_comp(ppp_pcb *pcb); +void ccp_reset_decomp(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if 0 /* unused */ +int ccp_fatal_error(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#endif /* unused */ +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT +int get_idle_time(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct ppp_idle *ip); +#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +int get_loop_output(void); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +/* Optional protocol names list, to make our messages a little more informative. */ +#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME +const char *protocol_name(int proto); +#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ + +/* Optional stats support, to get some statistics on the PPP interface */ +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT +void print_link_stats(void); /* Print stats, if available */ +void reset_link_stats(int u); /* Reset (init) stats when link goes up */ +void update_link_stats(int u); /* Get stats at link termination */ +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Inline versions of get/put char/short/long. + * Pointer is advanced; we assume that both arguments + * are lvalues and will already be in registers. + * cp MUST be u_char *. + */ +#define GETCHAR(c, cp) \ + { \ + (c) = *(cp)++; \ + } +#define PUTCHAR(c, cp) \ + { \ + *(cp)++ = (u_char)(c); \ + } +#define GETSHORT(s, cp) \ + { \ + (s) = *(cp)++ << 8; \ + (s) |= *(cp)++; \ + } +#define PUTSHORT(s, cp) \ + { \ + *(cp)++ = (u_char)((s) >> 8); \ + *(cp)++ = (u_char)(s); \ + } +#define GETLONG(l, cp) \ + { \ + (l) = *(cp)++ << 8; \ + (l) |= *(cp)++; \ + (l) <<= 8; \ + (l) |= *(cp)++; \ + (l) <<= 8; \ + (l) |= *(cp)++; \ + } +#define PUTLONG(l, cp) \ + { \ + *(cp)++ = (u_char)((l) >> 24); \ + *(cp)++ = (u_char)((l) >> 16); \ + *(cp)++ = (u_char)((l) >> 8); \ + *(cp)++ = (u_char)(l); \ + } + +#define INCPTR(n, cp) ((cp) += (n)) +#define DECPTR(n, cp) ((cp) -= (n)) + +/* + * System dependent definitions for user-level 4.3BSD UNIX implementation. + */ +#define TIMEOUT(f, a, t) \ + do { \ + sys_untimeout((f), (a)); \ + sys_timeout((t)*1000, (f), (a)); \ + } while (0) +#define TIMEOUTMS(f, a, t) \ + do { \ + sys_untimeout((f), (a)); \ + sys_timeout((t), (f), (a)); \ + } while (0) +#define UNTIMEOUT(f, a) sys_untimeout((f), (a)) + +#define BZERO(s, n) memset(s, 0, n) +#define BCMP(s1, s2, l) memcmp(s1, s2, l) + +#define PRINTMSG(m, l) \ + { \ + ppp_info("Remote message: %0.*v", l, m); \ + } + +/* + * MAKEHEADER - Add Header fields to a packet. + */ +#define MAKEHEADER(p, t) \ + { \ + PUTCHAR(PPP_ALLSTATIONS, p); \ + PUTCHAR(PPP_UI, p); \ + PUTSHORT(t, p); \ + } + +/* Procedures exported from auth.c */ +void link_required(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* we are starting to use the link */ +void link_terminated(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* we are finished with the link */ +void link_down(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* the LCP layer has left the Opened state */ +void upper_layers_down(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* take all NCPs down */ +void link_established(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* the link is up; authenticate now */ +void start_networks(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* start all the network control protos */ +void continue_networks(ppp_pcb *pcb); /* start network [ip, etc] control protos */ +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT +#if PPP_SERVER +int auth_check_passwd(ppp_pcb *pcb, char *auser, int userlen, char *apasswd, int passwdlen, const char **msg, int *msglen); +/* check the user name and passwd against configuration */ +void auth_peer_fail(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol); +/* peer failed to authenticate itself */ +void auth_peer_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol, int prot_flavor, const char *name, int namelen); +/* peer successfully authenticated itself */ +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +void auth_withpeer_fail(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol); +/* we failed to authenticate ourselves */ +void auth_withpeer_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol, int prot_flavor); +/* we successfully authenticated ourselves */ +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ +void np_up(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto); /* a network protocol has come up */ +void np_down(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto); /* a network protocol has gone down */ +void np_finished(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto); /* a network protocol no longer needs link */ +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT +int get_secret(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *client, const char *server, char *secret, int *secret_len, int am_server); +/* get "secret" for chap */ +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + +/* Procedures exported from ipcp.c */ +/* int parse_dotted_ip (char *, u32_t *); */ + +/* Procedures exported from demand.c */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +void demand_conf(void); /* config interface(s) for demand-dial */ +void demand_block(void); /* set all NPs to queue up packets */ +void demand_unblock(void); /* set all NPs to pass packets */ +void demand_discard(void); /* set all NPs to discard packets */ +void demand_rexmit(int, u32_t); /* retransmit saved frames for an NP*/ +int loop_chars(unsigned char *, int); /* process chars from loopback */ +int loop_frame(unsigned char *, int); /* should we bring link up? */ +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +/* Procedures exported from multilink.c */ +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK +void mp_check_options(void); /* Check multilink-related options */ +int mp_join_bundle(void); /* join our link to an appropriate bundle */ +void mp_exit_bundle(void); /* have disconnected our link from bundle */ +void mp_bundle_terminated(void); +char *epdisc_to_str(struct epdisc *); /* string from endpoint discrim. */ +int str_to_epdisc(struct epdisc *, char *); /* endpt disc. from str */ +#else +#define mp_bundle_terminated() /* nothing */ +#define mp_exit_bundle() /* nothing */ +#define doing_multilink 0 +#define multilink_master 0 +#endif + +/* Procedures exported from utils.c. */ +void ppp_print_string(const u_char *p, int len, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); /* Format a string for output */ +int ppp_slprintf(char *buf, int buflen, const char *fmt, ...); /* sprintf++ */ +int ppp_vslprintf(char *buf, int buflen, const char *fmt, va_list args); /* vsprintf++ */ +size_t ppp_strlcpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t len); /* safe strcpy */ +size_t ppp_strlcat(char *dest, const char *src, size_t len); /* safe strncpy */ +void ppp_dbglog(const char *fmt, ...); /* log a debug message */ +void ppp_info(const char *fmt, ...); /* log an informational message */ +void ppp_notice(const char *fmt, ...); /* log a notice-level message */ +void ppp_warn(const char *fmt, ...); /* log a warning message */ +void ppp_error(const char *fmt, ...); /* log an error message */ +void ppp_fatal(const char *fmt, ...); /* log an error message and die(1) */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +void ppp_dump_packet(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *tag, unsigned char *p, int len); +/* dump packet to debug log if interesting */ +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Number of necessary timers analysis. + * + * PPP use at least one timer per each of its protocol, but not all protocols are + * active at the same time, thus the number of necessary timeouts is actually + * lower than enabled protocols. Here is the actual necessary timeouts based + * on code analysis. + * + * Note that many features analysed here are not working at all and are only + * there for a comprehensive analysis of necessary timers in order to prevent + * having to redo that each time we add a feature. + * + * Timer list + * + * | holdoff timeout + * | low level protocol timeout (PPPoE or PPPoL2P) + * | LCP delayed UP + * | LCP retransmit (FSM) + * | LCP Echo timer + * .| PAP or CHAP or EAP authentication + * . | ECP retransmit (FSM) + * . | CCP retransmit (FSM) when MPPE is enabled + * . | CCP retransmit (FSM) when MPPE is NOT enabled + * . | IPCP retransmit (FSM) + * . .| IP6CP retransmit (FSM) + * . . | Idle time limit + * . . | Max connect time + * . . | Max octets + * . . | CCP RACK timeout + * . . . + * PPP_PHASE_DEAD + * PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF + * | . . . + * PPP_PHASE_INITIALIZE + * | . . . + * PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH + * | . . . + * |. . . + * | . . + * PPP_PHASE_AUTHENTICATE + * | . . + * || . . + * PPP_PHASE_NETWORK + * | || . . + * | ||| . + * PPP_PHASE_RUNNING + * | .||||| + * | . |||| + * PPP_PHASE_TERMINATE + * | . |||| + * PPP_PHASE_NETWORK + * |. . + * PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH + * PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT + * PPP_PHASE_DEAD + * + * Alright, PPP basic retransmission and LCP Echo consume one timer. + * 1 + * + * If authentication is enabled one timer is necessary during authentication. + * 1 + PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT + * + * If ECP is enabled one timer is necessary before IPCP and/or IP6CP, one more + * is necessary if CCP is enabled (only with MPPE support but we don't care much + * up to this detail level). + * 1 + ECP_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT + * + * If CCP is enabled it might consume a timer during IPCP or IP6CP, thus + * we might use IPCP, IP6CP and CCP timers simultaneously. + * 1 + PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT + * + * When entering running phase, IPCP or IP6CP is still running. If idle time limit + * is enabled one more timer is necessary. Same for max connect time and max + * octets features. Furthermore CCP RACK might be used past this point. + * 1 + PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -1 + PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT + PPP_MAXCONNECT + MAXOCTETS + CCP_SUPPORT + * + * IPv4 or IPv6 must be enabled, therefore we don't need to take care the authentication + * and the CCP + ECP case, thus reducing overall complexity. + * 1 + LWIP_MAX(PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT, PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -1 + PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT + PPP_MAXCONNECT + MAXOCTETS + CCP_SUPPORT) + * + * We don't support PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT + PPP_MAXCONNECT + MAXOCTETS features + * and adding those defines to ppp_opts.h just for having the value always + * defined to 0 isn't worth it. + * 1 + LWIP_MAX(PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT, PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -1 + CCP_SUPPORT) + * + * Thus, the following is enough for now. + * 1 + PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_PPP_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h index 9fc1b03a..051a93fe 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h @@ -1,610 +1,610 @@ -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_PPP_OPTS_H -#define LWIP_PPP_OPTS_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -/** - * PPP_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP. - */ -#ifndef PPP_SUPPORT -#define PPP_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * PPPOE_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP Over Ethernet - */ -#ifndef PPPOE_SUPPORT -#define PPPOE_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP Over L2TP - */ -#ifndef PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT -#define PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP Over L2TP Auth (enable MD5 support) - */ -#ifndef PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT -#define PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT -#endif - -/** - * PPPOS_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP Over Serial - */ -#ifndef PPPOS_SUPPORT -#define PPPOS_SUPPORT PPP_SUPPORT -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_PPP_API==1: Enable PPP API (in pppapi.c) - */ -#ifndef LWIP_PPP_API -#define LWIP_PPP_API (PPP_SUPPORT && (NO_SYS == 0)) -#endif - -#if PPP_SUPPORT - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB: the number of simultaneously active PPP - * connections (requires the PPP_SUPPORT option) - */ -#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB -#define MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB 1 -#endif - -/** - * PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS_PER_PCB: the number of sys_timeouts running in parallel per - * ppp_pcb. See the detailed explanation at the end of ppp_impl.h about simultaneous - * timers analysis. - */ -#ifndef PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS_PER_PCB -#define PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS_PER_PCB (1 + PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT) -#endif - -/* The number of sys_timeouts required for the PPP module */ -#define PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS (PPP_SUPPORT * PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS_PER_PCB * MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB) - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_PPPOS_INTERFACES: the number of concurrently active PPPoS - * interfaces (only used with PPPOS_SUPPORT==1) - */ -#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPPOS_INTERFACES -#define MEMP_NUM_PPPOS_INTERFACES MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES: the number of concurrently active PPPoE - * interfaces (only used with PPPOE_SUPPORT==1) - */ -#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES -#define MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES 1 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_PPPOL2TP_INTERFACES: the number of concurrently active PPPoL2TP - * interfaces (only used with PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT==1) - */ -#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPPOL2TP_INTERFACES -#define MEMP_NUM_PPPOL2TP_INTERFACES 1 -#endif - -/** - * MEMP_NUM_PPP_API_MSG: Number of concurrent PPP API messages (in pppapi.c) - */ -#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPP_API_MSG -#define MEMP_NUM_PPP_API_MSG 5 -#endif - -/** - * PPP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for PPP. - */ -#ifndef PPP_DEBUG -#define PPP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -/** - * PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE==1 call pppos_input() using tcpip_callback(). - * - * Please read the "PPPoS input path" chapter in the PPP documentation about this option. - */ -#ifndef PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE -#define PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE 0 -#endif - -/** - * PRINTPKT_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP print packet support - * - * Mandatory for debugging, it displays exchanged packet content in debug trace. - */ -#ifndef PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -#define PRINTPKT_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP IPv4 support - */ -#ifndef PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT -#define PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT (LWIP_IPV4) -#endif - -/** - * PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP IPv6 support - */ -#ifndef PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -#define PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT (LWIP_IPV6) -#endif - -/** - * PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE==1: Support PPP notify phase support - * - * PPP notify phase support allows you to set a callback which is - * called on change of the internal PPP state machine. - * - * This can be used for example to set a LED pattern depending on the - * current phase of the PPP session. - */ -#ifndef PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE -#define PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE 0 -#endif - -/** - * pbuf_type PPP is using for LCP, PAP, CHAP, EAP, CCP, IPCP and IP6CP packets. - * - * Memory allocated must be single buffered for PPP to works, it requires pbuf - * that are not going to be chained when allocated. This requires setting - * PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE to at least 512 bytes, which is quite huge for small systems. - * - * Setting PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM to 1 makes PPP use memory from heap where continuous - * buffers are required, allowing you to use a smaller PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE. - */ -#ifndef PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM -#define PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM 0 -#endif - -/** - * PPP_FCS_TABLE: Keep a 256*2 byte table to speed up FCS calculation for PPPoS - */ -#ifndef PPP_FCS_TABLE -#define PPP_FCS_TABLE 1 -#endif - -/** - * PAP_SUPPORT==1: Support PAP. - */ -#ifndef PAP_SUPPORT -#define PAP_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * CHAP_SUPPORT==1: Support CHAP. - */ -#ifndef CHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * MSCHAP_SUPPORT==1: Support MSCHAP. - */ -#ifndef MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#define MSCHAP_SUPPORT 0 -#endif -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -/* MSCHAP requires CHAP support */ -#undef CHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_SUPPORT 1 -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - -/** - * EAP_SUPPORT==1: Support EAP. - */ -#ifndef EAP_SUPPORT -#define EAP_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * CCP_SUPPORT==1: Support CCP. - */ -#ifndef CCP_SUPPORT -#define CCP_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * MPPE_SUPPORT==1: Support MPPE. - */ -#ifndef MPPE_SUPPORT -#define MPPE_SUPPORT 0 -#endif -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -/* MPPE requires CCP support */ -#undef CCP_SUPPORT -#define CCP_SUPPORT 1 -/* MPPE requires MSCHAP support */ -#undef MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#define MSCHAP_SUPPORT 1 -/* MSCHAP requires CHAP support */ -#undef CHAP_SUPPORT -#define CHAP_SUPPORT 1 -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -/** - * CBCP_SUPPORT==1: Support CBCP. CURRENTLY NOT SUPPORTED! DO NOT SET! - */ -#ifndef CBCP_SUPPORT -#define CBCP_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * ECP_SUPPORT==1: Support ECP. CURRENTLY NOT SUPPORTED! DO NOT SET! - */ -#ifndef ECP_SUPPORT -#define ECP_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * DEMAND_SUPPORT==1: Support dial on demand. CURRENTLY NOT SUPPORTED! DO NOT SET! - */ -#ifndef DEMAND_SUPPORT -#define DEMAND_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * LQR_SUPPORT==1: Support Link Quality Report. Do nothing except exchanging some LCP packets. - */ -#ifndef LQR_SUPPORT -#define LQR_SUPPORT 0 -#endif - -/** - * PPP_SERVER==1: Enable PPP server support (waiting for incoming PPP session). - * - * Currently only supported for PPPoS. - */ -#ifndef PPP_SERVER -#define PPP_SERVER 0 -#endif - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * PPP_OUR_NAME: Our name for authentication purposes - */ -#ifndef PPP_OUR_NAME -#define PPP_OUR_NAME "lwIP" -#endif -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/** - * VJ_SUPPORT==1: Support VJ header compression. - */ -#ifndef VJ_SUPPORT -#define VJ_SUPPORT 1 -#endif -/* VJ compression is only supported for TCP over IPv4 over PPPoS. */ -#if !PPPOS_SUPPORT || !PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT || !LWIP_TCP -#undef VJ_SUPPORT -#define VJ_SUPPORT 0 -#endif /* !PPPOS_SUPPORT */ - -/** - * PPP_MD5_RANDM==1: Use MD5 for better randomness. - * Enabled by default if CHAP, EAP, or L2TP AUTH support is enabled. - */ -#ifndef PPP_MD5_RANDM -#define PPP_MD5_RANDM (CHAP_SUPPORT || EAP_SUPPORT || PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT) -#endif - -/** - * PolarSSL embedded library - * - * - * lwIP contains some files fetched from the latest BSD release of - * the PolarSSL project (PolarSSL 0.10.1-bsd) for ciphers and encryption - * methods we need for lwIP PPP support. - * - * The PolarSSL files were cleaned to contain only the necessary struct - * fields and functions needed for lwIP. - * - * The PolarSSL API was not changed at all, so if you are already using - * PolarSSL you can choose to skip the compilation of the included PolarSSL - * library into lwIP. - * - * If you are not using the embedded copy you must include external - * libraries into your arch/cc.h port file. - * - * Beware of the stack requirements which can be a lot larger if you are not - * using our cleaned PolarSSL library. - */ - -/** - * LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL: Use external PolarSSL library - */ -#ifndef LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL -#define LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL 0 -#endif - -/** - * LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS: Use external mbed TLS library - */ -#ifndef LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS -#define LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS 0 -#endif - -/* - * PPP Timeouts - */ - -/** - * FSM_DEFTIMEOUT: Timeout time in seconds - */ -#ifndef FSM_DEFTIMEOUT -#define FSM_DEFTIMEOUT 6 -#endif - -/** - * FSM_DEFMAXTERMREQS: Maximum Terminate-Request transmissions - */ -#ifndef FSM_DEFMAXTERMREQS -#define FSM_DEFMAXTERMREQS 2 -#endif - -/** - * FSM_DEFMAXCONFREQS: Maximum Configure-Request transmissions - */ -#ifndef FSM_DEFMAXCONFREQS -#define FSM_DEFMAXCONFREQS 10 -#endif - -/** - * FSM_DEFMAXNAKLOOPS: Maximum number of nak loops - */ -#ifndef FSM_DEFMAXNAKLOOPS -#define FSM_DEFMAXNAKLOOPS 5 -#endif - -/** - * UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT: Timeout (seconds) for retransmitting req - */ -#ifndef UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT -#define UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT 6 -#endif - -/** - * UPAP_DEFTRANSMITS: Maximum number of auth-reqs to send - */ -#ifndef UPAP_DEFTRANSMITS -#define UPAP_DEFTRANSMITS 10 -#endif - -#if PPP_SERVER -/** - * UPAP_DEFREQTIME: Time to wait for auth-req from peer - */ -#ifndef UPAP_DEFREQTIME -#define UPAP_DEFREQTIME 30 -#endif -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/** - * CHAP_DEFTIMEOUT: Timeout (seconds) for retransmitting req - */ -#ifndef CHAP_DEFTIMEOUT -#define CHAP_DEFTIMEOUT 6 -#endif - -/** - * CHAP_DEFTRANSMITS: max # times to send challenge - */ -#ifndef CHAP_DEFTRANSMITS -#define CHAP_DEFTRANSMITS 10 -#endif - -#if PPP_SERVER -/** - * CHAP_DEFRECHALLENGETIME: If this option is > 0, rechallenge the peer every n seconds - */ -#ifndef CHAP_DEFRECHALLENGETIME -#define CHAP_DEFRECHALLENGETIME 0 -#endif -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/** - * EAP_DEFREQTIME: Time to wait for peer request - */ -#ifndef EAP_DEFREQTIME -#define EAP_DEFREQTIME 6 -#endif - -/** - * EAP_DEFALLOWREQ: max # times to accept requests - */ -#ifndef EAP_DEFALLOWREQ -#define EAP_DEFALLOWREQ 10 -#endif - -#if PPP_SERVER -/** - * EAP_DEFTIMEOUT: Timeout (seconds) for rexmit - */ -#ifndef EAP_DEFTIMEOUT -#define EAP_DEFTIMEOUT 6 -#endif - -/** - * EAP_DEFTRANSMITS: max # times to transmit - */ -#ifndef EAP_DEFTRANSMITS -#define EAP_DEFTRANSMITS 10 -#endif -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/** - * LCP_DEFLOOPBACKFAIL: Default number of times we receive our magic number from the peer - * before deciding the link is looped-back. - */ -#ifndef LCP_DEFLOOPBACKFAIL -#define LCP_DEFLOOPBACKFAIL 10 -#endif - -/** - * LCP_ECHOINTERVAL: Interval in seconds between keepalive echo requests, 0 to disable. - */ -#ifndef LCP_ECHOINTERVAL -#define LCP_ECHOINTERVAL 0 -#endif - -/** - * LCP_MAXECHOFAILS: Number of unanswered echo requests before failure. - */ -#ifndef LCP_MAXECHOFAILS -#define LCP_MAXECHOFAILS 3 -#endif - -/** - * PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG: Max Xmit idle time (in ms) before resend flag char. - */ -#ifndef PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG -#define PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG 100 -#endif - -/** - * PPP Packet sizes - */ - -/** - * PPP_MRU: Default MRU - */ -#ifndef PPP_MRU -#define PPP_MRU 1500 -#endif - -/** - * PPP_DEFMRU: Default MRU to try - */ -#ifndef PPP_DEFMRU -#define PPP_DEFMRU 1500 -#endif - -/** - * PPP_MAXMRU: Normally limit MRU to this (pppd default = 16384) - */ -#ifndef PPP_MAXMRU -#define PPP_MAXMRU 1500 -#endif - -/** - * PPP_MINMRU: No MRUs below this - */ -#ifndef PPP_MINMRU -#define PPP_MINMRU 128 -#endif - -/** - * PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU: Default MTU and MRU for L2TP - * Default = 1500 - PPPoE(6) - PPP Protocol(2) - IPv4 header(20) - UDP Header(8) - * - L2TP Header(6) - HDLC Header(2) - PPP Protocol(2) - MPPE Header(2) - PPP Protocol(2) - */ -#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT -#ifndef PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU -#define PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU 1450 -#endif -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ - -/** - * MAXNAMELEN: max length of hostname or name for auth - */ -#ifndef MAXNAMELEN -#define MAXNAMELEN 256 -#endif - -/** - * MAXSECRETLEN: max length of password or secret - */ -#ifndef MAXSECRETLEN -#define MAXSECRETLEN 256 -#endif - -/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ - -/* - * Build triggers for embedded PolarSSL - */ -#if !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL && !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS - -/* CHAP, EAP, L2TP AUTH and MD5 Random require MD5 support */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT || EAP_SUPPORT || PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT || PPP_MD5_RANDM -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 1 -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT || EAP_SUPPORT || PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT || PPP_MD5_RANDM */ - -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - -/* MSCHAP require MD4 support */ -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 1 -/* MSCHAP require SHA1 support */ -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 1 -/* MSCHAP require DES support */ -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES 1 - -/* MS-CHAP support is required for MPPE */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -/* MPPE require ARC4 support */ -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 1 -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL && !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS */ - -/* Default value if unset */ -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 0 -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 */ -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 0 -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 */ -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 0 -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 */ -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES 0 -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES */ -#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 -#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 0 -#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ - -/* Default value if unset */ -#ifndef PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS -#define PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS 0 -#endif /* PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_PPP_OPTS_H */ +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_PPP_OPTS_H +#define LWIP_PPP_OPTS_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +/** + * PPP_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP. + */ +#ifndef PPP_SUPPORT +#define PPP_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * PPPOE_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP Over Ethernet + */ +#ifndef PPPOE_SUPPORT +#define PPPOE_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP Over L2TP + */ +#ifndef PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT +#define PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP Over L2TP Auth (enable MD5 support) + */ +#ifndef PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT +#define PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT +#endif + +/** + * PPPOS_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP Over Serial + */ +#ifndef PPPOS_SUPPORT +#define PPPOS_SUPPORT PPP_SUPPORT +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_PPP_API==1: Enable PPP API (in pppapi.c) + */ +#ifndef LWIP_PPP_API +#define LWIP_PPP_API (PPP_SUPPORT && (NO_SYS == 0)) +#endif + +#if PPP_SUPPORT + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB: the number of simultaneously active PPP + * connections (requires the PPP_SUPPORT option) + */ +#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB +#define MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB 1 +#endif + +/** + * PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS_PER_PCB: the number of sys_timeouts running in parallel per + * ppp_pcb. See the detailed explanation at the end of ppp_impl.h about simultaneous + * timers analysis. + */ +#ifndef PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS_PER_PCB +#define PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS_PER_PCB (1 + PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + CCP_SUPPORT) +#endif + +/* The number of sys_timeouts required for the PPP module */ +#define PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS (PPP_SUPPORT * PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS_PER_PCB * MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB) + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_PPPOS_INTERFACES: the number of concurrently active PPPoS + * interfaces (only used with PPPOS_SUPPORT==1) + */ +#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPPOS_INTERFACES +#define MEMP_NUM_PPPOS_INTERFACES MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES: the number of concurrently active PPPoE + * interfaces (only used with PPPOE_SUPPORT==1) + */ +#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES +#define MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES 1 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_PPPOL2TP_INTERFACES: the number of concurrently active PPPoL2TP + * interfaces (only used with PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT==1) + */ +#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPPOL2TP_INTERFACES +#define MEMP_NUM_PPPOL2TP_INTERFACES 1 +#endif + +/** + * MEMP_NUM_PPP_API_MSG: Number of concurrent PPP API messages (in pppapi.c) + */ +#ifndef MEMP_NUM_PPP_API_MSG +#define MEMP_NUM_PPP_API_MSG 5 +#endif + +/** + * PPP_DEBUG: Enable debugging for PPP. + */ +#ifndef PPP_DEBUG +#define PPP_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +/** + * PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE==1 call pppos_input() using tcpip_callback(). + * + * Please read the "PPPoS input path" chapter in the PPP documentation about this option. + */ +#ifndef PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE +#define PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE 0 +#endif + +/** + * PRINTPKT_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP print packet support + * + * Mandatory for debugging, it displays exchanged packet content in debug trace. + */ +#ifndef PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +#define PRINTPKT_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP IPv4 support + */ +#ifndef PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT +#define PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT (LWIP_IPV4) +#endif + +/** + * PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT==1: Enable PPP IPv6 support + */ +#ifndef PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +#define PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT (LWIP_IPV6) +#endif + +/** + * PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE==1: Support PPP notify phase support + * + * PPP notify phase support allows you to set a callback which is + * called on change of the internal PPP state machine. + * + * This can be used for example to set a LED pattern depending on the + * current phase of the PPP session. + */ +#ifndef PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE +#define PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE 0 +#endif + +/** + * pbuf_type PPP is using for LCP, PAP, CHAP, EAP, CCP, IPCP and IP6CP packets. + * + * Memory allocated must be single buffered for PPP to works, it requires pbuf + * that are not going to be chained when allocated. This requires setting + * PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE to at least 512 bytes, which is quite huge for small systems. + * + * Setting PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM to 1 makes PPP use memory from heap where continuous + * buffers are required, allowing you to use a smaller PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE. + */ +#ifndef PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM +#define PPP_USE_PBUF_RAM 0 +#endif + +/** + * PPP_FCS_TABLE: Keep a 256*2 byte table to speed up FCS calculation for PPPoS + */ +#ifndef PPP_FCS_TABLE +#define PPP_FCS_TABLE 1 +#endif + +/** + * PAP_SUPPORT==1: Support PAP. + */ +#ifndef PAP_SUPPORT +#define PAP_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * CHAP_SUPPORT==1: Support CHAP. + */ +#ifndef CHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * MSCHAP_SUPPORT==1: Support MSCHAP. + */ +#ifndef MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#define MSCHAP_SUPPORT 0 +#endif +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +/* MSCHAP requires CHAP support */ +#undef CHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_SUPPORT 1 +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + +/** + * EAP_SUPPORT==1: Support EAP. + */ +#ifndef EAP_SUPPORT +#define EAP_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * CCP_SUPPORT==1: Support CCP. + */ +#ifndef CCP_SUPPORT +#define CCP_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * MPPE_SUPPORT==1: Support MPPE. + */ +#ifndef MPPE_SUPPORT +#define MPPE_SUPPORT 0 +#endif +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +/* MPPE requires CCP support */ +#undef CCP_SUPPORT +#define CCP_SUPPORT 1 +/* MPPE requires MSCHAP support */ +#undef MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#define MSCHAP_SUPPORT 1 +/* MSCHAP requires CHAP support */ +#undef CHAP_SUPPORT +#define CHAP_SUPPORT 1 +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +/** + * CBCP_SUPPORT==1: Support CBCP. CURRENTLY NOT SUPPORTED! DO NOT SET! + */ +#ifndef CBCP_SUPPORT +#define CBCP_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * ECP_SUPPORT==1: Support ECP. CURRENTLY NOT SUPPORTED! DO NOT SET! + */ +#ifndef ECP_SUPPORT +#define ECP_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * DEMAND_SUPPORT==1: Support dial on demand. CURRENTLY NOT SUPPORTED! DO NOT SET! + */ +#ifndef DEMAND_SUPPORT +#define DEMAND_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * LQR_SUPPORT==1: Support Link Quality Report. Do nothing except exchanging some LCP packets. + */ +#ifndef LQR_SUPPORT +#define LQR_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/** + * PPP_SERVER==1: Enable PPP server support (waiting for incoming PPP session). + * + * Currently only supported for PPPoS. + */ +#ifndef PPP_SERVER +#define PPP_SERVER 0 +#endif + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * PPP_OUR_NAME: Our name for authentication purposes + */ +#ifndef PPP_OUR_NAME +#define PPP_OUR_NAME "lwIP" +#endif +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/** + * VJ_SUPPORT==1: Support VJ header compression. + */ +#ifndef VJ_SUPPORT +#define VJ_SUPPORT 1 +#endif +/* VJ compression is only supported for TCP over IPv4 over PPPoS. */ +#if !PPPOS_SUPPORT || !PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT || !LWIP_TCP +#undef VJ_SUPPORT +#define VJ_SUPPORT 0 +#endif /* !PPPOS_SUPPORT */ + +/** + * PPP_MD5_RANDM==1: Use MD5 for better randomness. + * Enabled by default if CHAP, EAP, or L2TP AUTH support is enabled. + */ +#ifndef PPP_MD5_RANDM +#define PPP_MD5_RANDM (CHAP_SUPPORT || EAP_SUPPORT || PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT) +#endif + +/** + * PolarSSL embedded library + * + * + * lwIP contains some files fetched from the latest BSD release of + * the PolarSSL project (PolarSSL 0.10.1-bsd) for ciphers and encryption + * methods we need for lwIP PPP support. + * + * The PolarSSL files were cleaned to contain only the necessary struct + * fields and functions needed for lwIP. + * + * The PolarSSL API was not changed at all, so if you are already using + * PolarSSL you can choose to skip the compilation of the included PolarSSL + * library into lwIP. + * + * If you are not using the embedded copy you must include external + * libraries into your arch/cc.h port file. + * + * Beware of the stack requirements which can be a lot larger if you are not + * using our cleaned PolarSSL library. + */ + +/** + * LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL: Use external PolarSSL library + */ +#ifndef LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL +#define LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL 0 +#endif + +/** + * LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS: Use external mbed TLS library + */ +#ifndef LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS +#define LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS 0 +#endif + +/* + * PPP Timeouts + */ + +/** + * FSM_DEFTIMEOUT: Timeout time in seconds + */ +#ifndef FSM_DEFTIMEOUT +#define FSM_DEFTIMEOUT 6 +#endif + +/** + * FSM_DEFMAXTERMREQS: Maximum Terminate-Request transmissions + */ +#ifndef FSM_DEFMAXTERMREQS +#define FSM_DEFMAXTERMREQS 2 +#endif + +/** + * FSM_DEFMAXCONFREQS: Maximum Configure-Request transmissions + */ +#ifndef FSM_DEFMAXCONFREQS +#define FSM_DEFMAXCONFREQS 10 +#endif + +/** + * FSM_DEFMAXNAKLOOPS: Maximum number of nak loops + */ +#ifndef FSM_DEFMAXNAKLOOPS +#define FSM_DEFMAXNAKLOOPS 5 +#endif + +/** + * UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT: Timeout (seconds) for retransmitting req + */ +#ifndef UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT +#define UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT 6 +#endif + +/** + * UPAP_DEFTRANSMITS: Maximum number of auth-reqs to send + */ +#ifndef UPAP_DEFTRANSMITS +#define UPAP_DEFTRANSMITS 10 +#endif + +#if PPP_SERVER +/** + * UPAP_DEFREQTIME: Time to wait for auth-req from peer + */ +#ifndef UPAP_DEFREQTIME +#define UPAP_DEFREQTIME 30 +#endif +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/** + * CHAP_DEFTIMEOUT: Timeout (seconds) for retransmitting req + */ +#ifndef CHAP_DEFTIMEOUT +#define CHAP_DEFTIMEOUT 6 +#endif + +/** + * CHAP_DEFTRANSMITS: max # times to send challenge + */ +#ifndef CHAP_DEFTRANSMITS +#define CHAP_DEFTRANSMITS 10 +#endif + +#if PPP_SERVER +/** + * CHAP_DEFRECHALLENGETIME: If this option is > 0, rechallenge the peer every n seconds + */ +#ifndef CHAP_DEFRECHALLENGETIME +#define CHAP_DEFRECHALLENGETIME 0 +#endif +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/** + * EAP_DEFREQTIME: Time to wait for peer request + */ +#ifndef EAP_DEFREQTIME +#define EAP_DEFREQTIME 6 +#endif + +/** + * EAP_DEFALLOWREQ: max # times to accept requests + */ +#ifndef EAP_DEFALLOWREQ +#define EAP_DEFALLOWREQ 10 +#endif + +#if PPP_SERVER +/** + * EAP_DEFTIMEOUT: Timeout (seconds) for rexmit + */ +#ifndef EAP_DEFTIMEOUT +#define EAP_DEFTIMEOUT 6 +#endif + +/** + * EAP_DEFTRANSMITS: max # times to transmit + */ +#ifndef EAP_DEFTRANSMITS +#define EAP_DEFTRANSMITS 10 +#endif +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/** + * LCP_DEFLOOPBACKFAIL: Default number of times we receive our magic number from the peer + * before deciding the link is looped-back. + */ +#ifndef LCP_DEFLOOPBACKFAIL +#define LCP_DEFLOOPBACKFAIL 10 +#endif + +/** + * LCP_ECHOINTERVAL: Interval in seconds between keepalive echo requests, 0 to disable. + */ +#ifndef LCP_ECHOINTERVAL +#define LCP_ECHOINTERVAL 0 +#endif + +/** + * LCP_MAXECHOFAILS: Number of unanswered echo requests before failure. + */ +#ifndef LCP_MAXECHOFAILS +#define LCP_MAXECHOFAILS 3 +#endif + +/** + * PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG: Max Xmit idle time (in ms) before resend flag char. + */ +#ifndef PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG +#define PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG 100 +#endif + +/** + * PPP Packet sizes + */ + +/** + * PPP_MRU: Default MRU + */ +#ifndef PPP_MRU +#define PPP_MRU 1500 +#endif + +/** + * PPP_DEFMRU: Default MRU to try + */ +#ifndef PPP_DEFMRU +#define PPP_DEFMRU 1500 +#endif + +/** + * PPP_MAXMRU: Normally limit MRU to this (pppd default = 16384) + */ +#ifndef PPP_MAXMRU +#define PPP_MAXMRU 1500 +#endif + +/** + * PPP_MINMRU: No MRUs below this + */ +#ifndef PPP_MINMRU +#define PPP_MINMRU 128 +#endif + +/** + * PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU: Default MTU and MRU for L2TP + * Default = 1500 - PPPoE(6) - PPP Protocol(2) - IPv4 header(20) - UDP Header(8) + * - L2TP Header(6) - HDLC Header(2) - PPP Protocol(2) - MPPE Header(2) - PPP Protocol(2) + */ +#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT +#ifndef PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU +#define PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU 1450 +#endif +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ + +/** + * MAXNAMELEN: max length of hostname or name for auth + */ +#ifndef MAXNAMELEN +#define MAXNAMELEN 256 +#endif + +/** + * MAXSECRETLEN: max length of password or secret + */ +#ifndef MAXSECRETLEN +#define MAXSECRETLEN 256 +#endif + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* + * Build triggers for embedded PolarSSL + */ +#if !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL && !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS + +/* CHAP, EAP, L2TP AUTH and MD5 Random require MD5 support */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT || EAP_SUPPORT || PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT || PPP_MD5_RANDM +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 1 +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT || EAP_SUPPORT || PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT || PPP_MD5_RANDM */ + +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + +/* MSCHAP require MD4 support */ +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 1 +/* MSCHAP require SHA1 support */ +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 1 +/* MSCHAP require DES support */ +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES 1 + +/* MS-CHAP support is required for MPPE */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +/* MPPE require ARC4 support */ +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 1 +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_POLARSSL && !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS */ + +/* Default value if unset */ +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 0 +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 */ +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 0 +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 */ +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 0 +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 */ +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES 0 +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES */ +#ifndef LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 +#define LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 0 +#endif /* LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ + +/* Default value if unset */ +#ifndef PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS +#define PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS 0 +#endif /* PPP_NUM_TIMEOUTS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_PPP_OPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppapi.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppapi.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppapi.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppapi.h index 4d8c1c79..fb1a3280 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppapi.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppapi.h @@ -1,144 +1,144 @@ -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_PPPAPI_H -#define LWIP_PPPAPI_H - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_PPP_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ppp.h" -#if PPPOS_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/pppos.h" -#endif /* PPPOS_SUPPORT */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -struct pppapi_msg_msg { - ppp_pcb *ppp; - union { -#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE - struct - { - ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb; - } setnotifyphasecb; -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ -#if PPPOS_SUPPORT - struct - { - struct netif *pppif; - pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb; - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb; - void *ctx_cb; - } serialcreate; -#endif /* PPPOS_SUPPORT */ -#if PPPOE_SUPPORT - struct - { - struct netif *pppif; - struct netif *ethif; - const char *service_name; - const char *concentrator_name; - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb; - void *ctx_cb; - } ethernetcreate; -#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ -#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT - struct - { - struct netif *pppif; - struct netif *netif; - API_MSG_M_DEF_C(ip_addr_t, ipaddr); - u16_t port; -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - const u8_t *secret; - u8_t secret_len; -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb; - void *ctx_cb; - } l2tpcreate; -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ - struct - { - u16_t holdoff; - } connect; - struct - { - u8_t nocarrier; - } close; - struct - { - u8_t cmd; - void *arg; - } ioctl; - } msg; -}; - -struct pppapi_msg { - struct tcpip_api_call_data call; - struct pppapi_msg_msg msg; -}; - -/* API for application */ -err_t pppapi_set_default(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE -err_t pppapi_set_notify_phase_callback(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb); -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ -#if PPPOS_SUPPORT -ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppos_create(struct netif *pppif, pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb, ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); -#endif /* PPPOS_SUPPORT */ -#if PPPOE_SUPPORT -ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppoe_create(struct netif *pppif, struct netif *ethif, const char *service_name, - const char *concentrator_name, ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, - void *ctx_cb); -#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ -#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT -ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppol2tp_create(struct netif *pppif, struct netif *netif, ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, - const u8_t *secret, u8_t secret_len, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ -err_t pppapi_connect(ppp_pcb *pcb, u16_t holdoff); -#if PPP_SERVER -err_t pppapi_listen(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -err_t pppapi_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t nocarrier); -err_t pppapi_free(ppp_pcb *pcb); -err_t pppapi_ioctl(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t cmd, void *arg); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_PPP_API */ - -#endif /* LWIP_PPPAPI_H */ +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_PPPAPI_H +#define LWIP_PPPAPI_H + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_PPP_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ppp.h" +#if PPPOS_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/pppos.h" +#endif /* PPPOS_SUPPORT */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +struct pppapi_msg_msg { + ppp_pcb *ppp; + union { +#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE + struct + { + ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb; + } setnotifyphasecb; +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ +#if PPPOS_SUPPORT + struct + { + struct netif *pppif; + pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb; + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb; + void *ctx_cb; + } serialcreate; +#endif /* PPPOS_SUPPORT */ +#if PPPOE_SUPPORT + struct + { + struct netif *pppif; + struct netif *ethif; + const char *service_name; + const char *concentrator_name; + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb; + void *ctx_cb; + } ethernetcreate; +#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ +#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT + struct + { + struct netif *pppif; + struct netif *netif; + API_MSG_M_DEF_C(ip_addr_t, ipaddr); + u16_t port; +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + const u8_t *secret; + u8_t secret_len; +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb; + void *ctx_cb; + } l2tpcreate; +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ + struct + { + u16_t holdoff; + } connect; + struct + { + u8_t nocarrier; + } close; + struct + { + u8_t cmd; + void *arg; + } ioctl; + } msg; +}; + +struct pppapi_msg { + struct tcpip_api_call_data call; + struct pppapi_msg_msg msg; +}; + +/* API for application */ +err_t pppapi_set_default(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE +err_t pppapi_set_notify_phase_callback(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb); +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ +#if PPPOS_SUPPORT +ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppos_create(struct netif *pppif, pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb, ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); +#endif /* PPPOS_SUPPORT */ +#if PPPOE_SUPPORT +ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppoe_create(struct netif *pppif, struct netif *ethif, const char *service_name, + const char *concentrator_name, ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, + void *ctx_cb); +#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ +#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT +ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppol2tp_create(struct netif *pppif, struct netif *netif, ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, + const u8_t *secret, u8_t secret_len, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ +err_t pppapi_connect(ppp_pcb *pcb, u16_t holdoff); +#if PPP_SERVER +err_t pppapi_listen(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +err_t pppapi_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t nocarrier); +err_t pppapi_free(ppp_pcb *pcb); +err_t pppapi_ioctl(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t cmd, void *arg); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_PPP_API */ + +#endif /* LWIP_PPPAPI_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h index e20cc052..965eec5d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h @@ -1,144 +1,144 @@ -/* - * pppcrypt.c - PPP/DES linkage for MS-CHAP and EAP SRP-SHA1 - * - * Extracted from chap_ms.c by James Carlson. - * - * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/* This header file is included in all PPP modules needing hashes and/or ciphers */ - -#ifndef PPPCRYPT_H -#define PPPCRYPT_H - -/* - * If included PolarSSL copy is not used, user is expected to include - * external libraries in arch/cc.h (which is included by lwip/arch.h). - */ -#include "lwip/arch.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * Map hashes and ciphers functions to PolarSSL - */ -#if !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h" -#define lwip_md4_context md4_context -#define lwip_md4_init(context) -#define lwip_md4_starts md4_starts -#define lwip_md4_update md4_update -#define lwip_md4_finish md4_finish -#define lwip_md4_free(context) - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h" -#define lwip_md5_context md5_context -#define lwip_md5_init(context) -#define lwip_md5_starts md5_starts -#define lwip_md5_update md5_update -#define lwip_md5_finish md5_finish -#define lwip_md5_free(context) - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h" -#define lwip_sha1_context sha1_context -#define lwip_sha1_init(context) -#define lwip_sha1_starts sha1_starts -#define lwip_sha1_update sha1_update -#define lwip_sha1_finish sha1_finish -#define lwip_sha1_free(context) - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h" -#define lwip_des_context des_context -#define lwip_des_init(context) -#define lwip_des_setkey_enc des_setkey_enc -#define lwip_des_crypt_ecb des_crypt_ecb -#define lwip_des_free(context) - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h" -#define lwip_arc4_context arc4_context -#define lwip_arc4_init(context) -#define lwip_arc4_setup arc4_setup -#define lwip_arc4_crypt arc4_crypt -#define lwip_arc4_free(context) - -#endif /* !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS */ - -/* - * Map hashes and ciphers functions to mbed TLS - */ -#if LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS - -#define lwip_md4_context mbedtls_md4_context -#define lwip_md4_init mbedtls_md4_init -#define lwip_md4_starts mbedtls_md4_starts -#define lwip_md4_update mbedtls_md4_update -#define lwip_md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish -#define lwip_md4_free mbedtls_md4_free - -#define lwip_md5_context mbedtls_md5_context -#define lwip_md5_init mbedtls_md5_init -#define lwip_md5_starts mbedtls_md5_starts -#define lwip_md5_update mbedtls_md5_update -#define lwip_md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish -#define lwip_md5_free mbedtls_md5_free - -#define lwip_sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context -#define lwip_sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init -#define lwip_sha1_starts mbedtls_sha1_starts -#define lwip_sha1_update mbedtls_sha1_update -#define lwip_sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish -#define lwip_sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free - -#define lwip_des_context mbedtls_des_context -#define lwip_des_init mbedtls_des_init -#define lwip_des_setkey_enc mbedtls_des_setkey_enc -#define lwip_des_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb -#define lwip_des_free mbedtls_des_free - -#define lwip_arc4_context mbedtls_arc4_context -#define lwip_arc4_init mbedtls_arc4_init -#define lwip_arc4_setup mbedtls_arc4_setup -#define lwip_arc4_crypt(context, buffer, length) mbedtls_arc4_crypt(context, length, buffer, buffer) -#define lwip_arc4_free mbedtls_arc4_free - -#endif /* LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS */ - -void pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(u_char *key, u_char *des_key); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* PPPCRYPT_H */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * pppcrypt.c - PPP/DES linkage for MS-CHAP and EAP SRP-SHA1 + * + * Extracted from chap_ms.c by James Carlson. + * + * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/* This header file is included in all PPP modules needing hashes and/or ciphers */ + +#ifndef PPPCRYPT_H +#define PPPCRYPT_H + +/* + * If included PolarSSL copy is not used, user is expected to include + * external libraries in arch/cc.h (which is included by lwip/arch.h). + */ +#include "lwip/arch.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Map hashes and ciphers functions to PolarSSL + */ +#if !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h" +#define lwip_md4_context md4_context +#define lwip_md4_init(context) +#define lwip_md4_starts md4_starts +#define lwip_md4_update md4_update +#define lwip_md4_finish md4_finish +#define lwip_md4_free(context) + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h" +#define lwip_md5_context md5_context +#define lwip_md5_init(context) +#define lwip_md5_starts md5_starts +#define lwip_md5_update md5_update +#define lwip_md5_finish md5_finish +#define lwip_md5_free(context) + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h" +#define lwip_sha1_context sha1_context +#define lwip_sha1_init(context) +#define lwip_sha1_starts sha1_starts +#define lwip_sha1_update sha1_update +#define lwip_sha1_finish sha1_finish +#define lwip_sha1_free(context) + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h" +#define lwip_des_context des_context +#define lwip_des_init(context) +#define lwip_des_setkey_enc des_setkey_enc +#define lwip_des_crypt_ecb des_crypt_ecb +#define lwip_des_free(context) + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h" +#define lwip_arc4_context arc4_context +#define lwip_arc4_init(context) +#define lwip_arc4_setup arc4_setup +#define lwip_arc4_crypt arc4_crypt +#define lwip_arc4_free(context) + +#endif /* !LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS */ + +/* + * Map hashes and ciphers functions to mbed TLS + */ +#if LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS + +#define lwip_md4_context mbedtls_md4_context +#define lwip_md4_init mbedtls_md4_init +#define lwip_md4_starts mbedtls_md4_starts +#define lwip_md4_update mbedtls_md4_update +#define lwip_md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish +#define lwip_md4_free mbedtls_md4_free + +#define lwip_md5_context mbedtls_md5_context +#define lwip_md5_init mbedtls_md5_init +#define lwip_md5_starts mbedtls_md5_starts +#define lwip_md5_update mbedtls_md5_update +#define lwip_md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish +#define lwip_md5_free mbedtls_md5_free + +#define lwip_sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context +#define lwip_sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init +#define lwip_sha1_starts mbedtls_sha1_starts +#define lwip_sha1_update mbedtls_sha1_update +#define lwip_sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish +#define lwip_sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free + +#define lwip_des_context mbedtls_des_context +#define lwip_des_init mbedtls_des_init +#define lwip_des_setkey_enc mbedtls_des_setkey_enc +#define lwip_des_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb +#define lwip_des_free mbedtls_des_free + +#define lwip_arc4_context mbedtls_arc4_context +#define lwip_arc4_init mbedtls_arc4_init +#define lwip_arc4_setup mbedtls_arc4_setup +#define lwip_arc4_crypt(context, buffer, length) mbedtls_arc4_crypt(context, length, buffer, buffer) +#define lwip_arc4_free mbedtls_arc4_free + +#endif /* LWIP_USE_EXTERNAL_MBEDTLS */ + +void pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(u_char *key, u_char *des_key); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PPPCRYPT_H */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppdebug.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppdebug.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppdebug.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppdebug.h index f4854f45..ef6e5398 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppdebug.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppdebug.h @@ -1,88 +1,88 @@ -/***************************************************************************** -* pppdebug.h - System debugging utilities. -* -* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. -* portions Copyright (c) 1998 Global Election Systems Inc. -* portions Copyright (c) 2001 by Cognizant Pty Ltd. -* -* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, -* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided -* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this -* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any -* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required -* for any of the authorized uses. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR -* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -****************************************************************************** -* REVISION HISTORY (please don't use tabs!) -* -* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher -* Ported to lwIP. -* 98-07-29 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. -* Original. -* -***************************************************************************** -*/ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef PPPDEBUG_H -#define PPPDEBUG_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* Trace levels. */ -#define LOG_CRITICAL (PPP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE) -#define LOG_ERR (PPP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE) -#define LOG_NOTICE (PPP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) -#define LOG_WARNING (PPP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) -#define LOG_INFO (PPP_DEBUG) -#define LOG_DETAIL (PPP_DEBUG) -#define LOG_DEBUG (PPP_DEBUG) - -#if PPP_DEBUG - -#define MAINDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) -#define SYSDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) -#define FSMDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) -#define LCPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) -#define IPCPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) -#define IPV6CPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) -#define UPAPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) -#define CHAPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) -#define PPPDEBUG(a, b) LWIP_DEBUGF(a, b) - -#else /* PPP_DEBUG */ - -#define MAINDEBUG(a) -#define SYSDEBUG(a) -#define FSMDEBUG(a) -#define LCPDEBUG(a) -#define IPCPDEBUG(a) -#define IPV6CPDEBUG(a) -#define UPAPDEBUG(a) -#define CHAPDEBUG(a) -#define PPPDEBUG(a, b) - -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* PPPDEBUG_H */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/***************************************************************************** +* pppdebug.h - System debugging utilities. +* +* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. +* portions Copyright (c) 1998 Global Election Systems Inc. +* portions Copyright (c) 2001 by Cognizant Pty Ltd. +* +* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, +* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided +* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this +* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any +* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required +* for any of the authorized uses. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +****************************************************************************** +* REVISION HISTORY (please don't use tabs!) +* +* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher +* Ported to lwIP. +* 98-07-29 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. +* Original. +* +***************************************************************************** +*/ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef PPPDEBUG_H +#define PPPDEBUG_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Trace levels. */ +#define LOG_CRITICAL (PPP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE) +#define LOG_ERR (PPP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SEVERE) +#define LOG_NOTICE (PPP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) +#define LOG_WARNING (PPP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING) +#define LOG_INFO (PPP_DEBUG) +#define LOG_DETAIL (PPP_DEBUG) +#define LOG_DEBUG (PPP_DEBUG) + +#if PPP_DEBUG + +#define MAINDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) +#define SYSDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) +#define FSMDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) +#define LCPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) +#define IPCPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) +#define IPV6CPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) +#define UPAPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) +#define CHAPDEBUG(a) LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, a) +#define PPPDEBUG(a, b) LWIP_DEBUGF(a, b) + +#else /* PPP_DEBUG */ + +#define MAINDEBUG(a) +#define SYSDEBUG(a) +#define FSMDEBUG(a) +#define LCPDEBUG(a) +#define IPCPDEBUG(a) +#define IPV6CPDEBUG(a) +#define UPAPDEBUG(a) +#define CHAPDEBUG(a) +#define PPPDEBUG(a, b) + +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PPPDEBUG_H */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppoe.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppoe.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppoe.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppoe.h index 28e8df3b..9d9ac5d4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppoe.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppoe.h @@ -1,183 +1,183 @@ -/***************************************************************************** -* pppoe.h - PPP Over Ethernet implementation for lwIP. -* -* Copyright (c) 2006 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. -* -* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, -* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided -* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this -* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any -* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required -* for any of the authorized uses. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR -* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -****************************************************************************** -* REVISION HISTORY -* -* 06-01-01 Marc Boucher -* Ported to lwIP. -*****************************************************************************/ - -/* based on NetBSD: if_pppoe.c,v 1.64 2006/01/31 23:50:15 martin Exp */ - -/*- - * Copyright (c) 2002 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation - * by Martin Husemann . - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * This product includes software developed by the NetBSD - * Foundation, Inc. and its contributors. - * 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its - * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived - * from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS - * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS - * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR - * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF - * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE - * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOE_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef PPP_OE_H -#define PPP_OE_H - -#include "ppp.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct pppoehdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t vertype); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t session); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t plen); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct pppoetag { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t tag); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t len); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#define PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL 0 -#define PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT 1 -#define PPPOE_STATE_PADR_SENT 2 -#define PPPOE_STATE_SESSION 3 -/* passive */ -#define PPPOE_STATE_PADO_SENT 1 - -#define PPPOE_HEADERLEN sizeof(struct pppoehdr) -#define PPPOE_VERTYPE 0x11 /* VER=1, TYPE = 1 */ - -#define PPPOE_TAG_EOL 0x0000 /* end of list */ -#define PPPOE_TAG_SNAME 0x0101 /* service name */ -#define PPPOE_TAG_ACNAME 0x0102 /* access concentrator name */ -#define PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE 0x0103 /* host unique */ -#define PPPOE_TAG_ACCOOKIE 0x0104 /* AC cookie */ -#define PPPOE_TAG_VENDOR 0x0105 /* vendor specific */ -#define PPPOE_TAG_RELAYSID 0x0110 /* relay session id */ -#define PPPOE_TAG_SNAME_ERR 0x0201 /* service name error */ -#define PPPOE_TAG_ACSYS_ERR 0x0202 /* AC system error */ -#define PPPOE_TAG_GENERIC_ERR 0x0203 /* gerneric error */ - -#define PPPOE_CODE_PADI 0x09 /* Active Discovery Initiation */ -#define PPPOE_CODE_PADO 0x07 /* Active Discovery Offer */ -#define PPPOE_CODE_PADR 0x19 /* Active Discovery Request */ -#define PPPOE_CODE_PADS 0x65 /* Active Discovery Session confirmation */ -#define PPPOE_CODE_PADT 0xA7 /* Active Discovery Terminate */ - -#ifndef PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN -#define PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN 64 -#endif - -struct pppoe_softc { - struct pppoe_softc *next; - struct netif *sc_ethif; /* ethernet interface we are using */ - ppp_pcb *pcb; /* PPP PCB */ - - struct eth_addr sc_dest; /* hardware address of concentrator */ - u16_t sc_session; /* PPPoE session id */ - u8_t sc_state; /* discovery phase or session connected */ - -#ifdef PPPOE_TODO - u8_t *sc_service_name; /* if != NULL: requested name of service */ - u8_t *sc_concentrator_name; /* if != NULL: requested concentrator id */ -#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ - u8_t sc_ac_cookie[PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN]; /* content of AC cookie we must echo back */ - u8_t sc_ac_cookie_len; /* length of cookie data */ -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER - u8_t *sc_hunique; /* content of host unique we must echo back */ - u8_t sc_hunique_len; /* length of host unique */ -#endif - u8_t sc_padi_retried; /* number of PADI retries already done */ - u8_t sc_padr_retried; /* number of PADR retries already done */ -}; - -#define pppoe_init() /* compatibility define, no initialization needed */ - -ppp_pcb *pppoe_create(struct netif *pppif, - struct netif *ethif, - const char *service_name, const char *concentrator_name, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); - -/* - * Functions called from lwIP - * DO NOT CALL FROM lwIP USER APPLICATION. - */ -void pppoe_disc_input(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); -void pppoe_data_input(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* PPP_OE_H */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOE_SUPPORT */ +/***************************************************************************** +* pppoe.h - PPP Over Ethernet implementation for lwIP. +* +* Copyright (c) 2006 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. +* +* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, +* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided +* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this +* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any +* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required +* for any of the authorized uses. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +****************************************************************************** +* REVISION HISTORY +* +* 06-01-01 Marc Boucher +* Ported to lwIP. +*****************************************************************************/ + +/* based on NetBSD: if_pppoe.c,v 1.64 2006/01/31 23:50:15 martin Exp */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2002 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation + * by Martin Husemann . + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the NetBSD + * Foundation, Inc. and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOE_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef PPP_OE_H +#define PPP_OE_H + +#include "ppp.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct pppoehdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t vertype); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t code); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t session); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t plen); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct pppoetag { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t tag); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t len); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#define PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL 0 +#define PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT 1 +#define PPPOE_STATE_PADR_SENT 2 +#define PPPOE_STATE_SESSION 3 +/* passive */ +#define PPPOE_STATE_PADO_SENT 1 + +#define PPPOE_HEADERLEN sizeof(struct pppoehdr) +#define PPPOE_VERTYPE 0x11 /* VER=1, TYPE = 1 */ + +#define PPPOE_TAG_EOL 0x0000 /* end of list */ +#define PPPOE_TAG_SNAME 0x0101 /* service name */ +#define PPPOE_TAG_ACNAME 0x0102 /* access concentrator name */ +#define PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE 0x0103 /* host unique */ +#define PPPOE_TAG_ACCOOKIE 0x0104 /* AC cookie */ +#define PPPOE_TAG_VENDOR 0x0105 /* vendor specific */ +#define PPPOE_TAG_RELAYSID 0x0110 /* relay session id */ +#define PPPOE_TAG_SNAME_ERR 0x0201 /* service name error */ +#define PPPOE_TAG_ACSYS_ERR 0x0202 /* AC system error */ +#define PPPOE_TAG_GENERIC_ERR 0x0203 /* gerneric error */ + +#define PPPOE_CODE_PADI 0x09 /* Active Discovery Initiation */ +#define PPPOE_CODE_PADO 0x07 /* Active Discovery Offer */ +#define PPPOE_CODE_PADR 0x19 /* Active Discovery Request */ +#define PPPOE_CODE_PADS 0x65 /* Active Discovery Session confirmation */ +#define PPPOE_CODE_PADT 0xA7 /* Active Discovery Terminate */ + +#ifndef PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN +#define PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN 64 +#endif + +struct pppoe_softc { + struct pppoe_softc *next; + struct netif *sc_ethif; /* ethernet interface we are using */ + ppp_pcb *pcb; /* PPP PCB */ + + struct eth_addr sc_dest; /* hardware address of concentrator */ + u16_t sc_session; /* PPPoE session id */ + u8_t sc_state; /* discovery phase or session connected */ + +#ifdef PPPOE_TODO + u8_t *sc_service_name; /* if != NULL: requested name of service */ + u8_t *sc_concentrator_name; /* if != NULL: requested concentrator id */ +#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ + u8_t sc_ac_cookie[PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN]; /* content of AC cookie we must echo back */ + u8_t sc_ac_cookie_len; /* length of cookie data */ +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER + u8_t *sc_hunique; /* content of host unique we must echo back */ + u8_t sc_hunique_len; /* length of host unique */ +#endif + u8_t sc_padi_retried; /* number of PADI retries already done */ + u8_t sc_padr_retried; /* number of PADR retries already done */ +}; + +#define pppoe_init() /* compatibility define, no initialization needed */ + +ppp_pcb *pppoe_create(struct netif *pppif, + struct netif *ethif, + const char *service_name, const char *concentrator_name, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); + +/* + * Functions called from lwIP + * DO NOT CALL FROM lwIP USER APPLICATION. + */ +void pppoe_disc_input(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); +void pppoe_data_input(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PPP_OE_H */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOE_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h index 36e14a14..acf52010 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h @@ -1,208 +1,208 @@ -/** - * @file - * Network Point to Point Protocol over Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol header file. - * - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef PPPOL2TP_H -#define PPPOL2TP_H - -#include "ppp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* Timeout */ -#define PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT (5 * 1000) /* base for quick timeout calculation */ -#define PPPOL2TP_SLOW_RETRY (60 * 1000) /* persistent retry interval */ - -#define PPPOL2TP_MAXSCCRQ 4 /* retry SCCRQ four times (quickly) */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MAXICRQ 4 /* retry IRCQ four times */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MAXICCN 4 /* retry ICCN four times */ - -/* L2TP header flags */ -#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL 0x8000 -#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_LENGTH 0x4000 -#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_SEQUENCE 0x0800 -#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_OFFSET 0x0200 -#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_PRIORITY 0x0100 -#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_VERSION 0x0002 - -/* Mandatory bits for control: Control, Length, Sequence, Version 2 */ -#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY (PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL | PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_LENGTH | PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_SEQUENCE | PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_VERSION) -/* Forbidden bits for control: Offset, Priority */ -#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_FORBIDDEN (PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_OFFSET | PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_PRIORITY) - -/* Mandatory bits for data: Version 2 */ -#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_DATA_MANDATORY (PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_VERSION) - -/* AVP (Attribute Value Pair) header */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY 0x8000 -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_HIDDEN 0x4000 -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_LENGTHMASK 0x03ff - -/* -- AVP - Message type */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE 0 /* Message type */ - -/* Control Connection Management */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRQ 1 /* Start Control Connection Request */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP 2 /* Start Control Connection Reply */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCCN 3 /* Start Control Connection Connected */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_STOPCCN 4 /* Stop Control Connection Notification */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_HELLO 6 /* Hello */ -/* Call Management */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_OCRQ 7 /* Outgoing Call Request */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_OCRP 8 /* Outgoing Call Reply */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_OCCN 9 /* Outgoing Call Connected */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRQ 10 /* Incoming Call Request */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRP 11 /* Incoming Call Reply */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICCN 12 /* Incoming Call Connected */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_CDN 14 /* Call Disconnect Notify */ -/* Error reporting */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_WEN 15 /* WAN Error Notify */ -/* PPP Session Control */ -#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SLI 16 /* Set Link Info */ - -/* -- AVP - Result code */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_RESULTCODE 1 /* Result code */ -#define PPPOL2TP_RESULTCODE 1 /* General request to clear control connection */ - -/* -- AVP - Protocol version (!= L2TP Header version) */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_VERSION 2 -#define PPPOL2TP_VERSION 0x0100 /* L2TP Protocol version 1, revision 0 */ - -/* -- AVP - Framing capabilities */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_FRAMINGCAPABILITIES 3 /* Bearer capabilities */ -#define PPPOL2TP_FRAMINGCAPABILITIES 0x00000003 /* Async + Sync framing */ - -/* -- AVP - Bearer capabilities */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_BEARERCAPABILITIES 4 /* Bearer capabilities */ -#define PPPOL2TP_BEARERCAPABILITIES 0x00000003 /* Analog + Digital Access */ - -/* -- AVP - Tie breaker */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TIEBREAKER 5 - -/* -- AVP - Host name */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_HOSTNAME 7 /* Host name */ -#define PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME "lwIP" /* FIXME: make it configurable */ - -/* -- AVP - Vendor name */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_VENDORNAME 8 /* Vendor name */ -#define PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME "lwIP" /* FIXME: make it configurable */ - -/* -- AVP - Assign tunnel ID */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TUNNELID 9 /* Assign Tunnel ID */ - -/* -- AVP - Receive window size */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_RECEIVEWINDOWSIZE 10 /* Receive window size */ -#define PPPOL2TP_RECEIVEWINDOWSIZE 8 /* FIXME: make it configurable */ - -/* -- AVP - Challenge */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGE 11 /* Challenge */ - -/* -- AVP - Cause code */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CAUSECODE 12 /* Cause code*/ - -/* -- AVP - Challenge response */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE 13 /* Challenge response */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE_SIZE 16 - -/* -- AVP - Assign session ID */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_SESSIONID 14 /* Assign Session ID */ - -/* -- AVP - Call serial number */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CALLSERIALNUMBER 15 /* Call Serial Number */ - -/* -- AVP - Framing type */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_FRAMINGTYPE 19 /* Framing Type */ -#define PPPOL2TP_FRAMINGTYPE 0x00000001 /* Sync framing */ - -/* -- AVP - TX Connect Speed */ -#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TXCONNECTSPEED 24 /* TX Connect Speed */ -#define PPPOL2TP_TXCONNECTSPEED 100000000 /* Connect speed: 100 Mbits/s */ - -/* L2TP Session state */ -#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_INITIAL 0 -#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT 1 -#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICRQ_SENT 2 -#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICCN_SENT 3 -#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA 4 - -#define PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN 6 /* Our data header len */ - -/* - * PPPoL2TP interface control block. - */ -typedef struct pppol2tp_pcb_s pppol2tp_pcb; -struct pppol2tp_pcb_s { - ppp_pcb *ppp; /* PPP PCB */ - u8_t phase; /* L2TP phase */ - struct udp_pcb *udp; /* UDP L2TP Socket */ - struct netif *netif; /* Output interface, used as a default route */ - ip_addr_t remote_ip; /* LNS IP Address */ - u16_t remote_port; /* LNS port */ -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - const u8_t *secret; /* Secret string */ - u8_t secret_len; /* Secret string length */ - u8_t secret_rv[16]; /* Random vector */ - u8_t challenge_hash[16]; /* Challenge response */ - u8_t send_challenge; /* Boolean whether the next sent packet should contains a challenge response */ -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - u16_t tunnel_port; /* Tunnel port */ - u16_t our_ns; /* NS to peer */ - u16_t peer_nr; /* NR from peer */ - u16_t peer_ns; /* Expected NS from peer */ - u16_t source_tunnel_id; /* Tunnel ID assigned by peer */ - u16_t remote_tunnel_id; /* Tunnel ID assigned to peer */ - u16_t source_session_id; /* Session ID assigned by peer */ - u16_t remote_session_id; /* Session ID assigned to peer */ - - u8_t sccrq_retried; /* number of SCCRQ retries already done */ - u8_t icrq_retried; /* number of ICRQ retries already done */ - u8_t iccn_retried; /* number of ICCN retries already done */ -}; - -/* Create a new L2TP session. */ -ppp_pcb *pppol2tp_create(struct netif *pppif, - struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, - const u8_t *secret, u8_t secret_len, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ +/** + * @file + * Network Point to Point Protocol over Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol header file. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef PPPOL2TP_H +#define PPPOL2TP_H + +#include "ppp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Timeout */ +#define PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT (5 * 1000) /* base for quick timeout calculation */ +#define PPPOL2TP_SLOW_RETRY (60 * 1000) /* persistent retry interval */ + +#define PPPOL2TP_MAXSCCRQ 4 /* retry SCCRQ four times (quickly) */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MAXICRQ 4 /* retry IRCQ four times */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MAXICCN 4 /* retry ICCN four times */ + +/* L2TP header flags */ +#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL 0x8000 +#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_LENGTH 0x4000 +#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_SEQUENCE 0x0800 +#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_OFFSET 0x0200 +#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_PRIORITY 0x0100 +#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_VERSION 0x0002 + +/* Mandatory bits for control: Control, Length, Sequence, Version 2 */ +#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY (PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL | PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_LENGTH | PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_SEQUENCE | PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_VERSION) +/* Forbidden bits for control: Offset, Priority */ +#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_FORBIDDEN (PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_OFFSET | PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_PRIORITY) + +/* Mandatory bits for data: Version 2 */ +#define PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_DATA_MANDATORY (PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_VERSION) + +/* AVP (Attribute Value Pair) header */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY 0x8000 +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_HIDDEN 0x4000 +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_LENGTHMASK 0x03ff + +/* -- AVP - Message type */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE 0 /* Message type */ + +/* Control Connection Management */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRQ 1 /* Start Control Connection Request */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP 2 /* Start Control Connection Reply */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCCN 3 /* Start Control Connection Connected */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_STOPCCN 4 /* Stop Control Connection Notification */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_HELLO 6 /* Hello */ +/* Call Management */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_OCRQ 7 /* Outgoing Call Request */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_OCRP 8 /* Outgoing Call Reply */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_OCCN 9 /* Outgoing Call Connected */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRQ 10 /* Incoming Call Request */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRP 11 /* Incoming Call Reply */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICCN 12 /* Incoming Call Connected */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_CDN 14 /* Call Disconnect Notify */ +/* Error reporting */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_WEN 15 /* WAN Error Notify */ +/* PPP Session Control */ +#define PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SLI 16 /* Set Link Info */ + +/* -- AVP - Result code */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_RESULTCODE 1 /* Result code */ +#define PPPOL2TP_RESULTCODE 1 /* General request to clear control connection */ + +/* -- AVP - Protocol version (!= L2TP Header version) */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_VERSION 2 +#define PPPOL2TP_VERSION 0x0100 /* L2TP Protocol version 1, revision 0 */ + +/* -- AVP - Framing capabilities */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_FRAMINGCAPABILITIES 3 /* Bearer capabilities */ +#define PPPOL2TP_FRAMINGCAPABILITIES 0x00000003 /* Async + Sync framing */ + +/* -- AVP - Bearer capabilities */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_BEARERCAPABILITIES 4 /* Bearer capabilities */ +#define PPPOL2TP_BEARERCAPABILITIES 0x00000003 /* Analog + Digital Access */ + +/* -- AVP - Tie breaker */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TIEBREAKER 5 + +/* -- AVP - Host name */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_HOSTNAME 7 /* Host name */ +#define PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME "lwIP" /* FIXME: make it configurable */ + +/* -- AVP - Vendor name */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_VENDORNAME 8 /* Vendor name */ +#define PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME "lwIP" /* FIXME: make it configurable */ + +/* -- AVP - Assign tunnel ID */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TUNNELID 9 /* Assign Tunnel ID */ + +/* -- AVP - Receive window size */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_RECEIVEWINDOWSIZE 10 /* Receive window size */ +#define PPPOL2TP_RECEIVEWINDOWSIZE 8 /* FIXME: make it configurable */ + +/* -- AVP - Challenge */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGE 11 /* Challenge */ + +/* -- AVP - Cause code */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CAUSECODE 12 /* Cause code*/ + +/* -- AVP - Challenge response */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE 13 /* Challenge response */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE_SIZE 16 + +/* -- AVP - Assign session ID */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_SESSIONID 14 /* Assign Session ID */ + +/* -- AVP - Call serial number */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CALLSERIALNUMBER 15 /* Call Serial Number */ + +/* -- AVP - Framing type */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_FRAMINGTYPE 19 /* Framing Type */ +#define PPPOL2TP_FRAMINGTYPE 0x00000001 /* Sync framing */ + +/* -- AVP - TX Connect Speed */ +#define PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TXCONNECTSPEED 24 /* TX Connect Speed */ +#define PPPOL2TP_TXCONNECTSPEED 100000000 /* Connect speed: 100 Mbits/s */ + +/* L2TP Session state */ +#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_INITIAL 0 +#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT 1 +#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICRQ_SENT 2 +#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICCN_SENT 3 +#define PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA 4 + +#define PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN 6 /* Our data header len */ + +/* + * PPPoL2TP interface control block. + */ +typedef struct pppol2tp_pcb_s pppol2tp_pcb; +struct pppol2tp_pcb_s { + ppp_pcb *ppp; /* PPP PCB */ + u8_t phase; /* L2TP phase */ + struct udp_pcb *udp; /* UDP L2TP Socket */ + struct netif *netif; /* Output interface, used as a default route */ + ip_addr_t remote_ip; /* LNS IP Address */ + u16_t remote_port; /* LNS port */ +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + const u8_t *secret; /* Secret string */ + u8_t secret_len; /* Secret string length */ + u8_t secret_rv[16]; /* Random vector */ + u8_t challenge_hash[16]; /* Challenge response */ + u8_t send_challenge; /* Boolean whether the next sent packet should contains a challenge response */ +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + u16_t tunnel_port; /* Tunnel port */ + u16_t our_ns; /* NS to peer */ + u16_t peer_nr; /* NR from peer */ + u16_t peer_ns; /* Expected NS from peer */ + u16_t source_tunnel_id; /* Tunnel ID assigned by peer */ + u16_t remote_tunnel_id; /* Tunnel ID assigned to peer */ + u16_t source_session_id; /* Session ID assigned by peer */ + u16_t remote_session_id; /* Session ID assigned to peer */ + + u8_t sccrq_retried; /* number of SCCRQ retries already done */ + u8_t icrq_retried; /* number of ICRQ retries already done */ + u8_t iccn_retried; /* number of ICCN retries already done */ +}; + +/* Create a new L2TP session. */ +ppp_pcb *pppol2tp_create(struct netif *pppif, + struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, + const u8_t *secret, u8_t secret_len, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppos.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppos.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppos.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppos.h index 0001cd6e..9f794cff 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppos.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/pppos.h @@ -1,125 +1,125 @@ -/** - * @file - * Network Point to Point Protocol over Serial header file. - * - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOS_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef PPPOS_H -#define PPPOS_H - -#include "lwip/sys.h" - -#include "ppp.h" -#include "vj.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* PPP packet parser states. Current state indicates operation yet to be - * completed. */ -enum { - PDIDLE = 0, /* Idle state - waiting. */ - PDSTART, /* Process start flag. */ - PDADDRESS, /* Process address field. */ - PDCONTROL, /* Process control field. */ - PDPROTOCOL1, /* Process protocol field 1. */ - PDPROTOCOL2, /* Process protocol field 2. */ - PDDATA /* Process data byte. */ -}; - -/* PPPoS serial output callback function prototype */ -typedef u32_t (*pppos_output_cb_fn)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t *data, u32_t len, void *ctx); - -/* - * Extended asyncmap - allows any character to be escaped. - */ -typedef u8_t ext_accm[32]; - -/* - * PPPoS interface control block. - */ -typedef struct pppos_pcb_s pppos_pcb; -struct pppos_pcb_s { - /* -- below are data that will NOT be cleared between two sessions */ - ppp_pcb *ppp; /* PPP PCB */ - pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb; /* PPP serial output callback */ - - /* -- below are data that will be cleared between two sessions - * - * last_xmit must be the first member of cleared members, because it is - * used to know which part must not be cleared. - */ - u32_t last_xmit; /* Time of last transmission. */ - ext_accm out_accm; /* Async-Ctl-Char-Map for output. */ - - /* flags */ - unsigned int open : 1; /* Set if PPPoS is open */ - unsigned int pcomp : 1; /* Does peer accept protocol compression? */ - unsigned int accomp : 1; /* Does peer accept addr/ctl compression? */ - - /* PPPoS rx */ - ext_accm in_accm; /* Async-Ctl-Char-Map for input. */ - struct pbuf *in_head, *in_tail; /* The input packet. */ - u16_t in_protocol; /* The input protocol code. */ - u16_t in_fcs; /* Input Frame Check Sequence value. */ - u8_t in_state; /* The input process state. */ - u8_t in_escaped; /* Escape next character. */ -}; - -/* Create a new PPPoS session. */ -ppp_pcb *pppos_create(struct netif *pppif, pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); - -#if !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE -/* Pass received raw characters to PPPoS to be decoded through lwIP TCPIP thread. */ -err_t pppos_input_tcpip(ppp_pcb *ppp, u8_t *s, int l); -#endif /* !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - -/* PPP over Serial: this is the input function to be called for received data. */ -void pppos_input(ppp_pcb *ppp, u8_t *data, int len); - -/* - * Functions called from lwIP - * DO NOT CALL FROM lwIP USER APPLICATION. - */ -#if !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE -err_t pppos_input_sys(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); -#endif /* !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* PPPOS_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ +/** + * @file + * Network Point to Point Protocol over Serial header file. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOS_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef PPPOS_H +#define PPPOS_H + +#include "lwip/sys.h" + +#include "ppp.h" +#include "vj.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* PPP packet parser states. Current state indicates operation yet to be + * completed. */ +enum { + PDIDLE = 0, /* Idle state - waiting. */ + PDSTART, /* Process start flag. */ + PDADDRESS, /* Process address field. */ + PDCONTROL, /* Process control field. */ + PDPROTOCOL1, /* Process protocol field 1. */ + PDPROTOCOL2, /* Process protocol field 2. */ + PDDATA /* Process data byte. */ +}; + +/* PPPoS serial output callback function prototype */ +typedef u32_t (*pppos_output_cb_fn)(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t *data, u32_t len, void *ctx); + +/* + * Extended asyncmap - allows any character to be escaped. + */ +typedef u8_t ext_accm[32]; + +/* + * PPPoS interface control block. + */ +typedef struct pppos_pcb_s pppos_pcb; +struct pppos_pcb_s { + /* -- below are data that will NOT be cleared between two sessions */ + ppp_pcb *ppp; /* PPP PCB */ + pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb; /* PPP serial output callback */ + + /* -- below are data that will be cleared between two sessions + * + * last_xmit must be the first member of cleared members, because it is + * used to know which part must not be cleared. + */ + u32_t last_xmit; /* Time of last transmission. */ + ext_accm out_accm; /* Async-Ctl-Char-Map for output. */ + + /* flags */ + unsigned int open : 1; /* Set if PPPoS is open */ + unsigned int pcomp : 1; /* Does peer accept protocol compression? */ + unsigned int accomp : 1; /* Does peer accept addr/ctl compression? */ + + /* PPPoS rx */ + ext_accm in_accm; /* Async-Ctl-Char-Map for input. */ + struct pbuf *in_head, *in_tail; /* The input packet. */ + u16_t in_protocol; /* The input protocol code. */ + u16_t in_fcs; /* Input Frame Check Sequence value. */ + u8_t in_state; /* The input process state. */ + u8_t in_escaped; /* Escape next character. */ +}; + +/* Create a new PPPoS session. */ +ppp_pcb *pppos_create(struct netif *pppif, pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb); + +#if !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE +/* Pass received raw characters to PPPoS to be decoded through lwIP TCPIP thread. */ +err_t pppos_input_tcpip(ppp_pcb *ppp, u8_t *s, int l); +#endif /* !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + +/* PPP over Serial: this is the input function to be called for received data. */ +void pppos_input(ppp_pcb *ppp, u8_t *data, int len); + +/* + * Functions called from lwIP + * DO NOT CALL FROM lwIP USER APPLICATION. + */ +#if !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE +err_t pppos_input_sys(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); +#endif /* !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PPPOS_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/upap.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/upap.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/upap.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/upap.h index eed9e2d2..0e957155 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/upap.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/upap.h @@ -1,127 +1,127 @@ -/* - * upap.h - User/Password Authentication Protocol definitions. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: upap.h,v 1.8 2002/12/04 23:03:33 paulus Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef UPAP_H -#define UPAP_H - -#include "ppp.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * Packet header = Code, id, length. - */ -#define UPAP_HEADERLEN 4 - -/* - * UPAP codes. - */ -#define UPAP_AUTHREQ 1 /* Authenticate-Request */ -#define UPAP_AUTHACK 2 /* Authenticate-Ack */ -#define UPAP_AUTHNAK 3 /* Authenticate-Nak */ - -/* - * Client states. - */ -#define UPAPCS_INITIAL 0 /* Connection down */ -#define UPAPCS_CLOSED 1 /* Connection up, haven't requested auth */ -#define UPAPCS_PENDING 2 /* Connection down, have requested auth */ -#define UPAPCS_AUTHREQ 3 /* We've sent an Authenticate-Request */ -#define UPAPCS_OPEN 4 /* We've received an Ack */ -#define UPAPCS_BADAUTH 5 /* We've received a Nak */ - -/* - * Server states. - */ -#define UPAPSS_INITIAL 0 /* Connection down */ -#define UPAPSS_CLOSED 1 /* Connection up, haven't requested auth */ -#define UPAPSS_PENDING 2 /* Connection down, have requested auth */ -#define UPAPSS_LISTEN 3 /* Listening for an Authenticate */ -#define UPAPSS_OPEN 4 /* We've sent an Ack */ -#define UPAPSS_BADAUTH 5 /* We've sent a Nak */ - -/* - * Timeouts. - */ -#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ -#define UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT 3 /* Timeout (seconds) for retransmitting req */ -#define UPAP_DEFREQTIME 30 /* Time to wait for auth-req from peer */ -#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ - -/* - * Each interface is described by upap structure. - */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT -typedef struct upap_state { - const char *us_user; /* User */ - u8_t us_userlen; /* User length */ - const char *us_passwd; /* Password */ - u8_t us_passwdlen; /* Password length */ - u8_t us_clientstate; /* Client state */ -#if PPP_SERVER - u8_t us_serverstate; /* Server state */ -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - u8_t us_id; /* Current id */ - u8_t us_transmits; /* Number of auth-reqs sent */ -} upap_state; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - -void upap_authwithpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *user, const char *password); -#if PPP_SERVER -void upap_authpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -extern const struct protent pap_protent; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* UPAP_H */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * upap.h - User/Password Authentication Protocol definitions. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: upap.h,v 1.8 2002/12/04 23:03:33 paulus Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef UPAP_H +#define UPAP_H + +#include "ppp.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Packet header = Code, id, length. + */ +#define UPAP_HEADERLEN 4 + +/* + * UPAP codes. + */ +#define UPAP_AUTHREQ 1 /* Authenticate-Request */ +#define UPAP_AUTHACK 2 /* Authenticate-Ack */ +#define UPAP_AUTHNAK 3 /* Authenticate-Nak */ + +/* + * Client states. + */ +#define UPAPCS_INITIAL 0 /* Connection down */ +#define UPAPCS_CLOSED 1 /* Connection up, haven't requested auth */ +#define UPAPCS_PENDING 2 /* Connection down, have requested auth */ +#define UPAPCS_AUTHREQ 3 /* We've sent an Authenticate-Request */ +#define UPAPCS_OPEN 4 /* We've received an Ack */ +#define UPAPCS_BADAUTH 5 /* We've received a Nak */ + +/* + * Server states. + */ +#define UPAPSS_INITIAL 0 /* Connection down */ +#define UPAPSS_CLOSED 1 /* Connection up, haven't requested auth */ +#define UPAPSS_PENDING 2 /* Connection down, have requested auth */ +#define UPAPSS_LISTEN 3 /* Listening for an Authenticate */ +#define UPAPSS_OPEN 4 /* We've sent an Ack */ +#define UPAPSS_BADAUTH 5 /* We've sent a Nak */ + +/* + * Timeouts. + */ +#if 0 /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ +#define UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT 3 /* Timeout (seconds) for retransmitting req */ +#define UPAP_DEFREQTIME 30 /* Time to wait for auth-req from peer */ +#endif /* moved to ppp_opts.h */ + +/* + * Each interface is described by upap structure. + */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT +typedef struct upap_state { + const char *us_user; /* User */ + u8_t us_userlen; /* User length */ + const char *us_passwd; /* Password */ + u8_t us_passwdlen; /* Password length */ + u8_t us_clientstate; /* Client state */ +#if PPP_SERVER + u8_t us_serverstate; /* Server state */ +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + u8_t us_id; /* Current id */ + u8_t us_transmits; /* Number of auth-reqs sent */ +} upap_state; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + +void upap_authwithpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *user, const char *password); +#if PPP_SERVER +void upap_authpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +extern const struct protent pap_protent; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* UPAP_H */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/vj.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/vj.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/vj.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/vj.h index 110931a3..cfb4bac3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/vj.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/ppp/vj.h @@ -1,167 +1,167 @@ -/* - * Definitions for tcp compression routines. - * - * $Id: vj.h,v 1.7 2010/02/22 17:52:09 goldsimon Exp $ - * - * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted - * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are - * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, - * advertising materials, and other materials related to such - * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed - * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the - * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived - * from this software without specific prior written permission. - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - * - * Van Jacobson (van@helios.ee.lbl.gov), Dec 31, 1989: - * - Initial distribution. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#ifndef VJ_H -#define VJ_H - -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define MAX_SLOTS 16 /* must be > 2 and < 256 */ -#define MAX_HDR 128 - -/* - * Compressed packet format: - * - * The first octet contains the packet type (top 3 bits), TCP - * 'push' bit, and flags that indicate which of the 4 TCP sequence - * numbers have changed (bottom 5 bits). The next octet is a - * conversation number that associates a saved IP/TCP header with - * the compressed packet. The next two octets are the TCP checksum - * from the original datagram. The next 0 to 15 octets are - * sequence number changes, one change per bit set in the header - * (there may be no changes and there are two special cases where - * the receiver implicitly knows what changed -- see below). - * - * There are 5 numbers which can change (they are always inserted - * in the following order): TCP urgent pointer, window, - * acknowlegement, sequence number and IP ID. (The urgent pointer - * is different from the others in that its value is sent, not the - * change in value.) Since typical use of SLIP links is biased - * toward small packets (see comments on MTU/MSS below), changes - * use a variable length coding with one octet for numbers in the - * range 1 - 255 and 3 octets (0, MSB, LSB) for numbers in the - * range 256 - 65535 or 0. (If the change in sequence number or - * ack is more than 65535, an uncompressed packet is sent.) - */ - -/* - * Packet types (must not conflict with IP protocol version) - * - * The top nibble of the first octet is the packet type. There are - * three possible types: IP (not proto TCP or tcp with one of the - * control flags set); uncompressed TCP (a normal IP/TCP packet but - * with the 8-bit protocol field replaced by an 8-bit connection id -- - * this type of packet syncs the sender & receiver); and compressed - * TCP (described above). - * - * LSB of 4-bit field is TCP "PUSH" bit (a worthless anachronism) and - * is logically part of the 4-bit "changes" field that follows. Top - * three bits are actual packet type. For backward compatibility - * and in the interest of conserving bits, numbers are chosen so the - * IP protocol version number (4) which normally appears in this nibble - * means "IP packet". - */ - -/* packet types */ -#define TYPE_IP 0x40 -#define TYPE_UNCOMPRESSED_TCP 0x70 -#define TYPE_COMPRESSED_TCP 0x80 -#define TYPE_ERROR 0x00 - -/* Bits in first octet of compressed packet */ -#define NEW_C 0x40 /* flag bits for what changed in a packet */ -#define NEW_I 0x20 -#define NEW_S 0x08 -#define NEW_A 0x04 -#define NEW_W 0x02 -#define NEW_U 0x01 - -/* reserved, special-case values of above */ -#define SPECIAL_I (NEW_S | NEW_W | NEW_U) /* echoed interactive traffic */ -#define SPECIAL_D (NEW_S | NEW_A | NEW_W | NEW_U) /* unidirectional data */ -#define SPECIALS_MASK (NEW_S | NEW_A | NEW_W | NEW_U) - -#define TCP_PUSH_BIT 0x10 - -/* - * "state" data for each active tcp conversation on the wire. This is - * basically a copy of the entire IP/TCP header from the last packet - * we saw from the conversation together with a small identifier - * the transmit & receive ends of the line use to locate saved header. - */ -struct cstate { - struct cstate *cs_next; /* next most recently used state (xmit only) */ - u16_t cs_hlen; /* size of hdr (receive only) */ - u8_t cs_id; /* connection # associated with this state */ - u8_t cs_filler; - union { - char csu_hdr[MAX_HDR]; - struct ip_hdr csu_ip; /* ip/tcp hdr from most recent packet */ - } vjcs_u; -}; -#define cs_ip vjcs_u.csu_ip -#define cs_hdr vjcs_u.csu_hdr - -struct vjstat { - u32_t vjs_packets; /* outbound packets */ - u32_t vjs_compressed; /* outbound compressed packets */ - u32_t vjs_searches; /* searches for connection state */ - u32_t vjs_misses; /* times couldn't find conn. state */ - u32_t vjs_uncompressedin; /* inbound uncompressed packets */ - u32_t vjs_compressedin; /* inbound compressed packets */ - u32_t vjs_errorin; /* inbound unknown type packets */ - u32_t vjs_tossed; /* inbound packets tossed because of error */ -}; - -/* - * all the state data for one serial line (we need one of these per line). - */ -struct vjcompress { - struct cstate *last_cs; /* most recently used tstate */ - u8_t last_recv; /* last rcvd conn. id */ - u8_t last_xmit; /* last sent conn. id */ - u16_t flags; - u8_t maxSlotIndex; - u8_t compressSlot; /* Flag indicating OK to compress slot ID. */ -#if LINK_STATS - struct vjstat stats; -#endif - struct cstate tstate[MAX_SLOTS]; /* xmit connection states */ - struct cstate rstate[MAX_SLOTS]; /* receive connection states */ -}; - -/* flag values */ -#define VJF_TOSS 1U /* tossing rcvd frames because of input err */ - -extern void vj_compress_init(struct vjcompress *comp); -extern u8_t vj_compress_tcp(struct vjcompress *comp, struct pbuf **pb); -extern void vj_uncompress_err(struct vjcompress *comp); -extern int vj_uncompress_uncomp(struct pbuf *nb, struct vjcompress *comp); -extern int vj_uncompress_tcp(struct pbuf **nb, struct vjcompress *comp); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* VJ_H */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ +/* + * Definitions for tcp compression routines. + * + * $Id: vj.h,v 1.7 2010/02/22 17:52:09 goldsimon Exp $ + * + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted + * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, + * advertising materials, and other materials related to such + * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed + * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the + * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + * + * Van Jacobson (van@helios.ee.lbl.gov), Dec 31, 1989: + * - Initial distribution. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#ifndef VJ_H +#define VJ_H + +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define MAX_SLOTS 16 /* must be > 2 and < 256 */ +#define MAX_HDR 128 + +/* + * Compressed packet format: + * + * The first octet contains the packet type (top 3 bits), TCP + * 'push' bit, and flags that indicate which of the 4 TCP sequence + * numbers have changed (bottom 5 bits). The next octet is a + * conversation number that associates a saved IP/TCP header with + * the compressed packet. The next two octets are the TCP checksum + * from the original datagram. The next 0 to 15 octets are + * sequence number changes, one change per bit set in the header + * (there may be no changes and there are two special cases where + * the receiver implicitly knows what changed -- see below). + * + * There are 5 numbers which can change (they are always inserted + * in the following order): TCP urgent pointer, window, + * acknowlegement, sequence number and IP ID. (The urgent pointer + * is different from the others in that its value is sent, not the + * change in value.) Since typical use of SLIP links is biased + * toward small packets (see comments on MTU/MSS below), changes + * use a variable length coding with one octet for numbers in the + * range 1 - 255 and 3 octets (0, MSB, LSB) for numbers in the + * range 256 - 65535 or 0. (If the change in sequence number or + * ack is more than 65535, an uncompressed packet is sent.) + */ + +/* + * Packet types (must not conflict with IP protocol version) + * + * The top nibble of the first octet is the packet type. There are + * three possible types: IP (not proto TCP or tcp with one of the + * control flags set); uncompressed TCP (a normal IP/TCP packet but + * with the 8-bit protocol field replaced by an 8-bit connection id -- + * this type of packet syncs the sender & receiver); and compressed + * TCP (described above). + * + * LSB of 4-bit field is TCP "PUSH" bit (a worthless anachronism) and + * is logically part of the 4-bit "changes" field that follows. Top + * three bits are actual packet type. For backward compatibility + * and in the interest of conserving bits, numbers are chosen so the + * IP protocol version number (4) which normally appears in this nibble + * means "IP packet". + */ + +/* packet types */ +#define TYPE_IP 0x40 +#define TYPE_UNCOMPRESSED_TCP 0x70 +#define TYPE_COMPRESSED_TCP 0x80 +#define TYPE_ERROR 0x00 + +/* Bits in first octet of compressed packet */ +#define NEW_C 0x40 /* flag bits for what changed in a packet */ +#define NEW_I 0x20 +#define NEW_S 0x08 +#define NEW_A 0x04 +#define NEW_W 0x02 +#define NEW_U 0x01 + +/* reserved, special-case values of above */ +#define SPECIAL_I (NEW_S | NEW_W | NEW_U) /* echoed interactive traffic */ +#define SPECIAL_D (NEW_S | NEW_A | NEW_W | NEW_U) /* unidirectional data */ +#define SPECIALS_MASK (NEW_S | NEW_A | NEW_W | NEW_U) + +#define TCP_PUSH_BIT 0x10 + +/* + * "state" data for each active tcp conversation on the wire. This is + * basically a copy of the entire IP/TCP header from the last packet + * we saw from the conversation together with a small identifier + * the transmit & receive ends of the line use to locate saved header. + */ +struct cstate { + struct cstate *cs_next; /* next most recently used state (xmit only) */ + u16_t cs_hlen; /* size of hdr (receive only) */ + u8_t cs_id; /* connection # associated with this state */ + u8_t cs_filler; + union { + char csu_hdr[MAX_HDR]; + struct ip_hdr csu_ip; /* ip/tcp hdr from most recent packet */ + } vjcs_u; +}; +#define cs_ip vjcs_u.csu_ip +#define cs_hdr vjcs_u.csu_hdr + +struct vjstat { + u32_t vjs_packets; /* outbound packets */ + u32_t vjs_compressed; /* outbound compressed packets */ + u32_t vjs_searches; /* searches for connection state */ + u32_t vjs_misses; /* times couldn't find conn. state */ + u32_t vjs_uncompressedin; /* inbound uncompressed packets */ + u32_t vjs_compressedin; /* inbound compressed packets */ + u32_t vjs_errorin; /* inbound unknown type packets */ + u32_t vjs_tossed; /* inbound packets tossed because of error */ +}; + +/* + * all the state data for one serial line (we need one of these per line). + */ +struct vjcompress { + struct cstate *last_cs; /* most recently used tstate */ + u8_t last_recv; /* last rcvd conn. id */ + u8_t last_xmit; /* last sent conn. id */ + u16_t flags; + u8_t maxSlotIndex; + u8_t compressSlot; /* Flag indicating OK to compress slot ID. */ +#if LINK_STATS + struct vjstat stats; +#endif + struct cstate tstate[MAX_SLOTS]; /* xmit connection states */ + struct cstate rstate[MAX_SLOTS]; /* receive connection states */ +}; + +/* flag values */ +#define VJF_TOSS 1U /* tossing rcvd frames because of input err */ + +extern void vj_compress_init(struct vjcompress *comp); +extern u8_t vj_compress_tcp(struct vjcompress *comp, struct pbuf **pb); +extern void vj_uncompress_err(struct vjcompress *comp); +extern int vj_uncompress_uncomp(struct pbuf *nb, struct vjcompress *comp); +extern int vj_uncompress_tcp(struct pbuf **nb, struct vjcompress *comp); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* VJ_H */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/slipif.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/slipif.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/slipif.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/slipif.h index c028f121..8f9c41d6 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/slipif.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/slipif.h @@ -1,86 +1,86 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * SLIP netif API - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001, Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_SLIPIF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_SLIPIF_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -/** Set this to 1 to start a thread that blocks reading on the serial line - * (using sio_read()). - */ -#ifndef SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD -#define SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD !NO_SYS -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 to enable functions to pass in RX bytes from ISR context. - * If enabled, slipif_received_byte[s]() process incoming bytes and put assembled - * packets on a queue, which is fed into lwIP from slipif_poll(). - * If disabled, slipif_poll() polls the serial line (using sio_tryread()). - */ -#ifndef SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR -#define SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR 0 -#endif - -/** Set this to 1 (default for SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR) to queue incoming packets - * received by slipif_received_byte[s]() as long as PBUF_POOL pbufs are available. - * If disabled, packets will be dropped if more than one packet is received. - */ -#ifndef SLIP_RX_QUEUE -#define SLIP_RX_QUEUE SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -err_t slipif_init(struct netif *netif); -void slipif_poll(struct netif *netif); -#if SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR -void slipif_process_rxqueue(struct netif *netif); -void slipif_received_byte(struct netif *netif, u8_t data); -void slipif_received_bytes(struct netif *netif, u8_t *data, u8_t len); -#endif /* SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_SLIPIF_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * SLIP netif API + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001, Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_NETIF_SLIPIF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_NETIF_SLIPIF_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +/** Set this to 1 to start a thread that blocks reading on the serial line + * (using sio_read()). + */ +#ifndef SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD +#define SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD !NO_SYS +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 to enable functions to pass in RX bytes from ISR context. + * If enabled, slipif_received_byte[s]() process incoming bytes and put assembled + * packets on a queue, which is fed into lwIP from slipif_poll(). + * If disabled, slipif_poll() polls the serial line (using sio_tryread()). + */ +#ifndef SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR +#define SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR 0 +#endif + +/** Set this to 1 (default for SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR) to queue incoming packets + * received by slipif_received_byte[s]() as long as PBUF_POOL pbufs are available. + * If disabled, packets will be dropped if more than one packet is received. + */ +#ifndef SLIP_RX_QUEUE +#define SLIP_RX_QUEUE SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +err_t slipif_init(struct netif *netif); +void slipif_poll(struct netif *netif); +#if SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR +void slipif_process_rxqueue(struct netif *netif); +void slipif_received_byte(struct netif *netif, u8_t data); +void slipif_received_bytes(struct netif *netif, u8_t *data, u8_t len); +#endif /* SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_NETIF_SLIPIF_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/zepif.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/zepif.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/include/netif/zepif.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/zepif.h index 1a7c8fc9..25a2e8ad 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/include/netif/zepif.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/include/netif/zepif.h @@ -1,81 +1,81 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * A netif implementing the ZigBee Eencapsulation Protocol (ZEP). - * This is used to tunnel 6LowPAN over UDP. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ZEPIF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_ZEPIF_H - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "netif/lowpan6.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_UDP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define ZEPIF_DEFAULT_UDP_PORT 17754 - -/** Pass this struct as 'state' to netif_add to control the behaviour - * of this netif. If NULL is passed, default behaviour is chosen */ -struct zepif_init { - /** The UDP port used to ZEP frames from (0 = default) */ - u16_t zep_src_udp_port; - /** The UDP port used to ZEP frames to (0 = default) */ - u16_t zep_dst_udp_port; - /** The IP address to sed ZEP frames from (NULL = ANY) */ - const ip_addr_t *zep_src_ip_addr; - /** The IP address to sed ZEP frames to (NULL = BROADCAST) */ - const ip_addr_t *zep_dst_ip_addr; - /** If != NULL, the udp pcb is bound to this netif */ - const struct netif *zep_netif; - /** MAC address of the 6LowPAN device */ - u8_t addr[6]; -}; - -err_t zepif_init(struct netif *netif); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_UDP */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ZEPIF_H */ +/** + * @file + * + * A netif implementing the ZigBee Eencapsulation Protocol (ZEP). + * This is used to tunnel 6LowPAN over UDP. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_ZEPIF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_ZEPIF_H + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "netif/lowpan6.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_UDP /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define ZEPIF_DEFAULT_UDP_PORT 17754 + +/** Pass this struct as 'state' to netif_add to control the behaviour + * of this netif. If NULL is passed, default behaviour is chosen */ +struct zepif_init { + /** The UDP port used to ZEP frames from (0 = default) */ + u16_t zep_src_udp_port; + /** The UDP port used to ZEP frames to (0 = default) */ + u16_t zep_dst_udp_port; + /** The IP address to sed ZEP frames from (NULL = ANY) */ + const ip_addr_t *zep_src_ip_addr; + /** The IP address to sed ZEP frames to (NULL = BROADCAST) */ + const ip_addr_t *zep_dst_ip_addr; + /** If != NULL, the udp pcb is bound to this netif */ + const struct netif *zep_netif; + /** MAC address of the 6LowPAN device */ + u8_t addr[6]; +}; + +err_t zepif_init(struct netif *netif); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_UDP */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_ZEPIF_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/FILES b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/FILES similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/FILES rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/FILES index 1c193c08..1ffd6f2d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/FILES +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/FILES @@ -1,23 +1,23 @@ -This directory contains generic network interface device drivers that -do not contain any hardware or architecture specific code. The files -are: - -ethernet.c - Shared code for Ethernet based interfaces. - -lowpan6.c - A 6LoWPAN implementation as a netif. - -lowpan6_ble.c - A 6LoWPAN over Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) implementation as netif, - according to RFC-7668. - -slipif.c - A generic implementation of the SLIP (Serial Line IP) - protocol. It requires a sio (serial I/O) module to work. - -ppp/ Point-to-Point Protocol stack - The lwIP PPP support is based from pppd (http://ppp.samba.org) with - huge changes to match code size and memory requirements for embedded - devices. Please read /doc/ppp.txt and ppp/PPPD_FOLLOWUP for a detailed - explanation. +This directory contains generic network interface device drivers that +do not contain any hardware or architecture specific code. The files +are: + +ethernet.c + Shared code for Ethernet based interfaces. + +lowpan6.c + A 6LoWPAN implementation as a netif. + +lowpan6_ble.c + A 6LoWPAN over Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) implementation as netif, + according to RFC-7668. + +slipif.c + A generic implementation of the SLIP (Serial Line IP) + protocol. It requires a sio (serial I/O) module to work. + +ppp/ Point-to-Point Protocol stack + The lwIP PPP support is based from pppd (http://ppp.samba.org) with + huge changes to match code size and memory requirements for embedded + devices. Please read /doc/ppp.txt and ppp/PPPD_FOLLOWUP for a detailed + explanation. diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif.c index 92c4693e..48a0bc47 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif.c @@ -1,590 +1,590 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP netif implementing an IEEE 802.1D MAC Bridge - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -/** - * @defgroup bridgeif IEEE 802.1D bridge - * @ingroup netifs - * This file implements an IEEE 802.1D bridge by using a multilayer netif approach - * (one hardware-independent netif for the bridge that uses hardware netifs for its ports). - * On transmit, the bridge selects the outgoing port(s). - * On receive, the port netif calls into the bridge (via its netif->input function) and - * the bridge selects the port(s) (and/or its netif->input function) to pass the received pbuf to. - * - * Usage: - * - add the port netifs just like you would when using them as dedicated netif without a bridge - * - only NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP/NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET netifs are supported as bridge ports - * - add the bridge port netifs without IPv4 addresses (i.e. pass 'NULL, NULL, NULL') - * - don't add IPv6 addresses to the port netifs! - * - set up the bridge configuration in a global variable of type 'bridgeif_initdata_t' that contains - * - the MAC address of the bridge - * - some configuration options controlling the memory consumption (maximum number of ports - * and FDB entries) - * - e.g. for a bridge MAC address 00-01-02-03-04-05, 2 bridge ports, 1024 FDB entries + 16 static MAC entries: - * bridgeif_initdata_t mybridge_initdata = BRIDGEIF_INITDATA1(2, 1024, 16, ETH_ADDR(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)); - * - add the bridge netif (with IPv4 config): - * struct netif bridge_netif; - * netif_add(&bridge_netif, &my_ip, &my_netmask, &my_gw, &mybridge_initdata, bridgeif_init, tcpip_input); - * NOTE: the passed 'input' function depends on BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT setting, - * which controls where the forwarding is done (netif low level input context vs. tcpip_thread) - * - set up all ports netifs and the bridge netif - * - * - When adding a port netif, NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP flag will be removed from a port - * to prevent ETHARP working on that port netif (we only want one IP per bridge not per port). - * - When adding a port netif, its input function is changed to call into the bridge. - * - * - * @todo: - * - compact static FDB entries (instead of walking the whole array) - * - add FDB query/read access - * - add FDB change callback (when learning or dropping auto-learned entries) - * - prefill FDB with MAC classes that should never be forwarded - * - multicast snooping? (and only forward group addresses to interested ports) - * - support removing ports - * - check SNMP integration - * - VLAN handling / trunk ports - * - priority handling? (although that largely depends on TX queue limitations and lwIP doesn't provide tx-done handling) - */ - -#include "netif/bridgeif.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/ethip6.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include - -#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA - -/* Define those to better describe your network interface. */ -#define IFNAME0 'b' -#define IFNAME1 'r' - -struct bridgeif_private_s; -typedef struct bridgeif_port_private_s { - struct bridgeif_private_s *bridge; - struct netif *port_netif; - u8_t port_num; -} bridgeif_port_t; - -typedef struct bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_s { - u8_t used; - bridgeif_portmask_t dst_ports; - struct eth_addr addr; -} bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t; - -typedef struct bridgeif_private_s { - struct netif *netif; - struct eth_addr ethaddr; - u8_t max_ports; - u8_t num_ports; - bridgeif_port_t *ports; - u16_t max_fdbs_entries; - bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t *fdbs; - u16_t max_fdbd_entries; - void *fdbd; -} bridgeif_private_t; - -/* netif data index to get the bridge on input */ -u8_t bridgeif_netif_client_id = 0xff; - -/** - * @ingroup bridgeif - * Add a static entry to the forwarding database. - * A static entry marks where frames to a specific eth address (unicast or group address) are - * forwarded. - * bits [0..(BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS-1)]: hw ports - * bit [BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS]: cpu port - * 0: drop - */ -err_t bridgeif_fdb_add(struct netif *bridgeif, const struct eth_addr *addr, bridgeif_portmask_t ports) -{ - int i; - bridgeif_private_t *br; - BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid netif", bridgeif != NULL); - br = (bridgeif_private_t *)bridgeif->state; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid state", br != NULL); - - BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); - - for (i = 0; i < br->max_fdbs_entries; i++) { - if (!br->fdbs[i].used) { - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); - - if (!br->fdbs[i].used) { - br->fdbs[i].used = 1; - br->fdbs[i].dst_ports = ports; - memcpy(&br->fdbs[i].addr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr)); - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return ERR_OK; - } - - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); - } - } - - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return ERR_MEM; -} - -/** - * @ingroup bridgeif - * Remove a static entry from the forwarding database - */ -err_t bridgeif_fdb_remove(struct netif *bridgeif, const struct eth_addr *addr) -{ - int i; - bridgeif_private_t *br; - BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid netif", bridgeif != NULL); - br = (bridgeif_private_t *)bridgeif->state; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid state", br != NULL); - - BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); - - for (i = 0; i < br->max_fdbs_entries; i++) { - if (br->fdbs[i].used && !memcmp(&br->fdbs[i].addr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); - - if (br->fdbs[i].used && !memcmp(&br->fdbs[i].addr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { - memset(&br->fdbs[i], 0, sizeof(bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t)); - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return ERR_OK; - } - - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); - } - } - - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/** Get the forwarding port(s) (as bit mask) for the specified destination mac address */ -static bridgeif_portmask_t bridgeif_find_dst_ports(bridgeif_private_t *br, struct eth_addr *dst_addr) -{ - int i; - BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); - - /* first check for static entries */ - for (i = 0; i < br->max_fdbs_entries; i++) { - if (br->fdbs[i].used) { - if (!memcmp(&br->fdbs[i].addr, dst_addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { - bridgeif_portmask_t ret = br->fdbs[i].dst_ports; - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return ret; - } - } - } - - if (dst_addr->addr[0] & 1) { - /* no match found: flood remaining group address */ - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return BR_FLOOD; - } - - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - /* no match found: check dynamic fdb for port or fall back to flooding */ - return bridgeif_fdb_get_dst_ports(br->fdbd, dst_addr); -} - -/** Helper function to see if a destination mac belongs to the bridge - * (bridge netif or one of the port netifs), in which case the frame - * is sent to the cpu only. - */ -static int bridgeif_is_local_mac(bridgeif_private_t *br, struct eth_addr *addr) -{ - int i; - BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - if (!memcmp(br->netif->hwaddr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { - return 1; - } - - BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); - - for (i = 0; i < br->num_ports; i++) { - struct netif *portif = br->ports[i].port_netif; - - if (portif != NULL) { - if (!memcmp(portif->hwaddr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return 1; - } - } - } - - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return 0; -} - -/* Output helper function */ -static err_t bridgeif_send_to_port(bridgeif_private_t *br, struct pbuf *p, u8_t dstport_idx) -{ - if (dstport_idx < BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS) { - /* possibly an external port */ - if (dstport_idx < br->max_ports) { - struct netif *portif = br->ports[dstport_idx].port_netif; - - if ((portif != NULL) && (portif->linkoutput != NULL)) { - /* prevent sending out to rx port */ - if (netif_get_index(portif) != p->if_idx) { - if (netif_is_link_up(portif)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG, ("br -> flood(%p:%d) -> %d\n", (void *)p, p->if_idx, netif_get_index(portif))); - return portif->linkoutput(portif, p); - } - } - } - } - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid port index", dstport_idx == BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Helper function to pass a pbuf to all ports marked in 'dstports' - */ -static err_t bridgeif_send_to_ports(bridgeif_private_t *br, struct pbuf *p, bridgeif_portmask_t dstports) -{ - err_t err, ret_err = ERR_OK; - u8_t i; - bridgeif_portmask_t mask = 1; - BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); - - for (i = 0; i < BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS; i++, mask = (bridgeif_portmask_t)(mask << 1)) { - if (dstports & mask) { - err = bridgeif_send_to_port(br, p, i); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - ret_err = err; - } - } - } - - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return ret_err; -} - -/** Output function of the application port of the bridge (the one with an ip address). - * The forwarding port(s) where this pbuf is sent on is/are automatically selected - * from the FDB. - */ -static err_t bridgeif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - err_t err; - bridgeif_private_t *br = (bridgeif_private_t *)netif->state; - struct eth_addr *dst = (struct eth_addr *)(p->payload); - - bridgeif_portmask_t dstports = bridgeif_find_dst_ports(br, dst); - err = bridgeif_send_to_ports(br, p, dstports); - - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p->tot_len); - - if (((u8_t *)p->payload)[0] & 1) { - /* broadcast or multicast packet*/ - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutnucastpkts); - } else { - /* unicast packet */ - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutucastpkts); - } - - /* increase ifoutdiscards or ifouterrors on error */ - - LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); - - return err; -} - -/** The actual bridge input function. Port netif's input is changed to call - * here. This function decides where the frame is forwarded. - */ -static err_t bridgeif_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) -{ - u8_t rx_idx; - bridgeif_portmask_t dstports; - struct eth_addr *src, *dst; - bridgeif_private_t *br; - bridgeif_port_t *port; - - if (p == NULL || netif == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - port = (bridgeif_port_t *)netif_get_client_data(netif, bridgeif_netif_client_id); - LWIP_ASSERT("port data not set", port != NULL); - - if (port == NULL || port->bridge == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - br = (bridgeif_private_t *)port->bridge; - rx_idx = netif_get_index(netif); - /* store receive index in pbuf */ - p->if_idx = rx_idx; - - dst = (struct eth_addr *)p->payload; - src = (struct eth_addr *)(((u8_t *)p->payload) + sizeof(struct eth_addr)); - - if ((src->addr[0] & 1) == 0) { - /* update src for all non-group addresses */ - bridgeif_fdb_update_src(br->fdbd, src, port->port_num); - } - - if (dst->addr[0] & 1) { - /* group address -> flood + cpu? */ - dstports = bridgeif_find_dst_ports(br, dst); - bridgeif_send_to_ports(br, p, dstports); - - if (dstports & (1 << BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS)) { - /* we pass the reference to ->input or have to free it */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG, ("br -> input(%p)\n", (void *)p)); - - if (br->netif->input(p, br->netif) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - } else { - /* all references done */ - pbuf_free(p); - } - - /* always return ERR_OK here to prevent the caller freeing the pbuf */ - return ERR_OK; - } else { - /* is this for one of the local ports? */ - if (bridgeif_is_local_mac(br, dst)) { - /* yes, send to cpu port only */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG, ("br -> input(%p)\n", (void *)p)); - return br->netif->input(p, br->netif); - } - - /* get dst port */ - dstports = bridgeif_find_dst_ports(br, dst); - bridgeif_send_to_ports(br, p, dstports); - /* no need to send to cpu, flooding is for external ports only */ - /* by this, we consumed the pbuf */ - pbuf_free(p); - /* always return ERR_OK here to prevent the caller freeing the pbuf */ - return ERR_OK; - } -} - -#if !BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT -/** Input function for port netifs used to synchronize into tcpip_thread. - */ -static err_t bridgeif_tcpip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) -{ - return tcpip_inpkt(p, netif, bridgeif_input); -} -#endif /* BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT */ - -/** - * @ingroup bridgeif - * Initialization function passed to netif_add(). - * - * ATTENTION: A pointer to a @ref bridgeif_initdata_t must be passed as 'state' - * to @ref netif_add when adding the bridge. I supplies MAC address - * and controls memory allocation (number of ports, FDB size). - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this ethernetif - * @return ERR_OK if the loopif is initialized - * ERR_MEM if private data couldn't be allocated - * any other err_t on error - */ -err_t bridgeif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - bridgeif_initdata_t *init_data; - bridgeif_private_t *br; - size_t alloc_len_sizet; - mem_size_t alloc_len; - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("bridgeif needs an input callback", (netif->input != NULL)); -#if !BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT - - if (netif->input == tcpip_input) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_ON, ("bridgeif does not need tcpip_input, use netif_input/ethernet_input instead")); - } - -#endif - - if (bridgeif_netif_client_id == 0xFF) { - bridgeif_netif_client_id = netif_alloc_client_data_id(); - } - - init_data = (bridgeif_initdata_t *)netif->state; - LWIP_ASSERT("init_data != NULL", (init_data != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("init_data->max_ports <= BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS", - init_data->max_ports <= BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS); - - alloc_len_sizet = sizeof(bridgeif_private_t) + (init_data->max_ports * sizeof(bridgeif_port_t) + (init_data->max_fdb_static_entries * sizeof(bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t))); - alloc_len = (mem_size_t)alloc_len_sizet; - LWIP_ASSERT("alloc_len == alloc_len_sizet", alloc_len == alloc_len_sizet); - LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_DEBUG, ("bridgeif_init: allocating %d bytes for private data\n", (int)alloc_len)); - br = (bridgeif_private_t *)mem_calloc(1, alloc_len); - - if (br == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("bridgeif_init: out of memory\n")); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memcpy(&br->ethaddr, &init_data->ethaddr, sizeof(br->ethaddr)); - br->netif = netif; - - br->max_ports = init_data->max_ports; - br->ports = (bridgeif_port_t *)(br + 1); - - br->max_fdbs_entries = init_data->max_fdb_static_entries; - br->fdbs = (bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t *)(((u8_t *)(br + 1)) + (init_data->max_ports * sizeof(bridgeif_port_t))); - - br->max_fdbd_entries = init_data->max_fdb_dynamic_entries; - br->fdbd = bridgeif_fdb_init(init_data->max_fdb_dynamic_entries); - - if (br->fdbd == NULL) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("bridgeif_init: out of memory in fdb_init\n")); - mem_free(br); - return ERR_MEM; - } - -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME - /* Initialize interface hostname */ - netif->hostname = "lwip"; -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ - - /* - * Initialize the snmp variables and counters inside the struct netif. - * The last argument should be replaced with your link speed, in units - * of bits per second. - */ - MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_ethernet_csmacd, 0); - - netif->state = br; - netif->name[0] = IFNAME0; - netif->name[1] = IFNAME1; - /* We directly use etharp_output() here to save a function call. - * You can instead declare your own function an call etharp_output() - * from it if you have to do some checks before sending (e.g. if link - * is available...) */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - netif->output = etharp_output; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - netif->output_ip6 = ethip6_output; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - netif->linkoutput = bridgeif_output; - - /* set MAC hardware address length */ - netif->hwaddr_len = ETH_HWADDR_LEN; - - /* set MAC hardware address */ - memcpy(netif->hwaddr, &br->ethaddr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); - - /* maximum transfer unit */ - netif->mtu = 1500; - - /* device capabilities */ - /* don't set NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP if this device is not an ethernet one */ - netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET | NETIF_FLAG_IGMP | NETIF_FLAG_MLD6 | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD - - /* - * For hardware/netifs that implement MAC filtering. - * All-nodes link-local is handled by default, so we must let the hardware know - * to allow multicast packets in. - * Should set mld_mac_filter previously. */ - if (netif->mld_mac_filter != NULL) { - ip6_addr_t ip6_allnodes_ll; - ip6_addr_set_allnodes_linklocal(&ip6_allnodes_ll); - netif->mld_mac_filter(netif, &ip6_allnodes_ll, NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup bridgeif - * Add a port to the bridge - */ -err_t bridgeif_add_port(struct netif *bridgeif, struct netif *portif) -{ - bridgeif_private_t *br; - bridgeif_port_t *port; - - LWIP_ASSERT("bridgeif != NULL", bridgeif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("bridgeif->state != NULL", bridgeif->state != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("portif != NULL", portif != NULL); - - if (!(portif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP) || !(portif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET)) { - /* can only add ETHERNET/ETHARP interfaces */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - br = (bridgeif_private_t *)bridgeif->state; - - if (br->num_ports >= br->max_ports) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - port = &br->ports[br->num_ports]; - port->port_netif = portif; - port->port_num = br->num_ports; - port->bridge = br; - br->num_ports++; - - /* let the port call us on input */ -#if BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT - portif->input = bridgeif_input; -#else - portif->input = bridgeif_tcpip_input; -#endif - /* store pointer to bridge in netif */ - netif_set_client_data(portif, bridgeif_netif_client_id, port); - /* remove ETHARP flag to prevent sending report events on netif-up */ - netif_clear_flags(portif, NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA */ +/** + * @file + * lwIP netif implementing an IEEE 802.1D MAC Bridge + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +/** + * @defgroup bridgeif IEEE 802.1D bridge + * @ingroup netifs + * This file implements an IEEE 802.1D bridge by using a multilayer netif approach + * (one hardware-independent netif for the bridge that uses hardware netifs for its ports). + * On transmit, the bridge selects the outgoing port(s). + * On receive, the port netif calls into the bridge (via its netif->input function) and + * the bridge selects the port(s) (and/or its netif->input function) to pass the received pbuf to. + * + * Usage: + * - add the port netifs just like you would when using them as dedicated netif without a bridge + * - only NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP/NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET netifs are supported as bridge ports + * - add the bridge port netifs without IPv4 addresses (i.e. pass 'NULL, NULL, NULL') + * - don't add IPv6 addresses to the port netifs! + * - set up the bridge configuration in a global variable of type 'bridgeif_initdata_t' that contains + * - the MAC address of the bridge + * - some configuration options controlling the memory consumption (maximum number of ports + * and FDB entries) + * - e.g. for a bridge MAC address 00-01-02-03-04-05, 2 bridge ports, 1024 FDB entries + 16 static MAC entries: + * bridgeif_initdata_t mybridge_initdata = BRIDGEIF_INITDATA1(2, 1024, 16, ETH_ADDR(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)); + * - add the bridge netif (with IPv4 config): + * struct netif bridge_netif; + * netif_add(&bridge_netif, &my_ip, &my_netmask, &my_gw, &mybridge_initdata, bridgeif_init, tcpip_input); + * NOTE: the passed 'input' function depends on BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT setting, + * which controls where the forwarding is done (netif low level input context vs. tcpip_thread) + * - set up all ports netifs and the bridge netif + * + * - When adding a port netif, NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP flag will be removed from a port + * to prevent ETHARP working on that port netif (we only want one IP per bridge not per port). + * - When adding a port netif, its input function is changed to call into the bridge. + * + * + * @todo: + * - compact static FDB entries (instead of walking the whole array) + * - add FDB query/read access + * - add FDB change callback (when learning or dropping auto-learned entries) + * - prefill FDB with MAC classes that should never be forwarded + * - multicast snooping? (and only forward group addresses to interested ports) + * - support removing ports + * - check SNMP integration + * - VLAN handling / trunk ports + * - priority handling? (although that largely depends on TX queue limitations and lwIP doesn't provide tx-done handling) + */ + +#include "netif/bridgeif.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/ethip6.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include + +#if LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA + +/* Define those to better describe your network interface. */ +#define IFNAME0 'b' +#define IFNAME1 'r' + +struct bridgeif_private_s; +typedef struct bridgeif_port_private_s { + struct bridgeif_private_s *bridge; + struct netif *port_netif; + u8_t port_num; +} bridgeif_port_t; + +typedef struct bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_s { + u8_t used; + bridgeif_portmask_t dst_ports; + struct eth_addr addr; +} bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t; + +typedef struct bridgeif_private_s { + struct netif *netif; + struct eth_addr ethaddr; + u8_t max_ports; + u8_t num_ports; + bridgeif_port_t *ports; + u16_t max_fdbs_entries; + bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t *fdbs; + u16_t max_fdbd_entries; + void *fdbd; +} bridgeif_private_t; + +/* netif data index to get the bridge on input */ +u8_t bridgeif_netif_client_id = 0xff; + +/** + * @ingroup bridgeif + * Add a static entry to the forwarding database. + * A static entry marks where frames to a specific eth address (unicast or group address) are + * forwarded. + * bits [0..(BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS-1)]: hw ports + * bit [BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS]: cpu port + * 0: drop + */ +err_t bridgeif_fdb_add(struct netif *bridgeif, const struct eth_addr *addr, bridgeif_portmask_t ports) +{ + int i; + bridgeif_private_t *br; + BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid netif", bridgeif != NULL); + br = (bridgeif_private_t *)bridgeif->state; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid state", br != NULL); + + BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); + + for (i = 0; i < br->max_fdbs_entries; i++) { + if (!br->fdbs[i].used) { + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); + + if (!br->fdbs[i].used) { + br->fdbs[i].used = 1; + br->fdbs[i].dst_ports = ports; + memcpy(&br->fdbs[i].addr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr)); + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return ERR_OK; + } + + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); + } + } + + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return ERR_MEM; +} + +/** + * @ingroup bridgeif + * Remove a static entry from the forwarding database + */ +err_t bridgeif_fdb_remove(struct netif *bridgeif, const struct eth_addr *addr) +{ + int i; + bridgeif_private_t *br; + BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid netif", bridgeif != NULL); + br = (bridgeif_private_t *)bridgeif->state; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid state", br != NULL); + + BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); + + for (i = 0; i < br->max_fdbs_entries; i++) { + if (br->fdbs[i].used && !memcmp(&br->fdbs[i].addr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); + + if (br->fdbs[i].used && !memcmp(&br->fdbs[i].addr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { + memset(&br->fdbs[i], 0, sizeof(bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t)); + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return ERR_OK; + } + + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); + } + } + + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/** Get the forwarding port(s) (as bit mask) for the specified destination mac address */ +static bridgeif_portmask_t bridgeif_find_dst_ports(bridgeif_private_t *br, struct eth_addr *dst_addr) +{ + int i; + BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); + + /* first check for static entries */ + for (i = 0; i < br->max_fdbs_entries; i++) { + if (br->fdbs[i].used) { + if (!memcmp(&br->fdbs[i].addr, dst_addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { + bridgeif_portmask_t ret = br->fdbs[i].dst_ports; + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return ret; + } + } + } + + if (dst_addr->addr[0] & 1) { + /* no match found: flood remaining group address */ + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return BR_FLOOD; + } + + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + /* no match found: check dynamic fdb for port or fall back to flooding */ + return bridgeif_fdb_get_dst_ports(br->fdbd, dst_addr); +} + +/** Helper function to see if a destination mac belongs to the bridge + * (bridge netif or one of the port netifs), in which case the frame + * is sent to the cpu only. + */ +static int bridgeif_is_local_mac(bridgeif_private_t *br, struct eth_addr *addr) +{ + int i; + BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + if (!memcmp(br->netif->hwaddr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { + return 1; + } + + BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); + + for (i = 0; i < br->num_ports; i++) { + struct netif *portif = br->ports[i].port_netif; + + if (portif != NULL) { + if (!memcmp(portif->hwaddr, addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return 1; + } + } + } + + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return 0; +} + +/* Output helper function */ +static err_t bridgeif_send_to_port(bridgeif_private_t *br, struct pbuf *p, u8_t dstport_idx) +{ + if (dstport_idx < BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS) { + /* possibly an external port */ + if (dstport_idx < br->max_ports) { + struct netif *portif = br->ports[dstport_idx].port_netif; + + if ((portif != NULL) && (portif->linkoutput != NULL)) { + /* prevent sending out to rx port */ + if (netif_get_index(portif) != p->if_idx) { + if (netif_is_link_up(portif)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG, ("br -> flood(%p:%d) -> %d\n", (void *)p, p->if_idx, netif_get_index(portif))); + return portif->linkoutput(portif, p); + } + } + } + } + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid port index", dstport_idx == BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Helper function to pass a pbuf to all ports marked in 'dstports' + */ +static err_t bridgeif_send_to_ports(bridgeif_private_t *br, struct pbuf *p, bridgeif_portmask_t dstports) +{ + err_t err, ret_err = ERR_OK; + u8_t i; + bridgeif_portmask_t mask = 1; + BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); + + for (i = 0; i < BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS; i++, mask = (bridgeif_portmask_t)(mask << 1)) { + if (dstports & mask) { + err = bridgeif_send_to_port(br, p, i); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + ret_err = err; + } + } + } + + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return ret_err; +} + +/** Output function of the application port of the bridge (the one with an ip address). + * The forwarding port(s) where this pbuf is sent on is/are automatically selected + * from the FDB. + */ +static err_t bridgeif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + err_t err; + bridgeif_private_t *br = (bridgeif_private_t *)netif->state; + struct eth_addr *dst = (struct eth_addr *)(p->payload); + + bridgeif_portmask_t dstports = bridgeif_find_dst_ports(br, dst); + err = bridgeif_send_to_ports(br, p, dstports); + + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p->tot_len); + + if (((u8_t *)p->payload)[0] & 1) { + /* broadcast or multicast packet*/ + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutnucastpkts); + } else { + /* unicast packet */ + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutucastpkts); + } + + /* increase ifoutdiscards or ifouterrors on error */ + + LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); + + return err; +} + +/** The actual bridge input function. Port netif's input is changed to call + * here. This function decides where the frame is forwarded. + */ +static err_t bridgeif_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) +{ + u8_t rx_idx; + bridgeif_portmask_t dstports; + struct eth_addr *src, *dst; + bridgeif_private_t *br; + bridgeif_port_t *port; + + if (p == NULL || netif == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + port = (bridgeif_port_t *)netif_get_client_data(netif, bridgeif_netif_client_id); + LWIP_ASSERT("port data not set", port != NULL); + + if (port == NULL || port->bridge == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + br = (bridgeif_private_t *)port->bridge; + rx_idx = netif_get_index(netif); + /* store receive index in pbuf */ + p->if_idx = rx_idx; + + dst = (struct eth_addr *)p->payload; + src = (struct eth_addr *)(((u8_t *)p->payload) + sizeof(struct eth_addr)); + + if ((src->addr[0] & 1) == 0) { + /* update src for all non-group addresses */ + bridgeif_fdb_update_src(br->fdbd, src, port->port_num); + } + + if (dst->addr[0] & 1) { + /* group address -> flood + cpu? */ + dstports = bridgeif_find_dst_ports(br, dst); + bridgeif_send_to_ports(br, p, dstports); + + if (dstports & (1 << BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS)) { + /* we pass the reference to ->input or have to free it */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG, ("br -> input(%p)\n", (void *)p)); + + if (br->netif->input(p, br->netif) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + } else { + /* all references done */ + pbuf_free(p); + } + + /* always return ERR_OK here to prevent the caller freeing the pbuf */ + return ERR_OK; + } else { + /* is this for one of the local ports? */ + if (bridgeif_is_local_mac(br, dst)) { + /* yes, send to cpu port only */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FW_DEBUG, ("br -> input(%p)\n", (void *)p)); + return br->netif->input(p, br->netif); + } + + /* get dst port */ + dstports = bridgeif_find_dst_ports(br, dst); + bridgeif_send_to_ports(br, p, dstports); + /* no need to send to cpu, flooding is for external ports only */ + /* by this, we consumed the pbuf */ + pbuf_free(p); + /* always return ERR_OK here to prevent the caller freeing the pbuf */ + return ERR_OK; + } +} + +#if !BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT +/** Input function for port netifs used to synchronize into tcpip_thread. + */ +static err_t bridgeif_tcpip_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) +{ + return tcpip_inpkt(p, netif, bridgeif_input); +} +#endif /* BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT */ + +/** + * @ingroup bridgeif + * Initialization function passed to netif_add(). + * + * ATTENTION: A pointer to a @ref bridgeif_initdata_t must be passed as 'state' + * to @ref netif_add when adding the bridge. I supplies MAC address + * and controls memory allocation (number of ports, FDB size). + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this ethernetif + * @return ERR_OK if the loopif is initialized + * ERR_MEM if private data couldn't be allocated + * any other err_t on error + */ +err_t bridgeif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + bridgeif_initdata_t *init_data; + bridgeif_private_t *br; + size_t alloc_len_sizet; + mem_size_t alloc_len; + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("bridgeif needs an input callback", (netif->input != NULL)); +#if !BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT + + if (netif->input == tcpip_input) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_ON, ("bridgeif does not need tcpip_input, use netif_input/ethernet_input instead")); + } + +#endif + + if (bridgeif_netif_client_id == 0xFF) { + bridgeif_netif_client_id = netif_alloc_client_data_id(); + } + + init_data = (bridgeif_initdata_t *)netif->state; + LWIP_ASSERT("init_data != NULL", (init_data != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("init_data->max_ports <= BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS", + init_data->max_ports <= BRIDGEIF_MAX_PORTS); + + alloc_len_sizet = sizeof(bridgeif_private_t) + (init_data->max_ports * sizeof(bridgeif_port_t) + (init_data->max_fdb_static_entries * sizeof(bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t))); + alloc_len = (mem_size_t)alloc_len_sizet; + LWIP_ASSERT("alloc_len == alloc_len_sizet", alloc_len == alloc_len_sizet); + LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_DEBUG, ("bridgeif_init: allocating %d bytes for private data\n", (int)alloc_len)); + br = (bridgeif_private_t *)mem_calloc(1, alloc_len); + + if (br == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("bridgeif_init: out of memory\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memcpy(&br->ethaddr, &init_data->ethaddr, sizeof(br->ethaddr)); + br->netif = netif; + + br->max_ports = init_data->max_ports; + br->ports = (bridgeif_port_t *)(br + 1); + + br->max_fdbs_entries = init_data->max_fdb_static_entries; + br->fdbs = (bridgeif_fdb_static_entry_t *)(((u8_t *)(br + 1)) + (init_data->max_ports * sizeof(bridgeif_port_t))); + + br->max_fdbd_entries = init_data->max_fdb_dynamic_entries; + br->fdbd = bridgeif_fdb_init(init_data->max_fdb_dynamic_entries); + + if (br->fdbd == NULL) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(NETIF_DEBUG, ("bridgeif_init: out of memory in fdb_init\n")); + mem_free(br); + return ERR_MEM; + } + +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME + /* Initialize interface hostname */ + netif->hostname = "lwip"; +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ + + /* + * Initialize the snmp variables and counters inside the struct netif. + * The last argument should be replaced with your link speed, in units + * of bits per second. + */ + MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_ethernet_csmacd, 0); + + netif->state = br; + netif->name[0] = IFNAME0; + netif->name[1] = IFNAME1; + /* We directly use etharp_output() here to save a function call. + * You can instead declare your own function an call etharp_output() + * from it if you have to do some checks before sending (e.g. if link + * is available...) */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + netif->output = etharp_output; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + netif->output_ip6 = ethip6_output; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + netif->linkoutput = bridgeif_output; + + /* set MAC hardware address length */ + netif->hwaddr_len = ETH_HWADDR_LEN; + + /* set MAC hardware address */ + memcpy(netif->hwaddr, &br->ethaddr, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); + + /* maximum transfer unit */ + netif->mtu = 1500; + + /* device capabilities */ + /* don't set NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP if this device is not an ethernet one */ + netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET | NETIF_FLAG_IGMP | NETIF_FLAG_MLD6 | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD + + /* + * For hardware/netifs that implement MAC filtering. + * All-nodes link-local is handled by default, so we must let the hardware know + * to allow multicast packets in. + * Should set mld_mac_filter previously. */ + if (netif->mld_mac_filter != NULL) { + ip6_addr_t ip6_allnodes_ll; + ip6_addr_set_allnodes_linklocal(&ip6_allnodes_ll); + netif->mld_mac_filter(netif, &ip6_allnodes_ll, NETIF_ADD_MAC_FILTER); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_IPV6_MLD */ + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup bridgeif + * Add a port to the bridge + */ +err_t bridgeif_add_port(struct netif *bridgeif, struct netif *portif) +{ + bridgeif_private_t *br; + bridgeif_port_t *port; + + LWIP_ASSERT("bridgeif != NULL", bridgeif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("bridgeif->state != NULL", bridgeif->state != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("portif != NULL", portif != NULL); + + if (!(portif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP) || !(portif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET)) { + /* can only add ETHERNET/ETHARP interfaces */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + br = (bridgeif_private_t *)bridgeif->state; + + if (br->num_ports >= br->max_ports) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + port = &br->ports[br->num_ports]; + port->port_netif = portif; + port->port_num = br->num_ports; + port->bridge = br; + br->num_ports++; + + /* let the port call us on input */ +#if BRIDGEIF_PORT_NETIFS_OUTPUT_DIRECT + portif->input = bridgeif_input; +#else + portif->input = bridgeif_tcpip_input; +#endif + /* store pointer to bridge in netif */ + netif_set_client_data(portif, bridgeif_netif_client_id, port); + /* remove ETHARP flag to prevent sending report events on netif-up */ + netif_clear_flags(portif, NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c index 0535d23a..f5865ee4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/bridgeif_fdb.c @@ -1,223 +1,223 @@ -/** - * @file - * lwIP netif implementing an FDB for IEEE 802.1D MAC Bridge - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -/** - * @defgroup bridgeif_fdb FDB example code - * @ingroup bridgeif - * This file implements an example for an FDB (Forwarding DataBase) - */ - -#include "netif/bridgeif.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include - -#define BRIDGEIF_AGE_TIMER_MS 1000 - -#define BR_FDB_TIMEOUT_SEC (60 * 5) /* 5 minutes FDB timeout */ - -typedef struct bridgeif_dfdb_entry_s { - u8_t used; - u8_t port; - u32_t ts; - struct eth_addr addr; -} bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t; - -typedef struct bridgeif_dfdb_s { - u16_t max_fdb_entries; - bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *fdb; -} bridgeif_dfdb_t; - -/** - * @ingroup bridgeif_fdb - * A real simple and slow implementation of an auto-learning forwarding database that - * remembers known src mac addresses to know which port to send frames destined for that - * mac address. - * - * ATTENTION: This is meant as an example only, in real-world use, you should - * provide a better implementation :-) - */ -void bridgeif_fdb_update_src(void *fdb_ptr, struct eth_addr *src_addr, u8_t port_idx) -{ - int i; - bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)fdb_ptr; - BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); - - for (i = 0; i < fdb->max_fdb_entries; i++) { - bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *e = &fdb->fdb[i]; - - if (e->used && e->ts) { - if (!memcmp(&e->addr, src_addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FDB_DEBUG, ("br: update src %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x (from %d) @ idx %d\n", - src_addr->addr[0], src_addr->addr[1], src_addr->addr[2], src_addr->addr[3], src_addr->addr[4], src_addr->addr[5], - port_idx, i)); - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); - e->ts = BR_FDB_TIMEOUT_SEC; - e->port = port_idx; - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return; - } - } - } - - /* not found, allocate new entry from free */ - for (i = 0; i < fdb->max_fdb_entries; i++) { - bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *e = &fdb->fdb[i]; - - if (!e->used || !e->ts) { - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); - - /* check again when protected */ - if (!e->used || !e->ts) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FDB_DEBUG, ("br: create src %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x (from %d) @ idx %d\n", - src_addr->addr[0], src_addr->addr[1], src_addr->addr[2], src_addr->addr[3], src_addr->addr[4], src_addr->addr[5], - port_idx, i)); - memcpy(&e->addr, src_addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr)); - e->ts = BR_FDB_TIMEOUT_SEC; - e->port = port_idx; - e->used = 1; - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return; - } - - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); - } - } - - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - /* not found, no free entry -> flood */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup bridgeif_fdb - * Walk our list of auto-learnt fdb entries and return a port to forward or BR_FLOOD if unknown - */ -bridgeif_portmask_t bridgeif_fdb_get_dst_ports(void *fdb_ptr, struct eth_addr *dst_addr) -{ - int i; - bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)fdb_ptr; - BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); - - for (i = 0; i < fdb->max_fdb_entries; i++) { - bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *e = &fdb->fdb[i]; - - if (e->used && e->ts) { - if (!memcmp(&e->addr, dst_addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { - bridgeif_portmask_t ret = (bridgeif_portmask_t)(1 << e->port); - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return ret; - } - } - } - - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); - return BR_FLOOD; -} - -/** - * @ingroup bridgeif_fdb - * Aging implementation of our simple fdb - */ -static void bridgeif_fdb_age_one_second(void *fdb_ptr) -{ - int i; - bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb; - BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)fdb_ptr; - BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); - - for (i = 0; i < fdb->max_fdb_entries; i++) { - bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *e = &fdb->fdb[i]; - - if (e->used && e->ts) { - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); - - /* check again when protected */ - if (e->used && e->ts) { - if (--e->ts == 0) { - e->used = 0; - } - } - - BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); - } - } - - BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); -} - -/** Timer callback for fdb aging, called once per second */ -static void bridgeif_age_tmr(void *arg) -{ - bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)arg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid arg", arg != NULL); - - bridgeif_fdb_age_one_second(fdb); - sys_timeout(BRIDGEIF_AGE_TIMER_MS, bridgeif_age_tmr, arg); -} - -/** - * @ingroup bridgeif_fdb - * Init our simple fdb list - */ -void *bridgeif_fdb_init(u16_t max_fdb_entries) -{ - bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb; - size_t alloc_len_sizet = sizeof(bridgeif_dfdb_t) + (max_fdb_entries * sizeof(bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t)); - mem_size_t alloc_len = (mem_size_t)alloc_len_sizet; - LWIP_ASSERT("alloc_len == alloc_len_sizet", alloc_len == alloc_len_sizet); - LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_DEBUG, ("bridgeif_fdb_init: allocating %d bytes for private FDB data\n", (int)alloc_len)); - fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)mem_calloc(1, alloc_len); - - if (fdb == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - fdb->max_fdb_entries = max_fdb_entries; - fdb->fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *)(fdb + 1); - - sys_timeout(BRIDGEIF_AGE_TIMER_MS, bridgeif_age_tmr, fdb); - - return fdb; -} +/** + * @file + * lwIP netif implementing an FDB for IEEE 802.1D MAC Bridge + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +/** + * @defgroup bridgeif_fdb FDB example code + * @ingroup bridgeif + * This file implements an example for an FDB (Forwarding DataBase) + */ + +#include "netif/bridgeif.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include + +#define BRIDGEIF_AGE_TIMER_MS 1000 + +#define BR_FDB_TIMEOUT_SEC (60 * 5) /* 5 minutes FDB timeout */ + +typedef struct bridgeif_dfdb_entry_s { + u8_t used; + u8_t port; + u32_t ts; + struct eth_addr addr; +} bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t; + +typedef struct bridgeif_dfdb_s { + u16_t max_fdb_entries; + bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *fdb; +} bridgeif_dfdb_t; + +/** + * @ingroup bridgeif_fdb + * A real simple and slow implementation of an auto-learning forwarding database that + * remembers known src mac addresses to know which port to send frames destined for that + * mac address. + * + * ATTENTION: This is meant as an example only, in real-world use, you should + * provide a better implementation :-) + */ +void bridgeif_fdb_update_src(void *fdb_ptr, struct eth_addr *src_addr, u8_t port_idx) +{ + int i; + bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)fdb_ptr; + BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); + + for (i = 0; i < fdb->max_fdb_entries; i++) { + bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *e = &fdb->fdb[i]; + + if (e->used && e->ts) { + if (!memcmp(&e->addr, src_addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FDB_DEBUG, ("br: update src %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x (from %d) @ idx %d\n", + src_addr->addr[0], src_addr->addr[1], src_addr->addr[2], src_addr->addr[3], src_addr->addr[4], src_addr->addr[5], + port_idx, i)); + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); + e->ts = BR_FDB_TIMEOUT_SEC; + e->port = port_idx; + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return; + } + } + } + + /* not found, allocate new entry from free */ + for (i = 0; i < fdb->max_fdb_entries; i++) { + bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *e = &fdb->fdb[i]; + + if (!e->used || !e->ts) { + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); + + /* check again when protected */ + if (!e->used || !e->ts) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_FDB_DEBUG, ("br: create src %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x (from %d) @ idx %d\n", + src_addr->addr[0], src_addr->addr[1], src_addr->addr[2], src_addr->addr[3], src_addr->addr[4], src_addr->addr[5], + port_idx, i)); + memcpy(&e->addr, src_addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr)); + e->ts = BR_FDB_TIMEOUT_SEC; + e->port = port_idx; + e->used = 1; + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return; + } + + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); + } + } + + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + /* not found, no free entry -> flood */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup bridgeif_fdb + * Walk our list of auto-learnt fdb entries and return a port to forward or BR_FLOOD if unknown + */ +bridgeif_portmask_t bridgeif_fdb_get_dst_ports(void *fdb_ptr, struct eth_addr *dst_addr) +{ + int i; + bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)fdb_ptr; + BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); + + for (i = 0; i < fdb->max_fdb_entries; i++) { + bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *e = &fdb->fdb[i]; + + if (e->used && e->ts) { + if (!memcmp(&e->addr, dst_addr, sizeof(struct eth_addr))) { + bridgeif_portmask_t ret = (bridgeif_portmask_t)(1 << e->port); + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return ret; + } + } + } + + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); + return BR_FLOOD; +} + +/** + * @ingroup bridgeif_fdb + * Aging implementation of our simple fdb + */ +static void bridgeif_fdb_age_one_second(void *fdb_ptr) +{ + int i; + bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb; + BRIDGEIF_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)fdb_ptr; + BRIDGEIF_READ_PROTECT(lev); + + for (i = 0; i < fdb->max_fdb_entries; i++) { + bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *e = &fdb->fdb[i]; + + if (e->used && e->ts) { + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_PROTECT(lev); + + /* check again when protected */ + if (e->used && e->ts) { + if (--e->ts == 0) { + e->used = 0; + } + } + + BRIDGEIF_WRITE_UNPROTECT(lev); + } + } + + BRIDGEIF_READ_UNPROTECT(lev); +} + +/** Timer callback for fdb aging, called once per second */ +static void bridgeif_age_tmr(void *arg) +{ + bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)arg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid arg", arg != NULL); + + bridgeif_fdb_age_one_second(fdb); + sys_timeout(BRIDGEIF_AGE_TIMER_MS, bridgeif_age_tmr, arg); +} + +/** + * @ingroup bridgeif_fdb + * Init our simple fdb list + */ +void *bridgeif_fdb_init(u16_t max_fdb_entries) +{ + bridgeif_dfdb_t *fdb; + size_t alloc_len_sizet = sizeof(bridgeif_dfdb_t) + (max_fdb_entries * sizeof(bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t)); + mem_size_t alloc_len = (mem_size_t)alloc_len_sizet; + LWIP_ASSERT("alloc_len == alloc_len_sizet", alloc_len == alloc_len_sizet); + LWIP_DEBUGF(BRIDGEIF_DEBUG, ("bridgeif_fdb_init: allocating %d bytes for private FDB data\n", (int)alloc_len)); + fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_t *)mem_calloc(1, alloc_len); + + if (fdb == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + fdb->max_fdb_entries = max_fdb_entries; + fdb->fdb = (bridgeif_dfdb_entry_t *)(fdb + 1); + + sys_timeout(BRIDGEIF_AGE_TIMER_MS, bridgeif_age_tmr, fdb); + + return fdb; +} diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ethernet.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ethernet.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ethernet.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ethernet.c index 2ce623e1..937926f1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ethernet.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ethernet.c @@ -1,342 +1,342 @@ -/** - * @file - * Ethernet common functions - * - * @defgroup ethernet Ethernet - * @ingroup callbackstyle_api - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Leon Woestenberg - * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#if LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET - -#include "netif/ethernet.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" - -#include - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPPOE_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/pppoe.h" -#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ - -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME -#endif - -const struct eth_addr ethbroadcast = { { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff } }; -const struct eth_addr ethzero = { { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } }; - -/** - * @ingroup lwip_nosys - * Process received ethernet frames. Using this function instead of directly - * calling ip_input and passing ARP frames through etharp in ethernetif_input, - * the ARP cache is protected from concurrent access.\n - * Don't call directly, pass to netif_add() and call netif->input(). - * - * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the ethernet header - * @param netif the network interface on which the packet was received - * - * @see LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL - * @see ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN - * @see LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK - */ -err_t ethernet_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) -{ - struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; - u16_t type; -#if LWIP_ARP || ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN || LWIP_IPV6 - u16_t next_hdr_offset = SIZEOF_ETH_HDR; -#endif /* LWIP_ARP || ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN */ - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (p->len <= SIZEOF_ETH_HDR) { - /* a packet with only an ethernet header (or less) is not valid for us */ - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.proterr); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinerrors); - goto free_and_return; - } - - if (p->if_idx == NETIF_NO_INDEX) { - p->if_idx = netif_get_index(netif); - } - - /* points to packet payload, which starts with an Ethernet header */ - ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)p->payload; - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("ethernet_input: dest:%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ", src:%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ", type:%" X16_F "\n", - (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[0], (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[1], (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[2], - (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[3], (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[4], (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[5], - (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[0], (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[1], (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[2], - (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[3], (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[4], (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[5], - lwip_htons(ethhdr->type))); - - type = ethhdr->type; -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN - - if (type == PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_VLAN)) { - struct eth_vlan_hdr *vlan = (struct eth_vlan_hdr *)(((char *)ethhdr) + SIZEOF_ETH_HDR); - next_hdr_offset = SIZEOF_ETH_HDR + SIZEOF_VLAN_HDR; - - if (p->len <= SIZEOF_ETH_HDR + SIZEOF_VLAN_HDR) { - /* a packet with only an ethernet/vlan header (or less) is not valid for us */ - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.proterr); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinerrors); - goto free_and_return; - } - -#if defined(LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK) || defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK) || defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN) /* if not, allow all VLANs */ -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK - - if (!LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK(netif, ethhdr, vlan)) { -#elif defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN) - - if (!ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN(ethhdr, vlan)) { -#elif defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK) - - if (VLAN_ID(vlan) != ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK) { -#endif - /* silently ignore this packet: not for our VLAN */ - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - -#endif /* defined(LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK) || defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK) || defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN) */ - type = vlan->tpid; - } - -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN */ - -#if LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF - netif = LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF_FN(p, netif, lwip_htons(type)); -#endif /* LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF*/ - - if (ethhdr->dest.addr[0] & 1) { - /* this might be a multicast or broadcast packet */ - if (ethhdr->dest.addr[0] == LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_0) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if ((ethhdr->dest.addr[1] == LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_1) && - (ethhdr->dest.addr[2] == LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_2)) { - /* mark the pbuf as link-layer multicast */ - p->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_LLMCAST; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - } -#if LWIP_IPV6 - else if ((ethhdr->dest.addr[0] == LL_IP6_MULTICAST_ADDR_0) && - (ethhdr->dest.addr[1] == LL_IP6_MULTICAST_ADDR_1)) { - /* mark the pbuf as link-layer multicast */ - p->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_LLMCAST; - } -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - else if (eth_addr_cmp(ðhdr->dest, ðbroadcast)) { - /* mark the pbuf as link-layer broadcast */ - p->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_LLBCAST; - } - } - - switch (type) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP - - /* IP packet? */ - case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_IP): - if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP)) { - goto free_and_return; - } - - /* skip Ethernet header (min. size checked above) */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(p, next_hdr_offset)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("ethernet_input: IPv4 packet dropped, too short (%" U16_F "/%" U16_F ")\n", - p->tot_len, next_hdr_offset)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Can't move over header in packet")); - goto free_and_return; - } else { - /* pass to IP layer */ - ip4_input(p, netif); - } - - break; - - case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_ARP): - if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP)) { - goto free_and_return; - } - - /* skip Ethernet header (min. size checked above) */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(p, next_hdr_offset)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("ethernet_input: ARP response packet dropped, too short (%" U16_F "/%" U16_F ")\n", - p->tot_len, next_hdr_offset)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Can't move over header in packet")); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.lenerr); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); - goto free_and_return; - } else { - /* pass p to ARP module */ - etharp_input(p, netif); - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ -#if PPPOE_SUPPORT - - case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_PPPOEDISC): /* PPP Over Ethernet Discovery Stage */ - pppoe_disc_input(netif, p); - break; - - case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_PPPOE): /* PPP Over Ethernet Session Stage */ - pppoe_data_input(netif, p); - break; -#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_IPV6): /* IPv6 */ - - /* skip Ethernet header */ - if ((p->len < next_hdr_offset) || pbuf_remove_header(p, next_hdr_offset)) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, - ("ethernet_input: IPv6 packet dropped, too short (%" U16_F "/%" U16_F ")\n", - p->tot_len, next_hdr_offset)); - goto free_and_return; - } else { - /* pass to IPv6 layer */ - ip6_input(p, netif); - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - - default: -#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL - if (LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL(p, netif) == ERR_OK) { - break; - } - -#endif - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.proterr); - ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinunknownprotos); - goto free_and_return; - } - - /* This means the pbuf is freed or consumed, - so the caller doesn't have to free it again */ - return ERR_OK; - -free_and_return: - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup ethernet - * Send an ethernet packet on the network using netif->linkoutput(). - * The ethernet header is filled in before sending. - * - * @see LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET - * - * @param netif the lwIP network interface on which to send the packet - * @param p the packet to send. pbuf layer must be @ref PBUF_LINK. - * @param src the source MAC address to be copied into the ethernet header - * @param dst the destination MAC address to be copied into the ethernet header - * @param eth_type ethernet type (@ref lwip_ieee_eth_type) - * @return ERR_OK if the packet was sent, any other err_t on failure - */ -err_t ethernet_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, - const struct eth_addr *src, const struct eth_addr *dst, - u16_t eth_type) -{ - struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; - u16_t eth_type_be = lwip_htons(eth_type); - -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN && defined(LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET) - s32_t vlan_prio_vid = LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET(netif, p, src, dst, eth_type); - - if (vlan_prio_vid >= 0) { - struct eth_vlan_hdr *vlanhdr; - - LWIP_ASSERT("prio_vid must be <= 0xFFFF", vlan_prio_vid <= 0xFFFF); - - if (pbuf_add_header(p, SIZEOF_ETH_HDR + SIZEOF_VLAN_HDR) != 0) { - goto pbuf_header_failed; - } - - vlanhdr = (struct eth_vlan_hdr *)(((u8_t *)p->payload) + SIZEOF_ETH_HDR); - vlanhdr->tpid = eth_type_be; - vlanhdr->prio_vid = lwip_htons((u16_t)vlan_prio_vid); - - eth_type_be = PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_VLAN); - } else -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN && defined(LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET) */ - { - if (pbuf_add_header(p, SIZEOF_ETH_HDR) != 0) { - goto pbuf_header_failed; - } - } - - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)p->payload; - ethhdr->type = eth_type_be; - SMEMCPY(ðhdr->dest, dst, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); - SMEMCPY(ðhdr->src, src, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->hwaddr_len must be 6 for ethernet_output!", - (netif->hwaddr_len == ETH_HWADDR_LEN)); - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, - ("ethernet_output: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); - - /* send the packet */ - return netif->linkoutput(netif, p); - -pbuf_header_failed: - LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, - ("ethernet_output: could not allocate room for header.\n")); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); - return ERR_BUF; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET */ +/** + * @file + * Ethernet common functions + * + * @defgroup ethernet Ethernet + * @ingroup callbackstyle_api + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Leon Woestenberg + * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Axon Digital Design B.V., The Netherlands. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#if LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET + +#include "netif/ethernet.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" + +#include + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPPOE_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/pppoe.h" +#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ + +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#include LWIP_HOOK_FILENAME +#endif + +const struct eth_addr ethbroadcast = { { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff } }; +const struct eth_addr ethzero = { { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } }; + +/** + * @ingroup lwip_nosys + * Process received ethernet frames. Using this function instead of directly + * calling ip_input and passing ARP frames through etharp in ethernetif_input, + * the ARP cache is protected from concurrent access.\n + * Don't call directly, pass to netif_add() and call netif->input(). + * + * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the ethernet header + * @param netif the network interface on which the packet was received + * + * @see LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL + * @see ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN + * @see LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK + */ +err_t ethernet_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) +{ + struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; + u16_t type; +#if LWIP_ARP || ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN || LWIP_IPV6 + u16_t next_hdr_offset = SIZEOF_ETH_HDR; +#endif /* LWIP_ARP || ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN */ + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (p->len <= SIZEOF_ETH_HDR) { + /* a packet with only an ethernet header (or less) is not valid for us */ + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.proterr); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinerrors); + goto free_and_return; + } + + if (p->if_idx == NETIF_NO_INDEX) { + p->if_idx = netif_get_index(netif); + } + + /* points to packet payload, which starts with an Ethernet header */ + ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)p->payload; + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("ethernet_input: dest:%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ", src:%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ":%" X8_F ", type:%" X16_F "\n", + (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[0], (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[1], (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[2], + (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[3], (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[4], (unsigned char)ethhdr->dest.addr[5], + (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[0], (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[1], (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[2], + (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[3], (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[4], (unsigned char)ethhdr->src.addr[5], + lwip_htons(ethhdr->type))); + + type = ethhdr->type; +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN + + if (type == PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_VLAN)) { + struct eth_vlan_hdr *vlan = (struct eth_vlan_hdr *)(((char *)ethhdr) + SIZEOF_ETH_HDR); + next_hdr_offset = SIZEOF_ETH_HDR + SIZEOF_VLAN_HDR; + + if (p->len <= SIZEOF_ETH_HDR + SIZEOF_VLAN_HDR) { + /* a packet with only an ethernet/vlan header (or less) is not valid for us */ + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.proterr); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinerrors); + goto free_and_return; + } + +#if defined(LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK) || defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK) || defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN) /* if not, allow all VLANs */ +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK + + if (!LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK(netif, ethhdr, vlan)) { +#elif defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN) + + if (!ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN(ethhdr, vlan)) { +#elif defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK) + + if (VLAN_ID(vlan) != ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK) { +#endif + /* silently ignore this packet: not for our VLAN */ + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + +#endif /* defined(LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_CHECK) || defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK) || defined(ETHARP_VLAN_CHECK_FN) */ + type = vlan->tpid; + } + +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN */ + +#if LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF + netif = LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF_FN(p, netif, lwip_htons(type)); +#endif /* LWIP_ARP_FILTER_NETIF*/ + + if (ethhdr->dest.addr[0] & 1) { + /* this might be a multicast or broadcast packet */ + if (ethhdr->dest.addr[0] == LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_0) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if ((ethhdr->dest.addr[1] == LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_1) && + (ethhdr->dest.addr[2] == LL_IP4_MULTICAST_ADDR_2)) { + /* mark the pbuf as link-layer multicast */ + p->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_LLMCAST; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + } +#if LWIP_IPV6 + else if ((ethhdr->dest.addr[0] == LL_IP6_MULTICAST_ADDR_0) && + (ethhdr->dest.addr[1] == LL_IP6_MULTICAST_ADDR_1)) { + /* mark the pbuf as link-layer multicast */ + p->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_LLMCAST; + } +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + else if (eth_addr_cmp(ðhdr->dest, ðbroadcast)) { + /* mark the pbuf as link-layer broadcast */ + p->flags |= PBUF_FLAG_LLBCAST; + } + } + + switch (type) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP + + /* IP packet? */ + case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_IP): + if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP)) { + goto free_and_return; + } + + /* skip Ethernet header (min. size checked above) */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(p, next_hdr_offset)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("ethernet_input: IPv4 packet dropped, too short (%" U16_F "/%" U16_F ")\n", + p->tot_len, next_hdr_offset)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Can't move over header in packet")); + goto free_and_return; + } else { + /* pass to IP layer */ + ip4_input(p, netif); + } + + break; + + case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_ARP): + if (!(netif->flags & NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP)) { + goto free_and_return; + } + + /* skip Ethernet header (min. size checked above) */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(p, next_hdr_offset)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("ethernet_input: ARP response packet dropped, too short (%" U16_F "/%" U16_F ")\n", + p->tot_len, next_hdr_offset)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("Can't move over header in packet")); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.lenerr); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); + goto free_and_return; + } else { + /* pass p to ARP module */ + etharp_input(p, netif); + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_ARP */ +#if PPPOE_SUPPORT + + case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_PPPOEDISC): /* PPP Over Ethernet Discovery Stage */ + pppoe_disc_input(netif, p); + break; + + case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_PPPOE): /* PPP Over Ethernet Session Stage */ + pppoe_data_input(netif, p); + break; +#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + case PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_IPV6): /* IPv6 */ + + /* skip Ethernet header */ + if ((p->len < next_hdr_offset) || pbuf_remove_header(p, next_hdr_offset)) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, + ("ethernet_input: IPv6 packet dropped, too short (%" U16_F "/%" U16_F ")\n", + p->tot_len, next_hdr_offset)); + goto free_and_return; + } else { + /* pass to IPv6 layer */ + ip6_input(p, netif); + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + + default: +#ifdef LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL + if (LWIP_HOOK_UNKNOWN_ETH_PROTOCOL(p, netif) == ERR_OK) { + break; + } + +#endif + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.proterr); + ETHARP_STATS_INC(etharp.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinunknownprotos); + goto free_and_return; + } + + /* This means the pbuf is freed or consumed, + so the caller doesn't have to free it again */ + return ERR_OK; + +free_and_return: + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup ethernet + * Send an ethernet packet on the network using netif->linkoutput(). + * The ethernet header is filled in before sending. + * + * @see LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET + * + * @param netif the lwIP network interface on which to send the packet + * @param p the packet to send. pbuf layer must be @ref PBUF_LINK. + * @param src the source MAC address to be copied into the ethernet header + * @param dst the destination MAC address to be copied into the ethernet header + * @param eth_type ethernet type (@ref lwip_ieee_eth_type) + * @return ERR_OK if the packet was sent, any other err_t on failure + */ +err_t ethernet_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, + const struct eth_addr *src, const struct eth_addr *dst, + u16_t eth_type) +{ + struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; + u16_t eth_type_be = lwip_htons(eth_type); + +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN && defined(LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET) + s32_t vlan_prio_vid = LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET(netif, p, src, dst, eth_type); + + if (vlan_prio_vid >= 0) { + struct eth_vlan_hdr *vlanhdr; + + LWIP_ASSERT("prio_vid must be <= 0xFFFF", vlan_prio_vid <= 0xFFFF); + + if (pbuf_add_header(p, SIZEOF_ETH_HDR + SIZEOF_VLAN_HDR) != 0) { + goto pbuf_header_failed; + } + + vlanhdr = (struct eth_vlan_hdr *)(((u8_t *)p->payload) + SIZEOF_ETH_HDR); + vlanhdr->tpid = eth_type_be; + vlanhdr->prio_vid = lwip_htons((u16_t)vlan_prio_vid); + + eth_type_be = PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_VLAN); + } else +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_VLAN && defined(LWIP_HOOK_VLAN_SET) */ + { + if (pbuf_add_header(p, SIZEOF_ETH_HDR) != 0) { + goto pbuf_header_failed; + } + } + + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)p->payload; + ethhdr->type = eth_type_be; + SMEMCPY(ðhdr->dest, dst, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); + SMEMCPY(ðhdr->src, src, ETH_HWADDR_LEN); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->hwaddr_len must be 6 for ethernet_output!", + (netif->hwaddr_len == ETH_HWADDR_LEN)); + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, + ("ethernet_output: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); + + /* send the packet */ + return netif->linkoutput(netif, p); + +pbuf_header_failed: + LWIP_DEBUGF(ETHARP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_SERIOUS, + ("ethernet_output: could not allocate room for header.\n")); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); + return ERR_BUF; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_ARP || LWIP_ETHERNET */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6.c index 33c6ae7b..730546c9 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6.c @@ -1,976 +1,976 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * 6LowPAN output for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. Fragments packets to 6LowPAN units. - * - * This implementation aims to conform to IEEE 802.15.4(-2015), RFC 4944 and RFC 6282. - * @todo: RFC 6775. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -/** - * @defgroup sixlowpan 6LoWPAN (RFC4944) - * @ingroup netifs - * 6LowPAN netif implementation - */ - -#include "netif/lowpan6.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "netif/ieee802154.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_802154_HW_CRC -#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(buf, len) 0 -#else -#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(buf, len) LWIP_6LOWPAN_CALC_CRC(buf, len) -#endif - -/** This is a helper struct for reassembly of fragments - * (IEEE 802.15.4 limits to 127 bytes) - */ -struct lowpan6_reass_helper { - struct lowpan6_reass_helper *next_packet; - struct pbuf *reass; - struct pbuf *frags; - u8_t timer; - struct lowpan6_link_addr sender_addr; - u16_t datagram_size; - u16_t datagram_tag; -}; - -/** This struct keeps track of per-netif state */ -struct lowpan6_ieee802154_data { - /** fragment reassembly list */ - struct lowpan6_reass_helper *reass_list; -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 - /** address context for compression */ - ip6_addr_t lowpan6_context[LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS]; -#endif - /** Datagram Tag for fragmentation */ - u16_t tx_datagram_tag; - /** local PAN ID for IEEE 802.15.4 header */ - u16_t ieee_802154_pan_id; - /** Sequence Number for IEEE 802.15.4 transmission */ - u8_t tx_frame_seq_num; -}; - -/* Maximum frame size is 127 bytes minus CRC size */ -#define LOWPAN6_MAX_PAYLOAD (127 - 2) - -/** Currently, this state is global, since there's only one 6LoWPAN netif */ -static struct lowpan6_ieee802154_data lowpan6_data; - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 -#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif) lowpan6_data.lowpan6_context -#else -#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif) NULL -#endif - -static const struct lowpan6_link_addr ieee_802154_broadcast = { 2, { 0xff, 0xff } }; - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS -static struct lowpan6_link_addr short_mac_addr = { 2, { 0, 0 } }; -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ - -/* IEEE 802.15.4 specific functions: */ - -/** Write the IEEE 802.15.4 header that encapsulates the 6LoWPAN frame. - * Src and dst PAN IDs are filled with the ID set by @ref lowpan6_set_pan_id. - * - * Since the length is variable: - * @returns the header length - */ -static u8_t lowpan6_write_iee802154_header(struct ieee_802154_hdr *hdr, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, - const struct lowpan6_link_addr *dst) -{ - u8_t ieee_header_len; - u8_t *buffer; - u8_t i; - u16_t fc; - - fc = IEEE_802154_FC_FT_DATA; /* send data packet (2003 frame version) */ - fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_PANID_COMPR; /* set PAN ID compression, for now src and dst PANs are equal */ - - if (dst != &ieee_802154_broadcast) { - fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_ACK_REQ; /* data packet, no broadcast: ack required. */ - } - - if (dst->addr_len == 2) { - fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_SHORT; - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid dst address length", dst->addr_len == 8); - fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_EXT; - } - - if (src->addr_len == 2) { - fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_SHORT; - } else { - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid src address length", src->addr_len == 8); - fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_EXT; - } - - hdr->frame_control = fc; - hdr->sequence_number = lowpan6_data.tx_frame_seq_num++; - hdr->destination_pan_id = lowpan6_data.ieee_802154_pan_id; /* pan id */ - - buffer = (u8_t *)hdr; - ieee_header_len = 5; - i = dst->addr_len; - - /* reverse memcpy of dst addr */ - while (i-- > 0) { - buffer[ieee_header_len++] = dst->addr[i]; - } - - /* Source PAN ID skipped due to PAN ID Compression */ - i = src->addr_len; - - /* reverse memcpy of src addr */ - while (i-- > 0) { - buffer[ieee_header_len++] = src->addr[i]; - } - - return ieee_header_len; -} - -/** Parse the IEEE 802.15.4 header from a pbuf. - * If successful, the header is hidden from the pbuf. - * - * PAN IDs and seuqence number are not checked - * - * @param p input pbuf, p->payload pointing at the IEEE 802.15.4 header - * @param src pointer to source address filled from the header - * @param dest pointer to destination address filled from the header - * @returns ERR_OK if successful - */ -static err_t lowpan6_parse_iee802154_header(struct pbuf *p, struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, - struct lowpan6_link_addr *dest) -{ - u8_t *puc; - s8_t i; - u16_t frame_control, addr_mode; - u16_t datagram_offset; - - /* Parse IEEE 802.15.4 header */ - puc = (u8_t *)p->payload; - frame_control = puc[0] | (puc[1] << 8); - datagram_offset = 2; - - if (frame_control & IEEE_802154_FC_SEQNO_SUPPR) { - if (IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_VERSION_GET(frame_control) <= 1) { - /* sequence number suppressed, this is not valid for versions 0/1 */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - } else { - datagram_offset++; - } - - datagram_offset += 2; /* Skip destination PAN ID */ - addr_mode = frame_control & IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_MASK; - - if (addr_mode == IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_EXT) { - /* extended address (64 bit) */ - dest->addr_len = 8; - - /* reverse memcpy: */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - dest->addr[i] = puc[datagram_offset + 7 - i]; - } - - datagram_offset += 8; - } else if (addr_mode == IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_SHORT) { - /* short address (16 bit) */ - dest->addr_len = 2; - /* reverse memcpy: */ - dest->addr[0] = puc[datagram_offset + 1]; - dest->addr[1] = puc[datagram_offset]; - datagram_offset += 2; - } else { - /* unsupported address mode (do we need "no address"?) */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (!(frame_control & IEEE_802154_FC_PANID_COMPR)) { - /* No PAN ID compression, skip source PAN ID */ - datagram_offset += 2; - } - - addr_mode = frame_control & IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_MASK; - - if (addr_mode == IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_EXT) { - /* extended address (64 bit) */ - src->addr_len = 8; - - /* reverse memcpy: */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - src->addr[i] = puc[datagram_offset + 7 - i]; - } - - datagram_offset += 8; - } else if (addr_mode == IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_SHORT) { - /* short address (16 bit) */ - src->addr_len = 2; - src->addr[0] = puc[datagram_offset + 1]; - src->addr[1] = puc[datagram_offset]; - datagram_offset += 2; - } else { - /* unsupported address mode (do we need "no address"?) */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* hide IEEE802.15.4 header. */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(p, datagram_offset)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Calculate the 16-bit CRC as required by IEEE 802.15.4 */ -u16_t lowpan6_calc_crc(const void *buf, u16_t len) -{ -#define CCITT_POLY_16 0x8408U - u16_t i; - u8_t b; - u16_t crc = 0; - const u8_t *p = (const u8_t *)buf; - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - u8_t data = *p; - - for (b = 0U; b < 8U; b++) { - if (((data ^ crc) & 1) != 0) { - crc = (u16_t)((crc >> 1) ^ CCITT_POLY_16); - } else { - crc = (u16_t)(crc >> 1); - } - - data = (u8_t)(data >> 1); - } - - p++; - } - - return crc; -} - -/* Fragmentation specific functions: */ - -static void free_reass_datagram(struct lowpan6_reass_helper *lrh) -{ - if (lrh->reass) { - pbuf_free(lrh->reass); - } - - if (lrh->frags) { - pbuf_free(lrh->frags); - } - - mem_free(lrh); -} - -/** - * Removes a datagram from the reassembly queue. - **/ -static void dequeue_datagram(struct lowpan6_reass_helper *lrh, struct lowpan6_reass_helper *prev) -{ - if (lowpan6_data.reass_list == lrh) { - lowpan6_data.reass_list = lowpan6_data.reass_list->next_packet; - } else { - /* it wasn't the first, so it must have a valid 'prev' */ - LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check linked list", prev != NULL); - prev->next_packet = lrh->next_packet; - } -} - -/** - * Periodic timer for 6LowPAN functions: - * - * - Remove incomplete/old packets - */ -void lowpan6_tmr(void) -{ - struct lowpan6_reass_helper *lrh, *lrh_next, *lrh_prev = NULL; - - lrh = lowpan6_data.reass_list; - - while (lrh != NULL) { - lrh_next = lrh->next_packet; - - if ((--lrh->timer) == 0) { - dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); - free_reass_datagram(lrh); - } else { - lrh_prev = lrh; - } - - lrh = lrh_next; - } -} - -/* - * Encapsulates data into IEEE 802.15.4 frames. - * Fragments an IPv6 datagram into 6LowPAN units, which fit into IEEE 802.15.4 frames. - * If configured, will compress IPv6 and or UDP headers. - * */ -static err_t lowpan6_frag(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *dst) -{ - struct pbuf *p_frag; - u16_t frag_len, remaining_len, max_data_len; - u8_t *buffer; - u8_t ieee_header_len; - u8_t lowpan6_header_len; - u8_t hidden_header_len; - u16_t crc; - u16_t datagram_offset; - err_t err = ERR_IF; - - LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_frag: netif->linkoutput not set", netif->linkoutput != NULL); - - /* We'll use a dedicated pbuf for building 6LowPAN fragments. */ - p_frag = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 127, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p_frag == NULL) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece", p_frag->len == p_frag->tot_len); - - /* Write IEEE 802.15.4 header. */ - buffer = (u8_t *)p_frag->payload; - ieee_header_len = lowpan6_write_iee802154_header((struct ieee_802154_hdr *)buffer, src, dst); - LWIP_ASSERT("ieee_header_len < p_frag->len", ieee_header_len < p_frag->len); - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC - /* Perform 6LowPAN IPv6 header compression according to RFC 6282 */ - /* do the header compression (this does NOT copy any non-compressed data) */ - err = lowpan6_compress_headers(netif, (u8_t *)p->payload, p->len, - &buffer[ieee_header_len], p_frag->len - ieee_header_len, &lowpan6_header_len, - &hidden_header_len, LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif), src, dst); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); - pbuf_free(p_frag); - return err; - } - - pbuf_remove_header(p, hidden_header_len); - -#else /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ - /* Send uncompressed IPv6 header with appropriate dispatch byte. */ - lowpan6_header_len = 1; - buffer[ieee_header_len] = 0x41; /* IPv6 dispatch */ -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ - - /* Calculate remaining packet length */ - remaining_len = p->tot_len; - - if (remaining_len > 0x7FF) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); - /* datagram_size must fit into 11 bit */ - pbuf_free(p_frag); - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* Fragment, or 1 packet? */ - max_data_len = LOWPAN6_MAX_PAYLOAD - ieee_header_len - lowpan6_header_len; - - if (remaining_len > max_data_len) { - u16_t data_len; - /* We must move the 6LowPAN header to make room for the FRAG header. */ - memmove(&buffer[ieee_header_len + 4], &buffer[ieee_header_len], lowpan6_header_len); - - /* Now we need to fragment the packet. FRAG1 header first */ - buffer[ieee_header_len] = 0xc0 | (((p->tot_len + hidden_header_len) >> 8) & 0x7); - buffer[ieee_header_len + 1] = (p->tot_len + hidden_header_len) & 0xff; - - lowpan6_data.tx_datagram_tag++; - buffer[ieee_header_len + 2] = (lowpan6_data.tx_datagram_tag >> 8) & 0xff; - buffer[ieee_header_len + 3] = lowpan6_data.tx_datagram_tag & 0xff; - - /* Fragment follows. */ - data_len = (max_data_len - 4) & 0xf8; - frag_len = data_len + lowpan6_header_len; - - pbuf_copy_partial(p, buffer + ieee_header_len + lowpan6_header_len + 4, frag_len - lowpan6_header_len, 0); - remaining_len -= frag_len - lowpan6_header_len; - /* datagram offset holds the offset before compression */ - datagram_offset = frag_len - lowpan6_header_len + hidden_header_len; - LWIP_ASSERT("datagram offset must be a multiple of 8", (datagram_offset & 7) == 0); - - /* Calculate frame length */ - p_frag->len = p_frag->tot_len = ieee_header_len + 4 + frag_len + 2; /* add 2 bytes for crc*/ - - /* 2 bytes CRC */ - crc = LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(p_frag->payload, p_frag->len - 2); - pbuf_take_at(p_frag, &crc, 2, p_frag->len - 2); - - /* send the packet */ - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p_frag->tot_len); - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("lowpan6_send: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); - err = netif->linkoutput(netif, p_frag); - - while ((remaining_len > 0) && (err == ERR_OK)) { - struct ieee_802154_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee_802154_hdr *)buffer; - /* new frame, new seq num for ACK */ - hdr->sequence_number = lowpan6_data.tx_frame_seq_num++; - - buffer[ieee_header_len] |= 0x20; /* Change FRAG1 to FRAGN */ - - LWIP_ASSERT("datagram offset must be a multiple of 8", (datagram_offset & 7) == 0); - buffer[ieee_header_len + 4] = (u8_t)(datagram_offset >> 3); /* datagram offset in FRAGN header (datagram_offset is max. 11 bit) */ - - frag_len = (127 - ieee_header_len - 5 - 2) & 0xf8; - - if (frag_len > remaining_len) { - frag_len = remaining_len; - } - - pbuf_copy_partial(p, buffer + ieee_header_len + 5, frag_len, p->tot_len - remaining_len); - remaining_len -= frag_len; - datagram_offset += frag_len; - - /* Calculate frame length */ - p_frag->len = p_frag->tot_len = frag_len + 5 + ieee_header_len + 2; - - /* 2 bytes CRC */ - crc = LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(p_frag->payload, p_frag->len - 2); - pbuf_take_at(p_frag, &crc, 2, p_frag->len - 2); - - /* send the packet */ - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p_frag->tot_len); - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("lowpan6_send: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); - err = netif->linkoutput(netif, p_frag); - } - } else { - /* It fits in one frame. */ - frag_len = remaining_len; - - /* Copy IPv6 packet */ - pbuf_copy_partial(p, buffer + ieee_header_len + lowpan6_header_len, frag_len, 0); - remaining_len = 0; - - /* Calculate frame length */ - p_frag->len = p_frag->tot_len = frag_len + lowpan6_header_len + ieee_header_len + 2; - LWIP_ASSERT("", p_frag->len <= 127); - - /* 2 bytes CRC */ - crc = LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(p_frag->payload, p_frag->len - 2); - pbuf_take_at(p_frag, &crc, 2, p_frag->len - 2); - - /* send the packet */ - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p_frag->tot_len); - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("lowpan6_send: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); - err = netif->linkoutput(netif, p_frag); - } - - pbuf_free(p_frag); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup sixlowpan - * Set context - */ -err_t lowpan6_set_context(u8_t idx, const ip6_addr_t *context) -{ -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 - - if (idx >= LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(context); - - ip6_addr_set(&lowpan6_data.lowpan6_context[idx], context); - - return ERR_OK; -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(idx); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(context); - return ERR_ARG; -#endif -} - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS -/** - * @ingroup sixlowpan - * Set short address - */ -err_t lowpan6_set_short_addr(u8_t addr_high, u8_t addr_low) -{ - short_mac_addr.addr[0] = addr_high; - short_mac_addr.addr[1] = addr_low; - - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ - -/* Create IEEE 802.15.4 address from netif address */ -static err_t lowpan6_hwaddr_to_addr(struct netif *netif, struct lowpan6_link_addr *addr) -{ - addr->addr_len = 8; - - if (netif->hwaddr_len == 8) { - LWIP_ERROR("NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN >= 8 required", sizeof(netif->hwaddr) >= 8, return ERR_VAL;); - SMEMCPY(addr->addr, netif->hwaddr, 8); - } else if (netif->hwaddr_len == 6) { - /* Copy from MAC-48 */ - SMEMCPY(addr->addr, netif->hwaddr, 3); - addr->addr[3] = addr->addr[4] = 0xff; - SMEMCPY(&addr->addr[5], &netif->hwaddr[3], 3); - } else { - /* Invalid address length, don't know how to convert this */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup sixlowpan - * Resolve and fill-in IEEE 802.15.4 address header for outgoing IPv6 packet. - * - * Perform Header Compression and fragment if necessary. - * - * @param netif The lwIP network interface which the IP packet will be sent on. - * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. - * @param ip6addr The IP address of the packet destination. - * - * @return err_t - */ -err_t lowpan6_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - err_t result; - const u8_t *hwaddr; - struct lowpan6_link_addr src, dest; -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS - ip6_addr_t ip6_src; - struct ip6_hdr *ip6_hdr; -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS - /* Check if we can compress source address (use aligned copy) */ - ip6_hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)q->payload; - ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(ip6_src, ip6_hdr->src); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(&ip6_src, IP6_UNICAST, netif); - - if (lowpan6_get_address_mode(&ip6_src, &short_mac_addr) == 3) { - src.addr_len = 2; - src.addr[0] = short_mac_addr.addr[0]; - src.addr[1] = short_mac_addr.addr[1]; - } else -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ - { - result = lowpan6_hwaddr_to_addr(netif, &src); - - if (result != ERR_OK) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); - return result; - } - } - - /* multicast destination IP address? */ - if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6addr)) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutnucastpkts); - /* We need to send to the broadcast address.*/ - return lowpan6_frag(netif, q, &src, &ieee_802154_broadcast); - } - - /* We have a unicast destination IP address */ - /* @todo anycast? */ - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS - - if (src.addr_len == 2) { - /* If source address was compressable to short_mac_addr, and dest has same subnet and - * is also compressable to 2-bytes, assume we can infer dest as a short address too. */ - dest.addr_len = 2; - dest.addr[0] = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[38]; - dest.addr[1] = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[39]; - - if ((src.addr_len == 2) && (ip6_addr_netcmp_zoneless(&ip6_hdr->src, &ip6_hdr->dest)) && - (lowpan6_get_address_mode(ip6addr, &dest) == 3)) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutucastpkts); - return lowpan6_frag(netif, q, &src, &dest); - } - } - -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ - - /* Ask ND6 what to do with the packet. */ - result = nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue(netif, q, ip6addr, &hwaddr); - - if (result != ERR_OK) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); - return result; - } - - /* If no hardware address is returned, nd6 has queued the packet for later. */ - if (hwaddr == NULL) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Send out the packet using the returned hardware address. */ - dest.addr_len = netif->hwaddr_len; - /* XXX: Inferring the length of the source address from the destination address - * is not correct for IEEE 802.15.4, but currently we don't get this information - * from the neighbor cache */ - SMEMCPY(dest.addr, hwaddr, netif->hwaddr_len); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutucastpkts); - return lowpan6_frag(netif, q, &src, &dest); -} -/** - * @ingroup sixlowpan - * NETIF input function: don't free the input pbuf when returning != ERR_OK! - */ -err_t lowpan6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) -{ - u8_t *puc, b; - s8_t i; - struct lowpan6_link_addr src, dest; - u16_t datagram_size = 0; - u16_t datagram_offset, datagram_tag; - struct lowpan6_reass_helper *lrh, *lrh_next, *lrh_prev = NULL; - - if (p == NULL) { - return ERR_OK; - } - - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifinoctets, p->tot_len); - - if (p->len != p->tot_len) { - /* for now, this needs a pbuf in one piece */ - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } - - if (lowpan6_parse_iee802154_header(p, &src, &dest) != ERR_OK) { - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } - - /* Check dispatch. */ - puc = (u8_t *)p->payload; - - b = *puc; - - if ((b & 0xf8) == 0xc0) { - /* FRAG1 dispatch. add this packet to reassembly list. */ - datagram_size = ((u16_t)(puc[0] & 0x07) << 8) | (u16_t)puc[1]; - datagram_tag = ((u16_t)puc[2] << 8) | (u16_t)puc[3]; - - /* check for duplicate */ - lrh = lowpan6_data.reass_list; - - while (lrh != NULL) { - uint8_t discard = 0; - lrh_next = lrh->next_packet; - - if ((lrh->sender_addr.addr_len == src.addr_len) && - (memcmp(lrh->sender_addr.addr, src.addr, src.addr_len) == 0)) { - /* address match with packet in reassembly. */ - if ((datagram_tag == lrh->datagram_tag) && (datagram_size == lrh->datagram_size)) { - /* duplicate fragment. */ - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } else { - /* We are receiving the start of a new datagram. Discard old one (incomplete). */ - discard = 1; - } - } - - if (discard) { - dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); - free_reass_datagram(lrh); - } else { - lrh_prev = lrh; - } - - /* Check next datagram in queue. */ - lrh = lrh_next; - } - - pbuf_remove_header(p, 4); /* hide frag1 dispatch */ - - lrh = (struct lowpan6_reass_helper *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct lowpan6_reass_helper)); - - if (lrh == NULL) { - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } - - lrh->sender_addr.addr_len = src.addr_len; - - for (i = 0; i < src.addr_len; i++) { - lrh->sender_addr.addr[i] = src.addr[i]; - } - - lrh->datagram_size = datagram_size; - lrh->datagram_tag = datagram_tag; - lrh->frags = NULL; - - if (*(u8_t *)p->payload == 0x41) { - /* This is a complete IPv6 packet, just skip dispatch byte. */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, 1); /* hide dispatch byte. */ - lrh->reass = p; - } else if ((*(u8_t *)p->payload & 0xe0) == 0x60) { - lrh->reass = lowpan6_decompress(p, datagram_size, LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif), &src, &dest); - - if (lrh->reass == NULL) { - /* decompression failed */ - mem_free(lrh); - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } - } - - /* TODO: handle the case where we already have FRAGN received */ - lrh->next_packet = lowpan6_data.reass_list; - lrh->timer = 2; - lowpan6_data.reass_list = lrh; - - return ERR_OK; - } else if ((b & 0xf8) == 0xe0) { - /* FRAGN dispatch, find packet being reassembled. */ - datagram_size = ((u16_t)(puc[0] & 0x07) << 8) | (u16_t)puc[1]; - datagram_tag = ((u16_t)puc[2] << 8) | (u16_t)puc[3]; - datagram_offset = (u16_t)puc[4] << 3; - pbuf_remove_header(p, 4); /* hide frag1 dispatch but keep datagram offset for reassembly */ - - for (lrh = lowpan6_data.reass_list; lrh != NULL; lrh_prev = lrh, lrh = lrh->next_packet) { - if ((lrh->sender_addr.addr_len == src.addr_len) && - (memcmp(lrh->sender_addr.addr, src.addr, src.addr_len) == 0) && - (datagram_tag == lrh->datagram_tag) && - (datagram_size == lrh->datagram_size)) { - break; - } - } - - if (lrh == NULL) { - /* rogue fragment */ - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } - - /* Insert new pbuf into list of fragments. Each fragment is a pbuf, - this only works for unchained pbufs. */ - LWIP_ASSERT("p->next == NULL", p->next == NULL); - - if (lrh->reass != NULL) { - /* FRAG1 already received, check this offset against first len */ - if (datagram_offset < lrh->reass->len) { - /* fragment overlap, discard old fragments */ - dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); - free_reass_datagram(lrh); - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } - } - - if (lrh->frags == NULL) { - /* first FRAGN */ - lrh->frags = p; - } else { - /* find the correct place to insert */ - struct pbuf *q, *last; - u16_t new_frag_len = p->len - 1; /* p->len includes datagram_offset byte */ - - for (q = lrh->frags, last = NULL; q != NULL; last = q, q = q->next) { - u16_t q_datagram_offset = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[0] << 3; - u16_t q_frag_len = q->len - 1; - - if (datagram_offset < q_datagram_offset) { - if (datagram_offset + new_frag_len > q_datagram_offset) { - /* overlap, discard old fragments */ - dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); - free_reass_datagram(lrh); - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } - - /* insert here */ - break; - } else if (datagram_offset == q_datagram_offset) { - if (q_frag_len != new_frag_len) { - /* fragment mismatch, discard old fragments */ - dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); - free_reass_datagram(lrh); - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } - - /* duplicate, ignore */ - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - } - - /* insert fragment */ - if (last == NULL) { - lrh->frags = p; - } else { - last->next = p; - p->next = q; - } - } - - /* check if all fragments were received */ - if (lrh->reass) { - u16_t offset = lrh->reass->len; - struct pbuf *q; - - for (q = lrh->frags; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - u16_t q_datagram_offset = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[0] << 3; - - if (q_datagram_offset != offset) { - /* not complete, wait for more fragments */ - return ERR_OK; - } - - offset += q->len - 1; - } - - if (offset == datagram_size) { - /* all fragments received, combine pbufs */ - u16_t datagram_left = datagram_size - lrh->reass->len; - - for (q = lrh->frags; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - /* hide datagram_offset byte now */ - pbuf_remove_header(q, 1); - q->tot_len = datagram_left; - datagram_left -= q->len; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("datagram_left == 0", datagram_left == 0); - q = lrh->reass; - q->tot_len = datagram_size; - q->next = lrh->frags; - lrh->frags = NULL; - lrh->reass = NULL; - dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); - mem_free(lrh); - - /* @todo: distinguish unicast/multicast */ - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinucastpkts); - return ip6_input(q, netif); - } - } - - /* pbuf enqueued, waiting for more fragments */ - return ERR_OK; - } else { - if (b == 0x41) { - /* This is a complete IPv6 packet, just skip dispatch byte. */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, 1); /* hide dispatch byte. */ - } else if ((b & 0xe0) == 0x60) { - /* IPv6 headers are compressed using IPHC. */ - p = lowpan6_decompress(p, datagram_size, LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif), &src, &dest); - - if (p == NULL) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifindiscards); - return ERR_OK; - } - } else { - goto lowpan6_input_discard; - } - - /* @todo: distinguish unicast/multicast */ - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinucastpkts); - - return ip6_input(p, netif); - } - -lowpan6_input_discard: - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifindiscards); - pbuf_free(p); - /* always return ERR_OK here to prevent the caller freeing the pbuf */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup sixlowpan - */ -err_t lowpan6_if_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - netif->name[0] = 'L'; - netif->name[1] = '6'; - netif->output_ip6 = lowpan6_output; - - MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_other, 0); - - /* maximum transfer unit */ - netif->mtu = 1280; - - /* broadcast capability */ - netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST /* | NETIF_FLAG_LOWPAN6 */; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup sixlowpan - * Set PAN ID - */ -err_t lowpan6_set_pan_id(u16_t pan_id) -{ - lowpan6_data.ieee_802154_pan_id = pan_id; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if !NO_SYS -/** - * @ingroup sixlowpan - * Pass a received packet to tcpip_thread for input processing - * - * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the - * IEEE 802.15.4 header. - * @param inp the network interface on which the packet was received - */ -err_t tcpip_6lowpan_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - return tcpip_inpkt(p, inp, lowpan6_input); -} -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * + * 6LowPAN output for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. Fragments packets to 6LowPAN units. + * + * This implementation aims to conform to IEEE 802.15.4(-2015), RFC 4944 and RFC 6282. + * @todo: RFC 6775. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +/** + * @defgroup sixlowpan 6LoWPAN (RFC4944) + * @ingroup netifs + * 6LowPAN netif implementation + */ + +#include "netif/lowpan6.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "netif/ieee802154.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_802154_HW_CRC +#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(buf, len) 0 +#else +#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(buf, len) LWIP_6LOWPAN_CALC_CRC(buf, len) +#endif + +/** This is a helper struct for reassembly of fragments + * (IEEE 802.15.4 limits to 127 bytes) + */ +struct lowpan6_reass_helper { + struct lowpan6_reass_helper *next_packet; + struct pbuf *reass; + struct pbuf *frags; + u8_t timer; + struct lowpan6_link_addr sender_addr; + u16_t datagram_size; + u16_t datagram_tag; +}; + +/** This struct keeps track of per-netif state */ +struct lowpan6_ieee802154_data { + /** fragment reassembly list */ + struct lowpan6_reass_helper *reass_list; +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 + /** address context for compression */ + ip6_addr_t lowpan6_context[LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS]; +#endif + /** Datagram Tag for fragmentation */ + u16_t tx_datagram_tag; + /** local PAN ID for IEEE 802.15.4 header */ + u16_t ieee_802154_pan_id; + /** Sequence Number for IEEE 802.15.4 transmission */ + u8_t tx_frame_seq_num; +}; + +/* Maximum frame size is 127 bytes minus CRC size */ +#define LOWPAN6_MAX_PAYLOAD (127 - 2) + +/** Currently, this state is global, since there's only one 6LoWPAN netif */ +static struct lowpan6_ieee802154_data lowpan6_data; + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 +#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif) lowpan6_data.lowpan6_context +#else +#define LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif) NULL +#endif + +static const struct lowpan6_link_addr ieee_802154_broadcast = { 2, { 0xff, 0xff } }; + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS +static struct lowpan6_link_addr short_mac_addr = { 2, { 0, 0 } }; +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ + +/* IEEE 802.15.4 specific functions: */ + +/** Write the IEEE 802.15.4 header that encapsulates the 6LoWPAN frame. + * Src and dst PAN IDs are filled with the ID set by @ref lowpan6_set_pan_id. + * + * Since the length is variable: + * @returns the header length + */ +static u8_t lowpan6_write_iee802154_header(struct ieee_802154_hdr *hdr, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, + const struct lowpan6_link_addr *dst) +{ + u8_t ieee_header_len; + u8_t *buffer; + u8_t i; + u16_t fc; + + fc = IEEE_802154_FC_FT_DATA; /* send data packet (2003 frame version) */ + fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_PANID_COMPR; /* set PAN ID compression, for now src and dst PANs are equal */ + + if (dst != &ieee_802154_broadcast) { + fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_ACK_REQ; /* data packet, no broadcast: ack required. */ + } + + if (dst->addr_len == 2) { + fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_SHORT; + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid dst address length", dst->addr_len == 8); + fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_EXT; + } + + if (src->addr_len == 2) { + fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_SHORT; + } else { + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid src address length", src->addr_len == 8); + fc |= IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_EXT; + } + + hdr->frame_control = fc; + hdr->sequence_number = lowpan6_data.tx_frame_seq_num++; + hdr->destination_pan_id = lowpan6_data.ieee_802154_pan_id; /* pan id */ + + buffer = (u8_t *)hdr; + ieee_header_len = 5; + i = dst->addr_len; + + /* reverse memcpy of dst addr */ + while (i-- > 0) { + buffer[ieee_header_len++] = dst->addr[i]; + } + + /* Source PAN ID skipped due to PAN ID Compression */ + i = src->addr_len; + + /* reverse memcpy of src addr */ + while (i-- > 0) { + buffer[ieee_header_len++] = src->addr[i]; + } + + return ieee_header_len; +} + +/** Parse the IEEE 802.15.4 header from a pbuf. + * If successful, the header is hidden from the pbuf. + * + * PAN IDs and seuqence number are not checked + * + * @param p input pbuf, p->payload pointing at the IEEE 802.15.4 header + * @param src pointer to source address filled from the header + * @param dest pointer to destination address filled from the header + * @returns ERR_OK if successful + */ +static err_t lowpan6_parse_iee802154_header(struct pbuf *p, struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, + struct lowpan6_link_addr *dest) +{ + u8_t *puc; + s8_t i; + u16_t frame_control, addr_mode; + u16_t datagram_offset; + + /* Parse IEEE 802.15.4 header */ + puc = (u8_t *)p->payload; + frame_control = puc[0] | (puc[1] << 8); + datagram_offset = 2; + + if (frame_control & IEEE_802154_FC_SEQNO_SUPPR) { + if (IEEE_802154_FC_FRAME_VERSION_GET(frame_control) <= 1) { + /* sequence number suppressed, this is not valid for versions 0/1 */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + } else { + datagram_offset++; + } + + datagram_offset += 2; /* Skip destination PAN ID */ + addr_mode = frame_control & IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_MASK; + + if (addr_mode == IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_EXT) { + /* extended address (64 bit) */ + dest->addr_len = 8; + + /* reverse memcpy: */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + dest->addr[i] = puc[datagram_offset + 7 - i]; + } + + datagram_offset += 8; + } else if (addr_mode == IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_SHORT) { + /* short address (16 bit) */ + dest->addr_len = 2; + /* reverse memcpy: */ + dest->addr[0] = puc[datagram_offset + 1]; + dest->addr[1] = puc[datagram_offset]; + datagram_offset += 2; + } else { + /* unsupported address mode (do we need "no address"?) */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (!(frame_control & IEEE_802154_FC_PANID_COMPR)) { + /* No PAN ID compression, skip source PAN ID */ + datagram_offset += 2; + } + + addr_mode = frame_control & IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_MASK; + + if (addr_mode == IEEE_802154_FC_SRC_ADDR_MODE_EXT) { + /* extended address (64 bit) */ + src->addr_len = 8; + + /* reverse memcpy: */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + src->addr[i] = puc[datagram_offset + 7 - i]; + } + + datagram_offset += 8; + } else if (addr_mode == IEEE_802154_FC_DST_ADDR_MODE_SHORT) { + /* short address (16 bit) */ + src->addr_len = 2; + src->addr[0] = puc[datagram_offset + 1]; + src->addr[1] = puc[datagram_offset]; + datagram_offset += 2; + } else { + /* unsupported address mode (do we need "no address"?) */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* hide IEEE802.15.4 header. */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(p, datagram_offset)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Calculate the 16-bit CRC as required by IEEE 802.15.4 */ +u16_t lowpan6_calc_crc(const void *buf, u16_t len) +{ +#define CCITT_POLY_16 0x8408U + u16_t i; + u8_t b; + u16_t crc = 0; + const u8_t *p = (const u8_t *)buf; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + u8_t data = *p; + + for (b = 0U; b < 8U; b++) { + if (((data ^ crc) & 1) != 0) { + crc = (u16_t)((crc >> 1) ^ CCITT_POLY_16); + } else { + crc = (u16_t)(crc >> 1); + } + + data = (u8_t)(data >> 1); + } + + p++; + } + + return crc; +} + +/* Fragmentation specific functions: */ + +static void free_reass_datagram(struct lowpan6_reass_helper *lrh) +{ + if (lrh->reass) { + pbuf_free(lrh->reass); + } + + if (lrh->frags) { + pbuf_free(lrh->frags); + } + + mem_free(lrh); +} + +/** + * Removes a datagram from the reassembly queue. + **/ +static void dequeue_datagram(struct lowpan6_reass_helper *lrh, struct lowpan6_reass_helper *prev) +{ + if (lowpan6_data.reass_list == lrh) { + lowpan6_data.reass_list = lowpan6_data.reass_list->next_packet; + } else { + /* it wasn't the first, so it must have a valid 'prev' */ + LWIP_ASSERT("sanity check linked list", prev != NULL); + prev->next_packet = lrh->next_packet; + } +} + +/** + * Periodic timer for 6LowPAN functions: + * + * - Remove incomplete/old packets + */ +void lowpan6_tmr(void) +{ + struct lowpan6_reass_helper *lrh, *lrh_next, *lrh_prev = NULL; + + lrh = lowpan6_data.reass_list; + + while (lrh != NULL) { + lrh_next = lrh->next_packet; + + if ((--lrh->timer) == 0) { + dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); + free_reass_datagram(lrh); + } else { + lrh_prev = lrh; + } + + lrh = lrh_next; + } +} + +/* + * Encapsulates data into IEEE 802.15.4 frames. + * Fragments an IPv6 datagram into 6LowPAN units, which fit into IEEE 802.15.4 frames. + * If configured, will compress IPv6 and or UDP headers. + * */ +static err_t lowpan6_frag(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *dst) +{ + struct pbuf *p_frag; + u16_t frag_len, remaining_len, max_data_len; + u8_t *buffer; + u8_t ieee_header_len; + u8_t lowpan6_header_len; + u8_t hidden_header_len; + u16_t crc; + u16_t datagram_offset; + err_t err = ERR_IF; + + LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_frag: netif->linkoutput not set", netif->linkoutput != NULL); + + /* We'll use a dedicated pbuf for building 6LowPAN fragments. */ + p_frag = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 127, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p_frag == NULL) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece", p_frag->len == p_frag->tot_len); + + /* Write IEEE 802.15.4 header. */ + buffer = (u8_t *)p_frag->payload; + ieee_header_len = lowpan6_write_iee802154_header((struct ieee_802154_hdr *)buffer, src, dst); + LWIP_ASSERT("ieee_header_len < p_frag->len", ieee_header_len < p_frag->len); + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC + /* Perform 6LowPAN IPv6 header compression according to RFC 6282 */ + /* do the header compression (this does NOT copy any non-compressed data) */ + err = lowpan6_compress_headers(netif, (u8_t *)p->payload, p->len, + &buffer[ieee_header_len], p_frag->len - ieee_header_len, &lowpan6_header_len, + &hidden_header_len, LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif), src, dst); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); + pbuf_free(p_frag); + return err; + } + + pbuf_remove_header(p, hidden_header_len); + +#else /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ + /* Send uncompressed IPv6 header with appropriate dispatch byte. */ + lowpan6_header_len = 1; + buffer[ieee_header_len] = 0x41; /* IPv6 dispatch */ +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ + + /* Calculate remaining packet length */ + remaining_len = p->tot_len; + + if (remaining_len > 0x7FF) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); + /* datagram_size must fit into 11 bit */ + pbuf_free(p_frag); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* Fragment, or 1 packet? */ + max_data_len = LOWPAN6_MAX_PAYLOAD - ieee_header_len - lowpan6_header_len; + + if (remaining_len > max_data_len) { + u16_t data_len; + /* We must move the 6LowPAN header to make room for the FRAG header. */ + memmove(&buffer[ieee_header_len + 4], &buffer[ieee_header_len], lowpan6_header_len); + + /* Now we need to fragment the packet. FRAG1 header first */ + buffer[ieee_header_len] = 0xc0 | (((p->tot_len + hidden_header_len) >> 8) & 0x7); + buffer[ieee_header_len + 1] = (p->tot_len + hidden_header_len) & 0xff; + + lowpan6_data.tx_datagram_tag++; + buffer[ieee_header_len + 2] = (lowpan6_data.tx_datagram_tag >> 8) & 0xff; + buffer[ieee_header_len + 3] = lowpan6_data.tx_datagram_tag & 0xff; + + /* Fragment follows. */ + data_len = (max_data_len - 4) & 0xf8; + frag_len = data_len + lowpan6_header_len; + + pbuf_copy_partial(p, buffer + ieee_header_len + lowpan6_header_len + 4, frag_len - lowpan6_header_len, 0); + remaining_len -= frag_len - lowpan6_header_len; + /* datagram offset holds the offset before compression */ + datagram_offset = frag_len - lowpan6_header_len + hidden_header_len; + LWIP_ASSERT("datagram offset must be a multiple of 8", (datagram_offset & 7) == 0); + + /* Calculate frame length */ + p_frag->len = p_frag->tot_len = ieee_header_len + 4 + frag_len + 2; /* add 2 bytes for crc*/ + + /* 2 bytes CRC */ + crc = LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(p_frag->payload, p_frag->len - 2); + pbuf_take_at(p_frag, &crc, 2, p_frag->len - 2); + + /* send the packet */ + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p_frag->tot_len); + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("lowpan6_send: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); + err = netif->linkoutput(netif, p_frag); + + while ((remaining_len > 0) && (err == ERR_OK)) { + struct ieee_802154_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee_802154_hdr *)buffer; + /* new frame, new seq num for ACK */ + hdr->sequence_number = lowpan6_data.tx_frame_seq_num++; + + buffer[ieee_header_len] |= 0x20; /* Change FRAG1 to FRAGN */ + + LWIP_ASSERT("datagram offset must be a multiple of 8", (datagram_offset & 7) == 0); + buffer[ieee_header_len + 4] = (u8_t)(datagram_offset >> 3); /* datagram offset in FRAGN header (datagram_offset is max. 11 bit) */ + + frag_len = (127 - ieee_header_len - 5 - 2) & 0xf8; + + if (frag_len > remaining_len) { + frag_len = remaining_len; + } + + pbuf_copy_partial(p, buffer + ieee_header_len + 5, frag_len, p->tot_len - remaining_len); + remaining_len -= frag_len; + datagram_offset += frag_len; + + /* Calculate frame length */ + p_frag->len = p_frag->tot_len = frag_len + 5 + ieee_header_len + 2; + + /* 2 bytes CRC */ + crc = LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(p_frag->payload, p_frag->len - 2); + pbuf_take_at(p_frag, &crc, 2, p_frag->len - 2); + + /* send the packet */ + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p_frag->tot_len); + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("lowpan6_send: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); + err = netif->linkoutput(netif, p_frag); + } + } else { + /* It fits in one frame. */ + frag_len = remaining_len; + + /* Copy IPv6 packet */ + pbuf_copy_partial(p, buffer + ieee_header_len + lowpan6_header_len, frag_len, 0); + remaining_len = 0; + + /* Calculate frame length */ + p_frag->len = p_frag->tot_len = frag_len + lowpan6_header_len + ieee_header_len + 2; + LWIP_ASSERT("", p_frag->len <= 127); + + /* 2 bytes CRC */ + crc = LWIP_6LOWPAN_DO_CALC_CRC(p_frag->payload, p_frag->len - 2); + pbuf_take_at(p_frag, &crc, 2, p_frag->len - 2); + + /* send the packet */ + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p_frag->tot_len); + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("lowpan6_send: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); + err = netif->linkoutput(netif, p_frag); + } + + pbuf_free(p_frag); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup sixlowpan + * Set context + */ +err_t lowpan6_set_context(u8_t idx, const ip6_addr_t *context) +{ +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 + + if (idx >= LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + IP6_ADDR_ZONECHECK(context); + + ip6_addr_set(&lowpan6_data.lowpan6_context[idx], context); + + return ERR_OK; +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(idx); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(context); + return ERR_ARG; +#endif +} + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS +/** + * @ingroup sixlowpan + * Set short address + */ +err_t lowpan6_set_short_addr(u8_t addr_high, u8_t addr_low) +{ + short_mac_addr.addr[0] = addr_high; + short_mac_addr.addr[1] = addr_low; + + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ + +/* Create IEEE 802.15.4 address from netif address */ +static err_t lowpan6_hwaddr_to_addr(struct netif *netif, struct lowpan6_link_addr *addr) +{ + addr->addr_len = 8; + + if (netif->hwaddr_len == 8) { + LWIP_ERROR("NETIF_MAX_HWADDR_LEN >= 8 required", sizeof(netif->hwaddr) >= 8, return ERR_VAL;); + SMEMCPY(addr->addr, netif->hwaddr, 8); + } else if (netif->hwaddr_len == 6) { + /* Copy from MAC-48 */ + SMEMCPY(addr->addr, netif->hwaddr, 3); + addr->addr[3] = addr->addr[4] = 0xff; + SMEMCPY(&addr->addr[5], &netif->hwaddr[3], 3); + } else { + /* Invalid address length, don't know how to convert this */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup sixlowpan + * Resolve and fill-in IEEE 802.15.4 address header for outgoing IPv6 packet. + * + * Perform Header Compression and fragment if necessary. + * + * @param netif The lwIP network interface which the IP packet will be sent on. + * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. + * @param ip6addr The IP address of the packet destination. + * + * @return err_t + */ +err_t lowpan6_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + err_t result; + const u8_t *hwaddr; + struct lowpan6_link_addr src, dest; +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS + ip6_addr_t ip6_src; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6_hdr; +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS + /* Check if we can compress source address (use aligned copy) */ + ip6_hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)q->payload; + ip6_addr_copy_from_packed(ip6_src, ip6_hdr->src); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(&ip6_src, IP6_UNICAST, netif); + + if (lowpan6_get_address_mode(&ip6_src, &short_mac_addr) == 3) { + src.addr_len = 2; + src.addr[0] = short_mac_addr.addr[0]; + src.addr[1] = short_mac_addr.addr[1]; + } else +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ + { + result = lowpan6_hwaddr_to_addr(netif, &src); + + if (result != ERR_OK) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); + return result; + } + } + + /* multicast destination IP address? */ + if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip6addr)) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutnucastpkts); + /* We need to send to the broadcast address.*/ + return lowpan6_frag(netif, q, &src, &ieee_802154_broadcast); + } + + /* We have a unicast destination IP address */ + /* @todo anycast? */ + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS + + if (src.addr_len == 2) { + /* If source address was compressable to short_mac_addr, and dest has same subnet and + * is also compressable to 2-bytes, assume we can infer dest as a short address too. */ + dest.addr_len = 2; + dest.addr[0] = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[38]; + dest.addr[1] = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[39]; + + if ((src.addr_len == 2) && (ip6_addr_netcmp_zoneless(&ip6_hdr->src, &ip6_hdr->dest)) && + (lowpan6_get_address_mode(ip6addr, &dest) == 3)) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutucastpkts); + return lowpan6_frag(netif, q, &src, &dest); + } + } + +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_INFER_SHORT_ADDRESS */ + + /* Ask ND6 what to do with the packet. */ + result = nd6_get_next_hop_addr_or_queue(netif, q, ip6addr, &hwaddr); + + if (result != ERR_OK) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); + return result; + } + + /* If no hardware address is returned, nd6 has queued the packet for later. */ + if (hwaddr == NULL) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Send out the packet using the returned hardware address. */ + dest.addr_len = netif->hwaddr_len; + /* XXX: Inferring the length of the source address from the destination address + * is not correct for IEEE 802.15.4, but currently we don't get this information + * from the neighbor cache */ + SMEMCPY(dest.addr, hwaddr, netif->hwaddr_len); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutucastpkts); + return lowpan6_frag(netif, q, &src, &dest); +} +/** + * @ingroup sixlowpan + * NETIF input function: don't free the input pbuf when returning != ERR_OK! + */ +err_t lowpan6_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) +{ + u8_t *puc, b; + s8_t i; + struct lowpan6_link_addr src, dest; + u16_t datagram_size = 0; + u16_t datagram_offset, datagram_tag; + struct lowpan6_reass_helper *lrh, *lrh_next, *lrh_prev = NULL; + + if (p == NULL) { + return ERR_OK; + } + + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifinoctets, p->tot_len); + + if (p->len != p->tot_len) { + /* for now, this needs a pbuf in one piece */ + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } + + if (lowpan6_parse_iee802154_header(p, &src, &dest) != ERR_OK) { + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } + + /* Check dispatch. */ + puc = (u8_t *)p->payload; + + b = *puc; + + if ((b & 0xf8) == 0xc0) { + /* FRAG1 dispatch. add this packet to reassembly list. */ + datagram_size = ((u16_t)(puc[0] & 0x07) << 8) | (u16_t)puc[1]; + datagram_tag = ((u16_t)puc[2] << 8) | (u16_t)puc[3]; + + /* check for duplicate */ + lrh = lowpan6_data.reass_list; + + while (lrh != NULL) { + uint8_t discard = 0; + lrh_next = lrh->next_packet; + + if ((lrh->sender_addr.addr_len == src.addr_len) && + (memcmp(lrh->sender_addr.addr, src.addr, src.addr_len) == 0)) { + /* address match with packet in reassembly. */ + if ((datagram_tag == lrh->datagram_tag) && (datagram_size == lrh->datagram_size)) { + /* duplicate fragment. */ + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } else { + /* We are receiving the start of a new datagram. Discard old one (incomplete). */ + discard = 1; + } + } + + if (discard) { + dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); + free_reass_datagram(lrh); + } else { + lrh_prev = lrh; + } + + /* Check next datagram in queue. */ + lrh = lrh_next; + } + + pbuf_remove_header(p, 4); /* hide frag1 dispatch */ + + lrh = (struct lowpan6_reass_helper *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct lowpan6_reass_helper)); + + if (lrh == NULL) { + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } + + lrh->sender_addr.addr_len = src.addr_len; + + for (i = 0; i < src.addr_len; i++) { + lrh->sender_addr.addr[i] = src.addr[i]; + } + + lrh->datagram_size = datagram_size; + lrh->datagram_tag = datagram_tag; + lrh->frags = NULL; + + if (*(u8_t *)p->payload == 0x41) { + /* This is a complete IPv6 packet, just skip dispatch byte. */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, 1); /* hide dispatch byte. */ + lrh->reass = p; + } else if ((*(u8_t *)p->payload & 0xe0) == 0x60) { + lrh->reass = lowpan6_decompress(p, datagram_size, LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif), &src, &dest); + + if (lrh->reass == NULL) { + /* decompression failed */ + mem_free(lrh); + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } + } + + /* TODO: handle the case where we already have FRAGN received */ + lrh->next_packet = lowpan6_data.reass_list; + lrh->timer = 2; + lowpan6_data.reass_list = lrh; + + return ERR_OK; + } else if ((b & 0xf8) == 0xe0) { + /* FRAGN dispatch, find packet being reassembled. */ + datagram_size = ((u16_t)(puc[0] & 0x07) << 8) | (u16_t)puc[1]; + datagram_tag = ((u16_t)puc[2] << 8) | (u16_t)puc[3]; + datagram_offset = (u16_t)puc[4] << 3; + pbuf_remove_header(p, 4); /* hide frag1 dispatch but keep datagram offset for reassembly */ + + for (lrh = lowpan6_data.reass_list; lrh != NULL; lrh_prev = lrh, lrh = lrh->next_packet) { + if ((lrh->sender_addr.addr_len == src.addr_len) && + (memcmp(lrh->sender_addr.addr, src.addr, src.addr_len) == 0) && + (datagram_tag == lrh->datagram_tag) && + (datagram_size == lrh->datagram_size)) { + break; + } + } + + if (lrh == NULL) { + /* rogue fragment */ + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } + + /* Insert new pbuf into list of fragments. Each fragment is a pbuf, + this only works for unchained pbufs. */ + LWIP_ASSERT("p->next == NULL", p->next == NULL); + + if (lrh->reass != NULL) { + /* FRAG1 already received, check this offset against first len */ + if (datagram_offset < lrh->reass->len) { + /* fragment overlap, discard old fragments */ + dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); + free_reass_datagram(lrh); + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } + } + + if (lrh->frags == NULL) { + /* first FRAGN */ + lrh->frags = p; + } else { + /* find the correct place to insert */ + struct pbuf *q, *last; + u16_t new_frag_len = p->len - 1; /* p->len includes datagram_offset byte */ + + for (q = lrh->frags, last = NULL; q != NULL; last = q, q = q->next) { + u16_t q_datagram_offset = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[0] << 3; + u16_t q_frag_len = q->len - 1; + + if (datagram_offset < q_datagram_offset) { + if (datagram_offset + new_frag_len > q_datagram_offset) { + /* overlap, discard old fragments */ + dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); + free_reass_datagram(lrh); + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } + + /* insert here */ + break; + } else if (datagram_offset == q_datagram_offset) { + if (q_frag_len != new_frag_len) { + /* fragment mismatch, discard old fragments */ + dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); + free_reass_datagram(lrh); + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } + + /* duplicate, ignore */ + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + /* insert fragment */ + if (last == NULL) { + lrh->frags = p; + } else { + last->next = p; + p->next = q; + } + } + + /* check if all fragments were received */ + if (lrh->reass) { + u16_t offset = lrh->reass->len; + struct pbuf *q; + + for (q = lrh->frags; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + u16_t q_datagram_offset = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[0] << 3; + + if (q_datagram_offset != offset) { + /* not complete, wait for more fragments */ + return ERR_OK; + } + + offset += q->len - 1; + } + + if (offset == datagram_size) { + /* all fragments received, combine pbufs */ + u16_t datagram_left = datagram_size - lrh->reass->len; + + for (q = lrh->frags; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + /* hide datagram_offset byte now */ + pbuf_remove_header(q, 1); + q->tot_len = datagram_left; + datagram_left -= q->len; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("datagram_left == 0", datagram_left == 0); + q = lrh->reass; + q->tot_len = datagram_size; + q->next = lrh->frags; + lrh->frags = NULL; + lrh->reass = NULL; + dequeue_datagram(lrh, lrh_prev); + mem_free(lrh); + + /* @todo: distinguish unicast/multicast */ + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinucastpkts); + return ip6_input(q, netif); + } + } + + /* pbuf enqueued, waiting for more fragments */ + return ERR_OK; + } else { + if (b == 0x41) { + /* This is a complete IPv6 packet, just skip dispatch byte. */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, 1); /* hide dispatch byte. */ + } else if ((b & 0xe0) == 0x60) { + /* IPv6 headers are compressed using IPHC. */ + p = lowpan6_decompress(p, datagram_size, LWIP_6LOWPAN_CONTEXTS(netif), &src, &dest); + + if (p == NULL) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifindiscards); + return ERR_OK; + } + } else { + goto lowpan6_input_discard; + } + + /* @todo: distinguish unicast/multicast */ + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinucastpkts); + + return ip6_input(p, netif); + } + +lowpan6_input_discard: + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifindiscards); + pbuf_free(p); + /* always return ERR_OK here to prevent the caller freeing the pbuf */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup sixlowpan + */ +err_t lowpan6_if_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + netif->name[0] = 'L'; + netif->name[1] = '6'; + netif->output_ip6 = lowpan6_output; + + MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_other, 0); + + /* maximum transfer unit */ + netif->mtu = 1280; + + /* broadcast capability */ + netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST /* | NETIF_FLAG_LOWPAN6 */; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup sixlowpan + * Set PAN ID + */ +err_t lowpan6_set_pan_id(u16_t pan_id) +{ + lowpan6_data.ieee_802154_pan_id = pan_id; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if !NO_SYS +/** + * @ingroup sixlowpan + * Pass a received packet to tcpip_thread for input processing + * + * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the + * IEEE 802.15.4 header. + * @param inp the network interface on which the packet was received + */ +err_t tcpip_6lowpan_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + return tcpip_inpkt(p, inp, lowpan6_input); +} +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_ble.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_ble.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_ble.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_ble.c index 82c55102..2636a8ea 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_ble.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_ble.c @@ -1,449 +1,449 @@ -/** - * @file - * 6LowPAN over BLE output for IPv6 (RFC7668). -*/ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Benjamin Aigner - * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. , Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * Author: Benjamin Aigner - * - * Based on the original 6lowpan implementation of lwIP ( @see 6lowpan.c) - */ - -/** - * @defgroup rfc7668if 6LoWPAN over BLE (RFC7668) - * @ingroup netifs - * This file implements a RFC7668 implementation for 6LoWPAN over - * Bluetooth Low Energy. The specification is very similar to 6LoWPAN, - * so most of the code is re-used. - * Compared to 6LoWPAN, much functionality is already implemented in - * lower BLE layers (fragmenting, session management,...). - * - * Usage: - * - add this netif - * - don't add IPv4 addresses (no IPv4 support in RFC7668), pass 'NULL','NULL','NULL' - * - use the BLE to EUI64 conversation util to create an IPv6 link-local address from the BLE MAC (@ref ble_addr_to_eui64) - * - input function: @ref rfc7668_input - * - set the link output function, which transmits output data to an established L2CAP channel - * - If data arrives (HCI event "L2CAP_DATA_PACKET"): - * - allocate a @ref PBUF_RAW buffer - * - let the pbuf struct point to the incoming data or copy it to the buffer - * - call netif->input - * - * @todo: - * - further testing - * - support compression contexts - * - support multiple addresses - * - support multicast - * - support neighbor discovery - */ - -#include "netif/lowpan6_ble.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" - -#include - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 -/** context memory, containing IPv6 addresses */ -static ip6_addr_t rfc7668_context[LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS]; -#else -#define rfc7668_context NULL -#endif - -static struct lowpan6_link_addr rfc7668_local_addr; -static struct lowpan6_link_addr rfc7668_peer_addr; - -/** - * @ingroup rfc7668if - * convert BT address to EUI64 addr - * - * This method converts a Bluetooth MAC address to an EUI64 address, - * which is used within IPv6 communication - * - * @param dst IPv6 destination space - * @param src BLE MAC address source - * @param public_addr If the LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS - * option is set, bit 0x02 will be set if param=0 (no public addr); cleared otherwise - * - * @see LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS - */ -void ble_addr_to_eui64(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, int public_addr) -{ - /* according to RFC7668 ch 3.2.2. */ - memcpy(dst, src, 3); - dst[3] = 0xFF; - dst[4] = 0xFE; - memcpy(&dst[5], &src[3], 3); -#if LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS - - if (public_addr) { - dst[0] &= ~0x02; - } else { - dst[0] |= 0x02; - } - -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(public_addr); -#endif -} - -/** - * @ingroup rfc7668if - * convert EUI64 address to Bluetooth MAC addr - * - * This method converts an EUI64 address to a Bluetooth MAC address, - * - * @param dst BLE MAC address destination - * @param src IPv6 source - * - */ -void eui64_to_ble_addr(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src) -{ - /* according to RFC7668 ch 3.2.2. */ - memcpy(dst, src, 3); - memcpy(&dst[3], &src[5], 3); -} - -/** Set an address used for stateful compression. - * This expects an address of 6 or 8 bytes. - */ -static err_t rfc7668_set_addr(struct lowpan6_link_addr *addr, const u8_t *in_addr, size_t in_addr_len, int is_mac_48, int is_public_addr) -{ - if ((in_addr == NULL) || (addr == NULL)) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (is_mac_48) { - if (in_addr_len != 6) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - addr->addr_len = 8; - ble_addr_to_eui64(addr->addr, in_addr, is_public_addr); - } else { - if (in_addr_len != 8) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - addr->addr_len = 8; - memcpy(addr->addr, in_addr, 8); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Set the local address used for stateful compression. - * This expects an address of 8 bytes. - */ -err_t rfc7668_set_local_addr_eui64(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *local_addr, size_t local_addr_len) -{ - /* netif not used for now, the address is stored globally... */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - return rfc7668_set_addr(&rfc7668_local_addr, local_addr, local_addr_len, 0, 0); -} - -/** Set the local address used for stateful compression. - * This expects an address of 6 bytes. - */ -err_t rfc7668_set_local_addr_mac48(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *local_addr, size_t local_addr_len, int is_public_addr) -{ - /* netif not used for now, the address is stored globally... */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - return rfc7668_set_addr(&rfc7668_local_addr, local_addr, local_addr_len, 1, is_public_addr); -} - -/** Set the peer address used for stateful compression. - * This expects an address of 8 bytes. - */ -err_t rfc7668_set_peer_addr_eui64(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *peer_addr, size_t peer_addr_len) -{ - /* netif not used for now, the address is stored globally... */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - return rfc7668_set_addr(&rfc7668_peer_addr, peer_addr, peer_addr_len, 0, 0); -} - -/** Set the peer address used for stateful compression. - * This expects an address of 6 bytes. - */ -err_t rfc7668_set_peer_addr_mac48(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *peer_addr, size_t peer_addr_len, int is_public_addr) -{ - /* netif not used for now, the address is stored globally... */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - return rfc7668_set_addr(&rfc7668_peer_addr, peer_addr, peer_addr_len, 1, is_public_addr); -} - -/** Encapsulate IPv6 frames for BLE transmission - * - * This method implements the IPv6 header compression: - * *) According to RFC6282 - * *) See Figure 2, contains base format of bit positions - * *) Fragmentation not necessary (done at L2CAP layer of BLE) - * @note Currently the pbuf allocation uses 256 bytes. If longer packets are used (possible due to MTU=1480Bytes), increase it here! - * - * @param p Pbuf struct, containing the payload data - * @param netif Output network interface. Should be of RFC7668 type - * - * @return Same as netif->output. - */ -static err_t rfc7668_compress(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct pbuf *p_frag; - u16_t remaining_len; - u8_t *buffer; - u8_t lowpan6_header_len; - u8_t hidden_header_len; - err_t err; - - LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_frag: netif->linkoutput not set", netif->linkoutput != NULL); - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC - - /* We'll use a dedicated pbuf for building BLE fragments. - * We'll over-allocate it by the bytes saved for header compression. - */ - p_frag = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (p_frag == NULL) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece", p_frag->len == p_frag->tot_len); - - /* Write IP6 header (with IPHC). */ - buffer = (u8_t *)p_frag->payload; - - err = lowpan6_compress_headers(netif, (u8_t *)p->payload, p->len, buffer, p_frag->len, - &lowpan6_header_len, &hidden_header_len, rfc7668_context, &rfc7668_local_addr, &rfc7668_peer_addr); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); - pbuf_free(p_frag); - return err; - } - - pbuf_remove_header(p, hidden_header_len); - - /* Calculate remaining packet length */ - remaining_len = p->tot_len; - - /* Copy IPv6 packet */ - pbuf_copy_partial(p, buffer + lowpan6_header_len, remaining_len, 0); - - /* Calculate frame length */ - p_frag->len = p_frag->tot_len = remaining_len + lowpan6_header_len; - - /* send the packet */ - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p_frag->tot_len); - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("rfc7668_output: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); - err = netif->linkoutput(netif, p_frag); - - pbuf_free(p_frag); - - return err; -#else /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ - /* 6LoWPAN over BLE requires IPHC! */ - return ERR_IF; -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ -} - -/** - * @ingroup rfc7668if - * Set context id IPv6 address - * - * Store one IPv6 address to a given context id. - * - * @param idx Context id - * @param context IPv6 addr for this context - * - * @return ERR_OK (if everything is fine), ERR_ARG (if the context id is out of range), ERR_VAL (if contexts disabled) - */ -err_t rfc7668_set_context(u8_t idx, const ip6_addr_t *context) -{ -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 - - /* check if the ID is possible */ - if (idx >= LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS) { - return ERR_ARG; - } - - /* copy IPv6 address to context storage */ - ip6_addr_set(&rfc7668_context[idx], context); - return ERR_OK; -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(idx); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(context); - return ERR_VAL; -#endif -} - -/** - * @ingroup rfc7668if - * Compress outgoing IPv6 packet and pass it on to netif->linkoutput - * - * @param netif The lwIP network interface which the IP packet will be sent on. - * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. - * @param ip6addr The IP address of the packet destination. - * - * @return See rfc7668_compress - */ -err_t rfc7668_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - /* dst ip6addr is not used here, we only have one peer */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ip6addr); - - return rfc7668_compress(netif, q); -} - -/** - * @ingroup rfc7668if - * Process a received raw payload from an L2CAP channel - * - * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the - * IPv6 header (maybe compressed) - * @param netif the network interface on which the packet was received - * - * @return ERR_OK if everything was fine - */ -err_t rfc7668_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) -{ - u8_t *puc; - - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifinoctets, p->tot_len); - - /* Load first header byte */ - puc = (u8_t *)p->payload; - - /* no IP header compression */ - if (*puc == 0x41) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Completed packet, removing dispatch: 0x%2x \n", *puc)); - /* This is a complete IPv6 packet, just skip header byte. */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, 1); - /* IPHC header compression */ - } else if ((*puc & 0xe0) == 0x60) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Completed packet, decompress dispatch: 0x%2x \n", *puc)); - /* IPv6 headers are compressed using IPHC. */ - p = lowpan6_decompress(p, 0, rfc7668_context, &rfc7668_peer_addr, &rfc7668_local_addr); - - /* if no pbuf is returned, handle as discarded packet */ - if (p == NULL) { - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifindiscards); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* invalid header byte, discard */ - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Completed packet, discarding: 0x%2x \n", *puc)); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifindiscards); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* @todo: distinguish unicast/multicast */ - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinucastpkts); - -#if LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG - { - u16_t i; - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("IPv6 payload:\n")); - - for (i = 0; i < p->len; i++) { - if ((i % 4) == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("\n")); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("%2X ", *((uint8_t *)p->payload + i))); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("\np->len: %d\n", p->len)); - } -#endif - /* pass data to ip6_input */ - return ip6_input(p, netif); -} - -/** - * @ingroup rfc7668if - * Initialize the netif - * - * No flags are used (broadcast not possible, not ethernet, ...) - * The shortname for this netif is "BT" - * - * @param netif the network interface to be initialized as RFC7668 netif - * - * @return ERR_OK if everything went fine - */ -err_t rfc7668_if_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - netif->name[0] = 'b'; - netif->name[1] = 't'; - /* local function as IPv6 output */ - netif->output_ip6 = rfc7668_output; - - MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_other, 0); - - /* maximum transfer unit, set according to RFC7668 ch2.4 */ - netif->mtu = 1280; - - /* no flags set (no broadcast, ethernet,...)*/ - netif->flags = 0; - - /* everything fine */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if !NO_SYS -/** - * Pass a received packet to tcpip_thread for input processing - * - * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the - * IEEE 802.15.4 header. - * @param inp the network interface on which the packet was received - * - * @return see @ref tcpip_inpkt, same return values - */ -err_t tcpip_rfc7668_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - /* send data to upper layer, return the result */ - return tcpip_inpkt(p, inp, rfc7668_input); -} -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * 6LowPAN over BLE output for IPv6 (RFC7668). +*/ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Benjamin Aigner + * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. , Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Author: Benjamin Aigner + * + * Based on the original 6lowpan implementation of lwIP ( @see 6lowpan.c) + */ + +/** + * @defgroup rfc7668if 6LoWPAN over BLE (RFC7668) + * @ingroup netifs + * This file implements a RFC7668 implementation for 6LoWPAN over + * Bluetooth Low Energy. The specification is very similar to 6LoWPAN, + * so most of the code is re-used. + * Compared to 6LoWPAN, much functionality is already implemented in + * lower BLE layers (fragmenting, session management,...). + * + * Usage: + * - add this netif + * - don't add IPv4 addresses (no IPv4 support in RFC7668), pass 'NULL','NULL','NULL' + * - use the BLE to EUI64 conversation util to create an IPv6 link-local address from the BLE MAC (@ref ble_addr_to_eui64) + * - input function: @ref rfc7668_input + * - set the link output function, which transmits output data to an established L2CAP channel + * - If data arrives (HCI event "L2CAP_DATA_PACKET"): + * - allocate a @ref PBUF_RAW buffer + * - let the pbuf struct point to the incoming data or copy it to the buffer + * - call netif->input + * + * @todo: + * - further testing + * - support compression contexts + * - support multiple addresses + * - support multicast + * - support neighbor discovery + */ + +#include "netif/lowpan6_ble.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" + +#include + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 +/** context memory, containing IPv6 addresses */ +static ip6_addr_t rfc7668_context[LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS]; +#else +#define rfc7668_context NULL +#endif + +static struct lowpan6_link_addr rfc7668_local_addr; +static struct lowpan6_link_addr rfc7668_peer_addr; + +/** + * @ingroup rfc7668if + * convert BT address to EUI64 addr + * + * This method converts a Bluetooth MAC address to an EUI64 address, + * which is used within IPv6 communication + * + * @param dst IPv6 destination space + * @param src BLE MAC address source + * @param public_addr If the LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS + * option is set, bit 0x02 will be set if param=0 (no public addr); cleared otherwise + * + * @see LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS + */ +void ble_addr_to_eui64(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, int public_addr) +{ + /* according to RFC7668 ch 3.2.2. */ + memcpy(dst, src, 3); + dst[3] = 0xFF; + dst[4] = 0xFE; + memcpy(&dst[5], &src[3], 3); +#if LWIP_RFC7668_LINUX_WORKAROUND_PUBLIC_ADDRESS + + if (public_addr) { + dst[0] &= ~0x02; + } else { + dst[0] |= 0x02; + } + +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(public_addr); +#endif +} + +/** + * @ingroup rfc7668if + * convert EUI64 address to Bluetooth MAC addr + * + * This method converts an EUI64 address to a Bluetooth MAC address, + * + * @param dst BLE MAC address destination + * @param src IPv6 source + * + */ +void eui64_to_ble_addr(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src) +{ + /* according to RFC7668 ch 3.2.2. */ + memcpy(dst, src, 3); + memcpy(&dst[3], &src[5], 3); +} + +/** Set an address used for stateful compression. + * This expects an address of 6 or 8 bytes. + */ +static err_t rfc7668_set_addr(struct lowpan6_link_addr *addr, const u8_t *in_addr, size_t in_addr_len, int is_mac_48, int is_public_addr) +{ + if ((in_addr == NULL) || (addr == NULL)) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (is_mac_48) { + if (in_addr_len != 6) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + addr->addr_len = 8; + ble_addr_to_eui64(addr->addr, in_addr, is_public_addr); + } else { + if (in_addr_len != 8) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + addr->addr_len = 8; + memcpy(addr->addr, in_addr, 8); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Set the local address used for stateful compression. + * This expects an address of 8 bytes. + */ +err_t rfc7668_set_local_addr_eui64(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *local_addr, size_t local_addr_len) +{ + /* netif not used for now, the address is stored globally... */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + return rfc7668_set_addr(&rfc7668_local_addr, local_addr, local_addr_len, 0, 0); +} + +/** Set the local address used for stateful compression. + * This expects an address of 6 bytes. + */ +err_t rfc7668_set_local_addr_mac48(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *local_addr, size_t local_addr_len, int is_public_addr) +{ + /* netif not used for now, the address is stored globally... */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + return rfc7668_set_addr(&rfc7668_local_addr, local_addr, local_addr_len, 1, is_public_addr); +} + +/** Set the peer address used for stateful compression. + * This expects an address of 8 bytes. + */ +err_t rfc7668_set_peer_addr_eui64(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *peer_addr, size_t peer_addr_len) +{ + /* netif not used for now, the address is stored globally... */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + return rfc7668_set_addr(&rfc7668_peer_addr, peer_addr, peer_addr_len, 0, 0); +} + +/** Set the peer address used for stateful compression. + * This expects an address of 6 bytes. + */ +err_t rfc7668_set_peer_addr_mac48(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *peer_addr, size_t peer_addr_len, int is_public_addr) +{ + /* netif not used for now, the address is stored globally... */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + return rfc7668_set_addr(&rfc7668_peer_addr, peer_addr, peer_addr_len, 1, is_public_addr); +} + +/** Encapsulate IPv6 frames for BLE transmission + * + * This method implements the IPv6 header compression: + * *) According to RFC6282 + * *) See Figure 2, contains base format of bit positions + * *) Fragmentation not necessary (done at L2CAP layer of BLE) + * @note Currently the pbuf allocation uses 256 bytes. If longer packets are used (possible due to MTU=1480Bytes), increase it here! + * + * @param p Pbuf struct, containing the payload data + * @param netif Output network interface. Should be of RFC7668 type + * + * @return Same as netif->output. + */ +static err_t rfc7668_compress(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct pbuf *p_frag; + u16_t remaining_len; + u8_t *buffer; + u8_t lowpan6_header_len; + u8_t hidden_header_len; + err_t err; + + LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_frag: netif->linkoutput not set", netif->linkoutput != NULL); + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC + + /* We'll use a dedicated pbuf for building BLE fragments. + * We'll over-allocate it by the bytes saved for header compression. + */ + p_frag = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (p_frag == NULL) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("this needs a pbuf in one piece", p_frag->len == p_frag->tot_len); + + /* Write IP6 header (with IPHC). */ + buffer = (u8_t *)p_frag->payload; + + err = lowpan6_compress_headers(netif, (u8_t *)p->payload, p->len, buffer, p_frag->len, + &lowpan6_header_len, &hidden_header_len, rfc7668_context, &rfc7668_local_addr, &rfc7668_peer_addr); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); + pbuf_free(p_frag); + return err; + } + + pbuf_remove_header(p, hidden_header_len); + + /* Calculate remaining packet length */ + remaining_len = p->tot_len; + + /* Copy IPv6 packet */ + pbuf_copy_partial(p, buffer + lowpan6_header_len, remaining_len, 0); + + /* Calculate frame length */ + p_frag->len = p_frag->tot_len = remaining_len + lowpan6_header_len; + + /* send the packet */ + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifoutoctets, p_frag->tot_len); + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("rfc7668_output: sending packet %p\n", (void *)p)); + err = netif->linkoutput(netif, p_frag); + + pbuf_free(p_frag); + + return err; +#else /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ + /* 6LoWPAN over BLE requires IPHC! */ + return ERR_IF; +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ +} + +/** + * @ingroup rfc7668if + * Set context id IPv6 address + * + * Store one IPv6 address to a given context id. + * + * @param idx Context id + * @param context IPv6 addr for this context + * + * @return ERR_OK (if everything is fine), ERR_ARG (if the context id is out of range), ERR_VAL (if contexts disabled) + */ +err_t rfc7668_set_context(u8_t idx, const ip6_addr_t *context) +{ +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 + + /* check if the ID is possible */ + if (idx >= LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS) { + return ERR_ARG; + } + + /* copy IPv6 address to context storage */ + ip6_addr_set(&rfc7668_context[idx], context); + return ERR_OK; +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(idx); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(context); + return ERR_VAL; +#endif +} + +/** + * @ingroup rfc7668if + * Compress outgoing IPv6 packet and pass it on to netif->linkoutput + * + * @param netif The lwIP network interface which the IP packet will be sent on. + * @param q The pbuf(s) containing the IP packet to be sent. + * @param ip6addr The IP address of the packet destination. + * + * @return See rfc7668_compress + */ +err_t rfc7668_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *q, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + /* dst ip6addr is not used here, we only have one peer */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ip6addr); + + return rfc7668_compress(netif, q); +} + +/** + * @ingroup rfc7668if + * Process a received raw payload from an L2CAP channel + * + * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the + * IPv6 header (maybe compressed) + * @param netif the network interface on which the packet was received + * + * @return ERR_OK if everything was fine + */ +err_t rfc7668_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *netif) +{ + u8_t *puc; + + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(netif, ifinoctets, p->tot_len); + + /* Load first header byte */ + puc = (u8_t *)p->payload; + + /* no IP header compression */ + if (*puc == 0x41) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Completed packet, removing dispatch: 0x%2x \n", *puc)); + /* This is a complete IPv6 packet, just skip header byte. */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, 1); + /* IPHC header compression */ + } else if ((*puc & 0xe0) == 0x60) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Completed packet, decompress dispatch: 0x%2x \n", *puc)); + /* IPv6 headers are compressed using IPHC. */ + p = lowpan6_decompress(p, 0, rfc7668_context, &rfc7668_peer_addr, &rfc7668_local_addr); + + /* if no pbuf is returned, handle as discarded packet */ + if (p == NULL) { + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifindiscards); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* invalid header byte, discard */ + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Completed packet, discarding: 0x%2x \n", *puc)); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifindiscards); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* @todo: distinguish unicast/multicast */ + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifinucastpkts); + +#if LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG + { + u16_t i; + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("IPv6 payload:\n")); + + for (i = 0; i < p->len; i++) { + if ((i % 4) == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("\n")); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("%2X ", *((uint8_t *)p->payload + i))); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_RFC7668_IP_UNCOMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("\np->len: %d\n", p->len)); + } +#endif + /* pass data to ip6_input */ + return ip6_input(p, netif); +} + +/** + * @ingroup rfc7668if + * Initialize the netif + * + * No flags are used (broadcast not possible, not ethernet, ...) + * The shortname for this netif is "BT" + * + * @param netif the network interface to be initialized as RFC7668 netif + * + * @return ERR_OK if everything went fine + */ +err_t rfc7668_if_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + netif->name[0] = 'b'; + netif->name[1] = 't'; + /* local function as IPv6 output */ + netif->output_ip6 = rfc7668_output; + + MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_other, 0); + + /* maximum transfer unit, set according to RFC7668 ch2.4 */ + netif->mtu = 1280; + + /* no flags set (no broadcast, ethernet,...)*/ + netif->flags = 0; + + /* everything fine */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if !NO_SYS +/** + * Pass a received packet to tcpip_thread for input processing + * + * @param p the received packet, p->payload pointing to the + * IEEE 802.15.4 header. + * @param inp the network interface on which the packet was received + * + * @return see @ref tcpip_inpkt, same return values + */ +err_t tcpip_rfc7668_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + /* send data to upper layer, return the result */ + return tcpip_inpkt(p, inp, rfc7668_input); +} +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_common.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_common.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_common.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_common.c index 32a5e78f..0abc8049 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_common.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/lowpan6_common.c @@ -1,876 +1,876 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * Common 6LowPAN routines for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. Fragments packets to 6LowPAN units. - * - * This implementation aims to conform to IEEE 802.15.4(-2015), RFC 4944 and RFC 6282. - * @todo: RFC 6775. - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Ivan Delamer - * - * - * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer - * - */ - -/** - * @defgroup sixlowpan 6LoWPAN (RFC4944) - * @ingroup netifs - * 6LowPAN netif implementation - */ - -#include "netif/lowpan6_common.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - -#include "lwip/ip.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" - -#include - -/* Determine compression mode for unicast address. */ -s8_t lowpan6_get_address_mode(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *mac_addr) -{ - if (mac_addr->addr_len == 2) { - if ((ip6addr->addr[2] == (u32_t)PP_HTONL(0x000000ff)) && - ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xffff0000)) == PP_NTOHL(0xfe000000))) { - if ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0x0000ffff)) == lwip_ntohl((mac_addr->addr[0] << 8) | mac_addr->addr[1])) { - return 3; - } - } - } else if (mac_addr->addr_len == 8) { - if ((ip6addr->addr[2] == lwip_ntohl(((mac_addr->addr[0] ^ 2) << 24) | (mac_addr->addr[1] << 16) | mac_addr->addr[2] << 8 | mac_addr->addr[3])) && - (ip6addr->addr[3] == lwip_ntohl((mac_addr->addr[4] << 24) | (mac_addr->addr[5] << 16) | mac_addr->addr[6] << 8 | mac_addr->addr[7]))) { - return 3; - } - } - - if ((ip6addr->addr[2] == PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL)) && - ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xffff0000)) == PP_NTOHL(0xfe000000UL))) { - return 2; - } - - return 1; -} - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC - -/* Determine compression mode for multicast address. */ -static s8_t lowpan6_get_address_mode_mc(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - if ((ip6addr->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000)) && - (ip6addr->addr[1] == 0) && - (ip6addr->addr[2] == 0) && - ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xffffff00)) == 0)) { - return 3; - } else if (((ip6addr->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff00ffff)) == PP_HTONL(0xff000000)) && - (ip6addr->addr[1] == 0)) { - if ((ip6addr->addr[2] == 0) && - ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xff000000)) == 0)) { - return 2; - } else if ((ip6addr->addr[2] & PP_HTONL(0xffffff00)) == 0) { - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 -static s8_t lowpan6_context_lookup(const ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) -{ - s8_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS; i++) { - if (ip6_addr_netcmp(&lowpan6_contexts[i], ip6addr)) { - return i; - } - } - - return -1; -} -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 */ - -/* - * Compress IPv6 and/or UDP headers. - * */ -err_t lowpan6_compress_headers(struct netif *netif, u8_t *inbuf, size_t inbuf_size, u8_t *outbuf, size_t outbuf_size, - u8_t *lowpan6_header_len_out, u8_t *hidden_header_len_out, ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, - const struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *dst) -{ - u8_t *buffer, *inptr; - u8_t lowpan6_header_len; - u8_t hidden_header_len = 0; - s8_t i; - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; - ip_addr_t ip6src, ip6dst; - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("inbuf != NULL", inbuf != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("outbuf != NULL", outbuf != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_header_len_out != NULL", lowpan6_header_len_out != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("hidden_header_len_out != NULL", hidden_header_len_out != NULL); - - /* Perform 6LowPAN IPv6 header compression according to RFC 6282 */ - buffer = outbuf; - inptr = inbuf; - - if (inbuf_size < IP6_HLEN) { - /* input buffer too short */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (outbuf_size < IP6_HLEN) { - /* output buffer too short for worst case */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Point to ip6 header and align copies of src/dest addresses. */ - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)inptr; - ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(ip6dst, ip6hdr->dest); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst), IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); - ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(ip6src, ip6hdr->src); - ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&ip6src), IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); - - /* Basic length of 6LowPAN header, set dispatch and clear fields. */ - lowpan6_header_len = 2; - buffer[0] = 0x60; - buffer[1] = 0; - - /* Determine whether there will be a Context Identifier Extension byte or not. - * If so, set it already. */ -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 - buffer[2] = 0; - - i = lowpan6_context_lookup(lowpan6_contexts, ip_2_ip6(&ip6src)); - - if (i >= 0) { - /* Stateful source address compression. */ - buffer[1] |= 0x40; - buffer[2] |= (i & 0x0f) << 4; - } - - i = lowpan6_context_lookup(lowpan6_contexts, ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst)); - - if (i >= 0) { - /* Stateful destination address compression. */ - buffer[1] |= 0x04; - buffer[2] |= i & 0x0f; - } - - if (buffer[2] != 0x00) { - /* Context identifier extension byte is appended. */ - buffer[1] |= 0x80; - lowpan6_header_len++; - } - -#else /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(lowpan6_contexts); -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 */ - - /* Determine TF field: Traffic Class, Flow Label */ - if (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) == 0) { - /* Flow label is elided. */ - buffer[0] |= 0x10; - - if (IP6H_TC(ip6hdr) == 0) { - /* Traffic class (ECN+DSCP) elided too. */ - buffer[0] |= 0x08; - } else { - /* Traffic class (ECN+DSCP) appended. */ - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_TC(ip6hdr); - } - } else { - if (((IP6H_TC(ip6hdr) & 0x3f) == 0)) { - /* DSCP portion of Traffic Class is elided, ECN and FL are appended (3 bytes) */ - buffer[0] |= 0x08; - - buffer[lowpan6_header_len] = IP6H_TC(ip6hdr) & 0xc0; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] |= (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) >> 16) & 0x0f; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) >> 8) & 0xff; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) & 0xff; - } else { - /* Traffic class and flow label are appended (4 bytes) */ - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_TC(ip6hdr); - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) >> 16) & 0x0f; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) >> 8) & 0xff; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) & 0xff; - } - } - - /* Compress NH? - * Only if UDP for now. @todo support other NH compression. */ - if (IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr) == IP6_NEXTH_UDP) { - buffer[0] |= 0x04; - } else { - /* append nexth. */ - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr); - } - - /* Compress hop limit? */ - if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr) == 255) { - buffer[0] |= 0x03; - } else if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr) == 64) { - buffer[0] |= 0x02; - } else if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr) == 1) { - buffer[0] |= 0x01; - } else { - /* append hop limit */ - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr); - } - - /* Compress source address */ - if (((buffer[1] & 0x40) != 0) || - (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip6(&ip6src)))) { - /* Context-based or link-local source address compression. */ - i = lowpan6_get_address_mode(ip_2_ip6(&ip6src), src); - buffer[1] |= (i & 0x03) << 4; - - if (i == 1) { - MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 16, 8); - lowpan6_header_len += 8; - } else if (i == 2) { - MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 22, 2); - lowpan6_header_len += 2; - } - } else if (ip6_addr_isany(ip_2_ip6(&ip6src))) { - /* Special case: mark SAC and leave SAM=0 */ - buffer[1] |= 0x40; - } else { - /* Append full address. */ - MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 8, 16); - lowpan6_header_len += 16; - } - - /* Compress destination address */ - if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst))) { - /* @todo support stateful multicast address compression */ - - buffer[1] |= 0x08; - - i = lowpan6_get_address_mode_mc(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst)); - buffer[1] |= i & 0x03; - - if (i == 0) { - MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 24, 16); - lowpan6_header_len += 16; - } else if (i == 1) { - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[25]; - MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 35, 5); - lowpan6_header_len += 5; - } else if (i == 2) { - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[25]; - MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 37, 3); - lowpan6_header_len += 3; - } else if (i == 3) { - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = (inptr)[39]; - } - } else if (((buffer[1] & 0x04) != 0) || - (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst)))) { - /* Context-based or link-local destination address compression. */ - i = lowpan6_get_address_mode(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst), dst); - buffer[1] |= i & 0x03; - - if (i == 1) { - MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 32, 8); - lowpan6_header_len += 8; - } else if (i == 2) { - MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 38, 2); - lowpan6_header_len += 2; - } - } else { - /* Append full address. */ - MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 24, 16); - lowpan6_header_len += 16; - } - - /* Move to payload. */ - inptr += IP6_HLEN; - hidden_header_len += IP6_HLEN; - -#if LWIP_UDP - - /* Compress UDP header? */ - if (IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr) == IP6_NEXTH_UDP) { - /* @todo support optional checksum compression */ - - if (inbuf_size < IP6_HLEN + UDP_HLEN) { - /* input buffer too short */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if (outbuf_size < (size_t)(hidden_header_len + 7)) { - /* output buffer too short for worst case */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - buffer[lowpan6_header_len] = 0xf0; - - /* determine port compression mode. */ - if ((inptr[0] == 0xf0) && ((inptr[1] & 0xf0) == 0xb0) && - (inptr[2] == 0xf0) && ((inptr[3] & 0xf0) == 0xb0)) { - /* Compress source and dest ports. */ - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] |= 0x03; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = ((inptr[1] & 0x0f) << 4) | (inptr[3] & 0x0f); - } else if (inptr[0] == 0xf0) { - /* Compress source port. */ - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] |= 0x02; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[1]; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[2]; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[3]; - } else if (inptr[2] == 0xf0) { - /* Compress dest port. */ - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] |= 0x01; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[0]; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[1]; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[3]; - } else { - /* append full ports. */ - lowpan6_header_len++; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[0]; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[1]; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[2]; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[3]; - } - - /* elide length and copy checksum */ - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[6]; - buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[7]; - - hidden_header_len += UDP_HLEN; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - - *lowpan6_header_len_out = lowpan6_header_len; - *hidden_header_len_out = hidden_header_len; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Decompress IPv6 and UDP headers compressed according to RFC 6282 - * - * @param lowpan6_buffer compressed headers, first byte is the dispatch byte - * @param lowpan6_bufsize size of lowpan6_buffer (may include data after headers) - * @param decomp_buffer buffer where the decompressed headers are stored - * @param decomp_bufsize size of decomp_buffer - * @param hdr_size_comp returns the size of the compressed headers (skip to get to data) - * @param hdr_size_decomp returns the size of the decompressed headers (IPv6 + UDP) - * @param datagram_size datagram size from fragments or 0 if unfragmented - * @param compressed_size compressed datagram size (for unfragmented rx) - * @param lowpan6_contexts context addresses - * @param src source address of the outer layer, used for address compression - * @param dest destination address of the outer layer, used for address compression - * @return ERR_OK if decompression succeeded, an error otherwise - */ -static err_t lowpan6_decompress_hdr(u8_t *lowpan6_buffer, size_t lowpan6_bufsize, - u8_t *decomp_buffer, size_t decomp_bufsize, - u16_t *hdr_size_comp, u16_t *hdr_size_decomp, - u16_t datagram_size, u16_t compressed_size, - ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, - struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, struct lowpan6_link_addr *dest) -{ - u16_t lowpan6_offset; - struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; - s8_t i; - u32_t header_temp; - u16_t ip6_offset = IP6_HLEN; - - LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_buffer != NULL", lowpan6_buffer != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("decomp_buffer != NULL", decomp_buffer != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("src != NULL", src != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("dest != NULL", dest != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("hdr_size_comp != NULL", hdr_size_comp != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("dehdr_size_decompst != NULL", hdr_size_decomp != NULL); - - ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)decomp_buffer; - - if (decomp_bufsize < IP6_HLEN) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* output the full compressed packet, if set in @see lowpan6_opts.h */ -#if LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG - { - u16_t j; - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("lowpan6_decompress_hdr: IP6 payload (compressed): \n")); - - for (j = 0; j < lowpan6_bufsize; j++) { - if ((j % 4) == 0) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("\n")); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("%2X ", lowpan6_buffer[j])); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("\np->len: %d", lowpan6_bufsize)); - } -#endif - - /* offset for inline IP headers (RFC 6282 ch3)*/ - lowpan6_offset = 2; - - /* if CID is set (context identifier), the context byte - * follows immediately after the header, so other IPHC fields are @+3 */ - if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x80) { - lowpan6_offset++; - } - - /* Set IPv6 version, traffic class and flow label. (RFC6282, ch 3.1.1.)*/ - if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x18) == 0x00) { - header_temp = ((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] & 0x0f) << 16) | - (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 3]; - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("TF: 00, ECN: 0x%2x, Flowlabel+DSCP: 0x%8X\n", - lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset], header_temp)); - IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset], header_temp); - /* increase offset, processed 4 bytes here: - * TF=00: ECN + DSCP + 4-bit Pad + Flow Label (4 bytes)*/ - lowpan6_offset += 4; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x18) == 0x08) { - header_temp = ((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0x0f) << 16) | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2]; - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("TF: 01, ECN: 0x%2x, Flowlabel: 0x%2X, DSCP ignored\n", - lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0xc0, header_temp)); - IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0xc0, header_temp); - /* increase offset, processed 3 bytes here: - * TF=01: ECN + 2-bit Pad + Flow Label (3 bytes), DSCP is elided.*/ - lowpan6_offset += 3; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x18) == 0x10) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("TF: 10, DCSP+ECN: 0x%2x, Flowlabel ignored\n", lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset])); - IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset], 0); - /* increase offset, processed 1 byte here: - * ECN + DSCP (1 byte), Flow Label is elided.*/ - lowpan6_offset += 1; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x18) == 0x18) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("TF: 11, DCSP/ECN & Flowlabel ignored\n")); - /* don't increase offset, no bytes processed here */ - IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, 0, 0); - } - - /* Set Next Header (NH) */ - if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x04) == 0x00) { - /* 0: full next header byte carried inline (increase offset)*/ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("NH: 0x%2X\n", lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1])); - IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++]); - } else { - /* 1: NH compression, LOWPAN_NHC (RFC6282, ch 4.1) */ - /* We should fill this later with NHC decoding */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("NH: skipped, later done with NHC\n")); - IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, 0); - } - - /* Set Hop Limit, either carried inline or 3 different hops (1,64,255) */ - if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x03) == 0x00) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Hops: full value: %d\n", lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1])); - IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++]); - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x03) == 0x01) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Hops: compressed: 1\n")); - IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, 1); - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x03) == 0x02) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Hops: compressed: 64\n")); - IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, 64); - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x03) == 0x03) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Hops: compressed: 255\n")); - IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, 255); - } - - /* Source address decoding. */ - if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x40) == 0x00) { - /* Source address compression (SAC) = 0 -> stateless compression */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAC == 0, no context byte\n")); - - /* Stateless compression */ - if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x00) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 00, no src compression, fetching 128bits inline\n")); - /* copy full address, increase offset by 16 Bytes */ - MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->src.addr[0], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 16); - lowpan6_offset += 16; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x10) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 01, src compression, 64bits inline\n")); - /* set 64 bits to link local */ - ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL); - ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = 0; - /* copy 8 Bytes, increase offset */ - MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->src.addr[2], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 8); - lowpan6_offset += 8; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x20) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 10, src compression, 16bits inline\n")); - /* set 96 bits to link local */ - ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL); - ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = 0; - ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); - /* extract remaining 16bits from inline bytes, increase offset */ - ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8) | - lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); - lowpan6_offset += 2; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x30) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 11, src compression, 0bits inline, using other headers\n")); - /* no information avalaible, using other layers, see RFC6282 ch 3.2.2 */ - ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL); - ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = 0; - - if (src->addr_len == 2) { - ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); - ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (src->addr[0] << 8) | src->addr[1]); - } else if (src->addr_len == 8) { - ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = lwip_htonl(((src->addr[0] ^ 2) << 24) | (src->addr[1] << 16) | - (src->addr[2] << 8) | src->addr[3]); - ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((src->addr[4] << 24) | (src->addr[5] << 16) | - (src->addr[6] << 8) | src->addr[7]); - } else { - /* invalid source address length */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Invalid source address length\n")); - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - } else { - /* Source address compression (SAC) = 1 -> stateful/context-based compression */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAC == 1, additional context byte\n")); - - if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x00) { - /* SAM=00, address=> :: (ANY) */ - ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = 0; - ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = 0; - ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = 0; - ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = 0; - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 00, context compression, ANY (::)\n")); - } else { - /* Set prefix from context info */ - if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x80) { - i = (lowpan6_buffer[2] >> 4) & 0x0f; - } else { - i = 0; - } - - if (i >= LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS) { - /* Error */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 - ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = lowpan6_contexts[i].addr[0]; - ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = lowpan6_contexts[i].addr[1]; - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == xx, context compression found @%d: %8X, %8X\n", (int)i, ip6hdr->src.addr[0], ip6hdr->src.addr[1])); -#else - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(lowpan6_contexts); -#endif - } - - /* determine further address bits */ - if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x10) { - /* SAM=01, load additional 64bits */ - MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->src.addr[2], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 8); - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 01, context compression, 64bits inline\n")); - lowpan6_offset += 8; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x20) { - /* SAM=01, load additional 16bits */ - ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); - ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 10, context compression, 16bits inline\n")); - lowpan6_offset += 2; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x30) { - /* SAM=11, address is fully elided, load from other layers */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 11, context compression, 0bits inline, using other headers\n")); - - if (src->addr_len == 2) { - ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); - ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (src->addr[0] << 8) | src->addr[1]); - } else if (src->addr_len == 8) { - ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = lwip_htonl(((src->addr[0] ^ 2) << 24) | (src->addr[1] << 16) | (src->addr[2] << 8) | src->addr[3]); - ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((src->addr[4] << 24) | (src->addr[5] << 16) | (src->addr[6] << 8) | src->addr[7]); - } else { - /* invalid source address length */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Invalid source address length\n")); - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - } - - /* Destination address decoding. */ - if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x08) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("M=1: multicast\n")); - - /* Multicast destination */ - if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x04) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_ON, ("DAC == 1, context multicast: unsupported!!!\n")); - /* @todo support stateful multicast addressing */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x00) { - /* DAM = 00, copy full address (128bits) */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 00, no dst compression, fetching 128bits inline\n")); - MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->dest.addr[0], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 16); - lowpan6_offset += 16; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x01) { - /* DAM = 01, copy 4 bytes (32bits) */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 01, dst address form (48bits): ffXX::00XX:XXXX:XXXX\n")); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = lwip_htonl(0xff000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++] << 16)); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = 0; - ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = lwip_htonl(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++]); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 24) | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] << 16) | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 3]); - lowpan6_offset += 4; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x02) { - /* DAM = 10, copy 3 bytes (24bits) */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 10, dst address form (32bits): ffXX::00XX:XXXX\n")); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = lwip_htonl(0xff000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++] << 16)); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = 0; - ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = 0; - ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 16) | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2]); - lowpan6_offset += 3; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x03) { - /* DAM = 11, copy 1 byte (8bits) */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 11, dst address form (8bits): ff02::00XX\n")); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = 0; - ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = 0; - ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++]); - } - - } else { - /* no Multicast (M=0) */ - if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x04) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAC == 1, stateful compression\n")); - - /* Stateful destination compression */ - /* Set prefix from context info */ - if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x80) { - i = lowpan6_buffer[2] & 0x0f; - } else { - i = 0; - } - - if (i >= LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS) { - /* Error */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - -#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 - ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = lowpan6_contexts[i].addr[0]; - ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = lowpan6_contexts[i].addr[1]; -#endif - } else { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAC == 0, stateless compression, setting link local prefix\n")); - /* Link local address compression */ - ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = 0; - } - - /* M=0, DAC=0, determining destination address length via DAM=xx */ - if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x00) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 00, no dst compression, fetching 128bits inline")); - /* DAM=00, copy full address */ - MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->dest.addr[0], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 16); - lowpan6_offset += 16; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x01) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 01, dst compression, 64bits inline\n")); - /* DAM=01, copy 64 inline bits, increase offset */ - MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->dest.addr[2], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 8); - lowpan6_offset += 8; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x02) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 01, dst compression, 16bits inline\n")); - /* DAM=10, copy 16 inline bits, increase offset */ - ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); - lowpan6_offset += 2; - } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x03) { - /* DAM=11, no bits available, use other headers (not done here) */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 01, dst compression, 0bits inline, using other headers\n")); - - if (dest->addr_len == 2) { - ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (dest->addr[0] << 8) | dest->addr[1]); - } else if (dest->addr_len == 8) { - ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = lwip_htonl(((dest->addr[0] ^ 2) << 24) | (dest->addr[1] << 16) | dest->addr[2] << 8 | dest->addr[3]); - ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((dest->addr[4] << 24) | (dest->addr[5] << 16) | dest->addr[6] << 8 | dest->addr[7]); - } else { - /* invalid destination address length */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Invalid destination address length\n")); - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - } - - /* Next Header Compression (NHC) decoding? */ - if (lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x04) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("NHC decoding\n")); -#if LWIP_UDP - - if ((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0xf8) == 0xf0) { - /* NHC: UDP */ - struct udp_hdr *udphdr; - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("NHC: UDP\n")); - - /* UDP compression */ - IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, IP6_NEXTH_UDP); - udphdr = (struct udp_hdr *)((u8_t *)decomp_buffer + ip6_offset); - - if (decomp_bufsize < IP6_HLEN + UDP_HLEN) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Checksum decompression */ - if (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0x04) { - /* @todo support checksum decompress */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_ON, ("NHC: UDP chechsum decompression UNSUPPORTED\n")); - return ERR_VAL; - } - - /* Decompress ports, according to RFC4944 */ - i = lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++] & 0x03; - - if (i == 0) { - udphdr->src = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); - udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 3]); - lowpan6_offset += 4; - } else if (i == 0x01) { - udphdr->src = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); - udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(0xf000 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2]); - lowpan6_offset += 3; - } else if (i == 0x02) { - udphdr->src = lwip_htons(0xf000 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset]); - udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2]); - lowpan6_offset += 3; - } else if (i == 0x03) { - udphdr->src = lwip_htons(0xf0b0 | ((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] >> 4) & 0x0f)); - udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(0xf0b0 | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0x0f)); - lowpan6_offset += 1; - } - - udphdr->chksum = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); - lowpan6_offset += 2; - ip6_offset += UDP_HLEN; - - if (datagram_size == 0) { - datagram_size = compressed_size - lowpan6_offset + ip6_offset; - } - - udphdr->len = lwip_htons(datagram_size - IP6_HLEN); - - } else -#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ - { - LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_ON, ("NHC: unsupported protocol!\n")); - /* @todo support NHC other than UDP */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - - if (datagram_size == 0) { - datagram_size = compressed_size - lowpan6_offset + ip6_offset; - } - - /* Infer IPv6 payload length for header */ - IP6H_PLEN_SET(ip6hdr, datagram_size - IP6_HLEN); - - if (lowpan6_offset > lowpan6_bufsize) { - /* input buffer overflow */ - return ERR_VAL; - } - - *hdr_size_comp = lowpan6_offset; - *hdr_size_decomp = ip6_offset; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -struct pbuf * -lowpan6_decompress(struct pbuf *p, u16_t datagram_size, ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, - struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, struct lowpan6_link_addr *dest) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - u16_t lowpan6_offset, ip6_offset; - err_t err; - -#if LWIP_UDP -#define UDP_HLEN_ALLOC UDP_HLEN -#else -#define UDP_HLEN_ALLOC 0 -#endif - - /* Allocate a buffer for decompression. This buffer will be too big and will be - trimmed once the final size is known. */ - q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, p->len + IP6_HLEN + UDP_HLEN_ALLOC, PBUF_POOL); - - if (q == NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - return NULL; - } - - if (q->len < IP6_HLEN + UDP_HLEN_ALLOC) { - /* The headers need to fit into the first pbuf */ - pbuf_free(p); - pbuf_free(q); - return NULL; - } - - /* Decompress the IPv6 (and possibly UDP) header(s) into the new pbuf */ - err = lowpan6_decompress_hdr((u8_t *)p->payload, p->len, (u8_t *)q->payload, q->len, - &lowpan6_offset, &ip6_offset, datagram_size, p->tot_len, lowpan6_contexts, src, dest); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - pbuf_free(q); - return NULL; - } - - /* Now we copy leftover contents from p to q, so we have all L2 and L3 headers - (and L4?) in a single pbuf: */ - - /* Hide the compressed headers in p */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, lowpan6_offset); - /* Temporarily hide the headers in q... */ - pbuf_remove_header(q, ip6_offset); - /* ... copy the rest of p into q... */ - pbuf_copy(q, p); - /* ... and reveal the headers again... */ - pbuf_add_header_force(q, ip6_offset); - /* ... trim the pbuf to its correct size... */ - pbuf_realloc(q, ip6_offset + p->len); - - /* ... and cat possibly remaining (data-only) pbufs */ - if (p->next != NULL) { - pbuf_cat(q, p->next); - } - - /* the original (first) pbuf can now be freed */ - p->next = NULL; - pbuf_free(p); - - /* all done */ - return q; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +/** + * @file + * + * Common 6LowPAN routines for IPv6. Uses ND tables for link-layer addressing. Fragments packets to 6LowPAN units. + * + * This implementation aims to conform to IEEE 802.15.4(-2015), RFC 4944 and RFC 6282. + * @todo: RFC 6775. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Inico Technologies Ltd. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Ivan Delamer + * + * + * Please coordinate changes and requests with Ivan Delamer + * + */ + +/** + * @defgroup sixlowpan 6LoWPAN (RFC4944) + * @ingroup netifs + * 6LowPAN netif implementation + */ + +#include "netif/lowpan6_common.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + +#include "lwip/ip.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" + +#include + +/* Determine compression mode for unicast address. */ +s8_t lowpan6_get_address_mode(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *mac_addr) +{ + if (mac_addr->addr_len == 2) { + if ((ip6addr->addr[2] == (u32_t)PP_HTONL(0x000000ff)) && + ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xffff0000)) == PP_NTOHL(0xfe000000))) { + if ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0x0000ffff)) == lwip_ntohl((mac_addr->addr[0] << 8) | mac_addr->addr[1])) { + return 3; + } + } + } else if (mac_addr->addr_len == 8) { + if ((ip6addr->addr[2] == lwip_ntohl(((mac_addr->addr[0] ^ 2) << 24) | (mac_addr->addr[1] << 16) | mac_addr->addr[2] << 8 | mac_addr->addr[3])) && + (ip6addr->addr[3] == lwip_ntohl((mac_addr->addr[4] << 24) | (mac_addr->addr[5] << 16) | mac_addr->addr[6] << 8 | mac_addr->addr[7]))) { + return 3; + } + } + + if ((ip6addr->addr[2] == PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL)) && + ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xffff0000)) == PP_NTOHL(0xfe000000UL))) { + return 2; + } + + return 1; +} + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC + +/* Determine compression mode for multicast address. */ +static s8_t lowpan6_get_address_mode_mc(const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + if ((ip6addr->addr[0] == PP_HTONL(0xff020000)) && + (ip6addr->addr[1] == 0) && + (ip6addr->addr[2] == 0) && + ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xffffff00)) == 0)) { + return 3; + } else if (((ip6addr->addr[0] & PP_HTONL(0xff00ffff)) == PP_HTONL(0xff000000)) && + (ip6addr->addr[1] == 0)) { + if ((ip6addr->addr[2] == 0) && + ((ip6addr->addr[3] & PP_HTONL(0xff000000)) == 0)) { + return 2; + } else if ((ip6addr->addr[2] & PP_HTONL(0xffffff00)) == 0) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 +static s8_t lowpan6_context_lookup(const ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, const ip6_addr_t *ip6addr) +{ + s8_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS; i++) { + if (ip6_addr_netcmp(&lowpan6_contexts[i], ip6addr)) { + return i; + } + } + + return -1; +} +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 */ + +/* + * Compress IPv6 and/or UDP headers. + * */ +err_t lowpan6_compress_headers(struct netif *netif, u8_t *inbuf, size_t inbuf_size, u8_t *outbuf, size_t outbuf_size, + u8_t *lowpan6_header_len_out, u8_t *hidden_header_len_out, ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, + const struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, const struct lowpan6_link_addr *dst) +{ + u8_t *buffer, *inptr; + u8_t lowpan6_header_len; + u8_t hidden_header_len = 0; + s8_t i; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; + ip_addr_t ip6src, ip6dst; + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("inbuf != NULL", inbuf != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("outbuf != NULL", outbuf != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_header_len_out != NULL", lowpan6_header_len_out != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("hidden_header_len_out != NULL", hidden_header_len_out != NULL); + + /* Perform 6LowPAN IPv6 header compression according to RFC 6282 */ + buffer = outbuf; + inptr = inbuf; + + if (inbuf_size < IP6_HLEN) { + /* input buffer too short */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (outbuf_size < IP6_HLEN) { + /* output buffer too short for worst case */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Point to ip6 header and align copies of src/dest addresses. */ + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)inptr; + ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(ip6dst, ip6hdr->dest); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst), IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); + ip_addr_copy_from_ip6_packed(ip6src, ip6hdr->src); + ip6_addr_assign_zone(ip_2_ip6(&ip6src), IP6_UNKNOWN, netif); + + /* Basic length of 6LowPAN header, set dispatch and clear fields. */ + lowpan6_header_len = 2; + buffer[0] = 0x60; + buffer[1] = 0; + + /* Determine whether there will be a Context Identifier Extension byte or not. + * If so, set it already. */ +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 + buffer[2] = 0; + + i = lowpan6_context_lookup(lowpan6_contexts, ip_2_ip6(&ip6src)); + + if (i >= 0) { + /* Stateful source address compression. */ + buffer[1] |= 0x40; + buffer[2] |= (i & 0x0f) << 4; + } + + i = lowpan6_context_lookup(lowpan6_contexts, ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst)); + + if (i >= 0) { + /* Stateful destination address compression. */ + buffer[1] |= 0x04; + buffer[2] |= i & 0x0f; + } + + if (buffer[2] != 0x00) { + /* Context identifier extension byte is appended. */ + buffer[1] |= 0x80; + lowpan6_header_len++; + } + +#else /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(lowpan6_contexts); +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 */ + + /* Determine TF field: Traffic Class, Flow Label */ + if (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) == 0) { + /* Flow label is elided. */ + buffer[0] |= 0x10; + + if (IP6H_TC(ip6hdr) == 0) { + /* Traffic class (ECN+DSCP) elided too. */ + buffer[0] |= 0x08; + } else { + /* Traffic class (ECN+DSCP) appended. */ + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_TC(ip6hdr); + } + } else { + if (((IP6H_TC(ip6hdr) & 0x3f) == 0)) { + /* DSCP portion of Traffic Class is elided, ECN and FL are appended (3 bytes) */ + buffer[0] |= 0x08; + + buffer[lowpan6_header_len] = IP6H_TC(ip6hdr) & 0xc0; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] |= (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) >> 16) & 0x0f; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) >> 8) & 0xff; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) & 0xff; + } else { + /* Traffic class and flow label are appended (4 bytes) */ + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_TC(ip6hdr); + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) >> 16) & 0x0f; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = (IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) >> 8) & 0xff; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_FL(ip6hdr) & 0xff; + } + } + + /* Compress NH? + * Only if UDP for now. @todo support other NH compression. */ + if (IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr) == IP6_NEXTH_UDP) { + buffer[0] |= 0x04; + } else { + /* append nexth. */ + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr); + } + + /* Compress hop limit? */ + if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr) == 255) { + buffer[0] |= 0x03; + } else if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr) == 64) { + buffer[0] |= 0x02; + } else if (IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr) == 1) { + buffer[0] |= 0x01; + } else { + /* append hop limit */ + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = IP6H_HOPLIM(ip6hdr); + } + + /* Compress source address */ + if (((buffer[1] & 0x40) != 0) || + (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip6(&ip6src)))) { + /* Context-based or link-local source address compression. */ + i = lowpan6_get_address_mode(ip_2_ip6(&ip6src), src); + buffer[1] |= (i & 0x03) << 4; + + if (i == 1) { + MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 16, 8); + lowpan6_header_len += 8; + } else if (i == 2) { + MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 22, 2); + lowpan6_header_len += 2; + } + } else if (ip6_addr_isany(ip_2_ip6(&ip6src))) { + /* Special case: mark SAC and leave SAM=0 */ + buffer[1] |= 0x40; + } else { + /* Append full address. */ + MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 8, 16); + lowpan6_header_len += 16; + } + + /* Compress destination address */ + if (ip6_addr_ismulticast(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst))) { + /* @todo support stateful multicast address compression */ + + buffer[1] |= 0x08; + + i = lowpan6_get_address_mode_mc(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst)); + buffer[1] |= i & 0x03; + + if (i == 0) { + MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 24, 16); + lowpan6_header_len += 16; + } else if (i == 1) { + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[25]; + MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 35, 5); + lowpan6_header_len += 5; + } else if (i == 2) { + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[25]; + MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 37, 3); + lowpan6_header_len += 3; + } else if (i == 3) { + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = (inptr)[39]; + } + } else if (((buffer[1] & 0x04) != 0) || + (ip6_addr_islinklocal(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst)))) { + /* Context-based or link-local destination address compression. */ + i = lowpan6_get_address_mode(ip_2_ip6(&ip6dst), dst); + buffer[1] |= i & 0x03; + + if (i == 1) { + MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 32, 8); + lowpan6_header_len += 8; + } else if (i == 2) { + MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 38, 2); + lowpan6_header_len += 2; + } + } else { + /* Append full address. */ + MEMCPY(buffer + lowpan6_header_len, inptr + 24, 16); + lowpan6_header_len += 16; + } + + /* Move to payload. */ + inptr += IP6_HLEN; + hidden_header_len += IP6_HLEN; + +#if LWIP_UDP + + /* Compress UDP header? */ + if (IP6H_NEXTH(ip6hdr) == IP6_NEXTH_UDP) { + /* @todo support optional checksum compression */ + + if (inbuf_size < IP6_HLEN + UDP_HLEN) { + /* input buffer too short */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if (outbuf_size < (size_t)(hidden_header_len + 7)) { + /* output buffer too short for worst case */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + buffer[lowpan6_header_len] = 0xf0; + + /* determine port compression mode. */ + if ((inptr[0] == 0xf0) && ((inptr[1] & 0xf0) == 0xb0) && + (inptr[2] == 0xf0) && ((inptr[3] & 0xf0) == 0xb0)) { + /* Compress source and dest ports. */ + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] |= 0x03; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = ((inptr[1] & 0x0f) << 4) | (inptr[3] & 0x0f); + } else if (inptr[0] == 0xf0) { + /* Compress source port. */ + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] |= 0x02; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[1]; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[2]; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[3]; + } else if (inptr[2] == 0xf0) { + /* Compress dest port. */ + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] |= 0x01; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[0]; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[1]; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[3]; + } else { + /* append full ports. */ + lowpan6_header_len++; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[0]; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[1]; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[2]; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[3]; + } + + /* elide length and copy checksum */ + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[6]; + buffer[lowpan6_header_len++] = inptr[7]; + + hidden_header_len += UDP_HLEN; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + + *lowpan6_header_len_out = lowpan6_header_len; + *hidden_header_len_out = hidden_header_len; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Decompress IPv6 and UDP headers compressed according to RFC 6282 + * + * @param lowpan6_buffer compressed headers, first byte is the dispatch byte + * @param lowpan6_bufsize size of lowpan6_buffer (may include data after headers) + * @param decomp_buffer buffer where the decompressed headers are stored + * @param decomp_bufsize size of decomp_buffer + * @param hdr_size_comp returns the size of the compressed headers (skip to get to data) + * @param hdr_size_decomp returns the size of the decompressed headers (IPv6 + UDP) + * @param datagram_size datagram size from fragments or 0 if unfragmented + * @param compressed_size compressed datagram size (for unfragmented rx) + * @param lowpan6_contexts context addresses + * @param src source address of the outer layer, used for address compression + * @param dest destination address of the outer layer, used for address compression + * @return ERR_OK if decompression succeeded, an error otherwise + */ +static err_t lowpan6_decompress_hdr(u8_t *lowpan6_buffer, size_t lowpan6_bufsize, + u8_t *decomp_buffer, size_t decomp_bufsize, + u16_t *hdr_size_comp, u16_t *hdr_size_decomp, + u16_t datagram_size, u16_t compressed_size, + ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, + struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, struct lowpan6_link_addr *dest) +{ + u16_t lowpan6_offset; + struct ip6_hdr *ip6hdr; + s8_t i; + u32_t header_temp; + u16_t ip6_offset = IP6_HLEN; + + LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_buffer != NULL", lowpan6_buffer != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("decomp_buffer != NULL", decomp_buffer != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("src != NULL", src != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("dest != NULL", dest != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("hdr_size_comp != NULL", hdr_size_comp != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("dehdr_size_decompst != NULL", hdr_size_decomp != NULL); + + ip6hdr = (struct ip6_hdr *)decomp_buffer; + + if (decomp_bufsize < IP6_HLEN) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* output the full compressed packet, if set in @see lowpan6_opts.h */ +#if LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG + { + u16_t j; + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("lowpan6_decompress_hdr: IP6 payload (compressed): \n")); + + for (j = 0; j < lowpan6_bufsize; j++) { + if ((j % 4) == 0) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("\n")); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("%2X ", lowpan6_buffer[j])); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_IP_COMPRESSED_DEBUG, ("\np->len: %d", lowpan6_bufsize)); + } +#endif + + /* offset for inline IP headers (RFC 6282 ch3)*/ + lowpan6_offset = 2; + + /* if CID is set (context identifier), the context byte + * follows immediately after the header, so other IPHC fields are @+3 */ + if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x80) { + lowpan6_offset++; + } + + /* Set IPv6 version, traffic class and flow label. (RFC6282, ch 3.1.1.)*/ + if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x18) == 0x00) { + header_temp = ((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] & 0x0f) << 16) | + (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 3]; + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("TF: 00, ECN: 0x%2x, Flowlabel+DSCP: 0x%8X\n", + lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset], header_temp)); + IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset], header_temp); + /* increase offset, processed 4 bytes here: + * TF=00: ECN + DSCP + 4-bit Pad + Flow Label (4 bytes)*/ + lowpan6_offset += 4; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x18) == 0x08) { + header_temp = ((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0x0f) << 16) | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2]; + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("TF: 01, ECN: 0x%2x, Flowlabel: 0x%2X, DSCP ignored\n", + lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0xc0, header_temp)); + IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0xc0, header_temp); + /* increase offset, processed 3 bytes here: + * TF=01: ECN + 2-bit Pad + Flow Label (3 bytes), DSCP is elided.*/ + lowpan6_offset += 3; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x18) == 0x10) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("TF: 10, DCSP+ECN: 0x%2x, Flowlabel ignored\n", lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset])); + IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset], 0); + /* increase offset, processed 1 byte here: + * ECN + DSCP (1 byte), Flow Label is elided.*/ + lowpan6_offset += 1; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x18) == 0x18) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("TF: 11, DCSP/ECN & Flowlabel ignored\n")); + /* don't increase offset, no bytes processed here */ + IP6H_VTCFL_SET(ip6hdr, 6, 0, 0); + } + + /* Set Next Header (NH) */ + if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x04) == 0x00) { + /* 0: full next header byte carried inline (increase offset)*/ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("NH: 0x%2X\n", lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1])); + IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++]); + } else { + /* 1: NH compression, LOWPAN_NHC (RFC6282, ch 4.1) */ + /* We should fill this later with NHC decoding */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("NH: skipped, later done with NHC\n")); + IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, 0); + } + + /* Set Hop Limit, either carried inline or 3 different hops (1,64,255) */ + if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x03) == 0x00) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Hops: full value: %d\n", lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1])); + IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++]); + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x03) == 0x01) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Hops: compressed: 1\n")); + IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, 1); + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x03) == 0x02) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Hops: compressed: 64\n")); + IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, 64); + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x03) == 0x03) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Hops: compressed: 255\n")); + IP6H_HOPLIM_SET(ip6hdr, 255); + } + + /* Source address decoding. */ + if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x40) == 0x00) { + /* Source address compression (SAC) = 0 -> stateless compression */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAC == 0, no context byte\n")); + + /* Stateless compression */ + if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x00) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 00, no src compression, fetching 128bits inline\n")); + /* copy full address, increase offset by 16 Bytes */ + MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->src.addr[0], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 16); + lowpan6_offset += 16; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x10) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 01, src compression, 64bits inline\n")); + /* set 64 bits to link local */ + ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL); + ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = 0; + /* copy 8 Bytes, increase offset */ + MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->src.addr[2], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 8); + lowpan6_offset += 8; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x20) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 10, src compression, 16bits inline\n")); + /* set 96 bits to link local */ + ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL); + ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = 0; + ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); + /* extract remaining 16bits from inline bytes, increase offset */ + ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8) | + lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); + lowpan6_offset += 2; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x30) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 11, src compression, 0bits inline, using other headers\n")); + /* no information avalaible, using other layers, see RFC6282 ch 3.2.2 */ + ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL); + ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = 0; + + if (src->addr_len == 2) { + ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); + ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (src->addr[0] << 8) | src->addr[1]); + } else if (src->addr_len == 8) { + ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = lwip_htonl(((src->addr[0] ^ 2) << 24) | (src->addr[1] << 16) | + (src->addr[2] << 8) | src->addr[3]); + ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((src->addr[4] << 24) | (src->addr[5] << 16) | + (src->addr[6] << 8) | src->addr[7]); + } else { + /* invalid source address length */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Invalid source address length\n")); + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + } else { + /* Source address compression (SAC) = 1 -> stateful/context-based compression */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAC == 1, additional context byte\n")); + + if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x00) { + /* SAM=00, address=> :: (ANY) */ + ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = 0; + ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = 0; + ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = 0; + ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = 0; + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 00, context compression, ANY (::)\n")); + } else { + /* Set prefix from context info */ + if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x80) { + i = (lowpan6_buffer[2] >> 4) & 0x0f; + } else { + i = 0; + } + + if (i >= LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS) { + /* Error */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 + ip6hdr->src.addr[0] = lowpan6_contexts[i].addr[0]; + ip6hdr->src.addr[1] = lowpan6_contexts[i].addr[1]; + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == xx, context compression found @%d: %8X, %8X\n", (int)i, ip6hdr->src.addr[0], ip6hdr->src.addr[1])); +#else + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(lowpan6_contexts); +#endif + } + + /* determine further address bits */ + if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x10) { + /* SAM=01, load additional 64bits */ + MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->src.addr[2], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 8); + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 01, context compression, 64bits inline\n")); + lowpan6_offset += 8; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x20) { + /* SAM=01, load additional 16bits */ + ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); + ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 10, context compression, 16bits inline\n")); + lowpan6_offset += 2; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x30) == 0x30) { + /* SAM=11, address is fully elided, load from other layers */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("SAM == 11, context compression, 0bits inline, using other headers\n")); + + if (src->addr_len == 2) { + ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); + ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (src->addr[0] << 8) | src->addr[1]); + } else if (src->addr_len == 8) { + ip6hdr->src.addr[2] = lwip_htonl(((src->addr[0] ^ 2) << 24) | (src->addr[1] << 16) | (src->addr[2] << 8) | src->addr[3]); + ip6hdr->src.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((src->addr[4] << 24) | (src->addr[5] << 16) | (src->addr[6] << 8) | src->addr[7]); + } else { + /* invalid source address length */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Invalid source address length\n")); + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + } + + /* Destination address decoding. */ + if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x08) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("M=1: multicast\n")); + + /* Multicast destination */ + if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x04) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_ON, ("DAC == 1, context multicast: unsupported!!!\n")); + /* @todo support stateful multicast addressing */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x00) { + /* DAM = 00, copy full address (128bits) */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 00, no dst compression, fetching 128bits inline\n")); + MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->dest.addr[0], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 16); + lowpan6_offset += 16; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x01) { + /* DAM = 01, copy 4 bytes (32bits) */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 01, dst address form (48bits): ffXX::00XX:XXXX:XXXX\n")); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = lwip_htonl(0xff000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++] << 16)); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = 0; + ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = lwip_htonl(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++]); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 24) | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] << 16) | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 3]); + lowpan6_offset += 4; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x02) { + /* DAM = 10, copy 3 bytes (24bits) */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 10, dst address form (32bits): ffXX::00XX:XXXX\n")); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = lwip_htonl(0xff000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++] << 16)); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = 0; + ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = 0; + ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 16) | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2]); + lowpan6_offset += 3; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x03) { + /* DAM = 11, copy 1 byte (8bits) */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 11, dst address form (8bits): ff02::00XX\n")); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xff020000UL); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = 0; + ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = 0; + ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++]); + } + + } else { + /* no Multicast (M=0) */ + if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x04) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAC == 1, stateful compression\n")); + + /* Stateful destination compression */ + /* Set prefix from context info */ + if (lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x80) { + i = lowpan6_buffer[2] & 0x0f; + } else { + i = 0; + } + + if (i >= LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS) { + /* Error */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + +#if LWIP_6LOWPAN_NUM_CONTEXTS > 0 + ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = lowpan6_contexts[i].addr[0]; + ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = lowpan6_contexts[i].addr[1]; +#endif + } else { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAC == 0, stateless compression, setting link local prefix\n")); + /* Link local address compression */ + ip6hdr->dest.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000UL); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[1] = 0; + } + + /* M=0, DAC=0, determining destination address length via DAM=xx */ + if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x00) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 00, no dst compression, fetching 128bits inline")); + /* DAM=00, copy full address */ + MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->dest.addr[0], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 16); + lowpan6_offset += 16; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x01) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 01, dst compression, 64bits inline\n")); + /* DAM=01, copy 64 inline bits, increase offset */ + MEMCPY(&ip6hdr->dest.addr[2], lowpan6_buffer + lowpan6_offset, 8); + lowpan6_offset += 8; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x02) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 01, dst compression, 16bits inline\n")); + /* DAM=10, copy 16 inline bits, increase offset */ + ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8) | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); + lowpan6_offset += 2; + } else if ((lowpan6_buffer[1] & 0x03) == 0x03) { + /* DAM=11, no bits available, use other headers (not done here) */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("DAM == 01, dst compression, 0bits inline, using other headers\n")); + + if (dest->addr_len == 2) { + ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = PP_HTONL(0x000000ffUL); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl(0xfe000000UL | (dest->addr[0] << 8) | dest->addr[1]); + } else if (dest->addr_len == 8) { + ip6hdr->dest.addr[2] = lwip_htonl(((dest->addr[0] ^ 2) << 24) | (dest->addr[1] << 16) | dest->addr[2] << 8 | dest->addr[3]); + ip6hdr->dest.addr[3] = lwip_htonl((dest->addr[4] << 24) | (dest->addr[5] << 16) | dest->addr[6] << 8 | dest->addr[7]); + } else { + /* invalid destination address length */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("Invalid destination address length\n")); + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + } + + /* Next Header Compression (NHC) decoding? */ + if (lowpan6_buffer[0] & 0x04) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("NHC decoding\n")); +#if LWIP_UDP + + if ((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0xf8) == 0xf0) { + /* NHC: UDP */ + struct udp_hdr *udphdr; + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_LOWPAN6_DECOMPRESSION_DEBUG, ("NHC: UDP\n")); + + /* UDP compression */ + IP6H_NEXTH_SET(ip6hdr, IP6_NEXTH_UDP); + udphdr = (struct udp_hdr *)((u8_t *)decomp_buffer + ip6_offset); + + if (decomp_bufsize < IP6_HLEN + UDP_HLEN) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Checksum decompression */ + if (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0x04) { + /* @todo support checksum decompress */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_ON, ("NHC: UDP chechsum decompression UNSUPPORTED\n")); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /* Decompress ports, according to RFC4944 */ + i = lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset++] & 0x03; + + if (i == 0) { + udphdr->src = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); + udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 3]); + lowpan6_offset += 4; + } else if (i == 0x01) { + udphdr->src = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); + udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(0xf000 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2]); + lowpan6_offset += 3; + } else if (i == 0x02) { + udphdr->src = lwip_htons(0xf000 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset]); + udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 2]); + lowpan6_offset += 3; + } else if (i == 0x03) { + udphdr->src = lwip_htons(0xf0b0 | ((lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] >> 4) & 0x0f)); + udphdr->dest = lwip_htons(0xf0b0 | (lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] & 0x0f)); + lowpan6_offset += 1; + } + + udphdr->chksum = lwip_htons(lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset] << 8 | lowpan6_buffer[lowpan6_offset + 1]); + lowpan6_offset += 2; + ip6_offset += UDP_HLEN; + + if (datagram_size == 0) { + datagram_size = compressed_size - lowpan6_offset + ip6_offset; + } + + udphdr->len = lwip_htons(datagram_size - IP6_HLEN); + + } else +#endif /* LWIP_UDP */ + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(LWIP_DBG_ON, ("NHC: unsupported protocol!\n")); + /* @todo support NHC other than UDP */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + + if (datagram_size == 0) { + datagram_size = compressed_size - lowpan6_offset + ip6_offset; + } + + /* Infer IPv6 payload length for header */ + IP6H_PLEN_SET(ip6hdr, datagram_size - IP6_HLEN); + + if (lowpan6_offset > lowpan6_bufsize) { + /* input buffer overflow */ + return ERR_VAL; + } + + *hdr_size_comp = lowpan6_offset; + *hdr_size_decomp = ip6_offset; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +struct pbuf * +lowpan6_decompress(struct pbuf *p, u16_t datagram_size, ip6_addr_t *lowpan6_contexts, + struct lowpan6_link_addr *src, struct lowpan6_link_addr *dest) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + u16_t lowpan6_offset, ip6_offset; + err_t err; + +#if LWIP_UDP +#define UDP_HLEN_ALLOC UDP_HLEN +#else +#define UDP_HLEN_ALLOC 0 +#endif + + /* Allocate a buffer for decompression. This buffer will be too big and will be + trimmed once the final size is known. */ + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_IP, p->len + IP6_HLEN + UDP_HLEN_ALLOC, PBUF_POOL); + + if (q == NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + return NULL; + } + + if (q->len < IP6_HLEN + UDP_HLEN_ALLOC) { + /* The headers need to fit into the first pbuf */ + pbuf_free(p); + pbuf_free(q); + return NULL; + } + + /* Decompress the IPv6 (and possibly UDP) header(s) into the new pbuf */ + err = lowpan6_decompress_hdr((u8_t *)p->payload, p->len, (u8_t *)q->payload, q->len, + &lowpan6_offset, &ip6_offset, datagram_size, p->tot_len, lowpan6_contexts, src, dest); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + pbuf_free(q); + return NULL; + } + + /* Now we copy leftover contents from p to q, so we have all L2 and L3 headers + (and L4?) in a single pbuf: */ + + /* Hide the compressed headers in p */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, lowpan6_offset); + /* Temporarily hide the headers in q... */ + pbuf_remove_header(q, ip6_offset); + /* ... copy the rest of p into q... */ + pbuf_copy(q, p); + /* ... and reveal the headers again... */ + pbuf_add_header_force(q, ip6_offset); + /* ... trim the pbuf to its correct size... */ + pbuf_realloc(q, ip6_offset + p->len); + + /* ... and cat possibly remaining (data-only) pbufs */ + if (p->next != NULL) { + pbuf_cat(q, p->next); + } + + /* the original (first) pbuf can now be freed */ + p->next = NULL; + pbuf_free(p); + + /* all done */ + return q; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_6LOWPAN_IPHC */ +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/PPPD_FOLLOWUP b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/PPPD_FOLLOWUP similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/PPPD_FOLLOWUP rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/PPPD_FOLLOWUP index e131de2d..c231982a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/PPPD_FOLLOWUP +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/PPPD_FOLLOWUP @@ -1,473 +1,473 @@ -The lwIP PPP support is based from pppd 2.4.5 (http://ppp.samba.org) with -huge changes to match code size and memory requirements for embedded devices. - -Anyway, pppd has a mature codebase for years and the average commit count -is getting low on their Git repository, meaning that we can follow what -is happening on their side and merge what is relevant for lwIP. - -So, here is the pppd follow up, so that we don't get away too far from pppd. - - -== Patch fetched from from pppd Debian packages == - -This has nothing to do with pppd, but we merged some good patch from -Debian and this is a good place to be. - -- LCP adaptive echo, so that we don't send LCP echo request if we - are receiving data from peer, can be enabled by setting PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE - to true. - -- IPCP no/replace default route option, were added in the early stage of - the ppp port, but it wasn't really helpful and was disabled when adding - the new API ppp_set_default() call, which gives the lwIP user control over - which one is the default interface, it was actually a requirement if you - are doing PPP over PPP (i.e. PPPoL2TP, VPN link, over PPPoE, ADSL link). - -- using rp-pppoe pppd exits with EXIT_OK after receiving a timeout waiting - for PADO due to no modem attached, bug reported to pppd bug tracker, fixed - in Debian but not in the latest (at the time when the port were started) - pppd release. - - -== Commits on pppd == - -2010-03-06 - Document +ipv6 and ipv6cp-accept-local - e7537958aee79b3f653c601e903cb31d78fb7dcc - -Don't care. - - -2010-03-06 - Install pppol2tp plugins with sane permissions - 406215672cfadc03017341fe03802d1c7294b903 - -Don't care. - - -2010-03-07 - pppd: Terminate correctly if lcp_lowerup delayed calling - fsm_lowerup - 3eb9e810cfa515543655659b72dde30c54fea0a5 - -Merged 2012-05-17. - - -2010-03-07 - rp_pppoe: Copy acName and pppd_pppoe_service after option parsing - cab58617fd9d328029fffabc788020264b4fa91f - -Don't care, is a patch for pppd/plugins/rp-pppoe/plugin.c which is not part -of the port. - - -2010-08-23 - set and reset options to control environment variables - for scripts. - 2b6310fd24dba8e0fca8999916a162f0a1842a84 - -We can't fork processes in embedded, therefore all the pppd process run -feature is disabled in the port, so we don't care about the new -"environment variables" pppd feature. - - -2010-08-23 - Nit: use _exit when exec fails and restrict values to 0-255 - per POSIX. - 2b4ea140432eeba5a007c0d4e6236bd0e0c12ba4 - -Again, we are not running as a heavy process, so all exit() or _exit() calls -were removed. - - -2010-08-23 - Fix quote handling in configuration files to be more like shell - quoting. - 3089132cdf5b58dbdfc2daf08ec5c08eb47f8aca - -We are not parsing config file, all the filesystem I/O stuff were disabled -in our port. - - -2010-08-24 - rp-pppoe: allow MTU to be increased up to 1500 - fd1dcdf758418f040da3ed801ab001b5e46854e7 - -Only concern changes on RP-PPPoE plugin, which we don't use. - - -2010-09-11 - chat: Allow TIMEOUT value to come from environment variable - ae80bf833e48a6202f44a935a68083ae52ad3824 - -See 2b6310fd24dba8e0fca8999916a162f0a1842a84. - - -2011-03-05 - pppdump: Fix printfs with insufficient arguments - 7b8db569642c83ba3283745034f2e2c95e459423 - -pppdump is a ppp tool outside pppd source tree. - - -2012-05-06 - pppd: Don't unconditionally disable VJ compression under Linux - d8a66adf98a0e525cf38031b42098d539da6eeb6 - -Patch for sys-linux.c, which we don't use. - - -2012-05-20 - Remove old version of Linux if_pppol2tp.h - c41092dd4c49267f232f6cba3d31c6c68bfdf68d - -Not in the port. - - -2012-05-20 - pppd: Make MSCHAP-v2 cope better with packet loss - 08ef47ca532294eb428238c831616748940e24a2 - -This is an interesting patch. However it consumes much more memory for -MSCHAP and I am not sure if the benefit worth it. The PPP client can -always start the authentication again if it failed for whatever reason. - - -2012-05-20 - scripts: Make poff ignore extra arguments to pppd - 18f515f32c9f5723a9c2c912601e04335106534b - -Again, we are not running scripts. - - -2012-05-20 - rp-pppoe plugin: Print leading zeros in MAC address - f5dda0cfc220c4b52e26144096d729e27b30f0f7 - -Again, we are not using the RP-PPPoE plugin. - - -2012-05-20 - pppd: Notify IPv6 up/down as we do for IPv4 - 845cda8fa18939cf56e60b073f63a7efa65336fc - -This is just a patch that adds plugins hooks for IPv6, the plugin interface -was disabled because we don't have .so plugins in embedded. - - -2012-05-20 - pppd: Enable IPV6 by default and fix some warnings - 0b6118239615e98959f7e0b4e746bdd197533248 - -Change on Makefile for IPv6, warnings were already cleared during port. - - -2012-05-20 - contrib: Fix pppgetpass.gtk compilation - 80a8e2ce257ca12cce723519a0f20ea1d663b14a - -Change on Makefile, don't care. - - -2012-05-20 - pppd: Don't crash if crypt() returns NULL - 04c4348108d847e034dd91066cc6843f60d71731 - -We are using the PolarSSL DES implementation that does not return NULL. - - -2012-05-20 - pppd: Eliminate some warnings - c44ae5e6a7338c96eb463881fe709b2dfaffe568 - -Again, we are handling compilation warnings on our own. - - -2012-05-20 - rp-pppoe plugin: Import some fixes from rp-pppoe-3.10 - 1817d83e51a411044e730ba89ebdb0480e1c8cd4 - -Once more, we are not using the RP-PPPoE plugin. - - -2013-01-23 - pppd: Clarify circumstances where DNS1/DNS2 environment variables are set - cf2f5c9538b9400ade23446a194729b0a4113b3a - -Documentation only. - - -2013-02-03 - ppp: ignore unrecognised radiusclient configuration directives - 7f736dde0da3c19855997d9e67370e351e15e923 - -Radius plugin, not in the port. - - -2013-02-03 - pppd: Take out unused %r conversion completely - 356d8d558d844412119aa18c8e5a113bc6459c7b - -Merged 2014-04-15. - - -2013-02-03 - pppd: Arrange to use logwtmp from libutil on Linux - 9617a7eb137f4fee62799a677a9ecf8d834db3f5 - -Patch for sys-linux.c, which we don't use. - - -2013-02-03 - pppdump: Eliminate some compiler warnings - 3e3acf1ba2b3046c072a42c19164788a9e419bd1 - -pppdump is a ppp tool outside pppd source tree. - - -2013-02-03 - chat: Correct spelling errors in the man page - 8dea1b969d266ccbf6f3a8c5474eb6dcd8838e3b - -Documentation only. - - -2013-02-03 - pppd: Fix spelling errors in man page - 9e05a25d76b3f83096c661678010320df673df6b - -Documentation only. - - -2013-02-03 - plugins/passprompt: Fix potential out-of-bounds array reference - 8edb889b753056a691a3e4b217a110a35f9fdedb - -Plugin patch, we do not have plugins. - - -2013-02-03 - chat: Fix *roff errors in the man page - a7c3489eeaf44e83ce592143c7c8a5b5c29f4c48 - -Documentation only. - - -2013-03-02 - pppd: Fix man page description of case when remote IP address isn't known - 224841f4799f4f1e2e71bc490c54448d66740f4f - -Documentation only. - - -2013-03-02 - pppd: Add master_detach option - 398ed2585640d198c53e736ee5bbd67f7ce8168e - -Option for multilink support, we do not support multilink and this option -is about detaching from the terminal, which is out of the embedded scope. - - -2013-03-11 - pppd: Default exit status to EXIT_CONNECT_FAILED during connection phase - 225361d64ae737afdc8cb57579a2f33525461bc9 - -Commented out in our port, and already fixed by a previously applied Debian patch. - - -2013-03-11 - pppstats: Fix undefined macro in man page - d16a3985eade5280b8e171f5dd0670a91cba0d39 - -Documentation only. - - -2013-05-11 - plugins/radius: Handle bindaddr keyword in radiusclient.conf - d883b2dbafeed3ebd9d7a56ab1469373bd001a3b - -Radius plugin, not in the port. - - -2013-06-09 - pppoatm: Remove explicit loading of pppoatm kernel module - 52cd43a84bea524033b918b603698104f221bbb7 - -PPPoATM plugin, not in the port. - - -2013-06-09 - pppd: Fix segfault in update_db_entry() - 37476164f15a45015310b9d4b197c2d7db1f7f8f - -We do not use the samba db. - - -2013-06-09 - chat: Fix some text that was intended to be literal - cd9683676618adcee8add2c3cfa3382341b5a1f6 - -Documentation only. - - -2013-06-09 - README.pppoe: Minor semantic fix - b5b8898af6fd3d44e873cfc66810ace5f1f47e17 - -Documentation only. - - -2013-06-10 - radius: Handle additional attributes - 2f581cd986a56f2ec4a95abad4f8297a1b10d7e2 - -Radius plugin, not in the port. - - -2013-06-10 - chat, pppd: Use \e instead of \\ in man pages - 8d6942415d22f6ca4377340ca26e345c3f5fa5db - -Documentation only. - - -2014-01-02 - pppd: Don't crash if NULL pointer passed to vslprintf for %q or %v - 906814431bddeb2061825fa1ebad1a967b6d87a9 - -Merged 2014-04-15. - - -2014-01-02 - pppd: Accept IPCP ConfAck packets containing MS-WINS options - a243f217f1c6ac1aa7793806bc88590d077f490a - -Merged 2014-04-15. - - -2014-01-02 - config: Update Solaris compiler options and enable CHAPMS and IPV6 - 99c46caaed01b7edba87962aa52b77fad61bfd7b - -Solaris port, don't care. - - -2014-01-02 - Update README and patchlevel for 2.4.6 release - 4043750fca36e7e0eb90d702e048ad1da4929418 - -Just release stuff. - - -2014-02-18 - pppd: Add option "stop-bits" to set number of serial port stop bits. - ad993a20ee485f0d0e2ac4105221641b200da6e2 - -Low level serial port, not in the port. - - -2014-03-09 - pppd: Separate IPv6 handling for sifup/sifdown - b04d2dc6df5c6b5650fea44250d58757ee3dac4a - -Reimplemented. - - -2014-03-09 - pppol2tp: Connect up/down events to notifiers and add IPv6 ones - fafbe50251efc7d6b4a8be652d085316e112b34f - -Not in the port. - - -2014-03-09 - pppd: Add declarations to eliminate compile warnings - 50967962addebe15c7a7e63116ff46a0441dc464 - -We are handling compilation warnings on our own - - -2014-03-09 - pppd: Eliminate some unnecessary ifdefs - de8da14d845ee6db9236ccfddabf1d8ebf045ddb - -We mostly did that previously. Anyway, merged 2014-12-24. - - -2014-08-01 - radius: Fix realms-config-file option - 880a81be7c8e0fe8567227bc17a1bff3ea035943 - -Radius plugin, not in the port. - - -2014-08-01 - pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing - 7658e8257183f062dc01f87969c140707c7e52cb - -pppd config file parser, not in the port. - - -2014-08-01 - pppd: Eliminate memory leak with multiple instances of a string option - b94b7fbbaa0589aa6ec5fdc733aeb9ff294d2656 - -pppd config file parser, not in the port. - - -2014-08-01 - pppd: Fix a stack variable overflow in MSCHAP-v2 - 36733a891fb56594fcee580f667b33a64b990981 - -This fixes a bug introduced in 08ef47ca ("pppd: Make MSCHAP-v2 cope better with packet loss"). - -We didn't merge 08ef47ca ;-) - - -2014-08-01 - winbind plugin: Add -DMPPE=1 to eliminate compiler warnings - 2b05e22c62095e97dd0a97e4b5588402c2185071 - -Linux plugin, not in the port. - - -2014-08-09 - Update README and patchlevel for 2.4.7 release - 6e8eaa7a78b31cdab2edf140a9c8afdb02ffaca5 - -Just release stuff. - - -2014-08-10 - abort on errors in subdir builds - 5e90783d11a59268e05f4cfb29ce2343b13e8ab2 - -Linux Makefile, not in the port. - - -2014-06-03 - pppd: add support for defaultroute-metric option - 35e5a569c988b1ff865b02a24d9a727a00db4da9 - -Only necessary for Linux, lwIP does not support route metrics. - - -2014-12-13 - scripts: Avoid killing wrong pppd - 67811a647d399db5d188a242827760615a0f86b5 - -pppd helper script, not in the port. - - -2014-12-20 - pppd: Fix sign-extension when displaying bytes in octal - 5e8c3cb256a7e86e3572a82a75d51c6850efdbdc - -Merged 2016-07-02. - - -2015-03-01 - Suppress false error message on PPPoE disconnect - 219aac3b53d0827549377f1bfe22853ee52d4405 - -PPPoE plugin, not in the port. - - -2015-03-01 - Send PADT on PPPoE disconnect - cd2c14f998c57bbe6a01dc5854f2763c0d7f31fb - -PPPoE plugin, not in the port. And our PPPoE implementation already does -that: pppoe_disconnect() calls pppoe_send_padt(). - - -2015-08-14 - pppd: ipxcp: Prevent buffer overrun on remote router name - fe149de624f96629a7f46732055d8f718c74b856 - -We never ported IPX support. lwIP does not support IPX. - - -2015-03-25 - pppd: Fix ccp_options.mppe type - 234edab99a6bb250cc9ecd384cca27b0c8b475ce - -We found that while working on MPPE support in lwIP, that's our patch ;-) - - -2015-03-24 - pppd: Fix ccp_cilen calculated size if both deflate_correct and deflate_draft are enabled - 094cb8ae4c61db225e67fedadb4964f846dd0c27 - -We found that while working on MPPE support in lwIP, that's our patch ;-) - - -2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/ncopa/ppp - 3a5c9a8fbc8970375cd881151d44e4b6fe249c6a - -Merge commit, we don't care. - - -2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'master' of git://github.com/vapier/ppp - 912e4fc6665aca188dced7ea7fdc663ce5a2dd24 - -Merge commit, we don't care. - - -2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'bug_fix' of git://github.com/radaiming/ppp - dfd33d7f526ecd7b39dd1bba8101260d02af5ebb - -Merge commit, we don't care. - - -2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'master' of git://github.com/pprindeville/ppp - aa4a985f6114d08cf4e47634fb6325da71016473 - -Merge commit, we don't care. - - -2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'no-error-on-already-closed' of git://github.com/farnz/ppp - 6edf252483b30dbcdcc5059f01831455365d5b6e - -Merge commit, we don't care. - - -2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'send-padt-on-disconnect' of git://github.com/farnz/ppp - 84684243d651f55f6df69d2a6707b52fbbe62bb9 - -Merge commit, we don't care. +The lwIP PPP support is based from pppd 2.4.5 (http://ppp.samba.org) with +huge changes to match code size and memory requirements for embedded devices. + +Anyway, pppd has a mature codebase for years and the average commit count +is getting low on their Git repository, meaning that we can follow what +is happening on their side and merge what is relevant for lwIP. + +So, here is the pppd follow up, so that we don't get away too far from pppd. + + +== Patch fetched from from pppd Debian packages == + +This has nothing to do with pppd, but we merged some good patch from +Debian and this is a good place to be. + +- LCP adaptive echo, so that we don't send LCP echo request if we + are receiving data from peer, can be enabled by setting PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE + to true. + +- IPCP no/replace default route option, were added in the early stage of + the ppp port, but it wasn't really helpful and was disabled when adding + the new API ppp_set_default() call, which gives the lwIP user control over + which one is the default interface, it was actually a requirement if you + are doing PPP over PPP (i.e. PPPoL2TP, VPN link, over PPPoE, ADSL link). + +- using rp-pppoe pppd exits with EXIT_OK after receiving a timeout waiting + for PADO due to no modem attached, bug reported to pppd bug tracker, fixed + in Debian but not in the latest (at the time when the port were started) + pppd release. + + +== Commits on pppd == + +2010-03-06 - Document +ipv6 and ipv6cp-accept-local + e7537958aee79b3f653c601e903cb31d78fb7dcc + +Don't care. + + +2010-03-06 - Install pppol2tp plugins with sane permissions + 406215672cfadc03017341fe03802d1c7294b903 + +Don't care. + + +2010-03-07 - pppd: Terminate correctly if lcp_lowerup delayed calling + fsm_lowerup + 3eb9e810cfa515543655659b72dde30c54fea0a5 + +Merged 2012-05-17. + + +2010-03-07 - rp_pppoe: Copy acName and pppd_pppoe_service after option parsing + cab58617fd9d328029fffabc788020264b4fa91f + +Don't care, is a patch for pppd/plugins/rp-pppoe/plugin.c which is not part +of the port. + + +2010-08-23 - set and reset options to control environment variables + for scripts. + 2b6310fd24dba8e0fca8999916a162f0a1842a84 + +We can't fork processes in embedded, therefore all the pppd process run +feature is disabled in the port, so we don't care about the new +"environment variables" pppd feature. + + +2010-08-23 - Nit: use _exit when exec fails and restrict values to 0-255 + per POSIX. + 2b4ea140432eeba5a007c0d4e6236bd0e0c12ba4 + +Again, we are not running as a heavy process, so all exit() or _exit() calls +were removed. + + +2010-08-23 - Fix quote handling in configuration files to be more like shell + quoting. + 3089132cdf5b58dbdfc2daf08ec5c08eb47f8aca + +We are not parsing config file, all the filesystem I/O stuff were disabled +in our port. + + +2010-08-24 - rp-pppoe: allow MTU to be increased up to 1500 + fd1dcdf758418f040da3ed801ab001b5e46854e7 + +Only concern changes on RP-PPPoE plugin, which we don't use. + + +2010-09-11 - chat: Allow TIMEOUT value to come from environment variable + ae80bf833e48a6202f44a935a68083ae52ad3824 + +See 2b6310fd24dba8e0fca8999916a162f0a1842a84. + + +2011-03-05 - pppdump: Fix printfs with insufficient arguments + 7b8db569642c83ba3283745034f2e2c95e459423 + +pppdump is a ppp tool outside pppd source tree. + + +2012-05-06 - pppd: Don't unconditionally disable VJ compression under Linux + d8a66adf98a0e525cf38031b42098d539da6eeb6 + +Patch for sys-linux.c, which we don't use. + + +2012-05-20 - Remove old version of Linux if_pppol2tp.h + c41092dd4c49267f232f6cba3d31c6c68bfdf68d + +Not in the port. + + +2012-05-20 - pppd: Make MSCHAP-v2 cope better with packet loss + 08ef47ca532294eb428238c831616748940e24a2 + +This is an interesting patch. However it consumes much more memory for +MSCHAP and I am not sure if the benefit worth it. The PPP client can +always start the authentication again if it failed for whatever reason. + + +2012-05-20 - scripts: Make poff ignore extra arguments to pppd + 18f515f32c9f5723a9c2c912601e04335106534b + +Again, we are not running scripts. + + +2012-05-20 - rp-pppoe plugin: Print leading zeros in MAC address + f5dda0cfc220c4b52e26144096d729e27b30f0f7 + +Again, we are not using the RP-PPPoE plugin. + + +2012-05-20 - pppd: Notify IPv6 up/down as we do for IPv4 + 845cda8fa18939cf56e60b073f63a7efa65336fc + +This is just a patch that adds plugins hooks for IPv6, the plugin interface +was disabled because we don't have .so plugins in embedded. + + +2012-05-20 - pppd: Enable IPV6 by default and fix some warnings + 0b6118239615e98959f7e0b4e746bdd197533248 + +Change on Makefile for IPv6, warnings were already cleared during port. + + +2012-05-20 - contrib: Fix pppgetpass.gtk compilation + 80a8e2ce257ca12cce723519a0f20ea1d663b14a + +Change on Makefile, don't care. + + +2012-05-20 - pppd: Don't crash if crypt() returns NULL + 04c4348108d847e034dd91066cc6843f60d71731 + +We are using the PolarSSL DES implementation that does not return NULL. + + +2012-05-20 - pppd: Eliminate some warnings + c44ae5e6a7338c96eb463881fe709b2dfaffe568 + +Again, we are handling compilation warnings on our own. + + +2012-05-20 - rp-pppoe plugin: Import some fixes from rp-pppoe-3.10 + 1817d83e51a411044e730ba89ebdb0480e1c8cd4 + +Once more, we are not using the RP-PPPoE plugin. + + +2013-01-23 - pppd: Clarify circumstances where DNS1/DNS2 environment variables are set + cf2f5c9538b9400ade23446a194729b0a4113b3a + +Documentation only. + + +2013-02-03 - ppp: ignore unrecognised radiusclient configuration directives + 7f736dde0da3c19855997d9e67370e351e15e923 + +Radius plugin, not in the port. + + +2013-02-03 - pppd: Take out unused %r conversion completely + 356d8d558d844412119aa18c8e5a113bc6459c7b + +Merged 2014-04-15. + + +2013-02-03 - pppd: Arrange to use logwtmp from libutil on Linux + 9617a7eb137f4fee62799a677a9ecf8d834db3f5 + +Patch for sys-linux.c, which we don't use. + + +2013-02-03 - pppdump: Eliminate some compiler warnings + 3e3acf1ba2b3046c072a42c19164788a9e419bd1 + +pppdump is a ppp tool outside pppd source tree. + + +2013-02-03 - chat: Correct spelling errors in the man page + 8dea1b969d266ccbf6f3a8c5474eb6dcd8838e3b + +Documentation only. + + +2013-02-03 - pppd: Fix spelling errors in man page + 9e05a25d76b3f83096c661678010320df673df6b + +Documentation only. + + +2013-02-03 - plugins/passprompt: Fix potential out-of-bounds array reference + 8edb889b753056a691a3e4b217a110a35f9fdedb + +Plugin patch, we do not have plugins. + + +2013-02-03 - chat: Fix *roff errors in the man page + a7c3489eeaf44e83ce592143c7c8a5b5c29f4c48 + +Documentation only. + + +2013-03-02 - pppd: Fix man page description of case when remote IP address isn't known + 224841f4799f4f1e2e71bc490c54448d66740f4f + +Documentation only. + + +2013-03-02 - pppd: Add master_detach option + 398ed2585640d198c53e736ee5bbd67f7ce8168e + +Option for multilink support, we do not support multilink and this option +is about detaching from the terminal, which is out of the embedded scope. + + +2013-03-11 - pppd: Default exit status to EXIT_CONNECT_FAILED during connection phase + 225361d64ae737afdc8cb57579a2f33525461bc9 + +Commented out in our port, and already fixed by a previously applied Debian patch. + + +2013-03-11 - pppstats: Fix undefined macro in man page + d16a3985eade5280b8e171f5dd0670a91cba0d39 + +Documentation only. + + +2013-05-11 - plugins/radius: Handle bindaddr keyword in radiusclient.conf + d883b2dbafeed3ebd9d7a56ab1469373bd001a3b + +Radius plugin, not in the port. + + +2013-06-09 - pppoatm: Remove explicit loading of pppoatm kernel module + 52cd43a84bea524033b918b603698104f221bbb7 + +PPPoATM plugin, not in the port. + + +2013-06-09 - pppd: Fix segfault in update_db_entry() + 37476164f15a45015310b9d4b197c2d7db1f7f8f + +We do not use the samba db. + + +2013-06-09 - chat: Fix some text that was intended to be literal + cd9683676618adcee8add2c3cfa3382341b5a1f6 + +Documentation only. + + +2013-06-09 - README.pppoe: Minor semantic fix + b5b8898af6fd3d44e873cfc66810ace5f1f47e17 + +Documentation only. + + +2013-06-10 - radius: Handle additional attributes + 2f581cd986a56f2ec4a95abad4f8297a1b10d7e2 + +Radius plugin, not in the port. + + +2013-06-10 - chat, pppd: Use \e instead of \\ in man pages + 8d6942415d22f6ca4377340ca26e345c3f5fa5db + +Documentation only. + + +2014-01-02 - pppd: Don't crash if NULL pointer passed to vslprintf for %q or %v + 906814431bddeb2061825fa1ebad1a967b6d87a9 + +Merged 2014-04-15. + + +2014-01-02 - pppd: Accept IPCP ConfAck packets containing MS-WINS options + a243f217f1c6ac1aa7793806bc88590d077f490a + +Merged 2014-04-15. + + +2014-01-02 - config: Update Solaris compiler options and enable CHAPMS and IPV6 + 99c46caaed01b7edba87962aa52b77fad61bfd7b + +Solaris port, don't care. + + +2014-01-02 - Update README and patchlevel for 2.4.6 release + 4043750fca36e7e0eb90d702e048ad1da4929418 + +Just release stuff. + + +2014-02-18 - pppd: Add option "stop-bits" to set number of serial port stop bits. + ad993a20ee485f0d0e2ac4105221641b200da6e2 + +Low level serial port, not in the port. + + +2014-03-09 - pppd: Separate IPv6 handling for sifup/sifdown + b04d2dc6df5c6b5650fea44250d58757ee3dac4a + +Reimplemented. + + +2014-03-09 - pppol2tp: Connect up/down events to notifiers and add IPv6 ones + fafbe50251efc7d6b4a8be652d085316e112b34f + +Not in the port. + + +2014-03-09 - pppd: Add declarations to eliminate compile warnings + 50967962addebe15c7a7e63116ff46a0441dc464 + +We are handling compilation warnings on our own + + +2014-03-09 - pppd: Eliminate some unnecessary ifdefs + de8da14d845ee6db9236ccfddabf1d8ebf045ddb + +We mostly did that previously. Anyway, merged 2014-12-24. + + +2014-08-01 - radius: Fix realms-config-file option + 880a81be7c8e0fe8567227bc17a1bff3ea035943 + +Radius plugin, not in the port. + + +2014-08-01 - pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing + 7658e8257183f062dc01f87969c140707c7e52cb + +pppd config file parser, not in the port. + + +2014-08-01 - pppd: Eliminate memory leak with multiple instances of a string option + b94b7fbbaa0589aa6ec5fdc733aeb9ff294d2656 + +pppd config file parser, not in the port. + + +2014-08-01 - pppd: Fix a stack variable overflow in MSCHAP-v2 + 36733a891fb56594fcee580f667b33a64b990981 + +This fixes a bug introduced in 08ef47ca ("pppd: Make MSCHAP-v2 cope better with packet loss"). + +We didn't merge 08ef47ca ;-) + + +2014-08-01 - winbind plugin: Add -DMPPE=1 to eliminate compiler warnings + 2b05e22c62095e97dd0a97e4b5588402c2185071 + +Linux plugin, not in the port. + + +2014-08-09 - Update README and patchlevel for 2.4.7 release + 6e8eaa7a78b31cdab2edf140a9c8afdb02ffaca5 + +Just release stuff. + + +2014-08-10 - abort on errors in subdir builds + 5e90783d11a59268e05f4cfb29ce2343b13e8ab2 + +Linux Makefile, not in the port. + + +2014-06-03 - pppd: add support for defaultroute-metric option + 35e5a569c988b1ff865b02a24d9a727a00db4da9 + +Only necessary for Linux, lwIP does not support route metrics. + + +2014-12-13 - scripts: Avoid killing wrong pppd + 67811a647d399db5d188a242827760615a0f86b5 + +pppd helper script, not in the port. + + +2014-12-20 - pppd: Fix sign-extension when displaying bytes in octal + 5e8c3cb256a7e86e3572a82a75d51c6850efdbdc + +Merged 2016-07-02. + + +2015-03-01 - Suppress false error message on PPPoE disconnect + 219aac3b53d0827549377f1bfe22853ee52d4405 + +PPPoE plugin, not in the port. + + +2015-03-01 - Send PADT on PPPoE disconnect + cd2c14f998c57bbe6a01dc5854f2763c0d7f31fb + +PPPoE plugin, not in the port. And our PPPoE implementation already does +that: pppoe_disconnect() calls pppoe_send_padt(). + + +2015-08-14 - pppd: ipxcp: Prevent buffer overrun on remote router name + fe149de624f96629a7f46732055d8f718c74b856 + +We never ported IPX support. lwIP does not support IPX. + + +2015-03-25 - pppd: Fix ccp_options.mppe type + 234edab99a6bb250cc9ecd384cca27b0c8b475ce + +We found that while working on MPPE support in lwIP, that's our patch ;-) + + +2015-03-24 - pppd: Fix ccp_cilen calculated size if both deflate_correct and deflate_draft are enabled + 094cb8ae4c61db225e67fedadb4964f846dd0c27 + +We found that while working on MPPE support in lwIP, that's our patch ;-) + + +2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/ncopa/ppp + 3a5c9a8fbc8970375cd881151d44e4b6fe249c6a + +Merge commit, we don't care. + + +2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'master' of git://github.com/vapier/ppp + 912e4fc6665aca188dced7ea7fdc663ce5a2dd24 + +Merge commit, we don't care. + + +2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'bug_fix' of git://github.com/radaiming/ppp + dfd33d7f526ecd7b39dd1bba8101260d02af5ebb + +Merge commit, we don't care. + + +2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'master' of git://github.com/pprindeville/ppp + aa4a985f6114d08cf4e47634fb6325da71016473 + +Merge commit, we don't care. + + +2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'no-error-on-already-closed' of git://github.com/farnz/ppp + 6edf252483b30dbcdcc5059f01831455365d5b6e + +Merge commit, we don't care. + + +2015-08-14 - Merge branch 'send-padt-on-disconnect' of git://github.com/farnz/ppp + 84684243d651f55f6df69d2a6707b52fbbe62bb9 + +Merge commit, we don't care. diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/auth.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/auth.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/auth.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/auth.c index 91420210..0f48e064 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/auth.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/auth.c @@ -1,3085 +1,3085 @@ -/* - * auth.c - PPP authentication and phase control. - * - * Copyright (c) 1993-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * Derived from main.c, which is: - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#if defined(_PATH_LASTLOG) && defined(__linux__) -#include -#endif - -#include -#include -#include - -#ifdef HAS_SHADOW -#include -#ifndef PW_PPP -#define PW_PPP PW_LOGIN -#endif -#endif - -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" -#if CCP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ -#if ECP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/ecp.h" -#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ -#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" -#if PAP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/upap.h" -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/eap.h" -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CBCP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/cbcp.h" -#endif - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include "session.h" -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - /* Bits in scan_authfile return value */ -#define NONWILD_SERVER 1 -#define NONWILD_CLIENT 2 - -#define ISWILD(word) (word[0] == '*' && word[1] == 0) -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - /* List of addresses which the peer may use. */ - static struct permitted_ip *addresses[NUM_PPP]; - - /* Wordlist giving addresses which the peer may use - without authenticating itself. */ - static struct wordlist *noauth_addrs; - - /* Remote telephone number, if available */ - char remote_number[MAXNAMELEN]; - - /* Wordlist giving remote telephone numbers which may connect. */ - static struct wordlist *permitted_numbers; - - /* Extra options to apply, from the secrets file entry for the peer. */ - static struct wordlist *extra_options; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* Set if we require authentication only because we have a default route. */ -static bool default_auth; - -/* Hook to enable a plugin to control the idle time limit */ -int (*idle_time_hook)(struct ppp_idle *) = NULL; - -/* Hook for a plugin to say whether we can possibly authenticate any peer */ -int (*pap_check_hook)(void) = NULL; - -/* Hook for a plugin to check the PAP user and password */ -int (*pap_auth_hook)(char *user, char *passwd, char **msgp, - struct wordlist **paddrs, - struct wordlist **popts) = NULL; - -/* Hook for a plugin to know about the PAP user logout */ -void (*pap_logout_hook)(void) = NULL; - -/* Hook for a plugin to get the PAP password for authenticating us */ -int (*pap_passwd_hook)(char *user, char *passwd) = NULL; - -/* Hook for a plugin to say if we can possibly authenticate a peer using CHAP */ -int (*chap_check_hook)(void) = NULL; - -/* Hook for a plugin to get the CHAP password for authenticating us */ -int (*chap_passwd_hook)(char *user, char *passwd) = NULL; - -/* Hook for a plugin to say whether it is OK if the peer - refuses to authenticate. */ -int (*null_auth_hook)(struct wordlist **paddrs, - struct wordlist **popts) = NULL; - -int (*allowed_address_hook)(u32_t addr) = NULL; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK -/* Hook for plugin to hear when an interface joins a multilink bundle */ -void (*multilink_join_hook)(void) = NULL; -#endif - -#if PPP_NOTIFY -/* A notifier for when the peer has authenticated itself, - and we are proceeding to the network phase. */ -struct notifier *auth_up_notifier = NULL; - -/* A notifier for when the link goes down. */ -struct notifier *link_down_notifier = NULL; -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ - -/* - * Option variables. - */ -#if 0 /* MOVED TO ppp_settings */ - bool uselogin = 0; /* Use /etc/passwd for checking PAP */ - bool session_mgmt = 0; /* Do session management (login records) */ - bool cryptpap = 0; /* Passwords in pap-secrets are encrypted */ - bool refuse_pap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with PAP */ - bool refuse_chap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with CHAP */ - bool refuse_eap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with EAP */ -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - bool refuse_mschap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with MS-CHAP */ - bool refuse_mschap_v2 = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with MS-CHAPv2 */ -#else /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - bool refuse_mschap = 1; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with MS-CHAP */ - bool refuse_mschap_v2 = 1; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with MS-CHAPv2 */ -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - bool usehostname = 0; /* Use hostname for our_name */ - bool auth_required = 0; /* Always require authentication from peer */ - bool allow_any_ip = 0; /* Allow peer to use any IP address */ - bool explicit_remote = 0; /* User specified explicit remote name */ - bool explicit_user = 0; /* Set if "user" option supplied */ - bool explicit_passwd = 0; /* Set if "password" option supplied */ - char remote_name[MAXNAMELEN]; /* Peer's name for authentication */ - static char *uafname; /* name of most recent +ua file */ - - extern char *crypt(const char *, const char *); -#endif /* UNUSED */ -/* Prototypes for procedures local to this file. */ - -static void network_phase(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT -static void check_idle(void *arg); -#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ -#if PPP_MAXCONNECT -static void connect_time_expired(void *arg); -#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -static int null_login(int); -/* static int get_pap_passwd (char *); */ -static int have_pap_secret(int *); -static int have_chap_secret(char *, char *, int, int *); -static int have_srp_secret(char *client, char *server, int need_ip, - int *lacks_ipp); -static int ip_addr_check(u32_t, struct permitted_ip *); -static int scan_authfile(FILE *, char *, char *, char *, - struct wordlist **, struct wordlist **, - char *, int); -static void free_wordlist(struct wordlist *); -static void set_allowed_addrs(int, struct wordlist *, struct wordlist *); -static int some_ip_ok(struct wordlist *); -static int setupapfile(char **); -static int privgroup(char **); -static int set_noauth_addr(char **); -static int set_permitted_number(char **); -static void check_access(FILE *, char *); -static int wordlist_count(struct wordlist *); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#ifdef MAXOCTETS -static void check_maxoctets(void *); -#endif - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * Authentication-related options. - */ -option_t auth_options[] = { - { "auth", o_bool, &auth_required, - "Require authentication from peer", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, - { "noauth", o_bool, &auth_required, - "Don't require peer to authenticate", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_PRIV, - &allow_any_ip }, - { "require-pap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_upap, - "Require PAP authentication from peer", - OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, &auth_required }, - { "+pap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_upap, - "Require PAP authentication from peer", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, &auth_required }, - { "require-chap", o_bool, &auth_required, - "Require CHAP authentication from peer", - OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MD5, - &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, - { "+chap", o_bool, &auth_required, - "Require CHAP authentication from peer", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MD5, - &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - { "require-mschap", o_bool, &auth_required, - "Require MS-CHAP authentication from peer", - OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT, - &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, - { "+mschap", o_bool, &auth_required, - "Require MS-CHAP authentication from peer", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT, - &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, - { "require-mschap-v2", o_bool, &auth_required, - "Require MS-CHAPv2 authentication from peer", - OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2, - &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, - { "+mschap-v2", o_bool, &auth_required, - "Require MS-CHAPv2 authentication from peer", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2, - &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if 0 - { - "refuse-pap", o_bool, &refuse_pap, - "Don't agree to auth to peer with PAP", 1 - }, - { - "-pap", o_bool, &refuse_pap, - "Don't allow PAP authentication with peer", OPT_ALIAS | 1 - }, - { - "refuse-chap", o_bool, &refuse_chap, - "Don't agree to auth to peer with CHAP", - OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MD5, - &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype - }, - { - "-chap", o_bool, &refuse_chap, - "Don't allow CHAP authentication with peer", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MD5, - &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype - }, -#endif -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#if 0 - { - "refuse-mschap", o_bool, &refuse_mschap, - "Don't agree to auth to peer with MS-CHAP", - OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT, - &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype - }, - { - "-mschap", o_bool, &refuse_mschap, - "Don't allow MS-CHAP authentication with peer", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT, - &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype - }, - { - "refuse-mschap-v2", o_bool, &refuse_mschap_v2, - "Don't agree to auth to peer with MS-CHAPv2", - OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2, - &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype - }, - { - "-mschap-v2", o_bool, &refuse_mschap_v2, - "Don't allow MS-CHAPv2 authentication with peer", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2, - &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype - }, -#endif -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT*/ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - { "require-eap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_eap, - "Require EAP authentication from peer", OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, - &auth_required }, -#if 0 - { - "refuse-eap", o_bool, &refuse_eap, - "Don't agree to authenticate to peer with EAP", 1 - }, -#endif -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - { "name", o_string, our_name, - "Set local name for authentication", - OPT_PRIO | OPT_PRIV | OPT_STATIC, NULL, MAXNAMELEN }, - - { "+ua", o_special, (void *)setupapfile, - "Get PAP user and password from file", - OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL, &uafname }, - -#if 0 - { - "user", o_string, user, - "Set name for auth with peer", OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC, - &explicit_user, MAXNAMELEN - }, - - { - "password", o_string, passwd, - "Password for authenticating us to the peer", - OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC | OPT_HIDE, - &explicit_passwd, MAXSECRETLEN - }, -#endif - - { "usehostname", o_bool, &usehostname, - "Must use hostname for authentication", 1 }, - - { "remotename", o_string, remote_name, - "Set remote name for authentication", OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC, - &explicit_remote, MAXNAMELEN }, - - { "login", o_bool, &uselogin, - "Use system password database for PAP", OPT_A2COPY | 1, - &session_mgmt }, - { "enable-session", o_bool, &session_mgmt, - "Enable session accounting for remote peers", OPT_PRIV | 1 }, - - { "papcrypt", o_bool, &cryptpap, - "PAP passwords are encrypted", 1 }, - - { "privgroup", o_special, (void *)privgroup, - "Allow group members to use privileged options", OPT_PRIV | OPT_A2LIST }, - - { "allow-ip", o_special, (void *)set_noauth_addr, - "Set IP address(es) which can be used without authentication", - OPT_PRIV | OPT_A2LIST }, - - { "remotenumber", o_string, remote_number, - "Set remote telephone number for authentication", OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC, - NULL, MAXNAMELEN }, - - { "allow-number", o_special, (void *)set_permitted_number, - "Set telephone number(s) which are allowed to connect", - OPT_PRIV | OPT_A2LIST }, - - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* - * setupapfile - specifies UPAP info for authenticating with peer. - */ -static int setupapfile(argv) -char **argv; -{ - FILE *ufile; - int l; - uid_t euid; - char u[MAXNAMELEN], p[MAXSECRETLEN]; - char *fname; - - lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_upap = 1; - - /* open user info file */ - fname = strdup(*argv); - - if(fname == NULL) - { - novm("+ua file name"); - } - - euid = geteuid(); - - if(seteuid(getuid()) == -1) - { - option_error("unable to reset uid before opening %s: %m", fname); - return 0; - } - - ufile = fopen(fname, "r"); - - if(seteuid(euid) == -1) - { - fatal("unable to regain privileges: %m"); - } - - if(ufile == NULL) - { - option_error("unable to open user login data file %s", fname); - return 0; - } - - check_access(ufile, fname); - uafname = fname; - - /* get username */ - if(fgets(u, MAXNAMELEN - 1, ufile) == NULL - || fgets(p, MAXSECRETLEN - 1, ufile) == NULL) - { - fclose(ufile); - option_error("unable to read user login data file %s", fname); - return 0; - } - - fclose(ufile); - - /* get rid of newlines */ - l = strlen(u); - - if(l > 0 && u[l - 1] == '\n') - { - u[l - 1] = 0; - } - - l = strlen(p); - - if(l > 0 && p[l - 1] == '\n') - { - p[l - 1] = 0; - } - - if(override_value("user", option_priority, fname)) - { - strlcpy(ppp_settings.user, u, sizeof(ppp_settings.user)); - explicit_user = 1; - } - - if(override_value("passwd", option_priority, fname)) - { - strlcpy(ppp_settings.passwd, p, sizeof(ppp_settings.passwd)); - explicit_passwd = 1; - } - - return (1); -} - -/* - * privgroup - allow members of the group to have privileged access. - */ -static int privgroup(argv) -char **argv; -{ - struct group *g; - int i; - - g = getgrnam(*argv); - - if(g == 0) - { - option_error("group %s is unknown", *argv); - return 0; - } - - for(i = 0; i < ngroups; ++i) - { - if(groups[i] == g->gr_gid) - { - privileged = 1; - break; - } - } - - return 1; -} - - -/* - * set_noauth_addr - set address(es) that can be used without authentication. - * Equivalent to specifying an entry like `"" * "" addr' in pap-secrets. - */ -static int set_noauth_addr(argv) -char **argv; -{ - char *addr = *argv; - int l = strlen(addr) + 1; - struct wordlist *wp; - - wp = (struct wordlist *) malloc(sizeof(struct wordlist) + l); - - if(wp == NULL) - { - novm("allow-ip argument"); - } - - wp->word = (char *)(wp + 1); - wp->next = noauth_addrs; - MEMCPY(wp->word, addr, l); - noauth_addrs = wp; - return 1; -} - - -/* - * set_permitted_number - set remote telephone number(s) that may connect. - */ -static int set_permitted_number(argv) -char **argv; -{ - char *number = *argv; - int l = strlen(number) + 1; - struct wordlist *wp; - - wp = (struct wordlist *) malloc(sizeof(struct wordlist) + l); - - if(wp == NULL) - { - novm("allow-number argument"); - } - - wp->word = (char *)(wp + 1); - wp->next = permitted_numbers; - MEMCPY(wp->word, number, l); - permitted_numbers = wp; - return 1; -} -#endif - -/* - * An Open on LCP has requested a change from Dead to Establish phase. - */ -void link_required(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); -} - -#if 0 -/* - * Bring the link up to the point of being able to do ppp. - */ -void start_link(unit) -int unit; -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[unit]; - char *msg; - - status = EXIT_NEGOTIATION_FAILED; - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_SERIALCONN); - - hungup = 0; - devfd = the_channel->connect(); - msg = "Connect script failed"; - - if(devfd < 0) - { - goto fail; - } - - /* set up the serial device as a ppp interface */ - /* - * N.B. we used to do tdb_writelock/tdb_writeunlock around this - * (from establish_ppp to set_ifunit). However, we won't be - * doing the set_ifunit in multilink mode, which is the only time - * we need the atomicity that the tdb_writelock/tdb_writeunlock - * gives us. Thus we don't need the tdb_writelock/tdb_writeunlock. - */ - fd_ppp = the_channel->establish_ppp(devfd); - msg = "ppp establishment failed"; - - if(fd_ppp < 0) - { - status = EXIT_FATAL_ERROR; - goto disconnect; - } - - if(!demand && ifunit >= 0) - { - set_ifunit(1); - } - - /* - * Start opening the connection and wait for - * incoming events (reply, timeout, etc.). - */ - if(ifunit >= 0) - { - ppp_notice("Connect: %s <--> %s", ifname, ppp_devnam); - } - else - { - ppp_notice("Starting negotiation on %s", ppp_devnam); - } - - add_fd(fd_ppp); - - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH); - - lcp_lowerup(pcb); - return; - -disconnect: - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT); - - if(the_channel->disconnect) - { - the_channel->disconnect(); - } - -fail: - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); - - if(the_channel->cleanup) - { - (*the_channel->cleanup)(); - } -} -#endif - -/* - * LCP has terminated the link; go to the Dead phase and take the - * physical layer down. - */ -void link_terminated(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - if (pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_DEAD -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - || pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_MASTER -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - ) { - return; - } - - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT); - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(pap_logout_hook) - { - pap_logout_hook(); - } - - session_end(devnam); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - - if (!doing_multilink) { - ppp_notice("Connection terminated."); -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - print_link_stats(); -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - } else { - ppp_notice("Link terminated."); - } - - lcp_lowerdown(pcb); - - ppp_link_terminated(pcb); -#if 0 - - /* - * Delete pid files before disestablishing ppp. Otherwise it - * can happen that another pppd gets the same unit and then - * we delete its pid file. - */ - if(!doing_multilink && !demand) - { - remove_pidfiles(); - } - - /* - * If we may want to bring the link up again, transfer - * the ppp unit back to the loopback. Set the - * real serial device back to its normal mode of operation. - */ - if(fd_ppp >= 0) - { - remove_fd(fd_ppp); - clean_check(); - the_channel->disestablish_ppp(devfd); - - if(doing_multilink) - { - mp_exit_bundle(); - } - - fd_ppp = -1; - } - - if(!hungup) - { - lcp_lowerdown(pcb); - } - - if(!doing_multilink && !demand) - { - script_unsetenv("IFNAME"); - } - - /* - * Run disconnector script, if requested. - * XXX we may not be able to do this if the line has hung up! - */ - if(devfd >= 0 && the_channel->disconnect) - { - the_channel->disconnect(); - devfd = -1; - } - - if(the_channel->cleanup) - { - (*the_channel->cleanup)(); - } - - if(doing_multilink && multilink_master) - { - if(!bundle_terminating) - { - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_MASTER); - } - else - { - mp_bundle_terminated(); - } - } - else - { - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); - } - -#endif -} - -/* - * LCP has gone down; it will either die or try to re-establish. - */ -void link_down(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ -#if PPP_NOTIFY - notify(link_down_notifier, 0); -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ - - if (!doing_multilink) { - upper_layers_down(pcb); - - if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - && pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_MASTER -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - ) { - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH); - } - } - - /* XXX if doing_multilink, should do something to stop - network-layer traffic on the link */ -} - -void upper_layers_down(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - int i; - const struct protent *protp; - - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) { - if (protp->protocol != PPP_LCP && protp->lowerdown != NULL) { - (*protp->lowerdown)(pcb); - } - - if (protp->protocol < 0xC000 && protp->close != NULL) { - (*protp->close)(pcb, "LCP down"); - } - } - - pcb->num_np_open = 0; - pcb->num_np_up = 0; -} - -/* - * The link is established. - * Proceed to the Dead, Authenticate or Network phase as appropriate. - */ -void link_established(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT - int auth; -#if PPP_SERVER -#if PAP_SUPPORT - lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - lcp_options *ho = &pcb->lcp_hisoptions; -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - int i; - const struct protent *protp; - - /* - * Tell higher-level protocols that LCP is up. - */ - if (!doing_multilink) { - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (protp->protocol != PPP_LCP && protp->lowerup != NULL) { - (*protp->lowerup)(pcb); - } - } - -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT -#if PPP_SERVER -#if PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS - - if (!auth_required && noauth_addrs != NULL) { - set_allowed_addrs(unit, NULL, NULL); - } - -#endif /* PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS */ - - if (pcb->settings.auth_required && !(0 -#if PAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_upap -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_chap -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_eap -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - )) { - -#if PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS - - /* - * We wanted the peer to authenticate itself, and it refused: - * if we have some address(es) it can use without auth, fine, - * otherwise treat it as though it authenticated with PAP using - * a username of "" and a password of "". If that's not OK, - * boot it out. - */ - if (noauth_addrs != NULL) { - set_allowed_addrs(unit, NULL, NULL); - } else -#endif /* PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS */ - if (!pcb->settings.null_login -#if PAP_SUPPORT - || !wo->neg_upap -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - ) { - ppp_warn("peer refused to authenticate: terminating link"); -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - status = EXIT_PEER_AUTH_FAILED; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_AUTHFAIL; - lcp_close(pcb, "peer refused to authenticate"); - return; - } - } - -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_AUTHENTICATE); - auth = 0; -#if PPP_SERVER -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - if (go->neg_eap) { - eap_authpeer(pcb, PPP_OUR_NAME); - auth |= EAP_PEER; - } else -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - if (go->neg_chap) { - chap_auth_peer(pcb, PPP_OUR_NAME, CHAP_DIGEST(go->chap_mdtype)); - auth |= CHAP_PEER; - } else -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - if (go->neg_upap) { - upap_authpeer(pcb); - auth |= PAP_PEER; - } else -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - { - } - -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - if (ho->neg_eap) { - eap_authwithpeer(pcb, pcb->settings.user); - auth |= EAP_WITHPEER; - } else -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - if (ho->neg_chap) { - chap_auth_with_peer(pcb, pcb->settings.user, CHAP_DIGEST(ho->chap_mdtype)); - auth |= CHAP_WITHPEER; - } else -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - if (ho->neg_upap) { - upap_authwithpeer(pcb, pcb->settings.user, pcb->settings.passwd); - auth |= PAP_WITHPEER; - } else -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - { - } - - pcb->auth_pending = auth; - pcb->auth_done = 0; - - if (!auth) -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - network_phase(pcb); -} - -/* - * Proceed to the network phase. - */ -static void network_phase(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ -#if CBCP_SUPPORT - ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[unit]; -#endif -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - lcp_options *go = &lcp_gotoptions[unit]; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - /* Log calling number. */ - if(*remote_number) - { - ppp_notice("peer from calling number %q authorized", remote_number); - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if PPP_NOTIFY - - /* - * If the peer had to authenticate, notify it now. - */ - if (0 -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_chap -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_upap -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_eap -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - ) { - notify(auth_up_notifier, 0); - } - -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ - -#if CBCP_SUPPORT - - /* - * If we negotiated callback, do it now. - */ - if (go->neg_cbcp) { - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_CALLBACK); - (*cbcp_protent.open)(pcb); - return; - } - -#endif - -#if PPP_OPTIONS - - /* - * Process extra options from the secrets file - */ - if (extra_options) { - options_from_list(extra_options, 1); - free_wordlist(extra_options); - extra_options = 0; - } - -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - start_networks(pcb); -} - -void start_networks(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ -#if CCP_SUPPORT || ECP_SUPPORT - int i; - const struct protent *protp; -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT || ECP_SUPPORT */ - - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_NETWORK); - -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - - if (multilink) { - if (mp_join_bundle()) { - if (multilink_join_hook) { - (*multilink_join_hook)(); - } - - if (updetach && !nodetach) { - detach(); - } - - return; - } - } - -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - -#ifdef PPP_FILTER - - if (!demand) { - set_filters(&pass_filter, &active_filter); - } - -#endif -#if CCP_SUPPORT || ECP_SUPPORT - - /* Start CCP and ECP */ - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if ( - (0 -#if ECP_SUPPORT - || protp->protocol == PPP_ECP -#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ -#if CCP_SUPPORT - || protp->protocol == PPP_CCP -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ - ) && - protp->open != NULL) { - (*protp->open)(pcb); - } - -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT || ECP_SUPPORT */ - - /* - * Bring up other network protocols iff encryption is not required. - */ - if (1 -#if ECP_SUPPORT - && !ecp_gotoptions[unit].required -#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - && !pcb->ccp_gotoptions.mppe -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - ) { - continue_networks(pcb); - } -} - -void continue_networks(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - int i; - const struct protent *protp; - - /* - * Start the "real" network protocols. - */ - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (protp->protocol < 0xC000 -#if CCP_SUPPORT - && protp->protocol != PPP_CCP -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ -#if ECP_SUPPORT - && protp->protocol != PPP_ECP -#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ - && protp->open != NULL) { - (*protp->open)(pcb); - ++pcb->num_np_open; - } - - if (pcb->num_np_open == 0) - /* nothing to do */ - { - lcp_close(pcb, "No network protocols running"); - } -} - -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * auth_check_passwd - Check the user name and passwd against configuration. - * - * returns: - * 0: Authentication failed. - * 1: Authentication succeeded. - * In either case, msg points to an appropriate message and msglen to the message len. - */ -int auth_check_passwd(ppp_pcb *pcb, char *auser, int userlen, char *apasswd, int passwdlen, const char **msg, int *msglen) -{ - int secretuserlen; - int secretpasswdlen; - - if (pcb->settings.user && pcb->settings.passwd) { - secretuserlen = (int)strlen(pcb->settings.user); - secretpasswdlen = (int)strlen(pcb->settings.passwd); - - if (secretuserlen == userlen && secretpasswdlen == passwdlen && !memcmp(auser, pcb->settings.user, userlen) && !memcmp(apasswd, pcb->settings.passwd, passwdlen)) { - *msg = "Login ok"; - *msglen = sizeof("Login ok") - 1; - return 1; - } - } - - *msg = "Login incorrect"; - *msglen = sizeof("Login incorrect") - 1; - return 0; -} - -/* - * The peer has failed to authenticate himself using `protocol'. - */ -void auth_peer_fail(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(protocol); - /* - * Authentication failure: take the link down - */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - status = EXIT_PEER_AUTH_FAILED; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_AUTHFAIL; - lcp_close(pcb, "Authentication failed"); -} - -/* - * The peer has been successfully authenticated using `protocol'. - */ -void auth_peer_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol, int prot_flavor, const char *name, int namelen) -{ - int bit; -#ifndef HAVE_MULTILINK - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(namelen); -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - - switch (protocol) { -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - - case PPP_CHAP: - bit = CHAP_PEER; - - switch (prot_flavor) { - case CHAP_MD5: - bit |= CHAP_MD5_PEER; - break; -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - - case CHAP_MICROSOFT: - bit |= CHAP_MS_PEER; - break; - - case CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2: - bit |= CHAP_MS2_PEER; - break; -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - - default: - break; - } - - break; -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - - case PPP_PAP: - bit = PAP_PEER; - break; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - case PPP_EAP: - bit = EAP_PEER; - break; -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - - default: - ppp_warn("auth_peer_success: unknown protocol %x", protocol); - return; - } - -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - - /* - * Save the authenticated name of the peer for later. - */ - if (namelen > (int)sizeof(pcb->peer_authname) - 1) { - namelen = (int)sizeof(pcb->peer_authname) - 1; - } - - MEMCPY(pcb->peer_authname, name, namelen); - pcb->peer_authname[namelen] = 0; -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - script_setenv("PEERNAME",, 0); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - - /* Save the authentication method for later. */ - pcb->auth_done |= bit; - - /* - * If there is no more authentication still to be done, - * proceed to the network (or callback) phase. - */ - if ((pcb->auth_pending &= ~bit) == 0) { - network_phase(pcb); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * We have failed to authenticate ourselves to the peer using `protocol'. - */ -void auth_withpeer_fail(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(protocol); - /* - * We've failed to authenticate ourselves to our peer. - * - * Some servers keep sending CHAP challenges, but there - * is no point in persisting without any way to get updated - * authentication secrets. - * - * He'll probably take the link down, and there's not much - * we can do except wait for that. - */ - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_AUTHFAIL; - lcp_close(pcb, "Failed to authenticate ourselves to peer"); -} - -/* - * We have successfully authenticated ourselves with the peer using `protocol'. - */ -void auth_withpeer_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol, int prot_flavor) -{ - int bit; - const char *prot = ""; - - switch (protocol) { -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - - case PPP_CHAP: - bit = CHAP_WITHPEER; - prot = "CHAP"; - - switch (prot_flavor) { - case CHAP_MD5: - bit |= CHAP_MD5_WITHPEER; - break; -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - - case CHAP_MICROSOFT: - bit |= CHAP_MS_WITHPEER; - break; - - case CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2: - bit |= CHAP_MS2_WITHPEER; - break; -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - - default: - break; - } - - break; -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - - case PPP_PAP: - bit = PAP_WITHPEER; - prot = "PAP"; - break; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - case PPP_EAP: - bit = EAP_WITHPEER; - prot = "EAP"; - break; -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - - default: - ppp_warn("auth_withpeer_success: unknown protocol %x", protocol); - bit = 0; - /* no break */ - } - - ppp_notice("%s authentication succeeded", prot); - - /* Save the authentication method for later. */ - pcb->auth_done |= bit; - - /* - * If there is no more authentication still being done, - * proceed to the network (or callback) phase. - */ - if ((pcb->auth_pending &= ~bit) == 0) { - network_phase(pcb); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * np_up - a network protocol has come up. - */ -void np_up(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto) -{ -#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT - int tlim; -#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(proto); - - if (pcb->num_np_up == 0) { - /* - * At this point we consider that the link has come up successfully. - */ - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_RUNNING); - -#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(idle_time_hook != 0) - { - tlim = (*idle_time_hook)(NULL); - } - else -#endif /* UNUSED */ - tlim = pcb->settings.idle_time_limit; - - if (tlim > 0) { - TIMEOUT(check_idle, (void *)pcb, tlim); - } - -#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ - -#if PPP_MAXCONNECT - - /* - * Set a timeout to close the connection once the maximum - * connect time has expired. - */ - if (pcb->settings.maxconnect > 0) { - TIMEOUT(connect_time_expired, (void *)pcb, pcb->settings.maxconnect); - } - -#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ - -#ifdef MAXOCTETS - - if (maxoctets > 0) { - TIMEOUT(check_maxoctets, NULL, maxoctets_timeout); - } - -#endif - -#if 0 /* Unused */ - - /* - * Detach now, if the updetach option was given. - */ - if(updetach && !nodetach) - { - detach(); - } - -#endif /* Unused */ - } - - ++pcb->num_np_up; -} - -/* - * np_down - a network protocol has gone down. - */ -void np_down(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(proto); - - if (--pcb->num_np_up == 0) { -#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT - UNTIMEOUT(check_idle, (void *)pcb); -#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ -#if PPP_MAXCONNECT - UNTIMEOUT(connect_time_expired, NULL); -#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ -#ifdef MAXOCTETS - UNTIMEOUT(check_maxoctets, NULL); -#endif - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_NETWORK); - } -} - -/* - * np_finished - a network protocol has finished using the link. - */ -void np_finished(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(proto); - - if (--pcb->num_np_open <= 0) { - /* no further use for the link: shut up shop. */ - lcp_close(pcb, "No network protocols running"); - } -} - -#ifdef MAXOCTETS -static void check_maxoctets(arg) void *arg; -{ -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - unsigned int used; - - update_link_stats(ifunit); - link_stats_valid = 0; - - switch (maxoctets_dir) { - case PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_IN: - used = link_stats.bytes_in; - break; - - case PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_OUT: - used = link_stats.bytes_out; - break; - - case PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_MAXOVERAL: - case PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_MAXSESSION: - used = (link_stats.bytes_in > link_stats.bytes_out) ? link_stats.bytes_in : link_stats.bytes_out; - break; - - default: - used = link_stats.bytes_in + link_stats.bytes_out; - break; - } - - if (used > maxoctets) { - ppp_notice("Traffic limit reached. Limit: %u Used: %u", maxoctets, used); - status = EXIT_TRAFFIC_LIMIT; - lcp_close(pcb, "Traffic limit"); -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - need_holdoff = 0; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - } else { - TIMEOUT(check_maxoctets, NULL, maxoctets_timeout); - } - -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ -} -#endif /* MAXOCTETS */ - -#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT -/* - * check_idle - check whether the link has been idle for long - * enough that we can shut it down. - */ -static void check_idle(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - struct ppp_idle idle; - time_t itime; - int tlim; - - if (!get_idle_time(pcb, &idle)) { - return; - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(idle_time_hook != 0) - { - tlim = idle_time_hook(&idle); - } - else - { -#endif /* UNUSED */ - itime = LWIP_MIN(idle.xmit_idle, idle.recv_idle); - tlim = pcb->settings.idle_time_limit - itime; -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - - if (tlim <= 0) { - /* link is idle: shut it down. */ - ppp_notice("Terminating connection due to lack of activity."); - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_IDLETIMEOUT; - lcp_close(pcb, "Link inactive"); -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - need_holdoff = 0; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - } else { - TIMEOUT(check_idle, (void *)pcb, tlim); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ - -#if PPP_MAXCONNECT -/* - * connect_time_expired - log a message and close the connection. - */ -static void connect_time_expired(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - ppp_info("Connect time expired"); - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_CONNECTTIME; - lcp_close(pcb, "Connect time expired"); /* Close connection */ -} -#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * auth_check_options - called to check authentication options. - */ -void auth_check_options() -{ - lcp_options *wo = &lcp_wantoptions[0]; - int can_auth; - int lacks_ip; - - /* Default our_name to hostname, and user to our_name */ - if (our_name[0] == 0 || usehostname) { - strlcpy(our_name, hostname, sizeof(our_name)); - } - - /* If a blank username was explicitly given as an option, trust - the user and don't use our_name */ - if (ppp_settings.user[0] == 0 && !explicit_user) { - strlcpy(ppp_settings.user, our_name, sizeof(ppp_settings.user)); - } - - /* - * If we have a default route, require the peer to authenticate - * unless the noauth option was given or the real user is root. - */ - if (!auth_required && !allow_any_ip && have_route_to(0) && !privileged) { - auth_required = 1; - default_auth = 1; - } - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - - /* If we selected any CHAP flavors, we should probably negotiate it. :-) */ - if (wo->chap_mdtype) { - wo->neg_chap = 1; - } - -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ - - /* If authentication is required, ask peer for CHAP, PAP, or EAP. */ - if (auth_required) { - allow_any_ip = 0; - - if (1 -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - && !wo->neg_chap -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - && !wo->neg_upap -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - && !wo->neg_eap -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - ) { -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - wo->neg_chap = CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED != MDTYPE_NONE; - wo->chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - wo->neg_upap = 1; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - wo->neg_eap = 1; -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - } - } else { -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - wo->neg_chap = 0; - wo->chap_mdtype = MDTYPE_NONE; -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - wo->neg_upap = 0; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - wo->neg_eap = 0; -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - } - - /* - * Check whether we have appropriate secrets to use - * to authenticate the peer. Note that EAP can authenticate by way - * of a CHAP-like exchanges as well as SRP. - */ - lacks_ip = 0; -#if PAP_SUPPORT - can_auth = wo->neg_upap && (uselogin || have_pap_secret(&lacks_ip)); -#else - can_auth = 0; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - - if (!can_auth && (0 -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - || wo->neg_chap -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - || wo->neg_eap -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - )) { -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - can_auth = have_chap_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), - our_name, 1, &lacks_ip); -#else - can_auth = 0; -#endif - } - - if (!can_auth -#if EAP_SUPPORT - && wo->neg_eap -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - ) { - can_auth = have_srp_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), - our_name, 1, &lacks_ip); - } - - if (auth_required && !can_auth && noauth_addrs == NULL) { - if (default_auth) { - option_error( - "By default the remote system is required to authenticate itself"); - option_error( - "(because this system has a default route to the internet)"); - } else if (explicit_remote) - option_error( - "The remote system (%s) is required to authenticate itself", - remote_name); - else - option_error( - "The remote system is required to authenticate itself"); - - option_error( - "but I couldn't find any suitable secret (password) for it to use to do so."); - - if (lacks_ip) - option_error( - "(None of the available passwords would let it use an IP address.)"); - - exit(1); - } - - /* - * Early check for remote number authorization. - */ - if (!auth_number()) { - ppp_warn("calling number %q is not authorized", remote_number); - exit(EXIT_CNID_AUTH_FAILED); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* - * auth_reset - called when LCP is starting negotiations to recheck - * authentication options, i.e. whether we have appropriate secrets - * to use for authenticating ourselves and/or the peer. - */ -void auth_reset(unit) -int unit; -{ - lcp_options *go = &lcp_gotoptions[unit]; - lcp_options *ao = &lcp_allowoptions[unit]; - int hadchap; - - hadchap = -1; - ao->neg_upap = !refuse_pap && (passwd[0] != 0 || get_pap_passwd(NULL)); - ao->neg_chap = (!refuse_chap || !refuse_mschap || !refuse_mschap_v2) - && (passwd[0] != 0 || - (hadchap = have_chap_secret(user, (explicit_remote ? remote_name : - NULL), 0, NULL))); - ao->neg_eap = !refuse_eap && ( - passwd[0] != 0 || - (hadchap == 1 || (hadchap == -1 && have_chap_secret(user, - (explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), 0, NULL))) || - have_srp_secret(user, (explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), 0, NULL)); - - hadchap = -1; - - if(go->neg_upap && !uselogin && !have_pap_secret(NULL)) - { - go->neg_upap = 0; - } - - if(go->neg_chap) - { - if(!(hadchap = have_chap_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), - our_name, 1, NULL))) - { - go->neg_chap = 0; - } - } - - if(go->neg_eap && - (hadchap == 0 || (hadchap == -1 && - !have_chap_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), our_name, - 1, NULL))) && - !have_srp_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), our_name, 1, - NULL)) - { - go->neg_eap = 0; - } -} - -/* - * check_passwd - Check the user name and passwd against the PAP secrets - * file. If requested, also check against the system password database, - * and login the user if OK. - * - * returns: - * UPAP_AUTHNAK: Authentication failed. - * UPAP_AUTHACK: Authentication succeeded. - * In either case, msg points to an appropriate message. - */ -int check_passwd(unit, auser, userlen, apasswd, passwdlen, msg) -int unit; -char *auser; -int userlen; -char *apasswd; -int passwdlen; -char **msg; -{ - return UPAP_AUTHNAK; - int ret; - char *filename; - FILE *f; - struct wordlist *addrs = NULL, *opts = NULL; - char passwd[256], user[256]; - char secret[MAXWORDLEN]; - static int attempts = 0; - - /* - * Make copies of apasswd and auser, then null-terminate them. - * If there are unprintable characters in the password, make - * them visible. - */ - slprintf(ppp_settings.passwd, sizeof(ppp_settings.passwd), "%.*v", passwdlen, apasswd); - slprintf(ppp_settings.user, sizeof(ppp_settings.user), "%.*v", userlen, auser); - *msg = ""; - - /* - * Check if a plugin wants to handle this. - */ - if(pap_auth_hook) - { - ret = (*pap_auth_hook)(ppp_settings.user, ppp_settings.passwd, msg, &addrs, &opts); - - if(ret >= 0) - { - /* note: set_allowed_addrs() saves opts (but not addrs): - don't free it! */ - if(ret) - { - set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); - } - else if(opts != 0) - { - free_wordlist(opts); - } - - if(addrs != 0) - { - free_wordlist(addrs); - } - - BZERO(ppp_settings.passwd, sizeof(ppp_settings.passwd)); - return ret ? UPAP_AUTHACK : UPAP_AUTHNAK; - } - } - - /* - * Open the file of pap secrets and scan for a suitable secret - * for authenticating this user. - */ - filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; - addrs = opts = NULL; - ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; - f = fopen(filename, "r"); - - if(f == NULL) - { - ppp_error("Can't open PAP password file %s: %m", filename); - - } - else - { - check_access(f, filename); - - if(scan_authfile(f, ppp_settings.user, our_name, secret, &addrs, &opts, filename, 0) < 0) - { - ppp_warn("no PAP secret found for %s", user); - } - else - { - /* - * If the secret is "@login", it means to check - * the password against the login database. - */ - int login_secret = strcmp(secret, "@login") == 0; - ret = UPAP_AUTHACK; - - if(uselogin || login_secret) - { - /* login option or secret is @login */ - if(session_full(ppp_settings.user, ppp_settings.passwd, devnam, msg) == 0) - { - ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; - } - } - else if(session_mgmt) - { - if(session_check(ppp_settings.user, NULL, devnam, NULL) == 0) - { - ppp_warn("Peer %q failed PAP Session verification", user); - ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; - } - } - - if(secret[0] != 0 && !login_secret) - { - /* password given in pap-secrets - must match */ - if((cryptpap || strcmp(ppp_settings.passwd, secret) != 0) - && strcmp(crypt(ppp_settings.passwd, secret), secret) != 0) - { - ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; - } - } - } - - fclose(f); - } - - if(ret == UPAP_AUTHNAK) - { - if(**msg == 0) - { - *msg = "Login incorrect"; - } - - /* - * XXX can we ever get here more than once?? - * Frustrate passwd stealer programs. - * Allow 10 tries, but start backing off after 3 (stolen from login). - * On 10'th, drop the connection. - */ - if(attempts++ >= 10) - { - ppp_warn("%d LOGIN FAILURES ON %s, %s", attempts, devnam, user); - lcp_close(pcb, "login failed"); - } - - if(attempts > 3) - { - sleep((u_int)(attempts - 3) * 5); - } - - if(opts != NULL) - { - free_wordlist(opts); - } - - } - else - { - attempts = 0; /* Reset count */ - - if(**msg == 0) - { - *msg = "Login ok"; - } - - set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); - } - - if(addrs != NULL) - { - free_wordlist(addrs); - } - - BZERO(ppp_settings.passwd, sizeof(ppp_settings.passwd)); - BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); - - return ret; -} - -/* - * null_login - Check if a username of "" and a password of "" are - * acceptable, and iff so, set the list of acceptable IP addresses - * and return 1. - */ -static int null_login(unit) -int unit; -{ - char *filename; - FILE *f; - int i, ret; - struct wordlist *addrs, *opts; - char secret[MAXWORDLEN]; - - /* - * Check if a plugin wants to handle this. - */ - ret = -1; - - if(null_auth_hook) - { - ret = (*null_auth_hook)(&addrs, &opts); - } - - /* - * Open the file of pap secrets and scan for a suitable secret. - */ - if(ret <= 0) - { - filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; - addrs = NULL; - f = fopen(filename, "r"); - - if(f == NULL) - { - return 0; - } - - check_access(f, filename); - - i = scan_authfile(f, "", our_name, secret, &addrs, &opts, filename, 0); - ret = i >= 0 && secret[0] == 0; - BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); - fclose(f); - } - - if(ret) - { - set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); - } - else if(opts != 0) - { - free_wordlist(opts); - } - - if(addrs != 0) - { - free_wordlist(addrs); - } - - return ret; -} - -/* - * get_pap_passwd - get a password for authenticating ourselves with - * our peer using PAP. Returns 1 on success, 0 if no suitable password - * could be found. - * Assumes passwd points to MAXSECRETLEN bytes of space (if non-null). - */ -static int get_pap_passwd(passwd) -char *passwd; -{ - char *filename; - FILE *f; - int ret; - char secret[MAXWORDLEN]; - - /* - * Check whether a plugin wants to supply this. - */ - if(pap_passwd_hook) - { - ret = (*pap_passwd_hook)(ppp_settings, user, ppp_settings.passwd); - - if(ret >= 0) - { - return ret; - } - } - - filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; - f = fopen(filename, "r"); - - if(f == NULL) - { - return 0; - } - - check_access(f, filename); - ret = scan_authfile(f, user, - (remote_name[0] ? remote_name : NULL), - secret, NULL, NULL, filename, 0); - fclose(f); - - if(ret < 0) - { - return 0; - } - - if(passwd != NULL) - { - strlcpy(passwd, secret, MAXSECRETLEN); - } - - BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); - return 1; -} - -/* - * have_pap_secret - check whether we have a PAP file with any - * secrets that we could possibly use for authenticating the peer. - */ -static int have_pap_secret(lacks_ipp) -int *lacks_ipp; -{ - FILE *f; - int ret; - char *filename; - struct wordlist *addrs; - - /* let the plugin decide, if there is one */ - if(pap_check_hook) - { - ret = (*pap_check_hook)(); - - if(ret >= 0) - { - return ret; - } - } - - filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; - f = fopen(filename, "r"); - - if(f == NULL) - { - return 0; - } - - ret = scan_authfile(f, (explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), our_name, - NULL, &addrs, NULL, filename, 0); - fclose(f); - - if(ret >= 0 && !some_ip_ok(addrs)) - { - if(lacks_ipp != 0) - { - *lacks_ipp = 1; - } - - ret = -1; - } - - if(addrs != 0) - { - free_wordlist(addrs); - } - - return ret >= 0; -} - -/* - * have_chap_secret - check whether we have a CHAP file with a - * secret that we could possibly use for authenticating `client' - * on `server'. Either can be the null string, meaning we don't - * know the identity yet. - */ -static int have_chap_secret(client, server, need_ip, lacks_ipp) -char *client; -char *server; -int need_ip; -int *lacks_ipp; -{ - FILE *f; - int ret; - char *filename; - struct wordlist *addrs; - - if(chap_check_hook) - { - ret = (*chap_check_hook)(); - - if(ret >= 0) - { - return ret; - } - } - - filename = _PATH_CHAPFILE; - f = fopen(filename, "r"); - - if(f == NULL) - { - return 0; - } - - if(client != NULL && client[0] == 0) - { - client = NULL; - } - else if(server != NULL && server[0] == 0) - { - server = NULL; - } - - ret = scan_authfile(f, client, server, NULL, &addrs, NULL, filename, 0); - fclose(f); - - if(ret >= 0 && need_ip && !some_ip_ok(addrs)) - { - if(lacks_ipp != 0) - { - *lacks_ipp = 1; - } - - ret = -1; - } - - if(addrs != 0) - { - free_wordlist(addrs); - } - - return ret >= 0; -} - -/* - * have_srp_secret - check whether we have a SRP file with a - * secret that we could possibly use for authenticating `client' - * on `server'. Either can be the null string, meaning we don't - * know the identity yet. - */ -static int have_srp_secret(client, server, need_ip, lacks_ipp) -char *client; -char *server; -int need_ip; -int *lacks_ipp; -{ - FILE *f; - int ret; - char *filename; - struct wordlist *addrs; - - filename = _PATH_SRPFILE; - f = fopen(filename, "r"); - - if(f == NULL) - { - return 0; - } - - if(client != NULL && client[0] == 0) - { - client = NULL; - } - else if(server != NULL && server[0] == 0) - { - server = NULL; - } - - ret = scan_authfile(f, client, server, NULL, &addrs, NULL, filename, 0); - fclose(f); - - if(ret >= 0 && need_ip && !some_ip_ok(addrs)) - { - if(lacks_ipp != 0) - { - *lacks_ipp = 1; - } - - ret = -1; - } - - if(addrs != 0) - { - free_wordlist(addrs); - } - - return ret >= 0; -} -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT -/* - * get_secret - open the CHAP secret file and return the secret - * for authenticating the given client on the given server. - * (We could be either client or server). - */ -int get_secret(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *client, const char *server, char *secret, int *secret_len, int am_server) -{ - int len; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(server); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(am_server); - - if (!client || !client[0] || !pcb->settings.user || !pcb->settings.passwd || strcmp(client, pcb->settings.user)) { - return 0; - } - - len = (int)strlen(pcb->settings.passwd); - - if (len > MAXSECRETLEN) { - ppp_error("Secret for %s on %s is too long", client, server); - len = MAXSECRETLEN; - } - - MEMCPY(secret, pcb->settings.passwd, len); - *secret_len = len; - return 1; - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - FILE *f; - int ret, len; - char *filename; - struct wordlist *addrs, *opts; - char secbuf[MAXWORDLEN]; - struct wordlist *addrs; - addrs = NULL; - - if(!am_server && ppp_settings.passwd[0] != 0) - { - strlcpy(secbuf, ppp_settings.passwd, sizeof(secbuf)); - } - else if(!am_server && chap_passwd_hook) - { - if((*chap_passwd_hook)(client, secbuf) < 0) - { - ppp_error("Unable to obtain CHAP password for %s on %s from plugin", - client, server); - return 0; - } - } - else - { - filename = _PATH_CHAPFILE; - addrs = NULL; - secbuf[0] = 0; - - f = fopen(filename, "r"); - - if(f == NULL) - { - ppp_error("Can't open chap secret file %s: %m", filename); - return 0; - } - - check_access(f, filename); - - ret = scan_authfile(f, client, server, secbuf, &addrs, &opts, filename, 0); - fclose(f); - - if(ret < 0) - { - return 0; - } - - if(am_server) - { - set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); - } - else if(opts != 0) - { - free_wordlist(opts); - } - - if(addrs != 0) - { - free_wordlist(addrs); - } - } - - len = strlen(secbuf); - - if(len > MAXSECRETLEN) - { - ppp_error("Secret for %s on %s is too long", client, server); - len = MAXSECRETLEN; - } - - MEMCPY(secret, secbuf, len); - BZERO(secbuf, sizeof(secbuf)); - *secret_len = len; - - return 1; -#endif /* UNUSED */ -} -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* - * get_srp_secret - open the SRP secret file and return the secret - * for authenticating the given client on the given server. - * (We could be either client or server). - */ -int get_srp_secret(unit, client, server, secret, am_server) -int unit; -char *client; -char *server; -char *secret; -int am_server; -{ - FILE *fp; - int ret; - char *filename; - struct wordlist *addrs, *opts; - - if(!am_server && ppp_settings.passwd[0] != '\0') - { - strlcpy(secret, ppp_settings.passwd, MAXWORDLEN); - } - else - { - filename = _PATH_SRPFILE; - addrs = NULL; - - fp = fopen(filename, "r"); - - if(fp == NULL) - { - ppp_error("Can't open srp secret file %s: %m", filename); - return 0; - } - - check_access(fp, filename); - - secret[0] = '\0'; - ret = scan_authfile(fp, client, server, secret, &addrs, &opts, - filename, am_server); - fclose(fp); - - if(ret < 0) - { - return 0; - } - - if(am_server) - { - set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); - } - else if(opts != NULL) - { - free_wordlist(opts); - } - - if(addrs != NULL) - { - free_wordlist(addrs); - } - } - - return 1; -} - -/* - * set_allowed_addrs() - set the list of allowed addresses. - * Also looks for `--' indicating options to apply for this peer - * and leaves the following words in extra_options. - */ -static void set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts) -int unit; -struct wordlist *addrs; -struct wordlist *opts; -{ - int n; - struct wordlist *ap, **plink; - struct permitted_ip *ip; - char *ptr_word, *ptr_mask; - struct hostent *hp; - struct netent *np; - u32_t a, mask, ah, offset; - struct ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[unit]; - u32_t suggested_ip = 0; - - if(addresses[unit] != NULL) - { - free(addresses[unit]); - } - - addresses[unit] = NULL; - - if(extra_options != NULL) - { - free_wordlist(extra_options); - } - - extra_options = opts; - - /* - * Count the number of IP addresses given. - */ - n = wordlist_count(addrs) + wordlist_count(noauth_addrs); - - if(n == 0) - { - return; - } - - ip = (struct permitted_ip *) malloc((n + 1) * sizeof(struct permitted_ip)); - - if(ip == 0) - { - return; - } - - /* temporarily append the noauth_addrs list to addrs */ - for(plink = &addrs; *plink != NULL; plink = &(*plink)->next) - ; - - *plink = noauth_addrs; - - n = 0; - - for(ap = addrs; ap != NULL; ap = ap->next) - { - /* "-" means no addresses authorized, "*" means any address allowed */ - ptr_word = ap->word; - - if(strcmp(ptr_word, "-") == 0) - { - break; - } - - if(strcmp(ptr_word, "*") == 0) - { - ip[n].permit = 1; - ip[n].base = ip[n].mask = 0; - ++n; - break; - } - - ip[n].permit = 1; - - if(*ptr_word == '!') - { - ip[n].permit = 0; - ++ptr_word; - } - - mask = ~(u32_t) 0; - offset = 0; - ptr_mask = strchr(ptr_word, '/'); - - if(ptr_mask != NULL) - { - int bit_count; - char *endp; - - bit_count = (int) strtol(ptr_mask + 1, &endp, 10); - - if(bit_count <= 0 || bit_count > 32) - { - ppp_warn("invalid address length %v in auth. address list", - ptr_mask + 1); - continue; - } - - bit_count = 32 - bit_count; /* # bits in host part */ - - if(*endp == '+') - { - offset = ifunit + 1; - ++endp; - } - - if(*endp != 0) - { - ppp_warn("invalid address length syntax: %v", ptr_mask + 1); - continue; - } - - *ptr_mask = '\0'; - mask <<= bit_count; - } - - hp = gethostbyname(ptr_word); - - if(hp != NULL && hp->h_addrtype == AF_INET) - { - a = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; - } - else - { - np = getnetbyname(ptr_word); - - if(np != NULL && np->n_addrtype == AF_INET) - { - a = lwip_htonl((u32_t)np->n_net); - - if(ptr_mask == NULL) - { - /* calculate appropriate mask for net */ - ah = lwip_ntohl(a); - - if(IN_CLASSA(ah)) - { - mask = IN_CLASSA_NET; - } - else if(IN_CLASSB(ah)) - { - mask = IN_CLASSB_NET; - } - else if(IN_CLASSC(ah)) - { - mask = IN_CLASSC_NET; - } - } - } - else - { - a = inet_addr(ptr_word); - } - } - - if(ptr_mask != NULL) - { - *ptr_mask = '/'; - } - - if(a == (u32_t) -1L) - { - ppp_warn("unknown host %s in auth. address list", ap->word); - continue; - } - - if(offset != 0) - { - if(offset >= ~mask) - { - ppp_warn("interface unit %d too large for subnet %v", - ifunit, ptr_word); - continue; - } - - a = lwip_htonl((lwip_ntohl(a) & mask) + offset); - mask = ~(u32_t)0; - } - - ip[n].mask = lwip_htonl(mask); - ip[n].base = a & ip[n].mask; - ++n; - - if(~mask == 0 && suggested_ip == 0) - { - suggested_ip = a; - } - } - - *plink = NULL; - - ip[n].permit = 0; /* make the last entry forbid all addresses */ - ip[n].base = 0; /* to terminate the list */ - ip[n].mask = 0; - - addresses[unit] = ip; - - /* - * If the address given for the peer isn't authorized, or if - * the user hasn't given one, AND there is an authorized address - * which is a single host, then use that if we find one. - */ - if(suggested_ip != 0 - && (wo->hisaddr == 0 || !auth_ip_addr(unit, wo->hisaddr))) - { - wo->hisaddr = suggested_ip; - - /* - * Do we insist on this address? No, if there are other - * addresses authorized than the suggested one. - */ - if(n > 1) - { - wo->accept_remote = 1; - } - } -} - -/* - * auth_ip_addr - check whether the peer is authorized to use - * a given IP address. Returns 1 if authorized, 0 otherwise. - */ -int auth_ip_addr(unit, addr) -int unit; -u32_t addr; -{ - int ok; - - /* don't allow loopback or multicast address */ - if(bad_ip_adrs(addr)) - { - return 0; - } - - if(allowed_address_hook) - { - ok = allowed_address_hook(addr); - - if(ok >= 0) - { - return ok; - } - } - - if(addresses[unit] != NULL) - { - ok = ip_addr_check(addr, addresses[unit]); - - if(ok >= 0) - { - return ok; - } - } - - if(auth_required) - { - return 0; /* no addresses authorized */ - } - - return allow_any_ip || privileged || !have_route_to(addr); -} - -static int ip_addr_check(addr, addrs) -u32_t addr; -struct permitted_ip *addrs; -{ - for(; ; ++addrs) - if((addr & addrs->mask) == addrs->base) - { - return addrs->permit; - } -} - -/* - * bad_ip_adrs - return 1 if the IP address is one we don't want - * to use, such as an address in the loopback net or a multicast address. - * addr is in network byte order. - */ -int bad_ip_adrs(addr) -u32_t addr; -{ - addr = lwip_ntohl(addr); - return (addr >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT) == IN_LOOPBACKNET - || IN_MULTICAST(addr) || IN_BADCLASS(addr); -} - -/* - * some_ip_ok - check a wordlist to see if it authorizes any - * IP address(es). - */ -static int some_ip_ok(addrs) -struct wordlist *addrs; -{ - for(; addrs != 0; addrs = addrs->next) - { - if(addrs->word[0] == '-') - { - break; - } - - if(addrs->word[0] != '!') - { - return 1; /* some IP address is allowed */ - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/* - * auth_number - check whether the remote number is allowed to connect. - * Returns 1 if authorized, 0 otherwise. - */ -int auth_number() -{ - struct wordlist *wp = permitted_numbers; - int l; - - /* Allow all if no authorization list. */ - if(!wp) - { - return 1; - } - - /* Allow if we have a match in the authorization list. */ - while(wp) - { - /* trailing '*' wildcard */ - l = strlen(wp->word); - - if((wp->word)[l - 1] == '*') - { - l--; - } - - if(!strncasecmp(wp->word, remote_number, l)) - { - return 1; - } - - wp = wp->next; - } - - return 0; -} - -/* - * check_access - complain if a secret file has too-liberal permissions. - */ -static void check_access(f, filename) -FILE *f; -char *filename; -{ - struct stat sbuf; - - if(fstat(fileno(f), &sbuf) < 0) - { - ppp_warn("cannot stat secret file %s: %m", filename); - } - else if((sbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) != 0) - { - ppp_warn("Warning - secret file %s has world and/or group access", - filename); - } -} - -/* - * scan_authfile - Scan an authorization file for a secret suitable - * for authenticating `client' on `server'. The return value is -1 - * if no secret is found, otherwise >= 0. The return value has - * NONWILD_CLIENT set if the secret didn't have "*" for the client, and - * NONWILD_SERVER set if the secret didn't have "*" for the server. - * Any following words on the line up to a "--" (i.e. address authorization - * info) are placed in a wordlist and returned in *addrs. Any - * following words (extra options) are placed in a wordlist and - * returned in *opts. - * We assume secret is NULL or points to MAXWORDLEN bytes of space. - * Flags are non-zero if we need two colons in the secret in order to - * match. - */ -static int scan_authfile(f, client, server, secret, addrs, opts, filename, flags) -FILE *f; -char *client; -char *server; -char *secret; -struct wordlist **addrs; -struct wordlist **opts; -char *filename; -int flags; -{ - int newline, xxx; - int got_flag, best_flag; - FILE *sf; - struct wordlist *ap, *addr_list, *alist, **app; - char word[MAXWORDLEN]; - char atfile[MAXWORDLEN]; - char lsecret[MAXWORDLEN]; - char *cp; - - if(addrs != NULL) - { - *addrs = NULL; - } - - if(opts != NULL) - { - *opts = NULL; - } - - addr_list = NULL; - - if(!getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) - { - return -1; /* file is empty??? */ - } - - newline = 1; - best_flag = -1; - - for(;;) - { - /* - * Skip until we find a word at the start of a line. - */ - while(!newline && getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) - ; - - if(!newline) - { - break; /* got to end of file */ - } - - /* - * Got a client - check if it's a match or a wildcard. - */ - got_flag = 0; - - if(client != NULL && strcmp(word, client) != 0 && !ISWILD(word)) - { - newline = 0; - continue; - } - - if(!ISWILD(word)) - { - got_flag = NONWILD_CLIENT; - } - - /* - * Now get a server and check if it matches. - */ - if(!getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) - { - break; - } - - if(newline) - { - continue; - } - - if(!ISWILD(word)) - { - if(server != NULL && strcmp(word, server) != 0) - { - continue; - } - - got_flag |= NONWILD_SERVER; - } - - /* - * Got some sort of a match - see if it's better than what - * we have already. - */ - if(got_flag <= best_flag) - { - continue; - } - - /* - * Get the secret. - */ - if(!getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) - { - break; - } - - if(newline) - { - continue; - } - - /* - * SRP-SHA1 authenticator should never be reading secrets from - * a file. (Authenticatee may, though.) - */ - if(flags && ((cp = strchr(word, ':')) == NULL || - strchr(cp + 1, ':') == NULL)) - { - continue; - } - - if(secret != NULL) - { - /* - * Special syntax: @/pathname means read secret from file. - */ - if(word[0] == '@' && word[1] == '/') - { - strlcpy(atfile, word + 1, sizeof(atfile)); - - if((sf = fopen(atfile, "r")) == NULL) - { - ppp_warn("can't open indirect secret file %s", atfile); - continue; - } - - check_access(sf, atfile); - - if(!getword(sf, word, &xxx, atfile)) - { - ppp_warn("no secret in indirect secret file %s", atfile); - fclose(sf); - continue; - } - - fclose(sf); - } - - strlcpy(lsecret, word, sizeof(lsecret)); - } - - /* - * Now read address authorization info and make a wordlist. - */ - app = &alist; - - for(;;) - { - if(!getword(f, word, &newline, filename) || newline) - { - break; - } - - ap = (struct wordlist *) - malloc(sizeof(struct wordlist) + strlen(word) + 1); - - if(ap == NULL) - { - novm("authorized addresses"); - } - - ap->word = (char *)(ap + 1); - strcpy(ap->word, word); - *app = ap; - app = &ap->next; - } - - *app = NULL; - - /* - * This is the best so far; remember it. - */ - best_flag = got_flag; - - if(addr_list) - { - free_wordlist(addr_list); - } - - addr_list = alist; - - if(secret != NULL) - { - strlcpy(secret, lsecret, MAXWORDLEN); - } - - if(!newline) - { - break; - } - } - - /* scan for a -- word indicating the start of options */ - for(app = &addr_list; (ap = *app) != NULL; app = &ap->next) - if(strcmp(ap->word, "--") == 0) - { - break; - } - - /* ap = start of options */ - if(ap != NULL) - { - ap = ap->next; /* first option */ - free(*app); /* free the "--" word */ - *app = NULL; /* terminate addr list */ - } - - if(opts != NULL) - { - *opts = ap; - } - else if(ap != NULL) - { - free_wordlist(ap); - } - - if(addrs != NULL) - { - *addrs = addr_list; - } - else if(addr_list != NULL) - { - free_wordlist(addr_list); - } - - return best_flag; -} - -/* - * wordlist_count - return the number of items in a wordlist - */ -static int wordlist_count(wp) -struct wordlist *wp; -{ - int n; - - for(n = 0; wp != NULL; wp = wp->next) - { - ++n; - } - - return n; -} - -/* - * free_wordlist - release memory allocated for a wordlist. - */ -static void free_wordlist(wp) -struct wordlist *wp; -{ - struct wordlist *next; - - while(wp != NULL) - { - next = wp->next; - free(wp); - wp = next; - } -} -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * auth.c - PPP authentication and phase control. + * + * Copyright (c) 1993-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * Derived from main.c, which is: + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#if defined(_PATH_LASTLOG) && defined(__linux__) +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAS_SHADOW +#include +#ifndef PW_PPP +#define PW_PPP PW_LOGIN +#endif +#endif + +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" +#if CCP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ +#if ECP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/ecp.h" +#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ +#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" +#if PAP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/upap.h" +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/eap.h" +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CBCP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/cbcp.h" +#endif + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include "session.h" +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + /* Bits in scan_authfile return value */ +#define NONWILD_SERVER 1 +#define NONWILD_CLIENT 2 + +#define ISWILD(word) (word[0] == '*' && word[1] == 0) +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + /* List of addresses which the peer may use. */ + static struct permitted_ip *addresses[NUM_PPP]; + + /* Wordlist giving addresses which the peer may use + without authenticating itself. */ + static struct wordlist *noauth_addrs; + + /* Remote telephone number, if available */ + char remote_number[MAXNAMELEN]; + + /* Wordlist giving remote telephone numbers which may connect. */ + static struct wordlist *permitted_numbers; + + /* Extra options to apply, from the secrets file entry for the peer. */ + static struct wordlist *extra_options; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* Set if we require authentication only because we have a default route. */ +static bool default_auth; + +/* Hook to enable a plugin to control the idle time limit */ +int (*idle_time_hook)(struct ppp_idle *) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to say whether we can possibly authenticate any peer */ +int (*pap_check_hook)(void) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to check the PAP user and password */ +int (*pap_auth_hook)(char *user, char *passwd, char **msgp, + struct wordlist **paddrs, + struct wordlist **popts) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to know about the PAP user logout */ +void (*pap_logout_hook)(void) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to get the PAP password for authenticating us */ +int (*pap_passwd_hook)(char *user, char *passwd) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to say if we can possibly authenticate a peer using CHAP */ +int (*chap_check_hook)(void) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to get the CHAP password for authenticating us */ +int (*chap_passwd_hook)(char *user, char *passwd) = NULL; + +/* Hook for a plugin to say whether it is OK if the peer + refuses to authenticate. */ +int (*null_auth_hook)(struct wordlist **paddrs, + struct wordlist **popts) = NULL; + +int (*allowed_address_hook)(u32_t addr) = NULL; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK +/* Hook for plugin to hear when an interface joins a multilink bundle */ +void (*multilink_join_hook)(void) = NULL; +#endif + +#if PPP_NOTIFY +/* A notifier for when the peer has authenticated itself, + and we are proceeding to the network phase. */ +struct notifier *auth_up_notifier = NULL; + +/* A notifier for when the link goes down. */ +struct notifier *link_down_notifier = NULL; +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ + +/* + * Option variables. + */ +#if 0 /* MOVED TO ppp_settings */ + bool uselogin = 0; /* Use /etc/passwd for checking PAP */ + bool session_mgmt = 0; /* Do session management (login records) */ + bool cryptpap = 0; /* Passwords in pap-secrets are encrypted */ + bool refuse_pap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with PAP */ + bool refuse_chap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with CHAP */ + bool refuse_eap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with EAP */ +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + bool refuse_mschap = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with MS-CHAP */ + bool refuse_mschap_v2 = 0; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with MS-CHAPv2 */ +#else /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + bool refuse_mschap = 1; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with MS-CHAP */ + bool refuse_mschap_v2 = 1; /* Don't wanna auth. ourselves with MS-CHAPv2 */ +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + bool usehostname = 0; /* Use hostname for our_name */ + bool auth_required = 0; /* Always require authentication from peer */ + bool allow_any_ip = 0; /* Allow peer to use any IP address */ + bool explicit_remote = 0; /* User specified explicit remote name */ + bool explicit_user = 0; /* Set if "user" option supplied */ + bool explicit_passwd = 0; /* Set if "password" option supplied */ + char remote_name[MAXNAMELEN]; /* Peer's name for authentication */ + static char *uafname; /* name of most recent +ua file */ + + extern char *crypt(const char *, const char *); +#endif /* UNUSED */ +/* Prototypes for procedures local to this file. */ + +static void network_phase(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT +static void check_idle(void *arg); +#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ +#if PPP_MAXCONNECT +static void connect_time_expired(void *arg); +#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +static int null_login(int); +/* static int get_pap_passwd (char *); */ +static int have_pap_secret(int *); +static int have_chap_secret(char *, char *, int, int *); +static int have_srp_secret(char *client, char *server, int need_ip, + int *lacks_ipp); +static int ip_addr_check(u32_t, struct permitted_ip *); +static int scan_authfile(FILE *, char *, char *, char *, + struct wordlist **, struct wordlist **, + char *, int); +static void free_wordlist(struct wordlist *); +static void set_allowed_addrs(int, struct wordlist *, struct wordlist *); +static int some_ip_ok(struct wordlist *); +static int setupapfile(char **); +static int privgroup(char **); +static int set_noauth_addr(char **); +static int set_permitted_number(char **); +static void check_access(FILE *, char *); +static int wordlist_count(struct wordlist *); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#ifdef MAXOCTETS +static void check_maxoctets(void *); +#endif + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * Authentication-related options. + */ +option_t auth_options[] = { + { "auth", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Require authentication from peer", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, + { "noauth", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Don't require peer to authenticate", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_PRIV, + &allow_any_ip }, + { "require-pap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_upap, + "Require PAP authentication from peer", + OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, &auth_required }, + { "+pap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_upap, + "Require PAP authentication from peer", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, &auth_required }, + { "require-chap", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Require CHAP authentication from peer", + OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MD5, + &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, + { "+chap", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Require CHAP authentication from peer", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MD5, + &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + { "require-mschap", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Require MS-CHAP authentication from peer", + OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT, + &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, + { "+mschap", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Require MS-CHAP authentication from peer", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT, + &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, + { "require-mschap-v2", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Require MS-CHAPv2 authentication from peer", + OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2, + &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, + { "+mschap-v2", o_bool, &auth_required, + "Require MS-CHAPv2 authentication from peer", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2OR | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2, + &lcp_wantoptions[0].chap_mdtype }, +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if 0 + { + "refuse-pap", o_bool, &refuse_pap, + "Don't agree to auth to peer with PAP", 1 + }, + { + "-pap", o_bool, &refuse_pap, + "Don't allow PAP authentication with peer", OPT_ALIAS | 1 + }, + { + "refuse-chap", o_bool, &refuse_chap, + "Don't agree to auth to peer with CHAP", + OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MD5, + &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype + }, + { + "-chap", o_bool, &refuse_chap, + "Don't allow CHAP authentication with peer", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MD5, + &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype + }, +#endif +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#if 0 + { + "refuse-mschap", o_bool, &refuse_mschap, + "Don't agree to auth to peer with MS-CHAP", + OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT, + &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype + }, + { + "-mschap", o_bool, &refuse_mschap, + "Don't allow MS-CHAP authentication with peer", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT, + &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype + }, + { + "refuse-mschap-v2", o_bool, &refuse_mschap_v2, + "Don't agree to auth to peer with MS-CHAPv2", + OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2, + &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype + }, + { + "-mschap-v2", o_bool, &refuse_mschap_v2, + "Don't allow MS-CHAPv2 authentication with peer", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLRB | MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2, + &lcp_allowoptions[0].chap_mdtype + }, +#endif +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT*/ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + { "require-eap", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_eap, + "Require EAP authentication from peer", OPT_PRIOSUB | 1, + &auth_required }, +#if 0 + { + "refuse-eap", o_bool, &refuse_eap, + "Don't agree to authenticate to peer with EAP", 1 + }, +#endif +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + { "name", o_string, our_name, + "Set local name for authentication", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_PRIV | OPT_STATIC, NULL, MAXNAMELEN }, + + { "+ua", o_special, (void *)setupapfile, + "Get PAP user and password from file", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL, &uafname }, + +#if 0 + { + "user", o_string, user, + "Set name for auth with peer", OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC, + &explicit_user, MAXNAMELEN + }, + + { + "password", o_string, passwd, + "Password for authenticating us to the peer", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC | OPT_HIDE, + &explicit_passwd, MAXSECRETLEN + }, +#endif + + { "usehostname", o_bool, &usehostname, + "Must use hostname for authentication", 1 }, + + { "remotename", o_string, remote_name, + "Set remote name for authentication", OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC, + &explicit_remote, MAXNAMELEN }, + + { "login", o_bool, &uselogin, + "Use system password database for PAP", OPT_A2COPY | 1, + &session_mgmt }, + { "enable-session", o_bool, &session_mgmt, + "Enable session accounting for remote peers", OPT_PRIV | 1 }, + + { "papcrypt", o_bool, &cryptpap, + "PAP passwords are encrypted", 1 }, + + { "privgroup", o_special, (void *)privgroup, + "Allow group members to use privileged options", OPT_PRIV | OPT_A2LIST }, + + { "allow-ip", o_special, (void *)set_noauth_addr, + "Set IP address(es) which can be used without authentication", + OPT_PRIV | OPT_A2LIST }, + + { "remotenumber", o_string, remote_number, + "Set remote telephone number for authentication", OPT_PRIO | OPT_STATIC, + NULL, MAXNAMELEN }, + + { "allow-number", o_special, (void *)set_permitted_number, + "Set telephone number(s) which are allowed to connect", + OPT_PRIV | OPT_A2LIST }, + + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* + * setupapfile - specifies UPAP info for authenticating with peer. + */ +static int setupapfile(argv) +char **argv; +{ + FILE *ufile; + int l; + uid_t euid; + char u[MAXNAMELEN], p[MAXSECRETLEN]; + char *fname; + + lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_upap = 1; + + /* open user info file */ + fname = strdup(*argv); + + if(fname == NULL) + { + novm("+ua file name"); + } + + euid = geteuid(); + + if(seteuid(getuid()) == -1) + { + option_error("unable to reset uid before opening %s: %m", fname); + return 0; + } + + ufile = fopen(fname, "r"); + + if(seteuid(euid) == -1) + { + fatal("unable to regain privileges: %m"); + } + + if(ufile == NULL) + { + option_error("unable to open user login data file %s", fname); + return 0; + } + + check_access(ufile, fname); + uafname = fname; + + /* get username */ + if(fgets(u, MAXNAMELEN - 1, ufile) == NULL + || fgets(p, MAXSECRETLEN - 1, ufile) == NULL) + { + fclose(ufile); + option_error("unable to read user login data file %s", fname); + return 0; + } + + fclose(ufile); + + /* get rid of newlines */ + l = strlen(u); + + if(l > 0 && u[l - 1] == '\n') + { + u[l - 1] = 0; + } + + l = strlen(p); + + if(l > 0 && p[l - 1] == '\n') + { + p[l - 1] = 0; + } + + if(override_value("user", option_priority, fname)) + { + strlcpy(ppp_settings.user, u, sizeof(ppp_settings.user)); + explicit_user = 1; + } + + if(override_value("passwd", option_priority, fname)) + { + strlcpy(ppp_settings.passwd, p, sizeof(ppp_settings.passwd)); + explicit_passwd = 1; + } + + return (1); +} + +/* + * privgroup - allow members of the group to have privileged access. + */ +static int privgroup(argv) +char **argv; +{ + struct group *g; + int i; + + g = getgrnam(*argv); + + if(g == 0) + { + option_error("group %s is unknown", *argv); + return 0; + } + + for(i = 0; i < ngroups; ++i) + { + if(groups[i] == g->gr_gid) + { + privileged = 1; + break; + } + } + + return 1; +} + + +/* + * set_noauth_addr - set address(es) that can be used without authentication. + * Equivalent to specifying an entry like `"" * "" addr' in pap-secrets. + */ +static int set_noauth_addr(argv) +char **argv; +{ + char *addr = *argv; + int l = strlen(addr) + 1; + struct wordlist *wp; + + wp = (struct wordlist *) malloc(sizeof(struct wordlist) + l); + + if(wp == NULL) + { + novm("allow-ip argument"); + } + + wp->word = (char *)(wp + 1); + wp->next = noauth_addrs; + MEMCPY(wp->word, addr, l); + noauth_addrs = wp; + return 1; +} + + +/* + * set_permitted_number - set remote telephone number(s) that may connect. + */ +static int set_permitted_number(argv) +char **argv; +{ + char *number = *argv; + int l = strlen(number) + 1; + struct wordlist *wp; + + wp = (struct wordlist *) malloc(sizeof(struct wordlist) + l); + + if(wp == NULL) + { + novm("allow-number argument"); + } + + wp->word = (char *)(wp + 1); + wp->next = permitted_numbers; + MEMCPY(wp->word, number, l); + permitted_numbers = wp; + return 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * An Open on LCP has requested a change from Dead to Establish phase. + */ +void link_required(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); +} + +#if 0 +/* + * Bring the link up to the point of being able to do ppp. + */ +void start_link(unit) +int unit; +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[unit]; + char *msg; + + status = EXIT_NEGOTIATION_FAILED; + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_SERIALCONN); + + hungup = 0; + devfd = the_channel->connect(); + msg = "Connect script failed"; + + if(devfd < 0) + { + goto fail; + } + + /* set up the serial device as a ppp interface */ + /* + * N.B. we used to do tdb_writelock/tdb_writeunlock around this + * (from establish_ppp to set_ifunit). However, we won't be + * doing the set_ifunit in multilink mode, which is the only time + * we need the atomicity that the tdb_writelock/tdb_writeunlock + * gives us. Thus we don't need the tdb_writelock/tdb_writeunlock. + */ + fd_ppp = the_channel->establish_ppp(devfd); + msg = "ppp establishment failed"; + + if(fd_ppp < 0) + { + status = EXIT_FATAL_ERROR; + goto disconnect; + } + + if(!demand && ifunit >= 0) + { + set_ifunit(1); + } + + /* + * Start opening the connection and wait for + * incoming events (reply, timeout, etc.). + */ + if(ifunit >= 0) + { + ppp_notice("Connect: %s <--> %s", ifname, ppp_devnam); + } + else + { + ppp_notice("Starting negotiation on %s", ppp_devnam); + } + + add_fd(fd_ppp); + + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH); + + lcp_lowerup(pcb); + return; + +disconnect: + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT); + + if(the_channel->disconnect) + { + the_channel->disconnect(); + } + +fail: + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); + + if(the_channel->cleanup) + { + (*the_channel->cleanup)(); + } +} +#endif + +/* + * LCP has terminated the link; go to the Dead phase and take the + * physical layer down. + */ +void link_terminated(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + if (pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_DEAD +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + || pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_MASTER +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + ) { + return; + } + + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT); + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(pap_logout_hook) + { + pap_logout_hook(); + } + + session_end(devnam); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + + if (!doing_multilink) { + ppp_notice("Connection terminated."); +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + print_link_stats(); +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + } else { + ppp_notice("Link terminated."); + } + + lcp_lowerdown(pcb); + + ppp_link_terminated(pcb); +#if 0 + + /* + * Delete pid files before disestablishing ppp. Otherwise it + * can happen that another pppd gets the same unit and then + * we delete its pid file. + */ + if(!doing_multilink && !demand) + { + remove_pidfiles(); + } + + /* + * If we may want to bring the link up again, transfer + * the ppp unit back to the loopback. Set the + * real serial device back to its normal mode of operation. + */ + if(fd_ppp >= 0) + { + remove_fd(fd_ppp); + clean_check(); + the_channel->disestablish_ppp(devfd); + + if(doing_multilink) + { + mp_exit_bundle(); + } + + fd_ppp = -1; + } + + if(!hungup) + { + lcp_lowerdown(pcb); + } + + if(!doing_multilink && !demand) + { + script_unsetenv("IFNAME"); + } + + /* + * Run disconnector script, if requested. + * XXX we may not be able to do this if the line has hung up! + */ + if(devfd >= 0 && the_channel->disconnect) + { + the_channel->disconnect(); + devfd = -1; + } + + if(the_channel->cleanup) + { + (*the_channel->cleanup)(); + } + + if(doing_multilink && multilink_master) + { + if(!bundle_terminating) + { + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_MASTER); + } + else + { + mp_bundle_terminated(); + } + } + else + { + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); + } + +#endif +} + +/* + * LCP has gone down; it will either die or try to re-establish. + */ +void link_down(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ +#if PPP_NOTIFY + notify(link_down_notifier, 0); +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ + + if (!doing_multilink) { + upper_layers_down(pcb); + + if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + && pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_MASTER +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + ) { + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH); + } + } + + /* XXX if doing_multilink, should do something to stop + network-layer traffic on the link */ +} + +void upper_layers_down(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + int i; + const struct protent *protp; + + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) { + if (protp->protocol != PPP_LCP && protp->lowerdown != NULL) { + (*protp->lowerdown)(pcb); + } + + if (protp->protocol < 0xC000 && protp->close != NULL) { + (*protp->close)(pcb, "LCP down"); + } + } + + pcb->num_np_open = 0; + pcb->num_np_up = 0; +} + +/* + * The link is established. + * Proceed to the Dead, Authenticate or Network phase as appropriate. + */ +void link_established(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT + int auth; +#if PPP_SERVER +#if PAP_SUPPORT + lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + lcp_options *ho = &pcb->lcp_hisoptions; +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + int i; + const struct protent *protp; + + /* + * Tell higher-level protocols that LCP is up. + */ + if (!doing_multilink) { + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (protp->protocol != PPP_LCP && protp->lowerup != NULL) { + (*protp->lowerup)(pcb); + } + } + +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT +#if PPP_SERVER +#if PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS + + if (!auth_required && noauth_addrs != NULL) { + set_allowed_addrs(unit, NULL, NULL); + } + +#endif /* PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS */ + + if (pcb->settings.auth_required && !(0 +#if PAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_upap +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_chap +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_eap +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + )) { + +#if PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS + + /* + * We wanted the peer to authenticate itself, and it refused: + * if we have some address(es) it can use without auth, fine, + * otherwise treat it as though it authenticated with PAP using + * a username of "" and a password of "". If that's not OK, + * boot it out. + */ + if (noauth_addrs != NULL) { + set_allowed_addrs(unit, NULL, NULL); + } else +#endif /* PPP_ALLOWED_ADDRS */ + if (!pcb->settings.null_login +#if PAP_SUPPORT + || !wo->neg_upap +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + ) { + ppp_warn("peer refused to authenticate: terminating link"); +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + status = EXIT_PEER_AUTH_FAILED; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_AUTHFAIL; + lcp_close(pcb, "peer refused to authenticate"); + return; + } + } + +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_AUTHENTICATE); + auth = 0; +#if PPP_SERVER +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + if (go->neg_eap) { + eap_authpeer(pcb, PPP_OUR_NAME); + auth |= EAP_PEER; + } else +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + if (go->neg_chap) { + chap_auth_peer(pcb, PPP_OUR_NAME, CHAP_DIGEST(go->chap_mdtype)); + auth |= CHAP_PEER; + } else +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + if (go->neg_upap) { + upap_authpeer(pcb); + auth |= PAP_PEER; + } else +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + { + } + +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + if (ho->neg_eap) { + eap_authwithpeer(pcb, pcb->settings.user); + auth |= EAP_WITHPEER; + } else +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + if (ho->neg_chap) { + chap_auth_with_peer(pcb, pcb->settings.user, CHAP_DIGEST(ho->chap_mdtype)); + auth |= CHAP_WITHPEER; + } else +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + if (ho->neg_upap) { + upap_authwithpeer(pcb, pcb->settings.user, pcb->settings.passwd); + auth |= PAP_WITHPEER; + } else +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + { + } + + pcb->auth_pending = auth; + pcb->auth_done = 0; + + if (!auth) +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + network_phase(pcb); +} + +/* + * Proceed to the network phase. + */ +static void network_phase(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ +#if CBCP_SUPPORT + ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[unit]; +#endif +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + lcp_options *go = &lcp_gotoptions[unit]; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + /* Log calling number. */ + if(*remote_number) + { + ppp_notice("peer from calling number %q authorized", remote_number); + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if PPP_NOTIFY + + /* + * If the peer had to authenticate, notify it now. + */ + if (0 +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_chap +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_upap +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_eap +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + ) { + notify(auth_up_notifier, 0); + } + +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ + +#if CBCP_SUPPORT + + /* + * If we negotiated callback, do it now. + */ + if (go->neg_cbcp) { + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_CALLBACK); + (*cbcp_protent.open)(pcb); + return; + } + +#endif + +#if PPP_OPTIONS + + /* + * Process extra options from the secrets file + */ + if (extra_options) { + options_from_list(extra_options, 1); + free_wordlist(extra_options); + extra_options = 0; + } + +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + start_networks(pcb); +} + +void start_networks(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ +#if CCP_SUPPORT || ECP_SUPPORT + int i; + const struct protent *protp; +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT || ECP_SUPPORT */ + + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_NETWORK); + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + + if (multilink) { + if (mp_join_bundle()) { + if (multilink_join_hook) { + (*multilink_join_hook)(); + } + + if (updetach && !nodetach) { + detach(); + } + + return; + } + } + +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + +#ifdef PPP_FILTER + + if (!demand) { + set_filters(&pass_filter, &active_filter); + } + +#endif +#if CCP_SUPPORT || ECP_SUPPORT + + /* Start CCP and ECP */ + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if ( + (0 +#if ECP_SUPPORT + || protp->protocol == PPP_ECP +#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ +#if CCP_SUPPORT + || protp->protocol == PPP_CCP +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ + ) && + protp->open != NULL) { + (*protp->open)(pcb); + } + +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT || ECP_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * Bring up other network protocols iff encryption is not required. + */ + if (1 +#if ECP_SUPPORT + && !ecp_gotoptions[unit].required +#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + && !pcb->ccp_gotoptions.mppe +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + ) { + continue_networks(pcb); + } +} + +void continue_networks(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + int i; + const struct protent *protp; + + /* + * Start the "real" network protocols. + */ + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (protp->protocol < 0xC000 +#if CCP_SUPPORT + && protp->protocol != PPP_CCP +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ +#if ECP_SUPPORT + && protp->protocol != PPP_ECP +#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ + && protp->open != NULL) { + (*protp->open)(pcb); + ++pcb->num_np_open; + } + + if (pcb->num_np_open == 0) + /* nothing to do */ + { + lcp_close(pcb, "No network protocols running"); + } +} + +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * auth_check_passwd - Check the user name and passwd against configuration. + * + * returns: + * 0: Authentication failed. + * 1: Authentication succeeded. + * In either case, msg points to an appropriate message and msglen to the message len. + */ +int auth_check_passwd(ppp_pcb *pcb, char *auser, int userlen, char *apasswd, int passwdlen, const char **msg, int *msglen) +{ + int secretuserlen; + int secretpasswdlen; + + if (pcb->settings.user && pcb->settings.passwd) { + secretuserlen = (int)strlen(pcb->settings.user); + secretpasswdlen = (int)strlen(pcb->settings.passwd); + + if (secretuserlen == userlen && secretpasswdlen == passwdlen && !memcmp(auser, pcb->settings.user, userlen) && !memcmp(apasswd, pcb->settings.passwd, passwdlen)) { + *msg = "Login ok"; + *msglen = sizeof("Login ok") - 1; + return 1; + } + } + + *msg = "Login incorrect"; + *msglen = sizeof("Login incorrect") - 1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * The peer has failed to authenticate himself using `protocol'. + */ +void auth_peer_fail(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(protocol); + /* + * Authentication failure: take the link down + */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + status = EXIT_PEER_AUTH_FAILED; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_AUTHFAIL; + lcp_close(pcb, "Authentication failed"); +} + +/* + * The peer has been successfully authenticated using `protocol'. + */ +void auth_peer_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol, int prot_flavor, const char *name, int namelen) +{ + int bit; +#ifndef HAVE_MULTILINK + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(namelen); +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + + switch (protocol) { +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + + case PPP_CHAP: + bit = CHAP_PEER; + + switch (prot_flavor) { + case CHAP_MD5: + bit |= CHAP_MD5_PEER; + break; +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + + case CHAP_MICROSOFT: + bit |= CHAP_MS_PEER; + break; + + case CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2: + bit |= CHAP_MS2_PEER; + break; +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + + default: + break; + } + + break; +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + + case PPP_PAP: + bit = PAP_PEER; + break; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + case PPP_EAP: + bit = EAP_PEER; + break; +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + + default: + ppp_warn("auth_peer_success: unknown protocol %x", protocol); + return; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + + /* + * Save the authenticated name of the peer for later. + */ + if (namelen > (int)sizeof(pcb->peer_authname) - 1) { + namelen = (int)sizeof(pcb->peer_authname) - 1; + } + + MEMCPY(pcb->peer_authname, name, namelen); + pcb->peer_authname[namelen] = 0; +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + script_setenv("PEERNAME",, 0); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + + /* Save the authentication method for later. */ + pcb->auth_done |= bit; + + /* + * If there is no more authentication still to be done, + * proceed to the network (or callback) phase. + */ + if ((pcb->auth_pending &= ~bit) == 0) { + network_phase(pcb); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * We have failed to authenticate ourselves to the peer using `protocol'. + */ +void auth_withpeer_fail(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(protocol); + /* + * We've failed to authenticate ourselves to our peer. + * + * Some servers keep sending CHAP challenges, but there + * is no point in persisting without any way to get updated + * authentication secrets. + * + * He'll probably take the link down, and there's not much + * we can do except wait for that. + */ + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_AUTHFAIL; + lcp_close(pcb, "Failed to authenticate ourselves to peer"); +} + +/* + * We have successfully authenticated ourselves with the peer using `protocol'. + */ +void auth_withpeer_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, int protocol, int prot_flavor) +{ + int bit; + const char *prot = ""; + + switch (protocol) { +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + + case PPP_CHAP: + bit = CHAP_WITHPEER; + prot = "CHAP"; + + switch (prot_flavor) { + case CHAP_MD5: + bit |= CHAP_MD5_WITHPEER; + break; +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + + case CHAP_MICROSOFT: + bit |= CHAP_MS_WITHPEER; + break; + + case CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2: + bit |= CHAP_MS2_WITHPEER; + break; +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + + default: + break; + } + + break; +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + + case PPP_PAP: + bit = PAP_WITHPEER; + prot = "PAP"; + break; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + case PPP_EAP: + bit = EAP_WITHPEER; + prot = "EAP"; + break; +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + + default: + ppp_warn("auth_withpeer_success: unknown protocol %x", protocol); + bit = 0; + /* no break */ + } + + ppp_notice("%s authentication succeeded", prot); + + /* Save the authentication method for later. */ + pcb->auth_done |= bit; + + /* + * If there is no more authentication still being done, + * proceed to the network (or callback) phase. + */ + if ((pcb->auth_pending &= ~bit) == 0) { + network_phase(pcb); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * np_up - a network protocol has come up. + */ +void np_up(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto) +{ +#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT + int tlim; +#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(proto); + + if (pcb->num_np_up == 0) { + /* + * At this point we consider that the link has come up successfully. + */ + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_RUNNING); + +#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(idle_time_hook != 0) + { + tlim = (*idle_time_hook)(NULL); + } + else +#endif /* UNUSED */ + tlim = pcb->settings.idle_time_limit; + + if (tlim > 0) { + TIMEOUT(check_idle, (void *)pcb, tlim); + } + +#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ + +#if PPP_MAXCONNECT + + /* + * Set a timeout to close the connection once the maximum + * connect time has expired. + */ + if (pcb->settings.maxconnect > 0) { + TIMEOUT(connect_time_expired, (void *)pcb, pcb->settings.maxconnect); + } + +#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ + +#ifdef MAXOCTETS + + if (maxoctets > 0) { + TIMEOUT(check_maxoctets, NULL, maxoctets_timeout); + } + +#endif + +#if 0 /* Unused */ + + /* + * Detach now, if the updetach option was given. + */ + if(updetach && !nodetach) + { + detach(); + } + +#endif /* Unused */ + } + + ++pcb->num_np_up; +} + +/* + * np_down - a network protocol has gone down. + */ +void np_down(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(proto); + + if (--pcb->num_np_up == 0) { +#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT + UNTIMEOUT(check_idle, (void *)pcb); +#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ +#if PPP_MAXCONNECT + UNTIMEOUT(connect_time_expired, NULL); +#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ +#ifdef MAXOCTETS + UNTIMEOUT(check_maxoctets, NULL); +#endif + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_NETWORK); + } +} + +/* + * np_finished - a network protocol has finished using the link. + */ +void np_finished(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(proto); + + if (--pcb->num_np_open <= 0) { + /* no further use for the link: shut up shop. */ + lcp_close(pcb, "No network protocols running"); + } +} + +#ifdef MAXOCTETS +static void check_maxoctets(arg) void *arg; +{ +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + unsigned int used; + + update_link_stats(ifunit); + link_stats_valid = 0; + + switch (maxoctets_dir) { + case PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_IN: + used = link_stats.bytes_in; + break; + + case PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_OUT: + used = link_stats.bytes_out; + break; + + case PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_MAXOVERAL: + case PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_MAXSESSION: + used = (link_stats.bytes_in > link_stats.bytes_out) ? link_stats.bytes_in : link_stats.bytes_out; + break; + + default: + used = link_stats.bytes_in + link_stats.bytes_out; + break; + } + + if (used > maxoctets) { + ppp_notice("Traffic limit reached. Limit: %u Used: %u", maxoctets, used); + status = EXIT_TRAFFIC_LIMIT; + lcp_close(pcb, "Traffic limit"); +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + need_holdoff = 0; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + } else { + TIMEOUT(check_maxoctets, NULL, maxoctets_timeout); + } + +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ +} +#endif /* MAXOCTETS */ + +#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT +/* + * check_idle - check whether the link has been idle for long + * enough that we can shut it down. + */ +static void check_idle(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + struct ppp_idle idle; + time_t itime; + int tlim; + + if (!get_idle_time(pcb, &idle)) { + return; + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(idle_time_hook != 0) + { + tlim = idle_time_hook(&idle); + } + else + { +#endif /* UNUSED */ + itime = LWIP_MIN(idle.xmit_idle, idle.recv_idle); + tlim = pcb->settings.idle_time_limit - itime; +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + + if (tlim <= 0) { + /* link is idle: shut it down. */ + ppp_notice("Terminating connection due to lack of activity."); + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_IDLETIMEOUT; + lcp_close(pcb, "Link inactive"); +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + need_holdoff = 0; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + } else { + TIMEOUT(check_idle, (void *)pcb, tlim); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ + +#if PPP_MAXCONNECT +/* + * connect_time_expired - log a message and close the connection. + */ +static void connect_time_expired(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + ppp_info("Connect time expired"); + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_CONNECTTIME; + lcp_close(pcb, "Connect time expired"); /* Close connection */ +} +#endif /* PPP_MAXCONNECT */ + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * auth_check_options - called to check authentication options. + */ +void auth_check_options() +{ + lcp_options *wo = &lcp_wantoptions[0]; + int can_auth; + int lacks_ip; + + /* Default our_name to hostname, and user to our_name */ + if (our_name[0] == 0 || usehostname) { + strlcpy(our_name, hostname, sizeof(our_name)); + } + + /* If a blank username was explicitly given as an option, trust + the user and don't use our_name */ + if (ppp_settings.user[0] == 0 && !explicit_user) { + strlcpy(ppp_settings.user, our_name, sizeof(ppp_settings.user)); + } + + /* + * If we have a default route, require the peer to authenticate + * unless the noauth option was given or the real user is root. + */ + if (!auth_required && !allow_any_ip && have_route_to(0) && !privileged) { + auth_required = 1; + default_auth = 1; + } + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + + /* If we selected any CHAP flavors, we should probably negotiate it. :-) */ + if (wo->chap_mdtype) { + wo->neg_chap = 1; + } + +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ + + /* If authentication is required, ask peer for CHAP, PAP, or EAP. */ + if (auth_required) { + allow_any_ip = 0; + + if (1 +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + && !wo->neg_chap +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + && !wo->neg_upap +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + && !wo->neg_eap +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + ) { +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + wo->neg_chap = CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED != MDTYPE_NONE; + wo->chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + wo->neg_upap = 1; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + wo->neg_eap = 1; +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + } + } else { +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + wo->neg_chap = 0; + wo->chap_mdtype = MDTYPE_NONE; +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + wo->neg_upap = 0; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + wo->neg_eap = 0; +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + } + + /* + * Check whether we have appropriate secrets to use + * to authenticate the peer. Note that EAP can authenticate by way + * of a CHAP-like exchanges as well as SRP. + */ + lacks_ip = 0; +#if PAP_SUPPORT + can_auth = wo->neg_upap && (uselogin || have_pap_secret(&lacks_ip)); +#else + can_auth = 0; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + + if (!can_auth && (0 +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + || wo->neg_chap +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + || wo->neg_eap +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + )) { +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + can_auth = have_chap_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), + our_name, 1, &lacks_ip); +#else + can_auth = 0; +#endif + } + + if (!can_auth +#if EAP_SUPPORT + && wo->neg_eap +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + ) { + can_auth = have_srp_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), + our_name, 1, &lacks_ip); + } + + if (auth_required && !can_auth && noauth_addrs == NULL) { + if (default_auth) { + option_error( + "By default the remote system is required to authenticate itself"); + option_error( + "(because this system has a default route to the internet)"); + } else if (explicit_remote) + option_error( + "The remote system (%s) is required to authenticate itself", + remote_name); + else + option_error( + "The remote system is required to authenticate itself"); + + option_error( + "but I couldn't find any suitable secret (password) for it to use to do so."); + + if (lacks_ip) + option_error( + "(None of the available passwords would let it use an IP address.)"); + + exit(1); + } + + /* + * Early check for remote number authorization. + */ + if (!auth_number()) { + ppp_warn("calling number %q is not authorized", remote_number); + exit(EXIT_CNID_AUTH_FAILED); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* + * auth_reset - called when LCP is starting negotiations to recheck + * authentication options, i.e. whether we have appropriate secrets + * to use for authenticating ourselves and/or the peer. + */ +void auth_reset(unit) +int unit; +{ + lcp_options *go = &lcp_gotoptions[unit]; + lcp_options *ao = &lcp_allowoptions[unit]; + int hadchap; + + hadchap = -1; + ao->neg_upap = !refuse_pap && (passwd[0] != 0 || get_pap_passwd(NULL)); + ao->neg_chap = (!refuse_chap || !refuse_mschap || !refuse_mschap_v2) + && (passwd[0] != 0 || + (hadchap = have_chap_secret(user, (explicit_remote ? remote_name : + NULL), 0, NULL))); + ao->neg_eap = !refuse_eap && ( + passwd[0] != 0 || + (hadchap == 1 || (hadchap == -1 && have_chap_secret(user, + (explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), 0, NULL))) || + have_srp_secret(user, (explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), 0, NULL)); + + hadchap = -1; + + if(go->neg_upap && !uselogin && !have_pap_secret(NULL)) + { + go->neg_upap = 0; + } + + if(go->neg_chap) + { + if(!(hadchap = have_chap_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), + our_name, 1, NULL))) + { + go->neg_chap = 0; + } + } + + if(go->neg_eap && + (hadchap == 0 || (hadchap == -1 && + !have_chap_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), our_name, + 1, NULL))) && + !have_srp_secret((explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), our_name, 1, + NULL)) + { + go->neg_eap = 0; + } +} + +/* + * check_passwd - Check the user name and passwd against the PAP secrets + * file. If requested, also check against the system password database, + * and login the user if OK. + * + * returns: + * UPAP_AUTHNAK: Authentication failed. + * UPAP_AUTHACK: Authentication succeeded. + * In either case, msg points to an appropriate message. + */ +int check_passwd(unit, auser, userlen, apasswd, passwdlen, msg) +int unit; +char *auser; +int userlen; +char *apasswd; +int passwdlen; +char **msg; +{ + return UPAP_AUTHNAK; + int ret; + char *filename; + FILE *f; + struct wordlist *addrs = NULL, *opts = NULL; + char passwd[256], user[256]; + char secret[MAXWORDLEN]; + static int attempts = 0; + + /* + * Make copies of apasswd and auser, then null-terminate them. + * If there are unprintable characters in the password, make + * them visible. + */ + slprintf(ppp_settings.passwd, sizeof(ppp_settings.passwd), "%.*v", passwdlen, apasswd); + slprintf(ppp_settings.user, sizeof(ppp_settings.user), "%.*v", userlen, auser); + *msg = ""; + + /* + * Check if a plugin wants to handle this. + */ + if(pap_auth_hook) + { + ret = (*pap_auth_hook)(ppp_settings.user, ppp_settings.passwd, msg, &addrs, &opts); + + if(ret >= 0) + { + /* note: set_allowed_addrs() saves opts (but not addrs): + don't free it! */ + if(ret) + { + set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); + } + else if(opts != 0) + { + free_wordlist(opts); + } + + if(addrs != 0) + { + free_wordlist(addrs); + } + + BZERO(ppp_settings.passwd, sizeof(ppp_settings.passwd)); + return ret ? UPAP_AUTHACK : UPAP_AUTHNAK; + } + } + + /* + * Open the file of pap secrets and scan for a suitable secret + * for authenticating this user. + */ + filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; + addrs = opts = NULL; + ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + + if(f == NULL) + { + ppp_error("Can't open PAP password file %s: %m", filename); + + } + else + { + check_access(f, filename); + + if(scan_authfile(f, ppp_settings.user, our_name, secret, &addrs, &opts, filename, 0) < 0) + { + ppp_warn("no PAP secret found for %s", user); + } + else + { + /* + * If the secret is "@login", it means to check + * the password against the login database. + */ + int login_secret = strcmp(secret, "@login") == 0; + ret = UPAP_AUTHACK; + + if(uselogin || login_secret) + { + /* login option or secret is @login */ + if(session_full(ppp_settings.user, ppp_settings.passwd, devnam, msg) == 0) + { + ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; + } + } + else if(session_mgmt) + { + if(session_check(ppp_settings.user, NULL, devnam, NULL) == 0) + { + ppp_warn("Peer %q failed PAP Session verification", user); + ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; + } + } + + if(secret[0] != 0 && !login_secret) + { + /* password given in pap-secrets - must match */ + if((cryptpap || strcmp(ppp_settings.passwd, secret) != 0) + && strcmp(crypt(ppp_settings.passwd, secret), secret) != 0) + { + ret = UPAP_AUTHNAK; + } + } + } + + fclose(f); + } + + if(ret == UPAP_AUTHNAK) + { + if(**msg == 0) + { + *msg = "Login incorrect"; + } + + /* + * XXX can we ever get here more than once?? + * Frustrate passwd stealer programs. + * Allow 10 tries, but start backing off after 3 (stolen from login). + * On 10'th, drop the connection. + */ + if(attempts++ >= 10) + { + ppp_warn("%d LOGIN FAILURES ON %s, %s", attempts, devnam, user); + lcp_close(pcb, "login failed"); + } + + if(attempts > 3) + { + sleep((u_int)(attempts - 3) * 5); + } + + if(opts != NULL) + { + free_wordlist(opts); + } + + } + else + { + attempts = 0; /* Reset count */ + + if(**msg == 0) + { + *msg = "Login ok"; + } + + set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); + } + + if(addrs != NULL) + { + free_wordlist(addrs); + } + + BZERO(ppp_settings.passwd, sizeof(ppp_settings.passwd)); + BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * null_login - Check if a username of "" and a password of "" are + * acceptable, and iff so, set the list of acceptable IP addresses + * and return 1. + */ +static int null_login(unit) +int unit; +{ + char *filename; + FILE *f; + int i, ret; + struct wordlist *addrs, *opts; + char secret[MAXWORDLEN]; + + /* + * Check if a plugin wants to handle this. + */ + ret = -1; + + if(null_auth_hook) + { + ret = (*null_auth_hook)(&addrs, &opts); + } + + /* + * Open the file of pap secrets and scan for a suitable secret. + */ + if(ret <= 0) + { + filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; + addrs = NULL; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + + if(f == NULL) + { + return 0; + } + + check_access(f, filename); + + i = scan_authfile(f, "", our_name, secret, &addrs, &opts, filename, 0); + ret = i >= 0 && secret[0] == 0; + BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); + fclose(f); + } + + if(ret) + { + set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); + } + else if(opts != 0) + { + free_wordlist(opts); + } + + if(addrs != 0) + { + free_wordlist(addrs); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * get_pap_passwd - get a password for authenticating ourselves with + * our peer using PAP. Returns 1 on success, 0 if no suitable password + * could be found. + * Assumes passwd points to MAXSECRETLEN bytes of space (if non-null). + */ +static int get_pap_passwd(passwd) +char *passwd; +{ + char *filename; + FILE *f; + int ret; + char secret[MAXWORDLEN]; + + /* + * Check whether a plugin wants to supply this. + */ + if(pap_passwd_hook) + { + ret = (*pap_passwd_hook)(ppp_settings, user, ppp_settings.passwd); + + if(ret >= 0) + { + return ret; + } + } + + filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + + if(f == NULL) + { + return 0; + } + + check_access(f, filename); + ret = scan_authfile(f, user, + (remote_name[0] ? remote_name : NULL), + secret, NULL, NULL, filename, 0); + fclose(f); + + if(ret < 0) + { + return 0; + } + + if(passwd != NULL) + { + strlcpy(passwd, secret, MAXSECRETLEN); + } + + BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); + return 1; +} + +/* + * have_pap_secret - check whether we have a PAP file with any + * secrets that we could possibly use for authenticating the peer. + */ +static int have_pap_secret(lacks_ipp) +int *lacks_ipp; +{ + FILE *f; + int ret; + char *filename; + struct wordlist *addrs; + + /* let the plugin decide, if there is one */ + if(pap_check_hook) + { + ret = (*pap_check_hook)(); + + if(ret >= 0) + { + return ret; + } + } + + filename = _PATH_UPAPFILE; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + + if(f == NULL) + { + return 0; + } + + ret = scan_authfile(f, (explicit_remote ? remote_name : NULL), our_name, + NULL, &addrs, NULL, filename, 0); + fclose(f); + + if(ret >= 0 && !some_ip_ok(addrs)) + { + if(lacks_ipp != 0) + { + *lacks_ipp = 1; + } + + ret = -1; + } + + if(addrs != 0) + { + free_wordlist(addrs); + } + + return ret >= 0; +} + +/* + * have_chap_secret - check whether we have a CHAP file with a + * secret that we could possibly use for authenticating `client' + * on `server'. Either can be the null string, meaning we don't + * know the identity yet. + */ +static int have_chap_secret(client, server, need_ip, lacks_ipp) +char *client; +char *server; +int need_ip; +int *lacks_ipp; +{ + FILE *f; + int ret; + char *filename; + struct wordlist *addrs; + + if(chap_check_hook) + { + ret = (*chap_check_hook)(); + + if(ret >= 0) + { + return ret; + } + } + + filename = _PATH_CHAPFILE; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + + if(f == NULL) + { + return 0; + } + + if(client != NULL && client[0] == 0) + { + client = NULL; + } + else if(server != NULL && server[0] == 0) + { + server = NULL; + } + + ret = scan_authfile(f, client, server, NULL, &addrs, NULL, filename, 0); + fclose(f); + + if(ret >= 0 && need_ip && !some_ip_ok(addrs)) + { + if(lacks_ipp != 0) + { + *lacks_ipp = 1; + } + + ret = -1; + } + + if(addrs != 0) + { + free_wordlist(addrs); + } + + return ret >= 0; +} + +/* + * have_srp_secret - check whether we have a SRP file with a + * secret that we could possibly use for authenticating `client' + * on `server'. Either can be the null string, meaning we don't + * know the identity yet. + */ +static int have_srp_secret(client, server, need_ip, lacks_ipp) +char *client; +char *server; +int need_ip; +int *lacks_ipp; +{ + FILE *f; + int ret; + char *filename; + struct wordlist *addrs; + + filename = _PATH_SRPFILE; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + + if(f == NULL) + { + return 0; + } + + if(client != NULL && client[0] == 0) + { + client = NULL; + } + else if(server != NULL && server[0] == 0) + { + server = NULL; + } + + ret = scan_authfile(f, client, server, NULL, &addrs, NULL, filename, 0); + fclose(f); + + if(ret >= 0 && need_ip && !some_ip_ok(addrs)) + { + if(lacks_ipp != 0) + { + *lacks_ipp = 1; + } + + ret = -1; + } + + if(addrs != 0) + { + free_wordlist(addrs); + } + + return ret >= 0; +} +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT +/* + * get_secret - open the CHAP secret file and return the secret + * for authenticating the given client on the given server. + * (We could be either client or server). + */ +int get_secret(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *client, const char *server, char *secret, int *secret_len, int am_server) +{ + int len; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(server); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(am_server); + + if (!client || !client[0] || !pcb->settings.user || !pcb->settings.passwd || strcmp(client, pcb->settings.user)) { + return 0; + } + + len = (int)strlen(pcb->settings.passwd); + + if (len > MAXSECRETLEN) { + ppp_error("Secret for %s on %s is too long", client, server); + len = MAXSECRETLEN; + } + + MEMCPY(secret, pcb->settings.passwd, len); + *secret_len = len; + return 1; + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + FILE *f; + int ret, len; + char *filename; + struct wordlist *addrs, *opts; + char secbuf[MAXWORDLEN]; + struct wordlist *addrs; + addrs = NULL; + + if(!am_server && ppp_settings.passwd[0] != 0) + { + strlcpy(secbuf, ppp_settings.passwd, sizeof(secbuf)); + } + else if(!am_server && chap_passwd_hook) + { + if((*chap_passwd_hook)(client, secbuf) < 0) + { + ppp_error("Unable to obtain CHAP password for %s on %s from plugin", + client, server); + return 0; + } + } + else + { + filename = _PATH_CHAPFILE; + addrs = NULL; + secbuf[0] = 0; + + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + + if(f == NULL) + { + ppp_error("Can't open chap secret file %s: %m", filename); + return 0; + } + + check_access(f, filename); + + ret = scan_authfile(f, client, server, secbuf, &addrs, &opts, filename, 0); + fclose(f); + + if(ret < 0) + { + return 0; + } + + if(am_server) + { + set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); + } + else if(opts != 0) + { + free_wordlist(opts); + } + + if(addrs != 0) + { + free_wordlist(addrs); + } + } + + len = strlen(secbuf); + + if(len > MAXSECRETLEN) + { + ppp_error("Secret for %s on %s is too long", client, server); + len = MAXSECRETLEN; + } + + MEMCPY(secret, secbuf, len); + BZERO(secbuf, sizeof(secbuf)); + *secret_len = len; + + return 1; +#endif /* UNUSED */ +} +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* + * get_srp_secret - open the SRP secret file and return the secret + * for authenticating the given client on the given server. + * (We could be either client or server). + */ +int get_srp_secret(unit, client, server, secret, am_server) +int unit; +char *client; +char *server; +char *secret; +int am_server; +{ + FILE *fp; + int ret; + char *filename; + struct wordlist *addrs, *opts; + + if(!am_server && ppp_settings.passwd[0] != '\0') + { + strlcpy(secret, ppp_settings.passwd, MAXWORDLEN); + } + else + { + filename = _PATH_SRPFILE; + addrs = NULL; + + fp = fopen(filename, "r"); + + if(fp == NULL) + { + ppp_error("Can't open srp secret file %s: %m", filename); + return 0; + } + + check_access(fp, filename); + + secret[0] = '\0'; + ret = scan_authfile(fp, client, server, secret, &addrs, &opts, + filename, am_server); + fclose(fp); + + if(ret < 0) + { + return 0; + } + + if(am_server) + { + set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts); + } + else if(opts != NULL) + { + free_wordlist(opts); + } + + if(addrs != NULL) + { + free_wordlist(addrs); + } + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * set_allowed_addrs() - set the list of allowed addresses. + * Also looks for `--' indicating options to apply for this peer + * and leaves the following words in extra_options. + */ +static void set_allowed_addrs(unit, addrs, opts) +int unit; +struct wordlist *addrs; +struct wordlist *opts; +{ + int n; + struct wordlist *ap, **plink; + struct permitted_ip *ip; + char *ptr_word, *ptr_mask; + struct hostent *hp; + struct netent *np; + u32_t a, mask, ah, offset; + struct ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[unit]; + u32_t suggested_ip = 0; + + if(addresses[unit] != NULL) + { + free(addresses[unit]); + } + + addresses[unit] = NULL; + + if(extra_options != NULL) + { + free_wordlist(extra_options); + } + + extra_options = opts; + + /* + * Count the number of IP addresses given. + */ + n = wordlist_count(addrs) + wordlist_count(noauth_addrs); + + if(n == 0) + { + return; + } + + ip = (struct permitted_ip *) malloc((n + 1) * sizeof(struct permitted_ip)); + + if(ip == 0) + { + return; + } + + /* temporarily append the noauth_addrs list to addrs */ + for(plink = &addrs; *plink != NULL; plink = &(*plink)->next) + ; + + *plink = noauth_addrs; + + n = 0; + + for(ap = addrs; ap != NULL; ap = ap->next) + { + /* "-" means no addresses authorized, "*" means any address allowed */ + ptr_word = ap->word; + + if(strcmp(ptr_word, "-") == 0) + { + break; + } + + if(strcmp(ptr_word, "*") == 0) + { + ip[n].permit = 1; + ip[n].base = ip[n].mask = 0; + ++n; + break; + } + + ip[n].permit = 1; + + if(*ptr_word == '!') + { + ip[n].permit = 0; + ++ptr_word; + } + + mask = ~(u32_t) 0; + offset = 0; + ptr_mask = strchr(ptr_word, '/'); + + if(ptr_mask != NULL) + { + int bit_count; + char *endp; + + bit_count = (int) strtol(ptr_mask + 1, &endp, 10); + + if(bit_count <= 0 || bit_count > 32) + { + ppp_warn("invalid address length %v in auth. address list", + ptr_mask + 1); + continue; + } + + bit_count = 32 - bit_count; /* # bits in host part */ + + if(*endp == '+') + { + offset = ifunit + 1; + ++endp; + } + + if(*endp != 0) + { + ppp_warn("invalid address length syntax: %v", ptr_mask + 1); + continue; + } + + *ptr_mask = '\0'; + mask <<= bit_count; + } + + hp = gethostbyname(ptr_word); + + if(hp != NULL && hp->h_addrtype == AF_INET) + { + a = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; + } + else + { + np = getnetbyname(ptr_word); + + if(np != NULL && np->n_addrtype == AF_INET) + { + a = lwip_htonl((u32_t)np->n_net); + + if(ptr_mask == NULL) + { + /* calculate appropriate mask for net */ + ah = lwip_ntohl(a); + + if(IN_CLASSA(ah)) + { + mask = IN_CLASSA_NET; + } + else if(IN_CLASSB(ah)) + { + mask = IN_CLASSB_NET; + } + else if(IN_CLASSC(ah)) + { + mask = IN_CLASSC_NET; + } + } + } + else + { + a = inet_addr(ptr_word); + } + } + + if(ptr_mask != NULL) + { + *ptr_mask = '/'; + } + + if(a == (u32_t) -1L) + { + ppp_warn("unknown host %s in auth. address list", ap->word); + continue; + } + + if(offset != 0) + { + if(offset >= ~mask) + { + ppp_warn("interface unit %d too large for subnet %v", + ifunit, ptr_word); + continue; + } + + a = lwip_htonl((lwip_ntohl(a) & mask) + offset); + mask = ~(u32_t)0; + } + + ip[n].mask = lwip_htonl(mask); + ip[n].base = a & ip[n].mask; + ++n; + + if(~mask == 0 && suggested_ip == 0) + { + suggested_ip = a; + } + } + + *plink = NULL; + + ip[n].permit = 0; /* make the last entry forbid all addresses */ + ip[n].base = 0; /* to terminate the list */ + ip[n].mask = 0; + + addresses[unit] = ip; + + /* + * If the address given for the peer isn't authorized, or if + * the user hasn't given one, AND there is an authorized address + * which is a single host, then use that if we find one. + */ + if(suggested_ip != 0 + && (wo->hisaddr == 0 || !auth_ip_addr(unit, wo->hisaddr))) + { + wo->hisaddr = suggested_ip; + + /* + * Do we insist on this address? No, if there are other + * addresses authorized than the suggested one. + */ + if(n > 1) + { + wo->accept_remote = 1; + } + } +} + +/* + * auth_ip_addr - check whether the peer is authorized to use + * a given IP address. Returns 1 if authorized, 0 otherwise. + */ +int auth_ip_addr(unit, addr) +int unit; +u32_t addr; +{ + int ok; + + /* don't allow loopback or multicast address */ + if(bad_ip_adrs(addr)) + { + return 0; + } + + if(allowed_address_hook) + { + ok = allowed_address_hook(addr); + + if(ok >= 0) + { + return ok; + } + } + + if(addresses[unit] != NULL) + { + ok = ip_addr_check(addr, addresses[unit]); + + if(ok >= 0) + { + return ok; + } + } + + if(auth_required) + { + return 0; /* no addresses authorized */ + } + + return allow_any_ip || privileged || !have_route_to(addr); +} + +static int ip_addr_check(addr, addrs) +u32_t addr; +struct permitted_ip *addrs; +{ + for(; ; ++addrs) + if((addr & addrs->mask) == addrs->base) + { + return addrs->permit; + } +} + +/* + * bad_ip_adrs - return 1 if the IP address is one we don't want + * to use, such as an address in the loopback net or a multicast address. + * addr is in network byte order. + */ +int bad_ip_adrs(addr) +u32_t addr; +{ + addr = lwip_ntohl(addr); + return (addr >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT) == IN_LOOPBACKNET + || IN_MULTICAST(addr) || IN_BADCLASS(addr); +} + +/* + * some_ip_ok - check a wordlist to see if it authorizes any + * IP address(es). + */ +static int some_ip_ok(addrs) +struct wordlist *addrs; +{ + for(; addrs != 0; addrs = addrs->next) + { + if(addrs->word[0] == '-') + { + break; + } + + if(addrs->word[0] != '!') + { + return 1; /* some IP address is allowed */ + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * auth_number - check whether the remote number is allowed to connect. + * Returns 1 if authorized, 0 otherwise. + */ +int auth_number() +{ + struct wordlist *wp = permitted_numbers; + int l; + + /* Allow all if no authorization list. */ + if(!wp) + { + return 1; + } + + /* Allow if we have a match in the authorization list. */ + while(wp) + { + /* trailing '*' wildcard */ + l = strlen(wp->word); + + if((wp->word)[l - 1] == '*') + { + l--; + } + + if(!strncasecmp(wp->word, remote_number, l)) + { + return 1; + } + + wp = wp->next; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * check_access - complain if a secret file has too-liberal permissions. + */ +static void check_access(f, filename) +FILE *f; +char *filename; +{ + struct stat sbuf; + + if(fstat(fileno(f), &sbuf) < 0) + { + ppp_warn("cannot stat secret file %s: %m", filename); + } + else if((sbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) != 0) + { + ppp_warn("Warning - secret file %s has world and/or group access", + filename); + } +} + +/* + * scan_authfile - Scan an authorization file for a secret suitable + * for authenticating `client' on `server'. The return value is -1 + * if no secret is found, otherwise >= 0. The return value has + * NONWILD_CLIENT set if the secret didn't have "*" for the client, and + * NONWILD_SERVER set if the secret didn't have "*" for the server. + * Any following words on the line up to a "--" (i.e. address authorization + * info) are placed in a wordlist and returned in *addrs. Any + * following words (extra options) are placed in a wordlist and + * returned in *opts. + * We assume secret is NULL or points to MAXWORDLEN bytes of space. + * Flags are non-zero if we need two colons in the secret in order to + * match. + */ +static int scan_authfile(f, client, server, secret, addrs, opts, filename, flags) +FILE *f; +char *client; +char *server; +char *secret; +struct wordlist **addrs; +struct wordlist **opts; +char *filename; +int flags; +{ + int newline, xxx; + int got_flag, best_flag; + FILE *sf; + struct wordlist *ap, *addr_list, *alist, **app; + char word[MAXWORDLEN]; + char atfile[MAXWORDLEN]; + char lsecret[MAXWORDLEN]; + char *cp; + + if(addrs != NULL) + { + *addrs = NULL; + } + + if(opts != NULL) + { + *opts = NULL; + } + + addr_list = NULL; + + if(!getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) + { + return -1; /* file is empty??? */ + } + + newline = 1; + best_flag = -1; + + for(;;) + { + /* + * Skip until we find a word at the start of a line. + */ + while(!newline && getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) + ; + + if(!newline) + { + break; /* got to end of file */ + } + + /* + * Got a client - check if it's a match or a wildcard. + */ + got_flag = 0; + + if(client != NULL && strcmp(word, client) != 0 && !ISWILD(word)) + { + newline = 0; + continue; + } + + if(!ISWILD(word)) + { + got_flag = NONWILD_CLIENT; + } + + /* + * Now get a server and check if it matches. + */ + if(!getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) + { + break; + } + + if(newline) + { + continue; + } + + if(!ISWILD(word)) + { + if(server != NULL && strcmp(word, server) != 0) + { + continue; + } + + got_flag |= NONWILD_SERVER; + } + + /* + * Got some sort of a match - see if it's better than what + * we have already. + */ + if(got_flag <= best_flag) + { + continue; + } + + /* + * Get the secret. + */ + if(!getword(f, word, &newline, filename)) + { + break; + } + + if(newline) + { + continue; + } + + /* + * SRP-SHA1 authenticator should never be reading secrets from + * a file. (Authenticatee may, though.) + */ + if(flags && ((cp = strchr(word, ':')) == NULL || + strchr(cp + 1, ':') == NULL)) + { + continue; + } + + if(secret != NULL) + { + /* + * Special syntax: @/pathname means read secret from file. + */ + if(word[0] == '@' && word[1] == '/') + { + strlcpy(atfile, word + 1, sizeof(atfile)); + + if((sf = fopen(atfile, "r")) == NULL) + { + ppp_warn("can't open indirect secret file %s", atfile); + continue; + } + + check_access(sf, atfile); + + if(!getword(sf, word, &xxx, atfile)) + { + ppp_warn("no secret in indirect secret file %s", atfile); + fclose(sf); + continue; + } + + fclose(sf); + } + + strlcpy(lsecret, word, sizeof(lsecret)); + } + + /* + * Now read address authorization info and make a wordlist. + */ + app = &alist; + + for(;;) + { + if(!getword(f, word, &newline, filename) || newline) + { + break; + } + + ap = (struct wordlist *) + malloc(sizeof(struct wordlist) + strlen(word) + 1); + + if(ap == NULL) + { + novm("authorized addresses"); + } + + ap->word = (char *)(ap + 1); + strcpy(ap->word, word); + *app = ap; + app = &ap->next; + } + + *app = NULL; + + /* + * This is the best so far; remember it. + */ + best_flag = got_flag; + + if(addr_list) + { + free_wordlist(addr_list); + } + + addr_list = alist; + + if(secret != NULL) + { + strlcpy(secret, lsecret, MAXWORDLEN); + } + + if(!newline) + { + break; + } + } + + /* scan for a -- word indicating the start of options */ + for(app = &addr_list; (ap = *app) != NULL; app = &ap->next) + if(strcmp(ap->word, "--") == 0) + { + break; + } + + /* ap = start of options */ + if(ap != NULL) + { + ap = ap->next; /* first option */ + free(*app); /* free the "--" word */ + *app = NULL; /* terminate addr list */ + } + + if(opts != NULL) + { + *opts = ap; + } + else if(ap != NULL) + { + free_wordlist(ap); + } + + if(addrs != NULL) + { + *addrs = addr_list; + } + else if(addr_list != NULL) + { + free_wordlist(addr_list); + } + + return best_flag; +} + +/* + * wordlist_count - return the number of items in a wordlist + */ +static int wordlist_count(wp) +struct wordlist *wp; +{ + int n; + + for(n = 0; wp != NULL; wp = wp->next) + { + ++n; + } + + return n; +} + +/* + * free_wordlist - release memory allocated for a wordlist. + */ +static void free_wordlist(wp) +struct wordlist *wp; +{ + struct wordlist *next; + + while(wp != NULL) + { + next = wp->next; + free(wp); + wp = next; + } +} +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ccp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ccp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ccp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ccp.c index 4ea4541f..6fe774d7 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ccp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ccp.c @@ -1,1989 +1,1989 @@ -/* - * ccp.c - PPP Compression Control Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 1994-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && CCP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include -#include - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" /* lcp_close(), lcp_fsm */ -#include "netif/ppp/mppe.h" /* mppe_init() */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * Unfortunately there is a bug in zlib which means that using a - * size of 8 (window size = 256) for Deflate compression will cause - * buffer overruns and kernel crashes in the deflate module. - * Until this is fixed we only accept sizes in the range 9 .. 15. - * Thanks to James Carlson for pointing this out. - */ -#define DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS 9 - -/* - * Command-line options. - */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS -static int setbsdcomp(char **); -static int setdeflate(char **); -static char bsd_value[8]; -static char deflate_value[8]; - -/* - * Option variables. - */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -bool refuse_mppe_stateful = 1; /* Allow stateful mode? */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -static option_t ccp_option_list[] = { - { "noccp", o_bool, &ccp_protent.enabled_flag, - "Disable CCP negotiation" }, - { "-ccp", o_bool, &ccp_protent.enabled_flag, - "Disable CCP negotiation", OPT_ALIAS }, - - { "bsdcomp", o_special, (void *)setbsdcomp, - "Request BSD-Compress packet compression", - OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL | OPT_STATIC, bsd_value }, - { "nobsdcomp", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_compress, - "don't allow BSD-Compress", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, - &ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_compress }, - { "-bsdcomp", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_compress, - "don't allow BSD-Compress", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, - &ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_compress }, - - { "deflate", o_special, (void *)setdeflate, - "request Deflate compression", - OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL | OPT_STATIC, deflate_value }, - { "nodeflate", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate, - "don't allow Deflate compression", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, - &ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate }, - { "-deflate", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate, - "don't allow Deflate compression", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, - &ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate }, - - { "nodeflatedraft", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate_draft, - "don't use draft deflate #", OPT_A2COPY, - &ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate_draft }, - - { "predictor1", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].predictor_1, - "request Predictor-1", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, - { "nopredictor1", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].predictor_1, - "don't allow Predictor-1", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, - &ccp_allowoptions[0].predictor_1 }, - { "-predictor1", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].predictor_1, - "don't allow Predictor-1", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, - &ccp_allowoptions[0].predictor_1 }, - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - /* MPPE options are symmetrical ... we only set wantoptions here */ - { - "require-mppe", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe, - "require MPPE encryption", - OPT_PRIO | MPPE_OPT_40 | MPPE_OPT_128 }, - { "+mppe", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe, - "require MPPE encryption", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIO | MPPE_OPT_40 | MPPE_OPT_128 }, - { "nomppe", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe, - "don't allow MPPE encryption", OPT_PRIO }, - { "-mppe", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe, - "don't allow MPPE encryption", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIO }, - - /* We use ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe as a junk var ... it is reset later */ - { - "require-mppe-40", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, - "require MPPE 40-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_40, - &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, - { "+mppe-40", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, - "require MPPE 40-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_40, - &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, - { "nomppe-40", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, - "don't allow MPPE 40-bit encryption", - OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLRB | MPPE_OPT_40, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, - { "-mppe-40", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, - "don't allow MPPE 40-bit encryption", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLRB | MPPE_OPT_40, - &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, - - { "require-mppe-128", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, - "require MPPE 128-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_128, - &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, - { "+mppe-128", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, - "require MPPE 128-bit encryption", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_128, - &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, - { "nomppe-128", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, - "don't allow MPPE 128-bit encryption", - OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLRB | MPPE_OPT_128, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, - { "-mppe-128", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, - "don't allow MPPE 128-bit encryption", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLRB | MPPE_OPT_128, - &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, - - /* strange one; we always request stateless, but will we allow stateful? */ - { - "mppe-stateful", o_bool, &refuse_mppe_stateful, - "allow MPPE stateful mode", OPT_PRIO }, - { "nomppe-stateful", o_bool, &refuse_mppe_stateful, - "disallow MPPE stateful mode", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * Protocol entry points from main code. - */ -static void ccp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ccp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ccp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); -static void ccp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ccp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ccp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len); -static void ccp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static int ccp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT -static void ccp_datainput(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len); -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ - -const struct protent ccp_protent = { - PPP_CCP, - ccp_init, - ccp_input, - ccp_protrej, - ccp_lowerup, - ccp_lowerdown, - ccp_open, - ccp_close, -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - ccp_printpkt, -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT - ccp_datainput, -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - "CCP", - "Compressed", -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS - ccp_option_list, - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - NULL, - NULL -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -}; - -/* - * Callbacks for fsm code. - */ -static void ccp_resetci(fsm *); -static int ccp_cilen(fsm *); -static void ccp_addci(fsm *, u_char *, int *); -static int ccp_ackci(fsm *, u_char *, int); -static int ccp_nakci(fsm *, u_char *, int, int); -static int ccp_rejci(fsm *, u_char *, int); -static int ccp_reqci(fsm *, u_char *, int *, int); -static void ccp_up(fsm *); -static void ccp_down(fsm *); -static int ccp_extcode(fsm *, int, int, u_char *, int); -static void ccp_rack_timeout(void *); -static const char *method_name(ccp_options *, ccp_options *); - -static const fsm_callbacks ccp_callbacks = { - ccp_resetci, - ccp_cilen, - ccp_addci, - ccp_ackci, - ccp_nakci, - ccp_rejci, - ccp_reqci, - ccp_up, - ccp_down, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - ccp_extcode, - "CCP" -}; - -/* - * Do we want / did we get any compression? - */ -static int ccp_anycompress(ccp_options *opt) -{ - return (0 -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - || (opt)->deflate -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - || (opt)->bsd_compress -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - || (opt)->predictor_1 || (opt)->predictor_2 -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - || (opt)->mppe -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - ); -} - -/* - * Local state (mainly for handling reset-reqs and reset-acks). - */ -#define RACK_PENDING 1 /* waiting for reset-ack */ -#define RREQ_REPEAT 2 /* send another reset-req if no reset-ack */ - -#define RACKTIMEOUT 1 /* second */ - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * Option parsing - */ -static int setbsdcomp(argv) char **argv; -{ - int rbits, abits; - char *str, *endp; - - str = *argv; - abits = rbits = strtol(str, &endp, 0); - - if (endp != str && *endp == ',') { - str = endp + 1; - abits = strtol(str, &endp, 0); - } - - if (*endp != 0 || endp == str) { - option_error("invalid parameter '%s' for bsdcomp option", *argv); - return 0; - } - - if ((rbits != 0 && (rbits < BSD_MIN_BITS || rbits > BSD_MAX_BITS)) || (abits != 0 && (abits < BSD_MIN_BITS || abits > BSD_MAX_BITS))) { - option_error("bsdcomp option values must be 0 or %d .. %d", - BSD_MIN_BITS, BSD_MAX_BITS); - return 0; - } - - if (rbits > 0) { - ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_compress = 1; - ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_bits = rbits; - } else { - ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_compress = 0; - } - - if (abits > 0) { - ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_compress = 1; - ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_bits = abits; - } else { - ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_compress = 0; - } - - ppp_slprintf(bsd_value, sizeof(bsd_value), - rbits == abits ? "%d" : "%d,%d", rbits, abits); - - return 1; -} - -static int setdeflate(argv) char **argv; -{ - int rbits, abits; - char *str, *endp; - - str = *argv; - abits = rbits = strtol(str, &endp, 0); - - if (endp != str && *endp == ',') { - str = endp + 1; - abits = strtol(str, &endp, 0); - } - - if (*endp != 0 || endp == str) { - option_error("invalid parameter '%s' for deflate option", *argv); - return 0; - } - - if ((rbits != 0 && (rbits < DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE || rbits > DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE)) || (abits != 0 && (abits < DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE || abits > DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE))) { - option_error("deflate option values must be 0 or %d .. %d", - DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE, DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE); - return 0; - } - - if (rbits == DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE || abits == DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE) { - if (rbits == DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE) { - rbits = DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS; - } - - if (abits == DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE) { - abits = DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS; - } - - warn("deflate option value of %d changed to %d to avoid zlib bug", - DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE, DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS); - } - - if (rbits > 0) { - ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate = 1; - ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate_size = rbits; - } else { - ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate = 0; - } - - if (abits > 0) { - ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate = 1; - ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate_size = abits; - } else { - ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate = 0; - } - - ppp_slprintf(deflate_value, sizeof(deflate_value), - rbits == abits ? "%d" : "%d,%d", rbits, abits); - - return 1; -} -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * ccp_init - initialize CCP. - */ -static void ccp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; - - f->pcb = pcb; - f->protocol = PPP_CCP; - f->callbacks = &ccp_callbacks; - fsm_init(f); - -#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ - memset(wo, 0, sizeof(*wo)); - memset(go, 0, sizeof(*go)); - memset(ao, 0, sizeof(*ao)); - memset(ho, 0, sizeof(*ho)); -#endif /* 0 */ - -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - wo->deflate = 1; - wo->deflate_size = DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE; - wo->deflate_correct = 1; - wo->deflate_draft = 1; - ao->deflate = 1; - ao->deflate_size = DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE; - ao->deflate_correct = 1; - ao->deflate_draft = 1; -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ - -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - wo->bsd_compress = 1; - wo->bsd_bits = BSD_MAX_BITS; - ao->bsd_compress = 1; - ao->bsd_bits = BSD_MAX_BITS; -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ - -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - ao->predictor_1 = 1; -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ -} - -/* - * ccp_open - CCP is allowed to come up. - */ -static void ccp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; - - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - ccp_set(pcb, 1, 0, 0, 0); - } - - /* - * Find out which compressors the kernel supports before - * deciding whether to open in silent mode. - */ - ccp_resetci(f); - - if (!ccp_anycompress(go)) { - f->flags |= OPT_SILENT; - } - - fsm_open(f); -} - -/* - * ccp_close - Terminate CCP. - */ -static void ccp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; - ccp_set(pcb, 0, 0, 0, 0); - fsm_close(f, reason); -} - -/* - * ccp_lowerup - we may now transmit CCP packets. - */ -static void ccp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; - fsm_lowerup(f); -} - -/* - * ccp_lowerdown - we may not transmit CCP packets. - */ -static void ccp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; - fsm_lowerdown(f); -} - -/* - * ccp_input - process a received CCP packet. - */ -static void ccp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; - int oldstate; - - /* - * Check for a terminate-request so we can print a message. - */ - oldstate = f->state; - fsm_input(f, p, len); - - if (oldstate == PPP_FSM_OPENED && p[0] == TERMREQ && f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - ppp_notice("Compression disabled by peer."); -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (go->mppe) { - ppp_error("MPPE disabled, closing LCP"); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE disabled by peer"); - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - } - - /* - * If we get a terminate-ack and we're not asking for compression, - * close CCP. - */ - if (oldstate == PPP_FSM_REQSENT && p[0] == TERMACK && !ccp_anycompress(go)) { - ccp_close(pcb, "No compression negotiated"); - } -} - -/* - * Handle a CCP-specific code. - */ -static int ccp_extcode(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - switch (code) { - case CCP_RESETREQ: - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - break; - } - - ccp_reset_comp(pcb); - /* send a reset-ack, which the transmitter will see and - reset its compression state. */ - fsm_sdata(f, CCP_RESETACK, id, NULL, 0); - break; - - case CCP_RESETACK: - if ((pcb->ccp_localstate & RACK_PENDING) && id == f->reqid) { - pcb->ccp_localstate &= ~(RACK_PENDING | RREQ_REPEAT); - UNTIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f); - ccp_reset_decomp(pcb); - } - - break; - - default: - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* - * ccp_protrej - peer doesn't talk CCP. - */ -static void ccp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - ccp_set(pcb, 0, 0, 0, 0); - fsm_lowerdown(f); - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (go->mppe) { - ppp_error("MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -} - -/* - * ccp_resetci - initialize at start of negotiation. - */ -static void ccp_resetci(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; - ccp_options *wo = &pcb->ccp_wantoptions; -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - ccp_options *ao = &pcb->ccp_allowoptions; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT || PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - u_char opt_buf[CCP_MAX_OPTION_LENGTH]; -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT || PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - int res; -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (pcb->settings.require_mppe) { - wo->mppe = ao->mppe = - (pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_40 ? 0 : MPPE_OPT_40) | (pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_128 ? 0 : MPPE_OPT_128); - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - *go = *wo; - pcb->ccp_all_rejected = 0; - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (go->mppe) { - int auth_mschap_bits = pcb->auth_done; - int numbits; - - /* - * Start with a basic sanity check: mschap[v2] auth must be in - * exactly one direction. RFC 3079 says that the keys are - * 'derived from the credentials of the peer that initiated the call', - * however the PPP protocol doesn't have such a concept, and pppd - * cannot get this info externally. Instead we do the best we can. - * NB: If MPPE is required, all other compression opts are invalid. - * So, we return right away if we can't do it. - */ - - /* Leave only the mschap auth bits set */ - auth_mschap_bits &= (CHAP_MS_WITHPEER | CHAP_MS_PEER | - CHAP_MS2_WITHPEER | CHAP_MS2_PEER); - /* Count the mschap auths */ - auth_mschap_bits >>= CHAP_MS_SHIFT; - numbits = 0; - - do { - numbits += auth_mschap_bits & 1; - auth_mschap_bits >>= 1; - } while (auth_mschap_bits); - - if (numbits > 1) { - ppp_error("MPPE required, but auth done in both directions."); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but not available"); - return; - } - - if (!numbits) { - ppp_error("MPPE required, but MS-CHAP[v2] auth not performed."); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but not available"); - return; - } - - /* A plugin (eg radius) may not have obtained key material. */ - if (!pcb->mppe_keys_set) { - ppp_error("MPPE required, but keys are not available. " - "Possible plugin problem?"); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but not available"); - return; - } - - /* LM auth not supported for MPPE */ - if (pcb->auth_done & (CHAP_MS_WITHPEER | CHAP_MS_PEER)) { - /* This might be noise */ - if (go->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40) { - ppp_notice("Disabling 40-bit MPPE; MS-CHAP LM not supported"); - go->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; - wo->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; - } - } - - /* Last check: can we actually negotiate something? */ - if (!(go->mppe & (MPPE_OPT_40 | MPPE_OPT_128))) { - /* Could be misconfig, could be 40-bit disabled above. */ - ppp_error("MPPE required, but both 40-bit and 128-bit disabled."); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but not available"); - return; - } - - /* sync options */ - ao->mppe = go->mppe; - /* MPPE is not compatible with other compression types */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - ao->bsd_compress = go->bsd_compress = 0; -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - ao->predictor_1 = go->predictor_1 = 0; - ao->predictor_2 = go->predictor_2 = 0; -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - ao->deflate = go->deflate = 0; -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - /* - * Check whether the kernel knows about the various - * compression methods we might request. - */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - - /* FIXME: we don't need to test if BSD compress is available - * if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT is set, it is. - */ - if (go->bsd_compress) { - opt_buf[0] = CI_BSD_COMPRESS; - opt_buf[1] = CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - - for (;;) { - if (go->bsd_bits < BSD_MIN_BITS) { - go->bsd_compress = 0; - break; - } - - opt_buf[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, go->bsd_bits); - res = ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS, 0); - - if (res > 0) { - break; - } else if (res < 0) { - go->bsd_compress = 0; - break; - } - - go->bsd_bits--; - } - } - -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - - /* FIXME: we don't need to test if deflate is available - * if DEFLATE_SUPPORT is set, it is. - */ - if (go->deflate) { - if (go->deflate_correct) { - opt_buf[0] = CI_DEFLATE; - opt_buf[1] = CILEN_DEFLATE; - opt_buf[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; - - for (;;) { - if (go->deflate_size < DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS) { - go->deflate_correct = 0; - break; - } - - opt_buf[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size); - res = ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_DEFLATE, 0); - - if (res > 0) { - break; - } else if (res < 0) { - go->deflate_correct = 0; - break; - } - - go->deflate_size--; - } - } - - if (go->deflate_draft) { - opt_buf[0] = CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT; - opt_buf[1] = CILEN_DEFLATE; - opt_buf[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; - - for (;;) { - if (go->deflate_size < DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS) { - go->deflate_draft = 0; - break; - } - - opt_buf[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size); - res = ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_DEFLATE, 0); - - if (res > 0) { - break; - } else if (res < 0) { - go->deflate_draft = 0; - break; - } - - go->deflate_size--; - } - } - - if (!go->deflate_correct && !go->deflate_draft) { - go->deflate = 0; - } - } - -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - - /* FIXME: we don't need to test if predictor is available, - * if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT is set, it is. - */ - if (go->predictor_1) { - opt_buf[0] = CI_PREDICTOR_1; - opt_buf[1] = CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; - - if (ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_PREDICTOR_1, 0) <= 0) { - go->predictor_1 = 0; - } - } - - if (go->predictor_2) { - opt_buf[0] = CI_PREDICTOR_2; - opt_buf[1] = CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; - - if (ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_PREDICTOR_2, 0) <= 0) { - go->predictor_2 = 0; - } - } - -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ -} - -/* - * ccp_cilen - Return total length of our configuration info. - */ -static int ccp_cilen(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; - - return 0 -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - + (go->bsd_compress ? CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS : 0) -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - + (go->deflate && go->deflate_correct ? CILEN_DEFLATE : 0) + (go->deflate && go->deflate_draft ? CILEN_DEFLATE : 0) -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - + (go->predictor_1 ? CILEN_PREDICTOR_1 : 0) + (go->predictor_2 ? CILEN_PREDICTOR_2 : 0) -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - + (go->mppe ? CILEN_MPPE : 0) -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - ; -} - -/* - * ccp_addci - put our requests in a packet. - */ -static void ccp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int *lenp) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; - u_char *p0 = p; - - /* - * Add the compression types that we can receive, in decreasing - * preference order. - */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (go->mppe) { - p[0] = CI_MPPE; - p[1] = CILEN_MPPE; - MPPE_OPTS_TO_CI(go->mppe, &p[2]); - mppe_init(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp, go->mppe); - p += CILEN_MPPE; - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - - if (go->deflate) { - if (go->deflate_correct) { - p[0] = CI_DEFLATE; - p[1] = CILEN_DEFLATE; - p[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size); - p[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; - p += CILEN_DEFLATE; - } - - if (go->deflate_draft) { - p[0] = CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT; - p[1] = CILEN_DEFLATE; - p[2] = p[2 - CILEN_DEFLATE]; - p[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; - p += CILEN_DEFLATE; - } - } - -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - - if (go->bsd_compress) { - p[0] = CI_BSD_COMPRESS; - p[1] = CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - p[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, go->bsd_bits); - p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - } - -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - - /* XXX Should Predictor 2 be preferable to Predictor 1? */ - if (go->predictor_1) { - p[0] = CI_PREDICTOR_1; - p[1] = CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; - p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; - } - - if (go->predictor_2) { - p[0] = CI_PREDICTOR_2; - p[1] = CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; - p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; - } - -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ - - go->method = (p > p0) ? p0[0] : 0; - - *lenp = p - p0; -} - -/* - * ccp_ackci - process a received configure-ack, and return - * 1 iff the packet was OK. - */ -static int ccp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT || PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - u_char *p0 = p; -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT || PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (go->mppe) { - u_char opt_buf[CILEN_MPPE]; - - opt_buf[0] = CI_MPPE; - opt_buf[1] = CILEN_MPPE; - MPPE_OPTS_TO_CI(go->mppe, &opt_buf[2]); - - if (len < CILEN_MPPE || memcmp(opt_buf, p, CILEN_MPPE)) { - return 0; - } - - p += CILEN_MPPE; - len -= CILEN_MPPE; - - /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ - if (len == 0) { - return 1; - } - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - - if (go->deflate) { - if (len < CILEN_DEFLATE || p[0] != (go->deflate_correct ? CI_DEFLATE : CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT) || p[1] != CILEN_DEFLATE || p[2] != DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size) || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { - return 0; - } - - p += CILEN_DEFLATE; - len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; - - /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ - if (len == 0) { - return 1; - } - - if (go->deflate_correct && go->deflate_draft) { - if (len < CILEN_DEFLATE || p[0] != CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT || p[1] != CILEN_DEFLATE || p[2] != DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size) || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { - return 0; - } - - p += CILEN_DEFLATE; - len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; - } - } - -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - - if (go->bsd_compress) { - if (len < CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS || p[0] != CI_BSD_COMPRESS || p[1] != CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS || p[2] != BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, go->bsd_bits)) { - return 0; - } - - p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - len -= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - - /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ - if (p == p0 && len == 0) { - return 1; - } - } - -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - - if (go->predictor_1) { - if (len < CILEN_PREDICTOR_1 || p[0] != CI_PREDICTOR_1 || p[1] != CILEN_PREDICTOR_1) { - return 0; - } - - p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; - len -= CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; - - /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ - if (p == p0 && len == 0) { - return 1; - } - } - - if (go->predictor_2) { - if (len < CILEN_PREDICTOR_2 || p[0] != CI_PREDICTOR_2 || p[1] != CILEN_PREDICTOR_2) { - return 0; - } - - p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; - len -= CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; - - /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ - if (p == p0 && len == 0) { - return 1; - } - } - -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ - - if (len != 0) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* - * ccp_nakci - process received configure-nak. - * Returns 1 iff the nak was OK. - */ -static int ccp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; - ccp_options no; /* options we've seen already */ - ccp_options try_; /* options to ask for next time */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(treat_as_reject); -#if !MPPE_SUPPORT && !DEFLATE_SUPPORT && !BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); -#endif /* !MPPE_SUPPORT && !DEFLATE_SUPPORT && !BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ - - memset(&no, 0, sizeof(no)); - try_ = *go; - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (go->mppe && len >= CILEN_MPPE && p[0] == CI_MPPE && p[1] == CILEN_MPPE) { - no.mppe = 1; - /* - * Peer wants us to use a different strength or other setting. - * Fail if we aren't willing to use his suggestion. - */ - MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(&p[2], try_.mppe); - - if ((try_.mppe & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) && pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_stateful) { - ppp_error("Refusing MPPE stateful mode offered by peer"); - try_.mppe = 0; - } else if (((go->mppe | MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) & try_.mppe) != try_.mppe) { - /* Peer must have set options we didn't request (suggest) */ - try_.mppe = 0; - } - - if (!try_.mppe) { - ppp_error("MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); - } - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - - if (go->deflate && len >= CILEN_DEFLATE && p[0] == (go->deflate_correct ? CI_DEFLATE : CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT) && p[1] == CILEN_DEFLATE) { - no.deflate = 1; - - /* - * Peer wants us to use a different code size or something. - * Stop asking for Deflate if we don't understand his suggestion. - */ - if (DEFLATE_METHOD(p[2]) != DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL || DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2]) < DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { - try_.deflate = 0; - } else if (DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2]) < go->deflate_size) { - try_.deflate_size = DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2]); - } - - p += CILEN_DEFLATE; - len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; - - if (go->deflate_correct && go->deflate_draft && len >= CILEN_DEFLATE && p[0] == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT && p[1] == CILEN_DEFLATE) { - p += CILEN_DEFLATE; - len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; - } - } - -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - - if (go->bsd_compress && len >= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS && p[0] == CI_BSD_COMPRESS && p[1] == CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS) { - no.bsd_compress = 1; - - /* - * Peer wants us to use a different number of bits - * or a different version. - */ - if (BSD_VERSION(p[2]) != BSD_CURRENT_VERSION) { - try_.bsd_compress = 0; - } else if (BSD_NBITS(p[2]) < go->bsd_bits) { - try_.bsd_bits = BSD_NBITS(p[2]); - } - - p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - len -= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - } - -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ - - /* - * Predictor-1 and 2 have no options, so they can't be Naked. - * - * There may be remaining options but we ignore them. - */ - - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - *go = try_; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* - * ccp_rejci - reject some of our suggested compression methods. - */ -static int ccp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; - ccp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ - - try_ = *go; - - /* - * Cope with empty configure-rejects by ceasing to send - * configure-requests. - */ - if (len == 0 && pcb->ccp_all_rejected) { - return -1; - } - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (go->mppe && len >= CILEN_MPPE && p[0] == CI_MPPE && p[1] == CILEN_MPPE) { - ppp_error("MPPE required but peer refused"); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer refused"); - p += CILEN_MPPE; - len -= CILEN_MPPE; - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - - if (go->deflate_correct && len >= CILEN_DEFLATE && p[0] == CI_DEFLATE && p[1] == CILEN_DEFLATE) { - if (p[2] != DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size) || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { - return 0; /* Rej is bad */ - } - - try_.deflate_correct = 0; - p += CILEN_DEFLATE; - len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; - } - - if (go->deflate_draft && len >= CILEN_DEFLATE && p[0] == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT && p[1] == CILEN_DEFLATE) { - if (p[2] != DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size) || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { - return 0; /* Rej is bad */ - } - - try_.deflate_draft = 0; - p += CILEN_DEFLATE; - len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; - } - - if (!try_.deflate_correct && !try_.deflate_draft) { - try_.deflate = 0; - } - -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - - if (go->bsd_compress && len >= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS && p[0] == CI_BSD_COMPRESS && p[1] == CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS) { - if (p[2] != BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, go->bsd_bits)) { - return 0; - } - - try_.bsd_compress = 0; - p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - len -= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - } - -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - - if (go->predictor_1 && len >= CILEN_PREDICTOR_1 && p[0] == CI_PREDICTOR_1 && p[1] == CILEN_PREDICTOR_1) { - try_.predictor_1 = 0; - p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; - len -= CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; - } - - if (go->predictor_2 && len >= CILEN_PREDICTOR_2 && p[0] == CI_PREDICTOR_2 && p[1] == CILEN_PREDICTOR_2) { - try_.predictor_2 = 0; - p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; - len -= CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; - } - -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ - - if (len != 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - *go = try_; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* - * ccp_reqci - processed a received configure-request. - * Returns CONFACK, CONFNAK or CONFREJ and the packet modified - * appropriately. - */ -static int ccp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int *lenp, int dont_nak) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ccp_options *ho = &pcb->ccp_hisoptions; - ccp_options *ao = &pcb->ccp_allowoptions; - int ret, newret; -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - int res; - int nb; -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ - u_char *p0, *retp; - int len, clen, type; -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - u8_t rej_for_ci_mppe = 1; /* Are we rejecting based on a bad/missing */ - /* CI_MPPE, or due to other options? */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - ret = CONFACK; - retp = p0 = p; - len = *lenp; - - memset(ho, 0, sizeof(ccp_options)); - ho->method = (len > 0) ? p[0] : 0; - - while (len > 0) { - newret = CONFACK; - - if (len < 2 || p[1] < 2 || p[1] > len) { - /* length is bad */ - clen = len; - newret = CONFREJ; - - } else { - type = p[0]; - clen = p[1]; - - switch (type) { -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - case CI_MPPE: - if (!ao->mppe || clen != CILEN_MPPE) { - newret = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(&p[2], ho->mppe); - - /* Nak if anything unsupported or unknown are set. */ - if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_UNSUPPORTED) { - newret = CONFNAK; - ho->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_UNSUPPORTED; - } - - if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN) { - newret = CONFNAK; - ho->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN; - } - - /* Check state opt */ - if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) { - /* - * We can Nak and request stateless, but it's a - * lot easier to just assume the peer will request - * it if he can do it; stateful mode is bad over - * the Internet -- which is where we expect MPPE. - */ - if (pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_stateful) { - ppp_error("Refusing MPPE stateful mode offered by peer"); - newret = CONFREJ; - break; - } - } - - /* Find out which of {S,L} are set. */ - if ((ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128) && (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40)) { - /* Both are set, negotiate the strongest. */ - newret = CONFNAK; - - if (ao->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128) { - ho->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; - } else if (ao->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40) { - ho->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_128; - } else { - newret = CONFREJ; - break; - } - } else if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128) { - if (!(ao->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128)) { - newret = CONFREJ; - break; - } - } else if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40) { - if (!(ao->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40)) { - newret = CONFREJ; - break; - } - } else { - /* Neither are set. */ - /* We cannot accept this. */ - newret = CONFNAK; - /* Give the peer our idea of what can be used, - so it can choose and confirm */ - ho->mppe = ao->mppe; - } - - /* rebuild the opts */ - MPPE_OPTS_TO_CI(ho->mppe, &p[2]); - - if (newret == CONFACK) { - int mtu; - - mppe_init(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp, ho->mppe); - /* - * We need to decrease the interface MTU by MPPE_PAD - * because MPPE frames **grow**. The kernel [must] - * allocate MPPE_PAD extra bytes in xmit buffers. - */ - mtu = netif_get_mtu(pcb); - - if (mtu) { - netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu - MPPE_PAD); - } else { - newret = CONFREJ; - } - } - - /* - * We have accepted MPPE or are willing to negotiate - * MPPE parameters. A CONFREJ is due to subsequent - * (non-MPPE) processing. - */ - rej_for_ci_mppe = 0; - break; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - - case CI_DEFLATE: - case CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT: - if (!ao->deflate || clen != CILEN_DEFLATE || (!ao->deflate_correct && type == CI_DEFLATE) || (!ao->deflate_draft && type == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT)) { - newret = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - ho->deflate = 1; - ho->deflate_size = nb = DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2]); - - if (DEFLATE_METHOD(p[2]) != DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE || nb > ao->deflate_size || nb < DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS) { - newret = CONFNAK; - - if (!dont_nak) { - p[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(ao->deflate_size); - p[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; - /* fall through to test this #bits below */ - } else { - break; - } - } - - /* - * Check whether we can do Deflate with the window - * size they want. If the window is too big, reduce - * it until the kernel can cope and nak with that. - * We only check this for the first option. - */ - if (p == p0) { - for (;;) { - res = ccp_test(pcb, p, CILEN_DEFLATE, 1); - - if (res > 0) { - break; /* it's OK now */ - } - - if (res < 0 || nb == DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS || dont_nak) { - newret = CONFREJ; - p[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(ho->deflate_size); - break; - } - - newret = CONFNAK; - --nb; - p[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(nb); - } - } - - break; -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - - case CI_BSD_COMPRESS: - if (!ao->bsd_compress || clen != CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS) { - newret = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - ho->bsd_compress = 1; - ho->bsd_bits = nb = BSD_NBITS(p[2]); - - if (BSD_VERSION(p[2]) != BSD_CURRENT_VERSION || nb > ao->bsd_bits || nb < BSD_MIN_BITS) { - newret = CONFNAK; - - if (!dont_nak) { - p[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, ao->bsd_bits); - /* fall through to test this #bits below */ - } else { - break; - } - } - - /* - * Check whether we can do BSD-Compress with the code - * size they want. If the code size is too big, reduce - * it until the kernel can cope and nak with that. - * We only check this for the first option. - */ - if (p == p0) { - for (;;) { - res = ccp_test(pcb, p, CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS, 1); - - if (res > 0) { - break; - } - - if (res < 0 || nb == BSD_MIN_BITS || dont_nak) { - newret = CONFREJ; - p[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, - ho->bsd_bits); - break; - } - - newret = CONFNAK; - --nb; - p[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, nb); - } - } - - break; -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - - case CI_PREDICTOR_1: - if (!ao->predictor_1 || clen != CILEN_PREDICTOR_1) { - newret = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - ho->predictor_1 = 1; - - if (p == p0 && ccp_test(pcb, p, CILEN_PREDICTOR_1, 1) <= 0) { - newret = CONFREJ; - } - - break; - - case CI_PREDICTOR_2: - if (!ao->predictor_2 || clen != CILEN_PREDICTOR_2) { - newret = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - ho->predictor_2 = 1; - - if (p == p0 && ccp_test(pcb, p, CILEN_PREDICTOR_2, 1) <= 0) { - newret = CONFREJ; - } - - break; -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ - - default: - newret = CONFREJ; - } - } - - if (newret == CONFNAK && dont_nak) { - newret = CONFREJ; - } - - if (!(newret == CONFACK || (newret == CONFNAK && ret == CONFREJ))) { - /* we're returning this option */ - if (newret == CONFREJ && ret == CONFNAK) { - retp = p0; - } - - ret = newret; - - if (p != retp) { - MEMCPY(retp, p, clen); - } - - retp += clen; - } - - p += clen; - len -= clen; - } - - if (ret != CONFACK) { - if (ret == CONFREJ && *lenp == retp - p0) { - pcb->ccp_all_rejected = 1; - } else { - *lenp = retp - p0; - } - } - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (ret == CONFREJ && ao->mppe && rej_for_ci_mppe) { - ppp_error("MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - return ret; -} - -/* - * Make a string name for a compression method (or 2). - */ -static const char *method_name(ccp_options *opt, ccp_options *opt2) -{ - static char result[64]; -#if !DEFLATE_SUPPORT && !BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(opt2); -#endif /* !DEFLATE_SUPPORT && !BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ - - if (!ccp_anycompress(opt)) { - return "(none)"; - } - - switch (opt->method) { -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - case CI_MPPE: { - char *p = result; - char *q = result + sizeof(result); /* 1 past result */ - - ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "MPPE "); - p += 5; - - if (opt->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128) { - ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "128-bit "); - p += 8; - } - - if (opt->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40) { - ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "40-bit "); - p += 7; - } - - if (opt->mppe & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) { - ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "stateful"); - } else { - ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "stateless"); - } - - break; - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - - case CI_DEFLATE: - case CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT: - if (opt2 != NULL && opt2->deflate_size != opt->deflate_size) - ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "Deflate%s (%d/%d)", - (opt->method == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT ? "(old#)" : ""), - opt->deflate_size, opt2->deflate_size); - else - ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "Deflate%s (%d)", - (opt->method == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT ? "(old#)" : ""), - opt->deflate_size); - - break; -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - - case CI_BSD_COMPRESS: - if (opt2 != NULL && opt2->bsd_bits != opt->bsd_bits) - ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "BSD-Compress (%d/%d)", - opt->bsd_bits, opt2->bsd_bits); - else - ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "BSD-Compress (%d)", - opt->bsd_bits); - - break; -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - - case CI_PREDICTOR_1: - return "Predictor 1"; - - case CI_PREDICTOR_2: - return "Predictor 2"; -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ - - default: - ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "Method %d", opt->method); - } - - return result; -} - -/* - * CCP has come up - inform the kernel driver and log a message. - */ -static void ccp_up(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; - ccp_options *ho = &pcb->ccp_hisoptions; - char method1[64]; - - ccp_set(pcb, 1, 1, go->method, ho->method); - - if (ccp_anycompress(go)) { - if (ccp_anycompress(ho)) { - if (go->method == ho->method) { - ppp_notice("%s compression enabled", method_name(go, ho)); - } else { - ppp_strlcpy(method1, method_name(go, NULL), sizeof(method1)); - ppp_notice("%s / %s compression enabled", - method1, method_name(ho, NULL)); - } - } else { - ppp_notice("%s receive compression enabled", method_name(go, NULL)); - } - } else if (ccp_anycompress(ho)) { - ppp_notice("%s transmit compression enabled", method_name(ho, NULL)); - } - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (go->mppe) { - continue_networks(pcb); /* Bring up IP et al */ - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -} - -/* - * CCP has gone down - inform the kernel driver. - */ -static void ccp_down(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - if (pcb->ccp_localstate & RACK_PENDING) { - UNTIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f); - } - - pcb->ccp_localstate = 0; - ccp_set(pcb, 1, 0, 0, 0); -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - if (go->mppe) { - go->mppe = 0; - - if (pcb->lcp_fsm.state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - /* If LCP is not already going down, make sure it does. */ - ppp_error("MPPE disabled"); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE disabled"); - } - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -} - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * Print the contents of a CCP packet. - */ -static const char *const ccp_codenames[] = { - "ConfReq", - "ConfAck", - "ConfNak", - "ConfRej", - "TermReq", - "TermAck", - "CodeRej", - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - "ResetReq", - "ResetAck", -}; - -static int ccp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) -{ - const u_char *p0, *optend; - int code, id, len; - int optlen; - - p0 = p; - - if (plen < HEADERLEN) { - return 0; - } - - code = p[0]; - id = p[1]; - len = (p[2] << 8) + p[3]; - - if (len < HEADERLEN || len > plen) { - return 0; - } - - if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ccp_codenames) && ccp_codenames[code - 1] != NULL) { - printer(arg, " %s", ccp_codenames[code - 1]); - } else { - printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); - } - - printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); - len -= HEADERLEN; - p += HEADERLEN; - - switch (code) { - case CONFREQ: - case CONFACK: - case CONFNAK: - case CONFREJ: - - /* print list of possible compression methods */ - while (len >= 2) { - code = p[0]; - optlen = p[1]; - - if (optlen < 2 || optlen > len) { - break; - } - - printer(arg, " <"); - len -= optlen; - optend = p + optlen; - - switch (code) { -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - case CI_MPPE: - if (optlen >= CILEN_MPPE) { - u_char mppe_opts; - - MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(&p[2], mppe_opts); - printer(arg, "mppe %s %s %s %s %s %s%s", - (p[2] & MPPE_H_BIT) ? "+H" : "-H", - (p[5] & MPPE_M_BIT) ? "+M" : "-M", - (p[5] & MPPE_S_BIT) ? "+S" : "-S", - (p[5] & MPPE_L_BIT) ? "+L" : "-L", - (p[5] & MPPE_D_BIT) ? "+D" : "-D", - (p[5] & MPPE_C_BIT) ? "+C" : "-C", - (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN) ? " +U" : ""); - - if (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN) - printer(arg, " (%.2x %.2x %.2x %.2x)", - p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5]); - - p += CILEN_MPPE; - } - - break; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT - - case CI_DEFLATE: - case CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT: - if (optlen >= CILEN_DEFLATE) { - printer(arg, "deflate%s %d", - (code == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT ? "(old#)" : ""), - DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2])); - - if (DEFLATE_METHOD(p[2]) != DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL) { - printer(arg, " method %d", DEFLATE_METHOD(p[2])); - } - - if (p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { - printer(arg, " check %d", p[3]); - } - - p += CILEN_DEFLATE; - } - - break; -#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ -#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT - - case CI_BSD_COMPRESS: - if (optlen >= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS) { - printer(arg, "bsd v%d %d", BSD_VERSION(p[2]), - BSD_NBITS(p[2])); - p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; - } - - break; -#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ -#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT - - case CI_PREDICTOR_1: - if (optlen >= CILEN_PREDICTOR_1) { - printer(arg, "predictor 1"); - p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; - } - - break; - - case CI_PREDICTOR_2: - if (optlen >= CILEN_PREDICTOR_2) { - printer(arg, "predictor 2"); - p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; - } - - break; -#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ - - default: - break; - } - - while (p < optend) { - printer(arg, " %.2x", *p++); - } - - printer(arg, ">"); - } - - break; - - case TERMACK: - case TERMREQ: - if (len > 0 && *p >= ' ' && *p < 0x7f) { - ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); - p += len; - len = 0; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - /* dump out the rest of the packet in hex */ - while (--len >= 0) { - printer(arg, " %.2x", *p++); - } - - return p - p0; -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_DATAINPUT -/* - * We have received a packet that the decompressor failed to - * decompress. Here we would expect to issue a reset-request, but - * Motorola has a patent on resetting the compressor as a result of - * detecting an error in the decompressed data after decompression. - * (See US patent 5,130,993; international patent publication number - * WO 91/10289; Australian patent 73296/91.) - * - * So we ask the kernel whether the error was detected after - * decompression; if it was, we take CCP down, thus disabling - * compression :-(, otherwise we issue the reset-request. - */ -static void ccp_datainput(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len) -{ - fsm *f; -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pkt); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); - - f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; - - if (f->state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - if (ccp_fatal_error(pcb)) { - /* - * Disable compression by taking CCP down. - */ - ppp_error("Lost compression sync: disabling compression"); - ccp_close(pcb, "Lost compression sync"); -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - /* - * If we were doing MPPE, we must also take the link down. - */ - if (go->mppe) { - ppp_error("Too many MPPE errors, closing LCP"); - lcp_close(pcb, "Too many MPPE errors"); - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - } else { - /* - * Send a reset-request to reset the peer's compressor. - * We don't do that if we are still waiting for an - * acknowledgement to a previous reset-request. - */ - if (!(pcb->ccp_localstate & RACK_PENDING)) { - fsm_sdata(f, CCP_RESETREQ, f->reqid = ++f->id, NULL, 0); - TIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f, RACKTIMEOUT); - pcb->ccp_localstate |= RACK_PENDING; - } else { - pcb->ccp_localstate |= RREQ_REPEAT; - } - } - } -} -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ - -/* - * We have received a packet that the decompressor failed to - * decompress. Issue a reset-request. - */ -void ccp_resetrequest(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; - - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - return; - } - - /* - * Send a reset-request to reset the peer's compressor. - * We don't do that if we are still waiting for an - * acknowledgement to a previous reset-request. - */ - if (!(pcb->ccp_localstate & RACK_PENDING)) { - fsm_sdata(f, CCP_RESETREQ, f->reqid = ++f->id, NULL, 0); - TIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f, RACKTIMEOUT); - pcb->ccp_localstate |= RACK_PENDING; - } else { - pcb->ccp_localstate |= RREQ_REPEAT; - } -} - -/* - * Timeout waiting for reset-ack. - */ -static void ccp_rack_timeout(void *arg) -{ - fsm *f = (fsm *)arg; - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - - if (f->state == PPP_FSM_OPENED && (pcb->ccp_localstate & RREQ_REPEAT)) { - fsm_sdata(f, CCP_RESETREQ, f->reqid, NULL, 0); - TIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f, RACKTIMEOUT); - pcb->ccp_localstate &= ~RREQ_REPEAT; - } else { - pcb->ccp_localstate &= ~RACK_PENDING; - } -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CCP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * ccp.c - PPP Compression Control Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 1994-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && CCP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include +#include + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" /* lcp_close(), lcp_fsm */ +#include "netif/ppp/mppe.h" /* mppe_init() */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Unfortunately there is a bug in zlib which means that using a + * size of 8 (window size = 256) for Deflate compression will cause + * buffer overruns and kernel crashes in the deflate module. + * Until this is fixed we only accept sizes in the range 9 .. 15. + * Thanks to James Carlson for pointing this out. + */ +#define DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS 9 + +/* + * Command-line options. + */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS +static int setbsdcomp(char **); +static int setdeflate(char **); +static char bsd_value[8]; +static char deflate_value[8]; + +/* + * Option variables. + */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +bool refuse_mppe_stateful = 1; /* Allow stateful mode? */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +static option_t ccp_option_list[] = { + { "noccp", o_bool, &ccp_protent.enabled_flag, + "Disable CCP negotiation" }, + { "-ccp", o_bool, &ccp_protent.enabled_flag, + "Disable CCP negotiation", OPT_ALIAS }, + + { "bsdcomp", o_special, (void *)setbsdcomp, + "Request BSD-Compress packet compression", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL | OPT_STATIC, bsd_value }, + { "nobsdcomp", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_compress, + "don't allow BSD-Compress", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, + &ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_compress }, + { "-bsdcomp", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_compress, + "don't allow BSD-Compress", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, + &ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_compress }, + + { "deflate", o_special, (void *)setdeflate, + "request Deflate compression", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL | OPT_STATIC, deflate_value }, + { "nodeflate", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate, + "don't allow Deflate compression", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, + &ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate }, + { "-deflate", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate, + "don't allow Deflate compression", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, + &ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate }, + + { "nodeflatedraft", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate_draft, + "don't use draft deflate #", OPT_A2COPY, + &ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate_draft }, + + { "predictor1", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].predictor_1, + "request Predictor-1", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, + { "nopredictor1", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].predictor_1, + "don't allow Predictor-1", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, + &ccp_allowoptions[0].predictor_1 }, + { "-predictor1", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].predictor_1, + "don't allow Predictor-1", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, + &ccp_allowoptions[0].predictor_1 }, + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + /* MPPE options are symmetrical ... we only set wantoptions here */ + { + "require-mppe", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe, + "require MPPE encryption", + OPT_PRIO | MPPE_OPT_40 | MPPE_OPT_128 }, + { "+mppe", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe, + "require MPPE encryption", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIO | MPPE_OPT_40 | MPPE_OPT_128 }, + { "nomppe", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe, + "don't allow MPPE encryption", OPT_PRIO }, + { "-mppe", o_bool, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe, + "don't allow MPPE encryption", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIO }, + + /* We use ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe as a junk var ... it is reset later */ + { + "require-mppe-40", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, + "require MPPE 40-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_40, + &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, + { "+mppe-40", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, + "require MPPE 40-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_40, + &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, + { "nomppe-40", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, + "don't allow MPPE 40-bit encryption", + OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLRB | MPPE_OPT_40, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, + { "-mppe-40", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, + "don't allow MPPE 40-bit encryption", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLRB | MPPE_OPT_40, + &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, + + { "require-mppe-128", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, + "require MPPE 128-bit encryption", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_128, + &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, + { "+mppe-128", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, + "require MPPE 128-bit encryption", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2OR | MPPE_OPT_128, + &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, + { "nomppe-128", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, + "don't allow MPPE 128-bit encryption", + OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLRB | MPPE_OPT_128, &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, + { "-mppe-128", o_bool, &ccp_allowoptions[0].mppe, + "don't allow MPPE 128-bit encryption", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLRB | MPPE_OPT_128, + &ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe }, + + /* strange one; we always request stateless, but will we allow stateful? */ + { + "mppe-stateful", o_bool, &refuse_mppe_stateful, + "allow MPPE stateful mode", OPT_PRIO }, + { "nomppe-stateful", o_bool, &refuse_mppe_stateful, + "disallow MPPE stateful mode", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * Protocol entry points from main code. + */ +static void ccp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ccp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ccp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); +static void ccp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ccp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ccp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len); +static void ccp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static int ccp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT +static void ccp_datainput(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len); +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ + +const struct protent ccp_protent = { + PPP_CCP, + ccp_init, + ccp_input, + ccp_protrej, + ccp_lowerup, + ccp_lowerdown, + ccp_open, + ccp_close, +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + ccp_printpkt, +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT + ccp_datainput, +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + "CCP", + "Compressed", +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS + ccp_option_list, + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + NULL, + NULL +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +}; + +/* + * Callbacks for fsm code. + */ +static void ccp_resetci(fsm *); +static int ccp_cilen(fsm *); +static void ccp_addci(fsm *, u_char *, int *); +static int ccp_ackci(fsm *, u_char *, int); +static int ccp_nakci(fsm *, u_char *, int, int); +static int ccp_rejci(fsm *, u_char *, int); +static int ccp_reqci(fsm *, u_char *, int *, int); +static void ccp_up(fsm *); +static void ccp_down(fsm *); +static int ccp_extcode(fsm *, int, int, u_char *, int); +static void ccp_rack_timeout(void *); +static const char *method_name(ccp_options *, ccp_options *); + +static const fsm_callbacks ccp_callbacks = { + ccp_resetci, + ccp_cilen, + ccp_addci, + ccp_ackci, + ccp_nakci, + ccp_rejci, + ccp_reqci, + ccp_up, + ccp_down, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + ccp_extcode, + "CCP" +}; + +/* + * Do we want / did we get any compression? + */ +static int ccp_anycompress(ccp_options *opt) +{ + return (0 +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + || (opt)->deflate +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + || (opt)->bsd_compress +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + || (opt)->predictor_1 || (opt)->predictor_2 +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + || (opt)->mppe +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + ); +} + +/* + * Local state (mainly for handling reset-reqs and reset-acks). + */ +#define RACK_PENDING 1 /* waiting for reset-ack */ +#define RREQ_REPEAT 2 /* send another reset-req if no reset-ack */ + +#define RACKTIMEOUT 1 /* second */ + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * Option parsing + */ +static int setbsdcomp(argv) char **argv; +{ + int rbits, abits; + char *str, *endp; + + str = *argv; + abits = rbits = strtol(str, &endp, 0); + + if (endp != str && *endp == ',') { + str = endp + 1; + abits = strtol(str, &endp, 0); + } + + if (*endp != 0 || endp == str) { + option_error("invalid parameter '%s' for bsdcomp option", *argv); + return 0; + } + + if ((rbits != 0 && (rbits < BSD_MIN_BITS || rbits > BSD_MAX_BITS)) || (abits != 0 && (abits < BSD_MIN_BITS || abits > BSD_MAX_BITS))) { + option_error("bsdcomp option values must be 0 or %d .. %d", + BSD_MIN_BITS, BSD_MAX_BITS); + return 0; + } + + if (rbits > 0) { + ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_compress = 1; + ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_bits = rbits; + } else { + ccp_wantoptions[0].bsd_compress = 0; + } + + if (abits > 0) { + ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_compress = 1; + ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_bits = abits; + } else { + ccp_allowoptions[0].bsd_compress = 0; + } + + ppp_slprintf(bsd_value, sizeof(bsd_value), + rbits == abits ? "%d" : "%d,%d", rbits, abits); + + return 1; +} + +static int setdeflate(argv) char **argv; +{ + int rbits, abits; + char *str, *endp; + + str = *argv; + abits = rbits = strtol(str, &endp, 0); + + if (endp != str && *endp == ',') { + str = endp + 1; + abits = strtol(str, &endp, 0); + } + + if (*endp != 0 || endp == str) { + option_error("invalid parameter '%s' for deflate option", *argv); + return 0; + } + + if ((rbits != 0 && (rbits < DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE || rbits > DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE)) || (abits != 0 && (abits < DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE || abits > DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE))) { + option_error("deflate option values must be 0 or %d .. %d", + DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE, DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + if (rbits == DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE || abits == DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE) { + if (rbits == DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE) { + rbits = DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS; + } + + if (abits == DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE) { + abits = DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS; + } + + warn("deflate option value of %d changed to %d to avoid zlib bug", + DEFLATE_MIN_SIZE, DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS); + } + + if (rbits > 0) { + ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate = 1; + ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate_size = rbits; + } else { + ccp_wantoptions[0].deflate = 0; + } + + if (abits > 0) { + ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate = 1; + ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate_size = abits; + } else { + ccp_allowoptions[0].deflate = 0; + } + + ppp_slprintf(deflate_value, sizeof(deflate_value), + rbits == abits ? "%d" : "%d,%d", rbits, abits); + + return 1; +} +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * ccp_init - initialize CCP. + */ +static void ccp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; + + f->pcb = pcb; + f->protocol = PPP_CCP; + f->callbacks = &ccp_callbacks; + fsm_init(f); + +#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ + memset(wo, 0, sizeof(*wo)); + memset(go, 0, sizeof(*go)); + memset(ao, 0, sizeof(*ao)); + memset(ho, 0, sizeof(*ho)); +#endif /* 0 */ + +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + wo->deflate = 1; + wo->deflate_size = DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE; + wo->deflate_correct = 1; + wo->deflate_draft = 1; + ao->deflate = 1; + ao->deflate_size = DEFLATE_MAX_SIZE; + ao->deflate_correct = 1; + ao->deflate_draft = 1; +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ + +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + wo->bsd_compress = 1; + wo->bsd_bits = BSD_MAX_BITS; + ao->bsd_compress = 1; + ao->bsd_bits = BSD_MAX_BITS; +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ + +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + ao->predictor_1 = 1; +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ +} + +/* + * ccp_open - CCP is allowed to come up. + */ +static void ccp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; + + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + ccp_set(pcb, 1, 0, 0, 0); + } + + /* + * Find out which compressors the kernel supports before + * deciding whether to open in silent mode. + */ + ccp_resetci(f); + + if (!ccp_anycompress(go)) { + f->flags |= OPT_SILENT; + } + + fsm_open(f); +} + +/* + * ccp_close - Terminate CCP. + */ +static void ccp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; + ccp_set(pcb, 0, 0, 0, 0); + fsm_close(f, reason); +} + +/* + * ccp_lowerup - we may now transmit CCP packets. + */ +static void ccp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; + fsm_lowerup(f); +} + +/* + * ccp_lowerdown - we may not transmit CCP packets. + */ +static void ccp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; + fsm_lowerdown(f); +} + +/* + * ccp_input - process a received CCP packet. + */ +static void ccp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; + int oldstate; + + /* + * Check for a terminate-request so we can print a message. + */ + oldstate = f->state; + fsm_input(f, p, len); + + if (oldstate == PPP_FSM_OPENED && p[0] == TERMREQ && f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + ppp_notice("Compression disabled by peer."); +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (go->mppe) { + ppp_error("MPPE disabled, closing LCP"); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE disabled by peer"); + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + } + + /* + * If we get a terminate-ack and we're not asking for compression, + * close CCP. + */ + if (oldstate == PPP_FSM_REQSENT && p[0] == TERMACK && !ccp_anycompress(go)) { + ccp_close(pcb, "No compression negotiated"); + } +} + +/* + * Handle a CCP-specific code. + */ +static int ccp_extcode(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + switch (code) { + case CCP_RESETREQ: + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + break; + } + + ccp_reset_comp(pcb); + /* send a reset-ack, which the transmitter will see and + reset its compression state. */ + fsm_sdata(f, CCP_RESETACK, id, NULL, 0); + break; + + case CCP_RESETACK: + if ((pcb->ccp_localstate & RACK_PENDING) && id == f->reqid) { + pcb->ccp_localstate &= ~(RACK_PENDING | RREQ_REPEAT); + UNTIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f); + ccp_reset_decomp(pcb); + } + + break; + + default: + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * ccp_protrej - peer doesn't talk CCP. + */ +static void ccp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + ccp_set(pcb, 0, 0, 0, 0); + fsm_lowerdown(f); + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (go->mppe) { + ppp_error("MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +} + +/* + * ccp_resetci - initialize at start of negotiation. + */ +static void ccp_resetci(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; + ccp_options *wo = &pcb->ccp_wantoptions; +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + ccp_options *ao = &pcb->ccp_allowoptions; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT || PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + u_char opt_buf[CCP_MAX_OPTION_LENGTH]; +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT || PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + int res; +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (pcb->settings.require_mppe) { + wo->mppe = ao->mppe = + (pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_40 ? 0 : MPPE_OPT_40) | (pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_128 ? 0 : MPPE_OPT_128); + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + *go = *wo; + pcb->ccp_all_rejected = 0; + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (go->mppe) { + int auth_mschap_bits = pcb->auth_done; + int numbits; + + /* + * Start with a basic sanity check: mschap[v2] auth must be in + * exactly one direction. RFC 3079 says that the keys are + * 'derived from the credentials of the peer that initiated the call', + * however the PPP protocol doesn't have such a concept, and pppd + * cannot get this info externally. Instead we do the best we can. + * NB: If MPPE is required, all other compression opts are invalid. + * So, we return right away if we can't do it. + */ + + /* Leave only the mschap auth bits set */ + auth_mschap_bits &= (CHAP_MS_WITHPEER | CHAP_MS_PEER | + CHAP_MS2_WITHPEER | CHAP_MS2_PEER); + /* Count the mschap auths */ + auth_mschap_bits >>= CHAP_MS_SHIFT; + numbits = 0; + + do { + numbits += auth_mschap_bits & 1; + auth_mschap_bits >>= 1; + } while (auth_mschap_bits); + + if (numbits > 1) { + ppp_error("MPPE required, but auth done in both directions."); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but not available"); + return; + } + + if (!numbits) { + ppp_error("MPPE required, but MS-CHAP[v2] auth not performed."); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but not available"); + return; + } + + /* A plugin (eg radius) may not have obtained key material. */ + if (!pcb->mppe_keys_set) { + ppp_error("MPPE required, but keys are not available. " + "Possible plugin problem?"); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but not available"); + return; + } + + /* LM auth not supported for MPPE */ + if (pcb->auth_done & (CHAP_MS_WITHPEER | CHAP_MS_PEER)) { + /* This might be noise */ + if (go->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40) { + ppp_notice("Disabling 40-bit MPPE; MS-CHAP LM not supported"); + go->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; + wo->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; + } + } + + /* Last check: can we actually negotiate something? */ + if (!(go->mppe & (MPPE_OPT_40 | MPPE_OPT_128))) { + /* Could be misconfig, could be 40-bit disabled above. */ + ppp_error("MPPE required, but both 40-bit and 128-bit disabled."); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but not available"); + return; + } + + /* sync options */ + ao->mppe = go->mppe; + /* MPPE is not compatible with other compression types */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + ao->bsd_compress = go->bsd_compress = 0; +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + ao->predictor_1 = go->predictor_1 = 0; + ao->predictor_2 = go->predictor_2 = 0; +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + ao->deflate = go->deflate = 0; +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * Check whether the kernel knows about the various + * compression methods we might request. + */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + + /* FIXME: we don't need to test if BSD compress is available + * if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT is set, it is. + */ + if (go->bsd_compress) { + opt_buf[0] = CI_BSD_COMPRESS; + opt_buf[1] = CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + + for (;;) { + if (go->bsd_bits < BSD_MIN_BITS) { + go->bsd_compress = 0; + break; + } + + opt_buf[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, go->bsd_bits); + res = ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS, 0); + + if (res > 0) { + break; + } else if (res < 0) { + go->bsd_compress = 0; + break; + } + + go->bsd_bits--; + } + } + +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + + /* FIXME: we don't need to test if deflate is available + * if DEFLATE_SUPPORT is set, it is. + */ + if (go->deflate) { + if (go->deflate_correct) { + opt_buf[0] = CI_DEFLATE; + opt_buf[1] = CILEN_DEFLATE; + opt_buf[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; + + for (;;) { + if (go->deflate_size < DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS) { + go->deflate_correct = 0; + break; + } + + opt_buf[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size); + res = ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_DEFLATE, 0); + + if (res > 0) { + break; + } else if (res < 0) { + go->deflate_correct = 0; + break; + } + + go->deflate_size--; + } + } + + if (go->deflate_draft) { + opt_buf[0] = CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT; + opt_buf[1] = CILEN_DEFLATE; + opt_buf[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; + + for (;;) { + if (go->deflate_size < DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS) { + go->deflate_draft = 0; + break; + } + + opt_buf[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size); + res = ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_DEFLATE, 0); + + if (res > 0) { + break; + } else if (res < 0) { + go->deflate_draft = 0; + break; + } + + go->deflate_size--; + } + } + + if (!go->deflate_correct && !go->deflate_draft) { + go->deflate = 0; + } + } + +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + + /* FIXME: we don't need to test if predictor is available, + * if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT is set, it is. + */ + if (go->predictor_1) { + opt_buf[0] = CI_PREDICTOR_1; + opt_buf[1] = CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; + + if (ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_PREDICTOR_1, 0) <= 0) { + go->predictor_1 = 0; + } + } + + if (go->predictor_2) { + opt_buf[0] = CI_PREDICTOR_2; + opt_buf[1] = CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; + + if (ccp_test(pcb, opt_buf, CILEN_PREDICTOR_2, 0) <= 0) { + go->predictor_2 = 0; + } + } + +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ +} + +/* + * ccp_cilen - Return total length of our configuration info. + */ +static int ccp_cilen(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; + + return 0 +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + + (go->bsd_compress ? CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS : 0) +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + + (go->deflate && go->deflate_correct ? CILEN_DEFLATE : 0) + (go->deflate && go->deflate_draft ? CILEN_DEFLATE : 0) +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + + (go->predictor_1 ? CILEN_PREDICTOR_1 : 0) + (go->predictor_2 ? CILEN_PREDICTOR_2 : 0) +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + (go->mppe ? CILEN_MPPE : 0) +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + ; +} + +/* + * ccp_addci - put our requests in a packet. + */ +static void ccp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int *lenp) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; + u_char *p0 = p; + + /* + * Add the compression types that we can receive, in decreasing + * preference order. + */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (go->mppe) { + p[0] = CI_MPPE; + p[1] = CILEN_MPPE; + MPPE_OPTS_TO_CI(go->mppe, &p[2]); + mppe_init(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp, go->mppe); + p += CILEN_MPPE; + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + + if (go->deflate) { + if (go->deflate_correct) { + p[0] = CI_DEFLATE; + p[1] = CILEN_DEFLATE; + p[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size); + p[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; + p += CILEN_DEFLATE; + } + + if (go->deflate_draft) { + p[0] = CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT; + p[1] = CILEN_DEFLATE; + p[2] = p[2 - CILEN_DEFLATE]; + p[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; + p += CILEN_DEFLATE; + } + } + +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + + if (go->bsd_compress) { + p[0] = CI_BSD_COMPRESS; + p[1] = CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + p[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, go->bsd_bits); + p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + } + +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + + /* XXX Should Predictor 2 be preferable to Predictor 1? */ + if (go->predictor_1) { + p[0] = CI_PREDICTOR_1; + p[1] = CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; + p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; + } + + if (go->predictor_2) { + p[0] = CI_PREDICTOR_2; + p[1] = CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; + p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; + } + +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ + + go->method = (p > p0) ? p0[0] : 0; + + *lenp = p - p0; +} + +/* + * ccp_ackci - process a received configure-ack, and return + * 1 iff the packet was OK. + */ +static int ccp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT || PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + u_char *p0 = p; +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT || PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (go->mppe) { + u_char opt_buf[CILEN_MPPE]; + + opt_buf[0] = CI_MPPE; + opt_buf[1] = CILEN_MPPE; + MPPE_OPTS_TO_CI(go->mppe, &opt_buf[2]); + + if (len < CILEN_MPPE || memcmp(opt_buf, p, CILEN_MPPE)) { + return 0; + } + + p += CILEN_MPPE; + len -= CILEN_MPPE; + + /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ + if (len == 0) { + return 1; + } + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + + if (go->deflate) { + if (len < CILEN_DEFLATE || p[0] != (go->deflate_correct ? CI_DEFLATE : CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT) || p[1] != CILEN_DEFLATE || p[2] != DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size) || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { + return 0; + } + + p += CILEN_DEFLATE; + len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; + + /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ + if (len == 0) { + return 1; + } + + if (go->deflate_correct && go->deflate_draft) { + if (len < CILEN_DEFLATE || p[0] != CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT || p[1] != CILEN_DEFLATE || p[2] != DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size) || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { + return 0; + } + + p += CILEN_DEFLATE; + len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; + } + } + +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + + if (go->bsd_compress) { + if (len < CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS || p[0] != CI_BSD_COMPRESS || p[1] != CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS || p[2] != BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, go->bsd_bits)) { + return 0; + } + + p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + len -= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + + /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ + if (p == p0 && len == 0) { + return 1; + } + } + +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + + if (go->predictor_1) { + if (len < CILEN_PREDICTOR_1 || p[0] != CI_PREDICTOR_1 || p[1] != CILEN_PREDICTOR_1) { + return 0; + } + + p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; + len -= CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; + + /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ + if (p == p0 && len == 0) { + return 1; + } + } + + if (go->predictor_2) { + if (len < CILEN_PREDICTOR_2 || p[0] != CI_PREDICTOR_2 || p[1] != CILEN_PREDICTOR_2) { + return 0; + } + + p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; + len -= CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; + + /* XXX Cope with first/fast ack */ + if (p == p0 && len == 0) { + return 1; + } + } + +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ + + if (len != 0) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * ccp_nakci - process received configure-nak. + * Returns 1 iff the nak was OK. + */ +static int ccp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; + ccp_options no; /* options we've seen already */ + ccp_options try_; /* options to ask for next time */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(treat_as_reject); +#if !MPPE_SUPPORT && !DEFLATE_SUPPORT && !BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); +#endif /* !MPPE_SUPPORT && !DEFLATE_SUPPORT && !BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ + + memset(&no, 0, sizeof(no)); + try_ = *go; + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (go->mppe && len >= CILEN_MPPE && p[0] == CI_MPPE && p[1] == CILEN_MPPE) { + no.mppe = 1; + /* + * Peer wants us to use a different strength or other setting. + * Fail if we aren't willing to use his suggestion. + */ + MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(&p[2], try_.mppe); + + if ((try_.mppe & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) && pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_stateful) { + ppp_error("Refusing MPPE stateful mode offered by peer"); + try_.mppe = 0; + } else if (((go->mppe | MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) & try_.mppe) != try_.mppe) { + /* Peer must have set options we didn't request (suggest) */ + try_.mppe = 0; + } + + if (!try_.mppe) { + ppp_error("MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); + } + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + + if (go->deflate && len >= CILEN_DEFLATE && p[0] == (go->deflate_correct ? CI_DEFLATE : CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT) && p[1] == CILEN_DEFLATE) { + no.deflate = 1; + + /* + * Peer wants us to use a different code size or something. + * Stop asking for Deflate if we don't understand his suggestion. + */ + if (DEFLATE_METHOD(p[2]) != DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL || DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2]) < DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { + try_.deflate = 0; + } else if (DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2]) < go->deflate_size) { + try_.deflate_size = DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2]); + } + + p += CILEN_DEFLATE; + len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; + + if (go->deflate_correct && go->deflate_draft && len >= CILEN_DEFLATE && p[0] == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT && p[1] == CILEN_DEFLATE) { + p += CILEN_DEFLATE; + len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; + } + } + +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + + if (go->bsd_compress && len >= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS && p[0] == CI_BSD_COMPRESS && p[1] == CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS) { + no.bsd_compress = 1; + + /* + * Peer wants us to use a different number of bits + * or a different version. + */ + if (BSD_VERSION(p[2]) != BSD_CURRENT_VERSION) { + try_.bsd_compress = 0; + } else if (BSD_NBITS(p[2]) < go->bsd_bits) { + try_.bsd_bits = BSD_NBITS(p[2]); + } + + p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + len -= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + } + +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * Predictor-1 and 2 have no options, so they can't be Naked. + * + * There may be remaining options but we ignore them. + */ + + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + *go = try_; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * ccp_rejci - reject some of our suggested compression methods. + */ +static int ccp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; + ccp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ + + try_ = *go; + + /* + * Cope with empty configure-rejects by ceasing to send + * configure-requests. + */ + if (len == 0 && pcb->ccp_all_rejected) { + return -1; + } + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (go->mppe && len >= CILEN_MPPE && p[0] == CI_MPPE && p[1] == CILEN_MPPE) { + ppp_error("MPPE required but peer refused"); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer refused"); + p += CILEN_MPPE; + len -= CILEN_MPPE; + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + + if (go->deflate_correct && len >= CILEN_DEFLATE && p[0] == CI_DEFLATE && p[1] == CILEN_DEFLATE) { + if (p[2] != DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size) || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { + return 0; /* Rej is bad */ + } + + try_.deflate_correct = 0; + p += CILEN_DEFLATE; + len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; + } + + if (go->deflate_draft && len >= CILEN_DEFLATE && p[0] == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT && p[1] == CILEN_DEFLATE) { + if (p[2] != DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(go->deflate_size) || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { + return 0; /* Rej is bad */ + } + + try_.deflate_draft = 0; + p += CILEN_DEFLATE; + len -= CILEN_DEFLATE; + } + + if (!try_.deflate_correct && !try_.deflate_draft) { + try_.deflate = 0; + } + +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + + if (go->bsd_compress && len >= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS && p[0] == CI_BSD_COMPRESS && p[1] == CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS) { + if (p[2] != BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, go->bsd_bits)) { + return 0; + } + + try_.bsd_compress = 0; + p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + len -= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + } + +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + + if (go->predictor_1 && len >= CILEN_PREDICTOR_1 && p[0] == CI_PREDICTOR_1 && p[1] == CILEN_PREDICTOR_1) { + try_.predictor_1 = 0; + p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; + len -= CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; + } + + if (go->predictor_2 && len >= CILEN_PREDICTOR_2 && p[0] == CI_PREDICTOR_2 && p[1] == CILEN_PREDICTOR_2) { + try_.predictor_2 = 0; + p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; + len -= CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; + } + +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ + + if (len != 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + *go = try_; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * ccp_reqci - processed a received configure-request. + * Returns CONFACK, CONFNAK or CONFREJ and the packet modified + * appropriately. + */ +static int ccp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int *lenp, int dont_nak) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ccp_options *ho = &pcb->ccp_hisoptions; + ccp_options *ao = &pcb->ccp_allowoptions; + int ret, newret; +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + int res; + int nb; +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT || BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ + u_char *p0, *retp; + int len, clen, type; +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + u8_t rej_for_ci_mppe = 1; /* Are we rejecting based on a bad/missing */ + /* CI_MPPE, or due to other options? */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + ret = CONFACK; + retp = p0 = p; + len = *lenp; + + memset(ho, 0, sizeof(ccp_options)); + ho->method = (len > 0) ? p[0] : 0; + + while (len > 0) { + newret = CONFACK; + + if (len < 2 || p[1] < 2 || p[1] > len) { + /* length is bad */ + clen = len; + newret = CONFREJ; + + } else { + type = p[0]; + clen = p[1]; + + switch (type) { +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + case CI_MPPE: + if (!ao->mppe || clen != CILEN_MPPE) { + newret = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(&p[2], ho->mppe); + + /* Nak if anything unsupported or unknown are set. */ + if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_UNSUPPORTED) { + newret = CONFNAK; + ho->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN) { + newret = CONFNAK; + ho->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN; + } + + /* Check state opt */ + if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) { + /* + * We can Nak and request stateless, but it's a + * lot easier to just assume the peer will request + * it if he can do it; stateful mode is bad over + * the Internet -- which is where we expect MPPE. + */ + if (pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_stateful) { + ppp_error("Refusing MPPE stateful mode offered by peer"); + newret = CONFREJ; + break; + } + } + + /* Find out which of {S,L} are set. */ + if ((ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128) && (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40)) { + /* Both are set, negotiate the strongest. */ + newret = CONFNAK; + + if (ao->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128) { + ho->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; + } else if (ao->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40) { + ho->mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_128; + } else { + newret = CONFREJ; + break; + } + } else if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128) { + if (!(ao->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128)) { + newret = CONFREJ; + break; + } + } else if (ho->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40) { + if (!(ao->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40)) { + newret = CONFREJ; + break; + } + } else { + /* Neither are set. */ + /* We cannot accept this. */ + newret = CONFNAK; + /* Give the peer our idea of what can be used, + so it can choose and confirm */ + ho->mppe = ao->mppe; + } + + /* rebuild the opts */ + MPPE_OPTS_TO_CI(ho->mppe, &p[2]); + + if (newret == CONFACK) { + int mtu; + + mppe_init(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp, ho->mppe); + /* + * We need to decrease the interface MTU by MPPE_PAD + * because MPPE frames **grow**. The kernel [must] + * allocate MPPE_PAD extra bytes in xmit buffers. + */ + mtu = netif_get_mtu(pcb); + + if (mtu) { + netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu - MPPE_PAD); + } else { + newret = CONFREJ; + } + } + + /* + * We have accepted MPPE or are willing to negotiate + * MPPE parameters. A CONFREJ is due to subsequent + * (non-MPPE) processing. + */ + rej_for_ci_mppe = 0; + break; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + + case CI_DEFLATE: + case CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT: + if (!ao->deflate || clen != CILEN_DEFLATE || (!ao->deflate_correct && type == CI_DEFLATE) || (!ao->deflate_draft && type == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT)) { + newret = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + ho->deflate = 1; + ho->deflate_size = nb = DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2]); + + if (DEFLATE_METHOD(p[2]) != DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL || p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE || nb > ao->deflate_size || nb < DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS) { + newret = CONFNAK; + + if (!dont_nak) { + p[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(ao->deflate_size); + p[3] = DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE; + /* fall through to test this #bits below */ + } else { + break; + } + } + + /* + * Check whether we can do Deflate with the window + * size they want. If the window is too big, reduce + * it until the kernel can cope and nak with that. + * We only check this for the first option. + */ + if (p == p0) { + for (;;) { + res = ccp_test(pcb, p, CILEN_DEFLATE, 1); + + if (res > 0) { + break; /* it's OK now */ + } + + if (res < 0 || nb == DEFLATE_MIN_WORKS || dont_nak) { + newret = CONFREJ; + p[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(ho->deflate_size); + break; + } + + newret = CONFNAK; + --nb; + p[2] = DEFLATE_MAKE_OPT(nb); + } + } + + break; +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + + case CI_BSD_COMPRESS: + if (!ao->bsd_compress || clen != CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS) { + newret = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + ho->bsd_compress = 1; + ho->bsd_bits = nb = BSD_NBITS(p[2]); + + if (BSD_VERSION(p[2]) != BSD_CURRENT_VERSION || nb > ao->bsd_bits || nb < BSD_MIN_BITS) { + newret = CONFNAK; + + if (!dont_nak) { + p[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, ao->bsd_bits); + /* fall through to test this #bits below */ + } else { + break; + } + } + + /* + * Check whether we can do BSD-Compress with the code + * size they want. If the code size is too big, reduce + * it until the kernel can cope and nak with that. + * We only check this for the first option. + */ + if (p == p0) { + for (;;) { + res = ccp_test(pcb, p, CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS, 1); + + if (res > 0) { + break; + } + + if (res < 0 || nb == BSD_MIN_BITS || dont_nak) { + newret = CONFREJ; + p[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, + ho->bsd_bits); + break; + } + + newret = CONFNAK; + --nb; + p[2] = BSD_MAKE_OPT(BSD_CURRENT_VERSION, nb); + } + } + + break; +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + + case CI_PREDICTOR_1: + if (!ao->predictor_1 || clen != CILEN_PREDICTOR_1) { + newret = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + ho->predictor_1 = 1; + + if (p == p0 && ccp_test(pcb, p, CILEN_PREDICTOR_1, 1) <= 0) { + newret = CONFREJ; + } + + break; + + case CI_PREDICTOR_2: + if (!ao->predictor_2 || clen != CILEN_PREDICTOR_2) { + newret = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + ho->predictor_2 = 1; + + if (p == p0 && ccp_test(pcb, p, CILEN_PREDICTOR_2, 1) <= 0) { + newret = CONFREJ; + } + + break; +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ + + default: + newret = CONFREJ; + } + } + + if (newret == CONFNAK && dont_nak) { + newret = CONFREJ; + } + + if (!(newret == CONFACK || (newret == CONFNAK && ret == CONFREJ))) { + /* we're returning this option */ + if (newret == CONFREJ && ret == CONFNAK) { + retp = p0; + } + + ret = newret; + + if (p != retp) { + MEMCPY(retp, p, clen); + } + + retp += clen; + } + + p += clen; + len -= clen; + } + + if (ret != CONFACK) { + if (ret == CONFREJ && *lenp == retp - p0) { + pcb->ccp_all_rejected = 1; + } else { + *lenp = retp - p0; + } + } + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (ret == CONFREJ && ao->mppe && rej_for_ci_mppe) { + ppp_error("MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + return ret; +} + +/* + * Make a string name for a compression method (or 2). + */ +static const char *method_name(ccp_options *opt, ccp_options *opt2) +{ + static char result[64]; +#if !DEFLATE_SUPPORT && !BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(opt2); +#endif /* !DEFLATE_SUPPORT && !BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ + + if (!ccp_anycompress(opt)) { + return "(none)"; + } + + switch (opt->method) { +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + case CI_MPPE: { + char *p = result; + char *q = result + sizeof(result); /* 1 past result */ + + ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "MPPE "); + p += 5; + + if (opt->mppe & MPPE_OPT_128) { + ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "128-bit "); + p += 8; + } + + if (opt->mppe & MPPE_OPT_40) { + ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "40-bit "); + p += 7; + } + + if (opt->mppe & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) { + ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "stateful"); + } else { + ppp_slprintf(p, q - p, "stateless"); + } + + break; + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + + case CI_DEFLATE: + case CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT: + if (opt2 != NULL && opt2->deflate_size != opt->deflate_size) + ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "Deflate%s (%d/%d)", + (opt->method == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT ? "(old#)" : ""), + opt->deflate_size, opt2->deflate_size); + else + ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "Deflate%s (%d)", + (opt->method == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT ? "(old#)" : ""), + opt->deflate_size); + + break; +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + + case CI_BSD_COMPRESS: + if (opt2 != NULL && opt2->bsd_bits != opt->bsd_bits) + ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "BSD-Compress (%d/%d)", + opt->bsd_bits, opt2->bsd_bits); + else + ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "BSD-Compress (%d)", + opt->bsd_bits); + + break; +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + + case CI_PREDICTOR_1: + return "Predictor 1"; + + case CI_PREDICTOR_2: + return "Predictor 2"; +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ + + default: + ppp_slprintf(result, sizeof(result), "Method %d", opt->method); + } + + return result; +} + +/* + * CCP has come up - inform the kernel driver and log a message. + */ +static void ccp_up(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; + ccp_options *ho = &pcb->ccp_hisoptions; + char method1[64]; + + ccp_set(pcb, 1, 1, go->method, ho->method); + + if (ccp_anycompress(go)) { + if (ccp_anycompress(ho)) { + if (go->method == ho->method) { + ppp_notice("%s compression enabled", method_name(go, ho)); + } else { + ppp_strlcpy(method1, method_name(go, NULL), sizeof(method1)); + ppp_notice("%s / %s compression enabled", + method1, method_name(ho, NULL)); + } + } else { + ppp_notice("%s receive compression enabled", method_name(go, NULL)); + } + } else if (ccp_anycompress(ho)) { + ppp_notice("%s transmit compression enabled", method_name(ho, NULL)); + } + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (go->mppe) { + continue_networks(pcb); /* Bring up IP et al */ + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +} + +/* + * CCP has gone down - inform the kernel driver. + */ +static void ccp_down(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + if (pcb->ccp_localstate & RACK_PENDING) { + UNTIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f); + } + + pcb->ccp_localstate = 0; + ccp_set(pcb, 1, 0, 0, 0); +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + if (go->mppe) { + go->mppe = 0; + + if (pcb->lcp_fsm.state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + /* If LCP is not already going down, make sure it does. */ + ppp_error("MPPE disabled"); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE disabled"); + } + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +} + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * Print the contents of a CCP packet. + */ +static const char *const ccp_codenames[] = { + "ConfReq", + "ConfAck", + "ConfNak", + "ConfRej", + "TermReq", + "TermAck", + "CodeRej", + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + "ResetReq", + "ResetAck", +}; + +static int ccp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) +{ + const u_char *p0, *optend; + int code, id, len; + int optlen; + + p0 = p; + + if (plen < HEADERLEN) { + return 0; + } + + code = p[0]; + id = p[1]; + len = (p[2] << 8) + p[3]; + + if (len < HEADERLEN || len > plen) { + return 0; + } + + if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ccp_codenames) && ccp_codenames[code - 1] != NULL) { + printer(arg, " %s", ccp_codenames[code - 1]); + } else { + printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); + } + + printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); + len -= HEADERLEN; + p += HEADERLEN; + + switch (code) { + case CONFREQ: + case CONFACK: + case CONFNAK: + case CONFREJ: + + /* print list of possible compression methods */ + while (len >= 2) { + code = p[0]; + optlen = p[1]; + + if (optlen < 2 || optlen > len) { + break; + } + + printer(arg, " <"); + len -= optlen; + optend = p + optlen; + + switch (code) { +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + case CI_MPPE: + if (optlen >= CILEN_MPPE) { + u_char mppe_opts; + + MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(&p[2], mppe_opts); + printer(arg, "mppe %s %s %s %s %s %s%s", + (p[2] & MPPE_H_BIT) ? "+H" : "-H", + (p[5] & MPPE_M_BIT) ? "+M" : "-M", + (p[5] & MPPE_S_BIT) ? "+S" : "-S", + (p[5] & MPPE_L_BIT) ? "+L" : "-L", + (p[5] & MPPE_D_BIT) ? "+D" : "-D", + (p[5] & MPPE_C_BIT) ? "+C" : "-C", + (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN) ? " +U" : ""); + + if (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_UNKNOWN) + printer(arg, " (%.2x %.2x %.2x %.2x)", + p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5]); + + p += CILEN_MPPE; + } + + break; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if DEFLATE_SUPPORT + + case CI_DEFLATE: + case CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT: + if (optlen >= CILEN_DEFLATE) { + printer(arg, "deflate%s %d", + (code == CI_DEFLATE_DRAFT ? "(old#)" : ""), + DEFLATE_SIZE(p[2])); + + if (DEFLATE_METHOD(p[2]) != DEFLATE_METHOD_VAL) { + printer(arg, " method %d", DEFLATE_METHOD(p[2])); + } + + if (p[3] != DEFLATE_CHK_SEQUENCE) { + printer(arg, " check %d", p[3]); + } + + p += CILEN_DEFLATE; + } + + break; +#endif /* DEFLATE_SUPPORT */ +#if BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT + + case CI_BSD_COMPRESS: + if (optlen >= CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS) { + printer(arg, "bsd v%d %d", BSD_VERSION(p[2]), + BSD_NBITS(p[2])); + p += CILEN_BSD_COMPRESS; + } + + break; +#endif /* BSDCOMPRESS_SUPPORT */ +#if PREDICTOR_SUPPORT + + case CI_PREDICTOR_1: + if (optlen >= CILEN_PREDICTOR_1) { + printer(arg, "predictor 1"); + p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_1; + } + + break; + + case CI_PREDICTOR_2: + if (optlen >= CILEN_PREDICTOR_2) { + printer(arg, "predictor 2"); + p += CILEN_PREDICTOR_2; + } + + break; +#endif /* PREDICTOR_SUPPORT */ + + default: + break; + } + + while (p < optend) { + printer(arg, " %.2x", *p++); + } + + printer(arg, ">"); + } + + break; + + case TERMACK: + case TERMREQ: + if (len > 0 && *p >= ' ' && *p < 0x7f) { + ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); + p += len; + len = 0; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + /* dump out the rest of the packet in hex */ + while (--len >= 0) { + printer(arg, " %.2x", *p++); + } + + return p - p0; +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_DATAINPUT +/* + * We have received a packet that the decompressor failed to + * decompress. Here we would expect to issue a reset-request, but + * Motorola has a patent on resetting the compressor as a result of + * detecting an error in the decompressed data after decompression. + * (See US patent 5,130,993; international patent publication number + * WO 91/10289; Australian patent 73296/91.) + * + * So we ask the kernel whether the error was detected after + * decompression; if it was, we take CCP down, thus disabling + * compression :-(, otherwise we issue the reset-request. + */ +static void ccp_datainput(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *pkt, int len) +{ + fsm *f; +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + ccp_options *go = &pcb->ccp_gotoptions; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pkt); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(len); + + f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; + + if (f->state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + if (ccp_fatal_error(pcb)) { + /* + * Disable compression by taking CCP down. + */ + ppp_error("Lost compression sync: disabling compression"); + ccp_close(pcb, "Lost compression sync"); +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + /* + * If we were doing MPPE, we must also take the link down. + */ + if (go->mppe) { + ppp_error("Too many MPPE errors, closing LCP"); + lcp_close(pcb, "Too many MPPE errors"); + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + } else { + /* + * Send a reset-request to reset the peer's compressor. + * We don't do that if we are still waiting for an + * acknowledgement to a previous reset-request. + */ + if (!(pcb->ccp_localstate & RACK_PENDING)) { + fsm_sdata(f, CCP_RESETREQ, f->reqid = ++f->id, NULL, 0); + TIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f, RACKTIMEOUT); + pcb->ccp_localstate |= RACK_PENDING; + } else { + pcb->ccp_localstate |= RREQ_REPEAT; + } + } + } +} +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ + +/* + * We have received a packet that the decompressor failed to + * decompress. Issue a reset-request. + */ +void ccp_resetrequest(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ccp_fsm; + + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + return; + } + + /* + * Send a reset-request to reset the peer's compressor. + * We don't do that if we are still waiting for an + * acknowledgement to a previous reset-request. + */ + if (!(pcb->ccp_localstate & RACK_PENDING)) { + fsm_sdata(f, CCP_RESETREQ, f->reqid = ++f->id, NULL, 0); + TIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f, RACKTIMEOUT); + pcb->ccp_localstate |= RACK_PENDING; + } else { + pcb->ccp_localstate |= RREQ_REPEAT; + } +} + +/* + * Timeout waiting for reset-ack. + */ +static void ccp_rack_timeout(void *arg) +{ + fsm *f = (fsm *)arg; + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + + if (f->state == PPP_FSM_OPENED && (pcb->ccp_localstate & RREQ_REPEAT)) { + fsm_sdata(f, CCP_RESETREQ, f->reqid, NULL, 0); + TIMEOUT(ccp_rack_timeout, f, RACKTIMEOUT); + pcb->ccp_localstate &= ~RREQ_REPEAT; + } else { + pcb->ccp_localstate &= ~RACK_PENDING; + } +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CCP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c index 7d2a5045..a66761ae 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-md5.c @@ -1,131 +1,131 @@ -/* - * chap-md5.c - New CHAP/MD5 implementation. - * - * Copyright (c) 2003 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" -#include "netif/ppp/chap-md5.h" -#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" - -#define MD5_HASH_SIZE 16 -#define MD5_MIN_CHALLENGE 17 -#define MD5_MAX_CHALLENGE 24 -#define MD5_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE 3 /* 2^3-1 = 7, 17+7 = 24 */ - -#if PPP_SERVER -static void chap_md5_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *cp) -{ - int clen; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - clen = MD5_MIN_CHALLENGE + magic_pow(MD5_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE); - *cp++ = clen; - magic_random_bytes(cp, clen); -} - -static int chap_md5_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, const char *name, - const unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, - const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space) -{ - lwip_md5_context ctx; - unsigned char idbyte = id; - unsigned char hash[MD5_HASH_SIZE]; - int challenge_len, response_len; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - challenge_len = *challenge++; - response_len = *response++; - - if (response_len == MD5_HASH_SIZE) { - /* Generate hash of ID, secret, challenge */ - lwip_md5_init(&ctx); - lwip_md5_starts(&ctx); - lwip_md5_update(&ctx, &idbyte, 1); - lwip_md5_update(&ctx, secret, secret_len); - lwip_md5_update(&ctx, challenge, challenge_len); - lwip_md5_finish(&ctx, hash); - lwip_md5_free(&ctx); - - /* Test if our hash matches the peer's response */ - if (memcmp(hash, response, MD5_HASH_SIZE) == 0) { - ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "Access granted"); - return 1; - } - } - - ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "Access denied"); - return 0; -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -static void chap_md5_make_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *response, int id, const char *our_name, - const unsigned char *challenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *private_) -{ - lwip_md5_context ctx; - unsigned char idbyte = id; - int challenge_len = *challenge++; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(our_name); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(private_); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - lwip_md5_init(&ctx); - lwip_md5_starts(&ctx); - lwip_md5_update(&ctx, &idbyte, 1); - lwip_md5_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)secret, secret_len); - lwip_md5_update(&ctx, challenge, challenge_len); - lwip_md5_finish(&ctx, &response[1]); - lwip_md5_free(&ctx); - response[0] = MD5_HASH_SIZE; -} - -const struct chap_digest_type md5_digest = { - CHAP_MD5, /* code */ -#if PPP_SERVER - chap_md5_generate_challenge, - chap_md5_verify_response, -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - chap_md5_make_response, - NULL, /* check_success */ - NULL, /* handle_failure */ -}; - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * chap-md5.c - New CHAP/MD5 implementation. + * + * Copyright (c) 2003 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" +#include "netif/ppp/chap-md5.h" +#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" + +#define MD5_HASH_SIZE 16 +#define MD5_MIN_CHALLENGE 17 +#define MD5_MAX_CHALLENGE 24 +#define MD5_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE 3 /* 2^3-1 = 7, 17+7 = 24 */ + +#if PPP_SERVER +static void chap_md5_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *cp) +{ + int clen; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + clen = MD5_MIN_CHALLENGE + magic_pow(MD5_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE); + *cp++ = clen; + magic_random_bytes(cp, clen); +} + +static int chap_md5_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, const char *name, + const unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, + const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space) +{ + lwip_md5_context ctx; + unsigned char idbyte = id; + unsigned char hash[MD5_HASH_SIZE]; + int challenge_len, response_len; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + challenge_len = *challenge++; + response_len = *response++; + + if (response_len == MD5_HASH_SIZE) { + /* Generate hash of ID, secret, challenge */ + lwip_md5_init(&ctx); + lwip_md5_starts(&ctx); + lwip_md5_update(&ctx, &idbyte, 1); + lwip_md5_update(&ctx, secret, secret_len); + lwip_md5_update(&ctx, challenge, challenge_len); + lwip_md5_finish(&ctx, hash); + lwip_md5_free(&ctx); + + /* Test if our hash matches the peer's response */ + if (memcmp(hash, response, MD5_HASH_SIZE) == 0) { + ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "Access granted"); + return 1; + } + } + + ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "Access denied"); + return 0; +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +static void chap_md5_make_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *response, int id, const char *our_name, + const unsigned char *challenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *private_) +{ + lwip_md5_context ctx; + unsigned char idbyte = id; + int challenge_len = *challenge++; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(our_name); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(private_); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + lwip_md5_init(&ctx); + lwip_md5_starts(&ctx); + lwip_md5_update(&ctx, &idbyte, 1); + lwip_md5_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)secret, secret_len); + lwip_md5_update(&ctx, challenge, challenge_len); + lwip_md5_finish(&ctx, &response[1]); + lwip_md5_free(&ctx); + response[0] = MD5_HASH_SIZE; +} + +const struct chap_digest_type md5_digest = { + CHAP_MD5, /* code */ +#if PPP_SERVER + chap_md5_generate_challenge, + chap_md5_verify_response, +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + chap_md5_make_response, + NULL, /* check_success */ + NULL, /* handle_failure */ +}; + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-new.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-new.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-new.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-new.c index 533c2d23..98b05c81 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-new.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap-new.c @@ -1,782 +1,782 @@ -/* - * chap-new.c - New CHAP implementation. - * - * Copyright (c) 2003 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include "session.h" -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" -#include "netif/ppp/chap-md5.h" -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/chap_ms.h" -#endif -#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* Hook for a plugin to validate CHAP challenge */ -int (*chap_verify_hook)(const char *name, const char *ourname, int id, - const struct chap_digest_type *digest, - const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space) = NULL; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * Command-line options. - */ -static option_t chap_option_list[] = { - { "chap-restart", o_int, &chap_timeout_time, - "Set timeout for CHAP", OPT_PRIO }, - { "chap-max-challenge", o_int, &pcb->settings.chap_max_transmits, - "Set max #xmits for challenge", OPT_PRIO }, - { "chap-interval", o_int, &pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time, - "Set interval for rechallenge", OPT_PRIO }, - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* Values for flags in chap_client_state and chap_server_state */ -#define LOWERUP 1 -#define AUTH_STARTED 2 -#define AUTH_DONE 4 -#define AUTH_FAILED 8 -#define TIMEOUT_PENDING 0x10 -#define CHALLENGE_VALID 0x20 - -/* - * Prototypes. - */ -static void chap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void chap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void chap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PPP_SERVER -static void chap_timeout(void *arg); -static void chap_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void chap_handle_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int code, - unsigned char *pkt, int len); -static int chap_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *name, const char *ourname, int id, - const struct chap_digest_type *digest, - const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -static void chap_respond(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, - unsigned char *pkt, int len); -static void chap_handle_status(ppp_pcb *pcb, int code, int id, - unsigned char *pkt, int len); -static void chap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void chap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *pkt, int pktlen); -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static int chap_print_pkt(const unsigned char *p, int plen, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -/* List of digest types that we know about */ -static const struct chap_digest_type *const chap_digests[] = { - &md5_digest, -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - &chapms_digest, - &chapms2_digest, -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - NULL -}; - -/* - * chap_init - reset to initial state. - */ -static void chap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - -#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ - memset(&pcb->chap_client, 0, sizeof(chap_client_state)); -#if PPP_SERVER - memset(&pcb->chap_server, 0, sizeof(chap_server_state)); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -#endif /* 0 */ -} - -/* - * chap_lowerup - we can start doing stuff now. - */ -static void chap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - pcb->chap_client.flags |= LOWERUP; -#if PPP_SERVER - pcb->chap_server.flags |= LOWERUP; - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_STARTED) { - chap_timeout(pcb); - } - -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -} - -static void chap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - pcb->chap_client.flags = 0; -#if PPP_SERVER - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & TIMEOUT_PENDING) { - UNTIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb); - } - - pcb->chap_server.flags = 0; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * chap_auth_peer - Start authenticating the peer. - * If the lower layer is already up, we start sending challenges, - * otherwise we wait for the lower layer to come up. - */ -void chap_auth_peer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *our_name, int digest_code) -{ - const struct chap_digest_type *dp; - int i; - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_STARTED) { - ppp_error("CHAP: peer authentication already started!"); - return; - } - - for (i = 0; (dp = chap_digests[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (dp->code == digest_code) { - break; - } - - if (dp == NULL) - ppp_fatal("CHAP digest 0x%x requested but not available", - digest_code); - - pcb->chap_server.digest = dp; - pcb->chap_server.name = our_name; - /* Start with a random ID value */ - pcb->chap_server.id = magic(); - pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_STARTED; - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & LOWERUP) { - chap_timeout(pcb); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * chap_auth_with_peer - Prepare to authenticate ourselves to the peer. - * There isn't much to do until we receive a challenge. - */ -void chap_auth_with_peer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *our_name, int digest_code) -{ - const struct chap_digest_type *dp; - int i; - - if (NULL == our_name) { - return; - } - - if (pcb->chap_client.flags & AUTH_STARTED) { - ppp_error("CHAP: authentication with peer already started!"); - return; - } - - for (i = 0; (dp = chap_digests[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (dp->code == digest_code) { - break; - } - - if (dp == NULL) - ppp_fatal("CHAP digest 0x%x requested but not available", - digest_code); - - pcb->chap_client.digest = dp; - pcb->chap_client.name = our_name; - pcb->chap_client.flags |= AUTH_STARTED; -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * chap_timeout - It's time to send another challenge to the peer. - * This could be either a retransmission of a previous challenge, - * or a new challenge to start re-authentication. - */ -static void chap_timeout(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - struct pbuf *p; - - pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~TIMEOUT_PENDING; - - if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & CHALLENGE_VALID) == 0) { - pcb->chap_server.challenge_xmits = 0; - chap_generate_challenge(pcb); - pcb->chap_server.flags |= CHALLENGE_VALID; - } else if (pcb->chap_server.challenge_xmits >= pcb->settings.chap_max_transmits) { - pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~CHALLENGE_VALID; - pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_DONE | AUTH_FAILED; - auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); - return; - } - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(pcb->chap_server.challenge_pktlen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - MEMCPY(p->payload, pcb->chap_server.challenge, pcb->chap_server.challenge_pktlen); - ppp_write(pcb, p); - ++pcb->chap_server.challenge_xmits; - pcb->chap_server.flags |= TIMEOUT_PENDING; - TIMEOUT(chap_timeout, arg, pcb->settings.chap_timeout_time); -} - -/* - * chap_generate_challenge - generate a challenge string and format - * the challenge packet in pcb->chap_server.challenge_pkt. - */ -static void chap_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - int clen = 1, nlen, len; - unsigned char *p; - - p = pcb->chap_server.challenge; - MAKEHEADER(p, PPP_CHAP); - p += CHAP_HDRLEN; - pcb->chap_server.digest->generate_challenge(pcb, p); - clen = *p; - nlen = strlen(pcb->chap_server.name); - memcpy(p + 1 + clen, pcb->chap_server.name, nlen); - - len = CHAP_HDRLEN + 1 + clen + nlen; - pcb->chap_server.challenge_pktlen = PPP_HDRLEN + len; - - p = pcb->chap_server.challenge + PPP_HDRLEN; - p[0] = CHAP_CHALLENGE; - p[1] = ++pcb->chap_server.id; - p[2] = len >> 8; - p[3] = len; -} - -/* - * chap_handle_response - check the response to our challenge. - */ -static void chap_handle_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, - unsigned char *pkt, int len) -{ - int response_len, ok, mlen; - const unsigned char *response; - unsigned char *outp; - struct pbuf *p; - const char *name = NULL; /* initialized to shut gcc up */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - int (*verifier)(const char *, const char *, int, const struct chap_digest_type *, - const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, char *, int); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - char rname[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; - char message[256]; - - if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & LOWERUP) == 0) { - return; - } - - if (id != pcb->chap_server.challenge[PPP_HDRLEN + 1] || len < 2) { - return; - } - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & CHALLENGE_VALID) { - response = pkt; - GETCHAR(response_len, pkt); - len -= response_len + 1; /* length of name */ - name = (char *)pkt + response_len; - - if (len < 0) { - return; - } - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & TIMEOUT_PENDING) { - pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~TIMEOUT_PENDING; - UNTIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb); - } - -#if PPP_REMOTENAME - - if (pcb->settings.explicit_remote) { - name = pcb->remote_name; - } else -#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ - { - /* Null terminate and clean remote name. */ - ppp_slprintf(rname, sizeof(rname), "%.*v", len, name); - name = rname; - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(chap_verify_hook) - { - verifier = chap_verify_hook; - } - else - { - verifier = chap_verify_response; - } - - ok = (*verifier)(name, pcb->chap_server.name, id, pcb->chap_server.digest, - pcb->chap_server.challenge + PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN, - response, pcb->chap_server.message, sizeof(pcb->chap_server.message)); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - ok = chap_verify_response(pcb, name, pcb->chap_server.name, id, pcb->chap_server.digest, - pcb->chap_server.challenge + PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN, - response, message, sizeof(message)); -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(!ok || !auth_number()) - { -#endif /* UNUSED */ - - if (!ok) { - pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_FAILED; - ppp_warn("Peer %q failed CHAP authentication", name); - } - } else if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_DONE) == 0) { - return; - } - - /* send the response */ - mlen = strlen(message); - len = CHAP_HDRLEN + mlen; - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + len), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (unsigned char *)p->payload; - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_CHAP); - - outp[0] = (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_FAILED) ? CHAP_FAILURE : CHAP_SUCCESS; - outp[1] = id; - outp[2] = len >> 8; - outp[3] = len; - - if (mlen > 0) { - memcpy(outp + CHAP_HDRLEN, message, mlen); - } - - ppp_write(pcb, p); - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & CHALLENGE_VALID) { - pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~CHALLENGE_VALID; - - if (!(pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_DONE) && !(pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_FAILED)) { -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - /* - * Auth is OK, so now we need to check session restrictions - * to ensure everything is OK, but only if we used a - * plugin, and only if we're configured to check. This - * allows us to do PAM checks on PPP servers that - * authenticate against ActiveDirectory, and use AD for - * account info (like when using Winbind integrated with - * PAM). - */ - if(session_mgmt && - session_check(name, NULL, devnam, NULL) == 0) - { - pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_FAILED; - ppp_warn("Peer %q failed CHAP Session verification", name); - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - } - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_FAILED) { - auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); - } else { - if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_DONE) == 0) - auth_peer_success(pcb, PPP_CHAP, - pcb->chap_server.digest->code, - name, strlen(name)); - - if (pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time) { - pcb->chap_server.flags |= TIMEOUT_PENDING; - TIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb, - pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time); - } - } - - pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_DONE; - } -} - -/* - * chap_verify_response - check whether the peer's response matches - * what we think it should be. Returns 1 if it does (authentication - * succeeded), or 0 if it doesn't. - */ -static int chap_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *name, const char *ourname, int id, - const struct chap_digest_type *digest, - const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space) -{ - int ok; - unsigned char secret[MAXSECRETLEN]; - int secret_len; - - /* Get the secret that the peer is supposed to know */ - if (!get_secret(pcb, name, ourname, (char *)secret, &secret_len, 1)) { - ppp_error("No CHAP secret found for authenticating %q", name); - return 0; - } - - ok = digest->verify_response(pcb, id, name, secret, secret_len, challenge, - response, message, message_space); - memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret)); - - return ok; -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * chap_respond - Generate and send a response to a challenge. - */ -static void chap_respond(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, - unsigned char *pkt, int len) -{ - int clen, nlen; - int secret_len; - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - char rname[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; - char secret[MAXSECRETLEN + 1]; - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(RESP_MAX_PKTLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - if ((pcb->chap_client.flags & (LOWERUP | AUTH_STARTED)) != (LOWERUP | AUTH_STARTED)) { - return; /* not ready */ - } - - if (len < 2 || len < pkt[0] + 1) { - return; /* too short */ - } - - clen = pkt[0]; - nlen = len - (clen + 1); - - /* Null terminate and clean remote name. */ - ppp_slprintf(rname, sizeof(rname), "%.*v", nlen, pkt + clen + 1); - -#if PPP_REMOTENAME - - /* Microsoft doesn't send their name back in the PPP packet */ - if (pcb->settings.explicit_remote || (pcb->settings.remote_name[0] != 0 && rname[0] == 0)) { - strlcpy(rname, pcb->settings.remote_name, sizeof(rname)); - } - -#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ - - /* get secret for authenticating ourselves with the specified host */ - if (!get_secret(pcb, pcb->chap_client.name, rname, secret, &secret_len, 0)) { - secret_len = 0; /* assume null secret if can't find one */ - ppp_warn("No CHAP secret found for authenticating us to %q", rname); - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_CHAP); - outp += CHAP_HDRLEN; - - pcb->chap_client.digest->make_response(pcb, outp, id, pcb->chap_client.name, pkt, - secret, secret_len, pcb->chap_client.priv); - memset(secret, 0, secret_len); - - clen = *outp; - nlen = strlen(pcb->chap_client.name); - memcpy(outp + clen + 1, pcb->chap_client.name, nlen); - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload + PPP_HDRLEN; - len = CHAP_HDRLEN + clen + 1 + nlen; - outp[0] = CHAP_RESPONSE; - outp[1] = id; - outp[2] = len >> 8; - outp[3] = len; - - pbuf_realloc(p, PPP_HDRLEN + len); - ppp_write(pcb, p); -} - -static void chap_handle_status(ppp_pcb *pcb, int code, int id, - unsigned char *pkt, int len) -{ - const char *msg = NULL; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - - if ((pcb->chap_client.flags & (AUTH_DONE | AUTH_STARTED | LOWERUP)) != (AUTH_STARTED | LOWERUP)) { - return; - } - - pcb->chap_client.flags |= AUTH_DONE; - - if (code == CHAP_SUCCESS) { - /* used for MS-CHAP v2 mutual auth, yuck */ - if (pcb->chap_client.digest->check_success != NULL) { - if (!(*pcb->chap_client.digest->check_success)(pcb, pkt, len, pcb->chap_client.priv)) { - code = CHAP_FAILURE; - } - } else { - msg = "CHAP authentication succeeded"; - } - } else { - if (pcb->chap_client.digest->handle_failure != NULL) { - (*pcb->chap_client.digest->handle_failure)(pcb, pkt, len); - } else { - msg = "CHAP authentication failed"; - } - } - - if (msg) { - if (len > 0) { - ppp_info("%s: %.*v", msg, len, pkt); - } else { - ppp_info("%s", msg); - } - } - - if (code == CHAP_SUCCESS) { - auth_withpeer_success(pcb, PPP_CHAP, pcb->chap_client.digest->code); - } else { - pcb->chap_client.flags |= AUTH_FAILED; - ppp_error("CHAP authentication failed"); - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); - } -} - -static void chap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *pkt, int pktlen) -{ - unsigned char code, id; - int len; - - if (pktlen < CHAP_HDRLEN) { - return; - } - - GETCHAR(code, pkt); - GETCHAR(id, pkt); - GETSHORT(len, pkt); - - if (len < CHAP_HDRLEN || len > pktlen) { - return; - } - - len -= CHAP_HDRLEN; - - switch (code) { - case CHAP_CHALLENGE: - chap_respond(pcb, id, pkt, len); - break; -#if PPP_SERVER - - case CHAP_RESPONSE: - chap_handle_response(pcb, id, pkt, len); - break; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - - case CHAP_FAILURE: - case CHAP_SUCCESS: - chap_handle_status(pcb, code, id, pkt, len); - break; - - default: - break; - } -} - -static void chap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ -#if PPP_SERVER - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & TIMEOUT_PENDING) { - pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~TIMEOUT_PENDING; - UNTIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb); - } - - if (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_STARTED) { - pcb->chap_server.flags = 0; - auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); - } - -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - - if ((pcb->chap_client.flags & (AUTH_STARTED | AUTH_DONE)) == AUTH_STARTED) { - pcb->chap_client.flags &= ~AUTH_STARTED; - ppp_error("CHAP authentication failed due to protocol-reject"); - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); - } -} - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * chap_print_pkt - print the contents of a CHAP packet. - */ -static const char *const chap_code_names[] = { - "Challenge", "Response", "Success", "Failure" -}; - -static int chap_print_pkt(const unsigned char *p, int plen, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) -{ - int code, id, len; - int clen, nlen; - unsigned char x; - - if (plen < CHAP_HDRLEN) { - return 0; - } - - GETCHAR(code, p); - GETCHAR(id, p); - GETSHORT(len, p); - - if (len < CHAP_HDRLEN || len > plen) { - return 0; - } - - if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(chap_code_names)) { - printer(arg, " %s", chap_code_names[code - 1]); - } else { - printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); - } - - printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); - len -= CHAP_HDRLEN; - - switch (code) { - case CHAP_CHALLENGE: - case CHAP_RESPONSE: - if (len < 1) { - break; - } - - clen = p[0]; - - if (len < clen + 1) { - break; - } - - ++p; - nlen = len - clen - 1; - printer(arg, " <"); - - for (; clen > 0; --clen) { - GETCHAR(x, p); - printer(arg, "%.2x", x); - } - - printer(arg, ">, name = "); - ppp_print_string(p, nlen, printer, arg); - break; - - case CHAP_FAILURE: - case CHAP_SUCCESS: - printer(arg, " "); - ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); - break; - - default: - for (clen = len; clen > 0; --clen) { - GETCHAR(x, p); - printer(arg, " %.2x", x); - } - - /* no break */ - } - - return len + CHAP_HDRLEN; -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -const struct protent chap_protent = { - PPP_CHAP, - chap_init, - chap_input, - chap_protrej, - chap_lowerup, - chap_lowerdown, - NULL, /* open */ - NULL, /* close */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - chap_print_pkt, -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT - NULL, /* datainput */ -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - "CHAP", /* name */ - NULL, /* data_name */ -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS - chap_option_list, - NULL, /* check_options */ -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - NULL, - NULL -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -}; - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * chap-new.c - New CHAP implementation. + * + * Copyright (c) 2003 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include "session.h" +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" +#include "netif/ppp/chap-md5.h" +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/chap_ms.h" +#endif +#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* Hook for a plugin to validate CHAP challenge */ +int (*chap_verify_hook)(const char *name, const char *ourname, int id, + const struct chap_digest_type *digest, + const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space) = NULL; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * Command-line options. + */ +static option_t chap_option_list[] = { + { "chap-restart", o_int, &chap_timeout_time, + "Set timeout for CHAP", OPT_PRIO }, + { "chap-max-challenge", o_int, &pcb->settings.chap_max_transmits, + "Set max #xmits for challenge", OPT_PRIO }, + { "chap-interval", o_int, &pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time, + "Set interval for rechallenge", OPT_PRIO }, + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* Values for flags in chap_client_state and chap_server_state */ +#define LOWERUP 1 +#define AUTH_STARTED 2 +#define AUTH_DONE 4 +#define AUTH_FAILED 8 +#define TIMEOUT_PENDING 0x10 +#define CHALLENGE_VALID 0x20 + +/* + * Prototypes. + */ +static void chap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void chap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void chap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PPP_SERVER +static void chap_timeout(void *arg); +static void chap_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void chap_handle_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int code, + unsigned char *pkt, int len); +static int chap_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *name, const char *ourname, int id, + const struct chap_digest_type *digest, + const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +static void chap_respond(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, + unsigned char *pkt, int len); +static void chap_handle_status(ppp_pcb *pcb, int code, int id, + unsigned char *pkt, int len); +static void chap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void chap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *pkt, int pktlen); +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static int chap_print_pkt(const unsigned char *p, int plen, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +/* List of digest types that we know about */ +static const struct chap_digest_type *const chap_digests[] = { + &md5_digest, +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + &chapms_digest, + &chapms2_digest, +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + NULL +}; + +/* + * chap_init - reset to initial state. + */ +static void chap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + +#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ + memset(&pcb->chap_client, 0, sizeof(chap_client_state)); +#if PPP_SERVER + memset(&pcb->chap_server, 0, sizeof(chap_server_state)); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +#endif /* 0 */ +} + +/* + * chap_lowerup - we can start doing stuff now. + */ +static void chap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + pcb->chap_client.flags |= LOWERUP; +#if PPP_SERVER + pcb->chap_server.flags |= LOWERUP; + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_STARTED) { + chap_timeout(pcb); + } + +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +} + +static void chap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + pcb->chap_client.flags = 0; +#if PPP_SERVER + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & TIMEOUT_PENDING) { + UNTIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb); + } + + pcb->chap_server.flags = 0; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * chap_auth_peer - Start authenticating the peer. + * If the lower layer is already up, we start sending challenges, + * otherwise we wait for the lower layer to come up. + */ +void chap_auth_peer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *our_name, int digest_code) +{ + const struct chap_digest_type *dp; + int i; + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_STARTED) { + ppp_error("CHAP: peer authentication already started!"); + return; + } + + for (i = 0; (dp = chap_digests[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (dp->code == digest_code) { + break; + } + + if (dp == NULL) + ppp_fatal("CHAP digest 0x%x requested but not available", + digest_code); + + pcb->chap_server.digest = dp; + pcb->chap_server.name = our_name; + /* Start with a random ID value */ + pcb->chap_server.id = magic(); + pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_STARTED; + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & LOWERUP) { + chap_timeout(pcb); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * chap_auth_with_peer - Prepare to authenticate ourselves to the peer. + * There isn't much to do until we receive a challenge. + */ +void chap_auth_with_peer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *our_name, int digest_code) +{ + const struct chap_digest_type *dp; + int i; + + if (NULL == our_name) { + return; + } + + if (pcb->chap_client.flags & AUTH_STARTED) { + ppp_error("CHAP: authentication with peer already started!"); + return; + } + + for (i = 0; (dp = chap_digests[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (dp->code == digest_code) { + break; + } + + if (dp == NULL) + ppp_fatal("CHAP digest 0x%x requested but not available", + digest_code); + + pcb->chap_client.digest = dp; + pcb->chap_client.name = our_name; + pcb->chap_client.flags |= AUTH_STARTED; +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * chap_timeout - It's time to send another challenge to the peer. + * This could be either a retransmission of a previous challenge, + * or a new challenge to start re-authentication. + */ +static void chap_timeout(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + struct pbuf *p; + + pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~TIMEOUT_PENDING; + + if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & CHALLENGE_VALID) == 0) { + pcb->chap_server.challenge_xmits = 0; + chap_generate_challenge(pcb); + pcb->chap_server.flags |= CHALLENGE_VALID; + } else if (pcb->chap_server.challenge_xmits >= pcb->settings.chap_max_transmits) { + pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~CHALLENGE_VALID; + pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_DONE | AUTH_FAILED; + auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); + return; + } + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(pcb->chap_server.challenge_pktlen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + MEMCPY(p->payload, pcb->chap_server.challenge, pcb->chap_server.challenge_pktlen); + ppp_write(pcb, p); + ++pcb->chap_server.challenge_xmits; + pcb->chap_server.flags |= TIMEOUT_PENDING; + TIMEOUT(chap_timeout, arg, pcb->settings.chap_timeout_time); +} + +/* + * chap_generate_challenge - generate a challenge string and format + * the challenge packet in pcb->chap_server.challenge_pkt. + */ +static void chap_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + int clen = 1, nlen, len; + unsigned char *p; + + p = pcb->chap_server.challenge; + MAKEHEADER(p, PPP_CHAP); + p += CHAP_HDRLEN; + pcb->chap_server.digest->generate_challenge(pcb, p); + clen = *p; + nlen = strlen(pcb->chap_server.name); + memcpy(p + 1 + clen, pcb->chap_server.name, nlen); + + len = CHAP_HDRLEN + 1 + clen + nlen; + pcb->chap_server.challenge_pktlen = PPP_HDRLEN + len; + + p = pcb->chap_server.challenge + PPP_HDRLEN; + p[0] = CHAP_CHALLENGE; + p[1] = ++pcb->chap_server.id; + p[2] = len >> 8; + p[3] = len; +} + +/* + * chap_handle_response - check the response to our challenge. + */ +static void chap_handle_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, + unsigned char *pkt, int len) +{ + int response_len, ok, mlen; + const unsigned char *response; + unsigned char *outp; + struct pbuf *p; + const char *name = NULL; /* initialized to shut gcc up */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + int (*verifier)(const char *, const char *, int, const struct chap_digest_type *, + const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, char *, int); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + char rname[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; + char message[256]; + + if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & LOWERUP) == 0) { + return; + } + + if (id != pcb->chap_server.challenge[PPP_HDRLEN + 1] || len < 2) { + return; + } + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & CHALLENGE_VALID) { + response = pkt; + GETCHAR(response_len, pkt); + len -= response_len + 1; /* length of name */ + name = (char *)pkt + response_len; + + if (len < 0) { + return; + } + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & TIMEOUT_PENDING) { + pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~TIMEOUT_PENDING; + UNTIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb); + } + +#if PPP_REMOTENAME + + if (pcb->settings.explicit_remote) { + name = pcb->remote_name; + } else +#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ + { + /* Null terminate and clean remote name. */ + ppp_slprintf(rname, sizeof(rname), "%.*v", len, name); + name = rname; + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(chap_verify_hook) + { + verifier = chap_verify_hook; + } + else + { + verifier = chap_verify_response; + } + + ok = (*verifier)(name, pcb->chap_server.name, id, pcb->chap_server.digest, + pcb->chap_server.challenge + PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN, + response, pcb->chap_server.message, sizeof(pcb->chap_server.message)); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + ok = chap_verify_response(pcb, name, pcb->chap_server.name, id, pcb->chap_server.digest, + pcb->chap_server.challenge + PPP_HDRLEN + CHAP_HDRLEN, + response, message, sizeof(message)); +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(!ok || !auth_number()) + { +#endif /* UNUSED */ + + if (!ok) { + pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_FAILED; + ppp_warn("Peer %q failed CHAP authentication", name); + } + } else if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_DONE) == 0) { + return; + } + + /* send the response */ + mlen = strlen(message); + len = CHAP_HDRLEN + mlen; + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + len), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (unsigned char *)p->payload; + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_CHAP); + + outp[0] = (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_FAILED) ? CHAP_FAILURE : CHAP_SUCCESS; + outp[1] = id; + outp[2] = len >> 8; + outp[3] = len; + + if (mlen > 0) { + memcpy(outp + CHAP_HDRLEN, message, mlen); + } + + ppp_write(pcb, p); + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & CHALLENGE_VALID) { + pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~CHALLENGE_VALID; + + if (!(pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_DONE) && !(pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_FAILED)) { +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + /* + * Auth is OK, so now we need to check session restrictions + * to ensure everything is OK, but only if we used a + * plugin, and only if we're configured to check. This + * allows us to do PAM checks on PPP servers that + * authenticate against ActiveDirectory, and use AD for + * account info (like when using Winbind integrated with + * PAM). + */ + if(session_mgmt && + session_check(name, NULL, devnam, NULL) == 0) + { + pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_FAILED; + ppp_warn("Peer %q failed CHAP Session verification", name); + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + } + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_FAILED) { + auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); + } else { + if ((pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_DONE) == 0) + auth_peer_success(pcb, PPP_CHAP, + pcb->chap_server.digest->code, + name, strlen(name)); + + if (pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time) { + pcb->chap_server.flags |= TIMEOUT_PENDING; + TIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb, + pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time); + } + } + + pcb->chap_server.flags |= AUTH_DONE; + } +} + +/* + * chap_verify_response - check whether the peer's response matches + * what we think it should be. Returns 1 if it does (authentication + * succeeded), or 0 if it doesn't. + */ +static int chap_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *name, const char *ourname, int id, + const struct chap_digest_type *digest, + const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space) +{ + int ok; + unsigned char secret[MAXSECRETLEN]; + int secret_len; + + /* Get the secret that the peer is supposed to know */ + if (!get_secret(pcb, name, ourname, (char *)secret, &secret_len, 1)) { + ppp_error("No CHAP secret found for authenticating %q", name); + return 0; + } + + ok = digest->verify_response(pcb, id, name, secret, secret_len, challenge, + response, message, message_space); + memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret)); + + return ok; +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * chap_respond - Generate and send a response to a challenge. + */ +static void chap_respond(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, + unsigned char *pkt, int len) +{ + int clen, nlen; + int secret_len; + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + char rname[MAXNAMELEN + 1]; + char secret[MAXSECRETLEN + 1]; + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(RESP_MAX_PKTLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + if ((pcb->chap_client.flags & (LOWERUP | AUTH_STARTED)) != (LOWERUP | AUTH_STARTED)) { + return; /* not ready */ + } + + if (len < 2 || len < pkt[0] + 1) { + return; /* too short */ + } + + clen = pkt[0]; + nlen = len - (clen + 1); + + /* Null terminate and clean remote name. */ + ppp_slprintf(rname, sizeof(rname), "%.*v", nlen, pkt + clen + 1); + +#if PPP_REMOTENAME + + /* Microsoft doesn't send their name back in the PPP packet */ + if (pcb->settings.explicit_remote || (pcb->settings.remote_name[0] != 0 && rname[0] == 0)) { + strlcpy(rname, pcb->settings.remote_name, sizeof(rname)); + } + +#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ + + /* get secret for authenticating ourselves with the specified host */ + if (!get_secret(pcb, pcb->chap_client.name, rname, secret, &secret_len, 0)) { + secret_len = 0; /* assume null secret if can't find one */ + ppp_warn("No CHAP secret found for authenticating us to %q", rname); + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_CHAP); + outp += CHAP_HDRLEN; + + pcb->chap_client.digest->make_response(pcb, outp, id, pcb->chap_client.name, pkt, + secret, secret_len, pcb->chap_client.priv); + memset(secret, 0, secret_len); + + clen = *outp; + nlen = strlen(pcb->chap_client.name); + memcpy(outp + clen + 1, pcb->chap_client.name, nlen); + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload + PPP_HDRLEN; + len = CHAP_HDRLEN + clen + 1 + nlen; + outp[0] = CHAP_RESPONSE; + outp[1] = id; + outp[2] = len >> 8; + outp[3] = len; + + pbuf_realloc(p, PPP_HDRLEN + len); + ppp_write(pcb, p); +} + +static void chap_handle_status(ppp_pcb *pcb, int code, int id, + unsigned char *pkt, int len) +{ + const char *msg = NULL; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + + if ((pcb->chap_client.flags & (AUTH_DONE | AUTH_STARTED | LOWERUP)) != (AUTH_STARTED | LOWERUP)) { + return; + } + + pcb->chap_client.flags |= AUTH_DONE; + + if (code == CHAP_SUCCESS) { + /* used for MS-CHAP v2 mutual auth, yuck */ + if (pcb->chap_client.digest->check_success != NULL) { + if (!(*pcb->chap_client.digest->check_success)(pcb, pkt, len, pcb->chap_client.priv)) { + code = CHAP_FAILURE; + } + } else { + msg = "CHAP authentication succeeded"; + } + } else { + if (pcb->chap_client.digest->handle_failure != NULL) { + (*pcb->chap_client.digest->handle_failure)(pcb, pkt, len); + } else { + msg = "CHAP authentication failed"; + } + } + + if (msg) { + if (len > 0) { + ppp_info("%s: %.*v", msg, len, pkt); + } else { + ppp_info("%s", msg); + } + } + + if (code == CHAP_SUCCESS) { + auth_withpeer_success(pcb, PPP_CHAP, pcb->chap_client.digest->code); + } else { + pcb->chap_client.flags |= AUTH_FAILED; + ppp_error("CHAP authentication failed"); + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); + } +} + +static void chap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *pkt, int pktlen) +{ + unsigned char code, id; + int len; + + if (pktlen < CHAP_HDRLEN) { + return; + } + + GETCHAR(code, pkt); + GETCHAR(id, pkt); + GETSHORT(len, pkt); + + if (len < CHAP_HDRLEN || len > pktlen) { + return; + } + + len -= CHAP_HDRLEN; + + switch (code) { + case CHAP_CHALLENGE: + chap_respond(pcb, id, pkt, len); + break; +#if PPP_SERVER + + case CHAP_RESPONSE: + chap_handle_response(pcb, id, pkt, len); + break; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + + case CHAP_FAILURE: + case CHAP_SUCCESS: + chap_handle_status(pcb, code, id, pkt, len); + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +static void chap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ +#if PPP_SERVER + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & TIMEOUT_PENDING) { + pcb->chap_server.flags &= ~TIMEOUT_PENDING; + UNTIMEOUT(chap_timeout, pcb); + } + + if (pcb->chap_server.flags & AUTH_STARTED) { + pcb->chap_server.flags = 0; + auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); + } + +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + + if ((pcb->chap_client.flags & (AUTH_STARTED | AUTH_DONE)) == AUTH_STARTED) { + pcb->chap_client.flags &= ~AUTH_STARTED; + ppp_error("CHAP authentication failed due to protocol-reject"); + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_CHAP); + } +} + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * chap_print_pkt - print the contents of a CHAP packet. + */ +static const char *const chap_code_names[] = { + "Challenge", "Response", "Success", "Failure" +}; + +static int chap_print_pkt(const unsigned char *p, int plen, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) +{ + int code, id, len; + int clen, nlen; + unsigned char x; + + if (plen < CHAP_HDRLEN) { + return 0; + } + + GETCHAR(code, p); + GETCHAR(id, p); + GETSHORT(len, p); + + if (len < CHAP_HDRLEN || len > plen) { + return 0; + } + + if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(chap_code_names)) { + printer(arg, " %s", chap_code_names[code - 1]); + } else { + printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); + } + + printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); + len -= CHAP_HDRLEN; + + switch (code) { + case CHAP_CHALLENGE: + case CHAP_RESPONSE: + if (len < 1) { + break; + } + + clen = p[0]; + + if (len < clen + 1) { + break; + } + + ++p; + nlen = len - clen - 1; + printer(arg, " <"); + + for (; clen > 0; --clen) { + GETCHAR(x, p); + printer(arg, "%.2x", x); + } + + printer(arg, ">, name = "); + ppp_print_string(p, nlen, printer, arg); + break; + + case CHAP_FAILURE: + case CHAP_SUCCESS: + printer(arg, " "); + ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); + break; + + default: + for (clen = len; clen > 0; --clen) { + GETCHAR(x, p); + printer(arg, " %.2x", x); + } + + /* no break */ + } + + return len + CHAP_HDRLEN; +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +const struct protent chap_protent = { + PPP_CHAP, + chap_init, + chap_input, + chap_protrej, + chap_lowerup, + chap_lowerdown, + NULL, /* open */ + NULL, /* close */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + chap_print_pkt, +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT + NULL, /* datainput */ +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + "CHAP", /* name */ + NULL, /* data_name */ +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS + chap_option_list, + NULL, /* check_options */ +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + NULL, + NULL +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +}; + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c index 1ce2689e..22def463 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/chap_ms.c @@ -1,1020 +1,1020 @@ -/* - * chap_ms.c - Microsoft MS-CHAP compatible implementation. - * - * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -/* - * Modifications by Lauri Pesonen / lpesonen@clinet.fi, april 1997 - * - * Implemented LANManager type password response to MS-CHAP challenges. - * Now pppd provides both NT style and LANMan style blocks, and the - * prefered is set by option "ms-lanman". Default is to use NT. - * The hash text (StdText) was taken from Win95 RASAPI32.DLL. - * - * You should also use DOMAIN\\USERNAME as described in README.MSCHAP80 - */ - -/* - * Modifications by Frank Cusack, frank@google.com, March 2002. - * - * Implemented MS-CHAPv2 functionality, heavily based on sample - * implementation in RFC 2759. Implemented MPPE functionality, - * heavily based on sample implementation in RFC 3079. - * - * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" -#include "netif/ppp/chap_ms.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" -#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/mppe.h" /* For mppe_sha1_pad*, mppe_set_key() */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -#define SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20 -#define MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE 16 /* 16 bytes in a MD4 message digest */ -#define MAX_NT_PASSWORD 256 /* Max (Unicode) chars in an NT pass */ - -#define MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN 49 /* Response length for MS-CHAP */ -#define MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN 49 /* Response length for MS-CHAPv2 */ -#define MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH 40 /* MS-CHAPv2 authenticator response, */ -/* as ASCII */ - -/* Error codes for MS-CHAP failure messages. */ -#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS 646 -#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_ACCT_DISABLED 647 -#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_PASSWD_EXPIRED 648 -#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION 649 -#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE 691 -#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD 709 - -/* - * Offsets within the response field for MS-CHAP - */ -#define MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP 0 -#define MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP_LEN 24 -#define MS_CHAP_NTRESP 24 -#define MS_CHAP_NTRESP_LEN 24 -#define MS_CHAP_USENT 48 - -/* - * Offsets within the response field for MS-CHAP2 - */ -#define MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE 0 -#define MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN 16 -#define MS_CHAP2_RESERVED_LEN 8 -#define MS_CHAP2_NTRESP 24 -#define MS_CHAP2_NTRESP_LEN 24 -#define MS_CHAP2_FLAGS 48 - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - /* These values are the RADIUS attribute values--see RFC 2548. */ -#define MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED 1 -#define MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_REQUIRED 2 -#define MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_40 2 -#define MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_128 4 - - /* used by plugins (using above values) */ - extern void set_mppe_enc_types(int, int); -#endif /* UNUSED */ -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -/* Are we the authenticator or authenticatee? For MS-CHAPv2 key derivation. */ -#define MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE 0 -#define MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR 1 - -static void ascii2unicode(const char[], int, u_char[]); -static void NTPasswordHash(u_char *, int, u_char[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]); -static void ChallengeResponse(const u_char *, const u_char *, u_char[24]); -static void ChallengeHash(const u_char[16], const u_char *, const char *, u_char[8]); -static void ChapMS_NT(const u_char *, const char *, int, u_char[24]); -static void ChapMS2_NT(const u_char *, const u_char[16], const char *, const char *, int, - u_char[24]); -static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain(const char *, int, u_char[24], const u_char[16], const u_char *, - const char *, u_char[41]); -#ifdef MSLANMAN -static void ChapMS_LANMan(u_char *, char *, int, u_char *); -#endif - -static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(const u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], - u_char NTResponse[24], const u_char PeerChallenge[16], - const u_char *rchallenge, const char *username, - u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1]); - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -static void Set_Start_Key(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *, const char *, int); -static void SetMasterKeys(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *, int, u_char[24], int); -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -static void ChapMS(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *, const char *, int, u_char *); -static void ChapMS2(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *, const u_char *, const char *, const char *, int, - u_char *, u_char[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1], int); - -#ifdef MSLANMAN -bool ms_lanman = 0; /* Use LanMan password instead of NT */ -/* Has meaning only with MS-CHAP challenges */ -#endif - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY -/* For MPPE debug */ -/* Use "[]|}{?/><,`!2&&(" (sans quotes) for RFC 3079 MS-CHAPv2 test value */ -static char *mschap_challenge = NULL; -/* Use "!@\#$%^&*()_+:3|~" (sans quotes, backslash is to escape #) for ... */ -static char *mschap2_peer_challenge = NULL; -#endif - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" /* Need to poke MPPE options */ -#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * Command-line options. - */ -static option_t chapms_option_list[] = { -#ifdef MSLANMAN - { "ms-lanman", o_bool, &ms_lanman, - "Use LanMan passwd when using MS-CHAP", 1 }, -#endif -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY - { "mschap-challenge", o_string, &mschap_challenge, - "specify CHAP challenge" }, - { "mschap2-peer-challenge", o_string, &mschap2_peer_challenge, - "specify CHAP peer challenge" }, -#endif - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * chapms_generate_challenge - generate a challenge for MS-CHAP. - * For MS-CHAP the challenge length is fixed at 8 bytes. - * The length goes in challenge[0] and the actual challenge starts - * at challenge[1]. - */ -static void chapms_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *challenge) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - *challenge++ = 8; -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY - - if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 8) { - memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 8); - } else -#endif - magic_random_bytes(challenge, 8); -} - -static void chapms2_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *challenge) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - *challenge++ = 16; -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY - - if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 16) { - memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 16); - } else -#endif - magic_random_bytes(challenge, 16); -} - -static int chapms_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, const char *name, - const unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, - const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space) -{ - unsigned char md[MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN]; - int diff; - int challenge_len, response_len; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); - - challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 8 */ - response_len = *response++; - - if (response_len != MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN) { - goto bad; - } - -#ifndef MSLANMAN - - if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) { - /* Should really propagate this into the error packet. */ - ppp_notice("Peer request for LANMAN auth not supported"); - goto bad; - } - -#endif - - /* Generate the expected response. */ - ChapMS(pcb, (const u_char *)challenge, (const char *)secret, secret_len, md); - -#ifdef MSLANMAN - - /* Determine which part of response to verify against */ - if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) - diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], - &md[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP_LEN); - else -#endif - diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], &md[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], - MS_CHAP_NTRESP_LEN); - - if (diff == 0) { - ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "Access granted"); - return 1; - } - -bad: - /* See comments below for MS-CHAP V2 */ - ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0", - challenge_len, challenge); - return 0; -} - -static int chapms2_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, const char *name, - const unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, - const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, - char *message, int message_space) -{ - unsigned char md[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN]; - char saresponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1]; - int challenge_len, response_len; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - - challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 16 */ - response_len = *response++; - - if (response_len != MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN) { - goto bad; /* not even the right length */ - } - - /* Generate the expected response and our mutual auth. */ - ChapMS2(pcb, (const u_char *)challenge, (const u_char *)&response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], name, - (const char *)secret, secret_len, md, - (unsigned char *)saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR); - - /* compare MDs and send the appropriate status */ - /* - * Per RFC 2759, success message must be formatted as - * "S= M=" - * where - * is the Authenticator Response (mutual auth) - * is a text message - * - * However, some versions of Windows (win98 tested) do not know - * about the M= part (required per RFC 2759) and flag - * it as an error (reported incorrectly as an encryption error - * to the user). Since the RFC requires it, and it can be - * useful information, we supply it if the peer is a conforming - * system. Luckily (?), win98 sets the Flags field to 0x04 - * (contrary to RFC requirements) so we can use that to - * distinguish between conforming and non-conforming systems. - * - * Special thanks to Alex Swiridov for - * help debugging this. - */ - if (memcmp(&md[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], - MS_CHAP2_NTRESP_LEN) == 0) { - if (response[MS_CHAP2_FLAGS]) { - ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s", saresponse); - } else - ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s M=%s", - saresponse, "Access granted"); - - return 1; - } - -bad: - /* - * Failure message must be formatted as - * "E=e R=r C=c V=v M=m" - * where - * e = error code (we use 691, ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE) - * r = retry (we use 1, ok to retry) - * c = challenge to use for next response, we reuse previous - * v = Change Password version supported, we use 0 - * m = text message - * - * The M=m part is only for MS-CHAPv2. Neither win2k nor - * win98 (others untested) display the message to the user anyway. - * They also both ignore the E=e code. - * - * Note that it's safe to reuse the same challenge as we don't - * actually accept another response based on the error message - * (and no clients try to resend a response anyway). - * - * Basically, this whole bit is useless code, even the small - * implementation here is only because of overspecification. - */ - ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0 M=%s", - challenge_len, challenge, "Access denied"); - return 0; -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -static void chapms_make_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *response, int id, const char *our_name, - const unsigned char *challenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *private_) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(our_name); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(private_); - challenge++; /* skip length, should be 8 */ - *response++ = MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN; - ChapMS(pcb, challenge, secret, secret_len, response); -} - -static void chapms2_make_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *response, int id, const char *our_name, - const unsigned char *challenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *private_) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - challenge++; /* skip length, should be 16 */ - *response++ = MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN; - ChapMS2(pcb, challenge, -#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY - mschap2_peer_challenge, -#else - NULL, -#endif - our_name, secret, secret_len, response, private_, - MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE); -} - -static int chapms2_check_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *msg, int len, unsigned char *private_) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - if ((len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 2) || - strncmp((char *)msg, "S=", 2) != 0) { - /* Packet does not start with "S=" */ - ppp_error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); - return 0; - } - - msg += 2; - len -= 2; - - if (len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH || memcmp(msg, private_, MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH)) { - /* Authenticator Response did not match expected. */ - ppp_error("MS-CHAPv2 mutual authentication failed."); - return 0; - } - - /* Authenticator Response matches. */ - msg += MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; /* Eat it */ - len -= MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; - - if ((len >= 3) && !strncmp((char *)msg, " M=", 3)) { - msg += 3; /* Eat the delimiter */ - } else if (len) { - /* Packet has extra text which does not begin " M=" */ - ppp_error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static void chapms_handle_failure(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *inp, int len) -{ - int err; - const char *p; - char msg[64]; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - /* We want a null-terminated string for strxxx(). */ - len = LWIP_MIN(len, 63); - MEMCPY(msg, inp, len); - msg[len] = 0; - p = msg; - - /* - * Deal with MS-CHAP formatted failure messages; just print the - * M= part (if any). For MS-CHAP we're not really supposed - * to use M=, but it shouldn't hurt. See - * chapms[2]_verify_response. - */ - if (!strncmp(p, "E=", 2)) { - err = strtol(p + 2, NULL, 10); /* Remember the error code. */ - } else { - goto print_msg; /* Message is badly formatted. */ - } - - if (len && ((p = strstr(p, " M=")) != NULL)) { - /* M= field found. */ - p += 3; - } else { - /* No M=; use the error code. */ - switch (err) { - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS: - p = "E=646 Restricted logon hours"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_ACCT_DISABLED: - p = "E=647 Account disabled"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_PASSWD_EXPIRED: - p = "E=648 Password expired"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION: - p = "E=649 No dialin permission"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE: - p = "E=691 Authentication failure"; - break; - - case MS_CHAP_ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD: - /* Should never see this, we don't support Change Password. */ - p = "E=709 Error changing password"; - break; - - default: - ppp_error("Unknown MS-CHAP authentication failure: %.*v", - len, inp); - return; - } - } - -print_msg: - - if (p != NULL) { - ppp_error("MS-CHAP authentication failed: %v", p); - } -} - -static void ChallengeResponse(const u_char *challenge, - const u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], - u_char response[24]) -{ - u_char ZPasswordHash[21]; - lwip_des_context des; - u_char des_key[8]; - - BZERO(ZPasswordHash, sizeof(ZPasswordHash)); - MEMCPY(ZPasswordHash, PasswordHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - -#if 0 - dbglog("ChallengeResponse - ZPasswordHash %.*B", - sizeof(ZPasswordHash), ZPasswordHash); -#endif - - pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(ZPasswordHash + 0, des_key); - lwip_des_init(&des); - lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); - lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, challenge, response + 0); - lwip_des_free(&des); - - pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(ZPasswordHash + 7, des_key); - lwip_des_init(&des); - lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); - lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, challenge, response + 8); - lwip_des_free(&des); - - pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(ZPasswordHash + 14, des_key); - lwip_des_init(&des); - lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); - lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, challenge, response + 16); - lwip_des_free(&des); - -#if 0 - dbglog("ChallengeResponse - response %.24B", response); -#endif -} - -static void ChallengeHash(const u_char PeerChallenge[16], const u_char *rchallenge, - const char *username, u_char Challenge[8]) -{ - lwip_sha1_context sha1Context; - u_char sha1Hash[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - const char *user; - - /* remove domain from "domain\username" */ - if ((user = strrchr(username, '\\')) != NULL) { - ++user; - } else { - user = username; - } - - lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PeerChallenge, 16); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 16); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, (const unsigned char *)user, strlen(user)); - lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, sha1Hash); - lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); - - MEMCPY(Challenge, sha1Hash, 8); -} - -/* - * Convert the ASCII version of the password to Unicode. - * This implicitly supports 8-bit ISO8859/1 characters. - * This gives us the little-endian representation, which - * is assumed by all M$ CHAP RFCs. (Unicode byte ordering - * is machine-dependent.) - */ -static void ascii2unicode(const char ascii[], int ascii_len, u_char unicode[]) -{ - int i; - - BZERO(unicode, ascii_len * 2); - - for (i = 0; i < ascii_len; i++) { - unicode[i * 2] = (u_char)ascii[i]; - } -} - -static void NTPasswordHash(u_char *secret, int secret_len, u_char hash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) -{ - lwip_md4_context md4Context; - - lwip_md4_init(&md4Context); - lwip_md4_starts(&md4Context); - lwip_md4_update(&md4Context, secret, secret_len); - lwip_md4_finish(&md4Context, hash); - lwip_md4_free(&md4Context); -} - -static void ChapMS_NT(const u_char *rchallenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, - u_char NTResponse[24]) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - - /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - - ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse); -} - -static void ChapMS2_NT(const u_char *rchallenge, const u_char PeerChallenge[16], const char *username, - const char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24]) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char Challenge[8]; - - ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); - - /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - - ChallengeResponse(Challenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse); -} - -#ifdef MSLANMAN -static u_char *StdText = (u_char *)"KGS!@#$%"; /* key from rasapi32.dll */ - -static void ChapMS_LANMan(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *response) -{ - int i; - u_char UcasePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD]; /* max is actually 14 */ - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - lwip_des_context des; - u_char des_key[8]; - - /* LANMan password is case insensitive */ - BZERO(UcasePassword, sizeof(UcasePassword)); - - for (i = 0; i < secret_len; i++) { - UcasePassword[i] = (u_char)toupper(secret[i]); - } - - pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(UcasePassword + 0, des_key); - lwip_des_init(&des); - lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); - lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, StdText, PasswordHash + 0); - lwip_des_free(&des); - - pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(UcasePassword + 7, des_key); - lwip_des_init(&des); - lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); - lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, StdText, PasswordHash + 8); - lwip_des_free(&des); - - ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); -} -#endif - -static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(const u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], - u_char NTResponse[24], const u_char PeerChallenge[16], - const u_char *rchallenge, const char *username, - u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1]) -{ - /* - * "Magic" constants used in response generation, from RFC 2759. - */ - static const u_char Magic1[39] = /* "Magic server to client signing constant" */ - { - 0x4D, 0x61, 0x67, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, - 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65, - 0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, - 0x20, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x74 - }; - static const u_char Magic2[41] = /* "Pad to make it do more than one iteration" */ - { - 0x50, 0x61, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x6B, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x6F, - 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x6E, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, - 0x6E - }; - - int i; - lwip_sha1_context sha1Context; - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char Challenge[8]; - - lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); - lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); - lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); - - ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); - - lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Digest, sizeof(Digest)); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Challenge, sizeof(Challenge)); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Magic2, sizeof(Magic2)); - lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); - lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); - - /* Convert to ASCII hex string. */ - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_MAX((MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH / 2), (int)sizeof(Digest)); i++) { - sprintf((char *)&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]); - } -} - -static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain( - const char *secret, int secret_len, - u_char NTResponse[24], const u_char PeerChallenge[16], - const u_char *rchallenge, const char *username, - u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1]) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - - /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), - PasswordHashHash); - - GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, PeerChallenge, - rchallenge, username, authResponse); -} - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -/* - * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAP credentials. (see RFC 3079) - */ -static void Set_Start_Key(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *rchallenge, const char *secret, int secret_len) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - lwip_sha1_context sha1Context; - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - - /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); - - lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 8); - lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); - lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); - - /* Same key in both directions. */ - mppe_set_key(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp, Digest); - mppe_set_key(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp, Digest); - - pcb->mppe_keys_set = 1; -} - -/* - * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAPv2 credentials. (see RFC 3079) - */ -static void SetMasterKeys(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24], int IsServer) -{ - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - lwip_sha1_context sha1Context; - u_char MasterKey[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - const u_char *s; - - /* "This is the MPPE Master Key" */ - static const u_char Magic1[27] = { - 0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, - 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d, - 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79 - }; - /* "On the client side, this is the send key; " - "on the server side, it is the receive key." */ - static const u_char Magic2[84] = { - 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, - 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, - 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, - 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, - 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, - 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e - }; - /* "On the client side, this is the receive key; " - "on the server side, it is the send key." */ - static const u_char Magic3[84] = { - 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, - 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, - 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, - 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, - 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e - }; - - /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); - - lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); - lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, MasterKey); - lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); - - /* - * generate send key - */ - if (IsServer) { - s = Magic3; - } else { - s = Magic2; - } - - lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, mppe_sha1_pad1, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, s, 84); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, mppe_sha1_pad2, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); - lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); - - mppe_set_key(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp, Digest); - - /* - * generate recv key - */ - if (IsServer) { - s = Magic2; - } else { - s = Magic3; - } - - lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, mppe_sha1_pad1, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, s, 84); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, mppe_sha1_pad2, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); - lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); - - mppe_set_key(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp, Digest); - - pcb->mppe_keys_set = 1; -} - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -static void ChapMS(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *rchallenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, - unsigned char *response) -{ -#if !MPPE_SUPPORT - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); -#endif /* !MPPE_SUPPORT */ - BZERO(response, MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN); - - ChapMS_NT(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP]); - -#ifdef MSLANMAN - ChapMS_LANMan(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, - &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); - - /* preferred method is set by option */ - response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = !ms_lanman; -#else - response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = 1; -#endif - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - Set_Start_Key(pcb, rchallenge, secret, secret_len); -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -} - -/* - * If PeerChallenge is NULL, one is generated and the PeerChallenge - * field of response is filled in. Call this way when generating a response. - * If PeerChallenge is supplied, it is copied into the PeerChallenge field. - * Call this way when verifying a response (or debugging). - * Do not call with PeerChallenge = response. - * - * The PeerChallenge field of response is then used for calculation of the - * Authenticator Response. - */ -static void ChapMS2(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *rchallenge, const u_char *PeerChallenge, - const char *user, const char *secret, int secret_len, unsigned char *response, - u_char authResponse[], int authenticator) -{ - /* ARGSUSED */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(authenticator); -#if !MPPE_SUPPORT - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); -#endif /* !MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - BZERO(response, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); - - /* Generate the Peer-Challenge if requested, or copy it if supplied. */ - if (!PeerChallenge) { - magic_random_bytes(&response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN); - } else - MEMCPY(&response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], PeerChallenge, - MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN); - - /* Generate the NT-Response */ - ChapMS2_NT(rchallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], user, - secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP]); - - /* Generate the Authenticator Response. */ - GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain(secret, secret_len, - &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], - &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], - rchallenge, user, authResponse); - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - SetMasterKeys(pcb, secret, secret_len, - &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], authenticator); -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -} - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -/* - * Set MPPE options from plugins. - */ -void set_mppe_enc_types(int policy, int types) -{ - /* Early exit for unknown policies. */ - if(policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED || - policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_REQUIRED) - { - return; - } - - /* Don't modify MPPE if it's optional and wasn't already configured. */ - if(policy == MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED && !ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe) - { - return; - } - - /* - * Disable undesirable encryption types. Note that we don't ENABLE - * any encryption types, to avoid overriding manual configuration. - */ - switch(types) - { - case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_40: - ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_128; /* disable 128-bit */ - break; - - case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_128: - ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; /* disable 40-bit */ - break; - - default: - break; - } -} -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -const struct chap_digest_type chapms_digest = { - CHAP_MICROSOFT, /* code */ -#if PPP_SERVER - chapms_generate_challenge, - chapms_verify_response, -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - chapms_make_response, - NULL, /* check_success */ - chapms_handle_failure, -}; - -const struct chap_digest_type chapms2_digest = { - CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2, /* code */ -#if PPP_SERVER - chapms2_generate_challenge, - chapms2_verify_response, -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - chapms2_make_response, - chapms2_check_success, - chapms_handle_failure, -}; - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * chap_ms.c - Microsoft MS-CHAP compatible implementation. + * + * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Modifications by Lauri Pesonen / lpesonen@clinet.fi, april 1997 + * + * Implemented LANManager type password response to MS-CHAP challenges. + * Now pppd provides both NT style and LANMan style blocks, and the + * prefered is set by option "ms-lanman". Default is to use NT. + * The hash text (StdText) was taken from Win95 RASAPI32.DLL. + * + * You should also use DOMAIN\\USERNAME as described in README.MSCHAP80 + */ + +/* + * Modifications by Frank Cusack, frank@google.com, March 2002. + * + * Implemented MS-CHAPv2 functionality, heavily based on sample + * implementation in RFC 2759. Implemented MPPE functionality, + * heavily based on sample implementation in RFC 3079. + * + * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" +#include "netif/ppp/chap_ms.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" +#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/mppe.h" /* For mppe_sha1_pad*, mppe_set_key() */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +#define SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20 +#define MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE 16 /* 16 bytes in a MD4 message digest */ +#define MAX_NT_PASSWORD 256 /* Max (Unicode) chars in an NT pass */ + +#define MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN 49 /* Response length for MS-CHAP */ +#define MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN 49 /* Response length for MS-CHAPv2 */ +#define MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH 40 /* MS-CHAPv2 authenticator response, */ +/* as ASCII */ + +/* Error codes for MS-CHAP failure messages. */ +#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS 646 +#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_ACCT_DISABLED 647 +#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_PASSWD_EXPIRED 648 +#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION 649 +#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE 691 +#define MS_CHAP_ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD 709 + +/* + * Offsets within the response field for MS-CHAP + */ +#define MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP 0 +#define MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP_LEN 24 +#define MS_CHAP_NTRESP 24 +#define MS_CHAP_NTRESP_LEN 24 +#define MS_CHAP_USENT 48 + +/* + * Offsets within the response field for MS-CHAP2 + */ +#define MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE 0 +#define MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN 16 +#define MS_CHAP2_RESERVED_LEN 8 +#define MS_CHAP2_NTRESP 24 +#define MS_CHAP2_NTRESP_LEN 24 +#define MS_CHAP2_FLAGS 48 + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + /* These values are the RADIUS attribute values--see RFC 2548. */ +#define MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED 1 +#define MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_REQUIRED 2 +#define MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_40 2 +#define MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_128 4 + + /* used by plugins (using above values) */ + extern void set_mppe_enc_types(int, int); +#endif /* UNUSED */ +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +/* Are we the authenticator or authenticatee? For MS-CHAPv2 key derivation. */ +#define MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE 0 +#define MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR 1 + +static void ascii2unicode(const char[], int, u_char[]); +static void NTPasswordHash(u_char *, int, u_char[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]); +static void ChallengeResponse(const u_char *, const u_char *, u_char[24]); +static void ChallengeHash(const u_char[16], const u_char *, const char *, u_char[8]); +static void ChapMS_NT(const u_char *, const char *, int, u_char[24]); +static void ChapMS2_NT(const u_char *, const u_char[16], const char *, const char *, int, + u_char[24]); +static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain(const char *, int, u_char[24], const u_char[16], const u_char *, + const char *, u_char[41]); +#ifdef MSLANMAN +static void ChapMS_LANMan(u_char *, char *, int, u_char *); +#endif + +static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(const u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], + u_char NTResponse[24], const u_char PeerChallenge[16], + const u_char *rchallenge, const char *username, + u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1]); + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +static void Set_Start_Key(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *, const char *, int); +static void SetMasterKeys(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *, int, u_char[24], int); +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +static void ChapMS(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *, const char *, int, u_char *); +static void ChapMS2(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *, const u_char *, const char *, const char *, int, + u_char *, u_char[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1], int); + +#ifdef MSLANMAN +bool ms_lanman = 0; /* Use LanMan password instead of NT */ +/* Has meaning only with MS-CHAP challenges */ +#endif + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY +/* For MPPE debug */ +/* Use "[]|}{?/><,`!2&&(" (sans quotes) for RFC 3079 MS-CHAPv2 test value */ +static char *mschap_challenge = NULL; +/* Use "!@\#$%^&*()_+:3|~" (sans quotes, backslash is to escape #) for ... */ +static char *mschap2_peer_challenge = NULL; +#endif + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" /* Need to poke MPPE options */ +#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * Command-line options. + */ +static option_t chapms_option_list[] = { +#ifdef MSLANMAN + { "ms-lanman", o_bool, &ms_lanman, + "Use LanMan passwd when using MS-CHAP", 1 }, +#endif +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY + { "mschap-challenge", o_string, &mschap_challenge, + "specify CHAP challenge" }, + { "mschap2-peer-challenge", o_string, &mschap2_peer_challenge, + "specify CHAP peer challenge" }, +#endif + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * chapms_generate_challenge - generate a challenge for MS-CHAP. + * For MS-CHAP the challenge length is fixed at 8 bytes. + * The length goes in challenge[0] and the actual challenge starts + * at challenge[1]. + */ +static void chapms_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *challenge) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + *challenge++ = 8; +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY + + if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 8) { + memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 8); + } else +#endif + magic_random_bytes(challenge, 8); +} + +static void chapms2_generate_challenge(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *challenge) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + *challenge++ = 16; +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY + + if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 16) { + memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 16); + } else +#endif + magic_random_bytes(challenge, 16); +} + +static int chapms_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, const char *name, + const unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, + const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space) +{ + unsigned char md[MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN]; + int diff; + int challenge_len, response_len; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); + + challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 8 */ + response_len = *response++; + + if (response_len != MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN) { + goto bad; + } + +#ifndef MSLANMAN + + if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) { + /* Should really propagate this into the error packet. */ + ppp_notice("Peer request for LANMAN auth not supported"); + goto bad; + } + +#endif + + /* Generate the expected response. */ + ChapMS(pcb, (const u_char *)challenge, (const char *)secret, secret_len, md); + +#ifdef MSLANMAN + + /* Determine which part of response to verify against */ + if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) + diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], + &md[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP_LEN); + else +#endif + diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], &md[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], + MS_CHAP_NTRESP_LEN); + + if (diff == 0) { + ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "Access granted"); + return 1; + } + +bad: + /* See comments below for MS-CHAP V2 */ + ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0", + challenge_len, challenge); + return 0; +} + +static int chapms2_verify_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, int id, const char *name, + const unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, + const unsigned char *challenge, const unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space) +{ + unsigned char md[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN]; + char saresponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1]; + int challenge_len, response_len; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + + challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 16 */ + response_len = *response++; + + if (response_len != MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN) { + goto bad; /* not even the right length */ + } + + /* Generate the expected response and our mutual auth. */ + ChapMS2(pcb, (const u_char *)challenge, (const u_char *)&response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], name, + (const char *)secret, secret_len, md, + (unsigned char *)saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR); + + /* compare MDs and send the appropriate status */ + /* + * Per RFC 2759, success message must be formatted as + * "S= M=" + * where + * is the Authenticator Response (mutual auth) + * is a text message + * + * However, some versions of Windows (win98 tested) do not know + * about the M= part (required per RFC 2759) and flag + * it as an error (reported incorrectly as an encryption error + * to the user). Since the RFC requires it, and it can be + * useful information, we supply it if the peer is a conforming + * system. Luckily (?), win98 sets the Flags field to 0x04 + * (contrary to RFC requirements) so we can use that to + * distinguish between conforming and non-conforming systems. + * + * Special thanks to Alex Swiridov for + * help debugging this. + */ + if (memcmp(&md[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], + MS_CHAP2_NTRESP_LEN) == 0) { + if (response[MS_CHAP2_FLAGS]) { + ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s", saresponse); + } else + ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s M=%s", + saresponse, "Access granted"); + + return 1; + } + +bad: + /* + * Failure message must be formatted as + * "E=e R=r C=c V=v M=m" + * where + * e = error code (we use 691, ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE) + * r = retry (we use 1, ok to retry) + * c = challenge to use for next response, we reuse previous + * v = Change Password version supported, we use 0 + * m = text message + * + * The M=m part is only for MS-CHAPv2. Neither win2k nor + * win98 (others untested) display the message to the user anyway. + * They also both ignore the E=e code. + * + * Note that it's safe to reuse the same challenge as we don't + * actually accept another response based on the error message + * (and no clients try to resend a response anyway). + * + * Basically, this whole bit is useless code, even the small + * implementation here is only because of overspecification. + */ + ppp_slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0 M=%s", + challenge_len, challenge, "Access denied"); + return 0; +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +static void chapms_make_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *response, int id, const char *our_name, + const unsigned char *challenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *private_) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(our_name); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(private_); + challenge++; /* skip length, should be 8 */ + *response++ = MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN; + ChapMS(pcb, challenge, secret, secret_len, response); +} + +static void chapms2_make_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *response, int id, const char *our_name, + const unsigned char *challenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *private_) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + challenge++; /* skip length, should be 16 */ + *response++ = MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN; + ChapMS2(pcb, challenge, +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY + mschap2_peer_challenge, +#else + NULL, +#endif + our_name, secret, secret_len, response, private_, + MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE); +} + +static int chapms2_check_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *msg, int len, unsigned char *private_) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + if ((len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 2) || + strncmp((char *)msg, "S=", 2) != 0) { + /* Packet does not start with "S=" */ + ppp_error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); + return 0; + } + + msg += 2; + len -= 2; + + if (len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH || memcmp(msg, private_, MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH)) { + /* Authenticator Response did not match expected. */ + ppp_error("MS-CHAPv2 mutual authentication failed."); + return 0; + } + + /* Authenticator Response matches. */ + msg += MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; /* Eat it */ + len -= MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; + + if ((len >= 3) && !strncmp((char *)msg, " M=", 3)) { + msg += 3; /* Eat the delimiter */ + } else if (len) { + /* Packet has extra text which does not begin " M=" */ + ppp_error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static void chapms_handle_failure(ppp_pcb *pcb, unsigned char *inp, int len) +{ + int err; + const char *p; + char msg[64]; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + /* We want a null-terminated string for strxxx(). */ + len = LWIP_MIN(len, 63); + MEMCPY(msg, inp, len); + msg[len] = 0; + p = msg; + + /* + * Deal with MS-CHAP formatted failure messages; just print the + * M= part (if any). For MS-CHAP we're not really supposed + * to use M=, but it shouldn't hurt. See + * chapms[2]_verify_response. + */ + if (!strncmp(p, "E=", 2)) { + err = strtol(p + 2, NULL, 10); /* Remember the error code. */ + } else { + goto print_msg; /* Message is badly formatted. */ + } + + if (len && ((p = strstr(p, " M=")) != NULL)) { + /* M= field found. */ + p += 3; + } else { + /* No M=; use the error code. */ + switch (err) { + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS: + p = "E=646 Restricted logon hours"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_ACCT_DISABLED: + p = "E=647 Account disabled"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_PASSWD_EXPIRED: + p = "E=648 Password expired"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION: + p = "E=649 No dialin permission"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE: + p = "E=691 Authentication failure"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD: + /* Should never see this, we don't support Change Password. */ + p = "E=709 Error changing password"; + break; + + default: + ppp_error("Unknown MS-CHAP authentication failure: %.*v", + len, inp); + return; + } + } + +print_msg: + + if (p != NULL) { + ppp_error("MS-CHAP authentication failed: %v", p); + } +} + +static void ChallengeResponse(const u_char *challenge, + const u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], + u_char response[24]) +{ + u_char ZPasswordHash[21]; + lwip_des_context des; + u_char des_key[8]; + + BZERO(ZPasswordHash, sizeof(ZPasswordHash)); + MEMCPY(ZPasswordHash, PasswordHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + +#if 0 + dbglog("ChallengeResponse - ZPasswordHash %.*B", + sizeof(ZPasswordHash), ZPasswordHash); +#endif + + pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(ZPasswordHash + 0, des_key); + lwip_des_init(&des); + lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); + lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, challenge, response + 0); + lwip_des_free(&des); + + pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(ZPasswordHash + 7, des_key); + lwip_des_init(&des); + lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); + lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, challenge, response + 8); + lwip_des_free(&des); + + pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(ZPasswordHash + 14, des_key); + lwip_des_init(&des); + lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); + lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, challenge, response + 16); + lwip_des_free(&des); + +#if 0 + dbglog("ChallengeResponse - response %.24B", response); +#endif +} + +static void ChallengeHash(const u_char PeerChallenge[16], const u_char *rchallenge, + const char *username, u_char Challenge[8]) +{ + lwip_sha1_context sha1Context; + u_char sha1Hash[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + const char *user; + + /* remove domain from "domain\username" */ + if ((user = strrchr(username, '\\')) != NULL) { + ++user; + } else { + user = username; + } + + lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PeerChallenge, 16); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 16); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, (const unsigned char *)user, strlen(user)); + lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, sha1Hash); + lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); + + MEMCPY(Challenge, sha1Hash, 8); +} + +/* + * Convert the ASCII version of the password to Unicode. + * This implicitly supports 8-bit ISO8859/1 characters. + * This gives us the little-endian representation, which + * is assumed by all M$ CHAP RFCs. (Unicode byte ordering + * is machine-dependent.) + */ +static void ascii2unicode(const char ascii[], int ascii_len, u_char unicode[]) +{ + int i; + + BZERO(unicode, ascii_len * 2); + + for (i = 0; i < ascii_len; i++) { + unicode[i * 2] = (u_char)ascii[i]; + } +} + +static void NTPasswordHash(u_char *secret, int secret_len, u_char hash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) +{ + lwip_md4_context md4Context; + + lwip_md4_init(&md4Context); + lwip_md4_starts(&md4Context); + lwip_md4_update(&md4Context, secret, secret_len); + lwip_md4_finish(&md4Context, hash); + lwip_md4_free(&md4Context); +} + +static void ChapMS_NT(const u_char *rchallenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, + u_char NTResponse[24]) +{ + u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + + /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ + ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); + NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); + + ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse); +} + +static void ChapMS2_NT(const u_char *rchallenge, const u_char PeerChallenge[16], const char *username, + const char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24]) +{ + u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char Challenge[8]; + + ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); + + /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ + ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); + NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); + + ChallengeResponse(Challenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse); +} + +#ifdef MSLANMAN +static u_char *StdText = (u_char *)"KGS!@#$%"; /* key from rasapi32.dll */ + +static void ChapMS_LANMan(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *response) +{ + int i; + u_char UcasePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD]; /* max is actually 14 */ + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + lwip_des_context des; + u_char des_key[8]; + + /* LANMan password is case insensitive */ + BZERO(UcasePassword, sizeof(UcasePassword)); + + for (i = 0; i < secret_len; i++) { + UcasePassword[i] = (u_char)toupper(secret[i]); + } + + pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(UcasePassword + 0, des_key); + lwip_des_init(&des); + lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); + lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, StdText, PasswordHash + 0); + lwip_des_free(&des); + + pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(UcasePassword + 7, des_key); + lwip_des_init(&des); + lwip_des_setkey_enc(&des, des_key); + lwip_des_crypt_ecb(&des, StdText, PasswordHash + 8); + lwip_des_free(&des); + + ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); +} +#endif + +static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(const u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], + u_char NTResponse[24], const u_char PeerChallenge[16], + const u_char *rchallenge, const char *username, + u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1]) +{ + /* + * "Magic" constants used in response generation, from RFC 2759. + */ + static const u_char Magic1[39] = /* "Magic server to client signing constant" */ + { + 0x4D, 0x61, 0x67, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, + 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65, + 0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, + 0x20, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x74 + }; + static const u_char Magic2[41] = /* "Pad to make it do more than one iteration" */ + { + 0x50, 0x61, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x6B, + 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x6F, + 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x6E, + 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, + 0x6E + }; + + int i; + lwip_sha1_context sha1Context; + u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char Challenge[8]; + + lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); + lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); + lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); + + ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); + + lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Digest, sizeof(Digest)); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Challenge, sizeof(Challenge)); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Magic2, sizeof(Magic2)); + lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); + lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); + + /* Convert to ASCII hex string. */ + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_MAX((MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH / 2), (int)sizeof(Digest)); i++) { + sprintf((char *)&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]); + } +} + +static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain( + const char *secret, int secret_len, + u_char NTResponse[24], const u_char PeerChallenge[16], + const u_char *rchallenge, const char *username, + u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1]) +{ + u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + + /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ + ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); + NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); + NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), + PasswordHashHash); + + GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, PeerChallenge, + rchallenge, username, authResponse); +} + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +/* + * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAP credentials. (see RFC 3079) + */ +static void Set_Start_Key(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *rchallenge, const char *secret, int secret_len) +{ + u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + lwip_sha1_context sha1Context; + u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ + + /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ + ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); + NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); + NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); + + lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 8); + lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); + lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); + + /* Same key in both directions. */ + mppe_set_key(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp, Digest); + mppe_set_key(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp, Digest); + + pcb->mppe_keys_set = 1; +} + +/* + * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAPv2 credentials. (see RFC 3079) + */ +static void SetMasterKeys(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24], int IsServer) +{ + u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + lwip_sha1_context sha1Context; + u_char MasterKey[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ + u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ + const u_char *s; + + /* "This is the MPPE Master Key" */ + static const u_char Magic1[27] = { + 0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d, + 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79 + }; + /* "On the client side, this is the send key; " + "on the server side, it is the receive key." */ + static const u_char Magic2[84] = { + 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, + 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, + 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, + 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, + 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, + 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, + 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e + }; + /* "On the client side, this is the receive key; " + "on the server side, it is the send key." */ + static const u_char Magic3[84] = { + 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, + 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, + 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, + 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, + 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, + 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, + 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e + }; + + /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ + ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); + NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); + NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); + + lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); + lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, MasterKey); + lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); + + /* + * generate send key + */ + if (IsServer) { + s = Magic3; + } else { + s = Magic2; + } + + lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, mppe_sha1_pad1, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, s, 84); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, mppe_sha1_pad2, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); + lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); + + mppe_set_key(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp, Digest); + + /* + * generate recv key + */ + if (IsServer) { + s = Magic2; + } else { + s = Magic3; + } + + lwip_sha1_init(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1Context); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, mppe_sha1_pad1, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, s, 84); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1Context, mppe_sha1_pad2, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1Context, Digest); + lwip_sha1_free(&sha1Context); + + mppe_set_key(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp, Digest); + + pcb->mppe_keys_set = 1; +} + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +static void ChapMS(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *rchallenge, const char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *response) +{ +#if !MPPE_SUPPORT + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); +#endif /* !MPPE_SUPPORT */ + BZERO(response, MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN); + + ChapMS_NT(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP]); + +#ifdef MSLANMAN + ChapMS_LANMan(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, + &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); + + /* preferred method is set by option */ + response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = !ms_lanman; +#else + response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = 1; +#endif + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + Set_Start_Key(pcb, rchallenge, secret, secret_len); +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +} + +/* + * If PeerChallenge is NULL, one is generated and the PeerChallenge + * field of response is filled in. Call this way when generating a response. + * If PeerChallenge is supplied, it is copied into the PeerChallenge field. + * Call this way when verifying a response (or debugging). + * Do not call with PeerChallenge = response. + * + * The PeerChallenge field of response is then used for calculation of the + * Authenticator Response. + */ +static void ChapMS2(ppp_pcb *pcb, const u_char *rchallenge, const u_char *PeerChallenge, + const char *user, const char *secret, int secret_len, unsigned char *response, + u_char authResponse[], int authenticator) +{ + /* ARGSUSED */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(authenticator); +#if !MPPE_SUPPORT + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); +#endif /* !MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + BZERO(response, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); + + /* Generate the Peer-Challenge if requested, or copy it if supplied. */ + if (!PeerChallenge) { + magic_random_bytes(&response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN); + } else + MEMCPY(&response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], PeerChallenge, + MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN); + + /* Generate the NT-Response */ + ChapMS2_NT(rchallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], user, + secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP]); + + /* Generate the Authenticator Response. */ + GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain(secret, secret_len, + &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], + &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], + rchallenge, user, authResponse); + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + SetMasterKeys(pcb, secret, secret_len, + &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], authenticator); +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +} + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +/* + * Set MPPE options from plugins. + */ +void set_mppe_enc_types(int policy, int types) +{ + /* Early exit for unknown policies. */ + if(policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED || + policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_REQUIRED) + { + return; + } + + /* Don't modify MPPE if it's optional and wasn't already configured. */ + if(policy == MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED && !ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe) + { + return; + } + + /* + * Disable undesirable encryption types. Note that we don't ENABLE + * any encryption types, to avoid overriding manual configuration. + */ + switch(types) + { + case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_40: + ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_128; /* disable 128-bit */ + break; + + case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_128: + ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; /* disable 40-bit */ + break; + + default: + break; + } +} +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +const struct chap_digest_type chapms_digest = { + CHAP_MICROSOFT, /* code */ +#if PPP_SERVER + chapms_generate_challenge, + chapms_verify_response, +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + chapms_make_response, + NULL, /* check_success */ + chapms_handle_failure, +}; + +const struct chap_digest_type chapms2_digest = { + CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2, /* code */ +#if PPP_SERVER + chapms2_generate_challenge, + chapms2_verify_response, +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + chapms2_make_response, + chapms2_check_success, + chapms_handle_failure, +}; + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/demand.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/demand.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/demand.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/demand.c index d3fd85fb..fe99c601 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/demand.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/demand.c @@ -1,506 +1,506 @@ -/* - * demand.c - Support routines for demand-dialling. - * - * Copyright (c) 1996-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && DEMAND_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#ifdef PPP_FILTER -#include -#endif - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" - -char *frame; -int framelen; -int framemax; -int escape_flag; -int flush_flag; -int fcs; - -struct packet { - int length; - struct packet *next; - unsigned char data[1]; -}; - -struct packet *pend_q; -struct packet *pend_qtail; - -static int active_packet(unsigned char *, int); - -/* - * demand_conf - configure the interface for doing dial-on-demand. - */ -void demand_conf() -{ - int i; - const struct protent *protp; - - /* framemax = lcp_allowoptions[0].mru; - if (framemax < PPP_MRU) */ - framemax = PPP_MRU; - framemax += PPP_HDRLEN + PPP_FCSLEN; - frame = malloc(framemax); - - if (frame == NULL) { - novm("demand frame"); - } - - framelen = 0; - pend_q = NULL; - escape_flag = 0; - flush_flag = 0; - fcs = PPP_INITFCS; - - netif_set_mtu(pcb, LWIP_MIN(lcp_allowoptions[0].mru, PPP_MRU)); - - if (ppp_send_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, (u32_t)0, 0, 0) < 0 || ppp_recv_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, (u32_t)0, 0, 0) < 0) { - fatal("Couldn't set up demand-dialled PPP interface: %m"); - } - -#ifdef PPP_FILTER - set_filters(&pass_filter, &active_filter); -#endif - - /* - * Call the demand_conf procedure for each protocol that's got one. - */ - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (protp->demand_conf != NULL) { - ((*protp->demand_conf)(pcb)); - } - - /* FIXME: find a way to die() here */ -#if 0 - - if(!((*protp->demand_conf)(pcb))) - { - die(1); - } - -#endif -} - -/* - * demand_block - set each network protocol to block further packets. - */ -void demand_block() -{ - int i; - const struct protent *protp; - - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (protp->demand_conf != NULL) { - sifnpmode(pcb, protp->protocol & ~0x8000, NPMODE_QUEUE); - } - - get_loop_output(); -} - -/* - * demand_discard - set each network protocol to discard packets - * with an error. - */ -void demand_discard() -{ - struct packet *pkt, *nextpkt; - int i; - const struct protent *protp; - - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (protp->demand_conf != NULL) { - sifnpmode(pcb, protp->protocol & ~0x8000, NPMODE_ERROR); - } - - get_loop_output(); - - /* discard all saved packets */ - for (pkt = pend_q; pkt != NULL; pkt = nextpkt) { - nextpkt = pkt->next; - free(pkt); - } - - pend_q = NULL; - framelen = 0; - flush_flag = 0; - escape_flag = 0; - fcs = PPP_INITFCS; -} - -/* - * demand_unblock - set each enabled network protocol to pass packets. - */ -void demand_unblock() -{ - int i; - const struct protent *protp; - - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (protp->demand_conf != NULL) { - sifnpmode(pcb, protp->protocol & ~0x8000, NPMODE_PASS); - } -} - -/* - * FCS lookup table as calculated by genfcstab. - */ -static u_short fcstab[256] = { - 0x0000, 0x1189, 0x2312, 0x329b, 0x4624, 0x57ad, 0x6536, 0x74bf, - 0x8c48, 0x9dc1, 0xaf5a, 0xbed3, 0xca6c, 0xdbe5, 0xe97e, 0xf8f7, - 0x1081, 0x0108, 0x3393, 0x221a, 0x56a5, 0x472c, 0x75b7, 0x643e, - 0x9cc9, 0x8d40, 0xbfdb, 0xae52, 0xdaed, 0xcb64, 0xf9ff, 0xe876, - 0x2102, 0x308b, 0x0210, 0x1399, 0x6726, 0x76af, 0x4434, 0x55bd, - 0xad4a, 0xbcc3, 0x8e58, 0x9fd1, 0xeb6e, 0xfae7, 0xc87c, 0xd9f5, - 0x3183, 0x200a, 0x1291, 0x0318, 0x77a7, 0x662e, 0x54b5, 0x453c, - 0xbdcb, 0xac42, 0x9ed9, 0x8f50, 0xfbef, 0xea66, 0xd8fd, 0xc974, - 0x4204, 0x538d, 0x6116, 0x709f, 0x0420, 0x15a9, 0x2732, 0x36bb, - 0xce4c, 0xdfc5, 0xed5e, 0xfcd7, 0x8868, 0x99e1, 0xab7a, 0xbaf3, - 0x5285, 0x430c, 0x7197, 0x601e, 0x14a1, 0x0528, 0x37b3, 0x263a, - 0xdecd, 0xcf44, 0xfddf, 0xec56, 0x98e9, 0x8960, 0xbbfb, 0xaa72, - 0x6306, 0x728f, 0x4014, 0x519d, 0x2522, 0x34ab, 0x0630, 0x17b9, - 0xef4e, 0xfec7, 0xcc5c, 0xddd5, 0xa96a, 0xb8e3, 0x8a78, 0x9bf1, - 0x7387, 0x620e, 0x5095, 0x411c, 0x35a3, 0x242a, 0x16b1, 0x0738, - 0xffcf, 0xee46, 0xdcdd, 0xcd54, 0xb9eb, 0xa862, 0x9af9, 0x8b70, - 0x8408, 0x9581, 0xa71a, 0xb693, 0xc22c, 0xd3a5, 0xe13e, 0xf0b7, - 0x0840, 0x19c9, 0x2b52, 0x3adb, 0x4e64, 0x5fed, 0x6d76, 0x7cff, - 0x9489, 0x8500, 0xb79b, 0xa612, 0xd2ad, 0xc324, 0xf1bf, 0xe036, - 0x18c1, 0x0948, 0x3bd3, 0x2a5a, 0x5ee5, 0x4f6c, 0x7df7, 0x6c7e, - 0xa50a, 0xb483, 0x8618, 0x9791, 0xe32e, 0xf2a7, 0xc03c, 0xd1b5, - 0x2942, 0x38cb, 0x0a50, 0x1bd9, 0x6f66, 0x7eef, 0x4c74, 0x5dfd, - 0xb58b, 0xa402, 0x9699, 0x8710, 0xf3af, 0xe226, 0xd0bd, 0xc134, - 0x39c3, 0x284a, 0x1ad1, 0x0b58, 0x7fe7, 0x6e6e, 0x5cf5, 0x4d7c, - 0xc60c, 0xd785, 0xe51e, 0xf497, 0x8028, 0x91a1, 0xa33a, 0xb2b3, - 0x4a44, 0x5bcd, 0x6956, 0x78df, 0x0c60, 0x1de9, 0x2f72, 0x3efb, - 0xd68d, 0xc704, 0xf59f, 0xe416, 0x90a9, 0x8120, 0xb3bb, 0xa232, - 0x5ac5, 0x4b4c, 0x79d7, 0x685e, 0x1ce1, 0x0d68, 0x3ff3, 0x2e7a, - 0xe70e, 0xf687, 0xc41c, 0xd595, 0xa12a, 0xb0a3, 0x8238, 0x93b1, - 0x6b46, 0x7acf, 0x4854, 0x59dd, 0x2d62, 0x3ceb, 0x0e70, 0x1ff9, - 0xf78f, 0xe606, 0xd49d, 0xc514, 0xb1ab, 0xa022, 0x92b9, 0x8330, - 0x7bc7, 0x6a4e, 0x58d5, 0x495c, 0x3de3, 0x2c6a, 0x1ef1, 0x0f78 -}; - -/* - * loop_chars - process characters received from the loopback. - * Calls loop_frame when a complete frame has been accumulated. - * Return value is 1 if we need to bring up the link, 0 otherwise. - */ -int loop_chars(p, n) unsigned char *p; -int n; -{ - int c, rv; - - rv = 0; - - /* check for synchronous connection... */ - - if ((p[0] == 0xFF) && (p[1] == 0x03)) { - rv = loop_frame(p, n); - return rv; - } - - for (; n > 0; --n) { - c = *p++; - - if (c == PPP_FLAG) { - if (!escape_flag && !flush_flag && framelen > 2 && fcs == PPP_GOODFCS) { - framelen -= 2; - - if (loop_frame((unsigned char *)frame, framelen)) { - rv = 1; - } - } - - framelen = 0; - flush_flag = 0; - escape_flag = 0; - fcs = PPP_INITFCS; - continue; - } - - if (flush_flag) { - continue; - } - - if (escape_flag) { - c ^= PPP_TRANS; - escape_flag = 0; - } else if (c == PPP_ESCAPE) { - escape_flag = 1; - continue; - } - - if (framelen >= framemax) { - flush_flag = 1; - continue; - } - - frame[framelen++] = c; - fcs = PPP_FCS(fcs, c); - } - - return rv; -} - -/* - * loop_frame - given a frame obtained from the loopback, - * decide whether to bring up the link or not, and, if we want - * to transmit this frame later, put it on the pending queue. - * Return value is 1 if we need to bring up the link, 0 otherwise. - * We assume that the kernel driver has already applied the - * pass_filter, so we won't get packets it rejected. - * We apply the active_filter to see if we want this packet to - * bring up the link. - */ -int loop_frame(frame, len) unsigned char *frame; -int len; -{ - struct packet *pkt; - - /* dbglog("from loop: %P", frame, len); */ - if (len < PPP_HDRLEN) { - return 0; - } - - if ((PPP_PROTOCOL(frame) & 0x8000) != 0) { - return 0; /* shouldn't get any of these anyway */ - } - - if (!active_packet(frame, len)) { - return 0; - } - - pkt = (struct packet *)malloc(sizeof(struct packet) + len); - - if (pkt != NULL) { - pkt->length = len; - pkt->next = NULL; - memcpy(pkt->data, frame, len); - - if (pend_q == NULL) { - pend_q = pkt; - } else { - pend_qtail->next = pkt; - } - - pend_qtail = pkt; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* - * demand_rexmit - Resend all those frames which we got via the - * loopback, now that the real serial link is up. - */ -void demand_rexmit(proto, newip) int proto; -u32_t newip; -{ - struct packet *pkt, *prev, *nextpkt; - unsigned short checksum; - unsigned short pkt_checksum = 0; - unsigned iphdr; - struct timeval tv; - char cv = 0; - char ipstr[16]; - - prev = NULL; - pkt = pend_q; - pend_q = NULL; - tv.tv_sec = 1; - tv.tv_usec = 0; - select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv); /* Sleep for 1 Seconds */ - - for (; pkt != NULL; pkt = nextpkt) { - nextpkt = pkt->next; - - if (PPP_PROTOCOL(pkt->data) == proto) { - if ((proto == PPP_IP) && newip) { - /* Get old checksum */ - - iphdr = (pkt->data[4] & 15) << 2; - checksum = *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 14)); - - if (checksum == 0xFFFF) { - checksum = 0; - } - - if (pkt->data[13] == 17) { - pkt_checksum = *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 10 + iphdr)); - - if (pkt_checksum) { - cv = 1; - - if (pkt_checksum == 0xFFFF) { - pkt_checksum = 0; - } - } else { - cv = 0; - } - } - - if (pkt->data[13] == 6) { - pkt_checksum = *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 20 + iphdr)); - cv = 1; - - if (pkt_checksum == 0xFFFF) { - pkt_checksum = 0; - } - } - - /* Delete old Source-IP-Address */ - checksum -= *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 16)) ^ 0xFFFF; - checksum -= *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 18)) ^ 0xFFFF; - - pkt_checksum -= *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 16)) ^ 0xFFFF; - pkt_checksum -= *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 18)) ^ 0xFFFF; - - /* Change Source-IP-Address */ - *((u32_t *)(pkt->data + 16)) = newip; - - /* Add new Source-IP-Address */ - checksum += *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 16)) ^ 0xFFFF; - checksum += *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 18)) ^ 0xFFFF; - - pkt_checksum += *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 16)) ^ 0xFFFF; - pkt_checksum += *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 18)) ^ 0xFFFF; - - /* Write new checksum */ - if (!checksum) { - checksum = 0xFFFF; - } - - *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 14)) = checksum; - - if (pkt->data[13] == 6) { - *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 20 + iphdr)) = pkt_checksum; - } - - if (cv && (pkt->data[13] == 17)) { - *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 10 + iphdr)) = pkt_checksum; - } - - /* Log Packet */ - strcpy(ipstr, inet_ntoa(*((struct in_addr *)(pkt->data + 16)))); - - if (pkt->data[13] == 1) { - syslog(LOG_INFO, "Open ICMP %s -> %s\n", - ipstr, - inet_ntoa(*((struct in_addr *)(pkt->data + 20)))); - } else { - syslog(LOG_INFO, "Open %s %s:%d -> %s:%d\n", - pkt->data[13] == 6 ? "TCP" : "UDP", - ipstr, - ntohs(*((short *)(pkt->data + iphdr + 4))), - inet_ntoa(*((struct in_addr *)(pkt->data + 20))), - ntohs(*((short *)(pkt->data + iphdr + 6)))); - } - } - - output(pcb, pkt->data, pkt->length); - free(pkt); - } else { - if (prev == NULL) { - pend_q = pkt; - } else { - prev->next = pkt; - } - - prev = pkt; - } - } - - pend_qtail = prev; - - if (prev != NULL) { - prev->next = NULL; - } -} - -/* - * Scan a packet to decide whether it is an "active" packet, - * that is, whether it is worth bringing up the link for. - */ -static int active_packet(p, len) unsigned char *p; -int len; -{ - int proto, i; - const struct protent *protp; - - if (len < PPP_HDRLEN) { - return 0; - } - - proto = PPP_PROTOCOL(p); -#ifdef PPP_FILTER - p[0] = 1; /* outbound packet indicator */ - - if ((pass_filter.bf_len != 0 && bpf_filter(pass_filter.bf_insns, p, len, len) == 0) || (active_filter.bf_len != 0 && bpf_filter(active_filter.bf_insns, p, len, len) == 0)) { - p[0] = 0xff; - return 0; - } - - p[0] = 0xff; -#endif - - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) { - if (protp->protocol < 0xC000 && (protp->protocol & ~0x8000) == proto) { - if (protp->active_pkt == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - return (*protp->active_pkt)(p, len); - } - } - - return 0; /* not a supported protocol !!?? */ -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +/* + * demand.c - Support routines for demand-dialling. + * + * Copyright (c) 1996-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && DEMAND_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef PPP_FILTER +#include +#endif + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" + +char *frame; +int framelen; +int framemax; +int escape_flag; +int flush_flag; +int fcs; + +struct packet { + int length; + struct packet *next; + unsigned char data[1]; +}; + +struct packet *pend_q; +struct packet *pend_qtail; + +static int active_packet(unsigned char *, int); + +/* + * demand_conf - configure the interface for doing dial-on-demand. + */ +void demand_conf() +{ + int i; + const struct protent *protp; + + /* framemax = lcp_allowoptions[0].mru; + if (framemax < PPP_MRU) */ + framemax = PPP_MRU; + framemax += PPP_HDRLEN + PPP_FCSLEN; + frame = malloc(framemax); + + if (frame == NULL) { + novm("demand frame"); + } + + framelen = 0; + pend_q = NULL; + escape_flag = 0; + flush_flag = 0; + fcs = PPP_INITFCS; + + netif_set_mtu(pcb, LWIP_MIN(lcp_allowoptions[0].mru, PPP_MRU)); + + if (ppp_send_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, (u32_t)0, 0, 0) < 0 || ppp_recv_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, (u32_t)0, 0, 0) < 0) { + fatal("Couldn't set up demand-dialled PPP interface: %m"); + } + +#ifdef PPP_FILTER + set_filters(&pass_filter, &active_filter); +#endif + + /* + * Call the demand_conf procedure for each protocol that's got one. + */ + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (protp->demand_conf != NULL) { + ((*protp->demand_conf)(pcb)); + } + + /* FIXME: find a way to die() here */ +#if 0 + + if(!((*protp->demand_conf)(pcb))) + { + die(1); + } + +#endif +} + +/* + * demand_block - set each network protocol to block further packets. + */ +void demand_block() +{ + int i; + const struct protent *protp; + + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (protp->demand_conf != NULL) { + sifnpmode(pcb, protp->protocol & ~0x8000, NPMODE_QUEUE); + } + + get_loop_output(); +} + +/* + * demand_discard - set each network protocol to discard packets + * with an error. + */ +void demand_discard() +{ + struct packet *pkt, *nextpkt; + int i; + const struct protent *protp; + + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (protp->demand_conf != NULL) { + sifnpmode(pcb, protp->protocol & ~0x8000, NPMODE_ERROR); + } + + get_loop_output(); + + /* discard all saved packets */ + for (pkt = pend_q; pkt != NULL; pkt = nextpkt) { + nextpkt = pkt->next; + free(pkt); + } + + pend_q = NULL; + framelen = 0; + flush_flag = 0; + escape_flag = 0; + fcs = PPP_INITFCS; +} + +/* + * demand_unblock - set each enabled network protocol to pass packets. + */ +void demand_unblock() +{ + int i; + const struct protent *protp; + + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (protp->demand_conf != NULL) { + sifnpmode(pcb, protp->protocol & ~0x8000, NPMODE_PASS); + } +} + +/* + * FCS lookup table as calculated by genfcstab. + */ +static u_short fcstab[256] = { + 0x0000, 0x1189, 0x2312, 0x329b, 0x4624, 0x57ad, 0x6536, 0x74bf, + 0x8c48, 0x9dc1, 0xaf5a, 0xbed3, 0xca6c, 0xdbe5, 0xe97e, 0xf8f7, + 0x1081, 0x0108, 0x3393, 0x221a, 0x56a5, 0x472c, 0x75b7, 0x643e, + 0x9cc9, 0x8d40, 0xbfdb, 0xae52, 0xdaed, 0xcb64, 0xf9ff, 0xe876, + 0x2102, 0x308b, 0x0210, 0x1399, 0x6726, 0x76af, 0x4434, 0x55bd, + 0xad4a, 0xbcc3, 0x8e58, 0x9fd1, 0xeb6e, 0xfae7, 0xc87c, 0xd9f5, + 0x3183, 0x200a, 0x1291, 0x0318, 0x77a7, 0x662e, 0x54b5, 0x453c, + 0xbdcb, 0xac42, 0x9ed9, 0x8f50, 0xfbef, 0xea66, 0xd8fd, 0xc974, + 0x4204, 0x538d, 0x6116, 0x709f, 0x0420, 0x15a9, 0x2732, 0x36bb, + 0xce4c, 0xdfc5, 0xed5e, 0xfcd7, 0x8868, 0x99e1, 0xab7a, 0xbaf3, + 0x5285, 0x430c, 0x7197, 0x601e, 0x14a1, 0x0528, 0x37b3, 0x263a, + 0xdecd, 0xcf44, 0xfddf, 0xec56, 0x98e9, 0x8960, 0xbbfb, 0xaa72, + 0x6306, 0x728f, 0x4014, 0x519d, 0x2522, 0x34ab, 0x0630, 0x17b9, + 0xef4e, 0xfec7, 0xcc5c, 0xddd5, 0xa96a, 0xb8e3, 0x8a78, 0x9bf1, + 0x7387, 0x620e, 0x5095, 0x411c, 0x35a3, 0x242a, 0x16b1, 0x0738, + 0xffcf, 0xee46, 0xdcdd, 0xcd54, 0xb9eb, 0xa862, 0x9af9, 0x8b70, + 0x8408, 0x9581, 0xa71a, 0xb693, 0xc22c, 0xd3a5, 0xe13e, 0xf0b7, + 0x0840, 0x19c9, 0x2b52, 0x3adb, 0x4e64, 0x5fed, 0x6d76, 0x7cff, + 0x9489, 0x8500, 0xb79b, 0xa612, 0xd2ad, 0xc324, 0xf1bf, 0xe036, + 0x18c1, 0x0948, 0x3bd3, 0x2a5a, 0x5ee5, 0x4f6c, 0x7df7, 0x6c7e, + 0xa50a, 0xb483, 0x8618, 0x9791, 0xe32e, 0xf2a7, 0xc03c, 0xd1b5, + 0x2942, 0x38cb, 0x0a50, 0x1bd9, 0x6f66, 0x7eef, 0x4c74, 0x5dfd, + 0xb58b, 0xa402, 0x9699, 0x8710, 0xf3af, 0xe226, 0xd0bd, 0xc134, + 0x39c3, 0x284a, 0x1ad1, 0x0b58, 0x7fe7, 0x6e6e, 0x5cf5, 0x4d7c, + 0xc60c, 0xd785, 0xe51e, 0xf497, 0x8028, 0x91a1, 0xa33a, 0xb2b3, + 0x4a44, 0x5bcd, 0x6956, 0x78df, 0x0c60, 0x1de9, 0x2f72, 0x3efb, + 0xd68d, 0xc704, 0xf59f, 0xe416, 0x90a9, 0x8120, 0xb3bb, 0xa232, + 0x5ac5, 0x4b4c, 0x79d7, 0x685e, 0x1ce1, 0x0d68, 0x3ff3, 0x2e7a, + 0xe70e, 0xf687, 0xc41c, 0xd595, 0xa12a, 0xb0a3, 0x8238, 0x93b1, + 0x6b46, 0x7acf, 0x4854, 0x59dd, 0x2d62, 0x3ceb, 0x0e70, 0x1ff9, + 0xf78f, 0xe606, 0xd49d, 0xc514, 0xb1ab, 0xa022, 0x92b9, 0x8330, + 0x7bc7, 0x6a4e, 0x58d5, 0x495c, 0x3de3, 0x2c6a, 0x1ef1, 0x0f78 +}; + +/* + * loop_chars - process characters received from the loopback. + * Calls loop_frame when a complete frame has been accumulated. + * Return value is 1 if we need to bring up the link, 0 otherwise. + */ +int loop_chars(p, n) unsigned char *p; +int n; +{ + int c, rv; + + rv = 0; + + /* check for synchronous connection... */ + + if ((p[0] == 0xFF) && (p[1] == 0x03)) { + rv = loop_frame(p, n); + return rv; + } + + for (; n > 0; --n) { + c = *p++; + + if (c == PPP_FLAG) { + if (!escape_flag && !flush_flag && framelen > 2 && fcs == PPP_GOODFCS) { + framelen -= 2; + + if (loop_frame((unsigned char *)frame, framelen)) { + rv = 1; + } + } + + framelen = 0; + flush_flag = 0; + escape_flag = 0; + fcs = PPP_INITFCS; + continue; + } + + if (flush_flag) { + continue; + } + + if (escape_flag) { + c ^= PPP_TRANS; + escape_flag = 0; + } else if (c == PPP_ESCAPE) { + escape_flag = 1; + continue; + } + + if (framelen >= framemax) { + flush_flag = 1; + continue; + } + + frame[framelen++] = c; + fcs = PPP_FCS(fcs, c); + } + + return rv; +} + +/* + * loop_frame - given a frame obtained from the loopback, + * decide whether to bring up the link or not, and, if we want + * to transmit this frame later, put it on the pending queue. + * Return value is 1 if we need to bring up the link, 0 otherwise. + * We assume that the kernel driver has already applied the + * pass_filter, so we won't get packets it rejected. + * We apply the active_filter to see if we want this packet to + * bring up the link. + */ +int loop_frame(frame, len) unsigned char *frame; +int len; +{ + struct packet *pkt; + + /* dbglog("from loop: %P", frame, len); */ + if (len < PPP_HDRLEN) { + return 0; + } + + if ((PPP_PROTOCOL(frame) & 0x8000) != 0) { + return 0; /* shouldn't get any of these anyway */ + } + + if (!active_packet(frame, len)) { + return 0; + } + + pkt = (struct packet *)malloc(sizeof(struct packet) + len); + + if (pkt != NULL) { + pkt->length = len; + pkt->next = NULL; + memcpy(pkt->data, frame, len); + + if (pend_q == NULL) { + pend_q = pkt; + } else { + pend_qtail->next = pkt; + } + + pend_qtail = pkt; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * demand_rexmit - Resend all those frames which we got via the + * loopback, now that the real serial link is up. + */ +void demand_rexmit(proto, newip) int proto; +u32_t newip; +{ + struct packet *pkt, *prev, *nextpkt; + unsigned short checksum; + unsigned short pkt_checksum = 0; + unsigned iphdr; + struct timeval tv; + char cv = 0; + char ipstr[16]; + + prev = NULL; + pkt = pend_q; + pend_q = NULL; + tv.tv_sec = 1; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv); /* Sleep for 1 Seconds */ + + for (; pkt != NULL; pkt = nextpkt) { + nextpkt = pkt->next; + + if (PPP_PROTOCOL(pkt->data) == proto) { + if ((proto == PPP_IP) && newip) { + /* Get old checksum */ + + iphdr = (pkt->data[4] & 15) << 2; + checksum = *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 14)); + + if (checksum == 0xFFFF) { + checksum = 0; + } + + if (pkt->data[13] == 17) { + pkt_checksum = *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 10 + iphdr)); + + if (pkt_checksum) { + cv = 1; + + if (pkt_checksum == 0xFFFF) { + pkt_checksum = 0; + } + } else { + cv = 0; + } + } + + if (pkt->data[13] == 6) { + pkt_checksum = *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 20 + iphdr)); + cv = 1; + + if (pkt_checksum == 0xFFFF) { + pkt_checksum = 0; + } + } + + /* Delete old Source-IP-Address */ + checksum -= *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 16)) ^ 0xFFFF; + checksum -= *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 18)) ^ 0xFFFF; + + pkt_checksum -= *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 16)) ^ 0xFFFF; + pkt_checksum -= *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 18)) ^ 0xFFFF; + + /* Change Source-IP-Address */ + *((u32_t *)(pkt->data + 16)) = newip; + + /* Add new Source-IP-Address */ + checksum += *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 16)) ^ 0xFFFF; + checksum += *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 18)) ^ 0xFFFF; + + pkt_checksum += *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 16)) ^ 0xFFFF; + pkt_checksum += *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 18)) ^ 0xFFFF; + + /* Write new checksum */ + if (!checksum) { + checksum = 0xFFFF; + } + + *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 14)) = checksum; + + if (pkt->data[13] == 6) { + *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 20 + iphdr)) = pkt_checksum; + } + + if (cv && (pkt->data[13] == 17)) { + *((unsigned short *)(pkt->data + 10 + iphdr)) = pkt_checksum; + } + + /* Log Packet */ + strcpy(ipstr, inet_ntoa(*((struct in_addr *)(pkt->data + 16)))); + + if (pkt->data[13] == 1) { + syslog(LOG_INFO, "Open ICMP %s -> %s\n", + ipstr, + inet_ntoa(*((struct in_addr *)(pkt->data + 20)))); + } else { + syslog(LOG_INFO, "Open %s %s:%d -> %s:%d\n", + pkt->data[13] == 6 ? "TCP" : "UDP", + ipstr, + ntohs(*((short *)(pkt->data + iphdr + 4))), + inet_ntoa(*((struct in_addr *)(pkt->data + 20))), + ntohs(*((short *)(pkt->data + iphdr + 6)))); + } + } + + output(pcb, pkt->data, pkt->length); + free(pkt); + } else { + if (prev == NULL) { + pend_q = pkt; + } else { + prev->next = pkt; + } + + prev = pkt; + } + } + + pend_qtail = prev; + + if (prev != NULL) { + prev->next = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * Scan a packet to decide whether it is an "active" packet, + * that is, whether it is worth bringing up the link for. + */ +static int active_packet(p, len) unsigned char *p; +int len; +{ + int proto, i; + const struct protent *protp; + + if (len < PPP_HDRLEN) { + return 0; + } + + proto = PPP_PROTOCOL(p); +#ifdef PPP_FILTER + p[0] = 1; /* outbound packet indicator */ + + if ((pass_filter.bf_len != 0 && bpf_filter(pass_filter.bf_insns, p, len, len) == 0) || (active_filter.bf_len != 0 && bpf_filter(active_filter.bf_insns, p, len, len) == 0)) { + p[0] = 0xff; + return 0; + } + + p[0] = 0xff; +#endif + + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) { + if (protp->protocol < 0xC000 && (protp->protocol & ~0x8000) == proto) { + if (protp->active_pkt == NULL) { + return 1; + } + + return (*protp->active_pkt)(p, len); + } + } + + return 0; /* not a supported protocol !!?? */ +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && DEMAND_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eap.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eap.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eap.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eap.c index f7d4da36..4bb2a6e2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eap.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eap.c @@ -1,2740 +1,2740 @@ -/* - * eap.c - Extensible Authentication Protocol for PPP (RFC 2284) - * - * Copyright (c) 2001 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Non-exclusive rights to redistribute, modify, translate, and use - * this software in source and binary forms, in whole or in part, is - * hereby granted, provided that the above copyright notice is - * duplicated in any source form, and that neither the name of the - * copyright holder nor the author is used to endorse or promote - * products derived from this software. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - * - * Original version by James Carlson - * - * This implementation of EAP supports MD5-Challenge and SRP-SHA1 - * authentication styles. Note that support of MD5-Challenge is a - * requirement of RFC 2284, and that it's essentially just a - * reimplementation of regular RFC 1994 CHAP using EAP messages. - * - * As an authenticator ("server"), there are multiple phases for each - * style. In the first phase of each style, the unauthenticated peer - * name is queried using the EAP Identity request type. If the - * "remotename" option is used, then this phase is skipped, because - * the peer's name is presumed to be known. - * - * For MD5-Challenge, there are two phases, and the second phase - * consists of sending the challenge itself and handling the - * associated response. - * - * For SRP-SHA1, there are four phases. The second sends 's', 'N', - * and 'g'. The reply contains 'A'. The third sends 'B', and the - * reply contains 'M1'. The forth sends the 'M2' value. - * - * As an authenticatee ("client"), there's just a single phase -- - * responding to the queries generated by the peer. EAP is an - * authenticator-driven protocol. - * - * Based on draft-ietf-pppext-eap-srp-03.txt. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/eap.h" -#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" - -#ifdef USE_SRP -#include -#include -#include -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - -#ifndef SHA_DIGESTSIZE -#define SHA_DIGESTSIZE 20 -#endif - -#ifdef USE_SRP -static char *pn_secret = NULL; /* Pseudonym generating secret */ -#endif - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * Command-line options. - */ -static option_t eap_option_list[] = { - { "eap-restart", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_server.ea_timeout, - "Set retransmit timeout for EAP Requests (server)" }, - { "eap-max-sreq", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_server.ea_maxrequests, - "Set max number of EAP Requests sent (server)" }, - { "eap-timeout", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_client.ea_timeout, - "Set time limit for peer EAP authentication" }, - { "eap-max-rreq", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_client.ea_maxrequests, - "Set max number of EAP Requests allows (client)" }, - { "eap-interval", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_rechallenge, - "Set interval for EAP rechallenge" }, -#ifdef USE_SRP - { "srp-interval", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_lwrechallenge, - "Set interval for SRP lightweight rechallenge" }, - { "srp-pn-secret", o_string, &pn_secret, - "Long term pseudonym generation secret" }, - { "srp-use-pseudonym", o_bool, &eap_states[0].es_usepseudo, - "Use pseudonym if offered one by server", 1 }, -#endif - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * Protocol entry points. - */ -static void eap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void eap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int inlen); -static void eap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void eap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void eap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static int eap_printpkt(const u_char *inp, int inlen, - void (*)(void *arg, const char *fmt, ...), void *arg); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -const struct protent eap_protent = { - PPP_EAP, /* protocol number */ - eap_init, /* initialization procedure */ - eap_input, /* process a received packet */ - eap_protrej, /* process a received protocol-reject */ - eap_lowerup, /* lower layer has gone up */ - eap_lowerdown, /* lower layer has gone down */ - NULL, /* open the protocol */ - NULL, /* close the protocol */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - eap_printpkt, /* print a packet in readable form */ -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT - NULL, /* process a received data packet */ -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - "EAP", /* text name of protocol */ - NULL, /* text name of corresponding data protocol */ -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS - eap_option_list, /* list of command-line options */ - NULL, /* check requested options; assign defaults */ -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - NULL, /* configure interface for demand-dial */ - NULL /* say whether to bring up link for this pkt */ -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -}; - -#ifdef USE_SRP -/* - * A well-known 2048 bit modulus. - */ -static const u_char wkmodulus[] = { - 0xAC, 0x6B, 0xDB, 0x41, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x9A, 0x9B, - 0xF1, 0x66, 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x13, 0x89, 0x58, 0x2F, - 0xAF, 0x72, 0xB6, 0x65, 0x19, 0x87, 0xEE, 0x07, - 0xFC, 0x31, 0x92, 0x94, 0x3D, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x50, - 0xA3, 0x73, 0x29, 0xCB, 0xB4, 0xA0, 0x99, 0xED, - 0x81, 0x93, 0xE0, 0x75, 0x77, 0x67, 0xA1, 0x3D, - 0xD5, 0x23, 0x12, 0xAB, 0x4B, 0x03, 0x31, 0x0D, - 0xCD, 0x7F, 0x48, 0xA9, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xFD, 0x50, - 0xE8, 0x08, 0x39, 0x69, 0xED, 0xB7, 0x67, 0xB0, - 0xCF, 0x60, 0x95, 0x17, 0x9A, 0x16, 0x3A, 0xB3, - 0x66, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xFB, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0xAA, 0xE8, - 0x29, 0x18, 0xA9, 0x96, 0x2F, 0x0B, 0x93, 0xB8, - 0x55, 0xF9, 0x79, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x97, 0x5E, 0xEA, - 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x74, 0x0A, 0xDB, 0xF4, 0xFF, 0x74, - 0x73, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x41, 0xD5, 0xC3, 0x3E, 0xA7, - 0x1D, 0x28, 0x1E, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x14, 0x77, 0x3B, - 0xCA, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xFB, 0x80, 0x16, - 0x76, 0xBD, 0x20, 0x7A, 0x43, 0x6C, 0x64, 0x81, - 0xF1, 0xD2, 0xB9, 0x07, 0x87, 0x17, 0x46, 0x1A, - 0x5B, 0x9D, 0x32, 0xE6, 0x88, 0xF8, 0x77, 0x48, - 0x54, 0x45, 0x23, 0xB5, 0x24, 0xB0, 0xD5, 0x7D, - 0x5E, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0x27, 0x75, 0xD2, 0xEC, 0xFA, - 0x03, 0x2C, 0xFB, 0xDB, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0xB3, 0x78, - 0x61, 0x60, 0x27, 0x90, 0x04, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0xE6, - 0xAF, 0x87, 0x4E, 0x73, 0x03, 0xCE, 0x53, 0x29, - 0x9C, 0xCC, 0x04, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x08, 0xD8, - 0x2A, 0x56, 0x98, 0xF3, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0x82, - 0x71, 0xAE, 0x35, 0xF8, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xFB, 0xB6, - 0x94, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x03, 0xD8, 0x9F, 0x7A, 0xE4, - 0x35, 0xDE, 0x23, 0x6D, 0x52, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x75, - 0x9B, 0x65, 0xE3, 0x72, 0xFC, 0xD6, 0x8E, 0xF2, - 0x0F, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x1F, 0x9E, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x73 -}; -#endif - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* Local forward declarations. */ -static void eap_server_timeout(void *arg); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * Convert EAP state code to printable string for debug. - */ -static const char *eap_state_name(enum eap_state_code esc) -{ - static const char *state_names[] = { EAP_STATES }; - - return (state_names[(int)esc]); -} - -/* - * eap_init - Initialize state for an EAP user. This is currently - * called once by main() during start-up. - */ -static void eap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - BZERO(&pcb->eap, sizeof(eap_state)); -#if PPP_SERVER - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id = magic(); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -} - -/* - * eap_client_timeout - Give up waiting for the peer to send any - * Request messages. - */ -static void eap_client_timeout(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - - if (!eap_client_active(pcb)) { - return; - } - - ppp_error("EAP: timeout waiting for Request from peer"); - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapBadAuth; -} - -/* - * eap_authwithpeer - Authenticate to our peer (behave as client). - * - * Start client state and wait for requests. This is called only - * after eap_lowerup. - */ -void eap_authwithpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *localname) -{ - if (NULL == localname) { - return; - } - - /* Save the peer name we're given */ - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name = localname; - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen = strlen(localname); - - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapListen; - - /* - * Start a timer so that if the other end just goes - * silent, we don't sit here waiting forever. - */ - if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) - TIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb, - pcb->settings.eap_req_time); -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * Format a standard EAP Failure message and send it to the peer. - * (Server operation) - */ -static void eap_send_failure(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + EAP_HEADERLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); - - PUTCHAR(EAP_FAILURE, outp); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; - PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, outp); - PUTSHORT(EAP_HEADERLEN, outp); - - ppp_write(pcb, p); - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; - auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); -} - -/* - * Format a standard EAP Success message and send it to the peer. - * (Server operation) - */ -static void eap_send_success(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + EAP_HEADERLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); - - PUTCHAR(EAP_SUCCESS, outp); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; - PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, outp); - PUTSHORT(EAP_HEADERLEN, outp); - - ppp_write(pcb, p); - - auth_peer_success(pcb, PPP_EAP, 0, - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen); -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -#ifdef USE_SRP -/* - * Set DES key according to pseudonym-generating secret and current - * date. - */ -static bool pncrypt_setkey(int timeoffs) -{ - struct tm *tp; - char tbuf[9]; - SHA1_CTX ctxt; - u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE]; - time_t reftime; - - if (pn_secret == NULL) { - return (0); - } - - reftime = time(NULL) + timeoffs; - tp = localtime(&reftime); - SHA1Init(&ctxt); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pn_secret, strlen(pn_secret)); - strftime(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%Y%m%d", tp); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, tbuf, strlen(tbuf)); - SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); - /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ - return (DesSetkey(dig)); -} - -static char base64[] = - "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; - -struct b64state { - u32_t bs_bits; - int bs_offs; -}; - -static int b64enc(bs, inp, inlen, outp) struct b64state *bs; -u_char *inp; -int inlen; -u_char *outp; -{ - int outlen = 0; - - while (inlen > 0) { - bs->bs_bits = (bs->bs_bits << 8) | *inp++; - inlen--; - bs->bs_offs += 8; - - if (bs->bs_offs >= 24) { - *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 18) & 0x3F]; - *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 12) & 0x3F]; - *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 6) & 0x3F]; - *outp++ = base64[bs->bs_bits & 0x3F]; - outlen += 4; - bs->bs_offs = 0; - bs->bs_bits = 0; - } - } - - return (outlen); -} - -static int b64flush(bs, outp) struct b64state *bs; -u_char *outp; -{ - int outlen = 0; - - if (bs->bs_offs == 8) { - *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 2) & 0x3F]; - *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits << 4) & 0x3F]; - outlen = 2; - } else if (bs->bs_offs == 16) { - *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 10) & 0x3F]; - *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 4) & 0x3F]; - *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits << 2) & 0x3F]; - outlen = 3; - } - - bs->bs_offs = 0; - bs->bs_bits = 0; - return (outlen); -} - -static int b64dec(bs, inp, inlen, outp) struct b64state *bs; -u_char *inp; -int inlen; -u_char *outp; -{ - int outlen = 0; - char *cp; - - while (inlen > 0) { - if ((cp = strchr(base64, *inp++)) == NULL) { - break; - } - - bs->bs_bits = (bs->bs_bits << 6) | (cp - base64); - inlen--; - bs->bs_offs += 6; - - if (bs->bs_offs >= 8) { - *outp++ = bs->bs_bits >> (bs->bs_offs - 8); - outlen++; - bs->bs_offs -= 8; - } - } - - return (outlen); -} -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * Assume that current waiting server state is complete and figure - * next state to use based on available authentication data. 'status' - * indicates if there was an error in handling the last query. It is - * 0 for success and non-zero for failure. - */ -static void eap_figure_next_state(ppp_pcb *pcb, int status) -{ -#ifdef USE_SRP - unsigned char secbuf[MAXSECRETLEN], clear[8], *sp, *dp; - struct t_pw tpw; - struct t_confent *tce, mytce; - char *cp, *cp2; - struct t_server *ts; - int id, i, plen, toffs; - u_char vals[2]; - struct b64state bs; -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time = pcb->eap.es_savedtime; - - switch (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state) { - case eapBadAuth: - return; - - case eapIdentify: -#ifdef USE_SRP - /* Discard any previous session. */ - ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; - - if (ts != NULL) { - t_serverclose(ts); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = NULL; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = NULL; - } - -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - if (status != 0) { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; - break; - } - -#ifdef USE_SRP - - /* If we've got a pseudonym, try to decode to real name. */ - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen > SRP_PSEUDO_LEN && - strncmp(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, SRP_PSEUDO_ID, - SRP_PSEUDO_LEN) == 0 && - (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen - SRP_PSEUDO_LEN) * 3 / 4 < - sizeof(secbuf)) { - BZERO(&bs, sizeof(bs)); - plen = b64dec(&bs, - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer + SRP_PSEUDO_LEN, - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen - SRP_PSEUDO_LEN, - secbuf); - toffs = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { - pncrypt_setkey(toffs); - toffs -= 86400; - - /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ - if (!DesDecrypt(secbuf, clear)) { - ppp_dbglog("no DES here; cannot decode " - "pseudonym"); - return; - } - - id = *(unsigned char *)clear; - - if (id + 1 <= plen && id + 9 > plen) { - break; - } - } - - if (plen % 8 == 0 && i < 5) { - /* - * Note that this is always shorter than the - * original stored string, so there's no need - * to realloc. - */ - if ((i = plen = *(unsigned char *)clear) > 7) { - i = 7; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen = plen; - dp = (unsigned char *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer; - MEMCPY(dp, clear + 1, i); - plen -= i; - dp += i; - sp = secbuf + 8; - - while (plen > 0) { - /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ - (void)DesDecrypt(sp, dp); - sp += 8; - dp += 8; - plen -= 8; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer[pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen] = '\0'; - ppp_dbglog("decoded pseudonym to \"%.*q\"", - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen, - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer); - } else { - ppp_dbglog("failed to decode real name"); - /* Stay in eapIdentfy state; requery */ - break; - } - } - - /* Look up user in secrets database. */ - if (get_srp_secret(pcb->eap.es_unit, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name, (char *)secbuf, 1) != 0) { - /* Set up default in case SRP entry is bad */ - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; - /* Get t_confent based on index in srp-secrets */ - id = strtol((char *)secbuf, &cp, 10); - - if (*cp++ != ':' || id < 0) { - break; - } - - if (id == 0) { - mytce.index = 0; - mytce.modulus.data = (u_char *)wkmodulus; - mytce.modulus.len = sizeof(wkmodulus); - mytce.generator.data = (u_char *)"\002"; - mytce.generator.len = 1; - tce = &mytce; - } else if ((tce = gettcid(id)) != NULL) { - /* - * Client will have to verify this modulus/ - * generator combination, and that will take - * a while. Lengthen the timeout here. - */ - if (pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time > 0 && - pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time < 30) { - pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time = 30; - } - } else { - break; - } - - if ((cp2 = strchr(cp, ':')) == NULL) { - break; - } - - *cp2++ = '\0'; - tpw.pebuf.name = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer; - tpw.pebuf.password.len = t_fromb64((char *)tpw.pwbuf, - cp); - tpw.pebuf.password.data = tpw.pwbuf; - tpw.pebuf.salt.len = t_fromb64((char *)tpw.saltbuf, - cp2); - tpw.pebuf.salt.data = tpw.saltbuf; - - if ((ts = t_serveropenraw(&tpw.pebuf, tce)) == NULL) { - break; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = (void *)ts; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapSRP1; - vals[0] = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id + 1; - vals[1] = EAPT_SRP; - t_serveraddexdata(ts, vals, 2); - /* Generate B; must call before t_servergetkey() */ - t_servergenexp(ts); - break; - } - -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; - break; - - case eapSRP1: -#ifdef USE_SRP - ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; - - if (ts != NULL && status != 0) { - t_serverclose(ts); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = NULL; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = NULL; - } - -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - if (status == 1) { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; - } else if (status != 0 || pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session == NULL) { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; - } else { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapSRP2; - } - - break; - - case eapSRP2: -#ifdef USE_SRP - ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; - - if (ts != NULL && status != 0) { - t_serverclose(ts); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = NULL; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = NULL; - } - -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - if (status != 0 || pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session == NULL) { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; - } else { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapSRP3; - } - - break; - - case eapSRP3: - case eapSRP4: -#ifdef USE_SRP - ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; - - if (ts != NULL && status != 0) { - t_serverclose(ts); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = NULL; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = NULL; - } - -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - if (status != 0 || pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session == NULL) { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; - } else { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapOpen; - } - - break; - - case eapMD5Chall: - if (status != 0) { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; - } else { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapOpen; - } - - break; - - default: - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; - break; - } - - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapBadAuth) { - eap_send_failure(pcb); - } -} - -/* - * Format an EAP Request message and send it to the peer. Message - * type depends on current state. (Server operation) - */ -static void eap_send_request(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - u_char *lenloc; - int outlen; - int len; - const char *str; -#ifdef USE_SRP - struct t_server *ts; - u_char clear[8], cipher[8], dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE], *optr, *cp; - int i, j; - struct b64state b64; - SHA1_CTX ctxt; -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - /* Handle both initial auth and restart */ - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state < eapIdentify && - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapInitial) { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapIdentify; -#if PPP_REMOTENAME - - if (pcb->settings.explicit_remote && pcb->remote_name) { - /* - * If we already know the peer's - * unauthenticated name, then there's no - * reason to ask. Go to next state instead. - */ - int len = (int)strlen(pcb->remote_name); - - if (len > MAXNAMELEN) { - len = MAXNAMELEN; - } - - MEMCPY(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, pcb->remote_name, len); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer[len] = '\0'; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen = len; - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); - } - -#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ - } - - if (pcb->settings.eap_max_transmits > 0 && - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests >= pcb->settings.eap_max_transmits) { - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_responses > 0) { - ppp_error("EAP: too many Requests sent"); - } else { - ppp_error("EAP: no response to Requests"); - } - - eap_send_failure(pcb); - return; - } - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); - - PUTCHAR(EAP_REQUEST, outp); - PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, outp); - lenloc = outp; - INCPTR(2, outp); - - switch (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state) { - case eapIdentify: - PUTCHAR(EAPT_IDENTITY, outp); - str = "Name"; - len = strlen(str); - MEMCPY(outp, str, len); - INCPTR(len, outp); - break; - - case eapMD5Chall: - PUTCHAR(EAPT_MD5CHAP, outp); - /* - * pick a random challenge length between - * EAP_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH and EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH - */ - pcb->eap.es_challen = EAP_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH + - magic_pow(EAP_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); - PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_challen, outp); - magic_random_bytes(pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); - MEMCPY(outp, pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); - INCPTR(pcb->eap.es_challen, outp); - MEMCPY(outp, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen); - INCPTR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen, outp); - break; - -#ifdef USE_SRP - - case eapSRP1: - PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); - PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_CHALLENGE, outp); - - PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen, outp); - MEMCPY(outp, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen); - INCPTR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen, outp); - - ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; - assert(ts != NULL); - PUTCHAR(ts->s.len, outp); - MEMCPY(outp, ts->s.data, ts->s.len); - INCPTR(ts->s.len, outp); - - if (ts->g.len == 1 && ts->g.data[0] == 2) { - PUTCHAR(0, outp); - } else { - PUTCHAR(ts->g.len, outp); - MEMCPY(outp, ts->g.data, ts->g.len); - INCPTR(ts->g.len, outp); - } - - if (ts->n.len != sizeof(wkmodulus) || - BCMP(ts->n.data, wkmodulus, sizeof(wkmodulus)) != 0) { - MEMCPY(outp, ts->n.data, ts->n.len); - INCPTR(ts->n.len, outp); - } - - break; - - case eapSRP2: - PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); - PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_SKEY, outp); - - ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; - assert(ts != NULL); - MEMCPY(outp, ts->B.data, ts->B.len); - INCPTR(ts->B.len, outp); - break; - - case eapSRP3: - PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); - PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_SVALIDATOR, outp); - PUTLONG(SRPVAL_EBIT, outp); - ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; - assert(ts != NULL); - MEMCPY(outp, t_serverresponse(ts), SHA_DIGESTSIZE); - INCPTR(SHA_DIGESTSIZE, outp); - - if (pncrypt_setkey(0)) { - /* Generate pseudonym */ - optr = outp; - cp = (unsigned char *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer; - - if ((j = i = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen) > 7) { - j = 7; - } - - clear[0] = i; - MEMCPY(clear + 1, cp, j); - i -= j; - cp += j; - - /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ - if (!DesEncrypt(clear, cipher)) { - ppp_dbglog("no DES here; not generating pseudonym"); - break; - } - - BZERO(&b64, sizeof(b64)); - outp++; /* space for pseudonym length */ - outp += b64enc(&b64, cipher, 8, outp); - - while (i >= 8) { - /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ - (void)DesEncrypt(cp, cipher); - outp += b64enc(&b64, cipher, 8, outp); - cp += 8; - i -= 8; - } - - if (i > 0) { - MEMCPY(clear, cp, i); - cp += i; - magic_random_bytes(cp, 8 - i); - /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ - (void)DesEncrypt(clear, cipher); - outp += b64enc(&b64, cipher, 8, outp); - } - - outp += b64flush(&b64, outp); - - /* Set length and pad out to next 20 octet boundary */ - i = outp - optr - 1; - *optr = i; - i %= SHA_DIGESTSIZE; - - if (i != 0) { - magic_random_bytes(outp, SHA_DIGESTSIZE - i); - INCPTR(SHA_DIGESTSIZE - i, outp); - } - - /* Obscure the pseudonym with SHA1 hash */ - SHA1Init(&ctxt); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, &pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, 1); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey, - SESSION_KEY_LEN); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen); - - while (optr < outp) { - SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); - cp = dig; - - while (cp < dig + SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { - *optr++ ^= *cp++; - } - - SHA1Init(&ctxt); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, &pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, 1); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey, - SESSION_KEY_LEN); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, optr - SHA_DIGESTSIZE, - SHA_DIGESTSIZE); - } - } - - break; - - case eapSRP4: - PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); - PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE, outp); - pcb->eap.es_challen = EAP_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH + - magic_pow(EAP_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); - magic_random_bytes(pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); - MEMCPY(outp, pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); - INCPTR(pcb->eap.es_challen, outp); - break; -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - default: - return; - } - - outlen = (outp - (unsigned char *)p->payload) - PPP_HDRLEN; - PUTSHORT(outlen, lenloc); - - pbuf_realloc(p, outlen + PPP_HDRLEN); - ppp_write(pcb, p); - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests++; - - if (pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time > 0) { - TIMEOUT(eap_server_timeout, pcb, pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time); - } -} - -/* - * eap_authpeer - Authenticate our peer (behave as server). - * - * Start server state and send first request. This is called only - * after eap_lowerup. - */ -void eap_authpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *localname) -{ - /* Save the name we're given. */ - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name = localname; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen = strlen(localname); - - pcb->eap.es_savedtime = pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time; - - /* Lower layer up yet? */ - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapInitial || - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapPending) { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapPending; - return; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapPending; - - /* ID number not updated here intentionally; hashed into M1 */ - eap_send_request(pcb); -} - -/* - * eap_server_timeout - Retransmission timer for sending Requests - * expired. - */ -static void eap_server_timeout(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - - if (!eap_server_active(pcb)) { - return; - } - - /* EAP ID number must not change on timeout. */ - eap_send_request(pcb); -} - -/* - * When it's time to send rechallenge the peer, this timeout is - * called. Once the rechallenge is successful, the response handler - * will restart the timer. If it fails, then the link is dropped. - */ -static void eap_rechallenge(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapOpen && - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP4) { - return; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests = 0; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapIdentify; - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; - eap_send_request(pcb); -} - -static void srp_lwrechallenge(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapOpen || - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_type != EAPT_SRP) { - return; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests = 0; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapSRP4; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; - eap_send_request(pcb); -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * eap_lowerup - The lower layer is now up. - * - * This is called before either eap_authpeer or eap_authwithpeer. See - * link_established() in auth.c. All that's necessary here is to - * return to closed state so that those two routines will do the right - * thing. - */ -static void eap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapClosed; -#if PPP_SERVER - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapClosed; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -} - -/* - * eap_lowerdown - The lower layer is now down. - * - * Cancel all timeouts and return to initial state. - */ -static void eap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - if (eap_client_active(pcb) && pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); - } - -#if PPP_SERVER - - if (eap_server_active(pcb)) { - if (pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(eap_server_timeout, pcb); - } - } else { - if ((pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapOpen || - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapSRP4) && - pcb->eap.es_rechallenge > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(eap_rechallenge, (void *)pcb); - } - - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapOpen && - pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(srp_lwrechallenge, (void *)pcb); - } - } - - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapInitial; - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_requests = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests = 0; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -} - -/* - * eap_protrej - Peer doesn't speak this protocol. - * - * This shouldn't happen. If it does, it represents authentication - * failure. - */ -static void eap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - if (eap_client_active(pcb)) { - ppp_error("EAP authentication failed due to Protocol-Reject"); - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); - } - -#if PPP_SERVER - - if (eap_server_active(pcb)) { - ppp_error("EAP authentication of peer failed on Protocol-Reject"); - auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); - } - -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - eap_lowerdown(pcb); -} - -/* - * Format and send a regular EAP Response message. - */ -static void eap_send_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char id, u_char typenum, const u_char *str, int lenstr) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - int msglen; - - msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + sizeof(u_char) + lenstr; - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); - - PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); - PUTCHAR(id, outp); - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; - PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); - PUTCHAR(typenum, outp); - - if (lenstr > 0) { - MEMCPY(outp, str, lenstr); - } - - ppp_write(pcb, p); -} - -/* - * Format and send an MD5-Challenge EAP Response message. - */ -static void eap_chap_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char id, u_char *hash, const char *name, int namelen) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - int msglen; - - msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char) + MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE + - namelen; - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); - - PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); - PUTCHAR(id, outp); - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; - PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); - PUTCHAR(EAPT_MD5CHAP, outp); - PUTCHAR(MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE, outp); - MEMCPY(outp, hash, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - INCPTR(MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE, outp); - - if (namelen > 0) { - MEMCPY(outp, name, namelen); - } - - ppp_write(pcb, p); -} - -#ifdef USE_SRP -/* - * Format and send a SRP EAP Response message. - */ -static void eap_srp_response(esp, id, subtypenum, str, lenstr) - eap_state *esp; -u_char id; -u_char subtypenum; -u_char *str; -int lenstr; -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[pcb->eap.es_unit]; - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - int msglen; - - msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char) + lenstr; - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = p->payload; - - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); - - PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); - PUTCHAR(id, outp); - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; - PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); - PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); - PUTCHAR(subtypenum, outp); - - if (lenstr > 0) { - MEMCPY(outp, str, lenstr); - } - - ppp_write(pcb, p); -} - -/* - * Format and send a SRP EAP Client Validator Response message. - */ -static void eap_srpval_response(esp, id, flags, str) - eap_state *esp; -u_char id; -u32_t flags; -u_char *str; -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[pcb->eap.es_unit]; - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - int msglen; - - msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char) + sizeof(u32_t) + - SHA_DIGESTSIZE; - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = p->payload; - - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); - - PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); - PUTCHAR(id, outp); - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; - PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); - PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); - PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_CVALIDATOR, outp); - PUTLONG(flags, outp); - MEMCPY(outp, str, SHA_DIGESTSIZE); - - ppp_write(pcb, p); -} -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - -static void eap_send_nak(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char id, u_char type) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - int msglen; - - msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char); - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); - - PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); - PUTCHAR(id, outp); - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; - PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); - PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp); - PUTCHAR(type, outp); - - ppp_write(pcb, p); -} - -#ifdef USE_SRP -static char *name_of_pn_file() -{ - char *user, *path, *file; - struct passwd *pw; - size_t pl; - static bool pnlogged = 0; - - pw = getpwuid(getuid()); - - if (pw == NULL || (user = pw->pw_dir) == NULL || user[0] == 0) { - errno = EINVAL; - return (NULL); - } - - file = _PATH_PSEUDONYM; - pl = strlen(user) + strlen(file) + 2; - path = malloc(pl); - - if (path == NULL) { - return (NULL); - } - - (void)slprintf(path, pl, "%s/%s", user, file); - - if (!pnlogged) { - ppp_dbglog("pseudonym file: %s", path); - pnlogged = 1; - } - - return (path); -} - -static int open_pn_file(modebits) - mode_t modebits; -{ - char *path; - int fd, err; - - if ((path = name_of_pn_file()) == NULL) { - return (-1); - } - - fd = open(path, modebits, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); - err = errno; - free(path); - errno = err; - return (fd); -} - -static void remove_pn_file() -{ - char *path; - - if ((path = name_of_pn_file()) != NULL) { - (void)unlink(path); - (void)free(path); - } -} - -static void write_pseudonym(esp, inp, len, id) - eap_state *esp; -u_char *inp; -int len, id; -{ - u_char val; - u_char *datp, *digp; - SHA1_CTX ctxt; - u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE]; - int dsize, fd, olen = len; - - /* - * Do the decoding by working backwards. This eliminates the need - * to save the decoded output in a separate buffer. - */ - val = id; - - while (len > 0) { - if ((dsize = len % SHA_DIGESTSIZE) == 0) { - dsize = SHA_DIGESTSIZE; - } - - len -= dsize; - datp = inp + len; - SHA1Init(&ctxt); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, &val, 1); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey, SESSION_KEY_LEN); - - if (len > 0) { - SHA1Update(&ctxt, datp, SHA_DIGESTSIZE); - } else { - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen); - } - - SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); - - for (digp = dig; digp < dig + SHA_DIGESTSIZE; digp++) { - *datp++ ^= *digp; - } - } - - /* Now check that the result is sane */ - if (olen <= 0 || *inp + 1 > olen) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP: decoded pseudonym is unusable <%.*B>", olen, inp); - return; - } - - /* Save it away */ - fd = open_pn_file(O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC); - - if (fd < 0) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP: error saving pseudonym: %m"); - return; - } - - len = write(fd, inp + 1, *inp); - - if (close(fd) != -1 && len == *inp) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP: saved pseudonym"); - pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo = 0; - } else { - ppp_dbglog("EAP: failed to save pseudonym"); - remove_pn_file(); - } -} -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - -/* - * eap_request - Receive EAP Request message (client mode). - */ -static void eap_request(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) -{ - u_char typenum; - u_char vallen; - int secret_len; - char secret[MAXSECRETLEN]; - char rhostname[MAXNAMELEN]; - lwip_md5_context mdContext; - u_char hash[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; -#ifdef USE_SRP - struct t_client *tc; - struct t_num sval, gval, Nval, *Ap, Bval; - u_char vals[2]; - SHA1_CTX ctxt; - u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE]; - int fd; -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - /* - * Note: we update es_client.ea_id *only if* a Response - * message is being generated. Otherwise, we leave it the - * same for duplicate detection purposes. - */ - - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_requests++; - - if (pcb->settings.eap_allow_req != 0 && - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_requests > pcb->settings.eap_allow_req) { - ppp_info("EAP: received too many Request messages"); - - if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); - } - - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); - return; - } - - if (len <= 0) { - ppp_error("EAP: empty Request message discarded"); - return; - } - - GETCHAR(typenum, inp); - len--; - - switch (typenum) { - case EAPT_IDENTITY: - if (len > 0) { - ppp_info("EAP: Identity prompt \"%.*q\"", len, inp); - } - -#ifdef USE_SRP - - if (pcb->eap.es_usepseudo && - (pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo == 0 || - (pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo == 1 && - id == pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id))) { - pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo = 1; - - /* Try to get a pseudonym */ - if ((fd = open_pn_file(O_RDONLY)) >= 0) { - strcpy(rhostname, SRP_PSEUDO_ID); - len = read(fd, rhostname + SRP_PSEUDO_LEN, - sizeof(rhostname) - SRP_PSEUDO_LEN); - - /* XXX NAI unsupported */ - if (len > 0) { - eap_send_response(pcb, id, typenum, - rhostname, len + SRP_PSEUDO_LEN); - } - - (void)close(fd); - - if (len > 0) { - break; - } - } - } - - /* Stop using pseudonym now. */ - if (pcb->eap.es_usepseudo && pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo != 2) { - remove_pn_file(); - pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo = 2; - } - -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - eap_send_response(pcb, id, typenum, (const u_char *)pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen); - break; - - case EAPT_NOTIFICATION: - if (len > 0) { - ppp_info("EAP: Notification \"%.*q\"", len, inp); - } - - eap_send_response(pcb, id, typenum, NULL, 0); - break; - - case EAPT_NAK: - /* - * Avoid the temptation to send Response Nak in reply - * to Request Nak here. It can only lead to trouble. - */ - ppp_warn("EAP: unexpected Nak in Request; ignored"); - /* Return because we're waiting for something real. */ - return; - - case EAPT_MD5CHAP: - if (len < 1) { - ppp_error("EAP: received MD5-Challenge with no data"); - /* Bogus request; wait for something real. */ - return; - } - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen < 8 || vallen > len) { - ppp_error("EAP: MD5-Challenge with bad length %d (8..%d)", - vallen, len); - /* Try something better. */ - eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_SRP); - break; - } - - /* Not so likely to happen. */ - if (vallen >= len + sizeof(rhostname)) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP: trimming really long peer name down"); - MEMCPY(rhostname, inp + vallen, sizeof(rhostname) - 1); - rhostname[sizeof(rhostname) - 1] = '\0'; - } else { - MEMCPY(rhostname, inp + vallen, len - vallen); - rhostname[len - vallen] = '\0'; - } - -#if PPP_REMOTENAME - - /* In case the remote doesn't give us his name. */ - if (pcb->settings.explicit_remote || - (pcb->settings.remote_name[0] != '\0' && vallen == len)) { - strlcpy(rhostname, pcb->settings.remote_name, sizeof(rhostname)); - } - -#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ - - /* - * Get the secret for authenticating ourselves with - * the specified host. - */ - if (!get_secret(pcb, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, - rhostname, secret, &secret_len, 0)) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP: no MD5 secret for auth to %q", rhostname); - eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_SRP); - break; - } - - lwip_md5_init(&mdContext); - lwip_md5_starts(&mdContext); - typenum = id; - lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, &typenum, 1); - lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, (u_char *)secret, secret_len); - BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); - lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, inp, vallen); - lwip_md5_finish(&mdContext, hash); - lwip_md5_free(&mdContext); - eap_chap_response(pcb, id, hash, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen); - break; - -#ifdef USE_SRP - - case EAPT_SRP: - if (len < 1) { - ppp_error("EAP: received empty SRP Request"); - /* Bogus request; wait for something real. */ - return; - } - - /* Get subtype */ - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - switch (vallen) { - case EAPSRP_CHALLENGE: - tc = NULL; - - if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session != NULL) { - tc = (struct t_client *)pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session; - - /* - * If this is a new challenge, then start - * over with a new client session context. - * Otherwise, just resend last response. - */ - if (id != pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id) { - t_clientclose(tc); - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session = NULL; - tc = NULL; - } - } - - /* No session key just yet */ - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey = NULL; - - if (tc == NULL) { - int rhostnamelen; - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen >= len) { - ppp_error("EAP: badly-formed SRP Challenge" - " (name)"); - /* Ignore badly-formed messages */ - return; - } - - MEMCPY(rhostname, inp, vallen); - rhostname[vallen] = '\0'; - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - - /* - * In case the remote doesn't give us his name, - * use configured name. - */ - if (explicit_remote || - (remote_name[0] != '\0' && vallen == 0)) { - strlcpy(rhostname, remote_name, - sizeof(rhostname)); - } - - rhostnamelen = (int)strlen(rhostname); - - if (rhostnamelen > MAXNAMELEN) { - rhostnamelen = MAXNAMELEN; - } - - MEMCPY(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_peer, rhostname, rhostnamelen); - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_peer[rhostnamelen] = '\0'; - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_peerlen = rhostnamelen; - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen >= len) { - ppp_error("EAP: badly-formed SRP Challenge" - " (s)"); - /* Ignore badly-formed messages */ - return; - } - - sval.data = inp; - sval.len = vallen; - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen > len) { - ppp_error("EAP: badly-formed SRP Challenge" - " (g)"); - /* Ignore badly-formed messages */ - return; - } - - /* If no generator present, then use value 2 */ - if (vallen == 0) { - gval.data = (u_char *)"\002"; - gval.len = 1; - } else { - gval.data = inp; - gval.len = vallen; - } - - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - - /* - * If no modulus present, then use well-known - * value. - */ - if (len == 0) { - Nval.data = (u_char *)wkmodulus; - Nval.len = sizeof(wkmodulus); - } else { - Nval.data = inp; - Nval.len = len; - } - - tc = t_clientopen(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, - &Nval, &gval, &sval); - - if (tc == NULL) { - eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); - break; - } - - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session = (void *)tc; - - /* Add Challenge ID & type to verifier */ - vals[0] = id; - vals[1] = EAPT_SRP; - t_clientaddexdata(tc, vals, 2); - } - - Ap = t_clientgenexp(tc); - eap_srp_response(esp, id, EAPSRP_CKEY, Ap->data, - Ap->len); - break; - - case EAPSRP_SKEY: - tc = (struct t_client *)pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session; - - if (tc == NULL) { - ppp_warn("EAP: peer sent Subtype 2 without 1"); - eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); - break; - } - - if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey != NULL) { - /* - * ID number should not change here. Warn - * if it does (but otherwise ignore). - */ - if (id != pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id) { - ppp_warn("EAP: ID changed from %d to %d " - "in SRP Subtype 2 rexmit", - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id, id); - } - } else { - if (get_srp_secret(pcb->eap.es_unit, - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_peer, secret, 0) == 0) { - /* - * Can't work with this peer because - * the secret is missing. Just give - * up. - */ - eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); - break; - } - - Bval.data = inp; - Bval.len = len; - t_clientpasswd(tc, secret); - BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey = - t_clientgetkey(tc, &Bval); - - if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey == NULL) { - /* Server is rogue; stop now */ - ppp_error("EAP: SRP server is rogue"); - goto client_failure; - } - } - - eap_srpval_response(esp, id, SRPVAL_EBIT, - t_clientresponse(tc)); - break; - - case EAPSRP_SVALIDATOR: - tc = (struct t_client *)pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session; - - if (tc == NULL || pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey == NULL) { - ppp_warn("EAP: peer sent Subtype 3 without 1/2"); - eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); - break; - } - - /* - * If we're already open, then this ought to be a - * duplicate. Otherwise, check that the server is - * who we think it is. - */ - if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state == eapOpen) { - if (id != pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id) { - ppp_warn("EAP: ID changed from %d to %d " - "in SRP Subtype 3 rexmit", - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id, id); - } - } else { - len -= sizeof(u32_t) + SHA_DIGESTSIZE; - - if (len < 0 || t_clientverify(tc, inp + - sizeof(u32_t)) != 0) { - ppp_error("EAP: SRP server verification " - "failed"); - goto client_failure; - } - - GETLONG(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_keyflags, inp); - - /* Save pseudonym if user wants it. */ - if (len > 0 && pcb->eap.es_usepseudo) { - INCPTR(SHA_DIGESTSIZE, inp); - write_pseudonym(esp, inp, len, id); - } - } - - /* - * We've verified our peer. We're now mostly done, - * except for waiting on the regular EAP Success - * message. - */ - eap_srp_response(esp, id, EAPSRP_ACK, NULL, 0); - break; - - case EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE: - if (len < 4) { - ppp_warn("EAP: malformed Lightweight rechallenge"); - return; - } - - SHA1Init(&ctxt); - vals[0] = id; - SHA1Update(&ctxt, vals, 1); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey, - SESSION_KEY_LEN); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, inp, len); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen); - SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); - eap_srp_response(esp, id, EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE, dig, - SHA_DIGESTSIZE); - break; - - default: - ppp_error("EAP: unknown SRP Subtype %d", vallen); - eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); - break; - } - - break; -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - default: - ppp_info("EAP: unknown authentication type %d; Naking", typenum); - eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_SRP); - break; - } - - if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); - TIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb, - pcb->settings.eap_req_time); - } - - return; - -#ifdef USE_SRP -client_failure: - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapBadAuth; - - if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, (void *)esp); - } - - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session = NULL; - t_clientclose(tc); - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); -#endif /* USE_SRP */ -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * eap_response - Receive EAP Response message (server mode). - */ -static void eap_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) -{ - u_char typenum; - u_char vallen; - int secret_len; - char secret[MAXSECRETLEN]; - char rhostname[MAXNAMELEN]; - lwip_md5_context mdContext; - u_char hash[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; -#ifdef USE_SRP - struct t_server *ts; - struct t_num A; - SHA1_CTX ctxt; - u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE]; -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id != id) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP: discarding Response %d; expected ID %d", id, - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id); - return; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_responses++; - - if (len <= 0) { - ppp_error("EAP: empty Response message discarded"); - return; - } - - GETCHAR(typenum, inp); - len--; - - switch (typenum) { - case EAPT_IDENTITY: - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapIdentify) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP discarding unwanted Identify \"%.q\"", len, - inp); - break; - } - - ppp_info("EAP: unauthenticated peer name \"%.*q\"", len, inp); - - if (len > MAXNAMELEN) { - len = MAXNAMELEN; - } - - MEMCPY(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, inp, len); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer[len] = '\0'; - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen = len; - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); - break; - - case EAPT_NOTIFICATION: - ppp_dbglog("EAP unexpected Notification; response discarded"); - break; - - case EAPT_NAK: - if (len < 1) { - ppp_info("EAP: Nak Response with no suggested protocol"); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); - break; - } - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if ( -#if PPP_REMOTENAME - !pcb->explicit_remote && -#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapIdentify) { - /* Peer cannot Nak Identify Request */ - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); - break; - } - - switch (vallen) { - case EAPT_SRP: - /* Run through SRP validator selection again. */ - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapIdentify; - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); - break; - - case EAPT_MD5CHAP: - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; - break; - - default: - ppp_dbglog("EAP: peer requesting unknown Type %d", vallen); - - switch (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state) { - case eapSRP1: - case eapSRP2: - case eapSRP3: - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; - break; - - case eapMD5Chall: - case eapSRP4: - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapIdentify; - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); - break; - - default: - break; - } - - break; - } - - break; - - case EAPT_MD5CHAP: - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapMD5Chall) { - ppp_error("EAP: unexpected MD5-Response"); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); - break; - } - - if (len < 1) { - ppp_error("EAP: received MD5-Response with no data"); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); - break; - } - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen != 16 || vallen > len) { - ppp_error("EAP: MD5-Response with bad length %d", vallen); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); - break; - } - - /* Not so likely to happen. */ - if (vallen >= len + sizeof(rhostname)) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP: trimming really long peer name down"); - MEMCPY(rhostname, inp + vallen, sizeof(rhostname) - 1); - rhostname[sizeof(rhostname) - 1] = '\0'; - } else { - MEMCPY(rhostname, inp + vallen, len - vallen); - rhostname[len - vallen] = '\0'; - } - -#if PPP_REMOTENAME - - /* In case the remote doesn't give us his name. */ - if (explicit_remote || - (remote_name[0] != '\0' && vallen == len)) { - strlcpy(rhostname, remote_name, sizeof(rhostname)); - } - -#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ - - /* - * Get the secret for authenticating the specified - * host. - */ - if (!get_secret(pcb, rhostname, - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name, secret, &secret_len, 1)) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP: no MD5 secret for auth of %q", rhostname); - eap_send_failure(pcb); - break; - } - - lwip_md5_init(&mdContext); - lwip_md5_starts(&mdContext); - lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, &pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, 1); - lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, (u_char *)secret, secret_len); - BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); - lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); - lwip_md5_finish(&mdContext, hash); - lwip_md5_free(&mdContext); - - if (BCMP(hash, inp, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) != 0) { - eap_send_failure(pcb); - break; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_type = EAPT_MD5CHAP; - eap_send_success(pcb); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); - - if (pcb->eap.es_rechallenge != 0) { - TIMEOUT(eap_rechallenge, pcb, pcb->eap.es_rechallenge); - } - - break; - -#ifdef USE_SRP - - case EAPT_SRP: - if (len < 1) { - ppp_error("EAP: empty SRP Response"); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); - break; - } - - GETCHAR(typenum, inp); - len--; - - switch (typenum) { - case EAPSRP_CKEY: - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP1) { - ppp_error("EAP: unexpected SRP Subtype 1 Response"); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); - break; - } - - A.data = inp; - A.len = len; - ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; - assert(ts != NULL); - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = t_servergetkey(ts, &A); - - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey == NULL) { - /* Client's A value is bogus; terminate now */ - ppp_error("EAP: bogus A value from client"); - eap_send_failure(pcb); - } else { - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); - } - - break; - - case EAPSRP_CVALIDATOR: - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP2) { - ppp_error("EAP: unexpected SRP Subtype 2 Response"); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); - break; - } - - if (len < sizeof(u32_t) + SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { - ppp_error("EAP: M1 length %d < %d", len, - sizeof(u32_t) + SHA_DIGESTSIZE); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); - break; - } - - GETLONG(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_keyflags, inp); - ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; - assert(ts != NULL); - - if (t_serververify(ts, inp)) { - ppp_info("EAP: unable to validate client identity"); - eap_send_failure(pcb); - break; - } - - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); - break; - - case EAPSRP_ACK: - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP3) { - ppp_error("EAP: unexpected SRP Subtype 3 Response"); - eap_send_failure(esp); - break; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_type = EAPT_SRP; - eap_send_success(pcb, esp); - eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); - - if (pcb->eap.es_rechallenge != 0) - TIMEOUT(eap_rechallenge, pcb, - pcb->eap.es_rechallenge); - - if (pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge != 0) - TIMEOUT(srp_lwrechallenge, pcb, - pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge); - - break; - - case EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE: - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP4) { - ppp_info("EAP: unexpected SRP Subtype 4 Response"); - return; - } - - if (len != SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { - ppp_error("EAP: bad Lightweight rechallenge " - "response"); - return; - } - - SHA1Init(&ctxt); - vallen = id; - SHA1Update(&ctxt, &vallen, 1); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey, - SESSION_KEY_LEN); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); - SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen); - SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); - - if (BCMP(dig, inp, SHA_DIGESTSIZE) != 0) { - ppp_error("EAP: failed Lightweight rechallenge"); - eap_send_failure(pcb); - break; - } - - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapOpen; - - if (pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge != 0) - TIMEOUT(srp_lwrechallenge, esp, - pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge); - - break; - } - - break; -#endif /* USE_SRP */ - - default: - /* This can't happen. */ - ppp_error("EAP: unknown Response type %d; ignored", typenum); - return; - } - - if (pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(eap_server_timeout, pcb); - } - - if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapBadAuth && - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapOpen) { - pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; - eap_send_request(pcb); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * eap_success - Receive EAP Success message (client mode). - */ -static void eap_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - - if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state != eapOpen && !eap_client_active(pcb)) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP unexpected success message in state %s (%d)", - eap_state_name(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state), - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state); - return; - } - - if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); - } - - if (len > 0) { - /* This is odd. The spec doesn't allow for this. */ - PRINTMSG(inp, len); - } - - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapOpen; - auth_withpeer_success(pcb, PPP_EAP, 0); -} - -/* - * eap_failure - Receive EAP Failure message (client mode). - */ -static void eap_failure(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - - if (!eap_client_active(pcb)) { - ppp_dbglog("EAP unexpected failure message in state %s (%d)", - eap_state_name(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state), - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state); - } - - if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); - } - - if (len > 0) { - /* This is odd. The spec doesn't allow for this. */ - PRINTMSG(inp, len); - } - - pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapBadAuth; - - ppp_error("EAP: peer reports authentication failure"); - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); -} - -/* - * eap_input - Handle received EAP message. - */ -static void eap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int inlen) -{ - u_char code, id; - int len; - - /* - * Parse header (code, id and length). If packet too short, - * drop it. - */ - if (inlen < EAP_HEADERLEN) { - ppp_error("EAP: packet too short: %d < %d", inlen, EAP_HEADERLEN); - return; - } - - GETCHAR(code, inp); - GETCHAR(id, inp); - GETSHORT(len, inp); - - if (len < EAP_HEADERLEN || len > inlen) { - ppp_error("EAP: packet has illegal length field %d (%d..%d)", len, - EAP_HEADERLEN, inlen); - return; - } - - len -= EAP_HEADERLEN; - - /* Dispatch based on message code */ - switch (code) { - case EAP_REQUEST: - eap_request(pcb, inp, id, len); - break; - -#if PPP_SERVER - - case EAP_RESPONSE: - eap_response(pcb, inp, id, len); - break; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - - case EAP_SUCCESS: - eap_success(pcb, inp, id, len); - break; - - case EAP_FAILURE: - eap_failure(pcb, inp, id, len); - break; - - default: /* XXX Need code reject */ - /* Note: it's not legal to send EAP Nak here. */ - ppp_warn("EAP: unknown code %d received", code); - break; - } -} - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * eap_printpkt - print the contents of an EAP packet. - */ -static const char *const eap_codenames[] = { - "Request", "Response", "Success", "Failure" -}; - -static const char *const eap_typenames[] = { - "Identity", "Notification", "Nak", "MD5-Challenge", - "OTP", "Generic-Token", NULL, NULL, - "RSA", "DSS", "KEA", "KEA-Validate", - "TLS", "Defender", "Windows 2000", "Arcot", - "Cisco", "Nokia", "SRP" -}; - -static int eap_printpkt(const u_char *inp, int inlen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) -{ - int code, id, len, rtype, vallen; - const u_char *pstart; - u32_t uval; - - if (inlen < EAP_HEADERLEN) { - return (0); - } - - pstart = inp; - GETCHAR(code, inp); - GETCHAR(id, inp); - GETSHORT(len, inp); - - if (len < EAP_HEADERLEN || len > inlen) { - return (0); - } - - if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(eap_codenames)) { - printer(arg, " %s", eap_codenames[code - 1]); - } else { - printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); - } - - printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); - len -= EAP_HEADERLEN; - - switch (code) { - case EAP_REQUEST: - if (len < 1) { - printer(arg, " "); - break; - } - - GETCHAR(rtype, inp); - len--; - - if (rtype >= 1 && rtype <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(eap_typenames)) { - printer(arg, " %s", eap_typenames[rtype - 1]); - } else { - printer(arg, " type=0x%x", rtype); - } - - switch (rtype) { - case EAPT_IDENTITY: - case EAPT_NOTIFICATION: - if (len > 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - } else { - printer(arg, " "); - } - - break; - - case EAPT_MD5CHAP: - if (len <= 0) { - break; - } - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen > len) { - goto truncated; - } - - printer(arg, " ", vallen, inp); - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - - if (len > 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - } else { - printer(arg, " "); - } - - break; - - case EAPT_SRP: - if (len < 3) { - goto truncated; - } - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - printer(arg, "-%d", vallen); - - switch (vallen) { - case EAPSRP_CHALLENGE: - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen >= len) { - goto truncated; - } - - if (vallen > 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - } else { - printer(arg, " "); - } - - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen >= len) { - goto truncated; - } - - printer(arg, " ", vallen, inp); - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen > len) { - goto truncated; - } - - if (vallen == 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - } else { - printer(arg, " ", vallen, inp); - } - - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - - if (len == 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - } else { - printer(arg, " ", len, inp); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - } - - break; - - case EAPSRP_SKEY: - printer(arg, " ", len, inp); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - break; - - case EAPSRP_SVALIDATOR: - if (len < (int)sizeof(u32_t)) { - break; - } - - GETLONG(uval, inp); - len -= sizeof(u32_t); - - if (uval & SRPVAL_EBIT) { - printer(arg, " E"); - uval &= ~SRPVAL_EBIT; - } - - if (uval != 0) { - printer(arg, " f<%X>", uval); - } - - if ((vallen = len) > SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { - vallen = SHA_DIGESTSIZE; - } - - printer(arg, " ", len, inp, - len < SHA_DIGESTSIZE ? "?" : ""); - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - - if (len > 0) { - printer(arg, " ", len, inp); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - } - - break; - - case EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE: - printer(arg, " ", len, inp); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - break; - - default: - break; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - break; - - case EAP_RESPONSE: - if (len < 1) { - break; - } - - GETCHAR(rtype, inp); - len--; - - if (rtype >= 1 && rtype <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(eap_typenames)) { - printer(arg, " %s", eap_typenames[rtype - 1]); - } else { - printer(arg, " type=0x%x", rtype); - } - - switch (rtype) { - case EAPT_IDENTITY: - if (len > 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - } - - break; - - case EAPT_NAK: - if (len <= 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - break; - } - - GETCHAR(rtype, inp); - len--; - printer(arg, " = 1 && rtype < (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(eap_typenames)) { - printer(arg, " (%s)", eap_typenames[rtype - 1]); - } - - printer(arg, ">"); - break; - - case EAPT_MD5CHAP: - if (len <= 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - break; - } - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - - if (vallen > len) { - goto truncated; - } - - printer(arg, " ", vallen, inp); - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - - if (len > 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - } else { - printer(arg, " "); - } - - break; - - case EAPT_SRP: - if (len < 1) { - goto truncated; - } - - GETCHAR(vallen, inp); - len--; - printer(arg, "-%d", vallen); - - switch (vallen) { - case EAPSRP_CKEY: - printer(arg, " ", len, inp); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - break; - - case EAPSRP_CVALIDATOR: - if (len < (int)sizeof(u32_t)) { - break; - } - - GETLONG(uval, inp); - len -= sizeof(u32_t); - - if (uval & SRPVAL_EBIT) { - printer(arg, " E"); - uval &= ~SRPVAL_EBIT; - } - - if (uval != 0) { - printer(arg, " f<%X>", uval); - } - - printer(arg, " ", len, inp, - len == SHA_DIGESTSIZE ? "" : "?"); - INCPTR(len, inp); - len = 0; - break; - - case EAPSRP_ACK: - break; - - case EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE: - printer(arg, " ", len, inp, - len == SHA_DIGESTSIZE ? "" : "?"); - - if ((vallen = len) > SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { - vallen = SHA_DIGESTSIZE; - } - - INCPTR(vallen, inp); - len -= vallen; - break; - - default: - break; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - break; - - case EAP_SUCCESS: /* No payload expected for these! */ - case EAP_FAILURE: - default: - break; - - truncated: - printer(arg, " "); - break; - } - - if (len > 8) { - printer(arg, "%8B...", inp); - } else if (len > 0) { - printer(arg, "%.*B", len, inp); - } - - INCPTR(len, inp); - - return (inp - pstart); -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * eap.c - Extensible Authentication Protocol for PPP (RFC 2284) + * + * Copyright (c) 2001 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Non-exclusive rights to redistribute, modify, translate, and use + * this software in source and binary forms, in whole or in part, is + * hereby granted, provided that the above copyright notice is + * duplicated in any source form, and that neither the name of the + * copyright holder nor the author is used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + * + * Original version by James Carlson + * + * This implementation of EAP supports MD5-Challenge and SRP-SHA1 + * authentication styles. Note that support of MD5-Challenge is a + * requirement of RFC 2284, and that it's essentially just a + * reimplementation of regular RFC 1994 CHAP using EAP messages. + * + * As an authenticator ("server"), there are multiple phases for each + * style. In the first phase of each style, the unauthenticated peer + * name is queried using the EAP Identity request type. If the + * "remotename" option is used, then this phase is skipped, because + * the peer's name is presumed to be known. + * + * For MD5-Challenge, there are two phases, and the second phase + * consists of sending the challenge itself and handling the + * associated response. + * + * For SRP-SHA1, there are four phases. The second sends 's', 'N', + * and 'g'. The reply contains 'A'. The third sends 'B', and the + * reply contains 'M1'. The forth sends the 'M2' value. + * + * As an authenticatee ("client"), there's just a single phase -- + * responding to the queries generated by the peer. EAP is an + * authenticator-driven protocol. + * + * Based on draft-ietf-pppext-eap-srp-03.txt. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/eap.h" +#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" + +#ifdef USE_SRP +#include +#include +#include +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + +#ifndef SHA_DIGESTSIZE +#define SHA_DIGESTSIZE 20 +#endif + +#ifdef USE_SRP +static char *pn_secret = NULL; /* Pseudonym generating secret */ +#endif + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * Command-line options. + */ +static option_t eap_option_list[] = { + { "eap-restart", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_server.ea_timeout, + "Set retransmit timeout for EAP Requests (server)" }, + { "eap-max-sreq", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_server.ea_maxrequests, + "Set max number of EAP Requests sent (server)" }, + { "eap-timeout", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_client.ea_timeout, + "Set time limit for peer EAP authentication" }, + { "eap-max-rreq", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_client.ea_maxrequests, + "Set max number of EAP Requests allows (client)" }, + { "eap-interval", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_rechallenge, + "Set interval for EAP rechallenge" }, +#ifdef USE_SRP + { "srp-interval", o_int, &eap_states[0].es_lwrechallenge, + "Set interval for SRP lightweight rechallenge" }, + { "srp-pn-secret", o_string, &pn_secret, + "Long term pseudonym generation secret" }, + { "srp-use-pseudonym", o_bool, &eap_states[0].es_usepseudo, + "Use pseudonym if offered one by server", 1 }, +#endif + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * Protocol entry points. + */ +static void eap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void eap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int inlen); +static void eap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void eap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void eap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static int eap_printpkt(const u_char *inp, int inlen, + void (*)(void *arg, const char *fmt, ...), void *arg); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +const struct protent eap_protent = { + PPP_EAP, /* protocol number */ + eap_init, /* initialization procedure */ + eap_input, /* process a received packet */ + eap_protrej, /* process a received protocol-reject */ + eap_lowerup, /* lower layer has gone up */ + eap_lowerdown, /* lower layer has gone down */ + NULL, /* open the protocol */ + NULL, /* close the protocol */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + eap_printpkt, /* print a packet in readable form */ +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT + NULL, /* process a received data packet */ +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + "EAP", /* text name of protocol */ + NULL, /* text name of corresponding data protocol */ +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS + eap_option_list, /* list of command-line options */ + NULL, /* check requested options; assign defaults */ +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + NULL, /* configure interface for demand-dial */ + NULL /* say whether to bring up link for this pkt */ +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +}; + +#ifdef USE_SRP +/* + * A well-known 2048 bit modulus. + */ +static const u_char wkmodulus[] = { + 0xAC, 0x6B, 0xDB, 0x41, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x9A, 0x9B, + 0xF1, 0x66, 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x13, 0x89, 0x58, 0x2F, + 0xAF, 0x72, 0xB6, 0x65, 0x19, 0x87, 0xEE, 0x07, + 0xFC, 0x31, 0x92, 0x94, 0x3D, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x50, + 0xA3, 0x73, 0x29, 0xCB, 0xB4, 0xA0, 0x99, 0xED, + 0x81, 0x93, 0xE0, 0x75, 0x77, 0x67, 0xA1, 0x3D, + 0xD5, 0x23, 0x12, 0xAB, 0x4B, 0x03, 0x31, 0x0D, + 0xCD, 0x7F, 0x48, 0xA9, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xFD, 0x50, + 0xE8, 0x08, 0x39, 0x69, 0xED, 0xB7, 0x67, 0xB0, + 0xCF, 0x60, 0x95, 0x17, 0x9A, 0x16, 0x3A, 0xB3, + 0x66, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xFB, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0xAA, 0xE8, + 0x29, 0x18, 0xA9, 0x96, 0x2F, 0x0B, 0x93, 0xB8, + 0x55, 0xF9, 0x79, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x97, 0x5E, 0xEA, + 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x74, 0x0A, 0xDB, 0xF4, 0xFF, 0x74, + 0x73, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x41, 0xD5, 0xC3, 0x3E, 0xA7, + 0x1D, 0x28, 0x1E, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x14, 0x77, 0x3B, + 0xCA, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xFB, 0x80, 0x16, + 0x76, 0xBD, 0x20, 0x7A, 0x43, 0x6C, 0x64, 0x81, + 0xF1, 0xD2, 0xB9, 0x07, 0x87, 0x17, 0x46, 0x1A, + 0x5B, 0x9D, 0x32, 0xE6, 0x88, 0xF8, 0x77, 0x48, + 0x54, 0x45, 0x23, 0xB5, 0x24, 0xB0, 0xD5, 0x7D, + 0x5E, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0x27, 0x75, 0xD2, 0xEC, 0xFA, + 0x03, 0x2C, 0xFB, 0xDB, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0xB3, 0x78, + 0x61, 0x60, 0x27, 0x90, 0x04, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0xE6, + 0xAF, 0x87, 0x4E, 0x73, 0x03, 0xCE, 0x53, 0x29, + 0x9C, 0xCC, 0x04, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x08, 0xD8, + 0x2A, 0x56, 0x98, 0xF3, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0x82, + 0x71, 0xAE, 0x35, 0xF8, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xFB, 0xB6, + 0x94, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x03, 0xD8, 0x9F, 0x7A, 0xE4, + 0x35, 0xDE, 0x23, 0x6D, 0x52, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x75, + 0x9B, 0x65, 0xE3, 0x72, 0xFC, 0xD6, 0x8E, 0xF2, + 0x0F, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x1F, 0x9E, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x73 +}; +#endif + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* Local forward declarations. */ +static void eap_server_timeout(void *arg); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * Convert EAP state code to printable string for debug. + */ +static const char *eap_state_name(enum eap_state_code esc) +{ + static const char *state_names[] = { EAP_STATES }; + + return (state_names[(int)esc]); +} + +/* + * eap_init - Initialize state for an EAP user. This is currently + * called once by main() during start-up. + */ +static void eap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + BZERO(&pcb->eap, sizeof(eap_state)); +#if PPP_SERVER + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id = magic(); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +} + +/* + * eap_client_timeout - Give up waiting for the peer to send any + * Request messages. + */ +static void eap_client_timeout(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + + if (!eap_client_active(pcb)) { + return; + } + + ppp_error("EAP: timeout waiting for Request from peer"); + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapBadAuth; +} + +/* + * eap_authwithpeer - Authenticate to our peer (behave as client). + * + * Start client state and wait for requests. This is called only + * after eap_lowerup. + */ +void eap_authwithpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *localname) +{ + if (NULL == localname) { + return; + } + + /* Save the peer name we're given */ + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name = localname; + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen = strlen(localname); + + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapListen; + + /* + * Start a timer so that if the other end just goes + * silent, we don't sit here waiting forever. + */ + if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) + TIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb, + pcb->settings.eap_req_time); +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * Format a standard EAP Failure message and send it to the peer. + * (Server operation) + */ +static void eap_send_failure(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + EAP_HEADERLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); + + PUTCHAR(EAP_FAILURE, outp); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; + PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, outp); + PUTSHORT(EAP_HEADERLEN, outp); + + ppp_write(pcb, p); + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; + auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); +} + +/* + * Format a standard EAP Success message and send it to the peer. + * (Server operation) + */ +static void eap_send_success(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + EAP_HEADERLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); + + PUTCHAR(EAP_SUCCESS, outp); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; + PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, outp); + PUTSHORT(EAP_HEADERLEN, outp); + + ppp_write(pcb, p); + + auth_peer_success(pcb, PPP_EAP, 0, + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen); +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +#ifdef USE_SRP +/* + * Set DES key according to pseudonym-generating secret and current + * date. + */ +static bool pncrypt_setkey(int timeoffs) +{ + struct tm *tp; + char tbuf[9]; + SHA1_CTX ctxt; + u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE]; + time_t reftime; + + if (pn_secret == NULL) { + return (0); + } + + reftime = time(NULL) + timeoffs; + tp = localtime(&reftime); + SHA1Init(&ctxt); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pn_secret, strlen(pn_secret)); + strftime(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%Y%m%d", tp); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, tbuf, strlen(tbuf)); + SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); + /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ + return (DesSetkey(dig)); +} + +static char base64[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; + +struct b64state { + u32_t bs_bits; + int bs_offs; +}; + +static int b64enc(bs, inp, inlen, outp) struct b64state *bs; +u_char *inp; +int inlen; +u_char *outp; +{ + int outlen = 0; + + while (inlen > 0) { + bs->bs_bits = (bs->bs_bits << 8) | *inp++; + inlen--; + bs->bs_offs += 8; + + if (bs->bs_offs >= 24) { + *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 18) & 0x3F]; + *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 12) & 0x3F]; + *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 6) & 0x3F]; + *outp++ = base64[bs->bs_bits & 0x3F]; + outlen += 4; + bs->bs_offs = 0; + bs->bs_bits = 0; + } + } + + return (outlen); +} + +static int b64flush(bs, outp) struct b64state *bs; +u_char *outp; +{ + int outlen = 0; + + if (bs->bs_offs == 8) { + *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 2) & 0x3F]; + *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits << 4) & 0x3F]; + outlen = 2; + } else if (bs->bs_offs == 16) { + *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 10) & 0x3F]; + *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits >> 4) & 0x3F]; + *outp++ = base64[(bs->bs_bits << 2) & 0x3F]; + outlen = 3; + } + + bs->bs_offs = 0; + bs->bs_bits = 0; + return (outlen); +} + +static int b64dec(bs, inp, inlen, outp) struct b64state *bs; +u_char *inp; +int inlen; +u_char *outp; +{ + int outlen = 0; + char *cp; + + while (inlen > 0) { + if ((cp = strchr(base64, *inp++)) == NULL) { + break; + } + + bs->bs_bits = (bs->bs_bits << 6) | (cp - base64); + inlen--; + bs->bs_offs += 6; + + if (bs->bs_offs >= 8) { + *outp++ = bs->bs_bits >> (bs->bs_offs - 8); + outlen++; + bs->bs_offs -= 8; + } + } + + return (outlen); +} +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * Assume that current waiting server state is complete and figure + * next state to use based on available authentication data. 'status' + * indicates if there was an error in handling the last query. It is + * 0 for success and non-zero for failure. + */ +static void eap_figure_next_state(ppp_pcb *pcb, int status) +{ +#ifdef USE_SRP + unsigned char secbuf[MAXSECRETLEN], clear[8], *sp, *dp; + struct t_pw tpw; + struct t_confent *tce, mytce; + char *cp, *cp2; + struct t_server *ts; + int id, i, plen, toffs; + u_char vals[2]; + struct b64state bs; +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time = pcb->eap.es_savedtime; + + switch (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state) { + case eapBadAuth: + return; + + case eapIdentify: +#ifdef USE_SRP + /* Discard any previous session. */ + ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; + + if (ts != NULL) { + t_serverclose(ts); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = NULL; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = NULL; + } + +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + if (status != 0) { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; + break; + } + +#ifdef USE_SRP + + /* If we've got a pseudonym, try to decode to real name. */ + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen > SRP_PSEUDO_LEN && + strncmp(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, SRP_PSEUDO_ID, + SRP_PSEUDO_LEN) == 0 && + (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen - SRP_PSEUDO_LEN) * 3 / 4 < + sizeof(secbuf)) { + BZERO(&bs, sizeof(bs)); + plen = b64dec(&bs, + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer + SRP_PSEUDO_LEN, + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen - SRP_PSEUDO_LEN, + secbuf); + toffs = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + pncrypt_setkey(toffs); + toffs -= 86400; + + /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ + if (!DesDecrypt(secbuf, clear)) { + ppp_dbglog("no DES here; cannot decode " + "pseudonym"); + return; + } + + id = *(unsigned char *)clear; + + if (id + 1 <= plen && id + 9 > plen) { + break; + } + } + + if (plen % 8 == 0 && i < 5) { + /* + * Note that this is always shorter than the + * original stored string, so there's no need + * to realloc. + */ + if ((i = plen = *(unsigned char *)clear) > 7) { + i = 7; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen = plen; + dp = (unsigned char *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer; + MEMCPY(dp, clear + 1, i); + plen -= i; + dp += i; + sp = secbuf + 8; + + while (plen > 0) { + /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ + (void)DesDecrypt(sp, dp); + sp += 8; + dp += 8; + plen -= 8; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer[pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen] = '\0'; + ppp_dbglog("decoded pseudonym to \"%.*q\"", + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen, + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer); + } else { + ppp_dbglog("failed to decode real name"); + /* Stay in eapIdentfy state; requery */ + break; + } + } + + /* Look up user in secrets database. */ + if (get_srp_secret(pcb->eap.es_unit, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name, (char *)secbuf, 1) != 0) { + /* Set up default in case SRP entry is bad */ + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; + /* Get t_confent based on index in srp-secrets */ + id = strtol((char *)secbuf, &cp, 10); + + if (*cp++ != ':' || id < 0) { + break; + } + + if (id == 0) { + mytce.index = 0; + mytce.modulus.data = (u_char *)wkmodulus; + mytce.modulus.len = sizeof(wkmodulus); + mytce.generator.data = (u_char *)"\002"; + mytce.generator.len = 1; + tce = &mytce; + } else if ((tce = gettcid(id)) != NULL) { + /* + * Client will have to verify this modulus/ + * generator combination, and that will take + * a while. Lengthen the timeout here. + */ + if (pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time > 0 && + pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time < 30) { + pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time = 30; + } + } else { + break; + } + + if ((cp2 = strchr(cp, ':')) == NULL) { + break; + } + + *cp2++ = '\0'; + tpw.pebuf.name = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer; + tpw.pebuf.password.len = t_fromb64((char *)tpw.pwbuf, + cp); + tpw.pebuf.password.data = tpw.pwbuf; + tpw.pebuf.salt.len = t_fromb64((char *)tpw.saltbuf, + cp2); + tpw.pebuf.salt.data = tpw.saltbuf; + + if ((ts = t_serveropenraw(&tpw.pebuf, tce)) == NULL) { + break; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = (void *)ts; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapSRP1; + vals[0] = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id + 1; + vals[1] = EAPT_SRP; + t_serveraddexdata(ts, vals, 2); + /* Generate B; must call before t_servergetkey() */ + t_servergenexp(ts); + break; + } + +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; + break; + + case eapSRP1: +#ifdef USE_SRP + ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; + + if (ts != NULL && status != 0) { + t_serverclose(ts); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = NULL; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = NULL; + } + +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + if (status == 1) { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; + } else if (status != 0 || pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session == NULL) { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; + } else { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapSRP2; + } + + break; + + case eapSRP2: +#ifdef USE_SRP + ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; + + if (ts != NULL && status != 0) { + t_serverclose(ts); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = NULL; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = NULL; + } + +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + if (status != 0 || pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session == NULL) { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; + } else { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapSRP3; + } + + break; + + case eapSRP3: + case eapSRP4: +#ifdef USE_SRP + ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; + + if (ts != NULL && status != 0) { + t_serverclose(ts); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session = NULL; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = NULL; + } + +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + if (status != 0 || pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session == NULL) { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; + } else { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapOpen; + } + + break; + + case eapMD5Chall: + if (status != 0) { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; + } else { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapOpen; + } + + break; + + default: + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapBadAuth; + break; + } + + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapBadAuth) { + eap_send_failure(pcb); + } +} + +/* + * Format an EAP Request message and send it to the peer. Message + * type depends on current state. (Server operation) + */ +static void eap_send_request(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + u_char *lenloc; + int outlen; + int len; + const char *str; +#ifdef USE_SRP + struct t_server *ts; + u_char clear[8], cipher[8], dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE], *optr, *cp; + int i, j; + struct b64state b64; + SHA1_CTX ctxt; +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + /* Handle both initial auth and restart */ + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state < eapIdentify && + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapInitial) { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapIdentify; +#if PPP_REMOTENAME + + if (pcb->settings.explicit_remote && pcb->remote_name) { + /* + * If we already know the peer's + * unauthenticated name, then there's no + * reason to ask. Go to next state instead. + */ + int len = (int)strlen(pcb->remote_name); + + if (len > MAXNAMELEN) { + len = MAXNAMELEN; + } + + MEMCPY(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, pcb->remote_name, len); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer[len] = '\0'; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen = len; + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); + } + +#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ + } + + if (pcb->settings.eap_max_transmits > 0 && + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests >= pcb->settings.eap_max_transmits) { + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_responses > 0) { + ppp_error("EAP: too many Requests sent"); + } else { + ppp_error("EAP: no response to Requests"); + } + + eap_send_failure(pcb); + return; + } + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); + + PUTCHAR(EAP_REQUEST, outp); + PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, outp); + lenloc = outp; + INCPTR(2, outp); + + switch (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state) { + case eapIdentify: + PUTCHAR(EAPT_IDENTITY, outp); + str = "Name"; + len = strlen(str); + MEMCPY(outp, str, len); + INCPTR(len, outp); + break; + + case eapMD5Chall: + PUTCHAR(EAPT_MD5CHAP, outp); + /* + * pick a random challenge length between + * EAP_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH and EAP_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH + */ + pcb->eap.es_challen = EAP_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH + + magic_pow(EAP_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); + PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_challen, outp); + magic_random_bytes(pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); + MEMCPY(outp, pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); + INCPTR(pcb->eap.es_challen, outp); + MEMCPY(outp, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen); + INCPTR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen, outp); + break; + +#ifdef USE_SRP + + case eapSRP1: + PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); + PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_CHALLENGE, outp); + + PUTCHAR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen, outp); + MEMCPY(outp, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen); + INCPTR(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen, outp); + + ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; + assert(ts != NULL); + PUTCHAR(ts->s.len, outp); + MEMCPY(outp, ts->s.data, ts->s.len); + INCPTR(ts->s.len, outp); + + if (ts->g.len == 1 && ts->g.data[0] == 2) { + PUTCHAR(0, outp); + } else { + PUTCHAR(ts->g.len, outp); + MEMCPY(outp, ts->g.data, ts->g.len); + INCPTR(ts->g.len, outp); + } + + if (ts->n.len != sizeof(wkmodulus) || + BCMP(ts->n.data, wkmodulus, sizeof(wkmodulus)) != 0) { + MEMCPY(outp, ts->n.data, ts->n.len); + INCPTR(ts->n.len, outp); + } + + break; + + case eapSRP2: + PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); + PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_SKEY, outp); + + ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; + assert(ts != NULL); + MEMCPY(outp, ts->B.data, ts->B.len); + INCPTR(ts->B.len, outp); + break; + + case eapSRP3: + PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); + PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_SVALIDATOR, outp); + PUTLONG(SRPVAL_EBIT, outp); + ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; + assert(ts != NULL); + MEMCPY(outp, t_serverresponse(ts), SHA_DIGESTSIZE); + INCPTR(SHA_DIGESTSIZE, outp); + + if (pncrypt_setkey(0)) { + /* Generate pseudonym */ + optr = outp; + cp = (unsigned char *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer; + + if ((j = i = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen) > 7) { + j = 7; + } + + clear[0] = i; + MEMCPY(clear + 1, cp, j); + i -= j; + cp += j; + + /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ + if (!DesEncrypt(clear, cipher)) { + ppp_dbglog("no DES here; not generating pseudonym"); + break; + } + + BZERO(&b64, sizeof(b64)); + outp++; /* space for pseudonym length */ + outp += b64enc(&b64, cipher, 8, outp); + + while (i >= 8) { + /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ + (void)DesEncrypt(cp, cipher); + outp += b64enc(&b64, cipher, 8, outp); + cp += 8; + i -= 8; + } + + if (i > 0) { + MEMCPY(clear, cp, i); + cp += i; + magic_random_bytes(cp, 8 - i); + /* FIXME: if we want to do SRP, we need to find a way to pass the PolarSSL des_context instead of using static memory */ + (void)DesEncrypt(clear, cipher); + outp += b64enc(&b64, cipher, 8, outp); + } + + outp += b64flush(&b64, outp); + + /* Set length and pad out to next 20 octet boundary */ + i = outp - optr - 1; + *optr = i; + i %= SHA_DIGESTSIZE; + + if (i != 0) { + magic_random_bytes(outp, SHA_DIGESTSIZE - i); + INCPTR(SHA_DIGESTSIZE - i, outp); + } + + /* Obscure the pseudonym with SHA1 hash */ + SHA1Init(&ctxt); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, &pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, 1); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey, + SESSION_KEY_LEN); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen); + + while (optr < outp) { + SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); + cp = dig; + + while (cp < dig + SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { + *optr++ ^= *cp++; + } + + SHA1Init(&ctxt); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, &pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, 1); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey, + SESSION_KEY_LEN); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, optr - SHA_DIGESTSIZE, + SHA_DIGESTSIZE); + } + } + + break; + + case eapSRP4: + PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); + PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE, outp); + pcb->eap.es_challen = EAP_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH + + magic_pow(EAP_MIN_MAX_POWER_OF_TWO_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); + magic_random_bytes(pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); + MEMCPY(outp, pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); + INCPTR(pcb->eap.es_challen, outp); + break; +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + default: + return; + } + + outlen = (outp - (unsigned char *)p->payload) - PPP_HDRLEN; + PUTSHORT(outlen, lenloc); + + pbuf_realloc(p, outlen + PPP_HDRLEN); + ppp_write(pcb, p); + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests++; + + if (pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time > 0) { + TIMEOUT(eap_server_timeout, pcb, pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time); + } +} + +/* + * eap_authpeer - Authenticate our peer (behave as server). + * + * Start server state and send first request. This is called only + * after eap_lowerup. + */ +void eap_authpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *localname) +{ + /* Save the name we're given. */ + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name = localname; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_namelen = strlen(localname); + + pcb->eap.es_savedtime = pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time; + + /* Lower layer up yet? */ + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapInitial || + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapPending) { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapPending; + return; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapPending; + + /* ID number not updated here intentionally; hashed into M1 */ + eap_send_request(pcb); +} + +/* + * eap_server_timeout - Retransmission timer for sending Requests + * expired. + */ +static void eap_server_timeout(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + + if (!eap_server_active(pcb)) { + return; + } + + /* EAP ID number must not change on timeout. */ + eap_send_request(pcb); +} + +/* + * When it's time to send rechallenge the peer, this timeout is + * called. Once the rechallenge is successful, the response handler + * will restart the timer. If it fails, then the link is dropped. + */ +static void eap_rechallenge(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapOpen && + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP4) { + return; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests = 0; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapIdentify; + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; + eap_send_request(pcb); +} + +static void srp_lwrechallenge(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapOpen || + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_type != EAPT_SRP) { + return; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests = 0; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapSRP4; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; + eap_send_request(pcb); +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * eap_lowerup - The lower layer is now up. + * + * This is called before either eap_authpeer or eap_authwithpeer. See + * link_established() in auth.c. All that's necessary here is to + * return to closed state so that those two routines will do the right + * thing. + */ +static void eap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapClosed; +#if PPP_SERVER + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapClosed; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +} + +/* + * eap_lowerdown - The lower layer is now down. + * + * Cancel all timeouts and return to initial state. + */ +static void eap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + if (eap_client_active(pcb) && pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); + } + +#if PPP_SERVER + + if (eap_server_active(pcb)) { + if (pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(eap_server_timeout, pcb); + } + } else { + if ((pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapOpen || + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapSRP4) && + pcb->eap.es_rechallenge > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(eap_rechallenge, (void *)pcb); + } + + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapOpen && + pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(srp_lwrechallenge, (void *)pcb); + } + } + + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapInitial; + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_requests = pcb->eap.es_server.ea_requests = 0; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +} + +/* + * eap_protrej - Peer doesn't speak this protocol. + * + * This shouldn't happen. If it does, it represents authentication + * failure. + */ +static void eap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + if (eap_client_active(pcb)) { + ppp_error("EAP authentication failed due to Protocol-Reject"); + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); + } + +#if PPP_SERVER + + if (eap_server_active(pcb)) { + ppp_error("EAP authentication of peer failed on Protocol-Reject"); + auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); + } + +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + eap_lowerdown(pcb); +} + +/* + * Format and send a regular EAP Response message. + */ +static void eap_send_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char id, u_char typenum, const u_char *str, int lenstr) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + int msglen; + + msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + sizeof(u_char) + lenstr; + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); + + PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); + PUTCHAR(id, outp); + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; + PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); + PUTCHAR(typenum, outp); + + if (lenstr > 0) { + MEMCPY(outp, str, lenstr); + } + + ppp_write(pcb, p); +} + +/* + * Format and send an MD5-Challenge EAP Response message. + */ +static void eap_chap_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char id, u_char *hash, const char *name, int namelen) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + int msglen; + + msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char) + MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE + + namelen; + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); + + PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); + PUTCHAR(id, outp); + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; + PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); + PUTCHAR(EAPT_MD5CHAP, outp); + PUTCHAR(MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE, outp); + MEMCPY(outp, hash, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + INCPTR(MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE, outp); + + if (namelen > 0) { + MEMCPY(outp, name, namelen); + } + + ppp_write(pcb, p); +} + +#ifdef USE_SRP +/* + * Format and send a SRP EAP Response message. + */ +static void eap_srp_response(esp, id, subtypenum, str, lenstr) + eap_state *esp; +u_char id; +u_char subtypenum; +u_char *str; +int lenstr; +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[pcb->eap.es_unit]; + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + int msglen; + + msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char) + lenstr; + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = p->payload; + + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); + + PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); + PUTCHAR(id, outp); + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; + PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); + PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); + PUTCHAR(subtypenum, outp); + + if (lenstr > 0) { + MEMCPY(outp, str, lenstr); + } + + ppp_write(pcb, p); +} + +/* + * Format and send a SRP EAP Client Validator Response message. + */ +static void eap_srpval_response(esp, id, flags, str) + eap_state *esp; +u_char id; +u32_t flags; +u_char *str; +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[pcb->eap.es_unit]; + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + int msglen; + + msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char) + sizeof(u32_t) + + SHA_DIGESTSIZE; + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = p->payload; + + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); + + PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); + PUTCHAR(id, outp); + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; + PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); + PUTCHAR(EAPT_SRP, outp); + PUTCHAR(EAPSRP_CVALIDATOR, outp); + PUTLONG(flags, outp); + MEMCPY(outp, str, SHA_DIGESTSIZE); + + ppp_write(pcb, p); +} +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + +static void eap_send_nak(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char id, u_char type) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + int msglen; + + msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char); + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + msglen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP); + + PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp); + PUTCHAR(id, outp); + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id = id; + PUTSHORT(msglen, outp); + PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp); + PUTCHAR(type, outp); + + ppp_write(pcb, p); +} + +#ifdef USE_SRP +static char *name_of_pn_file() +{ + char *user, *path, *file; + struct passwd *pw; + size_t pl; + static bool pnlogged = 0; + + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + + if (pw == NULL || (user = pw->pw_dir) == NULL || user[0] == 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + return (NULL); + } + + file = _PATH_PSEUDONYM; + pl = strlen(user) + strlen(file) + 2; + path = malloc(pl); + + if (path == NULL) { + return (NULL); + } + + (void)slprintf(path, pl, "%s/%s", user, file); + + if (!pnlogged) { + ppp_dbglog("pseudonym file: %s", path); + pnlogged = 1; + } + + return (path); +} + +static int open_pn_file(modebits) + mode_t modebits; +{ + char *path; + int fd, err; + + if ((path = name_of_pn_file()) == NULL) { + return (-1); + } + + fd = open(path, modebits, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + err = errno; + free(path); + errno = err; + return (fd); +} + +static void remove_pn_file() +{ + char *path; + + if ((path = name_of_pn_file()) != NULL) { + (void)unlink(path); + (void)free(path); + } +} + +static void write_pseudonym(esp, inp, len, id) + eap_state *esp; +u_char *inp; +int len, id; +{ + u_char val; + u_char *datp, *digp; + SHA1_CTX ctxt; + u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE]; + int dsize, fd, olen = len; + + /* + * Do the decoding by working backwards. This eliminates the need + * to save the decoded output in a separate buffer. + */ + val = id; + + while (len > 0) { + if ((dsize = len % SHA_DIGESTSIZE) == 0) { + dsize = SHA_DIGESTSIZE; + } + + len -= dsize; + datp = inp + len; + SHA1Init(&ctxt); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, &val, 1); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey, SESSION_KEY_LEN); + + if (len > 0) { + SHA1Update(&ctxt, datp, SHA_DIGESTSIZE); + } else { + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen); + } + + SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); + + for (digp = dig; digp < dig + SHA_DIGESTSIZE; digp++) { + *datp++ ^= *digp; + } + } + + /* Now check that the result is sane */ + if (olen <= 0 || *inp + 1 > olen) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP: decoded pseudonym is unusable <%.*B>", olen, inp); + return; + } + + /* Save it away */ + fd = open_pn_file(O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC); + + if (fd < 0) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP: error saving pseudonym: %m"); + return; + } + + len = write(fd, inp + 1, *inp); + + if (close(fd) != -1 && len == *inp) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP: saved pseudonym"); + pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo = 0; + } else { + ppp_dbglog("EAP: failed to save pseudonym"); + remove_pn_file(); + } +} +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + +/* + * eap_request - Receive EAP Request message (client mode). + */ +static void eap_request(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) +{ + u_char typenum; + u_char vallen; + int secret_len; + char secret[MAXSECRETLEN]; + char rhostname[MAXNAMELEN]; + lwip_md5_context mdContext; + u_char hash[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; +#ifdef USE_SRP + struct t_client *tc; + struct t_num sval, gval, Nval, *Ap, Bval; + u_char vals[2]; + SHA1_CTX ctxt; + u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE]; + int fd; +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + /* + * Note: we update es_client.ea_id *only if* a Response + * message is being generated. Otherwise, we leave it the + * same for duplicate detection purposes. + */ + + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_requests++; + + if (pcb->settings.eap_allow_req != 0 && + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_requests > pcb->settings.eap_allow_req) { + ppp_info("EAP: received too many Request messages"); + + if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); + } + + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); + return; + } + + if (len <= 0) { + ppp_error("EAP: empty Request message discarded"); + return; + } + + GETCHAR(typenum, inp); + len--; + + switch (typenum) { + case EAPT_IDENTITY: + if (len > 0) { + ppp_info("EAP: Identity prompt \"%.*q\"", len, inp); + } + +#ifdef USE_SRP + + if (pcb->eap.es_usepseudo && + (pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo == 0 || + (pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo == 1 && + id == pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id))) { + pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo = 1; + + /* Try to get a pseudonym */ + if ((fd = open_pn_file(O_RDONLY)) >= 0) { + strcpy(rhostname, SRP_PSEUDO_ID); + len = read(fd, rhostname + SRP_PSEUDO_LEN, + sizeof(rhostname) - SRP_PSEUDO_LEN); + + /* XXX NAI unsupported */ + if (len > 0) { + eap_send_response(pcb, id, typenum, + rhostname, len + SRP_PSEUDO_LEN); + } + + (void)close(fd); + + if (len > 0) { + break; + } + } + } + + /* Stop using pseudonym now. */ + if (pcb->eap.es_usepseudo && pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo != 2) { + remove_pn_file(); + pcb->eap.es_usedpseudo = 2; + } + +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + eap_send_response(pcb, id, typenum, (const u_char *)pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen); + break; + + case EAPT_NOTIFICATION: + if (len > 0) { + ppp_info("EAP: Notification \"%.*q\"", len, inp); + } + + eap_send_response(pcb, id, typenum, NULL, 0); + break; + + case EAPT_NAK: + /* + * Avoid the temptation to send Response Nak in reply + * to Request Nak here. It can only lead to trouble. + */ + ppp_warn("EAP: unexpected Nak in Request; ignored"); + /* Return because we're waiting for something real. */ + return; + + case EAPT_MD5CHAP: + if (len < 1) { + ppp_error("EAP: received MD5-Challenge with no data"); + /* Bogus request; wait for something real. */ + return; + } + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen < 8 || vallen > len) { + ppp_error("EAP: MD5-Challenge with bad length %d (8..%d)", + vallen, len); + /* Try something better. */ + eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_SRP); + break; + } + + /* Not so likely to happen. */ + if (vallen >= len + sizeof(rhostname)) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP: trimming really long peer name down"); + MEMCPY(rhostname, inp + vallen, sizeof(rhostname) - 1); + rhostname[sizeof(rhostname) - 1] = '\0'; + } else { + MEMCPY(rhostname, inp + vallen, len - vallen); + rhostname[len - vallen] = '\0'; + } + +#if PPP_REMOTENAME + + /* In case the remote doesn't give us his name. */ + if (pcb->settings.explicit_remote || + (pcb->settings.remote_name[0] != '\0' && vallen == len)) { + strlcpy(rhostname, pcb->settings.remote_name, sizeof(rhostname)); + } + +#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ + + /* + * Get the secret for authenticating ourselves with + * the specified host. + */ + if (!get_secret(pcb, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, + rhostname, secret, &secret_len, 0)) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP: no MD5 secret for auth to %q", rhostname); + eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_SRP); + break; + } + + lwip_md5_init(&mdContext); + lwip_md5_starts(&mdContext); + typenum = id; + lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, &typenum, 1); + lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, (u_char *)secret, secret_len); + BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); + lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, inp, vallen); + lwip_md5_finish(&mdContext, hash); + lwip_md5_free(&mdContext); + eap_chap_response(pcb, id, hash, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen); + break; + +#ifdef USE_SRP + + case EAPT_SRP: + if (len < 1) { + ppp_error("EAP: received empty SRP Request"); + /* Bogus request; wait for something real. */ + return; + } + + /* Get subtype */ + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + switch (vallen) { + case EAPSRP_CHALLENGE: + tc = NULL; + + if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session != NULL) { + tc = (struct t_client *)pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session; + + /* + * If this is a new challenge, then start + * over with a new client session context. + * Otherwise, just resend last response. + */ + if (id != pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id) { + t_clientclose(tc); + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session = NULL; + tc = NULL; + } + } + + /* No session key just yet */ + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey = NULL; + + if (tc == NULL) { + int rhostnamelen; + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen >= len) { + ppp_error("EAP: badly-formed SRP Challenge" + " (name)"); + /* Ignore badly-formed messages */ + return; + } + + MEMCPY(rhostname, inp, vallen); + rhostname[vallen] = '\0'; + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + + /* + * In case the remote doesn't give us his name, + * use configured name. + */ + if (explicit_remote || + (remote_name[0] != '\0' && vallen == 0)) { + strlcpy(rhostname, remote_name, + sizeof(rhostname)); + } + + rhostnamelen = (int)strlen(rhostname); + + if (rhostnamelen > MAXNAMELEN) { + rhostnamelen = MAXNAMELEN; + } + + MEMCPY(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_peer, rhostname, rhostnamelen); + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_peer[rhostnamelen] = '\0'; + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_peerlen = rhostnamelen; + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen >= len) { + ppp_error("EAP: badly-formed SRP Challenge" + " (s)"); + /* Ignore badly-formed messages */ + return; + } + + sval.data = inp; + sval.len = vallen; + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen > len) { + ppp_error("EAP: badly-formed SRP Challenge" + " (g)"); + /* Ignore badly-formed messages */ + return; + } + + /* If no generator present, then use value 2 */ + if (vallen == 0) { + gval.data = (u_char *)"\002"; + gval.len = 1; + } else { + gval.data = inp; + gval.len = vallen; + } + + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + + /* + * If no modulus present, then use well-known + * value. + */ + if (len == 0) { + Nval.data = (u_char *)wkmodulus; + Nval.len = sizeof(wkmodulus); + } else { + Nval.data = inp; + Nval.len = len; + } + + tc = t_clientopen(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, + &Nval, &gval, &sval); + + if (tc == NULL) { + eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); + break; + } + + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session = (void *)tc; + + /* Add Challenge ID & type to verifier */ + vals[0] = id; + vals[1] = EAPT_SRP; + t_clientaddexdata(tc, vals, 2); + } + + Ap = t_clientgenexp(tc); + eap_srp_response(esp, id, EAPSRP_CKEY, Ap->data, + Ap->len); + break; + + case EAPSRP_SKEY: + tc = (struct t_client *)pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session; + + if (tc == NULL) { + ppp_warn("EAP: peer sent Subtype 2 without 1"); + eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); + break; + } + + if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey != NULL) { + /* + * ID number should not change here. Warn + * if it does (but otherwise ignore). + */ + if (id != pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id) { + ppp_warn("EAP: ID changed from %d to %d " + "in SRP Subtype 2 rexmit", + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id, id); + } + } else { + if (get_srp_secret(pcb->eap.es_unit, + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_peer, secret, 0) == 0) { + /* + * Can't work with this peer because + * the secret is missing. Just give + * up. + */ + eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); + break; + } + + Bval.data = inp; + Bval.len = len; + t_clientpasswd(tc, secret); + BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey = + t_clientgetkey(tc, &Bval); + + if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey == NULL) { + /* Server is rogue; stop now */ + ppp_error("EAP: SRP server is rogue"); + goto client_failure; + } + } + + eap_srpval_response(esp, id, SRPVAL_EBIT, + t_clientresponse(tc)); + break; + + case EAPSRP_SVALIDATOR: + tc = (struct t_client *)pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session; + + if (tc == NULL || pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey == NULL) { + ppp_warn("EAP: peer sent Subtype 3 without 1/2"); + eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); + break; + } + + /* + * If we're already open, then this ought to be a + * duplicate. Otherwise, check that the server is + * who we think it is. + */ + if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state == eapOpen) { + if (id != pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id) { + ppp_warn("EAP: ID changed from %d to %d " + "in SRP Subtype 3 rexmit", + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_id, id); + } + } else { + len -= sizeof(u32_t) + SHA_DIGESTSIZE; + + if (len < 0 || t_clientverify(tc, inp + + sizeof(u32_t)) != 0) { + ppp_error("EAP: SRP server verification " + "failed"); + goto client_failure; + } + + GETLONG(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_keyflags, inp); + + /* Save pseudonym if user wants it. */ + if (len > 0 && pcb->eap.es_usepseudo) { + INCPTR(SHA_DIGESTSIZE, inp); + write_pseudonym(esp, inp, len, id); + } + } + + /* + * We've verified our peer. We're now mostly done, + * except for waiting on the regular EAP Success + * message. + */ + eap_srp_response(esp, id, EAPSRP_ACK, NULL, 0); + break; + + case EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE: + if (len < 4) { + ppp_warn("EAP: malformed Lightweight rechallenge"); + return; + } + + SHA1Init(&ctxt); + vals[0] = id; + SHA1Update(&ctxt, vals, 1); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_skey, + SESSION_KEY_LEN); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, inp, len); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_client.ea_name, + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_namelen); + SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); + eap_srp_response(esp, id, EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE, dig, + SHA_DIGESTSIZE); + break; + + default: + ppp_error("EAP: unknown SRP Subtype %d", vallen); + eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_MD5CHAP); + break; + } + + break; +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + default: + ppp_info("EAP: unknown authentication type %d; Naking", typenum); + eap_send_nak(pcb, id, EAPT_SRP); + break; + } + + if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); + TIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb, + pcb->settings.eap_req_time); + } + + return; + +#ifdef USE_SRP +client_failure: + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapBadAuth; + + if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, (void *)esp); + } + + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_session = NULL; + t_clientclose(tc); + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); +#endif /* USE_SRP */ +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * eap_response - Receive EAP Response message (server mode). + */ +static void eap_response(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) +{ + u_char typenum; + u_char vallen; + int secret_len; + char secret[MAXSECRETLEN]; + char rhostname[MAXNAMELEN]; + lwip_md5_context mdContext; + u_char hash[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; +#ifdef USE_SRP + struct t_server *ts; + struct t_num A; + SHA1_CTX ctxt; + u_char dig[SHA_DIGESTSIZE]; +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id != id) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP: discarding Response %d; expected ID %d", id, + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id); + return; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_responses++; + + if (len <= 0) { + ppp_error("EAP: empty Response message discarded"); + return; + } + + GETCHAR(typenum, inp); + len--; + + switch (typenum) { + case EAPT_IDENTITY: + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapIdentify) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP discarding unwanted Identify \"%.q\"", len, + inp); + break; + } + + ppp_info("EAP: unauthenticated peer name \"%.*q\"", len, inp); + + if (len > MAXNAMELEN) { + len = MAXNAMELEN; + } + + MEMCPY(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, inp, len); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer[len] = '\0'; + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen = len; + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); + break; + + case EAPT_NOTIFICATION: + ppp_dbglog("EAP unexpected Notification; response discarded"); + break; + + case EAPT_NAK: + if (len < 1) { + ppp_info("EAP: Nak Response with no suggested protocol"); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); + break; + } + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if ( +#if PPP_REMOTENAME + !pcb->explicit_remote && +#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state == eapIdentify) { + /* Peer cannot Nak Identify Request */ + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); + break; + } + + switch (vallen) { + case EAPT_SRP: + /* Run through SRP validator selection again. */ + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapIdentify; + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); + break; + + case EAPT_MD5CHAP: + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; + break; + + default: + ppp_dbglog("EAP: peer requesting unknown Type %d", vallen); + + switch (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state) { + case eapSRP1: + case eapSRP2: + case eapSRP3: + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapMD5Chall; + break; + + case eapMD5Chall: + case eapSRP4: + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapIdentify; + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); + break; + + default: + break; + } + + break; + } + + break; + + case EAPT_MD5CHAP: + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapMD5Chall) { + ppp_error("EAP: unexpected MD5-Response"); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); + break; + } + + if (len < 1) { + ppp_error("EAP: received MD5-Response with no data"); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); + break; + } + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen != 16 || vallen > len) { + ppp_error("EAP: MD5-Response with bad length %d", vallen); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); + break; + } + + /* Not so likely to happen. */ + if (vallen >= len + sizeof(rhostname)) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP: trimming really long peer name down"); + MEMCPY(rhostname, inp + vallen, sizeof(rhostname) - 1); + rhostname[sizeof(rhostname) - 1] = '\0'; + } else { + MEMCPY(rhostname, inp + vallen, len - vallen); + rhostname[len - vallen] = '\0'; + } + +#if PPP_REMOTENAME + + /* In case the remote doesn't give us his name. */ + if (explicit_remote || + (remote_name[0] != '\0' && vallen == len)) { + strlcpy(rhostname, remote_name, sizeof(rhostname)); + } + +#endif /* PPP_REMOTENAME */ + + /* + * Get the secret for authenticating the specified + * host. + */ + if (!get_secret(pcb, rhostname, + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_name, secret, &secret_len, 1)) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP: no MD5 secret for auth of %q", rhostname); + eap_send_failure(pcb); + break; + } + + lwip_md5_init(&mdContext); + lwip_md5_starts(&mdContext); + lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, &pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id, 1); + lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, (u_char *)secret, secret_len); + BZERO(secret, sizeof(secret)); + lwip_md5_update(&mdContext, pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); + lwip_md5_finish(&mdContext, hash); + lwip_md5_free(&mdContext); + + if (BCMP(hash, inp, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) != 0) { + eap_send_failure(pcb); + break; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_type = EAPT_MD5CHAP; + eap_send_success(pcb); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); + + if (pcb->eap.es_rechallenge != 0) { + TIMEOUT(eap_rechallenge, pcb, pcb->eap.es_rechallenge); + } + + break; + +#ifdef USE_SRP + + case EAPT_SRP: + if (len < 1) { + ppp_error("EAP: empty SRP Response"); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); + break; + } + + GETCHAR(typenum, inp); + len--; + + switch (typenum) { + case EAPSRP_CKEY: + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP1) { + ppp_error("EAP: unexpected SRP Subtype 1 Response"); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); + break; + } + + A.data = inp; + A.len = len; + ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; + assert(ts != NULL); + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey = t_servergetkey(ts, &A); + + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey == NULL) { + /* Client's A value is bogus; terminate now */ + ppp_error("EAP: bogus A value from client"); + eap_send_failure(pcb); + } else { + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); + } + + break; + + case EAPSRP_CVALIDATOR: + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP2) { + ppp_error("EAP: unexpected SRP Subtype 2 Response"); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); + break; + } + + if (len < sizeof(u32_t) + SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { + ppp_error("EAP: M1 length %d < %d", len, + sizeof(u32_t) + SHA_DIGESTSIZE); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 1); + break; + } + + GETLONG(pcb->eap.es_server.ea_keyflags, inp); + ts = (struct t_server *)pcb->eap.es_server.ea_session; + assert(ts != NULL); + + if (t_serververify(ts, inp)) { + ppp_info("EAP: unable to validate client identity"); + eap_send_failure(pcb); + break; + } + + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); + break; + + case EAPSRP_ACK: + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP3) { + ppp_error("EAP: unexpected SRP Subtype 3 Response"); + eap_send_failure(esp); + break; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_type = EAPT_SRP; + eap_send_success(pcb, esp); + eap_figure_next_state(pcb, 0); + + if (pcb->eap.es_rechallenge != 0) + TIMEOUT(eap_rechallenge, pcb, + pcb->eap.es_rechallenge); + + if (pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge != 0) + TIMEOUT(srp_lwrechallenge, pcb, + pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge); + + break; + + case EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE: + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapSRP4) { + ppp_info("EAP: unexpected SRP Subtype 4 Response"); + return; + } + + if (len != SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { + ppp_error("EAP: bad Lightweight rechallenge " + "response"); + return; + } + + SHA1Init(&ctxt); + vallen = id; + SHA1Update(&ctxt, &vallen, 1); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_skey, + SESSION_KEY_LEN); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_challenge, pcb->eap.es_challen); + SHA1Update(&ctxt, pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peer, + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_peerlen); + SHA1Final(dig, &ctxt); + + if (BCMP(dig, inp, SHA_DIGESTSIZE) != 0) { + ppp_error("EAP: failed Lightweight rechallenge"); + eap_send_failure(pcb); + break; + } + + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state = eapOpen; + + if (pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge != 0) + TIMEOUT(srp_lwrechallenge, esp, + pcb->eap.es_lwrechallenge); + + break; + } + + break; +#endif /* USE_SRP */ + + default: + /* This can't happen. */ + ppp_error("EAP: unknown Response type %d; ignored", typenum); + return; + } + + if (pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(eap_server_timeout, pcb); + } + + if (pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapBadAuth && + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_state != eapOpen) { + pcb->eap.es_server.ea_id++; + eap_send_request(pcb); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * eap_success - Receive EAP Success message (client mode). + */ +static void eap_success(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + + if (pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state != eapOpen && !eap_client_active(pcb)) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP unexpected success message in state %s (%d)", + eap_state_name(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state), + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state); + return; + } + + if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); + } + + if (len > 0) { + /* This is odd. The spec doesn't allow for this. */ + PRINTMSG(inp, len); + } + + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapOpen; + auth_withpeer_success(pcb, PPP_EAP, 0); +} + +/* + * eap_failure - Receive EAP Failure message (client mode). + */ +static void eap_failure(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + + if (!eap_client_active(pcb)) { + ppp_dbglog("EAP unexpected failure message in state %s (%d)", + eap_state_name(pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state), + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state); + } + + if (pcb->settings.eap_req_time > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(eap_client_timeout, pcb); + } + + if (len > 0) { + /* This is odd. The spec doesn't allow for this. */ + PRINTMSG(inp, len); + } + + pcb->eap.es_client.ea_state = eapBadAuth; + + ppp_error("EAP: peer reports authentication failure"); + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_EAP); +} + +/* + * eap_input - Handle received EAP message. + */ +static void eap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int inlen) +{ + u_char code, id; + int len; + + /* + * Parse header (code, id and length). If packet too short, + * drop it. + */ + if (inlen < EAP_HEADERLEN) { + ppp_error("EAP: packet too short: %d < %d", inlen, EAP_HEADERLEN); + return; + } + + GETCHAR(code, inp); + GETCHAR(id, inp); + GETSHORT(len, inp); + + if (len < EAP_HEADERLEN || len > inlen) { + ppp_error("EAP: packet has illegal length field %d (%d..%d)", len, + EAP_HEADERLEN, inlen); + return; + } + + len -= EAP_HEADERLEN; + + /* Dispatch based on message code */ + switch (code) { + case EAP_REQUEST: + eap_request(pcb, inp, id, len); + break; + +#if PPP_SERVER + + case EAP_RESPONSE: + eap_response(pcb, inp, id, len); + break; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + + case EAP_SUCCESS: + eap_success(pcb, inp, id, len); + break; + + case EAP_FAILURE: + eap_failure(pcb, inp, id, len); + break; + + default: /* XXX Need code reject */ + /* Note: it's not legal to send EAP Nak here. */ + ppp_warn("EAP: unknown code %d received", code); + break; + } +} + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * eap_printpkt - print the contents of an EAP packet. + */ +static const char *const eap_codenames[] = { + "Request", "Response", "Success", "Failure" +}; + +static const char *const eap_typenames[] = { + "Identity", "Notification", "Nak", "MD5-Challenge", + "OTP", "Generic-Token", NULL, NULL, + "RSA", "DSS", "KEA", "KEA-Validate", + "TLS", "Defender", "Windows 2000", "Arcot", + "Cisco", "Nokia", "SRP" +}; + +static int eap_printpkt(const u_char *inp, int inlen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) +{ + int code, id, len, rtype, vallen; + const u_char *pstart; + u32_t uval; + + if (inlen < EAP_HEADERLEN) { + return (0); + } + + pstart = inp; + GETCHAR(code, inp); + GETCHAR(id, inp); + GETSHORT(len, inp); + + if (len < EAP_HEADERLEN || len > inlen) { + return (0); + } + + if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(eap_codenames)) { + printer(arg, " %s", eap_codenames[code - 1]); + } else { + printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); + } + + printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); + len -= EAP_HEADERLEN; + + switch (code) { + case EAP_REQUEST: + if (len < 1) { + printer(arg, " "); + break; + } + + GETCHAR(rtype, inp); + len--; + + if (rtype >= 1 && rtype <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(eap_typenames)) { + printer(arg, " %s", eap_typenames[rtype - 1]); + } else { + printer(arg, " type=0x%x", rtype); + } + + switch (rtype) { + case EAPT_IDENTITY: + case EAPT_NOTIFICATION: + if (len > 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + } else { + printer(arg, " "); + } + + break; + + case EAPT_MD5CHAP: + if (len <= 0) { + break; + } + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen > len) { + goto truncated; + } + + printer(arg, " ", vallen, inp); + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + + if (len > 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + } else { + printer(arg, " "); + } + + break; + + case EAPT_SRP: + if (len < 3) { + goto truncated; + } + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + printer(arg, "-%d", vallen); + + switch (vallen) { + case EAPSRP_CHALLENGE: + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen >= len) { + goto truncated; + } + + if (vallen > 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + } else { + printer(arg, " "); + } + + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen >= len) { + goto truncated; + } + + printer(arg, " ", vallen, inp); + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen > len) { + goto truncated; + } + + if (vallen == 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + } else { + printer(arg, " ", vallen, inp); + } + + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + + if (len == 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + } else { + printer(arg, " ", len, inp); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + } + + break; + + case EAPSRP_SKEY: + printer(arg, " ", len, inp); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + break; + + case EAPSRP_SVALIDATOR: + if (len < (int)sizeof(u32_t)) { + break; + } + + GETLONG(uval, inp); + len -= sizeof(u32_t); + + if (uval & SRPVAL_EBIT) { + printer(arg, " E"); + uval &= ~SRPVAL_EBIT; + } + + if (uval != 0) { + printer(arg, " f<%X>", uval); + } + + if ((vallen = len) > SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { + vallen = SHA_DIGESTSIZE; + } + + printer(arg, " ", len, inp, + len < SHA_DIGESTSIZE ? "?" : ""); + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + + if (len > 0) { + printer(arg, " ", len, inp); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + } + + break; + + case EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE: + printer(arg, " ", len, inp); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + break; + + case EAP_RESPONSE: + if (len < 1) { + break; + } + + GETCHAR(rtype, inp); + len--; + + if (rtype >= 1 && rtype <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(eap_typenames)) { + printer(arg, " %s", eap_typenames[rtype - 1]); + } else { + printer(arg, " type=0x%x", rtype); + } + + switch (rtype) { + case EAPT_IDENTITY: + if (len > 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + } + + break; + + case EAPT_NAK: + if (len <= 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + break; + } + + GETCHAR(rtype, inp); + len--; + printer(arg, " = 1 && rtype < (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(eap_typenames)) { + printer(arg, " (%s)", eap_typenames[rtype - 1]); + } + + printer(arg, ">"); + break; + + case EAPT_MD5CHAP: + if (len <= 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + break; + } + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + + if (vallen > len) { + goto truncated; + } + + printer(arg, " ", vallen, inp); + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + + if (len > 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + } else { + printer(arg, " "); + } + + break; + + case EAPT_SRP: + if (len < 1) { + goto truncated; + } + + GETCHAR(vallen, inp); + len--; + printer(arg, "-%d", vallen); + + switch (vallen) { + case EAPSRP_CKEY: + printer(arg, " ", len, inp); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + break; + + case EAPSRP_CVALIDATOR: + if (len < (int)sizeof(u32_t)) { + break; + } + + GETLONG(uval, inp); + len -= sizeof(u32_t); + + if (uval & SRPVAL_EBIT) { + printer(arg, " E"); + uval &= ~SRPVAL_EBIT; + } + + if (uval != 0) { + printer(arg, " f<%X>", uval); + } + + printer(arg, " ", len, inp, + len == SHA_DIGESTSIZE ? "" : "?"); + INCPTR(len, inp); + len = 0; + break; + + case EAPSRP_ACK: + break; + + case EAPSRP_LWRECHALLENGE: + printer(arg, " ", len, inp, + len == SHA_DIGESTSIZE ? "" : "?"); + + if ((vallen = len) > SHA_DIGESTSIZE) { + vallen = SHA_DIGESTSIZE; + } + + INCPTR(vallen, inp); + len -= vallen; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + break; + + case EAP_SUCCESS: /* No payload expected for these! */ + case EAP_FAILURE: + default: + break; + + truncated: + printer(arg, " "); + break; + } + + if (len > 8) { + printer(arg, "%8B...", inp); + } else if (len > 0) { + printer(arg, "%.*B", len, inp); + } + + INCPTR(len, inp); + + return (inp - pstart); +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ecp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ecp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ecp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ecp.c index ec41c7fc..af93c97c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ecp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ecp.c @@ -1,186 +1,186 @@ -/* - * ecp.c - PPP Encryption Control Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * Derived from ccp.c, which is: - * - * Copyright (c) 1994-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && ECP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ecp.h" - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -static option_t ecp_option_list[] = { - { "noecp", o_bool, &ecp_protent.enabled_flag, - "Disable ECP negotiation" }, - { "-ecp", o_bool, &ecp_protent.enabled_flag, - "Disable ECP negotiation", OPT_ALIAS }, - - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * Protocol entry points from main code. - */ -static void ecp_init(int unit); -/* -static void ecp_open (int unit); -static void ecp_close (int unit, char *); -static void ecp_lowerup (int unit); -static void ecp_lowerdown (int); -static void ecp_input (int unit, u_char *pkt, int len); -static void ecp_protrej (int unit); -*/ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static int ecp_printpkt(const u_char *pkt, int len, - void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...), - void *arg); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -/* -static void ecp_datainput (int unit, u_char *pkt, int len); -*/ - -const struct protent ecp_protent = { - PPP_ECP, - ecp_init, - NULL, /* ecp_input, */ - NULL, /* ecp_protrej, */ - NULL, /* ecp_lowerup, */ - NULL, /* ecp_lowerdown, */ - NULL, /* ecp_open, */ - NULL, /* ecp_close, */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - ecp_printpkt, -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT - NULL, /* ecp_datainput, */ -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - "ECP", - "Encrypted", -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS - ecp_option_list, - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - NULL, - NULL -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -}; - -fsm ecp_fsm[NUM_PPP]; -ecp_options ecp_wantoptions[NUM_PPP]; /* what to request the peer to use */ -ecp_options ecp_gotoptions[NUM_PPP]; /* what the peer agreed to do */ -ecp_options ecp_allowoptions[NUM_PPP]; /* what we'll agree to do */ -ecp_options ecp_hisoptions[NUM_PPP]; /* what we agreed to do */ - -static const fsm_callbacks ecp_callbacks = { - NULL, /* ecp_resetci, */ - NULL, /* ecp_cilen, */ - NULL, /* ecp_addci, */ - NULL, /* ecp_ackci, */ - NULL, /* ecp_nakci, */ - NULL, /* ecp_rejci, */ - NULL, /* ecp_reqci, */ - NULL, /* ecp_up, */ - NULL, /* ecp_down, */ - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, /* ecp_extcode, */ - "ECP" -}; - -/* - * ecp_init - initialize ECP. - */ -static void ecp_init(unit) int unit; -{ - fsm *f = &ecp_fsm[unit]; - - f->unit = unit; - f->protocol = PPP_ECP; - f->callbacks = &ecp_callbacks; - fsm_init(f); - -#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ - memset(&ecp_wantoptions[unit], 0, sizeof(ecp_options)); - memset(&ecp_gotoptions[unit], 0, sizeof(ecp_options)); - memset(&ecp_allowoptions[unit], 0, sizeof(ecp_options)); - memset(&ecp_hisoptions[unit], 0, sizeof(ecp_options)); -#endif /* 0 */ -} - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static int ecp_printpkt(p, plen, printer, arg) - const u_char *p; -int plen; -void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...); -void *arg; -{ - return 0; -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && ECP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * ecp.c - PPP Encryption Control Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * Derived from ccp.c, which is: + * + * Copyright (c) 1994-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && ECP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ecp.h" + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +static option_t ecp_option_list[] = { + { "noecp", o_bool, &ecp_protent.enabled_flag, + "Disable ECP negotiation" }, + { "-ecp", o_bool, &ecp_protent.enabled_flag, + "Disable ECP negotiation", OPT_ALIAS }, + + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * Protocol entry points from main code. + */ +static void ecp_init(int unit); +/* +static void ecp_open (int unit); +static void ecp_close (int unit, char *); +static void ecp_lowerup (int unit); +static void ecp_lowerdown (int); +static void ecp_input (int unit, u_char *pkt, int len); +static void ecp_protrej (int unit); +*/ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static int ecp_printpkt(const u_char *pkt, int len, + void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...), + void *arg); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +/* +static void ecp_datainput (int unit, u_char *pkt, int len); +*/ + +const struct protent ecp_protent = { + PPP_ECP, + ecp_init, + NULL, /* ecp_input, */ + NULL, /* ecp_protrej, */ + NULL, /* ecp_lowerup, */ + NULL, /* ecp_lowerdown, */ + NULL, /* ecp_open, */ + NULL, /* ecp_close, */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + ecp_printpkt, +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT + NULL, /* ecp_datainput, */ +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + "ECP", + "Encrypted", +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS + ecp_option_list, + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + NULL, + NULL +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +}; + +fsm ecp_fsm[NUM_PPP]; +ecp_options ecp_wantoptions[NUM_PPP]; /* what to request the peer to use */ +ecp_options ecp_gotoptions[NUM_PPP]; /* what the peer agreed to do */ +ecp_options ecp_allowoptions[NUM_PPP]; /* what we'll agree to do */ +ecp_options ecp_hisoptions[NUM_PPP]; /* what we agreed to do */ + +static const fsm_callbacks ecp_callbacks = { + NULL, /* ecp_resetci, */ + NULL, /* ecp_cilen, */ + NULL, /* ecp_addci, */ + NULL, /* ecp_ackci, */ + NULL, /* ecp_nakci, */ + NULL, /* ecp_rejci, */ + NULL, /* ecp_reqci, */ + NULL, /* ecp_up, */ + NULL, /* ecp_down, */ + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, /* ecp_extcode, */ + "ECP" +}; + +/* + * ecp_init - initialize ECP. + */ +static void ecp_init(unit) int unit; +{ + fsm *f = &ecp_fsm[unit]; + + f->unit = unit; + f->protocol = PPP_ECP; + f->callbacks = &ecp_callbacks; + fsm_init(f); + +#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ + memset(&ecp_wantoptions[unit], 0, sizeof(ecp_options)); + memset(&ecp_gotoptions[unit], 0, sizeof(ecp_options)); + memset(&ecp_allowoptions[unit], 0, sizeof(ecp_options)); + memset(&ecp_hisoptions[unit], 0, sizeof(ecp_options)); +#endif /* 0 */ +} + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static int ecp_printpkt(p, plen, printer, arg) + const u_char *p; +int plen; +void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...); +void *arg; +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && ECP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eui64.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eui64.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eui64.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eui64.c index d9eca120..5971bf0d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eui64.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/eui64.c @@ -1,57 +1,57 @@ -/* - * eui64.c - EUI64 routines for IPv6CP. - * - * Copyright (c) 1999 Tommi Komulainen. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Tommi Komulainen - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: eui64.c,v 1.6 2002/12/04 23:03:32 paulus Exp $ - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/eui64.h" - -/* - * eui64_ntoa - Make an ascii representation of an interface identifier - */ -char *eui64_ntoa(eui64_t e) -{ - static char buf[20]; - - sprintf(buf, "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x", - e.e8[0], e.e8[1], e.e8[2], e.e8[3], - e.e8[4], e.e8[5], e.e8[6], e.e8[7]); - return buf; -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +/* + * eui64.c - EUI64 routines for IPv6CP. + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Tommi Komulainen. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Tommi Komulainen + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: eui64.c,v 1.6 2002/12/04 23:03:32 paulus Exp $ + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/eui64.h" + +/* + * eui64_ntoa - Make an ascii representation of an interface identifier + */ +char *eui64_ntoa(eui64_t e) +{ + static char buf[20]; + + sprintf(buf, "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x", + e.e8[0], e.e8[1], e.e8[2], e.e8[3], + e.e8[4], e.e8[5], e.e8[6], e.e8[7]); + return buf; +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/fsm.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/fsm.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/fsm.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/fsm.c index b3e65858..7ce6bc4f 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/fsm.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/fsm.c @@ -1,917 +1,917 @@ -/* - * fsm.c - {Link, IP} Control Protocol Finite State Machine. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/* - * @todo: - * Randomize fsm id on link/init. - * Deal with variable outgoing MTU. - */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" - -static void fsm_timeout(void *); -static void fsm_rconfreq(fsm *f, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len); -static void fsm_rconfack(fsm *f, int id, u_char *inp, int len); -static void fsm_rconfnakrej(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *inp, int len); -static void fsm_rtermreq(fsm *f, int id, u_char *p, int len); -static void fsm_rtermack(fsm *f); -static void fsm_rcoderej(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int len); -static void fsm_sconfreq(fsm *f, int retransmit); - -#define PROTO_NAME(f) ((f)->callbacks->proto_name) - -/* - * fsm_init - Initialize fsm. - * - * Initialize fsm state. - */ -void fsm_init(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - f->state = PPP_FSM_INITIAL; - f->flags = 0; - f->id = 0; /* XXX Start with random id? */ - f->maxnakloops = pcb->settings.fsm_max_nak_loops; - f->term_reason_len = 0; -} - -/* - * fsm_lowerup - The lower layer is up. - */ -void fsm_lowerup(fsm *f) -{ - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_INITIAL: - f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSED; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_STARTING: - if (f->flags & OPT_SILENT) { - f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; - } else { - /* Send an initial configure-request */ - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - } - - break; - - default: - FSMDEBUG(("%s: Up event in state %d!", PROTO_NAME(f), f->state)); - /* no break */ - } -} - -/* - * fsm_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. - * - * Cancel all timeouts and inform upper layers. - */ -void fsm_lowerdown(fsm *f) -{ - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: - f->state = PPP_FSM_INITIAL; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: - f->state = PPP_FSM_STARTING; - - if (f->callbacks->starting) { - (*f->callbacks->starting)(f); - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: - f->state = PPP_FSM_INITIAL; - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - break; - - case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: - case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: - case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: - case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: - f->state = PPP_FSM_STARTING; - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - break; - - case PPP_FSM_OPENED: - if (f->callbacks->down) { - (*f->callbacks->down)(f); - } - - f->state = PPP_FSM_STARTING; - break; - - default: - FSMDEBUG(("%s: Down event in state %d!", PROTO_NAME(f), f->state)); - /* no break */ - } -} - -/* - * fsm_open - Link is allowed to come up. - */ -void fsm_open(fsm *f) -{ - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_INITIAL: - f->state = PPP_FSM_STARTING; - - if (f->callbacks->starting) { - (*f->callbacks->starting)(f); - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: - if (f->flags & OPT_SILENT) { - f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; - } else { - /* Send an initial configure-request */ - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: - f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPING; - - /* fall through */ - /* no break */ - case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: - case PPP_FSM_OPENED: - if (f->flags & OPT_RESTART) { - fsm_lowerdown(f); - fsm_lowerup(f); - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } -} - -/* - * terminate_layer - Start process of shutting down the FSM - * - * Cancel any timeout running, notify upper layers we're done, and - * send a terminate-request message as configured. - */ -static void terminate_layer(fsm *f, int nextstate) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - } else if (f->callbacks->down) { - (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers we're down */ - } - - /* Init restart counter and send Terminate-Request */ - f->retransmits = pcb->settings.fsm_max_term_transmits; - fsm_sdata(f, TERMREQ, f->reqid = ++f->id, - (const u_char *)f->term_reason, f->term_reason_len); - - if (f->retransmits == 0) { - /* - * User asked for no terminate requests at all; just close it. - * We've already fired off one Terminate-Request just to be nice - * to the peer, but we're not going to wait for a reply. - */ - f->state = nextstate == PPP_FSM_CLOSING ? PPP_FSM_CLOSED : PPP_FSM_STOPPED; - - if (f->callbacks->finished) { - (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); - } - - return; - } - - TIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f, pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time); - --f->retransmits; - - f->state = nextstate; -} - -/* - * fsm_close - Start closing connection. - * - * Cancel timeouts and either initiate close or possibly go directly to - * the PPP_FSM_CLOSED state. - */ -void fsm_close(fsm *f, const char *reason) -{ - f->term_reason = reason; - f->term_reason_len = (reason == NULL ? 0 : (u8_t)LWIP_MIN(strlen(reason), 0xFF)); - - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_STARTING: - f->state = PPP_FSM_INITIAL; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: - f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSED; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: - f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSING; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: - case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: - case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: - case PPP_FSM_OPENED: - terminate_layer(f, PPP_FSM_CLOSING); - break; - - default: - break; - } -} - -/* - * fsm_timeout - Timeout expired. - */ -static void fsm_timeout(void *arg) -{ - fsm *f = (fsm *)arg; - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: - case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: - if (f->retransmits <= 0) { - /* - * We've waited for an ack long enough. Peer probably heard us. - */ - f->state = (f->state == PPP_FSM_CLOSING) ? PPP_FSM_CLOSED : PPP_FSM_STOPPED; - - if (f->callbacks->finished) { - (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); - } - } else { - /* Send Terminate-Request */ - fsm_sdata(f, TERMREQ, f->reqid = ++f->id, - (const u_char *)f->term_reason, f->term_reason_len); - TIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f, pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time); - --f->retransmits; - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: - case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: - case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: - if (f->retransmits <= 0) { - ppp_warn("%s: timeout sending Config-Requests", PROTO_NAME(f)); - f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; - - if ((f->flags & OPT_PASSIVE) == 0 && f->callbacks->finished) { - (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); - } - - } else { - /* Retransmit the configure-request */ - if (f->callbacks->retransmit) { - (*f->callbacks->retransmit)(f); - } - - fsm_sconfreq(f, 1); /* Re-send Configure-Request */ - - if (f->state == PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD) { - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - } - } - - break; - - default: - FSMDEBUG(("%s: Timeout event in state %d!", PROTO_NAME(f), f->state)); - /* no break */ - } -} - -/* - * fsm_input - Input packet. - */ -void fsm_input(fsm *f, u_char *inpacket, int l) -{ - u_char *inp; - u_char code, id; - int len; - - /* - * Parse header (code, id and length). - * If packet too short, drop it. - */ - inp = inpacket; - - if (l < HEADERLEN) { - FSMDEBUG(("fsm_input(%x): Rcvd short header.", f->protocol)); - return; - } - - GETCHAR(code, inp); - GETCHAR(id, inp); - GETSHORT(len, inp); - - if (len < HEADERLEN) { - FSMDEBUG(("fsm_input(%x): Rcvd illegal length.", f->protocol)); - return; - } - - if (len > l) { - FSMDEBUG(("fsm_input(%x): Rcvd short packet.", f->protocol)); - return; - } - - len -= HEADERLEN; /* subtract header length */ - - if (f->state == PPP_FSM_INITIAL || f->state == PPP_FSM_STARTING) { - FSMDEBUG(("fsm_input(%x): Rcvd packet in state %d.", - f->protocol, f->state)); - return; - } - - /* - * Action depends on code. - */ - switch (code) { - case CONFREQ: - fsm_rconfreq(f, id, inp, len); - break; - - case CONFACK: - fsm_rconfack(f, id, inp, len); - break; - - case CONFNAK: - case CONFREJ: - fsm_rconfnakrej(f, code, id, inp, len); - break; - - case TERMREQ: - fsm_rtermreq(f, id, inp, len); - break; - - case TERMACK: - fsm_rtermack(f); - break; - - case CODEREJ: - fsm_rcoderej(f, inp, len); - break; - - default: - if (!f->callbacks->extcode || !(*f->callbacks->extcode)(f, code, id, inp, len)) { - fsm_sdata(f, CODEREJ, ++f->id, inpacket, len + HEADERLEN); - } - - break; - } -} - -/* - * fsm_rconfreq - Receive Configure-Request. - */ -static void fsm_rconfreq(fsm *f, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len) -{ - int code, reject_if_disagree; - - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: - /* Go away, we're closed */ - fsm_sdata(f, TERMACK, id, NULL, 0); - return; - - case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: - case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: - return; - - case PPP_FSM_OPENED: - - /* Go down and restart negotiation */ - if (f->callbacks->down) { - (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ - } - - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send initial Configure-Request */ - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: - /* Negotiation started by our peer */ - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send initial Configure-Request */ - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - break; - - default: - break; - } - - /* - * Pass the requested configuration options - * to protocol-specific code for checking. - */ - if (f->callbacks->reqci) /* Check CI */ - { - reject_if_disagree = (f->nakloops >= f->maxnakloops); - code = (*f->callbacks->reqci)(f, inp, &len, reject_if_disagree); - } else if (len) { - code = CONFREJ; /* Reject all CI */ - } else { - code = CONFACK; - } - - /* send the Ack, Nak or Rej to the peer */ - fsm_sdata(f, code, id, inp, len); - - if (code == CONFACK) { - if (f->state == PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD) { - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - f->state = PPP_FSM_OPENED; - - if (f->callbacks->up) { - (*f->callbacks->up)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ - } - } else { - f->state = PPP_FSM_ACKSENT; - } - - f->nakloops = 0; - - } else { - /* we sent CONFACK or CONFREJ */ - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD) { - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - } - - if (code == CONFNAK) { - ++f->nakloops; - } - } -} - -/* - * fsm_rconfack - Receive Configure-Ack. - */ -static void fsm_rconfack(fsm *f, int id, u_char *inp, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - - if (id != f->reqid || f->seen_ack) /* Expected id? */ - { - return; /* Nope, toss... */ - } - - if (!(f->callbacks->ackci ? (*f->callbacks->ackci)(f, inp, len) : - (len == 0))) { - /* Ack is bad - ignore it */ - ppp_error("Received bad configure-ack: %P", inp, len); - return; - } - - f->seen_ack = 1; - f->rnakloops = 0; - - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: - case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: - fsm_sdata(f, TERMACK, id, NULL, 0); - break; - - case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: - f->state = PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD; - f->retransmits = pcb->settings.fsm_max_conf_req_transmits; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: - /* Huh? an extra valid Ack? oh well... */ - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - f->state = PPP_FSM_OPENED; - f->retransmits = pcb->settings.fsm_max_conf_req_transmits; - - if (f->callbacks->up) { - (*f->callbacks->up)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_OPENED: - - /* Go down and restart negotiation */ - if (f->callbacks->down) { - (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ - } - - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send initial Configure-Request */ - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - break; - - default: - break; - } -} - -/* - * fsm_rconfnakrej - Receive Configure-Nak or Configure-Reject. - */ -static void fsm_rconfnakrej(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *inp, int len) -{ - int ret; - int treat_as_reject; - - if (id != f->reqid || f->seen_ack) /* Expected id? */ - { - return; /* Nope, toss... */ - } - - if (code == CONFNAK) { - ++f->rnakloops; - treat_as_reject = (f->rnakloops >= f->maxnakloops); - - if (f->callbacks->nakci == NULL || !(ret = f->callbacks->nakci(f, inp, len, treat_as_reject))) { - ppp_error("Received bad configure-nak: %P", inp, len); - return; - } - } else { - f->rnakloops = 0; - - if (f->callbacks->rejci == NULL || !(ret = f->callbacks->rejci(f, inp, len))) { - ppp_error("Received bad configure-rej: %P", inp, len); - return; - } - } - - f->seen_ack = 1; - - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: - case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: - fsm_sdata(f, TERMACK, id, NULL, 0); - break; - - case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: - case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: - /* They didn't agree to what we wanted - try another request */ - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - - if (ret < 0) { - f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; /* kludge for stopping CCP */ - } else { - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send Configure-Request */ - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: - /* Got a Nak/reject when we had already had an Ack?? oh well... */ - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_OPENED: - - /* Go down and restart negotiation */ - if (f->callbacks->down) { - (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ - } - - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send initial Configure-Request */ - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - break; - - default: - break; - } -} - -/* - * fsm_rtermreq - Receive Terminate-Req. - */ -static void fsm_rtermreq(fsm *f, int id, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: - case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; /* Start over but keep trying */ - break; - - case PPP_FSM_OPENED: - if (len > 0) { - ppp_info("%s terminated by peer (%0.*v)", PROTO_NAME(f), len, p); - } else { - ppp_info("%s terminated by peer", PROTO_NAME(f)); - } - - f->retransmits = 0; - f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPING; - - if (f->callbacks->down) { - (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ - } - - TIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f, pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time); - break; - - default: - break; - } - - fsm_sdata(f, TERMACK, id, NULL, 0); -} - -/* - * fsm_rtermack - Receive Terminate-Ack. - */ -static void fsm_rtermack(fsm *f) -{ - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); - f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSED; - - if (f->callbacks->finished) { - (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); - f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; - - if (f->callbacks->finished) { - (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - break; - - case PPP_FSM_OPENED: - if (f->callbacks->down) { - (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ - } - - fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - break; - - default: - break; - } -} - -/* - * fsm_rcoderej - Receive an Code-Reject. - */ -static void fsm_rcoderej(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int len) -{ - u_char code, id; - - if (len < HEADERLEN) { - FSMDEBUG(("fsm_rcoderej: Rcvd short Code-Reject packet!")); - return; - } - - GETCHAR(code, inp); - GETCHAR(id, inp); - ppp_warn("%s: Rcvd Code-Reject for code %d, id %d", PROTO_NAME(f), code, id); - - if (f->state == PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD) { - f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; - } -} - -/* - * fsm_protreject - Peer doesn't speak this protocol. - * - * Treat this as a catastrophic error (RXJ-). - */ -void fsm_protreject(fsm *f) -{ - switch (f->state) { - case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - - /* fall through */ - /* no break */ - case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: - f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSED; - - if (f->callbacks->finished) { - (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: - case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: - case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: - case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: - UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ - - /* fall through */ - /* no break */ - case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: - f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; - - if (f->callbacks->finished) { - (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); - } - - break; - - case PPP_FSM_OPENED: - terminate_layer(f, PPP_FSM_STOPPING); - break; - - default: - FSMDEBUG(("%s: Protocol-reject event in state %d!", - PROTO_NAME(f), f->state)); - /* no break */ - } -} - -/* - * fsm_sconfreq - Send a Configure-Request. - */ -static void fsm_sconfreq(fsm *f, int retransmit) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - int cilen; - - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_REQSENT && f->state != PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD && f->state != PPP_FSM_ACKSENT) { - /* Not currently negotiating - reset options */ - if (f->callbacks->resetci) { - (*f->callbacks->resetci)(f); - } - - f->nakloops = 0; - f->rnakloops = 0; - } - - if (!retransmit) { - /* New request - reset retransmission counter, use new ID */ - f->retransmits = pcb->settings.fsm_max_conf_req_transmits; - f->reqid = ++f->id; - } - - f->seen_ack = 0; - - /* - * Make up the request packet - */ - if (f->callbacks->cilen && f->callbacks->addci) { - cilen = (*f->callbacks->cilen)(f); - - if (cilen > pcb->peer_mru - HEADERLEN) { - cilen = pcb->peer_mru - HEADERLEN; - } - } else { - cilen = 0; - } - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(cilen + HEADERLEN + PPP_HDRLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - /* send the request to our peer */ - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - MAKEHEADER(outp, f->protocol); - PUTCHAR(CONFREQ, outp); - PUTCHAR(f->reqid, outp); - PUTSHORT(cilen + HEADERLEN, outp); - - if (cilen != 0) { - (*f->callbacks->addci)(f, outp, &cilen); - LWIP_ASSERT("cilen == p->len - HEADERLEN - PPP_HDRLEN", cilen == p->len - HEADERLEN - PPP_HDRLEN); - } - - ppp_write(pcb, p); - - /* start the retransmit timer */ - --f->retransmits; - TIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f, pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time); -} - -/* - * fsm_sdata - Send some data. - * - * Used for all packets sent to our peer by this module. - */ -void fsm_sdata(fsm *f, u_char code, u_char id, const u_char *data, int datalen) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - int outlen; - - /* Adjust length to be smaller than MTU */ - if (datalen > pcb->peer_mru - HEADERLEN) { - datalen = pcb->peer_mru - HEADERLEN; - } - - outlen = datalen + HEADERLEN; - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(outlen + PPP_HDRLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - - if (datalen) /* && data != outp + PPP_HDRLEN + HEADERLEN) -- was only for fsm_sconfreq() */ - { - MEMCPY(outp + PPP_HDRLEN + HEADERLEN, data, datalen); - } - - MAKEHEADER(outp, f->protocol); - PUTCHAR(code, outp); - PUTCHAR(id, outp); - PUTSHORT(outlen, outp); - ppp_write(pcb, p); -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * fsm.c - {Link, IP} Control Protocol Finite State Machine. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/* + * @todo: + * Randomize fsm id on link/init. + * Deal with variable outgoing MTU. + */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" + +static void fsm_timeout(void *); +static void fsm_rconfreq(fsm *f, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len); +static void fsm_rconfack(fsm *f, int id, u_char *inp, int len); +static void fsm_rconfnakrej(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *inp, int len); +static void fsm_rtermreq(fsm *f, int id, u_char *p, int len); +static void fsm_rtermack(fsm *f); +static void fsm_rcoderej(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int len); +static void fsm_sconfreq(fsm *f, int retransmit); + +#define PROTO_NAME(f) ((f)->callbacks->proto_name) + +/* + * fsm_init - Initialize fsm. + * + * Initialize fsm state. + */ +void fsm_init(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + f->state = PPP_FSM_INITIAL; + f->flags = 0; + f->id = 0; /* XXX Start with random id? */ + f->maxnakloops = pcb->settings.fsm_max_nak_loops; + f->term_reason_len = 0; +} + +/* + * fsm_lowerup - The lower layer is up. + */ +void fsm_lowerup(fsm *f) +{ + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_INITIAL: + f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSED; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_STARTING: + if (f->flags & OPT_SILENT) { + f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; + } else { + /* Send an initial configure-request */ + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + } + + break; + + default: + FSMDEBUG(("%s: Up event in state %d!", PROTO_NAME(f), f->state)); + /* no break */ + } +} + +/* + * fsm_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. + * + * Cancel all timeouts and inform upper layers. + */ +void fsm_lowerdown(fsm *f) +{ + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: + f->state = PPP_FSM_INITIAL; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: + f->state = PPP_FSM_STARTING; + + if (f->callbacks->starting) { + (*f->callbacks->starting)(f); + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: + f->state = PPP_FSM_INITIAL; + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + break; + + case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: + case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: + case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: + case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: + f->state = PPP_FSM_STARTING; + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + break; + + case PPP_FSM_OPENED: + if (f->callbacks->down) { + (*f->callbacks->down)(f); + } + + f->state = PPP_FSM_STARTING; + break; + + default: + FSMDEBUG(("%s: Down event in state %d!", PROTO_NAME(f), f->state)); + /* no break */ + } +} + +/* + * fsm_open - Link is allowed to come up. + */ +void fsm_open(fsm *f) +{ + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_INITIAL: + f->state = PPP_FSM_STARTING; + + if (f->callbacks->starting) { + (*f->callbacks->starting)(f); + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: + if (f->flags & OPT_SILENT) { + f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; + } else { + /* Send an initial configure-request */ + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: + f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPING; + + /* fall through */ + /* no break */ + case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: + case PPP_FSM_OPENED: + if (f->flags & OPT_RESTART) { + fsm_lowerdown(f); + fsm_lowerup(f); + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +/* + * terminate_layer - Start process of shutting down the FSM + * + * Cancel any timeout running, notify upper layers we're done, and + * send a terminate-request message as configured. + */ +static void terminate_layer(fsm *f, int nextstate) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + } else if (f->callbacks->down) { + (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers we're down */ + } + + /* Init restart counter and send Terminate-Request */ + f->retransmits = pcb->settings.fsm_max_term_transmits; + fsm_sdata(f, TERMREQ, f->reqid = ++f->id, + (const u_char *)f->term_reason, f->term_reason_len); + + if (f->retransmits == 0) { + /* + * User asked for no terminate requests at all; just close it. + * We've already fired off one Terminate-Request just to be nice + * to the peer, but we're not going to wait for a reply. + */ + f->state = nextstate == PPP_FSM_CLOSING ? PPP_FSM_CLOSED : PPP_FSM_STOPPED; + + if (f->callbacks->finished) { + (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); + } + + return; + } + + TIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f, pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time); + --f->retransmits; + + f->state = nextstate; +} + +/* + * fsm_close - Start closing connection. + * + * Cancel timeouts and either initiate close or possibly go directly to + * the PPP_FSM_CLOSED state. + */ +void fsm_close(fsm *f, const char *reason) +{ + f->term_reason = reason; + f->term_reason_len = (reason == NULL ? 0 : (u8_t)LWIP_MIN(strlen(reason), 0xFF)); + + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_STARTING: + f->state = PPP_FSM_INITIAL; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: + f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSED; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: + f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSING; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: + case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: + case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: + case PPP_FSM_OPENED: + terminate_layer(f, PPP_FSM_CLOSING); + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +/* + * fsm_timeout - Timeout expired. + */ +static void fsm_timeout(void *arg) +{ + fsm *f = (fsm *)arg; + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: + case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: + if (f->retransmits <= 0) { + /* + * We've waited for an ack long enough. Peer probably heard us. + */ + f->state = (f->state == PPP_FSM_CLOSING) ? PPP_FSM_CLOSED : PPP_FSM_STOPPED; + + if (f->callbacks->finished) { + (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); + } + } else { + /* Send Terminate-Request */ + fsm_sdata(f, TERMREQ, f->reqid = ++f->id, + (const u_char *)f->term_reason, f->term_reason_len); + TIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f, pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time); + --f->retransmits; + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: + case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: + case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: + if (f->retransmits <= 0) { + ppp_warn("%s: timeout sending Config-Requests", PROTO_NAME(f)); + f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; + + if ((f->flags & OPT_PASSIVE) == 0 && f->callbacks->finished) { + (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); + } + + } else { + /* Retransmit the configure-request */ + if (f->callbacks->retransmit) { + (*f->callbacks->retransmit)(f); + } + + fsm_sconfreq(f, 1); /* Re-send Configure-Request */ + + if (f->state == PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD) { + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + } + } + + break; + + default: + FSMDEBUG(("%s: Timeout event in state %d!", PROTO_NAME(f), f->state)); + /* no break */ + } +} + +/* + * fsm_input - Input packet. + */ +void fsm_input(fsm *f, u_char *inpacket, int l) +{ + u_char *inp; + u_char code, id; + int len; + + /* + * Parse header (code, id and length). + * If packet too short, drop it. + */ + inp = inpacket; + + if (l < HEADERLEN) { + FSMDEBUG(("fsm_input(%x): Rcvd short header.", f->protocol)); + return; + } + + GETCHAR(code, inp); + GETCHAR(id, inp); + GETSHORT(len, inp); + + if (len < HEADERLEN) { + FSMDEBUG(("fsm_input(%x): Rcvd illegal length.", f->protocol)); + return; + } + + if (len > l) { + FSMDEBUG(("fsm_input(%x): Rcvd short packet.", f->protocol)); + return; + } + + len -= HEADERLEN; /* subtract header length */ + + if (f->state == PPP_FSM_INITIAL || f->state == PPP_FSM_STARTING) { + FSMDEBUG(("fsm_input(%x): Rcvd packet in state %d.", + f->protocol, f->state)); + return; + } + + /* + * Action depends on code. + */ + switch (code) { + case CONFREQ: + fsm_rconfreq(f, id, inp, len); + break; + + case CONFACK: + fsm_rconfack(f, id, inp, len); + break; + + case CONFNAK: + case CONFREJ: + fsm_rconfnakrej(f, code, id, inp, len); + break; + + case TERMREQ: + fsm_rtermreq(f, id, inp, len); + break; + + case TERMACK: + fsm_rtermack(f); + break; + + case CODEREJ: + fsm_rcoderej(f, inp, len); + break; + + default: + if (!f->callbacks->extcode || !(*f->callbacks->extcode)(f, code, id, inp, len)) { + fsm_sdata(f, CODEREJ, ++f->id, inpacket, len + HEADERLEN); + } + + break; + } +} + +/* + * fsm_rconfreq - Receive Configure-Request. + */ +static void fsm_rconfreq(fsm *f, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len) +{ + int code, reject_if_disagree; + + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: + /* Go away, we're closed */ + fsm_sdata(f, TERMACK, id, NULL, 0); + return; + + case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: + case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: + return; + + case PPP_FSM_OPENED: + + /* Go down and restart negotiation */ + if (f->callbacks->down) { + (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ + } + + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send initial Configure-Request */ + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: + /* Negotiation started by our peer */ + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send initial Configure-Request */ + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + /* + * Pass the requested configuration options + * to protocol-specific code for checking. + */ + if (f->callbacks->reqci) /* Check CI */ + { + reject_if_disagree = (f->nakloops >= f->maxnakloops); + code = (*f->callbacks->reqci)(f, inp, &len, reject_if_disagree); + } else if (len) { + code = CONFREJ; /* Reject all CI */ + } else { + code = CONFACK; + } + + /* send the Ack, Nak or Rej to the peer */ + fsm_sdata(f, code, id, inp, len); + + if (code == CONFACK) { + if (f->state == PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD) { + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + f->state = PPP_FSM_OPENED; + + if (f->callbacks->up) { + (*f->callbacks->up)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ + } + } else { + f->state = PPP_FSM_ACKSENT; + } + + f->nakloops = 0; + + } else { + /* we sent CONFACK or CONFREJ */ + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD) { + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + } + + if (code == CONFNAK) { + ++f->nakloops; + } + } +} + +/* + * fsm_rconfack - Receive Configure-Ack. + */ +static void fsm_rconfack(fsm *f, int id, u_char *inp, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + + if (id != f->reqid || f->seen_ack) /* Expected id? */ + { + return; /* Nope, toss... */ + } + + if (!(f->callbacks->ackci ? (*f->callbacks->ackci)(f, inp, len) : + (len == 0))) { + /* Ack is bad - ignore it */ + ppp_error("Received bad configure-ack: %P", inp, len); + return; + } + + f->seen_ack = 1; + f->rnakloops = 0; + + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: + case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: + fsm_sdata(f, TERMACK, id, NULL, 0); + break; + + case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: + f->state = PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD; + f->retransmits = pcb->settings.fsm_max_conf_req_transmits; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: + /* Huh? an extra valid Ack? oh well... */ + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + f->state = PPP_FSM_OPENED; + f->retransmits = pcb->settings.fsm_max_conf_req_transmits; + + if (f->callbacks->up) { + (*f->callbacks->up)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_OPENED: + + /* Go down and restart negotiation */ + if (f->callbacks->down) { + (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ + } + + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send initial Configure-Request */ + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +/* + * fsm_rconfnakrej - Receive Configure-Nak or Configure-Reject. + */ +static void fsm_rconfnakrej(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *inp, int len) +{ + int ret; + int treat_as_reject; + + if (id != f->reqid || f->seen_ack) /* Expected id? */ + { + return; /* Nope, toss... */ + } + + if (code == CONFNAK) { + ++f->rnakloops; + treat_as_reject = (f->rnakloops >= f->maxnakloops); + + if (f->callbacks->nakci == NULL || !(ret = f->callbacks->nakci(f, inp, len, treat_as_reject))) { + ppp_error("Received bad configure-nak: %P", inp, len); + return; + } + } else { + f->rnakloops = 0; + + if (f->callbacks->rejci == NULL || !(ret = f->callbacks->rejci(f, inp, len))) { + ppp_error("Received bad configure-rej: %P", inp, len); + return; + } + } + + f->seen_ack = 1; + + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: + case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: + fsm_sdata(f, TERMACK, id, NULL, 0); + break; + + case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: + case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: + /* They didn't agree to what we wanted - try another request */ + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + + if (ret < 0) { + f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; /* kludge for stopping CCP */ + } else { + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send Configure-Request */ + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: + /* Got a Nak/reject when we had already had an Ack?? oh well... */ + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_OPENED: + + /* Go down and restart negotiation */ + if (f->callbacks->down) { + (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ + } + + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); /* Send initial Configure-Request */ + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +/* + * fsm_rtermreq - Receive Terminate-Req. + */ +static void fsm_rtermreq(fsm *f, int id, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: + case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; /* Start over but keep trying */ + break; + + case PPP_FSM_OPENED: + if (len > 0) { + ppp_info("%s terminated by peer (%0.*v)", PROTO_NAME(f), len, p); + } else { + ppp_info("%s terminated by peer", PROTO_NAME(f)); + } + + f->retransmits = 0; + f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPING; + + if (f->callbacks->down) { + (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ + } + + TIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f, pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time); + break; + + default: + break; + } + + fsm_sdata(f, TERMACK, id, NULL, 0); +} + +/* + * fsm_rtermack - Receive Terminate-Ack. + */ +static void fsm_rtermack(fsm *f) +{ + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); + f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSED; + + if (f->callbacks->finished) { + (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); + f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; + + if (f->callbacks->finished) { + (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + break; + + case PPP_FSM_OPENED: + if (f->callbacks->down) { + (*f->callbacks->down)(f); /* Inform upper layers */ + } + + fsm_sconfreq(f, 0); + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +/* + * fsm_rcoderej - Receive an Code-Reject. + */ +static void fsm_rcoderej(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int len) +{ + u_char code, id; + + if (len < HEADERLEN) { + FSMDEBUG(("fsm_rcoderej: Rcvd short Code-Reject packet!")); + return; + } + + GETCHAR(code, inp); + GETCHAR(id, inp); + ppp_warn("%s: Rcvd Code-Reject for code %d, id %d", PROTO_NAME(f), code, id); + + if (f->state == PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD) { + f->state = PPP_FSM_REQSENT; + } +} + +/* + * fsm_protreject - Peer doesn't speak this protocol. + * + * Treat this as a catastrophic error (RXJ-). + */ +void fsm_protreject(fsm *f) +{ + switch (f->state) { + case PPP_FSM_CLOSING: + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + + /* fall through */ + /* no break */ + case PPP_FSM_CLOSED: + f->state = PPP_FSM_CLOSED; + + if (f->callbacks->finished) { + (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_STOPPING: + case PPP_FSM_REQSENT: + case PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD: + case PPP_FSM_ACKSENT: + UNTIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f); /* Cancel timeout */ + + /* fall through */ + /* no break */ + case PPP_FSM_STOPPED: + f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; + + if (f->callbacks->finished) { + (*f->callbacks->finished)(f); + } + + break; + + case PPP_FSM_OPENED: + terminate_layer(f, PPP_FSM_STOPPING); + break; + + default: + FSMDEBUG(("%s: Protocol-reject event in state %d!", + PROTO_NAME(f), f->state)); + /* no break */ + } +} + +/* + * fsm_sconfreq - Send a Configure-Request. + */ +static void fsm_sconfreq(fsm *f, int retransmit) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + int cilen; + + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_REQSENT && f->state != PPP_FSM_ACKRCVD && f->state != PPP_FSM_ACKSENT) { + /* Not currently negotiating - reset options */ + if (f->callbacks->resetci) { + (*f->callbacks->resetci)(f); + } + + f->nakloops = 0; + f->rnakloops = 0; + } + + if (!retransmit) { + /* New request - reset retransmission counter, use new ID */ + f->retransmits = pcb->settings.fsm_max_conf_req_transmits; + f->reqid = ++f->id; + } + + f->seen_ack = 0; + + /* + * Make up the request packet + */ + if (f->callbacks->cilen && f->callbacks->addci) { + cilen = (*f->callbacks->cilen)(f); + + if (cilen > pcb->peer_mru - HEADERLEN) { + cilen = pcb->peer_mru - HEADERLEN; + } + } else { + cilen = 0; + } + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(cilen + HEADERLEN + PPP_HDRLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + /* send the request to our peer */ + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + MAKEHEADER(outp, f->protocol); + PUTCHAR(CONFREQ, outp); + PUTCHAR(f->reqid, outp); + PUTSHORT(cilen + HEADERLEN, outp); + + if (cilen != 0) { + (*f->callbacks->addci)(f, outp, &cilen); + LWIP_ASSERT("cilen == p->len - HEADERLEN - PPP_HDRLEN", cilen == p->len - HEADERLEN - PPP_HDRLEN); + } + + ppp_write(pcb, p); + + /* start the retransmit timer */ + --f->retransmits; + TIMEOUT(fsm_timeout, f, pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time); +} + +/* + * fsm_sdata - Send some data. + * + * Used for all packets sent to our peer by this module. + */ +void fsm_sdata(fsm *f, u_char code, u_char id, const u_char *data, int datalen) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + int outlen; + + /* Adjust length to be smaller than MTU */ + if (datalen > pcb->peer_mru - HEADERLEN) { + datalen = pcb->peer_mru - HEADERLEN; + } + + outlen = datalen + HEADERLEN; + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(outlen + PPP_HDRLEN), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + + if (datalen) /* && data != outp + PPP_HDRLEN + HEADERLEN) -- was only for fsm_sconfreq() */ + { + MEMCPY(outp + PPP_HDRLEN + HEADERLEN, data, datalen); + } + + MAKEHEADER(outp, f->protocol); + PUTCHAR(code, outp); + PUTCHAR(id, outp); + PUTSHORT(outlen, outp); + ppp_write(pcb, p); +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipcp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipcp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipcp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipcp.c index d6912e85..1b6f1302 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipcp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipcp.c @@ -1,2698 +1,2698 @@ -/* - * ipcp.c - PPP IP Control Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/* - * @todo: - */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - /* global vars */ - u32_t netmask = 0; /* IP netmask to set on interface */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - bool disable_defaultip = 0; /* Don't use hostname for default IP adrs */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if 0 /* moved to ppp_settings */ - bool noremoteip = 0; /* Let him have no IP address */ -#endif /* moved to ppp_setting */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - /* Hook for a plugin to know when IP protocol has come up */ - void (*ip_up_hook)(void) = NULL; - - /* Hook for a plugin to know when IP protocol has come down */ - void (*ip_down_hook)(void) = NULL; - - /* Hook for a plugin to choose the remote IP address */ - void (*ip_choose_hook)(u32_t *) = NULL; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if PPP_NOTIFY -/* Notifiers for when IPCP goes up and down */ -struct notifier *ip_up_notifier = NULL; -struct notifier *ip_down_notifier = NULL; -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ - -/* local vars */ -#if 0 /* moved to ppp_pcb */ - static int default_route_set[NUM_PPP]; /* Have set up a default route */ - static int proxy_arp_set[NUM_PPP]; /* Have created proxy arp entry */ - static int ipcp_is_up; /* have called np_up() */ - static int ipcp_is_open; /* haven't called np_finished() */ - static bool ask_for_local; /* request our address from peer */ -#endif /* moved to ppp_pcb */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - static char vj_value[8]; /* string form of vj option value */ - static char netmask_str[20]; /* string form of netmask value */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -/* - * Callbacks for fsm code. (CI = Configuration Information) - */ -static void ipcp_resetci(fsm *f); /* Reset our CI */ -static int ipcp_cilen(fsm *f); /* Return length of our CI */ -static void ipcp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp); /* Add our CI */ -static int ipcp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer ack'd our CI */ -static int ipcp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject); /* Peer nak'd our CI */ -static int ipcp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer rej'd our CI */ -static int ipcp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *len, int reject_if_disagree); /* Rcv CI */ -static void ipcp_up(fsm *f); /* We're UP */ -static void ipcp_down(fsm *f); /* We're DOWN */ -static void ipcp_finished(fsm *f); /* Don't need lower layer */ - -static const fsm_callbacks ipcp_callbacks = /* IPCP callback routines */ - { - ipcp_resetci, /* Reset our Configuration Information */ - ipcp_cilen, /* Length of our Configuration Information */ - ipcp_addci, /* Add our Configuration Information */ - ipcp_ackci, /* ACK our Configuration Information */ - ipcp_nakci, /* NAK our Configuration Information */ - ipcp_rejci, /* Reject our Configuration Information */ - ipcp_reqci, /* Request peer's Configuration Information */ - ipcp_up, /* Called when fsm reaches OPENED state */ - ipcp_down, /* Called when fsm leaves OPENED state */ - NULL, /* Called when we want the lower layer up */ - ipcp_finished, /* Called when we want the lower layer down */ - NULL, /* Called when Protocol-Reject received */ - NULL, /* Retransmission is necessary */ - NULL, /* Called to handle protocol-specific codes */ - "IPCP" /* String name of protocol */ - }; - -/* - * Command-line options. - */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS -static int setvjslots(char **); -static int setdnsaddr(char **); -static int setwinsaddr(char **); -static int setnetmask(char **); -int setipaddr(char *, char **, int); - -static void printipaddr(option_t *, void (*)(void *, char *, ...), void *); - -static option_t ipcp_option_list[] = { - { "noip", o_bool, &ipcp_protent.enabled_flag, - "Disable IP and IPCP" }, - { "-ip", o_bool, &ipcp_protent.enabled_flag, - "Disable IP and IPCP", OPT_ALIAS }, - - { "novj", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].neg_vj, - "Disable VJ compression", OPT_A2CLR, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].neg_vj }, - { "-vj", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].neg_vj, - "Disable VJ compression", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_allowoptions[0].neg_vj }, - - { "novjccomp", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].cflag, - "Disable VJ connection-ID compression", OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_allowoptions[0].cflag }, - { "-vjccomp", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].cflag, - "Disable VJ connection-ID compression", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_allowoptions[0].cflag }, - - { "vj-max-slots", o_special, (void *)setvjslots, - "Set maximum VJ header slots", - OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL | OPT_STATIC, vj_value }, - - { "ipcp-accept-local", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].accept_local, - "Accept peer's address for us", 1 }, - { "ipcp-accept-remote", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].accept_remote, - "Accept peer's address for it", 1 }, - - { "ipparam", o_string, &ipparam, - "Set ip script parameter", OPT_PRIO }, - - { "noipdefault", o_bool, &disable_defaultip, - "Don't use name for default IP adrs", 1 }, - - { "ms-dns", 1, (void *)setdnsaddr, - "DNS address for the peer's use" }, - { "ms-wins", 1, (void *)setwinsaddr, - "Nameserver for SMB over TCP/IP for peer" }, - - { "ipcp-restart", o_int, &ipcp_fsm[0].timeouttime, - "Set timeout for IPCP", OPT_PRIO }, - { "ipcp-max-terminate", o_int, &ipcp_fsm[0].maxtermtransmits, - "Set max #xmits for term-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, - { "ipcp-max-configure", o_int, &ipcp_fsm[0].maxconfreqtransmits, - "Set max #xmits for conf-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, - { "ipcp-max-failure", o_int, &ipcp_fsm[0].maxnakloops, - "Set max #conf-naks for IPCP", OPT_PRIO }, - - { "defaultroute", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].default_route, - "Add default route", OPT_ENABLE | 1, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].default_route }, - { "nodefaultroute", o_bool, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].default_route, - "disable defaultroute option", OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_wantoptions[0].default_route }, - { "-defaultroute", o_bool, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].default_route, - "disable defaultroute option", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_wantoptions[0].default_route }, - - { "replacedefaultroute", o_bool, - &ipcp_wantoptions[0].replace_default_route, - "Replace default route", 1 }, - { "noreplacedefaultroute", o_bool, - &ipcp_allowoptions[0].replace_default_route, - "Never replace default route", OPT_A2COPY, - &ipcp_wantoptions[0].replace_default_route }, - { "proxyarp", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].proxy_arp, - "Add proxy ARP entry", OPT_ENABLE | 1, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].proxy_arp }, - { "noproxyarp", o_bool, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].proxy_arp, - "disable proxyarp option", OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_wantoptions[0].proxy_arp }, - { "-proxyarp", o_bool, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].proxy_arp, - "disable proxyarp option", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_wantoptions[0].proxy_arp }, - - { "usepeerdns", o_bool, &usepeerdns, - "Ask peer for DNS address(es)", 1 }, - - { "netmask", o_special, (void *)setnetmask, - "set netmask", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL | OPT_STATIC, netmask_str }, - - { "ipcp-no-addresses", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].old_addrs, - "Disable old-style IP-Addresses usage", OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_allowoptions[0].old_addrs }, - { "ipcp-no-address", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].neg_addr, - "Disable IP-Address usage", OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_allowoptions[0].neg_addr }, - - { "noremoteip", o_bool, &noremoteip, - "Allow peer to have no IP address", 1 }, - - { "nosendip", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].neg_addr, - "Don't send our IP address to peer", OPT_A2CLR, - &ipcp_wantoptions[0].old_addrs }, - - { "IP addresses", o_wild, (void *)&setipaddr, - "set local and remote IP addresses", - OPT_NOARG | OPT_A2PRINTER, (void *)&printipaddr }, - - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * Protocol entry points from main code. - */ -static void ipcp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ipcp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ipcp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); -static void ipcp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ipcp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ipcp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len); -static void ipcp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static int ipcp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS -static void ip_check_options(void); -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -static int ip_demand_conf(int); -static int ip_active_pkt(u_char *, int); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - static void create_resolv(u32_t, u32_t); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -const struct protent ipcp_protent = { - PPP_IPCP, - ipcp_init, - ipcp_input, - ipcp_protrej, - ipcp_lowerup, - ipcp_lowerdown, - ipcp_open, - ipcp_close, -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - ipcp_printpkt, -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - "IPCP", - "IP", -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS - ipcp_option_list, - ip_check_options, -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - ip_demand_conf, - ip_active_pkt -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -}; - -static void ipcp_clear_addrs(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ouraddr, u32_t hisaddr, u8_t replacedefaultroute); - -/* - * Lengths of configuration options. - */ -#define CILEN_VOID 2 -#define CILEN_COMPRESS 4 /* min length for compression protocol opt. */ -#define CILEN_VJ 6 /* length for RFC1332 Van-Jacobson opt. */ -#define CILEN_ADDR 6 /* new-style single address option */ -#define CILEN_ADDRS 10 /* old-style dual address option */ - -#define CODENAME(x) ((x) == CONFACK ? "ACK" : \ - (x) == CONFNAK ? "NAK" : \ - "REJ") - -#if 0 /* UNUSED, already defined by lwIP */ -/* - * Make a string representation of a network IP address. - */ -char *ip_ntoa(ipaddr) -u32_t ipaddr; -{ - static char b[64]; - - slprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%I", ipaddr); - return b; -} -#endif /* UNUSED, already defined by lwIP */ - -/* - * Option parsing. - */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * setvjslots - set maximum number of connection slots for VJ compression - */ -static int setvjslots(argv) char **argv; -{ - int value; - - if (!int_option(*argv, &value)) { - return 0; - } - - if (value < 2 || value > 16) { - option_error("vj-max-slots value must be between 2 and 16"); - return 0; - } - - ipcp_wantoptions[0].maxslotindex = - ipcp_allowoptions[0].maxslotindex = value - 1; - slprintf(vj_value, sizeof(vj_value), "%d", value); - return 1; -} - -/* - * setdnsaddr - set the dns address(es) - */ -static int setdnsaddr(argv) char **argv; -{ - u32_t dns; - struct hostent *hp; - - dns = inet_addr(*argv); - - if (dns == (u32_t)-1) { - if ((hp = gethostbyname(*argv)) == NULL) { - option_error("invalid address parameter '%s' for ms-dns option", - *argv); - return 0; - } - - dns = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; - } - - /* We take the last 2 values given, the 2nd-last as the primary - and the last as the secondary. If only one is given it - becomes both primary and secondary. */ - if (ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[1] == 0) { - ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[0] = dns; - } else { - ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[0] = ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[1]; - } - - /* always set the secondary address value. */ - ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[1] = dns; - - return (1); -} - -/* - * setwinsaddr - set the wins address(es) - * This is primrarly used with the Samba package under UNIX or for pointing - * the caller to the existing WINS server on a Windows NT platform. - */ -static int setwinsaddr(argv) char **argv; -{ - u32_t wins; - struct hostent *hp; - - wins = inet_addr(*argv); - - if (wins == (u32_t)-1) { - if ((hp = gethostbyname(*argv)) == NULL) { - option_error("invalid address parameter '%s' for ms-wins option", - *argv); - return 0; - } - - wins = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; - } - - /* We take the last 2 values given, the 2nd-last as the primary - and the last as the secondary. If only one is given it - becomes both primary and secondary. */ - if (ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[1] == 0) { - ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[0] = wins; - } else { - ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[0] = ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[1]; - } - - /* always set the secondary address value. */ - ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[1] = wins; - - return (1); -} - -/* - * setipaddr - Set the IP address - * If doit is 0, the call is to check whether this option is - * potentially an IP address specification. - * Not static so that plugins can call it to set the addresses - */ -int setipaddr(arg, argv, doit) char *arg; -char **argv; -int doit; -{ - struct hostent *hp; - char *colon; - u32_t local, remote; - ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[0]; - static int prio_local = 0, prio_remote = 0; - - /* - * IP address pair separated by ":". - */ - if ((colon = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - if (!doit) { - return 1; - } - - /* - * If colon first character, then no local addr. - */ - if (colon != arg && option_priority >= prio_local) { - *colon = '\0'; - - if ((local = inet_addr(arg)) == (u32_t)-1) { - if ((hp = gethostbyname(arg)) == NULL) { - option_error("unknown host: %s", arg); - return 0; - } - - local = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; - } - - if (bad_ip_adrs(local)) { - option_error("bad local IP address %s", ip_ntoa(local)); - return 0; - } - - if (local != 0) { - wo->ouraddr = local; - } - - *colon = ':'; - prio_local = option_priority; - } - - /* - * If colon last character, then no remote addr. - */ - if (*++colon != '\0' && option_priority >= prio_remote) { - if ((remote = inet_addr(colon)) == (u32_t)-1) { - if ((hp = gethostbyname(colon)) == NULL) { - option_error("unknown host: %s", colon); - return 0; - } - - remote = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; - - if (remote_name[0] == 0) { - strlcpy(remote_name, colon, sizeof(remote_name)); - } - } - - if (bad_ip_adrs(remote)) { - option_error("bad remote IP address %s", ip_ntoa(remote)); - return 0; - } - - if (remote != 0) { - wo->hisaddr = remote; - } - - prio_remote = option_priority; - } - - return 1; -} - -static void printipaddr(opt, printer, arg) - option_t *opt; -void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...); -void *arg; -{ - ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[0]; - - if (wo->ouraddr != 0) { - printer(arg, "%I", wo->ouraddr); - } - - printer(arg, ":"); - - if (wo->hisaddr != 0) { - printer(arg, "%I", wo->hisaddr); - } -} - -/* - * setnetmask - set the netmask to be used on the interface. - */ -static int setnetmask(argv) char **argv; -{ - u32_t mask; - int n; - char *p; - - /* - * Unfortunately, if we use inet_addr, we can't tell whether - * a result of all 1s is an error or a valid 255.255.255.255. - */ - p = *argv; - n = parse_dotted_ip(p, &mask); - - mask = lwip_htonl(mask); - - if (n == 0 || p[n] != 0 || (netmask & ~mask) != 0) { - option_error("invalid netmask value '%s'", *argv); - return 0; - } - - netmask = mask; - slprintf(netmask_str, sizeof(netmask_str), "%I", mask); - - return (1); -} - -int parse_dotted_ip(p, vp) char *p; -u32_t *vp; -{ - int n; - u32_t v, b; - char *endp, *p0 = p; - - v = 0; - - for (n = 3;; --n) { - b = strtoul(p, &endp, 0); - - if (endp == p) { - return 0; - } - - if (b > 255) { - if (n < 3) { - return 0; - } - - /* accept e.g. 0xffffff00 */ - *vp = b; - return endp - p0; - } - - v |= b << (n * 8); - p = endp; - - if (n == 0) { - break; - } - - if (*p != '.') { - return 0; - } - - ++p; - } - - *vp = v; - return p - p0; -} -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * ipcp_init - Initialize IPCP. - */ -static void ipcp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; - - ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; - ipcp_options *ao = &pcb->ipcp_allowoptions; - - f->pcb = pcb; - f->protocol = PPP_IPCP; - f->callbacks = &ipcp_callbacks; - fsm_init(f); - - /* - * Some 3G modems use repeated IPCP NAKs as a way of stalling - * until they can contact a server on the network, so we increase - * the default number of NAKs we accept before we start treating - * them as rejects. - */ - f->maxnakloops = 100; - -#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ - memset(wo, 0, sizeof(*wo)); - memset(ao, 0, sizeof(*ao)); -#endif /* 0 */ - - wo->neg_addr = wo->old_addrs = 1; -#if VJ_SUPPORT - wo->neg_vj = 1; - wo->vj_protocol = IPCP_VJ_COMP; - wo->maxslotindex = MAX_STATES - 1; /* really max index */ - wo->cflag = 1; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - /* wanting default route by default */ - wo->default_route = 1; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - - ao->neg_addr = ao->old_addrs = 1; -#if VJ_SUPPORT - /* max slots and slot-id compression are currently hardwired in */ - /* ppp_if.c to 16 and 1, this needs to be changed (among other */ - /* things) gmc */ - - ao->neg_vj = 1; - ao->maxslotindex = MAX_STATES - 1; - ao->cflag = 1; -#endif /* #if VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - /* - * XXX These control whether the user may use the proxyarp - * and defaultroute options. - */ - ao->proxy_arp = 1; - ao->default_route = 1; -#endif /* UNUSED */ -} - -/* - * ipcp_open - IPCP is allowed to come up. - */ -static void ipcp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; - fsm_open(f); - pcb->ipcp_is_open = 1; -} - -/* - * ipcp_close - Take IPCP down. - */ -static void ipcp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; - fsm_close(f, reason); -} - -/* - * ipcp_lowerup - The lower layer is up. - */ -static void ipcp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; - fsm_lowerup(f); -} - -/* - * ipcp_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. - */ -static void ipcp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; - fsm_lowerdown(f); -} - -/* - * ipcp_input - Input IPCP packet. - */ -static void ipcp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; - fsm_input(f, p, len); -} - -/* - * ipcp_protrej - A Protocol-Reject was received for IPCP. - * - * Pretend the lower layer went down, so we shut up. - */ -static void ipcp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; - fsm_lowerdown(f); -} - -/* - * ipcp_resetci - Reset our CI. - * Called by fsm_sconfreq, Send Configure Request. - */ -static void ipcp_resetci(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; - ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; - ipcp_options *ao = &pcb->ipcp_allowoptions; - - wo->req_addr = (wo->neg_addr || wo->old_addrs) && - (ao->neg_addr || ao->old_addrs); - - if (wo->ouraddr == 0) { - wo->accept_local = 1; - } - - if (wo->hisaddr == 0) { - wo->accept_remote = 1; - } - -#if LWIP_DNS - wo->req_dns1 = wo->req_dns2 = pcb->settings.usepeerdns; /* Request DNS addresses from the peer */ -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - *go = *wo; - - if (!pcb->ask_for_local) { - go->ouraddr = 0; - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(ip_choose_hook) - { - ip_choose_hook(&wo->hisaddr); - - if(wo->hisaddr) - { - wo->accept_remote = 0; - } - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - BZERO(&pcb->ipcp_hisoptions, sizeof(ipcp_options)); -} - -/* - * ipcp_cilen - Return length of our CI. - * Called by fsm_sconfreq, Send Configure Request. - */ -static int ipcp_cilen(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; -#if VJ_SUPPORT - ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - ipcp_options *ho = &pcb->ipcp_hisoptions; - -#define LENCIADDRS(neg) (neg ? CILEN_ADDRS : 0) -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#define LENCIVJ(neg, old) (neg ? (old ? CILEN_COMPRESS : CILEN_VJ) : 0) -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ -#define LENCIADDR(neg) (neg ? CILEN_ADDR : 0) -#if LWIP_DNS -#define LENCIDNS(neg) LENCIADDR(neg) -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ -#define LENCIWINS(neg) LENCIADDR(neg) -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - /* - * First see if we want to change our options to the old - * forms because we have received old forms from the peer. - */ - if (go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs && !ho->neg_addr && ho->old_addrs) { - go->neg_addr = 0; - } - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - - if (wo->neg_vj && !go->neg_vj && !go->old_vj) { - /* try an older style of VJ negotiation */ - /* use the old style only if the peer did */ - if (ho->neg_vj && ho->old_vj) { - go->neg_vj = 1; - go->old_vj = 1; - go->vj_protocol = ho->vj_protocol; - } - } - -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - return (LENCIADDRS(!go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs) + -#if VJ_SUPPORT - LENCIVJ(go->neg_vj, go->old_vj) + -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - LENCIADDR(go->neg_addr) + -#if LWIP_DNS - LENCIDNS(go->req_dns1) + - LENCIDNS(go->req_dns2) + -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ - LENCIWINS(go->winsaddr[0]) + - LENCIWINS(go->winsaddr[1]) + -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - 0); -} - -/* - * ipcp_addci - Add our desired CIs to a packet. - * Called by fsm_sconfreq, Send Configure Request. - */ -static void ipcp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; - int len = *lenp; - -#define ADDCIADDRS(opt, neg, val1, val2) \ - if (neg) { \ - if (len >= CILEN_ADDRS) { \ - u32_t l; \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDRS, ucp); \ - l = lwip_ntohl(val1); \ - PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ - l = lwip_ntohl(val2); \ - PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ - len -= CILEN_ADDRS; \ - } else \ - go->old_addrs = 0; \ - } - -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#define ADDCIVJ(opt, neg, val, old, maxslotindex, cflag) \ - if (neg) { \ - int vjlen = old ? CILEN_COMPRESS : CILEN_VJ; \ - if (len >= vjlen) { \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(vjlen, ucp); \ - PUTSHORT(val, ucp); \ - if (!old) { \ - PUTCHAR(maxslotindex, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(cflag, ucp); \ - } \ - len -= vjlen; \ - } else \ - neg = 0; \ - } -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#define ADDCIADDR(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - if (len >= CILEN_ADDR) { \ - u32_t l; \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDR, ucp); \ - l = lwip_ntohl(val); \ - PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ - len -= CILEN_ADDR; \ - } else \ - neg = 0; \ - } - -#if LWIP_DNS -#define ADDCIDNS(opt, neg, addr) \ - if (neg) { \ - if (len >= CILEN_ADDR) { \ - u32_t l; \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDR, ucp); \ - l = lwip_ntohl(addr); \ - PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ - len -= CILEN_ADDR; \ - } else \ - neg = 0; \ - } -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ -#define ADDCIWINS(opt, addr) \ - if (addr) { \ - if (len >= CILEN_ADDR) { \ - u32_t l; \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDR, ucp); \ - l = lwip_ntohl(addr); \ - PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ - len -= CILEN_ADDR; \ - } else \ - addr = 0; \ - } -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - ADDCIADDRS(CI_ADDRS, !go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs, go->ouraddr, - go->hisaddr); - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - ADDCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, go->neg_vj, go->vj_protocol, go->old_vj, - go->maxslotindex, go->cflag); -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - ADDCIADDR(CI_ADDR, go->neg_addr, go->ouraddr); - -#if LWIP_DNS - ADDCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS1, go->req_dns1, go->dnsaddr[0]); - - ADDCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS2, go->req_dns2, go->dnsaddr[1]); -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ - ADDCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS1, go->winsaddr[0]); - - ADDCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS2, go->winsaddr[1]); -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - *lenp -= len; -} - -/* - * ipcp_ackci - Ack our CIs. - * Called by fsm_rconfack, Receive Configure ACK. - * - * Returns: - * 0 - Ack was bad. - * 1 - Ack was good. - */ -static int ipcp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; - u_short cilen, citype; - u32_t cilong; -#if VJ_SUPPORT - u_short cishort; - u_char cimaxslotindex, cicflag; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - /* - * CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent... - * Check packet length and CI length at each step. - * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. - */ - -#define ACKCIADDRS(opt, neg, val1, val2) \ - if (neg) { \ - u32_t l; \ - if ((len -= CILEN_ADDRS) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_ADDRS || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - if (val1 != cilong) \ - goto bad; \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - if (val2 != cilong) \ - goto bad; \ - } - -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#define ACKCIVJ(opt, neg, val, old, maxslotindex, cflag) \ - if (neg) { \ - int vjlen = old ? CILEN_COMPRESS : CILEN_VJ; \ - if ((len -= vjlen) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != vjlen || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - if (cishort != val) \ - goto bad; \ - if (!old) { \ - GETCHAR(cimaxslotindex, p); \ - if (cimaxslotindex != maxslotindex) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(cicflag, p); \ - if (cicflag != cflag) \ - goto bad; \ - } \ - } -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#define ACKCIADDR(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - u32_t l; \ - if ((len -= CILEN_ADDR) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_ADDR || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - if (val != cilong) \ - goto bad; \ - } - -#if LWIP_DNS -#define ACKCIDNS(opt, neg, addr) \ - if (neg) { \ - u32_t l; \ - if ((len -= CILEN_ADDR) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_ADDR || citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - if (addr != cilong) \ - goto bad; \ - } -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ -#define ACKCIWINS(opt, addr) \ - if (addr) { \ - u32_t l; \ - if ((len -= CILEN_ADDR) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_ADDR || citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - if (addr != cilong) \ - goto bad; \ - } -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - ACKCIADDRS(CI_ADDRS, !go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs, go->ouraddr, - go->hisaddr); - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - ACKCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, go->neg_vj, go->vj_protocol, go->old_vj, - go->maxslotindex, go->cflag); -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - ACKCIADDR(CI_ADDR, go->neg_addr, go->ouraddr); - -#if LWIP_DNS - ACKCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS1, go->req_dns1, go->dnsaddr[0]); - - ACKCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS2, go->req_dns2, go->dnsaddr[1]); -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ - ACKCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS1, go->winsaddr[0]); - - ACKCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS2, go->winsaddr[1]); -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - /* - * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. - */ - if (len != 0) { - goto bad; - } - - return (1); - -bad: - IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp_ackci: received bad Ack!")); - return (0); -} - -/* - * ipcp_nakci - Peer has sent a NAK for some of our CIs. - * This should not modify any state if the Nak is bad - * or if IPCP is in the OPENED state. - * Calback from fsm_rconfnakrej - Receive Configure-Nak or Configure-Reject. - * - * Returns: - * 0 - Nak was bad. - * 1 - Nak was good. - */ -static int ipcp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; - u_char citype, cilen, *next; -#if VJ_SUPPORT - u_char cimaxslotindex, cicflag; - u_short cishort; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - u32_t ciaddr1, ciaddr2, l; -#if LWIP_DNS - u32_t cidnsaddr; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - ipcp_options no; /* options we've seen Naks for */ - ipcp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ - - BZERO(&no, sizeof(no)); - try_ = *go; - - /* - * Any Nak'd CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. - * Check packet length and CI length at each step. - * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. - */ -#define NAKCIADDRS(opt, neg, code) \ - if ((neg) && \ - (cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDRS && \ - len >= cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - ciaddr2 = lwip_htonl(l); \ - no.old_addrs = 1; \ - code \ - } - -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#define NAKCIVJ(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_COMPRESS || cilen == CILEN_VJ) && \ - len >= cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#define NAKCIADDR(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - (cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR && \ - len >= cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } - -#if LWIP_DNS -#define NAKCIDNS(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR) && \ - len >= cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cidnsaddr = lwip_htonl(l); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - - /* - * Accept the peer's idea of {our,his} address, if different - * from our idea, only if the accept_{local,remote} flag is set. - */ - NAKCIADDRS( - CI_ADDRS, !go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs, - - if (treat_as_reject) { - try_.old_addrs = 0; - } else { - if (go->accept_local && ciaddr1) { - /* take his idea of our address */ - try_.ouraddr = ciaddr1; - } - - if (go->accept_remote && ciaddr2) { - /* take his idea of his address */ - try_.hisaddr = ciaddr2; - } - }); - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - /* - * Accept the peer's value of maxslotindex provided that it - * is less than what we asked for. Turn off slot-ID compression - * if the peer wants. Send old-style compress-type option if - * the peer wants. - */ - NAKCIVJ( - CI_COMPRESSTYPE, neg_vj, - - if (treat_as_reject) { - try_.neg_vj = 0; - } else if (cilen == CILEN_VJ) { - GETCHAR(cimaxslotindex, p); - GETCHAR(cicflag, p); - - if (cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP) { - try_.old_vj = 0; - - if (cimaxslotindex < go->maxslotindex) { - try_.maxslotindex = cimaxslotindex; - } - - if (!cicflag) { - try_.cflag = 0; - } - } else { - try_.neg_vj = 0; - } - } else { - if (cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP || cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP_OLD) { - try_.old_vj = 1; - try_.vj_protocol = cishort; - } else { - try_.neg_vj = 0; - } - }); -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - NAKCIADDR( - CI_ADDR, neg_addr, - - if (treat_as_reject) { - try_.neg_addr = 0; - try_.old_addrs = 0; - } else if (go->accept_local && ciaddr1) { - /* take his idea of our address */ - try_.ouraddr = ciaddr1; - }); - -#if LWIP_DNS - NAKCIDNS( - CI_MS_DNS1, req_dns1, - - if (treat_as_reject) { - try_.req_dns1 = 0; - } else { - try_.dnsaddr[0] = cidnsaddr; - }); - - NAKCIDNS( - CI_MS_DNS2, req_dns2, - - if (treat_as_reject) { - try_.req_dns2 = 0; - } else { - try_.dnsaddr[1] = cidnsaddr; - }); -#endif /* #if LWIP_DNS */ - - /* - * There may be remaining CIs, if the peer is requesting negotiation - * on an option that we didn't include in our request packet. - * If they want to negotiate about IP addresses, we comply. - * If they want us to ask for compression, we refuse. - * If they want us to ask for ms-dns, we do that, since some - * peers get huffy if we don't. - */ - while (len >= CILEN_VOID) { - GETCHAR(citype, p); - GETCHAR(cilen, p); - - if (cilen < CILEN_VOID || (len -= cilen) < 0) { - goto bad; - } - - next = p + cilen - 2; - - switch (citype) { -#if VJ_SUPPORT - - case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: - if (go->neg_vj || no.neg_vj || - (cilen != CILEN_VJ && cilen != CILEN_COMPRESS)) { - goto bad; - } - - no.neg_vj = 1; - break; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - case CI_ADDRS: - if ((!go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs) || no.old_addrs || cilen != CILEN_ADDRS) { - goto bad; - } - - try_.neg_addr = 0; - GETLONG(l, p); - ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); - - if (ciaddr1 && go->accept_local) { - try_.ouraddr = ciaddr1; - } - - GETLONG(l, p); - ciaddr2 = lwip_htonl(l); - - if (ciaddr2 && go->accept_remote) { - try_.hisaddr = ciaddr2; - } - - no.old_addrs = 1; - break; - - case CI_ADDR: - if (go->neg_addr || no.neg_addr || cilen != CILEN_ADDR) { - goto bad; - } - - try_.old_addrs = 0; - GETLONG(l, p); - ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); - - if (ciaddr1 && go->accept_local) { - try_.ouraddr = ciaddr1; - } - - if (try_.ouraddr != 0) { - try_.neg_addr = 1; - } - - no.neg_addr = 1; - break; -#if LWIP_DNS - - case CI_MS_DNS1: - if (go->req_dns1 || no.req_dns1 || cilen != CILEN_ADDR) { - goto bad; - } - - GETLONG(l, p); - try_.dnsaddr[0] = lwip_htonl(l); - try_.req_dns1 = 1; - no.req_dns1 = 1; - break; - - case CI_MS_DNS2: - if (go->req_dns2 || no.req_dns2 || cilen != CILEN_ADDR) { - goto bad; - } - - GETLONG(l, p); - try_.dnsaddr[1] = lwip_htonl(l); - try_.req_dns2 = 1; - no.req_dns2 = 1; - break; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - case CI_MS_WINS1: - case CI_MS_WINS2: - if(cilen != CILEN_ADDR) - { - goto bad; - } - - GETLONG(l, p); - ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); - - if(ciaddr1) - { - try_.winsaddr[citype == CI_MS_WINS2] = ciaddr1; - } - - break; -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - default: - break; - } - - p = next; - } - - /* - * OK, the Nak is good. Now we can update state. - * If there are any remaining options, we ignore them. - */ - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - *go = try_; - } - - return 1; - -bad: - IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp_nakci: received bad Nak!")); - return 0; -} - -/* - * ipcp_rejci - Reject some of our CIs. - * Callback from fsm_rconfnakrej. - */ -static int ipcp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; - u_char cilen; -#if VJ_SUPPORT - u_char cimaxslotindex, ciflag; - u_short cishort; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - u32_t cilong; - ipcp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ - - try_ = *go; - /* - * Any Rejected CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. - * Check packet length and CI length at each step. - * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. - */ -#define REJCIADDRS(opt, neg, val1, val2) \ - if ((neg) && \ - (cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDRS && \ - len >= cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - u32_t l; \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cilong != val1) \ - goto bad; \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cilong != val2) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.old_addrs = 0; \ - } - -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#define REJCIVJ(opt, neg, val, old, maxslot, cflag) \ - if (go->neg && \ - p[1] == (old ? CILEN_COMPRESS : CILEN_VJ) && \ - len >= p[1] && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= p[1]; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cishort != val) \ - goto bad; \ - if (!old) { \ - GETCHAR(cimaxslotindex, p); \ - if (cimaxslotindex != maxslot) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(ciflag, p); \ - if (ciflag != cflag) \ - goto bad; \ - } \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#define REJCIADDR(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - (cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR && \ - len >= cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - u32_t l; \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cilong != val) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } - -#if LWIP_DNS -#define REJCIDNS(opt, neg, dnsaddr) \ - if (go->neg && \ - ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR) && \ - len >= cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - u32_t l; \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cilong != dnsaddr) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ -#define REJCIWINS(opt, addr) \ - if (addr && \ - ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR) && \ - len >= cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - u32_t l; \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETLONG(l, p); \ - cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cilong != addr) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.winsaddr[opt == CI_MS_WINS2] = 0; \ - } -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - REJCIADDRS(CI_ADDRS, !go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs, - go->ouraddr, go->hisaddr); - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - REJCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, neg_vj, go->vj_protocol, go->old_vj, - go->maxslotindex, go->cflag); -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - REJCIADDR(CI_ADDR, neg_addr, go->ouraddr); - -#if LWIP_DNS - REJCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS1, req_dns1, go->dnsaddr[0]); - - REJCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS2, req_dns2, go->dnsaddr[1]); -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ - REJCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS1, go->winsaddr[0]); - - REJCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS2, go->winsaddr[1]); -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - /* - * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. - */ - if (len != 0) { - goto bad; - } - - /* - * Now we can update state. - */ - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - *go = try_; - } - - return 1; - -bad: - IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp_rejci: received bad Reject!")); - return 0; -} - -/* - * ipcp_reqci - Check the peer's requested CIs and send appropriate response. - * Callback from fsm_rconfreq, Receive Configure Request - * - * Returns: CONFACK, CONFNAK or CONFREJ and input packet modified - * appropriately. If reject_if_disagree is non-zero, doesn't return - * CONFNAK; returns CONFREJ if it can't return CONFACK. - * - * inp = Requested CIs - * len = Length of requested CIs - */ -static int ipcp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *len, int reject_if_disagree) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; - ipcp_options *ho = &pcb->ipcp_hisoptions; - ipcp_options *ao = &pcb->ipcp_allowoptions; - u_char *cip, *next; /* Pointer to current and next CIs */ - u_short cilen, citype; /* Parsed len, type */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT - u_short cishort; /* Parsed short value */ -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - u32_t tl, ciaddr1, ciaddr2; /* Parsed address values */ - int rc = CONFACK; /* Final packet return code */ - int orc; /* Individual option return code */ - u_char *p; /* Pointer to next char to parse */ - u_char *ucp = inp; /* Pointer to current output char */ - int l = *len; /* Length left */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT - u_char maxslotindex, cflag; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ -#if LWIP_DNS - int d; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - - /* - * Reset all his options. - */ - BZERO(ho, sizeof(*ho)); - - /* - * Process all his options. - */ - next = inp; - - while (l) { - orc = CONFACK; /* Assume success */ - cip = p = next; /* Remember begining of CI */ - - if (l < 2 || /* Not enough data for CI header or */ - p[1] < 2 || /* CI length too small or */ - p[1] > l) /* CI length too big? */ - { - IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp_reqci: bad CI length!")); - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject bad CI */ - cilen = l; /* Reject till end of packet */ - l = 0; /* Don't loop again */ - goto endswitch; - } - - GETCHAR(citype, p); /* Parse CI type */ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); /* Parse CI length */ - l -= cilen; /* Adjust remaining length */ - next += cilen; /* Step to next CI */ - - switch (citype) /* Check CI type */ - { - case CI_ADDRS: - if (!ao->old_addrs || ho->neg_addr || - cilen != CILEN_ADDRS) /* Check CI length */ - { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ - break; - } - - /* - * If he has no address, or if we both have his address but - * disagree about it, then NAK it with our idea. - * In particular, if we don't know his address, but he does, - * then accept it. - */ - GETLONG(tl, p); /* Parse source address (his) */ - ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(tl); - - if (ciaddr1 != wo->hisaddr && (ciaddr1 == 0 || !wo->accept_remote)) { - orc = CONFNAK; - - if (!reject_if_disagree) { - DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); - tl = lwip_ntohl(wo->hisaddr); - PUTLONG(tl, p); - } - } else if (ciaddr1 == 0 && wo->hisaddr == 0) { - /* - * If neither we nor he knows his address, reject the option. - */ - orc = CONFREJ; - wo->req_addr = 0; /* don't NAK with 0.0.0.0 later */ - break; - } - - /* - * If he doesn't know our address, or if we both have our address - * but disagree about it, then NAK it with our idea. - */ - GETLONG(tl, p); /* Parse desination address (ours) */ - ciaddr2 = lwip_htonl(tl); - - if (ciaddr2 != wo->ouraddr) { - if (ciaddr2 == 0 || !wo->accept_local) { - orc = CONFNAK; - - if (!reject_if_disagree) { - DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); - tl = lwip_ntohl(wo->ouraddr); - PUTLONG(tl, p); - } - } else { - wo->ouraddr = ciaddr2; /* accept peer's idea */ - } - } - - ho->old_addrs = 1; - ho->hisaddr = ciaddr1; - ho->ouraddr = ciaddr2; - break; - - case CI_ADDR: - if (!ao->neg_addr || ho->old_addrs || - cilen != CILEN_ADDR) /* Check CI length */ - { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ - break; - } - - /* - * If he has no address, or if we both have his address but - * disagree about it, then NAK it with our idea. - * In particular, if we don't know his address, but he does, - * then accept it. - */ - GETLONG(tl, p); /* Parse source address (his) */ - ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(tl); - - if (ciaddr1 != wo->hisaddr && (ciaddr1 == 0 || !wo->accept_remote)) { - orc = CONFNAK; - - if (!reject_if_disagree) { - DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); - tl = lwip_ntohl(wo->hisaddr); - PUTLONG(tl, p); - } - } else if (ciaddr1 == 0 && wo->hisaddr == 0) { - /* - * Don't ACK an address of 0.0.0.0 - reject it instead. - */ - orc = CONFREJ; - wo->req_addr = 0; /* don't NAK with 0.0.0.0 later */ - break; - } - - ho->neg_addr = 1; - ho->hisaddr = ciaddr1; - break; - -#if LWIP_DNS - - case CI_MS_DNS1: - case CI_MS_DNS2: - /* Microsoft primary or secondary DNS request */ - d = citype == CI_MS_DNS2; - - /* If we do not have a DNS address then we cannot send it */ - if (ao->dnsaddr[d] == 0 || - cilen != CILEN_ADDR) /* Check CI length */ - { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ - break; - } - - GETLONG(tl, p); - - if (lwip_htonl(tl) != ao->dnsaddr[d]) { - DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); - tl = lwip_ntohl(ao->dnsaddr[d]); - PUTLONG(tl, p); - orc = CONFNAK; - } - - break; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - case CI_MS_WINS1: - case CI_MS_WINS2: - /* Microsoft primary or secondary WINS request */ - d = citype == CI_MS_WINS2; - - /* If we do not have a DNS address then we cannot send it */ - if(ao->winsaddr[d] == 0 || - cilen != CILEN_ADDR) /* Check CI length */ - { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ - break; - } - - GETLONG(tl, p); - - if(lwip_htonl(tl) != ao->winsaddr[d]) - { - DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); - tl = lwip_ntohl(ao->winsaddr[d]); - PUTLONG(tl, p); - orc = CONFNAK; - } - - break; -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - - case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: - if (!ao->neg_vj || - (cilen != CILEN_VJ && cilen != CILEN_COMPRESS)) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - - if (!(cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP || - (cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP_OLD && cilen == CILEN_COMPRESS))) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - ho->neg_vj = 1; - ho->vj_protocol = cishort; - - if (cilen == CILEN_VJ) { - GETCHAR(maxslotindex, p); - - if (maxslotindex > ao->maxslotindex) { - orc = CONFNAK; - - if (!reject_if_disagree) { - DECPTR(1, p); - PUTCHAR(ao->maxslotindex, p); - } - } - - GETCHAR(cflag, p); - - if (cflag && !ao->cflag) { - orc = CONFNAK; - - if (!reject_if_disagree) { - DECPTR(1, p); - PUTCHAR(wo->cflag, p); - } - } - - ho->maxslotindex = maxslotindex; - ho->cflag = cflag; - } else { - ho->old_vj = 1; - ho->maxslotindex = MAX_STATES - 1; - ho->cflag = 1; - } - - break; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - default: - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - endswitch: - - if (orc == CONFACK && /* Good CI */ - rc != CONFACK) /* but prior CI wasnt? */ - { - continue; /* Don't send this one */ - } - - if (orc == CONFNAK) /* Nak this CI? */ - { - if (reject_if_disagree) /* Getting fed up with sending NAKs? */ - { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Get tough if so */ - } else { - if (rc == CONFREJ) /* Rejecting prior CI? */ - { - continue; /* Don't send this one */ - } - - if (rc == CONFACK) /* Ack'd all prior CIs? */ - { - rc = CONFNAK; /* Not anymore... */ - ucp = inp; /* Backup */ - } - } - } - - if (orc == CONFREJ && /* Reject this CI */ - rc != CONFREJ) /* but no prior ones? */ - { - rc = CONFREJ; - ucp = inp; /* Backup */ - } - - /* Need to move CI? */ - if (ucp != cip) { - MEMCPY(ucp, cip, cilen); /* Move it */ - } - - /* Update output pointer */ - INCPTR(cilen, ucp); - } - - /* - * If we aren't rejecting this packet, and we want to negotiate - * their address, and they didn't send their address, then we - * send a NAK with a CI_ADDR option appended. We assume the - * input buffer is long enough that we can append the extra - * option safely. - */ - if (rc != CONFREJ && !ho->neg_addr && !ho->old_addrs && - wo->req_addr && !reject_if_disagree && !pcb->settings.noremoteip) { - if (rc == CONFACK) { - rc = CONFNAK; - ucp = inp; /* reset pointer */ - wo->req_addr = 0; /* don't ask again */ - } - - PUTCHAR(CI_ADDR, ucp); - PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDR, ucp); - tl = lwip_ntohl(wo->hisaddr); - PUTLONG(tl, ucp); - } - - *len = ucp - inp; /* Compute output length */ - IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp: returning Configure-%s", CODENAME(rc))); - return (rc); /* Return final code */ -} - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* - * ip_check_options - check that any IP-related options are OK, - * and assign appropriate defaults. - */ -static void ip_check_options() -{ - struct hostent *hp; - u32_t local; - ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[0]; - - /* - * Default our local IP address based on our hostname. - * If local IP address already given, don't bother. - */ - if(wo->ouraddr == 0 && !disable_defaultip) - { - /* - * Look up our hostname (possibly with domain name appended) - * and take the first IP address as our local IP address. - * If there isn't an IP address for our hostname, too bad. - */ - wo->accept_local = 1; /* don't insist on this default value */ - - if((hp = gethostbyname(hostname)) != NULL) - { - local = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; - - if(local != 0 && !bad_ip_adrs(local)) - { - wo->ouraddr = local; - } - } - } - - ask_for_local = wo->ouraddr != 0 || !disable_defaultip; -} -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -/* - * ip_demand_conf - configure the interface as though - * IPCP were up, for use with dial-on-demand. - */ -static int ip_demand_conf(u) int u; -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[u]; - ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[u]; - - if (wo->hisaddr == 0 && !pcb->settings.noremoteip) { - /* make up an arbitrary address for the peer */ - wo->hisaddr = lwip_htonl(0x0a707070 + ifunit); - wo->accept_remote = 1; - } - - if (wo->ouraddr == 0) { - /* make up an arbitrary address for us */ - wo->ouraddr = lwip_htonl(0x0a404040 + ifunit); - wo->accept_local = 1; - ask_for_local = 0; /* don't tell the peer this address */ - } - - if (!sifaddr(pcb, wo->ouraddr, wo->hisaddr, get_mask(wo->ouraddr))) { - return 0; - } - - if (!sifup(pcb)) { - return 0; - } - - if (!sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_QUEUE)) { - return 0; - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(wo->default_route) - if(sifdefaultroute(pcb, wo->ouraddr, wo->hisaddr, - wo->replace_default_route)) - { - default_route_set[u] = 1; - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - - if(wo->proxy_arp) - if(sifproxyarp(pcb, wo->hisaddr)) - { - proxy_arp_set[u] = 1; - } - -#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - - ppp_notice("local IP address %I", wo->ouraddr); - - if (wo->hisaddr) { - ppp_notice("remote IP address %I", wo->hisaddr); - } - - return 1; -} -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * ipcp_up - IPCP has come UP. - * - * Configure the IP network interface appropriately and bring it up. - */ -static void ipcp_up(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - u32_t mask; - ipcp_options *ho = &pcb->ipcp_hisoptions; - ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; - ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; - - IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp: up")); - - /* - * We must have a non-zero IP address for both ends of the link. - */ - if (!ho->neg_addr && !ho->old_addrs) { - ho->hisaddr = wo->hisaddr; - } - - if (!(go->neg_addr || go->old_addrs) && (wo->neg_addr || wo->old_addrs) && wo->ouraddr != 0) { - ppp_error("Peer refused to agree to our IP address"); - ipcp_close(f->pcb, "Refused our IP address"); - return; - } - - if (go->ouraddr == 0) { - ppp_error("Could not determine local IP address"); - ipcp_close(f->pcb, "Could not determine local IP address"); - return; - } - - if (ho->hisaddr == 0 && !pcb->settings.noremoteip) { - ho->hisaddr = lwip_htonl(0x0a404040); - ppp_warn("Could not determine remote IP address: defaulting to %I", - ho->hisaddr); - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - script_setenv("IPLOCAL", ip_ntoa(go->ouraddr), 0); - - if(ho->hisaddr != 0) - { - script_setenv("IPREMOTE", ip_ntoa(ho->hisaddr), 1); - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if LWIP_DNS - - if (!go->req_dns1) { - go->dnsaddr[0] = 0; - } - - if (!go->req_dns2) { - go->dnsaddr[1] = 0; - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(go->dnsaddr[0]) - { - script_setenv("DNS1", ip_ntoa(go->dnsaddr[0]), 0); - } - - if(go->dnsaddr[1]) - { - script_setenv("DNS2", ip_ntoa(go->dnsaddr[1]), 0); - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - - if (pcb->settings.usepeerdns && (go->dnsaddr[0] || go->dnsaddr[1])) { - sdns(pcb, go->dnsaddr[0], go->dnsaddr[1]); -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - script_setenv("USEPEERDNS", "1", 0); - create_resolv(go->dnsaddr[0], go->dnsaddr[1]); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - - /* - * Check that the peer is allowed to use the IP address it wants. - */ - if (ho->hisaddr != 0) { - u32_t addr = lwip_ntohl(ho->hisaddr); - - if ((addr >> IP_CLASSA_NSHIFT) == IP_LOOPBACKNET || IP_MULTICAST(addr) || IP_BADCLASS(addr) - /* - * For now, consider that PPP in server mode with peer required - * to authenticate must provide the peer IP address, reject any - * IP address wanted by peer different than the one we wanted. - */ -#if PPP_SERVER && PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT - || (pcb->settings.auth_required && wo->hisaddr != ho->hisaddr) -#endif /* PPP_SERVER && PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - ) { - ppp_error("Peer is not authorized to use remote address %I", ho->hisaddr); - ipcp_close(pcb, "Unauthorized remote IP address"); - return; - } - } - -#if 0 /* Unused */ - - /* Upstream checking code */ - if(ho->hisaddr != 0 && !auth_ip_addr(f->unit, ho->hisaddr)) - { - ppp_error("Peer is not authorized to use remote address %I", ho->hisaddr); - ipcp_close(f->unit, "Unauthorized remote IP address"); - return; - } - -#endif /* Unused */ - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - /* set tcp compression */ - sifvjcomp(pcb, ho->neg_vj, ho->cflag, ho->maxslotindex); -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - - /* - * If we are doing dial-on-demand, the interface is already - * configured, so we put out any saved-up packets, then set the - * interface to pass IP packets. - */ - if (demand) { - if (go->ouraddr != wo->ouraddr || ho->hisaddr != wo->hisaddr) { - ipcp_clear_addrs(f->unit, wo->ouraddr, wo->hisaddr, - wo->replace_default_route); - - if (go->ouraddr != wo->ouraddr) { - ppp_warn("Local IP address changed to %I", go->ouraddr); - script_setenv("OLDIPLOCAL", ip_ntoa(wo->ouraddr), 0); - wo->ouraddr = go->ouraddr; - } else { - script_unsetenv("OLDIPLOCAL"); - } - - if (ho->hisaddr != wo->hisaddr && wo->hisaddr != 0) { - ppp_warn("Remote IP address changed to %I", ho->hisaddr); - script_setenv("OLDIPREMOTE", ip_ntoa(wo->hisaddr), 0); - wo->hisaddr = ho->hisaddr; - } else { - script_unsetenv("OLDIPREMOTE"); - } - - /* Set the interface to the new addresses */ - mask = get_mask(go->ouraddr); - - if (!sifaddr(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, mask)) { -#if PPP_DEBUG - ppp_warn("Interface configuration failed"); -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - ipcp_close(f->unit, "Interface configuration failed"); - return; - } - - /* assign a default route through the interface if required */ - if (ipcp_wantoptions[f->unit].default_route) - if (sifdefaultroute(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, - wo->replace_default_route)) { - default_route_set[f->unit] = 1; - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - - /* Make a proxy ARP entry if requested. */ - if(ho->hisaddr != 0 && ipcp_wantoptions[f->unit].proxy_arp) - if(sifproxyarp(pcb, ho->hisaddr)) - { - proxy_arp_set[f->unit] = 1; - } - -#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - } - - demand_rexmit(PPP_IP, go->ouraddr); - sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_PASS); - - } else -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - { - /* - * Set IP addresses and (if specified) netmask. - */ - mask = get_mask(go->ouraddr); - -#if !(defined(SVR4) && (defined(SNI) || defined(__USLC__))) - - if (!sifaddr(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, mask)) { -#if PPP_DEBUG - ppp_warn("Interface configuration failed"); -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - ipcp_close(f->pcb, "Interface configuration failed"); - return; - } - -#endif - - /* bring the interface up for IP */ - if (!sifup(pcb)) { -#if PPP_DEBUG - ppp_warn("Interface failed to come up"); -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - ipcp_close(f->pcb, "Interface configuration failed"); - return; - } - -#if (defined(SVR4) && (defined(SNI) || defined(__USLC__))) - - if (!sifaddr(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, mask)) { -#if PPP_DEBUG - ppp_warn("Interface configuration failed"); -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - ipcp_close(f->unit, "Interface configuration failed"); - return; - } - -#endif -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_PASS); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - /* assign a default route through the interface if required */ - if(wo->default_route) - if(sifdefaultroute(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, - wo->replace_default_route)) - { - pcb->default_route_set = 1; - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - - /* Make a proxy ARP entry if requested. */ - if(ho->hisaddr != 0 && wo->proxy_arp) - if(sifproxyarp(pcb, ho->hisaddr)) - { - pcb->proxy_arp_set = 1; - } - -#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - - wo->ouraddr = go->ouraddr; - - ppp_notice("local IP address %I", go->ouraddr); - - if (ho->hisaddr != 0) { - ppp_notice("remote IP address %I", ho->hisaddr); - } - -#if LWIP_DNS - - if (go->dnsaddr[0]) { - ppp_notice("primary DNS address %I", go->dnsaddr[0]); - } - - if (go->dnsaddr[1]) { - ppp_notice("secondary DNS address %I", go->dnsaddr[1]); - } - -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - } - -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - reset_link_stats(f->unit); -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - - np_up(pcb, PPP_IP); - pcb->ipcp_is_up = 1; - -#if PPP_NOTIFY - notify(ip_up_notifier, 0); -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(ip_up_hook) - { - ip_up_hook(); - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ -} - -/* - * ipcp_down - IPCP has gone DOWN. - * - * Take the IP network interface down, clear its addresses - * and delete routes through it. - */ -static void ipcp_down(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipcp_options *ho = &pcb->ipcp_hisoptions; - ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; - - IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp: down")); -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - /* XXX a bit IPv4-centric here, we only need to get the stats - * before the interface is marked down. */ - /* XXX more correct: we must get the stats before running the notifiers, - * at least for the radius plugin */ - update_link_stats(f->unit); -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_NOTIFY - notify(ip_down_notifier, 0); -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(ip_down_hook) - { - ip_down_hook(); - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - - if (pcb->ipcp_is_up) { - pcb->ipcp_is_up = 0; - np_down(pcb, PPP_IP); - } - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - sifvjcomp(pcb, 0, 0, 0); -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - print_link_stats(); /* _after_ running the notifiers and ip_down_hook(), - * because print_link_stats() sets link_stats_valid - * to 0 (zero) */ -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - - /* - * If we are doing dial-on-demand, set the interface - * to queue up outgoing packets (for now). - */ - if (demand) { - sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_QUEUE); - } else -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - { -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_DROP); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - sifdown(pcb); - ipcp_clear_addrs(pcb, go->ouraddr, - ho->hisaddr, 0); -#if LWIP_DNS - cdns(pcb, go->dnsaddr[0], go->dnsaddr[1]); -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - } -} - -/* - * ipcp_clear_addrs() - clear the interface addresses, routes, - * proxy arp entries, etc. - */ -static void ipcp_clear_addrs(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ouraddr, u32_t hisaddr, u8_t replacedefaultroute) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(replacedefaultroute); - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - - if(pcb->proxy_arp_set) - { - cifproxyarp(pcb, hisaddr); - pcb->proxy_arp_set = 0; - } - -#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - /* If replacedefaultroute, sifdefaultroute will be called soon - * with replacedefaultroute set and that will overwrite the current - * default route. This is the case only when doing demand, otherwise - * during demand, this cifdefaultroute would restore the old default - * route which is not what we want in this case. In the non-demand - * case, we'll delete the default route and restore the old if there - * is one saved by an sifdefaultroute with replacedefaultroute. - */ - if(!replacedefaultroute && pcb->default_route_set) - { - cifdefaultroute(pcb, ouraddr, hisaddr); - pcb->default_route_set = 0; - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - cifaddr(pcb, ouraddr, hisaddr); -} - -/* - * ipcp_finished - possibly shut down the lower layers. - */ -static void ipcp_finished(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - - if (pcb->ipcp_is_open) { - pcb->ipcp_is_open = 0; - np_finished(pcb, PPP_IP); - } -} - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* - * create_resolv - create the replacement resolv.conf file - */ -static void create_resolv(peerdns1, peerdns2) -u32_t peerdns1, peerdns2; -{ - -} -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * ipcp_printpkt - print the contents of an IPCP packet. - */ -static const char *const ipcp_codenames[] = { - "ConfReq", "ConfAck", "ConfNak", "ConfRej", - "TermReq", "TermAck", "CodeRej" -}; - -static int ipcp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) -{ - int code, id, len, olen; - const u_char *pstart, *optend; -#if VJ_SUPPORT - u_short cishort; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - u32_t cilong; - - if (plen < HEADERLEN) { - return 0; - } - - pstart = p; - GETCHAR(code, p); - GETCHAR(id, p); - GETSHORT(len, p); - - if (len < HEADERLEN || len > plen) { - return 0; - } - - if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ipcp_codenames)) { - printer(arg, " %s", ipcp_codenames[code - 1]); - } else { - printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); - } - - printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); - len -= HEADERLEN; - - switch (code) { - case CONFREQ: - case CONFACK: - case CONFNAK: - case CONFREJ: - - /* print option list */ - while (len >= 2) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - GETCHAR(olen, p); - p -= 2; - - if (olen < 2 || olen > len) { - break; - } - - printer(arg, " <"); - len -= olen; - optend = p + olen; - - switch (code) { - case CI_ADDRS: - if (olen == CILEN_ADDRS) { - p += 2; - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, "addrs %I", lwip_htonl(cilong)); - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, " %I", lwip_htonl(cilong)); - } - - break; -#if VJ_SUPPORT - - case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: - if (olen >= CILEN_COMPRESS) { - p += 2; - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - printer(arg, "compress "); - - switch (cishort) { - case IPCP_VJ_COMP: - printer(arg, "VJ"); - break; - - case IPCP_VJ_COMP_OLD: - printer(arg, "old-VJ"); - break; - - default: - printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); - } - } - - break; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - case CI_ADDR: - if (olen == CILEN_ADDR) { - p += 2; - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, "addr %I", lwip_htonl(cilong)); - } - - break; -#if LWIP_DNS - - case CI_MS_DNS1: - case CI_MS_DNS2: - p += 2; - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, "ms-dns%d %I", (code == CI_MS_DNS1 ? 1 : 2), - htonl(cilong)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - case CI_MS_WINS1: - case CI_MS_WINS2: - p += 2; - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, "ms-wins %I", lwip_htonl(cilong)); - break; -#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ - - default: - break; - } - - while (p < optend) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - printer(arg, " %.2x", code); - } - - printer(arg, ">"); - } - - break; - - case TERMACK: - case TERMREQ: - if (len > 0 && *p >= ' ' && *p < 0x7f) { - printer(arg, " "); - ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); - p += len; - len = 0; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - /* print the rest of the bytes in the packet */ - for (; len > 0; --len) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - printer(arg, " %.2x", code); - } - - return p - pstart; -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -/* - * ip_active_pkt - see if this IP packet is worth bringing the link up for. - * We don't bring the link up for IP fragments or for TCP FIN packets - * with no data. - */ -#define IP_HDRLEN 20 /* bytes */ -#define IP_OFFMASK 0x1fff -#ifndef IPPROTO_TCP -#define IPPROTO_TCP 6 -#endif -#define TCP_HDRLEN 20 -#define TH_FIN 0x01 - -/* - * We use these macros because the IP header may be at an odd address, - * and some compilers might use word loads to get th_off or ip_hl. - */ - -#define net_short(x) (((x)[0] << 8) + (x)[1]) -#define get_iphl(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[0] & 0xF) -#define get_ipoff(x) net_short((unsigned char *)(x) + 6) -#define get_ipproto(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[9]) -#define get_tcpoff(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[12] >> 4) -#define get_tcpflags(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[13]) - -static int ip_active_pkt(pkt, len) - u_char *pkt; -int len; -{ - u_char *tcp; - int hlen; - - len -= PPP_HDRLEN; - pkt += PPP_HDRLEN; - - if (len < IP_HDRLEN) { - return 0; - } - - if ((get_ipoff(pkt) & IP_OFFMASK) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (get_ipproto(pkt) != IPPROTO_TCP) { - return 1; - } - - hlen = get_iphl(pkt) * 4; - - if (len < hlen + TCP_HDRLEN) { - return 0; - } - - tcp = pkt + hlen; - - if ((get_tcpflags(tcp) & TH_FIN) != 0 && len == hlen + get_tcpoff(tcp) * 4) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +/* + * ipcp.c - PPP IP Control Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/* + * @todo: + */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + /* global vars */ + u32_t netmask = 0; /* IP netmask to set on interface */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + bool disable_defaultip = 0; /* Don't use hostname for default IP adrs */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if 0 /* moved to ppp_settings */ + bool noremoteip = 0; /* Let him have no IP address */ +#endif /* moved to ppp_setting */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + /* Hook for a plugin to know when IP protocol has come up */ + void (*ip_up_hook)(void) = NULL; + + /* Hook for a plugin to know when IP protocol has come down */ + void (*ip_down_hook)(void) = NULL; + + /* Hook for a plugin to choose the remote IP address */ + void (*ip_choose_hook)(u32_t *) = NULL; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if PPP_NOTIFY +/* Notifiers for when IPCP goes up and down */ +struct notifier *ip_up_notifier = NULL; +struct notifier *ip_down_notifier = NULL; +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ + +/* local vars */ +#if 0 /* moved to ppp_pcb */ + static int default_route_set[NUM_PPP]; /* Have set up a default route */ + static int proxy_arp_set[NUM_PPP]; /* Have created proxy arp entry */ + static int ipcp_is_up; /* have called np_up() */ + static int ipcp_is_open; /* haven't called np_finished() */ + static bool ask_for_local; /* request our address from peer */ +#endif /* moved to ppp_pcb */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + static char vj_value[8]; /* string form of vj option value */ + static char netmask_str[20]; /* string form of netmask value */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +/* + * Callbacks for fsm code. (CI = Configuration Information) + */ +static void ipcp_resetci(fsm *f); /* Reset our CI */ +static int ipcp_cilen(fsm *f); /* Return length of our CI */ +static void ipcp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp); /* Add our CI */ +static int ipcp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer ack'd our CI */ +static int ipcp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject); /* Peer nak'd our CI */ +static int ipcp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer rej'd our CI */ +static int ipcp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *len, int reject_if_disagree); /* Rcv CI */ +static void ipcp_up(fsm *f); /* We're UP */ +static void ipcp_down(fsm *f); /* We're DOWN */ +static void ipcp_finished(fsm *f); /* Don't need lower layer */ + +static const fsm_callbacks ipcp_callbacks = /* IPCP callback routines */ + { + ipcp_resetci, /* Reset our Configuration Information */ + ipcp_cilen, /* Length of our Configuration Information */ + ipcp_addci, /* Add our Configuration Information */ + ipcp_ackci, /* ACK our Configuration Information */ + ipcp_nakci, /* NAK our Configuration Information */ + ipcp_rejci, /* Reject our Configuration Information */ + ipcp_reqci, /* Request peer's Configuration Information */ + ipcp_up, /* Called when fsm reaches OPENED state */ + ipcp_down, /* Called when fsm leaves OPENED state */ + NULL, /* Called when we want the lower layer up */ + ipcp_finished, /* Called when we want the lower layer down */ + NULL, /* Called when Protocol-Reject received */ + NULL, /* Retransmission is necessary */ + NULL, /* Called to handle protocol-specific codes */ + "IPCP" /* String name of protocol */ + }; + +/* + * Command-line options. + */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS +static int setvjslots(char **); +static int setdnsaddr(char **); +static int setwinsaddr(char **); +static int setnetmask(char **); +int setipaddr(char *, char **, int); + +static void printipaddr(option_t *, void (*)(void *, char *, ...), void *); + +static option_t ipcp_option_list[] = { + { "noip", o_bool, &ipcp_protent.enabled_flag, + "Disable IP and IPCP" }, + { "-ip", o_bool, &ipcp_protent.enabled_flag, + "Disable IP and IPCP", OPT_ALIAS }, + + { "novj", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].neg_vj, + "Disable VJ compression", OPT_A2CLR, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].neg_vj }, + { "-vj", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].neg_vj, + "Disable VJ compression", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_allowoptions[0].neg_vj }, + + { "novjccomp", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].cflag, + "Disable VJ connection-ID compression", OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_allowoptions[0].cflag }, + { "-vjccomp", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].cflag, + "Disable VJ connection-ID compression", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_allowoptions[0].cflag }, + + { "vj-max-slots", o_special, (void *)setvjslots, + "Set maximum VJ header slots", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL | OPT_STATIC, vj_value }, + + { "ipcp-accept-local", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].accept_local, + "Accept peer's address for us", 1 }, + { "ipcp-accept-remote", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].accept_remote, + "Accept peer's address for it", 1 }, + + { "ipparam", o_string, &ipparam, + "Set ip script parameter", OPT_PRIO }, + + { "noipdefault", o_bool, &disable_defaultip, + "Don't use name for default IP adrs", 1 }, + + { "ms-dns", 1, (void *)setdnsaddr, + "DNS address for the peer's use" }, + { "ms-wins", 1, (void *)setwinsaddr, + "Nameserver for SMB over TCP/IP for peer" }, + + { "ipcp-restart", o_int, &ipcp_fsm[0].timeouttime, + "Set timeout for IPCP", OPT_PRIO }, + { "ipcp-max-terminate", o_int, &ipcp_fsm[0].maxtermtransmits, + "Set max #xmits for term-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, + { "ipcp-max-configure", o_int, &ipcp_fsm[0].maxconfreqtransmits, + "Set max #xmits for conf-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, + { "ipcp-max-failure", o_int, &ipcp_fsm[0].maxnakloops, + "Set max #conf-naks for IPCP", OPT_PRIO }, + + { "defaultroute", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].default_route, + "Add default route", OPT_ENABLE | 1, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].default_route }, + { "nodefaultroute", o_bool, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].default_route, + "disable defaultroute option", OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_wantoptions[0].default_route }, + { "-defaultroute", o_bool, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].default_route, + "disable defaultroute option", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_wantoptions[0].default_route }, + + { "replacedefaultroute", o_bool, + &ipcp_wantoptions[0].replace_default_route, + "Replace default route", 1 }, + { "noreplacedefaultroute", o_bool, + &ipcp_allowoptions[0].replace_default_route, + "Never replace default route", OPT_A2COPY, + &ipcp_wantoptions[0].replace_default_route }, + { "proxyarp", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].proxy_arp, + "Add proxy ARP entry", OPT_ENABLE | 1, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].proxy_arp }, + { "noproxyarp", o_bool, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].proxy_arp, + "disable proxyarp option", OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_wantoptions[0].proxy_arp }, + { "-proxyarp", o_bool, &ipcp_allowoptions[0].proxy_arp, + "disable proxyarp option", OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_wantoptions[0].proxy_arp }, + + { "usepeerdns", o_bool, &usepeerdns, + "Ask peer for DNS address(es)", 1 }, + + { "netmask", o_special, (void *)setnetmask, + "set netmask", OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2STRVAL | OPT_STATIC, netmask_str }, + + { "ipcp-no-addresses", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].old_addrs, + "Disable old-style IP-Addresses usage", OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_allowoptions[0].old_addrs }, + { "ipcp-no-address", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].neg_addr, + "Disable IP-Address usage", OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_allowoptions[0].neg_addr }, + + { "noremoteip", o_bool, &noremoteip, + "Allow peer to have no IP address", 1 }, + + { "nosendip", o_bool, &ipcp_wantoptions[0].neg_addr, + "Don't send our IP address to peer", OPT_A2CLR, + &ipcp_wantoptions[0].old_addrs }, + + { "IP addresses", o_wild, (void *)&setipaddr, + "set local and remote IP addresses", + OPT_NOARG | OPT_A2PRINTER, (void *)&printipaddr }, + + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * Protocol entry points from main code. + */ +static void ipcp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ipcp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ipcp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); +static void ipcp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ipcp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ipcp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len); +static void ipcp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static int ipcp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS +static void ip_check_options(void); +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +static int ip_demand_conf(int); +static int ip_active_pkt(u_char *, int); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + static void create_resolv(u32_t, u32_t); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +const struct protent ipcp_protent = { + PPP_IPCP, + ipcp_init, + ipcp_input, + ipcp_protrej, + ipcp_lowerup, + ipcp_lowerdown, + ipcp_open, + ipcp_close, +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + ipcp_printpkt, +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + "IPCP", + "IP", +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS + ipcp_option_list, + ip_check_options, +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + ip_demand_conf, + ip_active_pkt +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +}; + +static void ipcp_clear_addrs(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ouraddr, u32_t hisaddr, u8_t replacedefaultroute); + +/* + * Lengths of configuration options. + */ +#define CILEN_VOID 2 +#define CILEN_COMPRESS 4 /* min length for compression protocol opt. */ +#define CILEN_VJ 6 /* length for RFC1332 Van-Jacobson opt. */ +#define CILEN_ADDR 6 /* new-style single address option */ +#define CILEN_ADDRS 10 /* old-style dual address option */ + +#define CODENAME(x) ((x) == CONFACK ? "ACK" : \ + (x) == CONFNAK ? "NAK" : \ + "REJ") + +#if 0 /* UNUSED, already defined by lwIP */ +/* + * Make a string representation of a network IP address. + */ +char *ip_ntoa(ipaddr) +u32_t ipaddr; +{ + static char b[64]; + + slprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%I", ipaddr); + return b; +} +#endif /* UNUSED, already defined by lwIP */ + +/* + * Option parsing. + */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * setvjslots - set maximum number of connection slots for VJ compression + */ +static int setvjslots(argv) char **argv; +{ + int value; + + if (!int_option(*argv, &value)) { + return 0; + } + + if (value < 2 || value > 16) { + option_error("vj-max-slots value must be between 2 and 16"); + return 0; + } + + ipcp_wantoptions[0].maxslotindex = + ipcp_allowoptions[0].maxslotindex = value - 1; + slprintf(vj_value, sizeof(vj_value), "%d", value); + return 1; +} + +/* + * setdnsaddr - set the dns address(es) + */ +static int setdnsaddr(argv) char **argv; +{ + u32_t dns; + struct hostent *hp; + + dns = inet_addr(*argv); + + if (dns == (u32_t)-1) { + if ((hp = gethostbyname(*argv)) == NULL) { + option_error("invalid address parameter '%s' for ms-dns option", + *argv); + return 0; + } + + dns = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; + } + + /* We take the last 2 values given, the 2nd-last as the primary + and the last as the secondary. If only one is given it + becomes both primary and secondary. */ + if (ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[1] == 0) { + ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[0] = dns; + } else { + ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[0] = ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[1]; + } + + /* always set the secondary address value. */ + ipcp_allowoptions[0].dnsaddr[1] = dns; + + return (1); +} + +/* + * setwinsaddr - set the wins address(es) + * This is primrarly used with the Samba package under UNIX or for pointing + * the caller to the existing WINS server on a Windows NT platform. + */ +static int setwinsaddr(argv) char **argv; +{ + u32_t wins; + struct hostent *hp; + + wins = inet_addr(*argv); + + if (wins == (u32_t)-1) { + if ((hp = gethostbyname(*argv)) == NULL) { + option_error("invalid address parameter '%s' for ms-wins option", + *argv); + return 0; + } + + wins = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; + } + + /* We take the last 2 values given, the 2nd-last as the primary + and the last as the secondary. If only one is given it + becomes both primary and secondary. */ + if (ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[1] == 0) { + ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[0] = wins; + } else { + ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[0] = ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[1]; + } + + /* always set the secondary address value. */ + ipcp_allowoptions[0].winsaddr[1] = wins; + + return (1); +} + +/* + * setipaddr - Set the IP address + * If doit is 0, the call is to check whether this option is + * potentially an IP address specification. + * Not static so that plugins can call it to set the addresses + */ +int setipaddr(arg, argv, doit) char *arg; +char **argv; +int doit; +{ + struct hostent *hp; + char *colon; + u32_t local, remote; + ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[0]; + static int prio_local = 0, prio_remote = 0; + + /* + * IP address pair separated by ":". + */ + if ((colon = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (!doit) { + return 1; + } + + /* + * If colon first character, then no local addr. + */ + if (colon != arg && option_priority >= prio_local) { + *colon = '\0'; + + if ((local = inet_addr(arg)) == (u32_t)-1) { + if ((hp = gethostbyname(arg)) == NULL) { + option_error("unknown host: %s", arg); + return 0; + } + + local = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; + } + + if (bad_ip_adrs(local)) { + option_error("bad local IP address %s", ip_ntoa(local)); + return 0; + } + + if (local != 0) { + wo->ouraddr = local; + } + + *colon = ':'; + prio_local = option_priority; + } + + /* + * If colon last character, then no remote addr. + */ + if (*++colon != '\0' && option_priority >= prio_remote) { + if ((remote = inet_addr(colon)) == (u32_t)-1) { + if ((hp = gethostbyname(colon)) == NULL) { + option_error("unknown host: %s", colon); + return 0; + } + + remote = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; + + if (remote_name[0] == 0) { + strlcpy(remote_name, colon, sizeof(remote_name)); + } + } + + if (bad_ip_adrs(remote)) { + option_error("bad remote IP address %s", ip_ntoa(remote)); + return 0; + } + + if (remote != 0) { + wo->hisaddr = remote; + } + + prio_remote = option_priority; + } + + return 1; +} + +static void printipaddr(opt, printer, arg) + option_t *opt; +void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...); +void *arg; +{ + ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[0]; + + if (wo->ouraddr != 0) { + printer(arg, "%I", wo->ouraddr); + } + + printer(arg, ":"); + + if (wo->hisaddr != 0) { + printer(arg, "%I", wo->hisaddr); + } +} + +/* + * setnetmask - set the netmask to be used on the interface. + */ +static int setnetmask(argv) char **argv; +{ + u32_t mask; + int n; + char *p; + + /* + * Unfortunately, if we use inet_addr, we can't tell whether + * a result of all 1s is an error or a valid 255.255.255.255. + */ + p = *argv; + n = parse_dotted_ip(p, &mask); + + mask = lwip_htonl(mask); + + if (n == 0 || p[n] != 0 || (netmask & ~mask) != 0) { + option_error("invalid netmask value '%s'", *argv); + return 0; + } + + netmask = mask; + slprintf(netmask_str, sizeof(netmask_str), "%I", mask); + + return (1); +} + +int parse_dotted_ip(p, vp) char *p; +u32_t *vp; +{ + int n; + u32_t v, b; + char *endp, *p0 = p; + + v = 0; + + for (n = 3;; --n) { + b = strtoul(p, &endp, 0); + + if (endp == p) { + return 0; + } + + if (b > 255) { + if (n < 3) { + return 0; + } + + /* accept e.g. 0xffffff00 */ + *vp = b; + return endp - p0; + } + + v |= b << (n * 8); + p = endp; + + if (n == 0) { + break; + } + + if (*p != '.') { + return 0; + } + + ++p; + } + + *vp = v; + return p - p0; +} +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * ipcp_init - Initialize IPCP. + */ +static void ipcp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; + + ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; + ipcp_options *ao = &pcb->ipcp_allowoptions; + + f->pcb = pcb; + f->protocol = PPP_IPCP; + f->callbacks = &ipcp_callbacks; + fsm_init(f); + + /* + * Some 3G modems use repeated IPCP NAKs as a way of stalling + * until they can contact a server on the network, so we increase + * the default number of NAKs we accept before we start treating + * them as rejects. + */ + f->maxnakloops = 100; + +#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ + memset(wo, 0, sizeof(*wo)); + memset(ao, 0, sizeof(*ao)); +#endif /* 0 */ + + wo->neg_addr = wo->old_addrs = 1; +#if VJ_SUPPORT + wo->neg_vj = 1; + wo->vj_protocol = IPCP_VJ_COMP; + wo->maxslotindex = MAX_STATES - 1; /* really max index */ + wo->cflag = 1; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + /* wanting default route by default */ + wo->default_route = 1; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + + ao->neg_addr = ao->old_addrs = 1; +#if VJ_SUPPORT + /* max slots and slot-id compression are currently hardwired in */ + /* ppp_if.c to 16 and 1, this needs to be changed (among other */ + /* things) gmc */ + + ao->neg_vj = 1; + ao->maxslotindex = MAX_STATES - 1; + ao->cflag = 1; +#endif /* #if VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + /* + * XXX These control whether the user may use the proxyarp + * and defaultroute options. + */ + ao->proxy_arp = 1; + ao->default_route = 1; +#endif /* UNUSED */ +} + +/* + * ipcp_open - IPCP is allowed to come up. + */ +static void ipcp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; + fsm_open(f); + pcb->ipcp_is_open = 1; +} + +/* + * ipcp_close - Take IPCP down. + */ +static void ipcp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; + fsm_close(f, reason); +} + +/* + * ipcp_lowerup - The lower layer is up. + */ +static void ipcp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; + fsm_lowerup(f); +} + +/* + * ipcp_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. + */ +static void ipcp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; + fsm_lowerdown(f); +} + +/* + * ipcp_input - Input IPCP packet. + */ +static void ipcp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; + fsm_input(f, p, len); +} + +/* + * ipcp_protrej - A Protocol-Reject was received for IPCP. + * + * Pretend the lower layer went down, so we shut up. + */ +static void ipcp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ipcp_fsm; + fsm_lowerdown(f); +} + +/* + * ipcp_resetci - Reset our CI. + * Called by fsm_sconfreq, Send Configure Request. + */ +static void ipcp_resetci(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; + ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; + ipcp_options *ao = &pcb->ipcp_allowoptions; + + wo->req_addr = (wo->neg_addr || wo->old_addrs) && + (ao->neg_addr || ao->old_addrs); + + if (wo->ouraddr == 0) { + wo->accept_local = 1; + } + + if (wo->hisaddr == 0) { + wo->accept_remote = 1; + } + +#if LWIP_DNS + wo->req_dns1 = wo->req_dns2 = pcb->settings.usepeerdns; /* Request DNS addresses from the peer */ +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + *go = *wo; + + if (!pcb->ask_for_local) { + go->ouraddr = 0; + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(ip_choose_hook) + { + ip_choose_hook(&wo->hisaddr); + + if(wo->hisaddr) + { + wo->accept_remote = 0; + } + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + BZERO(&pcb->ipcp_hisoptions, sizeof(ipcp_options)); +} + +/* + * ipcp_cilen - Return length of our CI. + * Called by fsm_sconfreq, Send Configure Request. + */ +static int ipcp_cilen(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; +#if VJ_SUPPORT + ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + ipcp_options *ho = &pcb->ipcp_hisoptions; + +#define LENCIADDRS(neg) (neg ? CILEN_ADDRS : 0) +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#define LENCIVJ(neg, old) (neg ? (old ? CILEN_COMPRESS : CILEN_VJ) : 0) +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ +#define LENCIADDR(neg) (neg ? CILEN_ADDR : 0) +#if LWIP_DNS +#define LENCIDNS(neg) LENCIADDR(neg) +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ +#define LENCIWINS(neg) LENCIADDR(neg) +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + /* + * First see if we want to change our options to the old + * forms because we have received old forms from the peer. + */ + if (go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs && !ho->neg_addr && ho->old_addrs) { + go->neg_addr = 0; + } + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + + if (wo->neg_vj && !go->neg_vj && !go->old_vj) { + /* try an older style of VJ negotiation */ + /* use the old style only if the peer did */ + if (ho->neg_vj && ho->old_vj) { + go->neg_vj = 1; + go->old_vj = 1; + go->vj_protocol = ho->vj_protocol; + } + } + +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + return (LENCIADDRS(!go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs) + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + LENCIVJ(go->neg_vj, go->old_vj) + +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + LENCIADDR(go->neg_addr) + +#if LWIP_DNS + LENCIDNS(go->req_dns1) + + LENCIDNS(go->req_dns2) + +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ + LENCIWINS(go->winsaddr[0]) + + LENCIWINS(go->winsaddr[1]) + +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + 0); +} + +/* + * ipcp_addci - Add our desired CIs to a packet. + * Called by fsm_sconfreq, Send Configure Request. + */ +static void ipcp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; + int len = *lenp; + +#define ADDCIADDRS(opt, neg, val1, val2) \ + if (neg) { \ + if (len >= CILEN_ADDRS) { \ + u32_t l; \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDRS, ucp); \ + l = lwip_ntohl(val1); \ + PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ + l = lwip_ntohl(val2); \ + PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ + len -= CILEN_ADDRS; \ + } else \ + go->old_addrs = 0; \ + } + +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#define ADDCIVJ(opt, neg, val, old, maxslotindex, cflag) \ + if (neg) { \ + int vjlen = old ? CILEN_COMPRESS : CILEN_VJ; \ + if (len >= vjlen) { \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(vjlen, ucp); \ + PUTSHORT(val, ucp); \ + if (!old) { \ + PUTCHAR(maxslotindex, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(cflag, ucp); \ + } \ + len -= vjlen; \ + } else \ + neg = 0; \ + } +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#define ADDCIADDR(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + if (len >= CILEN_ADDR) { \ + u32_t l; \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDR, ucp); \ + l = lwip_ntohl(val); \ + PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ + len -= CILEN_ADDR; \ + } else \ + neg = 0; \ + } + +#if LWIP_DNS +#define ADDCIDNS(opt, neg, addr) \ + if (neg) { \ + if (len >= CILEN_ADDR) { \ + u32_t l; \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDR, ucp); \ + l = lwip_ntohl(addr); \ + PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ + len -= CILEN_ADDR; \ + } else \ + neg = 0; \ + } +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ +#define ADDCIWINS(opt, addr) \ + if (addr) { \ + if (len >= CILEN_ADDR) { \ + u32_t l; \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDR, ucp); \ + l = lwip_ntohl(addr); \ + PUTLONG(l, ucp); \ + len -= CILEN_ADDR; \ + } else \ + addr = 0; \ + } +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + ADDCIADDRS(CI_ADDRS, !go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs, go->ouraddr, + go->hisaddr); + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + ADDCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, go->neg_vj, go->vj_protocol, go->old_vj, + go->maxslotindex, go->cflag); +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + ADDCIADDR(CI_ADDR, go->neg_addr, go->ouraddr); + +#if LWIP_DNS + ADDCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS1, go->req_dns1, go->dnsaddr[0]); + + ADDCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS2, go->req_dns2, go->dnsaddr[1]); +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ + ADDCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS1, go->winsaddr[0]); + + ADDCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS2, go->winsaddr[1]); +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + *lenp -= len; +} + +/* + * ipcp_ackci - Ack our CIs. + * Called by fsm_rconfack, Receive Configure ACK. + * + * Returns: + * 0 - Ack was bad. + * 1 - Ack was good. + */ +static int ipcp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; + u_short cilen, citype; + u32_t cilong; +#if VJ_SUPPORT + u_short cishort; + u_char cimaxslotindex, cicflag; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent... + * Check packet length and CI length at each step. + * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. + */ + +#define ACKCIADDRS(opt, neg, val1, val2) \ + if (neg) { \ + u32_t l; \ + if ((len -= CILEN_ADDRS) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_ADDRS || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + if (val1 != cilong) \ + goto bad; \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + if (val2 != cilong) \ + goto bad; \ + } + +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#define ACKCIVJ(opt, neg, val, old, maxslotindex, cflag) \ + if (neg) { \ + int vjlen = old ? CILEN_COMPRESS : CILEN_VJ; \ + if ((len -= vjlen) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != vjlen || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + if (cishort != val) \ + goto bad; \ + if (!old) { \ + GETCHAR(cimaxslotindex, p); \ + if (cimaxslotindex != maxslotindex) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(cicflag, p); \ + if (cicflag != cflag) \ + goto bad; \ + } \ + } +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#define ACKCIADDR(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + u32_t l; \ + if ((len -= CILEN_ADDR) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_ADDR || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + if (val != cilong) \ + goto bad; \ + } + +#if LWIP_DNS +#define ACKCIDNS(opt, neg, addr) \ + if (neg) { \ + u32_t l; \ + if ((len -= CILEN_ADDR) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_ADDR || citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + if (addr != cilong) \ + goto bad; \ + } +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ +#define ACKCIWINS(opt, addr) \ + if (addr) { \ + u32_t l; \ + if ((len -= CILEN_ADDR) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_ADDR || citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + if (addr != cilong) \ + goto bad; \ + } +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + ACKCIADDRS(CI_ADDRS, !go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs, go->ouraddr, + go->hisaddr); + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + ACKCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, go->neg_vj, go->vj_protocol, go->old_vj, + go->maxslotindex, go->cflag); +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + ACKCIADDR(CI_ADDR, go->neg_addr, go->ouraddr); + +#if LWIP_DNS + ACKCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS1, go->req_dns1, go->dnsaddr[0]); + + ACKCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS2, go->req_dns2, go->dnsaddr[1]); +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ + ACKCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS1, go->winsaddr[0]); + + ACKCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS2, go->winsaddr[1]); +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + /* + * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. + */ + if (len != 0) { + goto bad; + } + + return (1); + +bad: + IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp_ackci: received bad Ack!")); + return (0); +} + +/* + * ipcp_nakci - Peer has sent a NAK for some of our CIs. + * This should not modify any state if the Nak is bad + * or if IPCP is in the OPENED state. + * Calback from fsm_rconfnakrej - Receive Configure-Nak or Configure-Reject. + * + * Returns: + * 0 - Nak was bad. + * 1 - Nak was good. + */ +static int ipcp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; + u_char citype, cilen, *next; +#if VJ_SUPPORT + u_char cimaxslotindex, cicflag; + u_short cishort; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + u32_t ciaddr1, ciaddr2, l; +#if LWIP_DNS + u32_t cidnsaddr; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + ipcp_options no; /* options we've seen Naks for */ + ipcp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ + + BZERO(&no, sizeof(no)); + try_ = *go; + + /* + * Any Nak'd CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. + * Check packet length and CI length at each step. + * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. + */ +#define NAKCIADDRS(opt, neg, code) \ + if ((neg) && \ + (cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDRS && \ + len >= cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + ciaddr2 = lwip_htonl(l); \ + no.old_addrs = 1; \ + code \ + } + +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#define NAKCIVJ(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_COMPRESS || cilen == CILEN_VJ) && \ + len >= cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#define NAKCIADDR(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + (cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR && \ + len >= cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } + +#if LWIP_DNS +#define NAKCIDNS(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR) && \ + len >= cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cidnsaddr = lwip_htonl(l); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + + /* + * Accept the peer's idea of {our,his} address, if different + * from our idea, only if the accept_{local,remote} flag is set. + */ + NAKCIADDRS( + CI_ADDRS, !go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs, + + if (treat_as_reject) { + try_.old_addrs = 0; + } else { + if (go->accept_local && ciaddr1) { + /* take his idea of our address */ + try_.ouraddr = ciaddr1; + } + + if (go->accept_remote && ciaddr2) { + /* take his idea of his address */ + try_.hisaddr = ciaddr2; + } + }); + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + /* + * Accept the peer's value of maxslotindex provided that it + * is less than what we asked for. Turn off slot-ID compression + * if the peer wants. Send old-style compress-type option if + * the peer wants. + */ + NAKCIVJ( + CI_COMPRESSTYPE, neg_vj, + + if (treat_as_reject) { + try_.neg_vj = 0; + } else if (cilen == CILEN_VJ) { + GETCHAR(cimaxslotindex, p); + GETCHAR(cicflag, p); + + if (cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP) { + try_.old_vj = 0; + + if (cimaxslotindex < go->maxslotindex) { + try_.maxslotindex = cimaxslotindex; + } + + if (!cicflag) { + try_.cflag = 0; + } + } else { + try_.neg_vj = 0; + } + } else { + if (cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP || cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP_OLD) { + try_.old_vj = 1; + try_.vj_protocol = cishort; + } else { + try_.neg_vj = 0; + } + }); +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + NAKCIADDR( + CI_ADDR, neg_addr, + + if (treat_as_reject) { + try_.neg_addr = 0; + try_.old_addrs = 0; + } else if (go->accept_local && ciaddr1) { + /* take his idea of our address */ + try_.ouraddr = ciaddr1; + }); + +#if LWIP_DNS + NAKCIDNS( + CI_MS_DNS1, req_dns1, + + if (treat_as_reject) { + try_.req_dns1 = 0; + } else { + try_.dnsaddr[0] = cidnsaddr; + }); + + NAKCIDNS( + CI_MS_DNS2, req_dns2, + + if (treat_as_reject) { + try_.req_dns2 = 0; + } else { + try_.dnsaddr[1] = cidnsaddr; + }); +#endif /* #if LWIP_DNS */ + + /* + * There may be remaining CIs, if the peer is requesting negotiation + * on an option that we didn't include in our request packet. + * If they want to negotiate about IP addresses, we comply. + * If they want us to ask for compression, we refuse. + * If they want us to ask for ms-dns, we do that, since some + * peers get huffy if we don't. + */ + while (len >= CILEN_VOID) { + GETCHAR(citype, p); + GETCHAR(cilen, p); + + if (cilen < CILEN_VOID || (len -= cilen) < 0) { + goto bad; + } + + next = p + cilen - 2; + + switch (citype) { +#if VJ_SUPPORT + + case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: + if (go->neg_vj || no.neg_vj || + (cilen != CILEN_VJ && cilen != CILEN_COMPRESS)) { + goto bad; + } + + no.neg_vj = 1; + break; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + case CI_ADDRS: + if ((!go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs) || no.old_addrs || cilen != CILEN_ADDRS) { + goto bad; + } + + try_.neg_addr = 0; + GETLONG(l, p); + ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); + + if (ciaddr1 && go->accept_local) { + try_.ouraddr = ciaddr1; + } + + GETLONG(l, p); + ciaddr2 = lwip_htonl(l); + + if (ciaddr2 && go->accept_remote) { + try_.hisaddr = ciaddr2; + } + + no.old_addrs = 1; + break; + + case CI_ADDR: + if (go->neg_addr || no.neg_addr || cilen != CILEN_ADDR) { + goto bad; + } + + try_.old_addrs = 0; + GETLONG(l, p); + ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); + + if (ciaddr1 && go->accept_local) { + try_.ouraddr = ciaddr1; + } + + if (try_.ouraddr != 0) { + try_.neg_addr = 1; + } + + no.neg_addr = 1; + break; +#if LWIP_DNS + + case CI_MS_DNS1: + if (go->req_dns1 || no.req_dns1 || cilen != CILEN_ADDR) { + goto bad; + } + + GETLONG(l, p); + try_.dnsaddr[0] = lwip_htonl(l); + try_.req_dns1 = 1; + no.req_dns1 = 1; + break; + + case CI_MS_DNS2: + if (go->req_dns2 || no.req_dns2 || cilen != CILEN_ADDR) { + goto bad; + } + + GETLONG(l, p); + try_.dnsaddr[1] = lwip_htonl(l); + try_.req_dns2 = 1; + no.req_dns2 = 1; + break; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + case CI_MS_WINS1: + case CI_MS_WINS2: + if(cilen != CILEN_ADDR) + { + goto bad; + } + + GETLONG(l, p); + ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(l); + + if(ciaddr1) + { + try_.winsaddr[citype == CI_MS_WINS2] = ciaddr1; + } + + break; +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + default: + break; + } + + p = next; + } + + /* + * OK, the Nak is good. Now we can update state. + * If there are any remaining options, we ignore them. + */ + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + *go = try_; + } + + return 1; + +bad: + IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp_nakci: received bad Nak!")); + return 0; +} + +/* + * ipcp_rejci - Reject some of our CIs. + * Callback from fsm_rconfnakrej. + */ +static int ipcp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; + u_char cilen; +#if VJ_SUPPORT + u_char cimaxslotindex, ciflag; + u_short cishort; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + u32_t cilong; + ipcp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ + + try_ = *go; + /* + * Any Rejected CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. + * Check packet length and CI length at each step. + * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. + */ +#define REJCIADDRS(opt, neg, val1, val2) \ + if ((neg) && \ + (cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDRS && \ + len >= cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + u32_t l; \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cilong != val1) \ + goto bad; \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cilong != val2) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.old_addrs = 0; \ + } + +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#define REJCIVJ(opt, neg, val, old, maxslot, cflag) \ + if (go->neg && \ + p[1] == (old ? CILEN_COMPRESS : CILEN_VJ) && \ + len >= p[1] && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= p[1]; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cishort != val) \ + goto bad; \ + if (!old) { \ + GETCHAR(cimaxslotindex, p); \ + if (cimaxslotindex != maxslot) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(ciflag, p); \ + if (ciflag != cflag) \ + goto bad; \ + } \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#define REJCIADDR(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + (cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR && \ + len >= cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + u32_t l; \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cilong != val) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } + +#if LWIP_DNS +#define REJCIDNS(opt, neg, dnsaddr) \ + if (go->neg && \ + ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR) && \ + len >= cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + u32_t l; \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cilong != dnsaddr) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ +#define REJCIWINS(opt, addr) \ + if (addr && \ + ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_ADDR) && \ + len >= cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + u32_t l; \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETLONG(l, p); \ + cilong = lwip_htonl(l); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cilong != addr) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.winsaddr[opt == CI_MS_WINS2] = 0; \ + } +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + REJCIADDRS(CI_ADDRS, !go->neg_addr && go->old_addrs, + go->ouraddr, go->hisaddr); + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + REJCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, neg_vj, go->vj_protocol, go->old_vj, + go->maxslotindex, go->cflag); +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + REJCIADDR(CI_ADDR, neg_addr, go->ouraddr); + +#if LWIP_DNS + REJCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS1, req_dns1, go->dnsaddr[0]); + + REJCIDNS(CI_MS_DNS2, req_dns2, go->dnsaddr[1]); +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ + REJCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS1, go->winsaddr[0]); + + REJCIWINS(CI_MS_WINS2, go->winsaddr[1]); +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + /* + * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. + */ + if (len != 0) { + goto bad; + } + + /* + * Now we can update state. + */ + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + *go = try_; + } + + return 1; + +bad: + IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp_rejci: received bad Reject!")); + return 0; +} + +/* + * ipcp_reqci - Check the peer's requested CIs and send appropriate response. + * Callback from fsm_rconfreq, Receive Configure Request + * + * Returns: CONFACK, CONFNAK or CONFREJ and input packet modified + * appropriately. If reject_if_disagree is non-zero, doesn't return + * CONFNAK; returns CONFREJ if it can't return CONFACK. + * + * inp = Requested CIs + * len = Length of requested CIs + */ +static int ipcp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *len, int reject_if_disagree) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; + ipcp_options *ho = &pcb->ipcp_hisoptions; + ipcp_options *ao = &pcb->ipcp_allowoptions; + u_char *cip, *next; /* Pointer to current and next CIs */ + u_short cilen, citype; /* Parsed len, type */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT + u_short cishort; /* Parsed short value */ +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + u32_t tl, ciaddr1, ciaddr2; /* Parsed address values */ + int rc = CONFACK; /* Final packet return code */ + int orc; /* Individual option return code */ + u_char *p; /* Pointer to next char to parse */ + u_char *ucp = inp; /* Pointer to current output char */ + int l = *len; /* Length left */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT + u_char maxslotindex, cflag; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ +#if LWIP_DNS + int d; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + + /* + * Reset all his options. + */ + BZERO(ho, sizeof(*ho)); + + /* + * Process all his options. + */ + next = inp; + + while (l) { + orc = CONFACK; /* Assume success */ + cip = p = next; /* Remember begining of CI */ + + if (l < 2 || /* Not enough data for CI header or */ + p[1] < 2 || /* CI length too small or */ + p[1] > l) /* CI length too big? */ + { + IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp_reqci: bad CI length!")); + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject bad CI */ + cilen = l; /* Reject till end of packet */ + l = 0; /* Don't loop again */ + goto endswitch; + } + + GETCHAR(citype, p); /* Parse CI type */ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); /* Parse CI length */ + l -= cilen; /* Adjust remaining length */ + next += cilen; /* Step to next CI */ + + switch (citype) /* Check CI type */ + { + case CI_ADDRS: + if (!ao->old_addrs || ho->neg_addr || + cilen != CILEN_ADDRS) /* Check CI length */ + { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ + break; + } + + /* + * If he has no address, or if we both have his address but + * disagree about it, then NAK it with our idea. + * In particular, if we don't know his address, but he does, + * then accept it. + */ + GETLONG(tl, p); /* Parse source address (his) */ + ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(tl); + + if (ciaddr1 != wo->hisaddr && (ciaddr1 == 0 || !wo->accept_remote)) { + orc = CONFNAK; + + if (!reject_if_disagree) { + DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); + tl = lwip_ntohl(wo->hisaddr); + PUTLONG(tl, p); + } + } else if (ciaddr1 == 0 && wo->hisaddr == 0) { + /* + * If neither we nor he knows his address, reject the option. + */ + orc = CONFREJ; + wo->req_addr = 0; /* don't NAK with 0.0.0.0 later */ + break; + } + + /* + * If he doesn't know our address, or if we both have our address + * but disagree about it, then NAK it with our idea. + */ + GETLONG(tl, p); /* Parse desination address (ours) */ + ciaddr2 = lwip_htonl(tl); + + if (ciaddr2 != wo->ouraddr) { + if (ciaddr2 == 0 || !wo->accept_local) { + orc = CONFNAK; + + if (!reject_if_disagree) { + DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); + tl = lwip_ntohl(wo->ouraddr); + PUTLONG(tl, p); + } + } else { + wo->ouraddr = ciaddr2; /* accept peer's idea */ + } + } + + ho->old_addrs = 1; + ho->hisaddr = ciaddr1; + ho->ouraddr = ciaddr2; + break; + + case CI_ADDR: + if (!ao->neg_addr || ho->old_addrs || + cilen != CILEN_ADDR) /* Check CI length */ + { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ + break; + } + + /* + * If he has no address, or if we both have his address but + * disagree about it, then NAK it with our idea. + * In particular, if we don't know his address, but he does, + * then accept it. + */ + GETLONG(tl, p); /* Parse source address (his) */ + ciaddr1 = lwip_htonl(tl); + + if (ciaddr1 != wo->hisaddr && (ciaddr1 == 0 || !wo->accept_remote)) { + orc = CONFNAK; + + if (!reject_if_disagree) { + DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); + tl = lwip_ntohl(wo->hisaddr); + PUTLONG(tl, p); + } + } else if (ciaddr1 == 0 && wo->hisaddr == 0) { + /* + * Don't ACK an address of 0.0.0.0 - reject it instead. + */ + orc = CONFREJ; + wo->req_addr = 0; /* don't NAK with 0.0.0.0 later */ + break; + } + + ho->neg_addr = 1; + ho->hisaddr = ciaddr1; + break; + +#if LWIP_DNS + + case CI_MS_DNS1: + case CI_MS_DNS2: + /* Microsoft primary or secondary DNS request */ + d = citype == CI_MS_DNS2; + + /* If we do not have a DNS address then we cannot send it */ + if (ao->dnsaddr[d] == 0 || + cilen != CILEN_ADDR) /* Check CI length */ + { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ + break; + } + + GETLONG(tl, p); + + if (lwip_htonl(tl) != ao->dnsaddr[d]) { + DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); + tl = lwip_ntohl(ao->dnsaddr[d]); + PUTLONG(tl, p); + orc = CONFNAK; + } + + break; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + case CI_MS_WINS1: + case CI_MS_WINS2: + /* Microsoft primary or secondary WINS request */ + d = citype == CI_MS_WINS2; + + /* If we do not have a DNS address then we cannot send it */ + if(ao->winsaddr[d] == 0 || + cilen != CILEN_ADDR) /* Check CI length */ + { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ + break; + } + + GETLONG(tl, p); + + if(lwip_htonl(tl) != ao->winsaddr[d]) + { + DECPTR(sizeof(u32_t), p); + tl = lwip_ntohl(ao->winsaddr[d]); + PUTLONG(tl, p); + orc = CONFNAK; + } + + break; +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + + case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: + if (!ao->neg_vj || + (cilen != CILEN_VJ && cilen != CILEN_COMPRESS)) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + + if (!(cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP || + (cishort == IPCP_VJ_COMP_OLD && cilen == CILEN_COMPRESS))) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + ho->neg_vj = 1; + ho->vj_protocol = cishort; + + if (cilen == CILEN_VJ) { + GETCHAR(maxslotindex, p); + + if (maxslotindex > ao->maxslotindex) { + orc = CONFNAK; + + if (!reject_if_disagree) { + DECPTR(1, p); + PUTCHAR(ao->maxslotindex, p); + } + } + + GETCHAR(cflag, p); + + if (cflag && !ao->cflag) { + orc = CONFNAK; + + if (!reject_if_disagree) { + DECPTR(1, p); + PUTCHAR(wo->cflag, p); + } + } + + ho->maxslotindex = maxslotindex; + ho->cflag = cflag; + } else { + ho->old_vj = 1; + ho->maxslotindex = MAX_STATES - 1; + ho->cflag = 1; + } + + break; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + default: + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + endswitch: + + if (orc == CONFACK && /* Good CI */ + rc != CONFACK) /* but prior CI wasnt? */ + { + continue; /* Don't send this one */ + } + + if (orc == CONFNAK) /* Nak this CI? */ + { + if (reject_if_disagree) /* Getting fed up with sending NAKs? */ + { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Get tough if so */ + } else { + if (rc == CONFREJ) /* Rejecting prior CI? */ + { + continue; /* Don't send this one */ + } + + if (rc == CONFACK) /* Ack'd all prior CIs? */ + { + rc = CONFNAK; /* Not anymore... */ + ucp = inp; /* Backup */ + } + } + } + + if (orc == CONFREJ && /* Reject this CI */ + rc != CONFREJ) /* but no prior ones? */ + { + rc = CONFREJ; + ucp = inp; /* Backup */ + } + + /* Need to move CI? */ + if (ucp != cip) { + MEMCPY(ucp, cip, cilen); /* Move it */ + } + + /* Update output pointer */ + INCPTR(cilen, ucp); + } + + /* + * If we aren't rejecting this packet, and we want to negotiate + * their address, and they didn't send their address, then we + * send a NAK with a CI_ADDR option appended. We assume the + * input buffer is long enough that we can append the extra + * option safely. + */ + if (rc != CONFREJ && !ho->neg_addr && !ho->old_addrs && + wo->req_addr && !reject_if_disagree && !pcb->settings.noremoteip) { + if (rc == CONFACK) { + rc = CONFNAK; + ucp = inp; /* reset pointer */ + wo->req_addr = 0; /* don't ask again */ + } + + PUTCHAR(CI_ADDR, ucp); + PUTCHAR(CILEN_ADDR, ucp); + tl = lwip_ntohl(wo->hisaddr); + PUTLONG(tl, ucp); + } + + *len = ucp - inp; /* Compute output length */ + IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp: returning Configure-%s", CODENAME(rc))); + return (rc); /* Return final code */ +} + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* + * ip_check_options - check that any IP-related options are OK, + * and assign appropriate defaults. + */ +static void ip_check_options() +{ + struct hostent *hp; + u32_t local; + ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[0]; + + /* + * Default our local IP address based on our hostname. + * If local IP address already given, don't bother. + */ + if(wo->ouraddr == 0 && !disable_defaultip) + { + /* + * Look up our hostname (possibly with domain name appended) + * and take the first IP address as our local IP address. + * If there isn't an IP address for our hostname, too bad. + */ + wo->accept_local = 1; /* don't insist on this default value */ + + if((hp = gethostbyname(hostname)) != NULL) + { + local = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; + + if(local != 0 && !bad_ip_adrs(local)) + { + wo->ouraddr = local; + } + } + } + + ask_for_local = wo->ouraddr != 0 || !disable_defaultip; +} +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +/* + * ip_demand_conf - configure the interface as though + * IPCP were up, for use with dial-on-demand. + */ +static int ip_demand_conf(u) int u; +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = &ppp_pcb_list[u]; + ipcp_options *wo = &ipcp_wantoptions[u]; + + if (wo->hisaddr == 0 && !pcb->settings.noremoteip) { + /* make up an arbitrary address for the peer */ + wo->hisaddr = lwip_htonl(0x0a707070 + ifunit); + wo->accept_remote = 1; + } + + if (wo->ouraddr == 0) { + /* make up an arbitrary address for us */ + wo->ouraddr = lwip_htonl(0x0a404040 + ifunit); + wo->accept_local = 1; + ask_for_local = 0; /* don't tell the peer this address */ + } + + if (!sifaddr(pcb, wo->ouraddr, wo->hisaddr, get_mask(wo->ouraddr))) { + return 0; + } + + if (!sifup(pcb)) { + return 0; + } + + if (!sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_QUEUE)) { + return 0; + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(wo->default_route) + if(sifdefaultroute(pcb, wo->ouraddr, wo->hisaddr, + wo->replace_default_route)) + { + default_route_set[u] = 1; + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + + if(wo->proxy_arp) + if(sifproxyarp(pcb, wo->hisaddr)) + { + proxy_arp_set[u] = 1; + } + +#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + + ppp_notice("local IP address %I", wo->ouraddr); + + if (wo->hisaddr) { + ppp_notice("remote IP address %I", wo->hisaddr); + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * ipcp_up - IPCP has come UP. + * + * Configure the IP network interface appropriately and bring it up. + */ +static void ipcp_up(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + u32_t mask; + ipcp_options *ho = &pcb->ipcp_hisoptions; + ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; + ipcp_options *wo = &pcb->ipcp_wantoptions; + + IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp: up")); + + /* + * We must have a non-zero IP address for both ends of the link. + */ + if (!ho->neg_addr && !ho->old_addrs) { + ho->hisaddr = wo->hisaddr; + } + + if (!(go->neg_addr || go->old_addrs) && (wo->neg_addr || wo->old_addrs) && wo->ouraddr != 0) { + ppp_error("Peer refused to agree to our IP address"); + ipcp_close(f->pcb, "Refused our IP address"); + return; + } + + if (go->ouraddr == 0) { + ppp_error("Could not determine local IP address"); + ipcp_close(f->pcb, "Could not determine local IP address"); + return; + } + + if (ho->hisaddr == 0 && !pcb->settings.noremoteip) { + ho->hisaddr = lwip_htonl(0x0a404040); + ppp_warn("Could not determine remote IP address: defaulting to %I", + ho->hisaddr); + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + script_setenv("IPLOCAL", ip_ntoa(go->ouraddr), 0); + + if(ho->hisaddr != 0) + { + script_setenv("IPREMOTE", ip_ntoa(ho->hisaddr), 1); + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if LWIP_DNS + + if (!go->req_dns1) { + go->dnsaddr[0] = 0; + } + + if (!go->req_dns2) { + go->dnsaddr[1] = 0; + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(go->dnsaddr[0]) + { + script_setenv("DNS1", ip_ntoa(go->dnsaddr[0]), 0); + } + + if(go->dnsaddr[1]) + { + script_setenv("DNS2", ip_ntoa(go->dnsaddr[1]), 0); + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + + if (pcb->settings.usepeerdns && (go->dnsaddr[0] || go->dnsaddr[1])) { + sdns(pcb, go->dnsaddr[0], go->dnsaddr[1]); +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + script_setenv("USEPEERDNS", "1", 0); + create_resolv(go->dnsaddr[0], go->dnsaddr[1]); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + + /* + * Check that the peer is allowed to use the IP address it wants. + */ + if (ho->hisaddr != 0) { + u32_t addr = lwip_ntohl(ho->hisaddr); + + if ((addr >> IP_CLASSA_NSHIFT) == IP_LOOPBACKNET || IP_MULTICAST(addr) || IP_BADCLASS(addr) + /* + * For now, consider that PPP in server mode with peer required + * to authenticate must provide the peer IP address, reject any + * IP address wanted by peer different than the one we wanted. + */ +#if PPP_SERVER && PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT + || (pcb->settings.auth_required && wo->hisaddr != ho->hisaddr) +#endif /* PPP_SERVER && PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + ) { + ppp_error("Peer is not authorized to use remote address %I", ho->hisaddr); + ipcp_close(pcb, "Unauthorized remote IP address"); + return; + } + } + +#if 0 /* Unused */ + + /* Upstream checking code */ + if(ho->hisaddr != 0 && !auth_ip_addr(f->unit, ho->hisaddr)) + { + ppp_error("Peer is not authorized to use remote address %I", ho->hisaddr); + ipcp_close(f->unit, "Unauthorized remote IP address"); + return; + } + +#endif /* Unused */ + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + /* set tcp compression */ + sifvjcomp(pcb, ho->neg_vj, ho->cflag, ho->maxslotindex); +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + + /* + * If we are doing dial-on-demand, the interface is already + * configured, so we put out any saved-up packets, then set the + * interface to pass IP packets. + */ + if (demand) { + if (go->ouraddr != wo->ouraddr || ho->hisaddr != wo->hisaddr) { + ipcp_clear_addrs(f->unit, wo->ouraddr, wo->hisaddr, + wo->replace_default_route); + + if (go->ouraddr != wo->ouraddr) { + ppp_warn("Local IP address changed to %I", go->ouraddr); + script_setenv("OLDIPLOCAL", ip_ntoa(wo->ouraddr), 0); + wo->ouraddr = go->ouraddr; + } else { + script_unsetenv("OLDIPLOCAL"); + } + + if (ho->hisaddr != wo->hisaddr && wo->hisaddr != 0) { + ppp_warn("Remote IP address changed to %I", ho->hisaddr); + script_setenv("OLDIPREMOTE", ip_ntoa(wo->hisaddr), 0); + wo->hisaddr = ho->hisaddr; + } else { + script_unsetenv("OLDIPREMOTE"); + } + + /* Set the interface to the new addresses */ + mask = get_mask(go->ouraddr); + + if (!sifaddr(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, mask)) { +#if PPP_DEBUG + ppp_warn("Interface configuration failed"); +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + ipcp_close(f->unit, "Interface configuration failed"); + return; + } + + /* assign a default route through the interface if required */ + if (ipcp_wantoptions[f->unit].default_route) + if (sifdefaultroute(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, + wo->replace_default_route)) { + default_route_set[f->unit] = 1; + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + + /* Make a proxy ARP entry if requested. */ + if(ho->hisaddr != 0 && ipcp_wantoptions[f->unit].proxy_arp) + if(sifproxyarp(pcb, ho->hisaddr)) + { + proxy_arp_set[f->unit] = 1; + } + +#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + } + + demand_rexmit(PPP_IP, go->ouraddr); + sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_PASS); + + } else +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + { + /* + * Set IP addresses and (if specified) netmask. + */ + mask = get_mask(go->ouraddr); + +#if !(defined(SVR4) && (defined(SNI) || defined(__USLC__))) + + if (!sifaddr(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, mask)) { +#if PPP_DEBUG + ppp_warn("Interface configuration failed"); +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + ipcp_close(f->pcb, "Interface configuration failed"); + return; + } + +#endif + + /* bring the interface up for IP */ + if (!sifup(pcb)) { +#if PPP_DEBUG + ppp_warn("Interface failed to come up"); +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + ipcp_close(f->pcb, "Interface configuration failed"); + return; + } + +#if (defined(SVR4) && (defined(SNI) || defined(__USLC__))) + + if (!sifaddr(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, mask)) { +#if PPP_DEBUG + ppp_warn("Interface configuration failed"); +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + ipcp_close(f->unit, "Interface configuration failed"); + return; + } + +#endif +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_PASS); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + /* assign a default route through the interface if required */ + if(wo->default_route) + if(sifdefaultroute(pcb, go->ouraddr, ho->hisaddr, + wo->replace_default_route)) + { + pcb->default_route_set = 1; + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + + /* Make a proxy ARP entry if requested. */ + if(ho->hisaddr != 0 && wo->proxy_arp) + if(sifproxyarp(pcb, ho->hisaddr)) + { + pcb->proxy_arp_set = 1; + } + +#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + + wo->ouraddr = go->ouraddr; + + ppp_notice("local IP address %I", go->ouraddr); + + if (ho->hisaddr != 0) { + ppp_notice("remote IP address %I", ho->hisaddr); + } + +#if LWIP_DNS + + if (go->dnsaddr[0]) { + ppp_notice("primary DNS address %I", go->dnsaddr[0]); + } + + if (go->dnsaddr[1]) { + ppp_notice("secondary DNS address %I", go->dnsaddr[1]); + } + +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + } + +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + reset_link_stats(f->unit); +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + + np_up(pcb, PPP_IP); + pcb->ipcp_is_up = 1; + +#if PPP_NOTIFY + notify(ip_up_notifier, 0); +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(ip_up_hook) + { + ip_up_hook(); + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ +} + +/* + * ipcp_down - IPCP has gone DOWN. + * + * Take the IP network interface down, clear its addresses + * and delete routes through it. + */ +static void ipcp_down(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipcp_options *ho = &pcb->ipcp_hisoptions; + ipcp_options *go = &pcb->ipcp_gotoptions; + + IPCPDEBUG(("ipcp: down")); +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + /* XXX a bit IPv4-centric here, we only need to get the stats + * before the interface is marked down. */ + /* XXX more correct: we must get the stats before running the notifiers, + * at least for the radius plugin */ + update_link_stats(f->unit); +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_NOTIFY + notify(ip_down_notifier, 0); +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(ip_down_hook) + { + ip_down_hook(); + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + + if (pcb->ipcp_is_up) { + pcb->ipcp_is_up = 0; + np_down(pcb, PPP_IP); + } + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + sifvjcomp(pcb, 0, 0, 0); +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + print_link_stats(); /* _after_ running the notifiers and ip_down_hook(), + * because print_link_stats() sets link_stats_valid + * to 0 (zero) */ +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + + /* + * If we are doing dial-on-demand, set the interface + * to queue up outgoing packets (for now). + */ + if (demand) { + sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_QUEUE); + } else +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + { +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + sifnpmode(pcb, PPP_IP, NPMODE_DROP); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + sifdown(pcb); + ipcp_clear_addrs(pcb, go->ouraddr, + ho->hisaddr, 0); +#if LWIP_DNS + cdns(pcb, go->dnsaddr[0], go->dnsaddr[1]); +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + } +} + +/* + * ipcp_clear_addrs() - clear the interface addresses, routes, + * proxy arp entries, etc. + */ +static void ipcp_clear_addrs(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ouraddr, u32_t hisaddr, u8_t replacedefaultroute) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(replacedefaultroute); + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + + if(pcb->proxy_arp_set) + { + cifproxyarp(pcb, hisaddr); + pcb->proxy_arp_set = 0; + } + +#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + /* If replacedefaultroute, sifdefaultroute will be called soon + * with replacedefaultroute set and that will overwrite the current + * default route. This is the case only when doing demand, otherwise + * during demand, this cifdefaultroute would restore the old default + * route which is not what we want in this case. In the non-demand + * case, we'll delete the default route and restore the old if there + * is one saved by an sifdefaultroute with replacedefaultroute. + */ + if(!replacedefaultroute && pcb->default_route_set) + { + cifdefaultroute(pcb, ouraddr, hisaddr); + pcb->default_route_set = 0; + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + cifaddr(pcb, ouraddr, hisaddr); +} + +/* + * ipcp_finished - possibly shut down the lower layers. + */ +static void ipcp_finished(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + + if (pcb->ipcp_is_open) { + pcb->ipcp_is_open = 0; + np_finished(pcb, PPP_IP); + } +} + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* + * create_resolv - create the replacement resolv.conf file + */ +static void create_resolv(peerdns1, peerdns2) +u32_t peerdns1, peerdns2; +{ + +} +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * ipcp_printpkt - print the contents of an IPCP packet. + */ +static const char *const ipcp_codenames[] = { + "ConfReq", "ConfAck", "ConfNak", "ConfRej", + "TermReq", "TermAck", "CodeRej" +}; + +static int ipcp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) +{ + int code, id, len, olen; + const u_char *pstart, *optend; +#if VJ_SUPPORT + u_short cishort; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + u32_t cilong; + + if (plen < HEADERLEN) { + return 0; + } + + pstart = p; + GETCHAR(code, p); + GETCHAR(id, p); + GETSHORT(len, p); + + if (len < HEADERLEN || len > plen) { + return 0; + } + + if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ipcp_codenames)) { + printer(arg, " %s", ipcp_codenames[code - 1]); + } else { + printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); + } + + printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); + len -= HEADERLEN; + + switch (code) { + case CONFREQ: + case CONFACK: + case CONFNAK: + case CONFREJ: + + /* print option list */ + while (len >= 2) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + GETCHAR(olen, p); + p -= 2; + + if (olen < 2 || olen > len) { + break; + } + + printer(arg, " <"); + len -= olen; + optend = p + olen; + + switch (code) { + case CI_ADDRS: + if (olen == CILEN_ADDRS) { + p += 2; + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, "addrs %I", lwip_htonl(cilong)); + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, " %I", lwip_htonl(cilong)); + } + + break; +#if VJ_SUPPORT + + case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: + if (olen >= CILEN_COMPRESS) { + p += 2; + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + printer(arg, "compress "); + + switch (cishort) { + case IPCP_VJ_COMP: + printer(arg, "VJ"); + break; + + case IPCP_VJ_COMP_OLD: + printer(arg, "old-VJ"); + break; + + default: + printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); + } + } + + break; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + case CI_ADDR: + if (olen == CILEN_ADDR) { + p += 2; + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, "addr %I", lwip_htonl(cilong)); + } + + break; +#if LWIP_DNS + + case CI_MS_DNS1: + case CI_MS_DNS2: + p += 2; + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, "ms-dns%d %I", (code == CI_MS_DNS1 ? 1 : 2), + htonl(cilong)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + case CI_MS_WINS1: + case CI_MS_WINS2: + p += 2; + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, "ms-wins %I", lwip_htonl(cilong)); + break; +#endif /* UNUSED - WINS */ + + default: + break; + } + + while (p < optend) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + printer(arg, " %.2x", code); + } + + printer(arg, ">"); + } + + break; + + case TERMACK: + case TERMREQ: + if (len > 0 && *p >= ' ' && *p < 0x7f) { + printer(arg, " "); + ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); + p += len; + len = 0; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + /* print the rest of the bytes in the packet */ + for (; len > 0; --len) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + printer(arg, " %.2x", code); + } + + return p - pstart; +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +/* + * ip_active_pkt - see if this IP packet is worth bringing the link up for. + * We don't bring the link up for IP fragments or for TCP FIN packets + * with no data. + */ +#define IP_HDRLEN 20 /* bytes */ +#define IP_OFFMASK 0x1fff +#ifndef IPPROTO_TCP +#define IPPROTO_TCP 6 +#endif +#define TCP_HDRLEN 20 +#define TH_FIN 0x01 + +/* + * We use these macros because the IP header may be at an odd address, + * and some compilers might use word loads to get th_off or ip_hl. + */ + +#define net_short(x) (((x)[0] << 8) + (x)[1]) +#define get_iphl(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[0] & 0xF) +#define get_ipoff(x) net_short((unsigned char *)(x) + 6) +#define get_ipproto(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[9]) +#define get_tcpoff(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[12] >> 4) +#define get_tcpflags(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[13]) + +static int ip_active_pkt(pkt, len) + u_char *pkt; +int len; +{ + u_char *tcp; + int hlen; + + len -= PPP_HDRLEN; + pkt += PPP_HDRLEN; + + if (len < IP_HDRLEN) { + return 0; + } + + if ((get_ipoff(pkt) & IP_OFFMASK) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (get_ipproto(pkt) != IPPROTO_TCP) { + return 1; + } + + hlen = get_iphl(pkt) * 4; + + if (len < hlen + TCP_HDRLEN) { + return 0; + } + + tcp = pkt + hlen; + + if ((get_tcpflags(tcp) & TH_FIN) != 0 && len == hlen + get_tcpoff(tcp) * 4) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c index 042a9bc0..827507ba 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ipv6cp.c @@ -1,1669 +1,1669 @@ -/* - * ipv6cp.c - PPP IPV6 Control Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 1999 Tommi Komulainen. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Tommi Komulainen - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - */ - -/* Original version, based on RFC2023 : - - Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Francis.Dupont@inria.fr, INRIA Rocquencourt, - Alain.Durand@imag.fr, IMAG, - Jean-Luc.Richier@imag.fr, IMAG-LSR. - - Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Francis.Dupont@inria.fr, GIE DYADE, - Alain.Durand@imag.fr, IMAG, - Jean-Luc.Richier@imag.fr, IMAG-LSR. - - Ce travail a été fait au sein du GIE DYADE (Groupement d'Intérêt - Économique ayant pour membres BULL S.A. et l'INRIA). - - Ce logiciel informatique est disponible aux conditions - usuelles dans la recherche, c'est-à-dire qu'il peut - être utilisé, copié, modifié, distribué à l'unique - condition que ce texte soit conservé afin que - l'origine de ce logiciel soit reconnue. - - Le nom de l'Institut National de Recherche en Informatique - et en Automatique (INRIA), de l'IMAG, ou d'une personne morale - ou physique ayant participé à l'élaboration de ce logiciel ne peut - être utilisé sans son accord préalable explicite. - - Ce logiciel est fourni tel quel sans aucune garantie, - support ou responsabilité d'aucune sorte. - Ce logiciel est dérivé de sources d'origine - "University of California at Berkeley" et - "Digital Equipment Corporation" couvertes par des copyrights. - - L'Institut d'Informatique et de Mathématiques Appliquées de Grenoble (IMAG) - est une fédération d'unités mixtes de recherche du CNRS, de l'Institut National - Polytechnique de Grenoble et de l'Université Joseph Fourier regroupant - sept laboratoires dont le laboratoire Logiciels, Systèmes, Réseaux (LSR). - - This work has been done in the context of GIE DYADE (joint R & D venture - between BULL S.A. and INRIA). - - This software is available with usual "research" terms - with the aim of retain credits of the software. - Permission to use, copy, modify and distribute this software for any - purpose and without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, - and the name of INRIA, IMAG, or any contributor not be used in advertising - or publicity pertaining to this material without the prior explicit - permission. The software is provided "as is" without any - warranties, support or liabilities of any kind. - This software is derived from source code from - "University of California at Berkeley" and - "Digital Equipment Corporation" protected by copyrights. - - Grenoble's Institute of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics (IMAG) - is a federation of seven research units funded by the CNRS, National - Polytechnic Institute of Grenoble and University Joseph Fourier. - The research unit in Software, Systems, Networks (LSR) is member of IMAG. -*/ - -/* - * Derived from : - * - * - * ipcp.c - PPP IP Control Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - * - * $Id: ipv6cp.c,v 1.21 2005/08/25 23:59:34 paulus Exp $ - */ - -/* - * @todo: - * - * Proxy Neighbour Discovery. - * - * Better defines for selecting the ordering of - * interface up / set address. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" - -/* global vars */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - int no_ifaceid_neg = 0; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -/* - * Callbacks for fsm code. (CI = Configuration Information) - */ -static void ipv6cp_resetci(fsm *f); /* Reset our CI */ -static int ipv6cp_cilen(fsm *f); /* Return length of our CI */ -static void ipv6cp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp); /* Add our CI */ -static int ipv6cp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer ack'd our CI */ -static int ipv6cp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject); /* Peer nak'd our CI */ -static int ipv6cp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer rej'd our CI */ -static int ipv6cp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *len, int reject_if_disagree); /* Rcv CI */ -static void ipv6cp_up(fsm *f); /* We're UP */ -static void ipv6cp_down(fsm *f); /* We're DOWN */ -static void ipv6cp_finished(fsm *f); /* Don't need lower layer */ - -static const fsm_callbacks ipv6cp_callbacks = /* IPV6CP callback routines */ - { - ipv6cp_resetci, /* Reset our Configuration Information */ - ipv6cp_cilen, /* Length of our Configuration Information */ - ipv6cp_addci, /* Add our Configuration Information */ - ipv6cp_ackci, /* ACK our Configuration Information */ - ipv6cp_nakci, /* NAK our Configuration Information */ - ipv6cp_rejci, /* Reject our Configuration Information */ - ipv6cp_reqci, /* Request peer's Configuration Information */ - ipv6cp_up, /* Called when fsm reaches OPENED state */ - ipv6cp_down, /* Called when fsm leaves OPENED state */ - NULL, /* Called when we want the lower layer up */ - ipv6cp_finished, /* Called when we want the lower layer down */ - NULL, /* Called when Protocol-Reject received */ - NULL, /* Retransmission is necessary */ - NULL, /* Called to handle protocol-specific codes */ - "IPV6CP" /* String name of protocol */ - }; - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * Command-line options. - */ -static int setifaceid(char **arg)); -static void printifaceid(option_t *, - void (*)(void *, char *, ...), void *)); - -static option_t ipv6cp_option_list[] = { - { "ipv6", o_special, (void *)setifaceid, - "Set interface identifiers for IPV6", - OPT_A2PRINTER, (void *)printifaceid }, - - { "+ipv6", o_bool, &ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag, - "Enable IPv6 and IPv6CP", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, - { "noipv6", o_bool, &ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag, - "Disable IPv6 and IPv6CP", OPT_PRIOSUB }, - { "-ipv6", o_bool, &ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag, - "Disable IPv6 and IPv6CP", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_ALIAS }, - - { "ipv6cp-accept-local", o_bool, &ipv6cp_allowoptions[0].accept_local, - "Accept peer's interface identifier for us", 1 }, - - { "ipv6cp-use-ipaddr", o_bool, &ipv6cp_allowoptions[0].use_ip, - "Use (default) IPv4 address as interface identifier", 1 }, - - { "ipv6cp-use-persistent", o_bool, &ipv6cp_wantoptions[0].use_persistent, - "Use uniquely-available persistent value for link local address", 1 }, - - { "ipv6cp-restart", o_int, &ipv6cp_fsm[0].timeouttime, - "Set timeout for IPv6CP", OPT_PRIO }, - { "ipv6cp-max-terminate", o_int, &ipv6cp_fsm[0].maxtermtransmits, - "Set max #xmits for term-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, - { "ipv6cp-max-configure", o_int, &ipv6cp_fsm[0].maxconfreqtransmits, - "Set max #xmits for conf-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, - { "ipv6cp-max-failure", o_int, &ipv6cp_fsm[0].maxnakloops, - "Set max #conf-naks for IPv6CP", OPT_PRIO }, - - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * Protocol entry points from main code. - */ -static void ipv6cp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ipv6cp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ipv6cp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); -static void ipv6cp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ipv6cp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void ipv6cp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len); -static void ipv6cp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PPP_OPTIONS -static void ipv6_check_options(void); -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -static int ipv6_demand_conf(int u); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static int ipv6cp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -static int ipv6_active_pkt(u_char *pkt, int len); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -const struct protent ipv6cp_protent = { - PPP_IPV6CP, - ipv6cp_init, - ipv6cp_input, - ipv6cp_protrej, - ipv6cp_lowerup, - ipv6cp_lowerdown, - ipv6cp_open, - ipv6cp_close, -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - ipv6cp_printpkt, -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - "IPV6CP", - "IPV6", -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS - ipv6cp_option_list, - ipv6_check_options, -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - ipv6_demand_conf, - ipv6_active_pkt -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -}; - -static void ipv6cp_clear_addrs(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t ourid, eui64_t hisid); -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -static void ipv6cp_script(char *)); -static void ipv6cp_script_done(void *)); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -/* - * Lengths of configuration options. - */ -#define CILEN_VOID 2 -#define CILEN_COMPRESS 4 /* length for RFC2023 compress opt. */ -#define CILEN_IFACEID 10 /* RFC2472, interface identifier */ - -#define CODENAME(x) ((x) == CONFACK ? "ACK" : \ - (x) == CONFNAK ? "NAK" : \ - "REJ") - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* - * This state variable is used to ensure that we don't - * run an ipcp-up/down script while one is already running. - */ -static enum script_state -{ - s_down, - s_up, -} ipv6cp_script_state; -static pid_t ipv6cp_script_pid; -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -static char *llv6_ntoa(eui64_t ifaceid); - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * setifaceid - set the interface identifiers manually - */ -static int setifaceid(argv) char **argv; -{ - char *comma, *arg, c; - ipv6cp_options *wo = &ipv6cp_wantoptions[0]; - struct in6_addr addr; - static int prio_local, prio_remote; - -#define VALIDID(a) ((((a).s6_addr32[0] == 0) && ((a).s6_addr32[1] == 0)) && \ - (((a).s6_addr32[2] != 0) || ((a).s6_addr32[3] != 0))) - - arg = *argv; - - if ((comma = strchr(arg, ',')) == NULL) { - comma = arg + strlen(arg); - } - - /* - * If comma first character, then no local identifier - */ - if (comma != arg) { - c = *comma; - *comma = '\0'; - - if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, arg, &addr) == 0 || !VALIDID(addr)) { - option_error("Illegal interface identifier (local): %s", arg); - return 0; - } - - if (option_priority >= prio_local) { - eui64_copy(addr.s6_addr32[2], wo->ourid); - wo->opt_local = 1; - prio_local = option_priority; - } - - *comma = c; - } - - /* - * If comma last character, the no remote identifier - */ - if (*comma != 0 && *++comma != '\0') { - if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, comma, &addr) == 0 || !VALIDID(addr)) { - option_error("Illegal interface identifier (remote): %s", comma); - return 0; - } - - if (option_priority >= prio_remote) { - eui64_copy(addr.s6_addr32[2], wo->hisid); - wo->opt_remote = 1; - prio_remote = option_priority; - } - } - - if (override_value("+ipv6", option_priority, option_source)) { - ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag = 1; - } - - return 1; -} - -static void printifaceid(opt, printer, arg) - option_t *opt; -void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...)); -void *arg; -{ - ipv6cp_options *wo = &ipv6cp_wantoptions[0]; - - if (wo->opt_local) { - printer(arg, "%s", llv6_ntoa(wo->ourid)); - } - - printer(arg, ","); - - if (wo->opt_remote) { - printer(arg, "%s", llv6_ntoa(wo->hisid)); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * Make a string representation of a network address. - */ -static char *llv6_ntoa(eui64_t ifaceid) -{ - static char b[26]; - - sprintf(b, "fe80::%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x", - ifaceid.e8[0], ifaceid.e8[1], ifaceid.e8[2], ifaceid.e8[3], - ifaceid.e8[4], ifaceid.e8[5], ifaceid.e8[6], ifaceid.e8[7]); - - return b; -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_init - Initialize IPV6CP. - */ -static void ipv6cp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->ipv6cp_fsm; - ipv6cp_options *wo = &pcb->ipv6cp_wantoptions; - ipv6cp_options *ao = &pcb->ipv6cp_allowoptions; - - f->pcb = pcb; - f->protocol = PPP_IPV6CP; - f->callbacks = &ipv6cp_callbacks; - fsm_init(f); - -#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ - memset(wo, 0, sizeof(*wo)); - memset(ao, 0, sizeof(*ao)); -#endif /* 0 */ - - wo->accept_local = 1; - wo->neg_ifaceid = 1; - ao->neg_ifaceid = 1; - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - wo->neg_vj = 1; - ao->neg_vj = 1; - wo->vj_protocol = IPV6CP_COMP; -#endif -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_open - IPV6CP is allowed to come up. - */ -static void ipv6cp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm_open(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm); -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_close - Take IPV6CP down. - */ -static void ipv6cp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason) -{ - fsm_close(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm, reason); -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_lowerup - The lower layer is up. - */ -static void ipv6cp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm_lowerup(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm); -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. - */ -static void ipv6cp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm_lowerdown(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm); -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_input - Input IPV6CP packet. - */ -static void ipv6cp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) -{ - fsm_input(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm, p, len); -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_protrej - A Protocol-Reject was received for IPV6CP. - * - * Pretend the lower layer went down, so we shut up. - */ -static void ipv6cp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm_lowerdown(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm); -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_resetci - Reset our CI. - */ -static void ipv6cp_resetci(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipv6cp_options *wo = &pcb->ipv6cp_wantoptions; - ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; - ipv6cp_options *ao = &pcb->ipv6cp_allowoptions; - - wo->req_ifaceid = wo->neg_ifaceid && ao->neg_ifaceid; - - if (!wo->opt_local) { - eui64_magic_nz(wo->ourid); - } - - *go = *wo; - eui64_zero(go->hisid); /* last proposed interface identifier */ -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_cilen - Return length of our CI. - */ -static int ipv6cp_cilen(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP -#define LENCIVJ(neg) (neg ? CILEN_COMPRESS : 0) -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ -#define LENCIIFACEID(neg) (neg ? CILEN_IFACEID : 0) - - return (LENCIIFACEID(go->neg_ifaceid) + -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - LENCIVJ(go->neg_vj) + -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - 0); -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_addci - Add our desired CIs to a packet. - */ -static void ipv6cp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; - int len = *lenp; - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP -#define ADDCIVJ(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - int vjlen = CILEN_COMPRESS; \ - if (len >= vjlen) { \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(vjlen, ucp); \ - PUTSHORT(val, ucp); \ - len -= vjlen; \ - } else \ - neg = 0; \ - } -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - -#define ADDCIIFACEID(opt, neg, val1) \ - if (neg) { \ - int idlen = CILEN_IFACEID; \ - if (len >= idlen) { \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(idlen, ucp); \ - eui64_put(val1, ucp); \ - len -= idlen; \ - } else \ - neg = 0; \ - } - - ADDCIIFACEID(CI_IFACEID, go->neg_ifaceid, go->ourid); - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - ADDCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, go->neg_vj, go->vj_protocol); -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - - *lenp -= len; -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_ackci - Ack our CIs. - * - * Returns: - * 0 - Ack was bad. - * 1 - Ack was good. - */ -static int ipv6cp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; - u_short cilen, citype; -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - u_short cishort; -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - eui64_t ifaceid; - - /* - * CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent... - * Check packet length and CI length at each step. - * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. - */ - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP -#define ACKCIVJ(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - int vjlen = CILEN_COMPRESS; \ - if ((len -= vjlen) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != vjlen || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - if (cishort != val) \ - goto bad; \ - } -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - -#define ACKCIIFACEID(opt, neg, val1) \ - if (neg) { \ - int idlen = CILEN_IFACEID; \ - if ((len -= idlen) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != idlen || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - eui64_get(ifaceid, p); \ - if (!eui64_equals(val1, ifaceid)) \ - goto bad; \ - } - - ACKCIIFACEID(CI_IFACEID, go->neg_ifaceid, go->ourid); - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - ACKCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, go->neg_vj, go->vj_protocol); -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - - /* - * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. - */ - if (len != 0) { - goto bad; - } - - return (1); - -bad: - IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp_ackci: received bad Ack!")); - return (0); -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_nakci - Peer has sent a NAK for some of our CIs. - * This should not modify any state if the Nak is bad - * or if IPV6CP is in the OPENED state. - * - * Returns: - * 0 - Nak was bad. - * 1 - Nak was good. - */ -static int ipv6cp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; - u_char citype, cilen, *next; -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - u_short cishort; -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - eui64_t ifaceid; - ipv6cp_options no; /* options we've seen Naks for */ - ipv6cp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ - - BZERO(&no, sizeof(no)); - try_ = *go; - - /* - * Any Nak'd CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. - * Check packet length and CI length at each step. - * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. - */ -#define NAKCIIFACEID(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= (cilen = CILEN_IFACEID) && \ - p[1] == cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - eui64_get(ifaceid, p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP -#define NAKCIVJ(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_COMPRESS) && \ - len >= cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - - /* - * Accept the peer's idea of {our,his} interface identifier, if different - * from our idea, only if the accept_{local,remote} flag is set. - */ - NAKCIIFACEID( - CI_IFACEID, neg_ifaceid, - - if (treat_as_reject) { - try_.neg_ifaceid = 0; - } else if (go->accept_local) { - while (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) || - eui64_equals(ifaceid, go->hisid)) /* bad luck */ - { - eui64_magic(ifaceid); - } - - try_.ourid = ifaceid; - IPV6CPDEBUG(("local LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(ifaceid))); - }); - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - NAKCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, neg_vj, - { - if (cishort == IPV6CP_COMP && !treat_as_reject) { - try_.vj_protocol = cishort; - } else { - try_.neg_vj = 0; - } - }); -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - - /* - * There may be remaining CIs, if the peer is requesting negotiation - * on an option that we didn't include in our request packet. - * If they want to negotiate about interface identifier, we comply. - * If they want us to ask for compression, we refuse. - */ - while (len >= CILEN_VOID) { - GETCHAR(citype, p); - GETCHAR(cilen, p); - - if (cilen < CILEN_VOID || (len -= cilen) < 0) { - goto bad; - } - - next = p + cilen - 2; - - switch (citype) { -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - - case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: - if (go->neg_vj || no.neg_vj || - (cilen != CILEN_COMPRESS)) { - goto bad; - } - - no.neg_vj = 1; - break; -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - - case CI_IFACEID: - if (go->neg_ifaceid || no.neg_ifaceid || cilen != CILEN_IFACEID) { - goto bad; - } - - try_.neg_ifaceid = 1; - eui64_get(ifaceid, p); - - if (go->accept_local) { - while (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) || - eui64_equals(ifaceid, go->hisid)) /* bad luck */ - { - eui64_magic(ifaceid); - } - - try_.ourid = ifaceid; - } - - no.neg_ifaceid = 1; - break; - - default: - break; - } - - p = next; - } - - /* If there is still anything left, this packet is bad. */ - if (len != 0) { - goto bad; - } - - /* - * OK, the Nak is good. Now we can update state. - */ - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - *go = try_; - } - - return 1; - -bad: - IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp_nakci: received bad Nak!")); - return 0; -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_rejci - Reject some of our CIs. - */ -static int ipv6cp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; - u_char cilen; -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - u_short cishort; -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - eui64_t ifaceid; - ipv6cp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ - - try_ = *go; - /* - * Any Rejected CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. - * Check packet length and CI length at each step. - * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. - */ -#define REJCIIFACEID(opt, neg, val1) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= (cilen = CILEN_IFACEID) && \ - p[1] == cilen && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= cilen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - eui64_get(ifaceid, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (!eui64_equals(ifaceid, val1)) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP -#define REJCIVJ(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - p[1] == CILEN_COMPRESS && \ - len >= p[1] && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= p[1]; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cishort != val) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - - REJCIIFACEID(CI_IFACEID, neg_ifaceid, go->ourid); - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - REJCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, neg_vj, go->vj_protocol); -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - - /* - * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. - */ - if (len != 0) { - goto bad; - } - - /* - * Now we can update state. - */ - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - *go = try_; - } - - return 1; - -bad: - IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp_rejci: received bad Reject!")); - return 0; -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_reqci - Check the peer's requested CIs and send appropriate response. - * - * Returns: CONFACK, CONFNAK or CONFREJ and input packet modified - * appropriately. If reject_if_disagree is non-zero, doesn't return - * CONFNAK; returns CONFREJ if it can't return CONFACK. - * - * inp = Requested CIs - * len = Length of requested CIs - * - */ -static int ipv6cp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *len, int reject_if_disagree) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipv6cp_options *wo = &pcb->ipv6cp_wantoptions; - ipv6cp_options *ho = &pcb->ipv6cp_hisoptions; - ipv6cp_options *ao = &pcb->ipv6cp_allowoptions; - ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; - u_char *cip, *next; /* Pointer to current and next CIs */ - u_short cilen, citype; /* Parsed len, type */ -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - u_short cishort; /* Parsed short value */ -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - eui64_t ifaceid; /* Parsed interface identifier */ - int rc = CONFACK; /* Final packet return code */ - int orc; /* Individual option return code */ - u_char *p; /* Pointer to next char to parse */ - u_char *ucp = inp; /* Pointer to current output char */ - int l = *len; /* Length left */ - - /* - * Reset all his options. - */ - BZERO(ho, sizeof(*ho)); - - /* - * Process all his options. - */ - next = inp; - - while (l) { - orc = CONFACK; /* Assume success */ - cip = p = next; /* Remember begining of CI */ - - if (l < 2 || /* Not enough data for CI header or */ - p[1] < 2 || /* CI length too small or */ - p[1] > l) /* CI length too big? */ - { - IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp_reqci: bad CI length!")); - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject bad CI */ - cilen = l; /* Reject till end of packet */ - l = 0; /* Don't loop again */ - goto endswitch; - } - - GETCHAR(citype, p); /* Parse CI type */ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); /* Parse CI length */ - l -= cilen; /* Adjust remaining length */ - next += cilen; /* Step to next CI */ - - switch (citype) /* Check CI type */ - { - case CI_IFACEID: - IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: received interface identifier ")); - - if (!ao->neg_ifaceid || - cilen != CILEN_IFACEID) /* Check CI length */ - { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ - break; - } - - /* - * If he has no interface identifier, or if we both have same - * identifier then NAK it with new idea. - * In particular, if we don't know his identifier, but he does, - * then accept it. - */ - eui64_get(ifaceid, p); - IPV6CPDEBUG(("(%s)", llv6_ntoa(ifaceid))); - - if (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) && eui64_iszero(go->ourid)) { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ - break; - } - - if (!eui64_iszero(wo->hisid) && - !eui64_equals(ifaceid, wo->hisid) && - eui64_iszero(go->hisid)) { - orc = CONFNAK; - ifaceid = wo->hisid; - go->hisid = ifaceid; - DECPTR(sizeof(ifaceid), p); - eui64_put(ifaceid, p); - } else if (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) || eui64_equals(ifaceid, go->ourid)) { - orc = CONFNAK; - - if (eui64_iszero(go->hisid)) /* first time, try option */ - { - ifaceid = wo->hisid; - } - - while (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) || - eui64_equals(ifaceid, go->ourid)) /* bad luck */ - { - eui64_magic(ifaceid); - } - - go->hisid = ifaceid; - DECPTR(sizeof(ifaceid), p); - eui64_put(ifaceid, p); - } - - ho->neg_ifaceid = 1; - ho->hisid = ifaceid; - break; - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - - case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: - IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: received COMPRESSTYPE ")); - - if (!ao->neg_vj || - (cilen != CILEN_COMPRESS)) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - IPV6CPDEBUG(("(%d)", cishort)); - - if (!(cishort == IPV6CP_COMP)) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - ho->neg_vj = 1; - ho->vj_protocol = cishort; - break; -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - - default: - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - endswitch: - IPV6CPDEBUG((" (%s)\n", CODENAME(orc))); - - if (orc == CONFACK && /* Good CI */ - rc != CONFACK) /* but prior CI wasnt? */ - { - continue; /* Don't send this one */ - } - - if (orc == CONFNAK) /* Nak this CI? */ - { - if (reject_if_disagree) /* Getting fed up with sending NAKs? */ - { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Get tough if so */ - } else { - if (rc == CONFREJ) /* Rejecting prior CI? */ - { - continue; /* Don't send this one */ - } - - if (rc == CONFACK) /* Ack'd all prior CIs? */ - { - rc = CONFNAK; /* Not anymore... */ - ucp = inp; /* Backup */ - } - } - } - - if (orc == CONFREJ && /* Reject this CI */ - rc != CONFREJ) /* but no prior ones? */ - { - rc = CONFREJ; - ucp = inp; /* Backup */ - } - - /* Need to move CI? */ - if (ucp != cip) { - MEMCPY(ucp, cip, cilen); /* Move it */ - } - - /* Update output pointer */ - INCPTR(cilen, ucp); - } - - /* - * If we aren't rejecting this packet, and we want to negotiate - * their identifier and they didn't send their identifier, then we - * send a NAK with a CI_IFACEID option appended. We assume the - * input buffer is long enough that we can append the extra - * option safely. - */ - if (rc != CONFREJ && !ho->neg_ifaceid && - wo->req_ifaceid && !reject_if_disagree) { - if (rc == CONFACK) { - rc = CONFNAK; - ucp = inp; /* reset pointer */ - wo->req_ifaceid = 0; /* don't ask again */ - } - - PUTCHAR(CI_IFACEID, ucp); - PUTCHAR(CILEN_IFACEID, ucp); - eui64_put(wo->hisid, ucp); - } - - *len = ucp - inp; /* Compute output length */ - IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: returning Configure-%s", CODENAME(rc))); - return (rc); /* Return final code */ -} - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * ipv6_check_options - check that any IP-related options are OK, - * and assign appropriate defaults. - */ -static void ipv6_check_options() -{ - ipv6cp_options *wo = &ipv6cp_wantoptions[0]; - - if (!ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag) { - return; - } - - /* - * Persistent link-local id is only used when user has not explicitly - * configure/hard-code the id - */ - if ((wo->use_persistent) && (!wo->opt_local) && (!wo->opt_remote)) { - /* - * On systems where there are no Ethernet interfaces used, there - * may be other ways to obtain a persistent id. Right now, it - * will fall back to using magic [see eui64_magic] below when - * an EUI-48 from MAC address can't be obtained. Other possibilities - * include obtaining EEPROM serial numbers, or some other unique - * yet persistent number. On Sparc platforms, this is possible, - * but too bad there's no standards yet for x86 machines. - */ - if (ether_to_eui64(&wo->ourid)) { - wo->opt_local = 1; - } - } - - if (!wo->opt_local) /* init interface identifier */ - { - if (wo->use_ip && eui64_iszero(wo->ourid)) { - eui64_setlo32(wo->ourid, lwip_ntohl(ipcp_wantoptions[0].ouraddr)); - - if (!eui64_iszero(wo->ourid)) { - wo->opt_local = 1; - } - } - - while (eui64_iszero(wo->ourid)) { - eui64_magic(wo->ourid); - } - } - - if (!wo->opt_remote) { - if (wo->use_ip && eui64_iszero(wo->hisid)) { - eui64_setlo32(wo->hisid, lwip_ntohl(ipcp_wantoptions[0].hisaddr)); - - if (!eui64_iszero(wo->hisid)) { - wo->opt_remote = 1; - } - } - } - - if (demand && (eui64_iszero(wo->ourid) || eui64_iszero(wo->hisid))) { - option_error("local/remote LL address required for demand-dialling\n"); - exit(1); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -/* - * ipv6_demand_conf - configure the interface as though - * IPV6CP were up, for use with dial-on-demand. - */ -static int ipv6_demand_conf(int u) -{ - ipv6cp_options *wo = &ipv6cp_wantoptions[u]; - - if (!sif6up(u)) { - return 0; - } - - if (!sif6addr(u, wo->ourid, wo->hisid)) { - return 0; - } - - if (!sifnpmode(u, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_QUEUE)) { - return 0; - } - - ppp_notice("ipv6_demand_conf"); - ppp_notice("local LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(wo->ourid)); - ppp_notice("remote LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(wo->hisid)); - - return 1; -} -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * ipv6cp_up - IPV6CP has come UP. - * - * Configure the IPv6 network interface appropriately and bring it up. - */ -static void ipv6cp_up(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipv6cp_options *wo = &pcb->ipv6cp_wantoptions; - ipv6cp_options *ho = &pcb->ipv6cp_hisoptions; - ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; - - IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: up")); - - /* - * We must have a non-zero LL address for both ends of the link. - */ - if (!ho->neg_ifaceid) { - ho->hisid = wo->hisid; - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - if(!no_ifaceid_neg) - { -#endif /* UNUSED */ - - if (eui64_iszero(ho->hisid)) { - ppp_error("Could not determine remote LL address"); - ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "Could not determine remote LL address"); - return; - } - - if (eui64_iszero(go->ourid)) { - ppp_error("Could not determine local LL address"); - ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "Could not determine local LL address"); - return; - } - - if (eui64_equals(go->ourid, ho->hisid)) { - ppp_error("local and remote LL addresses are equal"); - ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "local and remote LL addresses are equal"); - return; - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - script_setenv("LLLOCAL", llv6_ntoa(go->ourid), 0); - script_setenv("LLREMOTE", llv6_ntoa(ho->hisid), 0); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - /* set tcp compression */ - sif6comp(f->unit, ho->neg_vj); -#endif - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - - /* - * If we are doing dial-on-demand, the interface is already - * configured, so we put out any saved-up packets, then set the - * interface to pass IPv6 packets. - */ - if (demand) { - if (!eui64_equals(go->ourid, wo->ourid) || - !eui64_equals(ho->hisid, wo->hisid)) { - if (!eui64_equals(go->ourid, wo->ourid)) - warn("Local LL address changed to %s", - llv6_ntoa(go->ourid)); - - if (!eui64_equals(ho->hisid, wo->hisid)) - warn("Remote LL address changed to %s", - llv6_ntoa(ho->hisid)); - - ipv6cp_clear_addrs(f->pcb, go->ourid, ho->hisid); - - /* Set the interface to the new addresses */ - if (!sif6addr(f->pcb, go->ourid, ho->hisid)) { - if (debug) { - warn("sif6addr failed"); - } - - ipv6cp_close(f->unit, "Interface configuration failed"); - return; - } - } - - demand_rexmit(PPP_IPV6); - sifnpmode(f->unit, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_PASS); - - } else -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - { - /* - * Set LL addresses - */ - if (!sif6addr(f->pcb, go->ourid, ho->hisid)) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sif6addr failed")); - ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "Interface configuration failed"); - return; - } - - /* bring the interface up for IPv6 */ - if (!sif6up(f->pcb)) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sif6up failed (IPV6)")); - ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "Interface configuration failed"); - return; - } - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - sifnpmode(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_PASS); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - - ppp_notice("local LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(go->ourid)); - ppp_notice("remote LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(ho->hisid)); - } - - np_up(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6); - pcb->ipv6cp_is_up = 1; - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - /* - * Execute the ipv6-up script, like this: - * /etc/ppp/ipv6-up interface tty speed local-LL remote-LL - */ - if(ipv6cp_script_state == s_down && ipv6cp_script_pid == 0) - { - ipv6cp_script_state = s_up; - ipv6cp_script(_PATH_IPV6UP); - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_down - IPV6CP has gone DOWN. - * - * Take the IPv6 network interface down, clear its addresses - * and delete routes through it. - */ -static void ipv6cp_down(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; - ipv6cp_options *ho = &pcb->ipv6cp_hisoptions; - - IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: down")); -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - update_link_stats(f->unit); -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - - if (pcb->ipv6cp_is_up) { - pcb->ipv6cp_is_up = 0; - np_down(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6); - } - -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - sif6comp(f->unit, 0); -#endif - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - - /* - * If we are doing dial-on-demand, set the interface - * to queue up outgoing packets (for now). - */ - if (demand) { - sifnpmode(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_QUEUE); - } else -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - { -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - sifnpmode(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_DROP); -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - ipv6cp_clear_addrs(f->pcb, - go->ourid, - ho->hisid); - sif6down(f->pcb); - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - /* Execute the ipv6-down script */ - if(ipv6cp_script_state == s_up && ipv6cp_script_pid == 0) - { - ipv6cp_script_state = s_down; - ipv6cp_script(_PATH_IPV6DOWN); - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_clear_addrs() - clear the interface addresses, routes, - * proxy neighbour discovery entries, etc. - */ -static void ipv6cp_clear_addrs(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t ourid, eui64_t hisid) -{ - cif6addr(pcb, ourid, hisid); -} - -/* - * ipv6cp_finished - possibly shut down the lower layers. - */ -static void ipv6cp_finished(fsm *f) -{ - np_finished(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6); -} - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* - * ipv6cp_script_done - called when the ipv6-up or ipv6-down script - * has finished. - */ -static void ipv6cp_script_done(arg) -void *arg; -{ - ipv6cp_script_pid = 0; - - switch(ipv6cp_script_state) - { - case s_up: - if(ipv6cp_fsm[0].state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) - { - ipv6cp_script_state = s_down; - ipv6cp_script(_PATH_IPV6DOWN); - } - - break; - - case s_down: - if(ipv6cp_fsm[0].state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) - { - ipv6cp_script_state = s_up; - ipv6cp_script(_PATH_IPV6UP); - } - - break; - } -} - - -/* - * ipv6cp_script - Execute a script with arguments - * interface-name tty-name speed local-LL remote-LL. - */ -static void ipv6cp_script(script) -char *script; -{ - char strspeed[32], strlocal[32], strremote[32]; - char *argv[8]; - - sprintf(strspeed, "%d", baud_rate); - strcpy(strlocal, llv6_ntoa(ipv6cp_gotoptions[0].ourid)); - strcpy(strremote, llv6_ntoa(ipv6cp_hisoptions[0].hisid)); - - argv[0] = script; - argv[1] = ifname; - argv[2] = devnam; - argv[3] = strspeed; - argv[4] = strlocal; - argv[5] = strremote; - argv[6] = ipparam; - argv[7] = NULL; - - ipv6cp_script_pid = run_program(script, argv, 0, ipv6cp_script_done, - NULL, 0); -} -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * ipv6cp_printpkt - print the contents of an IPV6CP packet. - */ -static const char *const ipv6cp_codenames[] = { - "ConfReq", "ConfAck", "ConfNak", "ConfRej", - "TermReq", "TermAck", "CodeRej" -}; - -static int ipv6cp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) -{ - int code, id, len, olen; - const u_char *pstart, *optend; -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - u_short cishort; -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - eui64_t ifaceid; - - if (plen < HEADERLEN) { - return 0; - } - - pstart = p; - GETCHAR(code, p); - GETCHAR(id, p); - GETSHORT(len, p); - - if (len < HEADERLEN || len > plen) { - return 0; - } - - if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ipv6cp_codenames)) { - printer(arg, " %s", ipv6cp_codenames[code - 1]); - } else { - printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); - } - - printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); - len -= HEADERLEN; - - switch (code) { - case CONFREQ: - case CONFACK: - case CONFNAK: - case CONFREJ: - - /* print option list */ - while (len >= 2) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - GETCHAR(olen, p); - p -= 2; - - if (olen < 2 || olen > len) { - break; - } - - printer(arg, " <"); - len -= olen; - optend = p + olen; - - switch (code) { -#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP - - case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: - if (olen >= CILEN_COMPRESS) { - p += 2; - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - printer(arg, "compress "); - printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); - } - - break; -#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ - - case CI_IFACEID: - if (olen == CILEN_IFACEID) { - p += 2; - eui64_get(ifaceid, p); - printer(arg, "addr %s", llv6_ntoa(ifaceid)); - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - while (p < optend) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - printer(arg, " %.2x", code); - } - - printer(arg, ">"); - } - - break; - - case TERMACK: - case TERMREQ: - if (len > 0 && *p >= ' ' && *p < 0x7f) { - printer(arg, " "); - ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); - p += len; - len = 0; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - /* print the rest of the bytes in the packet */ - for (; len > 0; --len) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - printer(arg, " %.2x", code); - } - - return p - pstart; -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -/* - * ipv6_active_pkt - see if this IP packet is worth bringing the link up for. - * We don't bring the link up for IP fragments or for TCP FIN packets - * with no data. - */ -#define IP6_HDRLEN 40 /* bytes */ -#define IP6_NHDR_FRAG 44 /* fragment IPv6 header */ -#define TCP_HDRLEN 20 -#define TH_FIN 0x01 - -/* - * We use these macros because the IP header may be at an odd address, - * and some compilers might use word loads to get th_off or ip_hl. - */ - -#define get_ip6nh(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[6]) -#define get_tcpoff(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[12] >> 4) -#define get_tcpflags(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[13]) - -static int ipv6_active_pkt(u_char *pkt, int len) -{ - u_char *tcp; - - len -= PPP_HDRLEN; - pkt += PPP_HDRLEN; - - if (len < IP6_HDRLEN) { - return 0; - } - - if (get_ip6nh(pkt) == IP6_NHDR_FRAG) { - return 0; - } - - if (get_ip6nh(pkt) != IPPROTO_TCP) { - return 1; - } - - if (len < IP6_HDRLEN + TCP_HDRLEN) { - return 0; - } - - tcp = pkt + IP6_HDRLEN; - - if ((get_tcpflags(tcp) & TH_FIN) != 0 && len == IP6_HDRLEN + get_tcpoff(tcp) * 4) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +/* + * ipv6cp.c - PPP IPV6 Control Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Tommi Komulainen. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Tommi Komulainen + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + */ + +/* Original version, based on RFC2023 : + + Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Francis.Dupont@inria.fr, INRIA Rocquencourt, + Alain.Durand@imag.fr, IMAG, + Jean-Luc.Richier@imag.fr, IMAG-LSR. + + Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Francis.Dupont@inria.fr, GIE DYADE, + Alain.Durand@imag.fr, IMAG, + Jean-Luc.Richier@imag.fr, IMAG-LSR. + + Ce travail a été fait au sein du GIE DYADE (Groupement d'Intérêt + Économique ayant pour membres BULL S.A. et l'INRIA). + + Ce logiciel informatique est disponible aux conditions + usuelles dans la recherche, c'est-à-dire qu'il peut + être utilisé, copié, modifié, distribué à l'unique + condition que ce texte soit conservé afin que + l'origine de ce logiciel soit reconnue. + + Le nom de l'Institut National de Recherche en Informatique + et en Automatique (INRIA), de l'IMAG, ou d'une personne morale + ou physique ayant participé à l'élaboration de ce logiciel ne peut + être utilisé sans son accord préalable explicite. + + Ce logiciel est fourni tel quel sans aucune garantie, + support ou responsabilité d'aucune sorte. + Ce logiciel est dérivé de sources d'origine + "University of California at Berkeley" et + "Digital Equipment Corporation" couvertes par des copyrights. + + L'Institut d'Informatique et de Mathématiques Appliquées de Grenoble (IMAG) + est une fédération d'unités mixtes de recherche du CNRS, de l'Institut National + Polytechnique de Grenoble et de l'Université Joseph Fourier regroupant + sept laboratoires dont le laboratoire Logiciels, Systèmes, Réseaux (LSR). + + This work has been done in the context of GIE DYADE (joint R & D venture + between BULL S.A. and INRIA). + + This software is available with usual "research" terms + with the aim of retain credits of the software. + Permission to use, copy, modify and distribute this software for any + purpose and without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, + and the name of INRIA, IMAG, or any contributor not be used in advertising + or publicity pertaining to this material without the prior explicit + permission. The software is provided "as is" without any + warranties, support or liabilities of any kind. + This software is derived from source code from + "University of California at Berkeley" and + "Digital Equipment Corporation" protected by copyrights. + + Grenoble's Institute of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics (IMAG) + is a federation of seven research units funded by the CNRS, National + Polytechnic Institute of Grenoble and University Joseph Fourier. + The research unit in Software, Systems, Networks (LSR) is member of IMAG. +*/ + +/* + * Derived from : + * + * + * ipcp.c - PPP IP Control Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * $Id: ipv6cp.c,v 1.21 2005/08/25 23:59:34 paulus Exp $ + */ + +/* + * @todo: + * + * Proxy Neighbour Discovery. + * + * Better defines for selecting the ordering of + * interface up / set address. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" + +/* global vars */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + int no_ifaceid_neg = 0; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +/* + * Callbacks for fsm code. (CI = Configuration Information) + */ +static void ipv6cp_resetci(fsm *f); /* Reset our CI */ +static int ipv6cp_cilen(fsm *f); /* Return length of our CI */ +static void ipv6cp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp); /* Add our CI */ +static int ipv6cp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer ack'd our CI */ +static int ipv6cp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject); /* Peer nak'd our CI */ +static int ipv6cp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer rej'd our CI */ +static int ipv6cp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *len, int reject_if_disagree); /* Rcv CI */ +static void ipv6cp_up(fsm *f); /* We're UP */ +static void ipv6cp_down(fsm *f); /* We're DOWN */ +static void ipv6cp_finished(fsm *f); /* Don't need lower layer */ + +static const fsm_callbacks ipv6cp_callbacks = /* IPV6CP callback routines */ + { + ipv6cp_resetci, /* Reset our Configuration Information */ + ipv6cp_cilen, /* Length of our Configuration Information */ + ipv6cp_addci, /* Add our Configuration Information */ + ipv6cp_ackci, /* ACK our Configuration Information */ + ipv6cp_nakci, /* NAK our Configuration Information */ + ipv6cp_rejci, /* Reject our Configuration Information */ + ipv6cp_reqci, /* Request peer's Configuration Information */ + ipv6cp_up, /* Called when fsm reaches OPENED state */ + ipv6cp_down, /* Called when fsm leaves OPENED state */ + NULL, /* Called when we want the lower layer up */ + ipv6cp_finished, /* Called when we want the lower layer down */ + NULL, /* Called when Protocol-Reject received */ + NULL, /* Retransmission is necessary */ + NULL, /* Called to handle protocol-specific codes */ + "IPV6CP" /* String name of protocol */ + }; + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * Command-line options. + */ +static int setifaceid(char **arg)); +static void printifaceid(option_t *, + void (*)(void *, char *, ...), void *)); + +static option_t ipv6cp_option_list[] = { + { "ipv6", o_special, (void *)setifaceid, + "Set interface identifiers for IPV6", + OPT_A2PRINTER, (void *)printifaceid }, + + { "+ipv6", o_bool, &ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag, + "Enable IPv6 and IPv6CP", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, + { "noipv6", o_bool, &ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag, + "Disable IPv6 and IPv6CP", OPT_PRIOSUB }, + { "-ipv6", o_bool, &ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag, + "Disable IPv6 and IPv6CP", OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_ALIAS }, + + { "ipv6cp-accept-local", o_bool, &ipv6cp_allowoptions[0].accept_local, + "Accept peer's interface identifier for us", 1 }, + + { "ipv6cp-use-ipaddr", o_bool, &ipv6cp_allowoptions[0].use_ip, + "Use (default) IPv4 address as interface identifier", 1 }, + + { "ipv6cp-use-persistent", o_bool, &ipv6cp_wantoptions[0].use_persistent, + "Use uniquely-available persistent value for link local address", 1 }, + + { "ipv6cp-restart", o_int, &ipv6cp_fsm[0].timeouttime, + "Set timeout for IPv6CP", OPT_PRIO }, + { "ipv6cp-max-terminate", o_int, &ipv6cp_fsm[0].maxtermtransmits, + "Set max #xmits for term-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, + { "ipv6cp-max-configure", o_int, &ipv6cp_fsm[0].maxconfreqtransmits, + "Set max #xmits for conf-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, + { "ipv6cp-max-failure", o_int, &ipv6cp_fsm[0].maxnakloops, + "Set max #conf-naks for IPv6CP", OPT_PRIO }, + + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * Protocol entry points from main code. + */ +static void ipv6cp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ipv6cp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ipv6cp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason); +static void ipv6cp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ipv6cp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void ipv6cp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len); +static void ipv6cp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PPP_OPTIONS +static void ipv6_check_options(void); +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +static int ipv6_demand_conf(int u); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static int ipv6cp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +static int ipv6_active_pkt(u_char *pkt, int len); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +const struct protent ipv6cp_protent = { + PPP_IPV6CP, + ipv6cp_init, + ipv6cp_input, + ipv6cp_protrej, + ipv6cp_lowerup, + ipv6cp_lowerdown, + ipv6cp_open, + ipv6cp_close, +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + ipv6cp_printpkt, +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + "IPV6CP", + "IPV6", +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS + ipv6cp_option_list, + ipv6_check_options, +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + ipv6_demand_conf, + ipv6_active_pkt +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +}; + +static void ipv6cp_clear_addrs(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t ourid, eui64_t hisid); +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +static void ipv6cp_script(char *)); +static void ipv6cp_script_done(void *)); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +/* + * Lengths of configuration options. + */ +#define CILEN_VOID 2 +#define CILEN_COMPRESS 4 /* length for RFC2023 compress opt. */ +#define CILEN_IFACEID 10 /* RFC2472, interface identifier */ + +#define CODENAME(x) ((x) == CONFACK ? "ACK" : \ + (x) == CONFNAK ? "NAK" : \ + "REJ") + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* + * This state variable is used to ensure that we don't + * run an ipcp-up/down script while one is already running. + */ +static enum script_state +{ + s_down, + s_up, +} ipv6cp_script_state; +static pid_t ipv6cp_script_pid; +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +static char *llv6_ntoa(eui64_t ifaceid); + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * setifaceid - set the interface identifiers manually + */ +static int setifaceid(argv) char **argv; +{ + char *comma, *arg, c; + ipv6cp_options *wo = &ipv6cp_wantoptions[0]; + struct in6_addr addr; + static int prio_local, prio_remote; + +#define VALIDID(a) ((((a).s6_addr32[0] == 0) && ((a).s6_addr32[1] == 0)) && \ + (((a).s6_addr32[2] != 0) || ((a).s6_addr32[3] != 0))) + + arg = *argv; + + if ((comma = strchr(arg, ',')) == NULL) { + comma = arg + strlen(arg); + } + + /* + * If comma first character, then no local identifier + */ + if (comma != arg) { + c = *comma; + *comma = '\0'; + + if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, arg, &addr) == 0 || !VALIDID(addr)) { + option_error("Illegal interface identifier (local): %s", arg); + return 0; + } + + if (option_priority >= prio_local) { + eui64_copy(addr.s6_addr32[2], wo->ourid); + wo->opt_local = 1; + prio_local = option_priority; + } + + *comma = c; + } + + /* + * If comma last character, the no remote identifier + */ + if (*comma != 0 && *++comma != '\0') { + if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, comma, &addr) == 0 || !VALIDID(addr)) { + option_error("Illegal interface identifier (remote): %s", comma); + return 0; + } + + if (option_priority >= prio_remote) { + eui64_copy(addr.s6_addr32[2], wo->hisid); + wo->opt_remote = 1; + prio_remote = option_priority; + } + } + + if (override_value("+ipv6", option_priority, option_source)) { + ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag = 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +static void printifaceid(opt, printer, arg) + option_t *opt; +void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...)); +void *arg; +{ + ipv6cp_options *wo = &ipv6cp_wantoptions[0]; + + if (wo->opt_local) { + printer(arg, "%s", llv6_ntoa(wo->ourid)); + } + + printer(arg, ","); + + if (wo->opt_remote) { + printer(arg, "%s", llv6_ntoa(wo->hisid)); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * Make a string representation of a network address. + */ +static char *llv6_ntoa(eui64_t ifaceid) +{ + static char b[26]; + + sprintf(b, "fe80::%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x", + ifaceid.e8[0], ifaceid.e8[1], ifaceid.e8[2], ifaceid.e8[3], + ifaceid.e8[4], ifaceid.e8[5], ifaceid.e8[6], ifaceid.e8[7]); + + return b; +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_init - Initialize IPV6CP. + */ +static void ipv6cp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->ipv6cp_fsm; + ipv6cp_options *wo = &pcb->ipv6cp_wantoptions; + ipv6cp_options *ao = &pcb->ipv6cp_allowoptions; + + f->pcb = pcb; + f->protocol = PPP_IPV6CP; + f->callbacks = &ipv6cp_callbacks; + fsm_init(f); + +#if 0 /* Not necessary, everything is cleared in ppp_new() */ + memset(wo, 0, sizeof(*wo)); + memset(ao, 0, sizeof(*ao)); +#endif /* 0 */ + + wo->accept_local = 1; + wo->neg_ifaceid = 1; + ao->neg_ifaceid = 1; + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + wo->neg_vj = 1; + ao->neg_vj = 1; + wo->vj_protocol = IPV6CP_COMP; +#endif +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_open - IPV6CP is allowed to come up. + */ +static void ipv6cp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm_open(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm); +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_close - Take IPV6CP down. + */ +static void ipv6cp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason) +{ + fsm_close(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm, reason); +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_lowerup - The lower layer is up. + */ +static void ipv6cp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm_lowerup(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm); +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. + */ +static void ipv6cp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm_lowerdown(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm); +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_input - Input IPV6CP packet. + */ +static void ipv6cp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) +{ + fsm_input(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm, p, len); +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_protrej - A Protocol-Reject was received for IPV6CP. + * + * Pretend the lower layer went down, so we shut up. + */ +static void ipv6cp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm_lowerdown(&pcb->ipv6cp_fsm); +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_resetci - Reset our CI. + */ +static void ipv6cp_resetci(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipv6cp_options *wo = &pcb->ipv6cp_wantoptions; + ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; + ipv6cp_options *ao = &pcb->ipv6cp_allowoptions; + + wo->req_ifaceid = wo->neg_ifaceid && ao->neg_ifaceid; + + if (!wo->opt_local) { + eui64_magic_nz(wo->ourid); + } + + *go = *wo; + eui64_zero(go->hisid); /* last proposed interface identifier */ +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_cilen - Return length of our CI. + */ +static int ipv6cp_cilen(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP +#define LENCIVJ(neg) (neg ? CILEN_COMPRESS : 0) +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ +#define LENCIIFACEID(neg) (neg ? CILEN_IFACEID : 0) + + return (LENCIIFACEID(go->neg_ifaceid) + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + LENCIVJ(go->neg_vj) + +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + 0); +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_addci - Add our desired CIs to a packet. + */ +static void ipv6cp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; + int len = *lenp; + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP +#define ADDCIVJ(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + int vjlen = CILEN_COMPRESS; \ + if (len >= vjlen) { \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(vjlen, ucp); \ + PUTSHORT(val, ucp); \ + len -= vjlen; \ + } else \ + neg = 0; \ + } +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + +#define ADDCIIFACEID(opt, neg, val1) \ + if (neg) { \ + int idlen = CILEN_IFACEID; \ + if (len >= idlen) { \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(idlen, ucp); \ + eui64_put(val1, ucp); \ + len -= idlen; \ + } else \ + neg = 0; \ + } + + ADDCIIFACEID(CI_IFACEID, go->neg_ifaceid, go->ourid); + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + ADDCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, go->neg_vj, go->vj_protocol); +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + + *lenp -= len; +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_ackci - Ack our CIs. + * + * Returns: + * 0 - Ack was bad. + * 1 - Ack was good. + */ +static int ipv6cp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; + u_short cilen, citype; +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + u_short cishort; +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + eui64_t ifaceid; + + /* + * CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent... + * Check packet length and CI length at each step. + * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. + */ + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP +#define ACKCIVJ(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + int vjlen = CILEN_COMPRESS; \ + if ((len -= vjlen) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != vjlen || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + if (cishort != val) \ + goto bad; \ + } +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + +#define ACKCIIFACEID(opt, neg, val1) \ + if (neg) { \ + int idlen = CILEN_IFACEID; \ + if ((len -= idlen) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != idlen || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + eui64_get(ifaceid, p); \ + if (!eui64_equals(val1, ifaceid)) \ + goto bad; \ + } + + ACKCIIFACEID(CI_IFACEID, go->neg_ifaceid, go->ourid); + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + ACKCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, go->neg_vj, go->vj_protocol); +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + + /* + * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. + */ + if (len != 0) { + goto bad; + } + + return (1); + +bad: + IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp_ackci: received bad Ack!")); + return (0); +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_nakci - Peer has sent a NAK for some of our CIs. + * This should not modify any state if the Nak is bad + * or if IPV6CP is in the OPENED state. + * + * Returns: + * 0 - Nak was bad. + * 1 - Nak was good. + */ +static int ipv6cp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; + u_char citype, cilen, *next; +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + u_short cishort; +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + eui64_t ifaceid; + ipv6cp_options no; /* options we've seen Naks for */ + ipv6cp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ + + BZERO(&no, sizeof(no)); + try_ = *go; + + /* + * Any Nak'd CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. + * Check packet length and CI length at each step. + * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. + */ +#define NAKCIIFACEID(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= (cilen = CILEN_IFACEID) && \ + p[1] == cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + eui64_get(ifaceid, p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP +#define NAKCIVJ(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + ((cilen = p[1]) == CILEN_COMPRESS) && \ + len >= cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + + /* + * Accept the peer's idea of {our,his} interface identifier, if different + * from our idea, only if the accept_{local,remote} flag is set. + */ + NAKCIIFACEID( + CI_IFACEID, neg_ifaceid, + + if (treat_as_reject) { + try_.neg_ifaceid = 0; + } else if (go->accept_local) { + while (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) || + eui64_equals(ifaceid, go->hisid)) /* bad luck */ + { + eui64_magic(ifaceid); + } + + try_.ourid = ifaceid; + IPV6CPDEBUG(("local LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(ifaceid))); + }); + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + NAKCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, neg_vj, + { + if (cishort == IPV6CP_COMP && !treat_as_reject) { + try_.vj_protocol = cishort; + } else { + try_.neg_vj = 0; + } + }); +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + + /* + * There may be remaining CIs, if the peer is requesting negotiation + * on an option that we didn't include in our request packet. + * If they want to negotiate about interface identifier, we comply. + * If they want us to ask for compression, we refuse. + */ + while (len >= CILEN_VOID) { + GETCHAR(citype, p); + GETCHAR(cilen, p); + + if (cilen < CILEN_VOID || (len -= cilen) < 0) { + goto bad; + } + + next = p + cilen - 2; + + switch (citype) { +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + + case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: + if (go->neg_vj || no.neg_vj || + (cilen != CILEN_COMPRESS)) { + goto bad; + } + + no.neg_vj = 1; + break; +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + + case CI_IFACEID: + if (go->neg_ifaceid || no.neg_ifaceid || cilen != CILEN_IFACEID) { + goto bad; + } + + try_.neg_ifaceid = 1; + eui64_get(ifaceid, p); + + if (go->accept_local) { + while (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) || + eui64_equals(ifaceid, go->hisid)) /* bad luck */ + { + eui64_magic(ifaceid); + } + + try_.ourid = ifaceid; + } + + no.neg_ifaceid = 1; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + p = next; + } + + /* If there is still anything left, this packet is bad. */ + if (len != 0) { + goto bad; + } + + /* + * OK, the Nak is good. Now we can update state. + */ + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + *go = try_; + } + + return 1; + +bad: + IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp_nakci: received bad Nak!")); + return 0; +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_rejci - Reject some of our CIs. + */ +static int ipv6cp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; + u_char cilen; +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + u_short cishort; +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + eui64_t ifaceid; + ipv6cp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ + + try_ = *go; + /* + * Any Rejected CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. + * Check packet length and CI length at each step. + * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. + */ +#define REJCIIFACEID(opt, neg, val1) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= (cilen = CILEN_IFACEID) && \ + p[1] == cilen && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= cilen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + eui64_get(ifaceid, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (!eui64_equals(ifaceid, val1)) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP +#define REJCIVJ(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + p[1] == CILEN_COMPRESS && \ + len >= p[1] && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= p[1]; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cishort != val) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + + REJCIIFACEID(CI_IFACEID, neg_ifaceid, go->ourid); + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + REJCIVJ(CI_COMPRESSTYPE, neg_vj, go->vj_protocol); +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + + /* + * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. + */ + if (len != 0) { + goto bad; + } + + /* + * Now we can update state. + */ + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + *go = try_; + } + + return 1; + +bad: + IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp_rejci: received bad Reject!")); + return 0; +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_reqci - Check the peer's requested CIs and send appropriate response. + * + * Returns: CONFACK, CONFNAK or CONFREJ and input packet modified + * appropriately. If reject_if_disagree is non-zero, doesn't return + * CONFNAK; returns CONFREJ if it can't return CONFACK. + * + * inp = Requested CIs + * len = Length of requested CIs + * + */ +static int ipv6cp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *len, int reject_if_disagree) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipv6cp_options *wo = &pcb->ipv6cp_wantoptions; + ipv6cp_options *ho = &pcb->ipv6cp_hisoptions; + ipv6cp_options *ao = &pcb->ipv6cp_allowoptions; + ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; + u_char *cip, *next; /* Pointer to current and next CIs */ + u_short cilen, citype; /* Parsed len, type */ +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + u_short cishort; /* Parsed short value */ +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + eui64_t ifaceid; /* Parsed interface identifier */ + int rc = CONFACK; /* Final packet return code */ + int orc; /* Individual option return code */ + u_char *p; /* Pointer to next char to parse */ + u_char *ucp = inp; /* Pointer to current output char */ + int l = *len; /* Length left */ + + /* + * Reset all his options. + */ + BZERO(ho, sizeof(*ho)); + + /* + * Process all his options. + */ + next = inp; + + while (l) { + orc = CONFACK; /* Assume success */ + cip = p = next; /* Remember begining of CI */ + + if (l < 2 || /* Not enough data for CI header or */ + p[1] < 2 || /* CI length too small or */ + p[1] > l) /* CI length too big? */ + { + IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp_reqci: bad CI length!")); + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject bad CI */ + cilen = l; /* Reject till end of packet */ + l = 0; /* Don't loop again */ + goto endswitch; + } + + GETCHAR(citype, p); /* Parse CI type */ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); /* Parse CI length */ + l -= cilen; /* Adjust remaining length */ + next += cilen; /* Step to next CI */ + + switch (citype) /* Check CI type */ + { + case CI_IFACEID: + IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: received interface identifier ")); + + if (!ao->neg_ifaceid || + cilen != CILEN_IFACEID) /* Check CI length */ + { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ + break; + } + + /* + * If he has no interface identifier, or if we both have same + * identifier then NAK it with new idea. + * In particular, if we don't know his identifier, but he does, + * then accept it. + */ + eui64_get(ifaceid, p); + IPV6CPDEBUG(("(%s)", llv6_ntoa(ifaceid))); + + if (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) && eui64_iszero(go->ourid)) { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ + break; + } + + if (!eui64_iszero(wo->hisid) && + !eui64_equals(ifaceid, wo->hisid) && + eui64_iszero(go->hisid)) { + orc = CONFNAK; + ifaceid = wo->hisid; + go->hisid = ifaceid; + DECPTR(sizeof(ifaceid), p); + eui64_put(ifaceid, p); + } else if (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) || eui64_equals(ifaceid, go->ourid)) { + orc = CONFNAK; + + if (eui64_iszero(go->hisid)) /* first time, try option */ + { + ifaceid = wo->hisid; + } + + while (eui64_iszero(ifaceid) || + eui64_equals(ifaceid, go->ourid)) /* bad luck */ + { + eui64_magic(ifaceid); + } + + go->hisid = ifaceid; + DECPTR(sizeof(ifaceid), p); + eui64_put(ifaceid, p); + } + + ho->neg_ifaceid = 1; + ho->hisid = ifaceid; + break; + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + + case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: + IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: received COMPRESSTYPE ")); + + if (!ao->neg_vj || + (cilen != CILEN_COMPRESS)) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + IPV6CPDEBUG(("(%d)", cishort)); + + if (!(cishort == IPV6CP_COMP)) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + ho->neg_vj = 1; + ho->vj_protocol = cishort; + break; +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + + default: + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + endswitch: + IPV6CPDEBUG((" (%s)\n", CODENAME(orc))); + + if (orc == CONFACK && /* Good CI */ + rc != CONFACK) /* but prior CI wasnt? */ + { + continue; /* Don't send this one */ + } + + if (orc == CONFNAK) /* Nak this CI? */ + { + if (reject_if_disagree) /* Getting fed up with sending NAKs? */ + { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Get tough if so */ + } else { + if (rc == CONFREJ) /* Rejecting prior CI? */ + { + continue; /* Don't send this one */ + } + + if (rc == CONFACK) /* Ack'd all prior CIs? */ + { + rc = CONFNAK; /* Not anymore... */ + ucp = inp; /* Backup */ + } + } + } + + if (orc == CONFREJ && /* Reject this CI */ + rc != CONFREJ) /* but no prior ones? */ + { + rc = CONFREJ; + ucp = inp; /* Backup */ + } + + /* Need to move CI? */ + if (ucp != cip) { + MEMCPY(ucp, cip, cilen); /* Move it */ + } + + /* Update output pointer */ + INCPTR(cilen, ucp); + } + + /* + * If we aren't rejecting this packet, and we want to negotiate + * their identifier and they didn't send their identifier, then we + * send a NAK with a CI_IFACEID option appended. We assume the + * input buffer is long enough that we can append the extra + * option safely. + */ + if (rc != CONFREJ && !ho->neg_ifaceid && + wo->req_ifaceid && !reject_if_disagree) { + if (rc == CONFACK) { + rc = CONFNAK; + ucp = inp; /* reset pointer */ + wo->req_ifaceid = 0; /* don't ask again */ + } + + PUTCHAR(CI_IFACEID, ucp); + PUTCHAR(CILEN_IFACEID, ucp); + eui64_put(wo->hisid, ucp); + } + + *len = ucp - inp; /* Compute output length */ + IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: returning Configure-%s", CODENAME(rc))); + return (rc); /* Return final code */ +} + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * ipv6_check_options - check that any IP-related options are OK, + * and assign appropriate defaults. + */ +static void ipv6_check_options() +{ + ipv6cp_options *wo = &ipv6cp_wantoptions[0]; + + if (!ipv6cp_protent.enabled_flag) { + return; + } + + /* + * Persistent link-local id is only used when user has not explicitly + * configure/hard-code the id + */ + if ((wo->use_persistent) && (!wo->opt_local) && (!wo->opt_remote)) { + /* + * On systems where there are no Ethernet interfaces used, there + * may be other ways to obtain a persistent id. Right now, it + * will fall back to using magic [see eui64_magic] below when + * an EUI-48 from MAC address can't be obtained. Other possibilities + * include obtaining EEPROM serial numbers, or some other unique + * yet persistent number. On Sparc platforms, this is possible, + * but too bad there's no standards yet for x86 machines. + */ + if (ether_to_eui64(&wo->ourid)) { + wo->opt_local = 1; + } + } + + if (!wo->opt_local) /* init interface identifier */ + { + if (wo->use_ip && eui64_iszero(wo->ourid)) { + eui64_setlo32(wo->ourid, lwip_ntohl(ipcp_wantoptions[0].ouraddr)); + + if (!eui64_iszero(wo->ourid)) { + wo->opt_local = 1; + } + } + + while (eui64_iszero(wo->ourid)) { + eui64_magic(wo->ourid); + } + } + + if (!wo->opt_remote) { + if (wo->use_ip && eui64_iszero(wo->hisid)) { + eui64_setlo32(wo->hisid, lwip_ntohl(ipcp_wantoptions[0].hisaddr)); + + if (!eui64_iszero(wo->hisid)) { + wo->opt_remote = 1; + } + } + } + + if (demand && (eui64_iszero(wo->ourid) || eui64_iszero(wo->hisid))) { + option_error("local/remote LL address required for demand-dialling\n"); + exit(1); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +/* + * ipv6_demand_conf - configure the interface as though + * IPV6CP were up, for use with dial-on-demand. + */ +static int ipv6_demand_conf(int u) +{ + ipv6cp_options *wo = &ipv6cp_wantoptions[u]; + + if (!sif6up(u)) { + return 0; + } + + if (!sif6addr(u, wo->ourid, wo->hisid)) { + return 0; + } + + if (!sifnpmode(u, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_QUEUE)) { + return 0; + } + + ppp_notice("ipv6_demand_conf"); + ppp_notice("local LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(wo->ourid)); + ppp_notice("remote LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(wo->hisid)); + + return 1; +} +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * ipv6cp_up - IPV6CP has come UP. + * + * Configure the IPv6 network interface appropriately and bring it up. + */ +static void ipv6cp_up(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipv6cp_options *wo = &pcb->ipv6cp_wantoptions; + ipv6cp_options *ho = &pcb->ipv6cp_hisoptions; + ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; + + IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: up")); + + /* + * We must have a non-zero LL address for both ends of the link. + */ + if (!ho->neg_ifaceid) { + ho->hisid = wo->hisid; + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + if(!no_ifaceid_neg) + { +#endif /* UNUSED */ + + if (eui64_iszero(ho->hisid)) { + ppp_error("Could not determine remote LL address"); + ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "Could not determine remote LL address"); + return; + } + + if (eui64_iszero(go->ourid)) { + ppp_error("Could not determine local LL address"); + ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "Could not determine local LL address"); + return; + } + + if (eui64_equals(go->ourid, ho->hisid)) { + ppp_error("local and remote LL addresses are equal"); + ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "local and remote LL addresses are equal"); + return; + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + script_setenv("LLLOCAL", llv6_ntoa(go->ourid), 0); + script_setenv("LLREMOTE", llv6_ntoa(ho->hisid), 0); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + /* set tcp compression */ + sif6comp(f->unit, ho->neg_vj); +#endif + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + + /* + * If we are doing dial-on-demand, the interface is already + * configured, so we put out any saved-up packets, then set the + * interface to pass IPv6 packets. + */ + if (demand) { + if (!eui64_equals(go->ourid, wo->ourid) || + !eui64_equals(ho->hisid, wo->hisid)) { + if (!eui64_equals(go->ourid, wo->ourid)) + warn("Local LL address changed to %s", + llv6_ntoa(go->ourid)); + + if (!eui64_equals(ho->hisid, wo->hisid)) + warn("Remote LL address changed to %s", + llv6_ntoa(ho->hisid)); + + ipv6cp_clear_addrs(f->pcb, go->ourid, ho->hisid); + + /* Set the interface to the new addresses */ + if (!sif6addr(f->pcb, go->ourid, ho->hisid)) { + if (debug) { + warn("sif6addr failed"); + } + + ipv6cp_close(f->unit, "Interface configuration failed"); + return; + } + } + + demand_rexmit(PPP_IPV6); + sifnpmode(f->unit, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_PASS); + + } else +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + { + /* + * Set LL addresses + */ + if (!sif6addr(f->pcb, go->ourid, ho->hisid)) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sif6addr failed")); + ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "Interface configuration failed"); + return; + } + + /* bring the interface up for IPv6 */ + if (!sif6up(f->pcb)) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sif6up failed (IPV6)")); + ipv6cp_close(f->pcb, "Interface configuration failed"); + return; + } + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + sifnpmode(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_PASS); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + + ppp_notice("local LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(go->ourid)); + ppp_notice("remote LL address %s", llv6_ntoa(ho->hisid)); + } + + np_up(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6); + pcb->ipv6cp_is_up = 1; + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + /* + * Execute the ipv6-up script, like this: + * /etc/ppp/ipv6-up interface tty speed local-LL remote-LL + */ + if(ipv6cp_script_state == s_down && ipv6cp_script_pid == 0) + { + ipv6cp_script_state = s_up; + ipv6cp_script(_PATH_IPV6UP); + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_down - IPV6CP has gone DOWN. + * + * Take the IPv6 network interface down, clear its addresses + * and delete routes through it. + */ +static void ipv6cp_down(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + ipv6cp_options *go = &pcb->ipv6cp_gotoptions; + ipv6cp_options *ho = &pcb->ipv6cp_hisoptions; + + IPV6CPDEBUG(("ipv6cp: down")); +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + update_link_stats(f->unit); +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + + if (pcb->ipv6cp_is_up) { + pcb->ipv6cp_is_up = 0; + np_down(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6); + } + +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + sif6comp(f->unit, 0); +#endif + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + + /* + * If we are doing dial-on-demand, set the interface + * to queue up outgoing packets (for now). + */ + if (demand) { + sifnpmode(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_QUEUE); + } else +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + { +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + sifnpmode(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6, NPMODE_DROP); +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + ipv6cp_clear_addrs(f->pcb, + go->ourid, + ho->hisid); + sif6down(f->pcb); + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + /* Execute the ipv6-down script */ + if(ipv6cp_script_state == s_up && ipv6cp_script_pid == 0) + { + ipv6cp_script_state = s_down; + ipv6cp_script(_PATH_IPV6DOWN); + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_clear_addrs() - clear the interface addresses, routes, + * proxy neighbour discovery entries, etc. + */ +static void ipv6cp_clear_addrs(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t ourid, eui64_t hisid) +{ + cif6addr(pcb, ourid, hisid); +} + +/* + * ipv6cp_finished - possibly shut down the lower layers. + */ +static void ipv6cp_finished(fsm *f) +{ + np_finished(f->pcb, PPP_IPV6); +} + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* + * ipv6cp_script_done - called when the ipv6-up or ipv6-down script + * has finished. + */ +static void ipv6cp_script_done(arg) +void *arg; +{ + ipv6cp_script_pid = 0; + + switch(ipv6cp_script_state) + { + case s_up: + if(ipv6cp_fsm[0].state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) + { + ipv6cp_script_state = s_down; + ipv6cp_script(_PATH_IPV6DOWN); + } + + break; + + case s_down: + if(ipv6cp_fsm[0].state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) + { + ipv6cp_script_state = s_up; + ipv6cp_script(_PATH_IPV6UP); + } + + break; + } +} + + +/* + * ipv6cp_script - Execute a script with arguments + * interface-name tty-name speed local-LL remote-LL. + */ +static void ipv6cp_script(script) +char *script; +{ + char strspeed[32], strlocal[32], strremote[32]; + char *argv[8]; + + sprintf(strspeed, "%d", baud_rate); + strcpy(strlocal, llv6_ntoa(ipv6cp_gotoptions[0].ourid)); + strcpy(strremote, llv6_ntoa(ipv6cp_hisoptions[0].hisid)); + + argv[0] = script; + argv[1] = ifname; + argv[2] = devnam; + argv[3] = strspeed; + argv[4] = strlocal; + argv[5] = strremote; + argv[6] = ipparam; + argv[7] = NULL; + + ipv6cp_script_pid = run_program(script, argv, 0, ipv6cp_script_done, + NULL, 0); +} +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * ipv6cp_printpkt - print the contents of an IPV6CP packet. + */ +static const char *const ipv6cp_codenames[] = { + "ConfReq", "ConfAck", "ConfNak", "ConfRej", + "TermReq", "TermAck", "CodeRej" +}; + +static int ipv6cp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) +{ + int code, id, len, olen; + const u_char *pstart, *optend; +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + u_short cishort; +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + eui64_t ifaceid; + + if (plen < HEADERLEN) { + return 0; + } + + pstart = p; + GETCHAR(code, p); + GETCHAR(id, p); + GETSHORT(len, p); + + if (len < HEADERLEN || len > plen) { + return 0; + } + + if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(ipv6cp_codenames)) { + printer(arg, " %s", ipv6cp_codenames[code - 1]); + } else { + printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); + } + + printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); + len -= HEADERLEN; + + switch (code) { + case CONFREQ: + case CONFACK: + case CONFNAK: + case CONFREJ: + + /* print option list */ + while (len >= 2) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + GETCHAR(olen, p); + p -= 2; + + if (olen < 2 || olen > len) { + break; + } + + printer(arg, " <"); + len -= olen; + optend = p + olen; + + switch (code) { +#ifdef IPV6CP_COMP + + case CI_COMPRESSTYPE: + if (olen >= CILEN_COMPRESS) { + p += 2; + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + printer(arg, "compress "); + printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); + } + + break; +#endif /* IPV6CP_COMP */ + + case CI_IFACEID: + if (olen == CILEN_IFACEID) { + p += 2; + eui64_get(ifaceid, p); + printer(arg, "addr %s", llv6_ntoa(ifaceid)); + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + while (p < optend) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + printer(arg, " %.2x", code); + } + + printer(arg, ">"); + } + + break; + + case TERMACK: + case TERMREQ: + if (len > 0 && *p >= ' ' && *p < 0x7f) { + printer(arg, " "); + ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); + p += len; + len = 0; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + /* print the rest of the bytes in the packet */ + for (; len > 0; --len) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + printer(arg, " %.2x", code); + } + + return p - pstart; +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +/* + * ipv6_active_pkt - see if this IP packet is worth bringing the link up for. + * We don't bring the link up for IP fragments or for TCP FIN packets + * with no data. + */ +#define IP6_HDRLEN 40 /* bytes */ +#define IP6_NHDR_FRAG 44 /* fragment IPv6 header */ +#define TCP_HDRLEN 20 +#define TH_FIN 0x01 + +/* + * We use these macros because the IP header may be at an odd address, + * and some compilers might use word loads to get th_off or ip_hl. + */ + +#define get_ip6nh(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[6]) +#define get_tcpoff(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[12] >> 4) +#define get_tcpflags(x) (((unsigned char *)(x))[13]) + +static int ipv6_active_pkt(u_char *pkt, int len) +{ + u_char *tcp; + + len -= PPP_HDRLEN; + pkt += PPP_HDRLEN; + + if (len < IP6_HDRLEN) { + return 0; + } + + if (get_ip6nh(pkt) == IP6_NHDR_FRAG) { + return 0; + } + + if (get_ip6nh(pkt) != IPPROTO_TCP) { + return 1; + } + + if (len < IP6_HDRLEN + TCP_HDRLEN) { + return 0; + } + + tcp = pkt + IP6_HDRLEN; + + if ((get_tcpflags(tcp) & TH_FIN) != 0 && len == IP6_HDRLEN + get_tcpoff(tcp) * 4) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/lcp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/lcp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/lcp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/lcp.c index 3c4b27e6..d48c3971 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/lcp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/lcp.c @@ -1,3041 +1,3041 @@ -/* - * lcp.c - PPP Link Control Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/* - * @todo: - */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" - -/* - * When the link comes up we want to be able to wait for a short while, - * or until seeing some input from the peer, before starting to send - * configure-requests. We do this by delaying the fsm_lowerup call. - */ -/* steal a bit in fsm flags word */ -#define DELAYED_UP 0x80 - -static void lcp_delayed_up(void *arg); - -/* - * LCP-related command-line options. - */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - int lcp_echo_interval = 0; /* Interval between LCP echo-requests */ - int lcp_echo_fails = 0; /* Tolerance to unanswered echo-requests */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - /* options */ - static u_int lcp_echo_interval = LCP_ECHOINTERVAL; /* Interval between LCP echo-requests */ - static u_int lcp_echo_fails = LCP_MAXECHOFAILS; /* Tolerance to unanswered echo-requests */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#if PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE - bool lcp_echo_adaptive = 0; /* request echo only if the link was idle */ -#endif - bool lax_recv = 0; /* accept control chars in asyncmap */ - bool noendpoint = 0; /* don't send/accept endpoint discriminator */ -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -static int noopt(char **); -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK -static int setendpoint(char **); -static void printendpoint(option_t *, void (*)(void *, char *, ...), - void *); -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -static option_t lcp_option_list[] = { - /* LCP options */ - { - "-all", o_special_noarg, (void *)noopt, - "Don't request/allow any LCP options" }, - - { "noaccomp", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_accompression, - "Disable address/control compression", - OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_accompression }, - { "-ac", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_accompression, - "Disable address/control compression", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_accompression }, - - { "asyncmap", o_uint32, &lcp_wantoptions[0].asyncmap, - "Set asyncmap (for received packets)", - OPT_OR, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_asyncmap }, - { "-as", o_uint32, &lcp_wantoptions[0].asyncmap, - "Set asyncmap (for received packets)", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_OR, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_asyncmap }, - { "default-asyncmap", o_uint32, &lcp_wantoptions[0].asyncmap, - "Disable asyncmap negotiation", - OPT_OR | OPT_NOARG | OPT_VAL(~0U) | OPT_A2CLR, - &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_asyncmap }, - { "-am", o_uint32, &lcp_wantoptions[0].asyncmap, - "Disable asyncmap negotiation", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_OR | OPT_NOARG | OPT_VAL(~0U) | OPT_A2CLR, - &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_asyncmap }, - - { "nomagic", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_magicnumber, - "Disable magic number negotiation (looped-back line detection)", - OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_magicnumber }, - { "-mn", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_magicnumber, - "Disable magic number negotiation (looped-back line detection)", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_magicnumber }, - - { "mru", o_int, &lcp_wantoptions[0].mru, - "Set MRU (maximum received packet size) for negotiation", - OPT_PRIO, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_mru }, - { "default-mru", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_mru, - "Disable MRU negotiation (use default 1500)", - OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_mru }, - { "-mru", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_mru, - "Disable MRU negotiation (use default 1500)", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_mru }, - - { "mtu", o_int, &lcp_allowoptions[0].mru, - "Set our MTU", OPT_LIMITS, NULL, MAXMRU, MINMRU }, - - { "nopcomp", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_pcompression, - "Disable protocol field compression", - OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_pcompression }, - { "-pc", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_pcompression, - "Disable protocol field compression", - OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_pcompression }, - - { "passive", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].passive, - "Set passive mode", 1 }, - { "-p", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].passive, - "Set passive mode", OPT_ALIAS | 1 }, - - { "silent", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].silent, - "Set silent mode", 1 }, - - { "lcp-echo-failure", o_int, &lcp_echo_fails, - "Set number of consecutive echo failures to indicate link failure", - OPT_PRIO }, - { "lcp-echo-interval", o_int, &lcp_echo_interval, - "Set time in seconds between LCP echo requests", OPT_PRIO }, -#if PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE - { "lcp-echo-adaptive", o_bool, &lcp_echo_adaptive, - "Suppress LCP echo requests if traffic was received", 1 }, -#endif - { "lcp-restart", o_int, &lcp_fsm[0].timeouttime, - "Set time in seconds between LCP retransmissions", OPT_PRIO }, - { "lcp-max-terminate", o_int, &lcp_fsm[0].maxtermtransmits, - "Set maximum number of LCP terminate-request transmissions", OPT_PRIO }, - { "lcp-max-configure", o_int, &lcp_fsm[0].maxconfreqtransmits, - "Set maximum number of LCP configure-request transmissions", OPT_PRIO }, - { "lcp-max-failure", o_int, &lcp_fsm[0].maxnakloops, - "Set limit on number of LCP configure-naks", OPT_PRIO }, - - { "receive-all", o_bool, &lax_recv, - "Accept all received control characters", 1 }, - -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - { "mrru", o_int, &lcp_wantoptions[0].mrru, - "Maximum received packet size for multilink bundle", - OPT_PRIO, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_mrru }, - - { "mpshortseq", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_ssnhf, - "Use short sequence numbers in multilink headers", - OPT_PRIO | 1, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_ssnhf }, - { "nompshortseq", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_ssnhf, - "Don't use short sequence numbers in multilink headers", - OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_ssnhf }, - - { "endpoint", o_special, (void *)setendpoint, - "Endpoint discriminator for multilink", - OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2PRINTER, (void *)printendpoint }, -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - - { "noendpoint", o_bool, &noendpoint, - "Don't send or accept multilink endpoint discriminator", 1 }, - - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * Callbacks for fsm code. (CI = Configuration Information) - */ -static void lcp_resetci(fsm *f); /* Reset our CI */ -static int lcp_cilen(fsm *f); /* Return length of our CI */ -static void lcp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp); /* Add our CI to pkt */ -static int lcp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer ack'd our CI */ -static int lcp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject); /* Peer nak'd our CI */ -static int lcp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer rej'd our CI */ -static int lcp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *lenp, int reject_if_disagree); /* Rcv peer CI */ -static void lcp_up(fsm *f); /* We're UP */ -static void lcp_down(fsm *f); /* We're DOWN */ -static void lcp_starting(fsm *); /* We need lower layer up */ -static void lcp_finished(fsm *); /* We need lower layer down */ -static int lcp_extcode(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *inp, int len); -static void lcp_rprotrej(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int len); - -/* - * routines to send LCP echos to peer - */ - -static void lcp_echo_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void lcp_echo_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void LcpEchoTimeout(void *arg); -static void lcp_received_echo_reply(fsm *f, int id, u_char *inp, int len); -static void LcpSendEchoRequest(fsm *f); -static void LcpLinkFailure(fsm *f); -static void LcpEchoCheck(fsm *f); - -static const fsm_callbacks lcp_callbacks = /* LCP callback routines */ - { - lcp_resetci, /* Reset our Configuration Information */ - lcp_cilen, /* Length of our Configuration Information */ - lcp_addci, /* Add our Configuration Information */ - lcp_ackci, /* ACK our Configuration Information */ - lcp_nakci, /* NAK our Configuration Information */ - lcp_rejci, /* Reject our Configuration Information */ - lcp_reqci, /* Request peer's Configuration Information */ - lcp_up, /* Called when fsm reaches OPENED state */ - lcp_down, /* Called when fsm leaves OPENED state */ - lcp_starting, /* Called when we want the lower layer up */ - lcp_finished, /* Called when we want the lower layer down */ - NULL, /* Called when Protocol-Reject received */ - NULL, /* Retransmission is necessary */ - lcp_extcode, /* Called to handle LCP-specific codes */ - "LCP" /* String name of protocol */ - }; - -/* - * Protocol entry points. - * Some of these are called directly. - */ - -static void lcp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void lcp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len); -static void lcp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static int lcp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -const struct protent lcp_protent = { - PPP_LCP, - lcp_init, - lcp_input, - lcp_protrej, - lcp_lowerup, - lcp_lowerdown, - lcp_open, - lcp_close, -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - lcp_printpkt, -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - "LCP", - NULL, -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS - lcp_option_list, - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - NULL, - NULL -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -}; - -/* - * Length of each type of configuration option (in octets) - */ -#define CILEN_VOID 2 -#define CILEN_CHAR 3 -#define CILEN_SHORT 4 /* CILEN_VOID + 2 */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#define CILEN_CHAP 5 /* CILEN_VOID + 2 + 1 */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define CILEN_LONG 6 /* CILEN_VOID + 4 */ -#if LQR_SUPPORT -#define CILEN_LQR 8 /* CILEN_VOID + 2 + 4 */ -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ -#define CILEN_CBCP 3 - -#define CODENAME(x) ((x) == CONFACK ? "ACK" : \ - (x) == CONFNAK ? "NAK" : \ - "REJ") - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * noopt - Disable all options (why?). - */ -static int noopt(argv) char **argv; -{ - BZERO((char *)&lcp_wantoptions[0], sizeof(struct lcp_options)); - BZERO((char *)&lcp_allowoptions[0], sizeof(struct lcp_options)); - - return (1); -} -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK -static int setendpoint(argv) char **argv; -{ - if (str_to_epdisc(&lcp_wantoptions[0].endpoint, *argv)) { - lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_endpoint = 1; - return 1; - } - - option_error("Can't parse '%s' as an endpoint discriminator", *argv); - return 0; -} - -static void printendpoint(opt, printer, arg) - option_t *opt; -void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...); -void *arg; -{ - printer(arg, "%s", epdisc_to_str(&lcp_wantoptions[0].endpoint)); -} -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - -/* - * lcp_init - Initialize LCP. - */ -static void lcp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; - lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; - lcp_options *ao = &pcb->lcp_allowoptions; - - f->pcb = pcb; - f->protocol = PPP_LCP; - f->callbacks = &lcp_callbacks; - - fsm_init(f); - - BZERO(wo, sizeof(*wo)); - wo->neg_mru = 1; - wo->mru = PPP_DEFMRU; - wo->neg_asyncmap = 1; - wo->neg_magicnumber = 1; - wo->neg_pcompression = 1; - wo->neg_accompression = 1; - - BZERO(ao, sizeof(*ao)); - ao->neg_mru = 1; - ao->mru = PPP_MAXMRU; - ao->neg_asyncmap = 1; -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - ao->neg_chap = 1; - ao->chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - ao->neg_upap = 1; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - ao->neg_eap = 1; -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - ao->neg_magicnumber = 1; - ao->neg_pcompression = 1; - ao->neg_accompression = 1; - ao->neg_endpoint = 1; -} - -/* - * lcp_open - LCP is allowed to come up. - */ -void lcp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; - lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; - - f->flags &= ~(OPT_PASSIVE | OPT_SILENT); - - if (wo->passive) { - f->flags |= OPT_PASSIVE; - } - - if (wo->silent) { - f->flags |= OPT_SILENT; - } - - fsm_open(f); -} - -/* - * lcp_close - Take LCP down. - */ -void lcp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; - int oldstate; - - if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - && pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_MASTER -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - ) { - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_TERMINATE); - } - - if (f->flags & DELAYED_UP) { - UNTIMEOUT(lcp_delayed_up, f); - f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; - } - - oldstate = f->state; - - fsm_close(f, reason); - - if (oldstate == PPP_FSM_STOPPED && (f->flags & (OPT_PASSIVE | OPT_SILENT | DELAYED_UP))) { - /* - * This action is not strictly according to the FSM in RFC1548, - * but it does mean that the program terminates if you do a - * lcp_close() when a connection hasn't been established - * because we are in passive/silent mode or because we have - * delayed the fsm_lowerup() call and it hasn't happened yet. - */ - f->flags &= ~DELAYED_UP; - lcp_finished(f); - } -} - -/* - * lcp_lowerup - The lower layer is up. - */ -void lcp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; - fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; - - /* - * Don't use A/C or protocol compression on transmission, - * but accept A/C and protocol compressed packets - * if we are going to ask for A/C and protocol compression. - */ - if (ppp_send_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, 0xffffffff, 0, 0) < 0 || ppp_recv_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, (pcb->settings.lax_recv ? 0 : 0xffffffff), - wo->neg_pcompression, wo->neg_accompression) < 0) { - return; - } - - pcb->peer_mru = PPP_MRU; - - if (pcb->settings.listen_time != 0) { - f->flags |= DELAYED_UP; - TIMEOUTMS(lcp_delayed_up, f, pcb->settings.listen_time); - } else { - fsm_lowerup(f); - } -} - -/* - * lcp_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. - */ -void lcp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; - - if (f->flags & DELAYED_UP) { - f->flags &= ~DELAYED_UP; - UNTIMEOUT(lcp_delayed_up, f); - } else { - fsm_lowerdown(f); - } -} - -/* - * lcp_delayed_up - Bring the lower layer up now. - */ -static void lcp_delayed_up(void *arg) -{ - fsm *f = (fsm *)arg; - - if (f->flags & DELAYED_UP) { - f->flags &= ~DELAYED_UP; - fsm_lowerup(f); - } -} - -/* - * lcp_input - Input LCP packet. - */ -static void lcp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; - - if (f->flags & DELAYED_UP) { - f->flags &= ~DELAYED_UP; - UNTIMEOUT(lcp_delayed_up, f); - fsm_lowerup(f); - } - - fsm_input(f, p, len); -} - -/* - * lcp_extcode - Handle a LCP-specific code. - */ -static int lcp_extcode(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *inp, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - u_char *magp; - - switch (code) { - case PROTREJ: - lcp_rprotrej(f, inp, len); - break; - - case ECHOREQ: - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - break; - } - - magp = inp; - PUTLONG(go->magicnumber, magp); - fsm_sdata(f, ECHOREP, id, inp, len); - break; - - case ECHOREP: - lcp_received_echo_reply(f, id, inp, len); - break; - - case DISCREQ: - case IDENTIF: - case TIMEREM: - break; - - default: - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* - * lcp_rprotrej - Receive an Protocol-Reject. - * - * Figure out which protocol is rejected and inform it. - */ -static void lcp_rprotrej(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int len) -{ - int i; - const struct protent *protp; - u_short prot; -#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME - const char *pname; -#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ - - if (len < 2) { - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_rprotrej: Rcvd short Protocol-Reject packet!")); - return; - } - - GETSHORT(prot, inp); - - /* - * Protocol-Reject packets received in any state other than the LCP - * OPENED state SHOULD be silently discarded. - */ - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - LCPDEBUG(("Protocol-Reject discarded: LCP in state %d", f->state)); - return; - } - -#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME - pname = protocol_name(prot); -#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ - - /* - * Upcall the proper Protocol-Reject routine. - */ - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (protp->protocol == prot) { -#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME - - if (pname != NULL) - ppp_dbglog("Protocol-Reject for '%s' (0x%x) received", pname, - prot); - else -#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ - ppp_dbglog("Protocol-Reject for 0x%x received", prot); - - (*protp->protrej)(f->pcb); - return; - } - -#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME - - if (pname != NULL) - ppp_warn("Protocol-Reject for unsupported protocol '%s' (0x%x)", pname, - prot); - else -#endif /* #if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ - ppp_warn("Protocol-Reject for unsupported protocol 0x%x", prot); -} - -/* - * lcp_protrej - A Protocol-Reject was received. - */ -/*ARGSUSED*/ -static void lcp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - /* - * Can't reject LCP! - */ - ppp_error("Received Protocol-Reject for LCP!"); - fsm_protreject(&pcb->lcp_fsm); -} - -/* - * lcp_sprotrej - Send a Protocol-Reject for some protocol. - */ -void lcp_sprotrej(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; - /* - * Send back the protocol and the information field of the - * rejected packet. We only get here if LCP is in the OPENED state. - */ -#if 0 - p += 2; - len -= 2; -#endif - - fsm_sdata(f, PROTREJ, ++f->id, - p, len); -} - -/* - * lcp_resetci - Reset our CI. - */ -static void lcp_resetci(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - lcp_options *ao = &pcb->lcp_allowoptions; - -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT - - /* note: default value is true for allow options */ - if (pcb->settings.user && pcb->settings.passwd) { -#if PAP_SUPPORT - - if (pcb->settings.refuse_pap) { - ao->neg_upap = 0; - } - -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - - if (pcb->settings.refuse_chap) { - ao->chap_mdtype &= ~MDTYPE_MD5; - } - -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - - if (pcb->settings.refuse_mschap) { - ao->chap_mdtype &= ~MDTYPE_MICROSOFT; - } - - if (pcb->settings.refuse_mschap_v2) { - ao->chap_mdtype &= ~MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2; - } - -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - ao->neg_chap = (ao->chap_mdtype != MDTYPE_NONE); -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - if (pcb->settings.refuse_eap) { - ao->neg_eap = 0; - } - -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_SERVER - - /* note: default value is false for wanted options */ - if (pcb->settings.auth_required) { -#if PAP_SUPPORT - - if (!pcb->settings.refuse_pap) { - wo->neg_upap = 1; - } - -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - - if (!pcb->settings.refuse_chap) { - wo->chap_mdtype |= MDTYPE_MD5; - } - -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - - if (!pcb->settings.refuse_mschap) { - wo->chap_mdtype |= MDTYPE_MICROSOFT; - } - - if (!pcb->settings.refuse_mschap_v2) { - wo->chap_mdtype |= MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2; - } - -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - wo->neg_chap = (wo->chap_mdtype != MDTYPE_NONE); -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - if (!pcb->settings.refuse_eap) { - wo->neg_eap = 1; - } - -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - } - -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - - } else { -#if PAP_SUPPORT - ao->neg_upap = 0; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - ao->neg_chap = 0; - ao->chap_mdtype = MDTYPE_NONE; -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - ao->neg_eap = 0; -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp: auth protocols:")); -#if PAP_SUPPORT - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, (" PAP=%d", ao->neg_upap)); -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, (" CHAP=%d CHAP_MD5=%d", ao->neg_chap, !!(ao->chap_mdtype & MDTYPE_MD5))); -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, (" CHAP_MS=%d CHAP_MS2=%d", !!(ao->chap_mdtype & MDTYPE_MICROSOFT), !!(ao->chap_mdtype & MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2))); -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, (" EAP=%d", ao->neg_eap)); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("\n")); - -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - wo->magicnumber = magic(); - wo->numloops = 0; - *go = *wo; -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - - if (!multilink) { - go->neg_mrru = 0; -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - go->neg_ssnhf = 0; - go->neg_endpoint = 0; -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - } - -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - - if (pcb->settings.noendpoint) { - ao->neg_endpoint = 0; - } - - pcb->peer_mru = PPP_MRU; -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - auth_reset(pcb); -#endif /* UNUSED */ -} - -/* - * lcp_cilen - Return length of our CI. - */ -static int lcp_cilen(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - -#define LENCIVOID(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_VOID : 0) -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#define LENCICHAP(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_CHAP : 0) -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define LENCISHORT(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_SHORT : 0) -#define LENCILONG(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_LONG : 0) -#if LQR_SUPPORT -#define LENCILQR(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_LQR : 0) -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ -#define LENCICBCP(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_CBCP : 0) - /* - * NB: we only ask for one of CHAP, UPAP, or EAP, even if we will - * accept more than one. We prefer EAP first, then CHAP, then - * PAP. - */ - return (LENCISHORT(go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU) + - LENCILONG(go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF) + -#if EAP_SUPPORT - LENCISHORT(go->neg_eap) + -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - LENCICHAP(!go->neg_eap && go->neg_chap) + -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if !EAP_SUPPORT - LENCICHAP(go->neg_chap) + -#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT - LENCISHORT(!go->neg_eap && !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap) + -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT - LENCISHORT(!go->neg_eap && go->neg_upap) + -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT - LENCISHORT(!go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap) + -#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT - LENCISHORT(go->neg_upap) + -#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if LQR_SUPPORT - LENCILQR(go->neg_lqr) + -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ - LENCICBCP(go->neg_cbcp) + - LENCILONG(go->neg_magicnumber) + - LENCIVOID(go->neg_pcompression) + - LENCIVOID(go->neg_accompression) + -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - LENCISHORT(go->neg_mrru) + -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - LENCIVOID(go->neg_ssnhf) + - (go->neg_endpoint ? CILEN_CHAR + go->endpoint.length : 0)); -} - -/* - * lcp_addci - Add our desired CIs to a packet. - */ -static void lcp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - u_char *start_ucp = ucp; - -#define ADDCIVOID(opt, neg) \ - if (neg) { \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_VOID, ucp); \ - } -#define ADDCISHORT(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, ucp); \ - PUTSHORT(val, ucp); \ - } -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#define ADDCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - PUTCHAR((opt), ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, ucp); \ - PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR((CHAP_DIGEST(val)), ucp); \ - } -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define ADDCILONG(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_LONG, ucp); \ - PUTLONG(val, ucp); \ - } -#if LQR_SUPPORT -#define ADDCILQR(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_LQR, ucp); \ - PUTSHORT(PPP_LQR, ucp); \ - PUTLONG(val, ucp); \ - } -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ -#define ADDCICHAR(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAR, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(val, ucp); \ - } -#define ADDCIENDP(opt, neg, class, val, len) \ - if (neg) { \ - int i; \ - PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAR + len, ucp); \ - PUTCHAR(class, ucp); \ - for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) \ - PUTCHAR(val[i], ucp); \ - } - - ADDCISHORT(CI_MRU, go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU, go->mru); - ADDCILONG(CI_ASYNCMAP, go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF, - go->asyncmap); -#if EAP_SUPPORT - ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_eap, PPP_EAP); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - ADDCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && go->neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if !EAP_SUPPORT - ADDCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); -#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT - ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT - ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT - ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); -#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT - ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); -#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if LQR_SUPPORT - ADDCILQR(CI_QUALITY, go->neg_lqr, go->lqr_period); -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ - ADDCICHAR(CI_CALLBACK, go->neg_cbcp, CBCP_OPT); - ADDCILONG(CI_MAGICNUMBER, go->neg_magicnumber, go->magicnumber); - ADDCIVOID(CI_PCOMPRESSION, go->neg_pcompression); - ADDCIVOID(CI_ACCOMPRESSION, go->neg_accompression); -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - ADDCISHORT(CI_MRRU, go->neg_mrru, go->mrru); -#endif - ADDCIVOID(CI_SSNHF, go->neg_ssnhf); - ADDCIENDP(CI_EPDISC, go->neg_endpoint, go->endpoint.class_, - go->endpoint.value, go->endpoint.length); - - if (ucp - start_ucp != *lenp) { - /* this should never happen, because peer_mtu should be 1500 */ - ppp_error("Bug in lcp_addci: wrong length"); - } -} - -/* - * lcp_ackci - Ack our CIs. - * This should not modify any state if the Ack is bad. - * - * Returns: - * 0 - Ack was bad. - * 1 - Ack was good. - */ -static int lcp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - u_char cilen, citype, cichar; - u_short cishort; - u32_t cilong; - - /* - * CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. - * Check packet length and CI length at each step. - * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. - */ -#define ACKCIVOID(opt, neg) \ - if (neg) { \ - if ((len -= CILEN_VOID) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_VOID || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - } -#define ACKCISHORT(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - if ((len -= CILEN_SHORT) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_SHORT || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - if (cishort != val) \ - goto bad; \ - } -#define ACKCICHAR(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - if ((len -= CILEN_CHAR) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_CHAR || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - if (cichar != val) \ - goto bad; \ - } -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#define ACKCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - if ((len -= CILEN_CHAP) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_CHAP || \ - citype != (opt)) \ - goto bad; \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - if (cishort != PPP_CHAP) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - if (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val))) \ - goto bad; \ - } -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define ACKCILONG(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - if ((len -= CILEN_LONG) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_LONG || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETLONG(cilong, p); \ - if (cilong != val) \ - goto bad; \ - } -#if LQR_SUPPORT -#define ACKCILQR(opt, neg, val) \ - if (neg) { \ - if ((len -= CILEN_LQR) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_LQR || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - if (cishort != PPP_LQR) \ - goto bad; \ - GETLONG(cilong, p); \ - if (cilong != val) \ - goto bad; \ - } -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ -#define ACKCIENDP(opt, neg, class, val, vlen) \ - if (neg) { \ - int i; \ - if ((len -= CILEN_CHAR + vlen) < 0) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(citype, p); \ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ - if (cilen != CILEN_CHAR + vlen || \ - citype != opt) \ - goto bad; \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - if (cichar != class) \ - goto bad; \ - for (i = 0; i < vlen; ++i) { \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - if (cichar != val[i]) \ - goto bad; \ - } \ - } - - ACKCISHORT(CI_MRU, go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU, go->mru); - ACKCILONG(CI_ASYNCMAP, go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF, - go->asyncmap); -#if EAP_SUPPORT - ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_eap, PPP_EAP); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - ACKCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && go->neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if !EAP_SUPPORT - ACKCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); -#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT - ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT - ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT - ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); -#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT - ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); -#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if LQR_SUPPORT - ACKCILQR(CI_QUALITY, go->neg_lqr, go->lqr_period); -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ - ACKCICHAR(CI_CALLBACK, go->neg_cbcp, CBCP_OPT); - ACKCILONG(CI_MAGICNUMBER, go->neg_magicnumber, go->magicnumber); - ACKCIVOID(CI_PCOMPRESSION, go->neg_pcompression); - ACKCIVOID(CI_ACCOMPRESSION, go->neg_accompression); -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - ACKCISHORT(CI_MRRU, go->neg_mrru, go->mrru); -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - ACKCIVOID(CI_SSNHF, go->neg_ssnhf); - ACKCIENDP(CI_EPDISC, go->neg_endpoint, go->endpoint.class_, - go->endpoint.value, go->endpoint.length); - - /* - * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. - */ - if (len != 0) { - goto bad; - } - - return (1); -bad: - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_acki: received bad Ack!")); - return (0); -} - -/* - * lcp_nakci - Peer has sent a NAK for some of our CIs. - * This should not modify any state if the Nak is bad - * or if LCP is in the OPENED state. - * - * Returns: - * 0 - Nak was bad. - * 1 - Nak was good. - */ -static int lcp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; - u_char citype, cichar, *next; - u_short cishort; - u32_t cilong; - lcp_options no; /* options we've seen Naks for */ - lcp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ - int looped_back = 0; - int cilen; - - BZERO(&no, sizeof(no)); - try_ = *go; - - /* - * Any Nak'd CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. - * Check packet length and CI length at each step. - * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. - */ -#define NAKCIVOID(opt, neg) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_VOID && \ - p[1] == CILEN_VOID && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_VOID; \ - INCPTR(CILEN_VOID, p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#define NAKCICHAP(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#define NAKCICHAR(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_CHAR && \ - p[1] == CILEN_CHAR && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_CHAR; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } -#define NAKCISHORT(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_SHORT && \ - p[1] == CILEN_SHORT && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_SHORT; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } -#define NAKCILONG(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_LONG && \ - p[1] == CILEN_LONG && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_LONG; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETLONG(cilong, p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } -#if LQR_SUPPORT -#define NAKCILQR(opt, neg, code) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_LQR && \ - p[1] == CILEN_LQR && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_LQR; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - GETLONG(cilong, p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - code \ - } -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ -#define NAKCIENDP(opt, neg) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_CHAR && \ - p[0] == opt && \ - p[1] >= CILEN_CHAR && \ - p[1] <= len) { \ - len -= p[1]; \ - INCPTR(p[1], p); \ - no.neg = 1; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } - - /* - * NOTE! There must be no assignments to individual fields of *go in - * the code below. Any such assignment is a BUG! - */ - /* - * We don't care if they want to send us smaller packets than - * we want. Therefore, accept any MRU less than what we asked for, - * but then ignore the new value when setting the MRU in the kernel. - * If they send us a bigger MRU than what we asked, accept it, up to - * the limit of the default MRU we'd get if we didn't negotiate. - */ - if (go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU) { - NAKCISHORT(CI_MRU, neg_mru, - - if (cishort <= wo->mru || cishort <= PPP_DEFMRU) - try_.mru = cishort;); - } - - /* - * Add any characters they want to our (receive-side) asyncmap. - */ - if (go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF) { - NAKCILONG(CI_ASYNCMAP, neg_asyncmap, - try_.asyncmap = go->asyncmap | cilong;); - } - - /* - * If they've nak'd our authentication-protocol, check whether - * they are proposing a different protocol, or a different - * hash algorithm for CHAP. - */ - if ((0 -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_chap -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_upap -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_eap -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - ) && - len >= CILEN_SHORT && p[0] == CI_AUTHTYPE && p[1] >= CILEN_SHORT && p[1] <= len) { - cilen = p[1]; - len -= cilen; -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - no.neg_chap = go->neg_chap; -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - no.neg_upap = go->neg_upap; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - no.neg_eap = go->neg_eap; -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - INCPTR(2, p); - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - -#if PAP_SUPPORT - - if (cishort == PPP_PAP && cilen == CILEN_SHORT) { -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - /* If we were asking for EAP, then we need to stop that. */ - if (go->neg_eap) { - try_.neg_eap = 0; - } else -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - - /* If we were asking for CHAP, then we need to stop that. */ - if (go->neg_chap) { - try_.neg_chap = 0; - } else -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ - - /* - * If we weren't asking for CHAP or EAP, then we were asking for - * PAP, in which case this Nak is bad. - */ - goto bad; - } else -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - if (cishort == PPP_CHAP && cilen == CILEN_CHAP) { - GETCHAR(cichar, p); -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - /* Stop asking for EAP, if we were. */ - if (go->neg_eap) { - try_.neg_eap = 0; - - /* Try to set up to use their suggestion, if possible */ - if (CHAP_CANDIGEST(go->chap_mdtype, cichar)) { - try_.chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_D(cichar); - } - } else -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - if (go->neg_chap) { - /* - * We were asking for our preferred algorithm, they must - * want something different. - */ - if (cichar != CHAP_DIGEST(go->chap_mdtype)) { - if (CHAP_CANDIGEST(go->chap_mdtype, cichar)) { - /* Use their suggestion if we support it ... */ - try_.chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_D(cichar); - } else { - /* ... otherwise, try our next-preferred algorithm. */ - try_.chap_mdtype &= ~(CHAP_MDTYPE(try_.chap_mdtype)); - - if (try_.chap_mdtype == MDTYPE_NONE) /* out of algos */ - { - try_.neg_chap = 0; - } - } - } else { - /* - * Whoops, they Nak'd our algorithm of choice - * but then suggested it back to us. - */ - goto bad; - } - } else { - /* - * Stop asking for PAP if we were asking for it. - */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - try_.neg_upap = 0; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - } - - } else -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ - { - -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - /* - * If we were asking for EAP, and they're Conf-Naking EAP, - * well, that's just strange. Nobody should do that. - */ - if (cishort == PPP_EAP && cilen == CILEN_SHORT && go->neg_eap) { - ppp_dbglog("Unexpected Conf-Nak for EAP"); - } - - /* - * We don't recognize what they're suggesting. - * Stop asking for what we were asking for. - */ - if (go->neg_eap) { - try_.neg_eap = 0; - } else -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - if (go->neg_chap) { - try_.neg_chap = 0; - } else -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if PAP_SUPPORT - if (1) { - try_.neg_upap = 0; - } else -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - { - } - - p += cilen - CILEN_SHORT; - } - } - -#if LQR_SUPPORT - /* - * If they can't cope with our link quality protocol, we'll have - * to stop asking for LQR. We haven't got any other protocol. - * If they Nak the reporting period, take their value XXX ? - */ - NAKCILQR( - CI_QUALITY, neg_lqr, - - if (cishort != PPP_LQR) - try_.neg_lqr = 0; - else { - try_.lqr_period = cilong; - }); -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ - - /* - * Only implementing CBCP...not the rest of the callback options - */ - NAKCICHAR(CI_CALLBACK, neg_cbcp, - try_.neg_cbcp = 0; - (void)cichar; /* if CHAP support is not compiled, cichar is set but not used, which makes some compilers complaining */ - ); - - /* - * Check for a looped-back line. - */ - NAKCILONG(CI_MAGICNUMBER, neg_magicnumber, - try_.magicnumber = magic(); - looped_back = 1;); - - /* - * Peer shouldn't send Nak for protocol compression or - * address/control compression requests; they should send - * a Reject instead. If they send a Nak, treat it as a Reject. - */ - NAKCIVOID(CI_PCOMPRESSION, neg_pcompression); - NAKCIVOID(CI_ACCOMPRESSION, neg_accompression); - -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - - /* - * Nak for MRRU option - accept their value if it is smaller - * than the one we want. - */ - if (go->neg_mrru) { - NAKCISHORT(CI_MRRU, neg_mrru, - - if (treat_as_reject) - try_.neg_mrru = 0; - else if (cishort <= wo->mrru) - try_.mrru = cishort;); - } - -#else /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(treat_as_reject); -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - - /* - * Nak for short sequence numbers shouldn't be sent, treat it - * like a reject. - */ - NAKCIVOID(CI_SSNHF, neg_ssnhf); - - /* - * Nak of the endpoint discriminator option is not permitted, - * treat it like a reject. - */ - NAKCIENDP(CI_EPDISC, neg_endpoint); - - /* - * There may be remaining CIs, if the peer is requesting negotiation - * on an option that we didn't include in our request packet. - * If we see an option that we requested, or one we've already seen - * in this packet, then this packet is bad. - * If we wanted to respond by starting to negotiate on the requested - * option(s), we could, but we don't, because except for the - * authentication type and quality protocol, if we are not negotiating - * an option, it is because we were told not to. - * For the authentication type, the Nak from the peer means - * `let me authenticate myself with you' which is a bit pointless. - * For the quality protocol, the Nak means `ask me to send you quality - * reports', but if we didn't ask for them, we don't want them. - * An option we don't recognize represents the peer asking to - * negotiate some option we don't support, so ignore it. - */ - while (len >= CILEN_VOID) { - GETCHAR(citype, p); - GETCHAR(cilen, p); - - if (cilen < CILEN_VOID || (len -= cilen) < 0) { - goto bad; - } - - next = p + cilen - 2; - - switch (citype) { - case CI_MRU: - if ((go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU) || no.neg_mru || cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { - goto bad; - } - - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - - if (cishort < PPP_DEFMRU) { - try_.neg_mru = 1; - try_.mru = cishort; - } - - break; - - case CI_ASYNCMAP: - if ((go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF) || no.neg_asyncmap || cilen != CILEN_LONG) { - goto bad; - } - - break; - - case CI_AUTHTYPE: - if (0 -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_chap || no.neg_chap -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_upap || no.neg_upap -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - || go->neg_eap || no.neg_eap -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - ) { - goto bad; - } - - break; - - case CI_MAGICNUMBER: - if (go->neg_magicnumber || no.neg_magicnumber || - cilen != CILEN_LONG) { - goto bad; - } - - break; - - case CI_PCOMPRESSION: - if (go->neg_pcompression || no.neg_pcompression || cilen != CILEN_VOID) { - goto bad; - } - - break; - - case CI_ACCOMPRESSION: - if (go->neg_accompression || no.neg_accompression || cilen != CILEN_VOID) { - goto bad; - } - - break; -#if LQR_SUPPORT - - case CI_QUALITY: - if (go->neg_lqr || no.neg_lqr || cilen != CILEN_LQR) { - goto bad; - } - - break; -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - - case CI_MRRU: - if (go->neg_mrru || no.neg_mrru || cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { - goto bad; - } - - break; -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - - case CI_SSNHF: - if (go->neg_ssnhf || no.neg_ssnhf || cilen != CILEN_VOID) { - goto bad; - } - - try_.neg_ssnhf = 1; - break; - - case CI_EPDISC: - if (go->neg_endpoint || no.neg_endpoint || cilen < CILEN_CHAR) { - goto bad; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - p = next; - } - - /* - * OK, the Nak is good. Now we can update state. - * If there are any options left we ignore them. - */ - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - if (looped_back) { - if (++try_.numloops >= pcb->settings.lcp_loopbackfail) { - ppp_notice("Serial line is looped back."); - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_LOOPBACK; - lcp_close(f->pcb, "Loopback detected"); - } - } else { - try_.numloops = 0; - } - - *go = try_; - } - - return 1; - -bad: - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_nakci: received bad Nak!")); - return 0; -} - -/* - * lcp_rejci - Peer has Rejected some of our CIs. - * This should not modify any state if the Reject is bad - * or if LCP is in the OPENED state. - * - * Returns: - * 0 - Reject was bad. - * 1 - Reject was good. - */ -static int lcp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - u_char cichar; - u_short cishort; - u32_t cilong; - lcp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ - - try_ = *go; - - /* - * Any Rejected CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. - * Check packet length and CI length at each step. - * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. - */ -#define REJCIVOID(opt, neg) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_VOID && \ - p[1] == CILEN_VOID && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_VOID; \ - INCPTR(CILEN_VOID, p); \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } -#define REJCISHORT(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_SHORT && \ - p[1] == CILEN_SHORT && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_SHORT; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cishort != val) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT -#define REJCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if ((cishort != PPP_CHAP) || (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val)))) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - try_.neg_eap = try_.neg_upap = 0; \ - } -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT && !EAP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT -#define REJCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if ((cishort != PPP_CHAP) || (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val)))) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - try_.neg_upap = 0; \ - } -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT && !EAP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT && !PAP_SUPPORT -#define REJCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if ((cishort != PPP_CHAP) || (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val)))) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - try_.neg_eap = 0; \ - } -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT && !PAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT && !EAP_SUPPORT && !PAP_SUPPORT -#define REJCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if ((cishort != PPP_CHAP) || (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val)))) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT && !EAP_SUPPORT && !PAP_SUPPORT */ - -#define REJCILONG(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_LONG && \ - p[1] == CILEN_LONG && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_LONG; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETLONG(cilong, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cilong != val) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } -#if LQR_SUPPORT -#define REJCILQR(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_LQR && \ - p[1] == CILEN_LQR && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_LQR; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ - GETLONG(cilong, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cishort != PPP_LQR || cilong != val) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ -#define REJCICBCP(opt, neg, val) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_CBCP && \ - p[1] == CILEN_CBCP && \ - p[0] == opt) { \ - len -= CILEN_CBCP; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - /* Check rejected value. */ \ - if (cichar != val) \ - goto bad; \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } -#define REJCIENDP(opt, neg, class, val, vlen) \ - if (go->neg && \ - len >= CILEN_CHAR + vlen && \ - p[0] == opt && \ - p[1] == CILEN_CHAR + vlen) { \ - int i; \ - len -= CILEN_CHAR + vlen; \ - INCPTR(2, p); \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - if (cichar != class) \ - goto bad; \ - for (i = 0; i < vlen; ++i) { \ - GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ - if (cichar != val[i]) \ - goto bad; \ - } \ - try_.neg = 0; \ - } - - REJCISHORT(CI_MRU, neg_mru, go->mru); - REJCILONG(CI_ASYNCMAP, neg_asyncmap, go->asyncmap); -#if EAP_SUPPORT - REJCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, neg_eap, PPP_EAP); - - if (!go->neg_eap) { -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - REJCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); - - if (!go->neg_chap) { -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - REJCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, neg_upap, PPP_PAP); -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - } - -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - } - -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if LQR_SUPPORT - REJCILQR(CI_QUALITY, neg_lqr, go->lqr_period); -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ - REJCICBCP(CI_CALLBACK, neg_cbcp, CBCP_OPT); - REJCILONG(CI_MAGICNUMBER, neg_magicnumber, go->magicnumber); - REJCIVOID(CI_PCOMPRESSION, neg_pcompression); - REJCIVOID(CI_ACCOMPRESSION, neg_accompression); -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - REJCISHORT(CI_MRRU, neg_mrru, go->mrru); -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - REJCIVOID(CI_SSNHF, neg_ssnhf); - REJCIENDP(CI_EPDISC, neg_endpoint, go->endpoint.class_, - go->endpoint.value, go->endpoint.length); - - /* - * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. - */ - if (len != 0) { - goto bad; - } - - /* - * Now we can update state. - */ - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - *go = try_; - } - - return 1; - -bad: - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_rejci: received bad Reject!")); - return 0; -} - -/* - * lcp_reqci - Check the peer's requested CIs and send appropriate response. - * - * Returns: CONFACK, CONFNAK or CONFREJ and input packet modified - * appropriately. If reject_if_disagree is non-zero, doesn't return - * CONFNAK; returns CONFREJ if it can't return CONFACK. - * - * inp = Requested CIs - * lenp = Length of requested CIs - */ -static int lcp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *lenp, int reject_if_disagree) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - lcp_options *ho = &pcb->lcp_hisoptions; - lcp_options *ao = &pcb->lcp_allowoptions; - u_char *cip, *next; /* Pointer to current and next CIs */ - int cilen, citype, cichar; /* Parsed len, type, char value */ - u_short cishort; /* Parsed short value */ - u32_t cilong; /* Parse long value */ - int rc = CONFACK; /* Final packet return code */ - int orc; /* Individual option return code */ - u_char *p; /* Pointer to next char to parse */ - u_char *rejp; /* Pointer to next char in reject frame */ - struct pbuf *nakp; /* Nak buffer */ - u_char *nakoutp; /* Pointer to next char in Nak frame */ - int l = *lenp; /* Length left */ - - /* - * Reset all his options. - */ - BZERO(ho, sizeof(*ho)); - - /* - * Process all his options. - */ - next = inp; - nakp = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == nakp) { - return 0; - } - - if (nakp->tot_len != nakp->len) { - pbuf_free(nakp); - return 0; - } - - nakoutp = (u_char *)nakp->payload; - rejp = inp; - - while (l) { - orc = CONFACK; /* Assume success */ - cip = p = next; /* Remember begining of CI */ - - if (l < 2 || /* Not enough data for CI header or */ - p[1] < 2 || /* CI length too small or */ - p[1] > l) /* CI length too big? */ - { - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: bad CI length!")); - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject bad CI */ - cilen = l; /* Reject till end of packet */ - l = 0; /* Don't loop again */ - citype = 0; - goto endswitch; - } - - GETCHAR(citype, p); /* Parse CI type */ - GETCHAR(cilen, p); /* Parse CI length */ - l -= cilen; /* Adjust remaining length */ - next += cilen; /* Step to next CI */ - - switch (citype) /* Check CI type */ - { - case CI_MRU: - if (!ao->neg_mru || /* Allow option? */ - cilen != CILEN_SHORT) /* Check CI length */ - { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ - break; - } - - GETSHORT(cishort, p); /* Parse MRU */ - - /* - * He must be able to receive at least our minimum. - * No need to check a maximum. If he sends a large number, - * we'll just ignore it. - */ - if (cishort < PPP_MINMRU) { - orc = CONFNAK; /* Nak CI */ - PUTCHAR(CI_MRU, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_MINMRU, nakoutp); /* Give him a hint */ - break; - } - - ho->neg_mru = 1; /* Remember he sent MRU */ - ho->mru = cishort; /* And remember value */ - break; - - case CI_ASYNCMAP: - if (!ao->neg_asyncmap || - cilen != CILEN_LONG) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - GETLONG(cilong, p); - - /* - * Asyncmap must have set at least the bits - * which are set in lcp_allowoptions[unit].asyncmap. - */ - if ((ao->asyncmap & ~cilong) != 0) { - orc = CONFNAK; - PUTCHAR(CI_ASYNCMAP, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CILEN_LONG, nakoutp); - PUTLONG(ao->asyncmap | cilong, nakoutp); - break; - } - - ho->neg_asyncmap = 1; - ho->asyncmap = cilong; - break; - - case CI_AUTHTYPE: - if (cilen < CILEN_SHORT || - !(0 -#if PAP_SUPPORT - || ao->neg_upap -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - || ao->neg_chap -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - || ao->neg_eap -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - )) { - /* - * Reject the option if we're not willing to authenticate. - */ - ppp_dbglog("No auth is possible"); - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - - /* - * Authtype must be PAP, CHAP, or EAP. - * - * Note: if more than one of ao->neg_upap, ao->neg_chap, and - * ao->neg_eap are set, and the peer sends a Configure-Request - * with two or more authenticate-protocol requests, then we will - * reject the second request. - * Whether we end up doing CHAP, UPAP, or EAP depends then on - * the ordering of the CIs in the peer's Configure-Request. - */ - -#if PAP_SUPPORT - - if (cishort == PPP_PAP) { - /* we've already accepted CHAP or EAP */ - if (0 -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - || ho->neg_chap -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - || ho->neg_eap -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - || cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: rcvd AUTHTYPE PAP, rejecting...")); - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - if (!ao->neg_upap) /* we don't want to do PAP */ - { - orc = CONFNAK; /* NAK it and suggest CHAP or EAP */ - PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - if (ao->neg_eap) { - PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_EAP, nakoutp); - } else { -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CHAP_DIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype), nakoutp); -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - } - -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - break; - } - - ho->neg_upap = 1; - break; - } - -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - - if (cishort == PPP_CHAP) { - /* we've already accepted PAP or EAP */ - if ( -#if PAP_SUPPORT - ho->neg_upap || -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - ho->neg_eap || -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - cilen != CILEN_CHAP) { - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: rcvd AUTHTYPE CHAP, rejecting...")); - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - if (!ao->neg_chap) /* we don't want to do CHAP */ - { - orc = CONFNAK; /* NAK it and suggest EAP or PAP */ - PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - if (ao->neg_eap) { - PUTSHORT(PPP_EAP, nakoutp); - } else -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - if (1) { - PUTSHORT(PPP_PAP, nakoutp); - } else -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - { - } - - break; - } - - GETCHAR(cichar, p); /* get digest type */ - - if (!(CHAP_CANDIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype, cichar))) { - /* - * We can't/won't do the requested type, - * suggest something else. - */ - orc = CONFNAK; - PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CHAP_DIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype), nakoutp); - break; - } - - ho->chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_D(cichar); /* save md type */ - ho->neg_chap = 1; - break; - } - -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - if (cishort == PPP_EAP) { - /* we've already accepted CHAP or PAP */ - if ( -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - ho->neg_chap || -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - ho->neg_upap || -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: rcvd AUTHTYPE EAP, rejecting...")); - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - if (!ao->neg_eap) /* we don't want to do EAP */ - { - orc = CONFNAK; /* NAK it and suggest CHAP or PAP */ - PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - - if (ao->neg_chap) { - PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CHAP_DIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype), nakoutp); - } else -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - if (1) { - PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_PAP, nakoutp); - } else -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - { - } - - break; - } - - ho->neg_eap = 1; - break; - } - -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - - /* - * We don't recognize the protocol they're asking for. - * Nak it with something we're willing to do. - * (At this point we know ao->neg_upap || ao->neg_chap || - * ao->neg_eap.) - */ - orc = CONFNAK; - PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); - -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - if (ao->neg_eap) { - PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_EAP, nakoutp); - } else -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - if (ao->neg_chap) { - PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CHAP_DIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype), nakoutp); - } else -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - if (1) { - PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_PAP, nakoutp); - } else -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - { - } - - break; - -#if LQR_SUPPORT - - case CI_QUALITY: - if (!ao->neg_lqr || - cilen != CILEN_LQR) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - GETLONG(cilong, p); - - /* - * Check the protocol and the reporting period. - * XXX When should we Nak this, and what with? - */ - if (cishort != PPP_LQR) { - orc = CONFNAK; - PUTCHAR(CI_QUALITY, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CILEN_LQR, nakoutp); - PUTSHORT(PPP_LQR, nakoutp); - PUTLONG(ao->lqr_period, nakoutp); - break; - } - - break; -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ - - case CI_MAGICNUMBER: - if (!(ao->neg_magicnumber || go->neg_magicnumber) || - cilen != CILEN_LONG) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - GETLONG(cilong, p); - - /* - * He must have a different magic number. - */ - if (go->neg_magicnumber && - cilong == go->magicnumber) { - cilong = magic(); /* Don't put magic() inside macro! */ - orc = CONFNAK; - PUTCHAR(CI_MAGICNUMBER, nakoutp); - PUTCHAR(CILEN_LONG, nakoutp); - PUTLONG(cilong, nakoutp); - break; - } - - ho->neg_magicnumber = 1; - ho->magicnumber = cilong; - break; - - case CI_PCOMPRESSION: - if (!ao->neg_pcompression || - cilen != CILEN_VOID) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - ho->neg_pcompression = 1; - break; - - case CI_ACCOMPRESSION: - if (!ao->neg_accompression || - cilen != CILEN_VOID) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - ho->neg_accompression = 1; - break; - -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - - case CI_MRRU: - if (!ao->neg_mrru || !multilink || cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - /* possibly should insist on a minimum/maximum MRRU here */ - ho->neg_mrru = 1; - ho->mrru = cishort; - break; -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - - case CI_SSNHF: - if (!ao->neg_ssnhf -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - || !multilink -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - || cilen != CILEN_VOID) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - ho->neg_ssnhf = 1; - break; - - case CI_EPDISC: - if (!ao->neg_endpoint || - cilen < CILEN_CHAR || - cilen > CILEN_CHAR + MAX_ENDP_LEN) { - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - GETCHAR(cichar, p); - cilen -= CILEN_CHAR; - ho->neg_endpoint = 1; - ho->endpoint.class_ = cichar; - ho->endpoint.length = cilen; - MEMCPY(ho->endpoint.value, p, cilen); - INCPTR(cilen, p); - break; - - default: - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: rcvd unknown option %d", citype)); - orc = CONFREJ; - break; - } - - endswitch: - - if (orc == CONFACK && /* Good CI */ - rc != CONFACK) /* but prior CI wasnt? */ - { - continue; /* Don't send this one */ - } - - if (orc == CONFNAK) /* Nak this CI? */ - { - if (reject_if_disagree /* Getting fed up with sending NAKs? */ - && citype != CI_MAGICNUMBER) { - orc = CONFREJ; /* Get tough if so */ - } else { - if (rc == CONFREJ) /* Rejecting prior CI? */ - { - continue; /* Don't send this one */ - } - - rc = CONFNAK; - } - } - - if (orc == CONFREJ) /* Reject this CI */ - { - rc = CONFREJ; - - if (cip != rejp) /* Need to move rejected CI? */ - { - MEMCPY(rejp, cip, cilen); /* Move it */ - } - - INCPTR(cilen, rejp); /* Update output pointer */ - } - } - - /* - * If we wanted to send additional NAKs (for unsent CIs), the - * code would go here. The extra NAKs would go at *nakoutp. - * At present there are no cases where we want to ask the - * peer to negotiate an option. - */ - - switch (rc) { - case CONFACK: - *lenp = next - inp; - break; - - case CONFNAK: - /* - * Copy the Nak'd options from the nak buffer to the caller's buffer. - */ - *lenp = nakoutp - (u_char *)nakp->payload; - MEMCPY(inp, nakp->payload, *lenp); - break; - - case CONFREJ: - *lenp = rejp - inp; - break; - - default: - break; - } - - pbuf_free(nakp); - LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: returning CONF%s.", CODENAME(rc))); - return (rc); /* Return final code */ -} - -/* - * lcp_up - LCP has come UP. - */ -static void lcp_up(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; - lcp_options *ho = &pcb->lcp_hisoptions; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - lcp_options *ao = &pcb->lcp_allowoptions; - int mtu, mru; - - if (!go->neg_magicnumber) { - go->magicnumber = 0; - } - - if (!ho->neg_magicnumber) { - ho->magicnumber = 0; - } - - /* - * Set our MTU to the smaller of the MTU we wanted and - * the MRU our peer wanted. If we negotiated an MRU, - * set our MRU to the larger of value we wanted and - * the value we got in the negotiation. - * Note on the MTU: the link MTU can be the MRU the peer wanted, - * the interface MTU is set to the lowest of that, the - * MTU we want to use, and our link MRU. - */ - mtu = ho->neg_mru ? ho->mru : PPP_MRU; - mru = go->neg_mru ? LWIP_MAX(wo->mru, go->mru) : PPP_MRU; -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - - if (!(multilink && go->neg_mrru && ho->neg_mrru)) -#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ - netif_set_mtu(pcb, LWIP_MIN(LWIP_MIN(mtu, mru), ao->mru)); - - ppp_send_config(pcb, mtu, - (ho->neg_asyncmap ? ho->asyncmap : 0xffffffff), - ho->neg_pcompression, ho->neg_accompression); - ppp_recv_config(pcb, mru, - (pcb->settings.lax_recv ? 0 : go->neg_asyncmap ? go->asyncmap : - 0xffffffff), - go->neg_pcompression, go->neg_accompression); - - if (ho->neg_mru) { - pcb->peer_mru = ho->mru; - } - - lcp_echo_lowerup(f->pcb); /* Enable echo messages */ - - link_established(pcb); -} - -/* - * lcp_down - LCP has gone DOWN. - * - * Alert other protocols. - */ -static void lcp_down(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - - lcp_echo_lowerdown(f->pcb); - - link_down(pcb); - - ppp_send_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, 0xffffffff, 0, 0); - ppp_recv_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, - (go->neg_asyncmap ? go->asyncmap : 0xffffffff), - go->neg_pcompression, go->neg_accompression); - pcb->peer_mru = PPP_MRU; -} - -/* - * lcp_starting - LCP needs the lower layer up. - */ -static void lcp_starting(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - link_required(pcb); -} - -/* - * lcp_finished - LCP has finished with the lower layer. - */ -static void lcp_finished(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - link_terminated(pcb); -} - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * lcp_printpkt - print the contents of an LCP packet. - */ -static const char *const lcp_codenames[] = { - "ConfReq", "ConfAck", "ConfNak", "ConfRej", - "TermReq", "TermAck", "CodeRej", "ProtRej", - "EchoReq", "EchoRep", "DiscReq", "Ident", - "TimeRem" -}; - -static int lcp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) -{ - int code, id, len, olen, i; - const u_char *pstart, *optend; - u_short cishort; - u32_t cilong; - - if (plen < HEADERLEN) { - return 0; - } - - pstart = p; - GETCHAR(code, p); - GETCHAR(id, p); - GETSHORT(len, p); - - if (len < HEADERLEN || len > plen) { - return 0; - } - - if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(lcp_codenames)) { - printer(arg, " %s", lcp_codenames[code - 1]); - } else { - printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); - } - - printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); - len -= HEADERLEN; - - switch (code) { - case CONFREQ: - case CONFACK: - case CONFNAK: - case CONFREJ: - - /* print option list */ - while (len >= 2) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - GETCHAR(olen, p); - p -= 2; - - if (olen < 2 || olen > len) { - break; - } - - printer(arg, " <"); - len -= olen; - optend = p + olen; - - switch (code) { - case CI_MRU: - if (olen == CILEN_SHORT) { - p += 2; - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - printer(arg, "mru %d", cishort); - } - - break; - - case CI_ASYNCMAP: - if (olen == CILEN_LONG) { - p += 2; - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, "asyncmap 0x%x", cilong); - } - - break; - - case CI_AUTHTYPE: - if (olen >= CILEN_SHORT) { - p += 2; - printer(arg, "auth "); - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - - switch (cishort) { -#if PAP_SUPPORT - - case PPP_PAP: - printer(arg, "pap"); - break; -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - - case PPP_CHAP: - printer(arg, "chap"); - - if (p < optend) { - switch (*p) { - case CHAP_MD5: - printer(arg, " MD5"); - ++p; - break; -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - - case CHAP_MICROSOFT: - printer(arg, " MS"); - ++p; - break; - - case CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2: - printer(arg, " MS-v2"); - ++p; - break; -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ - - default: - break; - } - } - - break; -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - - case PPP_EAP: - printer(arg, "eap"); - break; -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - - default: - printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); - } - } - - break; -#if LQR_SUPPORT - - case CI_QUALITY: - if (olen >= CILEN_SHORT) { - p += 2; - printer(arg, "quality "); - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - - switch (cishort) { - case PPP_LQR: - printer(arg, "lqr"); - break; - - default: - printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); - } - } - - break; -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ - - case CI_CALLBACK: - if (olen >= CILEN_CHAR) { - p += 2; - printer(arg, "callback "); - GETCHAR(cishort, p); - - switch (cishort) { - case CBCP_OPT: - printer(arg, "CBCP"); - break; - - default: - printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); - } - } - - break; - - case CI_MAGICNUMBER: - if (olen == CILEN_LONG) { - p += 2; - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, "magic 0x%x", cilong); - } - - break; - - case CI_PCOMPRESSION: - if (olen == CILEN_VOID) { - p += 2; - printer(arg, "pcomp"); - } - - break; - - case CI_ACCOMPRESSION: - if (olen == CILEN_VOID) { - p += 2; - printer(arg, "accomp"); - } - - break; - - case CI_MRRU: - if (olen == CILEN_SHORT) { - p += 2; - GETSHORT(cishort, p); - printer(arg, "mrru %d", cishort); - } - - break; - - case CI_SSNHF: - if (olen == CILEN_VOID) { - p += 2; - printer(arg, "ssnhf"); - } - - break; - - case CI_EPDISC: -#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK - if (olen >= CILEN_CHAR) { - struct epdisc epd; - p += 2; - GETCHAR(epd.class, p); - epd.length = olen - CILEN_CHAR; - - if (epd.length > MAX_ENDP_LEN) { - epd.length = MAX_ENDP_LEN; - } - - if (epd.length > 0) { - MEMCPY(epd.value, p, epd.length); - p += epd.length; - } - - printer(arg, "endpoint [%s]", epdisc_to_str(&epd)); - } - -#else - printer(arg, "endpoint"); -#endif - break; - - default: - break; - } - - while (p < optend) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - printer(arg, " %.2x", code); - } - - printer(arg, ">"); - } - - break; - - case TERMACK: - case TERMREQ: - if (len > 0 && *p >= ' ' && *p < 0x7f) { - printer(arg, " "); - ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); - p += len; - len = 0; - } - - break; - - case ECHOREQ: - case ECHOREP: - case DISCREQ: - if (len >= 4) { - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, " magic=0x%x", cilong); - len -= 4; - } - - break; - - case IDENTIF: - case TIMEREM: - if (len >= 4) { - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, " magic=0x%x", cilong); - len -= 4; - } - - if (code == TIMEREM) { - if (len < 4) { - break; - } - - GETLONG(cilong, p); - printer(arg, " seconds=%u", cilong); - len -= 4; - } - - if (len > 0) { - printer(arg, " "); - ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); - p += len; - len = 0; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - /* print the rest of the bytes in the packet */ - for (i = 0; i < len && i < 32; ++i) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - printer(arg, " %.2x", code); - } - - if (i < len) { - printer(arg, " ..."); - p += len - i; - } - - return p - pstart; -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * Time to shut down the link because there is nothing out there. - */ - -static void LcpLinkFailure(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - - if (f->state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - ppp_info("No response to %d echo-requests", pcb->lcp_echos_pending); - ppp_notice("Serial link appears to be disconnected."); - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_PEERDEAD; - lcp_close(pcb, "Peer not responding"); - } -} - -/* - * Timer expired for the LCP echo requests from this process. - */ - -static void LcpEchoCheck(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - - LcpSendEchoRequest(f); - - if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - return; - } - - /* - * Start the timer for the next interval. - */ - if (pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running) { - ppp_warn("assertion lcp_echo_timer_running==0 failed"); - } - - TIMEOUT(LcpEchoTimeout, f, pcb->settings.lcp_echo_interval); - pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running = 1; -} - -/* - * LcpEchoTimeout - Timer expired on the LCP echo - */ - -static void LcpEchoTimeout(void *arg) -{ - fsm *f = (fsm *)arg; - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - - if (pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running != 0) { - pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running = 0; - LcpEchoCheck((fsm *)arg); - } -} - -/* - * LcpEchoReply - LCP has received a reply to the echo - */ - -static void lcp_received_echo_reply(fsm *f, int id, u_char *inp, int len) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - u32_t magic_val; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - - /* Check the magic number - don't count replies from ourselves. */ - if (len < 4) { - ppp_dbglog("lcp: received short Echo-Reply, length %d", len); - return; - } - - GETLONG(magic_val, inp); - - if (go->neg_magicnumber && magic_val == go->magicnumber) { - ppp_warn("appear to have received our own echo-reply!"); - return; - } - - /* Reset the number of outstanding echo frames */ - pcb->lcp_echos_pending = 0; -} - -/* - * LcpSendEchoRequest - Send an echo request frame to the peer - */ - -static void LcpSendEchoRequest(fsm *f) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; - lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; - u32_t lcp_magic; - u_char pkt[4], *pktp; - - /* - * Detect the failure of the peer at this point. - */ - if (pcb->settings.lcp_echo_fails != 0) { - if (pcb->lcp_echos_pending >= pcb->settings.lcp_echo_fails) { - LcpLinkFailure(f); - pcb->lcp_echos_pending = 0; - } - } - -#if PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE - - /* - * If adaptive echos have been enabled, only send the echo request if - * no traffic was received since the last one. - */ - if (pcb->settings.lcp_echo_adaptive) { - static unsigned int last_pkts_in = 0; - -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - update_link_stats(f->unit); - link_stats_valid = 0; -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - - if (link_stats.pkts_in != last_pkts_in) { - last_pkts_in = link_stats.pkts_in; - return; - } - } - -#endif - - /* - * Make and send the echo request frame. - */ - if (f->state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - lcp_magic = go->magicnumber; - pktp = pkt; - PUTLONG(lcp_magic, pktp); - fsm_sdata(f, ECHOREQ, pcb->lcp_echo_number++, pkt, pktp - pkt); - ++pcb->lcp_echos_pending; - } -} - -/* - * lcp_echo_lowerup - Start the timer for the LCP frame - */ - -static void lcp_echo_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; - - /* Clear the parameters for generating echo frames */ - pcb->lcp_echos_pending = 0; - pcb->lcp_echo_number = 0; - pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running = 0; - - /* If a timeout interval is specified then start the timer */ - if (pcb->settings.lcp_echo_interval != 0) { - LcpEchoCheck(f); - } -} - -/* - * lcp_echo_lowerdown - Stop the timer for the LCP frame - */ - -static void lcp_echo_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; - - if (pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running != 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(LcpEchoTimeout, f); - pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running = 0; - } -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * lcp.c - PPP Link Control Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/* + * @todo: + */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" + +/* + * When the link comes up we want to be able to wait for a short while, + * or until seeing some input from the peer, before starting to send + * configure-requests. We do this by delaying the fsm_lowerup call. + */ +/* steal a bit in fsm flags word */ +#define DELAYED_UP 0x80 + +static void lcp_delayed_up(void *arg); + +/* + * LCP-related command-line options. + */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + int lcp_echo_interval = 0; /* Interval between LCP echo-requests */ + int lcp_echo_fails = 0; /* Tolerance to unanswered echo-requests */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + /* options */ + static u_int lcp_echo_interval = LCP_ECHOINTERVAL; /* Interval between LCP echo-requests */ + static u_int lcp_echo_fails = LCP_MAXECHOFAILS; /* Tolerance to unanswered echo-requests */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#if PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE + bool lcp_echo_adaptive = 0; /* request echo only if the link was idle */ +#endif + bool lax_recv = 0; /* accept control chars in asyncmap */ + bool noendpoint = 0; /* don't send/accept endpoint discriminator */ +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +static int noopt(char **); +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK +static int setendpoint(char **); +static void printendpoint(option_t *, void (*)(void *, char *, ...), + void *); +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +static option_t lcp_option_list[] = { + /* LCP options */ + { + "-all", o_special_noarg, (void *)noopt, + "Don't request/allow any LCP options" }, + + { "noaccomp", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_accompression, + "Disable address/control compression", + OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_accompression }, + { "-ac", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_accompression, + "Disable address/control compression", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_accompression }, + + { "asyncmap", o_uint32, &lcp_wantoptions[0].asyncmap, + "Set asyncmap (for received packets)", + OPT_OR, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_asyncmap }, + { "-as", o_uint32, &lcp_wantoptions[0].asyncmap, + "Set asyncmap (for received packets)", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_OR, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_asyncmap }, + { "default-asyncmap", o_uint32, &lcp_wantoptions[0].asyncmap, + "Disable asyncmap negotiation", + OPT_OR | OPT_NOARG | OPT_VAL(~0U) | OPT_A2CLR, + &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_asyncmap }, + { "-am", o_uint32, &lcp_wantoptions[0].asyncmap, + "Disable asyncmap negotiation", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_OR | OPT_NOARG | OPT_VAL(~0U) | OPT_A2CLR, + &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_asyncmap }, + + { "nomagic", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_magicnumber, + "Disable magic number negotiation (looped-back line detection)", + OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_magicnumber }, + { "-mn", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_magicnumber, + "Disable magic number negotiation (looped-back line detection)", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_magicnumber }, + + { "mru", o_int, &lcp_wantoptions[0].mru, + "Set MRU (maximum received packet size) for negotiation", + OPT_PRIO, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_mru }, + { "default-mru", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_mru, + "Disable MRU negotiation (use default 1500)", + OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_mru }, + { "-mru", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_mru, + "Disable MRU negotiation (use default 1500)", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_mru }, + + { "mtu", o_int, &lcp_allowoptions[0].mru, + "Set our MTU", OPT_LIMITS, NULL, MAXMRU, MINMRU }, + + { "nopcomp", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_pcompression, + "Disable protocol field compression", + OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_pcompression }, + { "-pc", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_pcompression, + "Disable protocol field compression", + OPT_ALIAS | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_pcompression }, + + { "passive", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].passive, + "Set passive mode", 1 }, + { "-p", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].passive, + "Set passive mode", OPT_ALIAS | 1 }, + + { "silent", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].silent, + "Set silent mode", 1 }, + + { "lcp-echo-failure", o_int, &lcp_echo_fails, + "Set number of consecutive echo failures to indicate link failure", + OPT_PRIO }, + { "lcp-echo-interval", o_int, &lcp_echo_interval, + "Set time in seconds between LCP echo requests", OPT_PRIO }, +#if PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE + { "lcp-echo-adaptive", o_bool, &lcp_echo_adaptive, + "Suppress LCP echo requests if traffic was received", 1 }, +#endif + { "lcp-restart", o_int, &lcp_fsm[0].timeouttime, + "Set time in seconds between LCP retransmissions", OPT_PRIO }, + { "lcp-max-terminate", o_int, &lcp_fsm[0].maxtermtransmits, + "Set maximum number of LCP terminate-request transmissions", OPT_PRIO }, + { "lcp-max-configure", o_int, &lcp_fsm[0].maxconfreqtransmits, + "Set maximum number of LCP configure-request transmissions", OPT_PRIO }, + { "lcp-max-failure", o_int, &lcp_fsm[0].maxnakloops, + "Set limit on number of LCP configure-naks", OPT_PRIO }, + + { "receive-all", o_bool, &lax_recv, + "Accept all received control characters", 1 }, + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + { "mrru", o_int, &lcp_wantoptions[0].mrru, + "Maximum received packet size for multilink bundle", + OPT_PRIO, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_mrru }, + + { "mpshortseq", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_ssnhf, + "Use short sequence numbers in multilink headers", + OPT_PRIO | 1, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_ssnhf }, + { "nompshortseq", o_bool, &lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_ssnhf, + "Don't use short sequence numbers in multilink headers", + OPT_PRIOSUB | OPT_A2CLR, &lcp_allowoptions[0].neg_ssnhf }, + + { "endpoint", o_special, (void *)setendpoint, + "Endpoint discriminator for multilink", + OPT_PRIO | OPT_A2PRINTER, (void *)printendpoint }, +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + + { "noendpoint", o_bool, &noendpoint, + "Don't send or accept multilink endpoint discriminator", 1 }, + + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * Callbacks for fsm code. (CI = Configuration Information) + */ +static void lcp_resetci(fsm *f); /* Reset our CI */ +static int lcp_cilen(fsm *f); /* Return length of our CI */ +static void lcp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp); /* Add our CI to pkt */ +static int lcp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer ack'd our CI */ +static int lcp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject); /* Peer nak'd our CI */ +static int lcp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len); /* Peer rej'd our CI */ +static int lcp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *lenp, int reject_if_disagree); /* Rcv peer CI */ +static void lcp_up(fsm *f); /* We're UP */ +static void lcp_down(fsm *f); /* We're DOWN */ +static void lcp_starting(fsm *); /* We need lower layer up */ +static void lcp_finished(fsm *); /* We need lower layer down */ +static int lcp_extcode(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *inp, int len); +static void lcp_rprotrej(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int len); + +/* + * routines to send LCP echos to peer + */ + +static void lcp_echo_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void lcp_echo_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void LcpEchoTimeout(void *arg); +static void lcp_received_echo_reply(fsm *f, int id, u_char *inp, int len); +static void LcpSendEchoRequest(fsm *f); +static void LcpLinkFailure(fsm *f); +static void LcpEchoCheck(fsm *f); + +static const fsm_callbacks lcp_callbacks = /* LCP callback routines */ + { + lcp_resetci, /* Reset our Configuration Information */ + lcp_cilen, /* Length of our Configuration Information */ + lcp_addci, /* Add our Configuration Information */ + lcp_ackci, /* ACK our Configuration Information */ + lcp_nakci, /* NAK our Configuration Information */ + lcp_rejci, /* Reject our Configuration Information */ + lcp_reqci, /* Request peer's Configuration Information */ + lcp_up, /* Called when fsm reaches OPENED state */ + lcp_down, /* Called when fsm leaves OPENED state */ + lcp_starting, /* Called when we want the lower layer up */ + lcp_finished, /* Called when we want the lower layer down */ + NULL, /* Called when Protocol-Reject received */ + NULL, /* Retransmission is necessary */ + lcp_extcode, /* Called to handle LCP-specific codes */ + "LCP" /* String name of protocol */ + }; + +/* + * Protocol entry points. + * Some of these are called directly. + */ + +static void lcp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void lcp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len); +static void lcp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static int lcp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +const struct protent lcp_protent = { + PPP_LCP, + lcp_init, + lcp_input, + lcp_protrej, + lcp_lowerup, + lcp_lowerdown, + lcp_open, + lcp_close, +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + lcp_printpkt, +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + "LCP", + NULL, +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS + lcp_option_list, + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + NULL, + NULL +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +}; + +/* + * Length of each type of configuration option (in octets) + */ +#define CILEN_VOID 2 +#define CILEN_CHAR 3 +#define CILEN_SHORT 4 /* CILEN_VOID + 2 */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#define CILEN_CHAP 5 /* CILEN_VOID + 2 + 1 */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define CILEN_LONG 6 /* CILEN_VOID + 4 */ +#if LQR_SUPPORT +#define CILEN_LQR 8 /* CILEN_VOID + 2 + 4 */ +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ +#define CILEN_CBCP 3 + +#define CODENAME(x) ((x) == CONFACK ? "ACK" : \ + (x) == CONFNAK ? "NAK" : \ + "REJ") + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * noopt - Disable all options (why?). + */ +static int noopt(argv) char **argv; +{ + BZERO((char *)&lcp_wantoptions[0], sizeof(struct lcp_options)); + BZERO((char *)&lcp_allowoptions[0], sizeof(struct lcp_options)); + + return (1); +} +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK +static int setendpoint(argv) char **argv; +{ + if (str_to_epdisc(&lcp_wantoptions[0].endpoint, *argv)) { + lcp_wantoptions[0].neg_endpoint = 1; + return 1; + } + + option_error("Can't parse '%s' as an endpoint discriminator", *argv); + return 0; +} + +static void printendpoint(opt, printer, arg) + option_t *opt; +void (*printer)(void *, char *, ...); +void *arg; +{ + printer(arg, "%s", epdisc_to_str(&lcp_wantoptions[0].endpoint)); +} +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + +/* + * lcp_init - Initialize LCP. + */ +static void lcp_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; + lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; + lcp_options *ao = &pcb->lcp_allowoptions; + + f->pcb = pcb; + f->protocol = PPP_LCP; + f->callbacks = &lcp_callbacks; + + fsm_init(f); + + BZERO(wo, sizeof(*wo)); + wo->neg_mru = 1; + wo->mru = PPP_DEFMRU; + wo->neg_asyncmap = 1; + wo->neg_magicnumber = 1; + wo->neg_pcompression = 1; + wo->neg_accompression = 1; + + BZERO(ao, sizeof(*ao)); + ao->neg_mru = 1; + ao->mru = PPP_MAXMRU; + ao->neg_asyncmap = 1; +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + ao->neg_chap = 1; + ao->chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + ao->neg_upap = 1; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + ao->neg_eap = 1; +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + ao->neg_magicnumber = 1; + ao->neg_pcompression = 1; + ao->neg_accompression = 1; + ao->neg_endpoint = 1; +} + +/* + * lcp_open - LCP is allowed to come up. + */ +void lcp_open(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; + lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; + + f->flags &= ~(OPT_PASSIVE | OPT_SILENT); + + if (wo->passive) { + f->flags |= OPT_PASSIVE; + } + + if (wo->silent) { + f->flags |= OPT_SILENT; + } + + fsm_open(f); +} + +/* + * lcp_close - Take LCP down. + */ +void lcp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *reason) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; + int oldstate; + + if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + && pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_MASTER +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + ) { + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_TERMINATE); + } + + if (f->flags & DELAYED_UP) { + UNTIMEOUT(lcp_delayed_up, f); + f->state = PPP_FSM_STOPPED; + } + + oldstate = f->state; + + fsm_close(f, reason); + + if (oldstate == PPP_FSM_STOPPED && (f->flags & (OPT_PASSIVE | OPT_SILENT | DELAYED_UP))) { + /* + * This action is not strictly according to the FSM in RFC1548, + * but it does mean that the program terminates if you do a + * lcp_close() when a connection hasn't been established + * because we are in passive/silent mode or because we have + * delayed the fsm_lowerup() call and it hasn't happened yet. + */ + f->flags &= ~DELAYED_UP; + lcp_finished(f); + } +} + +/* + * lcp_lowerup - The lower layer is up. + */ +void lcp_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; + fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; + + /* + * Don't use A/C or protocol compression on transmission, + * but accept A/C and protocol compressed packets + * if we are going to ask for A/C and protocol compression. + */ + if (ppp_send_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, 0xffffffff, 0, 0) < 0 || ppp_recv_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, (pcb->settings.lax_recv ? 0 : 0xffffffff), + wo->neg_pcompression, wo->neg_accompression) < 0) { + return; + } + + pcb->peer_mru = PPP_MRU; + + if (pcb->settings.listen_time != 0) { + f->flags |= DELAYED_UP; + TIMEOUTMS(lcp_delayed_up, f, pcb->settings.listen_time); + } else { + fsm_lowerup(f); + } +} + +/* + * lcp_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. + */ +void lcp_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; + + if (f->flags & DELAYED_UP) { + f->flags &= ~DELAYED_UP; + UNTIMEOUT(lcp_delayed_up, f); + } else { + fsm_lowerdown(f); + } +} + +/* + * lcp_delayed_up - Bring the lower layer up now. + */ +static void lcp_delayed_up(void *arg) +{ + fsm *f = (fsm *)arg; + + if (f->flags & DELAYED_UP) { + f->flags &= ~DELAYED_UP; + fsm_lowerup(f); + } +} + +/* + * lcp_input - Input LCP packet. + */ +static void lcp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; + + if (f->flags & DELAYED_UP) { + f->flags &= ~DELAYED_UP; + UNTIMEOUT(lcp_delayed_up, f); + fsm_lowerup(f); + } + + fsm_input(f, p, len); +} + +/* + * lcp_extcode - Handle a LCP-specific code. + */ +static int lcp_extcode(fsm *f, int code, int id, u_char *inp, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + u_char *magp; + + switch (code) { + case PROTREJ: + lcp_rprotrej(f, inp, len); + break; + + case ECHOREQ: + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + break; + } + + magp = inp; + PUTLONG(go->magicnumber, magp); + fsm_sdata(f, ECHOREP, id, inp, len); + break; + + case ECHOREP: + lcp_received_echo_reply(f, id, inp, len); + break; + + case DISCREQ: + case IDENTIF: + case TIMEREM: + break; + + default: + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * lcp_rprotrej - Receive an Protocol-Reject. + * + * Figure out which protocol is rejected and inform it. + */ +static void lcp_rprotrej(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int len) +{ + int i; + const struct protent *protp; + u_short prot; +#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME + const char *pname; +#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ + + if (len < 2) { + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_rprotrej: Rcvd short Protocol-Reject packet!")); + return; + } + + GETSHORT(prot, inp); + + /* + * Protocol-Reject packets received in any state other than the LCP + * OPENED state SHOULD be silently discarded. + */ + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + LCPDEBUG(("Protocol-Reject discarded: LCP in state %d", f->state)); + return; + } + +#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME + pname = protocol_name(prot); +#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ + + /* + * Upcall the proper Protocol-Reject routine. + */ + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (protp->protocol == prot) { +#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME + + if (pname != NULL) + ppp_dbglog("Protocol-Reject for '%s' (0x%x) received", pname, + prot); + else +#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ + ppp_dbglog("Protocol-Reject for 0x%x received", prot); + + (*protp->protrej)(f->pcb); + return; + } + +#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME + + if (pname != NULL) + ppp_warn("Protocol-Reject for unsupported protocol '%s' (0x%x)", pname, + prot); + else +#endif /* #if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ + ppp_warn("Protocol-Reject for unsupported protocol 0x%x", prot); +} + +/* + * lcp_protrej - A Protocol-Reject was received. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void lcp_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + /* + * Can't reject LCP! + */ + ppp_error("Received Protocol-Reject for LCP!"); + fsm_protreject(&pcb->lcp_fsm); +} + +/* + * lcp_sprotrej - Send a Protocol-Reject for some protocol. + */ +void lcp_sprotrej(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *p, int len) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; + /* + * Send back the protocol and the information field of the + * rejected packet. We only get here if LCP is in the OPENED state. + */ +#if 0 + p += 2; + len -= 2; +#endif + + fsm_sdata(f, PROTREJ, ++f->id, + p, len); +} + +/* + * lcp_resetci - Reset our CI. + */ +static void lcp_resetci(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + lcp_options *ao = &pcb->lcp_allowoptions; + +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT + + /* note: default value is true for allow options */ + if (pcb->settings.user && pcb->settings.passwd) { +#if PAP_SUPPORT + + if (pcb->settings.refuse_pap) { + ao->neg_upap = 0; + } + +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + + if (pcb->settings.refuse_chap) { + ao->chap_mdtype &= ~MDTYPE_MD5; + } + +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + + if (pcb->settings.refuse_mschap) { + ao->chap_mdtype &= ~MDTYPE_MICROSOFT; + } + + if (pcb->settings.refuse_mschap_v2) { + ao->chap_mdtype &= ~MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2; + } + +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + ao->neg_chap = (ao->chap_mdtype != MDTYPE_NONE); +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + if (pcb->settings.refuse_eap) { + ao->neg_eap = 0; + } + +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_SERVER + + /* note: default value is false for wanted options */ + if (pcb->settings.auth_required) { +#if PAP_SUPPORT + + if (!pcb->settings.refuse_pap) { + wo->neg_upap = 1; + } + +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + + if (!pcb->settings.refuse_chap) { + wo->chap_mdtype |= MDTYPE_MD5; + } + +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + + if (!pcb->settings.refuse_mschap) { + wo->chap_mdtype |= MDTYPE_MICROSOFT; + } + + if (!pcb->settings.refuse_mschap_v2) { + wo->chap_mdtype |= MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2; + } + +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + wo->neg_chap = (wo->chap_mdtype != MDTYPE_NONE); +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + if (!pcb->settings.refuse_eap) { + wo->neg_eap = 1; + } + +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + } + +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + + } else { +#if PAP_SUPPORT + ao->neg_upap = 0; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + ao->neg_chap = 0; + ao->chap_mdtype = MDTYPE_NONE; +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + ao->neg_eap = 0; +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp: auth protocols:")); +#if PAP_SUPPORT + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, (" PAP=%d", ao->neg_upap)); +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, (" CHAP=%d CHAP_MD5=%d", ao->neg_chap, !!(ao->chap_mdtype & MDTYPE_MD5))); +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, (" CHAP_MS=%d CHAP_MS2=%d", !!(ao->chap_mdtype & MDTYPE_MICROSOFT), !!(ao->chap_mdtype & MDTYPE_MICROSOFT_V2))); +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, (" EAP=%d", ao->neg_eap)); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("\n")); + +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + wo->magicnumber = magic(); + wo->numloops = 0; + *go = *wo; +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + + if (!multilink) { + go->neg_mrru = 0; +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + go->neg_ssnhf = 0; + go->neg_endpoint = 0; +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + } + +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + + if (pcb->settings.noendpoint) { + ao->neg_endpoint = 0; + } + + pcb->peer_mru = PPP_MRU; +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + auth_reset(pcb); +#endif /* UNUSED */ +} + +/* + * lcp_cilen - Return length of our CI. + */ +static int lcp_cilen(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + +#define LENCIVOID(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_VOID : 0) +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#define LENCICHAP(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_CHAP : 0) +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define LENCISHORT(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_SHORT : 0) +#define LENCILONG(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_LONG : 0) +#if LQR_SUPPORT +#define LENCILQR(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_LQR : 0) +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ +#define LENCICBCP(neg) ((neg) ? CILEN_CBCP : 0) + /* + * NB: we only ask for one of CHAP, UPAP, or EAP, even if we will + * accept more than one. We prefer EAP first, then CHAP, then + * PAP. + */ + return (LENCISHORT(go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU) + + LENCILONG(go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF) + +#if EAP_SUPPORT + LENCISHORT(go->neg_eap) + +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + LENCICHAP(!go->neg_eap && go->neg_chap) + +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if !EAP_SUPPORT + LENCICHAP(go->neg_chap) + +#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT + LENCISHORT(!go->neg_eap && !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap) + +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT + LENCISHORT(!go->neg_eap && go->neg_upap) + +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT + LENCISHORT(!go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap) + +#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT + LENCISHORT(go->neg_upap) + +#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if LQR_SUPPORT + LENCILQR(go->neg_lqr) + +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ + LENCICBCP(go->neg_cbcp) + + LENCILONG(go->neg_magicnumber) + + LENCIVOID(go->neg_pcompression) + + LENCIVOID(go->neg_accompression) + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + LENCISHORT(go->neg_mrru) + +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + LENCIVOID(go->neg_ssnhf) + + (go->neg_endpoint ? CILEN_CHAR + go->endpoint.length : 0)); +} + +/* + * lcp_addci - Add our desired CIs to a packet. + */ +static void lcp_addci(fsm *f, u_char *ucp, int *lenp) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + u_char *start_ucp = ucp; + +#define ADDCIVOID(opt, neg) \ + if (neg) { \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_VOID, ucp); \ + } +#define ADDCISHORT(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, ucp); \ + PUTSHORT(val, ucp); \ + } +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#define ADDCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + PUTCHAR((opt), ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, ucp); \ + PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR((CHAP_DIGEST(val)), ucp); \ + } +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define ADDCILONG(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_LONG, ucp); \ + PUTLONG(val, ucp); \ + } +#if LQR_SUPPORT +#define ADDCILQR(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_LQR, ucp); \ + PUTSHORT(PPP_LQR, ucp); \ + PUTLONG(val, ucp); \ + } +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ +#define ADDCICHAR(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAR, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(val, ucp); \ + } +#define ADDCIENDP(opt, neg, class, val, len) \ + if (neg) { \ + int i; \ + PUTCHAR(opt, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAR + len, ucp); \ + PUTCHAR(class, ucp); \ + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) \ + PUTCHAR(val[i], ucp); \ + } + + ADDCISHORT(CI_MRU, go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU, go->mru); + ADDCILONG(CI_ASYNCMAP, go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF, + go->asyncmap); +#if EAP_SUPPORT + ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_eap, PPP_EAP); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + ADDCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && go->neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if !EAP_SUPPORT + ADDCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); +#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT + ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT + ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT + ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); +#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT + ADDCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); +#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if LQR_SUPPORT + ADDCILQR(CI_QUALITY, go->neg_lqr, go->lqr_period); +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ + ADDCICHAR(CI_CALLBACK, go->neg_cbcp, CBCP_OPT); + ADDCILONG(CI_MAGICNUMBER, go->neg_magicnumber, go->magicnumber); + ADDCIVOID(CI_PCOMPRESSION, go->neg_pcompression); + ADDCIVOID(CI_ACCOMPRESSION, go->neg_accompression); +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + ADDCISHORT(CI_MRRU, go->neg_mrru, go->mrru); +#endif + ADDCIVOID(CI_SSNHF, go->neg_ssnhf); + ADDCIENDP(CI_EPDISC, go->neg_endpoint, go->endpoint.class_, + go->endpoint.value, go->endpoint.length); + + if (ucp - start_ucp != *lenp) { + /* this should never happen, because peer_mtu should be 1500 */ + ppp_error("Bug in lcp_addci: wrong length"); + } +} + +/* + * lcp_ackci - Ack our CIs. + * This should not modify any state if the Ack is bad. + * + * Returns: + * 0 - Ack was bad. + * 1 - Ack was good. + */ +static int lcp_ackci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + u_char cilen, citype, cichar; + u_short cishort; + u32_t cilong; + + /* + * CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. + * Check packet length and CI length at each step. + * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. + */ +#define ACKCIVOID(opt, neg) \ + if (neg) { \ + if ((len -= CILEN_VOID) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_VOID || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + } +#define ACKCISHORT(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + if ((len -= CILEN_SHORT) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_SHORT || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + if (cishort != val) \ + goto bad; \ + } +#define ACKCICHAR(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + if ((len -= CILEN_CHAR) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_CHAR || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + if (cichar != val) \ + goto bad; \ + } +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#define ACKCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + if ((len -= CILEN_CHAP) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_CHAP || \ + citype != (opt)) \ + goto bad; \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + if (cishort != PPP_CHAP) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + if (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val))) \ + goto bad; \ + } +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define ACKCILONG(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + if ((len -= CILEN_LONG) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_LONG || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETLONG(cilong, p); \ + if (cilong != val) \ + goto bad; \ + } +#if LQR_SUPPORT +#define ACKCILQR(opt, neg, val) \ + if (neg) { \ + if ((len -= CILEN_LQR) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_LQR || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + if (cishort != PPP_LQR) \ + goto bad; \ + GETLONG(cilong, p); \ + if (cilong != val) \ + goto bad; \ + } +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ +#define ACKCIENDP(opt, neg, class, val, vlen) \ + if (neg) { \ + int i; \ + if ((len -= CILEN_CHAR + vlen) < 0) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(citype, p); \ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); \ + if (cilen != CILEN_CHAR + vlen || \ + citype != opt) \ + goto bad; \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + if (cichar != class) \ + goto bad; \ + for (i = 0; i < vlen; ++i) { \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + if (cichar != val[i]) \ + goto bad; \ + } \ + } + + ACKCISHORT(CI_MRU, go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU, go->mru); + ACKCILONG(CI_ASYNCMAP, go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF, + go->asyncmap); +#if EAP_SUPPORT + ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_eap, PPP_EAP); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + ACKCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && go->neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if !EAP_SUPPORT + ACKCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); +#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT /* cannot be improved, embedding a directive within macro arguments is not portable */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT + ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT + ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_eap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT + ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, !go->neg_chap && go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); +#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT + ACKCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, go->neg_upap, PPP_PAP); +#endif /* !EAP_SUPPORT && !CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if LQR_SUPPORT + ACKCILQR(CI_QUALITY, go->neg_lqr, go->lqr_period); +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ + ACKCICHAR(CI_CALLBACK, go->neg_cbcp, CBCP_OPT); + ACKCILONG(CI_MAGICNUMBER, go->neg_magicnumber, go->magicnumber); + ACKCIVOID(CI_PCOMPRESSION, go->neg_pcompression); + ACKCIVOID(CI_ACCOMPRESSION, go->neg_accompression); +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + ACKCISHORT(CI_MRRU, go->neg_mrru, go->mrru); +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + ACKCIVOID(CI_SSNHF, go->neg_ssnhf); + ACKCIENDP(CI_EPDISC, go->neg_endpoint, go->endpoint.class_, + go->endpoint.value, go->endpoint.length); + + /* + * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. + */ + if (len != 0) { + goto bad; + } + + return (1); +bad: + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_acki: received bad Ack!")); + return (0); +} + +/* + * lcp_nakci - Peer has sent a NAK for some of our CIs. + * This should not modify any state if the Nak is bad + * or if LCP is in the OPENED state. + * + * Returns: + * 0 - Nak was bad. + * 1 - Nak was good. + */ +static int lcp_nakci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len, int treat_as_reject) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; + u_char citype, cichar, *next; + u_short cishort; + u32_t cilong; + lcp_options no; /* options we've seen Naks for */ + lcp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ + int looped_back = 0; + int cilen; + + BZERO(&no, sizeof(no)); + try_ = *go; + + /* + * Any Nak'd CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. + * Check packet length and CI length at each step. + * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. + */ +#define NAKCIVOID(opt, neg) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_VOID && \ + p[1] == CILEN_VOID && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_VOID; \ + INCPTR(CILEN_VOID, p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#define NAKCICHAP(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#define NAKCICHAR(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_CHAR && \ + p[1] == CILEN_CHAR && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_CHAR; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } +#define NAKCISHORT(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_SHORT && \ + p[1] == CILEN_SHORT && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_SHORT; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } +#define NAKCILONG(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_LONG && \ + p[1] == CILEN_LONG && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_LONG; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETLONG(cilong, p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } +#if LQR_SUPPORT +#define NAKCILQR(opt, neg, code) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_LQR && \ + p[1] == CILEN_LQR && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_LQR; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + GETLONG(cilong, p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + code \ + } +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ +#define NAKCIENDP(opt, neg) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_CHAR && \ + p[0] == opt && \ + p[1] >= CILEN_CHAR && \ + p[1] <= len) { \ + len -= p[1]; \ + INCPTR(p[1], p); \ + no.neg = 1; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } + + /* + * NOTE! There must be no assignments to individual fields of *go in + * the code below. Any such assignment is a BUG! + */ + /* + * We don't care if they want to send us smaller packets than + * we want. Therefore, accept any MRU less than what we asked for, + * but then ignore the new value when setting the MRU in the kernel. + * If they send us a bigger MRU than what we asked, accept it, up to + * the limit of the default MRU we'd get if we didn't negotiate. + */ + if (go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU) { + NAKCISHORT(CI_MRU, neg_mru, + + if (cishort <= wo->mru || cishort <= PPP_DEFMRU) + try_.mru = cishort;); + } + + /* + * Add any characters they want to our (receive-side) asyncmap. + */ + if (go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF) { + NAKCILONG(CI_ASYNCMAP, neg_asyncmap, + try_.asyncmap = go->asyncmap | cilong;); + } + + /* + * If they've nak'd our authentication-protocol, check whether + * they are proposing a different protocol, or a different + * hash algorithm for CHAP. + */ + if ((0 +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_chap +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_upap +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_eap +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + ) && + len >= CILEN_SHORT && p[0] == CI_AUTHTYPE && p[1] >= CILEN_SHORT && p[1] <= len) { + cilen = p[1]; + len -= cilen; +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + no.neg_chap = go->neg_chap; +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + no.neg_upap = go->neg_upap; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + no.neg_eap = go->neg_eap; +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + INCPTR(2, p); + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + +#if PAP_SUPPORT + + if (cishort == PPP_PAP && cilen == CILEN_SHORT) { +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + /* If we were asking for EAP, then we need to stop that. */ + if (go->neg_eap) { + try_.neg_eap = 0; + } else +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + + /* If we were asking for CHAP, then we need to stop that. */ + if (go->neg_chap) { + try_.neg_chap = 0; + } else +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * If we weren't asking for CHAP or EAP, then we were asking for + * PAP, in which case this Nak is bad. + */ + goto bad; + } else +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + if (cishort == PPP_CHAP && cilen == CILEN_CHAP) { + GETCHAR(cichar, p); +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + /* Stop asking for EAP, if we were. */ + if (go->neg_eap) { + try_.neg_eap = 0; + + /* Try to set up to use their suggestion, if possible */ + if (CHAP_CANDIGEST(go->chap_mdtype, cichar)) { + try_.chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_D(cichar); + } + } else +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + if (go->neg_chap) { + /* + * We were asking for our preferred algorithm, they must + * want something different. + */ + if (cichar != CHAP_DIGEST(go->chap_mdtype)) { + if (CHAP_CANDIGEST(go->chap_mdtype, cichar)) { + /* Use their suggestion if we support it ... */ + try_.chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_D(cichar); + } else { + /* ... otherwise, try our next-preferred algorithm. */ + try_.chap_mdtype &= ~(CHAP_MDTYPE(try_.chap_mdtype)); + + if (try_.chap_mdtype == MDTYPE_NONE) /* out of algos */ + { + try_.neg_chap = 0; + } + } + } else { + /* + * Whoops, they Nak'd our algorithm of choice + * but then suggested it back to us. + */ + goto bad; + } + } else { + /* + * Stop asking for PAP if we were asking for it. + */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + try_.neg_upap = 0; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + } + + } else +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ + { + +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + /* + * If we were asking for EAP, and they're Conf-Naking EAP, + * well, that's just strange. Nobody should do that. + */ + if (cishort == PPP_EAP && cilen == CILEN_SHORT && go->neg_eap) { + ppp_dbglog("Unexpected Conf-Nak for EAP"); + } + + /* + * We don't recognize what they're suggesting. + * Stop asking for what we were asking for. + */ + if (go->neg_eap) { + try_.neg_eap = 0; + } else +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + if (go->neg_chap) { + try_.neg_chap = 0; + } else +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if PAP_SUPPORT + if (1) { + try_.neg_upap = 0; + } else +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + { + } + + p += cilen - CILEN_SHORT; + } + } + +#if LQR_SUPPORT + /* + * If they can't cope with our link quality protocol, we'll have + * to stop asking for LQR. We haven't got any other protocol. + * If they Nak the reporting period, take their value XXX ? + */ + NAKCILQR( + CI_QUALITY, neg_lqr, + + if (cishort != PPP_LQR) + try_.neg_lqr = 0; + else { + try_.lqr_period = cilong; + }); +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * Only implementing CBCP...not the rest of the callback options + */ + NAKCICHAR(CI_CALLBACK, neg_cbcp, + try_.neg_cbcp = 0; + (void)cichar; /* if CHAP support is not compiled, cichar is set but not used, which makes some compilers complaining */ + ); + + /* + * Check for a looped-back line. + */ + NAKCILONG(CI_MAGICNUMBER, neg_magicnumber, + try_.magicnumber = magic(); + looped_back = 1;); + + /* + * Peer shouldn't send Nak for protocol compression or + * address/control compression requests; they should send + * a Reject instead. If they send a Nak, treat it as a Reject. + */ + NAKCIVOID(CI_PCOMPRESSION, neg_pcompression); + NAKCIVOID(CI_ACCOMPRESSION, neg_accompression); + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + + /* + * Nak for MRRU option - accept their value if it is smaller + * than the one we want. + */ + if (go->neg_mrru) { + NAKCISHORT(CI_MRRU, neg_mrru, + + if (treat_as_reject) + try_.neg_mrru = 0; + else if (cishort <= wo->mrru) + try_.mrru = cishort;); + } + +#else /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(treat_as_reject); +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + + /* + * Nak for short sequence numbers shouldn't be sent, treat it + * like a reject. + */ + NAKCIVOID(CI_SSNHF, neg_ssnhf); + + /* + * Nak of the endpoint discriminator option is not permitted, + * treat it like a reject. + */ + NAKCIENDP(CI_EPDISC, neg_endpoint); + + /* + * There may be remaining CIs, if the peer is requesting negotiation + * on an option that we didn't include in our request packet. + * If we see an option that we requested, or one we've already seen + * in this packet, then this packet is bad. + * If we wanted to respond by starting to negotiate on the requested + * option(s), we could, but we don't, because except for the + * authentication type and quality protocol, if we are not negotiating + * an option, it is because we were told not to. + * For the authentication type, the Nak from the peer means + * `let me authenticate myself with you' which is a bit pointless. + * For the quality protocol, the Nak means `ask me to send you quality + * reports', but if we didn't ask for them, we don't want them. + * An option we don't recognize represents the peer asking to + * negotiate some option we don't support, so ignore it. + */ + while (len >= CILEN_VOID) { + GETCHAR(citype, p); + GETCHAR(cilen, p); + + if (cilen < CILEN_VOID || (len -= cilen) < 0) { + goto bad; + } + + next = p + cilen - 2; + + switch (citype) { + case CI_MRU: + if ((go->neg_mru && go->mru != PPP_DEFMRU) || no.neg_mru || cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { + goto bad; + } + + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + + if (cishort < PPP_DEFMRU) { + try_.neg_mru = 1; + try_.mru = cishort; + } + + break; + + case CI_ASYNCMAP: + if ((go->neg_asyncmap && go->asyncmap != 0xFFFFFFFF) || no.neg_asyncmap || cilen != CILEN_LONG) { + goto bad; + } + + break; + + case CI_AUTHTYPE: + if (0 +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_chap || no.neg_chap +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_upap || no.neg_upap +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + || go->neg_eap || no.neg_eap +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + ) { + goto bad; + } + + break; + + case CI_MAGICNUMBER: + if (go->neg_magicnumber || no.neg_magicnumber || + cilen != CILEN_LONG) { + goto bad; + } + + break; + + case CI_PCOMPRESSION: + if (go->neg_pcompression || no.neg_pcompression || cilen != CILEN_VOID) { + goto bad; + } + + break; + + case CI_ACCOMPRESSION: + if (go->neg_accompression || no.neg_accompression || cilen != CILEN_VOID) { + goto bad; + } + + break; +#if LQR_SUPPORT + + case CI_QUALITY: + if (go->neg_lqr || no.neg_lqr || cilen != CILEN_LQR) { + goto bad; + } + + break; +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + + case CI_MRRU: + if (go->neg_mrru || no.neg_mrru || cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { + goto bad; + } + + break; +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + + case CI_SSNHF: + if (go->neg_ssnhf || no.neg_ssnhf || cilen != CILEN_VOID) { + goto bad; + } + + try_.neg_ssnhf = 1; + break; + + case CI_EPDISC: + if (go->neg_endpoint || no.neg_endpoint || cilen < CILEN_CHAR) { + goto bad; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + p = next; + } + + /* + * OK, the Nak is good. Now we can update state. + * If there are any options left we ignore them. + */ + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + if (looped_back) { + if (++try_.numloops >= pcb->settings.lcp_loopbackfail) { + ppp_notice("Serial line is looped back."); + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_LOOPBACK; + lcp_close(f->pcb, "Loopback detected"); + } + } else { + try_.numloops = 0; + } + + *go = try_; + } + + return 1; + +bad: + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_nakci: received bad Nak!")); + return 0; +} + +/* + * lcp_rejci - Peer has Rejected some of our CIs. + * This should not modify any state if the Reject is bad + * or if LCP is in the OPENED state. + * + * Returns: + * 0 - Reject was bad. + * 1 - Reject was good. + */ +static int lcp_rejci(fsm *f, u_char *p, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + u_char cichar; + u_short cishort; + u32_t cilong; + lcp_options try_; /* options to request next time */ + + try_ = *go; + + /* + * Any Rejected CIs must be in exactly the same order that we sent. + * Check packet length and CI length at each step. + * If we find any deviations, then this packet is bad. + */ +#define REJCIVOID(opt, neg) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_VOID && \ + p[1] == CILEN_VOID && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_VOID; \ + INCPTR(CILEN_VOID, p); \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } +#define REJCISHORT(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_SHORT && \ + p[1] == CILEN_SHORT && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_SHORT; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cishort != val) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT +#define REJCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if ((cishort != PPP_CHAP) || (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val)))) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + try_.neg_eap = try_.neg_upap = 0; \ + } +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT && !EAP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT +#define REJCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if ((cishort != PPP_CHAP) || (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val)))) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + try_.neg_upap = 0; \ + } +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT && !EAP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT && !PAP_SUPPORT +#define REJCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if ((cishort != PPP_CHAP) || (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val)))) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + try_.neg_eap = 0; \ + } +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT && EAP_SUPPORT && !PAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT && !EAP_SUPPORT && !PAP_SUPPORT +#define REJCICHAP(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[1] == CILEN_CHAP && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_CHAP; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if ((cishort != PPP_CHAP) || (cichar != (CHAP_DIGEST(val)))) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT && !EAP_SUPPORT && !PAP_SUPPORT */ + +#define REJCILONG(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_LONG && \ + p[1] == CILEN_LONG && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_LONG; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETLONG(cilong, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cilong != val) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } +#if LQR_SUPPORT +#define REJCILQR(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_LQR && \ + p[1] == CILEN_LQR && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_LQR; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETSHORT(cishort, p); \ + GETLONG(cilong, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cishort != PPP_LQR || cilong != val) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ +#define REJCICBCP(opt, neg, val) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_CBCP && \ + p[1] == CILEN_CBCP && \ + p[0] == opt) { \ + len -= CILEN_CBCP; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + /* Check rejected value. */ \ + if (cichar != val) \ + goto bad; \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } +#define REJCIENDP(opt, neg, class, val, vlen) \ + if (go->neg && \ + len >= CILEN_CHAR + vlen && \ + p[0] == opt && \ + p[1] == CILEN_CHAR + vlen) { \ + int i; \ + len -= CILEN_CHAR + vlen; \ + INCPTR(2, p); \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + if (cichar != class) \ + goto bad; \ + for (i = 0; i < vlen; ++i) { \ + GETCHAR(cichar, p); \ + if (cichar != val[i]) \ + goto bad; \ + } \ + try_.neg = 0; \ + } + + REJCISHORT(CI_MRU, neg_mru, go->mru); + REJCILONG(CI_ASYNCMAP, neg_asyncmap, go->asyncmap); +#if EAP_SUPPORT + REJCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, neg_eap, PPP_EAP); + + if (!go->neg_eap) { +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + REJCICHAP(CI_AUTHTYPE, neg_chap, go->chap_mdtype); + + if (!go->neg_chap) { +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + REJCISHORT(CI_AUTHTYPE, neg_upap, PPP_PAP); +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + } + +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + } + +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if LQR_SUPPORT + REJCILQR(CI_QUALITY, neg_lqr, go->lqr_period); +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ + REJCICBCP(CI_CALLBACK, neg_cbcp, CBCP_OPT); + REJCILONG(CI_MAGICNUMBER, neg_magicnumber, go->magicnumber); + REJCIVOID(CI_PCOMPRESSION, neg_pcompression); + REJCIVOID(CI_ACCOMPRESSION, neg_accompression); +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + REJCISHORT(CI_MRRU, neg_mrru, go->mrru); +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + REJCIVOID(CI_SSNHF, neg_ssnhf); + REJCIENDP(CI_EPDISC, neg_endpoint, go->endpoint.class_, + go->endpoint.value, go->endpoint.length); + + /* + * If there are any remaining CIs, then this packet is bad. + */ + if (len != 0) { + goto bad; + } + + /* + * Now we can update state. + */ + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + *go = try_; + } + + return 1; + +bad: + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_rejci: received bad Reject!")); + return 0; +} + +/* + * lcp_reqci - Check the peer's requested CIs and send appropriate response. + * + * Returns: CONFACK, CONFNAK or CONFREJ and input packet modified + * appropriately. If reject_if_disagree is non-zero, doesn't return + * CONFNAK; returns CONFREJ if it can't return CONFACK. + * + * inp = Requested CIs + * lenp = Length of requested CIs + */ +static int lcp_reqci(fsm *f, u_char *inp, int *lenp, int reject_if_disagree) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + lcp_options *ho = &pcb->lcp_hisoptions; + lcp_options *ao = &pcb->lcp_allowoptions; + u_char *cip, *next; /* Pointer to current and next CIs */ + int cilen, citype, cichar; /* Parsed len, type, char value */ + u_short cishort; /* Parsed short value */ + u32_t cilong; /* Parse long value */ + int rc = CONFACK; /* Final packet return code */ + int orc; /* Individual option return code */ + u_char *p; /* Pointer to next char to parse */ + u_char *rejp; /* Pointer to next char in reject frame */ + struct pbuf *nakp; /* Nak buffer */ + u_char *nakoutp; /* Pointer to next char in Nak frame */ + int l = *lenp; /* Length left */ + + /* + * Reset all his options. + */ + BZERO(ho, sizeof(*ho)); + + /* + * Process all his options. + */ + next = inp; + nakp = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_CTRL_PBUF_MAX_SIZE), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == nakp) { + return 0; + } + + if (nakp->tot_len != nakp->len) { + pbuf_free(nakp); + return 0; + } + + nakoutp = (u_char *)nakp->payload; + rejp = inp; + + while (l) { + orc = CONFACK; /* Assume success */ + cip = p = next; /* Remember begining of CI */ + + if (l < 2 || /* Not enough data for CI header or */ + p[1] < 2 || /* CI length too small or */ + p[1] > l) /* CI length too big? */ + { + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: bad CI length!")); + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject bad CI */ + cilen = l; /* Reject till end of packet */ + l = 0; /* Don't loop again */ + citype = 0; + goto endswitch; + } + + GETCHAR(citype, p); /* Parse CI type */ + GETCHAR(cilen, p); /* Parse CI length */ + l -= cilen; /* Adjust remaining length */ + next += cilen; /* Step to next CI */ + + switch (citype) /* Check CI type */ + { + case CI_MRU: + if (!ao->neg_mru || /* Allow option? */ + cilen != CILEN_SHORT) /* Check CI length */ + { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Reject CI */ + break; + } + + GETSHORT(cishort, p); /* Parse MRU */ + + /* + * He must be able to receive at least our minimum. + * No need to check a maximum. If he sends a large number, + * we'll just ignore it. + */ + if (cishort < PPP_MINMRU) { + orc = CONFNAK; /* Nak CI */ + PUTCHAR(CI_MRU, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_MINMRU, nakoutp); /* Give him a hint */ + break; + } + + ho->neg_mru = 1; /* Remember he sent MRU */ + ho->mru = cishort; /* And remember value */ + break; + + case CI_ASYNCMAP: + if (!ao->neg_asyncmap || + cilen != CILEN_LONG) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + GETLONG(cilong, p); + + /* + * Asyncmap must have set at least the bits + * which are set in lcp_allowoptions[unit].asyncmap. + */ + if ((ao->asyncmap & ~cilong) != 0) { + orc = CONFNAK; + PUTCHAR(CI_ASYNCMAP, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CILEN_LONG, nakoutp); + PUTLONG(ao->asyncmap | cilong, nakoutp); + break; + } + + ho->neg_asyncmap = 1; + ho->asyncmap = cilong; + break; + + case CI_AUTHTYPE: + if (cilen < CILEN_SHORT || + !(0 +#if PAP_SUPPORT + || ao->neg_upap +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + || ao->neg_chap +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + || ao->neg_eap +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + )) { + /* + * Reject the option if we're not willing to authenticate. + */ + ppp_dbglog("No auth is possible"); + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + + /* + * Authtype must be PAP, CHAP, or EAP. + * + * Note: if more than one of ao->neg_upap, ao->neg_chap, and + * ao->neg_eap are set, and the peer sends a Configure-Request + * with two or more authenticate-protocol requests, then we will + * reject the second request. + * Whether we end up doing CHAP, UPAP, or EAP depends then on + * the ordering of the CIs in the peer's Configure-Request. + */ + +#if PAP_SUPPORT + + if (cishort == PPP_PAP) { + /* we've already accepted CHAP or EAP */ + if (0 +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + || ho->neg_chap +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + || ho->neg_eap +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + || cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: rcvd AUTHTYPE PAP, rejecting...")); + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + if (!ao->neg_upap) /* we don't want to do PAP */ + { + orc = CONFNAK; /* NAK it and suggest CHAP or EAP */ + PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + if (ao->neg_eap) { + PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_EAP, nakoutp); + } else { +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CHAP_DIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype), nakoutp); +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + } + +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + break; + } + + ho->neg_upap = 1; + break; + } + +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + + if (cishort == PPP_CHAP) { + /* we've already accepted PAP or EAP */ + if ( +#if PAP_SUPPORT + ho->neg_upap || +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + ho->neg_eap || +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + cilen != CILEN_CHAP) { + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: rcvd AUTHTYPE CHAP, rejecting...")); + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + if (!ao->neg_chap) /* we don't want to do CHAP */ + { + orc = CONFNAK; /* NAK it and suggest EAP or PAP */ + PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + if (ao->neg_eap) { + PUTSHORT(PPP_EAP, nakoutp); + } else +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + if (1) { + PUTSHORT(PPP_PAP, nakoutp); + } else +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + { + } + + break; + } + + GETCHAR(cichar, p); /* get digest type */ + + if (!(CHAP_CANDIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype, cichar))) { + /* + * We can't/won't do the requested type, + * suggest something else. + */ + orc = CONFNAK; + PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CHAP_DIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype), nakoutp); + break; + } + + ho->chap_mdtype = CHAP_MDTYPE_D(cichar); /* save md type */ + ho->neg_chap = 1; + break; + } + +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + if (cishort == PPP_EAP) { + /* we've already accepted CHAP or PAP */ + if ( +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + ho->neg_chap || +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + ho->neg_upap || +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: rcvd AUTHTYPE EAP, rejecting...")); + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + if (!ao->neg_eap) /* we don't want to do EAP */ + { + orc = CONFNAK; /* NAK it and suggest CHAP or PAP */ + PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + + if (ao->neg_chap) { + PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CHAP_DIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype), nakoutp); + } else +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + if (1) { + PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_PAP, nakoutp); + } else +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + { + } + + break; + } + + ho->neg_eap = 1; + break; + } + +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * We don't recognize the protocol they're asking for. + * Nak it with something we're willing to do. + * (At this point we know ao->neg_upap || ao->neg_chap || + * ao->neg_eap.) + */ + orc = CONFNAK; + PUTCHAR(CI_AUTHTYPE, nakoutp); + +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + if (ao->neg_eap) { + PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_EAP, nakoutp); + } else +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + if (ao->neg_chap) { + PUTCHAR(CILEN_CHAP, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_CHAP, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CHAP_DIGEST(ao->chap_mdtype), nakoutp); + } else +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + if (1) { + PUTCHAR(CILEN_SHORT, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_PAP, nakoutp); + } else +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + { + } + + break; + +#if LQR_SUPPORT + + case CI_QUALITY: + if (!ao->neg_lqr || + cilen != CILEN_LQR) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + GETLONG(cilong, p); + + /* + * Check the protocol and the reporting period. + * XXX When should we Nak this, and what with? + */ + if (cishort != PPP_LQR) { + orc = CONFNAK; + PUTCHAR(CI_QUALITY, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CILEN_LQR, nakoutp); + PUTSHORT(PPP_LQR, nakoutp); + PUTLONG(ao->lqr_period, nakoutp); + break; + } + + break; +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ + + case CI_MAGICNUMBER: + if (!(ao->neg_magicnumber || go->neg_magicnumber) || + cilen != CILEN_LONG) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + GETLONG(cilong, p); + + /* + * He must have a different magic number. + */ + if (go->neg_magicnumber && + cilong == go->magicnumber) { + cilong = magic(); /* Don't put magic() inside macro! */ + orc = CONFNAK; + PUTCHAR(CI_MAGICNUMBER, nakoutp); + PUTCHAR(CILEN_LONG, nakoutp); + PUTLONG(cilong, nakoutp); + break; + } + + ho->neg_magicnumber = 1; + ho->magicnumber = cilong; + break; + + case CI_PCOMPRESSION: + if (!ao->neg_pcompression || + cilen != CILEN_VOID) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + ho->neg_pcompression = 1; + break; + + case CI_ACCOMPRESSION: + if (!ao->neg_accompression || + cilen != CILEN_VOID) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + ho->neg_accompression = 1; + break; + +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + + case CI_MRRU: + if (!ao->neg_mrru || !multilink || cilen != CILEN_SHORT) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + /* possibly should insist on a minimum/maximum MRRU here */ + ho->neg_mrru = 1; + ho->mrru = cishort; + break; +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + + case CI_SSNHF: + if (!ao->neg_ssnhf +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + || !multilink +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + || cilen != CILEN_VOID) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + ho->neg_ssnhf = 1; + break; + + case CI_EPDISC: + if (!ao->neg_endpoint || + cilen < CILEN_CHAR || + cilen > CILEN_CHAR + MAX_ENDP_LEN) { + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + GETCHAR(cichar, p); + cilen -= CILEN_CHAR; + ho->neg_endpoint = 1; + ho->endpoint.class_ = cichar; + ho->endpoint.length = cilen; + MEMCPY(ho->endpoint.value, p, cilen); + INCPTR(cilen, p); + break; + + default: + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: rcvd unknown option %d", citype)); + orc = CONFREJ; + break; + } + + endswitch: + + if (orc == CONFACK && /* Good CI */ + rc != CONFACK) /* but prior CI wasnt? */ + { + continue; /* Don't send this one */ + } + + if (orc == CONFNAK) /* Nak this CI? */ + { + if (reject_if_disagree /* Getting fed up with sending NAKs? */ + && citype != CI_MAGICNUMBER) { + orc = CONFREJ; /* Get tough if so */ + } else { + if (rc == CONFREJ) /* Rejecting prior CI? */ + { + continue; /* Don't send this one */ + } + + rc = CONFNAK; + } + } + + if (orc == CONFREJ) /* Reject this CI */ + { + rc = CONFREJ; + + if (cip != rejp) /* Need to move rejected CI? */ + { + MEMCPY(rejp, cip, cilen); /* Move it */ + } + + INCPTR(cilen, rejp); /* Update output pointer */ + } + } + + /* + * If we wanted to send additional NAKs (for unsent CIs), the + * code would go here. The extra NAKs would go at *nakoutp. + * At present there are no cases where we want to ask the + * peer to negotiate an option. + */ + + switch (rc) { + case CONFACK: + *lenp = next - inp; + break; + + case CONFNAK: + /* + * Copy the Nak'd options from the nak buffer to the caller's buffer. + */ + *lenp = nakoutp - (u_char *)nakp->payload; + MEMCPY(inp, nakp->payload, *lenp); + break; + + case CONFREJ: + *lenp = rejp - inp; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + pbuf_free(nakp); + LCPDEBUG(("lcp_reqci: returning CONF%s.", CODENAME(rc))); + return (rc); /* Return final code */ +} + +/* + * lcp_up - LCP has come UP. + */ +static void lcp_up(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *wo = &pcb->lcp_wantoptions; + lcp_options *ho = &pcb->lcp_hisoptions; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + lcp_options *ao = &pcb->lcp_allowoptions; + int mtu, mru; + + if (!go->neg_magicnumber) { + go->magicnumber = 0; + } + + if (!ho->neg_magicnumber) { + ho->magicnumber = 0; + } + + /* + * Set our MTU to the smaller of the MTU we wanted and + * the MRU our peer wanted. If we negotiated an MRU, + * set our MRU to the larger of value we wanted and + * the value we got in the negotiation. + * Note on the MTU: the link MTU can be the MRU the peer wanted, + * the interface MTU is set to the lowest of that, the + * MTU we want to use, and our link MRU. + */ + mtu = ho->neg_mru ? ho->mru : PPP_MRU; + mru = go->neg_mru ? LWIP_MAX(wo->mru, go->mru) : PPP_MRU; +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + + if (!(multilink && go->neg_mrru && ho->neg_mrru)) +#endif /* HAVE_MULTILINK */ + netif_set_mtu(pcb, LWIP_MIN(LWIP_MIN(mtu, mru), ao->mru)); + + ppp_send_config(pcb, mtu, + (ho->neg_asyncmap ? ho->asyncmap : 0xffffffff), + ho->neg_pcompression, ho->neg_accompression); + ppp_recv_config(pcb, mru, + (pcb->settings.lax_recv ? 0 : go->neg_asyncmap ? go->asyncmap : + 0xffffffff), + go->neg_pcompression, go->neg_accompression); + + if (ho->neg_mru) { + pcb->peer_mru = ho->mru; + } + + lcp_echo_lowerup(f->pcb); /* Enable echo messages */ + + link_established(pcb); +} + +/* + * lcp_down - LCP has gone DOWN. + * + * Alert other protocols. + */ +static void lcp_down(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + + lcp_echo_lowerdown(f->pcb); + + link_down(pcb); + + ppp_send_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, 0xffffffff, 0, 0); + ppp_recv_config(pcb, PPP_MRU, + (go->neg_asyncmap ? go->asyncmap : 0xffffffff), + go->neg_pcompression, go->neg_accompression); + pcb->peer_mru = PPP_MRU; +} + +/* + * lcp_starting - LCP needs the lower layer up. + */ +static void lcp_starting(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + link_required(pcb); +} + +/* + * lcp_finished - LCP has finished with the lower layer. + */ +static void lcp_finished(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + link_terminated(pcb); +} + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * lcp_printpkt - print the contents of an LCP packet. + */ +static const char *const lcp_codenames[] = { + "ConfReq", "ConfAck", "ConfNak", "ConfRej", + "TermReq", "TermAck", "CodeRej", "ProtRej", + "EchoReq", "EchoRep", "DiscReq", "Ident", + "TimeRem" +}; + +static int lcp_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) +{ + int code, id, len, olen, i; + const u_char *pstart, *optend; + u_short cishort; + u32_t cilong; + + if (plen < HEADERLEN) { + return 0; + } + + pstart = p; + GETCHAR(code, p); + GETCHAR(id, p); + GETSHORT(len, p); + + if (len < HEADERLEN || len > plen) { + return 0; + } + + if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(lcp_codenames)) { + printer(arg, " %s", lcp_codenames[code - 1]); + } else { + printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); + } + + printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); + len -= HEADERLEN; + + switch (code) { + case CONFREQ: + case CONFACK: + case CONFNAK: + case CONFREJ: + + /* print option list */ + while (len >= 2) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + GETCHAR(olen, p); + p -= 2; + + if (olen < 2 || olen > len) { + break; + } + + printer(arg, " <"); + len -= olen; + optend = p + olen; + + switch (code) { + case CI_MRU: + if (olen == CILEN_SHORT) { + p += 2; + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + printer(arg, "mru %d", cishort); + } + + break; + + case CI_ASYNCMAP: + if (olen == CILEN_LONG) { + p += 2; + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, "asyncmap 0x%x", cilong); + } + + break; + + case CI_AUTHTYPE: + if (olen >= CILEN_SHORT) { + p += 2; + printer(arg, "auth "); + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + + switch (cishort) { +#if PAP_SUPPORT + + case PPP_PAP: + printer(arg, "pap"); + break; +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + + case PPP_CHAP: + printer(arg, "chap"); + + if (p < optend) { + switch (*p) { + case CHAP_MD5: + printer(arg, " MD5"); + ++p; + break; +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + + case CHAP_MICROSOFT: + printer(arg, " MS"); + ++p; + break; + + case CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2: + printer(arg, " MS-v2"); + ++p; + break; +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ + + default: + break; + } + } + + break; +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + + case PPP_EAP: + printer(arg, "eap"); + break; +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + + default: + printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); + } + } + + break; +#if LQR_SUPPORT + + case CI_QUALITY: + if (olen >= CILEN_SHORT) { + p += 2; + printer(arg, "quality "); + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + + switch (cishort) { + case PPP_LQR: + printer(arg, "lqr"); + break; + + default: + printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); + } + } + + break; +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ + + case CI_CALLBACK: + if (olen >= CILEN_CHAR) { + p += 2; + printer(arg, "callback "); + GETCHAR(cishort, p); + + switch (cishort) { + case CBCP_OPT: + printer(arg, "CBCP"); + break; + + default: + printer(arg, "0x%x", cishort); + } + } + + break; + + case CI_MAGICNUMBER: + if (olen == CILEN_LONG) { + p += 2; + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, "magic 0x%x", cilong); + } + + break; + + case CI_PCOMPRESSION: + if (olen == CILEN_VOID) { + p += 2; + printer(arg, "pcomp"); + } + + break; + + case CI_ACCOMPRESSION: + if (olen == CILEN_VOID) { + p += 2; + printer(arg, "accomp"); + } + + break; + + case CI_MRRU: + if (olen == CILEN_SHORT) { + p += 2; + GETSHORT(cishort, p); + printer(arg, "mrru %d", cishort); + } + + break; + + case CI_SSNHF: + if (olen == CILEN_VOID) { + p += 2; + printer(arg, "ssnhf"); + } + + break; + + case CI_EPDISC: +#ifdef HAVE_MULTILINK + if (olen >= CILEN_CHAR) { + struct epdisc epd; + p += 2; + GETCHAR(epd.class, p); + epd.length = olen - CILEN_CHAR; + + if (epd.length > MAX_ENDP_LEN) { + epd.length = MAX_ENDP_LEN; + } + + if (epd.length > 0) { + MEMCPY(epd.value, p, epd.length); + p += epd.length; + } + + printer(arg, "endpoint [%s]", epdisc_to_str(&epd)); + } + +#else + printer(arg, "endpoint"); +#endif + break; + + default: + break; + } + + while (p < optend) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + printer(arg, " %.2x", code); + } + + printer(arg, ">"); + } + + break; + + case TERMACK: + case TERMREQ: + if (len > 0 && *p >= ' ' && *p < 0x7f) { + printer(arg, " "); + ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); + p += len; + len = 0; + } + + break; + + case ECHOREQ: + case ECHOREP: + case DISCREQ: + if (len >= 4) { + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, " magic=0x%x", cilong); + len -= 4; + } + + break; + + case IDENTIF: + case TIMEREM: + if (len >= 4) { + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, " magic=0x%x", cilong); + len -= 4; + } + + if (code == TIMEREM) { + if (len < 4) { + break; + } + + GETLONG(cilong, p); + printer(arg, " seconds=%u", cilong); + len -= 4; + } + + if (len > 0) { + printer(arg, " "); + ppp_print_string(p, len, printer, arg); + p += len; + len = 0; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + /* print the rest of the bytes in the packet */ + for (i = 0; i < len && i < 32; ++i) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + printer(arg, " %.2x", code); + } + + if (i < len) { + printer(arg, " ..."); + p += len - i; + } + + return p - pstart; +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Time to shut down the link because there is nothing out there. + */ + +static void LcpLinkFailure(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + + if (f->state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + ppp_info("No response to %d echo-requests", pcb->lcp_echos_pending); + ppp_notice("Serial link appears to be disconnected."); + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_PEERDEAD; + lcp_close(pcb, "Peer not responding"); + } +} + +/* + * Timer expired for the LCP echo requests from this process. + */ + +static void LcpEchoCheck(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + + LcpSendEchoRequest(f); + + if (f->state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + return; + } + + /* + * Start the timer for the next interval. + */ + if (pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running) { + ppp_warn("assertion lcp_echo_timer_running==0 failed"); + } + + TIMEOUT(LcpEchoTimeout, f, pcb->settings.lcp_echo_interval); + pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running = 1; +} + +/* + * LcpEchoTimeout - Timer expired on the LCP echo + */ + +static void LcpEchoTimeout(void *arg) +{ + fsm *f = (fsm *)arg; + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + + if (pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running != 0) { + pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running = 0; + LcpEchoCheck((fsm *)arg); + } +} + +/* + * LcpEchoReply - LCP has received a reply to the echo + */ + +static void lcp_received_echo_reply(fsm *f, int id, u_char *inp, int len) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + u32_t magic_val; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + + /* Check the magic number - don't count replies from ourselves. */ + if (len < 4) { + ppp_dbglog("lcp: received short Echo-Reply, length %d", len); + return; + } + + GETLONG(magic_val, inp); + + if (go->neg_magicnumber && magic_val == go->magicnumber) { + ppp_warn("appear to have received our own echo-reply!"); + return; + } + + /* Reset the number of outstanding echo frames */ + pcb->lcp_echos_pending = 0; +} + +/* + * LcpSendEchoRequest - Send an echo request frame to the peer + */ + +static void LcpSendEchoRequest(fsm *f) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = f->pcb; + lcp_options *go = &pcb->lcp_gotoptions; + u32_t lcp_magic; + u_char pkt[4], *pktp; + + /* + * Detect the failure of the peer at this point. + */ + if (pcb->settings.lcp_echo_fails != 0) { + if (pcb->lcp_echos_pending >= pcb->settings.lcp_echo_fails) { + LcpLinkFailure(f); + pcb->lcp_echos_pending = 0; + } + } + +#if PPP_LCP_ADAPTIVE + + /* + * If adaptive echos have been enabled, only send the echo request if + * no traffic was received since the last one. + */ + if (pcb->settings.lcp_echo_adaptive) { + static unsigned int last_pkts_in = 0; + +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + update_link_stats(f->unit); + link_stats_valid = 0; +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + + if (link_stats.pkts_in != last_pkts_in) { + last_pkts_in = link_stats.pkts_in; + return; + } + } + +#endif + + /* + * Make and send the echo request frame. + */ + if (f->state == PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + lcp_magic = go->magicnumber; + pktp = pkt; + PUTLONG(lcp_magic, pktp); + fsm_sdata(f, ECHOREQ, pcb->lcp_echo_number++, pkt, pktp - pkt); + ++pcb->lcp_echos_pending; + } +} + +/* + * lcp_echo_lowerup - Start the timer for the LCP frame + */ + +static void lcp_echo_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; + + /* Clear the parameters for generating echo frames */ + pcb->lcp_echos_pending = 0; + pcb->lcp_echo_number = 0; + pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running = 0; + + /* If a timeout interval is specified then start the timer */ + if (pcb->settings.lcp_echo_interval != 0) { + LcpEchoCheck(f); + } +} + +/* + * lcp_echo_lowerdown - Stop the timer for the LCP frame + */ + +static void lcp_echo_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + fsm *f = &pcb->lcp_fsm; + + if (pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running != 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(LcpEchoTimeout, f); + pcb->lcp_echo_timer_running = 0; + } +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/magic.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/magic.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/magic.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/magic.c index f86c1976..e90d71e5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/magic.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/magic.c @@ -1,308 +1,308 @@ -/* - * magic.c - PPP Magic Number routines. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ -/***************************************************************************** -* randm.c - Random number generator program file. -* -* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. -* Copyright (c) 1998 by Global Election Systems Inc. -* -* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, -* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided -* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this -* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any -* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required -* for any of the authorized uses. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR -* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -****************************************************************************** -* REVISION HISTORY -* -* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher -* Ported to lwIP. -* 98-06-03 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. -* Extracted from avos. -*****************************************************************************/ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" - -#if PPP_MD5_RANDM /* Using MD5 for better randomness if enabled */ - -#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" - -#define MD5_HASH_SIZE 16 -static char magic_randpool[MD5_HASH_SIZE]; /* Pool of randomness. */ -static long magic_randcount; /* Pseudo-random incrementer */ -static u32_t magic_randomseed; /* Seed used for random number generation. */ - -/* - * Churn the randomness pool on a random event. Call this early and often - * on random and semi-random system events to build randomness in time for - * usage. For randomly timed events, pass a null pointer and a zero length - * and this will use the system timer and other sources to add randomness. - * If new random data is available, pass a pointer to that and it will be - * included. - * - * Ref: Applied Cryptography 2nd Ed. by Bruce Schneier p. 427 - */ -static void magic_churnrand(char *rand_data, u32_t rand_len) -{ - lwip_md5_context md5_ctx; - - /* LWIP_DEBUGF(LOG_INFO, ("magic_churnrand: %u@%P\n", rand_len, rand_data)); */ - lwip_md5_init(&md5_ctx); - lwip_md5_starts(&md5_ctx); - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)magic_randpool, sizeof(magic_randpool)); - - if (rand_data) { - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)rand_data, rand_len); - } else { - struct - { - /* INCLUDE fields for any system sources of randomness */ - u32_t jiffies; -#ifdef LWIP_RAND - u32_t rand; -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ - } sys_data; - magic_randomseed += sys_jiffies(); - sys_data.jiffies = magic_randomseed; -#ifdef LWIP_RAND - sys_data.rand = LWIP_RAND(); -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ - /* Load sys_data fields here. */ - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)&sys_data, sizeof(sys_data)); - } - - lwip_md5_finish(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)magic_randpool); - lwip_md5_free(&md5_ctx); - /* LWIP_DEBUGF(LOG_INFO, ("magic_churnrand: -> 0\n")); */ -} - -/* - * Initialize the random number generator. - */ -void magic_init(void) -{ - magic_churnrand(NULL, 0); -} - -/* - * Randomize our random seed value. - */ -void magic_randomize(void) -{ - magic_churnrand(NULL, 0); -} - -/* - * magic_random_bytes - Fill a buffer with random bytes. - * - * Use the random pool to generate random data. This degrades to pseudo - * random when used faster than randomness is supplied using magic_churnrand(). - * Note: It's important that there be sufficient randomness in magic_randpool - * before this is called for otherwise the range of the result may be - * narrow enough to make a search feasible. - * - * Ref: Applied Cryptography 2nd Ed. by Bruce Schneier p. 427 - * - * XXX Why does he not just call magic_churnrand() for each block? Probably - * so that you don't ever publish the seed which could possibly help - * predict future values. - * XXX Why don't we preserve md5 between blocks and just update it with - * magic_randcount each time? Probably there is a weakness but I wish that - * it was documented. - */ -void magic_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, u32_t buf_len) -{ - lwip_md5_context md5_ctx; - u_char tmp[MD5_HASH_SIZE]; - u32_t n; - - while (buf_len > 0) { - lwip_md5_init(&md5_ctx); - lwip_md5_starts(&md5_ctx); - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)magic_randpool, sizeof(magic_randpool)); - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)&magic_randcount, sizeof(magic_randcount)); - lwip_md5_finish(&md5_ctx, tmp); - lwip_md5_free(&md5_ctx); - magic_randcount++; - n = LWIP_MIN(buf_len, MD5_HASH_SIZE); - MEMCPY(buf, tmp, n); - buf += n; - buf_len -= n; - } -} - -/* - * Return a new random number. - */ -u32_t magic(void) -{ - u32_t new_rand; - - magic_random_bytes((unsigned char *)&new_rand, sizeof(new_rand)); - - return new_rand; -} - -#else /* PPP_MD5_RANDM */ - -/*****************************/ -/*** LOCAL DATA STRUCTURES ***/ -/*****************************/ -#ifndef LWIP_RAND -static int magic_randomized; /* Set when truely randomized. */ -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ -static u32_t magic_randomseed; /* Seed used for random number generation. */ - -/***********************************/ -/*** PUBLIC FUNCTION DEFINITIONS ***/ -/***********************************/ - -/* - * Initialize the random number generator. - * - * Here we attempt to compute a random number seed but even if - * it isn't random, we'll randomize it later. - * - * The current method uses the fields from the real time clock, - * the idle process counter, the millisecond counter, and the - * hardware timer tick counter. When this is invoked - * in startup(), then the idle counter and timer values may - * repeat after each boot and the real time clock may not be - * operational. Thus we call it again on the first random - * event. - */ -void magic_init(void) -{ - magic_randomseed += sys_jiffies(); -#ifndef LWIP_RAND - /* Initialize the Borland random number generator. */ - srand((unsigned)magic_randomseed); -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ -} - -/* - * magic_init - Initialize the magic number generator. - * - * Randomize our random seed value. Here we use the fact that - * this function is called at *truely random* times by the polling - * and network functions. Here we only get 16 bits of new random - * value but we use the previous value to randomize the other 16 - * bits. - */ -void magic_randomize(void) -{ -#ifndef LWIP_RAND - - if (!magic_randomized) { - magic_randomized = !0; - magic_init(); - /* The initialization function also updates the seed. */ - } else { -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ - magic_randomseed += sys_jiffies(); -#ifndef LWIP_RAND - } - -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ -} - -/* - * Return a new random number. - * - * Here we use the Borland rand() function to supply a pseudo random - * number which we make truely random by combining it with our own - * seed which is randomized by truely random events. - * Thus the numbers will be truely random unless there have been no - * operator or network events in which case it will be pseudo random - * seeded by the real time clock. - */ -u32_t magic(void) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_RAND - return LWIP_RAND() + magic_randomseed; -#else /* LWIP_RAND */ - return ((u32_t)rand() << 16) + (u32_t)rand() + magic_randomseed; -#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ -} - -/* - * magic_random_bytes - Fill a buffer with random bytes. - */ -void magic_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, u32_t buf_len) -{ - u32_t new_rand, n; - - while (buf_len > 0) { - new_rand = magic(); - n = LWIP_MIN(buf_len, sizeof(new_rand)); - MEMCPY(buf, &new_rand, n); - buf += n; - buf_len -= n; - } -} -#endif /* PPP_MD5_RANDM */ - -/* - * Return a new random number between 0 and (2^pow)-1 included. - */ -u32_t magic_pow(u8_t pow) -{ - return magic() & ~(~0UL << pow); -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * magic.c - PPP Magic Number routines. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ +/***************************************************************************** +* randm.c - Random number generator program file. +* +* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. +* Copyright (c) 1998 by Global Election Systems Inc. +* +* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, +* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided +* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this +* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any +* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required +* for any of the authorized uses. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +****************************************************************************** +* REVISION HISTORY +* +* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher +* Ported to lwIP. +* 98-06-03 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. +* Extracted from avos. +*****************************************************************************/ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" + +#if PPP_MD5_RANDM /* Using MD5 for better randomness if enabled */ + +#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" + +#define MD5_HASH_SIZE 16 +static char magic_randpool[MD5_HASH_SIZE]; /* Pool of randomness. */ +static long magic_randcount; /* Pseudo-random incrementer */ +static u32_t magic_randomseed; /* Seed used for random number generation. */ + +/* + * Churn the randomness pool on a random event. Call this early and often + * on random and semi-random system events to build randomness in time for + * usage. For randomly timed events, pass a null pointer and a zero length + * and this will use the system timer and other sources to add randomness. + * If new random data is available, pass a pointer to that and it will be + * included. + * + * Ref: Applied Cryptography 2nd Ed. by Bruce Schneier p. 427 + */ +static void magic_churnrand(char *rand_data, u32_t rand_len) +{ + lwip_md5_context md5_ctx; + + /* LWIP_DEBUGF(LOG_INFO, ("magic_churnrand: %u@%P\n", rand_len, rand_data)); */ + lwip_md5_init(&md5_ctx); + lwip_md5_starts(&md5_ctx); + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)magic_randpool, sizeof(magic_randpool)); + + if (rand_data) { + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)rand_data, rand_len); + } else { + struct + { + /* INCLUDE fields for any system sources of randomness */ + u32_t jiffies; +#ifdef LWIP_RAND + u32_t rand; +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ + } sys_data; + magic_randomseed += sys_jiffies(); + sys_data.jiffies = magic_randomseed; +#ifdef LWIP_RAND + sys_data.rand = LWIP_RAND(); +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ + /* Load sys_data fields here. */ + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)&sys_data, sizeof(sys_data)); + } + + lwip_md5_finish(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)magic_randpool); + lwip_md5_free(&md5_ctx); + /* LWIP_DEBUGF(LOG_INFO, ("magic_churnrand: -> 0\n")); */ +} + +/* + * Initialize the random number generator. + */ +void magic_init(void) +{ + magic_churnrand(NULL, 0); +} + +/* + * Randomize our random seed value. + */ +void magic_randomize(void) +{ + magic_churnrand(NULL, 0); +} + +/* + * magic_random_bytes - Fill a buffer with random bytes. + * + * Use the random pool to generate random data. This degrades to pseudo + * random when used faster than randomness is supplied using magic_churnrand(). + * Note: It's important that there be sufficient randomness in magic_randpool + * before this is called for otherwise the range of the result may be + * narrow enough to make a search feasible. + * + * Ref: Applied Cryptography 2nd Ed. by Bruce Schneier p. 427 + * + * XXX Why does he not just call magic_churnrand() for each block? Probably + * so that you don't ever publish the seed which could possibly help + * predict future values. + * XXX Why don't we preserve md5 between blocks and just update it with + * magic_randcount each time? Probably there is a weakness but I wish that + * it was documented. + */ +void magic_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, u32_t buf_len) +{ + lwip_md5_context md5_ctx; + u_char tmp[MD5_HASH_SIZE]; + u32_t n; + + while (buf_len > 0) { + lwip_md5_init(&md5_ctx); + lwip_md5_starts(&md5_ctx); + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)magic_randpool, sizeof(magic_randpool)); + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)&magic_randcount, sizeof(magic_randcount)); + lwip_md5_finish(&md5_ctx, tmp); + lwip_md5_free(&md5_ctx); + magic_randcount++; + n = LWIP_MIN(buf_len, MD5_HASH_SIZE); + MEMCPY(buf, tmp, n); + buf += n; + buf_len -= n; + } +} + +/* + * Return a new random number. + */ +u32_t magic(void) +{ + u32_t new_rand; + + magic_random_bytes((unsigned char *)&new_rand, sizeof(new_rand)); + + return new_rand; +} + +#else /* PPP_MD5_RANDM */ + +/*****************************/ +/*** LOCAL DATA STRUCTURES ***/ +/*****************************/ +#ifndef LWIP_RAND +static int magic_randomized; /* Set when truely randomized. */ +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ +static u32_t magic_randomseed; /* Seed used for random number generation. */ + +/***********************************/ +/*** PUBLIC FUNCTION DEFINITIONS ***/ +/***********************************/ + +/* + * Initialize the random number generator. + * + * Here we attempt to compute a random number seed but even if + * it isn't random, we'll randomize it later. + * + * The current method uses the fields from the real time clock, + * the idle process counter, the millisecond counter, and the + * hardware timer tick counter. When this is invoked + * in startup(), then the idle counter and timer values may + * repeat after each boot and the real time clock may not be + * operational. Thus we call it again on the first random + * event. + */ +void magic_init(void) +{ + magic_randomseed += sys_jiffies(); +#ifndef LWIP_RAND + /* Initialize the Borland random number generator. */ + srand((unsigned)magic_randomseed); +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ +} + +/* + * magic_init - Initialize the magic number generator. + * + * Randomize our random seed value. Here we use the fact that + * this function is called at *truely random* times by the polling + * and network functions. Here we only get 16 bits of new random + * value but we use the previous value to randomize the other 16 + * bits. + */ +void magic_randomize(void) +{ +#ifndef LWIP_RAND + + if (!magic_randomized) { + magic_randomized = !0; + magic_init(); + /* The initialization function also updates the seed. */ + } else { +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ + magic_randomseed += sys_jiffies(); +#ifndef LWIP_RAND + } + +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ +} + +/* + * Return a new random number. + * + * Here we use the Borland rand() function to supply a pseudo random + * number which we make truely random by combining it with our own + * seed which is randomized by truely random events. + * Thus the numbers will be truely random unless there have been no + * operator or network events in which case it will be pseudo random + * seeded by the real time clock. + */ +u32_t magic(void) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_RAND + return LWIP_RAND() + magic_randomseed; +#else /* LWIP_RAND */ + return ((u32_t)rand() << 16) + (u32_t)rand() + magic_randomseed; +#endif /* LWIP_RAND */ +} + +/* + * magic_random_bytes - Fill a buffer with random bytes. + */ +void magic_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, u32_t buf_len) +{ + u32_t new_rand, n; + + while (buf_len > 0) { + new_rand = magic(); + n = LWIP_MIN(buf_len, sizeof(new_rand)); + MEMCPY(buf, &new_rand, n); + buf += n; + buf_len -= n; + } +} +#endif /* PPP_MD5_RANDM */ + +/* + * Return a new random number between 0 and (2^pow)-1 included. + */ +u32_t magic_pow(u8_t pow) +{ + return magic() & ~(~0UL << pow); +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/mppe.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/mppe.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/mppe.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/mppe.c index 0b620217..0872134e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/mppe.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/mppe.c @@ -1,436 +1,436 @@ -/* - * mppe.c - interface MPPE to the PPP code. - * - * By Frank Cusack . - * Copyright (c) 2002,2003,2004 Google, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * License: - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its - * documentation is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright - * notice appears in all copies. This software is provided without any - * warranty, express or implied. - * - * Changelog: - * 08/12/05 - Matt Domsch - * Only need extra skb padding on transmit, not receive. - * 06/18/04 - Matt Domsch , Oleg Makarenko - * Use Linux kernel 2.6 arc4 and sha1 routines rather than - * providing our own. - * 2/15/04 - TS: added #include and testing for Kernel - * version before using - * MOD_DEC_USAGE_COUNT/MOD_INC_USAGE_COUNT which are - * deprecated in 2.6 - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && MPPE_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include - -#include "lwip/err.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/mppe.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppdebug.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" - -#define SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20 - -/* ppp_mppe_state.bits definitions */ -#define MPPE_BIT_A 0x80 /* Encryption table were (re)inititalized */ -#define MPPE_BIT_B 0x40 /* MPPC only (not implemented) */ -#define MPPE_BIT_C 0x20 /* MPPC only (not implemented) */ -#define MPPE_BIT_D 0x10 /* This is an encrypted frame */ - -#define MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED MPPE_BIT_A -#define MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED MPPE_BIT_D - -#define MPPE_BITS(p) ((p)[0] & 0xf0) -#define MPPE_CCOUNT(p) ((((p)[0] & 0x0f) << 8) + (p)[1]) -#define MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE 0x1000 /* The size of the ccount space */ - -#define MPPE_OVHD 2 /* MPPE overhead/packet */ -#define SANITY_MAX 1600 /* Max bogon factor we will tolerate */ - -/* - * Perform the MPPE rekey algorithm, from RFC 3078, sec. 7.3. - * Well, not what's written there, but rather what they meant. - */ -static void mppe_rekey(ppp_mppe_state *state, int initial_key) -{ - lwip_sha1_context sha1_ctx; - u8_t sha1_digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - - /* - * Key Derivation, from RFC 3078, RFC 3079. - * Equivalent to Get_Key() for MS-CHAP as described in RFC 3079. - */ - lwip_sha1_init(&sha1_ctx); - lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1_ctx); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1_ctx, state->master_key, state->keylen); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1_ctx, mppe_sha1_pad1, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1_ctx, state->session_key, state->keylen); - lwip_sha1_update(&sha1_ctx, mppe_sha1_pad2, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); - lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1_ctx, sha1_digest); - lwip_sha1_free(&sha1_ctx); - MEMCPY(state->session_key, sha1_digest, state->keylen); - - if (!initial_key) { - lwip_arc4_init(&state->arc4); - lwip_arc4_setup(&state->arc4, sha1_digest, state->keylen); - lwip_arc4_crypt(&state->arc4, state->session_key, state->keylen); - lwip_arc4_free(&state->arc4); - } - - if (state->keylen == 8) { - /* See RFC 3078 */ - state->session_key[0] = 0xd1; - state->session_key[1] = 0x26; - state->session_key[2] = 0x9e; - } - - lwip_arc4_init(&state->arc4); - lwip_arc4_setup(&state->arc4, state->session_key, state->keylen); -} - -/* - * Set key, used by MSCHAP before mppe_init() is actually called by CCP so we - * don't have to keep multiple copies of keys. - */ -void mppe_set_key(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, u8_t *key) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - MEMCPY(state->master_key, key, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN); -} - -/* - * Initialize (de)compressor state. - */ -void mppe_init(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, u8_t options) -{ -#if PPP_DEBUG - const u8_t *debugstr = (const u8_t *)"mppe_comp_init"; - - if (&pcb->mppe_decomp == state) { - debugstr = (const u8_t *)"mppe_decomp_init"; - } - -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - - /* Save keys. */ - MEMCPY(state->session_key, state->master_key, sizeof(state->master_key)); - - if (options & MPPE_OPT_128) { - state->keylen = 16; - } else if (options & MPPE_OPT_40) { - state->keylen = 8; - } else { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%s[%d]: unknown key length\n", debugstr, - pcb->netif->num)); - lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); - return; - } - - if (options & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) { - state->stateful = 1; - } - - /* Generate the initial session key. */ - mppe_rekey(state, 1); - -#if PPP_DEBUG - { - int i; - char mkey[sizeof(state->master_key) * 2 + 1]; - char skey[sizeof(state->session_key) * 2 + 1]; - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%s[%d]: initialized with %d-bit %s mode\n", - debugstr, pcb->netif->num, (state->keylen == 16) ? 128 : 40, - (state->stateful) ? "stateful" : "stateless")); - - for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(state->master_key); i++) { - sprintf(mkey + i * 2, "%02x", state->master_key[i]); - } - - for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(state->session_key); i++) { - sprintf(skey + i * 2, "%02x", state->session_key[i]); - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, - ("%s[%d]: keys: master: %s initial session: %s\n", - debugstr, pcb->netif->num, mkey, skey)); - } -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - - /* - * Initialize the coherency count. The initial value is not specified - * in RFC 3078, but we can make a reasonable assumption that it will - * start at 0. Setting it to the max here makes the comp/decomp code - * do the right thing (determined through experiment). - */ - state->ccount = MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE - 1; - - /* - * Note that even though we have initialized the key table, we don't - * set the FLUSHED bit. This is contrary to RFC 3078, sec. 3.1. - */ - state->bits = MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED; -} - -/* - * We received a CCP Reset-Request (actually, we are sending a Reset-Ack), - * tell the compressor to rekey. Note that we MUST NOT rekey for - * every CCP Reset-Request; we only rekey on the next xmit packet. - * We might get multiple CCP Reset-Requests if our CCP Reset-Ack is lost. - * So, rekeying for every CCP Reset-Request is broken as the peer will not - * know how many times we've rekeyed. (If we rekey and THEN get another - * CCP Reset-Request, we must rekey again.) - */ -void mppe_comp_reset(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - state->bits |= MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED; -} - -/* - * Compress (encrypt) a packet. - * It's strange to call this a compressor, since the output is always - * MPPE_OVHD + 2 bytes larger than the input. - */ -err_t mppe_compress(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, struct pbuf **pb, u16_t protocol) -{ - struct pbuf *n, *np; - u8_t *pl; - err_t err; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - /* TCP stack requires that we don't change the packet payload, therefore we copy - * the whole packet before encryption. - */ - np = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, MPPE_OVHD + sizeof(protocol) + (*pb)->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (!np) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Hide MPPE header + protocol */ - pbuf_remove_header(np, MPPE_OVHD + sizeof(protocol)); - - if ((err = pbuf_copy(np, *pb)) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(np); - return err; - } - - /* Reveal MPPE header + protocol */ - pbuf_add_header(np, MPPE_OVHD + sizeof(protocol)); - - *pb = np; - pl = (u8_t *)np->payload; - - state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_compress[%d]: ccount %d\n", pcb->netif->num, state->ccount)); - /* FIXME: use PUT* macros */ - pl[0] = state->ccount >> 8; - pl[1] = state->ccount; - - if (!state->stateful || /* stateless mode */ - ((state->ccount & 0xff) == 0xff) || /* "flag" packet */ - (state->bits & MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED)) /* CCP Reset-Request */ - { - /* We must rekey */ - if (state->stateful) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_compress[%d]: rekeying\n", pcb->netif->num)); - } - - mppe_rekey(state, 0); - state->bits |= MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED; - } - - pl[0] |= state->bits; - state->bits &= ~MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED; /* reset for next xmit */ - pl += MPPE_OVHD; - - /* Add protocol */ - /* FIXME: add PFC support */ - pl[0] = protocol >> 8; - pl[1] = protocol; - - /* Hide MPPE header */ - pbuf_remove_header(np, MPPE_OVHD); - - /* Encrypt packet */ - for (n = np; n != NULL; n = n->next) { - lwip_arc4_crypt(&state->arc4, (u8_t *)n->payload, n->len); - - if (n->tot_len == n->len) { - break; - } - } - - /* Reveal MPPE header */ - pbuf_add_header(np, MPPE_OVHD); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* - * We received a CCP Reset-Ack. Just ignore it. - */ -void mppe_decomp_reset(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(state); - return; -} - -/* - * Decompress (decrypt) an MPPE packet. - */ -err_t mppe_decompress(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, struct pbuf **pb) -{ - struct pbuf *n0 = *pb, *n; - u8_t *pl; - u16_t ccount; - u8_t flushed; - - /* MPPE Header */ - if (n0->len < MPPE_OVHD) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, - ("mppe_decompress[%d]: short pkt (%d)\n", - pcb->netif->num, n0->len)); - state->sanity_errors += 100; - goto sanity_error; - } - - pl = (u8_t *)n0->payload; - flushed = MPPE_BITS(pl) & MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED; - ccount = MPPE_CCOUNT(pl); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_decompress[%d]: ccount %d\n", - pcb->netif->num, ccount)); - - /* sanity checks -- terminate with extreme prejudice */ - if (!(MPPE_BITS(pl) & MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED)) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, - ("mppe_decompress[%d]: ENCRYPTED bit not set!\n", - pcb->netif->num)); - state->sanity_errors += 100; - goto sanity_error; - } - - if (!state->stateful && !flushed) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_decompress[%d]: FLUSHED bit not set in " - "stateless mode!\n", - pcb->netif->num)); - state->sanity_errors += 100; - goto sanity_error; - } - - if (state->stateful && ((ccount & 0xff) == 0xff) && !flushed) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_decompress[%d]: FLUSHED bit not set on " - "flag packet!\n", - pcb->netif->num)); - state->sanity_errors += 100; - goto sanity_error; - } - - /* - * Check the coherency count. - */ - - if (!state->stateful) { - /* Discard late packet */ - if ((ccount - state->ccount) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE > MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE / 2) { - state->sanity_errors++; - goto sanity_error; - } - - /* RFC 3078, sec 8.1. Rekey for every packet. */ - while (state->ccount != ccount) { - mppe_rekey(state, 0); - state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE; - } - } else { - /* RFC 3078, sec 8.2. */ - if (!state->discard) { - /* normal state */ - state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE; - - if (ccount != state->ccount) { - /* - * (ccount > state->ccount) - * Packet loss detected, enter the discard state. - * Signal the peer to rekey (by sending a CCP Reset-Request). - */ - state->discard = 1; - ccp_resetrequest(pcb); - return ERR_BUF; - } - } else { - /* discard state */ - if (!flushed) { - /* ccp.c will be silent (no additional CCP Reset-Requests). */ - return ERR_BUF; - } else { - /* Rekey for every missed "flag" packet. */ - while ((ccount & ~0xff) != - (state->ccount & ~0xff)) { - mppe_rekey(state, 0); - state->ccount = - (state->ccount + - 256) % - MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE; - } - - /* reset */ - state->discard = 0; - state->ccount = ccount; - /* - * Another problem with RFC 3078 here. It implies that the - * peer need not send a Reset-Ack packet. But RFC 1962 - * requires it. Hopefully, M$ does send a Reset-Ack; even - * though it isn't required for MPPE synchronization, it is - * required to reset CCP state. - */ - } - } - - if (flushed) { - mppe_rekey(state, 0); - } - } - - /* Hide MPPE header */ - pbuf_remove_header(n0, MPPE_OVHD); - - /* Decrypt the packet. */ - for (n = n0; n != NULL; n = n->next) { - lwip_arc4_crypt(&state->arc4, (u8_t *)n->payload, n->len); - - if (n->tot_len == n->len) { - break; - } - } - - /* good packet credit */ - state->sanity_errors >>= 1; - - return ERR_OK; - -sanity_error: - - if (state->sanity_errors >= SANITY_MAX) { - /* - * Take LCP down if the peer is sending too many bogons. - * We don't want to do this for a single or just a few - * instances since it could just be due to packet corruption. - */ - lcp_close(pcb, "Too many MPPE errors"); - } - - return ERR_BUF; -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MPPE_SUPPORT */ +/* + * mppe.c - interface MPPE to the PPP code. + * + * By Frank Cusack . + * Copyright (c) 2002,2003,2004 Google, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * License: + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its + * documentation is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appears in all copies. This software is provided without any + * warranty, express or implied. + * + * Changelog: + * 08/12/05 - Matt Domsch + * Only need extra skb padding on transmit, not receive. + * 06/18/04 - Matt Domsch , Oleg Makarenko + * Use Linux kernel 2.6 arc4 and sha1 routines rather than + * providing our own. + * 2/15/04 - TS: added #include and testing for Kernel + * version before using + * MOD_DEC_USAGE_COUNT/MOD_INC_USAGE_COUNT which are + * deprecated in 2.6 + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && MPPE_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include + +#include "lwip/err.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/mppe.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppdebug.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" + +#define SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20 + +/* ppp_mppe_state.bits definitions */ +#define MPPE_BIT_A 0x80 /* Encryption table were (re)inititalized */ +#define MPPE_BIT_B 0x40 /* MPPC only (not implemented) */ +#define MPPE_BIT_C 0x20 /* MPPC only (not implemented) */ +#define MPPE_BIT_D 0x10 /* This is an encrypted frame */ + +#define MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED MPPE_BIT_A +#define MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED MPPE_BIT_D + +#define MPPE_BITS(p) ((p)[0] & 0xf0) +#define MPPE_CCOUNT(p) ((((p)[0] & 0x0f) << 8) + (p)[1]) +#define MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE 0x1000 /* The size of the ccount space */ + +#define MPPE_OVHD 2 /* MPPE overhead/packet */ +#define SANITY_MAX 1600 /* Max bogon factor we will tolerate */ + +/* + * Perform the MPPE rekey algorithm, from RFC 3078, sec. 7.3. + * Well, not what's written there, but rather what they meant. + */ +static void mppe_rekey(ppp_mppe_state *state, int initial_key) +{ + lwip_sha1_context sha1_ctx; + u8_t sha1_digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + + /* + * Key Derivation, from RFC 3078, RFC 3079. + * Equivalent to Get_Key() for MS-CHAP as described in RFC 3079. + */ + lwip_sha1_init(&sha1_ctx); + lwip_sha1_starts(&sha1_ctx); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1_ctx, state->master_key, state->keylen); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1_ctx, mppe_sha1_pad1, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1_ctx, state->session_key, state->keylen); + lwip_sha1_update(&sha1_ctx, mppe_sha1_pad2, SHA1_PAD_SIZE); + lwip_sha1_finish(&sha1_ctx, sha1_digest); + lwip_sha1_free(&sha1_ctx); + MEMCPY(state->session_key, sha1_digest, state->keylen); + + if (!initial_key) { + lwip_arc4_init(&state->arc4); + lwip_arc4_setup(&state->arc4, sha1_digest, state->keylen); + lwip_arc4_crypt(&state->arc4, state->session_key, state->keylen); + lwip_arc4_free(&state->arc4); + } + + if (state->keylen == 8) { + /* See RFC 3078 */ + state->session_key[0] = 0xd1; + state->session_key[1] = 0x26; + state->session_key[2] = 0x9e; + } + + lwip_arc4_init(&state->arc4); + lwip_arc4_setup(&state->arc4, state->session_key, state->keylen); +} + +/* + * Set key, used by MSCHAP before mppe_init() is actually called by CCP so we + * don't have to keep multiple copies of keys. + */ +void mppe_set_key(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, u8_t *key) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + MEMCPY(state->master_key, key, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN); +} + +/* + * Initialize (de)compressor state. + */ +void mppe_init(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, u8_t options) +{ +#if PPP_DEBUG + const u8_t *debugstr = (const u8_t *)"mppe_comp_init"; + + if (&pcb->mppe_decomp == state) { + debugstr = (const u8_t *)"mppe_decomp_init"; + } + +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + + /* Save keys. */ + MEMCPY(state->session_key, state->master_key, sizeof(state->master_key)); + + if (options & MPPE_OPT_128) { + state->keylen = 16; + } else if (options & MPPE_OPT_40) { + state->keylen = 8; + } else { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%s[%d]: unknown key length\n", debugstr, + pcb->netif->num)); + lcp_close(pcb, "MPPE required but peer negotiation failed"); + return; + } + + if (options & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL) { + state->stateful = 1; + } + + /* Generate the initial session key. */ + mppe_rekey(state, 1); + +#if PPP_DEBUG + { + int i; + char mkey[sizeof(state->master_key) * 2 + 1]; + char skey[sizeof(state->session_key) * 2 + 1]; + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%s[%d]: initialized with %d-bit %s mode\n", + debugstr, pcb->netif->num, (state->keylen == 16) ? 128 : 40, + (state->stateful) ? "stateful" : "stateless")); + + for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(state->master_key); i++) { + sprintf(mkey + i * 2, "%02x", state->master_key[i]); + } + + for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(state->session_key); i++) { + sprintf(skey + i * 2, "%02x", state->session_key[i]); + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, + ("%s[%d]: keys: master: %s initial session: %s\n", + debugstr, pcb->netif->num, mkey, skey)); + } +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + + /* + * Initialize the coherency count. The initial value is not specified + * in RFC 3078, but we can make a reasonable assumption that it will + * start at 0. Setting it to the max here makes the comp/decomp code + * do the right thing (determined through experiment). + */ + state->ccount = MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE - 1; + + /* + * Note that even though we have initialized the key table, we don't + * set the FLUSHED bit. This is contrary to RFC 3078, sec. 3.1. + */ + state->bits = MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED; +} + +/* + * We received a CCP Reset-Request (actually, we are sending a Reset-Ack), + * tell the compressor to rekey. Note that we MUST NOT rekey for + * every CCP Reset-Request; we only rekey on the next xmit packet. + * We might get multiple CCP Reset-Requests if our CCP Reset-Ack is lost. + * So, rekeying for every CCP Reset-Request is broken as the peer will not + * know how many times we've rekeyed. (If we rekey and THEN get another + * CCP Reset-Request, we must rekey again.) + */ +void mppe_comp_reset(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + state->bits |= MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED; +} + +/* + * Compress (encrypt) a packet. + * It's strange to call this a compressor, since the output is always + * MPPE_OVHD + 2 bytes larger than the input. + */ +err_t mppe_compress(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, struct pbuf **pb, u16_t protocol) +{ + struct pbuf *n, *np; + u8_t *pl; + err_t err; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + /* TCP stack requires that we don't change the packet payload, therefore we copy + * the whole packet before encryption. + */ + np = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, MPPE_OVHD + sizeof(protocol) + (*pb)->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (!np) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Hide MPPE header + protocol */ + pbuf_remove_header(np, MPPE_OVHD + sizeof(protocol)); + + if ((err = pbuf_copy(np, *pb)) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(np); + return err; + } + + /* Reveal MPPE header + protocol */ + pbuf_add_header(np, MPPE_OVHD + sizeof(protocol)); + + *pb = np; + pl = (u8_t *)np->payload; + + state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_compress[%d]: ccount %d\n", pcb->netif->num, state->ccount)); + /* FIXME: use PUT* macros */ + pl[0] = state->ccount >> 8; + pl[1] = state->ccount; + + if (!state->stateful || /* stateless mode */ + ((state->ccount & 0xff) == 0xff) || /* "flag" packet */ + (state->bits & MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED)) /* CCP Reset-Request */ + { + /* We must rekey */ + if (state->stateful) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_compress[%d]: rekeying\n", pcb->netif->num)); + } + + mppe_rekey(state, 0); + state->bits |= MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED; + } + + pl[0] |= state->bits; + state->bits &= ~MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED; /* reset for next xmit */ + pl += MPPE_OVHD; + + /* Add protocol */ + /* FIXME: add PFC support */ + pl[0] = protocol >> 8; + pl[1] = protocol; + + /* Hide MPPE header */ + pbuf_remove_header(np, MPPE_OVHD); + + /* Encrypt packet */ + for (n = np; n != NULL; n = n->next) { + lwip_arc4_crypt(&state->arc4, (u8_t *)n->payload, n->len); + + if (n->tot_len == n->len) { + break; + } + } + + /* Reveal MPPE header */ + pbuf_add_header(np, MPPE_OVHD); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* + * We received a CCP Reset-Ack. Just ignore it. + */ +void mppe_decomp_reset(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(state); + return; +} + +/* + * Decompress (decrypt) an MPPE packet. + */ +err_t mppe_decompress(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_mppe_state *state, struct pbuf **pb) +{ + struct pbuf *n0 = *pb, *n; + u8_t *pl; + u16_t ccount; + u8_t flushed; + + /* MPPE Header */ + if (n0->len < MPPE_OVHD) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, + ("mppe_decompress[%d]: short pkt (%d)\n", + pcb->netif->num, n0->len)); + state->sanity_errors += 100; + goto sanity_error; + } + + pl = (u8_t *)n0->payload; + flushed = MPPE_BITS(pl) & MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED; + ccount = MPPE_CCOUNT(pl); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_decompress[%d]: ccount %d\n", + pcb->netif->num, ccount)); + + /* sanity checks -- terminate with extreme prejudice */ + if (!(MPPE_BITS(pl) & MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED)) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, + ("mppe_decompress[%d]: ENCRYPTED bit not set!\n", + pcb->netif->num)); + state->sanity_errors += 100; + goto sanity_error; + } + + if (!state->stateful && !flushed) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_decompress[%d]: FLUSHED bit not set in " + "stateless mode!\n", + pcb->netif->num)); + state->sanity_errors += 100; + goto sanity_error; + } + + if (state->stateful && ((ccount & 0xff) == 0xff) && !flushed) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("mppe_decompress[%d]: FLUSHED bit not set on " + "flag packet!\n", + pcb->netif->num)); + state->sanity_errors += 100; + goto sanity_error; + } + + /* + * Check the coherency count. + */ + + if (!state->stateful) { + /* Discard late packet */ + if ((ccount - state->ccount) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE > MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE / 2) { + state->sanity_errors++; + goto sanity_error; + } + + /* RFC 3078, sec 8.1. Rekey for every packet. */ + while (state->ccount != ccount) { + mppe_rekey(state, 0); + state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE; + } + } else { + /* RFC 3078, sec 8.2. */ + if (!state->discard) { + /* normal state */ + state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE; + + if (ccount != state->ccount) { + /* + * (ccount > state->ccount) + * Packet loss detected, enter the discard state. + * Signal the peer to rekey (by sending a CCP Reset-Request). + */ + state->discard = 1; + ccp_resetrequest(pcb); + return ERR_BUF; + } + } else { + /* discard state */ + if (!flushed) { + /* ccp.c will be silent (no additional CCP Reset-Requests). */ + return ERR_BUF; + } else { + /* Rekey for every missed "flag" packet. */ + while ((ccount & ~0xff) != + (state->ccount & ~0xff)) { + mppe_rekey(state, 0); + state->ccount = + (state->ccount + + 256) % + MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE; + } + + /* reset */ + state->discard = 0; + state->ccount = ccount; + /* + * Another problem with RFC 3078 here. It implies that the + * peer need not send a Reset-Ack packet. But RFC 1962 + * requires it. Hopefully, M$ does send a Reset-Ack; even + * though it isn't required for MPPE synchronization, it is + * required to reset CCP state. + */ + } + } + + if (flushed) { + mppe_rekey(state, 0); + } + } + + /* Hide MPPE header */ + pbuf_remove_header(n0, MPPE_OVHD); + + /* Decrypt the packet. */ + for (n = n0; n != NULL; n = n->next) { + lwip_arc4_crypt(&state->arc4, (u8_t *)n->payload, n->len); + + if (n->tot_len == n->len) { + break; + } + } + + /* good packet credit */ + state->sanity_errors >>= 1; + + return ERR_OK; + +sanity_error: + + if (state->sanity_errors >= SANITY_MAX) { + /* + * Take LCP down if the peer is sending too many bogons. + * We don't want to do this for a single or just a few + * instances since it could just be due to packet corruption. + */ + lcp_close(pcb, "Too many MPPE errors"); + } + + return ERR_BUF; +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MPPE_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/multilink.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/multilink.c similarity index 95% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/multilink.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/multilink.c index 2108ab9a..91167da5 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/multilink.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/multilink.c @@ -1,717 +1,717 @@ -/* - * multilink.c - support routines for multilink. - * - * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && defined(HAVE_MULTILINK) /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/* Multilink support - * - * Multilink uses Samba TDB (Trivial Database Library), which - * we cannot port, because it needs a filesystem. - * - * We have to choose between doing a memory-shared TDB-clone, - * or dropping multilink support at all. - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/tdb.h" - -bool endpoint_specified; /* user gave explicit endpoint discriminator */ -char *bundle_id; /* identifier for our bundle */ -char *blinks_id; /* key for the list of links */ -bool doing_multilink; /* multilink was enabled and agreed to */ -bool multilink_master; /* we own the multilink bundle */ - -extern TDB_CONTEXT *pppdb; -extern char db_key[]; - -static void make_bundle_links(int append); -static void remove_bundle_link(void); -static void iterate_bundle_links(void (*func)(char *)); - -static int get_default_epdisc(struct epdisc *); -static int parse_num(char *str, const char *key, int *valp); -static int owns_unit(TDB_DATA pid, int unit); - -#define set_ip_epdisc(ep, addr) \ - do { \ - ep->length = 4; \ - ep->value[0] = addr >> 24; \ - ep->value[1] = addr >> 16; \ - ep->value[2] = addr >> 8; \ - ep->value[3] = addr; \ - } while (0) - -#define LOCAL_IP_ADDR(addr) \ - (((addr)&0xff000000) == 0x0a000000 /* 10.x.x.x */ \ - || ((addr)&0xfff00000) == 0xac100000 /* 172.16.x.x */ \ - || ((addr)&0xffff0000) == 0xc0a80000) /* 192.168.x.x */ - -#define process_exists(n) (kill((n), 0) == 0 || errno != ESRCH) - -void mp_check_options() -{ - lcp_options *wo = &lcp_wantoptions[0]; - lcp_options *ao = &lcp_allowoptions[0]; - - doing_multilink = 0; - - if (!multilink) { - return; - } - - /* if we're doing multilink, we have to negotiate MRRU */ - if (!wo->neg_mrru) { - /* mrru not specified, default to mru */ - wo->mrru = wo->mru; - wo->neg_mrru = 1; - } - - ao->mrru = ao->mru; - ao->neg_mrru = 1; - - if (!wo->neg_endpoint && !noendpoint) { - /* get a default endpoint value */ - wo->neg_endpoint = get_default_epdisc(&wo->endpoint); - } -} - -/* - * Make a new bundle or join us to an existing bundle - * if we are doing multilink. - */ -int mp_join_bundle() -{ - lcp_options *go = &lcp_gotoptions[0]; - lcp_options *ho = &lcp_hisoptions[0]; - lcp_options *ao = &lcp_allowoptions[0]; - int unit, pppd_pid; - int l, mtu; - char *p; - TDB_DATA key, pid, rec; - - if (doing_multilink) { - /* have previously joined a bundle */ - if (!go->neg_mrru || !ho->neg_mrru) { - notice("oops, didn't get multilink on renegotiation"); - lcp_close(pcb, "multilink required"); - return 0; - } - - /* XXX should check the peer_authname and ho->endpoint - are the same as previously */ - return 0; - } - - if (!go->neg_mrru || !ho->neg_mrru) { - /* not doing multilink */ - if (go->neg_mrru) { - notice("oops, multilink negotiated only for receive"); - } - - mtu = ho->neg_mru ? ho->mru : PPP_MRU; - - if (mtu > ao->mru) { - mtu = ao->mru; - } - - if (demand) { - /* already have a bundle */ - cfg_bundle(0, 0, 0, 0); - netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu); - return 0; - } - - make_new_bundle(0, 0, 0, 0); - set_ifunit(1); - netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu); - return 0; - } - - doing_multilink = 1; - - /* - * Find the appropriate bundle or join a new one. - * First we make up a name for the bundle. - * The length estimate is worst-case assuming every - * character has to be quoted. - */ - l = 4 * strlen(peer_authname) + 10; - - if (ho->neg_endpoint) { - l += 3 * ho->endpoint.length + 8; - } - - if (bundle_name) { - l += 3 * strlen(bundle_name) + 2; - } - - bundle_id = malloc(l); - - if (bundle_id == 0) { - novm("bundle identifier"); - } - - p = bundle_id; - p += slprintf(p, l - 1, "BUNDLE=\"%q\"", peer_authname); - - if (ho->neg_endpoint || bundle_name) { - *p++ = '/'; - } - - if (ho->neg_endpoint) - p += slprintf(p, bundle_id + l - p, "%s", - epdisc_to_str(&ho->endpoint)); - - if (bundle_name) { - p += slprintf(p, bundle_id + l - p, "/%v", bundle_name); - } - - /* Make the key for the list of links belonging to the bundle */ - l = p - bundle_id; - blinks_id = malloc(l + 7); - - if (blinks_id == NULL) { - novm("bundle links key"); - } - - slprintf(blinks_id, l + 7, "BUNDLE_LINKS=%s", bundle_id + 7); - - /* - * For demand mode, we only need to configure the bundle - * and attach the link. - */ - mtu = LWIP_MIN(ho->mrru, ao->mru); - - if (demand) { - cfg_bundle(go->mrru, ho->mrru, go->neg_ssnhf, ho->neg_ssnhf); - netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu); - script_setenv("BUNDLE", bundle_id + 7, 1); - return 0; - } - - /* - * Check if the bundle ID is already in the database. - */ - unit = -1; - lock_db(); - key.dptr = bundle_id; - key.dsize = p - bundle_id; - pid = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); - - if (pid.dptr != NULL) { - /* bundle ID exists, see if the pppd record exists */ - rec = tdb_fetch(pppdb, pid); - - if (rec.dptr != NULL && rec.dsize > 0) { - /* make sure the string is null-terminated */ - rec.dptr[rec.dsize - 1] = 0; - /* parse the interface number */ - parse_num(rec.dptr, "IFNAME=ppp", &unit); - - /* check the pid value */ - if (!parse_num(rec.dptr, "PPPD_PID=", &pppd_pid) || !process_exists(pppd_pid) || !owns_unit(pid, unit)) { - unit = -1; - } - - free(rec.dptr); - } - - free(pid.dptr); - } - - if (unit >= 0) { - /* attach to existing unit */ - if (bundle_attach(unit)) { - set_ifunit(0); - script_setenv("BUNDLE", bundle_id + 7, 0); - make_bundle_links(1); - unlock_db(); - info("Link attached to %s", ifname); - return 1; - } - - /* attach failed because bundle doesn't exist */ - } - - /* we have to make a new bundle */ - make_new_bundle(go->mrru, ho->mrru, go->neg_ssnhf, ho->neg_ssnhf); - set_ifunit(1); - netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu); - script_setenv("BUNDLE", bundle_id + 7, 1); - make_bundle_links(pcb); - unlock_db(); - info("New bundle %s created", ifname); - multilink_master = 1; - return 0; -} - -void mp_exit_bundle() -{ - lock_db(); - remove_bundle_link(); - unlock_db(); -} - -static void sendhup(char *str) -{ - int pid; - - if (parse_num(str, "PPPD_PID=", &pid) && pid != getpid()) { - if (debug) { - dbglog("sending SIGHUP to process %d", pid); - } - - kill(pid, SIGHUP); - } -} - -void mp_bundle_terminated() -{ - TDB_DATA key; - - bundle_terminating = 1; - upper_layers_down(pcb); - notice("Connection terminated."); -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - print_link_stats(); -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - - if (!demand) { - remove_pidfiles(); - script_unsetenv("IFNAME"); - } - - lock_db(); - destroy_bundle(); - iterate_bundle_links(sendhup); - key.dptr = blinks_id; - key.dsize = strlen(blinks_id); - tdb_delete(pppdb, key); - unlock_db(); - - new_phase(PPP_PHASE_DEAD); - - doing_multilink = 0; - multilink_master = 0; -} - -static void make_bundle_links(int append) -{ - TDB_DATA key, rec; - char *p; - char entry[32]; - int l; - - key.dptr = blinks_id; - key.dsize = strlen(blinks_id); - slprintf(entry, sizeof(entry), "%s;", db_key); - p = entry; - - if (append) { - rec = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); - - if (rec.dptr != NULL && rec.dsize > 0) { - rec.dptr[rec.dsize - 1] = 0; - - if (strstr(rec.dptr, db_key) != NULL) { - /* already in there? strange */ - warn("link entry already exists in tdb"); - return; - } - - l = rec.dsize + strlen(entry); - p = malloc(l); - - if (p == NULL) { - novm("bundle link list"); - } - - slprintf(p, l, "%s%s", rec.dptr, entry); - } else { - warn("bundle link list not found"); - } - - if (rec.dptr != NULL) { - free(rec.dptr); - } - } - - rec.dptr = p; - rec.dsize = strlen(p) + 1; - - if (tdb_store(pppdb, key, rec, TDB_REPLACE)) - error("couldn't %s bundle link list", - append ? "update" : "create"); - - if (p != entry) { - free(p); - } -} - -static void remove_bundle_link() -{ - TDB_DATA key, rec; - char entry[32]; - char *p, *q; - int l; - - key.dptr = blinks_id; - key.dsize = strlen(blinks_id); - slprintf(entry, sizeof(entry), "%s;", db_key); - - rec = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); - - if (rec.dptr == NULL || rec.dsize <= 0) { - if (rec.dptr != NULL) { - free(rec.dptr); - } - - return; - } - - rec.dptr[rec.dsize - 1] = 0; - p = strstr(rec.dptr, entry); - - if (p != NULL) { - q = p + strlen(entry); - l = strlen(q) + 1; - memmove(p, q, l); - rec.dsize = p - rec.dptr + l; - - if (tdb_store(pppdb, key, rec, TDB_REPLACE)) { - error("couldn't update bundle link list (removal)"); - } - } - - free(rec.dptr); -} - -static void iterate_bundle_links(void (*func)(char *)) -{ - TDB_DATA key, rec, pp; - char *p, *q; - - key.dptr = blinks_id; - key.dsize = strlen(blinks_id); - rec = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); - - if (rec.dptr == NULL || rec.dsize <= 0) { - error("bundle link list not found (iterating list)"); - - if (rec.dptr != NULL) { - free(rec.dptr); - } - - return; - } - - p = rec.dptr; - p[rec.dsize - 1] = 0; - - while ((q = strchr(p, ';')) != NULL) { - *q = 0; - key.dptr = p; - key.dsize = q - p; - pp = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); - - if (pp.dptr != NULL && pp.dsize > 0) { - pp.dptr[pp.dsize - 1] = 0; - func(pp.dptr); - } - - if (pp.dptr != NULL) { - free(pp.dptr); - } - - p = q + 1; - } - - free(rec.dptr); -} - -static int parse_num(str, key, valp) char *str; -const char *key; -int *valp; -{ - char *p, *endp; - int i; - - p = strstr(str, key); - - if (p != 0) { - p += strlen(key); - i = strtol(p, &endp, 10); - - if (endp != p && (*endp == 0 || *endp == ';')) { - *valp = i; - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Check whether the pppd identified by `key' still owns ppp unit `unit'. - */ -static int owns_unit(key, unit) - TDB_DATA key; -int unit; -{ - char ifkey[32]; - TDB_DATA kd, vd; - int ret = 0; - - slprintf(ifkey, sizeof(ifkey), "IFNAME=ppp%d", unit); - kd.dptr = ifkey; - kd.dsize = strlen(ifkey); - vd = tdb_fetch(pppdb, kd); - - if (vd.dptr != NULL) { - ret = vd.dsize == key.dsize && memcmp(vd.dptr, key.dptr, vd.dsize) == 0; - free(vd.dptr); - } - - return ret; -} - -static int get_default_epdisc(ep) struct epdisc *ep; -{ - char *p; - struct hostent *hp; - u32_t addr; - - /* First try for an ethernet MAC address */ - p = get_first_ethernet(); - - if (p != 0 && get_if_hwaddr(ep->value, p) >= 0) { - ep->class = EPD_MAC; - ep->length = 6; - return 1; - } - - /* see if our hostname corresponds to a reasonable IP address */ - hp = gethostbyname(hostname); - - if (hp != NULL) { - addr = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; - - if (!bad_ip_adrs(addr)) { - addr = lwip_ntohl(addr); - - if (!LOCAL_IP_ADDR(addr)) { - ep->class = EPD_IP; - set_ip_epdisc(ep, addr); - return 1; - } - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/* - * epdisc_to_str - make a printable string from an endpoint discriminator. - */ - -static char *endp_class_names[] = { - "null", "local", "IP", "MAC", "magic", "phone" -}; - -char *epdisc_to_str(ep) struct epdisc *ep; -{ - static char str[MAX_ENDP_LEN * 3 + 8]; - u_char *p = ep->value; - int i, mask = 0; - char *q, c, c2; - - if (ep->class == EPD_NULL && ep->length == 0) { - return "null"; - } - - if (ep->class == EPD_IP && ep->length == 4) { - u32_t addr; - - GETLONG(addr, p); - slprintf(str, sizeof(str), "IP:%I", lwip_htonl(addr)); - return str; - } - - c = ':'; - c2 = '.'; - - if (ep->class == EPD_MAC && ep->length == 6) { - c2 = ':'; - } else if (ep->class == EPD_MAGIC && (ep->length % 4) == 0) { - mask = 3; - } - - q = str; - - if (ep->class <= EPD_PHONENUM) - q += slprintf(q, sizeof(str) - 1, "%s", - endp_class_names[ep->class]); - else { - q += slprintf(q, sizeof(str) - 1, "%d", ep->class); - } - - c = ':'; - - for (i = 0; i < ep->length && i < MAX_ENDP_LEN; ++i) { - if ((i & mask) == 0) { - *q++ = c; - c = c2; - } - - q += slprintf(q, str + sizeof(str) - q, "%.2x", ep->value[i]); - } - - return str; -} - -static int hexc_val(int c) -{ - if (c >= 'a') { - return c - 'a' + 10; - } - - if (c >= 'A') { - return c - 'A' + 10; - } - - return c - '0'; -} - -int str_to_epdisc(ep, str) struct epdisc *ep; -char *str; -{ - int i, l; - char *p, *endp; - - for (i = EPD_NULL; i <= EPD_PHONENUM; ++i) { - int sl = strlen(endp_class_names[i]); - - if (strncasecmp(str, endp_class_names[i], sl) == 0) { - str += sl; - break; - } - } - - if (i > EPD_PHONENUM) { - /* not a class name, try a decimal class number */ - i = strtol(str, &endp, 10); - - if (endp == str) { - return 0; /* can't parse class number */ - } - - str = endp; - } - - ep->class = i; - - if (*str == 0) { - ep->length = 0; - return 1; - } - - if (*str != ':' && *str != '.') { - return 0; - } - - ++str; - - if (i == EPD_IP) { - u32_t addr; - i = parse_dotted_ip(str, &addr); - - if (i == 0 || str[i] != 0) { - return 0; - } - - set_ip_epdisc(ep, addr); - return 1; - } - - if (i == EPD_MAC && get_if_hwaddr(ep->value, str) >= 0) { - ep->length = 6; - return 1; - } - - p = str; - - for (l = 0; l < MAX_ENDP_LEN; ++l) { - if (*str == 0) { - break; - } - - if (p <= str) - for (p = str; isxdigit(*p); ++p) - ; - - i = p - str; - - if (i == 0) { - return 0; - } - - ep->value[l] = hexc_val(*str++); - - if ((i & 1) == 0) { - ep->value[l] = (ep->value[l] << 4) + hexc_val(*str++); - } - - if (*str == ':' || *str == '.') { - ++str; - } - } - - if (*str != 0 || (ep->class == EPD_MAC && l != 6)) { - return 0; - } - - ep->length = l; - return 1; -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && HAVE_MULTILINK */ +/* + * multilink.c - support routines for multilink. + * + * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && defined(HAVE_MULTILINK) /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/* Multilink support + * + * Multilink uses Samba TDB (Trivial Database Library), which + * we cannot port, because it needs a filesystem. + * + * We have to choose between doing a memory-shared TDB-clone, + * or dropping multilink support at all. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/tdb.h" + +bool endpoint_specified; /* user gave explicit endpoint discriminator */ +char *bundle_id; /* identifier for our bundle */ +char *blinks_id; /* key for the list of links */ +bool doing_multilink; /* multilink was enabled and agreed to */ +bool multilink_master; /* we own the multilink bundle */ + +extern TDB_CONTEXT *pppdb; +extern char db_key[]; + +static void make_bundle_links(int append); +static void remove_bundle_link(void); +static void iterate_bundle_links(void (*func)(char *)); + +static int get_default_epdisc(struct epdisc *); +static int parse_num(char *str, const char *key, int *valp); +static int owns_unit(TDB_DATA pid, int unit); + +#define set_ip_epdisc(ep, addr) \ + do { \ + ep->length = 4; \ + ep->value[0] = addr >> 24; \ + ep->value[1] = addr >> 16; \ + ep->value[2] = addr >> 8; \ + ep->value[3] = addr; \ + } while (0) + +#define LOCAL_IP_ADDR(addr) \ + (((addr)&0xff000000) == 0x0a000000 /* 10.x.x.x */ \ + || ((addr)&0xfff00000) == 0xac100000 /* 172.16.x.x */ \ + || ((addr)&0xffff0000) == 0xc0a80000) /* 192.168.x.x */ + +#define process_exists(n) (kill((n), 0) == 0 || errno != ESRCH) + +void mp_check_options() +{ + lcp_options *wo = &lcp_wantoptions[0]; + lcp_options *ao = &lcp_allowoptions[0]; + + doing_multilink = 0; + + if (!multilink) { + return; + } + + /* if we're doing multilink, we have to negotiate MRRU */ + if (!wo->neg_mrru) { + /* mrru not specified, default to mru */ + wo->mrru = wo->mru; + wo->neg_mrru = 1; + } + + ao->mrru = ao->mru; + ao->neg_mrru = 1; + + if (!wo->neg_endpoint && !noendpoint) { + /* get a default endpoint value */ + wo->neg_endpoint = get_default_epdisc(&wo->endpoint); + } +} + +/* + * Make a new bundle or join us to an existing bundle + * if we are doing multilink. + */ +int mp_join_bundle() +{ + lcp_options *go = &lcp_gotoptions[0]; + lcp_options *ho = &lcp_hisoptions[0]; + lcp_options *ao = &lcp_allowoptions[0]; + int unit, pppd_pid; + int l, mtu; + char *p; + TDB_DATA key, pid, rec; + + if (doing_multilink) { + /* have previously joined a bundle */ + if (!go->neg_mrru || !ho->neg_mrru) { + notice("oops, didn't get multilink on renegotiation"); + lcp_close(pcb, "multilink required"); + return 0; + } + + /* XXX should check the peer_authname and ho->endpoint + are the same as previously */ + return 0; + } + + if (!go->neg_mrru || !ho->neg_mrru) { + /* not doing multilink */ + if (go->neg_mrru) { + notice("oops, multilink negotiated only for receive"); + } + + mtu = ho->neg_mru ? ho->mru : PPP_MRU; + + if (mtu > ao->mru) { + mtu = ao->mru; + } + + if (demand) { + /* already have a bundle */ + cfg_bundle(0, 0, 0, 0); + netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu); + return 0; + } + + make_new_bundle(0, 0, 0, 0); + set_ifunit(1); + netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu); + return 0; + } + + doing_multilink = 1; + + /* + * Find the appropriate bundle or join a new one. + * First we make up a name for the bundle. + * The length estimate is worst-case assuming every + * character has to be quoted. + */ + l = 4 * strlen(peer_authname) + 10; + + if (ho->neg_endpoint) { + l += 3 * ho->endpoint.length + 8; + } + + if (bundle_name) { + l += 3 * strlen(bundle_name) + 2; + } + + bundle_id = malloc(l); + + if (bundle_id == 0) { + novm("bundle identifier"); + } + + p = bundle_id; + p += slprintf(p, l - 1, "BUNDLE=\"%q\"", peer_authname); + + if (ho->neg_endpoint || bundle_name) { + *p++ = '/'; + } + + if (ho->neg_endpoint) + p += slprintf(p, bundle_id + l - p, "%s", + epdisc_to_str(&ho->endpoint)); + + if (bundle_name) { + p += slprintf(p, bundle_id + l - p, "/%v", bundle_name); + } + + /* Make the key for the list of links belonging to the bundle */ + l = p - bundle_id; + blinks_id = malloc(l + 7); + + if (blinks_id == NULL) { + novm("bundle links key"); + } + + slprintf(blinks_id, l + 7, "BUNDLE_LINKS=%s", bundle_id + 7); + + /* + * For demand mode, we only need to configure the bundle + * and attach the link. + */ + mtu = LWIP_MIN(ho->mrru, ao->mru); + + if (demand) { + cfg_bundle(go->mrru, ho->mrru, go->neg_ssnhf, ho->neg_ssnhf); + netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu); + script_setenv("BUNDLE", bundle_id + 7, 1); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Check if the bundle ID is already in the database. + */ + unit = -1; + lock_db(); + key.dptr = bundle_id; + key.dsize = p - bundle_id; + pid = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); + + if (pid.dptr != NULL) { + /* bundle ID exists, see if the pppd record exists */ + rec = tdb_fetch(pppdb, pid); + + if (rec.dptr != NULL && rec.dsize > 0) { + /* make sure the string is null-terminated */ + rec.dptr[rec.dsize - 1] = 0; + /* parse the interface number */ + parse_num(rec.dptr, "IFNAME=ppp", &unit); + + /* check the pid value */ + if (!parse_num(rec.dptr, "PPPD_PID=", &pppd_pid) || !process_exists(pppd_pid) || !owns_unit(pid, unit)) { + unit = -1; + } + + free(rec.dptr); + } + + free(pid.dptr); + } + + if (unit >= 0) { + /* attach to existing unit */ + if (bundle_attach(unit)) { + set_ifunit(0); + script_setenv("BUNDLE", bundle_id + 7, 0); + make_bundle_links(1); + unlock_db(); + info("Link attached to %s", ifname); + return 1; + } + + /* attach failed because bundle doesn't exist */ + } + + /* we have to make a new bundle */ + make_new_bundle(go->mrru, ho->mrru, go->neg_ssnhf, ho->neg_ssnhf); + set_ifunit(1); + netif_set_mtu(pcb, mtu); + script_setenv("BUNDLE", bundle_id + 7, 1); + make_bundle_links(pcb); + unlock_db(); + info("New bundle %s created", ifname); + multilink_master = 1; + return 0; +} + +void mp_exit_bundle() +{ + lock_db(); + remove_bundle_link(); + unlock_db(); +} + +static void sendhup(char *str) +{ + int pid; + + if (parse_num(str, "PPPD_PID=", &pid) && pid != getpid()) { + if (debug) { + dbglog("sending SIGHUP to process %d", pid); + } + + kill(pid, SIGHUP); + } +} + +void mp_bundle_terminated() +{ + TDB_DATA key; + + bundle_terminating = 1; + upper_layers_down(pcb); + notice("Connection terminated."); +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + print_link_stats(); +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + + if (!demand) { + remove_pidfiles(); + script_unsetenv("IFNAME"); + } + + lock_db(); + destroy_bundle(); + iterate_bundle_links(sendhup); + key.dptr = blinks_id; + key.dsize = strlen(blinks_id); + tdb_delete(pppdb, key); + unlock_db(); + + new_phase(PPP_PHASE_DEAD); + + doing_multilink = 0; + multilink_master = 0; +} + +static void make_bundle_links(int append) +{ + TDB_DATA key, rec; + char *p; + char entry[32]; + int l; + + key.dptr = blinks_id; + key.dsize = strlen(blinks_id); + slprintf(entry, sizeof(entry), "%s;", db_key); + p = entry; + + if (append) { + rec = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); + + if (rec.dptr != NULL && rec.dsize > 0) { + rec.dptr[rec.dsize - 1] = 0; + + if (strstr(rec.dptr, db_key) != NULL) { + /* already in there? strange */ + warn("link entry already exists in tdb"); + return; + } + + l = rec.dsize + strlen(entry); + p = malloc(l); + + if (p == NULL) { + novm("bundle link list"); + } + + slprintf(p, l, "%s%s", rec.dptr, entry); + } else { + warn("bundle link list not found"); + } + + if (rec.dptr != NULL) { + free(rec.dptr); + } + } + + rec.dptr = p; + rec.dsize = strlen(p) + 1; + + if (tdb_store(pppdb, key, rec, TDB_REPLACE)) + error("couldn't %s bundle link list", + append ? "update" : "create"); + + if (p != entry) { + free(p); + } +} + +static void remove_bundle_link() +{ + TDB_DATA key, rec; + char entry[32]; + char *p, *q; + int l; + + key.dptr = blinks_id; + key.dsize = strlen(blinks_id); + slprintf(entry, sizeof(entry), "%s;", db_key); + + rec = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); + + if (rec.dptr == NULL || rec.dsize <= 0) { + if (rec.dptr != NULL) { + free(rec.dptr); + } + + return; + } + + rec.dptr[rec.dsize - 1] = 0; + p = strstr(rec.dptr, entry); + + if (p != NULL) { + q = p + strlen(entry); + l = strlen(q) + 1; + memmove(p, q, l); + rec.dsize = p - rec.dptr + l; + + if (tdb_store(pppdb, key, rec, TDB_REPLACE)) { + error("couldn't update bundle link list (removal)"); + } + } + + free(rec.dptr); +} + +static void iterate_bundle_links(void (*func)(char *)) +{ + TDB_DATA key, rec, pp; + char *p, *q; + + key.dptr = blinks_id; + key.dsize = strlen(blinks_id); + rec = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); + + if (rec.dptr == NULL || rec.dsize <= 0) { + error("bundle link list not found (iterating list)"); + + if (rec.dptr != NULL) { + free(rec.dptr); + } + + return; + } + + p = rec.dptr; + p[rec.dsize - 1] = 0; + + while ((q = strchr(p, ';')) != NULL) { + *q = 0; + key.dptr = p; + key.dsize = q - p; + pp = tdb_fetch(pppdb, key); + + if (pp.dptr != NULL && pp.dsize > 0) { + pp.dptr[pp.dsize - 1] = 0; + func(pp.dptr); + } + + if (pp.dptr != NULL) { + free(pp.dptr); + } + + p = q + 1; + } + + free(rec.dptr); +} + +static int parse_num(str, key, valp) char *str; +const char *key; +int *valp; +{ + char *p, *endp; + int i; + + p = strstr(str, key); + + if (p != 0) { + p += strlen(key); + i = strtol(p, &endp, 10); + + if (endp != p && (*endp == 0 || *endp == ';')) { + *valp = i; + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check whether the pppd identified by `key' still owns ppp unit `unit'. + */ +static int owns_unit(key, unit) + TDB_DATA key; +int unit; +{ + char ifkey[32]; + TDB_DATA kd, vd; + int ret = 0; + + slprintf(ifkey, sizeof(ifkey), "IFNAME=ppp%d", unit); + kd.dptr = ifkey; + kd.dsize = strlen(ifkey); + vd = tdb_fetch(pppdb, kd); + + if (vd.dptr != NULL) { + ret = vd.dsize == key.dsize && memcmp(vd.dptr, key.dptr, vd.dsize) == 0; + free(vd.dptr); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int get_default_epdisc(ep) struct epdisc *ep; +{ + char *p; + struct hostent *hp; + u32_t addr; + + /* First try for an ethernet MAC address */ + p = get_first_ethernet(); + + if (p != 0 && get_if_hwaddr(ep->value, p) >= 0) { + ep->class = EPD_MAC; + ep->length = 6; + return 1; + } + + /* see if our hostname corresponds to a reasonable IP address */ + hp = gethostbyname(hostname); + + if (hp != NULL) { + addr = *(u32_t *)hp->h_addr; + + if (!bad_ip_adrs(addr)) { + addr = lwip_ntohl(addr); + + if (!LOCAL_IP_ADDR(addr)) { + ep->class = EPD_IP; + set_ip_epdisc(ep, addr); + return 1; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * epdisc_to_str - make a printable string from an endpoint discriminator. + */ + +static char *endp_class_names[] = { + "null", "local", "IP", "MAC", "magic", "phone" +}; + +char *epdisc_to_str(ep) struct epdisc *ep; +{ + static char str[MAX_ENDP_LEN * 3 + 8]; + u_char *p = ep->value; + int i, mask = 0; + char *q, c, c2; + + if (ep->class == EPD_NULL && ep->length == 0) { + return "null"; + } + + if (ep->class == EPD_IP && ep->length == 4) { + u32_t addr; + + GETLONG(addr, p); + slprintf(str, sizeof(str), "IP:%I", lwip_htonl(addr)); + return str; + } + + c = ':'; + c2 = '.'; + + if (ep->class == EPD_MAC && ep->length == 6) { + c2 = ':'; + } else if (ep->class == EPD_MAGIC && (ep->length % 4) == 0) { + mask = 3; + } + + q = str; + + if (ep->class <= EPD_PHONENUM) + q += slprintf(q, sizeof(str) - 1, "%s", + endp_class_names[ep->class]); + else { + q += slprintf(q, sizeof(str) - 1, "%d", ep->class); + } + + c = ':'; + + for (i = 0; i < ep->length && i < MAX_ENDP_LEN; ++i) { + if ((i & mask) == 0) { + *q++ = c; + c = c2; + } + + q += slprintf(q, str + sizeof(str) - q, "%.2x", ep->value[i]); + } + + return str; +} + +static int hexc_val(int c) +{ + if (c >= 'a') { + return c - 'a' + 10; + } + + if (c >= 'A') { + return c - 'A' + 10; + } + + return c - '0'; +} + +int str_to_epdisc(ep, str) struct epdisc *ep; +char *str; +{ + int i, l; + char *p, *endp; + + for (i = EPD_NULL; i <= EPD_PHONENUM; ++i) { + int sl = strlen(endp_class_names[i]); + + if (strncasecmp(str, endp_class_names[i], sl) == 0) { + str += sl; + break; + } + } + + if (i > EPD_PHONENUM) { + /* not a class name, try a decimal class number */ + i = strtol(str, &endp, 10); + + if (endp == str) { + return 0; /* can't parse class number */ + } + + str = endp; + } + + ep->class = i; + + if (*str == 0) { + ep->length = 0; + return 1; + } + + if (*str != ':' && *str != '.') { + return 0; + } + + ++str; + + if (i == EPD_IP) { + u32_t addr; + i = parse_dotted_ip(str, &addr); + + if (i == 0 || str[i] != 0) { + return 0; + } + + set_ip_epdisc(ep, addr); + return 1; + } + + if (i == EPD_MAC && get_if_hwaddr(ep->value, str) >= 0) { + ep->length = 6; + return 1; + } + + p = str; + + for (l = 0; l < MAX_ENDP_LEN; ++l) { + if (*str == 0) { + break; + } + + if (p <= str) + for (p = str; isxdigit(*p); ++p) + ; + + i = p - str; + + if (i == 0) { + return 0; + } + + ep->value[l] = hexc_val(*str++); + + if ((i & 1) == 0) { + ep->value[l] = (ep->value[l] << 4) + hexc_val(*str++); + } + + if (*str == ':' || *str == '.') { + ++str; + } + } + + if (*str != 0 || (ep->class == EPD_MAC && l != 6)) { + return 0; + } + + ep->length = l; + return 1; +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && HAVE_MULTILINK */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/README b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/README similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/README rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/README index d4bfc7e6..3fdf159e 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/README +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/README @@ -1,22 +1,22 @@ -About PolarSSL files into lwIP PPP support ------------------------------------------- - -This folder contains some files fetched from the latest BSD release of -the PolarSSL project (PolarSSL 0.10.1-bsd) for ciphers and encryption -methods we need for lwIP PPP support. - -The PolarSSL files were cleaned to contain only the necessary struct -fields and functions needed for lwIP. - -The PolarSSL API was not changed at all, so if you are already using -PolarSSL you can choose to skip the compilation of the included PolarSSL -library into lwIP. - -If you are not using the embedded copy you must include external -libraries into your arch/cc.h port file. - -Beware of the stack requirements which can be a lot larger if you are not -using our cleaned PolarSSL library. - - -PolarSSL project website: http://polarssl.org/ +About PolarSSL files into lwIP PPP support +------------------------------------------ + +This folder contains some files fetched from the latest BSD release of +the PolarSSL project (PolarSSL 0.10.1-bsd) for ciphers and encryption +methods we need for lwIP PPP support. + +The PolarSSL files were cleaned to contain only the necessary struct +fields and functions needed for lwIP. + +The PolarSSL API was not changed at all, so if you are already using +PolarSSL you can choose to skip the compilation of the included PolarSSL +library into lwIP. + +If you are not using the embedded copy you must include external +libraries into your arch/cc.h port file. + +Beware of the stack requirements which can be a lot larger if you are not +using our cleaned PolarSSL library. + + +PolarSSL project website: http://polarssl.org/ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c index 3cf3ba04..39b41dd0 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.c @@ -1,103 +1,103 @@ -/* - * An implementation of the ARCFOUR algorithm - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ -/* - * The ARCFOUR algorithm was publicly disclosed on 94/09. - * - * http://groups.google.com/group/sci.crypt/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h" -/* - * ARC4 key schedule - */ -void arc4_setup(arc4_context *ctx, unsigned char *key, int keylen) -{ - int i, j, k, a; - unsigned char *m; - - ctx->x = 0; - ctx->y = 0; - m = ctx->m; - - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { - m[i] = (unsigned char)i; - } - - j = k = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++, k++) { - if (k >= keylen) { - k = 0; - } - - a = m[i]; - j = (j + a + key[k]) & 0xFF; - m[i] = m[j]; - m[j] = (unsigned char)a; - } -} - -/* - * ARC4 cipher function - */ -void arc4_crypt(arc4_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) -{ - int i, x, y, a, b; - unsigned char *m; - - x = ctx->x; - y = ctx->y; - m = ctx->m; - - for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++) { - x = (x + 1) & 0xFF; - a = m[x]; - y = (y + a) & 0xFF; - b = m[y]; - - m[x] = (unsigned char)b; - m[y] = (unsigned char)a; - - buf[i] = (unsigned char)(buf[i] ^ m[(unsigned char)(a + b)]); - } - - ctx->x = x; - ctx->y = y; -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES */ +/* + * An implementation of the ARCFOUR algorithm + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * The ARCFOUR algorithm was publicly disclosed on 94/09. + * + * http://groups.google.com/group/sci.crypt/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_ARC4 + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/arc4.h" +/* + * ARC4 key schedule + */ +void arc4_setup(arc4_context *ctx, unsigned char *key, int keylen) +{ + int i, j, k, a; + unsigned char *m; + + ctx->x = 0; + ctx->y = 0; + m = ctx->m; + + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + m[i] = (unsigned char)i; + } + + j = k = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++, k++) { + if (k >= keylen) { + k = 0; + } + + a = m[i]; + j = (j + a + key[k]) & 0xFF; + m[i] = m[j]; + m[j] = (unsigned char)a; + } +} + +/* + * ARC4 cipher function + */ +void arc4_crypt(arc4_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) +{ + int i, x, y, a, b; + unsigned char *m; + + x = ctx->x; + y = ctx->y; + m = ctx->m; + + for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++) { + x = (x + 1) & 0xFF; + a = m[x]; + y = (y + a) & 0xFF; + b = m[y]; + + m[x] = (unsigned char)b; + m[y] = (unsigned char)a; + + buf[i] = (unsigned char)(buf[i] ^ m[(unsigned char)(a + b)]); + } + + ctx->x = x; + ctx->y = y; +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c index 8344c64a..a0caf26b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/des.c @@ -1,419 +1,419 @@ -/* - * FIPS-46-3 compliant Triple-DES implementation - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ -/* - * DES, on which TDES is based, was originally designed by Horst Feistel - * at IBM in 1974, and was adopted as a standard by NIST (formerly NBS). - * - * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h" - -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_ULONG_BE -#define GET_ULONG_BE(n, b, i) \ - { \ - (n) = ((unsigned long)(b)[(i)] << 24) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 2] << 8) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 3]); \ - } -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_ULONG_BE -#define PUT_ULONG_BE(n, b, i) \ - { \ - (b)[(i)] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 24); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 16); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 8); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)((n)); \ - } -#endif - -/* - * Expanded DES S-boxes - */ -static const unsigned long SB1[64] = { - 0x01010400, 0x00000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010404, - 0x01010004, 0x00010404, 0x00000004, 0x00010000, - 0x00000400, 0x01010400, 0x01010404, 0x00000400, - 0x01000404, 0x01010004, 0x01000000, 0x00000004, - 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00010400, - 0x00010400, 0x01010000, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, - 0x00010004, 0x01000004, 0x01000004, 0x00010004, - 0x00000000, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01000000, - 0x00010000, 0x01010404, 0x00000004, 0x01010000, - 0x01010400, 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x00000400, - 0x01010004, 0x00010000, 0x00010400, 0x01000004, - 0x00000400, 0x00000004, 0x01000404, 0x00010404, - 0x01010404, 0x00010004, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, - 0x01000004, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01010400, - 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00000000, - 0x00010004, 0x00010400, 0x00000000, 0x01010004 -}; - -static const unsigned long SB2[64] = { - 0x80108020, 0x80008000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, - 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, 0x80008020, - 0x80000020, 0x80108020, 0x80108000, 0x80000000, - 0x80008000, 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, - 0x00108000, 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x00000000, - 0x80000000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, 0x80100000, - 0x00100020, 0x80000020, 0x00000000, 0x00108000, - 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x80100000, 0x00008020, - 0x00000000, 0x00108020, 0x80100020, 0x00100000, - 0x80008020, 0x80100000, 0x80108000, 0x00008000, - 0x80100000, 0x80008000, 0x00000020, 0x80108020, - 0x00108020, 0x00000020, 0x00008000, 0x80000000, - 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x00100000, 0x80000020, - 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x80000020, 0x00100020, - 0x00108000, 0x00000000, 0x80008000, 0x00008020, - 0x80000000, 0x80100020, 0x80108020, 0x00108000 -}; - -static const unsigned long SB3[64] = { - 0x00000208, 0x08020200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, - 0x08000200, 0x00000000, 0x00020208, 0x08000200, - 0x00020008, 0x08000008, 0x08000008, 0x00020000, - 0x08020208, 0x00020008, 0x08020000, 0x00000208, - 0x08000000, 0x00000008, 0x08020200, 0x00000200, - 0x00020200, 0x08020000, 0x08020008, 0x00020208, - 0x08000208, 0x00020200, 0x00020000, 0x08000208, - 0x00000008, 0x08020208, 0x00000200, 0x08000000, - 0x08020200, 0x08000000, 0x00020008, 0x00000208, - 0x00020000, 0x08020200, 0x08000200, 0x00000000, - 0x00000200, 0x00020008, 0x08020208, 0x08000200, - 0x08000008, 0x00000200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, - 0x08000208, 0x00020000, 0x08000000, 0x08020208, - 0x00000008, 0x00020208, 0x00020200, 0x08000008, - 0x08020000, 0x08000208, 0x00000208, 0x08020000, - 0x00020208, 0x00000008, 0x08020008, 0x00020200 -}; - -static const unsigned long SB4[64] = { - 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, - 0x00802080, 0x00800081, 0x00800001, 0x00002001, - 0x00000000, 0x00802000, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, - 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00800080, 0x00800001, - 0x00000001, 0x00002000, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, - 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002001, 0x00002080, - 0x00800081, 0x00000001, 0x00002080, 0x00800080, - 0x00002000, 0x00802080, 0x00802081, 0x00000081, - 0x00800080, 0x00800001, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, - 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00802000, - 0x00002080, 0x00800080, 0x00800081, 0x00000001, - 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, - 0x00802081, 0x00000081, 0x00000001, 0x00002000, - 0x00800001, 0x00002001, 0x00802080, 0x00800081, - 0x00002001, 0x00002080, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, - 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002000, 0x00802080 -}; - -static const unsigned long SB5[64] = { - 0x00000100, 0x02080100, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, - 0x00080000, 0x00000100, 0x40000000, 0x02080000, - 0x40080100, 0x00080000, 0x02000100, 0x40080100, - 0x42000100, 0x42080000, 0x00080100, 0x40000000, - 0x02000000, 0x40080000, 0x40080000, 0x00000000, - 0x40000100, 0x42080100, 0x42080100, 0x02000100, - 0x42080000, 0x40000100, 0x00000000, 0x42000000, - 0x02080100, 0x02000000, 0x42000000, 0x00080100, - 0x00080000, 0x42000100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, - 0x40000000, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, 0x40080100, - 0x02000100, 0x40000000, 0x42080000, 0x02080100, - 0x40080100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, 0x42080000, - 0x42080100, 0x00080100, 0x42000000, 0x42080100, - 0x02080000, 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x42000000, - 0x00080100, 0x02000100, 0x40000100, 0x00080000, - 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x02080100, 0x40000100 -}; - -static const unsigned long SB6[64] = { - 0x20000010, 0x20400000, 0x00004000, 0x20404010, - 0x20400000, 0x00000010, 0x20404010, 0x00400000, - 0x20004000, 0x00404010, 0x00400000, 0x20000010, - 0x00400010, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, - 0x00000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00004000, - 0x00404000, 0x20004010, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, - 0x20400010, 0x00000000, 0x00404010, 0x20404000, - 0x00004010, 0x00404000, 0x20404000, 0x20000000, - 0x20004000, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, 0x00404000, - 0x20404010, 0x00400000, 0x00004010, 0x20000010, - 0x00400000, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, - 0x20000010, 0x20404010, 0x00404000, 0x20400000, - 0x00404010, 0x20404000, 0x00000000, 0x20400010, - 0x00000010, 0x00004000, 0x20400000, 0x00404010, - 0x00004000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00000000, - 0x20404000, 0x20000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010 -}; - -static const unsigned long SB7[64] = { - 0x00200000, 0x04200002, 0x04000802, 0x00000000, - 0x00000800, 0x04000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, - 0x04200802, 0x00200000, 0x00000000, 0x04000002, - 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x04200002, 0x00000802, - 0x04000800, 0x00200802, 0x00200002, 0x04000800, - 0x04000002, 0x04200000, 0x04200800, 0x00200002, - 0x04200000, 0x00000800, 0x00000802, 0x04200802, - 0x00200800, 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x00200800, - 0x04000000, 0x00200800, 0x00200000, 0x04000802, - 0x04000802, 0x04200002, 0x04200002, 0x00000002, - 0x00200002, 0x04000000, 0x04000800, 0x00200000, - 0x04200800, 0x00000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, - 0x00000802, 0x04000002, 0x04200802, 0x04200000, - 0x00200800, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x04200802, - 0x00000000, 0x00200802, 0x04200000, 0x00000800, - 0x04000002, 0x04000800, 0x00000800, 0x00200002 -}; - -static const unsigned long SB8[64] = { - 0x10001040, 0x00001000, 0x00040000, 0x10041040, - 0x10000000, 0x10001040, 0x00000040, 0x10000000, - 0x00040040, 0x10040000, 0x10041040, 0x00041000, - 0x10041000, 0x00041040, 0x00001000, 0x00000040, - 0x10040000, 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00001040, - 0x00041000, 0x00040040, 0x10040040, 0x10041000, - 0x00001040, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x10040040, - 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00041040, 0x00040000, - 0x00041040, 0x00040000, 0x10041000, 0x00001000, - 0x00000040, 0x10040040, 0x00001000, 0x00041040, - 0x10001000, 0x00000040, 0x10000040, 0x10040000, - 0x10040040, 0x10000000, 0x00040000, 0x10001040, - 0x00000000, 0x10041040, 0x00040040, 0x10000040, - 0x10040000, 0x10001000, 0x10001040, 0x00000000, - 0x10041040, 0x00041000, 0x00041000, 0x00001040, - 0x00001040, 0x00040040, 0x10000000, 0x10041000 -}; - -/* - * PC1: left and right halves bit-swap - */ -static const unsigned long LHs[16] = { - 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000100, 0x00000101, - 0x00010000, 0x00010001, 0x00010100, 0x00010101, - 0x01000000, 0x01000001, 0x01000100, 0x01000101, - 0x01010000, 0x01010001, 0x01010100, 0x01010101 -}; - -static const unsigned long RHs[16] = { - 0x00000000, - 0x01000000, - 0x00010000, - 0x01010000, - 0x00000100, - 0x01000100, - 0x00010100, - 0x01010100, - 0x00000001, - 0x01000001, - 0x00010001, - 0x01010001, - 0x00000101, - 0x01000101, - 0x00010101, - 0x01010101, -}; - -/* - * Initial Permutation macro - */ -#define DES_IP(X, Y) \ - { \ - T = ((X >> 4) ^ Y) & 0x0F0F0F0F; \ - Y ^= T; \ - X ^= (T << 4); \ - T = ((X >> 16) ^ Y) & 0x0000FFFF; \ - Y ^= T; \ - X ^= (T << 16); \ - T = ((Y >> 2) ^ X) & 0x33333333; \ - X ^= T; \ - Y ^= (T << 2); \ - T = ((Y >> 8) ^ X) & 0x00FF00FF; \ - X ^= T; \ - Y ^= (T << 8); \ - Y = ((Y << 1) | (Y >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ - T = (X ^ Y) & 0xAAAAAAAA; \ - Y ^= T; \ - X ^= T; \ - X = ((X << 1) | (X >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ - } - -/* - * Final Permutation macro - */ -#define DES_FP(X, Y) \ - { \ - X = ((X << 31) | (X >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ - T = (X ^ Y) & 0xAAAAAAAA; \ - X ^= T; \ - Y ^= T; \ - Y = ((Y << 31) | (Y >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ - T = ((Y >> 8) ^ X) & 0x00FF00FF; \ - X ^= T; \ - Y ^= (T << 8); \ - T = ((Y >> 2) ^ X) & 0x33333333; \ - X ^= T; \ - Y ^= (T << 2); \ - T = ((X >> 16) ^ Y) & 0x0000FFFF; \ - Y ^= T; \ - X ^= (T << 16); \ - T = ((X >> 4) ^ Y) & 0x0F0F0F0F; \ - Y ^= T; \ - X ^= (T << 4); \ - } - -/* - * DES round macro - */ -#define DES_ROUND(X, Y) \ - { \ - T = *SK++ ^ X; \ - Y ^= SB8[(T)&0x3F] ^ \ - SB6[(T >> 8) & 0x3F] ^ \ - SB4[(T >> 16) & 0x3F] ^ \ - SB2[(T >> 24) & 0x3F]; \ - \ - T = *SK++ ^ ((X << 28) | (X >> 4)); \ - Y ^= SB7[(T)&0x3F] ^ \ - SB5[(T >> 8) & 0x3F] ^ \ - SB3[(T >> 16) & 0x3F] ^ \ - SB1[(T >> 24) & 0x3F]; \ - } - -#define SWAP(a, b) \ - { \ - unsigned long t = a; \ - a = b; \ - b = t; \ - t = 0; \ - } - -static void des_setkey(unsigned long SK[32], unsigned char key[8]) -{ - int i; - unsigned long X, Y, T; - - GET_ULONG_BE(X, key, 0); - GET_ULONG_BE(Y, key, 4); - - /* - * Permuted Choice 1 - */ - T = ((Y >> 4) ^ X) & 0x0F0F0F0F; - X ^= T; - Y ^= (T << 4); - T = ((Y) ^ X) & 0x10101010; - X ^= T; - Y ^= (T); - - X = (LHs[(X)&0xF] << 3) | (LHs[(X >> 8) & 0xF] << 2) | (LHs[(X >> 16) & 0xF] << 1) | (LHs[(X >> 24) & 0xF]) | (LHs[(X >> 5) & 0xF] << 7) | (LHs[(X >> 13) & 0xF] << 6) | (LHs[(X >> 21) & 0xF] << 5) | (LHs[(X >> 29) & 0xF] << 4); - - Y = (RHs[(Y >> 1) & 0xF] << 3) | (RHs[(Y >> 9) & 0xF] << 2) | (RHs[(Y >> 17) & 0xF] << 1) | (RHs[(Y >> 25) & 0xF]) | (RHs[(Y >> 4) & 0xF] << 7) | (RHs[(Y >> 12) & 0xF] << 6) | (RHs[(Y >> 20) & 0xF] << 5) | (RHs[(Y >> 28) & 0xF] << 4); - - X &= 0x0FFFFFFF; - Y &= 0x0FFFFFFF; - - /* - * calculate subkeys - */ - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - if (i < 2 || i == 8 || i == 15) { - X = ((X << 1) | (X >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; - Y = ((Y << 1) | (Y >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; - } else { - X = ((X << 2) | (X >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; - Y = ((Y << 2) | (Y >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; - } - - *SK++ = ((X << 4) & 0x24000000) | ((X << 28) & 0x10000000) | ((X << 14) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 18) & 0x02080000) | ((X << 6) & 0x01000000) | ((X << 9) & 0x00200000) | ((X >> 1) & 0x00100000) | ((X << 10) & 0x00040000) | ((X << 2) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 10) & 0x00010000) | ((Y >> 13) & 0x00002000) | ((Y >> 4) & 0x00001000) | ((Y << 6) & 0x00000800) | ((Y >> 1) & 0x00000400) | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000200) | ((Y)&0x00000100) | ((Y >> 5) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 10) & 0x00000010) | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000008) | ((Y >> 18) & 0x00000004) | ((Y >> 26) & 0x00000002) | ((Y >> 24) & 0x00000001); - - *SK++ = ((X << 15) & 0x20000000) | ((X << 17) & 0x10000000) | ((X << 10) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 22) & 0x04000000) | ((X >> 2) & 0x02000000) | ((X << 1) & 0x01000000) | ((X << 16) & 0x00200000) | ((X << 11) & 0x00100000) | ((X << 3) & 0x00080000) | ((X >> 6) & 0x00040000) | ((X << 15) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 4) & 0x00010000) | ((Y >> 2) & 0x00002000) | ((Y << 8) & 0x00001000) | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000808) | ((Y >> 9) & 0x00000400) | ((Y)&0x00000200) | ((Y << 7) & 0x00000100) | ((Y >> 7) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000011) | ((Y << 2) & 0x00000004) | ((Y >> 21) & 0x00000002); - } -} - -/* - * DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) - */ -void des_setkey_enc(des_context *ctx, unsigned char key[8]) -{ - des_setkey(ctx->sk, key); -} - -/* - * DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) - */ -void des_setkey_dec(des_context *ctx, unsigned char key[8]) -{ - int i; - - des_setkey(ctx->sk, key); - - for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) { - SWAP(ctx->sk[i], ctx->sk[30 - i]); - SWAP(ctx->sk[i + 1], ctx->sk[31 - i]); - } -} - -/* - * DES-ECB block encryption/decryption - */ -void des_crypt_ecb(des_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[8], - unsigned char output[8]) -{ - int i; - unsigned long X, Y, T, *SK; - - SK = ctx->sk; - - GET_ULONG_BE(X, input, 0); - GET_ULONG_BE(Y, input, 4); - - DES_IP(X, Y); - - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - DES_ROUND(Y, X); - DES_ROUND(X, Y); - } - - DES_FP(Y, X); - - PUT_ULONG_BE(Y, output, 0); - PUT_ULONG_BE(X, output, 4); -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES */ +/* + * FIPS-46-3 compliant Triple-DES implementation + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * DES, on which TDES is based, was originally designed by Horst Feistel + * at IBM in 1974, and was adopted as a standard by NIST (formerly NBS). + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/des.h" + +/* + * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) + */ +#ifndef GET_ULONG_BE +#define GET_ULONG_BE(n, b, i) \ + { \ + (n) = ((unsigned long)(b)[(i)] << 24) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 2] << 8) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 3]); \ + } +#endif + +#ifndef PUT_ULONG_BE +#define PUT_ULONG_BE(n, b, i) \ + { \ + (b)[(i)] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 24); \ + (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 16); \ + (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 8); \ + (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)((n)); \ + } +#endif + +/* + * Expanded DES S-boxes + */ +static const unsigned long SB1[64] = { + 0x01010400, 0x00000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010404, + 0x01010004, 0x00010404, 0x00000004, 0x00010000, + 0x00000400, 0x01010400, 0x01010404, 0x00000400, + 0x01000404, 0x01010004, 0x01000000, 0x00000004, + 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00010400, + 0x00010400, 0x01010000, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, + 0x00010004, 0x01000004, 0x01000004, 0x00010004, + 0x00000000, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01000000, + 0x00010000, 0x01010404, 0x00000004, 0x01010000, + 0x01010400, 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x00000400, + 0x01010004, 0x00010000, 0x00010400, 0x01000004, + 0x00000400, 0x00000004, 0x01000404, 0x00010404, + 0x01010404, 0x00010004, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, + 0x01000004, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01010400, + 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00000000, + 0x00010004, 0x00010400, 0x00000000, 0x01010004 +}; + +static const unsigned long SB2[64] = { + 0x80108020, 0x80008000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, + 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, 0x80008020, + 0x80000020, 0x80108020, 0x80108000, 0x80000000, + 0x80008000, 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, + 0x00108000, 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x00000000, + 0x80000000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, 0x80100000, + 0x00100020, 0x80000020, 0x00000000, 0x00108000, + 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x80100000, 0x00008020, + 0x00000000, 0x00108020, 0x80100020, 0x00100000, + 0x80008020, 0x80100000, 0x80108000, 0x00008000, + 0x80100000, 0x80008000, 0x00000020, 0x80108020, + 0x00108020, 0x00000020, 0x00008000, 0x80000000, + 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x00100000, 0x80000020, + 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x80000020, 0x00100020, + 0x00108000, 0x00000000, 0x80008000, 0x00008020, + 0x80000000, 0x80100020, 0x80108020, 0x00108000 +}; + +static const unsigned long SB3[64] = { + 0x00000208, 0x08020200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, + 0x08000200, 0x00000000, 0x00020208, 0x08000200, + 0x00020008, 0x08000008, 0x08000008, 0x00020000, + 0x08020208, 0x00020008, 0x08020000, 0x00000208, + 0x08000000, 0x00000008, 0x08020200, 0x00000200, + 0x00020200, 0x08020000, 0x08020008, 0x00020208, + 0x08000208, 0x00020200, 0x00020000, 0x08000208, + 0x00000008, 0x08020208, 0x00000200, 0x08000000, + 0x08020200, 0x08000000, 0x00020008, 0x00000208, + 0x00020000, 0x08020200, 0x08000200, 0x00000000, + 0x00000200, 0x00020008, 0x08020208, 0x08000200, + 0x08000008, 0x00000200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, + 0x08000208, 0x00020000, 0x08000000, 0x08020208, + 0x00000008, 0x00020208, 0x00020200, 0x08000008, + 0x08020000, 0x08000208, 0x00000208, 0x08020000, + 0x00020208, 0x00000008, 0x08020008, 0x00020200 +}; + +static const unsigned long SB4[64] = { + 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, + 0x00802080, 0x00800081, 0x00800001, 0x00002001, + 0x00000000, 0x00802000, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, + 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00800080, 0x00800001, + 0x00000001, 0x00002000, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, + 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002001, 0x00002080, + 0x00800081, 0x00000001, 0x00002080, 0x00800080, + 0x00002000, 0x00802080, 0x00802081, 0x00000081, + 0x00800080, 0x00800001, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, + 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00802000, + 0x00002080, 0x00800080, 0x00800081, 0x00000001, + 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, + 0x00802081, 0x00000081, 0x00000001, 0x00002000, + 0x00800001, 0x00002001, 0x00802080, 0x00800081, + 0x00002001, 0x00002080, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, + 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002000, 0x00802080 +}; + +static const unsigned long SB5[64] = { + 0x00000100, 0x02080100, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, + 0x00080000, 0x00000100, 0x40000000, 0x02080000, + 0x40080100, 0x00080000, 0x02000100, 0x40080100, + 0x42000100, 0x42080000, 0x00080100, 0x40000000, + 0x02000000, 0x40080000, 0x40080000, 0x00000000, + 0x40000100, 0x42080100, 0x42080100, 0x02000100, + 0x42080000, 0x40000100, 0x00000000, 0x42000000, + 0x02080100, 0x02000000, 0x42000000, 0x00080100, + 0x00080000, 0x42000100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, + 0x40000000, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, 0x40080100, + 0x02000100, 0x40000000, 0x42080000, 0x02080100, + 0x40080100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, 0x42080000, + 0x42080100, 0x00080100, 0x42000000, 0x42080100, + 0x02080000, 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x42000000, + 0x00080100, 0x02000100, 0x40000100, 0x00080000, + 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x02080100, 0x40000100 +}; + +static const unsigned long SB6[64] = { + 0x20000010, 0x20400000, 0x00004000, 0x20404010, + 0x20400000, 0x00000010, 0x20404010, 0x00400000, + 0x20004000, 0x00404010, 0x00400000, 0x20000010, + 0x00400010, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, + 0x00000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00004000, + 0x00404000, 0x20004010, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, + 0x20400010, 0x00000000, 0x00404010, 0x20404000, + 0x00004010, 0x00404000, 0x20404000, 0x20000000, + 0x20004000, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, 0x00404000, + 0x20404010, 0x00400000, 0x00004010, 0x20000010, + 0x00400000, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, + 0x20000010, 0x20404010, 0x00404000, 0x20400000, + 0x00404010, 0x20404000, 0x00000000, 0x20400010, + 0x00000010, 0x00004000, 0x20400000, 0x00404010, + 0x00004000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00000000, + 0x20404000, 0x20000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010 +}; + +static const unsigned long SB7[64] = { + 0x00200000, 0x04200002, 0x04000802, 0x00000000, + 0x00000800, 0x04000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, + 0x04200802, 0x00200000, 0x00000000, 0x04000002, + 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x04200002, 0x00000802, + 0x04000800, 0x00200802, 0x00200002, 0x04000800, + 0x04000002, 0x04200000, 0x04200800, 0x00200002, + 0x04200000, 0x00000800, 0x00000802, 0x04200802, + 0x00200800, 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x00200800, + 0x04000000, 0x00200800, 0x00200000, 0x04000802, + 0x04000802, 0x04200002, 0x04200002, 0x00000002, + 0x00200002, 0x04000000, 0x04000800, 0x00200000, + 0x04200800, 0x00000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, + 0x00000802, 0x04000002, 0x04200802, 0x04200000, + 0x00200800, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x04200802, + 0x00000000, 0x00200802, 0x04200000, 0x00000800, + 0x04000002, 0x04000800, 0x00000800, 0x00200002 +}; + +static const unsigned long SB8[64] = { + 0x10001040, 0x00001000, 0x00040000, 0x10041040, + 0x10000000, 0x10001040, 0x00000040, 0x10000000, + 0x00040040, 0x10040000, 0x10041040, 0x00041000, + 0x10041000, 0x00041040, 0x00001000, 0x00000040, + 0x10040000, 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00001040, + 0x00041000, 0x00040040, 0x10040040, 0x10041000, + 0x00001040, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x10040040, + 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00041040, 0x00040000, + 0x00041040, 0x00040000, 0x10041000, 0x00001000, + 0x00000040, 0x10040040, 0x00001000, 0x00041040, + 0x10001000, 0x00000040, 0x10000040, 0x10040000, + 0x10040040, 0x10000000, 0x00040000, 0x10001040, + 0x00000000, 0x10041040, 0x00040040, 0x10000040, + 0x10040000, 0x10001000, 0x10001040, 0x00000000, + 0x10041040, 0x00041000, 0x00041000, 0x00001040, + 0x00001040, 0x00040040, 0x10000000, 0x10041000 +}; + +/* + * PC1: left and right halves bit-swap + */ +static const unsigned long LHs[16] = { + 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000100, 0x00000101, + 0x00010000, 0x00010001, 0x00010100, 0x00010101, + 0x01000000, 0x01000001, 0x01000100, 0x01000101, + 0x01010000, 0x01010001, 0x01010100, 0x01010101 +}; + +static const unsigned long RHs[16] = { + 0x00000000, + 0x01000000, + 0x00010000, + 0x01010000, + 0x00000100, + 0x01000100, + 0x00010100, + 0x01010100, + 0x00000001, + 0x01000001, + 0x00010001, + 0x01010001, + 0x00000101, + 0x01000101, + 0x00010101, + 0x01010101, +}; + +/* + * Initial Permutation macro + */ +#define DES_IP(X, Y) \ + { \ + T = ((X >> 4) ^ Y) & 0x0F0F0F0F; \ + Y ^= T; \ + X ^= (T << 4); \ + T = ((X >> 16) ^ Y) & 0x0000FFFF; \ + Y ^= T; \ + X ^= (T << 16); \ + T = ((Y >> 2) ^ X) & 0x33333333; \ + X ^= T; \ + Y ^= (T << 2); \ + T = ((Y >> 8) ^ X) & 0x00FF00FF; \ + X ^= T; \ + Y ^= (T << 8); \ + Y = ((Y << 1) | (Y >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = (X ^ Y) & 0xAAAAAAAA; \ + Y ^= T; \ + X ^= T; \ + X = ((X << 1) | (X >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + } + +/* + * Final Permutation macro + */ +#define DES_FP(X, Y) \ + { \ + X = ((X << 31) | (X >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = (X ^ Y) & 0xAAAAAAAA; \ + X ^= T; \ + Y ^= T; \ + Y = ((Y << 31) | (Y >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = ((Y >> 8) ^ X) & 0x00FF00FF; \ + X ^= T; \ + Y ^= (T << 8); \ + T = ((Y >> 2) ^ X) & 0x33333333; \ + X ^= T; \ + Y ^= (T << 2); \ + T = ((X >> 16) ^ Y) & 0x0000FFFF; \ + Y ^= T; \ + X ^= (T << 16); \ + T = ((X >> 4) ^ Y) & 0x0F0F0F0F; \ + Y ^= T; \ + X ^= (T << 4); \ + } + +/* + * DES round macro + */ +#define DES_ROUND(X, Y) \ + { \ + T = *SK++ ^ X; \ + Y ^= SB8[(T)&0x3F] ^ \ + SB6[(T >> 8) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB4[(T >> 16) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB2[(T >> 24) & 0x3F]; \ + \ + T = *SK++ ^ ((X << 28) | (X >> 4)); \ + Y ^= SB7[(T)&0x3F] ^ \ + SB5[(T >> 8) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB3[(T >> 16) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB1[(T >> 24) & 0x3F]; \ + } + +#define SWAP(a, b) \ + { \ + unsigned long t = a; \ + a = b; \ + b = t; \ + t = 0; \ + } + +static void des_setkey(unsigned long SK[32], unsigned char key[8]) +{ + int i; + unsigned long X, Y, T; + + GET_ULONG_BE(X, key, 0); + GET_ULONG_BE(Y, key, 4); + + /* + * Permuted Choice 1 + */ + T = ((Y >> 4) ^ X) & 0x0F0F0F0F; + X ^= T; + Y ^= (T << 4); + T = ((Y) ^ X) & 0x10101010; + X ^= T; + Y ^= (T); + + X = (LHs[(X)&0xF] << 3) | (LHs[(X >> 8) & 0xF] << 2) | (LHs[(X >> 16) & 0xF] << 1) | (LHs[(X >> 24) & 0xF]) | (LHs[(X >> 5) & 0xF] << 7) | (LHs[(X >> 13) & 0xF] << 6) | (LHs[(X >> 21) & 0xF] << 5) | (LHs[(X >> 29) & 0xF] << 4); + + Y = (RHs[(Y >> 1) & 0xF] << 3) | (RHs[(Y >> 9) & 0xF] << 2) | (RHs[(Y >> 17) & 0xF] << 1) | (RHs[(Y >> 25) & 0xF]) | (RHs[(Y >> 4) & 0xF] << 7) | (RHs[(Y >> 12) & 0xF] << 6) | (RHs[(Y >> 20) & 0xF] << 5) | (RHs[(Y >> 28) & 0xF] << 4); + + X &= 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y &= 0x0FFFFFFF; + + /* + * calculate subkeys + */ + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + if (i < 2 || i == 8 || i == 15) { + X = ((X << 1) | (X >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y = ((Y << 1) | (Y >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + } else { + X = ((X << 2) | (X >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y = ((Y << 2) | (Y >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + } + + *SK++ = ((X << 4) & 0x24000000) | ((X << 28) & 0x10000000) | ((X << 14) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 18) & 0x02080000) | ((X << 6) & 0x01000000) | ((X << 9) & 0x00200000) | ((X >> 1) & 0x00100000) | ((X << 10) & 0x00040000) | ((X << 2) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 10) & 0x00010000) | ((Y >> 13) & 0x00002000) | ((Y >> 4) & 0x00001000) | ((Y << 6) & 0x00000800) | ((Y >> 1) & 0x00000400) | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000200) | ((Y)&0x00000100) | ((Y >> 5) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 10) & 0x00000010) | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000008) | ((Y >> 18) & 0x00000004) | ((Y >> 26) & 0x00000002) | ((Y >> 24) & 0x00000001); + + *SK++ = ((X << 15) & 0x20000000) | ((X << 17) & 0x10000000) | ((X << 10) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 22) & 0x04000000) | ((X >> 2) & 0x02000000) | ((X << 1) & 0x01000000) | ((X << 16) & 0x00200000) | ((X << 11) & 0x00100000) | ((X << 3) & 0x00080000) | ((X >> 6) & 0x00040000) | ((X << 15) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 4) & 0x00010000) | ((Y >> 2) & 0x00002000) | ((Y << 8) & 0x00001000) | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000808) | ((Y >> 9) & 0x00000400) | ((Y)&0x00000200) | ((Y << 7) & 0x00000100) | ((Y >> 7) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000011) | ((Y << 2) & 0x00000004) | ((Y >> 21) & 0x00000002); + } +} + +/* + * DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) + */ +void des_setkey_enc(des_context *ctx, unsigned char key[8]) +{ + des_setkey(ctx->sk, key); +} + +/* + * DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) + */ +void des_setkey_dec(des_context *ctx, unsigned char key[8]) +{ + int i; + + des_setkey(ctx->sk, key); + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) { + SWAP(ctx->sk[i], ctx->sk[30 - i]); + SWAP(ctx->sk[i + 1], ctx->sk[31 - i]); + } +} + +/* + * DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +void des_crypt_ecb(des_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8]) +{ + int i; + unsigned long X, Y, T, *SK; + + SK = ctx->sk; + + GET_ULONG_BE(X, input, 0); + GET_ULONG_BE(Y, input, 4); + + DES_IP(X, Y); + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + DES_ROUND(Y, X); + DES_ROUND(X, Y); + } + + DES_FP(Y, X); + + PUT_ULONG_BE(Y, output, 0); + PUT_ULONG_BE(X, output, 4); +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_DES */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c index 8b88f824..cf9e2da1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.c @@ -1,287 +1,287 @@ -/* - * RFC 1186/1320 compliant MD4 implementation - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ -/* - * The MD4 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1990. - * - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1186.txt - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h" - -#include - -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_ULONG_LE -#define GET_ULONG_LE(n, b, i) \ - { \ - (n) = ((unsigned long)(b)[(i)]) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 1] << 8) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 2] << 16) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 3] << 24); \ - } -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_ULONG_LE -#define PUT_ULONG_LE(n, b, i) \ - { \ - (b)[(i)] = (unsigned char)((n)); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 8); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 16); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 24); \ - } -#endif - -/* - * MD4 context setup - */ -void md4_starts(md4_context *ctx) -{ - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; - ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; - ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; - ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; -} - -static void md4_process(md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - unsigned long X[16], A, B, C, D; - - GET_ULONG_LE(X[0], data, 0); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[1], data, 4); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[2], data, 8); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[3], data, 12); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[4], data, 16); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[5], data, 20); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[6], data, 24); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[7], data, 28); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[8], data, 32); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[9], data, 36); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[10], data, 40); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[11], data, 44); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[12], data, 48); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[13], data, 52); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[14], data, 56); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[15], data, 60); - -#define S(x, n) ((x << n) | ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - n))) - - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; - -#define F(x, y, z) ((x & y) | ((~x) & z)) -#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - { \ - a += F(b, c, d) + x; \ - a = S(a, s); \ - } - - P(A, B, C, D, X[0], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[1], 7); - P(C, D, A, B, X[2], 11); - P(B, C, D, A, X[3], 19); - P(A, B, C, D, X[4], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[5], 7); - P(C, D, A, B, X[6], 11); - P(B, C, D, A, X[7], 19); - P(A, B, C, D, X[8], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[9], 7); - P(C, D, A, B, X[10], 11); - P(B, C, D, A, X[11], 19); - P(A, B, C, D, X[12], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[13], 7); - P(C, D, A, B, X[14], 11); - P(B, C, D, A, X[15], 19); - -#undef P -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) ((x & y) | (x & z) | (y & z)) -#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - { \ - a += F(b, c, d) + x + 0x5A827999; \ - a = S(a, s); \ - } - - P(A, B, C, D, X[0], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[4], 5); - P(C, D, A, B, X[8], 9); - P(B, C, D, A, X[12], 13); - P(A, B, C, D, X[1], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[5], 5); - P(C, D, A, B, X[9], 9); - P(B, C, D, A, X[13], 13); - P(A, B, C, D, X[2], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[6], 5); - P(C, D, A, B, X[10], 9); - P(B, C, D, A, X[14], 13); - P(A, B, C, D, X[3], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[7], 5); - P(C, D, A, B, X[11], 9); - P(B, C, D, A, X[15], 13); - -#undef P -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) -#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - { \ - a += F(b, c, d) + x + 0x6ED9EBA1; \ - a = S(a, s); \ - } - - P(A, B, C, D, X[0], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[8], 9); - P(C, D, A, B, X[4], 11); - P(B, C, D, A, X[12], 15); - P(A, B, C, D, X[2], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[10], 9); - P(C, D, A, B, X[6], 11); - P(B, C, D, A, X[14], 15); - P(A, B, C, D, X[1], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[9], 9); - P(C, D, A, B, X[5], 11); - P(B, C, D, A, X[13], 15); - P(A, B, C, D, X[3], 3); - P(D, A, B, C, X[11], 9); - P(C, D, A, B, X[7], 11); - P(B, C, D, A, X[15], 15); - -#undef F -#undef P - - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; -} - -/* - * MD4 process buffer - */ -void md4_update(md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen) -{ - int fill; - unsigned long left; - - if (ilen <= 0) { - return; - } - - left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += ilen; - ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; - - if (ctx->total[0] < (unsigned long)ilen) { - ctx->total[1]++; - } - - if (left && ilen >= fill) { - MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), - input, fill); - md4_process(ctx, ctx->buffer); - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while (ilen >= 64) { - md4_process(ctx, input); - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; - } - - if (ilen > 0) { - MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), - input, ilen); - } -} - -static const unsigned char md4_padding[64] = { - 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 -}; - -/* - * MD4 final digest - */ -void md4_finish(md4_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]) -{ - unsigned long last, padn; - unsigned long high, low; - unsigned char msglen[8]; - - high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) | (ctx->total[1] << 3); - low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); - - PUT_ULONG_LE(low, msglen, 0); - PUT_ULONG_LE(high, msglen, 4); - - last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); - - md4_update(ctx, md4_padding, padn); - md4_update(ctx, msglen, 8); - - PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); - PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); - PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); - PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); -} - -/* - * output = MD4( input buffer ) - */ -void md4(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[16]) -{ - md4_context ctx; - - md4_starts(&ctx); - md4_update(&ctx, input, ilen); - md4_finish(&ctx, output); -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 */ +/* + * RFC 1186/1320 compliant MD4 implementation + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * The MD4 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1990. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1186.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/md4.h" + +#include + +/* + * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) + */ +#ifndef GET_ULONG_LE +#define GET_ULONG_LE(n, b, i) \ + { \ + (n) = ((unsigned long)(b)[(i)]) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 1] << 8) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 2] << 16) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 3] << 24); \ + } +#endif + +#ifndef PUT_ULONG_LE +#define PUT_ULONG_LE(n, b, i) \ + { \ + (b)[(i)] = (unsigned char)((n)); \ + (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 8); \ + (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 16); \ + (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 24); \ + } +#endif + +/* + * MD4 context setup + */ +void md4_starts(md4_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; +} + +static void md4_process(md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) +{ + unsigned long X[16], A, B, C, D; + + GET_ULONG_LE(X[0], data, 0); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[1], data, 4); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[2], data, 8); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[3], data, 12); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[4], data, 16); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[5], data, 20); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[6], data, 24); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[7], data, 28); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[8], data, 32); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[9], data, 36); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[10], data, 40); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[11], data, 44); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[12], data, 48); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[13], data, 52); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[14], data, 56); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[15], data, 60); + +#define S(x, n) ((x << n) | ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - n))) + + A = ctx->state[0]; + B = ctx->state[1]; + C = ctx->state[2]; + D = ctx->state[3]; + +#define F(x, y, z) ((x & y) | ((~x) & z)) +#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ + { \ + a += F(b, c, d) + x; \ + a = S(a, s); \ + } + + P(A, B, C, D, X[0], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[1], 7); + P(C, D, A, B, X[2], 11); + P(B, C, D, A, X[3], 19); + P(A, B, C, D, X[4], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[5], 7); + P(C, D, A, B, X[6], 11); + P(B, C, D, A, X[7], 19); + P(A, B, C, D, X[8], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[9], 7); + P(C, D, A, B, X[10], 11); + P(B, C, D, A, X[11], 19); + P(A, B, C, D, X[12], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[13], 7); + P(C, D, A, B, X[14], 11); + P(B, C, D, A, X[15], 19); + +#undef P +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) ((x & y) | (x & z) | (y & z)) +#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ + { \ + a += F(b, c, d) + x + 0x5A827999; \ + a = S(a, s); \ + } + + P(A, B, C, D, X[0], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[4], 5); + P(C, D, A, B, X[8], 9); + P(B, C, D, A, X[12], 13); + P(A, B, C, D, X[1], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[5], 5); + P(C, D, A, B, X[9], 9); + P(B, C, D, A, X[13], 13); + P(A, B, C, D, X[2], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[6], 5); + P(C, D, A, B, X[10], 9); + P(B, C, D, A, X[14], 13); + P(A, B, C, D, X[3], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[7], 5); + P(C, D, A, B, X[11], 9); + P(B, C, D, A, X[15], 13); + +#undef P +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) +#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ + { \ + a += F(b, c, d) + x + 0x6ED9EBA1; \ + a = S(a, s); \ + } + + P(A, B, C, D, X[0], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[8], 9); + P(C, D, A, B, X[4], 11); + P(B, C, D, A, X[12], 15); + P(A, B, C, D, X[2], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[10], 9); + P(C, D, A, B, X[6], 11); + P(B, C, D, A, X[14], 15); + P(A, B, C, D, X[1], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[9], 9); + P(C, D, A, B, X[5], 11); + P(B, C, D, A, X[13], 15); + P(A, B, C, D, X[3], 3); + P(D, A, B, C, X[11], 9); + P(C, D, A, B, X[7], 11); + P(B, C, D, A, X[15], 15); + +#undef F +#undef P + + ctx->state[0] += A; + ctx->state[1] += B; + ctx->state[2] += C; + ctx->state[3] += D; +} + +/* + * MD4 process buffer + */ +void md4_update(md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen) +{ + int fill; + unsigned long left; + + if (ilen <= 0) { + return; + } + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if (ctx->total[0] < (unsigned long)ilen) { + ctx->total[1]++; + } + + if (left && ilen >= fill) { + MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), + input, fill); + md4_process(ctx, ctx->buffer); + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while (ilen >= 64) { + md4_process(ctx, input); + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if (ilen > 0) { + MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), + input, ilen); + } +} + +static const unsigned char md4_padding[64] = { + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * MD4 final digest + */ +void md4_finish(md4_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]) +{ + unsigned long last, padn; + unsigned long high, low; + unsigned char msglen[8]; + + high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) | (ctx->total[1] << 3); + low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); + + PUT_ULONG_LE(low, msglen, 0); + PUT_ULONG_LE(high, msglen, 4); + + last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); + + md4_update(ctx, md4_padding, padn); + md4_update(ctx, msglen, 8); + + PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); + PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); + PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); + PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); +} + +/* + * output = MD4( input buffer ) + */ +void md4(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[16]) +{ + md4_context ctx; + + md4_starts(&ctx); + md4_update(&ctx, input, ilen); + md4_finish(&ctx, output); +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD4 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c index da47a68d..293de707 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.c @@ -1,295 +1,295 @@ -/* - * RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ -/* - * The MD5 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991. - * - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h" - -#include - -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_ULONG_LE -#define GET_ULONG_LE(n, b, i) \ - { \ - (n) = ((unsigned long)(b)[(i)]) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 1] << 8) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 2] << 16) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 3] << 24); \ - } -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_ULONG_LE -#define PUT_ULONG_LE(n, b, i) \ - { \ - (b)[(i)] = (unsigned char)((n)); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 8); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 16); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 24); \ - } -#endif - -/* - * MD5 context setup - */ -void md5_starts(md5_context *ctx) -{ - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; - ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; - ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; - ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; -} - -static void md5_process(md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - unsigned long X[16], A, B, C, D; - - GET_ULONG_LE(X[0], data, 0); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[1], data, 4); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[2], data, 8); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[3], data, 12); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[4], data, 16); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[5], data, 20); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[6], data, 24); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[7], data, 28); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[8], data, 32); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[9], data, 36); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[10], data, 40); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[11], data, 44); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[12], data, 48); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[13], data, 52); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[14], data, 56); - GET_ULONG_LE(X[15], data, 60); - -#define S(x, n) ((x << n) | ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - n))) - -#define P(a, b, c, d, k, s, t) \ - { \ - a += F(b, c, d) + X[k] + t; \ - a = S(a, s) + b; \ - } - - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; - -#define F(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) - - P(A, B, C, D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478); - P(D, A, B, C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756); - P(C, D, A, B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB); - P(B, C, D, A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE); - P(A, B, C, D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF); - P(D, A, B, C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A); - P(C, D, A, B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613); - P(B, C, D, A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501); - P(A, B, C, D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8); - P(D, A, B, C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF); - P(C, D, A, B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1); - P(B, C, D, A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE); - P(A, B, C, D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122); - P(D, A, B, C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193); - P(C, D, A, B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E); - P(B, C, D, A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821); - -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) (y ^ (z & (x ^ y))) - - P(A, B, C, D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562); - P(D, A, B, C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340); - P(C, D, A, B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51); - P(B, C, D, A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA); - P(A, B, C, D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D); - P(D, A, B, C, 10, 9, 0x02441453); - P(C, D, A, B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681); - P(B, C, D, A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8); - P(A, B, C, D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6); - P(D, A, B, C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6); - P(C, D, A, B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87); - P(B, C, D, A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED); - P(A, B, C, D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905); - P(D, A, B, C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8); - P(C, D, A, B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9); - P(B, C, D, A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A); - -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) - - P(A, B, C, D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942); - P(D, A, B, C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681); - P(C, D, A, B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122); - P(B, C, D, A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C); - P(A, B, C, D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44); - P(D, A, B, C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9); - P(C, D, A, B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60); - P(B, C, D, A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70); - P(A, B, C, D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6); - P(D, A, B, C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA); - P(C, D, A, B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085); - P(B, C, D, A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05); - P(A, B, C, D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039); - P(D, A, B, C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5); - P(C, D, A, B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8); - P(B, C, D, A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665); - -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z)) - - P(A, B, C, D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244); - P(D, A, B, C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97); - P(C, D, A, B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7); - P(B, C, D, A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039); - P(A, B, C, D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3); - P(D, A, B, C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92); - P(C, D, A, B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D); - P(B, C, D, A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1); - P(A, B, C, D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F); - P(D, A, B, C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0); - P(C, D, A, B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314); - P(B, C, D, A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1); - P(A, B, C, D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82); - P(D, A, B, C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235); - P(C, D, A, B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB); - P(B, C, D, A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391); - -#undef F - - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; -} - -/* - * MD5 process buffer - */ -void md5_update(md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen) -{ - int fill; - unsigned long left; - - if (ilen <= 0) { - return; - } - - left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += ilen; - ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; - - if (ctx->total[0] < (unsigned long)ilen) { - ctx->total[1]++; - } - - if (left && ilen >= fill) { - MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), - input, fill); - md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer); - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while (ilen >= 64) { - md5_process(ctx, input); - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; - } - - if (ilen > 0) { - MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), - input, ilen); - } -} - -static const unsigned char md5_padding[64] = { - 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 -}; - -/* - * MD5 final digest - */ -void md5_finish(md5_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]) -{ - unsigned long last, padn; - unsigned long high, low; - unsigned char msglen[8]; - - high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) | (ctx->total[1] << 3); - low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); - - PUT_ULONG_LE(low, msglen, 0); - PUT_ULONG_LE(high, msglen, 4); - - last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); - - md5_update(ctx, md5_padding, padn); - md5_update(ctx, msglen, 8); - - PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); - PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); - PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); - PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); -} - -/* - * output = MD5( input buffer ) - */ -void md5(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[16]) -{ - md5_context ctx; - - md5_starts(&ctx); - md5_update(&ctx, input, ilen); - md5_finish(&ctx, output); -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 */ +/* + * RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * The MD5 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/md5.h" + +#include + +/* + * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian) + */ +#ifndef GET_ULONG_LE +#define GET_ULONG_LE(n, b, i) \ + { \ + (n) = ((unsigned long)(b)[(i)]) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 1] << 8) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 2] << 16) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 3] << 24); \ + } +#endif + +#ifndef PUT_ULONG_LE +#define PUT_ULONG_LE(n, b, i) \ + { \ + (b)[(i)] = (unsigned char)((n)); \ + (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 8); \ + (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 16); \ + (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 24); \ + } +#endif + +/* + * MD5 context setup + */ +void md5_starts(md5_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; +} + +static void md5_process(md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) +{ + unsigned long X[16], A, B, C, D; + + GET_ULONG_LE(X[0], data, 0); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[1], data, 4); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[2], data, 8); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[3], data, 12); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[4], data, 16); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[5], data, 20); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[6], data, 24); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[7], data, 28); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[8], data, 32); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[9], data, 36); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[10], data, 40); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[11], data, 44); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[12], data, 48); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[13], data, 52); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[14], data, 56); + GET_ULONG_LE(X[15], data, 60); + +#define S(x, n) ((x << n) | ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - n))) + +#define P(a, b, c, d, k, s, t) \ + { \ + a += F(b, c, d) + X[k] + t; \ + a = S(a, s) + b; \ + } + + A = ctx->state[0]; + B = ctx->state[1]; + C = ctx->state[2]; + D = ctx->state[3]; + +#define F(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) + + P(A, B, C, D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478); + P(D, A, B, C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756); + P(C, D, A, B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB); + P(B, C, D, A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE); + P(A, B, C, D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF); + P(D, A, B, C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A); + P(C, D, A, B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613); + P(B, C, D, A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501); + P(A, B, C, D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8); + P(D, A, B, C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF); + P(C, D, A, B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1); + P(B, C, D, A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE); + P(A, B, C, D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122); + P(D, A, B, C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193); + P(C, D, A, B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E); + P(B, C, D, A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821); + +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) (y ^ (z & (x ^ y))) + + P(A, B, C, D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562); + P(D, A, B, C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340); + P(C, D, A, B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51); + P(B, C, D, A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA); + P(A, B, C, D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D); + P(D, A, B, C, 10, 9, 0x02441453); + P(C, D, A, B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681); + P(B, C, D, A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8); + P(A, B, C, D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6); + P(D, A, B, C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6); + P(C, D, A, B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87); + P(B, C, D, A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED); + P(A, B, C, D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905); + P(D, A, B, C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8); + P(C, D, A, B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9); + P(B, C, D, A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A); + +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) + + P(A, B, C, D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942); + P(D, A, B, C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681); + P(C, D, A, B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122); + P(B, C, D, A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C); + P(A, B, C, D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44); + P(D, A, B, C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9); + P(C, D, A, B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60); + P(B, C, D, A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70); + P(A, B, C, D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6); + P(D, A, B, C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA); + P(C, D, A, B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085); + P(B, C, D, A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05); + P(A, B, C, D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039); + P(D, A, B, C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5); + P(C, D, A, B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8); + P(B, C, D, A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665); + +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z)) + + P(A, B, C, D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244); + P(D, A, B, C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97); + P(C, D, A, B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7); + P(B, C, D, A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039); + P(A, B, C, D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3); + P(D, A, B, C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92); + P(C, D, A, B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D); + P(B, C, D, A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1); + P(A, B, C, D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F); + P(D, A, B, C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0); + P(C, D, A, B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314); + P(B, C, D, A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1); + P(A, B, C, D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82); + P(D, A, B, C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235); + P(C, D, A, B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB); + P(B, C, D, A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391); + +#undef F + + ctx->state[0] += A; + ctx->state[1] += B; + ctx->state[2] += C; + ctx->state[3] += D; +} + +/* + * MD5 process buffer + */ +void md5_update(md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen) +{ + int fill; + unsigned long left; + + if (ilen <= 0) { + return; + } + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if (ctx->total[0] < (unsigned long)ilen) { + ctx->total[1]++; + } + + if (left && ilen >= fill) { + MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), + input, fill); + md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer); + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while (ilen >= 64) { + md5_process(ctx, input); + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if (ilen > 0) { + MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), + input, ilen); + } +} + +static const unsigned char md5_padding[64] = { + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * MD5 final digest + */ +void md5_finish(md5_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]) +{ + unsigned long last, padn; + unsigned long high, low; + unsigned char msglen[8]; + + high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) | (ctx->total[1] << 3); + low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); + + PUT_ULONG_LE(low, msglen, 0); + PUT_ULONG_LE(high, msglen, 4); + + last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); + + md5_update(ctx, md5_padding, padn); + md5_update(ctx, msglen, 8); + + PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); + PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); + PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); + PUT_ULONG_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); +} + +/* + * output = MD5( input buffer ) + */ +void md5(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[16]) +{ + md5_context ctx; + + md5_starts(&ctx); + md5_update(&ctx, input, ilen); + md5_finish(&ctx, output); +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_MD5 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c index cd6632d8..f52899fb 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.c @@ -1,329 +1,329 @@ -/* - * FIPS-180-1 compliant SHA-1 implementation - * - * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine - * - * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker - * - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS - * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ -/* - * The SHA-1 standard was published by NIST in 1993. - * - * http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 - -#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h" - -#include - -/* - * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) - */ -#ifndef GET_ULONG_BE -#define GET_ULONG_BE(n, b, i) \ - { \ - (n) = ((unsigned long)(b)[(i)] << 24) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 2] << 8) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 3]); \ - } -#endif - -#ifndef PUT_ULONG_BE -#define PUT_ULONG_BE(n, b, i) \ - { \ - (b)[(i)] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 24); \ - (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 16); \ - (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 8); \ - (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)((n)); \ - } -#endif - -/* - * SHA-1 context setup - */ -void sha1_starts(sha1_context *ctx) -{ - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; - ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; - ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; - ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; - ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; -} - -static void sha1_process(sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - unsigned long temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; - - GET_ULONG_BE(W[0], data, 0); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[1], data, 4); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[2], data, 8); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[3], data, 12); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[4], data, 16); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[5], data, 20); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[6], data, 24); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[7], data, 28); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[8], data, 32); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[9], data, 36); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[10], data, 40); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[11], data, 44); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[12], data, 48); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[13], data, 52); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[14], data, 56); - GET_ULONG_BE(W[15], data, 60); - -#define S(x, n) ((x << n) | ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - n))) - -#define R(t) \ - ( \ - temp = W[(t - 3) & 0x0F] ^ W[(t - 8) & 0x0F] ^ \ - W[(t - 14) & 0x0F] ^ W[t & 0x0F], \ - (W[t & 0x0F] = S(temp, 1))) - -#define P(a, b, c, d, e, x) \ - { \ - e += S(a, 5) + F(b, c, d) + K + x; \ - b = S(b, 30); \ - } - - A = ctx->state[0]; - B = ctx->state[1]; - C = ctx->state[2]; - D = ctx->state[3]; - E = ctx->state[4]; - -#define F(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) -#define K 0x5A827999 - - P(A, B, C, D, E, W[0]); - P(E, A, B, C, D, W[1]); - P(D, E, A, B, C, W[2]); - P(C, D, E, A, B, W[3]); - P(B, C, D, E, A, W[4]); - P(A, B, C, D, E, W[5]); - P(E, A, B, C, D, W[6]); - P(D, E, A, B, C, W[7]); - P(C, D, E, A, B, W[8]); - P(B, C, D, E, A, W[9]); - P(A, B, C, D, E, W[10]); - P(E, A, B, C, D, W[11]); - P(D, E, A, B, C, W[12]); - P(C, D, E, A, B, W[13]); - P(B, C, D, E, A, W[14]); - P(A, B, C, D, E, W[15]); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(16)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(17)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(18)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(19)); - -#undef K -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) -#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 - - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(20)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(21)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(22)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(23)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(24)); - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(25)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(26)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(27)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(28)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(29)); - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(30)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(31)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(32)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(33)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(34)); - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(35)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(36)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(37)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(38)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(39)); - -#undef K -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) ((x & y) | (z & (x | y))) -#define K 0x8F1BBCDC - - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(40)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(41)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(42)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(43)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(44)); - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(45)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(46)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(47)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(48)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(49)); - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(50)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(51)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(52)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(53)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(54)); - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(55)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(56)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(57)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(58)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(59)); - -#undef K -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) -#define K 0xCA62C1D6 - - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(60)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(61)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(62)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(63)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(64)); - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(65)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(66)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(67)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(68)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(69)); - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(70)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(71)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(72)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(73)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(74)); - P(A, B, C, D, E, R(75)); - P(E, A, B, C, D, R(76)); - P(D, E, A, B, C, R(77)); - P(C, D, E, A, B, R(78)); - P(B, C, D, E, A, R(79)); - -#undef K -#undef F - - ctx->state[0] += A; - ctx->state[1] += B; - ctx->state[2] += C; - ctx->state[3] += D; - ctx->state[4] += E; -} - -/* - * SHA-1 process buffer - */ -void sha1_update(sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen) -{ - int fill; - unsigned long left; - - if (ilen <= 0) { - return; - } - - left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += ilen; - ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; - - if (ctx->total[0] < (unsigned long)ilen) { - ctx->total[1]++; - } - - if (left && ilen >= fill) { - MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), - input, fill); - sha1_process(ctx, ctx->buffer); - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while (ilen >= 64) { - sha1_process(ctx, input); - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; - } - - if (ilen > 0) { - MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), - input, ilen); - } -} - -static const unsigned char sha1_padding[64] = { - 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 -}; - -/* - * SHA-1 final digest - */ -void sha1_finish(sha1_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20]) -{ - unsigned long last, padn; - unsigned long high, low; - unsigned char msglen[8]; - - high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) | (ctx->total[1] << 3); - low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); - - PUT_ULONG_BE(high, msglen, 0); - PUT_ULONG_BE(low, msglen, 4); - - last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); - - sha1_update(ctx, sha1_padding, padn); - sha1_update(ctx, msglen, 8); - - PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); - PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); - PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); - PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); - PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[4], output, 16); -} - -/* - * output = SHA-1( input buffer ) - */ -void sha1(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[20]) -{ - sha1_context ctx; - - sha1_starts(&ctx); - sha1_update(&ctx, input, ilen); - sha1_finish(&ctx, output); -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 */ +/* + * FIPS-180-1 compliant SHA-1 implementation + * + * Based on XySSL: Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Christophe Devine + * + * Copyright (C) 2009 Paul Bakker + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the names of PolarSSL or XySSL nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * The SHA-1 standard was published by NIST in 1993. + * + * http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 + +#include "netif/ppp/polarssl/sha1.h" + +#include + +/* + * 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian) + */ +#ifndef GET_ULONG_BE +#define GET_ULONG_BE(n, b, i) \ + { \ + (n) = ((unsigned long)(b)[(i)] << 24) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 2] << 8) | ((unsigned long)(b)[(i) + 3]); \ + } +#endif + +#ifndef PUT_ULONG_BE +#define PUT_ULONG_BE(n, b, i) \ + { \ + (b)[(i)] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 24); \ + (b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 16); \ + (b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)((n) >> 8); \ + (b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)((n)); \ + } +#endif + +/* + * SHA-1 context setup + */ +void sha1_starts(sha1_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; +} + +static void sha1_process(sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) +{ + unsigned long temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; + + GET_ULONG_BE(W[0], data, 0); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[1], data, 4); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[2], data, 8); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[3], data, 12); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[4], data, 16); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[5], data, 20); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[6], data, 24); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[7], data, 28); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[8], data, 32); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[9], data, 36); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[10], data, 40); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[11], data, 44); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[12], data, 48); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[13], data, 52); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[14], data, 56); + GET_ULONG_BE(W[15], data, 60); + +#define S(x, n) ((x << n) | ((x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - n))) + +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + temp = W[(t - 3) & 0x0F] ^ W[(t - 8) & 0x0F] ^ \ + W[(t - 14) & 0x0F] ^ W[t & 0x0F], \ + (W[t & 0x0F] = S(temp, 1))) + +#define P(a, b, c, d, e, x) \ + { \ + e += S(a, 5) + F(b, c, d) + K + x; \ + b = S(b, 30); \ + } + + A = ctx->state[0]; + B = ctx->state[1]; + C = ctx->state[2]; + D = ctx->state[3]; + E = ctx->state[4]; + +#define F(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) +#define K 0x5A827999 + + P(A, B, C, D, E, W[0]); + P(E, A, B, C, D, W[1]); + P(D, E, A, B, C, W[2]); + P(C, D, E, A, B, W[3]); + P(B, C, D, E, A, W[4]); + P(A, B, C, D, E, W[5]); + P(E, A, B, C, D, W[6]); + P(D, E, A, B, C, W[7]); + P(C, D, E, A, B, W[8]); + P(B, C, D, E, A, W[9]); + P(A, B, C, D, E, W[10]); + P(E, A, B, C, D, W[11]); + P(D, E, A, B, C, W[12]); + P(C, D, E, A, B, W[13]); + P(B, C, D, E, A, W[14]); + P(A, B, C, D, E, W[15]); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(16)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(17)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(18)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(19)); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) +#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 + + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(20)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(21)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(22)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(23)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(24)); + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(25)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(26)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(27)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(28)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(29)); + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(30)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(31)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(32)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(33)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(34)); + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(35)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(36)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(37)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(38)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(39)); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) ((x & y) | (z & (x | y))) +#define K 0x8F1BBCDC + + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(40)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(41)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(42)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(43)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(44)); + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(45)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(46)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(47)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(48)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(49)); + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(50)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(51)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(52)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(53)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(54)); + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(55)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(56)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(57)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(58)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(59)); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) +#define K 0xCA62C1D6 + + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(60)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(61)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(62)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(63)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(64)); + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(65)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(66)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(67)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(68)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(69)); + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(70)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(71)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(72)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(73)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(74)); + P(A, B, C, D, E, R(75)); + P(E, A, B, C, D, R(76)); + P(D, E, A, B, C, R(77)); + P(C, D, E, A, B, R(78)); + P(B, C, D, E, A, R(79)); + +#undef K +#undef F + + ctx->state[0] += A; + ctx->state[1] += B; + ctx->state[2] += C; + ctx->state[3] += D; + ctx->state[4] += E; +} + +/* + * SHA-1 process buffer + */ +void sha1_update(sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, int ilen) +{ + int fill; + unsigned long left; + + if (ilen <= 0) { + return; + } + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if (ctx->total[0] < (unsigned long)ilen) { + ctx->total[1]++; + } + + if (left && ilen >= fill) { + MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), + input, fill); + sha1_process(ctx, ctx->buffer); + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while (ilen >= 64) { + sha1_process(ctx, input); + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if (ilen > 0) { + MEMCPY((void *)(ctx->buffer + left), + input, ilen); + } +} + +static const unsigned char sha1_padding[64] = { + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * SHA-1 final digest + */ +void sha1_finish(sha1_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20]) +{ + unsigned long last, padn; + unsigned long high, low; + unsigned char msglen[8]; + + high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) | (ctx->total[1] << 3); + low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); + + PUT_ULONG_BE(high, msglen, 0); + PUT_ULONG_BE(low, msglen, 4); + + last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); + + sha1_update(ctx, sha1_padding, padn); + sha1_update(ctx, msglen, 8); + + PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); + PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); + PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); + PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); + PUT_ULONG_BE(ctx->state[4], output, 16); +} + +/* + * output = SHA-1( input buffer ) + */ +void sha1(unsigned char *input, int ilen, unsigned char output[20]) +{ + sha1_context ctx; + + sha1_starts(&ctx); + sha1_update(&ctx, input, ilen); + sha1_finish(&ctx, output); +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && LWIP_INCLUDED_POLARSSL_SHA1 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ppp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ppp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ppp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ppp.c index 138ddb70..aa85b234 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ppp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/ppp.c @@ -1,1726 +1,1726 @@ -/***************************************************************************** -* ppp.c - Network Point to Point Protocol program file. -* -* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. -* portions Copyright (c) 1997 by Global Election Systems Inc. -* -* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, -* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided -* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this -* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any -* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required -* for any of the authorized uses. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR -* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -****************************************************************************** -* REVISION HISTORY -* -* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher -* Ported to lwIP. -* 97-11-05 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. -* Original. -*****************************************************************************/ - -/* - * ppp_defs.h - PPP definitions. - * - * if_pppvar.h - private structures and declarations for PPP. - * - * Copyright (c) 1994 The Australian National University. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its - * documentation is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright - * notice appears in all copies. This software is provided without any - * warranty, express or implied. The Australian National University - * makes no representations about the suitability of this software for - * any purpose. - * - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE TO ANY - * PARTY FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES - * ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE AND ITS DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF - * THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTIES, - * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE SOFTWARE PROVIDED HEREUNDER IS - * ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, AND THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY HAS NO - * OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, UPDATES, ENHANCEMENTS, - * OR MODIFICATIONS. - */ - -/* - * if_ppp.h - Point-to-Point Protocol definitions. - * - * Copyright (c) 1989 Carnegie Mellon University. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted - * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are - * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, - * advertising materials, and other materials related to such - * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed - * by Carnegie Mellon University. The name of the - * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived - * from this software without specific prior written permission. - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - */ - -/** - * @defgroup ppp PPP - * @ingroup netifs - * @verbinclude "ppp.txt" - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/ip4.h" /* for ip4_input() */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -#include "lwip/ip6.h" /* for ip6_input() */ -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ -#include "lwip/dns.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppos.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" - -#if PAP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/upap.h" -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/eap.h" -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CCP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/mppe.h" -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if ECP_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/ecp.h" -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/vj.h" -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -#include "netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h" -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - -/*************************/ -/*** LOCAL DEFINITIONS ***/ -/*************************/ - -/* Memory pools */ -#if PPPOS_SUPPORT -LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(PPPOS_PCB); -#endif -#if PPPOE_SUPPORT -LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(PPPOE_IF); -#endif -#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT -LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(PPPOL2TP_PCB); -#endif -#if LWIP_PPP_API && LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE -LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(PPPAPI_MSG); -#endif -LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB, sizeof(ppp_pcb), "PPP_PCB") - -/* FIXME: add stats per PPP session */ -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT -static struct timeval start_time; /* Time when link was started. */ -static struct pppd_stats old_link_stats; -struct pppd_stats link_stats; -unsigned link_connect_time; -int link_stats_valid; -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * PPP Data Link Layer "protocol" table. - * One entry per supported protocol. - * The last entry must be NULL. - */ -const struct protent *const protocols[] = { - &lcp_protent, -#if PAP_SUPPORT - &pap_protent, -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - &chap_protent, -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CBCP_SUPPORT - &cbcp_protent, -#endif /* CBCP_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT - &ipcp_protent, -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT - &ipv6cp_protent, -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ -#if CCP_SUPPORT - &ccp_protent, -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ -#if ECP_SUPPORT - &ecp_protent, -#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ -#ifdef AT_CHANGE - &atcp_protent, -#endif /* AT_CHANGE */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - &eap_protent, -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - NULL -}; - -/* Prototypes for procedures local to this file. */ -static void ppp_do_connect(void *arg); -static err_t ppp_netif_init_cb(struct netif *netif); -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT -static err_t ppp_netif_output_ip4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -static err_t ppp_netif_output_ip6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr); -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ -static err_t ppp_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, u16_t protocol); - -/***********************************/ -/*** PUBLIC FUNCTION DEFINITIONS ***/ -/***********************************/ -#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT -void ppp_set_auth(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t authtype, const char *user, const char *passwd) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); -#if PAP_SUPPORT - pcb->settings.refuse_pap = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_PAP); -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - pcb->settings.refuse_chap = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_CHAP); -#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT - pcb->settings.refuse_mschap = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_MSCHAP); - pcb->settings.refuse_mschap_v2 = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_MSCHAP_V2); -#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - pcb->settings.refuse_eap = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_EAP); -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - pcb->settings.user = user; - pcb->settings.passwd = passwd; -} -#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT -/* Set MPPE configuration */ -void ppp_set_mppe(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t flags) -{ - if (flags == PPP_MPPE_DISABLE) { - pcb->settings.require_mppe = 0; - return; - } - - pcb->settings.require_mppe = 1; - pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_stateful = !(flags & PPP_MPPE_ALLOW_STATEFUL); - pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_40 = !!(flags & PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_40); - pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_128 = !!(flags & PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_128); -} -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE -void ppp_set_notify_phase_callback(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb) -{ - pcb->notify_phase_cb = notify_phase_cb; - notify_phase_cb(pcb, pcb->phase, pcb->ctx_cb); -} -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ - -/* - * Initiate a PPP connection. - * - * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. - * - * Holdoff is the time to wait (in seconds) before initiating - * the connection. - * - * If this port connects to a modem, the modem connection must be - * established before calling this. - */ -err_t ppp_connect(ppp_pcb *pcb, u16_t holdoff) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD) { - return ERR_ALREADY; - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_connect[%d]: holdoff=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, holdoff)); - - magic_randomize(); - - if (holdoff == 0) { - ppp_do_connect(pcb); - return ERR_OK; - } - - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF); - sys_timeout((u32_t)(holdoff * 1000), ppp_do_connect, pcb); - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * Listen for an incoming PPP connection. - * - * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. - * - * If this port connects to a modem, the modem connection must be - * established before calling this. - */ -err_t ppp_listen(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD) { - return ERR_ALREADY; - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_listen[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); - - magic_randomize(); - - if (pcb->link_cb->listen) { - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_INITIALIZE); - pcb->link_cb->listen(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb); - return ERR_OK; - } - - return ERR_IF; -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * Initiate the end of a PPP connection. - * Any outstanding packets in the queues are dropped. - * - * Setting nocarrier to 1 close the PPP connection without initiating the - * shutdown procedure. Always using nocarrier = 0 is still recommended, - * this is going to take a little longer time if your link is down, but - * is a safer choice for the PPP state machine. - * - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. - */ -err_t ppp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t nocarrier) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_USER; - - /* holdoff phase, cancel the reconnection */ - if (pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF) { - sys_untimeout(ppp_do_connect, pcb); - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); - } - - /* dead phase, nothing to do, call the status callback to be consistent */ - if (pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_DEAD) { - pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Already terminating, nothing to do */ - if (pcb->phase >= PPP_PHASE_TERMINATE) { - return ERR_INPROGRESS; - } - - /* LCP not open, close link protocol */ - if (pcb->phase < PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH) { - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT); - ppp_link_terminated(pcb); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* - * Only accept carrier lost signal on the stable running phase in order - * to prevent changing the PPP phase FSM in transition phases. - * - * Always using nocarrier = 0 is still recommended, this is going to - * take a little longer time, but is a safer choice from FSM point of view. - */ - if (nocarrier && pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_RUNNING) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_close[%d]: carrier lost -> lcp_lowerdown\n", pcb->netif->num)); - lcp_lowerdown(pcb); - /* forced link termination, this will force link protocol to disconnect. */ - link_terminated(pcb); - return ERR_OK; - } - - /* Disconnect */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_close[%d]: kill_link -> lcp_close\n", pcb->netif->num)); - /* LCP soft close request. */ - lcp_close(pcb, "User request"); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* - * Release the control block. - * - * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. - * - * You must use ppp_close() before if you wish to terminate - * an established PPP session. - * - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. - */ -err_t ppp_free(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - err_t err; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD) { - return ERR_CONN; - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_free[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); - - netif_remove(pcb->netif); - - err = pcb->link_cb->free(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb); - - LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPP_PCB, pcb); - return err; -} - -/* Get and set parameters for the given connection. - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. */ -err_t ppp_ioctl(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t cmd, void *arg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - switch (cmd) { - case PPPCTLG_UPSTATUS: /* Get the PPP up status. */ - if (!arg) { - goto fail; - } - - *(int *)arg = (int)(0 -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT - || pcb->if4_up -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT - || pcb->if6_up -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - ); - return ERR_OK; - - case PPPCTLG_ERRCODE: /* Get the PPP error code. */ - if (!arg) { - goto fail; - } - - *(int *)arg = (int)(pcb->err_code); - return ERR_OK; - - default: - goto fail; - } - -fail: - return ERR_VAL; -} - -/**********************************/ -/*** LOCAL FUNCTION DEFINITIONS ***/ -/**********************************/ - -static void ppp_do_connect(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_DEAD || pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF", pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_DEAD || pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF); - - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_INITIALIZE); - pcb->link_cb->connect(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb); -} - -/* - * ppp_netif_init_cb - netif init callback - */ -static err_t ppp_netif_init_cb(struct netif *netif) -{ - netif->name[0] = 'p'; - netif->name[1] = 'p'; -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT - netif->output = ppp_netif_output_ip4; -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT - netif->output_ip6 = ppp_netif_output_ip6; -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_UP; -#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME - /* @todo: Initialize interface hostname */ - /* netif_set_hostname(netif, "lwip"); */ -#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT -/* - * Send an IPv4 packet on the given connection. - */ -static err_t ppp_netif_output_ip4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - return ppp_netif_output(netif, pb, PPP_IP); -} -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -/* - * Send an IPv6 packet on the given connection. - */ -static err_t ppp_netif_output_ip6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - return ppp_netif_output(netif, pb, PPP_IPV6); -} -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - -static err_t ppp_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, u16_t protocol) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)netif->state; - err_t err; - struct pbuf *fpb = NULL; - - /* Check that the link is up. */ - if (0 -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT - || (protocol == PPP_IP && !pcb->if4_up) -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT - || (protocol == PPP_IPV6 && !pcb->if6_up) -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - ) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_netif_output[%d]: link not up\n", pcb->netif->num)); - goto err_rte_drop; - } - -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - /* If MPPE is required, refuse any IP packet until we are able to crypt them. */ - if (pcb->settings.require_mppe && pcb->ccp_transmit_method != CI_MPPE) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_netif_output[%d]: MPPE required, not up\n", pcb->netif->num)); - goto err_rte_drop; - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - - /* - * Attempt Van Jacobson header compression if VJ is configured and - * this is an IP packet. - */ - if (protocol == PPP_IP && pcb->vj_enabled) { - switch (vj_compress_tcp(&pcb->vj_comp, &pb)) { - case TYPE_IP: - /* No change... - protocol = PPP_IP; */ - break; - - case TYPE_COMPRESSED_TCP: - /* vj_compress_tcp() returns a new allocated pbuf, indicate we should free - * our duplicated pbuf later */ - fpb = pb; - protocol = PPP_VJC_COMP; - break; - - case TYPE_UNCOMPRESSED_TCP: - /* vj_compress_tcp() returns a new allocated pbuf, indicate we should free - * our duplicated pbuf later */ - fpb = pb; - protocol = PPP_VJC_UNCOMP; - break; - - default: - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("ppp_netif_output[%d]: bad IP packet\n", pcb->netif->num)); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(pcb->netif, ifoutdiscards); - return ERR_VAL; - } - } - -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -#if CCP_SUPPORT - - switch (pcb->ccp_transmit_method) { - case 0: - break; /* Don't compress */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - case CI_MPPE: - if ((err = mppe_compress(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp, &pb, protocol)) != ERR_OK) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); - goto err; - } - - /* if VJ compressor returned a new allocated pbuf, free it */ - if (fpb) { - pbuf_free(fpb); - } - - /* mppe_compress() returns a new allocated pbuf, indicate we should free - * our duplicated pbuf later */ - fpb = pb; - protocol = PPP_COMP; - break; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - default: - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_netif_output[%d]: bad CCP transmit method\n", pcb->netif->num)); - goto err_rte_drop; /* Cannot really happen, we only negotiate what we are able to do */ - } - -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ - - err = pcb->link_cb->netif_output(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb, pb, protocol); - goto err; - -err_rte_drop: - err = ERR_RTE; - LINK_STATS_INC(link.rterr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); -err: - - if (fpb) { - pbuf_free(fpb); - } - - return err; -} - -/************************************/ -/*** PRIVATE FUNCTION DEFINITIONS ***/ -/************************************/ - -/* Initialize the PPP subsystem. */ -int ppp_init(void) -{ -#if PPPOS_SUPPORT - LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPPOS_PCB); -#endif -#if PPPOE_SUPPORT - LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPPOE_IF); -#endif -#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT - LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPPOL2TP_PCB); -#endif -#if LWIP_PPP_API && LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE - LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPPAPI_MSG); -#endif - - LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPP_PCB); - - /* - * Initialize magic number generator now so that protocols may - * use magic numbers in initialization. - */ - magic_init(); - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Create a new PPP control block. - * - * This initializes the PPP control block but does not - * attempt to negotiate the LCP session. - * - * Return a new PPP connection control block pointer - * on success or a null pointer on failure. - */ -ppp_pcb *ppp_new(struct netif *pppif, const struct link_callbacks *callbacks, void *link_ctx_cb, ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb; - const struct protent *protp; - int i; - - /* PPP is single-threaded: without a callback, - * there is no way to know when the link is up. */ - if (link_status_cb == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - pcb = (ppp_pcb *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(PPP_PCB); - - if (pcb == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - memset(pcb, 0, sizeof(ppp_pcb)); - - /* default configuration */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - pcb->settings.pap_timeout_time = UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT; - pcb->settings.pap_max_transmits = UPAP_DEFTRANSMITS; -#if PPP_SERVER - pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout = UPAP_DEFREQTIME; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ - -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - pcb->settings.chap_timeout_time = CHAP_DEFTIMEOUT; - pcb->settings.chap_max_transmits = CHAP_DEFTRANSMITS; -#if PPP_SERVER - pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time = CHAP_DEFRECHALLENGETIME; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPPORT */ - -#if EAP_SUPPORT - pcb->settings.eap_req_time = EAP_DEFREQTIME; - pcb->settings.eap_allow_req = EAP_DEFALLOWREQ; -#if PPP_SERVER - pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time = EAP_DEFTIMEOUT; - pcb->settings.eap_max_transmits = EAP_DEFTRANSMITS; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - - pcb->settings.lcp_loopbackfail = LCP_DEFLOOPBACKFAIL; - pcb->settings.lcp_echo_interval = LCP_ECHOINTERVAL; - pcb->settings.lcp_echo_fails = LCP_MAXECHOFAILS; - - pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time = FSM_DEFTIMEOUT; - pcb->settings.fsm_max_conf_req_transmits = FSM_DEFMAXCONFREQS; - pcb->settings.fsm_max_term_transmits = FSM_DEFMAXTERMREQS; - pcb->settings.fsm_max_nak_loops = FSM_DEFMAXNAKLOOPS; - - pcb->netif = pppif; - MIB2_INIT_NETIF(pppif, snmp_ifType_ppp, 0); - - if (!netif_add(pcb->netif, -#if LWIP_IPV4 - IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_BROADCAST, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - (void *)pcb, ppp_netif_init_cb, NULL)) { - LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPP_PCB, pcb); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_new: netif_add failed\n")); - return NULL; - } - - pcb->link_cb = callbacks; - pcb->link_ctx_cb = link_ctx_cb; - pcb->link_status_cb = link_status_cb; - pcb->ctx_cb = ctx_cb; - - /* - * Initialize each protocol. - */ - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) { - (*protp->init)(pcb); - } - - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); - return pcb; -} - -/** Initiate LCP open request */ -void ppp_start(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_start[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); - - /* Clean data not taken care by anything else, mostly shared data. */ -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - link_stats_valid = 0; -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - pcb->mppe_keys_set = 0; - memset(&pcb->mppe_comp, 0, sizeof(pcb->mppe_comp)); - memset(&pcb->mppe_decomp, 0, sizeof(pcb->mppe_decomp)); -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ -#if VJ_SUPPORT - vj_compress_init(&pcb->vj_comp); -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - /* Start protocol */ - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH); - lcp_open(pcb); - lcp_lowerup(pcb); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_start[%d]: finished\n", pcb->netif->num)); -} - -/** Called when link failed to setup */ -void ppp_link_failed(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_link_failed[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_OPEN; - pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); -} - -/** Called when link is normally down (i.e. it was asked to end) */ -void ppp_link_end(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_link_end[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); - new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); - - if (pcb->err_code == PPPERR_NONE) { - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_CONNECT; - } - - pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); -} - -/* - * Pass the processed input packet to the appropriate handler. - * This function and all handlers run in the context of the tcpip_thread - */ -void ppp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *pb) -{ - u16_t protocol; -#if PPP_DEBUG && PPP_PROTOCOLNAME - const char *pname; -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG && PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ - - magic_randomize(); - - if (pb->len < 2) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_input[%d]: packet too short\n", pcb->netif->num)); - goto drop; - } - - protocol = (((u8_t *)pb->payload)[0] << 8) | ((u8_t *)pb->payload)[1]; - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - ppp_dump_packet(pcb, "rcvd", (unsigned char *)pb->payload, pb->len); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - - pbuf_remove_header(pb, sizeof(protocol)); - - LINK_STATS_INC(link.recv); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(pcb->netif, ifinucastpkts); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(pcb->netif, ifinoctets, pb->tot_len); - - /* - * Toss all non-LCP packets unless LCP is OPEN. - */ - if (protocol != PPP_LCP && pcb->lcp_fsm.state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { - ppp_dbglog("Discarded non-LCP packet when LCP not open"); - goto drop; - } - - /* - * Until we get past the authentication phase, toss all packets - * except LCP, LQR and authentication packets. - */ - if (pcb->phase <= PPP_PHASE_AUTHENTICATE && !(protocol == PPP_LCP -#if LQR_SUPPORT - || protocol == PPP_LQR -#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ -#if PAP_SUPPORT - || protocol == PPP_PAP -#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ -#if CHAP_SUPPORT - || protocol == PPP_CHAP -#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ -#if EAP_SUPPORT - || protocol == PPP_EAP -#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ - )) { - ppp_dbglog("discarding proto 0x%x in phase %d", protocol, pcb->phase); - goto drop; - } - -#if CCP_SUPPORT -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - /* - * MPPE is required and unencrypted data has arrived (this - * should never happen!). We should probably drop the link if - * the protocol is in the range of what should be encrypted. - * At the least, we drop this packet. - */ - if (pcb->settings.require_mppe && protocol != PPP_COMP && protocol < 0x8000) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_input[%d]: MPPE required, received unencrypted data!\n", pcb->netif->num)); - goto drop; - } - -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - if (protocol == PPP_COMP) { - u8_t *pl; - - switch (pcb->ccp_receive_method) { -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - case CI_MPPE: - if (mppe_decompress(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp, &pb) != ERR_OK) { - goto drop; - } - - break; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - default: - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_input[%d]: bad CCP receive method\n", pcb->netif->num)); - goto drop; /* Cannot really happen, we only negotiate what we are able to do */ - } - - /* Assume no PFC */ - if (pb->len < 2) { - goto drop; - } - - /* Extract and hide protocol (do PFC decompression if necessary) */ - pl = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - - if (pl[0] & 0x01) { - protocol = pl[0]; - pbuf_remove_header(pb, 1); - } else { - protocol = (pl[0] << 8) | pl[1]; - pbuf_remove_header(pb, 2); - } - } - -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ - - switch (protocol) { -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT - - case PPP_IP: /* Internet Protocol */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_input[%d]: ip in pbuf len=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pb->tot_len)); - ip4_input(pb, pcb->netif); - return; -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT - - case PPP_IPV6: /* Internet Protocol Version 6 */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_input[%d]: ip6 in pbuf len=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pb->tot_len)); - ip6_input(pb, pcb->netif); - return; -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - -#if VJ_SUPPORT - - case PPP_VJC_COMP: /* VJ compressed TCP */ - /* - * Clip off the VJ header and prepend the rebuilt TCP/IP header and - * pass the result to IP. - */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_input[%d]: vj_comp in pbuf len=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pb->tot_len)); - - if (pcb->vj_enabled && vj_uncompress_tcp(&pb, &pcb->vj_comp) >= 0) { - ip4_input(pb, pcb->netif); - return; - } - - /* Something's wrong so drop it. */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("ppp_input[%d]: Dropping VJ compressed\n", pcb->netif->num)); - break; - - case PPP_VJC_UNCOMP: /* VJ uncompressed TCP */ - /* - * Process the TCP/IP header for VJ header compression and then pass - * the packet to IP. - */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_input[%d]: vj_un in pbuf len=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pb->tot_len)); - - if (pcb->vj_enabled && vj_uncompress_uncomp(pb, &pcb->vj_comp) >= 0) { - ip4_input(pb, pcb->netif); - return; - } - - /* Something's wrong so drop it. */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("ppp_input[%d]: Dropping VJ uncompressed\n", pcb->netif->num)); - break; -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - default: { - int i; - const struct protent *protp; - - /* - * Upcall the proper protocol input routine. - */ - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) { - if (protp->protocol == protocol) { - pb = pbuf_coalesce(pb, PBUF_RAW); - (*protp->input)(pcb, (u8_t *)pb->payload, pb->len); - goto out; - } - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - * - * This is actually a (hacked?) way for the Linux kernel to pass a data - * packet to pppd. pppd in normal condition only do signaling - * (LCP, PAP, CHAP, IPCP, ...) and does not handle any data packet at all. - * - * We don't even need this interface, which is only there because of PPP - * interface limitation between Linux kernel and pppd. For MPPE, which uses - * CCP to negotiate although it is not really a (de)compressor, we added - * ccp_resetrequest() in CCP and MPPE input data flow is calling either - * ccp_resetrequest() or lcp_close() if the issue is, respectively, non-fatal - * or fatal, this is what ccp_datainput() really do. - */ - - if(protocol == (protp->protocol & ~0x8000) - && protp->datainput != NULL) - { - (*protp->datainput)(pcb, pb->payload, pb->len); - goto out; - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - } - -#if PPP_DEBUG -#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME - pname = protocol_name(protocol); - - if (pname != NULL) { - ppp_warn("Unsupported protocol '%s' (0x%x) received", pname, protocol); - } else -#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ - ppp_warn("Unsupported protocol 0x%x received", protocol); - -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - - if (pbuf_add_header(pb, sizeof(protocol))) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("ppp_input[%d]: Dropping (pbuf_add_header failed)\n", pcb->netif->num)); - goto drop; - } - - lcp_sprotrej(pcb, (u8_t *)pb->payload, pb->len); - } break; - } - -drop: - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(pcb->netif, ifindiscards); - -out: - pbuf_free(pb); -} - -/* - * Write a pbuf to a ppp link, only used from PPP functions - * to send PPP packets. - * - * IPv4 and IPv6 packets from lwIP are sent, respectively, - * with ppp_netif_output_ip4() and ppp_netif_output_ip6() - * functions (which are callbacks of the netif PPP interface). - */ -err_t ppp_write(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p) -{ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - ppp_dump_packet(pcb, "sent", (unsigned char *)p->payload + 2, p->len - 2); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - return pcb->link_cb->write(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb, p); -} - -void ppp_link_terminated(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_link_terminated[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); - pcb->link_cb->disconnect(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_link_terminated[%d]: finished.\n", pcb->netif->num)); -} - -/************************************************************************ - * Functions called by various PPP subsystems to configure - * the PPP interface or change the PPP phase. - */ - -/* - * new_phase - signal the start of a new phase of pppd's operation. - */ -void new_phase(ppp_pcb *pcb, int p) -{ - pcb->phase = p; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp phase changed[%d]: phase=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->phase)); -#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE - - if (pcb->notify_phase_cb != NULL) { - pcb->notify_phase_cb(pcb, p, pcb->ctx_cb); - } - -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ -} - -/* - * ppp_send_config - configure the transmit-side characteristics of - * the ppp interface. - */ -int ppp_send_config(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mtu, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(mtu); - /* pcb->mtu = mtu; -- set correctly with netif_set_mtu */ - - if (pcb->link_cb->send_config) { - pcb->link_cb->send_config(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb, accm, pcomp, accomp); - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_send_config[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); - return 0; -} - -/* - * ppp_recv_config - configure the receive-side characteristics of - * the ppp interface. - */ -int ppp_recv_config(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mru, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(mru); - - if (pcb->link_cb->recv_config) { - pcb->link_cb->recv_config(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb, accm, pcomp, accomp); - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_recv_config[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); - return 0; -} - -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT -/* - * sifaddr - Config the interface IP addresses and netmask. - */ -int sifaddr(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t our_adr, u32_t his_adr, u32_t netmask) -{ - ip4_addr_t ip, nm, gw; - - ip4_addr_set_u32(&ip, our_adr); - ip4_addr_set_u32(&nm, netmask); - ip4_addr_set_u32(&gw, his_adr); - netif_set_addr(pcb->netif, &ip, &nm, &gw); - return 1; -} - -/******************************************************************** - * - * cifaddr - Clear the interface IP addresses, and delete routes - * through the interface if possible. - */ -int cifaddr(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t our_adr, u32_t his_adr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(our_adr); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_adr); - - netif_set_addr(pcb->netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_BROADCAST, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); - return 1; -} - -#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ -/******************************************************************** - * - * sifproxyarp - Make a proxy ARP entry for the peer. - */ - -int sifproxyarp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t his_adr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_adr); - return 0; -} - -/******************************************************************** - * - * cifproxyarp - Delete the proxy ARP entry for the peer. - */ - -int cifproxyarp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t his_adr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_adr); - return 0; -} -#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ - -#if LWIP_DNS -/* - * sdns - Config the DNS servers - */ -int sdns(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ns1, u32_t ns2) -{ - ip_addr_t ns; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(ns, ns1); - dns_setserver(0, &ns); - ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(ns, ns2); - dns_setserver(1, &ns); - return 1; -} - -/******************************************************************** - * - * cdns - Clear the DNS servers - */ -int cdns(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ns1, u32_t ns2) -{ - const ip_addr_t *nsa; - ip_addr_t nsb; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - nsa = dns_getserver(0); - ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(nsb, ns1); - - if (ip_addr_cmp(nsa, &nsb)) { - dns_setserver(0, IP_ADDR_ANY); - } - - nsa = dns_getserver(1); - ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(nsb, ns2); - - if (ip_addr_cmp(nsa, &nsb)) { - dns_setserver(1, IP_ADDR_ANY); - } - - return 1; -} -#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ - -#if VJ_SUPPORT -/******************************************************************** - * - * sifvjcomp - config tcp header compression - */ -int sifvjcomp(ppp_pcb *pcb, int vjcomp, int cidcomp, int maxcid) -{ - pcb->vj_enabled = vjcomp; - pcb->vj_comp.compressSlot = cidcomp; - pcb->vj_comp.maxSlotIndex = maxcid; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("sifvjcomp[%d]: VJ compress enable=%d slot=%d max slot=%d\n", - pcb->netif->num, vjcomp, cidcomp, maxcid)); - return 0; -} -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * sifup - Config the interface up and enable IP packets to pass. - */ -int sifup(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - pcb->if4_up = 1; - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_NONE; - netif_set_link_up(pcb->netif); - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sifup[%d]: err_code=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->err_code)); - pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); - return 1; -} - -/******************************************************************** - * - * sifdown - Disable the indicated protocol and config the interface - * down if there are no remaining protocols. - */ -int sifdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - pcb->if4_up = 0; - - if (1 -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT - /* set the interface down if IPv6 is down as well */ - && !pcb->if6_up -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - ) { - /* make sure the netif link callback is called */ - netif_set_link_down(pcb->netif); - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sifdown[%d]: err_code=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->err_code)); - return 1; -} - -/******************************************************************** - * - * Return user specified netmask, modified by any mask we might determine - * for address `addr' (in network byte order). - * Here we scan through the system's list of interfaces, looking for - * any non-point-to-point interfaces which might appear to be on the same - * network as `addr'. If we find any, we OR in their netmask to the - * user-specified netmask. - */ -u32_t get_mask(u32_t addr) -{ -#if 0 - u32_t mask, nmask; - - addr = lwip_htonl(addr); - - if(IP_CLASSA(addr)) /* determine network mask for address class */ - { - nmask = IP_CLASSA_NET; - } - else if(IP_CLASSB(addr)) - { - nmask = IP_CLASSB_NET; - } - else - { - nmask = IP_CLASSC_NET; - } - - /* class D nets are disallowed by bad_ip_adrs */ - mask = PP_HTONL(0xffffff00UL) | lwip_htonl(nmask); - - /* XXX - * Scan through the system's network interfaces. - * Get each netmask and OR them into our mask. - */ - /* return mask; */ - return mask; -#endif /* 0 */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); - return IPADDR_BROADCAST; -} -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT -#define IN6_LLADDR_FROM_EUI64(ip6, eui64) \ - do { \ - ip6.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000); \ - ip6.addr[1] = 0; \ - eui64_copy(eui64, ip6.addr[2]); \ - } while (0) - -/******************************************************************** - * - * sif6addr - Config the interface with an IPv6 link-local address - */ -int sif6addr(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t our_eui64, eui64_t his_eui64) -{ - ip6_addr_t ip6; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_eui64); - - IN6_LLADDR_FROM_EUI64(ip6, our_eui64); - netif_ip6_addr_set(pcb->netif, 0, &ip6); - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(pcb->netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED); - /* FIXME: should we add an IPv6 static neighbor using his_eui64 ? */ - return 1; -} - -/******************************************************************** - * - * cif6addr - Remove IPv6 address from interface - */ -int cif6addr(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t our_eui64, eui64_t his_eui64) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(our_eui64); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_eui64); - - netif_ip6_addr_set_state(pcb->netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_INVALID); - netif_ip6_addr_set(pcb->netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_ANY6); - return 1; -} - -/* - * sif6up - Config the interface up and enable IPv6 packets to pass. - */ -int sif6up(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - pcb->if6_up = 1; - pcb->err_code = PPPERR_NONE; - netif_set_link_up(pcb->netif); - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sif6up[%d]: err_code=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->err_code)); - pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); - return 1; -} - -/******************************************************************** - * - * sif6down - Disable the indicated protocol and config the interface - * down if there are no remaining protocols. - */ -int sif6down(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - pcb->if6_up = 0; - - if (1 -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT - /* set the interface down if IPv4 is down as well */ - && !pcb->if4_up -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ - ) { - /* make sure the netif link callback is called */ - netif_set_link_down(pcb->netif); - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sif6down[%d]: err_code=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->err_code)); - return 1; -} -#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -/* - * sifnpmode - Set the mode for handling packets for a given NP. - */ -int sifnpmode(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto, enum NPmode mode) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(proto); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(mode); - return 0; -} -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * netif_set_mtu - set the MTU on the PPP network interface. - */ -void netif_set_mtu(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mtu) -{ - pcb->netif->mtu = mtu; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("netif_set_mtu[%d]: mtu=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, mtu)); -} - -/* - * netif_get_mtu - get PPP interface MTU - */ -int netif_get_mtu(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - return pcb->netif->mtu; -} - -#if CCP_SUPPORT -#if 0 /* unused */ -/* - * ccp_test - whether a given compression method is acceptable for use. - */ -int ccp_test(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *opt_ptr, int opt_len, int for_transmit) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(opt_ptr); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(opt_len); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(for_transmit); - return -1; -} -#endif /* unused */ - -/* - * ccp_set - inform about the current state of CCP. - */ -void ccp_set(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t isopen, u8_t isup, u8_t receive_method, u8_t transmit_method) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(isopen); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(isup); - pcb->ccp_receive_method = receive_method; - pcb->ccp_transmit_method = transmit_method; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ccp_set[%d]: is_open=%d, is_up=%d, receive_method=%u, transmit_method=%u\n", - pcb->netif->num, isopen, isup, receive_method, transmit_method)); -} - -void ccp_reset_comp(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - switch (pcb->ccp_transmit_method) { -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - case CI_MPPE: - mppe_comp_reset(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp); - break; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - default: - break; - } -} - -void ccp_reset_decomp(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - switch (pcb->ccp_receive_method) { -#if MPPE_SUPPORT - - case CI_MPPE: - mppe_decomp_reset(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp); - break; -#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ - - default: - break; - } -} - -#if 0 /* unused */ -/* - * ccp_fatal_error - returns 1 if decompression was disabled as a - * result of an error detected after decompression of a packet, - * 0 otherwise. This is necessary because of patent nonsense. - */ -int ccp_fatal_error(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - return 1; -} -#endif /* unused */ -#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT -/******************************************************************** - * - * get_idle_time - return how long the link has been idle. - */ -int get_idle_time(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct ppp_idle *ip) -{ - /* FIXME: add idle time support and make it optional */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ip); - return 1; -} -#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ - -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT -/******************************************************************** - * - * get_loop_output - get outgoing packets from the ppp device, - * and detect when we want to bring the real link up. - * Return value is 1 if we need to bring up the link, 0 otherwise. - */ -int get_loop_output(void) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME -/* List of protocol names, to make our messages a little more informative. */ -struct protocol_list { - u_short proto; - const char *name; -} const protocol_list[] = { - { 0x21, "IP" }, - { 0x23, "OSI Network Layer" }, - { 0x25, "Xerox NS IDP" }, - { 0x27, "DECnet Phase IV" }, - { 0x29, "Appletalk" }, - { 0x2b, "Novell IPX" }, - { 0x2d, "VJ compressed TCP/IP" }, - { 0x2f, "VJ uncompressed TCP/IP" }, - { 0x31, "Bridging PDU" }, - { 0x33, "Stream Protocol ST-II" }, - { 0x35, "Banyan Vines" }, - { 0x39, "AppleTalk EDDP" }, - { 0x3b, "AppleTalk SmartBuffered" }, - { 0x3d, "Multi-Link" }, - { 0x3f, "NETBIOS Framing" }, - { 0x41, "Cisco Systems" }, - { 0x43, "Ascom Timeplex" }, - { 0x45, "Fujitsu Link Backup and Load Balancing (LBLB)" }, - { 0x47, "DCA Remote Lan" }, - { 0x49, "Serial Data Transport Protocol (PPP-SDTP)" }, - { 0x4b, "SNA over 802.2" }, - { 0x4d, "SNA" }, - { 0x4f, "IP6 Header Compression" }, - { 0x51, "KNX Bridging Data" }, - { 0x53, "Encryption" }, - { 0x55, "Individual Link Encryption" }, - { 0x57, "IPv6" }, - { 0x59, "PPP Muxing" }, - { 0x5b, "Vendor-Specific Network Protocol" }, - { 0x61, "RTP IPHC Full Header" }, - { 0x63, "RTP IPHC Compressed TCP" }, - { 0x65, "RTP IPHC Compressed non-TCP" }, - { 0x67, "RTP IPHC Compressed UDP 8" }, - { 0x69, "RTP IPHC Compressed RTP 8" }, - { 0x6f, "Stampede Bridging" }, - { 0x73, "MP+" }, - { 0xc1, "NTCITS IPI" }, - { 0xfb, "single-link compression" }, - { 0xfd, "Compressed Datagram" }, - { 0x0201, "802.1d Hello Packets" }, - { 0x0203, "IBM Source Routing BPDU" }, - { 0x0205, "DEC LANBridge100 Spanning Tree" }, - { 0x0207, "Cisco Discovery Protocol" }, - { 0x0209, "Netcs Twin Routing" }, - { 0x020b, "STP - Scheduled Transfer Protocol" }, - { 0x020d, "EDP - Extreme Discovery Protocol" }, - { 0x0211, "Optical Supervisory Channel Protocol" }, - { 0x0213, "Optical Supervisory Channel Protocol" }, - { 0x0231, "Luxcom" }, - { 0x0233, "Sigma Network Systems" }, - { 0x0235, "Apple Client Server Protocol" }, - { 0x0281, "MPLS Unicast" }, - { 0x0283, "MPLS Multicast" }, - { 0x0285, "IEEE p1284.4 standard - data packets" }, - { 0x0287, "ETSI TETRA Network Protocol Type 1" }, - { 0x0289, "Multichannel Flow Treatment Protocol" }, - { 0x2063, "RTP IPHC Compressed TCP No Delta" }, - { 0x2065, "RTP IPHC Context State" }, - { 0x2067, "RTP IPHC Compressed UDP 16" }, - { 0x2069, "RTP IPHC Compressed RTP 16" }, - { 0x4001, "Cray Communications Control Protocol" }, - { 0x4003, "CDPD Mobile Network Registration Protocol" }, - { 0x4005, "Expand accelerator protocol" }, - { 0x4007, "ODSICP NCP" }, - { 0x4009, "DOCSIS DLL" }, - { 0x400B, "Cetacean Network Detection Protocol" }, - { 0x4021, "Stacker LZS" }, - { 0x4023, "RefTek Protocol" }, - { 0x4025, "Fibre Channel" }, - { 0x4027, "EMIT Protocols" }, - { 0x405b, "Vendor-Specific Protocol (VSP)" }, - { 0x8021, "Internet Protocol Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8023, "OSI Network Layer Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8025, "Xerox NS IDP Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8027, "DECnet Phase IV Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8029, "Appletalk Control Protocol" }, - { 0x802b, "Novell IPX Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8031, "Bridging NCP" }, - { 0x8033, "Stream Protocol Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8035, "Banyan Vines Control Protocol" }, - { 0x803d, "Multi-Link Control Protocol" }, - { 0x803f, "NETBIOS Framing Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8041, "Cisco Systems Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8043, "Ascom Timeplex" }, - { 0x8045, "Fujitsu LBLB Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8047, "DCA Remote Lan Network Control Protocol (RLNCP)" }, - { 0x8049, "Serial Data Control Protocol (PPP-SDCP)" }, - { 0x804b, "SNA over 802.2 Control Protocol" }, - { 0x804d, "SNA Control Protocol" }, - { 0x804f, "IP6 Header Compression Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8051, "KNX Bridging Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8053, "Encryption Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8055, "Individual Link Encryption Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8057, "IPv6 Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8059, "PPP Muxing Control Protocol" }, - { 0x805b, "Vendor-Specific Network Control Protocol (VSNCP)" }, - { 0x806f, "Stampede Bridging Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8073, "MP+ Control Protocol" }, - { 0x80c1, "NTCITS IPI Control Protocol" }, - { 0x80fb, "Single Link Compression Control Protocol" }, - { 0x80fd, "Compression Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8207, "Cisco Discovery Protocol Control" }, - { 0x8209, "Netcs Twin Routing" }, - { 0x820b, "STP - Control Protocol" }, - { 0x820d, "EDPCP - Extreme Discovery Protocol Ctrl Prtcl" }, - { 0x8235, "Apple Client Server Protocol Control" }, - { 0x8281, "MPLSCP" }, - { 0x8285, "IEEE p1284.4 standard - Protocol Control" }, - { 0x8287, "ETSI TETRA TNP1 Control Protocol" }, - { 0x8289, "Multichannel Flow Treatment Protocol" }, - { 0xc021, "Link Control Protocol" }, - { 0xc023, "Password Authentication Protocol" }, - { 0xc025, "Link Quality Report" }, - { 0xc027, "Shiva Password Authentication Protocol" }, - { 0xc029, "CallBack Control Protocol (CBCP)" }, - { 0xc02b, "BACP Bandwidth Allocation Control Protocol" }, - { 0xc02d, "BAP" }, - { 0xc05b, "Vendor-Specific Authentication Protocol (VSAP)" }, - { 0xc081, "Container Control Protocol" }, - { 0xc223, "Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol" }, - { 0xc225, "RSA Authentication Protocol" }, - { 0xc227, "Extensible Authentication Protocol" }, - { 0xc229, "Mitsubishi Security Info Exch Ptcl (SIEP)" }, - { 0xc26f, "Stampede Bridging Authorization Protocol" }, - { 0xc281, "Proprietary Authentication Protocol" }, - { 0xc283, "Proprietary Authentication Protocol" }, - { 0xc481, "Proprietary Node ID Authentication Protocol" }, - { 0, NULL }, -}; - -/* - * protocol_name - find a name for a PPP protocol. - */ -const char *protocol_name(int proto) -{ - const struct protocol_list *lp; - - for (lp = protocol_list; lp->proto != 0; ++lp) { - if (proto == lp->proto) { - return lp->name; - } - } - - return NULL; -} -#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ - -#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT - -/* ---- Note on PPP Stats support ---- - * - * The one willing link stats support should add the get_ppp_stats() - * to fetch statistics from lwIP. - */ - -/* - * reset_link_stats - "reset" stats when link goes up. - */ -void reset_link_stats(int u) -{ - if (!get_ppp_stats(u, &old_link_stats)) { - return; - } - - gettimeofday(&start_time, NULL); -} - -/* - * update_link_stats - get stats at link termination. - */ -void update_link_stats(int u) -{ - struct timeval now; - char numbuf[32]; - - if (!get_ppp_stats(u, &link_stats) || gettimeofday(&now, NULL) < 0) { - return; - } - - link_connect_time = now.tv_sec - start_time.tv_sec; - link_stats_valid = 1; - - link_stats.bytes_in -= old_link_stats.bytes_in; - link_stats.bytes_out -= old_link_stats.bytes_out; - link_stats.pkts_in -= old_link_stats.pkts_in; - link_stats.pkts_out -= old_link_stats.pkts_out; -} - -void print_link_stats() -{ - /* - * Print connect time and statistics. - */ - if (link_stats_valid) { - int t = (link_connect_time + 5) / 6; /* 1/10ths of minutes */ - info("Connect time %d.%d minutes.", t / 10, t % 10); - info("Sent %u bytes, received %u bytes.", link_stats.bytes_out, link_stats.bytes_in); - link_stats_valid = 0; - } -} -#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/***************************************************************************** +* ppp.c - Network Point to Point Protocol program file. +* +* Copyright (c) 2003 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. +* portions Copyright (c) 1997 by Global Election Systems Inc. +* +* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, +* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided +* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this +* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any +* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required +* for any of the authorized uses. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +****************************************************************************** +* REVISION HISTORY +* +* 03-01-01 Marc Boucher +* Ported to lwIP. +* 97-11-05 Guy Lancaster , Global Election Systems Inc. +* Original. +*****************************************************************************/ + +/* + * ppp_defs.h - PPP definitions. + * + * if_pppvar.h - private structures and declarations for PPP. + * + * Copyright (c) 1994 The Australian National University. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its + * documentation is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appears in all copies. This software is provided without any + * warranty, express or implied. The Australian National University + * makes no representations about the suitability of this software for + * any purpose. + * + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE TO ANY + * PARTY FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE AND ITS DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF + * THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE SOFTWARE PROVIDED HEREUNDER IS + * ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, AND THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY HAS NO + * OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, UPDATES, ENHANCEMENTS, + * OR MODIFICATIONS. + */ + +/* + * if_ppp.h - Point-to-Point Protocol definitions. + * + * Copyright (c) 1989 Carnegie Mellon University. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted + * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, + * advertising materials, and other materials related to such + * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed + * by Carnegie Mellon University. The name of the + * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + */ + +/** + * @defgroup ppp PPP + * @ingroup netifs + * @verbinclude "ppp.txt" + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#include "lwip/api.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/ip4.h" /* for ip4_input() */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +#include "lwip/ip6.h" /* for ip6_input() */ +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +#include "lwip/dns.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppos.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" + +#if PAP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/upap.h" +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/chap-new.h" +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/eap.h" +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CCP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/ccp.h" +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/mppe.h" +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if ECP_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/ecp.h" +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/vj.h" +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +#include "netif/ppp/ipv6cp.h" +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + +/*************************/ +/*** LOCAL DEFINITIONS ***/ +/*************************/ + +/* Memory pools */ +#if PPPOS_SUPPORT +LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(PPPOS_PCB); +#endif +#if PPPOE_SUPPORT +LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(PPPOE_IF); +#endif +#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT +LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(PPPOL2TP_PCB); +#endif +#if LWIP_PPP_API && LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE +LWIP_MEMPOOL_PROTOTYPE(PPPAPI_MSG); +#endif +LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_PPP_PCB, sizeof(ppp_pcb), "PPP_PCB") + +/* FIXME: add stats per PPP session */ +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT +static struct timeval start_time; /* Time when link was started. */ +static struct pppd_stats old_link_stats; +struct pppd_stats link_stats; +unsigned link_connect_time; +int link_stats_valid; +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * PPP Data Link Layer "protocol" table. + * One entry per supported protocol. + * The last entry must be NULL. + */ +const struct protent *const protocols[] = { + &lcp_protent, +#if PAP_SUPPORT + &pap_protent, +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + &chap_protent, +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CBCP_SUPPORT + &cbcp_protent, +#endif /* CBCP_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + &ipcp_protent, +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + &ipv6cp_protent, +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +#if CCP_SUPPORT + &ccp_protent, +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ +#if ECP_SUPPORT + &ecp_protent, +#endif /* ECP_SUPPORT */ +#ifdef AT_CHANGE + &atcp_protent, +#endif /* AT_CHANGE */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + &eap_protent, +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + NULL +}; + +/* Prototypes for procedures local to this file. */ +static void ppp_do_connect(void *arg); +static err_t ppp_netif_init_cb(struct netif *netif); +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT +static err_t ppp_netif_output_ip4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr); +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +static err_t ppp_netif_output_ip6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr); +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ +static err_t ppp_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, u16_t protocol); + +/***********************************/ +/*** PUBLIC FUNCTION DEFINITIONS ***/ +/***********************************/ +#if PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT +void ppp_set_auth(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t authtype, const char *user, const char *passwd) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); +#if PAP_SUPPORT + pcb->settings.refuse_pap = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_PAP); +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + pcb->settings.refuse_chap = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_CHAP); +#if MSCHAP_SUPPORT + pcb->settings.refuse_mschap = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_MSCHAP); + pcb->settings.refuse_mschap_v2 = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_MSCHAP_V2); +#endif /* MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + pcb->settings.refuse_eap = !(authtype & PPPAUTHTYPE_EAP); +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + pcb->settings.user = user; + pcb->settings.passwd = passwd; +} +#endif /* PPP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT +/* Set MPPE configuration */ +void ppp_set_mppe(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t flags) +{ + if (flags == PPP_MPPE_DISABLE) { + pcb->settings.require_mppe = 0; + return; + } + + pcb->settings.require_mppe = 1; + pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_stateful = !(flags & PPP_MPPE_ALLOW_STATEFUL); + pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_40 = !!(flags & PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_40); + pcb->settings.refuse_mppe_128 = !!(flags & PPP_MPPE_REFUSE_128); +} +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE +void ppp_set_notify_phase_callback(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb) +{ + pcb->notify_phase_cb = notify_phase_cb; + notify_phase_cb(pcb, pcb->phase, pcb->ctx_cb); +} +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ + +/* + * Initiate a PPP connection. + * + * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. + * + * Holdoff is the time to wait (in seconds) before initiating + * the connection. + * + * If this port connects to a modem, the modem connection must be + * established before calling this. + */ +err_t ppp_connect(ppp_pcb *pcb, u16_t holdoff) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD) { + return ERR_ALREADY; + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_connect[%d]: holdoff=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, holdoff)); + + magic_randomize(); + + if (holdoff == 0) { + ppp_do_connect(pcb); + return ERR_OK; + } + + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF); + sys_timeout((u32_t)(holdoff * 1000), ppp_do_connect, pcb); + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * Listen for an incoming PPP connection. + * + * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. + * + * If this port connects to a modem, the modem connection must be + * established before calling this. + */ +err_t ppp_listen(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD) { + return ERR_ALREADY; + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_listen[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); + + magic_randomize(); + + if (pcb->link_cb->listen) { + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_INITIALIZE); + pcb->link_cb->listen(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb); + return ERR_OK; + } + + return ERR_IF; +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * Initiate the end of a PPP connection. + * Any outstanding packets in the queues are dropped. + * + * Setting nocarrier to 1 close the PPP connection without initiating the + * shutdown procedure. Always using nocarrier = 0 is still recommended, + * this is going to take a little longer time if your link is down, but + * is a safer choice for the PPP state machine. + * + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + */ +err_t ppp_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t nocarrier) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_USER; + + /* holdoff phase, cancel the reconnection */ + if (pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF) { + sys_untimeout(ppp_do_connect, pcb); + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); + } + + /* dead phase, nothing to do, call the status callback to be consistent */ + if (pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_DEAD) { + pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Already terminating, nothing to do */ + if (pcb->phase >= PPP_PHASE_TERMINATE) { + return ERR_INPROGRESS; + } + + /* LCP not open, close link protocol */ + if (pcb->phase < PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH) { + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DISCONNECT); + ppp_link_terminated(pcb); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* + * Only accept carrier lost signal on the stable running phase in order + * to prevent changing the PPP phase FSM in transition phases. + * + * Always using nocarrier = 0 is still recommended, this is going to + * take a little longer time, but is a safer choice from FSM point of view. + */ + if (nocarrier && pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_RUNNING) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_close[%d]: carrier lost -> lcp_lowerdown\n", pcb->netif->num)); + lcp_lowerdown(pcb); + /* forced link termination, this will force link protocol to disconnect. */ + link_terminated(pcb); + return ERR_OK; + } + + /* Disconnect */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_close[%d]: kill_link -> lcp_close\n", pcb->netif->num)); + /* LCP soft close request. */ + lcp_close(pcb, "User request"); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* + * Release the control block. + * + * This can only be called if PPP is in the dead phase. + * + * You must use ppp_close() before if you wish to terminate + * an established PPP session. + * + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + */ +err_t ppp_free(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + err_t err; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (pcb->phase != PPP_PHASE_DEAD) { + return ERR_CONN; + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_free[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); + + netif_remove(pcb->netif); + + err = pcb->link_cb->free(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb); + + LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPP_PCB, pcb); + return err; +} + +/* Get and set parameters for the given connection. + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. */ +err_t ppp_ioctl(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t cmd, void *arg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + switch (cmd) { + case PPPCTLG_UPSTATUS: /* Get the PPP up status. */ + if (!arg) { + goto fail; + } + + *(int *)arg = (int)(0 +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + || pcb->if4_up +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + || pcb->if6_up +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + ); + return ERR_OK; + + case PPPCTLG_ERRCODE: /* Get the PPP error code. */ + if (!arg) { + goto fail; + } + + *(int *)arg = (int)(pcb->err_code); + return ERR_OK; + + default: + goto fail; + } + +fail: + return ERR_VAL; +} + +/**********************************/ +/*** LOCAL FUNCTION DEFINITIONS ***/ +/**********************************/ + +static void ppp_do_connect(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_DEAD || pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF", pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_DEAD || pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_HOLDOFF); + + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_INITIALIZE); + pcb->link_cb->connect(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb); +} + +/* + * ppp_netif_init_cb - netif init callback + */ +static err_t ppp_netif_init_cb(struct netif *netif) +{ + netif->name[0] = 'p'; + netif->name[1] = 'p'; +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + netif->output = ppp_netif_output_ip4; +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + netif->output_ip6 = ppp_netif_output_ip6; +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_UP; +#if LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME + /* @todo: Initialize interface hostname */ + /* netif_set_hostname(netif, "lwip"); */ +#endif /* LWIP_NETIF_HOSTNAME */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT +/* + * Send an IPv4 packet on the given connection. + */ +static err_t ppp_netif_output_ip4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + return ppp_netif_output(netif, pb, PPP_IP); +} +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +/* + * Send an IPv6 packet on the given connection. + */ +static err_t ppp_netif_output_ip6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + return ppp_netif_output(netif, pb, PPP_IPV6); +} +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + +static err_t ppp_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb, u16_t protocol) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)netif->state; + err_t err; + struct pbuf *fpb = NULL; + + /* Check that the link is up. */ + if (0 +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + || (protocol == PPP_IP && !pcb->if4_up) +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + || (protocol == PPP_IPV6 && !pcb->if6_up) +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + ) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_netif_output[%d]: link not up\n", pcb->netif->num)); + goto err_rte_drop; + } + +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + /* If MPPE is required, refuse any IP packet until we are able to crypt them. */ + if (pcb->settings.require_mppe && pcb->ccp_transmit_method != CI_MPPE) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_netif_output[%d]: MPPE required, not up\n", pcb->netif->num)); + goto err_rte_drop; + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + + /* + * Attempt Van Jacobson header compression if VJ is configured and + * this is an IP packet. + */ + if (protocol == PPP_IP && pcb->vj_enabled) { + switch (vj_compress_tcp(&pcb->vj_comp, &pb)) { + case TYPE_IP: + /* No change... + protocol = PPP_IP; */ + break; + + case TYPE_COMPRESSED_TCP: + /* vj_compress_tcp() returns a new allocated pbuf, indicate we should free + * our duplicated pbuf later */ + fpb = pb; + protocol = PPP_VJC_COMP; + break; + + case TYPE_UNCOMPRESSED_TCP: + /* vj_compress_tcp() returns a new allocated pbuf, indicate we should free + * our duplicated pbuf later */ + fpb = pb; + protocol = PPP_VJC_UNCOMP; + break; + + default: + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("ppp_netif_output[%d]: bad IP packet\n", pcb->netif->num)); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(pcb->netif, ifoutdiscards); + return ERR_VAL; + } + } + +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +#if CCP_SUPPORT + + switch (pcb->ccp_transmit_method) { + case 0: + break; /* Don't compress */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + case CI_MPPE: + if ((err = mppe_compress(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp, &pb, protocol)) != ERR_OK) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); + goto err; + } + + /* if VJ compressor returned a new allocated pbuf, free it */ + if (fpb) { + pbuf_free(fpb); + } + + /* mppe_compress() returns a new allocated pbuf, indicate we should free + * our duplicated pbuf later */ + fpb = pb; + protocol = PPP_COMP; + break; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + default: + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_netif_output[%d]: bad CCP transmit method\n", pcb->netif->num)); + goto err_rte_drop; /* Cannot really happen, we only negotiate what we are able to do */ + } + +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ + + err = pcb->link_cb->netif_output(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb, pb, protocol); + goto err; + +err_rte_drop: + err = ERR_RTE; + LINK_STATS_INC(link.rterr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(netif, ifoutdiscards); +err: + + if (fpb) { + pbuf_free(fpb); + } + + return err; +} + +/************************************/ +/*** PRIVATE FUNCTION DEFINITIONS ***/ +/************************************/ + +/* Initialize the PPP subsystem. */ +int ppp_init(void) +{ +#if PPPOS_SUPPORT + LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPPOS_PCB); +#endif +#if PPPOE_SUPPORT + LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPPOE_IF); +#endif +#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT + LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPPOL2TP_PCB); +#endif +#if LWIP_PPP_API && LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE + LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPPAPI_MSG); +#endif + + LWIP_MEMPOOL_INIT(PPP_PCB); + + /* + * Initialize magic number generator now so that protocols may + * use magic numbers in initialization. + */ + magic_init(); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Create a new PPP control block. + * + * This initializes the PPP control block but does not + * attempt to negotiate the LCP session. + * + * Return a new PPP connection control block pointer + * on success or a null pointer on failure. + */ +ppp_pcb *ppp_new(struct netif *pppif, const struct link_callbacks *callbacks, void *link_ctx_cb, ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb; + const struct protent *protp; + int i; + + /* PPP is single-threaded: without a callback, + * there is no way to know when the link is up. */ + if (link_status_cb == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + pcb = (ppp_pcb *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(PPP_PCB); + + if (pcb == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + memset(pcb, 0, sizeof(ppp_pcb)); + + /* default configuration */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + pcb->settings.pap_timeout_time = UPAP_DEFTIMEOUT; + pcb->settings.pap_max_transmits = UPAP_DEFTRANSMITS; +#if PPP_SERVER + pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout = UPAP_DEFREQTIME; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ + +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + pcb->settings.chap_timeout_time = CHAP_DEFTIMEOUT; + pcb->settings.chap_max_transmits = CHAP_DEFTRANSMITS; +#if PPP_SERVER + pcb->settings.chap_rechallenge_time = CHAP_DEFRECHALLENGETIME; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPPORT */ + +#if EAP_SUPPORT + pcb->settings.eap_req_time = EAP_DEFREQTIME; + pcb->settings.eap_allow_req = EAP_DEFALLOWREQ; +#if PPP_SERVER + pcb->settings.eap_timeout_time = EAP_DEFTIMEOUT; + pcb->settings.eap_max_transmits = EAP_DEFTRANSMITS; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + + pcb->settings.lcp_loopbackfail = LCP_DEFLOOPBACKFAIL; + pcb->settings.lcp_echo_interval = LCP_ECHOINTERVAL; + pcb->settings.lcp_echo_fails = LCP_MAXECHOFAILS; + + pcb->settings.fsm_timeout_time = FSM_DEFTIMEOUT; + pcb->settings.fsm_max_conf_req_transmits = FSM_DEFMAXCONFREQS; + pcb->settings.fsm_max_term_transmits = FSM_DEFMAXTERMREQS; + pcb->settings.fsm_max_nak_loops = FSM_DEFMAXNAKLOOPS; + + pcb->netif = pppif; + MIB2_INIT_NETIF(pppif, snmp_ifType_ppp, 0); + + if (!netif_add(pcb->netif, +#if LWIP_IPV4 + IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_BROADCAST, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + (void *)pcb, ppp_netif_init_cb, NULL)) { + LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPP_PCB, pcb); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_new: netif_add failed\n")); + return NULL; + } + + pcb->link_cb = callbacks; + pcb->link_ctx_cb = link_ctx_cb; + pcb->link_status_cb = link_status_cb; + pcb->ctx_cb = ctx_cb; + + /* + * Initialize each protocol. + */ + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) { + (*protp->init)(pcb); + } + + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); + return pcb; +} + +/** Initiate LCP open request */ +void ppp_start(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_start[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); + + /* Clean data not taken care by anything else, mostly shared data. */ +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + link_stats_valid = 0; +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + pcb->mppe_keys_set = 0; + memset(&pcb->mppe_comp, 0, sizeof(pcb->mppe_comp)); + memset(&pcb->mppe_decomp, 0, sizeof(pcb->mppe_decomp)); +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ +#if VJ_SUPPORT + vj_compress_init(&pcb->vj_comp); +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + /* Start protocol */ + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_ESTABLISH); + lcp_open(pcb); + lcp_lowerup(pcb); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_start[%d]: finished\n", pcb->netif->num)); +} + +/** Called when link failed to setup */ +void ppp_link_failed(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_link_failed[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_OPEN; + pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); +} + +/** Called when link is normally down (i.e. it was asked to end) */ +void ppp_link_end(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_link_end[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); + new_phase(pcb, PPP_PHASE_DEAD); + + if (pcb->err_code == PPPERR_NONE) { + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_CONNECT; + } + + pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); +} + +/* + * Pass the processed input packet to the appropriate handler. + * This function and all handlers run in the context of the tcpip_thread + */ +void ppp_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *pb) +{ + u16_t protocol; +#if PPP_DEBUG && PPP_PROTOCOLNAME + const char *pname; +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG && PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ + + magic_randomize(); + + if (pb->len < 2) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_input[%d]: packet too short\n", pcb->netif->num)); + goto drop; + } + + protocol = (((u8_t *)pb->payload)[0] << 8) | ((u8_t *)pb->payload)[1]; + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + ppp_dump_packet(pcb, "rcvd", (unsigned char *)pb->payload, pb->len); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + + pbuf_remove_header(pb, sizeof(protocol)); + + LINK_STATS_INC(link.recv); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(pcb->netif, ifinucastpkts); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(pcb->netif, ifinoctets, pb->tot_len); + + /* + * Toss all non-LCP packets unless LCP is OPEN. + */ + if (protocol != PPP_LCP && pcb->lcp_fsm.state != PPP_FSM_OPENED) { + ppp_dbglog("Discarded non-LCP packet when LCP not open"); + goto drop; + } + + /* + * Until we get past the authentication phase, toss all packets + * except LCP, LQR and authentication packets. + */ + if (pcb->phase <= PPP_PHASE_AUTHENTICATE && !(protocol == PPP_LCP +#if LQR_SUPPORT + || protocol == PPP_LQR +#endif /* LQR_SUPPORT */ +#if PAP_SUPPORT + || protocol == PPP_PAP +#endif /* PAP_SUPPORT */ +#if CHAP_SUPPORT + || protocol == PPP_CHAP +#endif /* CHAP_SUPPORT */ +#if EAP_SUPPORT + || protocol == PPP_EAP +#endif /* EAP_SUPPORT */ + )) { + ppp_dbglog("discarding proto 0x%x in phase %d", protocol, pcb->phase); + goto drop; + } + +#if CCP_SUPPORT +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + /* + * MPPE is required and unencrypted data has arrived (this + * should never happen!). We should probably drop the link if + * the protocol is in the range of what should be encrypted. + * At the least, we drop this packet. + */ + if (pcb->settings.require_mppe && protocol != PPP_COMP && protocol < 0x8000) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_input[%d]: MPPE required, received unencrypted data!\n", pcb->netif->num)); + goto drop; + } + +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + if (protocol == PPP_COMP) { + u8_t *pl; + + switch (pcb->ccp_receive_method) { +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + case CI_MPPE: + if (mppe_decompress(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp, &pb) != ERR_OK) { + goto drop; + } + + break; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + default: + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("ppp_input[%d]: bad CCP receive method\n", pcb->netif->num)); + goto drop; /* Cannot really happen, we only negotiate what we are able to do */ + } + + /* Assume no PFC */ + if (pb->len < 2) { + goto drop; + } + + /* Extract and hide protocol (do PFC decompression if necessary) */ + pl = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + + if (pl[0] & 0x01) { + protocol = pl[0]; + pbuf_remove_header(pb, 1); + } else { + protocol = (pl[0] << 8) | pl[1]; + pbuf_remove_header(pb, 2); + } + } + +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ + + switch (protocol) { +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + + case PPP_IP: /* Internet Protocol */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_input[%d]: ip in pbuf len=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pb->tot_len)); + ip4_input(pb, pcb->netif); + return; +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + + case PPP_IPV6: /* Internet Protocol Version 6 */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_input[%d]: ip6 in pbuf len=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pb->tot_len)); + ip6_input(pb, pcb->netif); + return; +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + +#if VJ_SUPPORT + + case PPP_VJC_COMP: /* VJ compressed TCP */ + /* + * Clip off the VJ header and prepend the rebuilt TCP/IP header and + * pass the result to IP. + */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_input[%d]: vj_comp in pbuf len=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pb->tot_len)); + + if (pcb->vj_enabled && vj_uncompress_tcp(&pb, &pcb->vj_comp) >= 0) { + ip4_input(pb, pcb->netif); + return; + } + + /* Something's wrong so drop it. */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("ppp_input[%d]: Dropping VJ compressed\n", pcb->netif->num)); + break; + + case PPP_VJC_UNCOMP: /* VJ uncompressed TCP */ + /* + * Process the TCP/IP header for VJ header compression and then pass + * the packet to IP. + */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_input[%d]: vj_un in pbuf len=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pb->tot_len)); + + if (pcb->vj_enabled && vj_uncompress_uncomp(pb, &pcb->vj_comp) >= 0) { + ip4_input(pb, pcb->netif); + return; + } + + /* Something's wrong so drop it. */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("ppp_input[%d]: Dropping VJ uncompressed\n", pcb->netif->num)); + break; +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + default: { + int i; + const struct protent *protp; + + /* + * Upcall the proper protocol input routine. + */ + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) { + if (protp->protocol == protocol) { + pb = pbuf_coalesce(pb, PBUF_RAW); + (*protp->input)(pcb, (u8_t *)pb->payload, pb->len); + goto out; + } + +#if 0 /* UNUSED + * + * This is actually a (hacked?) way for the Linux kernel to pass a data + * packet to pppd. pppd in normal condition only do signaling + * (LCP, PAP, CHAP, IPCP, ...) and does not handle any data packet at all. + * + * We don't even need this interface, which is only there because of PPP + * interface limitation between Linux kernel and pppd. For MPPE, which uses + * CCP to negotiate although it is not really a (de)compressor, we added + * ccp_resetrequest() in CCP and MPPE input data flow is calling either + * ccp_resetrequest() or lcp_close() if the issue is, respectively, non-fatal + * or fatal, this is what ccp_datainput() really do. + */ + + if(protocol == (protp->protocol & ~0x8000) + && protp->datainput != NULL) + { + (*protp->datainput)(pcb, pb->payload, pb->len); + goto out; + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + } + +#if PPP_DEBUG +#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME + pname = protocol_name(protocol); + + if (pname != NULL) { + ppp_warn("Unsupported protocol '%s' (0x%x) received", pname, protocol); + } else +#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ + ppp_warn("Unsupported protocol 0x%x received", protocol); + +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + + if (pbuf_add_header(pb, sizeof(protocol))) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("ppp_input[%d]: Dropping (pbuf_add_header failed)\n", pcb->netif->num)); + goto drop; + } + + lcp_sprotrej(pcb, (u8_t *)pb->payload, pb->len); + } break; + } + +drop: + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(pcb->netif, ifindiscards); + +out: + pbuf_free(pb); +} + +/* + * Write a pbuf to a ppp link, only used from PPP functions + * to send PPP packets. + * + * IPv4 and IPv6 packets from lwIP are sent, respectively, + * with ppp_netif_output_ip4() and ppp_netif_output_ip6() + * functions (which are callbacks of the netif PPP interface). + */ +err_t ppp_write(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p) +{ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + ppp_dump_packet(pcb, "sent", (unsigned char *)p->payload + 2, p->len - 2); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + return pcb->link_cb->write(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb, p); +} + +void ppp_link_terminated(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_link_terminated[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); + pcb->link_cb->disconnect(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp_link_terminated[%d]: finished.\n", pcb->netif->num)); +} + +/************************************************************************ + * Functions called by various PPP subsystems to configure + * the PPP interface or change the PPP phase. + */ + +/* + * new_phase - signal the start of a new phase of pppd's operation. + */ +void new_phase(ppp_pcb *pcb, int p) +{ + pcb->phase = p; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ppp phase changed[%d]: phase=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->phase)); +#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE + + if (pcb->notify_phase_cb != NULL) { + pcb->notify_phase_cb(pcb, p, pcb->ctx_cb); + } + +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ +} + +/* + * ppp_send_config - configure the transmit-side characteristics of + * the ppp interface. + */ +int ppp_send_config(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mtu, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(mtu); + /* pcb->mtu = mtu; -- set correctly with netif_set_mtu */ + + if (pcb->link_cb->send_config) { + pcb->link_cb->send_config(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb, accm, pcomp, accomp); + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_send_config[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); + return 0; +} + +/* + * ppp_recv_config - configure the receive-side characteristics of + * the ppp interface. + */ +int ppp_recv_config(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mru, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(mru); + + if (pcb->link_cb->recv_config) { + pcb->link_cb->recv_config(pcb, pcb->link_ctx_cb, accm, pcomp, accomp); + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("ppp_recv_config[%d]\n", pcb->netif->num)); + return 0; +} + +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT +/* + * sifaddr - Config the interface IP addresses and netmask. + */ +int sifaddr(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t our_adr, u32_t his_adr, u32_t netmask) +{ + ip4_addr_t ip, nm, gw; + + ip4_addr_set_u32(&ip, our_adr); + ip4_addr_set_u32(&nm, netmask); + ip4_addr_set_u32(&gw, his_adr); + netif_set_addr(pcb->netif, &ip, &nm, &gw); + return 1; +} + +/******************************************************************** + * + * cifaddr - Clear the interface IP addresses, and delete routes + * through the interface if possible. + */ +int cifaddr(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t our_adr, u32_t his_adr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(our_adr); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_adr); + + netif_set_addr(pcb->netif, IP4_ADDR_ANY4, IP4_ADDR_BROADCAST, IP4_ADDR_ANY4); + return 1; +} + +#if 0 /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ +/******************************************************************** + * + * sifproxyarp - Make a proxy ARP entry for the peer. + */ + +int sifproxyarp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t his_adr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_adr); + return 0; +} + +/******************************************************************** + * + * cifproxyarp - Delete the proxy ARP entry for the peer. + */ + +int cifproxyarp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t his_adr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_adr); + return 0; +} +#endif /* UNUSED - PROXY ARP */ + +#if LWIP_DNS +/* + * sdns - Config the DNS servers + */ +int sdns(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ns1, u32_t ns2) +{ + ip_addr_t ns; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(ns, ns1); + dns_setserver(0, &ns); + ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(ns, ns2); + dns_setserver(1, &ns); + return 1; +} + +/******************************************************************** + * + * cdns - Clear the DNS servers + */ +int cdns(ppp_pcb *pcb, u32_t ns1, u32_t ns2) +{ + const ip_addr_t *nsa; + ip_addr_t nsb; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + nsa = dns_getserver(0); + ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(nsb, ns1); + + if (ip_addr_cmp(nsa, &nsb)) { + dns_setserver(0, IP_ADDR_ANY); + } + + nsa = dns_getserver(1); + ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(nsb, ns2); + + if (ip_addr_cmp(nsa, &nsb)) { + dns_setserver(1, IP_ADDR_ANY); + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* LWIP_DNS */ + +#if VJ_SUPPORT +/******************************************************************** + * + * sifvjcomp - config tcp header compression + */ +int sifvjcomp(ppp_pcb *pcb, int vjcomp, int cidcomp, int maxcid) +{ + pcb->vj_enabled = vjcomp; + pcb->vj_comp.compressSlot = cidcomp; + pcb->vj_comp.maxSlotIndex = maxcid; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("sifvjcomp[%d]: VJ compress enable=%d slot=%d max slot=%d\n", + pcb->netif->num, vjcomp, cidcomp, maxcid)); + return 0; +} +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * sifup - Config the interface up and enable IP packets to pass. + */ +int sifup(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + pcb->if4_up = 1; + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_NONE; + netif_set_link_up(pcb->netif); + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sifup[%d]: err_code=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->err_code)); + pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); + return 1; +} + +/******************************************************************** + * + * sifdown - Disable the indicated protocol and config the interface + * down if there are no remaining protocols. + */ +int sifdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + pcb->if4_up = 0; + + if (1 +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT + /* set the interface down if IPv6 is down as well */ + && !pcb->if6_up +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + ) { + /* make sure the netif link callback is called */ + netif_set_link_down(pcb->netif); + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sifdown[%d]: err_code=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->err_code)); + return 1; +} + +/******************************************************************** + * + * Return user specified netmask, modified by any mask we might determine + * for address `addr' (in network byte order). + * Here we scan through the system's list of interfaces, looking for + * any non-point-to-point interfaces which might appear to be on the same + * network as `addr'. If we find any, we OR in their netmask to the + * user-specified netmask. + */ +u32_t get_mask(u32_t addr) +{ +#if 0 + u32_t mask, nmask; + + addr = lwip_htonl(addr); + + if(IP_CLASSA(addr)) /* determine network mask for address class */ + { + nmask = IP_CLASSA_NET; + } + else if(IP_CLASSB(addr)) + { + nmask = IP_CLASSB_NET; + } + else + { + nmask = IP_CLASSC_NET; + } + + /* class D nets are disallowed by bad_ip_adrs */ + mask = PP_HTONL(0xffffff00UL) | lwip_htonl(nmask); + + /* XXX + * Scan through the system's network interfaces. + * Get each netmask and OR them into our mask. + */ + /* return mask; */ + return mask; +#endif /* 0 */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + return IPADDR_BROADCAST; +} +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT +#define IN6_LLADDR_FROM_EUI64(ip6, eui64) \ + do { \ + ip6.addr[0] = PP_HTONL(0xfe800000); \ + ip6.addr[1] = 0; \ + eui64_copy(eui64, ip6.addr[2]); \ + } while (0) + +/******************************************************************** + * + * sif6addr - Config the interface with an IPv6 link-local address + */ +int sif6addr(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t our_eui64, eui64_t his_eui64) +{ + ip6_addr_t ip6; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_eui64); + + IN6_LLADDR_FROM_EUI64(ip6, our_eui64); + netif_ip6_addr_set(pcb->netif, 0, &ip6); + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(pcb->netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_PREFERRED); + /* FIXME: should we add an IPv6 static neighbor using his_eui64 ? */ + return 1; +} + +/******************************************************************** + * + * cif6addr - Remove IPv6 address from interface + */ +int cif6addr(ppp_pcb *pcb, eui64_t our_eui64, eui64_t his_eui64) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(our_eui64); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(his_eui64); + + netif_ip6_addr_set_state(pcb->netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_INVALID); + netif_ip6_addr_set(pcb->netif, 0, IP6_ADDR_ANY6); + return 1; +} + +/* + * sif6up - Config the interface up and enable IPv6 packets to pass. + */ +int sif6up(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + pcb->if6_up = 1; + pcb->err_code = PPPERR_NONE; + netif_set_link_up(pcb->netif); + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sif6up[%d]: err_code=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->err_code)); + pcb->link_status_cb(pcb, pcb->err_code, pcb->ctx_cb); + return 1; +} + +/******************************************************************** + * + * sif6down - Disable the indicated protocol and config the interface + * down if there are no remaining protocols. + */ +int sif6down(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + pcb->if6_up = 0; + + if (1 +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT + /* set the interface down if IPv4 is down as well */ + && !pcb->if4_up +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT */ + ) { + /* make sure the netif link callback is called */ + netif_set_link_down(pcb->netif); + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("sif6down[%d]: err_code=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, pcb->err_code)); + return 1; +} +#endif /* PPP_IPV6_SUPPORT */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +/* + * sifnpmode - Set the mode for handling packets for a given NP. + */ +int sifnpmode(ppp_pcb *pcb, int proto, enum NPmode mode) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(proto); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(mode); + return 0; +} +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * netif_set_mtu - set the MTU on the PPP network interface. + */ +void netif_set_mtu(ppp_pcb *pcb, int mtu) +{ + pcb->netif->mtu = mtu; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("netif_set_mtu[%d]: mtu=%d\n", pcb->netif->num, mtu)); +} + +/* + * netif_get_mtu - get PPP interface MTU + */ +int netif_get_mtu(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + return pcb->netif->mtu; +} + +#if CCP_SUPPORT +#if 0 /* unused */ +/* + * ccp_test - whether a given compression method is acceptable for use. + */ +int ccp_test(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *opt_ptr, int opt_len, int for_transmit) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(opt_ptr); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(opt_len); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(for_transmit); + return -1; +} +#endif /* unused */ + +/* + * ccp_set - inform about the current state of CCP. + */ +void ccp_set(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t isopen, u8_t isup, u8_t receive_method, u8_t transmit_method) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(isopen); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(isup); + pcb->ccp_receive_method = receive_method; + pcb->ccp_transmit_method = transmit_method; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("ccp_set[%d]: is_open=%d, is_up=%d, receive_method=%u, transmit_method=%u\n", + pcb->netif->num, isopen, isup, receive_method, transmit_method)); +} + +void ccp_reset_comp(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + switch (pcb->ccp_transmit_method) { +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + case CI_MPPE: + mppe_comp_reset(pcb, &pcb->mppe_comp); + break; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + default: + break; + } +} + +void ccp_reset_decomp(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + switch (pcb->ccp_receive_method) { +#if MPPE_SUPPORT + + case CI_MPPE: + mppe_decomp_reset(pcb, &pcb->mppe_decomp); + break; +#endif /* MPPE_SUPPORT */ + + default: + break; + } +} + +#if 0 /* unused */ +/* + * ccp_fatal_error - returns 1 if decompression was disabled as a + * result of an error detected after decompression of a packet, + * 0 otherwise. This is necessary because of patent nonsense. + */ +int ccp_fatal_error(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + return 1; +} +#endif /* unused */ +#endif /* CCP_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT +/******************************************************************** + * + * get_idle_time - return how long the link has been idle. + */ +int get_idle_time(ppp_pcb *pcb, struct ppp_idle *ip) +{ + /* FIXME: add idle time support and make it optional */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ip); + return 1; +} +#endif /* PPP_IDLETIMELIMIT */ + +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT +/******************************************************************** + * + * get_loop_output - get outgoing packets from the ppp device, + * and detect when we want to bring the real link up. + * Return value is 1 if we need to bring up the link, 0 otherwise. + */ +int get_loop_output(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPP_PROTOCOLNAME +/* List of protocol names, to make our messages a little more informative. */ +struct protocol_list { + u_short proto; + const char *name; +} const protocol_list[] = { + { 0x21, "IP" }, + { 0x23, "OSI Network Layer" }, + { 0x25, "Xerox NS IDP" }, + { 0x27, "DECnet Phase IV" }, + { 0x29, "Appletalk" }, + { 0x2b, "Novell IPX" }, + { 0x2d, "VJ compressed TCP/IP" }, + { 0x2f, "VJ uncompressed TCP/IP" }, + { 0x31, "Bridging PDU" }, + { 0x33, "Stream Protocol ST-II" }, + { 0x35, "Banyan Vines" }, + { 0x39, "AppleTalk EDDP" }, + { 0x3b, "AppleTalk SmartBuffered" }, + { 0x3d, "Multi-Link" }, + { 0x3f, "NETBIOS Framing" }, + { 0x41, "Cisco Systems" }, + { 0x43, "Ascom Timeplex" }, + { 0x45, "Fujitsu Link Backup and Load Balancing (LBLB)" }, + { 0x47, "DCA Remote Lan" }, + { 0x49, "Serial Data Transport Protocol (PPP-SDTP)" }, + { 0x4b, "SNA over 802.2" }, + { 0x4d, "SNA" }, + { 0x4f, "IP6 Header Compression" }, + { 0x51, "KNX Bridging Data" }, + { 0x53, "Encryption" }, + { 0x55, "Individual Link Encryption" }, + { 0x57, "IPv6" }, + { 0x59, "PPP Muxing" }, + { 0x5b, "Vendor-Specific Network Protocol" }, + { 0x61, "RTP IPHC Full Header" }, + { 0x63, "RTP IPHC Compressed TCP" }, + { 0x65, "RTP IPHC Compressed non-TCP" }, + { 0x67, "RTP IPHC Compressed UDP 8" }, + { 0x69, "RTP IPHC Compressed RTP 8" }, + { 0x6f, "Stampede Bridging" }, + { 0x73, "MP+" }, + { 0xc1, "NTCITS IPI" }, + { 0xfb, "single-link compression" }, + { 0xfd, "Compressed Datagram" }, + { 0x0201, "802.1d Hello Packets" }, + { 0x0203, "IBM Source Routing BPDU" }, + { 0x0205, "DEC LANBridge100 Spanning Tree" }, + { 0x0207, "Cisco Discovery Protocol" }, + { 0x0209, "Netcs Twin Routing" }, + { 0x020b, "STP - Scheduled Transfer Protocol" }, + { 0x020d, "EDP - Extreme Discovery Protocol" }, + { 0x0211, "Optical Supervisory Channel Protocol" }, + { 0x0213, "Optical Supervisory Channel Protocol" }, + { 0x0231, "Luxcom" }, + { 0x0233, "Sigma Network Systems" }, + { 0x0235, "Apple Client Server Protocol" }, + { 0x0281, "MPLS Unicast" }, + { 0x0283, "MPLS Multicast" }, + { 0x0285, "IEEE p1284.4 standard - data packets" }, + { 0x0287, "ETSI TETRA Network Protocol Type 1" }, + { 0x0289, "Multichannel Flow Treatment Protocol" }, + { 0x2063, "RTP IPHC Compressed TCP No Delta" }, + { 0x2065, "RTP IPHC Context State" }, + { 0x2067, "RTP IPHC Compressed UDP 16" }, + { 0x2069, "RTP IPHC Compressed RTP 16" }, + { 0x4001, "Cray Communications Control Protocol" }, + { 0x4003, "CDPD Mobile Network Registration Protocol" }, + { 0x4005, "Expand accelerator protocol" }, + { 0x4007, "ODSICP NCP" }, + { 0x4009, "DOCSIS DLL" }, + { 0x400B, "Cetacean Network Detection Protocol" }, + { 0x4021, "Stacker LZS" }, + { 0x4023, "RefTek Protocol" }, + { 0x4025, "Fibre Channel" }, + { 0x4027, "EMIT Protocols" }, + { 0x405b, "Vendor-Specific Protocol (VSP)" }, + { 0x8021, "Internet Protocol Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8023, "OSI Network Layer Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8025, "Xerox NS IDP Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8027, "DECnet Phase IV Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8029, "Appletalk Control Protocol" }, + { 0x802b, "Novell IPX Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8031, "Bridging NCP" }, + { 0x8033, "Stream Protocol Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8035, "Banyan Vines Control Protocol" }, + { 0x803d, "Multi-Link Control Protocol" }, + { 0x803f, "NETBIOS Framing Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8041, "Cisco Systems Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8043, "Ascom Timeplex" }, + { 0x8045, "Fujitsu LBLB Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8047, "DCA Remote Lan Network Control Protocol (RLNCP)" }, + { 0x8049, "Serial Data Control Protocol (PPP-SDCP)" }, + { 0x804b, "SNA over 802.2 Control Protocol" }, + { 0x804d, "SNA Control Protocol" }, + { 0x804f, "IP6 Header Compression Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8051, "KNX Bridging Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8053, "Encryption Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8055, "Individual Link Encryption Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8057, "IPv6 Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8059, "PPP Muxing Control Protocol" }, + { 0x805b, "Vendor-Specific Network Control Protocol (VSNCP)" }, + { 0x806f, "Stampede Bridging Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8073, "MP+ Control Protocol" }, + { 0x80c1, "NTCITS IPI Control Protocol" }, + { 0x80fb, "Single Link Compression Control Protocol" }, + { 0x80fd, "Compression Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8207, "Cisco Discovery Protocol Control" }, + { 0x8209, "Netcs Twin Routing" }, + { 0x820b, "STP - Control Protocol" }, + { 0x820d, "EDPCP - Extreme Discovery Protocol Ctrl Prtcl" }, + { 0x8235, "Apple Client Server Protocol Control" }, + { 0x8281, "MPLSCP" }, + { 0x8285, "IEEE p1284.4 standard - Protocol Control" }, + { 0x8287, "ETSI TETRA TNP1 Control Protocol" }, + { 0x8289, "Multichannel Flow Treatment Protocol" }, + { 0xc021, "Link Control Protocol" }, + { 0xc023, "Password Authentication Protocol" }, + { 0xc025, "Link Quality Report" }, + { 0xc027, "Shiva Password Authentication Protocol" }, + { 0xc029, "CallBack Control Protocol (CBCP)" }, + { 0xc02b, "BACP Bandwidth Allocation Control Protocol" }, + { 0xc02d, "BAP" }, + { 0xc05b, "Vendor-Specific Authentication Protocol (VSAP)" }, + { 0xc081, "Container Control Protocol" }, + { 0xc223, "Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol" }, + { 0xc225, "RSA Authentication Protocol" }, + { 0xc227, "Extensible Authentication Protocol" }, + { 0xc229, "Mitsubishi Security Info Exch Ptcl (SIEP)" }, + { 0xc26f, "Stampede Bridging Authorization Protocol" }, + { 0xc281, "Proprietary Authentication Protocol" }, + { 0xc283, "Proprietary Authentication Protocol" }, + { 0xc481, "Proprietary Node ID Authentication Protocol" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +/* + * protocol_name - find a name for a PPP protocol. + */ +const char *protocol_name(int proto) +{ + const struct protocol_list *lp; + + for (lp = protocol_list; lp->proto != 0; ++lp) { + if (proto == lp->proto) { + return lp->name; + } + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif /* PPP_PROTOCOLNAME */ + +#if PPP_STATS_SUPPORT + +/* ---- Note on PPP Stats support ---- + * + * The one willing link stats support should add the get_ppp_stats() + * to fetch statistics from lwIP. + */ + +/* + * reset_link_stats - "reset" stats when link goes up. + */ +void reset_link_stats(int u) +{ + if (!get_ppp_stats(u, &old_link_stats)) { + return; + } + + gettimeofday(&start_time, NULL); +} + +/* + * update_link_stats - get stats at link termination. + */ +void update_link_stats(int u) +{ + struct timeval now; + char numbuf[32]; + + if (!get_ppp_stats(u, &link_stats) || gettimeofday(&now, NULL) < 0) { + return; + } + + link_connect_time = now.tv_sec - start_time.tv_sec; + link_stats_valid = 1; + + link_stats.bytes_in -= old_link_stats.bytes_in; + link_stats.bytes_out -= old_link_stats.bytes_out; + link_stats.pkts_in -= old_link_stats.pkts_in; + link_stats.pkts_out -= old_link_stats.pkts_out; +} + +void print_link_stats() +{ + /* + * Print connect time and statistics. + */ + if (link_stats_valid) { + int t = (link_connect_time + 5) / 6; /* 1/10ths of minutes */ + info("Connect time %d.%d minutes.", t / 10, t % 10); + info("Sent %u bytes, received %u bytes.", link_stats.bytes_out, link_stats.bytes_in); + link_stats_valid = 0; + } +} +#endif /* PPP_STATS_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppapi.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppapi.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppapi.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppapi.c index 512c45b2..fa69d2c1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppapi.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppapi.c @@ -1,399 +1,399 @@ -/** - * @file - * Point To Point Protocol Sequential API module - * - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" - -#if LWIP_PPP_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "netif/ppp/pppapi.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppoe.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppos.h" - -#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE -LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPPAPI_MSG, MEMP_NUM_PPP_API_MSG, sizeof(struct pppapi_msg), "PPPAPI_MSG") -#endif - -#define PPPAPI_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) -#define PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct pppapi_msg, name) -#define PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(name) API_VAR_ALLOC_POOL(struct pppapi_msg, PPPAPI_MSG, name, ERR_MEM) -#define PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(name) API_VAR_ALLOC_POOL(struct pppapi_msg, PPPAPI_MSG, name, NULL) -#define PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE_POOL(PPPAPI_MSG, name) - -/** - * Call ppp_set_default() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t -pppapi_do_ppp_set_default(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - ppp_set_default(msg->msg.ppp); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Call ppp_set_default() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -err_t pppapi_set_default(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - err_t err; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; - err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_set_default, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE -/** - * Call ppp_set_notify_phase_callback() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_set_notify_phase_callback(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - ppp_set_notify_phase_callback(msg->msg.ppp, msg->msg.msg.setnotifyphasecb.notify_phase_cb); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Call ppp_set_notify_phase_callback() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -err_t pppapi_set_notify_phase_callback(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb) -{ - err_t err; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.setnotifyphasecb.notify_phase_cb = notify_phase_cb; - err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_set_notify_phase_callback, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} -#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ - -#if PPPOS_SUPPORT -/** - * Call pppos_create() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t pppapi_do_pppos_create(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - msg->msg.ppp = pppos_create(msg->msg.msg.serialcreate.pppif, msg->msg.msg.serialcreate.output_cb, - msg->msg.msg.serialcreate.link_status_cb, msg->msg.msg.serialcreate.ctx_cb); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Call pppos_create() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppos_create(struct netif *pppif, pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) -{ - ppp_pcb *result; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(msg); - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = NULL; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.serialcreate.pppif = pppif; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.serialcreate.output_cb = output_cb; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.serialcreate.link_status_cb = link_status_cb; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.serialcreate.ctx_cb = ctx_cb; - tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_pppos_create, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - result = PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp; - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return result; -} -#endif /* PPPOS_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPPOE_SUPPORT -/** - * Call pppoe_create() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t pppapi_do_pppoe_create(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - msg->msg.ppp = pppoe_create(msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.pppif, msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.ethif, - msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.service_name, msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.concentrator_name, - msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.link_status_cb, msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.ctx_cb); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Call pppoe_create() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppoe_create(struct netif *pppif, struct netif *ethif, const char *service_name, - const char *concentrator_name, ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, - void *ctx_cb) -{ - ppp_pcb *result; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(msg); - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = NULL; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.pppif = pppif; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.ethif = ethif; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.service_name = service_name; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.concentrator_name = concentrator_name; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.link_status_cb = link_status_cb; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.ctx_cb = ctx_cb; - tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_pppoe_create, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - result = PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp; - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return result; -} -#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ - -#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT -/** - * Call pppol2tp_create() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t pppapi_do_pppol2tp_create(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - msg->msg.ppp = pppol2tp_create(msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.pppif, - msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.netif, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.ipaddr), msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.port, -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.secret, - msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.secret_len, -#else /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - NULL, - 0, -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.link_status_cb, msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.ctx_cb); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * Call pppol2tp_create() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppol2tp_create(struct netif *pppif, struct netif *netif, ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, - const u8_t *secret, u8_t secret_len, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) -{ - ppp_pcb *result; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(msg); -#if !PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(secret); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(secret_len); -#endif /* !PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = NULL; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.pppif = pppif; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.netif = netif; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.ipaddr = PPPAPI_VAR_REF(ipaddr); - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.port = port; -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.secret = secret; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.secret_len = secret_len; -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.link_status_cb = link_status_cb; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.ctx_cb = ctx_cb; - tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_pppol2tp_create, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - result = PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp; - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return result; -} -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ - -/** - * Call ppp_connect() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_connect(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - return ppp_connect(msg->msg.ppp, msg->msg.msg.connect.holdoff); -} - -/** - * Call ppp_connect() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -err_t pppapi_connect(ppp_pcb *pcb, u16_t holdoff) -{ - err_t err; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.connect.holdoff = holdoff; - err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_connect, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/** - * Call ppp_listen() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_listen(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - return ppp_listen(msg->msg.ppp); -} - -/** - * Call ppp_listen() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -err_t pppapi_listen(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - err_t err; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; - err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_listen, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/** - * Call ppp_close() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_close(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - return ppp_close(msg->msg.ppp, msg->msg.msg.close.nocarrier); -} - -/** - * Call ppp_close() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -err_t pppapi_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t nocarrier) -{ - err_t err; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.close.nocarrier = nocarrier; - err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_close, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -/** - * Call ppp_free() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_free(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - return ppp_free(msg->msg.ppp); -} - -/** - * Call ppp_free() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -err_t pppapi_free(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - err_t err; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; - err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_free, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -/** - * Call ppp_ioctl() inside the tcpip_thread context. - */ -static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_ioctl(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) -{ - /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. - * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ - struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; - - return ppp_ioctl(msg->msg.ppp, msg->msg.msg.ioctl.cmd, msg->msg.msg.ioctl.arg); -} - -/** - * Call ppp_ioctl() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the - * tcpip_thread context. - */ -err_t pppapi_ioctl(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t cmd, void *arg) -{ - err_t err; - PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); - PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); - - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ioctl.cmd = cmd; - PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ioctl.arg = arg; - err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_ioctl, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); - PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); - return err; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_PPP_API */ +/** + * @file + * Point To Point Protocol Sequential API module + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" + +#if LWIP_PPP_API /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "netif/ppp/pppapi.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppoe.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppos.h" + +#if LWIP_MPU_COMPATIBLE +LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPPAPI_MSG, MEMP_NUM_PPP_API_MSG, sizeof(struct pppapi_msg), "PPPAPI_MSG") +#endif + +#define PPPAPI_VAR_REF(name) API_VAR_REF(name) +#define PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(name) API_VAR_DECLARE(struct pppapi_msg, name) +#define PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(name) API_VAR_ALLOC_POOL(struct pppapi_msg, PPPAPI_MSG, name, ERR_MEM) +#define PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(name) API_VAR_ALLOC_POOL(struct pppapi_msg, PPPAPI_MSG, name, NULL) +#define PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(name) API_VAR_FREE_POOL(PPPAPI_MSG, name) + +/** + * Call ppp_set_default() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t +pppapi_do_ppp_set_default(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + ppp_set_default(msg->msg.ppp); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Call ppp_set_default() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +err_t pppapi_set_default(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + err_t err; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; + err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_set_default, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +#if PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE +/** + * Call ppp_set_notify_phase_callback() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_set_notify_phase_callback(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + ppp_set_notify_phase_callback(msg->msg.ppp, msg->msg.msg.setnotifyphasecb.notify_phase_cb); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Call ppp_set_notify_phase_callback() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +err_t pppapi_set_notify_phase_callback(ppp_pcb *pcb, ppp_notify_phase_cb_fn notify_phase_cb) +{ + err_t err; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.setnotifyphasecb.notify_phase_cb = notify_phase_cb; + err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_set_notify_phase_callback, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} +#endif /* PPP_NOTIFY_PHASE */ + +#if PPPOS_SUPPORT +/** + * Call pppos_create() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t pppapi_do_pppos_create(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + msg->msg.ppp = pppos_create(msg->msg.msg.serialcreate.pppif, msg->msg.msg.serialcreate.output_cb, + msg->msg.msg.serialcreate.link_status_cb, msg->msg.msg.serialcreate.ctx_cb); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Call pppos_create() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppos_create(struct netif *pppif, pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) +{ + ppp_pcb *result; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(msg); + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = NULL; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.serialcreate.pppif = pppif; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.serialcreate.output_cb = output_cb; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.serialcreate.link_status_cb = link_status_cb; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.serialcreate.ctx_cb = ctx_cb; + tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_pppos_create, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + result = PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp; + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return result; +} +#endif /* PPPOS_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPPOE_SUPPORT +/** + * Call pppoe_create() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t pppapi_do_pppoe_create(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + msg->msg.ppp = pppoe_create(msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.pppif, msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.ethif, + msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.service_name, msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.concentrator_name, + msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.link_status_cb, msg->msg.msg.ethernetcreate.ctx_cb); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Call pppoe_create() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppoe_create(struct netif *pppif, struct netif *ethif, const char *service_name, + const char *concentrator_name, ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, + void *ctx_cb) +{ + ppp_pcb *result; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(msg); + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = NULL; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.pppif = pppif; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.ethif = ethif; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.service_name = service_name; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.concentrator_name = concentrator_name; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.link_status_cb = link_status_cb; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ethernetcreate.ctx_cb = ctx_cb; + tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_pppoe_create, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + result = PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp; + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return result; +} +#endif /* PPPOE_SUPPORT */ + +#if PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT +/** + * Call pppol2tp_create() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t pppapi_do_pppol2tp_create(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + msg->msg.ppp = pppol2tp_create(msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.pppif, + msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.netif, API_EXPR_REF(msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.ipaddr), msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.port, +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.secret, + msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.secret_len, +#else /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + NULL, + 0, +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.link_status_cb, msg->msg.msg.l2tpcreate.ctx_cb); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * Call pppol2tp_create() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +ppp_pcb *pppapi_pppol2tp_create(struct netif *pppif, struct netif *netif, ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, + const u8_t *secret, u8_t secret_len, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) +{ + ppp_pcb *result; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC_RETURN_NULL(msg); +#if !PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(secret); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(secret_len); +#endif /* !PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = NULL; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.pppif = pppif; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.netif = netif; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.ipaddr = PPPAPI_VAR_REF(ipaddr); + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.port = port; +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.secret = secret; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.secret_len = secret_len; +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.link_status_cb = link_status_cb; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.l2tpcreate.ctx_cb = ctx_cb; + tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_pppol2tp_create, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + result = PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp; + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return result; +} +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ + +/** + * Call ppp_connect() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_connect(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + return ppp_connect(msg->msg.ppp, msg->msg.msg.connect.holdoff); +} + +/** + * Call ppp_connect() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +err_t pppapi_connect(ppp_pcb *pcb, u16_t holdoff) +{ + err_t err; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.connect.holdoff = holdoff; + err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_connect, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/** + * Call ppp_listen() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_listen(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + return ppp_listen(msg->msg.ppp); +} + +/** + * Call ppp_listen() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +err_t pppapi_listen(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + err_t err; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; + err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_listen, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/** + * Call ppp_close() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_close(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + return ppp_close(msg->msg.ppp, msg->msg.msg.close.nocarrier); +} + +/** + * Call ppp_close() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +err_t pppapi_close(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t nocarrier) +{ + err_t err; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.close.nocarrier = nocarrier; + err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_close, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +/** + * Call ppp_free() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_free(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + return ppp_free(msg->msg.ppp); +} + +/** + * Call ppp_free() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +err_t pppapi_free(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + err_t err; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; + err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_free, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +/** + * Call ppp_ioctl() inside the tcpip_thread context. + */ +static err_t pppapi_do_ppp_ioctl(struct tcpip_api_call_data *m) +{ + /* cast through void* to silence alignment warnings. + * We know it works because the structs have been instantiated as struct pppapi_msg */ + struct pppapi_msg *msg = (struct pppapi_msg *)(void *)m; + + return ppp_ioctl(msg->msg.ppp, msg->msg.msg.ioctl.cmd, msg->msg.msg.ioctl.arg); +} + +/** + * Call ppp_ioctl() in a thread-safe way by running that function inside the + * tcpip_thread context. + */ +err_t pppapi_ioctl(ppp_pcb *pcb, u8_t cmd, void *arg) +{ + err_t err; + PPPAPI_VAR_DECLARE(msg); + PPPAPI_VAR_ALLOC(msg); + + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.ppp = pcb; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ioctl.cmd = cmd; + PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).msg.msg.ioctl.arg = arg; + err = tcpip_api_call(pppapi_do_ppp_ioctl, &PPPAPI_VAR_REF(msg).call); + PPPAPI_VAR_FREE(msg); + return err; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_PPP_API */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c index 3d70ea33..da4c4b61 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppcrypt.c @@ -1,67 +1,67 @@ -/* - * pppcrypt.c - PPP/DES linkage for MS-CHAP and EAP SRP-SHA1 - * - * Extracted from chap_ms.c by James Carlson. - * - * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not necessary */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" - -static u_char pppcrypt_get_7bits(u_char *input, int startBit) -{ - unsigned int word; - - word = (unsigned)input[startBit / 8] << 8; - word |= (unsigned)input[startBit / 8 + 1]; - - word >>= 15 - (startBit % 8 + 7); - - return word & 0xFE; -} - -/* IN 56 bit DES key missing parity bits - * OUT 64 bit DES key with parity bits added - */ -void pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(u_char *key, u_char *des_key) -{ - des_key[0] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 0); - des_key[1] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 7); - des_key[2] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 14); - des_key[3] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 21); - des_key[4] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 28); - des_key[5] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 35); - des_key[6] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 42); - des_key[7] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 49); -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * pppcrypt.c - PPP/DES linkage for MS-CHAP and EAP SRP-SHA1 + * + * Extracted from chap_ms.c by James Carlson. + * + * Copyright (c) 1995 Eric Rosenquist. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not necessary */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" + +static u_char pppcrypt_get_7bits(u_char *input, int startBit) +{ + unsigned int word; + + word = (unsigned)input[startBit / 8] << 8; + word |= (unsigned)input[startBit / 8 + 1]; + + word >>= 15 - (startBit % 8 + 7); + + return word & 0xFE; +} + +/* IN 56 bit DES key missing parity bits + * OUT 64 bit DES key with parity bits added + */ +void pppcrypt_56_to_64_bit_key(u_char *key, u_char *des_key) +{ + des_key[0] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 0); + des_key[1] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 7); + des_key[2] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 14); + des_key[3] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 21); + des_key[4] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 28); + des_key[5] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 35); + des_key[6] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 42); + des_key[7] = pppcrypt_get_7bits(key, 49); +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && MSCHAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppoe.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppoe.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppoe.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppoe.c index e4fe4398..78a60cbd 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppoe.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppoe.c @@ -1,1320 +1,1320 @@ -/***************************************************************************** -* pppoe.c - PPP Over Ethernet implementation for lwIP. -* -* Copyright (c) 2006 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. -* -* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, -* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided -* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this -* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any -* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required -* for any of the authorized uses. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR -* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -****************************************************************************** -* REVISION HISTORY -* -* 06-01-01 Marc Boucher -* Ported to lwIP. -*****************************************************************************/ - -/* based on NetBSD: if_pppoe.c,v 1.64 2006/01/31 23:50:15 martin Exp */ - -/*- - * Copyright (c) 2002 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. - * All rights reserved. - * - * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation - * by Martin Husemann . - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * This product includes software developed by the NetBSD - * Foundation, Inc. and its contributors. - * 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its - * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived - * from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS - * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS - * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR - * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF - * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE - * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOE_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" - -#include "netif/ethernet.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppoe.h" - -/* Memory pool */ -LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPPOE_IF, MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES, sizeof(struct pppoe_softc), "PPPOE_IF") - -/* Add a 16 bit unsigned value to a buffer pointed to by PTR */ -#define PPPOE_ADD_16(PTR, VAL) \ - *(PTR)++ = (u8_t)((VAL) / 256); \ - *(PTR)++ = (u8_t)((VAL) % 256) - -/* Add a complete PPPoE header to the buffer pointed to by PTR */ -#define PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(PTR, CODE, SESS, LEN) \ - *(PTR)++ = PPPOE_VERTYPE; \ - *(PTR)++ = (CODE); \ - PPPOE_ADD_16(PTR, SESS); \ - PPPOE_ADD_16(PTR, LEN) - -#define PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT (5 * 1000) /* base for quick timeout calculation */ -#define PPPOE_SLOW_RETRY (60 * 1000) /* persistent retry interval */ -#define PPPOE_DISC_MAXPADI 4 /* retry PADI four times (quickly) */ -#define PPPOE_DISC_MAXPADR 2 /* retry PADR twice */ - -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER -#error "PPPOE_SERVER is not yet supported under lwIP!" -/* from if_spppsubr.c */ -#define IFF_PASSIVE IFF_LINK0 /* wait passively for connection */ -#endif - -#define PPPOE_ERRORSTRING_LEN 64 - -/* callbacks called from PPP core */ -static err_t pppoe_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p); -static err_t pppoe_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol); -static void pppoe_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); -static void pppoe_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); -static err_t pppoe_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); - -/* management routines */ -static void pppoe_abort_connect(struct pppoe_softc *); -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - static void pppoe_clear_softc(struct pppoe_softc *, const char *); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -/* internal timeout handling */ -static void pppoe_timeout(void *); - -/* sending actual protocol controll packets */ -static err_t pppoe_send_padi(struct pppoe_softc *); -static err_t pppoe_send_padr(struct pppoe_softc *); -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER -static err_t pppoe_send_pado(struct pppoe_softc *); -static err_t pppoe_send_pads(struct pppoe_softc *); -#endif -static err_t pppoe_send_padt(struct netif *, u_int, const u8_t *); - -/* internal helper functions */ -static err_t pppoe_xmit(struct pppoe_softc *sc, struct pbuf *pb); -static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_find_softc_by_session(u_int session, struct netif *rcvif); -static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_find_softc_by_hunique(u8_t *token, size_t len, struct netif *rcvif); - -/** linked list of created pppoe interfaces */ -static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_softc_list; - -/* Callbacks structure for PPP core */ -static const struct link_callbacks pppoe_callbacks = { - pppoe_connect, -#if PPP_SERVER - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - pppoe_disconnect, - pppoe_destroy, - pppoe_write, - pppoe_netif_output, - NULL, - NULL -}; - -/* - * Create a new PPP Over Ethernet (PPPoE) connection. - * - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. - */ -ppp_pcb *pppoe_create(struct netif *pppif, - struct netif *ethif, - const char *service_name, const char *concentrator_name, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) -{ - ppp_pcb *ppp; - struct pppoe_softc *sc; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(service_name); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(concentrator_name); - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(PPPOE_IF); - - if (sc == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - ppp = ppp_new(pppif, &pppoe_callbacks, sc, link_status_cb, ctx_cb); - - if (ppp == NULL) { - LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOE_IF, sc); - return NULL; - } - - memset(sc, 0, sizeof(struct pppoe_softc)); - sc->pcb = ppp; - sc->sc_ethif = ethif; - /* put the new interface at the head of the list */ - sc->next = pppoe_softc_list; - pppoe_softc_list = sc; - return ppp; -} - -/* Called by PPP core */ -static err_t pppoe_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; - struct pbuf *ph; /* Ethernet + PPPoE header */ - err_t ret; -#if MIB2_STATS - u16_t tot_len; -#else /* MIB2_STATS */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - - /* skip address & flags */ - pbuf_remove_header(p, 2); - - ph = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN), PBUF_RAM); - - if (!ph) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - pbuf_remove_header(ph, PPPOE_HEADERLEN); /* hide PPPoE header */ - pbuf_cat(ph, p); -#if MIB2_STATS - tot_len = ph->tot_len; -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - - ret = pppoe_xmit(sc, ph); - - if (ret != ERR_OK) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - return ret; - } - - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, (u16_t)tot_len); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* Called by PPP core */ -static err_t pppoe_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol) -{ - struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *pl; - err_t err; -#if MIB2_STATS - u16_t tot_len; -#else /* MIB2_STATS */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - - /* @todo: try to use pbuf_header() here! */ - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, PPPOE_HEADERLEN + sizeof(protocol), PBUF_RAM); - - if (!pb) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - pbuf_remove_header(pb, PPPOE_HEADERLEN); - - pl = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - PUTSHORT(protocol, pl); - - pbuf_chain(pb, p); -#if MIB2_STATS - tot_len = pb->tot_len; -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - - if ((err = pppoe_xmit(sc, pb)) != ERR_OK) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - return err; - } - - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, tot_len); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t pppoe_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; - struct pppoe_softc **copp, *freep; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); - - sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); - - /* remove interface from list */ - for (copp = &pppoe_softc_list; (freep = *copp); copp = &freep->next) { - if (freep == sc) { - *copp = freep->next; - break; - } - } - -#ifdef PPPOE_TODO - - if (sc->sc_concentrator_name) { - mem_free(sc->sc_concentrator_name); - } - - if (sc->sc_service_name) { - mem_free(sc->sc_service_name); - } - -#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ - LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOE_IF, sc); - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* - * Find the interface handling the specified session. - * Note: O(number of sessions open), this is a client-side only, mean - * and lean implementation, so number of open sessions typically should - * be 1. - */ -static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_find_softc_by_session(u_int session, struct netif *rcvif) -{ - struct pppoe_softc *sc; - - for (sc = pppoe_softc_list; sc != NULL; sc = sc->next) { - if (sc->sc_state == PPPOE_STATE_SESSION && sc->sc_session == session && sc->sc_ethif == rcvif) { - return sc; - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -/* Check host unique token passed and return appropriate softc pointer, - * or NULL if token is bogus. */ -static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_find_softc_by_hunique(u8_t *token, size_t len, struct netif *rcvif) -{ - struct pppoe_softc *sc, *t; - - if (len != sizeof sc) { - return NULL; - } - - MEMCPY(&t, token, len); - - for (sc = pppoe_softc_list; sc != NULL; sc = sc->next) { - if (sc == t) { - break; - } - } - - if (sc == NULL) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: alien host unique tag, no session found\n")); - return NULL; - } - - /* should be safe to access *sc now */ - if (sc->sc_state < PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT || sc->sc_state >= PPPOE_STATE_SESSION) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": host unique tag found, but it belongs to a connection in state %d\n", - sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, sc->sc_state)); - return NULL; - } - - if (sc->sc_ethif != rcvif) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": wrong interface, not accepting host unique\n", - sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); - return NULL; - } - - return sc; -} - -/* analyze and handle a single received packet while not in session state */ -void pppoe_disc_input(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb) -{ - u16_t tag, len, off; - u16_t session, plen; - struct pppoe_softc *sc; -#if PPP_DEBUG - const char *err_msg = NULL; -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - u8_t *ac_cookie; - u16_t ac_cookie_len; -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER - u8_t *hunique; - size_t hunique_len; -#endif - struct pppoehdr *ph; - struct pppoetag pt; - int err; - struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; - - /* don't do anything if there is not a single PPPoE instance */ - if (pppoe_softc_list == NULL) { - pbuf_free(pb); - return; - } - - pb = pbuf_coalesce(pb, PBUF_RAW); - - ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)pb->payload; - - ac_cookie = NULL; - ac_cookie_len = 0; -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER - hunique = NULL; - hunique_len = 0; -#endif - session = 0; - off = sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + sizeof(struct pppoehdr); - - if (pb->len < off) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: packet too short: %d\n", pb->len)); - goto done; - } - - ph = (struct pppoehdr *)(ethhdr + 1); - - if (ph->vertype != PPPOE_VERTYPE) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: unknown version/type packet: 0x%x\n", ph->vertype)); - goto done; - } - - session = lwip_ntohs(ph->session); - plen = lwip_ntohs(ph->plen); - - if (plen > (pb->len - off)) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: packet content does not fit: data available = %d, packet size = %u\n", - pb->len - off, plen)); - goto done; - } - - if (pb->tot_len == pb->len) { - u16_t framelen = off + plen; - - if (framelen < pb->len) { - /* ignore trailing garbage */ - pb->tot_len = pb->len = framelen; - } - } - - tag = 0; - len = 0; - sc = NULL; - - while (off + sizeof(pt) <= pb->len) { - MEMCPY(&pt, (u8_t *)pb->payload + off, sizeof(pt)); - tag = lwip_ntohs(pt.tag); - len = lwip_ntohs(pt.len); - - if (off + sizeof(pt) + len > pb->len) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: tag 0x%x len 0x%x is too long\n", tag, len)); - goto done; - } - - switch (tag) { - case PPPOE_TAG_EOL: - goto breakbreak; - - case PPPOE_TAG_SNAME: - break; /* ignored */ - - case PPPOE_TAG_ACNAME: - break; /* ignored */ - - case PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE: - if (sc != NULL) { - break; - } - -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER - hunique = (u8_t *)pb->payload + off + sizeof(pt); - hunique_len = len; -#endif - sc = pppoe_find_softc_by_hunique((u8_t *)pb->payload + off + sizeof(pt), len, netif); - break; - - case PPPOE_TAG_ACCOOKIE: - if (ac_cookie == NULL) { - if (len > PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: AC cookie is too long: len = %d, max = %d\n", len, PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN)); - goto done; - } - - ac_cookie = (u8_t *)pb->payload + off + sizeof(pt); - ac_cookie_len = len; - } - - break; -#if PPP_DEBUG - - case PPPOE_TAG_SNAME_ERR: - err_msg = "SERVICE NAME ERROR"; - break; - - case PPPOE_TAG_ACSYS_ERR: - err_msg = "AC SYSTEM ERROR"; - break; - - case PPPOE_TAG_GENERIC_ERR: - err_msg = "GENERIC ERROR"; - break; -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - - default: - break; - } - -#if PPP_DEBUG - - if (err_msg != NULL) { - char error_tmp[PPPOE_ERRORSTRING_LEN]; - u16_t error_len = LWIP_MIN(len, sizeof(error_tmp) - 1); - strncpy(error_tmp, (char *)pb->payload + off + sizeof(pt), error_len); - error_tmp[error_len] = '\0'; - - if (sc) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": %s: %s\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err_msg, error_tmp)); - } else { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %s: %s\n", err_msg, error_tmp)); - } - } - -#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ - off += sizeof(pt) + len; - } - -breakbreak:; - - switch (ph->code) { - case PPPOE_CODE_PADI: -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER - - /* - * got service name, concentrator name, and/or host unique. - * ignore if we have no interfaces with IFF_PASSIVE|IFF_UP. - */ - if (LIST_EMPTY(&pppoe_softc_list)) { - goto done; - } - - LIST_FOREACH(sc, &pppoe_softc_list, sc_list) - { - if (!(sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_UP)) { - continue; - } - - if (!(sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_PASSIVE)) { - continue; - } - - if (sc->sc_state == PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL) { - break; - } - } - - if (sc == NULL) { - /* PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: free passive interface is not found\n")); */ - goto done; - } - - if (hunique) { - if (sc->sc_hunique) { - mem_free(sc->sc_hunique); - } - - sc->sc_hunique = mem_malloc(hunique_len); - - if (sc->sc_hunique == NULL) { - goto done; - } - - sc->sc_hunique_len = hunique_len; - MEMCPY(sc->sc_hunique, hunique, hunique_len); - } - - MEMCPY(&sc->sc_dest, eh->ether_shost, sizeof sc->sc_dest); - sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_PADO_SENT; - pppoe_send_pado(sc); - break; -#endif /* PPPOE_SERVER */ - - case PPPOE_CODE_PADR: -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER - - /* - * get sc from ac_cookie if IFF_PASSIVE - */ - if (ac_cookie == NULL) { - /* be quiet if there is not a single pppoe instance */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: received PADR but not includes ac_cookie\n")); - goto done; - } - - sc = pppoe_find_softc_by_hunique(ac_cookie, ac_cookie_len, netif); - - if (sc == NULL) { - /* be quiet if there is not a single pppoe instance */ - if (!LIST_EMPTY(&pppoe_softc_list)) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: received PADR but could not find request for it\n")); - } - - goto done; - } - - if (sc->sc_state != PPPOE_STATE_PADO_SENT) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": received unexpected PADR\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); - goto done; - } - - if (hunique) { - if (sc->sc_hunique) { - mem_free(sc->sc_hunique); - } - - sc->sc_hunique = mem_malloc(hunique_len); - - if (sc->sc_hunique == NULL) { - goto done; - } - - sc->sc_hunique_len = hunique_len; - MEMCPY(sc->sc_hunique, hunique, hunique_len); - } - - pppoe_send_pads(sc); - sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_SESSION; - ppp_start(sc->pcb); /* notify upper layers */ - break; -#else - /* ignore, we are no access concentrator */ - goto done; -#endif /* PPPOE_SERVER */ - - case PPPOE_CODE_PADO: - if (sc == NULL) { - /* be quiet if there is not a single pppoe instance */ - if (pppoe_softc_list != NULL) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: received PADO but could not find request for it\n")); - } - - goto done; - } - - if (sc->sc_state != PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": received unexpected PADO\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); - goto done; - } - - if (ac_cookie) { - sc->sc_ac_cookie_len = ac_cookie_len; - MEMCPY(sc->sc_ac_cookie, ac_cookie, ac_cookie_len); - } - - MEMCPY(&sc->sc_dest, ethhdr->src.addr, sizeof(sc->sc_dest.addr)); - sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); - sc->sc_padr_retried = 0; - sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_PADR_SENT; - - if ((err = pppoe_send_padr(sc)) != 0) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to send PADR, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - sys_timeout(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT * (1 + sc->sc_padr_retried), pppoe_timeout, sc); - break; - - case PPPOE_CODE_PADS: - if (sc == NULL) { - goto done; - } - - sc->sc_session = session; - sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": session 0x%x connected\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, session)); - sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_SESSION; - ppp_start(sc->pcb); /* notify upper layers */ - break; - - case PPPOE_CODE_PADT: - /* Don't disconnect here, we let the LCP Echo/Reply find the fact - * that PPP session is down. Asking the PPP stack to end the session - * require strict checking about the PPP phase to prevent endless - * disconnection loops. - */ -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - if(sc == NULL) /* PADT frames are rarely sent with a hunique tag, this is actually almost always true */ - { - goto done; - } - - pppoe_clear_softc(sc, "received PADT"); -#endif /* UNUSED */ - break; - - default: - if (sc) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": unknown code (0x%" X16_F ") session = 0x%" X16_F "\n", - sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, - (u16_t)ph->code, session)); - } else { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: unknown code (0x%" X16_F ") session = 0x%" X16_F "\n", (u16_t)ph->code, session)); - } - - break; - } - -done: - pbuf_free(pb); - return; -} - -void pppoe_data_input(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb) -{ - u16_t session, plen; - struct pppoe_softc *sc; - struct pppoehdr *ph; -#ifdef PPPOE_TERM_UNKNOWN_SESSIONS - u8_t shost[ETHER_ADDR_LEN]; -#endif - -#ifdef PPPOE_TERM_UNKNOWN_SESSIONS - MEMCPY(shost, ((struct eth_hdr *)pb->payload)->src.addr, sizeof(shost)); -#endif - - if (pbuf_remove_header(pb, sizeof(struct eth_hdr)) != 0) { - /* bail out */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe_data_input: pbuf_remove_header failed\n")); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); - goto drop; - } - - if (pb->len < sizeof(*ph)) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe_data_input: could not get PPPoE header\n")); - goto drop; - } - - ph = (struct pppoehdr *)pb->payload; - - if (ph->vertype != PPPOE_VERTYPE) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe (data): unknown version/type packet: 0x%x\n", ph->vertype)); - goto drop; - } - - if (ph->code != 0) { - goto drop; - } - - session = lwip_ntohs(ph->session); - sc = pppoe_find_softc_by_session(session, netif); - - if (sc == NULL) { -#ifdef PPPOE_TERM_UNKNOWN_SESSIONS - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: input for unknown session 0x%x, sending PADT\n", session)); - pppoe_send_padt(netif, session, shost); -#endif - goto drop; - } - - plen = lwip_ntohs(ph->plen); - - if (pbuf_remove_header(pb, PPPOE_HEADERLEN) != 0) { - /* bail out */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe_data_input: pbuf_remove_header PPPOE_HEADERLEN failed\n")); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); - goto drop; - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe_data_input: %c%c%" U16_F ": pkthdr.len=%d, pppoe.len=%d\n", - sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, - pb->len, plen)); - - if (pb->tot_len < plen) { - goto drop; - } - - /* Dispatch the packet thereby consuming it. */ - ppp_input(sc->pcb, pb); - return; - -drop: - pbuf_free(pb); -} - -static err_t pppoe_output(struct pppoe_softc *sc, struct pbuf *pb) -{ - struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; - u16_t etype; - err_t res; - - /* make room for Ethernet header - should not fail */ - if (pbuf_add_header(pb, sizeof(struct eth_hdr)) != 0) { - /* bail out */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": pppoe_output: could not allocate room for Ethernet header\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); - pbuf_free(pb); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)pb->payload; - etype = sc->sc_state == PPPOE_STATE_SESSION ? ETHTYPE_PPPOE : ETHTYPE_PPPOEDISC; - ethhdr->type = lwip_htons(etype); - MEMCPY(ðhdr->dest.addr, &sc->sc_dest.addr, sizeof(ethhdr->dest.addr)); - MEMCPY(ðhdr->src.addr, &sc->sc_ethif->hwaddr, sizeof(ethhdr->src.addr)); - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F " (%x) state=%d, session=0x%x output -> %02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ", len=%d\n", - sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, etype, - sc->sc_state, sc->sc_session, - sc->sc_dest.addr[0], sc->sc_dest.addr[1], sc->sc_dest.addr[2], sc->sc_dest.addr[3], sc->sc_dest.addr[4], sc->sc_dest.addr[5], - pb->tot_len)); - - res = sc->sc_ethif->linkoutput(sc->sc_ethif, pb); - - pbuf_free(pb); - - return res; -} - -static err_t pppoe_send_padi(struct pppoe_softc *sc) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - int len; -#ifdef PPPOE_TODO - int l1 = 0, l2 = 0; /* XXX: gcc */ -#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ - - /* calculate length of frame (excluding ethernet header + pppoe header) */ - len = 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + sizeof sc; /* service name tag is required, host unique is send too */ -#ifdef PPPOE_TODO - - if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) { - l1 = (int)strlen(sc->sc_service_name); - len += l1; - } - - if (sc->sc_concentrator_name != NULL) { - l2 = (int)strlen(sc->sc_concentrator_name); - len += 2 + 2 + l2; - } - -#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ - LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len <= 0xffff", - sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len <= 0xffff); - - /* allocate a buffer */ - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len), PBUF_RAM); - - if (!pb) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - /* fill in pkt */ - PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADI, 0, (u16_t)len); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_SNAME); -#ifdef PPPOE_TODO - - if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) { - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, l1); - MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_service_name, l1); - p += l1; - } else -#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ - { - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, 0); - } - -#ifdef PPPOE_TODO - - if (sc->sc_concentrator_name != NULL) { - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_ACNAME); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, l2); - MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_concentrator_name, l2); - p += l2; - } - -#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sizeof(sc)); - MEMCPY(p, &sc, sizeof sc); - - /* send pkt */ - return pppoe_output(sc, pb); -} - -static void pppoe_timeout(void *arg) -{ - u32_t retry_wait; - int err; - struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)arg; - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": timeout\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); - - switch (sc->sc_state) { - case PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT: - - /* - * We have two basic ways of retrying: - * - Quick retry mode: try a few times in short sequence - * - Slow retry mode: we already had a connection successfully - * established and will try infinitely (without user - * intervention) - * We only enter slow retry mode if IFF_LINK1 (aka autodial) - * is not set. - */ - if (sc->sc_padi_retried < 0xff) { - sc->sc_padi_retried++; - } - - if (!sc->pcb->settings.persist && sc->sc_padi_retried >= PPPOE_DISC_MAXPADI) { -#if 0 - - if((sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_LINK1) == 0) - { - /* slow retry mode */ - retry_wait = PPPOE_SLOW_RETRY; - } - else -#endif - { - pppoe_abort_connect(sc); - return; - } - } - - /* initialize for quick retry mode */ - retry_wait = LWIP_MIN(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT * sc->sc_padi_retried, PPPOE_SLOW_RETRY); - - if ((err = pppoe_send_padi(sc)) != 0) { - sc->sc_padi_retried--; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to transmit PADI, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - sys_timeout(retry_wait, pppoe_timeout, sc); - break; - - case PPPOE_STATE_PADR_SENT: - sc->sc_padr_retried++; - - if (sc->sc_padr_retried >= PPPOE_DISC_MAXPADR) { - MEMCPY(&sc->sc_dest, ethbroadcast.addr, sizeof(sc->sc_dest)); - sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT; - sc->sc_padr_retried = 0; - - if ((err = pppoe_send_padi(sc)) != 0) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to send PADI, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - sys_timeout(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT * (1 + sc->sc_padi_retried), pppoe_timeout, sc); - return; - } - - if ((err = pppoe_send_padr(sc)) != 0) { - sc->sc_padr_retried--; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to send PADR, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - sys_timeout(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT * (1 + sc->sc_padr_retried), pppoe_timeout, sc); - break; - - default: - return; /* all done, work in peace */ - } -} - -/* Start a connection (i.e. initiate discovery phase) */ -static void pppoe_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - err_t err; - struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; - lcp_options *lcp_wo; - lcp_options *lcp_ao; -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT - ipcp_options *ipcp_wo; - ipcp_options *ipcp_ao; -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ - - sc->sc_session = 0; - sc->sc_ac_cookie_len = 0; - sc->sc_padi_retried = 0; - sc->sc_padr_retried = 0; - /* changed to real address later */ - MEMCPY(&sc->sc_dest, ethbroadcast.addr, sizeof(sc->sc_dest)); -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER - - /* wait PADI if IFF_PASSIVE */ - if ((sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_PASSIVE)) { - return 0; - } - -#endif - - lcp_wo = &ppp->lcp_wantoptions; - lcp_wo->mru = sc->sc_ethif->mtu - PPPOE_HEADERLEN - 2; /* two byte PPP protocol discriminator, then IP data */ - lcp_wo->neg_asyncmap = 0; - lcp_wo->neg_pcompression = 0; - lcp_wo->neg_accompression = 0; - lcp_wo->passive = 0; - lcp_wo->silent = 0; - - lcp_ao = &ppp->lcp_allowoptions; - lcp_ao->mru = sc->sc_ethif->mtu - PPPOE_HEADERLEN - 2; /* two byte PPP protocol discriminator, then IP data */ - lcp_ao->neg_asyncmap = 0; - lcp_ao->neg_pcompression = 0; - lcp_ao->neg_accompression = 0; - -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT - ipcp_wo = &ppp->ipcp_wantoptions; - ipcp_wo->neg_vj = 0; - ipcp_wo->old_vj = 0; - - ipcp_ao = &ppp->ipcp_allowoptions; - ipcp_ao->neg_vj = 0; - ipcp_ao->old_vj = 0; -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ - - /* save state, in case we fail to send PADI */ - sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT; - - if ((err = pppoe_send_padi(sc)) != 0) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to send PADI, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); - } - - sys_timeout(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT, pppoe_timeout, sc); -} - -/* disconnect */ -static void pppoe_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": disconnecting\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); - - if (sc->sc_state == PPPOE_STATE_SESSION) { - pppoe_send_padt(sc->sc_ethif, sc->sc_session, (const u8_t *)&sc->sc_dest); - } - - /* stop any timer, disconnect can be called while initiating is in progress */ - sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); - sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL; -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER - - if (sc->sc_hunique) { - mem_free(sc->sc_hunique); - sc->sc_hunique = NULL; /* probably not necessary, if state is initial we shouldn't have to access hunique anyway */ - } - - sc->sc_hunique_len = 0; /* probably not necessary, if state is initial we shouldn't have to access hunique anyway */ -#endif - ppp_link_end(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ - return; -} - -/* Connection attempt aborted */ -static void pppoe_abort_connect(struct pppoe_softc *sc) -{ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": could not establish connection\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); - sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL; - ppp_link_failed(sc->pcb); /* notify upper layers */ -} - -/* Send a PADR packet */ -static err_t pppoe_send_padr(struct pppoe_softc *sc) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - size_t len; -#ifdef PPPOE_TODO - size_t l1 = 0; /* XXX: gcc */ -#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ - - len = 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + sizeof(sc); /* service name, host unique */ -#ifdef PPPOE_TODO - - if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) /* service name tag maybe empty */ - { - l1 = strlen(sc->sc_service_name); - len += l1; - } - -#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ - - if (sc->sc_ac_cookie_len > 0) { - len += 2 + 2 + sc->sc_ac_cookie_len; /* AC cookie */ - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len <= 0xffff", - sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len <= 0xffff); - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len), PBUF_RAM); - - if (!pb) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADR, 0, len); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_SNAME); -#ifdef PPPOE_TODO - - if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) { - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, l1); - MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_service_name, l1); - p += l1; - } else -#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ - { - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, 0); - } - - if (sc->sc_ac_cookie_len > 0) { - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_ACCOOKIE); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sc->sc_ac_cookie_len); - MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_ac_cookie, sc->sc_ac_cookie_len); - p += sc->sc_ac_cookie_len; - } - - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sizeof(sc)); - MEMCPY(p, &sc, sizeof sc); - - return pppoe_output(sc, pb); -} - -/* send a PADT packet */ -static err_t pppoe_send_padt(struct netif *outgoing_if, u_int session, const u8_t *dest) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; - err_t res; - u8_t *p; - - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN), PBUF_RAM); - - if (!pb) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - - if (pbuf_add_header(pb, sizeof(struct eth_hdr))) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe: pppoe_send_padt: could not allocate room for PPPoE header\n")); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); - pbuf_free(pb); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)pb->payload; - ethhdr->type = PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_PPPOEDISC); - MEMCPY(ðhdr->dest.addr, dest, sizeof(ethhdr->dest.addr)); - MEMCPY(ðhdr->src.addr, &outgoing_if->hwaddr, sizeof(ethhdr->src.addr)); - - p = (u8_t *)(ethhdr + 1); - PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADT, session, 0); - - res = outgoing_if->linkoutput(outgoing_if, pb); - - pbuf_free(pb); - - return res; -} - -#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER -static err_t pppoe_send_pado(struct pppoe_softc *sc) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - size_t len; - - /* calc length */ - len = 0; - /* include ac_cookie */ - len += 2 + 2 + sizeof(sc); - /* include hunique */ - len += 2 + 2 + sc->sc_hunique_len; - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len), PBUF_RAM); - - if (!pb) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADO, 0, len); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_ACCOOKIE); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sizeof(sc)); - MEMCPY(p, &sc, sizeof(sc)); - p += sizeof(sc); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sc->sc_hunique_len); - MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_hunique, sc->sc_hunique_len); - return pppoe_output(sc, pb); -} - -static err_t pppoe_send_pads(struct pppoe_softc *sc) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - size_t len, l1 = 0; /* XXX: gcc */ - - sc->sc_session = mono_time.tv_sec % 0xff + 1; - /* calc length */ - len = 0; - /* include hunique */ - len += 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + sc->sc_hunique_len; /* service name, host unique*/ - - if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) /* service name tag maybe empty */ - { - l1 = strlen(sc->sc_service_name); - len += l1; - } - - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len), PBUF_RAM); - - if (!pb) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADS, sc->sc_session, len); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_SNAME); - - if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) { - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, l1); - MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_service_name, l1); - p += l1; - } else { - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, 0); - } - - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE); - PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sc->sc_hunique_len); - MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_hunique, sc->sc_hunique_len); - return pppoe_output(sc, pb); -} -#endif - -static err_t pppoe_xmit(struct pppoe_softc *sc, struct pbuf *pb) -{ - u8_t *p; - size_t len; - - len = pb->tot_len; - - /* make room for PPPoE header - should not fail */ - if (pbuf_add_header(pb, PPPOE_HEADERLEN) != 0) { - /* bail out */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": pppoe_xmit: could not allocate room for PPPoE header\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); - pbuf_free(pb); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, 0, sc->sc_session, len); - - return pppoe_output(sc, pb); -} - -#if 0 /*def PFIL_HOOKS*/ -static int pppoe_ifattach_hook(void *arg, struct pbuf **mp, struct netif *ifp, int dir) -{ - struct pppoe_softc *sc; - int s; - - if(mp != (struct pbuf **)PFIL_IFNET_DETACH) - { - return 0; - } - - LIST_FOREACH(sc, &pppoe_softc_list, sc_list) - { - if(sc->sc_ethif != ifp) - { - continue; - } - - if(sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_UP) - { - sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags &= ~(IFF_UP | IFF_RUNNING); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%"U16_F": ethernet interface detached, going down\n", - sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); - } - - sc->sc_ethif = NULL; - pppoe_clear_softc(sc, "ethernet interface detached"); - } - - return 0; -} -#endif - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -static void pppoe_clear_softc(struct pppoe_softc *sc, const char *message) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(message); - - /* stop timer */ - sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%"U16_F": session 0x%x terminated, %s\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, sc->sc_session, message)); - sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL; - ppp_link_end(sc->pcb); /* notify upper layers - /!\ dangerous /!\ - see pppoe_disc_input() */ -} -#endif /* UNUSED */ -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOE_SUPPORT */ +/***************************************************************************** +* pppoe.c - PPP Over Ethernet implementation for lwIP. +* +* Copyright (c) 2006 by Marc Boucher, Services Informatiques (MBSI) inc. +* +* The authors hereby grant permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, +* and license this software and its documentation for any purpose, provided +* that existing copyright notices are retained in all copies and that this +* notice and the following disclaimer are included verbatim in any +* distributions. No written agreement, license, or royalty fee is required +* for any of the authorized uses. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS *AS IS* AND ANY EXPRESS OR +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +****************************************************************************** +* REVISION HISTORY +* +* 06-01-01 Marc Boucher +* Ported to lwIP. +*****************************************************************************/ + +/* based on NetBSD: if_pppoe.c,v 1.64 2006/01/31 23:50:15 martin Exp */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2002 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation + * by Martin Husemann . + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the NetBSD + * Foundation, Inc. and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOE_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" + +#include "netif/ethernet.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppoe.h" + +/* Memory pool */ +LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPPOE_IF, MEMP_NUM_PPPOE_INTERFACES, sizeof(struct pppoe_softc), "PPPOE_IF") + +/* Add a 16 bit unsigned value to a buffer pointed to by PTR */ +#define PPPOE_ADD_16(PTR, VAL) \ + *(PTR)++ = (u8_t)((VAL) / 256); \ + *(PTR)++ = (u8_t)((VAL) % 256) + +/* Add a complete PPPoE header to the buffer pointed to by PTR */ +#define PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(PTR, CODE, SESS, LEN) \ + *(PTR)++ = PPPOE_VERTYPE; \ + *(PTR)++ = (CODE); \ + PPPOE_ADD_16(PTR, SESS); \ + PPPOE_ADD_16(PTR, LEN) + +#define PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT (5 * 1000) /* base for quick timeout calculation */ +#define PPPOE_SLOW_RETRY (60 * 1000) /* persistent retry interval */ +#define PPPOE_DISC_MAXPADI 4 /* retry PADI four times (quickly) */ +#define PPPOE_DISC_MAXPADR 2 /* retry PADR twice */ + +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER +#error "PPPOE_SERVER is not yet supported under lwIP!" +/* from if_spppsubr.c */ +#define IFF_PASSIVE IFF_LINK0 /* wait passively for connection */ +#endif + +#define PPPOE_ERRORSTRING_LEN 64 + +/* callbacks called from PPP core */ +static err_t pppoe_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p); +static err_t pppoe_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol); +static void pppoe_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); +static void pppoe_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); +static err_t pppoe_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); + +/* management routines */ +static void pppoe_abort_connect(struct pppoe_softc *); +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + static void pppoe_clear_softc(struct pppoe_softc *, const char *); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +/* internal timeout handling */ +static void pppoe_timeout(void *); + +/* sending actual protocol controll packets */ +static err_t pppoe_send_padi(struct pppoe_softc *); +static err_t pppoe_send_padr(struct pppoe_softc *); +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER +static err_t pppoe_send_pado(struct pppoe_softc *); +static err_t pppoe_send_pads(struct pppoe_softc *); +#endif +static err_t pppoe_send_padt(struct netif *, u_int, const u8_t *); + +/* internal helper functions */ +static err_t pppoe_xmit(struct pppoe_softc *sc, struct pbuf *pb); +static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_find_softc_by_session(u_int session, struct netif *rcvif); +static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_find_softc_by_hunique(u8_t *token, size_t len, struct netif *rcvif); + +/** linked list of created pppoe interfaces */ +static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_softc_list; + +/* Callbacks structure for PPP core */ +static const struct link_callbacks pppoe_callbacks = { + pppoe_connect, +#if PPP_SERVER + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + pppoe_disconnect, + pppoe_destroy, + pppoe_write, + pppoe_netif_output, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +/* + * Create a new PPP Over Ethernet (PPPoE) connection. + * + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + */ +ppp_pcb *pppoe_create(struct netif *pppif, + struct netif *ethif, + const char *service_name, const char *concentrator_name, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) +{ + ppp_pcb *ppp; + struct pppoe_softc *sc; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(service_name); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(concentrator_name); + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(PPPOE_IF); + + if (sc == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + ppp = ppp_new(pppif, &pppoe_callbacks, sc, link_status_cb, ctx_cb); + + if (ppp == NULL) { + LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOE_IF, sc); + return NULL; + } + + memset(sc, 0, sizeof(struct pppoe_softc)); + sc->pcb = ppp; + sc->sc_ethif = ethif; + /* put the new interface at the head of the list */ + sc->next = pppoe_softc_list; + pppoe_softc_list = sc; + return ppp; +} + +/* Called by PPP core */ +static err_t pppoe_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; + struct pbuf *ph; /* Ethernet + PPPoE header */ + err_t ret; +#if MIB2_STATS + u16_t tot_len; +#else /* MIB2_STATS */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + + /* skip address & flags */ + pbuf_remove_header(p, 2); + + ph = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN), PBUF_RAM); + + if (!ph) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + pbuf_remove_header(ph, PPPOE_HEADERLEN); /* hide PPPoE header */ + pbuf_cat(ph, p); +#if MIB2_STATS + tot_len = ph->tot_len; +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + + ret = pppoe_xmit(sc, ph); + + if (ret != ERR_OK) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + return ret; + } + + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, (u16_t)tot_len); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* Called by PPP core */ +static err_t pppoe_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol) +{ + struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *pl; + err_t err; +#if MIB2_STATS + u16_t tot_len; +#else /* MIB2_STATS */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + + /* @todo: try to use pbuf_header() here! */ + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, PPPOE_HEADERLEN + sizeof(protocol), PBUF_RAM); + + if (!pb) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + pbuf_remove_header(pb, PPPOE_HEADERLEN); + + pl = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + PUTSHORT(protocol, pl); + + pbuf_chain(pb, p); +#if MIB2_STATS + tot_len = pb->tot_len; +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + + if ((err = pppoe_xmit(sc, pb)) != ERR_OK) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + return err; + } + + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, tot_len); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t pppoe_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; + struct pppoe_softc **copp, *freep; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); + + sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); + + /* remove interface from list */ + for (copp = &pppoe_softc_list; (freep = *copp); copp = &freep->next) { + if (freep == sc) { + *copp = freep->next; + break; + } + } + +#ifdef PPPOE_TODO + + if (sc->sc_concentrator_name) { + mem_free(sc->sc_concentrator_name); + } + + if (sc->sc_service_name) { + mem_free(sc->sc_service_name); + } + +#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ + LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOE_IF, sc); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* + * Find the interface handling the specified session. + * Note: O(number of sessions open), this is a client-side only, mean + * and lean implementation, so number of open sessions typically should + * be 1. + */ +static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_find_softc_by_session(u_int session, struct netif *rcvif) +{ + struct pppoe_softc *sc; + + for (sc = pppoe_softc_list; sc != NULL; sc = sc->next) { + if (sc->sc_state == PPPOE_STATE_SESSION && sc->sc_session == session && sc->sc_ethif == rcvif) { + return sc; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* Check host unique token passed and return appropriate softc pointer, + * or NULL if token is bogus. */ +static struct pppoe_softc *pppoe_find_softc_by_hunique(u8_t *token, size_t len, struct netif *rcvif) +{ + struct pppoe_softc *sc, *t; + + if (len != sizeof sc) { + return NULL; + } + + MEMCPY(&t, token, len); + + for (sc = pppoe_softc_list; sc != NULL; sc = sc->next) { + if (sc == t) { + break; + } + } + + if (sc == NULL) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: alien host unique tag, no session found\n")); + return NULL; + } + + /* should be safe to access *sc now */ + if (sc->sc_state < PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT || sc->sc_state >= PPPOE_STATE_SESSION) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": host unique tag found, but it belongs to a connection in state %d\n", + sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, sc->sc_state)); + return NULL; + } + + if (sc->sc_ethif != rcvif) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": wrong interface, not accepting host unique\n", + sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); + return NULL; + } + + return sc; +} + +/* analyze and handle a single received packet while not in session state */ +void pppoe_disc_input(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb) +{ + u16_t tag, len, off; + u16_t session, plen; + struct pppoe_softc *sc; +#if PPP_DEBUG + const char *err_msg = NULL; +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + u8_t *ac_cookie; + u16_t ac_cookie_len; +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER + u8_t *hunique; + size_t hunique_len; +#endif + struct pppoehdr *ph; + struct pppoetag pt; + int err; + struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; + + /* don't do anything if there is not a single PPPoE instance */ + if (pppoe_softc_list == NULL) { + pbuf_free(pb); + return; + } + + pb = pbuf_coalesce(pb, PBUF_RAW); + + ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)pb->payload; + + ac_cookie = NULL; + ac_cookie_len = 0; +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER + hunique = NULL; + hunique_len = 0; +#endif + session = 0; + off = sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + sizeof(struct pppoehdr); + + if (pb->len < off) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: packet too short: %d\n", pb->len)); + goto done; + } + + ph = (struct pppoehdr *)(ethhdr + 1); + + if (ph->vertype != PPPOE_VERTYPE) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: unknown version/type packet: 0x%x\n", ph->vertype)); + goto done; + } + + session = lwip_ntohs(ph->session); + plen = lwip_ntohs(ph->plen); + + if (plen > (pb->len - off)) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: packet content does not fit: data available = %d, packet size = %u\n", + pb->len - off, plen)); + goto done; + } + + if (pb->tot_len == pb->len) { + u16_t framelen = off + plen; + + if (framelen < pb->len) { + /* ignore trailing garbage */ + pb->tot_len = pb->len = framelen; + } + } + + tag = 0; + len = 0; + sc = NULL; + + while (off + sizeof(pt) <= pb->len) { + MEMCPY(&pt, (u8_t *)pb->payload + off, sizeof(pt)); + tag = lwip_ntohs(pt.tag); + len = lwip_ntohs(pt.len); + + if (off + sizeof(pt) + len > pb->len) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: tag 0x%x len 0x%x is too long\n", tag, len)); + goto done; + } + + switch (tag) { + case PPPOE_TAG_EOL: + goto breakbreak; + + case PPPOE_TAG_SNAME: + break; /* ignored */ + + case PPPOE_TAG_ACNAME: + break; /* ignored */ + + case PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE: + if (sc != NULL) { + break; + } + +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER + hunique = (u8_t *)pb->payload + off + sizeof(pt); + hunique_len = len; +#endif + sc = pppoe_find_softc_by_hunique((u8_t *)pb->payload + off + sizeof(pt), len, netif); + break; + + case PPPOE_TAG_ACCOOKIE: + if (ac_cookie == NULL) { + if (len > PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: AC cookie is too long: len = %d, max = %d\n", len, PPPOE_MAX_AC_COOKIE_LEN)); + goto done; + } + + ac_cookie = (u8_t *)pb->payload + off + sizeof(pt); + ac_cookie_len = len; + } + + break; +#if PPP_DEBUG + + case PPPOE_TAG_SNAME_ERR: + err_msg = "SERVICE NAME ERROR"; + break; + + case PPPOE_TAG_ACSYS_ERR: + err_msg = "AC SYSTEM ERROR"; + break; + + case PPPOE_TAG_GENERIC_ERR: + err_msg = "GENERIC ERROR"; + break; +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + + default: + break; + } + +#if PPP_DEBUG + + if (err_msg != NULL) { + char error_tmp[PPPOE_ERRORSTRING_LEN]; + u16_t error_len = LWIP_MIN(len, sizeof(error_tmp) - 1); + strncpy(error_tmp, (char *)pb->payload + off + sizeof(pt), error_len); + error_tmp[error_len] = '\0'; + + if (sc) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": %s: %s\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err_msg, error_tmp)); + } else { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %s: %s\n", err_msg, error_tmp)); + } + } + +#endif /* PPP_DEBUG */ + off += sizeof(pt) + len; + } + +breakbreak:; + + switch (ph->code) { + case PPPOE_CODE_PADI: +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER + + /* + * got service name, concentrator name, and/or host unique. + * ignore if we have no interfaces with IFF_PASSIVE|IFF_UP. + */ + if (LIST_EMPTY(&pppoe_softc_list)) { + goto done; + } + + LIST_FOREACH(sc, &pppoe_softc_list, sc_list) + { + if (!(sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_UP)) { + continue; + } + + if (!(sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_PASSIVE)) { + continue; + } + + if (sc->sc_state == PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL) { + break; + } + } + + if (sc == NULL) { + /* PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: free passive interface is not found\n")); */ + goto done; + } + + if (hunique) { + if (sc->sc_hunique) { + mem_free(sc->sc_hunique); + } + + sc->sc_hunique = mem_malloc(hunique_len); + + if (sc->sc_hunique == NULL) { + goto done; + } + + sc->sc_hunique_len = hunique_len; + MEMCPY(sc->sc_hunique, hunique, hunique_len); + } + + MEMCPY(&sc->sc_dest, eh->ether_shost, sizeof sc->sc_dest); + sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_PADO_SENT; + pppoe_send_pado(sc); + break; +#endif /* PPPOE_SERVER */ + + case PPPOE_CODE_PADR: +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER + + /* + * get sc from ac_cookie if IFF_PASSIVE + */ + if (ac_cookie == NULL) { + /* be quiet if there is not a single pppoe instance */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: received PADR but not includes ac_cookie\n")); + goto done; + } + + sc = pppoe_find_softc_by_hunique(ac_cookie, ac_cookie_len, netif); + + if (sc == NULL) { + /* be quiet if there is not a single pppoe instance */ + if (!LIST_EMPTY(&pppoe_softc_list)) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: received PADR but could not find request for it\n")); + } + + goto done; + } + + if (sc->sc_state != PPPOE_STATE_PADO_SENT) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": received unexpected PADR\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); + goto done; + } + + if (hunique) { + if (sc->sc_hunique) { + mem_free(sc->sc_hunique); + } + + sc->sc_hunique = mem_malloc(hunique_len); + + if (sc->sc_hunique == NULL) { + goto done; + } + + sc->sc_hunique_len = hunique_len; + MEMCPY(sc->sc_hunique, hunique, hunique_len); + } + + pppoe_send_pads(sc); + sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_SESSION; + ppp_start(sc->pcb); /* notify upper layers */ + break; +#else + /* ignore, we are no access concentrator */ + goto done; +#endif /* PPPOE_SERVER */ + + case PPPOE_CODE_PADO: + if (sc == NULL) { + /* be quiet if there is not a single pppoe instance */ + if (pppoe_softc_list != NULL) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: received PADO but could not find request for it\n")); + } + + goto done; + } + + if (sc->sc_state != PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": received unexpected PADO\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); + goto done; + } + + if (ac_cookie) { + sc->sc_ac_cookie_len = ac_cookie_len; + MEMCPY(sc->sc_ac_cookie, ac_cookie, ac_cookie_len); + } + + MEMCPY(&sc->sc_dest, ethhdr->src.addr, sizeof(sc->sc_dest.addr)); + sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); + sc->sc_padr_retried = 0; + sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_PADR_SENT; + + if ((err = pppoe_send_padr(sc)) != 0) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to send PADR, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + sys_timeout(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT * (1 + sc->sc_padr_retried), pppoe_timeout, sc); + break; + + case PPPOE_CODE_PADS: + if (sc == NULL) { + goto done; + } + + sc->sc_session = session; + sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": session 0x%x connected\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, session)); + sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_SESSION; + ppp_start(sc->pcb); /* notify upper layers */ + break; + + case PPPOE_CODE_PADT: + /* Don't disconnect here, we let the LCP Echo/Reply find the fact + * that PPP session is down. Asking the PPP stack to end the session + * require strict checking about the PPP phase to prevent endless + * disconnection loops. + */ +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + if(sc == NULL) /* PADT frames are rarely sent with a hunique tag, this is actually almost always true */ + { + goto done; + } + + pppoe_clear_softc(sc, "received PADT"); +#endif /* UNUSED */ + break; + + default: + if (sc) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": unknown code (0x%" X16_F ") session = 0x%" X16_F "\n", + sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, + (u16_t)ph->code, session)); + } else { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: unknown code (0x%" X16_F ") session = 0x%" X16_F "\n", (u16_t)ph->code, session)); + } + + break; + } + +done: + pbuf_free(pb); + return; +} + +void pppoe_data_input(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *pb) +{ + u16_t session, plen; + struct pppoe_softc *sc; + struct pppoehdr *ph; +#ifdef PPPOE_TERM_UNKNOWN_SESSIONS + u8_t shost[ETHER_ADDR_LEN]; +#endif + +#ifdef PPPOE_TERM_UNKNOWN_SESSIONS + MEMCPY(shost, ((struct eth_hdr *)pb->payload)->src.addr, sizeof(shost)); +#endif + + if (pbuf_remove_header(pb, sizeof(struct eth_hdr)) != 0) { + /* bail out */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe_data_input: pbuf_remove_header failed\n")); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); + goto drop; + } + + if (pb->len < sizeof(*ph)) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe_data_input: could not get PPPoE header\n")); + goto drop; + } + + ph = (struct pppoehdr *)pb->payload; + + if (ph->vertype != PPPOE_VERTYPE) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe (data): unknown version/type packet: 0x%x\n", ph->vertype)); + goto drop; + } + + if (ph->code != 0) { + goto drop; + } + + session = lwip_ntohs(ph->session); + sc = pppoe_find_softc_by_session(session, netif); + + if (sc == NULL) { +#ifdef PPPOE_TERM_UNKNOWN_SESSIONS + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: input for unknown session 0x%x, sending PADT\n", session)); + pppoe_send_padt(netif, session, shost); +#endif + goto drop; + } + + plen = lwip_ntohs(ph->plen); + + if (pbuf_remove_header(pb, PPPOE_HEADERLEN) != 0) { + /* bail out */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe_data_input: pbuf_remove_header PPPOE_HEADERLEN failed\n")); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); + goto drop; + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe_data_input: %c%c%" U16_F ": pkthdr.len=%d, pppoe.len=%d\n", + sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, + pb->len, plen)); + + if (pb->tot_len < plen) { + goto drop; + } + + /* Dispatch the packet thereby consuming it. */ + ppp_input(sc->pcb, pb); + return; + +drop: + pbuf_free(pb); +} + +static err_t pppoe_output(struct pppoe_softc *sc, struct pbuf *pb) +{ + struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; + u16_t etype; + err_t res; + + /* make room for Ethernet header - should not fail */ + if (pbuf_add_header(pb, sizeof(struct eth_hdr)) != 0) { + /* bail out */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": pppoe_output: could not allocate room for Ethernet header\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); + pbuf_free(pb); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)pb->payload; + etype = sc->sc_state == PPPOE_STATE_SESSION ? ETHTYPE_PPPOE : ETHTYPE_PPPOEDISC; + ethhdr->type = lwip_htons(etype); + MEMCPY(ðhdr->dest.addr, &sc->sc_dest.addr, sizeof(ethhdr->dest.addr)); + MEMCPY(ðhdr->src.addr, &sc->sc_ethif->hwaddr, sizeof(ethhdr->src.addr)); + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F " (%x) state=%d, session=0x%x output -> %02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ":%02" X16_F ", len=%d\n", + sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, etype, + sc->sc_state, sc->sc_session, + sc->sc_dest.addr[0], sc->sc_dest.addr[1], sc->sc_dest.addr[2], sc->sc_dest.addr[3], sc->sc_dest.addr[4], sc->sc_dest.addr[5], + pb->tot_len)); + + res = sc->sc_ethif->linkoutput(sc->sc_ethif, pb); + + pbuf_free(pb); + + return res; +} + +static err_t pppoe_send_padi(struct pppoe_softc *sc) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + int len; +#ifdef PPPOE_TODO + int l1 = 0, l2 = 0; /* XXX: gcc */ +#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ + + /* calculate length of frame (excluding ethernet header + pppoe header) */ + len = 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + sizeof sc; /* service name tag is required, host unique is send too */ +#ifdef PPPOE_TODO + + if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) { + l1 = (int)strlen(sc->sc_service_name); + len += l1; + } + + if (sc->sc_concentrator_name != NULL) { + l2 = (int)strlen(sc->sc_concentrator_name); + len += 2 + 2 + l2; + } + +#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ + LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len <= 0xffff", + sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len <= 0xffff); + + /* allocate a buffer */ + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len), PBUF_RAM); + + if (!pb) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + /* fill in pkt */ + PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADI, 0, (u16_t)len); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_SNAME); +#ifdef PPPOE_TODO + + if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) { + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, l1); + MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_service_name, l1); + p += l1; + } else +#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ + { + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, 0); + } + +#ifdef PPPOE_TODO + + if (sc->sc_concentrator_name != NULL) { + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_ACNAME); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, l2); + MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_concentrator_name, l2); + p += l2; + } + +#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sizeof(sc)); + MEMCPY(p, &sc, sizeof sc); + + /* send pkt */ + return pppoe_output(sc, pb); +} + +static void pppoe_timeout(void *arg) +{ + u32_t retry_wait; + int err; + struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)arg; + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": timeout\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); + + switch (sc->sc_state) { + case PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT: + + /* + * We have two basic ways of retrying: + * - Quick retry mode: try a few times in short sequence + * - Slow retry mode: we already had a connection successfully + * established and will try infinitely (without user + * intervention) + * We only enter slow retry mode if IFF_LINK1 (aka autodial) + * is not set. + */ + if (sc->sc_padi_retried < 0xff) { + sc->sc_padi_retried++; + } + + if (!sc->pcb->settings.persist && sc->sc_padi_retried >= PPPOE_DISC_MAXPADI) { +#if 0 + + if((sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_LINK1) == 0) + { + /* slow retry mode */ + retry_wait = PPPOE_SLOW_RETRY; + } + else +#endif + { + pppoe_abort_connect(sc); + return; + } + } + + /* initialize for quick retry mode */ + retry_wait = LWIP_MIN(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT * sc->sc_padi_retried, PPPOE_SLOW_RETRY); + + if ((err = pppoe_send_padi(sc)) != 0) { + sc->sc_padi_retried--; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to transmit PADI, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + sys_timeout(retry_wait, pppoe_timeout, sc); + break; + + case PPPOE_STATE_PADR_SENT: + sc->sc_padr_retried++; + + if (sc->sc_padr_retried >= PPPOE_DISC_MAXPADR) { + MEMCPY(&sc->sc_dest, ethbroadcast.addr, sizeof(sc->sc_dest)); + sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT; + sc->sc_padr_retried = 0; + + if ((err = pppoe_send_padi(sc)) != 0) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to send PADI, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + sys_timeout(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT * (1 + sc->sc_padi_retried), pppoe_timeout, sc); + return; + } + + if ((err = pppoe_send_padr(sc)) != 0) { + sc->sc_padr_retried--; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to send PADR, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + sys_timeout(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT * (1 + sc->sc_padr_retried), pppoe_timeout, sc); + break; + + default: + return; /* all done, work in peace */ + } +} + +/* Start a connection (i.e. initiate discovery phase) */ +static void pppoe_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + err_t err; + struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; + lcp_options *lcp_wo; + lcp_options *lcp_ao; +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT + ipcp_options *ipcp_wo; + ipcp_options *ipcp_ao; +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ + + sc->sc_session = 0; + sc->sc_ac_cookie_len = 0; + sc->sc_padi_retried = 0; + sc->sc_padr_retried = 0; + /* changed to real address later */ + MEMCPY(&sc->sc_dest, ethbroadcast.addr, sizeof(sc->sc_dest)); +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER + + /* wait PADI if IFF_PASSIVE */ + if ((sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_PASSIVE)) { + return 0; + } + +#endif + + lcp_wo = &ppp->lcp_wantoptions; + lcp_wo->mru = sc->sc_ethif->mtu - PPPOE_HEADERLEN - 2; /* two byte PPP protocol discriminator, then IP data */ + lcp_wo->neg_asyncmap = 0; + lcp_wo->neg_pcompression = 0; + lcp_wo->neg_accompression = 0; + lcp_wo->passive = 0; + lcp_wo->silent = 0; + + lcp_ao = &ppp->lcp_allowoptions; + lcp_ao->mru = sc->sc_ethif->mtu - PPPOE_HEADERLEN - 2; /* two byte PPP protocol discriminator, then IP data */ + lcp_ao->neg_asyncmap = 0; + lcp_ao->neg_pcompression = 0; + lcp_ao->neg_accompression = 0; + +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT + ipcp_wo = &ppp->ipcp_wantoptions; + ipcp_wo->neg_vj = 0; + ipcp_wo->old_vj = 0; + + ipcp_ao = &ppp->ipcp_allowoptions; + ipcp_ao->neg_vj = 0; + ipcp_ao->old_vj = 0; +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ + + /* save state, in case we fail to send PADI */ + sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_PADI_SENT; + + if ((err = pppoe_send_padi(sc)) != 0) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": failed to send PADI, error=%d\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, err)); + } + + sys_timeout(PPPOE_DISC_TIMEOUT, pppoe_timeout, sc); +} + +/* disconnect */ +static void pppoe_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + struct pppoe_softc *sc = (struct pppoe_softc *)ctx; + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": disconnecting\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); + + if (sc->sc_state == PPPOE_STATE_SESSION) { + pppoe_send_padt(sc->sc_ethif, sc->sc_session, (const u8_t *)&sc->sc_dest); + } + + /* stop any timer, disconnect can be called while initiating is in progress */ + sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); + sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL; +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER + + if (sc->sc_hunique) { + mem_free(sc->sc_hunique); + sc->sc_hunique = NULL; /* probably not necessary, if state is initial we shouldn't have to access hunique anyway */ + } + + sc->sc_hunique_len = 0; /* probably not necessary, if state is initial we shouldn't have to access hunique anyway */ +#endif + ppp_link_end(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ + return; +} + +/* Connection attempt aborted */ +static void pppoe_abort_connect(struct pppoe_softc *sc) +{ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%" U16_F ": could not establish connection\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); + sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL; + ppp_link_failed(sc->pcb); /* notify upper layers */ +} + +/* Send a PADR packet */ +static err_t pppoe_send_padr(struct pppoe_softc *sc) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + size_t len; +#ifdef PPPOE_TODO + size_t l1 = 0; /* XXX: gcc */ +#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ + + len = 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + sizeof(sc); /* service name, host unique */ +#ifdef PPPOE_TODO + + if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) /* service name tag maybe empty */ + { + l1 = strlen(sc->sc_service_name); + len += l1; + } + +#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ + + if (sc->sc_ac_cookie_len > 0) { + len += 2 + 2 + sc->sc_ac_cookie_len; /* AC cookie */ + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len <= 0xffff", + sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len <= 0xffff); + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len), PBUF_RAM); + + if (!pb) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADR, 0, len); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_SNAME); +#ifdef PPPOE_TODO + + if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) { + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, l1); + MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_service_name, l1); + p += l1; + } else +#endif /* PPPOE_TODO */ + { + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, 0); + } + + if (sc->sc_ac_cookie_len > 0) { + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_ACCOOKIE); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sc->sc_ac_cookie_len); + MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_ac_cookie, sc->sc_ac_cookie_len); + p += sc->sc_ac_cookie_len; + } + + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sizeof(sc)); + MEMCPY(p, &sc, sizeof sc); + + return pppoe_output(sc, pb); +} + +/* send a PADT packet */ +static err_t pppoe_send_padt(struct netif *outgoing_if, u_int session, const u8_t *dest) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; + err_t res; + u8_t *p; + + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN), PBUF_RAM); + + if (!pb) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + + if (pbuf_add_header(pb, sizeof(struct eth_hdr))) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe: pppoe_send_padt: could not allocate room for PPPoE header\n")); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); + pbuf_free(pb); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)pb->payload; + ethhdr->type = PP_HTONS(ETHTYPE_PPPOEDISC); + MEMCPY(ðhdr->dest.addr, dest, sizeof(ethhdr->dest.addr)); + MEMCPY(ðhdr->src.addr, &outgoing_if->hwaddr, sizeof(ethhdr->src.addr)); + + p = (u8_t *)(ethhdr + 1); + PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADT, session, 0); + + res = outgoing_if->linkoutput(outgoing_if, pb); + + pbuf_free(pb); + + return res; +} + +#ifdef PPPOE_SERVER +static err_t pppoe_send_pado(struct pppoe_softc *sc) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + size_t len; + + /* calc length */ + len = 0; + /* include ac_cookie */ + len += 2 + 2 + sizeof(sc); + /* include hunique */ + len += 2 + 2 + sc->sc_hunique_len; + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len), PBUF_RAM); + + if (!pb) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADO, 0, len); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_ACCOOKIE); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sizeof(sc)); + MEMCPY(p, &sc, sizeof(sc)); + p += sizeof(sc); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sc->sc_hunique_len); + MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_hunique, sc->sc_hunique_len); + return pppoe_output(sc, pb); +} + +static err_t pppoe_send_pads(struct pppoe_softc *sc) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + size_t len, l1 = 0; /* XXX: gcc */ + + sc->sc_session = mono_time.tv_sec % 0xff + 1; + /* calc length */ + len = 0; + /* include hunique */ + len += 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + sc->sc_hunique_len; /* service name, host unique*/ + + if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) /* service name tag maybe empty */ + { + l1 = strlen(sc->sc_service_name); + len += l1; + } + + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (u16_t)(PPPOE_HEADERLEN + len), PBUF_RAM); + + if (!pb) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, PPPOE_CODE_PADS, sc->sc_session, len); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_SNAME); + + if (sc->sc_service_name != NULL) { + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, l1); + MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_service_name, l1); + p += l1; + } else { + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, 0); + } + + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, PPPOE_TAG_HUNIQUE); + PPPOE_ADD_16(p, sc->sc_hunique_len); + MEMCPY(p, sc->sc_hunique, sc->sc_hunique_len); + return pppoe_output(sc, pb); +} +#endif + +static err_t pppoe_xmit(struct pppoe_softc *sc, struct pbuf *pb) +{ + u8_t *p; + size_t len; + + len = pb->tot_len; + + /* make room for PPPoE header - should not fail */ + if (pbuf_add_header(pb, PPPOE_HEADERLEN) != 0) { + /* bail out */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppoe: %c%c%" U16_F ": pppoe_xmit: could not allocate room for PPPoE header\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); + pbuf_free(pb); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + PPPOE_ADD_HEADER(p, 0, sc->sc_session, len); + + return pppoe_output(sc, pb); +} + +#if 0 /*def PFIL_HOOKS*/ +static int pppoe_ifattach_hook(void *arg, struct pbuf **mp, struct netif *ifp, int dir) +{ + struct pppoe_softc *sc; + int s; + + if(mp != (struct pbuf **)PFIL_IFNET_DETACH) + { + return 0; + } + + LIST_FOREACH(sc, &pppoe_softc_list, sc_list) + { + if(sc->sc_ethif != ifp) + { + continue; + } + + if(sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags & IFF_UP) + { + sc->sc_sppp.pp_if.if_flags &= ~(IFF_UP | IFF_RUNNING); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("%c%c%"U16_F": ethernet interface detached, going down\n", + sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num)); + } + + sc->sc_ethif = NULL; + pppoe_clear_softc(sc, "ethernet interface detached"); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +static void pppoe_clear_softc(struct pppoe_softc *sc, const char *message) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(message); + + /* stop timer */ + sys_untimeout(pppoe_timeout, sc); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppoe: %c%c%"U16_F": session 0x%x terminated, %s\n", sc->sc_ethif->name[0], sc->sc_ethif->name[1], sc->sc_ethif->num, sc->sc_session, message)); + sc->sc_state = PPPOE_STATE_INITIAL; + ppp_link_end(sc->pcb); /* notify upper layers - /!\ dangerous /!\ - see pppoe_disc_input() */ +} +#endif /* UNUSED */ +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOE_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c index 5245fc00..bfccbf8b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppol2tp.c @@ -1,1290 +1,1290 @@ -/** - * @file - * Network Point to Point Protocol over Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol program file. - * - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -/* - * L2TP Support status: - * - * Supported: - * - L2TPv2 (PPP over L2TP, a.k.a. UDP tunnels) - * - LAC - * - * Not supported: - * - LNS (require PPP server support) - * - L2TPv3 ethernet pseudowires - * - L2TPv3 VLAN pseudowire - * - L2TPv3 PPP pseudowires - * - L2TPv3 IP encapsulation - * - L2TPv3 IP pseudowire - * - L2TP tunnel switching - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-l2tpext-tunnel-switching-08 - * - Multiple tunnels per UDP socket, as well as multiple sessions per tunnel - * - Hidden AVPs - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" -#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" - -/* Memory pool */ -LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPPOL2TP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_PPPOL2TP_INTERFACES, sizeof(pppol2tp_pcb), "PPPOL2TP_PCB") - -/* callbacks called from PPP core */ -static err_t pppol2tp_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p); -static err_t pppol2tp_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol); -static err_t pppol2tp_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); /* Destroy a L2TP control block */ -static void pppol2tp_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); /* Be a LAC, connect to a LNS. */ -static void pppol2tp_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); /* Disconnect */ - -/* Prototypes for procedures local to this file. */ -static void pppol2tp_input(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); -static void pppol2tp_dispatch_control_packet(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t port, struct pbuf *p, u16_t ns, u16_t nr); -static void pppol2tp_timeout(void *arg); -static void pppol2tp_abort_connect(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp); -static err_t pppol2tp_send_sccrq(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp); -static err_t pppol2tp_send_scccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns); -static err_t pppol2tp_send_icrq(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns); -static err_t pppol2tp_send_iccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns); -static err_t pppol2tp_send_zlb(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns, u16_t nr); -static err_t pppol2tp_send_stopccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns); -static err_t pppol2tp_xmit(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, struct pbuf *pb); -static err_t pppol2tp_udp_send(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, struct pbuf *pb); - -/* Callbacks structure for PPP core */ -static const struct link_callbacks pppol2tp_callbacks = { - pppol2tp_connect, -#if PPP_SERVER - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - pppol2tp_disconnect, - pppol2tp_destroy, - pppol2tp_write, - pppol2tp_netif_output, - NULL, - NULL -}; - -/* Create a new L2TP session. */ -ppp_pcb *pppol2tp_create(struct netif *pppif, - struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, - const u8_t *secret, u8_t secret_len, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) -{ - ppp_pcb *ppp; - pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp; - struct udp_pcb *udp; -#if !PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(secret); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(secret_len); -#endif /* !PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - if (ipaddr == NULL) { - goto ipaddr_check_failed; - } - - l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(PPPOL2TP_PCB); - - if (l2tp == NULL) { - goto memp_malloc_l2tp_failed; - } - - udp = udp_new_ip_type(IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr)); - - if (udp == NULL) { - goto udp_new_failed; - } - - udp_recv(udp, pppol2tp_input, l2tp); - - ppp = ppp_new(pppif, &pppol2tp_callbacks, l2tp, link_status_cb, ctx_cb); - - if (ppp == NULL) { - goto ppp_new_failed; - } - - memset(l2tp, 0, sizeof(pppol2tp_pcb)); - l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_INITIAL; - l2tp->ppp = ppp; - l2tp->udp = udp; - l2tp->netif = netif; - ip_addr_copy(l2tp->remote_ip, *ipaddr); - l2tp->remote_port = port; -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - l2tp->secret = secret; - l2tp->secret_len = secret_len; -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - return ppp; - -ppp_new_failed: - udp_remove(udp); -udp_new_failed: - LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOL2TP_PCB, l2tp); -memp_malloc_l2tp_failed: -ipaddr_check_failed: - return NULL; -} - -/* Called by PPP core */ -static err_t pppol2tp_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p) -{ - pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; - struct pbuf *ph; /* UDP + L2TP header */ - err_t ret; -#if MIB2_STATS - u16_t tot_len; -#else /* MIB2_STATS */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - - ph = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, (u16_t)(PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN), PBUF_RAM); - - if (!ph) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - pbuf_remove_header(ph, PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN); /* hide L2TP header */ - pbuf_cat(ph, p); -#if MIB2_STATS - tot_len = ph->tot_len; -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - - ret = pppol2tp_xmit(l2tp, ph); - - if (ret != ERR_OK) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - return ret; - } - - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, (u16_t)tot_len); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* Called by PPP core */ -static err_t pppol2tp_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol) -{ - pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *pl; - err_t err; -#if MIB2_STATS - u16_t tot_len; -#else /* MIB2_STATS */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - - /* @todo: try to use pbuf_header() here! */ - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN + sizeof(protocol), PBUF_RAM); - - if (!pb) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - pbuf_remove_header(pb, PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN); - - pl = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - PUTSHORT(protocol, pl); - - pbuf_chain(pb, p); -#if MIB2_STATS - tot_len = pb->tot_len; -#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ - - if ((err = pppol2tp_xmit(l2tp, pb)) != ERR_OK) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - return err; - } - - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, tot_len); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* Destroy a L2TP control block */ -static err_t pppol2tp_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); - - sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - udp_remove(l2tp->udp); - LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOL2TP_PCB, l2tp); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* Be a LAC, connect to a LNS. */ -static void pppol2tp_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - err_t err; - pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; - lcp_options *lcp_wo; - lcp_options *lcp_ao; -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT - ipcp_options *ipcp_wo; - ipcp_options *ipcp_ao; -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ - - l2tp->tunnel_port = l2tp->remote_port; - l2tp->our_ns = 0; - l2tp->peer_nr = 0; - l2tp->peer_ns = 0; - l2tp->source_tunnel_id = 0; - l2tp->remote_tunnel_id = 0; - l2tp->source_session_id = 0; - l2tp->remote_session_id = 0; - /* l2tp->*_retried are cleared when used */ - - lcp_wo = &ppp->lcp_wantoptions; - lcp_wo->mru = PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU; - lcp_wo->neg_asyncmap = 0; - lcp_wo->neg_pcompression = 0; - lcp_wo->neg_accompression = 0; - lcp_wo->passive = 0; - lcp_wo->silent = 0; - - lcp_ao = &ppp->lcp_allowoptions; - lcp_ao->mru = PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU; - lcp_ao->neg_asyncmap = 0; - lcp_ao->neg_pcompression = 0; - lcp_ao->neg_accompression = 0; - -#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT - ipcp_wo = &ppp->ipcp_wantoptions; - ipcp_wo->neg_vj = 0; - ipcp_wo->old_vj = 0; - - ipcp_ao = &ppp->ipcp_allowoptions; - ipcp_ao->neg_vj = 0; - ipcp_ao->old_vj = 0; -#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ - - /* Listen to a random source port, we need to do that instead of using udp_connect() - * because the L2TP LNS might answer with its own random source port (!= 1701) - */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(l2tp->udp->local_ip)) { - udp_bind(l2tp->udp, IP6_ADDR_ANY, 0); - } else -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - udp_bind(l2tp->udp, IP_ADDR_ANY, 0); - -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - - /* Generate random vector */ - if (l2tp->secret != NULL) { - magic_random_bytes(l2tp->secret_rv, sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv)); - } - -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - do { - l2tp->remote_tunnel_id = magic(); - } while (l2tp->remote_tunnel_id == 0); - - /* save state, in case we fail to send SCCRQ */ - l2tp->sccrq_retried = 0; - l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT; - - if ((err = pppol2tp_send_sccrq(l2tp)) != 0) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send SCCRQ, error=%d\n", err)); - } - - sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); -} - -/* Disconnect */ -static void pppol2tp_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; - - l2tp->our_ns++; - pppol2tp_send_stopccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns); - - /* stop any timer, disconnect can be called while initiating is in progress */ - sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_INITIAL; - ppp_link_end(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ -} - -/* UDP Callback for incoming IPv4 L2TP frames */ -static void pppol2tp_input(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)arg; - u16_t hflags, hlen, len = 0, tunnel_id = 0, session_id = 0, ns = 0, nr = 0, offset = 0; - u8_t *inp; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); - - /* we can't unbound a UDP pcb, thus we can still receive UDP frames after the link is closed */ - if (l2tp->phase < PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT) { - goto free_and_return; - } - - if (!ip_addr_cmp(&l2tp->remote_ip, addr)) { - goto free_and_return; - } - - /* discard packet if port mismatch, but only if we received a SCCRP */ - if (l2tp->phase > PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT && l2tp->tunnel_port != port) { - goto free_and_return; - } - - /* printf("-----------\nL2TP INPUT, %d\n", p->len); */ - - /* L2TP header */ - if (p->len < sizeof(hflags) + sizeof(tunnel_id) + sizeof(session_id)) { - goto packet_too_short; - } - - inp = (u8_t *)p->payload; - GETSHORT(hflags, inp); - - if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL) { - /* check mandatory flags for a control packet */ - if ((hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY) != PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: mandatory header flags for control packet not set\n")); - goto free_and_return; - } - - /* check forbidden flags for a control packet */ - if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_FORBIDDEN) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: forbidden header flags for control packet found\n")); - goto free_and_return; - } - } else { - /* check mandatory flags for a data packet */ - if ((hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_DATA_MANDATORY) != PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_DATA_MANDATORY) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: mandatory header flags for data packet not set\n")); - goto free_and_return; - } - } - - /* Expected header size */ - hlen = sizeof(hflags) + sizeof(tunnel_id) + sizeof(session_id); - - if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_LENGTH) { - hlen += sizeof(len); - } - - if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_SEQUENCE) { - hlen += sizeof(ns) + sizeof(nr); - } - - if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_OFFSET) { - hlen += sizeof(offset); - } - - if (p->len < hlen) { - goto packet_too_short; - } - - if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_LENGTH) { - GETSHORT(len, inp); - - if (p->len < len || len < hlen) { - goto packet_too_short; - } - } - - GETSHORT(tunnel_id, inp); - GETSHORT(session_id, inp); - - if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_SEQUENCE) { - GETSHORT(ns, inp); - GETSHORT(nr, inp); - } - - if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_OFFSET) { - GETSHORT(offset, inp) - - if (offset > 4096) /* don't be fooled with large offset which might overflow hlen */ - { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: strange packet received, offset=%d\n", offset)); - goto free_and_return; - } - - hlen += offset; - - if (p->len < hlen) { - goto packet_too_short; - } - - INCPTR(offset, inp); - } - - /* printf("HLEN = %d\n", hlen); */ - - /* skip L2TP header */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen) != 0) { - goto free_and_return; - } - - /* printf("LEN=%d, TUNNEL_ID=%d, SESSION_ID=%d, NS=%d, NR=%d, OFFSET=%d\n", len, tunnel_id, session_id, ns, nr, offset); */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: input packet, len=%" U16_F ", tunnel=%" U16_F ", session=%" U16_F ", ns=%" U16_F ", nr=%" U16_F "\n", - len, tunnel_id, session_id, ns, nr)); - - /* Control packet */ - if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL) { - pppol2tp_dispatch_control_packet(l2tp, port, p, ns, nr); - goto free_and_return; - } - - /* Data packet */ - if (l2tp->phase != PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA) { - goto free_and_return; - } - - if (tunnel_id != l2tp->remote_tunnel_id) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: tunnel ID mismatch, assigned=%d, received=%d\n", l2tp->remote_tunnel_id, tunnel_id)); - goto free_and_return; - } - - if (session_id != l2tp->remote_session_id) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: session ID mismatch, assigned=%d, received=%d\n", l2tp->remote_session_id, session_id)); - goto free_and_return; - } - - /* - * skip address & flags if necessary - * - * RFC 2661 does not specify whether the PPP frame in the L2TP payload should - * have a HDLC header or not. We handle both cases for compatibility. - */ - if (p->len >= 2) { - GETSHORT(hflags, inp); - - if (hflags == 0xff03) { - pbuf_remove_header(p, 2); - } - } - - /* Dispatch the packet thereby consuming it. */ - ppp_input(l2tp->ppp, p); - return; - -packet_too_short: - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: packet too short: %d\n", p->len)); -free_and_return: - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/* L2TP Control packet entry point */ -static void pppol2tp_dispatch_control_packet(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t port, struct pbuf *p, u16_t ns, u16_t nr) -{ - u8_t *inp; - u16_t avplen, avpflags, vendorid, attributetype, messagetype = 0; - err_t err; -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - lwip_md5_context md5_ctx; - u8_t md5_hash[16]; - u8_t challenge_id = 0; -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - /* printf("L2TP CTRL INPUT, ns=%d, nr=%d, len=%d\n", ns, nr, p->len); */ - - /* Drop unexpected packet */ - if (ns != l2tp->peer_ns) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: drop unexpected packet: received NS=%d, expected NS=%d\n", ns, l2tp->peer_ns)); - - /* - * In order to ensure that all messages are acknowledged properly - * (particularly in the case of a lost ZLB ACK message), receipt - * of duplicate messages MUST be acknowledged. - * - * In this very special case we Ack a packet we previously received. - * Therefore our NS is the NR we just received. And our NR is the - * NS we just received plus one. - */ - if ((s16_t)(ns - l2tp->peer_ns) < 0) { - pppol2tp_send_zlb(l2tp, nr, ns + 1); - } - - return; - } - - l2tp->peer_nr = nr; - - /* Handle the special case of the ICCN acknowledge */ - if (l2tp->phase == PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICCN_SENT && (s16_t)(l2tp->peer_nr - l2tp->our_ns) > 0) { - l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA; - sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - ppp_start(l2tp->ppp); /* notify upper layers */ - } - - /* ZLB packets */ - if (p->tot_len == 0) { - return; - } - - /* A ZLB packet does not consume a NS slot thus we don't record the NS value for ZLB packets */ - l2tp->peer_ns = ns + 1; - - p = pbuf_coalesce(p, PBUF_RAW); - inp = (u8_t *)p->payload; - - /* Decode AVPs */ - while (p->len > 0) { - if (p->len < sizeof(avpflags) + sizeof(vendorid) + sizeof(attributetype)) { - goto packet_too_short; - } - - GETSHORT(avpflags, inp); - avplen = avpflags & PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_LENGTHMASK; - - /* printf("AVPLEN = %d\n", avplen); */ - if (p->len < avplen || avplen < sizeof(avpflags) + sizeof(vendorid) + sizeof(attributetype)) { - goto packet_too_short; - } - - GETSHORT(vendorid, inp); - GETSHORT(attributetype, inp); - avplen -= sizeof(avpflags) + sizeof(vendorid) + sizeof(attributetype); - - /* Message type must be the first AVP */ - if (messagetype == 0) { - if (attributetype != 0 || vendorid != 0 || avplen != sizeof(messagetype)) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: message type must be the first AVP\n")); - return; - } - - GETSHORT(messagetype, inp); - - /* printf("Message type = %d\n", messagetype); */ - switch (messagetype) { - /* Start Control Connection Reply */ - case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP: - - /* Only accept SCCRP packet if we sent a SCCRQ */ - if (l2tp->phase != PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT) { - goto send_zlb; - } - - break; - - /* Incoming Call Reply */ - case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRP: - - /* Only accept ICRP packet if we sent a IRCQ */ - if (l2tp->phase != PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICRQ_SENT) { - goto send_zlb; - } - - break; - - /* Stop Control Connection Notification */ - case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_STOPCCN: - pppol2tp_send_zlb(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns + 1, l2tp->peer_ns); /* Ack the StopCCN before we switch to down state */ - - if (l2tp->phase < PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA) { - pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); - } else if (l2tp->phase == PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA) { - /* Don't disconnect here, we let the LCP Echo/Reply find the fact - * that PPP session is down. Asking the PPP stack to end the session - * require strict checking about the PPP phase to prevent endless - * disconnection loops. - */ - } - - return; - - default: - break; - } - - goto nextavp; - } - - /* Skip proprietary L2TP extensions */ - if (vendorid != 0) { - goto skipavp; - } - - switch (messagetype) { - /* Start Control Connection Reply */ - case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP: - switch (attributetype) { - case PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TUNNELID: - if (avplen != sizeof(l2tp->source_tunnel_id)) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: AVP Assign tunnel ID length check failed\n")); - return; - } - - GETSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, inp); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Assigned tunnel ID %" U16_F "\n", l2tp->source_tunnel_id)); - goto nextavp; -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - - case PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGE: - if (avplen == 0) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Challenge length check failed\n")); - return; - } - - if (l2tp->secret == NULL) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Received challenge from peer and no secret key available\n")); - pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); - return; - } - - /* Generate hash of ID, secret, challenge */ - lwip_md5_init(&md5_ctx); - lwip_md5_starts(&md5_ctx); - challenge_id = PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCCN; - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, &challenge_id, 1); - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, l2tp->secret, l2tp->secret_len); - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, inp, avplen); - lwip_md5_finish(&md5_ctx, l2tp->challenge_hash); - lwip_md5_free(&md5_ctx); - l2tp->send_challenge = 1; - goto skipavp; - - case PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE: - if (avplen != PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE_SIZE) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: AVP Challenge Response length check failed\n")); - return; - } - - /* Generate hash of ID, secret, challenge */ - lwip_md5_init(&md5_ctx); - lwip_md5_starts(&md5_ctx); - challenge_id = PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP; - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, &challenge_id, 1); - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, l2tp->secret, l2tp->secret_len); - lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, l2tp->secret_rv, sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv)); - lwip_md5_finish(&md5_ctx, md5_hash); - lwip_md5_free(&md5_ctx); - - if (memcmp(inp, md5_hash, sizeof(md5_hash))) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Received challenge response from peer and secret key do not match\n")); - pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); - return; - } - - goto skipavp; -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - default: - break; - } - - break; - - /* Incoming Call Reply */ - case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRP: - switch (attributetype) { - case PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_SESSIONID: - if (avplen != sizeof(l2tp->source_session_id)) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: AVP Assign session ID length check failed\n")); - return; - } - - GETSHORT(l2tp->source_session_id, inp); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Assigned session ID %" U16_F "\n", l2tp->source_session_id)); - goto nextavp; - - default: - break; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - skipavp: - INCPTR(avplen, inp); - nextavp: - - /* printf("AVP Found, vendor=%d, attribute=%d, len=%d\n", vendorid, attributetype, avplen); */ - /* next AVP */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(p, avplen + sizeof(avpflags) + sizeof(vendorid) + sizeof(attributetype)) != 0) { - return; - } - } - - switch (messagetype) { - /* Start Control Connection Reply */ - case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP: - do { - l2tp->remote_session_id = magic(); - } while (l2tp->remote_session_id == 0); - - l2tp->tunnel_port = port; /* LNS server might have chosen its own local port */ - l2tp->icrq_retried = 0; - l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICRQ_SENT; - l2tp->our_ns++; - - if ((err = pppol2tp_send_scccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send SCCCN, error=%d\n", err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - l2tp->our_ns++; - - if ((err = pppol2tp_send_icrq(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send ICRQ, error=%d\n", err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - break; - - /* Incoming Call Reply */ - case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRP: - l2tp->iccn_retried = 0; - l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICCN_SENT; - l2tp->our_ns++; - - if ((err = pppol2tp_send_iccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send ICCN, error=%d\n", err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - break; - - /* Unhandled packet, send ZLB ACK */ - default: - goto send_zlb; - } - - return; - -send_zlb: - pppol2tp_send_zlb(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns + 1, l2tp->peer_ns); - return; -packet_too_short: - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: packet too short: %d\n", p->len)); -} - -/* L2TP Timeout handler */ -static void pppol2tp_timeout(void *arg) -{ - pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)arg; - err_t err; - u32_t retry_wait; - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: timeout\n")); - - switch (l2tp->phase) { - case PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT: - - /* backoff wait */ - if (l2tp->sccrq_retried < 0xff) { - l2tp->sccrq_retried++; - } - - if (!l2tp->ppp->settings.persist && l2tp->sccrq_retried >= PPPOL2TP_MAXSCCRQ) { - pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); - return; - } - - retry_wait = LWIP_MIN(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT * l2tp->sccrq_retried, PPPOL2TP_SLOW_RETRY); - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: sccrq_retried=%d\n", l2tp->sccrq_retried)); - - if ((err = pppol2tp_send_sccrq(l2tp)) != 0) { - l2tp->sccrq_retried--; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send SCCRQ, error=%d\n", err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - sys_timeout(retry_wait, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - break; - - case PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICRQ_SENT: - l2tp->icrq_retried++; - - if (l2tp->icrq_retried >= PPPOL2TP_MAXICRQ) { - pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); - return; - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: icrq_retried=%d\n", l2tp->icrq_retried)); - - if ((s16_t)(l2tp->peer_nr - l2tp->our_ns) < 0) /* the SCCCN was not acknowledged */ - { - if ((err = pppol2tp_send_scccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns - 1)) != 0) { - l2tp->icrq_retried--; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send SCCCN, error=%d\n", err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - break; - } - } - - if ((err = pppol2tp_send_icrq(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { - l2tp->icrq_retried--; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send ICRQ, error=%d\n", err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - break; - - case PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICCN_SENT: - l2tp->iccn_retried++; - - if (l2tp->iccn_retried >= PPPOL2TP_MAXICCN) { - pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); - return; - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: iccn_retried=%d\n", l2tp->iccn_retried)); - - if ((err = pppol2tp_send_iccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { - l2tp->iccn_retried--; - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send ICCN, error=%d\n", err)); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ - } - - sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); - break; - - default: - return; /* all done, work in peace */ - } -} - -/* Connection attempt aborted */ -static void pppol2tp_abort_connect(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp) -{ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: could not establish connection\n")); - l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_INITIAL; - ppp_link_failed(l2tp->ppp); /* notify upper layers */ -} - -/* Initiate a new tunnel */ -static err_t pppol2tp_send_sccrq(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - u16_t len; - - /* calculate UDP packet length */ - len = 12 + 8 + 8 + 10 + 10 + 6 + sizeof(PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME) - 1 + 6 + sizeof(PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME) - 1 + 8 + 8; -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - - if (l2tp->secret != NULL) { - len += 6 + sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv); - } - -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - /* allocate a buffer */ - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (pb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - /* fill in pkt */ - /* L2TP control header */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); - PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Tunnel Id */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ - - /* AVP - Message type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRQ, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: SCCRQ */ - - /* AVP - L2TP Version */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_VERSION, p); /* Attribute type: Version */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_VERSION, p); /* Attribute value: L2TP Version */ - - /* AVP - Framing capabilities */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_FRAMINGCAPABILITIES, p); /* Attribute type: Framing capabilities */ - PUTLONG(PPPOL2TP_FRAMINGCAPABILITIES, p); /* Attribute value: Framing capabilities */ - - /* AVP - Bearer capabilities */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_BEARERCAPABILITIES, p); /* Attribute type: Bearer capabilities */ - PUTLONG(PPPOL2TP_BEARERCAPABILITIES, p); /* Attribute value: Bearer capabilities */ - - /* AVP - Host name */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 6 + sizeof(PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME) - 1, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_HOSTNAME, p); /* Attribute type: Hostname */ - MEMCPY(p, PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME, sizeof(PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME) - 1); /* Attribute value: Hostname */ - INCPTR(sizeof(PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME) - 1, p); - - /* AVP - Vendor name */ - PUTSHORT(6 + sizeof(PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME) - 1, p); /* len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_VENDORNAME, p); /* Attribute type: Vendor name */ - MEMCPY(p, PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME, sizeof(PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME) - 1); /* Attribute value: Vendor name */ - INCPTR(sizeof(PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME) - 1, p); - - /* AVP - Assign tunnel ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TUNNELID, p); /* Attribute type: Tunnel ID */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->remote_tunnel_id, p); /* Attribute value: Tunnel ID */ - - /* AVP - Receive window size */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_RECEIVEWINDOWSIZE, p); /* Attribute type: Receive window size */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_RECEIVEWINDOWSIZE, p); /* Attribute value: Receive window size */ - -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - - /* AVP - Challenge */ - if (l2tp->secret != NULL) { - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 6 + sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv), p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGE, p); /* Attribute type: Challenge */ - MEMCPY(p, l2tp->secret_rv, sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv)); /* Attribute value: Random vector */ - INCPTR(sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv), p); - } - -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); -} - -/* Complete tunnel establishment */ -static err_t pppol2tp_send_scccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - u16_t len; - - /* calculate UDP packet length */ - len = 12 + 8; -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - - if (l2tp->send_challenge) { - len += 6 + sizeof(l2tp->challenge_hash); - } - -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - /* allocate a buffer */ - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (pb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - /* fill in pkt */ - /* L2TP control header */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); - PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ - PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->peer_ns, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ - - /* AVP - Message type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCCN, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: SCCCN */ - -#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT - - /* AVP - Challenge response */ - if (l2tp->send_challenge) { - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 6 + sizeof(l2tp->challenge_hash), p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE, p); /* Attribute type: Challenge response */ - MEMCPY(p, l2tp->challenge_hash, sizeof(l2tp->challenge_hash)); /* Attribute value: Computed challenge */ - INCPTR(sizeof(l2tp->challenge_hash), p); - } - -#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ - - return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); -} - -/* Initiate a new session */ -static err_t pppol2tp_send_icrq(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - u16_t len; - u32_t serialnumber; - - /* calculate UDP packet length */ - len = 12 + 8 + 8 + 10; - - /* allocate a buffer */ - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (pb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - /* fill in pkt */ - /* L2TP control header */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); - PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ - PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->peer_ns, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ - - /* AVP - Message type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRQ, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: ICRQ */ - - /* AVP - Assign session ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_SESSIONID, p); /* Attribute type: Session ID */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->remote_session_id, p); /* Attribute value: Session ID */ - - /* AVP - Call Serial Number */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CALLSERIALNUMBER, p); /* Attribute type: Serial number */ - serialnumber = magic(); - PUTLONG(serialnumber, p); /* Attribute value: Serial number */ - - return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); -} - -/* Complete tunnel establishment */ -static err_t pppol2tp_send_iccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - u16_t len; - - /* calculate UDP packet length */ - len = 12 + 8 + 10 + 10; - - /* allocate a buffer */ - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (pb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - /* fill in pkt */ - /* L2TP control header */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); - PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_session_id, p); /* Session Id */ - PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->peer_ns, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ - - /* AVP - Message type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICCN, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: ICCN */ - - /* AVP - Framing type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_FRAMINGTYPE, p); /* Attribute type: Framing type */ - PUTLONG(PPPOL2TP_FRAMINGTYPE, p); /* Attribute value: Framing type */ - - /* AVP - TX Connect speed */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TXCONNECTSPEED, p); /* Attribute type: TX Connect speed */ - PUTLONG(PPPOL2TP_TXCONNECTSPEED, p); /* Attribute value: TX Connect speed */ - - return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); -} - -/* Send a ZLB ACK packet */ -static err_t pppol2tp_send_zlb(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns, u16_t nr) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - u16_t len; - - /* calculate UDP packet length */ - len = 12; - - /* allocate a buffer */ - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (pb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - /* fill in pkt */ - /* L2TP control header */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); - PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ - PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ - PUTSHORT(nr, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ - - return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); -} - -/* Send a StopCCN packet */ -static err_t pppol2tp_send_stopccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns) -{ - struct pbuf *pb; - u8_t *p; - u16_t len; - - /* calculate UDP packet length */ - len = 12 + 8 + 8 + 8; - - /* allocate a buffer */ - pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (pb == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); - - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - /* fill in pkt */ - /* L2TP control header */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); - PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ - PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->peer_ns, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ - - /* AVP - Message type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_STOPCCN, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: StopCCN */ - - /* AVP - Assign tunnel ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TUNNELID, p); /* Attribute type: Tunnel ID */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->remote_tunnel_id, p); /* Attribute value: Tunnel ID */ - - /* AVP - Result code */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_RESULTCODE, p); /* Attribute type: Result code */ - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_RESULTCODE, p); /* Attribute value: Result code */ - - return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); -} - -static err_t pppol2tp_xmit(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, struct pbuf *pb) -{ - u8_t *p; - - /* make room for L2TP header - should not fail */ - if (pbuf_add_header(pb, PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN) != 0) { - /* bail out */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppol2tp: pppol2tp_pcb: could not allocate room for L2TP header\n")); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); - pbuf_free(pb); - return ERR_BUF; - } - - p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; - PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_DATA_MANDATORY, p); - PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ - PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_session_id, p); /* Session Id */ - - return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); -} - -static err_t pppol2tp_udp_send(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, struct pbuf *pb) -{ - err_t err; - - if (l2tp->netif) { - err = udp_sendto_if(l2tp->udp, pb, &l2tp->remote_ip, l2tp->tunnel_port, l2tp->netif); - } else { - err = udp_sendto(l2tp->udp, pb, &l2tp->remote_ip, l2tp->tunnel_port); - } - - pbuf_free(pb); - return err; -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ +/** + * @file + * Network Point to Point Protocol over Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol program file. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +/* + * L2TP Support status: + * + * Supported: + * - L2TPv2 (PPP over L2TP, a.k.a. UDP tunnels) + * - LAC + * + * Not supported: + * - LNS (require PPP server support) + * - L2TPv3 ethernet pseudowires + * - L2TPv3 VLAN pseudowire + * - L2TPv3 PPP pseudowires + * - L2TPv3 IP encapsulation + * - L2TPv3 IP pseudowire + * - L2TP tunnel switching - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-l2tpext-tunnel-switching-08 + * - Multiple tunnels per UDP socket, as well as multiple sessions per tunnel + * - Hidden AVPs + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/ipcp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppol2tp.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppcrypt.h" +#include "netif/ppp/magic.h" + +/* Memory pool */ +LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPPOL2TP_PCB, MEMP_NUM_PPPOL2TP_INTERFACES, sizeof(pppol2tp_pcb), "PPPOL2TP_PCB") + +/* callbacks called from PPP core */ +static err_t pppol2tp_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p); +static err_t pppol2tp_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol); +static err_t pppol2tp_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); /* Destroy a L2TP control block */ +static void pppol2tp_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); /* Be a LAC, connect to a LNS. */ +static void pppol2tp_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); /* Disconnect */ + +/* Prototypes for procedures local to this file. */ +static void pppol2tp_input(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port); +static void pppol2tp_dispatch_control_packet(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t port, struct pbuf *p, u16_t ns, u16_t nr); +static void pppol2tp_timeout(void *arg); +static void pppol2tp_abort_connect(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp); +static err_t pppol2tp_send_sccrq(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp); +static err_t pppol2tp_send_scccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns); +static err_t pppol2tp_send_icrq(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns); +static err_t pppol2tp_send_iccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns); +static err_t pppol2tp_send_zlb(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns, u16_t nr); +static err_t pppol2tp_send_stopccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns); +static err_t pppol2tp_xmit(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, struct pbuf *pb); +static err_t pppol2tp_udp_send(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, struct pbuf *pb); + +/* Callbacks structure for PPP core */ +static const struct link_callbacks pppol2tp_callbacks = { + pppol2tp_connect, +#if PPP_SERVER + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + pppol2tp_disconnect, + pppol2tp_destroy, + pppol2tp_write, + pppol2tp_netif_output, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +/* Create a new L2TP session. */ +ppp_pcb *pppol2tp_create(struct netif *pppif, + struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *ipaddr, u16_t port, + const u8_t *secret, u8_t secret_len, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) +{ + ppp_pcb *ppp; + pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp; + struct udp_pcb *udp; +#if !PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(secret); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(secret_len); +#endif /* !PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + if (ipaddr == NULL) { + goto ipaddr_check_failed; + } + + l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(PPPOL2TP_PCB); + + if (l2tp == NULL) { + goto memp_malloc_l2tp_failed; + } + + udp = udp_new_ip_type(IP_GET_TYPE(ipaddr)); + + if (udp == NULL) { + goto udp_new_failed; + } + + udp_recv(udp, pppol2tp_input, l2tp); + + ppp = ppp_new(pppif, &pppol2tp_callbacks, l2tp, link_status_cb, ctx_cb); + + if (ppp == NULL) { + goto ppp_new_failed; + } + + memset(l2tp, 0, sizeof(pppol2tp_pcb)); + l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_INITIAL; + l2tp->ppp = ppp; + l2tp->udp = udp; + l2tp->netif = netif; + ip_addr_copy(l2tp->remote_ip, *ipaddr); + l2tp->remote_port = port; +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + l2tp->secret = secret; + l2tp->secret_len = secret_len; +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + return ppp; + +ppp_new_failed: + udp_remove(udp); +udp_new_failed: + LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOL2TP_PCB, l2tp); +memp_malloc_l2tp_failed: +ipaddr_check_failed: + return NULL; +} + +/* Called by PPP core */ +static err_t pppol2tp_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p) +{ + pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; + struct pbuf *ph; /* UDP + L2TP header */ + err_t ret; +#if MIB2_STATS + u16_t tot_len; +#else /* MIB2_STATS */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + + ph = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, (u16_t)(PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN), PBUF_RAM); + + if (!ph) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + pbuf_remove_header(ph, PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN); /* hide L2TP header */ + pbuf_cat(ph, p); +#if MIB2_STATS + tot_len = ph->tot_len; +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + + ret = pppol2tp_xmit(l2tp, ph); + + if (ret != ERR_OK) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + return ret; + } + + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, (u16_t)tot_len); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* Called by PPP core */ +static err_t pppol2tp_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p, u_short protocol) +{ + pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *pl; + err_t err; +#if MIB2_STATS + u16_t tot_len; +#else /* MIB2_STATS */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + + /* @todo: try to use pbuf_header() here! */ + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN + sizeof(protocol), PBUF_RAM); + + if (!pb) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.proterr); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + pbuf_remove_header(pb, PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN); + + pl = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + PUTSHORT(protocol, pl); + + pbuf_chain(pb, p); +#if MIB2_STATS + tot_len = pb->tot_len; +#endif /* MIB2_STATS */ + + if ((err = pppol2tp_xmit(l2tp, pb)) != ERR_OK) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + return err; + } + + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, tot_len); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* Destroy a L2TP control block */ +static err_t pppol2tp_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); + + sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + udp_remove(l2tp->udp); + LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOL2TP_PCB, l2tp); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* Be a LAC, connect to a LNS. */ +static void pppol2tp_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + err_t err; + pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; + lcp_options *lcp_wo; + lcp_options *lcp_ao; +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT + ipcp_options *ipcp_wo; + ipcp_options *ipcp_ao; +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ + + l2tp->tunnel_port = l2tp->remote_port; + l2tp->our_ns = 0; + l2tp->peer_nr = 0; + l2tp->peer_ns = 0; + l2tp->source_tunnel_id = 0; + l2tp->remote_tunnel_id = 0; + l2tp->source_session_id = 0; + l2tp->remote_session_id = 0; + /* l2tp->*_retried are cleared when used */ + + lcp_wo = &ppp->lcp_wantoptions; + lcp_wo->mru = PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU; + lcp_wo->neg_asyncmap = 0; + lcp_wo->neg_pcompression = 0; + lcp_wo->neg_accompression = 0; + lcp_wo->passive = 0; + lcp_wo->silent = 0; + + lcp_ao = &ppp->lcp_allowoptions; + lcp_ao->mru = PPPOL2TP_DEFMRU; + lcp_ao->neg_asyncmap = 0; + lcp_ao->neg_pcompression = 0; + lcp_ao->neg_accompression = 0; + +#if PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT + ipcp_wo = &ppp->ipcp_wantoptions; + ipcp_wo->neg_vj = 0; + ipcp_wo->old_vj = 0; + + ipcp_ao = &ppp->ipcp_allowoptions; + ipcp_ao->neg_vj = 0; + ipcp_ao->old_vj = 0; +#endif /* PPP_IPV4_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ + + /* Listen to a random source port, we need to do that instead of using udp_connect() + * because the L2TP LNS might answer with its own random source port (!= 1701) + */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + if (IP_IS_V6_VAL(l2tp->udp->local_ip)) { + udp_bind(l2tp->udp, IP6_ADDR_ANY, 0); + } else +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + udp_bind(l2tp->udp, IP_ADDR_ANY, 0); + +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + + /* Generate random vector */ + if (l2tp->secret != NULL) { + magic_random_bytes(l2tp->secret_rv, sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv)); + } + +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + do { + l2tp->remote_tunnel_id = magic(); + } while (l2tp->remote_tunnel_id == 0); + + /* save state, in case we fail to send SCCRQ */ + l2tp->sccrq_retried = 0; + l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT; + + if ((err = pppol2tp_send_sccrq(l2tp)) != 0) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send SCCRQ, error=%d\n", err)); + } + + sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); +} + +/* Disconnect */ +static void pppol2tp_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)ctx; + + l2tp->our_ns++; + pppol2tp_send_stopccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns); + + /* stop any timer, disconnect can be called while initiating is in progress */ + sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_INITIAL; + ppp_link_end(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ +} + +/* UDP Callback for incoming IPv4 L2TP frames */ +static void pppol2tp_input(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)arg; + u16_t hflags, hlen, len = 0, tunnel_id = 0, session_id = 0, ns = 0, nr = 0, offset = 0; + u8_t *inp; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + + /* we can't unbound a UDP pcb, thus we can still receive UDP frames after the link is closed */ + if (l2tp->phase < PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT) { + goto free_and_return; + } + + if (!ip_addr_cmp(&l2tp->remote_ip, addr)) { + goto free_and_return; + } + + /* discard packet if port mismatch, but only if we received a SCCRP */ + if (l2tp->phase > PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT && l2tp->tunnel_port != port) { + goto free_and_return; + } + + /* printf("-----------\nL2TP INPUT, %d\n", p->len); */ + + /* L2TP header */ + if (p->len < sizeof(hflags) + sizeof(tunnel_id) + sizeof(session_id)) { + goto packet_too_short; + } + + inp = (u8_t *)p->payload; + GETSHORT(hflags, inp); + + if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL) { + /* check mandatory flags for a control packet */ + if ((hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY) != PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: mandatory header flags for control packet not set\n")); + goto free_and_return; + } + + /* check forbidden flags for a control packet */ + if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_FORBIDDEN) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: forbidden header flags for control packet found\n")); + goto free_and_return; + } + } else { + /* check mandatory flags for a data packet */ + if ((hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_DATA_MANDATORY) != PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_DATA_MANDATORY) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: mandatory header flags for data packet not set\n")); + goto free_and_return; + } + } + + /* Expected header size */ + hlen = sizeof(hflags) + sizeof(tunnel_id) + sizeof(session_id); + + if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_LENGTH) { + hlen += sizeof(len); + } + + if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_SEQUENCE) { + hlen += sizeof(ns) + sizeof(nr); + } + + if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_OFFSET) { + hlen += sizeof(offset); + } + + if (p->len < hlen) { + goto packet_too_short; + } + + if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_LENGTH) { + GETSHORT(len, inp); + + if (p->len < len || len < hlen) { + goto packet_too_short; + } + } + + GETSHORT(tunnel_id, inp); + GETSHORT(session_id, inp); + + if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_SEQUENCE) { + GETSHORT(ns, inp); + GETSHORT(nr, inp); + } + + if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_OFFSET) { + GETSHORT(offset, inp) + + if (offset > 4096) /* don't be fooled with large offset which might overflow hlen */ + { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: strange packet received, offset=%d\n", offset)); + goto free_and_return; + } + + hlen += offset; + + if (p->len < hlen) { + goto packet_too_short; + } + + INCPTR(offset, inp); + } + + /* printf("HLEN = %d\n", hlen); */ + + /* skip L2TP header */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(p, hlen) != 0) { + goto free_and_return; + } + + /* printf("LEN=%d, TUNNEL_ID=%d, SESSION_ID=%d, NS=%d, NR=%d, OFFSET=%d\n", len, tunnel_id, session_id, ns, nr, offset); */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: input packet, len=%" U16_F ", tunnel=%" U16_F ", session=%" U16_F ", ns=%" U16_F ", nr=%" U16_F "\n", + len, tunnel_id, session_id, ns, nr)); + + /* Control packet */ + if (hflags & PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL) { + pppol2tp_dispatch_control_packet(l2tp, port, p, ns, nr); + goto free_and_return; + } + + /* Data packet */ + if (l2tp->phase != PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA) { + goto free_and_return; + } + + if (tunnel_id != l2tp->remote_tunnel_id) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: tunnel ID mismatch, assigned=%d, received=%d\n", l2tp->remote_tunnel_id, tunnel_id)); + goto free_and_return; + } + + if (session_id != l2tp->remote_session_id) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: session ID mismatch, assigned=%d, received=%d\n", l2tp->remote_session_id, session_id)); + goto free_and_return; + } + + /* + * skip address & flags if necessary + * + * RFC 2661 does not specify whether the PPP frame in the L2TP payload should + * have a HDLC header or not. We handle both cases for compatibility. + */ + if (p->len >= 2) { + GETSHORT(hflags, inp); + + if (hflags == 0xff03) { + pbuf_remove_header(p, 2); + } + } + + /* Dispatch the packet thereby consuming it. */ + ppp_input(l2tp->ppp, p); + return; + +packet_too_short: + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: packet too short: %d\n", p->len)); +free_and_return: + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/* L2TP Control packet entry point */ +static void pppol2tp_dispatch_control_packet(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t port, struct pbuf *p, u16_t ns, u16_t nr) +{ + u8_t *inp; + u16_t avplen, avpflags, vendorid, attributetype, messagetype = 0; + err_t err; +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + lwip_md5_context md5_ctx; + u8_t md5_hash[16]; + u8_t challenge_id = 0; +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + /* printf("L2TP CTRL INPUT, ns=%d, nr=%d, len=%d\n", ns, nr, p->len); */ + + /* Drop unexpected packet */ + if (ns != l2tp->peer_ns) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: drop unexpected packet: received NS=%d, expected NS=%d\n", ns, l2tp->peer_ns)); + + /* + * In order to ensure that all messages are acknowledged properly + * (particularly in the case of a lost ZLB ACK message), receipt + * of duplicate messages MUST be acknowledged. + * + * In this very special case we Ack a packet we previously received. + * Therefore our NS is the NR we just received. And our NR is the + * NS we just received plus one. + */ + if ((s16_t)(ns - l2tp->peer_ns) < 0) { + pppol2tp_send_zlb(l2tp, nr, ns + 1); + } + + return; + } + + l2tp->peer_nr = nr; + + /* Handle the special case of the ICCN acknowledge */ + if (l2tp->phase == PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICCN_SENT && (s16_t)(l2tp->peer_nr - l2tp->our_ns) > 0) { + l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA; + sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + ppp_start(l2tp->ppp); /* notify upper layers */ + } + + /* ZLB packets */ + if (p->tot_len == 0) { + return; + } + + /* A ZLB packet does not consume a NS slot thus we don't record the NS value for ZLB packets */ + l2tp->peer_ns = ns + 1; + + p = pbuf_coalesce(p, PBUF_RAW); + inp = (u8_t *)p->payload; + + /* Decode AVPs */ + while (p->len > 0) { + if (p->len < sizeof(avpflags) + sizeof(vendorid) + sizeof(attributetype)) { + goto packet_too_short; + } + + GETSHORT(avpflags, inp); + avplen = avpflags & PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_LENGTHMASK; + + /* printf("AVPLEN = %d\n", avplen); */ + if (p->len < avplen || avplen < sizeof(avpflags) + sizeof(vendorid) + sizeof(attributetype)) { + goto packet_too_short; + } + + GETSHORT(vendorid, inp); + GETSHORT(attributetype, inp); + avplen -= sizeof(avpflags) + sizeof(vendorid) + sizeof(attributetype); + + /* Message type must be the first AVP */ + if (messagetype == 0) { + if (attributetype != 0 || vendorid != 0 || avplen != sizeof(messagetype)) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: message type must be the first AVP\n")); + return; + } + + GETSHORT(messagetype, inp); + + /* printf("Message type = %d\n", messagetype); */ + switch (messagetype) { + /* Start Control Connection Reply */ + case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP: + + /* Only accept SCCRP packet if we sent a SCCRQ */ + if (l2tp->phase != PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT) { + goto send_zlb; + } + + break; + + /* Incoming Call Reply */ + case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRP: + + /* Only accept ICRP packet if we sent a IRCQ */ + if (l2tp->phase != PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICRQ_SENT) { + goto send_zlb; + } + + break; + + /* Stop Control Connection Notification */ + case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_STOPCCN: + pppol2tp_send_zlb(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns + 1, l2tp->peer_ns); /* Ack the StopCCN before we switch to down state */ + + if (l2tp->phase < PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA) { + pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); + } else if (l2tp->phase == PPPOL2TP_STATE_DATA) { + /* Don't disconnect here, we let the LCP Echo/Reply find the fact + * that PPP session is down. Asking the PPP stack to end the session + * require strict checking about the PPP phase to prevent endless + * disconnection loops. + */ + } + + return; + + default: + break; + } + + goto nextavp; + } + + /* Skip proprietary L2TP extensions */ + if (vendorid != 0) { + goto skipavp; + } + + switch (messagetype) { + /* Start Control Connection Reply */ + case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP: + switch (attributetype) { + case PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TUNNELID: + if (avplen != sizeof(l2tp->source_tunnel_id)) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: AVP Assign tunnel ID length check failed\n")); + return; + } + + GETSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, inp); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Assigned tunnel ID %" U16_F "\n", l2tp->source_tunnel_id)); + goto nextavp; +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + + case PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGE: + if (avplen == 0) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Challenge length check failed\n")); + return; + } + + if (l2tp->secret == NULL) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Received challenge from peer and no secret key available\n")); + pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); + return; + } + + /* Generate hash of ID, secret, challenge */ + lwip_md5_init(&md5_ctx); + lwip_md5_starts(&md5_ctx); + challenge_id = PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCCN; + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, &challenge_id, 1); + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, l2tp->secret, l2tp->secret_len); + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, inp, avplen); + lwip_md5_finish(&md5_ctx, l2tp->challenge_hash); + lwip_md5_free(&md5_ctx); + l2tp->send_challenge = 1; + goto skipavp; + + case PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE: + if (avplen != PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE_SIZE) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: AVP Challenge Response length check failed\n")); + return; + } + + /* Generate hash of ID, secret, challenge */ + lwip_md5_init(&md5_ctx); + lwip_md5_starts(&md5_ctx); + challenge_id = PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP; + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, &challenge_id, 1); + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, l2tp->secret, l2tp->secret_len); + lwip_md5_update(&md5_ctx, l2tp->secret_rv, sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv)); + lwip_md5_finish(&md5_ctx, md5_hash); + lwip_md5_free(&md5_ctx); + + if (memcmp(inp, md5_hash, sizeof(md5_hash))) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Received challenge response from peer and secret key do not match\n")); + pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); + return; + } + + goto skipavp; +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + default: + break; + } + + break; + + /* Incoming Call Reply */ + case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRP: + switch (attributetype) { + case PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_SESSIONID: + if (avplen != sizeof(l2tp->source_session_id)) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: AVP Assign session ID length check failed\n")); + return; + } + + GETSHORT(l2tp->source_session_id, inp); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: Assigned session ID %" U16_F "\n", l2tp->source_session_id)); + goto nextavp; + + default: + break; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + skipavp: + INCPTR(avplen, inp); + nextavp: + + /* printf("AVP Found, vendor=%d, attribute=%d, len=%d\n", vendorid, attributetype, avplen); */ + /* next AVP */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(p, avplen + sizeof(avpflags) + sizeof(vendorid) + sizeof(attributetype)) != 0) { + return; + } + } + + switch (messagetype) { + /* Start Control Connection Reply */ + case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRP: + do { + l2tp->remote_session_id = magic(); + } while (l2tp->remote_session_id == 0); + + l2tp->tunnel_port = port; /* LNS server might have chosen its own local port */ + l2tp->icrq_retried = 0; + l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICRQ_SENT; + l2tp->our_ns++; + + if ((err = pppol2tp_send_scccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send SCCCN, error=%d\n", err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + l2tp->our_ns++; + + if ((err = pppol2tp_send_icrq(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send ICRQ, error=%d\n", err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + break; + + /* Incoming Call Reply */ + case PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRP: + l2tp->iccn_retried = 0; + l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICCN_SENT; + l2tp->our_ns++; + + if ((err = pppol2tp_send_iccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send ICCN, error=%d\n", err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + sys_untimeout(pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + break; + + /* Unhandled packet, send ZLB ACK */ + default: + goto send_zlb; + } + + return; + +send_zlb: + pppol2tp_send_zlb(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns + 1, l2tp->peer_ns); + return; +packet_too_short: + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: packet too short: %d\n", p->len)); +} + +/* L2TP Timeout handler */ +static void pppol2tp_timeout(void *arg) +{ + pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp = (pppol2tp_pcb *)arg; + err_t err; + u32_t retry_wait; + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: timeout\n")); + + switch (l2tp->phase) { + case PPPOL2TP_STATE_SCCRQ_SENT: + + /* backoff wait */ + if (l2tp->sccrq_retried < 0xff) { + l2tp->sccrq_retried++; + } + + if (!l2tp->ppp->settings.persist && l2tp->sccrq_retried >= PPPOL2TP_MAXSCCRQ) { + pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); + return; + } + + retry_wait = LWIP_MIN(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT * l2tp->sccrq_retried, PPPOL2TP_SLOW_RETRY); + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: sccrq_retried=%d\n", l2tp->sccrq_retried)); + + if ((err = pppol2tp_send_sccrq(l2tp)) != 0) { + l2tp->sccrq_retried--; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send SCCRQ, error=%d\n", err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + sys_timeout(retry_wait, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + break; + + case PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICRQ_SENT: + l2tp->icrq_retried++; + + if (l2tp->icrq_retried >= PPPOL2TP_MAXICRQ) { + pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); + return; + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: icrq_retried=%d\n", l2tp->icrq_retried)); + + if ((s16_t)(l2tp->peer_nr - l2tp->our_ns) < 0) /* the SCCCN was not acknowledged */ + { + if ((err = pppol2tp_send_scccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns - 1)) != 0) { + l2tp->icrq_retried--; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send SCCCN, error=%d\n", err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + break; + } + } + + if ((err = pppol2tp_send_icrq(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { + l2tp->icrq_retried--; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send ICRQ, error=%d\n", err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + break; + + case PPPOL2TP_STATE_ICCN_SENT: + l2tp->iccn_retried++; + + if (l2tp->iccn_retried >= PPPOL2TP_MAXICCN) { + pppol2tp_abort_connect(l2tp); + return; + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: iccn_retried=%d\n", l2tp->iccn_retried)); + + if ((err = pppol2tp_send_iccn(l2tp, l2tp->our_ns)) != 0) { + l2tp->iccn_retried--; + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: failed to send ICCN, error=%d\n", err)); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(err); /* if PPPDEBUG is disabled */ + } + + sys_timeout(PPPOL2TP_CONTROL_TIMEOUT, pppol2tp_timeout, l2tp); + break; + + default: + return; /* all done, work in peace */ + } +} + +/* Connection attempt aborted */ +static void pppol2tp_abort_connect(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp) +{ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppol2tp: could not establish connection\n")); + l2tp->phase = PPPOL2TP_STATE_INITIAL; + ppp_link_failed(l2tp->ppp); /* notify upper layers */ +} + +/* Initiate a new tunnel */ +static err_t pppol2tp_send_sccrq(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + u16_t len; + + /* calculate UDP packet length */ + len = 12 + 8 + 8 + 10 + 10 + 6 + sizeof(PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME) - 1 + 6 + sizeof(PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME) - 1 + 8 + 8; +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + + if (l2tp->secret != NULL) { + len += 6 + sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv); + } + +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + /* allocate a buffer */ + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (pb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + /* fill in pkt */ + /* L2TP control header */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); + PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Tunnel Id */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ + + /* AVP - Message type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCRQ, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: SCCRQ */ + + /* AVP - L2TP Version */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_VERSION, p); /* Attribute type: Version */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_VERSION, p); /* Attribute value: L2TP Version */ + + /* AVP - Framing capabilities */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_FRAMINGCAPABILITIES, p); /* Attribute type: Framing capabilities */ + PUTLONG(PPPOL2TP_FRAMINGCAPABILITIES, p); /* Attribute value: Framing capabilities */ + + /* AVP - Bearer capabilities */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_BEARERCAPABILITIES, p); /* Attribute type: Bearer capabilities */ + PUTLONG(PPPOL2TP_BEARERCAPABILITIES, p); /* Attribute value: Bearer capabilities */ + + /* AVP - Host name */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 6 + sizeof(PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME) - 1, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_HOSTNAME, p); /* Attribute type: Hostname */ + MEMCPY(p, PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME, sizeof(PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME) - 1); /* Attribute value: Hostname */ + INCPTR(sizeof(PPPOL2TP_HOSTNAME) - 1, p); + + /* AVP - Vendor name */ + PUTSHORT(6 + sizeof(PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME) - 1, p); /* len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_VENDORNAME, p); /* Attribute type: Vendor name */ + MEMCPY(p, PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME, sizeof(PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME) - 1); /* Attribute value: Vendor name */ + INCPTR(sizeof(PPPOL2TP_VENDORNAME) - 1, p); + + /* AVP - Assign tunnel ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TUNNELID, p); /* Attribute type: Tunnel ID */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->remote_tunnel_id, p); /* Attribute value: Tunnel ID */ + + /* AVP - Receive window size */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_RECEIVEWINDOWSIZE, p); /* Attribute type: Receive window size */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_RECEIVEWINDOWSIZE, p); /* Attribute value: Receive window size */ + +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + + /* AVP - Challenge */ + if (l2tp->secret != NULL) { + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 6 + sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv), p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGE, p); /* Attribute type: Challenge */ + MEMCPY(p, l2tp->secret_rv, sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv)); /* Attribute value: Random vector */ + INCPTR(sizeof(l2tp->secret_rv), p); + } + +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); +} + +/* Complete tunnel establishment */ +static err_t pppol2tp_send_scccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + u16_t len; + + /* calculate UDP packet length */ + len = 12 + 8; +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + + if (l2tp->send_challenge) { + len += 6 + sizeof(l2tp->challenge_hash); + } + +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + /* allocate a buffer */ + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (pb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + /* fill in pkt */ + /* L2TP control header */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); + PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ + PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->peer_ns, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ + + /* AVP - Message type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_SCCCN, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: SCCCN */ + +#if PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT + + /* AVP - Challenge response */ + if (l2tp->send_challenge) { + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 6 + sizeof(l2tp->challenge_hash), p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CHALLENGERESPONSE, p); /* Attribute type: Challenge response */ + MEMCPY(p, l2tp->challenge_hash, sizeof(l2tp->challenge_hash)); /* Attribute value: Computed challenge */ + INCPTR(sizeof(l2tp->challenge_hash), p); + } + +#endif /* PPPOL2TP_AUTH_SUPPORT */ + + return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); +} + +/* Initiate a new session */ +static err_t pppol2tp_send_icrq(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + u16_t len; + u32_t serialnumber; + + /* calculate UDP packet length */ + len = 12 + 8 + 8 + 10; + + /* allocate a buffer */ + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (pb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + /* fill in pkt */ + /* L2TP control header */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); + PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ + PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->peer_ns, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ + + /* AVP - Message type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICRQ, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: ICRQ */ + + /* AVP - Assign session ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_SESSIONID, p); /* Attribute type: Session ID */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->remote_session_id, p); /* Attribute value: Session ID */ + + /* AVP - Call Serial Number */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_CALLSERIALNUMBER, p); /* Attribute type: Serial number */ + serialnumber = magic(); + PUTLONG(serialnumber, p); /* Attribute value: Serial number */ + + return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); +} + +/* Complete tunnel establishment */ +static err_t pppol2tp_send_iccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + u16_t len; + + /* calculate UDP packet length */ + len = 12 + 8 + 10 + 10; + + /* allocate a buffer */ + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (pb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + /* fill in pkt */ + /* L2TP control header */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); + PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_session_id, p); /* Session Id */ + PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->peer_ns, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ + + /* AVP - Message type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_ICCN, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: ICCN */ + + /* AVP - Framing type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_FRAMINGTYPE, p); /* Attribute type: Framing type */ + PUTLONG(PPPOL2TP_FRAMINGTYPE, p); /* Attribute value: Framing type */ + + /* AVP - TX Connect speed */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 10, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TXCONNECTSPEED, p); /* Attribute type: TX Connect speed */ + PUTLONG(PPPOL2TP_TXCONNECTSPEED, p); /* Attribute value: TX Connect speed */ + + return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); +} + +/* Send a ZLB ACK packet */ +static err_t pppol2tp_send_zlb(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns, u16_t nr) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + u16_t len; + + /* calculate UDP packet length */ + len = 12; + + /* allocate a buffer */ + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (pb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + /* fill in pkt */ + /* L2TP control header */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); + PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ + PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ + PUTSHORT(nr, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ + + return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); +} + +/* Send a StopCCN packet */ +static err_t pppol2tp_send_stopccn(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, u16_t ns) +{ + struct pbuf *pb; + u8_t *p; + u16_t len; + + /* calculate UDP packet length */ + len = 12 + 8 + 8 + 8; + + /* allocate a buffer */ + pb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (pb == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("pb->tot_len == pb->len", pb->tot_len == pb->len); + + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + /* fill in pkt */ + /* L2TP control header */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_CONTROL_MANDATORY, p); + PUTSHORT(len, p); /* Length */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Session Id */ + PUTSHORT(ns, p); /* NS Sequence number - to peer */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->peer_ns, p); /* NR Sequence number - expected for peer */ + + /* AVP - Message type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_MESSAGE, p); /* Attribute type: Message Type */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_MESSAGETYPE_STOPCCN, p); /* Attribute value: Message type: StopCCN */ + + /* AVP - Assign tunnel ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_TUNNELID, p); /* Attribute type: Tunnel ID */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->remote_tunnel_id, p); /* Attribute value: Tunnel ID */ + + /* AVP - Result code */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPHEADERFLAG_MANDATORY + 8, p); /* Mandatory flag + len field */ + PUTSHORT(0, p); /* Vendor ID */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_AVPTYPE_RESULTCODE, p); /* Attribute type: Result code */ + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_RESULTCODE, p); /* Attribute value: Result code */ + + return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); +} + +static err_t pppol2tp_xmit(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, struct pbuf *pb) +{ + u8_t *p; + + /* make room for L2TP header - should not fail */ + if (pbuf_add_header(pb, PPPOL2TP_OUTPUT_DATA_HEADER_LEN) != 0) { + /* bail out */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppol2tp: pppol2tp_pcb: could not allocate room for L2TP header\n")); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); + pbuf_free(pb); + return ERR_BUF; + } + + p = (u8_t *)pb->payload; + PUTSHORT(PPPOL2TP_HEADERFLAG_DATA_MANDATORY, p); + PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_tunnel_id, p); /* Tunnel Id */ + PUTSHORT(l2tp->source_session_id, p); /* Session Id */ + + return pppol2tp_udp_send(l2tp, pb); +} + +static err_t pppol2tp_udp_send(pppol2tp_pcb *l2tp, struct pbuf *pb) +{ + err_t err; + + if (l2tp->netif) { + err = udp_sendto_if(l2tp->udp, pb, &l2tp->remote_ip, l2tp->tunnel_port, l2tp->netif); + } else { + err = udp_sendto(l2tp->udp, pb, &l2tp->remote_ip, l2tp->tunnel_port); + } + + pbuf_free(pb); + return err; +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOL2TP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppos.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppos.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppos.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppos.c index 825580e2..1d41fbcd 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppos.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/pppos.c @@ -1,945 +1,945 @@ -/** - * @file - * Network Point to Point Protocol over Serial file. - * - */ - -/* - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOS_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include - -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/err.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/memp.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" -#include "lwip/api.h" -#include "lwip/ip4.h" /* for ip4_input() */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppos.h" -#include "netif/ppp/vj.h" - -/* Memory pool */ -LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPPOS_PCB, MEMP_NUM_PPPOS_INTERFACES, sizeof(pppos_pcb), "PPPOS_PCB") - -/* callbacks called from PPP core */ -static err_t pppos_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p); -static err_t pppos_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *pb, u16_t protocol); -static void pppos_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); -#if PPP_SERVER -static void pppos_listen(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -static void pppos_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); -static err_t pppos_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); -static void pppos_send_config(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); -static void pppos_recv_config(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); - -/* Prototypes for procedures local to this file. */ -#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE -static void pppos_input_callback(void *arg); -#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ -static void pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos_pcb *pppos); -static void pppos_input_drop(pppos_pcb *pppos); -static err_t pppos_output_append(pppos_pcb *pppos, err_t err, struct pbuf *nb, u8_t c, u8_t accm, u16_t *fcs); -static err_t pppos_output_last(pppos_pcb *pppos, err_t err, struct pbuf *nb, u16_t *fcs); - -/* Callbacks structure for PPP core */ -static const struct link_callbacks pppos_callbacks = { - pppos_connect, -#if PPP_SERVER - pppos_listen, -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - pppos_disconnect, - pppos_destroy, - pppos_write, - pppos_netif_output, - pppos_send_config, - pppos_recv_config -}; - -/* PPP's Asynchronous-Control-Character-Map. The mask array is used - * to select the specific bit for a character. */ -#define ESCAPE_P(accm, c) ((accm)[(c) >> 3] & 1 << (c & 0x07)) - -#if PPP_FCS_TABLE -/* - * FCS lookup table as calculated by genfcstab. - */ -static const u16_t fcstab[256] = { - 0x0000, 0x1189, 0x2312, 0x329b, 0x4624, 0x57ad, 0x6536, 0x74bf, - 0x8c48, 0x9dc1, 0xaf5a, 0xbed3, 0xca6c, 0xdbe5, 0xe97e, 0xf8f7, - 0x1081, 0x0108, 0x3393, 0x221a, 0x56a5, 0x472c, 0x75b7, 0x643e, - 0x9cc9, 0x8d40, 0xbfdb, 0xae52, 0xdaed, 0xcb64, 0xf9ff, 0xe876, - 0x2102, 0x308b, 0x0210, 0x1399, 0x6726, 0x76af, 0x4434, 0x55bd, - 0xad4a, 0xbcc3, 0x8e58, 0x9fd1, 0xeb6e, 0xfae7, 0xc87c, 0xd9f5, - 0x3183, 0x200a, 0x1291, 0x0318, 0x77a7, 0x662e, 0x54b5, 0x453c, - 0xbdcb, 0xac42, 0x9ed9, 0x8f50, 0xfbef, 0xea66, 0xd8fd, 0xc974, - 0x4204, 0x538d, 0x6116, 0x709f, 0x0420, 0x15a9, 0x2732, 0x36bb, - 0xce4c, 0xdfc5, 0xed5e, 0xfcd7, 0x8868, 0x99e1, 0xab7a, 0xbaf3, - 0x5285, 0x430c, 0x7197, 0x601e, 0x14a1, 0x0528, 0x37b3, 0x263a, - 0xdecd, 0xcf44, 0xfddf, 0xec56, 0x98e9, 0x8960, 0xbbfb, 0xaa72, - 0x6306, 0x728f, 0x4014, 0x519d, 0x2522, 0x34ab, 0x0630, 0x17b9, - 0xef4e, 0xfec7, 0xcc5c, 0xddd5, 0xa96a, 0xb8e3, 0x8a78, 0x9bf1, - 0x7387, 0x620e, 0x5095, 0x411c, 0x35a3, 0x242a, 0x16b1, 0x0738, - 0xffcf, 0xee46, 0xdcdd, 0xcd54, 0xb9eb, 0xa862, 0x9af9, 0x8b70, - 0x8408, 0x9581, 0xa71a, 0xb693, 0xc22c, 0xd3a5, 0xe13e, 0xf0b7, - 0x0840, 0x19c9, 0x2b52, 0x3adb, 0x4e64, 0x5fed, 0x6d76, 0x7cff, - 0x9489, 0x8500, 0xb79b, 0xa612, 0xd2ad, 0xc324, 0xf1bf, 0xe036, - 0x18c1, 0x0948, 0x3bd3, 0x2a5a, 0x5ee5, 0x4f6c, 0x7df7, 0x6c7e, - 0xa50a, 0xb483, 0x8618, 0x9791, 0xe32e, 0xf2a7, 0xc03c, 0xd1b5, - 0x2942, 0x38cb, 0x0a50, 0x1bd9, 0x6f66, 0x7eef, 0x4c74, 0x5dfd, - 0xb58b, 0xa402, 0x9699, 0x8710, 0xf3af, 0xe226, 0xd0bd, 0xc134, - 0x39c3, 0x284a, 0x1ad1, 0x0b58, 0x7fe7, 0x6e6e, 0x5cf5, 0x4d7c, - 0xc60c, 0xd785, 0xe51e, 0xf497, 0x8028, 0x91a1, 0xa33a, 0xb2b3, - 0x4a44, 0x5bcd, 0x6956, 0x78df, 0x0c60, 0x1de9, 0x2f72, 0x3efb, - 0xd68d, 0xc704, 0xf59f, 0xe416, 0x90a9, 0x8120, 0xb3bb, 0xa232, - 0x5ac5, 0x4b4c, 0x79d7, 0x685e, 0x1ce1, 0x0d68, 0x3ff3, 0x2e7a, - 0xe70e, 0xf687, 0xc41c, 0xd595, 0xa12a, 0xb0a3, 0x8238, 0x93b1, - 0x6b46, 0x7acf, 0x4854, 0x59dd, 0x2d62, 0x3ceb, 0x0e70, 0x1ff9, - 0xf78f, 0xe606, 0xd49d, 0xc514, 0xb1ab, 0xa022, 0x92b9, 0x8330, - 0x7bc7, 0x6a4e, 0x58d5, 0x495c, 0x3de3, 0x2c6a, 0x1ef1, 0x0f78 -}; -#define PPP_FCS(fcs, c) (((fcs) >> 8) ^ fcstab[((fcs) ^ (c)) & 0xff]) -#else /* PPP_FCS_TABLE */ -/* The HDLC polynomial: X**0 + X**5 + X**12 + X**16 (0x8408) */ -#define PPP_FCS_POLYNOMIAL 0x8408 -static u16_t ppp_get_fcs(u8_t byte) -{ - unsigned int octet; - int bit; - octet = byte; - - for (bit = 8; bit-- > 0;) { - octet = (octet & 0x01) ? ((octet >> 1) ^ PPP_FCS_POLYNOMIAL) : (octet >> 1); - } - - return octet & 0xffff; -} -#define PPP_FCS(fcs, c) (((fcs) >> 8) ^ ppp_get_fcs(((fcs) ^ (c)) & 0xff)) -#endif /* PPP_FCS_TABLE */ - -/* - * Values for FCS calculations. - */ -#define PPP_INITFCS 0xffff /* Initial FCS value */ -#define PPP_GOODFCS 0xf0b8 /* Good final FCS value */ - -#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE -#define PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) -#define PPPOS_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) -#define PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) -#else -#define PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev) -#define PPPOS_PROTECT(lev) -#define PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev) -#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - -/* - * Create a new PPP connection using the given serial I/O device. - * - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. - */ -ppp_pcb *pppos_create(struct netif *pppif, pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb, - ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) -{ - pppos_pcb *pppos; - ppp_pcb *ppp; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - pppos = (pppos_pcb *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(PPPOS_PCB); - - if (pppos == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - ppp = ppp_new(pppif, &pppos_callbacks, pppos, link_status_cb, ctx_cb); - - if (ppp == NULL) { - LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOS_PCB, pppos); - return NULL; - } - - memset(pppos, 0, sizeof(pppos_pcb)); - pppos->ppp = ppp; - pppos->output_cb = output_cb; - return ppp; -} - -/* Called by PPP core */ -static err_t pppos_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p) -{ - pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; - u8_t *s; - struct pbuf *nb; - u16_t n; - u16_t fcs_out; - err_t err; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); - - /* Grab an output buffer. Using PBUF_POOL here for tx is ok since the pbuf - gets freed by 'pppos_output_last' before this function returns and thus - cannot starve rx. */ - nb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_POOL); - - if (nb == NULL) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("pppos_write[%d]: alloc fail\n", ppp->netif->num)); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Set nb->tot_len to actual payload length */ - nb->tot_len = p->len; - - /* If the link has been idle, we'll send a fresh flag character to - * flush any noise. */ - err = ERR_OK; - - if ((sys_now() - pppos->last_xmit) >= PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG) { - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_FLAG, 0, NULL); - } - - /* Load output buffer. */ - fcs_out = PPP_INITFCS; - s = (u8_t *)p->payload; - n = p->len; - - while (n-- > 0) { - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, *s++, 1, &fcs_out); - } - - err = pppos_output_last(pppos, err, nb, &fcs_out); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_write[%d]: len=%d\n", ppp->netif->num, p->len)); - } else { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("pppos_write[%d]: output failed len=%d\n", ppp->netif->num, p->len)); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return err; -} - -/* Called by PPP core */ -static err_t pppos_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *pb, u16_t protocol) -{ - pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; - struct pbuf *nb, *p; - u16_t fcs_out; - err_t err; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); - - /* Grab an output buffer. Using PBUF_POOL here for tx is ok since the pbuf - gets freed by 'pppos_output_last' before this function returns and thus - cannot starve rx. */ - nb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_POOL); - - if (nb == NULL) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("pppos_netif_output[%d]: alloc fail\n", ppp->netif->num)); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - return ERR_MEM; - } - - /* Set nb->tot_len to actual payload length */ - nb->tot_len = pb->tot_len; - - /* If the link has been idle, we'll send a fresh flag character to - * flush any noise. */ - err = ERR_OK; - - if ((sys_now() - pppos->last_xmit) >= PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG) { - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_FLAG, 0, NULL); - } - - fcs_out = PPP_INITFCS; - - if (!pppos->accomp) { - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_ALLSTATIONS, 1, &fcs_out); - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_UI, 1, &fcs_out); - } - - if (!pppos->pcomp || protocol > 0xFF) { - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, (protocol >> 8) & 0xFF, 1, &fcs_out); - } - - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, protocol & 0xFF, 1, &fcs_out); - - /* Load packet. */ - for (p = pb; p; p = p->next) { - u16_t n = p->len; - u8_t *s = (u8_t *)p->payload; - - while (n-- > 0) { - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, *s++, 1, &fcs_out); - } - } - - err = pppos_output_last(pppos, err, nb, &fcs_out); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_netif_output[%d]: proto=0x%" X16_F ", len = %d\n", ppp->netif->num, protocol, pb->tot_len)); - } else { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("pppos_netif_output[%d]: output failed proto=0x%" X16_F ", len = %d\n", ppp->netif->num, protocol, pb->tot_len)); - } - - return err; -} - -static void pppos_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; - PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - -#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE - /* input pbuf left over from last session? */ - pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); -#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - - /* reset PPPoS control block to its initial state */ - memset(&pppos->last_xmit, 0, sizeof(pppos_pcb) - offsetof(pppos_pcb, last_xmit)); - - /* - * Default the in and out accm so that escape and flag characters - * are always escaped. - */ - pppos->in_accm[15] = 0x60; /* no need to protect since RX is not running */ - pppos->out_accm[15] = 0x60; - PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); - pppos->open = 1; - PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); - - /* - * Start the connection and handle incoming events (packet or timeout). - */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_connect: unit %d: connecting\n", ppp->netif->num)); - ppp_start(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -static void pppos_listen(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; - PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - -#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE - /* input pbuf left over from last session? */ - pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); -#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - - /* reset PPPoS control block to its initial state */ - memset(&pppos->last_xmit, 0, sizeof(pppos_pcb) - offsetof(pppos_pcb, last_xmit)); - - /* - * Default the in and out accm so that escape and flag characters - * are always escaped. - */ - pppos->in_accm[15] = 0x60; /* no need to protect since RX is not running */ - pppos->out_accm[15] = 0x60; - PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); - pppos->open = 1; - PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); - - /* - * Wait for something to happen. - */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_listen: unit %d: listening\n", ppp->netif->num)); - ppp_start(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -static void pppos_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; - PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - - PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); - pppos->open = 0; - PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); - - /* If PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE is used we cannot call - * pppos_input_free_current_packet() here because - * rx IRQ might still call pppos_input(). - */ -#if !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE - /* input pbuf left ? */ - pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); -#endif /* !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - - ppp_link_end(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ -} - -static err_t pppos_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) -{ - pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); - -#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE - /* input pbuf left ? */ - pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); -#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - - LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOS_PCB, pppos); - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE -/** Pass received raw characters to PPPoS to be decoded through lwIP TCPIP thread. - * - * This is one of the only functions that may be called outside of the TCPIP thread! - * - * @param ppp PPP descriptor index, returned by pppos_create() - * @param s received data - * @param l length of received data - */ -err_t pppos_input_tcpip(ppp_pcb *ppp, u8_t *s, int l) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - err_t err; - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, l, PBUF_POOL); - - if (!p) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - pbuf_take(p, s, l); - - err = tcpip_inpkt(p, ppp_netif(ppp), pppos_input_sys); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - return err; -} - -/* called from TCPIP thread */ -err_t pppos_input_sys(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - ppp_pcb *ppp = (ppp_pcb *)inp->state; - struct pbuf *n; - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); - - for (n = p; n; n = n->next) { - pppos_input(ppp, (u8_t *)n->payload, n->len); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - return ERR_OK; -} -#endif /* !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - -/** PPPoS input helper struct, must be packed since it is stored - * to pbuf->payload, which might be unaligned. */ -#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct pppos_input_header { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(ppp_pcb *ppp); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif -#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - -/** Pass received raw characters to PPPoS to be decoded. - * - * @param ppp PPP descriptor index, returned by pppos_create() - * @param s received data - * @param l length of received data - */ -void pppos_input(ppp_pcb *ppp, u8_t *s, int l) -{ - pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ppp->link_ctx_cb; - struct pbuf *next_pbuf; - u8_t cur_char; - u8_t escaped; - PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); -#if !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE - LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); -#endif - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppos_input[%d]: got %d bytes\n", ppp->netif->num, l)); - - while (l-- > 0) { - cur_char = *s++; - - PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); - - /* ppp_input can disconnect the interface, we need to abort to prevent a memory - * leak if there are remaining bytes because pppos_connect and pppos_listen - * functions expect input buffer to be free. Furthermore there are no real - * reason to continue reading bytes if we are disconnected. - */ - if (!pppos->open) { - PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); - return; - } - - escaped = ESCAPE_P(pppos->in_accm, cur_char); - PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); - - /* Handle special characters. */ - if (escaped) { - /* Check for escape sequences. */ - /* XXX Note that this does not handle an escaped 0x5d character which - * would appear as an escape character. Since this is an ASCII ']' - * and there is no reason that I know of to escape it, I won't complicate - * the code to handle this case. GLL */ - if (cur_char == PPP_ESCAPE) { - pppos->in_escaped = 1; - /* Check for the flag character. */ - } else if (cur_char == PPP_FLAG) { - /* If this is just an extra flag character, ignore it. */ - if (pppos->in_state <= PDADDRESS) { - /* ignore it */; - /* If we haven't received the packet header, drop what has come in. */ - } else if (pppos->in_state < PDDATA) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, - ("pppos_input[%d]: Dropping incomplete packet %d\n", - ppp->netif->num, pppos->in_state)); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); - pppos_input_drop(pppos); - /* If the fcs is invalid, drop the packet. */ - } else if (pppos->in_fcs != PPP_GOODFCS) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, - ("pppos_input[%d]: Dropping bad fcs 0x%" X16_F " proto=0x%" X16_F "\n", - ppp->netif->num, pppos->in_fcs, pppos->in_protocol)); - /* Note: If you get lots of these, check for UART frame errors or try different baud rate */ - LINK_STATS_INC(link.chkerr); - pppos_input_drop(pppos); - /* Otherwise it's a good packet so pass it on. */ - } else { - struct pbuf *inp; - - /* Trim off the checksum. */ - if (pppos->in_tail->len > 2) { - pppos->in_tail->len -= 2; - - pppos->in_tail->tot_len = pppos->in_tail->len; - - if (pppos->in_tail != pppos->in_head) { - pbuf_cat(pppos->in_head, pppos->in_tail); - } - } else { - pppos->in_tail->tot_len = pppos->in_tail->len; - - if (pppos->in_tail != pppos->in_head) { - pbuf_cat(pppos->in_head, pppos->in_tail); - } - - pbuf_realloc(pppos->in_head, pppos->in_head->tot_len - 2); - } - - /* Dispatch the packet thereby consuming it. */ - inp = pppos->in_head; - /* Packet consumed, release our references. */ - pppos->in_head = NULL; - pppos->in_tail = NULL; -#if IP_FORWARD || LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD - /* hide the room for Ethernet forwarding header */ - pbuf_remove_header(inp, PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN); -#endif /* IP_FORWARD || LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD */ -#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE - - if (tcpip_try_callback(pppos_input_callback, inp) != ERR_OK) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppos_input[%d]: tcpip_callback() failed, dropping packet\n", ppp->netif->num)); - pbuf_free(inp); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifindiscards); - } - -#else /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - ppp_input(ppp, inp); -#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - } - - /* Prepare for a new packet. */ - pppos->in_fcs = PPP_INITFCS; - pppos->in_state = PDADDRESS; - pppos->in_escaped = 0; - /* Other characters are usually control characters that may have - * been inserted by the physical layer so here we just drop them. */ - } else { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, - ("pppos_input[%d]: Dropping ACCM char <%d>\n", ppp->netif->num, cur_char)); - } - - /* Process other characters. */ - } else { - /* Unencode escaped characters. */ - if (pppos->in_escaped) { - pppos->in_escaped = 0; - cur_char ^= PPP_TRANS; - } - - /* Process character relative to current state. */ - switch (pppos->in_state) { - case PDIDLE: /* Idle state - waiting. */ - - /* Drop the character if it's not 0xff - * we would have processed a flag character above. */ - if (cur_char != PPP_ALLSTATIONS) { - break; - } - - /* no break */ - /* Fall through */ - - case PDSTART: /* Process start flag. */ - /* Prepare for a new packet. */ - pppos->in_fcs = PPP_INITFCS; - - /* no break */ - /* Fall through */ - - case PDADDRESS: /* Process address field. */ - if (cur_char == PPP_ALLSTATIONS) { - pppos->in_state = PDCONTROL; - break; - } - - /* no break */ - - /* Else assume compressed address and control fields so - * fall through to get the protocol... */ - /* Fall through */ - case PDCONTROL: /* Process control field. */ - - /* If we don't get a valid control code, restart. */ - if (cur_char == PPP_UI) { - pppos->in_state = PDPROTOCOL1; - break; - } - - /* no break */ - -#if 0 - else - { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, - ("pppos_input[%d]: Invalid control <%d>\n", ppp->netif->num, cur_char)); - pppos->in_state = PDSTART; - } - -#endif - - /* Fall through */ - - case PDPROTOCOL1: /* Process protocol field 1. */ - - /* If the lower bit is set, this is the end of the protocol - * field. */ - if (cur_char & 1) { - pppos->in_protocol = cur_char; - pppos->in_state = PDDATA; - } else { - pppos->in_protocol = (u16_t)cur_char << 8; - pppos->in_state = PDPROTOCOL2; - } - - break; - - case PDPROTOCOL2: /* Process protocol field 2. */ - pppos->in_protocol |= cur_char; - pppos->in_state = PDDATA; - break; - - case PDDATA: /* Process data byte. */ - - /* Make space to receive processed data. */ - if (pppos->in_tail == NULL || pppos->in_tail->len == PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE) { - u16_t pbuf_alloc_len; - - if (pppos->in_tail != NULL) { - pppos->in_tail->tot_len = pppos->in_tail->len; - - if (pppos->in_tail != pppos->in_head) { - pbuf_cat(pppos->in_head, pppos->in_tail); - /* give up the in_tail reference now */ - pppos->in_tail = NULL; - } - } - - /* If we haven't started a packet, we need a packet header. */ - pbuf_alloc_len = 0; -#if IP_FORWARD || LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD - - /* If IP forwarding is enabled we are reserving PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN - * + PBUF_LINK_HLEN bytes so the packet is being allocated with enough header - * space to be forwarded (to Ethernet for example). - */ - if (pppos->in_head == NULL) { - pbuf_alloc_len = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN; - } - -#endif /* IP_FORWARD || LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD */ - next_pbuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, pbuf_alloc_len, PBUF_POOL); - - if (next_pbuf == NULL) { - /* No free buffers. Drop the input packet and let the - * higher layers deal with it. Continue processing - * the received pbuf chain in case a new packet starts. */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppos_input[%d]: NO FREE PBUFS!\n", ppp->netif->num)); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); - pppos_input_drop(pppos); - pppos->in_state = PDSTART; /* Wait for flag sequence. */ - break; - } - - if (pppos->in_head == NULL) { - u8_t *payload = ((u8_t *)next_pbuf->payload) + pbuf_alloc_len; -#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE - ((struct pppos_input_header *)payload)->ppp = ppp; - payload += sizeof(struct pppos_input_header); - next_pbuf->len += sizeof(struct pppos_input_header); -#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - next_pbuf->len += sizeof(pppos->in_protocol); - *(payload++) = pppos->in_protocol >> 8; - *(payload) = pppos->in_protocol & 0xFF; - pppos->in_head = next_pbuf; - } - - pppos->in_tail = next_pbuf; - } - - /* Load character into buffer. */ - ((u8_t *)pppos->in_tail->payload)[pppos->in_tail->len++] = cur_char; - break; - - default: - break; - } - - /* update the frame check sequence number. */ - pppos->in_fcs = PPP_FCS(pppos->in_fcs, cur_char); - } - } /* while (l-- > 0), all bytes processed */ -} - -#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE -/* PPPoS input callback using one input pointer - */ -static void pppos_input_callback(void *arg) -{ - struct pbuf *pb = (struct pbuf *)arg; - ppp_pcb *ppp; - - ppp = ((struct pppos_input_header *)pb->payload)->ppp; - - if (pbuf_remove_header(pb, sizeof(struct pppos_input_header))) { - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); - goto drop; - } - - /* Dispatch the packet thereby consuming it. */ - ppp_input(ppp, pb); - return; - -drop: - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifindiscards); - pbuf_free(pb); -} -#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ - -static void pppos_send_config(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp) -{ - int i; - pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); - - pppos->pcomp = pcomp; - pppos->accomp = accomp; - - /* Load the ACCM bits for the 32 control codes. */ - for (i = 0; i < 32 / 8; i++) { - pppos->out_accm[i] = (u8_t)((accm >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF); - } - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_send_config[%d]: out_accm=%X %X %X %X\n", - pppos->ppp->netif->num, - pppos->out_accm[0], pppos->out_accm[1], pppos->out_accm[2], pppos->out_accm[3])); -} - -static void pppos_recv_config(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp) -{ - int i; - pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; - PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcomp); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(accomp); - - /* Load the ACCM bits for the 32 control codes. */ - PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); - - for (i = 0; i < 32 / 8; i++) { - pppos->in_accm[i] = (u8_t)(accm >> (i * 8)); - } - - PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); - - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_recv_config[%d]: in_accm=%X %X %X %X\n", - pppos->ppp->netif->num, - pppos->in_accm[0], pppos->in_accm[1], pppos->in_accm[2], pppos->in_accm[3])); -} - -/* - * Drop the input packet. - */ -static void pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos_pcb *pppos) -{ - if (pppos->in_head != NULL) { - if (pppos->in_tail && (pppos->in_tail != pppos->in_head)) { - pbuf_free(pppos->in_tail); - } - - pbuf_free(pppos->in_head); - pppos->in_head = NULL; - } - - pppos->in_tail = NULL; -} - -/* - * Drop the input packet and increase error counters. - */ -static void pppos_input_drop(pppos_pcb *pppos) -{ - if (pppos->in_head != NULL) { -#if 0 - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_input_drop: %d:%.*H\n", pppos->in_head->len, min(60, pppos->in_head->len * 2), pppos->in_head->payload)); -#endif - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_input_drop: pbuf len=%d, addr %p\n", pppos->in_head->len, (void *)pppos->in_head)); - } - - pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); -#if VJ_SUPPORT - vj_uncompress_err(&pppos->ppp->vj_comp); -#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ - - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(pppos->ppp->netif, ifindiscards); -} - -/* - * pppos_output_append - append given character to end of given pbuf. - * If out_accm is not 0 and the character needs to be escaped, do so. - * If pbuf is full, send the pbuf and reuse it. - * Return the current pbuf. - */ -static err_t pppos_output_append(pppos_pcb *pppos, err_t err, struct pbuf *nb, u8_t c, u8_t accm, u16_t *fcs) -{ - if (err != ERR_OK) { - return err; - } - - /* Make sure there is room for the character and an escape code. - * Sure we don't quite fill the buffer if the character doesn't - * get escaped but is one character worth complicating this? */ - if ((PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - nb->len) < 2) { - u32_t l = pppos->output_cb(pppos->ppp, (u8_t *)nb->payload, nb->len, pppos->ppp->ctx_cb); - - if (l != nb->len) { - return ERR_IF; - } - - nb->len = 0; - } - - /* Update FCS before checking for special characters. */ - if (fcs) { - *fcs = PPP_FCS(*fcs, c); - } - - /* Copy to output buffer escaping special characters. */ - if (accm && ESCAPE_P(pppos->out_accm, c)) { - *((u8_t *)nb->payload + nb->len++) = PPP_ESCAPE; - *((u8_t *)nb->payload + nb->len++) = c ^ PPP_TRANS; - } else { - *((u8_t *)nb->payload + nb->len++) = c; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t pppos_output_last(pppos_pcb *pppos, err_t err, struct pbuf *nb, u16_t *fcs) -{ - ppp_pcb *ppp = pppos->ppp; - - /* Add FCS and trailing flag. */ - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, ~(*fcs) & 0xFF, 1, NULL); - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, (~(*fcs) >> 8) & 0xFF, 1, NULL); - err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_FLAG, 0, NULL); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - goto failed; - } - - /* Send remaining buffer if not empty */ - if (nb->len > 0) { - u32_t l = pppos->output_cb(ppp, (u8_t *)nb->payload, nb->len, ppp->ctx_cb); - - if (l != nb->len) { - err = ERR_IF; - goto failed; - } - } - - pppos->last_xmit = sys_now(); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, nb->tot_len); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); - pbuf_free(nb); - return ERR_OK; - -failed: - pppos->last_xmit = 0; /* prepend PPP_FLAG to next packet */ - LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); - pbuf_free(nb); - return err; -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOS_SUPPORT */ +/** + * @file + * Network Point to Point Protocol over Serial file. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOS_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include + +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/err.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/memp.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcpip_priv.h" +#include "lwip/api.h" +#include "lwip/ip4.h" /* for ip4_input() */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppos.h" +#include "netif/ppp/vj.h" + +/* Memory pool */ +LWIP_MEMPOOL_DECLARE(PPPOS_PCB, MEMP_NUM_PPPOS_INTERFACES, sizeof(pppos_pcb), "PPPOS_PCB") + +/* callbacks called from PPP core */ +static err_t pppos_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p); +static err_t pppos_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *pb, u16_t protocol); +static void pppos_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); +#if PPP_SERVER +static void pppos_listen(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +static void pppos_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); +static err_t pppos_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx); +static void pppos_send_config(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); +static void pppos_recv_config(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp); + +/* Prototypes for procedures local to this file. */ +#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE +static void pppos_input_callback(void *arg); +#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ +static void pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos_pcb *pppos); +static void pppos_input_drop(pppos_pcb *pppos); +static err_t pppos_output_append(pppos_pcb *pppos, err_t err, struct pbuf *nb, u8_t c, u8_t accm, u16_t *fcs); +static err_t pppos_output_last(pppos_pcb *pppos, err_t err, struct pbuf *nb, u16_t *fcs); + +/* Callbacks structure for PPP core */ +static const struct link_callbacks pppos_callbacks = { + pppos_connect, +#if PPP_SERVER + pppos_listen, +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + pppos_disconnect, + pppos_destroy, + pppos_write, + pppos_netif_output, + pppos_send_config, + pppos_recv_config +}; + +/* PPP's Asynchronous-Control-Character-Map. The mask array is used + * to select the specific bit for a character. */ +#define ESCAPE_P(accm, c) ((accm)[(c) >> 3] & 1 << (c & 0x07)) + +#if PPP_FCS_TABLE +/* + * FCS lookup table as calculated by genfcstab. + */ +static const u16_t fcstab[256] = { + 0x0000, 0x1189, 0x2312, 0x329b, 0x4624, 0x57ad, 0x6536, 0x74bf, + 0x8c48, 0x9dc1, 0xaf5a, 0xbed3, 0xca6c, 0xdbe5, 0xe97e, 0xf8f7, + 0x1081, 0x0108, 0x3393, 0x221a, 0x56a5, 0x472c, 0x75b7, 0x643e, + 0x9cc9, 0x8d40, 0xbfdb, 0xae52, 0xdaed, 0xcb64, 0xf9ff, 0xe876, + 0x2102, 0x308b, 0x0210, 0x1399, 0x6726, 0x76af, 0x4434, 0x55bd, + 0xad4a, 0xbcc3, 0x8e58, 0x9fd1, 0xeb6e, 0xfae7, 0xc87c, 0xd9f5, + 0x3183, 0x200a, 0x1291, 0x0318, 0x77a7, 0x662e, 0x54b5, 0x453c, + 0xbdcb, 0xac42, 0x9ed9, 0x8f50, 0xfbef, 0xea66, 0xd8fd, 0xc974, + 0x4204, 0x538d, 0x6116, 0x709f, 0x0420, 0x15a9, 0x2732, 0x36bb, + 0xce4c, 0xdfc5, 0xed5e, 0xfcd7, 0x8868, 0x99e1, 0xab7a, 0xbaf3, + 0x5285, 0x430c, 0x7197, 0x601e, 0x14a1, 0x0528, 0x37b3, 0x263a, + 0xdecd, 0xcf44, 0xfddf, 0xec56, 0x98e9, 0x8960, 0xbbfb, 0xaa72, + 0x6306, 0x728f, 0x4014, 0x519d, 0x2522, 0x34ab, 0x0630, 0x17b9, + 0xef4e, 0xfec7, 0xcc5c, 0xddd5, 0xa96a, 0xb8e3, 0x8a78, 0x9bf1, + 0x7387, 0x620e, 0x5095, 0x411c, 0x35a3, 0x242a, 0x16b1, 0x0738, + 0xffcf, 0xee46, 0xdcdd, 0xcd54, 0xb9eb, 0xa862, 0x9af9, 0x8b70, + 0x8408, 0x9581, 0xa71a, 0xb693, 0xc22c, 0xd3a5, 0xe13e, 0xf0b7, + 0x0840, 0x19c9, 0x2b52, 0x3adb, 0x4e64, 0x5fed, 0x6d76, 0x7cff, + 0x9489, 0x8500, 0xb79b, 0xa612, 0xd2ad, 0xc324, 0xf1bf, 0xe036, + 0x18c1, 0x0948, 0x3bd3, 0x2a5a, 0x5ee5, 0x4f6c, 0x7df7, 0x6c7e, + 0xa50a, 0xb483, 0x8618, 0x9791, 0xe32e, 0xf2a7, 0xc03c, 0xd1b5, + 0x2942, 0x38cb, 0x0a50, 0x1bd9, 0x6f66, 0x7eef, 0x4c74, 0x5dfd, + 0xb58b, 0xa402, 0x9699, 0x8710, 0xf3af, 0xe226, 0xd0bd, 0xc134, + 0x39c3, 0x284a, 0x1ad1, 0x0b58, 0x7fe7, 0x6e6e, 0x5cf5, 0x4d7c, + 0xc60c, 0xd785, 0xe51e, 0xf497, 0x8028, 0x91a1, 0xa33a, 0xb2b3, + 0x4a44, 0x5bcd, 0x6956, 0x78df, 0x0c60, 0x1de9, 0x2f72, 0x3efb, + 0xd68d, 0xc704, 0xf59f, 0xe416, 0x90a9, 0x8120, 0xb3bb, 0xa232, + 0x5ac5, 0x4b4c, 0x79d7, 0x685e, 0x1ce1, 0x0d68, 0x3ff3, 0x2e7a, + 0xe70e, 0xf687, 0xc41c, 0xd595, 0xa12a, 0xb0a3, 0x8238, 0x93b1, + 0x6b46, 0x7acf, 0x4854, 0x59dd, 0x2d62, 0x3ceb, 0x0e70, 0x1ff9, + 0xf78f, 0xe606, 0xd49d, 0xc514, 0xb1ab, 0xa022, 0x92b9, 0x8330, + 0x7bc7, 0x6a4e, 0x58d5, 0x495c, 0x3de3, 0x2c6a, 0x1ef1, 0x0f78 +}; +#define PPP_FCS(fcs, c) (((fcs) >> 8) ^ fcstab[((fcs) ^ (c)) & 0xff]) +#else /* PPP_FCS_TABLE */ +/* The HDLC polynomial: X**0 + X**5 + X**12 + X**16 (0x8408) */ +#define PPP_FCS_POLYNOMIAL 0x8408 +static u16_t ppp_get_fcs(u8_t byte) +{ + unsigned int octet; + int bit; + octet = byte; + + for (bit = 8; bit-- > 0;) { + octet = (octet & 0x01) ? ((octet >> 1) ^ PPP_FCS_POLYNOMIAL) : (octet >> 1); + } + + return octet & 0xffff; +} +#define PPP_FCS(fcs, c) (((fcs) >> 8) ^ ppp_get_fcs(((fcs) ^ (c)) & 0xff)) +#endif /* PPP_FCS_TABLE */ + +/* + * Values for FCS calculations. + */ +#define PPP_INITFCS 0xffff /* Initial FCS value */ +#define PPP_GOODFCS 0xf0b8 /* Good final FCS value */ + +#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE +#define PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) +#define PPPOS_PROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) +#define PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev) SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) +#else +#define PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev) +#define PPPOS_PROTECT(lev) +#define PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev) +#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + +/* + * Create a new PPP connection using the given serial I/O device. + * + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + */ +ppp_pcb *pppos_create(struct netif *pppif, pppos_output_cb_fn output_cb, + ppp_link_status_cb_fn link_status_cb, void *ctx_cb) +{ + pppos_pcb *pppos; + ppp_pcb *ppp; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + pppos = (pppos_pcb *)LWIP_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(PPPOS_PCB); + + if (pppos == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + ppp = ppp_new(pppif, &pppos_callbacks, pppos, link_status_cb, ctx_cb); + + if (ppp == NULL) { + LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOS_PCB, pppos); + return NULL; + } + + memset(pppos, 0, sizeof(pppos_pcb)); + pppos->ppp = ppp; + pppos->output_cb = output_cb; + return ppp; +} + +/* Called by PPP core */ +static err_t pppos_write(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *p) +{ + pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; + u8_t *s; + struct pbuf *nb; + u16_t n; + u16_t fcs_out; + err_t err; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); + + /* Grab an output buffer. Using PBUF_POOL here for tx is ok since the pbuf + gets freed by 'pppos_output_last' before this function returns and thus + cannot starve rx. */ + nb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_POOL); + + if (nb == NULL) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("pppos_write[%d]: alloc fail\n", ppp->netif->num)); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Set nb->tot_len to actual payload length */ + nb->tot_len = p->len; + + /* If the link has been idle, we'll send a fresh flag character to + * flush any noise. */ + err = ERR_OK; + + if ((sys_now() - pppos->last_xmit) >= PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG) { + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_FLAG, 0, NULL); + } + + /* Load output buffer. */ + fcs_out = PPP_INITFCS; + s = (u8_t *)p->payload; + n = p->len; + + while (n-- > 0) { + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, *s++, 1, &fcs_out); + } + + err = pppos_output_last(pppos, err, nb, &fcs_out); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_write[%d]: len=%d\n", ppp->netif->num, p->len)); + } else { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("pppos_write[%d]: output failed len=%d\n", ppp->netif->num, p->len)); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return err; +} + +/* Called by PPP core */ +static err_t pppos_netif_output(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, struct pbuf *pb, u16_t protocol) +{ + pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; + struct pbuf *nb, *p; + u16_t fcs_out; + err_t err; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); + + /* Grab an output buffer. Using PBUF_POOL here for tx is ok since the pbuf + gets freed by 'pppos_output_last' before this function returns and thus + cannot starve rx. */ + nb = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_POOL); + + if (nb == NULL) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("pppos_netif_output[%d]: alloc fail\n", ppp->netif->num)); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* Set nb->tot_len to actual payload length */ + nb->tot_len = pb->tot_len; + + /* If the link has been idle, we'll send a fresh flag character to + * flush any noise. */ + err = ERR_OK; + + if ((sys_now() - pppos->last_xmit) >= PPP_MAXIDLEFLAG) { + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_FLAG, 0, NULL); + } + + fcs_out = PPP_INITFCS; + + if (!pppos->accomp) { + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_ALLSTATIONS, 1, &fcs_out); + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_UI, 1, &fcs_out); + } + + if (!pppos->pcomp || protocol > 0xFF) { + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, (protocol >> 8) & 0xFF, 1, &fcs_out); + } + + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, protocol & 0xFF, 1, &fcs_out); + + /* Load packet. */ + for (p = pb; p; p = p->next) { + u16_t n = p->len; + u8_t *s = (u8_t *)p->payload; + + while (n-- > 0) { + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, *s++, 1, &fcs_out); + } + } + + err = pppos_output_last(pppos, err, nb, &fcs_out); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_netif_output[%d]: proto=0x%" X16_F ", len = %d\n", ppp->netif->num, protocol, pb->tot_len)); + } else { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("pppos_netif_output[%d]: output failed proto=0x%" X16_F ", len = %d\n", ppp->netif->num, protocol, pb->tot_len)); + } + + return err; +} + +static void pppos_connect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; + PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + +#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE + /* input pbuf left over from last session? */ + pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); +#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + + /* reset PPPoS control block to its initial state */ + memset(&pppos->last_xmit, 0, sizeof(pppos_pcb) - offsetof(pppos_pcb, last_xmit)); + + /* + * Default the in and out accm so that escape and flag characters + * are always escaped. + */ + pppos->in_accm[15] = 0x60; /* no need to protect since RX is not running */ + pppos->out_accm[15] = 0x60; + PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); + pppos->open = 1; + PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); + + /* + * Start the connection and handle incoming events (packet or timeout). + */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_connect: unit %d: connecting\n", ppp->netif->num)); + ppp_start(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +static void pppos_listen(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; + PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + +#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE + /* input pbuf left over from last session? */ + pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); +#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + + /* reset PPPoS control block to its initial state */ + memset(&pppos->last_xmit, 0, sizeof(pppos_pcb) - offsetof(pppos_pcb, last_xmit)); + + /* + * Default the in and out accm so that escape and flag characters + * are always escaped. + */ + pppos->in_accm[15] = 0x60; /* no need to protect since RX is not running */ + pppos->out_accm[15] = 0x60; + PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); + pppos->open = 1; + PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); + + /* + * Wait for something to happen. + */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_listen: unit %d: listening\n", ppp->netif->num)); + ppp_start(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +static void pppos_disconnect(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; + PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + + PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); + pppos->open = 0; + PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); + + /* If PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE is used we cannot call + * pppos_input_free_current_packet() here because + * rx IRQ might still call pppos_input(). + */ +#if !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE + /* input pbuf left ? */ + pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); +#endif /* !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + + ppp_link_end(ppp); /* notify upper layers */ +} + +static err_t pppos_destroy(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx) +{ + pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); + +#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE + /* input pbuf left ? */ + pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); +#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + + LWIP_MEMPOOL_FREE(PPPOS_PCB, pppos); + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE +/** Pass received raw characters to PPPoS to be decoded through lwIP TCPIP thread. + * + * This is one of the only functions that may be called outside of the TCPIP thread! + * + * @param ppp PPP descriptor index, returned by pppos_create() + * @param s received data + * @param l length of received data + */ +err_t pppos_input_tcpip(ppp_pcb *ppp, u8_t *s, int l) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + err_t err; + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, l, PBUF_POOL); + + if (!p) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + pbuf_take(p, s, l); + + err = tcpip_inpkt(p, ppp_netif(ppp), pppos_input_sys); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + return err; +} + +/* called from TCPIP thread */ +err_t pppos_input_sys(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + ppp_pcb *ppp = (ppp_pcb *)inp->state; + struct pbuf *n; + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); + + for (n = p; n; n = n->next) { + pppos_input(ppp, (u8_t *)n->payload, n->len); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + return ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* !NO_SYS && !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + +/** PPPoS input helper struct, must be packed since it is stored + * to pbuf->payload, which might be unaligned. */ +#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct pppos_input_header { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(ppp_pcb *ppp); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif +#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + +/** Pass received raw characters to PPPoS to be decoded. + * + * @param ppp PPP descriptor index, returned by pppos_create() + * @param s received data + * @param l length of received data + */ +void pppos_input(ppp_pcb *ppp, u8_t *s, int l) +{ + pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ppp->link_ctx_cb; + struct pbuf *next_pbuf; + u8_t cur_char; + u8_t escaped; + PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); +#if !PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE + LWIP_ASSERT_CORE_LOCKED(); +#endif + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_DEBUG, ("pppos_input[%d]: got %d bytes\n", ppp->netif->num, l)); + + while (l-- > 0) { + cur_char = *s++; + + PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); + + /* ppp_input can disconnect the interface, we need to abort to prevent a memory + * leak if there are remaining bytes because pppos_connect and pppos_listen + * functions expect input buffer to be free. Furthermore there are no real + * reason to continue reading bytes if we are disconnected. + */ + if (!pppos->open) { + PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); + return; + } + + escaped = ESCAPE_P(pppos->in_accm, cur_char); + PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); + + /* Handle special characters. */ + if (escaped) { + /* Check for escape sequences. */ + /* XXX Note that this does not handle an escaped 0x5d character which + * would appear as an escape character. Since this is an ASCII ']' + * and there is no reason that I know of to escape it, I won't complicate + * the code to handle this case. GLL */ + if (cur_char == PPP_ESCAPE) { + pppos->in_escaped = 1; + /* Check for the flag character. */ + } else if (cur_char == PPP_FLAG) { + /* If this is just an extra flag character, ignore it. */ + if (pppos->in_state <= PDADDRESS) { + /* ignore it */; + /* If we haven't received the packet header, drop what has come in. */ + } else if (pppos->in_state < PDDATA) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, + ("pppos_input[%d]: Dropping incomplete packet %d\n", + ppp->netif->num, pppos->in_state)); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.lenerr); + pppos_input_drop(pppos); + /* If the fcs is invalid, drop the packet. */ + } else if (pppos->in_fcs != PPP_GOODFCS) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, + ("pppos_input[%d]: Dropping bad fcs 0x%" X16_F " proto=0x%" X16_F "\n", + ppp->netif->num, pppos->in_fcs, pppos->in_protocol)); + /* Note: If you get lots of these, check for UART frame errors or try different baud rate */ + LINK_STATS_INC(link.chkerr); + pppos_input_drop(pppos); + /* Otherwise it's a good packet so pass it on. */ + } else { + struct pbuf *inp; + + /* Trim off the checksum. */ + if (pppos->in_tail->len > 2) { + pppos->in_tail->len -= 2; + + pppos->in_tail->tot_len = pppos->in_tail->len; + + if (pppos->in_tail != pppos->in_head) { + pbuf_cat(pppos->in_head, pppos->in_tail); + } + } else { + pppos->in_tail->tot_len = pppos->in_tail->len; + + if (pppos->in_tail != pppos->in_head) { + pbuf_cat(pppos->in_head, pppos->in_tail); + } + + pbuf_realloc(pppos->in_head, pppos->in_head->tot_len - 2); + } + + /* Dispatch the packet thereby consuming it. */ + inp = pppos->in_head; + /* Packet consumed, release our references. */ + pppos->in_head = NULL; + pppos->in_tail = NULL; +#if IP_FORWARD || LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD + /* hide the room for Ethernet forwarding header */ + pbuf_remove_header(inp, PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN); +#endif /* IP_FORWARD || LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD */ +#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE + + if (tcpip_try_callback(pppos_input_callback, inp) != ERR_OK) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppos_input[%d]: tcpip_callback() failed, dropping packet\n", ppp->netif->num)); + pbuf_free(inp); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifindiscards); + } + +#else /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + ppp_input(ppp, inp); +#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + } + + /* Prepare for a new packet. */ + pppos->in_fcs = PPP_INITFCS; + pppos->in_state = PDADDRESS; + pppos->in_escaped = 0; + /* Other characters are usually control characters that may have + * been inserted by the physical layer so here we just drop them. */ + } else { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, + ("pppos_input[%d]: Dropping ACCM char <%d>\n", ppp->netif->num, cur_char)); + } + + /* Process other characters. */ + } else { + /* Unencode escaped characters. */ + if (pppos->in_escaped) { + pppos->in_escaped = 0; + cur_char ^= PPP_TRANS; + } + + /* Process character relative to current state. */ + switch (pppos->in_state) { + case PDIDLE: /* Idle state - waiting. */ + + /* Drop the character if it's not 0xff + * we would have processed a flag character above. */ + if (cur_char != PPP_ALLSTATIONS) { + break; + } + + /* no break */ + /* Fall through */ + + case PDSTART: /* Process start flag. */ + /* Prepare for a new packet. */ + pppos->in_fcs = PPP_INITFCS; + + /* no break */ + /* Fall through */ + + case PDADDRESS: /* Process address field. */ + if (cur_char == PPP_ALLSTATIONS) { + pppos->in_state = PDCONTROL; + break; + } + + /* no break */ + + /* Else assume compressed address and control fields so + * fall through to get the protocol... */ + /* Fall through */ + case PDCONTROL: /* Process control field. */ + + /* If we don't get a valid control code, restart. */ + if (cur_char == PPP_UI) { + pppos->in_state = PDPROTOCOL1; + break; + } + + /* no break */ + +#if 0 + else + { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, + ("pppos_input[%d]: Invalid control <%d>\n", ppp->netif->num, cur_char)); + pppos->in_state = PDSTART; + } + +#endif + + /* Fall through */ + + case PDPROTOCOL1: /* Process protocol field 1. */ + + /* If the lower bit is set, this is the end of the protocol + * field. */ + if (cur_char & 1) { + pppos->in_protocol = cur_char; + pppos->in_state = PDDATA; + } else { + pppos->in_protocol = (u16_t)cur_char << 8; + pppos->in_state = PDPROTOCOL2; + } + + break; + + case PDPROTOCOL2: /* Process protocol field 2. */ + pppos->in_protocol |= cur_char; + pppos->in_state = PDDATA; + break; + + case PDDATA: /* Process data byte. */ + + /* Make space to receive processed data. */ + if (pppos->in_tail == NULL || pppos->in_tail->len == PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE) { + u16_t pbuf_alloc_len; + + if (pppos->in_tail != NULL) { + pppos->in_tail->tot_len = pppos->in_tail->len; + + if (pppos->in_tail != pppos->in_head) { + pbuf_cat(pppos->in_head, pppos->in_tail); + /* give up the in_tail reference now */ + pppos->in_tail = NULL; + } + } + + /* If we haven't started a packet, we need a packet header. */ + pbuf_alloc_len = 0; +#if IP_FORWARD || LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD + + /* If IP forwarding is enabled we are reserving PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + * + PBUF_LINK_HLEN bytes so the packet is being allocated with enough header + * space to be forwarded (to Ethernet for example). + */ + if (pppos->in_head == NULL) { + pbuf_alloc_len = PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN; + } + +#endif /* IP_FORWARD || LWIP_IPV6_FORWARD */ + next_pbuf = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, pbuf_alloc_len, PBUF_POOL); + + if (next_pbuf == NULL) { + /* No free buffers. Drop the input packet and let the + * higher layers deal with it. Continue processing + * the received pbuf chain in case a new packet starts. */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_ERR, ("pppos_input[%d]: NO FREE PBUFS!\n", ppp->netif->num)); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.memerr); + pppos_input_drop(pppos); + pppos->in_state = PDSTART; /* Wait for flag sequence. */ + break; + } + + if (pppos->in_head == NULL) { + u8_t *payload = ((u8_t *)next_pbuf->payload) + pbuf_alloc_len; +#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE + ((struct pppos_input_header *)payload)->ppp = ppp; + payload += sizeof(struct pppos_input_header); + next_pbuf->len += sizeof(struct pppos_input_header); +#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + next_pbuf->len += sizeof(pppos->in_protocol); + *(payload++) = pppos->in_protocol >> 8; + *(payload) = pppos->in_protocol & 0xFF; + pppos->in_head = next_pbuf; + } + + pppos->in_tail = next_pbuf; + } + + /* Load character into buffer. */ + ((u8_t *)pppos->in_tail->payload)[pppos->in_tail->len++] = cur_char; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + /* update the frame check sequence number. */ + pppos->in_fcs = PPP_FCS(pppos->in_fcs, cur_char); + } + } /* while (l-- > 0), all bytes processed */ +} + +#if PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE +/* PPPoS input callback using one input pointer + */ +static void pppos_input_callback(void *arg) +{ + struct pbuf *pb = (struct pbuf *)arg; + ppp_pcb *ppp; + + ppp = ((struct pppos_input_header *)pb->payload)->ppp; + + if (pbuf_remove_header(pb, sizeof(struct pppos_input_header))) { + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); + goto drop; + } + + /* Dispatch the packet thereby consuming it. */ + ppp_input(ppp, pb); + return; + +drop: + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifindiscards); + pbuf_free(pb); +} +#endif /* PPP_INPROC_IRQ_SAFE */ + +static void pppos_send_config(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp) +{ + int i; + pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); + + pppos->pcomp = pcomp; + pppos->accomp = accomp; + + /* Load the ACCM bits for the 32 control codes. */ + for (i = 0; i < 32 / 8; i++) { + pppos->out_accm[i] = (u8_t)((accm >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF); + } + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_send_config[%d]: out_accm=%X %X %X %X\n", + pppos->ppp->netif->num, + pppos->out_accm[0], pppos->out_accm[1], pppos->out_accm[2], pppos->out_accm[3])); +} + +static void pppos_recv_config(ppp_pcb *ppp, void *ctx, u32_t accm, int pcomp, int accomp) +{ + int i; + pppos_pcb *pppos = (pppos_pcb *)ctx; + PPPOS_DECL_PROTECT(lev); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ppp); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcomp); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(accomp); + + /* Load the ACCM bits for the 32 control codes. */ + PPPOS_PROTECT(lev); + + for (i = 0; i < 32 / 8; i++) { + pppos->in_accm[i] = (u8_t)(accm >> (i * 8)); + } + + PPPOS_UNPROTECT(lev); + + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_recv_config[%d]: in_accm=%X %X %X %X\n", + pppos->ppp->netif->num, + pppos->in_accm[0], pppos->in_accm[1], pppos->in_accm[2], pppos->in_accm[3])); +} + +/* + * Drop the input packet. + */ +static void pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos_pcb *pppos) +{ + if (pppos->in_head != NULL) { + if (pppos->in_tail && (pppos->in_tail != pppos->in_head)) { + pbuf_free(pppos->in_tail); + } + + pbuf_free(pppos->in_head); + pppos->in_head = NULL; + } + + pppos->in_tail = NULL; +} + +/* + * Drop the input packet and increase error counters. + */ +static void pppos_input_drop(pppos_pcb *pppos) +{ + if (pppos->in_head != NULL) { +#if 0 + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_input_drop: %d:%.*H\n", pppos->in_head->len, min(60, pppos->in_head->len * 2), pppos->in_head->payload)); +#endif + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("pppos_input_drop: pbuf len=%d, addr %p\n", pppos->in_head->len, (void *)pppos->in_head)); + } + + pppos_input_free_current_packet(pppos); +#if VJ_SUPPORT + vj_uncompress_err(&pppos->ppp->vj_comp); +#endif /* VJ_SUPPORT */ + + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(pppos->ppp->netif, ifindiscards); +} + +/* + * pppos_output_append - append given character to end of given pbuf. + * If out_accm is not 0 and the character needs to be escaped, do so. + * If pbuf is full, send the pbuf and reuse it. + * Return the current pbuf. + */ +static err_t pppos_output_append(pppos_pcb *pppos, err_t err, struct pbuf *nb, u8_t c, u8_t accm, u16_t *fcs) +{ + if (err != ERR_OK) { + return err; + } + + /* Make sure there is room for the character and an escape code. + * Sure we don't quite fill the buffer if the character doesn't + * get escaped but is one character worth complicating this? */ + if ((PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - nb->len) < 2) { + u32_t l = pppos->output_cb(pppos->ppp, (u8_t *)nb->payload, nb->len, pppos->ppp->ctx_cb); + + if (l != nb->len) { + return ERR_IF; + } + + nb->len = 0; + } + + /* Update FCS before checking for special characters. */ + if (fcs) { + *fcs = PPP_FCS(*fcs, c); + } + + /* Copy to output buffer escaping special characters. */ + if (accm && ESCAPE_P(pppos->out_accm, c)) { + *((u8_t *)nb->payload + nb->len++) = PPP_ESCAPE; + *((u8_t *)nb->payload + nb->len++) = c ^ PPP_TRANS; + } else { + *((u8_t *)nb->payload + nb->len++) = c; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t pppos_output_last(pppos_pcb *pppos, err_t err, struct pbuf *nb, u16_t *fcs) +{ + ppp_pcb *ppp = pppos->ppp; + + /* Add FCS and trailing flag. */ + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, ~(*fcs) & 0xFF, 1, NULL); + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, (~(*fcs) >> 8) & 0xFF, 1, NULL); + err = pppos_output_append(pppos, err, nb, PPP_FLAG, 0, NULL); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + goto failed; + } + + /* Send remaining buffer if not empty */ + if (nb->len > 0) { + u32_t l = pppos->output_cb(ppp, (u8_t *)nb->payload, nb->len, ppp->ctx_cb); + + if (l != nb->len) { + err = ERR_IF; + goto failed; + } + } + + pppos->last_xmit = sys_now(); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_ADD(ppp->netif, ifoutoctets, nb->tot_len); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutucastpkts); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.xmit); + pbuf_free(nb); + return ERR_OK; + +failed: + pppos->last_xmit = 0; /* prepend PPP_FLAG to next packet */ + LINK_STATS_INC(link.err); + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + MIB2_STATS_NETIF_INC(ppp->netif, ifoutdiscards); + pbuf_free(nb); + return err; +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PPPOS_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/upap.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/upap.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/upap.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/upap.c index e95efccb..5bde7aee 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/upap.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/upap.c @@ -1,760 +1,760 @@ -/* - * upap.c - User/Password Authentication Protocol. - * - * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For permission or any legal - * details, please contact - * Office of Technology Transfer - * Carnegie Mellon University - * 5000 Forbes Avenue - * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 - * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 - * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu - * - * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services - * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." - * - * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -/* - * @todo: - */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/upap.h" - -#if PPP_OPTIONS -/* - * Command-line options. - */ -static option_t pap_option_list[] = { - { "hide-password", o_bool, &hide_password, - "Don't output passwords to log", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, - { "show-password", o_bool, &hide_password, - "Show password string in debug log messages", OPT_PRIOSUB | 0 }, - - { "pap-restart", o_int, &upap[0].us_timeouttime, - "Set retransmit timeout for PAP", OPT_PRIO }, - { "pap-max-authreq", o_int, &upap[0].us_maxtransmits, - "Set max number of transmissions for auth-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, - { "pap-timeout", o_int, &upap[0].us_reqtimeout, - "Set time limit for peer PAP authentication", OPT_PRIO }, - - { NULL } -}; -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ - -/* - * Protocol entry points. - */ -static void upap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void upap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void upap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); -static void upap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inpacket, int l); -static void upap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static int upap_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -const struct protent pap_protent = { - PPP_PAP, - upap_init, - upap_input, - upap_protrej, - upap_lowerup, - upap_lowerdown, - NULL, - NULL, -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - upap_printpkt, -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_DATAINPUT - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - "PAP", - NULL, -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ -#if PPP_OPTIONS - pap_option_list, - NULL, -#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ -#if DEMAND_SUPPORT - NULL, - NULL -#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ -}; - -static void upap_timeout(void *arg); -#if PPP_SERVER -static void upap_reqtimeout(void *arg); -static void upap_rauthreq(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -static void upap_rauthack(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len); -static void upap_rauthnak(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len); -static void upap_sauthreq(ppp_pcb *pcb); -#if PPP_SERVER -static void upap_sresp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char code, u_char id, const char *msg, int msglen); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * upap_init - Initialize a UPAP unit. - */ -static void upap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - pcb->upap.us_user = NULL; - pcb->upap.us_userlen = 0; - pcb->upap.us_passwd = NULL; - pcb->upap.us_passwdlen = 0; - pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_INITIAL; -#if PPP_SERVER - pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_INITIAL; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - pcb->upap.us_id = 0; -} - -/* - * upap_authwithpeer - Authenticate us with our peer (start client). - * - * Set new state and send authenticate's. - */ -void upap_authwithpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *user, const char *password) -{ - if (!user || !password) { - return; - } - - /* Save the username and password we're given */ - pcb->upap.us_user = user; - pcb->upap.us_userlen = (u8_t)LWIP_MIN(strlen(user), 0xff); - pcb->upap.us_passwd = password; - pcb->upap.us_passwdlen = (u8_t)LWIP_MIN(strlen(password), 0xff); - pcb->upap.us_transmits = 0; - - /* Lower layer up yet? */ - if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_INITIAL || - pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_PENDING) { - pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_PENDING; - return; - } - - upap_sauthreq(pcb); /* Start protocol */ -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * upap_authpeer - Authenticate our peer (start server). - * - * Set new state. - */ -void upap_authpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - /* Lower layer up yet? */ - if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_INITIAL || - pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_PENDING) { - pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_PENDING; - return; - } - - pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_LISTEN; - - if (pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout > 0) { - TIMEOUT(upap_reqtimeout, pcb, pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * upap_timeout - Retransmission timer for sending auth-reqs expired. - */ -static void upap_timeout(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - - if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate != UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) { - return; - } - - if (pcb->upap.us_transmits >= pcb->settings.pap_max_transmits) { - /* give up in disgust */ - ppp_error("No response to PAP authenticate-requests"); - pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_BADAUTH; - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); - return; - } - - upap_sauthreq(pcb); /* Send Authenticate-Request */ -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * upap_reqtimeout - Give up waiting for the peer to send an auth-req. - */ -static void upap_reqtimeout(void *arg) -{ - ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; - - if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate != UPAPSS_LISTEN) { - return; /* huh?? */ - } - - auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); - pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_BADAUTH; -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * upap_lowerup - The lower layer is up. - * - * Start authenticating if pending. - */ -static void upap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_INITIAL) { - pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_CLOSED; - } else if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_PENDING) { - upap_sauthreq(pcb); /* send an auth-request */ - } - -#if PPP_SERVER - - if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_INITIAL) { - pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_CLOSED; - } else if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_PENDING) { - pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_LISTEN; - - if (pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout > 0) { - TIMEOUT(upap_reqtimeout, pcb, pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout); - } - } - -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -} - -/* - * upap_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. - * - * Cancel all timeouts. - */ -static void upap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) /* Timeout pending? */ - { - UNTIMEOUT(upap_timeout, pcb); /* Cancel timeout */ - } - -#if PPP_SERVER - - if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_LISTEN && pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(upap_reqtimeout, pcb); - } - -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - - pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_INITIAL; -#if PPP_SERVER - pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_INITIAL; -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ -} - -/* - * upap_protrej - Peer doesn't speak this protocol. - * - * This shouldn't happen. In any case, pretend lower layer went down. - */ -static void upap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) { - ppp_error("PAP authentication failed due to protocol-reject"); - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); - } - -#if PPP_SERVER - - if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_LISTEN) { - ppp_error("PAP authentication of peer failed (protocol-reject)"); - auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); - } - -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - upap_lowerdown(pcb); -} - -/* - * upap_input - Input UPAP packet. - */ -static void upap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inpacket, int l) -{ - u_char *inp; - u_char code, id; - int len; - - /* - * Parse header (code, id and length). - * If packet too short, drop it. - */ - inp = inpacket; - - if (l < UPAP_HEADERLEN) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_input: rcvd short header.")); - return; - } - - GETCHAR(code, inp); - GETCHAR(id, inp); - GETSHORT(len, inp); - - if (len < UPAP_HEADERLEN) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_input: rcvd illegal length.")); - return; - } - - if (len > l) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_input: rcvd short packet.")); - return; - } - - len -= UPAP_HEADERLEN; - - /* - * Action depends on code. - */ - switch (code) { - case UPAP_AUTHREQ: -#if PPP_SERVER - upap_rauthreq(pcb, inp, id, len); -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - break; - - case UPAP_AUTHACK: - upap_rauthack(pcb, inp, id, len); - break; - - case UPAP_AUTHNAK: - upap_rauthnak(pcb, inp, id, len); - break; - - default: /* XXX Need code reject */ - break; - } -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * upap_rauth - Receive Authenticate. - */ -static void upap_rauthreq(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) -{ - u_char ruserlen, rpasswdlen; - char *ruser; - char *rpasswd; - char rhostname[256]; - int retcode; - const char *msg; - int msglen; - - if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate < UPAPSS_LISTEN) { - return; - } - - /* - * If we receive a duplicate authenticate-request, we are - * supposed to return the same status as for the first request. - */ - if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_OPEN) { - upap_sresp(pcb, UPAP_AUTHACK, id, "", 0); /* return auth-ack */ - return; - } - - if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_BADAUTH) { - upap_sresp(pcb, UPAP_AUTHNAK, id, "", 0); /* return auth-nak */ - return; - } - - /* - * Parse user/passwd. - */ - if (len < 1) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauth: rcvd short packet.")); - return; - } - - GETCHAR(ruserlen, inp); - len -= sizeof(u_char) + ruserlen + sizeof(u_char); - - if (len < 0) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauth: rcvd short packet.")); - return; - } - - ruser = (char *)inp; - INCPTR(ruserlen, inp); - GETCHAR(rpasswdlen, inp); - - if (len < rpasswdlen) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauth: rcvd short packet.")); - return; - } - - rpasswd = (char *)inp; - - /* - * Check the username and password given. - */ - retcode = UPAP_AUTHNAK; - - if (auth_check_passwd(pcb, ruser, ruserlen, rpasswd, rpasswdlen, &msg, &msglen)) { - retcode = UPAP_AUTHACK; - } - - BZERO(rpasswd, rpasswdlen); - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - - /* - * Check remote number authorization. A plugin may have filled in - * the remote number or added an allowed number, and rather than - * return an authenticate failure, is leaving it for us to verify. - */ - if(retcode == UPAP_AUTHACK) - { - if(!auth_number()) - { - /* We do not want to leak info about the pap result. */ - retcode = UPAP_AUTHNAK; /* XXX exit value will be "wrong" */ - warn("calling number %q is not authorized", remote_number); - } - } - - msglen = strlen(msg); - - if(msglen > 255) - { - msglen = 255; - } - -#endif /* UNUSED */ - - upap_sresp(pcb, retcode, id, msg, msglen); - - /* Null terminate and clean remote name. */ - ppp_slprintf(rhostname, sizeof(rhostname), "%.*v", ruserlen, ruser); - - if (retcode == UPAP_AUTHACK) { - pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_OPEN; - ppp_notice("PAP peer authentication succeeded for %q", rhostname); - auth_peer_success(pcb, PPP_PAP, 0, ruser, ruserlen); - } else { - pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_BADAUTH; - ppp_warn("PAP peer authentication failed for %q", rhostname); - auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); - } - - if (pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout > 0) { - UNTIMEOUT(upap_reqtimeout, pcb); - } -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -/* - * upap_rauthack - Receive Authenticate-Ack. - */ -static void upap_rauthack(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) -{ - u_char msglen; - char *msg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - - if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate != UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) /* XXX */ - { - return; - } - - /* - * Parse message. - */ - if (len < 1) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauthack: ignoring missing msg-length.")); - } else { - GETCHAR(msglen, inp); - - if (msglen > 0) { - len -= sizeof(u_char); - - if (len < msglen) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauthack: rcvd short packet.")); - return; - } - - msg = (char *)inp; - PRINTMSG(msg, msglen); - } - } - - pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_OPEN; - - auth_withpeer_success(pcb, PPP_PAP, 0); -} - -/* - * upap_rauthnak - Receive Authenticate-Nak. - */ -static void upap_rauthnak(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) -{ - u_char msglen; - char *msg; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); - - if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate != UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) /* XXX */ - { - return; - } - - /* - * Parse message. - */ - if (len < 1) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauthnak: ignoring missing msg-length.")); - } else { - GETCHAR(msglen, inp); - - if (msglen > 0) { - len -= sizeof(u_char); - - if (len < msglen) { - UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauthnak: rcvd short packet.")); - return; - } - - msg = (char *)inp; - PRINTMSG(msg, msglen); - } - } - - pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_BADAUTH; - - ppp_error("PAP authentication failed"); - auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); -} - -/* - * upap_sauthreq - Send an Authenticate-Request. - */ -static void upap_sauthreq(ppp_pcb *pcb) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - int outlen; - - outlen = UPAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char) + - pcb->upap.us_userlen + pcb->upap.us_passwdlen; - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + outlen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_PAP); - - PUTCHAR(UPAP_AUTHREQ, outp); - PUTCHAR(++pcb->upap.us_id, outp); - PUTSHORT(outlen, outp); - PUTCHAR(pcb->upap.us_userlen, outp); - MEMCPY(outp, pcb->upap.us_user, pcb->upap.us_userlen); - INCPTR(pcb->upap.us_userlen, outp); - PUTCHAR(pcb->upap.us_passwdlen, outp); - MEMCPY(outp, pcb->upap.us_passwd, pcb->upap.us_passwdlen); - - ppp_write(pcb, p); - - TIMEOUT(upap_timeout, pcb, pcb->settings.pap_timeout_time); - ++pcb->upap.us_transmits; - pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_AUTHREQ; -} - -#if PPP_SERVER -/* - * upap_sresp - Send a response (ack or nak). - */ -static void upap_sresp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char code, u_char id, const char *msg, int msglen) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - u_char *outp; - int outlen; - - outlen = UPAP_HEADERLEN + sizeof(u_char) + msglen; - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + outlen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); - - if (NULL == p) { - return; - } - - if (p->tot_len != p->len) { - pbuf_free(p); - return; - } - - outp = (u_char *)p->payload; - MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_PAP); - - PUTCHAR(code, outp); - PUTCHAR(id, outp); - PUTSHORT(outlen, outp); - PUTCHAR(msglen, outp); - MEMCPY(outp, msg, msglen); - - ppp_write(pcb, p); -} -#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * upap_printpkt - print the contents of a PAP packet. - */ -static const char *const upap_codenames[] = { - "AuthReq", "AuthAck", "AuthNak" -}; - -static int upap_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) -{ - int code, id, len; - int mlen, ulen, wlen; - const u_char *user, *pwd, *msg; - const u_char *pstart; - - if (plen < UPAP_HEADERLEN) { - return 0; - } - - pstart = p; - GETCHAR(code, p); - GETCHAR(id, p); - GETSHORT(len, p); - - if (len < UPAP_HEADERLEN || len > plen) { - return 0; - } - - if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(upap_codenames)) { - printer(arg, " %s", upap_codenames[code - 1]); - } else { - printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); - } - - printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); - len -= UPAP_HEADERLEN; - - switch (code) { - case UPAP_AUTHREQ: - if (len < 1) { - break; - } - - ulen = p[0]; - - if (len < ulen + 2) { - break; - } - - wlen = p[ulen + 1]; - - if (len < ulen + wlen + 2) { - break; - } - - user = (const u_char *)(p + 1); - pwd = (const u_char *)(p + ulen + 2); - p += ulen + wlen + 2; - len -= ulen + wlen + 2; - printer(arg, " user="); - ppp_print_string(user, ulen, printer, arg); - printer(arg, " password="); - /* FIXME: require ppp_pcb struct as printpkt() argument */ -#if 0 - - if(!pcb->settings.hide_password) -#endif - ppp_print_string(pwd, wlen, printer, arg); - -#if 0 - else - { - printer(arg, ""); - } - -#endif - break; - - case UPAP_AUTHACK: - case UPAP_AUTHNAK: - if (len < 1) { - break; - } - - mlen = p[0]; - - if (len < mlen + 1) { - break; - } - - msg = (const u_char *)(p + 1); - p += mlen + 1; - len -= mlen + 1; - printer(arg, " "); - ppp_print_string(msg, mlen, printer, arg); - break; - - default: - break; - } - - /* print the rest of the bytes in the packet */ - for (; len > 0; --len) { - GETCHAR(code, p); - printer(arg, " %.2x", code); - } - - return p - pstart; -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * upap.c - User/Password Authentication Protocol. + * + * Copyright (c) 1984-2000 Carnegie Mellon University. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name "Carnegie Mellon University" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For permission or any legal + * details, please contact + * Office of Technology Transfer + * Carnegie Mellon University + * 5000 Forbes Avenue + * Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 + * (412) 268-4387, fax: (412) 268-7395 + * tech-transfer@andrew.cmu.edu + * + * 4. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Computing Services + * at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/)." + * + * CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +/* + * @todo: + */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/upap.h" + +#if PPP_OPTIONS +/* + * Command-line options. + */ +static option_t pap_option_list[] = { + { "hide-password", o_bool, &hide_password, + "Don't output passwords to log", OPT_PRIO | 1 }, + { "show-password", o_bool, &hide_password, + "Show password string in debug log messages", OPT_PRIOSUB | 0 }, + + { "pap-restart", o_int, &upap[0].us_timeouttime, + "Set retransmit timeout for PAP", OPT_PRIO }, + { "pap-max-authreq", o_int, &upap[0].us_maxtransmits, + "Set max number of transmissions for auth-reqs", OPT_PRIO }, + { "pap-timeout", o_int, &upap[0].us_reqtimeout, + "Set time limit for peer PAP authentication", OPT_PRIO }, + + { NULL } +}; +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ + +/* + * Protocol entry points. + */ +static void upap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void upap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void upap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb); +static void upap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inpacket, int l); +static void upap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static int upap_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +const struct protent pap_protent = { + PPP_PAP, + upap_init, + upap_input, + upap_protrej, + upap_lowerup, + upap_lowerdown, + NULL, + NULL, +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + upap_printpkt, +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_DATAINPUT + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_DATAINPUT */ +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + "PAP", + NULL, +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ +#if PPP_OPTIONS + pap_option_list, + NULL, +#endif /* PPP_OPTIONS */ +#if DEMAND_SUPPORT + NULL, + NULL +#endif /* DEMAND_SUPPORT */ +}; + +static void upap_timeout(void *arg); +#if PPP_SERVER +static void upap_reqtimeout(void *arg); +static void upap_rauthreq(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +static void upap_rauthack(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len); +static void upap_rauthnak(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len); +static void upap_sauthreq(ppp_pcb *pcb); +#if PPP_SERVER +static void upap_sresp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char code, u_char id, const char *msg, int msglen); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * upap_init - Initialize a UPAP unit. + */ +static void upap_init(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + pcb->upap.us_user = NULL; + pcb->upap.us_userlen = 0; + pcb->upap.us_passwd = NULL; + pcb->upap.us_passwdlen = 0; + pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_INITIAL; +#if PPP_SERVER + pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_INITIAL; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + pcb->upap.us_id = 0; +} + +/* + * upap_authwithpeer - Authenticate us with our peer (start client). + * + * Set new state and send authenticate's. + */ +void upap_authwithpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *user, const char *password) +{ + if (!user || !password) { + return; + } + + /* Save the username and password we're given */ + pcb->upap.us_user = user; + pcb->upap.us_userlen = (u8_t)LWIP_MIN(strlen(user), 0xff); + pcb->upap.us_passwd = password; + pcb->upap.us_passwdlen = (u8_t)LWIP_MIN(strlen(password), 0xff); + pcb->upap.us_transmits = 0; + + /* Lower layer up yet? */ + if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_INITIAL || + pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_PENDING) { + pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_PENDING; + return; + } + + upap_sauthreq(pcb); /* Start protocol */ +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * upap_authpeer - Authenticate our peer (start server). + * + * Set new state. + */ +void upap_authpeer(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + /* Lower layer up yet? */ + if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_INITIAL || + pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_PENDING) { + pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_PENDING; + return; + } + + pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_LISTEN; + + if (pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout > 0) { + TIMEOUT(upap_reqtimeout, pcb, pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * upap_timeout - Retransmission timer for sending auth-reqs expired. + */ +static void upap_timeout(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + + if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate != UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) { + return; + } + + if (pcb->upap.us_transmits >= pcb->settings.pap_max_transmits) { + /* give up in disgust */ + ppp_error("No response to PAP authenticate-requests"); + pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_BADAUTH; + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); + return; + } + + upap_sauthreq(pcb); /* Send Authenticate-Request */ +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * upap_reqtimeout - Give up waiting for the peer to send an auth-req. + */ +static void upap_reqtimeout(void *arg) +{ + ppp_pcb *pcb = (ppp_pcb *)arg; + + if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate != UPAPSS_LISTEN) { + return; /* huh?? */ + } + + auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); + pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_BADAUTH; +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * upap_lowerup - The lower layer is up. + * + * Start authenticating if pending. + */ +static void upap_lowerup(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_INITIAL) { + pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_CLOSED; + } else if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_PENDING) { + upap_sauthreq(pcb); /* send an auth-request */ + } + +#if PPP_SERVER + + if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_INITIAL) { + pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_CLOSED; + } else if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_PENDING) { + pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_LISTEN; + + if (pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout > 0) { + TIMEOUT(upap_reqtimeout, pcb, pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout); + } + } + +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +} + +/* + * upap_lowerdown - The lower layer is down. + * + * Cancel all timeouts. + */ +static void upap_lowerdown(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) /* Timeout pending? */ + { + UNTIMEOUT(upap_timeout, pcb); /* Cancel timeout */ + } + +#if PPP_SERVER + + if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_LISTEN && pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(upap_reqtimeout, pcb); + } + +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + + pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_INITIAL; +#if PPP_SERVER + pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_INITIAL; +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ +} + +/* + * upap_protrej - Peer doesn't speak this protocol. + * + * This shouldn't happen. In any case, pretend lower layer went down. + */ +static void upap_protrej(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate == UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) { + ppp_error("PAP authentication failed due to protocol-reject"); + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); + } + +#if PPP_SERVER + + if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_LISTEN) { + ppp_error("PAP authentication of peer failed (protocol-reject)"); + auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); + } + +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + upap_lowerdown(pcb); +} + +/* + * upap_input - Input UPAP packet. + */ +static void upap_input(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inpacket, int l) +{ + u_char *inp; + u_char code, id; + int len; + + /* + * Parse header (code, id and length). + * If packet too short, drop it. + */ + inp = inpacket; + + if (l < UPAP_HEADERLEN) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_input: rcvd short header.")); + return; + } + + GETCHAR(code, inp); + GETCHAR(id, inp); + GETSHORT(len, inp); + + if (len < UPAP_HEADERLEN) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_input: rcvd illegal length.")); + return; + } + + if (len > l) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_input: rcvd short packet.")); + return; + } + + len -= UPAP_HEADERLEN; + + /* + * Action depends on code. + */ + switch (code) { + case UPAP_AUTHREQ: +#if PPP_SERVER + upap_rauthreq(pcb, inp, id, len); +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + break; + + case UPAP_AUTHACK: + upap_rauthack(pcb, inp, id, len); + break; + + case UPAP_AUTHNAK: + upap_rauthnak(pcb, inp, id, len); + break; + + default: /* XXX Need code reject */ + break; + } +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * upap_rauth - Receive Authenticate. + */ +static void upap_rauthreq(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) +{ + u_char ruserlen, rpasswdlen; + char *ruser; + char *rpasswd; + char rhostname[256]; + int retcode; + const char *msg; + int msglen; + + if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate < UPAPSS_LISTEN) { + return; + } + + /* + * If we receive a duplicate authenticate-request, we are + * supposed to return the same status as for the first request. + */ + if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_OPEN) { + upap_sresp(pcb, UPAP_AUTHACK, id, "", 0); /* return auth-ack */ + return; + } + + if (pcb->upap.us_serverstate == UPAPSS_BADAUTH) { + upap_sresp(pcb, UPAP_AUTHNAK, id, "", 0); /* return auth-nak */ + return; + } + + /* + * Parse user/passwd. + */ + if (len < 1) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauth: rcvd short packet.")); + return; + } + + GETCHAR(ruserlen, inp); + len -= sizeof(u_char) + ruserlen + sizeof(u_char); + + if (len < 0) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauth: rcvd short packet.")); + return; + } + + ruser = (char *)inp; + INCPTR(ruserlen, inp); + GETCHAR(rpasswdlen, inp); + + if (len < rpasswdlen) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauth: rcvd short packet.")); + return; + } + + rpasswd = (char *)inp; + + /* + * Check the username and password given. + */ + retcode = UPAP_AUTHNAK; + + if (auth_check_passwd(pcb, ruser, ruserlen, rpasswd, rpasswdlen, &msg, &msglen)) { + retcode = UPAP_AUTHACK; + } + + BZERO(rpasswd, rpasswdlen); + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + + /* + * Check remote number authorization. A plugin may have filled in + * the remote number or added an allowed number, and rather than + * return an authenticate failure, is leaving it for us to verify. + */ + if(retcode == UPAP_AUTHACK) + { + if(!auth_number()) + { + /* We do not want to leak info about the pap result. */ + retcode = UPAP_AUTHNAK; /* XXX exit value will be "wrong" */ + warn("calling number %q is not authorized", remote_number); + } + } + + msglen = strlen(msg); + + if(msglen > 255) + { + msglen = 255; + } + +#endif /* UNUSED */ + + upap_sresp(pcb, retcode, id, msg, msglen); + + /* Null terminate and clean remote name. */ + ppp_slprintf(rhostname, sizeof(rhostname), "%.*v", ruserlen, ruser); + + if (retcode == UPAP_AUTHACK) { + pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_OPEN; + ppp_notice("PAP peer authentication succeeded for %q", rhostname); + auth_peer_success(pcb, PPP_PAP, 0, ruser, ruserlen); + } else { + pcb->upap.us_serverstate = UPAPSS_BADAUTH; + ppp_warn("PAP peer authentication failed for %q", rhostname); + auth_peer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); + } + + if (pcb->settings.pap_req_timeout > 0) { + UNTIMEOUT(upap_reqtimeout, pcb); + } +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +/* + * upap_rauthack - Receive Authenticate-Ack. + */ +static void upap_rauthack(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) +{ + u_char msglen; + char *msg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + + if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate != UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) /* XXX */ + { + return; + } + + /* + * Parse message. + */ + if (len < 1) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauthack: ignoring missing msg-length.")); + } else { + GETCHAR(msglen, inp); + + if (msglen > 0) { + len -= sizeof(u_char); + + if (len < msglen) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauthack: rcvd short packet.")); + return; + } + + msg = (char *)inp; + PRINTMSG(msg, msglen); + } + } + + pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_OPEN; + + auth_withpeer_success(pcb, PPP_PAP, 0); +} + +/* + * upap_rauthnak - Receive Authenticate-Nak. + */ +static void upap_rauthnak(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char *inp, int id, int len) +{ + u_char msglen; + char *msg; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(id); + + if (pcb->upap.us_clientstate != UPAPCS_AUTHREQ) /* XXX */ + { + return; + } + + /* + * Parse message. + */ + if (len < 1) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauthnak: ignoring missing msg-length.")); + } else { + GETCHAR(msglen, inp); + + if (msglen > 0) { + len -= sizeof(u_char); + + if (len < msglen) { + UPAPDEBUG(("pap_rauthnak: rcvd short packet.")); + return; + } + + msg = (char *)inp; + PRINTMSG(msg, msglen); + } + } + + pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_BADAUTH; + + ppp_error("PAP authentication failed"); + auth_withpeer_fail(pcb, PPP_PAP); +} + +/* + * upap_sauthreq - Send an Authenticate-Request. + */ +static void upap_sauthreq(ppp_pcb *pcb) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + int outlen; + + outlen = UPAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof(u_char) + + pcb->upap.us_userlen + pcb->upap.us_passwdlen; + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + outlen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_PAP); + + PUTCHAR(UPAP_AUTHREQ, outp); + PUTCHAR(++pcb->upap.us_id, outp); + PUTSHORT(outlen, outp); + PUTCHAR(pcb->upap.us_userlen, outp); + MEMCPY(outp, pcb->upap.us_user, pcb->upap.us_userlen); + INCPTR(pcb->upap.us_userlen, outp); + PUTCHAR(pcb->upap.us_passwdlen, outp); + MEMCPY(outp, pcb->upap.us_passwd, pcb->upap.us_passwdlen); + + ppp_write(pcb, p); + + TIMEOUT(upap_timeout, pcb, pcb->settings.pap_timeout_time); + ++pcb->upap.us_transmits; + pcb->upap.us_clientstate = UPAPCS_AUTHREQ; +} + +#if PPP_SERVER +/* + * upap_sresp - Send a response (ack or nak). + */ +static void upap_sresp(ppp_pcb *pcb, u_char code, u_char id, const char *msg, int msglen) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + u_char *outp; + int outlen; + + outlen = UPAP_HEADERLEN + sizeof(u_char) + msglen; + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)(PPP_HDRLEN + outlen), PPP_CTRL_PBUF_TYPE); + + if (NULL == p) { + return; + } + + if (p->tot_len != p->len) { + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + outp = (u_char *)p->payload; + MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_PAP); + + PUTCHAR(code, outp); + PUTCHAR(id, outp); + PUTSHORT(outlen, outp); + PUTCHAR(msglen, outp); + MEMCPY(outp, msg, msglen); + + ppp_write(pcb, p); +} +#endif /* PPP_SERVER */ + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * upap_printpkt - print the contents of a PAP packet. + */ +static const char *const upap_codenames[] = { + "AuthReq", "AuthAck", "AuthNak" +}; + +static int upap_printpkt(const u_char *p, int plen, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) +{ + int code, id, len; + int mlen, ulen, wlen; + const u_char *user, *pwd, *msg; + const u_char *pstart; + + if (plen < UPAP_HEADERLEN) { + return 0; + } + + pstart = p; + GETCHAR(code, p); + GETCHAR(id, p); + GETSHORT(len, p); + + if (len < UPAP_HEADERLEN || len > plen) { + return 0; + } + + if (code >= 1 && code <= (int)LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(upap_codenames)) { + printer(arg, " %s", upap_codenames[code - 1]); + } else { + printer(arg, " code=0x%x", code); + } + + printer(arg, " id=0x%x", id); + len -= UPAP_HEADERLEN; + + switch (code) { + case UPAP_AUTHREQ: + if (len < 1) { + break; + } + + ulen = p[0]; + + if (len < ulen + 2) { + break; + } + + wlen = p[ulen + 1]; + + if (len < ulen + wlen + 2) { + break; + } + + user = (const u_char *)(p + 1); + pwd = (const u_char *)(p + ulen + 2); + p += ulen + wlen + 2; + len -= ulen + wlen + 2; + printer(arg, " user="); + ppp_print_string(user, ulen, printer, arg); + printer(arg, " password="); + /* FIXME: require ppp_pcb struct as printpkt() argument */ +#if 0 + + if(!pcb->settings.hide_password) +#endif + ppp_print_string(pwd, wlen, printer, arg); + +#if 0 + else + { + printer(arg, ""); + } + +#endif + break; + + case UPAP_AUTHACK: + case UPAP_AUTHNAK: + if (len < 1) { + break; + } + + mlen = p[0]; + + if (len < mlen + 1) { + break; + } + + msg = (const u_char *)(p + 1); + p += mlen + 1; + len -= mlen + 1; + printer(arg, " "); + ppp_print_string(msg, mlen, printer, arg); + break; + + default: + break; + } + + /* print the rest of the bytes in the packet */ + for (; len > 0; --len) { + GETCHAR(code, p); + printer(arg, " %.2x", code); + } + + return p - pstart; +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && PAP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/utils.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/utils.c similarity index 95% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/utils.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/utils.c index 04b65a81..3f1ab804 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/utils.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/utils.c @@ -1,1156 +1,1156 @@ -/* - * utils.c - various utility functions used in pppd. - * - * Copyright (c) 1999-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. - * - * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras - * ". - * - * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO - * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN - * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#ifdef SVR4 -#include -#endif -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" -#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" - -#if defined(SUNOS4) -extern char *strerror(); -#endif - -static void ppp_logit(int level, const char *fmt, va_list args); -static void ppp_log_write(int level, char *buf); -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -static void ppp_vslp_printer(void *arg, const char *fmt, ...); -static void ppp_format_packet(const u_char *p, int len, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); - -struct buffer_info { - char *ptr; - int len; -}; -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * ppp_strlcpy - like strcpy/strncpy, doesn't overflow destination buffer, - * always leaves destination null-terminated (for len > 0). - */ -size_t ppp_strlcpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t len) -{ - size_t ret = strlen(src); - - if (len != 0) { - if (ret < len) { - strcpy(dest, src); - } else { - strncpy(dest, src, len - 1); - dest[len - 1] = 0; - } - } - - return ret; -} - -/* - * ppp_strlcat - like strcat/strncat, doesn't overflow destination buffer, - * always leaves destination null-terminated (for len > 0). - */ -size_t ppp_strlcat(char *dest, const char *src, size_t len) -{ - size_t dlen = strlen(dest); - - return dlen + ppp_strlcpy(dest + dlen, src, (len > dlen ? len - dlen : 0)); -} - -/* - * ppp_slprintf - format a message into a buffer. Like sprintf except we - * also specify the length of the output buffer, and we handle - * %m (error message), %v (visible string), - * %q (quoted string), %t (current time) and %I (IP address) formats. - * Doesn't do floating-point formats. - * Returns the number of chars put into buf. - */ -int ppp_slprintf(char *buf, int buflen, const char *fmt, ...) -{ - va_list args; - int n; - - va_start(args, fmt); - n = ppp_vslprintf(buf, buflen, fmt, args); - va_end(args); - return n; -} - -/* - * ppp_vslprintf - like ppp_slprintf, takes a va_list instead of a list of args. - */ -#define OUTCHAR(c) (buflen > 0 ? (--buflen, *buf++ = (c)) : 0) - -int ppp_vslprintf(char *buf, int buflen, const char *fmt, va_list args) -{ - int c, i, n; - int width, prec, fillch; - int base, len, neg, quoted; - unsigned long val = 0; - const char *f; - char *str, *buf0; - const unsigned char *p; - char num[32]; -#if 0 /* need port */ - time_t t; -#endif /* need port */ - u32_t ip; - static char hexchars[] = "0123456789abcdef"; -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - struct buffer_info bufinfo; -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - - buf0 = buf; - --buflen; - - while (buflen > 0) { - for (f = fmt; *f != '%' && *f != 0; ++f) - ; - - if (f > fmt) { - len = f - fmt; - - if (len > buflen) { - len = buflen; - } - - memcpy(buf, fmt, len); - buf += len; - buflen -= len; - fmt = f; - } - - if (*fmt == 0) { - break; - } - - c = *++fmt; - width = 0; - prec = -1; - fillch = ' '; - - if (c == '0') { - fillch = '0'; - c = *++fmt; - } - - if (c == '*') { - width = va_arg(args, int); - c = *++fmt; - } else { - while (lwip_isdigit(c)) { - width = width * 10 + c - '0'; - c = *++fmt; - } - } - - if (c == '.') { - c = *++fmt; - - if (c == '*') { - prec = va_arg(args, int); - c = *++fmt; - } else { - prec = 0; - - while (lwip_isdigit(c)) { - prec = prec * 10 + c - '0'; - c = *++fmt; - } - } - } - - str = 0; - base = 0; - neg = 0; - ++fmt; - - switch (c) { - case 'l': - c = *fmt++; - - switch (c) { - case 'd': - val = va_arg(args, long); - - if ((long)val < 0) { - neg = 1; - val = (unsigned long)-(long)val; - } - - base = 10; - break; - - case 'u': - val = va_arg(args, unsigned long); - base = 10; - break; - - default: - OUTCHAR('%'); - OUTCHAR('l'); - --fmt; /* so %lz outputs %lz etc. */ - continue; - } - - break; - - case 'd': - i = va_arg(args, int); - - if (i < 0) { - neg = 1; - val = -i; - } else { - val = i; - } - - base = 10; - break; - - case 'u': - val = va_arg(args, unsigned int); - base = 10; - break; - - case 'o': - val = va_arg(args, unsigned int); - base = 8; - break; - - case 'x': - case 'X': - val = va_arg(args, unsigned int); - base = 16; - break; -#if 0 /* unused (and wrong on LLP64 systems) */ - - case 'p': - val = (unsigned long) va_arg(args, void *); - base = 16; - neg = 2; - break; -#endif /* unused (and wrong on LLP64 systems) */ - - case 's': - str = va_arg(args, char *); - break; - - case 'c': - num[0] = va_arg(args, int); - num[1] = 0; - str = num; - break; -#if 0 /* do we always have strerror() in embedded ? */ - - case 'm': - str = strerror(errno); - break; -#endif /* do we always have strerror() in embedded ? */ - - case 'I': - ip = va_arg(args, u32_t); - ip = lwip_ntohl(ip); - ppp_slprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d.%d.%d.%d", (ip >> 24) & 0xff, - (ip >> 16) & 0xff, (ip >> 8) & 0xff, ip & 0xff); - str = num; - break; -#if 0 /* need port */ - - case 't': - time(&t); - str = ctime(&t); - str += 4; /* chop off the day name */ - str[15] = 0; /* chop off year and newline */ - break; -#endif /* need port */ - - case 'v': /* "visible" string */ - case 'q': /* quoted string */ - quoted = c == 'q'; - p = va_arg(args, unsigned char *); - - if (p == NULL) { - p = (const unsigned char *)""; - } - - if (fillch == '0' && prec >= 0) { - n = prec; - } else { - n = strlen((const char *)p); - - if (prec >= 0 && n > prec) { - n = prec; - } - } - - while (n > 0 && buflen > 0) { - c = *p++; - --n; - - if (!quoted && c >= 0x80) { - OUTCHAR('M'); - OUTCHAR('-'); - c -= 0x80; - } - - if (quoted && (c == '"' || c == '\\')) { - OUTCHAR('\\'); - } - - if (c < 0x20 || (0x7f <= c && c < 0xa0)) { - if (quoted) { - OUTCHAR('\\'); - - switch (c) { - case '\t': - OUTCHAR('t'); - break; - - case '\n': - OUTCHAR('n'); - break; - - case '\b': - OUTCHAR('b'); - break; - - case '\f': - OUTCHAR('f'); - break; - - default: - OUTCHAR('x'); - OUTCHAR(hexchars[c >> 4]); - OUTCHAR(hexchars[c & 0xf]); - } - } else { - if (c == '\t') { - OUTCHAR(c); - } else { - OUTCHAR('^'); - OUTCHAR(c ^ 0x40); - } - } - } else { - OUTCHAR(c); - } - } - - continue; -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT - - case 'P': /* print PPP packet */ - bufinfo.ptr = buf; - bufinfo.len = buflen + 1; - p = va_arg(args, unsigned char *); - n = va_arg(args, int); - ppp_format_packet(p, n, ppp_vslp_printer, &bufinfo); - buf = bufinfo.ptr; - buflen = bufinfo.len - 1; - continue; -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - - case 'B': - p = va_arg(args, unsigned char *); - - for (n = prec; n > 0; --n) { - c = *p++; - - if (fillch == ' ') { - OUTCHAR(' '); - } - - OUTCHAR(hexchars[(c >> 4) & 0xf]); - OUTCHAR(hexchars[c & 0xf]); - } - - continue; - - default: - *buf++ = '%'; - - if (c != '%') { - --fmt; /* so %z outputs %z etc. */ - } - - --buflen; - continue; - } - - if (base != 0) { - str = num + sizeof(num); - *--str = 0; - - while (str > num + neg) { - *--str = hexchars[val % base]; - val = val / base; - - if (--prec <= 0 && val == 0) { - break; - } - } - - switch (neg) { - case 1: - *--str = '-'; - break; - - case 2: - *--str = 'x'; - *--str = '0'; - break; - - default: - break; - } - - len = num + sizeof(num) - 1 - str; - } else { - len = strlen(str); - - if (prec >= 0 && len > prec) { - len = prec; - } - } - - if (width > 0) { - if (width > buflen) { - width = buflen; - } - - if ((n = width - len) > 0) { - buflen -= n; - - for (; n > 0; --n) { - *buf++ = fillch; - } - } - } - - if (len > buflen) { - len = buflen; - } - - memcpy(buf, str, len); - buf += len; - buflen -= len; - } - - *buf = 0; - return buf - buf0; -} - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * vslp_printer - used in processing a %P format - */ -static void ppp_vslp_printer(void *arg, const char *fmt, ...) -{ - int n; - va_list pvar; - struct buffer_info *bi; - - va_start(pvar, fmt); - bi = (struct buffer_info *)arg; - n = ppp_vslprintf(bi->ptr, bi->len, fmt, pvar); - va_end(pvar); - - bi->ptr += n; - bi->len -= n; -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* - * log_packet - format a packet and log it. - */ - -void log_packet(p, len, prefix, level) -u_char *p; -int len; -char *prefix; -int level; -{ - init_pr_log(prefix, level); - ppp_format_packet(p, len, pr_log, &level); - end_pr_log(); -} -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * ppp_format_packet - make a readable representation of a packet, - * calling `printer(arg, format, ...)' to output it. - */ -static void ppp_format_packet(const u_char *p, int len, - void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) -{ - int i, n; - u_short proto; - const struct protent *protp; - - if (len >= 2) { - GETSHORT(proto, p); - len -= 2; - - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (proto == protp->protocol) { - break; - } - - if (protp != NULL) { - printer(arg, "[%s", protp->name); - n = (*protp->printpkt)(p, len, printer, arg); - printer(arg, "]"); - p += n; - len -= n; - } else { - for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) - if (proto == (protp->protocol & ~0x8000)) { - break; - } - - if (protp != 0 && protp->data_name != 0) { - printer(arg, "[%s data]", protp->data_name); - - if (len > 8) { - printer(arg, "%.8B ...", p); - } else { - printer(arg, "%.*B", len, p); - } - - len = 0; - } else { - printer(arg, "[proto=0x%x]", proto); - } - } - } - - if (len > 32) { - printer(arg, "%.32B ...", p); - } else { - printer(arg, "%.*B", len, p); - } -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ -/* - * init_pr_log, end_pr_log - initialize and finish use of pr_log. - */ - -static char line[256]; /* line to be logged accumulated here */ -static char *linep; /* current pointer within line */ -static int llevel; /* level for logging */ - -void init_pr_log(prefix, level) -const char *prefix; -int level; -{ - linep = line; - - if(prefix != NULL) - { - ppp_strlcpy(line, prefix, sizeof(line)); - linep = line + strlen(line); - } - - llevel = level; -} - -void end_pr_log() -{ - if(linep != line) - { - *linep = 0; - ppp_log_write(llevel, line); - } -} - -/* - * pr_log - printer routine for outputting to log - */ -void pr_log(void *arg, const char *fmt, ...) -{ - int l, n; - va_list pvar; - char *p, *eol; - char buf[256]; - - va_start(pvar, fmt); - n = ppp_vslprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, pvar); - va_end(pvar); - - p = buf; - eol = strchr(buf, '\n'); - - if(linep != line) - { - l = (eol == NULL) ? n : eol - buf; - - if(linep + l < line + sizeof(line)) - { - if(l > 0) - { - memcpy(linep, buf, l); - linep += l; - } - - if(eol == NULL) - { - return; - } - - p = eol + 1; - eol = strchr(p, '\n'); - } - - *linep = 0; - ppp_log_write(llevel, line); - linep = line; - } - - while(eol != NULL) - { - *eol = 0; - ppp_log_write(llevel, p); - p = eol + 1; - eol = strchr(p, '\n'); - } - - /* assumes sizeof(buf) <= sizeof(line) */ - l = buf + n - p; - - if(l > 0) - { - memcpy(line, p, n); - linep = line + l; - } -} -#endif /* UNUSED */ - -/* - * ppp_print_string - print a readable representation of a string using - * printer. - */ -void ppp_print_string(const u_char *p, int len, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) -{ - int c; - - printer(arg, "\""); - - for (; len > 0; --len) { - c = *p++; - - if (' ' <= c && c <= '~') { - if (c == '\\' || c == '"') { - printer(arg, "\\"); - } - - printer(arg, "%c", c); - } else { - switch (c) { - case '\n': - printer(arg, "\\n"); - break; - - case '\r': - printer(arg, "\\r"); - break; - - case '\t': - printer(arg, "\\t"); - break; - - default: - printer(arg, "\\%.3o", (u8_t)c); - /* no break */ - } - } - } - - printer(arg, "\""); -} - -/* - * ppp_logit - does the hard work for fatal et al. - */ -static void ppp_logit(int level, const char *fmt, va_list args) -{ - char buf[1024]; - - ppp_vslprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); - ppp_log_write(level, buf); -} - -static void ppp_log_write(int level, char *buf) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(level); /* necessary if PPPDEBUG is defined to an empty function */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(buf); - PPPDEBUG(level, ("%s\n", buf)); -#if 0 - - if(log_to_fd >= 0 && (level != LOG_DEBUG || debug)) - { - int n = strlen(buf); - - if(n > 0 && buf[n - 1] == '\n') - { - --n; - } - - if(write(log_to_fd, buf, n) != n - || write(log_to_fd, "\n", 1) != 1) - { - log_to_fd = -1; - } - } - -#endif -} - -/* - * ppp_fatal - log an error message and die horribly. - */ -void ppp_fatal(const char *fmt, ...) -{ - va_list pvar; - - va_start(pvar, fmt); - ppp_logit(LOG_ERR, fmt, pvar); - va_end(pvar); - - LWIP_ASSERT("ppp_fatal", 0); /* as promised */ -} - -/* - * ppp_error - log an error message. - */ -void ppp_error(const char *fmt, ...) -{ - va_list pvar; - - va_start(pvar, fmt); - ppp_logit(LOG_ERR, fmt, pvar); - va_end(pvar); -#if 0 /* UNUSED */ - ++error_count; -#endif /* UNUSED */ -} - -/* - * ppp_warn - log a warning message. - */ -void ppp_warn(const char *fmt, ...) -{ - va_list pvar; - - va_start(pvar, fmt); - ppp_logit(LOG_WARNING, fmt, pvar); - va_end(pvar); -} - -/* - * ppp_notice - log a notice-level message. - */ -void ppp_notice(const char *fmt, ...) -{ - va_list pvar; - - va_start(pvar, fmt); - ppp_logit(LOG_NOTICE, fmt, pvar); - va_end(pvar); -} - -/* - * ppp_info - log an informational message. - */ -void ppp_info(const char *fmt, ...) -{ - va_list pvar; - - va_start(pvar, fmt); - ppp_logit(LOG_INFO, fmt, pvar); - va_end(pvar); -} - -/* - * ppp_dbglog - log a debug message. - */ -void ppp_dbglog(const char *fmt, ...) -{ - va_list pvar; - - va_start(pvar, fmt); - ppp_logit(LOG_DEBUG, fmt, pvar); - va_end(pvar); -} - -#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT -/* - * ppp_dump_packet - print out a packet in readable form if it is interesting. - * Assumes len >= PPP_HDRLEN. - */ -void ppp_dump_packet(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *tag, unsigned char *p, int len) -{ - int proto; - - /* - * don't print data packets, i.e. IPv4, IPv6, VJ, and compressed packets. - */ - proto = (p[0] << 8) + p[1]; - - if (proto < 0xC000 && (proto & ~0x8000) == proto) { - return; - } - - /* - * don't print valid LCP echo request/reply packets if the link is up. - */ - if (proto == PPP_LCP && pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_RUNNING && len >= 2 + HEADERLEN) { - unsigned char *lcp = p + 2; - int l = (lcp[2] << 8) + lcp[3]; - - if ((lcp[0] == ECHOREQ || lcp[0] == ECHOREP) && l >= HEADERLEN && l <= len - 2) { - return; - } - } - - ppp_dbglog("%s %P", tag, p, len); -} -#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ - -#if 0 /* Unused */ - -/* - * complete_read - read a full `count' bytes from fd, - * unless end-of-file or an error other than EINTR is encountered. - */ -ssize_t complete_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count) -{ - size_t done; - ssize_t nb; - char *ptr = buf; - - for(done = 0; done < count;) - { - nb = read(fd, ptr, count - done); - - if(nb < 0) - { - if(errno == EINTR) - { - continue; - } - - return -1; - } - - if(nb == 0) - { - break; - } - - done += nb; - ptr += nb; - } - - return done; -} - -/* Procedures for locking the serial device using a lock file. */ -#ifndef LOCK_DIR -#ifdef __linux__ -#define LOCK_DIR "/var/lock" -#else -#ifdef SVR4 -#define LOCK_DIR "/var/spool/locks" -#else -#define LOCK_DIR "/var/spool/lock" -#endif -#endif -#endif /* LOCK_DIR */ - -static char lock_file[MAXPATHLEN]; - -/* - * lock - create a lock file for the named device - */ -int lock(dev) -char *dev; -{ -#ifdef LOCKLIB - int result; - - result = mklock(dev, (void *) 0); - - if(result == 0) - { - ppp_strlcpy(lock_file, dev, sizeof(lock_file)); - return 0; - } - - if(result > 0) - { - ppp_notice("Device %s is locked by pid %d", dev, result); - } - else - { - ppp_error("Can't create lock file %s", lock_file); - } - - return -1; - -#else /* LOCKLIB */ - - char lock_buffer[12]; - int fd, pid, n; - -#ifdef SVR4 - struct stat sbuf; - - if(stat(dev, &sbuf) < 0) - { - ppp_error("Can't get device number for %s: %m", dev); - return -1; - } - - if((sbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFCHR) - { - ppp_error("Can't lock %s: not a character device", dev); - return -1; - } - - ppp_slprintf(lock_file, sizeof(lock_file), "%s/LK.%03d.%03d.%03d", - LOCK_DIR, major(sbuf.st_dev), - major(sbuf.st_rdev), minor(sbuf.st_rdev)); -#else - char *p; - char lockdev[MAXPATHLEN]; - - if((p = strstr(dev, "dev/")) != NULL) - { - dev = p + 4; - strncpy(lockdev, dev, MAXPATHLEN - 1); - lockdev[MAXPATHLEN - 1] = 0; - - while((p = strrchr(lockdev, '/')) != NULL) - { - *p = '_'; - } - - dev = lockdev; - } - else if((p = strrchr(dev, '/')) != NULL) - { - dev = p + 1; - } - - ppp_slprintf(lock_file, sizeof(lock_file), "%s/LCK..%s", LOCK_DIR, dev); -#endif - - while((fd = open(lock_file, O_EXCL | O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0644)) < 0) - { - if(errno != EEXIST) - { - ppp_error("Can't create lock file %s: %m", lock_file); - break; - } - - /* Read the lock file to find out who has the device locked. */ - fd = open(lock_file, O_RDONLY, 0); - - if(fd < 0) - { - if(errno == ENOENT) /* This is just a timing problem. */ - { - continue; - } - - ppp_error("Can't open existing lock file %s: %m", lock_file); - break; - } - -#ifndef LOCK_BINARY - n = read(fd, lock_buffer, 11); -#else - n = read(fd, &pid, sizeof(pid)); -#endif /* LOCK_BINARY */ - close(fd); - fd = -1; - - if(n <= 0) - { - ppp_error("Can't read pid from lock file %s", lock_file); - break; - } - - /* See if the process still exists. */ -#ifndef LOCK_BINARY - lock_buffer[n] = 0; - pid = atoi(lock_buffer); -#endif /* LOCK_BINARY */ - - if(pid == getpid()) - { - return 1; /* somebody else locked it for us */ - } - - if(pid == 0 - || (kill(pid, 0) == -1 && errno == ESRCH)) - { - if(unlink(lock_file) == 0) - { - ppp_notice("Removed stale lock on %s (pid %d)", dev, pid); - continue; - } - - ppp_warn("Couldn't remove stale lock on %s", dev); - } - else - { - ppp_notice("Device %s is locked by pid %d", dev, pid); - } - - break; - } - - if(fd < 0) - { - lock_file[0] = 0; - return -1; - } - - pid = getpid(); -#ifndef LOCK_BINARY - ppp_slprintf(lock_buffer, sizeof(lock_buffer), "%10d\n", pid); - write(fd, lock_buffer, 11); -#else - write(fd, &pid, sizeof(pid)); -#endif - close(fd); - return 0; - -#endif -} - -/* - * relock - called to update our lockfile when we are about to detach, - * thus changing our pid (we fork, the child carries on, and the parent dies). - * Note that this is called by the parent, with pid equal to the pid - * of the child. This avoids a potential race which would exist if - * we had the child rewrite the lockfile (the parent might die first, - * and another process could think the lock was stale if it checked - * between when the parent died and the child rewrote the lockfile). - */ -int relock(pid) -int pid; -{ -#ifdef LOCKLIB - /* XXX is there a way to do this? */ - return -1; -#else /* LOCKLIB */ - - int fd; - char lock_buffer[12]; - - if(lock_file[0] == 0) - { - return -1; - } - - fd = open(lock_file, O_WRONLY, 0); - - if(fd < 0) - { - ppp_error("Couldn't reopen lock file %s: %m", lock_file); - lock_file[0] = 0; - return -1; - } - -#ifndef LOCK_BINARY - ppp_slprintf(lock_buffer, sizeof(lock_buffer), "%10d\n", pid); - write(fd, lock_buffer, 11); -#else - write(fd, &pid, sizeof(pid)); -#endif /* LOCK_BINARY */ - close(fd); - return 0; - -#endif /* LOCKLIB */ -} - -/* - * unlock - remove our lockfile - */ -void unlock() -{ - if(lock_file[0]) - { -#ifdef LOCKLIB - (void) rmlock(lock_file, (void *) 0); -#else - unlink(lock_file); -#endif - lock_file[0] = 0; - } -} - -#endif /* Unused */ - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ +/* + * utils.c - various utility functions used in pppd. + * + * Copyright (c) 1999-2002 Paul Mackerras. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * 3. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by Paul Mackerras + * ". + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef SVR4 +#include +#endif +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/fsm.h" +#include "netif/ppp/lcp.h" + +#if defined(SUNOS4) +extern char *strerror(); +#endif + +static void ppp_logit(int level, const char *fmt, va_list args); +static void ppp_log_write(int level, char *buf); +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +static void ppp_vslp_printer(void *arg, const char *fmt, ...); +static void ppp_format_packet(const u_char *p, int len, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg); + +struct buffer_info { + char *ptr; + int len; +}; +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * ppp_strlcpy - like strcpy/strncpy, doesn't overflow destination buffer, + * always leaves destination null-terminated (for len > 0). + */ +size_t ppp_strlcpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t len) +{ + size_t ret = strlen(src); + + if (len != 0) { + if (ret < len) { + strcpy(dest, src); + } else { + strncpy(dest, src, len - 1); + dest[len - 1] = 0; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ppp_strlcat - like strcat/strncat, doesn't overflow destination buffer, + * always leaves destination null-terminated (for len > 0). + */ +size_t ppp_strlcat(char *dest, const char *src, size_t len) +{ + size_t dlen = strlen(dest); + + return dlen + ppp_strlcpy(dest + dlen, src, (len > dlen ? len - dlen : 0)); +} + +/* + * ppp_slprintf - format a message into a buffer. Like sprintf except we + * also specify the length of the output buffer, and we handle + * %m (error message), %v (visible string), + * %q (quoted string), %t (current time) and %I (IP address) formats. + * Doesn't do floating-point formats. + * Returns the number of chars put into buf. + */ +int ppp_slprintf(char *buf, int buflen, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int n; + + va_start(args, fmt); + n = ppp_vslprintf(buf, buflen, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + return n; +} + +/* + * ppp_vslprintf - like ppp_slprintf, takes a va_list instead of a list of args. + */ +#define OUTCHAR(c) (buflen > 0 ? (--buflen, *buf++ = (c)) : 0) + +int ppp_vslprintf(char *buf, int buflen, const char *fmt, va_list args) +{ + int c, i, n; + int width, prec, fillch; + int base, len, neg, quoted; + unsigned long val = 0; + const char *f; + char *str, *buf0; + const unsigned char *p; + char num[32]; +#if 0 /* need port */ + time_t t; +#endif /* need port */ + u32_t ip; + static char hexchars[] = "0123456789abcdef"; +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + struct buffer_info bufinfo; +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + + buf0 = buf; + --buflen; + + while (buflen > 0) { + for (f = fmt; *f != '%' && *f != 0; ++f) + ; + + if (f > fmt) { + len = f - fmt; + + if (len > buflen) { + len = buflen; + } + + memcpy(buf, fmt, len); + buf += len; + buflen -= len; + fmt = f; + } + + if (*fmt == 0) { + break; + } + + c = *++fmt; + width = 0; + prec = -1; + fillch = ' '; + + if (c == '0') { + fillch = '0'; + c = *++fmt; + } + + if (c == '*') { + width = va_arg(args, int); + c = *++fmt; + } else { + while (lwip_isdigit(c)) { + width = width * 10 + c - '0'; + c = *++fmt; + } + } + + if (c == '.') { + c = *++fmt; + + if (c == '*') { + prec = va_arg(args, int); + c = *++fmt; + } else { + prec = 0; + + while (lwip_isdigit(c)) { + prec = prec * 10 + c - '0'; + c = *++fmt; + } + } + } + + str = 0; + base = 0; + neg = 0; + ++fmt; + + switch (c) { + case 'l': + c = *fmt++; + + switch (c) { + case 'd': + val = va_arg(args, long); + + if ((long)val < 0) { + neg = 1; + val = (unsigned long)-(long)val; + } + + base = 10; + break; + + case 'u': + val = va_arg(args, unsigned long); + base = 10; + break; + + default: + OUTCHAR('%'); + OUTCHAR('l'); + --fmt; /* so %lz outputs %lz etc. */ + continue; + } + + break; + + case 'd': + i = va_arg(args, int); + + if (i < 0) { + neg = 1; + val = -i; + } else { + val = i; + } + + base = 10; + break; + + case 'u': + val = va_arg(args, unsigned int); + base = 10; + break; + + case 'o': + val = va_arg(args, unsigned int); + base = 8; + break; + + case 'x': + case 'X': + val = va_arg(args, unsigned int); + base = 16; + break; +#if 0 /* unused (and wrong on LLP64 systems) */ + + case 'p': + val = (unsigned long) va_arg(args, void *); + base = 16; + neg = 2; + break; +#endif /* unused (and wrong on LLP64 systems) */ + + case 's': + str = va_arg(args, char *); + break; + + case 'c': + num[0] = va_arg(args, int); + num[1] = 0; + str = num; + break; +#if 0 /* do we always have strerror() in embedded ? */ + + case 'm': + str = strerror(errno); + break; +#endif /* do we always have strerror() in embedded ? */ + + case 'I': + ip = va_arg(args, u32_t); + ip = lwip_ntohl(ip); + ppp_slprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d.%d.%d.%d", (ip >> 24) & 0xff, + (ip >> 16) & 0xff, (ip >> 8) & 0xff, ip & 0xff); + str = num; + break; +#if 0 /* need port */ + + case 't': + time(&t); + str = ctime(&t); + str += 4; /* chop off the day name */ + str[15] = 0; /* chop off year and newline */ + break; +#endif /* need port */ + + case 'v': /* "visible" string */ + case 'q': /* quoted string */ + quoted = c == 'q'; + p = va_arg(args, unsigned char *); + + if (p == NULL) { + p = (const unsigned char *)""; + } + + if (fillch == '0' && prec >= 0) { + n = prec; + } else { + n = strlen((const char *)p); + + if (prec >= 0 && n > prec) { + n = prec; + } + } + + while (n > 0 && buflen > 0) { + c = *p++; + --n; + + if (!quoted && c >= 0x80) { + OUTCHAR('M'); + OUTCHAR('-'); + c -= 0x80; + } + + if (quoted && (c == '"' || c == '\\')) { + OUTCHAR('\\'); + } + + if (c < 0x20 || (0x7f <= c && c < 0xa0)) { + if (quoted) { + OUTCHAR('\\'); + + switch (c) { + case '\t': + OUTCHAR('t'); + break; + + case '\n': + OUTCHAR('n'); + break; + + case '\b': + OUTCHAR('b'); + break; + + case '\f': + OUTCHAR('f'); + break; + + default: + OUTCHAR('x'); + OUTCHAR(hexchars[c >> 4]); + OUTCHAR(hexchars[c & 0xf]); + } + } else { + if (c == '\t') { + OUTCHAR(c); + } else { + OUTCHAR('^'); + OUTCHAR(c ^ 0x40); + } + } + } else { + OUTCHAR(c); + } + } + + continue; +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT + + case 'P': /* print PPP packet */ + bufinfo.ptr = buf; + bufinfo.len = buflen + 1; + p = va_arg(args, unsigned char *); + n = va_arg(args, int); + ppp_format_packet(p, n, ppp_vslp_printer, &bufinfo); + buf = bufinfo.ptr; + buflen = bufinfo.len - 1; + continue; +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + + case 'B': + p = va_arg(args, unsigned char *); + + for (n = prec; n > 0; --n) { + c = *p++; + + if (fillch == ' ') { + OUTCHAR(' '); + } + + OUTCHAR(hexchars[(c >> 4) & 0xf]); + OUTCHAR(hexchars[c & 0xf]); + } + + continue; + + default: + *buf++ = '%'; + + if (c != '%') { + --fmt; /* so %z outputs %z etc. */ + } + + --buflen; + continue; + } + + if (base != 0) { + str = num + sizeof(num); + *--str = 0; + + while (str > num + neg) { + *--str = hexchars[val % base]; + val = val / base; + + if (--prec <= 0 && val == 0) { + break; + } + } + + switch (neg) { + case 1: + *--str = '-'; + break; + + case 2: + *--str = 'x'; + *--str = '0'; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + len = num + sizeof(num) - 1 - str; + } else { + len = strlen(str); + + if (prec >= 0 && len > prec) { + len = prec; + } + } + + if (width > 0) { + if (width > buflen) { + width = buflen; + } + + if ((n = width - len) > 0) { + buflen -= n; + + for (; n > 0; --n) { + *buf++ = fillch; + } + } + } + + if (len > buflen) { + len = buflen; + } + + memcpy(buf, str, len); + buf += len; + buflen -= len; + } + + *buf = 0; + return buf - buf0; +} + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * vslp_printer - used in processing a %P format + */ +static void ppp_vslp_printer(void *arg, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + int n; + va_list pvar; + struct buffer_info *bi; + + va_start(pvar, fmt); + bi = (struct buffer_info *)arg; + n = ppp_vslprintf(bi->ptr, bi->len, fmt, pvar); + va_end(pvar); + + bi->ptr += n; + bi->len -= n; +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* + * log_packet - format a packet and log it. + */ + +void log_packet(p, len, prefix, level) +u_char *p; +int len; +char *prefix; +int level; +{ + init_pr_log(prefix, level); + ppp_format_packet(p, len, pr_log, &level); + end_pr_log(); +} +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * ppp_format_packet - make a readable representation of a packet, + * calling `printer(arg, format, ...)' to output it. + */ +static void ppp_format_packet(const u_char *p, int len, + void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) +{ + int i, n; + u_short proto; + const struct protent *protp; + + if (len >= 2) { + GETSHORT(proto, p); + len -= 2; + + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (proto == protp->protocol) { + break; + } + + if (protp != NULL) { + printer(arg, "[%s", protp->name); + n = (*protp->printpkt)(p, len, printer, arg); + printer(arg, "]"); + p += n; + len -= n; + } else { + for (i = 0; (protp = protocols[i]) != NULL; ++i) + if (proto == (protp->protocol & ~0x8000)) { + break; + } + + if (protp != 0 && protp->data_name != 0) { + printer(arg, "[%s data]", protp->data_name); + + if (len > 8) { + printer(arg, "%.8B ...", p); + } else { + printer(arg, "%.*B", len, p); + } + + len = 0; + } else { + printer(arg, "[proto=0x%x]", proto); + } + } + } + + if (len > 32) { + printer(arg, "%.32B ...", p); + } else { + printer(arg, "%.*B", len, p); + } +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ +/* + * init_pr_log, end_pr_log - initialize and finish use of pr_log. + */ + +static char line[256]; /* line to be logged accumulated here */ +static char *linep; /* current pointer within line */ +static int llevel; /* level for logging */ + +void init_pr_log(prefix, level) +const char *prefix; +int level; +{ + linep = line; + + if(prefix != NULL) + { + ppp_strlcpy(line, prefix, sizeof(line)); + linep = line + strlen(line); + } + + llevel = level; +} + +void end_pr_log() +{ + if(linep != line) + { + *linep = 0; + ppp_log_write(llevel, line); + } +} + +/* + * pr_log - printer routine for outputting to log + */ +void pr_log(void *arg, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + int l, n; + va_list pvar; + char *p, *eol; + char buf[256]; + + va_start(pvar, fmt); + n = ppp_vslprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, pvar); + va_end(pvar); + + p = buf; + eol = strchr(buf, '\n'); + + if(linep != line) + { + l = (eol == NULL) ? n : eol - buf; + + if(linep + l < line + sizeof(line)) + { + if(l > 0) + { + memcpy(linep, buf, l); + linep += l; + } + + if(eol == NULL) + { + return; + } + + p = eol + 1; + eol = strchr(p, '\n'); + } + + *linep = 0; + ppp_log_write(llevel, line); + linep = line; + } + + while(eol != NULL) + { + *eol = 0; + ppp_log_write(llevel, p); + p = eol + 1; + eol = strchr(p, '\n'); + } + + /* assumes sizeof(buf) <= sizeof(line) */ + l = buf + n - p; + + if(l > 0) + { + memcpy(line, p, n); + linep = line + l; + } +} +#endif /* UNUSED */ + +/* + * ppp_print_string - print a readable representation of a string using + * printer. + */ +void ppp_print_string(const u_char *p, int len, void (*printer)(void *, const char *, ...), void *arg) +{ + int c; + + printer(arg, "\""); + + for (; len > 0; --len) { + c = *p++; + + if (' ' <= c && c <= '~') { + if (c == '\\' || c == '"') { + printer(arg, "\\"); + } + + printer(arg, "%c", c); + } else { + switch (c) { + case '\n': + printer(arg, "\\n"); + break; + + case '\r': + printer(arg, "\\r"); + break; + + case '\t': + printer(arg, "\\t"); + break; + + default: + printer(arg, "\\%.3o", (u8_t)c); + /* no break */ + } + } + } + + printer(arg, "\""); +} + +/* + * ppp_logit - does the hard work for fatal et al. + */ +static void ppp_logit(int level, const char *fmt, va_list args) +{ + char buf[1024]; + + ppp_vslprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + ppp_log_write(level, buf); +} + +static void ppp_log_write(int level, char *buf) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(level); /* necessary if PPPDEBUG is defined to an empty function */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(buf); + PPPDEBUG(level, ("%s\n", buf)); +#if 0 + + if(log_to_fd >= 0 && (level != LOG_DEBUG || debug)) + { + int n = strlen(buf); + + if(n > 0 && buf[n - 1] == '\n') + { + --n; + } + + if(write(log_to_fd, buf, n) != n + || write(log_to_fd, "\n", 1) != 1) + { + log_to_fd = -1; + } + } + +#endif +} + +/* + * ppp_fatal - log an error message and die horribly. + */ +void ppp_fatal(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list pvar; + + va_start(pvar, fmt); + ppp_logit(LOG_ERR, fmt, pvar); + va_end(pvar); + + LWIP_ASSERT("ppp_fatal", 0); /* as promised */ +} + +/* + * ppp_error - log an error message. + */ +void ppp_error(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list pvar; + + va_start(pvar, fmt); + ppp_logit(LOG_ERR, fmt, pvar); + va_end(pvar); +#if 0 /* UNUSED */ + ++error_count; +#endif /* UNUSED */ +} + +/* + * ppp_warn - log a warning message. + */ +void ppp_warn(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list pvar; + + va_start(pvar, fmt); + ppp_logit(LOG_WARNING, fmt, pvar); + va_end(pvar); +} + +/* + * ppp_notice - log a notice-level message. + */ +void ppp_notice(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list pvar; + + va_start(pvar, fmt); + ppp_logit(LOG_NOTICE, fmt, pvar); + va_end(pvar); +} + +/* + * ppp_info - log an informational message. + */ +void ppp_info(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list pvar; + + va_start(pvar, fmt); + ppp_logit(LOG_INFO, fmt, pvar); + va_end(pvar); +} + +/* + * ppp_dbglog - log a debug message. + */ +void ppp_dbglog(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list pvar; + + va_start(pvar, fmt); + ppp_logit(LOG_DEBUG, fmt, pvar); + va_end(pvar); +} + +#if PRINTPKT_SUPPORT +/* + * ppp_dump_packet - print out a packet in readable form if it is interesting. + * Assumes len >= PPP_HDRLEN. + */ +void ppp_dump_packet(ppp_pcb *pcb, const char *tag, unsigned char *p, int len) +{ + int proto; + + /* + * don't print data packets, i.e. IPv4, IPv6, VJ, and compressed packets. + */ + proto = (p[0] << 8) + p[1]; + + if (proto < 0xC000 && (proto & ~0x8000) == proto) { + return; + } + + /* + * don't print valid LCP echo request/reply packets if the link is up. + */ + if (proto == PPP_LCP && pcb->phase == PPP_PHASE_RUNNING && len >= 2 + HEADERLEN) { + unsigned char *lcp = p + 2; + int l = (lcp[2] << 8) + lcp[3]; + + if ((lcp[0] == ECHOREQ || lcp[0] == ECHOREP) && l >= HEADERLEN && l <= len - 2) { + return; + } + } + + ppp_dbglog("%s %P", tag, p, len); +} +#endif /* PRINTPKT_SUPPORT */ + +#if 0 /* Unused */ + +/* + * complete_read - read a full `count' bytes from fd, + * unless end-of-file or an error other than EINTR is encountered. + */ +ssize_t complete_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count) +{ + size_t done; + ssize_t nb; + char *ptr = buf; + + for(done = 0; done < count;) + { + nb = read(fd, ptr, count - done); + + if(nb < 0) + { + if(errno == EINTR) + { + continue; + } + + return -1; + } + + if(nb == 0) + { + break; + } + + done += nb; + ptr += nb; + } + + return done; +} + +/* Procedures for locking the serial device using a lock file. */ +#ifndef LOCK_DIR +#ifdef __linux__ +#define LOCK_DIR "/var/lock" +#else +#ifdef SVR4 +#define LOCK_DIR "/var/spool/locks" +#else +#define LOCK_DIR "/var/spool/lock" +#endif +#endif +#endif /* LOCK_DIR */ + +static char lock_file[MAXPATHLEN]; + +/* + * lock - create a lock file for the named device + */ +int lock(dev) +char *dev; +{ +#ifdef LOCKLIB + int result; + + result = mklock(dev, (void *) 0); + + if(result == 0) + { + ppp_strlcpy(lock_file, dev, sizeof(lock_file)); + return 0; + } + + if(result > 0) + { + ppp_notice("Device %s is locked by pid %d", dev, result); + } + else + { + ppp_error("Can't create lock file %s", lock_file); + } + + return -1; + +#else /* LOCKLIB */ + + char lock_buffer[12]; + int fd, pid, n; + +#ifdef SVR4 + struct stat sbuf; + + if(stat(dev, &sbuf) < 0) + { + ppp_error("Can't get device number for %s: %m", dev); + return -1; + } + + if((sbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFCHR) + { + ppp_error("Can't lock %s: not a character device", dev); + return -1; + } + + ppp_slprintf(lock_file, sizeof(lock_file), "%s/LK.%03d.%03d.%03d", + LOCK_DIR, major(sbuf.st_dev), + major(sbuf.st_rdev), minor(sbuf.st_rdev)); +#else + char *p; + char lockdev[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if((p = strstr(dev, "dev/")) != NULL) + { + dev = p + 4; + strncpy(lockdev, dev, MAXPATHLEN - 1); + lockdev[MAXPATHLEN - 1] = 0; + + while((p = strrchr(lockdev, '/')) != NULL) + { + *p = '_'; + } + + dev = lockdev; + } + else if((p = strrchr(dev, '/')) != NULL) + { + dev = p + 1; + } + + ppp_slprintf(lock_file, sizeof(lock_file), "%s/LCK..%s", LOCK_DIR, dev); +#endif + + while((fd = open(lock_file, O_EXCL | O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0644)) < 0) + { + if(errno != EEXIST) + { + ppp_error("Can't create lock file %s: %m", lock_file); + break; + } + + /* Read the lock file to find out who has the device locked. */ + fd = open(lock_file, O_RDONLY, 0); + + if(fd < 0) + { + if(errno == ENOENT) /* This is just a timing problem. */ + { + continue; + } + + ppp_error("Can't open existing lock file %s: %m", lock_file); + break; + } + +#ifndef LOCK_BINARY + n = read(fd, lock_buffer, 11); +#else + n = read(fd, &pid, sizeof(pid)); +#endif /* LOCK_BINARY */ + close(fd); + fd = -1; + + if(n <= 0) + { + ppp_error("Can't read pid from lock file %s", lock_file); + break; + } + + /* See if the process still exists. */ +#ifndef LOCK_BINARY + lock_buffer[n] = 0; + pid = atoi(lock_buffer); +#endif /* LOCK_BINARY */ + + if(pid == getpid()) + { + return 1; /* somebody else locked it for us */ + } + + if(pid == 0 + || (kill(pid, 0) == -1 && errno == ESRCH)) + { + if(unlink(lock_file) == 0) + { + ppp_notice("Removed stale lock on %s (pid %d)", dev, pid); + continue; + } + + ppp_warn("Couldn't remove stale lock on %s", dev); + } + else + { + ppp_notice("Device %s is locked by pid %d", dev, pid); + } + + break; + } + + if(fd < 0) + { + lock_file[0] = 0; + return -1; + } + + pid = getpid(); +#ifndef LOCK_BINARY + ppp_slprintf(lock_buffer, sizeof(lock_buffer), "%10d\n", pid); + write(fd, lock_buffer, 11); +#else + write(fd, &pid, sizeof(pid)); +#endif + close(fd); + return 0; + +#endif +} + +/* + * relock - called to update our lockfile when we are about to detach, + * thus changing our pid (we fork, the child carries on, and the parent dies). + * Note that this is called by the parent, with pid equal to the pid + * of the child. This avoids a potential race which would exist if + * we had the child rewrite the lockfile (the parent might die first, + * and another process could think the lock was stale if it checked + * between when the parent died and the child rewrote the lockfile). + */ +int relock(pid) +int pid; +{ +#ifdef LOCKLIB + /* XXX is there a way to do this? */ + return -1; +#else /* LOCKLIB */ + + int fd; + char lock_buffer[12]; + + if(lock_file[0] == 0) + { + return -1; + } + + fd = open(lock_file, O_WRONLY, 0); + + if(fd < 0) + { + ppp_error("Couldn't reopen lock file %s: %m", lock_file); + lock_file[0] = 0; + return -1; + } + +#ifndef LOCK_BINARY + ppp_slprintf(lock_buffer, sizeof(lock_buffer), "%10d\n", pid); + write(fd, lock_buffer, 11); +#else + write(fd, &pid, sizeof(pid)); +#endif /* LOCK_BINARY */ + close(fd); + return 0; + +#endif /* LOCKLIB */ +} + +/* + * unlock - remove our lockfile + */ +void unlock() +{ + if(lock_file[0]) + { +#ifdef LOCKLIB + (void) rmlock(lock_file, (void *) 0); +#else + unlink(lock_file); +#endif + lock_file[0] = 0; + } +} + +#endif /* Unused */ + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/vj.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/vj.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/vj.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/vj.c index a58088d4..9429b3d4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/ppp/vj.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/ppp/vj.c @@ -1,713 +1,713 @@ -/* - * Routines to compress and uncompess tcp packets (for transmission - * over low speed serial lines. - * - * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted - * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are - * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, - * advertising materials, and other materials related to such - * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed - * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the - * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived - * from this software without specific prior written permission. - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - * - * Van Jacobson (van@helios.ee.lbl.gov), Dec 31, 1989: - * Initial distribution. - * - * Modified June 1993 by Paul Mackerras, paulus@cs.anu.edu.au, - * so that the entire packet being decompressed doesn't have - * to be in contiguous memory (just the compressed header). - * - * Modified March 1998 by Guy Lancaster, glanca@gesn.com, - * for a 16 bit processor. - */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" -#if PPP_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ - -#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" -#include "netif/ppp/pppdebug.h" - -#include "netif/ppp/vj.h" - -#include - -#if LINK_STATS -#define INCR(counter) ++comp->stats.counter -#else -#define INCR(counter) -#endif - -void vj_compress_init(struct vjcompress *comp) -{ - u8_t i; - struct cstate *tstate = comp->tstate; - -#if MAX_SLOTS == 0 - memset((char *)comp, 0, sizeof(*comp)); -#endif - comp->maxSlotIndex = MAX_SLOTS - 1; - comp->compressSlot = 0; /* Disable slot ID compression by default. */ - - for (i = MAX_SLOTS - 1; i > 0; --i) { - tstate[i].cs_id = i; - tstate[i].cs_next = &tstate[i - 1]; - } - - tstate[0].cs_next = &tstate[MAX_SLOTS - 1]; - tstate[0].cs_id = 0; - comp->last_cs = &tstate[0]; - comp->last_recv = 255; - comp->last_xmit = 255; - comp->flags = VJF_TOSS; -} - -/* ENCODE encodes a number that is known to be non-zero. ENCODEZ - * checks for zero (since zero has to be encoded in the long, 3 byte - * form). - */ -#define ENCODE(n) \ - { \ - if ((u16_t)(n) >= 256) { \ - *cp++ = 0; \ - cp[1] = (u8_t)(n); \ - cp[0] = (u8_t)((n) >> 8); \ - cp += 2; \ - } else { \ - *cp++ = (u8_t)(n); \ - } \ - } -#define ENCODEZ(n) \ - { \ - if ((u16_t)(n) >= 256 || (u16_t)(n) == 0) { \ - *cp++ = 0; \ - cp[1] = (u8_t)(n); \ - cp[0] = (u8_t)((n) >> 8); \ - cp += 2; \ - } else { \ - *cp++ = (u8_t)(n); \ - } \ - } - -#define DECODEL(f) \ - { \ - if (*cp == 0) { \ - u32_t tmp_ = lwip_ntohl(f) + ((cp[1] << 8) | cp[2]); \ - (f) = lwip_htonl(tmp_); \ - cp += 3; \ - } else { \ - u32_t tmp_ = lwip_ntohl(f) + (u32_t)*cp++; \ - (f) = lwip_htonl(tmp_); \ - } \ - } - -#define DECODES(f) \ - { \ - if (*cp == 0) { \ - u16_t tmp_ = lwip_ntohs(f) + (((u16_t)cp[1] << 8) | cp[2]); \ - (f) = lwip_htons(tmp_); \ - cp += 3; \ - } else { \ - u16_t tmp_ = lwip_ntohs(f) + (u16_t)*cp++; \ - (f) = lwip_htons(tmp_); \ - } \ - } - -#define DECODEU(f) \ - { \ - if (*cp == 0) { \ - (f) = lwip_htons(((u16_t)cp[1] << 8) | cp[2]); \ - cp += 3; \ - } else { \ - (f) = lwip_htons((u16_t)*cp++); \ - } \ - } - -/* Helper structures for unaligned *u32_t and *u16_t accesses */ -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct vj_u32_t { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t v); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct vj_u16_t { - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t v); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -/* - * vj_compress_tcp - Attempt to do Van Jacobson header compression on a - * packet. This assumes that nb and comp are not null and that the first - * buffer of the chain contains a valid IP header. - * Return the VJ type code indicating whether or not the packet was - * compressed. - */ -u8_t vj_compress_tcp(struct vjcompress *comp, struct pbuf **pb) -{ - struct pbuf *np = *pb; - struct ip_hdr *ip = (struct ip_hdr *)np->payload; - struct cstate *cs = comp->last_cs->cs_next; - u16_t ilen = IPH_HL(ip); - u16_t hlen; - struct tcp_hdr *oth; - struct tcp_hdr *th; - u16_t deltaS, deltaA = 0; - u32_t deltaL; - u32_t changes = 0; - u8_t new_seq[16]; - u8_t *cp = new_seq; - - /* - * Check that the packet is IP proto TCP. - */ - if (IPH_PROTO(ip) != IP_PROTO_TCP) { - return (TYPE_IP); - } - - /* - * Bail if this is an IP fragment or if the TCP packet isn't - * `compressible' (i.e., ACK isn't set or some other control bit is - * set). - */ - if ((IPH_OFFSET(ip) & PP_HTONS(0x3fff)) || np->tot_len < 40) { - return (TYPE_IP); - } - - th = (struct tcp_hdr *)&((struct vj_u32_t *)ip)[ilen]; - - if ((TCPH_FLAGS(th) & (TCP_SYN | TCP_FIN | TCP_RST | TCP_ACK)) != TCP_ACK) { - return (TYPE_IP); - } - - /* Check that the TCP/IP headers are contained in the first buffer. */ - hlen = ilen + TCPH_HDRLEN(th); - hlen <<= 2; - - if (np->len < hlen) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_compress_tcp: header len %d spans buffers\n", hlen)); - return (TYPE_IP); - } - - /* TCP stack requires that we don't change the packet payload, therefore we copy - * the whole packet before compression. */ - np = pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_RAM, *pb); - - if (!np) { - return (TYPE_IP); - } - - *pb = np; - ip = (struct ip_hdr *)np->payload; - - /* - * Packet is compressible -- we're going to send either a - * COMPRESSED_TCP or UNCOMPRESSED_TCP packet. Either way we need - * to locate (or create) the connection state. Special case the - * most recently used connection since it's most likely to be used - * again & we don't have to do any reordering if it's used. - */ - INCR(vjs_packets); - - if (!ip4_addr_cmp(&ip->src, &cs->cs_ip.src) || !ip4_addr_cmp(&ip->dest, &cs->cs_ip.dest) || (*(struct vj_u32_t *)th).v != (((struct vj_u32_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[IPH_HL(&cs->cs_ip)]).v) { - /* - * Wasn't the first -- search for it. - * - * States are kept in a circularly linked list with - * last_cs pointing to the end of the list. The - * list is kept in lru order by moving a state to the - * head of the list whenever it is referenced. Since - * the list is short and, empirically, the connection - * we want is almost always near the front, we locate - * states via linear search. If we don't find a state - * for the datagram, the oldest state is (re-)used. - */ - struct cstate *lcs; - struct cstate *lastcs = comp->last_cs; - - do { - lcs = cs; - cs = cs->cs_next; - INCR(vjs_searches); - - if (ip4_addr_cmp(&ip->src, &cs->cs_ip.src) && ip4_addr_cmp(&ip->dest, &cs->cs_ip.dest) && (*(struct vj_u32_t *)th).v == (((struct vj_u32_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[IPH_HL(&cs->cs_ip)]).v) { - goto found; - } - } while (cs != lastcs); - - /* - * Didn't find it -- re-use oldest cstate. Send an - * uncompressed packet that tells the other side what - * connection number we're using for this conversation. - * Note that since the state list is circular, the oldest - * state points to the newest and we only need to set - * last_cs to update the lru linkage. - */ - INCR(vjs_misses); - comp->last_cs = lcs; - goto uncompressed; - - found: - - /* - * Found it -- move to the front on the connection list. - */ - if (cs == lastcs) { - comp->last_cs = lcs; - } else { - lcs->cs_next = cs->cs_next; - cs->cs_next = lastcs->cs_next; - lastcs->cs_next = cs; - } - } - - oth = (struct tcp_hdr *)&((struct vj_u32_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[ilen]; - deltaS = ilen; - - /* - * Make sure that only what we expect to change changed. The first - * line of the `if' checks the IP protocol version, header length & - * type of service. The 2nd line checks the "Don't fragment" bit. - * The 3rd line checks the time-to-live and protocol (the protocol - * check is unnecessary but costless). The 4th line checks the TCP - * header length. The 5th line checks IP options, if any. The 6th - * line checks TCP options, if any. If any of these things are - * different between the previous & current datagram, we send the - * current datagram `uncompressed'. - */ - if ((((struct vj_u16_t *)ip)[0]).v != (((struct vj_u16_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[0]).v || (((struct vj_u16_t *)ip)[3]).v != (((struct vj_u16_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[3]).v || (((struct vj_u16_t *)ip)[4]).v != (((struct vj_u16_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[4]).v || TCPH_HDRLEN(th) != TCPH_HDRLEN(oth) || (deltaS > 5 && BCMP(ip + 1, &cs->cs_ip + 1, (deltaS - 5) << 2)) || (TCPH_HDRLEN(th) > 5 && BCMP(th + 1, oth + 1, (TCPH_HDRLEN(th) - 5) << 2))) { - goto uncompressed; - } - - /* - * Figure out which of the changing fields changed. The - * receiver expects changes in the order: urgent, window, - * ack, seq (the order minimizes the number of temporaries - * needed in this section of code). - */ - if (TCPH_FLAGS(th) & TCP_URG) { - deltaS = lwip_ntohs(th->urgp); - ENCODEZ(deltaS); - changes |= NEW_U; - } else if (th->urgp != oth->urgp) { - /* argh! URG not set but urp changed -- a sensible - * implementation should never do this but RFC793 - * doesn't prohibit the change so we have to deal - * with it. */ - goto uncompressed; - } - - if ((deltaS = (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(th->wnd) - lwip_ntohs(oth->wnd))) != 0) { - ENCODE(deltaS); - changes |= NEW_W; - } - - if ((deltaL = lwip_ntohl(th->ackno) - lwip_ntohl(oth->ackno)) != 0) { - if (deltaL > 0xffff) { - goto uncompressed; - } - - deltaA = (u16_t)deltaL; - ENCODE(deltaA); - changes |= NEW_A; - } - - if ((deltaL = lwip_ntohl(th->seqno) - lwip_ntohl(oth->seqno)) != 0) { - if (deltaL > 0xffff) { - goto uncompressed; - } - - deltaS = (u16_t)deltaL; - ENCODE(deltaS); - changes |= NEW_S; - } - - switch (changes) { - case 0: - - /* - * Nothing changed. If this packet contains data and the - * last one didn't, this is probably a data packet following - * an ack (normal on an interactive connection) and we send - * it compressed. Otherwise it's probably a retransmit, - * retransmitted ack or window probe. Send it uncompressed - * in case the other side missed the compressed version. - */ - if (IPH_LEN(ip) != IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip) && - lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) == hlen) { - break; - } - - /* no break */ - /* fall through */ - - case SPECIAL_I: - case SPECIAL_D: - /* - * actual changes match one of our special case encodings -- - * send packet uncompressed. - */ - goto uncompressed; - - case NEW_S | NEW_A: - if (deltaS == deltaA && deltaS == lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) - hlen) { - /* special case for echoed terminal traffic */ - changes = SPECIAL_I; - cp = new_seq; - } - - break; - - case NEW_S: - if (deltaS == lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) - hlen) { - /* special case for data xfer */ - changes = SPECIAL_D; - cp = new_seq; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - deltaS = (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(ip)) - lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(&cs->cs_ip))); - - if (deltaS != 1) { - ENCODEZ(deltaS); - changes |= NEW_I; - } - - if (TCPH_FLAGS(th) & TCP_PSH) { - changes |= TCP_PUSH_BIT; - } - - /* - * Grab the cksum before we overwrite it below. Then update our - * state with this packet's header. - */ - deltaA = lwip_ntohs(th->chksum); - MEMCPY(&cs->cs_ip, ip, hlen); - - /* - * We want to use the original packet as our compressed packet. - * (cp - new_seq) is the number of bytes we need for compressed - * sequence numbers. In addition we need one byte for the change - * mask, one for the connection id and two for the tcp checksum. - * So, (cp - new_seq) + 4 bytes of header are needed. hlen is how - * many bytes of the original packet to toss so subtract the two to - * get the new packet size. - */ - deltaS = (u16_t)(cp - new_seq); - - if (!comp->compressSlot || comp->last_xmit != cs->cs_id) { - comp->last_xmit = cs->cs_id; - hlen -= deltaS + 4; - - if (pbuf_remove_header(np, hlen)) { - /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); - } - - cp = (u8_t *)np->payload; - *cp++ = (u8_t)(changes | NEW_C); - *cp++ = cs->cs_id; - } else { - hlen -= deltaS + 3; - - if (pbuf_remove_header(np, hlen)) { - /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); - } - - cp = (u8_t *)np->payload; - *cp++ = (u8_t)changes; - } - - *cp++ = (u8_t)(deltaA >> 8); - *cp++ = (u8_t)deltaA; - MEMCPY(cp, new_seq, deltaS); - INCR(vjs_compressed); - return (TYPE_COMPRESSED_TCP); - - /* - * Update connection state cs & send uncompressed packet (that is, - * a regular ip/tcp packet but with the 'conversation id' we hope - * to use on future compressed packets in the protocol field). - */ -uncompressed: - MEMCPY(&cs->cs_ip, ip, hlen); - IPH_PROTO_SET(ip, cs->cs_id); - comp->last_xmit = cs->cs_id; - return (TYPE_UNCOMPRESSED_TCP); -} - -/* - * Called when we may have missed a packet. - */ -void vj_uncompress_err(struct vjcompress *comp) -{ - comp->flags |= VJF_TOSS; - INCR(vjs_errorin); -} - -/* - * "Uncompress" a packet of type TYPE_UNCOMPRESSED_TCP. - * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. - */ -int vj_uncompress_uncomp(struct pbuf *nb, struct vjcompress *comp) -{ - u32_t hlen; - struct cstate *cs; - struct ip_hdr *ip; - - ip = (struct ip_hdr *)nb->payload; - hlen = IPH_HL(ip) << 2; - - if (IPH_PROTO(ip) >= MAX_SLOTS || hlen + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) > nb->len || (hlen += TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES((struct tcp_hdr *)&((char *)ip)[hlen])) > nb->len || hlen > MAX_HDR) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_uncompress_uncomp: bad cid=%d, hlen=%d buflen=%d\n", - IPH_PROTO(ip), hlen, nb->len)); - vj_uncompress_err(comp); - return -1; - } - - cs = &comp->rstate[comp->last_recv = IPH_PROTO(ip)]; - comp->flags &= ~VJF_TOSS; - IPH_PROTO_SET(ip, IP_PROTO_TCP); - /* copy from/to bigger buffers checked above instead of cs->cs_ip and ip - just to help static code analysis to see this is correct ;-) */ - MEMCPY(&cs->cs_hdr, nb->payload, hlen); - cs->cs_hlen = (u16_t)hlen; - INCR(vjs_uncompressedin); - return 0; -} - -/* - * Uncompress a packet of type TYPE_COMPRESSED_TCP. - * The packet is composed of a buffer chain and the first buffer - * must contain an accurate chain length. - * The first buffer must include the entire compressed TCP/IP header. - * This procedure replaces the compressed header with the uncompressed - * header and returns the length of the VJ header. - */ -int vj_uncompress_tcp(struct pbuf **nb, struct vjcompress *comp) -{ - u8_t *cp; - struct tcp_hdr *th; - struct cstate *cs; - struct vj_u16_t *bp; - struct pbuf *n0 = *nb; - u32_t tmp; - u32_t vjlen, hlen, changes; - - INCR(vjs_compressedin); - cp = (u8_t *)n0->payload; - changes = *cp++; - - if (changes & NEW_C) { - /* - * Make sure the state index is in range, then grab the state. - * If we have a good state index, clear the 'discard' flag. - */ - if (*cp >= MAX_SLOTS) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: bad cid=%d\n", *cp)); - goto bad; - } - - comp->flags &= ~VJF_TOSS; - comp->last_recv = *cp++; - } else { - /* - * this packet has an implicit state index. If we've - * had a line error since the last time we got an - * explicit state index, we have to toss the packet. - */ - if (comp->flags & VJF_TOSS) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: tossing\n")); - INCR(vjs_tossed); - return (-1); - } - } - - cs = &comp->rstate[comp->last_recv]; - hlen = IPH_HL(&cs->cs_ip) << 2; - th = (struct tcp_hdr *)&((u8_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[hlen]; - th->chksum = lwip_htons((*cp << 8) | cp[1]); - cp += 2; - - if (changes & TCP_PUSH_BIT) { - TCPH_SET_FLAG(th, TCP_PSH); - } else { - TCPH_UNSET_FLAG(th, TCP_PSH); - } - - switch (changes & SPECIALS_MASK) { - case SPECIAL_I: { - u32_t i = lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) - cs->cs_hlen; - /* some compilers can't nest inline assembler.. */ - tmp = lwip_ntohl(th->ackno) + i; - th->ackno = lwip_htonl(tmp); - tmp = lwip_ntohl(th->seqno) + i; - th->seqno = lwip_htonl(tmp); - } break; - - case SPECIAL_D: - /* some compilers can't nest inline assembler.. */ - tmp = lwip_ntohl(th->seqno) + lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) - cs->cs_hlen; - th->seqno = lwip_htonl(tmp); - break; - - default: - if (changes & NEW_U) { - TCPH_SET_FLAG(th, TCP_URG); - DECODEU(th->urgp); - } else { - TCPH_UNSET_FLAG(th, TCP_URG); - } - - if (changes & NEW_W) { - DECODES(th->wnd); - } - - if (changes & NEW_A) { - DECODEL(th->ackno); - } - - if (changes & NEW_S) { - DECODEL(th->seqno); - } - - break; - } - - if (changes & NEW_I) { - DECODES(cs->cs_ip._id); - } else { - IPH_ID_SET(&cs->cs_ip, lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(&cs->cs_ip)) + 1); - IPH_ID_SET(&cs->cs_ip, lwip_htons(IPH_ID(&cs->cs_ip))); - } - - /* - * At this point, cp points to the first byte of data in the - * packet. Fill in the IP total length and update the IP - * header checksum. - */ - vjlen = (u16_t)(cp - (u8_t *)n0->payload); - - if (n0->len < vjlen) { - /* - * We must have dropped some characters (crc should detect - * this but the old slip framing won't) - */ - PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: head buffer %d too short %d\n", - n0->len, vjlen)); - goto bad; - } - -#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN - tmp = n0->tot_len - vjlen + cs->cs_hlen; - IPH_LEN_SET(&cs->cs_ip, lwip_htons((u16_t)tmp)); -#else - IPH_LEN_SET(&cs->cs_ip, lwip_htons(n0->tot_len - vjlen + cs->cs_hlen)); -#endif - - /* recompute the ip header checksum */ - bp = (struct vj_u16_t *)&cs->cs_ip; - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(&cs->cs_ip, 0); - - for (tmp = 0; hlen > 0; hlen -= 2) { - tmp += (*bp++).v; - } - - tmp = (tmp & 0xffff) + (tmp >> 16); - tmp = (tmp & 0xffff) + (tmp >> 16); - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(&cs->cs_ip, (u16_t)(~tmp)); - - /* Remove the compressed header and prepend the uncompressed header. */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(n0, vjlen)) { - /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); - goto bad; - } - - if (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(n0->payload) != n0->payload) { - struct pbuf *np; - -#if IP_FORWARD - /* If IP forwarding is enabled we are using a PBUF_LINK packet type so - * the packet is being allocated with enough header space to be - * forwarded (to Ethernet for example). - */ - np = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, n0->len + cs->cs_hlen, PBUF_POOL); -#else /* IP_FORWARD */ - np = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, n0->len + cs->cs_hlen, PBUF_POOL); -#endif /* IP_FORWARD */ - - if (!np) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: realign failed\n")); - goto bad; - } - - if (pbuf_remove_header(np, cs->cs_hlen)) { - /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ - LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); - goto bad; - } - - pbuf_take(np, n0->payload, n0->len); - - if (n0->next) { - pbuf_chain(np, n0->next); - pbuf_dechain(n0); - } - - pbuf_free(n0); - n0 = np; - } - - if (pbuf_add_header(n0, cs->cs_hlen)) { - struct pbuf *np; - - LWIP_ASSERT("vj_uncompress_tcp: cs->cs_hlen <= PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE", cs->cs_hlen <= PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE); - np = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, cs->cs_hlen, PBUF_POOL); - - if (!np) { - PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: prepend failed\n")); - goto bad; - } - - pbuf_cat(np, n0); - n0 = np; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("n0->len >= cs->cs_hlen", n0->len >= cs->cs_hlen); - MEMCPY(n0->payload, &cs->cs_ip, cs->cs_hlen); - - *nb = n0; - - return vjlen; - -bad: - vj_uncompress_err(comp); - return (-1); -} - -#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ +/* + * Routines to compress and uncompess tcp packets (for transmission + * over low speed serial lines. + * + * Copyright (c) 1989 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted + * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, + * advertising materials, and other materials related to such + * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed + * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the + * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + * + * Van Jacobson (van@helios.ee.lbl.gov), Dec 31, 1989: + * Initial distribution. + * + * Modified June 1993 by Paul Mackerras, paulus@cs.anu.edu.au, + * so that the entire packet being decompressed doesn't have + * to be in contiguous memory (just the compressed header). + * + * Modified March 1998 by Guy Lancaster, glanca@gesn.com, + * for a 16 bit processor. + */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_opts.h" +#if PPP_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT /* don't build if not configured for use in lwipopts.h */ + +#include "netif/ppp/ppp_impl.h" +#include "netif/ppp/pppdebug.h" + +#include "netif/ppp/vj.h" + +#include + +#if LINK_STATS +#define INCR(counter) ++comp->stats.counter +#else +#define INCR(counter) +#endif + +void vj_compress_init(struct vjcompress *comp) +{ + u8_t i; + struct cstate *tstate = comp->tstate; + +#if MAX_SLOTS == 0 + memset((char *)comp, 0, sizeof(*comp)); +#endif + comp->maxSlotIndex = MAX_SLOTS - 1; + comp->compressSlot = 0; /* Disable slot ID compression by default. */ + + for (i = MAX_SLOTS - 1; i > 0; --i) { + tstate[i].cs_id = i; + tstate[i].cs_next = &tstate[i - 1]; + } + + tstate[0].cs_next = &tstate[MAX_SLOTS - 1]; + tstate[0].cs_id = 0; + comp->last_cs = &tstate[0]; + comp->last_recv = 255; + comp->last_xmit = 255; + comp->flags = VJF_TOSS; +} + +/* ENCODE encodes a number that is known to be non-zero. ENCODEZ + * checks for zero (since zero has to be encoded in the long, 3 byte + * form). + */ +#define ENCODE(n) \ + { \ + if ((u16_t)(n) >= 256) { \ + *cp++ = 0; \ + cp[1] = (u8_t)(n); \ + cp[0] = (u8_t)((n) >> 8); \ + cp += 2; \ + } else { \ + *cp++ = (u8_t)(n); \ + } \ + } +#define ENCODEZ(n) \ + { \ + if ((u16_t)(n) >= 256 || (u16_t)(n) == 0) { \ + *cp++ = 0; \ + cp[1] = (u8_t)(n); \ + cp[0] = (u8_t)((n) >> 8); \ + cp += 2; \ + } else { \ + *cp++ = (u8_t)(n); \ + } \ + } + +#define DECODEL(f) \ + { \ + if (*cp == 0) { \ + u32_t tmp_ = lwip_ntohl(f) + ((cp[1] << 8) | cp[2]); \ + (f) = lwip_htonl(tmp_); \ + cp += 3; \ + } else { \ + u32_t tmp_ = lwip_ntohl(f) + (u32_t)*cp++; \ + (f) = lwip_htonl(tmp_); \ + } \ + } + +#define DECODES(f) \ + { \ + if (*cp == 0) { \ + u16_t tmp_ = lwip_ntohs(f) + (((u16_t)cp[1] << 8) | cp[2]); \ + (f) = lwip_htons(tmp_); \ + cp += 3; \ + } else { \ + u16_t tmp_ = lwip_ntohs(f) + (u16_t)*cp++; \ + (f) = lwip_htons(tmp_); \ + } \ + } + +#define DECODEU(f) \ + { \ + if (*cp == 0) { \ + (f) = lwip_htons(((u16_t)cp[1] << 8) | cp[2]); \ + cp += 3; \ + } else { \ + (f) = lwip_htons((u16_t)*cp++); \ + } \ + } + +/* Helper structures for unaligned *u32_t and *u16_t accesses */ +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct vj_u32_t { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t v); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct vj_u16_t { + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t v); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +/* + * vj_compress_tcp - Attempt to do Van Jacobson header compression on a + * packet. This assumes that nb and comp are not null and that the first + * buffer of the chain contains a valid IP header. + * Return the VJ type code indicating whether or not the packet was + * compressed. + */ +u8_t vj_compress_tcp(struct vjcompress *comp, struct pbuf **pb) +{ + struct pbuf *np = *pb; + struct ip_hdr *ip = (struct ip_hdr *)np->payload; + struct cstate *cs = comp->last_cs->cs_next; + u16_t ilen = IPH_HL(ip); + u16_t hlen; + struct tcp_hdr *oth; + struct tcp_hdr *th; + u16_t deltaS, deltaA = 0; + u32_t deltaL; + u32_t changes = 0; + u8_t new_seq[16]; + u8_t *cp = new_seq; + + /* + * Check that the packet is IP proto TCP. + */ + if (IPH_PROTO(ip) != IP_PROTO_TCP) { + return (TYPE_IP); + } + + /* + * Bail if this is an IP fragment or if the TCP packet isn't + * `compressible' (i.e., ACK isn't set or some other control bit is + * set). + */ + if ((IPH_OFFSET(ip) & PP_HTONS(0x3fff)) || np->tot_len < 40) { + return (TYPE_IP); + } + + th = (struct tcp_hdr *)&((struct vj_u32_t *)ip)[ilen]; + + if ((TCPH_FLAGS(th) & (TCP_SYN | TCP_FIN | TCP_RST | TCP_ACK)) != TCP_ACK) { + return (TYPE_IP); + } + + /* Check that the TCP/IP headers are contained in the first buffer. */ + hlen = ilen + TCPH_HDRLEN(th); + hlen <<= 2; + + if (np->len < hlen) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_compress_tcp: header len %d spans buffers\n", hlen)); + return (TYPE_IP); + } + + /* TCP stack requires that we don't change the packet payload, therefore we copy + * the whole packet before compression. */ + np = pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_RAM, *pb); + + if (!np) { + return (TYPE_IP); + } + + *pb = np; + ip = (struct ip_hdr *)np->payload; + + /* + * Packet is compressible -- we're going to send either a + * COMPRESSED_TCP or UNCOMPRESSED_TCP packet. Either way we need + * to locate (or create) the connection state. Special case the + * most recently used connection since it's most likely to be used + * again & we don't have to do any reordering if it's used. + */ + INCR(vjs_packets); + + if (!ip4_addr_cmp(&ip->src, &cs->cs_ip.src) || !ip4_addr_cmp(&ip->dest, &cs->cs_ip.dest) || (*(struct vj_u32_t *)th).v != (((struct vj_u32_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[IPH_HL(&cs->cs_ip)]).v) { + /* + * Wasn't the first -- search for it. + * + * States are kept in a circularly linked list with + * last_cs pointing to the end of the list. The + * list is kept in lru order by moving a state to the + * head of the list whenever it is referenced. Since + * the list is short and, empirically, the connection + * we want is almost always near the front, we locate + * states via linear search. If we don't find a state + * for the datagram, the oldest state is (re-)used. + */ + struct cstate *lcs; + struct cstate *lastcs = comp->last_cs; + + do { + lcs = cs; + cs = cs->cs_next; + INCR(vjs_searches); + + if (ip4_addr_cmp(&ip->src, &cs->cs_ip.src) && ip4_addr_cmp(&ip->dest, &cs->cs_ip.dest) && (*(struct vj_u32_t *)th).v == (((struct vj_u32_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[IPH_HL(&cs->cs_ip)]).v) { + goto found; + } + } while (cs != lastcs); + + /* + * Didn't find it -- re-use oldest cstate. Send an + * uncompressed packet that tells the other side what + * connection number we're using for this conversation. + * Note that since the state list is circular, the oldest + * state points to the newest and we only need to set + * last_cs to update the lru linkage. + */ + INCR(vjs_misses); + comp->last_cs = lcs; + goto uncompressed; + + found: + + /* + * Found it -- move to the front on the connection list. + */ + if (cs == lastcs) { + comp->last_cs = lcs; + } else { + lcs->cs_next = cs->cs_next; + cs->cs_next = lastcs->cs_next; + lastcs->cs_next = cs; + } + } + + oth = (struct tcp_hdr *)&((struct vj_u32_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[ilen]; + deltaS = ilen; + + /* + * Make sure that only what we expect to change changed. The first + * line of the `if' checks the IP protocol version, header length & + * type of service. The 2nd line checks the "Don't fragment" bit. + * The 3rd line checks the time-to-live and protocol (the protocol + * check is unnecessary but costless). The 4th line checks the TCP + * header length. The 5th line checks IP options, if any. The 6th + * line checks TCP options, if any. If any of these things are + * different between the previous & current datagram, we send the + * current datagram `uncompressed'. + */ + if ((((struct vj_u16_t *)ip)[0]).v != (((struct vj_u16_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[0]).v || (((struct vj_u16_t *)ip)[3]).v != (((struct vj_u16_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[3]).v || (((struct vj_u16_t *)ip)[4]).v != (((struct vj_u16_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[4]).v || TCPH_HDRLEN(th) != TCPH_HDRLEN(oth) || (deltaS > 5 && BCMP(ip + 1, &cs->cs_ip + 1, (deltaS - 5) << 2)) || (TCPH_HDRLEN(th) > 5 && BCMP(th + 1, oth + 1, (TCPH_HDRLEN(th) - 5) << 2))) { + goto uncompressed; + } + + /* + * Figure out which of the changing fields changed. The + * receiver expects changes in the order: urgent, window, + * ack, seq (the order minimizes the number of temporaries + * needed in this section of code). + */ + if (TCPH_FLAGS(th) & TCP_URG) { + deltaS = lwip_ntohs(th->urgp); + ENCODEZ(deltaS); + changes |= NEW_U; + } else if (th->urgp != oth->urgp) { + /* argh! URG not set but urp changed -- a sensible + * implementation should never do this but RFC793 + * doesn't prohibit the change so we have to deal + * with it. */ + goto uncompressed; + } + + if ((deltaS = (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(th->wnd) - lwip_ntohs(oth->wnd))) != 0) { + ENCODE(deltaS); + changes |= NEW_W; + } + + if ((deltaL = lwip_ntohl(th->ackno) - lwip_ntohl(oth->ackno)) != 0) { + if (deltaL > 0xffff) { + goto uncompressed; + } + + deltaA = (u16_t)deltaL; + ENCODE(deltaA); + changes |= NEW_A; + } + + if ((deltaL = lwip_ntohl(th->seqno) - lwip_ntohl(oth->seqno)) != 0) { + if (deltaL > 0xffff) { + goto uncompressed; + } + + deltaS = (u16_t)deltaL; + ENCODE(deltaS); + changes |= NEW_S; + } + + switch (changes) { + case 0: + + /* + * Nothing changed. If this packet contains data and the + * last one didn't, this is probably a data packet following + * an ack (normal on an interactive connection) and we send + * it compressed. Otherwise it's probably a retransmit, + * retransmitted ack or window probe. Send it uncompressed + * in case the other side missed the compressed version. + */ + if (IPH_LEN(ip) != IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip) && + lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) == hlen) { + break; + } + + /* no break */ + /* fall through */ + + case SPECIAL_I: + case SPECIAL_D: + /* + * actual changes match one of our special case encodings -- + * send packet uncompressed. + */ + goto uncompressed; + + case NEW_S | NEW_A: + if (deltaS == deltaA && deltaS == lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) - hlen) { + /* special case for echoed terminal traffic */ + changes = SPECIAL_I; + cp = new_seq; + } + + break; + + case NEW_S: + if (deltaS == lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) - hlen) { + /* special case for data xfer */ + changes = SPECIAL_D; + cp = new_seq; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + deltaS = (u16_t)(lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(ip)) - lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(&cs->cs_ip))); + + if (deltaS != 1) { + ENCODEZ(deltaS); + changes |= NEW_I; + } + + if (TCPH_FLAGS(th) & TCP_PSH) { + changes |= TCP_PUSH_BIT; + } + + /* + * Grab the cksum before we overwrite it below. Then update our + * state with this packet's header. + */ + deltaA = lwip_ntohs(th->chksum); + MEMCPY(&cs->cs_ip, ip, hlen); + + /* + * We want to use the original packet as our compressed packet. + * (cp - new_seq) is the number of bytes we need for compressed + * sequence numbers. In addition we need one byte for the change + * mask, one for the connection id and two for the tcp checksum. + * So, (cp - new_seq) + 4 bytes of header are needed. hlen is how + * many bytes of the original packet to toss so subtract the two to + * get the new packet size. + */ + deltaS = (u16_t)(cp - new_seq); + + if (!comp->compressSlot || comp->last_xmit != cs->cs_id) { + comp->last_xmit = cs->cs_id; + hlen -= deltaS + 4; + + if (pbuf_remove_header(np, hlen)) { + /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); + } + + cp = (u8_t *)np->payload; + *cp++ = (u8_t)(changes | NEW_C); + *cp++ = cs->cs_id; + } else { + hlen -= deltaS + 3; + + if (pbuf_remove_header(np, hlen)) { + /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); + } + + cp = (u8_t *)np->payload; + *cp++ = (u8_t)changes; + } + + *cp++ = (u8_t)(deltaA >> 8); + *cp++ = (u8_t)deltaA; + MEMCPY(cp, new_seq, deltaS); + INCR(vjs_compressed); + return (TYPE_COMPRESSED_TCP); + + /* + * Update connection state cs & send uncompressed packet (that is, + * a regular ip/tcp packet but with the 'conversation id' we hope + * to use on future compressed packets in the protocol field). + */ +uncompressed: + MEMCPY(&cs->cs_ip, ip, hlen); + IPH_PROTO_SET(ip, cs->cs_id); + comp->last_xmit = cs->cs_id; + return (TYPE_UNCOMPRESSED_TCP); +} + +/* + * Called when we may have missed a packet. + */ +void vj_uncompress_err(struct vjcompress *comp) +{ + comp->flags |= VJF_TOSS; + INCR(vjs_errorin); +} + +/* + * "Uncompress" a packet of type TYPE_UNCOMPRESSED_TCP. + * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int vj_uncompress_uncomp(struct pbuf *nb, struct vjcompress *comp) +{ + u32_t hlen; + struct cstate *cs; + struct ip_hdr *ip; + + ip = (struct ip_hdr *)nb->payload; + hlen = IPH_HL(ip) << 2; + + if (IPH_PROTO(ip) >= MAX_SLOTS || hlen + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) > nb->len || (hlen += TCPH_HDRLEN_BYTES((struct tcp_hdr *)&((char *)ip)[hlen])) > nb->len || hlen > MAX_HDR) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_uncompress_uncomp: bad cid=%d, hlen=%d buflen=%d\n", + IPH_PROTO(ip), hlen, nb->len)); + vj_uncompress_err(comp); + return -1; + } + + cs = &comp->rstate[comp->last_recv = IPH_PROTO(ip)]; + comp->flags &= ~VJF_TOSS; + IPH_PROTO_SET(ip, IP_PROTO_TCP); + /* copy from/to bigger buffers checked above instead of cs->cs_ip and ip + just to help static code analysis to see this is correct ;-) */ + MEMCPY(&cs->cs_hdr, nb->payload, hlen); + cs->cs_hlen = (u16_t)hlen; + INCR(vjs_uncompressedin); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Uncompress a packet of type TYPE_COMPRESSED_TCP. + * The packet is composed of a buffer chain and the first buffer + * must contain an accurate chain length. + * The first buffer must include the entire compressed TCP/IP header. + * This procedure replaces the compressed header with the uncompressed + * header and returns the length of the VJ header. + */ +int vj_uncompress_tcp(struct pbuf **nb, struct vjcompress *comp) +{ + u8_t *cp; + struct tcp_hdr *th; + struct cstate *cs; + struct vj_u16_t *bp; + struct pbuf *n0 = *nb; + u32_t tmp; + u32_t vjlen, hlen, changes; + + INCR(vjs_compressedin); + cp = (u8_t *)n0->payload; + changes = *cp++; + + if (changes & NEW_C) { + /* + * Make sure the state index is in range, then grab the state. + * If we have a good state index, clear the 'discard' flag. + */ + if (*cp >= MAX_SLOTS) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: bad cid=%d\n", *cp)); + goto bad; + } + + comp->flags &= ~VJF_TOSS; + comp->last_recv = *cp++; + } else { + /* + * this packet has an implicit state index. If we've + * had a line error since the last time we got an + * explicit state index, we have to toss the packet. + */ + if (comp->flags & VJF_TOSS) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: tossing\n")); + INCR(vjs_tossed); + return (-1); + } + } + + cs = &comp->rstate[comp->last_recv]; + hlen = IPH_HL(&cs->cs_ip) << 2; + th = (struct tcp_hdr *)&((u8_t *)&cs->cs_ip)[hlen]; + th->chksum = lwip_htons((*cp << 8) | cp[1]); + cp += 2; + + if (changes & TCP_PUSH_BIT) { + TCPH_SET_FLAG(th, TCP_PSH); + } else { + TCPH_UNSET_FLAG(th, TCP_PSH); + } + + switch (changes & SPECIALS_MASK) { + case SPECIAL_I: { + u32_t i = lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) - cs->cs_hlen; + /* some compilers can't nest inline assembler.. */ + tmp = lwip_ntohl(th->ackno) + i; + th->ackno = lwip_htonl(tmp); + tmp = lwip_ntohl(th->seqno) + i; + th->seqno = lwip_htonl(tmp); + } break; + + case SPECIAL_D: + /* some compilers can't nest inline assembler.. */ + tmp = lwip_ntohl(th->seqno) + lwip_ntohs(IPH_LEN(&cs->cs_ip)) - cs->cs_hlen; + th->seqno = lwip_htonl(tmp); + break; + + default: + if (changes & NEW_U) { + TCPH_SET_FLAG(th, TCP_URG); + DECODEU(th->urgp); + } else { + TCPH_UNSET_FLAG(th, TCP_URG); + } + + if (changes & NEW_W) { + DECODES(th->wnd); + } + + if (changes & NEW_A) { + DECODEL(th->ackno); + } + + if (changes & NEW_S) { + DECODEL(th->seqno); + } + + break; + } + + if (changes & NEW_I) { + DECODES(cs->cs_ip._id); + } else { + IPH_ID_SET(&cs->cs_ip, lwip_ntohs(IPH_ID(&cs->cs_ip)) + 1); + IPH_ID_SET(&cs->cs_ip, lwip_htons(IPH_ID(&cs->cs_ip))); + } + + /* + * At this point, cp points to the first byte of data in the + * packet. Fill in the IP total length and update the IP + * header checksum. + */ + vjlen = (u16_t)(cp - (u8_t *)n0->payload); + + if (n0->len < vjlen) { + /* + * We must have dropped some characters (crc should detect + * this but the old slip framing won't) + */ + PPPDEBUG(LOG_INFO, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: head buffer %d too short %d\n", + n0->len, vjlen)); + goto bad; + } + +#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN + tmp = n0->tot_len - vjlen + cs->cs_hlen; + IPH_LEN_SET(&cs->cs_ip, lwip_htons((u16_t)tmp)); +#else + IPH_LEN_SET(&cs->cs_ip, lwip_htons(n0->tot_len - vjlen + cs->cs_hlen)); +#endif + + /* recompute the ip header checksum */ + bp = (struct vj_u16_t *)&cs->cs_ip; + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(&cs->cs_ip, 0); + + for (tmp = 0; hlen > 0; hlen -= 2) { + tmp += (*bp++).v; + } + + tmp = (tmp & 0xffff) + (tmp >> 16); + tmp = (tmp & 0xffff) + (tmp >> 16); + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(&cs->cs_ip, (u16_t)(~tmp)); + + /* Remove the compressed header and prepend the uncompressed header. */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(n0, vjlen)) { + /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); + goto bad; + } + + if (LWIP_MEM_ALIGN(n0->payload) != n0->payload) { + struct pbuf *np; + +#if IP_FORWARD + /* If IP forwarding is enabled we are using a PBUF_LINK packet type so + * the packet is being allocated with enough header space to be + * forwarded (to Ethernet for example). + */ + np = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, n0->len + cs->cs_hlen, PBUF_POOL); +#else /* IP_FORWARD */ + np = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, n0->len + cs->cs_hlen, PBUF_POOL); +#endif /* IP_FORWARD */ + + if (!np) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: realign failed\n")); + goto bad; + } + + if (pbuf_remove_header(np, cs->cs_hlen)) { + /* Can we cope with this failing? Just assert for now */ + LWIP_ASSERT("pbuf_remove_header failed\n", 0); + goto bad; + } + + pbuf_take(np, n0->payload, n0->len); + + if (n0->next) { + pbuf_chain(np, n0->next); + pbuf_dechain(n0); + } + + pbuf_free(n0); + n0 = np; + } + + if (pbuf_add_header(n0, cs->cs_hlen)) { + struct pbuf *np; + + LWIP_ASSERT("vj_uncompress_tcp: cs->cs_hlen <= PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE", cs->cs_hlen <= PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE); + np = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, cs->cs_hlen, PBUF_POOL); + + if (!np) { + PPPDEBUG(LOG_WARNING, ("vj_uncompress_tcp: prepend failed\n")); + goto bad; + } + + pbuf_cat(np, n0); + n0 = np; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("n0->len >= cs->cs_hlen", n0->len >= cs->cs_hlen); + MEMCPY(n0->payload, &cs->cs_ip, cs->cs_hlen); + + *nb = n0; + + return vjlen; + +bad: + vj_uncompress_err(comp); + return (-1); +} + +#endif /* PPP_SUPPORT && VJ_SUPPORT */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/slipif.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/slipif.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/slipif.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/slipif.c index 90fb98c6..740c01f9 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/slipif.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/slipif.c @@ -1,577 +1,577 @@ -/** - * @file - * SLIP Interface - * - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is built upon the file: src/arch/rtxc/netif/sioslip.c - * - * Author: Magnus Ivarsson - * Simon Goldschmidt - */ - -/** - * @defgroup slipif SLIP - * @ingroup netifs - * - * This is an arch independent SLIP netif. The specific serial hooks must be - * provided by another file. They are sio_open, sio_read/sio_tryread and sio_send - * - * Usage: This netif can be used in three ways:\n - * 1) For NO_SYS==0, an RX thread can be used which blocks on sio_read() - * until data is received.\n - * 2) In your main loop, call slipif_poll() to check for new RX bytes, - * completed packets are fed into netif->input().\n - * 3) Call slipif_received_byte[s]() from your serial RX ISR and - * slipif_process_rxqueue() from your main loop. ISR level decodes - * packets and puts completed packets on a queue which is fed into - * the stack from the main loop (needs SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT for - * pbuf_alloc to work on ISR level!). - * - */ - -#include "netif/slipif.h" -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/sio.h" - -#define SLIP_END 0xC0 /* 0300: start and end of every packet */ -#define SLIP_ESC 0xDB /* 0333: escape start (one byte escaped data follows) */ -#define SLIP_ESC_END 0xDC /* 0334: following escape: original byte is 0xC0 (END) */ -#define SLIP_ESC_ESC 0xDD /* 0335: following escape: original byte is 0xDB (ESC) */ - -/** Maximum packet size that is received by this netif */ -#ifndef SLIP_MAX_SIZE -#define SLIP_MAX_SIZE 1500 -#endif - -/** Define this to the interface speed for SNMP - * (sio_fd is the sio_fd_t returned by sio_open). - * The default value of zero means 'unknown'. - */ -#ifndef SLIP_SIO_SPEED -#define SLIP_SIO_SPEED(sio_fd) 0 -#endif - -enum slipif_recv_state { - SLIP_RECV_NORMAL, - SLIP_RECV_ESCAPE -}; - -struct slipif_priv { - sio_fd_t sd; - /* q is the whole pbuf chain for a packet, p is the current pbuf in the chain */ - struct pbuf *p, *q; - u8_t state; - u16_t i, recved; -#if SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR - struct pbuf *rxpackets; -#endif -}; - -/** - * Send a pbuf doing the necessary SLIP encapsulation - * - * Uses the serial layer's sio_send() - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif - * @param p the pbuf chain packet to send - * @return always returns ERR_OK since the serial layer does not provide return values - */ -static err_t slipif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct slipif_priv *priv; - struct pbuf *q; - u16_t i; - u8_t c; - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", (p != NULL)); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif_output: sending %" U16_F " bytes\n", p->tot_len)); - priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; - - /* Send pbuf out on the serial I/O device. */ - /* Start with packet delimiter. */ - sio_send(SLIP_END, priv->sd); - - for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - for (i = 0; i < q->len; i++) { - c = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[i]; - - switch (c) { - case SLIP_END: - /* need to escape this byte (0xC0 -> 0xDB, 0xDC) */ - sio_send(SLIP_ESC, priv->sd); - sio_send(SLIP_ESC_END, priv->sd); - break; - - case SLIP_ESC: - /* need to escape this byte (0xDB -> 0xDB, 0xDD) */ - sio_send(SLIP_ESC, priv->sd); - sio_send(SLIP_ESC_ESC, priv->sd); - break; - - default: - /* normal byte - no need for escaping */ - sio_send(c, priv->sd); - break; - } - } - } - - /* End with packet delimiter. */ - sio_send(SLIP_END, priv->sd); - return ERR_OK; -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -/** - * Send a pbuf doing the necessary SLIP encapsulation - * - * Uses the serial layer's sio_send() - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif - * @param p the pbuf chain packet to send - * @param ipaddr the ip address to send the packet to (not used for slipif) - * @return always returns ERR_OK since the serial layer does not provide return values - */ -static err_t slipif_output_v4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - return slipif_output(netif, p); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -#if LWIP_IPV6 -/** - * Send a pbuf doing the necessary SLIP encapsulation - * - * Uses the serial layer's sio_send() - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif - * @param p the pbuf chain packet to send - * @param ipaddr the ip address to send the packet to (not used for slipif) - * @return always returns ERR_OK since the serial layer does not provide return values - */ -static err_t slipif_output_v6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - return slipif_output(netif, p); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/** - * Handle the incoming SLIP stream character by character - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif - * @param c received character (multiple calls to this function will - * return a complete packet, NULL is returned before - used for polling) - * @return The IP packet when SLIP_END is received - */ -static struct pbuf *slipif_rxbyte(struct netif *netif, u8_t c) -{ - struct slipif_priv *priv; - struct pbuf *t; - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); - - priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; - - switch (priv->state) { - case SLIP_RECV_NORMAL: - switch (c) { - case SLIP_END: - if (priv->recved > 0) { - /* Received whole packet. */ - /* Trim the pbuf to the size of the received packet. */ - pbuf_realloc(priv->q, priv->recved); - - LINK_STATS_INC(link.recv); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif: Got packet (%" U16_F " bytes)\n", priv->recved)); - t = priv->q; - priv->p = priv->q = NULL; - priv->i = priv->recved = 0; - return t; - } - - return NULL; - - case SLIP_ESC: - priv->state = SLIP_RECV_ESCAPE; - return NULL; - - default: - break; - } /* end switch (c) */ - - break; - - case SLIP_RECV_ESCAPE: - - /* un-escape END or ESC bytes, leave other bytes - (although that would be a protocol error) */ - switch (c) { - case SLIP_ESC_END: - c = SLIP_END; - break; - - case SLIP_ESC_ESC: - c = SLIP_ESC; - break; - - default: - break; - } - - priv->state = SLIP_RECV_NORMAL; - break; - - default: - break; - } /* end switch (priv->state) */ - - /* byte received, packet not yet completely received */ - if (priv->p == NULL) { - /* allocate a new pbuf */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif_input: alloc\n")); - priv->p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - PBUF_LINK_HLEN - PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN), PBUF_POOL); - - if (priv->p == NULL) { - LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); - LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif_input: no new pbuf! (DROP)\n")); - /* don't process any further since we got no pbuf to receive to */ - return NULL; - } - - if (priv->q != NULL) { - /* 'chain' the pbuf to the existing chain */ - pbuf_cat(priv->q, priv->p); - } else { - /* p is the first pbuf in the chain */ - priv->q = priv->p; - } - } - - /* this automatically drops bytes if > SLIP_MAX_SIZE */ - if ((priv->p != NULL) && (priv->recved <= SLIP_MAX_SIZE)) { - ((u8_t *)priv->p->payload)[priv->i] = c; - priv->recved++; - priv->i++; - - if (priv->i >= priv->p->len) { - /* on to the next pbuf */ - priv->i = 0; - - if (priv->p->next != NULL && priv->p->next->len > 0) { - /* p is a chain, on to the next in the chain */ - priv->p = priv->p->next; - } else { - /* p is a single pbuf, set it to NULL so next time a new - * pbuf is allocated */ - priv->p = NULL; - } - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -/** Like slipif_rxbyte, but passes completed packets to netif->input - * - * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif - * @param c received character - */ -static void slipif_rxbyte_input(struct netif *netif, u8_t c) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - p = slipif_rxbyte(netif, c); - - if (p != NULL) { - if (netif->input(p, netif) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - } -} - -#if SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD -/** - * The SLIP input thread. - * - * Feed the IP layer with incoming packets - * - * @param nf the lwip network interface structure for this slipif - */ -static void slipif_loop_thread(void *nf) -{ - u8_t c; - struct netif *netif = (struct netif *)nf; - struct slipif_priv *priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; - - while (1) { - if (sio_read(priv->sd, &c, 1) > 0) { - slipif_rxbyte_input(netif, c); - } - } -} -#endif /* SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD */ - -/** - * @ingroup slipif - * SLIP netif initialization - * - * Call the arch specific sio_open and remember - * the opened device in the state field of the netif. - * - * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif - * @return ERR_OK if serial line could be opened, - * ERR_MEM if no memory could be allocated, - * ERR_IF is serial line couldn't be opened - * - * @note If netif->state is interpreted as an u8_t serial port number. - * - */ -err_t slipif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct slipif_priv *priv; - u8_t sio_num; - - LWIP_ASSERT("slipif needs an input callback", netif->input != NULL); - - /* netif->state contains serial port number */ - sio_num = LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(u8_t, netif->state); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif_init: netif->num=%" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)sio_num)); - - /* Allocate private data */ - priv = (struct slipif_priv *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct slipif_priv)); - - if (!priv) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - netif->name[0] = 's'; - netif->name[1] = 'l'; -#if LWIP_IPV4 - netif->output = slipif_output_v4; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ -#if LWIP_IPV6 - netif->output_ip6 = slipif_output_v6; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - netif->mtu = SLIP_MAX_SIZE; - - /* Try to open the serial port. */ - priv->sd = sio_open(sio_num); - - if (!priv->sd) { - /* Opening the serial port failed. */ - mem_free(priv); - return ERR_IF; - } - - /* Initialize private data */ - priv->p = NULL; - priv->q = NULL; - priv->state = SLIP_RECV_NORMAL; - priv->i = 0; - priv->recved = 0; -#if SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR - priv->rxpackets = NULL; -#endif - - netif->state = priv; - - /* initialize the snmp variables and counters inside the struct netif */ - MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_slip, SLIP_SIO_SPEED(priv->sd)); - -#if SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD - /* Create a thread to poll the serial line. */ - sys_thread_new(SLIPIF_THREAD_NAME, slipif_loop_thread, netif, - SLIPIF_THREAD_STACKSIZE, SLIPIF_THREAD_PRIO); -#endif /* SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** - * @ingroup slipif - * Polls the serial device and feeds the IP layer with incoming packets. - * - * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif - */ -void slipif_poll(struct netif *netif) -{ - u8_t c; - struct slipif_priv *priv; - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); - - priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; - - while (sio_tryread(priv->sd, &c, 1) > 0) { - slipif_rxbyte_input(netif, c); - } -} - -#if SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR -/** - * @ingroup slipif - * Feeds the IP layer with incoming packets that were receive - * - * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif - */ -void slipif_process_rxqueue(struct netif *netif) -{ - struct slipif_priv *priv; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); - - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); - - priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; - - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); - - while (priv->rxpackets != NULL) { - struct pbuf *p = priv->rxpackets; -#if SLIP_RX_QUEUE - /* dequeue packet */ - struct pbuf *q = p; - - while ((q->len != q->tot_len) && (q->next != NULL)) { - q = q->next; - } - - priv->rxpackets = q->next; - q->next = NULL; -#else /* SLIP_RX_QUEUE */ - priv->rxpackets = NULL; -#endif /* SLIP_RX_QUEUE */ - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); - - if (netif->input(p, netif) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); -} - -/** Like slipif_rxbyte, but queues completed packets. - * - * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif - * @param data Received serial byte - */ -static void slipif_rxbyte_enqueue(struct netif *netif, u8_t data) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - struct slipif_priv *priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; - SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); - - p = slipif_rxbyte(netif, data); - - if (p != NULL) { - SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); - - if (priv->rxpackets != NULL) { -#if SLIP_RX_QUEUE - /* queue multiple pbufs */ - struct pbuf *q = p; - - while (q->next != NULL) { - q = q->next; - } - - q->next = p; - } else { -#else /* SLIP_RX_QUEUE */ - pbuf_free(priv->rxpackets); - } - - { -#endif /* SLIP_RX_QUEUE */ - priv->rxpackets = p; - } - - SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); - } -} - -/** - * @ingroup slipif - * Process a received byte, completed packets are put on a queue that is - * fed into IP through slipif_process_rxqueue(). - * - * This function can be called from ISR if SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT is enabled. - * - * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif - * @param data received character - */ -void slipif_received_byte(struct netif *netif, u8_t data) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); - slipif_rxbyte_enqueue(netif, data); -} - -/** - * @ingroup slipif - * Process multiple received byte, completed packets are put on a queue that is - * fed into IP through slipif_process_rxqueue(). - * - * This function can be called from ISR if SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT is enabled. - * - * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif - * @param data received character - * @param len Number of received characters - */ -void slipif_received_bytes(struct netif *netif, u8_t *data, u8_t len) -{ - u8_t i; - u8_t *rxdata = data; - LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); - LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++, rxdata++) { - slipif_rxbyte_enqueue(netif, *rxdata); - } -} -#endif /* SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR */ +/** + * @file + * SLIP Interface + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is built upon the file: src/arch/rtxc/netif/sioslip.c + * + * Author: Magnus Ivarsson + * Simon Goldschmidt + */ + +/** + * @defgroup slipif SLIP + * @ingroup netifs + * + * This is an arch independent SLIP netif. The specific serial hooks must be + * provided by another file. They are sio_open, sio_read/sio_tryread and sio_send + * + * Usage: This netif can be used in three ways:\n + * 1) For NO_SYS==0, an RX thread can be used which blocks on sio_read() + * until data is received.\n + * 2) In your main loop, call slipif_poll() to check for new RX bytes, + * completed packets are fed into netif->input().\n + * 3) Call slipif_received_byte[s]() from your serial RX ISR and + * slipif_process_rxqueue() from your main loop. ISR level decodes + * packets and puts completed packets on a queue which is fed into + * the stack from the main loop (needs SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT for + * pbuf_alloc to work on ISR level!). + * + */ + +#include "netif/slipif.h" +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/sio.h" + +#define SLIP_END 0xC0 /* 0300: start and end of every packet */ +#define SLIP_ESC 0xDB /* 0333: escape start (one byte escaped data follows) */ +#define SLIP_ESC_END 0xDC /* 0334: following escape: original byte is 0xC0 (END) */ +#define SLIP_ESC_ESC 0xDD /* 0335: following escape: original byte is 0xDB (ESC) */ + +/** Maximum packet size that is received by this netif */ +#ifndef SLIP_MAX_SIZE +#define SLIP_MAX_SIZE 1500 +#endif + +/** Define this to the interface speed for SNMP + * (sio_fd is the sio_fd_t returned by sio_open). + * The default value of zero means 'unknown'. + */ +#ifndef SLIP_SIO_SPEED +#define SLIP_SIO_SPEED(sio_fd) 0 +#endif + +enum slipif_recv_state { + SLIP_RECV_NORMAL, + SLIP_RECV_ESCAPE +}; + +struct slipif_priv { + sio_fd_t sd; + /* q is the whole pbuf chain for a packet, p is the current pbuf in the chain */ + struct pbuf *p, *q; + u8_t state; + u16_t i, recved; +#if SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR + struct pbuf *rxpackets; +#endif +}; + +/** + * Send a pbuf doing the necessary SLIP encapsulation + * + * Uses the serial layer's sio_send() + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif + * @param p the pbuf chain packet to send + * @return always returns ERR_OK since the serial layer does not provide return values + */ +static err_t slipif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct slipif_priv *priv; + struct pbuf *q; + u16_t i; + u8_t c; + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("p != NULL", (p != NULL)); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif_output: sending %" U16_F " bytes\n", p->tot_len)); + priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; + + /* Send pbuf out on the serial I/O device. */ + /* Start with packet delimiter. */ + sio_send(SLIP_END, priv->sd); + + for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + for (i = 0; i < q->len; i++) { + c = ((u8_t *)q->payload)[i]; + + switch (c) { + case SLIP_END: + /* need to escape this byte (0xC0 -> 0xDB, 0xDC) */ + sio_send(SLIP_ESC, priv->sd); + sio_send(SLIP_ESC_END, priv->sd); + break; + + case SLIP_ESC: + /* need to escape this byte (0xDB -> 0xDB, 0xDD) */ + sio_send(SLIP_ESC, priv->sd); + sio_send(SLIP_ESC_ESC, priv->sd); + break; + + default: + /* normal byte - no need for escaping */ + sio_send(c, priv->sd); + break; + } + } + } + + /* End with packet delimiter. */ + sio_send(SLIP_END, priv->sd); + return ERR_OK; +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +/** + * Send a pbuf doing the necessary SLIP encapsulation + * + * Uses the serial layer's sio_send() + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif + * @param p the pbuf chain packet to send + * @param ipaddr the ip address to send the packet to (not used for slipif) + * @return always returns ERR_OK since the serial layer does not provide return values + */ +static err_t slipif_output_v4(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + return slipif_output(netif, p); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +#if LWIP_IPV6 +/** + * Send a pbuf doing the necessary SLIP encapsulation + * + * Uses the serial layer's sio_send() + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif + * @param p the pbuf chain packet to send + * @param ipaddr the ip address to send the packet to (not used for slipif) + * @return always returns ERR_OK since the serial layer does not provide return values + */ +static err_t slipif_output_v6(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip6_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + return slipif_output(netif, p); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/** + * Handle the incoming SLIP stream character by character + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif + * @param c received character (multiple calls to this function will + * return a complete packet, NULL is returned before - used for polling) + * @return The IP packet when SLIP_END is received + */ +static struct pbuf *slipif_rxbyte(struct netif *netif, u8_t c) +{ + struct slipif_priv *priv; + struct pbuf *t; + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); + + priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; + + switch (priv->state) { + case SLIP_RECV_NORMAL: + switch (c) { + case SLIP_END: + if (priv->recved > 0) { + /* Received whole packet. */ + /* Trim the pbuf to the size of the received packet. */ + pbuf_realloc(priv->q, priv->recved); + + LINK_STATS_INC(link.recv); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif: Got packet (%" U16_F " bytes)\n", priv->recved)); + t = priv->q; + priv->p = priv->q = NULL; + priv->i = priv->recved = 0; + return t; + } + + return NULL; + + case SLIP_ESC: + priv->state = SLIP_RECV_ESCAPE; + return NULL; + + default: + break; + } /* end switch (c) */ + + break; + + case SLIP_RECV_ESCAPE: + + /* un-escape END or ESC bytes, leave other bytes + (although that would be a protocol error) */ + switch (c) { + case SLIP_ESC_END: + c = SLIP_END; + break; + + case SLIP_ESC_ESC: + c = SLIP_ESC; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + priv->state = SLIP_RECV_NORMAL; + break; + + default: + break; + } /* end switch (priv->state) */ + + /* byte received, packet not yet completely received */ + if (priv->p == NULL) { + /* allocate a new pbuf */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif_input: alloc\n")); + priv->p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE - PBUF_LINK_HLEN - PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN), PBUF_POOL); + + if (priv->p == NULL) { + LINK_STATS_INC(link.drop); + LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif_input: no new pbuf! (DROP)\n")); + /* don't process any further since we got no pbuf to receive to */ + return NULL; + } + + if (priv->q != NULL) { + /* 'chain' the pbuf to the existing chain */ + pbuf_cat(priv->q, priv->p); + } else { + /* p is the first pbuf in the chain */ + priv->q = priv->p; + } + } + + /* this automatically drops bytes if > SLIP_MAX_SIZE */ + if ((priv->p != NULL) && (priv->recved <= SLIP_MAX_SIZE)) { + ((u8_t *)priv->p->payload)[priv->i] = c; + priv->recved++; + priv->i++; + + if (priv->i >= priv->p->len) { + /* on to the next pbuf */ + priv->i = 0; + + if (priv->p->next != NULL && priv->p->next->len > 0) { + /* p is a chain, on to the next in the chain */ + priv->p = priv->p->next; + } else { + /* p is a single pbuf, set it to NULL so next time a new + * pbuf is allocated */ + priv->p = NULL; + } + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** Like slipif_rxbyte, but passes completed packets to netif->input + * + * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif + * @param c received character + */ +static void slipif_rxbyte_input(struct netif *netif, u8_t c) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + p = slipif_rxbyte(netif, c); + + if (p != NULL) { + if (netif->input(p, netif) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + } +} + +#if SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD +/** + * The SLIP input thread. + * + * Feed the IP layer with incoming packets + * + * @param nf the lwip network interface structure for this slipif + */ +static void slipif_loop_thread(void *nf) +{ + u8_t c; + struct netif *netif = (struct netif *)nf; + struct slipif_priv *priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; + + while (1) { + if (sio_read(priv->sd, &c, 1) > 0) { + slipif_rxbyte_input(netif, c); + } + } +} +#endif /* SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD */ + +/** + * @ingroup slipif + * SLIP netif initialization + * + * Call the arch specific sio_open and remember + * the opened device in the state field of the netif. + * + * @param netif the lwip network interface structure for this slipif + * @return ERR_OK if serial line could be opened, + * ERR_MEM if no memory could be allocated, + * ERR_IF is serial line couldn't be opened + * + * @note If netif->state is interpreted as an u8_t serial port number. + * + */ +err_t slipif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct slipif_priv *priv; + u8_t sio_num; + + LWIP_ASSERT("slipif needs an input callback", netif->input != NULL); + + /* netif->state contains serial port number */ + sio_num = LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(u8_t, netif->state); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(SLIP_DEBUG, ("slipif_init: netif->num=%" U16_F "\n", (u16_t)sio_num)); + + /* Allocate private data */ + priv = (struct slipif_priv *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct slipif_priv)); + + if (!priv) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + netif->name[0] = 's'; + netif->name[1] = 'l'; +#if LWIP_IPV4 + netif->output = slipif_output_v4; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ +#if LWIP_IPV6 + netif->output_ip6 = slipif_output_v6; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + netif->mtu = SLIP_MAX_SIZE; + + /* Try to open the serial port. */ + priv->sd = sio_open(sio_num); + + if (!priv->sd) { + /* Opening the serial port failed. */ + mem_free(priv); + return ERR_IF; + } + + /* Initialize private data */ + priv->p = NULL; + priv->q = NULL; + priv->state = SLIP_RECV_NORMAL; + priv->i = 0; + priv->recved = 0; +#if SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR + priv->rxpackets = NULL; +#endif + + netif->state = priv; + + /* initialize the snmp variables and counters inside the struct netif */ + MIB2_INIT_NETIF(netif, snmp_ifType_slip, SLIP_SIO_SPEED(priv->sd)); + +#if SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD + /* Create a thread to poll the serial line. */ + sys_thread_new(SLIPIF_THREAD_NAME, slipif_loop_thread, netif, + SLIPIF_THREAD_STACKSIZE, SLIPIF_THREAD_PRIO); +#endif /* SLIP_USE_RX_THREAD */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** + * @ingroup slipif + * Polls the serial device and feeds the IP layer with incoming packets. + * + * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif + */ +void slipif_poll(struct netif *netif) +{ + u8_t c; + struct slipif_priv *priv; + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); + + priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; + + while (sio_tryread(priv->sd, &c, 1) > 0) { + slipif_rxbyte_input(netif, c); + } +} + +#if SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR +/** + * @ingroup slipif + * Feeds the IP layer with incoming packets that were receive + * + * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif + */ +void slipif_process_rxqueue(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct slipif_priv *priv; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); + + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); + + priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; + + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); + + while (priv->rxpackets != NULL) { + struct pbuf *p = priv->rxpackets; +#if SLIP_RX_QUEUE + /* dequeue packet */ + struct pbuf *q = p; + + while ((q->len != q->tot_len) && (q->next != NULL)) { + q = q->next; + } + + priv->rxpackets = q->next; + q->next = NULL; +#else /* SLIP_RX_QUEUE */ + priv->rxpackets = NULL; +#endif /* SLIP_RX_QUEUE */ + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); + + if (netif->input(p, netif) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); +} + +/** Like slipif_rxbyte, but queues completed packets. + * + * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif + * @param data Received serial byte + */ +static void slipif_rxbyte_enqueue(struct netif *netif, u8_t data) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + struct slipif_priv *priv = (struct slipif_priv *)netif->state; + SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(old_level); + + p = slipif_rxbyte(netif, data); + + if (p != NULL) { + SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(old_level); + + if (priv->rxpackets != NULL) { +#if SLIP_RX_QUEUE + /* queue multiple pbufs */ + struct pbuf *q = p; + + while (q->next != NULL) { + q = q->next; + } + + q->next = p; + } else { +#else /* SLIP_RX_QUEUE */ + pbuf_free(priv->rxpackets); + } + + { +#endif /* SLIP_RX_QUEUE */ + priv->rxpackets = p; + } + + SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(old_level); + } +} + +/** + * @ingroup slipif + * Process a received byte, completed packets are put on a queue that is + * fed into IP through slipif_process_rxqueue(). + * + * This function can be called from ISR if SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT is enabled. + * + * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif + * @param data received character + */ +void slipif_received_byte(struct netif *netif, u8_t data) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); + slipif_rxbyte_enqueue(netif, data); +} + +/** + * @ingroup slipif + * Process multiple received byte, completed packets are put on a queue that is + * fed into IP through slipif_process_rxqueue(). + * + * This function can be called from ISR if SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT is enabled. + * + * @param netif The lwip network interface structure for this slipif + * @param data received character + * @param len Number of received characters + */ +void slipif_received_bytes(struct netif *netif, u8_t *data, u8_t len) +{ + u8_t i; + u8_t *rxdata = data; + LWIP_ASSERT("netif != NULL", (netif != NULL)); + LWIP_ASSERT("netif->state != NULL", (netif->state != NULL)); + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++, rxdata++) { + slipif_rxbyte_enqueue(netif, *rxdata); + } +} +#endif /* SLIP_RX_FROM_ISR */ diff --git a/components/lwip/src/netif/zepif.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/zepif.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/src/netif/zepif.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/zepif.c index e70d9dec..94429933 100644 --- a/components/lwip/src/netif/zepif.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/src/netif/zepif.c @@ -1,333 +1,333 @@ -/** - * @file - * - * @defgroup zepif ZEP - ZigBee Encapsulation Protocol - * @ingroup netifs - * A netif implementing the ZigBee Encapsulation Protocol (ZEP). - * This is used to tunnel 6LowPAN over UDP. - * - * Usage (there must be a default netif before!): - * @code{.c} - * netif_add(&zep_netif, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, zepif_init, tcpip_6lowpan_input); - * netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(&zep_netif, 1); - * netif_set_up(&zep_netif); - * netif_set_link_up(&zep_netif); - * @endcode - */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include "netif/zepif.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_UDP - -#include "netif/lowpan6.h" -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include - -/** Define this to 1 to loop back TX packets for testing */ -#ifndef ZEPIF_LOOPBACK -#define ZEPIF_LOOPBACK 0 -#endif - -#define ZEP_MAX_DATA_LEN 127 - -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/bpstruct.h" -#endif -PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -struct zep_hdr { - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t prot_id[2]); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t prot_version); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t channel_id); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t device_id); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t crc_mode); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t unknown_1); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t timestamp[2]); - PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t seq_num); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t unknown_2[10]); - PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t len); -} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; -PACK_STRUCT_END -#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES -#include "arch/epstruct.h" -#endif - -struct zepif_state { - struct zepif_init init; - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - u32_t seqno; -}; - -static u8_t zep_lowpan_timer_running; - -/* Helper function that calls the 6LoWPAN timer and reschedules itself */ -static void zep_lowpan_timer(void *arg) -{ - lowpan6_tmr(); - - if (zep_lowpan_timer_running) { - sys_timeout(LOWPAN6_TMR_INTERVAL, zep_lowpan_timer, arg); - } -} - -/* Pass received pbufs into 6LowPAN netif */ -static void zepif_udp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - err_t err; - struct netif *netif_lowpan6 = (struct netif *)arg; - struct zep_hdr *zep; - - LWIP_ASSERT("arg != NULL", arg != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); - - if (p == NULL) { - return; - } - - /* Parse and hide the ZEP header */ - if (p->len < sizeof(struct zep_hdr)) { - /* need the zep_hdr in one piece */ - goto err_return; - } - - zep = (struct zep_hdr *)p->payload; - - if (zep->prot_id[0] != 'E') { - goto err_return; - } - - if (zep->prot_id[1] != 'X') { - goto err_return; - } - - if (zep->prot_version != 2) { - /* we only support this version for now */ - goto err_return; - } - - if (zep->type != 1) { - goto err_return; - } - - if (zep->crc_mode != 1) { - goto err_return; - } - - if (zep->len != p->tot_len - sizeof(struct zep_hdr)) { - goto err_return; - } - - /* everything seems to be OK, hide the ZEP header */ - if (pbuf_remove_header(p, sizeof(struct zep_hdr))) { - goto err_return; - } - - /* TODO Check CRC? */ - /* remove CRC trailer */ - pbuf_realloc(p, p->tot_len - 2); - - /* Call into 6LoWPAN code. */ - err = netif_lowpan6->input(p, netif_lowpan6); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - return; - } - -err_return: - pbuf_free(p); -} - -/* Send 6LoWPAN TX packets as UDP broadcast */ -static err_t zepif_linkoutput(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - err_t err; - struct pbuf *q; - struct zep_hdr *zep; - struct zepif_state *state; - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid netif", netif != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pbuf", p != NULL); - - if (p->tot_len > ZEP_MAX_DATA_LEN) { - return ERR_VAL; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("TODO: support chained pbufs", p->next == NULL); - - state = (struct zepif_state *)netif->state; - LWIP_ASSERT("state->pcb != NULL", state->pcb != NULL); - - q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct zep_hdr) + p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); - - if (q == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - zep = (struct zep_hdr *)q->payload; - memset(zep, 0, sizeof(struct zep_hdr)); - zep->prot_id[0] = 'E'; - zep->prot_id[1] = 'X'; - zep->prot_version = 2; - zep->type = 1; /* Data */ - zep->channel_id = 0; /* whatever */ - zep->device_id = lwip_htons(1); /* whatever */ - zep->crc_mode = 1; - zep->unknown_1 = 0xff; - zep->seq_num = lwip_htonl(state->seqno); - state->seqno++; - zep->len = (u8_t)p->tot_len; - - err = pbuf_take_at(q, p->payload, p->tot_len, sizeof(struct zep_hdr)); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { -#if ZEPIF_LOOPBACK - zepif_udp_recv(netif, state->pcb, pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_RAM, q), NULL, 0); -#endif - err = udp_sendto(state->pcb, q, state->init.zep_dst_ip_addr, state->init.zep_dst_udp_port); - } - - pbuf_free(q); - - return err; -} - -/** - * @ingroup zepif - * Set up a raw 6LowPAN netif and surround it with input- and output - * functions for ZEP - */ -err_t zepif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - err_t err; - struct zepif_init *init_state = (struct zepif_init *)netif->state; - struct zepif_state *state = (struct zepif_state *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct zepif_state)); - - LWIP_ASSERT("zepif needs an input callback", netif->input != NULL); - - if (state == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct zepif_state)); - - if (init_state != NULL) { - memcpy(&state->init, init_state, sizeof(struct zepif_init)); - } - - if (state->init.zep_src_udp_port == 0) { - state->init.zep_src_udp_port = ZEPIF_DEFAULT_UDP_PORT; - } - - if (state->init.zep_dst_udp_port == 0) { - state->init.zep_dst_udp_port = ZEPIF_DEFAULT_UDP_PORT; - } - -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (state->init.zep_dst_ip_addr == NULL) { - /* With IPv4 enabled, default to broadcasting packets if no address is set */ - state->init.zep_dst_ip_addr = IP_ADDR_BROADCAST; - } - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - netif->state = NULL; - - state->pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); - - if (state->pcb == NULL) { - err = ERR_MEM; - goto err_ret; - } - - err = udp_bind(state->pcb, state->init.zep_src_ip_addr, state->init.zep_src_udp_port); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - goto err_ret; - } - - if (state->init.zep_netif != NULL) { - udp_bind_netif(state->pcb, state->init.zep_netif); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("udp_bind(lowpan6_broadcast_pcb) failed", err == ERR_OK); - ip_set_option(state->pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); - udp_recv(state->pcb, zepif_udp_recv, netif); - - err = lowpan6_if_init(netif); - LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_if_init set a state", netif->state == NULL); - - if (err == ERR_OK) { - netif->state = state; - netif->hwaddr_len = 6; - - if (init_state != NULL) { - memcpy(netif->hwaddr, init_state->addr, 6); - } else { - u8_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - netif->hwaddr[i] = i; - } - - netif->hwaddr[0] &= 0xfc; - } - - netif->linkoutput = zepif_linkoutput; - - if (!zep_lowpan_timer_running) { - sys_timeout(LOWPAN6_TMR_INTERVAL, zep_lowpan_timer, NULL); - zep_lowpan_timer_running = 1; - } - - return ERR_OK; - } - -err_ret: - - if (state->pcb != NULL) { - udp_remove(state->pcb); - } - - mem_free(state); - return err; -} - -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_UDP */ +/** + * @file + * + * @defgroup zepif ZEP - ZigBee Encapsulation Protocol + * @ingroup netifs + * A netif implementing the ZigBee Encapsulation Protocol (ZEP). + * This is used to tunnel 6LowPAN over UDP. + * + * Usage (there must be a default netif before!): + * @code{.c} + * netif_add(&zep_netif, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, zepif_init, tcpip_6lowpan_input); + * netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(&zep_netif, 1); + * netif_set_up(&zep_netif); + * netif_set_link_up(&zep_netif); + * @endcode + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include "netif/zepif.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_UDP + +#include "netif/lowpan6.h" +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include + +/** Define this to 1 to loop back TX packets for testing */ +#ifndef ZEPIF_LOOPBACK +#define ZEPIF_LOOPBACK 0 +#endif + +#define ZEP_MAX_DATA_LEN 127 + +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/bpstruct.h" +#endif +PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +struct zep_hdr { + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t prot_id[2]); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t prot_version); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t type); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t channel_id); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u16_t device_id); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t crc_mode); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t unknown_1); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t timestamp[2]); + PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(u32_t seq_num); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t unknown_2[10]); + PACK_STRUCT_FLD_8(u8_t len); +} PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT; +PACK_STRUCT_END +#ifdef PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES +#include "arch/epstruct.h" +#endif + +struct zepif_state { + struct zepif_init init; + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + u32_t seqno; +}; + +static u8_t zep_lowpan_timer_running; + +/* Helper function that calls the 6LoWPAN timer and reschedules itself */ +static void zep_lowpan_timer(void *arg) +{ + lowpan6_tmr(); + + if (zep_lowpan_timer_running) { + sys_timeout(LOWPAN6_TMR_INTERVAL, zep_lowpan_timer, arg); + } +} + +/* Pass received pbufs into 6LowPAN netif */ +static void zepif_udp_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + err_t err; + struct netif *netif_lowpan6 = (struct netif *)arg; + struct zep_hdr *zep; + + LWIP_ASSERT("arg != NULL", arg != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("pcb != NULL", pcb != NULL); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); /* for LWIP_NOASSERT */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); + + if (p == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* Parse and hide the ZEP header */ + if (p->len < sizeof(struct zep_hdr)) { + /* need the zep_hdr in one piece */ + goto err_return; + } + + zep = (struct zep_hdr *)p->payload; + + if (zep->prot_id[0] != 'E') { + goto err_return; + } + + if (zep->prot_id[1] != 'X') { + goto err_return; + } + + if (zep->prot_version != 2) { + /* we only support this version for now */ + goto err_return; + } + + if (zep->type != 1) { + goto err_return; + } + + if (zep->crc_mode != 1) { + goto err_return; + } + + if (zep->len != p->tot_len - sizeof(struct zep_hdr)) { + goto err_return; + } + + /* everything seems to be OK, hide the ZEP header */ + if (pbuf_remove_header(p, sizeof(struct zep_hdr))) { + goto err_return; + } + + /* TODO Check CRC? */ + /* remove CRC trailer */ + pbuf_realloc(p, p->tot_len - 2); + + /* Call into 6LoWPAN code. */ + err = netif_lowpan6->input(p, netif_lowpan6); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + return; + } + +err_return: + pbuf_free(p); +} + +/* Send 6LoWPAN TX packets as UDP broadcast */ +static err_t zepif_linkoutput(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + err_t err; + struct pbuf *q; + struct zep_hdr *zep; + struct zepif_state *state; + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid netif", netif != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid pbuf", p != NULL); + + if (p->tot_len > ZEP_MAX_DATA_LEN) { + return ERR_VAL; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("TODO: support chained pbufs", p->next == NULL); + + state = (struct zepif_state *)netif->state; + LWIP_ASSERT("state->pcb != NULL", state->pcb != NULL); + + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, sizeof(struct zep_hdr) + p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); + + if (q == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + zep = (struct zep_hdr *)q->payload; + memset(zep, 0, sizeof(struct zep_hdr)); + zep->prot_id[0] = 'E'; + zep->prot_id[1] = 'X'; + zep->prot_version = 2; + zep->type = 1; /* Data */ + zep->channel_id = 0; /* whatever */ + zep->device_id = lwip_htons(1); /* whatever */ + zep->crc_mode = 1; + zep->unknown_1 = 0xff; + zep->seq_num = lwip_htonl(state->seqno); + state->seqno++; + zep->len = (u8_t)p->tot_len; + + err = pbuf_take_at(q, p->payload, p->tot_len, sizeof(struct zep_hdr)); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { +#if ZEPIF_LOOPBACK + zepif_udp_recv(netif, state->pcb, pbuf_clone(PBUF_RAW, PBUF_RAM, q), NULL, 0); +#endif + err = udp_sendto(state->pcb, q, state->init.zep_dst_ip_addr, state->init.zep_dst_udp_port); + } + + pbuf_free(q); + + return err; +} + +/** + * @ingroup zepif + * Set up a raw 6LowPAN netif and surround it with input- and output + * functions for ZEP + */ +err_t zepif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + err_t err; + struct zepif_init *init_state = (struct zepif_init *)netif->state; + struct zepif_state *state = (struct zepif_state *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct zepif_state)); + + LWIP_ASSERT("zepif needs an input callback", netif->input != NULL); + + if (state == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct zepif_state)); + + if (init_state != NULL) { + memcpy(&state->init, init_state, sizeof(struct zepif_init)); + } + + if (state->init.zep_src_udp_port == 0) { + state->init.zep_src_udp_port = ZEPIF_DEFAULT_UDP_PORT; + } + + if (state->init.zep_dst_udp_port == 0) { + state->init.zep_dst_udp_port = ZEPIF_DEFAULT_UDP_PORT; + } + +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (state->init.zep_dst_ip_addr == NULL) { + /* With IPv4 enabled, default to broadcasting packets if no address is set */ + state->init.zep_dst_ip_addr = IP_ADDR_BROADCAST; + } + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + netif->state = NULL; + + state->pcb = udp_new_ip_type(IPADDR_TYPE_ANY); + + if (state->pcb == NULL) { + err = ERR_MEM; + goto err_ret; + } + + err = udp_bind(state->pcb, state->init.zep_src_ip_addr, state->init.zep_src_udp_port); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + goto err_ret; + } + + if (state->init.zep_netif != NULL) { + udp_bind_netif(state->pcb, state->init.zep_netif); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("udp_bind(lowpan6_broadcast_pcb) failed", err == ERR_OK); + ip_set_option(state->pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); + udp_recv(state->pcb, zepif_udp_recv, netif); + + err = lowpan6_if_init(netif); + LWIP_ASSERT("lowpan6_if_init set a state", netif->state == NULL); + + if (err == ERR_OK) { + netif->state = state; + netif->hwaddr_len = 6; + + if (init_state != NULL) { + memcpy(netif->hwaddr, init_state->addr, 6); + } else { + u8_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + netif->hwaddr[i] = i; + } + + netif->hwaddr[0] &= 0xfc; + } + + netif->linkoutput = zepif_linkoutput; + + if (!zep_lowpan_timer_running) { + sys_timeout(LOWPAN6_TMR_INTERVAL, zep_lowpan_timer, NULL); + zep_lowpan_timer_running = 1; + } + + return ERR_OK; + } + +err_ret: + + if (state->pcb != NULL) { + udp_remove(state->pcb); + } + + mem_free(state); + return err; +} + +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 && LWIP_UDP */ diff --git a/components/lwip/system/arch/bpstruct.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/bpstruct.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/system/arch/bpstruct.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/bpstruct.h index 9b130f87..f4493ce4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/system/arch/bpstruct.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/bpstruct.h @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) -#pragma pack(1) -#endif +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma pack(1) +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/system/arch/cc.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/cc.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/system/arch/cc.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/cc.h index 43c92033..fbebf0da 100644 --- a/components/lwip/system/arch/cc.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/cc.h @@ -1,92 +1,95 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef __CC_H__ -#define __CC_H__ - -#include "cpu.h" -#include -#include -// #include "bflb_platform.h" - -typedef int sys_prot_t; - -#define LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO - -#if defined(__GNUC__) & !defined(__CC_ARM) - -#define LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE 0 -#include - -#endif - -/* define compiler specific symbols */ -#if defined(__ICCARM__) - -#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT -#define PACK_STRUCT_END -#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x -#define PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES - -#elif defined(__GNUC__) - -#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT __attribute__((__packed__)) -#define PACK_STRUCT_END -#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x - -#elif defined(__CC_ARM) - -#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN __packed -#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT -#define PACK_STRUCT_END -#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x - -#elif defined(__TASKING__) - -#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN -#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT -#define PACK_STRUCT_END -#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x - -#endif - -#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT(x) \ - do { \ - printf("Assertion \"%s\" failed at line %d in %s\n", \ - x, __LINE__, __FILE__); \ - } while (0) - -/* Define random number generator function */ -#define LWIP_RAND() ((u32_t)rand()) - -#endif /* __CC_H__ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef __CC_H__ +#define __CC_H__ + +#include "cpu.h" +#include "sys_arch.h" +#include +#include +#include +// #include "bflb_platform.h" + +typedef int sys_prot_t; + +#if defined(__GNUC__) & !defined(__CC_ARM) + +#define LWIP_TIMEVAL_PRIVATE 0 +#include + +#endif + +/* define compiler specific symbols */ +#if defined(__ICCARM__) + +#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT +#define PACK_STRUCT_END +#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x +#define PACK_STRUCT_USE_INCLUDES + +#elif defined(__GNUC__) + +#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT __attribute__((__packed__)) +#define PACK_STRUCT_END +#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x + +#elif defined(__CC_ARM) + +#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN __packed +#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT +#define PACK_STRUCT_END +#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x + +#elif defined(__TASKING__) + +#define PACK_STRUCT_BEGIN +#define PACK_STRUCT_STRUCT +#define PACK_STRUCT_END +#define PACK_STRUCT_FIELD(x) x + +#endif + +#define LWIP_PLATFORM_ASSERT(x) \ + do { \ + printf("Assertion \"%s\" failed at line %d in %s\n", \ + x, __LINE__, __FILE__); \ + } while (0) + +#define LWIP_PLATFORM_DIAG(x) \ + do { \ + printf x; \ + printf("\r"); \ + } while (0) + +#endif /* __CC_H__ */ diff --git a/components/lwip/system/arch/cpu.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/cpu.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/system/arch/cpu.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/cpu.h index 677a17cc..f32fb0f2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/system/arch/cpu.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/cpu.h @@ -1,39 +1,39 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef __CPU_H__ -#define __CPU_H__ - -#ifndef BYTE_ORDER -#define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN -#endif - -#endif /* __CPU_H__ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef __CPU_H__ +#define __CPU_H__ + +#ifndef BYTE_ORDER +#define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN +#endif + +#endif /* __CPU_H__ */ diff --git a/components/lwip/system/arch/epstruct.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/epstruct.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/system/arch/epstruct.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/epstruct.h index 747e8ebb..5573d611 100644 --- a/components/lwip/system/arch/epstruct.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/epstruct.h @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) -#pragma pack() -#endif +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma pack() +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/system/arch/init.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/init.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/system/arch/init.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/init.h index 504d832a..3873dffa 100644 --- a/components/lwip/system/arch/init.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/init.h @@ -1,40 +1,40 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef __ARCH_INIT_H__ -#define __ARCH_INIT_H__ - -#define TCPIP_INIT_DONE(arg) tcpip_init_done(arg) - -void tcpip_init_done(void *); -int wait_for_tcpip_init(void); - -#endif /* __ARCH_INIT_H__ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef __ARCH_INIT_H__ +#define __ARCH_INIT_H__ + +#define TCPIP_INIT_DONE(arg) tcpip_init_done(arg) + +void tcpip_init_done(void *); +int wait_for_tcpip_init(void); + +#endif /* __ARCH_INIT_H__ */ diff --git a/components/lwip/system/arch/lib.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/lib.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/system/arch/lib.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/lib.h index f5ba3cc8..0b301259 100644 --- a/components/lwip/system/arch/lib.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/lib.h @@ -1,37 +1,37 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef __LIB_H__ -#define __LIB_H__ - -#include - -#endif /* __LIB_H__ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef __LIB_H__ +#define __LIB_H__ + +#include + +#endif /* __LIB_H__ */ diff --git a/components/lwip/system/arch/perf.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/perf.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/system/arch/perf.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/perf.h index a996a88d..28d0c330 100644 --- a/components/lwip/system/arch/perf.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/perf.h @@ -1,38 +1,38 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef __PERF_H__ -#define __PERF_H__ - -#define PERF_START /* null definition */ -#define PERF_STOP(x) /* null definition */ - -#endif /* __PERF_H__ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef __PERF_H__ +#define __PERF_H__ + +#define PERF_START /* null definition */ +#define PERF_STOP(x) /* null definition */ + +#endif /* __PERF_H__ */ diff --git a/components/lwip/system/arch/sys_arch.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/sys_arch.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/system/arch/sys_arch.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/sys_arch.h index 2194a960..18c7766a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/system/arch/sys_arch.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/arch/sys_arch.h @@ -1,70 +1,70 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ -#ifndef __SYS_ARCH_H__ -#define __SYS_ARCH_H__ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" - -#include "FreeRTOS.h" -#include "task.h" -#include "queue.h" -#include "semphr.h" - -#if (NO_SYS != 0) -#error "NO_SYS need to be set to 0 to use threaded API" -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define SYS_MBOX_NULL (xQueueHandle)0 -#define SYS_SEM_NULL (xSemaphoreHandle)0 - -#define osPriorityIdle 0 //< priority: idle (lowest) -#define osPriorityLow 1 //< priority: low -#define osPriorityBelowNormal 2 //< priority: below normal -#define osPriorityNormal 3 //< priority: normal (default) -#define osPriorityAboveNormal 4 //< priority: above normal -#define osPriorityHigh 5 //< priority: high -#define osPriorityRealtime 6 //< priority: realtime (highest) - -typedef xSemaphoreHandle sys_sem_t; -typedef xSemaphoreHandle sys_mutex_t; -typedef xQueueHandle sys_mbox_t; -typedef xTaskHandle sys_thread_t; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* __SYS_ARCH_H__ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ +#ifndef __SYS_ARCH_H__ +#define __SYS_ARCH_H__ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" + +#include "FreeRTOS.h" +#include "task.h" +#include "queue.h" +#include "semphr.h" + +#if (NO_SYS != 0) +#error "NO_SYS need to be set to 0 to use threaded API" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define SYS_MBOX_NULL (xQueueHandle)0 +#define SYS_SEM_NULL (xSemaphoreHandle)0 + +#define osPriorityIdle 0 //< priority: idle (lowest) +#define osPriorityLow 1 //< priority: low +#define osPriorityBelowNormal 2 //< priority: below normal +#define osPriorityNormal 3 //< priority: normal (default) +#define osPriorityAboveNormal 4 //< priority: above normal +#define osPriorityHigh 5 //< priority: high +#define osPriorityRealtime 6 //< priority: realtime (highest) + +typedef xSemaphoreHandle sys_sem_t; +typedef xSemaphoreHandle sys_mutex_t; +typedef xQueueHandle sys_mbox_t; +typedef xTaskHandle sys_thread_t; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* __SYS_ARCH_H__ */ diff --git a/components/lwip/system/os/sys_arch.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/os/sys_arch.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/system/os/sys_arch.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/system/os/sys_arch.c index 9de910ab..253857b2 100644 --- a/components/lwip/system/os/sys_arch.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/system/os/sys_arch.c @@ -1,451 +1,451 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Adam Dunkels - * - */ - -/* lwIP includes. */ -#include "lwip/debug.h" -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#if !NO_SYS - -#if defined(LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO) -int errno; -#endif - -/* This is the number of threads that can be started with sys_thread_new() */ -#define SYS_THREAD_MAX 6 - -static u16_t s_nextthread = 0; - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -// Creates an empty mailbox. -err_t sys_mbox_new(sys_mbox_t *mbox, int size) -{ - (void)size; - - *mbox = xQueueCreate(TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE, sizeof(void *)); - -#if SYS_STATS - ++lwip_stats.sys.mbox.used; - - if (lwip_stats.sys.mbox.max < lwip_stats.sys.mbox.used) { - lwip_stats.sys.mbox.max = lwip_stats.sys.mbox.used; - } - -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - - if (*mbox == NULL) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/* - Deallocates a mailbox. If there are messages still present in the - mailbox when the mailbox is deallocated, it is an indication of a - programming error in lwIP and the developer should be notified. -*/ -void sys_mbox_free(sys_mbox_t *mbox) -{ - if (uxQueueMessagesWaiting(*mbox)) { - /* Line for breakpoint. Should never break here! */ - portNOP(); -#if SYS_STATS - lwip_stats.sys.mbox.err++; -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - // TODO notify the user of failure. - } - - vQueueDelete(*mbox); - -#if SYS_STATS - --lwip_stats.sys.mbox.used; -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -// Posts the "msg" to the mailbox. -void sys_mbox_post(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *data) -{ - while (xQueueSendToBack(*mbox, &data, portMAX_DELAY) != pdTRUE) { - }; -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -// Try to post the "msg" to the mailbox. -err_t sys_mbox_trypost(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg) -{ - err_t result; - - if (xQueueSend(*mbox, &msg, 0) == pdPASS) { - result = ERR_OK; - } else { - // could not post, queue must be full - result = ERR_MEM; -#if SYS_STATS - lwip_stats.sys.mbox.err++; -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - } - - return result; -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -// Try to post the "msg" to the mailbox. -err_t sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr_unused(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg) -{ - return sys_mbox_trypost(mbox, msg); -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/* - Blocks the thread until a message arrives in the mailbox, but does - not block the thread longer than "timeout" milliseconds (similar to - the sys_arch_sem_wait() function). The "msg" argument is a result - parameter that is set by the function (i.e., by doing "*msg = - ptr"). The "msg" parameter maybe NULL to indicate that the message - should be dropped. - - The return values are the same as for the sys_arch_sem_wait() function: - Number of milliseconds spent waiting or SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT if there was a - timeout. - - Note that a function with a similar name, sys_mbox_fetch(), is - implemented by lwIP. -*/ -u32_t sys_arch_mbox_fetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg, u32_t timeout) -{ - void *dummyptr; - portTickType StartTime, EndTime, Elapsed; - - StartTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); - - if (msg == NULL) { - msg = &dummyptr; - } - - if (timeout != 0) { - if (pdTRUE == xQueueReceive(*mbox, &(*msg), timeout / portTICK_RATE_MS)) { - EndTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); - Elapsed = (EndTime - StartTime) * portTICK_RATE_MS; - return (Elapsed); - } else { - // timed out blocking for message - *msg = NULL; - return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; - } - } else { - // block forever for a message. - while (pdTRUE != xQueueReceive(*mbox, &(*msg), portMAX_DELAY)) { - } // time is arbitrary - - EndTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); - Elapsed = (EndTime - StartTime) * portTICK_RATE_MS; - return (Elapsed); // return time blocked TODO test - } -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/* - Similar to sys_arch_mbox_fetch, but if message is not ready immediately, we'll - return with SYS_MBOX_EMPTY. On success, 0 is returned. -*/ -u32_t sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg) -{ - void *dummyptr; - - if (msg == NULL) { - msg = &dummyptr; - } - - if (pdTRUE == xQueueReceive(*mbox, &(*msg), 0)) { - return ERR_OK; - } else { - return SYS_MBOX_EMPTY; - } -} -/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -int sys_mbox_valid(sys_mbox_t *mbox) -{ - if (*mbox == SYS_MBOX_NULL) { - return 0; - } else { - return 1; - } -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -void sys_mbox_set_invalid(sys_mbox_t *mbox) -{ - *mbox = SYS_MBOX_NULL; -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -// Creates a new semaphore. The "count" argument specifies -// the initial state of the semaphore. -err_t sys_sem_new(sys_sem_t *sem, u8_t count) -{ - vSemaphoreCreateBinary(*sem); - - if (*sem == NULL) { -#if SYS_STATS - ++lwip_stats.sys.sem.err; -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - - if (count == 0) // Means it can't be taken - { - xSemaphoreTake(*sem, 1); - } - -#if SYS_STATS - ++lwip_stats.sys.sem.used; - - if (lwip_stats.sys.sem.max < lwip_stats.sys.sem.used) { - lwip_stats.sys.sem.max = lwip_stats.sys.sem.used; - } - -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/* - Blocks the thread while waiting for the semaphore to be - signaled. If the "timeout" argument is non-zero, the thread should - only be blocked for the specified time (measured in - milliseconds). - - If the timeout argument is non-zero, the return value is the number of - milliseconds spent waiting for the semaphore to be signaled. If the - semaphore wasn't signaled within the specified time, the return value is - SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT. If the thread didn't have to wait for the semaphore - (i.e., it was already signaled), the function may return zero. - - Notice that lwIP implements a function with a similar name, - sys_sem_wait(), that uses the sys_arch_sem_wait() function. -*/ -u32_t sys_arch_sem_wait(sys_sem_t *sem, u32_t timeout) -{ - portTickType StartTime, EndTime, Elapsed; - - StartTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); - - if (timeout != 0) { - if (xSemaphoreTake(*sem, timeout / portTICK_RATE_MS) == pdTRUE) { - EndTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); - Elapsed = (EndTime - StartTime) * portTICK_RATE_MS; - return (Elapsed); // return time blocked TODO test - } else { - return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; - } - } else { - // must block without a timeout - while (xSemaphoreTake(*sem, portMAX_DELAY) != pdTRUE) { - } - - EndTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); - Elapsed = (EndTime - StartTime) * portTICK_RATE_MS; - return (Elapsed); // return time blocked - } -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -// Signals a semaphore -void sys_sem_signal(sys_sem_t *sem) -{ - xSemaphoreGive(*sem); -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -// Deallocates a semaphore -void sys_sem_free(sys_sem_t *sem) -{ -#if SYS_STATS - --lwip_stats.sys.sem.used; -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - - vQueueDelete(*sem); -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -int sys_sem_valid(sys_sem_t *sem) -{ - if (*sem == SYS_SEM_NULL) { - return 0; - } else { - return 1; - } -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -void sys_sem_set_invalid(sys_sem_t *sem) -{ - *sem = SYS_SEM_NULL; -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -// Initialize sys arch -void sys_init(void) -{ - // keep track of how many threads have been created - s_nextthread = 0; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/* Mutexes*/ -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -#if LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX == 0 -/* Create a new mutex*/ -err_t sys_mutex_new(sys_mutex_t *mutex) -{ - *mutex = xSemaphoreCreateMutex(); - - if (*mutex == NULL) { -#if SYS_STATS - ++lwip_stats.sys.mutex.err; -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - return ERR_MEM; - } - -#if SYS_STATS - ++lwip_stats.sys.mutex.used; - - if (lwip_stats.sys.mutex.max < lwip_stats.sys.mutex.used) { - lwip_stats.sys.mutex.max = lwip_stats.sys.mutex.used; - } - -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - return ERR_OK; -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/* Deallocate a mutex*/ -void sys_mutex_free(sys_mutex_t *mutex) -{ -#if SYS_STATS - --lwip_stats.sys.mutex.used; -#endif /* SYS_STATS */ - vQueueDelete(*mutex); -} -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/* Lock a mutex*/ -void sys_mutex_lock(sys_mutex_t *mutex) -{ - sys_arch_sem_wait(mutex, 0); -} - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/* Unlock a mutex*/ -void sys_mutex_unlock(sys_mutex_t *mutex) -{ - xSemaphoreGive(*mutex); -} -#endif /*LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX*/ -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -// TODO -/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ -/* - Starts a new thread with priority "prio" that will begin its execution in the - function "thread()". The "arg" argument will be passed as an argument to the - thread() function. The id of the new thread is returned. Both the id and - the priority are system dependent. -*/ -sys_thread_t sys_thread_new(const char *name, lwip_thread_fn thread, void *arg, int stacksize, int prio) -{ - xTaskHandle CreatedTask; - int result; - - if (s_nextthread < SYS_THREAD_MAX) { - result = xTaskCreate(thread, name, stacksize, arg, prio, &CreatedTask); - - // For each task created, store the task handle (pid) in the timers array. - // This scheme doesn't allow for threads to be deleted - //s_timeoutlist[s_nextthread++].pid = CreatedTask; - - if (result == pdPASS) { - return CreatedTask; - } else { - return NULL; - } - } else { - return NULL; - } -} - -/* - This optional function does a "fast" critical region protection and returns - the previous protection level. This function is only called during very short - critical regions. An embedded system which supports ISR-based drivers might - want to implement this function by disabling interrupts. Task-based systems - might want to implement this by using a mutex or disabling tasking. This - function should support recursive calls from the same task or interrupt. In - other words, sys_arch_protect() could be called while already protected. In - that case the return value indicates that it is already protected. - - sys_arch_protect() is only required if your port is supporting an operating - system. - - Note: This function is based on FreeRTOS API, because no equivalent CMSIS-RTOS - API is available -*/ -sys_prot_t sys_arch_protect(void) -{ - taskENTER_CRITICAL(); - return (sys_prot_t)1; -} - -/* - This optional function does a "fast" set of critical region protection to the - value specified by pval. See the documentation for sys_arch_protect() for - more information. This function is only required if your port is supporting - an operating system. - - Note: This function is based on FreeRTOS API, because no equivalent CMSIS-RTOS - API is available -*/ -void sys_arch_unprotect(sys_prot_t pval) -{ - (void)pval; - taskEXIT_CRITICAL(); -} - -u32_t sys_now(void) -{ - //FIXME any idea about efficiency - return xTaskGetTickCount() / portTICK_PERIOD_MS; -} - -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Adam Dunkels + * + */ + +/* lwIP includes. */ +#include "lwip/debug.h" +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#if !NO_SYS + +#if defined(LWIP_PROVIDE_ERRNO) +int errno; +#endif + +/* This is the number of threads that can be started with sys_thread_new() */ +#define SYS_THREAD_MAX 6 + +static u16_t s_nextthread = 0; + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +// Creates an empty mailbox. +err_t sys_mbox_new(sys_mbox_t *mbox, int size) +{ + (void)size; + + *mbox = xQueueCreate(TCPIP_MBOX_SIZE, sizeof(void *)); + +#if SYS_STATS + ++lwip_stats.sys.mbox.used; + + if (lwip_stats.sys.mbox.max < lwip_stats.sys.mbox.used) { + lwip_stats.sys.mbox.max = lwip_stats.sys.mbox.used; + } + +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + + if (*mbox == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* + Deallocates a mailbox. If there are messages still present in the + mailbox when the mailbox is deallocated, it is an indication of a + programming error in lwIP and the developer should be notified. +*/ +void sys_mbox_free(sys_mbox_t *mbox) +{ + if (uxQueueMessagesWaiting(*mbox)) { + /* Line for breakpoint. Should never break here! */ + portNOP(); +#if SYS_STATS + lwip_stats.sys.mbox.err++; +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + // TODO notify the user of failure. + } + + vQueueDelete(*mbox); + +#if SYS_STATS + --lwip_stats.sys.mbox.used; +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +// Posts the "msg" to the mailbox. +void sys_mbox_post(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *data) +{ + while (xQueueSendToBack(*mbox, &data, portMAX_DELAY) != pdTRUE) { + }; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +// Try to post the "msg" to the mailbox. +err_t sys_mbox_trypost(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg) +{ + err_t result; + + if (xQueueSend(*mbox, &msg, 0) == pdPASS) { + result = ERR_OK; + } else { + // could not post, queue must be full + result = ERR_MEM; +#if SYS_STATS + lwip_stats.sys.mbox.err++; +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + } + + return result; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +// Try to post the "msg" to the mailbox. +err_t sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr_unused(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void *msg) +{ + return sys_mbox_trypost(mbox, msg); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* + Blocks the thread until a message arrives in the mailbox, but does + not block the thread longer than "timeout" milliseconds (similar to + the sys_arch_sem_wait() function). The "msg" argument is a result + parameter that is set by the function (i.e., by doing "*msg = + ptr"). The "msg" parameter maybe NULL to indicate that the message + should be dropped. + + The return values are the same as for the sys_arch_sem_wait() function: + Number of milliseconds spent waiting or SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT if there was a + timeout. + + Note that a function with a similar name, sys_mbox_fetch(), is + implemented by lwIP. +*/ +u32_t sys_arch_mbox_fetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg, u32_t timeout) +{ + void *dummyptr; + portTickType StartTime, EndTime, Elapsed; + + StartTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); + + if (msg == NULL) { + msg = &dummyptr; + } + + if (timeout != 0) { + if (pdTRUE == xQueueReceive(*mbox, &(*msg), timeout / portTICK_RATE_MS)) { + EndTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); + Elapsed = (EndTime - StartTime) * portTICK_RATE_MS; + return (Elapsed); + } else { + // timed out blocking for message + *msg = NULL; + return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; + } + } else { + // block forever for a message. + while (pdTRUE != xQueueReceive(*mbox, &(*msg), portMAX_DELAY)) { + } // time is arbitrary + + EndTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); + Elapsed = (EndTime - StartTime) * portTICK_RATE_MS; + return (Elapsed); // return time blocked TODO test + } +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* + Similar to sys_arch_mbox_fetch, but if message is not ready immediately, we'll + return with SYS_MBOX_EMPTY. On success, 0 is returned. +*/ +u32_t sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(sys_mbox_t *mbox, void **msg) +{ + void *dummyptr; + + if (msg == NULL) { + msg = &dummyptr; + } + + if (pdTRUE == xQueueReceive(*mbox, &(*msg), 0)) { + return ERR_OK; + } else { + return SYS_MBOX_EMPTY; + } +} +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +int sys_mbox_valid(sys_mbox_t *mbox) +{ + if (*mbox == SYS_MBOX_NULL) { + return 0; + } else { + return 1; + } +} +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +void sys_mbox_set_invalid(sys_mbox_t *mbox) +{ + *mbox = SYS_MBOX_NULL; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +// Creates a new semaphore. The "count" argument specifies +// the initial state of the semaphore. +err_t sys_sem_new(sys_sem_t *sem, u8_t count) +{ + vSemaphoreCreateBinary(*sem); + + if (*sem == NULL) { +#if SYS_STATS + ++lwip_stats.sys.sem.err; +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + + if (count == 0) // Means it can't be taken + { + xSemaphoreTake(*sem, 1); + } + +#if SYS_STATS + ++lwip_stats.sys.sem.used; + + if (lwip_stats.sys.sem.max < lwip_stats.sys.sem.used) { + lwip_stats.sys.sem.max = lwip_stats.sys.sem.used; + } + +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* + Blocks the thread while waiting for the semaphore to be + signaled. If the "timeout" argument is non-zero, the thread should + only be blocked for the specified time (measured in + milliseconds). + + If the timeout argument is non-zero, the return value is the number of + milliseconds spent waiting for the semaphore to be signaled. If the + semaphore wasn't signaled within the specified time, the return value is + SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT. If the thread didn't have to wait for the semaphore + (i.e., it was already signaled), the function may return zero. + + Notice that lwIP implements a function with a similar name, + sys_sem_wait(), that uses the sys_arch_sem_wait() function. +*/ +u32_t sys_arch_sem_wait(sys_sem_t *sem, u32_t timeout) +{ + portTickType StartTime, EndTime, Elapsed; + + StartTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); + + if (timeout != 0) { + if (xSemaphoreTake(*sem, timeout / portTICK_RATE_MS) == pdTRUE) { + EndTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); + Elapsed = (EndTime - StartTime) * portTICK_RATE_MS; + return (Elapsed); // return time blocked TODO test + } else { + return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; + } + } else { + // must block without a timeout + while (xSemaphoreTake(*sem, portMAX_DELAY) != pdTRUE) { + } + + EndTime = xTaskGetTickCount(); + Elapsed = (EndTime - StartTime) * portTICK_RATE_MS; + return (Elapsed); // return time blocked + } +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +// Signals a semaphore +void sys_sem_signal(sys_sem_t *sem) +{ + xSemaphoreGive(*sem); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +// Deallocates a semaphore +void sys_sem_free(sys_sem_t *sem) +{ +#if SYS_STATS + --lwip_stats.sys.sem.used; +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + + vQueueDelete(*sem); +} +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +int sys_sem_valid(sys_sem_t *sem) +{ + if (*sem == SYS_SEM_NULL) { + return 0; + } else { + return 1; + } +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +void sys_sem_set_invalid(sys_sem_t *sem) +{ + *sem = SYS_SEM_NULL; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +// Initialize sys arch +void sys_init(void) +{ + // keep track of how many threads have been created + s_nextthread = 0; +} +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Mutexes*/ +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +#if LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX == 0 +/* Create a new mutex*/ +err_t sys_mutex_new(sys_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + *mutex = xSemaphoreCreateMutex(); + + if (*mutex == NULL) { +#if SYS_STATS + ++lwip_stats.sys.mutex.err; +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + return ERR_MEM; + } + +#if SYS_STATS + ++lwip_stats.sys.mutex.used; + + if (lwip_stats.sys.mutex.max < lwip_stats.sys.mutex.used) { + lwip_stats.sys.mutex.max = lwip_stats.sys.mutex.used; + } + +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + return ERR_OK; +} +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Deallocate a mutex*/ +void sys_mutex_free(sys_mutex_t *mutex) +{ +#if SYS_STATS + --lwip_stats.sys.mutex.used; +#endif /* SYS_STATS */ + vQueueDelete(*mutex); +} +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Lock a mutex*/ +void sys_mutex_lock(sys_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + sys_arch_sem_wait(mutex, 0); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Unlock a mutex*/ +void sys_mutex_unlock(sys_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + xSemaphoreGive(*mutex); +} +#endif /*LWIP_COMPAT_MUTEX*/ +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +// TODO +/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* + Starts a new thread with priority "prio" that will begin its execution in the + function "thread()". The "arg" argument will be passed as an argument to the + thread() function. The id of the new thread is returned. Both the id and + the priority are system dependent. +*/ +sys_thread_t sys_thread_new(const char *name, lwip_thread_fn thread, void *arg, int stacksize, int prio) +{ + xTaskHandle CreatedTask; + int result; + + if (s_nextthread < SYS_THREAD_MAX) { + result = xTaskCreate(thread, name, stacksize, arg, prio, &CreatedTask); + + // For each task created, store the task handle (pid) in the timers array. + // This scheme doesn't allow for threads to be deleted + //s_timeoutlist[s_nextthread++].pid = CreatedTask; + + if (result == pdPASS) { + return CreatedTask; + } else { + return NULL; + } + } else { + return NULL; + } +} + +/* + This optional function does a "fast" critical region protection and returns + the previous protection level. This function is only called during very short + critical regions. An embedded system which supports ISR-based drivers might + want to implement this function by disabling interrupts. Task-based systems + might want to implement this by using a mutex or disabling tasking. This + function should support recursive calls from the same task or interrupt. In + other words, sys_arch_protect() could be called while already protected. In + that case the return value indicates that it is already protected. + + sys_arch_protect() is only required if your port is supporting an operating + system. + + Note: This function is based on FreeRTOS API, because no equivalent CMSIS-RTOS + API is available +*/ +sys_prot_t sys_arch_protect(void) +{ + taskENTER_CRITICAL(); + return (sys_prot_t)1; +} + +/* + This optional function does a "fast" set of critical region protection to the + value specified by pval. See the documentation for sys_arch_protect() for + more information. This function is only required if your port is supporting + an operating system. + + Note: This function is based on FreeRTOS API, because no equivalent CMSIS-RTOS + API is available +*/ +void sys_arch_unprotect(sys_prot_t pval) +{ + (void)pval; + taskEXIT_CRITICAL(); +} + +u32_t sys_now(void) +{ + //FIXME any idea about efficiency + return xTaskGetTickCount() / portTICK_PERIOD_MS; +} + +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/Makefile b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/Makefile similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/Makefile rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/Makefile index 1923d578..ccbe9561 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/Makefile +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/Makefile @@ -1,54 +1,54 @@ -# -# Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. -# All rights reserved. -# -# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -# are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -# -# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -# and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -# 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products -# derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -# -# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED -# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT -# SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, -# EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT -# OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS -# INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN -# CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING -# IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY -# OF SUCH DAMAGE. -# -# This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. -# -# Author: Adam Dunkels -# - -all compile: lwip_fuzz -.PHONY: all clean - -CC=afl-gcc -LDFLAGS=-lm -# use 'make D=-DUSER_DEFINE' to pass a user define to gcc -CFLAGS=-O0 $(D) - -CONTRIBDIR=../../../lwip-contrib -include $(CONTRIBDIR)/ports/unix/Common.mk - -clean: - rm -f *.o $(LWIPLIBCOMMON) $(APPLIB) lwip_fuzz *.s .depend* *.core core - -depend dep: .depend - -include .depend - -.depend: fuzz.c $(LWIPFILES) $(APPFILES) - $(CCDEP) $(CFLAGS) -MM $^ > .depend || rm -f .depend - -lwip_fuzz: .depend $(LWIPLIBCOMMON) $(APPLIB) fuzz.o - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o lwip_fuzz fuzz.o $(APPLIB) $(LWIPLIBCOMMON) $(LDFLAGS) +# +# Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, +# are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, +# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation +# and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +# 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +# derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT +# SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, +# EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT +# OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +# INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +# CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING +# IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY +# OF SUCH DAMAGE. +# +# This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. +# +# Author: Adam Dunkels +# + +all compile: lwip_fuzz +.PHONY: all clean + +CC=afl-gcc +LDFLAGS=-lm +# use 'make D=-DUSER_DEFINE' to pass a user define to gcc +CFLAGS=-O0 $(D) + +CONTRIBDIR=../../../lwip-contrib +include $(CONTRIBDIR)/ports/unix/Common.mk + +clean: + rm -f *.o $(LWIPLIBCOMMON) $(APPLIB) lwip_fuzz *.s .depend* *.core core + +depend dep: .depend + +include .depend + +.depend: fuzz.c $(LWIPFILES) $(APPFILES) + $(CCDEP) $(CFLAGS) -MM $^ > .depend || rm -f .depend + +lwip_fuzz: .depend $(LWIPLIBCOMMON) $(APPLIB) fuzz.o + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o lwip_fuzz fuzz.o $(APPLIB) $(LWIPLIBCOMMON) $(LDFLAGS) diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/README b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/README similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/README rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/README index 4cf497f2..de6fb756 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/README +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/README @@ -1,37 +1,37 @@ - -Fuzzing the lwIP stack (afl-fuzz requires linux/unix or similar) - -This directory contains a small app that reads Ethernet frames from stdin and -processes them. It is used together with the 'american fuzzy lop' tool (found -at http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/) and the sample inputs to test how -unexpected inputs are handled. The afl tool will read the known inputs, and -try to modify them to exercise as many code paths as possible, by instrumenting -the code and keeping track of which code is executed. - -Just running make will produce the test program. - -Running make with parameter 'D=-DLWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET' will produce a binary -that parses the input data as multiple packets (experimental!). - -Then run afl with: - -afl-fuzz -i inputs/ -o output ./lwip_fuzz - -and it should start working. It will probably complain about CPU scheduler, -set AFL_SKIP_CPUFREQ=1 to ignore it. -If it complains about invalid "/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern" setting, try -executing "sudo bash -c 'echo core > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern'". - -The input is split into different subdirectories since they test different -parts of the code, and since you want to run one instance of afl-fuzz on each -core. - -When afl finds a crash or a hang, the input that caused it will be placed in -the output directory. If you have hexdump and text2pcap tools installed, -running output_to_pcap.sh will create pcap files for each input -file to simplify viewing in wireshark. - -The lwipopts.h file needs to have checksum checking off, otherwise almost every -packet will be discarded because of that. The other options can be tuned to -expose different parts of the code. - + +Fuzzing the lwIP stack (afl-fuzz requires linux/unix or similar) + +This directory contains a small app that reads Ethernet frames from stdin and +processes them. It is used together with the 'american fuzzy lop' tool (found +at http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/) and the sample inputs to test how +unexpected inputs are handled. The afl tool will read the known inputs, and +try to modify them to exercise as many code paths as possible, by instrumenting +the code and keeping track of which code is executed. + +Just running make will produce the test program. + +Running make with parameter 'D=-DLWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET' will produce a binary +that parses the input data as multiple packets (experimental!). + +Then run afl with: + +afl-fuzz -i inputs/ -o output ./lwip_fuzz + +and it should start working. It will probably complain about CPU scheduler, +set AFL_SKIP_CPUFREQ=1 to ignore it. +If it complains about invalid "/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern" setting, try +executing "sudo bash -c 'echo core > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern'". + +The input is split into different subdirectories since they test different +parts of the code, and since you want to run one instance of afl-fuzz on each +core. + +When afl finds a crash or a hang, the input that caused it will be placed in +the output directory. If you have hexdump and text2pcap tools installed, +running output_to_pcap.sh will create pcap files for each input +file to simplify viewing in wireshark. + +The lwipopts.h file needs to have checksum checking off, otherwise almost every +packet will be discarded because of that. The other options can be tuned to +expose different parts of the code. + diff --git a/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/config.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e69de29b diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/fuzz.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/fuzz.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/fuzz.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/fuzz.c index 724aa535..0f719fca 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/fuzz.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/fuzz.c @@ -1,197 +1,197 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Erik Ekman - * - */ - -#include "lwip/init.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/dns.h" -#include "netif/etharp.h" -#if LWIP_IPV6 -#include "lwip/ethip6.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#endif - -#include "lwip/apps/httpd.h" -#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" -#include "lwip/apps/lwiperf.h" -#include "lwip/apps/mdns.h" - -#include -#include - -/* This define enables multi packet processing. - * For this, the input is interpreted as 2 byte length + data + 2 byte length + data... - * #define LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET -*/ -#ifdef LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET -u8_t pktbuf[20000]; -#else -u8_t pktbuf[2000]; -#endif - -/* no-op send function */ -static err_t lwip_tx_func(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t testif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - netif->name[0] = 'f'; - netif->name[1] = 'z'; - netif->output = etharp_output; - netif->linkoutput = lwip_tx_func; - netif->mtu = 1500; - netif->hwaddr_len = 6; - netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_IGMP; - - netif->hwaddr[0] = 0x00; - netif->hwaddr[1] = 0x23; - netif->hwaddr[2] = 0xC1; - netif->hwaddr[3] = 0xDE; - netif->hwaddr[4] = 0xD0; - netif->hwaddr[5] = 0x0D; - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - netif->output_ip6 = ethip6_output; - netif->ip6_autoconfig_enabled = 1; - netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(netif, 1); - netif->flags |= NETIF_FLAG_MLD6; -#endif - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void input_pkt(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *data, size_t len) -{ - struct pbuf *p, *q; - err_t err; - - LWIP_ASSERT("pkt too big", len <= 0xFFFF); - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)len, PBUF_POOL); - LWIP_ASSERT("alloc failed", p); - - for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - MEMCPY(q->payload, data, q->len); - data += q->len; - } - - err = netif->input(p, netif); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - } -} - -static void input_pkts(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *data, size_t len) -{ -#ifdef LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET - const u16_t max_packet_size = 1514; - const u8_t *ptr = data; - size_t rem_len = len; - - while (rem_len > sizeof(u16_t)) { - u16_t frame_len; - memcpy(&frame_len, ptr, sizeof(u16_t)); - ptr += sizeof(u16_t); - rem_len -= sizeof(u16_t); - frame_len = htons(frame_len) & 0x7FF; - frame_len = LWIP_MIN(frame_len, max_packet_size); - - if (frame_len > rem_len) { - frame_len = (u16_t)rem_len; - } - - if (frame_len != 0) { - input_pkt(netif, ptr, frame_len); - } - - ptr += frame_len; - rem_len -= frame_len; - } - -#else /* LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET */ - input_pkt(netif, data, len); -#endif /* LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET */ -} - -int main(int argc, char **argv) -{ - struct netif net_test; - ip4_addr_t addr; - ip4_addr_t netmask; - ip4_addr_t gw; - size_t len; - - lwip_init(); - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 172, 30, 115, 84); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 255, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 172, 30, 115, 1); - - netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); - netif_set_up(&net_test); - netif_set_link_up(&net_test); - -#if LWIP_IPV6 - nd6_tmr(); /* tick nd to join multicast groups */ -#endif - dns_setserver(0, &net_test.gw); - - /* initialize apps */ - httpd_init(); - lwiperf_start_tcp_server_default(NULL, NULL); - mdns_resp_init(); - mdns_resp_add_netif(&net_test, "hostname", 255); - snmp_init(); - - if (argc > 1) { - FILE *f; - const char *filename; - printf("reading input from file... "); - fflush(stdout); - filename = argv[1]; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid filename", filename != NULL); - f = fopen(filename, "rb"); - LWIP_ASSERT("open failed", f != NULL); - len = fread(pktbuf, 1, sizeof(pktbuf), f); - fclose(f); - printf("testing file: \"%s\"...\r\n", filename); - } else { - len = fread(pktbuf, 1, sizeof(pktbuf), stdin); - } - - input_pkts(&net_test, pktbuf, len); - - return 0; -} +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Erik Ekman + * + */ + +#include "lwip/init.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/dns.h" +#include "netif/etharp.h" +#if LWIP_IPV6 +#include "lwip/ethip6.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#endif + +#include "lwip/apps/httpd.h" +#include "lwip/apps/snmp.h" +#include "lwip/apps/lwiperf.h" +#include "lwip/apps/mdns.h" + +#include +#include + +/* This define enables multi packet processing. + * For this, the input is interpreted as 2 byte length + data + 2 byte length + data... + * #define LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET +*/ +#ifdef LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET +u8_t pktbuf[20000]; +#else +u8_t pktbuf[2000]; +#endif + +/* no-op send function */ +static err_t lwip_tx_func(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t testif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + netif->name[0] = 'f'; + netif->name[1] = 'z'; + netif->output = etharp_output; + netif->linkoutput = lwip_tx_func; + netif->mtu = 1500; + netif->hwaddr_len = 6; + netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_IGMP; + + netif->hwaddr[0] = 0x00; + netif->hwaddr[1] = 0x23; + netif->hwaddr[2] = 0xC1; + netif->hwaddr[3] = 0xDE; + netif->hwaddr[4] = 0xD0; + netif->hwaddr[5] = 0x0D; + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + netif->output_ip6 = ethip6_output; + netif->ip6_autoconfig_enabled = 1; + netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(netif, 1); + netif->flags |= NETIF_FLAG_MLD6; +#endif + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void input_pkt(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + struct pbuf *p, *q; + err_t err; + + LWIP_ASSERT("pkt too big", len <= 0xFFFF); + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)len, PBUF_POOL); + LWIP_ASSERT("alloc failed", p); + + for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + MEMCPY(q->payload, data, q->len); + data += q->len; + } + + err = netif->input(p, netif); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + } +} + +static void input_pkts(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *data, size_t len) +{ +#ifdef LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET + const u16_t max_packet_size = 1514; + const u8_t *ptr = data; + size_t rem_len = len; + + while (rem_len > sizeof(u16_t)) { + u16_t frame_len; + memcpy(&frame_len, ptr, sizeof(u16_t)); + ptr += sizeof(u16_t); + rem_len -= sizeof(u16_t); + frame_len = htons(frame_len) & 0x7FF; + frame_len = LWIP_MIN(frame_len, max_packet_size); + + if (frame_len > rem_len) { + frame_len = (u16_t)rem_len; + } + + if (frame_len != 0) { + input_pkt(netif, ptr, frame_len); + } + + ptr += frame_len; + rem_len -= frame_len; + } + +#else /* LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET */ + input_pkt(netif, data, len); +#endif /* LWIP_FUZZ_MULTI_PACKET */ +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct netif net_test; + ip4_addr_t addr; + ip4_addr_t netmask; + ip4_addr_t gw; + size_t len; + + lwip_init(); + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 172, 30, 115, 84); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 255, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 172, 30, 115, 1); + + netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); + netif_set_up(&net_test); + netif_set_link_up(&net_test); + +#if LWIP_IPV6 + nd6_tmr(); /* tick nd to join multicast groups */ +#endif + dns_setserver(0, &net_test.gw); + + /* initialize apps */ + httpd_init(); + lwiperf_start_tcp_server_default(NULL, NULL); + mdns_resp_init(); + mdns_resp_add_netif(&net_test, "hostname", 255); + snmp_init(); + + if (argc > 1) { + FILE *f; + const char *filename; + printf("reading input from file... "); + fflush(stdout); + filename = argv[1]; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid filename", filename != NULL); + f = fopen(filename, "rb"); + LWIP_ASSERT("open failed", f != NULL); + len = fread(pktbuf, 1, sizeof(pktbuf), f); + fclose(f); + printf("testing file: \"%s\"...\r\n", filename); + } else { + len = fread(pktbuf, 1, sizeof(pktbuf), stdin); + } + + input_pkts(&net_test, pktbuf, len); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/arp/arp_req.bin b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/arp/arp_req.bin similarity index 100% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/arp/arp_req.bin rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/arp/arp_req.bin diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/icmp/icmp_ping.bin b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/icmp/icmp_ping.bin similarity index 100% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/icmp/icmp_ping.bin rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/icmp/icmp_ping.bin diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/ipv6/neighbor_solicitation.bin b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/ipv6/neighbor_solicitation.bin similarity index 100% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/ipv6/neighbor_solicitation.bin rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/ipv6/neighbor_solicitation.bin diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/ipv6/router_adv.bin b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/ipv6/router_adv.bin similarity index 100% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/ipv6/router_adv.bin rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/ipv6/router_adv.bin diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/tcp/tcp_syn.bin b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/tcp/tcp_syn.bin similarity index 100% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/tcp/tcp_syn.bin rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/tcp/tcp_syn.bin diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/udp/udp_port_5000.bin b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/udp/udp_port_5000.bin similarity index 100% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/udp/udp_port_5000.bin rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/inputs/udp/udp_port_5000.bin diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/lwipopts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/lwipopts.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/lwipopts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/lwipopts.h index 5d39952c..61518b80 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/lwipopts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/lwipopts.h @@ -1,80 +1,80 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H__ -#define LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H__ - -/* Prevent having to link sys_arch.c (we don't test the API layers in unit tests) */ -#define NO_SYS 1 -#define LWIP_NETCONN 0 -#define LWIP_SOCKET 0 -#define SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT 0 - -#define LWIP_IPV6 1 -#define IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER 1 -#define LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS 0 - -/* Enable some protocols to test them */ -#define LWIP_DHCP 1 -#define LWIP_AUTOIP 1 - -#define LWIP_IGMP 1 -#define LWIP_DNS 1 - -#define LWIP_ALTCP 1 - -/* Turn off checksum verification of fuzzed data */ -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 0 -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 0 -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 0 -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP 0 -#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 0 - -/* Minimal changes to opt.h required for tcp unit tests: */ -#define MEM_SIZE 16000 -#define TCP_SND_QUEUELEN 40 -#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG TCP_SND_QUEUELEN -#define TCP_OVERSIZE 1 -#define TCP_SND_BUF (12 * TCP_MSS) -#define TCP_WND (10 * TCP_MSS) -#define LWIP_WND_SCALE 1 -#define TCP_RCV_SCALE 2 -#define PBUF_POOL_SIZE 400 /* pbuf tests need ~200KByte */ - -/* Minimal changes to opt.h required for etharp unit tests: */ -#define ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES 1 - -#define LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA 1 -#define LWIP_SNMP 1 -#define MIB2_STATS 1 -#define LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER 1 - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H__ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H__ +#define LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H__ + +/* Prevent having to link sys_arch.c (we don't test the API layers in unit tests) */ +#define NO_SYS 1 +#define LWIP_NETCONN 0 +#define LWIP_SOCKET 0 +#define SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT 0 + +#define LWIP_IPV6 1 +#define IPV6_FRAG_COPYHEADER 1 +#define LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS 0 + +/* Enable some protocols to test them */ +#define LWIP_DHCP 1 +#define LWIP_AUTOIP 1 + +#define LWIP_IGMP 1 +#define LWIP_DNS 1 + +#define LWIP_ALTCP 1 + +/* Turn off checksum verification of fuzzed data */ +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_IP 0 +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_UDP 0 +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_TCP 0 +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP 0 +#define CHECKSUM_CHECK_ICMP6 0 + +/* Minimal changes to opt.h required for tcp unit tests: */ +#define MEM_SIZE 16000 +#define TCP_SND_QUEUELEN 40 +#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG TCP_SND_QUEUELEN +#define TCP_OVERSIZE 1 +#define TCP_SND_BUF (12 * TCP_MSS) +#define TCP_WND (10 * TCP_MSS) +#define LWIP_WND_SCALE 1 +#define TCP_RCV_SCALE 2 +#define PBUF_POOL_SIZE 400 /* pbuf tests need ~200KByte */ + +/* Minimal changes to opt.h required for etharp unit tests: */ +#define ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES 1 + +#define LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA 1 +#define LWIP_SNMP 1 +#define MIB2_STATS 1 +#define LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER 1 + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H__ */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/output_to_pcap.sh b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/output_to_pcap.sh similarity index 95% rename from components/lwip/test/fuzz/output_to_pcap.sh rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/output_to_pcap.sh index 318218e4..c999ff03 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/fuzz/output_to_pcap.sh +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/fuzz/output_to_pcap.sh @@ -1,31 +1,31 @@ -#!/bin/bash - -if [ -z "$1" ] -then - echo "This script will make pcap files from the afl-fuzz crash/hang files" - echo "It needs hexdump and text2pcap" - echo "Please give output directory as argument" - exit 2 -fi - -for i in `ls $1/crashes/id*` -do - PCAPNAME=`echo $i | grep pcap` - if [ -z "$PCAPNAME" ]; then - hexdump -C $i > $1/$$.tmp - text2pcap $1/$$.tmp ${i}.pcap - fi -done -for i in `ls $1/hangs/id*` -do - PCAPNAME=`echo $i | grep pcap` - if [ -z "$PCAPNAME" ]; then - hexdump -C $i > $1/$$.tmp - text2pcap $1/$$.tmp ${i}.pcap - fi -done -rm -f $1/$$.tmp - -echo -echo "Created pcap files:" -ls $1/*/*.pcap +#!/bin/bash + +if [ -z "$1" ] +then + echo "This script will make pcap files from the afl-fuzz crash/hang files" + echo "It needs hexdump and text2pcap" + echo "Please give output directory as argument" + exit 2 +fi + +for i in `ls $1/crashes/id*` +do + PCAPNAME=`echo $i | grep pcap` + if [ -z "$PCAPNAME" ]; then + hexdump -C $i > $1/$$.tmp + text2pcap $1/$$.tmp ${i}.pcap + fi +done +for i in `ls $1/hangs/id*` +do + PCAPNAME=`echo $i | grep pcap` + if [ -z "$PCAPNAME" ]; then + hexdump -C $i > $1/$$.tmp + text2pcap $1/$$.tmp ${i}.pcap + fi +done +rm -f $1/$$.tmp + +echo +echo "Created pcap files:" +ls $1/*/*.pcap diff --git a/components/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.c index d0c06d70..01ebfa67 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.c @@ -1,785 +1,785 @@ -/** - * @file - * Sockets stresstest - * - * This file uses the lwIP socket API to do stress tests that should test the - * stability when used in many different situations, with many concurrent - * sockets making concurrent transfers in different manners. - * - * - test rely on loopback sockets for now, so netif drivers are not tested - * - all enabled functions shall be used - * - parallelism of the tests depend on enough resources being available - * (configure your lwipopts.h settings high enough) - * - test should also be able to run in a real target - * - * TODO: - * - full duplex - * - add asserts about internal socket/netconn/pcb state? - */ - -/* -* Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt -* All rights reserved. -* -* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -* -* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products -* derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -* -* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED -* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT -* SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, -* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT -* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS -* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN -* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING -* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY -* OF SUCH DAMAGE. -* -* This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. -* -* Author: Simon Goldschmidt -* -*/ - -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "sockets_stresstest.h" - -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/sys.h" - -#include "lwip/mem.h" - -#include -#include - -#if LWIP_SOCKET && LWIP_IPV4 /* this uses IPv4 loopback sockets, currently */ - -#ifndef TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS -#define TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS LWIP_DBG_OFF -#endif - -#define TEST_TIME_SECONDS 10 -#define TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE (TCP_MSS * 2) -#define TEST_MAX_RXWAIT_MS 50 -#define TEST_MAX_CONNECTIONS 50 - -#define TEST_SOCK_READABLE 0x01 -#define TEST_SOCK_WRITABLE 0x02 -#define TEST_SOCK_ERR 0x04 - -#define TEST_MODE_SELECT 0x01 -#define TEST_MODE_POLL 0x02 -#define TEST_MODE_NONBLOCKING 0x04 -#define TEST_MODE_WAIT 0x08 -#define TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO 0x10 -#define TEST_MODE_SLEEP 0x20 - -static int sockets_stresstest_numthreads; - -struct test_settings { - struct sockaddr_storage addr; - int start_client; - int loop_cnt; -}; - -struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex { - int s; - volatile int closed; -}; - -static void fill_test_data(void *buf, size_t buf_len_bytes) -{ - u8_t *p = (u8_t *)buf; - u16_t i, chk; - - LWIP_ASSERT("buffer too short", buf_len_bytes >= 4); - LWIP_ASSERT("buffer too big", buf_len_bytes <= 0xFFFF); - /* store the total number of bytes */ - p[0] = (u8_t)(buf_len_bytes >> 8); - p[1] = (u8_t)buf_len_bytes; - - /* fill buffer with random */ - chk = 0; - - for (i = 4; i < buf_len_bytes; i++) { - u8_t rnd = (u8_t)LWIP_RAND(); - p[i] = rnd; - chk += rnd; - } - - /* store checksum */ - p[2] = (u8_t)(chk >> 8); - p[3] = (u8_t)chk; -} - -static size_t check_test_data(const void *buf, size_t buf_len_bytes) -{ - u8_t *p = (u8_t *)buf; - u16_t i, chk, chk_rx, len_rx; - - LWIP_ASSERT("buffer too short", buf_len_bytes >= 4); - len_rx = (((u16_t)p[0]) << 8) | p[1]; - LWIP_ASSERT("len too short", len_rx >= 4); - - if (len_rx > buf_len_bytes) { - /* not all data received in this segment */ - LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("check-\n")); - return buf_len_bytes; - } - - chk_rx = (((u16_t)p[2]) << 8) | p[3]; - /* calculate received checksum */ - chk = 0; - - for (i = 4; i < len_rx; i++) { - chk += p[i]; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid checksum", chk == chk_rx); - - if (len_rx < buf_len_bytes) { - size_t data_left = buf_len_bytes - len_rx; - memmove(p, &p[len_rx], data_left); - return data_left; - } - - /* if we come here, we received exactly one chunk - -> next offset is 0 */ - return 0; -} - -static size_t recv_and_check_data_return_offset(int s, char *rxbuf, size_t rxbufsize, size_t rxoff, int *closed, const char *dbg) -{ - ssize_t ret; - - ret = lwip_read(s, &rxbuf[rxoff], rxbufsize - rxoff); - - if (ret == 0) { - *closed = 1; - return rxoff; - } - - *closed = 0; - LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("%s %d rx %d\n", dbg, s, (int)ret)); - - if (ret == -1) { - /* TODO: for this to work, 'errno' has to support multithreading... */ - int err = errno; - - if (err == ENOTCONN) { - *closed = 1; - return 0; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("err == 0", err == 0); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("ret > 0", ret > 0); - return check_test_data(rxbuf, rxoff + ret); -} - -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT -static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_select(int s, int timeout_ms) -{ - int ret; - struct timeval tv; - fd_set fs_r; - fd_set fs_w; - fd_set fs_e; - - FD_ZERO(&fs_r); - FD_ZERO(&fs_w); - FD_ZERO(&fs_e); - - FD_SET(s, &fs_r); - FD_SET(s, &fs_e); - - tv.tv_sec = timeout_ms / 1000; - tv.tv_usec = (timeout_ms - (tv.tv_sec * 1000)) * 1000; - ret = lwip_select(s + 1, &fs_r, &fs_w, &fs_e, &tv); - LWIP_ASSERT("select error", ret >= 0); - - if (ret) { - /* convert poll flags to our flags */ - ret = 0; - - if (FD_ISSET(s, &fs_r)) { - ret |= TEST_SOCK_READABLE; - } - - if (FD_ISSET(s, &fs_w)) { - ret |= TEST_SOCK_WRITABLE; - } - - if (FD_ISSET(s, &fs_e)) { - ret |= TEST_SOCK_ERR; - } - - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif - -#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL -static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_poll(int s, int timeout_ms) -{ - int ret; - struct pollfd pfd; - - pfd.fd = s; - pfd.revents = 0; - pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLERR; - - ret = lwip_poll(&pfd, 1, timeout_ms); - - if (ret) { - /* convert poll flags to our flags */ - ret = 0; - - if (pfd.revents & POLLIN) { - ret |= TEST_SOCK_READABLE; - } - - if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT) { - ret |= TEST_SOCK_WRITABLE; - } - - if (pfd.revents & POLLERR) { - ret |= TEST_SOCK_ERR; - } - - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif - -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO -static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_recvtimeo(int s, int timeout_ms) -{ - int ret; - char buf; -#if LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD - int opt_on = timeout_ms; - int opt_off = 0; -#else - struct timeval opt_on, opt_off; - opt_on.tv_sec = timeout_ms / 1000; - opt_on.tv_usec = (timeout_ms - (opt_on.tv_sec * 1000)) * 1000; - opt_off.tv_sec = 0; - opt_off.tv_usec = 0; -#endif - - /* enable receive timeout */ - ret = lwip_setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &opt_on, sizeof(opt_on)); - LWIP_ASSERT("setsockopt error", ret == 0); - - /* peek for one byte with timeout */ - ret = lwip_recv(s, &buf, 1, MSG_PEEK); - - /* disable receive timeout */ - ret = lwip_setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &opt_off, sizeof(opt_off)); - LWIP_ASSERT("setsockopt error", ret == 0); - - if (ret == 1) { - return TEST_SOCK_READABLE; - } - - if (ret == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (ret == -1) { - return TEST_SOCK_ERR; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid return value", 0); - return TEST_SOCK_ERR; -} -#endif - -static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_wait_peek(int s, int timeout_ms) -{ - int ret; - char buf; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(timeout_ms); /* cannot time out here */ - - /* peek for one byte */ - ret = lwip_recv(s, &buf, 1, MSG_PEEK); - - if (ret == 1) { - return TEST_SOCK_READABLE; - } - - if (ret == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (ret == -1) { - return TEST_SOCK_ERR; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid return value", 0); - return TEST_SOCK_ERR; -} - -static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_nonblock(int s, int timeout_ms) -{ - int ret; - char buf; - u32_t wait_until = sys_now() + timeout_ms; - - while (sys_now() < wait_until) { - /* peek for one byte */ - ret = lwip_recv(s, &buf, 1, MSG_PEEK | MSG_DONTWAIT); - - if (ret == 1) { - return TEST_SOCK_READABLE; - } - - if (ret == -1) { - /* TODO: for this to work, 'errno' has to support multithreading... */ - int err = errno; - - if (err != EWOULDBLOCK) { - return TEST_SOCK_ERR; - } - } - - /* TODO: sleep? */ - } - - return 0; -} - -static int sockets_stresstest_rand_mode(int allow_wait, int allow_rx) -{ - u32_t random_value = LWIP_RAND(); -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT - - if (random_value & TEST_MODE_SELECT) { - return TEST_MODE_SELECT; - } - -#endif -#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL - - if (random_value & TEST_MODE_POLL) { - return TEST_MODE_POLL; - } - -#endif - - if (!allow_rx) { - return TEST_MODE_SLEEP; - } - -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO - - if (random_value & TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO) { - return TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO; - } - -#endif - - if (allow_wait) { - if (random_value & TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO) { - return TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO; - } - } - - return TEST_MODE_NONBLOCKING; -} - -static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable(int mode, int s, int timeout_ms) -{ - switch (mode) { -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT - - case TEST_MODE_SELECT: - return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_select(s, timeout_ms); -#endif -#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL - - case TEST_MODE_POLL: - return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_poll(s, timeout_ms); -#endif -#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO - - case TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO: - return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_recvtimeo(s, timeout_ms); -#endif - - case TEST_MODE_WAIT: - return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_wait_peek(s, timeout_ms); - - case TEST_MODE_NONBLOCKING: - return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_nonblock(s, timeout_ms); - - case TEST_MODE_SLEEP: { - sys_msleep(timeout_ms); - return 1; - } - - default: - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid mode", 0); - break; - } - - return 0; -} - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX -static void sockets_stresstest_conn_client_r(void *arg) -{ - struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex *fd = (struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex *)arg; - int s = fd->s; - size_t rxoff = 0; - char rxbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; - - while (1) { - int closed; - - if (fd->closed) { - break; - } - - rxoff = recv_and_check_data_return_offset(s, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), rxoff, &closed, "cli"); - - if (fd->closed) { - break; - } - - if (closed) { - lwip_close(s); - break; - } - } - - SYS_ARCH_DEC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); - LWIP_ASSERT("", sockets_stresstest_numthreads >= 0); -} -#endif - -static void sockets_stresstest_conn_client(void *arg) -{ - struct sockaddr_storage addr; - struct sockaddr_in *addr_in; - int s, ret; - char txbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; - char rxbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; - size_t rxoff = 0; - u32_t max_time = sys_now() + (TEST_TIME_SECONDS * 1000); - int do_rx = 1; - struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex *data = NULL; - - memcpy(&addr, arg, sizeof(addr)); - LWIP_ASSERT("", addr.ss_family == AF_INET); - addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; - addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); - - /* sleep a random time between 1 and 2 seconds */ - sys_msleep(1000 + (LWIP_RAND() % 1000)); - - /* connect to the server */ - s = lwip_socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("s >= 0", s >= 0); - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX - - if (LWIP_RAND() & 1) { - sys_thread_t t; - data = (struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex)); - LWIP_ASSERT("data != NULL", data != 0); - SYS_ARCH_INC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); - data->s = s; - data->closed = 0; - t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_conn_client_r", sockets_stresstest_conn_client_r, data, 0, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); - do_rx = 0; - } - -#endif - - /* @todo: nonblocking connect? */ - ret = lwip_connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); - - while (sys_now() < max_time) { - int closed; - int mode = sockets_stresstest_rand_mode(0, do_rx); - int timeout_ms = LWIP_RAND() % TEST_MAX_RXWAIT_MS; - ret = sockets_stresstest_wait_readable(mode, s, timeout_ms); - - if (ret) { - if (do_rx) { - /* read some */ - LWIP_ASSERT("readable", ret == TEST_SOCK_READABLE); - rxoff = recv_and_check_data_return_offset(s, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), rxoff, &closed, "cli"); - LWIP_ASSERT("client got closed", !closed); - } - } else { - /* timeout, send some */ - size_t send_len = (LWIP_RAND() % (sizeof(txbuf) - 4)) + 4; - fill_test_data(txbuf, send_len); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("cli %d tx %d\n", s, (int)send_len)); - ret = lwip_write(s, txbuf, send_len); - - if (ret == -1) { - /* TODO: for this to work, 'errno' has to support multithreading... */ - int err = errno; - LWIP_ASSERT("err == 0", err == 0); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == send_len", ret == (int)send_len); - } - } - - if (data) { - data->closed = 1; - } - - ret = lwip_close(s); - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); - - SYS_ARCH_DEC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); - LWIP_ASSERT("", sockets_stresstest_numthreads >= 0); -} - -static void sockets_stresstest_conn_server(void *arg) -{ - int s, ret; - char txbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; - char rxbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; - size_t rxoff = 0; - - s = (int)arg; - - while (1) { - int closed; - int mode = sockets_stresstest_rand_mode(1, 1); - int timeout_ms = LWIP_RAND() % TEST_MAX_RXWAIT_MS; - ret = sockets_stresstest_wait_readable(mode, s, timeout_ms); - - if (ret) { - if (ret & TEST_SOCK_ERR) { - /* closed? */ - break; - } - - /* read some */ - LWIP_ASSERT("readable", ret == TEST_SOCK_READABLE); - rxoff = recv_and_check_data_return_offset(s, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), rxoff, &closed, "srv"); - - if (closed) { - break; - } - } else { - /* timeout, send some */ - size_t send_len = (LWIP_RAND() % (sizeof(txbuf) - 4)) + 4; - fill_test_data(txbuf, send_len); - LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("srv %d tx %d\n", s, (int)send_len)); - ret = lwip_write(s, txbuf, send_len); - - if (ret == -1) { - /* TODO: for this to work, 'errno' has to support multithreading... */ - int err = errno; - - if (err == ECONNRESET) { - break; - } - - if (err == ENOTCONN) { - break; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("unknown error", 0); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == send_len", ret == (int)send_len); - } - } - - ret = lwip_close(s); - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); - - SYS_ARCH_DEC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); - LWIP_ASSERT("", sockets_stresstest_numthreads >= 0); -} - -static int sockets_stresstest_start_clients(const struct sockaddr_storage *remote_addr) -{ - /* limit the number of connections */ - const int max_connections = LWIP_MIN(TEST_MAX_CONNECTIONS, MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB / 3); - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < max_connections; i++) { - sys_thread_t t; - SYS_ARCH_INC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); - t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_conn_client", sockets_stresstest_conn_client, (void *)remote_addr, 0, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); - } - - return max_connections; -} - -static void sockets_stresstest_listener(void *arg) -{ - int slisten; - int ret; - struct sockaddr_storage addr; - socklen_t addr_len; - struct test_settings *settings = (struct test_settings *)arg; - int num_clients, num_servers = 0; - - slisten = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("slisten >= 0", slisten >= 0); - - memcpy(&addr, &settings->addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); - ret = lwip_bind(slisten, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); - - ret = lwip_listen(slisten, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); - - addr_len = sizeof(addr); - ret = lwip_getsockname(slisten, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addr_len); - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); - - num_clients = sockets_stresstest_start_clients(&addr); - - while (num_servers < num_clients) { - struct sockaddr_storage aclient; - socklen_t aclient_len = sizeof(aclient); - int sclient = lwip_accept(slisten, (struct sockaddr *)&aclient, &aclient_len); -#if 1 - /* using server threads */ - { - sys_thread_t t; - SYS_ARCH_INC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); - num_servers++; - t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_conn_server", sockets_stresstest_conn_server, (void *)sclient, 0, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); - } -#else - /* using server select */ -#endif - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener: all %d connections established\n", num_clients)); - - /* accepted all clients */ - while (sockets_stresstest_numthreads > 0) { - sys_msleep(1); - } - - ret = lwip_close(slisten); - LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener: done\n")); -} - -static void sockets_stresstest_listener_loop(void *arg) -{ - int i; - struct test_settings *settings = (struct test_settings *)arg; - - if (settings->loop_cnt) { - for (i = 0; i < settings->loop_cnt; i++) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener_loop: iteration %d\n", i)); - sockets_stresstest_listener(arg); - sys_msleep(2); - } - - LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener_loop: done\n")); - } else { - for (i = 0;; i++) { - LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener_loop: iteration %d\n", i)); - sockets_stresstest_listener(arg); - sys_msleep(2); - } - } -} - -void sockets_stresstest_init_loopback(int addr_family) -{ - sys_thread_t t; - struct test_settings *settings = (struct test_settings *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct test_settings)); - - LWIP_ASSERT("OOM", settings != NULL); - memset(settings, 0, sizeof(struct test_settings)); -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid addr_family", (addr_family == AF_INET) || (addr_family == AF_INET6)); -#endif - settings->addr.ss_family = (sa_family_t)addr_family; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr_family); - settings->start_client = 1; - - t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_listener_loop", sockets_stresstest_listener_loop, settings, 0, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); -} - -void sockets_stresstest_init_server(int addr_family, u16_t server_port) -{ - sys_thread_t t; - struct test_settings *settings = (struct test_settings *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct test_settings)); - - LWIP_ASSERT("OOM", settings != NULL); - memset(settings, 0, sizeof(struct test_settings)); -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid addr_family", (addr_family == AF_INET) || (addr_family == AF_INET6)); - settings->addr.ss_family = (sa_family_t)addr_family; -#endif - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr_family); - ((struct sockaddr_in *)(&settings->addr))->sin_port = server_port; - - t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_listener", sockets_stresstest_listener, settings, 0, 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); -} - -void sockets_stresstest_init_client(const char *remote_ip, u16_t remote_port) -{ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - ip4_addr_t ip4; -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - ip6_addr_t ip6; -#endif - struct sockaddr_storage *addr = (struct sockaddr_storage *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); - - LWIP_ASSERT("OOM", addr != NULL); - memset(addr, 0, sizeof(struct test_settings)); -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - if (ip4addr_aton(remote_ip, &ip4)) { - addr->ss_family = AF_INET; - ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(&ip4); - } -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 - else -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - if (ip6addr_aton(remote_ip, &ip6)) { - addr->ss_family = AF_INET6; - /* todo: copy ipv6 address */ - } - -#endif - ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_port = remote_port; - sockets_stresstest_start_clients(addr); -} - -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET && LWIP_IPV4 */ +/** + * @file + * Sockets stresstest + * + * This file uses the lwIP socket API to do stress tests that should test the + * stability when used in many different situations, with many concurrent + * sockets making concurrent transfers in different manners. + * + * - test rely on loopback sockets for now, so netif drivers are not tested + * - all enabled functions shall be used + * - parallelism of the tests depend on enough resources being available + * (configure your lwipopts.h settings high enough) + * - test should also be able to run in a real target + * + * TODO: + * - full duplex + * - add asserts about internal socket/netconn/pcb state? + */ + +/* +* Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt +* All rights reserved. +* +* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, +* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +* +* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, +* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation +* and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +* derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT +* SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, +* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT +* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING +* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY +* OF SUCH DAMAGE. +* +* This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. +* +* Author: Simon Goldschmidt +* +*/ + +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "sockets_stresstest.h" + +#include "lwip/sockets.h" +#include "lwip/sys.h" + +#include "lwip/mem.h" + +#include +#include + +#if LWIP_SOCKET && LWIP_IPV4 /* this uses IPv4 loopback sockets, currently */ + +#ifndef TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS +#define TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS LWIP_DBG_OFF +#endif + +#define TEST_TIME_SECONDS 10 +#define TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE (TCP_MSS * 2) +#define TEST_MAX_RXWAIT_MS 50 +#define TEST_MAX_CONNECTIONS 50 + +#define TEST_SOCK_READABLE 0x01 +#define TEST_SOCK_WRITABLE 0x02 +#define TEST_SOCK_ERR 0x04 + +#define TEST_MODE_SELECT 0x01 +#define TEST_MODE_POLL 0x02 +#define TEST_MODE_NONBLOCKING 0x04 +#define TEST_MODE_WAIT 0x08 +#define TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO 0x10 +#define TEST_MODE_SLEEP 0x20 + +static int sockets_stresstest_numthreads; + +struct test_settings { + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + int start_client; + int loop_cnt; +}; + +struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex { + int s; + volatile int closed; +}; + +static void fill_test_data(void *buf, size_t buf_len_bytes) +{ + u8_t *p = (u8_t *)buf; + u16_t i, chk; + + LWIP_ASSERT("buffer too short", buf_len_bytes >= 4); + LWIP_ASSERT("buffer too big", buf_len_bytes <= 0xFFFF); + /* store the total number of bytes */ + p[0] = (u8_t)(buf_len_bytes >> 8); + p[1] = (u8_t)buf_len_bytes; + + /* fill buffer with random */ + chk = 0; + + for (i = 4; i < buf_len_bytes; i++) { + u8_t rnd = (u8_t)LWIP_RAND(); + p[i] = rnd; + chk += rnd; + } + + /* store checksum */ + p[2] = (u8_t)(chk >> 8); + p[3] = (u8_t)chk; +} + +static size_t check_test_data(const void *buf, size_t buf_len_bytes) +{ + u8_t *p = (u8_t *)buf; + u16_t i, chk, chk_rx, len_rx; + + LWIP_ASSERT("buffer too short", buf_len_bytes >= 4); + len_rx = (((u16_t)p[0]) << 8) | p[1]; + LWIP_ASSERT("len too short", len_rx >= 4); + + if (len_rx > buf_len_bytes) { + /* not all data received in this segment */ + LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("check-\n")); + return buf_len_bytes; + } + + chk_rx = (((u16_t)p[2]) << 8) | p[3]; + /* calculate received checksum */ + chk = 0; + + for (i = 4; i < len_rx; i++) { + chk += p[i]; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid checksum", chk == chk_rx); + + if (len_rx < buf_len_bytes) { + size_t data_left = buf_len_bytes - len_rx; + memmove(p, &p[len_rx], data_left); + return data_left; + } + + /* if we come here, we received exactly one chunk + -> next offset is 0 */ + return 0; +} + +static size_t recv_and_check_data_return_offset(int s, char *rxbuf, size_t rxbufsize, size_t rxoff, int *closed, const char *dbg) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = lwip_read(s, &rxbuf[rxoff], rxbufsize - rxoff); + + if (ret == 0) { + *closed = 1; + return rxoff; + } + + *closed = 0; + LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("%s %d rx %d\n", dbg, s, (int)ret)); + + if (ret == -1) { + /* TODO: for this to work, 'errno' has to support multithreading... */ + int err = errno; + + if (err == ENOTCONN) { + *closed = 1; + return 0; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("err == 0", err == 0); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("ret > 0", ret > 0); + return check_test_data(rxbuf, rxoff + ret); +} + +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT +static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_select(int s, int timeout_ms) +{ + int ret; + struct timeval tv; + fd_set fs_r; + fd_set fs_w; + fd_set fs_e; + + FD_ZERO(&fs_r); + FD_ZERO(&fs_w); + FD_ZERO(&fs_e); + + FD_SET(s, &fs_r); + FD_SET(s, &fs_e); + + tv.tv_sec = timeout_ms / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = (timeout_ms - (tv.tv_sec * 1000)) * 1000; + ret = lwip_select(s + 1, &fs_r, &fs_w, &fs_e, &tv); + LWIP_ASSERT("select error", ret >= 0); + + if (ret) { + /* convert poll flags to our flags */ + ret = 0; + + if (FD_ISSET(s, &fs_r)) { + ret |= TEST_SOCK_READABLE; + } + + if (FD_ISSET(s, &fs_w)) { + ret |= TEST_SOCK_WRITABLE; + } + + if (FD_ISSET(s, &fs_e)) { + ret |= TEST_SOCK_ERR; + } + + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL +static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_poll(int s, int timeout_ms) +{ + int ret; + struct pollfd pfd; + + pfd.fd = s; + pfd.revents = 0; + pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLERR; + + ret = lwip_poll(&pfd, 1, timeout_ms); + + if (ret) { + /* convert poll flags to our flags */ + ret = 0; + + if (pfd.revents & POLLIN) { + ret |= TEST_SOCK_READABLE; + } + + if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT) { + ret |= TEST_SOCK_WRITABLE; + } + + if (pfd.revents & POLLERR) { + ret |= TEST_SOCK_ERR; + } + + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO +static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_recvtimeo(int s, int timeout_ms) +{ + int ret; + char buf; +#if LWIP_SO_SNDRCVTIMEO_NONSTANDARD + int opt_on = timeout_ms; + int opt_off = 0; +#else + struct timeval opt_on, opt_off; + opt_on.tv_sec = timeout_ms / 1000; + opt_on.tv_usec = (timeout_ms - (opt_on.tv_sec * 1000)) * 1000; + opt_off.tv_sec = 0; + opt_off.tv_usec = 0; +#endif + + /* enable receive timeout */ + ret = lwip_setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &opt_on, sizeof(opt_on)); + LWIP_ASSERT("setsockopt error", ret == 0); + + /* peek for one byte with timeout */ + ret = lwip_recv(s, &buf, 1, MSG_PEEK); + + /* disable receive timeout */ + ret = lwip_setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &opt_off, sizeof(opt_off)); + LWIP_ASSERT("setsockopt error", ret == 0); + + if (ret == 1) { + return TEST_SOCK_READABLE; + } + + if (ret == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (ret == -1) { + return TEST_SOCK_ERR; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid return value", 0); + return TEST_SOCK_ERR; +} +#endif + +static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_wait_peek(int s, int timeout_ms) +{ + int ret; + char buf; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(timeout_ms); /* cannot time out here */ + + /* peek for one byte */ + ret = lwip_recv(s, &buf, 1, MSG_PEEK); + + if (ret == 1) { + return TEST_SOCK_READABLE; + } + + if (ret == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (ret == -1) { + return TEST_SOCK_ERR; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid return value", 0); + return TEST_SOCK_ERR; +} + +static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_nonblock(int s, int timeout_ms) +{ + int ret; + char buf; + u32_t wait_until = sys_now() + timeout_ms; + + while (sys_now() < wait_until) { + /* peek for one byte */ + ret = lwip_recv(s, &buf, 1, MSG_PEEK | MSG_DONTWAIT); + + if (ret == 1) { + return TEST_SOCK_READABLE; + } + + if (ret == -1) { + /* TODO: for this to work, 'errno' has to support multithreading... */ + int err = errno; + + if (err != EWOULDBLOCK) { + return TEST_SOCK_ERR; + } + } + + /* TODO: sleep? */ + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sockets_stresstest_rand_mode(int allow_wait, int allow_rx) +{ + u32_t random_value = LWIP_RAND(); +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT + + if (random_value & TEST_MODE_SELECT) { + return TEST_MODE_SELECT; + } + +#endif +#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL + + if (random_value & TEST_MODE_POLL) { + return TEST_MODE_POLL; + } + +#endif + + if (!allow_rx) { + return TEST_MODE_SLEEP; + } + +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO + + if (random_value & TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO) { + return TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO; + } + +#endif + + if (allow_wait) { + if (random_value & TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO) { + return TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO; + } + } + + return TEST_MODE_NONBLOCKING; +} + +static int sockets_stresstest_wait_readable(int mode, int s, int timeout_ms) +{ + switch (mode) { +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT + + case TEST_MODE_SELECT: + return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_select(s, timeout_ms); +#endif +#if LWIP_SOCKET_POLL + + case TEST_MODE_POLL: + return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_poll(s, timeout_ms); +#endif +#if LWIP_SO_RCVTIMEO + + case TEST_MODE_RECVTIMEO: + return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_recvtimeo(s, timeout_ms); +#endif + + case TEST_MODE_WAIT: + return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_wait_peek(s, timeout_ms); + + case TEST_MODE_NONBLOCKING: + return sockets_stresstest_wait_readable_nonblock(s, timeout_ms); + + case TEST_MODE_SLEEP: { + sys_msleep(timeout_ms); + return 1; + } + + default: + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid mode", 0); + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX +static void sockets_stresstest_conn_client_r(void *arg) +{ + struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex *fd = (struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex *)arg; + int s = fd->s; + size_t rxoff = 0; + char rxbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; + + while (1) { + int closed; + + if (fd->closed) { + break; + } + + rxoff = recv_and_check_data_return_offset(s, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), rxoff, &closed, "cli"); + + if (fd->closed) { + break; + } + + if (closed) { + lwip_close(s); + break; + } + } + + SYS_ARCH_DEC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); + LWIP_ASSERT("", sockets_stresstest_numthreads >= 0); +} +#endif + +static void sockets_stresstest_conn_client(void *arg) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + struct sockaddr_in *addr_in; + int s, ret; + char txbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; + char rxbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; + size_t rxoff = 0; + u32_t max_time = sys_now() + (TEST_TIME_SECONDS * 1000); + int do_rx = 1; + struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex *data = NULL; + + memcpy(&addr, arg, sizeof(addr)); + LWIP_ASSERT("", addr.ss_family == AF_INET); + addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; + addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); + + /* sleep a random time between 1 and 2 seconds */ + sys_msleep(1000 + (LWIP_RAND() % 1000)); + + /* connect to the server */ + s = lwip_socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("s >= 0", s >= 0); + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX + + if (LWIP_RAND() & 1) { + sys_thread_t t; + data = (struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct sockets_stresstest_fullduplex)); + LWIP_ASSERT("data != NULL", data != 0); + SYS_ARCH_INC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); + data->s = s; + data->closed = 0; + t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_conn_client_r", sockets_stresstest_conn_client_r, data, 0, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); + do_rx = 0; + } + +#endif + + /* @todo: nonblocking connect? */ + ret = lwip_connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); + + while (sys_now() < max_time) { + int closed; + int mode = sockets_stresstest_rand_mode(0, do_rx); + int timeout_ms = LWIP_RAND() % TEST_MAX_RXWAIT_MS; + ret = sockets_stresstest_wait_readable(mode, s, timeout_ms); + + if (ret) { + if (do_rx) { + /* read some */ + LWIP_ASSERT("readable", ret == TEST_SOCK_READABLE); + rxoff = recv_and_check_data_return_offset(s, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), rxoff, &closed, "cli"); + LWIP_ASSERT("client got closed", !closed); + } + } else { + /* timeout, send some */ + size_t send_len = (LWIP_RAND() % (sizeof(txbuf) - 4)) + 4; + fill_test_data(txbuf, send_len); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("cli %d tx %d\n", s, (int)send_len)); + ret = lwip_write(s, txbuf, send_len); + + if (ret == -1) { + /* TODO: for this to work, 'errno' has to support multithreading... */ + int err = errno; + LWIP_ASSERT("err == 0", err == 0); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == send_len", ret == (int)send_len); + } + } + + if (data) { + data->closed = 1; + } + + ret = lwip_close(s); + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); + + SYS_ARCH_DEC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); + LWIP_ASSERT("", sockets_stresstest_numthreads >= 0); +} + +static void sockets_stresstest_conn_server(void *arg) +{ + int s, ret; + char txbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; + char rxbuf[TEST_TXRX_BUFSIZE]; + size_t rxoff = 0; + + s = (int)arg; + + while (1) { + int closed; + int mode = sockets_stresstest_rand_mode(1, 1); + int timeout_ms = LWIP_RAND() % TEST_MAX_RXWAIT_MS; + ret = sockets_stresstest_wait_readable(mode, s, timeout_ms); + + if (ret) { + if (ret & TEST_SOCK_ERR) { + /* closed? */ + break; + } + + /* read some */ + LWIP_ASSERT("readable", ret == TEST_SOCK_READABLE); + rxoff = recv_and_check_data_return_offset(s, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), rxoff, &closed, "srv"); + + if (closed) { + break; + } + } else { + /* timeout, send some */ + size_t send_len = (LWIP_RAND() % (sizeof(txbuf) - 4)) + 4; + fill_test_data(txbuf, send_len); + LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("srv %d tx %d\n", s, (int)send_len)); + ret = lwip_write(s, txbuf, send_len); + + if (ret == -1) { + /* TODO: for this to work, 'errno' has to support multithreading... */ + int err = errno; + + if (err == ECONNRESET) { + break; + } + + if (err == ENOTCONN) { + break; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("unknown error", 0); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == send_len", ret == (int)send_len); + } + } + + ret = lwip_close(s); + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); + + SYS_ARCH_DEC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); + LWIP_ASSERT("", sockets_stresstest_numthreads >= 0); +} + +static int sockets_stresstest_start_clients(const struct sockaddr_storage *remote_addr) +{ + /* limit the number of connections */ + const int max_connections = LWIP_MIN(TEST_MAX_CONNECTIONS, MEMP_NUM_TCP_PCB / 3); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < max_connections; i++) { + sys_thread_t t; + SYS_ARCH_INC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); + t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_conn_client", sockets_stresstest_conn_client, (void *)remote_addr, 0, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); + } + + return max_connections; +} + +static void sockets_stresstest_listener(void *arg) +{ + int slisten; + int ret; + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + socklen_t addr_len; + struct test_settings *settings = (struct test_settings *)arg; + int num_clients, num_servers = 0; + + slisten = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("slisten >= 0", slisten >= 0); + + memcpy(&addr, &settings->addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); + ret = lwip_bind(slisten, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); + + ret = lwip_listen(slisten, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); + + addr_len = sizeof(addr); + ret = lwip_getsockname(slisten, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addr_len); + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); + + num_clients = sockets_stresstest_start_clients(&addr); + + while (num_servers < num_clients) { + struct sockaddr_storage aclient; + socklen_t aclient_len = sizeof(aclient); + int sclient = lwip_accept(slisten, (struct sockaddr *)&aclient, &aclient_len); +#if 1 + /* using server threads */ + { + sys_thread_t t; + SYS_ARCH_INC(sockets_stresstest_numthreads, 1); + num_servers++; + t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_conn_server", sockets_stresstest_conn_server, (void *)sclient, 0, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); + } +#else + /* using server select */ +#endif + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener: all %d connections established\n", num_clients)); + + /* accepted all clients */ + while (sockets_stresstest_numthreads > 0) { + sys_msleep(1); + } + + ret = lwip_close(slisten); + LWIP_ASSERT("ret == 0", ret == 0); + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener: done\n")); +} + +static void sockets_stresstest_listener_loop(void *arg) +{ + int i; + struct test_settings *settings = (struct test_settings *)arg; + + if (settings->loop_cnt) { + for (i = 0; i < settings->loop_cnt; i++) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener_loop: iteration %d\n", i)); + sockets_stresstest_listener(arg); + sys_msleep(2); + } + + LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener_loop: done\n")); + } else { + for (i = 0;; i++) { + LWIP_DEBUGF(TEST_SOCKETS_STRESS | LWIP_DBG_STATE, ("sockets_stresstest_listener_loop: iteration %d\n", i)); + sockets_stresstest_listener(arg); + sys_msleep(2); + } + } +} + +void sockets_stresstest_init_loopback(int addr_family) +{ + sys_thread_t t; + struct test_settings *settings = (struct test_settings *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct test_settings)); + + LWIP_ASSERT("OOM", settings != NULL); + memset(settings, 0, sizeof(struct test_settings)); +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid addr_family", (addr_family == AF_INET) || (addr_family == AF_INET6)); +#endif + settings->addr.ss_family = (sa_family_t)addr_family; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr_family); + settings->start_client = 1; + + t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_listener_loop", sockets_stresstest_listener_loop, settings, 0, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); +} + +void sockets_stresstest_init_server(int addr_family, u16_t server_port) +{ + sys_thread_t t; + struct test_settings *settings = (struct test_settings *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct test_settings)); + + LWIP_ASSERT("OOM", settings != NULL); + memset(settings, 0, sizeof(struct test_settings)); +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid addr_family", (addr_family == AF_INET) || (addr_family == AF_INET6)); + settings->addr.ss_family = (sa_family_t)addr_family; +#endif + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr_family); + ((struct sockaddr_in *)(&settings->addr))->sin_port = server_port; + + t = sys_thread_new("sockets_stresstest_listener", sockets_stresstest_listener, settings, 0, 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("thread != NULL", t != 0); +} + +void sockets_stresstest_init_client(const char *remote_ip, u16_t remote_port) +{ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + ip4_addr_t ip4; +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + ip6_addr_t ip6; +#endif + struct sockaddr_storage *addr = (struct sockaddr_storage *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); + + LWIP_ASSERT("OOM", addr != NULL); + memset(addr, 0, sizeof(struct test_settings)); +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + if (ip4addr_aton(remote_ip, &ip4)) { + addr->ss_family = AF_INET; + ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = ip4_addr_get_u32(&ip4); + } +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + else +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + if (ip6addr_aton(remote_ip, &ip6)) { + addr->ss_family = AF_INET6; + /* todo: copy ipv6 address */ + } + +#endif + ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_port = remote_port; + sockets_stresstest_start_clients(addr); +} + +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET && LWIP_IPV4 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.h index e9cff771..256ea000 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/sockets/sockets_stresstest.h @@ -1,40 +1,40 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_STRESSTEST -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_STRESSTEST - -void sockets_stresstest_init_loopback(int addr_family); -void sockets_stresstest_init_server(int addr_family, u16_t server_port); -void sockets_stresstest_init_client(const char *remote_ip, u16_t remote_port); - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_STRESSTEST */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_STRESSTEST +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_STRESSTEST + +void sockets_stresstest_init_loopback(int addr_family); +void sockets_stresstest_init_server(int addr_family, u16_t server_port); +void sockets_stresstest_init_client(const char *remote_ip, u16_t remote_port); + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_STRESSTEST */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.cmake b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.cmake similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.cmake rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.cmake index 4ad47701..e1f40bc9 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.cmake +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.cmake @@ -1,31 +1,31 @@ -# This file is indended to be included in end-user CMakeLists.txt -# include(/path/to/Filelists.cmake) -# It assumes the variable LWIP_DIR is defined pointing to the -# root path of lwIP sources. -# -# This file is NOT designed (on purpose) to be used as cmake -# subdir via add_subdirectory() -# The intention is to provide greater flexibility to users to -# create their own targets using the *_SRCS variables. - -set(LWIP_TESTDIR ${LWIP_DIR}/test/unit) -set(LWIP_TESTFILES - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/lwip_unittests.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/api/test_sockets.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/arch/sys_arch.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_def.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_mem.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_netif.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_pbuf.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_timers.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/dhcp/test_dhcp.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/etharp/test_etharp.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/ip4/test_ip4.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/ip6/test_ip6.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/mdns/test_mdns.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/mqtt/test_mqtt.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/tcp/tcp_helper.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/tcp/test_tcp.c - ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/udp/test_udp.c -) +# This file is indended to be included in end-user CMakeLists.txt +# include(/path/to/Filelists.cmake) +# It assumes the variable LWIP_DIR is defined pointing to the +# root path of lwIP sources. +# +# This file is NOT designed (on purpose) to be used as cmake +# subdir via add_subdirectory() +# The intention is to provide greater flexibility to users to +# create their own targets using the *_SRCS variables. + +set(LWIP_TESTDIR ${LWIP_DIR}/test/unit) +set(LWIP_TESTFILES + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/lwip_unittests.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/api/test_sockets.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/arch/sys_arch.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_def.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_mem.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_netif.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_pbuf.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/core/test_timers.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/dhcp/test_dhcp.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/etharp/test_etharp.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/ip4/test_ip4.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/ip6/test_ip6.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/mdns/test_mdns.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/mqtt/test_mqtt.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/tcp/tcp_helper.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/tcp/test_tcp.c + ${LWIP_TESTDIR}/udp/test_udp.c +) diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.mk b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.mk similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.mk rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.mk index f6640b3d..4b770782 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.mk +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/Filelists.mk @@ -1,51 +1,51 @@ -# -# Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. -# All rights reserved. -# -# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, -# are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: -# -# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, -# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, -# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation -# and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -# 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products -# derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -# -# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED -# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT -# SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, -# EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT -# OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS -# INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN -# CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING -# IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY -# OF SUCH DAMAGE. -# -# This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. -# -# Author: Adam Dunkels -# - -TESTDIR=$(LWIPDIR)/../test/unit -TESTFILES=$(TESTDIR)/lwip_unittests.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/api/test_sockets.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/arch/sys_arch.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/core/test_def.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/core/test_mem.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/core/test_netif.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/core/test_pbuf.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/core/test_timers.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/dhcp/test_dhcp.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/etharp/test_etharp.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/ip4/test_ip4.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/ip6/test_ip6.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/mdns/test_mdns.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/mqtt/test_mqtt.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/tcp/tcp_helper.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/tcp/test_tcp.c \ - $(TESTDIR)/udp/test_udp.c - +# +# Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, +# are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, +# this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation +# and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +# 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +# derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT +# SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, +# EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT +# OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +# INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +# CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING +# IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY +# OF SUCH DAMAGE. +# +# This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. +# +# Author: Adam Dunkels +# + +TESTDIR=$(LWIPDIR)/../test/unit +TESTFILES=$(TESTDIR)/lwip_unittests.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/api/test_sockets.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/arch/sys_arch.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/core/test_def.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/core/test_mem.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/core/test_netif.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/core/test_pbuf.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/core/test_timers.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/dhcp/test_dhcp.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/etharp/test_etharp.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/ip4/test_ip4.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/ip6/test_ip6.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/mdns/test_mdns.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/mqtt/test_mqtt.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/tcp/tcp_helper.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/tcp/test_tcp.c \ + $(TESTDIR)/udp/test_udp.c + diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.c index b3b87fce..95e5bb14 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.c @@ -1,881 +1,881 @@ -#include "test_sockets.h" - -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/opt.h" -#include "lwip/sockets.h" -#include "lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/api.h" - -static int test_sockets_get_used_count(void) -{ - int used = 0; - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_SOCKETS; i++) { - struct lwip_sock *s = lwip_socket_dbg_get_socket(i); - - if (s != NULL) { - if (s->fd_used) { - used++; - } - } - } - - return used; -} - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static void sockets_setup(void) -{ - /* expect full free heap */ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void sockets_teardown(void) -{ - fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); - /* poll until all memory is released... */ - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - - while (tcp_tw_pcbs) { - tcp_abort(tcp_tw_pcbs); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - } - - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - /* ensure full free heap */ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -#ifndef NUM_SOCKETS -#define NUM_SOCKETS MEMP_NUM_NETCONN -#endif - -#if LWIP_SOCKET -static int test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(int domain, int type) -{ - int s = lwip_socket(domain, type, 0); - - if (s >= 0) { - int ret = lwip_fcntl(s, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - } - - return s; -} - -/* Verify basic sockets functionality - */ -START_TEST(test_sockets_basics) -{ - int s, i, ret; - int s2[NUM_SOCKETS]; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - s = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - fail_unless(s >= 0); - lwip_close(s); - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_SOCKETS; i++) { - s2[i] = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - fail_unless(s2[i] >= 0); - } - - /* all sockets used, now it should fail */ - s = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - fail_unless(s == -1); - /* close one socket */ - ret = lwip_close(s2[0]); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - /* now it should succeed */ - s2[0] = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - fail_unless(s2[0] >= 0); - - /* close all sockets */ - for (i = 0; i < NUM_SOCKETS; i++) { - ret = lwip_close(s2[i]); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - } -} -END_TEST - -static void test_sockets_allfunctions_basic_domain(int domain) -{ - int s, s2, s3, ret; - struct sockaddr_storage addr, addr2; - socklen_t addrlen, addr2len; - char buf[4]; - /* listen socket */ - s = lwip_socket(domain, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - fail_unless(s >= 0); - - ret = lwip_listen(s, 0); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - addrlen = sizeof(addr); - ret = lwip_getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - s2 = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_STREAM); - fail_unless(s2 >= 0); - - /* nonblocking connect s2 to s (but use loopback address) */ - if (domain == AF_INET) { -#if LWIP_IPV4 - struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; - addr4->sin_addr.s_addr = PP_HTONL(INADDR_LOOPBACK); -#endif - } else { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr; - struct in6_addr lo6 = IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT; - addr6->sin6_addr = lo6; -#endif - } - - ret = lwip_connect(s2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - fail_unless(errno == EINPROGRESS); - ret = lwip_connect(s2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - fail_unless(errno == EALREADY); - - while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) - ; - - s3 = lwip_accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr2, &addr2len); - fail_unless(s3 >= 0); - - ret = lwip_connect(s2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - fail_unless(errno == EISCONN); - - /* write from server to client */ - ret = write(s3, "test", 4); - fail_unless(ret == 4); - - ret = lwip_shutdown(s3, SHUT_WR); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) - ; - - ret = lwip_recv(s2, buf, 3, MSG_PEEK); - fail_unless(ret == 3); - - ret = lwip_recv(s2, buf, 3, MSG_PEEK); - fail_unless(ret == 3); - - ret = lwip_read(s2, buf, 4); - fail_unless(ret == 4); - - ret = lwip_read(s2, buf, 1); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - ret = lwip_read(s2, buf, 1); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - - ret = lwip_write(s2, "foo", 3); - fail_unless(ret == 3); - - ret = lwip_close(s2); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) - ; - - /* read one byte more than available to check handling FIN */ - ret = lwip_read(s3, buf, 4); - fail_unless(ret == 3); - - ret = lwip_read(s3, buf, 1); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - ret = lwip_read(s3, buf, 1); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - - while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) - ; - - ret = lwip_close(s); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - ret = lwip_close(s3); - fail_unless(ret == 0); -} - -/* Try to step through all sockets functions once... - */ -START_TEST(test_sockets_allfunctions_basic) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); -#if LWIP_IPV4 - test_sockets_allfunctions_basic_domain(AF_INET); -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - test_sockets_allfunctions_basic_domain(AF_INET6); -#endif -} -END_TEST - -static void test_sockets_init_loopback_addr(int domain, struct sockaddr_storage *addr_st, socklen_t *sz) -{ - memset(addr_st, 0, sizeof(*addr_st)); - - switch (domain) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - case AF_INET6: { - struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr_st; - struct in6_addr lo6 = IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT; - addr->sin6_family = AF_INET6; - addr->sin6_port = 0; /* use ephemeral port */ - addr->sin6_addr = lo6; - *sz = sizeof(*addr); - } break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - case AF_INET: { - struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr_st; - addr->sin_family = AF_INET; - addr->sin_port = 0; /* use ephemeral port */ - addr->sin_addr.s_addr = PP_HTONL(INADDR_LOOPBACK); - *sz = sizeof(*addr); - } break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - - default: - *sz = 0; - fail(); - break; - } -} - -static void test_sockets_msgapi_update_iovs(struct msghdr *msg, size_t bytes) -{ - int i; - - /* note: this modifies the underyling iov_base and iov_len for a partial - read for an individual vector. This updates the msg->msg_iov pointer - to skip fully consumed vecotrs */ - - /* process fully consumed vectors */ - for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; i++) { - if (msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len <= bytes) { - /* reduce bytes by amount of this vector */ - bytes -= msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; - } else { - break; /* iov not fully consumed */ - } - } - - /* slide down over fully consumed vectors */ - msg->msg_iov = &msg->msg_iov[i]; - msg->msg_iovlen -= i; - - /* update new first vector with any remaining amount */ - msg->msg_iov[0].iov_base = ((u8_t *)msg->msg_iov[0].iov_base + bytes); - msg->msg_iov[0].iov_len -= bytes; -} - -static void test_sockets_msgapi_tcp(int domain) -{ -#define BUF_SZ (TCP_SND_BUF / 4) -#define TOTAL_DATA_SZ (BUF_SZ * 8) /* ~(TCP_SND_BUF*2) that accounts for integer rounding */ -#define NEED_TRAILER (BUF_SZ % 4 != 0) - int listnr, s1, s2, i, ret, opt; - int bytes_written, bytes_read; - struct sockaddr_storage addr_storage; - socklen_t addr_size; - struct iovec siovs[8]; - struct msghdr smsg; - u8_t *snd_buf; - struct iovec riovs[5]; - struct iovec riovs_tmp[5]; - struct msghdr rmsg; - u8_t *rcv_buf; - int rcv_off; - int rcv_trailer = 0; - u8_t val; - - test_sockets_init_loopback_addr(domain, &addr_storage, &addr_size); - - listnr = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_STREAM); - fail_unless(listnr >= 0); - s1 = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_STREAM); - fail_unless(s1 >= 0); - - /* setup a listener socket on loopback with ephemeral port */ - ret = lwip_bind(listnr, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - ret = lwip_listen(listnr, 0); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* update address with ephemeral port */ - ret = lwip_getsockname(listnr, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, &addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* connect, won't complete until we accept it */ - ret = lwip_connect(s1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - fail_unless(errno == EINPROGRESS); - - while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) - ; - - /* accept, creating the other side of the connection */ - s2 = lwip_accept(listnr, NULL, NULL); - fail_unless(s2 >= 0); - - /* double check s1 is connected */ - ret = lwip_connect(s1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - fail_unless(errno == EISCONN); - - /* set s2 to non-blocking, not inherited from listener */ - opt = lwip_fcntl(s2, F_GETFL, 0); - fail_unless(opt == 6); - opt = O_NONBLOCK; - ret = lwip_fcntl(s2, F_SETFL, opt); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* we are done with listener, close it */ - ret = lwip_close(listnr); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* allocate a buffer for a stream of incrementing hex (0x00..0xFF) which we will use - to create an input vector set that is larger than the TCP's send buffer. This will - force execution of the partial IO vector send case */ - snd_buf = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(BUF_SZ); - val = 0x00; - fail_unless(snd_buf != NULL); - - for (i = 0; i < BUF_SZ; i++, val++) { - snd_buf[i] = val; - } - - /* send the buffer 8 times in one message, equating to TOTAL_DATA_SZ */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - siovs[i].iov_base = snd_buf; - siovs[i].iov_len = BUF_SZ; - } - - /* allocate a receive buffer, same size as snd_buf for easy verification */ - rcv_buf = (u8_t *)mem_calloc(1, BUF_SZ); - fail_unless(rcv_buf != NULL); - - /* split across iovs */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - riovs[i].iov_base = &rcv_buf[i * (BUF_SZ / 4)]; - riovs[i].iov_len = BUF_SZ / 4; - } - - /* handling trailing bytes if buffer doesn't evenly divide by 4 */ -#if NEED_TRAILER - - if ((BUF_SZ % 4) != 0) { - riovs[5].iov_base = &rcv_buf[4 * (BUF_SZ / 4)]; - riovs[5].iov_len = BUF_SZ - (4 * (BUF_SZ / 4)); - rcv_trailer = 1; - } - -#endif /* NEED_TRAILER */ - - /* we use a copy of riovs since we'll be modifying base and len during - receiving. This gives us an easy way to reset the iovs for next recvmsg */ - memcpy(riovs_tmp, riovs, sizeof(riovs)); - - memset(&smsg, 0, sizeof(smsg)); - smsg.msg_iov = siovs; - smsg.msg_iovlen = 8; - - memset(&rmsg, 0, sizeof(rmsg)); - rmsg.msg_iov = riovs_tmp; - rmsg.msg_iovlen = (rcv_trailer ? 5 : 4); - - bytes_written = 0; - bytes_read = 0; - rcv_off = 0; - - while (bytes_written < TOTAL_DATA_SZ && (bytes_read < TOTAL_DATA_SZ)) { - /* send data */ - if (bytes_written < TOTAL_DATA_SZ) { - ret = lwip_sendmsg(s1, &smsg, 0); - /* note: since we always receive after sending, there will be open - space in the send buffer */ - fail_unless(ret > 0); - - bytes_written += ret; - - if (bytes_written < TOTAL_DATA_SZ) { - test_sockets_msgapi_update_iovs(&smsg, (size_t)ret); - } - } - - while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) - ; - - /* receive and verify data */ - do { - if (bytes_read < TOTAL_DATA_SZ) { - ret = lwip_recvmsg(s2, &rmsg, 0); - fail_unless(ret > 0 || (ret == -1 && errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); - - if (ret > 0) { - rcv_off += ret; - - /* we have received a full buffer */ - if (rcv_off == BUF_SZ) { - /* note: since iovs are just pointers, compare underlying buf */ - fail_unless(!memcmp(snd_buf, rcv_buf, BUF_SZ)); - bytes_read += BUF_SZ; - /* reset receive state for next buffer */ - rcv_off = 0; - memset(rcv_buf, 0, BUF_SZ); - memcpy(riovs_tmp, riovs, sizeof(riovs)); - rmsg.msg_iov = riovs_tmp; - rmsg.msg_iovlen = (rcv_trailer ? 5 : 4); - } else /* partial read */ - { - test_sockets_msgapi_update_iovs(&rmsg, (size_t)ret); - } - } - } else { - break; - } - } while (ret > 0); - } - - ret = lwip_close(s1); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - ret = lwip_close(s2); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - mem_free(snd_buf); - mem_free(rcv_buf); -} - -static void test_sockets_msgapi_udp_send_recv_loop(int s, struct msghdr *smsg, struct msghdr *rmsg) -{ - int i, ret; - - /* send/receive our datagram of IO vectors 10 times */ - for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { - ret = lwip_sendmsg(s, smsg, 0); - fail_unless(ret == 4); - - while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) - ; - - /* receive the datagram split across 4 buffers */ - ret = lwip_recvmsg(s, rmsg, 0); - fail_unless(ret == 4); - - /* verify data */ - fail_unless(*((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[0].iov_base) == 0xDE); - fail_unless(*((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[1].iov_base) == 0xAD); - fail_unless(*((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[2].iov_base) == 0xBE); - fail_unless(*((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[3].iov_base) == 0xEF); - - /* clear rcv_buf to ensure no data is being skipped */ - *((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[0].iov_base) = 0x00; - *((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[1].iov_base) = 0x00; - *((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[2].iov_base) = 0x00; - *((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[3].iov_base) = 0x00; - } -} - -static void test_sockets_msgapi_udp(int domain) -{ - int s, i, ret; - struct sockaddr_storage addr_storage; - socklen_t addr_size; - struct iovec riovs[4]; - struct msghdr rmsg; - u8_t rcv_buf[4]; - struct iovec siovs[4]; - struct msghdr smsg; - u8_t snd_buf[4] = { 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF }; - - /* initialize IO vectors with data */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - siovs[i].iov_base = &snd_buf[i]; - siovs[i].iov_len = sizeof(u8_t); - riovs[i].iov_base = &rcv_buf[i]; - riovs[i].iov_len = sizeof(u8_t); - } - - test_sockets_init_loopback_addr(domain, &addr_storage, &addr_size); - - s = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_DGRAM); - fail_unless(s >= 0); - - ret = lwip_bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* Update addr with epehermal port */ - ret = lwip_getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, &addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - switch (domain) { -#if LWIP_IPV6 - - case AF_INET6: - fail_unless(addr_size == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ -#if LWIP_IPV4 - - case AF_INET: - fail_unless(addr_size == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); - break; -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - - default: - fail(); - break; - } - - /* send and receive the datagram in 4 pieces */ - memset(&smsg, 0, sizeof(smsg)); - smsg.msg_iov = siovs; - smsg.msg_iovlen = 4; - memset(&rmsg, 0, sizeof(rmsg)); - rmsg.msg_iov = riovs; - rmsg.msg_iovlen = 4; - - /* perform a sendmsg with remote host (self) */ - smsg.msg_name = &addr_storage; - smsg.msg_namelen = addr_size; - - test_sockets_msgapi_udp_send_recv_loop(s, &smsg, &rmsg); - - /* Connect to self, allowing us to not pass message name */ - ret = lwip_connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - smsg.msg_name = NULL; - smsg.msg_namelen = 0; - - test_sockets_msgapi_udp_send_recv_loop(s, &smsg, &rmsg); - - ret = lwip_close(s); - fail_unless(ret == 0); -} - -#if LWIP_IPV4 -static void test_sockets_msgapi_cmsg(int domain) -{ - int s, ret, enable; - struct sockaddr_storage addr_storage; - socklen_t addr_size; - struct iovec iov; - struct msghdr msg; - struct cmsghdr *cmsg; - struct in_pktinfo *pktinfo; - u8_t rcv_buf[4]; - u8_t snd_buf[4] = { 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF }; - u8_t cmsg_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo))]; - - test_sockets_init_loopback_addr(domain, &addr_storage, &addr_size); - - s = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_DGRAM); - fail_unless(s >= 0); - - ret = lwip_bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* Update addr with epehermal port */ - ret = lwip_getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, &addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - enable = 1; - ret = lwip_setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_PKTINFO, &enable, sizeof(enable)); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* Receive full message, including control message */ - iov.iov_base = rcv_buf; - iov.iov_len = sizeof(rcv_buf); - msg.msg_control = cmsg_buf; - msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_buf); - msg.msg_flags = 0; - msg.msg_iov = &iov; - msg.msg_iovlen = 1; - msg.msg_name = NULL; - msg.msg_namelen = 0; - - memset(rcv_buf, 0, sizeof(rcv_buf)); - ret = lwip_sendto(s, snd_buf, sizeof(snd_buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == sizeof(snd_buf)); - - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - - ret = lwip_recvmsg(s, &msg, 0); - fail_unless(ret == sizeof(rcv_buf)); - fail_unless(!memcmp(rcv_buf, snd_buf, sizeof(rcv_buf))); - - /* Verify message header */ - cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); - fail_unless(cmsg != NULL); - fail_unless(cmsg->cmsg_len > 0); - fail_unless(cmsg->cmsg_level == IPPROTO_IP); - fail_unless(cmsg->cmsg_type == IP_PKTINFO); - - /* Verify message data */ - pktinfo = (struct in_pktinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); - /* We only have loopback interface enabled */ - fail_unless(pktinfo->ipi_ifindex == 1); - fail_unless(pktinfo->ipi_addr.s_addr == PP_HTONL(INADDR_LOOPBACK)); - - /* Verify there are no additional messages */ - cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg); - fail_unless(cmsg == NULL); - - /* Send datagram again, testing truncation */ - memset(rcv_buf, 0, sizeof(rcv_buf)); - ret = lwip_sendto(s, snd_buf, sizeof(snd_buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); - fail_unless(ret == sizeof(snd_buf)); - - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - - msg.msg_controllen = 1; - msg.msg_flags = 0; - ret = lwip_recvmsg(s, &msg, 0); - fail_unless(ret == sizeof(rcv_buf)); - fail_unless(!memcmp(rcv_buf, snd_buf, sizeof(rcv_buf))); - /* Ensure truncation was returned */ - fail_unless(msg.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC); - /* Ensure no control messages were returned */ - fail_unless(msg.msg_controllen == 0); - - ret = lwip_close(s); - fail_unless(ret == 0); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ - -START_TEST(test_sockets_msgapis) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); -#if LWIP_IPV4 - test_sockets_msgapi_udp(AF_INET); - test_sockets_msgapi_tcp(AF_INET); - test_sockets_msgapi_cmsg(AF_INET); -#endif -#if LWIP_IPV6 - test_sockets_msgapi_udp(AF_INET6); - test_sockets_msgapi_tcp(AF_INET6); -#endif -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_sockets_select) -{ -#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT - int s; - int ret; - fd_set readset; - fd_set writeset; - fd_set errset; - struct timeval tv; - - fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); - - s = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - fail_unless(s >= 0); - fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); - - FD_ZERO(&readset); - FD_SET(s, &readset); - FD_ZERO(&writeset); - FD_SET(s, &writeset); - FD_ZERO(&errset); - FD_SET(s, &errset); - - tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_usec = 0; - ret = lwip_select(s + 1, &readset, &writeset, &errset, &tv); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); - - ret = lwip_close(s); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - -#endif - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_sockets_recv_after_rst) -{ - int sl, sact; - int spass = -1; - int ret; - struct sockaddr_in sa_listen; - const u16_t port = 1234; - int arg; - const char txbuf[] = "something"; - char rxbuf[16]; - struct lwip_sock *sact_sock; - int err; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); - - memset(&sa_listen, 0, sizeof(sa_listen)); - sa_listen.sin_family = AF_INET; - sa_listen.sin_port = PP_HTONS(port); - sa_listen.sin_addr.s_addr = PP_HTONL(INADDR_LOOPBACK); - - /* set up the listener */ - sl = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - fail_unless(sl >= 0); - fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); - - ret = lwip_bind(sl, (struct sockaddr *)&sa_listen, sizeof(sa_listen)); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - ret = lwip_listen(sl, 0); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* set up the client */ - sact = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - fail_unless(sact >= 0); - fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); - /* set the client to nonblocking to simplify this test */ - arg = 1; - ret = lwip_ioctl(sact, FIONBIO, &arg); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* connect */ - do { - ret = lwip_connect(sact, (struct sockaddr *)&sa_listen, sizeof(sa_listen)); - err = errno; - fail_unless((ret == 0) || (ret == -1)); - - if (ret != 0) { - if (err == EISCONN) { - /* Although this is not valid, use EISCONN as an indicator for successful connection. - This marks us as "connect phase is done". On error, we would either have a different - errno code or "send" fails later... -> good enough for this test. */ - ret = 0; - } else { - fail_unless(err == EINPROGRESS); - - if (err != EINPROGRESS) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* we're in progress: little side check: test for EALREADY */ - ret = lwip_connect(sact, (struct sockaddr *)&sa_listen, sizeof(sa_listen)); - err = errno; - fail_unless(ret == -1); - fail_unless(err == EALREADY); - - if ((ret != -1) || (err != EALREADY)) { - goto cleanup; - } - } - - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - } - } while (ret != 0); - - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - /* accept the server connection part */ - spass = lwip_accept(sl, NULL, NULL); - fail_unless(spass >= 0); - - /* write data from client */ - ret = lwip_send(sact, txbuf, sizeof(txbuf), 0); - fail_unless(ret == sizeof(txbuf)); - - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - - /* issue RST (This is a HACK, don't try this in your own app!) */ - sact_sock = lwip_socket_dbg_get_socket(sact); - fail_unless(sact_sock != NULL); - - if (sact_sock != NULL) { - struct netconn *sact_conn = sact_sock->conn; - fail_unless(sact_conn != NULL); - - if (sact_conn != NULL) { - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = sact_conn->pcb.tcp; - fail_unless(pcb != NULL); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - tcp_rst(pcb, pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, - pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port); - } - } - } - - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - - /* expect to receive data first */ - ret = lwip_recv(spass, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), 0); - fail_unless(ret > 0); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - - /* expect to receive RST indication */ - ret = lwip_recv(spass, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), 0); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - err = errno; - fail_unless(err == ECONNRESET); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - - /* expect to receive ENOTCONN indication */ - ret = lwip_recv(spass, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), 0); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - err = errno; - fail_unless(err == ENOTCONN); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - - /* expect to receive ENOTCONN indication */ - ret = lwip_recv(spass, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), 0); - fail_unless(ret == -1); - err = errno; - fail_unless(err == ENOTCONN); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - -cleanup: - ret = lwip_close(sl); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - ret = lwip_close(sact); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - - if (spass >= 0) { - ret = lwip_close(spass); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - } -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *sockets_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_sockets_basics), - TESTFUNC(test_sockets_allfunctions_basic), - TESTFUNC(test_sockets_msgapis), - TESTFUNC(test_sockets_select), - TESTFUNC(test_sockets_recv_after_rst), - }; - return create_suite("SOCKETS", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), sockets_setup, sockets_teardown); -} - -#else /* LWIP_SOCKET */ - -Suite *sockets_suite(void) -{ - return create_suite("SOCKETS", NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); -} -#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ +#include "test_sockets.h" + +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/opt.h" +#include "lwip/sockets.h" +#include "lwip/priv/sockets_priv.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/api.h" + +static int test_sockets_get_used_count(void) +{ + int used = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_SOCKETS; i++) { + struct lwip_sock *s = lwip_socket_dbg_get_socket(i); + + if (s != NULL) { + if (s->fd_used) { + used++; + } + } + } + + return used; +} + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static void sockets_setup(void) +{ + /* expect full free heap */ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void sockets_teardown(void) +{ + fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); + /* poll until all memory is released... */ + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + + while (tcp_tw_pcbs) { + tcp_abort(tcp_tw_pcbs); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + } + + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + /* ensure full free heap */ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +#ifndef NUM_SOCKETS +#define NUM_SOCKETS MEMP_NUM_NETCONN +#endif + +#if LWIP_SOCKET +static int test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(int domain, int type) +{ + int s = lwip_socket(domain, type, 0); + + if (s >= 0) { + int ret = lwip_fcntl(s, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + } + + return s; +} + +/* Verify basic sockets functionality + */ +START_TEST(test_sockets_basics) +{ + int s, i, ret; + int s2[NUM_SOCKETS]; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + s = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + fail_unless(s >= 0); + lwip_close(s); + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_SOCKETS; i++) { + s2[i] = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + fail_unless(s2[i] >= 0); + } + + /* all sockets used, now it should fail */ + s = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + fail_unless(s == -1); + /* close one socket */ + ret = lwip_close(s2[0]); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + /* now it should succeed */ + s2[0] = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + fail_unless(s2[0] >= 0); + + /* close all sockets */ + for (i = 0; i < NUM_SOCKETS; i++) { + ret = lwip_close(s2[i]); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + } +} +END_TEST + +static void test_sockets_allfunctions_basic_domain(int domain) +{ + int s, s2, s3, ret; + struct sockaddr_storage addr, addr2; + socklen_t addrlen, addr2len; + char buf[4]; + /* listen socket */ + s = lwip_socket(domain, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + fail_unless(s >= 0); + + ret = lwip_listen(s, 0); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + ret = lwip_getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + s2 = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_STREAM); + fail_unless(s2 >= 0); + + /* nonblocking connect s2 to s (but use loopback address) */ + if (domain == AF_INET) { +#if LWIP_IPV4 + struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; + addr4->sin_addr.s_addr = PP_HTONL(INADDR_LOOPBACK); +#endif + } else { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr; + struct in6_addr lo6 = IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT; + addr6->sin6_addr = lo6; +#endif + } + + ret = lwip_connect(s2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + fail_unless(errno == EINPROGRESS); + ret = lwip_connect(s2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + fail_unless(errno == EALREADY); + + while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) + ; + + s3 = lwip_accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr2, &addr2len); + fail_unless(s3 >= 0); + + ret = lwip_connect(s2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + fail_unless(errno == EISCONN); + + /* write from server to client */ + ret = write(s3, "test", 4); + fail_unless(ret == 4); + + ret = lwip_shutdown(s3, SHUT_WR); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) + ; + + ret = lwip_recv(s2, buf, 3, MSG_PEEK); + fail_unless(ret == 3); + + ret = lwip_recv(s2, buf, 3, MSG_PEEK); + fail_unless(ret == 3); + + ret = lwip_read(s2, buf, 4); + fail_unless(ret == 4); + + ret = lwip_read(s2, buf, 1); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + ret = lwip_read(s2, buf, 1); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + + ret = lwip_write(s2, "foo", 3); + fail_unless(ret == 3); + + ret = lwip_close(s2); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) + ; + + /* read one byte more than available to check handling FIN */ + ret = lwip_read(s3, buf, 4); + fail_unless(ret == 3); + + ret = lwip_read(s3, buf, 1); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + ret = lwip_read(s3, buf, 1); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + + while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) + ; + + ret = lwip_close(s); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + ret = lwip_close(s3); + fail_unless(ret == 0); +} + +/* Try to step through all sockets functions once... + */ +START_TEST(test_sockets_allfunctions_basic) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); +#if LWIP_IPV4 + test_sockets_allfunctions_basic_domain(AF_INET); +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + test_sockets_allfunctions_basic_domain(AF_INET6); +#endif +} +END_TEST + +static void test_sockets_init_loopback_addr(int domain, struct sockaddr_storage *addr_st, socklen_t *sz) +{ + memset(addr_st, 0, sizeof(*addr_st)); + + switch (domain) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + case AF_INET6: { + struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr_st; + struct in6_addr lo6 = IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT; + addr->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + addr->sin6_port = 0; /* use ephemeral port */ + addr->sin6_addr = lo6; + *sz = sizeof(*addr); + } break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + case AF_INET: { + struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr_st; + addr->sin_family = AF_INET; + addr->sin_port = 0; /* use ephemeral port */ + addr->sin_addr.s_addr = PP_HTONL(INADDR_LOOPBACK); + *sz = sizeof(*addr); + } break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + + default: + *sz = 0; + fail(); + break; + } +} + +static void test_sockets_msgapi_update_iovs(struct msghdr *msg, size_t bytes) +{ + int i; + + /* note: this modifies the underyling iov_base and iov_len for a partial + read for an individual vector. This updates the msg->msg_iov pointer + to skip fully consumed vecotrs */ + + /* process fully consumed vectors */ + for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; i++) { + if (msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len <= bytes) { + /* reduce bytes by amount of this vector */ + bytes -= msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len; + } else { + break; /* iov not fully consumed */ + } + } + + /* slide down over fully consumed vectors */ + msg->msg_iov = &msg->msg_iov[i]; + msg->msg_iovlen -= i; + + /* update new first vector with any remaining amount */ + msg->msg_iov[0].iov_base = ((u8_t *)msg->msg_iov[0].iov_base + bytes); + msg->msg_iov[0].iov_len -= bytes; +} + +static void test_sockets_msgapi_tcp(int domain) +{ +#define BUF_SZ (TCP_SND_BUF / 4) +#define TOTAL_DATA_SZ (BUF_SZ * 8) /* ~(TCP_SND_BUF*2) that accounts for integer rounding */ +#define NEED_TRAILER (BUF_SZ % 4 != 0) + int listnr, s1, s2, i, ret, opt; + int bytes_written, bytes_read; + struct sockaddr_storage addr_storage; + socklen_t addr_size; + struct iovec siovs[8]; + struct msghdr smsg; + u8_t *snd_buf; + struct iovec riovs[5]; + struct iovec riovs_tmp[5]; + struct msghdr rmsg; + u8_t *rcv_buf; + int rcv_off; + int rcv_trailer = 0; + u8_t val; + + test_sockets_init_loopback_addr(domain, &addr_storage, &addr_size); + + listnr = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_STREAM); + fail_unless(listnr >= 0); + s1 = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_STREAM); + fail_unless(s1 >= 0); + + /* setup a listener socket on loopback with ephemeral port */ + ret = lwip_bind(listnr, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + ret = lwip_listen(listnr, 0); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* update address with ephemeral port */ + ret = lwip_getsockname(listnr, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, &addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* connect, won't complete until we accept it */ + ret = lwip_connect(s1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + fail_unless(errno == EINPROGRESS); + + while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) + ; + + /* accept, creating the other side of the connection */ + s2 = lwip_accept(listnr, NULL, NULL); + fail_unless(s2 >= 0); + + /* double check s1 is connected */ + ret = lwip_connect(s1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + fail_unless(errno == EISCONN); + + /* set s2 to non-blocking, not inherited from listener */ + opt = lwip_fcntl(s2, F_GETFL, 0); + fail_unless(opt == 6); + opt = O_NONBLOCK; + ret = lwip_fcntl(s2, F_SETFL, opt); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* we are done with listener, close it */ + ret = lwip_close(listnr); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* allocate a buffer for a stream of incrementing hex (0x00..0xFF) which we will use + to create an input vector set that is larger than the TCP's send buffer. This will + force execution of the partial IO vector send case */ + snd_buf = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(BUF_SZ); + val = 0x00; + fail_unless(snd_buf != NULL); + + for (i = 0; i < BUF_SZ; i++, val++) { + snd_buf[i] = val; + } + + /* send the buffer 8 times in one message, equating to TOTAL_DATA_SZ */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + siovs[i].iov_base = snd_buf; + siovs[i].iov_len = BUF_SZ; + } + + /* allocate a receive buffer, same size as snd_buf for easy verification */ + rcv_buf = (u8_t *)mem_calloc(1, BUF_SZ); + fail_unless(rcv_buf != NULL); + + /* split across iovs */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + riovs[i].iov_base = &rcv_buf[i * (BUF_SZ / 4)]; + riovs[i].iov_len = BUF_SZ / 4; + } + + /* handling trailing bytes if buffer doesn't evenly divide by 4 */ +#if NEED_TRAILER + + if ((BUF_SZ % 4) != 0) { + riovs[5].iov_base = &rcv_buf[4 * (BUF_SZ / 4)]; + riovs[5].iov_len = BUF_SZ - (4 * (BUF_SZ / 4)); + rcv_trailer = 1; + } + +#endif /* NEED_TRAILER */ + + /* we use a copy of riovs since we'll be modifying base and len during + receiving. This gives us an easy way to reset the iovs for next recvmsg */ + memcpy(riovs_tmp, riovs, sizeof(riovs)); + + memset(&smsg, 0, sizeof(smsg)); + smsg.msg_iov = siovs; + smsg.msg_iovlen = 8; + + memset(&rmsg, 0, sizeof(rmsg)); + rmsg.msg_iov = riovs_tmp; + rmsg.msg_iovlen = (rcv_trailer ? 5 : 4); + + bytes_written = 0; + bytes_read = 0; + rcv_off = 0; + + while (bytes_written < TOTAL_DATA_SZ && (bytes_read < TOTAL_DATA_SZ)) { + /* send data */ + if (bytes_written < TOTAL_DATA_SZ) { + ret = lwip_sendmsg(s1, &smsg, 0); + /* note: since we always receive after sending, there will be open + space in the send buffer */ + fail_unless(ret > 0); + + bytes_written += ret; + + if (bytes_written < TOTAL_DATA_SZ) { + test_sockets_msgapi_update_iovs(&smsg, (size_t)ret); + } + } + + while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) + ; + + /* receive and verify data */ + do { + if (bytes_read < TOTAL_DATA_SZ) { + ret = lwip_recvmsg(s2, &rmsg, 0); + fail_unless(ret > 0 || (ret == -1 && errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); + + if (ret > 0) { + rcv_off += ret; + + /* we have received a full buffer */ + if (rcv_off == BUF_SZ) { + /* note: since iovs are just pointers, compare underlying buf */ + fail_unless(!memcmp(snd_buf, rcv_buf, BUF_SZ)); + bytes_read += BUF_SZ; + /* reset receive state for next buffer */ + rcv_off = 0; + memset(rcv_buf, 0, BUF_SZ); + memcpy(riovs_tmp, riovs, sizeof(riovs)); + rmsg.msg_iov = riovs_tmp; + rmsg.msg_iovlen = (rcv_trailer ? 5 : 4); + } else /* partial read */ + { + test_sockets_msgapi_update_iovs(&rmsg, (size_t)ret); + } + } + } else { + break; + } + } while (ret > 0); + } + + ret = lwip_close(s1); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + ret = lwip_close(s2); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + mem_free(snd_buf); + mem_free(rcv_buf); +} + +static void test_sockets_msgapi_udp_send_recv_loop(int s, struct msghdr *smsg, struct msghdr *rmsg) +{ + int i, ret; + + /* send/receive our datagram of IO vectors 10 times */ + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { + ret = lwip_sendmsg(s, smsg, 0); + fail_unless(ret == 4); + + while (tcpip_thread_poll_one()) + ; + + /* receive the datagram split across 4 buffers */ + ret = lwip_recvmsg(s, rmsg, 0); + fail_unless(ret == 4); + + /* verify data */ + fail_unless(*((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[0].iov_base) == 0xDE); + fail_unless(*((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[1].iov_base) == 0xAD); + fail_unless(*((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[2].iov_base) == 0xBE); + fail_unless(*((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[3].iov_base) == 0xEF); + + /* clear rcv_buf to ensure no data is being skipped */ + *((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[0].iov_base) = 0x00; + *((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[1].iov_base) = 0x00; + *((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[2].iov_base) = 0x00; + *((u8_t *)rmsg->msg_iov[3].iov_base) = 0x00; + } +} + +static void test_sockets_msgapi_udp(int domain) +{ + int s, i, ret; + struct sockaddr_storage addr_storage; + socklen_t addr_size; + struct iovec riovs[4]; + struct msghdr rmsg; + u8_t rcv_buf[4]; + struct iovec siovs[4]; + struct msghdr smsg; + u8_t snd_buf[4] = { 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF }; + + /* initialize IO vectors with data */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + siovs[i].iov_base = &snd_buf[i]; + siovs[i].iov_len = sizeof(u8_t); + riovs[i].iov_base = &rcv_buf[i]; + riovs[i].iov_len = sizeof(u8_t); + } + + test_sockets_init_loopback_addr(domain, &addr_storage, &addr_size); + + s = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_DGRAM); + fail_unless(s >= 0); + + ret = lwip_bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* Update addr with epehermal port */ + ret = lwip_getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, &addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + switch (domain) { +#if LWIP_IPV6 + + case AF_INET6: + fail_unless(addr_size == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#if LWIP_IPV4 + + case AF_INET: + fail_unless(addr_size == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); + break; +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + + default: + fail(); + break; + } + + /* send and receive the datagram in 4 pieces */ + memset(&smsg, 0, sizeof(smsg)); + smsg.msg_iov = siovs; + smsg.msg_iovlen = 4; + memset(&rmsg, 0, sizeof(rmsg)); + rmsg.msg_iov = riovs; + rmsg.msg_iovlen = 4; + + /* perform a sendmsg with remote host (self) */ + smsg.msg_name = &addr_storage; + smsg.msg_namelen = addr_size; + + test_sockets_msgapi_udp_send_recv_loop(s, &smsg, &rmsg); + + /* Connect to self, allowing us to not pass message name */ + ret = lwip_connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + smsg.msg_name = NULL; + smsg.msg_namelen = 0; + + test_sockets_msgapi_udp_send_recv_loop(s, &smsg, &rmsg); + + ret = lwip_close(s); + fail_unless(ret == 0); +} + +#if LWIP_IPV4 +static void test_sockets_msgapi_cmsg(int domain) +{ + int s, ret, enable; + struct sockaddr_storage addr_storage; + socklen_t addr_size; + struct iovec iov; + struct msghdr msg; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + struct in_pktinfo *pktinfo; + u8_t rcv_buf[4]; + u8_t snd_buf[4] = { 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF }; + u8_t cmsg_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo))]; + + test_sockets_init_loopback_addr(domain, &addr_storage, &addr_size); + + s = test_sockets_alloc_socket_nonblocking(domain, SOCK_DGRAM); + fail_unless(s >= 0); + + ret = lwip_bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* Update addr with epehermal port */ + ret = lwip_getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, &addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + enable = 1; + ret = lwip_setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_PKTINFO, &enable, sizeof(enable)); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* Receive full message, including control message */ + iov.iov_base = rcv_buf; + iov.iov_len = sizeof(rcv_buf); + msg.msg_control = cmsg_buf; + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_buf); + msg.msg_flags = 0; + msg.msg_iov = &iov; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; + msg.msg_name = NULL; + msg.msg_namelen = 0; + + memset(rcv_buf, 0, sizeof(rcv_buf)); + ret = lwip_sendto(s, snd_buf, sizeof(snd_buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == sizeof(snd_buf)); + + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + + ret = lwip_recvmsg(s, &msg, 0); + fail_unless(ret == sizeof(rcv_buf)); + fail_unless(!memcmp(rcv_buf, snd_buf, sizeof(rcv_buf))); + + /* Verify message header */ + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); + fail_unless(cmsg != NULL); + fail_unless(cmsg->cmsg_len > 0); + fail_unless(cmsg->cmsg_level == IPPROTO_IP); + fail_unless(cmsg->cmsg_type == IP_PKTINFO); + + /* Verify message data */ + pktinfo = (struct in_pktinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); + /* We only have loopback interface enabled */ + fail_unless(pktinfo->ipi_ifindex == 1); + fail_unless(pktinfo->ipi_addr.s_addr == PP_HTONL(INADDR_LOOPBACK)); + + /* Verify there are no additional messages */ + cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg); + fail_unless(cmsg == NULL); + + /* Send datagram again, testing truncation */ + memset(rcv_buf, 0, sizeof(rcv_buf)); + ret = lwip_sendto(s, snd_buf, sizeof(snd_buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_storage, addr_size); + fail_unless(ret == sizeof(snd_buf)); + + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + + msg.msg_controllen = 1; + msg.msg_flags = 0; + ret = lwip_recvmsg(s, &msg, 0); + fail_unless(ret == sizeof(rcv_buf)); + fail_unless(!memcmp(rcv_buf, snd_buf, sizeof(rcv_buf))); + /* Ensure truncation was returned */ + fail_unless(msg.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC); + /* Ensure no control messages were returned */ + fail_unless(msg.msg_controllen == 0); + + ret = lwip_close(s); + fail_unless(ret == 0); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV4 */ + +START_TEST(test_sockets_msgapis) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); +#if LWIP_IPV4 + test_sockets_msgapi_udp(AF_INET); + test_sockets_msgapi_tcp(AF_INET); + test_sockets_msgapi_cmsg(AF_INET); +#endif +#if LWIP_IPV6 + test_sockets_msgapi_udp(AF_INET6); + test_sockets_msgapi_tcp(AF_INET6); +#endif +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_sockets_select) +{ +#if LWIP_SOCKET_SELECT + int s; + int ret; + fd_set readset; + fd_set writeset; + fd_set errset; + struct timeval tv; + + fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); + + s = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + fail_unless(s >= 0); + fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); + + FD_ZERO(&readset); + FD_SET(s, &readset); + FD_ZERO(&writeset); + FD_SET(s, &writeset); + FD_ZERO(&errset); + FD_SET(s, &errset); + + tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_usec = 0; + ret = lwip_select(s + 1, &readset, &writeset, &errset, &tv); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); + + ret = lwip_close(s); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + +#endif + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_sockets_recv_after_rst) +{ + int sl, sact; + int spass = -1; + int ret; + struct sockaddr_in sa_listen; + const u16_t port = 1234; + int arg; + const char txbuf[] = "something"; + char rxbuf[16]; + struct lwip_sock *sact_sock; + int err; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); + + memset(&sa_listen, 0, sizeof(sa_listen)); + sa_listen.sin_family = AF_INET; + sa_listen.sin_port = PP_HTONS(port); + sa_listen.sin_addr.s_addr = PP_HTONL(INADDR_LOOPBACK); + + /* set up the listener */ + sl = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + fail_unless(sl >= 0); + fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); + + ret = lwip_bind(sl, (struct sockaddr *)&sa_listen, sizeof(sa_listen)); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + ret = lwip_listen(sl, 0); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* set up the client */ + sact = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + fail_unless(sact >= 0); + fail_unless(test_sockets_get_used_count() == 0); + /* set the client to nonblocking to simplify this test */ + arg = 1; + ret = lwip_ioctl(sact, FIONBIO, &arg); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* connect */ + do { + ret = lwip_connect(sact, (struct sockaddr *)&sa_listen, sizeof(sa_listen)); + err = errno; + fail_unless((ret == 0) || (ret == -1)); + + if (ret != 0) { + if (err == EISCONN) { + /* Although this is not valid, use EISCONN as an indicator for successful connection. + This marks us as "connect phase is done". On error, we would either have a different + errno code or "send" fails later... -> good enough for this test. */ + ret = 0; + } else { + fail_unless(err == EINPROGRESS); + + if (err != EINPROGRESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* we're in progress: little side check: test for EALREADY */ + ret = lwip_connect(sact, (struct sockaddr *)&sa_listen, sizeof(sa_listen)); + err = errno; + fail_unless(ret == -1); + fail_unless(err == EALREADY); + + if ((ret != -1) || (err != EALREADY)) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + } + } while (ret != 0); + + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + /* accept the server connection part */ + spass = lwip_accept(sl, NULL, NULL); + fail_unless(spass >= 0); + + /* write data from client */ + ret = lwip_send(sact, txbuf, sizeof(txbuf), 0); + fail_unless(ret == sizeof(txbuf)); + + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + + /* issue RST (This is a HACK, don't try this in your own app!) */ + sact_sock = lwip_socket_dbg_get_socket(sact); + fail_unless(sact_sock != NULL); + + if (sact_sock != NULL) { + struct netconn *sact_conn = sact_sock->conn; + fail_unless(sact_conn != NULL); + + if (sact_conn != NULL) { + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = sact_conn->pcb.tcp; + fail_unless(pcb != NULL); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + tcp_rst(pcb, pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rcv_nxt, &pcb->local_ip, &pcb->remote_ip, + pcb->local_port, pcb->remote_port); + } + } + } + + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + + /* expect to receive data first */ + ret = lwip_recv(spass, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), 0); + fail_unless(ret > 0); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + + /* expect to receive RST indication */ + ret = lwip_recv(spass, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), 0); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + err = errno; + fail_unless(err == ECONNRESET); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + + /* expect to receive ENOTCONN indication */ + ret = lwip_recv(spass, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), 0); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + err = errno; + fail_unless(err == ENOTCONN); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + + /* expect to receive ENOTCONN indication */ + ret = lwip_recv(spass, rxbuf, sizeof(rxbuf), 0); + fail_unless(ret == -1); + err = errno; + fail_unless(err == ENOTCONN); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + +cleanup: + ret = lwip_close(sl); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + ret = lwip_close(sact); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + + if (spass >= 0) { + ret = lwip_close(spass); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + } +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *sockets_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_sockets_basics), + TESTFUNC(test_sockets_allfunctions_basic), + TESTFUNC(test_sockets_msgapis), + TESTFUNC(test_sockets_select), + TESTFUNC(test_sockets_recv_after_rst), + }; + return create_suite("SOCKETS", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), sockets_setup, sockets_teardown); +} + +#else /* LWIP_SOCKET */ + +Suite *sockets_suite(void) +{ + return create_suite("SOCKETS", NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); +} +#endif /* LWIP_SOCKET */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.h similarity index 94% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.h index 65f0a9f3..0abb7a30 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/api/test_sockets.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *sockets_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_SOCKETS_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *sockets_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.c index 564e5c15..7c5e765a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.c @@ -1,362 +1,362 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ - -#include -#include -#if !NO_SYS -#include "sys_arch.h" -#endif -#include -#include -#include - -#include - -u32_t lwip_sys_now; - -u32_t sys_jiffies(void) -{ - return lwip_sys_now; -} - -u32_t sys_now(void) -{ - return lwip_sys_now; -} - -void sys_init(void) -{ -} - -#if !NO_SYS - -test_sys_arch_waiting_fn the_waiting_fn; - -void test_sys_arch_wait_callback(test_sys_arch_waiting_fn waiting_fn) -{ - the_waiting_fn = waiting_fn; -} - -err_t sys_sem_new(sys_sem_t *sem, u8_t count) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); - *sem = count + 1; - return ERR_OK; -} - -void sys_sem_free(sys_sem_t *sem) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); - *sem = 0; -} - -void sys_sem_set_invalid(sys_sem_t *sem) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); - *sem = 0; -} - -/* semaphores are 1-based because RAM is initialized as 0, which would be valid */ -u32_t sys_arch_sem_wait(sys_sem_t *sem, u32_t timeout) -{ - u32_t ret = 0; - LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); - - if (*sem == 1) { - /* need to wait */ - if (!timeout) { - /* wait infinite */ - LWIP_ASSERT("cannot wait without waiting callback", the_waiting_fn != NULL); - - do { - int expectSomething = the_waiting_fn(sem, NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("expecting a semaphore count but it's 0", !expectSomething || (*sem > 1)); - ret++; - - if (ret == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - ret--; - } - } while (*sem == 1); - } else { - if (the_waiting_fn) { - int expectSomething = the_waiting_fn(sem, NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("expecting a semaphore count but it's 0", !expectSomething || (*sem > 1)); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); - - if (*sem == 1) { - return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; - } - - ret = 1; - } - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); - (*sem)--; - LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); - /* return the time we waited for the sem */ - return ret; -} - -void sys_sem_signal(sys_sem_t *sem) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); - (*sem)++; - LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); -} - -err_t sys_mutex_new(sys_mutex_t *mutex) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); - *mutex = 1; /* 1 allocated */ - return ERR_OK; -} - -void sys_mutex_free(sys_mutex_t *mutex) -{ - /* parameter check */ - LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex >= 1); - *mutex = 0; -} - -void sys_mutex_set_invalid(sys_mutex_t *mutex) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); - *mutex = 0; -} - -void sys_mutex_lock(sys_mutex_t *mutex) -{ - /* nothing to do, no multithreading supported */ - LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); - /* check that the mutext is valid and unlocked (no nested locking) */ - LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex == 1); - /* we count up just to check the correct pairing of lock/unlock */ - (*mutex)++; - LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex >= 1); -} - -void sys_mutex_unlock(sys_mutex_t *mutex) -{ - /* nothing to do, no multithreading supported */ - LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex >= 1); - /* we count down just to check the correct pairing of lock/unlock */ - (*mutex)--; - LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex >= 1); -} - -sys_thread_t sys_thread_new(const char *name, lwip_thread_fn function, void *arg, int stacksize, int prio) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(function); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(stacksize); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(prio); - /* threads not supported */ - return 0; -} - -err_t sys_mbox_new(sys_mbox_t *mbox, int size) -{ - int mboxsize = size; - LWIP_ASSERT("mbox != NULL", mbox != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("size >= 0", size >= 0); - - if (size == 0) { - mboxsize = 1024; - } - - mbox->head = mbox->tail = 0; - mbox->sem = mbox; /* just point to something for sys_mbox_valid() */ - mbox->q_mem = (void **)malloc(sizeof(void *) * mboxsize); - mbox->size = mboxsize; - mbox->used = 0; - - memset(mbox->q_mem, 0, sizeof(void *) * mboxsize); - return ERR_OK; -} - -void sys_mbox_free(sys_mbox_t *mbox) -{ - /* parameter check */ - LWIP_ASSERT("mbox != NULL", mbox != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("mbox->sem != NULL", mbox->sem != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("mbox->sem == mbox", mbox->sem == mbox); - LWIP_ASSERT("mbox->q_mem != NULL", mbox->q_mem != NULL); - mbox->sem = NULL; - free(mbox->q_mem); - mbox->q_mem = NULL; -} - -void sys_mbox_set_invalid(sys_mbox_t *mbox) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("mbox != NULL", mbox != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("mbox->q_mem == NULL", mbox->q_mem == NULL); - mbox->sem = NULL; - mbox->q_mem = NULL; -} - -void sys_mbox_post(sys_mbox_t *q, void *msg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("q != SYS_MBOX_NULL", q != SYS_MBOX_NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->sem == q", q->sem == q); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->q_mem != NULL", q->q_mem != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->size > 0", q->size > 0); - - LWIP_ASSERT("mbox already full", q->used < q->size); - - q->q_mem[q->head] = msg; - q->head++; - - if (q->head >= (unsigned int)q->size) { - q->head = 0; - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("mbox is full!", q->head != q->tail); - q->used++; -} - -err_t sys_mbox_trypost(sys_mbox_t *q, void *msg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("q != SYS_MBOX_NULL", q != SYS_MBOX_NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->sem == q", q->sem == q); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->q_mem != NULL", q->q_mem != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->size > 0", q->size > 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->used <= q->size", q->used <= q->size); - - if (q->used == q->size) { - return ERR_MEM; - } - - sys_mbox_post(q, msg); - return ERR_OK; -} - -err_t sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr(sys_mbox_t *q, void *msg) -{ - return sys_mbox_trypost(q, msg); -} - -u32_t sys_arch_mbox_fetch(sys_mbox_t *q, void **msg, u32_t timeout) -{ - u32_t ret = 0; - u32_t ret2; - LWIP_ASSERT("q != SYS_MBOX_NULL", q != SYS_MBOX_NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->sem == q", q->sem == q); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->q_mem != NULL", q->q_mem != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->size > 0", q->size > 0); - - if (q->used == 0) { - /* need to wait */ - /* need to wait */ - if (!timeout) { - /* wait infinite */ - LWIP_ASSERT("cannot wait without waiting callback", the_waiting_fn != NULL); - - do { - int expectSomething = the_waiting_fn(NULL, q); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("expecting item available but it's 0", !expectSomething || (q->used > 0)); - ret++; - - if (ret == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { - ret--; - } - } while (q->used == 0); - } else { - if (the_waiting_fn) { - int expectSomething = the_waiting_fn(NULL, q); - LWIP_ASSERT("expecting item available count but it's 0", !expectSomething || (q->used > 0)); - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); - - if (q->used == 0) { - if (msg) { - *msg = NULL; - } - - return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; - } - - ret = 1; - } - } - - LWIP_ASSERT("q->used > 0", q->used > 0); - ret2 = sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(q, msg); - LWIP_ASSERT("got no message", ret2 == 0); - return ret; -} - -u32_t sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(sys_mbox_t *q, void **msg) -{ - LWIP_ASSERT("q != SYS_MBOX_NULL", q != SYS_MBOX_NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->sem == q", q->sem == q); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->q_mem != NULL", q->q_mem != NULL); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); - LWIP_ASSERT("q->size > 0", q->size > 0); - - if (!q->used) { - return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; - } - - if (msg) { - *msg = q->q_mem[q->tail]; - } - - q->tail++; - - if (q->tail >= (unsigned int)q->size) { - q->tail = 0; - } - - q->used--; - LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); - return 0; -} - -#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD -#error LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1 not supported -#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ - -#endif /* !NO_SYS */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ + +#include +#include +#if !NO_SYS +#include "sys_arch.h" +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +u32_t lwip_sys_now; + +u32_t sys_jiffies(void) +{ + return lwip_sys_now; +} + +u32_t sys_now(void) +{ + return lwip_sys_now; +} + +void sys_init(void) +{ +} + +#if !NO_SYS + +test_sys_arch_waiting_fn the_waiting_fn; + +void test_sys_arch_wait_callback(test_sys_arch_waiting_fn waiting_fn) +{ + the_waiting_fn = waiting_fn; +} + +err_t sys_sem_new(sys_sem_t *sem, u8_t count) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); + *sem = count + 1; + return ERR_OK; +} + +void sys_sem_free(sys_sem_t *sem) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); + *sem = 0; +} + +void sys_sem_set_invalid(sys_sem_t *sem) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); + *sem = 0; +} + +/* semaphores are 1-based because RAM is initialized as 0, which would be valid */ +u32_t sys_arch_sem_wait(sys_sem_t *sem, u32_t timeout) +{ + u32_t ret = 0; + LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); + + if (*sem == 1) { + /* need to wait */ + if (!timeout) { + /* wait infinite */ + LWIP_ASSERT("cannot wait without waiting callback", the_waiting_fn != NULL); + + do { + int expectSomething = the_waiting_fn(sem, NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("expecting a semaphore count but it's 0", !expectSomething || (*sem > 1)); + ret++; + + if (ret == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + ret--; + } + } while (*sem == 1); + } else { + if (the_waiting_fn) { + int expectSomething = the_waiting_fn(sem, NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("expecting a semaphore count but it's 0", !expectSomething || (*sem > 1)); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); + + if (*sem == 1) { + return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; + } + + ret = 1; + } + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); + (*sem)--; + LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); + /* return the time we waited for the sem */ + return ret; +} + +void sys_sem_signal(sys_sem_t *sem) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("sem != NULL", sem != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); + (*sem)++; + LWIP_ASSERT("*sem > 0", *sem > 0); +} + +err_t sys_mutex_new(sys_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); + *mutex = 1; /* 1 allocated */ + return ERR_OK; +} + +void sys_mutex_free(sys_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + /* parameter check */ + LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex >= 1); + *mutex = 0; +} + +void sys_mutex_set_invalid(sys_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); + *mutex = 0; +} + +void sys_mutex_lock(sys_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + /* nothing to do, no multithreading supported */ + LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); + /* check that the mutext is valid and unlocked (no nested locking) */ + LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex == 1); + /* we count up just to check the correct pairing of lock/unlock */ + (*mutex)++; + LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex >= 1); +} + +void sys_mutex_unlock(sys_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + /* nothing to do, no multithreading supported */ + LWIP_ASSERT("mutex != NULL", mutex != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex >= 1); + /* we count down just to check the correct pairing of lock/unlock */ + (*mutex)--; + LWIP_ASSERT("*mutex >= 1", *mutex >= 1); +} + +sys_thread_t sys_thread_new(const char *name, lwip_thread_fn function, void *arg, int stacksize, int prio) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(name); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(function); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(stacksize); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(prio); + /* threads not supported */ + return 0; +} + +err_t sys_mbox_new(sys_mbox_t *mbox, int size) +{ + int mboxsize = size; + LWIP_ASSERT("mbox != NULL", mbox != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("size >= 0", size >= 0); + + if (size == 0) { + mboxsize = 1024; + } + + mbox->head = mbox->tail = 0; + mbox->sem = mbox; /* just point to something for sys_mbox_valid() */ + mbox->q_mem = (void **)malloc(sizeof(void *) * mboxsize); + mbox->size = mboxsize; + mbox->used = 0; + + memset(mbox->q_mem, 0, sizeof(void *) * mboxsize); + return ERR_OK; +} + +void sys_mbox_free(sys_mbox_t *mbox) +{ + /* parameter check */ + LWIP_ASSERT("mbox != NULL", mbox != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("mbox->sem != NULL", mbox->sem != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("mbox->sem == mbox", mbox->sem == mbox); + LWIP_ASSERT("mbox->q_mem != NULL", mbox->q_mem != NULL); + mbox->sem = NULL; + free(mbox->q_mem); + mbox->q_mem = NULL; +} + +void sys_mbox_set_invalid(sys_mbox_t *mbox) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("mbox != NULL", mbox != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("mbox->q_mem == NULL", mbox->q_mem == NULL); + mbox->sem = NULL; + mbox->q_mem = NULL; +} + +void sys_mbox_post(sys_mbox_t *q, void *msg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("q != SYS_MBOX_NULL", q != SYS_MBOX_NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->sem == q", q->sem == q); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->q_mem != NULL", q->q_mem != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->size > 0", q->size > 0); + + LWIP_ASSERT("mbox already full", q->used < q->size); + + q->q_mem[q->head] = msg; + q->head++; + + if (q->head >= (unsigned int)q->size) { + q->head = 0; + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("mbox is full!", q->head != q->tail); + q->used++; +} + +err_t sys_mbox_trypost(sys_mbox_t *q, void *msg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("q != SYS_MBOX_NULL", q != SYS_MBOX_NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->sem == q", q->sem == q); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->q_mem != NULL", q->q_mem != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->size > 0", q->size > 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->used <= q->size", q->used <= q->size); + + if (q->used == q->size) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + sys_mbox_post(q, msg); + return ERR_OK; +} + +err_t sys_mbox_trypost_fromisr(sys_mbox_t *q, void *msg) +{ + return sys_mbox_trypost(q, msg); +} + +u32_t sys_arch_mbox_fetch(sys_mbox_t *q, void **msg, u32_t timeout) +{ + u32_t ret = 0; + u32_t ret2; + LWIP_ASSERT("q != SYS_MBOX_NULL", q != SYS_MBOX_NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->sem == q", q->sem == q); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->q_mem != NULL", q->q_mem != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->size > 0", q->size > 0); + + if (q->used == 0) { + /* need to wait */ + /* need to wait */ + if (!timeout) { + /* wait infinite */ + LWIP_ASSERT("cannot wait without waiting callback", the_waiting_fn != NULL); + + do { + int expectSomething = the_waiting_fn(NULL, q); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("expecting item available but it's 0", !expectSomething || (q->used > 0)); + ret++; + + if (ret == SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT) { + ret--; + } + } while (q->used == 0); + } else { + if (the_waiting_fn) { + int expectSomething = the_waiting_fn(NULL, q); + LWIP_ASSERT("expecting item available count but it's 0", !expectSomething || (q->used > 0)); + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); + + if (q->used == 0) { + if (msg) { + *msg = NULL; + } + + return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; + } + + ret = 1; + } + } + + LWIP_ASSERT("q->used > 0", q->used > 0); + ret2 = sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(q, msg); + LWIP_ASSERT("got no message", ret2 == 0); + return ret; +} + +u32_t sys_arch_mbox_tryfetch(sys_mbox_t *q, void **msg) +{ + LWIP_ASSERT("q != SYS_MBOX_NULL", q != SYS_MBOX_NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->sem == q", q->sem == q); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->q_mem != NULL", q->q_mem != NULL); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); + LWIP_ASSERT("q->size > 0", q->size > 0); + + if (!q->used) { + return SYS_ARCH_TIMEOUT; + } + + if (msg) { + *msg = q->q_mem[q->tail]; + } + + q->tail++; + + if (q->tail >= (unsigned int)q->size) { + q->tail = 0; + } + + q->used--; + LWIP_ASSERT("q->used >= 0", q->used >= 0); + return 0; +} + +#if LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD +#error LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD==1 not supported +#endif /* LWIP_NETCONN_SEM_PER_THREAD */ + +#endif /* !NO_SYS */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.h index 0a17db03..672dac28 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/arch/sys_arch.h @@ -1,71 +1,71 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_SYS_ARCH_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_SYS_ARCH_H - -typedef int sys_sem_t; -#define sys_sem_valid(sema) ((sema) != NULL) - -typedef int sys_mutex_t; -#define sys_mutex_valid(mutex) (((mutex) != NULL) - -struct lwip_mbox { - void *sem; - void **q_mem; - unsigned int head, tail; - int size; - int used; -}; -typedef struct lwip_mbox sys_mbox_t; -#define SYS_MBOX_NULL NULL -#define sys_mbox_valid(mbox) ((mbox != NULL) && ((mbox)->sem != NULL) && ((mbox)->sem != (void *)-1)) -#define sys_mbox_valid_val(mbox) (((mbox).sem != NULL) && ((mbox).sem != (void *)-1)) - -/* DWORD (thread id) is used for sys_thread_t but we won't include windows.h */ -typedef u32_t sys_thread_t; - -#define SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) -#define SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) -#define SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) - -/* to implement doing something while blocking on an mbox or semaphore: - * pass a function to test_sys_arch_wait_callback() that returns - * '0' if waiting again and - * '1' if now there should be something to do (used for asserting) - */ -typedef int (*test_sys_arch_waiting_fn)(sys_sem_t *wait_sem, sys_mbox_t *wait_mbox); -void test_sys_arch_wait_callback(test_sys_arch_waiting_fn waiting_fn); - -/* current time */ -extern u32_t lwip_sys_now; - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TEST_SYS_ARCH_H */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Simon Goldschmidt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_SYS_ARCH_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_SYS_ARCH_H + +typedef int sys_sem_t; +#define sys_sem_valid(sema) ((sema) != NULL) + +typedef int sys_mutex_t; +#define sys_mutex_valid(mutex) (((mutex) != NULL) + +struct lwip_mbox { + void *sem; + void **q_mem; + unsigned int head, tail; + int size; + int used; +}; +typedef struct lwip_mbox sys_mbox_t; +#define SYS_MBOX_NULL NULL +#define sys_mbox_valid(mbox) ((mbox != NULL) && ((mbox)->sem != NULL) && ((mbox)->sem != (void *)-1)) +#define sys_mbox_valid_val(mbox) (((mbox).sem != NULL) && ((mbox).sem != (void *)-1)) + +/* DWORD (thread id) is used for sys_thread_t but we won't include windows.h */ +typedef u32_t sys_thread_t; + +#define SYS_ARCH_DECL_PROTECT(lev) +#define SYS_ARCH_PROTECT(lev) +#define SYS_ARCH_UNPROTECT(lev) + +/* to implement doing something while blocking on an mbox or semaphore: + * pass a function to test_sys_arch_wait_callback() that returns + * '0' if waiting again and + * '1' if now there should be something to do (used for asserting) + */ +typedef int (*test_sys_arch_waiting_fn)(sys_sem_t *wait_sem, sys_mbox_t *wait_mbox); +void test_sys_arch_wait_callback(test_sys_arch_waiting_fn waiting_fn); + +/* current time */ +extern u32_t lwip_sys_now; + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_TEST_SYS_ARCH_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.c index 6f814627..90adb331 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.c @@ -1,80 +1,80 @@ -#include "test_def.h" - -#include "lwip/def.h" - -#define MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE 0x7a -#define TEST_BUFSIZE 32 -#define GUARD_SIZE 4 - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static void def_setup(void) -{ -} - -static void def_teardown(void) -{ -} - -static void def_check_range_untouched(const char *buf, size_t len) -{ - size_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - fail_unless(buf[i] == (char)MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE); - } -} - -static void test_def_itoa(int number, const char *expected) -{ - char buf[TEST_BUFSIZE]; - char *test_buf = &buf[GUARD_SIZE]; - - size_t exp_len = strlen(expected); - fail_unless(exp_len + 4 < (TEST_BUFSIZE - (2 * GUARD_SIZE))); - - memset(buf, MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE, sizeof(buf)); - lwip_itoa(test_buf, exp_len + 1, number); - def_check_range_untouched(buf, GUARD_SIZE); - fail_unless(test_buf[exp_len] == 0); - fail_unless(!memcmp(test_buf, expected, exp_len)); - def_check_range_untouched(&test_buf[exp_len + 1], TEST_BUFSIZE - GUARD_SIZE - exp_len - 1); - - /* check with too small buffer */ - memset(buf, MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE, sizeof(buf)); - lwip_itoa(test_buf, exp_len, number); - def_check_range_untouched(buf, GUARD_SIZE); - def_check_range_untouched(&test_buf[exp_len + 1], TEST_BUFSIZE - GUARD_SIZE - exp_len - 1); - - /* check with too large buffer */ - memset(buf, MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE, sizeof(buf)); - lwip_itoa(test_buf, exp_len + 4, number); - def_check_range_untouched(buf, GUARD_SIZE); - fail_unless(test_buf[exp_len] == 0); - fail_unless(!memcmp(test_buf, expected, exp_len)); - def_check_range_untouched(&test_buf[exp_len + 4], TEST_BUFSIZE - GUARD_SIZE - exp_len - 4); -} - -START_TEST(test_def_lwip_itoa) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - test_def_itoa(0, "0"); - test_def_itoa(1, "1"); - test_def_itoa(-1, "-1"); - test_def_itoa(15, "15"); - test_def_itoa(-15, "-15"); - test_def_itoa(156, "156"); - test_def_itoa(1192, "1192"); - test_def_itoa(-156, "-156"); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *def_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_def_lwip_itoa) - }; - return create_suite("DEF", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), def_setup, def_teardown); -} +#include "test_def.h" + +#include "lwip/def.h" + +#define MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE 0x7a +#define TEST_BUFSIZE 32 +#define GUARD_SIZE 4 + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static void def_setup(void) +{ +} + +static void def_teardown(void) +{ +} + +static void def_check_range_untouched(const char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + fail_unless(buf[i] == (char)MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE); + } +} + +static void test_def_itoa(int number, const char *expected) +{ + char buf[TEST_BUFSIZE]; + char *test_buf = &buf[GUARD_SIZE]; + + size_t exp_len = strlen(expected); + fail_unless(exp_len + 4 < (TEST_BUFSIZE - (2 * GUARD_SIZE))); + + memset(buf, MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE, sizeof(buf)); + lwip_itoa(test_buf, exp_len + 1, number); + def_check_range_untouched(buf, GUARD_SIZE); + fail_unless(test_buf[exp_len] == 0); + fail_unless(!memcmp(test_buf, expected, exp_len)); + def_check_range_untouched(&test_buf[exp_len + 1], TEST_BUFSIZE - GUARD_SIZE - exp_len - 1); + + /* check with too small buffer */ + memset(buf, MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE, sizeof(buf)); + lwip_itoa(test_buf, exp_len, number); + def_check_range_untouched(buf, GUARD_SIZE); + def_check_range_untouched(&test_buf[exp_len + 1], TEST_BUFSIZE - GUARD_SIZE - exp_len - 1); + + /* check with too large buffer */ + memset(buf, MAGIC_UNTOUCHED_BYTE, sizeof(buf)); + lwip_itoa(test_buf, exp_len + 4, number); + def_check_range_untouched(buf, GUARD_SIZE); + fail_unless(test_buf[exp_len] == 0); + fail_unless(!memcmp(test_buf, expected, exp_len)); + def_check_range_untouched(&test_buf[exp_len + 4], TEST_BUFSIZE - GUARD_SIZE - exp_len - 4); +} + +START_TEST(test_def_lwip_itoa) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + test_def_itoa(0, "0"); + test_def_itoa(1, "1"); + test_def_itoa(-1, "-1"); + test_def_itoa(15, "15"); + test_def_itoa(-15, "-15"); + test_def_itoa(156, "156"); + test_def_itoa(1192, "1192"); + test_def_itoa(-156, "-156"); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *def_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_def_lwip_itoa) + }; + return create_suite("DEF", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), def_setup, def_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.h index d4566c2c..73160512 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_def.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_DEF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_DEF_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *def_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_DEF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_DEF_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *def_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.c index 5f4131c7..c66fc7c6 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.c @@ -1,222 +1,222 @@ -#include "test_mem.h" - -#include "lwip/mem.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#if !LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS -#error "This tests needs MEM-statistics enabled" -#endif -#if LWIP_DNS -#error "This test needs DNS turned off (as it mallocs on init)" -#endif - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static void mem_setup(void) -{ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void mem_teardown(void) -{ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -/* Test functions */ - -/** Call mem_malloc, mem_free and mem_trim and check stats */ -START_TEST(test_mem_one) -{ -#define SIZE1 16 -#define SIZE1_2 12 -#define SIZE2 16 - void *p1, *p2; - mem_size_t s1, s2; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - - p1 = mem_malloc(SIZE1); - fail_unless(p1 != NULL); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used >= SIZE1); - s1 = lwip_stats.mem.used; - - p2 = mem_malloc(SIZE2); - fail_unless(p2 != NULL); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used >= SIZE2 + s1); - s2 = lwip_stats.mem.used; - - mem_trim(p1, SIZE1_2); - - mem_free(p2); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used <= s2 - SIZE2); - - mem_free(p1); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); -} -END_TEST - -static void malloc_keep_x(int x, int num, int size, int freestep) -{ - int i; - void *p[16]; - LWIP_ASSERT("invalid size", size >= 0 && size < (mem_size_t)-1); - memset(p, 0, sizeof(p)); - - for (i = 0; i < num && i < 16; i++) { - p[i] = mem_malloc((mem_size_t)size); - fail_unless(p[i] != NULL); - } - - for (i = 0; i < num && i < 16; i += freestep) { - if (i == x) { - continue; - } - - mem_free(p[i]); - p[i] = NULL; - } - - for (i = 0; i < num && i < 16; i++) { - if (i == x) { - continue; - } - - if (p[i] != NULL) { - mem_free(p[i]); - p[i] = NULL; - } - } - - fail_unless(p[x] != NULL); - mem_free(p[x]); -} - -START_TEST(test_mem_random) -{ - const int num = 16; - int x; - int size; - int freestep; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - - for (x = 0; x < num; x++) { - for (size = 1; size < 32; size++) { - for (freestep = 1; freestep <= 3; freestep++) { - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - malloc_keep_x(x, num, size, freestep); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - } - } - } -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_mem_invalid_free) -{ - u8_t *ptr, *ptr_low, *ptr_high; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); - - ptr = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(1); - fail_unless(ptr != NULL); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); - - ptr_low = ptr - 0x10; - mem_free(ptr_low); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); - lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; - - ptr_high = ptr + (MEM_SIZE * 2); - mem_free(ptr_high); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); - lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; - - mem_free(ptr); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_mem_double_free) -{ - u8_t *ptr1b, *ptr1, *ptr2, *ptr3; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); - - ptr1 = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(1); - fail_unless(ptr1 != NULL); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); - - ptr2 = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(1); - fail_unless(ptr2 != NULL); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); - - ptr3 = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(1); - fail_unless(ptr3 != NULL); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); - - /* free the middle mem */ - mem_free(ptr2); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); - - /* double-free of middle mem: should fail */ - mem_free(ptr2); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); - lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; - - /* free upper memory and try again */ - mem_free(ptr3); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); - - mem_free(ptr2); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); - lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; - - /* free lower memory and try again */ - mem_free(ptr1); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - - mem_free(ptr2); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; - - /* reallocate lowest memory, now overlapping already freed ptr2 */ -#ifndef MIN_SIZE -#define MIN_SIZE 12 -#endif - ptr1b = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(MIN_SIZE * 2); - fail_unless(ptr1b != NULL); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); - - mem_free(ptr2); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); - lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; - - memset(ptr1b, 1, MIN_SIZE * 2); - - mem_free(ptr2); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); - lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; - - mem_free(ptr1b); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *mem_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_mem_one), - TESTFUNC(test_mem_random), - TESTFUNC(test_mem_invalid_free), - TESTFUNC(test_mem_double_free) - }; - return create_suite("MEM", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), mem_setup, mem_teardown); -} +#include "test_mem.h" + +#include "lwip/mem.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#if !LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS +#error "This tests needs MEM-statistics enabled" +#endif +#if LWIP_DNS +#error "This test needs DNS turned off (as it mallocs on init)" +#endif + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static void mem_setup(void) +{ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void mem_teardown(void) +{ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +/* Test functions */ + +/** Call mem_malloc, mem_free and mem_trim and check stats */ +START_TEST(test_mem_one) +{ +#define SIZE1 16 +#define SIZE1_2 12 +#define SIZE2 16 + void *p1, *p2; + mem_size_t s1, s2; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + + p1 = mem_malloc(SIZE1); + fail_unless(p1 != NULL); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used >= SIZE1); + s1 = lwip_stats.mem.used; + + p2 = mem_malloc(SIZE2); + fail_unless(p2 != NULL); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used >= SIZE2 + s1); + s2 = lwip_stats.mem.used; + + mem_trim(p1, SIZE1_2); + + mem_free(p2); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used <= s2 - SIZE2); + + mem_free(p1); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); +} +END_TEST + +static void malloc_keep_x(int x, int num, int size, int freestep) +{ + int i; + void *p[16]; + LWIP_ASSERT("invalid size", size >= 0 && size < (mem_size_t)-1); + memset(p, 0, sizeof(p)); + + for (i = 0; i < num && i < 16; i++) { + p[i] = mem_malloc((mem_size_t)size); + fail_unless(p[i] != NULL); + } + + for (i = 0; i < num && i < 16; i += freestep) { + if (i == x) { + continue; + } + + mem_free(p[i]); + p[i] = NULL; + } + + for (i = 0; i < num && i < 16; i++) { + if (i == x) { + continue; + } + + if (p[i] != NULL) { + mem_free(p[i]); + p[i] = NULL; + } + } + + fail_unless(p[x] != NULL); + mem_free(p[x]); +} + +START_TEST(test_mem_random) +{ + const int num = 16; + int x; + int size; + int freestep; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + + for (x = 0; x < num; x++) { + for (size = 1; size < 32; size++) { + for (freestep = 1; freestep <= 3; freestep++) { + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + malloc_keep_x(x, num, size, freestep); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + } + } + } +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_mem_invalid_free) +{ + u8_t *ptr, *ptr_low, *ptr_high; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); + + ptr = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(1); + fail_unless(ptr != NULL); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); + + ptr_low = ptr - 0x10; + mem_free(ptr_low); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); + lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; + + ptr_high = ptr + (MEM_SIZE * 2); + mem_free(ptr_high); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); + lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; + + mem_free(ptr); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_mem_double_free) +{ + u8_t *ptr1b, *ptr1, *ptr2, *ptr3; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); + + ptr1 = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(1); + fail_unless(ptr1 != NULL); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); + + ptr2 = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(1); + fail_unless(ptr2 != NULL); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); + + ptr3 = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(1); + fail_unless(ptr3 != NULL); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); + + /* free the middle mem */ + mem_free(ptr2); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); + + /* double-free of middle mem: should fail */ + mem_free(ptr2); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); + lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; + + /* free upper memory and try again */ + mem_free(ptr3); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); + + mem_free(ptr2); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); + lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; + + /* free lower memory and try again */ + mem_free(ptr1); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + + mem_free(ptr2); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; + + /* reallocate lowest memory, now overlapping already freed ptr2 */ +#ifndef MIN_SIZE +#define MIN_SIZE 12 +#endif + ptr1b = (u8_t *)mem_malloc(MIN_SIZE * 2); + fail_unless(ptr1b != NULL); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used != 0); + + mem_free(ptr2); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); + lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; + + memset(ptr1b, 1, MIN_SIZE * 2); + + mem_free(ptr2); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 1); + lwip_stats.mem.illegal = 0; + + mem_free(ptr1b); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.illegal == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *mem_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_mem_one), + TESTFUNC(test_mem_random), + TESTFUNC(test_mem_invalid_free), + TESTFUNC(test_mem_double_free) + }; + return create_suite("MEM", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), mem_setup, mem_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.h index 4a02d7df..325134c3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_mem.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_MEM_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_MEM_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *mem_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_MEM_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_MEM_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *mem_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.c index 32340f08..d5ce49cf 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.c @@ -1,218 +1,218 @@ -#include "test_netif.h" - -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "netif/ethernet.h" - -#if !LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK -#error "This tests needs LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK enabled" -#endif - -struct netif net_test; - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static void netif_setup(void) -{ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void netif_teardown(void) -{ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -/* test helper functions */ - -static err_t testif_tx_func(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t testif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - netif->name[0] = 'c'; - netif->name[1] = 'h'; - netif->output = etharp_output; - netif->linkoutput = testif_tx_func; - netif->mtu = 1500; - netif->hwaddr_len = 6; - netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET | NETIF_FLAG_IGMP | NETIF_FLAG_MLD6; - - netif->hwaddr[0] = 0x02; - netif->hwaddr[1] = 0x03; - netif->hwaddr[2] = 0x04; - netif->hwaddr[3] = 0x05; - netif->hwaddr[4] = 0x06; - netif->hwaddr[5] = 0x07; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -#define MAX_NSC_REASON_IDX 10 -static netif_nsc_reason_t expected_reasons; -static int callback_ctr; - -static int dummy_active; - -static void test_netif_ext_callback_dummy(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(reason); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(args); - - fail_unless(dummy_active); -} - -static void test_netif_ext_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(args); /* @todo */ - callback_ctr++; - - fail_unless(netif == &net_test); - - fail_unless(expected_reasons == reason); -} - -/* Test functions */ - -NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(netif_callback_1) -NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(netif_callback_2) -NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(netif_callback_3) - -START_TEST(test_netif_extcallbacks) -{ - ip4_addr_t addr; - ip4_addr_t netmask; - ip4_addr_t gw; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); - - netif_add_ext_callback(&netif_callback_3, test_netif_ext_callback_dummy); - netif_add_ext_callback(&netif_callback_2, test_netif_ext_callback); - netif_add_ext_callback(&netif_callback_1, test_netif_ext_callback_dummy); - - dummy_active = 1; - - /* positive tests: check that single events come as expected */ - - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_NETIF_ADDED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_link_up(&net_test); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_up(&net_test); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 1, 2, 3, 4); - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_ipaddr(&net_test, &addr); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 255, 0); - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_netmask(&net_test, &netmask); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 1, 2, 3, 254); - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_gw(&net_test, &gw); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_ipaddr(&net_test, &addr); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_netmask(&net_test, &netmask); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_gw(&net_test, &gw); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - /* check for multi-events (only one combined callback expected) */ - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 1, 2, 3, 4); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 255, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 1, 2, 3, 254); - expected_reasons = (netif_nsc_reason_t)(LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED | - LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED); - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_addr(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - /* check that for no-change, no callback is expected */ - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_NONE; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_ipaddr(&net_test, &addr); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 0); - - netif_set_netmask(&net_test, &netmask); - callback_ctr = 0; - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 0); - - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_gw(&net_test, &gw); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 0); - - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_addr(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 0); - - /* check for single-events */ - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 1, 2, 3, 5); - expected_reasons = (netif_nsc_reason_t)(LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED); - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_addr(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_set_down(&net_test); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_NETIF_REMOVED; - callback_ctr = 0; - netif_remove(&net_test); - fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); - - expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_NONE; - - netif_remove_ext_callback(&netif_callback_2); - netif_remove_ext_callback(&netif_callback_3); - netif_remove_ext_callback(&netif_callback_1); - dummy_active = 0; -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *netif_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_netif_extcallbacks) - }; - return create_suite("NETIF", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), netif_setup, netif_teardown); -} +#include "test_netif.h" + +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "netif/ethernet.h" + +#if !LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK +#error "This tests needs LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK enabled" +#endif + +struct netif net_test; + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static void netif_setup(void) +{ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void netif_teardown(void) +{ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +/* test helper functions */ + +static err_t testif_tx_func(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t testif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + netif->name[0] = 'c'; + netif->name[1] = 'h'; + netif->output = etharp_output; + netif->linkoutput = testif_tx_func; + netif->mtu = 1500; + netif->hwaddr_len = 6; + netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET | NETIF_FLAG_IGMP | NETIF_FLAG_MLD6; + + netif->hwaddr[0] = 0x02; + netif->hwaddr[1] = 0x03; + netif->hwaddr[2] = 0x04; + netif->hwaddr[3] = 0x05; + netif->hwaddr[4] = 0x06; + netif->hwaddr[5] = 0x07; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +#define MAX_NSC_REASON_IDX 10 +static netif_nsc_reason_t expected_reasons; +static int callback_ctr; + +static int dummy_active; + +static void test_netif_ext_callback_dummy(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(reason); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(args); + + fail_unless(dummy_active); +} + +static void test_netif_ext_callback(struct netif *netif, netif_nsc_reason_t reason, const netif_ext_callback_args_t *args) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(args); /* @todo */ + callback_ctr++; + + fail_unless(netif == &net_test); + + fail_unless(expected_reasons == reason); +} + +/* Test functions */ + +NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(netif_callback_1) +NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(netif_callback_2) +NETIF_DECLARE_EXT_CALLBACK(netif_callback_3) + +START_TEST(test_netif_extcallbacks) +{ + ip4_addr_t addr; + ip4_addr_t netmask; + ip4_addr_t gw; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + netif_add_ext_callback(&netif_callback_3, test_netif_ext_callback_dummy); + netif_add_ext_callback(&netif_callback_2, test_netif_ext_callback); + netif_add_ext_callback(&netif_callback_1, test_netif_ext_callback_dummy); + + dummy_active = 1; + + /* positive tests: check that single events come as expected */ + + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_NETIF_ADDED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_LINK_CHANGED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_link_up(&net_test); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_up(&net_test); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 1, 2, 3, 4); + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_ipaddr(&net_test, &addr); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 255, 0); + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_netmask(&net_test, &netmask); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 1, 2, 3, 254); + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_gw(&net_test, &gw); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_ipaddr(&net_test, &addr); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_netmask(&net_test, &netmask); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_gw(&net_test, &gw); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + /* check for multi-events (only one combined callback expected) */ + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 1, 2, 3, 4); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 255, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 1, 2, 3, 254); + expected_reasons = (netif_nsc_reason_t)(LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_NETMASK_CHANGED | + LWIP_NSC_IPV4_GATEWAY_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED); + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_addr(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + /* check that for no-change, no callback is expected */ + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_NONE; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_ipaddr(&net_test, &addr); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 0); + + netif_set_netmask(&net_test, &netmask); + callback_ctr = 0; + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 0); + + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_gw(&net_test, &gw); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 0); + + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_addr(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 0); + + /* check for single-events */ + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 1, 2, 3, 5); + expected_reasons = (netif_nsc_reason_t)(LWIP_NSC_IPV4_ADDRESS_CHANGED | LWIP_NSC_IPV4_SETTINGS_CHANGED); + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_addr(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_STATUS_CHANGED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_set_down(&net_test); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_NETIF_REMOVED; + callback_ctr = 0; + netif_remove(&net_test); + fail_unless(callback_ctr == 1); + + expected_reasons = LWIP_NSC_NONE; + + netif_remove_ext_callback(&netif_callback_2); + netif_remove_ext_callback(&netif_callback_3); + netif_remove_ext_callback(&netif_callback_1); + dummy_active = 0; +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *netif_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_netif_extcallbacks) + }; + return create_suite("NETIF", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), netif_setup, netif_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.h index 52137ea9..8f2b6b46 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_netif.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_NETIF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_NETIF_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *netif_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_NETIF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_NETIF_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *netif_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.c index fe521872..27ba1750 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.c @@ -1,272 +1,272 @@ -#include "test_pbuf.h" - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" - -#if !LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS || !MEMP_STATS -#error "This tests needs MEM- and MEMP-statistics enabled" -#endif -#if LWIP_DNS -#error "This test needs DNS turned off (as it mallocs on init)" -#endif -#if !LWIP_TCP || !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || !LWIP_WND_SCALE -#error "This test needs TCP OOSEQ queueing and window scaling enabled" -#endif - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static void pbuf_setup(void) -{ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void pbuf_teardown(void) -{ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -#define TESTBUFSIZE_1 65535 -#define TESTBUFSIZE_2 65530 -#define TESTBUFSIZE_3 50050 -static u8_t testbuf_1[TESTBUFSIZE_1]; -static u8_t testbuf_1a[TESTBUFSIZE_1]; -static u8_t testbuf_2[TESTBUFSIZE_2]; -static u8_t testbuf_2a[TESTBUFSIZE_2]; -static u8_t testbuf_3[TESTBUFSIZE_3]; -static u8_t testbuf_3a[TESTBUFSIZE_3]; - -/* Test functions */ -START_TEST(test_pbuf_alloc_zero_pbufs) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_ROM); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_RAM); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_REF); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_POOL); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } -} -END_TEST - -/** Call pbuf_copy on a pbuf with zero length */ START_TEST(test_pbuf_copy_zero_pbuf) -{ - struct pbuf *p1, *p2, *p3; - err_t err; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_PBUF_POOL) == 0); - - p1 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 1024, PBUF_RAM); - fail_unless(p1 != NULL); - fail_unless(p1->ref == 1); - - p2 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 2, PBUF_POOL); - fail_unless(p2 != NULL); - fail_unless(p2->ref == 1); - p2->len = p2->tot_len = 0; - - pbuf_cat(p1, p2); - fail_unless(p1->ref == 1); - fail_unless(p2->ref == 1); - - p3 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, p1->tot_len, PBUF_POOL); - err = pbuf_copy(p3, p1); - fail_unless(err == ERR_VAL); - - pbuf_free(p1); - pbuf_free(p3); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_PBUF_POOL) == 0); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_pbuf_split_64k_on_small_pbufs) -{ - struct pbuf *p, *rest = NULL; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 1, PBUF_POOL); - pbuf_split_64k(p, &rest); - fail_unless(p->tot_len == 1); - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_pbuf_queueing_bigger_than_64k) -{ - int i; - err_t err; - struct pbuf *p1, *p2, *p3, *rest2 = NULL, *rest3 = NULL; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - for (i = 0; i < TESTBUFSIZE_1; i++) { - testbuf_1[i] = (u8_t)rand(); - } - - for (i = 0; i < TESTBUFSIZE_2; i++) { - testbuf_2[i] = (u8_t)rand(); - } - - for (i = 0; i < TESTBUFSIZE_3; i++) { - testbuf_3[i] = (u8_t)rand(); - } - - p1 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, TESTBUFSIZE_1, PBUF_POOL); - fail_unless(p1 != NULL); - p2 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, TESTBUFSIZE_2, PBUF_POOL); - fail_unless(p2 != NULL); - p3 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, TESTBUFSIZE_3, PBUF_POOL); - fail_unless(p3 != NULL); - err = pbuf_take(p1, testbuf_1, TESTBUFSIZE_1); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - err = pbuf_take(p2, testbuf_2, TESTBUFSIZE_2); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - err = pbuf_take(p3, testbuf_3, TESTBUFSIZE_3); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - - pbuf_cat(p1, p2); - pbuf_cat(p1, p3); - - pbuf_split_64k(p1, &rest2); - fail_unless(p1->tot_len == TESTBUFSIZE_1); - fail_unless(rest2->tot_len == (u16_t)((TESTBUFSIZE_2 + TESTBUFSIZE_3) & 0xFFFF)); - pbuf_split_64k(rest2, &rest3); - fail_unless(rest2->tot_len == TESTBUFSIZE_2); - fail_unless(rest3->tot_len == TESTBUFSIZE_3); - - pbuf_copy_partial(p1, testbuf_1a, TESTBUFSIZE_1, 0); - pbuf_copy_partial(rest2, testbuf_2a, TESTBUFSIZE_2, 0); - pbuf_copy_partial(rest3, testbuf_3a, TESTBUFSIZE_3, 0); - fail_if(memcmp(testbuf_1, testbuf_1a, TESTBUFSIZE_1)); - fail_if(memcmp(testbuf_2, testbuf_2a, TESTBUFSIZE_2)); - fail_if(memcmp(testbuf_3, testbuf_3a, TESTBUFSIZE_3)); - - pbuf_free(p1); - pbuf_free(rest2); - pbuf_free(rest3); -} -END_TEST - -/* Test for bug that writing with pbuf_take_at() did nothing - * and returned ERR_OK when writing at beginning of a pbuf - * in the chain. - */ -START_TEST(test_pbuf_take_at_edge) -{ - err_t res; - u8_t *out; - int i; - u8_t testdata[] = { 0x01, 0x08, 0x82, 0x02 }; - struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 1024, PBUF_POOL); - struct pbuf *q = p->next; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - /* alloc big enough to get a chain of pbufs */ - fail_if(p->tot_len == p->len); - memset(p->payload, 0, p->len); - memset(q->payload, 0, q->len); - - /* copy data to the beginning of first pbuf */ - res = pbuf_take_at(p, &testdata, sizeof(testdata), 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - out = (u8_t *)p->payload; - - for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(testdata); i++) { - fail_unless(out[i] == testdata[i], - "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", i, out[i], testdata[i]); - } - - /* copy data to the just before end of first pbuf */ - res = pbuf_take_at(p, &testdata, sizeof(testdata), p->len - 1); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - out = (u8_t *)p->payload; - fail_unless(out[p->len - 1] == testdata[0], - "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len - 1, out[p->len - 1], testdata[0]); - out = (u8_t *)q->payload; - - for (i = 1; i < (int)sizeof(testdata); i++) { - fail_unless(out[i - 1] == testdata[i], - "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len - 1 + i, out[i - 1], testdata[i]); - } - - /* copy data to the beginning of second pbuf */ - res = pbuf_take_at(p, &testdata, sizeof(testdata), p->len); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - out = (u8_t *)p->payload; - - for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(testdata); i++) { - fail_unless(out[i] == testdata[i], - "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len + i, out[i], testdata[i]); - } - - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST - -/* Verify pbuf_put_at()/pbuf_get_at() when using - * offsets equal to beginning of new pbuf in chain - */ -START_TEST(test_pbuf_get_put_at_edge) -{ - u8_t *out; - u8_t testdata = 0x01; - u8_t getdata; - struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 1024, PBUF_POOL); - struct pbuf *q = p->next; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - /* alloc big enough to get a chain of pbufs */ - fail_if(p->tot_len == p->len); - memset(p->payload, 0, p->len); - memset(q->payload, 0, q->len); - - /* put byte at the beginning of second pbuf */ - pbuf_put_at(p, p->len, testdata); - - out = (u8_t *)q->payload; - fail_unless(*out == testdata, - "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len, *out, testdata); - - getdata = pbuf_get_at(p, p->len); - fail_unless(*out == getdata, - "pbuf_get_at() returned bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len, getdata, *out); - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *pbuf_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_alloc_zero_pbufs), - TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_copy_zero_pbuf), - TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_split_64k_on_small_pbufs), - TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_queueing_bigger_than_64k), - TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_take_at_edge), - TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_get_put_at_edge) - }; - return create_suite("PBUF", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), pbuf_setup, pbuf_teardown); -} +#include "test_pbuf.h" + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" + +#if !LWIP_STATS || !MEM_STATS || !MEMP_STATS +#error "This tests needs MEM- and MEMP-statistics enabled" +#endif +#if LWIP_DNS +#error "This test needs DNS turned off (as it mallocs on init)" +#endif +#if !LWIP_TCP || !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ || !LWIP_WND_SCALE +#error "This test needs TCP OOSEQ queueing and window scaling enabled" +#endif + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static void pbuf_setup(void) +{ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void pbuf_teardown(void) +{ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +#define TESTBUFSIZE_1 65535 +#define TESTBUFSIZE_2 65530 +#define TESTBUFSIZE_3 50050 +static u8_t testbuf_1[TESTBUFSIZE_1]; +static u8_t testbuf_1a[TESTBUFSIZE_1]; +static u8_t testbuf_2[TESTBUFSIZE_2]; +static u8_t testbuf_2a[TESTBUFSIZE_2]; +static u8_t testbuf_3[TESTBUFSIZE_3]; +static u8_t testbuf_3a[TESTBUFSIZE_3]; + +/* Test functions */ +START_TEST(test_pbuf_alloc_zero_pbufs) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_ROM); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_RAM); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_REF); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 0, PBUF_POOL); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } +} +END_TEST + +/** Call pbuf_copy on a pbuf with zero length */ START_TEST(test_pbuf_copy_zero_pbuf) +{ + struct pbuf *p1, *p2, *p3; + err_t err; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_PBUF_POOL) == 0); + + p1 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 1024, PBUF_RAM); + fail_unless(p1 != NULL); + fail_unless(p1->ref == 1); + + p2 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 2, PBUF_POOL); + fail_unless(p2 != NULL); + fail_unless(p2->ref == 1); + p2->len = p2->tot_len = 0; + + pbuf_cat(p1, p2); + fail_unless(p1->ref == 1); + fail_unless(p2->ref == 1); + + p3 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, p1->tot_len, PBUF_POOL); + err = pbuf_copy(p3, p1); + fail_unless(err == ERR_VAL); + + pbuf_free(p1); + pbuf_free(p3); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_PBUF_POOL) == 0); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_pbuf_split_64k_on_small_pbufs) +{ + struct pbuf *p, *rest = NULL; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 1, PBUF_POOL); + pbuf_split_64k(p, &rest); + fail_unless(p->tot_len == 1); + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_pbuf_queueing_bigger_than_64k) +{ + int i; + err_t err; + struct pbuf *p1, *p2, *p3, *rest2 = NULL, *rest3 = NULL; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + for (i = 0; i < TESTBUFSIZE_1; i++) { + testbuf_1[i] = (u8_t)rand(); + } + + for (i = 0; i < TESTBUFSIZE_2; i++) { + testbuf_2[i] = (u8_t)rand(); + } + + for (i = 0; i < TESTBUFSIZE_3; i++) { + testbuf_3[i] = (u8_t)rand(); + } + + p1 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, TESTBUFSIZE_1, PBUF_POOL); + fail_unless(p1 != NULL); + p2 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, TESTBUFSIZE_2, PBUF_POOL); + fail_unless(p2 != NULL); + p3 = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, TESTBUFSIZE_3, PBUF_POOL); + fail_unless(p3 != NULL); + err = pbuf_take(p1, testbuf_1, TESTBUFSIZE_1); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + err = pbuf_take(p2, testbuf_2, TESTBUFSIZE_2); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + err = pbuf_take(p3, testbuf_3, TESTBUFSIZE_3); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + + pbuf_cat(p1, p2); + pbuf_cat(p1, p3); + + pbuf_split_64k(p1, &rest2); + fail_unless(p1->tot_len == TESTBUFSIZE_1); + fail_unless(rest2->tot_len == (u16_t)((TESTBUFSIZE_2 + TESTBUFSIZE_3) & 0xFFFF)); + pbuf_split_64k(rest2, &rest3); + fail_unless(rest2->tot_len == TESTBUFSIZE_2); + fail_unless(rest3->tot_len == TESTBUFSIZE_3); + + pbuf_copy_partial(p1, testbuf_1a, TESTBUFSIZE_1, 0); + pbuf_copy_partial(rest2, testbuf_2a, TESTBUFSIZE_2, 0); + pbuf_copy_partial(rest3, testbuf_3a, TESTBUFSIZE_3, 0); + fail_if(memcmp(testbuf_1, testbuf_1a, TESTBUFSIZE_1)); + fail_if(memcmp(testbuf_2, testbuf_2a, TESTBUFSIZE_2)); + fail_if(memcmp(testbuf_3, testbuf_3a, TESTBUFSIZE_3)); + + pbuf_free(p1); + pbuf_free(rest2); + pbuf_free(rest3); +} +END_TEST + +/* Test for bug that writing with pbuf_take_at() did nothing + * and returned ERR_OK when writing at beginning of a pbuf + * in the chain. + */ +START_TEST(test_pbuf_take_at_edge) +{ + err_t res; + u8_t *out; + int i; + u8_t testdata[] = { 0x01, 0x08, 0x82, 0x02 }; + struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 1024, PBUF_POOL); + struct pbuf *q = p->next; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + /* alloc big enough to get a chain of pbufs */ + fail_if(p->tot_len == p->len); + memset(p->payload, 0, p->len); + memset(q->payload, 0, q->len); + + /* copy data to the beginning of first pbuf */ + res = pbuf_take_at(p, &testdata, sizeof(testdata), 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + out = (u8_t *)p->payload; + + for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(testdata); i++) { + fail_unless(out[i] == testdata[i], + "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", i, out[i], testdata[i]); + } + + /* copy data to the just before end of first pbuf */ + res = pbuf_take_at(p, &testdata, sizeof(testdata), p->len - 1); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + out = (u8_t *)p->payload; + fail_unless(out[p->len - 1] == testdata[0], + "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len - 1, out[p->len - 1], testdata[0]); + out = (u8_t *)q->payload; + + for (i = 1; i < (int)sizeof(testdata); i++) { + fail_unless(out[i - 1] == testdata[i], + "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len - 1 + i, out[i - 1], testdata[i]); + } + + /* copy data to the beginning of second pbuf */ + res = pbuf_take_at(p, &testdata, sizeof(testdata), p->len); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + out = (u8_t *)p->payload; + + for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(testdata); i++) { + fail_unless(out[i] == testdata[i], + "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len + i, out[i], testdata[i]); + } + + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST + +/* Verify pbuf_put_at()/pbuf_get_at() when using + * offsets equal to beginning of new pbuf in chain + */ +START_TEST(test_pbuf_get_put_at_edge) +{ + u8_t *out; + u8_t testdata = 0x01; + u8_t getdata; + struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, 1024, PBUF_POOL); + struct pbuf *q = p->next; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + /* alloc big enough to get a chain of pbufs */ + fail_if(p->tot_len == p->len); + memset(p->payload, 0, p->len); + memset(q->payload, 0, q->len); + + /* put byte at the beginning of second pbuf */ + pbuf_put_at(p, p->len, testdata); + + out = (u8_t *)q->payload; + fail_unless(*out == testdata, + "Bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len, *out, testdata); + + getdata = pbuf_get_at(p, p->len); + fail_unless(*out == getdata, + "pbuf_get_at() returned bad data at pos %d, was %02X, expected %02X", p->len, getdata, *out); + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *pbuf_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_alloc_zero_pbufs), + TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_copy_zero_pbuf), + TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_split_64k_on_small_pbufs), + TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_queueing_bigger_than_64k), + TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_take_at_edge), + TESTFUNC(test_pbuf_get_put_at_edge) + }; + return create_suite("PBUF", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), pbuf_setup, pbuf_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.h index c13083bd..da7730a4 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_pbuf.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_PBUF_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_PBUF_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *pbuf_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_PBUF_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_PBUF_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *pbuf_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.c index 41e3f00d..1c0cd230 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.c @@ -1,222 +1,222 @@ -#include "test_timers.h" - -#include "lwip/def.h" -#include "lwip/timeouts.h" -#include "arch/sys_arch.h" - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static struct sys_timeo *old_list_head; - -static void timers_setup(void) -{ - struct sys_timeo **list_head = sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(); - old_list_head = *list_head; - *list_head = NULL; -} - -static void timers_teardown(void) -{ - struct sys_timeo **list_head = sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(); - *list_head = old_list_head; - lwip_sys_now = 0; -} - -static int fired[3]; -static void dummy_handler(void *arg) -{ - int index = LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(int, arg); - fired[index] = 1; -} - -#define HANDLER_EXECUTION_TIME 5 -static int cyclic_fired; -static void dummy_cyclic_handler(void) -{ - cyclic_fired = 1; - lwip_sys_now += HANDLER_EXECUTION_TIME; -} - -struct lwip_cyclic_timer test_cyclic = { 10, dummy_cyclic_handler }; - -static void do_test_cyclic_timers(u32_t offset) -{ - struct sys_timeo **list_head = sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(); - - /* verify normal timer expiration */ - lwip_sys_now = offset + 0; - sys_timeout(test_cyclic.interval_ms, lwip_cyclic_timer, &test_cyclic); - - cyclic_fired = 0; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(cyclic_fired == 0); - - lwip_sys_now = offset + test_cyclic.interval_ms; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(cyclic_fired == 1); - - fail_unless((*list_head)->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + test_cyclic.interval_ms - HANDLER_EXECUTION_TIME)); - - sys_untimeout(lwip_cyclic_timer, &test_cyclic); - - /* verify "overload" - next cyclic timer execution is already overdue twice */ - lwip_sys_now = offset + 0; - sys_timeout(test_cyclic.interval_ms, lwip_cyclic_timer, &test_cyclic); - - cyclic_fired = 0; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(cyclic_fired == 0); - - lwip_sys_now = offset + 2 * test_cyclic.interval_ms; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(cyclic_fired == 1); - - fail_unless((*list_head)->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + test_cyclic.interval_ms)); -} - -START_TEST(test_cyclic_timers) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* check without u32_t wraparound */ - do_test_cyclic_timers(0); - - /* check with u32_t wraparound */ - do_test_cyclic_timers(0xfffffff0); -} -END_TEST - -/* reproduce bug #52748: the bug in timeouts.c */ START_TEST(test_bug52748) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&fired, 0, sizeof(fired)); - - lwip_sys_now = 50; - sys_timeout(20, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); - sys_timeout(5, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 2)); - - lwip_sys_now = 55; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); - fail_unless(fired[1] == 0); - fail_unless(fired[2] == 1); - - lwip_sys_now = 60; - sys_timeout(10, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 1)); - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); - fail_unless(fired[1] == 0); - fail_unless(fired[2] == 1); - - lwip_sys_now = 70; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[0] == 1); - fail_unless(fired[1] == 1); - fail_unless(fired[2] == 1); -} -END_TEST - -static void do_test_timers(u32_t offset) -{ - struct sys_timeo **list_head = sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(); - - lwip_sys_now = offset + 0; - - sys_timeout(10, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); - fail_unless(sys_timeouts_sleeptime() == 10); - sys_timeout(20, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 1)); - fail_unless(sys_timeouts_sleeptime() == 10); - sys_timeout(5, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 2)); - fail_unless(sys_timeouts_sleeptime() == 5); - - /* linked list correctly sorted? */ - fail_unless((*list_head)->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + 5)); - fail_unless((*list_head)->next->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + 10)); - fail_unless((*list_head)->next->next->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + 20)); - - /* check timers expire in correct order */ - memset(&fired, 0, sizeof(fired)); - - lwip_sys_now += 4; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[2] == 0); - - lwip_sys_now += 1; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[2] == 1); - - lwip_sys_now += 4; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); - - lwip_sys_now += 1; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[0] == 1); - - lwip_sys_now += 9; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[1] == 0); - - lwip_sys_now += 1; - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[1] == 1); - - sys_untimeout(dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); - sys_untimeout(dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 1)); - sys_untimeout(dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 2)); -} - -START_TEST(test_timers) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* check without u32_t wraparound */ - do_test_timers(0); - - /* check with u32_t wraparound */ - do_test_timers(0xfffffff0); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_long_timer) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&fired, 0, sizeof(fired)); - lwip_sys_now = 0; - - sys_timeout(LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 4, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); - fail_unless(sys_timeouts_sleeptime() == LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 4); - - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); - - lwip_sys_now += LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 8; - - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); - - lwip_sys_now += LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 8; - - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); - - lwip_sys_now += 1; - - sys_check_timeouts(); - fail_unless(fired[0] == 1); - - sys_untimeout(dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *timers_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_bug52748), - TESTFUNC(test_cyclic_timers), - TESTFUNC(test_timers), - TESTFUNC(test_long_timer), - }; - return create_suite("TIMERS", tests, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tests), timers_setup, timers_teardown); -} +#include "test_timers.h" + +#include "lwip/def.h" +#include "lwip/timeouts.h" +#include "arch/sys_arch.h" + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static struct sys_timeo *old_list_head; + +static void timers_setup(void) +{ + struct sys_timeo **list_head = sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(); + old_list_head = *list_head; + *list_head = NULL; +} + +static void timers_teardown(void) +{ + struct sys_timeo **list_head = sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(); + *list_head = old_list_head; + lwip_sys_now = 0; +} + +static int fired[3]; +static void dummy_handler(void *arg) +{ + int index = LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(int, arg); + fired[index] = 1; +} + +#define HANDLER_EXECUTION_TIME 5 +static int cyclic_fired; +static void dummy_cyclic_handler(void) +{ + cyclic_fired = 1; + lwip_sys_now += HANDLER_EXECUTION_TIME; +} + +struct lwip_cyclic_timer test_cyclic = { 10, dummy_cyclic_handler }; + +static void do_test_cyclic_timers(u32_t offset) +{ + struct sys_timeo **list_head = sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(); + + /* verify normal timer expiration */ + lwip_sys_now = offset + 0; + sys_timeout(test_cyclic.interval_ms, lwip_cyclic_timer, &test_cyclic); + + cyclic_fired = 0; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(cyclic_fired == 0); + + lwip_sys_now = offset + test_cyclic.interval_ms; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(cyclic_fired == 1); + + fail_unless((*list_head)->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + test_cyclic.interval_ms - HANDLER_EXECUTION_TIME)); + + sys_untimeout(lwip_cyclic_timer, &test_cyclic); + + /* verify "overload" - next cyclic timer execution is already overdue twice */ + lwip_sys_now = offset + 0; + sys_timeout(test_cyclic.interval_ms, lwip_cyclic_timer, &test_cyclic); + + cyclic_fired = 0; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(cyclic_fired == 0); + + lwip_sys_now = offset + 2 * test_cyclic.interval_ms; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(cyclic_fired == 1); + + fail_unless((*list_head)->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + test_cyclic.interval_ms)); +} + +START_TEST(test_cyclic_timers) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* check without u32_t wraparound */ + do_test_cyclic_timers(0); + + /* check with u32_t wraparound */ + do_test_cyclic_timers(0xfffffff0); +} +END_TEST + +/* reproduce bug #52748: the bug in timeouts.c */ START_TEST(test_bug52748) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&fired, 0, sizeof(fired)); + + lwip_sys_now = 50; + sys_timeout(20, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); + sys_timeout(5, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 2)); + + lwip_sys_now = 55; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); + fail_unless(fired[1] == 0); + fail_unless(fired[2] == 1); + + lwip_sys_now = 60; + sys_timeout(10, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 1)); + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); + fail_unless(fired[1] == 0); + fail_unless(fired[2] == 1); + + lwip_sys_now = 70; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[0] == 1); + fail_unless(fired[1] == 1); + fail_unless(fired[2] == 1); +} +END_TEST + +static void do_test_timers(u32_t offset) +{ + struct sys_timeo **list_head = sys_timeouts_get_next_timeout(); + + lwip_sys_now = offset + 0; + + sys_timeout(10, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); + fail_unless(sys_timeouts_sleeptime() == 10); + sys_timeout(20, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 1)); + fail_unless(sys_timeouts_sleeptime() == 10); + sys_timeout(5, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 2)); + fail_unless(sys_timeouts_sleeptime() == 5); + + /* linked list correctly sorted? */ + fail_unless((*list_head)->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + 5)); + fail_unless((*list_head)->next->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + 10)); + fail_unless((*list_head)->next->next->time == (u32_t)(lwip_sys_now + 20)); + + /* check timers expire in correct order */ + memset(&fired, 0, sizeof(fired)); + + lwip_sys_now += 4; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[2] == 0); + + lwip_sys_now += 1; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[2] == 1); + + lwip_sys_now += 4; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); + + lwip_sys_now += 1; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[0] == 1); + + lwip_sys_now += 9; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[1] == 0); + + lwip_sys_now += 1; + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[1] == 1); + + sys_untimeout(dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); + sys_untimeout(dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 1)); + sys_untimeout(dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 2)); +} + +START_TEST(test_timers) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* check without u32_t wraparound */ + do_test_timers(0); + + /* check with u32_t wraparound */ + do_test_timers(0xfffffff0); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_long_timer) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&fired, 0, sizeof(fired)); + lwip_sys_now = 0; + + sys_timeout(LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 4, dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); + fail_unless(sys_timeouts_sleeptime() == LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 4); + + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); + + lwip_sys_now += LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 8; + + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); + + lwip_sys_now += LWIP_UINT32_MAX / 8; + + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[0] == 0); + + lwip_sys_now += 1; + + sys_check_timeouts(); + fail_unless(fired[0] == 1); + + sys_untimeout(dummy_handler, LWIP_PTR_NUMERIC_CAST(void *, 0)); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *timers_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_bug52748), + TESTFUNC(test_cyclic_timers), + TESTFUNC(test_timers), + TESTFUNC(test_long_timer), + }; + return create_suite("TIMERS", tests, LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tests), timers_setup, timers_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.h similarity index 94% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.h index 55b903f7..b16ab75b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/core/test_timers.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_TIMERS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_TIMERS_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *timers_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_TIMERS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_TIMERS_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *timers_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.c index 8661449b..2bffcdcb 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.c @@ -1,1077 +1,1077 @@ -#include "test_dhcp.h" - -#include "lwip/netif.h" -#include "lwip/dhcp.h" -#include "lwip/prot/dhcp.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "netif/ethernet.h" - -struct netif net_test; - -static const u8_t broadcast[6] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; - -static const u8_t magic_cookie[] = { 0x63, 0x82, 0x53, 0x63 }; - -static u8_t dhcp_offer[] = { - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, /* To unit */ - 0x00, 0x0F, 0xEE, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x22, /* From Remote host */ - 0x08, 0x00, /* Protocol: IP */ - 0x45, 0x10, 0x01, 0x48, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x36, 0xcc, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* IP header */ - 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x34, 0x00, 0x00, /* UDP header */ - - 0x02, /* Type == Boot reply */ - 0x01, 0x06, /* Hw Ethernet, 6 bytes addrlen */ - 0x00, /* 0 hops */ - 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, /* Transaction id, will be overwritten */ - 0x00, 0x00, /* 0 seconds elapsed */ - 0x00, 0x00, /* Flags (unicast) */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Client ip */ - 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* Your IP */ - 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* DHCP server ip */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* relay agent */ - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* MAC addr + padding */ - - /* Empty server name and boot file name */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - - 0x63, 0x82, 0x53, 0x63, /* Magic cookie */ - 0x35, 0x01, 0x02, /* Message type: Offer */ - 0x36, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Server identifier (IP) */ - 0x33, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x78, /* Lease time 2 minutes */ - 0x03, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Router IP */ - 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* Subnet mask */ - 0xff, /* End option */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Padding */ -}; - -static u8_t dhcp_ack[] = { - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, /* To unit */ - 0x00, 0x0f, 0xEE, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x22, /* From remote host */ - 0x08, 0x00, /* Proto IP */ - 0x45, 0x10, 0x01, 0x48, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x36, 0xcc, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* IP header */ - 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x34, 0x00, 0x00, /* UDP header */ - 0x02, /* Bootp reply */ - 0x01, 0x06, /* Hw type Eth, len 6 */ - 0x00, /* 0 hops */ - 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, - 0x00, 0x00, /* 0 seconds elapsed */ - 0x00, 0x00, /* Flags (unicast) */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Client IP */ - 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* Your IP */ - 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* DHCP server IP */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Relay agent */ - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Macaddr + padding */ - - /* Empty server name and boot file name */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - - 0x63, 0x82, 0x53, 0x63, /* Magic cookie */ - 0x35, 0x01, 0x05, /* Dhcp message type ack */ - 0x36, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* DHCP server identifier */ - 0x33, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x78, /* Lease time 2 minutes */ - 0x03, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Router IP */ - 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* Netmask */ - 0xff, /* End marker */ - - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Padding */ -}; - -static const u8_t arpreply[] = { - 0x00, 0x23, 0xC1, 0xDE, 0xD0, 0x0D, /* dst mac */ - 0x00, 0x32, 0x44, 0x20, 0x01, 0x02, /* src mac */ - 0x08, 0x06, /* proto arp */ - 0x00, 0x01, /* hw eth */ - 0x08, 0x00, /* proto ip */ - 0x06, /* hw addr len 6 */ - 0x04, /* proto addr len 4 */ - 0x00, 0x02, /* arp reply */ - 0x00, 0x32, 0x44, 0x20, 0x01, 0x02, /* sender mac */ - 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* sender ip */ - 0x00, 0x23, 0xC1, 0xDE, 0xD0, 0x0D, /* target mac */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* target ip */ -}; - -static int txpacket; -static enum tcase { - TEST_LWIP_DHCP, - TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK, - TEST_LWIP_DHCP_RELAY, - TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK_NO_ENDMARKER, - TEST_LWIP_DHCP_INVALID_OVERLOAD, - TEST_NONE -} tcase; - -static int debug = 0; -static void setdebug(int a) -{ - debug = a; -} - -static int tick = 0; -static void tick_lwip(void) -{ - tick++; - - if (tick % 5 == 0) { - dhcp_fine_tmr(); - } - - if (tick % 600 == 0) { - dhcp_coarse_tmr(); - } -} - -static void send_pkt(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *data, size_t len) -{ - struct pbuf *p, *q; - LWIP_ASSERT("pkt too big", len <= 0xFFFF); - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)len, PBUF_POOL); - - if (debug) { - /* Dump data */ - u32_t i; - printf("RX data (len %d)", p->tot_len); - - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - printf(" %02X", data[i]); - } - - printf("\n"); - } - - fail_unless(p != NULL); - - for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - memcpy(q->payload, data, q->len); - data += q->len; - } - - netif->input(p, netif); -} - -static err_t lwip_tx_func(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); - -static err_t testif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - netif->name[0] = 'c'; - netif->name[1] = 'h'; - netif->output = etharp_output; - netif->linkoutput = lwip_tx_func; - netif->mtu = 1500; - netif->hwaddr_len = 6; - netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP; - - netif->hwaddr[0] = 0x00; - netif->hwaddr[1] = 0x23; - netif->hwaddr[2] = 0xC1; - netif->hwaddr[3] = 0xDE; - netif->hwaddr[4] = 0xD0; - netif->hwaddr[5] = 0x0D; - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void dhcp_setup(void) -{ - txpacket = 0; - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void dhcp_teardown(void) -{ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void check_pkt(struct pbuf *p, u32_t pos, const u8_t *mem, u32_t len) -{ - u8_t *data; - - fail_if((pos + len) > p->tot_len); - - while (pos > p->len && p->next) { - pos -= p->len; - p = p->next; - } - - fail_if(p == NULL); - fail_unless(pos + len <= p->len); /* All data we seek within same pbuf */ - - data = (u8_t *)p->payload; - fail_if(memcmp(&data[pos], mem, len), "data at pos %d, len %d in packet %d did not match", pos, len, txpacket); -} - -static void check_pkt_fuzzy(struct pbuf *p, u32_t startpos, const u8_t *mem, u32_t len) -{ - int found; - u32_t i; - u8_t *data; - - fail_if((startpos + len) > p->tot_len); - - while (startpos > p->len && p->next) { - startpos -= p->len; - p = p->next; - } - - fail_if(p == NULL); - fail_unless(startpos + len <= p->len); /* All data we seek within same pbuf */ - - found = 0; - data = (u8_t *)p->payload; - - for (i = startpos; i <= (p->len - len); i++) { - if (memcmp(&data[i], mem, len) == 0) { - found = 1; - break; - } - } - - fail_unless(found); -} - -static err_t lwip_tx_func(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - fail_unless(netif == &net_test); - txpacket++; - - if (debug) { - struct pbuf *pp = p; - /* Dump data */ - printf("TX data (pkt %d, len %d, tick %d)", txpacket, p->tot_len, tick); - - do { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < pp->len; i++) { - printf(" %02X", ((u8_t *)pp->payload)[i]); - } - - if (pp->next) { - pp = pp->next; - } - } while (pp->next); - - printf("\n"); - } - - switch (tcase) { - case TEST_LWIP_DHCP: - switch (txpacket) { - case 1: - case 2: { - const u8_t ipproto[] = { 0x08, 0x00 }; - const u8_t bootp_start[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00 }; /* bootp request, eth, hwaddr len 6, 0 hops */ - const u8_t ipaddrs[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; - - check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ - check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ - - check_pkt(p, 12, ipproto, sizeof(ipproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ - - check_pkt(p, 42, bootp_start, sizeof(bootp_start)); - - check_pkt(p, 53, ipaddrs, sizeof(ipaddrs)); - - check_pkt(p, 70, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* mac addr inside bootp */ - - check_pkt(p, 278, magic_cookie, sizeof(magic_cookie)); - - /* Check dchp message type, can be at different positions */ - if (txpacket == 1) { - u8_t dhcp_discover_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x01 }; - check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_discover_opt, sizeof(dhcp_discover_opt)); - } else if (txpacket == 2) { - u8_t dhcp_request_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x03 }; - u8_t requested_ipaddr[] = { 0x32, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8 }; /* Ask for offered IP */ - - check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_request_opt, sizeof(dhcp_request_opt)); - check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, requested_ipaddr, sizeof(requested_ipaddr)); - } - - break; - } - - case 3: - case 4: - case 5: { - const u8_t arpproto[] = { 0x08, 0x06 }; - - check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ - check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ - - check_pkt(p, 12, arpproto, sizeof(arpproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ - break; - } - - default: - fail(); - break; - } - - break; - - case TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK: { - const u8_t ipproto[] = { 0x08, 0x00 }; - const u8_t bootp_start[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00 }; /* bootp request, eth, hwaddr len 6, 0 hops */ - const u8_t ipaddrs[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; - const u8_t dhcp_nak_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x04 }; - const u8_t requested_ipaddr[] = { 0x32, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8 }; /* offered IP */ - - fail_unless(txpacket == 4); - check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ - check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ - - check_pkt(p, 12, ipproto, sizeof(ipproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ - - check_pkt(p, 42, bootp_start, sizeof(bootp_start)); - - check_pkt(p, 53, ipaddrs, sizeof(ipaddrs)); - - check_pkt(p, 70, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* mac addr inside bootp */ - - check_pkt(p, 278, magic_cookie, sizeof(magic_cookie)); - - check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_nak_opt, sizeof(dhcp_nak_opt)); /* NAK the ack */ - - check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, requested_ipaddr, sizeof(requested_ipaddr)); - break; - } - - case TEST_LWIP_DHCP_RELAY: - switch (txpacket) { - case 1: - case 2: { - const u8_t ipproto[] = { 0x08, 0x00 }; - const u8_t bootp_start[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00 }; /* bootp request, eth, hwaddr len 6, 0 hops */ - const u8_t ipaddrs[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; - - check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ - check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ - - check_pkt(p, 12, ipproto, sizeof(ipproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ - - check_pkt(p, 42, bootp_start, sizeof(bootp_start)); - - check_pkt(p, 53, ipaddrs, sizeof(ipaddrs)); - - check_pkt(p, 70, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* mac addr inside bootp */ - - check_pkt(p, 278, magic_cookie, sizeof(magic_cookie)); - - /* Check dchp message type, can be at different positions */ - if (txpacket == 1) { - u8_t dhcp_discover_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x01 }; - check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_discover_opt, sizeof(dhcp_discover_opt)); - } else if (txpacket == 2) { - u8_t dhcp_request_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x03 }; - u8_t requested_ipaddr[] = { 0x32, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05 }; /* Ask for offered IP */ - - check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_request_opt, sizeof(dhcp_request_opt)); - check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, requested_ipaddr, sizeof(requested_ipaddr)); - } - - break; - } - - case 3: - case 4: - case 5: - case 6: { - const u8_t arpproto[] = { 0x08, 0x06 }; - - check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ - check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ - - check_pkt(p, 12, arpproto, sizeof(arpproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ - break; - } - - case 7: { - const u8_t fake_arp[6] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xab }; - const u8_t ipproto[] = { 0x08, 0x00 }; - const u8_t bootp_start[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00 }; /* bootp request, eth, hwaddr len 6, 0 hops */ - const u8_t ipaddrs[] = { 0x00, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; - const u8_t dhcp_request_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x03 }; - - check_pkt(p, 0, fake_arp, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ - check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ - - check_pkt(p, 12, ipproto, sizeof(ipproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ - - check_pkt(p, 42, bootp_start, sizeof(bootp_start)); - - check_pkt(p, 53, ipaddrs, sizeof(ipaddrs)); - - check_pkt(p, 70, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* mac addr inside bootp */ - - check_pkt(p, 278, magic_cookie, sizeof(magic_cookie)); - - /* Check dchp message type, can be at different positions */ - check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_request_opt, sizeof(dhcp_request_opt)); - break; - } - - default: - fail(); - break; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -/* - * Test basic happy flow DHCP session. - * Validate that xid is checked. - */ -START_TEST(test_dhcp) -{ - ip4_addr_t addr; - ip4_addr_t netmask; - ip4_addr_t gw; - int i; - u32_t xid; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP; - setdebug(0); - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); - - netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); - netif_set_link_up(&net_test); - netif_set_up(&net_test); - - dhcp_start(&net_test); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ - xid = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ - memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); - - /* IP addresses should be zero */ - fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 1, "TX %d packets, expected 1", txpacket); /* Nothing more sent */ - xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); - memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 2, "TX %d packets, expected 2", txpacket); /* DHCP request sent */ - xid = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ - memcpy(&dhcp_ack[46], &xid, 4); - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_ack, sizeof(dhcp_ack)); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 2, "TX %d packets, still expected 2", txpacket); /* No more sent */ - xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ - memcpy(&dhcp_ack[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_ack, sizeof(dhcp_ack)); - - for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { - tick_lwip(); - } - - fail_unless(txpacket == 5, "TX %d packets, expected 5", txpacket); /* ARP requests sent */ - - /* Interface up */ - fail_unless(netif_is_up(&net_test)); - - /* Now it should have taken the IP */ - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 195, 170, 189, 200); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 255, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 195, 170, 189, 171); - fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - - tcase = TEST_NONE; - dhcp_stop(&net_test); - dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); - netif_remove(&net_test); -} -END_TEST - -/* - * Test that IP address is not taken and NAK is sent if someone - * replies to ARP requests for the offered address. - */ -START_TEST(test_dhcp_nak) -{ - ip4_addr_t addr; - ip4_addr_t netmask; - ip4_addr_t gw; - u32_t xid; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP; - setdebug(0); - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); - - netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); - netif_set_link_up(&net_test); - netif_set_up(&net_test); - - dhcp_start(&net_test); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ - xid = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ - memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); - - /* IP addresses should be zero */ - fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ - xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); - memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* DHCP request sent */ - xid = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ - memcpy(&dhcp_ack[46], &xid, 4); - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_ack, sizeof(dhcp_ack)); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* No more sent */ - xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ - memcpy(&dhcp_ack[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_ack, sizeof(dhcp_ack)); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 3); /* ARP request sent */ - - tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK; /* Switch testcase */ - - /* Send arp reply, mark offered IP as taken */ - send_pkt(&net_test, arpreply, sizeof(arpreply)); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 4); /* DHCP nak sent */ - - tcase = TEST_NONE; - dhcp_stop(&net_test); - dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); - netif_remove(&net_test); -} -END_TEST - -/* - * Test case based on captured data where - * replies are sent from a different IP than the - * one the client unicasted to. - */ -START_TEST(test_dhcp_relayed) -{ - u8_t relay_offer[] = { - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, - 0x00, 0x22, 0x93, 0x5a, 0xf7, 0x60, - 0x08, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, - 0x01, 0x38, 0xfd, 0x53, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x11, - 0x78, 0x46, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x02, 0x4f, 0x8a, - 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x24, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x51, 0x35, - 0xb6, 0xa0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x23, - 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x63, 0x82, - 0x53, 0x63, 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x00, - 0x03, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, - 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x00, 0xb4, 0x55, 0x08, 0x1f, 0xd1, - 0x1c, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0xff, 0x33, 0x04, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x54, 0x49, 0x35, 0x01, 0x02, 0x36, - 0x04, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0xff - }; - - u8_t relay_ack1[] = { - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x22, - 0x93, 0x5a, 0xf7, 0x60, 0x08, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, - 0x01, 0x38, 0xfd, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x11, - 0x78, 0x44, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x02, 0x4f, 0x8a, - 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x24, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x51, 0x35, - 0xb6, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x23, - 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x63, 0x82, - 0x53, 0x63, 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x00, - 0x03, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, - 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x00, 0xb4, 0x55, 0x08, 0x1f, 0xd1, - 0x1c, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0xff, 0x33, 0x04, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x54, 0x49, 0x35, 0x01, 0x05, 0x36, - 0x04, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0xff - }; - - u8_t relay_ack2[] = { - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, - 0x00, 0x22, 0x93, 0x5a, 0xf7, 0x60, - 0x08, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, - 0x01, 0x38, 0xfa, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x11, - 0x7b, 0x81, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x02, 0x4f, 0x8a, - 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x24, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x49, 0x8b, - 0x6e, 0xab, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x8a, - 0x33, 0x05, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x23, - 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x63, 0x82, - 0x53, 0x63, 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x00, - 0x03, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, - 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x00, 0xb4, 0x55, 0x08, 0x1f, 0xd1, - 0x1c, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0xff, 0x33, 0x04, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x54, 0x60, 0x35, 0x01, 0x05, 0x36, - 0x04, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0xff - }; - - const u8_t arp_resp[] = { - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, /* DEST */ - 0x00, 0x22, 0x93, 0x5a, 0xf7, 0x60, /* SRC */ - 0x08, 0x06, /* Type: ARP */ - 0x00, 0x01, /* HW: Ethernet */ - 0x08, 0x00, /* PROTO: IP */ - 0x06, /* HW size */ - 0x04, /* PROTO size */ - 0x00, 0x02, /* OPCODE: Reply */ - - 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xab, /* Target MAC */ - 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x01, /* Target IP */ - - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0x00, 0x06, 0x50, /* src mac */ - 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, /* src ip */ - - /* Padding follows.. */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 - }; - - ip4_addr_t addr; - ip4_addr_t netmask; - ip4_addr_t gw; - int i; - u32_t xid; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP_RELAY; - setdebug(0); - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); - - netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); - netif_set_link_up(&net_test); - netif_set_up(&net_test); - - dhcp_start(&net_test); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ - - /* IP addresses should be zero */ - fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ - xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); - memcpy(&relay_offer[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ - send_pkt(&net_test, relay_offer, sizeof(relay_offer)); - - /* request sent? */ - fail_unless(txpacket == 2, "txpkt = %d, should be 2", txpacket); - xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ - memcpy(&relay_ack1[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ - send_pkt(&net_test, relay_ack1, sizeof(relay_ack1)); - - for (i = 0; i < 25; i++) { - tick_lwip(); - } - - fail_unless(txpacket == 5, "txpkt should be 5, is %d", txpacket); /* ARP requests sent */ - - /* Interface up */ - fail_unless(netif_is_up(&net_test)); - - /* Now it should have taken the IP */ - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 79, 138, 51, 5); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 254, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 79, 138, 50, 1); - fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 5, "txpacket = %d", txpacket); - - for (i = 0; i < 108000 - 25; i++) { - tick_lwip(); - } - - fail_unless(netif_is_up(&net_test)); - fail_unless(txpacket == 6, "txpacket = %d", txpacket); - - /* We need to send arp response here.. */ - - send_pkt(&net_test, arp_resp, sizeof(arp_resp)); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 7, "txpacket = %d", txpacket); - fail_unless(netif_is_up(&net_test)); - - xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ - memcpy(&relay_ack2[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ - send_pkt(&net_test, relay_ack2, sizeof(relay_ack2)); - - for (i = 0; i < 100000; i++) { - tick_lwip(); - } - - fail_unless(txpacket == 7, "txpacket = %d", txpacket); - - tcase = TEST_NONE; - dhcp_stop(&net_test); - dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); - netif_remove(&net_test); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_dhcp_nak_no_endmarker) -{ - ip4_addr_t addr; - ip4_addr_t netmask; - ip4_addr_t gw; - - u8_t dhcp_nack_no_endmarker[] = { - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x54, 0x75, - 0xd0, 0x26, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x08, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, - 0x01, 0x15, 0x38, 0x86, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x11, - 0xc0, 0xa8, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x01, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x7a, 0xcb, - 0xba, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x23, - 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x63, 0x82, - 0x53, 0x63, 0x35, 0x01, 0x06, 0x36, 0x04, 0xc0, - 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0x31, 0xef, 0xad, 0x72, 0x31, - 0x43, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x30, 0x32, 0x35, 0x30, 0x43, - 0x52, 0x47, 0x44, 0x38, 0x35, 0x36, 0x3c, 0x08, - 0x4d, 0x53, 0x46, 0x54, 0x20, 0x35, 0x2e, 0x30, - 0x37, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x03, 0x06, 0x2c, 0x2e, - 0x2f, 0x1f, 0x21, 0x79, 0xf9, 0x2b, 0xfc, 0xff, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x71, - 0xf3, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x71, 0x2e, 0x01, 0x08, 0x03, - 0x04, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0xeb, 0x1e, - 0x44, 0xec, 0xeb, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x37, 0x0c, 0x01, - 0x0f, 0x03, 0x06, 0x2c, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x1f, 0x21, - 0x79, 0xf9, 0x2b, 0xff, 0x25, 0xc0, 0x09, 0xd6, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 - }; - u32_t xid; - struct dhcp *dhcp; - u8_t tries; - u16_t request_timeout; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK_NO_ENDMARKER; - setdebug(0); - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); - - netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); - netif_set_link_up(&net_test); - netif_set_up(&net_test); - - dhcp_start(&net_test); - dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ - xid = dhcp->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ - memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); - - /* IP addresses should be zero */ - fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ - xid = htonl(dhcp->xid); - memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); - - fail_unless(dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* No more sent */ - xid = htonl(dhcp->xid); /* xid updated */ - memcpy(&dhcp_nack_no_endmarker[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ - tries = dhcp->tries; - request_timeout = dhcp->request_timeout; - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_nack_no_endmarker, sizeof(dhcp_nack_no_endmarker)); - - /* NAK should be ignored */ - fail_unless(dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING); - fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* No more sent */ - fail_unless(xid == htonl(dhcp->xid)); - fail_unless(tries == dhcp->tries); - fail_unless(request_timeout == dhcp->request_timeout); - - tcase = TEST_NONE; - dhcp_stop(&net_test); - dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); - netif_remove(&net_test); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_dhcp_invalid_overload) -{ - u8_t dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[] = { - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, /* To unit */ - 0x00, 0x0F, 0xEE, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x22, /* From Remote host */ - 0x08, 0x00, /* Protocol: IP */ - 0x45, 0x10, 0x01, 0x48, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x36, 0xcc, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* IP header */ - 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x34, 0x00, 0x00, /* UDP header */ - - 0x02, /* Type == Boot reply */ - 0x01, 0x06, /* Hw Ethernet, 6 bytes addrlen */ - 0x00, /* 0 hops */ - 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, /* Transaction id, will be overwritten */ - 0x00, 0x00, /* 0 seconds elapsed */ - 0x00, 0x00, /* Flags (unicast) */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Client ip */ - 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* Your IP */ - 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* DHCP server ip */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* relay agent */ - 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* MAC addr + padding */ - - /* Empty server name */ - 0x34, 0x01, 0x02, 0xff, /* Overload: SNAME + END */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* Empty boot file name */ - 0x34, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, /* Overload FILE + END */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - - 0x63, 0x82, 0x53, 0x63, /* Magic cookie */ - 0x35, 0x01, 0x02, /* Message type: Offer */ - 0x36, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Server identifier (IP) */ - 0x33, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x78, /* Lease time 2 minutes */ - 0x03, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Router IP */ - 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* Subnet mask */ - 0x34, 0x01, 0x03, /* Overload: FILE + SNAME */ - 0xff, /* End option */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Padding */ - }; - ip4_addr_t addr; - ip4_addr_t netmask; - ip4_addr_t gw; - u32_t xid; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP_INVALID_OVERLOAD; - setdebug(0); - - IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); - - netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); - netif_set_link_up(&net_test); - netif_set_up(&net_test); - - dhcp_start(&net_test); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ - xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); - memcpy(&dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ - dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[311] = 3; - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer_invalid_overload, sizeof(dhcp_offer_invalid_overload)); - /* IP addresses should be zero */ - fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ - - dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[311] = 2; - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer_invalid_overload, sizeof(dhcp_offer_invalid_overload)); - /* IP addresses should be zero */ - fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ - - dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[311] = 1; - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer_invalid_overload, sizeof(dhcp_offer_invalid_overload)); - /* IP addresses should be zero */ - fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); - fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ - - dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[311] = 0; - send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer_invalid_overload, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); - - fail_unless(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING); - - fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* No more sent */ - xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ - - tcase = TEST_NONE; - dhcp_stop(&net_test); - dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); - netif_remove(&net_test); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *dhcp_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_dhcp), - TESTFUNC(test_dhcp_nak), - TESTFUNC(test_dhcp_relayed), - TESTFUNC(test_dhcp_nak_no_endmarker), - TESTFUNC(test_dhcp_invalid_overload) - }; - return create_suite("DHCP", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), dhcp_setup, dhcp_teardown); -} +#include "test_dhcp.h" + +#include "lwip/netif.h" +#include "lwip/dhcp.h" +#include "lwip/prot/dhcp.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "netif/ethernet.h" + +struct netif net_test; + +static const u8_t broadcast[6] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; + +static const u8_t magic_cookie[] = { 0x63, 0x82, 0x53, 0x63 }; + +static u8_t dhcp_offer[] = { + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, /* To unit */ + 0x00, 0x0F, 0xEE, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x22, /* From Remote host */ + 0x08, 0x00, /* Protocol: IP */ + 0x45, 0x10, 0x01, 0x48, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x36, 0xcc, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* IP header */ + 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x34, 0x00, 0x00, /* UDP header */ + + 0x02, /* Type == Boot reply */ + 0x01, 0x06, /* Hw Ethernet, 6 bytes addrlen */ + 0x00, /* 0 hops */ + 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, /* Transaction id, will be overwritten */ + 0x00, 0x00, /* 0 seconds elapsed */ + 0x00, 0x00, /* Flags (unicast) */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Client ip */ + 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* Your IP */ + 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* DHCP server ip */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* relay agent */ + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* MAC addr + padding */ + + /* Empty server name and boot file name */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + + 0x63, 0x82, 0x53, 0x63, /* Magic cookie */ + 0x35, 0x01, 0x02, /* Message type: Offer */ + 0x36, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Server identifier (IP) */ + 0x33, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x78, /* Lease time 2 minutes */ + 0x03, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Router IP */ + 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* Subnet mask */ + 0xff, /* End option */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Padding */ +}; + +static u8_t dhcp_ack[] = { + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, /* To unit */ + 0x00, 0x0f, 0xEE, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x22, /* From remote host */ + 0x08, 0x00, /* Proto IP */ + 0x45, 0x10, 0x01, 0x48, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x36, 0xcc, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* IP header */ + 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x34, 0x00, 0x00, /* UDP header */ + 0x02, /* Bootp reply */ + 0x01, 0x06, /* Hw type Eth, len 6 */ + 0x00, /* 0 hops */ + 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, + 0x00, 0x00, /* 0 seconds elapsed */ + 0x00, 0x00, /* Flags (unicast) */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Client IP */ + 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* Your IP */ + 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* DHCP server IP */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Relay agent */ + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Macaddr + padding */ + + /* Empty server name and boot file name */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + + 0x63, 0x82, 0x53, 0x63, /* Magic cookie */ + 0x35, 0x01, 0x05, /* Dhcp message type ack */ + 0x36, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* DHCP server identifier */ + 0x33, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x78, /* Lease time 2 minutes */ + 0x03, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Router IP */ + 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* Netmask */ + 0xff, /* End marker */ + + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Padding */ +}; + +static const u8_t arpreply[] = { + 0x00, 0x23, 0xC1, 0xDE, 0xD0, 0x0D, /* dst mac */ + 0x00, 0x32, 0x44, 0x20, 0x01, 0x02, /* src mac */ + 0x08, 0x06, /* proto arp */ + 0x00, 0x01, /* hw eth */ + 0x08, 0x00, /* proto ip */ + 0x06, /* hw addr len 6 */ + 0x04, /* proto addr len 4 */ + 0x00, 0x02, /* arp reply */ + 0x00, 0x32, 0x44, 0x20, 0x01, 0x02, /* sender mac */ + 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* sender ip */ + 0x00, 0x23, 0xC1, 0xDE, 0xD0, 0x0D, /* target mac */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* target ip */ +}; + +static int txpacket; +static enum tcase { + TEST_LWIP_DHCP, + TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK, + TEST_LWIP_DHCP_RELAY, + TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK_NO_ENDMARKER, + TEST_LWIP_DHCP_INVALID_OVERLOAD, + TEST_NONE +} tcase; + +static int debug = 0; +static void setdebug(int a) +{ + debug = a; +} + +static int tick = 0; +static void tick_lwip(void) +{ + tick++; + + if (tick % 5 == 0) { + dhcp_fine_tmr(); + } + + if (tick % 600 == 0) { + dhcp_coarse_tmr(); + } +} + +static void send_pkt(struct netif *netif, const u8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + struct pbuf *p, *q; + LWIP_ASSERT("pkt too big", len <= 0xFFFF); + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, (u16_t)len, PBUF_POOL); + + if (debug) { + /* Dump data */ + u32_t i; + printf("RX data (len %d)", p->tot_len); + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + printf(" %02X", data[i]); + } + + printf("\n"); + } + + fail_unless(p != NULL); + + for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + memcpy(q->payload, data, q->len); + data += q->len; + } + + netif->input(p, netif); +} + +static err_t lwip_tx_func(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p); + +static err_t testif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + netif->name[0] = 'c'; + netif->name[1] = 'h'; + netif->output = etharp_output; + netif->linkoutput = lwip_tx_func; + netif->mtu = 1500; + netif->hwaddr_len = 6; + netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP; + + netif->hwaddr[0] = 0x00; + netif->hwaddr[1] = 0x23; + netif->hwaddr[2] = 0xC1; + netif->hwaddr[3] = 0xDE; + netif->hwaddr[4] = 0xD0; + netif->hwaddr[5] = 0x0D; + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void dhcp_setup(void) +{ + txpacket = 0; + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void dhcp_teardown(void) +{ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void check_pkt(struct pbuf *p, u32_t pos, const u8_t *mem, u32_t len) +{ + u8_t *data; + + fail_if((pos + len) > p->tot_len); + + while (pos > p->len && p->next) { + pos -= p->len; + p = p->next; + } + + fail_if(p == NULL); + fail_unless(pos + len <= p->len); /* All data we seek within same pbuf */ + + data = (u8_t *)p->payload; + fail_if(memcmp(&data[pos], mem, len), "data at pos %d, len %d in packet %d did not match", pos, len, txpacket); +} + +static void check_pkt_fuzzy(struct pbuf *p, u32_t startpos, const u8_t *mem, u32_t len) +{ + int found; + u32_t i; + u8_t *data; + + fail_if((startpos + len) > p->tot_len); + + while (startpos > p->len && p->next) { + startpos -= p->len; + p = p->next; + } + + fail_if(p == NULL); + fail_unless(startpos + len <= p->len); /* All data we seek within same pbuf */ + + found = 0; + data = (u8_t *)p->payload; + + for (i = startpos; i <= (p->len - len); i++) { + if (memcmp(&data[i], mem, len) == 0) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + + fail_unless(found); +} + +static err_t lwip_tx_func(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + fail_unless(netif == &net_test); + txpacket++; + + if (debug) { + struct pbuf *pp = p; + /* Dump data */ + printf("TX data (pkt %d, len %d, tick %d)", txpacket, p->tot_len, tick); + + do { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < pp->len; i++) { + printf(" %02X", ((u8_t *)pp->payload)[i]); + } + + if (pp->next) { + pp = pp->next; + } + } while (pp->next); + + printf("\n"); + } + + switch (tcase) { + case TEST_LWIP_DHCP: + switch (txpacket) { + case 1: + case 2: { + const u8_t ipproto[] = { 0x08, 0x00 }; + const u8_t bootp_start[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00 }; /* bootp request, eth, hwaddr len 6, 0 hops */ + const u8_t ipaddrs[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + + check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ + check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ + + check_pkt(p, 12, ipproto, sizeof(ipproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ + + check_pkt(p, 42, bootp_start, sizeof(bootp_start)); + + check_pkt(p, 53, ipaddrs, sizeof(ipaddrs)); + + check_pkt(p, 70, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* mac addr inside bootp */ + + check_pkt(p, 278, magic_cookie, sizeof(magic_cookie)); + + /* Check dchp message type, can be at different positions */ + if (txpacket == 1) { + u8_t dhcp_discover_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x01 }; + check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_discover_opt, sizeof(dhcp_discover_opt)); + } else if (txpacket == 2) { + u8_t dhcp_request_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x03 }; + u8_t requested_ipaddr[] = { 0x32, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8 }; /* Ask for offered IP */ + + check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_request_opt, sizeof(dhcp_request_opt)); + check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, requested_ipaddr, sizeof(requested_ipaddr)); + } + + break; + } + + case 3: + case 4: + case 5: { + const u8_t arpproto[] = { 0x08, 0x06 }; + + check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ + check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ + + check_pkt(p, 12, arpproto, sizeof(arpproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ + break; + } + + default: + fail(); + break; + } + + break; + + case TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK: { + const u8_t ipproto[] = { 0x08, 0x00 }; + const u8_t bootp_start[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00 }; /* bootp request, eth, hwaddr len 6, 0 hops */ + const u8_t ipaddrs[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + const u8_t dhcp_nak_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x04 }; + const u8_t requested_ipaddr[] = { 0x32, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8 }; /* offered IP */ + + fail_unless(txpacket == 4); + check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ + check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ + + check_pkt(p, 12, ipproto, sizeof(ipproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ + + check_pkt(p, 42, bootp_start, sizeof(bootp_start)); + + check_pkt(p, 53, ipaddrs, sizeof(ipaddrs)); + + check_pkt(p, 70, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* mac addr inside bootp */ + + check_pkt(p, 278, magic_cookie, sizeof(magic_cookie)); + + check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_nak_opt, sizeof(dhcp_nak_opt)); /* NAK the ack */ + + check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, requested_ipaddr, sizeof(requested_ipaddr)); + break; + } + + case TEST_LWIP_DHCP_RELAY: + switch (txpacket) { + case 1: + case 2: { + const u8_t ipproto[] = { 0x08, 0x00 }; + const u8_t bootp_start[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00 }; /* bootp request, eth, hwaddr len 6, 0 hops */ + const u8_t ipaddrs[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + + check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ + check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ + + check_pkt(p, 12, ipproto, sizeof(ipproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ + + check_pkt(p, 42, bootp_start, sizeof(bootp_start)); + + check_pkt(p, 53, ipaddrs, sizeof(ipaddrs)); + + check_pkt(p, 70, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* mac addr inside bootp */ + + check_pkt(p, 278, magic_cookie, sizeof(magic_cookie)); + + /* Check dchp message type, can be at different positions */ + if (txpacket == 1) { + u8_t dhcp_discover_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x01 }; + check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_discover_opt, sizeof(dhcp_discover_opt)); + } else if (txpacket == 2) { + u8_t dhcp_request_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x03 }; + u8_t requested_ipaddr[] = { 0x32, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05 }; /* Ask for offered IP */ + + check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_request_opt, sizeof(dhcp_request_opt)); + check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, requested_ipaddr, sizeof(requested_ipaddr)); + } + + break; + } + + case 3: + case 4: + case 5: + case 6: { + const u8_t arpproto[] = { 0x08, 0x06 }; + + check_pkt(p, 0, broadcast, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ + check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ + + check_pkt(p, 12, arpproto, sizeof(arpproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ + break; + } + + case 7: { + const u8_t fake_arp[6] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xab }; + const u8_t ipproto[] = { 0x08, 0x00 }; + const u8_t bootp_start[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00 }; /* bootp request, eth, hwaddr len 6, 0 hops */ + const u8_t ipaddrs[] = { 0x00, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + const u8_t dhcp_request_opt[] = { 0x35, 0x01, 0x03 }; + + check_pkt(p, 0, fake_arp, 6); /* eth level dest: broadcast */ + check_pkt(p, 6, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* eth level src: unit mac */ + + check_pkt(p, 12, ipproto, sizeof(ipproto)); /* eth level proto: ip */ + + check_pkt(p, 42, bootp_start, sizeof(bootp_start)); + + check_pkt(p, 53, ipaddrs, sizeof(ipaddrs)); + + check_pkt(p, 70, netif->hwaddr, 6); /* mac addr inside bootp */ + + check_pkt(p, 278, magic_cookie, sizeof(magic_cookie)); + + /* Check dchp message type, can be at different positions */ + check_pkt_fuzzy(p, 282, dhcp_request_opt, sizeof(dhcp_request_opt)); + break; + } + + default: + fail(); + break; + } + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +/* + * Test basic happy flow DHCP session. + * Validate that xid is checked. + */ +START_TEST(test_dhcp) +{ + ip4_addr_t addr; + ip4_addr_t netmask; + ip4_addr_t gw; + int i; + u32_t xid; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP; + setdebug(0); + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); + netif_set_link_up(&net_test); + netif_set_up(&net_test); + + dhcp_start(&net_test); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ + xid = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ + memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); + + /* IP addresses should be zero */ + fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 1, "TX %d packets, expected 1", txpacket); /* Nothing more sent */ + xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); + memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 2, "TX %d packets, expected 2", txpacket); /* DHCP request sent */ + xid = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ + memcpy(&dhcp_ack[46], &xid, 4); + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_ack, sizeof(dhcp_ack)); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 2, "TX %d packets, still expected 2", txpacket); /* No more sent */ + xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ + memcpy(&dhcp_ack[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_ack, sizeof(dhcp_ack)); + + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + tick_lwip(); + } + + fail_unless(txpacket == 5, "TX %d packets, expected 5", txpacket); /* ARP requests sent */ + + /* Interface up */ + fail_unless(netif_is_up(&net_test)); + + /* Now it should have taken the IP */ + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 195, 170, 189, 200); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 255, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 195, 170, 189, 171); + fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + + tcase = TEST_NONE; + dhcp_stop(&net_test); + dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); + netif_remove(&net_test); +} +END_TEST + +/* + * Test that IP address is not taken and NAK is sent if someone + * replies to ARP requests for the offered address. + */ +START_TEST(test_dhcp_nak) +{ + ip4_addr_t addr; + ip4_addr_t netmask; + ip4_addr_t gw; + u32_t xid; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP; + setdebug(0); + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); + netif_set_link_up(&net_test); + netif_set_up(&net_test); + + dhcp_start(&net_test); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ + xid = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ + memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); + + /* IP addresses should be zero */ + fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ + xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); + memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* DHCP request sent */ + xid = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ + memcpy(&dhcp_ack[46], &xid, 4); + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_ack, sizeof(dhcp_ack)); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* No more sent */ + xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ + memcpy(&dhcp_ack[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_ack, sizeof(dhcp_ack)); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 3); /* ARP request sent */ + + tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK; /* Switch testcase */ + + /* Send arp reply, mark offered IP as taken */ + send_pkt(&net_test, arpreply, sizeof(arpreply)); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 4); /* DHCP nak sent */ + + tcase = TEST_NONE; + dhcp_stop(&net_test); + dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); + netif_remove(&net_test); +} +END_TEST + +/* + * Test case based on captured data where + * replies are sent from a different IP than the + * one the client unicasted to. + */ +START_TEST(test_dhcp_relayed) +{ + u8_t relay_offer[] = { + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, + 0x00, 0x22, 0x93, 0x5a, 0xf7, 0x60, + 0x08, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x38, 0xfd, 0x53, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x11, + 0x78, 0x46, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x02, 0x4f, 0x8a, + 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x24, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x51, 0x35, + 0xb6, 0xa0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x23, + 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x63, 0x82, + 0x53, 0x63, 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x00, + 0x03, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, + 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x00, 0xb4, 0x55, 0x08, 0x1f, 0xd1, + 0x1c, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0xff, 0x33, 0x04, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x54, 0x49, 0x35, 0x01, 0x02, 0x36, + 0x04, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0xff + }; + + u8_t relay_ack1[] = { + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x22, + 0x93, 0x5a, 0xf7, 0x60, 0x08, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x38, 0xfd, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x11, + 0x78, 0x44, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x02, 0x4f, 0x8a, + 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x24, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x51, 0x35, + 0xb6, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x23, + 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x63, 0x82, + 0x53, 0x63, 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x00, + 0x03, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, + 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x00, 0xb4, 0x55, 0x08, 0x1f, 0xd1, + 0x1c, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0xff, 0x33, 0x04, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x54, 0x49, 0x35, 0x01, 0x05, 0x36, + 0x04, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0xff + }; + + u8_t relay_ack2[] = { + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, + 0x00, 0x22, 0x93, 0x5a, 0xf7, 0x60, + 0x08, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x38, 0xfa, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x11, + 0x7b, 0x81, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x02, 0x4f, 0x8a, + 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x24, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x49, 0x8b, + 0x6e, 0xab, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x8a, + 0x33, 0x05, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x23, + 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x63, 0x82, + 0x53, 0x63, 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x00, + 0x03, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, + 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x00, 0xb4, 0x55, 0x08, 0x1f, 0xd1, + 0x1c, 0x04, 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0xff, 0x33, 0x04, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x54, 0x60, 0x35, 0x01, 0x05, 0x36, + 0x04, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x01, 0xff + }; + + const u8_t arp_resp[] = { + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, /* DEST */ + 0x00, 0x22, 0x93, 0x5a, 0xf7, 0x60, /* SRC */ + 0x08, 0x06, /* Type: ARP */ + 0x00, 0x01, /* HW: Ethernet */ + 0x08, 0x00, /* PROTO: IP */ + 0x06, /* HW size */ + 0x04, /* PROTO size */ + 0x00, 0x02, /* OPCODE: Reply */ + + 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xab, /* Target MAC */ + 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x01, /* Target IP */ + + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0x00, 0x06, 0x50, /* src mac */ + 0x4f, 0x8a, 0x33, 0x05, /* src ip */ + + /* Padding follows.. */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }; + + ip4_addr_t addr; + ip4_addr_t netmask; + ip4_addr_t gw; + int i; + u32_t xid; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP_RELAY; + setdebug(0); + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); + netif_set_link_up(&net_test); + netif_set_up(&net_test); + + dhcp_start(&net_test); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ + + /* IP addresses should be zero */ + fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ + xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); + memcpy(&relay_offer[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ + send_pkt(&net_test, relay_offer, sizeof(relay_offer)); + + /* request sent? */ + fail_unless(txpacket == 2, "txpkt = %d, should be 2", txpacket); + xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ + memcpy(&relay_ack1[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ + send_pkt(&net_test, relay_ack1, sizeof(relay_ack1)); + + for (i = 0; i < 25; i++) { + tick_lwip(); + } + + fail_unless(txpacket == 5, "txpkt should be 5, is %d", txpacket); /* ARP requests sent */ + + /* Interface up */ + fail_unless(netif_is_up(&net_test)); + + /* Now it should have taken the IP */ + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 79, 138, 51, 5); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 255, 255, 254, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 79, 138, 50, 1); + fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 5, "txpacket = %d", txpacket); + + for (i = 0; i < 108000 - 25; i++) { + tick_lwip(); + } + + fail_unless(netif_is_up(&net_test)); + fail_unless(txpacket == 6, "txpacket = %d", txpacket); + + /* We need to send arp response here.. */ + + send_pkt(&net_test, arp_resp, sizeof(arp_resp)); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 7, "txpacket = %d", txpacket); + fail_unless(netif_is_up(&net_test)); + + xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ + memcpy(&relay_ack2[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ + send_pkt(&net_test, relay_ack2, sizeof(relay_ack2)); + + for (i = 0; i < 100000; i++) { + tick_lwip(); + } + + fail_unless(txpacket == 7, "txpacket = %d", txpacket); + + tcase = TEST_NONE; + dhcp_stop(&net_test); + dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); + netif_remove(&net_test); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_dhcp_nak_no_endmarker) +{ + ip4_addr_t addr; + ip4_addr_t netmask; + ip4_addr_t gw; + + u8_t dhcp_nack_no_endmarker[] = { + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x54, 0x75, + 0xd0, 0x26, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x08, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x15, 0x38, 0x86, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x11, + 0xc0, 0xa8, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0x7a, 0xcb, + 0xba, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x23, + 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x63, 0x82, + 0x53, 0x63, 0x35, 0x01, 0x06, 0x36, 0x04, 0xc0, + 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0x31, 0xef, 0xad, 0x72, 0x31, + 0x43, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x30, 0x32, 0x35, 0x30, 0x43, + 0x52, 0x47, 0x44, 0x38, 0x35, 0x36, 0x3c, 0x08, + 0x4d, 0x53, 0x46, 0x54, 0x20, 0x35, 0x2e, 0x30, + 0x37, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x03, 0x06, 0x2c, 0x2e, + 0x2f, 0x1f, 0x21, 0x79, 0xf9, 0x2b, 0xfc, 0xff, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x71, + 0xf3, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x71, 0x2e, 0x01, 0x08, 0x03, + 0x04, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0xeb, 0x1e, + 0x44, 0xec, 0xeb, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x37, 0x0c, 0x01, + 0x0f, 0x03, 0x06, 0x2c, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x1f, 0x21, + 0x79, 0xf9, 0x2b, 0xff, 0x25, 0xc0, 0x09, 0xd6, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }; + u32_t xid; + struct dhcp *dhcp; + u8_t tries; + u16_t request_timeout; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP_NAK_NO_ENDMARKER; + setdebug(0); + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); + netif_set_link_up(&net_test); + netif_set_up(&net_test); + + dhcp_start(&net_test); + dhcp = netif_dhcp_data(&net_test); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ + xid = dhcp->xid; /* Write bad xid, not using htonl! */ + memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); + + /* IP addresses should be zero */ + fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ + xid = htonl(dhcp->xid); + memcpy(&dhcp_offer[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); + + fail_unless(dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* No more sent */ + xid = htonl(dhcp->xid); /* xid updated */ + memcpy(&dhcp_nack_no_endmarker[46], &xid, 4); /* insert transaction id */ + tries = dhcp->tries; + request_timeout = dhcp->request_timeout; + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_nack_no_endmarker, sizeof(dhcp_nack_no_endmarker)); + + /* NAK should be ignored */ + fail_unless(dhcp->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING); + fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* No more sent */ + fail_unless(xid == htonl(dhcp->xid)); + fail_unless(tries == dhcp->tries); + fail_unless(request_timeout == dhcp->request_timeout); + + tcase = TEST_NONE; + dhcp_stop(&net_test); + dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); + netif_remove(&net_test); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_dhcp_invalid_overload) +{ + u8_t dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[] = { + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, /* To unit */ + 0x00, 0x0F, 0xEE, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x22, /* From Remote host */ + 0x08, 0x00, /* Protocol: IP */ + 0x45, 0x10, 0x01, 0x48, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x36, 0xcc, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* IP header */ + 0x00, 0x43, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x34, 0x00, 0x00, /* UDP header */ + + 0x02, /* Type == Boot reply */ + 0x01, 0x06, /* Hw Ethernet, 6 bytes addrlen */ + 0x00, /* 0 hops */ + 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, /* Transaction id, will be overwritten */ + 0x00, 0x00, /* 0 seconds elapsed */ + 0x00, 0x00, /* Flags (unicast) */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Client ip */ + 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xc8, /* Your IP */ + 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* DHCP server ip */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* relay agent */ + 0x00, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xde, 0xd0, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* MAC addr + padding */ + + /* Empty server name */ + 0x34, 0x01, 0x02, 0xff, /* Overload: SNAME + END */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + /* Empty boot file name */ + 0x34, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, /* Overload FILE + END */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + + 0x63, 0x82, 0x53, 0x63, /* Magic cookie */ + 0x35, 0x01, 0x02, /* Message type: Offer */ + 0x36, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Server identifier (IP) */ + 0x33, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x78, /* Lease time 2 minutes */ + 0x03, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xab, /* Router IP */ + 0x01, 0x04, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* Subnet mask */ + 0x34, 0x01, 0x03, /* Overload: FILE + SNAME */ + 0xff, /* End option */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Padding */ + }; + ip4_addr_t addr; + ip4_addr_t netmask; + ip4_addr_t gw; + u32_t xid; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + tcase = TEST_LWIP_DHCP_INVALID_OVERLOAD; + setdebug(0); + + IP4_ADDR(&addr, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&netmask, 0, 0, 0, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&gw, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + netif_add(&net_test, &addr, &netmask, &gw, &net_test, testif_init, ethernet_input); + netif_set_link_up(&net_test); + netif_set_up(&net_test); + + dhcp_start(&net_test); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* DHCP discover sent */ + xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); + memcpy(&dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[46], &xid, 4); /* insert correct transaction id */ + dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[311] = 3; + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer_invalid_overload, sizeof(dhcp_offer_invalid_overload)); + /* IP addresses should be zero */ + fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ + + dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[311] = 2; + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer_invalid_overload, sizeof(dhcp_offer_invalid_overload)); + /* IP addresses should be zero */ + fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ + + dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[311] = 1; + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer_invalid_overload, sizeof(dhcp_offer_invalid_overload)); + /* IP addresses should be zero */ + fail_if(memcmp(&addr, &net_test.ip_addr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&netmask, &net_test.netmask, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_if(memcmp(&gw, &net_test.gw, sizeof(ip4_addr_t))); + fail_unless(txpacket == 1); /* Nothing more sent */ + + dhcp_offer_invalid_overload[311] = 0; + send_pkt(&net_test, dhcp_offer_invalid_overload, sizeof(dhcp_offer)); + + fail_unless(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->state == DHCP_STATE_REQUESTING); + + fail_unless(txpacket == 2); /* No more sent */ + xid = htonl(netif_dhcp_data(&net_test)->xid); /* xid updated */ + + tcase = TEST_NONE; + dhcp_stop(&net_test); + dhcp_cleanup(&net_test); + netif_remove(&net_test); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *dhcp_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_dhcp), + TESTFUNC(test_dhcp_nak), + TESTFUNC(test_dhcp_relayed), + TESTFUNC(test_dhcp_nak_no_endmarker), + TESTFUNC(test_dhcp_invalid_overload) + }; + return create_suite("DHCP", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), dhcp_setup, dhcp_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.h index edcc01d7..0e982471 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/dhcp/test_dhcp.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_DHCP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_DHCP_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *dhcp_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_DHCP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_DHCP_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *dhcp_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.c index 5c04ba4e..b4412b08 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.c @@ -1,275 +1,275 @@ -#include "test_etharp.h" - -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/etharp.h" -#include "netif/ethernet.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" - -#if !LWIP_STATS || !UDP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS || !ETHARP_STATS -#error "This tests needs UDP-, MEMP- and ETHARP-statistics enabled" -#endif -#if !ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES -#error "This test needs ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES enabled" -#endif - -static struct netif test_netif; -static ip4_addr_t test_ipaddr, test_netmask, test_gw; -struct eth_addr test_ethaddr = { { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 } }; -struct eth_addr test_ethaddr2 = { { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2 } }; -struct eth_addr test_ethaddr3 = { { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3 } }; -struct eth_addr test_ethaddr4 = { { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4 } }; -static int linkoutput_ctr; - -/* Helper functions */ -static void etharp_remove_all(void) -{ - int i; - - /* call etharp_tmr often enough to have all entries cleaned */ - for (i = 0; i < 0xff; i++) { - etharp_tmr(); - } -} - -static err_t default_netif_linkoutput(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - fail_unless(netif == &test_netif); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - linkoutput_ctr++; - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t default_netif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - fail_unless(netif != NULL); - netif->linkoutput = default_netif_linkoutput; - netif->output = etharp_output; - netif->mtu = 1500; - netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; - netif->hwaddr_len = ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN; - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void default_netif_add(void) -{ - IP4_ADDR(&test_gw, 192, 168, 0, 1); - IP4_ADDR(&test_ipaddr, 192, 168, 0, 1); - IP4_ADDR(&test_netmask, 255, 255, 0, 0); - - fail_unless(netif_default == NULL); - netif_set_default(netif_add(&test_netif, &test_ipaddr, &test_netmask, - &test_gw, NULL, default_netif_init, NULL)); - netif_set_up(&test_netif); -} - -static void default_netif_remove(void) -{ - fail_unless(netif_default == &test_netif); - netif_remove(&test_netif); -} - -static void create_arp_response(ip4_addr_t *adr) -{ - int k; - struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; - struct etharp_hdr *etharphdr; - struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + sizeof(struct etharp_hdr), PBUF_RAM); - - if (p == NULL) { - FAIL_RET(); - } - - ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)p->payload; - etharphdr = (struct etharp_hdr *)(ethhdr + 1); - - ethhdr->dest = test_ethaddr; - ethhdr->src = test_ethaddr2; - ethhdr->type = htons(ETHTYPE_ARP); - - etharphdr->hwtype = htons(LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET); - etharphdr->proto = htons(ETHTYPE_IP); - etharphdr->hwlen = ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN; - etharphdr->protolen = sizeof(ip4_addr_t); - etharphdr->opcode = htons(ARP_REPLY); - - SMEMCPY(ðarphdr->sipaddr, adr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t)); - SMEMCPY(ðarphdr->dipaddr, &test_ipaddr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t)); - - k = 6; - - while (k > 0) { - k--; - /* Write the ARP MAC-Addresses */ - etharphdr->shwaddr.addr[k] = test_ethaddr2.addr[k]; - etharphdr->dhwaddr.addr[k] = test_ethaddr.addr[k]; - /* Write the Ethernet MAC-Addresses */ - ethhdr->dest.addr[k] = test_ethaddr.addr[k]; - ethhdr->src.addr[k] = test_ethaddr2.addr[k]; - } - - ethernet_input(p, &test_netif); -} - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static void etharp_setup(void) -{ - etharp_remove_all(); - default_netif_add(); - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void etharp_teardown(void) -{ - etharp_remove_all(); - default_netif_remove(); - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -/* Test functions */ - -START_TEST(test_etharp_table) -{ -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES - err_t err; -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - ssize_t idx; - const ip4_addr_t *unused_ipaddr; - struct eth_addr *unused_ethaddr; - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - if (netif_default != &test_netif) { - fail("This test needs a default netif"); - } - - linkoutput_ctr = 0; - - pcb = udp_new(); - fail_unless(pcb != NULL); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - ip4_addr_t adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 2]; - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 2; i++) { - IP4_ADDR(&adrs[i], 192, 168, 0, i + 2); - } - - /* fill ARP-table with dynamic entries */ - for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { - struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 10, PBUF_RAM); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - err_t err2; - ip_addr_t dst; - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dst, adrs[i]); - err2 = udp_sendto(pcb, p, &dst, 123); - fail_unless(err2 == ERR_OK); - /* etharp request sent? */ - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == (2 * i) + 1); - pbuf_free(p); - - /* create an ARP response */ - create_arp_response(&adrs[i]); - /* queued UDP packet sent? */ - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == (2 * i) + 2); - - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[i], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - fail_unless(idx == i); - etharp_tmr(); - } - } - - linkoutput_ctr = 0; -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES - /* create one static entry */ - err = etharp_add_static_entry(&adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &test_ethaddr3); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - fail_unless(idx == 0); - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - - linkoutput_ctr = 0; - - /* fill ARP-table with dynamic entries */ - for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { - struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 10, PBUF_RAM); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - err_t err2; - ip_addr_t dst; - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dst, adrs[i]); - err2 = udp_sendto(pcb, p, &dst, 123); - fail_unless(err2 == ERR_OK); - /* etharp request sent? */ - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == (2 * i) + 1); - pbuf_free(p); - - /* create an ARP response */ - create_arp_response(&adrs[i]); - /* queued UDP packet sent? */ - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == (2 * i) + 2); - - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[i], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - - if (i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE - 1) { - fail_unless(idx == i + 1); - } else { - /* the last entry must not overwrite the static entry! */ - fail_unless(idx == 1); - } - - etharp_tmr(); - } - } - -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES - /* create a second static entry */ - err = etharp_add_static_entry(&adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1], &test_ethaddr4); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - fail_unless(idx == 0); - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - fail_unless(idx == 2); - /* and remove it again */ - err = etharp_remove_static_entry(&adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1]); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - fail_unless(idx == 0); - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - fail_unless(idx == -1); -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - - /* check that static entries don't time out */ - etharp_remove_all(); - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - fail_unless(idx == 0); - -#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES - /* remove the first static entry */ - err = etharp_remove_static_entry(&adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE]); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - fail_unless(idx == -1); - idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); - fail_unless(idx == -1); -#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ - - udp_remove(pcb); - } -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *etharp_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_etharp_table) - }; - return create_suite("ETHARP", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), etharp_setup, etharp_teardown); -} +#include "test_etharp.h" + +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/etharp.h" +#include "netif/ethernet.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/prot/iana.h" + +#if !LWIP_STATS || !UDP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS || !ETHARP_STATS +#error "This tests needs UDP-, MEMP- and ETHARP-statistics enabled" +#endif +#if !ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES +#error "This test needs ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES enabled" +#endif + +static struct netif test_netif; +static ip4_addr_t test_ipaddr, test_netmask, test_gw; +struct eth_addr test_ethaddr = { { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 } }; +struct eth_addr test_ethaddr2 = { { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2 } }; +struct eth_addr test_ethaddr3 = { { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3 } }; +struct eth_addr test_ethaddr4 = { { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4 } }; +static int linkoutput_ctr; + +/* Helper functions */ +static void etharp_remove_all(void) +{ + int i; + + /* call etharp_tmr often enough to have all entries cleaned */ + for (i = 0; i < 0xff; i++) { + etharp_tmr(); + } +} + +static err_t default_netif_linkoutput(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + fail_unless(netif == &test_netif); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + linkoutput_ctr++; + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t default_netif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + fail_unless(netif != NULL); + netif->linkoutput = default_netif_linkoutput; + netif->output = etharp_output; + netif->mtu = 1500; + netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; + netif->hwaddr_len = ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN; + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void default_netif_add(void) +{ + IP4_ADDR(&test_gw, 192, 168, 0, 1); + IP4_ADDR(&test_ipaddr, 192, 168, 0, 1); + IP4_ADDR(&test_netmask, 255, 255, 0, 0); + + fail_unless(netif_default == NULL); + netif_set_default(netif_add(&test_netif, &test_ipaddr, &test_netmask, + &test_gw, NULL, default_netif_init, NULL)); + netif_set_up(&test_netif); +} + +static void default_netif_remove(void) +{ + fail_unless(netif_default == &test_netif); + netif_remove(&test_netif); +} + +static void create_arp_response(ip4_addr_t *adr) +{ + int k; + struct eth_hdr *ethhdr; + struct etharp_hdr *etharphdr; + struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + sizeof(struct etharp_hdr), PBUF_RAM); + + if (p == NULL) { + FAIL_RET(); + } + + ethhdr = (struct eth_hdr *)p->payload; + etharphdr = (struct etharp_hdr *)(ethhdr + 1); + + ethhdr->dest = test_ethaddr; + ethhdr->src = test_ethaddr2; + ethhdr->type = htons(ETHTYPE_ARP); + + etharphdr->hwtype = htons(LWIP_IANA_HWTYPE_ETHERNET); + etharphdr->proto = htons(ETHTYPE_IP); + etharphdr->hwlen = ETHARP_HWADDR_LEN; + etharphdr->protolen = sizeof(ip4_addr_t); + etharphdr->opcode = htons(ARP_REPLY); + + SMEMCPY(ðarphdr->sipaddr, adr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t)); + SMEMCPY(ðarphdr->dipaddr, &test_ipaddr, sizeof(ip4_addr_t)); + + k = 6; + + while (k > 0) { + k--; + /* Write the ARP MAC-Addresses */ + etharphdr->shwaddr.addr[k] = test_ethaddr2.addr[k]; + etharphdr->dhwaddr.addr[k] = test_ethaddr.addr[k]; + /* Write the Ethernet MAC-Addresses */ + ethhdr->dest.addr[k] = test_ethaddr.addr[k]; + ethhdr->src.addr[k] = test_ethaddr2.addr[k]; + } + + ethernet_input(p, &test_netif); +} + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static void etharp_setup(void) +{ + etharp_remove_all(); + default_netif_add(); + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void etharp_teardown(void) +{ + etharp_remove_all(); + default_netif_remove(); + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +/* Test functions */ + +START_TEST(test_etharp_table) +{ +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES + err_t err; +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + ssize_t idx; + const ip4_addr_t *unused_ipaddr; + struct eth_addr *unused_ethaddr; + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + if (netif_default != &test_netif) { + fail("This test needs a default netif"); + } + + linkoutput_ctr = 0; + + pcb = udp_new(); + fail_unless(pcb != NULL); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + ip4_addr_t adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 2]; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 2; i++) { + IP4_ADDR(&adrs[i], 192, 168, 0, i + 2); + } + + /* fill ARP-table with dynamic entries */ + for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { + struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 10, PBUF_RAM); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + err_t err2; + ip_addr_t dst; + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dst, adrs[i]); + err2 = udp_sendto(pcb, p, &dst, 123); + fail_unless(err2 == ERR_OK); + /* etharp request sent? */ + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == (2 * i) + 1); + pbuf_free(p); + + /* create an ARP response */ + create_arp_response(&adrs[i]); + /* queued UDP packet sent? */ + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == (2 * i) + 2); + + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[i], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + fail_unless(idx == i); + etharp_tmr(); + } + } + + linkoutput_ctr = 0; +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES + /* create one static entry */ + err = etharp_add_static_entry(&adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &test_ethaddr3); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + fail_unless(idx == 0); + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + + linkoutput_ctr = 0; + + /* fill ARP-table with dynamic entries */ + for (i = 0; i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE; i++) { + struct pbuf *p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 10, PBUF_RAM); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + err_t err2; + ip_addr_t dst; + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(dst, adrs[i]); + err2 = udp_sendto(pcb, p, &dst, 123); + fail_unless(err2 == ERR_OK); + /* etharp request sent? */ + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == (2 * i) + 1); + pbuf_free(p); + + /* create an ARP response */ + create_arp_response(&adrs[i]); + /* queued UDP packet sent? */ + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == (2 * i) + 2); + + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[i], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + + if (i < ARP_TABLE_SIZE - 1) { + fail_unless(idx == i + 1); + } else { + /* the last entry must not overwrite the static entry! */ + fail_unless(idx == 1); + } + + etharp_tmr(); + } + } + +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES + /* create a second static entry */ + err = etharp_add_static_entry(&adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1], &test_ethaddr4); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + fail_unless(idx == 0); + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + fail_unless(idx == 2); + /* and remove it again */ + err = etharp_remove_static_entry(&adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1]); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + fail_unless(idx == 0); + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + fail_unless(idx == -1); +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + + /* check that static entries don't time out */ + etharp_remove_all(); + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + fail_unless(idx == 0); + +#if ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES + /* remove the first static entry */ + err = etharp_remove_static_entry(&adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE]); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + fail_unless(idx == -1); + idx = etharp_find_addr(NULL, &adrs[ARP_TABLE_SIZE + 1], &unused_ethaddr, &unused_ipaddr); + fail_unless(idx == -1); +#endif /* ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES */ + + udp_remove(pcb); + } +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *etharp_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_etharp_table) + }; + return create_suite("ETHARP", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), etharp_setup, etharp_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.h similarity index 94% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.h index 09bcc1ee..aa0bd01d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/etharp/test_etharp.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_ETHARP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_ETHARP_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *etharp_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_ETHARP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_ETHARP_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *etharp_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.c index ad6eb45f..02783f59 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.c @@ -1,160 +1,160 @@ -#include "test_ip4.h" - -#include "lwip/ip4.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip4.h" - -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" - -#if !LWIP_IPV4 || !IP_REASSEMBLY || !MIB2_STATS || !IPFRAG_STATS -#error "This tests needs LWIP_IPV4, IP_REASSEMBLY; MIB2- and IPFRAG-statistics enabled" -#endif - -/* Helper functions */ -static void create_ip4_input_fragment(u16_t ip_id, u16_t start, u16_t len, int last) -{ - struct pbuf *p; - struct netif *input_netif = netif_list; /* just use any netif */ - fail_unless((start & 7) == 0); - fail_unless(((len & 7) == 0) || last); - fail_unless(input_netif != NULL); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, len + sizeof(struct ip_hdr), PBUF_RAM); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - err_t err; - struct ip_hdr *iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - IPH_VHL_SET(iphdr, 4, sizeof(struct ip_hdr) / 4); - IPH_TOS_SET(iphdr, 0); - IPH_LEN_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(p->tot_len)); - IPH_ID_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(ip_id)); - - if (last) { - IPH_OFFSET_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(start / 8)); - } else { - IPH_OFFSET_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons((start / 8) | IP_MF)); - } - - IPH_TTL_SET(iphdr, 5); - IPH_PROTO_SET(iphdr, IP_PROTO_UDP); - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); - ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->src, *netif_ip4_addr(input_netif)); - iphdr->src.addr = lwip_htonl(lwip_htonl(iphdr->src.addr) + 1); - ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->dest, *netif_ip4_addr(input_netif)); - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, sizeof(struct ip_hdr))); - - err = ip4_input(p, input_netif); - - if (err != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - } -} - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static void ip4_setup(void) -{ - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void ip4_teardown(void) -{ - if (netif_list->loop_first != NULL) { - pbuf_free(netif_list->loop_first); - netif_list->loop_first = NULL; - } - - netif_list->loop_last = NULL; - /* poll until all memory is released... */ - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -/* Test functions */ - -START_TEST(test_ip4_reass) -{ - const u16_t ip_id = 128; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&lwip_stats.mib2, 0, sizeof(lwip_stats.mib2)); - - create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 8 * 200, 200, 1); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 1); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); - - create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 0 * 200, 200, 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 2); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); - - create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 1 * 200, 200, 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 3); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); - - create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 2 * 200, 200, 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 4); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); - - create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 3 * 200, 200, 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 5); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); - - create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 4 * 200, 200, 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 6); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); - - create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 7 * 200, 200, 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 7); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); - - create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 6 * 200, 200, 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 8); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); - - create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 5 * 200, 200, 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 9); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 1); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *ip4_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_ip4_reass), - }; - return create_suite("IPv4", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), ip4_setup, ip4_teardown); -} +#include "test_ip4.h" + +#include "lwip/ip4.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip4.h" + +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" + +#if !LWIP_IPV4 || !IP_REASSEMBLY || !MIB2_STATS || !IPFRAG_STATS +#error "This tests needs LWIP_IPV4, IP_REASSEMBLY; MIB2- and IPFRAG-statistics enabled" +#endif + +/* Helper functions */ +static void create_ip4_input_fragment(u16_t ip_id, u16_t start, u16_t len, int last) +{ + struct pbuf *p; + struct netif *input_netif = netif_list; /* just use any netif */ + fail_unless((start & 7) == 0); + fail_unless(((len & 7) == 0) || last); + fail_unless(input_netif != NULL); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, len + sizeof(struct ip_hdr), PBUF_RAM); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + err_t err; + struct ip_hdr *iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + IPH_VHL_SET(iphdr, 4, sizeof(struct ip_hdr) / 4); + IPH_TOS_SET(iphdr, 0); + IPH_LEN_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(p->tot_len)); + IPH_ID_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(ip_id)); + + if (last) { + IPH_OFFSET_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons(start / 8)); + } else { + IPH_OFFSET_SET(iphdr, lwip_htons((start / 8) | IP_MF)); + } + + IPH_TTL_SET(iphdr, 5); + IPH_PROTO_SET(iphdr, IP_PROTO_UDP); + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, 0); + ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->src, *netif_ip4_addr(input_netif)); + iphdr->src.addr = lwip_htonl(lwip_htonl(iphdr->src.addr) + 1); + ip4_addr_copy(iphdr->dest, *netif_ip4_addr(input_netif)); + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, sizeof(struct ip_hdr))); + + err = ip4_input(p, input_netif); + + if (err != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + } +} + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static void ip4_setup(void) +{ + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void ip4_teardown(void) +{ + if (netif_list->loop_first != NULL) { + pbuf_free(netif_list->loop_first); + netif_list->loop_first = NULL; + } + + netif_list->loop_last = NULL; + /* poll until all memory is released... */ + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +/* Test functions */ + +START_TEST(test_ip4_reass) +{ + const u16_t ip_id = 128; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&lwip_stats.mib2, 0, sizeof(lwip_stats.mib2)); + + create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 8 * 200, 200, 1); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 1); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); + + create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 0 * 200, 200, 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 2); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); + + create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 1 * 200, 200, 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 3); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); + + create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 2 * 200, 200, 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 4); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); + + create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 3 * 200, 200, 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 5); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); + + create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 4 * 200, 200, 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 6); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); + + create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 7 * 200, 200, 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 7); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); + + create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 6 * 200, 200, 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 8); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 0); + + create_ip4_input_fragment(ip_id, 5 * 200, 200, 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.recv == 9); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.err == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.memerr == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.ip_frag.drop == 0); + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mib2.ipreasmoks == 1); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *ip4_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_ip4_reass), + }; + return create_suite("IPv4", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), ip4_setup, ip4_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.h index bda519d8..ff885b7d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip4/test_ip4.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_IP4_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_IP4_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *ip4_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_IP4_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_IP4_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *ip4_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.c index 8408f377..d39b73c3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.c @@ -1,306 +1,306 @@ -#include "test_ip6.h" - -#include "lwip/ethip6.h" -#include "lwip/ip6.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/nd6.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip.h" -#include "lwip/prot/ip6.h" - -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" - -#if LWIP_IPV6 /* allow to build the unit tests without IPv6 support */ - -static struct netif test_netif6; -static int linkoutput_ctr; - -static err_t default_netif_linkoutput(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - fail_unless(netif == &test_netif6); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - linkoutput_ctr++; - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t default_netif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - fail_unless(netif != NULL); - netif->linkoutput = default_netif_linkoutput; - netif->output_ip6 = ethip6_output; - netif->mtu = 1500; - netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET | NETIF_FLAG_MLD6; - netif->hwaddr_len = ETH_HWADDR_LEN; - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void default_netif_add(void) -{ - struct netif *n; - fail_unless(netif_default == NULL); - n = netif_add_noaddr(&test_netif6, NULL, default_netif_init, NULL); - fail_unless(n == &test_netif6); - netif_set_default(&test_netif6); -} - -static void default_netif_remove(void) -{ - fail_unless(netif_default == &test_netif6); - netif_remove(&test_netif6); -} - -static void ip6_test_handle_timers(int count) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - nd6_tmr(); - } -} - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static void ip6_setup(void) -{ - default_netif_add(); - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void ip6_teardown(void) -{ - if (netif_list->loop_first != NULL) { - pbuf_free(netif_list->loop_first); - netif_list->loop_first = NULL; - } - - netif_list->loop_last = NULL; - /* poll until all memory is released... */ - tcpip_thread_poll_one(); - default_netif_remove(); - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -/* Test functions */ - -static void test_ip6_ll_addr_iter(int expected_ctr1, int expected_ctr2) -{ - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); - - /* test that nothing is sent with link uo but netif down */ - netif_set_link_up(&test_netif6); - ip6_test_handle_timers(500); - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); - netif_set_link_down(&test_netif6); - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); - - /* test that nothing is sent with link down but netif up */ - netif_set_up(&test_netif6); - ip6_test_handle_timers(500); - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); - netif_set_down(&test_netif6); - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); - - /* test what is sent with link up + netif up */ - netif_set_link_up(&test_netif6); - netif_set_up(&test_netif6); - ip6_test_handle_timers(500); - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == expected_ctr1); - netif_set_down(&test_netif6); - netif_set_link_down(&test_netif6); - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == expected_ctr1); - linkoutput_ctr = 0; - - netif_set_up(&test_netif6); - netif_set_link_up(&test_netif6); - ip6_test_handle_timers(500); - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == expected_ctr2); - netif_set_link_down(&test_netif6); - netif_set_down(&test_netif6); - fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == expected_ctr2); - linkoutput_ctr = 0; -} - -START_TEST(test_ip6_ll_addr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* test without link-local address */ - test_ip6_ll_addr_iter(0, 0); - - /* test with link-local address */ - netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(&test_netif6, 1); - test_ip6_ll_addr_iter(3 + LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS + LWIP_IPV6_MLD, 3); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_ip6_aton_ipv4mapped) -{ - int ret; - ip_addr_t addr; - ip6_addr_t addr6; - const ip_addr_t addr_expected = IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0, 0, 0xFFFF, 0xD4CC65D2); - const char *full_ipv6_addr = "0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:D4CC:65D2"; - const char *shortened_ipv6_addr = "::FFFF:D4CC:65D2"; - const char *full_ipv4_mapped_addr = "0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:212.204.101.210"; - const char *shortened_ipv4_mapped_addr = "::FFFF:212.204.101.210"; - const char *bogus_ipv4_mapped_addr = "::FFFF:212.204.101.2101"; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* check IPv6 representation */ - memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); - ret = ip6addr_aton(full_ipv6_addr, &addr6); - fail_unless(ret == 1); - fail_unless(memcmp(&addr6, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); - memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); - ret = ipaddr_aton(full_ipv6_addr, &addr); - fail_unless(ret == 1); - fail_unless(memcmp(&addr, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); - - /* check shortened IPv6 representation */ - memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); - ret = ip6addr_aton(shortened_ipv6_addr, &addr6); - fail_unless(ret == 1); - fail_unless(memcmp(&addr6, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); - memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); - ret = ipaddr_aton(shortened_ipv6_addr, &addr); - fail_unless(ret == 1); - fail_unless(memcmp(&addr, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); - - /* checked shortened mixed representation */ - memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); - ret = ip6addr_aton(shortened_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr6); - fail_unless(ret == 1); - fail_unless(memcmp(&addr6, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); - memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); - ret = ipaddr_aton(shortened_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr); - fail_unless(ret == 1); - fail_unless(memcmp(&addr, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); - - /* checked mixed representation */ - memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); - ret = ip6addr_aton(full_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr6); - fail_unless(ret == 1); - fail_unless(memcmp(&addr6, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); - memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); - ret = ipaddr_aton(full_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr); - fail_unless(ret == 1); - fail_unless(memcmp(&addr, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); - - /* checked bogus mixed representation */ - memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); - ret = ip6addr_aton(bogus_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr6); - fail_unless(ret == 0); - memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); - ret = ipaddr_aton(bogus_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr); - fail_unless(ret == 0); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_ip6_ntoa_ipv4mapped) -{ - const ip_addr_t addr = IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0, 0, 0xFFFF, 0xD4CC65D2); - char buf[128]; - char *str; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - str = ip6addr_ntoa_r(ip_2_ip6(&addr), buf, sizeof(buf)); - fail_unless(str == buf); - fail_unless(!strcmp(str, "::FFFF:212.204.101.210")); -} -END_TEST - -struct test_addr_and_str { - ip_addr_t addr; - const char *str; -}; - -START_TEST(test_ip6_ntoa) -{ - struct test_addr_and_str tests[] = { - { IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xfe800000, 0x00000000, 0xb2a1a2ff, 0xfea3a4a5), "FE80::B2A1:A2FF:FEA3:A4A5" }, /* test shortened zeros */ - { IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xfe800000, 0xff000000, 0xb2a1a2ff, 0xfea3a4a5), "FE80:0:FF00:0:B2A1:A2FF:FEA3:A4A5" }, /* don't omit single zero blocks */ - { IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xfe800000, 0xff000000, 0xb2000000, 0x0000a4a5), "FE80:0:FF00:0:B200::A4A5" }, /* omit longest zero block */ - }; - char buf[128]; - char *str; - size_t i; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tests); i++) { - str = ip6addr_ntoa_r(ip_2_ip6(&tests[i].addr), buf, sizeof(buf)); - fail_unless(str == buf); - fail_unless(!strcmp(str, tests[i].str)); - } -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_ip6_lladdr) -{ - u8_t zeros[128]; - const u8_t test_mac_addr[6] = { 0xb0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5 }; - const u32_t expected_ip6_addr_1[4] = { PP_HTONL(0xfe800000), 0, PP_HTONL(0xb2a1a2ff), PP_HTONL(0xfea3a4a5) }; - const u32_t expected_ip6_addr_2[4] = { PP_HTONL(0xfe800000), 0, PP_HTONL(0x0000b0a1), PP_HTONL(0xa2a3a4a5) }; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - memset(zeros, 0, sizeof(zeros)); - - fail_unless(test_netif6.hwaddr_len == 6); - fail_unless(!memcmp(test_netif6.hwaddr, zeros, 6)); - - fail_unless(test_netif6.ip6_addr_state[0] == 0); - fail_unless(!memcmp(netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0), zeros, sizeof(ip6_addr_t))); - - /* set specific mac addr */ - memcpy(test_netif6.hwaddr, test_mac_addr, 6); - - /* create link-local addr based on mac (EUI-48) */ - netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(&test_netif6, 1); - fail_unless(IP_IS_V6(&test_netif6.ip6_addr[0])); - fail_unless(!memcmp(&netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0)->addr, expected_ip6_addr_1, 16)); -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - fail_unless(netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0)->zone == (test_netif6.num + 1)); -#endif - /* reset address */ - memset(&test_netif6.ip6_addr[0], 0, sizeof(ip6_addr_t)); - test_netif6.ip6_addr_state[0] = 0; - - /* create link-local addr based interface ID */ - netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(&test_netif6, 0); - fail_unless(IP_IS_V6(&test_netif6.ip6_addr[0])); - fail_unless(!memcmp(&netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0)->addr, expected_ip6_addr_2, 16)); -#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES - fail_unless(netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0)->zone == (test_netif6.num + 1)); -#endif - /* reset address */ - memset(&test_netif6.ip6_addr[0], 0, sizeof(ip6_addr_t)); - test_netif6.ip6_addr_state[0] = 0; - - /* reset mac address */ - memset(&test_netif6.hwaddr, 0, sizeof(test_netif6.hwaddr)); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *ip6_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_ip6_ll_addr), - TESTFUNC(test_ip6_aton_ipv4mapped), - TESTFUNC(test_ip6_ntoa_ipv4mapped), - TESTFUNC(test_ip6_ntoa), - TESTFUNC(test_ip6_lladdr) - }; - return create_suite("IPv6", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), ip6_setup, ip6_teardown); -} - -#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ - -/* allow to build the unit tests without IPv6 support */ -START_TEST(test_ip6_dummy) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); -} -END_TEST - -Suite *ip6_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_ip6_dummy), - }; - return create_suite("IPv6", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), NULL, NULL); -} -#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ +#include "test_ip6.h" + +#include "lwip/ethip6.h" +#include "lwip/ip6.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/nd6.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ethernet.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip.h" +#include "lwip/prot/ip6.h" + +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" + +#if LWIP_IPV6 /* allow to build the unit tests without IPv6 support */ + +static struct netif test_netif6; +static int linkoutput_ctr; + +static err_t default_netif_linkoutput(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + fail_unless(netif == &test_netif6); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + linkoutput_ctr++; + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t default_netif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + fail_unless(netif != NULL); + netif->linkoutput = default_netif_linkoutput; + netif->output_ip6 = ethip6_output; + netif->mtu = 1500; + netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHERNET | NETIF_FLAG_MLD6; + netif->hwaddr_len = ETH_HWADDR_LEN; + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void default_netif_add(void) +{ + struct netif *n; + fail_unless(netif_default == NULL); + n = netif_add_noaddr(&test_netif6, NULL, default_netif_init, NULL); + fail_unless(n == &test_netif6); + netif_set_default(&test_netif6); +} + +static void default_netif_remove(void) +{ + fail_unless(netif_default == &test_netif6); + netif_remove(&test_netif6); +} + +static void ip6_test_handle_timers(int count) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + nd6_tmr(); + } +} + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static void ip6_setup(void) +{ + default_netif_add(); + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void ip6_teardown(void) +{ + if (netif_list->loop_first != NULL) { + pbuf_free(netif_list->loop_first); + netif_list->loop_first = NULL; + } + + netif_list->loop_last = NULL; + /* poll until all memory is released... */ + tcpip_thread_poll_one(); + default_netif_remove(); + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +/* Test functions */ + +static void test_ip6_ll_addr_iter(int expected_ctr1, int expected_ctr2) +{ + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); + + /* test that nothing is sent with link uo but netif down */ + netif_set_link_up(&test_netif6); + ip6_test_handle_timers(500); + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); + netif_set_link_down(&test_netif6); + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); + + /* test that nothing is sent with link down but netif up */ + netif_set_up(&test_netif6); + ip6_test_handle_timers(500); + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); + netif_set_down(&test_netif6); + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == 0); + + /* test what is sent with link up + netif up */ + netif_set_link_up(&test_netif6); + netif_set_up(&test_netif6); + ip6_test_handle_timers(500); + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == expected_ctr1); + netif_set_down(&test_netif6); + netif_set_link_down(&test_netif6); + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == expected_ctr1); + linkoutput_ctr = 0; + + netif_set_up(&test_netif6); + netif_set_link_up(&test_netif6); + ip6_test_handle_timers(500); + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == expected_ctr2); + netif_set_link_down(&test_netif6); + netif_set_down(&test_netif6); + fail_unless(linkoutput_ctr == expected_ctr2); + linkoutput_ctr = 0; +} + +START_TEST(test_ip6_ll_addr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* test without link-local address */ + test_ip6_ll_addr_iter(0, 0); + + /* test with link-local address */ + netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(&test_netif6, 1); + test_ip6_ll_addr_iter(3 + LWIP_IPV6_DUP_DETECT_ATTEMPTS + LWIP_IPV6_MLD, 3); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_ip6_aton_ipv4mapped) +{ + int ret; + ip_addr_t addr; + ip6_addr_t addr6; + const ip_addr_t addr_expected = IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0, 0, 0xFFFF, 0xD4CC65D2); + const char *full_ipv6_addr = "0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:D4CC:65D2"; + const char *shortened_ipv6_addr = "::FFFF:D4CC:65D2"; + const char *full_ipv4_mapped_addr = "0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:212.204.101.210"; + const char *shortened_ipv4_mapped_addr = "::FFFF:212.204.101.210"; + const char *bogus_ipv4_mapped_addr = "::FFFF:212.204.101.2101"; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* check IPv6 representation */ + memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); + ret = ip6addr_aton(full_ipv6_addr, &addr6); + fail_unless(ret == 1); + fail_unless(memcmp(&addr6, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + ret = ipaddr_aton(full_ipv6_addr, &addr); + fail_unless(ret == 1); + fail_unless(memcmp(&addr, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); + + /* check shortened IPv6 representation */ + memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); + ret = ip6addr_aton(shortened_ipv6_addr, &addr6); + fail_unless(ret == 1); + fail_unless(memcmp(&addr6, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + ret = ipaddr_aton(shortened_ipv6_addr, &addr); + fail_unless(ret == 1); + fail_unless(memcmp(&addr, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); + + /* checked shortened mixed representation */ + memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); + ret = ip6addr_aton(shortened_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr6); + fail_unless(ret == 1); + fail_unless(memcmp(&addr6, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + ret = ipaddr_aton(shortened_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr); + fail_unless(ret == 1); + fail_unless(memcmp(&addr, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); + + /* checked mixed representation */ + memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); + ret = ip6addr_aton(full_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr6); + fail_unless(ret == 1); + fail_unless(memcmp(&addr6, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + ret = ipaddr_aton(full_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr); + fail_unless(ret == 1); + fail_unless(memcmp(&addr, &addr_expected, 16) == 0); + + /* checked bogus mixed representation */ + memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); + ret = ip6addr_aton(bogus_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr6); + fail_unless(ret == 0); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + ret = ipaddr_aton(bogus_ipv4_mapped_addr, &addr); + fail_unless(ret == 0); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_ip6_ntoa_ipv4mapped) +{ + const ip_addr_t addr = IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0, 0, 0xFFFF, 0xD4CC65D2); + char buf[128]; + char *str; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + str = ip6addr_ntoa_r(ip_2_ip6(&addr), buf, sizeof(buf)); + fail_unless(str == buf); + fail_unless(!strcmp(str, "::FFFF:212.204.101.210")); +} +END_TEST + +struct test_addr_and_str { + ip_addr_t addr; + const char *str; +}; + +START_TEST(test_ip6_ntoa) +{ + struct test_addr_and_str tests[] = { + { IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xfe800000, 0x00000000, 0xb2a1a2ff, 0xfea3a4a5), "FE80::B2A1:A2FF:FEA3:A4A5" }, /* test shortened zeros */ + { IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xfe800000, 0xff000000, 0xb2a1a2ff, 0xfea3a4a5), "FE80:0:FF00:0:B2A1:A2FF:FEA3:A4A5" }, /* don't omit single zero blocks */ + { IPADDR6_INIT_HOST(0xfe800000, 0xff000000, 0xb2000000, 0x0000a4a5), "FE80:0:FF00:0:B200::A4A5" }, /* omit longest zero block */ + }; + char buf[128]; + char *str; + size_t i; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + for (i = 0; i < LWIP_ARRAYSIZE(tests); i++) { + str = ip6addr_ntoa_r(ip_2_ip6(&tests[i].addr), buf, sizeof(buf)); + fail_unless(str == buf); + fail_unless(!strcmp(str, tests[i].str)); + } +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_ip6_lladdr) +{ + u8_t zeros[128]; + const u8_t test_mac_addr[6] = { 0xb0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5 }; + const u32_t expected_ip6_addr_1[4] = { PP_HTONL(0xfe800000), 0, PP_HTONL(0xb2a1a2ff), PP_HTONL(0xfea3a4a5) }; + const u32_t expected_ip6_addr_2[4] = { PP_HTONL(0xfe800000), 0, PP_HTONL(0x0000b0a1), PP_HTONL(0xa2a3a4a5) }; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + memset(zeros, 0, sizeof(zeros)); + + fail_unless(test_netif6.hwaddr_len == 6); + fail_unless(!memcmp(test_netif6.hwaddr, zeros, 6)); + + fail_unless(test_netif6.ip6_addr_state[0] == 0); + fail_unless(!memcmp(netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0), zeros, sizeof(ip6_addr_t))); + + /* set specific mac addr */ + memcpy(test_netif6.hwaddr, test_mac_addr, 6); + + /* create link-local addr based on mac (EUI-48) */ + netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(&test_netif6, 1); + fail_unless(IP_IS_V6(&test_netif6.ip6_addr[0])); + fail_unless(!memcmp(&netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0)->addr, expected_ip6_addr_1, 16)); +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + fail_unless(netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0)->zone == (test_netif6.num + 1)); +#endif + /* reset address */ + memset(&test_netif6.ip6_addr[0], 0, sizeof(ip6_addr_t)); + test_netif6.ip6_addr_state[0] = 0; + + /* create link-local addr based interface ID */ + netif_create_ip6_linklocal_address(&test_netif6, 0); + fail_unless(IP_IS_V6(&test_netif6.ip6_addr[0])); + fail_unless(!memcmp(&netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0)->addr, expected_ip6_addr_2, 16)); +#if LWIP_IPV6_SCOPES + fail_unless(netif_ip6_addr(&test_netif6, 0)->zone == (test_netif6.num + 1)); +#endif + /* reset address */ + memset(&test_netif6.ip6_addr[0], 0, sizeof(ip6_addr_t)); + test_netif6.ip6_addr_state[0] = 0; + + /* reset mac address */ + memset(&test_netif6.hwaddr, 0, sizeof(test_netif6.hwaddr)); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *ip6_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_ip6_ll_addr), + TESTFUNC(test_ip6_aton_ipv4mapped), + TESTFUNC(test_ip6_ntoa_ipv4mapped), + TESTFUNC(test_ip6_ntoa), + TESTFUNC(test_ip6_lladdr) + }; + return create_suite("IPv6", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), ip6_setup, ip6_teardown); +} + +#else /* LWIP_IPV6 */ + +/* allow to build the unit tests without IPv6 support */ +START_TEST(test_ip6_dummy) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); +} +END_TEST + +Suite *ip6_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_ip6_dummy), + }; + return create_suite("IPv6", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), NULL, NULL); +} +#endif /* LWIP_IPV6 */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.h index d3e0e0dc..e39cd830 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/ip6/test_ip6.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_IP6_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_IP6_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *ip6_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_IP6_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_IP6_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *ip6_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/lwip_check.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/lwip_check.h similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/lwip_check.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/lwip_check.h index 9a377b1e..9d96126b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/lwip_check.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/lwip_check.h @@ -1,62 +1,62 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LWIP_CHECK_H -#define LWIP_HDR_LWIP_CHECK_H - -/* Common header file for lwIP unit tests using the check framework */ - -#include -#include -#include - -#define FAIL_RET() \ - do { \ - fail(); \ - return; \ - } while (0) -#define EXPECT(x) fail_unless(x) -#define EXPECT_RET(x) \ - do { \ - fail_unless(x); \ - if (!(x)) { \ - return; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define EXPECT_RETX(x, y) \ - do { \ - fail_unless(x); \ - if (!(x)) { \ - return y; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define EXPECT_RETNULL(x) EXPECT_RETX(x, NULL) - -typedef struct -{ - TFun func; - const char *name; -} testfunc; - -#define TESTFUNC(x) \ - { \ - (x), "" #x "" \ - } - -/* Modified function from check.h, supplying function name */ -#define tcase_add_named_test(tc, tf) \ - _tcase_add_test((tc), (tf).func, (tf).name, 0, 0, 0, 1) - -/** typedef for a function returning a test suite */ -typedef Suite *(suite_getter_fn)(void); - -/** Create a test suite */ -Suite *create_suite(const char *name, testfunc *tests, size_t num_tests, SFun setup, SFun teardown); - -#ifdef LWIP_UNITTESTS_LIB -int lwip_unittests_run(void) -#endif - -/* helper functions */ -#define SKIP_POOL(x) (1 << x) -#define SKIP_HEAP (1 << MEMP_MAX) - void lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(unsigned int skip); - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LWIP_CHECK_H */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LWIP_CHECK_H +#define LWIP_HDR_LWIP_CHECK_H + +/* Common header file for lwIP unit tests using the check framework */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#define FAIL_RET() \ + do { \ + fail(); \ + return; \ + } while (0) +#define EXPECT(x) fail_unless(x) +#define EXPECT_RET(x) \ + do { \ + fail_unless(x); \ + if (!(x)) { \ + return; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define EXPECT_RETX(x, y) \ + do { \ + fail_unless(x); \ + if (!(x)) { \ + return y; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define EXPECT_RETNULL(x) EXPECT_RETX(x, NULL) + +typedef struct +{ + TFun func; + const char *name; +} testfunc; + +#define TESTFUNC(x) \ + { \ + (x), "" #x "" \ + } + +/* Modified function from check.h, supplying function name */ +#define tcase_add_named_test(tc, tf) \ + _tcase_add_test((tc), (tf).func, (tf).name, 0, 0, 0, 1) + +/** typedef for a function returning a test suite */ +typedef Suite *(suite_getter_fn)(void); + +/** Create a test suite */ +Suite *create_suite(const char *name, testfunc *tests, size_t num_tests, SFun setup, SFun teardown); + +#ifdef LWIP_UNITTESTS_LIB +int lwip_unittests_run(void) +#endif + +/* helper functions */ +#define SKIP_POOL(x) (1 << x) +#define SKIP_HEAP (1 << MEMP_MAX) + void lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(unsigned int skip); + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LWIP_CHECK_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/lwip_unittests.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/lwip_unittests.c similarity index 95% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/lwip_unittests.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/lwip_unittests.c index 2c30072c..415c6f9c 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/lwip_unittests.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/lwip_unittests.c @@ -1,112 +1,112 @@ -#include "lwip_check.h" - -#include "ip4/test_ip4.h" -#include "ip6/test_ip6.h" -#include "udp/test_udp.h" -#include "tcp/test_tcp.h" -#include "tcp/test_tcp_oos.h" -#include "core/test_def.h" -#include "core/test_mem.h" -#include "core/test_netif.h" -#include "core/test_pbuf.h" -#include "core/test_timers.h" -#include "etharp/test_etharp.h" -#include "dhcp/test_dhcp.h" -#include "mdns/test_mdns.h" -#include "mqtt/test_mqtt.h" -#include "api/test_sockets.h" - -#include "lwip/init.h" -#if !NO_SYS -#include "lwip/tcpip.h" -#endif - -Suite *create_suite(const char *name, testfunc *tests, size_t num_tests, SFun setup, SFun teardown) -{ - size_t i; - Suite *s = suite_create(name); - - for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { - TCase *tc_core = tcase_create(name); - - if ((setup != NULL) || (teardown != NULL)) { - tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_core, setup, teardown); - } - - tcase_add_named_test(tc_core, tests[i]); - suite_add_tcase(s, tc_core); - } - - return s; -} - -void lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(unsigned int skip) -{ - int i; - unsigned int mask; - - if (!(skip & SKIP_HEAP)) { - fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); - } - - for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < MEMP_MAX; i++, mask <<= 1) { - if (!(skip & mask)) { - fail_unless(lwip_stats.memp[i]->used == 0); - } - } -} - -#ifdef LWIP_UNITTESTS_LIB -int lwip_unittests_run(void) -#else -int main(void) -#endif -{ - int number_failed; - SRunner *sr; - size_t i; - suite_getter_fn *suites[] = { - ip4_suite, - ip6_suite, - udp_suite, - tcp_suite, - tcp_oos_suite, - def_suite, - mem_suite, - netif_suite, - pbuf_suite, - timers_suite, - etharp_suite, - dhcp_suite, - mdns_suite, - mqtt_suite, - sockets_suite - }; - size_t num = sizeof(suites) / sizeof(void *); - LWIP_ASSERT("No suites defined", num > 0); - -#if NO_SYS - lwip_init(); -#else - tcpip_init(NULL, NULL); -#endif - - sr = srunner_create((suites[0])()); - srunner_set_xml(sr, "lwip_unittests.xml"); - - for (i = 1; i < num; i++) { - srunner_add_suite(sr, ((suite_getter_fn *)suites[i])()); - } - -#ifdef LWIP_UNITTESTS_NOFORK - srunner_set_fork_status(sr, CK_NOFORK); -#endif -#ifdef LWIP_UNITTESTS_FORK - srunner_set_fork_status(sr, CK_FORK); -#endif - - srunner_run_all(sr, CK_NORMAL); - number_failed = srunner_ntests_failed(sr); - srunner_free(sr); - return (number_failed == 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE; -} +#include "lwip_check.h" + +#include "ip4/test_ip4.h" +#include "ip6/test_ip6.h" +#include "udp/test_udp.h" +#include "tcp/test_tcp.h" +#include "tcp/test_tcp_oos.h" +#include "core/test_def.h" +#include "core/test_mem.h" +#include "core/test_netif.h" +#include "core/test_pbuf.h" +#include "core/test_timers.h" +#include "etharp/test_etharp.h" +#include "dhcp/test_dhcp.h" +#include "mdns/test_mdns.h" +#include "mqtt/test_mqtt.h" +#include "api/test_sockets.h" + +#include "lwip/init.h" +#if !NO_SYS +#include "lwip/tcpip.h" +#endif + +Suite *create_suite(const char *name, testfunc *tests, size_t num_tests, SFun setup, SFun teardown) +{ + size_t i; + Suite *s = suite_create(name); + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { + TCase *tc_core = tcase_create(name); + + if ((setup != NULL) || (teardown != NULL)) { + tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_core, setup, teardown); + } + + tcase_add_named_test(tc_core, tests[i]); + suite_add_tcase(s, tc_core); + } + + return s; +} + +void lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(unsigned int skip) +{ + int i; + unsigned int mask; + + if (!(skip & SKIP_HEAP)) { + fail_unless(lwip_stats.mem.used == 0); + } + + for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < MEMP_MAX; i++, mask <<= 1) { + if (!(skip & mask)) { + fail_unless(lwip_stats.memp[i]->used == 0); + } + } +} + +#ifdef LWIP_UNITTESTS_LIB +int lwip_unittests_run(void) +#else +int main(void) +#endif +{ + int number_failed; + SRunner *sr; + size_t i; + suite_getter_fn *suites[] = { + ip4_suite, + ip6_suite, + udp_suite, + tcp_suite, + tcp_oos_suite, + def_suite, + mem_suite, + netif_suite, + pbuf_suite, + timers_suite, + etharp_suite, + dhcp_suite, + mdns_suite, + mqtt_suite, + sockets_suite + }; + size_t num = sizeof(suites) / sizeof(void *); + LWIP_ASSERT("No suites defined", num > 0); + +#if NO_SYS + lwip_init(); +#else + tcpip_init(NULL, NULL); +#endif + + sr = srunner_create((suites[0])()); + srunner_set_xml(sr, "lwip_unittests.xml"); + + for (i = 1; i < num; i++) { + srunner_add_suite(sr, ((suite_getter_fn *)suites[i])()); + } + +#ifdef LWIP_UNITTESTS_NOFORK + srunner_set_fork_status(sr, CK_NOFORK); +#endif +#ifdef LWIP_UNITTESTS_FORK + srunner_set_fork_status(sr, CK_FORK); +#endif + + srunner_run_all(sr, CK_NORMAL); + number_failed = srunner_ntests_failed(sr); + srunner_free(sr); + return (number_failed == 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE; +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/lwipopts.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/lwipopts.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/lwipopts.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/lwipopts.h index 4ec08965..94fc623b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/lwipopts.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/lwipopts.h @@ -1,85 +1,85 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Simon Goldschmidt - * - */ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H - -#define LWIP_TESTMODE 1 - -#define LWIP_IPV6 1 - -#define LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY 1 -#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK 1 -#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL(printfmsg) LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL", 0) - -/* We link to special sys_arch.c (for basic non-waiting API layers unit tests) */ -#define NO_SYS 0 -#define SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT 0 -#define LWIP_NETCONN !NO_SYS -#define LWIP_SOCKET !NO_SYS -#define LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX LWIP_SOCKET -#define LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO 1 -#define LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF 1 -#define TCPIP_THREAD_TEST - -/* Enable DHCP to test it, disable UDP checksum to easier inject packets */ -#define LWIP_DHCP 1 - -/* Minimal changes to opt.h required for tcp unit tests: */ -#define MEM_SIZE 16000 -#define TCP_SND_QUEUELEN 40 -#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG TCP_SND_QUEUELEN -#define TCP_SND_BUF (12 * TCP_MSS) -#define TCP_WND (10 * TCP_MSS) -#define LWIP_WND_SCALE 1 -#define TCP_RCV_SCALE 0 -#define PBUF_POOL_SIZE 400 /* pbuf tests need ~200KByte */ - -/* Enable IGMP and MDNS for MDNS tests */ -#define LWIP_IGMP 1 -#define LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER 1 -#define LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA (LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER) - -/* Minimal changes to opt.h required for etharp unit tests: */ -#define ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES 1 - -#define MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT (LWIP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT_INTERNAL + 8) - -/* MIB2 stats are required to check IPv4 reassembly results */ -#define MIB2_STATS 1 - -/* netif tests want to test this, so enable: */ -#define LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK 1 - -/* Check lwip_stats.mem.illegal instead of asserting */ -#define LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE(msg) /* to nothing */ - -#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Swedish Institute of Computer Science. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Simon Goldschmidt + * + */ +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H + +#define LWIP_TESTMODE 1 + +#define LWIP_IPV6 1 + +#define LWIP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY 1 +#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK 1 +#define TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL(printfmsg) LWIP_ASSERT("TCP_CHECKSUM_ON_COPY_SANITY_CHECK_FAIL", 0) + +/* We link to special sys_arch.c (for basic non-waiting API layers unit tests) */ +#define NO_SYS 0 +#define SYS_LIGHTWEIGHT_PROT 0 +#define LWIP_NETCONN !NO_SYS +#define LWIP_SOCKET !NO_SYS +#define LWIP_NETCONN_FULLDUPLEX LWIP_SOCKET +#define LWIP_NETBUF_RECVINFO 1 +#define LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF 1 +#define TCPIP_THREAD_TEST + +/* Enable DHCP to test it, disable UDP checksum to easier inject packets */ +#define LWIP_DHCP 1 + +/* Minimal changes to opt.h required for tcp unit tests: */ +#define MEM_SIZE 16000 +#define TCP_SND_QUEUELEN 40 +#define MEMP_NUM_TCP_SEG TCP_SND_QUEUELEN +#define TCP_SND_BUF (12 * TCP_MSS) +#define TCP_WND (10 * TCP_MSS) +#define LWIP_WND_SCALE 1 +#define TCP_RCV_SCALE 0 +#define PBUF_POOL_SIZE 400 /* pbuf tests need ~200KByte */ + +/* Enable IGMP and MDNS for MDNS tests */ +#define LWIP_IGMP 1 +#define LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER 1 +#define LWIP_NUM_NETIF_CLIENT_DATA (LWIP_MDNS_RESPONDER) + +/* Minimal changes to opt.h required for etharp unit tests: */ +#define ETHARP_SUPPORT_STATIC_ENTRIES 1 + +#define MEMP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT (LWIP_NUM_SYS_TIMEOUT_INTERNAL + 8) + +/* MIB2 stats are required to check IPv4 reassembly results */ +#define MIB2_STATS 1 + +/* netif tests want to test this, so enable: */ +#define LWIP_NETIF_EXT_STATUS_CALLBACK 1 + +/* Check lwip_stats.mem.illegal instead of asserting */ +#define LWIP_MEM_ILLEGAL_FREE(msg) /* to nothing */ + +#endif /* LWIP_HDR_LWIPOPTS_H */ diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.c index 5f442ada..a7f93c85 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.c @@ -1,859 +1,859 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, - * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT - * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT - * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS - * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN - * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING - * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY - * OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. - * - * Author: Erik Ekman - * - */ - -#include "test_mdns.h" - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/apps/mdns.h" -#include "lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h" - -START_TEST(readname_basic) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00 }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); - fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(data)); - fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, data, sizeof(data))); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_anydata) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { 0x05, 0x00, 0xFF, 0x08, 0xc0, 0x0f, 0x04, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x82, 0x88, 0x00 }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); - fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(data)); - fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, data, sizeof(data))); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_short_buf) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a' }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_long_label) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', - 0x52, 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', - 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', - 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', - 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', - 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', - 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_overflow) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_earlier) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - /* Some padding needed, not supported to jump to bytes containing dns header */ - /* 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* 10 */ 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00, 0xab, - /* 20 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x0c - }; - static const u8_t fullname[] = { - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 20, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); - fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(fullname)); - - fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, fullname, sizeof(fullname))); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_earlier_jump) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - /* Some padding needed, not supported to jump to bytes containing dns header */ - /* 0x00 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* 0x08 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0xf2, - /* 0x10 */ 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00, 0xc0, 0x10, - /* 0x18 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0xc0, 0x16 - }; - static const u8_t fullname[] = { - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0x18, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); - fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(fullname)); - - fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, fullname, sizeof(fullname))); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_maxdepth) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - /* Some padding needed, not supported to jump to bytes containing dns header */ - /* 0x00 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* 0x08 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0xf2, - /* 0x10 */ 0x04, 'n', 'a', 'm', 'e', 0xc0, 0x27, 0x03, - /* 0x18 */ 0x03, 'd', 'n', 's', 0xc0, 0x10, 0xc0, 0x10, - /* 0x20 */ 0x04, 'd', 'e', 'e', 'p', 0xc0, 0x18, 0x00, - /* 0x28 */ 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x20, 0xb0, - /* 0x30 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0xc0, 0x28 - }; - static const u8_t fullname[] = { - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', - 0x04, 'd', 'e', 'e', 'p', 0x03, 'd', 'n', 's', - 0x04, 'n', 'a', 'm', 'e', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0x30, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); - fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(fullname)); - - fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, fullname, sizeof(fullname))); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_later) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - /* 0x00 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x10, 0x00, 0x01, 0x40, - /* 0x10 */ 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00, 0xab - }; - static const u8_t fullname[] = { - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == 13); - fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(fullname)); - - fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, fullname, sizeof(fullname))); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_half_jump) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_toolong) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc2, 0x10, 0x00, 0x01, 0x40 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_loop_label) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - /* 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* 10 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x10 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 10, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_loop_jump) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - /* 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* 10 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x15 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - offset = mdns_readname(p, 10, &domain); - pbuf_free(p); - fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(add_label_basic) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00 }; - struct mdns_domain domain; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "multi", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "cast", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(data)); - fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, data, sizeof(data))); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(add_label_long_label) -{ - static const char *toolong = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-"; - struct mdns_domain domain; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "multi", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, toolong, (u8_t)strlen(toolong)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(add_label_full) -{ - static const char *label = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"; - struct mdns_domain domain; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == 33); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == 66); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == 99); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == 132); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == 165); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == 198); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == 231); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); - fail_unless(domain.length == 231); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, 25); - fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); - fail_unless(domain.length == 231); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, 24); - fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); - fail_unless(domain.length == 231); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, 23); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == 255); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain.length == 256); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); - fail_unless(domain.length == 256); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_basic) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00 - }; - struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "multi", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "cast", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(domain1.length == sizeof(data)); - - memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "multi", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "cast", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - fail_unless(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_diff) -{ - struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "multi", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "base", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "multi", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "cast", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - fail_if(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_case) -{ - struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "multi", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "cast", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "MulTI", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "casT", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - fail_unless(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_anydata) -{ - static const u8_t data1[] = { 0x05, 0xcc, 0xdc, 0x00, 0xa0 }; - static const u8_t data2[] = { 0x7f, 0x8c, 0x01, 0xff, 0xcf }; - struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, (const char *)data1, sizeof(data1)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "cast", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, (const char *)data2, sizeof(data2)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, (const char *)data1, sizeof(data1)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "casT", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, (const char *)data2, sizeof(data2)); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - fail_unless(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_length) -{ - struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); - memset(domain1.name, 0xAA, sizeof(MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "multi", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "cast", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); - memset(domain2.name, 0xBB, sizeof(MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "multi", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "cast", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - fail_unless(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(compress_full_match) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x00, 0x00, - 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - u16_t length; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - offset = 2; - length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); - /* Write 0 bytes, then a jump to addr 2 */ - fail_unless(length == 0); - fail_unless(offset == 2); - - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(compress_full_match_subset) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x00, 0x00, - 0x02, 'g', 'o', 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - u16_t length; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - offset = 2; - length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); - /* Write 0 bytes, then a jump to addr 5 */ - fail_unless(length == 0); - fail_unless(offset == 5); - - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(compress_full_match_jump) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - /* 0x00 */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, - /* 0x10 */ 0x04, 'l', 'w', 'i', 'p', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, - /* 0x20 */ 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0xc0, 0x15 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - u16_t length; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - offset = 0x20; - length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); - /* Write 0 bytes, then a jump to addr 0x20 */ - fail_unless(length == 0); - fail_unless(offset == 0x20); - - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(compress_no_match) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x00, 0x00, - 0x04, 'l', 'w', 'i', 'p', 0x05, 'w', 'i', 'k', 'i', 'a', 0x03, 'c', 'o', 'm', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - u16_t length; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - offset = 2; - length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); - /* Write all bytes, no jump */ - fail_unless(length == domain.length); - - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(compress_2nd_label) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x00, 0x00, - 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - u16_t length; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "lwip", 4); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - offset = 2; - length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); - /* Write 5 bytes, then a jump to addr 9 */ - fail_unless(length == 5); - fail_unless(offset == 9); - - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(compress_2nd_label_short) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x00, 0x00, - 0x04, 'l', 'w', 'i', 'p', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - u16_t length; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - offset = 2; - length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); - /* Write 5 bytes, then a jump to addr 7 */ - fail_unless(length == 7); - fail_unless(offset == 7); - - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(compress_jump_to_jump) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - /* 0x00 */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, - /* 0x10 */ 0x04, 'l', 'w', 'i', 'p', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, - /* 0x20 */ 0x07, 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a', 's', 0xc0, 0x15 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - u16_t length; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - offset = 0x20; - length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); - /* Dont compress if jump would be to a jump */ - fail_unless(length == domain.length); - - offset = 0x10; - length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); - /* Write 7 bytes, then a jump to addr 0x15 */ - fail_unless(length == 7); - fail_unless(offset == 0x15); - - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(compress_long_match) -{ - static const u8_t data[] = { - 0x00, 0x00, - 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x03, 'c', 'o', 'm', 0x00 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - struct mdns_domain domain; - u16_t offset; - u16_t length; - err_t res; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); - fail_if(p == NULL); - p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; - - memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); - fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); - - offset = 2; - length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); - fail_unless(length == domain.length); - - pbuf_free(p); -} -END_TEST - -Suite *mdns_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(readname_basic), - TESTFUNC(readname_anydata), - TESTFUNC(readname_short_buf), - TESTFUNC(readname_long_label), - TESTFUNC(readname_overflow), - TESTFUNC(readname_jump_earlier), - TESTFUNC(readname_jump_earlier_jump), - TESTFUNC(readname_jump_maxdepth), - TESTFUNC(readname_jump_later), - TESTFUNC(readname_half_jump), - TESTFUNC(readname_jump_toolong), - TESTFUNC(readname_jump_loop_label), - TESTFUNC(readname_jump_loop_jump), - - TESTFUNC(add_label_basic), - TESTFUNC(add_label_long_label), - TESTFUNC(add_label_full), - - TESTFUNC(domain_eq_basic), - TESTFUNC(domain_eq_diff), - TESTFUNC(domain_eq_case), - TESTFUNC(domain_eq_anydata), - TESTFUNC(domain_eq_length), - - TESTFUNC(compress_full_match), - TESTFUNC(compress_full_match_subset), - TESTFUNC(compress_full_match_jump), - TESTFUNC(compress_no_match), - TESTFUNC(compress_2nd_label), - TESTFUNC(compress_2nd_label_short), - TESTFUNC(compress_jump_to_jump), - TESTFUNC(compress_long_match), - }; - return create_suite("MDNS", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), NULL, NULL); -} +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Verisure Innovation AB + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, + * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT + * SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY + * OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * This file is part of the lwIP TCP/IP stack. + * + * Author: Erik Ekman + * + */ + +#include "test_mdns.h" + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/apps/mdns.h" +#include "lwip/apps/mdns_priv.h" + +START_TEST(readname_basic) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00 }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); + fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(data)); + fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, data, sizeof(data))); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_anydata) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { 0x05, 0x00, 0xFF, 0x08, 0xc0, 0x0f, 0x04, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x82, 0x88, 0x00 }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); + fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(data)); + fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, data, sizeof(data))); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_short_buf) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a' }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_long_label) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', + 0x52, 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', + 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', + 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', + 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', + 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', + 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 'a', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_overflow) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_earlier) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + /* Some padding needed, not supported to jump to bytes containing dns header */ + /* 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + /* 10 */ 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00, 0xab, + /* 20 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x0c + }; + static const u8_t fullname[] = { + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 20, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); + fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(fullname)); + + fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, fullname, sizeof(fullname))); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_earlier_jump) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + /* Some padding needed, not supported to jump to bytes containing dns header */ + /* 0x00 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + /* 0x08 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0xf2, + /* 0x10 */ 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00, 0xc0, 0x10, + /* 0x18 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0xc0, 0x16 + }; + static const u8_t fullname[] = { + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0x18, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); + fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(fullname)); + + fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, fullname, sizeof(fullname))); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_maxdepth) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + /* Some padding needed, not supported to jump to bytes containing dns header */ + /* 0x00 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + /* 0x08 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0xf2, + /* 0x10 */ 0x04, 'n', 'a', 'm', 'e', 0xc0, 0x27, 0x03, + /* 0x18 */ 0x03, 'd', 'n', 's', 0xc0, 0x10, 0xc0, 0x10, + /* 0x20 */ 0x04, 'd', 'e', 'e', 'p', 0xc0, 0x18, 0x00, + /* 0x28 */ 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x20, 0xb0, + /* 0x30 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0xc0, 0x28 + }; + static const u8_t fullname[] = { + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', + 0x04, 'd', 'e', 'e', 'p', 0x03, 'd', 'n', 's', + 0x04, 'n', 'a', 'm', 'e', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0x30, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == sizeof(data)); + fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(fullname)); + + fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, fullname, sizeof(fullname))); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_later) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + /* 0x00 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x10, 0x00, 0x01, 0x40, + /* 0x10 */ 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00, 0xab + }; + static const u8_t fullname[] = { + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == 13); + fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(fullname)); + + fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, fullname, sizeof(fullname))); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_half_jump) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_toolong) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc2, 0x10, 0x00, 0x01, 0x40 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 0, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_loop_label) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + /* 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + /* 10 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x10 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 10, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(readname_jump_loop_jump) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + /* 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + /* 10 */ 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0xc0, 0x15 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + offset = mdns_readname(p, 10, &domain); + pbuf_free(p); + fail_unless(offset == MDNS_READNAME_ERROR); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(add_label_basic) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00 }; + struct mdns_domain domain; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "multi", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "cast", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == sizeof(data)); + fail_if(memcmp(&domain.name, data, sizeof(data))); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(add_label_long_label) +{ + static const char *toolong = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-"; + struct mdns_domain domain; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "multi", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, toolong, (u8_t)strlen(toolong)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(add_label_full) +{ + static const char *label = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"; + struct mdns_domain domain; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == 33); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == 66); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == 99); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == 132); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == 165); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == 198); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == 231); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, (u8_t)strlen(label)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); + fail_unless(domain.length == 231); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, 25); + fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); + fail_unless(domain.length == 231); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, 24); + fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); + fail_unless(domain.length == 231); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, label, 23); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == 255); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain.length == 256); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_VAL); + fail_unless(domain.length == 256); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_basic) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x05, 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 'i', 0x04, 'c', 'a', 's', 't', 0x00 + }; + struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "multi", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "cast", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(domain1.length == sizeof(data)); + + memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "multi", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "cast", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + fail_unless(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_diff) +{ + struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "multi", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "base", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "multi", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "cast", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + fail_if(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_case) +{ + struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "multi", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "cast", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "MulTI", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "casT", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + fail_unless(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_anydata) +{ + static const u8_t data1[] = { 0x05, 0xcc, 0xdc, 0x00, 0xa0 }; + static const u8_t data2[] = { 0x7f, 0x8c, 0x01, 0xff, 0xcf }; + struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, (const char *)data1, sizeof(data1)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "cast", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, (const char *)data2, sizeof(data2)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, (const char *)data1, sizeof(data1)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "casT", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, (const char *)data2, sizeof(data2)); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + fail_unless(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(domain_eq_length) +{ + struct mdns_domain domain1, domain2; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&domain1, 0, sizeof(domain1)); + memset(domain1.name, 0xAA, sizeof(MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "multi", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain1, "cast", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + memset(&domain2, 0, sizeof(domain2)); + memset(domain2.name, 0xBB, sizeof(MDNS_DOMAIN_MAXLEN)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "multi", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain2, "cast", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + fail_unless(mdns_domain_eq(&domain1, &domain2)); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(compress_full_match) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x00, 0x00, + 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + u16_t length; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + offset = 2; + length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); + /* Write 0 bytes, then a jump to addr 2 */ + fail_unless(length == 0); + fail_unless(offset == 2); + + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(compress_full_match_subset) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x00, 0x00, + 0x02, 'g', 'o', 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + u16_t length; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + offset = 2; + length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); + /* Write 0 bytes, then a jump to addr 5 */ + fail_unless(length == 0); + fail_unless(offset == 5); + + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(compress_full_match_jump) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + /* 0x00 */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + /* 0x10 */ 0x04, 'l', 'w', 'i', 'p', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, + /* 0x20 */ 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0xc0, 0x15 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + u16_t length; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + offset = 0x20; + length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); + /* Write 0 bytes, then a jump to addr 0x20 */ + fail_unless(length == 0); + fail_unless(offset == 0x20); + + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(compress_no_match) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x00, 0x00, + 0x04, 'l', 'w', 'i', 'p', 0x05, 'w', 'i', 'k', 'i', 'a', 0x03, 'c', 'o', 'm', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + u16_t length; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + offset = 2; + length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); + /* Write all bytes, no jump */ + fail_unless(length == domain.length); + + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(compress_2nd_label) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x00, 0x00, + 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + u16_t length; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "lwip", 4); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + offset = 2; + length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); + /* Write 5 bytes, then a jump to addr 9 */ + fail_unless(length == 5); + fail_unless(offset == 9); + + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(compress_2nd_label_short) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x00, 0x00, + 0x04, 'l', 'w', 'i', 'p', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + u16_t length; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + offset = 2; + length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); + /* Write 5 bytes, then a jump to addr 7 */ + fail_unless(length == 7); + fail_unless(offset == 7); + + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(compress_jump_to_jump) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + /* 0x00 */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + /* 0x10 */ 0x04, 'l', 'w', 'i', 'p', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x00, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, + /* 0x20 */ 0x07, 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a', 's', 0xc0, 0x15 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + u16_t length; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + offset = 0x20; + length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); + /* Dont compress if jump would be to a jump */ + fail_unless(length == domain.length); + + offset = 0x10; + length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); + /* Write 7 bytes, then a jump to addr 0x15 */ + fail_unless(length == 7); + fail_unless(offset == 0x15); + + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(compress_long_match) +{ + static const u8_t data[] = { + 0x00, 0x00, + 0x06, 'f', 'o', 'o', 'b', 'a', 'r', 0x05, 'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 0x03, 'c', 'o', 'm', 0x00 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + struct mdns_domain domain; + u16_t offset; + u16_t length; + err_t res; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(data), PBUF_ROM); + fail_if(p == NULL); + p->payload = (void *)(size_t)data; + + memset(&domain, 0, sizeof(domain)); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "foobar", 6); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, "local", 5); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + res = mdns_domain_add_label(&domain, NULL, 0); + fail_unless(res == ERR_OK); + + offset = 2; + length = mdns_compress_domain(p, &offset, &domain); + fail_unless(length == domain.length); + + pbuf_free(p); +} +END_TEST + +Suite *mdns_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(readname_basic), + TESTFUNC(readname_anydata), + TESTFUNC(readname_short_buf), + TESTFUNC(readname_long_label), + TESTFUNC(readname_overflow), + TESTFUNC(readname_jump_earlier), + TESTFUNC(readname_jump_earlier_jump), + TESTFUNC(readname_jump_maxdepth), + TESTFUNC(readname_jump_later), + TESTFUNC(readname_half_jump), + TESTFUNC(readname_jump_toolong), + TESTFUNC(readname_jump_loop_label), + TESTFUNC(readname_jump_loop_jump), + + TESTFUNC(add_label_basic), + TESTFUNC(add_label_long_label), + TESTFUNC(add_label_full), + + TESTFUNC(domain_eq_basic), + TESTFUNC(domain_eq_diff), + TESTFUNC(domain_eq_case), + TESTFUNC(domain_eq_anydata), + TESTFUNC(domain_eq_length), + + TESTFUNC(compress_full_match), + TESTFUNC(compress_full_match_subset), + TESTFUNC(compress_full_match_jump), + TESTFUNC(compress_no_match), + TESTFUNC(compress_2nd_label), + TESTFUNC(compress_2nd_label_short), + TESTFUNC(compress_jump_to_jump), + TESTFUNC(compress_long_match), + }; + return create_suite("MDNS", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), NULL, NULL); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.h index 480ae0ef..301c15e3 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mdns/test_mdns.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_MDNS_H__ -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_MDNS_H__ - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *mdns_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_MDNS_H__ +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_MDNS_H__ + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *mdns_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.c index 0bf6ee98..9c6fed64 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.c @@ -1,115 +1,115 @@ -#include "test_mqtt.h" - -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/apps/mqtt.h" -#include "lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -const ip_addr_t test_mqtt_local_ip = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(192, 168, 1, 1); -const ip_addr_t test_mqtt_remote_ip = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(192, 168, 1, 2); -const ip_addr_t test_mqtt_netmask = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(255, 255, 255, 0); - -static err_t test_mqtt_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, - const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void test_mqtt_init_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *ip_addr, const ip_addr_t *netmask) -{ - struct netif *n; - memset(netif, 0, sizeof(struct netif)); - netif->output = test_mqtt_netif_output; - netif->flags |= NETIF_FLAG_UP | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(netif->netmask, *ip_2_ip4(netmask)); - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(netif->ip_addr, *ip_2_ip4(ip_addr)); - - for (n = netif_list; n != NULL; n = n->next) { - if (n == netif) { - return; - } - } - - netif->next = NULL; - netif_list = netif; -} - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ -static struct netif *old_netif_list; -static struct netif *old_netif_default; - -static void mqtt_setup(void) -{ - old_netif_list = netif_list; - old_netif_default = netif_default; - netif_list = NULL; - netif_default = NULL; - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void mqtt_teardown(void) -{ - netif_list = NULL; - netif_default = NULL; - /* restore netif_list for next tests (e.g. loopif) */ - netif_list = old_netif_list; - netif_default = old_netif_default; - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void test_mqtt_connection_cb(mqtt_client_t *client, void *arg, mqtt_connection_status_t status) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(client); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(status); -} - -START_TEST(basic_connect) -{ - mqtt_client_t *client; - struct netif netif; - err_t err; - struct mqtt_connect_client_info_t client_info = { - "dumm", - NULL, NULL, - 10, - NULL, NULL, 0, 0 - }; - struct pbuf *p; - unsigned char rxbuf[] = { 0x20, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00 }; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - test_mqtt_init_netif(&netif, &test_mqtt_local_ip, &test_mqtt_netmask); - - client = mqtt_client_new(); - fail_unless(client != NULL); - err = mqtt_client_connect(client, &test_mqtt_remote_ip, 1234, test_mqtt_connection_cb, NULL, &client_info); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - - client->conn->connected(client->conn->callback_arg, client->conn, ERR_OK); - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(rxbuf), PBUF_REF); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - p->payload = rxbuf; - /* since we hack the rx path, we have to hack the rx window, too: */ - client->conn->rcv_wnd -= p->tot_len; - - if (client->conn->recv(client->conn->callback_arg, client->conn, p, ERR_OK) != ERR_OK) { - pbuf_free(p); - } - - mqtt_disconnect(client); - /* fixme: mqtt_client_fre() is missing... */ - mem_free(client); -} -END_TEST - -Suite *mqtt_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(basic_connect), - }; - return create_suite("MQTT", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), mqtt_setup, mqtt_teardown); -} +#include "test_mqtt.h" + +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/apps/mqtt.h" +#include "lwip/apps/mqtt_priv.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +const ip_addr_t test_mqtt_local_ip = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(192, 168, 1, 1); +const ip_addr_t test_mqtt_remote_ip = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(192, 168, 1, 2); +const ip_addr_t test_mqtt_netmask = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(255, 255, 255, 0); + +static err_t test_mqtt_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, + const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(netif); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(p); + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void test_mqtt_init_netif(struct netif *netif, const ip_addr_t *ip_addr, const ip_addr_t *netmask) +{ + struct netif *n; + memset(netif, 0, sizeof(struct netif)); + netif->output = test_mqtt_netif_output; + netif->flags |= NETIF_FLAG_UP | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(netif->netmask, *ip_2_ip4(netmask)); + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(netif->ip_addr, *ip_2_ip4(ip_addr)); + + for (n = netif_list; n != NULL; n = n->next) { + if (n == netif) { + return; + } + } + + netif->next = NULL; + netif_list = netif; +} + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ +static struct netif *old_netif_list; +static struct netif *old_netif_default; + +static void mqtt_setup(void) +{ + old_netif_list = netif_list; + old_netif_default = netif_default; + netif_list = NULL; + netif_default = NULL; + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void mqtt_teardown(void) +{ + netif_list = NULL; + netif_default = NULL; + /* restore netif_list for next tests (e.g. loopif) */ + netif_list = old_netif_list; + netif_default = old_netif_default; + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void test_mqtt_connection_cb(mqtt_client_t *client, void *arg, mqtt_connection_status_t status) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(client); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(status); +} + +START_TEST(basic_connect) +{ + mqtt_client_t *client; + struct netif netif; + err_t err; + struct mqtt_connect_client_info_t client_info = { + "dumm", + NULL, NULL, + 10, + NULL, NULL, 0, 0 + }; + struct pbuf *p; + unsigned char rxbuf[] = { 0x20, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00 }; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + test_mqtt_init_netif(&netif, &test_mqtt_local_ip, &test_mqtt_netmask); + + client = mqtt_client_new(); + fail_unless(client != NULL); + err = mqtt_client_connect(client, &test_mqtt_remote_ip, 1234, test_mqtt_connection_cb, NULL, &client_info); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + + client->conn->connected(client->conn->callback_arg, client->conn, ERR_OK); + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, sizeof(rxbuf), PBUF_REF); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + p->payload = rxbuf; + /* since we hack the rx path, we have to hack the rx window, too: */ + client->conn->rcv_wnd -= p->tot_len; + + if (client->conn->recv(client->conn->callback_arg, client->conn, p, ERR_OK) != ERR_OK) { + pbuf_free(p); + } + + mqtt_disconnect(client); + /* fixme: mqtt_client_fre() is missing... */ + mem_free(client); +} +END_TEST + +Suite *mqtt_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(basic_connect), + }; + return create_suite("MQTT", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), mqtt_setup, mqtt_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.h index 71f39944..315ccf37 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/mqtt/test_mqtt.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_MQTT_H__ -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_MQTT_H__ - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *mqtt_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_MQTT_H__ +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_MQTT_H__ + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *mqtt_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.c index 4ab8a2b9..b70ebfa0 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.c @@ -1,329 +1,329 @@ -#include "tcp_helper.h" - -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/pbuf.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" -#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" - -#if !LWIP_STATS || !TCP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS -#error "This tests needs TCP- and MEMP-statistics enabled" -#endif - -const ip_addr_t test_local_ip = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(192, 168, 1, 1); -const ip_addr_t test_remote_ip = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(192, 168, 1, 2); -const ip_addr_t test_netmask = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(255, 255, 255, 0); - -/** Remove all pcbs on the given list. */ -static void tcp_remove(struct tcp_pcb *pcb_list) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = pcb_list; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb2; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - pcb2 = pcb; - pcb = pcb->next; - tcp_abort(pcb2); - } -} - -/** Remove all pcbs on listen-, active- and time-wait-list (bound- isn't exported). */ -void tcp_remove_all(void) -{ - tcp_remove(tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs); - tcp_remove(tcp_bound_pcbs); - tcp_remove(tcp_active_pcbs); - tcp_remove(tcp_tw_pcbs); - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB_LISTEN) == 0); - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_SEG) == 0); - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_PBUF_POOL) == 0); -} - -/** Create a TCP segment usable for passing to tcp_input */ -static struct pbuf *tcp_create_segment_wnd(ip_addr_t *src_ip, ip_addr_t *dst_ip, - u16_t src_port, u16_t dst_port, void *data, size_t data_len, - u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, u8_t headerflags, u16_t wnd) -{ - struct pbuf *p, *q; - struct ip_hdr *iphdr; - struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; - u16_t pbuf_len = (u16_t)(sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + data_len); - LWIP_ASSERT("data_len too big", data_len <= 0xFFFF); - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, pbuf_len, PBUF_POOL); - EXPECT_RETNULL(p != NULL); - /* first pbuf must be big enough to hold the headers */ - EXPECT_RETNULL(p->len >= (sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr))); - - if (data_len > 0) { - /* first pbuf must be big enough to hold at least 1 data byte, too */ - EXPECT_RETNULL(p->len > (sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr))); - } - - for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - memset(q->payload, 0, q->len); - } - - iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - /* fill IP header */ - iphdr->dest.addr = ip_2_ip4(dst_ip)->addr; - iphdr->src.addr = ip_2_ip4(src_ip)->addr; - IPH_VHL_SET(iphdr, 4, IP_HLEN / 4); - IPH_TOS_SET(iphdr, 0); - IPH_LEN_SET(iphdr, htons(p->tot_len)); - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, IP_HLEN)); - - /* let p point to TCP header */ - pbuf_header(p, -(s16_t)sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - - tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; - tcphdr->src = htons(src_port); - tcphdr->dest = htons(dst_port); - tcphdr->seqno = htonl(seqno); - tcphdr->ackno = htonl(ackno); - TCPH_HDRLEN_SET(tcphdr, sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) / 4); - TCPH_FLAGS_SET(tcphdr, headerflags); - tcphdr->wnd = htons(wnd); - - if (data_len > 0) { - /* let p point to TCP data */ - pbuf_header(p, -(s16_t)sizeof(struct tcp_hdr)); - /* copy data */ - pbuf_take(p, data, (u16_t)data_len); - /* let p point to TCP header again */ - pbuf_header(p, sizeof(struct tcp_hdr)); - } - - /* calculate checksum */ - - tcphdr->chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(p, - IP_PROTO_TCP, p->tot_len, src_ip, dst_ip); - - pbuf_header(p, sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - - return p; -} - -/** Create a TCP segment usable for passing to tcp_input */ -struct pbuf * -tcp_create_segment(ip_addr_t *src_ip, ip_addr_t *dst_ip, - u16_t src_port, u16_t dst_port, void *data, size_t data_len, - u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, u8_t headerflags) -{ - return tcp_create_segment_wnd(src_ip, dst_ip, src_port, dst_port, data, - data_len, seqno, ackno, headerflags, TCP_WND); -} - -/** Create a TCP segment usable for passing to tcp_input - * - IP-addresses, ports, seqno and ackno are taken from pcb - * - seqno and ackno can be altered with an offset - */ -struct pbuf * -tcp_create_rx_segment(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *data, size_t data_len, u32_t seqno_offset, - u32_t ackno_offset, u8_t headerflags) -{ - return tcp_create_segment(&pcb->remote_ip, &pcb->local_ip, pcb->remote_port, pcb->local_port, - data, data_len, pcb->rcv_nxt + seqno_offset, pcb->lastack + ackno_offset, headerflags); -} - -/** Create a TCP segment usable for passing to tcp_input - * - IP-addresses, ports, seqno and ackno are taken from pcb - * - seqno and ackno can be altered with an offset - * - TCP window can be adjusted - */ -struct pbuf *tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *data, size_t data_len, - u32_t seqno_offset, u32_t ackno_offset, u8_t headerflags, u16_t wnd) -{ - return tcp_create_segment_wnd(&pcb->remote_ip, &pcb->local_ip, pcb->remote_port, pcb->local_port, - data, data_len, pcb->rcv_nxt + seqno_offset, pcb->lastack + ackno_offset, headerflags, wnd); -} - -/** Safely bring a tcp_pcb into the requested state */ -void tcp_set_state(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, enum tcp_state state, const ip_addr_t *local_ip, - const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, u16_t local_port, u16_t remote_port) -{ - u32_t iss; - - /* @todo: are these all states? */ - /* @todo: remove from previous list */ - pcb->state = state; - - iss = tcp_next_iss(pcb); - pcb->snd_wl2 = iss; - pcb->snd_nxt = iss; - pcb->lastack = iss; - pcb->snd_lbb = iss; - - if (state == ESTABLISHED) { - TCP_REG(&tcp_active_pcbs, pcb); - ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); - pcb->local_port = local_port; - ip_addr_copy(pcb->remote_ip, *remote_ip); - pcb->remote_port = remote_port; - } else if (state == LISTEN) { - TCP_REG(&tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs, pcb); - ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); - pcb->local_port = local_port; - } else if (state == TIME_WAIT) { - TCP_REG(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); - ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); - pcb->local_port = local_port; - ip_addr_copy(pcb->remote_ip, *remote_ip); - pcb->remote_port = remote_port; - } else { - fail(); - } -} - -void test_tcp_counters_err(void *arg, err_t err) -{ - struct test_tcp_counters *counters = (struct test_tcp_counters *)arg; - EXPECT_RET(arg != NULL); - counters->err_calls++; - counters->last_err = err; -} - -static void test_tcp_counters_check_rxdata(struct test_tcp_counters *counters, struct pbuf *p) -{ - struct pbuf *q; - u32_t i, received; - - if (counters->expected_data == NULL) { - /* no data to compare */ - return; - } - - EXPECT_RET(counters->recved_bytes + p->tot_len <= counters->expected_data_len); - received = counters->recved_bytes; - - for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { - char *data = (char *)q->payload; - - for (i = 0; i < q->len; i++) { - EXPECT_RET(data[i] == counters->expected_data[received]); - received++; - } - } - - EXPECT(received == counters->recved_bytes + p->tot_len); -} - -err_t test_tcp_counters_recv(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - struct test_tcp_counters *counters = (struct test_tcp_counters *)arg; - EXPECT_RETX(arg != NULL, ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RETX(pcb != NULL, ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RETX(err == ERR_OK, ERR_OK); - - if (p != NULL) { - if (counters->close_calls == 0) { - counters->recv_calls++; - test_tcp_counters_check_rxdata(counters, p); - counters->recved_bytes += p->tot_len; - } else { - counters->recv_calls_after_close++; - counters->recved_bytes_after_close += p->tot_len; - } - - pbuf_free(p); - } else { - counters->close_calls++; - } - - EXPECT(counters->recv_calls_after_close == 0 && counters->recved_bytes_after_close == 0); - return ERR_OK; -} - -/** Allocate a pcb and set up the test_tcp_counters_* callbacks */ -struct tcp_pcb * -test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(struct test_tcp_counters *counters) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb = tcp_new(); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - /* set up args and callbacks */ - tcp_arg(pcb, counters); - tcp_recv(pcb, test_tcp_counters_recv); - tcp_err(pcb, test_tcp_counters_err); - pcb->snd_wnd = TCP_WND; - pcb->snd_wnd_max = TCP_WND; - } - - return pcb; -} - -/** Calls tcp_input() after adjusting current_iphdr_dest */ -void test_tcp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) -{ - struct ip_hdr *iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - /* these lines are a hack, don't use them as an example :-) */ - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(*ip_current_dest_addr(), iphdr->dest); - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(*ip_current_src_addr(), iphdr->src); - ip_current_netif() = inp; - ip_data.current_ip4_header = iphdr; - - /* since adding IPv6, p->payload must point to tcp header, not ip header */ - pbuf_header(p, -(s16_t)sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - - tcp_input(p, inp); - - ip_addr_set_zero(ip_current_dest_addr()); - ip_addr_set_zero(ip_current_src_addr()); - ip_current_netif() = NULL; - ip_data.current_ip4_header = NULL; -} - -static err_t test_tcp_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, - const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - struct test_tcp_txcounters *txcounters = (struct test_tcp_txcounters *)netif->state; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); - - if (txcounters != NULL) { - txcounters->num_tx_calls++; - txcounters->num_tx_bytes += p->tot_len; - - if (txcounters->copy_tx_packets) { - struct pbuf *p_copy = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); - err_t err; - EXPECT(p_copy != NULL); - err = pbuf_copy(p_copy, p); - EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); - - if (txcounters->tx_packets == NULL) { - txcounters->tx_packets = p_copy; - } else { - pbuf_cat(txcounters->tx_packets, p_copy); - } - } - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -void test_tcp_init_netif(struct netif *netif, struct test_tcp_txcounters *txcounters, - const ip_addr_t *ip_addr, const ip_addr_t *netmask) -{ - struct netif *n; - memset(netif, 0, sizeof(struct netif)); - - if (txcounters != NULL) { - memset(txcounters, 0, sizeof(struct test_tcp_txcounters)); - netif->state = txcounters; - } - - netif->output = test_tcp_netif_output; - netif->flags |= NETIF_FLAG_UP | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(netif->netmask, *ip_2_ip4(netmask)); - ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(netif->ip_addr, *ip_2_ip4(ip_addr)); - - for (n = netif_list; n != NULL; n = n->next) { - if (n == netif) { - return; - } - } - - netif->next = NULL; - netif_list = netif; -} +#include "tcp_helper.h" + +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/pbuf.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" +#include "lwip/ip_addr.h" + +#if !LWIP_STATS || !TCP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS +#error "This tests needs TCP- and MEMP-statistics enabled" +#endif + +const ip_addr_t test_local_ip = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(192, 168, 1, 1); +const ip_addr_t test_remote_ip = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(192, 168, 1, 2); +const ip_addr_t test_netmask = IPADDR4_INIT_BYTES(255, 255, 255, 0); + +/** Remove all pcbs on the given list. */ +static void tcp_remove(struct tcp_pcb *pcb_list) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = pcb_list; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb2; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + pcb2 = pcb; + pcb = pcb->next; + tcp_abort(pcb2); + } +} + +/** Remove all pcbs on listen-, active- and time-wait-list (bound- isn't exported). */ +void tcp_remove_all(void) +{ + tcp_remove(tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs); + tcp_remove(tcp_bound_pcbs); + tcp_remove(tcp_active_pcbs); + tcp_remove(tcp_tw_pcbs); + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB_LISTEN) == 0); + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_SEG) == 0); + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_PBUF_POOL) == 0); +} + +/** Create a TCP segment usable for passing to tcp_input */ +static struct pbuf *tcp_create_segment_wnd(ip_addr_t *src_ip, ip_addr_t *dst_ip, + u16_t src_port, u16_t dst_port, void *data, size_t data_len, + u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, u8_t headerflags, u16_t wnd) +{ + struct pbuf *p, *q; + struct ip_hdr *iphdr; + struct tcp_hdr *tcphdr; + u16_t pbuf_len = (u16_t)(sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + data_len); + LWIP_ASSERT("data_len too big", data_len <= 0xFFFF); + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_RAW, pbuf_len, PBUF_POOL); + EXPECT_RETNULL(p != NULL); + /* first pbuf must be big enough to hold the headers */ + EXPECT_RETNULL(p->len >= (sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr))); + + if (data_len > 0) { + /* first pbuf must be big enough to hold at least 1 data byte, too */ + EXPECT_RETNULL(p->len > (sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr))); + } + + for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + memset(q->payload, 0, q->len); + } + + iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + /* fill IP header */ + iphdr->dest.addr = ip_2_ip4(dst_ip)->addr; + iphdr->src.addr = ip_2_ip4(src_ip)->addr; + IPH_VHL_SET(iphdr, 4, IP_HLEN / 4); + IPH_TOS_SET(iphdr, 0); + IPH_LEN_SET(iphdr, htons(p->tot_len)); + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(iphdr, inet_chksum(iphdr, IP_HLEN)); + + /* let p point to TCP header */ + pbuf_header(p, -(s16_t)sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + + tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; + tcphdr->src = htons(src_port); + tcphdr->dest = htons(dst_port); + tcphdr->seqno = htonl(seqno); + tcphdr->ackno = htonl(ackno); + TCPH_HDRLEN_SET(tcphdr, sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) / 4); + TCPH_FLAGS_SET(tcphdr, headerflags); + tcphdr->wnd = htons(wnd); + + if (data_len > 0) { + /* let p point to TCP data */ + pbuf_header(p, -(s16_t)sizeof(struct tcp_hdr)); + /* copy data */ + pbuf_take(p, data, (u16_t)data_len); + /* let p point to TCP header again */ + pbuf_header(p, sizeof(struct tcp_hdr)); + } + + /* calculate checksum */ + + tcphdr->chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(p, + IP_PROTO_TCP, p->tot_len, src_ip, dst_ip); + + pbuf_header(p, sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + + return p; +} + +/** Create a TCP segment usable for passing to tcp_input */ +struct pbuf * +tcp_create_segment(ip_addr_t *src_ip, ip_addr_t *dst_ip, + u16_t src_port, u16_t dst_port, void *data, size_t data_len, + u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, u8_t headerflags) +{ + return tcp_create_segment_wnd(src_ip, dst_ip, src_port, dst_port, data, + data_len, seqno, ackno, headerflags, TCP_WND); +} + +/** Create a TCP segment usable for passing to tcp_input + * - IP-addresses, ports, seqno and ackno are taken from pcb + * - seqno and ackno can be altered with an offset + */ +struct pbuf * +tcp_create_rx_segment(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *data, size_t data_len, u32_t seqno_offset, + u32_t ackno_offset, u8_t headerflags) +{ + return tcp_create_segment(&pcb->remote_ip, &pcb->local_ip, pcb->remote_port, pcb->local_port, + data, data_len, pcb->rcv_nxt + seqno_offset, pcb->lastack + ackno_offset, headerflags); +} + +/** Create a TCP segment usable for passing to tcp_input + * - IP-addresses, ports, seqno and ackno are taken from pcb + * - seqno and ackno can be altered with an offset + * - TCP window can be adjusted + */ +struct pbuf *tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *data, size_t data_len, + u32_t seqno_offset, u32_t ackno_offset, u8_t headerflags, u16_t wnd) +{ + return tcp_create_segment_wnd(&pcb->remote_ip, &pcb->local_ip, pcb->remote_port, pcb->local_port, + data, data_len, pcb->rcv_nxt + seqno_offset, pcb->lastack + ackno_offset, headerflags, wnd); +} + +/** Safely bring a tcp_pcb into the requested state */ +void tcp_set_state(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, enum tcp_state state, const ip_addr_t *local_ip, + const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, u16_t local_port, u16_t remote_port) +{ + u32_t iss; + + /* @todo: are these all states? */ + /* @todo: remove from previous list */ + pcb->state = state; + + iss = tcp_next_iss(pcb); + pcb->snd_wl2 = iss; + pcb->snd_nxt = iss; + pcb->lastack = iss; + pcb->snd_lbb = iss; + + if (state == ESTABLISHED) { + TCP_REG(&tcp_active_pcbs, pcb); + ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); + pcb->local_port = local_port; + ip_addr_copy(pcb->remote_ip, *remote_ip); + pcb->remote_port = remote_port; + } else if (state == LISTEN) { + TCP_REG(&tcp_listen_pcbs.pcbs, pcb); + ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); + pcb->local_port = local_port; + } else if (state == TIME_WAIT) { + TCP_REG(&tcp_tw_pcbs, pcb); + ip_addr_copy(pcb->local_ip, *local_ip); + pcb->local_port = local_port; + ip_addr_copy(pcb->remote_ip, *remote_ip); + pcb->remote_port = remote_port; + } else { + fail(); + } +} + +void test_tcp_counters_err(void *arg, err_t err) +{ + struct test_tcp_counters *counters = (struct test_tcp_counters *)arg; + EXPECT_RET(arg != NULL); + counters->err_calls++; + counters->last_err = err; +} + +static void test_tcp_counters_check_rxdata(struct test_tcp_counters *counters, struct pbuf *p) +{ + struct pbuf *q; + u32_t i, received; + + if (counters->expected_data == NULL) { + /* no data to compare */ + return; + } + + EXPECT_RET(counters->recved_bytes + p->tot_len <= counters->expected_data_len); + received = counters->recved_bytes; + + for (q = p; q != NULL; q = q->next) { + char *data = (char *)q->payload; + + for (i = 0; i < q->len; i++) { + EXPECT_RET(data[i] == counters->expected_data[received]); + received++; + } + } + + EXPECT(received == counters->recved_bytes + p->tot_len); +} + +err_t test_tcp_counters_recv(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + struct test_tcp_counters *counters = (struct test_tcp_counters *)arg; + EXPECT_RETX(arg != NULL, ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RETX(pcb != NULL, ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RETX(err == ERR_OK, ERR_OK); + + if (p != NULL) { + if (counters->close_calls == 0) { + counters->recv_calls++; + test_tcp_counters_check_rxdata(counters, p); + counters->recved_bytes += p->tot_len; + } else { + counters->recv_calls_after_close++; + counters->recved_bytes_after_close += p->tot_len; + } + + pbuf_free(p); + } else { + counters->close_calls++; + } + + EXPECT(counters->recv_calls_after_close == 0 && counters->recved_bytes_after_close == 0); + return ERR_OK; +} + +/** Allocate a pcb and set up the test_tcp_counters_* callbacks */ +struct tcp_pcb * +test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(struct test_tcp_counters *counters) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb = tcp_new(); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + /* set up args and callbacks */ + tcp_arg(pcb, counters); + tcp_recv(pcb, test_tcp_counters_recv); + tcp_err(pcb, test_tcp_counters_err); + pcb->snd_wnd = TCP_WND; + pcb->snd_wnd_max = TCP_WND; + } + + return pcb; +} + +/** Calls tcp_input() after adjusting current_iphdr_dest */ +void test_tcp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp) +{ + struct ip_hdr *iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + /* these lines are a hack, don't use them as an example :-) */ + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(*ip_current_dest_addr(), iphdr->dest); + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(*ip_current_src_addr(), iphdr->src); + ip_current_netif() = inp; + ip_data.current_ip4_header = iphdr; + + /* since adding IPv6, p->payload must point to tcp header, not ip header */ + pbuf_header(p, -(s16_t)sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + + tcp_input(p, inp); + + ip_addr_set_zero(ip_current_dest_addr()); + ip_addr_set_zero(ip_current_src_addr()); + ip_current_netif() = NULL; + ip_data.current_ip4_header = NULL; +} + +static err_t test_tcp_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, + const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + struct test_tcp_txcounters *txcounters = (struct test_tcp_txcounters *)netif->state; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(ipaddr); + + if (txcounters != NULL) { + txcounters->num_tx_calls++; + txcounters->num_tx_bytes += p->tot_len; + + if (txcounters->copy_tx_packets) { + struct pbuf *p_copy = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_LINK, p->tot_len, PBUF_RAM); + err_t err; + EXPECT(p_copy != NULL); + err = pbuf_copy(p_copy, p); + EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); + + if (txcounters->tx_packets == NULL) { + txcounters->tx_packets = p_copy; + } else { + pbuf_cat(txcounters->tx_packets, p_copy); + } + } + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +void test_tcp_init_netif(struct netif *netif, struct test_tcp_txcounters *txcounters, + const ip_addr_t *ip_addr, const ip_addr_t *netmask) +{ + struct netif *n; + memset(netif, 0, sizeof(struct netif)); + + if (txcounters != NULL) { + memset(txcounters, 0, sizeof(struct test_tcp_txcounters)); + netif->state = txcounters; + } + + netif->output = test_tcp_netif_output; + netif->flags |= NETIF_FLAG_UP | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(netif->netmask, *ip_2_ip4(netmask)); + ip_addr_copy_from_ip4(netif->ip_addr, *ip_2_ip4(ip_addr)); + + for (n = netif_list; n != NULL; n = n->next) { + if (n == netif) { + return; + } + } + + netif->next = NULL; + netif_list = netif; +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.h similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.h index 3a5e99e3..e470207d 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/tcp_helper.h @@ -1,57 +1,57 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCP_HELPER_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TCP_HELPER_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" -#include "lwip/arch.h" -#include "lwip/tcp.h" -#include "lwip/netif.h" - -/* counters used for test_tcp_counters_* callback functions */ -struct test_tcp_counters { - u32_t recv_calls; - u32_t recved_bytes; - u32_t recv_calls_after_close; - u32_t recved_bytes_after_close; - u32_t close_calls; - u32_t err_calls; - err_t last_err; - char *expected_data; - u32_t expected_data_len; -}; - -struct test_tcp_txcounters { - u32_t num_tx_calls; - u32_t num_tx_bytes; - u8_t copy_tx_packets; - struct pbuf *tx_packets; -}; - -extern const ip_addr_t test_local_ip; -extern const ip_addr_t test_remote_ip; -extern const ip_addr_t test_netmask; -#define TEST_REMOTE_PORT 0x100 -#define TEST_LOCAL_PORT 0x101 - -/* Helper functions */ -void tcp_remove_all(void); - -struct pbuf *tcp_create_segment(ip_addr_t *src_ip, ip_addr_t *dst_ip, - u16_t src_port, u16_t dst_port, void *data, size_t data_len, - u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, u8_t headerflags); -struct pbuf *tcp_create_rx_segment(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *data, size_t data_len, - u32_t seqno_offset, u32_t ackno_offset, u8_t headerflags); -struct pbuf *tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *data, size_t data_len, - u32_t seqno_offset, u32_t ackno_offset, u8_t headerflags, u16_t wnd); -void tcp_set_state(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, enum tcp_state state, const ip_addr_t *local_ip, - const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, u16_t local_port, u16_t remote_port); -void test_tcp_counters_err(void *arg, err_t err); -err_t test_tcp_counters_recv(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); - -struct tcp_pcb *test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(struct test_tcp_counters *counters); - -void test_tcp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); - -void test_tcp_init_netif(struct netif *netif, struct test_tcp_txcounters *txcounters, - const ip_addr_t *ip_addr, const ip_addr_t *netmask); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TCP_HELPER_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TCP_HELPER_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" +#include "lwip/arch.h" +#include "lwip/tcp.h" +#include "lwip/netif.h" + +/* counters used for test_tcp_counters_* callback functions */ +struct test_tcp_counters { + u32_t recv_calls; + u32_t recved_bytes; + u32_t recv_calls_after_close; + u32_t recved_bytes_after_close; + u32_t close_calls; + u32_t err_calls; + err_t last_err; + char *expected_data; + u32_t expected_data_len; +}; + +struct test_tcp_txcounters { + u32_t num_tx_calls; + u32_t num_tx_bytes; + u8_t copy_tx_packets; + struct pbuf *tx_packets; +}; + +extern const ip_addr_t test_local_ip; +extern const ip_addr_t test_remote_ip; +extern const ip_addr_t test_netmask; +#define TEST_REMOTE_PORT 0x100 +#define TEST_LOCAL_PORT 0x101 + +/* Helper functions */ +void tcp_remove_all(void); + +struct pbuf *tcp_create_segment(ip_addr_t *src_ip, ip_addr_t *dst_ip, + u16_t src_port, u16_t dst_port, void *data, size_t data_len, + u32_t seqno, u32_t ackno, u8_t headerflags); +struct pbuf *tcp_create_rx_segment(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *data, size_t data_len, + u32_t seqno_offset, u32_t ackno_offset, u8_t headerflags); +struct pbuf *tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, void *data, size_t data_len, + u32_t seqno_offset, u32_t ackno_offset, u8_t headerflags, u16_t wnd); +void tcp_set_state(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, enum tcp_state state, const ip_addr_t *local_ip, + const ip_addr_t *remote_ip, u16_t local_port, u16_t remote_port); +void test_tcp_counters_err(void *arg, err_t err); +err_t test_tcp_counters_recv(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); + +struct tcp_pcb *test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(struct test_tcp_counters *counters); + +void test_tcp_input(struct pbuf *p, struct netif *inp); + +void test_tcp_init_netif(struct netif *netif, struct test_tcp_txcounters *txcounters, + const ip_addr_t *ip_addr, const ip_addr_t *netmask); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.c index b1a7f066..99f95bc8 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.c @@ -1,1726 +1,1726 @@ -#include "test_tcp.h" - -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "tcp_helper.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" - -#ifdef _MSC_VER -#pragma warning(disable : 4307) /* we explicitly wrap around TCP seqnos */ -#endif - -#if !LWIP_STATS || !TCP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS -#error "This tests needs TCP- and MEMP-statistics enabled" -#endif -#if TCP_SND_BUF <= TCP_WND -#error "This tests needs TCP_SND_BUF to be > TCP_WND" -#endif - -/* used with check_seqnos() */ -#define SEQNO1 (0xFFFFFF00 - TCP_MSS) -#define ISS 6510 -static u32_t seqnos[] = { - SEQNO1, - SEQNO1 + (1 * TCP_MSS), - SEQNO1 + (2 * TCP_MSS), - SEQNO1 + (3 * TCP_MSS), - SEQNO1 + (4 * TCP_MSS), - SEQNO1 + (5 * TCP_MSS) -}; - -static u8_t test_tcp_timer; - -/* our own version of tcp_tmr so we can reset fast/slow timer state */ -static void test_tcp_tmr(void) -{ - tcp_fasttmr(); - - if (++test_tcp_timer & 1) { - tcp_slowtmr(); - } -} - -/* Setups/teardown functions */ -static struct netif *old_netif_list; -static struct netif *old_netif_default; - -static void tcp_setup(void) -{ - struct tcp_pcb dummy_pcb; /* we need this for tcp_next_iss() only */ - - old_netif_list = netif_list; - old_netif_default = netif_default; - netif_list = NULL; - netif_default = NULL; - /* reset iss to default (6510) */ - tcp_ticks = 0; - tcp_ticks = 0 - (tcp_next_iss(&dummy_pcb) - 6510); - tcp_next_iss(&dummy_pcb); - tcp_ticks = 0; - - test_tcp_timer = 0; - tcp_remove_all(); - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void tcp_teardown(void) -{ - netif_list = NULL; - netif_default = NULL; - tcp_remove_all(); - /* restore netif_list for next tests (e.g. loopif) */ - netif_list = old_netif_list; - netif_default = old_netif_default; - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -/* Test functions */ - -/** Call tcp_new() and tcp_abort() and test memp stats */ -START_TEST(test_tcp_new_abort) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); - - pcb = tcp_new(); - fail_unless(pcb != NULL); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); - } -} -END_TEST - -/** Call tcp_new() and tcp_abort() and test memp stats */ START_TEST(test_tcp_listen_passive_open) -{ - struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *pcbl; - struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb; - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct pbuf *p; - ip_addr_t src_addr; - err_t err; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); - - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - pcb = tcp_new(); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - err = tcp_bind(pcb, &netif.ip_addr, 1234); - EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); - pcbl = tcp_listen(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(pcbl != NULL); - EXPECT_RET(pcbl != pcb); - lpcb = (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)pcbl; - - ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(src_addr, lwip_htonl(lwip_ntohl(ip_addr_get_ip4_u32(&lpcb->local_ip)) + 1)); - - /* check correct syn packet */ - p = tcp_create_segment(&src_addr, &lpcb->local_ip, 12345, - lpcb->local_port, NULL, 0, 12345, 54321, TCP_SYN); - EXPECT(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - } - - /* check syn packet with short length */ - p = tcp_create_segment(&src_addr, &lpcb->local_ip, 12345, - lpcb->local_port, NULL, 0, 12345, 54321, TCP_SYN); - EXPECT(p != NULL); - EXPECT(p->next == NULL); - - if ((p != NULL) && (p->next == NULL)) { - p->len -= 2; - p->tot_len -= 2; - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - } - - tcp_close(pcbl); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create an ESTABLISHED pcb and check if receive callback is called */ START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_inseq) -{ - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - char data[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 }; - u16_t data_len; - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - data_len = sizeof(data); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = data_len; - counters.expected_data = data; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - - /* create a segment */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, counters.expected_data, data_len, 0, 0, 0); - EXPECT(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == data_len); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - } - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create an ESTABLISHED pcb and check if receive callback is called if a segment - * overlapping rcv_nxt is received */ -START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_inseq_trim) -{ - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - char data[PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE * 2]; - u16_t data_len; - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - const u32_t new_data_len = 40; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - data_len = sizeof(data); - memset(data, 0, sizeof(data)); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = data_len; - counters.expected_data = data; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - - /* create a segment (with an overlapping/old seqno so that the new data begins in the 2nd pbuf) */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, counters.expected_data, data_len, (u32_t)(0 - (data_len - new_data_len)), 0, 0); - EXPECT(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - EXPECT(p->next != NULL); - - if (p->next != NULL) { - EXPECT(p->next->next != NULL); - } - } - - if ((p != NULL) && (p->next != NULL) && (p->next->next != NULL)) { - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == new_data_len); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - } - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -static err_t test_tcp_recv_expect1byte(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); - -static err_t test_tcp_recv_expectclose(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - EXPECT_RETX(pcb != NULL, ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RETX(err == ERR_OK, ERR_OK); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - if (p != NULL) { - fail(); - } else { - /* correct: FIN received; close our end, too */ - err_t err2 = tcp_close(pcb); - fail_unless(err2 == ERR_OK); - /* set back to some other rx function, just to not get here again */ - tcp_recv(pcb, test_tcp_recv_expect1byte); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t test_tcp_recv_expect1byte(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) -{ - EXPECT_RETX(pcb != NULL, ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RETX(err == ERR_OK, ERR_OK); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); - - if (p != NULL) { - if ((p->len == 1) && (p->tot_len == 1)) { - tcp_recv(pcb, test_tcp_recv_expectclose); - } else { - fail(); - } - - pbuf_free(p); - } else { - fail(); - } - - return ERR_OK; -} - -START_TEST(test_tcp_passive_close) -{ - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - char data = 0x0f; - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = 1; - counters.expected_data = &data; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - - /* create a segment without data */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data, 1, 0, 0, TCP_FIN); - EXPECT(p != NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - tcp_recv(pcb, test_tcp_recv_expect1byte); - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - } - - /* don't free the pcb here (part of the test!) */ -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_active_abort) -{ - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - char data = 0x0f; - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = 1; - counters.expected_data = &data; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - - /* abort the pcb */ - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 1; - tcp_abort(pcb); - txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 0; - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 40U); - EXPECT(txcounters.tx_packets != NULL); - - if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { - u16_t ret; - struct tcp_hdr tcphdr; - ret = pbuf_copy_partial(txcounters.tx_packets, &tcphdr, 20, 20); - EXPECT(ret == 20); - EXPECT(tcphdr.dest == PP_HTONS(TEST_REMOTE_PORT)); - EXPECT(tcphdr.src == PP_HTONS(TEST_LOCAL_PORT)); - pbuf_free(txcounters.tx_packets); - txcounters.tx_packets = NULL; - } - - /* don't free the pcb here (part of the test!) */ -} -END_TEST - -/** Check that we handle malformed tcp headers, and discard the pbuf(s) */ START_TEST(test_tcp_malformed_header) -{ - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - char data[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 }; - u16_t data_len, chksum; - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct tcp_hdr *hdr; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - data_len = sizeof(data); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = data_len; - counters.expected_data = data; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - - /* create a segment */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, counters.expected_data, data_len, 0, 0, 0); - - pbuf_header(p, -(s16_t)sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - - hdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; - TCPH_HDRLEN_FLAGS_SET(hdr, 15, 0x3d1); - - hdr->chksum = 0; - - chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(p, IP_PROTO_TCP, p->tot_len, - &test_remote_ip, &test_local_ip); - - hdr->chksum = chksum; - - pbuf_header(p, sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - - EXPECT(p != NULL); - EXPECT(p->next == NULL); - - if (p != NULL) { - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - } - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -/** Provoke fast retransmission by duplicate ACKs and then recover by ACKing all sent data. - * At the end, send more data. */ -START_TEST(test_tcp_fast_retx_recover) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - char data1[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 }; - char data2[] = { 5, 6, 7, 8 }; - char data3[] = { 9, 10, 11, 12 }; - char data4[] = { 13, 14, 15, 16 }; - char data5[] = { 17, 18, 19, 20 }; - char data6[TCP_MSS] = { 21, 22, 23, 24 }; - err_t err; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; - /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ - pcb->cwnd = pcb->snd_wnd; - - /* send data1 */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data1, sizeof(data1), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data1) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* "recv" ACK for data1 */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 4, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked == NULL); - /* send data2 */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data2, sizeof(data2), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data2) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* duplicate ACK for data1 (data2 is lost) */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->dupacks == 1); - /* send data3 */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data3, sizeof(data3), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /* nagle enabled, no tx calls */ - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* 2nd duplicate ACK for data1 (data2 and data3 are lost) */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->dupacks == 2); - /* queue data4, don't send it (unsent-oversize is != 0) */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data4, sizeof(data4), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /* 3nd duplicate ACK for data1 (data2 and data3 are lost) -> fast retransmission */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /*EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1);*/ - EXPECT_RET(pcb->dupacks == 3); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* @todo: check expected data?*/ - - /* send data5, not output yet */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /*err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK);*/ - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - { - int i = 0; - - do { - err = tcp_write(pcb, data6, TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - i++; - } while (err == ERR_OK); - - EXPECT_RET(err != ERR_OK); - } - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /*EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0);*/ - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - /* send even more data */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /* ...and even more data */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /* ...and even more data */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /* ...and even more data */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - - /* send ACKs for data2 and data3 */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 12, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /*EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0);*/ - - /* ...and even more data */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /* ...and even more data */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - -#if 0 - /* create expected segment */ - p1 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, counters.expected_data, data_len, 0, 0, 0); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - - if(p != NULL) - { - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT_RET(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT_RET(counters.recv_calls == 1); - EXPECT_RET(counters.recved_bytes == data_len); - EXPECT_RET(counters.err_calls == 0); - } - -#endif - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -static u8_t tx_data[TCP_WND * 2]; - -static void check_seqnos(struct tcp_seg *segs, int num_expected, u32_t *seqnos_expected) -{ - struct tcp_seg *s = segs; - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < num_expected; i++, s = s->next) { - EXPECT_RET(s != NULL); - EXPECT(s->tcphdr->seqno == htonl(seqnos_expected[i])); - } - - EXPECT(s == NULL); -} - -/** Send data with sequence numbers that wrap around the u32_t range. - * Then, provoke fast retransmission by duplicate ACKs and check that all - * segment lists are still properly sorted. */ -START_TEST(test_tcp_fast_rexmit_wraparound) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - err_t err; - size_t i; - u16_t sent_total = 0; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tx_data); i++) { - tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; - /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ - pcb->cwnd = 2 * TCP_MSS; - /* start in congestion advoidance */ - pcb->ssthresh = pcb->cwnd; - - /* send 6 mss-sized segments */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - sent_total += TCP_MSS; - } - - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 6, seqnos); - EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 2); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 2 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 2, seqnos); - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 4, &seqnos[2]); - - /* ACK the first segment */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* ensure this didn't trigger a retransmission. Only one - segment should be transmitted because cwnd opened up by - TCP_MSS and a fraction since we are in congestion avoidance */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MSS + 40U); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 2, &seqnos[1]); - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 3, &seqnos[3]); - - /* 3 dupacks */ - EXPECT(pcb->dupacks == 0); - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->dupacks == 1); - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->dupacks == 2); - /* 3rd dupack -> fast rexmit */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT(pcb->dupacks == 3); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 4); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 5, &seqnos[1]); - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -/** Send data with sequence numbers that wrap around the u32_t range. - * Then, provoke RTO retransmission and check that all - * segment lists are still properly sorted. */ -START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_rexmit_wraparound) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct tcp_pcb dummy_pcb_for_iss; /* we need this for tcp_next_iss() only */ - err_t err; - size_t i; - u16_t sent_total = 0; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tx_data); i++) { - tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - tcp_ticks = 0; - tcp_ticks = 0 - tcp_next_iss(&dummy_pcb_for_iss); - tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - tcp_next_iss(&dummy_pcb_for_iss); - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; - /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ - pcb->cwnd = 2 * TCP_MSS; - - /* send 6 mss-sized segments */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - sent_total += TCP_MSS; - } - - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 6, seqnos); - EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 2); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 2 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 2, seqnos); - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 4, &seqnos[2]); - - /* call the tcp timer some times */ - for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - } - - /* 11th call to tcp_tmr: RTO rexmit fires */ - test_tcp_tmr(); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 1, seqnos); - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 5, &seqnos[1]); - - /* fake greater cwnd */ - pcb->cwnd = pcb->snd_wnd; - /* send more data */ - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); - /* check queues are sorted */ - EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 6, seqnos); - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -/** Provoke fast retransmission by duplicate ACKs and then recover by ACKing all sent data. - * At the end, send more data. */ -static void test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost(u8_t zero_window_probe_from_unsent) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - err_t err; - size_t i; - u16_t sent_total; - u8_t expected = 0xFE; - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tx_data); i++) { - u8_t d = (u8_t)i; - - if (d == 0xFE) { - d = 0xF0; - } - - tx_data[i] = d; - } - - if (zero_window_probe_from_unsent) { - tx_data[TCP_WND] = expected; - } else { - tx_data[0] = expected; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; - /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ - pcb->cwnd = pcb->snd_wnd; - - /* send a full window (minus 1 packets) of TCP data in MSS-sized chunks */ - sent_total = 0; - - if ((TCP_WND - TCP_MSS) % TCP_MSS != 0) { - u16_t initial_data_len = (TCP_WND - TCP_MSS) % TCP_MSS; - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], initial_data_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == initial_data_len + 40U); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - sent_total += initial_data_len; - } - - for (; sent_total < (TCP_WND - TCP_MSS); sent_total += TCP_MSS) { - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MSS + 40U); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - } - - EXPECT(sent_total == (TCP_WND - TCP_MSS)); - - /* now ACK the packet before the first */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* ensure this didn't trigger a retransmission */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); - /* send the last packet, now a complete window has been sent */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - sent_total += TCP_MSS; - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MSS + 40U); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); - - if (zero_window_probe_from_unsent) { - /* ACK all data but close the TX window */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_WND, TCP_ACK, 0); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* ensure this didn't trigger any transmission */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - /* window is completely full, but persist timer is off since send buffer is empty */ - EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); - } - - /* send one byte more (out of window) -> persist timer starts */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], 1, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - if (!zero_window_probe_from_unsent) { - /* no persist timer unless a zero window announcement has been received */ - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); - } else { - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 1); - - /* call tcp_timer some more times to let persist timer count up */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - } - - /* this should trigger the zero-window-probe */ - txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 1; - test_tcp_tmr(); - txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 0; - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 + 40U); - EXPECT(txcounters.tx_packets != NULL); - - if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { - u8_t sent; - u16_t ret; - ret = pbuf_copy_partial(txcounters.tx_packets, &sent, 1, 40U); - EXPECT(ret == 1); - EXPECT(sent == expected); - } - - if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { - pbuf_free(txcounters.tx_packets); - txcounters.tx_packets = NULL; - } - } - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} - -START_TEST(test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost_from_unsent) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost(1); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost_from_unacked) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost(0); -} -END_TEST - -/** Send data, provoke retransmission and then add data to a segment - * that already has been sent before. */ -START_TEST(test_tcp_retx_add_to_sent) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - char data1a[] = { 1, 2, 3 }; - char data1b[] = { 4 }; - char data2a[] = { 5, 6, 7, 8 }; - char data2b[] = { 5, 6, 7 }; - char data3[] = { 9, 10, 11, 12, 12 }; - char data4[] = { 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 }; - err_t err; - int i; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; - /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ - pcb->cwnd = pcb->snd_wnd; - - /* send data1 */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data1a, sizeof(data1a), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_write(pcb, data1b, sizeof(data1b), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data1a) + sizeof(data1b) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* "recv" ACK for data1 */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 4, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked == NULL); - /* send data2 */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data2a, sizeof(data2a), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_write(pcb, data2b, sizeof(data2b), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data2a) + sizeof(data2b) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* send data3 */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data3, sizeof(data3), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - /* data3 not sent yet (nagle) */ - EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked != NULL); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->unsent != NULL); - - /* disable nagle for this test so data to sent segment can be added below... */ - tcp_nagle_disable(pcb); - - /* call the tcp timer some times */ - for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - - if (txcounters.num_tx_calls != 0) { - break; - } - } - - /* data3 sent */ - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data3) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked != NULL); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->unsent == NULL); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - tcp_nagle_enable(pcb); - - /* call the tcp timer some times */ - for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - - if (txcounters.num_tx_calls != 0) { - break; - } - } - - /* RTO: rexmit of data2 */ - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data2a) + sizeof(data2b) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked != NULL); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->unsent != NULL); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - /* send data4 */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, data4, sizeof(data4), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /* disable nagle for this test so data to transmit without further ACKs... */ - tcp_nagle_disable(pcb); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - /* nagle enabled, no tx calls */ - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data3) + sizeof(data4) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_tracking) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - err_t err; - size_t i; - u16_t sent_total = 0; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tx_data); i++) { - tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; - /* Set congestion window large enough to send all our segments */ - pcb->cwnd = 5 * TCP_MSS; - - /* send 5 mss-sized segments */ - for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - sent_total += TCP_MSS; - } - - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 5, seqnos); - EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 5); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 5 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* Check all 5 are in-flight */ - EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 5, seqnos); - - /* Force us into retransmisson timeout */ - while (!(pcb->flags & TF_RTO)) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - } - - /* Ensure 4 remaining segments are back on unsent, ready for retransmission */ - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 4, &seqnos[1]); - /* Ensure 1st segment is on unacked (already retransmitted) */ - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 1, seqnos); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MSS + 40U); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* Ensure rto_end points to next byte */ - EXPECT(pcb->rto_end == seqnos[5]); - EXPECT(pcb->rto_end == pcb->snd_nxt); - /* Check cwnd was reset */ - EXPECT(pcb->cwnd == pcb->mss); - - /* Add another segment to send buffer which is outside of RTO */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - sent_total += TCP_MSS; - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 5, &seqnos[1]); - /* Ensure no new data was sent */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->rto_end == pcb->snd_nxt); - - /* ACK first segment */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* Next two retranmissions should go out, due to cwnd in slow start */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 2); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 2 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 2, &seqnos[1]); - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 3, &seqnos[3]); - /* RTO should still be marked */ - EXPECT(pcb->flags & TF_RTO); - /* cwnd should have only grown by 1 MSS */ - EXPECT(pcb->cwnd == (tcpwnd_size_t)(2 * pcb->mss)); - /* Ensure no new data was sent */ - EXPECT(pcb->rto_end == pcb->snd_nxt); - - /* ACK the next two segments */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 2 * TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* Final 2 retransmissions and 1 new data should go out */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 3); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 3 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 3, &seqnos[3]); - EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); - /* RTO should still be marked */ - EXPECT(pcb->flags & TF_RTO); - /* cwnd should have only grown by 1 MSS */ - EXPECT(pcb->cwnd == (tcpwnd_size_t)(3 * pcb->mss)); - /* snd_nxt should have been advanced past rto_end */ - EXPECT(TCP_SEQ_GT(pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rto_end)); - - /* ACK the next two segments, finishing our RTO, leaving new segment unacked */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 2 * TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT(!(pcb->flags & TF_RTO)); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 1, &seqnos[5]); - /* We should be in ABC congestion avoidance, so no change in cwnd */ - EXPECT(pcb->cwnd == (tcpwnd_size_t)(3 * pcb->mss)); - EXPECT(pcb->cwnd >= pcb->ssthresh); - /* Ensure ABC congestion avoidance is tracking bytes acked */ - EXPECT(pcb->bytes_acked == (tcpwnd_size_t)(2 * pcb->mss)); - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -static void test_tcp_rto_timeout_impl(int link_down) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *cur; - err_t err; - size_t i; - const size_t max_wait_ctr = 1024 * 1024; - - /* Setup data for a single segment */ - for (i = 0; i < TCP_MSS; i++) { - tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; - pcb->cwnd = TCP_MSS; - - /* send our segment */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[0], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); - - /* Force us into retransmisson timeout */ - for (i = 0; !(pcb->flags & TF_RTO) && i < max_wait_ctr; i++) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - } - - EXPECT(i < max_wait_ctr); - - /* check first rexmit */ - EXPECT(pcb->nrtx == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - - /* still no error expected */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); - - if (link_down) { - netif_set_link_down(&netif); - } - - /* keep running the timer till we hit our maximum RTO */ - for (i = 0; counters.last_err == ERR_OK && i < max_wait_ctr; i++) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - } - - EXPECT(i < max_wait_ctr); - - /* check number of retransmissions */ - if (link_down) { - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - } else { - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == TCP_MAXRTX); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MAXRTX * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - } - - /* check the connection (pcb) has been aborted */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_ABRT); - - /* check our pcb is no longer active */ - for (cur = tcp_active_pcbs; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { - EXPECT(cur != pcb); - } - - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} - -START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_timeout) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - test_tcp_rto_timeout_impl(0); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_timeout_link_down) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - test_tcp_rto_timeout_impl(1); -} -END_TEST - -static void test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_impl(int link_down) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *cur; - err_t err; - size_t i; - const size_t max_wait_ctr = 1024 * 1024; - const u16_t tcp_syn_opts_len = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS | TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE | TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM | TF_SEG_OPTS_TS); - - /* Setup data for a single segment */ - for (i = 0; i < TCP_MSS; i++) { - tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - err = tcp_connect(pcb, &netif.gw, 123, NULL); - EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); - EXPECT_RET(pcb->state == SYN_SENT); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 40U + tcp_syn_opts_len); - - /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); - - txcounters.num_tx_calls = 0; - txcounters.num_tx_bytes = 0; - - /* Force us into retransmisson timeout */ - for (i = 0; !(pcb->flags & TF_RTO) && i < max_wait_ctr; i++) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - } - - EXPECT(i < max_wait_ctr); - - /* check first rexmit */ - EXPECT(pcb->nrtx == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 40U + tcp_syn_opts_len); /* 40: headers; >=: options */ - - /* still no error expected */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); - - if (link_down) { - /* set link down and check what happens to the RTO counter */ - netif_set_link_down(&netif); - } - - /* keep running the timer till we hit our maximum RTO */ - for (i = 0; counters.last_err == ERR_OK && i < max_wait_ctr; i++) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - } - - EXPECT(i < max_wait_ctr); - - /* check number of retransmissions */ - if (link_down) { - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 40U + tcp_syn_opts_len); - } else { - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == TCP_SYNMAXRTX); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_SYNMAXRTX * (tcp_syn_opts_len + 40U)); - } - - /* check the connection (pcb) has been aborted */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_ABRT); - - /* check our pcb is no longer active */ - for (cur = tcp_active_pcbs; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { - EXPECT(cur != pcb); - } - - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} - -START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_impl(0); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_link_down) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_impl(1); -} -END_TEST - -static void test_tcp_zwp_timeout_impl(int link_down) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *cur; - struct pbuf *p; - err_t err; - size_t i; - - /* Setup data for two segments */ - for (i = 0; i < 2 * TCP_MSS; i++) { - tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; - pcb->cwnd = TCP_MSS; - - /* send first segment */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[0], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); - - /* verify segment is in-flight */ - EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 1, seqnos); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - /* ACK the segment and close the TX window */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK, 0); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); - EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); - /* send buffer empty, persist should be off */ - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == 0); - - /* send second segment, should be buffered */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[TCP_MSS], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); - - /* ensure it is buffered and persist timer started */ - EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 1, &seqnos[1]); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 1); - - /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); - - /* run timer till first probe */ - EXPECT(pcb->persist_probe == 0); - - while (pcb->persist_probe == 0) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - } - - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == (1 + 40U)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - /* respond to probe with remote's current SEQ, ACK, and zero-window */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK, 0); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* ensure zero-window is still active, but probe count reset */ - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff > 1); - EXPECT(pcb->persist_probe == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == 0); - - /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); - - if (link_down) { - netif_set_link_down(&netif); - } - - /* now run the timer till we hit our maximum probe count */ - while (counters.last_err == ERR_OK) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - } - - if (link_down) { - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - } else { - /* check maximum number of 1 byte probes were sent */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == TCP_MAXRTX); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MAXRTX * (1 + 40U)); - } - - /* check the connection (pcb) has been aborted */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_ABRT); - - /* check our pcb is no longer active */ - for (cur = tcp_active_pcbs; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { - EXPECT(cur != pcb); - } - - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} - -START_TEST(test_tcp_zwp_timeout) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - test_tcp_zwp_timeout_impl(0); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_zwp_timeout_link_down) -{ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - test_tcp_zwp_timeout_impl(1); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_persist_split) -{ - struct netif netif; - struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p; - err_t err; - size_t i; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* Setup data for four segments */ - for (i = 0; i < 4 * TCP_MSS; i++) { - tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; - /* set window to three segments */ - pcb->cwnd = 3 * TCP_MSS; - pcb->snd_wnd = 3 * TCP_MSS; - pcb->snd_wnd_max = 3 * TCP_MSS; - - /* send four segments. Fourth should stay buffered and is a 3/4 MSS segment to - get coverage on the oversized segment case */ - err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[0], (3 * TCP_MSS) + (TCP_MSS - (TCP_MSS / 4)), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); - EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); - err = tcp_output(pcb); - EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); - - /* verify 3 segments are in-flight */ - EXPECT(pcb->unacked != NULL); - check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 3, seqnos); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 3); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 3 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - /* verify 4th segment is on unsent */ - EXPECT(pcb->unsent != NULL); - EXPECT(pcb->unsent->len == TCP_MSS - (TCP_MSS / 4)); - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 1, &seqnos[3]); -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - EXPECT(pcb->unsent_oversize == TCP_MSS / 4); -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - EXPECT(pcb->unsent->oversize_left == pcb->unsent_oversize); -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - - /* ACK the 3 segments and update the window to only 1/2 TCP_MSS. - 4th segment should stay on unsent because it's bigger than 1/2 MSS */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 3 * TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK, TCP_MSS / 2); - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); - EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == TCP_MSS / 2); - EXPECT(pcb->unsent != NULL); - check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 1, &seqnos[3]); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - /* persist timer should be started since 4th segment is stuck waiting on snd_wnd */ - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 1); - - /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); - - /* call tcp_timer some more times to let persist timer count up */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - test_tcp_tmr(); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); - } - - /* this should be the first timer shot, which should split the - * segment and send a runt (of the remaining window size) */ - txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 1; - test_tcp_tmr(); - txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 0; - /* persist will be disabled as RTO timer takes over */ - EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == ((TCP_MSS / 2) + 40U)); - /* verify 1/2 MSS segment sent, 1/4 MSS still buffered */ - EXPECT(pcb->unsent != NULL); - EXPECT(pcb->unsent->len == TCP_MSS / 4); - EXPECT(pcb->unacked != NULL); - EXPECT(pcb->unacked->len == TCP_MSS / 2); -#if TCP_OVERSIZE - /* verify there is no oversized remaining since during the - segment split, the remainder pbuf is always the exact length */ - EXPECT(pcb->unsent_oversize == 0); -#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK - /* Split segment already transmitted, should be at 0 */ - EXPECT(pcb->unacked->oversize_left == 0); - /* Remainder segement should match pcb value (which is 0) */ - EXPECT(pcb->unsent->oversize_left == pcb->unsent_oversize); -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ -#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ - - /* verify first half segment */ - EXPECT(txcounters.tx_packets != NULL); - - if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { - u8_t sent[TCP_MSS / 2]; - u16_t ret; - ret = pbuf_copy_partial(txcounters.tx_packets, &sent, TCP_MSS / 2, 40U); - EXPECT(ret == TCP_MSS / 2); - EXPECT(memcmp(sent, &tx_data[3 * TCP_MSS], TCP_MSS / 2) == 0); - } - - if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { - pbuf_free(txcounters.tx_packets); - txcounters.tx_packets = NULL; - } - - memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); - - /* ACK the half segment, leave window at half segment */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_MSS / 2, TCP_ACK, TCP_MSS / 2); - txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 1; - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 0; - /* ensure remaining segment was sent */ - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); - EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == ((TCP_MSS / 4) + 40U)); - EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); - EXPECT(pcb->unacked != NULL); - EXPECT(pcb->unacked->len == TCP_MSS / 4); - EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == TCP_MSS / 2); - - /* verify remainder segment */ - EXPECT(txcounters.tx_packets != NULL); - - if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { - u8_t sent[TCP_MSS / 4]; - u16_t ret; - ret = pbuf_copy_partial(txcounters.tx_packets, &sent, TCP_MSS / 4, 40U); - EXPECT(ret == TCP_MSS / 4); - EXPECT(memcmp(sent, &tx_data[(3 * TCP_MSS) + TCP_MSS / 2], TCP_MSS / 4) == 0); - } - - if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { - pbuf_free(txcounters.tx_packets); - txcounters.tx_packets = NULL; - } - - /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *tcp_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_new_abort), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_listen_passive_open), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_inseq), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_inseq_trim), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_passive_close), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_active_abort), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_malformed_header), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_fast_retx_recover), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_fast_rexmit_wraparound), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_rexmit_wraparound), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost_from_unacked), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost_from_unsent), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_retx_add_to_sent), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_tracking), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_timeout), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_timeout_link_down), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_link_down), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_zwp_timeout), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_zwp_timeout_link_down), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_persist_split) - }; - return create_suite("TCP", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), tcp_setup, tcp_teardown); -} +#include "test_tcp.h" + +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "tcp_helper.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" + +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#pragma warning(disable : 4307) /* we explicitly wrap around TCP seqnos */ +#endif + +#if !LWIP_STATS || !TCP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS +#error "This tests needs TCP- and MEMP-statistics enabled" +#endif +#if TCP_SND_BUF <= TCP_WND +#error "This tests needs TCP_SND_BUF to be > TCP_WND" +#endif + +/* used with check_seqnos() */ +#define SEQNO1 (0xFFFFFF00 - TCP_MSS) +#define ISS 6510 +static u32_t seqnos[] = { + SEQNO1, + SEQNO1 + (1 * TCP_MSS), + SEQNO1 + (2 * TCP_MSS), + SEQNO1 + (3 * TCP_MSS), + SEQNO1 + (4 * TCP_MSS), + SEQNO1 + (5 * TCP_MSS) +}; + +static u8_t test_tcp_timer; + +/* our own version of tcp_tmr so we can reset fast/slow timer state */ +static void test_tcp_tmr(void) +{ + tcp_fasttmr(); + + if (++test_tcp_timer & 1) { + tcp_slowtmr(); + } +} + +/* Setups/teardown functions */ +static struct netif *old_netif_list; +static struct netif *old_netif_default; + +static void tcp_setup(void) +{ + struct tcp_pcb dummy_pcb; /* we need this for tcp_next_iss() only */ + + old_netif_list = netif_list; + old_netif_default = netif_default; + netif_list = NULL; + netif_default = NULL; + /* reset iss to default (6510) */ + tcp_ticks = 0; + tcp_ticks = 0 - (tcp_next_iss(&dummy_pcb) - 6510); + tcp_next_iss(&dummy_pcb); + tcp_ticks = 0; + + test_tcp_timer = 0; + tcp_remove_all(); + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void tcp_teardown(void) +{ + netif_list = NULL; + netif_default = NULL; + tcp_remove_all(); + /* restore netif_list for next tests (e.g. loopif) */ + netif_list = old_netif_list; + netif_default = old_netif_default; + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +/* Test functions */ + +/** Call tcp_new() and tcp_abort() and test memp stats */ +START_TEST(test_tcp_new_abort) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); + + pcb = tcp_new(); + fail_unless(pcb != NULL); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); + } +} +END_TEST + +/** Call tcp_new() and tcp_abort() and test memp stats */ START_TEST(test_tcp_listen_passive_open) +{ + struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *pcbl; + struct tcp_pcb_listen *lpcb; + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct pbuf *p; + ip_addr_t src_addr; + err_t err; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); + + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + pcb = tcp_new(); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + err = tcp_bind(pcb, &netif.ip_addr, 1234); + EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); + pcbl = tcp_listen(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(pcbl != NULL); + EXPECT_RET(pcbl != pcb); + lpcb = (struct tcp_pcb_listen *)pcbl; + + ip_addr_set_ip4_u32_val(src_addr, lwip_htonl(lwip_ntohl(ip_addr_get_ip4_u32(&lpcb->local_ip)) + 1)); + + /* check correct syn packet */ + p = tcp_create_segment(&src_addr, &lpcb->local_ip, 12345, + lpcb->local_port, NULL, 0, 12345, 54321, TCP_SYN); + EXPECT(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + } + + /* check syn packet with short length */ + p = tcp_create_segment(&src_addr, &lpcb->local_ip, 12345, + lpcb->local_port, NULL, 0, 12345, 54321, TCP_SYN); + EXPECT(p != NULL); + EXPECT(p->next == NULL); + + if ((p != NULL) && (p->next == NULL)) { + p->len -= 2; + p->tot_len -= 2; + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + } + + tcp_close(pcbl); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create an ESTABLISHED pcb and check if receive callback is called */ START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_inseq) +{ + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + char data[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 }; + u16_t data_len; + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + data_len = sizeof(data); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = data_len; + counters.expected_data = data; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + + /* create a segment */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, counters.expected_data, data_len, 0, 0, 0); + EXPECT(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == data_len); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + } + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create an ESTABLISHED pcb and check if receive callback is called if a segment + * overlapping rcv_nxt is received */ +START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_inseq_trim) +{ + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + char data[PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE * 2]; + u16_t data_len; + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + const u32_t new_data_len = 40; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + data_len = sizeof(data); + memset(data, 0, sizeof(data)); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = data_len; + counters.expected_data = data; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + + /* create a segment (with an overlapping/old seqno so that the new data begins in the 2nd pbuf) */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, counters.expected_data, data_len, (u32_t)(0 - (data_len - new_data_len)), 0, 0); + EXPECT(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + EXPECT(p->next != NULL); + + if (p->next != NULL) { + EXPECT(p->next->next != NULL); + } + } + + if ((p != NULL) && (p->next != NULL) && (p->next->next != NULL)) { + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == new_data_len); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + } + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +static err_t test_tcp_recv_expect1byte(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err); + +static err_t test_tcp_recv_expectclose(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + EXPECT_RETX(pcb != NULL, ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RETX(err == ERR_OK, ERR_OK); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + if (p != NULL) { + fail(); + } else { + /* correct: FIN received; close our end, too */ + err_t err2 = tcp_close(pcb); + fail_unless(err2 == ERR_OK); + /* set back to some other rx function, just to not get here again */ + tcp_recv(pcb, test_tcp_recv_expect1byte); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t test_tcp_recv_expect1byte(void *arg, struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, err_t err) +{ + EXPECT_RETX(pcb != NULL, ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RETX(err == ERR_OK, ERR_OK); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(arg); + + if (p != NULL) { + if ((p->len == 1) && (p->tot_len == 1)) { + tcp_recv(pcb, test_tcp_recv_expectclose); + } else { + fail(); + } + + pbuf_free(p); + } else { + fail(); + } + + return ERR_OK; +} + +START_TEST(test_tcp_passive_close) +{ + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + char data = 0x0f; + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = 1; + counters.expected_data = &data; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + + /* create a segment without data */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data, 1, 0, 0, TCP_FIN); + EXPECT(p != NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + tcp_recv(pcb, test_tcp_recv_expect1byte); + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + } + + /* don't free the pcb here (part of the test!) */ +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_active_abort) +{ + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + char data = 0x0f; + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = 1; + counters.expected_data = &data; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + + /* abort the pcb */ + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 1; + tcp_abort(pcb); + txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 0; + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 40U); + EXPECT(txcounters.tx_packets != NULL); + + if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { + u16_t ret; + struct tcp_hdr tcphdr; + ret = pbuf_copy_partial(txcounters.tx_packets, &tcphdr, 20, 20); + EXPECT(ret == 20); + EXPECT(tcphdr.dest == PP_HTONS(TEST_REMOTE_PORT)); + EXPECT(tcphdr.src == PP_HTONS(TEST_LOCAL_PORT)); + pbuf_free(txcounters.tx_packets); + txcounters.tx_packets = NULL; + } + + /* don't free the pcb here (part of the test!) */ +} +END_TEST + +/** Check that we handle malformed tcp headers, and discard the pbuf(s) */ START_TEST(test_tcp_malformed_header) +{ + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + char data[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 }; + u16_t data_len, chksum; + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct tcp_hdr *hdr; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + data_len = sizeof(data); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = data_len; + counters.expected_data = data; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + + /* create a segment */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, counters.expected_data, data_len, 0, 0, 0); + + pbuf_header(p, -(s16_t)sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + + hdr = (struct tcp_hdr *)p->payload; + TCPH_HDRLEN_FLAGS_SET(hdr, 15, 0x3d1); + + hdr->chksum = 0; + + chksum = ip_chksum_pseudo(p, IP_PROTO_TCP, p->tot_len, + &test_remote_ip, &test_local_ip); + + hdr->chksum = chksum; + + pbuf_header(p, sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + + EXPECT(p != NULL); + EXPECT(p->next == NULL); + + if (p != NULL) { + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + } + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +/** Provoke fast retransmission by duplicate ACKs and then recover by ACKing all sent data. + * At the end, send more data. */ +START_TEST(test_tcp_fast_retx_recover) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + char data1[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 }; + char data2[] = { 5, 6, 7, 8 }; + char data3[] = { 9, 10, 11, 12 }; + char data4[] = { 13, 14, 15, 16 }; + char data5[] = { 17, 18, 19, 20 }; + char data6[TCP_MSS] = { 21, 22, 23, 24 }; + err_t err; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; + /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ + pcb->cwnd = pcb->snd_wnd; + + /* send data1 */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data1, sizeof(data1), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data1) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* "recv" ACK for data1 */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 4, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked == NULL); + /* send data2 */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data2, sizeof(data2), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data2) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* duplicate ACK for data1 (data2 is lost) */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->dupacks == 1); + /* send data3 */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data3, sizeof(data3), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /* nagle enabled, no tx calls */ + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* 2nd duplicate ACK for data1 (data2 and data3 are lost) */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->dupacks == 2); + /* queue data4, don't send it (unsent-oversize is != 0) */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data4, sizeof(data4), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /* 3nd duplicate ACK for data1 (data2 and data3 are lost) -> fast retransmission */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /*EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1);*/ + EXPECT_RET(pcb->dupacks == 3); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* @todo: check expected data?*/ + + /* send data5, not output yet */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /*err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK);*/ + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + { + int i = 0; + + do { + err = tcp_write(pcb, data6, TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + i++; + } while (err == ERR_OK); + + EXPECT_RET(err != ERR_OK); + } + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /*EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0);*/ + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + /* send even more data */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /* ...and even more data */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /* ...and even more data */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /* ...and even more data */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + + /* send ACKs for data2 and data3 */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 12, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /*EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0);*/ + + /* ...and even more data */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /* ...and even more data */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data5, sizeof(data5), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + +#if 0 + /* create expected segment */ + p1 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, counters.expected_data, data_len, 0, 0, 0); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + + if(p != NULL) + { + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT_RET(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT_RET(counters.recv_calls == 1); + EXPECT_RET(counters.recved_bytes == data_len); + EXPECT_RET(counters.err_calls == 0); + } + +#endif + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +static u8_t tx_data[TCP_WND * 2]; + +static void check_seqnos(struct tcp_seg *segs, int num_expected, u32_t *seqnos_expected) +{ + struct tcp_seg *s = segs; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_expected; i++, s = s->next) { + EXPECT_RET(s != NULL); + EXPECT(s->tcphdr->seqno == htonl(seqnos_expected[i])); + } + + EXPECT(s == NULL); +} + +/** Send data with sequence numbers that wrap around the u32_t range. + * Then, provoke fast retransmission by duplicate ACKs and check that all + * segment lists are still properly sorted. */ +START_TEST(test_tcp_fast_rexmit_wraparound) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + err_t err; + size_t i; + u16_t sent_total = 0; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tx_data); i++) { + tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; + /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ + pcb->cwnd = 2 * TCP_MSS; + /* start in congestion advoidance */ + pcb->ssthresh = pcb->cwnd; + + /* send 6 mss-sized segments */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + sent_total += TCP_MSS; + } + + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 6, seqnos); + EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 2); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 2 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 2, seqnos); + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 4, &seqnos[2]); + + /* ACK the first segment */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* ensure this didn't trigger a retransmission. Only one + segment should be transmitted because cwnd opened up by + TCP_MSS and a fraction since we are in congestion avoidance */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MSS + 40U); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 2, &seqnos[1]); + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 3, &seqnos[3]); + + /* 3 dupacks */ + EXPECT(pcb->dupacks == 0); + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->dupacks == 1); + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->dupacks == 2); + /* 3rd dupack -> fast rexmit */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT(pcb->dupacks == 3); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 4); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 5, &seqnos[1]); + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +/** Send data with sequence numbers that wrap around the u32_t range. + * Then, provoke RTO retransmission and check that all + * segment lists are still properly sorted. */ +START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_rexmit_wraparound) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct tcp_pcb dummy_pcb_for_iss; /* we need this for tcp_next_iss() only */ + err_t err; + size_t i; + u16_t sent_total = 0; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tx_data); i++) { + tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + tcp_ticks = 0; + tcp_ticks = 0 - tcp_next_iss(&dummy_pcb_for_iss); + tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - tcp_next_iss(&dummy_pcb_for_iss); + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; + /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ + pcb->cwnd = 2 * TCP_MSS; + + /* send 6 mss-sized segments */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + sent_total += TCP_MSS; + } + + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 6, seqnos); + EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 2); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 2 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 2, seqnos); + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 4, &seqnos[2]); + + /* call the tcp timer some times */ + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + } + + /* 11th call to tcp_tmr: RTO rexmit fires */ + test_tcp_tmr(); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 1, seqnos); + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 5, &seqnos[1]); + + /* fake greater cwnd */ + pcb->cwnd = pcb->snd_wnd; + /* send more data */ + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); + /* check queues are sorted */ + EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 6, seqnos); + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +/** Provoke fast retransmission by duplicate ACKs and then recover by ACKing all sent data. + * At the end, send more data. */ +static void test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost(u8_t zero_window_probe_from_unsent) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + err_t err; + size_t i; + u16_t sent_total; + u8_t expected = 0xFE; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tx_data); i++) { + u8_t d = (u8_t)i; + + if (d == 0xFE) { + d = 0xF0; + } + + tx_data[i] = d; + } + + if (zero_window_probe_from_unsent) { + tx_data[TCP_WND] = expected; + } else { + tx_data[0] = expected; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; + /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ + pcb->cwnd = pcb->snd_wnd; + + /* send a full window (minus 1 packets) of TCP data in MSS-sized chunks */ + sent_total = 0; + + if ((TCP_WND - TCP_MSS) % TCP_MSS != 0) { + u16_t initial_data_len = (TCP_WND - TCP_MSS) % TCP_MSS; + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], initial_data_len, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == initial_data_len + 40U); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + sent_total += initial_data_len; + } + + for (; sent_total < (TCP_WND - TCP_MSS); sent_total += TCP_MSS) { + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MSS + 40U); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + } + + EXPECT(sent_total == (TCP_WND - TCP_MSS)); + + /* now ACK the packet before the first */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* ensure this didn't trigger a retransmission */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); + /* send the last packet, now a complete window has been sent */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + sent_total += TCP_MSS; + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MSS + 40U); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); + + if (zero_window_probe_from_unsent) { + /* ACK all data but close the TX window */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_WND, TCP_ACK, 0); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* ensure this didn't trigger any transmission */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + /* window is completely full, but persist timer is off since send buffer is empty */ + EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); + } + + /* send one byte more (out of window) -> persist timer starts */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], 1, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + if (!zero_window_probe_from_unsent) { + /* no persist timer unless a zero window announcement has been received */ + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); + } else { + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 1); + + /* call tcp_timer some more times to let persist timer count up */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + } + + /* this should trigger the zero-window-probe */ + txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 1; + test_tcp_tmr(); + txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 0; + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 + 40U); + EXPECT(txcounters.tx_packets != NULL); + + if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { + u8_t sent; + u16_t ret; + ret = pbuf_copy_partial(txcounters.tx_packets, &sent, 1, 40U); + EXPECT(ret == 1); + EXPECT(sent == expected); + } + + if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { + pbuf_free(txcounters.tx_packets); + txcounters.tx_packets = NULL; + } + } + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} + +START_TEST(test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost_from_unsent) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost(1); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost_from_unacked) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost(0); +} +END_TEST + +/** Send data, provoke retransmission and then add data to a segment + * that already has been sent before. */ +START_TEST(test_tcp_retx_add_to_sent) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + char data1a[] = { 1, 2, 3 }; + char data1b[] = { 4 }; + char data2a[] = { 5, 6, 7, 8 }; + char data2b[] = { 5, 6, 7 }; + char data3[] = { 9, 10, 11, 12, 12 }; + char data4[] = { 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 }; + err_t err; + int i; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; + /* disable initial congestion window (we don't send a SYN here...) */ + pcb->cwnd = pcb->snd_wnd; + + /* send data1 */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data1a, sizeof(data1a), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_write(pcb, data1b, sizeof(data1b), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data1a) + sizeof(data1b) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* "recv" ACK for data1 */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 4, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked == NULL); + /* send data2 */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data2a, sizeof(data2a), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_write(pcb, data2b, sizeof(data2b), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data2a) + sizeof(data2b) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* send data3 */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data3, sizeof(data3), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + /* data3 not sent yet (nagle) */ + EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked != NULL); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->unsent != NULL); + + /* disable nagle for this test so data to sent segment can be added below... */ + tcp_nagle_disable(pcb); + + /* call the tcp timer some times */ + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + + if (txcounters.num_tx_calls != 0) { + break; + } + } + + /* data3 sent */ + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data3) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked != NULL); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->unsent == NULL); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + tcp_nagle_enable(pcb); + + /* call the tcp timer some times */ + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + + if (txcounters.num_tx_calls != 0) { + break; + } + } + + /* RTO: rexmit of data2 */ + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data2a) + sizeof(data2b) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->unacked != NULL); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->unsent != NULL); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + /* send data4 */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, data4, sizeof(data4), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /* disable nagle for this test so data to transmit without further ACKs... */ + tcp_nagle_disable(pcb); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + /* nagle enabled, no tx calls */ + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT_RET(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == sizeof(data3) + sizeof(data4) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_tracking) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + err_t err; + size_t i; + u16_t sent_total = 0; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tx_data); i++) { + tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; + /* Set congestion window large enough to send all our segments */ + pcb->cwnd = 5 * TCP_MSS; + + /* send 5 mss-sized segments */ + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + sent_total += TCP_MSS; + } + + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 5, seqnos); + EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 5); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 5 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* Check all 5 are in-flight */ + EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 5, seqnos); + + /* Force us into retransmisson timeout */ + while (!(pcb->flags & TF_RTO)) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + } + + /* Ensure 4 remaining segments are back on unsent, ready for retransmission */ + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 4, &seqnos[1]); + /* Ensure 1st segment is on unacked (already retransmitted) */ + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 1, seqnos); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MSS + 40U); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* Ensure rto_end points to next byte */ + EXPECT(pcb->rto_end == seqnos[5]); + EXPECT(pcb->rto_end == pcb->snd_nxt); + /* Check cwnd was reset */ + EXPECT(pcb->cwnd == pcb->mss); + + /* Add another segment to send buffer which is outside of RTO */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[sent_total], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + sent_total += TCP_MSS; + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 5, &seqnos[1]); + /* Ensure no new data was sent */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->rto_end == pcb->snd_nxt); + + /* ACK first segment */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* Next two retranmissions should go out, due to cwnd in slow start */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 2); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 2 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 2, &seqnos[1]); + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 3, &seqnos[3]); + /* RTO should still be marked */ + EXPECT(pcb->flags & TF_RTO); + /* cwnd should have only grown by 1 MSS */ + EXPECT(pcb->cwnd == (tcpwnd_size_t)(2 * pcb->mss)); + /* Ensure no new data was sent */ + EXPECT(pcb->rto_end == pcb->snd_nxt); + + /* ACK the next two segments */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 2 * TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* Final 2 retransmissions and 1 new data should go out */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 3); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 3 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 3, &seqnos[3]); + EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); + /* RTO should still be marked */ + EXPECT(pcb->flags & TF_RTO); + /* cwnd should have only grown by 1 MSS */ + EXPECT(pcb->cwnd == (tcpwnd_size_t)(3 * pcb->mss)); + /* snd_nxt should have been advanced past rto_end */ + EXPECT(TCP_SEQ_GT(pcb->snd_nxt, pcb->rto_end)); + + /* ACK the next two segments, finishing our RTO, leaving new segment unacked */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 2 * TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT(!(pcb->flags & TF_RTO)); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 1, &seqnos[5]); + /* We should be in ABC congestion avoidance, so no change in cwnd */ + EXPECT(pcb->cwnd == (tcpwnd_size_t)(3 * pcb->mss)); + EXPECT(pcb->cwnd >= pcb->ssthresh); + /* Ensure ABC congestion avoidance is tracking bytes acked */ + EXPECT(pcb->bytes_acked == (tcpwnd_size_t)(2 * pcb->mss)); + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +static void test_tcp_rto_timeout_impl(int link_down) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *cur; + err_t err; + size_t i; + const size_t max_wait_ctr = 1024 * 1024; + + /* Setup data for a single segment */ + for (i = 0; i < TCP_MSS; i++) { + tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; + pcb->cwnd = TCP_MSS; + + /* send our segment */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[0], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); + + /* Force us into retransmisson timeout */ + for (i = 0; !(pcb->flags & TF_RTO) && i < max_wait_ctr; i++) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + } + + EXPECT(i < max_wait_ctr); + + /* check first rexmit */ + EXPECT(pcb->nrtx == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + + /* still no error expected */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); + + if (link_down) { + netif_set_link_down(&netif); + } + + /* keep running the timer till we hit our maximum RTO */ + for (i = 0; counters.last_err == ERR_OK && i < max_wait_ctr; i++) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + } + + EXPECT(i < max_wait_ctr); + + /* check number of retransmissions */ + if (link_down) { + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + } else { + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == TCP_MAXRTX); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MAXRTX * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + } + + /* check the connection (pcb) has been aborted */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_ABRT); + + /* check our pcb is no longer active */ + for (cur = tcp_active_pcbs; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + EXPECT(cur != pcb); + } + + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} + +START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_timeout) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + test_tcp_rto_timeout_impl(0); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_timeout_link_down) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + test_tcp_rto_timeout_impl(1); +} +END_TEST + +static void test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_impl(int link_down) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *cur; + err_t err; + size_t i; + const size_t max_wait_ctr = 1024 * 1024; + const u16_t tcp_syn_opts_len = LWIP_TCP_OPT_LENGTH(TF_SEG_OPTS_MSS | TF_SEG_OPTS_WND_SCALE | TF_SEG_OPTS_SACK_PERM | TF_SEG_OPTS_TS); + + /* Setup data for a single segment */ + for (i = 0; i < TCP_MSS; i++) { + tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + err = tcp_connect(pcb, &netif.gw, 123, NULL); + EXPECT_RET(err == ERR_OK); + EXPECT_RET(pcb->state == SYN_SENT); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 40U + tcp_syn_opts_len); + + /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); + + txcounters.num_tx_calls = 0; + txcounters.num_tx_bytes = 0; + + /* Force us into retransmisson timeout */ + for (i = 0; !(pcb->flags & TF_RTO) && i < max_wait_ctr; i++) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + } + + EXPECT(i < max_wait_ctr); + + /* check first rexmit */ + EXPECT(pcb->nrtx == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 40U + tcp_syn_opts_len); /* 40: headers; >=: options */ + + /* still no error expected */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); + + if (link_down) { + /* set link down and check what happens to the RTO counter */ + netif_set_link_down(&netif); + } + + /* keep running the timer till we hit our maximum RTO */ + for (i = 0; counters.last_err == ERR_OK && i < max_wait_ctr; i++) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + } + + EXPECT(i < max_wait_ctr); + + /* check number of retransmissions */ + if (link_down) { + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 40U + tcp_syn_opts_len); + } else { + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == TCP_SYNMAXRTX); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_SYNMAXRTX * (tcp_syn_opts_len + 40U)); + } + + /* check the connection (pcb) has been aborted */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_ABRT); + + /* check our pcb is no longer active */ + for (cur = tcp_active_pcbs; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + EXPECT(cur != pcb); + } + + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} + +START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_impl(0); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_link_down) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_impl(1); +} +END_TEST + +static void test_tcp_zwp_timeout_impl(int link_down) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb, *cur; + struct pbuf *p; + err_t err; + size_t i; + + /* Setup data for two segments */ + for (i = 0; i < 2 * TCP_MSS; i++) { + tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; + pcb->cwnd = TCP_MSS; + + /* send first segment */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[0], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); + + /* verify segment is in-flight */ + EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 1, seqnos); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 1 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + /* ACK the segment and close the TX window */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK, 0); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); + EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); + /* send buffer empty, persist should be off */ + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == 0); + + /* send second segment, should be buffered */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[TCP_MSS], TCP_MSS, TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); + + /* ensure it is buffered and persist timer started */ + EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 1, &seqnos[1]); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 1); + + /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); + + /* run timer till first probe */ + EXPECT(pcb->persist_probe == 0); + + while (pcb->persist_probe == 0) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + } + + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == (1 + 40U)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + /* respond to probe with remote's current SEQ, ACK, and zero-window */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 0, TCP_ACK, 0); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* ensure zero-window is still active, but probe count reset */ + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff > 1); + EXPECT(pcb->persist_probe == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == 0); + + /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); + + if (link_down) { + netif_set_link_down(&netif); + } + + /* now run the timer till we hit our maximum probe count */ + while (counters.last_err == ERR_OK) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + } + + if (link_down) { + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + } else { + /* check maximum number of 1 byte probes were sent */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == TCP_MAXRTX); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == TCP_MAXRTX * (1 + 40U)); + } + + /* check the connection (pcb) has been aborted */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_ABRT); + + /* check our pcb is no longer active */ + for (cur = tcp_active_pcbs; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + EXPECT(cur != pcb); + } + + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} + +START_TEST(test_tcp_zwp_timeout) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + test_tcp_zwp_timeout_impl(0); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_zwp_timeout_link_down) +{ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + test_tcp_zwp_timeout_impl(1); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_persist_split) +{ + struct netif netif; + struct test_tcp_txcounters txcounters; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p; + err_t err; + size_t i; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* Setup data for four segments */ + for (i = 0; i < 4 * TCP_MSS; i++) { + tx_data[i] = (u8_t)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, &txcounters, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + tcp_ticks = SEQNO1 - ISS; + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->mss = TCP_MSS; + /* set window to three segments */ + pcb->cwnd = 3 * TCP_MSS; + pcb->snd_wnd = 3 * TCP_MSS; + pcb->snd_wnd_max = 3 * TCP_MSS; + + /* send four segments. Fourth should stay buffered and is a 3/4 MSS segment to + get coverage on the oversized segment case */ + err = tcp_write(pcb, &tx_data[0], (3 * TCP_MSS) + (TCP_MSS - (TCP_MSS / 4)), TCP_WRITE_FLAG_COPY); + EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); + err = tcp_output(pcb); + EXPECT(err == ERR_OK); + + /* verify 3 segments are in-flight */ + EXPECT(pcb->unacked != NULL); + check_seqnos(pcb->unacked, 3, seqnos); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 3); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 3 * (TCP_MSS + 40U)); + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + /* verify 4th segment is on unsent */ + EXPECT(pcb->unsent != NULL); + EXPECT(pcb->unsent->len == TCP_MSS - (TCP_MSS / 4)); + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 1, &seqnos[3]); +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + EXPECT(pcb->unsent_oversize == TCP_MSS / 4); +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + EXPECT(pcb->unsent->oversize_left == pcb->unsent_oversize); +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + + /* ACK the 3 segments and update the window to only 1/2 TCP_MSS. + 4th segment should stay on unsent because it's bigger than 1/2 MSS */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, 3 * TCP_MSS, TCP_ACK, TCP_MSS / 2); + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + EXPECT(pcb->unacked == NULL); + EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == TCP_MSS / 2); + EXPECT(pcb->unsent != NULL); + check_seqnos(pcb->unsent, 1, &seqnos[3]); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + /* persist timer should be started since 4th segment is stuck waiting on snd_wnd */ + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 1); + + /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); + + /* call tcp_timer some more times to let persist timer count up */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + test_tcp_tmr(); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == 0); + } + + /* this should be the first timer shot, which should split the + * segment and send a runt (of the remaining window size) */ + txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 1; + test_tcp_tmr(); + txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 0; + /* persist will be disabled as RTO timer takes over */ + EXPECT(pcb->persist_backoff == 0); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == ((TCP_MSS / 2) + 40U)); + /* verify 1/2 MSS segment sent, 1/4 MSS still buffered */ + EXPECT(pcb->unsent != NULL); + EXPECT(pcb->unsent->len == TCP_MSS / 4); + EXPECT(pcb->unacked != NULL); + EXPECT(pcb->unacked->len == TCP_MSS / 2); +#if TCP_OVERSIZE + /* verify there is no oversized remaining since during the + segment split, the remainder pbuf is always the exact length */ + EXPECT(pcb->unsent_oversize == 0); +#if TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK + /* Split segment already transmitted, should be at 0 */ + EXPECT(pcb->unacked->oversize_left == 0); + /* Remainder segement should match pcb value (which is 0) */ + EXPECT(pcb->unsent->oversize_left == pcb->unsent_oversize); +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE_DBGCHECK */ +#endif /* TCP_OVERSIZE */ + + /* verify first half segment */ + EXPECT(txcounters.tx_packets != NULL); + + if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { + u8_t sent[TCP_MSS / 2]; + u16_t ret; + ret = pbuf_copy_partial(txcounters.tx_packets, &sent, TCP_MSS / 2, 40U); + EXPECT(ret == TCP_MSS / 2); + EXPECT(memcmp(sent, &tx_data[3 * TCP_MSS], TCP_MSS / 2) == 0); + } + + if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { + pbuf_free(txcounters.tx_packets); + txcounters.tx_packets = NULL; + } + + memset(&txcounters, 0, sizeof(txcounters)); + + /* ACK the half segment, leave window at half segment */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment_wnd(pcb, NULL, 0, 0, TCP_MSS / 2, TCP_ACK, TCP_MSS / 2); + txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 1; + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + txcounters.copy_tx_packets = 0; + /* ensure remaining segment was sent */ + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_calls == 1); + EXPECT(txcounters.num_tx_bytes == ((TCP_MSS / 4) + 40U)); + EXPECT(pcb->unsent == NULL); + EXPECT(pcb->unacked != NULL); + EXPECT(pcb->unacked->len == TCP_MSS / 4); + EXPECT(pcb->snd_wnd == TCP_MSS / 2); + + /* verify remainder segment */ + EXPECT(txcounters.tx_packets != NULL); + + if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { + u8_t sent[TCP_MSS / 4]; + u16_t ret; + ret = pbuf_copy_partial(txcounters.tx_packets, &sent, TCP_MSS / 4, 40U); + EXPECT(ret == TCP_MSS / 4); + EXPECT(memcmp(sent, &tx_data[(3 * TCP_MSS) + TCP_MSS / 2], TCP_MSS / 4) == 0); + } + + if (txcounters.tx_packets != NULL) { + pbuf_free(txcounters.tx_packets); + txcounters.tx_packets = NULL; + } + + /* ensure no errors have been recorded */ + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.last_err == ERR_OK); + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT_RET(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *tcp_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_new_abort), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_listen_passive_open), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_inseq), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_inseq_trim), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_passive_close), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_active_abort), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_malformed_header), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_fast_retx_recover), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_fast_rexmit_wraparound), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_rexmit_wraparound), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost_from_unacked), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_tx_full_window_lost_from_unsent), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_retx_add_to_sent), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_tracking), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_timeout), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_timeout_link_down), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_rto_timeout_syn_sent_link_down), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_zwp_timeout), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_zwp_timeout_link_down), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_persist_split) + }; + return create_suite("TCP", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), tcp_setup, tcp_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.h index 4258999d..f28ee565 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_TCP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_TCP_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *tcp_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_TCP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_TCP_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *tcp_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c similarity index 97% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c index 0c0d8080..41599de1 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.c @@ -1,1031 +1,1031 @@ -#include "test_tcp_oos.h" - -#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "tcp_helper.h" - -#if !LWIP_STATS || !TCP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS -#error "This tests needs TCP- and MEMP-statistics enabled" -#endif -#if !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ -#error "This tests needs TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ enabled" -#endif - -/** CHECK_SEGMENTS_ON_OOSEQ: - * 1: check count, seqno and len of segments on pcb->ooseq (strict) - * 0: only check that bytes are received in correct order (less strict) */ -#define CHECK_SEGMENTS_ON_OOSEQ 1 - -#if CHECK_SEGMENTS_ON_OOSEQ -#define EXPECT_OOSEQ(x) EXPECT(x) -#else -#define EXPECT_OOSEQ(x) -#endif - -/* helper functions */ - -/** Get the numbers of segments on the ooseq list */ -static int tcp_oos_count(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - int num = 0; - struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; - - while (seg != NULL) { - num++; - seg = seg->next; - } - - return num; -} - -#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS < ((TCP_WND / TCP_MSS) + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) -/** Get the numbers of pbufs on the ooseq list */ -static int tcp_oos_pbuf_count(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - int num = 0; - struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; - - while (seg != NULL) { - num += pbuf_clen(seg->p); - seg = seg->next; - } - - return num; -} -#endif - -/** Get the seqno of a segment (by index) on the ooseq list - * - * @param pcb the pcb to check for ooseq segments - * @param seg_index index of the segment on the ooseq list - * @return seqno of the segment - */ -static u32_t tcp_oos_seg_seqno(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int seg_index) -{ - int num = 0; - struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; - - /* then check the actual segment */ - while (seg != NULL) { - if (num == seg_index) { - return seg->tcphdr->seqno; - } - - num++; - seg = seg->next; - } - - fail(); - return 0; -} - -/** Get the tcplen (datalen + SYN/FIN) of a segment (by index) on the ooseq list - * - * @param pcb the pcb to check for ooseq segments - * @param seg_index index of the segment on the ooseq list - * @return tcplen of the segment - */ -static int tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int seg_index) -{ - int num = 0; - struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; - - /* then check the actual segment */ - while (seg != NULL) { - if (num == seg_index) { - return TCP_TCPLEN(seg); - } - - num++; - seg = seg->next; - } - - fail(); - return -1; -} - -/** Get the tcplen (datalen + SYN/FIN) of all segments on the ooseq list - * - * @param pcb the pcb to check for ooseq segments - * @return tcplen of all segment - */ -static int tcp_oos_tcplen(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) -{ - int len = 0; - struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; - - /* then check the actual segment */ - while (seg != NULL) { - len += TCP_TCPLEN(seg); - seg = seg->next; - } - - return len; -} - -/* Setup/teardown functions */ -static struct netif *old_netif_list; -static struct netif *old_netif_default; - -static void tcp_oos_setup(void) -{ - old_netif_list = netif_list; - old_netif_default = netif_default; - netif_list = NULL; - netif_default = NULL; - tcp_remove_all(); - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void tcp_oos_teardown(void) -{ - netif_list = NULL; - netif_default = NULL; - tcp_remove_all(); - /* restore netif_list for next tests (e.g. loopif) */ - netif_list = old_netif_list; - netif_default = old_netif_default; - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -/* Test functions */ - -/** create multiple segments and pass them to tcp_input in a wrong - * order to see if ooseq-caching works correctly - * FIN is received in out-of-sequence segments only */ -START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_FIN_OOSEQ) -{ - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p_8_9, *p_4_8, *p_4_10, *p_2_14, *p_fin, *pinseq; - char data[] = { - 1, 2, 3, 4, - 5, 6, 7, 8, - 9, 10, 11, 12, - 13, 14, 15, 16 - }; - u16_t data_len; - struct netif netif; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - data_len = sizeof(data); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = data_len; - counters.expected_data = data; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - - /* create segments */ - /* pinseq is sent as last segment! */ - pinseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[0], 4, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* p1: 8 bytes before FIN */ - /* seqno: 8..16 */ - p_8_9 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[8], 8, 8, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); - /* p2: 4 bytes before p1, including the first 4 bytes of p1 (partly duplicate) */ - /* seqno: 4..11 */ - p_4_8 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[4], 8, 4, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* p3: same as p2 but 2 bytes longer */ - /* seqno: 4..13 */ - p_4_10 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[4], 10, 4, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* p4: 14 bytes before FIN, includes data from p1 and p2, plus partly from pinseq */ - /* seqno: 2..15 */ - p_2_14 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[2], 14, 2, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* FIN, seqno 16 */ - p_fin = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 16, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); - EXPECT(pinseq != NULL); - EXPECT(p_8_9 != NULL); - EXPECT(p_4_8 != NULL); - EXPECT(p_4_10 != NULL); - EXPECT(p_2_14 != NULL); - EXPECT(p_fin != NULL); - - if ((pinseq != NULL) && (p_8_9 != NULL) && (p_4_8 != NULL) && (p_4_10 != NULL) && (p_2_14 != NULL) && (p_fin != NULL)) { - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_8_9, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 8); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 9); /* includes FIN */ - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_4_8, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 4); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 4); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 8); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 9); /* includes FIN */ - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_4_10, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* ooseq queue: unchanged */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 4); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 4); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 8); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 9); /* includes FIN */ - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_2_14, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 2); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 15); /* includes FIN */ - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_fin, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* ooseq queue: unchanged */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 2); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 15); /* includes FIN */ - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(pinseq, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == data_len); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); - } - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -/** create multiple segments and pass them to tcp_input in a wrong - * order to see if ooseq-caching works correctly - * FIN is received IN-SEQUENCE at the end */ -START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_FIN_INSEQ) -{ - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p_1_2, *p_4_8, *p_3_11, *p_2_12, *p_15_1, *p_15_1a, *pinseq, *pinseqFIN; - char data[] = { - 1, 2, 3, 4, - 5, 6, 7, 8, - 9, 10, 11, 12, - 13, 14, 15, 16 - }; - u16_t data_len; - struct netif netif; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - data_len = sizeof(data); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = data_len; - counters.expected_data = data; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - - /* create segments */ - /* p1: 7 bytes - 2 before FIN */ - /* seqno: 1..2 */ - p_1_2 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[1], 2, 1, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* p2: 4 bytes before p1, including the first 4 bytes of p1 (partly duplicate) */ - /* seqno: 4..11 */ - p_4_8 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[4], 8, 4, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* p3: same as p2 but 2 bytes longer and one byte more at the front */ - /* seqno: 3..13 */ - p_3_11 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[3], 11, 3, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* p4: 13 bytes - 2 before FIN - should be ignored as contained in p1 and p3 */ - /* seqno: 2..13 */ - p_2_12 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[2], 12, 2, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* pinseq is the first segment that is held back to create ooseq! */ - /* seqno: 0..3 */ - pinseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[0], 4, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* p5: last byte before FIN */ - /* seqno: 15 */ - p_15_1 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[15], 1, 15, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* p6: same as p5, should be ignored */ - p_15_1a = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[15], 1, 15, 0, TCP_ACK); - /* pinseqFIN: last 2 bytes plus FIN */ - /* only segment containing seqno 14 and FIN */ - pinseqFIN = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[14], 2, 14, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); - EXPECT(pinseq != NULL); - EXPECT(p_1_2 != NULL); - EXPECT(p_4_8 != NULL); - EXPECT(p_3_11 != NULL); - EXPECT(p_2_12 != NULL); - EXPECT(p_15_1 != NULL); - EXPECT(p_15_1a != NULL); - EXPECT(pinseqFIN != NULL); - - if ((pinseq != NULL) && (p_1_2 != NULL) && (p_4_8 != NULL) && (p_3_11 != NULL) && (p_2_12 != NULL) && (p_15_1 != NULL) && (p_15_1a != NULL) && (pinseqFIN != NULL)) { - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_1_2, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 2); - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_4_8, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 2); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 4); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 8); - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_3_11, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 2); - /* p_3_11 has removed p_4_8 from ooseq */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 3); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 11); - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_2_12, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 2); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 12); - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(pinseq, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 14); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_15_1, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 14); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 15); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 1); - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_15_1a, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 14); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue: unchanged */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 15); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 1); - - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(pinseqFIN, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 1); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 2); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == data_len); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); - } - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} -END_TEST - -static char data_full_wnd[TCP_WND + TCP_MSS]; - -/** create multiple segments and pass them to tcp_input with the first segment missing - * to simulate overruning the rxwin with ooseq queueing enabled */ -START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_overrun_rxwin) -{ -#if !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS - int i, k; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *pinseq, *p_ovr; - struct netif netif; - int datalen = 0; - int datalen2; - - for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { - data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; - counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->rcv_nxt = 0x8000; - - /* create segments */ - /* pinseq is sent as last segment! */ - pinseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[0], TCP_MSS, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - - for (i = TCP_MSS, k = 0; i < TCP_WND; i += TCP_MSS, k++) { - int count, expected_datalen; - struct pbuf *p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS * (k + 1)], - TCP_MSS, TCP_MSS * (k + 1), 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - count = tcp_oos_count(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(count == k + 1); - datalen = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); - - if (i + TCP_MSS < TCP_WND) { - expected_datalen = (k + 1) * TCP_MSS; - } else { - expected_datalen = TCP_WND - TCP_MSS; - } - - if (datalen != expected_datalen) { - EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == expected_datalen); - } - } - - /* pass in one more segment, cleary overrunning the rxwin */ - p_ovr = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS * (k + 1)], TCP_MSS, TCP_MSS * (k + 1), 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p_ovr != NULL); - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_ovr, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == k); - datalen2 = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == datalen2); - - /* now pass inseq */ - test_tcp_input(pinseq, &netif); - EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -#endif /* !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); -} -END_TEST - -/** similar to above test, except seqno starts near the max rxwin */ START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_overrun_rxwin_edge) -{ -#if !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS - int i, k; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *pinseq, *p_ovr; - struct netif netif; - int datalen = 0; - int datalen2; - - for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { - data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; - counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->rcv_nxt = 0xffffffff - (TCP_WND / 2); - - /* create segments */ - /* pinseq is sent as last segment! */ - pinseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[0], TCP_MSS, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - - for (i = TCP_MSS, k = 0; i < TCP_WND; i += TCP_MSS, k++) { - int count, expected_datalen; - struct pbuf *p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS * (k + 1)], - TCP_MSS, TCP_MSS * (k + 1), 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - count = tcp_oos_count(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(count == k + 1); - datalen = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); - - if (i + TCP_MSS < TCP_WND) { - expected_datalen = (k + 1) * TCP_MSS; - } else { - expected_datalen = TCP_WND - TCP_MSS; - } - - if (datalen != expected_datalen) { - EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == expected_datalen); - } - } - - /* pass in one more segment, cleary overrunning the rxwin */ - p_ovr = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS * (k + 1)], TCP_MSS, TCP_MSS * (k + 1), 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p_ovr != NULL); - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_ovr, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == k); - datalen2 = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == datalen2); - - /* now pass inseq */ - test_tcp_input(pinseq, &netif); - EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -#endif /* !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_max_bytes) -{ -#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES < (TCP_WND + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) - int i, k; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p_ovr; - struct netif netif; - int datalen = 0; - int datalen2; - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { - data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; - counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->rcv_nxt = 0x8000; - - /* don't 'recv' the first segment (1 byte) so that all other segments will be ooseq */ - - /* create segments and 'recv' them */ - for (k = 1, i = 1; k < TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES; k += TCP_MSS, i++) { - int count; - struct pbuf *p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[k], - TCP_MSS, k, 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - EXPECT_RET(p->next == NULL); - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - count = tcp_oos_pbuf_count(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(count == i); - datalen = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == (i * TCP_MSS)); - } - - /* pass in one more segment, overrunning the limit */ - p_ovr = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[k + 1], 1, k + 1, 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p_ovr != NULL); - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_ovr, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue (ensure the new segment was not accepted) */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == (i - 1)); - datalen2 = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen2 == ((i - 1) * TCP_MSS)); - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES < (TCP_WND + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); -} -END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_max_pbufs) -{ -#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS < ((TCP_WND / TCP_MSS) + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) - int i; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p_ovr; - struct netif netif; - int datalen = 0; - int datalen2; - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { - data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; - counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &local_ip, &remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->rcv_nxt = 0x8000; - - /* don't 'recv' the first segment (1 byte) so that all other segments will be ooseq */ - - /* create segments and 'recv' them */ - for (i = 1; i <= TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS; i++) { - int count; - struct pbuf *p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[i], - 1, i, 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - EXPECT_RET(p->next == NULL); - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue */ - count = tcp_oos_pbuf_count(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(count == i); - datalen = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == i); - } - - /* pass in one more segment, overrunning the limit */ - p_ovr = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[i + 1], 1, i + 1, 0, TCP_ACK); - EXPECT_RET(p_ovr != NULL); - /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ - test_tcp_input(p_ovr, &netif); - /* check if counters are as expected */ - EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); - EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); - EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); - /* check ooseq queue (ensure the new segment was not accepted) */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == (i - 1)); - datalen2 = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen2 == (i - 1)); - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES < (TCP_WND + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) */ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); -} -END_TEST - -static void check_rx_counters(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct test_tcp_counters *counters, u32_t exp_close_calls, u32_t exp_rx_calls, - u32_t exp_rx_bytes, u32_t exp_err_calls, int exp_oos_count, int exp_oos_len) -{ - int oos_len; - EXPECT(counters->close_calls == exp_close_calls); - EXPECT(counters->recv_calls == exp_rx_calls); - EXPECT(counters->recved_bytes == exp_rx_bytes); - EXPECT(counters->err_calls == exp_err_calls); - /* check that pbuf is queued in ooseq */ - EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == exp_oos_count); - oos_len = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); - EXPECT_OOSEQ(exp_oos_len == oos_len); -} - -/* this test uses 4 packets: - * - data (len=TCP_MSS) - * - FIN - * - data after FIN (len=1) (invalid) - * - 2nd FIN (invalid) - * - * the parameter 'delay_packet' is a bitmask that choses which on these packets is ooseq - */ -static void test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FINs(int delay_packet) -{ - int i, k; - struct test_tcp_counters counters; - struct tcp_pcb *pcb; - struct pbuf *p_normal_fin, *p_data_after_fin, *p, *p_2nd_fin_ooseq; - struct netif netif; - u32_t exp_rx_calls = 0, exp_rx_bytes = 0, exp_close_calls = 0, exp_oos_pbufs = 0, exp_oos_tcplen = 0; - int first_dropped = 0xff; - - for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { - data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; - } - - /* initialize local vars */ - test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); - /* initialize counter struct */ - memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); - counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; - counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; - - /* create and initialize the pcb */ - pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); - EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); - tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); - pcb->rcv_nxt = 0x8000; - - /* create segments */ - p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[0], TCP_MSS, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); - p_normal_fin = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, TCP_MSS, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); - k = 1; - p_data_after_fin = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS + 1], k, TCP_MSS + 1, 0, TCP_ACK); - p_2nd_fin_ooseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, TCP_MSS + 1 + k, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); - - if (delay_packet & 1) { - /* drop normal data */ - first_dropped = 1; - } else { - /* send normal data */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - exp_rx_calls++; - exp_rx_bytes += TCP_MSS; - } - - /* check if counters are as expected */ - check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); - - if (delay_packet & 2) { - /* drop FIN */ - if (first_dropped > 2) { - first_dropped = 2; - } - } else { - /* send FIN */ - test_tcp_input(p_normal_fin, &netif); - - if (first_dropped < 2) { - /* already dropped packets, this one is ooseq */ - exp_oos_pbufs++; - exp_oos_tcplen++; - } else { - /* inseq */ - exp_close_calls++; - } - } - - /* check if counters are as expected */ - check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); - - if (delay_packet & 4) { - /* drop data-after-FIN */ - if (first_dropped > 3) { - first_dropped = 3; - } - } else { - /* send data-after-FIN */ - test_tcp_input(p_data_after_fin, &netif); - - if (first_dropped < 3) { - /* already dropped packets, this one is ooseq */ - if (delay_packet & 2) { - /* correct FIN was ooseq */ - exp_oos_pbufs++; - exp_oos_tcplen += k; - } - } else { - /* inseq: no change */ - } - } - - /* check if counters are as expected */ - check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); - - if (delay_packet & 8) { - /* drop 2nd-FIN */ - if (first_dropped > 4) { - first_dropped = 4; - } - } else { - /* send 2nd-FIN */ - test_tcp_input(p_2nd_fin_ooseq, &netif); - - if (first_dropped < 3) { - /* already dropped packets, this one is ooseq */ - if (delay_packet & 2) { - /* correct FIN was ooseq */ - exp_oos_pbufs++; - exp_oos_tcplen++; - } - } else { - /* inseq: no change */ - } - } - - /* check if counters are as expected */ - check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); - - if (delay_packet & 1) { - /* dropped normal data before */ - test_tcp_input(p, &netif); - exp_rx_calls++; - exp_rx_bytes += TCP_MSS; - - if ((delay_packet & 2) == 0) { - /* normal FIN was NOT delayed */ - exp_close_calls++; - exp_oos_pbufs = exp_oos_tcplen = 0; - } - } - - /* check if counters are as expected */ - check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); - - if (delay_packet & 2) { - /* dropped normal FIN before */ - test_tcp_input(p_normal_fin, &netif); - exp_close_calls++; - exp_oos_pbufs = exp_oos_tcplen = 0; - } - - /* check if counters are as expected */ - check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); - - if (delay_packet & 4) { - /* dropped data-after-FIN before */ - test_tcp_input(p_data_after_fin, &netif); - } - - /* check if counters are as expected */ - check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); - - if (delay_packet & 8) { - /* dropped 2nd-FIN before */ - test_tcp_input(p_2nd_fin_ooseq, &netif); - } - - /* check if counters are as expected */ - check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); - - /* check that ooseq data has been dumped */ - EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); - - /* make sure the pcb is freed */ - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); - tcp_abort(pcb); - EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); -} - -/** create multiple segments and pass them to tcp_input with the first segment missing - * to simulate overruning the rxwin with ooseq queueing enabled */ -#define FIN_TEST(name, num) \ - START_TEST(name) \ - { \ - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); \ - test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FINs(num); \ - } \ - END_TEST -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_0, 0) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_1, 1) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_2, 2) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_3, 3) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_4, 4) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_5, 5) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_6, 6) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_7, 7) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_8, 8) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_9, 9) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_10, 10) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_11, 11) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_12, 12) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_13, 13) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_14, 14) -FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_15, 15) - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite * -tcp_oos_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_FIN_OOSEQ), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_FIN_INSEQ), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_overrun_rxwin), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_overrun_rxwin_edge), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_max_bytes), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_max_pbufs), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_0), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_1), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_2), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_3), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_4), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_5), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_6), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_7), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_8), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_9), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_10), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_11), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_12), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_13), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_14), - TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_15) - }; - return create_suite("TCP_OOS", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), tcp_oos_setup, tcp_oos_teardown); -} +#include "test_tcp_oos.h" + +#include "lwip/priv/tcp_priv.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "tcp_helper.h" + +#if !LWIP_STATS || !TCP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS +#error "This tests needs TCP- and MEMP-statistics enabled" +#endif +#if !TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ +#error "This tests needs TCP_QUEUE_OOSEQ enabled" +#endif + +/** CHECK_SEGMENTS_ON_OOSEQ: + * 1: check count, seqno and len of segments on pcb->ooseq (strict) + * 0: only check that bytes are received in correct order (less strict) */ +#define CHECK_SEGMENTS_ON_OOSEQ 1 + +#if CHECK_SEGMENTS_ON_OOSEQ +#define EXPECT_OOSEQ(x) EXPECT(x) +#else +#define EXPECT_OOSEQ(x) +#endif + +/* helper functions */ + +/** Get the numbers of segments on the ooseq list */ +static int tcp_oos_count(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + int num = 0; + struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; + + while (seg != NULL) { + num++; + seg = seg->next; + } + + return num; +} + +#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS < ((TCP_WND / TCP_MSS) + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) +/** Get the numbers of pbufs on the ooseq list */ +static int tcp_oos_pbuf_count(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + int num = 0; + struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; + + while (seg != NULL) { + num += pbuf_clen(seg->p); + seg = seg->next; + } + + return num; +} +#endif + +/** Get the seqno of a segment (by index) on the ooseq list + * + * @param pcb the pcb to check for ooseq segments + * @param seg_index index of the segment on the ooseq list + * @return seqno of the segment + */ +static u32_t tcp_oos_seg_seqno(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int seg_index) +{ + int num = 0; + struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; + + /* then check the actual segment */ + while (seg != NULL) { + if (num == seg_index) { + return seg->tcphdr->seqno; + } + + num++; + seg = seg->next; + } + + fail(); + return 0; +} + +/** Get the tcplen (datalen + SYN/FIN) of a segment (by index) on the ooseq list + * + * @param pcb the pcb to check for ooseq segments + * @param seg_index index of the segment on the ooseq list + * @return tcplen of the segment + */ +static int tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, int seg_index) +{ + int num = 0; + struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; + + /* then check the actual segment */ + while (seg != NULL) { + if (num == seg_index) { + return TCP_TCPLEN(seg); + } + + num++; + seg = seg->next; + } + + fail(); + return -1; +} + +/** Get the tcplen (datalen + SYN/FIN) of all segments on the ooseq list + * + * @param pcb the pcb to check for ooseq segments + * @return tcplen of all segment + */ +static int tcp_oos_tcplen(struct tcp_pcb *pcb) +{ + int len = 0; + struct tcp_seg *seg = pcb->ooseq; + + /* then check the actual segment */ + while (seg != NULL) { + len += TCP_TCPLEN(seg); + seg = seg->next; + } + + return len; +} + +/* Setup/teardown functions */ +static struct netif *old_netif_list; +static struct netif *old_netif_default; + +static void tcp_oos_setup(void) +{ + old_netif_list = netif_list; + old_netif_default = netif_default; + netif_list = NULL; + netif_default = NULL; + tcp_remove_all(); + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void tcp_oos_teardown(void) +{ + netif_list = NULL; + netif_default = NULL; + tcp_remove_all(); + /* restore netif_list for next tests (e.g. loopif) */ + netif_list = old_netif_list; + netif_default = old_netif_default; + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +/* Test functions */ + +/** create multiple segments and pass them to tcp_input in a wrong + * order to see if ooseq-caching works correctly + * FIN is received in out-of-sequence segments only */ +START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_FIN_OOSEQ) +{ + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p_8_9, *p_4_8, *p_4_10, *p_2_14, *p_fin, *pinseq; + char data[] = { + 1, 2, 3, 4, + 5, 6, 7, 8, + 9, 10, 11, 12, + 13, 14, 15, 16 + }; + u16_t data_len; + struct netif netif; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + data_len = sizeof(data); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = data_len; + counters.expected_data = data; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + + /* create segments */ + /* pinseq is sent as last segment! */ + pinseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[0], 4, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* p1: 8 bytes before FIN */ + /* seqno: 8..16 */ + p_8_9 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[8], 8, 8, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); + /* p2: 4 bytes before p1, including the first 4 bytes of p1 (partly duplicate) */ + /* seqno: 4..11 */ + p_4_8 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[4], 8, 4, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* p3: same as p2 but 2 bytes longer */ + /* seqno: 4..13 */ + p_4_10 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[4], 10, 4, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* p4: 14 bytes before FIN, includes data from p1 and p2, plus partly from pinseq */ + /* seqno: 2..15 */ + p_2_14 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[2], 14, 2, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* FIN, seqno 16 */ + p_fin = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, 16, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); + EXPECT(pinseq != NULL); + EXPECT(p_8_9 != NULL); + EXPECT(p_4_8 != NULL); + EXPECT(p_4_10 != NULL); + EXPECT(p_2_14 != NULL); + EXPECT(p_fin != NULL); + + if ((pinseq != NULL) && (p_8_9 != NULL) && (p_4_8 != NULL) && (p_4_10 != NULL) && (p_2_14 != NULL) && (p_fin != NULL)) { + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_8_9, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 8); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 9); /* includes FIN */ + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_4_8, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 4); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 4); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 8); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 9); /* includes FIN */ + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_4_10, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* ooseq queue: unchanged */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 4); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 4); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 8); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 9); /* includes FIN */ + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_2_14, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 2); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 15); /* includes FIN */ + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_fin, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* ooseq queue: unchanged */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 2); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 15); /* includes FIN */ + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(pinseq, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == data_len); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); + } + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +/** create multiple segments and pass them to tcp_input in a wrong + * order to see if ooseq-caching works correctly + * FIN is received IN-SEQUENCE at the end */ +START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_FIN_INSEQ) +{ + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p_1_2, *p_4_8, *p_3_11, *p_2_12, *p_15_1, *p_15_1a, *pinseq, *pinseqFIN; + char data[] = { + 1, 2, 3, 4, + 5, 6, 7, 8, + 9, 10, 11, 12, + 13, 14, 15, 16 + }; + u16_t data_len; + struct netif netif; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + data_len = sizeof(data); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = data_len; + counters.expected_data = data; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + + /* create segments */ + /* p1: 7 bytes - 2 before FIN */ + /* seqno: 1..2 */ + p_1_2 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[1], 2, 1, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* p2: 4 bytes before p1, including the first 4 bytes of p1 (partly duplicate) */ + /* seqno: 4..11 */ + p_4_8 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[4], 8, 4, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* p3: same as p2 but 2 bytes longer and one byte more at the front */ + /* seqno: 3..13 */ + p_3_11 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[3], 11, 3, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* p4: 13 bytes - 2 before FIN - should be ignored as contained in p1 and p3 */ + /* seqno: 2..13 */ + p_2_12 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[2], 12, 2, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* pinseq is the first segment that is held back to create ooseq! */ + /* seqno: 0..3 */ + pinseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[0], 4, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* p5: last byte before FIN */ + /* seqno: 15 */ + p_15_1 = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[15], 1, 15, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* p6: same as p5, should be ignored */ + p_15_1a = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[15], 1, 15, 0, TCP_ACK); + /* pinseqFIN: last 2 bytes plus FIN */ + /* only segment containing seqno 14 and FIN */ + pinseqFIN = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data[14], 2, 14, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); + EXPECT(pinseq != NULL); + EXPECT(p_1_2 != NULL); + EXPECT(p_4_8 != NULL); + EXPECT(p_3_11 != NULL); + EXPECT(p_2_12 != NULL); + EXPECT(p_15_1 != NULL); + EXPECT(p_15_1a != NULL); + EXPECT(pinseqFIN != NULL); + + if ((pinseq != NULL) && (p_1_2 != NULL) && (p_4_8 != NULL) && (p_3_11 != NULL) && (p_2_12 != NULL) && (p_15_1 != NULL) && (p_15_1a != NULL) && (pinseqFIN != NULL)) { + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_1_2, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 2); + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_4_8, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 2); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 4); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 8); + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_3_11, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 2); + /* p_3_11 has removed p_4_8 from ooseq */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 3); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 11); + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_2_12, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 2); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 1) == 2); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 1) == 12); + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(pinseq, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 14); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_15_1, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 14); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 15); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 1); + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_15_1a, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 14); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue: unchanged */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == 1); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_seqno(pcb, 0) == 15); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_seg_tcplen(pcb, 0) == 1); + + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(pinseqFIN, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 1); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 2); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == data_len); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); + } + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} +END_TEST + +static char data_full_wnd[TCP_WND + TCP_MSS]; + +/** create multiple segments and pass them to tcp_input with the first segment missing + * to simulate overruning the rxwin with ooseq queueing enabled */ +START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_overrun_rxwin) +{ +#if !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS + int i, k; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *pinseq, *p_ovr; + struct netif netif; + int datalen = 0; + int datalen2; + + for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { + data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; + counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->rcv_nxt = 0x8000; + + /* create segments */ + /* pinseq is sent as last segment! */ + pinseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[0], TCP_MSS, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + + for (i = TCP_MSS, k = 0; i < TCP_WND; i += TCP_MSS, k++) { + int count, expected_datalen; + struct pbuf *p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS * (k + 1)], + TCP_MSS, TCP_MSS * (k + 1), 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + count = tcp_oos_count(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(count == k + 1); + datalen = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); + + if (i + TCP_MSS < TCP_WND) { + expected_datalen = (k + 1) * TCP_MSS; + } else { + expected_datalen = TCP_WND - TCP_MSS; + } + + if (datalen != expected_datalen) { + EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == expected_datalen); + } + } + + /* pass in one more segment, cleary overrunning the rxwin */ + p_ovr = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS * (k + 1)], TCP_MSS, TCP_MSS * (k + 1), 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p_ovr != NULL); + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_ovr, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == k); + datalen2 = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == datalen2); + + /* now pass inseq */ + test_tcp_input(pinseq, &netif); + EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +#endif /* !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); +} +END_TEST + +/** similar to above test, except seqno starts near the max rxwin */ START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_overrun_rxwin_edge) +{ +#if !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS + int i, k; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *pinseq, *p_ovr; + struct netif netif; + int datalen = 0; + int datalen2; + + for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { + data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; + counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->rcv_nxt = 0xffffffff - (TCP_WND / 2); + + /* create segments */ + /* pinseq is sent as last segment! */ + pinseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[0], TCP_MSS, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + + for (i = TCP_MSS, k = 0; i < TCP_WND; i += TCP_MSS, k++) { + int count, expected_datalen; + struct pbuf *p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS * (k + 1)], + TCP_MSS, TCP_MSS * (k + 1), 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + count = tcp_oos_count(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(count == k + 1); + datalen = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); + + if (i + TCP_MSS < TCP_WND) { + expected_datalen = (k + 1) * TCP_MSS; + } else { + expected_datalen = TCP_WND - TCP_MSS; + } + + if (datalen != expected_datalen) { + EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == expected_datalen); + } + } + + /* pass in one more segment, cleary overrunning the rxwin */ + p_ovr = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS * (k + 1)], TCP_MSS, TCP_MSS * (k + 1), 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p_ovr != NULL); + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_ovr, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == k); + datalen2 = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == datalen2); + + /* now pass inseq */ + test_tcp_input(pinseq, &netif); + EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +#endif /* !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && !TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_max_bytes) +{ +#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES < (TCP_WND + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) + int i, k; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p_ovr; + struct netif netif; + int datalen = 0; + int datalen2; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { + data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; + counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->rcv_nxt = 0x8000; + + /* don't 'recv' the first segment (1 byte) so that all other segments will be ooseq */ + + /* create segments and 'recv' them */ + for (k = 1, i = 1; k < TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES; k += TCP_MSS, i++) { + int count; + struct pbuf *p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[k], + TCP_MSS, k, 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + EXPECT_RET(p->next == NULL); + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + count = tcp_oos_pbuf_count(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(count == i); + datalen = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == (i * TCP_MSS)); + } + + /* pass in one more segment, overrunning the limit */ + p_ovr = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[k + 1], 1, k + 1, 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p_ovr != NULL); + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_ovr, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue (ensure the new segment was not accepted) */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == (i - 1)); + datalen2 = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen2 == ((i - 1) * TCP_MSS)); + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES < (TCP_WND + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); +} +END_TEST START_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_max_pbufs) +{ +#if TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS < ((TCP_WND / TCP_MSS) + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) + int i; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p_ovr; + struct netif netif; + int datalen = 0; + int datalen2; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { + data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; + counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &local_ip, &remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->rcv_nxt = 0x8000; + + /* don't 'recv' the first segment (1 byte) so that all other segments will be ooseq */ + + /* create segments and 'recv' them */ + for (i = 1; i <= TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS; i++) { + int count; + struct pbuf *p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[i], + 1, i, 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + EXPECT_RET(p->next == NULL); + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue */ + count = tcp_oos_pbuf_count(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(count == i); + datalen = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen == i); + } + + /* pass in one more segment, overrunning the limit */ + p_ovr = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[i + 1], 1, i + 1, 0, TCP_ACK); + EXPECT_RET(p_ovr != NULL); + /* pass the segment to tcp_input */ + test_tcp_input(p_ovr, &netif); + /* check if counters are as expected */ + EXPECT(counters.close_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recv_calls == 0); + EXPECT(counters.recved_bytes == 0); + EXPECT(counters.err_calls == 0); + /* check ooseq queue (ensure the new segment was not accepted) */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == (i - 1)); + datalen2 = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(datalen2 == (i - 1)); + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +#endif /* TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_PBUFS && (TCP_OOSEQ_MAX_BYTES < (TCP_WND + 1)) && (PBUF_POOL_BUFSIZE >= (TCP_MSS + PBUF_LINK_ENCAPSULATION_HLEN + PBUF_LINK_HLEN + PBUF_IP_HLEN + PBUF_TRANSPORT_HLEN)) */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); +} +END_TEST + +static void check_rx_counters(struct tcp_pcb *pcb, struct test_tcp_counters *counters, u32_t exp_close_calls, u32_t exp_rx_calls, + u32_t exp_rx_bytes, u32_t exp_err_calls, int exp_oos_count, int exp_oos_len) +{ + int oos_len; + EXPECT(counters->close_calls == exp_close_calls); + EXPECT(counters->recv_calls == exp_rx_calls); + EXPECT(counters->recved_bytes == exp_rx_bytes); + EXPECT(counters->err_calls == exp_err_calls); + /* check that pbuf is queued in ooseq */ + EXPECT_OOSEQ(tcp_oos_count(pcb) == exp_oos_count); + oos_len = tcp_oos_tcplen(pcb); + EXPECT_OOSEQ(exp_oos_len == oos_len); +} + +/* this test uses 4 packets: + * - data (len=TCP_MSS) + * - FIN + * - data after FIN (len=1) (invalid) + * - 2nd FIN (invalid) + * + * the parameter 'delay_packet' is a bitmask that choses which on these packets is ooseq + */ +static void test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FINs(int delay_packet) +{ + int i, k; + struct test_tcp_counters counters; + struct tcp_pcb *pcb; + struct pbuf *p_normal_fin, *p_data_after_fin, *p, *p_2nd_fin_ooseq; + struct netif netif; + u32_t exp_rx_calls = 0, exp_rx_bytes = 0, exp_close_calls = 0, exp_oos_pbufs = 0, exp_oos_tcplen = 0; + int first_dropped = 0xff; + + for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(data_full_wnd); i++) { + data_full_wnd[i] = (char)i; + } + + /* initialize local vars */ + test_tcp_init_netif(&netif, NULL, &test_local_ip, &test_netmask); + /* initialize counter struct */ + memset(&counters, 0, sizeof(counters)); + counters.expected_data_len = TCP_WND; + counters.expected_data = data_full_wnd; + + /* create and initialize the pcb */ + pcb = test_tcp_new_counters_pcb(&counters); + EXPECT_RET(pcb != NULL); + tcp_set_state(pcb, ESTABLISHED, &test_local_ip, &test_remote_ip, TEST_LOCAL_PORT, TEST_REMOTE_PORT); + pcb->rcv_nxt = 0x8000; + + /* create segments */ + p = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[0], TCP_MSS, 0, 0, TCP_ACK); + p_normal_fin = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, TCP_MSS, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); + k = 1; + p_data_after_fin = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, &data_full_wnd[TCP_MSS + 1], k, TCP_MSS + 1, 0, TCP_ACK); + p_2nd_fin_ooseq = tcp_create_rx_segment(pcb, NULL, 0, TCP_MSS + 1 + k, 0, TCP_ACK | TCP_FIN); + + if (delay_packet & 1) { + /* drop normal data */ + first_dropped = 1; + } else { + /* send normal data */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + exp_rx_calls++; + exp_rx_bytes += TCP_MSS; + } + + /* check if counters are as expected */ + check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); + + if (delay_packet & 2) { + /* drop FIN */ + if (first_dropped > 2) { + first_dropped = 2; + } + } else { + /* send FIN */ + test_tcp_input(p_normal_fin, &netif); + + if (first_dropped < 2) { + /* already dropped packets, this one is ooseq */ + exp_oos_pbufs++; + exp_oos_tcplen++; + } else { + /* inseq */ + exp_close_calls++; + } + } + + /* check if counters are as expected */ + check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); + + if (delay_packet & 4) { + /* drop data-after-FIN */ + if (first_dropped > 3) { + first_dropped = 3; + } + } else { + /* send data-after-FIN */ + test_tcp_input(p_data_after_fin, &netif); + + if (first_dropped < 3) { + /* already dropped packets, this one is ooseq */ + if (delay_packet & 2) { + /* correct FIN was ooseq */ + exp_oos_pbufs++; + exp_oos_tcplen += k; + } + } else { + /* inseq: no change */ + } + } + + /* check if counters are as expected */ + check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); + + if (delay_packet & 8) { + /* drop 2nd-FIN */ + if (first_dropped > 4) { + first_dropped = 4; + } + } else { + /* send 2nd-FIN */ + test_tcp_input(p_2nd_fin_ooseq, &netif); + + if (first_dropped < 3) { + /* already dropped packets, this one is ooseq */ + if (delay_packet & 2) { + /* correct FIN was ooseq */ + exp_oos_pbufs++; + exp_oos_tcplen++; + } + } else { + /* inseq: no change */ + } + } + + /* check if counters are as expected */ + check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); + + if (delay_packet & 1) { + /* dropped normal data before */ + test_tcp_input(p, &netif); + exp_rx_calls++; + exp_rx_bytes += TCP_MSS; + + if ((delay_packet & 2) == 0) { + /* normal FIN was NOT delayed */ + exp_close_calls++; + exp_oos_pbufs = exp_oos_tcplen = 0; + } + } + + /* check if counters are as expected */ + check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); + + if (delay_packet & 2) { + /* dropped normal FIN before */ + test_tcp_input(p_normal_fin, &netif); + exp_close_calls++; + exp_oos_pbufs = exp_oos_tcplen = 0; + } + + /* check if counters are as expected */ + check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); + + if (delay_packet & 4) { + /* dropped data-after-FIN before */ + test_tcp_input(p_data_after_fin, &netif); + } + + /* check if counters are as expected */ + check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); + + if (delay_packet & 8) { + /* dropped 2nd-FIN before */ + test_tcp_input(p_2nd_fin_ooseq, &netif); + } + + /* check if counters are as expected */ + check_rx_counters(pcb, &counters, exp_close_calls, exp_rx_calls, exp_rx_bytes, 0, exp_oos_pbufs, exp_oos_tcplen); + + /* check that ooseq data has been dumped */ + EXPECT(pcb->ooseq == NULL); + + /* make sure the pcb is freed */ + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 1); + tcp_abort(pcb); + EXPECT(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_TCP_PCB) == 0); +} + +/** create multiple segments and pass them to tcp_input with the first segment missing + * to simulate overruning the rxwin with ooseq queueing enabled */ +#define FIN_TEST(name, num) \ + START_TEST(name) \ + { \ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); \ + test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FINs(num); \ + } \ + END_TEST +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_0, 0) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_1, 1) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_2, 2) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_3, 3) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_4, 4) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_5, 5) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_6, 6) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_7, 7) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_8, 8) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_9, 9) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_10, 10) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_11, 11) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_12, 12) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_13, 13) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_14, 14) +FIN_TEST(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_15, 15) + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite * +tcp_oos_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_FIN_OOSEQ), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_FIN_INSEQ), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_overrun_rxwin), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_overrun_rxwin_edge), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_max_bytes), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_max_pbufs), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_0), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_1), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_2), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_3), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_4), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_5), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_6), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_7), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_8), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_9), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_10), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_11), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_12), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_13), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_14), + TESTFUNC(test_tcp_recv_ooseq_double_FIN_15) + }; + return create_suite("TCP_OOS", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), tcp_oos_setup, tcp_oos_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.h similarity index 94% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.h index 8b2e6484..5b82013b 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/tcp/test_tcp_oos.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_TCP_OOS_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_TCP_OOS_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *tcp_oos_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_TCP_OOS_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_TCP_OOS_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *tcp_oos_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.c similarity index 96% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.c rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.c index 73ad8419..4653844a 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.c +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.c @@ -1,340 +1,340 @@ -#include "test_udp.h" - -#include "lwip/udp.h" -#include "lwip/stats.h" -#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" - -#if !LWIP_STATS || !UDP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS -#error "This tests needs UDP- and MEMP-statistics enabled" -#endif - -struct test_udp_rxdata { - u32_t rx_cnt; - u32_t rx_bytes; - struct udp_pcb *pcb; -}; - -static struct netif test_netif1, test_netif2; -static ip4_addr_t test_gw1, test_ipaddr1, test_netmask1; -static ip4_addr_t test_gw2, test_ipaddr2, test_netmask2; -static int output_ctr, linkoutput_ctr; - -/* Helper functions */ -static void udp_remove_all(void) -{ - struct udp_pcb *pcb = udp_pcbs; - struct udp_pcb *pcb2; - - while (pcb != NULL) { - pcb2 = pcb; - pcb = pcb->next; - udp_remove(pcb2); - } - - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_UDP_PCB) == 0); -} - -static err_t default_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) -{ - fail_unless((netif == &test_netif1) || (netif == &test_netif2)); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - fail_unless(ipaddr != NULL); - output_ctr++; - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t default_netif_linkoutput(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) -{ - fail_unless((netif == &test_netif1) || (netif == &test_netif2)); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - linkoutput_ctr++; - return ERR_OK; -} - -static err_t default_netif_init(struct netif *netif) -{ - fail_unless(netif != NULL); - netif->output = default_netif_output; - netif->linkoutput = default_netif_linkoutput; - netif->mtu = 1500; - netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; - netif->hwaddr_len = 6; - return ERR_OK; -} - -static void default_netif_add(void) -{ - struct netif *n; - -#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - fail_unless(netif_list != NULL); /* the loopif */ - fail_unless(netif_list->next == NULL); -#else - fail_unless(netif_list == NULL); -#endif - fail_unless(netif_default == NULL); - - IP4_ADDR(&test_ipaddr1, 192, 168, 0, 1); - IP4_ADDR(&test_netmask1, 255, 255, 255, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&test_gw1, 192, 168, 0, 254); - n = netif_add(&test_netif1, &test_ipaddr1, &test_netmask1, - &test_gw1, NULL, default_netif_init, NULL); - fail_unless(n == &test_netif1); - - IP4_ADDR(&test_ipaddr2, 192, 168, 1, 1); - IP4_ADDR(&test_netmask2, 255, 255, 255, 0); - IP4_ADDR(&test_gw2, 192, 168, 1, 254); - n = netif_add(&test_netif2, &test_ipaddr2, &test_netmask2, - &test_gw2, NULL, default_netif_init, NULL); - fail_unless(n == &test_netif2); - - netif_set_default(&test_netif1); - netif_set_up(&test_netif1); - netif_set_up(&test_netif2); -} - -static void default_netif_remove(void) -{ - fail_unless(netif_default == &test_netif1); - netif_remove(&test_netif1); - netif_remove(&test_netif2); - fail_unless(netif_default == NULL); -#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF - fail_unless(netif_list != NULL); /* the loopif */ - fail_unless(netif_list->next == NULL); -#else - fail_unless(netif_list == NULL); -#endif -} -/* Setups/teardown functions */ - -static void udp_setup(void) -{ - udp_remove_all(); - default_netif_add(); - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -static void udp_teardown(void) -{ - udp_remove_all(); - default_netif_remove(); - lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); -} - -/* Test functions */ - -START_TEST(test_udp_new_remove) -{ - struct udp_pcb *pcb; - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_UDP_PCB) == 0); - - pcb = udp_new(); - fail_unless(pcb != NULL); - - if (pcb != NULL) { - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_UDP_PCB) == 1); - udp_remove(pcb); - fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_UDP_PCB) == 0); - } -} -END_TEST - -static void test_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, - const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) -{ - struct test_udp_rxdata *ctr = (struct test_udp_rxdata *)arg; - - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); - - fail_unless(arg != NULL); - fail_unless(ctr->pcb == pcb); - - ctr->rx_cnt++; - ctr->rx_bytes += p->tot_len; - - if (p != NULL) { - pbuf_free(p); - } -} - -static struct pbuf *test_udp_create_test_packet(u16_t length, u16_t port, u32_t dst_addr) -{ - err_t err; - u8_t ret; - struct udp_hdr *uh; - struct ip_hdr *ih; - struct pbuf *p; - const u8_t test_data[16] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd, 0xe, 0xf }; - - p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, length, PBUF_POOL); - fail_unless(p != NULL); - - if (p == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - fail_unless(p->next == NULL); - err = pbuf_take(p, test_data, length); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - - /* add UDP header */ - ret = pbuf_add_header(p, sizeof(struct udp_hdr)); - fail_unless(!ret); - uh = (struct udp_hdr *)p->payload; - uh->chksum = 0; - uh->dest = uh->src = lwip_htons(port); - uh->len = lwip_htons(p->tot_len); - /* add IPv4 header */ - ret = pbuf_add_header(p, sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); - fail_unless(!ret); - ih = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; - memset(ih, 0, sizeof(*ih)); - ih->dest.addr = dst_addr; - ih->_len = lwip_htons(p->tot_len); - ih->_ttl = 32; - ih->_proto = IP_PROTO_UDP; - IPH_VHL_SET(ih, 4, sizeof(struct ip_hdr) / 4); - IPH_CHKSUM_SET(ih, inet_chksum(ih, sizeof(struct ip_hdr))); - return p; -} - -/* bind 2 pcbs to specific netif IP and test which one gets broadcasts */ -START_TEST(test_udp_broadcast_rx_with_2_netifs) -{ - err_t err; - struct udp_pcb *pcb1, *pcb2; - const u16_t port = 12345; - struct test_udp_rxdata ctr1, ctr2; - struct pbuf *p; -#if SO_REUSE - struct udp_pcb *pcb_any; - struct test_udp_rxdata ctr_any; -#endif - LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); - - pcb1 = udp_new(); - fail_unless(pcb1 != NULL); - pcb2 = udp_new(); - fail_unless(pcb2 != NULL); - -#if SO_REUSE - pcb_any = udp_new(); - fail_unless(pcb_any != NULL); - - ip_set_option(pcb1, SOF_REUSEADDR); - ip_set_option(pcb2, SOF_REUSEADDR); - ip_set_option(pcb_any, SOF_REUSEADDR); - - err = udp_bind(pcb_any, NULL, port); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - memset(&ctr_any, 0, sizeof(ctr_any)); - ctr_any.pcb = pcb_any; - udp_recv(pcb_any, test_recv, &ctr_any); -#endif - - err = udp_bind(pcb1, &test_netif1.ip_addr, port); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - err = udp_bind(pcb2, &test_netif2.ip_addr, port); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - - memset(&ctr1, 0, sizeof(ctr1)); - ctr1.pcb = pcb1; - memset(&ctr2, 0, sizeof(ctr2)); - ctr2.pcb = pcb2; - - udp_recv(pcb1, test_recv, &ctr1); - udp_recv(pcb2, test_recv, &ctr2); - - /* unicast to netif1 */ - p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, test_ipaddr1.addr); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif1); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 1); - fail_unless(ctr1.rx_bytes == 16); - fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 0); -#if SO_REUSE - fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); -#endif - ctr1.rx_cnt = ctr1.rx_bytes = 0; - - /* unicast to netif2 */ - p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, test_ipaddr2.addr); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif2); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 1); - fail_unless(ctr2.rx_bytes == 16); - fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 0); -#if SO_REUSE - fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); -#endif - ctr2.rx_cnt = ctr2.rx_bytes = 0; - - /* broadcast to netif1-broadcast, input to netif2 */ - p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, test_ipaddr1.addr | ~test_netmask1.addr); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif2); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 1); - fail_unless(ctr1.rx_bytes == 16); - fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 0); -#if SO_REUSE - fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); -#endif - ctr1.rx_cnt = ctr1.rx_bytes = 0; - - /* broadcast to netif2-broadcast, input to netif1 */ - p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, test_ipaddr2.addr | ~test_netmask2.addr); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif1); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 1); - fail_unless(ctr2.rx_bytes == 16); - fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 0); -#if SO_REUSE - fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); -#endif - ctr2.rx_cnt = ctr2.rx_bytes = 0; - - /* broadcast to global-broadcast, input to netif1 */ - p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, 0xffffffff); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif1); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 1); - fail_unless(ctr1.rx_bytes == 16); - fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 0); -#if SO_REUSE - fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); -#endif - ctr1.rx_cnt = ctr1.rx_bytes = 0; - - /* broadcast to global-broadcast, input to netif2 */ - p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, 0xffffffff); - EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); - err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif2); - fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); - fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 1); - fail_unless(ctr2.rx_bytes == 16); - fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 0); -#if SO_REUSE - fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); -#endif - ctr2.rx_cnt = ctr2.rx_bytes = 0; -} -END_TEST - -/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ -Suite *udp_suite(void) -{ - testfunc tests[] = { - TESTFUNC(test_udp_new_remove), - TESTFUNC(test_udp_broadcast_rx_with_2_netifs) - }; - return create_suite("UDP", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), udp_setup, udp_teardown); -} +#include "test_udp.h" + +#include "lwip/udp.h" +#include "lwip/stats.h" +#include "lwip/inet_chksum.h" + +#if !LWIP_STATS || !UDP_STATS || !MEMP_STATS +#error "This tests needs UDP- and MEMP-statistics enabled" +#endif + +struct test_udp_rxdata { + u32_t rx_cnt; + u32_t rx_bytes; + struct udp_pcb *pcb; +}; + +static struct netif test_netif1, test_netif2; +static ip4_addr_t test_gw1, test_ipaddr1, test_netmask1; +static ip4_addr_t test_gw2, test_ipaddr2, test_netmask2; +static int output_ctr, linkoutput_ctr; + +/* Helper functions */ +static void udp_remove_all(void) +{ + struct udp_pcb *pcb = udp_pcbs; + struct udp_pcb *pcb2; + + while (pcb != NULL) { + pcb2 = pcb; + pcb = pcb->next; + udp_remove(pcb2); + } + + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_UDP_PCB) == 0); +} + +static err_t default_netif_output(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p, const ip4_addr_t *ipaddr) +{ + fail_unless((netif == &test_netif1) || (netif == &test_netif2)); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + fail_unless(ipaddr != NULL); + output_ctr++; + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t default_netif_linkoutput(struct netif *netif, struct pbuf *p) +{ + fail_unless((netif == &test_netif1) || (netif == &test_netif2)); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + linkoutput_ctr++; + return ERR_OK; +} + +static err_t default_netif_init(struct netif *netif) +{ + fail_unless(netif != NULL); + netif->output = default_netif_output; + netif->linkoutput = default_netif_linkoutput; + netif->mtu = 1500; + netif->flags = NETIF_FLAG_BROADCAST | NETIF_FLAG_ETHARP | NETIF_FLAG_LINK_UP; + netif->hwaddr_len = 6; + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void default_netif_add(void) +{ + struct netif *n; + +#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + fail_unless(netif_list != NULL); /* the loopif */ + fail_unless(netif_list->next == NULL); +#else + fail_unless(netif_list == NULL); +#endif + fail_unless(netif_default == NULL); + + IP4_ADDR(&test_ipaddr1, 192, 168, 0, 1); + IP4_ADDR(&test_netmask1, 255, 255, 255, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&test_gw1, 192, 168, 0, 254); + n = netif_add(&test_netif1, &test_ipaddr1, &test_netmask1, + &test_gw1, NULL, default_netif_init, NULL); + fail_unless(n == &test_netif1); + + IP4_ADDR(&test_ipaddr2, 192, 168, 1, 1); + IP4_ADDR(&test_netmask2, 255, 255, 255, 0); + IP4_ADDR(&test_gw2, 192, 168, 1, 254); + n = netif_add(&test_netif2, &test_ipaddr2, &test_netmask2, + &test_gw2, NULL, default_netif_init, NULL); + fail_unless(n == &test_netif2); + + netif_set_default(&test_netif1); + netif_set_up(&test_netif1); + netif_set_up(&test_netif2); +} + +static void default_netif_remove(void) +{ + fail_unless(netif_default == &test_netif1); + netif_remove(&test_netif1); + netif_remove(&test_netif2); + fail_unless(netif_default == NULL); +#if LWIP_HAVE_LOOPIF + fail_unless(netif_list != NULL); /* the loopif */ + fail_unless(netif_list->next == NULL); +#else + fail_unless(netif_list == NULL); +#endif +} +/* Setups/teardown functions */ + +static void udp_setup(void) +{ + udp_remove_all(); + default_netif_add(); + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +static void udp_teardown(void) +{ + udp_remove_all(); + default_netif_remove(); + lwip_check_ensure_no_alloc(SKIP_POOL(MEMP_SYS_TIMEOUT)); +} + +/* Test functions */ + +START_TEST(test_udp_new_remove) +{ + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_UDP_PCB) == 0); + + pcb = udp_new(); + fail_unless(pcb != NULL); + + if (pcb != NULL) { + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_UDP_PCB) == 1); + udp_remove(pcb); + fail_unless(MEMP_STATS_GET(used, MEMP_UDP_PCB) == 0); + } +} +END_TEST + +static void test_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, + const ip_addr_t *addr, u16_t port) +{ + struct test_udp_rxdata *ctr = (struct test_udp_rxdata *)arg; + + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); + + fail_unless(arg != NULL); + fail_unless(ctr->pcb == pcb); + + ctr->rx_cnt++; + ctr->rx_bytes += p->tot_len; + + if (p != NULL) { + pbuf_free(p); + } +} + +static struct pbuf *test_udp_create_test_packet(u16_t length, u16_t port, u32_t dst_addr) +{ + err_t err; + u8_t ret; + struct udp_hdr *uh; + struct ip_hdr *ih; + struct pbuf *p; + const u8_t test_data[16] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd, 0xe, 0xf }; + + p = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, length, PBUF_POOL); + fail_unless(p != NULL); + + if (p == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + fail_unless(p->next == NULL); + err = pbuf_take(p, test_data, length); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + + /* add UDP header */ + ret = pbuf_add_header(p, sizeof(struct udp_hdr)); + fail_unless(!ret); + uh = (struct udp_hdr *)p->payload; + uh->chksum = 0; + uh->dest = uh->src = lwip_htons(port); + uh->len = lwip_htons(p->tot_len); + /* add IPv4 header */ + ret = pbuf_add_header(p, sizeof(struct ip_hdr)); + fail_unless(!ret); + ih = (struct ip_hdr *)p->payload; + memset(ih, 0, sizeof(*ih)); + ih->dest.addr = dst_addr; + ih->_len = lwip_htons(p->tot_len); + ih->_ttl = 32; + ih->_proto = IP_PROTO_UDP; + IPH_VHL_SET(ih, 4, sizeof(struct ip_hdr) / 4); + IPH_CHKSUM_SET(ih, inet_chksum(ih, sizeof(struct ip_hdr))); + return p; +} + +/* bind 2 pcbs to specific netif IP and test which one gets broadcasts */ +START_TEST(test_udp_broadcast_rx_with_2_netifs) +{ + err_t err; + struct udp_pcb *pcb1, *pcb2; + const u16_t port = 12345; + struct test_udp_rxdata ctr1, ctr2; + struct pbuf *p; +#if SO_REUSE + struct udp_pcb *pcb_any; + struct test_udp_rxdata ctr_any; +#endif + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(_i); + + pcb1 = udp_new(); + fail_unless(pcb1 != NULL); + pcb2 = udp_new(); + fail_unless(pcb2 != NULL); + +#if SO_REUSE + pcb_any = udp_new(); + fail_unless(pcb_any != NULL); + + ip_set_option(pcb1, SOF_REUSEADDR); + ip_set_option(pcb2, SOF_REUSEADDR); + ip_set_option(pcb_any, SOF_REUSEADDR); + + err = udp_bind(pcb_any, NULL, port); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + memset(&ctr_any, 0, sizeof(ctr_any)); + ctr_any.pcb = pcb_any; + udp_recv(pcb_any, test_recv, &ctr_any); +#endif + + err = udp_bind(pcb1, &test_netif1.ip_addr, port); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + err = udp_bind(pcb2, &test_netif2.ip_addr, port); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + + memset(&ctr1, 0, sizeof(ctr1)); + ctr1.pcb = pcb1; + memset(&ctr2, 0, sizeof(ctr2)); + ctr2.pcb = pcb2; + + udp_recv(pcb1, test_recv, &ctr1); + udp_recv(pcb2, test_recv, &ctr2); + + /* unicast to netif1 */ + p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, test_ipaddr1.addr); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif1); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 1); + fail_unless(ctr1.rx_bytes == 16); + fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 0); +#if SO_REUSE + fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); +#endif + ctr1.rx_cnt = ctr1.rx_bytes = 0; + + /* unicast to netif2 */ + p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, test_ipaddr2.addr); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif2); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 1); + fail_unless(ctr2.rx_bytes == 16); + fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 0); +#if SO_REUSE + fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); +#endif + ctr2.rx_cnt = ctr2.rx_bytes = 0; + + /* broadcast to netif1-broadcast, input to netif2 */ + p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, test_ipaddr1.addr | ~test_netmask1.addr); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif2); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 1); + fail_unless(ctr1.rx_bytes == 16); + fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 0); +#if SO_REUSE + fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); +#endif + ctr1.rx_cnt = ctr1.rx_bytes = 0; + + /* broadcast to netif2-broadcast, input to netif1 */ + p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, test_ipaddr2.addr | ~test_netmask2.addr); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif1); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 1); + fail_unless(ctr2.rx_bytes == 16); + fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 0); +#if SO_REUSE + fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); +#endif + ctr2.rx_cnt = ctr2.rx_bytes = 0; + + /* broadcast to global-broadcast, input to netif1 */ + p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, 0xffffffff); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif1); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 1); + fail_unless(ctr1.rx_bytes == 16); + fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 0); +#if SO_REUSE + fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); +#endif + ctr1.rx_cnt = ctr1.rx_bytes = 0; + + /* broadcast to global-broadcast, input to netif2 */ + p = test_udp_create_test_packet(16, port, 0xffffffff); + EXPECT_RET(p != NULL); + err = ip4_input(p, &test_netif2); + fail_unless(err == ERR_OK); + fail_unless(ctr2.rx_cnt == 1); + fail_unless(ctr2.rx_bytes == 16); + fail_unless(ctr1.rx_cnt == 0); +#if SO_REUSE + fail_unless(ctr_any.rx_cnt == 0); +#endif + ctr2.rx_cnt = ctr2.rx_bytes = 0; +} +END_TEST + +/** Create the suite including all tests for this module */ +Suite *udp_suite(void) +{ + testfunc tests[] = { + TESTFUNC(test_udp_new_remove), + TESTFUNC(test_udp_broadcast_rx_with_2_netifs) + }; + return create_suite("UDP", tests, sizeof(tests) / sizeof(testfunc), udp_setup, udp_teardown); +} diff --git a/components/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.h similarity index 93% rename from components/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.h rename to components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.h index a3dabd26..e509b8cd 100644 --- a/components/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.h +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip/test/unit/udp/test_udp.h @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_UDP_H -#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_UDP_H - -#include "../lwip_check.h" - -Suite *udp_suite(void); - -#endif +#ifndef LWIP_HDR_TEST_UDP_H +#define LWIP_HDR_TEST_UDP_H + +#include "../lwip_check.h" + +Suite *udp_suite(void); + +#endif diff --git a/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/CMakeLists.txt b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e592db6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_DHCPD dhcpd) +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_PING ping) + diff --git a/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/CMakeLists.txt b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c9fcf9f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +sdk_generate_library() + +sdk_library_add_sources(dhcp_server_raw.c) +sdk_add_include_directories(.) diff --git a/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/bouffalo.mk b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/bouffalo.mk new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3167ed38 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/bouffalo.mk @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# Component Makefile +# +## These include paths would be exported to project level +COMPONENT_ADD_INCLUDEDIRS += . + +## not be exported to project level +COMPONENT_PRIV_INCLUDEDIRS := + +## This component's src +COMPONENT_SRCS := dhcp_server_raw.c +COMPONENT_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,%.o, $(COMPONENT_SRCS)) + +COMPONENT_SRCDIRS := . + + +## +#CPPFLAGS += \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/dhcp_server.h b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/dhcp_server.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7750cc82 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/dhcp_server.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ + +/** + **************************************************************************************** + * + * @file dhcp_server.h + * Copyright (C) Bouffalo Lab 2016-2018 + * + **************************************************************************************** + */ + + +#ifndef DHCPV4_SERVER_H__ +#define DHCPV4_SERVER_H__ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +void dhcpd_start(struct netif *netif); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif + diff --git a/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/dhcp_server_raw.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/dhcp_server_raw.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7dfdf27d --- /dev/null +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/dhcpd/dhcp_server_raw.c @@ -0,0 +1,795 @@ + +/** + **************************************************************************************** + * + * @file dhcp_server_raw.c + * Copyright (C) Bouffalo Lab 2016-2018 + * + **************************************************************************************** + */ + + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +#include + +/* DHCP server option */ +#define DHCP_CLIENT_PORT 68 +#define DHCP_SERVER_PORT 67 + +/* allocated client ip range */ +#ifndef DHCPD_CLIENT_IP_MIN + #define DHCPD_CLIENT_IP_MIN 2 +#endif +#ifndef DHCPD_CLIENT_IP_MAX + #define DHCPD_CLIENT_IP_MAX 254 +#endif + +/* the DHCP server address */ +#ifndef DHCPD_SERVER_IP + #define DHCPD_SERVER_IP "192.168.169.1" +#endif + +#define DHCP_DEBUG_PRINTF + +#ifdef DHCP_DEBUG_PRINTF +#undef printf + #define DEBUG_PRINTF(...) printf("[DHCP] "__VA_ARGS__) +#else + #define DEBUG_PRINTF(...) +#endif /* DHCP_DEBUG_PRINTF */ + +/* we need some routines in the DHCP of lwIP */ +#undef LWIP_DHCP +#define LWIP_DHCP 1 +#include + +/** Mac address length */ +#define DHCP_MAX_HLEN 6 +/** dhcp default live time */ +#define DHCP_DEFAULT_LIVE_TIME 0x80510100 + +/** Minimum length for request before packet is parsed */ +#define DHCP_MIN_REQUEST_LEN 44 + +#define LWIP_NETIF_LOCK(...) +#define LWIP_NETIF_UNLOCK(...) + +/** +* The dhcp client node struct. +*/ +struct dhcp_client_node +{ + struct dhcp_client_node *next; + u8_t chaddr[DHCP_MAX_HLEN]; + ip4_addr_t ipaddr; + u32_t lease_end; +}; + +/** +* The dhcp server struct. +*/ +struct dhcp_server +{ + struct dhcp_server *next; + struct netif *netif; + struct udp_pcb *pcb; + struct dhcp_client_node *node_list; + ip4_addr_t start; + ip4_addr_t end; + ip4_addr_t current; +}; + +static u8_t *dhcp_server_option_find(u8_t *buf, u16_t len, u8_t option); + +/** +* The dhcp server struct list. +*/ +static struct dhcp_server *lw_dhcp_server; + +/** +* Find a dhcp client node by mac address +* +* @param dhcpserver The dhcp server +* @param chaddr Mac address +* @param hlen Mac address length +* @return dhcp client node +*/ +static struct dhcp_client_node * +dhcp_client_find_by_mac(struct dhcp_server *dhcpserver, const u8_t *chaddr, u8_t hlen) +{ + struct dhcp_client_node *node; + + for (node = dhcpserver->node_list; node != NULL; node = node->next) + { + if (memcmp(node->chaddr, chaddr, hlen) == 0) + { + return node; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** +* Find a dhcp client node by ip address +* +* @param dhcpserver The dhcp server +* @param chaddr Mac address +* @param hlen Mac address length +* @return dhcp client node +*/ +static struct dhcp_client_node * +dhcp_client_find_by_ip(struct dhcp_server *dhcpserver, const uint8_t *ip) +{ + struct dhcp_client_node *node; + ip4_addr_t ipaddr;//FIXME we only support IPv4, so we use ip4_addr_t here + uint32_t ipval; + + // Copy ipaddr to avoid aligment issue + memcpy(&ipval, ip, sizeof(ipval)); + ip4_addr_set_u32(&ipaddr, ipval); + for (node = dhcpserver->node_list; node != NULL; node = node->next) + { + if (ip4_addr_cmp(&node->ipaddr, &ipaddr)) + { + return node; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** +* Find a dhcp client node by ip address +* +* @param dhcpserver The dhcp server +* @param chaddr Mac address +* @param hlen Mac address length +* @return dhcp client node +*/ +static struct dhcp_client_node * +dhcp_client_find(struct dhcp_server *dhcpserver, struct dhcp_msg *msg, + u8_t *opt_buf, u16_t len) +{ + u8_t *opt; + //u32_t ipaddr; + struct dhcp_client_node *node; + + node = dhcp_client_find_by_mac(dhcpserver, msg->chaddr, msg->hlen); + if (node != NULL) + { + return node; + } + + opt = dhcp_server_option_find(opt_buf, len, DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP); + if (opt != NULL) + { + node = dhcp_client_find_by_ip(dhcpserver, &opt[2]); + if (node != NULL) + { + if (0 == memcmp(node->chaddr, msg->chaddr, msg->hlen)) { + return node; + } else { + puts("IP Found, but MAC address is NOT the same\r\n"); + // return node; //FIXME use hostname instead of mac address + } + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** +* Find a dhcp client node by ip address +* +* @param dhcpserver The dhcp server +* @param chaddr Mac address +* @param hlen Mac address length +* @return dhcp client node +*/ +static struct dhcp_client_node * +dhcp_client_alloc(struct dhcp_server *dhcpserver, struct dhcp_msg *msg, + u8_t *opt_buf, u16_t len) +{ + u8_t *opt; + u32_t ipaddr; + struct dhcp_client_node *node; + + node = dhcp_client_find_by_mac(dhcpserver, msg->chaddr, msg->hlen); + if (node != NULL) + { + return node; + } + + opt = dhcp_server_option_find(opt_buf, len, DHCP_OPTION_REQUESTED_IP); + if (opt != NULL) + { + node = dhcp_client_find_by_ip(dhcpserver, &opt[2]); + if (node != NULL) + { + return node; + } + } + +dhcp_alloc_again: + node = dhcp_client_find_by_ip(dhcpserver, (uint8_t*)&dhcpserver->current); + if (node != NULL) + { + ipaddr = (ntohl(dhcpserver->current.addr) + 1); + if (ipaddr > ntohl(dhcpserver->end.addr)) + { + ipaddr = ntohl(dhcpserver->start.addr); + } + dhcpserver->current.addr = htonl(ipaddr); + goto dhcp_alloc_again; + } + node = (struct dhcp_client_node *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct dhcp_client_node)); + if (node == NULL) + { + return NULL; + } + SMEMCPY(node->chaddr, msg->chaddr, msg->hlen); + node->ipaddr = dhcpserver->current; + + node->next = dhcpserver->node_list; + dhcpserver->node_list = node; + + return node; +} + +/** +* find option from buffer. +* +* @param buf The buffer to find option +* @param len The buffer length +* @param option Which option to find +* @return dhcp option buffer +*/ +static u8_t * +dhcp_server_option_find(u8_t *buf, u16_t len, u8_t option) +{ + u8_t *end = buf + len; + while ((buf < end) && (*buf != DHCP_OPTION_END)) + { + if (*buf == option) + { + return buf; + } + buf += (buf[1] + 2); + } + return NULL; +} + +/** +* If an incoming DHCP message is in response to us, then trigger the state machine +*/ +static void +dhcp_server_recv(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct pbuf *p, const ip_addr_t *recv_addr, u16_t port) +{ + struct dhcp_server *dhcp_server = (struct dhcp_server *)arg; + struct dhcp_msg *msg; + struct pbuf *q; + u8_t *opt_buf; + u8_t *opt; + struct dhcp_client_node *node; + u8_t msg_type; + u16_t length; + ip_addr_t addr = *recv_addr; + u32_t tmp; + + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("[%s:%d] %c%c recv %d\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, dhcp_server->netif->name[0], dhcp_server->netif->name[1], p->tot_len)); + /* prevent warnings about unused arguments */ + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(pcb); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(addr); + LWIP_UNUSED_ARG(port); + + if (p->len < DHCP_MIN_REQUEST_LEN) + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("DHCP request message or pbuf too short\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + q = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT, 1500, PBUF_RAM); + if (q == NULL) + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("pbuf_alloc dhcp_msg failed!\n")); + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + if (q->tot_len < p->tot_len) + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("pbuf_alloc dhcp_msg too small %d:%d\n", q->tot_len, p->tot_len)); + pbuf_free(p); + return; + } + + pbuf_copy(q, p); + pbuf_free(p); + + msg = (struct dhcp_msg *)q->payload; + if (msg->op != DHCP_BOOTREQUEST) + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("not a DHCP request message, but type %"U16_F"\n", (u16_t)msg->op)); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + if (msg->cookie != PP_HTONL(DHCP_MAGIC_COOKIE)) + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE | LWIP_DBG_LEVEL_WARNING, ("bad DHCP_MAGIC_COOKIE!\n")); + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + if (msg->hlen > DHCP_MAX_HLEN) + { + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + + opt_buf = (u8_t *)msg + DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS; + length = q->tot_len - DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS; + opt = dhcp_server_option_find(opt_buf, length, DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE); + if (opt) + { + msg_type = *(opt + 2); + if (msg_type == DHCP_DISCOVER) + { + node = dhcp_client_alloc(dhcp_server, msg, opt_buf, length); + if (node == NULL) + { + goto free_pbuf_and_return; + } + node->lease_end = DHCP_DEFAULT_LIVE_TIME; + /* create dhcp offer and send */ + msg->op = DHCP_BOOTREPLY; + msg->hops = 0; + msg->secs = 0; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(&msg->siaddr, &(dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr), 4); + msg->sname[0] = '\0'; + msg->file[0] = '\0'; + msg->cookie = PP_HTONL(DHCP_MAGIC_COOKIE); + SMEMCPY(&msg->yiaddr, &node->ipaddr, 4); + + opt_buf = (u8_t *)msg + DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS; + /* add msg type */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE; + *opt_buf++ = 1; + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OFFER; + + /* add server id */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID; + *opt_buf++ = 4; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &(dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr), 4); + opt_buf += 4; + + /* add_lease_time */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_LEASE_TIME; + *opt_buf++ = 4; + tmp = PP_HTONL(DHCP_DEFAULT_LIVE_TIME); + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &tmp, 4); + opt_buf += 4; + + /* add config */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_SUBNET_MASK; + *opt_buf++ = 4; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &ip_2_ip4(&dhcp_server->netif->netmask)->addr, 4); + opt_buf += 4; + + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_DNS_SERVER; + *opt_buf++ = 4; +#ifdef DHCP_DNS_SERVER_IP + { + ip_addr_t dns_addr; + ipaddr_aton(DHCP_DNS_SERVER_IP, &dns_addr); + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &ip_2_ip4(&dns_addr)->addr, 4); + } +#else + /* default use gatewary dns server */ + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &(dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr), 4); +#endif /* DHCP_DNS_SERVER_IP */ + opt_buf += 4; + + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_ROUTER; + *opt_buf++ = 4; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &ip_2_ip4(&dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr)->addr, 4); + opt_buf += 4; + + /* add option end */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_END; + + length = (u32_t)opt_buf - (u32_t)msg; + if (length < q->tot_len) + { + pbuf_realloc(q, length); + } + + ip_2_ip4(&addr)->addr = INADDR_BROADCAST; + udp_sendto_if(pcb, q, &addr, port, dhcp_server->netif); + } + else + { + if (1) + { + if (msg_type == DHCP_REQUEST) + { + node = dhcp_client_find(dhcp_server, msg, opt_buf, length); + if (node != NULL) + { + /* Send ack */ + node->lease_end = DHCP_DEFAULT_LIVE_TIME; + /* create dhcp offer and send */ + msg->op = DHCP_BOOTREPLY; + msg->hops = 0; + msg->secs = 0; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(&msg->siaddr, &(dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr), 4); + msg->sname[0] = '\0'; + msg->file[0] = '\0'; + msg->cookie = PP_HTONL(DHCP_MAGIC_COOKIE); + SMEMCPY(&msg->yiaddr, &node->ipaddr, 4); + opt_buf = (u8_t *)msg + DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS; + + /* add msg type */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE; + *opt_buf++ = 1; + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_ACK; + + /* add server id */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID; + *opt_buf++ = 4; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &(dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr), 4); + opt_buf += 4; + + /* add_lease_time */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_LEASE_TIME; + *opt_buf++ = 4; + tmp = PP_HTONL(DHCP_DEFAULT_LIVE_TIME); + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &tmp, 4); + opt_buf += 4; + + /* add config */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_SUBNET_MASK; + *opt_buf++ = 4; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &ip_2_ip4(&dhcp_server->netif->netmask)->addr, 4); + opt_buf += 4; + + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_DNS_SERVER; + *opt_buf++ = 4; +#ifdef DHCP_DNS_SERVER_IP + { + ip_addr_t dns_addr; + ipaddr_aton(DHCP_DNS_SERVER_IP, &dns_addr); + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &ip_2_ip4(&dns_addr)->addr, 4); + } +#else + /* default use gatewary dns server */ + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &(dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr), 4); +#endif /* DHCP_DNS_SERVER_IP */ + opt_buf += 4; + + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_ROUTER; + *opt_buf++ = 4; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &ip_2_ip4(&dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr)->addr, 4); + opt_buf += 4; + + /* add option end */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_END; + + length = (u32_t)opt_buf - (u32_t)msg; + if (length < q->tot_len) + { + pbuf_realloc(q, length); + } + + ip_2_ip4(&addr)->addr = INADDR_BROADCAST; + udp_sendto_if(pcb, q, &addr, port, dhcp_server->netif); + } + else + { + /* Send no ack */ + /* create dhcp offer and send */ + msg->op = DHCP_BOOTREPLY; + msg->hops = 0; + msg->secs = 0; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(&msg->siaddr, &(dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr), 4); + msg->sname[0] = '\0'; + msg->file[0] = '\0'; + msg->cookie = PP_HTONL(DHCP_MAGIC_COOKIE); + memset(&msg->yiaddr, 0, 4); + opt_buf = (u8_t *)msg + DHCP_OPTIONS_OFS; + + /* add msg type */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_MESSAGE_TYPE; + *opt_buf++ = 1; + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_NAK; + + /* add server id */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_SERVER_ID; + *opt_buf++ = 4; + //FIXME we use ip_addr_t as ip4_addr_t here + SMEMCPY(opt_buf, &(dhcp_server->netif->ip_addr), 4); + opt_buf += 4; + + /* add option end */ + *opt_buf++ = DHCP_OPTION_END; + length = (u32_t)opt_buf - (u32_t)msg; + if (length < q->tot_len) + { + pbuf_realloc(q, length); + } + + ip_2_ip4(&addr)->addr = INADDR_BROADCAST; + udp_sendto_if(pcb, q, &addr, port, dhcp_server->netif); + } + } + else if (msg_type == DHCP_RELEASE) + { + struct dhcp_client_node *node_prev = NULL; + + for (node = dhcp_server->node_list; node != NULL; node = node->next) + { + if (memcmp(node->chaddr, msg->chaddr, msg->hlen) == 0) + { + if (node == dhcp_server->node_list) + { + dhcp_server->node_list = node->next; + } + else + { + node_prev->next = node->next; + } + break; + } + node_prev = node; + node = node->next; + } + + if (node != NULL) + { + mem_free(node); + } + } + else if (msg_type == DHCP_DECLINE) + { + ; + } + else if (msg_type == DHCP_INFORM) + { + ; + } + } + } + } + +free_pbuf_and_return: + pbuf_free(q); +} + +/** +* start dhcp server for a netif +* +* @param netif The netif which use dhcp server +* @param start The Start IP address +* @param end The netif which use dhcp server +* @return lwIP error code +* - ERR_OK - No error +* - ERR_MEM - Out of memory +*/ +err_t +dhcp_server_start(struct netif *netif, ip4_addr_t *start, ip4_addr_t *end) +{ + struct dhcp_server *dhcp_server; + + /* If this netif alreday use the dhcp server. */ + for (dhcp_server = lw_dhcp_server; dhcp_server != NULL; dhcp_server = dhcp_server->next) + { + if (dhcp_server->netif == netif) + { + dhcp_server->start = *start; + dhcp_server->end = *end; + dhcp_server->current = *start; + return ERR_OK; + } + } + + dhcp_server = NULL; + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_server_start(): starting new DHCP server\n")); + dhcp_server = (struct dhcp_server *)mem_malloc(sizeof(struct dhcp_server)); + if (dhcp_server == NULL) + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_server_start(): could not allocate dhcp\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + /* clear data structure */ + memset(dhcp_server, 0, sizeof(struct dhcp_server)); + + /* store this dhcp server to list */ + dhcp_server->next = lw_dhcp_server; + lw_dhcp_server = dhcp_server; + dhcp_server->netif = netif; + dhcp_server->node_list = NULL; + dhcp_server->start = *start; + dhcp_server->end = *end; + dhcp_server->current = *start; + + /* allocate UDP PCB */ + dhcp_server->pcb = udp_new(); + if (dhcp_server->pcb == NULL) + { + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_server_start(): could not obtain pcb\n")); + return ERR_MEM; + } + + ip_set_option(dhcp_server->pcb, SOF_BROADCAST); + /* set up local and remote port for the pcb */ + udp_bind(dhcp_server->pcb, IP_ADDR_ANY, DHCP_SERVER_PORT); + //udp_connect(dhcp_server->pcb, IP_ADDR_ANY, DHCP_CLIENT_PORT); + /* set up the recv callback and argument */ + udp_recv(dhcp_server->pcb, dhcp_server_recv, dhcp_server); + LWIP_DEBUGF(DHCP_DEBUG | LWIP_DBG_TRACE, ("dhcp_server_start(): starting DHCP server\n")); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +//FIXME thread safe?? +err_t dhcp_server_stop(struct netif *netif) +{ + struct dhcp_server *dhcp_server; + + /* If this netif is in the dhcp server list. */ + for (dhcp_server = lw_dhcp_server; dhcp_server != NULL; dhcp_server = dhcp_server->next) { + if (dhcp_server->netif == netif) { + break; + } + } + + if (NULL == dhcp_server) { + DEBUG_PRINTF("[DHCPD] CRITICAL: no dhcp_server instance found\r\n"); + return ERR_VAL; + } + + /*clean PCB first*/ + if (dhcp_server->pcb) { + udp_remove(dhcp_server->pcb); + } + /*clean linked list*/ + //FIXME no linked list, just one pointer + lw_dhcp_server = NULL; + mem_free(dhcp_server); + + return ERR_OK; +} + +static void set_if(struct netif *netif, char* ip_addr, char* gw_addr, char* nm_addr) +{ + ip4_addr_t *ip; + ip4_addr_t addr; + + ip = (ip4_addr_t *)&addr; + + /* set ip address */ + if ((ip_addr != NULL) && ip4addr_aton(ip_addr, &addr)) { + netif_set_ipaddr(netif, ip); + } + + /* set gateway address */ + if ((gw_addr != NULL) && ip4addr_aton(gw_addr, &addr)) { + netif_set_gw(netif, ip); + } + + /* set netmask address */ + if ((nm_addr != NULL) && ip4addr_aton(nm_addr, &addr)) { + netif_set_netmask(netif, ip); + } +} + +//TODO better dhcpd_stop flow? +void dhcpd_start(struct netif *netif) +{ + err_t res; + + if (1) + { + dhcp_stop(netif); + + set_if(netif, DHCPD_SERVER_IP, "0.0.0.0", "255.255.255.0"); + + netif_set_up(netif); + } + + { + char str_tmp[4 * 4 + 4] = DHCPD_SERVER_IP; + char *p = str_tmp; + ip4_addr_t ip_start, ip_end; + + p = strchr(str_tmp, '.'); + if (p) + { + p = strchr(p + 1, '.'); + if (p) + { + p = strchr(p + 1, '.'); + } + } + if (!p) + { + DEBUG_PRINTF("DHCPD_SERVER_IP: %s error!\r\n", str_tmp); + goto _exit; + } + p = p + 1; /* move to xxx.xxx.xxx.^ */ + + sprintf(p, "%d", DHCPD_CLIENT_IP_MIN); + ip4addr_aton(str_tmp, &ip_start); + DEBUG_PRINTF("ip_start: [%s]\r\n", str_tmp); + sprintf(p, "%d", DHCPD_CLIENT_IP_MAX); + ip4addr_aton(str_tmp, &ip_end); + DEBUG_PRINTF("ip_start: [%s]\r\n", str_tmp); + + res = dhcp_server_start(netif, &ip_start, &ip_end); + if (res != 0) + { + DEBUG_PRINTF("dhcp_server_start res: %d.\r\n", res); + } + } + +_exit: + LWIP_NETIF_UNLOCK(); + return; +} + +void dhcpd_stop(const char *netif_name) +{ + struct netif *netif = netif_list; + + DEBUG_PRINTF("%s: %s\r\n", __func__, netif_name); + + LWIP_NETIF_LOCK(); + if (strlen(netif_name) > sizeof(netif->name)) { + DEBUG_PRINTF("network interface name too long!\r\n"); + goto _exit; + } + + while (netif != NULL) { + if (strncmp(netif_name, netif->name, sizeof(netif->name)) == 0) + break; + + netif = netif->next; + if (netif == NULL) + { + DEBUG_PRINTF("network interface: %s not found!\r\n", netif_name); + break; + } + } + + if (netif == NULL) { + goto _exit; + } + + dhcp_server_stop(netif); + +_exit: + LWIP_NETIF_UNLOCK(); + return; +} diff --git a/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/ping/CMakeLists.txt b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/ping/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..37570a91 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/ping/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +sdk_generate_library() + +sdk_library_add_sources(ping.c) + +sdk_add_link_options(-ucmd_ping) diff --git a/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/ping/ping.c b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/ping/ping.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e18ce265 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/net/lwip/lwip_apps/ping/ping.c @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +/* + * netutils: ping implementation + */ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * PING_DEBUG: Enable debugging for PING. + */ +#ifndef PING_DEBUG +#define PING_DEBUG LWIP_DBG_ON +#endif + +/** ping receive timeout - in milliseconds */ +#define PING_RCV_TIMEO (2000 * portTICK_PERIOD_MS) +/** ping delay - in milliseconds */ +#define PING_DELAY (1000 * portTICK_PERIOD_MS) + +/** ping identifier - must fit on a u16_t */ +#ifndef PING_ID +#define PING_ID 0xAFAF +#endif + +/** ping additional data size to include in the packet */ +#ifndef PING_DATA_SIZE +#define PING_DATA_SIZE 32 +#endif + +/* ping variables */ +static u16_t ping_seq_num; +struct _ip_addr { + uint8_t addr0, addr1, addr2, addr3; +}; + +/** Prepare a echo ICMP request */ +static void ping_prepare_echo(struct icmp_echo_hdr *iecho, u16_t len) +{ + size_t i; + size_t data_len = len - sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr); + + ICMPH_TYPE_SET(iecho, ICMP_ECHO); + ICMPH_CODE_SET(iecho, 0); + iecho->chksum = 0; + iecho->id = PING_ID; + iecho->seqno = htons(++ping_seq_num); + + /* fill the additional data buffer with some data */ + for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { + ((char *)iecho)[sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr) + i] = (char)i; + } + + iecho->chksum = inet_chksum(iecho, len); +} + +/* Ping using the socket ip */ +err_t lwip_ping_send(int s, ip_addr_t *addr, int size) +{ + int err; + struct icmp_echo_hdr *iecho; + struct sockaddr_in to; + int ping_size = sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr) + size; + LWIP_ASSERT("ping_size is too big", ping_size <= 0xffff); + + iecho = mem_malloc(ping_size); + if (iecho == NULL) { + return ERR_MEM; + } + + ping_prepare_echo(iecho, (u16_t)ping_size); + + to.sin_len = sizeof(to); + to.sin_family = AF_INET; +#if LWIP_IPV4 && LWIP_IPV6 + to.sin_addr.s_addr = addr->u_addr.ip4.addr; +#elif LWIP_IPV4 + to.sin_addr.s_addr = addr->addr; +#elif LWIP_IPV6 +#error Not supported IPv6. +#endif + + err = lwip_sendto(s, iecho, ping_size, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&to, sizeof(to)); + mem_free(iecho); + + return (err == ping_size ? ERR_OK : ERR_VAL); +} + +int lwip_ping_recv(int s, int *ttl) +{ + char buf[64]; + int fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in), len; + struct sockaddr_in from; + struct ip_hdr *iphdr; + struct icmp_echo_hdr *iecho; + + while ((len = lwip_recvfrom(s, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&from, (socklen_t *)&fromlen)) > 0) { + if (len >= (int)(sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct icmp_echo_hdr))) { + iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *)buf; + iecho = (struct icmp_echo_hdr *)(buf + (IPH_HL(iphdr) * 4)); + if ((iecho->id == PING_ID) && (iecho->seqno == htons(ping_seq_num))) { + *ttl = iphdr->_ttl; + return len; + } + } + } + + return len; +} + +/* using the lwIP custom ping */ +uint32_t ping(char *target_name, uint16_t interval, uint16_t size, uint32_t count) +{ +#if LWIP_VERSION_MAJOR >= 2U + struct timeval timeout = { PING_RCV_TIMEO / (1000 * portTICK_PERIOD_MS), PING_RCV_TIMEO % (1000 * portTICK_PERIOD_MS) }; +#else + int timeout = PING_RCV_TIMEO * 1000UL / (1000 * portTICK_PERIOD_MS); +#endif + + int s, ttl, recv_len; + ip_addr_t target_addr; + uint32_t send_times; + uint32_t recv_start_tick; + struct addrinfo hint, *res = NULL; + struct sockaddr_in *h = NULL; + struct in_addr ina; + + send_times = 0; + ping_seq_num = 0; + + if (size == 0) { + size = PING_DATA_SIZE; + } + + memset(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint)); + /* convert URL to IP */ + if (lwip_getaddrinfo(target_name, NULL, &hint, &res) != 0) { + printf("ping: unknown host %s\n\r", target_name); + return -1; + } + memcpy(&h, &res->ai_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in *)); + memcpy(&ina, &h->sin_addr, sizeof(ina)); + lwip_freeaddrinfo(res); + if (inet_aton(inet_ntoa(ina), &target_addr) == 0) { + printf("ping: unknown host %s\n\r", target_name); + return -1; + } + /* new a socket */ + if ((s = lwip_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IP_PROTO_ICMP)) < 0) { + printf("ping: create socket failed\n\r"); + return -1; + } + + lwip_setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &timeout, sizeof(timeout)); + + while (1) { + int elapsed_time; + + if (lwip_ping_send(s, &target_addr, size) == ERR_OK) { + recv_start_tick = sys_now(); + if ((recv_len = lwip_ping_recv(s, &ttl)) >= 0) { + elapsed_time = (sys_now() - recv_start_tick) * 1000UL / (1000 * portTICK_PERIOD_MS); + printf("%d bytes from %s icmp_seq=%d ttl=%d time=%d ms\n\r", recv_len, inet_ntoa(ina), send_times, + ttl, elapsed_time); + } else { + printf("From %s icmp_seq=%d timeout\n\r", inet_ntoa(ina), send_times); + } + } else { + printf("Send %s - error\n\r", inet_ntoa(ina)); + } + + send_times++; + if (send_times >= count) { + /* send ping times reached, stop */ + break; + } + + vTaskDelay(interval); /* take a delay */ + } + + lwip_close(s); + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SHELL +#include +#include "utils_getopt.h" + +#define PING_USAGE \ +"ping [-c count] [-i interval] [-s size] [-h help] destination\r\n" \ +"\t\t-c count of ping requests. default is 4\r\n" \ +"\t\t-i interval in ms. default is 1000\r\n" \ +"\t\t-s ICMP payload size in bytes. default is 32\r\n" \ +"\t\t-h print this help\r\n" + +int cmd_ping(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int opt; + getopt_env_t getopt_env; + u16_t interval = PING_DELAY; + u16_t data_size = PING_DATA_SIZE; + u32_t total_count = 4; + + if (argc == 1) { + goto usage; + } else { + utils_getopt_init(&getopt_env, 0); + + while ((opt = utils_getopt(&getopt_env, argc, argv, ":i:s:c:W:h")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case 'i': + interval = atoi(getopt_env.optarg); + break; + case 's': + data_size = atoi(getopt_env.optarg); + break; + case 'c': + total_count = atoi(getopt_env.optarg); + break; + case 'h': + goto usage; + case ':': + printf("%s: %c requires an argument\r\n", *argv, getopt_env.optopt); + goto usage; + case '?': + printf("%s: unknown option %c\r\n", *argv, getopt_env.optopt); + goto usage; + } + } + + if (getopt_env.optind + 1 == argc) { + ping(argv[getopt_env.optind], interval, data_size, total_count); + } else { + printf("Need target address\r\n"); + goto usage; + } + } + + return 0; + +usage: + printf("%s", PING_USAGE); + return 0; +} +SHELL_CMD_EXPORT_ALIAS(cmd_ping, ping, ping network host); +#endif diff --git a/components/os/CMakeLists.txt b/components/os/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..78500fe9 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_FREERTOS freertos) diff --git a/components/freertos/CMakeLists.txt b/components/os/freertos/CMakeLists.txt similarity index 58% rename from components/freertos/CMakeLists.txt rename to components/os/freertos/CMakeLists.txt index 0813e712..1e233ad1 100644 --- a/components/freertos/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/os/freertos/CMakeLists.txt @@ -7,13 +7,12 @@ sdk_library_add_sources(tasks.c) sdk_library_add_sources(timers.c) sdk_library_add_sources(timers.c) sdk_library_add_sources(freertos_port.c) -if(CONFIG_TLSF) sdk_library_add_sources(portable/MemMang/heap_3.c) -else() -sdk_library_add_sources(portable/MemMang/heap_5.c) -endif() + sdk_add_include_directories(include) +sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_FREERTOS) + if(("${CHIP}" STREQUAL "bl808") AND ("${CPU_ID}" STREQUAL "d0")) sdk_library_add_sources(portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/port.c) sdk_library_add_sources(portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/portASM.S) @@ -28,3 +27,19 @@ sdk_add_include_directories(portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/ sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DportasmHANDLE_INTERRUPT=interrupt_entry -Ddefault_interrupt_handler=freertos_risc_v_trap_handler) endif() + +if(CONFIG_POSIX) +# posix for freertos +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_clock.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_mqueue.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_barrier.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_cond.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_mutex.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_sched.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_semaphore.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_timer.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_unistd.c) +sdk_library_add_sources(posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_utils.c) +sdk_add_include_directories(posix/include) +endif() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/freertos/croutine.c b/components/os/freertos/croutine.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/croutine.c rename to components/os/freertos/croutine.c diff --git a/components/freertos/event_groups.c b/components/os/freertos/event_groups.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/event_groups.c rename to components/os/freertos/event_groups.c diff --git a/components/freertos/freertos_port.c b/components/os/freertos/freertos_port.c similarity index 79% rename from components/freertos/freertos_port.c rename to components/os/freertos/freertos_port.c index 10ee530d..f378d433 100644 --- a/components/freertos/freertos_port.c +++ b/components/os/freertos/freertos_port.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ #include "semphr.h" #include "stdio.h" -void vAssertCalled(void) +__attribute__((weak)) void vAssertCalled(void) { printf("vAssertCalled\r\n"); @@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ void vAssertCalled(void) ; } -void vApplicationTickHook(void) +__attribute__((weak)) void vApplicationTickHook(void) { //printf("vApplicationTickHook\r\n"); } -void vApplicationStackOverflowHook(TaskHandle_t xTask, char *pcTaskName) +__attribute__((weak)) void vApplicationStackOverflowHook(TaskHandle_t xTask, char *pcTaskName) { printf("vApplicationStackOverflowHook\r\n"); @@ -23,14 +23,15 @@ void vApplicationStackOverflowHook(TaskHandle_t xTask, char *pcTaskName) ; } -void vApplicationMallocFailedHook(void) +__attribute__((weak)) void vApplicationMallocFailedHook(void) { printf("vApplicationMallocFailedHook\r\n"); while (1) ; } -void vApplicationGetIdleTaskMemory(StaticTask_t **ppxIdleTaskTCBBuffer, StackType_t **ppxIdleTaskStackBuffer, uint32_t *pulIdleTaskStackSize) + +__attribute__((weak)) void vApplicationGetIdleTaskMemory(StaticTask_t **ppxIdleTaskTCBBuffer, StackType_t **ppxIdleTaskStackBuffer, uint32_t *pulIdleTaskStackSize) { /* If the buffers to be provided to the Idle task are declared inside this function then they must be declared static - otherwise they will be allocated on @@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ void vApplicationGetIdleTaskMemory(StaticTask_t **ppxIdleTaskTCBBuffer, StackTyp /* configSUPPORT_STATIC_ALLOCATION and configUSE_TIMERS are both set to 1, so the application must provide an implementation of vApplicationGetTimerTaskMemory() to provide the memory that is used by the Timer service task. */ -void vApplicationGetTimerTaskMemory(StaticTask_t **ppxTimerTaskTCBBuffer, StackType_t **ppxTimerTaskStackBuffer, uint32_t *pulTimerTaskStackSize) +__attribute__((weak)) void vApplicationGetTimerTaskMemory(StaticTask_t **ppxTimerTaskTCBBuffer, StackType_t **ppxTimerTaskStackBuffer, uint32_t *pulTimerTaskStackSize) { /* If the buffers to be provided to the Timer task are declared inside this function then they must be declared static - otherwise they will be allocated on diff --git a/components/freertos/include/FreeRTOS.h b/components/os/freertos/include/FreeRTOS.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/FreeRTOS.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/FreeRTOS.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/StackMacros.h b/components/os/freertos/include/StackMacros.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/StackMacros.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/StackMacros.h diff --git a/components/os/freertos/include/atomic_rtos.h b/components/os/freertos/include/atomic_rtos.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d23ca45 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/include/atomic_rtos.h @@ -0,0 +1,547 @@ +/* + * FreeRTOS Kernel V10.2.1 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * + * 1 tab == 4 spaces! + */ + +/** + * @file atomic.h + * @brief FreeRTOS atomic operation support. + * + * Two implementations of atomic are given in this header file: + * 1. Disabling interrupt globally. + * 2. ISA native atomic support. + * The former is available to all ports (compiler-architecture combination), + * while the latter is only available to ports compiling with GCC (version at + * least 4.7.0), which also have ISA atomic support. + * + * User can select which implementation to use by: + * setting/clearing configUSE_ATOMIC_INSTRUCTION in FreeRTOSConfig.h. + * Define AND set configUSE_ATOMIC_INSTRUCTION to 1 for ISA native atomic support. + * Undefine OR clear configUSE_ATOMIC_INSTRUCTION for disabling global interrupt + * implementation. + * + * @see GCC Built-in Functions for Memory Model Aware Atomic Operations + * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/_005f_005fatomic-Builtins.html + */ + +#ifndef ATOMIC_H +#define ATOMIC_H + +#ifndef INC_FREERTOS_H + #error "include FreeRTOS.h must appear in source files before include atomic.h" +#endif + +/* Standard includes. */ +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + /* Needed for __atomic_compare_exchange() weak=false. */ + #include + + /* This branch is for GCC compiler and GCC compiler only. */ + #ifndef portFORCE_INLINE + #define portFORCE_INLINE inline __attribute__((always_inline)) + #endif + +#else + + /* Port specific definitions -- entering/exiting critical section. + * Refer template -- ./lib/FreeRTOS/portable/Compiler/Arch/portmacro.h + * + * Every call to ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL() must be closely paired with + * ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(). + */ + #if defined( portSET_INTERRUPT_MASK_FROM_ISR ) + + /* Nested interrupt scheme is supported in this port. */ + #define ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL() \ + UBaseType_t uxCriticalSectionType = portSET_INTERRUPT_MASK_FROM_ISR() + + #define ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL() \ + portCLEAR_INTERRUPT_MASK_FROM_ISR( uxCriticalSectionType ) + + #else + + /* Nested interrupt scheme is NOT supported in this port. */ + #define ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL() portENTER_CRITICAL() + #define ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL() portEXIT_CRITICAL() + + #endif /* portSET_INTERRUPT_MASK_FROM_ISR() */ + + /* Port specific definition -- "always inline". + * Inline is compiler specific, and may not always get inlined depending on your optimization level. + * Also, inline is considerred as performance optimization for atomic. + * Thus, if portFORCE_INLINE is not provided by portmacro.h, instead of resulting error, + * simply define it. + */ + #ifndef portFORCE_INLINE + #define portFORCE_INLINE + #endif + +#endif /* configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS */ + +#define ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS 0x1U /**< Compare and swap succeeded, swapped. */ +#define ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_FAILURE 0x0U /**< Compare and swap failed, did not swap. */ + +/*----------------------------- Swap && CAS ------------------------------*/ + +/** + * Atomic compare-and-swap + * + * @brief Performs an atomic compare-and-swap operation on the specified values. + * + * @param[in, out] pDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is + * to be loaded and checked. + * @param[in] ulExchange If condition meets, write this value to memory. + * @param[in] ulComparand Swap condition. + * + * @return Unsigned integer of value 1 or 0. 1 for swapped, 0 for not swapped. + * + * @note This function only swaps *pDestination with ulExchange, if previous + * *pDestination value equals ulComparand. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_CompareAndSwap_u32( + uint32_t volatile * pDestination, + uint32_t ulExchange, + uint32_t ulComparand ) +{ + + uint32_t ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_FAILURE; + +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + if ( __atomic_compare_exchange( pDestination, + &ulComparand, + &ulExchange, + false, + __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST, + __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST ) ) + { + ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS; + } + +#else + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + if ( *pDestination == ulComparand ) + { + *pDestination = ulExchange; + ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS; + } + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + +#endif + + return ulReturnValue; + +} + +/** + * Atomic swap (pointers) + * + * @brief Atomically sets the address pointed to by *ppDestination to the value + * of *pExchange. + * + * @param[in, out] ppDestination Pointer to memory location from where a pointer + * value is to be loaded and written back to. + * @param[in] pExchange Pointer value to be written to *ppDestination. + * + * @return The initial value of *ppDestination. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE void * Atomic_SwapPointers_p32( + void * volatile * ppDestination, + void * pExchange ) +{ + void * pReturnValue; + +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + __atomic_exchange( ppDestination, &pExchange, &pReturnValue, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST ); + +#else + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + pReturnValue = *ppDestination; + + *ppDestination = pExchange; + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + +#endif + + return pReturnValue; +} + +/** + * Atomic compare-and-swap (pointers) + * + * @brief Performs an atomic compare-and-swap operation on the specified pointer + * values. + * + * @param[in, out] ppDestination Pointer to memory location from where a pointer + * value is to be loaded and checked. + * @param[in] pExchange If condition meets, write this value to memory. + * @param[in] pComparand Swap condition. + * + * @return Unsigned integer of value 1 or 0. 1 for swapped, 0 for not swapped. + * + * @note This function only swaps *ppDestination with pExchange, if previous + * *ppDestination value equals pComparand. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_CompareAndSwapPointers_p32( + void * volatile * ppDestination, + void * pExchange, void * pComparand ) +{ + uint32_t ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_FAILURE; + +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + if ( __atomic_compare_exchange( ppDestination, + &pComparand, + &pExchange, + false, + __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST, + __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST ) ) + { + ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS; + } + +#else + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + if ( *ppDestination == pComparand ) + { + *ppDestination = pExchange; + ulReturnValue = ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS; + } + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + +#endif + + return ulReturnValue; +} + + +/*----------------------------- Arithmetic ------------------------------*/ + +/** + * Atomic add + * + * @brief Atomically adds count to the value of the specified pointer points to. + * + * @param[in,out] pAddend Pointer to memory location from where value is to be + * loaded and written back to. + * @param[in] ulCount Value to be added to *pAddend. + * + * @return previous *pAddend value. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_Add_u32( + uint32_t volatile * pAddend, + uint32_t ulCount ) +{ +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + return __atomic_fetch_add(pAddend, ulCount, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + +#else + + uint32_t ulCurrent; + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + ulCurrent = *pAddend; + + *pAddend += ulCount; + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + return ulCurrent; + +#endif +} + +/** + * Atomic subtract + * + * @brief Atomically subtracts count from the value of the specified pointer + * pointers to. + * + * @param[in,out] pAddend Pointer to memory location from where value is to be + * loaded and written back to. + * @param[in] ulCount Value to be subtract from *pAddend. + * + * @return previous *pAddend value. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_Subtract_u32( + uint32_t volatile * pAddend, + uint32_t ulCount ) +{ +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + return __atomic_fetch_sub(pAddend, ulCount, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + +#else + + uint32_t ulCurrent; + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + ulCurrent = *pAddend; + + *pAddend -= ulCount; + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + return ulCurrent; + +#endif +} + +/** + * Atomic increment + * + * @brief Atomically increments the value of the specified pointer points to. + * + * @param[in,out] pAddend Pointer to memory location from where value is to be + * loaded and written back to. + * + * @return *pAddend value before increment. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_Increment_u32( uint32_t volatile * pAddend ) +{ +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + return __atomic_fetch_add(pAddend, 1, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + +#else + + uint32_t ulCurrent; + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + ulCurrent = *pAddend; + + *pAddend += 1; + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + return ulCurrent; + +#endif +} + +/** + * Atomic decrement + * + * @brief Atomically decrements the value of the specified pointer points to + * + * @param[in,out] pAddend Pointer to memory location from where value is to be + * loaded and written back to. + * + * @return *pAddend value before decrement. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_Decrement_u32( uint32_t volatile * pAddend ) +{ +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + return __atomic_fetch_sub(pAddend, 1, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + +#else + + uint32_t ulCurrent; + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + ulCurrent = *pAddend; + + *pAddend -= 1; + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + return ulCurrent; + +#endif +} + +/*----------------------------- Bitwise Logical ------------------------------*/ + +/** + * Atomic OR + * + * @brief Performs an atomic OR operation on the specified values. + * + * @param [in, out] pDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is + * to be loaded and written back to. + * @param [in] ulValue Value to be ORed with *pDestination. + * + * @return The original value of *pDestination. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_OR_u32( + uint32_t volatile * pDestination, + uint32_t ulValue ) +{ +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + return __atomic_fetch_or(pDestination, ulValue, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + +#else + + uint32_t ulCurrent; + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + ulCurrent = *pDestination; + + *pDestination |= ulValue; + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + return ulCurrent; + +#endif +} + +/** + * Atomic AND + * + * @brief Performs an atomic AND operation on the specified values. + * + * @param [in, out] pDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is + * to be loaded and written back to. + * @param [in] ulValue Value to be ANDed with *pDestination. + * + * @return The original value of *pDestination. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_AND_u32( + uint32_t volatile * pDestination, + uint32_t ulValue ) +{ +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + return __atomic_fetch_and(pDestination, ulValue, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + +#else + + uint32_t ulCurrent; + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + ulCurrent = *pDestination; + + *pDestination &= ulValue; + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + return ulCurrent; + +#endif +} + +/** + * Atomic NAND + * + * @brief Performs an atomic NAND operation on the specified values. + * + * @param [in, out] pDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is + * to be loaded and written back to. + * @param [in] ulValue Value to be NANDed with *pDestination. + * + * @return The original value of *pDestination. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_NAND_u32( + uint32_t volatile * pDestination, + uint32_t ulValue ) +{ +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + return __atomic_fetch_nand(pDestination, ulValue, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + +#else + + uint32_t ulCurrent; + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + ulCurrent = *pDestination; + + *pDestination = ~(ulCurrent & ulValue); + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + return ulCurrent; + +#endif +} + +/** + * Atomic XOR + * + * @brief Performs an atomic XOR operation on the specified values. + * + * @param [in, out] pDestination Pointer to memory location from where value is + * to be loaded and written back to. + * @param [in] ulValue Value to be XORed with *pDestination. + * + * @return The original value of *pDestination. + */ +static portFORCE_INLINE uint32_t Atomic_XOR_u32( + uint32_t volatile * pDestination, + uint32_t ulValue ) +{ +#if defined ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS ) && ( configUSE_GCC_BUILTIN_ATOMICS == 1 ) + + return __atomic_fetch_xor(pDestination, ulValue, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + +#else + + uint32_t ulCurrent; + + ATOMIC_ENTER_CRITICAL(); + + ulCurrent = *pDestination; + + *pDestination ^= ulValue; + + ATOMIC_EXIT_CRITICAL(); + + return ulCurrent; + +#endif +} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ATOMIC_H */ diff --git a/components/freertos/include/croutine.h b/components/os/freertos/include/croutine.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/croutine.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/croutine.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/deprecated_definitions.h b/components/os/freertos/include/deprecated_definitions.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/deprecated_definitions.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/deprecated_definitions.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/event_groups.h b/components/os/freertos/include/event_groups.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/event_groups.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/event_groups.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/list.h b/components/os/freertos/include/list.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/list.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/list.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/message_buffer.h b/components/os/freertos/include/message_buffer.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/message_buffer.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/message_buffer.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/mpu_prototypes.h b/components/os/freertos/include/mpu_prototypes.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/mpu_prototypes.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/mpu_prototypes.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/mpu_wrappers.h b/components/os/freertos/include/mpu_wrappers.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/mpu_wrappers.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/mpu_wrappers.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/portable.h b/components/os/freertos/include/portable.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/portable.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/portable.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/projdefs.h b/components/os/freertos/include/projdefs.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/projdefs.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/projdefs.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/queue.h b/components/os/freertos/include/queue.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/queue.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/queue.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/semphr.h b/components/os/freertos/include/semphr.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/semphr.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/semphr.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/stack_macros.h b/components/os/freertos/include/stack_macros.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/stack_macros.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/stack_macros.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/stdint.readme b/components/os/freertos/include/stdint.readme similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/stdint.readme rename to components/os/freertos/include/stdint.readme diff --git a/components/freertos/include/stream_buffer.h b/components/os/freertos/include/stream_buffer.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/stream_buffer.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/stream_buffer.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/task.h b/components/os/freertos/include/task.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/task.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/task.h diff --git a/components/freertos/include/timers.h b/components/os/freertos/include/timers.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/include/timers.h rename to components/os/freertos/include/timers.h diff --git a/components/freertos/list.c b/components/os/freertos/list.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/list.c rename to components/os/freertos/list.c diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/Common/mpu_wrappers.c b/components/os/freertos/portable/Common/mpu_wrappers.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/Common/mpu_wrappers.c rename to components/os/freertos/portable/Common/mpu_wrappers.c diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/Documentation.url b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/Documentation.url similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/Documentation.url rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/Documentation.url diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/chip_specific_extensions/Thead_E906FD_RV32IMAFDC/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/chip_specific_extensions/Thead_E906FD_RV32IMAFDC/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/chip_specific_extensions/Thead_E906FD_RV32IMAFDC/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/chip_specific_extensions/Thead_E906FD_RV32IMAFDC/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/port.c b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/port.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/port.c rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/port.c diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/portASM.S b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/portASM.S similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/portASM.S rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/portASM.S diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/portmacro.h b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/portmacro.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/portmacro.h rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/c906/portmacro.h diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/Pulpino_Vega_RV32M1RM/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/Pulpino_Vega_RV32M1RM/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/Pulpino_Vega_RV32M1RM/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/Pulpino_Vega_RV32M1RM/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/RISCV_MTIME_CLINT_no_extensions/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/RISCV_MTIME_CLINT_no_extensions/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/RISCV_MTIME_CLINT_no_extensions/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/RISCV_MTIME_CLINT_no_extensions/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/RV32I_CLINT_no_extensions/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/RV32I_CLINT_no_extensions/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/RV32I_CLINT_no_extensions/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/RV32I_CLINT_no_extensions/freertos_risc_v_chip_specific_extensions.h diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/readme.txt b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/readme.txt similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/readme.txt rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/chip_specific_extensions/readme.txt diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/port.c b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/port.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/port.c rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/port.c diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/portASM.S b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/portASM.S similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/portASM.S rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/portASM.S diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/portmacro.h b/components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/portmacro.h similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/portmacro.h rename to components/os/freertos/portable/GCC/RISC-V/common/portmacro.h diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_1.c b/components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_1.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_1.c rename to components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_1.c diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_2.c b/components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_2.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_2.c rename to components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_2.c diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_3.c b/components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_3.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_3.c rename to components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_3.c diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_4.c b/components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_4.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_4.c rename to components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_4.c diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_5.c b/components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_5.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_5.c rename to components/os/freertos/portable/MemMang/heap_5.c diff --git a/components/freertos/portable/readme.txt b/components/os/freertos/portable/readme.txt similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/portable/readme.txt rename to components/os/freertos/portable/readme.txt diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/LICENSE b/components/os/freertos/posix/LICENSE new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90228dbb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/LICENSE @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +MIT License + +Copyright (c) 2019 FreeRTOS + +Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal +in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights +to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell +copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all +copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER +LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, +OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE +SOFTWARE. diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/README.md b/components/os/freertos/posix/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..be6b57b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## FreeRTOS+POSIX: Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX threading wrapper) for FreeRTOS + +The Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) is a family of standards specified by the IEEE Computer Society for maintaining compatibility between operating systems. FreeRTOS+POSIX implements *a small subset* of the [POSIX threading](https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/7908799/xsh/threads.html) API. This subset allows application developers familiar with POSIX API to develop a FreeRTOS application using POSIX like threading primitives. FreeRTOS+POSIX does not implement more than 80% of the POSIX API. Therefore, an existing POSIX compliant application or a POSIX compliant library cannot be ported to run on FreeRTOS Kernel using only this wrapper. + + +This repository only contains source code. For demo applications, please visit https://github.com/FreeRTOS/FreeRTOS-Labs. + +## To consume FreeRTOS+POSIX +It is recommended to use this repository as a submodule. Please refer to [Git Tools — Submodules](https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Tools-Submodules). + +## Notes +This project is undergoing optimizations or refactorization to improve memory usage, modularity, documentation, demo usability, or test coverage. diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..d9387092 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX.h + * @brief FreeRTOS+POSIX header. + * + * This file must be included before all other FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_H_ + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX platform-specific configuration headers. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable_default.h" + +/* FreeRTOS includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS.h" +#include "event_groups.h" +#include "semphr.h" +#include "task.h" + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX data types and internal structs. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/sys/types.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX_internal.h" + +#endif /* _FREERTOS_POSIX_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..5ca3a320 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file errno.h + * @brief System error numbers. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/errno.h.html + * + * The values defined in this file may not be compatible with the strerror + * function provided by this system. + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_ERRNO_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_ERRNO_H_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Undefine all errnos to avoid redefinition errors with system errnos. */ +#undef EPERM +#undef ENOENT +#undef EBADF +#undef EAGAIN +#undef ENOMEM +#undef EEXIST +#undef EBUSY +#undef EINVAL +#undef ENOSPC +#undef ERANGE +#undef ENAMETOOLONG +#undef EDEADLK +#undef EOVERFLOW +#undef ENOSYS +#undef EMSGSIZE +#undef ENOTSUP +#undef ETIMEDOUT + +/** + * @name Definition of POSIX errnos. + */ +/**@{ */ +#define EPERM 1 /**< Operation not permitted. */ +#define ENOENT 2 /**< No such file or directory. */ +#define EBADF 9 /**< Bad file descriptor. */ +#define EAGAIN 11 /**< Resource unavailable, try again. */ +#define ENOMEM 12 /**< Not enough space. */ +#define EEXIST 17 /**< File exists. */ +#define EBUSY 16 /**< Device or resource busy. */ +#define EINVAL 22 /**< Invalid argument. */ +#define ENOSPC 28 /**< No space left on device. */ +#define ERANGE 34 /**< Result too large. */ +#define ENAMETOOLONG 36 /**< File name too long. */ +#define EDEADLK 45 /**< Resource deadlock would occur. */ +#define EOVERFLOW 75 /**< Value too large to be stored in data type. */ +#define ENOSYS 88 /**< Function not supported. */ +#define EMSGSIZE 90 /**< Message too long. */ +#define ENOTSUP 95 /**< Operation not supported. */ +#define ETIMEDOUT 116 /**< Connection timed out. */ +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name System Variable + * + * @brief Define FreeRTOS+POSIX errno, if enabled. + * Set configUSE_POSIX_ERRNO to enable, and clear to disable. See FreeRTOS.h. + * + * @{ + */ +#if ( configUSE_POSIX_ERRNO == 1 ) + extern int FreeRTOS_errno; + #define errno FreeRTOS_errno +#endif +/**@} */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_ERRNO_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/fcntl.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/fcntl.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..e1b41d4f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/fcntl.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file fcntl.h + * @brief File control options. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/fcntl.h.html + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_FCNTL_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_FCNTL_H_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @name File creation flags for use in the oflag value to open() and openat(). + */ +/**@{ */ +#define O_CLOEXEC 0x0001 /**< Close the file descriptor upon exec(). */ +#define O_CREAT 0x0002 /**< Create file if it does not exist. */ +#define O_DIRECTORY 0x0004 /**< Fail if file is a non-directory file. */ +#define O_EXCL 0x0008 /**< Exclusive use flag. */ +#define O_NOCTTY 0x0010 /**< Do not assign controlling terminal. */ +#define O_NOFOLLOW 0x0020 /**< Do not follow symbolic links. */ +#define O_TRUNC 0x0040 /**< Truncate flag. */ +#define O_TTY_INIT 0x0080 /**< termios structure provides conforming behavior. */ +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name File status flags for open(), openat(), and fcntl(). + */ +/**@{ */ +#define O_APPEND 0x0100 /**< Set append mode. */ +#define O_DSYNC 0x0200 /**< Write according to synchronized I/O data integrity completion. */ +#define O_NONBLOCK 0x0400 /**< Non-blocking mode. */ +#define O_RSYNC 0x0800 /**< Synchronized read I/O operations. */ +#define O_SYNC 0x0200 /**< Write according to synchronized I/O file integrity completion. */ +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name Mask for file access modes. + */ +/**@{ */ +#define O_ACCMODE 0xF000 +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name File access modes for open(), openat(), and fcntl(). + */ +/**@{ */ +#define O_EXEC 0x1000 /**< Open for execute only (non-directory files). */ +#define O_RDONLY 0x2000 /**< Open for reading only. */ +#define O_RDWR 0xA000 /**< Open for reading and writing. */ +#define O_SEARCH 0x4000 /**< Open directory for search only. */ +#define O_WRONLY 0x8000 /**< Open for writing only. */ +/**@} */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_FCNTL_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/mqueue.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/mqueue.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..4a2b164f --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/mqueue.h @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file mqueue.h + * @brief Message queues. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/mqueue.h.html + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_MQUEUE_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_MQUEUE_H_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/time.h" + +/** + * @brief Message queue descriptor. + */ +typedef void * mqd_t; + +/** + * @brief Message queue attributes. + */ +struct mq_attr +{ + long mq_flags; /**< Message queue flags. */ + long mq_maxmsg; /**< Maximum number of messages. */ + long mq_msgsize; /**< Maximum message size. */ + long mq_curmsgs; /**< Number of messages currently queued. */ +}; + +/** + * @brief Close a message queue. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/mq_close.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion + * @retval -1 - A error occurred. errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EBADF - The mqdes argument is not a valid message queue descriptor. + */ +int mq_close( mqd_t mqdes ); + +/** + * @brief Get message queue attributes. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/mq_getattr.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion + * @retval -1 - A error occurred. errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * DBADF - The mqdes argument is not a valid message queue descriptor. + */ +int mq_getattr( mqd_t mqdes, + struct mq_attr * mqstat ); + +/** + * @brief Open a message queue. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/mq_open.html + * + * @note Supported name pattern: leading <slash> character in name is always required; + * the maximum length (excluding null-terminator) of the name argument can be NAME_MAX. + * The default value of NAME_MAX in FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable_default.h is 64, which can be + * overwritten by user. + * @note mode argument is not supported. + * @note Supported oflags: O_RDWR, O_CREAT, O_EXCL, and O_NONBLOCK. + * + * @retval Message queue descriptor -- Upon successful completion + * @retval (mqd_t) - 1 -- An error occurred. errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EINVAL - name argument is invalid (not following name pattern), + * OR if O_CREAT is specified in oflag with attr argument not NULL and either mq_maxmsg or mq_msgsize is equal to or less than zero, + * OR either O_CREAT or O_EXCL is not set and a queue with the same name is unlinked but pending to be removed. + *
+ * EEXIST - O_CREAT and O_EXCL are set and the named message queue already exists. + *
+ * ENOSPC - There is insufficient space for the creation of the new message queue. + *
+ * ENOENT - O_CREAT is not set and the named message queue does not exist. + */ +mqd_t mq_open( const char * name, + int oflag, + mode_t mode, + struct mq_attr * attr ); + +/** + * @brief Receive a message from a message queue. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/mq_receive.html + * + * @note msg_prio argument is not supported. Messages are not checked for corruption. + * + * @retval The length of the selected message in bytes - Upon successful completion. + * The message is removed from the queue + * @retval -1 - An error occurred. errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EBADF - The mqdes argument is not a valid message queue descriptor open for reading. + *
+ * EMSGSIZE - The specified message buffer size, msg_len, is less than the message size attribute of the message queue. + *
+ * ETIMEDOUT - The O_NONBLOCK flag was not set when the message queue was opened, + * but no message arrived on the queue before the specified timeout expired. + *
+ * EAGAIN - O_NONBLOCK was set in the message description associated with mqdes, and the specified message queue is empty. + */ +ssize_t mq_receive( mqd_t mqdes, + char * msg_ptr, + size_t msg_len, + unsigned int * msg_prio ); + +/** + * @brief Send a message to a message queue. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/mq_send.html + * + * @note msg_prio argument is not supported. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval -1 - An error occurred. errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EBADF - The mqdes argument is not a valid message queue descriptor open for writing. + *
+ * EMSGSIZE - The specified message length, msg_len, exceeds the message size attribute of the message queue, + * OR insufficient memory for the message to be sent. + *
+ * ETIMEDOUT - The O_NONBLOCK flag was not set when the message queue was opened, + * but the timeout expired before the message could be added to the queue. + *
+ * EAGAIN - The O_NONBLOCK flag is set in the message queue description associated with mqdes, + * and the specified message queue is full. + */ +int mq_send( mqd_t mqdes, + const char * msg_ptr, + size_t msg_len, + unsigned msg_prio ); + +/** + * @brief Receive a message from a message queue with timeout. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/mq_timedreceive.html + * + * @note msg_prio argument is not supported. Messages are not checked for corruption. + * + * @retval The length of the selected message in bytes - Upon successful completion. + * The message is removed from the queue + * @retval -1 - An error occurred. errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EBADF - The mqdes argument is not a valid message queue descriptor open for reading. + *
+ * EMSGSIZE - The specified message buffer size, msg_len, is less than the message size attribute of the message queue. + *
+ * EINVAL - The process or thread would have blocked, and the abstime parameter specified a nanoseconds field value + * less than zero or greater than or equal to 1000 million. + *
+ * ETIMEDOUT - The O_NONBLOCK flag was not set when the message queue was opened, + * but no message arrived on the queue before the specified timeout expired. + *
+ * EAGAIN - O_NONBLOCK was set in the message description associated with mqdes, and the specified message queue is empty. + */ +ssize_t mq_timedreceive( mqd_t mqdes, + char * msg_ptr, + size_t msg_len, + unsigned * msg_prio, + const struct timespec * abstime ); + +/** + * @brief Send a message to a message queue with timeout. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/mq_timedsend.html + * + * @note msg_prio argument is not supported. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval -1 - An error occurred. errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EBADF - The mqdes argument is not a valid message queue descriptor open for writing. + *
+ * EMSGSIZE - The specified message length, msg_len, exceeds the message size attribute of the message queue, + * OR insufficient memory for the message to be sent. + *
+ * EINVAL - The process or thread would have blocked, and the abstime parameter specified a nanoseconds field + * value less than zero or greater than or equal to 1000 million. + *
+ * ETIMEDOUT - The O_NONBLOCK flag was not set when the message queue was opened, + * but the timeout expired before the message could be added to the queue. + *
+ * EAGAIN - The O_NONBLOCK flag is set in the message queue description associated with mqdes, + * and the specified message queue is full. + */ +int mq_timedsend( mqd_t mqdes, + const char * msg_ptr, + size_t msg_len, + unsigned msg_prio, + const struct timespec * abstime ); + +/** + * @brief Remove a message queue. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/mq_unlink.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval -1 - An error occurred. errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EINVAL - name argument is invalid. Refer to requirements on name argument in mq_open(). + *
+ * ENOENT - The named message queue does not exist. + */ +int mq_unlink( const char * name ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_MQUEUE_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/pthread.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/pthread.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..16eb8c42 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/pthread.h @@ -0,0 +1,529 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file pthread.h + * @brief Threads. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/pthread.h.html + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_PTHREAD_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_PTHREAD_H_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. POSIX states that this header shall make symbols + * defined in sched.h and time.h visible. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/sched.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/time.h" + +/** + * @name pthread detach state. + */ +/**@{ */ +#define PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED 0 /**< Detached. */ +#define PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE 1 /**< Joinable (default). */ +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name Returned to a single thread after a successful pthread_barrier_wait. + * + * @brief POSIX specifies that "The constant PTHREAD_BARRIER_SERIAL_THREAD is defined in + * and its value shall be distinct from any other value returned by pthread_barrier_wait()." + * So it's defined as negative to distinguish it from the errnos, which are positive. + */ +#define PTHREAD_BARRIER_SERIAL_THREAD ( -2 ) + +/** + * @name Mutex types. + */ +/**@{ */ +#ifndef PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL + #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL 0 /**< Non-robust, deadlock on relock, does not remember owner. */ +#endif +#ifndef PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK + #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK 1 /**< Non-robust, error on relock, remembers owner. */ +#endif +#ifndef PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE + #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE 2 /**< Non-robust, recursive relock, remembers owner. */ +#endif +#ifndef PTHREAD_MUTEX_DEFAULT + #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_DEFAULT PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL /**< PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL (default). */ +#endif +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name Compile-time initializers. + * + * @brief To use PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER, posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T needs to be set to 1 + * in port specific POSIX config file. + * + * To use PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER, posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T needs to be set to 1 in + * port specific POSIX config file. + */ +/**@{ */ +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T == 1 + #define PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER FREERTOS_POSIX_COND_INITIALIZER /**< pthread_cond_t. */ +#endif + +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T == 1 + #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER FREERTOS_POSIX_MUTEX_INITIALIZER /**< pthread_mutex_t. */ +#endif + +/**@} */ + +/** + * @brief Destroy the thread attributes object. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_attr_destroy.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_attr_destroy( pthread_attr_t * attr ); + +/** + * @brief Get detachstate attribute. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_attr_getdetachstate.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_attr_getdetachstate( const pthread_attr_t * attr, + int * detachstate ); + +/** + * @brief Get schedparam attribute. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_attr_getschedparam.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_attr_getschedparam( const pthread_attr_t * attr, + struct sched_param * param ); + +/** + * @brief Get stacksize attribute. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_attr_getstacksize.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_attr_getstacksize( const pthread_attr_t * attr, + size_t * stacksize ); + +/** + * @brief Initialize the thread attributes object. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_attr_init.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * + * @note Currently, only stack size, sched_param, and detach state attributes + * are supported. Also see pthread_attr_get*() and pthread_attr_set*(). + */ +int pthread_attr_init( pthread_attr_t * attr ); + +/** + * @brief Set detachstate attribute. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_attr_setdetachstate.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion + * @retval EINVAL - The value of detachstate is not valid. Currently, supported detach states are -- + * PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED and PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE. + */ +int pthread_attr_setdetachstate( pthread_attr_t * attr, + int detachstate ); + +/** + * @brief Set schedparam attribute. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_attr_setschedparam.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - The value of param is not valid. + * @retval ENOTSUP - An attempt was made to set the attribute to an unsupported value. + */ +int pthread_attr_setschedparam( pthread_attr_t * attr, + const struct sched_param * param ); + +/** + * @brief Set the schedpolicy attribute. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_attr_setschedpolicy.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * + * @warning This function is a stub and always returns 0. + */ +int pthread_attr_setschedpolicy( pthread_attr_t * attr, + int policy ); + +/** + * @brief Set stacksize attribute. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_attr_setstacksize.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - The value of stacksize is less than {PTHREAD_STACK_MIN}. + */ +int pthread_attr_setstacksize( pthread_attr_t * attr, + size_t stacksize ); + +/** + * @brief Destroy a barrier object. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_barrier_destroy.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * + * @note This function does not validate whether there is any thread blocking on the barrier before destroying. + */ +int pthread_barrier_destroy( pthread_barrier_t * barrier ); + +/** + * @brief Initialize a barrier object. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_barrier_init.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - The value specified by count is equal to zero. + * @retval ENOMEM - count cannot fit into FreeRTOS event group type OR insufficient memory exists to initialize the barrier. + * + * @note attr is ignored. + * + * @note pthread_barrier_init() is implemented with FreeRTOS event group. + * To ensure count fits in event group, count may be at most 8 when configUSE_16_BIT_TICKS is 1; + * it may be at most 24 otherwise. configUSE_16_BIT_TICKS is configured in application FreeRTOSConfig.h + * file, which defines how many bits tick count type has. See further details and limitation about event + * group and configUSE_16_BIT_TICKS in FreeRTOS site. + */ +int pthread_barrier_init( pthread_barrier_t * barrier, + const pthread_barrierattr_t * attr, + unsigned count ); + +/** + * @brief Synchronize at a barrier. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_barrier_wait.html + * + * @retval PTHREAD_BARRIER_SERIAL_THREAD - Upon successful completion, the first thread. + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion, other thread(s). + */ +int pthread_barrier_wait( pthread_barrier_t * barrier ); + +/** + * @brief Request cancellation of thread. + * + * @see https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_cancel.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_cancel( pthread_t thread ); + +/** + * @brief Thread creation. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_create.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EAGAIN - Insufficient memory for either thread structure or task creation. + */ +int pthread_create( pthread_t * thread, + const pthread_attr_t * attr, + void *( *startroutine )( void * ), + void * arg ); + +/** + * @brief Broadcast a condition. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_cond_broadcast.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_cond_broadcast( pthread_cond_t * cond ); + +/** + * @brief Destroy condition variables. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_cond_destroy.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_cond_destroy( pthread_cond_t * cond ); + +/** + * @brief Initialize condition variables. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_cond_init.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval ENOMEM - Insufficient memory exists to initialize the condition variable. + * + * @note attr is ignored and treated as NULL. Default setting is always used. + */ +int pthread_cond_init( pthread_cond_t * cond, + const pthread_condattr_t * attr ); + +/** + * @brief Signal a condition. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_cond_signal.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_cond_signal( pthread_cond_t * cond ); + +/** + * @brief Wait on a condition with a timeout. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_cond_timedwait.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - The abstime argument passed in does not refer to an initialized structure OR + * the abstime parameter specified a nanoseconds field value less than zero or + * greater than or equal to 1000 million. + * @retval ETIMEDOUT - The time specified by abstime to pthread_cond_timedwait() has passed. + */ +int pthread_cond_timedwait( pthread_cond_t * cond, + pthread_mutex_t * mutex, + const struct timespec * abstime ); + +/** + * @brief Wait on a condition. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_cond_wait.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_cond_wait( pthread_cond_t * cond, + pthread_mutex_t * mutex ); + +/** + * @brief Compare thread IDs. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_equal.html + * + * @retval 0 - t1 and t2 are both not NULL && equal. + * @retval non-zero - otherwise. + */ +int pthread_equal( pthread_t t1, + pthread_t t2 ); + +/** + * @brief Thread termination. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_exit.html + * + * @retval void - this function cannot return to its caller. + */ +void pthread_exit( void * value_ptr ); + +/** + * @brief Dynamic thread scheduling parameters access. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_getschedparam.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * + * @note policy is always set to SCHED_OTHER by this function. + */ +int pthread_getschedparam( pthread_t thread, + int * policy, + struct sched_param * param ); + +/** + * @brief Wait for thread termination. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_join.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EDEADLK - The value specified by the thread argument to pthread_join() does not refer + * to a joinable thread OR multiple simultaneous calls to pthread_join() + * specifying the same target thread OR the value specified by the thread argument + * to pthread_join() refers to the calling thread. + */ +int pthread_join( pthread_t thread, + void ** retval ); + +/** + * @brief Marks the thread identified by thread as detached. + * + * @see https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009695399/functions/pthread_detach.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - The implementation has detected that the value specified by thread does not refer + * to a joinable thread. + */ +int pthread_detach(pthread_t thread); + +/** + * @brief Destroy a mutex. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutex_destroy.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * + * @note If there exists a thread holding this mutex, this function returns 0 with mutex not being destroyed. + */ +int pthread_mutex_destroy( pthread_mutex_t * mutex ); + +/** + * @brief Initialize a mutex. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutex_init.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval ENOMEM - Insufficient memory exists to initialize the mutex structure. + * @retval EAGAIN - Unable to initialize the mutex structure member(s). + */ +int pthread_mutex_init( pthread_mutex_t * mutex, + const pthread_mutexattr_t * attr ); + +/** + * @brief Lock a mutex. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutex_lock.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - the abstime parameter specified a nanoseconds field value less than zero + * or greater than or equal to 1000 million. + * @retval EDEADLK - The mutex type is PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK and the current thread already + * owns the mutex. + */ +int pthread_mutex_lock( pthread_mutex_t * mutex ); + +/** + * @brief Lock a mutex with timeout. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutex_timedlock.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - The abstime argument passed in does not refer to an initialized structure OR + * the abstime parameter specified a nanoseconds field value less than zero or + * greater than or equal to 1000 million. + * @retval EDEADLK - The mutex type is PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK and the current thread already owns the mutex. + * @retval ETIMEDOUT - The mutex could not be locked before the specified timeout expired. + */ +int pthread_mutex_timedlock( pthread_mutex_t * mutex, + const struct timespec * abstime ); + +/** + * @brief Attempt to lock a mutex. Fail immediately if mutex is already locked. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutex_trylock.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - the abstime parameter specified a nanoseconds field value less than zero + * or greater than or equal to 1000 million. + * @retval EDEADLK - The mutex type is PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK and the current thread already + * owns the mutex. + * @retval EBUSY - The mutex could not be acquired because it was already locked. + */ +int pthread_mutex_trylock( pthread_mutex_t * mutex ); + +/** + * @brief Unlock a mutex. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutex_unlock.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EPERM - The mutex type is PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK or PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE, and + * the current thread does not own the mutex. + */ +int pthread_mutex_unlock( pthread_mutex_t * mutex ); + +/** + * @brief Destroy the mutex attributes object. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutexattr_destroy.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_mutexattr_destroy( pthread_mutexattr_t * attr ); + +/** + * @brief Get the mutex type attribute. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutexattr_gettype.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_mutexattr_gettype( const pthread_mutexattr_t * attr, + int * type ); + +/** + * @brief Initialize the mutex attributes object. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutexattr_init.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * + * @note Currently, only the type attribute is supported. Also see pthread_mutexattr_settype() + * and pthread_mutexattr_gettype(). + */ +int pthread_mutexattr_init( pthread_mutexattr_t * attr ); + +/** + * @brief Set the mutex type attribute. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_mutexattr_settype.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - The value type is invalid. + */ +int pthread_mutexattr_settype( pthread_mutexattr_t * attr, + int type ); + +/** + * @brief Get the calling thread ID. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_self.html + * + * @retval the thread ID of the calling thread. + */ +pthread_t pthread_self( void ); + +/** + * @brief Dynamic thread scheduling parameters access. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/pthread_setschedparam.html + * + * @note policy is ignored; only priority (param.sched_priority) may be changed. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int pthread_setschedparam( pthread_t thread, + int policy, + const struct sched_param * param ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* _FREERTOS_POSIX_PTHREAD_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/sched.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/sched.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..b6e79e9a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/sched.h @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file sched.h + * @brief Execution scheduling. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/sched.h.html + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_SCHED_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_SCHED_H_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @name Scheduling Policies + */ +/**@{ */ +#define SCHED_OTHER 0 /**< Another scheduling policy. */ +/**@} */ + +/** + * @brief Scheduling parameters required for implementation of each supported + * scheduling policy. + */ +struct sched_param +{ + int sched_priority; /**< Process or thread execution scheduling priority. */ +}; + +/** + * @brief Get priority limit (max). + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sched_get_priority_max.html + * + * @note policy is ignored. + * + * @return the maximum priority value (0-based) system configuration allows. + *
+ * e.g. if configMAX_PRIORITIES == 7, this function returns (configMAX_PRIORITIES - 1). + * configMAX_PRIORITIES is configured in application FreeRTOSConfig.h file. + */ +int sched_get_priority_max( int policy ); + +/** + * @brief Get priority limit (min). + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sched_get_priority_min.html + * + * @note policy is ignored. + */ +int sched_get_priority_min( int policy ); + +/** + * @brief Yield the processor. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sched_yield.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion + */ +int sched_yield( void ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_SCHED_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/semaphore.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/semaphore.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..661809a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/semaphore.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file semaphore.h + * @brief Semaphores. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/semaphore.h.html + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_SEMAPHORE_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_SEMAPHORE_H_ + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/time.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX_types.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @brief Semaphore type. + */ +typedef PosixSemType_t sem_t; + +/** + * @brief Destroy an unnamed semaphore. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sem_destroy.html + * + * @retval 0 - upon successful completion + * + * @note Semaphore is destroyed regardless of whether there is any thread currently blocked on this semaphore. + */ +int sem_destroy( sem_t * sem ); + +/** + * @brief Get the value of a semaphore. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sem_getvalue.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion + * + * @note If sem is locked, then the object to which sval points is set to zero. + */ +int sem_getvalue( sem_t * sem, + int * sval ); + +/** + * @brief Initialize an unnamed semaphore. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sem_init.html + * + * @note pshared is ignored. Semaphores will always be considered "shared". + * + * @retval 0 - upon successful completion + * @retval -1 - otherwise. System error variable errno is also set in this case. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EINVAL - The value argument exceeds {SEM_VALUE_MAX}. + *
+ * ENOSPC - A resource required to initialize the semaphore has been exhausted. + */ +int sem_init( sem_t * sem, + int pshared, + unsigned value ); + +/** + * @brief Unlock a semaphore. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sem_post.html + * + * @retval 0 - upon successful completion + */ +int sem_post( sem_t * sem ); + +/** + * @brief Lock a semaphore with timeout. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sem_timedwait.html + * + * @retval 0 - upon successful completion + * @retval -1 - otherwise. System error variable errno is also set in this case. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EINVAL - parameter specified a nanoseconds field value less than zero or greater + * than or equal to 1000 million + *
+ * ETIMEDOUT - The semaphore could not be locked before the specified timeout expired. + * + * @note Deadlock detection is not implemented. + */ +int sem_timedwait( sem_t * sem, + const struct timespec * abstime ); + +/** + * @brief Lock a semaphore if available. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sem_trywait.html + * + * @retval 0 - upon successful completion + * @retval -1 - otherwise. System error variable errno is also set in this case. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EAGAIN - The semaphore was already locked, so it cannot be immediately locked by the sem_trywait() operation. + */ +int sem_trywait( sem_t * sem ); + +/** + * @brief Lock a semaphore. + * + * @see http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sem_wait.html + * + * @retval 0 - upon successful completion + * @retval -1 - otherwise. System error variable errno is also set in this case. + * + * @note Deadlock detection is not implemented. + */ +int sem_wait( sem_t * sem ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_SEMAPHORE_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/signal.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/signal.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..d99aa4af --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/signal.h @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file signal.h + * @brief Signals. + * + * Signals are currently not implemented in FreeRTOS+POSIX. This header only + * defines the signal data structures used elsewhere. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/signal.h.html + */ + + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_SIGNAL_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_SIGNAL_H_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * @name Values of sigev_notify. + */ +/**@{ */ +#define SIGEV_NONE 0 /**< No asynchronous notification is delivered when the event of interest occurs. */ +#define SIGEV_SIGNAL 1 /**< A queued signal, with an application-defined value, is generated when the event of interest occurs. Not supported. */ +#define SIGEV_THREAD 2 /**< A notification function is called to perform notification. */ +/**@} */ + +/** + * @brief Signal value. + */ +union sigval +{ + int sival_int; /**< Integer signal value. */ + void * sival_ptr; /**< Pointer signal value. */ +}; + +/** + * @brief Signal event structure. + */ +struct sigevent +{ + int sigev_notify; /**< Notification type. A value of SIGEV_SIGNAL is not supported. */ + int sigev_signo; /**< Signal number. This member is ignored. */ + union sigval sigev_value; /**< Signal value. Only the sival_ptr member is used. */ + void ( * sigev_notify_function )( union sigval ); /**< Notification function. */ + pthread_attr_t * sigev_notify_attributes; /**< Notification attributes. */ +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_SIGNAL_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/sys/types.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/sys/types.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..4a5e9225 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/sys/types.h @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file sys/types.h + * @brief Data types. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/sys_types.h.html + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_TYPES_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_TYPES_H_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include + +/* FreeRTOS types include */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX_types.h" + +/** + * @brief Used for system times in clock ticks or CLOCKS_PER_SEC. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_CLOCK_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_CLOCK_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_CLOCK_T == 1 ) + typedef uint32_t clock_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used for clock ID type in the clock and timer functions. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_CLOCKID_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_CLOCKID_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_CLOCKID_T == 1 ) + typedef int clockid_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used for some file attributes. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_MODE_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_MODE_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_MODE_T == 1 ) + typedef int mode_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used for process IDs and process group IDs. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_PID_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_PID_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_PID_T == 1 ) + typedef int pid_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used to identify a thread attribute object. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_ATTR_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_ATTR_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_ATTR_T == 1 ) + typedef PthreadAttrType_t pthread_attr_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used to identify a barrier. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_BARRIER_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_BARRIER_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_BARRIER_T == 1 ) + typedef PthreadBarrierType_t pthread_barrier_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used to define a barrier attributes object. + */ +typedef void * pthread_barrierattr_t; + +/** + * @brief Used for condition variables. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T == 1 ) + typedef PthreadCondType_t pthread_cond_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used to identify a condition attribute object. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_CONDATTR_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_CONDATTR_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_CONDATTR_T == 1 ) + typedef void * pthread_condattr_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used for mutexes. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T == 1 ) + typedef PthreadMutexType_t pthread_mutex_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used to identify a mutex attribute object. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEXATTR_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEXATTR_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEXATTR_T == 1 ) + typedef PthreadMutexAttrType_t pthread_mutexattr_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used to identify a thread. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_T == 1 ) + typedef void * pthread_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used for a count of bytes or an error indication. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_SSIZE_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_SSIZE_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_SSIZE_T == 1 ) + typedef int ssize_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used for time in seconds. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_TIME_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_TIME_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_TIME_T == 1 ) + typedef int64_t time_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used for timer ID returned by timer_create(). + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_TIMER_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_TIMER_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_TIMER_T == 1 ) + typedef void * timer_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used for time in microseconds. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_USECONDS_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_USECONDS_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_USECONDS_T == 1 ) + typedef unsigned long useconds_t; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Used for file sizes. + * + * Enabled/disabled by posixconfigENABLE_OFF_T. + */ +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_OFF_T ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_OFF_T == 1 ) + typedef long int off_t; +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_TYPES_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/time.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/time.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..d28336de --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/time.h @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file time.h + * @brief Time types. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/time.h.html + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_TIME_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_TIME_H_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/sys/types.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/signal.h" + +/** + * @name Unit conversion constants. + */ +/**@{ */ +#define MICROSECONDS_PER_SECOND ( 1000000LL ) /**< Microseconds per second. */ +#define NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND ( 1000000000LL ) /**< Nanoseconds per second. */ +#define NANOSECONDS_PER_TICK ( NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND / configTICK_RATE_HZ ) /**< Nanoseconds per FreeRTOS tick. */ +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name Clock identifiers. + */ +/**@{ */ +#define CLOCK_REALTIME 0 /**< The identifier of the system-wide clock measuring real time. */ +#define CLOCK_MONOTONIC 1 /**< The identifier for the system-wide monotonic clock.*/ +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name A number used to convert the value returned by the clock() function into seconds. + */ +/**@{ */ +#define CLOCKS_PER_SEC ( ( clock_t ) configTICK_RATE_HZ ) +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name Flag indicating time is absolute. + * + * For functions taking timer objects, this refers to the clock associated with the timer. + */ +/**@{ */ +#define TIMER_ABSTIME 0x01 +/**@} */ + +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_TIMESPEC ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_TIMESPEC == 1 ) + +/** + * @brief represents an elapsed time + */ + struct timespec + { + time_t tv_sec; /**< Seconds. */ + long tv_nsec; /**< Nanoseconds. */ + }; +#endif + +#if !defined( posixconfigENABLE_ITIMERSPEC ) || ( posixconfigENABLE_ITIMERSPEC == 1 ) + +/** + * @brief timer + */ + struct itimerspec + { + struct timespec it_interval; /**< Timer period. */ + struct timespec it_value; /**< Timer expiration. */ + }; +#endif + +/** + * @brief Report CPU time used. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/clock.html + * + * @return The number of FreeRTOS ticks since the scheduler + * was started minus the ticks spent in the idle task. + * + * @note This function does NOT report the number of ticks spent by the calling thread. + */ +clock_t clock( void ); + +/** + * @brief Access a process CPU-time clock. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/clock_getcpuclockid.html + * + * @retval EPERM + * + * @note This function is currently unsupported. + * + */ +int clock_getcpuclockid( pid_t pid, + clockid_t * clock_id ); + +/** + * @brief Returns the resolution of a clock. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/clock_getres.html + * + * @note clock_id is ignored + * @note This function stores the resolution of the FreeRTOS tick count in the object res points to. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful execution + */ +int clock_getres( clockid_t clock_id, + struct timespec * res ); + +/** + * @brief Returns the current value for the specified clock, clock_id. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/clock_gettime.html + * + * @note clock_id is ignored + * @note this function does not check for overflows of time_t. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int clock_gettime( clockid_t clock_id, + struct timespec * tp ); + +/** + * @brief High resolution sleep with specifiable clock. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/clock_nanosleep.html + * + * @note clock_id is ignored, as this function uses the FreeRTOS tick count as its clock. + * @note flags is ignored, if INCLUDE_vTaskDelayUntil is 0. i.e. the FreeRTOS function vTaskDelayUntil isn't available. + * @note rmtp is also ignored, as signals are not implemented. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval EINVAL - The rqtp argument specified a nanosecond value less than zero or greater than or equal to 1000 million. + */ +int clock_nanosleep( clockid_t clock_id, + int flags, + const struct timespec * rqtp, + struct timespec * rmtp ); + +/** + * @brief Sets the time for the specified clock. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/clock_settime.html + * + * @retval -1 with errno set to EPERM. + * + * @note This function is currently unsupported, as FreeRTOS does not provide a function to modify the tick count. + */ +int clock_settime( clockid_t clock_id, + const struct timespec * tp ); + +/** + * @brief High resolution sleep. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/nanosleep.html + * + * @note rmtp is ignored, as signals are not implemented. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval -1 - The rqtp argument is invalid OR the rqtp argument specified a nanosecond value less than zero or greater than or equal to 1000 million. + * + */ +int nanosleep( const struct timespec * rqtp, + struct timespec * rmtp ); + +/** + * @brief Create a per-process timer. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/timer_create.html + * + * @note clock_id is ignored, as this function used the FreeRTOS tick count as its clock. + * @note evp.sigev_notify must be set to SIGEV_THREAD, since signals are currently not supported. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion, with location referenced by timerid updated. + * @retval -1 - If an error occurs. errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * ENOTSUP - If evp is NULL OR evp->sigen_notify == SIGEV_SIGNAL. + *
+ * EAGAIN - The system lacks sufficient signal queuing resources to honor the request. + */ +int timer_create( clockid_t clockid, + struct sigevent * evp, + timer_t * timerid ); + +/** + * @brief Delete a per-process timer. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/timer_delete.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int timer_delete( timer_t timerid ); + +/** + * @brief Get the timer overrun count. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/timer_getoverrun.html + * + * @retval 0 - Always return 0, since signals are not supported. + */ +int timer_getoverrun( timer_t timerid ); + +/** + * @brief Get the amount of time until the timer expires. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/timer_gettime.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int timer_gettime( timer_t timerid, + struct itimerspec * value ); + +/** + * @brief Set the time until the next expiration of the timer. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/timer_settime.html + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * @retval -1 - An error occurred, errno is also set. + * + * @sideeffect Possible errno values + *
+ * EINVAL - A value structure specified a nanosecond value less than zero or greater than or equal to 1000 million, + * AND the it_value member of that structure did not specify zero seconds and nanoseconds. + */ +int timer_settime( timer_t timerid, + int flags, + const struct itimerspec * value, + struct itimerspec * ovalue ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_TIME_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/unistd.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/unistd.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..a70a1450 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/unistd.h @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file unistd.h + * @brief Standard symbolic constants and types + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/unistd.h.html + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_UNISTD_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_UNISTD_H_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/sys/types.h" + +/** + * @brief Suspend execution for an interval of time. + * + * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/sleep.html + * + * @param[in] seconds The number of seconds to suspend execution. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + * + * @note Return value of a positive number is not yet supported. + */ +unsigned sleep( unsigned seconds ); + +/** + * @brief Suspend execution for microsecond intervals. + * + * This is a useful, non-POSIX function. + * @param[in] usec The number of microseconds to suspend execution. + * + * @retval 0 - Upon successful completion. + */ +int usleep( useconds_t usec ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_UNISTD_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..60306e6a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2019 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file utils.h + * @brief Utility functions used by FreeRTOS+POSIX. + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_UTILS_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_UTILS_ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/time.h" + +/** + * @brief Calculates the length of pcString, up to xMaxLength. + * + * @param[in] pcString The string to find the length of. + * @param[in] xMaxLength The limit when searching for the end of pcString. + * + * @return 0 if pcString is NULL; otherwise, the length of pcString or xMaxLength, + * whichever is smaller. + */ +size_t UTILS_strnlen( const char * const pcString, + size_t xMaxLength ); + +/** + * @brief Calculates the number of ticks between now and a given timespec. + * + * @param[in] pxAbsoluteTime A time in the future, specified as seconds and + * nanoseconds since CLOCK_REALTIME's 0. + * @param[in] pxCurrentTime current time, specified as seconds and + * nanoseconds. + * @param[out] pxResult Where the result of the conversion is stored. The result + * is rounded up for fractional ticks. + * + * @return 0 on success. Otherwise, ETIMEDOUT if pxAbsoluteTime is in the past, + * or EINVAL for invalid parameters. + */ +int UTILS_AbsoluteTimespecToDeltaTicks( const struct timespec * const pxAbsoluteTime, + const struct timespec * const pxCurrentTime, + TickType_t * const pxResult ); + +/** + * @brief Converts a struct timespec to FreeRTOS ticks. + * + * @param[in] pxTimespec The timespec to convert. + * @param[out] Where the result of the conversion is stored. The result is rounded + * up for fractional ticks. + * + * @return 0 on success. Otherwise, EINVAL for invalid parameters. + */ +int UTILS_TimespecToTicks( const struct timespec * const pxTimespec, + TickType_t * const pxResult ); + +/** + * @brief Converts an integer value to a timespec. + * + * @param[in] llSource The value to convert. + * @param[out] pxDestination Where to store the converted value. + * + * @return No return value. + */ +void UTILS_NanosecondsToTimespec( int64_t llSource, + struct timespec * const pxDestination ); + +/** + * @brief Calculates pxResult = x + y. + * + * @param[in] x The first argument for addition. + * @param[in] y The second argument for addition. + * @param[out] pxResult Where the result of the calculation is stored. + * + * @return -1 if any argument was NULL; 1 if result is negative (overflow); otherwise, 0. + */ +int UTILS_TimespecAdd( const struct timespec * const x, + const struct timespec * const y, + struct timespec * const pxResult ); + +/** + * @brief Calculates pxResult = x + ( struct timespec ) nanosec. + * + * @param[in] x The first argument for addition. + * @param[in] llNanoseconds The second argument for addition. + * @param[out] pxResult Where the result of the calculation is stored. + * + * @return -1 if pxResult or x was NULL; 1 if result is negative; otherwise, 0. + */ +int UTILS_TimespecAddNanoseconds( const struct timespec * const x, + int64_t llNanoseconds, + struct timespec * const pxResult ); + +/** + * @brief Calculates pxResult = x - y. If the result is negative contents of + * pResult are undefined + * + * @param[in] x The first argument for subtraction. + * @param[in] y The second argument for subtraction. + * @param[out] pxResult Where the result of the calculation is stored. + * + * @return -1 if any argument was NULL; 1 if result is negative; otherwise, 0. + */ +int UTILS_TimespecSubtract( const struct timespec * const x, + const struct timespec * const y, + struct timespec * const pxResult ); + +/** + * @brief Compare x == y. + * + * @param[in] x The first argument for comparison. + * @param[in] y The second argument for comparison. + * + * @return 0 if x == y; 1 if x > y; -1 if x < y or any argument was NULL + */ +int UTILS_TimespecCompare( const struct timespec * const x, + const struct timespec * const y ); + +/** + * @brief Checks that a timespec conforms to POSIX. + * + * A valid timespec must have 0 <= tv_nsec < 1000000000. + * + * @param[in] pxTimespec The timespec to validate. + * + * @return true if the pxTimespec is valid, false otherwise. + */ +bool UTILS_ValidateTimespec( const struct timespec * const pxTimespec ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_UTILS_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_internal.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_internal.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..16f8036b --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_INTERNAL_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_INTERNAL_H_ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_internal.h + * @brief Internal structs and initializers for FreeRTOS+POSIX. + */ + +/* Amazon FreeRTOS includes. */ +#include "iot_doubly_linked_list.h" + +/** + * @brief Mutex attribute object. + */ +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEXATTR_T == 1 + typedef struct pthread_mutexattr_internal + { + int iType; /**< Mutex type. */ + } pthread_mutexattr_internal_t; +#endif + +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T == 1 + +/** + * @brief Mutex. + */ + typedef struct pthread_mutex_internal + { + BaseType_t xIsInitialized; /**< Set to pdTRUE if this mutex is initialized, pdFALSE otherwise. */ + StaticSemaphore_t xMutex; /**< FreeRTOS mutex. */ + TaskHandle_t xTaskOwner; /**< Owner; used for deadlock detection and permission checks. */ + pthread_mutexattr_internal_t xAttr; /**< Mutex attributes. */ + } pthread_mutex_internal_t; + +/** + * @brief Compile-time initializer of pthread_mutex_internal_t. + */ + #define FREERTOS_POSIX_MUTEX_INITIALIZER \ + ( ( ( pthread_mutex_internal_t ) \ + { \ + .xIsInitialized = pdFALSE, \ + .xMutex = { { 0 } }, \ + .xTaskOwner = NULL, \ + .xAttr = { .iType = 0 } \ + } \ + ) \ + ) +#endif /* if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T == 1 */ + +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T == 1 + +/** + * @brief Condition variable. + */ + typedef struct pthread_cond_internal + { + BaseType_t xIsInitialized; /**< Set to pdTRUE if this condition variable is initialized, pdFALSE otherwise. */ + StaticSemaphore_t xCondWaitSemaphore; /**< Threads block on this semaphore in pthread_cond_wait. */ + unsigned iWaitingThreads; /**< The number of threads currently waiting on this condition variable. */ + } pthread_cond_internal_t; + +/** + * @brief Compile-time initializer of pthread_cond_internal_t. + */ + + #define FREERTOS_POSIX_COND_INITIALIZER \ + ( ( ( pthread_cond_internal_t ) \ + { \ + .xIsInitialized = pdFALSE, \ + .xCondWaitSemaphore = { { 0 } }, \ + .iWaitingThreads = 0 \ + } \ + ) \ + ) + +#endif /* if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T == 1 */ + +#if posixconfigENABLE_SEM_T == 1 + +/** + * @brief Semaphore type. + */ + typedef struct + { + StaticSemaphore_t xSemaphore; /**< FreeRTOS semaphore. */ + int value; /**< POSIX semaphore count. */ + } sem_internal_t; +#endif /* if posixconfigENABLE_SEM_T == 1 */ + +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_BARRIER_T == 1 + +/** + * @brief Barrier object. + */ + typedef struct pthread_barrier_internal + { + unsigned uThreadCount; /**< Current number of threads that have entered barrier. */ + unsigned uThreshold; /**< The count argument of pthread_barrier_init. */ + StaticSemaphore_t xThreadCountSemaphore; /**< Prevents more than uThreshold threads from exiting pthread_barrier_wait at once. */ + StaticEventGroup_t xBarrierEventGroup; /**< FreeRTOS event group that blocks to wait on threads entering barrier. */ + } pthread_barrier_internal_t; +#endif /* if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_BARRIER_T == 1 */ + +#endif /* _FREERTOS_POSIX_INTERNAL_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..46097827 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS+POSIX V1.0.4 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable.h + * @brief Port-specific configuration of FreeRTOS+POSIX. + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_PORTABLE_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_PORTABLE_H_ + +#define posixconfigENABLE_CLOCK_T 0 +#define posixconfigENABLE_CLOCKID_T 0 +#define posixconfigENABLE_MODE_T 0 +#define posixconfigENABLE_PID_T 0 +#define posixconfigENABLE_TIME_T 0 +#define posixconfigENABLE_TIMER_T 0 +#define posixconfigENABLE_TIMESPEC 0 +#define posixconfigENABLE_ITIMERSPEC 0 + +/* This port uses the defaults in FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable_default.h, so this + * file is empty. */ +#include + +#endif /* _FREERTOS_POSIX_PORTABLE_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable_default.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable_default.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..763b9015 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable_default.h @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_portable_default.h + * @brief Defaults for port-specific configuration of FreeRTOS+POSIX. + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_PORTABLE_DEFAULT_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_PORTABLE_DEFAULT_H_ + +/** + * @name The FreeRTOS task name given to pthreads. + */ +/**@{ */ +#ifndef posixconfigPTHREAD_TASK_NAME + #define posixconfigPTHREAD_TASK_NAME "pthread" /**< Task name. */ +#endif +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name the FreeRTOS timer name given to POSIX timers. + */ +/**@{ */ +#ifndef posixconfigTIMER_NAME + #define posixconfigTIMER_NAME "timer" /**< Timer name. */ +#endif +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name Defaults for POSIX message queue implementation. + */ +/**@{ */ +#ifndef posixconfigMQ_MAX_MESSAGES + #define posixconfigMQ_MAX_MESSAGES 10 /**< Maximum number of messages in an mq at one time. */ +#endif + +#ifndef posixconfigMQ_MAX_SIZE + #define posixconfigMQ_MAX_SIZE 128 /**< Maximum size (in bytes) of each message. */ +#endif +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name POSIX implementation-dependent constants usually defined in limits.h. + * + * They are defined here to provide portability between platforms. + */ +/**@{ */ +#ifndef PTHREAD_STACK_MIN + #define PTHREAD_STACK_MIN configMINIMAL_STACK_SIZE * sizeof( StackType_t ) /**< Minimum size in bytes of thread stack storage. */ +#endif +#ifndef NAME_MAX + #define NAME_MAX 64 /**< Maximum number of bytes in a filename (not including terminating null). */ +#endif +#ifndef SEM_VALUE_MAX + #define SEM_VALUE_MAX 0x7FFFU /**< Maximum value of a sem_t. */ +#endif +/**@} */ + +/** + * @name Enable typedefs of POSIX types. + * + * Set these values to 1 or 0 to enable or disable the typedefs, respectively. + * These typedefs should only be disabled if they conflict with system typedefs. + */ +/**@{ */ +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_CLOCK_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_CLOCK_T 1 /**< clock_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_CLOCKID_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_CLOCKID_T 1 /**< clockid_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_MODE_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_MODE_T 1 /**< mode_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_PID_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_PID_T 1 /**< pid_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_ATTR_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_ATTR_T 1 /**< pthread_attr_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T 1 /**< pthread_cond_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_CONDATTR_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_CONDATTR_T 1 /**< pthread_condattr_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T 1 /**< pthread_mutex_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEXATTR_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEXATTR_T 1 /**< pthread_mutexattr_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_T 1 /**< pthread_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_SSIZE_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_SSIZE_T 1 /**< ssize_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_TIME_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_TIME_T 1 /**< time_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_TIMER_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_TIMER_T 1 /**< timer_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_USECONDS_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_USECONDS_T 1 /**< useconds_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_TIMESPEC + #define posixconfigENABLE_TIMESPEC 1 /**< struct timespec in time.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_ITIMERSPEC + #define posixconfigENABLE_ITIMERSPEC 1 /**< struct itimerspec in time.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_SEM_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_SEM_T 1 /**< struct sem_t in semaphore.h */ +#endif +#ifndef posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_BARRIER_T + #define posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_BARRIER_T 1 /**< pthread_barrier_t in sys/types.h */ +#endif +/**@} */ + +#endif /* ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_PORTABLE_DEFAULT_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_types.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_types.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..3b45b8d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/FreeRTOS_POSIX_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +#ifndef _FREERTOS_POSIX_INTERNAL_TYPES_H_ +#define _FREERTOS_POSIX_INTERNAL_TYPES_H_ + +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX_internal.h" + +/* + * sys/types.h defines a POSIX type when posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD__T + * is not defined AND when posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD__T is set to 1. + * FreeRTOS_POSIX_internal.h defines internal type ONLY when + * posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD__T is set to 1. + * #else part below is to have a type defined, so the code compiles, when + * posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD__T is not defined. + */ +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEX_T == 1 + typedef pthread_mutex_internal_t PthreadMutexType_t; +#else + typedef void * PthreadMutexType_t; +#endif + +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_COND_T == 1 + typedef pthread_cond_internal_t PthreadCondType_t; +#else + typedef void * PthreadCondType_t; +#endif + +#if posixconfigENABLE_SEM_T == 1 + typedef sem_internal_t PosixSemType_t; +#else + typedef void * PosixSemType_t; +#endif + +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_MUTEXATTR_T == 1 + typedef struct pthread_mutexattr + { + uint32_t ulpthreadMutexAttrStorage; + } PthreadMutexAttrType_t; +#else + typedef void * PthreadMutexAttrType_t; +#endif + +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_ATTR_T == 1 + typedef struct pthread_attr + { + uint32_t ulpthreadAttrStorage; + } PthreadAttrType_t; +#else + typedef void * PthreadAttrType_t; +#endif + +#if posixconfigENABLE_PTHREAD_BARRIER_T == 1 + typedef pthread_barrier_internal_t PthreadBarrierType_t; +#else + typedef void * PthreadBarrierType_t; +#endif + +#endif /* _FREERTOS_POSIX_INTERNAL_TYPES_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/include/iot_doubly_linked_list.h b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/iot_doubly_linked_list.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..338c539a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/include/iot_doubly_linked_list.h @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS Common V1.0.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file iot_doubly_linked_list.h + * @brief Doubly Linked List implementation. + * + * A generic implementation of circular Doubly Linked List which consists of a + * list head and some list entries (zero in case of an empty list). + * + * To start with, a structure of type Link_t should be embedded in the structure + * which is to be organized as doubly linked list. + * @code + * typedef struct UserStruct + * { + * uint32_t ulField1; + * uint32_t ulField2; + * Link_t xLink; + * } UserStruct_t; + * @endcode + * + * A List head should then be defined and initialized. + * @code + * Link_t xListHead; + * listINIT_HEAD( &xListHead ); + * @endcode + * + * listADD can then be used to add nodes to the list. + * @code + * listADD( &( xListHead ), &( pxUserStruct->xLink ) ); + * @endcode + * + * listFOR_EACH can be used for traversing the list. + * @code + * Link_t *pxLink; + * UserStruct_t *pxUserStruct; + * listFOR_EACH( pxLink, &( xListHead ) ) + * { + * pxUserStruct = listCONTAINER( pxLink, UserStruct_t, xLink ); + * } + * @endcode + * + * listFOR_EACH_SAFE should be used if you want to perform destructive operations + * (like free) on nodes while traversing the list. + * @code + * Link_t *pxLink, *pxTempLink; + * UserStruct_t *pxUserStruct; + * listFOR_EACH( pxLink, pxTempLink, &( xListHead ) ) + * { + * pxUserStruct = listCONTAINER( pxLink, UserStruct_t, xLink ); + * free( pxUserStruct ); + * } + * @endcode + */ + +#ifndef _AWS_DOUBLY_LINKED_LIST_H_ +#define _AWS_DOUBLY_LINKED_LIST_H_ + +#include +#include + +/** + * @brief Struct embedded in any struct to make it a doubly linked + * list. + * + * pxNext in the head points to the first node in the list and pxPrev + * in the head points to the last node in the list. In case of empty + * list, both pxPrev and pxNext in the head point to the head node itself. + */ +typedef struct Link +{ + struct Link * pxPrev; /**< Pointer to the previous node. */ + struct Link * pxNext; /**< Pointer to the next node. */ +} Link_t; + +/** + * @brief Initializes the given list head to an empty list. + * + * @param[in] pxHead The given list head to initialize. + */ +#define listINIT_HEAD( pxHead ) \ + { \ + ( pxHead )->pxPrev = ( pxHead ); \ + ( pxHead )->pxNext = ( pxHead ); \ + } + +/** + * @brief Adds the given new node to the given list. + * + * @param[in] pxHead The head of the given list. + * @param[in] pxLink The given new node to be added to the given + * list. + */ +#define listADD( pxHead, pxLink ) \ + { \ + Link_t * pxPrevLink = ( pxHead ); \ + Link_t * pxNextLink = ( ( pxHead )->pxNext ); \ + \ + ( pxLink )->pxNext = pxNextLink; \ + pxNextLink->pxPrev = ( pxLink ); \ + pxPrevLink->pxNext = ( pxLink ); \ + ( pxLink )->pxPrev = ( pxPrevLink ); \ + } + +/** + * @brief Removes the given node from the list it is part of. + * + * If the given node is not a part of any list (i.e. next and previous + * nodes are NULL), nothing happens. + * + * @param[in] pxLink The given node to remove from the list. + */ +#define listREMOVE( pxLink ) \ + { \ + /* If the link is part of a list, remove it from the list. */ \ + if( ( pxLink )->pxNext != NULL && ( pxLink )->pxPrev != NULL ) \ + { \ + ( pxLink )->pxPrev->pxNext = ( pxLink )->pxNext; \ + ( pxLink )->pxNext->pxPrev = ( pxLink )->pxPrev; \ + } \ + \ + /* Make sure that this link is not part of any list anymore. */ \ + ( pxLink )->pxPrev = NULL; \ + ( pxLink )->pxNext = NULL; \ + } + +/** + * @brief Given the head of a list, checks if the list is empty. + * + * @param[in] pxHead The head of the given list. + */ +#define listIS_EMPTY( pxHead ) ( ( ( pxHead ) == NULL ) || ( ( pxHead )->pxNext == ( pxHead ) ) ) + +/** + * @brief Removes the first node from the given list and returns it. + * + * Removes the first node from the given list and assigns it to the + * pxLink parameter. If the list is empty, it assigns NULL to the + * pxLink. + * + * @param[in] pxHead The head of the list from which to remove the + * first node. + * @param[out] pxLink The output parameter to receive the removed + * node. + */ +#define listPOP( pxHead, pxLink ) \ + { \ + if( listIS_EMPTY( ( pxHead ) ) ) \ + { \ + ( pxLink ) = NULL; \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + ( pxLink ) = ( pxHead )->pxNext; \ + /* If the link is part of a list, remove it from the list. */ \ + if( ( pxLink )->pxNext != NULL && ( pxLink )->pxPrev != NULL ) \ + { \ + ( pxLink )->pxPrev->pxNext = ( pxLink )->pxNext; \ + ( pxLink )->pxNext->pxPrev = ( pxLink )->pxPrev; \ + } \ + \ + /* Make sure that this link is not part of any list anymore. */ \ + ( pxLink )->pxPrev = NULL; \ + ( pxLink )->pxNext = NULL; \ + } \ + } + +/** + * @brief Merges a list into a given list. + * + * @param[in] pxHeadResultList The head of the given list into which the + * other list should be merged. + * @param[in] pxHeadListToMerge The head of the list to be merged into the + * given list. + */ +#define listMERGE( pxHeadResultList, pxHeadListToMerge ) \ + { \ + if( !listIS_EMPTY( ( pxHeadListToMerge ) ) ) \ + { \ + /* Setup links between last node of listToMerge and first node of resultList. */ \ + ( pxHeadListToMerge )->pxPrev->pxNext = ( pxHeadResultList )->pxNext; \ + ( pxHeadResultList )->pxNext->pxPrev = ( pxHeadListToMerge )->pxPrev; \ + \ + /* Setup links between first node of listToMerge and the head of resultList. */ \ + ( pxHeadListToMerge )->pxNext->pxPrev = ( pxHeadResultList ); \ + ( pxHeadResultList )->pxNext = ( pxHeadListToMerge )->pxNext; \ + /* Empty the merged list. */ \ + listINIT_HEAD( ( pxHeadListToMerge ) ); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * @brief Helper macro to iterate over a list. pxLink contains the link node + * in each iteration. + */ +#define listFOR_EACH( pxLink, pxHead ) \ + for( ( pxLink ) = ( pxHead )->pxNext; \ + ( pxLink ) != ( pxHead ); \ + ( pxLink ) = ( pxLink )->pxNext ) + +/** + * @brief Helper macro to iterate over a list. It is safe to destroy/free the + * nodes while iterating. pxLink contains the link node in each iteration. + */ +#define listFOR_EACH_SAFE( pxLink, pxTempLink, pxHead ) \ + for( ( pxLink ) = ( pxHead )->pxNext, ( pxTempLink ) = ( pxLink )->pxNext; \ + ( pxLink ) != ( pxHead ); \ + ( pxLink ) = ( pxTempLink ), ( pxTempLink ) = ( pxLink )->pxNext ) + +/** + * @brief Given the pointer to the link member (of type Link_t) in a struct, + * extracts the pointer to the containing struct. + * + * @param[in] pxLink The pointer to the link member. + * @param[in] type The type of the containing struct. + * @param[in] member Name of the link member in the containing struct. + */ +#define listCONTAINER( pxLink, type, member ) ( ( type * ) ( ( uint8_t * ) ( pxLink ) - ( uint8_t * ) ( &( ( type * ) 0 )->member ) ) ) + +#endif /* _AWS_DOUBLY_LINKED_LIST_H_ */ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_clock.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_clock.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..51e592ae --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_clock.c @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_clock.c + * @brief Implementation of clock functions in time.h + */ + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/time.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h" + +/* Declaration of snprintf. The header stdio.h is not included because it + * includes conflicting symbols on some platforms. */ +extern int snprintf( char * s, + size_t n, + const char * format, + ... ); + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +clock_t clock( void ) +{ + /* This function is currently unsupported. It will always return -1. */ + + return ( clock_t ) -1; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int clock_getcpuclockid( pid_t pid, + clockid_t * clock_id ) +{ + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) pid; + ( void ) clock_id; + + /* This function is currently unsupported. It will always return EPERM. */ + return EPERM; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int clock_getres( clockid_t clock_id, + struct timespec * res ) +{ + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) clock_id; + + /* Convert FreeRTOS tick resolution as timespec. */ + if( res != NULL ) + { + res->tv_sec = 0; + res->tv_nsec = NANOSECONDS_PER_TICK; + } + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int clock_gettime( clockid_t clock_id, + struct timespec * tp ) +{ + TimeOut_t xCurrentTime = { 0 }; + + /* Intermediate variable used to convert TimeOut_t to struct timespec. + * Also used to detect overflow issues. It must be unsigned because the + * behavior of signed integer overflow is undefined. */ + uint64_t ullTickCount = 0ULL; + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) clock_id; + + /* Get the current tick count and overflow count. vTaskSetTimeOutState() + * is used to get these values because they are both static in tasks.c. */ + vTaskSetTimeOutState( &xCurrentTime ); + + /* Adjust the tick count for the number of times a TickType_t has overflowed. + * portMAX_DELAY should be the maximum value of a TickType_t. */ + ullTickCount = ( uint64_t ) ( xCurrentTime.xOverflowCount ) << ( sizeof( TickType_t ) * 8 ); + + /* Add the current tick count. */ + ullTickCount += xCurrentTime.xTimeOnEntering; + + /* Convert ullTickCount to timespec. */ + UTILS_NanosecondsToTimespec( ( int64_t ) ullTickCount * NANOSECONDS_PER_TICK, tp ); + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int clock_nanosleep( clockid_t clock_id, + int flags, + const struct timespec * rqtp, + struct timespec * rmtp ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + TickType_t xSleepTime = 0; + struct timespec xCurrentTime = { 0 }; + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) clock_id; + ( void ) rmtp; + ( void ) flags; /* This is only ignored if INCLUDE_vTaskDelayUntil is 0. */ + + /* Check rqtp. */ + if( UTILS_ValidateTimespec( rqtp ) == false ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + /* Get current time */ + if( ( iStatus == 0 ) && ( clock_gettime( CLOCK_REALTIME, &xCurrentTime ) != 0 ) ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Check for absolute time sleep. */ + if( ( flags & TIMER_ABSTIME ) == TIMER_ABSTIME ) + { + /* Get current time */ + if( clock_gettime( CLOCK_REALTIME, &xCurrentTime ) != 0 ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + /* Get number of ticks until absolute time. */ + if( ( iStatus == 0 ) && ( UTILS_AbsoluteTimespecToDeltaTicks( rqtp, &xCurrentTime, &xSleepTime ) == 0 ) ) + { + /* Delay until absolute time if vTaskDelayUntil is available. */ + #if ( INCLUDE_vTaskDelayUntil == 1 ) + + /* Get the current tick count. This variable isn't declared + * at the top of the function because it's only used and needed + * if vTaskDelayUntil is available. */ + TickType_t xCurrentTicks = xTaskGetTickCount(); + + /* Delay until absolute time. */ + vTaskDelayUntil( &xCurrentTicks, xSleepTime ); + #else + + /* If vTaskDelayUntil isn't available, ignore the TIMER_ABSTIME flag + * and sleep for a relative time. */ + vTaskDelay( xSleepTime ); + #endif + } + } + else + { + /* If TIMER_ABSTIME isn't specified, convert rqtp to ticks and + * sleep for a relative time. */ + if( UTILS_TimespecToTicks( rqtp, &xSleepTime ) == 0 ) + { + vTaskDelay( xSleepTime ); + } + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int clock_settime( clockid_t clock_id, + const struct timespec * tp ) +{ + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) clock_id; + ( void ) tp; + + /* This function is currently unsupported. It will always return -1 and + * set errno to EPERM. */ + errno = EPERM; + + return -1; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int nanosleep( const struct timespec * rqtp, + struct timespec * rmtp ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + TickType_t xSleepTime = 0; + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) rmtp; + + /* Check rqtp. */ + if( UTILS_ValidateTimespec( rqtp ) == false ) + { + errno = EINVAL; + iStatus = -1; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Convert rqtp to ticks and delay. */ + if( UTILS_TimespecToTicks( rqtp, &xSleepTime ) == 0 ) + { + vTaskDelay( xSleepTime ); + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_mqueue.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_mqueue.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..9f9079bb --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_mqueue.c @@ -0,0 +1,893 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_mqueue.c + * @brief Implementation of message queue functions in mqueue.h + */ + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/fcntl.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/mqueue.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h" + +/** + * @brief Element of the FreeRTOS queues that store mq data. + */ +typedef struct QueueElement +{ + char * pcData; /**< Data in queue. Type char* to match msg_ptr. */ + size_t xDataSize; /**< Size of data pointed by pcData. */ +} QueueElement_t; + +/** + * @brief Data structure of an mq. + * + * FreeRTOS isn't guaranteed to have a file-like abstraction, so message + * queues in this implementation are stored as a linked list (in RAM). + */ +typedef struct QueueListElement +{ + Link_t xLink; /**< Pointer to the next element in the list. */ + QueueHandle_t xQueue; /**< FreeRTOS queue handle. */ + size_t xOpenDescriptors; /**< Number of threads that have opened this queue. */ + char * pcName; /**< Null-terminated queue name. */ + struct mq_attr xAttr; /**< Queue attibutes. */ + BaseType_t xPendingUnlink; /**< If pdTRUE, this queue will be unlinked once all descriptors close. */ +} QueueListElement_t; + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +/** + * @brief Convert an absolute timespec into a tick timeout, taking into account + * queue flags. + * + * @param[in] lMessageQueueFlags Message queue flags to consider. + * @param[in] pxAbsoluteTimeout The absolute timespec to convert. + * @param[out] pxTimeoutTicks Output parameter of the timeout in ticks. + * + * @return 0 if successful; EINVAL if pxAbsoluteTimeout is invalid, or ETIMEDOUT + * if pxAbsoluteTimeout is in the past. + */ +static int prvCalculateTickTimeout( long lMessageQueueFlags, + const struct timespec * const pxAbsoluteTimeout, + TickType_t * pxTimeoutTicks ); + +/** + * @brief Add a new queue to the queue list. + * + * @param[out] ppxMessageQueue Pointer to new queue. + * @param[in] pxAttr mq_attr of the new queue. + * @param[in] pcName Name of new queue. + * @param[in] xNameLength Length of pcName. + * + * @return pdTRUE if the queue is found; pdFALSE otherwise. + */ +static BaseType_t prvCreateNewMessageQueue( QueueListElement_t ** ppxMessageQueue, + const struct mq_attr * const pxAttr, + const char * const pcName, + size_t xNameLength ); + +/** + * @brief Free all the resources used by a message queue. + * + * @param[out] pxMessageQueue Pointer to queue to free. + * + * @return nothing + */ +static void prvDeleteMessageQueue( const QueueListElement_t * const pxMessageQueue ); + +/** + * @brief Attempt to find the queue identified by pcName or xMqId in the queue list. + * + * Matches queues by pcName first; if pcName is NULL, matches by xMqId. + * @param[out] ppxQueueListElement Output parameter set when queue is found. + * @param[in] pcName A queue name to match. + * @param[in] xMessageQueueDescriptor A queue descriptor to match. + * + * @return pdTRUE if the queue is found; pdFALSE otherwise. + */ +static BaseType_t prvFindQueueInList( QueueListElement_t ** const ppxQueueListElement, + const char * const pcName, + mqd_t xMessageQueueDescriptor ); + +/** + * @brief Initialize the queue list. + * + * Performs initialization of the queue list mutex and queue list head. + * + * @return nothing + */ +static void prvInitializeQueueList( void ); + +/** + * @brief Checks that pcName is a valid name for a message queue. + * + * Also outputs the length of pcName. + * @param[in] pcName The name to check. + * @param[out] pxNameLength Output parameter for name length. + * + * @return pdTRUE if the name is valid; pdFALSE otherwise. + */ +static BaseType_t prvValidateQueueName( const char * const pcName, + size_t * pxNameLength ); + +/** + * @brief Guards access to the list of message queues. + */ +static StaticSemaphore_t xQueueListMutex = { { 0 }, .u = { 0 } }; + +/** + * @brief Head of the linked list of queues. + */ +static Link_t xQueueListHead = { 0 }; + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static int prvCalculateTickTimeout( long lMessageQueueFlags, + const struct timespec * const pxAbsoluteTimeout, + TickType_t * pxTimeoutTicks ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + + /* Check for nonblocking queue. */ + if( lMessageQueueFlags & O_NONBLOCK ) + { + /* No additional checks are done for nonblocking queues. Timeout is 0. */ + *pxTimeoutTicks = 0; + } + else + { + /* No absolute timeout given. Block forever. */ + if( pxAbsoluteTimeout == NULL ) + { + *pxTimeoutTicks = portMAX_DELAY; + } + else + { + struct timespec xCurrentTime = { 0 }; + + /* Check that the given timespec is valid. */ + if( UTILS_ValidateTimespec( pxAbsoluteTimeout ) == false ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + /* Get current time */ + if( ( iStatus == 0 ) && ( clock_gettime( CLOCK_REALTIME, &xCurrentTime ) != 0 ) ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + /* Convert absolute timespec to ticks. */ + if( ( iStatus == 0 ) && + ( UTILS_AbsoluteTimespecToDeltaTicks( pxAbsoluteTimeout, &xCurrentTime, pxTimeoutTicks ) != 0 ) ) + { + iStatus = ETIMEDOUT; + } + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static BaseType_t prvCreateNewMessageQueue( QueueListElement_t ** ppxMessageQueue, + const struct mq_attr * const pxAttr, + const char * const pcName, + size_t xNameLength ) +{ + BaseType_t xStatus = pdTRUE; + + /* Allocate space for a new queue element. */ + *ppxMessageQueue = pvPortMalloc( sizeof( QueueListElement_t ) ); + + /* Check that memory allocation succeeded. */ + if( *ppxMessageQueue == NULL ) + { + xStatus = pdFALSE; + } + + /* Create the FreeRTOS queue. */ + if( xStatus == pdTRUE ) + { + ( *ppxMessageQueue )->xQueue = + xQueueCreate( pxAttr->mq_maxmsg, sizeof( QueueElement_t ) ); + + /* Check that queue creation succeeded. */ + if( ( *ppxMessageQueue )->xQueue == NULL ) + { + vPortFree( *ppxMessageQueue ); + xStatus = pdFALSE; + } + } + + if( xStatus == pdTRUE ) + { + /* Allocate space for the queue name plus null-terminator. */ + ( *ppxMessageQueue )->pcName = pvPortMalloc( xNameLength + 1 ); + + /* Check that memory was successfully allocated for queue name. */ + if( ( *ppxMessageQueue )->pcName == NULL ) + { + vQueueDelete( ( *ppxMessageQueue )->xQueue ); + vPortFree( *ppxMessageQueue ); + xStatus = pdFALSE; + } + else + { + /* Copy queue name. Copying xNameLength+1 will cause strncpy to add + * the null-terminator. */ + ( void ) strncpy( ( *ppxMessageQueue )->pcName, pcName, xNameLength + 1 ); + } + } + + if( xStatus == pdTRUE ) + { + /* Copy attributes. */ + ( *ppxMessageQueue )->xAttr = *pxAttr; + + /* A newly-created queue will have 1 open descriptor for it. */ + ( *ppxMessageQueue )->xOpenDescriptors = 1; + + /* A newly-created queue will not be pending unlink. */ + ( *ppxMessageQueue )->xPendingUnlink = pdFALSE; + + /* Add the new queue to the list. */ + listADD( &xQueueListHead, &( *ppxMessageQueue )->xLink ); + } + + return xStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static void prvDeleteMessageQueue( const QueueListElement_t * const pxMessageQueue ) +{ + QueueElement_t xQueueElement = { 0 }; + + /* Free all data in the queue. It's assumed that no more data will be added + * to the queue, so xQueueReceive does not block. */ + while( xQueueReceive( pxMessageQueue->xQueue, + ( void * ) &xQueueElement, + 0 ) == pdTRUE ) + { + vPortFree( xQueueElement.pcData ); + } + + /* Free memory used by this message queue. */ + vQueueDelete( pxMessageQueue->xQueue ); + vPortFree( ( void * ) pxMessageQueue->pcName ); + vPortFree( ( void * ) pxMessageQueue ); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static BaseType_t prvFindQueueInList( QueueListElement_t ** const ppxQueueListElement, + const char * const pcName, + mqd_t xMessageQueueDescriptor ) +{ + Link_t * pxQueueListLink = NULL; + QueueListElement_t * pxMessageQueue = NULL; + BaseType_t xQueueFound = pdFALSE; + + /* Iterate through the list of queues. */ + listFOR_EACH( pxQueueListLink, &xQueueListHead ) + { + pxMessageQueue = listCONTAINER( pxQueueListLink, QueueListElement_t, xLink ); + + /* Match by name first if provided. */ + if( ( pcName != NULL ) && ( strcmp( pxMessageQueue->pcName, pcName ) == 0 ) ) + { + xQueueFound = pdTRUE; + break; + } + /* If name doesn't match, match by descriptor. */ + else + { + if( ( mqd_t ) pxMessageQueue == xMessageQueueDescriptor ) + { + xQueueFound = pdTRUE; + break; + } + } + } + + /* If the queue was found, set the output parameter. */ + if( ( xQueueFound == pdTRUE ) && ( ppxQueueListElement != NULL ) ) + { + *ppxQueueListElement = pxMessageQueue; + } + + return xQueueFound; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static void prvInitializeQueueList( void ) +{ + /* Keep track of whether the queue list has been initialized. */ + static BaseType_t xQueueListInitialized = pdFALSE; + + /* Check if queue list needs to be initialized. */ + if( xQueueListInitialized == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Initialization must be in a critical section to prevent two threads + * from initializing at the same time. */ + taskENTER_CRITICAL(); + + /* Check again that queue list is still uninitialized, i.e. it wasn't + * initialized while this function was waiting to enter the critical + * section. */ + if( xQueueListInitialized == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Initialize the queue list mutex and list head. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateMutexStatic( &xQueueListMutex ); + listINIT_HEAD( &xQueueListHead ); + xQueueListInitialized = pdTRUE; + } + + /* Exit the critical section. */ + taskEXIT_CRITICAL(); + } +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static BaseType_t prvValidateQueueName( const char * const pcName, + size_t * pxNameLength ) +{ + BaseType_t xStatus = pdTRUE; + size_t xNameLength = 0; + + /* All message queue names must start with '/'. */ + if( pcName[ 0 ] != '/' ) + { + xStatus = pdFALSE; + } + else + { + /* Get the length of pcName, excluding the first '/' and null-terminator. */ + xNameLength = UTILS_strnlen( pcName, NAME_MAX + 2 ); + + if( xNameLength == NAME_MAX + 2 ) + { + /* Name too long. */ + xStatus = pdFALSE; + } + else + { + /* Name length passes, set output parameter. */ + *pxNameLength = xNameLength; + } + } + + return xStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int mq_close( mqd_t mqdes ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + QueueListElement_t * pxMessageQueue = ( QueueListElement_t * ) mqdes; + BaseType_t xQueueRemoved = pdFALSE; + + /* Initialize the queue list, if needed. */ + prvInitializeQueueList(); + + /* Lock the mutex that guards access to the queue list. This call will + * never fail because it blocks forever. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex, portMAX_DELAY ); + + /* Attempt to find the message queue based on the given descriptor. */ + if( prvFindQueueInList( NULL, NULL, mqdes ) == pdTRUE ) + { + /* Decrement the number of open descriptors. */ + if( pxMessageQueue->xOpenDescriptors > 0 ) + { + pxMessageQueue->xOpenDescriptors--; + } + + /* Check if the queue has any more open descriptors. */ + if( pxMessageQueue->xOpenDescriptors == 0 ) + { + /* If no open descriptors remain and mq_unlink has already been called, + * remove the queue. */ + if( pxMessageQueue->xPendingUnlink == pdTRUE ) + { + listREMOVE( &pxMessageQueue->xLink ); + + /* Set the flag to delete the queue. Deleting the queue is deferred + * until xQueueListMutex is released. */ + xQueueRemoved = pdTRUE; + } + /* Otherwise, wait for the call to mq_unlink. */ + else + { + pxMessageQueue->xPendingUnlink = pdTRUE; + } + } + } + else + { + /* Queue not found; bad descriptor. */ + errno = EBADF; + iStatus = -1; + } + + /* Release the mutex protecting the queue list. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex ); + + /* Delete all resources used by the queue if needed. */ + if( xQueueRemoved == pdTRUE ) + { + prvDeleteMessageQueue( pxMessageQueue ); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int mq_getattr( mqd_t mqdes, + struct mq_attr * mqstat ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + QueueListElement_t * pxMessageQueue = ( QueueListElement_t * ) mqdes; + + /* Lock the mutex that guards access to the queue list. This call will + * never fail because it blocks forever. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex, portMAX_DELAY ); + + /* Find the mq referenced by mqdes. */ + if( prvFindQueueInList( NULL, NULL, mqdes ) == pdTRUE ) + { + /* Update the number of messages in the queue and copy the attributes + * into mqstat. */ + pxMessageQueue->xAttr.mq_curmsgs = ( long ) uxQueueMessagesWaiting( pxMessageQueue->xQueue ); + *mqstat = pxMessageQueue->xAttr; + } + else + { + /* Queue not found; bad descriptor. */ + errno = EBADF; + iStatus = -1; + } + + /* Release the mutex protecting the queue list. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex ); + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +mqd_t mq_open( const char * name, + int oflag, + mode_t mode, + struct mq_attr * attr ) +{ + mqd_t xMessageQueue = NULL; + size_t xNameLength = 0; + + /* Default mq_attr. */ + struct mq_attr xQueueCreationAttr = + { + .mq_flags = 0, + .mq_maxmsg = posixconfigMQ_MAX_MESSAGES, + .mq_msgsize = posixconfigMQ_MAX_SIZE, + .mq_curmsgs = 0 + }; + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) mode; + + /* Initialize the queue list, if needed. */ + prvInitializeQueueList(); + + /* Check queue name. */ + if( prvValidateQueueName( name, &xNameLength ) == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Invalid name. */ + errno = EINVAL; + xMessageQueue = ( mqd_t ) -1; + } + + /* Check attributes, if given. */ + if( xMessageQueue == NULL ) + { + if( ( oflag & O_CREAT ) && ( attr != NULL ) && ( ( attr->mq_maxmsg <= 0 ) || ( attr->mq_msgsize <= 0 ) ) ) + { + /* Invalid mq_attr.mq_maxmsg or mq_attr.mq_msgsize. */ + errno = EINVAL; + xMessageQueue = ( mqd_t ) -1; + } + } + + if( xMessageQueue == NULL ) + { + /* Lock the mutex that guards access to the queue list. This call will + * never fail because it blocks forever. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex, portMAX_DELAY ); + + /* Search the queue list to check if the queue exists. */ + if( prvFindQueueInList( ( QueueListElement_t ** ) &xMessageQueue, + name, + ( mqd_t ) NULL ) == pdTRUE ) + { + /* If the mq exists, check that this function wasn't called with + * O_CREAT and O_EXCL. */ + if( ( oflag & O_EXCL ) && ( oflag & O_CREAT ) ) + { + errno = EEXIST; + xMessageQueue = ( mqd_t ) -1; + } + else + { + /* Check if the mq has been unlinked and is pending removal. */ + if( ( ( QueueListElement_t * ) xMessageQueue )->xPendingUnlink == pdTRUE ) + { + /* Queue pending deletion. Don't allow it to be re-opened. */ + errno = EINVAL; + xMessageQueue = ( mqd_t ) -1; + } + else + { + /* Increase count of open file descriptors for queue. */ + ( ( QueueListElement_t * ) xMessageQueue )->xOpenDescriptors++; + } + } + } + /* Queue does not exist. */ + else + { + /* Only create the new queue if O_CREAT was specified. */ + if( oflag & O_CREAT ) + { + /* Copy attributes if provided. */ + if( attr != NULL ) + { + xQueueCreationAttr = *attr; + } + + /* Copy oflags. */ + xQueueCreationAttr.mq_flags = ( long ) oflag; + + /* Create the new message queue. */ + if( prvCreateNewMessageQueue( ( QueueListElement_t ** ) &xMessageQueue, + &xQueueCreationAttr, + name, + xNameLength ) == pdFALSE ) + { + errno = ENOSPC; + xMessageQueue = ( mqd_t ) -1; + } + } + else + { + errno = ENOENT; + xMessageQueue = ( mqd_t ) -1; + } + } + + /* Release the mutex protecting the queue list. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex ); + } + + return xMessageQueue; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +ssize_t mq_receive( mqd_t mqdes, + char * msg_ptr, + size_t msg_len, + unsigned int * msg_prio ) +{ + return mq_timedreceive( mqdes, msg_ptr, msg_len, msg_prio, NULL ); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int mq_send( mqd_t mqdes, + const char * msg_ptr, + size_t msg_len, + unsigned msg_prio ) +{ + return mq_timedsend( mqdes, msg_ptr, msg_len, msg_prio, NULL ); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +ssize_t mq_timedreceive( mqd_t mqdes, + char * msg_ptr, + size_t msg_len, + unsigned * msg_prio, + const struct timespec * abstime ) +{ + ssize_t xStatus = 0; + int iCalculateTimeoutReturn = 0; + TickType_t xTimeoutTicks = 0; + QueueListElement_t * pxMessageQueue = ( QueueListElement_t * ) mqdes; + QueueElement_t xReceiveData = { 0 }; + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) msg_prio; + + /* Lock the mutex that guards access to the queue list. This call will + * never fail because it blocks forever. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex, portMAX_DELAY ); + + /* Find the mq referenced by mqdes. */ + if( prvFindQueueInList( NULL, NULL, mqdes ) == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Queue not found; bad descriptor. */ + errno = EBADF; + xStatus = -1; + } + + /* Verify that msg_len is large enough. */ + if( xStatus == 0 ) + { + if( msg_len < ( size_t ) pxMessageQueue->xAttr.mq_msgsize ) + { + /* msg_len too small. */ + errno = EMSGSIZE; + xStatus = -1; + } + } + + if( xStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Convert abstime to a tick timeout. */ + iCalculateTimeoutReturn = prvCalculateTickTimeout( pxMessageQueue->xAttr.mq_flags, + abstime, + &xTimeoutTicks ); + + if( iCalculateTimeoutReturn != 0 ) + { + errno = iCalculateTimeoutReturn; + xStatus = -1; + } + } + + /* Release the mutex protecting the queue list. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex ); + + if( xStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Receive data from the FreeRTOS queue. */ + if( xQueueReceive( pxMessageQueue->xQueue, + &xReceiveData, + xTimeoutTicks ) == pdFALSE ) + { + /* If queue receive fails, set the appropriate errno. */ + if( pxMessageQueue->xAttr.mq_flags & O_NONBLOCK ) + { + /* Set errno to EAGAIN for nonblocking mq. */ + errno = EAGAIN; + } + else + { + /* Otherwise, set errno to ETIMEDOUT. */ + errno = ETIMEDOUT; + } + + xStatus = -1; + } + } + + if( xStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Get the length of data for return value. */ + xStatus = ( ssize_t ) xReceiveData.xDataSize; + + /* Copy received data into given buffer, then free it. */ + ( void ) memcpy( msg_ptr, xReceiveData.pcData, xReceiveData.xDataSize ); + vPortFree( xReceiveData.pcData ); + } + + return xStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int mq_timedsend( mqd_t mqdes, + const char * msg_ptr, + size_t msg_len, + unsigned int msg_prio, + const struct timespec * abstime ) +{ + int iStatus = 0, iCalculateTimeoutReturn = 0; + TickType_t xTimeoutTicks = 0; + QueueListElement_t * pxMessageQueue = ( QueueListElement_t * ) mqdes; + QueueElement_t xSendData = { 0 }; + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) msg_prio; + + /* Lock the mutex that guards access to the queue list. This call will + * never fail because it blocks forever. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex, portMAX_DELAY ); + + /* Find the mq referenced by mqdes. */ + if( prvFindQueueInList( NULL, NULL, mqdes ) == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Queue not found; bad descriptor. */ + errno = EBADF; + iStatus = -1; + } + + /* Verify that mq_msgsize is large enough. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + if( msg_len > ( size_t ) pxMessageQueue->xAttr.mq_msgsize ) + { + /* msg_len too large. */ + errno = EMSGSIZE; + iStatus = -1; + } + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Convert abstime to a tick timeout. */ + iCalculateTimeoutReturn = prvCalculateTickTimeout( pxMessageQueue->xAttr.mq_flags, + abstime, + &xTimeoutTicks ); + + if( iCalculateTimeoutReturn != 0 ) + { + errno = iCalculateTimeoutReturn; + iStatus = -1; + } + } + + /* Release the mutex protecting the queue list. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex ); + + /* Allocate memory for the message. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + xSendData.xDataSize = msg_len; + xSendData.pcData = pvPortMalloc( msg_len ); + + /* Check that memory allocation succeeded. */ + if( xSendData.pcData == NULL ) + { + /* msg_len too large. */ + errno = EMSGSIZE; + iStatus = -1; + } + else + { + /* Copy the data to send. */ + ( void ) memcpy( xSendData.pcData, msg_ptr, msg_len ); + } + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Send data to the FreeRTOS queue. */ + if( xQueueSend( pxMessageQueue->xQueue, + &xSendData, + xTimeoutTicks ) == pdFALSE ) + { + /* If queue send fails, set the appropriate errno. */ + if( pxMessageQueue->xAttr.mq_flags & O_NONBLOCK ) + { + /* Set errno to EAGAIN for nonblocking mq. */ + errno = EAGAIN; + } + else + { + /* Otherwise, set errno to ETIMEDOUT. */ + errno = ETIMEDOUT; + } + + /* Free the allocated queue data. */ + vPortFree( xSendData.pcData ); + + iStatus = -1; + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int mq_unlink( const char * name ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + size_t xNameSize = 0; + BaseType_t xQueueRemoved = pdFALSE; + QueueListElement_t * pxMessageQueue = NULL; + + /* Initialize the queue list, if needed. */ + prvInitializeQueueList(); + + /* Check queue name. */ + if( prvValidateQueueName( name, &xNameSize ) == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Error with mq name. */ + errno = EINVAL; + iStatus = -1; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Lock the mutex that guards access to the queue list. This call will + * never fail because it blocks forever. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex, portMAX_DELAY ); + + /* Check if the named queue exists. */ + if( prvFindQueueInList( &pxMessageQueue, name, ( mqd_t ) NULL ) == pdTRUE ) + { + /* If the queue exists and there are no open descriptors to it, + * remove it from the list. */ + if( pxMessageQueue->xOpenDescriptors == 0 ) + { + listREMOVE( &pxMessageQueue->xLink ); + + /* Set the flag to delete the queue. Deleting the queue is deferred + * until xQueueListMutex is released. */ + xQueueRemoved = pdTRUE; + } + else + { + /* If the queue has open descriptors, set the pending unlink flag + * so that mq_close will free its resources. */ + pxMessageQueue->xPendingUnlink = pdTRUE; + } + } + else + { + /* The named message queue doesn't exist. */ + errno = ENOENT; + iStatus = -1; + } + + /* Release the mutex protecting the queue list. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &xQueueListMutex ); + } + + /* Delete all resources used by the queue if needed. */ + if( xQueueRemoved == pdTRUE ) + { + prvDeleteMessageQueue( pxMessageQueue ); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..49d15a2c --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread.c @@ -0,0 +1,578 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread.c + * @brief Implementation of thread functions in pthread.h + */ + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/pthread.h" + +/** + * @brief Thread attribute object. + */ +typedef struct pthread_attr_internal +{ + uint16_t usStackSize; /**< Stack size. */ + uint16_t usSchedPriorityDetachState; /**< Schedule priority 15 bits (LSB) Detach state: 1 bits (MSB) */ +} pthread_attr_internal_t; + +#define pthreadDETACH_STATE_MASK 0x8000 +#define pthreadSCHED_PRIORITY_MASK 0x7FFF +#define pthreadDETACH_STATE_SHIFT 15 +#define pthreadGET_SCHED_PRIORITY( var ) ( ( var ) & ( pthreadSCHED_PRIORITY_MASK ) ) +#define pthreadIS_JOINABLE( var ) ( ( ( var ) & ( pthreadDETACH_STATE_MASK ) ) == pthreadDETACH_STATE_MASK ) + +/** + * @brief Thread object. + */ +typedef struct pthread_internal +{ + pthread_attr_internal_t xAttr; /**< Thread attributes. */ + void * ( *pvStartRoutine )( void * ); /**< Application thread function. */ + void * xTaskArg; /**< Arguments for application thread function. */ + TaskHandle_t xTaskHandle; /**< FreeRTOS task handle. */ + StaticSemaphore_t xJoinBarrier; /**< Synchronizes the two callers of pthread_join. */ + StaticSemaphore_t xJoinMutex; /**< Ensures that only one other thread may join this thread. */ + void * xReturn; /**< Return value of pvStartRoutine. */ +} pthread_internal_t; + +/** + * @brief Terminates the calling thread. + * + * For joinable threads, this function waits for pthread_join. Otherwise, + * it deletes the thread and frees up resources used by the thread. + * + * @return This function does not return. + */ +static void prvExitThread( void ); + +/** + * @brief Wrapper function for the user's thread routine. + * + * This function is executed as a FreeRTOS task function. + * @param[in] pxArg A pointer to a pthread_internal_t. + * + * @return nothing + */ +static void prvRunThread( void * pxArg ); + +/** + * @brief Default pthread_attr_t. + */ +static const pthread_attr_internal_t xDefaultThreadAttributes = +{ + .usStackSize = PTHREAD_STACK_MIN, + .usSchedPriorityDetachState = ( ( uint16_t ) tskIDLE_PRIORITY & pthreadSCHED_PRIORITY_MASK ) | ( PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE << pthreadDETACH_STATE_SHIFT ), +}; + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static void prvExitThread( void ) +{ + pthread_internal_t * pxThread = ( pthread_internal_t * ) pthread_self(); + + /* If this thread is joinable, wait for a call to pthread_join. */ + if( pthreadIS_JOINABLE( pxThread->xAttr.usSchedPriorityDetachState ) ) + { + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinBarrier ); + + /* Suspend until the call to pthread_join. The caller of pthread_join + * will perform cleanup. */ + vTaskSuspend( NULL ); + } + else + { + /* For a detached thread, perform cleanup of thread object. */ + vPortFree( pxThread ); + vTaskDelete( NULL ); + } +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static void prvRunThread( void * pxArg ) +{ + pthread_internal_t * pxThread = ( pthread_internal_t * ) pxArg; + + /* Run the thread routine. */ + pxThread->xReturn = pxThread->pvStartRoutine( ( void * ) pxThread->xTaskArg ); + + /* Exit once finished. This function does not return. */ + prvExitThread(); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_attr_destroy( pthread_attr_t * attr ) +{ + ( void ) attr; + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_attr_getdetachstate( const pthread_attr_t * attr, + int * detachstate ) +{ + pthread_attr_internal_t * pxAttr = ( pthread_attr_internal_t * ) ( attr ); + + if( pthreadIS_JOINABLE( pxAttr->usSchedPriorityDetachState ) ) + { + *detachstate = PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE; + } + else + { + *detachstate = PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED; + } + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_attr_getschedparam( const pthread_attr_t * attr, + struct sched_param * param ) +{ + pthread_attr_internal_t * pxAttr = ( pthread_attr_internal_t * ) ( attr ); + + param->sched_priority = ( int ) ( pthreadGET_SCHED_PRIORITY( pxAttr->usSchedPriorityDetachState ) ); + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_attr_getstacksize( const pthread_attr_t * attr, + size_t * stacksize ) +{ + pthread_attr_internal_t * pxAttr = ( pthread_attr_internal_t * ) ( attr ); + + *stacksize = ( size_t ) pxAttr->usStackSize; + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_attr_init( pthread_attr_t * attr ) +{ + /* Copy the default values into the new thread attributes object. */ + *( ( pthread_attr_internal_t * ) ( attr ) ) = xDefaultThreadAttributes; + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_attr_setdetachstate( pthread_attr_t * attr, + int detachstate ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_attr_internal_t * pxAttr = ( pthread_attr_internal_t * ) ( attr ); + + if( ( detachstate != PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED ) && ( detachstate != PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE ) ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else + { + /* clear and then set msb bit to detachstate) */ + pxAttr->usSchedPriorityDetachState &= ~pthreadDETACH_STATE_MASK; + pxAttr->usSchedPriorityDetachState |= ( ( uint16_t ) detachstate << pthreadDETACH_STATE_SHIFT ); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_attr_setschedparam( pthread_attr_t * attr, + const struct sched_param * param ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_attr_internal_t * pxAttr = ( pthread_attr_internal_t * ) ( attr ); + + /* Check for NULL param. */ + if( param == NULL ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure that param.sched_priority is valid. */ + if( ( iStatus == 0 ) && + ( ( param->sched_priority > sched_get_priority_max( SCHED_OTHER ) ) || + ( param->sched_priority < 0 ) ) ) + { + iStatus = ENOTSUP; + } + + /* Set the sched_param. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* clear and then set 15 LSB to schedule priority) */ + pxAttr->usSchedPriorityDetachState &= ~pthreadSCHED_PRIORITY_MASK; + pxAttr->usSchedPriorityDetachState |= ( ( uint16_t ) param->sched_priority ); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_attr_setschedpolicy( pthread_attr_t * attr, + int policy ) +{ + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) attr; + ( void ) policy; + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_attr_setstacksize( pthread_attr_t * attr, + size_t stacksize ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_attr_internal_t * pxAttr = ( pthread_attr_internal_t * ) ( attr ); + + if( stacksize < PTHREAD_STACK_MIN ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else + { + pxAttr->usStackSize = ( uint16_t ) stacksize; + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_create( pthread_t * thread, + const pthread_attr_t * attr, + void *( *startroutine )( void * ), + void * arg ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_internal_t * pxThread = NULL; + struct sched_param xSchedParam = { .sched_priority = tskIDLE_PRIORITY }; + + /* Allocate memory for new thread object. */ + pxThread = ( pthread_internal_t * ) pvPortMalloc( sizeof( pthread_internal_t ) ); + + if( pxThread == NULL ) + { + /* No memory. */ + iStatus = EAGAIN; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* No attributes given, use default attributes. */ + if( attr == NULL ) + { + pxThread->xAttr = xDefaultThreadAttributes; + } + /* Otherwise, use provided attributes. */ + else + { + pxThread->xAttr = *( ( pthread_attr_internal_t * ) ( attr ) ); + } + + /* Get priority from attributes */ + xSchedParam.sched_priority = ( int ) pthreadGET_SCHED_PRIORITY( pxThread->xAttr.usSchedPriorityDetachState ); + + /* Set argument and start routine. */ + pxThread->xTaskArg = arg; + pxThread->pvStartRoutine = startroutine; + + /* If this thread is joinable, create the synchronization mechanisms for + * pthread_join. */ + + if( pthreadIS_JOINABLE( pxThread->xAttr.usSchedPriorityDetachState ) ) + { + /* These calls will not fail when their arguments aren't NULL. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateMutexStatic( &pxThread->xJoinMutex ); + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateBinaryStatic( &pxThread->xJoinBarrier ); + } + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Suspend all tasks to create a critical section. This ensures that + * the new thread doesn't exit before a tag is assigned. */ + vTaskSuspendAll(); + + /* Create the FreeRTOS task that will run the pthread. */ + if( xTaskCreate( prvRunThread, + posixconfigPTHREAD_TASK_NAME, + ( uint16_t ) ( pxThread->xAttr.usStackSize / sizeof( StackType_t ) ), + ( void * ) pxThread, + xSchedParam.sched_priority, + &pxThread->xTaskHandle ) != pdPASS ) + { + /* Task creation failed, no memory. */ + vPortFree( pxThread ); + iStatus = EAGAIN; + } + else + { + /* Store the pointer to the thread object in the task tag. */ + vTaskSetApplicationTaskTag( pxThread->xTaskHandle, ( TaskHookFunction_t ) pxThread ); + + /* Set the thread object for the user. */ + *thread = ( pthread_t ) pxThread; + } + + /* End the critical section. */ + xTaskResumeAll(); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_getschedparam( pthread_t thread, + int * policy, + struct sched_param * param ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_internal_t * pxThread = ( pthread_internal_t * ) thread; + + *policy = SCHED_OTHER; + param->sched_priority = ( int ) pthreadGET_SCHED_PRIORITY( pxThread->xAttr.usSchedPriorityDetachState ); + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_equal( pthread_t t1, + pthread_t t2 ) +{ + return t1 == t2; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +void pthread_exit( void * value_ptr ) +{ + pthread_internal_t * pxThread = ( pthread_internal_t * ) pthread_self(); + + /* Set the return value. */ + pxThread->xReturn = value_ptr; + + /* Exit this thread. */ + prvExitThread(); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_join( pthread_t pthread, + void ** retval ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_internal_t * pxThread = ( pthread_internal_t * ) pthread; + + /* Make sure pthread is joinable. Otherwise, this function would block + * forever waiting for an unjoinable thread. */ + if( !pthreadIS_JOINABLE( pxThread->xAttr.usSchedPriorityDetachState ) ) + { + iStatus = EDEADLK; + } + + /* Only one thread may attempt to join another. Lock the join mutex + * to prevent other threads from calling pthread_join on the same thread. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + if( xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinMutex, 0 ) != pdPASS ) + { + /* Another thread has already joined the requested thread, which would + * cause this thread to wait forever. */ + iStatus = EDEADLK; + } + } + + /* Attempting to join the calling thread would cause a deadlock. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + if( pthread_equal( pthread_self(), pthread ) != 0 ) + { + iStatus = EDEADLK; + } + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Wait for the joining thread to finish. Because this call waits forever, + * it should never fail. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinBarrier, portMAX_DELAY ); + + /* Create a critical section to clean up the joined thread. */ + vTaskSuspendAll(); + + /* Release xJoinBarrier and delete it. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinBarrier ); + vSemaphoreDelete( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinBarrier ); + + /* Release xJoinMutex and delete it. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinMutex ); + vSemaphoreDelete( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinMutex ); + + /* Delete the FreeRTOS task that ran the thread. */ + vTaskDelete( pxThread->xTaskHandle ); + + /* Set the return value. */ + if( retval != NULL ) + { + *retval = pxThread->xReturn; + } + + /* Free the thread object. */ + vPortFree( pxThread ); + + /* End the critical section. */ + xTaskResumeAll(); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_detach(pthread_t pthread) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_internal_t * pxThread = ( pthread_internal_t * ) pthread; + eTaskState pThreadState; + + /* Make sure pthread is joinable. */ + if( !pthreadIS_JOINABLE( pxThread->xAttr.usSchedPriorityDetachState ) ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + if ( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Create a critical section to verify that pthread is joinable. */ + vTaskSuspendAll(); + + pThreadState = eTaskGetState(pxThread->xTaskHandle); + + /* Thread has been deleted or is invalid. */ + if ( (pThreadState == eDeleted) || (pThreadState == eInvalid) ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else + { + /* Release xJoinBarrier and delete it. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinBarrier ); + vSemaphoreDelete( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinBarrier ); + + /* Release xJoinMutex and delete it. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinMutex ); + vSemaphoreDelete( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxThread->xJoinMutex ); + + /* Thread has been finished */ + if ( pThreadState == eSuspended ) + { + /* Delete the FreeRTOS task that ran the thread. */ + vTaskDelete( pxThread->xTaskHandle ); + + /* Free the thread object. */ + vPortFree( pxThread ); + } + else + { + /* Thread is in the running or ready state. */ + pthread_attr_setdetachstate( (pthread_attr_t *) &pxThread->xAttr, PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED ); + } + } + + /* End the critical section. */ + xTaskResumeAll(); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ +int pthread_cancel( pthread_t pthread ) +{ + (void)pthread; + + errno = ENOSYS; + return ENOSYS; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +pthread_t pthread_self( void ) +{ + /* Return a reference to this pthread object, which is stored in the + * FreeRTOS task tag. */ + return ( pthread_t ) xTaskGetApplicationTaskTag( NULL ); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_setschedparam( pthread_t thread, + int policy, + const struct sched_param * param ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + + pthread_internal_t * pxThread = ( pthread_internal_t * ) thread; + + /* Silence compiler warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) policy; + + /* Copy the given sched_param. */ + iStatus = pthread_attr_setschedparam( ( pthread_attr_t * ) &pxThread->xAttr, param ); + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Change the priority of the FreeRTOS task. */ + vTaskPrioritySet( pxThread->xTaskHandle, param->sched_priority ); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_barrier.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_barrier.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..2efecda7 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_barrier.c @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_barrier.c + * @brief Implementation of barrier functions in pthread.h + */ + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/pthread.h" + +#include "atomic_rtos.h" + +/* + * @brief barrier max count + * + * Barriers are implemented on FreeRTOS event groups, of which 8 bits are usable + * when configUSE_16_BIT_TICKS is 1. Otherwise, 24 bits are usable. + */ +/**@{ */ +#if ( configUSE_16_BIT_TICKS == 1 ) + #define posixPTHREAD_BARRIER_MAX_COUNT ( 8 ) +#else + #define posixPTHREAD_BARRIER_MAX_COUNT ( 24 ) +#endif +/**@} */ + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_barrier_destroy( pthread_barrier_t * barrier ) +{ + pthread_barrier_internal_t * pxBarrier = ( pthread_barrier_internal_t * ) ( barrier ); + + /* Free all resources used by the barrier. */ + ( void ) vEventGroupDelete( ( EventGroupHandle_t ) &pxBarrier->xBarrierEventGroup ); + ( void ) vSemaphoreDelete( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxBarrier->xThreadCountSemaphore ); + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_barrier_init( pthread_barrier_t * barrier, + const pthread_barrierattr_t * attr, + unsigned count ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_barrier_internal_t * pxNewBarrier = ( pthread_barrier_internal_t * ) ( barrier ); + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) attr; + + /* Ensure count is greater than 0. */ + if( count == 0 ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure that count will fit in a FreeRTOS event group. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + if( count > posixPTHREAD_BARRIER_MAX_COUNT ) + { + /* No memory exists in the event group for more than + * posixPTHREAD_BARRIER_MAX_COUNT threads. */ + iStatus = ENOMEM; + } + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Set the current thread count and threshold. */ + pxNewBarrier->uThreadCount = 0; + pxNewBarrier->uThreshold = count; + + /* Create the FreeRTOS event group. This call will not fail when its + * argument isn't NULL. */ + ( void ) xEventGroupCreateStatic( &pxNewBarrier->xBarrierEventGroup ); + + /* Create the semaphore that prevents more than count threads from being + * unblocked by a single successful pthread_barrier_wait. This semaphore + * counts down from count and cannot decrement below 0. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateCountingStatic( ( UBaseType_t ) count, /* Max count. */ + ( UBaseType_t ) count, /* Initial count. */ + &pxNewBarrier->xThreadCountSemaphore ); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_barrier_wait( pthread_barrier_t * barrier ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + unsigned i = 0; /* Loop iterator. */ + pthread_barrier_internal_t * pxBarrier = ( pthread_barrier_internal_t * ) ( barrier ); + unsigned uThreadNumber = 0; + + /* Decrement the number of threads waiting on this barrier. This will prevent more + * than pxBarrier->uThreshold threads from being unblocked by a single successful + * pthread_barrier_wait call. + * + * This call will never fail because it blocks forever. + */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxBarrier->xThreadCountSemaphore, portMAX_DELAY ); + + uThreadNumber = Atomic_Increment_u32( ( uint32_t * ) &pxBarrier->uThreadCount ); + + /* Set the bit in the event group representing this thread, then wait for the other + * threads to set their bit. This call should wait forever until all threads have set + * their bit, so the return value is ignored. */ + ( void ) xEventGroupSync( ( EventGroupHandle_t ) &pxBarrier->xBarrierEventGroup, + 1 << uThreadNumber, /* Which bit in the event group to set. */ + ( 1 << pxBarrier->uThreshold ) - 1, /* Wait for all threads to set their bits. */ + portMAX_DELAY ); + + /* The first thread to enter the barrier gets PTHREAD_BARRIER_SERIAL_THREAD as its + * return value and resets xThreadCountSemaphore. */ + + if( uThreadNumber == 0 ) + { + iStatus = PTHREAD_BARRIER_SERIAL_THREAD; + + /* uThreadCount can be safely changed without locking xThreadCountMutex + * because xThreadCountSemaphore is currently 0. */ + pxBarrier->uThreadCount = 0; + + /* Reset xThreadCountSemaphore. This allows more threads to enter the + * barrier, starting a new cycle. */ + for( i = 0; i < pxBarrier->uThreshold; i++ ) + { + xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxBarrier->xThreadCountSemaphore ); + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_cond.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_cond.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..885b4ae0 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_cond.c @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_cond.c + * @brief Implementation of condition variable functions in pthread.h + */ + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/pthread.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h" + +#include "atomic_rtos.h" + +/** + * @brief Initialize a PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER cond. + * + * PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER sets a flag for a cond to be initialized later. + * This function performs the initialization. + * @param[in] pxCond The cond to initialize. + * + * @return nothing + */ +static void prvInitializeStaticCond( pthread_cond_internal_t * pxCond ); + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static void prvInitializeStaticCond( pthread_cond_internal_t * pxCond ) +{ + /* Check if the condition variable needs to be initialized. */ + if( pxCond->xIsInitialized == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Cond initialization must be in a critical section to prevent two threads + * from initializing it at the same time. */ + taskENTER_CRITICAL(); + + /* Check again that the cond is still uninitialized, i.e. it wasn't + * initialized while this function was waiting to enter the critical + * section. */ + if( pxCond->xIsInitialized == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Set the members of the cond. The semaphore create calls will never fail + * when their arguments aren't NULL. */ + pxCond->xIsInitialized = pdTRUE; + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateCountingStatic( INT_MAX, 0U, &pxCond->xCondWaitSemaphore ); + pxCond->iWaitingThreads = 0; + } + + /* Exit the critical section. */ + taskEXIT_CRITICAL(); + } +} + +/** + * @brief Check "atomically" if iLocalWaitingThreads == pxCond->iWaitingThreads and decrement. + */ +static void prvTestAndDecrement( pthread_cond_t * pxCond, + unsigned iLocalWaitingThreads ) +{ + /* Test local copy of threads waiting is larger than zero. */ + while( iLocalWaitingThreads > 0 ) + { + /* Test-and-set. Atomically check whether the copy in memory has changed. + * And, if not decrease the copy of threads waiting in memory. */ + if( ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS == Atomic_CompareAndSwap_u32( ( uint32_t * ) &pxCond->iWaitingThreads, ( uint32_t ) iLocalWaitingThreads - 1, ( uint32_t ) iLocalWaitingThreads ) ) + { + /* Signal one succeeded. Break. */ + break; + } + + /* Local copy may be out dated. Reload, and retry. */ + iLocalWaitingThreads = pxCond->iWaitingThreads; + } +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_cond_broadcast( pthread_cond_t * cond ) +{ + unsigned i = 0; + pthread_cond_internal_t * pxCond = ( pthread_cond_internal_t * ) ( cond ); + + /* If the cond is uninitialized, perform initialization. */ + prvInitializeStaticCond( pxCond ); + + /* Local copy of number of threads waiting. */ + unsigned iLocalWaitingThreads = pxCond->iWaitingThreads; + + /* Test local copy of threads waiting is larger than zero. */ + while( iLocalWaitingThreads > 0 ) + { + /* Test-and-set. Atomically check whether the copy in memory has changed. + * And, if not set the copy of threads waiting in memory to zero. */ + if( ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS == Atomic_CompareAndSwap_u32( ( uint32_t * ) &pxCond->iWaitingThreads, 0, ( uint32_t ) iLocalWaitingThreads ) ) + { + /* Unblock all. */ + for( i = 0; i < iLocalWaitingThreads; i++ ) + { + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxCond->xCondWaitSemaphore ); + } + + break; + } + + /* Local copy is out dated. Reload, and retry. */ + iLocalWaitingThreads = pxCond->iWaitingThreads; + } + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_cond_destroy( pthread_cond_t * cond ) +{ + pthread_cond_internal_t * pxCond = ( pthread_cond_internal_t * ) ( cond ); + + /* Free all resources in use by the cond. */ + vSemaphoreDelete( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxCond->xCondWaitSemaphore ); + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_cond_init( pthread_cond_t * cond, + const pthread_condattr_t * attr ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_cond_internal_t * pxCond = ( pthread_cond_internal_t * ) cond; + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) attr; + + if( pxCond == NULL ) + { + iStatus = ENOMEM; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Set the members of the cond. The semaphore create calls will never fail + * when their arguments aren't NULL. */ + pxCond->xIsInitialized = pdTRUE; + + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateCountingStatic( INT_MAX, 0U, &pxCond->xCondWaitSemaphore ); + pxCond->iWaitingThreads = 0; + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_cond_signal( pthread_cond_t * cond ) +{ + pthread_cond_internal_t * pxCond = ( pthread_cond_internal_t * ) ( cond ); + + /* If the cond is uninitialized, perform initialization. */ + prvInitializeStaticCond( pxCond ); + + /* Local copy of number of threads waiting. */ + unsigned iLocalWaitingThreads = pxCond->iWaitingThreads; + + /* Test local copy of threads waiting is larger than zero. */ + while( iLocalWaitingThreads > 0 ) + { + /* Test-and-set. Atomically check whether the copy in memory has changed. + * And, if not decrease the copy of threads waiting in memory. */ + if( ATOMIC_COMPARE_AND_SWAP_SUCCESS == Atomic_CompareAndSwap_u32( ( uint32_t * ) &pxCond->iWaitingThreads, ( uint32_t ) iLocalWaitingThreads - 1, ( uint32_t ) iLocalWaitingThreads ) ) + { + /* Unblock one. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxCond->xCondWaitSemaphore ); + + /* Signal one succeeded. Break. */ + break; + } + + /* Local copy may be out dated. Reload, and retry. */ + iLocalWaitingThreads = pxCond->iWaitingThreads; + } + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_cond_timedwait( pthread_cond_t * cond, + pthread_mutex_t * mutex, + const struct timespec * abstime ) +{ + unsigned iLocalWaitingThreads; + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_cond_internal_t * pxCond = ( pthread_cond_internal_t * ) ( cond ); + TickType_t xDelay = portMAX_DELAY; + + /* If the cond is uninitialized, perform initialization. */ + prvInitializeStaticCond( pxCond ); + + /* Convert abstime to a delay in TickType_t if provided. */ + if( abstime != NULL ) + { + struct timespec xCurrentTime = { 0 }; + + /* Get current time */ + if( clock_gettime( CLOCK_REALTIME, &xCurrentTime ) != 0 ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else + { + iStatus = UTILS_AbsoluteTimespecToDeltaTicks( abstime, &xCurrentTime, &xDelay ); + } + } + + /* Increase the counter of threads blocking on condition variable, then + * unlock mutex. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Atomically increments thread waiting by 1, and + * stores number of threads waiting before increment. */ + iLocalWaitingThreads = Atomic_Increment_u32( ( uint32_t * ) &pxCond->iWaitingThreads ); + + iStatus = pthread_mutex_unlock( mutex ); + } + + /* Wait on the condition variable. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + if( xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxCond->xCondWaitSemaphore, + xDelay ) == pdPASS ) + { + /* When successful, relock mutex. */ + iStatus = pthread_mutex_lock( mutex ); + } + else + { + /* Timeout. Relock mutex and decrement number of waiting threads. */ + iStatus = ETIMEDOUT; + ( void ) pthread_mutex_lock( mutex ); + + /* Atomically decrements thread waiting by 1. + * If iLocalWaitingThreads is updated by other thread(s) in between, + * this implementation guarantees to decrement by 1 based on the + * value currently in pxCond->iWaitingThreads. */ + prvTestAndDecrement( pxCond, iLocalWaitingThreads + 1 ); + } + } + else + { + /* Atomically decrements thread waiting by 1. + * If iLocalWaitingThreads is updated by other thread(s) in between, + * this implementation guarantees to decrement by 1 based on the + * value currently in pxCond->iWaitingThreads. */ + prvTestAndDecrement( pxCond, iLocalWaitingThreads + 1 ); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_cond_wait( pthread_cond_t * cond, + pthread_mutex_t * mutex ) +{ + return pthread_cond_timedwait( cond, mutex, NULL ); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_mutex.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_mutex.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..0ea3aeb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_mutex.c @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_pthread_mutex.c + * @brief Implementation of mutex functions in pthread.h + */ + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/pthread.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h" + +/** + * @brief Initialize a PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER mutex. + * + * PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER sets a flag for a mutex to be initialized later. + * This function performs the initialization. + * @param[in] pxMutex The mutex to initialize. + * + * @return nothing + */ +static void prvInitializeStaticMutex( pthread_mutex_internal_t * pxMutex ); + +/** + * @brief Default pthread_mutexattr_t. + */ +static const pthread_mutexattr_internal_t xDefaultMutexAttributes = +{ + .iType = PTHREAD_MUTEX_DEFAULT, +}; + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static void prvInitializeStaticMutex( pthread_mutex_internal_t * pxMutex ) +{ + /* Check if the mutex needs to be initialized. */ + if( pxMutex->xIsInitialized == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Mutex initialization must be in a critical section to prevent two threads + * from initializing it at the same time. */ + taskENTER_CRITICAL(); + + /* Check again that the mutex is still uninitialized, i.e. it wasn't + * initialized while this function was waiting to enter the critical + * section. */ + if( pxMutex->xIsInitialized == pdFALSE ) + { + /* Set the mutex as the default type. */ + pxMutex->xAttr.iType = PTHREAD_MUTEX_DEFAULT; + + /* Call the correct FreeRTOS mutex initialization function based on + * the mutex type. */ + #if PTHREAD_MUTEX_DEFAULT == PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateRecursiveMutexStatic( &pxMutex->xMutex ); + #else + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateMutexStatic( &pxMutex->xMutex ); + #endif + + pxMutex->xIsInitialized = pdTRUE; + } + + /* Exit the critical section. */ + taskEXIT_CRITICAL(); + } +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutex_destroy( pthread_mutex_t * mutex ) +{ + pthread_mutex_internal_t * pxMutex = ( pthread_mutex_internal_t * ) ( mutex ); + + /* Free resources in use by the mutex. */ + if( pxMutex->xTaskOwner == NULL ) + { + vSemaphoreDelete( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxMutex->xMutex ); + } + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutex_init( pthread_mutex_t * mutex, + const pthread_mutexattr_t * attr ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_mutex_internal_t * pxMutex = ( pthread_mutex_internal_t * ) mutex; + + if( pxMutex == NULL ) + { + /* No memory. */ + iStatus = ENOMEM; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + *pxMutex = FREERTOS_POSIX_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; + + /* No attributes given, use default attributes. */ + if( attr == NULL ) + { + pxMutex->xAttr = xDefaultMutexAttributes; + } + /* Otherwise, use provided attributes. */ + else + { + pxMutex->xAttr = *( ( pthread_mutexattr_internal_t * ) ( attr ) ); + } + + /* Call the correct FreeRTOS mutex creation function based on mutex type. */ + if( pxMutex->xAttr.iType == PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE ) + { + /* Recursive mutex. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateRecursiveMutexStatic( &pxMutex->xMutex ); + } + else + { + /* All other mutex types. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateMutexStatic( &pxMutex->xMutex ); + } + + /* Ensure that the FreeRTOS mutex was successfully created. */ + if( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxMutex->xMutex == NULL ) + { + /* Failed to create mutex. Set error EAGAIN and free mutex object. */ + iStatus = EAGAIN; + vPortFree( pxMutex ); + } + else + { + /* Mutex successfully created. */ + pxMutex->xIsInitialized = pdTRUE; + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutex_lock( pthread_mutex_t * mutex ) +{ + return pthread_mutex_timedlock( mutex, NULL ); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutex_timedlock( pthread_mutex_t * mutex, + const struct timespec * abstime ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_mutex_internal_t * pxMutex = ( pthread_mutex_internal_t * ) ( mutex ); + TickType_t xDelay = portMAX_DELAY; + BaseType_t xFreeRTOSMutexTakeStatus = pdFALSE; + + /* If mutex in uninitialized, perform initialization. */ + prvInitializeStaticMutex( pxMutex ); + + /* At this point, the mutex should be initialized. */ + configASSERT( pxMutex->xIsInitialized == pdTRUE ); + + /* Convert abstime to a delay in TickType_t if provided. */ + if( abstime != NULL ) + { + struct timespec xCurrentTime = { 0 }; + + /* Get current time */ + if( clock_gettime( CLOCK_REALTIME, &xCurrentTime ) != 0 ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else + { + iStatus = UTILS_AbsoluteTimespecToDeltaTicks( abstime, &xCurrentTime, &xDelay ); + } + + /* If abstime was in the past, still attempt to lock the mutex without + * blocking, per POSIX spec. */ + if( iStatus == ETIMEDOUT ) + { + xDelay = 0; + iStatus = 0; + } + } + + /* Check if trying to lock a currently owned mutex. */ + if( ( iStatus == 0 ) && + ( pxMutex->xAttr.iType == PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK ) && /* Only PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK type detects deadlock. */ + ( pxMutex->xTaskOwner == xTaskGetCurrentTaskHandle() ) ) /* Check if locking a currently owned mutex. */ + { + iStatus = EDEADLK; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Call the correct FreeRTOS mutex take function based on mutex type. */ + if( pxMutex->xAttr.iType == PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE ) + { + xFreeRTOSMutexTakeStatus = xSemaphoreTakeRecursive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxMutex->xMutex, xDelay ); + } + else + { + xFreeRTOSMutexTakeStatus = xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxMutex->xMutex, xDelay ); + } + + /* If the mutex was successfully taken, set its owner. */ + if( xFreeRTOSMutexTakeStatus == pdPASS ) + { + pxMutex->xTaskOwner = xTaskGetCurrentTaskHandle(); + } + /* Otherwise, the mutex take timed out. */ + else + { + iStatus = ETIMEDOUT; + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutex_trylock( pthread_mutex_t * mutex ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + struct timespec xTimeout = + { + .tv_sec = 0, + .tv_nsec = 0 + }; + + /* Attempt to lock with no timeout. */ + iStatus = pthread_mutex_timedlock( mutex, &xTimeout ); + + /* POSIX specifies that this function should return EBUSY instead of + * ETIMEDOUT for attempting to lock a locked mutex. */ + if( iStatus == ETIMEDOUT ) + { + iStatus = EBUSY; + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutex_unlock( pthread_mutex_t * mutex ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_mutex_internal_t * pxMutex = ( pthread_mutex_internal_t * ) ( mutex ); + + /* If mutex in uninitialized, perform initialization. */ + prvInitializeStaticMutex( pxMutex ); + + /* Check if trying to unlock an unowned mutex. */ + if( ( ( pxMutex->xAttr.iType == PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK ) || + ( pxMutex->xAttr.iType == PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE ) ) && + ( pxMutex->xTaskOwner != xTaskGetCurrentTaskHandle() ) ) + { + iStatus = EPERM; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Suspend the scheduler so that + * mutex is unlocked AND owner is updated atomically */ + vTaskSuspendAll(); + + /* Call the correct FreeRTOS mutex unlock function based on mutex type. */ + if( pxMutex->xAttr.iType == PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE ) + { + ( void ) xSemaphoreGiveRecursive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxMutex->xMutex ); + } + else + { + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxMutex->xMutex ); + } + + /* Update the owner of the mutex. A recursive mutex may still have an + * owner, so it should be updated with xSemaphoreGetMutexHolder. */ + pxMutex->xTaskOwner = xSemaphoreGetMutexHolder( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxMutex->xMutex ); + + /* Resume the scheduler */ + ( void ) xTaskResumeAll(); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutexattr_destroy( pthread_mutexattr_t * attr ) +{ + ( void ) attr; + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutexattr_gettype( const pthread_mutexattr_t * attr, + int * type ) +{ + pthread_mutexattr_internal_t * pxAttr = ( pthread_mutexattr_internal_t * ) ( attr ); + + *type = pxAttr->iType; + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutexattr_init( pthread_mutexattr_t * attr ) +{ + *( ( pthread_mutexattr_internal_t * ) ( attr ) ) = xDefaultMutexAttributes; + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int pthread_mutexattr_settype( pthread_mutexattr_t * attr, + int type ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + pthread_mutexattr_internal_t * pxAttr = ( pthread_mutexattr_internal_t * ) ( attr ); + + switch( type ) + { + case PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL: + case PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE: + case PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK: + pxAttr->iType = type; + break; + + default: + iStatus = EINVAL; + break; + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_sched.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_sched.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..7916a99e --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_sched.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_sched.c + * @brief Implementation of scheduler functions in sched.h + */ + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/sched.h" + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sched_get_priority_max( int policy ) +{ + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) policy; + + return configMAX_PRIORITIES - 1; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sched_get_priority_min( int policy ) +{ + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) policy; + + return tskIDLE_PRIORITY; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sched_yield( void ) +{ + taskYIELD(); + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_semaphore.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_semaphore.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..8a4c8788 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_semaphore.c @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_semaphore.c + * @brief Implementation of functions in semaphore.h + */ + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/semaphore.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h" + +#include "atomic_rtos.h" + + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sem_destroy( sem_t * sem ) +{ + sem_internal_t * pxSem = ( sem_internal_t * ) ( sem ); + + /* Free the resources in use by the semaphore. */ + vSemaphoreDelete( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxSem->xSemaphore ); + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sem_getvalue( sem_t * sem, + int * sval ) +{ + sem_internal_t * pxSem = ( sem_internal_t * ) ( sem ); + + /* Get value does not need atomic operation, since -- Open Group + * states "the updated value represents an actual semaphore value that + * occurred at some unspecified time during the call, but it need not be the + * actual value of the semaphore when it is returned to the calling process." + */ + *sval = pxSem->value; + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sem_init( sem_t * sem, + int pshared, + unsigned value ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + sem_internal_t * pxSem = ( sem_internal_t * ) ( sem ); + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) pshared; + + /* Check value parameter. */ + if( value > SEM_VALUE_MAX ) + { + errno = EINVAL; + iStatus = -1; + } + + /* value is guaranteed to not exceed INT32_MAX, which is the default value of SEM_VALUE_MAX (0x7FFFU). */ + pxSem->value = ( int ) value; + + /* Create the FreeRTOS semaphore. + * This is only used to queue threads when no semaphore is available. + * Initializing with semaphore initial count zero. + * This call will not fail because the memory for the semaphore has already been allocated. + */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + ( void ) xSemaphoreCreateCountingStatic( SEM_VALUE_MAX, 0, &pxSem->xSemaphore ); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sem_post( sem_t * sem ) +{ + sem_internal_t * pxSem = ( sem_internal_t * ) ( sem ); + + int iPreviouValue = Atomic_Increment_u32( ( uint32_t * ) &pxSem->value ); + + /* If previous semaphore value is equal or larger than zero, there is no + * thread waiting for this semaphore. Otherwise (<0), call FreeRTOS interface + * to wake up a thread. */ + if( iPreviouValue < 0 ) + { + /* Give the semaphore using the FreeRTOS API. */ + ( void ) xSemaphoreGive( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxSem->xSemaphore ); + } + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sem_timedwait( sem_t * sem, + const struct timespec * abstime ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + sem_internal_t * pxSem = ( sem_internal_t * ) ( sem ); + TickType_t xDelay = portMAX_DELAY; + int iPreviousValue = Atomic_Decrement_u32( ( uint32_t * ) &pxSem->value ); + + if( abstime != NULL ) + { + /* If the provided timespec is invalid, still attempt to take the + * semaphore without blocking, per POSIX spec. */ + if( UTILS_ValidateTimespec( abstime ) == false ) + { + xDelay = 0; + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else + { + struct timespec xCurrentTime = { 0 }; + + /* Get current time */ + if( clock_gettime( CLOCK_REALTIME, &xCurrentTime ) != 0 ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else + { + iStatus = UTILS_AbsoluteTimespecToDeltaTicks( abstime, &xCurrentTime, &xDelay ); + } + + /* If abstime was in the past, still attempt to take the semaphore without + * blocking, per POSIX spec. */ + if( iStatus == ETIMEDOUT ) + { + xDelay = 0; + } + } + } + + /* If previous semaphore value is larger than zero, the thread entering this function call + * can take the semaphore without yielding. Else (<=0), calling into FreeRTOS API to yield. + */ + if( iPreviousValue > 0 ) + { + /* Under no circumstance shall the function fail with a timeout if the semaphore can be locked immediately. */ + iStatus = 0; + } + else + { + /* Take the semaphore using the FreeRTOS API. */ + if( xSemaphoreTake( ( SemaphoreHandle_t ) &pxSem->xSemaphore, + xDelay ) != pdTRUE ) + { + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + errno = ETIMEDOUT; + } + else + { + errno = iStatus; + } + + iStatus = -1; + } + else + { + iStatus = 0; + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sem_trywait( sem_t * sem ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + + /* Setting an absolute timeout of 0 (i.e. in the past) will cause sem_timedwait + * to not block. */ + struct timespec xTimeout = { 0 }; + + iStatus = sem_timedwait( sem, &xTimeout ); + + /* POSIX specifies that this function should set errno to EAGAIN and not + * ETIMEDOUT. */ + if( ( iStatus == -1 ) && ( errno == ETIMEDOUT ) ) + { + errno = EAGAIN; + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int sem_wait( sem_t * sem ) +{ + return sem_timedwait( sem, NULL ); +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_timer.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_timer.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..9c5eebb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_timer.c @@ -0,0 +1,337 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_timer.c + * @brief Implementation of timer functions in time.h + */ + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/pthread.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/signal.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/time.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h" + +/* FreeRTOS timer include. */ +#include "timers.h" + +/* Timespec zero check macros. */ +#define TIMESPEC_IS_ZERO( xTimespec ) ( xTimespec.tv_sec == 0 && xTimespec.tv_nsec == 0 ) /**< Check for 0. */ +#define TIMESPEC_IS_NOT_ZERO( xTimespec ) ( !( TIMESPEC_IS_ZERO( xTimespec ) ) ) /**< Check for not 0. */ + +/** + * @brief Internal timer structure. + */ +typedef struct timer_internal +{ + StaticTimer_t xTimerBuffer; /**< Memory that holds the FreeRTOS timer. */ + struct sigevent xTimerEvent; /**< What to do when this timer expires. */ + TickType_t xTimerPeriod; /**< Period of this timer. */ +} timer_internal_t; + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +void prvTimerCallback( TimerHandle_t xTimerHandle ) +{ + timer_internal_t * pxTimer = ( timer_internal_t * ) pvTimerGetTimerID( xTimerHandle ); + pthread_t xTimerNotificationThread; + + /* The value of the timer ID, set in timer_create, should not be NULL. */ + configASSERT( pxTimer != NULL ); + + /* A value of SIGEV_SIGNAL isn't supported and should not have been successfully + * set. */ + configASSERT( pxTimer->xTimerEvent.sigev_notify != SIGEV_SIGNAL ); + + /* Update the timer period, which may need to be set to an it_interval + * argument. This call should not block. */ + if( pxTimer->xTimerPeriod > 0 ) + { + xTimerChangePeriod( xTimerHandle, pxTimer->xTimerPeriod, 0 ); + } + + /* Create the timer notification thread if requested. */ + if( pxTimer->xTimerEvent.sigev_notify == SIGEV_THREAD ) + { + /* if the user has provided thread attributes, create a thread + * with the provided attributes. Otherwise dispatch callback directly */ + if( pxTimer->xTimerEvent.sigev_notify_attributes == NULL ) + { + ( *pxTimer->xTimerEvent.sigev_notify_function )( pxTimer->xTimerEvent.sigev_value ); + } + else + { + ( void ) pthread_create( &xTimerNotificationThread, + pxTimer->xTimerEvent.sigev_notify_attributes, + ( void * ( * )( void * ) )pxTimer->xTimerEvent.sigev_notify_function, + pxTimer->xTimerEvent.sigev_value.sival_ptr ); + } + } +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int timer_create( clockid_t clockid, + struct sigevent * evp, + timer_t * timerid ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + timer_internal_t * pxTimer = NULL; + + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) clockid; + + /* POSIX specifies that when evp is NULL, the behavior shall be as is + * sigev_notify is SIGEV_SIGNAL. SIGEV_SIGNAL is currently not supported. */ + if( ( evp == NULL ) || ( evp->sigev_notify == SIGEV_SIGNAL ) ) + { + errno = ENOTSUP; + iStatus = -1; + } + + /* Allocate memory for a new timer object. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + pxTimer = pvPortMalloc( sizeof( timer_internal_t ) ); + + if( pxTimer == NULL ) + { + errno = EAGAIN; + iStatus = -1; + } + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Copy the event notification structure and set the current timer period. */ + pxTimer->xTimerEvent = *evp; + pxTimer->xTimerPeriod = 0; + + /* Create a new FreeRTOS timer. This call will not fail because the + * memory for it has already been allocated, so the output parameter is + * also set. */ + *timerid = ( timer_t ) xTimerCreateStatic( posixconfigTIMER_NAME, /* Timer name. */ + portMAX_DELAY, /* Initial timer period. Timers are created disarmed. */ + pdFALSE, /* Don't auto-reload timer. */ + ( void * ) pxTimer, /* Timer id. */ + prvTimerCallback, /* Timer expiration callback. */ + &pxTimer->xTimerBuffer ); /* Pre-allocated memory for timer. */ + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int timer_delete( timer_t timerid ) +{ + TimerHandle_t xTimerHandle = (void*)timerid; + timer_internal_t * pxTimer = ( timer_internal_t * ) pvTimerGetTimerID( xTimerHandle ); + + /* The value of the timer ID, set in timer_create, should not be NULL. */ + configASSERT( pxTimer != NULL ); + + /* Stop the FreeRTOS timer. Because the timer is statically allocated, no call + * to xTimerDelete is necessary. The timer is stopped so that it's not referenced + * anywhere. xTimerStop will not fail when it has unlimited block time. */ + ( void ) xTimerStop( xTimerHandle, portMAX_DELAY ); + + /* Wait until the timer stop command is processed. */ + while( xTimerIsTimerActive( xTimerHandle ) == pdTRUE ) + { + vTaskDelay( 1 ); + } + + /* Free the memory in use by the timer. */ + vPortFree( pxTimer ); + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int timer_getoverrun( timer_t timerid ) +{ + /* Silence warnings about unused parameters. */ + ( void ) timerid; + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int timer_settime( timer_t timerid, + int flags, + const struct itimerspec * value, + struct itimerspec * ovalue ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + TimerHandle_t xTimerHandle = (void*)timerid; + timer_internal_t * pxTimer = ( timer_internal_t * ) pvTimerGetTimerID( xTimerHandle ); + TickType_t xNextTimerExpiration = 0, xTimerExpirationPeriod = 0; + BaseType_t xTimerCommandSent = pdFAIL; + + /* Validate the value argument, but only if the timer isn't being disarmed. */ + if( TIMESPEC_IS_NOT_ZERO( value->it_value ) ) + { + if( ( UTILS_ValidateTimespec( &value->it_interval ) == false ) || + ( UTILS_ValidateTimespec( &value->it_value ) == false ) ) + { + errno = EINVAL; + iStatus = -1; + } + } + + /* Set ovalue, if given. */ + if( ovalue != NULL ) + { + ( void ) timer_gettime( timerid, ovalue ); + } + + /* Stop the timer if it's currently active. */ + if( ( iStatus == 0 ) && xTimerIsTimerActive( xTimerHandle ) ) + { + ( void ) xTimerStop( xTimerHandle, portMAX_DELAY ); + } + + /* Only restart the timer if it_value is not zero. */ + if( ( iStatus == 0 ) && TIMESPEC_IS_NOT_ZERO( value->it_value ) ) + { + /* Convert it_interval to ticks, but only if it_interval is not 0. If + * it_interval is 0, then the timer is not periodic. */ + if( TIMESPEC_IS_NOT_ZERO( value->it_interval ) ) + { + ( void ) UTILS_TimespecToTicks( &value->it_interval, &xTimerExpirationPeriod ); + } + + /* Set the new timer period. A non-periodic timer will have its period set + * to portMAX_DELAY. */ + pxTimer->xTimerPeriod = xTimerExpirationPeriod; + + /* Convert it_value to ticks, but only if it_value is not 0. If it_value + * is 0, then the timer will remain disarmed. */ + if( TIMESPEC_IS_NOT_ZERO( value->it_value ) ) + { + /* Absolute timeout. */ + if( ( flags & TIMER_ABSTIME ) == TIMER_ABSTIME ) + { + struct timespec xCurrentTime = { 0 }; + + /* Get current time */ + if( clock_gettime( CLOCK_REALTIME, &xCurrentTime ) != 0 ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else + { + iStatus = UTILS_AbsoluteTimespecToDeltaTicks( &value->it_value, &xCurrentTime, &xNextTimerExpiration ); + } + + /* Make sure xNextTimerExpiration is zero in case we got negative time difference */ + if( iStatus != 0 ) + { + xNextTimerExpiration = 0; + + if( iStatus == ETIMEDOUT ) + { + /* Set Status to 0 as absolute time is past is treated as expiry but not an error */ + iStatus = 0; + } + } + } + /* Relative timeout. */ + else + { + ( void ) UTILS_TimespecToTicks( &value->it_value, &xNextTimerExpiration ); + } + } + + /* If xNextTimerExpiration is still 0, that means that it_value specified + * an absolute timeout in the past. Per POSIX spec, a notification should be + * triggered immediately. */ + if( xNextTimerExpiration == 0 ) + { + prvTimerCallback( xTimerHandle ); + } + else + { + /* Set the timer to expire at the it_value, then start it. */ + ( void ) xTimerChangePeriod( xTimerHandle, xNextTimerExpiration, portMAX_DELAY ); + xTimerCommandSent = xTimerStart( xTimerHandle, xNextTimerExpiration ); + + /* Wait until the timer start command is processed. */ + while( ( xTimerCommandSent != pdFAIL ) && ( xTimerIsTimerActive( xTimerHandle ) == pdFALSE ) ) + { + vTaskDelay( 1 ); + } + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int timer_gettime( timer_t timerid, + struct itimerspec * value ) +{ + TimerHandle_t xTimerHandle = (void*)timerid; + timer_internal_t * pxTimer = ( timer_internal_t * ) pvTimerGetTimerID( xTimerHandle ); + TickType_t xNextExpirationTime = xTimerGetExpiryTime( xTimerHandle ) - xTaskGetTickCount(), + xTimerExpirationPeriod = pxTimer->xTimerPeriod; + + /* Set it_value only if the timer is armed. Otherwise, set it to 0. */ + if( xTimerIsTimerActive( xTimerHandle ) != pdFALSE ) + { + value->it_value.tv_sec = ( time_t ) ( xNextExpirationTime / configTICK_RATE_HZ ); + value->it_value.tv_nsec = ( long ) ( ( xNextExpirationTime % configTICK_RATE_HZ ) * NANOSECONDS_PER_TICK ); + } + else + { + value->it_value.tv_sec = 0; + value->it_value.tv_nsec = 0; + } + + /* Set it_interval only if the timer is periodic. Otherwise, set it to 0. */ + if( xTimerExpirationPeriod != portMAX_DELAY ) + { + value->it_interval.tv_sec = ( time_t ) ( xTimerExpirationPeriod / configTICK_RATE_HZ ); + value->it_interval.tv_nsec = ( long ) ( ( xTimerExpirationPeriod % configTICK_RATE_HZ ) * NANOSECONDS_PER_TICK ); + } + else + { + value->it_interval.tv_sec = 0; + value->it_interval.tv_nsec = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_unistd.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_unistd.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..0d3d9144 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_unistd.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_unistd.c + * @brief Implementation of functions in unistd.h + */ + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/unistd.h" + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +unsigned sleep( unsigned seconds ) +{ + vTaskDelay( pdMS_TO_TICKS( seconds * 1000 ) ); + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int usleep( useconds_t usec ) +{ + /* To avoid delaying for less than usec, always round up. */ + vTaskDelay( pdMS_TO_TICKS( usec / 1000 + ( usec % 1000 != 0 ) ) ); + + return 0; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_utils.c b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_utils.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..c1215878 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/os/freertos/posix/source/FreeRTOS_POSIX_utils.c @@ -0,0 +1,388 @@ +/* + * Amazon FreeRTOS POSIX V1.1.0 + * Copyright (C) 2018 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of + * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in + * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to + * use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of + * the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + * subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all + * copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS + * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR + * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + * + * http://aws.amazon.com/freertos + * http://www.FreeRTOS.org + */ + +/** + * @file FreeRTOS_POSIX_utils.c + * @brief Implementation of utility functions in utils.h + */ + +/* C standard library includes. */ +#include +#include + +/* FreeRTOS+POSIX includes. */ +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/errno.h" +#include "FreeRTOS_POSIX/utils.h" + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +size_t UTILS_strnlen( const char * const pcString, + size_t xMaxLength ) +{ + const char * pcCharPointer = pcString; + size_t xLength = 0; + + if( pcString != NULL ) + { + while( ( *pcCharPointer != '\0' ) && ( xLength < xMaxLength ) ) + { + xLength++; + pcCharPointer++; + } + } + + return xLength; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int UTILS_AbsoluteTimespecToDeltaTicks( const struct timespec * const pxAbsoluteTime, + const struct timespec * const pxCurrentTime, + TickType_t * const pxResult ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + struct timespec xDifference = { 0 }; + + /* Check parameters. */ + if( ( pxAbsoluteTime == NULL ) || ( pxCurrentTime == NULL ) || ( pxResult == NULL ) ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + /* Calculate the difference between the current time and absolute time. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + iStatus = UTILS_TimespecSubtract( pxAbsoluteTime, pxCurrentTime, &xDifference ); + + if( iStatus == 1 ) + { + /* pxAbsoluteTime was in the past. */ + iStatus = ETIMEDOUT; + } + else if( iStatus == -1 ) + { + /* error */ + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + } + + /* Convert the time difference to ticks. */ + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + iStatus = UTILS_TimespecToTicks( &xDifference, pxResult ); + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int UTILS_TimespecToTicks( const struct timespec * const pxTimespec, + TickType_t * const pxResult ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + int64_t llTotalTicks = 0; + long lNanoseconds = 0; + + /* Check parameters. */ + if( ( pxTimespec == NULL ) || ( pxResult == NULL ) ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else if( ( iStatus == 0 ) && ( UTILS_ValidateTimespec( pxTimespec ) == false ) ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Convert timespec.tv_sec to ticks. */ + llTotalTicks = ( int64_t ) configTICK_RATE_HZ * ( pxTimespec->tv_sec ); + + /* Convert timespec.tv_nsec to ticks. This value does not have to be checked + * for overflow because a valid timespec has 0 <= tv_nsec < 1000000000 and + * NANOSECONDS_PER_TICK > 1. */ + lNanoseconds = pxTimespec->tv_nsec / ( long ) NANOSECONDS_PER_TICK + /* Whole nanoseconds. */ + ( long ) ( pxTimespec->tv_nsec % ( long ) NANOSECONDS_PER_TICK != 0 ); /* Add 1 to round up if needed. */ + + /* Add the nanoseconds to the total ticks. */ + llTotalTicks += ( int64_t ) lNanoseconds; + + /* Check for overflow */ + if( llTotalTicks < 0 ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + else + { + /* check if TickType_t is 32 bit or 64 bit */ + uint32_t ulTickTypeSize = sizeof( TickType_t ); + + /* check for downcast overflow */ + if( ulTickTypeSize == sizeof( uint32_t ) ) + { + if( llTotalTicks > UINT_MAX ) + { + iStatus = EINVAL; + } + } + } + + /* Write result. */ + *pxResult = ( TickType_t ) llTotalTicks; + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +void UTILS_NanosecondsToTimespec( int64_t llSource, + struct timespec * const pxDestination ) +{ + long lCarrySec = 0; + + /* Convert to timespec. */ + pxDestination->tv_sec = ( time_t ) ( llSource / NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND ); + pxDestination->tv_nsec = ( long ) ( llSource % NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND ); + + /* Subtract from tv_sec if tv_nsec < 0. */ + if( pxDestination->tv_nsec < 0L ) + { + /* Compute the number of seconds to carry. */ + lCarrySec = ( pxDestination->tv_nsec / ( long ) NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND ) + 1L; + + pxDestination->tv_sec -= ( time_t ) ( lCarrySec ); + pxDestination->tv_nsec += lCarrySec * ( long ) NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND; + } +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int UTILS_TimespecAdd( const struct timespec * const x, + const struct timespec * const y, + struct timespec * const pxResult ) +{ + int64_t llPartialSec = 0; + int iStatus = 0; + + /* Check parameters. */ + if( ( pxResult == NULL ) || ( x == NULL ) || ( y == NULL ) ) + { + iStatus = -1; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* Perform addition. */ + pxResult->tv_nsec = x->tv_nsec + y->tv_nsec; + + /* check for overflow in case nsec value was invalid */ + if( pxResult->tv_nsec < 0 ) + { + iStatus = 1; + } + else + { + llPartialSec = ( pxResult->tv_nsec ) / NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND; + pxResult->tv_nsec = ( pxResult->tv_nsec ) % NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND; + pxResult->tv_sec = x->tv_sec + y->tv_sec + llPartialSec; + + /* check for overflow */ + if( pxResult->tv_sec < 0 ) + { + iStatus = 1; + } + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int UTILS_TimespecAddNanoseconds( const struct timespec * const x, + int64_t llNanoseconds, + struct timespec * const pxResult ) +{ + int64_t llTotalNSec = 0; + int iStatus = 0; + + /* Check parameters. */ + if( ( pxResult == NULL ) || ( x == NULL ) ) + { + iStatus = -1; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + /* add nano seconds */ + llTotalNSec = x->tv_nsec + llNanoseconds; + + /* check for nano seconds overflow */ + if( llTotalNSec < 0 ) + { + iStatus = 1; + } + else + { + pxResult->tv_nsec = llTotalNSec % NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND; + pxResult->tv_sec = x->tv_sec + ( llTotalNSec / NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND ); + + /* check for seconds overflow */ + if( pxResult->tv_sec < 0 ) + { + iStatus = 1; + } + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int UTILS_TimespecSubtract( const struct timespec * const x, + const struct timespec * const y, + struct timespec * const pxResult ) +{ + int iCompareResult = 0; + int iStatus = 0; + + /* Check parameters. */ + if( ( pxResult == NULL ) || ( x == NULL ) || ( y == NULL ) ) + { + iStatus = -1; + } + + if( iStatus == 0 ) + { + iCompareResult = UTILS_TimespecCompare( x, y ); + + /* if x < y then result would be negative, return 1 */ + if( iCompareResult == -1 ) + { + iStatus = 1; + } + else if( iCompareResult == 0 ) + { + /* if times are the same return zero */ + pxResult->tv_sec = 0; + pxResult->tv_nsec = 0; + } + else + { + /* If x > y Perform subtraction. */ + pxResult->tv_sec = x->tv_sec - y->tv_sec; + pxResult->tv_nsec = x->tv_nsec - y->tv_nsec; + + /* check if nano seconds value needs to borrow */ + if( pxResult->tv_nsec < 0 ) + { + /* Based on comparison, tv_sec > 0 */ + pxResult->tv_sec--; + pxResult->tv_nsec += ( long ) NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND; + } + + /* if nano second is negative after borrow, it is an overflow error */ + if( pxResult->tv_nsec < 0 ) + { + iStatus = -1; + } + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +int UTILS_TimespecCompare( const struct timespec * const x, + const struct timespec * const y ) +{ + int iStatus = 0; + + /* Check parameters */ + if( ( x == NULL ) && ( y == NULL ) ) + { + iStatus = 0; + } + else if( y == NULL ) + { + iStatus = 1; + } + else if( x == NULL ) + { + iStatus = -1; + } + else if( x->tv_sec > y->tv_sec ) + { + iStatus = 1; + } + else if( x->tv_sec < y->tv_sec ) + { + iStatus = -1; + } + else + { + /* seconds are equal compare nano seconds */ + if( x->tv_nsec > y->tv_nsec ) + { + iStatus = 1; + } + else if( x->tv_nsec < y->tv_nsec ) + { + iStatus = -1; + } + else + { + iStatus = 0; + } + } + + return iStatus; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ + +bool UTILS_ValidateTimespec( const struct timespec * const pxTimespec ) +{ + bool xReturn = false; + + if( pxTimespec != NULL ) + { + /* Verify 0 <= tv_nsec < 1000000000. */ + if( ( pxTimespec->tv_nsec >= 0 ) && + ( pxTimespec->tv_nsec < NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND ) ) + { + xReturn = true; + } + } + + return xReturn; +} + +/*-----------------------------------------------------------*/ diff --git a/components/freertos/queue.c b/components/os/freertos/queue.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/queue.c rename to components/os/freertos/queue.c diff --git a/components/freertos/stream_buffer.c b/components/os/freertos/stream_buffer.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/stream_buffer.c rename to components/os/freertos/stream_buffer.c diff --git a/components/freertos/tasks.c b/components/os/freertos/tasks.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/tasks.c rename to components/os/freertos/tasks.c diff --git a/components/freertos/timers.c b/components/os/freertos/timers.c similarity index 100% rename from components/freertos/timers.c rename to components/os/freertos/timers.c diff --git a/components/runtime/CMakeLists.txt b/components/runtime/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8313c720 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/runtime/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_LUA lua) diff --git a/components/lua/CMakeLists.txt b/components/runtime/lua/CMakeLists.txt similarity index 98% rename from components/lua/CMakeLists.txt rename to components/runtime/lua/CMakeLists.txt index 9776cef9..96604627 100644 --- a/components/lua/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/runtime/lua/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -sdk_generate_library() +sdk_generate_library() sdk_library_add_sources(core/src/lapi.c) sdk_library_add_sources(core/src/lauxlib.c) sdk_library_add_sources(core/src/lbaselib.c) diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lapi.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lapi.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lapi.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lapi.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lauxlib.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lauxlib.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lauxlib.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lauxlib.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lcode.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lcode.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lcode.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lcode.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lctype.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lctype.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lctype.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lctype.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/ldebug.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ldebug.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/ldebug.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ldebug.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/ldo.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ldo.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/ldo.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ldo.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lfunc.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lfunc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lfunc.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lfunc.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lgc.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lgc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lgc.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lgc.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/ljumptab.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ljumptab.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/ljumptab.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ljumptab.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/llex.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/llex.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/llex.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/llex.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/llimits.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/llimits.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/llimits.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/llimits.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lmem.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lmem.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lmem.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lmem.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lobject.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lobject.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lobject.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lobject.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lopcodes.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lopcodes.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lopcodes.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lopcodes.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lopnames.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lopnames.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lopnames.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lopnames.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lparser.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lparser.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lparser.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lparser.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lprefix.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lprefix.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lprefix.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lprefix.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lstate.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lstate.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lstate.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lstate.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lstring.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lstring.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lstring.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lstring.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/ltable.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ltable.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/ltable.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ltable.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/ltm.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ltm.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/ltm.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/ltm.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lua.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lua.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lua.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lua.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/luaconf.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/luaconf.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/luaconf.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/luaconf.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lualib.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lualib.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lualib.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lualib.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/luaport.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/luaport.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/luaport.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/luaport.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lundump.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lundump.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lundump.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lundump.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lvm.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lvm.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lvm.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lvm.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/inc/lzio.h b/components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lzio.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/inc/lzio.h rename to components/runtime/lua/core/inc/lzio.h diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lapi.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lapi.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lapi.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lapi.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lauxlib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lauxlib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lauxlib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lauxlib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lbaselib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lbaselib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lbaselib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lbaselib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lcode.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lcode.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lcode.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lcode.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lcorolib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lcorolib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lcorolib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lcorolib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lctype.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lctype.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lctype.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lctype.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/ldblib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/ldblib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/ldblib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/ldblib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/ldebug.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/ldebug.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/ldebug.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/ldebug.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/ldo.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/ldo.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/ldo.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/ldo.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/ldump.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/ldump.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/ldump.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/ldump.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lfunc.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lfunc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lfunc.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lfunc.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lgc.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lgc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lgc.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lgc.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/linit.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/linit.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/linit.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/linit.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/liolib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/liolib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/liolib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/liolib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/llex.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/llex.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/llex.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/llex.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lmathlib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lmathlib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lmathlib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lmathlib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lmem.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lmem.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lmem.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lmem.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/loadlib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/loadlib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/loadlib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/loadlib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lobject.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lobject.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lobject.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lobject.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lopcodes.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lopcodes.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lopcodes.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lopcodes.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/loslib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/loslib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/loslib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/loslib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lparser.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lparser.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lparser.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lparser.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lstate.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lstate.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lstate.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lstate.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lstring.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lstring.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lstring.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lstring.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lstrlib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lstrlib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lstrlib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lstrlib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/ltable.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/ltable.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/ltable.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/ltable.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/ltablib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/ltablib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/ltablib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/ltablib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/ltm.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/ltm.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/ltm.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/ltm.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/luaport.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/luaport.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/luaport.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/luaport.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lundump.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lundump.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lundump.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lundump.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lutf8lib.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lutf8lib.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lutf8lib.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lutf8lib.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lvm.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lvm.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lvm.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lvm.c diff --git a/components/lua/core/src/lzio.c b/components/runtime/lua/core/src/lzio.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/core/src/lzio.c rename to components/runtime/lua/core/src/lzio.c diff --git a/components/lua/lhal/llib_core.c b/components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_core.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/lhal/llib_core.c rename to components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_core.c diff --git a/components/lua/lhal/llib_gpio.c b/components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_gpio.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/lhal/llib_gpio.c rename to components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_gpio.c diff --git a/components/lua/lhal/llib_init.c b/components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_init.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/lhal/llib_init.c rename to components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_init.c diff --git a/components/lua/lhal/llib_init.h b/components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_init.h similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/lhal/llib_init.h rename to components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_init.h diff --git a/components/lua/lhal/llib_mtimer.c b/components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_mtimer.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/lhal/llib_mtimer.c rename to components/runtime/lua/lhal/llib_mtimer.c diff --git a/components/lua/start/lua_start.c b/components/runtime/lua/start/lua_start.c similarity index 100% rename from components/lua/start/lua_start.c rename to components/runtime/lua/start/lua_start.c diff --git a/components/shell/CMakeLists.txt b/components/shell/CMakeLists.txt index a23cd9b3..acbe1d11 100644 --- a/components/shell/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/shell/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ -sdk_generate_library() +sdk_generate_library() sdk_library_add_sources(shell.c) sdk_add_include_directories(.) if(CONFIG_FREERTOS) sdk_library_add_sources(shell_freertos.c) -endif() \ No newline at end of file +endif() + +sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_SHELL) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/shell/shell_config.h b/components/shell/shell_config.h index 090aefc7..8d125470 100644 --- a/components/shell/shell_config.h +++ b/components/shell/shell_config.h @@ -18,15 +18,15 @@ #endif #ifndef SHELL_CMD_SIZE -#define SHELL_CMD_SIZE 50 +#define SHELL_CMD_SIZE 120 #endif #ifndef SHELL_ARG_NUM -#define SHELL_ARG_NUM 8 +#define SHELL_ARG_NUM 16 #endif //#define SHELL_USING_FS -//#define SHELL_USING_COLOR +#define SHELL_USING_COLOR #ifndef SHELL_THREAD_STACK_SIZE #define SHELL_THREAD_STACK_SIZE 1024 @@ -36,4 +36,4 @@ #define SHELL_THREAD_PRIO 5 #endif -#endif \ No newline at end of file +#endif diff --git a/components/shell/shell_freertos.c b/components/shell/shell_freertos.c index 3d457bc1..fae426b7 100644 --- a/components/shell/shell_freertos.c +++ b/components/shell/shell_freertos.c @@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ static void shell_task(void *pvParameters) void shell_init_with_task(struct bflb_device_s *shell) { uart_shell = shell; + vSemaphoreCreateBinary(sem_shell); + bflb_uart_rxint_mask(uart_shell, false); bflb_irq_attach(uart_shell->irq_num, uart_shell_isr, NULL); bflb_irq_enable(uart_shell->irq_num); @@ -66,6 +68,39 @@ void shell_init_with_task(struct bflb_device_s *shell) Ring_Buffer_Init(&shell_rb, shell_buffer, sizeof(shell_buffer), NULL, NULL); shell_init(); - vSemaphoreCreateBinary(sem_shell); xTaskCreate(shell_task, (char *)"shell_task", SHELL_THREAD_STACK_SIZE, NULL, SHELL_THREAD_PRIO, &shell_handle); -} \ No newline at end of file +} + +static void ps_cmd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *pcWriteBuffer, *info; + const char *const pcHeader = "State Priority Stack # Base\r\n********************************************************\r\n"; + BaseType_t xSpacePadding; + + info = malloc(1536); + if (NULL == info) { + return; + } + pcWriteBuffer = info; + + /* Generate a table of task stats. */ + strcpy(pcWriteBuffer, "Task"); + pcWriteBuffer += strlen(pcWriteBuffer); + + /* Minus three for the null terminator and half the number of characters in + "Task" so the column lines up with the centre of the heading. */ + for (xSpacePadding = strlen("Task"); xSpacePadding < (configMAX_TASK_NAME_LEN - 3); xSpacePadding++) { + /* Add a space to align columns after the task's name. */ + *pcWriteBuffer = ' '; + pcWriteBuffer++; + + /* Ensure always terminated. */ + *pcWriteBuffer = 0x00; + } + strcpy(pcWriteBuffer, pcHeader); + vTaskList(pcWriteBuffer + strlen(pcHeader)); + printf(info); + + free(info); +} +SHELL_CMD_EXPORT_ALIAS(ps_cmd, ps, shell ps); diff --git a/components/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.c b/components/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.c deleted file mode 100644 index e656bb6c..00000000 --- a/components/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -#include "tlsf.h" -#include "bflb_tlsf.h" - -static tlsf_t tlsf_ptr = 0; - -int bflb_mmheap_init(void *begin_addr, uint32_t size) -{ - tlsf_ptr = (tlsf_t)tlsf_create_with_pool(begin_addr, size); - - if (tlsf_ptr == 0) { - return -1; - } - return 0; -} - -void *bflb_malloc(size_t nbytes) -{ - void *ptr; - ptr = tlsf_malloc(tlsf_ptr, nbytes); - - return ptr; -} - -void bflb_free(void *ptr) -{ - tlsf_free(tlsf_ptr, ptr); -} - -void *bflb_realloc(void *ptr, size_t nbytes) -{ - if (tlsf_ptr) { - ptr = tlsf_realloc(tlsf_ptr, ptr, nbytes); - } - return ptr; -} - -void *bflb_calloc(size_t count, size_t nbytes) -{ - void *ptr = NULL; - size_t total_size; - - total_size = count * nbytes; - ptr = tlsf_malloc(tlsf_ptr, nbytes); - if (ptr != NULL) { - /* clean memory */ - memset(ptr, 0, total_size); - } - - return ptr; -} - -void *bflb_malloc_align(size_t align, size_t size) -{ - void *ptr = NULL; - - ptr = tlsf_memalign(tlsf_ptr, align, size); - - return ptr; -} - -void tlsf_size_walker(void* ptr, size_t size, int used, void* user) -{ - if (used) { - ((bflb_tlsf_size_container_t *)user)->used += (unsigned int)size; - } - else { - ((bflb_tlsf_size_container_t *)user)->free += (unsigned int)size; - } -} - -bflb_tlsf_size_container_t *bflb_tlsf_stats() { - static bflb_tlsf_size_container_t sizes; - sizes.free = 0; - sizes.used = 0; - tlsf_walk_pool(tlsf_get_pool(tlsf_ptr), tlsf_size_walker, &sizes); - return &sizes; -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.h b/components/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.h deleted file mode 100644 index 6b3bad5f..00000000 --- a/components/tlsf/bflb_tlsf.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef BFLB_TLSF_H -#define BFLB_TLSF_H - -#include -#include - -typedef struct { - unsigned free; /**< total free size */ - unsigned used; /**< total used size */ -} bflb_tlsf_size_container_t; - -int bflb_mmheap_init(void *begin_addr, uint32_t size); -void *bflb_malloc(size_t nbytes); -void bflb_free(void *ptr); -void *bflb_realloc(void *ptr, size_t nbytes); -void *bflb_calloc(size_t count, size_t size); -void *bflb_malloc_align(size_t align, size_t size); -bflb_tlsf_size_container_t *bflb_tlsf_stats(); - -#endif \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/usb/CMakeLists.txt b/components/usb/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40626900 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/usb/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_CHERRYUSB cherryusb) diff --git a/components/cherryusb/CMakeLists.txt b/components/usb/cherryusb/CMakeLists.txt similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/CMakeLists.txt rename to components/usb/cherryusb/CMakeLists.txt diff --git a/components/cherryusb/cherryusb_config_template.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/cherryusb_config_template.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/cherryusb_config_template.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/cherryusb_config_template.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/audio/usb_audio.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/audio/usb_audio.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/audio/usb_audio.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/audio/usb_audio.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/audio/usbd_audio.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/audio/usbd_audio.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/audio/usbd_audio.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/audio/usbd_audio.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/audio/usbd_audio.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/audio/usbd_audio.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/audio/usbd_audio.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/audio/usbd_audio.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usb_cdc.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usb_cdc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usb_cdc.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usb_cdc.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbd_cdc.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbd_cdc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbd_cdc.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbd_cdc.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbd_cdc.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbd_cdc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbd_cdc.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbd_cdc.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbh_cdc_acm.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbh_cdc_acm.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbh_cdc_acm.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbh_cdc_acm.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbh_cdc_acm.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbh_cdc_acm.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbh_cdc_acm.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/cdc/usbh_cdc_acm.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/hid/usb_hid.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usb_hid.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/hid/usb_hid.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usb_hid.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/hid/usbd_hid.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usbd_hid.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/hid/usbd_hid.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usbd_hid.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/hid/usbd_hid.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usbd_hid.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/hid/usbd_hid.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usbd_hid.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/hid/usbh_hid.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usbh_hid.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/hid/usbh_hid.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usbh_hid.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/hid/usbh_hid.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usbh_hid.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/hid/usbh_hid.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/hid/usbh_hid.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/hub/usb_hub.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/hub/usb_hub.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/hub/usb_hub.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/hub/usb_hub.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/hub/usbh_hub.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/hub/usbh_hub.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/hub/usbh_hub.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/hub/usbh_hub.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/hub/usbh_hub.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/hub/usbh_hub.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/hub/usbh_hub.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/hub/usbh_hub.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/msc/usb_msc.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usb_msc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/msc/usb_msc.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usb_msc.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/msc/usb_scsi.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usb_scsi.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/msc/usb_scsi.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usb_scsi.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/msc/usbd_msc.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usbd_msc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/msc/usbd_msc.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usbd_msc.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/msc/usbd_msc.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usbd_msc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/msc/usbd_msc.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usbd_msc.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/msc/usbh_msc.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usbh_msc.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/msc/usbh_msc.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usbh_msc.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/msc/usbh_msc.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usbh_msc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/msc/usbh_msc.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/msc/usbh_msc.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/video/usb_video.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usb_video.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/video/usb_video.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usb_video.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/video/usbd_video.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usbd_video.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/video/usbd_video.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usbd_video.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/video/usbd_video.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usbd_video.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/video/usbd_video.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usbd_video.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/video/usbh_video.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usbh_video.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/video/usbh_video.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usbh_video.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/class/video/usbh_video.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usbh_video.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/class/video/usbh_video.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/class/video/usbh_video.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/common/usb_dc.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_dc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/common/usb_dc.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_dc.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/common/usb_def.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_def.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/common/usb_def.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_def.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/common/usb_errno.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_errno.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/common/usb_errno.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_errno.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/common/usb_hc.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_hc.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/common/usb_hc.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_hc.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/common/usb_list.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_list.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/common/usb_list.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_list.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/common/usb_log.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_log.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/common/usb_log.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_log.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/common/usb_mem.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_mem.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/common/usb_mem.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_mem.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/common/usb_util.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_util.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/common/usb_util.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/common/usb_util.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/core/usbd_core.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/core/usbd_core.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/core/usbd_core.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/core/usbd_core.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/core/usbd_core.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/core/usbd_core.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/core/usbd_core.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/core/usbd_core.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/core/usbh_core.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/core/usbh_core.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/core/usbh_core.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/core/usbh_core.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/core/usbh_core.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/core/usbh_core.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/core/usbh_core.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/core/usbh_core.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal.h diff --git a/components/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_freertos.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_freertos.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_freertos.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_freertos.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_rtthread.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_rtthread.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_rtthread.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/osal/usb_osal_rtthread.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/port/ehci/usb_hc_ehci.c b/components/usb/cherryusb/port/ehci/usb_hc_ehci.c similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/port/ehci/usb_hc_ehci.c rename to components/usb/cherryusb/port/ehci/usb_hc_ehci.c diff --git a/components/cherryusb/port/ehci/usb_hc_ehci.h b/components/usb/cherryusb/port/ehci/usb_hc_ehci.h similarity index 100% rename from components/cherryusb/port/ehci/usb_hc_ehci.h rename to components/usb/cherryusb/port/ehci/usb_hc_ehci.h diff --git a/components/utils/CMakeLists.txt b/components/utils/CMakeLists.txt index a6dc7474..195c8d41 100644 --- a/components/utils/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/components/utils/CMakeLists.txt @@ -23,59 +23,10 @@ endif() sdk_library_add_sources(log/log.c) sdk_add_include_directories(log) -# vsnprintf config -if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_FLOAT=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT}) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_LIBC_FLOAT=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT}) -endif() -if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT_EX) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_FLOAT_EX=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT_EX}) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_LIBC_FLOAT_EX=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_FLOAT_EX}) -endif() -if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_LONG_LONG) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_LONG_LONG=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_LONG_LONG}) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_LIBC_LONG_LONG=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_LONG_LONG}) -endif() -if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_WRITEBACK) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_WRITEBACK=${CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_WRITEBACK}) -endif() - -# libc or vlibc select -if(CONFIG_VLIBC) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC) - # vlibc debug enable - if (CONFIG_VLIBC_DEBUG) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_DEBUG) +if(CONFIG_BFLOG) + if(CONFIG_FREERTOS) + sdk_library_add_sources(log/log_freertos.c) endif() - - # vlibc fatfs port enable - if(CONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_VLIBC_FATFS) - endif() - - sdk_library_add_sources(vlibc/printf.c) - sdk_library_add_sources(vlibc/syscalls.c) - sdk_library_add_sources(vlibc/vlibc_stdio.c) - sdk_library_add_sources(vlibc/vlibc_vsnprintf.c) - sdk_add_include_directories(vlibc) -else() - if(CONFIG_VSNPRINTF_NANO) - sdk_library_add_sources(libc/vsnprintf_nano.c) - else() - sdk_library_add_sources(libc/vsnprintf.c) - endif() - - sdk_library_add_sources(libc/syscalls.c) - sdk_library_add_sources(libc/printf.c) -endif() - -# memheap -sdk_library_add_sources(mmheap/bflb_mmheap.c) -sdk_add_include_directories(mmheap) - -# memheap lock user config -if (CONFIG_MMHEAP_USER) - sdk_add_compile_definitions(-DCONFIG_MMHEAP_USER) endif() # ring_buffer @@ -110,5 +61,6 @@ endif() sdk_library_add_sources(bflb_timestamp/bflb_timestamp.c) sdk_add_include_directories(bflb_timestamp) -sdk_add_compile_options(-fno-builtin-printf) -sdk_add_link_options(-u_malloc_r) \ No newline at end of file +# getopt +sdk_library_add_sources(getopt/utils_getopt.c) +sdk_add_include_directories(getopt) diff --git a/components/utils/getopt/utils_getopt.c b/components/utils/getopt/utils_getopt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..36451197 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/utils/getopt/utils_getopt.c @@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ +/* + * This file is derived from musl v1.2.0. + * Modifications are applied. + * Copyright (C) Bouffalo Lab 2016-2020 + */ + +/* + * Copyright © 2005-2020 Rich Felker, et al. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining + * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the + * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including + * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, + * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to + * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to + * the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be + * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, + * TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE + * SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int utils_getopt_init(getopt_env_t *env, int opterr) +{ + if (!env) { + return -1; + } + env->optarg = NULL; + env->optind = 1; + env->opterr = opterr; + env->optopt = 0; + env->__optpos = 0; + return 0; +} + +#define NEWLINE "\r\n" + +int utils_getopt(getopt_env_t *env, int argc, char *const argv[], const char *optstring) +{ + int i; + char c, d; + char *optchar; + + if (!env) { + return -1; + } + + if (env->optind >= argc || !argv[env->optind]) + return -1; + + if (argv[env->optind][0] != '-') { + if (optstring[0] == '-') { + env->optarg = argv[env->optind++]; + return 1; + } + return -1; + } + + if (!argv[env->optind][1]) + return -1; + + if (argv[env->optind][1] == '-' && !argv[env->optind][2]) + return env->optind++, -1; + + if (!env->__optpos) + env->__optpos++; + c = argv[env->optind][env->__optpos]; + optchar = argv[env->optind] + env->__optpos; + env->__optpos += !!c; + + if (!argv[env->optind][env->__optpos]) { + env->optind++; + env->__optpos = 0; + } + + if (optstring[0] == '-' || optstring[0] == '+') + optstring++; + + i = 0; + do + d = optstring[i++]; + while (d && d != c); + + if (d != c || c == ':') { + env->optopt = c; + if (optstring[0] != ':' && env->opterr) + printf("%s: unrecognized option: %c" NEWLINE, argv[0], *optchar); + return '?'; + } + if (optstring[i] == ':') { + env->optarg = 0; + if (optstring[i + 1] != ':' || env->__optpos) { + env->optarg = argv[env->optind++] + env->__optpos; + env->__optpos = 0; + } + if (env->optind > argc) { + env->optopt = c; + if (optstring[0] == ':') + return ':'; + if (env->opterr) { + printf("%s: option requires an argument: %c" NEWLINE, argv[0], *optchar); + } + return '?'; + } + } + return c; +} + +static int params_filter(char **params, uint32_t *r) +{ + char *p; + uint32_t result = 0; + uint8_t base = 0; + + p = *params; + + if ((*p == '0') && ((*(p + 1) == 'x') || (*(p + 1) == 'X'))) { + p = p + 2; + base = 16; + + } else { + base = 10; + } + + while (*p) { + result *= base; + if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '9') + result += *p - '0'; + else if (base == 10) + return -1; + + if (base == 16) { + if (*p >= 'a' && *p <= 'f') + result += *p - 'a' + 10; + else if (*p >= 'A' && *p <= 'F') + result += *p - 'A' + 10; + } + p++; + } + + *r = result; + return 0; +} + +void get_bytearray_from_string(char **params, uint8_t *result, int array_size) +{ + int i = 0; + char rand[3]; + + for (i = 0; i < array_size; i++) { + strncpy(rand, (const char *)*params, 2); + rand[2] = '\0'; + result[i] = strtol(rand, NULL, 16); + *params = *params + 2; + } +} + +void get_uint8_from_string(char **params, uint8_t *result) +{ + uint32_t p = 0; + int state = 0; + + state = params_filter(params, &p); + if (!state) { + *result = p & 0xff; + } else + *result = 0; +} + +void get_uint16_from_string(char **params, uint16_t *result) +{ + uint32_t p = 0; + int state = 0; + + state = params_filter(params, &p); + if (!state) { + *result = p & 0xffff; + } else + *result = 0; +} + +void get_uint32_from_string(char **params, uint32_t *result) +{ + uint32_t p = 0; + int state = 0; + + state = params_filter(params, &p); + if (!state) { + *result = p; + } else + *result = 0; +} + +void utils_parse_number(const char *str, char sep, uint8_t *buf, int buflen, int base) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++) { + buf[i] = (uint8_t)strtol(str, NULL, base); + str = strchr(str, sep); + if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') { + break; + } + str++; + } +} + +void utils_parse_number_adv(const char *str, char sep, uint8_t *buf, int buflen, int base, int *count) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++) { + buf[i] = (uint8_t)strtol(str, NULL, base); + str = strchr(str, sep); + if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') { + break; + } + str++; + } + *count = (i + 1); +} + +unsigned long long convert_arrayToU64(uint8_t *inputArray) +{ + unsigned long long result = 0; + for (uint8_t i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + result <<= 8; + result |= (unsigned long long)inputArray[7 - i]; + } + + return result; +} + +void convert_u64ToArray(unsigned long long inputU64, uint8_t result[8]) +{ + for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + result[i] = inputU64 >> (i * 8); + } +} + +void utils_memdrain8(void *src, size_t len) +{ + volatile uint8_t *s = (uint8_t *)src; + uint8_t tmp; + + while (len--) { + tmp = *s++; + } + + (void)tmp; +} + +void utils_memdrain16(void *src, size_t len) +{ + volatile uint16_t *s = (uint16_t *)src; + uint16_t tmp; + + len >>= 1; //convert to half words + + while (len--) { + tmp = *s++; + } + + (void)tmp; +} + +void utils_memdrain32(void *src, size_t len) +{ + volatile uint32_t *s = (uint32_t *)src; + uint32_t tmp; + + len >>= 2; //convert to words + + while (len--) { + tmp = *s++; + } + + (void)tmp; +} + +void utils_memdrain64(void *src, size_t len) +{ + volatile uint64_t *s = (uint64_t *)src; + uint64_t tmp; + + len >>= 3; //convert to two words + + while (len--) { + tmp = *s++; + } + + (void)tmp; +} + +void *utils_memdrain8_with_check(void *src, size_t len, uint8_t seq) +{ + volatile uint8_t *s = (uint8_t *)src; + uint8_t tmp; + + (void)tmp; + + while (len--) { + tmp = *s++; + if ((seq++) != tmp) { + return (uint8_t *)s - 1; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +void *utils_memdrain16_with_check(void *src, size_t len, uint16_t seq) +{ + volatile uint16_t *s = (uint16_t *)src; + uint16_t tmp; + (void)tmp; + + len >>= 1; //convert to half words + + while (len--) { + tmp = *s++; + if ((seq++) != tmp) { + return (uint16_t *)s - 1; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +void *utils_memdrain32_with_check(void *src, size_t len, uint32_t seq) +{ + volatile uint32_t *s = (uint32_t *)src; + uint32_t tmp; + (void)tmp; + + len >>= 2; //convert to words + + while (len--) { + tmp = *s++; + if ((seq++) != tmp) { + return (uint32_t *)s - 1; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +void *utils_memdrain64_with_check(void *src, size_t len, uint64_t seq) +{ + volatile uint64_t *s = (uint64_t *)src; + uint64_t tmp; + (void)tmp; + + len >>= 3; //convert to two words + + while (len--) { + tmp = *s++; + if ((seq++) != tmp) { + return (uint64_t *)s - 1; + } + } + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/components/utils/getopt/utils_getopt.h b/components/utils/getopt/utils_getopt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ffaf2d1a --- /dev/null +++ b/components/utils/getopt/utils_getopt.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +#ifndef __GETOPT_H__ +#define __GETOPT_H__ +/** + * @brief Parameters needed to parse the command line + * + */ +typedef struct getopt_env { + char *optarg; /*!< if the option accepts parameters, then optarg point to the option parameter*/ + int optind; /*!< current index of argv*/ + int opterr; /*!< non-zero enable error message output, while 0,no error message output*/ + int optopt; /*!< contain unrecognized option character*/ + int __optpos; +} getopt_env_t; + +/** + * @brief Initialize struct getopt_env + * + * @param env pointer to struct getopt_env + * @param opterr set error message output method + * + * @return + * - 0: success + * - -1: fail + */ +int utils_getopt_init(getopt_env_t *env, int opterr); + +/** + * @brief Parses the command-line arguments + * + * @param env pointer to struct getopt_env + * @param argc the argument count + * @param argv the argument array + * + * @return + * - option character : an option was successfully found + * - -1 : all command-line options have been parsed + * - '?' : option character was not in optstring + * - ':' or '?' : If utils_getopt() encounters an option with a missing argument, then the return value depends on the first character in optstring: if it is ':', then ':' is returned; otherwise '?' is returned + * + * @note Example + * @code + * + * #include + * #include + * + * void cmd(char *buf, int len, int argc, char **argv) + * { + * int opt; + getopt_env_t getopt_env; + utils_getopt_init(&getopt_env, 0); + * //put ':' in the starting of the string so that program can distinguish between '?' and ':' + * while ((opt = utils_getopt(&getopt_env, argc, argv, ":if:lr")) != -1) { + * switch(opt) + * { + * case 'i': + * case 'l': + * case 'r': + * printf("option: %c\r\n", opt); + * break; + * case 'f': + * printf("filename: %s\r\n", getopt_env.optarg); + * break; + * case ':': + printf("%s: %c requires an argument\r\n", *argv, getopt_env.optopt); + * break; + * case '?': + * printf("unknow option: %c\r\n", getopt_env.optopt); + * break; + * } + * } + * //optind is for the extra arguments which are not parsed + * for(; getopt_env.optind < argc; getopt_env.optind++){ + * printf("extra arguments: %s\r\n", argv[getopt_env.optind]); + * } + * + * } + * @endcode + */ +int utils_getopt(getopt_env_t *env, int argc, char *const argv[], const char *optstring); + +void get_bytearray_from_string(char **params, uint8_t *result, int array_size); +void get_uint8_from_string(char **params, uint8_t *result); +void get_uint16_from_string(char **params, uint16_t *result); +void get_uint32_from_string(char **params, uint32_t *result); +void utils_parse_number(const char *str, char sep, uint8_t *buf, int buflen, int base); +void utils_parse_number_adv(const char *str, char sep, uint8_t *buf, int buflen, int base, int *count); +unsigned long long convert_arrayToU64(uint8_t *inputArray); +void convert_u64ToArray(unsigned long long inputU64, uint8_t result[8]); +void utils_memdrain8(void *src, size_t len); +void utils_memdrain16(void *src, size_t len); +void utils_memdrain32(void *src, size_t len); +void utils_memdrain64(void *src, size_t len); +void *utils_memdrain8_with_check(void *src, size_t len, uint8_t seq); +void *utils_memdrain16_with_check(void *src, size_t len, uint16_t seq); +void *utils_memdrain32_with_check(void *src, size_t len, uint32_t seq); +void *utils_memdrain64_with_check(void *src, size_t len, uint64_t seq); + +#endif /* __GETOPT_H__ */ diff --git a/components/utils/libc/syscalls.c b/components/utils/libc/syscalls.c deleted file mode 100644 index b59fb308..00000000 --- a/components/utils/libc/syscalls.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,279 +0,0 @@ -#include -#include -#include -#include "bflb_uart.h" -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF -#include "bflb_tlsf.h" -#else -#include "bflb_mmheap.h" - -extern struct heap_info mmheap_root; -#endif - -extern struct bflb_device_s *console; - -/* Reentrant versions of system calls. */ - -/* global errno */ -static volatile int _sys_errno = 0; - -#ifndef _REENT_ONLY -int *__errno() -{ - return (int *)&_sys_errno; -} -#endif - -int _getpid_r(struct _reent *ptr) -{ - return 0; -} - -int _execve_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *name, char *const *argv, char *const *env) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _fcntl_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, int cmd, int arg) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _fork_r(struct _reent *ptr) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _fstat_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, struct stat *pstat) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _isatty_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _kill_r(struct _reent *ptr, int pid, int sig) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _link_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *old, const char *new) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -_off_t _lseek_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, _off_t pos, int whence) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _mkdir_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *name, int mode) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _open_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *file, int flags, int mode) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _close_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -_ssize_t _read_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _rename_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *old, const char *new) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _stat_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *file, struct stat *pstat) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _unlink_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *file) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _wait_r(struct _reent *ptr, int *status) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -_ssize_t _write_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - if ((STDOUT_FILENO == fd) || (STDERR_FILENO == fd)) { - bflb_uart_put(console, (uint8_t *)buf, nbytes); - } - return 0; -} - -void *_malloc_r(struct _reent *ptr, size_t size) -{ - void *result; -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS - result = pvPortMalloc(size); -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - result = (void *)bflb_malloc(size); -#else - result = (void *)bflb_mmheap_alloc(&mmheap_root, size); -#endif -#endif - if (result == NULL) { - ptr->_errno = -ENOMEM; - } - return result; -} - -void *_realloc_r(struct _reent *ptr, void *old, size_t newlen) -{ - void *result; -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - result = (void *)bflb_realloc(old, newlen); -#else - result = (void *)bflb_mmheap_realloc(&mmheap_root, old, newlen); -#endif -#endif - if (result == NULL) { - ptr->_errno = -ENOMEM; - } - return result; -} - -void *_calloc_r(struct _reent *ptr, size_t size, size_t len) -{ - void *result; -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS - result = pvPortMalloc(size * len); -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - result = (void *)bflb_calloc(size, len); -#else - result = (void *)bflb_mmheap_calloc(&mmheap_root, size, len); -#endif -#endif - if (result == NULL) { - ptr->_errno = -ENOMEM; - } - if (result) { - memset(result, 0, size * len); - } - return result; -} - -void *_memalign_r(struct _reent *ptr, size_t align, size_t size) -{ - void *result; -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - result = (void *)bflb_malloc_align(align, size); -#else - result = (void *)bflb_mmheap_align_alloc(&mmheap_root, align, size); -#endif -#endif - if (result == NULL) { - ptr->_errno = -ENOMEM; - } - - return result; -} - -void _free_r(struct _reent *ptr, void *addr) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS - vPortFree(addr); -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - bflb_free(addr); -#else - bflb_mmheap_free(&mmheap_root, addr); -#endif -#endif -} - -void *_sbrk_r(struct _reent *ptr, ptrdiff_t incr) -{ - void *ret; - ptr->_errno = ENOMEM; - ret = (void *)-1; - - return ret; -} - -/* for exit() and abort() */ -void __attribute__((noreturn)) -_exit(int status) -{ - while (1) { - } -} - -void _system(const char *s) -{ -} - -void __libc_init_array(void) -{ - /* we not use __libc init_aray to initialize C++ objects */ -} - -mode_t umask(mode_t mask) -{ - return 022; -} - -int flock(int fd, int operation) -{ - return 0; -} - -/* -These functions are implemented and replaced by the 'common/time.c' file -int _gettimeofday_r(struct _reent *ptr, struct timeval *__tp, void *__tzp); -_CLOCK_T_ _times_r(struct _reent *ptr, struct tms *ptms); -*/ diff --git a/components/utils/log/log.c b/components/utils/log/log.c index 128094ab..e2972cc6 100644 --- a/components/utils/log/log.c +++ b/components/utils/log/log.c @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +#include "bflb_uart.h" + #ifdef CONFIG_BFLOG #include "bflog.h" @@ -6,34 +8,42 @@ #endif bflog_t __bflog_recorder; +void *__bflog_recorder_pointer = &__bflog_recorder; static uint8_t bflog_pool[CONFIG_BFLOG_POOL_SIZE]; bflog_direct_stream_t bflog_direct_stream; -extern uint16_t __console_output(void *ptr, uint16_t size); +extern struct bflb_device_s *console; +static uint16_t console_output(void *ptr, uint16_t size) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) { + bflb_uart_putchar(console, ((char *)ptr)[i]); + } + return size; +} #endif -void log_init(void) +void log_start(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_BFLOG void *record = (void *)&__bflog_recorder; void *direct = (void *)&bflog_direct_stream; /*!< create recorder */ - bflog_create_s(record, bflog_pool, CONFIG_BFLOG_POOL_SIZE, BFLOG_MODE_SYNC); + bflog_create(record, bflog_pool, CONFIG_BFLOG_POOL_SIZE, BFLOG_MODE_SYNC); /*!< create stream direct */ bflog_direct_create(direct, BFLOG_DIRECT_TYPE_STREAM, BFLOG_DIRECT_COLOR_ENABLE, NULL, NULL); - bflog_direct_init_stream_s((void *)direct, __console_output); + bflog_direct_init_stream((void *)direct, console_output); /*!< connect direct and recorder */ - bflog_append_s(record, direct); + bflog_append(record, direct); /*!< resume direct */ - bflog_direct_resume_s(direct); + bflog_direct_resume(direct); /*!< resume record */ - bflog_resume_s(record); + bflog_resume(record); #endif } diff --git a/components/utils/log/log.h b/components/utils/log/log.h index eb24600e..569bb983 100644 --- a/components/utils/log/log.h +++ b/components/utils/log/log.h @@ -27,106 +27,148 @@ #include #include -#ifdef CONFIG_BFLOG -#include "bflog.h" -extern bflog_t __bflog_recorder; -#endif - #ifndef DBG_TAG #define DBG_TAG "" #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_BFLOG +#include "bflog.h" +extern bflog_t __bflog_recorder; +extern void *__bflog_recorder_pointer; + +#undef BFLOG_TAG +#define BFLOG_TAG DBG_TAG +#else +#define BFLOG_DEFINE_TAG(name, _string, enable) +#define BFLOG_EXTERN_TAG(name) +#define BFLOG_GET_TAG(name) NULL +#define BFLOG_TAG NULL +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_LOG_DISABLE -#define LOG_F(...) (void(0)) -#define LOG_E(...) (void(0)) -#define LOG_W(...) (void(0)) -#define LOG_I(...) (void(0)) -#define LOG_D(...) (void(0)) -#define LOG_T(...) (void(0)) -#define LOG_FLUSH() (void(0)) + +#define LOG_F(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RF(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_E(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RE(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_W(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RW(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_I(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RI(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_D(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RD(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_T(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RT(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_FLUSH() ((void)0) + #else #ifdef CONFIG_BFLOG #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 0) -#define LOG_F(...) BFLOG_F((void *)&__bflog_recorder, DBG_TAG, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_F(...) BFLOG_F((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RF(...) BFLOG_RF((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_F(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_F(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RF(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 1) -#define LOG_E(...) BFLOG_E((void *)&__bflog_recorder, DBG_TAG, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_E(...) BFLOG_E((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RE(...) BFLOG_RE((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_E(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_E(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RE(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 2) -#define LOG_W(...) BFLOG_W((void *)&__bflog_recorder, DBG_TAG, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_W(...) BFLOG_W((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RW(...) BFLOG_RW((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_W(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_W(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RW(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 3) -#define LOG_I(...) BFLOG_I((void *)&__bflog_recorder, DBG_TAG, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_I(...) BFLOG_I((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RI(...) BFLOG_RI((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_I(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_I(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RI(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 4) -#define LOG_D(...) BFLOG_D((void *)&__bflog_recorder, DBG_TAG, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_D(...) BFLOG_D((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RD(...) BFLOG_RD((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_D(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_D(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RD(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 5) -#define LOG_T(...) BFLOG_T((void *)&__bflog_recorder, DBG_TAG, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_T(...) BFLOG_T((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RT(...) BFLOG_RT((void *)&__bflog_recorder, __VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_T(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_T(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RT(...) ((void)0) #endif -#define LOG_FLUSH() bflog_flush_s(&__bflog_recorder) +#define LOG_FLUSH() bflog_flush(&__bflog_recorder) #else #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 0) -#define LOG_F(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_F(...) printf("[F][" DBG_TAG "] " __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RF(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_F(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_F(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RF(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 1) -#define LOG_E(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_E(...) printf("[E][" DBG_TAG "] " __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RE(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_E(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_E(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RE(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 2) -#define LOG_W(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_W(...) printf("[W][" DBG_TAG "] " __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RW(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_W(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_W(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RW(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 3) -#define LOG_I(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_I(...) printf("[I][" DBG_TAG "] " __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RI(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_I(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_I(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RI(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 4) -#define LOG_D(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_D(...) printf("[D][" DBG_TAG "] " __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RD(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_D(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_D(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RD(...) ((void)0) #endif #if (CONFIG_LOG_LEVEL >= 5) -#define LOG_T(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_T(...) printf("[T][" DBG_TAG "] " __VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_RT(...) printf(__VA_ARGS__) #else -#define LOG_T(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_T(...) ((void)0) +#define LOG_RT(...) ((void)0) #endif #define LOG_FLUSH() ((void)0) #endif + #endif extern void error_handler(void); @@ -147,27 +189,30 @@ extern void error_handler(void); error_handler(); \ } while (0) -#define _ASSERT_PARAM(x) \ - if ((uint32_t)(x) == 0) { \ - printf("(Assertion Faild)\r\n"); \ - printf("(%s)\r\n", (const char *)(#x)); \ - LOG_F("Assertion Faild\r\n"); \ - LOG_F("%s\r\n", (const char *)(#x)); \ - LOG_FLUSH(); \ - error_handler(); \ +#define _ASSERT_PARAM(x) \ + if ((uint32_t)(x) == 0) { \ + printf("(Assertion Faild)\r\n"); \ + printf("(" #x "\r\n"); \ + LOG_F("Assertion Faild\r\n"); \ + LOG_F(#x "\r\n"); \ + LOG_FLUSH(); \ + error_handler(); \ } -#define _ASSERT_FUNC(x) \ - do { \ - if ((uint32_t)(x) == 0) { \ - printf("(Assertion Faild)\r\n"); \ - printf("(%s)\r\n", (const char *)(#x)); \ - LOG_F("Assertion Faild\r\n"); \ - LOG_F("%s\r\n", (const char *)(#x)); \ - LOG_FLUSH(); \ - error_handler(); \ - } \ +#define _ASSERT_FUNC(x) \ + do { \ + if ((uint32_t)(x) == 0) { \ + printf("(Assertion Faild)\r\n"); \ + printf("(" #x ")\r\n"); \ + LOG_F("Assertion Faild\r\n"); \ + LOG_F(#x "\r\n"); \ + LOG_FLUSH(); \ + error_handler(); \ + } \ } while (0) #endif +extern void log_restart(void); +extern void log_start(void); + #endif diff --git a/components/utils/log/log_freertos.c b/components/utils/log/log_freertos.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e0e5de23 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/utils/log/log_freertos.c @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +#define DBG_TAG "Svc LOG" + +#include +#include "task.h" +#include "queue.h" +#include "semphr.h" +#include "timers.h" +#include "event_groups.h" +#include "log.h" + +BFLOG_DEFINE_TAG(SVC_LOG, DBG_TAG, true); +#undef BFLOG_TAG +#define BFLOG_TAG BFLOG_GET_TAG(SVC_LOG) + +/* flush notice ------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static EventGroupHandle_t event_group_server_log_flush_notice; +static int log_flush_notice(void) +{ + xEventGroupSetBits(event_group_server_log_flush_notice, 0x00000001); + return 0; +} + +/* Task Function ------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +static TaskHandle_t task_log; +static void task_function_log(void *param) +{ + LOG_I("start log task\r\n"); + + while (1) { + xEventGroupWaitBits(event_group_server_log_flush_notice, 0x00000001, pdTRUE, pdFALSE, portMAX_DELAY); + LOG_FLUSH(); + } + + LOG_E("delete log task\r\n"); + vTaskDelete(NULL); +} + +/* BFLOG Varibale ------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +extern bflog_t __bflog_recorder; +extern bflog_direct_stream_t bflog_direct_stream; + +#ifdef LOG_ENABLE_FILESYSTEM +static bflog_direct_file_time_t bflog_direct_filetime; +static bflog_direct_file_size_t bflog_direct_filesize; +#endif + +/* BFLOG Mutex ------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +static SemaphoreHandle_t sem_server_log; + +static int +bflog_enter_critical(void) +{ + if (pdTRUE == xSemaphoreTake(sem_server_log, (TickType_t)200)) { + return 0; + } else { + return -1; + } +} + +static int +bflog_exit_critical(void) +{ + xSemaphoreGive(sem_server_log); + return 0; +} + +/* BFLOG Stream Mutex ------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +// SemaphoreHandle_t sem_server_uart0; + +// static int +// bflog_direct_stream_lock(void) +// { +// if (pdTRUE == xSemaphoreTake(sem_server_uart0, (TickType_t)200)) { +// return 0; +// } else { +// return -1; +// } +// } + +// static int +// bflog_direct_stream_unlock(void) +// { +// xSemaphoreGive(sem_server_uart0); +// return 0; +// } + +/* APP init ------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +void log_restart(void) +{ + LOG_I("log start init\r\n"); + + LOG_FLUSH(); + + // sem_server_uart0 = xSemaphoreCreateMutex(); + // _ASSERT_PARAM(NULL != sem_server_uart0); + + /*!< create event flag */ + event_group_server_log_flush_notice = xEventGroupCreate(); + _ASSERT_PARAM(NULL != event_group_server_log_flush_notice); + + /*!< create mutex */ + sem_server_log = xSemaphoreCreateMutex(); + _ASSERT_PARAM(NULL != sem_server_log); + + /*!< suspen recorder */ + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_suspend(&__bflog_recorder)); + + /*!< reconfig async mode */ + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_control(&__bflog_recorder, BFLOG_CMD_FLUSH_NOTICE, (uint32_t)log_flush_notice)); + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_control(&__bflog_recorder, BFLOG_CMD_MODE, BFLOG_MODE_ASYNC)); + + /*!< recofig uart0 direct stream, set lock unlock function */ + // _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_suspend((void *)&example_uart_stream)); + // _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_control((void *)&example_uart_stream, BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_LOCK, (uint32_t)bflog_direct_stream_lock)); + // _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_control((void *)&example_uart_stream, BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_UNLOCK, (uint32_t)bflog_direct_stream_unlock)); + // _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_resume((void *)&example_uart_stream)); + +#ifdef LOG_ENABLE_FILESYSTEM + /*!< create and config file time direct, keep common log info */ + /*!< lock unlcok function not need, fatfs support re-entrancy mode */ + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_create((void *)&bflog_direct_filetime, BFLOG_DIRECT_TYPE_FILE_TIME, BFLOG_DIRECT_COLOR_DISABLE, NULL, NULL)); + /*!< 6 * 60 * 60 second create a file */ + /*!< keep max 120 files */ + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_init_file_time((void *)&bflog_direct_filetime, "sd:/log/common", 6 * 60 * 60, 120)); + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_append(&__bflog_recorder, (void *)&bflog_direct_filetime)); + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_resume((void *)&bflog_direct_filetime)); + + /*!< create and config file time direct, only keep error and warning log info */ + /*!< lock unlcok function not need, fatfs support re-entrancy mode */ + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_create((void *)&bflog_direct_filesize, BFLOG_DIRECT_TYPE_FILE_SIZE, BFLOG_DIRECT_COLOR_DISABLE, NULL, NULL)); + /*!< 128 * 1024 bytes create a file */ + /*!< keep max 16 files */ + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_init_file_size((void *)&bflog_direct_filesize, "sd:/log/error", 128 * 1024, 16)); + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_control((void *)&bflog_direct_filesize, BFLOG_DIRECT_CMD_LEVEL, BFLOG_LEVEL_WARN)); + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_append(&__bflog_recorder, (void *)&bflog_direct_filesize)); + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_direct_resume((void *)&bflog_direct_filesize)); +#endif + + /*!< config mutex */ + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_control(&__bflog_recorder, BFLOG_CMD_ENTER_CRITICAL, (uint32_t)bflog_enter_critical)); + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_control(&__bflog_recorder, BFLOG_CMD_EXIT_CRITICAL, (uint32_t)bflog_exit_critical)); + + /*!< resume recorder */ + _ASSERT_FUNC(0 == bflog_resume(&__bflog_recorder)); + + /*!< create flush task */ + _ASSERT_FUNC(pdPASS == xTaskCreate( + /*!< task function */ task_function_log, + /*!< task name */ "LOG", + /*!< stack size */ 2048, + /*!< task param */ NULL, + /*!< task priority */ 3, + /*!< task handle */ &task_log)); + + LOG_I("log init success\r\n"); +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/components/utils/queue/queue.h b/components/utils/queue/queue.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..062b0136 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/utils/queue/queue.h @@ -0,0 +1,880 @@ +/*- + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)queue.h 8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94 + * $FreeBSD$ + */ + +#ifndef _SYS_QUEUE_H_ +#define _SYS_QUEUE_H_ + +/* + * This file defines four types of data structures: singly-linked lists, + * singly-linked tail queues, lists and tail queues. + * + * A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements + * are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at + * the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be + * added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list. + * Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit + * macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may + * only be traversed in the forward direction. Singly-linked lists are ideal + * for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for + * implementing a LIFO queue. + * + * A singly-linked tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the + * head of the list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are + * singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at the + * expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be added + * to the list after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the + * end of the list. Elements being removed from the head of the tail queue + * should use the explicit macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. + * A singly-linked tail queue may only be traversed in the forward direction. + * Singly-linked tail queues are ideal for applications with large datasets + * and few or no removals or for implementing a FIFO queue. + * + * A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward + * pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked + * so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before + * or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list + * may be traversed in either direction. + * + * A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly + * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or + * after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of + * the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction. + * + * For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page. + * + * Below is a summary of implemented functions where: + * + means the macro is available + * - means the macro is not available + * s means the macro is available but is slow (runs in O(n) time) + * + * SLIST LIST STAILQ TAILQ + * _HEAD + + + + + * _CLASS_HEAD + + + + + * _HEAD_INITIALIZER + + + + + * _ENTRY + + + + + * _CLASS_ENTRY + + + + + * _INIT + + + + + * _EMPTY + + + + + * _END + + + + + * _FIRST + + + + + * _NEXT + + + + + * _PREV - + - + + * _LAST - - + + + * _LAST_FAST - - - + + * _FOREACH + + + + + * _FOREACH_FROM + + + + + * _FOREACH_SAFE + + + + + * _FOREACH_FROM_SAFE + + + + + * _FOREACH_REVERSE - - - + + * _FOREACH_REVERSE_FROM - - - + + * _FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE - - - + + * _FOREACH_REVERSE_FROM_SAFE - - - + + * _INSERT_HEAD + + + + + * _INSERT_BEFORE - + - + + * _INSERT_AFTER + + + + + * _INSERT_TAIL - - + + + * _CONCAT s s + + + * _REMOVE_AFTER + - + - + * _REMOVE_HEAD + - + - + * _REMOVE s + s + + * _SWAP + + + + + * + */ +#ifdef QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG +#warn Use QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRACE and/or QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRASH +#define QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRACE +#define QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRASH +#endif + +#ifdef QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRACE +/* Store the last 2 places the queue element or head was altered */ +struct qm_trace { + unsigned long lastline; + unsigned long prevline; + const char *lastfile; + const char *prevfile; +}; + +#define TRACEBUF struct qm_trace trace; +#define TRACEBUF_INITIALIZER { __LINE__, 0, __FILE__, NULL } , + +#define QMD_TRACE_HEAD(head) do { \ + (head)->trace.prevline = (head)->trace.lastline; \ + (head)->trace.prevfile = (head)->trace.lastfile; \ + (head)->trace.lastline = __LINE__; \ + (head)->trace.lastfile = __FILE__; \ +} while (0) + +#define QMD_TRACE_ELEM(elem) do { \ + (elem)->trace.prevline = (elem)->trace.lastline; \ + (elem)->trace.prevfile = (elem)->trace.lastfile; \ + (elem)->trace.lastline = __LINE__; \ + (elem)->trace.lastfile = __FILE__; \ +} while (0) + +#else /* !QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRACE */ +#define QMD_TRACE_ELEM(elem) +#define QMD_TRACE_HEAD(head) +#define TRACEBUF +#define TRACEBUF_INITIALIZER +#endif /* QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRACE */ + +#ifdef QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRASH +#define QMD_SAVELINK(name, link) void **name = (void *)&(link) +#define TRASHIT(x) do {(x) = (void *)-1;} while (0) +#define QMD_IS_TRASHED(x) ((x) == (void *)(intptr_t)-1) +#else /* !QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRASH */ +#define QMD_SAVELINK(name, link) +#define TRASHIT(x) +#define QMD_IS_TRASHED(x) 0 +#endif /* QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG_TRASH */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +/* + * In C++ there can be structure lists and class lists: + */ +#define QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) type +#else +#define QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) struct type +#endif + +/* + * Singly-linked List declarations. + */ +#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *slh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define SLIST_CLASS_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + class type *slh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL } + +#define SLIST_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *sle_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +#define SLIST_CLASS_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + class type *sle_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +/* + * Singly-linked List functions. + */ +#if (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(INVARIANTS)) +#define QMD_SLIST_CHECK_PREVPTR(prevp, elm) do { \ + if (*(prevp) != (elm)) \ + panic("Bad prevptr *(%p) == %p != %p", \ + (prevp), *(prevp), (elm)); \ +} while (0) +#else +#define QMD_SLIST_CHECK_PREVPTR(prevp, elm) +#endif + +#define SLIST_CONCAT(head1, head2, type, field) do { \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) *curelm = SLIST_FIRST(head1); \ + if (curelm == NULL) { \ + if ((SLIST_FIRST(head1) = SLIST_FIRST(head2)) != NULL) \ + SLIST_INIT(head2); \ + } else if (SLIST_FIRST(head2) != NULL) { \ + while (SLIST_NEXT(curelm, field) != NULL) \ + curelm = SLIST_NEXT(curelm, field); \ + SLIST_NEXT(curelm, field) = SLIST_FIRST(head2); \ + SLIST_INIT(head2); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_EMPTY(head) ((head)->slh_first == NULL) + +#define SLIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->slh_first) + +#define SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for ((var) = SLIST_FIRST((head)); \ + (var); \ + (var) = SLIST_NEXT((var), field)) + +#define SLIST_FOREACH_FROM(var, head, field) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : SLIST_FIRST((head))); \ + (var); \ + (var) = SLIST_NEXT((var), field)) + +#define SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = SLIST_FIRST((head)); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = SLIST_NEXT((var), field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define SLIST_FOREACH_FROM_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : SLIST_FIRST((head))); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = SLIST_NEXT((var), field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR(var, varp, head, field) \ + for ((varp) = &SLIST_FIRST((head)); \ + ((var) = *(varp)) != NULL; \ + (varp) = &SLIST_NEXT((var), field)) + +#define SLIST_INIT(head) do { \ + SLIST_FIRST((head)) = NULL; \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do { \ + SLIST_NEXT((elm), field) = SLIST_NEXT((slistelm), field); \ + SLIST_NEXT((slistelm), field) = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + SLIST_NEXT((elm), field) = SLIST_FIRST((head)); \ + SLIST_FIRST((head)) = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sle_next) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do { \ + if (SLIST_FIRST((head)) == (elm)) { \ + SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field); \ + } \ + else { \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) *curelm = SLIST_FIRST(head); \ + while (SLIST_NEXT(curelm, field) != (elm)) \ + curelm = SLIST_NEXT(curelm, field); \ + SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER(curelm, field); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER(elm, field) do { \ + QMD_SAVELINK(oldnext, SLIST_NEXT(elm, field)->field.sle_next); \ + SLIST_NEXT(elm, field) = \ + SLIST_NEXT(SLIST_NEXT(elm, field), field); \ + TRASHIT(*oldnext); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \ + QMD_SAVELINK(oldnext, SLIST_FIRST(head)->field.sle_next); \ + SLIST_FIRST((head)) = SLIST_NEXT(SLIST_FIRST((head)), field); \ + TRASHIT(*oldnext); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE_PREVPTR(prevp, elm, field) do { \ + QMD_SLIST_CHECK_PREVPTR(prevp, elm); \ + *(prevp) = SLIST_NEXT(elm, field); \ + TRASHIT((elm)->field.sle_next); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_SWAP(head1, head2, type) do { \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) *swap_first = SLIST_FIRST(head1); \ + SLIST_FIRST(head1) = SLIST_FIRST(head2); \ + SLIST_FIRST(head2) = swap_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_END(head) NULL + +/* + * Singly-linked Tail queue declarations. + */ +#define STAILQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *stqh_first;/* first element */ \ + struct type **stqh_last;/* addr of last next element */ \ +} + +#define STAILQ_CLASS_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + class type *stqh_first; /* first element */ \ + class type **stqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ +} + +#define STAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL, &(head).stqh_first } + +#define STAILQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *stqe_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +#define STAILQ_CLASS_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + class type *stqe_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +/* + * Singly-linked Tail queue functions. + */ +#define STAILQ_CONCAT(head1, head2) do { \ + if (!STAILQ_EMPTY((head2))) { \ + *(head1)->stqh_last = (head2)->stqh_first; \ + (head1)->stqh_last = (head2)->stqh_last; \ + STAILQ_INIT((head2)); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define STAILQ_EMPTY(head) ((head)->stqh_first == NULL) + +#define STAILQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->stqh_first) + +#define STAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = STAILQ_FIRST((head)); \ + (var); \ + (var) = STAILQ_NEXT((var), field)) + +#define STAILQ_FOREACH_FROM(var, head, field) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : STAILQ_FIRST((head))); \ + (var); \ + (var) = STAILQ_NEXT((var), field)) + +#define STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = STAILQ_FIRST((head)); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = STAILQ_NEXT((var), field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define STAILQ_FOREACH_FROM_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : STAILQ_FIRST((head))); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = STAILQ_NEXT((var), field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define STAILQ_INIT(head) do { \ + STAILQ_FIRST((head)) = NULL; \ + (head)->stqh_last = &STAILQ_FIRST((head)); \ +} while (0) + +#define STAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, tqelm, elm, field) do { \ + if ((STAILQ_NEXT((elm), field) = STAILQ_NEXT((tqelm), field)) == NULL)\ + (head)->stqh_last = &STAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ + STAILQ_NEXT((tqelm), field) = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define STAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if ((STAILQ_NEXT((elm), field) = STAILQ_FIRST((head))) == NULL) \ + (head)->stqh_last = &STAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ + STAILQ_FIRST((head)) = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + STAILQ_NEXT((elm), field) = NULL; \ + *(head)->stqh_last = (elm); \ + (head)->stqh_last = &STAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ +} while (0) + +#define STAILQ_LAST(head, type, field) \ + (STAILQ_EMPTY((head)) ? NULL : \ + __containerof((head)->stqh_last, \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type), field.stqe_next)) + +#define STAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.stqe_next) + +#define STAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do { \ + QMD_SAVELINK(oldnext, (elm)->field.stqe_next); \ + if (STAILQ_FIRST((head)) == (elm)) { \ + STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field); \ + } \ + else { \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) *curelm = STAILQ_FIRST(head); \ + while (STAILQ_NEXT(curelm, field) != (elm)) \ + curelm = STAILQ_NEXT(curelm, field); \ + STAILQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, curelm, field); \ + } \ + TRASHIT(*oldnext); \ +} while (0) + +#define STAILQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do { \ + if ((STAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) = \ + STAILQ_NEXT(STAILQ_NEXT(elm, field), field)) == NULL) \ + (head)->stqh_last = &STAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ +} while (0) + +#define STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \ + if ((STAILQ_FIRST((head)) = \ + STAILQ_NEXT(STAILQ_FIRST((head)), field)) == NULL) \ + (head)->stqh_last = &STAILQ_FIRST((head)); \ +} while (0) + +#define STAILQ_SWAP(head1, head2, type) do { \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) *swap_first = STAILQ_FIRST(head1); \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) **swap_last = (head1)->stqh_last; \ + STAILQ_FIRST(head1) = STAILQ_FIRST(head2); \ + (head1)->stqh_last = (head2)->stqh_last; \ + STAILQ_FIRST(head2) = swap_first; \ + (head2)->stqh_last = swap_last; \ + if (STAILQ_EMPTY(head1)) \ + (head1)->stqh_last = &STAILQ_FIRST(head1); \ + if (STAILQ_EMPTY(head2)) \ + (head2)->stqh_last = &STAILQ_FIRST(head2); \ +} while (0) + +#define STAILQ_END(head) NULL + + +/* + * List declarations. + */ +#define LIST_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *lh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define LIST_CLASS_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + class type *lh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL } + +#define LIST_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *le_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type **le_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ +} + +#define LIST_CLASS_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + class type *le_next; /* next element */ \ + class type **le_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ +} + +/* + * List functions. + */ + +#if (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(INVARIANTS)) +/* + * QMD_LIST_CHECK_HEAD(LIST_HEAD *head, LIST_ENTRY NAME) + * + * If the list is non-empty, validates that the first element of the list + * points back at 'head.' + */ +#define QMD_LIST_CHECK_HEAD(head, field) do { \ + if (LIST_FIRST((head)) != NULL && \ + LIST_FIRST((head))->field.le_prev != \ + &LIST_FIRST((head))) \ + panic("Bad list head %p first->prev != head", (head)); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * QMD_LIST_CHECK_NEXT(TYPE *elm, LIST_ENTRY NAME) + * + * If an element follows 'elm' in the list, validates that the next element + * points back at 'elm.' + */ +#define QMD_LIST_CHECK_NEXT(elm, field) do { \ + if (LIST_NEXT((elm), field) != NULL && \ + LIST_NEXT((elm), field)->field.le_prev != \ + &((elm)->field.le_next)) \ + panic("Bad link elm %p next->prev != elm", (elm)); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * QMD_LIST_CHECK_PREV(TYPE *elm, LIST_ENTRY NAME) + * + * Validates that the previous element (or head of the list) points to 'elm.' + */ +#define QMD_LIST_CHECK_PREV(elm, field) do { \ + if (*(elm)->field.le_prev != (elm)) \ + panic("Bad link elm %p prev->next != elm", (elm)); \ +} while (0) +#else +#define QMD_LIST_CHECK_HEAD(head, field) +#define QMD_LIST_CHECK_NEXT(elm, field) +#define QMD_LIST_CHECK_PREV(elm, field) +#endif /* (_KERNEL && INVARIANTS) */ + +#define LIST_CONCAT(head1, head2, type, field) do { \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) *curelm = LIST_FIRST(head1); \ + if (curelm == NULL) { \ + if ((LIST_FIRST(head1) = LIST_FIRST(head2)) != NULL) { \ + LIST_FIRST(head2)->field.le_prev = \ + &LIST_FIRST((head1)); \ + LIST_INIT(head2); \ + } \ + } else if (LIST_FIRST(head2) != NULL) { \ + while (LIST_NEXT(curelm, field) != NULL) \ + curelm = LIST_NEXT(curelm, field); \ + LIST_NEXT(curelm, field) = LIST_FIRST(head2); \ + LIST_FIRST(head2)->field.le_prev = &LIST_NEXT(curelm, field); \ + LIST_INIT(head2); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_EMPTY(head) ((head)->lh_first == NULL) + +#define LIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->lh_first) + +#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for ((var) = LIST_FIRST((head)); \ + (var); \ + (var) = LIST_NEXT((var), field)) + +#define LIST_FOREACH_FROM(var, head, field) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : LIST_FIRST((head))); \ + (var); \ + (var) = LIST_NEXT((var), field)) + +#define LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = LIST_FIRST((head)); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = LIST_NEXT((var), field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define LIST_FOREACH_FROM_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : LIST_FIRST((head))); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = LIST_NEXT((var), field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define LIST_INIT(head) do { \ + LIST_FIRST((head)) = NULL; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + QMD_LIST_CHECK_NEXT(listelm, field); \ + if ((LIST_NEXT((elm), field) = LIST_NEXT((listelm), field)) != NULL)\ + LIST_NEXT((listelm), field)->field.le_prev = \ + &LIST_NEXT((elm), field); \ + LIST_NEXT((listelm), field) = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = &LIST_NEXT((listelm), field); \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + QMD_LIST_CHECK_PREV(listelm, field); \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev; \ + LIST_NEXT((elm), field) = (listelm); \ + *(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.le_prev = &LIST_NEXT((elm), field); \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + QMD_LIST_CHECK_HEAD((head), field); \ + if ((LIST_NEXT((elm), field) = LIST_FIRST((head))) != NULL) \ + LIST_FIRST((head))->field.le_prev = &LIST_NEXT((elm), field);\ + LIST_FIRST((head)) = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = &LIST_FIRST((head)); \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.le_next) + +#define LIST_PREV(elm, head, type, field) \ + ((elm)->field.le_prev == &LIST_FIRST((head)) ? NULL : \ + __containerof((elm)->field.le_prev, \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type), field.le_next)) + +#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do { \ + QMD_SAVELINK(oldnext, (elm)->field.le_next); \ + QMD_SAVELINK(oldprev, (elm)->field.le_prev); \ + QMD_LIST_CHECK_NEXT(elm, field); \ + QMD_LIST_CHECK_PREV(elm, field); \ + if (LIST_NEXT((elm), field) != NULL) \ + LIST_NEXT((elm), field)->field.le_prev = \ + (elm)->field.le_prev; \ + *(elm)->field.le_prev = LIST_NEXT((elm), field); \ + TRASHIT(*oldnext); \ + TRASHIT(*oldprev); \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_SWAP(head1, head2, type, field) do { \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) *swap_tmp = LIST_FIRST(head1); \ + LIST_FIRST((head1)) = LIST_FIRST((head2)); \ + LIST_FIRST((head2)) = swap_tmp; \ + if ((swap_tmp = LIST_FIRST((head1))) != NULL) \ + swap_tmp->field.le_prev = &LIST_FIRST((head1)); \ + if ((swap_tmp = LIST_FIRST((head2))) != NULL) \ + swap_tmp->field.le_prev = &LIST_FIRST((head2)); \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_END(head) NULL + +/* + * Tail queue declarations. + */ +#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *tqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type **tqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ + TRACEBUF \ +} + +#define TAILQ_CLASS_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + class type *tqh_first; /* first element */ \ + class type **tqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ + TRACEBUF \ +} + +#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL, &(head).tqh_first, TRACEBUF_INITIALIZER } + +#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *tqe_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type **tqe_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ + TRACEBUF \ +} + +#define TAILQ_CLASS_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + class type *tqe_next; /* next element */ \ + class type **tqe_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ + TRACEBUF \ +} + +/* + * Tail queue functions. + */ +#if (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(INVARIANTS)) +/* + * QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_HEAD(TAILQ_HEAD *head, TAILQ_ENTRY NAME) + * + * If the tailq is non-empty, validates that the first element of the tailq + * points back at 'head.' + */ +#define QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_HEAD(head, field) do { \ + if (!TAILQ_EMPTY(head) && \ + TAILQ_FIRST((head))->field.tqe_prev != \ + &TAILQ_FIRST((head))) \ + panic("Bad tailq head %p first->prev != head", (head)); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_TAIL(TAILQ_HEAD *head, TAILQ_ENTRY NAME) + * + * Validates that the tail of the tailq is a pointer to pointer to NULL. + */ +#define QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_TAIL(head, field) do { \ + if (*(head)->tqh_last != NULL) \ + panic("Bad tailq NEXT(%p->tqh_last) != NULL", (head)); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_NEXT(TYPE *elm, TAILQ_ENTRY NAME) + * + * If an element follows 'elm' in the tailq, validates that the next element + * points back at 'elm.' + */ +#define QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_NEXT(elm, field) do { \ + if (TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field) != NULL && \ + TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field)->field.tqe_prev != \ + &((elm)->field.tqe_next)) \ + panic("Bad link elm %p next->prev != elm", (elm)); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_PREV(TYPE *elm, TAILQ_ENTRY NAME) + * + * Validates that the previous element (or head of the tailq) points to 'elm.' + */ +#define QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_PREV(elm, field) do { \ + if (*(elm)->field.tqe_prev != (elm)) \ + panic("Bad link elm %p prev->next != elm", (elm)); \ +} while (0) +#else +#define QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_HEAD(head, field) +#define QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_TAIL(head, headname) +#define QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_NEXT(elm, field) +#define QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_PREV(elm, field) +#endif /* (_KERNEL && INVARIANTS) */ + +#define TAILQ_CONCAT(head1, head2, field) do { \ + if (!TAILQ_EMPTY(head2)) { \ + *(head1)->tqh_last = (head2)->tqh_first; \ + (head2)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = (head1)->tqh_last; \ + (head1)->tqh_last = (head2)->tqh_last; \ + TAILQ_INIT((head2)); \ + QMD_TRACE_HEAD(head1); \ + QMD_TRACE_HEAD(head2); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_EMPTY(head) ((head)->tqh_first == NULL) + +#define TAILQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->tqh_first) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for ((var) = TAILQ_FIRST((head)); \ + (var); \ + (var) = TAILQ_NEXT((var), field)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_FROM(var, head, field) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : TAILQ_FIRST((head))); \ + (var); \ + (var) = TAILQ_NEXT((var), field)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = TAILQ_FIRST((head)); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = TAILQ_NEXT((var), field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_FROM_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : TAILQ_FIRST((head))); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = TAILQ_NEXT((var), field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, headname, field) \ + for ((var) = TAILQ_LAST((head), headname); \ + (var); \ + (var) = TAILQ_PREV((var), headname, field)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_FROM(var, head, headname, field) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : TAILQ_LAST((head), headname)); \ + (var); \ + (var) = TAILQ_PREV((var), headname, field)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = TAILQ_LAST((head), headname); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = TAILQ_PREV((var), headname, field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_FROM_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = ((var) ? (var) : TAILQ_LAST((head), headname)); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = TAILQ_PREV((var), headname, field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define TAILQ_INIT(head) do { \ + TAILQ_FIRST((head)) = NULL; \ + (head)->tqh_last = &TAILQ_FIRST((head)); \ + QMD_TRACE_HEAD(head); \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_NEXT(listelm, field); \ + if ((TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field) = TAILQ_NEXT((listelm), field)) != NULL)\ + TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field)->field.tqe_prev = \ + &TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ + else { \ + (head)->tqh_last = &TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ + QMD_TRACE_HEAD(head); \ + } \ + TAILQ_NEXT((listelm), field) = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &TAILQ_NEXT((listelm), field); \ + QMD_TRACE_ELEM(&(elm)->field); \ + QMD_TRACE_ELEM(&(listelm)->field); \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_PREV(listelm, field); \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field) = (listelm); \ + *(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ + QMD_TRACE_ELEM(&(elm)->field); \ + QMD_TRACE_ELEM(&(listelm)->field); \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_HEAD(head, field); \ + if ((TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field) = TAILQ_FIRST((head))) != NULL) \ + TAILQ_FIRST((head))->field.tqe_prev = \ + &TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ + TAILQ_FIRST((head)) = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &TAILQ_FIRST((head)); \ + QMD_TRACE_HEAD(head); \ + QMD_TRACE_ELEM(&(elm)->field); \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_TAIL(head, field); \ + TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field) = NULL; \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last; \ + *(head)->tqh_last = (elm); \ + (head)->tqh_last = &TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ + QMD_TRACE_HEAD(head); \ + QMD_TRACE_ELEM(&(elm)->field); \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname) \ + (*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last)) + +/* + * The FAST function is fast in that it causes no data access other + * then the access to the head. The standard LAST function above + * will cause a data access of both the element you want and + * the previous element. FAST is very useful for instances when + * you may want to prefetch the last data element. + */ +#define TAILQ_LAST_FAST(head, type, field) \ + (TAILQ_EMPTY(head) ? NULL : __containerof((head)->tqh_last, QUEUE_TYPEOF(type), field.tqe_next)) + +#define TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.tqe_next) + +#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field) \ + (*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last)) + +#define TAILQ_PREV_FAST(elm, head, type, field) \ + ((elm)->field.tqe_prev == &(head)->tqh_first ? NULL : \ + __containerof((elm)->field.tqe_prev, QUEUE_TYPEOF(type), field.tqe_next)) + +#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \ + QMD_SAVELINK(oldnext, (elm)->field.tqe_next); \ + QMD_SAVELINK(oldprev, (elm)->field.tqe_prev); \ + QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_NEXT(elm, field); \ + QMD_TAILQ_CHECK_PREV(elm, field); \ + if ((TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field)) != NULL) \ + TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field)->field.tqe_prev = \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + else { \ + (head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + QMD_TRACE_HEAD(head); \ + } \ + *(elm)->field.tqe_prev = TAILQ_NEXT((elm), field); \ + TRASHIT(*oldnext); \ + TRASHIT(*oldprev); \ + QMD_TRACE_ELEM(&(elm)->field); \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_SWAP(head1, head2, type, field) do { \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) *swap_first = (head1)->tqh_first; \ + QUEUE_TYPEOF(type) **swap_last = (head1)->tqh_last; \ + (head1)->tqh_first = (head2)->tqh_first; \ + (head1)->tqh_last = (head2)->tqh_last; \ + (head2)->tqh_first = swap_first; \ + (head2)->tqh_last = swap_last; \ + if ((swap_first = (head1)->tqh_first) != NULL) \ + swap_first->field.tqe_prev = &(head1)->tqh_first; \ + else \ + (head1)->tqh_last = &(head1)->tqh_first; \ + if ((swap_first = (head2)->tqh_first) != NULL) \ + swap_first->field.tqe_prev = &(head2)->tqh_first; \ + else \ + (head2)->tqh_last = &(head2)->tqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_END(head) NULL + +#endif /* !_SYS_QUEUE_H_ */ diff --git a/components/utils/tree/tree.h b/components/utils/tree/tree.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ee90e1c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/utils/tree/tree.h @@ -0,0 +1,1061 @@ +/* $NetBSD: tree.h,v 1.8 2004/03/28 19:38:30 provos Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.7 2002/10/17 21:51:54 art Exp $ */ +/* $FreeBSD$ */ + +/*- + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD + * + * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _SYS_TREE_H_ +#define _SYS_TREE_H_ + +/* + * This file defines data structures for different types of trees: + * splay trees and rank-balanced trees. + * + * A splay tree is a self-organizing data structure. Every operation + * on the tree causes a splay to happen. The splay moves the requested + * node to the root of the tree and partly rebalances it. + * + * This has the benefit that request locality causes faster lookups as + * the requested nodes move to the top of the tree. On the other hand, + * every lookup causes memory writes. + * + * The Balance Theorem bounds the total access time for m operations + * and n inserts on an initially empty tree as O((m + n)lg n). The + * amortized cost for a sequence of m accesses to a splay tree is O(lg n); + * + * A rank-balanced tree is a binary search tree with an integer + * rank-difference as an attribute of each pointer from parent to child. + * The sum of the rank-differences on any path from a node down to null is + * the same, and defines the rank of that node. The rank of the null node + * is -1. + * + * Different additional conditions define different sorts of balanced trees, + * including "red-black" and "AVL" trees. The set of conditions applied here + * are the "weak-AVL" conditions of Haeupler, Sen and Tarjan presented in in + * "Rank Balanced Trees", ACM Transactions on Algorithms Volume 11 Issue 4 June + * 2015 Article No.: 30pp 1–26 https://doi.org/10.1145/2689412 (the HST paper): + * - every rank-difference is 1 or 2. + * - the rank of any leaf is 1. + * + * For historical reasons, rank differences that are even are associated + * with the color red (Rank-Even-Difference), and the child that a red edge + * points to is called a red child. + * + * Every operation on a rank-balanced tree is bounded as O(lg n). + * The maximum height of a rank-balanced tree is 2lg (n+1). + */ + +#define SPLAY_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *sph_root; /* root of the tree */ \ +} + +#define SPLAY_INITIALIZER(root) \ + { NULL } + +#define SPLAY_INIT(root) do { \ + (root)->sph_root = NULL; \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +#define SPLAY_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *spe_left; /* left element */ \ + struct type *spe_right; /* right element */ \ +} + +#define SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) (elm)->field.spe_left +#define SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) (elm)->field.spe_right +#define SPLAY_ROOT(head) (head)->sph_root +#define SPLAY_EMPTY(head) (SPLAY_ROOT(head) == NULL) + +/* SPLAY_ROTATE_{LEFT,RIGHT} expect that tmp hold SPLAY_{RIGHT,LEFT} */ +#define SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = tmp; \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +#define SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = tmp; \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +#define SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + tmp = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +#define SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + tmp = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +#define SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, node, left, right, field) do { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(left, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + SPLAY_LEFT(right, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(node, field); \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(node, field); \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */ + +#define SPLAY_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp) \ +void name##_SPLAY(struct name *, struct type *); \ +void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *, int); \ +struct type *name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *); \ +struct type *name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *); \ + \ +/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */ \ +static __unused __inline struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) \ + return(NULL); \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) \ + return (head->sph_root); \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +static __unused __inline struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_NEXT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + if (SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) != NULL) { \ + elm = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + while (SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) != NULL) { \ + elm = SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field); \ + } \ + } else \ + elm = NULL; \ + return (elm); \ +} \ + \ +static __unused __inline struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(struct name *head, int val) \ +{ \ + name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(head, val); \ + return (SPLAY_ROOT(head)); \ +} + +/* Main splay operation. + * Moves node close to the key of elm to top + */ +#define SPLAY_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp) \ +struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) { \ + SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL; \ + } else { \ + __typeof(cmp(NULL, NULL)) __comp; \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + __comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root); \ + if (__comp < 0) { \ + SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL; \ + } else if (__comp > 0) { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL; \ + } else \ + return ((head)->sph_root); \ + } \ + (head)->sph_root = (elm); \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *__tmp; \ + if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) \ + return (NULL); \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) { \ + if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL) { \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + } else { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = __tmp; \ + } \ + return (elm); \ + } \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +void \ +name##_SPLAY(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp; \ + __typeof(cmp(NULL, NULL)) __comp; \ +\ + SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\ + __left = __right = &__node; \ +\ + while ((__comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root)) != 0) { \ + if (__comp < 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) < 0){ \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field); \ + } else if (__comp > 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) > 0){ \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field); \ + } \ + } \ + SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field); \ +} \ + \ +/* Splay with either the minimum or the maximum element \ + * Used to find minimum or maximum element in tree. \ + */ \ +void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *head, int __comp) \ +{ \ + struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp; \ +\ + SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\ + __left = __right = &__node; \ +\ + while (1) { \ + if (__comp < 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if (__comp < 0){ \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field); \ + } else if (__comp > 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if (__comp > 0) { \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field); \ + } \ + } \ + SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field); \ +} + +#define SPLAY_NEGINF -1 +#define SPLAY_INF 1 + +#define SPLAY_INSERT(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_INSERT(x, y) +#define SPLAY_REMOVE(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(x, y) +#define SPLAY_FIND(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_FIND(x, y) +#define SPLAY_NEXT(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_NEXT(x, y) +#define SPLAY_MIN(name, x) (SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL \ + : name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_NEGINF)) +#define SPLAY_MAX(name, x) (SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL \ + : name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_INF)) + +#define SPLAY_FOREACH(x, name, head) \ + for ((x) = SPLAY_MIN(name, head); \ + (x) != NULL; \ + (x) = SPLAY_NEXT(name, head, x)) + +/* Macros that define a rank-balanced tree */ +#define RB_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *rbh_root; /* root of the tree */ \ +} + +#define RB_INITIALIZER(root) \ + { NULL } + +#define RB_INIT(root) do { \ + (root)->rbh_root = NULL; \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +#define RB_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *rbe_link[3]; \ +} + +/* + * With the expectation that any object of struct type has an + * address that is a multiple of 4, and that therefore the + * 2 least significant bits of a pointer to struct type are + * always zero, this implementation sets those bits to indicate + * that the left or right child of the tree node is "red". + */ +#define _RB_LINK(elm, dir, field) (elm)->field.rbe_link[dir] +#define _RB_UP(elm, field) _RB_LINK(elm, 0, field) +#define _RB_L ((__uintptr_t)1) +#define _RB_R ((__uintptr_t)2) +#define _RB_LR ((__uintptr_t)3) +#define _RB_BITS(elm) (*(__uintptr_t *)&elm) +#define _RB_BITSUP(elm, field) _RB_BITS(_RB_UP(elm, field)) +#define _RB_PTR(elm) (__typeof(elm)) \ + ((__uintptr_t)elm & ~_RB_LR) + +#define RB_PARENT(elm, field) _RB_PTR(_RB_UP(elm, field)) +#define RB_LEFT(elm, field) _RB_LINK(elm, _RB_L, field) +#define RB_RIGHT(elm, field) _RB_LINK(elm, _RB_R, field) +#define RB_ROOT(head) (head)->rbh_root +#define RB_EMPTY(head) (RB_ROOT(head) == NULL) + +#define RB_SET_PARENT(dst, src, field) do { \ + _RB_BITSUP(dst, field) = (__uintptr_t)src | \ + (_RB_BITSUP(dst, field) & _RB_LR); \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +#define RB_SET(elm, parent, field) do { \ + _RB_UP(elm, field) = parent; \ + RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL; \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +/* + * Either RB_AUGMENT or RB_AUGMENT_CHECK is invoked in a loop at the root of + * every modified subtree, from the bottom up to the root, to update augmented + * node data. RB_AUGMENT_CHECK returns true only when the update changes the + * node data, so that updating can be stopped short of the root when it returns + * false. + */ +#ifndef RB_AUGMENT_CHECK +#ifndef RB_AUGMENT +#define RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(x) 0 +#else +#define RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(x) (RB_AUGMENT(x), 1) +#endif +#endif + +#define RB_UPDATE_AUGMENT(elm, field) do { \ + __typeof(elm) rb_update_tmp = (elm); \ + while (RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(rb_update_tmp) && \ + (rb_update_tmp = RB_PARENT(rb_update_tmp, field)) != NULL) \ + ; \ +} while (0) + +#define RB_SWAP_CHILD(head, par, out, in, field) do { \ + if (par == NULL) \ + RB_ROOT(head) = (in); \ + else if ((out) == RB_LEFT(par, field)) \ + RB_LEFT(par, field) = (in); \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(par, field) = (in); \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +/* + * RB_ROTATE macro partially restructures the tree to improve balance. In the + * case when dir is _RB_L, tmp is a right child of elm. After rotation, elm + * is a left child of tmp, and the subtree that represented the items between + * them, which formerly hung to the left of tmp now hangs to the right of elm. + * The parent-child relationship between elm and its former parent is not + * changed; where this macro once updated those fields, that is now left to the + * caller of RB_ROTATE to clean up, so that a pair of rotations does not twice + * update the same pair of pointer fields with distinct values. + */ +#define RB_ROTATE(elm, tmp, dir, field) do { \ + if ((_RB_LINK(elm, dir ^ _RB_LR, field) = \ + _RB_LINK(tmp, dir, field)) != NULL) \ + RB_SET_PARENT(_RB_LINK(tmp, dir, field), elm, field); \ + _RB_LINK(tmp, dir, field) = (elm); \ + RB_SET_PARENT(elm, tmp, field); \ +} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0) + +/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */ +#define RB_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp) \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp) \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __unused static) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_RANK(name, type, attr) \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT_COLOR(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_REMOVE_COLOR(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT_FINISH(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_REMOVE(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_FIND(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_NFIND(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_NEXT(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT_NEXT(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_PREV(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT_PREV(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_MINMAX(name, type, attr); \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_REINSERT(name, type, attr); +#ifdef _RB_DIAGNOSTIC +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_RANK(name, type, attr) \ + attr int name##_RB_RANK(struct type *); +#else +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_RANK(name, type, attr) +#endif +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT_COLOR(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *, \ + struct type *, struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_REMOVE_COLOR(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *, \ + struct type *, struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_REMOVE(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT_FINISH(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT_FINISH(struct name *, \ + struct type *, struct type **, struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_FIND(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_FIND(struct name *, struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_NFIND(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *, struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_NEXT(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT_NEXT(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT_NEXT(struct name *, \ + struct type *, struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_PREV(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_PREV(struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INSERT_PREV(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT_PREV(struct name *, \ + struct type *, struct type *) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_MINMAX(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *, int) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_REINSERT(name, type, attr) \ + attr struct type *name##_RB_REINSERT(struct name *, struct type *) + +/* Main rb operation. + * Moves node close to the key of elm to top + */ +#define RB_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp) \ + RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,) +#define RB_GENERATE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp) \ + RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __unused static) +#define RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_RANK(name, type, field, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_INSERT_COLOR(name, type, field, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_REMOVE_COLOR(name, type, field, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_INSERT_FINISH(name, type, field, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_INSERT(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_REMOVE(name, type, field, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_FIND(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_NFIND(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_NEXT(name, type, field, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_INSERT_NEXT(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_PREV(name, type, field, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_INSERT_PREV(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_MINMAX(name, type, field, attr) \ + RB_GENERATE_REINSERT(name, type, field, cmp, attr) + +#ifdef _RB_DIAGNOSTIC +#ifndef RB_AUGMENT +#define _RB_AUGMENT_VERIFY(x) RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(x) +#else +#define _RB_AUGMENT_VERIFY(x) 0 +#endif +#define RB_GENERATE_RANK(name, type, field, attr) \ +/* \ + * Return the rank of the subtree rooted at elm, or -1 if the subtree \ + * is not rank-balanced, or has inconsistent augmentation data. + */ \ +attr int \ +name##_RB_RANK(struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *left, *right, *up; \ + int left_rank, right_rank; \ + \ + if (elm == NULL) \ + return (0); \ + up = _RB_UP(elm, field); \ + left = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + left_rank = ((_RB_BITS(up) & _RB_L) ? 2 : 1) + \ + name##_RB_RANK(left); \ + right = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + right_rank = ((_RB_BITS(up) & _RB_R) ? 2 : 1) + \ + name##_RB_RANK(right); \ + if (left_rank != right_rank || \ + (left_rank == 2 && left == NULL && right == NULL) || \ + _RB_AUGMENT_VERIFY(elm)) \ + return (-1); \ + return (left_rank); \ +} +#else +#define RB_GENERATE_RANK(name, type, field, attr) +#endif + +#define RB_GENERATE_INSERT_COLOR(name, type, field, attr) \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *head, \ + struct type *parent, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + /* \ + * Initially, elm is a leaf. Either its parent was previously \ + * a leaf, with two black null children, or an interior node \ + * with a black non-null child and a red null child. The \ + * balance criterion "the rank of any leaf is 1" precludes the \ + * possibility of two red null children for the initial parent. \ + * So the first loop iteration cannot lead to accessing an \ + * uninitialized 'child', and a later iteration can only happen \ + * when a value has been assigned to 'child' in the previous \ + * one. \ + */ \ + struct type *child, *child_up, *gpar; \ + __uintptr_t elmdir, sibdir; \ + \ + do { \ + /* the rank of the tree rooted at elm grew */ \ + gpar = _RB_UP(parent, field); \ + elmdir = RB_RIGHT(parent, field) == elm ? _RB_R : _RB_L; \ + if (_RB_BITS(gpar) & elmdir) { \ + /* shorten the parent-elm edge to rebalance */ \ + _RB_BITSUP(parent, field) ^= elmdir; \ + return (NULL); \ + } \ + sibdir = elmdir ^ _RB_LR; \ + /* the other edge must change length */ \ + _RB_BITSUP(parent, field) ^= sibdir; \ + if ((_RB_BITS(gpar) & _RB_LR) == 0) { \ + /* both edges now short, retry from parent */ \ + child = elm; \ + elm = parent; \ + continue; \ + } \ + _RB_UP(parent, field) = gpar = _RB_PTR(gpar); \ + if (_RB_BITSUP(elm, field) & elmdir) { \ + /* \ + * Exactly one of the edges descending from elm \ + * is long. The long one is in the same \ + * direction as the edge from parent to elm, \ + * so change that by rotation. The edge from \ + * parent to z was shortened above. Shorten \ + * the long edge down from elm, and adjust \ + * other edge lengths based on the downward \ + * edges from 'child'. \ + * \ + * par par \ + * / \ / \ \ + * elm z / z \ + * / \ child \ + * / child / \ \ + * / / \ elm \ \ + * w / \ / \ y \ + * x y w \ \ + * x \ + */ \ + RB_ROTATE(elm, child, elmdir, field); \ + child_up = _RB_UP(child, field); \ + if (_RB_BITS(child_up) & sibdir) \ + _RB_BITSUP(parent, field) ^= elmdir; \ + if (_RB_BITS(child_up) & elmdir) \ + _RB_BITSUP(elm, field) ^= _RB_LR; \ + else \ + _RB_BITSUP(elm, field) ^= elmdir; \ + /* if child is a leaf, don't augment elm, \ + * since it is restored to be a leaf again. */ \ + if ((_RB_BITS(child_up) & _RB_LR) == 0) \ + elm = child; \ + } else \ + child = elm; \ + \ + /* \ + * The long edge descending from 'child' points back \ + * in the direction of 'parent'. Rotate to make \ + * 'parent' a child of 'child', then make both edges \ + * of 'child' short to rebalance. \ + * \ + * par child \ + * / \ / \ \ + * / z x par \ + * child / \ \ + * / \ / z \ + * x \ y \ + * y \ + */ \ + RB_ROTATE(parent, child, sibdir, field); \ + _RB_UP(child, field) = gpar; \ + RB_SWAP_CHILD(head, gpar, parent, child, field); \ + /* \ + * Elements rotated down have new, smaller subtrees, \ + * so update augmentation for them. \ + */ \ + if (elm != child) \ + (void)RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(elm); \ + (void)RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(parent); \ + return (child); \ + } while ((parent = gpar) != NULL); \ + return (NULL); \ +} + +#ifndef RB_STRICT_HST +/* + * In REMOVE_COLOR, the HST paper, in figure 3, in the single-rotate case, has + * 'parent' with one higher rank, and then reduces its rank if 'parent' has + * become a leaf. This implementation always has the parent in its new position + * with lower rank, to avoid the leaf check. Define RB_STRICT_HST to 1 to get + * the behavior that HST describes. + */ +#define RB_STRICT_HST 0 +#endif + +#define RB_GENERATE_REMOVE_COLOR(name, type, field, attr) \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *head, \ + struct type *parent, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *gpar, *sib, *up; \ + __uintptr_t elmdir, sibdir; \ + \ + if (RB_RIGHT(parent, field) == elm && \ + RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) { \ + /* Deleting a leaf that is an only-child creates a \ + * rank-2 leaf. Demote that leaf. */ \ + _RB_UP(parent, field) = _RB_PTR(_RB_UP(parent, field)); \ + elm = parent; \ + if ((parent = _RB_UP(elm, field)) == NULL) \ + return (NULL); \ + } \ + do { \ + /* the rank of the tree rooted at elm shrank */ \ + gpar = _RB_UP(parent, field); \ + elmdir = RB_RIGHT(parent, field) == elm ? _RB_R : _RB_L; \ + _RB_BITS(gpar) ^= elmdir; \ + if (_RB_BITS(gpar) & elmdir) { \ + /* lengthen the parent-elm edge to rebalance */ \ + _RB_UP(parent, field) = gpar; \ + return (NULL); \ + } \ + if (_RB_BITS(gpar) & _RB_LR) { \ + /* shorten other edge, retry from parent */ \ + _RB_BITS(gpar) ^= _RB_LR; \ + _RB_UP(parent, field) = gpar; \ + gpar = _RB_PTR(gpar); \ + continue; \ + } \ + sibdir = elmdir ^ _RB_LR; \ + sib = _RB_LINK(parent, sibdir, field); \ + up = _RB_UP(sib, field); \ + _RB_BITS(up) ^= _RB_LR; \ + if ((_RB_BITS(up) & _RB_LR) == 0) { \ + /* shorten edges descending from sib, retry */ \ + _RB_UP(sib, field) = up; \ + continue; \ + } \ + if ((_RB_BITS(up) & sibdir) == 0) { \ + /* \ + * The edge descending from 'sib' away from \ + * 'parent' is long. The short edge descending \ + * from 'sib' toward 'parent' points to 'elm*' \ + * Rotate to make 'sib' a child of 'elm*' \ + * then adjust the lengths of the edges \ + * descending from 'sib' and 'elm*'. \ + * \ + * par par \ + * / \ / \ \ + * / sib elm \ \ + * / / \ elm* \ + * elm elm* \ / \ \ + * / \ \ / \ \ + * / \ z / \ \ + * x y x sib \ + * / \ \ + * / z \ + * y \ + */ \ + elm = _RB_LINK(sib, elmdir, field); \ + /* elm is a 1-child. First rotate at elm. */ \ + RB_ROTATE(sib, elm, sibdir, field); \ + up = _RB_UP(elm, field); \ + _RB_BITSUP(parent, field) ^= \ + (_RB_BITS(up) & elmdir) ? _RB_LR : elmdir; \ + _RB_BITSUP(sib, field) ^= \ + (_RB_BITS(up) & sibdir) ? _RB_LR : sibdir; \ + _RB_BITSUP(elm, field) |= _RB_LR; \ + } else { \ + if ((_RB_BITS(up) & elmdir) == 0 && \ + RB_STRICT_HST && elm != NULL) { \ + /* if parent does not become a leaf, \ + do not demote parent yet. */ \ + _RB_BITSUP(parent, field) ^= sibdir; \ + _RB_BITSUP(sib, field) ^= _RB_LR; \ + } else if ((_RB_BITS(up) & elmdir) == 0) { \ + /* demote parent. */ \ + _RB_BITSUP(parent, field) ^= elmdir; \ + _RB_BITSUP(sib, field) ^= sibdir; \ + } else \ + _RB_BITSUP(sib, field) ^= sibdir; \ + elm = sib; \ + } \ + \ + /* \ + * The edge descending from 'elm' away from 'parent' \ + * is short. Rotate to make 'parent' a child of 'elm', \ + * then lengthen the short edges descending from \ + * 'parent' and 'elm' to rebalance. \ + * \ + * par elm \ + * / \ / \ \ + * e \ / \ \ + * elm / \ \ + * / \ par s \ + * / \ / \ \ + * / \ e \ \ + * x s x \ + */ \ + RB_ROTATE(parent, elm, elmdir, field); \ + RB_SET_PARENT(elm, gpar, field); \ + RB_SWAP_CHILD(head, gpar, parent, elm, field); \ + /* \ + * An element rotated down, but not into the search \ + * path has a new, smaller subtree, so update \ + * augmentation for it. \ + */ \ + if (sib != elm) \ + (void)RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(sib); \ + return (parent); \ + } while (elm = parent, (parent = gpar) != NULL); \ + return (NULL); \ +} + +#define _RB_AUGMENT_WALK(elm, match, field) \ +do { \ + if (match == elm) \ + match = NULL; \ +} while (RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(elm) && \ + (elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field)) != NULL) + +#define RB_GENERATE_REMOVE(name, type, field, attr) \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *out) \ +{ \ + struct type *child, *in, *opar, *parent; \ + \ + child = RB_LEFT(out, field); \ + in = RB_RIGHT(out, field); \ + opar = _RB_UP(out, field); \ + if (in == NULL || child == NULL) { \ + in = child = (in == NULL ? child : in); \ + parent = opar = _RB_PTR(opar); \ + } else { \ + parent = in; \ + while (RB_LEFT(in, field)) \ + in = RB_LEFT(in, field); \ + RB_SET_PARENT(child, in, field); \ + RB_LEFT(in, field) = child; \ + child = RB_RIGHT(in, field); \ + if (parent != in) { \ + RB_SET_PARENT(parent, in, field); \ + RB_RIGHT(in, field) = parent; \ + parent = RB_PARENT(in, field); \ + RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child; \ + } \ + _RB_UP(in, field) = opar; \ + opar = _RB_PTR(opar); \ + } \ + RB_SWAP_CHILD(head, opar, out, in, field); \ + if (child != NULL) \ + _RB_UP(child, field) = parent; \ + if (parent != NULL) { \ + opar = name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(head, parent, child); \ + /* if rotation has made 'parent' the root of the same \ + * subtree as before, don't re-augment it. */ \ + if (parent == in && RB_LEFT(parent, field) == NULL) { \ + opar = NULL; \ + parent = RB_PARENT(parent, field); \ + } \ + _RB_AUGMENT_WALK(parent, opar, field); \ + if (opar != NULL) { \ + /* \ + * Elements rotated into the search path have \ + * changed subtrees, so update augmentation for \ + * them if AUGMENT_WALK didn't. \ + */ \ + (void)RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(opar); \ + (void)RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(RB_PARENT(opar, field)); \ + } \ + } \ + return (out); \ +} + +#define RB_GENERATE_INSERT_FINISH(name, type, field, attr) \ +/* Inserts a node into the RB tree */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_INSERT_FINISH(struct name *head, struct type *parent, \ + struct type **pptr, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp = NULL; \ + \ + RB_SET(elm, parent, field); \ + *pptr = elm; \ + if (parent != NULL) \ + tmp = name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(head, parent, elm); \ + _RB_AUGMENT_WALK(elm, tmp, field); \ + if (tmp != NULL) \ + /* \ + * An element rotated into the search path has a \ + * changed subtree, so update augmentation for it if \ + * AUGMENT_WALK didn't. \ + */ \ + (void)RB_AUGMENT_CHECK(tmp); \ + return (NULL); \ +} + +#define RB_GENERATE_INSERT(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ +/* Inserts a node into the RB tree */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp; \ + struct type **tmpp = &RB_ROOT(head); \ + struct type *parent = NULL; \ + \ + while ((tmp = *tmpp) != NULL) { \ + parent = tmp; \ + __typeof(cmp(NULL, NULL)) comp = (cmp)(elm, parent); \ + if (comp < 0) \ + tmpp = &RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ + else if (comp > 0) \ + tmpp = &RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ + else \ + return (parent); \ + } \ + return (name##_RB_INSERT_FINISH(head, parent, tmpp, elm)); \ +} + +#define RB_GENERATE_FIND(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ +/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + __typeof(cmp(NULL, NULL)) comp; \ + while (tmp) { \ + comp = cmp(elm, tmp); \ + if (comp < 0) \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + else if (comp > 0) \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + return (tmp); \ + } \ + return (NULL); \ +} + +#define RB_GENERATE_NFIND(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ +/* Finds the first node greater than or equal to the search key */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + struct type *res = NULL; \ + __typeof(cmp(NULL, NULL)) comp; \ + while (tmp) { \ + comp = cmp(elm, tmp); \ + if (comp < 0) { \ + res = tmp; \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + } \ + else if (comp > 0) \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + return (tmp); \ + } \ + return (res); \ +} + +#define RB_GENERATE_NEXT(name, type, field, attr) \ +/* ARGSUSED */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) { \ + elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + while (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) \ + elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + } else { \ + while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ + (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))) \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + } \ + return (elm); \ +} + +#if defined(_KERNEL) && defined(DIAGNOSTIC) +#define _RB_ORDER_CHECK(cmp, lo, hi) do { \ + KASSERT((cmp)(lo, hi) < 0, ("out of order insertion")); \ +} while (0) +#else +#define _RB_ORDER_CHECK(cmp, lo, hi) do {} while (0) +#endif + +#define RB_GENERATE_INSERT_NEXT(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ +/* Inserts a node into the next position in the RB tree */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_INSERT_NEXT(struct name *head, \ + struct type *elm, struct type *next) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp; \ + struct type **tmpp = &RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + \ + _RB_ORDER_CHECK(cmp, elm, next); \ + if (name##_RB_NEXT(elm) != NULL) \ + _RB_ORDER_CHECK(cmp, next, name##_RB_NEXT(elm)); \ + while ((tmp = *tmpp) != NULL) { \ + elm = tmp; \ + tmpp = &RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + } \ + return (name##_RB_INSERT_FINISH(head, elm, tmpp, next)); \ +} + +#define RB_GENERATE_PREV(name, type, field, attr) \ +/* ARGSUSED */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_PREV(struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) { \ + elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + while (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) \ + elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + } else { \ + while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ + (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))) \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + } \ + return (elm); \ +} + +#define RB_GENERATE_INSERT_PREV(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ +/* Inserts a node into the prev position in the RB tree */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_INSERT_PREV(struct name *head, \ + struct type *elm, struct type *prev) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp; \ + struct type **tmpp = &RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + \ + _RB_ORDER_CHECK(cmp, prev, elm); \ + if (name##_RB_PREV(elm) != NULL) \ + _RB_ORDER_CHECK(cmp, name##_RB_PREV(elm), prev); \ + while ((tmp = *tmpp) != NULL) { \ + elm = tmp; \ + tmpp = &RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + } \ + return (name##_RB_INSERT_FINISH(head, elm, tmpp, prev)); \ +} + +#define RB_GENERATE_MINMAX(name, type, field, attr) \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + struct type *parent = NULL; \ + while (tmp) { \ + parent = tmp; \ + if (val < 0) \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + } \ + return (parent); \ +} + +#define RB_GENERATE_REINSERT(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_REINSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *cmpelm; \ + if (((cmpelm = RB_PREV(name, head, elm)) != NULL && \ + cmp(cmpelm, elm) >= 0) || \ + ((cmpelm = RB_NEXT(name, head, elm)) != NULL && \ + cmp(elm, cmpelm) >= 0)) { \ + /* XXXLAS: Remove/insert is heavy handed. */ \ + RB_REMOVE(name, head, elm); \ + return (RB_INSERT(name, head, elm)); \ + } \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + +#define RB_NEGINF -1 +#define RB_INF 1 + +#define RB_INSERT(name, x, y) name##_RB_INSERT(x, y) +#define RB_INSERT_NEXT(name, x, y, z) name##_RB_INSERT_NEXT(x, y, z) +#define RB_INSERT_PREV(name, x, y, z) name##_RB_INSERT_PREV(x, y, z) +#define RB_REMOVE(name, x, y) name##_RB_REMOVE(x, y) +#define RB_FIND(name, x, y) name##_RB_FIND(x, y) +#define RB_NFIND(name, x, y) name##_RB_NFIND(x, y) +#define RB_NEXT(name, x, y) name##_RB_NEXT(y) +#define RB_PREV(name, x, y) name##_RB_PREV(y) +#define RB_MIN(name, x) name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_NEGINF) +#define RB_MAX(name, x) name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_INF) +#define RB_REINSERT(name, x, y) name##_RB_REINSERT(x, y) + +#define RB_FOREACH(x, name, head) \ + for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head); \ + (x) != NULL; \ + (x) = name##_RB_NEXT(x)) + +#define RB_FOREACH_FROM(x, name, y) \ + for ((x) = (y); \ + ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_NEXT(x), (x) != NULL); \ + (x) = (y)) + +#define RB_FOREACH_SAFE(x, name, head, y) \ + for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head); \ + ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_NEXT(x), (x) != NULL); \ + (x) = (y)) + +#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE(x, name, head) \ + for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head); \ + (x) != NULL; \ + (x) = name##_RB_PREV(x)) + +#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE_FROM(x, name, y) \ + for ((x) = (y); \ + ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_PREV(x), (x) != NULL); \ + (x) = (y)) + +#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(x, name, head, y) \ + for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head); \ + ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_PREV(x), (x) != NULL); \ + (x) = (y)) + +#endif /* _SYS_TREE_H_ */ diff --git a/components/utils/vlibc/syscalls.c b/components/utils/vlibc/syscalls.c deleted file mode 100644 index b59fb308..00000000 --- a/components/utils/vlibc/syscalls.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,279 +0,0 @@ -#include -#include -#include -#include "bflb_uart.h" -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF -#include "bflb_tlsf.h" -#else -#include "bflb_mmheap.h" - -extern struct heap_info mmheap_root; -#endif - -extern struct bflb_device_s *console; - -/* Reentrant versions of system calls. */ - -/* global errno */ -static volatile int _sys_errno = 0; - -#ifndef _REENT_ONLY -int *__errno() -{ - return (int *)&_sys_errno; -} -#endif - -int _getpid_r(struct _reent *ptr) -{ - return 0; -} - -int _execve_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *name, char *const *argv, char *const *env) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _fcntl_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, int cmd, int arg) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _fork_r(struct _reent *ptr) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _fstat_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, struct stat *pstat) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _isatty_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _kill_r(struct _reent *ptr, int pid, int sig) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _link_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *old, const char *new) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -_off_t _lseek_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, _off_t pos, int whence) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _mkdir_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *name, int mode) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _open_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *file, int flags, int mode) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _close_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -_ssize_t _read_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _rename_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *old, const char *new) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _stat_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *file, struct stat *pstat) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _unlink_r(struct _reent *ptr, const char *file) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -int _wait_r(struct _reent *ptr, int *status) -{ - /* return "not supported" */ - ptr->_errno = -ENOSYS; - return -1; -} - -_ssize_t _write_r(struct _reent *ptr, int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - if ((STDOUT_FILENO == fd) || (STDERR_FILENO == fd)) { - bflb_uart_put(console, (uint8_t *)buf, nbytes); - } - return 0; -} - -void *_malloc_r(struct _reent *ptr, size_t size) -{ - void *result; -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS - result = pvPortMalloc(size); -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - result = (void *)bflb_malloc(size); -#else - result = (void *)bflb_mmheap_alloc(&mmheap_root, size); -#endif -#endif - if (result == NULL) { - ptr->_errno = -ENOMEM; - } - return result; -} - -void *_realloc_r(struct _reent *ptr, void *old, size_t newlen) -{ - void *result; -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - result = (void *)bflb_realloc(old, newlen); -#else - result = (void *)bflb_mmheap_realloc(&mmheap_root, old, newlen); -#endif -#endif - if (result == NULL) { - ptr->_errno = -ENOMEM; - } - return result; -} - -void *_calloc_r(struct _reent *ptr, size_t size, size_t len) -{ - void *result; -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS - result = pvPortMalloc(size * len); -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - result = (void *)bflb_calloc(size, len); -#else - result = (void *)bflb_mmheap_calloc(&mmheap_root, size, len); -#endif -#endif - if (result == NULL) { - ptr->_errno = -ENOMEM; - } - if (result) { - memset(result, 0, size * len); - } - return result; -} - -void *_memalign_r(struct _reent *ptr, size_t align, size_t size) -{ - void *result; -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - result = (void *)bflb_malloc_align(align, size); -#else - result = (void *)bflb_mmheap_align_alloc(&mmheap_root, align, size); -#endif -#endif - if (result == NULL) { - ptr->_errno = -ENOMEM; - } - - return result; -} - -void _free_r(struct _reent *ptr, void *addr) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_USE_FREERTOS - vPortFree(addr); -#else -#ifdef CONFIG_TLSF - bflb_free(addr); -#else - bflb_mmheap_free(&mmheap_root, addr); -#endif -#endif -} - -void *_sbrk_r(struct _reent *ptr, ptrdiff_t incr) -{ - void *ret; - ptr->_errno = ENOMEM; - ret = (void *)-1; - - return ret; -} - -/* for exit() and abort() */ -void __attribute__((noreturn)) -_exit(int status) -{ - while (1) { - } -} - -void _system(const char *s) -{ -} - -void __libc_init_array(void) -{ - /* we not use __libc init_aray to initialize C++ objects */ -} - -mode_t umask(mode_t mask) -{ - return 022; -} - -int flock(int fd, int operation) -{ - return 0; -} - -/* -These functions are implemented and replaced by the 'common/time.c' file -int _gettimeofday_r(struct _reent *ptr, struct timeval *__tp, void *__tzp); -_CLOCK_T_ _times_r(struct _reent *ptr, struct tms *ptms); -*/ diff --git a/components/wireless/CMakeLists.txt b/components/wireless/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e155b012 --- /dev/null +++ b/components/wireless/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_BLUETOOTH bluetooth) +sdk_add_subdirectory_ifdef(CONFIG_WIFI6 wifi6)